Space Acquisitions: Challenges Facing DOD as it Changes Approaches to Space Acquisitions
Published: 2016-03-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD is shifting its traditional approach to space acquisitions, bolstering its protection of space systems, and engaging with more commercial providers. Given the time and resource demands of DOD's space systems and today's budget environment, challenges that hinder these transitions must be addressed.
This statement focuses on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD space system acquisitions, and (2) challenges and barriers DOD faces in addressing future space-based mission needs. This statement highlights the results of GAO's work on space acquisitions over the past year and presents preliminary observations from ongoing work. We obtained comments from DOD on a draft of preliminary findings contained in this statement.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Most major space programs have experienced significant cost and schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program, a protected satellite communications system, have grown 116 percent as of our latest review, and its first satellite was launched more than 3 years late. For the Space Based Infrared System High, a missile warning satellite program, costs grew almost 300 percent and its first satellite was launched roughly 9 years late. Last year, we reported that contract costs for the Global Positioning System (GPS) ground system, designed to control on-orbit GPS satellites, had more than doubled and the program had experienced a 4-year delay. The delivery of that ground system is now estimated to be delayed another 2 years, for a cumulative 6-year delay. Some DOD officials say even that is an optimistic timeline. Though steps have been taken to improve acquisition management in space, problems with GPS show that much more work is needed, especially since DOD is considering going in new directions for space programs.
Right now, DOD is at a crossroads for space. Fiscal constraints and increasing threats—both environmental and adversarial—to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring and launching space-based capabilities, such as: disaggregating large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads; relying on commercial satellites to host government payloads; and procuring certain capabilities, such as bandwidth and ground control, as services instead of developing and deploying government-owned networks or spacecraft.
This year, GAO's work on space acquisitions continued to show that DOD faces several major challenges as it undertakes efforts to change its approaches to space acquisitions. Our work assessed a range of issues including DOD's analysis supporting its decisions on future weather satellites, space leadership, and the introduction of competition into space launch acquisitions. These and other studies surfaced several challenges:
First, though DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives to support decisions about the future of space programs, there are gaps in cost and other data needed to weigh the pros and cons of changes to space systems.
Second, most changes being considered today will impact ground systems and user equipment, but these systems continue to be troubled by management and development issues.
Third, leadership for space acquisitions is still fragmented, which will likely hamper the implementation of new acquisition approaches, especially those that stretch across satellites, ground systems and user equipment.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Past GAO reports have generally recommended that DOD adopt best practices. DOD has generally agreed and taken actions to address these recommendations. Consequently, GAO is not making any recommendations in this statement.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) space system acquisitions. DOD’s space systems  provide critical capabilities that support military and other government  operations and can take a long time to develop, produce, and launch.  These systems can also be expensive to acquire and field, amounting to  billions of dollars each year. Given the time and resource demands of  DOD’s space systems and the need to ensure taxpayer dollars are used  effectively, especially in light of today’s constrained government budget  environment, it is essential that DOD manage system acquisitions  carefully and avoid repeating past problems. Moreover, DOD is at a  crossroads with space as it is seeking to bolster its protection of space  systems, introduce changes to long-standing acquisition approaches, and  engage more with commercial providers. It is important that DOD address  barriers that stand in the way of making these transitions, such as  leadership fragmentation and lack of synchronization between satellites  and their corresponding ground acquisition programs.
My statement for the record will focus on (1) the current status and cost of  major DOD space system acquisitions, and (2) the challenges and  barriers DOD faces in addressing future space-based mission needs.  This statement is based on GAO reports issued over the past 7 years on  space programs and work performed in support of our current and past  annual weapon systems assessments; space-related work in support of  our 2015 annual report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation across  the federal government; GAO updates on cost increases, investment  trends, and improvements in the last year; and preliminary observations  from ongoing GAO work related to space system acquisition efforts.,  More information on our scope and methodology is available in our  related products. We conducted the work on which this statement is  based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. DOD provided technical  comments on preliminary findings contained in this statement, which were  incorporated as appropriate.
subsections: section_title: Status of Major Programs
paragraphs: DOD space systems support and provide a wide range of capabilities to a  large number of users, including the military services, the intelligence  community, civil agencies, and others. These capabilities include  positioning, navigation, and timing; meteorology; missile warning; and  secure communications, among others. Space systems can take a long  time to develop and often consist of multiple components, including  satellites, ground control stations, terminals, and user equipment. DOD  satellite systems are also expensive to acquire. Unit costs for current  DOD satellites can range from $500 million to over $3 billion, and ground  systems can cost as much as $3.5 billion. The cost to launch just one  satellite can climb to well over $100 million.
Most major space programs have experienced significant cost and  schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced  Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite  communications system, had grown 116 percent as of our latest review,  and its first satellite was launched over 3.5 years late. For the Space  Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High), a missile warning satellite  program, costs grew nearly 300 percent and the launch of the first  satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Last year, we reported that contract  costs for the Global Positioning System (GPS) ground system, designed  to control on-orbit GPS satellites, had more than doubled and the  program had experienced a 4-year delay. The delivery of that ground  system is now estimated to be delayed another 2 years, for a cumulative  6-year delay. Some DOD officials say even that is an optimistic timeline.
Table 1 below provides more details on the current status of DOD’s major  space programs.
Cost and schedule growth in DOD’s space programs is sometimes driven  by the inherent risks associated with developing complex space  technology; however, for at least the past 7 years we have identified a  number of other management and oversight problems that can worsen  the situation. These include overly optimistic cost and schedule  estimating, pushing programs forward without sufficient knowledge about  technology and design, and problems in overseeing and managing  contractors, among others. Some of DOD’s programs in operation were  also exceedingly ambitious, which in turn increased technology, design,  and engineering risks. While satellite programs have provided users with  important and useful capabilities, their cost growth has significantly limited  DOD’s buying power—at a time when more resources may be needed to  protect space systems and to recapitalize the space portfolio.
Since 2013, I have testified that DOD has implemented actions to  address space acquisition problems, and most of its major space  programs have transitioned into the production phase where fewer  problems tend to occur. These range from improvements to cost  estimating practices and development testing to improvements in  oversight and leadership, such as the addition of the Defense Space  Council, designed to bring together senior leaders on important issues  facing space. DOD has also started fewer new programs and even those  are less ambitious than prior efforts, which helps to reduce the risk of cost  and schedule growth. Given the problems we have identified in the GPS  program, however, it is clear that more needs to be done to improve the  management of space acquisitions. Our past work has recommended  numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we typically  see in space programs. Generally, we have recommended that DOD  separate the process of technology discovery from acquisition, follow an  incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and  requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and  demonstrable knowledge to move programs forward to next phases. We  also have identified practices related to cost estimating, program  manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array of  other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit  space programs.
section_title: Challenges in Addressing Future Needs
paragraphs: Right now, DOD is at a crossroads for space. Fiscal constraints and  increasing threats—both environmental and adversarial—to space  systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring and  launching space-based capabilities. For satellites, our reports since 2013  have described efforts such as: disaggregating large satellites into  multiple, smaller satellites or payloads; relying on commercial satellites to  host government payloads; and procuring certain capabilities, such as  bandwidth and ground control, as services instead of developing and  deploying government-owned networks or spacecraft. For space launch  this includes continuing to introduce competition into acquisitions as well  as eliminating reliance on Russian-built rocket engines. In some cases,  such as space launch, changes are being implemented. For example, as  we reported in April 2015, DOD has introduced competition into  acquisitions. In other areas, such as space-based environmental (or  weather) monitoring, decisions have just recently been made. In still  others, such as protected satellite communications and overhead  persistent infrared sensing, decisions on the way forward, including  satellite architectures, have not yet been made though alternatives have  been assessed. Figure 1 describes some changes DOD is considering in  some areas for space.
In multiple reports since our last testimony on this subject in April 2015,  our work has touched on these and other potential changes. Our reports  have specifically covered issues associated with protecting space assets,  transforming launch acquisitions, and improving purchases of commercial  satellite bandwidth, as well as the development of the GPS ground control  system and user equipment. We are also currently examining the  analysis used to support decisions on future weather system acquisitions  as well as space leadership. All of this work is summarized below.  Together, these reports highlight several major challenges facing DOD as  it undertakes efforts to change its approaches to space acquisitions. First,  though DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives to support decisions  about the future of various programs, our preliminary work suggests there  are gaps in cost and other data needed to weigh the pros and cons of  changes to space systems. Second, most changes being considered  today will impact ground systems and user equipment, but these systems  continue to be very troubled by cost and schedule overruns. Third,  leadership for space acquisitions is still fragmented, which may hamper  the implementation of changes, especially those that stretch across  satellites, ground systems and user equipment.
Space Situational Awareness Costs. According to Air Force Space  Command, U.S. space systems face intentional and unintentional  threats, which have increased rapidly over the past 20 years. These  include radio frequency interference (including jamming), laser  dazzling and blinding, kinetic intercept vehicles, and ground system  attacks. Additionally, the hazards of the already-harsh space  environment (for example, extreme temperature fluctuations and  radiation) have increased, including numbers of active and inactive  satellites, spent rocket bodies, and other fragments and debris. In  response, recent government-wide and DOD-specific strategic and  policy guidance have stressed the need for U.S. space systems to be  survivable or resilient against such threats. The government relies  primarily on DOD and the intelligence community to provide Space  Situational Awareness (SSA)—the current and predictive knowledge  and characterization of space objects and the operational  environment upon which space operations depend—to provide critical  data for planning, operating, and protecting space assets and to  inform government and military operations.
In October 2015, as mandated by the Senate Armed Services  Committee, we reported on estimated costs of SSA efforts over the  next 5 years. Specifically, we reported that the government’s  planned unclassified budget for SSA core efforts—DOD, the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) operations of  sensors, upgrades, and new developments—averages about $1  billion per year for fiscal years 2015 through 2020. Operations and  payroll accounts for about 63 percent of the core budget during fiscal  years 2015 through 2020, while investments for new sensors and  systems, as well as upgrades for existing ones, account for the rest.  Moreover, we could not report total costs since SSA is not the primary  mission for many of the sensors that perform this mission. This is  partly because DOD leverages systems that perform other missions to  conduct SSA. This is a good practice since it reduces duplication and  overlap but it makes accounting for SSA costs difficult. For example,  missile defense sensors also perform SSA missions. The Missile  Defense Agency has not determined what percentage of its budget for  operating its missile defense sensors, which averages about $538  million per year over the next several years, would be allocated to the  SSA mission. Moreover, these sensors would be procured by the  Missile Defense Agency even if they were not involved in the SSA  mission.
Responsive Launch. In light of DOD’s dramatically increased demand  and dependence on space capabilities and that operationally  responsive low cost launch could assist in addressing such needs,  DOD was required to report to the Congress on “responsive launch,”  which generally means the ability to launch space assets to their  intended orbits as the need arises, possibly to augment or reconstitute  existing space capabilities. In October 2015, we reported that DOD  did not yet have a consolidated plan for developing a responsive  launch capability since there were no formal requirements for such a  capability.
DOD and contractor officials we spoke with also highlighted several  potential challenges DOD faces as it pursues operationally responsive  launch capabilities. For example, DOD officials told us that existing  national security space program architectures (including payloads,  ground systems, user equipment, and launch systems) may need to  be modified to improve responsiveness, which could present  challenges. That is, modifying one program could have repercussions  for another, including changes to infrastructure and command and  control elements. Further, while smaller, simpler satellites may require  less time and effort to develop, build, and launch, a larger number of  satellites may be needed to provide the same level of capability, and  the transition from existing system designs could increase costs. DOD  plans to validate future responsive launch requirements as it gains  knowledge about emerging threats. Once this is done, having a single  focal point for prioritizing and developing its responsive launch  capabilities will be important, especially since different components of  DOD already have ongoing efforts in place to develop responsive  launch capabilities.
Competitive Launch Acquisition. The Air Force is working to introduce  competition into the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)  program. For almost 10 years, the EELV program had only one  company capable of providing launches. In working to introduce  competition into launch contracts, the Air Force is changing its  acquisition approach for launch services, including the amount of cost  and performance data that it plans to obtain under future launch  contracts. Given these expected changes, the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for us to  examine the advisability of requiring that launch providers establish or  maintain business systems that comply with the data requirements  and cost accounting standards of the Department of Defense. The  United Launch Alliance (ULA)—EELV’s incumbent provider—currently  provides national security space launch services under a contract with  cost-reimbursable provisions awarded using negotiated procedures.  Under this type of contract, the Air Force is able to obtain from ULA  cost and performance data from contractor business systems. The Air  Force uses this business data for a variety of purposes, including  monitoring contractor performance and identifying risks that could  affect the program’s cost, schedule, or performance. However, for at  least the first phase of future launches, the Air Force chose to change  its acquisition approach to procure launch services as a commercial  item using a firm-fixed-price contract, which will prevent the service  from collecting business data at the same level of detail. As a result,  the Air Force will have significantly less insight into program costs and  performance than what it has under the current contract with ULA,  though according to the Air Force the level of information gathered is  sufficient for monitoring launch costs in a competitive, fixed-price  environment.
In August 2015, we reported that the acquisition approach chosen for  the first competitive launches offers some benefits to the government,  including increased competition, but it could limit program oversight  and scheduling flexibility. The Air Force asserts that the use of full  and open competitive procedures in a commercial item acquisition will  increase the potential to keep more than one launch company viable.  The Air Force’s use of commercial item contracts eliminates the need  for contractors to develop the business systems associated with a  cost-reimbursement contract and generally places greater  responsibility upon the contractor for cost control. However, the Air  Force has struggled with EELV program management and lack of  oversight in the past, and removing the requirement for cost and  performance data could leave it vulnerable to similar problems in the  future in an uncertain commercial market. Also, the first competitive  contracts may limit the Air Force’s flexibility in modifying its launch  schedule, and schedule changes resulting from satellite production  delays may result in added costs. Satellite delays have historically  been an issue for the program, and the Air Force’s ability to modify  the launch schedule is an important component of the current  acquisition approach with ULA.
We also reported that the Air Force is at risk of making decisions  about future EELV acquisitions without sufficient knowledge. The Air  Force plans to develop an acquisition strategy for the next phase of  competitive launches before it has any actionable data from the first  competitive launches. In addition, the Air Force views competition as  crucial to the success of its new acquisition strategy, yet the viability  of a competitive launch industry is uncertain. The launch industry is  undergoing changes, and the ability of the domestic industry to  sustain two or more providers in the long-term, while desirable, is  unclear. Presently, there is only one company certified to compete  with ULA for national security launches, and there are no other  potential competitors in the near future. To adequately plan for future  competitions and ensure informed decision making before committing  to a strategy, it will be important for the Air Force to obtain knowledge  about its new acquisition approach and on the launch industry. The  Air Force concurred with our recommendation to ensure the next  phases incorporate lessons learned.
Purchases of commercial satellite bandwidth. DOD depends on  commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) to support a variety  of critical mission needs, from unmanned aerial vehicles and  intelligence to voice and data for military personnel. Data from fiscal  year 2011, the most recent information available, show that DOD  spent over $1 billion leasing commercial SATCOM. In prior work, we  found that some major DOD users of commercial SATCOM were  dissatisfied with the Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISA)  acquisition process, seeing it as too costly and lengthy. These users  also indicated that the contracts used were too inflexible. The Senate  Armed Services Committee’s report accompanying a bill for the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a  provision for DOD to provide a report detailing a 5-, 10-, and 25-year  strategy for using a mix of DOD and commercial satellite bandwidth,  and for us to review DOD’s acquisition strategy of the report, issued in  August 2014. In July 2015, we reported that DOD procurement of  SATCOM is fragmented and inefficient. DOD policy requires all of its  components to procure commercial SATCOM through DISA but we  found that some components were independently procuring SATCOM  to meet their individual needs. DOD’s most recent SATCOM usage  report estimates that over 30 percent of commercial SATCOM is  bought independently by DOD components, even though DOD found  the average cost of commercial SATCOM bought through DISA is  about 16 percent lower than independently bought commercial  SATCOM. Fragmentation such as this limits opportunities for DOD to  bundle purchases, share services, and streamline its procurement of  commercial SATCOM.
DOD is taking steps to improve its SATCOM procurement and  address challenges through “pathfinder” efforts aimed at identifying  short- and long-term options. For example, DOD intends to study the  potential benefits of using innovative contracting approaches as it  procures military and commercial SATCOM, and refine its  understanding of DOD’s global SATCOM requirements. However, it  may be several years before DOD is able to evaluate the results of its  pathfinder efforts. For example, all of the 10 pathfinders planned or  already underway are expected to be completed in or beyond fiscal  year 2017. DOD’s efforts to improve its procurement of military and  commercial SATCOM will also be hampered by two long-standing  challenges—lack of knowledge of what DOD is spending on  commercial SATCOM and resistance to centralized management of  SATCOM procurement. We reported on and made recommendations  to improve both in 2003. Specifically, we recommended that DOD  strengthen its capacity to provide accurate and complete analyses of  commercial bandwidth spending and implement a strategic  management framework for improving the acquisition of commercial  bandwidth. DOD generally concurred with our 2003 recommendations  and developed a plan to address them, but none of DOD’s corrective  actions were carried out as intended. These challenges are commonly  faced by organizations seeking to strategically source procurements  of services, but our work has shown they can be overcome by  employing best practices, to include conducting detailed spend  analyses and centralized management of service procurements to  identify procurement inefficiencies and opportunities.
GPS Ground System and User Equipment. In 2009, we reported that  development of space systems is not optimally aligned, and we  recently noted that development of satellites often outpaces that of  ground systems and user terminals (such as those on airplanes,  ground vehicles, and ships), leading to underutilized on-orbit satellites  and delays in getting new capabilities to end users. In some cases,  gaps in delivery can add up to years, meaning that a satellite is  launched but not effectively used for years until ground systems  become available. The reasons for the gaps in the delivery of space  system segments include funding instability, and poor acquisition  management (requirements instability, underestimation of technical  complexity, and poor contractor oversight). Our September 2015  report on GPS showed that these problems still persist. Specifically,  we reported that the Air Force awarded the contract to begin GPS  Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX) development— the command and control system for GPS III satellites—without  following key acquisition practices such as completing a preliminary  design review before development start as called for by best practices  and generally required by statute. In addition, key requirements,  particularly for cybersecurity, were not well understood by the Air  Force and contractor at the time of contract award. The contractor,  Raytheon, experienced significant software development challenges  from the onset, but the Air Force consistently presented optimistic  assessments of OCX progress to acquisition overseers. Further, the  Air Force complicated matters by accelerating OCX development to  better synchronize it with the projected completion time lines of the  GPS III satellite program, but this resulted in disruptions to the OCX  development effort.
As Raytheon continued to struggle developing OCX, the program  office paused development in late 2013 to fix what it believed were the  root causes of the development issues, and significantly increased the  program’s cost and schedule estimates. However, progress reports to  DOD acquisition leadership continued to be overly optimistic relative  to the reality of OCX problems. OCX issues appear to be persistent  and systemic, raising doubts whether all root causes have been  adequately identified, let alone addressed, and whether realistic cost  and schedule estimates have been developed. Furthermore, since we  reported in September 2015, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has directed the OCX program  to add an additional 24 months to its delivery schedule, increasing the  delay to roughly 6 years from what was estimated at contract award.  And some DOD officials believe the program could realistically need  another 2 years beyond that before the first increment of the OCX  ground system is delivered.
We also reported that the Air Force revised the Military GPS User  Equipment (MGUE) acquisition strategy several times in attempts to  develop military-code (or M-code) capability—which can help users  operate in jamming environments. Even so, the military services were  unlikely to have sufficient knowledge about MGUE design and  performance to make informed procurement decisions starting in  fiscal year 2018 because it was uncertain whether an important  design review would be conducted prior to that time and because  operational testing would still be under way. Again, GPS is not the  only program where we have seen these types of problems. AEHF  and the Mobile User Objective System have encountered significant  delays with the delivery of user equipment and the SBIRS High  ground system was not fully completed when satellites were  launched. Moreover, we have reported that these challenges could  intensify with the potentially larger numbers and novel configurations  of satellites, payloads, and other components of a disaggregated  approach.
Analysis of Alternatives for Weather Systems. DOD has been  conducting analyses of alternatives (AOA) to assist in deciding what  space assets should be acquired for its missile warning, protected  communications and environmental monitoring (weather) missions.  AOAs provide insight into the technical feasibility and costs of  alternatives and can carry significant weight in the decision-making  process, in part because they involve participation and oversight by a  diverse mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel. We testified  last year that the time frames for making decisions about the way  forward are narrowing, and if not made in time, DOD may be forced to  continue with existing approaches for its next systems. As of today,  only the weather AOA has been completed and approved by DOD.  We were required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2015 to review this particular AOA.
We are currently in the process of completing this review and expect  to issue our final report in mid-March 2016. Our preliminary findings  are that the AOA provided thorough analysis of some of the 12  capabilities identified for the assessment, but ineffective coordination  with NOAA, among other issues, imposed limitations on the analysis  of the two highest-priority capabilities—cloud characterization and  theater weather imagery. Specifically, DOD did not employ a formal  collaboration mechanism that identified roles and responsibilities for  DOD and NOAA in conducting the AOA, which contributed to DOD  making an incorrect assumption about the continued availability of  critical data from European partner satellites. As a result, the two  capabilities were not as thoroughly analyzed for potential solutions,  and they are now being re-assessed outside of the AOA process as  near-term gaps approach. We plan to recommend that DOD ensure  the leads of future planning efforts establish formal mechanisms for  coordination and collaboration with NOAA that specify roles and  responsibilities to ensure accountability for both agencies. DOD  concurred with this recommendation in its review of our draft report. A  positive aspect of the weather AOA was that DOD took a relatively  new approach to analyzing alternatives with cost-efficiency in mind,  including considering which capabilities DOD needed to provide and  which could be provided by leveraging other sources of data. This  should help DOD find cost-effective ways for meeting some of its  needs.
Space Leadership. The DOD’s space acquisition portfolio has  numerous stakeholders, including each of the military services;  intelligence community organizations; research agencies; multiple  DOD headquarters offices; civil government agencies; and the  Executive Office of the President. Over more than the last 15 years,  we have noted—along with congressional committees, and various  commissions and reviews—concern about the fragmented nature of  DOD’s space system acquisition processes and acquisition  oversight. In September 2015, we began a review based on language  in the Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 which is looking at: (1) how  DOD’s management and oversight of space system acquisitions are  structured; (2) whether past recommendations for improving this  structure have been implemented; and (3) what challenges, if any,  result from this current structure.
Our preliminary findings indicate that the structure of space system  acquisitions and oversight continues to be complicated. It involves a  large number of stakeholders, and there is no single individual, office,  or entity in place that provides oversight for the overall space program  acquisition structure. A number of commissions and study groups  have recommended substantive changes to the way the government  plans for, acquires, and manages space systems, including  centralizing planning and decision-making authority for space systems  and establishing oversight authority outside the Air Force.  Additionally, various DOD officials and experts that we spoke with  noted other problems with the process of acquiring and managing  space systems, including long acquisition timelines and extensive  review processes, decision-making authority being at too high a level,  and little long-term planning or system architecture work.
DOD does point to a recent change in DOD’s organizational structure  for space programs that attempts to mitigate these problems. The  Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Air  Force as the Principal DOD Space Advisor, with responsibility for  overseeing all defense space policies, strategies and plans, and  serving as an independent advisor on all space matters to the  Secretary of Defense and other DOD leadership. This is a new  position and its responsibilities are still being fully established  according to DOD officials; however at this point it is too early to tell  whether this position will have sufficient enforcement authority and the  extent to which it will address the leadership problems raised in the  past.
Our reviews in recent years have made a number of recommendations  aimed at putting DOD on a better footing as it considers and implements  significant changes for space programs.  For example, we recommended  that when planning for the next phase of competition for launches, the Air  Force use an incremental approach to the next acquisition strategy to  ensure that it does not commit itself to a strategy until data is available to  make an informed decision.  For purchases of commercial bandwidth, we  recommended that DOD conduct a spend analysis identifying  procurement inefficiencies and opportunities; and assess whether further  centralization of commercial SATCOM procurement could be beneficial.  DOD concurred.  It is too early to determine the extent to which DOD will  implement these and other recommendations made this year but we have  seen considerable efforts to address recommendations from other  reports.  For instance, in 2013, we recommended that future DOD  satellite acquisition programs be directed to determine a business case  for proceeding with either a dedicated or shared network for that  program’s satellite control operations and develop a department-wide  long-term plan for modernizing its Air Force Satellite Control Network and  any future shared networks and implementing commercial practices to  improve DOD satellite control networks.  DOD has taken initial steps  toward making a significant transformation in its satellite control  operations.  We look forward to assessing its plans in the near future in  response to a mandate from this Committee.
As noted earlier, we have also made numerous recommendations related  to acquisition management and our ongoing review of space leadership  will highlight what past recommendations may still be worth addressing.  Overall, it is exceedingly important that DOD address acquisition  governance and management problems in the near future. Work is  already underway on recapitalizing the space portfolio, yet fiscal  constraints and past problems have limited resources available for new  programs. Moreover, protecting space assets will likely require more  investments as well as more effective coordination.
Chairman Sessions and Ranking Member Donnelly, this concludes my  statement for the record.
section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina  Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Rich  Horiuchi, Assistant Director; Claire Buck; Maricela Cherveny; Alyssa  Weir; Emily Bond; and Oziel Trevino. Key contributors for the previous  work on which this statement is based are listed in the products cited. Key  contributors to related ongoing work include Raj Chitikila; Laura Hook;  Andrea Evans; Brenna Guarneros; Krista Mantsch; and James Tallon.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Space Acquisitions: GAO Assessment of DOD Responsive Launch  Report. GAO-16-156R. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2015.
Space Situational Awareness: Status of Efforts and Planned Budgets.  GAO-16-6R. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2015.
GPS: Actions Needed to Address Ground System Development Problems  and User Equipment Production Readiness. GAO-15-657. Washington,  D.C.: September 9, 2015.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to Adopt an  Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable  Incorporation of Lessons Learned. GAO-15-623. Washington, D.C.:  August 11, 2015.
Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to  Improve Procurements. GAO-15-459. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2015.
Space Acquisitions: Some Programs Have Overcome Past Problems, but  Challenges and Uncertainty Remain for the Future. GAO-15-492T.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2015.
Space Acquisitions: Space Based Infrared System Could Benefit from  Technology Insertion Planning. GAO-15-366. Washington, D.C.: April 2,  2015.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-15-342SP. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2015.
Defense Major Automated Information Systems: Cost and Schedule  Commitments Need to Be Established Earlier. GAO-15-282. Washington,  D.C.: February 26, 2015.
DOD Space Systems: Additional Knowledge Would Better Support  Decisions about Disaggregating Large Satellites. GAO-15-7. Washington,  D.C.: October 30, 2014.
Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but  Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs. GAO-14-382T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.
U.S. Launch Enterprise: Acquisition Best Practices Can Benefit Future  Efforts. GAO-14-776T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2014.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: Introducing Competition into  National Security Space Launch Acquisitions. GAO-14-259T.  Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2014  The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive  Procurement. GAO-14-377R. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014.  2014 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-14-343SP. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2014.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-14-340SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2014.
Space Acquisitions: Assessment of Overhead Persistent Infrared  Technology Report. GAO-14-287R. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2014.
Space: Defense and Civilian Agencies Request Significant Funding for  Launch-Related Activities. GAO-13-802R. Washington, D.C.: September  9, 2013.
Global Positioning System: A Comprehensive Assessment of Potential  Options and Related Costs is Needed. GAO-13-729. Washington, D.C.:  September 9, 2013.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but  Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments are Optimized.  GAO-13-508T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2013.
Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. GAO-13-317R.  Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2013.
Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial  Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations. GAO-13-315. Washington,  D.C.: April 18, 2013.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-13-294SP. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge  Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822. Washington, D.C.:  July 26, 2012.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of  Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. Washington, D.C.:  March 21, 2012.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but  Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. GAO-11-590T.  Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011.
Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering  Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities. GAO-11-545.  Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2011.
Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to  Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs. GAO-11-404.  Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011.
Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading  Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. Washington, D.C.: September 15,  2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System  Components. GAO-10-55. Washington D.C.: October 29, 2009.
Satellite Communications: Strategic Approach Needed for DOD’s  Procurement of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth. GAO-04-206.  Washington D.C.: December 10, 2003.
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