Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform Joint Training
Published: 2005-06-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. forces are conducting more complex operations, requiring increased interoperability between the military commands, services, and other organizations. Department of Defense (DOD) planning guidance calls for transforming military training by increasing the jointness in training. The overall intent of DOD's Training Transformation Program is to assure commanders that forces deployed to their theater are not experiencing joint operations for the first time. Therefore, the program's strategic goals focus on providing joint training that meets commanders' needs and links to readiness assessments. Given the significant investment planned in the program and the impact it will have on the military, this report provides a program overview, including (1) DOD's overall management approach and status of key initiatives, and (2) some significant management challenges that have emerged early in the program's implementation.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and unit training focused on combatant commanders' needs and linked to readiness assessments. Thus far, the department has established program accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership management and oversight roles and responsibilities. DOD has also established three training transformation initiatives designed to prepare individuals, units, and staffs for joint operations and to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. The initiatives are being developed incrementally, wherein each initiative matures through the "build a little, test a little" philosophy. DOD plans to complete its first program assessment later this year. One significant challenge that has emerged early and will require continued focus is establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders via comprehensive communication and coordination to gain their full participation and buy-in to achieve training transformation goals. DOD has taken positive steps to communicate and coordinate with these stakeholders, which include DOD's combatant commanders, services, and training commands, as well as representatives from the Federal departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national security interagency community. However, GAO found an inconsistent understanding among some DOD stakeholders of the strategic vision and rationale behind the implementation and development pace of the initiatives. DOD has not assessed its communication and coordination efforts to determine why some stakeholders may not fully understand the overall vision. Similarly, DOD officials have been proactive in engaging external stakeholders in identifying potential joint training opportunities. However, DOD's outreach to the senior-level leadership of external organizations has been limited to date, thus risking their full commitment to future planning and implementation of joint training. Anothersignificant challenge that has emerged early and will require continued focus is developing joint training requirements--and the specific training tasks that support the requirements--that meet combatant command mission needs. Rather than identifying joint training tasks through DOD's established process called the "Joint Training System" that is used to translate combatant command needs into training requirements, the department is developing some joint tasks through a working group process that does not ensure widespread participation by the combatant commands' and services' representatives. As a result, the department risks developing joint training requirements that combatant commands and services may not fully support. Both these challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding support among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the Training Transformation Program at risk.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As recently demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces are  conducting significantly more complex operations, requiring increased  interoperability between and among the military services, combatant  commands, and other Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD  organizations.  In the past, military services experienced some joint  operations training during joint exercises, but most service training  focused on individual service competencies with limited joint context. To  successfully conduct today’s joint missions, DOD’s planning guidance calls  for transforming military training to better enable joint force operations by  increasing the level of joint context in military training.  The overall intent  of the department’s Training Transformation Program is to assure  combatant commanders that forces deployed to their theater are not  experiencing joint operations for the first time.  The strategic goals of  training transformation are to provide joint training that is (1) focused on  combatant commanders’ operational requirements, and (2) linked to  readiness assessments through a robust network of training capabilities  that are integrated throughout the department.
The overall objective of this report is to provide an overview of DOD’s  Training Transformation Program and its implementation challenges,  especially given DOD’s plans for significant investments in the program  and the impact that training transformation will have on the combatant  commands and the services.  Specifically, we (1) determined DOD’s  overall management approach and status in implementing the Training  Transformation Program, and (2) identified some significant management  challenges that have emerged early in the program’s implementation. We  prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General, and  are addressing this report to you because of your committee’s oversight in  this area.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed key  departmentwide documents—including the Office of the Secretary of  Defense’s 2004 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan—  to identify milestones for each of three training transformation initiatives.  Additionally, we met with key officials in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense and the Joint Staff, as well as officials from the combatant  commands and service organizations that are affected by the Training  Transformation Program’s implementation.  We performed our work from  June 2004 to May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Further information on our scope and methodology  appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Service military training has historically focused on individual service  competencies, with less emphasis on joint operations involving joint  commands, other services, and emerging operations with other  governmental and nongovernmental agencies and international partners.  While this has allowed the services to meet their core training  responsibilities, it has also contributed to forces entering combat without  having had previous experience or training in joint operations.  For  example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, many forces had to be given some  level of basic joint operations training after they had already entered the  Iraqi theater of war, because they were experiencing joint operations for  the first time.  In a changing security environment, joint operations are  becoming more important given the complex nature of military operations.  Specifically, this importance is being driven by the combatant commands’  need to combine the capabilities of multiple services to address the global  threat as well as the growing interdependence of capabilities among the  services.
Under Title 10, both combatant commanders and the military services are  given the authority to determine training requirements, plan training  exercises, and execute training activities.  Specifically, combatant  commanders oversee all aspects of military operations, joint training, and  logistics using the forces assigned to them, while the military service  secretaries are generally responsible for recruiting, organizing, supplying,  equipping, and training their service personnel. Furthermore, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are responsible for  formulating joint training policy and doctrine. The Joint Forces  Command is DOD’s lead in providing joint warfighting capability through  joint training.
The idea to transform training in the department initially surfaced in 2001,  when the department, in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, recognized  that training was a key to dealing with a continuously changing  environment, and emphasized a need to enhance jointness and capitalize  on technology advances.  Defense guidance issued shortly thereafter  directed the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, to  work with the services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the  combatant commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command to develop a  plan for transforming military training that would better enable joint force  operations. The department’s vision for the Training Transformation  Program is to provide “dynamic, capabilities-based training for DOD in  support of national security requirements across the full spectrum of  service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational  operations,” and is built upon a foundation of three capabilities.
According to the 2004 Training Transformation Implementation Plan,  these three capabilities, or initiatives, are designed to prepare individuals,  units, and staffs for the new strategic environment, and to provide  enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. Through these three  capabilities, combatant commanders are expected to receive better­ prepared forces that align with their joint operational needs.
The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) is expected to prepare  forces by providing units and command staffs with an integrated live,  virtual, and constructive training environment. This capability would add  enhanced service and combatant command training that emphasizes  jointness and enables global training and mission rehearsal in support of  combatant command operations.
The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) is  intended to prepare future decision makers and leaders to better  understand joint operations and the common operational picture, as well  as respond innovatively to adversaries. Program officials believe this  capability will enhance existing joint individual education with newly  developed courses and make these courses readily accessible through an  expanded knowledge distribution network.
The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability (JAEC) is expected to assist  leaders in assessing the value of transformational training initiatives on  individuals, organizations, and processes, and link the impact of the  Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders’ readiness  requirements.  This capability is also supposed to provide the processes  and tools to continuously improve joint training.
section_title: DOD’s Efforts Have Focused on Establishing Plans and Program Accountability, but Much Remains to be Done to Achieve Full Operational Capability
paragraphs: Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training  Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has  established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated  throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and  collective training focused on the combatant commanders’ needs and  linked to readiness assessments.  Through its 2003 Training  Transformation Implementation Plan, the department established  program accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership  management and oversight roles and responsibilities.  While each program  initiative has focused on developing a management structure, defining  joint training requirements, and developing mechanisms and networks to  deliver enhanced joint training, all three still have a great deal remaining to  be accomplished to meet program goals.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Established Training Transformation Program Accountability and Authorities
paragraphs: In early 2003, DOD issued its first Training Transformation  Implementation Plan, which established the basic management approach  for implementing the Training Transformation Program.  As part of this  approach, the department has taken action to establish program  accountability and authority.
The department designated the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness with overall responsibility for implementing  the Training Transformation Program.  Furthermore, the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for Readiness has been given executive agent  responsibility for training transformation planning, programming,  budgeting, and execution progress.  To carry out their responsibilities,  these offices use three standing working groups, as follows:
The Executive Steering Group is made up of senior executive-level  officials—including four star general officers/flag officers and equivalent  senior executive service civilians —and is headed by the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.  In addition to high-level program  execution oversight, this group, according to program officials, makes  department-level policy decisions and deals with unresolved issues as it  pertains to training transformation.
Subordinate to this executive group, the Senior Advisory Group is led by  the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and consists of  senior-level officials, including three star general officers/flag officers and  equivalent senior executive service civilians.  This group, according to  program officials, has directive authority and is responsible for overseeing  the execution and updates to the Training Transformation  Implementation Plan, and the timely allocation, transfer, and execution of  the program’s resources.
The Joint Integrated Process Team, being subordinate to the above two  groups, serves as the primary collaborative working forum that provides  input to the oversight groups and responds to their guidance.  Led by the  Director of Readiness and Training Plans and Policy, this team consists of  senior analysts, planners, and action officers from staffs, agencies, and  commands contributing to the department’s Training Transformation  Program.
Each of these groups has representatives from the services, the Joint  Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff, and a  wide cross-section of department-level offices, such as the Offices of  Program Analysis and Evaluation, and Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics.
DOD is employing an incremental approach to developing and  implementing the Training Transformation Program, designed to reduce  development cycle time and increase the speed at which advanced  capabilities are delivered.  According to a DOD official, DOD’s approach to  developing and implementing the training transformation initiatives  follows a “build a little, test a little” philosophy that is unlike a more  traditional development approach, where initiatives within a program are  developed sequentially with planning, development, implementation, and  assessment phases.  Under this development approach, some elements of  the three training transformation initiatives—the JNTC, the JKDDC, and  the JAEC—are developed concurrently, while other elements are  sequentially developed.  The department’s expectation is that the three  initiatives will work together to successively build a training environment  that meets combatant command needs in three phases.  Phase 1 (2005)  focuses on providing combatant commanders with a steady flow of joint­ trained individuals, units, and staff.  Phase 2 (2007) places an emphasis on  supporting an innovative training environment for new joint operational  capabilities based on combatant commanders’ demands.  Phase 3 (2009)  will transition joint training into a real-time mission planning and rehearsal  environment.
Reflective of the iterative implementation approach described above,  DOD’s framework for assessing Training Transformation Program  performance will likewise follow the three phases of the program’s  development.  Performance metrics are being continuously developed  during each of these phases to mirror the actual development and  evolution of each initiative’s capabilities. Similarly, formal program  assessments using these metrics to measure training transformation’s  impact on joint force readiness and guide subsequent investments in  training transformation capabilities will begin in 2005, at the end of Phase  1, and occur every 2 years thereafter.
The management of each of the three training transformation initiatives is  carried out largely by joint management offices within each initiative’s  sponsoring organization.  For example, the JNTC joint management office  is in the Joint Training Directorate of the Joint Forces Command.  These  offices serve as the primary focal points for planning, program  preparation, and execution of all resources and events associated with  their respective training transformation capability.  The joint management  office directors, having the responsibility to implement their respective  initiative, report directly to the organization sponsoring their initiative.  Each of the joint management offices also reports to the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for Readiness through the Joint Integrated Process  Team.  The offices are organized functionally to align with their primary  goals and objectives.
section_title: Status and Funding of Training Transformation Initiatives Vary
paragraphs: The implementation status of each of DOD’s three initiatives—the JNTC,  the JKDDC, and the JAEC—varies, as program managers are intentionally  staggering the rollout of the initiatives in accordance with the incremental  development approach aimed at reducing  development cycle time and  increasing the speed at which advanced capabilities are delivered. The  current and planned funding of these initiatives also reflects this  development plan.
Overall, the three initiatives are designed to prepare individuals, units, and  staffs for a new strategic environment that requires services and  combatant commands to work together, and to provide enabling tools and  processes to carry out missions. These initiatives to transform military  training are expected to result in a robust network of training capabilities  integrated throughout DOD that provides enhanced joint individual and  collective training focused on the combatant commanders’ needs and is  linked to readiness assessments.  Program managers designated the JNTC  initiative as the leading effort to transform military training, and thus its  progress is further advanced than the other two initiatives.  However,  officials responsible for both the JKDDC and JAEC have established a  management structure and initiated a number of efforts to meet program  goals.
subsections: section_title: The Joint National Training Capability
paragraphs: The JNTC initiative is focused on providing enhanced collective joint  training for units or other military and defense organizations. During the  2002–03 time frame, a joint management office for the JNTC initiative  within Joint Forces Command was established and resourced. Early JNTC  efforts have been targeted at identifying and analyzing combatant  commanders’ joint training requirements for an enhanced joint training  environment that will cut horizontally—to improve interoperability among  services—and vertically—to improve joint planning and execution of  training—across various components and command levels.  This effort  includes, but is not limited to, analyzing combatant commands’ mission­ essential tasks; identifying joint training requirements evolving from  operational and prior training experiences; analyzing joint training  required at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operations; and  setting the framework for accrediting and certifying future joint training  programs and facilities.
Additionally, a considerable portion of the JNTC organization has been  focused on identifying, defining, and developing the facilities and  technologies necessary to develop a global joint training network that can  deliver live, virtual, and constructive joint training capabilities to the  services, combatant commanders, and interagency and multinational  partners. In keeping with training transformation’s approach to introduce  capabilities more rapidly, JNTC managers working with the services  during 2004 provided an early demonstration of the ability to enhance four  existing exercises with live, virtual, and constructive capabilities by  integrating these capabilities to improve joint horizontal and vertical  training.  In October 2004, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for  Readiness, who has been given executive oversight responsibility for the  Training Transformation Program, deemed the JNTC initiative to be  operationally capable—indicating that the initial infrastructure of  networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint context of  training exercises was in place.  During fiscal year 2005, JNTC managers  plan to incorporate this demonstrated capability in 14 additional service or  combatant command exercises.
Additionally, JNTC managers expect to continue their efforts to enhance  DOD’s capability, increasing the level of jointness in military training by  involving joint commands, other services, and federal agencies involved in  current military operations.  Among these efforts, JNTC managers would  like to complete development of a permanent network of communications,  instrumentation, and supporting infrastructure to support joint military  training.  JNTC managers plan to create a Web-based capability to deliver  joint operational planning and mission rehearsal training.  They also plan  to have the capability to conduct overseas/multinational training events by  fiscal year 2007.  Additionally, they plan to continue developing training  requirements that support joint training at all levels, and accrediting joint  training programs and certifying training facilities.  The certification of  DOD’s training facilities relies on their ability to meet joint training needs.  Although DOD’s JNTC initiative is designed to enhance communication  and infrastructure to better simulate a joint environment, the services  continue to face challenges in maintaining training facilities to meet their  own service-specific training requirements.  GAO has just recently  completed a review looking at the current condition of DOD’s military  training facilities. The report concluded that current training range  facilities are deteriorating and compromise the realism essential to  effective training.
section_title: The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability
paragraphs: The JKDDC initiative is intended to enhance individual servicemember  joint training. Efforts under the JKDDC initiative have been focused on  organizing a management structure, initiating a process for identifying  joint individual training requirements, and establishing an organizational  and technical framework for developing and distributing courses to  address these requirements. In late 2003, a joint management office within  the Joint Staff’s Office of the Director for Operational Plans and Joint  Force Development was established to manage the JKDDC initiative and  oversee the development of joint individual education and training.  Also,  in October 2003, the JKDDC Working Group was established to begin  identifying and prioritizing joint individual education and training  requirements.  During fiscal year 2004, the JKDDC Working Group  identified 38 combatant command requirements for joint individual  courseware.  A key milestone for the JKDDC initiative—identifying the  technologies and infrastructure needed to achieve an interim course  materials distribution capability—was reached in January 2005.  As of  January 2005, the JKDDC initiative has developed and distributed two joint  individual courses to satisfy some of the combatant commanders’ initial  requirements.  Another 17 courses are under development.
JKDDC managers plan to continue identifying and developing joint  individual education requirements and associated courseware.  They also  plan to develop a long-term joint individual training continuum and a  global distribution capability for joint education and training that include  multinational and international partners.  A pilot global distribution  capability demonstration is planned for fiscal year 2006, with a mature  joint individual training continuum expected in late 2009.
section_title: The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability
paragraphs: The JAEC initiative is focused on continually monitoring program results  and identifying improvements in joint training.  The JAEC joint  management office was established during fiscal year 2004 under the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness.  Most of the early  efforts conducted under this initiative have been focused on planning,  assessing, and developing tools and techniques that can be embedded in  the other training transformation initiatives in order to provide a robust  joint assessment and enabling capability.  This effort has resulted in the  establishment of preliminary training transformation performance  assessment metrics in early 2005.  The first of three formal periodic  program assessments will occur from April to October 2005 and  refinements to the metrics will continue to be made as this process  progresses.  Additionally, the JAEC joint management office is developing  a process that would uniformly track joint training, education, and  experience, and ensure this information can be linked to readiness  assessments by 2006.  Within this initiative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has  the lead for evaluating enhancements to DOD’s Joint Training System to  make it more user friendly and adaptable to evolving operational concepts  and to complete these enhancements by 2009.
section_title: Funding of Initiatives Reflects Incremental Rollout Plans
paragraphs: Current and future funding also reflect the incremental development  approach DOD is using to implement the program.  The JNTC initiative,  the leading effort for transforming military training, accounts for $1.48  billion, or 84 percent, of the total $1.76 billion budgeted for fiscal years  2003 through 2011.  Efforts related to the JKDDC and JAEC (the trailing  initiatives) are collectively budgeted for $284.9 million.  For the first time,  in fiscal year 2005, all three training transformation initiatives prepared  program execution plans reflecting what they expected to spend during  that fiscal year, as shown in table 1.
Resources to manage the Training Transformation Program come from  three primary sources:  (1) funding provided directly to and controlled by  the services for service-specific program activities related to the JNTC  initiative;  (2) funding provided directly to the Joint Forces Command, the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff for their own  training transformation activities; and (3) funding provided directly to the  Joint Forces Command for distribution to the services for service-specific  JNTC program activities.  By providing the Joint Forces Command with  this funding, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has given the command  the flexibility to annually fund service activities deemed critical to the  Training Transformation Program, because they contribute to meeting the  goals and objectives identified in the Training Transformation  Implementation Plan.
section_title: DOD’s Training Transformation Program Faces Two Significant Management Challenges at This Time
paragraphs: DOD’s Training Transformation Program will likely face some significant  management challenges throughout its implementation.  Two significant  challenges that have emerged early and will require continued focus are  (1) establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders, such as  the services and combatant commands, through comprehensive  communication and coordination; and (2) developing joint training  requirements that meet combatant commands’ mission needs.  Both these  challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding support  among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the  Training Transformation Program at risk.
subsections: section_title: Establishing Effective Partnerships with Stakeholders Is a Significant Management Challenge
paragraphs: Establishing effective partnerships through comprehensive  communication and coordination is a significant management challenge  and is a key to obtaining full buy-in and commitment of internal and  external program stakeholders.  These include DOD’s combatant  commanders, services, and training commands, as well as representatives  from the federal departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise  the national security interagency community.  Commitment from the  combatant commands and services is critical in achieving the training  transformation goals because they play a key role in planning and funding  training events.  The same commitment is necessary from non-DOD  stakeholders given the changing nature of our military operations, which  require more intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners  than ever before.
Attributes inherent to transformational programs—such as program  complexity and the need for stakeholders to make cultural adaptations—  along with DOD’s limited authority to influence external stakeholders,  make communication and coordination especially difficult.  Recognizing  the challenge these elements pose, DOD has taken some positive steps to  communicate and coordinate with training transformation internal and  external stakeholders.  However, we found that an inconsistent  understanding of the Training Transformation Program remains among  some internal stakeholders.  Additionally, the department’s efforts to  engage senior leaders in non-DOD organizations to establish joint training  requirements to collectively respond to the nation’s security challenges  across the full spectrum of interagency, intergovernmental, and  multinational operations have been limited.  These operations may  include, but are not limited to, global war, humanitarian assistance, and  disaster relief.
subsections: section_title: Program Attributes Make Communication and Coordination Challenging
paragraphs: DOD officials agree that there are several attributes in managing the  Training Transformation Program that make communication and  coordination with stakeholders a challenge.  Officials acknowledge that  their use of a rapid, incremental approach to developing and implementing  the program adds a degree of complexity over traditional approaches.  Moreover, DOD’s decentralized management of the three program  initiatives and dependencies on integration of separately led combatant  command and service training initiatives introduce additional complexity.  Further, encouraging stakeholders to make the cultural changes inherent  to the successful implementation of governmental and defense  transformational programs, such as the Training Transformation Program,  generally also requires focused management attention to communication  and coordination.  The Training Transformation Program’s call for  communication and coordination beyond DOD entities may pose an  additional challenge, because of DOD’s lack of direct authority over non- DOD partner organizations.
The complexity of the Training Transformation Program heightens the  communication and coordination challenge.  The department’s choice to  employ a rapid, incremental development approach provides management  with a process to review, assess, adjust, and redirect actions that  collectively transform training, and, according to DOD officials, is a  contributing factor to the complexity of the program.  Some DOD officials  we spoke with referred to the development approach as a “state of  constant change.”  Furthermore, in an effort to meet the Training  Transformation Program’s goals, DOD has assigned separate  organizations—the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for  Readiness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Forces Command—to  oversee development of each initiative.  In addition, the ability to leverage  evolving and developing technologies to deliver an integrated live, virtual,  and constructive joint training environment requires the successful  integration of separately led combatant command and service training  initiatives.  For example, the Pacific Command and its Navy component,  according to command officials, are developing their own discrete training  capabilities that are expected to eventually link to and enhance the JNTC.  Achieving JNTC goals relies upon existing training events, led and funded  by combatant commands and services.  The successful linkage of these  efforts will depend on continued comprehensive communication and  coordination.
We have previously reported that transformational programs across  government require particular attention to managing cultural change.Within the Training Transformation Program, we believe there are two  areas where communication and coordination will play an important role  towards achieving cultural adaptation.  First, the training developed under  the program is expected to respond to combatant commanders’  capabilities-based requirements, moving away from mission-based  requirements that are based on specific threats.  A capabilities-based  approach focuses on identifying the capabilities that U.S. forces will need  to deter and defeat any potential adversaries, being able to respond  decisively anywhere and anytime to any type of challenge.  Second,  training developed under the program will be “joint” in nature and will  reflect the growing need for different services and commands to work  together to achieve common goals.  DOD acknowledges, in its Training  Transformation Implementation Plan, that it has to balance the priority  to provide the services with more joint training at the individual and  service levels against the services’ priorities to train to their service­ specific core competencies.  The program also emphasizes training across  interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, which  creates additional cultural challenges for program stakeholders.
section_title: DOD Proactive in Efforts to Communicate and Coordinate with Internal Stakeholders, but Inconsistent Understanding Continues
paragraphs: DOD recognizes that program complexity and adaptation to cultural  change are inherent to training transformation, and DOD has taken some  positive steps to communicate and coordinate with internal stakeholders,  as illustrated by the following actions:
According to DOD officials, at program inception, DOD designated a single  integrating authority under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness with oversight responsibility to coordinate  strategy within and among the training transformation initiatives, as well  as into other DOD transformational efforts to achieve the desired  integration.
DOD prepares and presents the Training Transformation Program  strategic plan, implementation plan, and road map at regularly scheduled  working-level meetings, with the intent to update stakeholders and  generate discussion.  In addition, the department created an interactive  program Web site containing a repository of these documents, which  allows stakeholders to comment on materials directly.
Under the leadership of the Joint Staff, the Joint Lessons Learned Program  expanded the existing lessons learned concept by establishing joint  lessons-learned specialists’ positions at all combatant commands and  services. The physical presence of these program specialists serves to  increase the understanding of the Training Transformation Program, as  well as improve the collection, analysis, and feedback processes for  lessons learned.
DOD has begun an outreach campaign with the aim of better facilitating  the collection of training requirements from combatant commands and  services.  A Joint Forces Command official, acknowledging a need for  better marketing of the JNTC, has visited with some stakeholders such as  the European and Pacific combatant commands.  Representatives under  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  with the intent of outreach and communicating joint integration and  development issues, also visited every combatant command this past year,  and intend to continue this practice on a periodic basis.
Despite DOD’s efforts to communicate and coordinate with training  transformation internal stakeholders, during our interviews with services  headquarters and command staffs we found an inconsistent understanding  among some program stakeholders regarding the strategic vision and the  rationale behind the implementation and development timing of different  components of the program.  For example, representatives from three of  the command staffs we visited viewed the JNTC as Joint Forces  Command’s attempt to impose additional requirements on existing service  and combatant command exercises rather than providing enabling  capabilities to enhance existing training exercises.  Also, general  consensus among all stakeholders attending the Joint Integrated Process  Team meeting in December of 2004 was that they did not fully understand  the Training Transformation Program’s accreditation and certification  processes—which are designed to ensure the joint content of military  training programs and the adequacy of supporting facilities—because of  the complexity of the processes as well as the lack of clear definitions  during its initial implementation.  In addition, stakeholders from a service  headquarters and a command staff that we spoke with described the  JKDDC as an initiative limited to the development of joint training courses.  It appears that these stakeholders did not have a full understanding of the  larger strategic vision of the initiative to leverage evolving technologies  that will provide or distribute education and training needed anytime and  anywhere, across the full spectrum of forces. Also, some stakeholders  from two service headquarters and a command staff expressed a lack of  understanding of the program managers’ decision to iteratively develop  the JAEC, as they develop metrics and perform assessments of the JNTC  and JKDDC.  In particular, some of the stakeholders associated with the  JNTC and JKDDC initiatives expressed discomfort about being measured  against specified outcomes when they were not initially provided with  standards to measure results.  We found this overall lack of understanding  evident mostly at the service level, among representatives of headquarters  and command staffs.
Our discussion with training transformation officials indicated that they  were not specifically aware of this level of inconsistent understanding of  training transformation’s concepts and initiatives.  However, they did  indicate that the program’s complexity and development approach could  easily lead to inconsistent understanding among stakeholders.  We found  that they had not assessed the extent to which their communication and  coordination efforts have impacted stakeholders’ comprehension of the  overall concept and vision of the Training Transformation Program.  This  lack of understanding risks not obtaining stakeholders’ buy-in and  commitment needed to fully implement the goals of the program.
section_title: DOD Is Communicating and Coordinating with External Stakeholders, but Efforts to Engage Senior Non-DOD Leaders Have Been Limited to Date
paragraphs: While DOD has been proactive in engaging interagency,  intergovernmental, and multinational partners in identifying common  areas for potential joint training opportunities, their outreach has not yet  been elevated to senior-level leadership to ensure their full cooperation.  Some DOD missions—strategic defense, homeland defense, and civil  support—have already been identified as potential areas where DOD could  consider future training opportunities with the Department of Homeland  Security, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy.  Within  the Training Transformation Program, the Training Transformation  Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational Mission Essential Tasks  effort was launched to develop capabilities and tasks for conducting  broader, more inclusive joint operations, such as reestablishing order and  promoting stability in other nations with multinational partners. Starting in  early 2005, the department began engaging members of the external  stakeholder community in collaboratively identifying tasks for conducting  broader, more inclusive joint operations with interagency community  partners.  These efforts are mostly focused on building a task force and  determining what is required for communication, cooperation,  coordination, collaboration, and interoperability among the interagency,  intergovernmental, and multinational partners at this time.
The most recent Training Transformation Interagency Intergovernmental  Multinational Mission Essential Tasks conference, in February 2005,  consisted of more than 150 operators, planners, strategists, and policy  developers from 40 organizations, including different non-DOD agencies  and departments across the U.S. government, as well as from the United  Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International  Committee of the Red Cross.  While the effort has significant upper-level  support within DOD, the level of effort to gain support and participation  among the external stakeholders’ senior-level management has been  limited.  Some DOD officials we spoke with acknowledged that, as the  effort moves forward into planning and implementation, it will require  increasing levels of participation from non-DOD stakeholders.  They also  believe that, without equally significant support from upper-level  leadership among those agencies and organizations that DOD has no direct  authority over, DOD may face challenges in maintaining a collaborative  environment and successfully achieving future planning and  implementation outcomes for training with those partners. The extent to  which the leadership at non-DOD partner organizations is committed to  defense training transformation is unknown, because of DOD’s limited  efforts to engage these individuals to date.  DOD officials acknowledge the  importance of reaching out to the leadership of external organizations and  recognize that their efforts in this regard have been very limited to date.
section_title: Developing Joint Training Requirements That Meet Combatant Commands’ Needs Is a Significant Challenge
paragraphs: Joint Forces Command’s new process for developing tactical-level joint  training requirements—and the specific training tasks that support the  requirements—does not ensure that these tasks necessarily reflect  combatant command needs nor does it ensure buy-in from internal  stakeholders—combatant commanders, services, and training commands.  In the past, joint training tasks were primarily focused at the command  level and were identified through DOD’s authoritative process that built  requirements by translating combatant commander inputs into training  requirements. Training transformation has expanded joint training  requirements to include those at the tactical level in addition to joint  command-level training.  The current process Joint Forces Command is  using to develop these joint tactical-level tasks does not build these  requirements starting with the combatant commands’ analysis of training  needs.  Rather, the requirements are based on Joint Forces Command’s  analysis of perceived training deficiencies.  In addition, Joint Forces  Command’s process for identifying and validating these tasks does not  ensure widespread participation among the combatant commands and  service representatives.  Some internal stakeholders have expressed  reservations about the validity of some recently developed joint tasks,  because the tasks did not evolve through the established Joint Training  System process in which they originated as combatant command  requirements.  Thus, DOD risks developing training requirements that may  not be accepted as valid or necessary to meet combatant command  training needs.
subsections: section_title: Command-Level Joint Training Requirements Rely on the Joint Training System
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 1994, the Joint Training System has been DOD’s  authoritative process for collaboratively gathering each combatant  command’s mission analysis and translating it into command-level training  requirements that the services must include in their training events.  Historically, joint training requirements have only been targeted to  command-level training.
The command-level joint training tasks developed by the Joint Training  System are referred to as joint mission essential tasks, and are derived  from a common, universal joint task list that has been used or suggested  by the combatant commands and approved by the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff.  The Joint Training System is further supported by the  annual worldwide joint training conference, where combatant command  and service representatives discuss the list of joint mission-essential tasks  to which the services must train. This collaboration ensures that the  services understand what they must include in their training to meet  combatant command joint training requirements.
section_title: Combatant Command and Service Representatives Have Expressed Reservations about the Validity of Some Joint Tasks
paragraphs: The Training Transformation Program has brought an emphasis on joint  training at the tactical level in addition to the command-level tasks  discussed above.  Training at the tactical level was typically a service  responsibility prior to training transformation. Today, however, Joint  Forces Command, as directed in the Training Transformation  Implementation Plan, develops joint tasks, which include joint tasks at  the tactical level in addition to command-level tasks.
Rather than identifying joint tactical tasks directly through the established  Joint Training System, whose outputs are approved by the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forces Command relies on a working group  process to identify and validate these tasks. The identification of these  joint training tasks is based primarily on the working group’s analysis of  perceived training deficiencies in combatant command and service  training, rather than being based on the combatant commands’ analyses of  training needs. Any working group participant may submit a joint task to  be considered for inclusion in future joint training, but the submission  must be sponsored by a voting member. After a task is approved by the  working group, it is validated by performing the task at one or two training  events and then resubmitted to the working group for approval as a new or  revised task. Throughout the working group process, service and  combatant command representatives who participate have the opportunity  to voice concerns regarding any of the candidate joint tasks. For example,  the Joint Forces Command working group approved 43 joint tasks in  October 2004 that they believe the services should include in their training  to meet combatant command training requirements. Of these joint tasks,  21 of them (49 percent), as identified by one service command, were new  tactical-level tasks that had not been previously identified through the  existing Joint Training System, and as such have not been derived from a  combatant command’s mission analysis.
Although combatant command representatives are invited to attend  working group meetings, the working group process does not ensure the  same level of widespread participation that the established Joint Training  System achieves, and Joint Forces Command risks developing training  requirements that lack widespread combatant command and service  support. Representatives from service commands and combatant  commands staff with whom we spoke expressed reservations about the  validity of tasks developed in this manner, because they did not come from  the Joint Training System, which systematically builds requirements based  on combatant commanders’ needs, nor were they vetted through the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the combatant  commands.  Combatant commands’ representatives said that they have  provided little input into the original development of the tasks identified  by the Joint Forces Command’s working group to date. Because of the  process used, they questioned how many of these joint tasks actually  reflect the combatant commands’ training needs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Training Transformation Program is a multifaceted effort that touches  nearly everyone associated with the joint training community.  With  complex initiatives being developed and employed at various stages of  maturity, comprehensive communication and coordination are critical to  establish effective partnerships.  Until DOD assesses its approach to  communicating and coordinating training transformation initiatives and  takes additional steps to ensure full understanding among joint training  stakeholders at all levels—from combatant commands to services, and  from headquarters to training commands—DOD risks not building the  effective partnerships necessary to gain stakeholders’ buy-in and  commitment to fully implement training transformation.  This lack of  understanding of the complexities and potential benefits associated with  the training transformation initiatives would likely impair DOD’s efforts to  enhance joint training that will enable troops to better carry out  combatant commanders’ missions.
The department’s transformation effort also encompasses the way training  can be integrated with all levels of government as well as with allies and  coalition partners.  Enhanced coordination at interagency,  intergovernmental, and multinational levels will promote increased  cooperation, more rapid response, and the ability to conduct seamless  operations.  Although senior leadership support for this effort exists  within DOD, in the absence of a targeted effort to ensure equally  significant senior leadership support from non-DOD agency and  organization partners, DOD is at risk of not being able to maintain a  collaborative environment with its external stakeholders and to implement  interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational training outcomes  successfully.
The department has an established, authoritative process to develop joint  training requirements in the Joint Training System, which relies on the  combatant commands to align training requirements with their assigned  missions.  By not fully utilizing this system to develop the training  requirements to support the JNTC component-based, tactical-level joint  training, DOD may risk the services and combatant commands not fully  accepting these training requirements as valid.  If such requirements are  not embraced as combatant command-generated training requirements,  the services and combatant commands may not completely support the  need to enhance joint training at the tactical level, thus potentially  underutilizing the capability being developed by the JNTC.
Recommendations for 	 To promote effective partnerships and mitigate the risk of implementing  Executive Action Training Transformation Program components that are not fully supported  by the combatant commands, services, and other federal agencies, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Defense take the following three  actions: direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness to assess the effectiveness of their communication and  coordination efforts of the training transformation initiatives and take  additional steps to enhance stakeholders’ understanding of the program’s  goals and initiatives; direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within non-DOD  agencies and organizations to ensure these stakeholders’ full  understanding, buy-in, and commitment; and direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System to  establish all training requirements at the joint tactical level in order to  promote widespread participation and better opportunities for  stakeholders’ acceptance of the requirements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third.  DOD  concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness  to assess the effectiveness of their communication and coordination  efforts of the training transformation initiatives and take additional steps  to enhance stakeholders’ understanding of the program’s goals and  initiatives.  DOD stated that in addition to its continued effort to  communicate and coordinate through Training Transformation Joint  Integrated Process Team, the Senior Advisory Group and Executive  Steering Group, it will be placing Joint Forces Command personnel within  key Service and Combatant Command training organizations to improve  understanding of training transformation.  Additionally, DOD stated it  would evaluate the effectiveness of the program’s overall communication  and coordination in its first and subsequent assessments of the training  transformation program.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within non- DOD agencies and organizations to ensure these stakeholders’ full  understanding, buy-in, and commitment.  In its response, DOD stated that  an initiative led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) will  address this recommendation by the end of fiscal year 2006.  DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System  to establish all training requirements at the joint tactical level in order to  promote widespread participation and better opportunities for  stakeholders’ acceptance of the requirements.  DOD stated that the Joint  Forces Command uses the Joint Training System to develop its Joint  Training Plan as required by DOD directive.  Nevertheless, DOD also  acknowledged that GAO is correct in its assessment that some joint  training requirements may not be documented in the Joint Training System  or recognized by some users of the Joint Training System.  In this regard,  they further stated that USJFCOM has been directed to submit these  training requirements that are derived from joint tactical tasks for  inclusion in the Joint Training System and that the Joint Staff consider  them in future updates.
We agree with DOD’s comments concerning Joint Forces Command’s role  and responsibilities in developing training requirements.  However, we  continue to believe that the services’ and combatant commands’  commitment and ownership of these tactical training tasks would be  enhanced if they originated from the combatant commands’ annual  training needs analysis, which is an integral part of the Joint Training  System, and not just included in the system after the fact.  As stated in our  report, if such requirements are not embraced as combatant command­ generated training requirements, the services and combatant commands  may not completely support the need to enhance joint training at the  tactical level, thus potentially underutilizing the capability being developed  by the joint national training capability.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander,  U.S. Joint Forces Command.  We will also make copies available to others upon request.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4402.  Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine DOD’s overall management approach and status in  implementing the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed relevant  DOD plans, policies, guidance, and other documents pertaining to training  transformation.  We discussed training transformation issues with a  variety of officials at DOD, service headquarters offices, several combatant  commands, and other stakeholders that are involved with the Training  Transformation Program (see table 2).  Specifically, we did the following:
To determine the DOD’s overall management approach in implementing  the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed key documentation  related to the management responsibilities, development approach, status  of each initiative, and resource allocation among the three initiatives.
To determine the DOD’s overall status in implementing the Training  Transformation Program, we conducted interviews with key officials  supporting each initiative.
To better understand the roles, responsibilities, and funding profiles  within the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed and analyzed  key documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2004  revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2003 JNTC  Implementation Plan, the September 2004 DOD directive on military  training, and available program execution plans prepared by the joint  management offices from fiscal years 2002 through 2005.
To identify significant management challenges that have emerged early in  the program’s implementation, we again reviewed relevant DOD plans,  policies, guidance, and other documents pertaining to training  transformation and interviewed many of the same officials indicated in  table 2.  We reviewed and analyzed some additional key documents,  including DOD’s 2003 Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,  the 2002 Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, the 2003  Transformation Planning Guidance, the 2004 Training Capabilities  Analysis of Alternatives Final Report, various Joint Integrated Process  Team briefs, and prior GAO reports.  To better understand some of the  management challenges, we attended meetings of the JKDDC working  group, the Joint Integrated Process Team, and the Training  Transformation Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Mission  Essential Tasks Task Force.  We also obtained and reviewed all the  minutes from the working groups and task force meetings that we  attended.  Additionally, to assess the challenge in developing joint training  requirements that met combatant commands’ mission needs, we obtained  a list of approved joint tasks developed by the Joint Forces Command  working group and solicited feedback from combatant command and  service representatives.
We performed our review from June 2004 through May 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland, Fred Harrison,  Marie Mak, Todd Dice, Gwyneth Blevins, Jonathan Clark, and R.K. Wild  also made major contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Chemical And Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to  Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat  Training Centers. GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.:  January 28, 2005.
Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully  Address Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and  Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform  Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004.
Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could  Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program. GAO­ 03-1026.  Washington, D.C.:  September 30, 2003.
Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase  Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training  Ranges. GAO-03-976. Washington, D.C.:  September 29, 2003.
Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper  Air Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505. Washington, D.C.: May 2,  2003.
Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on  Training Ranges Still Evolving. GAO-03-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 2,  2003.
Military Transformation: Progress and Challenges for DOD's Advanced  Distributed Learning Programs. GAO-03-393. Washington, D.C.:  February 28, 2003.
Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage  Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.:  June 11, 2002.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage  Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-727T.  Washington, D.C.:  May 16, 2002.
Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in  Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525.  Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped, but Training  and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain. GAO-01-27. Washington,  D.C.: November 14, 2000.