Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces
Published: 2009-01-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and with the Department of State (State), directs international efforts to train and equip Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As part of these efforts, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Navy spent about $120 million to procure small arms and light weapons for ANSF. International donors also provided weapons. GAO analyzed whether Defense can account for these weapons and ensure ANSF can safeguard and account for them. GAO reviewed Defense and State documents on accountability procedures, reviewed contractor reports on ANSF training, met with U.S. and Afghan officials, observed accountability practices, analyzed inventory records, and attempted to locate a random sample of weapons.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Defense did not establishclear guidance for U.S. personnel to follow when obtaining, transporting, and storing weapons for the Afghan National Security Forces, resulting in significant lapses in accountability. While Defense has accountability requirements for its own weapons, including serial number tracking and routine inventories, it did not clearly specify whether they applied to ANSF weapons under U.S. control. GAO estimates USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC could not provide serial numbers, and GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain records on the location or disposition of about 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A also did not maintain reliable records for about 135,000 weapons it obtained for ANSF from 21 other countries. Accountability lapses occurred throughout the supply chain and were primarily due to a lack of clear direction and staffing shortages. During our review, CSTC-A began correcting some shortcomings, but indicated that its continuation of these efforts depends on staffing and other factors. Despite CSTC-A's training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and account for weapons and sensitive equipment. Defense and State have deployed hundreds of trainers and mentors to help ANSF establish accountability practices. CSTC-A's policy is not to issue equipment without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units' ability to account for weapons, mentors have reported major accountability weaknesses, which CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute to a variety of cultural and institutional problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As part of international efforts to train and equip the Afghan National  Army and the Afghan National Police, collectively referred to as the  Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the U.S. Department of Defense  (Defense) obtained and provided or intends to provide about 380,000 small  arms and light weapons, as well as other equipment and supplies. Defense  and 21 donor nations report the value of these weapons at over  $223 million. Given the unstable security conditions in Afghanistan, the  risk of loss and theft of these weapons is significant.
The United States has provided most of the U.S.-procured weapons to  Afghanistan using an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)  program, which is managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency  (DSCA) in cooperation with other U.S. military organizations, including  the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Navy  International Programs Office (IPO). Defense purchased weapons using  funds appropriated by Congress for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund,  funds drawn down under authority provided in the Afghan Freedom  Support Act, and Foreign Military Financing funds. The Combined  Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a joint service,  coalition organization under the command and control of Defense’s U.S.  Central Command, is primarily responsible for the training and equipping  of ANSF with support from the Department of State (State). As part of  that responsibility, CSTC-A receives and stores weapons provided by the  United States and international donors and distributes them to ANSF  units. In addition, CSTC-A is responsible for conducting U.S. government  security assistance activities in Afghanistan, including monitoring the end  use of U.S.-procured weapons and other sensitive equipment.
At your request, we reviewed the accountability for weapons that Defense  obtained, transported, stored, and distributed to ANSF. In particular, we  examined (1) whether Defense can account for weapons intended for  ANSF, and (2) the extent to which CSTC-A has ensured that ANSF can  properly safeguard and account for weapons and other sensitive  equipment issued to ANSF.
To address these objectives, we reviewed documentation and interviewed  officials from Defense, U.S. Central Command, CSTC-A, USASAC, and  Navy IPO. On the basis of records provided to us, we compiled detailed  information on weapons reported as shipped to CSTC-A in Afghanistan by  the United States and other countries from June 2002 through June 2008.  We traveled to Afghanistan in August 2008 to examine records and meet  with officials at CSTC-A headquarters, visit the two central depots where  the weapons provided for ANSF are stored, and meet with staff at an  Afghan National Army unit that had received weapons. While in  Afghanistan we attempted to determine the location or disposition of a  random sample of weapons in order to reach general conclusions about  CSTC-A’s ability to account for weapons purchased by the United States  for ANSF. We also discussed equipment accountability with cognizant  officials from the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, the U.S.  Embassy, and contractors involved in building ANSF’s capacity to account  for and manage its weapons inventory. We also met with officials from  Defense’s Office of Inspector General to discuss an audit it had completed  relating to weapons accountability in Afghanistan during 2008 and  reviewed the related report.
We performed our work from November 2007 through January 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. A detailed description of our scope and  methodology is included in appendix I of this report.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government provided  approximately $16.5 billion for the training and equipping of Afghan  National Security Forces. State and Defense officials told us they will  request over $5.7 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police in  fiscal year 2009. The goal of these efforts is to transfer responsibility for  the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the  Afghan government. As part of this effort, from June 2002 through June  2008, CSTC-A obtained about 380,000 small arms and light weapons from  the United States and other countries for the Afghan army and police. The  United States purchased over 240,000 of these weapons for about  $120 million and shipped them to Afghanistan beginning in December  2004. Also, CSTC-A reported that it coordinated the donation of about  135,000 additional weapons from 21 countries, which valued their  donations at about $103 million (see app. II). Figure 1 illustrates the  number of weapons obtained for ANSF by USASAC, Navy IPO, and  international donors since June 2002.
The United States and international donors have provided rifles, pistols,  machine guns, grenade launchers, shotguns, rocket-propelled grenade  launchers, and other weapons. About 80 percent of the U.S.-procured  weapons were “non-standard” weapons, which are not typically supplied  by Defense. Many non-standard weapons, including about 79,000 AK-47  rifles, were received from former Warsaw Pact countries or were  obtained from vendors in those countries. (See fig. 2 for details on U.S.- procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan for ANSF.)
USASAC and Navy IPO procured most of the 242,000 weapons for ANSF  through an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program  referred to by Defense as “pseudo-FMS.” As in traditional FMS,  pseudo-FMS procurements are overseen by DSCA. However, in contrast to  traditional FMS procurements, for Afghanistan, Defense primarily used  funds appropriated by the Congress for the Afghanistan Security Forces  Fund to purchase weapons to train and equip ANSF. USASAC procured  about 205,000 (85 percent) of these weapons, including about  135,000 non-standard weapons purchased from four U.S.-based  contractors. Navy IPO provided the remaining 37,000 (15 percent) M-16  rifles for the Afghan National Army.
After procuring weapons for ANSF, Defense or its contractors transported  them to Afghanistan by air, and CSTC-A received the weapons at Kabul  International Airport. The Afghan National Army transported the  weapons from the airport to one of two central storage depots in Kabul— one for the Afghan National Army and another for the Afghan National  Police. Due to the limited operational capacity of the Afghan army and  police and the extremely hostile environment in which they operate,  CSTC-A retains control and custody of the weapons provided by the  United States and international donors during storage at the central depots  until the weapons are issued to ANSF units. In addition to maintaining the  security and control of weapons stored at the central depots, CSTC-A  trains ANSF in inventory management and weapons accountability. To this  end, the central depots are staffed by U.S. and coalition military personnel,  U.S. contractors, contract Afghan staff, and ANSF personnel.
According to DSCA officials, equipment provided to ANSF is subject to  end use monitoring, which is meant to provide reasonable assurances  that the ANSF is using the equipment for its intended purposes. CSTC-A  serves as the security assistance organization (SAO) for Afghanistan, with  responsibility for monitoring the end use of U.S.-procured weapons and  other equipment provided to ANSF, among other security assistance  duties.
DSCA’s Security Assistance Management Manual provides guidance for  end use monitoring, which is classified as either “routine” or “enhanced,”  depending on the sensitivity of the equipment and other factors, as  follows:  Routine end use monitoring. For non-sensitive equipment provided to a  trusted partner, DSCA guidance calls for SAOs to conduct routine  monitoring in conjunction with other required security assistance duties.  As such, according to DSCA officials, DSCA expects SAOs to record  relevant end use monitoring observations made during interactions with  host country military and defense officials, such as visits to defense  facilities, meetings or telephone conversations, military ceremonies, and  dignitary visits.
Enhanced end use monitoring. For sensitive defense articles and  technology transfers made within sensitive political situations, DSCA  guidance calls for more intensive and formal monitoring. This includes  providing DSCA with equipment delivery records with serial numbers,  conducting routine physical inventories of the equipment by serial  number, and quarterly reporting on inventory results.
Figure 3 illustrates the accountability process for weapons that CSTC-A  provides to ANSF.
section_title: Defense Cannot Fully Account for Weapons
paragraphs: Defense did not establish clear guidance on what accountability  procedures apply when it is handling, transporting, and storing weapons  obtained for ANSF through U.S. procurements and international  donations. As a result, our tests and analysis of inventory records show  significant lapses in accountability for these weapons. Such accountability  lapses occurred throughout the weapons supply process. First, when  USASAC and CSTC-A initially obtained weapons for ANSF, they did not  record all the corresponding serial numbers. Second, USASAC and  CSTC-A did not maintain control or visibility over U.S.-procured weapons  during transport to the two ANSF central storage depots in Kabul. Third,  CSTC-A did not maintain complete and accurate inventory records or  perform physical inventories of weapons stored at the central depots.  Finally, inadequate U.S. and ANSF staffing at the central depots along with  poor security and persistent management challenges have contributed to  the vulnerability of stored weapons to theft or misuse. These lapses have  hampered CSTC-A’s ability to detect weapons theft or other losses.  CSTC-A has recently taken steps to correct some of the deficiencies we  identified, but CSTC-A has indicated that its continued implementation of  the new accountability procedures is not certain, considering staffing  constraints and other factors.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Clear Accountability Procedures
paragraphs: Defense did not clearly establish what accountability procedures applied  to the physical security of weapons intended for ANSF. As a result, the  Defense organizations involved in providing weapons for ANSF, including  DSCA, USASAC, Navy IPO, U.S. Central Command, and CSTC-A, did not  have a common understanding of what accountability procedures to apply  to these weapons while they were in U.S. control and custody.
Defense guidance on weapons accountability lays out procedures for  Defense organizations to follow when handling, storing, protecting,  securing, and transporting Defense-owned weapons. These procedures  include (1) serial number registration and reporting and (2) 100 percent  physical inventories of weapons stored in depots by both quantity and  serial number at least once annually. The objective of serial number  registration and reporting procedures, according to Defense guidance, is  to establish continuous visibility over weapons through the various stages  of the supply process, including “from the contractor to depot;  in  storage.” However, Defense did not specifically direct U.S. personnel to  apply these or any alternative weapons accountability procedures for the  weapons in their control and custody intended for ANSF, and CSTC-A  officials we spoke to were uncertain about the applicability of existing  Defense guidance.
In August 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence  emphasized the importance of safeguarding weapons in accordance with  existing accountability guidance until they are formally transferred to  ANSF, stating that “the security of conventional [arms, ammunition, and  explosives] is paramount, as the theft or misuse of this material would  gravely jeopardize the safety and security of personnel and installations  world-wide.” However, in October 2008, Defense’s Inspector General  reported that U.S. Central Command had not clearly defined procedures  for accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied weapons  to ANSF, and as a result, misplacement, loss, and theft of weapons may  not be prevented. The Inspector General recommended, among other  things, that U.S. Central Command issue formal guidance directing the  commands and forces in its area of responsibility, including CSTC-A, to  apply existing Defense weapons accountability procedures. U.S. Central  Command and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence concurred with this recommendation. Nonetheless, U.S.  Central Command officials we spoke to in December 2008 did not have a  common understanding of when formal transfer of the weapons to ANSF  is considered to have occurred, and hence up to what point to apply  Defense accountability procedures, if at all. As of December 2008, U.S.  Central Command had not decided what new guidance to issue.
In July 2007, we made Defense and the Multinational Force-Iraq aware that  they had not specified which accountability procedures applied for  weapons provided to Iraq under the train-and-equip program in that  country. To help ensure that U.S.-funded equipment reaches the Iraqi  security forces as intended, we recommended that the Secretary of  Defense determine which accountability procedures should apply to that  program. In January 2008, the Congress passed legislation requiring that  no defense articles may be provided to Iraq until the President certifies  that a registration and monitoring system has been established and  includes, among other things, the serial number registration of all small  arms to be provided to Iraq, and a detailed record of the origin, shipping,  and distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq Security  Forces Fund or any other security assistance program.
section_title: USASAC and CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Complete Inventory Records for Weapons
paragraphs: On the basis of our data analysis and tests of weapons inventory records,  we estimate that USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records  for about 87,000 weapons—about 36 percent of over 242,000 weapons they  procured for ANSF and shipped from December 2004 through June 2008.  For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC did not maintain serial number  records—information fundamental to weapons accountability—and for an  estimated 41,000 weapons, CSTC-A did not maintain documentation on the  location or disposition, based on our testing of a random sample of  available serial number records. Weapons for which CSTC-A could not  provide complete accountability records were not limited to any particular  type of weapon or a specific shipment period. Records were missing for  six of the seven types of weapons we tested and from shipments made  during every year from 2004 to 2008.
In addition, CSTC-A did not maintain complete or reliable records for the  weapons it reported it had obtained from international donations from  June 2002 through June 2008. According to CSTC-A, this totals about  135,000 weapons.
section_title: Lapses in Accountability Began When Weapons Were Obtained
paragraphs: USASAC and Navy IPO records indicate that they procured over 242,000  weapons and shipped them to Afghanistan from December 2004 through  June 2008. However, USASAC did not record and maintain the serial  numbers for over 46,000 of the weapons it purchased. USASAC’s records  were incomplete because it did not require contractors to submit serial  numbers for non-standard weapons they provided—a standard practice in  traditional Foreign Military Sales. In July 2008, USASAC indicated that it  would begin recording serial numbers for all weapons it procures for  ANSF. (See app. III for a timeline of key events relating to accountability  for ANSF weapons and other sensitive equipment.) However, as of  December 2008 USASAC had not yet included provisions in its  procurement contracts requiring the vendors of nonstandard weapons to  provide these serial numbers.
Furthermore, CSTC-A did not record the serial numbers for the weapons it  received from international donors and stored in the central depots in  Kabul for eventual distribution to ANSF. In a July 2007 memorandum, the  Commanding General of CSTC-A noted that for international donations  there was “no shipping paperwork to confirm receipt, and equipment was  not inventoried at arrival for validation.” By not recording serial numbers  for weapons upon receipt, USASAC and CSTC-A could not verify the  delivery and subsequent control of weapons in Afghanistan. In July 2008,  CSTC-A began to record serial numbers for all the weapons it received,  including U.S.-procurements and international donations. However,  CSTC-A had indicated that its continued recording of serial numbers was  not certain. In the standard operating procedures it established in July  2008, CSTC-A indicated that it would record these numbers “if conditions  are favorable with enough time and manpower allotted to inventory.” In  December 2008, CSTC-A officials told us that to date they were fully  implementing these new procedures.
section_title: Defense and CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Control or Oversight of Weapons during Transport or Document Title Transfer
paragraphs: USASAC, Navy IPO, CSTC-A, Defense shippers, and contractors have been  involved in arranging the transport of U.S.-procured weapons into Kabul  by air. However, these organizations did not communicate adequately to  ensure that accountability was maintained over weapons during transport.  In particular, according to CSTC-A officials:    USASAC and Navy IPO did not always provide CSTC-A with serial number  records for weapons shipped to Afghanistan against which CSTC-A could  verify receipt.
Defense shippers sometimes split weapons shipments among multiple  flights, making it difficult for CSTC-A to reconcile partial shipments  received at different times with the information the suppliers provided for  the entire order.
Suppliers did not always label weapons shipments clearly, leading to  confusion over their contents and intended destinations.
CSTC-A did not always send confirmation of its receipt of weapons to the  supplying organizations.
Without detailed information about weapons shipments it was difficult for  USASAC, Navy IPO, and CSTC-A to detect discrepancies, if any, between  what weapons suppliers reported as shipped and those CSTC-A received.
According to CSTC-A, when weapons arrived at the Kabul Afghanistan  International Airport, CSTC-A personnel typically identified and counted  incoming pallets of weapons but did not count individual weapons or  record serial numbers. CSTC-A then temporarily gave physical custody of  the weapons to the Afghan National Army for unescorted transport from  the airport to the central depots in Kabul. Because CSTC-A did not  conduct physical inventory checks on weapons arriving at the airport, due  to security concerns at that facility, CSTC-A had limited ability to ensure  that weapons were not lost or stolen in transit to the depots.
After the Afghan National Army transported weapons to the central  depots, CSTC-A did not document the transfer of title for weapons to  ANSF. Since no Afghan officers were present at the depots to take  possession of the weapons, CSTC-A personnel received the weapons and  processed them into inventory for storage. Although Defense did not  provide direction to CSTC-A on how and when to transfer title to ANSF,  CSTC-A officials told us they considered title transfer to have occurred,  without any formal documentation, when information about the weapons  was typed into computer inventory systems at the central depots. In  February 2008, a revision to DSCA’s Security Assistance Management  Manual called for U.S. government officials delivering equipment to a  foreign nation under pseudo-FMS to keep documentation showing when,  where, and to whom delivery was made and report this information to the  military organization responsible for procurement. CSTC-A officials told  us that they were not certain whether this revised guidance applied to  ANSF weapons and therefore have not provided any title transfer  documentation to USASAC or Navy IPO, the procuring organizations.  However, regardless of how and when title passed to ANSF and how title  transfer was documented, because ANSF officials were not present at the  depots to take possession, CSTC-A retained control and custody of the  weapons at the depots.
section_title: CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Inventory Controls or Adequate Security at Storage Depots
paragraphs: CSTC-A did not maintain complete and accurate inventory records for  weapons at the central storage depots and allowed poor security to  persist. Until July 2008, CSTC-A did not track all weapons at the depots by  serial number or conduct routine physical inventories. Moreover, CSTC-A  could not identify and respond to incidents of actual or potential  compromise, including suspected pilferage, due to poor security and  unreliable data systems. Specific gaps in accountability controls include  the following:  Incomplete serial number recording. For over 5 years, CSTC-A stored  weapons in the central depots and distributed them to ANSF units without  recording their serial numbers. In August 2007, nearly 10 months after  CSTC-A’s Commanding General mandated serial number control, CSTC-A  began registering weapons by serial number as they were issued to ANSF  units. While this established some accountability at the point of  distribution, thousands of weapons under CSTC-A control had no uniquely  identifiable inventory record. CSTC-A initiated comprehensive serial  number tracking in July 2008, recording the serial numbers of all weapons  in inventory at that time and beginning to register additional weapons  upon receipt at the central depots. Nonetheless, CSTC-A officials told us  that staff shortages made serial number recording challenging.
Lack of physical inventories. CSTC-A did not conduct its first full  inventory of weapons in the central depots until June 2008. Without  conducting regular physical inventories, it was difficult for CSTC-A to  maintain accountability for weapons at the depots and detect weapons  losses.
Poor security. CSTC-A officials have reported concerns about the  trustworthiness of Afghan contract staff and guards at the central depot  that serves the Afghan National Army. We also observed deficiencies in  facility security at this depot, including Afghan guards sleeping on duty  and missing from their posts. Demonstrating the importance of conducting  physical inventories, in June 2008, within 1 month of completing its first  full weapons inventory, CSTC-A officials identified the theft of 47 pistols  from this depot. CSTC-A officials also told us that a persistent lack of  CSTC-A and responsible ANSF personnel at the central depots had  increased the vulnerability of inventories to pilferage.
Unreliable inventory information systems. The information systems  CSTC-A uses for inventory management at the central depots are  rudimentary and have introduced data reliability problems. CTSC-A  officials told us that for items received before 2006, they had only “limited  data” from manual records at the Afghan National Army central depot. In  2006, CSTC-A’s contractor installed a commercial-off-the-shelf inventory  management database system. However, the system permits users to enter  duplicate serial numbers, allowing data entry mistakes to compromise  critical data. Furthermore, due to a limited number of user licenses,  multiple users enter information using the same account, resulting in a  loss of control and accountability for key inventory management records.  CSTC-A also established an Excel spreadsheet record-keeping system in  2006 for the central depot where Afghan National Police weapons are  stored. However, training of Afghan National Police personnel at that  depot has not yet begun, and training Afghan National Army personnel in  the use of depot information systems has been problematic due to  illiteracy and a lack of basic math skills. In a report about operations at the  central depot that serves the Afghan National Army, CSTC-A’s logistics  training contractor noted that only “one in four [Afghan National Army  personnel] have the basic education to operate either the manual or  automated systems.”
section_title: Staffing and Other Management Challenges at Storage Depots Increased Weapons Vulnerability
paragraphs: According to CSTC-A, inadequate staffing of U.S. and Afghan personnel at  the central storage depots along with persistent management concerns  have contributed to the vulnerability of stored weapons to theft or misuse.  Although CSTC-A originally envisioned that ANSF would assume  responsibility for the majority of central depot operations, ANSF has not  asserted ownership of the central depots as planned, leaving U.S.  personnel to continue exercising control and custody over the stored  weapons. In addition, CSTC-A officials told us this resulted in ambiguities  regarding roles and responsibilities and increased risk to stored weapons  supplies. Specific challenges in this area include the following.
Difficulty providing adequate U.S. staff to maintain full accountability.  CSTC-A officials told us that the increasing volumes of equipment moving  through the central depots had compounded the management challenges  they faced, which included insufficient U.S. personnel on site to keep up  with the implementation of equipment accountability procedures. They  specifically cited staff shortages as having limited CSTC-A’s capacity to  conduct full depot inventories, maintain security, and invest in the training  of ANSF personnel.
Lack of accountable Afghan officers and staff. CSTC-A accountability  procedures call for ANSF officers to be on site at the central depots to  take responsibility for ANSF property. However, according to CSTC-A, the  Afghan ministries did not consider the central depots to be ANSF facilities,  given the high level of CSTC-A control. Thus, ANSF was reluctant to  participate in central depot operations and did not post any officers or  sufficient Afghan staff to the depots. According to CSTC-A officials, these  problems resulted in ambiguities regarding roles and responsibilities at the  central depots and placed an increased burden on limited U.S. forces to  fulfill mandatory accountability and security procedures.
Difficulties raising the capacity of ANSF depot personnel. According to  CSTC-A officials, efforts to develop the capabilities of ANSF personnel to  manage the central depots have been hampered by the lack of basic  education or skills among ANSF personnel and frequent turnover of  Afghan staff. As of December 2008, no Afghan National Police personnel  have been trained at the police depot. Contractors responsible for Afghan  National Army equipment accountability training told us that their efforts  have been hampered by the Afghans’ reluctance to attend training and by a  lack of basic literacy and math skills needed to carry out depot operations.  CSTC-A officials also told us that their embedded military trainers were  frequently unable to focus on training and mentoring at the Afghan  National Army depot, given their operational imperatives.
section_title: Despite CSTC-A Training Efforts, ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and Account for Weapons
paragraphs: CSTC-A and State have deployed hundreds of U.S. military trainers and  contract mentors to help ANSF units, among other things, establish and  implement equipment accountability procedures. Although CSTC-A has  instituted a system for U.S. and coalition military trainers to assess the  logistics capacity of ANSF units, they have not always assessed equipment  accountability capabilities specifically. However, as part of their reporting  to CSTC-A and State, contract mentors have documented significant  weaknesses in the capacity of ANSF units to safeguard and account for  weapons. As a result, the weapons CSTC-A has provided are at serious risk  of theft or loss. Furthermore, CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end  use of sensitive night vision devices until about 15 months after issuing  them to Afghan National Army Units.
subsections: section_title: CSTC-A Has Sponsored Training for ANSF on Weapons Accountability
paragraphs: CSTC-A has recognized the critical need to develop ANSF units’ capacity  to account for weapons and other equipment issued to them. In February  2008, CSTC-A acknowledged that it was issuing equipment to Afghan  National Police units before providing training on accountability practices  and ensuring that effective controls were in place. In June 2008, Defense  reported to the Congress that it was CSTC-A’s policy not to issue  equipment to ANSF units unless appropriate supply and accountability  procedures were verified.
As of June 2008, CSTC-A employed over 250 U.S. military or coalition  personnel and contractors to advise ANSF on logistics matters, including  establishing and maintaining a system of accountability for weapons.  CSTC-A has also helped the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior  establish decrees, modeled after U.S. regulations, requiring ANSF units to  adopt accountability procedures. These procedures include tracking  weapons by serial number using a “property book” to record receipt and  inventory information, and conducting routine physical inventories of  weapons. CSTC-A and State, with support from their respective  contractors, MPRI and DynCorp, have conducted training for Afghan  National Army and Afghan National Police personnel on the  implementation of these decrees. CSTC-A has also assigned contract  mentors and U.S. and coalition embedded trainers to work closely with  property book officers and other logistics staff in ANSF units to improve  accountability practices. In addition, State assigns contract mentors to  monitor Afghan National Police units that have received accountability  training. These mentors visit the units and evaluate, among other things,  the implementation of basic accountability procedures and concepts, such  as maintenance of property books and weapons storage rooms. We  previously reported that Defense has cited significant shortfalls in the  number of fielded embedded trainers and mentors as the primary  impediment to advancing the capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces.  According to information provided by CSTC-A officials, as of December  2008, CSTC-A had only 64 percent of the 6,675 personnel it required to  perform its mission overall and only about half of the 4,159 mentors it  required.
section_title: CSTC-A Has Not Consistently Assessed ANSF Accountability Capacity, but Significant Weaknesses Have Been Reported
paragraphs: While CSTC-A has established a system for assessing the logistics capacity  of ANSF units, it has not consistently assessed or verified ANSF’s ability to  properly account for weapons and other equipment.
Afghan National Army. As Afghan National Army units achieve greater  levels of capability, embedded U.S. and coalition military trainers are  responsible for assessing and validating their progress. Trainers used  various checklists in 2008 to assess and validate Afghan National Army  units. One checklist we reviewed addressed seven dimensions of logistics  capacity and performance, but did not specifically mention accountability  for weapons or other equipment. The assessment category in the checklist  most relevant to equipment accountability was a rating on whether a unit  “understands the  logistical process and utilizes it  with reasonable effectiveness.” Another checklist we reviewed addressed  15 dimensions of “sustainment operations” and was used to assess units’  overall demonstration of logistics management capacity and “ability to  effectively receive, store, and issue supplies.” However, the checklist did  not address weapons or equipment accountability specifically.  Furthermore, more detailed notes accompanying the completed checklists  we reviewed provided virtually no information on equipment  accountability as a factor in the logistics ratings the CSTC-A training team  assigned to the unit.
Afghan National Police. CSTC-A has also introduced a monthly  assessment tool to be used by its mentors to evaluate Afghan National  Police capability and identify strengths and weaknesses. Prior to June  2008, CSTC-A did not specifically evaluate the capacity of police units to  account for weapons and other equipment. CSTC-A changed the format of  its police assessment checklist to specifically address four dimensions of  equipment accountability. According to the reformatted assessments we  reviewed, as of September 30, 2008, some trained and equipped Afghan  National Police units had not yet implemented accountability procedures  required by the Afghan Ministry of Interior. These assessments indicated  that of the first seven police districts to receive intensive training and  weapons under CSTC-A’s Focused District Development Program, which  began in November 2007, two districts were not maintaining property  accountability, including property books, and one was not conducting  audits and physical inventories periodically or when directed.
Contract mentors employed by CSTC-A and State have reported  extensively on weaknesses they observed in ANSF units’ capacity to  safeguard and account for weapons and other equipment. Reports we  reviewed, prepared by MPRI and DynCorp mentors between October 2007  and August 2008, indicated that ANSF units throughout Afghanistan had  not implemented the basic property accountability procedures required by  the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. Although these reports did  not address accountability capacities in a consistent manner that would  allow a systematic or comprehensive assessment of all units, they did  highlight common problems relating to weapons accountability, including  a lack of functioning property book operations and poor physical security.
Lack of functioning property book operations. Mentors reported that  many Afghan army and police units did not properly maintain property  books, which are fundamental tools used to establish equipment  accountability and are required by Afghan ministerial decrees. In a report  dated March 2008, a MPRI mentor to the property book officer for one  Afghan National Army unit stated, “for 3 years, the unit property books  have not been established properly” and that “a lack of functionality  existed in every property book operation.” Another report, from March  2008, concluded, “equipment accountability and equipment maintainability  is a big concern; equipment is often lost, damaged, or stolen, and the  proper procedures are not followed to properly document and/or account  for equipment.” In a 2008 MPRI quarterly progress report on Afghan  National Police in Kandahar, a mentor noted that property book items  were issued but not posted to any records, because personnel did not  know their duties and responsibilities. The report further states that “at  present the property managers are not tracking any classes of supplies at  all levels” and that “ANSF is very basic in its day to day function,”  exhibiting no consideration for property accountability.
Poor security. MPRI reports also indicated that some Afghan National  Police units did not have facilities adequate to ensure the physical security  of weapons and protect them against theft in a high-risk environment. For  example, a March 2008 MPRI report on Afghan National Police in one  northern province stated that the arms room of the police district office  was behind a wooden door and had only a miniature padlock, and that this  represented “basically the same austere conditions as in the other  districts.”
Defense and State contractor reports identified various causes of ANSF  accountability weaknesses, including illiteracy, corruption, desertion, and  unclear guidance from Afghan ministries.
Illiteracy. Mentors reported that widespread illiteracy among Afghan army  and police personnel had substantially impaired equipment accountability.  For instance, a March 2008 MPRI report on an Afghan National Army unit  noted that illiteracy was directly interfering with the ability of supply  section personnel to implement property accountability processes and  procedures, despite repeated training efforts. In July 2008, a police mentor  in the Zari district of Balkh province stated that, “a lack of personnel [at  the district headquarters] who can read and write is hampering efficient  operations,” and added that there is currently one literate person being  mentored to take charge of logistics. In addition, an August 2008 DynCorp  report on the Afghan National Police noted that in Kandahar, “concerns   expressed over  maintaining control over  the storage facility keys. He cannot read or write, does not record anything  that is being given out or have a request form for supplies filled out.  is  the same individual that was handing out automatic weapons to civilians  the previous week.”
Corruption. Reports of alleged theft and unauthorized resale of weapons  are common. During 2008, DynCorp mentors reported multiple instances  of Afghan National Police personnel, including an Afghan Border Police  battalion commander in Khost province, allegedly selling weapons to  anti-coalition forces. In a March 2008 report, mentors noted that despite  repeated requests, the Afghan National Police Chief Logistical Officer for  Paktika province would not produce a list of serial numbers for weapons  on hand. The DynCorp mentors suggested this reluctance to share  information could be part of an attempt to conceal inventory  discrepancies. In addition, a May 2008 DynCorp report on police cited  corruption in Helmand as that province’s most significant problem, noting  that the logistics officer had been named in all allegations of theft,  extortion, and deceit reported to mentors by their Afghan National Police  contacts.
Desertion. DynCorp mentors also reported cases of desertion in the  Afghan National Police, which resulted in the loss of weapons. For  instance, in July 2008, mentors reported that when Afghan Border Police  officers at a Faryab province checkpoint deserted to ally themselves with  anti-coalition forces, they took all their weapons and two vehicles with  them. Another DynCorp mentor team training police in Ghazni province  reported in July 2008 that 65 Afghan National Police personnel had  deserted and would not be coming to the base to be processed. The police  officers that did arrive came without their issued weapons.
Unclear guidance. MPRI mentors reported that Afghan ministry logistics  policies were not always clear to Afghan army and police property  managers. A MPRI report dated April 2008 stated that approved Ministry of  Interior policies outlining material accountability procedures were not  widely disseminated and many logistics officers did not recognize any of  the logistical policies as rule. Additionally, a MPRI mentor to the Afghan  National Army told us that despite the new decrees, Afghan National Army  logistics officers often carried out property accountability functions using  Soviet-style accounting methods and that the Ministry of Defense was still  auditing army accounts against those defunct standards.
Senior Afghan Ministry of Defense officials we met with also described  similar accountability weaknesses. In a written statement provided in  response to our questions about Afghan National Army weapons  accountability, the ministry officials indicated that soldiers deserting with  their weapons had a negative effect on the Afghan National Army and  reduced supplies on hand in units. They also indicated that Afghan  National Army units in the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Paktika  have been particularly vulnerable to equipment theft.
section_title: CSTC-A Has Recently Begun Conducting End Use Monitoring of Weapons and Sensitive Night Vision Devices
paragraphs: According to DSCA officials, U.S.-procured weapons and sensitive  equipment provided to ANSF are subject to end use monitoring, which is  meant to provide reasonable assurances that ANSF is using the equipment  for intended purposes. Under DSCA guidance, weapons are subject to  routine end use monitoring, which, according to DSCA officials, entails  making and recording observations on weapons usage in conjunction with  other duties and during interactions with local defense officials. For  specified sensitive defense items, such as night vision devices, DSCA  guidance calls for additional controls and enhanced end use monitoring.  This includes providing equipment delivery records with serial numbers to  DSCA, conducting routine physical inventories, and reporting on quarterly  inventory results. For night vision devices this also includes the  establishment of a physical security and accountability control plan.
In July 2007, CSTC-A began issuing 2,410 night vision devices to Afghan  National Army units without establishing the appropriate controls or  conducting enhanced end use monitoring. According to U.S. Central  Command, these devices pose a special danger to the public and U.S.  forces if in the wrong hands. DSCA did not ensure that CSTC-A followed  the end use monitoring guidance because CSTC-A purchased these devices  directly and without the knowledge or involvement of DSCA officials. To  address this, DSCA and CSTC-A established procedures in April 2008 to  prohibit CSTC-A’s procurement of weapons and sensitive equipment in- country without DSCA involvement.
In May 2008, CSTC-A first developed an end use monitoring plan that  established both routine and enhanced monitoring procedures. The plan  calls for the use of U.S. trainers and mentors embedded in ANSF units to  provide reasonable assurances that the recipients are complying with U.S.  requirements on the use, transfer, and security of the items. CSTC-A  informed us that it began implementing the plan in July 2008, but noted it  did not have sufficient staff or mentors to conduct the monitoring  envisioned. CSTC-A officials told us they started to conduct and document  routine end use monitoring for weapons provided to the Afghan police in  31 of Afghanistan’s 365 police districts. CSTC-A had not been able to  undertake any monitoring in the remaining 334 police districts due to  security constraints.
During the course of our review, CSTC-A began following DSCA’s  enhanced end use monitoring guidance for the night vision devices it had  issued. CSTC-A started conducting inventories of these devices in October  2008, about 15 months after it began issuing them, and plans to conduct  full physical inventories by serial number quarterly. As of December 2008,  CSTC-A had accounted for all but 10 of the devices it had issued.
DSCA and CSTC-A attributed this limited end use monitoring to a shortage  of security assistance staff and expertise at CSTC-A, exacerbated by  frequent CSTC-A staff rotations. Defense’s Inspector General similarly  reported in October 2008 that CSTC-A did not have sufficient personnel  with the necessary security assistance skills and experience and that short  tours of duty and different rotation policies among the military services  hindered the execution of security assistance activities. We also noted  these problems in 2004, when we reported that the Office of Military  Organization-Afghanistan, CSTC-A’s predecessor, did not have adequate  personnel trained in security assistance procedures to support its efforts  and that frequent personnel rotations were limiting Defense’s efforts to  train key personnel in defense security assistance procedures and  preserve institutional knowledge. CSTC-A officials told us that the  addition of a USASAC liaison to the CSTC-A staff in Kabul had helped to  offset some of these challenges, as the liaison was knowledgeable in  security assistance procedures and had been able to provide some basic  training for CSTC-A staff.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Oversight and accountability for weapons is critical in high-threat  environments, especially in Afghanistan, where potential theft and misuse  of lethal equipment pose a significant danger to U.S. and coalition forces  involved in security, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts. Because  Defense organizations throughout the weapons supply chain have not had  a common understanding of what procedures are necessary to safeguard  and account for weapons, inventory records, including serial numbers, are  not complete and accurate. As a result, Defense cannot be certain that  weapons intended for ANSF have reached those forces. Further, weapons  stored in poorly secured central depots are significantly vulnerable, and  the United States has limited ability to detect the loss of these weapons  without conducting routine inventories. Although CSTC-A established new  weapons accountability procedures during the course of our review, it is  not yet clear that, without a mandate from Defense and sufficient  resources, CSTC-A will consistently implement these procedures. Because  Afghan army and police units face significant challenges in controlling and  accounting for weapons, it is essential that Defense enhance its efforts in  working with ANSF units in this area. Systematically assessing ANSF’s  ability to implement required weapons accountability procedures is  particularly important for gaining reasonable assurances that ANSF units  are prepared to receive and safeguard weapons as well as for evaluating  overall progress in developing ANSF’s accountability capacity. Moreover,  adequately monitoring night vision devices and other sensitive equipment  after it is transferred to ANSF will help to ensure that such equipment is  used for its intended purposes. As development of the Afghan security  forces continues, it is vital that clear oversight and accountability  mechanisms are in place to account for weapons and other sensitive  equipment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the United States can account for weapons that it  procures or receives from international donors for ANSF, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense establish clear accountability procedures for  weapons in the control and custody of the United States, and direct  USASAC, CSTC-A, and other military organizations involved in providing  these weapons to (1) track all weapons by serial number and (2) conduct  routine physical inventories.
To help ensure that ANSF units can safeguard and account for weapons  and other sensitive equipment they receive from the United States and  international donors, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  CSTC-A to (1) specifically and systematically assess the ability of each  ANSF unit to safeguard and account for weapons in accordance with  Afghan ministerial decrees and (2) explicitly verify that adequate  safeguards and accountability procedures are in place, prior to providing  weapons to ANSF units, unless a specific waiver or exception is granted  based on due consideration of practicality, cost, and mission performance.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense devote the necessary  resources to address the staffing shortages that hamper CSTC-A’s efforts  to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in equipment accountability matters.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. IV).   Defense concurred with our recommendations and provided additional  information on its efforts to help ensure accountability for weapons  intended for the ANSF. Defense also provided technical corrections, which  we incorporated into the report as appropriate. State did not provide  comments.
Defense concurred with our recommendation to establish clear  accountability procedures for weapons intended for ANSF. It noted that  Defense requirements and procedures exist for small arms tracking by  serial number. However, Defense went on to state that DSCA, in  conjunction with U.S. Central Command, has been directed to implement  in Afghanistan congressionally-mandated controls that Defense is  implementing in Iraq. These include (a) the registration of serial numbers  of all small arms, (b) an end-use monitoring program for all lethal  assistance, and (c) the maintenance of detailed records for all defense  articles transferred to Afghanistan. As we indicated in our report, Defense  organizations did not have a common understanding of whether existing  accountability procedures applied to weapons obtained for ANSF,  underscoring the importance of these controls. Defense did not state when  these measures would be implemented; however, if Defense follows  through on these actions and, in addition, clearly requires routine  inventories of weapons in U.S. custody and control, our concerns will be  largely addressed.
Defense also concurred with our recommendation to systematically assess  each ANSF unit’s capacity to account for and safeguard weapons and to  ensure that adequate procedures are in place prior to providing weapons.   Defense indicated that embedded mentors and trainers are assessing  ANSF units’ accountability capacity. It also stated that for the Afghan  National Army, weapons are only issued with coalition mentors present to  provide oversight at all levels of command; and for the Afghan National  Police, most weapons are currently being issued to selected units that  have received focused training, including instruction on equipment  accountability. We note that at the time of our review, ANSF unit  assessments did not systematically address the units’ capacity to  safeguard and account for weapons in its possession. We also note that  Defense has cited significant shortfalls in the number of personnel  required to train and mentor ANSF units. Unless these matters are  addressed, we are not confident the shortcomings we reported will be  adequately addressed.
Finally, Defense also concurred with our recommendation that it address  the staffing shortfalls that hamper CSTC-A’s efforts to train, mentor, and  assess ANSF in weapons accountability matters. Defense commented that  it is looking into ways to address the shortages, but did not state how or  when additional staffing would be provided.
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section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine whether Defense and the Combined Security Transition  Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) could account for weapons obtained,  transported, stored, and distributed to Afghan National Security Forces  (ANSF), we conducted the following work.
We sought to determine which Defense accountability procedures are  generally applicable to Defense equipment by reviewing documents and  meeting with officials from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida;  Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and Defense’s Office of  Inspector General in Arlington, Virginia; and CSTC-A in Kabul,  Afghanistan. We also reviewed relevant Defense regulations, instructions,  and manuals.
We compiled detailed information on 242,203 weapons the United States  procured for ANSF and shipped to Afghanistan from December 2004  through June 2008. We identified the types, quantity, shipment dates, and  cost of these weapons by reviewing and analyzing pseudo-FMS case  documentation provided by DSCA and data provided by the U.S. Army  Security Assistance Command (USASAC) in New Cumberland,  Pennsylvania, and Navy IPO in Arlington, Virginia. To ensure we had a  complete record of all weapons ordered and shipped during this time  period, we checked USASAC and Navy shipment details against line-item  details in Letters of Offer and Acceptance provided to us by DSCA. For  each shipment of weapons we isolated in the USASAC and Navy  International Programs Office (IPO) files, we compiled lists of serial  numbers or determined the total number of weapons for which no serial  number records were available. We identified 195,671 weapons for which  USASAC and Navy IPO could provide serial numbers and 46,532 for which  they could not. In some cases, quantities of weapons required by the Letter  of Offer and Acceptance differed from those recorded as shipped; we  followed up on these discrepancies with officials at USASAC, who  explained that such differences were due to changes in market pricing  between the time of the request and the time of purchase. We determined  that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To assess Defense’s ability to account for the location or disposition of  weapons, we selected a stratified random probability sample of 245  weapons from the population of 196,671 U.S.-procured weapons for which  Defense could provide serial numbers. The sample population of weapons  included all years in which U.S.-procured weapons had been shipped to  ANSF and seven specific categories of weapons obtained. Our random  sample did not include certain miscellaneous weapon types, which we  categorized as “other.” Each weapon in the population had a known  probability of being included in our probability sample. We divided the  weapons into two strata, based on the format of the weapons lists we  obtained. About half of the serial numbers were available to us in  electronic databases, allowing us to select a simple random sample of 96  weapons from those records. The remaining 98,462 serial numbers were  provided to us in paper lists or electronic scans of paper files. From those  records we selected a random systematic sample of 149 weapons by  choosing a random start and selecting every subsequent 679th serial  number. Each weapon selected in the sample was weighted in the analysis  to account statistically for all the weapons in the population, including  those that were not selected. In Afghanistan, we attempted either to  physically locate each weapon in our sample or obtain documentation  confirming that CSTC-A had recorded its issuance to ANSF or otherwise  disposed of it. We used the results of our work to generalize to the  universe of weapons from which we drew our sample and derive an  estimated number of weapons for which CSTC-A cannot provide  information on location or disposition. Because we followed a probability  procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large  number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could  have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the  precision of our results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g. plus or  minus 5 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the  actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have  drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence  intervals we have reported will include the true values in the study.
We compiled detailed information on the approximately 135,000 weapons  CSTC-A obtained for ANSF from international donors. We identified the  estimated dollar values, types, quantities, and sources of these weapons by  analyzing records from the office of CSTC-A’s Deputy Commanding  General for International Security Cooperation. We assessed the reliability  of these data by interviewing CSTC-A officials knowledgeable about the  data and by analyzing the records they provided to identify problems with  completeness or accuracy. CSTC-A officials told us the dollar amounts  they track for the value of weapons donations had been provided by the  donors and were of questionable accuracy, as they had not been  independently verified by CSTC-A. We also reviewed CSTC-A’s records on  the types, quantities, and sources of weapons donations. CSTC-A officials  told us that due to a long-standing lack of accountability procedures for  handling weapons donations received at the central storage depots, they  had been unable to independently verify the quantities reported by donors.  After our visit to Kabul, we continued to work closely with CSTC-A  officials to identify additional data concerns. When we found  discrepancies, such as data entry errors, we brought them to CSTC-A’s  attention and worked with its officials to correct the discrepancies, to the  extent that we could, before conducting our descriptive analyses. While  CSTC-A’s procedures for ensuring the accuracy of these data have  improved during the past year, documentation on procedures was lacking  prior to March 2007, which made it impossible for us to independently  assess the data’s accuracy. Because we still have concerns about the  reliability of these data, we are only reporting them as background  information and in an appendix to provide a sense of who donated the  weapons and when.
We documented weapons accountability practices and procedures by  examining records and meeting with officials from DSCA, USASAC, Navy  IPO, and CSTC-A—the organizations directly involved with obtaining,  transporting, storing, and distributing weapons for ANSF. In Afghanistan,  we observed weapons accountability practices at the Kabul Afghanistan  International Airport and the two ANSF central storage depots in Kabul  where weapons intended for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan  National Police are stored before distribution to ANSF units. While at the  central depots, we discussed weapons management with CSTC-A officials  and mentors employed by MPRI, Defense’s ANSF development contractor.  We also observed depot operations, including security procedures, storage  conditions, and inventory information systems. In addition, we examined  weapons inventory records at CSTC-A headquarters in Kabul.
We met with officials from Defense’s Inspector General to discuss two  audits it conducted during 2008 relating to weapons accountability in  Afghanistan and reviewed a related report it issued in October 2008.
To assess the extent to which CSTC-A has ensured that ANSF can properly  safeguard and account for weapons and other sensitive equipment issued  to it, we conducted the following work.
We obtained information on ANSF weapons accountability practices by  meeting with cognizant officials from the Afghan Ministries of Defense and  Interior. The Ministry of Defense also provided written responses to our  questions on this subject. In addition, we reviewed ministerial decrees  documenting equipment accountability requirements applicable to the  Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police and discussed the  development and the implementation status of those decrees with CSTC-A  and MPRI.
We obtained information on CSTC-A’s efforts to train, mentor, and assess  ANSF units on accountability for weapons and other equipment by  reviewing documents and meeting with officials from CSTC-A and MPRI in  Kabul. We reviewed all available weekly, monthly, quarterly, and ad hoc  reports submitted by MPRI logistics mentors from October 2007 to August  2008 that included observations regarding ANSF equipment accountability  practices. We also reviewed all available reports, including checklists and  assessment tools, prepared by CSTC-A’s embedded military trainers to  assess the logistics capabilities of Afghan army and police units. To gain a  better understanding of ANSF weapons accountability practices and  challenges, we visited an Afghan National Army commando unit near  Kabul that had received weapons and night vision devices from CSTC-A  and met with the unit’s property book officer and MPRI mentors assigned  to that unit. Due to travel restrictions imposed by CSTC-A based on  heightened security threats during our visit to Afghanistan, we were  unable to travel outside of the Kabul area, as planned, to visit other ANSF  units in the country that had also received weapons from CSTC-A.
We obtained information on State’s efforts to ensure accountability for  weapons provided to the Afghan National Police by reviewing documents  and meeting with officials from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and State’s  Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in  Washington, D.C. We also reviewed all weekly reports submitted to State  between January and August 2008 by State’s Afghan National Police  development contractor, DynCorp, that included observations regarding  police equipment accountability practices.
We determined the end use monitoring procedures generally applicable to  weapons transferred to foreign countries under Foreign Military Sales by  reviewing DSCA’s Security Assistance Management Manual. We sought  clarification on this guidance and views on its applicability to U.S.  procured weapons and internationally donated weapons in Afghanistan  from officials at DSCA and U.S. Central Command.
We determined end use monitoring policies and practices in Afghanistan  by reviewing documents and meeting with officials from U.S. Central  Command, CSTC-A, DSCA, and State. In Afghanistan, we met with officials  in CSTC-A’s Security Assistance Office, including the USASAC liaison to  CSTC-A. We reviewed all available documentation of the end use  monitoring CSTC-A had conducted as of December 2008 for weapons and  other sensitive equipment, including night vision devices, provided to  ANSF.
section_title: Appendix II: International Donations Obtained for ANSF by CSTC-A
paragraphs: Since June 2002, CSTC-A’s office of the Deputy Commanding General for  International Security Cooperation has vetted, tracked, and coordinated  the delivery of weapons donated to ANSF by the international community.  CSTC-A officials reported to us that they had obtained about 135,000  weapons for ANSF in this manner, though we were unable to  independently confirm that figure. CSTC-A officials also told us they had  not evaluated the reliability of the dollar values assigned by donors for  these weapons and noted that some quantities may be overstated, as many  of the donated weapons were damaged or unusable. (See table 1 for a  summary of the data CSTC-A reported to us on weapons provided by  international donors.)
While CSTC-A’s procedures for ensuring the accuracy of these data have  improved during the past year, documentation was lacking prior to March  2007, which made it impossible for us to independently assess the data’s  accuracy. Because we have concerns about the reliability of these data, we  are only reporting them here to provide a sense of who donated the  weapons.
Included in CSTC-A’s records were details indicating that weapons  donations have included rifles, pistols, light and heavy machine guns,  grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and mortars.  According to this information, about 79 percent of the weapons donated  were AK-47 assault rifles.
section_title: Appendix III: Timeline of Key Weapons Accountability Events
paragraphs: Since international donors began providing weapons for ANSF in June  2002, CSTC-A and others have taken a variety of steps to improve  accountability. Many of these steps occurred during the course of our  review. Figure 4 provides a timeline of key events relating to  accountability for ANSF weapons and other sensitive equipment.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report include Albert H. Huntington III, Assistant  Director; James B. Michels; Emily Rachman; Mattias Fenton; James  Ashley; Mary Moutsos; Joseph Carney; Etana Finkler; Jena Sinkfield; and  Richard Brown.