National Security: Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD's Southern and Africa Commands
Published: 2010-07-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Recognizing the limits of military power in today's security environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) is collaborating with other U.S. federal agencies to achieve its missions around the world. DOD's combatant commands, such as U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), play key roles in this effort. Both aim to build partner nation capacity and perform humanitarian assistance, while standing ready to perform a variety of military operations. Among its missions, SOUTHCOM supports U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Americas and Caribbean in disrupting illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism. As DOD's newest command, AFRICOM works with U.S. diplomacy and development agencies on activities such as maritime security and pandemic response efforts. Today GAO issued reports that the subcommittee requested on SOUTHCOM (GAO-10-801) and AFRICOM (GAO-10-794), which in part evaluated how each collaborates with U.S. interagency partners. This testimony summarizes that work and provides observations from ongoing work on U.S. counterpiracy efforts by focusing on 3 key areas essential for interagency collaboration.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's work has shown that developing overarching strategies, creating collaborative organizations, and building a workforce that understands how to fully engage partners are key areas where agencies can enhance interagency collaboration on national security issues. GAO found that DOD's SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have demonstrated some practices that will help enhance and sustain collaboration, but areas for improvement remain. (1) Overarching strategies: SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have sought input from several federal agencies in creating their theater campaign plans, which outline command priorities, and for other strategies and plans. However, AFRICOM has not completed plans that detail its activities by country and that align with embassy strategic plans to ensure U.S. government unity of effort in Africa. Also, GAO's preliminary work indicates that a U.S. action plan provides a framework for interagency collaboration to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa region, but the plan does not assign agencies their roles or responsibilities for the majority of tasks in the plan. (2) Collaborative organizations: Both commands have organizational structures that encourage interagency involvement in their missions. Each has a military deputy commander to oversee military operations and a civilian deputy to the commander from the State Department to oversee civil-military activities. Both commands also embed interagency officials within their organizations, but limited resources at other federal agencies have prevented interagency personnel from participating at the numbers desired. However, AFRICOM has struggled to fully leverage the expertise of embedded officials. Moreover, while SOUTHCOM's organizational structure was designed to facilitate interagency collaboration, the 2010 Haiti earthquake response revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large-scale military operation. (3) Well-trained workforce: AFRICOM has emphasized the need to work closely with U.S. embassies to ensure that activities are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and to contribute to a unity of effort among interagency partners. In addition, the command has designated cultural awareness as a core competency for its staff. However, some AFRICOM staff have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and about cultural issues in Africa, which has resulted in some cultural missteps. Further, limited training is available to enhance personnel expertise. While GAO's work on SOUTHCOM did not focus on training, personnel from the command also expressed the need for more opportunities to improve their understanding of working in an interagency environment. GAO made recommendations to the commands aimed at improving their capabilities to perform their missions through the development of plans and training. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss some of the ways that the  Department of Defense (DOD) is collaborating with other U.S. federal  government agencies to carry out its missions around the world. Recent  terrorist events and lessons learned from the ongoing wars in Iraq and  Afghanistan illustrate that today’s global security challenges have  expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War era. These new  threats can be unconventional and ambiguous, requiring enhanced  collaboration with interagency partners and other stakeholders. For its  part, DOD recognizes the limits of traditional military power in today’s  security environment, which consists of a wide-range of challenges (e.g.,  terrorism, illicit trafficking, organized crime, piracy) that are often  exacerbated by conditions of poverty and profound cultural and  demographic tensions. The military’s approach to these challenges  requires increased collaboration with interagency partners such as the  Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), with DOD often serving in a supporting role to  other federal agencies.
Two of DOD’s geographic combatant commands, U.S. Southern Command  (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), play key roles in  this effort outside of the United States. Both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM  aim to build partner nation capacity and conduct humanitarian assistance  projects, while standing ready to perform a variety of military operations,   as directed. Among its missions, SOUTHCOM supports U.S. law  enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Americas and the Caribbean  in disrupting illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism. Having reorganized in  2008, in part to focus on interagency collaboration, SOUTHCOM has been  viewed as having mature interagency processes and coordinating  mechanisms. AFRICOM, as DOD’s newest combatant command, works  with U.S. diplomacy and development agencies on activities ranging from  maritime security to pandemic response efforts on the African continent.  The 2008 National Defense Strategy cites both SOUTHCOM and  AFRICOM as pointing the way toward a whole-of-government approach to  achieving common goals.
Today we issued the reports you requested on SOUTHCOM and  AFRICOM, which in part evaluated how each command collaborates with  interagency partners. In addition, last September we issued a report on  key issues and actions needed to enhance interagency collaboration on  national security for Congress and the administration to consider in their  oversight and management agendas. My statement today discusses  findings from our SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM reviews in three areas  essential for interagency collaboration. In addition, the statement provides  some preliminary information from our ongoing review of counterpiracy  efforts in the Horn of Africa region that was also requested by the  subcommittee and will be completed later this year.
This statement is based largely on completed GAO work, which was  performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. To conduct our work, we reviewed relevant documents,  analyzed data, traveled to the regions, and interviewed officials from  various agencies including the Departments of Defense, Homeland  Security, Justice, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and the U.S. Agency  for International Development. Additional information about our scope  and methodology for our AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM work can be found  within the full reports.
subsections: section_title: Key Areas for Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: Our body of work on interagency collaboration has identified several key  areas that are essential for collaboration among U.S. federal agencies in  addressing security challenges. Three are particularly important for  SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM: (1) developing and implementing overarching  strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, and (3) building a well- trained workforce. Underlying the success of these key areas is committed  and effective leadership.
Developing and implementing overarching strategies: Our prior  work, as well as that by national security experts, has found that  strategic direction is required as a foundation for collaboration on  national security goals. The means to operate across multiple agencies  and organizations—such as compatible policies and procedures that  facilitate collaboration across agencies and mechanisms to share  information frequently—enhances and sustains collaboration among  federal agencies. Strategies can help agencies develop mutually  reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and  performance measures for implementing those strategies. Moreover, a  strategy defining organizational roles and responsibilities can help  agencies clarify who will lead or participate in activities, help organize  their joint and individual efforts, facilitate decision making, and  address how conflicts would be resolved.
Creating collaborative organizations: Given the differences among  U.S. government agencies—such as differences in structure, planning  processes, and funding sources—developing adequate coordination  mechanisms is critical to achieving integrated approaches. U.S.  government agencies, such as DOD, State, and USAID, among others,  spend billions of dollars annually on various defense, diplomatic, and  development missions in support of national security. Without  coordination mechanisms, the results can be a patchwork of activities  that waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal  efforts.
Developing a well-trained workforce: Collaborative approaches to  national security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and  experience to integrate the government’s diverse capabilities and  resources. A lack of understanding of other agencies’ cultures,  processes, and core capabilities can hamper U.S. national security  partners’ ability to work together effectively. However, training can  help personnel develop the skills and understanding of other agencies’  capabilities needed to facilitate interagency collaboration.
Effective leadership is essential to achieving success in each of these  areas. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states that by integrating  U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national security— including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade, and  intelligence—the nation can ensure that the right mix of expertise is at  hand to take advantage of emerging opportunities and to thwart potential  threats. In addition, the 2010 National Security Strategy calls for a  renewed emphasis on building a stronger leadership foundation for the  long term to more effectively advance U.S. interests.
section_title: Interagency Practices and Challenges at SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, and with U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts
paragraphs: Our work on SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM found that both commands have  demonstrated some practices that will help enhance and sustain  interagency collaboration, but areas for improvement remain. Moreover,  our preliminary work on counterpiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa region  suggests that U.S. agencies have made progress in leading and supporting  international efforts to counter piracy, but implementation challenges  exist.
subsections: section_title: Interagency Partners Have Helped Develop Strategies and Plans, but Some Remain Unfinished at AFRICOM and for Counterpiracy Efforts
paragraphs: SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have sought input from several federal  agencies in developing overarching strategies and plans, but AFRICOM  has not yet completed many specific plans to guide activities and ensure a  U.S. government unity of effort in Africa. In addition, our preliminary work  shows that a U.S. action plan has been developed which provides a  framework for interagency collaboration, but the roles and responsibilities  of the multiples agencies involved in countering piracy in the Horn of  Africa region are not clearly assigned.
subsections: section_title: Commands Have Engaged Interagency Partners in Developing Strategies and Plans
paragraphs: In its Guidance for Employment of the Force, DOD required both  SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, as prototype test cases, to seek broader  involvement from other departments in drafting their theater campaign  and contingency plans. To meet this requirement, SOUTHCOM held a  series of meetings with interagency officials that focused on involving and  gathering input from interagency partners. In developing its 2009 theater  campaign plan, which lays out command priorities and guides its resource  allocations, SOUTHCOM coordinated with over 10 U.S. government  departments and offices, including the Departments of State, Homeland  Security, Justice, the Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation and the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence (see fig. 1). According to  both SOUTHCOM and interagency partners, this coordination helped  SOUTHCOM understand the diverse missions of its interagency partners  and better align activities and resources in the Americas and the  Caribbean. As a result of this effort, SOUTHCOM’s 2009 theater campaign  plan includes 30 theater objectives, of which 22 are led by interagency  partners with SOUTHCOM serving in a supporting role. SOUTHCOM also  provides input into State’s regional strategic plans. Both SOUTHCOM and  interagency partners told us that this coordination has helped ensure that  SOUTHCOM and interagency partner strategic goals were mutually  reinforcing and has helped align activities and resources in achieving  broad U.S. objectives.
Similarly, AFRICOM met with representatives from many agencies to gain  interagency input into its theater campaign plan. We spoke with officials  from State, USAID, and the U.S. Coast Guard who stated that they  provided input into several additional strategy documents, including  DOD’s Guidance for Employment of the Force and AFRICOM’s posture  statement, and participated in activity planning meetings. Federal agency  officials also noted progress in AFRICOM’s interagency coordination since  its establishment. State officials said that AFRICOM had made  improvements in taking their feedback and creating an environment that is  conducive to cooperation across agencies. Similarly, USAID officials said  that AFRICOM had improved its coordination with their agency at the  USAID headquarters level. Notwithstanding this collaboration, AFRICOM  officials told us that aligning strategies among partners can be difficult  because of different planning horizons among agencies. For example,  AFRICOM’s theater campaign plan covers fiscal years 2010 through 2014,  whereas the State/USAID strategic plan spans fiscal years 2007 through  2012.
section_title: Some AFRICOM Plans Remain Unfinished, Which Hinders Unity of Effort
paragraphs: While AFRICOM has collaborated with partners on overarching strategies,  it has not yet completed some plans, which hinders planning and  implementation efforts with partners. AFRICOM currently lacks regional  engagement and country work plans for Africa, which are called for in its  theater campaign plan and would provide specific information on  conducting activities. One key requirement for the country work plans, for  example, is to align them with embassy strategic plans to ensure unity of  effort. Figure 2 shows AFRICOM’s plans in the context of national  strategies, guidance, and other federal agencies’ planning efforts.
AFRICOM’s Army component stated that perhaps the greatest challenge to  creating positive conditions in Africa is ensuring that U.S. defense efforts  remain synchronized; if plans are not coordinated, their efforts could have  unintended consequences, such as the potential for Africans to perceive  the U.S. military as trying to influence public opinion in a region sensitive  to the military’s presence. At the time we completed our audit work,  AFRICOM’s regional plans had not been approved by the command, and  the country plans were still in the process of being developed. Therefore,  we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct AFRICOM to  expedite the completion of its plans and to develop a process whereby  plans are reviewed on a recurring basis to ensure that efforts across the  command are complementary, comprehensive, and supportive of  AFRICOM’s mission. DOD agreed with our recommendation, stating that  some of the plans are in the final stages of review and approval by  AFRICOM’s leadership.
section_title: U.S. Government Has Action Plan to Counter Piracy, but Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities Are Not Clearly Defined
paragraphs: Our preliminary work on U.S. counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of Africa  shows that the United States has an action plan that serves as an  overarching strategy and provides a framework for interagency  collaboration, but roles and responsibilities have not been clearly  assigned. The action plan establishes three main lines of action for  interagency stakeholders, in collaboration with industry and international  partners, to take in countering piracy. These actions are (1) prevent pirate  attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; (2)  interrupt and terminate acts of piracy, consistent with international law  and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states; and (3) ensure  that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their  actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim,  and coastal states and, in appropriate cases, the United States.
While piracy in the Horn of Africa region emanates primarily from  Somalia, a country located within AFRICOM’s area of responsibility, most  attacks are carried out in waters within U.S. Central Command’s  jurisdiction. Outside DOD, many other stakeholders are involved in  counterpiracy efforts. Specifically, the action plan states that, subject to  the availability of resources, the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland  Security, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury and the Office of the  Director of National Intelligence shall also contribute to, coordinate, and  undertake initiatives. Our preliminary work indicates that the National  Security Council, which authored the plan, has not assigned the majority  of tasks outlined in the plan to specific agencies. As of July 2010, only one  task, providing an interdiction-capable presence, had been assigned to the  Navy and Coast Guard. Roles and responsibilities for other tasks—such as  strategic communications, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating  prosecution of suspected pirates—have not been clearly assigned. Without  specific roles and responsibilities for essential tasks outlined in the action  plan, the U.S. government cannot ensure that agencies’ approaches are  comprehensive, complementary, and effectively coordinated.
section_title: Commands Have Developed Structures to Facilitate Interagency Collaboration, but Organizational Challenges Remain at Both Commands
paragraphs: SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have developed organizational structures to  facilitate interagency collaboration, but challenges include fully leveraging  interagency personnel and maintaining the ability to organize quickly for  large-scale military operations when necessary.
subsections: section_title: Commands Have Established Organizational Structures That Facilitate Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: Both commands have established key leadership positions for interagency  officials within their organizational structures. In addition to a deputy  military commander who oversees military operations, each command has  a civilian deputy to the commander from State who oversees civil-military  activities. At SOUTHCOM, the civilian deputy to the commander—a senior  foreign service officer with the rank of Minister Counselor at State— advises SOUTHCOM’s commander on foreign policy issues and serves as  the primary liaison with State and with U.S. embassies located in  SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility. At AFRICOM, the civilian deputy to  the commander directs AFRICOM’s activities related to areas such as  health, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and peace support  operations.
Both commands have also embedded interagency officials throughout  their organizations. As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that it had  embedded 27 interagency partners into its headquarters staff from several  federal agencies (see table 1), and according to officials at AFRICOM and  State, it plans to integrate five foreign policy advisors from State later this  year. Moreover, DOD has signed memorandums of understanding with  nine federal agencies to outline conditions for sending interagency  partners to AFRICOM. As of July 2010, SOUTHCOM reported that it had 20  embedded interagency officials (see table 1), with several placed directly  into key senior leadership positions. SOUTHCOM has also created a  partnering directorate, which among its responsibilities, has the role of  embedding interagency personnel into the command. Decisions to embed  interagency officials at SOUTHCOM are made on a case-by-case basis,  with most agencies sending a representative to SOUTHCOM on a short- term basis to discuss needs, roles, and responsibilities and to assess  whether a full-time embedded official would be mutually beneficial.
Both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have indicated that they currently do not  have a specific requirement for the number of embedded interagency  personnel at their commands but would benefit from additional personnel.  However, limited resources at other federal agencies have prevented  interagency personnel from participating in the numbers desired. In  February 2009, we reported that AFRICOM initially expected to fill 52  positions with personnel from other government agencies. However,  State officials told us that they would not likely be able to provide  employees to fill the positions requested by AFRICOM because they were  already facing a 25 percent shortfall in midlevel personnel. Similarly,  SOUTHCOM has identified the need for around 40 interagency personnel,  but had only filled 20 of those positions as of July 2010. According to  SOUTHCOM officials, it has taken about 3 years to fill its interagency  positions because of lack of funding at the command or the inability of  partners to provide personnel. Because many agencies have limited  personnel and resources, SOUTHCOM and its interagency partners have,  on occasion, developed other means to gain stakeholder input and  perspectives. For example, in lieu of embedding a Department of the  Treasury (Treasury) official at the command, SOUTHCOM and Treas ury  decided that providing a local Treasury representative with access to thecommand and establishing a memorandum of understanding would serve to improve communication and coordination among the organizations.
section_title: AFRICOM May Not Fully Leverage Expertise of Interagency Partners
paragraphs: While embedding interagency personnel into a DOD command can be an  effective means of coordination, interagency personnel serving at  AFRICOM may not be fully leveraged for their expertise within the  organization. AFRICOM officials told us that it is a challenge to determine  where in the command to include interagency personnel. For example, an  embedded interagency staff member stated that AFRICOM initially placed  him in a directorate unrelated to his skill set, and he initiated a transfer to  another directorate that would better enable him to share his expertise.  Moreover, several embedded interagency officials said that there is little  incentive to take a position at AFRICOM because it will not enhance one’s  career position upon return to the original agency after the rotation.
Difficulties with leveraging interagency personnel are not unique to  AFRICOM. We have previously reported that personnel systems often do  not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, which could diminish  interest in serving in interagency efforts. AFRICOM officials said that it  would be helpful to have additional interagency personnel at the  command, but they understand that staffing limitations, resource  imbalances, and lack of career progression incentives for embedded staff  from other federal agencies may limit the number of personnel who can be  brought in from these agencies. Despite challenges, AFRICOM has made  some efforts that could improve interagency collaboration within the  command, such as expanding its interagency orientation process. Last fall,  the command conducted an assessment of the embedded interagency  process to analyze successes and identify lessons learned, including  recommendations on how to integrate interagency personnel into  command planning and operations. In July 2010, AFRICOM stated that it  had established an interagency collaborative forum to assess, prioritize,  and implement the recommendations from the assessment.
section_title: Haiti Response Revealed Weaknesses in SOUTHCOM’s Organizational Structure
paragraphs: SOUTHCOM’s recent experience in responding to the Haiti earthquake  serves as a reminder that while interagency collaboration is important in  addressing security challenges, DOD’s commands must also be prepared  to respond to a wide range of contingencies, including large-scale disaster  relief operations. While our work found that SOUTHCOM has taken  significant steps in building partnerships to enhance and sustain  collaboration, the command faces challenges preparing for the divergent  needs of its potential missions. SOUTHCOM must have an organizational  structure that is prepared for military contingencies and that is also  effective in supporting interagency partners in meeting challenges such as  corruption, crime, and poverty.
In 2008, SOUTHCOM developed an organizational structure to improve  collaboration with interagency stakeholders, which included a civilian  deputy to the vommander, interagency partners embedded into key  leadership positions, and a directorate focused on sustaining partnerships.  While SOUTHCOM’s organizational structure was designed to facilitate  interagency collaboration, the 2010 Haiti earthquake response revealed  weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a  large-scale military operation. For example, the command’s structure  lacked a division to address planning for military operations occurring  over 30 days to 1 year in duration. In addition, SOUTHCOM had  suboptimized some core functions that were necessary to respond to  large-scale contingencies. For example, SOUTHCOM’s logistics function  was suboptimized because it was placed under another directorate in the  organizational structure rather than being its own core function. As a  result, the command had difficulty planning for the required logistics  support—including supply, maintenance, deployment distribution, health  support, and engineering—during the large-scale Haiti relief effort, which  SOUTHCOM reported peaked at more than 20,000 deployed military  personnel, about 2 weeks after the earthquake occurred (see fig. 4).
According to command officials, SOUTHCOM was able to integrate  additional interagency and international partners into its headquarters as  Haiti relief operations grew in scale; however, the command had not  identified the military personnel augmentation required for a large  contingency nor had it developed a plan to integrate military personnel  into its headquarters structure. Ultimately, SOUTHCOM received 500  military augmentees to provide additional capabilities to its existing  command staff of about 800, including an entire staff office from U.S.  Northern Command, filling vital gaps in SOUTHCOM’s ability to support  operations in Haiti. However, augmented military personnel were not  familiar with SOUTHCOM’s organizational structure and did not initially  understand where they could best contribute because many of the  traditional joint staff functions were divided among SOUTHCOM’s  directorates. To address these challenges, SOUTHCOM’s commander  returned the command to a traditional joint staff structure while retaining  elements from its 2008 reorganization and plans to retain this structure for  the foreseeable future.
Our report made recommendations aimed at improving SOUTHCOM’s  ability to conduct the full range of military missions that may be required  in the region, while balancing its efforts to support interagency partners in  enhancing regional security and cooperation. DOD acknowledged the  challenges it had faced and agreed with our recommendations. In its  response, the department noted that SOUTHCOM’s ability to respond to  the Haiti crisis quickly was in part a by-product of close, collaborative  relationships developed with a range of U.S. government interagency  partners over many years.
section_title: AFRICOM Staff Could Benefit from More Comprehensive Training or Guidance on Working with Interagency Officials in Africa
paragraphs: AFRICOM, as a relatively new command engaged in capacity-building  efforts, has emphasized the need to work closely with U.S. embassies to  ensure that activities are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and to  contribute to a unity of effort among interagency partners (see fig. 5). In  addition, the command has designated cultural awareness as a core  competency for its staff. However, we found that some AFRICOM staff  have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and about  cultural issues in Africa, and the training or guidance available to augment  personnel expertise in these areas is limited. While AFRICOM has efforts  under way to strengthen staff expertise in these areas, the limited  knowledge among some staff puts AFRICOM at risk of being unable to  fully leverage resources with U.S. embassy personnel, build relationships  with African nations, and effectively carry out activities.
AFRICOM emphasizes the importance of collaborating with its interagency  partners, but some personnel’s limited knowledge of working with U.S.  embassies can impose burdens on embassies’ staff who may be taken  away from their assigned duties to help AFRICOM. For example, a U.S.  embassy official in Uganda stated that AFRICOM personnel arrived in  country with the expectations that the embassy would take care of basic  cultural and logistical issues for them. Also, AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa  task force personnel have, at times, approached the Djiboutian  government ministries directly with concepts for activities rather than  following the established procedure of having the U.S. embassy in Djibouti  initiate the contact. Additionally, while cultural awareness is a core  competency for AFRICOM, the limited knowledge of some personnel in  the command and its military service components regarding Africa  cultural issues has occasionally led to difficulties in building relationships  with African nations—such as when AFRICOM’s task force distributed  used clothing to local Djibouti villagers during Ramadan, which offended  the Muslim population, or proposed drilling a well without considering  how its placement could affect local clan relationships.
While AFRICOM personnel and forces deploying for activities receive  some training on working with interagency partners and on African  cultural awareness—and efforts are under way to increase training for  some personnel—our review of training presentations indicated that they  were insufficient to adequately build the skills of its staff. AFRICOM  officials told us that training includes Web courses and seminars, and that there are other training requirements for personnel deploying to Africa  such as medical and cultural awareness training. Officials said, however,  that while training is encouraged, it is not required, and that the comm does not currently monitor the completion of training courses.  Furthermore, officials from several AFRICOM components voiced a  preference for more cultural training and capabilities.
In our prior work on AFRICOM’s Horn of Africa task force, we similarly   was  reported that the task force’s training on working with U.S. embassies not shared with all staff, and cultural awareness training was limited. We  recommended, and DOD agreed, that the Secretary of Defense dir AFRICOM to develop comprehensive training guidance or a program t augments assigned personnel’s understanding of African cultural  awareness and working with interagency partners. In addition, in our  report on AFRICOM released today, we recommended that the Secretary  of Defense direct AFRICOM, in consultation with State and USAID, to  develop a comprehensive training program for staff and forces involved in AFRICOM activities that focuses on working with interagency partners  and on cultural issues related to Africa. DOD agreed with the  recommendation, describing some efforts that AFRICOM was taking and  stating that the command will continue to develop and conduct trainin improve its ability to work with embassies and other agencies. While ou work on SOUTHCOM did not focus on workforce training, comm personnel have expressed the need for more opportunities to improve  th eir understanding of working in an interagency environment.
Mr. Chairman, this  concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may  have at this time.
For future information regarding this statement, please contact John H.  Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this statement. Key contributors to this statement are listed in  appendix I.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Directors Stephen Caldwell and  Jess Ford; Assistant Directors Patricia Lentini, Marie Mak, and Suzanne  Wren; and Alissa Czyz, Richard Geiger, Dawn Hoff, Brandon Hunt,  Farhanaz Kermalli, Arthur Lord, Tobin McMurdie, Jennifer Neer, Jodie  Sandel, Leslie Sarapu, and Erin Smith made key contributions to this  statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency  Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. GAO-10-794.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates  Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed  Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. GAO-10-801.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen  Interagency Collaboration. GAO-10-822T. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2010.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of  Africa Task Force. GAO-10-504. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency  Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions.  GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of  National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and  Information Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25,  2009.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory  and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and  Regional Proficiency. GAO-09-568. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009.
Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation’s Planning and  Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. GAO-09-760T. Washington, D.C.:  June 3, 2009.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.  GAO-09-679SP. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2009.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and  Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response  Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-615. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.
Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency  Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current  Efforts. GAO-09-192. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges  to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies.  GAO-09-476T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2009.
Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland  Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further  Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. GAO-09-63.  Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,  Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs  Associated with the U.S. Africa Command. GAO-09-181. Washington,  D.C.: February 20, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of  Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in  Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide  Implementation and Assess Progress. GAO-08-637T. Washington, D.C.:  July 23, 2008.
Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and  Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command.  GAO-08-947T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in  Countering Transnational Terrorism. GAO-08-887SP. Washington, D.C.:  July 2008.
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a  Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian  Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability  Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to  Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.  GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and  Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,  D.C.: October 21, 2005.
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