Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at U.S. Diplomatic Posts in Developing Countries
Published: 2003-04-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the mid-1990s, GAO has highlighted the need for the Department of State and other agencies to establish a systematic process for determining their overseas staffing levels. To support this long-standing need and in support of the President's Management Agenda, GAO developed a framework for assessing overseas workforce size and identified options for rightsizing. Because the framework was largely based on work at the U.S. embassy in Paris, GAO was asked to determine whether the rightsizing framework is applicable at U.S. embassies in developing countries. To accomplish this objective, we visited three U.S. embassies in West Africa--a medium-sized post in Dakar, Senegal; and two small embassies in Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania--and applied the framework and its corresponding questions there.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's rightsizing framework can be applied at U.S. embassies in developing countries. Officials from the Bureau of African Affairs, and U.S. embassy officials in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania, said that the framework's questions highlighted specific issues at each post that should be considered in determining staffing levels. Officials in other State bureaus also believed that the security, mission, cost, and option components of the framework provided a logical basis for planning and making rightsizing decisions. At each of the posts GAO visited, application of the framework and corresponding questions generally highlighted (1) physical and technical security deficiencies that needed to be weighed against proposed staff increases; (2) mission priorities and requirements that are not fully documented or justified in the posts' Mission Performance Plans; (3) cost of operations data that were unavailable, incomplete, or fragmented across funding sources; and (4) rightsizing actions and other options that post managers should consider for adjusting the number of personnel.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the mid-1990s, GAO has highlighted the need for the Department of  State and other agencies to establish a systematic process for determining  their overseas staffing levels. Shortly after the 1998 bombings of two U.S.  embassies in East Africa, two high level independent groups called for the  reassessment of staffing levels at U.S. embassies and consulates. In August  2001, the President’s Management Agenda directed all agencies to  “rightsize” their overseas presence to the minimum necessary to meet U.S.  foreign policy goals. To support the long-standing need for a successful  rightsizing initiative, in 2002 we developed a framework that identifies  critical elements of embassy operations—physical security, mission  priorities and requirements, and cost—and also includes rightsizing  options for consideration. Each element contains a set of corresponding  questions for rightsizing the overseas workforce. The questions provide a  basis for decision makers to systematically link the elements of security,  mission, and cost to embassy staffing levels and requirements. The  framework also includes questions on rightsizing options, including  relocating staff to the United States or to regional centers, and  competitively sourcing certain functions. (See app. II for the rightsizing  framework and corresponding questions.) After responding to the  questions, decision makers should then be in a position to determine  whether rightsizing actions are needed to add, reduce, or change the staff  mix at an embassy, and to consider rightsizing options.
Our July 2002 report recommended that the Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) use our framework to support the administration’s  rightsizing initiatives, starting with its assessments of staffing levels and  rightsizing options at posts in Europe and Eurasia. OMB said the  framework would serve as a valuable starting point for rightsizing  embassies. However, because the questions were developed primarily  based on our work at the U.S. embassy in Paris, OMB was not confident  that the questions could be uniformly applied at all posts worldwide. In  response to OMB’s concerns, you requested that we determine whether  the questions could be applied at U.S. embassies in developing countries.
This report presents the results of our work at three U.S. embassies we  visited in West Africa—the medium-sized post in Dakar, Senegal; and two  small embassies in Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania. The  objective of our work at these embassies was to determine whether our  rightsizing framework is applicable at U.S. embassies in developing  countries. To accomplish this objective, we applied the questions to each  post in West Africa by reviewing embassy planning and requirements  documents and by interviewing embassy managers and officials in the  Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs regarding each embassy’s  security, mission, cost, and rightsizing options. We also discussed security  issues at those posts with officials in State’s Bureau of Diplomatic  Security. In addition, we met with officials in State’s Bureau of East Asian  and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to discuss the  potential applicability of the framework at posts in other developing  countries.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In our reviews of embassy staffing issues during the 1990s, we found that  the Department of State and some other agencies operating overseas  lacked clear criteria for staffing overseas embassies. Other reviews  reached similar conclusions. In early 1999, the Accountability Review  Boards that investigated the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East  Africa concluded that the United States should consider adjusting the size  of its embassies and consulates to reduce security vulnerabilities. Later  that year, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) recommended  that rightsizing be a key strategy to improve security and reduce operating  costs. In August 2001, President Bush announced that achieving a  rightsized overseas presence was one of his 14 management priorities. The  September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States added impetus for  this initiative. In May 2002, we testified before the Subcommittee on  National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House  Committee on Government Reform, on a proposed framework for  determining the appropriate number of staff to be assigned to a U.S.  embassy.
To further assess the applicability of GAO’s rightsizing framework, we  selected the embassies in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and  Nouakchott, Mauritania. We selected these embassies based on OMB’s  questions about whether our framework can be uniformly applied at all  posts, and because experts suggest that rightsizing in Africa is a significant  challenge. The embassy in Dakar is a medium-sized post that provides  regional support to several embassies including Cape Verde, Guinea, The  Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone. Embassy Dakar has about 90  direct-hire Americans and 350 local hires working in seven U.S. agencies.
Embassy Banjul is a special embassy program post with 7 American  direct hires and about 65 local hires. Embassy Nouakchott is also a special  embassy program post with 14 American direct hires and about 42 local  hires.
section_title: Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied and Used to Highlight Specific Issues at Each Embassy
paragraphs: Our work at the three posts in West Africa further demonstrated that our  framework and corresponding questions can provide a systematic  approach for assessing overseas workforce size and identifying options for  rightsizing in developing countries. We identified examples of the specific  security, mission, and cost issues at each post, which, when considered  collectively, highlighted staffing issues and rightsizing options to consider.  (See app. I for more details on our findings at each of the embassies.)
subsections: section_title: Physical and Technical Security of Facilities and Employees
paragraphs: The ability to protect personnel should be a critical factor in determining  embassy staffing levels. Recurring security threats to embassies and  consulates further highlight the importance of rightsizing as a tool to  minimize the number of embassy employees at risk. Our security questions  address a broad range of issues, including the security of embassy  buildings, the use of existing secure space, and the vulnerabilities of staff  to terrorist attack. Officials at the embassies in Dakar, Banjul, and  Nouakchott agreed that security vulnerability should be a key concern in  determining the size and composition of staffing levels at the posts and  should be addressed in conjunction with the other rightsizing elements of  mission and cost.
Each post has undergone security upgrades since the 1998 embassy  bombings to address deficiencies and ensure better security. However,  until facilities are replaced as part of the long-term construction plan, most  will not meet security standards. For example, many buildings at overseas  posts do not meet the security setback requirement. At the Dakar post,  responses to the framework’s security questions identified significant  limitations in facility security and office space that likely limit the number  of additional staff that could be adequately protected in the embassy  compound. This is a significant issue for the embassy in Dakar given its  expanding regional role and projected increases in staffing to  accommodate visa workload and increasing personnel at non-State  agencies, as well as because planned construction of a new secure  embassy compound will not be completed until at least 2007. In contrast,  Embassy Banjul has unused office space that could accommodate  additional staff within the embassy compound. Although U.S. interests are  limited in The Gambia, a staff increase could be accommodated if decision  makers determine that additional staff are needed as a result of answering  the framework’s questions. In Nouakchott, existing space is limited but  adequate. However, officials raised concerns about the security risks  associated with the expected increase in personnel on the compound.
section_title: Mission Priorities and Staff Requirements
paragraphs: The placement and composition of staff overseas must reflect the highest  priority goals of U.S. foreign policy. Questions in this section of our  framework include assessing the overall justification of agency staffing  levels in relation to embassy priorities and the extent to which it is  necessary for each agency to maintain or change its presence in a country,  given the scope of its responsibilities and its mission. Related questions  include asking if each agency’s mission reinforces embassy priorities and  if an agency’s mission could be pursued in other ways. Responses to the  questions showed that there are key management systems for controlling  and planning staffing levels currently in use at overseas posts, but they are  not designed or used to systematically address these staffing, priority, and  mission issues.
One such management system is the National Security Decision Directive- 38 (NSDD-38). NSDD-38 is a long-standing directive that requires non-State  agencies to seek approval by chiefs of missions on any proposed changes  in staff. NSDD-38 does not, however, direct the Chief of Mission to  initiate an assessment of an agency’s overall presence. The Overseas  Presence Advisory Panel reported that the directive is not designed to  enable ambassadors to make decisions on each new agency position in a  coordinated, interagency plan for U.S. operations at a post. Post officials  agreed that the NSDD-38 system has only limited usefulness for controlling  staffing levels and achieving rightsizing objectives.
Another management system is the Department of State’s Mission  Performance Plan (MPP). The MPP is the primary planning document for  each overseas post. State’s MPP process has been strengthened  significantly to require each embassy to set its top priorities and link  staffing and workload requirements to those priorities. However, the MPP  does not address rightsizing as a management issue or provide full  guidance to posts for assessing overall staffing levels, by agency, in  relation to a post’s mission. At the three posts we visited, staffing requests  were addressed in the MPPs in the context of each post’s mission  performance goals; however, these documents did not address the security  and cost trade-offs associated with making such staffing changes. In  addition, Embassy Dakar has an increasing regional role, which is not  sufficiently addressed in the MPP.
Finally, the Department of State’s Overseas Staffing Model provides  guidance for State in assigning its full-time American direct hire staff to  posts, but it does not include comprehensive guidance on linking staffing  levels to security, workload requirements, cost, and other elements of  rightsizing. It also does not provide guidance on staffing levels for foreign  service nationals or for other agencies at a post.
Using various methods for addressing staffing and other key resource  requirements is not effective in planning for or controlling growth. The  Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Dakar agreed, as this has resulted in  growth beyond the post’s capacity. Specifically, The Department of State  has added at least seven American direct-hire positions to the post, and  non-State agencies operating in Dakar have added another six positions  over the last year. In addition, post officials project more increases in  personnel by fiscal year 2004 to accommodate other agencies interested in  working out of Dakar. Post officials agreed that a more systematic and  comprehensive approach might improve the post’s ability to plan for and  control growth.
Responses to the framework’s questions by Banjul and Dakar consular  officers also indicated that they could further explore processing all  nonimmigrant visas from the Dakar post, particularly since Dakar has  done so in the past on a temporary basis. Neither post’s MPP discussed the  possibility of covering these functions on a regional basis from Dakar, yet  doing so would relieve Banjul’s consular officer from processing  nonimmigrant visas, thereby allowing more time for political and  economic reporting. Thus, the post might not need to request a junior  officer to handle such reporting. However, Banjul post officials said this  arrangement would not be feasible for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless,  their assessment illustrates the importance of weighing the benefits and  trade-offs of exercising rightsizing options. Officials at both posts also  agreed that applying the rightsizing questions, as part of the post’s annual  MPP process, would result in an improved and more systematic approach  for addressing rightsizing issues.
section_title: Cost of Operations
paragraphs: The cost section of our framework includes questions that involve  developing and consolidating cost information from all agencies at a  particular embassy to permit cost-based decision-making. Without  comprehensive cost data, decision makers cannot determine the  correlation between costs and the work being performed, nor can they  assess the short- and long-term costs associated with feasible business  alternatives.
At all of the posts, we found there was no mechanism to provide the  ambassador or other decision makers with comprehensive data on State’s  and other agencies’ cost of operations. For example, complete budget data  that reflect the cost of employee salaries and benefits and certain  information management expenses for each agency at post were not  available. Further, we found that embassy profile reports maintained by  State’s Bureau of Administration contained incomplete and inaccurate  information for each embassy’s funding levels and sources. Officials at  each post agreed that it is difficult to discern overall costs because data  are incomplete and fragmented across funding sources, thereby making it  difficult for decision makers to justify staffing levels in relation to overall  post costs.
In view of Embassy Dakar’s plans to expand its regional responsibilities,  embassy officials said it would be beneficial to document and justify the  cost effectiveness of providing support to posts in the region. The type of  support can be substantial and can have significant implications for  planning future staffing and other resource requirements. For example,  Embassy Nouakchott relies heavily on Embassy Dakar for budget and  fiscal support, security engineering, public affairs, medical/medevac  services, and procurement/purchasing, in addition to temporary  warehousing for certain goods.
OMB and the Department of State recognize that lack of cost-based  decision-making is a long-standing problem. As part of the President’s  Management Agenda, they are working to better identify the full operating  costs at individual posts and improve cost accounting mechanisms for  overseas presence.
section_title: Consideration of Rightsizing Actions and Other Options
paragraphs: Our work demonstrates that responses to our questions could be used to  identify and exercise rightsizing actions and options, such as adjusting  staffing requirements, competitively sourcing certain commercial goods  and services, and streamlining warehousing operations. Examples of  identifying and exercising rightsizing options include the following:    Embassy space and security limitations in Dakar suggest that planned  increases in staff levels may not be feasible. If Embassy Dakar used our  framework to complete a full and comprehensive analysis of its regional  capabilities, in conjunction with analyses of mission priorities and  requirements of other embassies in West Africa, then staffing levels could  be adjusted at some of the posts in the region. One rightsizing option  includes having Embassy Banjul’s visa services handled from Dakar.
The general services officers at the Dakar and Banjul posts agreed that our  framework could be used to identify competitive sourcing opportunities in  their locations. One rightsizing option includes assessing the feasibility of  competitively sourcing the work of currently employed painters,  upholsterers, electricians, and others to yield cost savings and reduce staff  requirements. This could have a particularly significant impact at the  Dakar post, which employs more than 70 staff who are working in these  types of positions.
The Dakar and Banjul embassies operate substantial warehousing and  maintenance complexes. Post officials said that operations and staffing  requirements at these government-owned facilities could be potentially  streamlined in a number of areas. The Department of State and other  agencies maintain separate nonexpendable properties, such as furniture  and appliances in Dakar, while the Department of State and Peace Corps  maintain their own warehouses in the same compound in Banjul.  Department of State logistics managers and post general services  personnel agree that pooling such items could potentially reduce overall  inventories, costs, and staffing requirements.
Relocating staff, competitively sourcing goods and services, and other  rightsizing options should be based on a full feasibility and cost analysis,  and thus we are not recommending them in this report. However, such  rightsizing options deserve consideration, particularly in view of Embassy  Dakar’s concerns about how to manage anticipated increasing  regionalization, the general security threats to embassies around the  world, and the President’s Management Agenda’s emphasis on reducing  costs of overseas operations.
section_title: Framework’s Questions Provide a Systematic Approach to Rightsizing
paragraphs: The need for a systematic approach to rightsizing the U.S. overseas  presence has been a recurring theme in developing our framework. We  have noted that the criteria for assigning staff to individual overseas posts  vary significantly by agency and that agencies do not fully and collectively  consider embassy security, mission priorities, and workload requirements.  At the three embassies we visited in West Africa, we found that rightsizing  issues have not been systematically assessed as part of the embassy  management and planning process. However, The Department of State has  taken several steps that help lay the groundwork for such a process by  refining its overseas post MPP guidance. That guidance, applicable to  posts in all countries, was recently strengthened and now directs each  embassy to set five top priorities and link staffing and workload  requirements to fulfilling those priorities. Chiefs of Mission also certify  that the performance goals in their MPPs accurately reflect the highest  priorities of their embassies. This is consistent with questions in our  framework addressing program priorities. The guidance does not,  however, identify rightsizing as a management goal or explicitly discuss  how rightsizing issues of security, mission, cost, and options should be  addressed. For example, it does not ask embassies to formally consider  the extent to which it is necessary for each agency to maintain its current  presence in country, or to consider relocation to the United States or  regional centers, given the scope of each embassies’ responsibilities and  missions.
Officials at the posts in West Africa generally agreed that applying the  framework and corresponding questions could result in an improved and  more systematic approach to rightsizing. They agreed that the framework  can be adjusted to consider emerging rightsizing issues and staffing  conditions. For example, at Embassy Dakar, the regional security officer  suggested including a question addressing the capacity of the host country  police, military, and intelligence services as part of the physical and  technical security section. Other officials suggested including a question  regarding the extent to which health conditions in the host country might  limit the number of employees that should be assigned to a post.
Officials in the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs generally  agreed that applying our questions provides a logical basis for  systematically addressing rightsizing issues. They agreed it is important  that the Department of State and other agencies consider staffing issues  based on a common set of criteria, for both existing embassies and future  facilities. Officials in the Department of State’s Bureau of East Asian and  Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs also agreed that the  security, mission, cost, and option elements of the framework provide a  logical basis for planning and making rightsizing decisions. They also  believed that rightsizing analyses would be most effective if the framework  were adopted as a part of the Department of State’s MPP process.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Our rightsizing framework and its corresponding questions can be applied  to embassies in developing countries and help decision makers  collectively focus on security, mission, and cost trade-offs associated with  staffing levels and rightsizing options. The rightsizing questions  systematically provide embassy and agency decision makers a common  set of criteria and a logical approach for coordinating and determining  staffing levels at U.S. diplomatic posts. We recognize that the framework  and its questions are a starting point and that modification of the questions  may be considered in future planning, as appropriate. The Department of  State’s MPP process has been strengthened and addresses some of the  rightsizing questions in our framework. In particular, it better addresses  embassy priorities, a key factor in our rightsizing framework. However,  the mission planning process neither specifically addresses embassy  rightsizing as a policy or critical management issue nor calls for  assessments of related security and cost issues affecting all agencies  operating at overseas posts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In keeping with the administration’s rightsizing initiative, we are  recommending that  the Director of OMB, in coordination with the Secretary of State, ensure  that application of our framework be expanded as a basis for assessing  staffing levels at embassies and consulates worldwide; and the Secretary of State adopt the framework as part of the embassy Mission  Performance Planning process to ensure participation of all agencies at  posts and the use of comparable criteria to address security, mission, cost  issues, and rightsizing options.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: OMB and The Department of State provided written comments on a draft  of this report (see apps. III and IV). OMB said that it agrees with our  findings and recommendations and stated that our framework may serve  as a valuable base for the development of a broader methodology that can  be applied worldwide. OMB agreed that security, mission, and cost are key  elements to consider in making rightsizing decisions. In addition, OMB  noted that workload requirements, options for information technology,  regionalization possibilities, and competitive sourcing opportunities  should be considered in order to adapt the methodology to fit each post.
The Department of State generally agreed with our recommendations and  said that it welcomed GAO’s work on developing a rightsizing framework.  The Department of State said that the rightsizing questions provide a good  foundation for it to proceed in working with OMB and other agencies to  improve the process for determining overseas staffing levels. The  Department of State noted that some elements of the framework are  already being undertaken and that it plans to incorporate additional  elements of our rightsizing questions into its future planning processes,  including the MPP. Department of State comments are reprinted in  appendix IV. The Department of State also provided technical comments,  which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which our framework’s questions are  applicable in developing regions, we visited three West African  embassies—Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott,  Mauritania. At all posts, we spoke with regional security officers, in  addition to ambassadors and other post officials, regarding the security  status of their embassies and related security concerns. At all locations,  we reviewed the applicability of the mission priorities and requirements  section of the framework by asking the ambassadors, deputy chiefs of  mission, administrative officers, consular officers, and general services  officers to answer key questions in that section. To assess the usefulness  of the cost section, we spoke with the same officers, in addition to  Embassy Dakar’s financial management officer who provides regional  support to both Banjul and Nouakchott. We also discussed with key  officials whether opportunities exist to exercise certain rightsizing options  such as competitively sourcing post goods and services or streamlining  embassy functions that are commercial in nature. In addition, we  interviewed Bureau of African Affairs executive officers, officials in the  Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Washington, D.C., and the heads of key  agencies operating in each country. Specifically, in Dakar we interviewed  the Director and Deputy Director of the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) and the U.S. Treasury representative. In Banjul and  Nouakchott, we interviewed the Directors of Peace Corps. We also met  with officials in the executive offices of the Department of State’s Bureau  of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to  determine the applicability of the framework in those regions.
We conducted our work from October 2002 through January 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested members of  Congress. We are also sending copies of this report to the Director of OMB  and the Secretary of State. We also will make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will also be available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  on (202) 512-4128 or John Brummet on (202) 512-5260. In addition to the  persons named above, Janey Cohen, Lynn Moore, Ann M. Ulrich, and  Joseph Zamoyta made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African Posts
paragraphs: This appendix provides detailed information on the responses to the  rightsizing questions in our framework at the embassies in Dakar, Senegal;  Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania. Specific rightsizing  issues, actions, and options for consideration are highlighted.
subsections: section_title: Dakar: Physical and Technical Security
paragraphs: Prior to the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, U.S. diplomatic  facilities in Dakar had serious physical security vulnerabilities, including  insufficient setbacks at most office buildings, including the chancery.  Since 1998, many steps have been taken to ensure better security  throughout the post. Important steps included (1) the relocation of the  U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to a more secure  location, (2) host-country cooperation for embassy-only traffic on the four  streets surrounding the embassy’s main building, (3) the renovation and  expansion of a more secure “waiting facility” for the consular affairs  section, and (4) an increase in surveillance and detection units for the  entire compound and employee residences.
Although security at the Dakar post is now characterized as “good” for the  current number of personnel, embassy officials cautioned that actions by  Senegalese authorities to close off streets adjacent to the embassy are  temporary measures that could be reversed at any time. In addition, the  office space in the chancery can only accommodate a slight increase in  personnel. Officials said that adding personnel to the post would aggravate  certain security concerns.
section_title: Dakar: Mission Priorities and Requirements
paragraphs: Embassy Dakar increasingly has more regional responsibilities and there  are significant pressures to assign more personnel to Dakar—a situation  that has been exacerbated as a result of the recently ordered departure  status at the U.S. embassy in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. The Dakar post now  has about 90 American direct-hire personnel and 350 local hires. Staff  projections over the next two fiscal years indicate an increase in staffing at  the embassy for additional agencies, such as the Centers for Disease  Control and Prevention and the Departments of Agriculture and Homeland  Security, and the possible transfer of Foreign Commercial Service  employees from the embassy in Abidjan. In addition, the Dakar consular  section will be increasing its consular officers for visa purposes from two  to four and may need additional staff in the future. As a result of  increasing regional responsibilities and more personnel, Embassy Dakar  may require additional Department of State support personnel as well.
In spite of Dakar’s increasing regional role and responsibilities, the post  has difficulty attracting and retaining experienced foreign service officers.  Embassy officials indicated that senior foreign service officers perceive  the post as having a relatively high cost of living, a low pay differential,  and no available consumables. Hence, many key positions are filled with  inexperienced junior staff, placing constraints on some offices in carrying  out their mission.
section_title: Dakar: Cost of Operations
paragraphs: Comprehensive information was not available to identify the total annual  operating costs for Embassy Dakar or for each agency at the post. Cost  data were incomplete and fragmented. For example, embassy budget  personnel estimated operating costs of at least $7.7 million, not including  American employee salaries or allowances. Available Bureau of African  Affairs budget data for the post estimated fiscal year 2003 operating costs  of at least $6 million, including State’s public diplomacy costs, post  administered costs, and International Cooperative Administrative Support  Services expenses, but these costs did not reflect the salaries and benefits  of Department of State and other U.S. agency American employees and the  State bureau allotments, such as for diplomatic security. If all costs were  included in a comprehensive budget, the total annual operating costs at  the post would be significantly higher than both estimates. Post and  Bureau officials agreed that fragmented and incomplete cost data make it  difficult for them to systematically and collectively approach rightsizing  initiatives and consider the relative cost-effectiveness of rightsizing  options.
section_title: Dakar: Consideration of Rightsizing Actions and Options
paragraphs: Responses to the framework’s questions regarding rightsizing actions and  other options at Embassy Dakar highlighted the impact of security  conditions on anticipated staffing increases and the need to define and  document the embassy’s growing regional responsibilities as part of the  MPP process. They also highlighted potential opportunities for  competitively sourcing certain embassy services to the private sector, as  well as opportunities for streamlining warehouse operations. Embassy  officials are reluctant to purchase commercial goods and services from the  local economy due to quality and reliability concerns, and thus they  employ a large number of direct-hire personnel to maintain and provide all  post goods and services. If goods and services were competitively sourced  to the local economy, the number of direct hires and costs could possibly  be reduced. Opportunities also exist for streamlining Embassy Dakar’s  warehousing operations, which could yield cost savings.
The left box of figure 1 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that were  raised at Embassy Dakar in response to the framework’s questions. The  box on the right side identifies possible corresponding rightsizing actions  and other options post decision makers could consider when collectively  assessing their rightsizing issues.
section_title: Banjul: Physical and Technical Security
paragraphs: Officials at the post in Banjul characterized the compound as having good  physical security and enough office space to accommodate additional  staff. The post chancery compound is a “lock-and-leave” facility, as it does  not have the 24-hour presence of U.S. government personnel. There are  two leased vacant residential houses located directly behind the chancery  building but separated from the chancery by a dividing wall. Embassy  officials in Banjul have proposed buying the houses but explained that it is  difficult to justify the cost because the purchase would put the embassy  over its allotted number of homes (i.e., giving it nine homes for seven  personnel). Some officials have suggested that the houses could be used  for temporary duty personnel working at the post. During our work,  visiting officials from the Immigration and Naturalization Service were  using one of the houses to conduct political asylum visa interviews.  Usually, however, the houses are vacant. According to the ambassador and  the regional security officer, if the vacant houses were to be leased by  nonembassy tenants, the chancery’s physical security would be seriously  compromised. In addition, the regional security officer expressed  concerns regarding the training and quality of the security contractor,  particularly because the post does not have a Marine detachment to back  up the security guards.
section_title: Banjul: Mission Priorities and Requirements
paragraphs: Much of Embassy Banjul’s resources are devoted to supporting internal  post operations instead of focusing on external goals, such as political  reporting and public diplomacy. For example, more than 60 local hires  carry out facilities maintenance and other post support functions while  only 3 of the 7 American direct-hire personnel address the post’s 3 main  program goals in The Gambia—namely, reinforcing democracy, increasing  economic prosperity, and improving the population’s health. Since the  consular officer is also responsible for political and economic reporting,  the post recently requested one junior officer rotational position to help  balance the duties in all three areas. Over the past 2 years the number of  nonimmigrant visa applications in Banjul more than doubled—from 1,712  applications in March 2000 to 4,635 applications in September 2002—while  the percentage of refused applications decreased from a high of 65 percent  in September 2000 to a low of 38 percent in September 2002. Post officials  said that the lack of a full-time consular officer may impede the post’s  ability to focus on preventing fraudulent visa applications. The post has  also requested one dual-purpose local employee to back up its growing  public diplomacy and security assistance portfolios.
section_title: Banjul: Cost of Operations
paragraphs: Banjul’s primary post planning document, the MPP, did not include  comprehensive data on the total cost of operations. The Bureau of African  Affairs’ budget for the post estimated total costs of at least $1.7 million for  fiscal year 2003. However, these estimates did not include American  salaries and other expenses, such as State Bureau allotments.
The left box of figure 2 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that were  raised at Embassy Banjul in response to the framework’s questions. The  box on the right identifies corresponding rightsizing actions and other  options post decision makers could consider when collectively assessing  their rightsizing issues.
section_title: Nouakchott: Physical and Technical Security
paragraphs: Embassy Nouakchott officials characterize the post compound as having  good physical security, which has been upgraded since 1998. However, the  chancery does not meet security setback requirements, and compound  facilities have security deficiencies. Answering the framework’s questions  regarding physical security did not indicate a need to change the number  of staff based on existing security conditions at the embassy office  buildings. However, embassy officials said that the questions helped  highlight the need to consider the security risks and trade-offs associated  with expected increases in the number of personnel at post.
section_title: Nouakchott: Mission Priorities and Requirements
paragraphs: When asked specific questions regarding mission priorities and  requirements, Embassy Nouakchott officials told us that the post has an  adequate number of personnel to meet current mission requirements and  priorities but that there are generally few bidders for positions at the post.  The Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission emphasized that an increase  or decrease of one employee greatly affects how the post accomplishes its  mission—more so than at a larger post, such as Dakar. For example, the  Regional Security Officer position is vacant and is being covered on a  temporary duty basis by Dakar’s Assistant Regional Security Officer. Also,  the post currently has no positions for political and public diplomacy  officers. One officer may be assigned to multiple positions owing to  limited demand for certain services. For example, the Consular Officer at  Embassy Nouakchott is also responsible for the duties of a  commercial/economic officer. However, the post hopes to add one full- time officer for political and human rights reporting, according to the  post’s MPP.
section_title: Nouakchott: Cost of Operations
paragraphs: Operating costs for the Nouakchott post are not fully documented in the  MPP or used to justify staffing levels. Embassy Nouakchott officials  roughly estimated total operating costs of about $4 million for fiscal year  2003. The Bureau of African Affairs’ budget for the post estimated partial  operating costs of only $2.1 million annually, but the estimate did not  include American salaries, diplomatic security, and other costs.
The left box of figure 3 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that were  raised at Embassy Nouakchott in response to the framework’s questions.  The box on the right side identifies corresponding rightsizing actions and  other options post decision makers could consider when collectively  assessing their rightsizing issues.
section_title: Appendix II: Rightsizing Framework and Corresponding Questions
subsections: section_title: Physical/technical security of facilities and employees What is the threat and security profile of the embassy? Has the ability to protect personnel been a factor in determining staffing levels at the embassy? To what extent are existing office buildings secure?
paragraphs: Is existing space being optimally utilized?
Have all practical options for improving the security of facilities been considered?    Do issues involving facility security put the staff at an unacceptable level of risk or limit mission accomplishment?    What is the capacity level of the host country police, military, and intelligence services?     Do security vulnerabilities suggest the need to reduce or relocate staff?    Do health conditions in the host country pose personal security concerns that limit the number of employees that should be  Mission priorities and requirements    What are the staffing levels and mission of each agency?    How do agencies determine embassy staffing levels?
Is there an adequate justification for the number of employees at each agency compared with the agency’s mission?  Is there adequate justification for the number of direct hire personnel devoted to support and administrative operations?
What are the priorities of the embassy?     Does each agency’s mission reinforce embassy priorities?    To what extent are mission priorities not being sufficiently addressed due to staffing limitations or other impediments?    To what extent are workload requirements validated and prioritized and is the embassy able to balance them with core functions?    Do the activities of any agencies overlap?    Given embassy priorities and the staffing profile, are increases in the number of existing staff or additional agency representation    To what extent is it necessary for each agency to maintain its current presence in country, given the scope of its responsibilities  Could an agency’s mission be pursued in other ways?  Does an agency have regional responsibilities or is its mission entirely focused on the host country?
Cost of operations    What is the embassy’s total annual operating cost?    What are the operating costs for each agency at the embassy?    To what extent are agencies considering the full cost of operations in making staffing decisions?    To what extent are costs commensurate with overall embassy strategic importance, with agency programs, and with specific  Consideration of rightsizing options    What are the security, mission, and cost implications of relocating certain functions to the United States, regional centers, or to  other locations, such as commercial space or host country counterpart agencies?
To what extent could agency program and/or routine administrative functions (procurement, logistics, and financial management  functions) be handled from a regional center or other locations?
Do new technologies and transportation links offer greater opportunities for operational support from other locations?    Do the host country and regional environments suggest there are options for doing business differently, that is, are there adequate  transportation and communications links and a vibrant private sector?
To what extent is it practical to purchase embassy services from the private sector?    Does the ratio of support staff to program staff at the embassy suggest opportunities for streamlining?    Can functions be reengineered to provide greater efficiencies and reduce requirements for personnel?
Are there best practices of other bilateral embassies or private corporations that could be adapted by the U.S. embassy?
To what extent are there U.S. or host country legal, policy, or procedural obstacles that may impact the feasibility of rightsizing options?
We added this question based on the suggestion of officials at the Office of Management and  Budget.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Office of Management and Budget
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated February 25, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We did not set priorities for the elements in the framework that appear  in this report. Moreover, we believe that decision makers need to  consider security, mission, and cost collectively in order to weigh the  trade-offs associated with staffing levels and rightsizing options.  2.  We did not imply that there is a problem of exploding growth in  overseas staffing levels that needs to be reined in. Our statement that  there is a need for a systematic process to determine overseas staffing  levels (i.e., rightsizing) was made on the basis that the elements of  security, mission, cost, and other rightsizing options are not  collectively addressed in a formal process to determine staffing levels  at overseas posts. On page 1 of the report, we state that rightsizing may  result in the addition, reduction, or change in the mix of staff.  3.  We modified our report on page 7 to discuss the Overseas Staffing  Model.  4.  We modified our report on pages 6-7 to more accurately describe the  National Security Decision Directive-38.  5.  International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) is  only one component of a post’s total overseas costs and include the  costs of common administrative support, such as motor pool  operations, vehicle maintenance, travel services, mail and messenger  services, building operations, information management, and other  administrative services. However, this component does not cover all  employee salaries and benefits, all housing, office furnishings and  equipment, diplomatic security, representation, miscellaneous  expenses, and other costs for all agencies operating at a post. Total  costs associated with each post need to be considered when overseas  staffing decisions are made.