Regional Missile Defense: DOD's 2014 Report Generally Addressed Required Reporting Elements, but Excluded Additional Key Details
Published: 2014-12-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Regional BMD constitutes an essential element in deterring enemies from using ballistic missiles and supporting defense commitments to U.S. allies and partners. DOD's 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report noted that the United States would pursue phased, tailored, and adaptive approaches to regional BMD in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Middle East. A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated DOD to submit within 180 days a report to the congressional defense committees on eight elements related to the status and progress of regional BMD programs and efforts. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the NDAA mandated that GAO provide its views on DOD's report. Separately, GAO was requested to provide its results in a written, publicly releasable form.
This report assesses the extent to which DOD's report addressed the required reporting elements and provides views on other key information, if any, that DOD could have included in the report. GAO used a scorecard methodology to compare the required reporting elements to the information in DOD's BMD report. Further, GAO reviewed the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report , combatant commander integrated priority lists, and other DOD documents and policy, and interviewed DOD officials to gain further insight on DOD's regional BMD efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) June 2014 regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) report addressed five of the eight required reporting elements, and partially addressed the remaining three required reporting elements.
DOD's report addressed elements relating to a BMD risk assessment, the role that regional missile defenses play in the homeland defense mission, the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities, and two elements on the roles and contributions of allies.
DOD's report partially addressed the required reporting elements regarding the alignment of regional approaches to missile defense with combatant command-integrated priorities, the concept of operations for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and the testing and development of key EPAA elements.
Additionally, GAO determined that DOD's report did not include key details for some elements that would have benefitted the congressional defense committees' oversight of DOD's regional BMD efforts. Generally accepted research standards for preparing sound and complete defense studies include providing complete, accurate, and relevant information. However, DOD's report does not consistently meet this standard, based on GAO's review. For example, the explanation in DOD's report of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's transfer of authority process did not include sufficient detail to clearly convey the process. DOD's report also did not include details regarding the combatant commands' requirements, nor did it fully describe issues affecting the testing and development of key regional BMD systems (see fig.). DOD officials told GAO that the report was intended to address each of the eight required reporting elements concisely, that DOD regularly provides more detailed analysis on some of these topics to Congress via periodic briefings, and that they did not want to provide duplicative information in this report. GAO recognizes that judgment is needed in preparing reports to Congress; however, DOD's report did not include details on key BMD assets and risks to the EPAA schedule, which limits the report's utility to the congressional defense committees in their oversight of DOD's regional BMD programs.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Because DOD prepared its report in response to a nonrecurring mandate, GAO is not making recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) constitutes an essential element  in both deterring enemies from using ballistic missiles and supporting  defense commitments to U.S. allies and partners. The Department of  Defense’s (DOD) February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report  noted that the United States would pursue phased, tailored, and adaptive  approaches to regional BMD in Europe—known as the European Phased  Adaptive Approach (EPAA)—as well as in the Asia-Pacific region and the  Middle East. According to DOD, BMD combined with other U.S.  capabilities reinforces regional defense throughout the spectrum of  conflict—in peacetime, by providing opportunities for closer defense  cooperation; in an escalating crisis, by preserving freedom of action and  limiting coercion; and in a conflict, by reducing the effects of missile  strikes.
Since 2002, DOD’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been developing  and deploying the BMD system. From 2002 through 2014, MDA spent  more than $98 billion to develop and deploy a diverse collection of land-,  sea-, and space-based assets, and plans to invest an additional $38  billion for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 to continue its efforts. As DOD  implements the EPAA and other regional BMD approaches, there are a  number of factors that could complicate BMD operations. The factors  include the interaction of various allies contributing to BMD, potential  issues regarding the interoperability of BMD systems, and challenges with  integrating offensive and defensive operations.
Section 233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2014 required DOD to submit a report to the congressional defense  committees on the status and progress of DOD’s regional BMD programs  and efforts, to include eight specific reporting elements, not later than 180  days after the date of the enactment of the act.mandate required DOD to describe certain regional BMD risk   Among other things, the  assessments, discuss matters related to the EPAA concept of operations,  describe progress made in developing and testing elements of systems  intended for EPAA, and describe matters related to allied contributions to  U.S. regional BMD activities. DOD responded to this mandate with a  report submitted to congressional defense committees in June 2014.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 also mandated that GAO provide  its views on DOD’s report.  Separately, the Chairman of the Strategic  Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, and the  Ranking Member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate  Armed Services Committee, requested that we provide the results of our  review in a written, publicly releasable form. This report assesses the  extent to which DOD’s report addressed the required reporting elements  and provides our views on other key information, if any, that DOD could  have included in the report.
To assess the extent to which DOD’s report addressed the required  reporting elements, we compared the contents of DOD’s June 2014  regional BMD report with the requirements established in section 233 of  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 by using a  scorecard methodology. Specifically, we  reviewed the language of section 233 to identify and document the  required reporting elements and subelements; developed, based on the required reporting elements, scoring criteria  to assess the report’s content; assessed the extent to which the report’s content addressed the  required reporting elements by having three analysts independently  compare the report’s content to the scoring criteria; and   compiled scorecard results of the three analysts in an anonymous  format and, with the assistance of a research methodologist, reached  a consensus on the final assigned score for each required reporting  element.
Based on this review, the team determined whether the report’s content  addressed, partially addressed, or did not address each of the required  reporting elements as follows:
Addressed: The report contains information relating to the specific  required reporting element and all its subelements.
Partially addressed: The report contains some, but not all, of the  information required by the specific required reporting element or  includes information on some, but not all, of its subelements.
Not addressed: The report does not mention any information relating  to the specific required reporting element or any of its subelements.
We also collected documents and interviewed officials at organizations  that DOD officials told us provided significant contributions to the report,  such as the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Joint  Staff, MDA, and U.S. Strategic Command, and we interviewed officials  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Joint  Staff about the process they used to prepare the report and for any other  insights they might have on the content of the report. After we determined  the extent to which the required reporting elements were addressed, we  interviewed DOD officials regarding any elements that we rated as  partially addressed to better understand why DOD reported or did not  report certain information.
To provide our views on other information, if any, that DOD could have  included in the report to better inform oversight by congressional  committees, we identified information available to DOD as it was  preparing its report. Specifically, we reviewed combatant commands’  integrated priority lists, MDA acquisition and system engineering  documentation, DOD’s Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision  2020, the 2012 Ballistic Missile Defense System Warfighter Capability  Acceptance document, and other documentation to determine the  information available to DOD as it was preparing its report. Further, to  help us provide views on other key information, if any, that DOD could  have included in its report, we used generally accepted standards for a  sound, complete, and high-quality defense research study that we  identified in a 2006 GAO report. Specifically, we used the standards we  previously identified that were related to the presentation of results,  because this review focuses on the information contained in DOD’s June  2014 regional BMD report. These specific standards include that the  report address the objectives, that the conclusions be sound and  complete, and that the study results be presented in a clear manner. We  compared these specific standards to the contents of DOD’s June 2014  report and to the other information available to DOD to determine what  details, if any, DOD excluded from its report. We also reviewed relevant  DOD documents to determine examples of other information DOD had on  regional BMD operations, such as the Joint Force Readiness Review, the  2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, and a briefing on the  employment of BMD assets with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  (NATO). Furthermore, we interviewed DOD officials who compiled the  report regarding the approach they used to develop the report, including  their rationale for choosing the level of detail that they provided for  particular elements in the report.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2014 to December 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Section 233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2014 required DOD to report on various regional BMD topics, including  the eight specific elements presented in table 1, by June 24, 2014.
DOD identified its current approach to regional BMD in the 2010 Ballistic  Missile Defense Review Report. In that report, DOD stated it would match  U.S. BMD strategies, policies, and capabilities to the requirements of  current and future threats and use that information to inform BMD  planning, budgeting, and oversight. DOD also noted that phased,  adaptive approaches to BMD would enable a flexible, scalable response  to BMD threats around the world by incorporating new technologies  quickly and cost-effectively, and described the advantages of mobile BMD  assets that can be readily transported from one region to another, over  fixed assets. In addition, DOD indicated that new assets would undergo  testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions,  prior to deployment. Finally, DOD emphasized working with regional allies  to strengthen BMD and its deterrent value. The 2010 Ballistic Missile  Defense Review Report indicates that the United States would pursue a  phased, adaptive approach to missile defense within each region that is  tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to each region. An area  of emphasis in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report was on  the EPAA—the U.S. approach to regional BMD in Europe.
In the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, DOD also discussed  the development of regional phased, adaptive approaches to BMD in the  Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. The 2010 report highlighted differences  among the ballistic missile threat posed to each region, as well as the  differences among the regional defensive arrangements that exist  between the United States and its partners. In an August 2013 report on  regional BMD issues, DOD stated that its process of working with  regional allies and partners was well under way and included the  participation, along with the United States, of some allies and partners in  regional command and control centers that conduct BMD operations. In  the Pacific, DOD noted that cooperation is most robust with Japan, that  other allies and partners participate to varying degrees, and that allies  and partners in the Asia-Pacific region generally have exhibited an  increasing interest in enhanced cooperation with DOD. DOD’s August  2013 report also noted that in the Middle East the United States is  working with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council States on a bilateral  basis, including supporting the purchase of BMD systems through the  Foreign Military Sales program.
DOD’s regional BMD effort consists of a number of specific weapon  systems or elements that compose the BMD system as a whole. They are  the following:
Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications  (C2BMC): a system that integrates individual BMD elements and  allows users to plan BMD operations, maintain situational awareness  and communications, and manage networked sensors.
Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2  (AN/TPY-2) X-Band Radar: a sensor that tracks ballistic missiles in  flight.
Aegis BMD Weapons System: a ship-based weapon system that  consists of a radar, software, and processors to track threat missiles  and cue Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors.
Aegis Ashore: a land-based version of the Aegis BMD interceptor  system, which will employ Aegis BMD Weapons System upgrades  and SM-3 upgrades as they become available.
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3): a family of defensive missiles that  intercept regional threat missiles of various ranges.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): a mobile, ground- based missile defense system that includes a fire control and  communications system, a radar, interceptors, and other support  equipment.
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): a mobile defense against  short-range missiles. It is now operated and fielded by the U.S. Army  and may be used in a variety of regional BMD approaches.
According to DOD, various versions of these weapon systems are being  deployed in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and in the Middle East, but  the EPAA is the only regional approach described extensively in the 2010  Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. To support Phase 1 of the EPAA  for operations in Europe, by December 2011 MDA delivered an AN/TPY-2  X-band radar, an Aegis BMD ship with SM-3 Block IA missiles, and an  upgrade to C2BMC. As we reported in March 2014,the EPAA are intended to provide improved integration and  interoperability among sensors and interceptor systems, which would  expand the area being defended, as well as improve the ability to defend  against attacks involving a larger number of incoming missiles.  Specifically, for Phase 2, MDA plans to deploy improved versions of the  Aegis BMD Weapons System on ships and Aegis Ashore in Romania with  the next generation of SM-3 interceptor, called SM-3 Block IB. MDA also  plans to field improvements to C2BMC, upgrading an existing version in  the 2015 time frame and fielding a new version in 2017. For Phase 3,  MDA is developing further improvements to the Aegis BMD system,  including a new version of the weapons system and new interceptor,  called SM-3 Block IIA, as well as an additional Aegis Ashore installation in  Poland and further improvements to C2BMC for fielding in 2018. Figure 1  depicts the weapon systems that DOD plans to deploy in and around  Europe in support of the EPAA in its three phases.
DOD, Report to Congress: Regional Ballistic Missile Defense.
section_title: DOD’s Report Addressed or Partially Addressed the Required Reporting Elements, but Did Not Provide Additional Key Details
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Report Addressed or Partially Addressed All Eight of the Required Reporting Elements
paragraphs: Compared to the statutory reporting requirements, DOD’s June 2014  regional BMD report addressed five of the eight required reporting  elements, and partially addressed the remaining three elements. DOD  addressed elements that describe the overall risk assessment from the  Global Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment, the role of  regional missile defenses in the homeland defense mission, the  integration of offensive and defensive capabilities, and two elements on  the roles and contributions of allies. DOD partially addressed the  remaining three reporting elements, regarding the alignment of regional  approaches to missile defense with combatant command integrated  priorities, the concept of operations for EPAA, and the testing and  development of key EPAA elements. Table 2 summarizes our  assessment of DOD’s report.
section_title: DOD’s Report Did Not Provide Additional Key Details
paragraphs: Additionally, through interviews with DOD officials and from our  application of generally accepted standards that define a sound and  complete defense research study, we found that DOD’s report did not  include key details for some required reporting elements that we believe  could have benefitted congressional defense committees’ oversight of  DOD’s regional BMD programs. Generally accepted standards that define  a sound and complete defense research study include that a report  provide complete, accurate, and relevant information for the client and  stakeholders. However, DOD’s report does not consistently meet this  standard, based on GAO’s review. For example, the standards for the  presentation of results state that findings should be complete and  accurate, but we found that key information regarding the characterization  of the testing and development of EPAA systems was incomplete.
DOD’s June 2014 report could have provided additional details for several  of the required reporting elements. Specifically:  In support of element F, regarding integration of offensive and  defensive capabilities, the report described some plans regarding  implementation of the imperatives suggested in the Joint Integrated  Air and Missile Defense Vision for 2020. We determined that DOD’s  report met the statutory requirement to describe the manner in which  enhanced integration of offensive and defensive capabilities will fit into  regional missile defense planning and force structure assessments.  Although not required, we found the report did not provide  comprehensive information on how DOD will identify and address  potential capability and capacity shortfalls in support of air and missile  defense missions, nor did it provide a description of policies to  increase cooperation among partners and allies, as emphasized by  the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Vision for 2020, which is  information that provides more insight into how DOD manages  regional BMD resources and risks.
In support of elements G and H, regarding allied contributions to  regional BMD, DOD’s report included some information that did not  relate to regional missile defense and characterized a number of allied  contributions as notional, which could misrepresent the extent to  which particular allies and partners contribute to regional BMD. For  example, the report mentions Denmark hosting an Upgraded Early  Warning Radar in Greenland as an allied contribution to European  missile defense, but that radar is used exclusively for supporting the  homeland defense BMD mission. Additionally, the report did not  include estimates of actual or potential cost savings derived from  taking advantage of economies of scale or a reduced number of U.S.  deployments due to allied capabilities. For instance, Japan’s effort to  develop and deploy the Aegis BMD Weapon System on Japanese  ships is mentioned by the report, but without concrete information on  the effect that may have on U.S. resources. Appendix I highlights U.S.  and allied contributions to regional BMD operations.
Additionally, we determined that DOD’s report omitted key details  regarding its approach to regional BMD for the three elements that it  partially addressed in the report, regarding the combatant commands’  force structure and deployment options, concepts for operating with  NATO, and the development of EPAA systems. We believe that by not  including these details, although not required, DOD reduced the report’s  usefulness to the congressional defense committees and to their  oversight of DOD’s regional BMD programs.
subsections: section_title: Combatant Command Force Structure Deployment Options Lacked Both Detail and a Comparison with Integrated Priorities
paragraphs: In support of element B, regarding the combatant commands’ deployment  options, as stated earlier, we determined that DOD’s report partially  addressed the required reporting element because it did not include key  details about U.S. European Command’s and U.S. Pacific Command’s  planned options to increase BMD capability in response to an imminent  threat, nor did the report provide a comprehensive analysis regarding how  the various regional approaches to BMD will meet combatant command  integrated priorities. DOD’s report also did not provide an analysis of the  BMD assets that each combatant command needs to meet their  respective integrated priorities, nor did it describe how many assets each  combatant command has in-theater to address these requirements, or  identify how many assets DOD could reasonably deploy into the area if  additional capability were needed during a crisis. U.S. Strategic  Command and the Joint Staff track the deployment and availability of  BMD forces, such as the Aegis BMD Weapon System, THAAD, and PAC- 3, and make priority recommendations for their deployment, so that senior  DOD decision makers can assess risk and priorities when allocating  assets among regions.
section_title: Description of European Command and Control Lacked Key Details
paragraphs: In support of element C, related to operational control of assets in  Europe, we found that DOD’s report lacked key details about how  command of assets are allocated between U.S. European Command and  NATO. For example, in the briefing referenced by the report, DOD  provides some description of how Aegis ships would be transferred from  one command’s authority to the other and provides the current  operational control status for the forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-band radar.  However, neither the report nor the briefing contain the operational details  that are important to fully understanding the circumstances under which  each of the relevant BMD systems could be transferred from one  command’s authority to another. This information is important to fully  understanding the implications of how control of BMD assets is allocated,  as well as the effect those circumstances have on various BMD systems.
section_title: Report Did Not Describe Key C2BMC or Aegis BMD Issues in Describing EPAA Testing and Development
paragraphs: In support of element D, regarding the development and testing of BMD  systems that are part of EPAA, DOD’s report did not include details about  C2BMC and Aegis BMD testing and development issues, and the lack of  such detail may limit Congress’ ability to understand the extent to which  the EPAA system can be integrated:
C2BMC: The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report and  MDA’s acquisition and system engineering documentation underscore  the importance of C2BMC for all regional approaches, since it is the  system that enables system-level capabilities. In EPAA, C2BMC is  necessary to link allied systems, such as NATO’s Active Layered  Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, with the U.S. systems. It also  controls the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar, and integrates Aegis BMD  ships, as well as additional sensors and an Aegis Ashore as they  become available in Phases 2 and 3. As the integrator, C2BMC allows  the BMD system to defend against more missiles simultaneously, to  conserve interceptor inventory, and to defend a larger area than  individual systems operating independently. For Phase 2 of the EPAA,  MDA plans to upgrade the C2BMC system in 2015 to address new  threats and, in 2017, to integrate additional sensors and improve the  ability of Aegis BMD to launch an interceptor before its shipboard  radar acquires a threat missile. In 2018, for Phase 3 of the EPAA,  MDA plans additional C2BMC upgrades, including some that would  enable the Aegis BMD to intercept missiles based on tracks passed  through C2BMC from forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-band radars,  without having to detect the threat with its own radar. However, our  current and previous work indicates that some capability upgrades to  C2BMC for Phase 3 of the EPAA have been deferred indefinitely,  which DOD did not reference in its June 2014 report. For example,  according to our analysis of MDA’s system engineering  documentation, we found that MDA has deferred the delivery of a key  C2BMC capability that would further integrate the BMD system and  improve its management of limited BMD resources by allowing  C2BMC to directly send engagement commands to interceptor  systems. According to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,  effective “battle management” requires C2BMC to not only collect and  process information from sensors and weapons, as it currently does,  but to also determine which threats should be engaged by which  weapon to produce the highest probability of engagement success  and then transmit this information back to the sensors and weapons.
Aegis BMD Weapon System: DOD’s report did not fully describe the  performance and acquisition risks to the Aegis BMD systems slated  for Phase 2 of the EPAA, which we have identified through our prior  work. Aegis BMD is the primary interceptor system for EPAA. MDA  plans upgrades for Phase 2 of the EPAA that increase the types and  number of threats it can engage. However, in April 2014, we found  that one SM-3 Block 1B failed in flight during an interceptor test in  September 2013, which, according to our current work, could increase  reliability risk. Since then, DOD officials told us that MDA is seeking  to maintain reliability of the interceptor by developing a redesign; it is  unclear when this redesign will be flight-tested. MDA told us that it  plans to ground-test the redesign. Moreover, our reviews of MDA’s  Aegis BMD Baseline Execution Reviews from April 2013, August  2013, and June 2014 indicated that the certification of a new version  of Aegis BMD software called Aegis BMD 4.1, which is needed for  Phase 2, had been delayed at least 3 months past Phase 2  declaration. Additionally, based on our analysis of MDA’s August  2013 and June 2014 Baseline Execution Reviews, MDA continues to  discover software defects faster than it is able to fix them for another  version of Aegis BMD, also planned for Phase 2 of the EPAA.  Furthermore, although DOD officials told us that the Aegis Ashore  program is on track, our review of MDA’s March 2014 test  documentation identified schedule slips that delayed Aegis Ashore’s  participation in key interoperability tests, compressing the time to  rectify issues should they be discovered prior to the planned Phase 2  declaration in 2015.
DOD officials who developed the June 2014 regional BMD report told us  that they used their best judgment in determining the appropriate level of  detail for the report. The officials added that their goal was to address  each of the required reporting elements concisely. Furthermore, they  explained that they regularly provide more detailed analysis on some of  these topics to congressional defense committees via periodic briefings,  and that they did not want to provide duplicative or unnecessary  information. Although we recognize the need for professional judgment by  DOD officials when preparing the report, our review concluded that  DOD’s report did not include details that we believe could have made the  report more useful to Congress in its oversight of DOD’s regional BMD  programs. However, DOD’s report was prepared in response to a  onetime, nonrecurring mandate, and therefore we are not making any  recommendations to amend the report and provide additional detail.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: DOD reviewed a draft of this report, but did not provide formal agency  comments. DOD did provide technical comments, and we incorporated  these changes as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and to the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs  of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Director,  MDA. This report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at 202-512-9971 or KirschbaumJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Allied Contributions to Regional Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
paragraphs: Appendix I: Allied Contributions to Regional  Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Figure 2 summarizes key information provided by the Department of  Defense (DOD) regarding the contributions of allies to regional BMD.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kevin O’Neill, Assistant Director;  David Best; Patricia Donahue; Amie Lesser; Randy Neice; Wiktor J.  Niewiadomski; Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; Mike Shaughnessy;  and Jina Yu made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation  Issues and Estimate Long-Term Costs for European Capabilities.   GAO-14-314. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2014.
Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and  Improving Accountability. GAO-14-351. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2014.
Regional Missile Defense: DOD’s Report Provided Limited Information;  Assessment of Acquisition Risks is Optimistic. GAO-14-248R.  Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2014.
Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition  Management. GAO-13-432. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2013.
Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by  Reducing Concurrency. GAO-12-486. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Training Integration  and Increase Transparency of Training Resources. GAO-11-625.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2011.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and  Accountability. GAO-11-372. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2011.
Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and  Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe.   GAO-11-220. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2011.
Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face  Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.   GAO-11-179R. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects  Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. GAO-10-676. Washington,  D.C.: July 14, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to  Strengthen Acquisition Approach. GAO-10-311. Washington, D.C.:  February 25, 2010.