Federal Real Property: Proposed Civilian Board Could Address Disposal of Unneeded Facilities
Published: 2011-06-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The federal government holds more than 45,000 underutilized properties that cost nearly $1.7 billion annually to operate, yet significant obstacles impede efforts to close, consolidate, or find other uses for these properties. GAO has designated federal real property management as a high-risk area, in part because of the number and cost of these properties. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for reviewing federal agencies' progress in real property management. In 2007, GAO recommended that OMB assist agencies by developing an action plan to address key obstacles associated with decisions related to unneeded real property, including stakeholder influences. In May 2011, the administration proposed legislation, referred to as the Civilian Property Realignment Act (CPRA), to, among other things, establish a legislative framework for disposing of and consolidating civilian real property and that could help limit stakeholder influences in real property decision making. This statement identifies (1) progress the government has made toward addressing obstacles to federal real property management, (2) some of the challenges that remain and how CPRA may be responsive to those challenges, and (3) key elements of the Department of Defense's (DOD) base realignment and closure (BRAC) process that could expedite the disposal of unneeded civilian properties. To do this work, GAO relied on its prior work, and reviewed CPRA and other relevant reports.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In designating federal real property management as a high-risk area, GAO reported that despite the magnitude and complexity of real-property-related problems, there was no governmentwide strategic focus on real property issues and governmentwide data were unreliable and outdated. The administration and real-property-holding agencies have subsequently improved their strategic management of real property by establishing an interagency Federal Real Property Council designed to enhance real property planning processes and implementing controls to improve the reliability of federal real property data. Even with this progress, problems related to unneeded property and leasing persist because the government has not yet addressed other challenges to effective real property management, such as legal and financial limitations and stakeholder influences. CPRA is somewhat responsive to these challenges. For example, CPRA proposes an independent board that would streamline the disposal process by selecting properties it considers appropriate for public benefit uses. This streamlined process could reduce disposal time and costs. CPRA would also establish an Asset Proceeds and Space Management Fund that could be used to reimburse agencies for necessary disposal costs. The proposed independent board would address stakeholder influences by recommending federal properties for disposal or consolidation after receiving recommendations from civilian landholding agencies and independently reviewing the agencies' recommendations. CPRA does not explicitly address the government's overreliance on leasing, but could help do so through board recommendations for consolidating operations where appropriate. GAO is currently examining issues related to leasing costs and excess property. Certain key elements of DOD's BRAC process--which, like CPRA, was designed to address obstacles to closures or realignments--may be applicable to the disposal and realignment of real property governmentwide. These elements include establishing goals, developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, estimating the costs and savings anticipated from implementing recommendations, and involving the audit community. A key similarity between BRAC and CPRA is that both establish an independent board to review agency recommendations. A key difference is that while the BRAC process places the Secretary of Defense in a central role to review and submit candidate recommendations to the independent board, CPRA does not provide for any similar central role for civilian agencies.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on our work related to  excess and underutilized federal real property held by civilian federal  agencies, as well as our work on the military Base Realignment and  Closure (BRAC) process. The federal government occupies more owned  and leased buildings than it needs. In fiscal year 2009, 24 landholding  agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), reported 45,190  underutilized buildings with a total of 341 million square feet, or 1,830  more such buildings than they reported the previous fiscal year. These  underutilized buildings cost $1.66 billion annually to operate and are  potentially valuable. The federal government also leases more property  than is cost-efficient, resulting in millions of dollars of additional costs to  the federal government. Since 2008, the General Services Administration  (GSA) has leased more property than it owns—more than 8,000  buildings—even though owning a federal building is often a more cost- effective way of meeting an agency’s long-term space needs. Because of  these and other issues, we have designated the management of federal real  property as a high-risk area. On May 4, 2011, the administration proposed  legislation, referred to as the Civilian Property Realignment Act (CPRA).  CPRA legislation has also been introduced in the House of  Representatives. Differences exist between the House bill and the  administration’s proposal. Throughout this statement, any reference to  CPRA is the administration’s proposed legislation.
At the request of this subcommittee, we have recently begun two new  engagements related to federal real property management. The first will  examine how federal agencies designate excess federal real property and  what actions they are taking to better use remaining property. The second  will examine the leasing costs incurred by the federal government.
Like GSA, DOD has faced long-term challenges in managing its portfolio of  facilities, halting degradation of facilities, and reducing unneeded  infrastructure to free up funds to better maintain the facilities that it still  uses and to meet other needs. DOD’s management of its support  infrastructure is also on our high-risk list, in part because of challenges  DOD faces in reducing excess and obsolete infrastructure. As you know,  DOD has been working through the BRAC process as one way to reduce  the amount of unneeded property that it owns and leases. This process,  which is designed to address the obstacles to matching needed  infrastructure to the needed workforce and missions, may also be  applicable to civilian real property management.
This statement discusses (1) progress the government has made toward  addressing obstacles to federal real property management; (2) some of the  challenges that remain for effective federal real property management and  how the administration’s proposed CPRA could be responsive to those  challenges; and (3) key elements of the BRAC process that could be  applied to expedite the disposal of unneeded civilian properties.
To address these objectives, we reviewed our previous work, reports by  the interagency Federal Real Property Council (FRPC), and CPRA.  We  also visited an office and warehouse complex currently in the disposal  process that included multiple types of real property at one address.  This  complex was judgmentally selected on the basis of its characteristics and  its geographic proximity to our field office in Dallas, Texas.  In addition,  we reviewed the BRAC legislation and our reports on DOD’s BRAC  process and are currently monitoring BRAC 2005 implementation.  We  shared the relevant information in this statement with the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB), GSA, and DOD officials.  OMB and GSA  did not provide comment.  DOD provided technical comments which we  incorporated as appropriate.  We performed this work from May 2011 to  June 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The federal real property portfolio is vast and diverse, totaling more than  900,000 buildings and structures—including office buildings, warehouses,  laboratories, hospitals, and family housing—and worth hundreds of  billions of dollars. The six largest federal real property holding agencies— DOD; GSA; the U.S. Postal Service; and the Departments of Veterans  Affairs (VA), Energy, and the Interior—occupy 87.6 percent of the total  square footage in federal buildings. Overall, the federal government owns  approximately 83 percent of this space and leases or otherwise manages  the rest; however, these proportions vary by agency. For example GSA, the  central leasing agent for most agencies, now leases more space than it  owns.
The federal real property portfolio includes many properties the federal  government no longer needs. In May 2011, the White House posted an  interactive map of excess federal properties on its Web site, noting that  the map illustrates a sampling of over 7,000 buildings and structures  currently designated as excess. These properties range from sheds to  underutilized office buildings and empty warehouses. We visited an office  and warehouse complex in Fort Worth, Texas that was listed on the Web  site. Ten of the properties listed on the Web site as part of the Fort Worth  complex were parceled together and auctioned in May 2011, but the sale is  not yet final. The structures ranged from large warehouses to a concrete  slab. (See fig. 1.) Work we are currently doing for this subcommittee on  how federal agencies designate excess federal real property will include  visits to other properties from around the country that are considered  excess.
After we first designated federal real property as a high-risk area in 2003,  the President issued Executive Order 13327 in February 2004, which  established new federal property guidelines for 24 executive branch  departments and agencies. Among other things, the executive order called  for creating the interagency FRPC to develop guidance, collect best  practices, and help agencies improve the management of their real  property assets.
DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently  implementing its fifth round. Generally, the purpose of prior BRAC  rounds was to generate savings to apply to other priorities, reduce  property deemed excess to needs, and realign DOD’s workload and  workforce to achieve efficiencies in property management. As a result of  the prior BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, DOD reported that it  had reduced its domestic infrastructure, and transferred hundreds of  thousands of acres of unneeded property to other federal and nonfederal  entities. DOD data show that the department had generated an estimated  $28.9 billion in net savings or cost avoidances from the prior four BRAC  rounds through fiscal year 2003 and expects to save about $7 billion each  year thereafter, which could be applied to other higher priority defense  needs. These savings reflect money that DOD has estimated it would likely  have spent to operate military bases had they remained open. However,  we found that DOD’s savings estimates are imprecise because the military  services have not updated them regularly despite our prior reported  concerns on this issue. The 2005 BRAC round affected hundreds of  locations across the country through 24 major closures, 24 major  realignments, and 765 lesser actions, which also included terminating  leases and consolidating various activities. Legislation authorizing the  2005 BRAC round maintained requirements established for the three  previous BRAC rounds that GAO provide a detailed analysis of DOD’s  recommendations and of the BRAC selection process. We submitted the  results of our analysis in a 2005 report and testified before the BRAC  Commission soon thereafter. Since that time, we have published annual  reports on the progress, challenges, and costs and savings of the 2005  round, in addition to numerous reports on other aspects of implementing  the 2005 BRAC round.
section_title: The Government Has Adopted a More Strategic Focus to Improve Real Property Management and Has Taken Steps to Increase Data Reliability
paragraphs: The administration and real-property-holding agencies have made progress  in a number of areas since we designated federal real property as high risk  in 2003. In 2003, we reported that despite the magnitude and complexity of  real-property-related problems, there had been no governmentwide  strategic focus on real property issues. Not having a strategic focus can  lead to ineffective decision making. As part of the government’s efforts to  strategically manage its real property, the administration established  FRPC—a group composed of the OMB Controller and senior real property  officers of landholding agencies—to support real property reform efforts.  Through FRPC, the landholding agencies have also established asset  management plans, standardized real property data reporting, and adopted  various performance measures to track progress. The asset management  plans are updated annually and help agencies take a more strategic  approach to real property management by indicating how real property  moves the agency’s mission forward; outlining the agency’s capital  management plans; and describing how the agency plans to operate its  facilities and dispose of unneeded real property, including listing current  and future disposal plans. According to several member agencies, FRPC  no longer meets regularly but remains a forum for agency coordination on  real property issues and could serve a larger role in future real property  management.
We also earlier reported that a lack of reliable real property data  compounded real property management problems. The governmentwide  data maintained at that time were unreliable, out of date, and of limited  value. In addition, certain key data that would be useful for budgeting and  strategic management were not being maintained, such as data on space  utilization, facility condition, historical significance, security, and age. We  found that some of the major real-property-holding agencies faced  challenges developing reliable data on their real property assets. We noted  that reliable governmentwide and agency-specific real property data are  critical for addressing real property management challenges. For example,  better data would help the government determine whether assets are being  used efficiently, make investment decisions, and identify unneeded  properties.
In our February 2011 high-risk update, we reported that the federal  government has taken numerous steps since 2003 to improve the  completeness and reliability of its real property data. FRPC, in  conjunction with GSA, established the Federal Real Property Profile  (FRPP) to meet a requirement in Executive Order 13327 for a single real  property database that includes all real property under the control of  executive branch agencies. FRPP contains asset-level information  submitted annually by agencies on 25 high-level data elements, including  four performance measures that enable agencies to track progress in  achieving property management objectives. In response to our 2007  recommendation to improve the reliability of FRPP data, OMB required,  and agencies implemented, data validation plans that include procedures  to verify that the data are accurate and complete. Furthermore, GSA’s  Office of Governmentwide Policy (OGP), which administers the FRPP  database, instituted a data validation process that precludes FRPP from  accepting an agency’s data until the data pass all established business  rules and data checks. In our most recent analysis of the reliability of  FRPP data, we found none of the previous basic problems, such as missing  data or inexplicably large changes between years. In addition, agencies  continue to improve their real property data for their own purposes. From  a governmentwide perspective, OGP has sufficient standards and  processes in place for us to consider the 25 elements in FRPP as a  database that is sufficiently reliable to describe the real property holdings  of the federal government. Consequently, we removed the data element of  real property management from our high-risk list this year.
section_title: CPRA Could Help Agencies Address Underlying Challenges to Disposing of Unneeded Property
paragraphs: The government now has a more strategic focus on real property issues  and more reliable real property data, but problems related to unneeded  property and leasing persist because the government has not addressed  underlying legal and financial limitations and stakeholder influences. In  our February 2011 high-risk update, we noted that the legal requirements  agencies must adhere to before disposing of a property, such as  requirements for screening and environmental cleanup, present a  challenge to consolidating federal properties. Currently, before GSA can  dispose of a property that a federal agency no longer needs, it must offer  the property to other federal agencies. If other federal agencies do not  need the property, GSA must then make the property available to state and  local governments and certain nonprofit organizations and institutions for  public benefit uses, such as homeless shelters, educational facilities, or  fire or police training centers. As a result of this lengthy process, GSA’s  underutilized or excess properties may remain in an agency’s possession  for years and continue to accumulate maintenance and operations costs.  We have also noted that the National Historic Preservation Act, as  amended, requires agencies to manage historic properties under their  control and jurisdiction and to consider the effects of their actions on  historic preservation. The average age of properties in GSA’s portfolio is  46 years, and since properties more than 50 years old are eligible for  historic designation, this issue will soon become critically important to  GSA.
The costs of disposing of federal property further hamper some agencies’  efforts to address their excess and underutilized real property problems.  For example, federal agencies are required by law to assess and pay for  any environmental cleanup that may be needed before disposing of a  property—a process that may require years of study and result in  significant costs. In some cases, the cost of the environmental cleanup  may exceed the costs of continuing to maintain the excess property in a  shut-down status. The associated costs of complying with these legal  requirements create disincentives to dispose of excess property.
Moreover, local stakeholders—including local governments, business  interests, private real estate interests, private-sector construction and  leasing firms, historic preservation organizations, various advocacy groups  for citizens that benefit from federal programs, and the public in general— often view federal facilities as the physical face of the federal government  in their communities. The interests of these multiple, and often competing  stakeholders, may not always align with the most efficient use of  government resources and can complicate real property decisions. For  example, as we first reported in 2007, VA officials noted that stakeholders  and constituencies, such as historic building advocates or local  communities that want to maintain their relationship with VA, often  prevent the agency from disposing of properties. In 2003, we indicated  that an independent commission or governmentwide task force might be  necessary to help overcome stakeholder influences in real property  decision making.
In 2007, we recommended that OMB, which is responsible for reviewing  agencies’ progress on federal real property management, assist agencies  by developing an action plan to address the key problems associated with  decisions related to unneeded real property, including stakeholder  influences. OMB agreed with the recommendation. The administration’s  recently proposed legislative framework, CPRA, is somewhat responsive  to our recommendation in that it addresses legal and financial limitations,  as well as stakeholder influences in real property decision making.
With the goal of streamlining the disposal process, CPRA provides for an  independent board to determine which properties it considers would be  the most appropriate for public benefit uses.  This streamlined process  could reduce both the time it takes for the government to dispose of  property and the amount the government pays to maintain property.
To provide financial assistance to the agencies, CPRA establishes an Asset  Proceeds and Space Management Fund from which funds could be  transferred to reimburse an agency for necessary costs associated with  disposing of property. Reimbursing agencies for the costs they incur  would potentially facilitate the disposal process.
To address stakeholder influences, the independent board established  under CPRA would, among other things, recommend federal properties for  disposal or consolidation after receiving recommendations from civilian  landholding agencies and would independently review the agencies’  recommendations. Grouping all disposal and consolidation decisions into  one set of proposals that Congress would consider in its entirety could  help to limit local stakeholder influences at any individual site.
CPRA does not explicitly address the government’s overreliance on  leasing. In 2008, we found that decisions to lease selected federal  properties were not always driven by cost-effectiveness considerations.  For example, we estimated that the decision to lease the Federal Bureau  of Investigation’s field office in Chicago, Illinois, instead of constructing a  building the government would own, cost about $40 million more over 30  years. GSA officials noted that the limited availability of upfront capital  was one of the reasons that prevented ownership at that time. Federal  budget scorekeeping rules require the full cost of construction to be  recorded up front in the budget, whereas only the annual lease payments  plus cancellation costs need to be recorded for operating leases. In April  2007 and January 2008, we recommended that OMB develop a strategy to  reduce agencies’ reliance on costly leasing where ownership would result  in long-term savings. We noted that such a strategy could identify the  conditions under which leasing is an acceptable alternative, include an  analysis of real property budget scoring issues, and provide an assessment  of viable alternatives. OMB concurred with this recommendation but has  not yet developed a strategy to reduce agencies’ reliance on leasing. One  of CPRA’s purposes—to realign civilian real property by consolidating,  colocating, and reconfiguring space to increase efficiency—could help to  reduce the government’s overreliance on leasing. Our current work  examines the efficiency of the federal government’s real property lease  management in more detail.
section_title: Key Elements of DOD’s BRAC Process That Could Expedite the Disposal of Unneeded Civilian Properties
paragraphs: DOD has undergone five BRAC rounds to realign DOD’s workload to  achieve efficiencies and savings in property management, including  reducing excess properties. The BRAC process, much like CPRA, was  designed to address obstacles to closures or realignments, thus permitting  DOD to close or realign installations and its missions to better use its  facilities and generate savings. Certain key elements of DOD’s process for  closing and realigning its installations may be applicable to the  realignment of real property governmentwide. Some of these key elements  include establishing goals, developing criteria for evaluating closures and  realignments, developing a structural plan for applying selection criteria,  estimating the costs and savings anticipated from implementing  recommendations, establishing a structured process for obtaining and  analyzing data, and involving the audit community.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s 2005 BRAC Process
paragraphs: DOD’s BRAC process was designed to address certain challenges to base  closures or realignments, including stakeholder interests, thereby  permitting the department to realign its missions to better use its facilities,  generate savings, and sometimes also resulting in the disposal of property.  The most recent defense base closure and realignment round followed a  historical analytical framework, carrying many elements of the process  forward or building upon lessons learned from the department’s four  previous rounds. DOD used a logical, reasoned, and well-documented  process. In addition, we have identified lessons learned from DOD’s 1988,  1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds, and we have begun an effort to assess  lessons learned from the 2005 BRAC round.
DOD’s 2005 BRAC process consisted of activities that followed a series of  statutorily prescribed steps, including:    Congress established clear time frames for implementation;    DOD developed options for closure or realignment recommendations;    BRAC Commission independently reviewed DOD’s proposed    President reviewed and approved the BRAC recommendations; and    Congress did not disapprove of the recommendations and thus they  became binding.
section_title: Key Elements That DOD Used to Develop Its 2005 BRAC Recommendations That Could Benefit a Civilian Real Property Closure or Realignment Process
paragraphs: In developing its recommendations for the BRAC Commission, DOD relied  on certain elements in its process that Congress may wish to consider as it  evaluates the administration’s proposed legislation for disposing of or  realigning civilian real property, as follows:  Establish goals for the process. The Secretary of Defense emphasized  the importance of transforming the military to make it more efficient as  part of the 2005 BRAC round. Other goals for the 2005 BRAC process  included fostering jointness among the four military services, reducing  excess infrastructure, and producing savings. Prior rounds were more  about reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings.
Develop criteria for evaluating closures and realignments. DOD  initially proposed eight selection criteria, which were made available for  public comments via the Federal Register. Ultimately, Congress enacted  the eight final BRAC selection criteria in law  and specified that four  selection criteria, known as the “military value criteria,” were to be given  priority in developing closure and realignment recommendations. The  primary military value criteria include such considerations as an  installation’s current and future mission capabilities and the impact on  operational readiness of the total force; the availability and condition of  land, facilities, and associated airspace at both existing and potentially  receiving locations; the ability to accommodate a surge in the force and  future total force requirements at both existing and potentially receiving  locations; and costs of operations and personnel implications. In addition,  Congress specified that in developing its recommendations, DOD was to  apply “other criteria,” such as the costs and savings associated with a  recommendation; the economic impact on existing communities near the  installations; the ability of the infrastructure in existing and potential  communities to support forces, missions, and personnel; and  environmental impact. Further, Congress required that the Secretary of  Defense develop and submit to Congress a force structure plan that  described the probable size of major military units—for example,  divisions, ships, and air wings—needed to address probable threats to  national security based on the Secretary’s assessment of those threats for  the 20-year period beginning in 2005, along with a comprehensive  inventory of global military installations. In authorizing the 2005 BRAC  round, Congress specified that the Secretary of Defense publish a list of  recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations  inside the United States based on the statutorily-required 20-year force- structure plan and infrastructure inventory, and on the selection criteria.
Estimate costs and savings to implement closure and realignment  recommendations. To address the cost and savings criteria, DOD  developed and used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions model  (COBRA) a quantitative tool that DOD has used since the 1988 BRAC  round to provide consistency in potential cost, savings, and return-on- investment estimates for closure and realignment options. We reviewed  the COBRA model as part of our review of the 2005 and prior BRAC  rounds and found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing  potential costs and savings among alternatives. As with any model, the  quality of the output is a direct function of the input data. Also, DOD’s  COBRA model relies to a large extent on standard factors and averages  and does not represent budget quality estimates that are developed once  BRAC decisions are made and detailed implementation plans are  developed. Nonetheless, the financial information provides important  input into the selection process as decision makers weigh the financial  implications—along with military value criteria and other  considerations—in arriving at final decisions about the suitability of  various closure and realignment options. However, according to our  assessment of the 2005 BRAC round, actual costs and savings were  different from estimates.
Establish an organizational structure. The Office of the Secretary of  Defense emphasized the need for joint cross-service groups to analyze  common business-oriented functions. For the 2005 BRAC round, as for the  1993 and 1995 rounds, these joint cross-service groups performed analyses  and developed closure and realignment options in addition to those  developed by the military services. In contrast, our evaluation of DOD’s  1995 BRAC round indicated that few cross-service recommendations were  made, in part because of the lack of high-level leadership to encourage  consolidations across the services’ functions. In the 1995 BRAC round,  the joint cross-service groups submitted options through the military  services for approval, but few were approved. The number of approved  recommendations that the joint cross-service groups developed  significantly increased in the 2005 BRAC round. This was in part, because  high-level leadership ensured that the options were approved not by the  military services but rather by a DOD senior-level group.
Establish a common analytical framework. To ensure that the  selection criteria were consistently applied, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the military services, and the seven joint cross-service groups  first performed a capacity analysis of facilities and functions in which all  installations received some basic capacity questions according to DOD.   Before developing the candidate recommendations, DOD's capacity  analysis relied on data calls to hundreds of locations to obtain certified  data to assess such factors as maximum potential capacity, current  capacity, current usage, and excess capacity. Then, the military services  and joint cross-service groups performed a military value analysis for the  facilities and functions based on primary military value criteria, which  included a facility’s or function’s current and future mission capabilities,  physical condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of  operations.
Involve the audit community to better ensure data accuracy. The  DOD Inspector General and military service audit agencies played key  roles in identifying data limitations, pointing out needed corrections, and  improving the accuracy of the data used in the process. In their oversight  roles, the audit organizations, who had access to relevant information and  officials as the process evolved, helped to improve the accuracy of the  data used in the BRAC process and thus strengthened the quality and  integrity of the data used to develop closure and realignment  recommendations. For example, the auditors worked to ensure certified  information was used for BRAC analysis, and reviewed other facets of the  process, including the various internal control plans, the COBRA model,  and other modeling and analytical tools that were used in the development  of recommendations.
There are a number of important similarities between BRAC and a civilian  process as proposed in the administration’s CPRA. As a similarity, both  BRAC and CPRA employ the all-or-nothing approach to disposals and  consolidations, meaning that once the final list is approved by the  independent commission or board, it must be accepted or rejected as a  whole. Another important similarity is that both the BRAC and proposed  CPRA processes call for an independent board or commission to review  recommendations.
A key difference between BRAC and the administration’s proposed CPRA  is that while the BRAC process placed the Secretary of Defense in a  central role to review and submit candidate recommendations to the  independent board, CPRA does not provide for any similar central role for  civilian agencies.  The BRAC process required the Secretary of Defense to  develop and submit recommendations to the BRAC Commission for  review.  In this role, the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed and  revised the various candidate recommendations developed by the four  military services and the seven separate joint cross service groups. In  contrast, the administration’s proposed CPRA does not place any official  or organization in such a central role to review and submit the  recommendations proposed by various federal agencies to the  independent board for assessment and approval. Another key difference  between BRAC and CPRA is the time period in which the commission will  be in existence. CPRA, as proposed by the administration, is a continuing  commission which will provide recommendations twice a year for 12  years, whereas, the BRAC Commission convened only for those years in  which it was authorized. For example, after the most recent 2005 BRAC  round, the Commission terminated by law in April 2006.  However, we  believe the need for a phased approach involving multiple rounds of  civilian property realignments is warranted given it may take several  BRAC-like rounds to complete the disposals and consolidations of civilian  real property owned and leased by many disparate agencies including  GSA, VA, Department of the Interior, Department of Energy, and others.
In closing, the government has made strides toward strategically managing  its real property and improving its real property planning and data over the  last 10 years, but those efforts have not yet led to sufficient reductions in  excess property and overreliance on leasing. DOD’s experience with  BRAC could help the process move forward to dispose of unneeded  civilian real property and generate savings for the taxpayer.
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes our prepared statement. We will be pleased  to answer any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact David Wise at  (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov regarding federal real property, or Brian  Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov regarding the BRAC process.  Contact points for our Congressional Relations and Public Affairs offices  may be found on the last page of this statement. In addition to the contacts  named above, Keith Cunningham, Assistant Director; Laura Talbott,  Assistant Director; Vijay Barnabas; Elizabeth Eisenstadt; Amy Higgins;  Susan Michal-Smith; Crystal Wesco; and Michael Willems made important  contributions to this statement.
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