Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies
Published: 2005-05-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials; and describe issues related to protection at their residences.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues. Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism procedures. State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program. State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in residential areas.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss the report we are releasing today on  State Department efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families from  terrorist attacks outside of embassies.
U.S. government officials and their families living and working overseas  are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have  been attacked—23 fatally—by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State  Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, concerns are  growing that terrorist groups are likely to focus on “soft” targets—such as  homes, schools, and places of worship. Recent terrorist attacks against  housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and places of  worship in Turkey illustrate this growing threat. State-initiated security  assessments have further documented this growing concern and  recommended that State develop better measures to protect U.S. officials  and their families in soft target areas.
Our report addresses four issues: (1) whether State has a strategy for soft  target protection, (2) an assessment of State’s efforts to protect U.S.  officials and their families against terrorist attacks while traveling to and  from work, (3) State’s efforts to improve security at schools overseas  attended by the children of U.S. officials, and (4) issues related to  protection of U.S. officials and their families at residences. I will also  discuss our recommendations to State and State’s response.
For our work on this subject, we reviewed State documents and  interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and at five posts in four  countries. We also attended security trainings and briefings available to  State officials. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Although State has not yet formally defined what constitutes a soft target,  State Department travel warnings and security officers generally consider  soft targets to be places where Americans and other westerners live,  congregate, shop, or visit, such as hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping  centers, housing compounds, places of worship, schools, or public  recreation events. Travel routes of U.S. government employees are also  considered soft targets, based on their history of terrorist attacks.
The State Department is responsible for protecting more than 60,000  government employees, and their family members, who work in embassies  and consulates abroad in 180 countries. Although the host nation is  responsible for providing protection to diplomatic personnel and missions  under the 1961 Vienna Convention, State has a variety of programs and  activities to further protect U.S. officials and family members both inside  and outside of the embassy.
Following a terrorist attack that involves serious injury or loss of life or  significant destruction of a U.S. government mission, State is required to  convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB). ARBs investigate the  attack and issue a report with recommendations to improve security  programs and practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions  it has taken in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there  have been 11 ARBs convened since the board’s establishment in 1986.
Concerned that State was not providing adequate security for U.S. officials  and their families outside the embassy, the American Foreign Service  Association testified on a number of occasions before the Senate  Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the  Judiciary on the need for State to expand its security measures. The  subcommittee, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate  a strategy for addressing threats to locales abroad that are frequented by  U.S. officials and their families. It focused its concern about soft targets on  schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering places.  In fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005, Congress earmarked a total of $15  million for soft target protection each year, particularly to address security  vulnerabilities at overseas schools. Moreover, in 2005, the Senate  appropriations report directed State to develop a comprehensive strategy  for addressing the threats posed to soft targets no later than June 1, 2005.
section_title: State Lacks a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need to Be Resolved
paragraphs: State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.  officials and their families outside the embassy, including security  briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection.  However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly  identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to  protect U.S. official and their families.
State officials cited several complex issues involved with protecting soft  targets. As the terrorist threat grows, State is being asked to provide ever  greater levels of protection to more people in more dangerous locations,  and they questioned how far State’s protection of soft targets should  extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to protect U.S.  officials and their families at private sector locations or places of worship  was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial  challenges—including sovereignty and separation of church and state— that have not been resolved by the department. State officials also  indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets— including taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and areas  where U.S. officials and their families congregate—that would be  necessary to complete a strategy.
Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy,  some State officials told us that several existing programs could help  protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs are  not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that they  should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be  more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether  new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.
A senior official with State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) told us  that in January 2005, DS formed a working group to develop a  comprehensive soft targets strategy to address the appropriate level of  protection of U.S. officials and their families at schools, residences, and  other areas outside the embassy. According to State, the strategy should  be completed by June 1, 2005.
section_title: State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel
paragraphs: To identify vulnerabilities in State’s soft target protection, and determine if  State had corrected these vulnerabilities, we reviewed the ARB reports  conducted after U.S. officials were assassinated outside the embassy. Of  the 11 ARBs conducted since 1986, the majority (5) have focused on soft  target attacks, compared with attacks against embassies (2) or other U.S.  facilities (4). We found that, 17 years after the first soft target ARB, State  has still not addressed the vulnerabilities and recommendations identified  in that and more recent reports: specifically, the need for hands-on  counterterrorism training and accountability mechanisms to promote  compliance with personal security procedures. Despite State’s assurances  to Congress that it would implement recommendations aimed at reducing  these vulnerabilities, we found that State’s hands-on training course is still  not mandatory, and procedures to monitor compliance with security  requirements have not been fully implemented. We also found that  ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and regional security officers were  not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to protect  U.S. officials outside the embassies.
subsections: section_title: Despite State’s Agreement That Counterterrorism Training Is Needed, It Is Still Not Required
paragraphs: Since 1988, State has reported to Congress that it agreed with ARB  recommendations to provide counterterrorism training. For example, in  1995, State reported that it “re-established the Diplomatic Security  Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for those going to critical-threat posts to  teach surveillance detection and avoidance, and defensive and evasive  driving techniques.” In 2003, State reported it agreed with the  recommendations that employees from all agencies should receive  security briefings and indicated that it would review the adequacy of its  training and other personal security measures.
Although State implemented the board’s recommendation to require  security briefings for all staff, hands-on counterterrorism training is still  not mandatory, and few officials or family members have taken DSAC.  Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings are no longer  adequate to protect against current terrorist threats. In June 2004, DS  developed a proposal to make DSAC training mandatory. DS officials said  that DSAC training should be required for all officials, but that issues such  as costs and adequacy of training facilities were constraining factors. As of  April 18, 2005, the proposal had not been approved.
Although State has agreed on the need to implement an accountability  system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since  1988, there is still no such system in place. Beginning in 2003, State has  tried to incorporate some limited accountability to promote compliance.  However, based on our work at five posts, we found that post officials are  following few, if any, of these new procedures.
In response to a 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve  compliance with State’s personal security procedures for officials outside  the embassy. In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria to  take personal security into account when preparing performance  appraisals, and in December 2003, State revised its Foreign Affairs Manual  to mandate and improve implementation of personal security practices. In  May 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal Security  Self-Assessment Checklist to improve security outside the embassy.  However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these and other  key policy changes. For example, none of the officials we met with,  including ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, regional security  officers, or staff, were aware that the annual ratings process now includes  an assessment of whether staff are following the personal security  measures or that managers are now responsible for the reasonable  oversight of subordinates’ personal security activities. Furthermore, none  of the supervisors were aware of the checklist, and we found no one was  using the checklists to improve their personal security practices.
In explaining why posts were not aware of the new personal security  regulations, DS officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed by work  and may have simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign Affairs  Manual. They also noted that changes like this take time to be  implemented globally.
Furthermore, State’s original plan, to use the checklist as an accountability  mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its June 2003  report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB recommendations,  State stipulated that staff would be required to use the checklist  periodically and that managers would review the checklists to ensure  compliance. However, State never implemented this accountability  mechanism out of concern it would consume too much staff time.
We also found that key officials receive no training on how to promote  personal security outside the embassy. According to a number of State  officials, improvements in this area must start with the ambassador and  the deputy chief of mission. Yet no ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission,  or regional security officers receive any training in how to maximize soft  target protection at embassies. DS officials agreed that this critical  component should be added to their training curriculum.
section_title: State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools, but Scope Is Not Yet Fully Defined
paragraphs: In response to several congressional committee reports, State began  developing a “Soft Targets” program in 2003 to help protect overseas  schools against terrorism. The program has four proposed phases. The  first two phases are focused on department-sponsored schools that have  previously received grant funding from the State Department, and the third  and fourth phases focus on the nondepartment-sponsored schools with  American students.
In phase one, department-sponsored schools were offered funding for  basic security hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way  radios for communication between the school and the embassy, and public  address systems. As of November 19, 2004, 189 department-sponsored  schools had received $10.5 million in funding for security equipment in  phase one of the program. The second phase provided additional security  enhancements, such as perimeter fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard  booths. As of November 2004, State has obligated over $15 million for  phase two security upgrades. For phases three and four, State plans to  provide similar types of security upgrades to eligible nondepartment- sponsored schools.
The program also funds security enhancements for off-compound embassy  employee association facilities, such as recreation centers. Security  upgrades include funding for perimeter walls and shatter-resistant window  film. In fiscal year 2004, almost $1 million was obligated for these  enhancements.
subsections: section_title: Full Scope of School Program Not Yet Determined
paragraphs: Regional Security Officers (RSO) said that identifying and funding for  security enhancements at department-sponsored schools were  straightforward because of the department’s pre-existing relationship with  these schools. However, they said it has been difficult to identify eligible  nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three because of the vast  number of schools that might qualify, the lack of any pre-existing  relationship, and limited guidance on eligibility criteria. For example,  some RSOs questioned how many American students should attend a  school for it to be eligible for security upgrades. Some RSOs were  considering funding schools with just a few American students. Moreover,  one RSO was considering providing security upgrades to informal  educational facilities, such as those attended by children of U.S.  missionaries.
State is trying to determine the appropriate scope of the program, and sent  cables to posts in the summer of 2004 asking RSOs to gather data on  nondepartment-sponsored schools attended by American students,  particularly U.S. government dependents. State officials acknowledged  that the process of gathering data has been difficult since there are  hundreds of such schools worldwide. According to an Overseas Buildings  Operations (OBO) official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the  more than 250 posts have provided responses regarding such schools.  OBO plans to use the data to develop criteria for which schools might be  eligible for funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four of the  program.
In anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program, RSOs  have been asked to identify other facilities and areas that Americans  frequent, beyond schools and off-compound employee association  facilities, that may be vulnerable to a terrorist attack. State Department  officials were concerned about the large number of sites RSOs could  identify as potential soft target sites, and the department’s ability to  protect them.
section_title: Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families at Residences against Terrorist Threats
paragraphs: State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment for  U.S. officials and their families overseas. However, we found that State’s  primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their families at  residences, the Residential Security program, is principally designed to  deter crime, not terrorism. The program includes basic security hardware  and guard service; and as the crime threat increases, the hardware and  guard services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. State  officials said that while the Residential Security program, augmented by  the local guard program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it  could provide limited or no deterrence to minimize the risk and  consequences of a residential terrorist attack. State officials told us that  the best residential scenario for posts is to have a variety of housing  options, including apartments and single-family homes, to reduce the  potential for a catastrophic attack.
To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we  visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The  program is intended to enhance the embassies’ ability to detect  preoperational terrorist surveillance and stop the attack. According to  State’s guidance, surveillance detection units are primarily designed to  protect embassies, and their use in residential areas is discouraged.  However, we found RSOs at some of the posts we visited were routinely  utilizing surveillance detection units to cover areas outside the embassies,  such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and schools attended by  U.S. embassy dependents. RSOs told us that the Surveillance Detection  program is instrumental in providing deterrence against potential terrorist  attacks, and argued that the current program guidelines are too  restrictive. Senior State officials agreed that the use of the surveillance  detection in soft target areas could be beneficial, but noted that the  program is labor intensive and expensive, and any expansion of the  program could require significant funding.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please call Diana Glod at   (202) 512-8945. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony  included Edward George and Andrea Miller.
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