Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
Published: 2008-06-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2003, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) transferred from the General Services Administration (GSA) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). FPS provides physical security and law enforcement services to about 9,000 GSA facilities. To accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about $1 billion, 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located throughout the country. Recently, FPS has faced several challenges protecting GSA facilities and federal employees. This report provides information and analysis on (1) FPS's operational challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2) funding challenges FPS faces and actions it has taken to address them, and (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. To address these objectives, we conducted site visits at 7 of FPS's 11 regions and interviewed FPS, GSA, tenant agencies, and local law enforcement officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FPS faces several operational challenges that hamper its ability to accomplish its mission, and the actions it has taken may not fully resolve these challenges. FPS's staff decreased by about 20 percent between fiscal years 2004 and 2007. FPS has managed the decreases in its staffing resources in a manner that has diminished security at GSA facilities and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks at many GSA facilities. For example, with the exception of a few locations, FPS no longer provides proactive patrols at GSA facilities to detect and prevent criminal incidents and terrorism-related activities. FPS also continues to face problems with managing its contract guard program and ensuring that security countermeasures, such as security cameras and magnetometers, are operational. For example, according to FPS, it has investigated significant crimes at multiple high-risk facilities, but the security cameras installed in those buildings were not working properly, preventing FPS investigators from identifying the suspects. To address some of its operational challenges, FPS is moving to an inspector-based workforce, which seeks to eliminate the police officer position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS believes that this change will ensure that its staff has the right mix of technical skills and training needed to accomplish its mission. FPS is also hiring an additional 150 inspectors and developing a new system for completing building security assessments. However, these actions may not fully resolve FPS's operational challenges because, for example, inspectors might not be able to fulfill both law enforcement and physical security roles simultaneously. FPS also faces funding challenges, and the actions it has taken to address them have had some adverse implications. To fund its operations, FPS charges each tenant agency fees for its security services. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, FPS's projected expenses exceeded its collections and DHS had to transfer funds to make up the difference. FPS also instituted cost-saving measures such as restricting hiring and travel and limiting training and overtime. According to FPS, these measures have affected staff morale, safety and increased attrition. FPS has been authorized to increase the basic security fee four times since it transferred to DHS, currently charging tenant agencies 62 cents per square foot for basic security services. Because of these actions, FPS's collections in fiscal year 2007 were sufficient to cover costs, and FPS projects that collections will also cover costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS's primary means of funding its operations--the basic security fee--does not account for the risk faced by specific buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost of providing services, raising questions about equity. Several stakeholders also expressed concern about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of its costs to provide security at federal facilities. FPS has developed output measures, but lacks outcome measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Its output measures include determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational. However, FPS has not developed outcome measures to evaluate its efforts to protect federal facilities that could provide FPS with broader information on program results. FPS also lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measures.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2003, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) transferred from the General  Services Administration (GSA) to the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS). It is responsible for providing physical security and law  enforcement services to about 9,000 GSA facilities. Within DHS, FPS is  part of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) component, the  largest investigative arm of DHS. FPS is fully funded by the security fees it  collects from the agencies it protects and does not receive a separate  appropriation. To accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities, FPS  currently has an annual budget of about $1 billion, about 1,100 employees,  and 15,000 contract guards located throughout the country. While there  has not been a large-scale attack on a domestic federal facility since the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 1995 bombing of the Alfred  P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, ongoing terror  threats and crime require that FPS effectively manage its resources to  protect the over 1 million employees as well as members of the public that  work in and visit GSA facilities each year.
Recently, FPS has faced several challenges. Chief among them is ensuring  that it has sufficient staffing and funding resources to accomplish its  mission of protecting GSA facilities. It has also faced challenges in  assessing the physical security of the facilities it protects and overseeing  its contract guard program. To help address these challenges, in 2007, FPS  adopted a new approach to protect GSA facilities. Under this approach,  FPS plans to essentially eliminate its police officer position and mainly use  inspectors and special agents to perform multiple law enforcement and  physical security duties concurrently and will place more emphasis on  physical security activities, such as completing building security  assessments (BSA), and less emphasis on law enforcement activities, such  as proactive patrol. In addition, while FPS plans to maintain a level of  15,000 contract guards, the majority of the guards are stationed at fixed  posts, which they are not permitted to leave, and do not have arrest  authority. These challenges have raised questions about FPS’s ability to  accomplish its facility protection mission.
You requested that we review FPS’s efforts to protect GSA facilities since  it transferred to DHS. This report provides information and analysis on (1)  FPS’s operational challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2)  funding challenges FPS faces and actions it has taken to address them, and  (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA  facilities.
To determine operational challenges FPS may face in protecting GSA  facilities and actions it has taken to address them, we conducted site visits  at 7 of FPS’s 11 regions, which have responsibility for protecting about  5,169, or about 58 percent, of the approximately 9,000 buildings in FPS’s  portfolio. To select the regions, we considered the number of federal  buildings in each region, geographic dispersion across the United States,  the number of FPS employees in each region, and input from FPS and GSA  officials. At these locations, we interviewed a total of 167 FPS police  officers, inspectors, special agents, management, and support staff; 53  GSA regional management and security officials; representatives from 22  building security committees (BSC); and 8 local law enforcement agencies  about FPS’s efforts to protect federal employees, facilities, and the public.  We also interviewed officials at FPS and GSA headquarters. We reviewed  and analyzed laws related to jurisdictional issues at GSA facilities and FPS  authority, and various FPS planning documents. We also analyzed FPS  staffing data from fiscal years 2004 through 2007 to identify trends in  staffing and attrition. To determine funding challenges FPS may face, we  interviewed budget officials from the Office of Management and Budget  (OMB), ICE Office of the Chief Financial Officer, FPS, and GSA. We  analyzed appropriation acts, the President’s budget for FPS, and budget  justifications for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. To determine how FPS  measures the effectiveness of its efforts, we analyzed FPS’s fiscal year  2008 through 2011 strategic plan and other reports, and interviewed  officials from FPS’s Risk Management Division. Because of the sensitivity  of some of the information in this report, we cannot provide information  about the specific locations of crimes or other incidents discussed. We  conducted this performance audit from April 2007 to June 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for further details about our  methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As the primary federal agency that is responsible for protecting and  securing GSA facilities and federal employees across the country, FPS has  the authority to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting  federally owned and leased properties and the persons on such property  and, among other things, to conduct investigations related to offenses  against the property and persons on the property. To protect the over 1  million federal employees and about 9,000 GSA facilities from the risk of  terrorist and criminal attacks, in fiscal year 2007, FPS had about 1,100  employees, of which 541, or almost 50 percent, were inspectors, as shown  in figure 1. FPS also has about 15,000 contract guards.
FPS inspectors are primarily responsible for  responding to incidents and demonstrations,   completing BSAs for numerous buildings,    serving as contracting officer technical representatives (COTR) for    collecting and reviewing time cards for guards, and    participating in tenant agencies’ BSC meetings.
FPS police officers are primarily responsible for  responding to criminal incidents,   assisting in the monitoring of contract guards, and  responding to demonstrations at GSA facilities and conducting basic  criminal investigations.
FPS physical security specialists, who do not have law enforcement  authority, are responsible for    participating in tenant agencies’ BSC meetings, and    assisting in the monitoring of contract guard services.
Special agents are the lead entity within FPS for    gathering intelligence for criminal and antiterrorist activities, and    planning and conducting investigations relating to alleged or suspected  violations of criminal laws against GSA facilities and their occupants.
According to FPS, its 15,000 contract guards are used primarily to monitor  facilities through fixed post assignments and access control. According to  FPS policy documents, contract guards may detain individuals who are  being seriously disruptive, violent, or suspected of committing a crime at a  GSA facility, but do not have arrest authority.
FPS provides law enforcement and physical security services to its  customers. Law enforcement services provided by FPS include proactive  patrol and responding to incidents in or around GSA facilities. Physical  security services provided by FPS include the completion of BSAs,  oversight of contract guards, participation in BSC meetings, and the  recommendation of security countermeasures. The level of physical  protection services FPS provides at each of the approximately 9,000  facilities varies depending on the facility’s security level. To determine a  facility’s security level, FPS uses the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)  Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines, which are summarized below.
A level I facility has 10 or fewer federal employees, 2,500 or fewer square  feet of office space, and a low volume of public contact or contact with  only a small segment of the population. A typical level I facility is a small  storefront-type operation, such as a military recruiting office.
A level II facility has between 11 and 150 federal employees; more than  2,500 to 80,000 square feet; a moderate volume of public contact; and  federal activities that are routine in nature, similar to commercial  activities.
A level III facility has between 151 and 450 federal employees, more than  80,000 to 150,000 square feet and a moderate to high volume of public  contact.
A level IV facility has over 450 federal employees; more than 150,000  square feet; a high volume of public contact; and tenant agencies that may  include high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies, courts,  judicial offices, and highly sensitive government records.
A Level V facility is similar to a Level IV facility in terms of the number of  employees and square footage, but contains mission functions critical to  national security. FPS does not have responsibility for protecting any level  V buildings.
On the basis of the DOJ Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines, FPS  categorized the approximately 9,000 GSA facilities in its portfolio into five  security levels, as shown in figure 2.
FPS also follows DOJ guidance for completing BSAs. DOJ guidance states  that BSAs are required to be completed every 2 to 4 years, depending on  the security level of the building. For example, a BSA for a level IV  building is completed every 2 years and every 4 years for a level I building.  As part of each assessment, the inspector is required to conduct an on-site  physical security analysis using FPS’s Federal Security Risk Manager  (FSRM) methodology and interview the Chairman and each member of the  BSC, GSA realty specialists, designated officials of tenant agencies, site  security supervisors, and building managers. After completing their  assessments, inspectors make recommendations to the BSC for building  security countermeasures. The BSC is responsible for approving the  recommended countermeasures. In some cases, FPS has delegated the  protection of facilities to tenant agencies, which may have their own law  enforcement authority or may contract separately for guard services.
FPS is a reimbursable organization and is fully funded by collecting  security fees from tenant agencies. To fund its operations, FPS charges  each tenant agency a basic security fee per square foot of space occupied  in a GSA facility. In 2008, the basic security fee is 62 cents per square foot  and covers services such as patrol, monitoring of building perimeter  alarms, and dispatching of law enforcement response through its control  centers, criminal investigations, and BSAs. FPS also collects an  administrative fee it charges tenant agencies for building specific security  services such as access control to facilities’ entrances and exits; employee  and visitor checks; and the purchase, installation, and maintenance of  security equipment, including cameras, alarms, magnetometers, and X-ray  machines. In addition to these security services, FPS provides agencies  with additional services upon request, which are funded through  reimbursable Security Work Authorizations (SWA), for which FPS charges  an administrative fee. For example, agencies may request additional  magnetometers or more advanced perimeter surveillance capabilities.
While FPS’s fiscal year 2008 annual budget totals $1 billion, for the  purposes of this report we are focusing on the fees FPS estimates it will  collect for the security services it provides to tenant agencies. For  example, in fiscal year 2008, FPS estimates collections will total about  $230 million, of which $187 million will be from its basic security services,  $23 million from building specific services, and $20 million from SWAs, as  shown in figure 3.
section_title: FPS’s Ability to Accomplish Its Mission Is Hampered by Operational Challenges and Its Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges
paragraphs: FPS currently faces several operational challenges, such as a decrease in  staff, that make it difficult to accomplish its facility protection mission.  This decrease in staff has affected FPS’s ability to provide mission-critical  services such as proactive patrol, contract guard oversight, and quality  BSAs in a timely manner. FPS is taking steps to address these challenges.  For example, FPS is moving to an inspector-based workforce, hiring 150  additional inspectors, and developing a new system to improve the quality  and timeliness of BSAs. However, these actions may not fully resolve  FPS’s operational challenges.
subsections: section_title: FPS’s Staff Has Steadily Declined Since Transferring to DHS
paragraphs: Providing law enforcement and physical security services to GSA facilities  is inherently labor intensive and requires effective management of  available staffing resources. However, since transferring from GSA to  DHS, FPS’s staff has declined and the agency has managed its staffing  resources in a manner that has diminished security at GSA facilities and  increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks at many GSA facilities.  Specifically, FPS’s staff has decreased by about 20 percent, from almost  1,400 employees at the end of fiscal year 2004 to about 1,100 employees at  the end of fiscal year 2007, as shown in figure 4, while the number of  buildings FPS has responsibility for has increased from approximately  8,800 to about 9,000. Over 60 percent of the decrease in staffing occurred  in fiscal year 2007, when FPS’s staff decreased by about 170 employees  because FPS offered voluntary early retirement, detailed assignments to  other ICE and DHS components, and did not replace positions that were  lost to attrition. In fiscal year 2008, FPS initially planned to reduce its staff  further. However, a provision in the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act  requires FPS to increase its staff to 1,200 by July 31, 2008. According to  FPS’s Director, the agency expects to meet this requirement. In addition,  according to the Director of FPS, in fiscal year 2010 it plans to increase its  staff to 1,450.
Between fiscal years 2004 and 2007, the number of employees in each  position also decreased, with the largest decrease occurring in the police  officer position. For example, the number of police officers decreased  from 359 in fiscal year 2004 to 215 in fiscal year 2007, and the number of  inspectors decreased from 600 in fiscal year 2004 to 541 at the end of fiscal  year 2007, as shown in figure 5.
section_title: Critical Law Enforcement Services Have Been Reduced or Eliminated
paragraphs: At many facilities FPS has eliminated proactive patrol of GSA facilities to  prevent or detect criminal violations. The FPS Policy Handbook states that  patrol should be used to prevent crime and terrorist actions and delegates  responsibility for determining the frequency and location of patrols to  FPS’s Regional Directors. The elimination of proactive patrol has a  negative effect on security at GSA facilities because law enforcement  personnel cannot effectively monitor individuals surveilling federal  buildings, inspect suspicious vehicles (including potential vehicles for  bombing federal buildings), and detect and deter criminal activity in and  around federal buildings. While the number of contract guards employed  in GSA facilities will not be decreased, most are stationed at fixed posts,  which they are not permitted to leave, and do not have arrest authority.  According to a FPS policy document, contract guards are authorized to  detain individuals. However, according to some regional officials, some  contract guards do not exercise their detention authority because of  liability concerns.
According to some FPS officials at regions we visited, not providing  proactive patrol has limited its law enforcement personnel to a reactive  force. In addition, FPS officials at several regions we visited said that  proactive patrol has, in the past, allowed its police officers and inspectors  to identify and apprehend individuals that were surveilling GSA facilities.  In contrast, when FPS is not able to patrol federal buildings, there is  increased potential for illegal entry and other criminal activity at federal  buildings. For example, in one city we visited, a deceased individual had  been found in a vacant GSA facility that was not regularly patrolled by  FPS. FPS officials stated that the deceased individual had been inside the  building for approximately 3 months.
Reports issued by multiple government entities acknowledge the  importance of proactive patrol in detecting and deterring terrorist  surveillance teams, which frequently use information such as the  placement of armed guards and proximity to law enforcement agency  stations when choosing targets and planning attacks. These sophisticated  surveillance and research techniques can be derailed by active law  enforcement patrols in and around federal facilities. According to several  inspectors and police officers in one FPS region, proactive patrol is  important in their region because, in the span of 1 year, there were 72  homicides within three blocks of a major federal office building and  because most of the crime in their area takes place after hours, when there  are no FPS personnel on duty. Tenant representatives in some regions we  visited have noticed a decline in FPS’s law enforcement presence in recent  years and believe this has negatively affected security. For example, one  tenant stated that FPS used to provide proactive patrols in the area at  night and on weekends but stopped in early 2006. Most tenant  representatives we interviewed believe that FPS’s law enforcement  function is highly valued and would like to see more police officers  patrolling their facilities.
In addition to eliminating proactive patrol, many FPS regions have  reduced their hours of operation for providing law enforcement services in  multiple locations, which has resulted in a lack of coverage when most  federal employees are either entering or leaving federal buildings or on  weekends when some facilities remain open to the public. Moreover, FPS  police officers and inspectors in two cities explained that this lack of  coverage has left some federal day care facilities vulnerable to loitering by  homeless individuals and drug users. Some FPS police officers and  inspectors also said that reducing hours has increased response time in  some locations by as much as a few hours to a couple of days, depending  on the location of the incident. For example, one consequence of reduced  hours is that some police officers often have to travel from locations in  another state in order to respond to incidents in both major metropolitan  and rural locations.
The decrease in FPS’s duty hours has jeopardized police officer and  inspector safety, as well as building security. Some FPS police officers and  inspectors said that they are frequently in dangerous situations without  any FPS backup because many FPS regions have reduced their hours of  operation and overtime. In one region, FPS officials said that a public  demonstration in a large metropolitan area required that all eight police  officers and inspectors scheduled to work during the shift be deployed to  the demonstration for crowd control. During the demonstration, however,  two inspectors had to leave the demonstration to arrest a suspect at  another facility; two more also left to respond to a building alarm. Four  FPS personnel remained to cover the demonstration, a fact that  contributed to an unsafe environment for FPS staff.
Additionally, FPS has a decreased capacity to handle situations in which a  large FPS presence is needed while maintaining day-to-day operations. For  example, during a high-profile criminal trial, approximately 75 percent of  one region’s workforce was detailed to coordinate with local law  enforcement agencies and other federal law enforcement agencies to  provide perimeter security for a courthouse, leaving few FPS police  officers and inspectors to respond to criminal incidents and other tenant  needs in the rest of the region. This problem was also reported by  inspectors in several other regions in the context of providing law  enforcement at public demonstrations and criminal trials, which can occur  frequently at some GSA facilities. According to FPS, in September 2007, it  drafted a policy that created Crisis Response Teams, which will handle  situations in which a large FPS presence is needed.
section_title: Adequate Oversight of Contract Guard Program Remains a Challenge
paragraphs: Contract guard inspections are important for several reasons, including  ensuring compliance with contract requirements, guards have up-to-date  certifications for required training including firearms or cardio pulmonary  resuscitation, and guards are completing assigned duties. FPS policy states  that guard posts should be inspected frequently, and some FPS officials  have stated that guard posts should be inspected once per month.  However, some posts are inspected less than once per year, in part  because contract guards are often posted in buildings hours or days away  from the nearest FPS inspector. For example, one area supervisor  reported guard posts that had not been inspected in 18 months, while  another reported posts that had not been inspected in over 1 year. In  another region, FPS inspectors and police officers reported that managers  told them to complete “2820” guard inspections over the telephone,  instead of in person. In addition, when inspectors do perform guard  inspections, they do not visit the post during each shift; consequently  some guard shifts may never be inspected by an FPS official. As a result,  some guards may be supervised exclusively by a representative of the  contract guard company. Moreover, in one area we visited with a large  FPS presence officials reported difficulty in getting to every post within  the required 1-month period. We obtained a copy of a contract guard  inspection schedule in one metropolitan city that showed 20 of 68 post  inspections were completed for the month.
Some tenant agencies have also noticed a decline in the level of guard  oversight in recent years and believe this has led to poor performance on  the part of some contract guards. For example, in one city, tenant  representatives in a major federal building stated that many of the tenants  complain about the quality of contract guard services because they do not  have enough guidance from FPS inspectors, and as a result, there have  been several security breaches, such as stolen property. According to  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and GSA officials in one of the  regions we visited, contract guards failed to report the theft of an FBI  surveillance trailer worth over $500,000, even though security cameras  captured the trailer being stolen while guards were on duty. The FBI did  not realize it was missing until 3 days later. Only after the FBI started  making inquiries did the guards report the theft to FPS and the FBI. During  another incident, FPS officials reported contract guards—who were  armed—taking no action as a shirtless suspect wearing handcuffs on one  wrist ran through the lobby of a major federal building while being chased  by an FPS inspector. In addition, one official reported that during an off- hours alarm call to a federal building, the official arrived to find the front  guard post empty, while the guard’s loaded firearm was left unattended in  the unlocked post. We also personally witnessed an incident in which an  individual attempted to enter a level IV facility with illegal weapons.  According to FPS policies, contract guards are required to confiscate  illegal weapons, detain and question the individual, and notify FPS. In this  instance, the weapons were not confiscated, the individual was not  detained or questioned, FPS was not notified, and the individual was  allowed to leave with the weapons.
section_title: Difficulties in Ensuring Quality and Timeliness of Building Security Assessments
paragraphs: Building security assessments, which are completed by both inspectors  and physical security specialists, are the core component of FPS’s physical  security mission. However, ensuring the quality and timeliness of them is  an area in which FPS continues to face challenges. Many inspectors in the  seven regions we visited stated that they are not provided sufficient time  to complete BSAs. For example, while FPS officials have stated that BSAs  for level IV facilities should be completed in 2 to 4 weeks, several  inspectors reported having only 1 or 2 days to complete assessments for  their buildings because of pressure from supervisors to complete BSAs as  quickly as possible. For example, 1 region is attempting to complete more  than 100 BSAs by June 30, 2008, 3 months earlier than required, because  staff will be needed to assist with a large political event in the region. In  addition, one inspector in this region reported having one day to complete  site work for six BSAs in a predominately rural state in the region. Some  regional supervisors have also found problems with the accuracy of BSAs.  One regional supervisor reported that an inspector was repeatedly  counseled and required to redo BSAs when supervisors found he was  copying and pasting from previous BSAs. Similarly, one regional  supervisor stated that in the course of reviewing a BSA for an address he  had personally visited, he realized that the inspector completing the BSA  had not actually visited the site because the inspector referred to a large  building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA.  According to FPS, the Director of FPS issued a memorandum in December   2007 emphasizing the importance of conducting BSAs in an ethical  manner.
A 2006 report prepared by ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility on  performance in one FPS region found that nearly all of the completed  BSAs were missing interviews with required stakeholders and that  Interagency Security Committee security design criteria were not used in  the assessment of a preconstruction project as required. Additionally,  several tenant agencies stated that they are using or plan to find  contractors to complete additional BSAs because of concerns with the  quality and timeliness of the assessments completed by FPS. Furthermore,  we have previously reported that several DHS components are completing  their own BSAs over and above the assessment completed by FPS because  FPS’s assessments are not always timely or lack quality. Similarly, many  facilities have received waivers from FPS to enable the agencies to  complete their own BSAs, and the lack of FPS personnel with top secret  clearances has led to an increase in the number of agencies granted  waivers for BSAs.
Some GSA and FPS officials have stated that inspectors lack the training  and physical security expertise to prepare BSAs according to the  standards. Currently, inspectors receive instructions on how to complete  BSAs as part of a 4-week course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training  Center’s Physical Security Training Program. However, many inspectors  and supervisors in the regions we visited stated that this training is  insufficient and that refresher training is necessary in order to keep  inspectors informed about emerging technology, but this refresher training  has not been provided in recent years. Regional GSA officials also stated  that they believe the physical security training provided to inspectors is  inadequate and that it has affected the quality of BSAs they receive. FPS  officials have stated the Physical Security Training Program curriculum is  currently being revised and the agency recently conducted a 1-week  physical security refresher course in one region and plans to conduct this  training in three others.
FPS’s ability to ensure the quality and timeliness of BSAs is also  complicated by challenges with the current risk assessment tool. We have  previously reported that there are three primary concerns with the FSRM  system, the tool FPS currently uses to conduct BSAs. First, it does not  allow FPS to compare risks from building to building so that security  improvements to buildings can be prioritized. Second, current risk  assessments need to be categorized more precisely. According to FPS, too  many BSAs are categorized as high or low, which does not allow for a  refined prioritization of security improvements. Third, FSRM does not  allow for tracking the implementation status of security recommendations  based on assessments.
section_title: Some Security Countermeasures Have Not Been Maintained
paragraphs: According to FPS, GSA, and tenant agency officials in the regions we  visited, some of the security countermeasures, such as security cameras,  magnetometers, and X-ray machines at some facilities, as well as some  FPS radios and BSA equipment, have been broken for months or years and  are poorly maintained. At one level IV facility, FPS and GSA officials stated  that 11 of 150 security cameras were fully functional and able to record  images. Similarly, at another level IV facility, a large camera project  designed to expand and enhance an existing camera system was put on  hold because FPS did not have the funds to complete the project. FPS  officials stated that broken cameras and other security equipment can  negate the deterrent effect of these countermeasures as well as eliminate  their usefulness as an investigative tool. For example, according to FPS, it  has investigated significant crimes at multiple level IV facilities, but the  security cameras installed in those buildings were not working properly,  preventing FPS investigators from identifying the suspects.
Complicating this issue, FPS officials, GSA officials, and tenant  representatives stated that additional countermeasures are difficult to  implement because they require approval from BSCs, which are composed  of representatives from each tenant agency who generally are not security  professionals. In some of the buildings that we visited, security  countermeasures were not implemented because BSC members cannot  agree on what countermeasures to implement or are unable to obtain  funding from their agencies. For example, a FPS official in a major  metropolitan city stated that over the last 4 years inspectors have  recommended 24-hour contract guard coverage at one high-risk building  located in a high crime area multiple times, however, the BSC is not able  to obtain approval from all its members. In addition, several FPS  inspectors stated that their regional managers have instructed them not to  recommend security countermeasures in BSAs if FPS would be  responsible for funding the measures because there is not sufficient  money in regional budgets to purchase and maintain the security  equipment.
section_title: FPS Has Taken Some Actions to Resolve Operational Challenges, but Its Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges
paragraphs: FPS is taking steps to address the operational challenges it faces. For  example, FPS is implementing a plan to move to an inspector-based  workforce, hiring 150 additional inspectors, and plans to develop and  implement a new system to improve the quality and timeliness of BSAs.  However, these actions may not fully resolve its operational challenges  because, for example, some inspectors may not be able to perform both  law enforcement and physical security duties simultaneously.
subsections: section_title: FPS Is Implementing an Inspector-Based Workforce Approach
paragraphs: In 2007, FPS decided to adopt an inspector-based workforce approach to  protect GSA facilities. According to FPS, this approach will provide it with  the capabilities and flexibility to perform law enforcement and physical  security services. Under the inspector-based workforce approach, the  composition of FPS’s workforce will change from a combination of  inspectors and police officers to mainly inspectors; FPS will place more  emphasis on physical security, such as BSAs, and less emphasis on the law  enforcement part of its mission; contract guards will continue to be the  front-line defense for protection at GSA facilities; and there will be a  continued reliance on local law enforcement. According to FPS, this  approach will allow it to focus on enforcing the Interagency Security  Committee’s security standards, complete BSAs in a timely manner,  manage the contract guard program, and test security standards. While  FPS’s current workforce includes police officers, inspectors, criminal  investigators/special agents, and support staff; police officers will be  phased out under FPS’s new approach. Inspectors will be required to  complete law enforcement activities such as patrolling and responding to  incidents at GSA facilities in addition to their physical security activities.  Special agents will continue to be responsible for conducting  investigations. According to FPS, an inspector-based workforce will help it  to achieve its strategic goals such as ensuring that its staff has the right  mix of technical skills and training needed to accomplish its mission and  building effective relationships with its stakeholders.
The inspector-based workforce approach presents some additional  challenges for FPS and may exacerbate some of its long-standing  challenges. For example, the approach does not emphasize law  enforcement responsibilities, such as proactive patrol. In addition, having  inspectors perform both law enforcement and physical security duties  simultaneously may prevent some inspectors from responding to criminal  incidents in a timely manner and patrolling federal buildings. For example,  some officials stated that if inspectors are in a meeting with tenants, it will  take them more time to get in their vehicle and drive to respond to an  incident than it would for a police officer who is already in a car or on the  street patrolling and that given the difficulty with scheduling meetings  with BSCs, inspectors may decide not to respond to a nonviolent or non- emergency situation at another facility. However, according to FPS  headquarters officials, if MegaCenter protocols are followed, this situation  will not occur because another inspector would be called to respond to  the incident.
In April 2007, a DHS official and several FPS inspectors testified before  Congress that FPS’s inspector-based workforce will require increased  reliance on state and local law enforcement agencies for assistance with  crime and other incidents at GSA facilities and that FPS would seek to  enter into memorandums of agreement with local law enforcement  agencies. However, according to FPS’s Director, the agency recently  decided not to pursue memorandums of agreement with local law  enforcement agencies, in part because of reluctance on the part of local  law enforcement officials to sign such memorandums and because 96  percent of the properties in FPS’s inventory are listed as concurrent  jurisdiction facilities where both federal and state governments have  jurisdiction over the property. Under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA),  state law may be assimilated to fill gaps in federal criminal law where the  federal government has concurrent jurisdiction with the state. For  properties with concurrent jurisdiction, both FPS and state and local law  enforcement officers and agents are authorized to enforce state laws. FPS  police officers, inspectors, and agents are also authorized by law to  enforce federal laws and regulations for the protection of persons and  property regarding property owned or occupied by the federal  government, but state and local law enforcement officials would have no  authority to enforce federal laws and regulations.
As an alternative to memorandums of agreement, according to FPS’s  Director, the agency will rely on the informal relationships that exist  between local law enforcement agencies and FPS. However, whether this  type of relationship will provide FPS with the type of assistance it will  need under the inspector-based workforce is unknown. Representatives of  seven of the eight local law enforcement agencies we visited were  unaware of decreases in FPS’s workforce or its transition to an all- inspector workforce. Officials from five of the eight local law enforcement  agencies we interviewed stated that their agencies did not have the  capacity to take on the additional job of responding to incidents at federal  buildings and stated that their departments were already strained for  resources. Many of the FPS officials in the seven regions we visited also  expressed concern about the potential lack of capacity on the part of local  law enforcement. One regional FPS official, for example, reported that  there have been incidents in which local law enforcement authorities  refused to respond to certain types of calls, especially in one of the major  cities in the region.
The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized by law to utilize the  facilities and services of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies  with the consent of the agencies when the Secretary determines it to be  economical and in the public interest. However, one local law  enforcement official stated that even if the federal government were to  reimburse the local law enforcement agency for services, the police  department would not be able to hire and train enough staff to handle the  extra responsibilities. Three local law enforcement agencies stated that  they did not know enough about FPS’s activities in the area to judge their  department’s ability to take over additional responsibility for FPS at GSA  facilities. In addition, many FPS and local law enforcement officials in the  regions we visited stated that jurisdictional authority would pose a  significant barrier to gaining the assistance of local law enforcement  agencies. Local law enforcement representatives also expressed concerns  about being prohibited from entering GSA facilities with service weapons,  especially courthouses. Similarly, local law enforcement officials in a  major U.S. city stated that they cannot make an arrest or initiate a  complaint on federal property, so they have to wait until a FPS officer or  inspector arrives. FPS officials and local law enforcement agencies have  cited confusion over the law as one reason for jurisdictional difficulties.
FPS also provides facility protection to approximately 400 properties  where the federal government maintains exclusive federal jurisdiction.  Under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the federal government has all of the  legislative authority within the land area in question and the state has no  residual police powers. The ACA also applies to properties with exclusive  federal jurisdiction, but unlike properties with concurrent jurisdiction,  state and local law enforcement officials are not authorized to enforce  state and local laws. Furthermore, like those properties with concurrent  federal jurisdiction, state and local law enforcement officials would have  no authority to enforce federal laws and regulations. Even if the Secretary  of Homeland Security utilized the facilities and services of state and local  law enforcement agencies, according to ICE’s legal counsel, state and local  law enforcement officials would only be able to assist FPS in functions  such as crowd and traffic control, monitoring law enforcement  communications and dispatch, and training.
section_title: FPS Plans to Hire Additional Inspectors
paragraphs: In the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress included a  provision requiring FPS to employ no fewer than 1,200 employees, 900 of  which must be law enforcement personnel. To comply with this  legislation, FPS is in the process of recruiting an additional 150 inspectors  to reach the mandated staffing levels. These inspectors will be assigned to  8 of FPS’s 11 regions. According to the Director of FPS, the addition of 150  inspectors to its current workforce will allow FPS to resume providing  proactive patrol and 24-hour presence based on risk and threat levels at  some facilities. However, these additional 150 inspectors will not have an  impact on the 3 regions that will not receive them. In addition, while this  increase will help FPS to achieve its mission, this staffing level is still  below the 1,279 employees that FPS had at the end of fiscal year 2006,  when, according to FPS officials, tenant agencies experienced a decrease  in service. In addition, in 2006, FPS completed a workforce study that  recommended an overall staffing level of more than 2,700, including about  1,800 uniformed law enforcement positions (inspectors and police  officers). According to this study, with 1,800 law enforcement positions  FPS could, among other things, provide 24-hour patrol in 23 metropolitan  areas, perform weekly guard post inspections, allow time for training, and  participate on BSCs.
section_title: FPS Is Developing a New System for Completing BSAs
paragraphs: FPS’s Risk Management Division is in the process of developing a new tool  referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP) to  replace its current system (FSRM) for completing BSAs. According to  FPS, a pilot version of RAMP is expected to be rolled out in fiscal year  2009. RAMP will be accessible to inspectors via a secure wireless  connection anywhere in the United States and will guide them through the  process of completing a BSA to ensure that standardized information is  collected on all GSA facilities. According to FPS, once implemented,  RAMP will provide inspectors with accurate information that will enable  them to make more informed and defensible recommendations for  security countermeasures. FPS also anticipates that RAMP will allow  inspectors to obtain information from one source, generate reports  automatically, enable the agency to track selected countermeasures  throughout their life cycle, address some issues with the subjectivity of  BSAs, and reduce the amount of time spent on administrative work by  inspectors and managers.
section_title: FPS Faces Funding Challenges, and Its Actions to Address Them Have Had Adverse Implications
paragraphs: FPS’s collections have not been sufficient to cover its projected  operational costs in recent years, and FPS has faced projected shortfalls  twice in the last 4 years. While FPS has taken actions to address these  gaps, its actions have had adverse implications, including low morale  among staff, increased attrition, and the loss of institutional knowledge as  well as difficulties in recruiting new staff. Also, FPS’s primary means of  funding its operations—the basic security fee—does not account for the  risk faced by particular buildings and, depending on that risk, the level of  service provided to tenant agencies or the cost of providing those services.
subsections: section_title: FPS’s Collections Have Not Been Sufficient to Cover Operational Costs
paragraphs: FPS funds its operations through the collection of security fees charged to  tenant agencies for security services. However, these fees have not been  sufficient to cover its operational costs in recent years. FPS has addressed  this gap in a variety of ways. When FPS was located at GSA it received  additional funding from the Federal Buildings Fund to cover the gap  between collections and costs. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the  Federal Buildings Fund provided for the approximately $140 million  difference between FPS’s collections and costs. Also, the first year after  the transfer to DHS, fiscal year 2004, FPS needed $81 million from the  Federal Buildings Fund to cover the difference between collections and  the cost of operations. While fiscal year 2004 was the last year funding  from the Federal Buildings Fund was available to support FPS, the agency  continued to experience budgetary challenges because of the gap between  operational costs and fee collections, and also because of increases in its  support costs after the transfer to DHS.
In fiscal year 2005, FPS was authorized to increase the basic security fee  from 30 cents per square foot to 35 cents per square foot, providing  approximately $15 million in additional collections. However, FPS’s  collections were projected to be $70 million short of its operational costs  that year. To make up for the projected shortfall and to avoid a potential  Anti-deficiency Act violation, FPS instituted a number of cost-saving  measures that included restricted hiring and travel, limited training and  overtime, and no employee performance awards. Similarly, in fiscal year  2006, FPS faced another projected shortfall of $57 million. To address this  projected shortfall, FPS maintained existing cost savings measures and  DHS had to transfer $29 million in emergency supplemental funding to  FPS. DHS’s Acting Undersecretary for Management stated that this  funding was necessary to avoid a shortfall in fiscal year 2006, and to  ensure that security at GSA facilities would not be jeopardized.
In fiscal year 2007, FPS continued its cost-saving measures, which resulted  in approximately $27 million in savings, and increased the basic security  fee from 35 cents per square foot to 39 cents per square foot. Because of  these actions, fiscal year 2007 was the first year that FPS did not face a  projected shortfall. However, according to a FPS memo to the DHS Chief  Financial Officer, FPS had recommended increasing the basic security fee  to 49 cents per square foot in fiscal year 2007. The memo also stated that  the increase was needed to avoid a dramatic reduction in the level of  security provided at GSA facilities. A basic security fee of 49 cents per  square foot in fiscal year 2007 would have provided approximately $30  million in additional collections, which might have negated the need to  implement cost-saving measures for that year. In addition, Booz Allen  Hamilton reported that the basic security fees for fiscal years 2006 and  2007 were too low to recover FPS’s costs of providing security and stated  that they should have been about 25 cents more per square foot, or about  60 cents per square foot. In fiscal year 2008, the basic security fee  increased to 62 cents per square foot, and FPS is projecting that the fee  will be sufficient to cover its operational costs and that it will not have to  implement any cost-saving measures, although a FPS official noted that  the loss of staff in recent years has helped decrease its operational costs.  In fiscal year 2009, FPS’s basic security fees will increase to 66 cents per  square foot, which represents the fourth time FPS has increased the basic  security fee since transferring to DHS.
section_title: FPS’s Actions to Address Budgetary Challenges Have Had Adverse Implications
paragraphs: According to FPS, its cost-saving measures have also had adverse  implications, including low morale among staff, increased attrition and the  loss of institutional knowledge, as well as difficulties in recruiting new  staff. In addition, several FPS police officers and inspectors said that  overwhelming workloads, uncertainty surrounding their job security, and  a lack of equipment have diminished morale within the agency. These  working conditions could affect the performance and safety of FPS  personnel. FPS officials said the agency has lost many of its most  experienced law enforcement staff in recent years, and several police  officers and inspectors said they were actively looking for new jobs  outside FPS. For example, FPS reports that 73 inspectors, police officers,  and physical security specialists left the agency in fiscal year 2006,  representing about 65 percent of the total attrition in the agency for that  year. Attrition rates have steadily increased from fiscal years 2004 to 2007,  as shown in figure 6. The attrition rate for the inspector position has  increased, despite FPS’s plan to move to an inspector-based workforce.  FPS officials said its cost-saving measures have helped the agency address  projected revenue shortfalls and have been eliminated in fiscal year 2008.  In addition, according to FPS, these measures will not be necessary in  fiscal year 2009 because the basic security fee was increased and staffing  has decreased.
section_title: FPS’s Basic Security Fee Does Not Account for Risk and Raises Questions about Equity
paragraphs: FPS’s primary means of funding its operations is the fee it charges tenant  agencies for basic security services, as shown in figure 7.
However, this fee does not fully account for the risk faced by particular  buildings or the level of basic security services provided, and does not  reflect the actual cost of providing services. Some of the basic security  services covered by this fee include law enforcement activities at GSA  facilities, preliminary investigations, the capture and detention of  suspects, and BSAs, among other services. In fiscal year 2008, FPS charged  62 cents per square foot for basic security and has been authorized to  increase the rate to 66 cents per square foot in fiscal year 2009. FPS  charges federal agencies the same basic security fee regardless of the  perceived threat to that particular building or agency. Although FPS  categorizes buildings according to security levels based on its assessment  of the building’s risk and size, it does not affect the security fee charged by  FPS. For example, level I facilities typically face less risk because they are  generally small storefront-type operations with a low level of public  contact, such as a small post office or Social Security Administration  office. However, these facilities are charged the same basic security fee of  62 cents per square foot as a level IV facility that has a high volume of  public contact and may contain high-risk law enforcement and intelligence  agencies and highly sensitive government records.
In addition, FPS’s basic security rate has raised questions about equity  because federal agencies are required to pay the fee regardless of the level  of service it provides or the cost of providing the service. For instance, in  some of the regions we visited, FPS officials described situations where  staff are stationed hundreds of miles from buildings under its  responsibility, with many of these buildings rarely receiving services from  FPS staff and relying mostly on local law enforcement agencies for law  enforcement services. However, FPS charges these tenant agencies the  same basic security fees as buildings in major metropolitan areas where  numerous FPS police officers and inspectors are stationed and are  available to provide security services. Consequently, FPS’s cost of  providing services is not reflected in its basic security charges. For  instance, a June 2006 FPS workload study estimating the amount of time  spent on various security services showed differences in the amount of  resources dedicated to buildings at various security levels. The study said  that FPS staff spend approximately six times more hours providing  security services to higher-risk buildings (levels III and IV buildings)  compared to lower-risk buildings (levels I and II buildings). In addition, a  2007 Booz Allen Hamilton report of FPS’s operational costs found that FPS  does not link the actual cost of providing basic security services with the  security fees it charges tenant agencies. The report recommends  incorporating a security fee that takes into account the complexity or the  level of effort of the service being performed for the higher-level security  facilities. The report states that FPS’s failure to consider the costs of  protecting buildings at varying risk levels could result in some tenants  being overcharged. We also have reported that basing government fees on  the cost of providing a service promotes equity, especially when the cost  of providing the service differs significantly among different users, as is  the case with FPS.
Changes in FPS’s security fees have also had adverse implications for  agencies, specifically the frequent late notifications about rate increases.  In the last 3 years, FPS has increased its rates but has not notified agencies  of these increases until late in the federal budget cycle. According to an  official from ICE’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer, FPS is required to  announce its basic security fee at the same time GSA announces its rent  charges, which are typically set by June 1 of the preceding year. However,  since transferring to DHS, FPS has not complied with this schedule. For  example, FPS announced that its administrative security fees for fiscal  year 2007 would increase from 8 percent to 15 percent several months  after tenant agencies received their annual appropriation for 2007. In  March of fiscal year 2008, FPS announced that the basic security fee for  fiscal year 2008 would increase from 57 cents per square foot to 62 cents  per square foot and that the increase would be retroactive. Consequently,  most tenant agencies have to fund these unexpected increases outside of  the federal budget cycle. GSA officials said this would have a significant  impact on many federal agencies, causing them to divert funds from  operational budgets to account for this unexpected increase in cost.
section_title: Several Stakeholders Have Expressed Concern about FPS’s Ability to Determine Its Costs of Providing Security Services
paragraphs: Several stakeholders have raised questions about whether FPS has an  accurate understanding of the cost of providing security at GSA facilities.  An official from ICE’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer said FPS has  experienced difficulty in estimating its costs because of inaccurate cost  data. In addition, OMB officials said they have asked FPS to develop a  better cost-accounting system in past years. The 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton  report found that FPS does not have a methodology to assign costs to its  different security activities and that it should begin capturing the cost of  providing various security services to better plan, manage, and budget its  resources. We have also previously cited problems with ICE’s and FPS’s  financial system, including problems associated with tracking  expenditures. We also have previously reported on the importance of  having accurate cost information for budgetary purposes and to set fees  and prices for services. We have found that without accurate cost  information, it is difficult for agencies to determine if fees need to be  increased or decreased, accurately measure performance, and improve  efficiency. Also, federal accounting standards and the Chief Financial  Officers Act of 1990 require agencies to maintain accurate cost data and  set standards for federal agencies that include requirements for  determining and reporting on the full costs of government services.
section_title: FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance
paragraphs: To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect GSA  facilities, FPS has identified some output measures that are a part of  OMB’s Performance Assessment Rating Tool. These measures include  determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and  are fully operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to an incident,  and the percentage of BSAs completed on time. Some of these measures  are also included in FPS’s federal facilities security index, which is used to  assess its performance. However, FPS has not developed outcome  measures to evaluate the net effect of its efforts to protect GSA facilities.  While output measures are helpful, outcome measures are also important  because they can provide FPS with broader information on program  results, such as the extent to which its decision to move to an inspector- based workforce will enhance security at GSA facilities or help identify the  security gaps that remain at GSA facilities and determine what action may  be needed to address them. The Government Performance and Results Act  requires federal agencies to, among other things, measure agency  performance in achieving outcome-oriented goals. Measuring performance  allows organizations to track the progress they are making toward their  goals and gives managers critical information on which to base decisions  for improving their progress. In addition, we and other federal agencies  have maintained that adequate and reliable performance measures are a  necessary component of effective management. We have also found that  performance measures should provide agency managers with timely,  action-oriented information in a format conducive to helping them make  decisions that improve program performance, including decisions to  adjust policies and priorities. However, FPS does not appear to be using  these key management practices to manage its security program.
FPS is also limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to  protect GSA facilities, in part because it does not have a data management  system that will allow it to provide complete and accurate information on  its security program. Without a reliable data management system, it is  difficult for FPS and others to determine the effectiveness of its efforts to  protect GSA facilities or for FPS to accurately track and monitor incident  response time, effectiveness of security countermeasures, and whether  BSAs are completed on time.
Currently, FPS primarily uses Web Records Management System  (WebRMS) and Security Tracking System (STS) to track and monitor  output measures. These output measures include FPS’s efficiency in  response to calls for law enforcement assistance; determining whether  appropriate security countermeasures have been recommended, deployed,  and are fully operational; and to what extent BSAs are completed on  time. However, FPS acknowledged that there are weaknesses with these  systems that make it difficult to accurately track and monitor these output  measures. For example, according to FPS, STS, which is used to track  security countermeasures, does not allow for tracking the implementation  status of recommended countermeasures, such as security cameras,  bollards, or X-ray machines. Without this ability, FPS has difficulty  determining whether it has mitigated the risk of GSA facilities to crime or  a terrorist attack.
In addition, according to many FPS officials at the seven regions we  visited, the data maintained in WebRMS may not be a reliable and accurate  indicator of crimes and other incidents for several reasons. First, because  FPS does not write an incident report for every incident, not all incidents  are entered in WebRMS. Second, according to FPS, there are many  incidents phoned into the MegaCenter that would not show up in WebRMS  because FPS police officers or inspectors did not complete the report.  Third, the types and definitions of prohibited items vary not only region by  region, but also building by building. For example, a can of pepper spray  may be prohibited in one building, but allowed in another building in the  same region. Standard guidelines and definitions would minimize the  amount of subjectivity that police officers and inspectors may apply when  deciding how and what types of information to enter in WebRMS. Finally,  according to FPS, having fewer police officers has decreased the total  number of crime and incident reports entered in WebRMS because there is  less time spent on law enforcement activities. The officials in one FPS  region we visited stated that 2 years ago there were 25,000 reports filed  through WebRMS. However, this year they are projecting about 10,000  reports because there are fewer FPS police officers to respond to an  incident and write a report if necessary.
FPS officials also stated that inspectors and police officers often have to  enter the same information into multiple data systems, leading to a greater  risk for human error, such as transposing numbers, affecting the accuracy  of the data. Our past work has shown that when data management systems  are not integrated and compatible, excessive use of resources and  inconsistent analysis of program results can occur.
FPS has recognized the need to improve its current data management  systems. As mentioned earlier, FPS is developing RAMP and expects it to  be fully operational in 2011. According to FPS, the development and  implementation of RAMP will provide it with an integrated system and a  set of standard guidelines to use when collecting information, such as the  types and definition of incidents and incident response times. FPS is also  planning to procure a computer-assisted dispatch system for use at its  MegaCenters, which will help to improve its ability to accurately track,  analyze, and report crime and other incidents.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Providing law enforcement and physical security support services to GSA  facilities requires effective management of available staffing and funding  resources. Since FPS transferred to DHS, its understanding of its staffing  needs has changed frequently, and it is unclear whether the agency has an  accurate estimate of the number of employees needed to achieve its  mission. While FPS has taken some actions to address the operational and  funding challenges it faces, many of these actions may not fully resolve  these challenges. For example, FPS currently is in the process of changing  to an all-inspector workforce and adding 150 inspectors to its workforce.  The additional inspectors could have a positive impact on the eight regions  where they will be assigned. However, it may not enhance FPS’s ability to  provide law enforcement services such as proactive patrol and 24-hour  response to GSA facilities. In addition, it is unclear whether FPS’s  inspector-based workforce and the additional 150 inspectors will improve  its oversight of contract guards or the quality and timeliness of BSAs. FPS  could also benefit from better aligning its staffing resources with the  agency’s goals and performance. This alignment could enable FPS to  identify gaps in security protection at GSA facilities and assign employees  to the highest-risk areas. It is also important that FPS ensure that its  decision to move to an inspector-based workforce does not hamper its  ability to protect GSA facilities. For example, FPS believes that it can rely  on the informal relationships that exist between it and local law  enforcement agencies for assistance with responding to incidents at GSA  facilities. However, local law enforcement agencies and FPS regional  officials believe that there are jurisdictional issues that need to be  clarified.
Moreover, FPS’s primary means of funding its operations—the basic  security fee—does not account for the level of risk faced by buildings and,  depending on that risk, the level of service provided or the cost of  providing security at GSA facilities. This issue raises questions about  whether some federal agencies are being overcharged by FPS. FPS also  does not have a detailed understanding of its operational costs, including  accurate information about the cost of providing its security services at  GSA facilities with different risk levels. Without this type of information,  FPS has difficulty justifying the rate of the basic security fee to its  customers. We have found that by having accurate cost information, an  organization can demonstrate its cost-effectiveness and productivity to  stakeholders, link levels of performance with budget expenditures,  provide baseline and trend data for stakeholders to compare performance,  and provide a basis for focusing an organization’s efforts and resources to  improve its performance. In addition, FPS has generally funded its  operations by using a fee-based system. However, historically and recently  FPS’s collections have not been sufficient to cover its projected  operational costs and the steps it has taken to address the projected  shortfalls have reduced staff morale and diminished security at GSA  facilities. Thus, we believe it is important that FPS assess whether the fee- based system or an alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for  funding the agency.
Given the operational and funding challenges FPS faces, it is important  that the agency develop and implement business and performance  management practices that will ensure that it is providing services  efficiently, effectively, and in accordance with risk-based management.  Having specific guidance and standards for measuring its efforts to protect  GSA facilities from the risk of terrorist attacks, crime, or related incidents  will also be beneficial to FPS. We have found that numerous federal and  private sector organizations use security-related performance measures to  help improve security, make decisions about risk management and  resource allocation, and evaluate program effectiveness. Performance  measurements can also be used to prioritize security needs and justify  investment decisions so that an agency can maximize limited resources.  While the output measures FPS uses are helpful, outcome measures are  also important because they can provide FPS with broader information on  program results, such as the extent to which its decision to move to an  inspector-based workforce will enhance security at GSA facilities or help  identify the security gaps that remain at GSA facilities and what action  may be needed to address them.
Finally, a reliable data management system will allow FPS to provide  complete and accurate information on its security program. In past  reports, we have discussed the importance of maintaining timely and  accurate data to help monitor and improve the effectiveness of  government programs. We have found that in order to make informed  decisions and ensure accountability, agencies need data management  systems that can generate timely, accurate, and useful information.  Without a reliable data management system, it is difficult for FPS and  other stakeholders to determine the effectiveness of its efforts to protect  GSA facilities or for FPS to accurately track and monitor incident  response time, effectiveness of security countermeasures, and whether  BSAs are completed on time.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve its ability to address its operational and funding challenges  and to ensure that it has useful performance measures and reliable  information to assess the effectiveness of efforts to protect GSA facilities,  we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the  Director of FPS to take the following six actions:    develop and implement a strategic approach to manage its staffing  resources that, among other things, determines the optimum number of  employees needed to accomplish its facility protection mission and  allocate these resources based on risk management principles and the  agency’s goals and performance measures;   clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies in  regard to responding to incidents at GSA facilities; improve FPS’s use of the fee-based system by developing a method to  accurately account for the cost of providing security services to tenant  agencies and ensuring that its fee structure takes into consideration the  varying levels of risk and service provided at GSA facilities;   evaluate whether FPS’s current use of a fee-based system or an alternative  funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund the agency;   develop and implement specific guidelines and standards for measuring its  performance, including outcome measures to assess its performance and  improve the accountability of FPS; and  improve how FPS categorizes, collects, and analyzes data to help it better  manage and understand the results of its efforts to protect GSA facilities.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.  DHS concurred with the report’s findings and recommendations. DHS’s  comments can be found in appendix II.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of Homeland Security, DHS’s Assistant Secretary for Immigration and  Customs Enforcement, and appropriate congressional committees. We  also will make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine any operational challenges the Federal Protective Service  (FPS) faces in protecting General Services Administration (GSA) facilities  and actions it has taken to address those challenges, we interviewed about  170 FPS police officers, inspectors, special agents, support personnel, and  administrators at headquarters and at 7 of FPS’s 11 regions. These 7  regions represent about 59 percent of FPS’s facility protection portfolio.  We also interviewed about 53 GSA headquarters and regional management  and security officials, 101 tenant agency officials from 22 building security  committees, and 8 local law enforcement agencies about FPS’s efforts to  protect federal employees, facilities, and the public. These 7 regions were  selected using both quantitative and qualitative criteria in order to  maximize diversity among the site visits. In selecting regions to visit, we  considered the number of buildings in each region, geographic dispersion  across the United States, the number of FPS personnel in each region, and  input from FPS and GSA officials. We analyzed FPS staffing data from  fiscal years 2004 through 2007 to identify trends in staffing. To validate  staffing data received from FPS, we compared the data to staffing numbers  from the Office of Personnel Management and found them to be accurate.  We also analyzed laws relating to jurisdictional issues at GSA facilities and  FPS’s authority. We analyzed a FPS workforce study, Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Professional Responsibility  performance reports, and the FPS policy handbook.
To determine any budgetary and funding challenges FPS faces and actions  it has taken to address them, we interviewed budget officials from the  Office of Management and Budget, ICE’s Office of the Chief Financial  Officer, FPS, and GSA. We analyzed appropriation acts, and FPS’s budget  and budget justifications for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. In addition, we  analyzed FPS’s 2006 workforce study and a 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton  activity-based costing study.
To determine how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts, we  analyzed FPS’s strategic plan for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 and   strategic planning and performance reports and interviewed officials from  FPS’s Risk Management Division. We also analyzed crime and incident  data from FPS’s Web Records Management System and interviewed FPS  officials about the reliability of the data. Because of inconsistency in  reporting among regions and problems with ensuring that all incidents are  included in the data, we determined that this data do not reliably capture  all crime and incidents in federal buildings.
Because of the sensitivity of some of the information in this report, we  cannot provide information about the specific locations of crime or other  incidents discussed. We conducted this performance audit from April 2007  to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Tammy Conquest, Assistant  Director; Daniel Cain; Collin Fallon; Brandon Haller, Aaron Johnson; Katie  Hamer; Carol Henn; Daniel Hoy; and Susan Michal-Smith made key  contributions to this report.