Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts
Published: 2011-06-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) protects people, information, and property at over 400 locations worldwide and has experienced a large growth in its budget and personnel over the last decade. Diplomatic Security trains its workforce and others to address a variety of threats, including crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. To meet its training needs, Diplomatic Security relies primarily on its Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC). GAO was asked to examine (1) how Diplomatic Security ensures the quality and appropriateness of its training, (2) the extent to which Diplomatic Security ensures that training requirements are being met, and (3) any challenges that Diplomatic Security faces in carrying out its training mission. GAO examined compliance with accreditation processes; analyzed data and documentation related to the agency's training efforts; and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and five overseas posts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic Security primarily adheres to Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) standards, along with other standards. Diplomatic Security incorporated FLETA standards into its standard operating procedures, using a course design framework tailored for DSTC. To meet standards, DSTC also integrates both formal and informal feedback from evaluations and other sources to improve its courses. However, GAO found DSTC's systems do not have the capability to obtain feedback for some required training, including distributed learning efforts (interactive online course content). Without feedback, DSTC is less able to ensure the effectiveness of these efforts. Diplomatic Security developed career training paths for its personnel that identify the training required for selected job positions at different career levels. It uses various systems to track participation in its training, but DSTC's systems do not have the capability to track whether personnel have completed all required training. DSTC systems also are not designed to track training delivered through distributed learning. Diplomatic Security faces significant challenges to carrying out its training mission. DSTC must train Diplomatic Security personnel to perform new missions in Iraq as they take on many of the protective and security functions previously provided by the U.S. military. DSTC also faces dramatic increases in high-threat training provided to State and non-State personnel, but State does not have an action plan and time frames to manage proposed increases. These expanded training missions constrain DSTC's ability to meet training needs. In addition, many of DSTC's training facilities do not meet its training needs, a situation that hampers efficient and effective operations. To meet some of its needs, in 2007, DSTC developed an Interim Training Facility. In 2009, State allocated funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and other acts to develop a consolidated training facility; State is in the process of identifying a suitable location.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that State enhance DSTC's course evaluation and tracking capabilities. GAO also recommends that State develop an action plan and time frames to address proposed increases in high-threat training. State reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with all of the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security  (Diplomatic Security) is responsible for the protection of people,  information, and property at over 400 foreign missions and domestic  locations. Since the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, the  scope and complexity of threats facing Americans abroad and at home  have increased. Diplomatic Security must be prepared to counter threats  such as crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological  intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. As we previously reported,  Diplomatic Security has experienced a large growth in both its budget and  personnel to meet these growing threats. Diplomatic Security’s  responsibilities are expected to further increase given the planned U.S.  troop withdrawal in Iraq.
Diplomatic Security trains its workforce of agents, investigators, Security  Protective Specialists, engineers, technicians, and couriers not only to  provide protection and counter an increasing number of threats, but also  to manage a growing number of security contracts and contractors. To  meet the training needs of its workforce, Diplomatic Security relies  primarily on its Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC), housed  within its Training Directorate. Diplomatic Security also increasingly  provides information technology security awareness training to non-State  personnel and enhanced personal security training to non-Diplomatic  Security personnel being posted to high-threat posts such as Afghanistan,  Iraq, and Pakistan, as well as Sudan, Yemen, and parts of Mexico.
In response to your request, we (1) determined how Diplomatic Security  ensures the quality and appropriateness of its training, (2) examined the  extent to which Diplomatic Security ensures that training requirements are  being met, and (3) assessed any challenges that Diplomatic Security faces  in carrying out its training mission.
To address these objectives, we reviewed past GAO reports on both  Diplomatic Security and training, Office of Personnel Management  guidance, State and other legislative and regulatory guidance and policy,  and education standards and processes of established educational  organizations. We interviewed and corresponded with a key official from  Federal Law Enforcement and Training Accreditation (FLETA). We also  reviewed and analyzed data and documentation related to Diplomatic  Security-provided training efforts, such as standard operating procedure,  planning, performance, course development, course evaluation,  accreditation, and career development documents; information and data  on recent DSTC and other Diplomatic Security-provided course offerings;  and overall funding for training from 2006 to 2011. We interviewed officials  and instructors at Diplomatic Security headquarters, several training  facilities, and several overseas posts, including Diplomatic Security agents  in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Washington, D.C., field office, and  engineers and technicians in Germany, South Africa, and Florida. We  observed classroom- and exercise-based training at several Diplomatic  Security training facilities and viewed examples of other types of DSTC- provided learning. We also interviewed officials from several other State  offices, as well as officials from the U.S. General Services Administration.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to May 2011, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains additional details about  our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The core mission of Diplomatic Security is to provide a safe and secure  environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Diplomatic Security is  one of several bureaus that report to the Undersecretary for Management  within State and contains several directorates, including Diplomatic  Security’s Training Directorate (see app. II).
To implement U.S. statute, the Diplomatic Security Training Directorate  trains or helps train Diplomatic Security’s 1,943 law enforcement agents  and investigators, 340 technical security specialist engineers and  technicians, 101 couriers, and a growing number of new Security  Protective Specialists, as well as other U.S. government personnel, and  runs several specialized programs designed to enhance Diplomatic  Security’s capabilities. In fiscal year 2010, DSTC conducted 342 sessions of  its 61 courses and trained 4,739 students.
The training directorate is headed by a senior Foreign Service Officer and  has three offices, the Offices of Training and Performance Standards,  Mobile Security Deployment (MSD), and Antiterrorism Assistance, which  do the following:    The Office of Training and Performance Standards’ mission is to train  and sustain a security workforce capable of effectively addressing law  enforcement and security challenges to support U.S. foreign policy in  the global threat environment—now and into the future. The office’s  mission has grown along with the expanding mission of Diplomatic  Security. The Office of Training and Performance Standards  encompasses DSTC and is often referred to as DSTC. The office is the  primary provider of Diplomatic Security’s training, and its entire  mission falls within the scope of this report; its efforts are the focus of  our review. The office also provides personal security training to  Diplomatic Security and non-Diplomatic Security personnel posted to  the high-threat environments, including the 5-week High Threat  Tactical (HTT) course designed for Diplomatic Security special agents  and Security Protective Specialists operating in high-threat or  hazardous environments, the 3-week Security for Non-traditional  Operating Environment (SNOE) course designed for Civilian Response  Corps and Provincial Reconstruction Team personnel operating in  remote areas, and the 1-week Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT)  course designed for all U.S. personnel under Chief of Mission authority  at high-threat posts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.
The Office of Mobile Security Deployment’s mission is to provide  security training and exercises for overseas posts, enhanced security  for overseas posts, and counterassault capability for domestic and  overseas protective security details. The first of these missions—to  provide training to U.S. government personnel and dependents at posts  abroad—falls within the scope of this report.
The Office of Antiterrorism Assistance’s mission is to build the  counterterrorism capacity of friendly governments, enhance bilateral  relationships, and increase respect for human rights. Because of its  exclusive training of non-U.S. government personnel, the Office of  Antiterrorism Assistance falls outside the scope of this report.
subsections: section_title: Growth in Diplomatic Security Training Budget and Personnel
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security’s training budget grew steadily from fiscal years 2006  to 2010—increasing from approximately $24 million in fiscal year 2006 to  nearly $70 million in fiscal year 2010 (see table 1). During this period,  Diplomatic Security’s training budget increased from 1.5 percent to 3  percent of the bureau’s total budget.
The Diplomatic Security Training Directorate is responsible for training  Diplomatic Security’s over 3,000 direct hires to carry out various security  functions (see table 2). The size of Diplomatic Security’s direct-hire  workforce has more than doubled since 1998. Recently, Diplomatic  Security’s reliance on contractors has grown to fill critical needs in high- threat posts. According to DSTC officials, they also rely on contractors to  support course development and serve as instructors in many of their  courses. In addition to training Diplomatic Security personnel, the Training  Directorate also provides training to non-State personnel supporting  embassy security functions such as the Marine Security Guards and Navy  Seabees, as well as to personnel from other federal agencies through its  high-threat training and information security awareness courses.
section_title: Diplomatic Security’s Training Development Process Generally Adheres to Standards, but Evaluation Component Has Weaknesses
paragraphs: To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic  Security primarily adheres to Federal Law Enforcement Training  Accreditation standards, along with other statutory and State standards. In  2005, Diplomatic Security incorporated the FLETA standards into its  standard operating procedures, using a course design framework tailored  for the organization. To meet the combination of FLETA and other  standards, DSTC integrates both formal and informal feedback from  evaluations and other sources into its courses. However, DSTC does not  have the systems in place to obtain feedback from its entire training  population.
subsections: section_title: Diplomatic Security Complies with Multiple Sets of Standards to Ensure Quality and Appropriateness of Its Training
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security’s training responsibilities are established by a number  of statutory standards and State Department policies. The Omnibus  Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as codified at section  4802 of title 22 of the United States Code, provided the security authorities  for the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State delegated these security  responsibilities, including law enforcement training, to Diplomatic  Security and granted it authority to establish its own training academy.  Diplomatic Security also follows policy guidance and procedures found in  State’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and its Foreign Affairs  Handbooks, which also establish Diplomatic Security’s Training  Directorate.
Diplomatic Security is accredited by and relies primarily on the standards  of the FLETA process. The FLETA Board was established in 2002 to create  and maintain a body of standards to enhance the quality of law  enforcement training and to administer an independent accreditation  process for federal law enforcement agencies. The voluntary accreditation  process provides assurance that every 3 years, the agency carries out a  systematic self-assessment to ensure the standards established by the law  enforcement community are met; each self-assessment must be verified by  FLETA’s external peer reviewers, whose findings are then reviewed by a  committee of the FLETA Board. FLETA standards are designed to  describe what must be accomplished; however, it is up to each agency to  determine how it will meet the standards. Agencies may submit  applications to have their basic agent and instructor development courses  accredited, and if they obtain accreditation for both courses, they can  apply for academy accreditation. In 2010, FLETA revised its standards.  (For more details on the FLETA process see app. III.)
Beginning in 2005, DSTC established standard operating procedures in order  to comply with FLETA and other standards. In 2005, Diplomatic Security  began hiring training professionals and created the Instructional Systems  Management division to formalize course development, instead of relying  solely on the knowledge of experienced personnel and subject matter  experts. According to DSTC officials, the formalized process resulted in  greater consistency in how courses are developed and taught. Diplomatic  Security was the first federal agency to ever receive accreditation through  the FLETA process, in 2005, and was reaccredited in 2008. (For more details  on DSTC’s accreditation results see app. IV.) DSTC is currently undergoing  a new cycle of reaccreditation. DSTC officials expressed confidence that  their courses and the academy would be reaccredited.
section_title: DSTC Uses a Training Framework to Meet Accreditation Standards and Training Needs
paragraphs: To meet accreditation standards and its training needs, DSTC uses an  industry-recognized training framework for course design and  development. According to a senior FLETA official, 44 percent of FLETA  standards are based on this training framework. The seven-phased DSTC  framework is applied to new courses or course revisions (see fig. 1 and  app. V for examples of the documents and reports created during the  different phases of the framework and hyperlinked to the figure).  Throughout the process and at each phase, DSTC involves division chiefs,  branch chiefs, subject matter experts, and its instructional staff. At the end  of each phase, a report is produced for a DSTC training advisor to  approve, before the process progresses to the next phase. The seven  phases are    Proposal phase: DSTC staff analyzes the request for development or  revision to a training course and makes recommendations to senior  management on whether to proceed.
Analysis phase: DSTC staff examines the audience, identifies job  tasks and job performance measures, selects the instructional setting,  and validates cost estimates. A task list is developed to guide initial  course development, which involves subject matter experts in verifying  the job tasks.
Design phase: DSTC staff determines the training objectives, lists  course prerequisites, identifies needed learning objectives, and  establishes the appropriate performance tests.
Development phase: DSTC staff develops the appropriate  instructional materials, reviews and selects existing course materials,  and develops the necessary coursework.
Implementation phase: A pilot course is created and taught by an  approved instructor to a targeted audience. The pilot course is tested  and observed by both subject matter experts and instructional design  staff.
Evaluation phase: DSTC staff and the students evaluate the  effectiveness of the training. DSTC conducts three types of evaluations:  1.  tier-1 evaluations of the training and the instructors by the students  shortly after taking the course,  2.  tier-2 evaluations to check extent of knowledge and skills transfer to  the students during the course, and  3.  tier-3 evaluations of the students’ ability to apply the training on the  job 6 to 12 months after training depending on when the skills are  used.
According to DSTC officials, tier-1 and tier-3 evaluations are generally  made up of survey questions with some short answers, while tier-2  evaluations involve testing students through either a practical or written  exam, or both.
Revision: Courses go through the revision process at least every 5  years, prompted and guided in part by evaluations and feedback from  students, supervisors, and other stakeholders.
DSTC applies its training framework to all courses, not just the courses for  which it seeks accreditation through the FLETA process. We previously  reported that agencies need to ensure that they have the flexibility and  capability to quickly incorporate changes into training and development  efforts when needed. According to DSTC, its training framework allows  for flexibility and supports frequent evaluation, giving Diplomatic Security  the ability to respond to changes in its mission and its customers’  requirements. Moreover, agency officials noted that because DSTC’s  training framework model is well established for developing courses,  Mobile Training Teams and Diplomatic Couriers—-both of which  provide training to meet their own organizational needs outside of DSTC— use the model as a foundation for tailoring their courses.
section_title: DSTC Uses Various Methods of Collecting Feedback
paragraphs: DSTC uses a variety of methods to collect feedback from students,  supervisors, and other stakeholders. FLETA standards and DSTC’s  standard operating procedures require DSTC to collect feedback and use  significant feedback to shape and revise courses. According to DSTC,  feedback is valued because it demonstrates the extent to which the  training is yielding the desired outcomes in performance and helps  instructional staff identify what should be modified to achieve the  outcomes more effectively. DSTC receives feedback from multiple  sources, including tier-1, tier-2, and tier-3 evaluations, as well as focus  groups, in-country visits, inspection reports, counterparts across the  government, and directives from senior officials—such as ambassadors.  For instance, following the 1998 embassy bombings, DSTC implemented  the State-convened Accountability Review Board recommendation to  enhance surveillance detection and crisis management training provided  to the Regional Security Officers.
In addition, DSTC regularly meets with other State offices and bureaus to  discuss how to maintain effective training or identify needed changes to  course material. For example, DSTC meets quarterly with the Office of  International Programs, which is responsible for managing the RSOs  posted overseas, to ensure that the basic Regional Security Officer course  materials remain relevant. HTT provides another example of course  revision. HTT was initially 39 days long but was shortened to about 27  days in response to senior management’s need to get more people  overseas faster, as well as feedback from agents indicating that they were  not extensively using certain aspects of the course such as land navigation  and helicopter training. (See the fig. 2 text box concerning revisions to the  FACT course for more examples of how feedback is incorporated into  course revisions.) On the basis of interviews with Diplomatic Security  personnel at nine posts and training sites, we found that DSTC’s overall  training was viewed as high-quality and appropriate. Diplomatic Security  personnel we interviewed generally agreed that DSTC’s training was a  significant improvement compared with the training they received prior to  DSTC’s accreditation.
section_title: DSTC’s Systems Do Not Have the Capability to Obtain Comprehensive Feedback on All Training
paragraphs: Because of difficulties obtaining satisfactory response rates for some  evaluations, identifying users of its distributed learning efforts, and  contacting non-State students, DSTC officials acknowledged that their  systems do not have the capability to obtain a comprehensive evaluation  of all of their training as required by their training framework. However,  DSTC officials said they are exploring ways to address identifying users of  its distributed learning efforts and contacting non-State students. We  previously reported that evaluating training is important and that the  agencies need to develop a systematic evaluation processes to assess the  benefits of training development efforts. According to DSTC officials, the  tier-1 response rate for most courses averages about 80-90 percent, and the  tier-3 evaluations response rate for its courses averages about 30 percent  for 6-month feedback.
DSTC officials acknowledged that they currently do not have a system in  place to identify who has accessed distributed learning and certain other  learning tools, and thus they have few effective options for soliciting  student feedback on those tools. According to DSTC officials, distributed  learning efforts are growing as part of DSTC efforts to save costs and  reach people in the field. DSTC is exploring several different ways to  deliver distributed learning efforts. For example, Diplomatic Security is  expected to provide personnel recovery training to about 20,000 people— many of whom are non-State personnel. This training will be done  primarily through online distributed learning as well as classroom  instruction. In addition to its distributed learning efforts, DSTC sends out  to posts its “Knowledge from the Field” DVDs, an information and  professional development product that includes lessons learned from  attacks and other incidents at consulates and embassies. DSTC is also  developing new interactive computer-based training simulations.  However, DSTC’s systems do not have the capability to track who is  accessing its online materials or who is accessing the DVDs. Without  knowing who to send evaluations to, DSTC cannot solicit feedback to see  if these efforts are helpful or effective.
According to DSTC officials, DSTC also has difficulty obtaining feedback  from non-State personnel, which constitute a growing portion of its  student body because of DSTC’s provision of training to multiple agencies.  For example, DSTC provides information awareness and cybersecurity  training to State, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and  National Archives and Records Administration, among others. In  addition, as noted in figure 2, the number of students taking FACT  training, which is provided to non-State personnel, has increased  significantly. While DSTC collects feedback after each lesson and course  via tier-1 evaluations and makes efforts to collect tier-3 evaluations,  according to DSTC officials, it is the responsibility of the students’ home  agencies to send out evaluations to their personnel on the training that  DSTC provides. According to DSTC officials, evaluations conducted by  other agencies are not automatically shared with DSTC. Instead, to  measure the effectiveness of its training for non-State personnel, DSTC  relies on voluntary comments from the agencies or individual students  from those agencies.
DSTC officials noted that they are pursuing access to a more robust  learning management system to address some of the difficulties with their  existing systems. Learning management systems are software applications  for the administration, documentation, tracking, and reporting of training  programs, classroom and online events, e-learning programs, and training  content. DSTC officials stated that their current suite of software,  including Microsoft Office SharePoint and several State-specific systems,  does not provide all the functionality they need to effectively evaluate all  of their courses. DSTC has increased its reliance on using Microsoft Office  SharePoint to store current learning materials for DSTC courses on its  intranet, but the software does not have an evaluation mechanism in place.
According to DSTC officials, they were interested in procuring a learning  management system that would cost about $284,000, with additional  maintenance and technical support costing about $28,500 a year. In 2009,  DSTC officials conducted a cost-benefit analysis by examining the savings  from converting two existing courses into courses delivered entirely  online. The analysis indicated that State would save about $2 million a  year in travel costs alone as well as give DSTC a number of additional  functionalities. According to DSTC, as of May 2011, its request to purchase  the system is under review, and DSTC was advised to explore FSI’s  learning management system. According to FSI and DSTC officials, DSTC  began discussions with FSI about the use of FSI’s learning management  system. FSI officials noted that FSI’s learning management system has or  can be modified to have several of the capabilities DSTC is looking for,  including the ability to limit access to specific groups (such as Diplomatic  Security personnel or non-State personnel), to distribute and evaluate  distributed learning, and to e-mail evaluations to non-State students.  According to DSTC officials, DSTC and FSI are working to create a  subdomain in FSI’s learning management system for DSTC content. They  are also discussing the process for using the learning management system  for classified material. As of May 2011, these matters are still under  discussion.
section_title: Diplomatic Security Generally Ensures That Personnel Follow Established Career Training Paths, but DSTC’s Systems Do Not Have the Capability to Track All Its Training
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security developed career training paths for its personnel that  identify the training required for each major job position at different  career levels. Using various systems, Diplomatic Security can track  instructor-led training that its personnel take. However, DSTC’s systems  do not have a way of accumulating the names of personnel who have not  taken required courses. DSTC also faces difficulties tracking everyone  who receives training through its distributed learning and its courses for  non-State personnel. However, DSTC is working to address these  difficulties.
subsections: section_title: Diplomatic Security Developed Training Requirements for Its Career Paths
paragraphs: DSTC established career training paths that specify the required training  for entry-level, midlevel, and in some cases senior-level personnel  according to their career specialty (see fig. 3, and for a description of the  specialty positions, see table 2 above). All Diplomatic Security Foreign  Service career specialists attend required State orientation for Foreign  Service personnel provided by FSI. (For additional information on training  at FSI, see our recently issued report on State training.) As they progress  from entry level to midlevel, and in some specialties to senior level,  Diplomatic Security personnel follow their career training paths. For  example, after orientation, the Security Engineering Officers take  technical and fundamental training. As the SEOs move on to midlevel  positions, they complete a variety of in-service training courses. All  midlevel and most senior-level positions require leadership and  management training provided by FSI. DSTC officials noted that all DSTC  training fulfills either a career training path requirement or some other  training requirement. For example, outside of standard training courses,  DSTC provides specialized training to meet evolving threats, such as HTT,  that is required for special agents at high-threat posts. See appendix VI for  additional details on the training requirements for different career paths.
section_title: DSTC Uses Various Systems to Track Participation in Its Training
paragraphs: DSTC uses various systems to track participation in its training. DSTC  relies on State’s Career Development and Assignments Office and its  registrar database to keep records, in addition to an internal tracker for  participants in FACT training. State’s Career Development and  Assignments office also provides career development guidance and is  responsible for ensuring that State personnel attend training required for  upcoming assignments. For example, when an agent is assigned to a high- threat post, the office checks to make sure the agent has taken the HTT  course; an agent who has not taken the course is scheduled for training,  and must complete the course prior to deploying. Both the DSTC registrar  and the Career Development and Assignments office use the Student  Training Management System to track the training completed by State  personnel. This system is State’s registrar system for maintaining  personnel training records; it records enrollments, no shows, and  completions. The Student Training Management System regularly provides  updated data directly to the Government Employee Management System,  State’s human resources management system, which populates training  information into employee personnel records. The DSTC registrar office  and State’s Career Development and Assignments office work together to  confirm completion of training before personnel move on to their next  assignment. However, if State employees need to demonstrate course  completion, they can access the Student Training Management System  online to retrieve a copy of their training record from their personal  records and print out an unofficial transcript for their supervisor;  alternatively, their supervisor can contact the DSTC registrar’s office to  verify that the student has completed the course.
The registrar database has the ability to verify personnel who have taken  high-threat training, but does not have a way of accumulating the names of  these personnel. Because State is responsible for the safety and security of  U.S. personnel under Chief of Mission authority and requires high-threat  training for all personnel at high-threat posts, DSTC officials noted that  they have instituted unofficial methods of tracking completion of the  training for those going to these posts. DSTC designed and implemented  the FACT tracker on its internal web site to log in all personnel who take  the class. The FACT tracker provides a continuously updated unofficial  document listing all personnel who have taken the FACT course—which  includes non-State students. The RSOs in high-threat posts can access the  FACT tracker to check on new arrivals to see if they have taken the  course. Those who have not completed FACT must remain within the  safety of the compound until they are sent home. DSTC officials  acknowledged that in the past—before the FACT tracker—they used  graduation photographs of FACT graduates to ensure that personnel  completed the required training. This was a flawed verification process  since students could opt out of having their photos taken. In addition to  the FACT tracker, Diplomatic Security maintains a separate spreadsheet of  over 700 agents who have taken HTT, which is always available for the  director of Diplomatic Security to consult. This enables the director to  quickly determine which agents are eligible for assignments to support  temporary needs at high-threat posts.
section_title: DSTC Is Working to Improve Its Ability to Track Required Training and Participation in Distributed Learning
paragraphs: According to DSTC officials, DSTC faces challenges in ensuring that  personnel complete all required training, particularly in tracking personnel  who use distributed learning efforts. However, DSTC has initiatives in  place to address some of these issues. The challenges stem from a  combination of factors, including training schedules that are constrained  by the lack of resources and staff. This creates an obstacle for personnel  who cannot fit the training into their work schedules or whose jobs take  priority. According to several Diplomatic Security personnel, staff often do  not have the time to take in-service training when required, in part because  of scheduling constraints. For example, staff could be on temporary duty  or travel when in-service training is offered. In addition to the costs for  travel to attend in-service training at other posts, several posts are  understaffed. According to the Diplomatic Security personnel, they often  do not have enough personnel to support the post when staff go to in- service training.
Even though DSTC relies on the Student Training Management System, the  system does not allow DSTC to effectively track who has or has not taken  what course, when, and also be able to schedule a person for the next  available course. According to DSTC officials, their system does not have  the ability to automatically identify how many people required to take a  given course have not yet taken it. Additionally, agents are required to  pass a firearms requalification every 4 months when they are posted  domestically and once a year if posted overseas. It is the agents’ and  supervisors’ responsibility to keep track when their next requalification is  due. According to DSTC officials, when agents are posted overseas at  certain posts where firearms training is restricted, they often fall behind  on their requalification because this can be completed only at a limited  number of facilities. As a result, according to Diplomatic Security officials,  some personnel fail to maintain weapons qualification, especially if they  have been overseas for a number of years.
DSTC has increased its use of distributed learning to enhance training of its  workforce, but it does not have a way to keep records of participation or  performance of personnel who take training through distributed learning.  For example, DSTC shares interactive online content on Microsoft Office  SharePoint for personnel to use, but according to DSTC officials, SharePoint  does not have a tracking mechanism to see who has accessed the content.  In another example, DSTC provides distributed learning on OC Spray (also  known as pepper spray) that is required every year. However, DSTC cannot  say for certain if its personnel have accessed the training and does not have  the systems in place to track distributed learning efforts.
DSTC is working to develop the ability to ensure that personnel complete  all required training and to keep track of who completes DSTC training  through distributed learning. DSTC officials stated that their current suite  of software systems does not include the capabilities needed to track all  their training efficiently and effectively, in particular training delivered  through distributed learning. As noted above, DSTC has begun discussions  with FSI about the possibility of using FSI’s learning management system  or procuring its own system to help DSTC improve its ability to track  training. As of May 2011, it appears that some of DSTC’s tracking and  evaluation needs may be met through FSI’s learning management system.  DSTC is in the process of working with FSI to determine how to meet  these needs.
section_title: DSTC Faces Significant Challenges to Carrying Out Its Expanded Mission
paragraphs: DSTC faces several challenges that affect its operations. In particular,  DSTC is faced with training Diplomatic Security personnel to meet their  new roles and responsibilities in Iraq as the U.S. military transfers to State  many of its protective and security functions for the U.S. diplomatic  presence. In addition to this expanded training mission, State has  proposed a fivefold increase in the amount of training DSTC provides to  non-Diplomatic Security personnel. At the same time, many of DSTC’s  training facilities pose additional challenges. DSTC lacks a consolidated  training facility of its own and therefore uses 16 different leased, rented, or  borrowed facilities at which DSTC’s training needs are not the priority.  Moreover, several of the facilities do not meet DSTC’s training needs  and/or are in need of refurbishment. According to Diplomatic Security  officials, this situation has proven inefficient; it has expanded training  times and likely increased costs. To meet some of its current needs, in  2007 DSTC developed an Interim Training Facility, and in 2009 State  allocated funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and  other acts to begin the process of building a consolidated training facility.  State is in the process of identifying a suitable location for the facility.
subsections: section_title: Expanding Diplomatic Security Missions in Iraq and Other High-Threat Posts Constrain DSTC’s Ability to Meet Training Needs
paragraphs: With the planned withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq in December  2011, Diplomatic Security is expected to assume full responsibility for  ensuring safety and security for the U.S. civilian presence. As part of its  new responsibilities, Diplomatic Security plans to add critical support  services that the U.S. military currently provides, and which Diplomatic  Security has had little or no experience in providing, including downed  aircraft recovery, explosives ordnance disposal, route clearance, and  rocket and mortar countermeasures, among others. Consequently,  Diplomatic Security is leveraging Department of Defense expertise and  equipment to build the capabilities and capacity necessary to undertake its  new missions. For example, the Department of Defense is assisting  Diplomatic Security with the operation of a sense-and-warn system to  detect and alert to artillery and mortar fire. As a result of its increased  security responsibilities, Diplomatic Security anticipates substantial use of  contractors to provide many of these specialized services. Nevertheless,  Diplomatic Security personnel will still need training in order to properly  manage and oversee those contractors and to perform those services for  which contractors are not being hired.
DSTC noted that it is following events in Iraq, seeking feedback from  Embassy Baghdad, and evaluating and updating its training programs to  ensure they remain relevant to the needs of post personnel and conditions  on the ground. To identify training needs, DSTC is collaborating with  multiple offices on various contingency plans. DSTC is a member of the  Diplomatic Security Iraq Transition Working Group. The purpose of this  working group is to identify and analyze the structural, logistical,  personnel, and training impacts of the transition on Diplomatic Security  and the Regional Security Office in Baghdad as U.S. military forces draw  down in Iraq. Additionally, DSTC is an active participant in the  Contingency Operations Working Group, whose purpose is to improve  collaboration within Diplomatic Security to support RSO operations in  Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Sudan. DSTC also is a member of  the Iraq Policy and Operations Group, chaired by State’s Bureau of Near  Eastern Affairs, and the Iraq Training Course Advisory Group, chaired by  FSI.
DSTC is developing training plans to address various contingencies arising  from anticipated Diplomatic Security personnel increases in Iraq and  introduction of new equipment. Regarding personnel increases, DSTC is  identifying resources and planning to train additional security personnel to  meet Embassy Baghdad’s goal of filling 84 Security Protective Specialist  positions and 25 new special agent positions in Iraq. High-threat courses  are also being added to accommodate additional Diplomatic Security  personnel being assigned to Iraq and other high-threat locations. For  example, an additional four HTT courses were added to the DSTC training  schedule, making a total of 13 course offerings in fiscal year 2011  compared with 9 in fiscal year 2010.
According to DSTC, it is endeavoring to meet the need for new capabilities  and equipment. DSTC, in coordination with the Diplomatic Security Mine- Resistant/Ambush Protection (MRAP) armored vehicles working group, is  developing ways to integrate MRAP training into Diplomatic Security  courses, and as of March 2011 had completed the design and development  of a training course. This effort includes acquiring an MRAP egress trainer  at the ITF in West Virginia and one at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. To  address expanding RSO air operations, DSTC acquired UH-1 and CH-46  nonflyable helicopter airframes from Cherry Point Marine Air Station in  order to improve air operations training. An additional helicopter airframe,  a CH-53, is also being acquired from the same location. For FACT  students, protective vests and helmets were obtained to better accustom  students to working conditions on the ground. Other HTT additions will  include personnel recovery, tactical communications, and tactical  operations command training. DSTC is working closely with the Iraq  Training Course Advisory Group to develop a new Iraq predeployment  immersion training course for civilian employees, as well as special agents,  which will combine both security and operational exercises. According to  Diplomatic Security officials, this training will likely increase the time  needed to get trained Diplomatic Security personnel into the field.
Despite these efforts, Diplomatic Security noted that the locations,  personnel numbers, and resources that Diplomatic Security will require in  Iraq are being finalized through the various transitional working groups  mentioned above, as well as by Embassy Baghdad and U.S. Forces-Iraq.  However, according to State’s Inspector General, Diplomatic Security does  not have the funding, personnel, experience, equipment, or training to  replicate the U.S. military’s security mission in Iraq. Similar concerns  were raised by the Commission on Wartime Contracting and a majority  report issued by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Diplomatic  Security acknowledged it is not designed to assume the military’s mission  in Iraq and will have to rely on its own resources and the assistance of the  host country to protect the U.S. mission in the absence of the funding,  personnel, equipment, and protection formerly provided by the U.S.  military. Furthermore, with clear deadlines in place for the U.S. military  departure from Iraq, delays in finalizing State’s operations in Iraq could  affect DSTC’s ability to develop and deliver any additional required  training.
subsections: section_title: Future Training Requirements May Further Strain DSTC Resources
paragraphs: In addition to the resource demands placed on DSTC by the pending  drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq, DSTC has seen a significant  increase in the number of U.S. personnel to whom it provides training,  especially high-threat training such as FACT, SNOE, and HTT (see fig. 4).  Most notable is the increase in the number of non-Diplomatic Security  personnel to whom Diplomatic Security must provide training since both  FACT and SNOE are designed for nonagents. For example, the number of  U.S. personnel taking high-threat training in fiscal year 2006 was 971. That  number more than doubled in fiscal year 2010 to 2,132.
In addition to the significant increase in students, State has levied  additional training requirements on DSTC that may further strain DSTC’s  resources. State’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review  (QDDR) stated that all personnel at high-threat posts, as well as those at  critical-threat posts, will now receive FACT training. According to  Diplomatic Security officials, this change in policy would increase the  number of posts for which FACT is required from 23 to 178, increasing the  number of students taking FACT each year from 2,132 in fiscal year 2010  to over 10,000. DSTC officials noted that they lack the capacity to handle  so many students and that current FACT classes are already filled to  DSTC’s capacity. DSTC would need to locate or build additional driving  tracks, firearms ranges, and explosives ranges, as well as obtain  instructors and other staff to support such a dramatic increase in students.  At a cost of almost $4,000 per student, not including the need to develop  additional facilities, this requirement could cost government agencies over  $30 million. The QDDR did not identify additional resources or facilities to  support this decision. According to Diplomatic Security officials, State has  not completed an action plan or established time frames to carry out the  QDDR recommendation. Given these difficulties, Diplomatic Security  officials noted that they did not see how the new requirement could be  implemented.
section_title: Existing Facilities Hamper Training Efforts and Strain Resources; However, DSTC Has Taken Interim Steps and Has Long-Term Plans to Address These Challenges
paragraphs: The Diplomatic Security Training Directorate’s three offices, including  DSTC, use 16 facilities to accomplish their training missions (see app. VII),  which DSTC officials believe is inefficient and more costly than a  consolidated training facility would be. For example, DSTC maintains a  fleet of vehicles to transport students from one training facility to another.  In 2009, DSTC officials estimated that students spent 1 week of the then 8- week HTT course in transit. According to DSTC officials, until recently the  Training Directorate used four additional facilities, including three other  military bases, but military officials at those bases decided that they could  no longer accommodate DSTC and still meet their own training needs.  This forced DSTC to find or make use of alternative training sites.
Diplomatic Security leases, rents, or borrows all the facilities it uses, and  the number of facilities in use at any given time and how they are used will  vary based on training requirements and facility availability. For example,  although Marine Corps Base Quantico is primarily used for firearms  training, Diplomatic Security also uses its ranges for land navigation and  its mock villages for scenario training with nonlethal ammunition.  According to DSTC officials, because Diplomatic Security does not own  the facilities it uses (or the land on which they are built, in the case of its  ITF), its access to some facilities may be constrained by the facility  owners. For example, Diplomatic Security uses the firearms ranges at  Marine Corps Base Quantico to train with heavier weapons that none of its  other facilities can accommodate (see fig. 5). However, according to  Diplomatic Security officials, the Marines occasionally force Diplomatic  Security to change its training schedule, sometimes with minimal notice,  which increases costs and makes it difficult for DSTC staff to meet  training objectives within the time available. DSTC noted, however, that  the Marines work with them to minimize the disruptions to Diplomatic  Security training at Marine Corps Base Quantico.
Several of the leased facilities, notably the State Annex (SA) buildings, do  not meet DSTC’s needs. For example, SA-7, in Springfield, Virginia, was  originally leased commercially in the 1970s when, according to Diplomatic  Security officials, Diplomatic Security had fewer than 500 special agents,  less than one-third of the approximately 1,900 it has now. Both SA-7 and  SA-31 are overcrowded and need various repairs, according to Diplomatic  Security officials, in part because of disputes between Diplomatic Security  and its lessor over which party is responsible for structural repairs such as  leaks in the ceiling, repairs to water pipes, and repairs to the ventilation  systems (see fig. 6 for pictures of SA-7). DSTC’s main firearms ranges are  located in these buildings, but according to DSTC officials, the ranges are  small and have some unusable firing lanes (see fig. 6). Because of the  limitations of its facilities, Diplomatic Security has had to improvise with  makeshift solutions to provide some types of training, for example, placing  tape on the floors of its garage at SA-11 to simulate walls for conducting  room-entry training (see fig. 7). DSTC officials commented that this was  not the most effective way to conduct training.
To help meet the training demands of its growing mission, DSTC has  identified alternate sites as backup training locations and used them in the  past year when other facilities could not be used to meet training  requirements. For example, the HTT course used a paintball park in 2010  when Marine Corps Base Quantico could not accommodate DSTC’s final  practical exercise. As noted below, with the increased capability at the  ITF, Diplomatic Security has been able to consolidate some functions and  reduce, but not eliminate, the need for other facilities. In April 2011,  Diplomatic Security officials stated that DSTC began firearms training and  requalifications at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center’s  Cheltenham, Maryland, facility. Diplomatic Security now has access to the  firing ranges at Cheltenham to conduct agents’ firearms requalifications, as  well as support office, classroom, and storage space—allowing them to  use the small SA-7 firing range as a backup range.
subsections: section_title: Diplomatic Security Is Developing an Interim Training Facility to Address Some Current but Not Future Needs
paragraphs: Recognizing that its existing facilities were inadequate, in 2007, according  to DSTC officials, Diplomatic Security signed a 5-year contract with one of  its lessors, Bill Scott Raceway, to fence off 12.5 acres of land and build a  modular Interim Training Facility in Summit Point, West Virginia, for  approximately $10 million (see fig. 8). The facility includes a number of  training features that Diplomatic Security needs, including a gymnasium  with mat rooms, a two-story indoor tactical maze, an indoor firing range, a  video-based firearms simulation, and a mock urban training area. As the  ITF is located on Bill Scott Raceway land, it is colocated with the facilities  Diplomatic Security leases to provide driver training, some small arms  training, bunker training, and small explosives demonstrations (see fig. 9).
Diplomatic Security acknowledged that the ITF is helping it meet several  of its training needs, including most defensive tactics training and scenario  training with nonlethal ammunition. Nevertheless, Diplomatic Security  officials noted that the ITF is only a stopgap solution with inherent  limitations and cannot meet a number of Diplomatic Security’s training  needs such as the firing of heavier weapons, the use of more powerful  explosives to train agents in incident management, and the integrated  tactical use of driving and firearms training in a mock urban environment.  The ITF also lacks space for Diplomatic Security to train its personnel for  many of the additional missions that they are expected to take over from  the U.S. military in Iraq, such as land navigation and downed aircraft  recovery, among others. In addition, the ITF lacks many of the support  services that a training academy might otherwise have, such as campus  housing; adequate classroom, office, and dining areas, and storage areas  for the explosives used in training.
section_title: Diplomatic Security Is Pursuing Construction of a Consolidated Training Facility
paragraphs: After years of unsuccessful funding efforts, in 2009 State allocated $118.1  million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and Worldwide  Security and Protection funds to acquire a site for, design, and build the  Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC), a consolidated training  facility (see table 3). State began the search for a dedicated training facility  in 1993 and revisited the need in 1998 following the embassy bombings in  Africa prior to developing the Interim Training Facility. In 2004, State  received funding to develop the Center for Antiterrorism and Security  Training. In 2006, when the plans for locating such a center at Aberdeen  Proving Ground were not successful, the development of CAST was  abandoned and Diplomatic Security sought guidance from State’s legal  office. According to Diplomatic Security officials, based on the legislative  language, State’s legal office stated that no specific site was indicated.  Therefore, according to officials, based on Diplomatic Security’s critical  need for an antiterrorism training center, the funds could be spent on a  temporary facility. Consequently, the remaining funds were used to  expand Diplomatic Security’s use of the Bill Scott Raceway facilities and  develop the ITF. State also informed us that congressional staff were  briefed regarding the use of funds appropriated for CAST.
In June 2009, the U.S. General Services Administration announced that it  had initiated the search on behalf of State for an appropriate space to  build the FASTC, thereby initiating development of the consolidated  facility. According to State and General Services Administration officials,  State obligated approximately $10.6 million of the American Recovery and  Reinvestment Act funds on architectural planning and project  management. State obligated the remaining Recovery Act funds by  transferring them to the General Services Administration to continue the  identification and development of the FASTC. State also allocated about  $48.1 million of fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2009 supplemental  Worldwide Security and Protection funds and an additional $17.6 million  of fiscal year 2010 Worldwide Security and Protection funds, all of which  were obligated to the General Services Administration to build the FASTC.  Subsequent phases of the project are expected to be wholly funded  through Worldwide Security and Protection funds. Diplomatic Security  expects future costs to be approximately $30 million annually.  Diplomatic Security received no additional funds in the fiscal year 2011  budget, and the administration did not include additional funds in its fiscal  year 2012 budget request; nevertheless, State and the General Services  Administration continued development of the FASTC.
After going through a formalized process of identifying a location and  working with the General Services Administration, State identified a  potential location for the FASTC in Queen Anne’s County, Maryland. State  had planned to begin building by early 2011; however, on June 28, 2010,  State and the General Services Administration determined that the site  would no longer be considered, because of local concerns regarding  environmental and other land use issues that could delay the project for  several years.
State subsequently expanded its FASTC criteria, most notably increasing  the acceptable distance from Washington, D.C., and—because of a  presidential memorandum issued in June 2010 requesting that agencies try  to use existing federal land instead of purchasing new property—focusing  the search on publicly owned properties. The General Services  Administration evaluated approximately 40 sites against the revised site  criteria, which include four steps to determine the viability of the site for  placement of the FASTC project. Step 1 evaluates the site regarding public  ownership, size, the ability to support 24/7 operations, climate conditions,  and proximity to Diplomatic Security headquarters. A site that meets Step  1 criteria continues on to Step 2, which evaluates the site’s developable  area, compatible surroundings, ease of acquisition, life support and  community support, and suitable climate, and includes performing initial  test fits of the site. A site that meets Step 2 criteria will move on to Step 3,  in which a feasibility study is conducted on the site. The feasibility study  takes into consideration the mission, program requirements, phasing, risk,  cost, procurement, environmental assessment, and utilities. Step 4 of the  criteria is to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement under the  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 for the preferred site.
Two of the evaluated sites met the Step 1 criteria. One site also met Step 2  criteria, and moved on to Step 3 in which a feasibility study was  completed. The second site under consideration is currently being  evaluated under Step 2 criteria. If the site meets Step 2 criteria, the  process will continue to Step 3 and a feasibility study will be conducted.  Once both sites have been assessed, senior department officials will make  a recommendation on which site will proceed to Step 4. Environmental  studies will be conducted on the selected site, and the master plan and  construction documents will be completed. Step 4 environmental studies  are estimated to take 18 to 24 months to complete. Construction could  begin, pending funding availability, after the studies and construction  documents are complete. State officials noted that in an ideal situation  they could begin building the FASTC by the end of 2013; however, they  said it was difficult to know what environmental obstacles, if any, they  might encounter and how those obstacles might affect the FASTC’s  development.
State expects the FASTC will include state-of-the-art classrooms,  simulation and practical applications laboratories, administrative support  offices, and a fitness center to meet soft skill training needs. State plans  to construct a series of indoor and outdoor weapons firing ranges, an  explosives demonstration area, several mock urban environments  designed to simulate a variety of urban scenarios, and driving tracks to  meet its hard skill training needs. State also expects to provide various  support elements, including dormitories, a dining facility, physical fitness  facilities to include an athletic field and track, bike and jogging trails, and  on-site medical and fire emergency services. State expects to build,  enhance, or rely on existing infrastructure, such as power, potable water,  wastewater treatment, and telecommunications capabilities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. diplomats and other personnel at overseas diplomatic posts face a  growing number of threats from global terrorism to cyberattacks and, in  some countries, from constant dangers due to the violence of war or civil  unrest. To counter these growing threats, State has expanded the mission  of its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, with a corresponding rapid increase  in its staffing. As a result, DSTC has had to meet the challenge of training  more personnel to perform additional duties while still getting Diplomatic  Security’s agents, engineers, technicians, and other staff—as well as a  growing number of personnel outside of its workforce—into the field,  where they are needed. DSTC has largely met this challenge. Certain  issues, however, constrain the effectiveness of DSTC’s systems. First,  DSTC is shifting more of its training online to better serve its student  population, but does not have the systems needed to evaluate the  training’s effectiveness despite its own standards to do so. Without this  feedback, DSTC will be less able to ensure the effectiveness of and  improve the training it provides. Second, DSTC systems do not accurately  and adequately track the use of some of its training. For example, DSTC  cannot identify who has not taken required training. Consequently, DSTC  cannot be assured that all personnel are adequately trained to counter  threats to U.S. personnel, information, and property.
DSTC also faces a number of challenges as a result of an increasing  number of training missions, particularly in Iraq, and inadequate training  facilities. These challenges should be addressed strategically; however,  State’s recent effort to conduct a strategic review, the QDDR, added to  DSTC’s training missions. Specifically, the QDDR levied a requirement on  Diplomatic Security to quintuple its student body by providing FACT  training to an additional 8,000 students without addressing necessary  resources. Without an action plan and associated time frames to meet the  new requirement, it is unclear to what extent State can accomplish its  training mission and ensure the security preparedness of civilian  personnel assigned overseas.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of State  1.  develop or improve the process to obtain participant evaluations for all  of DSTC required training, including distributed learning efforts;  2.  develop or improve the process to track individual DSTC training  requirements and completion of DSTC training; and  3.  develop an action plan and associated time frames needed to carry out  the QDDR recommendation to increase the number of posts at which  FACT is required.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of State. State  provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix VIII.
State agreed with all three recommendations, and noted several steps it is  taking or is planning to take to address the recommendations. In  particular, DSTC noted that it will seek an electronic survey tool to  enhance its evaluation efforts and is exploring ways to modify existing  State computer systems to enhance its ability to track training. In addition,  Diplomatic Security is working with the other State offices to set  parameters for expanding FACT training to additional personnel. State  also noted that existing Diplomatic Security training facilities and  instructor resources are at maximum capacity, and emphasized DSTC’s  need for a consolidated training facility to meet its expanded training  mission.
We also provided relevant portions of the report to FLETA and the  General Services Administration for technical comments. We incorporated  technical comments from both agencies and State throughout the report,  as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested Members of  Congress, the Secretary of State, and relevant agency heads. In addition,  this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-4268  or mailto:fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made major contribution to this report are listed in  appendix IX.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We (1) evaluated how Diplomatic Security ensures the quality and  appropriateness of its training, (2) examined Diplomatic Security’s training  strategies for its personnel and other U.S. government personnel and how  Diplomatic Security ensures that training requirements are being met, and  (3) assessed the challenges that Diplomatic Security faces in meeting its  training mission.
To address these objectives and establish criteria, we reviewed past GAO  reports on both Diplomatic Security and training, Office of Personnel  Management guidance, State and other legislative and regulatory guidance  and policy, and education standards and processes of established  educational organizations. To understand the accreditation process to  which Diplomatic Security was subject, we obtained information from a  key official from Federal Law Enforcement and Training Accreditation.  We also reviewed and analyzed data and documentation related to  Diplomatic Security-provided training efforts, such as standard operating  procedure, planning, performance, course development, course  evaluation, accreditation, and career development documents; information  and data on recent Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC)- and other  Diplomatic Security-provided course offerings; and overall funding for  training from 2006 to 2011. To assess the reliability of registrar data for  detailing the increase in students taking high-threat courses, Diplomatic  Security training budget data, and Foreign Affairs Security Training Center  (FASTC) funding data, we discussed with Diplomatic Security officials the  quality of the data and how they were collected, and corroborated the data  by comparing them with data supplied by or interviews with other  officials. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.
We interviewed officials and instructors at Diplomatic Security  headquarters, several training facilities, and several overseas posts. Among  others, we interviewed DSTC officials, including DSTC instructors and  contractors at several training facilities and officials from all of DSTC’s  divisions and branches (see app. II). We interviewed other Diplomatic  Security Training Directorate officials, including officials from the Offices  of Mobile Security Deployment and Antiterrorism Assistance. We also  interviewed officials from the Diplomatic Courier Service. We asked a  standard set of questions through in-person and videoconference  interviews with Diplomatic Security agents in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan,  and the Washington, D.C., field office, as well as engineers and technicians  in Germany, South Africa, and Florida, to get feedback from supervisors  on the quality of their staff’s training and any unmet training needs. These  posts and offices represent a judgmental sample selected because of their  regional coverage and relatively large number of personnel compared with  that of personnel at other posts and offices. We observed a wide variety of  both classroom-based and exercise-based training at six Diplomatic  Security training facilities in Virginia and West Virginia and viewed  examples of other types of DSTC-provided learning. In addition, we  interviewed officials from State’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to discuss  their course registration and learning management systems, as well as how  they coordinate with DSTC, and States’ Career Development and  Assignment office on how it tracks training. We interviewed Diplomatic  Security officials from a variety of offices concerning the transition in Iraq,  results of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR),  and how the purchase of new security technology is coordinated with  DSTC. We also interviewed officials from State headquarters and the  General Services Administration to discuss the status of the project to  develop a consolidated training facility. We evaluated the information we  received from both documentation and interviews against the identified  criteria.
Our review focused on the efforts of the Training Directorate’s Office of  Training and Performance Standards and to a lesser extent the Training  Directorate’s Office of Mobile Security Deployment and other offices  within Diplomatic Security, such as the Diplomatic Courier Service— which has called upon the expertise of DSTC to help develop its own  training. Because the Training Directorate’s Office of Antiterrorism  Assistance provides training to non-U.S. personnel, it fell outside the scope  of our work. In addition, because we recently reviewed training provided  by FSI, this report does not include an assessment of the training that  Diplomatic Security personnel receive through FSI.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to May 2011, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Organization of the Diplomatic Security Training Center
paragraphs: The Office of Training and Performance Standards, also known as DSTC,  is the primary provider of Diplomatic Security’s training. To carry out its  mission, DSTC is organized into four divisions, each with three or four  branches (see fig. 10).
The Security and Law Enforcement Training Division consists of three  branches: Domestic Training, Overseas Training, and Special Skills.  The division is primarily responsible for training Diplomatic Security’s  agents, investigators, and Security Protective Specialists. The division  is also responsible for providing personal security training to  Diplomatic Security and non-Diplomatic Security personnel posted to  the high-threat environments, including the High Threat Tactical (HTT),  Security for Non-traditional Operating Environment (SNOE), and  Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) courses.
The Security Engineering and Computer Security Division consists of  three branches: Security Engineering, Technical Training, and  Information Assurance. The division is primarily responsible for training  Diplomatic Security’s security engineers and technicians, as well as  providing information technology security awareness training to a  number of U.S. departments and agencies such as the National Archives  and Records Administration and the Department of Homeland Security.
Instructional Systems Management ensures that the Diplomatic Security  Training Center meets independent Federal Law Enforcement Training  Accreditation (FLETA) standards by providing course needs analysis  and course design and development for both the Security and Law  Enforcement Training Division and Security Engineering and Computer  Security Division, creating and posting learning tools, obtaining and  analyzing student feedback, and providing instructor training. In  addition, Instructional Systems Management assists other offices within  Diplomatic Security, such as the Diplomatic Courier Service, with non- DSTC course development and learning tools, as needed.
Administrative and Training Support Services manages the DSTC  registrar and student records, coordinates with FSI, manages external  training, and provides a variety of other support functions such as  managing DSTC’s budget and maintaining training facilities and  equipment.
section_title: Appendix III: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation Process
paragraphs: To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic  Security relies primarily on the standards of the Federal Law Enforcement  Training Accreditation process. Generally, the process involves the five  steps summarized below (see fig. 11).  1.  Application: An agency can apply for accreditation of a program, an  academy, or both. However, a separate application must be submitted  for each program and academy. In most cases, agencies first submit  applications for their basic agent training and instructor training first.  Once those have been accredited, the agency submits an application to  have its academy accredited.  2.  Agency preparation: The agency conducts a self-assessment and gap  analysis to identify which of the FLETA standards it does not meet;  identifies corrective steps, if necessary; and reports its results to  FLETA’s Office of Accreditation.  3.  FLETA assessment: FLETA carries out its assessment. The  assessment teams visit training locations, review files documenting the  agency’s compliance with standards, observe training, and interview  administrators and trainers. If deficiencies are found during the  assessment process, the agency must prepare a corrective action plan.  The assessment team prepares the final report of the FLETA  assessment, which is submitted to the FLETA Board Review  Committee.  4.  FLETA accreditation: A FLETA Board Review Committee reviews  the findings before FLETA awards accreditation to the submitted  course, academy, or both. Afterward, the agency provides annual  updates to FLETA in order to maintain the accreditation. The updates  include information that would modify the previous submissions to  ensure continued compliance with current FLETA standards.  5.  Reaccreditation: Reaccreditation is a fresh look at a course or  academy to ensure continued compliance with the FLETA standards.  Reaccreditation occurs every 3 years. The course or academy submits  supporting evidence for each year since the previous accreditation.
FLETA thoroughly assesses the agency’s program or academy using the  FLETA guidelines and professional training standards for program and  academy accreditation. For a program to receive accreditation, an agency  must demonstrate that the program’s policies and procedures, facilities,  and resources comply with applicable FLETA standards. In general, the  academy meets the same FLETA standards as the programs, but the  standards are applied to the organization as a whole. As of 2010, agencies  applying for accreditation must provide evidence that at least five other  programs, in addition to the basic agent training and instructor  development training, comply with FLETA standards.
FLETA standards are designed to describe what must be accomplished;  however, it is up to each agency to determine how it will meet the  standards. FLETA has one set of academy standards and four sections of  program standards, which include: (1) program administration, (2) training  staff, (3) training development, and (4) training delivery. Each set or  section of standards has 7 to 23 individual standards. For example, 1  academy standard requires that the academy establish a vision, mission,  goals, and objectives, while 1 training staff standard requires that new  instructors are monitored and mentored.
A FLETA Assessment Team reviews all documented administrative  controls and supporting evidence submitted, including academy policies,  procedures, and operations, and the team also conducts interviews with  key personnel. To further support documentation, site visits are conducted  at the agency’s training facilities. Live training scenarios are also observed.
section_title: Appendix IV: DSTC Accreditation Results
paragraphs: DSTC has gone through the accreditation process for the basic special  agent and the instructor development programs and for its academy,  DSTC. In 2005, DSTC opted to have the academy accredited first—an  option no longer available under current FLETA standards. DSTC then  sought accreditation for two programs—the basic special agent course  and the instructor development course—which were accredited in 2006. In  2008, DSTC opted to have those programs and the academy go through the  accreditation process simultaneously. (See table 4.) DSTC is currently  undergoing reaccreditation for its programs and academy and expects that  this process will be completed in 2011.
section_title: Appendix V: DSTC Training Framework Example Documents and Reports
subsections: section_title: DSTC uses a seven-phase training framework for course design and development. Examples of the documents and reports created during the different phases of the framework, and hyperlinked to figure 1 on page 11, can be found below
section_title: Appendix VI: DSTC Career Training Paths by Diplomatic Security Position
subsections: section_title: Special Agents
paragraphs: Special agents are the lead operational employees of Diplomatic Security.  In general, when special agents are overseas, they manage post security  requirements; when they serve domestically, they conduct investigations  and provide protective details. New special agents follow an entry-level  career training path designed to equip them to fulfill the basic  responsibilities of the job. For example, after the 3-week orientation  provided by FSI, special agents go through the basic special agent course.  It includes about 12 weeks at the Federal Law Enforcement Training  Center and is followed by about 12 weeks of additional DSTC training.  Upon assignment to an overseas post, special agents must take the basic  Regional Security Officer course, the basic field firearms officer course,  and the security overseas seminar. If special agents are posted to a  designated high-threat post, they must also take the high-threat tactical  training course. In addition, at all career levels, depending on the post,  special agents may have to take language training.
Once special agents are in a supervisory role, both midlevel and senior- level agents have additional required training. For example, they are  required to attend FSI-provided leadership and management training. If  agents are posted to a designated high-threat post at this level, they must  take the HTT course if they have not taken HTT within the previous 5  years. Special agents are also required to take Regional Security Officer in- service training every 3 years, to keep up to date on current policies and  procedures.
In addition to following the standard special agent career path, special  agents have the option of specializing in different areas—for example, in  providing security protection and training or in focusing on investigations  into visa and passport fraud, human trafficking, smuggling, and internal  malfeasance. Each specialty has its own required training. Those opting to  specialize in security protection and training can apply to join the Mobile  Security Deployment Division (MSD) for a 3-year tour. When they become  MSD agents, special agents receive 6 months of additional training.  Similarly, those who opt to focus on investigations, becoming Assistant  Regional Security Officers-Investigators, must also take additional  training.
section_title: Security Engineering Officers (SEO)
paragraphs: Security engineers are responsible for the technical and informational  security programs at diplomatic and consular posts overseas. While both  SEOs and Security Technical Specialists (STS) share similar tasks at posts,  SEOs are expected to be more engineering and design oriented, while STS  are expected to be hands-on technicians. To become SEOs, personnel  must have specific types of engineering or technical degrees. SEO training  was recently restructured. Following the 3-week FSI-provided orientation,  SEOs go through technical training and SEO fundamentals courses for  about 107 days while assigned to a domestic office for 12 to 24 months.  SEOs also go through technical surveillance countermeasures training, in  addition to administrative training. If assigned to a technical security  overseas position, the SEO then takes the Overseas SEO training course,  which takes 25 days. During training, SEOs (if budget and resources are  available) can complete a 3- or 4-week temporary duty training program at  an Engineer Service Center or Engineer Service Office to get practical on- the-job experience. In addition, at all career levels, depending on the post,  SEOs may have to take language training.
Once SEOs achieve a supervisory role (both midlevel and senior-level  positions), they are required to take additional FSI-provided leadership  and management courses. SEOs at the midlevel are also required to take  additional in-service training, which may include a focus on computer  network and operating systems, access control systems, investigation  skills, and video surveillance systems, among others. SEOs are required to  take in-service training every 2-3 years, depending on the needs of the post  and available resources.
section_title: Security Technical Specialists
paragraphs: Security Technical Specialists are assigned throughout the world to  develop, implement, and maintain technical security programs at posts  overseas. As noted above, despite the different career paths, in practice  their work is often similar to that of the SEOs. STS generally have a  technical background. Following the 3-week FSI-provided orientation, STS  are required to take technical training and STS fundamentals at DSTC.  During training, STS (if budget and resources are available) can complete  a 3- or 4-week temporary duty training program at an Engineer Service  Center or Engineer Service Office to get practical on-the-job experience.  STS also have to take FSI-provided administrative training. In addition, at  all career levels, depending on the post, STS may have to take language  training.
Once STS achieve midlevel positions, they have additional required  training. STS are required to take FSI-provided leadership and  management training. In addition, STS are also required to take various in- service training that includes video surveillance, access control systems,  and explosives detection, among others. This is similar to the in-service  training that SEOs take. The STS career path, however, does not have  senior-level positions, so STS do not take senior-level administrative,  leadership, and management training.
section_title: Diplomatic Couriers
paragraphs: Couriers ensure the secure movement of classified U.S. government  materials across international borders. The Diplomatic Courier Service is a  small organization within Diplomatic Security whose members travel  constantly; Diplomatic Courier Service officials noted that they had unique  training challenges—particularly with regard to the travel logistics to  attend training—and have taken responsibility for training their own  personnel. Couriers first go through a 3-week orientation to the State  Department that is identical to the FSI-provided orientation but is  provided by the Diplomatic Courier Service; the new hires then undergo 3  weeks of functional introductory courier training. This is the only required  course for couriers. However, the couriers also have a midlevel courier  manager training course that prepares couriers for the manager position,  focusing on supervisory and managerial issues. In addition, the Diplomatic  Courier Service is developing its own in-service training and hub training  courses. The in-service course will act as a refresher to the initial training,  and the hub training would be a 1-day module on how overseas courier  hubs function. No additional training is required for senior-level couriers.
section_title: Appendix VII: Diplomatic Security Training Facilities
paragraphs: The Diplomatic Security Training Directorate’s three offices, including  DSTC, currently use 16 facilities to accomplish their training missions (see  table 5).
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Anthony Moran, Assistant  Director; Thomas Costa; Anh Nguyen; David Dayton; and Daniel Elbert  provided significant contributions to the work. Martin de Alteriis, Miriam  Carroll Fenton, Cheron Green, Lisa Helmer, Grace Lui, and Jamilah Moon  provided technical assistance and other support.