Nuclear Nonproliferation: Preliminary Observations on IAEA's Role in Verifying the Iran Agreement
Published: 2016-02-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In July 2015, multilateral talks with Iran culminated in an agreement called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), through which Iran committed to limits on its nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions put in place by the United States and other nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent international organization that administers safeguards designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, was requested to monitor and verify Iran's adherence to these limits. The U.S. Department of State coordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA.
GAO was asked to review the authorities and resources IAEA has to carry out its activities regarding the JCPOA. On the basis of preliminary results of ongoing work that GAO is conducting, this report provides observations on (1) the JCPOA commitments that IAEA has been asked to verify and its authorities to do so, (2) the resources IAEA has identified as necessary to verify the JCPOA, and (3) potential challenges and mitigating actions IAEA and others have identified with regard to verifying the JCPOA. GAO analyzed the JCPOA and key IAEA documents and interviewed current and former IAEA officials, U.S. government officials, national laboratory representatives, and experts from research institutions.
GAO is not making recommendations at this time and expects to issue a final report on this work later this year.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As outlined in the JCPOA, IAEA was asked to verify Iran's implementation of a range of nuclear-related commitments, and IAEA uses its authorities and conducts additional verification activities to do so, according to IAEA. Iran's commitments include limits on uranium enrichment levels and enriched uranium inventories. GAO's preliminary observations indicate that IAEA plans to verify Iran's implementation of these commitments through a range of activities conducted by its Safeguards Department, such as inspecting Iran's nuclear facilities and analyzing environmental samples. To verify Iran's implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA, IAEA officials told GAO that the agency uses its authorities and conducts additional verification activities agreed to by Iran under the JCPOA, such as monitoring Iran's uranium mines and mills. In addition, under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol, an agreement that will expand IAEA's access, including to locations where undeclared materials and activities—those that an IAEA member state is required to, but has not declared under its agreements with IAEA—may be suspected. The JCPOA also includes a mechanism in which participants to the agreement commit to resolve an access request from the agency within 24 days after the request is made.
GAO's preliminary observations indicate that IAEA has identified the resources necessary to verify the nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA. IAEA has estimated that it needs approximately $10 million per year for 15 years in additional funding above its current safeguards budget for JCPOA verification. In addition, IAEA plans to transfer 18 experienced inspectors to its Iran Task Force from other safeguards divisions and to hire and train additional inspectors. According to IAEA officials, existing safeguards technical resources are sufficient to implement the JCPOA. According to IAEA documents, all of IAEA's JCPOA work through 2016 will be funded through extra-budgetary contributions. IAEA officials said that the agency intends to propose that of the $10 million, approximately $5.7 million for all Additional Protocol activities and inspector costs attributable to the JCPOA be funded through IAEA's regular budget after 2016.
GAO's preliminary observations indicate that IAEA may face potential challenges in monitoring and verifying Iran's implementation of certain nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA. According to current and former IAEA and U.S. officials and experts, these potential challenges include (1) integrating JCPOA-related funding into its regular budget and managing human resources in the safeguards program, (2) access challenges depending on Iran's cooperation and the untested JCPOA mechanism to resolve access requests, and (3) the inherent challenge of detecting undeclared nuclear materials and activities—such as potential weapons development activities that may not involve nuclear material. According to knowledgeable current and former U.S. government officials, detection of undeclared material and activities in Iran and worldwide is IAEA's greatest challenge. According to IAEA documents, Iran has previously failed to declare activity to IAEA. However, according to a former IAEA official as well as current IAEA and U.S. government officials GAO interviewed, IAEA has improved its capabilities in detecting undeclared activity, such as by adapting its inspector training program.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear program have threatened regional and  global security and presented significant challenges to the United States.  The United States and other nations imposed sanctions on Iran that have  adversely affected the Iranian economy. In July 2015, multilateral talks  with Iran culminated in an agreement—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action (JCPOA)—in which the United States, France, Germany, the  United Kingdom, Russia, and China, with the High Representative of the  European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agreed to  reciprocal commitments with Iran. These commitments include providing  sanctions relief if Iran addressed those countries’ concerns about its  nuclear program. The JCPOA details, among other things, Iran’s  commitments related to its nuclear facilities, equipment, materials, and  activities. The United Nations Security Council endorsed the JCPOA and  requested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitor  and verify these commitments. IAEA—an independent international  organization based in Vienna, Austria, and affiliated with the United  Nations—has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear  energy and verifying that nuclear technologies and materials intended for  peaceful purposes are not diverted to weapons development efforts.
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which  came into force in 1970, requires non-nuclear weapon states that are  party to the treaty—countries, such as Iran, that had not manufactured  and detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967—to agree not to  acquire nuclear weapons and to subject all nuclear material used in  peaceful activities to IAEA safeguards. IAEA has found Iran to be in non- compliance with its safeguards obligations within the last 15 years.
You asked us to review the authorities and resources IAEA has to carry  out its activities to monitor and verify certain nuclear-related commitments  under the JCPOA. In response to that request, we have work ongoing on  IAEA’s authorities, resources, and potential challenges faced in  supporting implementation of the JCPOA. In January 2016, we briefed  your staff on the preliminary results of our work, and this report transmits  information from that briefing. Specifically, this report provides our  preliminary observations on (1) the JCPOA commitments that IAEA has  been asked to verify and its authorities to do so; (2) the resources IAEA  has identified as necessary to verify the JCPOA; and (3) potential  challenges and mitigating actions, if any, IAEA and others have identified  with regard to verifying the JCPOA. We will issue a separate report with  the final results of our work later this year.
To identify the nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA that IAEA has  been asked to verify and IAEA’s authorities for verifying these  commitments, we analyzed the JCPOA, and IAEA documentation  concerning the safeguards legal framework, including the Statute of the  IAEA (the Statute), information circular (INFCIRC)/153, which provides  the basis for a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) that most  countries have concluded with IAEA and that covers all of the countries’  civilian nuclear activities, and INFCIRC/540, which provides the basis for  an Additional Protocol that most countries with a CSA have concluded  with IAEA to provide additional information about countries’ nuclear and  nuclear-related activities. To examine the resources IAEA has identified  as necessary to verify the JCPOA, we reviewed IAEA planning and  budget documents, such as “The Agency’s Programme and Budget  2016–2017,” and statements by the IAEA Director General. In addition, to  further understand IAEA authorities and resource needs, and to examine  potential challenges and mitigating actions IAEA and others have  identified with regard to verifying the JCPOA, we interviewed officials of  IAEA, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy’s (DOE)  National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); as well as  representatives of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Los Alamos National  Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National  Laboratory, and Brookhaven National Laboratory. We also interviewed 8  former IAEA and 10 former U.S. government and national laboratory  officials, and representatives of 10 expert organizations—research  institutions and nongovernmental organizations with knowledge in the  areas of nuclear verification, monitoring, and safeguards. Appendix I  provides a more detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and  methodology.
Our preliminary observations are based on our ongoing work, which is  being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: IAEA safeguards are a set of technical measures and activities by which  IAEA seeks to verify that nuclear material subject to safeguards is not  diverted to nuclear weapons or other proscribed purposes. To carry out  its safeguards activities, inspectors and analysts in IAEA’s Safeguards  Department collaborate to verify that the quantities of nuclear material  that non-nuclear weapon states have formally declared to the agency are  correct and complete. All NPT non-nuclear weapon states are required to  have a CSA that covers all of their civilian nuclear activities and serves as  the basis for the agency’s safeguards activities. Iran’s CSA entered into  force in May 1974. Most countries with a CSA have also brought into  force an Additional Protocol to their CSAs. IAEA developed the Additional  Protocol to provide additional information about countries’ nuclear and  nuclear-related activities as part of its response to the 1991 discovery of a  clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq. The Additional Protocol,  when ratified or otherwise brought into force by a country, requires that  country to provide IAEA with a broader range of information on the  country’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities. It also gives the agency’s  inspectors access to an expanded range of declared activities and  locations, including buildings at nuclear sites, as well as locations where  undeclared activities may be suspected. Undeclared nuclear material and  activities are those a state has not declared and placed under safeguards  but is required to do so pursuant to its CSA.
In addition to its safeguards program, IAEA’s other programs include  nuclear safety and security, nuclear energy, nuclear sciences, and  technical cooperation. For example, IAEA’s technical cooperation  program helps member states achieve their sustainable development  priorities by furnishing them with relevant nuclear technologies and  expertise. IAEA funds its programs primarily through (1) its regular  budget, for which all member countries are assessed, and (2) voluntary  extra-budgetary cash contributions from certain member countries and  other donors to meet critical needs. In 2015, IAEA reported that its  regular budget was $375.8 million, of which the nuclear verification  program (i.e., safeguards) budget comprised $144.2 million. IAEA has a  Board of Governors that provides overall policy direction and oversight for  the agency. A Secretariat, headed by the Director General, is responsible  for implementing the policies and programs of the IAEA General  Conference and the Board of Governors. The U.S. Department of State  coordinates the United States’ financial and policy relationship with IAEA.
Under the JCPOA, IAEA verification of Iran’s implementation of its  nuclear-related commitments was a condition to the lifting of specified  U.S., European Union, and United Nations nuclear-related sanctions on  Iran. These sanctions were lifted on the JCPOA’s “Implementation Day”  (January 16, 2016), when IAEA verified and reported that Iran had fully  implemented its commitments defined in Annex V, paragraph 15, of the  JCPOA. In addition, the JCPOA provides for a “Transition Day,” when  the United States and European Union will take further steps to eliminate  nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, either on October 18, 2023, or before if  IAEA reaches what it calls a “broader conclusion.” A broader conclusion  refers to the agency’s determination that for a given year, a country has  demonstrated that all declared nuclear material within its borders  remained in peaceful activities and that there are no indications of  diversion of declared nuclear material or of undeclared nuclear activities.
section_title: IAEA Uses Its Authorities to Carry out Its Verification Activities under the JCPOA
paragraphs: manufacturing; and (3) conditions on uranium ore concentrate. Iran also  agreed not to engage in spent fuel reprocessing, uranium or plutonium  metallurgy, or activities that could contribute to the design and  development of a nuclear explosive device. The duration of certain  commitments is from 8 (for certain centrifuge restrictions) to 25 years (for  monitoring of Iran’s uranium ore concentrate). Iran also agreed to fully  implement the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present  Outstanding Issues” agreed to with IAEA. The Roadmap sets out a  process for IAEA to address issues relating to the “possible military  dimensions” (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. IAEA issued a report on  the results of its PMD investigation in December 2015, and the Board of  Governors subsequently issued a resolution closing its consideration of  PMD. State officials noted that the Board, in its resolution, stated that it  will be watching closely to verify that Iran fully implements its  commitments under the JCPOA and will remain focused going forward on  the full implementation of the JCPOA in order to ensure the exclusively  peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.
According to officials in IAEA’s Office of the Legal Affairs, the agency will  draw on existing authorities to verify Iran’s implementation of these  commitments. For example, using its safeguards authorities, including the  CSA, IAEA will verify implementation of most of Iran’s nuclear-related  commitments largely through a range of traditional safeguards  approaches and techniques that it has used in the past, such as  inspecting nuclear facilities and conducting nuclear material accountancy  to verify quantities of nuclear material declared to the agency and any  changes in the quantities over time. For example, to verify non-diversion  of nuclear material, IAEA inspectors count items (e.g., containers of  uranium or plutonium), measure attributes of these items (e.g., isotopic  composition), and compare their findings with records and declared  amounts. Other IAEA safeguards activities include environmental  sampling, remote monitoring, analysis of commercial satellite imagery,  and analysis of open source documents.
Under the JCPOA, IAEA also conducts certain activities agreed to by  Iran, such as monitoring of Iran’s uranium mines and mills, according to  IAEA officials. Such activities include containment and surveillance  measures. Containment and surveillance measures include using video  cameras to detect movement of nuclear material and tampering with  agency equipment as well as seals that indicate whether the state has  tampered with installed IAEA safeguards systems. Further, under the  JCPOA, Iran agreed to provisionally apply, and seek ratification of the  Additional Protocol, which gives the agency’s inspectors access to an  expanded range of declared activities and locations, including buildings at  nuclear sites, and locations where undeclared activities may be  suspected. Under the JCPOA, Iran also agreed to fully implement  “Modified Code 3.1” of the subsidiary arrangement to its CSA.  According to IAEA, the text of the Modified Code 3.1 in Iran’s subsidiary  arrangement is based on model language under which a country is  generally required to provide preliminary design information for new  nuclear facilities “as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize  construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier.”
In addition, Iran made commitments under the JCPOA to cooperate with  IAEA and facilitate its safeguards activities. For example, Iran agreed to  make arrangements to allow for the long-term presence of IAEA  inspectors by issuing long-term visas, among other things. Iran also  agreed to permit the use of modern technologies such as online  enrichment monitors to increase the efficiency of monitoring activities.  The JCPOA includes a mechanism in which its participants commit to  resolve an access request from the agency within 24 days after the  request is made. The JCPOA also describes a dispute resolution  mechanism through which a participant in the agreement can bring a  complaint if it feels that commitments are not being met and that allows  the participant to cease performance of its commitments in certain cases  if dispute resolution fails to resolve the participant’s concerns.
Iran has also agreed to import enumerated nuclear-related and nuclear- related dual-use materials and equipment exclusively through a new  “procurement channel” established under the JCPOA. The JCPOA  details the establishment of a Joint Commission comprised of  representatives of participants in the agreement, whose “procurement  working group” will provide information to IAEA on these proposed  imports. Under the JCPOA, IAEA may access the locations of intended  use of such nuclear-related imports. IAEA officials told us that they  expect the information provided through the procurement channel to  support the agency’s efforts to detect undeclared activity.
section_title: IAEA Has Identified the Financial, Human, and Technical Resources Necessary to Verify the Nuclear- Related Commitments in the JCPOA
paragraphs: Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA has estimated the  financial, human, and technical resources necessary to verify Iran’s  implementation of nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA. IAEA has  estimated that it needs approximately $10 million per year for 15 years in  additional funding above its current safeguards budget to fund additional  inspections, among other things. Of this amount, IAEA estimates that it  will need about $3.3 million for costs associated with implementing the  Additional Protocol, about $2.4 million for other inspector and direct staff  costs, and about $4.4 million in other costs, such as travel, equipment,  and support services beyond those associated with Additional Protocol  implementation (see table 1).
IAEA officials said that, pursuant to the Statute, the agency intends to  propose to the Board of Governors that the approximately $5.7 million for  all Additional Protocol activities and inspector costs attributable to the  JCPOA be funded through IAEA’s regular budget after 2016. These  officials said that the remaining $4.4 million in estimated funding needs  for the following 15 years will remain unfunded in the regular budget and  will therefore be supported through extra-budgetary funding. Under the  Statute of the IAEA, IAEA is to apportion the costs of implementing  safeguards, which would include inspector salaries and the cost of  implementing the Additional Protocol, through assessments on member  countries. As previously noted, such assessments form IAEA’s regular  budget. The Statute also states that any voluntary contributions may be  used as the Board of Governors, with the approval of the General  Conference, may determine. The JCPOA was not finalized in time for  the agency to include these costs for 2016 in its assessments.  Consequently, according to a 2015 IAEA report, all of IAEA’s JCPOA  work through 2016 will be funded through extra-budgetary contributions.  According to IAEA officials, how quickly the $5.7 million in JCPOA costs  are incorporated into the regular budget depends on member state  support. These officials told us that IAEA hopes to resolve the questions  about funding the JCPOA through the regular budget by the June 2016  Board of Governors meeting.
IAEA’s annual $10 million funding estimate includes approximately $7.5  million in funding to cover estimated human resource costs associated  with additional inspectors and support services under the JCPOA. IAEA  officials told us that the agency plans to transfer 18 experienced  inspectors and nearly twice that number of other staff to its Iran Task  Force from other divisions within its Safeguards Department that cover  countries and regions beyond Iran. According to IAEA officials, the other  Safeguards divisions would backfill the vacancies created by the transfer  of inspectors to the Iran Task Force by hiring and training new inspectors.  In addition, according to IAEA officials, existing safeguards technical  resources are sufficient to implement IAEA’s activities under the JCPOA.
section_title: Verifying the JCPOA’s Nuclear-Related Commitments May Present Potential Challenges to IAEA’s Safeguards Efforts
paragraphs: Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA may face some potential  challenges in monitoring and verifying Iran’s implementation of certain  nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA, according to current U.S.  and IAEA officials as well as some former U.S. officials, several former  IAEA officials, and many expert organizations we interviewed. These  potential challenges include (1) the inherent challenge of detecting  undeclared nuclear materials and activities, (2) potential access  challenges to sites in Iran, and (3) safeguards resource management  challenges.
subsections: section_title: IAEA Faces an Inherent Challenge in Detecting Undeclared Nuclear Materials and Activities
paragraphs: Our preliminary observations indicate that detection of undeclared nuclear  materials and activities is an inherent challenge for IAEA particularly with  regard to activities that do not involve nuclear material, such as some  weapons development activities and centrifuge manufacturing, according  to current U.S. officials, a former U.S. official, several former IAEA  officials, and several expert organizations we interviewed. According to  U.S. government officials, as well as a former U.S. official, detection of  undeclared material and activities in Iran and worldwide is IAEA’s  greatest challenge. Iran has previously failed to declare activity to IAEA.  For example, according to IAEA documents, prior to 2003, Iran failed to  provide IAEA information on a number of nuclear-fuel-cycle-related  activities and nuclear material. In addition, according to IAEA  documents and officials, Iran failed to notify the agency before 2009 that it  had constructed the Fordow enrichment facility, as required under  Modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangement to Iran’s CSA.
To detect undeclared materials and activities, IAEA looks for indicators  of such activities, including equipment, nuclear and non-nuclear material,  infrastructure support, and traces in the environment, according to an  IAEA document. However, some activities may not be visible through  satellite imagery or do not involve nuclear material, and may not leave  traces in the environment, such as some weapons development activities.  According to a former U.S. government official, some former IAEA  officials, and several expert organization interviews, this creates a  challenge for IAEA in detecting undeclared activity.
Furthermore, according to one expert organization we interviewed, the  Board of Governors’ vote to close its consideration of the PMD issue  without a complete accounting of Iran’s past nuclear program could  reduce the indicators at IAEA’s disposal to detect potential undeclared  activity. However, DOE officials noted that under the JCPOA, IAEA will  have the authorities of the Additional Protocol and enhanced  transparency measures of the JCPOA with which to investigate any  indication of undeclared activities. In addition, IAEA officials told us that  any uncertainties regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program  that may arise during the course of the agency’s verification and  monitoring under the JCPOA would have to be resolved for the agency to  reach a broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in  peaceful activities. IAEA officials told us that the agency does not draw a  broader conclusion lightly, for any state, and that it has traditionally taken  3 to 5 years for most member states.
According to a former IAEA official as well as current IAEA and U.S.  government officials we interviewed, IAEA has improved its capabilities in  detecting undeclared activity. For example, according to U.S. government  officials and national laboratory representatives, IAEA has adapted its  inspector training program to focus on potential indicators of undeclared  activity, beyond the agency’s traditional safeguards focus on nuclear  materials accountancy. IAEA also has analytical tools at its disposal,  some of which IAEA officials demonstrated to us, to detect undeclared  activity worldwide. Furthermore, IAEA receives member-state support in  detecting undeclared activity. For example, member states provided  some of the information that formed the basis of IAEA’s PMD  investigation. State officials agreed that the detection of undeclared  nuclear material and activities in Iran, and all states, is a serious  challenge for IAEA, but added that the JCPOA puts IAEA in a better  position to detect such activities in Iran.
The procurement channel established under the JCPOA may also serve  as an additional source of indicators for IAEA on potential undeclared  activities in Iran, according to current and two former U.S. government  officials as well as representatives from two organizations we interviewed.  IAEA officials told us that there is additional work to be done in informing  exporting countries of their obligations and standardizing the data that the  countries would report to IAEA so that they are usable to the agency.  Officials noted that ensuring that countries report the data as required is  particularly a challenge for countries that do not have a robust export  control system.
section_title: IAEA Access Depends on Iran’s Cooperation and the JCPOA Mechanism to Resolve Access Requests Is Untested
paragraphs: Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA could face potential  challenges in gaining access to Iranian sites, according to two former  U.S. government officials, a former IAEA official, and one expert  organization. IAEA’s safeguards activities in Iran, as in every state,  depend on the cooperation of the member state, and those officials noted  that Iran has a history of denying access to IAEA inspectors. For  example, IAEA requested access in February 2012 to the Iranian military  complex at Parchin—where high-explosive experiments were believed to  have been conducted—and Iran did not allow access until the fall of 2015  as part of IAEA’s PMD investigation.
One expert organization we interviewed said that Iran’s limited  cooperation during the PMD investigation may have set a precedent for  limiting IAEA access going forward. However, IAEA officials told us that  the closure of the PMD investigation would not preclude future IAEA  access requests to the sites that were part of the investigation, should  IAEA determine that such access is warranted. These officials added that  IAEA’s PMD investigation was conducted without the Additional Protocol  and that any future investigations into potential undeclared activity would  be conducted under the expanded legal authority of the Additional  Protocol. According to IAEA officials we interviewed, Iran’s agreement to  provisionally apply the Additional Protocol will facilitate the agency’s  access to sites in Iran. Specifically, they told us that under the Additional  Protocol, the agency can access any part of a site that it is inspecting  within 2 hours’ notice and any other site within 24 hours. DOE officials  noted that the JCPOA’s provisions for the reinstatement of sanctions will  encourage Iranian cooperation with and access for IAEA. Additionally,  State officials noted that refusal by Iran to comply with the access  provisions of the Additional Protocol or JCPOA could lead to the  reinstatement of sanctions.
If Iran were to deny access, IAEA officials said that they could report the  state’s noncompliance to the Board of Governors, though there is no  deadline in the CSA or Additional Protocol that compels a state to  cooperate, and according to a former IAEA official, the Board of  Governors cannot impose a deadline for the state’s cooperation.  However, as we noted earlier, the JCPOA includes a mechanism that  limits the time for resolution of differences between the participants to 24  days for matters related to JCPOA implementation. According to some  former U.S. government officials, the mechanism is an advantage for  IAEA in that it imposes a time frame for Iran’s cooperation with access  requests. However, a former IAEA official and one expert organization  noted that the mechanism is untested, and that it is too soon to tell  whether it will improve access.
section_title: IAEA Faces Potential Budgetary and Human Resource Management Challenges Stemming from JCPOA-Related Workload Integrating JCPOA-Related Funding Needs into IAEA’s Regular Budget
paragraphs: Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA faces potential resource  management challenges stemming from the monitoring and verification  workload in Iran, including integrating the additional JCPOA-related  funding needs that IAEA has identified into the agency’s regular budget  and managing human resources within the safeguards program that could  affect IAEA’s safeguards efforts internationally.
State and NNSA officials told us that they are confident that IAEA would  obtain any funding it would need in the form of extra-budgetary  contributions from the United States and other member states to support  its JCPOA activities. However, IAEA officials expressed concerns about  the reliability of sustained extra-budgetary contributions for IAEA JCPOA  activities due to possible donor fatigue in the long run, as IAEA will be  conducting certain JCPOA verification activities for 10 or more years.  IAEA and State officials, as well as a former IAEA official and one expert  organization, also stated that funding the JCPOA from the IAEA regular  budget would give the safeguards program a more stable and predictable  funding base for its monitoring and verification activities. We have  previously concluded that IAEA cannot necessarily assume that donors  will continue to make extra-budgetary contributions at the same levels as  in the past.
However, our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA may face  challenges in incorporating some of its JCPOA activities under its regular  budget, which requires support from the General Conference. IAEA  officials, as well as a former IAEA official, two former U.S. government  officials, and one expert organization we interviewed stated that the  proposal to move funding for monitoring and verification efforts under the  JCPOA into the IAEA safeguards’ regular budget could face resistance  from some member states without corresponding budget increases for  other IAEA programs, such as the Technical Cooperation program, which  supports nuclear power development and other civilian nuclear  applications. State officials noted that delay or failure to incorporate costs  into the regular budget would increase the reliance of IAEA on extra- budgetary contributions, but would not prevent IAEA from carrying out  JCPOA-related activities as long as those contributions are forthcoming.  These officials added that they recognize that long-term reliance on extra- budgetary contributions risks donor fatigue, and that they will plan for  providing support with a view toward filling any future funding gaps that  arise.
subsections: section_title: Managing Human Resources in the Safeguards Program
paragraphs: Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA faces a potential human  resource management challenge in its safeguards program as it  implements actions to monitor and verify the JCPOA, which could affect  its broader international safeguards mission. Specifically, our preliminary  observations indicate that IAEA’s strategy of transferring inspectors to its  Iran Task Force from other safeguards divisions may pose a challenge to  IAEA and its safeguards work in other countries because of the extensive  time taken to hire and train new inspectors for those divisions.
According to current IAEA and U.S. government officials, as well as two  former IAEA officials and two expert organizations, hiring and training  qualified inspectors can take years. A former IAEA official and current  officials noted that inspector skills are highly specialized—typically  requiring a combination of nuclear engineering knowledge with analytical  abilities—making recruitment difficult. These officials also noted that  IAEA’s hiring process is lengthy, requiring multiple interviews and  examinations. Furthermore, current IAEA officials and two former IAEA  officials, as well as one expert organization noted that training new  inspectors to be proficient in executing their safeguards responsibilities  can be a time-consuming process. As a result, IAEA faces a potential  challenge as it prioritizes the JCPOA in meeting the need for additional  experienced inspectors to work on Iran-related safeguards, while  ensuring that other safeguards efforts in other countries are not  understaffed. IAEA officials have said that its work in Iran is its priority.  However, a former IAEA official, as well as some former U.S. government  officials and several expert organizations told us that IAEA could mitigate  human resources challenges in the short term through remote monitoring  and the use of cost-free experts in its headquarters.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We are not making any recommendations in this report. We provided the  Departments of State and Energy and IAEA a draft of this report to for  their review and comment. State, DOE, and IAEA provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
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If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report provides our preliminary observations on (1) the Joint  Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments that the  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been asked to verify and  its authorities to do so, (2) the resources IAEA has identified as  necessary to verify the JCPOA, and (3) potential challenges and  mitigating actions, if any, IAEA and others have identified with regard to  verifying the JCPOA. We will issue a separate report with the final results  of our work later this year.
To identify the nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA that IAEA has  been asked to verify and IAEA’s authorities for verifying these  commitments, we analyzed the JCPOA, in close coordination with IAEA  and the Department of State. We also analyzed IAEA documentation  concerning the safeguards legal framework, including the Statute of the  IAEA, which authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request  of parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement; “The Structure and  Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in  Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”  (information circular (INFCIRC)/153), which provides the basis for the  comprehensive safeguards agreement that most countries have  concluded with IAEA and that covers all of the countries’ civilian nuclear  activities; Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214);  the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which provides the basis  for an Additional Protocol  that most countries with a CSA have concluded  with IAEA to provide additional information about countries’ nuclear and  nuclear-related activities; and the November 2011 IAEA Safeguards  Report, which details items concerning “possible military dimensions” of  Iran’s nuclear program; IAEA’s report on its investigation of the possible  military dimensions; and the related Board of Governor’s resolution. We  also analyzed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  (NPT) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which  requests IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of  Iran’s commitments.
To examine the resources IAEA has identified as necessary to verify the  JCPOA, we reviewed IAEA planning and budget documents, such as  “The Agency’s Programme and Budget 2016 –2017,” the Director  General’s report titled “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic  of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231  (2015),” and pertinent Director General’s statements to the Board of  Governors.
In addition, to further understand IAEA authorities and resource needs,  and to examine potential challenges and mitigating actions IAEA and  others have identified with regard to verifying the JCPOA, we interviewed  officials of IAEA, the Department of State, and the Department of  Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); as  well as representatives of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Los Alamos  National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Brookhaven  National Laboratory. We also held classified interviews with officials in the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence and representatives of  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The information from these  interviews is not reflected in this report.
We also interviewed 8 former IAEA, and 10 former U.S. government and  national laboratory officials, and representatives of 10 expert  organizations—research institutions and nongovernmental organizations  with knowledge in the areas of nuclear verification, monitoring, and  safeguards. We selected these experts by first identifying organizations  that had previously served as sources of IAEA subject matter experts for  GAO. To ensure a wide range of viewpoints, we supplemented our initial  selection with individuals and organizations identified through a literature  search and by recommendations from our initial set of expert  organizations. We requested interviews from all the identified experts and  suggested contacts and interviewed all who agreed to participate (two  experts provided written responses in lieu of in-person interviews). We  analyzed their responses and grouped them into overall themes related to  different elements of the objective. When referring to these categories of  interviewees throughout the report, we use “some” to refer to three  members of a group, “several” to refer to four or five members of a group,  and “many” to refer to more than five members of a group.
Our preliminary observations are based on our ongoing work, which is  being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, William Hoehn (Assistant  Director), Alisa Beyninson, Antoinette Capaccio, R. Scott Fletcher,  Bridget Grimes, Joseph Kirschbaum, Grace Lui, Thomas Melito, Alison  O’Neill, Sophia Payind, Timothy M. Persons, Steven Putansu, Vasiliki  Theodoropoulos, and Pierre Toureille made key contributions to this  report.