Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program
Published: 2003-04-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15 air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior to the F-15 by being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, less detectable, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years. Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in February and March 2003 respectively. This testimony summarizes our work on the F/A-22 program, covering performance, cost, and scheduling issues.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In the past several years, we have reported on a range of problems affecting the development of F/A-22. Specifically, F/A-22 estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration, maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and range in searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems have surfaced related to overheating during high-speed flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication, navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however, testing in some areas is restricted. Each year since 1998, we have reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time than planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be delivered late to the test center for flight-testing. We have also reported annually since 2000 that flight-test program efficiency--the amount of flight-testing accomplished--has been less than planned. Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since development began in 1991. Since 1997, the Air Force's estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has increased by $3.2 billion bringing the total estimate to $21.9 billion. In addition, over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in estimated production cost growth bringing the total estimate to $42.2 billion--which exceeds the congressionally mandated production cost limit of $36.8 billion. Further, modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. Actions to offset estimated cost growth have had mixed success. These problems have dramatically affected the F/A-22 program. Cost increases, in part, have forced the Air Force to substantially decrease the number of aircraft to be purchased--from 648 to 276. Delays in testing also have significant consequences. Continuing to acquire aircraft before adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could serve to further increase production costs. Moreover, F/A-22 problems have limited DOD's ability to upgrade its aging tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had met its original goals, the Air Force could have been replacing older aircraft with F/A-22 aircraft over 7 years ago. Now, however, it will not begin replacing aircraft until late 2005 at the earliest. The rate of replenishment will be substantially lower, due to the decrease in the number of new aircraft to be purchased. As a result, DOD will have to continue to use tactical aircraft that contribute to increased operating and support costs and it will have to wait longer than anticipated to have access to the advanced capabilities to be offered by the F/A-22.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the F/A-22  development and production programs. Today’s hearing occurs at a  critical time—with the Department of Defense (DOD) conducting  operations overseas while seeking to respond to changes in security  threats and still meeting the challenge of transforming the military. DOD is  spending an average of $150 billion annually on acquisition to support its  current missions and to invest in future capabilities. The magnitude of this  investment, combined with fiscal pressures across the government and the  public’s growing expectations for demonstrable results, clearly requires  DOD to be as efficient and effective as possible in obtaining new weapons  systems.
The F/A-22 Raptor, designed to be superior to any known or projected  adversary aircraft, is a key component in DOD’s modernization strategy as  it is designed to replace the F-15 fighter. As you know, the Air Force  started developing the F/A-22 in 1991. While it plans to complete  development in July 2004, important operational test and evaluation  activities have yet to be completed. Low-rate production was approved in  August 2001, and the Air Force plans to procure a minimum of 276 aircraft  for $42.2 billion.
As requested, I will discuss our past and recent findings related to the F/A- 22 program. Specifically, I will highlight the Air Force’s progress in (1)  addressing performance issues and the status of actions to address them,  (2) resolving delays in flight-testing and (3) dealing with cost growth. I will  also identify risks in the Air Force’s acquisition plan. Problems in these  areas have dramatically affected the program. For example, cost increases  have been a factor in the Air Force substantially decreasing the number of  aircraft to be purchased—from 648 to 276. Performance problems, which  are now being addressed, have limited the Air Force’s ability to test the  aircraft. Delays in testing have significant consequences. Continuing to  acquire aircraft before adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could  serve to further increase production costs.
Together, these problems have rippling effects on DOD’s ability to upgrade  its aging tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had met its original  goals, the Air Force could have been replacing older aircraft with F/A-22  aircraft over 7 years ago. Now, however, it will not begin replacing aircraft  until late 2005 at the earliest. Moreover, the rate of replenishment will be  substantially lower, due to the decrease in the number of new aircraft to  be purchased. As a result, DOD will have to continue to use tactical  aircraft that contribute to increased operating and support costs and it will  have to wait longer than anticipated to have access to the advanced  capabilities offered by the F/A-22.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15  air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior to the F-15 by  being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, less  detectable, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved  awareness of the surrounding situation.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us  to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine  whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost  goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have  also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years.  Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in  February and March 2003, respectively.
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the  development phase of the F/A-22 program, the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation for  both the development and production programs. Subsequently, the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 eliminated the  cost limitation for the development program but left the cost limit for  production in place. The production program is now limited to $36.8  billion. The current cost estimate of the development program is $21.9  billion.
section_title: Performance Issues
paragraphs: In the past several years, we have reported on a range of performance  issues that have arisen during the development of the F/A-22. F/A-22  estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration,  maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and radar range in  searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems  have surfaced related to some overheating concerns during high-speed  flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication,  navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as  excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to  some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however,  testing in some areas is restricted.
In 2001, we reported on continuing increases in aircraft weight and that  more frequent maintenance than planned on the aircraft was being  required. We also reported on structural inadequacies in the aft (rear)  fuselage and on problems with the separation of some materials within the  horizontal tail section and cracking of the clear section of the canopy. In  2002, we again reported that the F/A-22’s performance could be affected by  increased aircraft weight and maintenance needs as well as a potential  problem with “buffeting”, or excessive movement, of the aircraft’s vertical  tails. We also continued to report on problems with the separation of  materials within the horizontal tail section and cracking of the clear  section of the canopy.
We reported last month that the F/A-22 developmental program did not  meet key performance goals established for fiscal year 2002 and continues  to confront numerous technical challenges, specifically:    Avionics instability: Software instability has hampered efforts to integrate  advanced avionics capabilities into the F/A-22 system. Avionics control  and integrated airborne electronics and sensors are designed to provide an  increased awareness of the situation around the pilot. The Air Force told  us avionics have failed or shut down during numerous tests of F/A-22  aircraft due to software problems. The shutdowns have occurred when the  pilot attempts to use the radar, communication, navigation, identification,  and electronic warfare systems concurrently. Although the plane can still  be flown after the avionics have failed, the pilot is unable to successfully  demonstrate the performance of the avionics. Therefore, the Air Force has  had to extend the test program schedule.
The Air Force has recognized that the avionics problems pose a high  technical risk to the F/A-22 program, and in June 2002 the Air Force  convened a special team to address the problem. According to the team,  the unpredictable nature of the shutdowns was not surprising considering  the complexity of the avionics system. The team recommended that the  software be stabilized in the laboratory before releasing it to flight-testing.  The team further recommended conducting a stress test on the software  system architecture to reduce problems and ensure it is operating  properly. The Air Force implemented these recommendations. Further, the  Air Force extended the avionics schedule to accommodate avionics  stability testing and it now plans to complete avionics testing in the first  quarter of 2005. However, Air Force officials stated they do not yet  understand the problems associated with the instability of the avionics  software well enough to predict when they will be able to resolve this  problem.
Vertical fin buffeting: Under some circumstances, the F/A-22 experiences  violent movement, or buffeting, of the vertical fins in the tail section of the  aircraft. Buffeting occurs as air, moving first over the body and the wings  of the aircraft, places unequal pressures on the vertical fins and rudders.  The buffeting problem has restricted the testing of aerial maneuvers of the  aircraft. In addition, unless the violent movement is resolved or the fins  strengthened, the fins will break over time because the pressures  experienced exceed the strength limits of the fins. This could have an  impact on the expected structural life of the aircraft. Lockheed Martin has  developed several modifications to strengthen the vertical fins.
Overheating concerns: Overheating in the rear portions of the aircraft has  significantly restricted the duration of high-speed flight-testing. As the F/A- 22 flies, heat builds up inside several areas in the rear of the aircraft.  Continued exposure to high temperatures would weaken these areas. For  example, a portion of the airframe that sits between the engines’ exhausts  experiences the highest temperatures. This intense heat could weaken or  damage the airframe. To prevent this heat buildup during flight-testing, the  aircraft is restricted to flying just over 500 miles per hour, about the same  speed as a modern jet liner, and significantly below the supercruise  requirement. Currently, the F/A-22 flies with temperature sensors in those  areas of the aircraft and slows down whenever the temperature  approaches a certain level. The Air Force may incorporate a modification  that adds copper sheets to the rear of the aircraft to alleviate the problem.  The Air Force began these modifications in January 2003 and plans to  complete them by July 2003.
Horizontal tail material separations: F/A-22 aircraft have experienced  separations of materials in the horizontal tail and the shaft, which allow  the tail to pivot. Because the separations reduce tail strength, the Air  Force restricted flight-testing of some aircraft until it had determined that  this problem would not affect flight safety during testing. The Air Force  and the contractor initially believed that improvements to the aircraft’s  manufacturing process would solve this problem. However, the Air Force  has determined that it could only solve this problem by redesigning the  aircraft’s tail. The Air Force plans to conduct flight-testing of the  redesigned tail between February 2004 and April 2004.
Airlift support requirements: The Air Force estimates it will not meet the  F/A-22 airlift support requirement—a key performance parameter. The  airlift support requirement is that 8 C-141 aircraft or their equivalents  would be sufficient to deploy a squadron of 24 F/A-22s for 30 days without  resupply. Today, the Air Force estimates that 8.8 C-141 equivalents will be  necessary.
Impact of maintenance needs on performance: The F/A-22’s performance  may also be affected by maintenance needs that exceed established  objectives. The Air Force estimates that the F/A-22 should, at this point in  its development, be able to complete 1.67 flying hours between  maintenance actions and 1.95 flying hours by the end of development.  However, aircraft are requiring five times the maintenance actions  expected at this point in development. As of November 2002, the  development test aircraft have been completing only .29 flying hours  between maintenance actions. Therefore, the development test aircraft are  spending more time than planned on the ground undergoing maintenance.
section_title: Flight Test Schedule Delays
paragraphs: Testing is instrumental to gauging the progress being made when an idea  or a concept is translated into an actual product that people use. DOD  divides testing into two categories: developmental and operational. The  goal of developmental tests is to determine whether the weapon system  meets the technical specifications of the contract. The goal of operational  testing is to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of the weapon  system in realistic combat conditions. Operational testing is managed by  different military test organizations that represent the customers, such as  the combat units that will use the weapons. The results of operational  tests are provided to Congress as well as the Secretary of Defense and  senior service officials.
Our reviews over the years have underscored the importance of not  delaying tests too late in development—when it is more difficult, costly,  and time consuming to fix any problems discovered. Yet, we have been  reporting on delays of flight tests for the F/A-22 and that these delays have  contributed to scheduling and cost problems affecting the program.
F/A-22 flight-testing began in late 1997. Each year since 1998, we have  reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time than  planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be delivered late to  the test center for flight-testing. We have also reported annually since 2000  that the flight-test program efficiency—the amount of flight-testing  accomplished—has been less than planned.
In March 2003, we reported that F/A-22 flight-testing was slower than  expected in 2002 in all test areas according to Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) testing officials. Consequently, the Air Force extended  flight test schedules and reduced the number of flight tests. Many tasks  originally planned for 2002 were rescheduled for 2003. Further, the Air  Force now plans to conduct more developmental flight-testing  concurrently with operational testing.
Continuing technical problems were the primary reasons for the most  recent delay in flight-testing. In addition, late delivery of development  aircraft to the flight-test center continued to be a contributing problem.  Late deliveries were due not only to technical problems but also to  ongoing problems associated with the manufacture and assembly of  development aircraft by the prime contractor.
With the new schedule, the Air Force delayed the beginning of operational  testing for 4 months, until the portion of developmental testing required to  begin operational testing could be completed. Operational testing is now  planned to begin in August 2003. Table 1 shows the changes in key F/A-22  schedule events.
Further, according to OSD officials involved in operational testing, there is  a high risk of not completing an adequate amount of development flight- testing before operational testing is scheduled to begin. Indeed, we believe  that it is unlikely that the Air Force will be able to complete all necessary  avionics flight-testing prior to the planned start of operational testing.  Based on F/A-22 flight test accomplishment data and current flight test  plans, we project that the start of operational testing might be delayed  until January 2004. As a result, operational testing could be delayed by  several months beyond the current planned date of August 2003.
section_title: Cost Increases
paragraphs: Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since it began in 1991.  They have spurred Congress to impose spending limits and have forced  the Air Force to scale back production. Nevertheless, the Air Force is still  contending with cost increases in three principal areas: development,  production, and modernization.
subsections: section_title: Development Costs
paragraphs: Since 1997, the Air Force’s estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has  increased by $3.2 billion. Figure 1 highlights development cost limitation  and estimate increases during the past 6 years.
Increases prior to 1998 have prompted limitations on spending from  Congress. While the Air Force held the position that these limitations  could be met until recently, our reviews showed that there was a potential  for additional increases because of delays. Table 2 presents a time line of  congressional limitations, our findings and DOD’s positions.
The initial congressional limitation of $18.688 billion established in 1997  followed an Air Force team’s review of estimated development and  production costs. That team concluded in 1997 that additional time would  be required to complete the development program and estimated that  costs would increase from $17.4 billion to $18.688 billion. The team  recommended several changes to the development program’s schedule,  including slower manufacturing than planned for a more efficient  transition from development to low-rate initial production and an  additional 12 months to complete avionics development.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 then  established this $18.688 billion amount as a cost limitation for the  development program. Congressional direction in fiscal year 2000  legislation shifted six production representative test aircraft to the  development program and caused the cost limitation to be adjusted  upward to $20.4 billion. In September 2001, DOD acknowledged that the  cost to complete the development program would exceed the cost  limitation by $557 million. This increase brought the development cost  estimate to $21 billion. Subsequently, in December 2001, the National  Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 eliminated the development  cost limitation.
In March 2003, we reported that the Air Force estimated that development  costs had increased by $876 million, bringing total development cost to  $21.9 billion. This increase was due to the technical problems and  schedule delays related to avionics and vertical fin buffeting discussed  earlier.
section_title: Production Cost Growth
paragraphs: Over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in estimated  production cost growth during the course of two DOD program reviews.  As a result, the estimated cost of the production program currently  exceeds the congressional cost limit. The Air Force has implemented cost  reduction plans designed to offset a significant amount of this estimated  cost growth. But the effectiveness of these cost reduction plans has varied.
During a 1997 review, the Air Force estimated cost growth of $13.1  billion. The major contributing factors to this cost growth were inflation,  increased estimates of labor costs and materials associated with the  airframe and engine, and engineering changes to the airframe and engine.  These factors made up about 75 percent of the cost growth identified in  1997.
In August 2001, DOD estimated an additional $5.4 billion in cost growth for  the production of the F/A-22, bringing total estimated production cost to  $43 billion. The major contributing factors to this cost growth were again  due to increased labor costs and airframe and engine costs. These factors  totaled almost 70 percent of the cost growth. According to program  officials, major contractors’ and suppliers’ inability to achieve the  expected reductions in labor costs throughout the building of the  development and early production aircraft has been the primary reason for  estimating this additional cost growth.
subsections: section_title: Mixed Success With Cost Reduction Plans
paragraphs: The Air Force was able to implement cost reduction plans and offset cost  growth by nearly $2 billion in the first four production contracts awarded.  As shown in table 2, the total offsets for these contracts slightly exceeded  earlier projections by about $.5 million.
Cost reduction plans exist but have not yet been implemented for  subsequent production lots planned for fiscal years 2003 through 2010  because contracts for these production lots have not yet been awarded. If  implemented successfully, the Air Force expects these cost reduction  plans to achieve billions of dollars in offsets to estimated cost growth and  to allow the production program to be completed within the current  production cost estimate of $43 billion. However, this amount exceeds  the production cost limit of $36.8 billion.
In addition, while the Air Force has been attempting to offset costs  through production improvement programs (PIP), recent funding cutbacks  for PIPs may reduce their effectiveness. PIPs focus specifically on  improving production processes to realize savings by using an initial  government investment. The earlier the Air Force implements PIPs, the  greater the impact on the cost of production. Examples of PIPs previously  implemented by the Air Force include manufacturing process  improvements for avionics, improvements in fabrication and assembly  processes for the airframe, and redesign of several components to enable  lower production costs.
As shown in figure 2, the Air Force reduced the funding available for  investment in PIPs by $61 million for lot 1 and $26 million for lot 2 to cover  cost growth in production lots 1 and 2. As a result, it is unlikely that PIPs  covering these two lots will be able to offset cost growth as planned.
Figure 3 shows the remaining planned investment in PIPs through fiscal  year 2006 and the $3.7 billion in estimated cost growth that can potentially  be offset through fiscal year 2010 if the Air Force invests as planned in  these PIPs.
In the past, Congress has been concerned about the Air Force’s practice of  requesting fiscal year funding for these PIPs but then using part of that  funding for F/A-22 airframe cost increases.  Recently, Congress directed  the Air Force to submit a request if it plans to use PIP funds for an  alternate purpose.
section_title: Modernization Cost Increases
paragraphs: Modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. In fiscal  year 2001, the Air Force plan was to spend a total of $166 million for  upgrades to enhance the operational capabilities of the F/A-22. Currently,  Air Force plans in 2004 call for spending almost $3 billion through fiscal  year 2009 for modernization projects. (See fig. 4). Most of the recent  increase in modernization funding is necessary to provide increased  ground attack capability. Other modernization projects include upgrading  avionics software, adding an improved short-range missile capability,  upgrading instrumentation for testing, and incorporating a classified  project.
section_title: Broader Effects of Cost Increases
paragraphs: The cost increases experienced by the F/A-22 program have, in part,  forced the Air Force to reduce its planned procurement over time by more  than half (see fig. 5). Such a decrease, in turn, has jeopardized the Air  Force’s ability to modernize its fleet of tactical aircraft.
In late 2001, in the face of a significant cost overrun in the estimated cost  to produce the F/A-22, the total aircraft to be produced was reduced. At  the same time, DOD requested that Congress remove the production cost  limit. While the congressional limit on production costs remains in effect,  DOD transferred production funding to help offset $876 million in  development cost growth. The net effect was another decrease in total  aircraft to be produced—now estimated at 276.
This reduction may have a negative effect on Air Force plans to modernize  its tactical aircraft fleet. The F/A-22 is designed to be a replacement for the  F-15 aircraft, but the F/A-22 quantity reductions that have occurred since  1991 tend to exacerbate the increasing trend in the average age of current  Air Force fighter aircraft. In 2001, we reported that the average age of Air  Force tactical fighters would continue to increase until the fleet reached  an average age of 21 years in 2011. This is almost twice the average age  goal of the Air Force. Aging equipment contributes significantly to  increased operating and support costs.
section_title: Risks in the F/A-22 Acquisition Plan
paragraphs: Despite continuing development problems and challenges, the Air Force  plans to continue acquiring production aircraft at increasing annual rates.  For example, the Air Force plans to acquire 20 aircraft during 2003, rather  than the maximum of 16 Congress allowed without DOD’s submittal of a  risk assessment and certification. Since 2001, we have reported that this  is a very risky strategy because the Air Force runs the chance of higher  production costs by acquiring significant quantities of aircraft before  adequate testing is complete. Late testing could identify problems  requiring costly modifications to achieve satisfactory performance.
As shown in figure 6, the Air Force is committed to acquiring 73  production aircraft (26 percent) before operational and development  testing is complete. We believe that this is an overly optimistic strategy  given the remaining F/A-22 technical problems and the current status of  testing. As we have noted, acquiring aircraft before completing adequate  testing to resolve significant technical problems increases the risk of  costly modifications later. If F/A-22 testing schedules slip further—as we  believe is likely—even more aircraft will be acquired before development  and operational testing is complete, and the risk of costly modifications  will increase still more.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The F/A-22 has the potential for being the most advanced air superiority  aircraft ever to join the Air Force’s inventory—using several advanced  technologies and capabilities. But performance problems, schedule delays,  and cost overruns threaten the program’s success as well as DOD’s ability  to modernize its tactical aircraft fleet. Moreover, uncertainties about some  of the performance capabilities have increased the risk that the Air Force  will have to modify a larger quantity of aircraft after they are built. For  these reasons, our recommendations have stressed the need for the Air  Force to (1) avail itself of all opportunities for gaining manufacturing  efficiencies during production, (2) find ways to fund cost reduction plans  that require initial government investment instead of using funding to  cover cost growth in earlier aircraft lots, and (3) reconsider its decision to  increase the annual production rate beyond 16 until greater knowledge on  any need for modifications is established through operational testing.  Moreover, we have also recommended, in light of the high risk nature of  the program, that Congress be informed about the amount of cost  reduction plans identified to offset cost growth, the potential cost of  production if cost reduction plans are not as effective as planned, or the  quantity of aircraft that can be produced within the cost limit. Congress  would be able to use this information to help exercise proper program  oversight.