D.C. Charter Schools: Strengthening Monitoring and Process When Schools Close Could Improve Accountability and Ease Student Transitions
Published: 2005-11-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: D.C. has a larger percentage of students in charter schools than any state. To help oversee D.C. charter schools, Congress established two authorizers--the Board of Education (BOE), which has an Office of Charter Schools responsible for oversight, and the independent Public Charter School Board (PCSB). Congress required the GAO to conduct a study of the authorizers. This report--which completes GAO's May 2005 study--examines the (1) authorizers' resources, (2) oversight practices, and (3) actions taken once charter schools close. GAO examined BOE and PCSB monitoring reports, revenue and expenditure documents, and closure procedures.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The two D.C. charter school authorizers differed in revenue, number of staff overseeing schools, and use of D.C. services, but both spent their funds to support oversight activities. The BOE Office of Charter Schools had less revenue and fewer staff overseeing fewer schools than PCSB. It fulfilled its oversight responsibilities by using some D.C. Public School services and also occasionally calling upon D.C. agencies for financial operations reviews. The PCSB had a larger staff that oversaw more schools and had revenue more than two times larger than that of the BOE Office of Charter Schools. The PCSB did not use any D.C. Public Schools services, but did refer one school to a D.C. agency for further examination. Despite these differences, both authorizers used most of their fiscal year 2004 expenses for in-house board operations, such as personnel, and also hired consultants to help monitor charter schools. Both D.C. authorizers provided technical assistance to schools and had similar oversight practices, such as tracking school academics and finances, but took different approaches. The BOE Office of Charter Schools, with only 3 staff, provided the same level of oversight to all of its 16 schools and thereby limited its ability to target additional resources to schools requiring more assistance. Moreover, when the BOE Office of Charter Schools gave its Board monitoring information on its charter schools, the Board--also responsible for the city's 167 traditional schools--did not regularly review that information. In contrast, the PCSB targeted additional oversight on new charter schools and those where problems had been identified. The PCSB also granted more flexibility to well-managed schools. Although problems persisted at some schools, the PCSB's targeted system enabled it to focus more attention on these schools. Once D.C. charter schools closed, both authorizers took a number of actions to safeguard student records and public assets and inform parents of their children's educational options; however, issues arose that both authorizers found difficult to adequately address, particularly when the closed school was insolvent. Managing and safeguarding student records was the most expensive and challenging aspect of closing schools, authorizers reported. Moreover, the authorizers' closure processes were different each of the 9 times charter schools closed, which limited opportunities to build on past experiences.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: When the school doors opened for the 2004-2005 school year in the  When the school doors opened for the 2004-2005 school year in the  District of Columbia, over a fifth of all students were attending charter  District of Columbia, over a fifth of all students were attending charter  schools. The District of Columbia has a larger percentage of students  schools. The District of Columbia has a larger percentage of students  enrolled in such schools than any state. Six new charter schools opened in  enrolled in such schools than any state. Six new charter schools opened in  the 2004-2005 school year alone. To help fund the growing number of  the 2004-2005 school year alone. To help fund the growing number of  charter schools, Congress designated $13 million specifically for D.C.  charter schools, Congress designated $13 million specifically for D.C.  charter schools in the 2005 D.C. Appropriations Act.  charter schools in the 2005 D.C. Appropriations Act.
Charter schools are public schools that are exempt from certain state and  Charter schools are public schools that are exempt from certain state and  local regulations in exchange for increased accountability for improving  local regulations in exchange for increased accountability for improving  student achievement. Charter school authorizers—the entities that  student achievement. Charter school authorizers—the entities that  approve and oversee charter schools—are responsible for ensuring that  approve and oversee charter schools—are responsible for ensuring that  charter schools achieve expected outcomes and comply with applicable  charter schools achieve expected outcomes and comply with applicable  laws. The District of Columbia School Reform Act, as amended, (D.C.  laws. The District of Columbia School Reform Act, as amended, (D.C.  School Reform Act) established two entities, the D.C. Board of Education  School Reform Act) established two entities, the D.C. Board of Education  (BOE) and the D.C. Public Charter School Board (PCSB), as charter  (BOE) and the D.C. Public Charter School Board (PCSB), as charter  school authorizers. The law requires that the authorizers approve and  school authorizers. The law requires that the authorizers approve and  oversee charter school implementation. Although the law gives both  oversee charter school implementation. Although the law gives both  authorizers similar responsibilities, each has some latitude in how it  authorizers similar responsibilities, each has some latitude in how it  implements these responsibilities. As an independent agency, the PCSB  implements these responsibilities. As an independent agency, the PCSB  devotes all of its resources to charter schools, while the BOE, which also  devotes all of its resources to charter schools, while the BOE, which also  has responsibility for D.C.’s traditional public schools, has established an  Office of Charter Schools to monitor its charter schools. As interest in  charter schools grows among parents, questions have been raised about  how the District oversees its charter schools.
As required by the 2005 D.C. Appropriations Act, we examined the  performance of D.C. charter school authorizers in their oversight roles. In  May 2005, we published the interim findings of our study in Charter  Schools: Oversight Practices in the District of Columbia (GAO-05-490),  which outlined the legal responsibilities of the D.C. authorizers. To  complete our study, we are addressing the following questions in this  report: (1) what resources (financial and otherwise) do the D.C.  authorizers have and how have they used these resources; (2) how have  the D.C. authorizers provided oversight and technical assistance to charter  schools after they have opened; and (3) what actions did the authorizers  take once charter schools closed to help students transition to new  schools, protect student records, and safeguard public assets.
To analyze the authorizers’ resources and to learn how they have used  them, we examined their budgets, revenues, and expenses for fiscal years  2003 and 2004. Our budget analysis is based on the amount of funds each  authorizer received per school rather than per student, because the  authorizers provided services that generally benefited schools as a whole,  not individual students. We also examined the authorizers’ use of their  staff. To analyze the authorizers’ provision of oversight, we examined  monitoring reports, audits, and related documentation from 8 of the   42 D.C. charter schools—4 from each authorizer. These eight schools were  selected to include variety in school performance, demographics, number  of years in operation, and the schools’ history of sanctions. Additionally,  we convened two focus groups of charter school administrators (one  focus group per authorizer) to substantiate and augment information the  authorizers provided. Appendix I provides our methodology and additional  information on the schools selected for our document reviews and focus  groups. To analyze the procedures in place once charter schools close, we  examined the actions the authorizers took to address issues arising from  the closure of the nine charter schools that have lost their charters as of  September 2005. In these cases, we examined monitoring reports and  other documents related to the closures and interviewed authorizer staff  and board members. Finally, we examined the authorizers’ use of services  available to them by interviewing officials of District agencies, including  D.C. Public Schools, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of  the D.C. Auditor, and the D.C. Office of Inspector General.
We conducted our work between January and November 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Charter schools are public schools established under contracts that grant  them greater levels of autonomy from certain state and local laws and  regulations in exchange for agreeing to meet certain student performance  goals. Charter schools are often exempt from certain state and school  district education laws and in some states may receive waivers or  exemptions from other laws; however, charter schools must comply with  select laws, including those pertaining to special education, civil rights,  and health and safety conditions. While charter schools are free from  many educational regulations, they are accountable for their educational  and financial performance, including the testing requirements under the  No Child Left Behind Act.
A wide range of individuals or groups, including parents, educators,  nonprofit organizations and universities, may apply to create a charter  school. Charter schools are typically nonprofit organizations and, like  other nonprofits, are governed by a board of trustees. The board of  trustees, which is initially selected by the school founders, oversees legal  compliance, financial management, contracts with external parties, and  other school policies. School trustees are also responsible for identifying  existing and potential risks facing the charter school and taking steps to  reduce or eliminate these risks.
Charters to operate a school are authorized by various bodies, depending  on the state’s laws, but may include local school districts, municipal  governments, or special chartering boards. According to a GAO survey,  about half of the charter school states and the District of Columbia  allowed more than one authorizer, providing charter school founders an  opportunity to find support for a wider range of instructional approaches  or educational philosophies than might be possible with a single  authorizer. Many charter school authorizing bodies have formal  procedures to monitor charter school performance in areas such as  student performance, compliance with regulations, financial record  keeping, and the provision of special education services. If charter schools  do not meet expected performance measures, authorizers may revoke a  school’s charter or decide not to renew the charter when it expires,  resulting in the charter school’s closure. Since the first charter school  opened in Minnesota in 1992, about 350 charter schools—of the  approximately 3,700 that opened—have closed as of April 2005.
The D.C. School Reform Act, a federal law that applies only to D.C.,  designated two charter school authorizers—the D.C. Board of Education  (BOE) and the D.C. Public Charter School Board (PCSB). Both authorizers  have similar responsibilities, but are structured differently. While the  PCSB was created as an independent board with the sole purpose of  approving and overseeing charter schools, the BOE oversees both the   167 traditional public schools that enrolled about 59,000 students in the  2004-2005 school year and charter schools. To effectively manage its  oversight responsibilities for both traditional public schools and charter  schools, the BOE created an internal Office of Charter Schools to manage  its functions as an authorizer. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the BOE  generally determined how much local funding to allocate to each of the  Board’s functions, including charter schools, while Congress determined  the level of PCSB’s local funds through its D.C. Appropriations Act. In  addition to the two authorizers, several D.C. offices have responsibilities  related to the District’s charter schools, including the D.C. Inspector  General, the D.C. Auditor, the D.C. Chief Financial Officer, the Mayor’s  State Education Office, and the State Education Agency, which is part of  the D.C. Public School system (see fig. 1).
The D.C. School Reform Act allows the BOE and the PCSB to grant up to  10 charters each per year. Each charter authorizes a school for 15 years, at  which point the charter may be renewed if the authorizer approves. To  date, no school has reached the end of its 15-year term. After granting  charters to schools, each authorizer is responsible for monitoring those  schools. Under the D.C. School Reform Act, the BOE and PCSB are  required to monitor charter schools’ academic achievement, operations,  and compliance with applicable laws. Both authorizers conduct pre- opening visits to new schools and subsequently conduct annual  monitoring visits and data reviews to meet this requirement (see fig. 2). All  schools granted a charter in D.C. must create an accountability plan that  outlines the school’s 5-year academic goals. Accountability plans become  part of each school’s charter and are used as guides for the authorizers to  monitor academic progress. Additionally, under the D.C. School Reform  Act, the D.C. authorizers must conduct more comprehensive reviews of  charter schools every 5 years to determine if the schools should be  allowed to continue operating. Charter schools that are not meeting  academic performance goals may be closed following a 5-year review.  Charter schools may be closed for other reasons, such as financial  mismanagement or legal noncompliance, at any time.
As we noted in our May 2005 report, the BOE first began chartering  schools in 1996, and the PCSB chartered its first schools in 1997. As of the  2004-05 school year, 23 BOE and 27 PCSB charter schools had opened.  However, between 1998 and September 2005, nine charter schools closed.  The BOE has revoked seven charters, and two PCSB charter schools  closed; one voluntarily released its charter, and the other had its charter  revoked at the end of the 2004-2005 school year. Financial reasons  contributed to the closing of most of the schools that had their charters  revoked. During the 2004-05 school year, 16 BOE schools and 26 PCSB  were in operation. As of January 2005, BOE charter schools enrolled   3,945 students, and PCSB charter schools enrolled 11,555 students.
The two D.C. authorizers monitored a diverse set of schools (see table 1).  These schools enrolled students at all grade levels, from pre-kindergarten  to high school and offered varied instructional and academic models. For  example some schools had a particular curricular emphasis, such as math  and science, art, or foreign language, while other charter schools focused  on specific populations, such as students with learning disabilities,  students who have dropped out or are at risk of doing so, youth who have  been involved in the criminal justice system, and adults. Additionally, the  charter schools pursued a variety of school-specific goals that were  aligned with their missions or the student populations they served. The  D.C. School Reform Act requires the authorizers to monitor schools’  annual and 5-year progress toward these goals. Some examples of goals  included in school charters are improved attendance rates and increased  parental satisfaction. Other goals varied widely. For example, Maya  Angelou, a high school serving at-risk youth, included among its 5-year  goals both an 85 percent graduation rate, as well as a significant reduction  in violent behavior by students. JOS-ARZ, a high school serving students  with emotional and behavioral problems, included as a goal that at least  half of its students would acquire skills that would allow them to function  independently and would earn a high school diploma or the equivalent.
D.C. charter schools receive funding from a wide range of sources. Charter  schools in D.C. receive funding on a per-pupil basis using the same  allocation formula for operating expenses that is applied to traditional  D.C. public schools. In the 2004-2005 school year, charter and traditional  public schools in D.C. received $6,904 to $8,077 for a regular education  student depending on grade level. D.C. charter schools received an  additional allotment—equal to $2,380 per non-residential student and  $6,426 per residential student—to help cover the cost of school facilities.  In addition to the per-pupil allotments, charter schools in D.C., like all  public schools that meet federal criteria, are eligible for other federal  funds, such as funding under the No Child Left Behind Act and the  Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act. A few charter  schools also receive additional funding from foundation grants and other  fundraising efforts.
section_title: D.C. Authorizing Boards Differed in Revenue and Their Use of D.C. Government Services, but Spent Their Financial Resources on Similar Oversight Activities
paragraphs: The two D.C. authorizers’ revenue, staff, and use of available D.C. services  differed, but the authorizers spent their funds on similar activities. The  BOE Office of Charter Schools had less revenue and fewer schools and  staff to oversee them than the PCSB. To help fulfill its oversight  responsibilities, the BOE Office of Charter Schools occasionally called  upon D.C. agencies for financial operations reviews and used some D.C.  Public School services. The PCSB, which had more staff and oversaw  more schools, had total revenue that was more than twice that of the BOE  Office of Charter Schools’ and employed a larger staff. The PCSB also  received more revenue per school than the BOE Office of Charter Schools.  Unlike the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB did not use D.C.  Public Schools services, which were available to it, but did use D.C.  government services on one occasion. Despite these differences, both  authorizers used their financial resources similarly. Both spent most of  their fiscal year 2004 funds on board operations, including personnel  costs, and their remaining funds on consultants to help with monitoring,  application review and school closures.
subsections: section_title: BOE Office of Charter Schools Received Less Funding and Had Fewer Staff to Oversee Fewer Schools Than PCSB, but Used More Available Government Services
paragraphs: The BOE Office of Charter Schools received less funding from its two  main sources of revenue—the local funds allocated to it by the BOE and  the administrative fees it was permitted to charge the schools it oversaw— than the corresponding amounts received by the PCSB (see table 2). The  BOE Office of Charter Schools received $307,340 from the BOE in fiscal  year 2004, less than half the amount of local funds the PCSB received in  accordance with congressional directives, and collected $251,623 in fees  from the schools it oversaw. The BOE Office of Charter Schools collected  less in fees from schools than the PCSB, because these fees are based on  the number of students per school, and the PCSB oversaw more schools  with more students. In total revenue, the BOE Office of Charter Schools  received approximately $38,000 per school in fiscal year 2004.
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the BOE Office of Charter Schools had three  staff, including its Executive Director, to oversee its schools, which was  less than a third the staff of the PCSB’s. In October 2005, the new budget  for the BOE made possible the hiring of three new staff for its Office of  Charter Schools. The BOE Office of Charter Schools supplemented its  staff by using consultants to help oversee charter schools. In fiscal year  2004, the Office of Charter Schools spent $121,502 on consultants in areas  such as reviewing applications, conducting annual monitoring visits, and  assisting with school closings. Consultants with issue area expertise also  provided specialized assistance associated with monitoring schools’  financial condition and special education compliance. The BOE Office of  Charter Schools spent $28,589 per school on both in-house personnel and  consultants in fiscal year 2004, which was 16 percent less than the PCSB  spent.
In addition to using consultants, the BOE Office of Charter Schools  augmented its financial and staff resources by leveraging services  provided by other D.C. government agencies. On four occasions, the BOE  Office of Charter Schools referred schools to the D.C. Auditor or the Office  of the Chief Financial Officer for financial operations reviews. For  example, in 2002, the BOE Office of Charter Schools asked the Office of  the Chief Financial Officer to review the internal controls of one school.  Additionally, the BOE Office of Charter Schools referred one school to a  special interagency team that included the D.C. Department of Mental  Health and the D.C. Child and Family Services Agency, to review the level  of services provided to children. For the past 2 years, D.C. Public Schools  has provided the BOE Office of Charter Schools with some test score  analysis and school performance data, which the office used to determine  if its charter schools were in compliance with No Child Left Behind Act  requirements.
section_title: PCSB Received More Funding and Had More Staff to Oversee Schools, and Used Fewer Available Government Services
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the PCSB received more revenue, had a  larger staff and oversaw more schools than the BOE Office of Charter  Schools. As an agency independent from the D.C. Board of Education, the  PCSB received $660,000 in local funds in fiscal year 2004, as required by  Congress. Additionally, the PCSB collected over $500,000 in fees from  schools that year and in total received $61,360 per school. The PCSB used  its revenue, which was more than double that of the BOE Office of Charter  Schools, in part to employ nine people to oversee 22 charter schools in  fiscal year 2004. The PCSB also had other revenue sources that the BOE  Office of Charter Schools did not, such as grants and interest income. Like  the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB supplemented its staff by  using consultants. In fiscal year 2004, the PCSB spent $134,756 on  consultants to help with charter school oversight, such as reviewing  applications, conducting annual monitoring visits, and assisting with  school closings. PCSB consultants also reviewed schools’ financial  conditions and special education compliance. The PCSB spent more than  its counterpart—$33,897 per school—on both in-house personnel and  consultants.
The PCSB used fewer services available to the authorizers from D.C.  government agencies than the BOE Office of Charter Schools. Unlike the  BOE Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB did not use D.C. Public Schools  test score analysis to determine if its schools were meeting No Child Left  Behind Act standards. However, in April 2005, upon the recommendation  of its financial consultants, the PCSB referred one school to the D.C.  Inspector General for investigation of certain questionable financial  practices. Although the PCSB could refer more cases to D.C. agencies, a  PCSB official stated that the PCSB instead tries to resolve all school issues  by itself in order to help maintain the organization’s independence as an  authorizing board.
section_title: Both Authorizers Spent Their Financial Resources to Support Oversight Activities
paragraphs: Although the two authorizers differed in terms of revenue available to  them, they both used their financial resources to support oversight  activities. Both authorizers used their staff and consultants to perform  functions such as reviewing applications, monitoring schools, and  overseeing school closures, although the costs associated with in-house  staff were not separately tracked by the authorizers. For both authorizers,  the majority of their expenses were used to support salaries and benefits  for authorizer personnel involved in these activities, and other operational  costs, such as conferences and technology. In fiscal year 2004, about three- quarters of the BOE Office of Charter Schools’ expenses, and 88 percent of  the PCSB’s expenses were used in this way (see fig. 4). However, a smaller  percentage of the PCSB’s expenses were used on personnel and a larger  percentage on other operational costs, such as technology, conferences,  and books. The PCSB also had to pay for office space, an expense that the  BOE Office of Charter Schools did not have to incur as its offices were  provided by the BOE.
The BOE Office of Charter Schools used a larger percentage of its total  expenses for consultants than the PCSB. Consultant fees represented one- quarter of the BOE Office of Charter Schools’ total expenses and one- eighth of the PCSB’s in fiscal year 2004. Both used consultants primarily to  monitor schools, but both also hired consultants to review applications  and help with school closings. For example, both the BOE and PCSB hired  consultants to conduct site visits and review schools’ academic programs.  Expenses for both authorizers in fiscal year 2003 were similar to 2004  expenses, as both authorizers used most of their expenses for personnel  and other operational costs. See table 3 for detailed expense information  for both authorizers.
section_title: Both Authorizers Provided Technical Assistance and Collected Academic, Financial, and Other School Data, but Extent and Level of Oversight Differed
paragraphs: Both D.C. authorizers provided schools technical assistance and oversight  of charter schools by tracking schools’ academic achievement and  financial condition. Both authorizers provided charter schools with  assistance and had similar oversight practices, such as visiting each school  at least once annually to assess performance and school operations.  However, their approaches to oversight differed. The BOE Office of  Charter Schools, staffed with only three employees, provided the same  level of oversight to all of its 16 schools and in doing so limited its ability  to provide additional assistance to those schools needing more help.  Moreover, the BOE, which was also responsible for 167 traditional public  schools, did not regularly review information collected by its Office of  Charter Schools. BOE board members we interviewed acknowledged that  problems were sometimes allowed to go unresolved for too long. By  contrast, the PCSB targeted additional oversight on new charter schools  and those where problems had been identified.
subsections: section_title: Both Authorizers Provided Schools with Technical Assistance
paragraphs: Both authorizers provided charter schools technical assistance in several  areas. They often integrated technical assistance and monitoring to help  schools improve academic and financial programs, identify potential  facilities, and apply for facility funding. For example, the BOE Office of  Charter Schools helped a school improve its financial condition after its  2003 audit raised questions about the school’s financial viability.  Specifically, its staff helped the school end a disadvantageous relationship  with a school management company and negotiate a lower rent and  security deposit for new school facilities. In another case, the BOE Office  of Charter Schools obtained a financial operations review from the D.C.  Chief Financial Officer in 2003 and a multi-agency school review in 2004 to  help a school that was identified as having enrollment and funding  problems. The PCSB also integrated technical assistance and monitoring.  For example, the PCSB referred a school to several local organizations for  help, after the PCSB’s 2005 review concluded that the school needed to  improve teacher professional development. PCSB has also established a  governance project to develop pools of candidates for schools’ boards of  trustees, created a financial policy manual for charter schools, and  provided guidance to help schools address transitional issues as the  schools increase enrollment and add grade levels. To help schools address  academic deficiencies identified through monitoring, both authorizers  have helped schools develop their academic accountability plans.
The BOE Office of Charter Schools and PCSB also helped schools develop  school improvement plans to meet No Child Left Behind Act requirements.  For example, BOE Office of Charter Schools officials told us that they  worked with one school to help it create an academic improvement plan  and get relevant training for school leadership after the school did not  make Adequate Yearly Progress in reading and math under the No Child  Left Behind Act in 2005. They also said that they worked with the seven  schools identified as needing improvement as a result of not achieving  Adequate Yearly Progress in the 2004-2005 school year by identifying  actions each school must take to comply with the law, such as developing  school improvement plans outlining corrective strategies and offering  services such as tutoring. The BOE Office of Charter Schools plans to use  its annual monitoring visits to track these schools’ progress. For the   13 PCSB schools identified in 2004-2005 as needing improvement as a  result of not making Adequate Yearly Progress, the PCSB closed one and  has made plans to track schools’ improvement efforts through its annual  monitoring visits. For example, it has incorporated key questions into its  visit protocols in order to measure schools’ progress.
section_title: BOE Collected Data Uniformly from Schools, but Did Not Always Use Information to Address Problems
paragraphs: The BOE Office of Charter Schools provided oversight to charter schools  by using a uniform process to collect academic and financial data from all  its schools, as well as other information about schools’ governance  structure and compliance with laws. Specifically, it required each school  to submit the same information, such as monthly financial statements,  annual student test scores, and teacher information. It also visited each  school at least twice a year—once before the school year began to check  the school’s facilities and operational systems and again during the school  year to monitor school performance. At the beginning of the school year,  the BOE Office of Charter Schools focused on compliance and governance  issues, by checking areas such as school board membership, student  record storage, and adequacy of school facilities. In subsequent visits  during the school year, the BOE Office of Charter Schools monitored  mainly performance information, such as tracking schools’ progress in  achieving their own academic goals and reviewing school budgets and  annual audits.
Although the BOE Office of Charter Schools’ monitoring approach has  enabled it to compile comprehensive data on every school, this approach  has limited its ability to focus attention on those schools most in need of  the monitoring: new schools and schools considered to be at risk. Because  the office has collected the same data from all schools regardless of their  years of operation or performance history, the small staff has had to spend  considerable time sifting through considerable amounts of data on all  schools, while problems at some schools go unaddressed. For example, by  visiting all schools at the beginning of every school year—rather than only  visiting new schools or schools in new locations—the BOE Office of  Charter Schools has dedicated staff resources that could have been  focused on higher risk schools. Moreover, according to a BOE Office of  Charter Schools official, in the past collecting and reviewing monthly  financial statements from all of its schools had been nearly a full-time  responsibility. Furthermore, while the BOE Office of Charter Schools has  relied on the schools’ annual financial statement audits for key  information related to financial oversight, it has not developed a system to  assign priority to schools whose audits documented ongoing problems.  For example, one school’s 2002 audit identified weaknesses that made the  school vulnerable to an embezzlement. Although this particular weakness  was corrected, the 2003 audit showed additional evidence of weak internal  controls. When we asked BOE Office of Charter Schools officials whether  it was possible to focus oversight on schools like this one, they told us that  their practice was to review all schools during the annual monitoring visit  to determine whether the issues have been resolved and require a  corrective action plan if they have not. Additionally, the BOE Office of  Charter Schools generally has not reviewed schools’ annual financial  statement audits when they were submitted to the office, and instead  waited until after the authorizers’ financial monitors completed their  reviews of the schools. This approach may not allow the BOE Office of  Charter Schools to respond in a timely manner to schools with immediate  problems and may have contributed to the number of BOE charter schools  that closed for financial reasons.
Even after BOE Office of Charter Schools staff identified problems,  resolution was sometimes prolonged. For example, two Board members  we interviewed said that timely action was not taken with regard to the  Village Learning Center that eventually closed in 2004. According to the  BOE Office of Charter Schools’ own monitoring reports, this school  experienced numerous problems over a period of years, including  noncompliance with special education requirements, and failure to pay  federal taxes and submit required federal grant performance reports. This  school was open for 6 years and was granted three probationary periods  totaling 180 days. Of the seven BOE schools whose charters were revoked,  four with long-standing problems were allowed to remain open 4 years or  more. In two of these cases, the BOE allowed the schools to stay open to  give them time to correct their deficiencies. According to two BOE Board  members we interviewed, the Board did not regularly review information  collected by the BOE Office of Charter Schools and has not always acted  upon information it received. They also stated that the BOE has not  provided adequate oversight of its charter schools; as one Board member  explained, it is easy to think of charter school oversight as a secondary  concern to overseeing the public school system as a whole. Furthermore,  during our review of the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the BOE had not  held regular meetings devoted to charter schools and did not have a  committee dedicated to charter school oversight. In October 2005, the  BOE approved the creation of a charter school committee. Additionally,  our review of BOE minutes showed that charter schools were infrequently  discussed at BOE’s meetings. According to the BOE Office of Charter  Schools Director, BOE Board members devoted some working sessions to  charter school oversight issues; however, no minutes were taken of these  meetings.
section_title: PCSB Used Data to Target Additional Monitoring Efforts to Schools Most in Need
paragraphs: The PCSB also monitored schools’ financial condition and academic  performance but targeted additional monitoring on schools that needed  more oversight. To monitor schools’ financial performance, the PCSB  collected and reviewed school budgets, monthly financial statements, and  annual financial statement audits. To monitor academics, the PCSB visited  schools annually and collected and analyzed test scores and other data to  track schools’ outcomes as measured against their own academic goals  and D.C. performance standards. Additionally, the PCSB created an annual  compliance review process to track compliance with the No Child Left  Behind Act, special education requirements, provisions of the D.C. School  Reform Act and other laws. When schools have been identified as being  out of compliance, the PCSB has used this process to identify specific  actions each school must take to comply with the law, such as developing  school improvement plans, offering services such as tutoring, and  notifying parents. The PCSB has also monitored issues related to the  schools’ governance, such as the composition and operation of school  boards of trustees, through its annual review of schools’ compliance with  applicable laws and regulations.
To ensure that new schools or schools identified as at risk receive  sufficient oversight, the PCSB has targeted monitoring to ensure that  higher-risk schools receive more attention, while lower-risk entities that  were operating smoothly received less scrutiny. For example, at the  beginning of the school year, the PCSB conducted pre-opening  assessments of only new schools and schools opening in new facilities,  thereby freeing up staff resources for higher risk schools. The PCSB also  provided additional oversight to new schools by conducting a special  financial management review of the internal controls of schools in their  first year of operation. According to the PCSB, the purpose of this early  review was both to assess school compliance and help the schools address  issues early in their implementation. Additionally, the PCSB required  schools in their first year to prepare a self-study, providing another  opportunity for the school to identify challenges that require attention.
The PCSB also applied targeted monitoring to its financial reviews.  Schools with demonstrated financial performance have been allowed by  the PCSB to submit their financial statements on a quarterly—rather than  monthly—basis. The PCSB required schools to return to monthly  submissions of financial statements when financial concerns emerged. For  example, in October 2004, the PCSB required one school to resume  monthly reporting after it failed to submit a financial statement audit that  was due in November 2003. Additionally, the PCSB has conducted interim  financial reviews of schools where financial problems have been detected  through regular monitoring. After identifying a potential budgetary  shortfall at one school, the PCSB conducted an interim financial review of  the school to assess its financial condition. According to a PCSB official,  this review provided the PCSB with the opportunity to make  recommendations to the school to reduce its expenses, which helped  restore the school’s financial condition.
The PCSB also modified its annual and 5-year review processes to  highlight or prioritize schools considered at risk. For example, PCSB’s  annual program review, which has focused on academic performance,  labeled some trouble areas as “mission-critical problems,” signaling to the  school that inadequate improvement in these areas could threaten the  school’s viability. In one case, the PCSB highlighted a school leader’s  extended absences as a mission-critical problem that needed to be  addressed. Following the PCSB’s monitoring report, the school leader  resigned, and the school hired a new principal. Furthermore, the PCSB has  applied criteria to schools during their 5th year of operation to determine  whether each school has met the majority of its academic and  nonacademic goals. Any school that has not met both its academic and  nonacademic goals can be placed on PCSB’s “Priority Review List.” In May  2004, the PCSB placed one such school on this list—the SouthEast  Academy for Academic Excellence—and subsequently revoked its charter.  One PCSB official stated that the rationale for using a targeted monitoring  approach is to free up more resources for technical assistance.
Although some of its schools have experienced problems, the PCSB’s  targeted monitoring approach allowed it to identify and provide technical  assistance to schools in need of attention, which helped PCSB schools  focus on their deficiencies. For example, the PCSB’s monitoring reports  highlighted one school’s need for retaining qualified special education staff  as a “mission-critical” problem for 3 consecutive years. In response, the  PCSB targeted additional monitoring on this school and worked with the  school to develop plans for hiring and training teachers to mitigate the  school’s special education skills shortfall. The PCSB’s targeted monitoring  approach also highlighted problems at both of the PCSB’s schools that  later closed. For example, PCSB monitoring reports show that the  authorizer identified problems, such as noncompliance with special  education requirements, noncompliance with its charter, and late financial  statement audits, at Associates for Renewal in Education Public Charter  School, in the school’s second year of operation. The PCSB also identified  problems at SouthEast Academy, including the school’s inability to  implement its own academic improvement plans. In both cases, the PCSB  responded by intensifying monitoring and placing the schools on  probation, and in the case of SouthEast Academy, revoked the school’s  charter after it failed to correct identified deficiencies.
section_title: Authorizers Undertook a Wide Range of Activities When Schools Closed, but the Process Was Not Well Defined
paragraphs: When charter schools have closed, both authorizers undertook a wide  range of activities to ensure student records and public assets were  safeguarded, parents informed of their children’s school options, and  closing schools received the assistance they needed; however, issues arose  during closings that both found difficult to readily address. Officials from  both authorizers stated that closing charter schools was costly,  particularly when the closed schools were financially insolvent, and  managing student records was the most challenging aspect of school  closures. The authorizers’ processes for closing all nine schools varied in  every instance.
subsections: section_title: When Schools Closed, Authorizers Took Actions to Manage Student Records, Safeguard Public Assets, and Inform Parents
paragraphs: Authorizers used their staff and financial resources to oversee school  closings as well as handle closing logistics, such as distributing student  records, inventorying assets, and communicating with parents. Authorizer  staff inventoried school property, returned assets bought with federal  dollars to the U.S. government, and disbursed remaining assets to other  non-profit organizations, including existing charter schools. For example,  when BOE Office of Charter Schools closed one of its schools, D.C. Public  School staff helped the office inventory and dispose of its property. In a  case when the closing school was financially insolvent, BOE Office of  Charter Schools staff referred its creditors to appropriate parties for  repayment. When one of PCSB’s schools closed, it hired a contractor to  inventory the school’s records. Additionally, both authorizers  communicated closing procedures to parents and students. BOE Office of  Charter Schools officials stated that when charter schools closed, they  sent letters to students and spoke with parents about the closure process.  When the PCSB closed SouthEast Academy in 2005, GAO staff observed a  town hall meeting where PCSB discussed the closure and students’  options for moving to another school. However, parents at the meeting  still expressed confusion about the closure process and their questions  about whether the closed school would reopen under new management  could not be definitively answered at that time.
subsections: section_title: Overseeing School Closures Was Sometimes Costly for Authorizers
paragraphs: Both the BOE and PCSB incurred costs when closing charter schools,  particularly for the five schools that were financially insolvent. For  example, a PCSB official stated that when PCSB closed the Associates for  Renewal in Education Public Charter School, the PCSB spent over   $15,000 from its budget. The authorizers often had to hire additional  temporary staff to help with closing logistics. For example, in some  instances, the authorizers hired administrators from the closed schools to  help transfer records and dispose of inventory, such as textbooks,  computers, and desks. BOE Office of Charter School and PCSB staff stated  that hiring these school administrators helped make the closing process  more efficient because the administrators were knowledgeable of the  schools’ financial and student record keeping systems, as well as the  school staff, parents and students. Four of the nine schools that were  closed were financially solvent. In these cases, the authorizers used school  resources to help defray the cost of closing. For example, the PCSB used  the remaining assets from one closed school to hire a records management  company to help collect, transfer, and store student records. Both  authorizers also devoted staff resources to school closings. Staff spent  time inventorying and dispersing assets, speaking with parents, and  dealing with creditors when schools closed.
section_title: Managing Student Records Was the Most Challenging Aspect of School Closings
paragraphs: Both authorizers reported managing and safeguarding student records was  the most challenging aspect of closing schools. Authorizers have assumed  responsibility for reviewing student records for completeness, collecting  records from closing schools, and distributing records to new schools.  BOE Office of Charter Schools officials stated that this process can be  delayed when student records were missing or were not complete. In some  instances, student records may be on teachers’ desks or in classrooms  rather than in central files, according to BOE Office of Charter Schools  officials. Authorizer staff must then find and collect missing records.  Student records can also be missing information or contain incorrect data.  For example, BOE Office of Charter Schools officials told us that some  student records have not included information about the most recent  school quarter, while other records contained grade or class information  that the students have stated is not correct. BOE Office of Charter Schools  officials stated that updating and correcting these records can be difficult  as the administrators or teachers with the pertinent information may no  longer be available to provide assistance. PCSB officials also cited  problems with managing student records. For example, PCSB officials  stated that transferring records to new schools has been complicated  when parents and students were unsure which school they would attend in  the fall.
In instances where students were no longer continuing their education,  both authorizers had to find a place to store student records. Although  D.C. law requires that student records become the property of D.C. Public  Schools when a charter school closes, D.C. Public Schools officials stated  that they thought responsibility for charter school records belonged to the  authorizers. D.C. Public Schools officials nevertheless told the PCSB in  September 2005 that they would be able to transfer these records to the  D.C. Public Schools central administrative office once this office was  ready to receive them.  According to PCSB officials, as of November 2005,  D.C. Public School officials have not notified them that they are ready to  receive these records and therefore the records remain at the PCSB office.   Similarly, BOE Office of Charter Schools staff told us that they also kept  the records of students who did not continue their education in their  office.
Authorizer staff expressed concerns that parents and students could have  difficulty locating these records, which they would need if they wished to  continue their education or join the military. For example, students—who  may have only had contact with school administrators, rather than  authorizer staff—might not know which authorizer was responsible for  their charter school or how to contact the authorizer when they need to  obtain records from a closed charter school.
section_title: Process for Closing Schools Often Varied with Each Closure
paragraphs: In all nine instances where schools had been closed, neither authorizer has  followed a consistent closure process, and each has dealt with issues as  they arose on a case-by- case basis. For example, the PCSB recently had to  deal with a new closure problem, when for the first time, a charter school  was closed that owned rather than leased its facility. PCSB officials  expressed concerns that the facility might not remain available to D.C.  charter schools, a particular concern as new charter schools have often  had difficulty finding adequate space and existing ones have had difficulty  acquiring space to expand. In this case, the PCSB established guidance  outlining a process by which a closed school could receive petitions from  existing charter schools to utilize its facility, and subsequently approved  the arrangement reached between schools.  BOE Office of Charter Schools  and PCSB officials stated that they varied their school closing process  based partly on the size and type of school and its financial condition at  the time of closing, but such a varied process and the reasons for it may  not be evident to parents as they try to think through what they need to do  to transition their children to other schools. For example, when the BOE  has closed schools, its Office of Charter Schools notified parents of the  closure through letters and phone calls, while PCSB officials also held a  town hall meeting when it revoked a charter. The handling of student  records has varied across school closings and could be confusing for  parents. When PCSB closed Associates for Renewal in Education Public  Charter School, the PCSB hand delivered student records or sent them by  certified mail to the new schools. In a few instances, students also  collected their records from the PCSB office. However, when SouthEast  Academy had its charter revoked, the PCSB hired a record management  company to collect and transfer all records using the funds from the  closed school. PCSB staff and board members stated that they are hoping  to use the SouthEast Academy closure procedures as a model for future  school closings. While both authorizers have gained considerable  experience with respect to what is required when schools close, neither  has put in place a plan that would better guide school closing that would  make it more efficient and clear to parents.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With over a fifth of its students in charter schools, the District of Columbia  has made a significant investment in charter schools. To protect this  investment, the authorizers have a responsibility to provide timely  oversight that ensures that students’ interests are served. However, the  two authorizers conducted their monitoring differently, with the PCSB  targeting its resources and the BOE Office of Charter Schools generally  providing the same level of oversight to all its schools regardless of risk.  While both approaches comply with the law’s requirements for  authorizers, BOE can more effectively focus its resources where possible  to oversee charter schools, particularly given its limited staff. Without  such targeting, this authorizer may not be well positioned to ensure that its  schools receive the assistance they need when they are most at risk.
Additionally, the Board of Education did not have a routine structure or  process to ensure that its members regularly reviewed monitoring data for  the charter schools under its purview. As a result, the Board has not  always reviewed the information before it in time to react effectively and  in a timely manner. Although the Board has begun to address this issue by  taking steps to create a charter school committee, it is not yet clear that  this action will be sufficient to ensure that charter schools receive  appropriate attention.
Finally, when charter schools close, it is critical that a transparent process  exist to ensure that schools, parents, and students understand their  options. While each authorizer undertook a wide range of activities when  schools closed, no process existed to guide the authorizers, schools, and  students through the closing. Lacking such a process, school  administrators and parents may not understand what is required and  expected of them to ensure a smooth educational transition for students.  Additionally, the absence of such a process may result in student records  being misplaced or difficult for students to locate in the future,  particularly if they do not know which entity authorized their school.  Additionally, closing charter schools without a systematic approach may  not allow the authorizers to build on previous experience or learn from  each other. As a result, an opportunity may be lost to develop a uniform,  transparent, and efficient process that protects the interests of all parties.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that D.C. charter schools authorized by the BOE receive  appropriate oversight, we recommend that the BOE Office of Charter  Schools implement a risk-based oversight system that targets additional  monitoring resources to new charter schools and those identified at risk.  Additionally, we recommend that the BOE create a routine and timely  process to review the monitoring information, including audit reports,  collected by its Office of Charter Schools. To help alleviate confusion  among parents, students and school administrators following the closure  of a charter school and to help the D.C. authorizers close schools  efficiently, we recommend that the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the  PCSB and D.C. Public Schools establish a routine process when schools  close, including, among other things, a system for the secure transfer and  maintenance of student records.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the BOE Office of Charter Schools. In  her response, the Executive Director of the BOE Office of Charter Schools  noted that the BOE was taking actions that would address the  recommendations in this report. For example, in response to the first  recommendation, the Executive Director stated that the hiring of three  new staff members will help focus greater oversight on schools in need.  Similarly, in response to the second recommendation, the Executive  Director stated that the BOE’s newly established committee on charter  schools has begun reviewing monitoring data. BOE Board members also  provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate in  this report. In response to Board member comments, we did not change  enrollment or school data, because the audited enrollment count and D.C.  Public Schools confirmed our initial information was accurate.
We also provided a draft of this report to the PCSB. The comments of the  PCSB Executive Director supported our recommendation that the BOE  Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB and D.C. Public Schools establish a  routine process for the secure transfer and maintenance of records when  schools close. PCSB officials also provided technical clarifications, which  we incorporated as appropriate in this report.
We are sending copies of this report to relevant District of Columbia  officials, relevant congressional committees, the Secretary of the  Department of Education, and other interested parties. We will also make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please  contact me at (202) 512-7215 if you or your staffs have any questions about  this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and  Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other major  contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: As required by the D.C. Appropriations Act of 2005, we conducted a review  of D.C.’s two charter school authorizers, the Board of Education (BOE)  and the Public Charter School Board (PCSB). In conducting our analysis,  we reviewed the D.C. School Reform Act, as amended, and other  applicable federal and District laws and regulations to determine the  authorizers’ legal responsibilities. To determine how the authorizers used  their resources (financial and otherwise), we analyzed the authorizers’  budgets and expenses for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We also examined  the authorizers’ use of staff resources and D.C. government services.  Specifically, we identified the types of services available to the authorizers  by D.C. agencies and learned if and how the authorizers used these  services. To analyze the authorizers’ provision of oversight, we examined  monitoring reports, audits and related documentation from 8 of the 42 DC  charter schools operating in school year 2004-2005. We selected these  schools using nonprobability procedures. In nonprobability sampling, staff  selected a sample based on their knowledge of the population’s  characteristics. We selected schools to ensure that our report was able to  address a variety of the issues that the oversight boards faced in their  monitoring efforts. Results from this nonprobability sample cannot be  generalized to the entire population of schools. GAO also convened two  focus groups of charter school administrators (one focus group per  authorizer) to substantiate and augment information provided by the  authorizers. Finally, we examined the actions the authorizers took to  address issues arising from the closure of the nine charter schools that  have lost their charters to date. (See below for more information about our  budget, monitoring, and closure document analysis and use of focus  groups.) We interviewed authorizer staff and board members and officials  of District agencies, including D.C. Public Schools, the Office of the Chief  Financial Officer, the Office of the D.C. Auditor, and the D.C. Office of the  Inspector General. We also interviewed representatives from the D.C.  Public Charter School Association and Friends of Choice in Urban  Schools, a D.C. charter school advocacy group.
We conducted our work between January and November 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Analysis of Financial Documents
paragraphs: To analyze the authorizers’ resources and to learn how they have used  them, we examined the PCSB’s and BOE Office of Charter Schools’s  income and expense statements for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We  analyzed the income statements to determine the proportion of income  each board derived from various sources. Additionally, through interviews  with authorizer staff, we identified income that was carried over from the  previous fiscal year, which was not specifically labeled as such. We  analyzed expenses and categorized these expenses into similar groupings  for comparability purposes. We compared these data with projected  budgets for corresponding fiscal years to identify differences. Finally, we  reviewed the PCSB’s financial statement audits for these fiscal years.  While the D.C. School Reform Act explicitly requires the PCSB to obtain  an annual financial statement audit, the Act contains no such requirement  for the BOE Office of Charter Schools. As a result, we used unaudited  financial information from the BOE Office of Charter Schools.
section_title: Analysis of Monitoring Documents
paragraphs: To obtain information about the processes both authorizers used to  monitor charter schools after they had opened, we examined monitoring  documentation for eight charter schools—four from each authorizer.  These eight schools were selected for variation in the date the schools  opened, grades served, and the schools’ history of probation or sanctions.  Additionally, in selecting the 8 schools, we considered whether or not the  charter school had gone through the 5-year review process, targeted a  special needs population, and had achieved Adequate Yearly Progress in  math or reading as required by the No Child Left Behind Act, and chose  schools for variation in these areas. While our nonprobability selection of  8 of the 42 D.C. charter schools does not allow GAO to generalize results  to all 42 charter schools, our sampling procedures helped ensure that GAO  was able to address the full assortment of issues that the oversight boards  faced in their monitoring efforts. Once the schools were selected, we  requested the authorizers provide us with all monitoring documents,  including documentation of pre-opening visits, annual monitoring site  visits, annual audited financial statements, and documentation of any  sanctions placed on the school. We examined these documents to learn  how the BOE and PCSB monitored academics, finances, school  governance and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. For  each of these areas, we examined the types of deficiencies the authorizers  identified at the schools and how the authorizers ensured deficiencies  were corrected. We analyzed this information on a year-by-year basis to  identify trends in how the BOE and PCSB monitored schools and  addressed problems. We also reviewed Board minutes from monthly  meetings held between January 2003 and April 2005 to learn information  about how the BOE and PCSB address charter school problems at board  meetings. We also used this information to learn more about specific  issues at D.C.’s charter schools.
section_title: Focus Groups
paragraphs: We also used focus groups to obtain the opinions and insights of D.C.  charter school principals and other school officials regarding PCSB and  BOE oversight efforts. Focus groups are a form of qualitative research in  which a specially trained leader, the moderator, meets with a small group  of people who have similar characteristics and are knowledgeable about  the specific issue. The results from the discussion groups are descriptive,  showing the range of opinions and ideas among participants. However, the  results cannot serve as a basis for statistical inference because discussion  groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the extent of a problem or to  generalize results to a larger population, (2) develop a consensus for an  agreed-upon plan of action, or (3) provide statistically representative  samples with reliable quantitative estimates. The opinions of many group  participants showed a great deal of consensus, and the recurring themes  provide some amount of validation.
We conducted two focus groups—one with school leaders from schools  overseen by PCSB and one with school leaders from schools overseen by  BOE. We invited all of the eight schools whose monitoring documents had  been assessed by GAO to attend their respective focus groups. In addition,  we invited representatives from a random selection of the remaining  charter schools (those whose monitoring documents were not assessed by  GAO) to gather information from additional schools. Attendance on the  part of invited participants was voluntary. We had three participants from  three different schools at each of our two focus groups for a total of six  schools participating. A trained focus group moderator led the  discussions. We developed a discussion group guide to assist the  moderator in leading the discussions. A transcription service recorded and  then transcribed the conversations.
section_title: Analysis of Documentation from Closed Charter Schools
paragraphs: To determine the actions the authorizers have taken when D.C. charter  schools closed, we examined documentation from the seven charter  schools closed by the BOE and the two closed PCSB charter schools—one  voluntarily and one through charter revocation. In each instance, we  reviewed the monitoring documentation for each of the closed schools to  determine how the authorizers had identified and reacted to problems at  the schools. We reviewed Board minutes to determine if and when  sanctions were placed on the schools and how the schools responded to  these disciplinary actions. We reviewed revocation documentation,  including school and authorizer correspondence, school appeals, and  minutes from Board meetings when revocations were discussed.  Additionally, we analyzed the authorizers’ budget documents to determine  how the authorizers used their financial resources to close schools. We  reviewed D.C. Public School policies for closing schools and compared  these policies with the authorizers’ school closure procedures. We  attended a town hall meeting organized by the PCSB for parents of a  charter school that was being closed to observe how the authorizer’s staff  and school administrators communicated closure information to students  and parents. Finally, we interviewed one school administrator from a  school that had its charter revoked to learn about the closure process  from the school’s perspective.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the D.C. Board of Education
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the PCSB
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Sherri Doughty, Assistant Director, and Tamara Fucile, Analyst in Charge,  managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects  of this report. Christopher Morehouse also made significant contributions,  and Carlos Hazera, Walter Vance, and Shannon VanCleave aided in this  assignment. In addition, Richard Burkard and Shelia McCoy assisted in the  legal analysis, Julie Phillips assisted with the financial analysis, and   Tovah Rom and Rachael Chamberlin assisted in the message and report  development.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Charter Schools: Oversight Practices in the District of Columbia.   GAO-05-490. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2005.
Charter Schools: To Enhance Education’s Monitoring and Research,  More Charter School-Level Data Are Needed. GAO-05-5. Washington, D.C.:  January 12, 2005.
No Child Left Behind Act: Education Needs to Provide Additional  Technical Assistance and Conduct Implementation Studies for School  Choice Provision. GAO-05-7. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2004.
District of Columbia’s Performance Accountability Report. GAO-04-940R.  Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2004.
Charter Schools: New Charter Schools across the Country and in the  District of Columbia Face Similar Start-Up Challenges. GAO-03-899.  Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2003.
Public Schools: Insufficient Research to Determine Effectiveness of  Selected Private Education Companies. GAO-03-11. Washington, D.C.:  October 29, 2002.
DCPS: Attorneys’ Fees for Access to Special Education Opportunities.  GAO-02-559R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2002.
District of Columbia: Performance Report Reflects Progress and  Opportunities for Improvement. GAO-02-588. Washington, D.C.: April 15,  2002.
Title I Funding: Poor Children Benefit though Funding per Poor Child  Differs. GAO-02-242. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2002.
District of Columbia: Comments on Fiscal Year 2000 Performance  Report. GAO-01-804. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2001.
Charter Schools: Limited Access to Facility Financing.   GAO/HEHS-00-163. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2000.
Charter Schools: Federal Funding Available but Barriers Exist.  GAO/HEHS-98-84. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 1998.
Charter Schools: Issues Affecting Access to Federal Funds.   GAO/T-HEHS-97-216. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 1997.