Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of DOD's Long-Term Corrosion Strategy
Published: 2004-06-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends an estimated $20 billion to repair the damage to military equipment and infrastructure caused by corrosion. Furthermore, corrosion profoundly impacts military readiness as well as the safety of military personnel. In the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Congress directed that DOD develop a long-term corrosion strategy, including specific requirements, and that GAO assess it. DOD submitted its strategy in December 2003. This report assesses the potential of the corrosion strategy (in terms of three elements--resources, performance metrics, and policy guidance) to effectively prevent and mitigate corrosion and its effects on military equipment and infrastructure.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While DOD's new long-term corrosion strategy generally addresses the requirements in the congressional mandate, it falls short of representing a comprehensive plan needed to implement successfully the strategy and manage DOD's extensive corrosion problems in the future. An effective, results-oriented strategy identifies resources required to achieve its goals and outcome-based performance metrics that can measure progress toward achieving those goals. Without addressing certain key elements, the strategy is unlikely to serve as an effective tool in preventing and mitigating corrosion and its effects on military equipment and infrastructure. These shortcomings could lead to the loss of billions of dollars in avoidable maintenance costs and the degradation of safety and readiness. GAO's review of three key elements showed the following. Funding and personnel resources--The strategy does not identify the level of funding and personnel resources needed to implement the corrosion reduction plan in the near- or long-term. Officials in DOD's corrosion office said that resource needs are still being determined and firm estimates should be available in December 2004. However, preliminary projections made by the corrosion task force indicated that the DOD-wide corrosion reduction program would require about $1.9 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. DOD and the services, however, have not included any funds for fiscal year 2004 and less than 10 percent of the task force's fiscal year 2005 estimates. While the strategy calls for a mechanism that ensures sustained, long-term funding, DOD has been using a year-by-year funding approach. Performance measures and milestones--While the strategy includes some performance measures and milestones, they are not the resultsoriented metrics needed to successfully monitor the program's progress. In addition, DOD does not plan to complete a critically needed, corrosion cost baseline study until 2011 because of limited funding. Without results-oriented metrics and a baseline, DOD will not be in a sound position to establish cost-effective resource priorities or monitor progress toward corrosion reduction. Policy guidance--While the strategy strengthens DOD's policy guidance on corrosion prevention and mitigation, improvements can be made. The new guidance establishes a review process for corrosion prevention plans for major weapon systems programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter. However, the guidance does not extend the review to non-major weapons systems and infrastructure programs, which are under the purview of the military services. The guidance also does not require the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's Focused Logistics Functional Capabilities Review to consider corrosion prevention planning when it reviews project requirements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Corrosion and its deteriorating impacts are so extensive that military  equipment and military infrastructure are severely affected. The financial  burdens are also substantial—estimates show that the Department of  Defense (DOD) spends as much as $20 billion a year in direct costs alone  to repair the damage caused by corrosion. Corrosion has equally profound  impacts on the safety and readiness of the military services. For example,  as we recently reported, the Navy suspended carrier operations in March  2002 when one F-14 aircraft crashed because its landing gear collapsed  because of corrosion. Our report also indicated that corrosion-related  problems had degraded the readiness of all of the Army’s approximately  2,450 force modernization helicopters.
Congress, in the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization act, directed the  Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a long-term strategy to  reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on the DOD’s military  equipment and infrastructure. The mandate required that the strategy  include, among other things, policy guidance, performance measures and  milestones, and an assessment of the necessary personnel and funding to  accomplish the long-term strategy. The mandate also required that DOD  include an assessment of these elements for four specific initiatives. The  mandate directed us to monitor the implementation of the long-term  strategy and submit our report to Congress no later than 18 months after  the date of the enactment of the act.
In July 2003, following the enactment of this legislation, we issued a report  on corrosion costs and readiness issues. In that report, we recommended,  and DOD concurred with those recommendations, that in crafting an  effective strategy, DOD should include a number of key elements,  including clearly defined goals, outcome-oriented objectives, performance  measures, and the level of resources needed to accomplish the goals and  objectives.
DOD submitted its long-term corrosion strategy to Congress in December  2003. As agreed with your offices, because so little time has passed since  the strategy was submitted, our assessment focused on the potential of the  overall corrosion strategy in terms of three elements—funding and  personnel resources, performance measures and milestones, and policy  guidance—to effectively prevent and mitigate corrosion and its effects on  military equipment and infrastructure in the long term. We also assessed  these three elements as they relate to the four initiatives specifically  identified in the congressional mandate.
In conducting our review, we monitored the activities of the DOD  corrosion task force set up to develop the long-term strategy and reviewed  briefings and studies associated with its preparation. We met with DOD  and military service officials to obtain their views, documentation, and  studies on the strengths and weaknesses of the new strategy. We also  analyzed the adequacy of the strategy’s key elements by comparing them  with criteria established in the Government Performance and Results Act  of 1993 and related internal controls guidance and studies. We conducted  our review between November 2003 and April 2004 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards and determined that  the data used in the report are sufficiently reliable for meeting our  purposes. A detailed description of our scope and methodology is  provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD acquires, operates, and maintains a vast array of physical assets,  ranging from aircraft, ships, and land vehicles to buildings, ports, and  other facilities. Corrosion is an extensive problem that affects these assets  and has an impact on military funding requirements, readiness, and safety.  It is estimated that the direct costs to DOD of corrosion on military  equipment and infrastructure is between $10 billion and $20 billion  annually.
In our prior work, we reported in July 2003 that, although the full impact  of corrosion could not be quantified because of the limited amount of  reliable data that DOD and the military services had available, corrosion  has a substantial impact in terms of cost, readiness, and safety on military  equipment and facilities. Moreover, we found that DOD and the military  services did not have an effective management approach to mitigate and  prevent corrosion. As a result, we recommended, and DOD concurred,  that it should develop a departmentwide strategic plan with clearly  defined goals, measurable outcome-oriented objectives, and performance  measures.
In recognizing the extent of DOD’s corrosion problem, Congress enacted  legislation as part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2003 that directed the Secretary of Defense to designate an  officer or organization to be responsible for the prevention and mitigation  of corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure. The legislation also  required the Secretary to develop a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion  and the effects of corrosion on military equipment and infrastructure, and  submit the report to Congress no later than 12 months after the date of the  enactment of the Act.
The mandate required that the strategy include, among other things, policy  guidance, performance measures and milestones, and an assessment of  the necessary personnel and funding to accomplish the long-term strategy.  The mandate also required that DOD include an assessment of these  elements for four specific initiatives. These initiatives are: (1) expansion of  the emphasis on corrosion prevention and mitigation within DOD to  include coverage of infrastructure; (2) application uniformly throughout  DOD of requirements and criteria for the testing and certification of new  corrosion-prevention technologies for equipment and infrastructure with  similar characteristics, similar missions, or similar operating  environments; (3) implementation of programs, including supporting  databases, to ensure that a focused and coordinated approach is taken  throughout DOD to collect, review, validate, and distribute information on  proven methods and products that are relevant to the prevention of  corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure; and (4) establishment  of a coordinated research and development program for the prevention  and mitigation of corrosion for new and existing military equipment and  infrastructure that includes a plan to transition new corrosion prevention  technologies into operational systems.
To prepare a strategy, DOD established a corrosion policy and oversight  task force. The task force is located in the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics and reports to the  Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisitions, Technology, and  Logistics. The task force consists of seven working groups responsible for  addressing seven corrosion focus areas: (1) policy and requirements;  (2) impact, metrics, and sustainment; (3) science and technology,  (4) communication and outreach; (5) training and doctrine; (6) facilities;  and (7) specifications or standards and product qualification. According to  DOD officials, these seven areas were identified to address the  congressional concerns that led to the mandate and the issues discussed in  our 2003 report. These officials said that because the key elements of the  mandate (funding and personnel, performance measures and milestones,  and policy guidance) are comprehensive, they each apply one way or  another to the seven focus areas in the strategy.
section_title: Corrosion Strategy Shortcomings May Hinder Successful Implementation
paragraphs: While the long-term corrosion strategy generally addresses the mandate’s  requirements, several shortcomings are likely to hamper the successful  implementation of DOD’s long-term corrosion strategy. The strategy  (1) does not identify the level of funding and personnel resources needed  to tackle corrosion problems; (2) does not provide outcome-oriented  performance measures and a baseline study to measure progress; and  (3) strengthens existing policy guidance, but some improvements can be  made. In addition, we recommended in our July 2003 corrosion report, and  DOD concurred with our recommendation, that a long-term strategy  should include elements compatible with the Government Performance  and Results Act of 1993. Among these elements were the level of resources  needed to accomplish the strategy’s goals and objectives and performance  measures, such as the expected return on investment and realized net  savings of prevention projects that show progress toward achieving the  strategy’s objectives.
subsections: section_title: Strategy Does Not Identify Specific Funding and Personnel Resources
paragraphs: While DOD’s corrosion strategy generally addresses the issue of funding,  it does not include any estimates of the specific dollar amounts that  are needed for its near- or long-term implementation. According to the  strategy, the newly formed Corrosion Policy and Oversight task force will  develop inputs to the Future Years Defense Program based on corrosion  requirements and projects. DOD corrosion officials told us, however, that  funding estimates were not included in the strategy because DOD and the  military services are still in the process of determining the requirements.  The officials said they expect to have firm estimates by December 2004.
In a separate study during the preparation of the strategy, however,  DOD’s corrosion task force developed a preliminary schedule of funding  requirements for corrosion reduction efforts. These estimates projected  that DOD and the military services would need a total of about $1.9 billion  in departmentwide corrosion prevention and mitigation resources for  fiscal years 2004 through 2009. DOD corrosion officials said that the task  force’s figures represent an initial attempt to estimate DOD’s and the  military service’s funding needs. Table 1 shows the task force’s estimated  funding requirements for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts for  both military equipment and infrastructure for the period from fiscal year  2004 through fiscal year 2009.
The task force’s estimates indicated that the services would need about  $74.4 million in fiscal year 2004 for corrosion prevention and mitigation  projects, but this funding has not been allocated or obligated. The task  force identified 93 projects that had high potential returns on investment  and were ready to be undertaken immediately. These projects included,  for example, the installation of sensors to monitor fuel tanks and pipes for  corrosion and the use of corrosion-inhibiting lubricants for avionics  equipment on military aircraft. Corrosion officials told us that the $74.4  million was not included in DOD’s fiscal year 2004 budget request because  the task force developed the estimate too late to be incorporated in the  budget request. Corrosion officials said they hoped to obtain funding that  would become available during fiscal year 2004, but, as of April 2004, DOD  and the services had not allocated or obligated these funds.
The task force also estimated that the services would need about  $312 million for equipment and infrastructure corrosion projects in fiscal  year 2005. However, DOD's Comptroller officials told us that the services  included only $27 million, less than 10 percent of the projected amount for  departmentwide corrosion prevention and mitigation projects in their  fiscal year 2005 budget request. To fund these projects, DOD Comptroller  officials approved a budget change of $27 million from a special project  designed to counter threats to the Civil Reserve Fleet and other aircraft to  the services’ operation and maintenance accounts ($9 million each for  Army and Air Force, $7 million for the Navy, and $2 million for the Marine  Corps). DOD corrosion officials told us that they are using these service  accounts because DOD does not have an account that is dedicated to  departmentwide corrosion reduction. These officials also said that, after  the funds are appropriated, they plan to issue a letter of instruction to the  services requiring them to obtain approval from DOD’s corrosion office for  the use of these funds. Of the $27 million, DOD corrosion officials said  they expect to use $24 million for corrosion projects (e.g., for rinse  facilities for the services’ helicopters and other aircraft and temporary  shelters for military equipment and vehicles), $2.5 million to begin a  corrosion impact baseline study; and $500,000 for the corrosion task  force’s operating expenses. DOD corrosion officials told us that, while the  $27 million falls far short of the amount needed to fully implement the  strategy, it represents the first time that DOD expects to use funds for  corrosion reduction on a departmentwide basis, and it demonstrates  DOD’s commitment to augment the funding resources that have previously  been under the purview of the military services.
DOD Comptroller officials told us that, in future fiscal years, corrosion  reduction efforts would likely continue to be funded on a year-to-year  basis by program offsets, such as those used for 2005. They said they  eventually expect that departmentwide funding will no longer be needed  as the military services assume a greater role in funding their own  corrosion reduction projects. Comptroller officials said that the services  have the knowledge and expertise to manage their own corrosion control  projects and, therefore, are in a much better position to identify and  allocate funding for these efforts. However, DOD corrosion officials said  that the services are not in a position of knowing which corrosion projects  have the best potential to provide departmentwide benefits and,  furthermore, that these projects are not well coordinated within and  among the military services.
DOD’s corrosion officials said that the corrosion reduction strategy may  continue to be underfunded because of the lack of an effective long term  funding mechanism that would better ensure that corrosion reduction  projects have sustained funding over a period of years. At the present time,  the corrosion prevention program is being supported piecemeal through  budget change proposals or offsets. Corrosion officials told us that with a  long-term funding mechanism dedicated to departmentwide corrosion  prevention and mitigation, the program might be able to secure a  commitment for funding these projects for future years. Such a  mechanism could also fund projects that crosscut the services and that  have the greatest potential for cost savings. Corrosion officials said that  they prefer to have a long-term funding mechanism, such as a program  element, but the DOD Comptroller does not think that this is necessary at  this time.
As we reported in July 2003, the corrosion mitigation program may  continue to be underfunded because DOD and the military services  continue to give corrosion prevention a lower priority than other  requirements. According to DOD corrosion officials, corrosion reduction  projects must compete with other operation and maintenance programs.  Because DOD and the military services give higher priority to projects that  show immediate results, they have limited funding for corrosion reduction  efforts whose benefits may not be apparent for many years. Corrosion  officials told us that one of the biggest challenges to getting needed  funding is to change DOD and military service personnel attitudes—from  thinking that money spent on corrosion prevention detracts from other  projects to realizing that it saves money in the long run.
According to DOD corrosion officials, if DOD and the services do not  request more funding for corrosion prevention projects, DOD may lose or  delay the opportunity to realize savings amounting to billions of dollars in  avoidable maintenance costs for military equipment and facilities now and  in the future. According to corrosion officials, the average potential return  on investment for a corrosion prevention project is about 10 to 1, with  some projects showing a return as high as 80 to 1, and with the savings  realized about 5 years after funding begins. DOD corrosion officials said  that this means, for example, that if DOD invests $500 million in a  corrosion project today, it could realize a potential savings of about  $4.5 billion 5 years from now.
In terms of personnel resources, the strategy generally provided an  assessment of the personnel necessary to manage the corrosion program  effectively in DOD and the services, but the strategy did not identify the  level of personnel resources needed to implement the strategy. The  strategy noted the establishment of an Office of Corrosion Policy and  Oversight that is responsible for developing and implementing the  corrosion strategy and specified that the office would have a director.  DOD corrosion officials told us the office also includes a deputy director  and engineer and that these positions are temporary. The strategy also  indicated that a corrosion prevention and control working group,  consisting primarily of corrosion professionals from DOD, would provide  support for the corrosion office. DOD corrosion officials said these  individuals are not permanently assigned to the office but serve on a part- time basis. These officials added that, because the strategy was recently  established, DOD and the military services have had little time to  determine the number of personnel needed to implement it. These officials  told us that the requirements would likely be minimal and they expect to  have a firmer estimate by December 2004.
The strategy does not identify the specific amount of funding or personnel  needed to move ahead with the four initiatives specified in the  congressional mandate. While the strategy includes descriptions of  military equipment and facilities projects that address in varying ways  these four areas, it states that these projects require an assessment of  funding and other resources needed to support them. DOD corrosion  officials told us that they plan to systematically evaluate each project and  that this assessment will include determining the resources needed to  implement the effort.
section_title: Lack of Outcome-Based Performance Measures and Baseline Study Hamper Tracking Progress and Setting Priorities
paragraphs: While DOD’s corrosion strategy includes performance measures and  milestones, they are not the outcome-oriented metrics that are needed to  successfully monitor the department’s progress in mitigating corrosion  and its impacts. Instead, the strategy contains output-oriented metrics that  measure the number of program activities. For example, DOD plans to  measure progress toward achieving the strategy’s goals by counting the  number of major acquisition programs that have developed corrosion  prevention plans, tracking the number of injury-related incidents related  to corroding equipment or facilities, and recording the number of  maintenance personnel enrolled in corrosion-mitigation training modules.  By contrast, an outcome-oriented performance metric would allow DOD  to determine how much corrosion-prevention projects have reduced the  amount of maintenance costs for Navy aircraft carriers, decreased the  failure rates for the Army’s 155 millimeter medium-towed howitzer, or  decreased Air Force Base fuel pipeline ruptures—all within a certain  timeframe.
In addition, the development of meaningful performance metrics will be  hampered until a baseline study of the costs and the extent of corrosion  problems departmentwide is completed. In our July 2003 report, we  indicated that the lack of reliable data made it difficult to adequately  assess the overall impact of the corrosion problem. A baseline study  would identify the cost of corrosion on military equipment and facilities  across the services as well as corrosion’s impact on military personnel  safety and operational readiness. Such a study would document where  corrosion problems exist, identify their causes, and prioritize them  according to their relative severity.
However, while the long-term strategy acknowledges the critical  importance of developing a baseline of corrosion costs, including those  related to safety and readiness, DOD does not plan to complete such a  baseline until 2011. DOD corrosion officials told us they plan to allocate  $2.5 million of the $27 million provided for fiscal year 2005 corrosion- related projects to begin such a study. DOD corrosion officials told us that  the task force estimated that it would take an additional $1.25 million for  each of the next 6 fiscal years (2006 through 2011) to complete the study,  for a total cost of $10 million. They said that it would take that long  primarily because of the limited funding available for the strategy, which  has forced them to stretch out funding for the baseline over a period of  several years. The officials also said that the study would take some time  to complete because of data reliability issues, the lack of consistency in  corrosion data within and among the military services, and the  incompatibility of information systems that contain the data.
Without a corrosion baseline, DOD will not be able to develop adequate  performance metrics to measure—or report on—its initial progress toward  reducing corrosion and its impacts. Furthermore, DOD will not have an  overall picture of the extent of corrosion problems, making it difficult to  effectively identify areas that are most severely impacted by corrosion and  that require high-priority attention and resources.
While DOD’s corrosion strategy includes some performance measures and  milestones for the four initiatives, the metrics are not the results-oriented  performance measures needed to successfully implement the strategy.
section_title: Strategy Strengthens DOD’s Corrosion Mitigation Policy Guidance but Could Be Improved
paragraphs: As part of the long-term corrosion strategy, DOD strengthened its policy  guidance for corrosion prevention and control activities, but there are  opportunities to build on these improvements. The new guidance  explicitly calls for the consideration of corrosion prevention and control  planning during the earliest stages of the acquisition process for military  weapon systems and military infrastructure programs; earlier guidance did  not single out the need for such planning. DOD also included the need to  consider corrosion prevention and control in an existing guidebook  for  weapons systems program managers.
While the strategy contains a policy memorandum that sets up a review  process for corrosion-related issues for major weapon systems programs  (e.g., Joint Strike Fighter), it does not extend this review to non-major  weapon systems (e.g., Torpedo Defense System Program) and  infrastructure programs. The guidance directs the corrosion prevention  and control working group to regularly review the adequacy of corrosion  prevention plans of all weapon system programs subject to Defense  Acquisition Board review. If they identify an issue, the product group will  bring it to the attention of the board. Furthermore, the policy  memorandum states that the Acting Undersecretary of Defense for  Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics will personally evaluate the  corrosion plans for programs subject to board review. According to  DOD corrosion officials, the guidance did not extend this review to the  non-major weapons programs, which are under the responsibility of  individual military services. The corrosion officials said this was done so  that the services could retain flexibility in managing their own programs.  Military service officials told us that they have not established a corrosion  prevention plan review process for their programs because the policy  memorandum is relatively new, and they prefer to wait to see how the  process works before they establish a similar review process. However,  these service officials and DOD officials said that they recognize that all  programs, both major and non-major weapon systems and infrastructure,  experience significant corrosion impacts and that all of their corrosion  prevention plans would benefit from a review process.
In addition, DOD’s new corrosion strategy does not include any corrosion  planning or review requirements for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff’s  Focused Logistics Capabilities Board. However, Joint Chiefs of Staff  officials said they will include corrosion prevention planning in the board’s  sustainability assessments of military weapon systems. DOD corrosion  officials told us that this effort by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would support  the strategy and enhance DOD’s overall corrosion reduction programs.
While the strategy provides general policy guidance, it does not  specifically provide policy guidance for the four initiatives.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: By focusing attention on the extensive and costly problem of corrosion  and its debilitating impact on military equipment and facilities, DOD’s new  long-term corrosion strategy is a step in the right direction. However,  because the strategy falls short of providing the basic elements of an  effective management plan, DOD’s ability to implement it successfully  remains at risk. Because of the strategy’s limited assessment of funding  and personnel needs, lack of a baseline study, and weak performance  measures, it is not certain that DOD’s corrosion prevention and mitigation  efforts will be adequately funded, monitored, or thoroughly evaluated.  Without a sufficient assessment of the funding and personnel resources  required to reduce the effects of corrosion, Congress does not have the  information it needs to make informed, corrosion-related funding  decisions in the future. In addition, if DOD and the services do not  adequately fund corrosion prevention efforts in the near term, they will  lose or delay the opportunity to realize billions of dollars in avoidable  maintenance costs over the long term. They will also face increasing  degradation in the safety and readiness of military equipment and  personnel. Furthermore, without establishing a departmentwide corrosion  baseline, DOD cannot reliably estimate its overall resource needs,  determine which ones have the highest priority, and track and measure its  progress toward meeting these needs. Moreover, without good results- oriented performance metrics, DOD cannot adequately measure its  progress in reducing the impact of corrosion. Finally, without expanding  its policy guidance to require a review of all corrosion prevention  planning, DOD will not be able to ensure that all new programs and  activities—including non-major weapon systems and infrastructure—are  thoroughly evaluated. As a result, some acquisition and construction  programs could slip by without effective planning to prevent and control  corrosion. In addition, DOD will miss an opportunity to strengthen its  efforts to reduce the impact of corrosion on all new acquisitions and  facilities in the future. Without fully addressing the strategy’s weaknesses,  the effects of corrosion will continue to exact a tremendous toll on the  financial and operational condition of the military.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide better assurances that the Department of Defense’s long-term  corrosion strategy is successfully implemented as envisioned by Congress,  we are making five recommendations. We are recommending that the  Secretary of Defense instruct the Undersecretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in consultation with the DOD  Comptroller, take the following actions:    Establish a date to complete the corrosion baseline study well before its  original estimated completion date of 2011 in order that cost-effective  resource priorities and results-oriented performance measures can be  established to monitor progress in reducing corrosion and its impacts on  equipment and infrastructure;    Establish a funding mechanism to implement the corrosion strategy that  would be consistent with the strategy’s long-term focus; and    Submit to Congress, as part of the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, a  report identifying the long-term funding and personnel resources needed  to implement the strategy, a status report of corrosion reduction projects  funded in fiscal year 2005, and the status of a baseline study.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries of the military services  establish policy guidance that would include the review of the corrosion  prevention and control plans of non-major weapons systems and  infrastructure programs.
Finally, we recommend that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the  Focused Logistics Capabilities Board to include corrosion prevention  issues in its sustainability assessments of military weapon systems.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Director of Defense  Procurement and Acquisitions Policy concurred with all five of our  recommendations. The comments are included in appendix II of  this report.
In concurring with our recommendation to complete a corrosion baseline  study as soon as possible, DOD noted that, as part of the long-term  strategic plan, it would continue its efforts to evaluate corrosion costs.  However, DOD did not indicate when it would complete the overall,  departmentwide baseline study of corrosion costs that we believe is  essential for establishing cost-effective resource priorities and tracking  progress towards reducing corrosion and its impacts on equipment and  infrastructure. We continue to believe that this baseline study should be  completed as soon as possible. Therefore, we have modified our  recommendation to be more specific and stated that DOD should establish  a date to complete the corrosion baseline study well before its original  estimated completion date of 2011.
In concurring with our recommendation to establish a funding mechanism  to implement the corrosion strategy that would be consistent with the  strategy’s long-term focus, DOD stated that the corrosion office would  submit funding requests through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting,  and Execution process. In addition, DOD noted that funding requests for  corrosion prevention would compete for funds with other DOD programs  based on need priorities and fiscal constraints. Although DOD did not  provide specific details, we would expect that funding requests for  corrosion would be made during the budget submission process and be  included in DOD’s submission to Congress rather than be made through  budget change proposals or offsets after funds are obligated. We would  also expect that corrosion prevention funding estimates would be included  in the Future Years Defense Program. Unless DOD adopts these types of  approaches, corrosion prevention funding will continue to receive a lower  priority than other DOD efforts, and as a result, DOD will lose the  opportunity to save billions of dollars in avoidable maintenance costs and  to improve the safety and readiness of military equipment and  infrastructure.
In concurring with our recommendation that the Secretaries of the  military services establish policy guidance calling for reviews of corrosion  prevention and control plans of non-major weapons systems and  infrastructure programs, DOD indicated that it would encourage the  Secretaries to implement such reviews. DOD also stated that non-major  programs are reviewed subject to the requirements of different acquisition  authorities within the military services. We do not believe that DOD’s  comments are fully responsive to our recommendation. We continue to  believe that non-major weapons systems experience corrosion problems  similar to those experienced by major weapons systems and that they  would benefit from the same kind of corrosion prevention plan review.  Our recommendation also applies to infrastructure programs that are  primarily managed by the military services. We recognize that the  authority to manage the activities of non-major weapons systems and  infrastructure programs lies, for the most part, with the military services  and that is why our recommendation is directed to the Secretaries of the  services. As a result, we would expect the Secretaries to implement the  recommendation by establishing policy guidance appropriate to their  respective services.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested  congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-8365 if you or your staff have any  questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were  Lawson Gist, Jr., Allen Westheimer, Hector Wong, Nancy Benco, and  Katherine Lenane.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess each of the three key areas of the report, we held numerous  discussions with officials of DOD’s Corrosion Policy and Oversight task  force and reviewed relevant DOD documents, including the final strategy  report to Congress. Furthermore, to determine the adequacy of each key  area, we applied internal control tools and results-oriented performance  standards that are necessary components for successful management  activities in departments and, by extension, individual programs.
To assess whether the DOD’s corrosion strategy identified and obtained  resources to prevent and mitigate corrosion on equipment and  infrastructure, we reviewed funding requirements and cost estimates for  DOD and the military services and spoke to DOD officials about unfunded  corrosion prevention project requirements, the identification of funding  resources, and future-year funding requirements. We also reviewed the  unfunded service requirements list and the fiscal year 2004 corrosion  prevention projects list. We interviewed DOD Comptroller officials and  discussed the fiscal year 2005 budget request and the prospect for future  years funding. We also discussed our review of DOD’s Program Budget  Directive document to understand why the task force did not have its own  budgeted account.
To determine whether the strategy’s performance measures and baseline  data were adequate to prevent and mitigate corrosion DOD-wide, we  interviewed the leader of the task force working group for Metrics,  Impacts, and Sustainment about the development of the strategy’s  performance measures, barriers to gathering cost data across the military  services, and plans to develop a corrosion cost baseline. We analyzed the  costs used to prepare existing cost impact studies, particularly studies the  metrics working groups plan to use to help establish the baseline. We  observed meetings and internal discussions of the working group for  Metrics, Impacts, and Sustainment at four separate corrosion forums  sponsored by the task force. We also reviewed corrosion prevention  documents related to the development of performance metrics and the  baseline study.
To assess the adequacy of the strategy’s policy guidance for preventing  and mitigating corrosion, we met with the Office of the Deputy  Undersecretary of Defense for Defense Systems, the Joint Chiefs of Staff  for Logistics, and members of the task force’s working group for Policy  and Requirements. To determine how the corrosion policy affected  military infrastructure, we interviewed officials in the Office of the Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, and  members of the task force’s working group for Facilities. We also attended  the TriService Corrosion Conference, the Army Corrosion Conference, and  all four Corrosion Forums sponsored by the corrosion task force to better  understand the role of policy and its impact on military equipment and  infrastructure. We also reviewed relevant policy documents, memos,  instructions, and regulations.
To assess the reliability of the estimated funding needs for corrosion  prevention projects for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 by the military  services we (1) interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data and  (2) assessed related funding requirements studies and reports. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. We conducted our review between November 2003 and April 2004  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Mission
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs