United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve Lasting Results
Published: 2005-03-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.N. regular budget for the 2004-2005 biennium exceeded $3 billion for the first time. In light of the organization's increasing demands, the U.N. Secretary General and member states have called on the Secretariat to better define priorities and eliminate outdated activities. In response, the Secretary General launched major reform initiatives in 1997 and 2002, and we reported on the status of these efforts in February 2004. Audits and investigations of the U.N. Oil for Food program have also brought attention to recurring management weaknesses. As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States has a strong interest in the completion of the Secretary General's reforms. GAO provides observations on areas for U.N. reform based on our 2004 report and our continuing review of the Oil for Food program, including our analysis of internal audit reports and other documents.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The United Nations needs sustained oversight at all levels of the organization to achieve lasting results on its reform agenda. We reported in 2004 that the Secretariat had made progress in implementing 51 percent of the Secretary General's 1997 and 2002 management reform initiatives. However, we found that more than one-quarter of the completed reforms only consisted of developing plans or establishing new offices--the first steps in achieving longer term reform goals. In addition, the Secretariat had not periodically conducted comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of its reforms. Accordingly, the Secretariat had not been able to determine what progress had been made or where future improvements were needed. A t the program level, management reviews that compare actual performance to expected results are critical elements of effective oversight and accountability. The United Nations has completed the initial phase of implementing reforms in a key area--performance-based budgeting. It adopted a budget that reflects a result-based budgeting format, including specific program costs, objectives, expected results, and performance indicators to measure results. However, the United Nations has yet to implement the next critical step in performance-based budgeting--a system to monitor and evaluate program impact or results. Program reviews that compare actual performance to expected outcomes are important for accounting for resources and achieving effective results. A strong internal audit function provides additional oversight and accountability through independent assessments of U.N. activities, as demonstrated by audits of the U.N Oil for Food program. U.N. internal auditors found recurring management weaknesses in 58 audits it conducted over 5 years. However, constraints on their scope and authority prevented the auditors from examining and reporting widely on problems in the Oil for Food program. U.N. oversight bodies did not obtain timely reporting on serious management problems and were unable to take corrective actions when needed. These constraints limited the internal audit unit's effectiveness as an oversight tool. GAO plans to conduct more detailed work on the role of the internal auditors in upcoming engagements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our review of the United Nations’  (U.N.) reform efforts.
The U.N. regular budget for the 2004-2005 biennium exceeded $3 billion  for the first time. In light of increasing demands, the U.N. Secretary  General and member states called on the Secretariat to better define  priorities and eliminate outdated activities. The Secretary General  responded with major reform initiatives in 1997 and 2002. Investigations of  the U.N. Oil for Food program have also brought attention to recurring  management weaknesses. As its largest financial contributor, the United  States has a strong interest in the completion of U.N. reforms.
Today, I will provide observations on U.N. reform efforts based on our  2004 report and our continuing review of the Oil for Food program,  including our analysis of internal audit reports and other documents.
To address these objectives, we reviewed our February 2004 report on  progress in implementing reforms and updated information where  possible.  We also drew upon information from our previous reports of  the Oil for Food program, including our analysis of internal audit reports  and other documents.
In accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, we  conducted our work on the status of U.N. reforms from June 2003 through  January 2004, updated information in February 2005, and conducted work  on the Oil for Food program from January through February 2005.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In July 1997, the Secretary General proposed a broad reform program to  focus the United Nations on achieving results as it carried out its  mandates. These reforms included restructuring U.N. leadership and  operations, developing a human capital system based on results, and  introducing a performance-based programming and budgeting process.  Although the Secretary General does not have direct authority over  specialized agencies and many funds and programs, changes at the  Secretariat were intended to serve as a model for reforms throughout the  U.N. system. The Secretary General launched a second round of reforms in  2002 that expanded on the 1997 initiatives and reflected new areas of  focus, such as public information activities and the human rights program.  The overall goal was to align U.N. activities with the priorities defined by  the Millennium Declaration and the new security environment.
The 1997 and 2002 initiatives followed several efforts to reform the United  Nations that began soon after its creation in 1945. Despite periodic cycles  of reform, U.N. member states have continued to have concerns about  inefficient operations; problems of fragmentation, duplication, and poor  coordination; and the proliferation of mandates. These calls have also  highlighted the need for more accountable leadership and improvement in  key management practices. As the largest financial contributor to the  United Nations, the United States has a strong interest in the completion  of these reforms and has played a significant role in promoting financial,  administrative, and programmatic changes. The State Department and the  U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations continue to promote further  reforms and report on the status of major reform initiatives to the U.S.  Congress.
The call for reforms has also grown as a result of problems identified in  the United Nations’ management of the Oil for Food program. Last year we  reported that the former Iraqi government obtained $10.1 billion through  oil smuggling and illicit commissions and surcharges on commodity and  oil contracts. The Iraq Survey Group, responsible for investigating Iraq’s  activities in developing weapons of mass destruction, estimated illicit  revenues at $10.9 billion and found similar irregularities in contract  overpricing and surcharges. In April 2004, the Secretary General  established the U.N. Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC) to investigate  allegations of mismanagement and misconduct within the Oil for Food  program. In February 2005, the IIC issued an interim report on the initial  procurement of U.N. contractors, recipients of oil allocations, internal  audit structure and activities, and management of administrative  expenses. The Committee offered numerous recommendations for  improving the United Nations’ internal audit function.
section_title: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Lasting Results
paragraphs: Sustained oversight at all levels of the organization is needed for the  United Nations to advance its reform agenda and achieve lasting results.  The United Nations had completed 51 percent of its 1997 and 2002 reform  initiatives. However, it has not periodically conducted comprehensive  assessments to determine the status and impact of the reforms.  Consequently, the Secretariat could not determine if it was meeting the  Secretary General’s overall reform goals.
subsections: section_title: Reforms under the Secretary General’s Authority Advanced More Quickly
paragraphs: The Secretary General launched two major reform initiatives, in 1997 and  2002, to address the United Nation’s core management challenges—poor  leadership of the Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and  programs, and the lack of accountability for staff performance. In  assessing the status of these reforms, we found that the United Nations  had made some progress in implementing these initiatives, putting in place  51 percent of all reforms. We found that 60 percent of the 88 reform  initiatives in the 1997 agenda and 38 percent of the 66 reforms in the 2002  agenda were in place.
The 1997 agenda consisted of initiatives that the Secretary General could  implement on his own authority and those that required member states’  approval. The implementation of reforms under the Secretary General’s  authority advanced more quickly than those under the authority of  member states. We found that 70 percent of reform initiatives under the  Secretary General’s authority were in place, compared with 44 percent of  the initiatives requiring member state approval. Delays in acquiring  member state approval are due, in part, to the longer time needed for the  General Assembly to reach agreement from the majority.
In addition, many reform efforts comprise only the first step in achieving  longer-term goals. More than one-quarter of the Secretary General’s  completed reforms in both the 1997 and 2002 agendas consisted of  developing a written plan or establishing a new office. Although the  establishment of a new office or department—such as the office to  manage the U.N.’s interrelated programs to combat crime, drugs, and  terrorism—can be counted as a completed reform, it is the office’s  performance in meeting its objectives that will determine its impact and  the extent to which it contributes to the Secretary General’s overall reform  goals.
section_title: Periodic Assessments Are Not Conducted So Impact of Reforms Is Unclear
paragraphs: We also reported that the Secretariat had not conducted systematic,  comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of the Secretary  General’s 1997 and 2002 reform initiatives. Without such assessments, the  Secretariat was not able to determine what progress had been made and  where further improvements were needed. Individual departments and  offices within the Secretariat tracked reforms that related to their specific  area of work. OIOS also monitored and evaluated the impact of selected  reforms but was not responsible for overseeing the implementation of the  overall reform agendas. In addition, the Deputy Secretary General, who is  responsible for overseeing the overall reform process, neither  systematically assessed departments’ performance in implementing  reforms nor held managers directly accountable. The office of the Deputy  Secretary General had only one full-time professional staff member  dedicated to reform issues. In 1998 and 2003, the Secretary General issued  status reports on the 1997 and 2002 reforms, respectively. These reports  did not cover all of the initiatives in the respective reform plans or include  comprehensive assessments of the reforms.
In February 2005, we contacted the Office of the Deputy Secretary General  to determine recent actions it has taken to report on the status and impact  of the Secretary General’s reform initiatives. An official stated that the  office has conducted an internal assessment but has not released this  document to member states. The Secretary General announced his  intention to submit additional reform proposals to improve the  organization’s transparency and accountability before a September 2005  summit of world leaders.
Holding staff accountable for implementing these reforms and measuring  their impact is difficult without regular, comprehensive reports on the  overall status and impact of reform initiatives. Adopting key practices in  management, oversight, and accountability for reforms, such as systematic  monitoring and evaluation, could facilitate the achievement of the  Secretary General’s overall reform goals.
section_title: Performance-Based Budgeting Had Begun but Lacked Monitoring and Evaluation
paragraphs: At the program level, management reviews that compare actual  performance to expected outcomes are critical elements of effective  oversight and accountability. The United Nations has completed the initial  phase of implementing reforms in a key area—performance-based  budgeting. It adopted a budget that reflects a result-based budgeting  format, including specific program costs, objectives, expected results, and  performance indicators to measure results. However, it has yet to develop  a system to regularly monitor and evaluate program results to shift  resources to more effective programs. Program reviews that compare  actual performance to expected outcomes are important to account for  resources and achieve effective results.
subsections: section_title: Secretariat Has First Element of Performance- Based Budgeting in Place
paragraphs: We reported in February 2004 report that the United Nations had begun to  adopt a performance-based budgeting system. A performance-based  budgeting framework includes three key elements: (1) a budget that  reflects a budgeting structure based on results, linking budgeted activities  to performance expectations; (2) a system to regularly monitor and  evaluate the impact of programs; and (3) procedures to shift resources to  meet program objectives. In December 2000, the Secretariat implemented  the first key element of a performance-based budgeting framework by  adopting a budget that reflects a results-based budgeting format, including  specific program costs, objectives, expected results, and performance  indicators to measure the results. For the first time, the 2004-2005 budget  included specific performance targets and baseline data for many  performance indicators that can help measure performance over time and  allow program managers to compare actual achievements to expected  results. However, oversight committees have reported that some programs  still lacked clear and concise expected outcomes and performance  indicators.
Further, although the United Nations had developed measures for  assessing program progress, many of these measures represent tasks and  outputs rather than outcomes. For example, in 2003, a key objective of the  peacekeeping operation in East Timor was to increase the capacity of the  national police force to provide internal security. The indicator for  measuring results was the number of police trained—a goal of 2,830 police  by 2004. We reported, however, that the number of police trained did not  reflect the quality of their training or whether they improved security in  East Timor.
subsections: section_title: A Monitoring and Evaluation System Had Not Been Developed
paragraphs: The Secretariat had not systematically monitored and evaluated program  impact or results—the second element of performance budgeting. In 2002,  the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) found that nearly half of  U.N. program managers did not comply with U.N. regulations to regularly  monitor and evaluate program performance. Program managers were not  held accountable for meeting program objectives because U.N. regulations  prevented linking program effectiveness and impact with program  managers’ performance. OIOS did not provide statistics on the number or  percentage of program managers complying with U.N. regulations  regarding monitoring and evaluation activities in its most recent report on  the Secretariat’s evaluation efforts. However, OIOS reported that  program managers did not develop comprehensive monitoring and  evaluation plans in 12 out of 20 programs surveyed, and management  review of evaluations was inconsistent among programs.
OIOS also reported that, overall, evaluation findings were not used to  improve program performance. In some cases, such as with the Office of  the High Commissioner for Human Rights, monitoring and evaluation  responsibilities were assigned to low-level staff with minimal oversight  from program managers. Further, for the majority of programs, no  resources had been assessed or allocated for monitoring and evaluation  activities. As a result, it is unlikely that the Secretariat will meet its goal of  implementing a full performance-based budgeting system by 2006.
The final component of performance budgeting—procedures to review  evaluation results, eliminate obsolete programs, and shift resources to  other programs—was not in place. The Advisory Committee on  Administrative and Budgetary Questions reported in 2003 that it did not  receive systematic information from the Secretariat on program impact  and effectiveness to determine whether a program was meeting its  expected results. In 2004, the Committee for Program and Coordination  recommended that the Secretariat improve its monitoring and evaluation  system to measure impact and report on results. In December 2003, the  General Assembly approved the elimination of 912 of more than 50,000  outputs in the 2004-2005 program budget based on the Secretariat’s review  of program activities. However, in 2003, the Advisory Committee on  Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Committee for Program  and Coordination reported that many sections in the budget still lacked  justifications for continuing certain outputs. The committees  recommended that program managers in the Secretariat identify obsolete  outputs in U.N. budgets in compliance with U.N. regulations so resources  could be moved to new priority areas.
Our February 2004 report contained recommendations to promote full  implementation and accountability of the Secretary General’s overall  actions. Specifically, we recommended that the United States work with  other member states to encourage the Secretary General to (1) report  regularly on the status and impact of the 1997 and 2002 reforms and other  reform that may follow, (2) differentiate between short- and long-term  goals and establish time frames for completion, and (3) conduct  assessments of the financial and personnel implications needed to  implement the reforms.
section_title: U.N. Oil for Food Program
paragraphs: In addition to a systematic monitoring and evaluation system, a strong  internal audit and evaluation function can provide the independent  assessments needed to help ensure oversight and accountability. OIOS  provides this service through audits, evaluations, inspections, and  investigations of U.N. funds and programs. This office provided detailed  oversight of many aspects of the Oil for Food program, and its 58 reports  point to the need for continued U.N. attention to management reforms.  Specifically, reports by the internal auditors and the Independent Inquiry  Commission revealed lax oversight of Oil for Food program contracts that  resulted in repeated violations of procurement rules and weaknesses in  contract management. In addition, constraints on the internal auditors’  scope and authority prevented the auditors from examining and reporting  more widely on some critical areas of the Oil for Food program. U.N.  oversight bodies did not obtain timely reporting on serious management  problems and were unable to take corrective actions when needed. These  constraints limited the internal audit unit’s effectiveness as an oversight  tool.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Oversight Allowed Procurement Violations and Poor Contract Management
paragraphs: Our review of the OIOS audit reports of the Oil for Food program released  in January 2005 identified 702 findings and 667 recommendations across  numerous programs and sectors.  OIOS found recurring problems in  procurement, financial and asset management, personnel and staffing,  project planning and coordination, security, and information technology.  The findings in these audits, which were conducted from 1999 to 2004,  suggested a lack of oversight and accountability by the offices and entities  audited. In particular, we identified 219 findings and 212 recommendations  related to procurement and contract management deficiencies.
In February 2005, the IIC also reported that the initial procurement of  three major Oil for Food contracts awarded in 1996 did not meet  reasonable standards of fairness and transparency. The IIC reported that it  will make recommendations concerning greater institutional transparency  and accountability in a later report. OIOS also conducted audits of three  key contracts for inspecting commodities coming into Iraq and for  independent experts to monitor Iraq’s oil exports. OIOS’ findings in the  management of two of these contracts supplemented the IIC’s information  on the bidding and awarding process. The IIC found that the initial  selection process did not conform to competitive bidding rules, while  OIOS found lax oversight by the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program (OIP)  over contractor performance.
subsections: section_title: IIC Found Lack of Compliance with Procurement Regulations
paragraphs: The IIC reviewed three major contracts awarded in 1996 to determine if  their selections were free from improper influence and were conducted in  accordance with U.N. regulations. These contracts were awarded to  Lloyd’s Register Inspection Ltd. to inspect humanitarian goods coming  into Iraq, Saybolt Eastern Hemisphere BV to inspect oil exported from  Iraq, and Banque National de Paris to maintain revenues from Iraqi oil  sales.
In its February 2005 report, the IIC found that the United Nations initiated  expedited competitive bidding processes for both the humanitarian goods  and oil inspection contracts. The IIC concluded that, during the bid  process, the U.N. Iraq Steering Committee and the Chief of the Sanctions  Branch prejudiced and preempted the competitive process by rejecting the  lowest qualified bidder in favor of an award to Lloyd’s Register. The IIC  found that the regular bidding process was tainted when the branch chief  provided a diplomat from the United Kingdom with insider information on  the bid amount that Lloyd’s Register needed to win the contract.
Similarly, the IIC found that a U.N. procurement officer allowed Saybolt to  amend its bid to become the lowest bidder. The IIC characterized the  bidding process for this contract as neither fair nor transparent.
The IIC also found irregularities in the award of a contract to Banque  National de Paris. The decision did not conform to the U.N. requirement to  award contracts to the lowest acceptable bidder, and no official justified  the rejection of the lowest acceptable bidder in writing, as required by  U.N. regulations.
section_title: OIOS Found Weaknesses in Procurement and Contract Oversight
paragraphs: OIOS conducted audits of the Lloyd’s Register and Saybolt contracts as  well as the contract to Cotecna Inspection SA, the company that  succeeded Lloyd’s Register for the inspection of humanitarian goods.
In a July 1999 audit of the Lloyd’s Register contract, OIOS found  contractor overcharges, unverified invoices, violations of procurement  regulations, and limited U.N. oversight. For example, while the contract  allowed the United Nations to inspect and test all contractor services, the  auditors found that OIP had received, certified, and approved the  contractor’s invoices without on-site verification or inspection reports. In  responding to the auditors findings, OIP rejected the call for on-site  inspections and stated that any dissatisfaction with the contractor’s  services should come from the suppliers or their home countries.
A July 2002 audit of Saybolt’s operation found similar problems, including  inadequate documentation for contractor charges and payments made for  equipment already included in the contractor’s daily staff cost structure.  As with the Lloyd’s Register contract, OIOS found that OIP officials  charged with monitoring the Saybolt contract had made no inspection  visits to Iraq but had certified the contractor’s satisfactory compliance  with the contract and approved extensions to the contract.
In an April 2003 report, OIOS cited concerns about amendments and  extensions to Cotecna’s original $4.9 million contract. Specifically, OIOS  found that OIP increased Cotecna’s contract by $356,000 4 days after the  contract was signed. The amendment included additional costs for  communication equipment and operations that OIOS asserted were  included in the original contract. In addition, OIOS found that the contract  equaled the offer of the second lowest bidder through amendments and  extensions during the contract’s first year. Accordingly, OIOS concluded  that, one year after the start of the contract, the reason for awarding the  contract to Cotecna—on the grounds that it was the lowest bidder—was  no longer valid.
In addition to the three inspection contracts, OIOS reported procurement  weaknesses in other areas of the Oil for Food program. For example, in  November 2002, OIOS reported that almost $38 million in procurement of  equipment for the U.N.-Habitat program was not based on a needs  assessment. As a result, 51 generators went unused from September 2000  to March 2002, and 12 generators meant for project-related activities were  converted to office use. OIOS further reported that 11 purchase orders  totaling almost $14 million showed no documentary evidence supporting  the requisitions.
section_title: Effectiveness of Internal Oversight Was Limited by Budgeting and Reporting Constraints
paragraphs: In 1994, the General Assembly established OIOS to conduct audits,  evaluations, inspections, and investigations of U.N. programs and funds.  Its mandate reflects many characteristics of U.S. inspector general offices  in purpose, authority, and budget. For example, OIOS staff have access to  all U.N. records, documents, or other material assets necessary to fulfill  their responsibilities.
We reported in 1997 that OIOS was in a position to be operationally  independent, had overcome certain start-up problems, and had developed  policies and procedures for much of its work. We could not test whether  OIOS exercised its authority and implemented its procedures in an  independent manner because OIOS did not provide us with access to  certain audit and investigation reports and its working papers. However,  we concluded that OIOS could do more to help ensure that the  information it presents, the conclusions it reaches, and the  recommendations it makes can be relied upon as fair, accurate, and  balanced. The IIC also made a number of recommendations in January  2005 to help provide OIOS’ audit division with the mandate, structure, and  support it needs to operate effectively.
The IIC found a need for greater reporting and budgetary independence  for OIOS and its internal audit division. This division has two funding  sources: (1) the U.N. regular budget, which covers normal, recurring audit  activities; and (2) extra-budgetary funds allocated outside the U.N. regular  budget, which cover audits of special non-recurring funds and programs,  such as the Oil for Food program. OIOS’ internal audit division received  extra-budgetary funds directly from the Oil for Food program managers it  audited. It assigned 2 to 6 auditors to cover the program. The IIC found  that this level of staffing was low compared to OIOS’ oversight of  peacekeeping operations and to levels recommended by the U.N. Board of  Auditors.
The IIC found that the practice of allowing executive directors of funds  and programs the right to approve the budgets and staffing of internal  audit activities can lead to critical and high risk areas being excluded from  internal audit examination and review by oversight bodies. For example:    Since its inception, OIOS has generally submitted its audit reports only to  the head of the audited agency. However, in August 2000 OIOS tried to  widen its report distribution by sending its Oil for Food reports to the  Security Council. However, the OIP director opposed this proposal, stating  that it would compromise the division of responsibility between internal  and external audit. The Deputy Secretary General also denied the request,  and OIOS subsequently abandoned any efforts to report directly to the  Security Council.
OIOS did not examine OIP’s oversight of the contracts for humanitarian  goods in central and southern Iraq that accounted for almost $40 billion in  Oil for Food proceeds. OIP was responsible for examining these contracts  for price and value at its New York headquarters. The Iraqi government’s  ability to negotiate contracts directly with commodity suppliers was an  important factor in enabling Iraq to levy illegal commissions. OIOS  believed that these contracts were outside its purview because the  Security Council’s sanctions committee was responsible for their approval.  However, OIP management also steered OIOS toward program activities in  Iraq rather than headquarters functions where OIP reviewed the  humanitarian contracts.
In May 2002, OIP’s executive director did not approve the auditors’ request  to conduct a risk assessment of OIP’s Program Management Division,  citing financial reasons. We reported last year that it was unclear how  certain entities involved in the Oil for Food program, including OIP,  exercised their oversight responsibilities over humanitarian contracts and  sanctions compliance by member states. Such an assessment might have  clarified OIP’s oversight role and the actions it was taking to carry out its  management responsibilities.
In 2002, the U.N. Compensation Commission challenged OIOS’ audit  authority. In its legal opinion, the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs noted that  the audit authority extended to computing the amounts of compensation  but did not extend to reviewing those aspects of the panels’ work that  constitute a legal process. However, OIOS disputed the legal opinion,  noting that its mandate was to review and appraise the use of U.N.  financial resources. OIOS believed that the opinion would effectively  restrict any meaningful audit of the claims process. OIOS identified more  than $500 million in potential overpayments by the Commission. However,  as a result of the legal opinion, the Commission did not respond to many  OIOS observations and recommendations, considering them beyond the  scope of an audit.
Constraints on the internal auditors’ scope and authority prevented the  auditors from examining and reporting more widely on problem areas in  the Oil for Food program. These limitations hampered the auditors’  coverage of the Oil for Food program and its effectiveness as an oversight  tool. U.N. oversight bodies did not obtain timely reporting on serious  management problems and were unable to take corrective actions when  needed. However, in December 2004, the General Assembly required OIOS  to include in its annual and semi-annual reports titles and brief summaries  of all OIOS reports issued during the reporting period and to provide  member states with access to original versions of OIOS reports upon  request. The IIC also recommended that OIOS and its internal audit  division directly report to a non-executive board and that budgets and  staffing levels for all audit activities be submitted to the General Assembly  and endorsed by an independent board.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The Secretary General’s announcement that he intends to offer a U.N.  reform agenda in September 2005 offers the United Nations an opportunity  to take a more strategic approach to management reform. A systematic  review of the status of the 154 reforms begun in 1997 and 2002 and  information from the Oil for Food program would allow the Secretary  General to develop a comprehensive, prioritized agenda for continued  U.N. reform. We also encourage continued attention to our February 2004  recommendation that the United States work with other member states to  encourage the Secretary General to report regularly on the status of  reform efforts, prioritize short- and long-term goals, and establish time  frames to complete reforms.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee members may have.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202) 512- 8979. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony and the  reports on which it was based are Phyllis Anderson, Leland Cogliani, Lynn  Cothern, Katie Hartsburg, Jeremy Latimer, Tetsuo Miyabara, Michael  Rohrback, and Audrey Solis.
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