Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality Throughout the Process
Published: 2013-11-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2012, the DNI reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a personnel security clearance. Furthermore, GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations in fiscal year 2011. A high quality process is essential to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that information about individuals with criminal activity or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed as part of the process for granting or retaining clearances. Security clearances may allow personnel to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. Recent events, such as unauthorized disclosures of classified information, have illustrated the need for additional work to help ensure the process functions effectively and efficiently.
This testimony addresses the (1) roles and responsibilities of different executive branch agencies involved in the personnel security process; (2) different phases of the process; and (3) extent that agencies assess the quality of the process. This testimony is based on GAO work issued between 2008 and 2013 on DOD's personnel security clearance program and government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. As part of that work, GAO (1) reviewed statutes, executive orders, guidance, and processes; (2) examined agency data on timeliness and quality; (3) assessed reform efforts; and (4) reviewed samples of case files for DOD personnel.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Several agencies in the executive branch have key roles and responsibilities in the personnel security clearance process. Executive Order 13467 designates the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the Security Executive Agent, who is responsible for developing policies and procedures for background investigations and adjudications. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts investigations for most of the federal government. Adjudicators from agencies, such as the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security, that request background investigations use the investigative report and consider federal adjudicative guidelines when making clearance determinations. Reform efforts to enhance the personnel security process throughout the executive branch are principally driven and overseen by the Performance Accountability Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Executive branch agencies rely on a multi-phased personnel security clearance process that includes requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication, appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and reinvestigation (for renewal or upgrade of an existing clearance). In the requirements determination phase, agency officials must determine whether positions require access to classified information. After an individual has been selected for a position that requires a personnel security clearance and the individual submits an application for a clearance, investigators--often contractors--from OPM conduct background investigations for most executive branch agencies. Adjudicators from requesting agencies use the information from these investigations and consider federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a clearance. If a clearance is denied or revoked by an agency, appeals of the adjudication decision are possible. Individuals granted clearances are subject to reinvestigations at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance.
Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the process. For example, GAO reported in May 2009 that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008 for DOD, documentation was incomplete for most of OPM's investigative reports. GAO also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 reports did not contain the required personal subject interview. To improve the quality of investigative documentation, GAO recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its reports met federal investigative standards. OPM did not agree or disagree with this recommendation, and as of August 2013 had not implemented it. Further, GAO reported in 2010 that agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the reciprocity of personnel security clearances, which is an agency's acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative agency. OPM created a metric in early 2009 to track reciprocity, but this metric does not track how often an existing security clearance was successfully honored. GAO recommended that OMB develop comprehensive metrics to track reciprocity. OMB agreed with the recommendation, but has not yet fully implemented actions to implement this recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss the quality of the  federal government’s personnel security clearance process. In 2012, the  Director of National Intelligence (DNI) reported that more than 4.9 million  federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to  hold a security clearance, posing formidable challenges to those  responsible for deciding who should be granted a clearance. Personnel  security clearances allow for access to classified information on a need to  know basis. Federal agencies also use other processes and procedures  to determine if an individual should be granted access to certain  government buildings or facilities or be employed as a military, federal  civilian, or contractor employee for the federal government. Separate  from, but related to, personnel security clearances are determinations of  suitability that the executive branch uses to ensure individuals are  suitable, based on character and conduct, for federal employment in their  agency or position. We have reported that the federal government spent  over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations  (in support of both personnel security clearances and suitability  determinations for government employment outside of the intelligence  community) in fiscal year 2011.
A high-quality process is essential in order to minimize the risks of  unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that  information about individuals with criminal activity or other questionable  behavior is identified and assessed as part of the process for granting or  retaining clearances. Security clearances may allow personnel to gain  access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure,  can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national  security. Recent events, such as unauthorized disclosures of classified  information, have illustrated both the potential consequences of such  disclosures and the need for additional work on the part of federal  agencies to help ensure the process functions effectively and efficiently,  so that only trustworthy individuals obtain and keep security clearances  and the resulting access to classified information that clearances make  possible. We have an extensive body of work on issues related to the  personnel security clearance process going back over a decade. Since  2008, we have focused on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) clearance  program and the government-wide effort to reform the security clearance  process, and have reported repeatedly on the need to build quality into  the process.
My testimony today will focus on three topics related to personnel security  clearances: (1) the roles and responsibilities of the different executive  branch agencies involved in the personnel security clearance process,    (2) the different phases of the security clearance process that are typically  followed by most executive branch agencies, and (3) the extent that  executive branch agencies assess the quality of the security clearance  process during these different phases.
This testimony is based on our reports and testimonies issued from 2008  through 2013 on DOD’s personnel security clearance program and  government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. A list of  these related products appears at the end of my statement. As part of the  work for these products, we reviewed relevant statutes and executive  orders, federal guidance, and processes; examined agency personnel  security clearance policies; examined agency data on the timeliness and  quality of investigations and adjudications; assessed reform efforts; and  reviewed a sample of investigative and adjudication files for DOD  personnel. Further, as part of our ongoing effort to determine the status of  agency actions to address our prior recommendations, we reviewed the  current proposal to revise a relevant federal regulation regarding position  designation.
The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details about the  scope and methodology can be found in each of these related products.
subsections: section_title: Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities in the Personnel Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: Several agencies in the executive branch have key roles and  responsibilities in the federal government’s personnel security clearance  process. In a 2008 memorandum, the President called for a reform of the  security clearance and suitability determination processes and  subsequently issued Executive Order 13467, which designates the  Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the Security Executive Agent. As  such, the DNI is responsible for developing policies and procedures to  help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background  investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for  access to classified information and eligibility to hold a sensitive position.  Positions designated as sensitive are any positions within a department  or agency where the occupant could bring about, by virtue of the nature of  the position, a material adverse effect on national security.
Further, Executive Order 13467 established a Suitability and Security  Clearance Performance Accountability Council, commonly called the  Performance Accountability Council, that is accountable to the President  for achieving the goals of the reform effort, which include an efficient,  practical, reciprocal, and aligned system for investigating and determining  eligibility for access to classified information. Under the executive order,  this council is responsible for driving implementation of the reform effort,  including ensuring the alignment of security and suitability processes,  holding agencies accountable for implementation, and establishing goals  and metrics for progress. The order also appointed the Deputy Director  for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as the  chair of the council.heads shall assist the Performance Accountability Council and executive  agents in carrying out any function under the order, as well as  implementing any policies or procedures developed pursuant to the order.
In addition, the executive order states that agency  Executive branch agencies that request background investigations use  the information from investigative reports to determine whether an  applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance. Two of the  agencies that grant the most security clearances are DOD and the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DOD accounts for the majority  of all personnel security clearances, and spent $787 million on suitability  and security clearance background investigations in fiscal year 2011.  Investigators—often contractors—from Federal Investigative Services  within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct the  investigations for most of the federal government. DOD is OPM’s largest  customer, and its Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) is  responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the  implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel,  physical, industrial, information, operations, chemical/biological, and DOD  Special Access Program security. Additionally, the Defense Security  Service, under the authority, direction, and control of USD(I), manages  and administers the DOD portion of the National Industrial Security  Program for the DOD components and other federal agencies by  agreement, as well as providing security education and training, among  other things.
DHS spent more than $57 million on suitability and security clearance  background investigations in fiscal year 2011. Within DHS, the Chief  Security Officer develops, implements, and oversees the department’s  security policies, programs, and standards; delivers security training and  education to DHS personnel; and provides security support to the DHS  components. The Chief of DHS’s Personnel Security Division, under the  direction of the Chief Security Officer, has responsibility for personnel  security and suitability policies, programs, and standards, including  procedures for granting, denying, and revoking access to classified  information as well as initiating and adjudicating personnel security and  suitability background investigations and periodic reinvestigations of  applicants. Within the DHS components, the component Chief Security  Officers implement established personnel security directives and policies  within their respective components.
The personnel security clearance process has also been the subject of  congressional oversight and statutory reporting requirements. Section  3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004  prompted government-wide suitability and security clearance reform. The  act required, among other matters, an annual report to Congress—in  February of each year from 2006 through 2011—about progress and key  measurements on the timeliness of granting security clearances. It  specifically required those reports to include the periods of time required  for conducting investigations and adjudicating or granting clearances.  However, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act  requirement for the executive branch to report annually on its timeliness  expired in 2011. More recently, the Intelligence Authorization Act of  2010 established a new requirement that the President annually report  to Congress the total amount of time required to process certain security  clearance determinations for the previous fiscal year for each element of   The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010  the Intelligence Community.additionally requires that those annual reports include the total number of  active security clearances throughout the United States government, to  include both government employees and contractors. Unlike the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 reporting  requirement, the requirement to submit these annual reports does not  expire.
section_title: Phases of the Personnel Security Process
paragraphs: To help ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel in positions  with access to classified information, executive branch agencies rely on a  personnel security clearance process that includes multiple phases:  requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication,  appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and  reinvestigation (where applicable, for renewal or upgrade of an existing  clearance). Figure 1 illustrates the steps in the personnel security  clearance process, which is representative of the general process  followed by most executive branch agencies and includes procedures for  appeals and renewals. While different departments and agencies may  have slightly different personnel security clearance processes, the phases  that follow are illustrative of a typical process. Since 1997, federal  agencies have followed a common set of personnel security investigative  standards and adjudicative guidelines for determining whether federal  civilian workers, military personnel, and others, such as private industry  personnel contracted by the government, are eligible to hold a security  clearance.
Executive branch agencies first determine which of their positions— military, civilian, or private-industry contractors—require access to  classified information and, therefore, which people must apply for and  undergo a personnel security clearance investigation. This involves  assessing the risk and sensitivity level associated with that position, to  determine whether it requires access to classified information and, if  required, the level of access. Security clearances are generally  categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential. The  level of classification denotes the degree of protection required for  information and the amount of damage that unauthorized disclosure could  reasonably be expected to cause to national defense.
A sound requirements process is important because requests for  clearances for positions that do not need a clearance or need a lower  level of clearance increase investigative workloads and costs. A high  volume of clearances continue to be processed and a sound  requirements determination process is needed to effectively manage  costs, since agencies spend significant amounts annually on national  security and other background investigations. In addition to cost  implications, limiting the access to classified information and reducing the  associated risks to national security underscore the need for executive  branch agencies to have a sound process to determine which positions  require a security clearance.
Agency heads are responsible for designating positions within their  respective agencies as sensitive if the occupant of that position could, by  virtue of the nature of the position, bring about a material adverse effect  on national security. In addition, Executive Order 12968, issued in 1995,  makes the heads of agencies—including executive branch agencies and  the military departments—responsible for establishing and maintaining an  effective program to ensure that access to classified information by each  employee is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. This  order also states that, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility for access  to classified information shall only be requested and granted on the basis  of a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. Further, part 732 of Title  5 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides requirements and  procedures for the designation of national security positions, which  include positions that (1) involve activities of the government that are  concerned with the protection of the nation from foreign aggression or  espionage, and (2) require regular use of or access to classified national  security information.
Part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations also states that  most federal government positions that could bring about, by virtue of the  nature of the position, a material adverse effect on national security must  be designated as a sensitive position and require a sensitivity level  designation. The sensitivity level designation determines the type of  background investigation required, with positions designated at a greater  sensitivity level requiring a more extensive background investigation. Part  732 establishes three sensitivity levels—special-sensitive, critical- sensitive, and noncritical-sensitive—which are described in figure 2.  According to OPM, positions that an agency designates as special- sensitive and critical-sensitive require a background investigation that  typically results in a top secret clearance. Noncritical-sensitive positions  typically require an investigation that supports a secret or confidential  clearance. OPM also defines non-sensitive positions that do not have a  national security element, and thus do not require a security clearance,  but still require a designation of risk for suitability purposes. That risk level  informs the type of investigation required for those positions. Those  investigations include aspects of an individual’s character or conduct that  may have an effect on the integrity or efficiency of the service.
Figure 2 illustrates the process used by both DOD and DHS to determine  the need for a personnel security clearance for a federal civilian position  generally used government-wide.
Once an applicant is selected for a position that requires a personnel  security clearance, the applicant must obtain a security clearance in order  to gain access to classified information. To determine whether an  investigation would be required, the agency requesting a security  clearance investigation conducts a check of existing personnel security  databases to determine whether there is an existing security clearance  investigation underway or whether the individual has already been  favorably adjudicated for a clearance in accordance with current  standards. If such a security clearance does not exist for that individual, a  security officer from an executive branch agency (1) requests an  investigation of an individual requiring a clearance; (2) forwards a  personnel security questionnaire (Standard Form 86) to the individual to  complete using OPM’s electronic Questionnaires for Investigations  Processing (e-QIP) system or a paper copy; (3) reviews the completed  questionnaire; and (4) sends the questionnaire and supporting  documentation, such as fingerprints and signed waivers, to OPM or its  investigation service provider.
subsections: section_title: Investigation Phase
paragraphs: During the investigation phase, investigators—often contractors—from  OPM’s Federal Investigative Services use federal investigative standards  and OPM’s internal guidance to conduct and document the investigation  of the applicant. The scope of information gathered in an investigation  depends on the needs of the client agency and the personnel security  clearance requirements of an applicant’s position, as well as whether the  investigation is for an initial clearance or a reinvestigation to renew a  clearance. For example, in an investigation for a top secret clearance,  investigators gather additional information through more time-consuming  efforts, such as traveling to conduct in-person interviews to corroborate  information about an applicant’s employment and education. However,  many background investigation types have similar components. For  instance, for all investigations, information that applicants provide on  electronic applications are checked against numerous databases. Both  secret and top secret investigations contain credit and criminal history  checks, while top secret investigations also contain citizenship, public  record, and spouse checks as well as reference interviews and an  Enhanced Subject Interview to gain insight into an applicant’s character.
Table 1 highlights the investigative components generally associated with  the secret and top secret clearance levels. After OPM, or the designated  provider, completes the background investigation, the resulting  investigative report is provided to the requesting agencies for their  internal adjudicators.
In December 2012, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence  (ODNI) and OPM jointly issued a revised version of the federal  investigative standards for the conduct of background investigations for  individuals that work for or on behalf of the federal government. According  to October 31, 2013 testimony by an ODNI official, the revised standards  will be implemented through a phased approach beginning in 2014 and  continuing through 2017.
section_title: Adjudication and Appeals Phases
paragraphs: During the adjudication phase, adjudicators from the hiring agency use  the information from the investigative report along with federal  adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a  security clearance.adjudicative guidelines specify that adjudicators consider 13 specific  areas that elicit information about (1) conduct that could raise security  concerns and (2) factors that could allay those security concerns and   To make clearance eligibility decisions, the  permit granting a clearance.weighing of a number of variables, to include disqualifying and mitigating  factors, known as the “whole-person” concept. For example, when a  person’s life history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness,  questions can arise as to whether the person can be relied on and trusted  to exercise the responsibility necessary for working in a secure  environment where protecting national security is paramount. As part of  the adjudication process, the adjudicative guidelines require agencies to  determine whether a prospective individual meets the adjudicative criteria  for determining eligibility, including personal conduct and financial  considerations. If an individual has conditions that raise a security  concern or may be disqualifying, the adjudicator evaluates whether there  are other factors that mitigate such risks (such as a good-faith effort to  repay a federal tax debt). On the basis of this assessment, the agency  may make a risk-management decision to grant the security-clearance  eligibility determination, possibly with a warning that future incidents of a  similar nature may result in revocation of access.
The adjudication process is a careful  If a clearance is denied or revoked, appeals of the adjudication decision  are generally possible. We have work underway to review the process for  security clearance revocations. We expect to issue a report on this  process in the spring of 2014.
section_title: Reinvestigation Phase
paragraphs: Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as  long as they remain in a position that requires access to classified  national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically  at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance. For  example, top secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 5 years,  and secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 10 years. Some of  the information gathered during a reinvestigation would focus specifically  on the period of time since the last approved clearance, such as a check  of local law enforcement agencies where an individual lived and worked  since the last investigation.
section_title: Agencies Do Not Consistently Assess Quality Throughout the Personnel Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout  the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not  fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key  aspects of the personnel security clearance process. To promote  oversight and positive outcomes, such as maximizing the likelihood that  individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely, we  have emphasized, since the late 1990s, the need to build and monitor  quality throughout the personnel security clearance process. While our  work historically was focused on DOD, particularly since we placed  DOD’s personnel security clearance program on our high-risk list in  2005 because of delays in completing clearances, we have included  DHS in our most recent reviews of personnel security clearance issues.  Having assessment tools and performance metrics in place is a critical  initial step toward instituting a program to monitor and independently  validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures.
subsections: section_title: Guidance Not Developed for Determining if Positions Require a Clearance or for Reviewing Existing Position Designations
paragraphs: In July 2012, we reported that the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent,  had not provided agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to  consistently determine if a position requires a personnel security  clearance, or established guidance to require agencies to review and  revise or validate existing federal civilian position designations. As a  result, we concluded that DHS and DOD, along with other executive  branch agencies, do not have reasonable assurance that security  clearance position designations are correct, which could compromise  national security if positions are underdesignated, or create unnecessary  and costly investigative coverage if positions are overdesignated.
In the absence of clear guidance, agencies are using a position  designation tool that OPM designed to determine the sensitivity and risk  levels of civilian positions that, in turn, inform the type of investigation  needed. This tool—namely, the Position Designation of National  Security and Public Trust Positions—is intended to enable a user to  evaluate a position’s national security and suitability requirements so as  to determine a position’s sensitivity and risk levels, which in turn dictate  the type of background investigation that will be required for the individual  who will occupy that position. Both DOD and DHS components use the  tool. In addition, DOD issued guidance in September 2011 and August  2012 requiring its personnel to use OPM’s tool to determine the proper  position sensitivity designation. A DHS instruction requires personnel to  designate all DHS positions—including positions in the DHS  components—by using OPM’s position sensitivity designation guidance,  which is the basis of the tool.
OPM audits, however, have found inconsistency in these position  designations, and some agencies described problems implementing  OPM’s tool. For example, during the course of our 2012 review, DOD and  DHS officials raised concerns regarding the guidance provided through  the tool and expressed that they had difficulty implementing it.  Specifically, officials from DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement stated that the use of the tool occasionally resulted in  inconsistency, such as over- or underdesignating a position, and  expressed a need for additional clear, easily interpreted guidance on  designating national security positions. DOD officials stated that they  have had difficulty implementing the tool because it focuses more on  suitability than security, and the national security aspects of DOD’s  positions are of more concern to them than the suitability aspects.  Further, although the DNI was designated as the Security Executive  Agent in 2008, ODNI officials noted that the DNI did not have input into  recent revisions of OPM’s position designation tool.
As a result, we recommended that the DNI, in coordination with the  Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate,  issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow  when determining if federal civilian positions require a personnel security  clearance. In written comments on our July 2012 report, the ODNI  concurred with this recommendation. In May 2013, ODNI and OPM jointly  drafted a proposed revision to the federal regulations on position  designation which, if finalized in its current form, would provide additional  requirements and examples of position duties at each sensitivity level. We  also recommended that once those policies and procedures are in place,  the DNI and the Director of OPM, in their roles as executive agents,  collaborate to revise the position designation tool to reflect the new  guidance. ODNI and OPM concurred with this recommendation and  recently told us that they are in the process of revising the tool.
In July 2012, we also reported that the executive branch did not have a  consistent process for reviewing and validating existing security clearance  requirements for federal civilian positions. According to Executive Order  12968, the number of employees that each agency determines is eligible  for access to classified information shall be kept to the minimum required,  and, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility shall be requested or granted  only on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. During  our 2012 review of several DOD and DHS components, we found that  officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security  clearances to a minimum but were not always subject to a standard  requirement to review and validate the security clearance needs of  existing positions on a periodic basis. We found, instead, that agencies’  policies provided for a variety of practices for reviewing the clearance  needs of federal civilian positions. In addition, agency officials told us that  their policies were implemented inconsistently.
DOD 5200.2-R, Department of Defense Personnel Security Program (January 1987,  reissued incorporating changes Feb. 23, 1996), as modified by Under Secretary of  Defense Memorandum, Implementation of the Position Designation Automated Tool (May  10, 2011). annually during the performance review process to ensure that the duties  and responsibilities on the position description are up-to-date and  accurate. However, officials stated that U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement does not have policies or requirements in place to ensure  any particular level of detail in that review.
During our 2012 review, DOD and DHS officials acknowledged that  overdesignating a position can result in expenses for unnecessary  investigations. When a position is overdesignated, additional resources  are unnecessarily spent conducting the investigation and adjudication of a  background investigation that exceeds agency requirements. Without a  requirement to consistently review, revise, or validate existing security  clearance position designations, we concluded that executive branch  agencies—such as DOD and DHS—may be hiring and budgeting for both  initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position  descriptions and security clearance requirements that do not reflect  national security needs. Moreover, since reviews were not being done  consistently, DOD, DHS, and other executive branch agencies did not  have reasonable assurance that they were keeping to a minimum the  number of positions that require security clearances on the basis of a  demonstrated and foreseeable need for access.
Therefore, we recommended in July 2012 that the DNI, in coordination  with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as  appropriate, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to  periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal  civilian positions. In written comments on that report, the ODNI concurred  with this recommendation and stated that as duties and responsibilities of  federal positions may be subject to change, it planned to work with OPM  and other executive branch agencies to ensure that position designation  policies and procedures include a provision for periodic reviews. OPM  stated in its written comments to our report that it would work with the DNI  on guidance concerning periodic reviews of existing designations.
ODNI and OPM are currently in the process of finalizing revisions to the  position designation federal regulation. As part of our ongoing processes  to routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior  recommendations, we note that the proposed regulation would newly  require agencies to conduct a one-time reassessment of position  designations within 24 months of the final regulation’s effective date,  which is an important step towards ensuring that the current designations  of national security positions are accurate. However, the national security  environment and the duties and descriptions of positions may change  over time, thus the importance of periodic review or validation. The  proposed regulation, if finalized in its current form, would not require a  periodic reassessment of positions’ need for access to classified  information as we recommended. We believe this needs to be done and,  as part of monitoring the status of our recommendation, we will continue  to review the finalized federal regulation and any related guidance that  directs position designation to determine whether periodic review or  validation is required.
section_title: Quality of OPM Investigative Reports Not Measured
paragraphs: As of August 2013, OPM had not yet implemented metrics to measure the  completeness of its investigative reports—results from background  investigations—although we have previously identified deficiencies in  these reports. OPM supplies about 90 percent of all federal clearance  investigations, including those for DOD. For example, in May 2009 we  reported that, with respect to DOD initial top secret clearances  adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM  investigative reports. We independently estimated that 87 percent of  about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make  clearance decisions were missing at least one type of documentation   The type of documentation  required by federal investigative standards.most often missing from investigative reports was verification of all of the  applicant’s employment, followed by information from the required  number of social references for the applicant and complete security  forms. We also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 investigative  reports did not contain a required personal subject interview. Officials  within various executive branch agencies have noted to us that the  information gathered during the interview and investigative portion of the  process is essential for making adjudicative decisions.
At the time of our 2009 review, OPM did not measure the completeness  of its investigative reports, which limited the agency’s ability to explain the  extent or the reasons why some reports were incomplete. As a result of  the incompleteness of OPM’s investigative reports on DOD personnel, we  recommended in May 2009 that OPM measure the frequency with which  its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards, so that the  executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete reports  and take corrective actions.recommendation.
OPM did not agree or disagree with our  In a subsequent February 2011 report, we noted that OMB, ODNI, DOD,  and OPM leaders had provided congressional members with metrics to  assess the quality of the security clearance process, including  investigative reports and other aspects of the process. Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations was one tool the  executive branch agencies planned to use for measuring quality, or  completeness, of OPM’s background investigations.according to an OPM official in June 2012, OPM chose not to use this  tool. Instead, OPM stated that it opted to develop another tool. In  following up on our 2009 recommendations, as of August 2013, OPM had  not provided enough details on its tool for us to determine if the tool had  met the intent of our 2009 recommendation, and included the attributes of  successful performance measures identified in best practices, nor could  we determine the extent to which the tool was being used.
GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2011). not reflect the quality of OPM’s total investigation workload. We are  beginning work to further review OPM’s actions to improve the quality of  investigations.
We have also reported that deficiencies in investigative reports affect the  quality and timeliness of the adjudicative process. Specifically, in  November 2010, we reported that agency officials who utilize OPM as  their investigative service provider cited challenges related to deficient  investigative reports as a factor that slows agencies’ abilities to make  adjudicative decisions. The quality and completeness of investigative  reports directly affects adjudicator workloads, including whether additional  steps are required before adjudications can be made, as well as agency  costs. For example, some agency officials noted that OPM investigative  reports do not include complete copies of associated police reports and  criminal record checks. Several agency officials stated that in order to  avoid further costs or delays that would result from working with OPM,  they often choose to perform additional steps internally to obtain missing  information. According to ODNI and OPM officials, OPM investigators  provide a summary of police and criminal reports and assert that there is  no policy requiring inclusion of copies of the original records. However,  ODNI officials also stated that adjudicators may want or need entire  records as critical elements may be left out of the investigator’s summary.  For example, according to Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals  officials, in one case, an investigator’s summary of a police report  incorrectly identified the subject as a thief when the subject was actually  the victim.
section_title: Some Steps Taken to Determine Completeness of Adjudicative Files
paragraphs: To address issues identified in our 2009 report regarding the quality of  DOD adjudications, DOD has taken some intermittent steps to implement  measures to determine the completeness of its adjudicative files. In 2009,  we reported that some clearances were granted by DOD adjudicators  even though some required data were missing from the OPM  investigative reports used to make such determinations. For example,  we estimated that 22 percent of the adjudicative files for about 3,500  initial top secret clearances that were adjudicated favorably did not  contain all the required documentation, even though DOD regulations  require that adjudicators maintain a record of each favorable and  unfavorable adjudication decision and document the rationale for granting  clearance eligibility to applicants with security concerns revealed during  the investigation. Documentation most frequently missing from  adjudicative files was the rationale for granting security clearances to  applicants with security concerns related to foreign influence, financial  considerations, and criminal conduct. At the time of our 2009 review,  DOD did not measure the completeness of its adjudicative files, which  limited the agency’s ability to explain the extent or the reasons why some  files are incomplete.
In 2009, we made two recommendations to improve the quality of  adjudicative files. First, we recommended that DOD measure the  frequency with which adjudicative files meet requirements, so that the  executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete files and  include the results of such measurement in annual reports to Congress  on clearances. In November 2009, DOD subsequently issued a  memorandum that established a tool to measure the frequency with which  adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. Specifically,  the DOD memorandum stated that it would use a tool called the Review  of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales, or RADAR, to  gather specific information about adjudication processes at the  adjudication facilities and assess the quality of adjudicative  documentation. In following up on our 2009 recommendations, as of  2012, a DOD official stated that RADAR had been used in fiscal year  2010 to evaluate some adjudications, but was not used in fiscal year 2011  due to funding shortfalls. DOD stated that it restarted the use of RADAR  in fiscal year 2012.
Second, we recommended that DOD issue guidance to clarify when  adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for  granting clearances. In response to our recommendation, DOD’s  November 2009 guidance that established RADAR also outlines the  minimum documentation requirements adjudicators must adhere to when  documenting personnel security clearance determinations for cases with  potentially damaging information. In addition, DOD issued guidance in  March 2010 that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete  investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. This guidance  provides standards that can be used for the sufficient explanation of  incomplete investigative reports.
section_title: Extent of Clearance Reciprocity Not Measured
paragraphs: Executive branch agencies have not yet developed and implemented  metrics to track the reciprocity of personnel security clearances, which is  an agency’s acceptance of a background investigation or clearance  determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative  agency, although some efforts have been made to develop quality  metrics. Executive branch agency officials have stated that reciprocity is  regularly granted, as it is an opportunity to save time as well as reduce  costs and investigative workloads; however, we reported in 2010 that  agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to  which reciprocity is granted government-wide. ODNI guidance requires,  except in limited circumstances, that all Intelligence Community elements  “accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations.”  Additionally, OMB guidance requires agencies to honor a clearance  when (1) the prior clearance was not granted on an interim or temporary  basis; (2) the prior clearance investigation is current and in-scope; (3)  there is no new adverse information already in the possession of the  gaining agency; and (4) there are no conditions, deviations, waivers, or  unsatisfied additional requirements (such as polygraphs) if the individual  is being considered for access to highly sensitive programs.
While the Performance Accountability Council has identified reciprocity as  a government-wide strategic goal, we have found that agencies do not  consistently and comprehensively track when reciprocity is granted, and  lack a standard metric for tracking reciprocity. Further, while OPM and  the Performance Accountability Council have developed quality metrics  for reciprocity, the metrics do not measure the extent to which reciprocity  is being granted. For example, OPM created a metric in early 2009 to  track reciprocity, but this metric only measures the number of  investigations requested from OPM that are rejected based on the  existence of a previous investigation and does not track the number of  cases in which an existing security clearance was or was not successfully  honored by the agency. Without comprehensive, standardized metrics to  track reciprocity and consistent documentation of the findings, decision  makers will not have a complete picture of the extent to which reciprocity  is granted or the challenges that agencies face when attempting to honor  previously granted security clearances.
In 2010, we reported that executive branch officials routinely honor other  agencies’ security clearances, and personnel security clearance  information is shared between OPM, DOD, and, to some extent,  Intelligence Community databases. agencies find it necessary to take additional steps to address limitations  with available information on prior investigations, such as insufficient  information in the databases or variances in the scope of investigations,  before granting reciprocity. For instance, OPM has taken steps to ensure  certain clearance data necessary for reciprocity are available to  adjudicators, such as holding interagency meetings to determine new  data fields to include in shared data. However, we also found that the  shared information available to adjudicators contains summary-level  detail that may not be complete. As a result, agencies may take steps to  obtain additional information, which creates challenges to immediately  granting reciprocity.
GAO-11-65. adjudicators, according to agency officials, a subject’s prior clearance  investigation and adjudication may not meet the standards of the inquiring  agency. Although OPM has developed some training, security clearance  investigators and adjudicators are not required to complete a certain type  or number of classes. As a result, the extent to which investigators and  adjudicators receive training varies by agency. Consequently, as we have  previously reported, agencies are reluctant to be accountable for  investigations and/or adjudications conducted by other agencies or  organizations. To achieve fuller reciprocity, clearance-granting agencies  seek to have confidence in the quality of prior investigations and  adjudications.
Consequently, we recommended in 2010 that the Deputy Director of  Management, OMB, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance  Accountability Council, should develop comprehensive metrics to track  reciprocity and then report the findings from the expanded tracking to  Congress. Although OMB agreed with our recommendation, a 2011 ODNI  report found that Intelligence Community agencies experienced difficulty  reporting on reciprocity. The agencies are required to report on a  quarterly basis the number of security clearance determinations granted  based on a prior existing clearance as well as the number not granted  when a clearance existed. The numbers of reciprocal determinations  made and denied are categorized by the individual’s originating and  receiving organizational type: (1) government to government, (2)  government to contractor, (3) contractor to government, and (4)  contractor to contractor. The report stated that data fields necessary to  collect the information described above do not currently reside in any of  the datasets available and the process was completed in an agency  specific, semi-manual method. Further, the Deputy Assistant Director for  Special Security of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted  in testimony in June 2012 that measuring reciprocity is difficult, and  despite an abundance of anecdotes, real data is hard to come by. To  address this problem, ODNI is developing a web-based form for  individuals to submit their experience with reciprocity issues to the ODNI.  According to ODNI, this will allow them to collect empirical data, perform  systemic trend analysis, and assist agencies with achieving workable  solutions.
section_title: Recent Efforts and Sustained Leadership Could Facilitate Progress in Assessing Quality
paragraphs: Several efforts are underway to review the security clearance process,  and those efforts, combined with sustained leadership attention, could  help facilitate progress in assessing and improving the quality of the  security clearance process. After the September 16, 2013 shooting at the  Washington Navy Yard, the President directed the Office of Management  and Budget, in coordination with ODNI and OPM, to conduct a  government-wide review into the oversight, nature, and implementation of  security and suitability standards for federal employees and contractors.  In addition, in September 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed an  independent review to identify and recommend actions that address gaps  or deficiencies in DOD programs, policies, and procedures regarding  security at DOD installations and the granting and renewal of security  clearances for DOD employees and contractor personnel. The primary  objective of this review is to determine whether there are weaknesses in  DOD programs, policies, or procedures regarding physical security at  DOD installations and the security clearance and reinvestigation process  that can be strengthened to prevent a similar tragedy.
As previously discussed, DOD and DHS account for the majority of  security clearances within the federal government. We initially placed  DOD’s personnel security clearance program on our high-risk list in 2005  because of delays in completing clearances. It remained on our list until  2011 because of ongoing concerns about delays in processing  clearances and problems with the quality of investigations and  adjudications. In February 2011, we removed DOD’s personnel security  clearance program from our high-risk list largely because of the  department’s demonstrated progress in expediting the amount of time   We also noted DOD’s efforts to develop and  processing clearances.implement tools to evaluate the quality of investigations and  adjudications.
Even with the significant progress leading to removal of DOD’s program  from our high-risk list, the Comptroller General noted in June 2012 that  sustained leadership would be necessary to continue to implement,  monitor, and update outcome-focused performance measures.initial development of some tools and metrics to monitor and track quality  not only for DOD but government-wide were positive steps; however, full  implementation of these tools and measures government-wide have not  yet been realized. While progress in DOD’s personnel security clearance  program resulted in the removal of this area from our high-risk list,  significant government-wide challenges remain in ensuring that personnel  security clearance investigations and adjudications are high-quality.  However, if the oversight and leadership that helped address the  timeliness issues focuses now on the current problems associated with  quality, we believe that progress in helping executive branch agencies to  assess the quality of the security clearance process could be made.
In conclusion, to avoid the risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of  classified information, oversight of the reform efforts to measure and  improve the quality of the security clearance process are imperative next  steps. The progress that was made with respect to expediting the amount  of time processing clearances would not have been possible without  committed and sustained congressional oversight and the leadership of  the Performance Accountability Council. Further actions are needed now  to fully develop and implement metrics to oversee quality at every step in  the process. We will continue to monitor the outcome of the agency  actions discussed above to address our outstanding recommendations.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the  Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgment
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S.  Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be  reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this testimony include David E. Moser (Assistant Director), Jim Ashley,  Renee S. Brown, Ryan D’Amore, and Michael Willems.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Personnel Security Clearances: Full Development and Implementation of  Metrics Needed to Measure Quality of Process. GAO-14-157T.  Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2013.
Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the  Process and Realize Efficiencies. GAO-13-728T. Washington, D.C.: June  20, 2013.
Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals  under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.:  April 19, 2013.
Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for  Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington,  D.C.: July 12, 2012.
Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can  Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. GAO-12-815T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2012.  2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and  Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.  GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to  Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings.  GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  16, 2011.
Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to  Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T.  Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve  Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum.  GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s  Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T.  Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and  Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide  Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T.  Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce  Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain  Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is  Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington,  D.C.: May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January  2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement.  GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts  to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington,  D.C.: September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of  Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.  GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January  2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
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