Hurricane Katrina: Strategic Planning Needed to Guide Future Enhancements Beyond Interim Levee Repairs
Published: 2006-09-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Hurricane Katrina's storm surge and floodwaters breached levees and floodwalls causing billions of dollars of property damage, and more than 1,300 deaths. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct reviews on his own initiative, GAO reviewed the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (1) progress in repairing damage to hurricane protection projects by June 1, 2006; (2) plans and estimated costs to make other repairs and complete five existing hurricane protection projects; and (3) plans and estimated costs to add enhancements and strengthen hurricane protection for the region. GAO reviewed related laws and regulations, Corps planning documents and repair tracking reports, observed ongoing repair work, and met with key agency officials and other stakeholders.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Following Hurricane Katrina, the Corps worked quickly to repair and restore almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures to prehurricane levels of protection. Although the Corps stated that it had restored prehurricane levels of protection to the area by June 1, 2006, it used temporary solutions and developed emergency procedures to protect against flooding, in the event of a hurricane, for sections where permanent repairs could not be completed in time. For example, the Corps constructed interim gates on three canals to prevent storm surges from flooding New Orleans. When construction of one canal gate fell behind schedule and could not be completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps devised an emergency plan to drive sheet piling into the canal and close it off if a hurricane threatened before the gate was completed. More importantly, because these initial repairs were performed only on levees and floodwalls with obvious visual damage, the reliability of those adjacent to them is still unknown. The Corps originally allocated $801 million for initial repairs, but the current allocation has increased to over $1 billion. After completing the initial repairs, the Corps plans to conduct additional repairs and construction on the existing hurricane protection system. These plans include (1) repairing all damaged pumps, motors, and pumping stations by about March 2007; (2) restoring sections of existing hurricane protection projects that have settled over time to their original design elevations; and (3) completing construction of incomplete portions of five previously authorized hurricane and flood control projects by September 2007. An additional $941 million had been allocated for this additional work, but the Corps expects actual costs will be greater because of subsequent decisions to change the design of these projects, cover the local sponsor's share, and because of rapidly escalating construction costs. In addition, the Corps plans to undertake further work to enhance and strengthen the hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana. These projects are estimated to take years and require billions of dollars to complete. Since September 2005, the Congress has appropriated more than $7 billion for some aspects of this work and additional appropriations are expected. According to an external review organization established by the Corps, hurricane protection systems should be deliberately designed and built as integrated systems to enhance reliability and provide consistent levels of protection. However, the Corps does not have a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan to integrate the repairs already authorized and planned and that would ensure the efficient use of federal funds. Instead, the Corps appears to be following a piecemeal approach, similar to its past practice of building projects without giving sufficient attention to the interrelationships between various elements of those projects or fully considering whether the projects will provide an integrated level of hurricane protection for the area.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina came ashore near Buras, Louisiana,  about 60 miles southeast of New Orleans, with wind speeds of up to 127  miles per hour and a storm driven wave surge of up to 30 feet. The size and  strength of the storm and subsequent flooding resulted in one of the  largest natural disasters in U.S. history, as storm waters flowed over  floodwalls and breached levees in Louisiana’s Orleans and neighboring  parishes, causing widespread flooding, billions of dollars of property  damage, and more than 1,300 deaths.
The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) began constructing hurricane  protection projects in southeastern Louisiana almost 60 years ago, in the  1940s. Over the years, the Corps constructed five major hurricane and  flood damage reduction projects in southeastern Louisiana, comprising  about 350 miles of earthen levees and concrete floodwalls across six  parishes. These projects were designed to provide various levels of  hurricane protection, and generally could withstand storms with  maximum wind speeds between 87 and 115 miles per hour. The hurricane  protection projects in Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes  suffered the greatest damage from Hurricane Katrina. The Corps estimates  that more than one-half of the 269 miles of federally constructed levees  and floodwalls in these three parishes were damaged by the storm’s winds  and flood waters.
The Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Act of 1941, as amended,  authorizes the Corps to respond in cases where flooding occurs due to a  storm and repair or restore flood control and hurricane protection  projects including levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures  damaged or destroyed by flood waters. Generally, it is Corps policy to pay  for the full costs of repairs to federally constructed levees and to fund   80 percent of the cost to repair certain nonfederally constructed levees,  and the local sponsor or government funds the remaining 20 percent.  However, because of the unprecedented damage and loss caused by  Hurricane Katrina, the Corps deviated from its usual policy and has funded  100 percent of the repair, restoration, and construction costs for both  federal and nonfederal levees and flood control structures.
The official Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 to November 30,  when 97 percent of all tropical storms and hurricanes normally occur.  After Hurricane Katrina, the Corps stated that it would repair the 169 miles  of levees, floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures damaged  by Katrina to prestorm conditions by June 1, 2006—the beginning of the  2006 Atlantic hurricane season. After June 2006, the Corps had planned to  repair damaged pumps, pump motors and pump stations, restore all  hurricane protection structures that had subsided over time to their  authorized design heights (the elevation specified in their design), and  complete construction of incomplete portions of previously authorized  hurricane protection projects. In April 2006, the Federal Emergency  Management Agency released advisory flood elevations for New Orleans  and the surrounding area based on a 1 percent annual chance of flooding,  also called a 100-year flood. In response, the Corps is revising its plans and  cost estimates to raise the height of levees and floodwalls to provide the  area with a 100-year level of protection. In addition, the Congress required  the Corps to conduct an analysis and design for comprehensive  improvements in the coastal area of Mississippi in the interest of hurricane  and storm damage reduction and for several other purposes, and to  provide an interim report of its findings on June 30, 2006, and issue a final  report by December 30, 2007.
We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to  conduct evaluations on his own initiative, as part of our continued effort  to assist the Congress by (1) monitoring the extensive damage to  southeastern Louisiana caused by Hurricane Katrina and (2) evaluating  ongoing efforts to repair and strengthen the region’s hurricane protection  projects. Specifically, for this report we reviewed the Corps’ (1) progress  in repairing damage to hurricane protection projects by June 1, 2006;   (2) plans and estimated costs to make other repairs, restore levees and  flood control structures to design elevations, and complete construction of  previously authorized but incomplete portions of five existing hurricane  protection projects; and (3) plans and estimated costs to add  enhancements and strengthen hurricane protection projects for the region.
To determine the status of work to repair damage to hurricane protection  projects, we tracked the progress of repairs and funds spent by reviewing  weekly repair reports and daily funds status reports obtained from the  Corps’ New Orleans district. We interviewed officials at Corps  headquarters, the New Orleans district office, as well as officials assigned  to the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force. We also observed  repairs at selected sites in Orleans and St. Bernard parishes. To determine  the Corps’ plans and estimated costs to repair pumps and pump stations,  restore projects to design grade, and complete construction of incomplete  portions of previously authorized hurricane protection projects, we  reviewed documentation of the Corps’ plans, estimated costs, and results  of surveys and reports of damage assessments. We also interviewed New  Orleans District officials about their plans and estimated costs for this  work. To determine the Corps’ plans, timelines and estimated costs to add  hurricane project enhancements and strengthen the level of hurricane  protection, we reviewed documentation of plans, estimated timelines and  costs, and laws authorizing funding and authority to the Corps to make  repairs and rebuild. We also interviewed New Orleans District officials on  their plans, timelines and estimated costs for this work. We conducted our  work between January and July 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: There are five major federally authorized projects comprised of more than  350 miles of levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures across  six parishes that provide hurricane protection in southeastern Louisiana.  While construction of hurricane protection projects in southeastern  Louisiana began almost 60 years ago, construction of three major projects  began about 40 years ago in the 1960s. Segments of those were still  incomplete when Hurricane Katrina struck the area in late August 2005.  The projects were designed to provide protection from hurricanes with  maximum wind speeds of 87 to 115 miles per hour (115 miles per hour  being roughly equivalent to a Category 3 hurricane). Hurricane Katrina  made landfall with wind speeds equivalent to a Category 3 hurricane, or  winds up to 127 miles per hour, and record high storm surge. To determine  the extent of the damage to levees and floodwalls caused by Hurricane  Katrina, the Corps contracted for an initial assessment in September 2005  and a second assessment in April 2006. Both assessments were based on  visual inspections of the levees and floodwalls. For the first assessment,  engineers walked the levees and floodwalls in Orleans, Plaquemines and  St. Bernard parishes and looked for damage. The second assessment  reexamined only those sections that were initially reported to be  undamaged. The first assessment found 169 miles of damaged levees and  floodwalls of which 128 miles were moderately damaged and 41 were  severely damaged or destroyed. Most of the damage was found in  Plaquemines Parish where 150 miles of levees and floodwalls were  damaged. The second assessment of those sections initially found to be  undamaged found additional cracks in the levees, soil erosion near  floodwalls, and levee heights that had settled below their design elevation.  Subsequently, the Corps and the contractors conducted sampling and  other tests to determine the extent of the damage, but this was only done  where exterior damage—such as cracks, depressions, or seepage—was  observed. Both assessments documented obvious external damage but did  not indicate whether other structures without visible damage—but similar  in design and composition to damaged levees and floodwalls—were, in  fact, damaged or weakened.
In its May 2006 draft final report, an independent team sponsored by the  National Science Foundation reviewed the failures of the hurricane  protection projects and concluded that the pervasiveness of problems and  failures calls into question the integrity and reliability of other sections of  flood protection projects that did not fail during Hurricane Katrina. In its  June 2006 draft final report, the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task  Force—a team of 150 experts from the Corps and about 50 federal, state,  international, academic, and industrial organizations—found that repaired  sections of levees and floodwalls were likely the strongest parts of the  system until remaining sections could be similarly upgraded and  completed. The task force report concluded that since there are many  areas where protection levels are only the same as before Hurricane  Katrina, the New Orleans metropolitan area remained vulnerable to storm  surge and wave conditions equivalent to or greater than Hurricane Katrina.
The most severely damaged portions of the hurricane protection projects  in the area were found in the three parishes of Orleans, Plaquemines, and  St. Bernard. Within these three parishes, there are approximately 243 miles  of earthen levees and 26 miles of floodwalls. The 26 miles of floodwalls  comprised 19 miles of I-walls and 7 miles of T-walls. I-walls are vertical  concrete barriers anchored to levees by steel sheet pile driven vertically  into the levees. T-walls are vertical concrete barriers with a horizontal  concrete base anchored by multiple steel beams driven diagonally into the  levees and are stronger than I-walls (see fig. 1).
Corps officials told us that T- or L-walls will be constructed to replace  floodwalls that were destroyed and need to be replaced.
subsections: section_title: Corps of Engineers Has the Authority and Responsibility to Rebuild and Restore Damage to Hurricane Protection Projects
paragraphs: Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1941, as amended, commonly  referred to as Public Law 84-99, authorizes the Corps to conduct  emergency operations and rehabilitation activities when levees fail or are  damaged during storms. Under the implementing regulations for Public  Law 84-99, after a storm, the Corps may repair and restore federally  authorized flood control projects and hurricane protection structures, or  nonfederal flood control projects that were inspected and found to have  met federal standards for construction and maintenance prior to the flood  event. Assistance for the rehabilitation of hurricane protection structures  is limited to repair or restoration to the prestorm condition and level of  protection (e.g., the prestorm elevation/height of levees, allowing for  normal settlement).
Under Corps policy, damage to federally constructed levees that have been  completed and officially turned over to a nonfederal sponsor are to be  repaired with 100 percent of the cost borne by the federal government and  damage to nonfederally constructed levees are to be repaired with   80 percent of the cost borne by the federal government and 20 percent by  the local sponsor or government. However, in September 2005, the Corps  noted that Hurricane Katrina had caused unprecedented damage and loss  of infrastructure in the Gulf Coast region. According to the Corps, damage  to the region eroded the tax base to such an extent that local sponsors  would have great difficulty funding their share of rebuilding expenses. In  response, the Corps requested a one-time waiver from the Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Civil Works from the policy requiring local  sponsors to fund 20 percent of the cost of rehabilitating nonfederal flood  and hurricane protection projects. For federally authorized projects that  were under construction when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the Corps  also requested a waiver from the policy requirement that local sponsors  fund a share of the repair cost. In October 2005, the Assistant Secretary of  the Army for Civil Works approved both requests. In the December 2005  emergency supplemental, Congress appropriated funding to the Corps to  repair levees and flood control structures damaged by Hurricane Katrina  to the level of protection for which they were designed, at full federal  expense.
section_title: Construction of Earthen Levees Depends on Local Building Materials and Soil Foundations
paragraphs: Most earthen levees are constructed with a mixture of clay and sand. The  most commonly used method is to build an earthen embankment sloped  on both sides and rising to a flat crown (see fig. 2).
Depending on local conditions and the availability of suitable materials,  levees can be built in one or more stages. The number of stages is  generally dependent on the ability of the local soil to provide an adequate  base, and not sink under the weight of levees, and to compact and provide  suitable strength. When appropriate conditions exist, levees can be built in  a single stage. In other cases, levees may need to be built in stages (also  called lifts) that allow for subsidence of the foundation soil or settlement  of the fill material. Between stages the levees are allowed to settle for up  to 5 years. Because the soil in southeastern Louisiana has a tendency of  settling, historically most levees built in the New Orleans area were  required to be built in three to four stages, and construction took 15 to 20  years. Because of the urgency of the repairs that the Corps made after  Hurricane Katrina, earthen levees in the New Orleans area had to be  rebuilt in only several months. To do this, the Corps relied on mechanical  compaction by heavy construction equipment to compensate for the  normal settlement that would occur over time.
Building levees quickly can pose risks, however, as was witnessed on   May 30, 2006, when a 400-foot section of a reconstructed levee in  Plaquemines Parish slipped 3 to 4 feet under its own weight. Corps  officials said the underlying soil was weaker than previous tests had  indicated and was unable to support the weight of the newly constructed  levee. To provide interim protection, the Corps constructed a small  earthen berm on top of the levee to return it to approved design height by  June 7, 2006.
section_title: Current Repairs to the Hurricane Protection Projects Are Limited to Prestorm or Previously Authorized Levels of Protection
paragraphs: By June 1, 2006, the Corps planned to complete repairs to 169 miles of  southeastern Louisiana hurricane protection projects to prestorm  conditions—that is, to repair most levees and floodwalls to the condition  they were in before Hurricane Katrina. For 128 miles of levees with minor  or moderate damage, the Corps planned to repair or fill scour (erosion)  and holes. For 41 miles of levees and floodwalls with major damage, or  that were completely destroyed, the Corps planned to rebuild these  damaged sections entirely, including rebuilding to the original design  grade, plus an allowance for settlement. The Corps only planned to repair  hurricane-damaged levees and structures and did not plan to repair or  replace any existing levees or floodwalls unless exterior damage was  observed.
The Corps awarded 59 contracts to repair damage in three sections of the  city of New Orleans (Orleans East Bank, New Orleans East and the Inner  Harbor Navigation Canal, commonly called the Industrial Canal) and the  parishes of Plaquemines and St. Bernard. The following sections briefly  describe the location and damage caused by Hurricane Katrina for these  five areas and the number of contracts the Corps awarded for completing  the repairs.
subsections: section_title: Orleans East Bank
paragraphs: Orleans East Bank is located south of Lake Pontchartrain, from the 17th  Street Canal to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, and along the western  bank of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal to the Mississippi River. About  19 miles of levees and floodwalls are along the Orleans Lakefront, the  Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and three drainage canals—17th Street,  Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue—which drain rainwater from New  Orleans into Lake Pontchartrain (see fig. 3).
A total of about one mile of levees and floodwalls were damaged along the  17th Street Canal and two sides of the London Avenue Canal. There was  also intermittent minor erosion, and all 13 of the area’s pump stations  were damaged. The Corps constructed interim sheet pile walls at the  breach sites along the drainage canals and contracted for the construction  of permanent T-walls at each of the breach sites. However, the Corps was  concerned about the integrity of the canal walls that were not breached  during Hurricane Katrina. The Corps chose to construct interim closure  structures (gates) where the canals empty into Lake Pontchartrain to  reduce storm surge from entering the canals during hurricanes and storms.  According to Corps officials, the Corps did not have the authority to  construct permanent gates; so, in late January and early February 2006, the  Corps awarded contracts for the construction of three interim gates and 34  pumps along the three drainage canals. A total of 12 contracts were  awarded for the Orleans East Bank area.
section_title: Inner Harbor Navigation Canal
paragraphs: The Inner Harbor Navigation Canal is a 5.5 mile long waterway that  connects the Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain. The east and west  sides of the Industrial Canal are lined by a total of 12.3 miles of levees and  floodwalls (see fig. 4).
A total of 5 miles of levees and floodwalls were damaged by Hurricane  Katrina along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Two breaches occurred  on the western side of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, near the  intersection of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Inner Harbor  Navigation Canal, and two separate large breaches occurred on the lower  eastern side, resulting in major flooding to New Orleans’ Lower Ninth  Ward. The Corps awarded eight contracts to repair and completely rebuild  damaged and destroyed levees and floodwalls along the Inner Harbor  Navigation Canal.
section_title: New Orleans East
paragraphs: New Orleans East is bounded by the east bank of the Inner Harbor  Navigation Canal on the west, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, Bayou  Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge to the east, and the Gulf Intracoastal  Waterway to the south. The area has 39 miles of exterior levees and  floodwalls and eight pump stations (see fig. 5).
The hurricane damaged 4.6 miles of levees and floodwalls and all eight  pump stations. Ten contracts were awarded to repair this damage.
section_title: Plaquemines Parish
paragraphs: Plaquemines Parish includes long, narrow strips of land on both sides of  the Mississippi River between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. The  Mississippi River levees protect the parish from floods coming down the  river, and the New Orleans to Venice hurricane protection project  (portions of which are not yet completed) protects against hurricane- induced tidal surges. The distance between these Gulf-side levees, called  back levees, and the Mississippi River levees is less than 1 mile, in most  places. Plaquemines Parish has a total of 169 miles of levees and  floodwalls and 18 pump stations (see fig. 6).
In Plaquemines Parish, a total of 150 miles of levees and floodwalls were  damaged along with 18 pump stations. The Corps awarded 20 contracts to  repair and rebuild levees and floodwalls damaged by Hurricane Katrina in  Plaquemines Parish. According to the Corps, there was considerable  erosion scour along the total length of the levees. The Mississippi River  levees were also damaged by numerous ships and barges that crashed into  them. Five of the 6 miles of floodwalls along the Mississippi River were  also destroyed but will be replaced with earthen levees because the Corps  determined that the underlying foundation could not support the weight of  a concrete floodwall.
section_title: St. Bernard Parish
paragraphs: In St. Bernard Parish, levees and floodwalls extend along the Gulf  Intracoastal Waterway to the north, along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet  to the east and south, and then turn west toward the Mississippi River,  continuing along the river to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal along the  western side. St. Bernard Parish has 30 miles of exterior levees and  floodwalls, 22 miles of nonfederal interior levees, and eight pump stations  (see fig. 7).
In St. Bernard Parish, 8 miles of exterior levees and floodwalls were  damaged, 14 miles of nonfederal interior levees (back levees) were  damaged and all eight pump stations and two control structures were  damaged. The Corps awarded nine contracts to repair and rebuild the  levees, floodwalls, and flood control structures in St. Bernard Parish.
section_title: Independent Research Teams Have Studied the Cause of Hurricane Protection Failure
paragraphs: Following Hurricane Katrina, several independent review teams began  studies to determine the cause of hurricane protection failures in  southeastern Louisiana. These teams included the Interagency  Performance Evaluation Task Force, Independent Levee Investigation  Team sponsored by the National Science Foundation, and the American  Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel. The Interagency  Performance Evaluation Task Force and Independent Levee Investigation  Team have issued preliminary reports of their findings and conclusions.  The American Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel was  assembled to review the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force  work and conclusions. On June 1, 2006, the Interagency Performance  Evaluation Task Force issued a draft final report that concluded that the  levees and floodwalls in New Orleans and southeastern Louisiana did not  perform as a system and that it was a system in name only. According to  the report, the hurricane system’s performance was compromised by the  incompleteness of the system, the inconsistency in the levels of protection,  and the lack of redundancy. Inconsistent levels of protection were caused  by differences in the quality of materials used in the levees and variations  in elevations due to subsidence and construction below design  specifications. Corps officials said they considered the findings and  recommendations of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force  when making decisions about how to repair levees and floodwalls  damaged by Hurricane Katrina.
section_title: Billions of Dollars Have Been Appropriated for Post-Katrina Hurricane Protection Repairs and Construction
paragraphs: The Corps has received over $7 billion dollars to restore hurricane  protection and complete construction on existing hurricane protection  projects in southeastern Louisiana through three emergency supplemental  appropriations. In September and December 2005, the Corps received a  total of $3.299 billion in the second and third emergency supplemental  appropriations. In September 2005, the second emergency supplemental  appropriation provided the Corps with $400 million for repair of flood  control and hurricane protection projects. In December 2005, the third  supplemental appropriation provided the Corps with $2.899 billion, of  which $2.3 billion was provided for emergency response to and recovery  from coastal storm damages and flooding from hurricanes Katrina and  Rita. The Corps has allocated nearly $2.1 billion to the New Orleans  District to repair damage to existing hurricane protection, rebuild existing  projects to original authorized height, and complete unconstructed  portions of previously authorized hurricane protection projects. In turn,  the New Orleans District has allocated nearly $1.9 billion for this work.
In June 2006, through the fourth emergency supplemental appropriation,  the Congress provided almost $4 billion to the Corps to strengthen the  region’s hurricane defenses and restore areas of coastal wetlands. The  legislation included specific provisions for southeastern Louisiana  hurricane protection and flood reduction project enhancements (canal  closures, selective levee armoring, and storm proofing pump stations), and  incorporating nonfederal levees in Plaquemines Parish into the federal  levee system. The June 2006 emergency supplemental also provided  general construction funding that the Corps plans to use to, among other  things, raise levee heights for certain hurricane protection projects in  order to certify them in the National Flood Insurance Program (also called  a 100-year flood level of protection). Table 1 summarizes the estimated  costs and funds allocated for the Corps’ planned work to date.
section_title: At the Start of the 2006 Hurricane Season, Most Prehurricane Protection Had Been Restored to Southeastern Louisiana
paragraphs: On June 1, 2006, the Corps reported that 100 percent of prehurricane  protection levels had been restored to southeastern Louisiana. However,  work continued on almost half of the contracts because some were behind  schedule while other contracts were not scheduled to be completed until  as late as March 2007. In instances where the Corps determined it could  not complete permanent repairs by June 1, 2006, the Corps installed  temporary structures or levee supports and developed emergency  procedures to protect against flooding in the event of a hurricane. The  Corps originally allocated $801 million for this phase of the repairs;  however, the current allocation for total costs for this phase is just over   $1 billion.
To restore 100 percent of prehurricane levels of protection in southeastern  Louisiana by the start of the 2006 hurricane season, the Corps worked  quickly to award contracts for a variety of work to be performed in a  relatively short period of time. Between October 2005 and March 2006, the  Corps awarded 59 contracts to repair and rebuild earthen levees, concrete  floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures, and to construct  interim repairs in areas where final repairs could not be completed by  June 1. To complete repairs quickly, some contractors worked 24 hours a  day, and Corps project managers monitored the progress of the work. As  of June 1, 2006, the Corps reported that 22.7 miles of new levees and 195  miles of scour repairs were completed. Although the Corps reported that  100 percent of prehurricane levels of protection had been restored by   June 1, 2006, as of July 18, 2006, 27 of the 59 contracts were not  completed. Of those 27 contracts, the Corps projected that 20 would be  completed by September 30, 2006, and the remaining 7 contracts would be  completed by March 2007. The remaining work includes grading,  compacting, and shaping the levees, as well as grass seeding and  fertilizing.
In some instances, to restore prehurricane levels of protection, the Corps  decided to change the design of the existing hurricane structure. For  example, in the Orleans East Bank, the Corps determined that it did not  have the time to assess the stability of existing canal walls nor could it  complete repairs to all of the breaches along the drainage canals before  June 1, 2006. As a result, at a cost of $111 million, the Corps decided to  install interim gated closure structures (gates) on all three canals—17th  Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue—where they intersect Lake  Pontchartrain to prevent storm surge from entering the canals and to  install 34 temporary pumps to drain floodwaters from the Orleans East  Bank portion of the city (see fig. 8). According to Corps officials, the  agency planned to install interim gates and temporary pumps because it  did not have the authority to install permanent gates and pumps under its  emergency flood control authority. The Corps expects the interim gates  and temporary pumps to remain in place for 3 to 5 years, after which the  Corps will construct permanent gates and pumps. The 2006 emergency  supplemental appropriation provides $530 million for permanent gates and  pumps at the three drainage canals.
According to the Corps, the interim gates will be operated manually, and  the temporary pumps will not be enclosed. If a major storm or hurricane  should occur, the Corps plans to close the gates when water levels in the  17th Street and London Avenue canals reach 5 feet and the water level in  the Orleans Avenue canal reaches 9 feet. The Corps is reviewing the  results of recent soil samples collected in the area and may change its  plans, depending on these results, a Corps official said. The temporary  pumps being installed by the Corps can only pump out a portion of the  drainage water that would normally be pumped into the canals during a  storm event. As a result of the restriction being placed on the water levels  pumped into the canals and the limited pump capacity of the temporary  pumps, the Corps has acknowledged that some flooding could occur from  the heavy rainfall that normally occurs during a hurricane.
In instances where the Corps did not expect permanent repairs to be  completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps devised some interim and temporary  solutions to provide the same level of protection that existed before  Hurricane Katrina. For example, as of June 1, 2006, construction of one of  the three interim gates—the 17th Street canal gate—was behind schedule.  The Corps estimated it would be completed by September 15, 2006. If a  hurricane threatens before the interim gate is in place, the Corps plans to  drive sheet piling in front of the Hammond Highway Bridge that crosses  the 17th Street canal to close off the canal from Lake Pontchartrain. On  June 12, 2006, the Corps announced that the temporary pumps built for the  drainage canals could not provide the required pumping capacity. The  Corps plans to procure replacement pumps with different specifications  for the 17th Street canal and repair new pumps already installed at the  Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals. Under normal conditions, the  Corps said it would have conducted hydraulic modeling and testing to  determine the correct pump configuration. The Corps did not perform  modeling and testing, officials said, because the process can take months,  and there was insufficient time to do so before the start of the hurricane  season. If the canals must be closed due to a hurricane, before pumping  capacity is restored at the drainage canals, the Corps plans to use a  combination of temporary and portable pumps.
Similarly, in Plaquemines Parish, the Corps made temporary repairs to 5  miles of levees along the Mississippi River after the Corps concluded that a  floodwall located on top of a section of levee was not reliable. The Corps  decided to add a temporary reinforcement because there was not enough  time to replace 5 miles of floodwalls before the start of the 2006 hurricane  season. To provide this interim protection, the Corps added compacted  clay along the backside of the damaged levee. The Corps subsequently  determined that the foundation soil in this area would be unable to  support the weight of floodwalls, so the Corps has decided to construct a  full earthen levee embankment instead. However, this permanent structure  is not scheduled to be completed until March 2007.
The Corps allocated about $801 million to repair levees and floodwalls to  pre-Katrina conditions. An additional $217 million was needed to fund the  $125 million costs to increase the pumping capacity of the new temporary  pumps for the drainage canals and $92 million to fund such things as   (1) additional work that has been required on existing repair contracts,  relating to weakened levees in Plaquemines parish, the three drainage  canal gates, and two hurricane protection and flood reduction projects;   (2) contingency measures that had to be implemented until the temporary  gates on the drainage canals are completed; and (3) costs to acquire  nearby real estate for construction of the gates and associated levees. The  Corps allocated these additional funds from the $566 million that was  allocated by the Corps for raising all hurricane protection structures to  their authorized design elevations, which is discussed in greater detail in  the next section of this report.
section_title: Cost Estimates for Restoring Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Protection Projects to Originally-Designed Levels and Completing Construction of Incomplete Portions Continue to Rise
paragraphs: Beyond the repairs that were to be completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps  has additional plans to continue repairs, restoration, and construction  activities on other portions of the existing five southeastern Louisiana  hurricane protection and flood control projects. The Corps plans to   (1) repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations by about March  2007; (2) restore sections of the five hurricane protection and flood  control projects that have settled over time to their original design  elevation; as well as (3) complete construction of previously authorized  but incomplete portions of these hurricane protection and flood control  projects by September 2007. Although $1.165 billion was originally  allocated for this work, the Corps expects actual costs will be greater  because the original allocation did not reflect design changes, additional  costs to fund the local sponsor’s share, and rapidly escalating construction  costs. Further, in June 2006, the Corps shifted $224 million from this  allocation to pay for the additional costs to repair damaged levees and  floodwalls, leaving only $941 million for this work.
subsections: section_title: The Corps Plans to Repair Damaged Pumps, Motors, and Pump Stations by March 2007
paragraphs: The Corps plans to repair pumps and pump motors at 66 of 75 pump  stations damaged by flood waters that were caused by Hurricane Katrina.  The pump stations are located in Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines  parishes as well as in neighboring Jefferson Parish. Pumps remove storm  runoff from city streets. The Corps plans to make electrical and  mechanical repairs to pumps and motors—such as rewiring motors and  replacing pump bearings—and structural repairs to pump stations, such as  repairing roof tops. As of June 2006, the Corps had planned to complete  repairs to all of these pumps, pump motors, and pump stations by March  2007, for an estimated cost of $59 million. However, to date, the Corps has  allocated $70 million for the pump repairs. A Corps project manager said  that five contracts have been awarded for $7.7 million, as of June 2006, and  that he expects to award a total of 25 contracts for this work.
In April 2006, three pump motors that were flooded during Hurricane  Katrina caught fire during a rainstorm and shut down, raising questions  about the reliability of other pumps that had also been flooded. The  possible failure of pumps due to fires combined with (1) the restrictions  placed on the level of water that can be pumped into the canals because of  uncertainty about the integrity of the canal floodwalls and (2) the reduced  capacity of the temporary pumps to remove water from the canals has led  to widely reported concerns about flooding from rainwater during a  hurricane. In response to these concerns, the Corps accelerated plans to  repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations. A Corps official  estimated it would take several weeks to repair each of the larger and  older pump motors. The Corps plans to repair pumps and pump motors by  taking some of them offline one at a time, thereby maintaining as much of  the available pumping capacity at each pumping station as possible.
section_title: Restoration of Hurricane Protection to Authorized Design Elevations Is Expected by September 2007
paragraphs: The Corps plans to raise the height of all federal and some nonfederal  levees, floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures within the  southeastern Louisiana area, which have settled over the years, to their  original design elevation by September 1, 2007. In December 2005, the  Corps surveyed levees not damaged by Hurricane Katrina and estimated  that about 48 miles of levees were 1 to 2½ feet below design elevation in  St. Bernard, Orleans, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes. The Corps  estimated that restoring these levees to their designed height would cost  $50.8 million. However, the Corps allocated $566 million from funds  provided in the December 2005 emergency supplemental appropriation to  raise not only the heights of these levees but also the heights of floodwalls  and other structures in southeastern Louisiana, which may have settled  over time, to their original design height. The primary difference between  the Corps’ initial cost estimate and the funds allocated in the emergency  supplemental is the higher cost of raising floodwalls and other structures,  compared with the cost of raising only about 48 miles of levees. In July  2006, the Corps estimated that 94 miles of levees, about 16 miles of  floodwalls, 89 gates, and 2 control structures were below design elevation  in Orleans, Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes. According to a Corps  official, the agency is revising the plans and estimated costs for this work  to include the costs of raising all settled floodwalls and the cost of  replacing all I-walls with T-walls or L-walls.
As of July 2006, the Corps had not announced the results of its second  damage assessment. Currently, this work is still scheduled to be  completed by September 1, 2007. As of June 2006, funds allocated for this  work were reduced to $342 million because, as previously mentioned,   $224 million was shifted to help fund the escalating costs to repair  damaged levees and floodwalls to pre-Katrina levels by June 1, 2006, and  to fund repairs to hurricane damage at other hurricane protection and  coastal protection projects. According to a Corps official, cost estimates  for this work were to be available by July 15, 2006, after which the Corps  plans to determine if it needs to request more funds.
section_title: Completion of Previously Authorized but Unconstructed Portions of Five Hurricane and Flood Reduction Projects Expected by September 2007
paragraphs: By September 30, 2007, the Corps plans to complete the construction of all  previously authorized but incomplete portions of the five hurricane  protection and flood reduction projects in southeastern Louisiana. In  December 2005, the Corps estimated the cost of completing these five  projects to be $529 million. However, the Corps is revising its cost  estimates due to escalating construction costs and design changes that  have occurred since Hurricane Katrina. The Corps’ costs will also increase  because local sponsors are no longer required to share any of the costs  incurred to complete these projects. Details of the five projects are  described below.
subsections: section_title: Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project
paragraphs: The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project is  located in St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Charles parishes in  southeastern Louisiana, in the vicinity of the city of New Orleans and  between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. The project  includes a series of control structures, concrete flood walls, and about 125  miles of earthen levees designed to protect residents living between Lake  Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River levees from storm surges in the  lake (see fig. 9).
This project was designed to provide protection from a standard project  hurricane (equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane). The Flood  Control Act of 1965 authorized the project that, at the time of Hurricane  Katrina, was 90 percent complete in St. Bernard and Orleans parishes,   70 percent complete in Jefferson Parish, and 60 percent complete in   St. Charles Parish. The pre-Katrina scheduled completion date for this  project was 2015, at an estimated cost of $738 million, where the estimated  federal share was $528 million and the estimated local sponsor share was  $210 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the  remainder of the project were $121 million. This estimate is expected to  increase due to higher construction costs following Hurricane Katrina.
section_title: West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
paragraphs: The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project is located on the  west bank of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of the city of New  Orleans and in Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines parishes. The project  is designed to provide hurricane protection to residents from storm surges  from Lakes Cataouatche and Salvador, and waterways leading to the Gulf  of Mexico. The project encompasses 66 miles of earthen levees and  floodwalls (see fig. 10).
This project was designed to provide Category 3 level of hurricane  protection. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 authorized this  project. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was 38 percent  complete. The pre-Katrina completion date for this project was 2016, at an  estimated cost of $331 million, where the federal estimated share was   $215 million and the estimated local sponsor share was $116 million. At  the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the remainder of the  project were $148 million; however, the Corps expects the final cost to be  much higher. The design for this project includes 4 miles of T-walls, and  since the cost of T-walls has escalated, officials said they expect the cost  to complete the project will increase as well.
section_title: Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
paragraphs: The Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project is  located in southeastern Louisiana, about 30 miles southwest of New  Orleans, along Bayou Lafourche and between the communities of Larose  and Golden Meadow in Lafourche Parish. The project is a ring-shaped  levee about 40 miles in length (see fig. 11).
According to Corps officials, this project was designed to provide a   100-year level of hurricane protection to about 2,300 acres of residential  and commercial land and 9,400 acres of agricultural land. The Flood  Control Act of 1965 authorized this project that, at the time of Hurricane  Katrina, was about 96 percent complete. The pre-Katrina completion date  of this project was 2007, at an estimated cost of $116 million, where the  federal estimated share was $81 million and the estimated local sponsor  was $35 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the  remainder of the project were $4 million. However, according to the  project manager, significant settlement has occurred throughout the  project and levees are between 1 to 1 ½ feet below design elevation.  Further, when this project was designed in the early 1970s, a nearby marsh  was expected to help slow storm surge. Since that time, the local  environment has changed causing the marsh to disappear and, according  to the project manager, the Corps is reconsidering the project design and  may have to recommend raising the height of the levees in order to  provide authorized levels of protection, which could significantly increase  the costs of the project.
section_title: Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project
paragraphs: The Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project is located on the  east bank of the Mississippi River, in Orleans Parish, and on the east and  west banks of the Mississippi River, in Jefferson Parish and St. Tammany  Parish. The project was designed to provide drainage and flood protection  from a 10-year rainfall event and encompasses major drainage lines and  canals, additional pumping capacity, and new pump stations (see fig. 12).
The project was originally authorized by the Energy and Water  Development Appropriations Act, 1996 and the Water Resources  Development Act of 1996. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project  was about 60 percent complete. The pre-Katrina completion date for this  project was 2009, at an estimated cost of $908 million, of which the federal  estimated share was $678 million and the estimated local sponsor share  was $230 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the  remainder of the project were $225 million (this estimate has been revised  to $339 million). According to a Corps official, this estimate will increase  further because costs for engineering and construction have escalated in  the months following Hurricane Katrina.
section_title: New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project
paragraphs: The New Orleans to Venice Hurricane Protection Project is located along  the east bank of the Mississippi River from Phoenix, Louisiana—about 28  miles southeast of New Orleans—down to Bohemia, Louisiana, and along  the west bank of the river from St. Jude, Louisiana—about 39 miles  southeast of New Orleans—down to the vicinity of Venice, Louisiana. The  project was designed to provide protection from hurricane tidal overflow  from a 100-year storm and consists of 87 miles of enlarged levees built on  the back side of the ring of levees (see fig. 13).
This project was authorized under the River and Harbor Act of 1962. At  the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was about 84 percent complete.
The pre-Katrina completion date for this project was 2018, at an estimated  cost of $253 million, where the federal share was $177 million and the  estimated local sponsor share was $76 million. At the time of the storm,  estimated costs to complete the remainder of the project were $32 million.  According to a Corps official, estimated costs to complete this project are  expected to increase due, in part, to design changes.
section_title: The Corps Lacks a Comprehensive Approach for Planning and Managing the Multiple Restoration, Construction, and Future Enhancements Proposed for Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Protection
paragraphs: In response to various requirements and directives from stakeholders, the  Corps has already developed or is in the process of developing a number  of plans and projects that will further restore, construct, and/or enhance  hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana, to make it stronger and  better. Constructing these projects may take years and require billions of  dollars in federal funds. However, the Corps does not have a  comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that all of these efforts are  effectively integrated and an implementation plan to ensure funding  allocations are made in the most efficient manner possible, avoiding  redundancies and misuse of resources.
In addition to the repairs and construction activities already described in  prior sections of this report, a number of requirements and directives  placed on the Corps over the last several months have required it to  modify existing plans or develop new plans for hurricane protection in  southeastern Louisiana:    The 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation provided nearly   $4 billion to the Corps to enhance hurricane protection in southeastern  Louisiana. Specific provisions provided $530 million for permanent  pumps and closures for New Orleans’ three drainage canals; $350 million  for two navigable closures to prevent hurricane surge from entering the  Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway;   $250 million to storm-proof existing interior drainage pump stations in  Jefferson and Orleans parishes; $170 million to armor critical sections of  New Orleans levees; and $215 million to include nonfederal levees in  Plaquemines Parish into the federal system, which means the levees will  be repaired and built to Corps standards and eligible for future  rehabilitation. These projects are in addition to the other work described  in prior sections of this report.
The 2006 emergency supplemental also appropriated nearly $1.6 billion to  the Corps to reinforce or replace floodwalls in the New Orleans  metropolitan area and provided that at least $495 million of the amounts  appropriated for construction be used to raise levees for the Lake  Pontchartrain and West Bank levee projects to provide a level of  protection necessary to satisfy the certification requirements of the  National Flood Insurance Program (often referred to as the 100-year flood  standard.) In April 2006, the Federal Emergency Management Agency  announced the release of new advisory flood elevations for New Orleans  and the surrounding area based on a 1 percent annual chance of flooding,  or a 100-year flood. The Corps’ restoration plans for hurricane protection  did not meet these new elevation requirements. In response, the Corps  revised its plans and estimated costs to raise the height of levees and  floodwalls to provide the area with a 100-year level of protection. The  Corps estimated it would need an additional $4.1 billion to upgrade all of  the floodwalls and raise levees to meet the new standard by 2010. The  Corps’ estimate included $2.5 billion to raise the height of levees in all of  the New Orleans area, except for lower Plaquemines Parish, in some cases  by as much as 7 feet, which included $900 million to complete other levee  work in the area and upgrade or replace existing I-walls with T-walls. In  lower Plaquemines Parish, the estimated cost to replace all I-walls with T- walls is $1.6 billion.
As required by the 2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations  Act and Department of Defense Appropriations Act, the Corps is  conducting a study of flood control, coastal restoration, and hurricane  protection measures for the southeastern Louisiana coastal region. The  Corps must propose design and technical requirements to protect the  region from a Category 5 hurricane. The two laws appropriated a total of  $20 million to the Corps for this study. The Corps was required to provide  a preliminary technical report to Congress by June 30, 2006 (which was  issued on July 10, 2006) and a final technical report by December 30, 2007.  The final study must consider alternative designs to protect against a  storm surge produced by a Category 5 hurricane originating from the Gulf  of Mexico. According to the Corps, alternatives being considered include a  structural design consisting of a contiguous line of earthen or concrete  walls along southern coastal Louisiana, a nonstructural alternative  involving only environmental or coastal restoration measures, or a  combination of those alternatives. The Corps’ July 2006 preliminary  technical report did not specifically identify which alternatives the Corps  would recommend but instead provided a conceptual framework for both  structural and nonstructural components that should be considered in  developing long-term solutions for the region. Although the cost to provide  a Category 5 level of protection for the southeastern Louisiana coastal  region has not yet been determined, it would be in addition to the over   $7 billion already provided to the Corps in the three emergency  supplemental appropriations discussed in previous sections of this report.
Finally, the Corps is responding to the findings and recommendations  from the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force and its review of  the existing hurricane protection and why it failed. For example, the task  force reported that overtopping and erosion caused most breaches to  levees and floodwalls and recommended armoring to prevent scour from  overtopping, thereby reducing the chance of breaching. As discussed  above, the 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation provided   $170 million to armor critical areas on levees.
Although the long-term solutions for southeastern Louisiana have not yet  been determined and may not be decided for some time, the Corps is  proceeding with over $7 billion of already authorized repair and  restoration work without a comprehensive strategy to guide its efforts.  Without such a strategy, we believe that the Corps may end up replicating  past missteps, which occurred because it was required to follow a  piecemeal approach to developing the existing hurricane protection that,  according to experts, is not well integrated. For example, the draft final  report issued May 2006 by the investigation team sponsored by the  National Science Foundation stated (1) that there was a failure to integrate  the individual parts of a complex hurricane system, (2) that insufficient  attention was given to creating an integrated series of components to  create a reliable overall system, and (3) that projects were engineered and  constructed in piecemeal fashion to conform to incremental  appropriations. In its June 2006 draft final report, the Interagency  Performance Evaluation Task Force also concluded that hurricane  protection systems should be deliberately designed and built as integrated  systems to enhance reliability and provide consistent levels of protection.
According to the Corps, the technical report due to the Congress in  December 2007 will include the long-range strategy that will provide an  integrated and comprehensive review of flood control, coastal restoration,  and hurricane and storm damage reduction measures for the southeastern  Louisiana region, and the preliminary framework for this strategy is  included in the report provided to the Congress on July 10, 2006. However,  according to a senior Corps official, there is currently no other strategic  plan in place to guide its efforts. We are concerned that the Corps has  embarked on a multibillion dollar repair and construction effort in  response to the appropriations it has already received, without a guiding  strategic plan, and appears to be simply doing whatever it takes to comply  with the requirements placed on it by the Congress and other  stakeholders. Consequently, we are concerned that the Corps is once  again, during this interim period, taking an incremental approach that is  based on funding and direction provided through specific appropriations  and is at risk of constructing redundant or obsolete structures that may be  superseded by future decisions, thereby increasing the overall costs to the  federal government for this project.
During the past 4 years, we reported that the Corps’ planning for civil  works projects were fraught with errors, mistakes, and miscalculations  and used invalid assumptions and outdated data. We recommended, and  the Corps agreed, that an external peer review of its plans and decisions  was needed, especially for high risk and costly proposed projects. In the  aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Corps established the Interagency  Performance Evaluation Task Force and used the task force’s findings and  lessons learned to improve its engineering practices and policies to  provide hurricane protection. However, the task force is set to dissolve  once its final report is released in September 2006, and the Corps has not  indicated that it plans to establish another similar body to help guide its  interim repair and restoration efforts, monitor progress, or provide expert  advice.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Following Hurricane Katrina—one of the largest natural disasters in U.S.  history—the Army Corps of Engineers rapidly repaired and restored  almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood control  structures to prehurricane levels of protection in time for the start of the  2006 hurricane season. Now that these urgent repairs have been  completed, the Corps is beginning to implement a variety of other plans to  make many additional repairs and enhancements to existing southeastern  Louisiana hurricane protection projects that may cost billions of dollars  and take years to complete. Further, additional enhancements are being  considered to increase the overall level of protection for the area to  protect against even larger hurricanes that may add many billions of  dollars and many years to the scope of the Corps efforts.
Currently, the Corps does not know what ultimate level of protection will  be authorized for southeastern Louisiana and therefore cannot make  strategic decisions about which components of a hurricane protection  system will most effectively provide the required level of protection.  Nonetheless, the Corps has been appropriated over $7 billion to continue  repairs and construction on five existing hurricane protection projects in  the area. However, it does not have a comprehensive strategy to guide  these efforts and appears to be simply doing whatever it takes to comply  with the requirements placed on it by the Congress and other  stakeholders. We believe that taking such an incremental and piecemeal  approach for such a complex and expensive repair and restoration project  is imprudent and that, even for these interim repairs and enhancements,  the Corps should be fully considering project interrelationships to avoid  unnecessary duplication and redundancy, and to reduce federal costs. We  also believe that relying on an independent body like the Interagency  Performance Evaluation Task Force to help guide and oversee this  process will help ensure that the Corps obtains objective and reliable  support as it implements these authorized enhancements to the existing  hurricane protection projects.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to construct a hurricane protection system that provides the  appropriate level of protection to southeastern Louisiana and ensures the  most efficient use of federal resources, we are making the following two  recommendations:  The Army Corps of Engineers should develop (1) a comprehensive  strategy that includes an integrated approach for all projects and plans for  rebuilding and strengthening the system and (2) an implementation plan  that will achieve the specific level of protection in a cost-effective manner,  within a reasonable time frame.
The Army Corps of Engineers should establish an evaluative organization  like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, to assist in its  efforts in developing a strategic plan, monitoring progress, and providing  expert advice for constructing a stronger and well-integrated hurricane  protection system.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense (DOD) for  its review and comment. In commenting on a draft of the report, DOD  concurred with our first recommendation that the Army Corps of  Engineers develop (1) a comprehensive strategy to integrate projects and  plans for rebuilding and strengthening hurricane protection and (2) an  implementation plan that will provide a specific level of protection in a  cost-effective manner within a reasonable time frame. DOD partially  concurred with our second recommendation that the Army Corps of  Engineers establish an evaluative organization to assist in its efforts to  develop a strategic plan, monitor progress, and provide expert advice for  constructing a stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection system,  because it believes that a body like the Interagency Performance  Evaluation Task Force is not the proper mechanism for this work.  According to DOD, the Corps will rely on three teams of experts to plan  and monitor the construction of a hurricane protection system. First, an  independent technical review person or team will identify, explain, and  comment on the assumptions underlying the Corps’ economic,  engineering, and environmental analyses for each project, and evaluate the  soundness of Corps’ models and planning methods. Second, the team  currently reviewing flood control, coastal restoration, and hurricane and  storm damage reduction measures for the southeastern Louisiana region  will assist the Corps in developing a strategic plan for constructing a  stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection system. Lastly, the  Corps has assembled a Federal Principals Group consisting of senior  leaders from federal agencies to guide the development of a  comprehensive plan and monitor implementation of the plan. We believe  that the Corps’ proposal to use three external groups of experts satisfies  the spirit of our recommendation. DOD’s comments are included in  appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,  Secretary of Defense, and interested congressional committees. We will  also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the report will be  available, at no charge, on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or MittalA@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Edward Zadjura, Assistant  Director; John Delicath, James Dishmon, Doreen Feldman, Christine Frye,  John Kalmar, Carol Kolarik and Omari Norman made key contributions to  this report.