Federal Emergency Management Agency: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Handling of Employee Misconduct Allegations
Published: 2017-07-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: FEMA is responsible for coordinating government-wide efforts in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural or man-made disasters, including acts of terror. The agency relies on permanent and disaster-related temporary employees and has a total workforce of over 22,000. Employee misconduct incidents can detract from FEMA's mission, damage the agency's reputation, and hamper its ability to respond to disasters and maintain public trust.
GAO was asked to review employee misconduct at FEMA. This report examines: (1) the extent to which FEMA developed policies and procedures for addressing misconduct; (2) available data on FEMA misconduct cases and the extent to which FEMA uses the data to identify and address trends; and (3) the extent that misconduct cases are shared within FEMA and with DHS OIG. GAO reviewed FEMA procedures, analyzed misconduct data, and interviewed officials from FEMA HQ and three regions (selected based on geographic dispersion and number of misconduct allegations). GAO also analyzed a random, non-generalizable sample of 20 complaints referred from DHS OIG to FEMA to determine whether they were addressed.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed and documented misconduct policies and procedures for most employees, but not its entire workforce. Specifically, FEMA has developed policies and procedures regarding misconduct investigations that apply to all FEMA personnel and has also documented options to address misconduct and appeal rights for Title 5 (generally permanent employees) and Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees (temporary employees who support disaster related activities). However, FEMA has not documented misconduct policies and procedures for Surge Capacity Force members, who may augment FEMA's workforce in the event of a catastrophic disaster. Additionally, FEMA's Reservist (intermittent disaster employees) policies and procedures do not outline disciplinary actions or the appeals process currently in practice at the agency. As a result, supervisors and Reservist employees may not be aware of all aspects of the process. Clearly documented policies and procedures for all workforce categories could help to better prepare management to address misconduct and mitigate perceptions that misconduct is handled inconsistently.
FEMA records data on misconduct cases and their outcomes; however, aspects of this data limit their usefulness for identifying and addressing trends. GAO reviewed misconduct complaints recorded by FEMA's Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) from January 2014 through September 30, 2016, and identified 595 complaints involving 799 alleged offenses, the most common of which were integrity and ethics violations. FEMA reported 546 disciplinary actions related to misconduct from calendar year 2014 through 2016. In addition to OCSO, two other FEMA offices involved in investigating and adjudicating misconduct also record data. However, limited standardization of data fields and entries within fields, limited use of unique case identifiers, and a lack of documented guidance on data entry across all three offices restricts the data's usefulness for identifying and addressing trends in employee misconduct. Improved quality control measures could help the agency use the data to better identify potential problem areas and opportunities for training.
FEMA shares misconduct case information internally and with the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) on a regular basis; however, FEMA does not have reconciliation procedures in place to track DHS OIG referred cases to ensure that they are reviewed and addressed. GAO reviewed a random sample of 20 cases DHS OIG referred to FEMA in fiscal year 2016 and found that FEMA missed 6 of the 20 complaints during the referral process and had not reviewed them at the time of GAO's inquiry. As a result of GAO's review, FEMA took action to review the complaints and opened inquiries in 5 of the 6 cases (1 case was closed for lack of information). In 3 of these cases, officials determined that the complaints did not involve FEMA employees. The 2 remaining cases were open as of April 2017. While the results from this review are not generalizable to the entire population of referrals from DHS OIG to FEMA, they raise questions as to whether there could be additional instances of misconduct complaints that FEMA has not reviewed or addressed. Procedures to ensure reconciliation of referred cases across FEMA and DHS OIG records could help ensure that FEMA accounts for all complaints.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making six recommendations with which DHS concurred, including that FEMA document policies and procedures for addressing Surge Capacity Force and Reservist misconduct, improve the quality and usefulness of its misconduct data, and develop reconciliation procedures to consistently track referred cases.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component of  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for  coordinating government-wide efforts in preparing for, protecting against,  mitigating the effects of, responding to, and recovering from all domestic  natural or man-made disasters, including acts of terror. To accomplish  this mission, FEMA relies on both permanent and disaster-related  temporary employees. FEMA’s combined workforce tripled from fiscal  year 2005 through March 2017 (from approximately 7,500 to 22,600).  These employees play a key role in supporting communities and first  responders. However, incidents of employee misconduct can detract from  FEMA’s mission, damage the agency’s reputation, and hamper the  agency’s ability to respond to disasters and maintain public trust if not  effectively managed.
FEMA defines employee misconduct as the violation of any federal, state,  or local law; DHS or FEMA regulation or policy; or any other applicable  standard of conduct. Misconduct applies to both on-the-job behavior and  conduct during non-duty hours that may adversely affect FEMA  personnel, programs, and operations. Examples of misconduct include  ethics violations, criminal or violent acts, harassment, and disruptive  behavior in the workplace.
Given the broad scope of FEMA’s mission and the growth of its  workforce, you requested that we review FEMA’s efforts to address  employee misconduct. Specifically:  (1)  To what extent has FEMA developed policies and procedures for  addressing employee misconduct?  (2)  What data are available on FEMA employee misconduct cases  and their outcomes, and to what extent does FEMA use these  data to identify and address trends in employee misconduct?  (3)  To what extent is information regarding misconduct cases shared  within FEMA’s personnel management offices and with the DHS  Office of Inspector General (OIG)?
To address our first objective we reviewed, where available, FEMA’s  documented policies and procedures for reporting, investigating, and  adjudicating allegations of misconduct across all of the agency’s  workforce categories, including the following: Title 5 employees, Cadre  of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees (CORE), Reservists, Surge  Capacity Force members, and FEMA Corps members. To further  understand how these policies and procedures are implemented at the  headquarters level, we interviewed officials from FEMA offices with  responsibilities related to managing misconduct. We interviewed cadre  management officials from FEMA’s three largest cadres — Public  Assistance, Individual Assistance, and Logistics — to discuss Reservist  misconduct policies and procedures, and spoke with union  representatives from two FEMA bargaining units to obtain employee  perspectives. To further obtain supervisor and management  perspectives on the misconduct process, we interviewed the Regional  Administrators or their designated representatives, five Federal  Coordinating Officers (FCO), and 11 Branch Chiefs from FEMA Regions  2, 4, and 6. We selected these three regions based on factors such as  geographic dispersion and regions that typically respond to different types  of disasters, as well as those with the highest number of misconduct  allegations from January 1, 2014, through September 30, 2016. The  results of these interviews are not generalizable to all 10 of FEMA’s  regions or all of FEMA’s cadres; however, they provided us with both  regional and Joint Field Office perspectives on policies and procedures  for addressing employee misconduct and supervisory misconduct  training.
To address our second objective, we reviewed and analyzed available  2014 through 2016 data contained in three misconduct case tracking  spreadsheets maintained by FEMA. In order to summarize alleged  misconduct offenses, we created eight offense category definitions and  assigned alleged offenses to the categories. To assess the reliability of  these data, we reviewed the spreadsheets for any gaps and  inconsistencies and interviewed agency officials to discuss the  mechanisms in place to ensure data quality. While we identified  limitations which we discuss later in this report, overall we found the data  in the spreadsheets sufficiently reliable to provide some general  information on the nature and characteristics of employee misconduct. In  order to determine the extent to which FEMA currently uses these data to  identify and address trends in employee misconduct, we interviewed  FEMA headquarters officials, as well as supervisors and managers in  FEMA Regions 2, 4, and 6. Although the information obtained from  interviews with regional officials is not generalizable to all 10 FEMA  regions or all FEMA cadres, it provided insights on how misconduct  information is shared with FEMA field supervisors.
To address our third objective, we reviewed FEMA and DHS OIG  employee misconduct directives and manuals to identify any  requirements for coordination among internal FEMA offices and with DHS  OIG. We interviewed FEMA headquarters officials with responsibilities  related to managing misconduct and DHS OIG officials to determine the  extent to which they coordinate and communicate misconduct  information, and to obtain their perspectives on information sharing  related to misconduct investigations and outcomes. We analyzed  documents, including case tracking spreadsheets, to determine what, and  how frequently, employee misconduct information is shared within FEMA  and with DHS OIG. Additionally, to review FEMA’s case tracking system,  we used fiscal year 2016 data from DHS OIG’s Enforcement Data System  to randomly select a non-generalizable sample of 20 FEMA employee  misconduct complaints that had been referred from DHS OIG to FEMA in  fiscal year 2016. We compared these complaints to a case tracking  spreadsheet provided by FEMA to determine the extent to which FEMA  had taken action to review or investigate the complaints. While not  generalizable to all complaints referred from DHS OIG to FEMA, the  results of our review provided insight about FEMA’s procedures for  tracking referred complaints and ensuring that all allegations of  misconduct are addressed. For all three objectives, we reviewed the  documents and information we gathered and evaluated them against  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. For additional  information on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2016 through July 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Overview of FEMA’s Workforce
paragraphs: FEMA’s workforce consists of employees hired under both Title 5 and the  Stafford Act, as well as individuals from two other workforce components  who are not FEMA employees, but who can be deployed for disaster  response: the DHS Surge Capacity Force and FEMA Corps.
Title 5 employees are permanent and temporary employees who form  FEMA’s day-to-day workforce, and can be deployed as needed during  a disaster.
Stafford Act employees include CORE and Reservists hired  specifically to support disaster-related activities on a temporary or  intermittent basis. COREs are temporary employees with 2- to 4-year  appointments, while Reservists work on an intermittent basis and are  deployed as needed.
Surge Capacity Force volunteers include employees of other DHS  components who augment FEMA’s workforce in the event of a  catastrophic disaster. Their first and only deployment as of May 2017  was to assist in response and recovery efforts after Hurricane Sandy  in 2012. FEMA manages and coordinates the Surge Capacity Force  program.
FEMA Corps is a national service program managed by AmeriCorps  National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC). FEMA Corps members  support disaster response and recovery efforts and work under the  direction of FEMA staff.
As shown in table 1 below, FEMA’s available disaster response  workforce, including Surge Capacity Force and FEMA Corps totaled over  22,600 in March 2017.
FEMA’s workforce categories are subject to different employee rights and  legal protections. For example, Title 5 employees are generally afforded  notice and appeal rights, while Reservists serve in temporary  intermittent positions and can be terminated at any time with or without  cause.
section_title: FEMA Misconduct Directive and Manuals
paragraphs: In 2012, FEMA issued a policy directive outlining procedures for reporting  misconduct within the agency, conducting administrative investigations,  and reporting actions taken in cases where the misconduct allegation was  sustained. The FEMA Administrative Investigations Policy directive (FD  123-19) lays out misconduct responsibilities for employees, managers,  and supervisors, and for the personnel management offices involved in  managing misconduct. The directive also describes three types of  administrative investigations:
Managerial Inquiry: managers or supervisors may be assigned to  conduct an inquiry when the allegation is not complex (e.g., tardiness,  absence without leave) and involves a minimal number of witnesses.
Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) Investigation: OCSO  personnel are assigned to conduct investigations of allegations that  are criminal in nature, or have the potential to be criminal in nature, for  example travel card fraud or a physical altercation.
Independent Investigation: senior FEMA or other government  officials may be assigned to conduct investigations into complex  allegations that involve multiple offices and witnesses, senior  employees, or prohibited personnel practices such as political  coercion.
The process for conducting investigations is further discussed in FEMA’s  Administrative Investigations Policy manual (FEMA Manual 123-19-1).
FEMA’s Employee Discipline Manual (FEMA Manual 255-3-1) describes  the policies, procedures, and responsibilities for taking conduct-related  discipline against permanent Title 5 employees. The manual discusses  options for disciplinary actions, which include reprimands and  suspensions of 14 days or less, and adverse actions, which include  suspensions for 15 days or more, demotions, and removals. The manual  also lays out employee grievance and appeal rights. The policies and  procedures described in the manual apply solely to permanent Title 5  employees. As discussed later in this report, the discipline and appeals  process varies for other workforce categories.
section_title: FEMA Offices Involved in Managing Misconduct
paragraphs: Within FEMA, three primary offices are involved in reviewing,  investigating, and adjudicating employee misconduct allegations.
OCSO Internal Investigations Branch (IIB): conducts investigations  related to more serious allegations, such as those that may involve  potential criminal misconduct.
The Office of the Chief Component Human Capital Officer  (OCCHCO) Labor and Employee Relations Branch (LER): advises  supervisors who conduct lower level investigations and inquiries, such  as time and attendance violations, and provides recommendations on  any counseling or any disciplinary or adverse action for all cases.
The Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC) Personnel Law Branch  (PLB): provides legal advice during investigations and conducts legal  reviews of certain reports of investigation and all disciplinary and  adverse actions.
Representatives from these three offices form FEMA’s Administrative  Investigations Directive (AID) Committee, which reviews misconduct  allegations, assigns investigators, and tracks the status of open cases.
section_title: DHS OIG Role in Reviewing and Investigating Misconduct
paragraphs: DHS OIG also plays a role in reviewing and investigating certain  misconduct allegations. DHS Management Directive 0801.1 requires  officials from all DHS components, including FEMA, to refer certain  categories of misconduct to DHS OIG for review, such as allegations of  criminal misconduct against a DHS employee and any allegations of  misconduct against senior employees. After reviewing the allegation,  DHS OIG may elect to initiate an investigation or refer the case back to  the component, such as FEMA, for review. DHS OIG receives  complaints (from employees, supervisors, the public, and agency  referrals) against employees in all DHS components through the DHS  OIG Hotline, which is a resource for reporting corruption, fraud, waste,  abuse, mismanagement, or misconduct. Table 2 below shows the  average number of misconduct complaints received through the DHS OIG  Hotline from fiscal year 2014 through 2016 by selected DHS  component. These complaints represent alleged offenses only, and not  final actions or adjudication results.
section_title: General Misconduct Process
paragraphs: FEMA receives allegations of employee misconduct from individuals both  within and outside the agency. Individuals (including members of the  public) can report these allegations through a number of different  mechanisms, including, but not limited to, FEMA’s OCSO Tipline, LER  specialists, and the DHS OIG Hotline. Employees can also report  misconduct to their supervisors and union representatives. The AID  Committee reviews most allegations, including those declined by DHS  OIG and returned to FEMA. LER reviews complaints received directly  from managers or employees to determine if they need to be discussed at  the AID Committee meetings. Allegations may then be assigned to one  of the three types of administrative investigations discussed earlier. Once  completed, reports of investigation are forwarded to LER for review.  LER recommends appropriate disciplinary or adverse action, if warranted.  Figure 1 below outlines the general steps in FEMA’s misconduct process,  including DHS OIG’s role in reviewing and investigating allegations.  Variations in potential case outcomes and the appeals process by  workforce category are discussed later in this report.
section_title: FEMA Has Developed and Documented Misconduct Policies and Procedures for Most Employees, but Not its Entire Workforce
subsections: section_title: FEMA Has Documented Misconduct Policies and Procedures for Most of its Employees, and Is Taking Steps to Offer Misconduct Training to Supervisors
paragraphs: FEMA has developed a policy outlining procedures regarding  investigations of misconduct as documented in FEMA’s Administrative  Investigations Policy directive. The directive applies to all FEMA  personnel. While FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force members are  not FEMA employees, OCSO officials stated that the investigations  process is the same regardless of the workforce category. FEMA has  also documented misconduct policies and procedures regarding options  to address misconduct and appeals for Title 5 and CORE employees.  For Title 5 employees the options to address misconduct include both  disciplinary and adverse actions. FEMA Corps disciplinary policies and  procedures are the responsibility of AmeriCorps NCCC and are  documented in their member handbook. Figure 2 outlines the options to  address misconduct and appeal rights for Title 5, CORE, and FEMA  Corps as documented in their respective employee discipline and  program manuals.
According to LER officials, as of February 2017, most supervisors had  been offered training on FEMA’s 2015 Employee Discipline Manual,  which applies to Title 5 employees. Three more training sessions are  planned for 2017. Additionally, PLB partnered with LER in 2016 to offer  misconduct and documentation training for all supervisors. In 2016, PLB  and LER completed 21 joint trainings. They held two more joint trainings  in March 2017.
section_title: FEMA Has Not Documented Misconduct Policies and Procedures for Surge Capacity Force
paragraphs: FEMA has not documented misconduct policies and procedures for Surge  Capacity Force members. DHS issued the Surge Capacity Force Concept  of Operations in 2010, which outlines FEMA’s base implementation plan  for the Surge Capacity Force. However, the document does not address  any elements pertaining to Surge Capacity Force human capital  management, specifically misconduct and disciplinary policies and  procedures.
According to the FEMA Surge Capacity Force Coordinator, despite the  lack of documentation, any incidents of misconduct would likely be  investigated by FEMA’s OCSO, which would then refer the completed  report of investigation to the employee’s home component for  adjudication and potential disciplinary action. Additionally, OCSO officials  said that while they were unaware of any misconduct investigations  involving Surge Capacity Force members to date, if an incident were to  occur they would follow the procedures in the Administrative  Investigations Policy directive and also notify the member’s home  component of the incident. However, although no allegations of  misconduct were made at the time, the FCO in charge of one of the  Hurricane Sandy Joint Field Offices said he had not seen anything in  writing or any formal guidance that documents or explains how the  process would work and stated that he would have had to contact FEMA  headquarters for assistance in determining how to address any  misconduct. Furthermore, he noted that taking the time to figure out the  Surge Capacity Force misconduct process would have detracted from  time spent on the Joint Field Office’s mission. LER officials stated that  they would be able to walk through the procedures with supervisors and  managers if asked. However, because these procedures are not  documented, the process is not transparent and information is not readily  available. LER officials noted that while LER specialists can quickly  answer questions, it would be beneficial for the procedures to be  documented. A PLB official also told us that FEMA should have a written  policy for potential Surge Capacity Force misconduct.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government advises  management to develop and maintain documentation of its internal  control system. This documentation can assist in management’s ability to  communicate controls to personnel, and is a means to retain  organizational knowledge as well as communicating that knowledge to  external parties. Without documented guidance, FEMA cannot ensure  that Surge Capacity Force misconduct is addressed adequately in a  timely and comprehensive manner, which could negatively affect the  extent to which Joint Field Offices can accomplish their mission after a  disaster. Furthermore, FEMA’s 2015 update to the Surge Capacity Force  Concept of Operations calls for increasing the size of the Surge Capacity  Force workforce from its current size of approximately 6,000 volunteers to  36,000 volunteers and also does not address any human capital  management issues, including misconduct. This planned expansion  further underscores the importance of documenting policies and  procedures in order to address potential misconduct.
section_title: Reservist Policies and Procedures Do Not Outline Disciplinary Actions or Address the Appeals Process
paragraphs: FEMA’s Reservist Program Manual lacks documented policies and  procedures on disciplinary options to address misconduct and appeal  rights for Reservists. Both LER and PLB officials told us that, in practice,  disciplinary actions for Reservists are limited to reprimands and  termination. According to these officials, FEMA does not suspend  Reservists because they are an intermittent, at-will workforce deployed as  needed to respond to disasters. FCOs and cadre managers have the  authority to demobilize Reservists and remove them from a Joint Field  Office if misconduct occurs, which may be done in lieu of suspension.  Furthermore, LER and PLB officials also told us that, in practice, FEMA  grants Reservists the right to appeal a reprimand or termination to their  second-level supervisor. Although officials stated that FEMA is carrying  out these policies and procedures in practice, the actions are not  documented in the Reservist Program Manual.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government advises  management to document policies for each unit in its area of  responsibility. Each unit, with guidance from management, determines  the policies necessary to operate, as well as documents policies in the  appropriate level of detail to allow management to effectively monitor  activity. According to FEMA officials, because of the at-will nature of their  employment, Reservists are not subject to the same policies, procedures,  and appeal rights as Title 5 employees, such as a suspension as an  option to address misconduct. However, the procedures that are  executed in practice are not reflected in the Reservist Program Manual.  Without documented Reservist disciplinary options and appeals policies,  supervisors and Reservist employees may not be aware of all aspects of  the disciplinary and appeals process. Additionally, seven supervisors and  managers in two of the three regions and one of the three cadres we  spoke with noted that there is a perception of inconsistency and  unfairness in the discipline process. For example, one manager told us  that if cadre management provided more information on outcomes in  addressing misconduct, it would help improve the perception that  misconduct is being seriously addressed at FEMA. Clear documentation  of the Reservist disciplinary options and appeals policies and procedures  currently in practice would help to address the concerns of inconsistency.
section_title: FEMA Does Not Communicate Range of Offenses and Penalties to its Entire Workforce
paragraphs: FEMA revised its employee disciplinary manual for Title 5 employees in  2015, and in doing so, eliminated the agency’s table of offenses and  penalties. Tables of offenses and penalties are used by agencies to  provide guidance on the range of penalties available when formal  discipline is taken. They also provide awareness and inform employees of  the penalties which may be imposed for misconduct. Since revising the  manual and removing the table, FEMA no longer communicates possible  punishable offenses to its entire workforce. Instead, information is now  communicated to supervisors and employees on an individual basis.  Specifically, LER specialists currently use a “comparators” spreadsheet  with historical data on previous misconduct cases to determine a range of  disciplinary or adverse actions for each specific misconduct case. The  information used to determine the range of penalties is shared with the  supervisor on a case-by-case basis; however LER specialists noted that  due to privacy protections they are the only FEMA officials who have  access to the comparators spreadsheet. PLB and LER officials stated  that the new comparators spreadsheet is an improvement over the old  table, which contained overly broad categories and had not been updated  since 1981. According to officials, the comparators spreadsheet is easier  to use and thus it is easier to ensure cases are consistent across the  agency.
Supervisors and managers we spoke with shared their perspectives on  how offenses and penalties are communicated both through the prior  table and the new comparators spreadsheet. Specifically, 11 supervisors  and managers in all three regions and cadres we spoke with, as well as  both union representatives we interviewed, cited the benefits of a table in  communicating punishable offenses and the range of penalties. These  benefits included transparency, consistency, and possible deterrence  against engaging in misconduct. For example, one supervisor noted that  a table of offenses and penalties is beneficial for both employees and  supervisors because it removes ambiguity and makes the disciplinary  process more transparent. Additionally, as discussed earlier, other  supervisors and managers told us that there is a perception that  misconduct cases are handled inconsistently. However, management  officials in one region, and one supervisor in another region, noted they  preferred the new case-by-case comparators system and did not see  benefits to having a table of offenses and penalties. Another manager  noted that a table was useful in certain cases with specific rules, such as  travel card misuse; however, many cases are more complicated and in  those situations a strict table is less effective. The remaining supervisors  and managers did not offer their perspective on this topic.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government advises  management to consider standards of conduct, assigned responsibility,  and delegated authority when establishing expectations. Management  establishes expectations of competence for key roles as well as for all  personnel through policies within internal control systems. Because  information about offenses and penalties is not universally shared with  supervisors and employees, FEMA management are limited in their ability  to set expectations about appropriate conduct in the workplace and to  communicate consequences of inappropriate conduct. Additionally, a  FEMA OCCHCO official noted that FEMA is considering re-introducing a  table which would inform employees and supervisors of misconduct  offenses and penalties. Communicating information about offenses and  common ranges of penalties, such as in a summary table that does not  include individual case information, could help to provide transparency for  employees and their supervisors on the range of penalties to expect for  different types of misconduct and mitigate the perception that misconduct  is handled inconsistently across FEMA’s workforce.
section_title: FEMA Records Data on Employee Misconduct Cases and Their Outcomes, but Could Improve the Quality and Usefulness of These Data
subsections: section_title: Multiple FEMA Offices Collect and Store Data on Employee Misconduct
paragraphs: The three offices on the AID Committee involved in investigating and  adjudicating employee misconduct complaints each maintain separate  case tracking spreadsheets with data on employee misconduct to  facilitate their respective roles in the process.
OCSO collects data in a case tracking spreadsheet about employee  misconduct complaints and investigations. For example, the  spreadsheet contains fields with narrative descriptions of alleged  offenses and investigation updates, the locations and FEMA regions  where alleged offenses occurred, and the number of days an  investigation was open. According to agency officials, all of the cases  discussed during weekly AID Committee meetings are in the OCSO  case tracking spreadsheet.
LER also collects data on employee misconduct complaints in a case  tracking spreadsheet. Specifically, LER records information on lower- level allegations that do not rise to the level of AID Committee review  as well as adjudication information for allegations which were  investigated by OCSO. In addition to employee misconduct  complaints, LER specialists record all inquiries from supervisors in the  LER case tracking spreadsheet, including questions about  performance, grievances, and employee counseling. Fields in the LER  case tracking spreadsheet include, for example, narrative descriptions  of alleged offenses and case summaries, comments with case status  updates, and the disciplinary or adverse actions taken, if any.
PLB collects data on misconduct-related disciplinary or adverse  actions it reviews in a case tracking spreadsheet. Fields in the PLB  spreadsheet include narrative descriptions of the charge or issue, the  employee position and type, and the disciplinary or adverse action  taken. According to PLB officials, the data are based on information  provided by LER.
section_title: FEMA OCSO Recorded Approximately 600 Misconduct Complaints from January 2014 through September 30, 2016
paragraphs: We analyzed data provided by OCSO in its case tracking spreadsheet  and found that there were 595 complaints from January 2014 through  September 30, 2016. The complaints involved alleged offenses of  employee misconduct which may or may not have been substantiated  over the course of an investigation. Some complaints involved multiple  allegations of various offenses against multiple subjects. In order to better  summarize the number and type of alleged offenses, we developed eight  general categories (see table 3 below).
Based on our analysis, the 595 complaints contained approximately 799  alleged offenses from January 2014 through September 30, 2016. As  shown in figure 3 below, the most common type of alleged offenses were  integrity and ethics violations (278), inappropriate comments and conduct  (140), and misuse of government property or funds (119). For example,  one complaint categorized as integrity and ethics involved allegations that  a FEMA employee at a Joint Field Office was accepting illegal gifts from a  FEMA contractor and a state contractor. Another complaint categorized  as inappropriate comments and conduct involved allegations that a FEMA  employee’s supervisor and other employees had bullied and cursed at  them, creating an unhealthy work environment. Finally, a complaint  categorized as misuse of government property or funds involved  allegations that a former FEMA employee was terminated but did not  return a FEMA-owned laptop.
LER officials provided summary data on employee misconduct outcomes  separately from the LER case tracking spreadsheet. According to the  summary data, there were 546 disciplinary or adverse actions related to  employee misconduct taken during the last three calendar years — from  January 2014 through December 2016. Of those actions, the most  common were removals or terminations (354), reprimands (115),  suspensions of 14 days or less (64), and suspensions of 15 days or more  (6). The most common employee types affected by actions were  Reservist (235) and Title 5 (110).
We also analyzed data provided by PLB in its case tracking spreadsheet  and found that PLB reviewed 454 final disciplinary or adverse actions  related to employee misconduct from January 2014 through September  30, 2016. The most common types of action were reprimands (144),  suspensions ranging from 1 to 45 days (121), and terminations (118). The  most common employee types affected by actions were Title 5 (265),  CORE (180), and Reservist (6).
There are several potential explanations for the differences between the  LER and PLB data on employee misconduct outcomes. A PLB official  stated that PLB does not review all disciplinary actions against  Reservists; therefore, LER Reservist actions may not appear in the PLB  spreadsheet. Further, LER officials stated that they recently started  adjusting their recordkeeping and it was possible that some actions were  not input by LER specialists into the case tracking spreadsheet.  Differences in the data may also be related to limitations we identified in  the spreadsheets, as discussed below.
section_title: Aspects of FEMA’s Data Limit Their Usefulness for Identifying and Addressing Trends in Employee Misconduct
paragraphs: OCSO, LER, and PLB collect data on employee misconduct and  outcomes, but limited standardization of fields and entries within fields,  limited use of unique case identifiers, and a lack of documented guidance  on data entry restricts their usefulness for identifying and addressing  trends in employee misconduct.
subsections: section_title: Limited Standardization of Fields and Entries
paragraphs: We found that there was limited standardization of fields based on our  review of OCSO, LER, and PLB case tracking spreadsheets. For  example, we attempted to summarize misconduct allegations by  employee type using the OCSO spreadsheet. Out of approximately 704  subjects named in complaints from January 2014 through September 30,  2016, the most common employee type was unknown because either the  information was not consistently available, or not enough information was  available in the case tracking spreadsheet. In 2014 and 2016, the  OCSO spreadsheet sometimes included information on the subject’s  employee type embedded within narrative summary of allegation fields. In  2015, that information was sometimes included in the narrative fields and  sometimes listed in a subject type field unique to that year.
There was also limited standardization of entries within fields. For  example, in all years the offense field in the OCSO spreadsheet consisted  of text entries that described similar offenses in different ways, such as  “Travel Card Violation” and “Travel Policy Violation”, or multiple offenses  related to a specific complaint, such as “Fraud / Travel Card Violation”.  The LER spreadsheet also contained examples of fields with limited  standardization of entries. For example, the fields which described a  subject’s pay grade consisted of varied text entries, such as “9”, “GS-09”,  and “GS-9”. The PLB spreadsheet had similar issues with other fields.  Limited standardization of fields and entries within fields restricts the  usefulness of the data for identifying and addressing trends in employee  misconduct because it makes timely evaluation, summarization, and  verification of the data more difficult.
section_title: Limited Use of Unique Case Identifiers
paragraphs: We found that there was limited use of unique case identifiers in the  OCSO, PLB, and LER case tracking spreadsheets. The OCSO  spreadsheet contained several unique case identifier fields, including an  IIB case number, OIG case number, and incident number. However, the  LER and PLB spreadsheets provided to GAO did not contain these  unique case identifier fields. A PLB official confirmed that the LER and  PLB case tracking spreadsheets do not include case numbers as  identifiers, only subject names. OCSO officials also stated that LER does  not use the OCSO IIB case number or the OIG case number, although  LER does have access to the OCSO IIB case number from AID  Committee meetings. As a result, the spreadsheets do not share the  same unique identifier, which makes it more difficult to track the status  and outcome of cases across the three case tracking spreadsheets.
section_title: Lack of Documented Guidance on Data Entry
paragraphs: OCSO, LER, and PLB officials stated that they do not have data  dictionaries or documented guidance on data entry for their respective  case tracking spreadsheets. A PLB official reported that data are entered  into the PLB spreadsheet by a paralegal and spot-checked by a senior  PLB official. LER officials noted that they did not provide data dictionaries  or guidance because the original case tracker involved a simple Excel  spreadsheet rather than a more complicated database system. However,  a lack of documented guidance on data entry may make it more difficult to  maintain and verify the completeness and accuracy of the data. For  example, we identified variations in data entry into the LER case tracking  spreadsheet across LER specialists. In 2015, of the 9 LER specialists  who entered information into the case tracking spreadsheet, 6 specialists  did not enter information into the employee pay grade field, 2 specialists  sometimes entered information, and 1 specialist always entered  information.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government advises  management to process data into quality information which is appropriate,  current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis.  Additionally, management should evaluate processed information, make  revisions when necessary so that the information is quality information,  and use the information to make informed decisions. As described above,  FEMA employee misconduct data are not readily accessible and cannot  be verified as accurate and complete on a timely basis. These limitations  restrict management’s ability to process the data into quality information  which can be used to identify and address trends in employee  misconduct. For example, an OCSO official stated that senior OCSO  officials recently requested employee misconduct information based on  employee type, such as the number of Reservists. However, the data are  largely captured in narrative fields, making it difficult to extract without  manual review. LER officials stated that LER specialists do not regularly  conduct trend analysis on employee misconduct cases, but if they notice  an apparent trend such as a number of cases involving misuse and non- payment of travel credit cards they will discuss it during quarterly  meetings with component management. Five supervisors and  management officials from each of the three regions we spoke with said  that information on trends and patterns in employee misconduct would be  useful. For example, supervisors could use trend analysis to identify  specific types of employee misconduct which have become more  common, allowing them to send out policy guidance or schedule targeted  trainings to help address the issue.
LER and OCSO are taking steps to improve their case tracking  spreadsheets. Specifically, LER officials reported that they began using  Microsoft SharePoint software in January 2017 which includes drop-down  selections for all fields except the subject name and comments. The  officials stated that they switched to SharePoint in response to DHS  requests for specific misconduct information as well as our requests,  which raised their awareness of the LER spreadsheet’s limitations.  Similarly, an OCSO official stated that OCSO planned to add new fields to  their spreadsheet which will make it easier to generate reports and show  trends. These are positive steps towards addressing the issues with  employee misconduct data quality identified above. However, it is not  clear that they will be sufficient to address each of the data limitations we  identified and improve the ability to conduct trend analysis. For example,  although the LER SharePoint spreadsheet does include an entry number  field, it was unclear whether that would allow officials to track the status  and outcomes of specific cases across all three case tracking  spreadsheets. New fields and increased use of drop-down selections in  the LER SharePoint spreadsheet may help improve standardization of  fields and entries within fields, but LER specialists may differ in how they  interpret fields without documented guidance on data entry. Additionally, it  is unclear whether OCSO’s modifications will include increased use of  drop-down selections or other means to standardize entries. An OCSO  official stated that they are also exploring DHS OIG’s database software,  and noted that, if it could be adapted for FEMA’s purposes, it would be a  substantial improvement.
There are a number of possible quality control measures that could be  implemented to help improve the usefulness of FEMA’s data for use in  identifying and addressing trends in employee misconduct. At a minimum,  based on our analysis of FEMA’s misconduct spreadsheets, the offices  could: add additional drop-down fields with standardized entries to make  fields easier to summarize; add unique case identifier fields to improve the ability to track cases  across the three program offices’ case tracking spreadsheets; develop guidance documents to ensure standardized data entry within  each office, including a procedure for quality control checks; or  consider adopting the use of database software, which could improve  standardization and case tracking across offices.
These actions, combined with routine reporting on misconduct trends,  could improve upon the initial steps already underway at LER and OCSO  and better enable FEMA to manage and report on misconduct  information.
section_title: FEMA Shares Misconduct Case Information Among Personnel Management Offices and with DHS OIG, but Does Not Accurately Track DHS OIG Referred Misconduct Complaints
subsections: section_title: FEMA Personnel Management Offices Meet Regularly to Discuss Misconduct Allegations and Ongoing Investigations and Send Monthly Status Updates to DHS OIG
paragraphs: In accordance with FEMA’s Administrative Investigations Policy directive,  officials from OCSO, LER, and PLB conduct weekly AID Committee  meetings to coordinate information on misconduct allegations and  investigations. The committee reviews allegations, refers cases for  investigation or inquiry, and discusses the status of investigations.  According to PLB officials, FEMA’s process for addressing employee  misconduct was ad hoc and informal prior to the release of the directive in  2012. For example, officials from key offices did not always meet and  share information on a regular basis, as they do now. PLB officials noted  that a new FEMA Chief Counsel in 2010 drove changes calling for a  formalized directive and clear instructions for managing misconduct. In  addition to the weekly AID Committee meetings, LER and PLB officials  stated that they meet on a regular basis to discuss disciplinary and  adverse actions and ensure that any penalties are consistent and  defensible in court. Employee misconduct information is also shared  directly with FEMA’s Chief Security Officer and Chief Counsel. For  example, OCSO provides the Chief Security Officer with a monthly report  of all open investigations. Additionally, PLB provides the Chief Counsel  with a monthly report of significant employee litigation, and includes in  that report a list of all significant investigations, such as those involving  high-level employees as the subject or witness in a case. Within FEMA,  these regular meetings and status reports provide officials from key  personnel management offices opportunities to communicate and share  information about employee misconduct.
FEMA also provides DHS OIG with information on employee misconduct  cases on a regular basis. DHS Management Directive 0810.1 requires  that all DHS organizational elements, including FEMA, provide monthly  reports to DHS OIG on all open investigations. OCSO complies with this  requirement and sends a monthly report that includes updates on  investigative activity to DHS OIG. OCSO officials stated that they also  provide limited outcome information on a case-by-case basis if DHS OIG  specifically requests this information. According to OCSO and DHS OIG  officials, DHS OIG does not regularly provide FEMA with updates on  ongoing investigations it conducts. However, OCSO officials stated they  ask DHS OIG for status updates on these cases frequently, especially if  the employee was placed on administrative leave during the  investigation.
section_title: FEMA’s Procedures for Tracking DHS OIG Referred Cases Need Improvement
paragraphs: Our review indicates that OCSO has not established effective procedures  to ensure that all cases referred to FEMA by DHS OIG are accounted for  and subsequently reviewed and addressed. As discussed earlier, FEMA  is required to refer certain misconduct allegations to DHS OIG for review  before taking any action. OCSO officials told us they follow the guidelines  closely and refer all serious misconduct allegations to DHS OIG for initial  review. They also noted that DHS OIG declines to investigate and refers  most cases back to FEMA for action. As also discussed above, OCSO  sends a monthly report of open investigations to DHS OIG. However,  while these reports provide awareness of specific investigations,  according to OCSO officials, neither office reconciles the reports to a list  of referred cases to ensure that all cases are accounted for.
We reviewed a non-generalizable random sample of employee  misconduct complaints DHS OIG referred to FEMA for review and found  that FEMA did not adequately track all referred complaints and therefore  could not ensure that all complaints in the sample we selected were  reviewed and addressed at the time of our inquiry. Specifically, we  tracked a random sample of 20 fiscal year 2016 employee misconduct  complaints DHS OIG declined to investigate and referred to FEMA for  action. We found that FEMA missed 6 of the 20 complaints during the  referral process and had not reviewed them at the time of our inquiry.  DHS OIG referred 3 of the 6 complaints to FEMA a year or more prior to  our review. As a result of our review, FEMA subsequently took action to  review the complaints. The AID Committee recommended that OCSO  open inquiries in 3 of the 6 cases to determine whether the allegations  were against FEMA employees, assigned 2 cases to LER for further  review, and closed 1 case for lack of information. According to an OCSO  official, OCSO subsequently determined that none of the allegations in  the 3 cases they opened involved FEMA employees and the cases were  closed. The remaining 2 cases were open as of April 2017.
The results from our sample cannot be generalized to the entire  population of referrals from DHS OIG to FEMA; however, they raise  questions as to whether there could be additional instances of misconduct  complaints that FEMA has not reviewed or addressed. FEMA OCSO  officials offered several possible explanations for why the complaints we  identified were missed. According to these officials, they sometimes  receive large batches of complaints through the FEMA Tipline – some of  which may be duplicative. DHS OIG referrals also come in through the  Tipline and officials said that it is possible that they may not always  accurately identify and record all of the referrals for the AID Committee  since some of them are misclassified and some do not involve FEMA  employees. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  advises management to perform ongoing monitoring – including  comparisons and reconciliations or other routine actions. Such activities,  either undertaken internally within OCSO or in coordination with DHS  OIG, could improve the process. A senior OCSO official agreed that  reconciliation procedures would help ensure that all complaints referred  by DHS OIG to FEMA are accounted for and noted that FEMA is working  with DHS OIG to improve reporting processes and case reconciliation.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Employee misconduct can detract from FEMA’s mission and negatively  impact public perceptions of the agency, particularly when associated  with disaster response efforts. Given the broad scope of FEMA’s mission  and the growth and different categories that make up its workforce, an  effective process is key to mitigating any negative employee misconduct  effects. FEMA has taken actions to manage the employee misconduct  investigation and adjudication process. Specifically, FEMA has developed  and documented misconduct policies and procedures for most of its  employees, and has established procedures for regular internal  communication and coordination, as well as information sharing with DHS  OIG. However, misconduct policies and procedures for Surge Capacity  Force members and outcome options and appeals policies and  procedures for Reservists are not documented, and FEMA does not  communicate the range of penalties for offenses to all employees. Clear  documentation establishing who is responsible for investigating and  adjudicating misconduct is especially important given FEMA’s goal of  significantly expanding the Surge Capacity Force. Because the Reservist  disciplinary action options and appeals currently in practice are not  documented, FEMA supervisors and Reservist employees may not be  aware of all aspects of the process. Similarly, the lack of communication  on the range of penalties for specific offenses to FEMA’s workforce limits  management’s ability to set expectations about appropriate conduct in the  workplace and to communicate consequences of inappropriate conduct.  Clearly documented policies and procedures for all workforce categories  and communication about offenses and penalties could help to better  prepare management to address misconduct and to mitigate any  perceptions that misconduct is handled inconsistently across FEMA’s  workforce.
In addition, while several FEMA offices collect data on employee  misconduct allegations, investigations, and outcomes, limitations related  to how the data are collected and managed restrict their usefulness for  identifying and addressing trends in employee misconduct. Addressing  these limitations by implementing quality control measures could improve  FEMA’s ability to track misconduct cases and to identify potential problem  areas and opportunities for targeted training. Moreover, developing  reconciliation procedures to track cases referred from DHS OIG to FEMA  could help reduce the risk that FEMA does not address all misconduct  complaints.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to improve employee misconduct policies and procedures, the  Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to  take the following three actions: document policies and procedures to address potential Surge document Reservist disciplinary options and appeals policies and  procedures that are currently in practice at the agency; and  communicate the range of penalties for specific misconduct offenses  to all employees and supervisors.
In order to better identify and address trends in employee misconduct, the  Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to  take the following actions:  improve the quality and usefulness of the misconduct data it collects  by implementing quality control measures, such as adding additional  drop-down fields with standardized entries, adding unique case  identifier fields, developing documented guidance for data entry, or  considering the adoption of database software; and once the quality of the data is improved, conduct routine reporting on  employee misconduct trends.
In order to ensure that all allegations of employee misconduct referred by  DHS OIG are reviewed and addressed, the Secretary of Homeland  Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to develop reconciliation  procedures to consistently track referred cases.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FEMA for review and  comment. DHS provided written comments which are reproduced in  appendix II. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations  and described actions planned to address them. FEMA and DHS OIG  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
With regard to our first recommendation, that FEMA document policies  and procedures to address potential Surge Capacity Force misconduct,  DHS stated that FEMA is developing a Human Capital plan for the Surge  Capacity Force and will include policies and procedures relating to  potential misconduct. DHS noted that these policies and procedures will  take into account FEMA’s limited authorities over Surge Capacity  personnel who are not FEMA employees. DHS estimated that this effort  would be completed by June 30, 2018. This action, if fully implemented,  should address the intent of the recommendation.
With regard to our second recommendation, that FEMA document  Reservist policies and procedures related to disciplinary options and  appeals currently in practice at the agency, DHS stated that FEMA will  update FEMA Directive 010-06, FEMA Reservist Program, to include  procedures for disciplinary actions and appeals current in practice at the  agency. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by December  31, 2017. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of  the recommendation.
With regard to our third recommendation, that FEMA communicate the  range of penalties for specific misconduct offenses to all employees and  supervisors, DHS stated that FEMA’s OCCHCO is currently drafting a  table of offenses and penalties and will take steps to communicate those  penalties to employees throughout the agency once the table is finalized.  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by December 31,  2017. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the  recommendation.
With regard to our fourth and fifth recommendations, that FEMA improve  the quality and usefulness of its misconduct data by implementing quality  control measures, and, once the quality of the data is improved, conduct  routine reporting on employee misconduct trends, DHS stated that  FEMA’s OCCHCO is working with the DHS OIG to develop a new case  management system. The system will use drop-down fields with  standardized entries and provide tools for trend analysis. Once the new  system is implemented, DHS stated that FEMA will be able to routinely  identify and address emerging trends of misconduct. DHS estimated that  these efforts would be completed by March 31, 2018. These actions, if  fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendations.
With regard to our sixth recommendation, for FEMA to develop  reconciliation procedures to consistently track referred cases, DHS stated  that once the new case management system described above is  established and fully operational, FEMA will be able to upload all DHS  OIG referrals into a single, agency-wide database. Additionally, FEMA will  work with DHS OIG to establish processes and procedures that will  improve reconciliation of case data. DHS estimated that these efforts  would be completed by March 31, 2018. These actions, if fully  implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security and interested congressional committees.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the extent to which the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed policies  and procedures for addressing employee misconduct; (2) what data are  available on FEMA employee misconduct cases and their outcomes, and  the extent to which FEMA uses these data to identify and address trends  in employee misconduct; and (3) the extent to which information  regarding misconduct cases is shared within FEMA’s personnel  management offices and with the Department of Homeland Security  Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG).
To address objective one, we reviewed, where available, FEMA’s policies  and procedures for reporting, investigating, and adjudicating allegations  of misconduct across all of the agency’s workforce categories, including:  Title 5 employees, Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees  (CORE), Reservists, Surge Capacity Force members, and FEMA Corps  members. Specifically, we reviewed investigation and discipline  directives and manuals, as well as program directives and manuals, and  interagency agreements related to FEMA Corps, to determine the extent  to which FEMA has developed misconduct policies and procedures. At  FEMA headquarters we interviewed senior officials from the Office of the  Chief Security Officer (OCSO), Office of the Chief Component Human  Capital Officer, Labor and Employee Relations Branch (LER), and Office  of the Chief Counsel, Personnel Law Branch (PLB). Additionally, we  interviewed the Surge Capacity Force and FEMA Corps Coordinators, as  well as AmeriCorps officials, to discuss Surge Capacity Force and FEMA  Corps misconduct policies and procedures. We interviewed cadre  management officials from FEMA’s three largest cadres - Public  Assistance, Individual Assistance, and Logistics - to discuss Reservist  misconduct policies and procedures. We also spoke with union  representatives from two FEMA bargaining units to gain their perspective  on how misconduct policies and procedures are implemented for Title 5  and CORE employees.
Additionally, we interviewed a non-probability sample of supervisors and  managers in three FEMA regions. Specifically, we interviewed three  FEMA Regional Administrators or their designated representatives; five  Federal Coordinating Officers (FCO), and 11 Public Assistance, Individual  Assistance, and Logistics Branch Chiefs from FEMA Regions 2,4, and 6.  We selected these three regions based on factors such as geographic  dispersion and regions that typically respond to different types of  disasters, as well as those with the highest number of misconduct  allegations reported to OCSO from January 2014 through September 30,  2016. The results of these interviews are not generalizable to all 10 of  FEMA’s regions or all cadres; however, they provided us with both  regional and Joint Field Office perspectives on policies and procedures  for addressing employee misconduct and supervisory misconduct  training.
To address objective two, we reviewed and analyzed misconduct case  tracking spreadsheets maintained by OCSO, LER, and PLB. We were  unable to identify and account for possible duplication of the same  complaints in the different spreadsheets. As such, we focused our  analysis on individual spreadsheets rather than on aggregating  information across all spreadsheets. Specifically, in order to summarize  alleged misconduct offenses recorded in the OCSO case tracking  spreadsheet, we first reviewed all of the data available on complaints  which were received from January 1, 2014 through September 30, 2016.  Next, we created eight offense category definitions based on prior GAO  reports, discussions with stakeholders, and our review of the summary of  allegations and offense fields. Finally, we assigned alleged offenses from the OCSO spreadsheet to the categories. We also attempted to review  and summarize the subjects included in each complaint by employee  type. However, our ability to do so was limited because that information  was not consistently included in the OCSO spreadsheet. In order to  summarize final disciplinary and adverse actions reviewed by PLB and  recorded in the PLB case tracking spreadsheet, we reviewed all of the  data available from January 2, 2014 through September 28, 2016. Next,  we selected actions which were categorized as related to employee  misconduct and excluded proposed actions. Finally, we summarized final  actions by the action type and employee type using existing spreadsheet  fields. We also reviewed information on past employee misconduct  outcomes and disciplinary actions provided by LER.
To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed the three  spreadsheets for any gaps and inconsistencies. We also interviewed  agency officials from each office about how data are entered into the  spreadsheets, who enters the data, whether they have guidance  documents for data entry, and the process of assigning complaints to the  offices. We identified limitations which we discuss in the report, but  overall found the data in the spreadsheets sufficiently reliable to provide  some general information on the nature and characteristics of employee  misconduct complaints. In order to determine the extent to which FEMA  currently uses these data to identify and address trends in employee  misconduct, we interviewed OCSO, LER, and PLB officials. Additionally,  we included related questions during the interviews with supervisors and  managers in FEMA Regions 2, 4, and 6. Although information obtained  from these interviews, as mentioned above, is not generalizable to all 10  regions or all FEMA cadres, it provided insights into how employee  misconduct information is shared with FEMA field supervisors.
To address objective three, we first reviewed FEMA and DHS OIG  employee misconduct directives and manuals to identify any  requirements for coordination among internal FEMA offices and with DHS  OIG. Next, we interviewed senior OCSO, LER, PLB, and DHS OIG  officials to determine the extent to which they coordinate and  communicate misconduct information and to obtain their perspectives on  information sharing related to misconduct investigations and outcomes.  We analyzed documents, including case tracking spreadsheets and  reports, to determine what and how frequently employee misconduct  information is shared within FEMA and with DHS OIG. Finally, we used  fiscal year 2016 data from DHS OIG’s Enforcement Data System to  randomly select a non-generalizable sample of 20 FEMA employee  misconduct complaints which were referred from DHS OIG to FEMA. We  compared these complaints to the OSCO case tracking spreadsheet  provided by FEMA. For complaints we were unable to locate, we  requested that OCSO provide us with their statuses, including whether or  not OCSO had taken action to review or investigate the complaints.  Additionally, we asked OCSO to coordinate with LER and PLB and obtain  information on the outcomes of all 20 complaints. While not generalizable  to all complaints referred from DHS OIG to FEMA, the results of our  review provided insight about FEMA’s procedures for tracking referred  complaints and ensuring that all allegations of misconduct are addressed.  For all three objectives, we reviewed the documents and information we  gathered and evaluated them against Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2016 to July 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Ben Atwater (Assistant Director),  Sarah Turpin (Analyst-in-Charge), David Alexander, Dominick Dale, Eric  Hauswirth, Rianna Jansen, Stephen Komadina, Kristiana D. Moore, and  Heidi Nielson made key contributions to this report.