Displaced Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees
Published: 2010-12-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced since February 2006 is about 1.6 million, and numerous Iraqis are in neighboring countries. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families have returned home and the number is slowly increasing. GAO examined (1) conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, (2) actions the international community is taking to address these conditions and reintegration, and (3) the extent to which the international community has an effective reintegration strategy. GAO analyzed reports and data, met with officials from the U.S. and Iraqi governments and international and nongovernmental organizations, and did fieldwork in Geneva and Baghdad.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Several issues impede the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration. Problems in securing property restitution or compensation and shelter have made it difficult to return and reintegrate. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 43 percent of the internally displaced that it surveyed did not have access to their homes, primarily because their property was occupied or destroyed. IOM also reported that one-third of the heads of returnee families it assessed were unemployed. Iraq continues to lack adequate access to essential services--that is, food, water, sanitation, electricity, health services, and education. Moreover, insufficient government capacity and commitment cross over each of the problem areas and serve as a deterrent to returns and reintegration. The international community has taken action to address the impediments that displaced Iraqis face, but the extent to which these efforts will result in reintegration of displaced Iraqis is uncertain. International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and other donor funding, have initiated projects. However, the extent to which these projects specifically target and affect reintegration is not consistently measured. The Iraqi government has initiated efforts to encourage returns and reintegration. However, progress in this area has been limited due to insufficient commitment and capacity, according to international and U.S. officials. Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international community do not have an integrated international strategy for the reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The international community lacks integrated plans because Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government support, according to U.S. and international officials; the United Nation's (UN) strategy and plans have not specifically focused on reintegration; and an unclassified version of the current U.S. government strategy has not been made publicly available. This situation has hindered efforts to efficiently assess the needs of internally displaced Iraqis and returnees. Moreover, the international community has not yet reached an agreement on goals and expected outcomes for reintegration. Also, the UN has not integrated data on returnee needs from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) into its new Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), which was established to provide a central point for collecting and assessing data, and UNHCR is not taking advantage of IAU resources and coordination efforts. Furthermore, it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and responsibilities and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms. One area with significant potential for inefficiencies is in the establishment and operation of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq by various entities to assist returnees, the internally displaced, and other vulnerable Iraqis.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that (1) the Secretary of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator assist Iraq in developing an effective integrated international strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis; (2) State and USAID make publicly available an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy; (3) State encourage UNHCR to share primary data collected and take advantage of the IAU efforts; and (4) State and USAID work with UNHCR and others to inventory and assess the operations of the various assistance centers to determine and achieve an optimal framework. The Department of State and USAID concurred with our recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced since  February 2006 is about 1.6 million, according to the United Nations High  Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization  for Migration (IOM). In addition, governments in the region report that  about 1.5 to 1.7 million Iraqi refugees are in their countries, although the  actual number is unknown. According to IOM, tens of thousands of Iraqi  families have returned and the number of returnees is slowly increasing;  however, UNHCR officials question the sustainability of these returns. On  February 27, 2009, President Obama stated that it is in the United States’  strategic interest—and a moral responsibility—to help displaced Iraqis.  According to the President, the U.S. government “will work with the Iraqi  government over time to resettle refugees and displaced Iraqis within  Iraq—because there are few more powerful indicators of lasting peace  than displaced citizens returning home.”
GAO assessed U.S. and international efforts to reintegrate internally  displaced Iraqis and returning Iraqi refugees. The United Nations (UN)  defines reintegration as the achievement of sustainable returns. In this  report, we address (1) the conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to the  reintegration of displaced Iraqis; (2) the actions that the United States,  Iraq, and other members of the international community have taken to  address these conditions and reintegration; and (3) the extent to which the  United States, Iraq, and other members of the international community  have an effective strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis. This report  builds on our prior work assessing U.S. and international efforts to protect  and assist Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries. Because of broad  congressional interest in the U.S. engagement in Iraq, we have completed  this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct  evaluations on his own initiative.
To address these objectives, we interviewed officials and reviewed reports  and data from the U.S. government, the Iraqi government, UNHCR and  other UN agencies, IOM, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and  research institutes. To identify conditions that pose a challenge to  reintegrating displaced Iraqis, we reviewed research papers and  assessments; strategies and policy papers; program implementation,  monitoring, and progress reports; and related documents. We assessed  challenges by considering factors such as their significance and the degree  to which they could be generalized, and then grouped them by category.  To identify the actions that the United States, Iraq, and the international  community have taken to address these conditions and reintegration, we  reviewed policy, strategy, planning, and funding documents; UN appeals;  monitoring and progress reports; and related documents. To determine the  extent to which the United States, Iraq, and the international community  have an effective strategy to address the reintegration of displaced Iraqis,  we reviewed policy, strategy, and planning documents from the U.S. and  Iraqi governments, the UN, UNHCR, and IOM. We interviewed U.S. agency,  Iraqi government, international organization, NGO, and research  institution officials and reviewed their documents to determine known  issues and problems. For each objective, we documented evidence from  multiple sources and validated it with knowledgeable U.S., UN, IOM, and  NGO officials to ensure accuracy. Appendix I contains a more detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to December 2010  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Iraq has had a long history of displacement due to wars and the policies of  the Saddam Hussein regime. That regime instituted “Arabization” policies  to force out many non-Arabs from Kirkuk and the surrounding areas and  replace them with Arab citizens to strengthen the regime’s political control  over the areas’ oil fields and fertile lands. Displacement occurred during  the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s; the campaign against the Kurds, which  intensified after the war in 1988; the draining of the marshes in southern  Iraq during the war and again after the first Gulf War in 1991; and the 2003  fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. UNHCR reported in December 2009  that an estimated 2.76 million individuals were displaced in Iraq, 1.2  million of which had been displaced prior to 2006. The latest wave of  large-scale displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing of the  Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, which triggered a rise in sectarian violence.  According to State and UN reports, insurgents, death squads, militias, and  terrorists increased their attacks against civilians in 2006. According to  UNHCR and IOM, there was a sharp increase in the numbers of Iraqis  abandoning their homes for other locations in Iraq and abroad as a result  of the sectarian intimidation and violence that erupted during this period.  IOM reported that the majority of the Iraqi displacement occurred in 2006  and 2007. According to IOM, as of September 2008, about 90 percent of the  post-2006 IDPs in Iraq originated from Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa  governorates (see fig. 1).
According to IOM, 4 years after the Al-Askari bombing, displaced families  are returning and new displacement is rare; however, the number of those  displaced who had returned (returnees) remains well below the estimated  number of those who remain displaced. As of the end of 2009, UNHCR  estimated that of those who were displaced before and after the Al-Askari  bombing, 745,630 IDPs and 433,696 refugees had returned. IOM reported  in February 2010, that of those who were displaced after the 2006 Al- Askari bombing, IOM returnee field monitors had identified an estimated  374,166 returnees. Additionally, the numbers of returnees varies by  governorate, with Baghdad experiencing the largest share of IDP and  refugee returns, according to UNHCR. The majority of those who initially  returned were IDPs rather than refugees, which is a pattern that has been  seen in other displacement situations worldwide, according to IOM and  UNHCR officials. IOM reported in February 2010, that its assessments of  an estimated 1.3 million IDPs identified by its field monitors, showed that  49 percent of all post-Al-Askari bombing IDPs want to return to their  places of origin, 29 percent want to remain and integrate into their current  places of displacement, 19 percent want to resettle to a third location, and  3 percent are waiting to make a decision.
According to UNHCR officials, displaced Iraqis tend to be educated and  come from urban, middle-class backgrounds, which is in sharp contrast to  displaced communities in other nations. UNHCR also reported that the  displaced Iraqi population comprises Sunnis, Shias, Christians, and other  groups that were forced to relocate to areas where they constitute the  dominant groups. According to IOM, 58 percent of the 1.3 million IDPs  that they had assessed reported to be Shia Muslim and 33 percent reported  to be Sunni Muslim, as of February 2010 (see fig. 2); however, religious  affiliations and ethnicity varied by governorates. According to UNHCR,  21 percent of the Iraqi refugees that were actively registered in  neighboring countries at the end of 2008 identified themselves as Shia  Muslims, and 56 percent identified themselves as Sunni Muslims   (see fig. 3).
The UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines an  internally displaced person as one who has been forced or obliged to leave  his or her home as a result of armed conflict, generalized violence,  violation of human rights, or disaster, but has not crossed an international  border. A refugee, as defined by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the  Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, is a person who “owing to a well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,  membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the  country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling  to avail himself of the protection of that country.” According UNHCR’s  Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, reintegration is  a process that should result in the disappearance of differences in legal  rights and duties between returnees and their compatriots and the equal  access of returnees to services, productive assets, and opportunities.  UNHCR’s Handbook also states that such a process assumes that refugees  return to societies that are more or less stable, and, when this is not the  case, returnees and communities in areas of return should benefit equally  from improved access to productive assets and social services. According  to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation and reintegration is the preferred  durable solution for refugees.
Iraqi and U.S. government entities, international organizations, and NGOs  play significant roles in addressing Iraqi displacement in Iraq and the  region. For information on the key responsible entities and their  respective roles, see appendix II.
section_title: Inadequate Security, Property Resolution and Shelter, Income- Generating Opportunities, Essential Services, and Governance Pose Challenges to Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis
paragraphs: Problems in securing a safe environment, property and shelter, income,  essential services, and government capacity and commitment may impede  large numbers of returns and the reintegration of displaced Iraqis,  according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. UNHCR  considers that the basic conditions necessary to encourage and sustain  large-scale returns to Iraq have not been established. UNHCR had  predicted large-scale returns for 2009 after security conditions had  improved in the latter half of 2007 and in 2008, but they did not  materialize, according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. UN,  IOM, and U.S. government officials agree that the decision to return and  the ability to reintegrate involve a complex set of factors that may vary by  location and individual circumstance. Moreover, according to the UN,  IOM, and NGOs, many of these factors also negatively affect vulnerable  Iraqis in the communities that host IDPs and Iraqis who did not have the  means to flee the conflict or the ensuing economic hardships.
subsections: section_title: Uncertain Security Conditions May Impede Iraqi Returns and Reintegration
paragraphs: Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 2006, the  actual and perceived threat across governorates and neighborhoods  continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration, according to U.S.  government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. According to the UN, voluntary  return is the preferred solution, but Iraqis should not be encouraged to  return until the security situation allows for large-scale return and  sufficient monitoring of returns. According to DOD, overall violence in  Iraq, after peaking in 2007, remains at its lowest level in 5 years. However,  the level and nature of violence has varied by governorate. DOD reported  that from December 2009 to February 2010, about 73 percent of the  attacks occurred in 4 out of the 18 governorates—Baghdad, Diyala,  Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. The first three of these governates account for  89 percent of the displacement occurring after the February 2006 Samarra  Al-Askari Mosque bombing, according to the UN. In contrast, the  Kurdistan Region, with its relatively homogenous population and the  presence of the Kurdish security forces, remained relatively safe and  stable, according to DOD.
Many displaced Iraqis may be afraid of returning because of the fear of  violent reprisals from militants and members of opposing sects, according  to USAID and UNHCR officials. IOM reported in 2008 that returnees were  threatened, shot at, or killed after returning home. An MODM official  reported that one of the initial families that had returned to a Baghdad  neighborhood was killed as a warning to others not to return. UNHCR and  IOM officials stated that some displaced Iraqis, particularly those from  targeted minority groups, have no plans to return out of fear of  persecution. According to the UN, although a decrease in violence in Iraq  has been observed, grave and systematic human rights violations persist  and remain largely unreported. The UN also reported that violence against  professionals, women, and members of minority communities occur often  and are rarely punished.
Moreover, many displaced Iraqis and returnees have had difficulties in  accessing services, including those provided by humanitarian  organizations, because of obstacles such as curfews, checkpoints, and  areas affected by intense fighting, according to UNHCR, IOM, other UN  agencies, and NGOs. In addition, according to UNHCR, the precarious  security situation is requiring UNHCR to increase investments in the  security of staff and may continue to limit UNHCR’s mobility inside Iraq  (see fig. 4). The UN, UNHCR, IOM, and International Committee of the Red  Cross (ICRC) cautioned that while access may be improving overall, the  security situation could deteriorate again, which could limit their access to  the population.
section_title: Lack of Property Restitution or Compensation and Shelter May Impede Iraqi Returns and Reintegration
paragraphs: Problems in securing property restitution or compensation and shelter  have made it difficult for displaced Iraqis to return and reintegrate or  integrate elsewhere in Iraq, according to UNHCR and IOM officials.  According to a 2009 United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report, the  lack of policies addressing displacement-related property issues is a major  obstacle to returns and may prolong instability, hinder reconciliation, and  nurture grievances along ethnic or sectarian lines. In November 2009, IOM  reported that about one-third of surveyed returnees found their homes in  bad condition. In February 2009, IOM reported that 43 percent of the  post-2006 Samarra bombing IDPs surveyed did not have access to their  homes, primarily because the property was occupied or destroyed (see fig.  5); and that 38 percent did not know the status of their property, often  because they could not safely access it. According to the 2009 USIP  report and IOM, hundreds of thousands of displaced families are estimated  to have homes that are occupied or used by strangers, such as militants,  squatters, other displaced Iraqis, or, in rare cases, Iraqi Army or other  government officials, sometimes resulting in multiple scenarios of  competing claims. Many displaced Iraqis have also lost personal property,  business stock, usage rights for farm land, and farming equipment,  according to the report. Moreover, a number of returnees with leases to  apartments have had difficulties in reclaiming their accommodations  because, in some cases, landlords took advantage of their tenants’ absence  to re-lease the properties at higher rents, according to the 2009 USIP  report.
Further complicating property restitution and compensation are the Iraqi  government’s policies that distinguish between Iraqis who were displaced  before and after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. The implementation  of these policies has yet to be proven effective for either group. For pre- March 2003 cases, the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property  Disputes was established in 2006 to address property issues resulting from  the Ba’athist regime’s policies of forced displacement, according to the  2009 USIP report. According to the report, the commission’s  “quasijudicial” system is not well adapted to the nature and number of  cases and thus is cumbersome and prone to delays. As of January 2009, the  commission had decided about 67,000 cases of the approximately 150,000  cases filed since March 2004. However, due to appeals and re-reviews, only  about 30,000 decisions were deemed final and enforceable and  compensation was paid only in about 1,000 cases. Moreover, USIP  reported that data are not available regarding the number of claimants— with decisions in their favor—able to reoccupy their houses or land. An  Iraqi government official stated that many IDPs typically require more  assistance than what the government provides to replace lost properties  and rebuild or repair damaged homes.
For post-March 2003 cases, the Iraqi government initially deemed that  property violations were the fault of terrorists and criminals and thus were  a law enforcement problem that could be resolved in the courts, if needed.  According to the 2009 USIP report, the existing legal framework may have  been inadequate to fairly resolve complex displacement cases and to  effectively handle the potentially large caseload. In 2008, according to the  U.S. government and IOM, the Iraqi government recognized the need to  further address property issues and thus initiated changes to its policies  and efforts.
The property restitution and compensation problem is further exacerbated  by the reported lack of adequate shelter. UN-HABITAT reported in July  2009 that Iraq had a housing shortage of at least 1.5 million units, and  demand was increasing. According to UN-HABITAT, just over 70 percent  of Iraqis lived in urban areas, and more than 10 percent of the houses in  these areas had more than 10 occupants and more than 35 percent had   3 or more people per room. According to IOM, displaced families continue  to have difficulty in finding adequate housing in their places of  displacement, even several years after leaving home. IOM reported that  IDPs’ shelter arrangements include renting, moving in with friends and  relatives, occupying empty public buildings, establishing collective  settlements, and other arrangements (see fig. 6). However, these  arrangements may not be sustainable because they pose costs to both the  displaced and their host communities. For example, IOM reported that the  majority of internally displaced Iraqis are living in rental accommodations,  but, as time passes, rent prices increase and their ability to pay decreases.  Friends and relatives, already struggling to provide for themselves, are  additionally burdened by housing the displaced, according to UN- HABITAT. Moreover, IDPs living in settlements or public buildings may  often be at risk from eviction by local authorities or private owners. Less  than 1 percent of displaced Iraqis live in tent camps.
section_title: Lack of Income Opportunities May Impede Iraqi Returns and Reintegration
paragraphs: According to USAID and international organization officials, without  employment or other income-generating opportunities, displaced Iraqis  may not return to their former communities or may have difficulty in  reintegrating. In November 2009, IOM reported that 34 percent of the  heads of returning households that it had surveyed stated that they could  not find employment, even though they were able to work. IOM also  found that employment rates were higher in certain governorates, such as  Baghdad. Employment for IDPs has also been scarce and varied across the  governorates, according to USAID. According to IOM, 31.7 percent of the  IDP families assessed had at least one employed family member as of  December 2009. In general, employment in Iraq is scarce, according to  USAID and UNHCR officials. The UN reported in January 2009 that the  unemployment rate was 18 percent. In addition, the UN and IOM  estimate that over 50 percent of the active population is unemployed or  underemployed, and that over 55 percent may face difficulties in covering  basic living costs. Underemployment and poverty pose a significant risk to  the reconciliation and stability of the country, according to the UN.
Moreover, IOM officials said that regaining former employment is difficult  for displaced Iraqis. According to an international organization, the largest  employer in Iraq is the government, but, according to IOM, returnees have  difficulty in regaining prior government employment, either due to  discrimination or corruption. In March 2010, State reported allegations of  employment discrimination by several ministries based on religious,  ethnic, and political affiliations. The agricultural sector is the second- largest contributor to the economy, according to the UN. IOM reported the  need to provide returnees and IDPs in rural areas who want to farm with  the necessary means, such as land, seeds, fertilizers, tools, poultry, and  cattle. In addition, according to IOM officials, many skilled professionals  became displaced, and the longer they are displaced, the greater the  likelihood that their skills will become outdated. Furthermore, MODM  reported that Iraq lacks procedures to recognize professional certificates  and diplomas acquired abroad. Officials from the United Nations Office for  the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNHCR are  concerned that Iraqi refugees from professional or middle-class  backgrounds may be reluctant to return for low-skilled and low-paying  jobs, which could potentially affect government capacity and economic  growth in Iraq.
section_title: Inadequate Access to Essential Services May Impede Iraqi Returns and Reintegration
subsections: section_title: Food and Nonfood Items
paragraphs: The lack of access to food and nonfood items is a deterrent to returns and  reintegration, according to UNHCR officials. The top three priority needs  identified by returnee families assessed by IOM were food (over   60 percent), fuel (over 40 percent), and other nonfood items (over   40 percent), according to a November 2009 IOM report. According to the  UN, most Iraqis, including IDPs and returnees, receive monthly food  rations from the Public Distribution System. According to a UN report,  although the Public Distribution System largely shields Iraqis from rising  global food costs, local prices have climbed higher than global prices.  According to IOM, IDP families have also reported having no or partial  access to the Public Distribution System. The World Food Program  (WFP) reported in 2008 that distribution across the country had been  uneven due to the conflict. Many IDP families have had difficulties in  obtaining the proper documents to register for the Public Distribution  System in their new locations, which is required to obtain rations,  according to UNHCR officials. According to USAID officials, the re- registration of Public Distribution System cards was improving as of  January 2010. Additionally, the rise in fuel prices and the difficulties of  obtaining fuel have placed considerable burden on many Iraqis, including  IDPs and returnees, according to IOM and the ICRC. IOM further reported  that the returnee families it assessed listed fuel as one of the highest  priority needs.
section_title: Water, Sanitation, and Electricity
paragraphs: The UN reported in December 2008, that about 40 percent of Iraqis  continued to suffer from poor water quality and sanitation services due to  dysfunctional systems, network breakdowns, aging infrastructure, and  frequent power supply interruptions (see fig. 7). According to IOM,  access to potable water is a major concern of IDPs, returnees, and Iraqis in  general. Although approximately more than 80 percent of IOM-assessed  returnees in 2009 had access to municipal water networks, the water may  not have been potable, according to IOM. A 2007 survey of Iraqi  households also found that although 81.3 percent of individuals lived in  dwellings connected to public water networks only 12.5 percent of these  individuals had reported that their supply of water was constant.
According to the UN, sewage is also a common sight in many  neighborhoods, and solid waste management at the family level is a  serious problem (see fig. 8). For example, IOM reported in May 2009 that  because of blocked sanitation networks, several houses in Baghdad had  been damaged by water and left structurally compromised or had  collapsed. ICRC reported that a number of water treatment plants in Iraq  had either shut down or reduced their operating capacity as a result of the  electricity supply issue.
According to DOD, the electricity supply for many Iraqis is still  intermittent and unpredictable, although the gap between demand and  supply has narrowed. UN-HABITAT reported in October 2009 that Iraqis  experienced, on average, 16 hours of power interruption per day.
section_title: Health Care
paragraphs: Displaced and vulnerable Iraqis may also find challenges in obtaining  access to health care. In November 2009, IOM reported that more than  one-third of assessed families reported having no access to health care,  but that this figure was higher for certain governorates (e.g., just over one- half of the assessed families in Baghdad). Lack of access is most often  due to the distance to the nearest health care center or lack of equipment  and staff. ICRC reported that of the 34,000 doctors registered in 1990, at  least 20,000 have left the country, and 2,200 doctors and nurses have been  killed since 2003. In addition, ICRC reported that hospitals and other  health facilities often lack drugs and other essential items. In 2009, OCHA  reported that mental health issues were also a concern, because many  Iraqis had been affected by conflict and displacement.  In addition, IDPs  may not have the money to secure transportation to public health facilities  or purchase medication and services that are not available through the  public system. Furthermore, according to the World Health Organization  (WHO) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre officials,  discrimination based on sectarian grounds and fear of traveling to health  facilities could also limit access to health care.
According to WHO officials, there is little data on the health needs of  displaced Iraqis. Although Iraq’s public health system does generate up-to- date information, WHO officials said that they have had to rely on surveys  conducted in 2006/2007 for much of their information. These officials also  said that without sufficient health data, decision makers will not have the  information to identify vulnerable populations, such as displaced Iraqis,  and develop strategies to meet Iraq’s health needs.
section_title: Education
paragraphs: According to IOM, just under 10 percent of the returnee families with  school-age children in Iraq reported having no access to education;  however, this figure varies greatly across the country. For example, almost  two-thirds of returnee families reported having no access to schooling in  the Babylon governorate. According to USAID, schools have been  damaged and looted (see fig. 9). According to OCHA, military  interventions, during March and April, 2008, in Baghdad caused the closing  of 22 schools, 11 of which sustained major damages. During this period,  curfews were imposed and attendance dropped to 30 percent. In addition,  IOM reported in April 2009 that many Christian IDPs from Mosul were  unable to enroll in school because they lacked documentation.  Furthermore, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), a number of  Iraqi schools are overcrowded and lack proper sanitation facilities, which  would make it difficult for these facilities to absorb returning displaced  children. Also, UNICEF reported in January 2009 that a number of  students who were returning to their homes after being displaced may not  have registered with the government to receive standard school supplies.
section_title: Insufficient Iraqi Government Capacity and Commitment May Impede Iraqi Returns and Reintegration
paragraphs: IOM and UNHCR officials said that shortfalls in the Iraqi government’s  capacity and commitment have limited the potential for reintegrating  displaced Iraqis. According to U.S. and international assessments and  officials, years of neglect, a highly centralized decision-making system  under the former regime, and looting in 2003 decimated Iraq’s government  ministries (see fig. 10). In March 2009, GAO reported that Iraqi ministries  had significant shortages of personnel who could formulate budgets,  procure goods and services, and perform other ministry tasks. GAO also  reported that violence and sectarian strife; the exodus of skilled labor  from Iraq; and the weakness in Iraqi procurement, budgeting, and  accounting procedures limited the Iraqi government’s ability to spend its  capital project budget.
According to U.S. and UNHCR officials, although there has been some  progress, the Iraqi government appears to be noncommittal in addressing  displacement issues. For example, the Iraqi Prime Minister has appointed  a senior official to coordinate IDP and refugee issues, but the Iraqi  government does not appear ready to direct significant resources to assist  refugees. DOD also reported in 2009 that given other priorities, engaging  Syria and Jordan on the return of a largely Sunni refugee population  remained a low priority for the Iraqi government. Furthermore, U.S. and  international organization officials said that the Iraqi government has not  given MODM the authority and capacity to direct or coordinate  government efforts to address displacement issues. In addition, IOM  officials stated that many of the Sunni Iraqi refugees will not return until  they see true national reconciliation in Iraq because they do not trust the  current Iraqi government to protect them.
section_title: International Community Is Addressing Impediments That Iraqis Face; However, the Extent to Which These Efforts Result in Reintegration Is Not Measured, and Officials Reported Insufficient Iraqi Government Commitment and Capacity
paragraphs: Although international and nongovernmental organizations and U.S. and  Iraqi governments have taken action to address the impediments that Iraqi  IDPs and refugees face to return and reintegration, the extent to which  these efforts will result in reintegration (i.e., sustainable returns) is  unknown. The extent to which these projects specifically target and  impact reintegration is not consistently measured or reported in the  aggregate against international goals for reintegration. U.S. goals and  outcomes for these efforts were classified or considered sensitive and thus  an unclassified assessment and reporting of progress made toward U.S.  goals could not be made. Moreover, the Iraqi government has made limited  progress due to the lack of uniform government support and capacity,  according to international community officials. A March 2010 report stated  that the rates of return of IDPs and refugees had not increased in the last  year.
subsections: section_title: International and Nongovernmental Organizations Have Initiated Projects Addressing Conditions That Impede Returns and Reintegration, but the Effect on Reintegration Is Not Consistently Measured
paragraphs: International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and  other donor funding, have initiated many projects to address impediments  to returns and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. However, according to  international organization and U.S. government officials, the extent to  which these projects specifically target and impact reintegration is not  consistently measured or reported in the aggregate against measurable  goals and objectives for reintegration. According to the UN, international  efforts focus on all vulnerable Iraqis. Thus, these projects target a mix of  vulnerable populations in Iraq, including IDPs, returning refugees, non- Iraqi refugees, other conflict victims, and the communities that host them  (see table 1). According to international and U.S. government officials,  host communities are often equally vulnerable and including them reduces  the likelihood of resentment toward providing assistance to IDPs and  returning refugees.
Through its 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region, the UN  coordinated most international organization efforts and funding to meet  humanitarian needs in Iraq and for Iraqi refugees and the communities that  host them in neighboring countries. In June 2009, the UN revised its  consolidated appeal by increasing the amount requested from $547.3  million to $650.4 million. According to OCHA, the U.S. government  contributed about 71 percent of new contributions to the 2009 appeal and  funded at least 56 percent of all reported 2009 assistance to Iraq and the  region.
The UN did not issue a consolidated appeal for Iraq and the region for  2010. Instead, UN assistance requests are primarily found in three  documents:    The Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan, developed by 9 UN agencies,  IOM, and 12 NGOs operating in the country, focuses on overall  humanitarian assistance for Iraq, including efforts that also target IDPs  and returnees, and requests about $193.6 million.
The UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011 for Iraq focuses on IDPs, returning  refugees, other refugees and stateless people inside Iraq and requests  about $264.3 million for 2010, of which about $31.1 million is targeted for  reintegration projects that include returnees and host communities.
The Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees focuses on Iraqi refugees  and the host communities in 12 neighboring and other countries and  requests about $364.2 million.
section_title: U.S. Government Implements Its Objectives by Conducting Diplomatic Efforts and Providing Assistance through Its Implementing Partners
paragraphs: In a February 2009 speech, President Obama stated that diplomacy and  assistance were required to help displaced Iraqis. This speech established  a policy that National Security Council (NSC), State, USAID, and DOD  officials follow in finding durable solutions for displaced Iraqis, including  reintegrating voluntary returns within and to Iraq. While the following  information provides examples of U.S. diplomatic efforts and assistance,  we note that overall U.S. goals, objectives, and outcomes for U.S. efforts  were classified or considered sensitive information during our review.  Accordingly, the information in this section is descriptive and can provide  no assessment of the extent to which U.S. assistance is achieving its  intended goals. Subsequent to concluding our field work and our exit  meetings with U.S. agencies and the NSC, the NSC provided GAO with an  unclassified summary, that had not been made public, of a classified May  2009 U.S. government strategy regarding support for returning Iraqi  refugees and IDPs. The stated U.S. goal was to create conditions inside  key areas of Iraq that will allow the maximum number of voluntary returns  to be sustainable. Objectives were provided for fiscal years 2009-2011.  However, the NSC also noted that the summary prepared for GAO in July  2010 was based on a “historical document”, should be viewed in that  context, and that it had not been updated to reflect the current situation.
subsections: section_title: Diplomatic Efforts
paragraphs: In August 2009, the White House announced that the NSC’s Senior  Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights would serve as its  coordinator on Iraqi refugees and IDPs. In November 2009, the Senior  Director and the Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and  Migration met with the Iraqi government’s refugees and IDP coordinator  and the head of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Implementation and Follow-up  Committee on National Reconciliation to discuss the challenges related to  the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The officials subsequently  issued a joint statement that described steps agreed upon by both the U.S.  and Iraqi governments to assist Iraq’s displaced population and support  national unity. One of the agreed-upon steps was to promote cooperation  with other nations to broaden international support efforts and thereby  make returns more sustainable. In August 2009, the White House also  assigned a senior Foreign Service Officer to take up the post of Senior  Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons at the U.S.  embassy. The Senior Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the U.S.  government’s work in Iraq on refugees and IDPs and representing the  United States on Iraqi displacement issues with the Iraqi government, the  international community, and NGOs.
section_title: Humanitarian and Development Assistance
paragraphs: To provide humanitarian and developmental assistance, the U.S.  government primarily contributes funds to UN appeals and provides  bilateral assistance through its implementing partners. U.S. funding does  not solely target returnees; it supports programs that include assistance  for both returnees and other vulnerable populations. As of September 30,  2009, State and USAID had obligated about $1.9 billion and expended  about $1.5 billion in fiscal years 2003 through 2009 for all Iraq-related  humanitarian assistance in Iraq and the region. This total included funds to  assist Iraqi refugees and the communities that host them in neighboring  countries (see app. III for funding and intended beneficiaries). Table 2  provides State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration’s (PRM)  implementing partners, activities, country locations, and funding obligated  for fiscal year 2009. Of these activities, about $45 million of the $303.4  million obligated in fiscal year 2009 was allocated to IOM and UNHCR for  projects under State’s new “returns program” in Iraq. These two programs  are targeted to benefit returnees and other vulnerable Iraqis.
USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funds and  oversees a wide range of humanitarian assistance activities that are  implemented by a number of NGO and UN partners who provide programs  for IDPs and other vulnerable Iraqis. Table 3 provides USAID/OFDA’s  implementing partners, activities, locations, and funding obligated for  fiscal year 2009. Of the about $83.4 million obligated, $60 million was for  programs intended to provide direct assistance to returning families;  support to communities with significant numbers of current or anticipated  returnees; and general assistance to vulnerable populations, regardless of  displacement status. According to USAID/OFDA, since Iraq is transitioning  from an emergency to a development phase, OFDA plans to conclude its  work in Iraq in 2011.
In addition, USAID’s Middle East Bureau/Office of Iraq Reconstruction  (ME/IR) and USAID/Iraq at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad continue to  support programs focusing on development assistance. Although not  directly tied to current reintegration efforts, development assistance could  improve conditions in Iraq that could increase the number of returns and  foster reintegration, according to U.S. and international organization  officials. As of September 30, 2009, USAID had obligated about $6.4 billion  and expended about $5.6 billion in fiscal years 2003 through 2009 for  development assistance projects in Iraq (see app. IV for funding by source  and funding by implementing partner). For example, USAID’s Community  Stabilization Program, completed in October 2009, offered employment  activities, vocational training, small grants, and small infrastructure  projects in communities affected by insurgent violence. USAID’s  development assistance also supported programs focusing on building  capacity for all levels of the government and other organizations. For  example, in July 2006, USAID implemented the National Capacity  Development Program, known in Arabic as Tatweer. The aim of this  program is to increase the effectiveness of ministries by reforming internal  operational systems and instituting best practices and international  standards. The program is expected to end in January 2011. Tatweer  works with 10 ministries, including MODM, and 7 executive offices. For  MODM, Tatweer is providing assistance on capacity-building activities,  including improvements to the information technology infrastructure and  the management of relief supplies, according to USAID.
Finally, DOD provides assistance in Iraq through its Commander’s  Emergency Response Program. This program enables local commanders  to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements  within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that  immediately assist the local population. According to DOD officials,  although the program is not targeted to returns and reintegration, in some  cases, relief and reconstruction are carried out in areas heavily populated  by IDPs. DOD had obligated about $3.6 billion in fiscal years 2004 through  2009 for projects under the program in Iraq, including water and  sanitation, health care, and other projects, according to DOD officials.
section_title: Iraqi Government Has Initiated Steps to Encourage Returns and Reintegration; However, Officials Report That Progress Has Been Limited Due to Insufficient Commitment and Capacity
paragraphs: The Iraqi government’s efforts to encourage returns and reintegration have  been limited by insufficient political commitment and capacity within the  government, according to international organization and U.S. government  officials. The Iraqi government has developed policies and taken initial  steps to assist IDPs and encourage voluntary returns and reintegration.  MODM issued a National Policy on Displacement and the government  issued a decree and orders that allow for financial stipends and assistance  in safely recovering property. However, the international community has  reported that MODM was not able to implement its policy, and that  bureaucratic challenges, based on lack of capacity and political  commitment at various levels of the Iraqi government, have prevented  many returnees from recovering their property and receiving stipends. In  June 2009, DOD reported that “serious efforts” to facilitate the return of  refugees by the Iraqi government have been “all but non-existent.”
MODM, a relatively new ministry, has lacked the authority and capacity to  lead ministerial efforts regarding returns and reintegration, according to  international organization and U.S. government officials. In July 2008,  MODM issued a National Policy on Displacement, which recognized  displacement as a key challenge facing the government of Iraq and the  international community. The policy set a goal to find durable solutions  for displaced Iraqis, established objectives, stressed the rights of displaced  persons, described the basic needs of Iraqi IDPs, and recommended  activities to address the needs. However, the policy was not fully  implemented because MODM lacked the authority and capacity to  coordinate efforts within the Iraqi government, according to international  organization and U.S. government officials. According to officials, the  more established ministries—such as Defense, Interior, Health, Education,  and others—continued to work independently of MODM. Furthermore,  MODM did not have uniform support at all levels of the government for the  policy or for efforts to facilitate the return of refugees of all sects,  according to international organization, NGO, and U.S. government  officials. Moreover, MODM received a relatively small budget in 2008  because its role was originally viewed as primarily a coordinating rather  than an implementing role, according to U.S. government and international  organization officials. For 2009, the total Iraqi budget decreased, including  that of MODM. According to the MODM Minister and U.S. government and  international organization officials, the budgeted amount for 2009 was  insufficient (see table 4), particularly since MODM began implementing  programs and delivering services. However, according to officials, other  ministries may be independently assisting IDPs and returnees through  their own budgets and efforts. For example, the Ministry of Housing is  planning to build shelters, according to officials. For 2010, the MODM  budget was slightly higher than the amount that it expended in 2008 and  more than triple the amount of its 2009 budget.
The Iraqi government issued a decree and orders to facilitate certain  returns and reintegration for some displaced Iraqis, primarily in Baghdad  and Diyala (see table 5); however, progress has been limited.
International organizations and NGOs have identified problems regarding  this decree and these orders and their implementation. According to USIP,  Decree 262 and Order 101 cover only a limited segment of the displaced  population, require extensive documentation that returnees may have lost  due to displacement, do not clarify the roles of the various agencies  involved in the process, and do not dedicate resources for administration  and oversight. USIP reported that by the end of 2008, about 10,000  returnee families had registered to receive the grant under Decree 262, but  only a small number had received it. In January 2009, the volume of new  cases dropped significantly, which according to UNHCR, IOM, and NGOs,  may have been due to the low rate of payments. According to international  organization and U.S. government officials, the amount of the stipends  under these orders is insufficient to cover expenses and serve as an  incentive for returns. In addition, IMC officials said the Iraqi government  has not been proactive in providing squatters with the 6 months of rental  assistance due under Decree 262. Moreover, according to OCHA and IMC,  MODM issued a Ministerial Order on February 12, 2009 that precluded  further registration of IDPs for benefits and refocused efforts on  monitoring returnees. According to OCHA, the order sought to prevent  double registrations and forgery; however, it may restrict legitimate IDPs’  access to benefits. OCHA further noted that the Ministerial Order may  restrict unregistered IDPs’ ability to register as returnees and receive  benefits under Decree 262 and Order 101, since they have to be registered  as IDPs first to re-register as returnees.
According to U.S. government officials, a key indicator for Iraqi  government progress will be how the Iraqi government, at the central,  governorate, and local levels, moves forward with its funding for and  implementation of Order 54 regarding returns and reintegration in Diyala.  The Iraqi government has made Diyala the focus of an initiative, led by the  Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation, to create conditions for  large-scale IDP and refugee returns. According to State, the Iraqi  government has pledged 37 billion dinar (about $30 million) for use by the  Diyala Governor to reconstruct destroyed homes and pledged to provide 6- month contract jobs for up to 10,000 returnee families and 10,000  nonreturnee families. DOD reported in April 2010, that the Iraqi Security  Forces continue to make progress in improving security in Diyala by  eliminating insurgent support and thereby setting the conditions for  economic recovery and return of displaced Iraqis. However, the  perception of disproportionate targeting of Sunnis has strained sectarian  relations, allowing Shi’a extremists and criminal elements much greater  freedom of movement.
section_title: Iraq, the United States, and Other Members of the International Community Lack an Integrated International Strategy for Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis
paragraphs: Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international community  lack an integrated strategy for the reintegration of displaced Iraqis. An  effective strategy would be integrated and provide Iraq and its  implementing partners with a tool to shape policies and programs so that  stakeholders can achieve the desired results in an accountable and  effective manner. International community stakeholders agree that to be  effective, the strategy should be Iraqi-led with the assistance of the  international community. The lack of an integrated strategy for  reintegration resulted in a lack of agreed-upon strategic goals and  outcomes, has hindered efforts to efficiently and effectively assess the  needs of Iraqi IDPs and returnees, and has hindered stakeholder  coordination and efficiency of service delivery.
subsections: section_title: Iraq, the United States, and the UN Lack Integrated Plans for Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis
paragraphs: Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international community  lack an integrated plan for reintegrating displaced Iraqis because Iraqi  MODM planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity,  and broader Iraqi government support; the UN’s strategy and plans have  primarily focused on assistance to the most vulnerable Iraqis and have not  specifically focused on reintegration; and the current U.S. government  strategy has not been made publicly available. An effective strategy would  be integrated and provide Iraq and its implementing partners with a tool to  shape policies and programs so that stakeholders can achieve the desired  results in an accountable, efficient, and effective manner.
subsections: section_title: Iraqi MODM Planning Efforts Stalled Due to Lack of Authority, Capacity, and Iraqi Government Support
paragraphs: According to international organization, U.S. government, and NGO  officials, MODM does not have the authority, capacity, or Iraqi government  support to implement its displacement policy and develop an effective  strategy. In July 2008, MODM issued the National Policy on Displacement.  This policy offers a general description of the problem, identifies basic  goals, defines terms, stresses the rights of displaced persons, describes the  basic needs of Iraqi IDPs, and recommends activities to mitigate some of  the problems identified. The policy also calls for setting up a  comprehensive, effective, and realistic workplan; providing adequate  protection and assistance to displaced persons; specifying coordination  structures among all state institutions; and allocating funds and  developing financial procedures for the implementation of the policy.  However, international organization, U.S. government, and NGO officials  noted that MODM efforts have stalled because the ministry has had little  authority or ability to coordinate efforts within the Iraqi government to  implement the policy and develop an effective strategy. International and  nongovernmental organization officials have expressed concern about the  lack of unified Iraqi support for the policy and development of a strategy.  UNHCR, IOM, and other actors will continue to build on the National  Policy on Displacement as well as relevant legal authorities that we have  described previously, according to the UN. According to State officials, the  extent to which the Iraqi government implements Order 54, which focuses  a range of efforts in Diyala and essentially makes Diyala a test case, may  determine the future development of a viable strategy.
section_title: UN Strategy and Plans Have Primarily Focused on Assistance to the Most Vulnerable Iraqis and Have Not Specifically Focused on Reintegration
paragraphs: Overall UN strategic efforts in Iraq have targeted humanitarian assistance  to the most vulnerable Iraqis, which may or may not include IDPs and  returnees, but are not specifically focused on reintegration. The United  Nations 2008-2010 Iraq Assistance Strategy focuses on needs and  planned assistance by sector, and although it occasionally mentions the  impact of IDPs on sectors and includes a few broadly stated outputs  regarding IDPs, it does not address reintegration. As part of its strategic  approach, the UN issued its consolidated 2009 funding appeal for  assistance efforts in Iraq and neighboring and other countries hosting  refugees. The UN noted in its midyear review that, although IDPs were  returning, large numbers of returns had not yet materialized and should  not be encouraged. Thus, the UN continued to address the needs of  vulnerable groups within the entire population and not to limit efforts to  IDPs and returnees. In the UN’s 2010 appeal, the UN interspersed some  new efforts intended to facilitate returns and reintegration while also  assisting other vulnerable Iraqis. However, after making progress in  consolidating its 2009 appeal, the UN divided its 2010 appeal into three  planning documents, further fragmenting its initial planning efforts to  address returns and reintegration. Additionally, although the initial  planning efforts may include outputs, such as that at least 35 mobile teams  and 14 Protection and Assistance Centers provide legal aid and monitor  the needs of people of concern, they do not define reintegration (i.e., what  is a sustainable return) or include specific indicators or outcomes for  reintegration, as would be expected in an effective strategic plan.
section_title: Current U.S. Government Strategy Is Not Publicly Available
paragraphs: According to NSC, State, and USAID officials, the U.S. strategy regarding  the reintegration of Iraqis is delineated in three classified or sensitive  documents that have not been made available in a public document. Also,  an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy has not been developed  and made public. Administration officials stated that the classified and  sensitive documents were not drafted with the aim of creating a publicly  announced strategy to persuade Iraqis to return home; rather, they are  planning documents describing how to use U.S. assistance to ensure that  Iraqis who choose to return to Iraq have support systems in place. In the  absence of a publicly available strategy, administration officials stated that  the United States will focus on the three efforts announced by the U.S.  President in February 2009. The President stated that the administration  would provide more assistance and take steps to generate international  support for countries hosting refugees, cooperate with others to resettle  refugees facing great personal risk, and work with the Iraqi government  over time to resettle refugees and displaced Iraqis within Iraq.
Subsequent to concluding our field work and our exit meetings with U.S.  agencies and the NSC, in July 2010 NSC provided GAO with an  unclassified summary of a classified May 2009 U.S. government strategy  regarding support for returning Iraqi refugees and IDPs. While the  summary was made available to GAO, it had not been made public. The  NSC summary included a fiscal year 2010 objective to assist the Iraqi  government, in coordination with international organizations and other  donors, in developing a comprehensive strategy to support the  reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The strategy was to include active  participation of the Iraqi government line ministries. However, such a  strategy was not developed. The NSC noted that the summary prepared for  GAO was based on a “historical document,” should be viewed in that  context, and that it had not been updated to reflect the current situation.
section_title: Iraq, the United States, and Other International Community Stakeholders Have Not Yet Reached Agreement on Defined Goals and Outcomes, Including Defining the Target Population and Reintegration
paragraphs: Clearly defined and agreed-upon strategic goals and intended outcomes  for reintegration have not been specifically developed. Strategic goals  explain what results are expected and when they are expected. A direct  alignment between strategic goals and strategies for achieving those goals  is important for assessing an ability to achieve those goals. In the case of  reintegrating displaced Iraqis, key parameters have not yet been agreed  upon, which makes it difficult to establish measurable goals.
For example, the international community has no agreed-upon  determination of when the displacement it is addressing in Iraq began or  when the displaced are considered reintegrated. MODM’s National Policy  on Displacement includes a focus on an estimated 1.2 million Iraqis who  were displaced over the 40 years before the fall of Saddam Hussein’s  regime in 2003 and on an estimated more than 1.6 million who were  internally displaced after; while the Iraqi government’s 2008 and 2009  orders and decree focus assistance to a limited segment of the displaced  population. The U.S. government and some international organization  programs are more focused on displacement since 2003, particularly the  large displacement occurring after the February 2006 Samarra bombing.
Similarly complex is agreeing upon when the displaced are considered  reintegrated and international assistance is no longer required for  reintegration. Reintegration is defined as “sustainable returns,” but a clear  and uniform definition of “sustainable” in the context of Iraq has not been  agreed to by the international community. MODM’s National Policy on  Displacement defines durable solutions as based on three elements—long- term security, restitution of or compensation for lost property, and an  environment that sustains life under normal economic and social  conditions. Under the policy, the displaced may return to their home or  place of habitual residence; integrate locally into the social, economic,  cultural, and political fabric of the community where they initially found  temporary refuge; or resettle in a new community. However, restitution of  or compensation for lost property may occur long after the displaced  return, integrate, or resettle, and there is little agreement on what  constitutes normal economic and social conditions for Iraq. According to  U.S. government officials, they plan to address the lack of clarity and  agreement over definitions and parameters as they develop their plans to  assist the Iraqi government in reintegration efforts.
section_title: Lack of an Integrated Strategy Has Hindered Efforts to Efficiently and Effectively Assess the Needs of Iraqi IDPs and Returnees
paragraphs: The lack of an integrated strategy has hindered efforts to efficiently and  effectively assess the needs of Iraqi IDPs and returnees. A strategy for  reintegration must include information on the needs of displaced Iraqis  and be updated on the basis of the assistance provided and remaining  needs. While various UN agencies, affiliated organizations, and their  implementing partners have collected and assessed data for their  specialized work in Iraq, gaps remain. In addition, the UN has not  integrated data from UNHCR into its new Inter-Agency Information  Analysis Unit, which was established to provide a central point for  collecting and assessing needs-based data, according to a senior IAU  official.
Over time, the UN and its partners have individually attempted to identify  and estimate the numbers of vulnerable Iraqis, internally displaced,  returnees, and Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees; survey returnees and IDPs on  their reasons for leaving, immediate needs, and priority needs for return;  document protection, property, livelihood, and governance issues; and  determine the status of essential services across the country. However,  international organization, NGO, and U.S. government officials stated that  it was often difficult to identify the best data available because data from  different sources did not always agree, some of the data were incomplete  or outdated, or the methodology used to obtain and assess the reliability of  some data was not clear. According to UNHCR, OCHA should have been  coordinating the data collection and assessments from the beginning, but  they did not initially have a presence in Iraq. As a result, each organization  collected and assessed its own data, according to UNHCR. According to  some officials, the Iraqi population has been over surveyed as a result of  these separate assessments. According to international and  nongovernmental organizations, gaps in information and data remain. For  example:  In 2009, UNHCR predicted that over 400,000 refugees would return to Iraq  in 2009. The returns did not materialize and no further fact-based  assessments and predictions on the rate of return have been made to  facilitate planning efforts, according to UNHCR and U.S. government  officials.
According to international organizations, no inventory and analysis has  been conducted of the various financial assistance programs available to  IDPs and returnees to determine gaps, overlap, or impact. As a result,  there is no assurance that resources are allocated in a rational and fair  manner. Some international organizations provide returnees and  vulnerable populations with cash, cash for work, and in-kind grants for  business development. USIP reported that in addition to grants provided  by the central government, ministries, provincial governments, and  municipalities provide other forms of financial assistance and other  specific funds for houses damaged in particular military operations, and  that there are a variety of victims and martyrs commissions that provide  other sorts of compensation.
Despite efforts to improve outreach and surveys of vulnerable  populations, some areas have not been accessible to international  organizations and NGOs due to security concerns and lack of trained  national staff. To begin to address this problem, in 2009, OCHA planned to  inventory and train national NGOs through three workshops and  subsequently carried out training inside Iraq for 74 Iraqi NGOs on  humanitarian principles, rapid needs assessments, and results based  management. By 2011, UNHCR plans to increase its presence in Iraq by  relocating staff from Jordan and Kuwait; increasing its network of national  NGOs across Iraq; and working through international NGO partners to  provide support, oversight, and a review of the capacity of national NGOs  to access areas, identify vulnerable populations, and provide assistance,  particularly should security deteriorate.
To address data gaps and overlap, in February 2008, the UN established  the IAU in Amman, Jordan, under the direction of OCHA and the United  Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. According to a senior IAU official, the  primary purpose of the IAU is to be a “one-stop shop” for collecting and  providing data on Iraq and to ensure that the best data are available. The  IAU is intended to bring together analysts from UN agencies and NGOs to  facilitate and enhance data collection, sharing, analysis, and joint  assessments; provide timely and accurate information on the situation and  needs in the different areas of Iraq; and increase coordination to reduce  project duplication and maximize the targeting of vulnerable  communities. According to the senior IAU official, in the spring of 2010,  the UN Country Team established a new steering committee composed of  agency heads that met for the first time to set priorities and develop a  work plan for the IAU. As of July 2010, the IAU has staff in Jordan and  Iraq, including new governate-based Information Management Offices.  According to the senior IAU official, the IAU now receives data and  assessments from most organizations conducting work in Iraq, have  analysts from most of the major contributors as part of their team, and  help plan for and coordinate future surveys. Through an agreement  between the UN and the U.S. government, the IAU will also begin to  analyze declassified U.S. databases and share information.
However, according to the senior IAU official, although UNHCR is a  participating agency of the IAU, is a member of the UN Country Team, and  shares it reports with the IAU, UNHCR is not fully participating in the IAU.  UNHCR is not sharing the raw or primary data it collects on IDPs,  returnees, and vulnerable populations; its methodology and data  limitations; and an analyst to work with the IAU team and is not taking  advantage of IAU resources and coordination. The IAU official stated that  as a result, UNHCR issues are not on the agenda, and other agencies are  unaware of the composition and quality of UNHCR data. The official  added that UNHCR is not taking advantage of IAU staff expertise and  lessons learned on how to implement surveys using NGOs and how to  scrub and assess raw data. For example, UNHCR conducted a survey of  returnees but has not shared its questionnaire and raw data with the IAU.  Moreover, UNHCR is not involved in planning future surveys, such as a  major activity of the IAU this year, which is to work with the Iraqi  government and civil society to develop a socioeconomic monitoring  system for Iraq within the Central Organization for Statistics and  Information Technology and the Kurdistan Regional Statistic Office,  according to the IAU official.
According to UNHCR and IAU officials, UNHCR had initially assigned an  analyst to the IAU, but has not refilled the position since the staff member  left it in 2009. According to the IAU official, UNHCR informed the IAU that  it had abolished the position because it did not have a qualified staff  member to detail to the IAU. UNHCR officials stated that they found little  added value from having a staff person detailed to the IAU.
section_title: Lack of an Integrated Strategy Has Hindered Stakeholder Coordination and Efficiency
paragraphs: Without an integrated strategy, it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively  delineate roles and responsibilities and establish coordination and  oversight mechanisms for effective and efficient implementation. The  MODM Minister stated that his ministry’s initial role was limited to that of  a coordinating body, leaving no single entity charged with implementing  the necessary tasks. The Minister added that although the Ministries of  Health, Education, Interior, and Defense are essential to addressing  impediments to returns, they do not have programs specifically focusing  on IDPs.
Roles and efforts among international organizations may overlap,  particularly since organizations plan their work independently of each  other and work bilaterally with local leaders, the Iraqi government, and  donor country agencies. According to international and NGO officials,  decreasing international donor community contributions to these  organizations has caused them to compete for funding and trained  national staff. At UN Country Team meetings and UN Assistance Mission  for Iraq activities, officials at one agency stated that while some  information is shared, organizations “protect their turf,” and opportunities  to build on the efforts of others are lost. According to IOM and UNHCR,  although organizations try to avoid conflicts by focusing their efforts in  different sectors—such as UNHCR focusing its projects on shelter and  property issues, IOM focusing on livelihood projects, and WFP focusing on  delivery of food—efforts may overlap. For example, WFP is expanding its  focus in Iraq to include livelihood projects. According to IMC,  coordinating committees are prolific in Iraq but they are not always  effective. For example, according to IMC, IMC and USAID/OFDA were  working on shelter rehabilitation in one area, only to find out from field  staff that UNHCR was doing similar work. According to IMC officials, they  have been involved in the UN sector outcome teams, but the meetings  were generally held in Amman without an Iraqi government presence,  thereby limiting effective coordination.
One area with significant potential for overlap is the establishment of  numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq to register or  assist returnees, IDPs, and vulnerable Iraqis. International and U.S.  government officials expressed concerns about the need for multiple  centers, possible inefficiencies, and extent to which the MODM will be  capable of assuming responsibilities for centers in the future. Although  each center initially had its own purpose, some of the activities at these  centers now overlap, and all require oversight and administrative support,  according to international organization officials. A number of these  centers are funded by State and USAID and managed or supported by  MODM, UNHCR, IMC, and IOM. A sample of these centers includes the  following:    MODM Return and Assistance Centers: According to UNHCR, as of July  2010, MODM had established three main Return and Assistance Centers— two in Baghdad (Karkh and Resafa) and one in Diyala—to register and  assist displaced Iraqis who want to return to their original homes. In  addition, each of the 14 MODM branches outside of Baghdad and Diyala  has a Registration Department where the same functions are performed.  The centers register new arrivals, streamline returnee access to assistance,  offer returning Iraqis legal aid and advice, assist in resolving property  disputes, help replace lost documents, and help with access to MODM and  government benefits. IMC supports the Karkh and Diyala centers with  funding from USAID and strategic guidance from UNHCR. According to an  IMC official, IMC is essentially comanaging the centers at MODM’s request  because MODM lacks trained staff. IMC also supports some of the MODM  Registration Departments. UNHCR, with State’s PRM funding, supports  operations of the Resafa center, including its mobile teams, and supports  two of the Karkh center mobile teams. According to UNHCR, although it is  not ideal to have a medical NGO co-operating the centers, IMC was one of  the few UNHCR partners and international NGOs positioned in Iraq when  the centers were established.
UNHCR Protection and Assistance Centers: As of March 2010, UNHCR  had established and continued to operate 15 Protection and Assistance  Centers and 40 associated mobile teams that provide services to displaced,  returning, and vulnerable Iraqis and others in all 18 governorates in Iraq.
As of May 2010, the centers included a total of 125 staff, including lawyers,  social workers, monitors, and public information and database officers.  The centers conduct protection monitoring assessments to identify needs,  gather information, and identify opportune interventions regarding basic  human rights and physical security; provide legal assistance addressing a  broad spectrum of needs, including legal counseling and interventions and  access to services, documentation, and compensation; provide assistance  and referrals to services and other stakeholders, such as authorities,  NGOs, UNHCR, or other Protection and Assistance Centers; and provide  briefings and information sessions to raise awareness of protection needs.
UNHCR Return Integration Community Centers: In mid-2009, UNHCR  established and began operating 12 Return Integration Community Centers  to expand its capacity to reach out to return communities. The centers  coordinate with and relay information to local communities; conduct  needs assessments; and address the social, assistance, and information  needs of displaced and returning IDPs and refugees. Six of the centers are  based in Baghdad and the others are based in Anbar, Basrah, Diyala,  Kirkuk, Missan, and Ninewa. UNHCR plans to increase the number of  these centers to at least 16 in 2010. As of May 2010, these centers included  a total of 159 staff.
IOM Community Outreach and Women Centers: IOM and its partners are  establishing four Women Centers with funding from State. The centers will  provide legal aid, psychosocial support, health counseling, and livelihood  support to the most vulnerable IDP and returnee female-headed  households in Baghdad, Diyala, and Missan.
After our fieldwork discussions with UNHCR and U.S. government  officials, UNHCR informed us in June 2010 that it was taking action to  address the multiple assistance centers and potential for duplication and  lost efficiencies. First, UNHCR informed us that it had agreed to merge all  Protection and Assistance Centers and Return Integration Community  Centers in 2011 to reduce administrative costs. Second, UNHCR, in  discussions with the U.S. Embassy, suggested that all MODM Return and  Assistance Center activities be placed under one management umbrella.  According to UNHCR, doing so would enable them to have a more  harmonized approach that would avoid potential confusion and  duplication. UNHCR also stated that this approach will provide it with the  opportunity to harmonize staff payments and incentives.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: It is in the U.S. government’s interest to work with Iraq and international  community stakeholders to develop an integrated international strategy  for reintegrating displaced Iraqis that transitions efforts and costs over  time to the Iraqi government. First, Iraq is a sovereign nation that should  lead efforts to address impediments to the return and reintegration of all  displaced Iraqis. Second, in MODM’s National Policy on Displacement, the  Iraqi government states that it cannot address this issue without the help  of the international community. Third, in fiscal year 2009, the United  States funded more than one-half of the humanitarian assistance provided  to Iraq, and the lack of an international strategy may result in lost  efficiencies and wasted funds. One possible example of this may be the  administration of many assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq.  Furthermore, President Obama stated in his February 2009 speech on  responsibly ending the war in Iraq that the United States will pursue a  transition to Iraq and that the United States has a moral responsibility to  help displaced Iraqis. We recognize that strategies themselves are not end  points, but starting points, and that implementation is the key. However,  an integrated strategy—along with transparent goals and shared, accurate  data on the conditions and effectiveness of projects—is useful in  suggesting ways to enhance the value of plans, filling in gaps, speeding  implementation, guiding resource allocations, and providing oversight  opportunities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance the ability of the Iraqi and U.S. governments, international  organizations, and NGOs to effectively plan and integrate their efforts to  assist and reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we recommend that the Secretary  of State and the USAID Administrator work with the appropriate  international organizations to assist the Iraqi government in developing an  international strategy that addresses impediments to return and prepares  for and facilitates the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis.
To ensure that the U.S. goals and plans are fully integrated with those of  Iraq and other international community stakeholders and that progress  toward meeting those goals is transparent, we recommend that the  Secretary of State and USAID Administrator make public an unclassified  version of the current U.S. strategy and their implementing plans for  assisting and reintegrating displaced Iraqis, including their goals,  performance measures, and progress assessments.
To ensure that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, other donors, international  organizations, and implementing partners have the best data available  regarding the numbers and needs of IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable  Iraqis, in the most efficient manner, we recommend that the Secretary of  State encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and methodology with the  IAU and take advantage of IAU expertise and coordinated efforts.
To ensure the effective and efficient use of resources by its implementing  partners, we recommend that the Secretary of State and USAID  Administrator work with UNHCR and its other implementing partners to  take inventory of and assess the purposes, organization, operations, and  results of the various assistance, return, and registration centers and  mobile units in Iraq to determine and achieve an optimal framework for  assisting IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable Iraqis.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense  and USAID. State and USAID provided written comments, which are  reprinted in appendixes V and VI. DOD provided oral comments which are  summarized below. State and DOD also provided technical comments,  which we incorporated where appropriate.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State and USAID agreed with our  recommendations regarding the need to assist the Iraqi government in  developing an international strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis and  to make public an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy and  their implementing plans. State and USAID also agreed with our  recommendation regarding the need to work with UNHCR and other  implementing partners to take inventory of and assess the various  assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units to determine  and achieve an optimal framework. USAID and State noted that efforts to  address this recommendation have begun. According to State, UNHCR has  begun to consolidate services and plan the merger of centers. State also  agreed with our recommendation regarding the need to encourage UNHCR  to share its raw data and methodology with the IAU and take advantage of  IAU expertise and coordinated efforts. In addition, DOD commented that it  agreed with the report and supports State and USAID in the execution of  their mission to assist and reintegrate displaced Iraqis.
We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees,  the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and the Secretary of  Defense. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine efforts to reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we reviewed (1) the  conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to their reintegration; (2) the  actions that the United States, Iraq, and other members of the  international community have taken to address these conditions and  reintegration; and (3) the extent to which the United States, Iraq, and other  members of the international community have an effective strategy for  reintegrating displaced Iraqis. When reintegration challenges and efforts  were intertwined with efforts to assist internally displaced and vulnerable  Iraqis, we included both in our scope. We conducted fieldwork in  Washington, D.C.; New York City (United Nations (UN) agencies); Geneva,  Switzerland (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),  International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other international  organization headquarters); and Iraq. We also conducted telephone  interviews with UN officials in Amman, Jordan, that were responsible for  work in Iraq.
Within the U.S. government, we reviewed documents and interviewed  officials of the National Security Council’s (NSC) Office of Multilateral  Affairs and Human Rights; Department of State’s (State) Bureau of  Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and Bureau of Near Eastern  Affairs; Department of Defense’s Office of the Secretary of Defense and  Joint Staff; the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID)  Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Middle East/Iraq  Reconstruction Office; the Central Intelligence Agency; the U.S. missions  in New York and Geneva; the U.S. embassy and USAID mission in  Baghdad, Iraq; and the Multi-National Force-Iraq representative to the U.S.  Embassy’s IDP Working Group.
Within the Iraq government, we interviewed the Iraqi Minister of  Displacement and Migration and reviewed Iraqi government and  ministerial documents, including publicly available reported numbers of  IDPs and returnees. We toured the facilities and interviewed Iraqi and  nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials at the Karkh Return and  Assistance Center in Baghdad, Iraq.
We interviewed officials and reviewed documents from international  organizations, including the UNHCR, IOM, UN Office for the Coordination  of Humanitarian Affairs, International Committee of the Red Cross, UN  Department of Political Affairs, UN Development Programme, World  Heath Organization, World Food Program, and UN Children’s Fund  (UNICEF). We also reviewed documents from the UN Human Settlements  Programme (UN-HABITAT).
With the assistance of Interaction in the United States and the  International Council of Voluntary Agencies in Geneva, Switzerland, we  held discussion groups with international NGOs that had, have, or plan to  have a presence in Iraq to discuss challenges to reintegration, actions  taken and planned, and gaps remaining to be addressed.
We interviewed and reviewed studies and papers from research institutes  and advocacy groups, such as the Brookings Institute’s Brookings-Bern  Project on Internal Displacement, the Norwegian Refugee Council’s  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Refugees International, Human  Rights First, and the U.S. Institute of Peace.
To identify conditions that pose a challenge to reintegrating displaced  Iraqis, we reviewed research papers and assessments; strategies and  policy papers; program implementation, monitoring, and progress reports;  and related documents and interviewed officials from the U.S. and Iraqi  governments, international organizations, NGOs, and research institutes.  We filtered challenges by considering factors, such as their significance  and the degree to which they could be generalized, and then grouped them  by category. We documented evidence from multiple sources and  validated it with knowledgeable U.S., UN, IOM, and NGO officials to  ensure accuracy. In addition, we also considered data compiled by IOM  through the assessments and surveys that it has conducted of Iraqi IDPs  and returnees since 2006. To determine the reliability of IOM data on  conditions in Iraq, we interviewed officials from IOM, USAID, PRM, the  U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and the Brookings Institution and reviewed  IOM’s data collection methodology and reports. The 2009 assessments of  internally displaced persons (IDP) covered more than 80 percent of the  estimated total of about 270,000 IDP families; however, it cannot be  generalized to the population of all IDPs. The 2009 survey of identified  returnee families was based on a sample of 4,061 of the 58,110 returnee  families. The survey cannot be generalized to all returnee families because  it relied on a mixture of random and judgmental sampling methods and  had a low response rate. These two data sources cannot be directly  compared because of their different populations, data collection methods,  and sample sizes. We determined that in conjunction with testimonial and  documentary evidence, the IOM data are sufficiently reliable to describe  the conditions that impede reintegration for those surveyed, but that the  data cannot be used to make inferences to the larger IDP and returnee  populations in Iraq.
To identify the actions that the United States, Iraq, and the international  community have taken to address these conditions, we reviewed policy,  strategy, planning, and funding documents; UN funding appeals;  monitoring and progress reports; and related documents and interviewed  officials from the U.S. and Iraqi governments, international organizations,  NGOs, and research institutes. We reviewed U.S. agency-reported amounts  obligated, and expended for fiscal years 2003 through 2009, as of  September 30, 2009, for humanitarian assistance and development  assistance. State provided us with funding data from its Abacus database  and Global Financial Management System. USAID provided data from its  Phoenix database. We checked data provided against the source database  printouts and discussed data reliability with agency officials. To verify our  summarization of the funding and associated data, we sent out draft tables  to agency contributors, resolved discrepancies, and made supported  changes. We found the funding data from State and USAID to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. The Army Budget  Office provided the amounts obligated for fiscal years 2003 through 2009,  as of September 30, 2009, for the Commander’s Emergency Response  Program from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System. Based on  prior work and data reliability assessments, we found the Army’s funding  data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To determine the extent to which the United States, Iraq, and other  members of the international community have an effective strategy to  address the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, we reviewed policy, strategy,  and planning documents from the U.S. and Iraqi governments, the UN, and  IOM. We interviewed U.S. agency, Iraqi government, international  organization, NGO, and research institution officials and reviewed their  documents to determine issues and problems resulting from the lack of a  strategy. We documented evidence from multiple sources and validated it  with knowledgeable U.S., UN, IOM, and NGO officials to ensure accuracy.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to December 2010  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Roles and Responsibilities of Key U.S. and Iraqi Government and International Community Entities Addressing Iraqi Displacement
paragraphs: Appendix II: Roles and Responsibilities of Key  U.S. and Iraqi Government and International  Community Entities Addressing Iraqi  Displacement The NSC’s Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights serves as the coordinator  for U.S. government efforts addressing assistance, repatriation and reintegration, and  resettlement for displaced Iraqis. This position was first filled in August 2009.
The Senior Coordinator, a senior Foreign Service officer stationed at the U.S. embassy in  Baghdad, is responsible for coordinating U.S. government efforts in Iraq that address Iraqi  displacement. The Senior Coordinator is also responsible for representing the United States in  its dealings with the Iraqi government, the international community, and nongovernmental  organizations (NGO) on displacement issues. This position was established by Public Law 110- 181 § 1245 (2008) and first filled in July 2008.
PRM is responsible for coordinating protection, humanitarian assistance, and resettlement for  refugees and conflict victims; is the lead U.S. agency interface with international organizations and  NGOs on refugee issues; funds implementing international organization and NGO partners, such  as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for assistance to refugees and  internally displaced persons (IDP); and formulates U.S. foreign policy on population issues and  international migration. To protect and assist Iraqi refugees and returnees, PRM works with the  NSC, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), regional bureaus, and U.S.  missions to provide guidance to its international organization and NGO implementing partners and  to engage with donor countries and countries hosting Iraqi refugees.
The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs advises on and develops policy for the assistance and  reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The bureau participates in the NSC’s interagency planning  committees.
OFDA funds and oversees a wide range of humanitarian assistance activities that are  implemented by a number of NGO and United Nations (UN) partners who provide humanitarian  assistance programs for IDPs and other vulnerable Iraqis. OFDA coordinates these relief efforts  with other USAID offices, State, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations and  agencies in Iraq.
ME/IR funds and oversees implementing partners—primarily, private contractors, NGOs, and  international organizations—that implement programs focusing on economic development and  capacity building at all levels of the Iraqi government. The USAID Iraq Mission, located in  Baghdad, works closely with coalition forces and other U.S. government agencies; international  institutions, such as the UN and World Bank; Iraq’s national, provincial, and local governments;  and a network of partners that include NGOs, local community groups, and Iraqi citizens to  implement USAID’s development programs.
MNF-I worked to improve security conditions and maintain stability for all Iraqis and provided  security for U.S. and UN officials that enabled them to safely assist Iraqis. U.S. Forces-Iraq  (replacing MNF-I on Jan. 1, 2010) negotiates with tribal leaders, trains Iraqi Security Forces  (ISF), and assists Provincial Reconstruction Teams as they build essential services for the Iraqi  people, including IDPs. DOD personnel have provided support, such as information sharing, to  USAID, State, and international organizations to address displacement. DOD participates in the  National Security Council’s interagency planning committees.
A political advisor to the Prime Minister of Iraq was appointed by the Prime Minister to also serve  as the Iraqi government’s coordinator for Iraqi refugee and IDP issues in September 2009.
MODM was established as a coordinating body within the Iraqi government ministries on  displacement issues. As of 2008, MODM was empowered to provide additional grants and  establish centers to receive and register displaced and returning Iraqis.
The Implementation and Follow-up Committee plays a lead role in promoting reconciliation  between Sunnis (in particular, those that were associated with the Saddam regime) and Iraq’s  Shiite majority and chairs efforts for reconciliation and reintegration in Diyala.
The Iraqi Security Forces, in addition to providing general security, are also responsible for  enforcing laws and government orders designed to assist displaced Iraqis, such as evicting  squatters from homes owned by displaced Iraqis.
UNHCR has a global mandate to lead and coordinate international action for the protection of  refugees and stateless people and to find lasting solutions to their plight. UNHCR coordinates  efforts with the Iraqi government and works to reintegrate displaced Iraqis. UNHCR chairs the UN  Country Team addressing protection and co-chairs the team addressing shelter in Iraq. UNHCR  provides protection, shelter, and emergency assistance to IDPs, refugees, and returnees.
OCHA, on behalf of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, mobilizes and coordinates  humanitarian action in Iraq. OCHA is responsible for information management and analysis,  advocacy and public information, resource mobilization and management, disaster  preparedness and response, and protection. OCHA works in partnership with UN agencies,  international organizations, and NGOs. The consolidated appeal process for Iraq was led by  OCHA. Through the Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), OCHA collates and  analyzes data on the humanitarian situation to create and disseminate information products,  such as maps, charts and graphs, reports and assessments, and contact information, and  maintains the OCHA and IAU Web sites to share these products.
IOM is an intergovernmental organization that works on migration issues worldwide. IOM, in  partnership with other international organizations and the Iraqi government, conducts a wide  range of activities in Iraq, such as building capacity in certain Iraqi ministries, monitoring and  providing emergency assistance to IDPs and other vulnerable groups, and assisting efforts to  redress property rights. IOM is also a member of the UN Country Team.
ICRC is an international organization that works to ensure humanitarian protection and  assistance to victims of war and other situations of violence worldwide. ICRC has a permanent  mandate founded under international law to take impartial action for persons affected by conflict.  ICRC provides relief assistance to IDPs and other vulnerable groups inside Iraq. It also has  assessed the detention and treatment conditions of detainees, provided medical supplies to  hospitals, and rehabilitated existing water and sanitation infrastructure, among other things.
International and national NGOs conduct significant efforts in Iraq for the benefit of IDPs,  returnees, and all vulnerable Iraqis.
A number of Irai government ministries are relevant to MODM’s efforts, such as the Ministries of  Finance, Planning and Development Cooperation, Trade, Health, Education, Interior, and Defense,  among others.
The UN Country Team, which includes UNHCR, OCHA, and IOM, works to coordinate UN efforts  and to provide assistance in myriad areas in Ira that may directly or indirectly address Irai  displacement. Other UN Country Team members include the Economic and Social Commission for  Western Asia; Food and Agriculture Organization; International Labour Organization; Office of the UN  High Commissioner for Human Rights; UN Development Programme; UN Environment Programme;  UN Education, Science and Cultural Organization; UN Population Fund; UN Centre for Human  Settlements; UN Children’s Fund; UN Industrial Development Organization; UN Fund for  Advancement of Women; UN Office for Project Services; the World Food Program; and the World  Health Organization. IOM and the World Bank are affiliated bodies of the UN Country Team, not UN  organizations.
section_title: Appendix III: U.S. Funds Obligated and Expended for Iraq-Related Humanitarian Assistance Projects, and Intended Beneficiaries, Fiscal Years 2003-2009, as of September 30, 2009
paragraphs: Appendix III: U.S. Funds Obligated and  Expended for Iraq-Related Humanitarian  Assistance Projects, and Intended  Beneficiaries, Fiscal Years 2003-2009, as of  September 30, 2009 State/Population, Refugees,  and Migration Bureau (PRM)
USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign  Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
In region: Government  of Jordan to meet the  needs of Iraqi refugees  and host country  population  In Iraq: IDPs and  vulnerable populations   may include other Irais at risk; Irais who have returned from other  countries; refugees in Ira from other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims.  i refugees  in the region do not allow donors to provide assistance solely to Irai refugees. In some cases, a  portion of the funds was contributed to international organizations that may have spent the funds in  one or a number of the countries hosting Irais in the region. Host countries receiving assistance  include Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran.
According to USAID, in 2003, USAID’s Food for Peace Program received $191.1 million, which was  reallocated from funds originally appropriated in P.L. 108-7 to Development Assistance, Economic  Support Fund, Child Survival and Health, and International Disaster and Famine Assistance  accounts.
The U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance fund is drawn upon by the President to meet  unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs whenever the President determines that it is in the  U.S. national interest to do so. Funds are appropriated annually to this fund and remain available until  expended.
section_title: Appendix IV: U.S. Development Assistance Funding, Partners, and Activities in Iraq, Fiscal Years 2003-2009
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2003 through 2009, the U.S. government, through USAID’s  Middle East Bureau’s Office of Iraq Reconstruction (ME/IR), obligated  about $6.4 billion and expended about $5.6 billion for development  assistance projects in Iraq (see table 6). The USAID Iraq Mission, located  in Baghdad, worked with USAID’s partners to implement these projects  (see table 7). The intended beneficiaries of these activities included local  Iraqi NGOs, local and regional government entities, provincial  directorates, local courts, universities, local media outlets, the  Independent Higher Electoral Commission, community action groups,  victims of coalition operations, and ministries at the national and  provincial levels.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition, Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Martin De Alteriis; Farhanaz  Kermalli; Gilbert Kim; Heather Latta; Kathleen Monahan; and Mary  Moutsos made key contributions to this report. Additional assistance was  provided by Todd Anderson, Gergana Danailova-Trainor, Karen Deans,  Timothy DiNapoli, Walker Fullerton, Cheron Green, Emily Gupta, Bruce  Kutnick, Charlotte Moore, Christopher Mulkins, Diahanna Post, and  Gwyneth Woolwine.