Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness
Published: 2011-06-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness--that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions--a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a previous, sensitive report..
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has identified numerous maritime capability gaps and developed documents that articulate a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness. However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that adequately defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps, aligns objectives with national strategy, and includes measures to guide the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts, and to assess and manage risk associated with capability gaps. GAO has previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and responsibilities, and measures performance against objectives. DOD and its components have developed a number of documents that incorporate some of these key elements of an overall strategy for maritime domain awareness such as a definition of the problem. However, collectively they do not have several key elements a strategy should contain. For example, neither DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept nor the DOD's Executive Agent Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans fully address organizational roles and responsibilities and resources, investments, performance measures, and risk management. Additionally, DOD leverages numerous capabilities to collect, fuse, and share maritime information to respond to global maritime challenges. DOD components have identified and started prioritizing capability gaps; however, DOD does not have a departmentwide risk assessment to address high priority capability gaps. DOD combatant commands and components prioritize maritime domain awareness differently based upon their respective missions and these component-level views may not provide a full view of the risks associated with these gaps at a departmentwide level. Prior GAO work has emphasized the importance of using a comprehensive risk assessment process. A strategy that includes a comprehensive, risk-based approach to managing maritime domain awareness may provide better information to decision makers about the potential implications of policy and resourcing decisions both within DOD and across the interagency. In the absence of a departmentwide strategy, DOD may not be effectively managing its maritime domain awareness efforts. This report is a publicly releasable version of a previously issued, sensitive report.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, aligns with DOD's corporate process, identifies capability resourcing responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability gaps and future investments. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Security threats to the United States from the maritime domain include the  naval forces of potential adversary nations as well as terrorism and piracy.  Historical and potential threats include the use of large merchant vessels  to transport weapons of mass destruction; explosive-laden suicide boats as  weapons; and vessels to smuggle people, drugs, weapons, and other  contraband. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and  on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats to U.S.  interests and persons. The September 2005 National Strategy for  Maritime Security identifies as a key national security requirement the  understanding of all the activities, events, and trends within the maritime  domain that could threaten the safety, security, economy, or environment  of the United States and its people.
The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain  awareness—that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with  sufficient awareness to counter those threats—a means for facilitating  effective action in the maritime domain. DOD does not consider maritime  domain awareness to be a distinct mission, but rather an enabler for the  range of military operations performed in the maritime domain. Maritime  domain awareness is also a critical supporting pillar for DOD’s maritime  homeland defense mission and for the execution of the National Military  Strategy of the United States of America. In addition, the February 2010  Quadrennial Defense Review called for DOD and its interagency partners  to more comprehensively monitor the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber  domains for potential direct threats to the United States. As we have  previously reported, the federal government is facing serious long-term  fiscal challenges, and DOD may confront increased competition over the  next decade for federal discretionary funds. In this environment, it will be  increasingly important for DOD decision makers to evaluate competing  priorities and alternatives to determine the most cost-effective solutions  for providing needed capabilities, including capabilities to enhance  maritime domain awareness.
The federal government has actively sought to enhance maritime security  and has established entities dedicated to maritime domain awareness.  DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of  Transportation have all appointed executive agents for the federal  government’s maritime domain awareness efforts. No single department,  agency, or entity holds all of the authorities and capabilities necessary to  fully achieve effective maritime domain awareness, and the cost  associated with maritime domain awareness efforts is spread across  multiple agencies, making the total cost difficult to determine. In addition,  resources and funding for maritime capabilities can come from a number  of sources including national intelligence funding, military intelligence  funding, military service funding, and funding from other interagency  partners such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border  Protection. Additionally, the intelligence community’s diverse  organizational cultures, funding arrangements, requirements processes,  and missions that DOD supports present a challenge for DOD in  prioritizing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities,  including capabilities that support maritime domain awareness.
Combatant commands use maritime domain awareness to support their  key missions. For example, for U.S. Northern Command and North  American Aerospace Defense Command, maritime domain awareness is  critical for meeting the maritime homeland defense and maritime warning  missions, respectively. For U.S. Pacific Command, maritime domain  awareness supports overall awareness of its extremely large area of  responsibility, including location of friendly forces, force projection, and  theater security. U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task  Force-South both use maritime intelligence capabilities to aid in locating  and tracking highly mobile illicit traffickers.
DOD considers the ability to monitor activity around the globe in order to  identify unknown threats to be a key aspect of maritime domain  awareness. The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness  refers to this ability as persistent monitoring, which is defined as the  integrated management of a diverse set of collection and processing  capabilities, operated to detect and understand the activity of interest to  expeditiously assess adversary actions, predict adversary plans, deny  sanctuary to an adversary, and assess results of U.S. and partner actions.
DOD relies on both its own and national intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance assets to provide comprehensive intelligence to the joint  warfighting forces.
Our prior work relating to maritime domain awareness focused on the role  of the U.S. Coast Guard, which uses maritime domain awareness  particularly to protect U.S. ports and waterways. You asked us to examine  DOD’s current and planned maritime domain awareness capabilities and  maritime homeland defense efforts. This is a public version of a sensitive  report, issued in November 2010 and examines the extent to which DOD  has developed a strategy and uses a risk-based approach to manage its  maritime domain awareness efforts. This version omits information on  specific DOD intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities;  capability gaps; and operations. As we agreed with your offices, we will  address maritime homeland defense and report separately in 2011 on those  issues.
To address this objective, we analyzed national and DOD maritime domain  awareness planning documents; interviewed DOD and partner agency  maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits to  facilities, such as operations centers and combatant commands engaged in  maritime domain awareness and homeland defense activities. We selected  these visits based on interviews with DOD officials and reviews of relevant  maritime domain awareness policy and strategy documents and combatant  command documents. To determine the extent to which DOD has  developed a strategy to guide implementation of maritime domain  awareness, we assessed information in the Department of Defense  Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept and the DOD  Executive Agent’s Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual  Maritime Domain Awareness Plans 2009 against our prior work on  desirable characteristics of national strategies. We also assessed the  documents against information obtained from interviews with combatant  command, Navy, intelligence agency, and Coast Guard officials. In  addition, we evaluated DOD efforts to allocate resources, measure  performance, and monitor progress in addressing maritime domain  awareness capability gaps. We compared information found in relevant  DOD and DOD component-level plans and strategies with GAO criteria on  management best practices. To determine what capabilities DOD currently  uses to support maritime domain awareness, what gaps still exist, and how  these gaps are prioritized, we assessed information we received in  interviews and site visits with combatant command, military service, and  supporting intelligence agencies’ officials. We compared this information  with capability needs established in national guidance such as the  National Strategy for Maritime Security and the National Plan to  Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness and DOD guidance such as the  Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept and DOD  Directive 2005.02E, which establishes DOD policy for maritime domain  awareness. We reviewed prior GAO work on risk management and  compared it to existing DOD maritime domain awareness capability  documents to determine the extent to which DOD applies a risk-based  approach to managing capabilities related to maritime domain awareness.  Appendix I provides additional details regarding the scope and  methodology of this report.
We conducted this performance audit primarily from June 2009 through  November 2010, and coordinated with DOD from January to June 2011 to  produce this public version of the prior, sensitive report issued in  November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD Shares Responsibility for Maritime Domain Awareness with Other Interagency Partners
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has emphasized the  need for a coordinated response to maritime threats. In December 2004,  the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 41 (NSPD- 41)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13), Maritime  Security Policy, defining maritime domain awareness as the effective  understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain  that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the  United States. NSPD-41/HSPD-13 also directed the Secretaries of Defense  and of Homeland Security to jointly lead an interagency effort to prepare a  National Strategy for Maritime Security to align all federal government  maritime security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive and  cohesive national effort involving appropriate federal, state, local, and  private sector entities.
Interagency coordination for maritime domain awareness is primarily  exercised within the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee,  which reports to the National Security Council Deputies Committee. A  Maritime Domain Awareness Stakeholders Board consists of  representatives from all departments and the intelligence community  advises the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee through its  Executive Steering Committee. DOD, the Department of Homeland  Security, and the Department of Transportation have all appointed  executive agents for maritime domain awareness who, together with a  representative of the intelligence community, constitute the Maritime  Domain Awareness Stakeholder Board Executive Steering Committee.
DOD Directive 2005.02E establishes policy and roles and responsibilities  for maritime domain awareness within DOD. This directive designated the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as Office of the Secretary of  Defense Principal Staff Assistant to oversee the activities of the DOD  Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness and designated the  Secretary of the Navy as the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain  Awareness. In addition, the directive establishes several management  functions that the Executive Agent is required to conduct for maritime  domain awareness, including:    Overseeing the execution of maritime domain awareness initiatives  within DOD and coordinating maritime domain awareness policy with  the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy);    Developing and distributing goals, objectives, and desired effects for  maritime domain awareness, in coordination with the Under Secretary  of Defense (Policy) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence);  Identifying and updating maritime domain awareness requirements and  resources for the effective performance of DOD missions; and    Recommending DOD-wide maritime domain awareness planning and  programming guidance to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and  the Director of Programming, Analysis, and Evaluation (now the Office  of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation).
The Secretary of the Navy issued an instruction in January 2009 that  assigned the Chief of Naval Operations with responsibility for achieving  maritime domain awareness within the Navy. This responsibility includes  aligning Navy guidance with DOD policy guidance and coordinating with  the Joint Staff to ensure that combatant commands have the necessary  Navy resources to support their respective maritime domain awareness  requirements.
In May 2009, the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness  requested that the Joint Staff solicit maritime domain awareness annual  plans from the military services, combatant commands, and defense  intelligence components, as required by DOD Directive 2005.02E. In  December 2009, the DOD Executive Agent completed an assessment of  DOD components’ annual maritime domain awareness plans. The effort  was intended to provide the Executive Agent with a “horizontal look” at  maritime domain awareness concerns across DOD. The Executive Agent  used information from the plans to: (1) gather program and project  priorities, (2) formulate and update overarching DOD maritime domain  awareness goals and objectives, (3) craft programming and planning  recommendations, and (4) synchronize and align combatant command and  component efforts and resources. The DOD Executive Agent is currently  conducting an assessment of 2010 component plans.
DOD relies on organizations both within and outside of the department to  achieve maritime domain awareness. The Office of Naval Intelligence is a  core element of Global Maritime Intelligence Integration, whose goal is  complete maritime domain awareness and their primary mission is to  produce meaningful maritime intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence  produces a Common Operating Picture and Common Intelligence Picture,  both of which are compiled from multiple sources of intelligence. The  Office of Naval Intelligence, together with the Coast Guard’s Intelligence  Coordination Center, compiles and provides a list of vessels of interest to  DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components. In  addition, the National Maritime Intelligence Center, created by the  Director of National Intelligence, serves as the integration point for  maritime information and intelligence collection and analysis in support of  national policy and decision makers, maritime domain awareness  objectives, and interagency operations at all levels.
section_title: DOD Leverages Numerous Capabilities to Collect, Fuse, and Share Maritime Information to Respond to Global Maritime Challenges
paragraphs: DOD, combatant commands, and joint task forces leverage numerous  capabilities to enhance maritime domain awareness, including  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection platforms;  intelligence fusion and analysis; and information sharing and  dissemination. These capabilities assist DOD in responding to the range of  maritime challenges, some of which are identified in figure 1.
A range of platforms, such as sensors on naval vessels and aircraft,  provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection  capabilities. Once maritime domain awareness related data is collected,  fusion and analysis capabilities assist DOD combatant commands and  joint task forces to combine data from a variety of sources to provide  information that may include location, course, destination, cargo, crew,  and passengers of a given vessel. In addition, DOD uses a number of  capabilities to promote the sharing and dissemination of maritime domain  awareness information. For example, the Maritime Safety and Security  Information System uses an existing, worldwide vessel safety system—the  Automatic Information System—to produce an unclassified, Internet- based, password-protected ship tracking system. Currently, more than 50  nations participate in the Maritime Safety and Security Information  System. In addition, DOD is working with other international partners to  set up more advanced networks to share information.
To validate joint warfighting requirements, including those associated with  maritime domain awareness, DOD uses its Joint Capabilities Integration  and Development System. The primary objective of the system is to ensure  the capabilities required by the joint warfighter are identified with their  associated operational performance criteria in order to successfully  execute assigned missions. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council  oversees this system and Functional Capabilities Boards, headed by a  general, admiral, or government civilian equivalent, support the council by  evaluating capability needs, recommending enhancements, examining  joint priorities, and minimizing duplication of effort across the  department. There are eight Functional Capabilities Boards: Battlespace  Awareness, Building Partnerships, Command and Control, Force  Application, Force Support, Logistics, Net-Centric, and Protection.
section_title: DOD Identified Numerous Maritime Capability Gaps, but Does Not Have a Comprehensive, Departmentwide Strategy to Manage Risk Associated with These Capability Gaps and Guide Future Investments
paragraphs: DOD has articulated a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness and  identified numerous maritime capability gaps through various documents.  However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that adequately  defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps, aligns objectives  with national strategy, and includes measures to guide the implementation  of maritime domain awareness efforts, measure progress, and assess and  manage risk associated with capability gaps.
subsections: section_title: DOD Strategy Documents Does Not Have Departmentwide Objectives, Identify Roles and Responsibilities, and Align with National Strategies
paragraphs: We previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy that  lays out goals and objectives, identifies actions for addressing those  objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and responsibilities, and  measures performance against objectives. The federal government, DOD,  and its components have developed a number of documents that  incorporate some of these key elements of an overall strategy for maritime  domain awareness. Examples include the following:    The National Strategy for Maritime Security broadly identifies threats  to maritime security and strategic objectives and actions needed to  achieve maritime security.
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is  intended to guide the execution of the security plans tasked in NSPD- 41/HSPD-13. It supports the National Strategy for Maritime Security  by outlining broad goals, objectives, threats, and priorities in order to  coordinate maritime domain awareness efforts at the federal level.
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command worked with the  Joint Staff to develop DOD’s Maritime Domain Awareness Joint  Integrating Concept to, among other things, provide a common vision  for the future of maritime domain awareness related operations within  DOD, identify maritime domain awareness capabilities and tasks and  conditions for each capability, and inform future capability analyses.
The DOD’s Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness  completed an annual assessment of maritime domain awareness plans  prepared by several DOD commands, military services, and defense  intelligence components. The assessment organized the analyzed  information from the plans into three critical areas where it determined  that DOD must focus and expand its efforts: increased information  sharing, enhanced situational awareness, and enhanced data on  vessels, cargo, and people.
We found that these documents and others DOD and the Navy have  developed demonstrate a considerable amount of effort toward defining  and organizing DOD’s maritime domain awareness efforts, but we  determined that they do not have several key elements that a strategy  should contain. DOD’s Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating  Concept and the Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual  Maritime Domain Awareness Plans are two of the key documents used  to guide current maritime domain awareness efforts and execute the  national strategies. Table 1 summarizes the desirable characteristics of a  strategy and compares the elements contained in DOD’s Maritime  Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept and the DOD Executive  Agent’s Assessment of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime  Domain Awareness Plans 2009.
DOD and its components have completed or are developing additional  efforts that may assist the department in organizing its maritime domain  awareness efforts. The Department of the Navy developed a strategy for  maritime domain awareness in response to a congressional committee  report requirement, and several draft maritime domain awareness  roadmaps to guide the Navy’s implementation of maritime domain  awareness. Additionally, as of November 2010, the Chief of Naval  Operation’s Information Dominance Office was developing a Navy  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Roadmap that outlines the  Navy’s vision for capabilities needed to fulfill its missions and priorities,  including maritime domain awareness. As of November 2010, U.S. Pacific  Command was in the process of drafting a maritime domain awareness  concept of operations. This concept of operations is intended to provide a  common understanding of intelligence support to maritime domain  awareness throughout the combatant command. In June 2010, an  interagency working group issued the Current State Report, a reference  document which identifies maritime domain awareness tasks, capabilities  gaps, and ongoing efforts related to each gap. Finally, in July 2010, the  DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness developed  maritime domain awareness planning and programming  recommendations, which were based, among other things, on the 2009  annual maritime domain awareness plans submitted by DOD components  to the Executive Agent. While these efforts may help the individual  components work towards more effective maritime domain awareness,  developing a departmentwide strategy that clearly outlines objectives and  roles and responsibilities will better position DOD to align more detailed  objectives with national strategies and coordinate the results of ongoing  and future efforts across the department.
section_title: National and DOD Strategy Documents Also Do Not Have Provisions for Allocating Resources, Measuring Performance, and Monitoring Progress
paragraphs: As part of the overall framework for successful strategies, prior GAO work  has also emphasized the importance of allocating resources, measuring  performance, and monitoring progress as sound management practices  critical for decision making and achieving results in specified time  frames.
While DOD, its interagency partners, and other DOD components have  identified numerous capability gaps, DOD does not have a risk-based  approach for assessing its maritime capabilities and gaps. Although some  interagency-level and DOD component-level documents have prioritized  maritime domain awareness capability gaps in comparison to other  maritime gaps, the identified gaps have not been allocated resources  within DOD. Additionally, DOD does not measure performance and  monitor progress in implementing maritime domain awareness and  addressing these gaps.
We assessed a number of DOD and interagency documents to determine  the extent to which resource allocation and performance measurement  were incorporated and found mixed results. Examples include:    National Maritime Domain Awareness Interagency Investment  Strategy. DOD representatives collaborated with interagency  stakeholders to develop a document that identified critical tasks and  recommended lead and supporting federal agency stakeholders to  coordinate interagency activities to address these tasks. However, the  Interagency Investment Strategy is not what is traditionally considered  an investment strategy with developed cost estimates or proposed  dollar amounts for each agency to invest. Instead, it identifies critical  capability gaps and makes recommendations on areas for interagency  efforts. For example, it recommended that DOD work with DHS and  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to establish national  data standards for maritime domain awareness.  Interagency Solutions Analysis Current State Report. The Current  State Report provides the status of maritime domain awareness  capability gaps, solutions, and tools in use to address those gaps and  the effectiveness of those solutions to mitigate the gaps. This document  is an output of the Interagency Solutions Analysis Working Group, a  group of interagency subject matter experts that are comparing current  capabilities against scenarios that required, among other things,  information sharing and other capabilities in the maritime domain. The  DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness, the  Department of the Navy, and the Office of Naval Intelligence  participated in this process. However, this document does not identify  resources to address identified gaps. Additionally, this document does  not provide metrics to assess performance or monitor progress in  addressing identified gaps.
Department of Defense Maritime Domain Awareness Joint  Integrating Concept. This document identifies required capabilities,  associated tasks, and the DOD joint capability area for each required  capability and each associated task. However, it does not identify  how resources should be targeted to address the capabilities and tasks  nor does it assign specific components within DOD to address each  capability and task. Additionally, this document does not contain  milestones for measuring progress in addressing the capability gaps  and tasks will be measured.
Assessment of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime  Domain Awareness Plans 2009. The DOD Executive Agent solicited  maritime domain awareness annual plans from DOD combatant  commands, military services, and defense intelligence components.  The plans outlined each component’s planned maritime domain  awareness capabilities and described current gaps. The Executive  Agent assessed the plans and listed critical areas for expanded focus  and efforts. However, several DOD components did not submit plans,  so the assessment may not include departmentwide data. Also, as  identified in table 1, this assessment does not incorporate several key  elements that would help guide DOD’s implementation of maritime  domain awareness including an allocation of resources and  investments, performance measures, and a mechanism to monitor  progress.
Department of the Navy Initial Capabilities Document for Data  Fusion and Analysis Functions of Navy Maritime Domain  Awareness. This 2009 Navy document summarized a capabilities-based  assessment that identified capability shortfalls and recommended  approaches to improve Navy’s overall maritime domain awareness  capability. According to some DOD officials this initial capabilities  document reflects the Navy’s view, but not necessarily the views of  other DOD components and interagency stakeholders. For example,  many Navy maritime domain awareness documents are Navy-centric  and it is unclear how they align with interagency efforts. Lastly, the  Navy initial capabilities document does not resource identified gaps.
These documents articulated broad strategic goals for maritime domain  awareness and identified several critical capability gaps; however, DOD  has not allocated resources to these efforts. Additionally, the Department  of the Navy initial capabilities document, DOD’s Maritime Domain  Awareness Joint Integrating Concept, and the National Maritime Domain  Awareness Working Group Interagency Investment Strategy gaps were  separately approved by DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council, but  DOD has not developed a departmentwide capability gap assessment for  approval by the council. We also previously reported that the requirements  determination process is more focused on the needs of military services  than the joint warfighter, and combatant commands and defense  intelligence agency needs are often not incorporated into this process. A  departmentwide strategy, including a capability gap assessment, would  assist DOD in assessing and prioritizing maritime domain awareness  capability gaps that have already been identified through various service  and interagency efforts in order to integrate them into its corporate  processes—such as the Joint Capabilities Integration Development  System—for determining requirements and allocating resources.
subsections: section_title: Multiple DOD and Interagency Documents Have Identified Maritime Capability Gaps Primarily in the Areas of Collection, Fusion and Analysis, and Information Sharing
paragraphs: Interagency maritime domain awareness documents identified maritime  capability gaps and designated DOD as the lead agency to address some of  these gaps. For example, in October 2005, the National Plan to Achieve  Maritime Domain Awareness identified numerous near- and long-term  maritime domain awareness priorities relating to maritime capabilities,  and listed DOD as the lead agency for 22 of these priorities. In May 2007,  the National Maritime Domain Awareness Requirements and Capabilities  Working Group developed the National Maritime Domain Awareness  Study Interagency Investment Strategy, which prioritized capability  gaps. The Interagency Investment Strategy listed DOD as the lead or co- lead agency to address a majority of the prioritized gaps. The Maritime  Domain Awareness Steering Executive Steering Committee approved an  execution plan for a maritime domain awareness Interagency Solutions  Analysis which would develop a coordinated, interagency approach for  addressing previously identified gaps. In April 2010, the Interagency  Solutions Analysis Working Group decided to focus immediate efforts on  closing existing gaps related to information about the three areas of  people, cargo, and vessels for the interagency group to initially address.
In addition to interagency efforts, DOD and Navy documents have  identified maritime domain awareness capability gaps related to the  department’s ability to collect, analyze, and share information on maritime  vessels. For example, DOD’s Maritime Domain Awareness Joint  Integrating Concept identified required capabilities that the joint forces  will need to address in order to conduct future operations to develop and  maintain awareness of the maritime domain. In addition, DOD is  conducting a Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept  capabilities-based assessment that is considering current and programmed  capabilities through 2012 in addition to projections of future programs. An  initial capabilities document for this assessment was approved on  November 29, 2010. This capabilities-based assessment is also intended to  validate the Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept and  provide a baseline of maritime domain awareness elements to inform  interagency efforts.
Key themes have emerged through the identification of capability gaps in  several national, interagency, and department documents that DOD may  need to address to support maritime domain awareness. DOD components  have also identified maritime domain awareness capability gaps. While  initial capability assessments share common themes, there has not been a  departmentwide prioritization of these capability gaps. As DOD  components start developing solutions for these gaps and allocating  resources, the absence of a departmentwide prioritization may result in  unnecessary duplication of efforts or redundancy in addressing shared  capability gaps. A departmentwide prioritization, determined by a  comprehensive, risk-based approach would assist decision makers in more  effectively allocating resources to the joint forces departmentwide and  contribute to interagency efforts to prioritize maritime capability gaps.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive, Risk-Based Approach to Assessing Maritime Domain Awareness Capability Gaps
paragraphs: DOD has not assessed the risk associated with its maritime capability  gaps, in addition to not prioritizing these gaps. As we have previously  reported, an agency’s strategic plan should, among other things, address  risk-related issues that are central to the agency’s mission. To provide a  basis for analyzing these risk management strategies, we have developed a  framework based on industry best practices and other criteria. This  framework, shown in figure 2, divides risk management into five major  phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining  constraints; (2) assessing risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for addressing  these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and (5)  implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and  results achieved.
Even though DOD, its interagency partners, and its components have  made efforts to identify and start prioritizing capability gaps, DOD does  not have a departmentwide risk assessment to address high priority  capability gaps. DOD Directive 2005.02E, which establishes the  department’s policy for maritime domain awareness, states that the  department will determine its resource priorities and awareness levels  needed to persistently monitor the maritime domain. The 2010  Quadrennial Defense Review states that risk management is central to  effective decision-making. As shown in table 1, we have previously  reported that risk assessment and risk management are desirable  characteristics of national strategies. We have described risk assessments  as including an analysis of threats to, and vulnerabilities of, critical assets  and operations. The results of risk assessments may be used to define and  prioritize related resource and operational requirements.
Currently, maritime domain awareness is prioritized through various  mechanisms across DOD, instead of through a departmentwide approach.  For example, DOD’s combatant commands and components prioritize  maritime domain awareness differently based upon their respective  missions. Additionally, when prioritizing capabilities across DOD,  maritime domain awareness falls into multiple capability areas. For  example, according to DOD documents and DOD officials, maritime  domain awareness capabilities are assessed under multiple joint capability  areas and functional capability boards through the Joint Capabilities  Integration and Development System process. Figure 3 illustrates this.
The various interagency and DOD views on capability gaps and priorities  may not provide a full assessment of the risks associated with these gaps  at a departmentwide level. Table 2 illustrates that current DOD-wide  documents do not meet all of GAO’s criteria for a risk assessment. Prior  GAO work has cited that while principles of risk management  acknowledge that risk generally cannot be eliminated altogether,  enhancing protection from known or potential threats can serve to  significantly reduce risk.
Efforts such as The Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating  Concept and Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Maritime  Domain Awareness Plans have demonstrated DOD’s progress in  identifying capability gaps related to maritime domain awareness, but have  not been included in a larger, departmentwide maritime domain  awareness risk assessment. As a result, DOD may lack the insight needed  to actively manage the risk associated with identified capability gaps.
Additionally, because maritime domain awareness is a broad interagency  effort, DOD may be unable to effectively coordinate with its interagency  partners in the absence of a clear departmentwide strategy for maritime  domain awareness. Consolidating these component efforts to prioritize  capability gaps into a comprehensive departmentwide approach to risk  management may facilitate developing solutions for each gap. A strategy  that includes a comprehensive, risk-based approach to managing maritime  domain awareness, including a departmentwide assessment of the critical  capabilities, may also provide better information to decision makers about  the potential implications of policy and resourcing decisions both within  DOD and across the interagency.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Our prior work has shown that a strategy including goals, roles, and  responsibilities; resource allocation; and performance measures can help  ensure that agencies are supporting national and interagency objectives.  Achieving maritime domain awareness requires cooperation across a  range of agencies throughout the federal, state, and local levels. DOD has a  lead role in maritime domain awareness both because it serves as a key  enabler for its own maritime activities and because DOD is positioned to  provide so many of the resources which assist other agencies in meeting  their respective maritime domain awareness needs. It is important that  DOD components’ efforts are consolidated together and aligned amongst  each other to ensure that departmentwide maritime domain awareness  needs are met and appropriate contributions to the efforts of its  interagency partners are made. In the absence of a departmentwide  strategy for maritime domain awareness, including the prioritized  allocation of resources to maritime domain awareness, measures of  performance in meeting the goals and objectives, monitoring of progress  in addressing capability gaps, and assessing risk, DOD may not be  effectively managing its maritime domain awareness efforts. Efforts on the  part of DOD combatant commands, military services, the DOD Executive  Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness, and interagency working groups  resulted in the identification of several capability gaps, some identified by  multiple components. The next step in achieving effective departmentwide  maritime domain awareness would be a departmentwide strategy and risk  assessment that incorporates these efforts. As DOD and the rest of  government face increasing demand and competition for resources,  policymakers will confront difficult decisions on funding priorities.  Threats to the maritime domain are numerous and include the use of large  merchant vessels to transport weapons of mass destruction; explosive- laden suicide boats as weapons; and vessels to smuggle people, drugs,  weapons, and other contraband. The importance and vulnerabilities of the  maritime domain require that efforts be made to reduce the risk of  maritime threats and challenges, such as a terrorist attack or acts of  piracy. Additionally, a comprehensive, risk-based approach would help  DOD capitalize on the considerable effort it and its components have  already devoted to maritime domain awareness, make the best use of  resources in a fiscally constrained environment, and contribute to  interagency efforts to address maritime threats. A strategic, risk-based  approach is particularly important in light of emerging threats in the  maritime domain and an increased strain on government resources. Such a  departmentwide approach will provide DOD with important tools that can  assist in confronting the myriad policy and fiscal challenges the  department faces.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s ability to manage the implementation of maritime  domain awareness across DOD we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, as DOD’s Executive Agent, to  take the following two actions:    Develop and implement a departmentwide strategy for maritime  domain awareness that, at a minimum  Identifies DOD objectives and roles and responsibilities within DOD  for achieving maritime domain awareness, and aligns efforts and  objectives with DOD’s corporate process for determining  requirements and allocating resources; and  Identifies responsibilities for resourcing capability areas and  includes performance measures for assessing progress of the  overall strategy that will assist in the implementation of maritime  domain awareness efforts.
In collaboration with other maritime interagency stakeholders, such as  the Coast Guard and the National Maritime Intelligence Center,  perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis to include consideration  of threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities relating to the management  of maritime domain awareness in order to prioritize and address DOD’s  critical maritime capability gaps and guide future investments.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of the prior, sensitive report, DOD  concurred with our recommendations and discussed actions they are  taking—or plan to take—to address them. DOD’s written comments are  reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided technical  comments, which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.
In concurring with the first recommendation, DOD stated that they have  completed the initial policy, goals, and objectives for maritime domain  awareness and promulgated it in a document to all DOD components.  DOD also stated their intent to identify responsibilities for resourcing  capability gaps and performance measures for assessing progress in  achieving maritime domain awareness. DOD identified further steps it is  taking to establish objectives for maritime domain awareness, assign  appropriate roles and responsibilities, and conduct a second assessment  of annual maritime domain awareness plans to inform DOD’s overall effort  to develop a departmentwide strategy. We believe these actions will  address the intent of our recommendation and better enable DOD to  address maritime capability gaps.
DOD also concurred with our second recommendation. DOD stated that it  will collaborate with the other principal members of the National Maritime  Domain Awareness Coordination Office to develop a comprehensive, risk- based approach for maritime domain awareness. The DOD Executive  Agent is also requesting that DOD components include risk assessments in  their annual maritime domain awareness plans. We believe these actions  will address the intent of our recommendation and help DOD prioritize its  maritime capability gaps and guide future investment decisions.
We are distributing this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary  of the Navy, and other relevant DOD officials. We are also sending copies  of this report to interested congressional committees. The report is also  available on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We were initially asked to look at four questions: (1) to what extent has  the Department of Defense (DOD) developed the capability to perform  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities in the  maritime domain; (2) to what extent has DOD integrated the maritime  domain awareness investment strategy into its overall ISR capability  investment strategy; (3) to what extent does DOD have operational plans,  planning and coordination structures in place to meet maritime domain  awareness and maritime homeland defense requirements; and (4) what  gaps, if any, exist in DOD’s ability to identify maritime threats, achieve  fusion of information sources from interagency and international partners,  coordinate a response, and deploy forces to address identified threats at  all relevant distances from the United States. We agreed with the  requesters to respond to this request with two reports. The first report  focuses on maritime capabilities and the second report will focus on  maritime homeland defense. However, we considered the homeland  defense perspective when we determined our site visits so we could gather  relevant data on maritime homeland defense where possible and feasible  to support the second report. As a result, we focused the scope of this  audit on geographic combatant commands that had both a maritime focus  and a homeland defense mission set. We determined that U.S. Northern  Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command met this  criteria, and we conducted site visits to a facilities, such as operations  centers, engaged in both maritime domain awareness and homeland  defense that support these combatant commands.
To determine what capabilities DOD currently uses to support maritime  domain awareness, what gaps still exist and how these gaps are  prioritized, we assessed capability needs established in national guidance  such as the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness and  DOD guidance such as the Joint Integrating Concept and DOD Directive  2005.02E, which establishes DOD policy for maritime domain awareness.  We compared this information with current capabilities and gaps  described by combatant command, military service, and supporting  intelligence agency’s officials during interviews and site visits. For  example, we visited several combatant and joint operation centers to  observe what capabilities were used at maritime operations centers. In  addition, we evaluated DOD’s efforts to prioritize capability gaps against  established DOD acquisition processes such as the Joint Capabilities  Integration and Development System. We reviewed prior GAO work on  risk management and compared it to existing DOD maritime domain  awareness capability documents to determine the extent to which DOD  applies a risk-based approach to managing capabilities and identified gaps  related to maritime domain awareness.
To determine the extent to which DOD developed a strategy to address  maritime domain awareness capability gaps, we reviewed prior GAO work  on strategic planning including GAO’s work on assessing specific  components of national strategies. Given that there is no established set of  requirements for strategies, we relied on GAO assessments of national  strategies and the criteria that were applied to assess these strategies. We  identified six desirable characteristics that national or departmentwide  strategies should contain. We assessed these criteria against existing DOD  and component-level documents such as the Joint Integrating Concept,  the DOD Executive Agent’s Assessment of the U.S. Defense Components  Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans 2009, and the Department of  the Navy’s capability assessment and roadmaps to determine the extent to  which these documents contain the elements of a departmentwide  strategy. We specifically focused our assessment on the two  departmentwide efforts to identify a maritime domain awareness strategy,  DOD’s Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept and  DOD’s Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness’s Assessment of  U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans  2009. To determine the extent to which DOD has allocated resources,  measured performance and monitored progress in addressing identified  capability gaps, we reviewed the same documents noted above to see if  identified gaps were resourced within DOD, and if implementation and  monitoring programs were discussed in relation to these gaps. We also  assessed the information described in these documents against  information obtained from combatant command, military service, and  supporting intelligence agency’s officials during interviews and site visits.
To evaluate our reporting objectives, we obtained relevant national,  interagency, and DOD-level documentation and interviewed officials from  the following DOD components and interagency partners:    Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and  America’s Security Affairs    Defense Intelligence Agency    Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency    Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)    Joint Chiefs of Staff    Department of the Navy    Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N3/N5)    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Information Dominance  Division (N2/N6)
Office of the Chief Information Officer    Office of Naval Intelligence    Office of Naval Research    U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet    U.S. Navy Third Fleet    Naval Air Systems Command    Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command    Combatant Commands    Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command    Headquarters, U.S. Northern Command    Headquarters, North American Aerospace Defense Command    Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command    Headquarters, Fleet Forces Command    Joint Forces Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and  Reconnaissance, U.S. Strategic Command    The United States Coast Guard    Headquarters    District Five, Sector Hampton Roads    District Eleven, Sector San Diego  Intelligence Coordination Center    Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (Atlantic Area)    Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (Pacific Area)    Joint Harbor Operations Center, Port of San Diego    The Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness / National  Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office  We conducted this performance audit primarily from June 2009 through  November 2010, and coordinated with DOD from January to June 2011 to  produce this public version of the prior, sensitive report issued in  November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum (Assistant  Director), Alisa Beyninson, Christy Bilardo, Stephen Caldwell, Gina  Flacco, Brent Helt, Greg Marchand, Timothy Persons, Steven Putansu,  Amie Steele, and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report.