Disaster Response: FEMA Has Made Progress Implementing Key Programs, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist
Published: 2016-02-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In a disaster requiring a federal response, the Department of Homeland Security's FEMA provides various response resources to state, local, and tribal governments. Such assistance can include deploying US&R teams to help locate survivors and human remains, IMAT teams to help coordinate and provide federal support, and evacuation assistance, when applicable.
GAO was asked to review aspects of FEMA's disaster response programs. Specifically, this report addresses FEMA's efforts to implement, assess, and improve selected disaster response programs for urban search and rescue, incident management, and evacuation tracking. GAO reviewed documentation such as policies, procedures, after action reports, and readiness assessments for these programs and deployments to select disasters for fiscal years 2010 through 2014—capturing pre and post Hurricane Sandy disasters. GAO also interviewed FEMA and state officials, and a nongeneralizable sample of nine US&R task forces to gain insights into FEMA's efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken steps to implement, assess, and improve select disaster response programs, but GAO identified opportunities to strengthen program management. Specifically, GAO found that FEMA uses leading management practices in implementing its Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) program. For example, FEMA has aligned the mission of the US&R Program--to save lives and reduce suffering in communities impacted by a disaster-- with its goal setting efforts in its US&R Strategic Plan. It also communicates program risks to stakeholders and assesses performance so the program can be continuously strengthened. However, all nine US&R task forces GAO interviewed reported challenges funding the maintenance and replacement of their aging equipment to ensure that it is not outdated and adheres to manufacturer standards. FEMA has not developed a plan to prioritize and fund the replacement of this equipment and doing so would help ensure that these task forces are capable of meeting their important response mission.
FEMA applies some leading program management practices in implementing, assessing, and improving its Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT)—such as setting strategic goals and identifying program risks—but does not use other practices that would enhance program management. National and regional IMAT team members are comprised of FEMA employees hired on temporary 4-year contracts. GAO found that FEMA lacks a standardized plan to ensure that all national and regional IMAT members receive required training, and IMAT teams do not always develop after action reports after disaster deployments and document lessons learned. GAO also found that the IMAT program has experienced high attrition across national and regional IMAT teams—since its implementation in fiscal year 2013—and FEMA has not developed a strategy to address these challenges. Developing a plan to address training and retention challenges would help FEMA better meet IMAT program goals.
FEMA's efforts to implement, assess, and improve its evacuation tracking system nationwide have been inconsistent due to lack of state and local resources and interest in using the system. However, FEMA officials said they are taking steps to address concerns raised by users of the system, including technical issues with the software. For example, FEMA has developed a new implementation plan to provide guidance to its regional offices for better communicating and training state and local officials on the use of its tracking software and intends to finalize a system strategic plan in the next nine to 15 months. Since these efforts are ongoing, GAO cannot yet assess the extent that they will address the inconsistences or user concerns with the system.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that FEMA develop a plan to prioritize and fund the replacement of US&R task force equipment; a plan to ensure that IMAT teams receive required training, and a workforce strategy for retention of IMAT staff; and document, track, and analyze recommendations and lessons learned from disaster deployments. DHS concurred with the recommendations and described plans to implement them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The decisions and actions of emergency personnel determine the cost,  duration, and success of the response to a disaster. In an emergency that  requires a federal response, the Department of Homeland Security’s  (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assists state,  local, and tribal governments in coordinating response and recovery  efforts and provides federal disaster response resources including search  and rescue teams, incident response teams, and evacuation assistance,  when applicable. For example, in March 2014, a mudslide traveling  about 200 miles per hour flooded the city of Oso, Washington without  warning and spread debris over 300 acres. The slide was massive,  covering 6,000 feet of highway, destroying over 50 homes, blocking the  North Fork of the Stillaguamish River, and creating a dam that then  formed a lake where none had existed before. On this day, there were 59  people at home when the slide hit; only 16 survived. FEMA deployed its  urban search and rescue (US&R) task forces to help locate survivors and  human remains as well as its incident management assistance teams  (IMAT)  to assist with response efforts. These FEMA disaster response  programs are called for in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management  Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) along with a requirement that  FEMA assist state and local officials with evacuation planning. One way  in which FEMA is meeting this requirement is the creation of the National  Mass Evacuation Tracking System (NMETS). These programs along with  several other FEMA programs were established in response to disasters  such as Hurricane Katrina which severely tested disaster management at  the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in response  programs.
You asked us to review aspects of select FEMA disaster response  programs. This report addresses FEMA’s efforts to implement, assess  and improve disaster response programs for urban search and rescue,  incident management, and evacuation tracking.
To answer our objective, we gathered and reviewed relevant  documentation such as policies and procedures, program directives,  strategic plans, guides, memoranda and internal documents for each of  the programs. We also gathered data on program expenditure costs, and  the type and number of deployments for each of the programs for fiscal  years 2010 through 2014. We selected disasters during this time frame to  which FEMA deployed both a US&R task force and an IMAT  team, and to  capture any changes made to the US&R and IMAT  programs based on  their response to Hurricane Sandy which struck the United States in  October 2012. As a result, we selected seven disasters for review. For  FEMA’s US&R program, we interviewed 10 US&R task forces to discuss  their response to recent disasters, coordination with federal, state, and  local officials, and strengths and challenges with the program. We  selected 3 task forces from each US&R division that responded to at least  one disaster that an IMAT  responded to from 2010 to 2014, and that  included a mix of types of responses (e.g. responses to hurricanes,  tornadoes, and mudslides), as well as 1 inactive task force. We also  observed an US&R exercise in April 2015 to gather information on the  US&R roles, response, and specialized equipment used during an  incident or disaster. Although the information obtained cannot be  generalized across all 28 task forces, it provides a broad understanding of  the challenges and incidents task forces encounter in responding to  disasters.
For FEMA’s IMAT  program, we interviewed team leaders from each of the  three national IMAT  teams and regional IMAT  team leaders or response  directors who manage the IMATs from each of FEMA’s 10 regions. We  gathered information on each region’s deployment history, and  performance, and any differences or challenges in program management  across the 10 regions. We obtained data on attrition for Cadre-of-On-Call  Response Employee (CORE) IMAT  employees for fiscal years 2013-2015  from FEMA’s response directorate. In addition, we interviewed state  emergency managers from each state affected by the disasters we  selected. We also reviewed and analyzed US&R and IMAT  after-action  reports (AAR) for the seven disasters in our review and readiness  assessments of US&R task forces for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 and  IMAT  readiness assessments for fiscal years 2012 through 2014.
For FEMA’s NMETS program, we obtained information on its features  and use by states and localities. We interviewed officials from FEMA  headquarters and from each of FEMA’s 10 regional offices, and nine state  managers responsible for evacuations and sheltering for their states.
To determine the reliability of the deployment, assessment, and attrition  data, we reviewed relevant documentation and internal and third-party  reviews of data collection methods, and interviewed agency officials. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  review. (See appendix I for list of disasters and selected states.) Finally,  we reviewed the documents and information we gathered and compared  them against leading practices identified in the Program Management  Institute’s (PMI) Standard for Program Management.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to January 2016  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  finding and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces
paragraphs: The National US&R task forces are designed to assist state and local  governments in responding to structural collapse incidents and in  conducting search and rescue operations. When a state requests federal  search and rescue assistance, FEMA program managers identify one or  multiple task forces for deployment and issue an activation order. Once a  task force has been activated, all team members are to report to their  point of departure within 4 hours if traveling by ground and within 6 hours  if traveling by air.
Urban Search and Rescue Exercise-April  2015 sponsored by Virginia Task Force 1  From April 24th-25th FEMA’s  Virginia Task  Force 1 hosted a full-scale training exercise in  Lorton, VA. Maryland Task Force 1,  Pennsylvania Task Force 1, members of  foreign US&R teams from Chile, Mexico,  Argentina, and Peru, and USAID’s Office of  Foreign Disaster Assistance also participated.  The exercise began w ith a simulation of an  international deployment to a natural disaster.  The exercise involved 62 role players reacting  to multiple  training scenarios including an  apartment building collapse, a parking garage  collapse, and a highw ay bridge collapse. The  exercise was designed to practice and  evaluate the deployment of a heavy US&R  team in a field setting, the set-up and  management of base operations, and  coordination w ith the Department of  Homeland  Security and others.
Support Function 9 designates FEMA as the federal coordinating agency  for search and rescue operations, with support from the U.S. Coast  Guard, the National Park Service, and the Department of Defense.  Following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in  Oklahoma City, Oklahoma the US&R program added the ability to field  task forces for National Special Security Events and first exercised this  ability at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics and the 1997 presidential  inauguration in Washington D.C. After the terrorist attacks of September  11, 2001 (9/11), the US&R program developed operational capabilities for  chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive environments. In  addition to receiving annual appropriations, in 2002, Congress  appropriated $54 million to the task forces, as part of a supplemental  appropriation. Between 1992 and 2014, the US&R task forces have  deployed to 77 events (see appendix II for the list of events), including the  attacks on 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, the earthquake in  Haiti, and prepositioning for National Special Security Events.
The US&R program includes 28 US&R task forces across the United  States, as shown in figure 1. Each task force is sponsored by an  emergency management response agency, typically a fire department.  Task force members are career or volunteer first responders, such as  canine handlers, physicians, and structural engineers. Every task force  has up to 210 members that are to be capable of arriving on scene at a  disaster within 16 hours of notification. The task forces are designed with  “three-deep” rosters, meaning they strive to have at least three people to  fill each staff position on the roster. The positions on the roster differ  based on the type of team. Type 1 teams have 70 personnel with a full  equipment cache and the capacity to respond to hazardous materials  (Hazmat) and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive  incidents. Type 3 teams have 28 personnel and a smaller equipment  cache that is primarily designed to response to weather-driven  disasters.
Each US&R task force is to maintain a cache of equipment in eight  categories: communications, Hazmat, logistics, medical, planning, rescue,  technical, and water, as shown in figure 2. The cache requirements are  uniform for each task force, a fact that promotes interoperability among  task forces when they are working together on a deployment. Each task  force maintains a cache of more than 2,000 types of items and there may  be more than one of each item. For example, hydrogen peroxide is one  item on the cache list used for wound care, but the team is required to  carry 10 units, or bottles, of that item. The items in each category range  from small, easy to transport items like hand held radios and hammers, to  large items that require special transportation, such as water rescue  boats. Some items require replacement after use, like bandages, while  others should last years, like a canine kennel. Some items in the cache  are low-cost and routinely replaced, while others require regular  maintenance and are costly to replace. For example, the 2014 unit price  of the Raker Shore System, a pneumatic powered tool that is used for  rescue, is $16,832, while aspirin used for medical treatment costs $0.03  per tablet.
The US&R program is managed by FEMA’s Operations Division’s US&R  Branch of the Response Directorate. The US&R Branch develops  policies, procedures, and guidance for the US&R program and is  available to provide technical assistance to task forces. In accordance  with guidance from the US&R program’s Strategic Group, FEMA allocates  a portion of its annual appropriation to each task force for training  exercises, equipment acquisition and maintenance, program  management, and other support functions. Annual costs are funded  through readiness cooperative agreements between FEMA and each of  the 28 task force sponsoring agencies. Between fiscal year 2010 and  fiscal year 2014, each US&R task force received an average of $1.1  million per year in cooperative agreement funds. Task forces’ disaster- specific costs are funded through the Disaster Relief Fund. Between fiscal  year 2010 and fiscal year 2014 the US&R task forces received  approximately $25 million in reimbursements from the Disaster Relief  Fund.
section_title: Incident Management Assistance Teams
paragraphs: When states request federal assistance and the President declares a  major disaster, IMATs  must arrive at the affected state or jurisdiction  within 12 hours.  IMATs are made up of FEMA emergency management  staff in areas such as operations, logistics, planning, and finance and  administration. The IMAT  program includes 3 national teams and 13  regional teams across FEMA’s 10 regions. (See appendix III  for a map  with IMAT  locations).  National IMAT  teams typically respond to Level I  catastrophic events which require significant federal assistance and  coordination in response and recovery. Regional teams typically respond  to Level II  and III  incidents that may require a high or moderate amount of  federal assistance. IMATs can also provide assistance in events that  are not disasters, such as National Special Security Events. For example,  the national IMAT  teams assisted the Centers for Disease Control and  Prevention in the Ebola response as well as providing support during the  influx of unaccompanied minors in 2014. Regional IMAT  teams have  provided support at the Democratic and Republican National Conventions  and Superbowl, as well as the United Nations African Leaders Summit in  Washington, D.C.
Oso, Washington Mudslide   On Saturday, March 22, 2014 at 10:45 am a  large and unprecedented landslide occurred  north of the Stillaguamish River, along State  Route 530 in Washington State, tw o miles  east of the small tow n of Oso.  The slide w as  massive, covering 6,000 feet of highw ay,  destroying over 50 homes, blocking the North  Fork of the Stillaguamish River, and creating a  dam w hich then formed a lake w here none  existed before.  On this day, there w ere 59  people at home w hen the slide hit. Only 16  survived this horrific event that occurred with  no w arning.   The local and regional community responded  and initiated immediate  lifesaving and incident  command operations. Affecting numerous  rescues and rapidly determining the size,  scale and complexity of the devastation.   Additional requests for assistance were  initiated from local to State and the Federal  Government.  FEMA deployed resources to  the incident to include its Urban Search  Rescue (US&R) Task Force and its 20 Canine  Search Teams - Human Remains Detection  Teams; and a National Incident Management  Assistance Team among other resources. required to respond to the incident. The IMAT  may support first  responders in providing shelter, emergency food and supplies, and  restoration of government services. IMAT  team members may also help  state and local officials in obtaining temporary housing or counseling for  disaster victims and providing estimates for replacement of damaged  infrastructure. IMAT  teams have responded to a range of disasters  including Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012; the 2013 floods in  Colorado; and the 2014 mudslide in Oso, Washington.
The IMAT  program was historically staffed by permanent full time FEMA  employees, whose salaries and benefits were supplemented by funds  from the disaster relief fund for expenses when the teams were deployed  to specific disasters. After FEMA used nearly all of its IMAT  teams in  response to Hurricane Sandy, the agency increased the number of IMAT  staff. FEMA increased total program staffing by replacing its 97  permanent full time employees in fiscal year 2010 with 255 new CORE  positions for fiscal year 2015. CORE IMAT  employees are hired on 4-year  contracts, and the positions may be renewed if there is ongoing disaster  work and funding is available. Under the new team composition, the 3  national IMAT  teams grew from 16-member teams staffed by permanent  full time employees to 32-member teams staffed by CORE employees. At  the same time, the regional IMAT  teams grew from teams of 4 permanent  full time employees to teams of 12 CORE employees (See appendix IV  for national and regional IMAT  position organizational charts). In  establishing the CORE teams, FEMA shifted all program funding to the  disaster relief fund and program expenditures increased from  approximately $13 million in fiscal year 2010 to $35 million obligated from  the disaster relief fund for fiscal year 2015 (to include all salaries and  benefits and available program costs, but not including disaster-specific  costs). (See appendix V for detailed IMAT  positions and program  funding.) As of July 2015, all IMATs  have transitioned to the new CORE  teams. Figure 3 shows the evolution of FEMA’s incident response teams  and changes in IMAT  size and composition since 2006.
section_title: FEMA Emergency Evacuation Assistance and National Mass Evacuation Tracking System
paragraphs: Emergency evacuations are the responsibility of state and local  governments. However, FEMA is responsible for providing direction,  guidance, and technical assistance on state and local evacuation plans  that contain integrated information on transportation operations, shelters,  and other elements of a successful evacuation. FEMA provides  evacuation support and response through its Office of Response and  Recovery primarily through three programs: the National Hurricane  Program, the National Evacuations Contracts, and NMETS, a database  tool that is intended to support state transportation-assisted evacuees  and facilitate data sharing among declared and host states or  jurisdictions.
In fiscal year 2007, FEMA developed NMETS with initial program funding  of $2 million.  NMETS is designed to assist state and local officials in  registering persons, pets, and personal property requiring government- assisted evacuation in response to a disaster or impending disaster;  identifying their individual needs; accounting for them as they move  through embarkation, and debarkation; and connecting them with other  family members, pets, and personal items. During evacuation, electronic  barcodes link all household members and their possessions and key  information collected consists of name, date of birth, gender, pre- evacuation address, family members, medical needs or equipment, and  service animals.
section_title: FEMA Has Taken Some Steps to Implement, Assess, and Improve Three Disaster Response Programs but Opportunities for Improvement Exist
subsections: section_title: FEMA Uses Leading Practices for Implementing and Assessing the US&R Program, but Lacks a Plan for Replacing Aging Task Force Equipment
subsections: section_title: FEMA Uses Leading Practices to Implement the US&R Program
paragraphs: FEMA uses leading program management practices for goal setting,  communication, and program execution to provide urban search and  rescue services for a wide variety of disasters.
Goal setting: FEMA has ensured that the mission of the US&R  program aligns with the goals and resources of the program. The  US&R Strategic Plan outlines six mission goals including response,  readiness, communication, collaboration, accountability, and  implementation of the US&R strategic training plan. US&R program  officers established specific objectives, strategies, and performance  measures to support the goals. For example, one goal is to save lives  and protect property in an all-hazards environment. An objective  supporting this goal is refinement of the structural collapse mission. In  an effort to achieve this objective, the US&R program plans to  develop, review, and update deployment concepts of operations for  potential secondary missions such as Hazmat and human remains  detection canine missions. State emergency managers we spoke with  said that during a disaster, US&R task forces will do whatever is  needed to achieve their mission. During recent disasters, this has  meant that the US&R task forces provided assistance beyond  traditional structural collapse operations. For example, in response to  Hurricane Sandy, task forces were needed to provide humanitarian  assistance in conducting wellness checks in affected neighborhoods.  After the mudslide in Oso, Washington, US&R task forces were  needed to conduct canine human remains detection searches, and  the task forces deployed 22 canine units. The clear mission,  objectives, and strategies set by the program gives the task forces the  authority to take action to save lives and help the task forces achieve  their overarching mission. This alignment of agency mission with  strategic goals and resources is a leading practice for effective  program management.
Communication:  FEMA communicates US&R program risks and  performance issues through the US&R Advisory Organization. The  advisory organization is composed of senior members or specialists  from the 28 task forces. When the task forces raise an issue to the  advisory organization, it is to assign subgroups to examine the issue  in order to propose a solution or course of action. For example, at a  September 2015 meeting of the organization, the Logistics sub-group  briefed the advisory organization on a plan they are developing to  reduce the equipment cache to ensure they are able to rapidly  respond to incidents. The advisory organization maintains an Action  Tracker List with priority issues that the group addresses. A majority  of the task forces (6 of the 9 we contacted) said the advisory  organization was an effective mechanism for collaboration and  communication and addressing challenges within the US&R program.  Creating a venue for communicating program risks and uncertainties  and addressing issues that arise during the course of program  performance is another leading practice for effective program  management.
Program execution: Each of the 28 US&R task forces uses the same  operations manual, which outlines procedures for task force  activation, operation in the field, and demobilization. All 9 task forces  we interviewed reported that they rely on the operations manual as a  reference to conduct task force operations. In addition, each of the 28  US&R task forces is governed by a similar cooperative agreement  between its sponsoring agency and FEMA and the members of each  task force must meet the same training standards and carry the same  equipment cache. This uniformity in management of the task forces  promotes interoperability  and reliability,  both for task forces  collaborating in a disaster response and for states anticipating US&R  assistance after a request to FEMA. This is also a leading practice for  effective program management.
FEMA officials cited several benefits of the US&R program. For example,  they said the US&R program is more cost-efficient than a full-time federal  US&R resource. They estimated that, in order to staff three shifts (or 24  hour coverage) of an equivalent,  federally-maintained 70 member US&R  team, it would cost $22.7 million per task force. In comparison, the fiscal  year 2014 budget for the US&R program (all 28 task forces) was  approximately $35 million. They also said that US&R sponsoring  agencies benefit from sponsoring a task force because the training and  equipment they receive is often valuable for their primary function as a  fire department or emergency response agency. Eight out of nine state  emergency managers we interviewed expressed a positive opinion of the  US&R program and said that they would request search and rescue  assistance from FEMA if it was ever needed. None of the state  emergency managers we spoke with identified challenges or issues in  requesting US&R assistance from FEMA.
section_title: FEMA Uses Leading Practices to Assess the US&R Program
paragraphs: We also found that FEMA uses leading program management practices  for conducting periodic reviews based on program standards to assess  the US&R program. FEMA uses after action reports (AAR), administrative  readiness evaluations, and the Operational Readiness Exercise  Evaluation Program to assess the US&R program.
After action reports: After every deployment or exercise, each task force  produces an AAR with a chronology of events, an evaluation of team  effectiveness, recommendations for improvement, and lessons  learned. We reviewed 32 AARs on responses to Hurricane Irene,  Hurricane Isaac, Hurricane Sandy, the 2013 Oklahoma Tornadoes,  the 2013 Colorado flooding, the 2013 Arkansas Tornado, and the  Oso, Washington Mudslide. We found that each AAR includes a  standard format for communicating and addressing issues that arose  during the course of US&R’s Task Forces’ response to specific  disasters. For example, in response to the 2013 Colorado flooding,  each task force deployed (four in total) issued an AAR containing the  areas cited above—which included a section on the task force’s  performance on six elements: search, medical, rescue, safety,  communications, and logistics. For each element, a description of the  task, analysis of performance, and improvement action to be taken  was reported, if applicable.
Administrative readiness evaluations: These evaluations assess  task forces on their readiness for deployment and include two parts:  an annual self-assessment conducted by each task force and a  triennial peer review, led by members of peer task forces. Both  reviews use the same assessment instrument to evaluate task forces  based on their operational, logistics, and management readiness. We  reviewed 28 evaluations which included one evaluation for each of the  28 task forces for fiscal years 2012 through 2014. On the basis of the  results of the peer evaluation, task forces may be deemed “fully  operational”, “conditional,” or “non-operational”. If a task force is not  fully operational, it must develop a corrective action plan in  collaboration with officials from the FEMA US&R Branch and  implement that plan. We found that 1 of the 28 US&R task forces has  been in a conditional or non-operational status for 7 years. That task  force was first placed on non-operational status in 2007 and regained  conditional status in 2010, only to fall back to non-operational status in  2012. That task force was again placed on conditional status in 2013,  non-operational in 2014, and in September 2015, FEMA announced  that it would be removed from the US&R program. FEMA US&R  officials said they had provided sufficient time for the task force to take  corrective actions, but the task force failed to effectively respond.  During our review, FEMA issued a draft program memorandum with  administrative procedures for removing task forces that fail to regain  fully-operational  status within 2 years of being placed on non- operational status. According to the draft program memorandum,  the task force will have the opportunity to appeal the decision for its  removal.
Operational Readiness Exercise Evaluation Program: This  program requires task forces to conduct a large-scale training  exercise every 3 years, develop a training plan based on that  exercise, and update the plan annually. Task forces use the Exercise  Evaluation Guide to assess their performance. We observed one of  FEMA’s large-scale exercises in April 2015, where US&R task forces  conducted three rescue scenarios and were evaluated on their  performance. In addition, we reviewed the results for another large- scale training exercise and found that the reporting followed the  criteria laid out in the US&R evaluation guide. Task forces receive a  score of fully, partially, or not complete for tasks such as the ability to  assemble personnel and equipment at designated location. Task force  mobilization, deployment, tactical operations, and demobilization are  some of the broad tasks assessed at the exercise conducted by  Texas Task Force 1.
Leading program management practices include conducting periodic  reviews of the progress of the program in delivering its expected benefits,  thereby enabling the organization to assess and enforce program  conformance with organizational standards. By establishing these  multiple approaches to assessing the program, and continually  incorporating program changes thorough AARs, the advisory  organization, and corrective action reviews, FEMA is positioned to  respond to US&R program changing needs and requirements.
section_title: FEMA Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Improve Replacement of US&R Task Force Equipment
paragraphs: The aging status of the task forces’ equipment has not yet been an  operational issue identified by the various US&R assessments, but all 9  task forces we interviewed reported challenges funding the maintenance  and replacement of their equipment caches. FEMA originally funded the  caches between 1990 and 2005, including specialty equipment such as  Hazmat/chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, and water  safety equipment (added after 9/11) and new communications equipment  added between 2005 and 2007. While some items are low-cost and  routinely replaced after use, like bandages, other items have a much  longer service life, may require regular maintenance, and are costly to  replace. For example, each task force has pneumatic powered tools, such  as the strut system which is used to support collapsed buildings for  search and rescue. The total strut kit, which consists of multiple  expandable struts and other support equipment, cost about $72,000 in  2014, see figure 4 for an example of its use.
Task force leaders we interviewed identified challenges in funding  maintenance and upgrade of the equipment in their cache, along with  adhering to recommended manufacturer shelf life requirements. For  example, the standard US&R radio system is 10 years old and is  becoming outdated. In addition, US&R hazmat equipment has a 5-year  replacement cycle and is due for replacement. Through the US&R  cooperative grant agreements, FEMA allocates about $155,000 to each  task force annually, identified for equipment maintenance and acquisition.  US&R team leaders said that the allocation covers equipment  maintenance but is not sufficient to acquire or replace equipment.
The 2013-2017 US&R Strategic Plan identified the need for the Logistics  Functional Group within the advisory organization to develop a  replacement life cycle analysis as part of a strategy to finance the  replacement of high-cost items in the equipment caches. While FEMA  program officials have not yet developed this strategy, they have drafted  a position paper detailing the life cycle and costs (along with multiple  replacement options) for one piece of critical equipment in the US&R  cache—the self-contained breathing apparatus. In September 2015,  FEMA replaced this piece of equipment (approximately $1.1 million) using  funding that had been intended for the task force that was de- commissioned during the course of our review. In addition, FEMA  changed the funding cycle for the annual grants from 1 year to 3 years  beginning in 2015 in an effort to provide task forces more flexibility  for  high-dollar purchases. Task force managers we spoke with reported that  a longer funding cycle could help them budget for equipment  replacement. The increased flexibility in the annual grant funding cycle  and the position paper for one of the high-cost items in the equipment  caches represent progress towards aligning task force resources with  US&R program goals.
However, FEMA has not developed a comprehensive plan that would  enable program managers and task force leaders to prioritize and fund  the replacement of all items in the equipment cache. A key component of  effective program management is committing resources that support the  goals and strategic mission of the program. The Standard for Program  Management calls for agencies to engage in resource planning to  determine which resources are needed and when they are needed to  successfully implement the program. FEMA program managers agreed  that a comprehensive plan would help them better prioritize future high- cost equipment purchases, noting that they had not yet focused their  management attention on this issue. Developing a plan to prioritize and  fund equipment needs will help FEMA to ensure US&R teams have the  equipment they need to fulfill their mission.
section_title: FEMA Uses Some Leading Practices to Implement, Assess, and Improve the IMAT Program but Additional Actions Would Strengthen this Program
paragraphs: FEMA uses some leading program management practices in  implementing, assessing, and improving the IMAT  program components  but does not use other practices that would enhance program  management. Specifically, FEMA lacks a standardized training plan for all  national and regional IMAT  members to effectively implement the  program and has an inconsistent assessment process that limits its  effectiveness. FEMA also has not developed a plan to address  challenges related to staff attrition.
subsections: section_title: FEMA Uses Some Leading Practices to Implement the IMAT Program but Has Not Effectively Implemented Program Training and Assessments
paragraphs: FEMA Response Directorate officials have developed a number of  strategic documents and policy guidance to provide goals and a  management structure for implementing and managing the IMAT  program  in accordance with leading practices in program management. For  example, FEMA’s Response Directorate Operating Plan outlines the  IMAT  role in disaster response, while the Response Directorate Strategic  Plan establishes strategic goals for IMAT  development and  performance. The Response Directorate Strategic Plan also calls for  continuing emphasis on quality of response teams, promoting a stable,  flexible, and fully qualified workforce, and ensuring a robust training  curriculum. The draft IMAT  Procedures Guide provides details on IMAT  protocols and the IMAT  role in supporting FEMA’s mission, while the  IMAT  Program Directive outlines the agency-wide policy for  administration, implementation, and oversight of the program. These  documents also offer guidance outlining the overall disaster response  procedure and position-specific duties on the IMAT.  Establishment of  clear goals and managerial structure is a leading practice for effective  program management.
Additionally,  FEMA Response Directorate officials developed  mechanisms to communicate program risks and address issues in IMAT  program performance, another leading practice. For example, to share  lessons learned and best practices after deployments and exercises,  IMAT  team leaders hold monthly meetings. These meetings provide an  opportunity for team leaders to address challenges or problems that arise  during incidents and work to establish strategies to resolve these issues.  FEMA Response Directorate officials also told us that IMAT  members  participate in monthly meetings so that those performing the same job  functions can share experiences and strategies for effective disaster  response. FEMA officials also communicate potential program risks and  performance issues through three strategic working groups, which  address program-specific challenges in the areas of retention, training,  and equipment. These groups allow IMAT  members to discuss issues  and share findings and recommendations for program changes. For  example, one working group is exploring ways to centralize certain types  of equipment to be used during catastrophic incidents.
With the implementation of the new CORE IMAT  program in 2013, FEMA  Response Directorate officials also employed leading practices in  program management for promoting program execution by enabling staff  to obtain training. Specifically, they established a preliminary training  program through the IMAT  Academy and long-term training requirements  for staff to acquire the requisite skills and abilities to effectively conduct  their position-specific responsibilities and become fully qualified under the  FEMA Qualification System (FQS). As part of their training, IMAT  members first participate in the 14-week IMAT  Academy, which includes  orientation to FEMA’s emergency management system, team building,  and real-world exercises. IMAT  members are then to complete  subsequent cadre-specific training courses at the Emergency  Management Institute and build experience through on-the-job training  during disaster deployments and exercises to become qualified under  FQS.
However, IMAT  leaders at the regional and national levels expressed  concerns about limited access to training opportunities after the academy  as well as limited funds available to enable IMAT  members to fulfill  training requirements. Specifically, all 10 regional IMAT  representatives  and 1 of 3 national team leaders said that there was not sufficient funding  or access to training opportunities for staff during their 4-year contracts as  CORE employees. Regional IMAT  team leaders said that many required  courses through the Emergency Management Institute are not offered  frequently enough for IMAT  members to attend, or have not yet been  developed. IMAT  leaders also said that limited funds and infrequent  disasters result in inconsistent training across teams. They also said that  since their regions do not have budgets dedicated to IMAT  training, they  do not track costs associated with regional IMAT  training. FEMA  Response Directorate officials told us that cadre managers in FEMA  headquarters are responsible for ensuring that staff in their cadres have  access to appropriate courses. Regional officials from one region also  told us that without planning to ensure consistent access to required  courses, it could take 2 years for some IMAT  CORE members to  complete all their cadre-specific requirements.
Although state emergency managers reported having positive  experiences and strong relationships with the previous IMAT  teams  staffed by more experienced permanent full time FEMA employees, they  expressed concerns about a lack of qualified staff on the new CORE  IMATs. For example, officials from two states said that the previous  IMATs were very experienced and performed a key role in providing  management assistance during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. An official from  another state described crucial support provided by the previous IMATs  during the response to the Oso mudslide in 2014, including providing  technical and subject matter assistance and coordinating federal  resources. State officials had limited interactions with new CORE IMATs  but described mixed experiences. For example, officials in two states  expressed positive views of IMAT  assistance and the states’ overall  relationships with the new IMATs,  while officials from two other states  where the new IMAT  teams had deployed expressed concerns about the  lack of experience among the new teams in performing key duties during  disaster response. Specifically, they told us that they spent additional time  and resources “training FEMA staff on their state processes,” taking up  time that they could have spent working on their state’s disaster  response.
We have assessed FEMA’s workforce planning, including similar issues  related to training and the FQS system, in our prior work on FEMA’s  Reservists (temporary disaster response employees that FEMA deploys,  as needed, to specific disasters). Specifically,  In 2012, we reported that FEMA lacked long term plans and goals  related to training, and we identified the need for FEMA to establish  timelines and a system to track training costs for its Reservist  workforce. To improve FEMA’s workforce planning and training  efforts, we recommended that they identify long-term goals, establish  timeframes for developing performance measures, and develop a  process to collect and analyze workforce and training data. In April  2015, FEMA said it would issue a Human Capital Strategic Plan  addressing these recommendations by September 2015. However,  we have not yet received documentation of this new plan. To  improve management and training in the Reservist program, we  recommended that FEMA take steps to improve monitoring and  communication of program policies across all regions, establish  criteria for program hiring, establish a more rigorous performance  appraisal system, and implement training milestones and a  mechanism to track training costs. FEMA has taken steps to address  these including updating policies and guidance, centralizing  management of the program, implementing a new communication  strategy, standardizing hiring criteria, establishing a training plan with  milestones, and establishing a system to track training costs.  According to FEMA officials, agency guidance regarding the  performance management system for Reservists was due to be  developed by July 2015. We have not yet received pending  documentation confirming issuance of this guidance.
FEMA Qualification System (FQS)  FEMA’s FQS is the latest initiative in FEMA’s  ongoing efforts to credential its w orkforce.   According to agency officials, FQS is intended  to standardize and streamline the certification  process for all FEMA employees, in  comparison to prior credentialing efforts which  focused on temporary Disaster Assistance  Employees.  As part of FQS, FEMA  established performance and training  standards for each FEMA disaster-related  position.    The FQS system is intended to certify an  employee’s status based on the employee’s  recognized performance and know ledge, as  w ell as the training the employee has  completed, measured against established  standards.   Under the FQS, individuals are  assigned a qualification title of entry-level  “trainee” or the more experienced title of  “qualified” based on training and experience  levels. deploying to disasters were not all trained to the FQS level to which  they were assigned. We found that these long-standing challenges  continue to impact the IMAT  program. In particular, we reported on  steps FEMA is taking to address longstanding workforce challenges  related to the DHS Surge Capacity Force and FEMA Corps. We made  five recommendations, including for FEMA to improve recruitment  track costs associated with its workforce, and improve program  performance tracking.  FEMA concurred with our recommendations;  however we have not received documentation on actions it has taken  or plans to take in response to these recommendations.
According to leading practices on workforce training, agencies should  plan to ensure sufficient training opportunities as well as track cost and  performance of training programs to ensure effective program  execution. Further, leading practices in human capital management call  for federal agencies to develop long-term strategies for developing staff to  achieve programmatic goals. Finally, the 2015 IMAT  Program Directive  requires all IMAT  members to be trained according to FQS guidelines for  incident management and incident support positions.
FEMA Response Directorate officials said they had not developed an  IMAT  workforce plan to meet the training and funding needs of the new  CORE IMATs because the program was early in its implementation. The  officials also said that ensuring access to training specific to each cadre is  the responsibility of cadre managers, not the IMAT  program. To address  regional officials’ concerns about access to IMAT  training opportunities,  FEMA Response Directorate officials said they intended to develop a  standard IMAT  training program by forming a strategic working group.  The working group’s proposed IMAT  training program will include ongoing  training at the IMAT  Academy for both experienced and new IMAT  members, annual validation  training, and quarterly exercises and training  to improve interoperability among regional and national IMAT  teams.
They intend to work with the Emergency Management Institute to make  courses available for IMAT  members and implement the new training  program by January 1, 2016. However, these efforts do not address the  cadre-specific training needs of CORE IMAT  members.
FEMA Response Directorate officials said they also intended to take  steps in response to concerns about limited training budgets raised by  regional officials. Specifically, FEMA Response Directorate officials said  they updated their budget planning documents in September 2015 to  account for funds for IMAT  training and program costs in fiscal year 2016;  IMAT  leaders told us that previously the FEMA Response Directorate did  not have a budget allocation specific to IMAT  training. They said they  intend to provide annual funding for the new regional CORE IMAT teams  from the Disaster Relief Fund.
Though FEMA Response Directorate officials have established a working  group to develop a training program and intend to begin accounting for  regional IMAT  training and other program costs, the process is ongoing,  and we cannot yet assess the its effectiveness or determine whether  these steps will help to address the challenges we have identified related  to access to and funding for IMAT  training. Further, FEMA has not  developed a comprehensive training plan for its IMAT  members that links  the IMAT  training and cadre-specific training requirements to available  training opportunities to ensure timely completion of the requirements.  Such a plan would also help program officials better anticipate and  budget for the costs of implementing the training needed for the new  CORE IMAT  teams to become fully qualified under FQS. Without a  comprehensive plan to ensure sufficient training opportunities as well as  to track cost and performance of IMAT-specific and cadre training  programs, IMAT  program managers will continue to face challenges in  implementing their new 2015 IMAT  Program Directive and ensuring that  IMAT  teams consistently have the skills and qualifications to fulfill their  disaster response duties.
section_title: FEMA Uses Leading Practices to Assess the IMAT Program but Inconsistent After-Action Reporting, Tracking, and Guidance May Limit Program Improvements
paragraphs: FEMA demonstrates leading practices in program management including  conducting periodic program reviews, developing metrics to track  program performance, and creating a venue to address issues of program  performance. FEMA demonstrates these leading practices through  several assessment mechanisms that evaluate IMAT  readiness, report on  IMAT  performance, and gather information that can be used to make  program-wide changes.
Operational readiness evaluations: These annual assessments  measure the IMATs’ ability to deploy to disasters and assist state and  local partners, including measuring performance in the areas of  personnel, management, training, and equipment of each IMAT  team.  In our review of all 10 operational readiness evaluations conducted in  2014 for both regional and national IMAT  teams, we found that each  team received a 90 percent (or higher) score. For example,  according to their 2014 operational readiness evaluation, the national  IMAT  West team demonstrated a strong performance in the areas of  management and personnel, as well as effective use of  communications equipment during its 2014 exercise. However, the  exercise evaluation also pointed out that the team had several  personnel vacancies that needed to be filled, as well as a lack of FQS  qualification for many team members. Of the 10 teams that conducted  an annual operational readiness exercise evaluation in 2014, the  national IMAT  West team was the 1 team that had adopted the new  CORE IMAT  structure, while the 9 other teams being reviewed were  previous teams staffed by permanent full-time employees. As a  result, the majority of the most recent operational readiness  evaluations available at the time of our review did not assess FEMA’s  IMAT  teams under its new staffing model.
Thunderbolts: FEMA conducts annual “Thunderbolt” exercises,  which are no-notice events to evaluate IMAT  readiness in such areas  as mobilization, communications readiness, and deployment to  operations-based exercises simulating a catastrophic disaster  environment. FEMA has previously used findings from these  exercises to make changes to the IMAT  program, including  implementing recommendations to expand the teams and improve  IMAT  training.
DHS Annual Performance Reports: FEMA also gathers and reports  on IMAT  preparedness and performance as part of the DHS Annual  Performance Report. As part of this reporting, FEMA has developed  annual performance metrics for IMATs,  including the ability of IMAT  teams to deploy to and stabilize an incident within 72 hours and  establish joint objectives with state partners within 18 hours. FEMA  Response Directorate officials capture and analyze this data through  the National Watch Center, which tracks IMAT  status and deployment  time after disaster declarations. For fiscal year 2014, the DHS Annual  Performance Report stated that 100 percent of IMAT  teams met their  targets for these two measures. In addition, the IMAT  program has  established individual  and team-based performance measures to  evaluate each individual’s ability to carry out his or her own  responsibilities within a given time frame.
After-action reports: IMATs are required to produce AARs after  disaster deployments to assess functions and tasks carried out during  the deployment along with lessons learned, best practices, and areas  needing improvement. Program officials in FEMA headquarters are to  review these reports after every deployment. Additionally,  FEMA  Response Directorate officials drafted an IMAT  Procedures Guide  with requirements and a template for AARs that all regions are  expected to use after every deployment. These requirements for after- action reporting create a venue for FEMA Response Directorate  officials to review and address issues of IMAT  program performance.
FEMA Readiness Assessment Program: The FEMA readiness  assessment program evaluates performance and overall team  readiness of IMAT  teams as well as other teams involved in response  and recovery. The readiness assessment program is a group within  the Office of Response and Recovery that gathers data through  observing exercises and conducting reviews after disaster  deployments. Reviewers may then record their observations and, in  some cases make recommendations in an Excel spreadsheet.  FEMA program officials may then use these findings to conduct trend  analyses to identify common themes or areas for improvement after  exercises or a response.
Conducting annual reviews, developing metrics and tracking  performance, assessing progress and addressing issues of program  performance of the IMAT  program reflects leading practices in program  management. However, while FEMA has demonstrated some leading  program management practices in establishing requirements for these  assessments, we found inconsistencies in IMAT  program after-action  reporting as well as limitations in FEMA’s use of the FEMA Readiness  Assessment Program to conduct comprehensive IMAT  program analysis.  Specifically, we found a lack of consistency in how frequently IMATs  produce AARs after deployments to disasters or after full scale exercises,  what information they include in the reports, and how they share the  results.
According to our discussions with regional teams and our analysis of data  provided by FEMA, not all regions produce AARs after every deployment.  For example, 6 out of 10 regional IMATs  stated that they produce AARs  after every major deployment and none of the 3 national IMAT  teams  produced AARs since the implementation of the CORE staff in 2013. Four  of 10 regional IMATs do not include improvement plan matrices in their  AARs to track lessons learned and recommendation implementation.  Despite the fact that IMAT  guidance requires an AAR after every  deployment, five of 10 regional IMATs said that they do not produce and  share AARs with FEMA headquarters after every disaster deployment. In  addition, the 2015 IMAT  directive does not include requirements for  FEMA headquarters IMATs  or regional IMATs  to track implementation of  AARs’ recommendations, perform trend analysis across teams and  AARs, or use findings to enact system-wide policy changes. Similarly,  while the FEMA Readiness Assessment Program creates a venue to  analyze IMAT  program trends, there is no guidance for how these  assessments will be used to evaluate the IMAT  program. Specifically,  while FEMA Response Directorate officials described the readiness  assessment program as the primary means to analyze IMAT  program  trends, IMAT  guidance does not establish policies or procedures detailing  what are to be included in the assessments, when program officials are to  conduct them, or how program officials plan to use the results.  Furthermore, IMAT  guidance includes no mention of the Excel  spreadsheet or how it should be used. Response Directorate officials told  us that IMAT  teams do not generally use the spreadsheet to share  feedback on program performance.
According to The Standards for Program Management, “agencies should  collect, measure, and disseminate performance information and analyze  program trends, and point to areas in need of adjustment” and programs  should conduct periodic program reviews to assess program viability and  provide a venue to assess program conformance with organizational  standards.
FEMA Response Directorate officials acknowledged the inconsistent  implementation of the AAR requirement in their program directive. They  also said that they had not required that all teams use the template for  AARs in the IMAT  Procedures Guide because the document was in draft,  but as of September 2015 they are requiring teams to use this template.  Finally, Response Directorate officials told us that, although they do not  have a system to track and document recommendations and their  implementation, IMAT  leaders share lessons learned and best practices  during monthly team leader conference calls. However, without  documenting the issues raised and tracking their resolution, FEMA’s  ability to effectively use the information shared during these discussions  to improve the program will be limited. Similarly, without policies or  procedures that describe how FEMA Response Directorate officials will  track recommendation implementation, perform trend analysis, or  otherwise use readiness assessment program’s findings to enact system- wide policy change for the IMAT  program, FEMA lacks assurance that the  data gathered will be used to improve the effectiveness of the IMAT  program.
section_title: FEMA Lacks a Strategy for Managing IMAT Attrition to Improve Program Retention
paragraphs: Since implementing the new CORE IMAT concept in 2013, the IMAT  program has experienced high attrition rates of new CORE employees  across all regional and national IMATs  but program managers do not  routinely gather data on attrition and have not developed a strategy to  improve program retention. According to data provided by FEMA in  September 2015, the IMAT  program has experienced approximately 40  percent attrition across its 3 national teams since 2013, and all 7 regional  IMATs that transitioned to the CORE concept in 2013 and 2014 reported  some attrition. Discussions with IMAT  leaders conducted by the  strategic working group on retention revealed that turnover can have a  negative impact on IMAT  performance, relationships with state and other  partners, and team cohesion, and it may limit the return on investment of  hiring and training new CORE staff. See table 1 for FEMA’s transition to  its new IMAT  teams and attrition.
According to IMAT  officials from 9 of 10 regions and 1 of 3 national IMATs  key reasons cited for the attrition in the initial years of implementing the  program are the relatively low pay and lack of upward mobility for CORE  IMAT  members. FEMA’s new pay-for-performance system for CORE  employees starts new staff at a pay rate lower than that of the permanent  full time employees previously staffing the IMATs, and team members  rely on disaster deployments and training exercises to receive  performance-based pay raises and bonuses. Because pay-for- performance is tied to disasters and training, team leaders said that it can  be challenging for team members to earn higher pay when there are not  opportunities to deploy to disasters and limited training opportunities.  Further, high attrition in the IMAT  program can be costly because of the  investment required to hire and train new staff. For example, as described  above, all new IMATs must participate in a 14-week IMAT  Academy.  According to FEMA, this costs approximately $39,000 per team member.  High attrition results in additional costs to FEMA to continually train new  staff to replace those who leave before completing their 4-year contracts.  For example, total IMAT  attrition cost FEMA $2.2 million in additional  IMAT  Academy training costs for training replacement CORE IMAT  team  members in fiscal years 2013, 2014 and 2015, based on FEMA’s  estimated cost per member.
In response to concerns about attrition, FEMA Response Directorate  officials established a working group to address IMAT  retention in July  2015. According to FEMA officials, they plan to speak with all team  leaders and begin to gather data on the reasons for IMAT  staff attrition.  FEMA Response Directorate officials stated that the team will analyze  and present its findings to program managers in December 2015.  However, FEMA officials told us that their Human Capital Office does not  have a process for systematically tracking IMAT  attrition. Our prior work  on leading practices in human capital management has found that federal  agencies should develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing,  and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals. Additionally,  according to The Standards for Program Management, “agencies should  collect, measure, and disseminate performance information and analyze  program trends.” Without a strategy that includes a process for  systematically gathering attrition data and a plan to retain CORE  employees, FEMA will continue to face potential impairments to IMAT  readiness and increased program costs as team members continue to  leave.
section_title: FEMA’s Efforts to Implement NMETS Have Been Inconsistent but Officials Have Developed a New Implementation Plan
paragraphs: After developing the original NMETS program in 2007, NMETS program  officials decided to discontinue development and support of NMETS in  2008. They said this was the result of their discussions with state officials  in Gulf Coast states, including Louisiana and Texas who said they had  purchased their own evacuation tracking systems and did not need  NMETS. NMETS program managers decided to resurrect the program  in 2009, after Louisiana officials identified continuing issues associated  with their ability to track critical transportation needs of survivors in  Louisiana during Hurricane Gustav. Program managers said although  there were issues regarding the system software, they provided test  versions of NMETS to 8 states (in 5 of FEMA’s 10 regions) in 2010 to  solicit feedback. However, in 2011 and 2012, due to deployments to  Hurricanes Irene and Sandy, the associated demands on the program  managers significantly limited the work and funding on NMETS. As a  result, they did not follow up with the eight states that had tested the most  recent iteration of NMETS to identify any suggestions for improving the  system.
Following Hurricanes Irene and Sandy in 2013, NMETS program officials  participated in two workshops in Chicago sponsored by a Regional  Catastrophic Planning Team because of the focus on evacuations of  several of the team’s projects as grantees of FEMA’s Regional  Catastrophic Grant Program. During the workshops in 2013 and 2014,  program officials worked with the team to test and assess aspects of  NMETS, such as the ability to access NMETS from a state’s information  system at multiple locations to generate reports and enroll evacuees into  NMETS. According to NMETS program officials, they used the results of  these assessments to further improve and revise the system. For  example, they said they developed a way to access NMETS via the  Internet and use the system to locate evacuees and unaccompanied  minors to facilitate reunification of family members.
In order to more consistently manage the program, NMETS program  officials drafted an NMETS Strategic Implementation Plan in January  2015 to provide guidance to FEMA regional offices for communicating  and training state and local officials on the use and implementation of  NMETS. The draft plan establishes goals and objectives and calls for a  routine forum of NMETS users to review issues and concerns on  application functionality and lessons learned. Officials also said they  developed a licensing agreement, which includes the terms and  conditions of NMETS use. During 2015, NMETS program officials  provided the NMETS software and conducted webinars with all 10 FEMA  regions and provided the NMETS licensing agreement to several states.  NMETS program officials also told us that they plan to conduct additional  presentations to FEMA Regions II,  III,  and IV in fiscal year 2016. (See  figure 5 for the NMETS implementation and assessment timeline since  fiscal year 2007.)
FEMA regional officials emphasized that NMETS is an optional  evacuation tracking tool and most said that states’ interest in the system  was limited. Specifically, FEMA regional officials in 7 out of the 10 FEMA  regions (accounting for about 39 states and territories) reported that their  states and territories were either not planning to use NMETS or, still  considering whether to use it. Regional officials reported that 3 states are  planning to use NMETS in case of an evacuation. FEMA regional and  selected state officials told us that positive features such as the ability to  track unaccompanied minors, or the states’ ability to own the NMETS  software without paying leasing fees were the reasons they are electing  to use the software. Conversely, regional and selected state officials told  us that reasons for not electing to use the NMETS software included a  lack of resources to support or maintain the NMETS system (e.g. laptops  and wristbands) or staff to manage the system (e.g. staff needed to enter  information into the system), a lack of system compatibility between  NMETS and the state’s internal database system to exchange data, a  pre-existing state tracking system, or the lack of a perceived need for an  evacuation tracking system. States’ use of NMETS as of fiscal year 2015  is depicted in figure 6.
NMETS program officials said they are taking steps to address NMETS  concerns identified by states such as finalizing the implementation plan  and conducting a workshop on mass care and evacuation assistance in  fiscal year 2016. FEMA intends to finalize the Strategic Implementation  Plan as part of a national planning effort to revise the Mass Evacuation  Incident Annex (for Emergency Support Function 6) to the National  Response Framework; they estimated the process would take 9 to 15  months. Because the process is ongoing, we cannot yet determine  whether the steps described by the program officials will help to address  historical inconsistencies of FEMA management of the NMETS program.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In the years since Hurricane Katrina, FEMA has taken steps to improve  its ability to respond rapidly and effectively to disasters for three key  programs and has incorporated many leading program management  practices into these efforts. By clearly defining the US&R program’s  goals, communicating its guidance and policies, and ensuring the goals  are met through continual program assessments and refinements; FEMA  has created an environment for continuing assessment and improvement.  However, FEMA does not have a program strategy for replacing and  maintaining high-cost equipment, which would help further improve its  management of the US&R program and better prioritize future equipment  purchases to strengthen the task forces’ readiness and capabilities to  respond to disasters. Similarly, the clear policies and procedures,  readiness goals and assessment mechanisms, FEMA has established for  the IMAT  program, will help program managers in transitioning to its new  CORE IMAT  approach. However, changes in the program since  Hurricane Sandy have created new challenges for program officials in  training IMAT  members and assessing the results of deployments, as well  as costly and disruptive attrition at both the national and regional levels.  Without a comprehensive plan to ensure sufficient training opportunities,  FEMA lacks assurance that teams will have the skills and qualifications to  fulfill their disaster response duties. Further, without policies or  procedures that describe how FEMA will track implementation of  recommendations and lessons learned from past deployments, FEMA’s  ability to improve the effectiveness of the IMAT  program will be limited.  Finally, until FEMA develops a more organized and systematic approach  to understanding and addressing underlying attrition issues, FEMA will  continue to face potential impairments to IMAT  readiness and increased  program costs as team members continue to leave.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enable FEMA to and more effectively respond to disasters, we  recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA  Administrator to:  1.  develop a comprehensive plan to prioritize and finance the  replacement of equipment for the US&R task forces,  2.  develop a comprehensive training plan that links the IMAT  training  and cadre-specific training requirements to available training  opportunities to help ensure timely completion of the requirements.  3.  implement a process to document, track, and analyze  recommendations and implement lessons learned from Regional and  National IMAT  teams after disaster deployments, and  4.  develop a workforce strategy to manage and improve retention that  includes a process for systematically gathering attrition data and a  plan to retain IMAT  CORE employees.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for their review and comment.   DHS provided written comments on January 21, 2016, which are  summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix VI.  DHS concurred  with all four recommendations and described planned actions to address  them. In addition, DHS provided written technical comments, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DHS concurred with our first recommendation that FEMA develop a  comprehensive plan to prioritize and finance the replacement of  equipment for its US&R task forces. DHS stated that FEMA’s US&R  program managers and its Strategic Group have been working with  FEMA Operations Division leadership to determine the appropriate  method to address necessary equipment replacement for US&R task  forces. They plan to develop a comprehensive strategy that prioritizes  needed equipment replacements, as well as potential courses of action to  finance these replacements. DHS estimated that the will be completed by  November 30, 2016. These actions, if implemented effectively, should  address the intent of our recommendation.
DHS also concurred with our second recommendation that FEMA  develop a comprehensive training plan that links the IMAT  training and  cadre-specific training requirements to available training opportunities to  help ensure timely completion of the requirements. DHS stated that the  FEMA Field Operations Directorate is currently conducting an analysis of  the IMAT  program that will identify key operational requirements for  National and Regional teams. As an outcome of this analysis, the  Directorate plans to develop a comprehensive training and exercise  program for the IMATs.  DHS estimates that these actions will be  completed by August 31, 2016. These actions, if implemented effectively,  should address the intent of our recommendation.
DHS concurred with our third recommendation that FEMA implement a  process to document, track, and analyze recommendations and  implement lessons learned from Regional and National IMAT  teams after  disaster deployments. DHS stated that FEMA is developing and  implementing formal procedures to document, track, analyze and  incorporate lessons learned into annual training and exercise  requirements as well as policies and performance measures applicable to  the IMAT  program. DHS estimates that these actions will be completed by  June 30, 2016. These actions, if implemented effectively, should address  the intent of our recommendation.
DHS concurred with our last recommendation that FEMA develop a  workforce strategy to manage and improve retention that includes a  process for systematically gathering attrition data and a plan to retain  IMAT  CORE employees. DHS stated that FEMA is conducting an  analysis of the IMAT  program to include a review of attrition data. FEMA  stated that it is also conducting an IMAT  employee satisfaction survey to  develop a greater understanding of employee concerns within the  Program and plans to use the findings of the analysis and employee  satisfaction survey to develop a strategy to address workforce  management of IMAT  CORE employees. DHS estimates that these  actions will be completed by June 30, 2016. These actions, if  implemented effectively, should address the intent of our  recommendation.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security,  the FEMA Administrator, and appropriate congressional committees. If  you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Other key contributors to this report are listed in appendix  VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Disasters Requiring FEMA Disaster Response Assistance from Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces and Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATS) for Fiscal Years 2010 to 2014
subsections: section_title: Year
paragraphs: FEMA assigns each major disaster a “disaster declaration number,” preceded by the abbreviation  “DR.”
section_title: Appendix II: Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Deployment Event History 1992- 2014
paragraphs: Not applicable (n/a)
subsections: section_title: Year- month
section_title: Appendix III: National and Regional Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) Locations1
paragraphs: Regions IV, VI and IX each have 2 Regional IMAT  teams.
section_title: Appendix IV: Incident Management Assistance Teams-National and Regional Organizational Charts
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Christopher A. Keisling (Assistant  Director), Aditi S. Archer (Analyst-in-Charge), Lorraine Ettaro, Jillian  Feirson, Eric Hauswirth, Tracey King, Amanda Parker, Rachel Pittenger,  Tovah Rom, and Su Jin Yon made key contributions to this report.