International Mail Security: Costs and Benefits of Using Electronic Data to Screen Mail Need to Be Assessed
Published: 2017-08-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Expanding international use of e-commerce has increased the volume of global trade, potentially increasing threats sent to the United States via international mail and express cargo. Some in Congress have called for additional measures to identify prohibited items, such as increased collection of EAD that may provide CBP with information to better focus its screening efforts by targeting mail for inspection. GAO was asked to review the security of inbound international mail.
In this report, GAO addresses, among other objectives, (1) how inbound international items are inspected as they arrive in the United States; and (2) what options exist to collect EAD and the costs and benefits of using it to target mail for inspection. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from CBP, USPS, the U.S. Department of State, and, based on 2015 inbound international volume, the three largest express consignment operators. GAO also conducted site visits to all of USPS's International Service Centers and two express consignment operators' facilities, to observe screening operations and interview officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Express consignment operators (like FedEx and DHL) and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) work with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to inspect inbound international express cargo and mail. Express consignment operators are required to provide “electronic advance data” (EAD)—such as the shipper's and recipient's name and address—for all inbound express cargo. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses this information to target inspections. USPS is not required to provide this information to CBP. Nonetheless, as of March 2017, advance data are unavailable for roughly half of inbound international mail. Although USPS and CBP have two pilot programs under way to target mail for inspection based on EAD, they have not established specific and measureable goals and therefore lack the performance targets needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the pilots. Without these performance targets, USPS and CBP are unable to make well-informed decisions about the possible expansion of these pilots in the future. While USPS officials reported in November of 2016 that they planned to expand one of the pilots, CBP officials stated that the pilot was not ready for expansion because of USPS's inability to provide 100 percent of targeted mail to CBP for inspection. USPS stated that it is working to address challenges related to identifying targeted mail within sacks containing hundreds of individual pieces of mail (see figure).
Options for collecting EAD include negotiating agreements with foreign postal operators and legally requiring EAD, but the costs and benefits of using EAD to target mail for inspection are unclear. USPS and CBP officials stated that having EAD to target mail for inspection could result in saving time and resources and increase the percentage of inspections that identify threatening items. However, USPS has not calculated the cost of collecting EAD from countries with which it has data-sharing agreements, and neither USPS nor CBP has collected the necessary information to determine the extent to which the use of EAD would provide benefits relative to current methods of choosing mail for inspection. For example, CBP has collected data on the rate of seizures per inspection for current pilot programs, but it has not collected comparable data for other screening methods it uses to target mail for inspection. As such, USPS and CBP risk spending resources on efforts that may not increase the security of inbound international mail or that may not result in sufficient improvement to justify the costs.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that CBP, in coordination with USPS: (1) establish measureable performance goals to assess pilot programs and (2) evaluate the costs and benefits of using EAD to target mail for inspection compared with other targeting methods. CBP and USPS agreed with these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States receives hundreds of millions of letters and packages  every year from all over the world. In fiscal year 2016, the U.S. Postal  Service (USPS) alone handled about 621-million pieces of international  mail bound for addressees in the United States, an increase of about 54  percent over 2012. The expanding international use of e-commerce and  the ease and expediency of cross-border transactions have resulted in a  much higher volume of global trade, as consumers are potentially  importing goods and services when they make purchases over the  internet.
While this expansion may provide increased opportunities for businesses  of all sizes to compete on a global scale, it could also increase the  potential for threats to national security, in addition to public health and  safety, because international mail and express cargo can be used to send  illegal or otherwise prohibited items to the United States. For example,  there has been a recent increase in deaths in the United States related to  the synthetic opioid fentanyl, a controlled substance, which could arrive in  the United States in international mail or express cargo. USPS and  express consignment operators—such as FedEx, DHL, and the United  Parcel Service (UPS) —play key roles in this area, as they handle  inbound international items. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  also has a critical role as the primary federal agency tasked with targeting  and inspecting suspicious inbound international items and seizing illegal  goods entering the country.
Some Members of Congress and others have called for additional  security efforts related to inbound international mail, such as increasing  the collection of electronic advance data (EAD) that may provide CBP  with information to better focus its targeting and inspection efforts. For the  purpose of this report, EAD refers to electronic data collected and shared  among postal operators (such as USPS), cargo carriers (such as those  transporting express cargo), and customs agencies (such as CBP) in  advance of the scheduled arrival of cargo (including mail and express  cargo) in the United States to identify inbound international items that  may pose a threat to the United States. These data include the sender’s  name and address, recipient’s name and address, contents’ description,  number of pieces, and total weight.
You asked us to review issues related to the security of inbound  international mail. In this report, we address:  1.  types of items CBP has seized from mail and express cargo sent to  the United States;  2.  how inbound international items are inspected as they arrive in the  3.  options to collect electronic advance data for mail and the costs and  benefits of using these data to target mail for inspection.
Specific details that are related to the screening process and foreign  postal operators and that CBP and USPS considered sensitive are not  included in this report. For the purpose of this report, we use the term  “screening” to refer to the process of identifying inbound international  items for inspection. Additionally, in referring to any item handled by  USPS—including letters and packages—we use the term “mail.” When  referring specifically to items handled by express consignment operators,  we use the term “express cargo.”
To describe the types of items CBP has seized in mail and express cargo  sent to the United States, we reviewed and analyzed CBP data on  seizures of mail and express cargo items for fiscal years 2012 through  2016 as documented in CBP’s Seized Asset and Case Tracking System  (SEACATS). Specifically, we reviewed information on fiscal year, item  description, and statute cited as the basis for the seizure. To determine  the reliability of SEACATS data for the purposes of this report, we  reviewed related documentation; conducted electronic and manual data  testing to identify missing data, outliers, and obvious errors; and  interviewed appropriate CBP officials about related internal controls and  procedures and the limitations of the data. We found these data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of providing contextual information  about the types and quantity of threats identified by CBP in inbound  international items. However, we have taken into account some  limitations of the data, as described in appendix I of this report.
To describe how inbound international items are inspected as they arrive  in the United States, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations; USPS  and CBP guidance; USPS Office of Inspector General’s reports; and  international mail agreements, including requirements set by the  Universal Postal Union (UPU). We conducted site visits to all five USPS  International Service Centers (ISC)—the facilities at which USPS receives  the majority of inbound international mail—to interview officials, observe  the CBP inspection process, and identify associated challenges. We  interviewed officials from USPS, CBP’s Office of Field Operations and its  National Targeting Center, and the Transportation Security Administration  (TSA) and representatives from the three largest express consignment  operators (based on CBP cargo volume data for fiscal year 2015): UPS,  FedEx, and DHL.
To describe changes in USPS’s inbound international volume, we  reviewed USPS data on inbound international mail volume. To determine  the reliability of volume data, we interviewed appropriate USPS officials  about the systems used to generate the data and related internal controls.  We found these data to be reliable for the purpose of describing general  trends in USPS’s inbound international mail volume. We reviewed  available reports, plans, and performance information related to pilot  programs conducted by USPS and CBP using EAD to target mail for  inspection for the period from July 2014 through January 2017 (the time  period for which data were available). To determine the reliability of  performance data related to these pilot programs, we interviewed  appropriate CBP officials about related procedures and the limitations of  the data. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  providing information on the current status of the pilots. To assess CBP’s  and USPS’s efforts related to these pilots, we compared available  documentation on the goals and performance of the pilots to federal  internal control standards related to defining program goals. We did not  assess the effectiveness of CBP’s screening efforts for inbound  international express cargo or mail because that was outside the scope of  our review.
To identify options to obtain additional EAD for inbound mail as well as  related considerations, we interviewed officials from USPS and the  Department of State and reviewed existing agreements for EAD with  foreign postal operators, UPU documents related to the collection and  sharing of EAD, and proposed federal legislation. To identify the benefits  and costs of using EAD for targeting mail for inspection, we interviewed  officials from USPS and CBP’s Office of Field Operations and its National  Targeting Center and reviewed related agency performance information and reports. To assess USPS’s and CBP’s efforts to collect and  implement EAD, we compared these efforts to GAO guidance on program  evaluation. Additional information on our research objectives, scope, and  methodology is available in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 through August  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit  to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis  for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Several federal agencies and other entities have responsibility for the  movement of inbound international mail and express cargo into the United  States. The Universal Postal Union (UPU), a United Nations specialized  agency with over 190 member countries, governs the international  movement of mail amongst member countries under the Universal Postal  Convention. The Department of State (State Department) represents the  United States, along with USPS, at the UPU Congress and other UPU  meetings, including those at which policies and requirements related to  mail security are discussed. As the designated postal operator in the  United States, USPS accepts and delivers inbound international mail on  behalf of designated postal operators around the world. Inbound  international mail generally arrives in the United States via five  international service centers (ISC) located in New York City, New York;  Miami, Florida; Los Angeles, California; San Francisco, California; and  Chicago, Illinois. Ground handlers employed by air carriers transport mail  to ISCs, where it is accepted by USPS. In general, USPS is required to  present all inbound international mail to CBP for inspection.
Express consignment operators accept items from customers in foreign  countries and transport and deliver those items in the United States. For  cargo arriving by aircraft, express consignment operators are required to  provide EAD to CBP prior to the scheduled arrival of express cargo in the  Unites States.
A number of federal agencies are responsible for screening mail and  express cargo upon arrival in the United States. Under the Department of  Homeland Security, CBP has, among other responsibilities, primary  responsibility for enforcing customs and agriculture laws and regulations  and for preventing terrorists and their weapons from entering at U.S. ports  of entry. As such, CBP operates 328 ports of entry at which it inspects  inbound cargo, including express cargo and mail, to enforce laws and  regulations while seeking to ensure the safe and efficient flow of goods  through U.S. ports of entry. CBP coordinates with other federal  agencies—including TSA, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS),  and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—to assess the compliance  of inbound items with applicable laws and regulations. For additional  information on the above entities as well as others with a role in ensuring  the security of inbound international items, see appendix II.
section_title: CBP Seizes a Variety of Inbound Items That May Pose Threats to U.S. Security
paragraphs: CBP has identified and seized a variety of inbound international items that  may pose a threat to U.S. security, health and safety, business, and  ecology. Screening and review to identify illegal and prohibited items may  occur either prior to or after the items’ arrival in the United States.
CBP’s highest priority in screening inbound international items is to  prevent terrorists and their weapons—including hazardous materials or  weapons that may threaten the safety of airline passengers and crew— from entering the United States. Generally, measures to identify these  types of threats occur prior to items arriving in the United States. For  example, in 2010, individuals located in Yemen with ties to al Qaida  attempted to ship explosive devices in express cargo on-board aircraft  destined for the United States. Those items were identified and  intercepted before reaching the United States. According to CBP, while  no additional attempted attacks of that nature have been reported since,  CBP has identified a substantial number of air cargo shipments that have  potential ties to terrorism and that therefore may represent a threat.
CBP inspects mail and express cargo arriving in the United States and  seizes illegal goods, including those that may pose threats to health and  safety, ecology, and U.S. businesses. According to data from CBP’s  Seized Asset and Case Tracking System (SEACATS), during fiscal  years 2012 through 2016 CBP conducted about 308,000 seizures of  threatening or illegal goods in inbound international items. Of those,  CBP seized about 70 percent from mail and 30 percent from express  cargo (see fig. 1). This does not necessarily indicate a higher rate of  seizures from mail compared to express cargo, as seizure rates may be  affected by differences in inbound volume among mail and express cargo, as well as differences in CBP inspection processes for each, as  discussed later in this report. Seized items are categorized in SEACATS  as either drugs or merchandise.
Drugs: Illegal or inadmissible drugs accounted for about 47 percent of  total seizures from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 and, among those, the  top 10 categories are shown in figure 2. Examples of seized drugs are  shown in figure 3.
According to testimony by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  official, a recent increase in deaths related to the synthetic opioid fentanyl  has resulted in an increased focus on identifying methods by which  traffickers bring fentanyl into the United States. In fiscal years 2012  through 2015, CBP’s seizure data reflect zero seizures of fentanyl, but  show 53 such seizures in fiscal year 2016 via both mail and express  cargo. According to CBP, a specific category code for fentanyl was added  to SEACATS in fiscal year 2016. Prior to that, seizures of fentanyl were  captured under other categories in SEACATS.
Merchandise: Merchandise accounted for about 53 percent of total  seizures in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Common categories of goods  seized were Cuban cigars, cigarettes, fraudulent identification documents,  clothing, footwear, and other counterfeit goods (see fig. 4). CBP may  seize merchandise based on several different types of violations. For  example, according to SEACATS data, Cuban cigars may violate laws  against trading with targeted foreign countries and regimes, including  Cuba. CBP generally seizes clothing, footwear, watches, and other  counterfeit goods based on laws against trademark infringement (see  examples in fig. 5).
According to USPIS and CBP officials, USPIS works with CBP to seize  fraudulent mail, such as illegal sweepstakes and lottery schemes. These  seizures are tracked in SEACATS, but do not represent a large  percentage of seizures. For example, there were approximately 2,000  seizures of illegal lottery mail reported in SEACATS from 2012 through  2016.
CBP also coordinates with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to  intercept agricultural items including plants and pests that could be  harmful to consumers or U.S. agriculture. In fiscal year 2016, CBP  reported about 170,000 such interceptions at ports of entry (including  mail, express cargo, and other cargo). However, these interceptions may  be undercounted in SEACATS. For example, CBP officials stated that if  inspection of a package containing many items results in identification of  one prohibited agricultural item, CBP would likely intercept only the  prohibited item and allow delivery of the rest of the package, so it would  not be counted as a seizure.
section_title: Express Consignment Operators and USPS Work with CBP to Inspect Inbound International Items, but USPS’s Pilot Programs Lack Assessment Plans
subsections: section_title: Express Consignment Operators Work with CBP to Screen Inbound International Items
paragraphs: Express consignment operators accept items for delivery to the United  States at points of sale in foreign countries and maintain control of items  until they are delivered to addressees in the United States. Express cargo  undergoes screening at various points as required, including before and  after it arrives in the United States. (see fig. 6).
As a result of their control over the collection of EAD, express  consignment operators are able to provide EAD to CBP at two different  stages: (1) prior to loading items on aircraft at foreign airports under the  currently voluntary Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot and (2)  prior to items’ scheduled arrival in the United States:  1.  CBP and TSA have established the Air Cargo Advance Screening  (ACAS) pilot project to receive EAD from participating air carriers on  cargo bound for the United States as a means to identify cargo that  may have a catastrophic impact on the aircraft prior to being loaded  onto that aircraft. Under the pilot, passenger air carriers, freight  forwarders, and all-cargo air carriers voluntarily send EAD for air  cargo to CBP. CBP and TSA review EAD under the ACAS pilot prior  to the cargo’s being loaded onto the aircraft and conduct analyses  only to identify threats to aviation security—not threats to, for  example, public health, ecology, and U.S. businesses. Additionally,  the ACAS pilot does not include inbound international mail.  2.  All cargo carriers, including those transporting express cargo, are  required to provide EAD to CBP for all inbound cargo arriving by  aircraft prior to its scheduled arrival in the United States.
As express consignment operators unload and process express cargo in  the United States, items are routed based on the results of CBP’s  analysis of EAD. CBP and other federal agencies each separately  determine which arriving shipment items should be inspected. Express  consignment operators scan each item as it is unloaded and, depending  on the results of the scan, route items for CBP or other inspection, for  other review including brokerage assessment, or to be processed for  delivery. CBP officials told us that analysis of EAD is only one tool among  many that help CBP identify threats in inbound international express  cargo items. For example, even with access to EAD, CBP officials stated  that they conduct random inspections in order to identify new trends.
section_title: USPS Coordinates with CBP to Screen Inbound International Mail, but Has Not Established Performance Targets for Pilot Programs
subsections: section_title: USPS and CBP Screening Processes
paragraphs: As mail arrives in the United States, USPS takes possession of the mail  and presents it to CBP for inspection. Mail undergoes screening at  various steps as required, including before and after it arrives in the  United States (see fig. 7).
At each location, CBP determines which mail it inspects based on risk  determinations made by CBP. Additionally, CBP officials may target mail  based on intelligence and characteristics resulting from past experiences  and seizures. As such, CBP officials at each ISC may use different  criteria to target and inspect different types of mail. At all five ISC  locations, USPS and CBP officials stated that they meet and  communicate regularly to discuss logistics and that they generally have a  good working relationship. For example, during the holiday season, CBP  and USPS officials coordinate to establish expanded operating hours to  accommodate the increase in mail volume.
USPS and CBP described challenges in screening mail:  Increase in Mail Volume: USPS reported a 54 percent increase in  inbound international mail volume from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year  2016, an increase that, according to USPS and CBP officials, has  presented a challenge for USPS and CBP to process and inspect  mail. USPS receives inbound mail from foreign postal operators in  various types of receptacles—including sacks and bins—that are  scanned as they are accepted at the ISCs. Each receptacle may, in  turn, contain many (in some cases hundreds) individual pieces of  mail. As shown in figure 8, for example, the ISCs may receive  thousands of large sacks of mail—transported via large pallets or  dollies—per day. USPS and CBP officials at one ISC told us that,  because the volume of mail has increased in recent years, CBP asked  USPS to sort mail in a manner that will allow CBP to focus on items  they consider to be higher risk. According to USPS officials, they are  currently developing an automated system to sort mail per CBP’s  preference, as manual sorting was too time consuming.
Presentation of Mail: The USPS Office of Inspector General (OIG)  recently found that at one ISC, USPS did not consistently present all  mail to CBP as required. CBP officials we spoke with generally said  they believe USPS is trying to follow requirements for presenting mail,  but CBP officials at two ISCs said that there are occasional lapses.  In response to the OIG’s finding, USPS management stated that they  had clarified requirements with CBP officials, issued new procedures,  and provided training and instructions for employees. Additionally,  USPS and CBP are developing a memorandum of understanding  (MOU) that is intended to detail the work methods and processing  procedures for presenting mail to CBP.  According to officials, CBP is  hopeful that the MOU will be completed by December 31, 2017.
section_title: USPS’s Efforts to Obtain EAD
paragraphs: Unlike express consignment operators, USPS is not currently required to  provide CBP with EAD for inbound international mail and does not have  control over mail prior to its arrival in the United States. Thus, USPS  relies on foreign postal operators to collect and provide EAD voluntarily or  by mutual agreement. According to USPS data, USPS received EAD for  about one third of all inbound international mail (excluding letters, flats,  and military/diplomatic mail) for the period from April 2016 through March  2017.The most recently available data for the month of March 2017  indicate that EAD was unavailable for roughly half of all inbound  international mail (excluding letters, flats, and military/diplomatic mail).
While USPS takes part in data-sharing agreements involving over 30  countries to obtain EAD for several types of mail, the agreements do not  currently cover EAD for all products or necessarily require participating  countries to provide EAD. According to USPS officials, they participate  in two types of data-sharing agreements: (1) agreements that establish  standards for, but do not require, data sharing; and (2) agreements that  establish rates for specific types of mail and require participants to  provide EAD for mail covered under the agreements. Even for products  covered under agreements that establish data-sharing requirements,  USPS does not receive EAD for all covered inbound mail. USPS stated  several reasons foreign postal operators may not share EAD for mail  covered under EAD-sharing agreements, including:
The foreign postal operator, or some of its retail outlets, may not have  the technology infrastructure to collect and transmit EAD to USPS.
The foreign postal operator has focused on providing EAD only for a  certain type of mail (such as commercial versus retail).
The costs of collecting and transmitting EAD are prohibitive or not  justified by the small amount of mail.
According to USPS officials, as foreign postal operators with which USPS  has established binding data-sharing agreements make progress in  fulfilling obligations to share EAD, USPS officials plan to monitor progress  and use appropriate contractual remedies if they determine there is a  breach of contract.
section_title: USPS’s and CBP’s Pilot Programs Lack Performance Targets
paragraphs: In 2014 and 2015, USPS and CBP initiated two pilot programs at the New  York ISC to target certain mail for inspection using some of the EAD  obtained under data-sharing agreements with foreign postal operators.  According to USPS documents, the goal of these pilots is to test the  effectiveness of placing holds on mail that has been targeted based on  EAD. Currently, CBP does not use EAD to target mail for inspection  outside of these pilots.
In the first pilot (Pilot 1), USPS agreed to provide EAD to CBP for  certain mail from a country with a small mail volume. CBP targets an  average of five pieces of mail per day for USPS to provide to CBP for  inspection.
In the second pilot (Pilot 2), USPS provides CBP with EAD on certain  mail from a country with a large mail volume, from which CBP targets  an average of 10 pieces of mail each day for USPS to locate and  provide for inspection.
According to USPS officials, when USPS employees scan either  individual targeted pieces or larger sacks containing targeted mail, they  are alerted to the CBP hold and set it aside for inspection. USPS provided  information on the implementation costs for these pilots thus far, though  further costs could be incurred as USPS identifies solutions to address  challenges: $1.8 million for information technology upgrades to exchange $75,000 annually in personnel costs related to identifying and  providing targeted mail to CBP, and $1.3 million to upgrade mail receptacle scanning technology.
Since each pilot began, USPS has made efforts to locate and provide  CBP with the targeted mail. For these pilots, CBP has collected  performance data on the percentage of targeted mail USPS has provided  for inspection as well as the percentage of inspected mail seized.  According to GAO’s analysis of available data on the percentage of  targeted mail provided for inspection:
For Pilot 1, for the period from July 2014 through January 2017 (the  time period for which these data were available), USPS provided  about 82 percent of targeted mail for inspection.
For Pilot 2, for the period from November 2015 through December of  2016 (the time period for which these data were available), USPS  provided approximately 58 percent of targeted mail for inspection.
These percentages reflect a rolling average of targeted mail provided for  inspection during this period and percentages vary substantially from  month to month. As discussed below, USPS is currently testing  methods for identifying targeted mail that may improve their ability to  provide targeted mail to CBP.
According to USPS and CBP, USPS has been unable to provide some  targeted mail for inspection because locating targeted mail once it arrives  at an ISC has been a challenge. As discussed earlier, each sack may  contain hundreds of pieces of mail that are not individually scanned upon  arrival, so locating a targeted item requires manually sorting through the  entire sack, and USPS employees may overlook the item while sorting  through the larger sack to locate targeted mail. According to USPS  officials, they are currently testing an automated method to identify  targeted mail within these larger sacks.
Another challenge that USPS officials identified in implementing the pilots  is that USPS relies on data from foreign postal operators on which pieces  of mail are contained in each sack or receptacle, which may be  inaccurate. As such, USPS may not be able to locate targeted mail  because (1) the item was actually located in a sack that had already been  processed or (2) the item is located in a sack that has not yet arrived in  the United States. USPS officials stated that if the sack containing  targeted mail is not set aside as sacks are scanned—before sacks are  opened and emptied—USPS is unlikely to identify individual pieces of  mail again until they are individually scanned; either at delivery or as they  move between post offices. According to USPS officials, they are  currently collecting data to better understand this problem.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  defining program goals in specific and measurable terms allows for the  assessment of performance toward achieving objectives. As stated by  USPS, the goal of these pilots is to test the effectiveness of placing holds  on mail that has been targeted based on EAD.
However, USPS and CBP have not defined the goal for these pilots in  specific and measurable terms. While USPS and CBP have collected  some performance information for these pilots, including the percentage  of targeted mail identified and provided to CBP, this information is not  linked to a specific performance target agreed upon by USPS and CBP— such as a specific percentage of targeted mail provided to CBP for  inspection. Further, the agencies have not conducted an analysis to  determine if the pilot programs are achieving the desired outcomes. In  November 2016, USPS officials told us they were planning to expand the  pilots to other ISCs to include additional products and mail from other  countries—and CBP headquarters officials stated that the expansion  would happen as early as that month for one ISC. However, as of  February 2017, CBP officials involved in the pilot did not agree that it was  ready for expansion based on USPS’s frequent inability to provide  targeted mail to CBP for inspection. The CBP officials estimated that to  expand the pilot, they would want USPS to be able to locate close to 100  percent of the targeted mail. CBP headquarters officials stated in June  2017 that they would consider the pilots to be successful if USPS  provided more than 95 percent of targeted mail for inspection.
Because USPS and CBP have not agreed to specific performance goals  or targets, it is difficult to make well-informed decisions regarding the  possible expansion of these pilots in the future. Without established  performance goals against which the success of the pilots are to be  evaluated, USPS and CBP may risk using resources to expand or  implement a program that may not further efforts to provide targeted mail  to CBP for inspection.
section_title: Various Options for Obtaining Electronic Advance Data Pose Trade-offs, but Costs and Benefits of Using Data Are Unclear
subsections: section_title: USPS and State Department Officials Identified Options to Obtain More Electronic Advance Data and Related Considerations
paragraphs: USPS and State Department officials identified three options to obtain  more EAD, as well as potential tradeoffs associated with each.
Strategically pursue additional agreements with foreign postal operators  to provide EAD: The USPS OIG recently recommended that USPS  pursue collection of additional EAD in future bilateral agreements with  foreign postal operators based on USPS and CBP recognition of the  importance of EAD in targeting mail for inspection. USPS has been  pursuing this option in recent years, as discussed above, and, according  to USPS officials, is currently negotiating with several additional countries  to reach agreements on providing EAD. USPS officials stated that in  future negotiations, their intention is to establish binding bilateral data- sharing agreements, rather than agreements that establish standards for,  but do not require, data sharing. In addition, according to a State  Department official with responsibility for international postal policy, the  Department is considering elevating the issue of mail security and related  agreements into the diplomatic arena, a step that could have the effect of  prioritizing this issue, though USPS would continue to lead negotiations  with foreign postal operators. According to USPS officials, this option  could result in availability of EAD for a large percentage of inbound mail if  the focus is on negotiating with large-volume countries.
However, using this option, USPS and CBP would still be dependent on  foreign postal operators to provide data voluntarily or by mutual  agreement. Additionally, according to USPS officials—even if they  participate in a data-sharing agreement with USPS—foreign postal  operators retain the ability to send mail without EAD to the United States  under standard Universal Postal Union (UPU) requirements (USPS stated  that foreign postal operators might not provide EAD as established in  agreements for a variety of reasons, as discussed above). Further,  according to a State Department official, establishing data-sharing  agreements with some countries may present privacy concerns.  According to the official, some of the countries that are most eager to  exchange EAD tend to be countries that have an interest in surveilling  their citizens. Conversely, the official stated that some countries are  concerned about collecting the personal information of citizens and are  reluctant to enter into agreements for sharing EAD.
Pursue EAD requirements through the Universal Postal Union: During the  2016 UPU Congress, member countries agreed to changes—including  future requirements for barcodes on small packets—that have laid the  groundwork for EAD requirements in the future. The United States  drives this effort as joint chair with India on a UPU committee focused on  issues related to security, customs, transportation, and standards.  Additionally, USPS officials told us they are participating—along with 52  other postal operators—in a UPU program designed to increase  transmission of EAD for e-commerce shipments. According to a State  Department official, changes to UPU requirements could result in more  universal adoption of EAD collection than current efforts to establish data- sharing agreements. The official also stated that while adoption of  universal EAD requirements may occur incrementally over many years,  the data-sharing standards and tools that are currently being developed  through this UPU process could provide countries with capacity-building  resources that would not be available to them outside of a UPU-driven  process (in a bilateral negotiation, for example). However, State  Department and USPS officials stated that universal adoption of EAD  requirements through the UPU will likely take many years because many  foreign postal operators lack the infrastructure and capacity to collect  EAD and it is unclear how willing some countries are to build that  capacity.
Legally Require Collection of EAD: On February 14, 2017, versions of the  Synthetics Trafficking and Overdose Prevention Act of 2017 (STOP Act)  were introduced in both the House of Representatives and the U.S.  Senate. The STOP Act bills, if passed, would require that all inbound  international mail—those items USPS receives from foreign postal  operators—be accompanied by EAD, which would be provided to CBP for  analysis. The bills would also authorize the collection of an additional  customs fee as well as establish penalties for non-compliance.  According to a State Department official, the requirements in the two  pending bills could cause some countries to provide EAD to USPS.  However, according to USPS and State Department officials, many  countries do not currently have the ability to carry out the provisions in the  bills. As a result, the officials stated that the requirement would likely  result in a temporary disruption to the flow of inbound international mail  and commerce and potentially result in a long-term halt to the flow of mail  from some countries. Additionally, the officials stated that the proposed  requirement could have implications related to USPS participation in the  UPU and, thus, the exchange of mail between the United States and UPU  member countries.
section_title: USPS and CBP Have Not Evaluated Relative Costs and Benefits of Increased Use of Electronic Advance Data
paragraphs: According to USPS and CBP officials, increasing the use of EAD to target  mail for inspection may have benefits, such as reducing the volume of  inspected mail and increasing the percentage of inspections that result in  identification of a threatening or illegal item. This potential outcome could  decrease time and resources needed for the screening process— potentially decreasing costs—and may increase the security of inbound  mail. However, the costs of collecting and implementing the use of EAD  are not yet known and neither USPS nor CPB currently collect the data  necessary to know whether using EAD might increase the security of  inbound mail or decrease the time and costs associated with screening.
Regarding the costs of collecting EAD, USPS has not calculated the  current costs of collecting EAD from countries with which USPS has data- sharing agreements, but USPS officials stated that USPS does not incur  significant additional costs for each new designated postal operator or  type of mail for which USPS begins collecting EAD. While some of the  costs of obtaining EAD may be borne by designated postal operators in  other countries, rather than directly by USPS, costs to USPS to use EAD  to target mail for inspection may include:
Equipment and personnel required to identify targeted mail (such as  equipment required to sort through hundreds of pieces of mail to  identify a single piece of mail): For example, USPS estimated that the  cost for software upgrades needed for Pilots 1 and 2 (currently the  only efforts USPS and CBP have underway to use EAD to target mail  for inspection) to identify individual pieces of mail within larger sacks  was about $150,000. This technology is currently being tested—so  any further costs are unknown—but USPS officials stated that it will  be included as a part of these pilots if they are expanded to other  ISCs.
Software upgrades required to exchange data with foreign postal  operators and with CBP: USPS officials stated, as noted above, that  developing the technological capability to receive and utilize EAD from  foreign posts related to Pilots 1 and 2 cost about $1.8 million.
An analysis of the costs associated with planned efforts is particularly  critical given USPS’s financial challenges. As we recently found, USPS  reported a net loss of $5.6 billion in fiscal year 2016—its 10th consecutive  year of net losses. We have reported that USPS urgently needs to  restructure to align its costs with revenues. In light of this situation, any  expenditure of financial resources to make any additional infrastructure  and information technology upgrades necessary to implement the use of  EAD for targeting merit careful consideration.
Beyond costs, USPS and CBP have not performed an analysis of the  benefits of using EAD to target mail for inspection, including the  effectiveness of targeted inspection based on EAD relative to other  methods of selecting mail for inspection. Thus, the extent to which  targeting based on EAD might result in an increased ability to identify  threats or other benefits over current methods is unknown. For example,  CBP has collected data on the percent of inspections resulting in a  seizure for mail inspected as a result of targeting in Pilots 1 and 2.  However, CBP does not collect comparable data for seizures resulting  from inspections conducted based on current methods of choosing mail  for inspection.
Although CBP has been using EAD to target express cargo for inspection  since approximately 2004, it has not evaluated whether this method  results in benefits relative to other methods of choosing express cargo, or  cargo more generally, for inspection. We recently reported that CBP  generally lacks targets for its trade enforcement activities, which include  targeting inbound items for inspection. We found that this may impede  CBP’s ability to assess the effectiveness of those activities, and  recommended that CBP develop such targets.
Moreover, USPS and CBP experience challenges related to inspecting  mail that may limit their ability to effectively use EAD to target mail for  screening, and, thus, to experience EAD’s possible benefits. For  example, in discussing the implementation of Pilots 1 and 2, USPS and  CBP officials described several challenges:
High inbound international mail volumes may make individual  scanning time consuming and possibly impractical. According to CBP  data, there were about 571-million inbound international air-cargo  packages in fiscal year 2016, of which express cargo would account  for only a portion. Comparatively, USPS alone accepted about 621  million pieces of inbound international mail in fiscal year 2016.  According to representatives we spoke to from express consignment  operators, they are able to individually scan each item upon arrival,  providing an opportunity to identify and set aside express cargo  targeted for CBP inspection based on EAD. Conversely, individually  scanning hundreds of millions of pieces of mail may limit USPS’ ability  to process mail in a timely manner or could require additional  personnel and resources.
USPS depends on foreign postal operators, which, according to  USPS and State Department officials, may not share the same  security priorities as USPS and CBP, to make EAD available. In  March 2017, including countries with which USPS has agreed to  share EAD, USPS received EAD for roughly half of inbound mail.  Further, lack of control over data collection may result in lower quality  and/or reliability of EAD, as compared to that collected by express  consignment operators. As such, while CBP has access to EAD for  express cargo as a result of the Trade Act of 2002, obtaining EAD for  mail may present substantial challenges, as discussed earlier. If the  amount of available EAD remains limited for inbound mail, this may  limit the effectiveness of CBP’s targeting efforts or could limit CBP’s  ability to reduce the volume of mail it inspects.
Our prior work has found that, in designing preventive measures—such  as the screening of inbound mail to identify potential threats—it is helpful  to conduct a thorough assessment of vulnerabilities as well as cost- benefit analyses of alternative strategies. In the absence of information  on the relative costs of various methods of selecting mail for inspection— including the use of EAD to target mail—as well as their effectiveness at  identifying potential threats in inbound mail, USPS and CBP are unable to  fully understand whether obtaining additional EAD for targeting purposes  will provide security or resource benefits.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Protecting the U.S. citizens, economy, and ecology from threats in items  shipped to the United States as mail and express cargo requires  balancing risks to health and safety with maintaining the flow of  international shipping. Beyond threats posed by concealed weapons and  other hazards, the United States is experiencing an increase in deaths  related to the use of fentanyl, an increase that may be exacerbated by  drugs arriving from overseas via mail and express cargo. Express  consignment operators, USPS, and CBP coordinate to conduct screening  of inbound international items after their arrival in the United States and  USPS and CBP have implemented pilot programs making limited use of  EAD to target mail for inspection. However, because CBP and USPS lack  clear performance goals for these pilots, they risk spending additional  time and resources expanding them prior to fully assessing the pilots’  success or failure.
Similarly, because USPS and CBP have not conducted an analysis to  identify the potential costs and benefits of using EAD for targeting mail in  comparison with other methods of choosing mail for inspection, it is  unknown whether using EAD would further efforts to identify threats in  inbound mail. Particularly in light of the challenges that collecting and  using these data present, it is important that CBP and USPS carefully  consider actions to enhance inbound international mail security to avoid  wasting time and money on potentially ineffective and costly endeavors.  As USPS and CBP contemplate the expansion of pilot programs to other  ISCs and types of mail, existing pilots could be used as an opportunity for  CBP and USPS: (1) to articulate performance goals for the pilots, (2) to  collect data and assess the pilots on their success in enabling USPS to  provide targeted mail to CBP for inspection, and (3) to assess the costs  and benefits of various methods of choosing mail for inspection.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that current pilot programs related to electronic advance data  provide insights that help in assessing USPS’s effectiveness at providing  mail targeted by CBP for inspection, the Secretary of Homeland Security  should direct the Commissioner of CBP to, in conjunction with USPS, (1)  establish measureable performance goals for pilot programs and (2)  assess the performance of the pilots in achieving these goals.
To provide information on the costs and benefits of collecting electronic  advance data for use in targeting inbound international mail for screening,  the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of  CBP to, in conjunction with USPS, evaluate the relative costs and  benefits of collecting electronic advance data for targeting mail for  inspection in comparison to other methods.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Postal Service and  Departments of State and Homeland Security for review and comment.
In its written comments, reproduced in appendix III, DHS concurred with  our recommendations and indicated it would coordinate with USPS to  implement the recommendations.
In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, USPS agreed with  our findings and provided updates on the expansion of Pilots 1 and 2 and  plans for coordinating with CBP to address our recommendations.  USPS stated that it has expanded these pilots to the Los Angeles,  California, ISC beginning on June 19, 2017 (after our audit work was  completed). In light of this expansion, we believe it will be even more  important for USPS and CBP to establish measureable performance  goals for these pilots to aid in assessing their performance. Additionally,  USPS reiterated the distinctions between USPS and express  consignment operators related to USPS’s lack of control over the  collection of EAD by foreign postal operators. Nonetheless, USPS  affirmed its commitment to increasing the percentage of inbound mail for  which EAD is available.
USPS and the Departments of Homeland Security and State also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report’s date. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate  congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security, the  Postmaster General of the United States, and the Secretary of State. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at 202-512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff making key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we address (1) types of items CBP has seized from mail  and express cargo sent to the United States; (2) how inbound  international items are inspected as they arrive in the United States; and  (3) options to collect electronic advance data for mail and the costs and  benefits of using electronic advance data for targeting mail for inspection.  Specific details related to the screening process and foreign postal  operators that CBP and USPS considered sensitive are not included in  this report. Express consignment operators are defined, in general, as  those entities moving cargo by special express commercial service under  closely integrated administrative control with reliable, timely, door-to-door  delivery. Under the Trade Act of 2002, as amended, and implementing  regulations, all cargo, including express cargo but not including inbound  international mail, is subject to requirements for electronic advance data  (EAD).
Despite important differences—including the level of control of shipments  at the point of acceptance—the door-to-door delivery provided by express  consignment operators is more comparable to services provided by  USPS than other cargo services. As such, we have reviewed efforts to  screen inbound international mail and express cargo only, and have not  included other types of cargo. For the purpose of this report, the term  inbound international items will refer to those items handled by USPS and  express consignment operators, but does not include non-express cargo  shipped to the United States. For the purposes of this report, EAD refers  to electronic data collected and shared among postal operators (such as  USPS); cargo carriers (such as those transporting express cargo); and  customs agencies (such as CBP) in advance of the scheduled arrival of  cargo (including mail and express cargo) in the United States for the  purpose of identifying inbound international items that may pose a threat  to the United States. These data include the sender’s name and address,  recipient’s name and address, contents description, number of pieces,  and total weight. We use the term ‘screening’ to refer to the process of  identifying inbound international items for further inspection. Additionally,  in referring to any item handled by USPS—including letters and  packages—we use the term ‘mail.’ When referring specifically to items  handled by express consignment operators, we use the term ‘express  cargo.’  To describe the types of items CBP has seized in mail and express cargo  sent to the United States, we reviewed and analyzed CBP data on  seizures of mail and express cargo items for fiscal years 2012 through  2016 documented in CBP’s Seized Asset and Case Tracking System  (SEACATS). Specifically, we reviewed information on fiscal year, item  description, and statute cited as the basis for the seizure. To determine  the reliability of SEACATS data for the purposes of this report, we  reviewed related documentation; conducted electronic and manual data  testing to identify missing data, outliers, and obvious errors; and  interviewed appropriate CBP officials about related internal controls and  procedures and the limitations of the data. While we found this data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of providing contextual information  about the types and quantity of threats identified by CBP in inbound  international items, we have reported these data after taking into account  some limitations, which may affect the reliability of the statistics we report:
About 20,000 of the 308,000 total seizures (about 6.5 percent) cited  more than 1 item description or federal statute as the basis of the  seizure because shipments containing more than 1 type of item are  reported as a single incident. For example, a package containing both  cocaine and marijuana would be counted as a single seizure, but  would have two separate item descriptions (cocaine and marijuana).  The statistics we report account only for the first item description  listed. We have not reported seizures by cited federal statute because  the first statute cited might not accurately represent the basis of the  seizure. For example, the first statute cited in SEACATS may be laws  granting CBP the authority to seize prohibited items; while this may be  part of the basis for the seizure, it does not illustrate the type of threat  that was identified. As a result, the frequencies we report represent  the minimum number of seizures in each category.
Nine of the 308,000 total seizures were cited as both drug and  merchandise seizures because the associated items contained  both drugs and other goods, such as drug paraphernalia. As such,  these incidents are counted twice—as both drugs and  merchandise.
For about 118,000 of the seizures (about 38 percent), SEACATS data  did not include a country of origin because, according to CBP, this  field is not mandatory. As a result, we were unable to report seizures  by country of origin.
To describe how inbound international items are inspected as they arrive  in the United States, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations; USPS  and CBP guidance; USPS Office of Inspector General reports; and  international mail agreements, including requirements set by the  Universal Postal Union (UPU). We conducted site visits to all five USPS  International Service Centers (ISC)—the facilities at which USPS receives  the majority of inbound international mail to interview officials, observe the  CBP inspection process, and identify associated challenges. We  interviewed officials from USPS, CBP’s Office of Field Operations and  National Targeting Center, and the Transportation Security Administration  (TSA) and representatives from the three largest express consignment  operators (based on CBP cargo volume data for fiscal year 2015): UPS,  FedEx, and DHL.
To describe changes in USPS inbound international volume, we reviewed  USPS data on inbound international mail volume. To determine the  reliability of these volume data, we interviewed appropriate USPS officials  about the systems used to generate the data and related internal controls.  We found these data to be reliable for the purpose of describing general  trends in USPS inbound international mail volume.
We reviewed available reports, plans, and performance data from fiscal  years 2015–2016 related to pilot programs conducted by USPS and CBP  using EAD to target mail for inspection for the period from July 2014  through January 2017 (the time period for which data were available). To  determine the reliability of performance data related to these pilots, we  interviewed appropriate CBP officials about related procedures and the  limitations of the data. We found this data to be sufficiently reliable for the  purpose of providing information on the current status of the pilots. To  assess CBP’s and USPS’s efforts related to these pilots, we compared  available documentation on the goals and performance of the pilots to  federal internal control standards related to defining program goals. We  did not assess the effectiveness of CBP’s screening of inbound  international express cargo or mail because that was outside the scope of  our review.
To identify options for obtaining additional EAD for inbound mail as well  as related considerations, we interviewed officials from USPS and the  Department of State and reviewed existing agreements for EAD with  foreign postal operators, UPU documents related to the collection and  sharing of EAD, and proposed legislation. To identify the benefits and  costs of using EAD for targeting mail for inspection, we interviewed  officials from USPS and CBP’s Office of Field Operations and National  Targeting Center and reviewed related agency performance data and  reports, including performance data on the USPS and CBP pilot projects  to use EAD to target mail for inspection, as discussed above. We also  reviewed information provided by USPS in response to questions about  equipment and personnel costs associated with the pilots. To assess  USPS’s and CBP’s efforts to collect and implement EAD, we compared  these efforts to GAO guidance on program evaluation, including  assessing the quality of preventive measures.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 through August  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit  to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis  for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Roles and Responsibilities for Security of International Mail and Express Cargo
paragraphs: A range of federal agencies and other stakeholders have a role in  keeping prohibited items from entering the country in international mail  and express cargo.
subsections: section_title: Entities with Responsibility for the Movement of International Mail and Express Cargo
subsections: section_title: U.S. Postal Service
paragraphs: As the designated postal operator in the United States, the U.S. Postal  Service (USPS) accepts and delivers inbound international mail on behalf  of foreign postal operators, which generally arrives via five international  service centers (ISC) located in New York City, New York; Miami, Florida;  Los Angeles, California; San Francisco, California; and Chicago, Illinois in  addition to smaller facilities in Hawaii, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and the  U.S. Virgin Islands. USPS is required to present all inbound international  mail, with some exceptions, to U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) for inspection.
section_title: Universal Postal Union
paragraphs: The international movement of mail amongst member countries is  governed under the Universal Postal Convention by the Universal Postal  Union (UPU), a United Nations specialized agency with over 190 member  countries. The UPU’s mission is “to facilitate communication between the  inhabitants of the world.” The UPU facilitates the exchange of  international mail by guaranteeing the free circulation of postal items over  a single postal territory composed of interconnected networks; creating  common standards, including those related to security and electronic  advance data (EAD); establishing requirements for freedom of transit and  basic services; and establishing the terms of reimbursement for certain  services. Reimbursement for these activities (called the “terminal dues”  rate) is determined based on each country’s gross national income per  capita and the cost for each country’s designated postal operator to  deliver mail.
section_title: Department of State
paragraphs: The Department of State (State Department) has responsibility for  formulation, coordination, and oversight of foreign policy related to  international postal services and other international delivery services. As  such, the State Department represents the United States, along with  USPS, at the UPU Congress and other UPU meetings, including those at  which policies and requirements related to mail security are discussed.
section_title: Express Consignment Operators
paragraphs: Express consignment operators accept items from customers in foreign  countries and transport and deliver those items in the United States. For  cargo arriving by aircraft from any foreign port or place in North America,  including locations in Mexico, Central America, South America (from north  of the equator only), the Caribbean, and Bermuda, air carriers, including  those carrying express cargo, are required to provide CBP with electronic  advance data (EAD) no later than the time of the departure (“wheels up”)  of the aircraft directly to the United States. For cargo arriving by aircraft  from other foreign ports, air carriers are required to provide EAD no later  than 4 hours prior to the scheduled arrival of items in the United States  and to present all inbound items to CBP for inspection.
section_title: Federal Agencies with Responsibility for Inspecting Inbound International Mail and Express Cargo
subsections: section_title: U.S. Customs and Border Protection
subsections: section_title: Office of Field Operations
paragraphs: Under the Department of Homeland Security, CBP’s Office of Field  Operations has, among other responsibilities, primary responsibility for  enforcing customs and agriculture laws and regulations and for  preventing terrorists and their weapons from entering at U.S. ports of  entry. As such, CBP operates 328 ports of entry at which it inspects  inbound cargo, including express cargo and mail, to enforce laws and  regulations while seeking to ensure the safe and efficient flow of goods  through U.S. ports of entry.
section_title: National Targeting Center
paragraphs: Under the Department of Homeland Security, CBP’s National Targeting  Center (NTC) identifies high-risk people and cargo traveling to the United  States prior to their arrival in the United States. The NTC coordinates  examination of cargo that may be connected to terrorist or other crimes,  such as narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, merchandise  counterfeiting, and money laundering.
section_title: Transportation Security Administration
paragraphs: As part of its mission to secure the U.S. civil-aviation system, the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is statutorily required to  assess the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports (1)  served by a U.S. air carrier, (2) from which a foreign air carrier serves the  United States, or (3) that pose a high risk of introducing danger to  international air travel. In addition, TSA has statutory and regulatory  authority to regulate security-related matters with respect to U.S. air  carriers at airports around the world and foreign air carriers operating  from last points of departure airports to the United States. These  operations are subject to TSA-approved security program requirements,  such as screening of air cargo (including express cargo and non-U.S.  Mail) for any unauthorized weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and other  destructive devices, items, or substances, prior to loading on the aircraft.  TSA inspects these air carrier operations at international locations at least  annually to ensure compliance with TSA security program requirements.
section_title: U.S. Postal Inspection Service
paragraphs: As the federal law enforcement, crime prevention, and security arm of  USPS, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s (USPIS) mission is to ensure  confidence in the U.S. mail. While USPIS does not have primary  responsibility for inspecting inbound international mail, it coordinates with  USPS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to facilitate the inspection  of inbound international mail.
section_title: Other Federal Agencies
paragraphs: More than 40 federal agencies coordinate with CBP to assess the  compliance of inbound items with applicable laws and regulations. For  example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reviews  pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, medical devices, and other items regulated  by the FDA that have been identified in inbound mail and express cargo  prior to CBP seizure. Other federal agencies coordinating with CBP in this  way include the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Fish and  Wildlife Administration.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Postal Service
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Derrick Collins, Assistant  Director; Katie Hamer, Analyst-In-Charge; Geoff Hamilton; Greg Hanna;  Thanh Lu; Amanda Miller; Josh Ormond; Minette Richardson; Rachel  Stoiko; and Michelle Weathers made significant contributions to this  report.