Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation
Published: 2001-10-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Events surrounding the 2000 presidential election raised concerns about the reliability of various types of voting equipment, the role of election officials, the disqualification of absentee ballots, and the accuracy of vote counts and recounts. As a result, public officials and various interest groups have proposed reforms to address perceived shortcomings. This report discusses: (1) voter registration; (2) absentee and early voting; (3) election day administration; and (4) vote counts, certification, and recounts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Events surrounding the 2000 presidential election raised such issues as the reliability of different  types of voting equipment, the role of election officials, the disqualification of absentee ballots, and  the accuracy of vote counts and recounts.  As a result, public officials and various interest groups  have proposed reform measures to address the perceived shortcomings of election systems.
You asked us to provide comprehensive information and analysis on the administration of elections  and the election process as of November 2000.  Specifically, this report describes in detail the  operations and challenges associated with each stage of the U.S. election process:  voter registration;   absentee and early voting;  election day administration; and  vote counts, certification, and recounts.
The report also provides analysis that you and Senator Barbara Boxer requested on issues associated  with voting technologies in the November 2000 election and the potential use of the Internet for  voting.
Copies of this report are being sent to the President, the congressional leadership, and the Chairman  and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on House Administration.  Copies will also be  sent to local election jurisdictions that participated in our research and will be made available to  other interested parties upon request.
If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this report, please contact me on  (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Tax Administration and Justice, on (202) 512- 9110; or Richard M. Stana, Director, on (202) 512-8777.  They also can be reached by e-mail at  rabkinn@gao.gov and stanar@gao.gov, respectively.  Contacts and key  contributors are listed in appendix VIII.
subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: An election is the act or process by which citizens cast a vote to select an  individual for an office.  Although an election is a single event, an election  system involves the integration of the people, processes, and technology  that are generally associated with the preparation and administration of an  election.  The basic goals of election systems in the United States are to  enable every eligible citizen who wishes to vote to cast a single ballot in  private and have the votes on that ballot counted accurately.  Administering  an election is a year-round activity that generally consists of the following:  Voter registration--This includes local election officials registering  eligible voters and maintaining voter registration lists to include updates  to registrants’ information and deletions of the names of registrants who  are no longer eligible to vote.
Absentee and early voting--This type of voting allows eligible persons to  vote in-person or by mail before election day.
The conduct of an election--This aspect of election administration  includes preparation before election day, such as local election officials  arranging for polling places, recruiting and training poll workers,  designing ballots, and preparing voting equipment for use in casting and  tabulating votes; and election day activities, such as opening and closing  polling places and assisting voters to cast votes.
Vote counting--This includes election officials tabulating the cast ballots;  determining whether and how to count ballots that cannot be read by  the vote counting equipment; certifying the final vote counts; and  performing recounts, if required.  As shown in figure 3, each stage of an  election involves people and technology.
subsections: section_title: Major Federal Voting Requirements
paragraphs: Under its various constitutional authorities, Congress has passed  legislation regarding the administration of both federal and state elections,  including voter registration, absentee voting, accessibility provisions for  the elderly and handicapped, and prohibitions against discriminatory  practices. Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act of 1993  (NVRA) commonly known as the “Motor Voter” Act, to establish  registration procedures designed to “increase the number of eligible  citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office,” without  compromising “the integrity of the electoral process” or the maintenance of  “accurate and current voter registration rolls.”  NVRA expanded the  number of locations and opportunities for citizens to apply to register.  For  example, under NVRA, citizens are to be able to apply to register (1) when  applying for or renewing a driver’s license; (2) at various state agencies,  such as public assistance centers; or (3) by mailing a national voter  registration application to a designated election official. NVRA also  establishes requirements to ensure that state programs to identify and  remove from voter registration rolls the names of individuals who are no  longer eligible to vote are uniform, nondiscriminatory, and do not exclude a  voter from the rolls solely because of his or her failure to vote.  Finally,  NVRA requires that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) submit to  Congress a biennial report with recommendations assessing the impact of  the NVRA on the administration of elections for federal office during the  preceding 2-year period.
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986  (UOCAVA) requires that states permit the following categories of citizens  to apply to register and vote by absentee voting in federal elections: (1)  members of the uniformed services living overseas, (2) all other citizens  living overseas, and (3) uniformed services voters and their dependents in  the United States who are living outside of their voting jurisdiction.
In addition, the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of  1984 requires, with some exceptions, election jurisdictions to provide  alternate means of casting a ballot (e.g., absentee and early voting) for all  elections in which election day polling places are not accessible to people  with disabilities.
Congress, however, has been most active with respect to enacting  prohibitions against discriminatory voting practices.  For example, the  Voting Rights Act of 1965 codifies and effectuates the Fifteenth  Amendment’s guarantee that no person shall be denied the right to vote on  account of race or color.  Subsequent amendments to the Act expanded it  to include protections for members of language minority groups, as well as  other matters regarding voting registration and procedures.
section_title: State Responsibilities
paragraphs: States regulate the election process, including, for example, ballot access,  registration procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of  voting places, provision of election day workers, and counting and  certification of the vote.  As described by the Supreme Court, “the tates  have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election  codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and  state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general  elections, the registration of voters, and the selection and qualification of  candidates.”  In fact, the U.S. election system comprises 51 somewhat  distinct election systems—those of the 50 states and the District of  Columbia.  However, although election policy and procedures are legislated  primarily at the state level, states typically have decentralized this process  so that the details of administering elections are carried out at the city or  county levels, and voting is done at the local level.
section_title: Election Administration
paragraphs: At the federal level, no agency bears direct responsibility for election  administration. However, in 1975, Congress created FEC to administer and  enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act.  To carry out this role, FEC  discloses campaign finance information; enforces provisions of the law,  such as limits and prohibitions on contributions; and oversees the public  funding of presidential elections.  FEC’s Office of Election Administration  (OEA) serves as a national clearinghouse for information regarding the  administration of federal elections.  As such, OEA assists state and local  election officials by developing voluntary voting system standards,  responding to inquiries, publishing research on election issues, and  conducting workshops on matters related to election administration.
The administrative structure and authority given to those responsible for  elections vary from state to state.  The majority of states vest election  authority in a secretary of state (or other state cabinet-level official) who is  elected for a term of 2 to 4 years.  The approval of voting equipment for use  in a state may be a responsibility of the secretary of state or another entity,  such as a State Board of Elections.  State officials usually provide  information services and technical support to local election jurisdictions  but seldom participate in the day-to-day administration of an election.
subsections: section_title: Local Election Jurisdictions Conduct Elections
paragraphs: Local election jurisdictions, such as counties, cities, townships, and  villages, conduct elections, including federal and state contests.  Although  some states bear some election costs, it is local jurisdictions that pay for  elections and provide the officials who conduct the elections.  Local  election administration officials may be elected, appointed, or be  professional employees.  State or local regulations determine who  functions as the chief elections official.  Elections may be conducted by  county or town clerks, registrars, election boards, bureaus, or  commissions, or some combination thereof.  The election administration  official may have extensive or little experience and training in running  elections.  Local jurisdictions administer elections within the framework of  state laws and regulations that provide for differing degrees of local control  over how elections are conducted, including voting equipment to be used,  ballot design, and voter identification requirements at polling places.
One of the responsibilities of state and/or local election officials is to  recruit, train, assign, and compensate permanent and temporary personnel.   These personnel may include: voting equipment operators, voter registrars,  absentee ballot clerks, polling place workers, and election day phone bank  operators.  Depending on the jurisdiction, these workers could be part-time  or full-time, appointed or elected, paid or unpaid volunteers. Some election  workers support election administration activities during the year, and  others work only on election day.  For the November 2000 election, about  1.4 million poll workers staffed precincts across the country on election  day.
section_title: All Voters Are Assigned to a Precinct to Vote
paragraphs: The size of local election jurisdictions varies enormously, from a few  hundred voters in some rural counties to Los Angeles County, whose total  of registered voters exceeds that of 41 states.  For the purposes of voting,  election authorities subdivide local election jurisdictions into precincts,  which range in size from a few hundred to more than a thousand people.  Voters are assigned to a specific precinct where they are to vote on election  day.  All voters in a precinct vote at one place, such as a school or other  public facility.  For the November 2000 election, there were more than  about 186,000 precincts in about 10,000 local election jurisdictions.   However, precincts may be combined in a single polling place.  For  example, voters from a few precincts in a small jurisdiction may vote in a  single location, such as the town high school.
section_title: Voting Technologies
paragraphs: Voting technologies are tools for accommodating the millions of voters in  our nation’s approximately 10,000 local election jurisdictions.  These tools  can be as simple as a pencil, paper, and a box, or as sophisticated as  computer-based touchscreens—and one day, perhaps, Web-based  applications running on personal computers.  To be fully understood, all  these technologies need to be examined in relation to the people who  participate in elections (both voters and election workers) and the  processes that govern their interaction with each other and with the  technologies.  To integrate the functions associated with readying vote  casting and tallying equipment for a given election with other election  management functions, jurisdictions can use election management  systems.
subsections: section_title: Five Voting Methods Were Used in the November 2000 Election
paragraphs: The methods by which votes are cast and counted in the United States  today can be placed into five categories; the latter four methods employ  varying degrees of technology.  The five methods are paper ballot, lever  machine, punch card, optical scan, and direct recording electronic (DRE).   Table 1 shows the percentage of jurisdictions, precincts, and registered  voters who used the different voting methods.
The paper ballot and lever machines have been used in the United States  for more than a century, and versions of the other three methods have been  used for 20 to 40 years.  For paper ballots, the vote count is done by hand;  lever machines keep a mechanical count.  The three newer methods (punch  card, optical scan, and DRE) depend on computers to tally votes.  In three  of the five methods (paper ballot, punch card, and optical scan), voters use  paper to cast their votes.  In the other two methods (lever machine and  DRE), voters manipulate the equipment.
Each method possesses a unique history and set of characteristics.  When  these are overlaid with the evolution and composition of the more than  10,000 local election jurisdictions in the United States, the result is much  diversity across the nation in the technology used to conduct elections and  how it is used.
subsections: section_title: Paper Ballot
paragraphs: The paper ballot, sometimes referred to as the Australian ballot, was first  used in the United States in 1889 and is still used in some jurisdictions  today.  Paper ballots, which are generally uniform in size, thickness, and  color, list the names of the candidates and the issues to be voted on.  Voters  generally complete their ballots in the privacy of a voting booth, recording  their choices by placing marks in boxes corresponding to the candidates’  names and the issues.  After making their choices, voters drop the ballots  into sealed ballot boxes.  Election officials gather the sealed boxes and  transfer them to a central location, where the ballots are manually counted  and tabulated.  Figure 4 shows an example of a paper ballot.
In 1892, the lever voting machine, known then as the Myer Automatic  Booth, was first used in the United States.  By 1930, lever machines were  used in almost all major cities, and by the 1960s, over half the nation’s votes  were cast and counted on lever machines.  During this time, lever machines  helped alleviate concerns about vote fraud and manipulation that were  common with paper ballots.  Unlike paper ballots, however, lever machines  do not provide individual records of each vote.
Lever machines are mechanical, with a “ballot” composed of a rectangular  array of levers, which can be physically arranged either horizontally or  vertically.  Adjacent levers in each row are placed about one inch apart, and  the rows of levers are spaced 2 to 3 inches apart.  Printed strips listing the  candidates and issues are placed next to each lever.  Because the ballot is  limited to the size of the front of the lever machine, it is difficult to  accommodate multiple languages.
When using a lever machine, voters first close a privacy curtain, using a  long handle attached to the machine.  They vote by pulling down those  levers next to the candidates or issues of their choice.  Making a particular  selection prevents any other selection in that contest (unless it is a vote-for- no-more-than-N contest, in which case no more than N levers would be  selectable).  Overvoting is prevented by the interlocking of the appropriate  mechanical levers in the machine before the election.
Write-in votes are recorded on a paper roll within the lever machine.  The  voter opens the write-in slot by moving the lever to the appropriate position  and then writes in his or her choice on the exposed paper above the office  name.  Once this occurs, the machine locks and will no longer allow the  voter to vote for another candidate listed on the ballot for that particular  contest.
After voting, the voter once again moves the handle, which simultaneously  opens the privacy curtain, records the vote, and resets the levers.  Figure 5  shows a lever machine.
Votes are tallied by mechanical counters, which are attached to each lever.   These counters rotate after the voter moves the handle to open the privacy  curtain.  The counters are composed of three gears—units, tens, and  hundreds.  Each vote causes a gear to make one tenth of a turn.  After 10  turns, the units gear turns to 0, and the tens gear turns to 1, equaling 10  votes.  Similarly, after 100 turns, the tens gear turns to 0, and the hundreds  gear turns to 1, equaling 100 votes.  At the close of the election, election  officials tally the votes by reading the counting mechanism totals on each  lever voting machine. Some machines can also print a paper copy of the  totals.
The design of the lever machine does not allow for a recount of individual  voter records.  Therefore, if the machine malfunctions and a gear fails to  turn, no record exists from which a proper tally can be determined.   Mechanical lever machines are no longer manufactured.  As a result,  maintaining lever machines is becoming more challenging, and some  jurisdictions have turned to “cannibalizing” machines to get needed parts.
section_title: Punch Card
paragraphs: The punch card was invented by Herman Hollerith to help perform  statistical computations analyzing data from the 1880 U.S. Census.  In the  1960s, this technology was first applied to vote casting and tallying.  In  1964, Fulton and De Kalb counties in Georgia, Lane county in Oregon, and  San Joaquin and Monterey counties in California were the first jurisdictions  to use punch cards and computer tally machines in a federal election.
Punch card voting equipment is generally comprised of a ballot, a vote  recording device (this device holds the ballot in place and allows the voter  to punch holes in it), a privacy booth, and a computerized tabulation  device.  There are two basic types of punch card devices: Votomatic and  Datavote.
The Votomatic relies on machine-readable cards that contain 228, 312, or  456 prescored numbered boxes representing ballot choices.  The  corresponding ballot choices are indicated to the voter in a booklet  attached to the vote recording device, with the appropriate places to punch  indicated for each candidate and ballot choice.  To vote, the voter inserts  the ballot into the vote-recording device and uses a stylus to punch out the  appropriate prescored boxes.
Votomatic punch card voting offers certain challenges because the ballot  must be properly aligned in the vote-recording device for the holes in the  ballot card to be punched all the way through.  Incomplete punches are not  uncommon, so that the rectangular scrap (the “chad”) punched by the  stylus may cling to the hole in the card and create what is referred to as a  “hanging chad.”  Hanging chads can cause tabulation machines to read  votes incorrectly and can make it difficult to determine voter intent in a  recount or contested election.  Voters cannot easily review a completed  ballot, because the ballot lacks candidate or issue information, having only  hole numbers. In addition, voters must use a separate piece of paper and  attach it to the ballot with the names of write-in candidates.  Figure 6  shows a Votomatic vote recording device and a Votomatic ballot.
The Datavote also relies on a machine-readable card, but unlike the  Votomatic, the names of the candidates and issues are printed on the card  itself, eliminating the need for a ballot booklet.  The ballots are not  prescored, except for those used for absentee voting.  The voter uses a  stapler-like punching device to punch a hole corresponding to each  candidate and issue.  Spaces for write-in candidates are generally placed on  the ballot.  Because the candidates' names are printed on Datavote punch  card ballots, each voter may require multiple ballot cards in elections that  have a large number of candidates and issues.  (Figure 7 shows a Datavote  ballot.)
For both the Votomatic and Datavote, software is used to program each  vote tabulation machine to correctly assign each vote read into the  computer to the proper contest and candidate or issue.  Generally, the  software is used to identify the particular contests in each precinct, assign  punch card positions to each candidate, and configure any special options,  such as straight party voting and vote-for-no-more-than-N contests.  In  addition, vote-tally software is often used to tally the vote totals from one  or more vote tabulation machines.
For both types of punch cards, jurisdictions can count the ballots either at  the polling place or at a central location. In a polling place count, either the  voters or election officials put their ballot cards into the vote tabulators. In  a central count, voters drop ballots into sealed boxes, and the sealed boxes  are transferred to a central location after the polls close.  At the central  location, ballots are run through the vote tabulators.  In either case, the  tabulator counts the ballots by reading the holes in the ballots.  Generally,  central-count tabulators are higher speed machines, allowing more ballots  to be counted in less time than do precinct-based machines.  Both precinct- count and central-count tabulators store votes on electronic storage media.   These media can be removed manually or transferred via cable  communication.  Figure 8 shows punch card tabulation machines.
Optical scan technology has been used for decades for such tasks as  scoring standardized tests, but it was not applied to voting until the 1980s.   An optical scan voting system is comprised of computer-readable ballots,  appropriate marking devices, privacy booths, and a computerized  tabulation machine.  The ballot can vary in size and lists the names of the  candidates and the issues.  Voters record their choices using an appropriate  writing instrument to fill in boxes or ovals, or to complete an arrow next to  the candidate’s name or the issue.  The ballot includes a space for write-ins  to be placed directly on the ballot. Figure 9 shows an optical scan ballot.
Like punch card software, the software for optical scan equipment is used  to program the tabulation equipment to correctly assign each vote read into  the computer to the proper contest and candidate or issue (i.e., to assign  the location of valid marks on the ballot to the proper candidate or issue).   In addition to identifying the particular contests and the candidates in each  contest, the software is also used to configure any special options, such as  straight party voting and vote-for-no-more-than-N contests.  Precinct-based  optical scanners can also be programmed to detect and/or reject overvotes  and undervotes (where the voter does not vote for all contests and/or  issues on the ballot).  In addition, similar to punch cards, optical scan  systems often use vote-tally software to tally the vote totals from one or  more vote tabulation machines.
Like punch cards, optical scan ballots are counted by being run through  computerized tabulation equipment, in this case, optical-mark-recognition  equipment.  This equipment counts the ballots by sensing or reading the  marks on the ballot.  Ballots can be counted in the polling place or in a  central location.  If ballots are counted at the polling place, voters or  election officials put the ballots into the tabulation equipment.  In this case,  either vote tallies can be captured in removable storage media that can be  taken from the voting equipment and transported to a central tally location,  or they can be electronically transmitted from the polling place to the  central tally location.  If ballots are centrally counted, voters drop ballots  into sealed boxes, and election officials transfer the sealed boxes to the  central location after the polls close, at which time election officials run the  ballots through the tabulation equipment.
Election officials can program precinct-based optical scan equipment to  detect and reject overvotes and undervotes, which allows voters to fix their  mistakes before leaving the polling place.  However, if voters are unwilling  or unable to correct their ballots, a poll worker can manually override the  program and accept the ballot, even though it has been overvoted or  undervoted.  If ballots are tabulated centrally, voters do not have the  opportunity to correct mistakes that may have been made.
Precinct-count optical scan equipment sits on a ballot box with two  compartments for scanned ballots—one for accepted ballots (i.e., those  that are properly filled out) and one for rejected ballots (i.e., blank ballots,  ballots with write-ins, or those accepted because of a forced override).  In  addition, an auxiliary compartment in the ballot box is used for storing  ballots if an emergency arises (e.g., loss of power or machine failure) that  prevents the ballots from being scanned.  Figure 10 shows precinct- and  central-count optical scan tabulators.
First introduced in the 1970s, DRE equipment is an electronic  implementation of the old lever machines.  DREs come in two basic types,  pushbutton or touchscreen, the pushbutton being the older and more  widely used of the two.  The two types of DREs vary considerably in  appearance.  Pushbutton DREs are larger and heavier than touchscreens.   Figure 11 shows DRE pushbutton and touchscreen voting machines.
Pushbutton and touchscreen DREs also differ significantly in the way they  present ballots to the voter.  With the DRE pushbutton, all ballot  information is presented on a single “full-face” ballot.  For example, a ballot  may have 50 buttons on a 3 by 3 foot ballot, with a candidate or issue next  to each button.  In contrast, touchscreen DREs display the ballot  information on an electronic display screen.  For both pushbutton and  touchscreen DREs, the ballot information is programmed onto an  electronic storage medium, which is then uploaded to the machine.  For  touchscreens, ballot information can be displayed in color and can  incorporate pictures of the candidates.  Because the ballot space is much  smaller than the pushbuttons, voters who use touchscreens must page  through the ballot information.  Both touchscreen and pushbutton DREs  can accommodate multilingual ballots; however, because the ballot is  limited to the size of the screen, pushbutton machines can generally display  no more than two languages.
Despite the differences, the two types of DREs have some similarities, such  as how the voter interacts with the voting equipment.  For pushbuttons,  voters press a button next to the candidate or issue, which then lights up to  indicate the selection.  Similarly, voters using touchscreen DREs make  their selections by touching the screen next to the candidate or issue,  which is then highlighted.  When voters are finished making their selections  on a touchscreen or a pushbutton DRE, they cast their votes by pressing a  final “vote” button or screen.  Both types of DREs allow voters to write in  candidates.  While most DREs allow voters to type write-ins on a keyboard,  some pushbutton DREs require voters to write the name on paper tape that  is part of the voting equipment.
Unlike punch card and optical scan voting equipment, DREs do not use  paper ballots.  However, they do retain permanent electronic images of all  the ballots, which can be stored on various media, including internal hard- disk drives, flash cards, or memory cartridges.  These ballot images, which  can be printed, can be used for auditing and recounts.
Like punch card and optical scan devices, DREs require the use of software  to program the various ballot styles and tally the votes, which is generally  done through the use of memory cartridges or other media.  The software is  used to generate ballots for each precinct within the voting jurisdiction,  which includes defining the ballot layout, identifying the contests in each  precinct, and assigning candidates to contests.  The software is also used to  configure any special options, such as straight party voting and vote-for-no- more-than-N contests.  In addition, for pushbutton DREs, the software  assigns the buttons to particular candidates and, for touchscreens, the  software defines the size and location on the screen where the voter makes  the selection.  Vote-tally software is often used to tally the vote totals from  one or more DREs.
DREs also offer various configurations for tallying the votes.  Some contain  removable storage media that can be taken from the voting equipment and  transported to a central location to be tallied.  Others can be configured to  electronically transmit the vote totals from the polling place to a central  tally location.
Because all DREs are programmable, they offer various options that are  not as easily supplied by other voting methods.  For example, they do not  allow overvotes.  In addition, voters can change their selections before  hitting the final button to cast their votes.
DRE touchscreens offer the most flexibility because they can present  numerous screens of data; for example, they allow unlimited multilingual  ballots, unlike pushbutton DREs.  They can also offer a “review” feature  (i.e., requiring voters to review each page of the ballot before pressing the  button to cast the vote) and various visual enhancements (such as color  highlighting of ballot choices, candidate pictures, etc.).
section_title: Election Management Systems
paragraphs: Each type of voting equipment performs critical vote casting and tallying  functions.  However, before the equipment can be used in any given  election to perform these functions, election officials must program the  equipment to accommodate the unique characteristics of that election.  For  example, regardless of the voting equipment used, election officials must  prepare a ballot that is unique to that election and, depending on the voting  equipment, program the equipment to present the ballot to the voter and/or  read the ballot as voted.
Election management systems integrate the functions associated with  readying vote casting and tallying equipment for a given election with other  election management functions.  Election management systems run on  jurisdictions’ existing personal computers or vendor-provided election  management system computer platforms.  In brief, election management  systems (hardware and software) generally consist of one or more  interactive databases containing information about a jurisdiction’s  precincts, the election contest, the candidates, and the issues being  decided.  These election management systems can be used to design and  generate various ballots.  Election management systems also allow  jurisdictions to program their vote casting and tallying equipment to  properly assign each vote to the proper contest and candidate. These  systems also can centrally tally and generate reports on election progress  and results.
Some election management systems offer more sophisticated capabilities,  such as managing the absentee ballot process.  For example, some systems  have the capability to automate the massive ballot mailings and recording  of returns and support barcoding and imaging for ballot application  signature verification.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To describe elections in the United States, we reviewed reports by FEC and  others, including the reports of the various national and state election  reform commissions as they were completed.  To obtain examples of the  various stages of an election and any associated challenges, we had to get  information from the level of government responsible for administering  elections-that is, from the local election jurisdictions, which in most states  involved counties.  To get this information about the November 2000  election, we used a mail survey that is generalizable to 90 percent of the  U.S. population, and a telephone survey that is generalizable nationwide.   We also interviewed local election officials.  To describe selected statutory  requirements in the 50 states and the District of Columbia for voter  registration, absentee and provisional balloting, and recounts, we reviewed  state and D.C. statutes.  We also conducted a survey of D.C. and state  election directors, and reviewed information from the National Conference  of State Legislatures on state election requirements and recent  amendments to those requirements.
To identify the types of voting methods used on November 7, 2000, and the  distribution of these methods among local election jurisdictions and their  precincts, we used several sources of information, including two  databases—one for counties and one for subcounty minor civil divisions  (MCDs) in the New England states—from Election Data Services, Inc., a  private company that collects election-related data from state and local  jurisdictions.  We then used several methods to validate the data in the  databases.  We also checked state Web sites, such as those of the  Secretaries of State, and compared any data on voting methods from these  sources to those in Election Data Services, Inc.’s database for the  respective states.
To assess the characteristics of different types of voting equipment, we  reviewed available studies, interviewed voting equipment vendors,  reviewed vendor documentation on their equipment, used data from our  mail survey of local election jurisdictions and data from our survey of state  election directors, and interviewed election officials from our 27  judgmentally selected local election jurisdictions.  Two of these  jurisdictions had recently used new voting equipment in the November  2000 election, and one had purchased new equipment for delivery in 2001.   To identify new voting equipment, we surveyed vendors and reviewed  vendor publications, attended vendor marketing events and conferences,  and researched periodicals and vendor Web sites.  To estimate the potential  cost of replacing existing voting equipment in the United States, we  developed data on the distribution of voting equipment in the United  States—among the states, counties within the states, and precincts within  each county.  For the cost of purchasing optical scan or DRE equipment,  we used data obtained from voting equipment vendors.  Our estimates  generally include only the cost to purchase the equipment and do not  contain software costs associated with the equipment to support a specific  election and to perform related election management functions, which  generally varied by the size of the jurisdiction that purchased the  equipment.  Because of the wide variation in the ways jurisdictions handle  operation and maintenance (e.g., in-house or by a contract), our estimates  do not include operations and maintenance costs.  The cost of software and  other items could substantially increase the actual cost of purchasing new  voting equipment.
To identify and describe issues associated with the use of the Internet for  vote casting and tabulation, we interviewed vendors, reviewed vendor  publications, attended vendor marketing events, and researched  periodicals and vendor Web sites.  We did not independently validate  vendor-provided information. To identify Internet voting options and  issues, we reviewed relevant recent studies, researched publications and  material, and assessed preliminary Internet voting pilot reports.  We also  interviewed recognized experts from various institutions—academia,  professional associations, and voting industry—that are familiar with  issues surrounding Internet voting.  In addition, we interviewed Internet  voting equipment vendors that were involved in conducting these Internet  voting pilots.
We did our work between March 2001 and September 2001 in Washington,  D.C.; Atlanta; Los Angeles; Dallas; Norfolk; San Francisco; and 27 local  election jurisdictions in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
Appendix I contains additional detail on our objectives, scope, and  methodology.
section_title: Voter Registration
paragraphs: The November 2000 election resulted in widespread concerns about voter  registration in the United States.  Headlines and reports have questioned  the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration by highlighting  accounts of individuals who thought they were registered being turned  away from polling places on election day, the fraudulent use of the names  of dead people to cast additional votes, and jurisdictions incorrectly  removing the names of eligible voters from voter registration lists.
For purposes of this report, voter registration includes the processes,  people, and technology involved in registering eligible voters and in  compiling and maintaining accurate and complete voter registration lists.   List maintenance is performed by election officials and consists of updating  registrants’ information and deleting the names of registrants who are no  longer eligible to vote.  This chapter discusses (1) state requirements to  vote, (2) applying to register to vote, (3) compiling voter registration lists,  and (4) voter registration list maintenance.
subsections: section_title: State Requirements to Vote
paragraphs: Voter Eligibility Requirements Varied From State to State  Registration Was a Prerequisite to Vote in All States but One Although the federal government has enacted legislation that affects  registration procedures, registering to vote is not a federal requirement.   Instead, registration is one of several potential requirements, in addition to  citizenship, age, and residency, that states may require citizens to meet to  be eligible to vote.  Although voter eligibility requirements varied from  state to state, registration was a prerequisite to vote in nearly all  jurisdictions in the United States.  However, because of differences in state  voter eligibility requirements, citizens with the same qualifications were  eligible to vote in some states but not in others.
subsections: section_title: Voter Eligibility Requirements Varied From State to State
paragraphs: The 50 states and the District of Columbia are empowered by the U.S.  Constitution to establish voter eligibility requirements within their  jurisdictions.  At a minimum, every state and the District of Columbia  required that a voter be at least 18 years of age, a U.S. citizen, and a  resident of the state or the District.  In addition, most states limited voter  eligibility on the basis of criminal status and mental competency, although  the specifics of these limitations varied.
subsections: section_title: Criminal Status
paragraphs: Based on our review of information developed by the Justice Department,  48 states and the District of Columbia prohibited individuals from voting  while incarcerated for a felony conviction but varied in their provisions for  restoring voting rights after the incarceration period.  Thirty-eight states  and the District of Columbia provided for automatic restoration of voting  rights.  In 12 of these states and the District of Columbia, restoration  occurred after the individual's release from incarceration.  In the other 26  states, restoration occurred after the individual completed his or her  sentence, including any term of probation or parole.  Ten states did not  provide for automatic restoration of voting rights.  In these states,  individuals could seek restoration of voting rights through pardon  procedures established by the state (e.g., gubernatorial pardons).  In a few  states, individuals convicted of specific offenses permanently lost the right  to vote.  Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee permanently disenfranchised  those convicted of certain voting-related crimes, such as buying or selling  votes. Tennessee also permanently disenfranchised those convicted of  treason, rape or murder.  In Delaware, individuals convicted of murder,  manslaughter, felony sexual offenses, or certain public corruption offenses  permanently lost the right to vote.
section_title: Mental Competence
paragraphs: The majority of states and the District of Columbia also prohibited  individuals who were mentally incompetent from voting.  Nearly all of  these states and the District of Columbia required a judicial determination  of incompetence to disqualify a citizen from voting.  For example, in Texas,  those who were judged by a court to be mentally incompetent were  ineligible to vote.  In Oklahoma, individuals judged to be incapacitated  could not vote, and those judged to be partially incapacitated also could  not vote, if so stated in the court order.  A few states, such as Delaware, did  not require a judicial determination of incompetence, but simply  disqualified individuals who were mentally incompetent from voting.
section_title: Registration Was a Prerequisite to Vote in All States But One
paragraphs: Registration was a prerequisite to vote in nearly all jurisdictions.  In the  United States, citizens were responsible for applying to register to vote.   For the November 2000 election, FEC reported that nearly 168 million  people, or about 82 percent of the voting age population, were registered  to vote.
All states, except North Dakota with 53 counties, required citizens to apply  to register and be registered with the appropriate local election official  before they could vote in an election.  Because of North Dakota’s rural  character, voting occurred in numerous relatively small precincts, which  are the areas covered by a polling place.  According to North Dakota  officials, the establishment of small precincts was intended to ensure that  election boards knew the voters who came to the polls and could easily  determine if an individual should not be voting in the precinct.  In the  November 2000 election, North Dakota voters in 696 precincts cast 292,249  ballots, representing about 62 percent of the voting age population.
section_title: Applying to Register to Vote
paragraphs: Citizens Could Apply to Register to Vote in Many Ways  Citizens Learned About the Registration Process Through Different   Officials Faced Challenges in Processing Applications  Officials Had Concerns About Applications Submitted at Motor  Registering to vote appeared to be a simple step in the election system- generally, a qualified citizen provided basic personal information, such as  name and address, to an election official and was able to vote in all  subsequent elections.  But applying to register and being registered were  not synonymous.  A citizen became a registered voter only after his or her  application was received, processed, and confirmed by an election official.   We found that citizens could apply to register to vote and could learn about  the registration process in numerous ways, and that election officials faced  challenges in processing these applications, especially in processing  applications received from motor vehicle authorities.
subsections: section_title: Citizens Could Apply to Register to Vote in Many Ways
paragraphs: Citizens had numerous opportunities to apply to register to vote.  Figure 12  shows several of these opportunities, such as applying at a local election  office or at a motor vehicle authority, or obtaining and mailing an  application to a local election official.  These and other examples of how  citizens were able to apply to register are illustrated by the situations we  found in our visits to local election jurisdictions-cities, counties, and  townships.
In most of the jurisdictions we visited, individuals were able to apply in  person to register at (1) their local election office, (2) a motor vehicle  authority, and (3) various other agencies such as public assistance  agencies, or via voter registration drives through political parties or other  organizations.
Applying Through Local Election Offices To apply at a local election office, individuals completed an accepted state  registration application and submitted it to their local election official.   Some local election officials we visited also provided registration services  outside of their offices, such as at schools or other community events.  For  example, officials at some jurisdictions told us they visited high schools to  provide eligible students with voter education, registration forms, and  assistance.  Officials in some jurisdictions said they held registration events  at local malls, county open houses, libraries, county fairs, and at other  community programs.  In one medium-sized jurisdiction, 600 deputy  registrars were trained to register citizens at various events and within  their communities and civic organizations.  Finally, citizens in one large  jurisdiction we visited were able to apply to register at a mobile voter  registration van (shown in figure 13).
Applying at a Motor Vehicle Authority In most states, citizens could apply to register to vote at a motor vehicle  authority under NVRA, which is widely known as the Motor Voter Act.   There were variations in how NVRA was implemented and how citizens  were able to apply to register at motor vehicle authorities in the  jurisdictions we visited.
National data from FEC and the Census Bureau indicated that the use of  motor voter programs increased over the past 4 years.  The percentage of  all applications received through motor vehicle authorities in states  covered by NVRA increased to 38 percent of the total number of  registration applications received from 1999 through 2000, from 33 percent  from 1995 through 1996.  Similarly, we estimate that at least one-third of  people in 2000 reported registering to vote when obtaining or renewing a  driver’s license, up from 1996 levels.
The jurisdictions we visited varied in their implementation of motor voter  programs.  In many of these jurisdictions, election officials told us that  motor vehicle authority staff were to offer to assist individuals obtaining or  renewing a driver’s license or other form of identification, in applying to  register to vote.  In other jurisdictions, we were told that the voter  registration assistance provided by the motor vehicle authority consisted of  making voter registration applications available on a table.  However, in  one small jurisdiction we visited, an election office employee was available  at the motor vehicle authority to provide individuals with registration  information and assistance.
The procedure for applying to register to vote at motor vehicle authorities  also varied across the jurisdictions we visited.  For example, at some  jurisdictions, a citizen applied to register by completing a voter registration  section of the driver’s license application.  In others, we were told that the  voter registration application was printed using information from the  motor vehicle authority database and was provided to the applicant for  verification, confirmation of citizenship, and signature.  Two jurisdictions  in the same state provided voter registration terminals at motor vehicle  authorities where applicants could complete their voter registration form  and obtain a copy of the transaction.
Applying at Other Agencies and Locations Finally, citizens could apply in person to register to vote at several state  agencies and locations, or through other organizations.  NVRA requires  states to provide citizens with the opportunity to apply to register at public  assistance agencies; state-funded disability service offices; armed forces  recruitment offices; and state-designated agencies, such as public libraries,  public schools, or marriage license bureaus.
The number of voter registration applications submitted at NVRA- designated agencies decreased during the past 4 years.  According to FEC,  from 1999 through 2000, voter registration applications received at these  agencies and locations accounted for less than 8 percent of the total, a  decrease from 1995 through 1996, when 11 percent of applications had  been submitted at these agencies.  In a very large jurisdiction we visited,  local election officials reported a substantial decline in the number of  registration applications received from social service agencies from 24,878  applications in 1996 to 1,309 in 2000.  Officials in that jurisdiction noted that  “when the program  was initially instituted, there was widespread  interest both from potential voters as well as from agency personnel.”  The  officials suggested possible reasons for the decline in applications,  including that the majority of social service clients were repeat clients, and  thus already registered, or that some clients were no longer using social  services because they had been placed in jobs.
Citizens could also apply to register to vote in person through other  organizations.  We estimate that in November 2000, at least 16 percent of  respondents completed an application at a registration drive, which  included political rallies, someone coming to their door, or registration  drives at a mall, market, fair, or public library.  Officials in some  jurisdictions we visited noted that political parties were a major source of  voter registration applications in their jurisdiction.
subsections: section_title: Mail Application for Voter Registration
paragraphs: In addition to applying to register in person, citizens could apply by  obtaining, completing, and mailing a voter registration application to the  appropriate election official.  According to FEC, during 1999-2000, 31  percent of total registration applications submitted in the states covered by  NVRA were submitted by mail.  In the jurisdictions we visited, we found a  variety of ways for citizens to obtain applications and multiple forms for  citizens to use.
Sources for Voter Registration Applications Within most jurisdictions we visited, registration applications generally  were available at many places, including at state and local election offices,  public libraries, post offices, and schools.  In one very large jurisdiction,  registration applications were available at over 1,200 locations.  Other  jurisdictions we visited included registration information and applications  in the local telephone book or in state tax packets.
Some states and jurisdictions provided citizens the opportunity to  download or request registration application forms over the Internet.  Many  of the states and jurisdictions we visited included on their Web sites  registration application forms that could be downloaded and used for  registering, while others included a form for requesting a registration  application.  Still others allowed citizens to complete and electronically  submit an application form on the state’s Web site.  The state election office  then mailed the applicant the completed application form to be signed and  then mailed back to the office.  The applicant would not be officially  registered until election officials accepted the signed form.
In November 2000, U.S. citizens could use over 50 different forms to apply  to register to vote.  For example, some states used more than one form,  having a standard state application as well as a separate form for NVRA- designated agencies.  In addition, citizens could apply to register using the  National Mail Voter Registration Form and the Federal Post Card  Application (FPCA).  The National Mail Voter Registration Form was  developed by FEC to allow citizens to register to vote from anywhere in the  United States.  NVRA required states to accept and use the National Mail  Voter Registration Form in addition to their own state application form.   According to FEC, as of June 2001, 26 states accepted paper reproductions  of the form.
U.S. citizens serving with the military or working overseas and their  dependents were allowed to register to vote by mail using the FPCA  (shown in figure 14).  This form allowed an applicant to simultaneously  register to vote and request an absentee ballot.  In some states, those who  used the FPCA were not placed on the state’s permanent registration list.   Instead, their registrations were valid for only 1 year, after which they were  required to reregister in order to be eligible to vote.
We found variation in the application forms available to apply to register to  vote.  At the jurisdictions we visited, the most common information  requested on applications was full name, address, and signature.  Most  jurisdictions also requested date of birth, while others requested social  security number, gender, race, and/or place of birth.  Some registration  applications requested more or less information from an applicant than  was required to register to vote within the particular jurisdiction.  On some  forms, information not required to register to vote was clearly indicated as  optional; on other forms it was not.  As a result, one completed application  might be accepted in some states but not in others.  Examples of  differences in the applications included the following:  According to FEC, as of June 2001, seven states required applicants to  provide their full social security number, and two required the last four  digits of the number.  Twenty others only requested that applicants  provide the number (17 full and 3 the last four digits). The National Mail  Voter Registration Form did not provide a specific space for applicants  to provide their social security number, but the FPCA did.
The application forms in several of the jurisdictions we visited  requested that the applicant provide more information than was  required to register, such as gender and telephone number.  Application  forms in some of these jurisdictions stated that identifying gender or  providing a telephone number was optional; others did not.  The FPCA  had spaces for applicants to indicate their gender, but not telephone  number.  The National Mail Voter Registration Form did not include a  space for applicants to provide gender, and indicated that providing a  telephone number was optional.
The application forms for some states and jurisdictions asked for  applicants to identify their race or ethnic group and their place of birth.   Both the FPCA and the National Mail Voter Registration Form had  spaces for an applicant to use to identify race, but neither form had a  space to indicate place of birth.  Figures 15 and 16 show voter  registration forms from jurisdictions we visited.
section_title: Citizens Could Learn About the Registration Process Through Different Means
paragraphs: Informing citizens about the registration process was important, given the  various ways people could apply to register, the numerous forms they  could complete, and different information required for completing the  applications.  On the basis of our mail survey, we estimated that 14 percent  (plus or minus 4 percent) of jurisdictions nationwide actively sought  comments or suggestions from voters about voter registration.  The  jurisdictions we visited differed in the emphasis they placed on voter  education.  Officials at some jurisdictions told us they offered little in the  way of registration education.  A few jurisdictions said that they relied on  external organizations, such as the League of Women Voters and/or  political groups, to educate voters.  However, most of the jurisdictions we  visited educated voters about registration in a variety of ways.
Many of the jurisdictions we visited printed registration deadlines,  locations, and procedures in at least one newspaper.  Some used television  and others used radio to publicize registration information.  In some states  and jurisdictions we visited, Web sites offered voter registration  information, including deadlines, qualifications to register, and where to  submit an application.  Some of these jurisdictions offered interactive Web  sites where individuals could determine their registration status and locate  their voting precinct.  Other registration education efforts included  mailing each household a voter guide with registration information;  speaking to civic groups, churches, unions, high schools, and other   providing handouts and registration applications at naturalization   distributing flyers and newsletters.
section_title: Election Officials Faced Challenges in Processing Registration Applications
paragraphs: The results of our nationwide surveys and meetings with election officials  indicated that election officials faced challenges, such as implementing  state requirements, handling applicant errors, and coordinating with  multiple agencies, in processing applications.  Local election officials  described how they processed applications, including (1) receiving  applications, (2) obtaining information from registrants who submit  incomplete applications, (3) verifying information on the application, and  (4) confirming registration status.
subsections: section_title: Receiving Registration Applications
paragraphs: Citizens were required to submit registration applications to local election  officials by certain deadlines, specified by state statutes, to be eligible to  vote in an upcoming election.  These deadlines varied, allowing citizens in  different states different amounts of time to submit applications.  Local  election officials expressed concerns about processing applications in the  allotted time before election day and varied in how they handled late  applications.
In 30 states, registration applications were to be received by the local  election office about 1 month before the election.  Six states–Idaho,  Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming--allowed  same-day registration where their residents could register to vote on  election day.  In Maine, for same-day registration, citizens were to register  at the voter registrar’s office or the board of elections instead of at the polls  as in the 5 other states that allowed same-day registration.  Figure 17 shows  the registration deadlines across the United States, and appendix IV  contains information about these deadlines.
Deadlines closer to election day, or election day itself, provide citizens  more time to apply to register.  However, some local election officials  expressed concerns about not having enough time to process applications  if deadlines for their submission were shortened or eliminated.  California  recently passed legislation that shortened its registration deadline from 29  days before an election to 15 days.  A local election official in a very large  jurisdiction in California said that processing the registration applications,  sending out the sample ballots, and processing registrants absentee ballot  requests within 15 days, instead of 29 days, would be “impossible for a  major election.”
A few local election officials raised concerns about the possibility of voter  fraud, as there may not be time to verify an applicant’s eligibility.  All of the  states that allowed same-day registration required citizens to sign a  registration oath or to show some proof of identification or residency when  applying to register.  For example, Minnesota allowed citizens to register  on election day by completing the registration card under oath and by  providing proof of residence, such as a Minnesota driver’s license.   However, one local election official from a state that allowed same-day  registration said that she “didn’t believe same-day voter registration should  be allowed as there is little regulation, nor proper time to verify voters.”   The official noted that in the last election they averaged one  a  minute.  In contrast, officials in another jurisdiction that allowed same-day  registration said that they did not have concerns about fraud, nor did they  have concerns about verifying applications on election day.
In those states that had registration deadlines, local election officials in  jurisdictions we visited differed in how they dealt with applications  received after the deadline.  In some jurisdictions, registrants were  informed via mail that their application was received late and that they  were not eligible to vote in the upcoming election.  Officials in one large  jurisdiction said that applications were officially accepted for 5 working  days after the close of the registration period if the date on the form was  before the 30-day deadline.  However, they said that in practice they  accepted registration applications at any time before the day of the  election.
section_title: Obtaining Information From Registrants Who Submit Incomplete Applications
paragraphs: Local election officials we visited reviewed applications for completeness.   However, they varied in how they processed applications missing any of  the required or requested information.  The variations included how strict  they were in accepting applications with missing information and how they  attempted to obtain missing information.  In addition, even within the same  jurisdiction, applicants who submitted different types of forms lacking the  same piece of information were treated differently.
At one medium-sized jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that if  someone applying in person refused to provide his or her birth date, he or  she was registered if “it was clear” the individual was 18 or older.  Officials  at some other jurisdictions said they called (if a phone number was  provided) or sent written notification to the applicant to get the missing  information.  For example, in one large jurisdiction, officials told us if there  was not enough time for the applicant to provide the birth date before the  registration deadline, they registered him or her anyway and tried to get the  information at the polling precinct.  The official at one small jurisdiction  said that when a birth date was missing from the application, she registered  the applicant and entered the birth date as January 1, 1850.  She told us that  people were usually more than willing to correct that date at the polls.
Differences in Processing Applications Within the Same  Jurisdiction Even within the same jurisdiction, there were differences in how  applications missing the same piece of information were treated.  Officials  at these jurisdictions told us these differences were the result of accepting  different types of application forms for registration.  For example, in one  large jurisdiction we visited where the last four digits of the social security  number were required by the state, applicants who did not provide the  information were treated differently, depending on the form they used to  apply.  Officials at that jurisdiction told us that some motor vehicle  authorities were still using an old voter registration form that did not  request the social security information.  In order not to disadvantage these  applicants, they were registered without having to provide the information  and were able to vote in the November 2000 election.  Other applicants in  the same jurisdiction downloaded and used the National Mail Voter  Registration Form from the Internet.  That form also did not ask for the  social security number, although the state-specific directions for the form  noted that the information was required and instructed applicants to  provide it.  Notices were sent to any applicants who used the National Mail  Voter Registration Form and did not provide the social security  information.  Unless they reapplied with the social security information,  they were not registered or allowed to vote in the November 2000 election.
In another very large jurisdiction, election officials told us that the standard  state voter registration form asked for information on place of birth and  that applicants who mailed the standard state form but did not provide  their place of birth, were put in a “pending” status and were notified by mail  that they would not be registered until the information was provided.   However, when applicants used the National Mail Voter Registration Form  or the FPCA, which did not request the applicant’s place of birth, the  officials told us they registered the applicant and then tried to obtain the  information by sending the registrant a letter requesting the place of birth.
At one medium-sized jurisdiction we visited, the officials told us that if an  applicant registered in person, he or she had to use a state form and  present identification, but if the same applicant registered by mail, the  National Mail Voter Registration Form could be used and no identification  was required.
section_title: Verifying Information on the Application
paragraphs: When jurisdictions received completed applications, the degree to which  they verified the information on the forms to ensure the applicant was truly  eligible to vote, based on statutory requirements, varied.  Some local  officials in jurisdictions we visited said they considered the registration  application process to be an honor system and they simply relied on the  applicant to tell the truth.  All registration applications in the jurisdictions  we visited required the applicant to sign an oath declaring that they were  citizens and were eligible to vote.  In other cases, an applicant may have  had to present identification at the time of application.  Officials at one very  large jurisdiction told us they verified application information for a random  1 percent of all applicants.  A form letter and a copy of the registration  application were mailed to these applicants, who were asked to complete  and return the form as verification of the application.  We found varying  degrees of checks on citizenship, residency, and multiple registrations to  ensure that the applicant was qualified to register.
On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 34 percent (plus or  minus 11 percent) of jurisdictions nationwide checked for U.S. citizenship  to determine initial and/or continued eligibility for voter registration.  Some  election officials said that they checked that the affirmation on the  application was signed or that the applicant had marked the box on the  application indicating that he or she was a citizen.  Other election officials  told us they used jury lists to compare with voter registration records, since  some people identified themselves as noncitizens as a reason for declining  to perform jury duty.  However, some local election officials we met with  indicated that they had no way to verify that an applicant was indeed a  citizen.
We estimate that nearly all (96 percent) jurisdictions nationwide checked whether an individual’s address was outside of their jurisdiction to determine eligibility for voter registration.
GAO Telephone Survey of Jurisdictions On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 96 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide checked whether an individual’s address was  outside of their jurisdiction.  Some local election officials we visited used  street maps or city planning files to confirm whether an address was a valid  location within their jurisdiction.  Others said that they used information  such as property tax appraisal and building permit files to verify addresses  within their jurisdictions. “You can ask any county clerk in the state and they will tell you that the biggest problem is  motor voter.  Residents can register at the welfare office, the health department, the motor  vehicle authorities, and they do, time and again.  This results in tons of registrations which  are costly and time-consuming to sort through and check against records.”
We estimate that nearly all (99 percent) jurisdictions nationwide checked whether an individual was already registered within their jurisdiction to determine eligibility for voter registration.
GAO Telephone Survey of Jurisdictions On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 99 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide checked whether an individual was already  registered in their jurisdiction.  Jurisdictions we visited varied in the  processes they used to check for multiple registrants.  For example, in a  medium-sized jurisdiction we were told that the state provided the election  officials with a report identifying possible duplicate registrants.  The  officials investigated these and canceled any they found to be duplicates.   In many jurisdictions we visited, however, officials checked new  registration applications against records of registered citizens.
Officials in several jurisdictions noted that names alone were not a  sufficient identification source.  For example, after the November 2000  election, the Illinois State Board of Elections completed a brief analysis of  multiple registrations by looking at voter registration records submitted by  local election officials in all but 2 counties in the state.  Using data  collected between December 15, 2000 and February 28, 2001, the study  found that of 7,197,838 voters registered in Illinois, 143,080, or 2 percent,  were multiple instances of the same voter.  The study also found that there  were 283 people registered as “Maria Rodriguez” in Chicago and 159 as  “Jose Hernandez.”  There were also 919 “Robert Smiths” registered in  Illinois.  The study noted that “additional criteria are needed to  differentiate these voters, as they are obviously not all multiple  registrations of the same person.”  According to some local election  officials, using social security numbers to identify registered voters helped  to avoid multiple registrations of the same person.  One small jurisdiction  we visited used the first three letters of the last name and date of birth to  identify any registrants who may already be registered. “…We were even on 60 Minutes in 1998 with our 16,000 fraudulent voter  registrations….However, we did track those. We did not have a single one of those people  vote.”
section_title: Confirming Registration Status
paragraphs: After accepting a registration application, election officials informed the  applicant that he or she had been registered.  In all of the jurisdictions that  we visited, officials informed citizens that they had been registered by  mailing a voter registration card or letter (an example of which is shown in  figure 18).  Registration confirmation was also an important step in the  verification process.  Local election officials told us that registration  confirmations were mailed as nonforwardable mail and thus also served as  a check on the registrant actually living at the address provided.  In  addition, the confirmation allowed registrants to review and correct any  information about their registration status before election day.
Some jurisdictions varied in how they confirmed individuals’ registration  status close to the date of elections.  A few local election officials said that  closer to election day they might not have been sufficiently staffed to  confirm all applicants’ registrations.
section_title: Local Election Officials Expressed Concerns About Processing Applications Submitted at Motor Vehicle Authorities
paragraphs: We estimate that about 46 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems with NVRA during the November 2000 election.
GAO Telephone Survey of Jurisdictions NVRA expanded the opportunities for citizens to apply for registration to  include submitting applications at motor vehicle authorities, and in the  recent election cycle, such applications have increased.  Local election  officials around the country expressed concerns about processing  applications submitted at motor vehicle authorities.  At most of the  jurisdictions we visited, applications submitted by citizens at motor vehicle  authorities were hand delivered, mailed, or electronically transmitted to a  state or local election office.  On the basis of our telephone survey, we  estimate that 46 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems, in  general, with NVRA registrations during the November 2000 election.   Officials most frequently noted challenges with processing incomplete or  illegible applications, applications that arrived late at the local election  office, and applications that never arrived.  According to local election  officials, each of these three situations could result in individuals showing  up at the polls to vote and discovering that they were never registered.   Local election officials offered suggestions to address these problems, such  as using technology, expanding voter education, and increasing training at  motor vehicle authorities.
subsections: section_title: Incomplete and Illegible Applications
paragraphs: Local election officials at the jurisdictions we visited described instances in  which they received incomplete or illegible applications from the state  motor vehicles authorities that  had incomplete or incorrect addresses;  were missing signatures;  were missing required information, such as date of birth or social   had signatures that were illegible or did not match the typed name on  the application.
In particular, one challenge that local election officials noted involved state  statutory requirements for an original signature on the registration  application.  Local election officials in jurisdictions that received  applications via electronic transmission also had to receive a separate  paper application that contained the applicant’s original signature.   Officials in a large jurisdiction we visited noted problems because the  mailed signature cards did not arrive at the same time as the electronically  submitted applications and, in some instances, took up to 3 months to  arrive.
section_title: Late Applications
paragraphs: Processing late applications submitted at motor vehicle authorities was a  challenge in some of the jurisdictions that we visited.  In one medium-sized  jurisdiction, applications dated in July were received at the election office  with October transmittal dates from the motor vehicle authority.  For the  November 2000 election, to speed up the process of mailing applications,  one large jurisdiction arranged to send elections staff to the offices of the  motor vehicle authority on the last day citizens could apply to register to  pick up and deliver the applications directly to the county elections office.
section_title: Applications That Never Arrived at Local Election Offices
paragraphs: When election offices failed to receive applications, citizens could show up  to vote on election day to find that they were not registered.  Local election  officials we met with described the following accounts of citizens not  included on registration lists showing up at polling precincts on election  day claiming that they had registered to vote at a motor vehicle authority.
In one very large jurisdiction we visited, between September 15, 2000,  and November 28, 2000, a total of 688 calls were received from potential  voters who claimed they had either registered or changed their address  through the motor vehicle authority.  Upon investigation of these cases,  39 percent needed to either register or reregister at their current  address.
In one medium-sized jurisdiction, 22 percent of citizens who were not on  registration lists, but who claimed that they had registered, said they did  so at a motor vehicle authority.  However, the local election official  believed that most of these citizens were not registered to vote.
section_title: Election Officials’ Suggested Ways to Improve Registration at Motor Vehicle Authorities
paragraphs: Election officials suggested ways for addressing the occurrence of a citizen  showing up at the polls on election day after incorrectly assuming that he  or she had registered to vote at a motor vehicle authority.  These fixes  included implementing technology options, such as electronically  submitting applications, increasing voter education efforts, and providing  training opportunities for motor vehicle authority employees.
Local election officials relied on available technology and suggested  changes to current systems they believed could address problems with  registration applications.  Some local election officials suggested that voter  registration information be transmitted electronically to election offices.   Officials in two small jurisdictions in the same state described how  registration information was sent electronically from the motor vehicle  authority to the statewide voter registration system, which then sent the  information to the jurisdiction in which the applicant wished to be  registered.  In addition, local election officials in a medium-sized  jurisdiction said they would like to redesign the application used to apply at  motor vehicle authorities to allow a user to input registration information  into a computer and have an application print out for the applicant to sign  and submit.  However, electronic transmission of registration applications  in states that required an original signature on an application would still  require that a paper copy be transferred to local election officials.
Increased public education may reduce the number of people who come to vote on election  day believing they are registered when they are not.  The public should be educated about  the importance of receiving the confirmation card in the mail after registering and the  importance of saving the receipt given to voters who register at the motor vehicle authority  until the confirmation card is received. “The biggest problem is that voters are not educated on motor voter procedures. New voters  misunderstand that a driver license card is not a voter registration card… that they are  applying to register to vote, not actually registering to vote… Motor voter has helped  registration activities in the latest election because it has provided a steadier stream of new  voters.  But, the enactment of motor voter makes it easier for applicants to place the blame  for registration problems on others instead of themselves.”
Training Opportunities for Motor Vehicle Authority Employees As a result of NVRA, election officials were to share some of the  responsibility of administering voter registration with motor vehicle  authorities, whose primary purpose is unrelated to election administration.   Some local election officials felt that, as a result, the registration process  was more difficult to manage, and that motor vehicle authority staff had  too much responsibility for registering voters.  Others we surveyed and met  with agreed that for motor voter programs to successfully function, motor  vehicle authority staff needed to be trained about registering voters.  In one  very large jurisdiction we visited, local election officials coordinated with  motor vehicle staff to provide training sessions and information about  registering voters.  In one small jurisdiction, a local election official was  situated in the lobby of the motor vehicle authority.  The election official  provided voter registration services to reduce the number of citizens who  mistakenly believed that they had registered and to reduce the number of  applications denied due to missing or incomplete information.
section_title: Compiling Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Lists Had Multiple Uses and Helped Ensure That Only Qualified   Officials Used Different Methods, Providing Varying Capabilities, to  Election officials compiled confirmed registration applications into lists of  registered voters for use throughout the election process.  Officials used  different technologies and systems to compile the lists, and each system  had different capabilities and limitations.
subsections: section_title: Voter Registration Lists Had Multiple Uses and Helped Ensure That Only Qualified Persons Voted
paragraphs: Election officials used lists of registered voters for several purposes.  A  citizen’s access to voting was based primarily on the appearance of his or  her name on such a list.  For example, for both absentee and election day  voting, election officials typically verified an individual’s eligibility using a  list of registered voters or a poll book before allowing him or her to vote.   In some jurisdictions, officials also used registration lists for defining who  in the jurisdiction received election-related information like sample ballots  or voter information guides.  The registration lists also provided election  officials with a basis for determining the quantity of supplies, such as  ballots and voting machines and the numbers of personnel needed on  election day.
section_title: Officials Used Different Methods, Which Provided Varying Capabilities, to Compile Registration Applications Into a List of Registered Voters
paragraphs: States and local election jurisdictions used different systems to compile  registration applications into a list of registered voters.  Some officials  compiled voter registration lists manually or, as most did, through an  automated system.  All of the local election jurisdictions we visited used  automated systems to compile registration lists.  Some jurisdictions used a  local computerized system for maintaining registration lists, and others  were linked to a statewide automated voter registration system.  The  various systems provided different capabilities, such as those for  processing applicants’ signatures, generating reports and notifications for  registrants, and sharing information with other jurisdictions.
subsections: section_title: Local Automated Voter Registration Systems
paragraphs: Many of the local election jurisdictions we visited used local automated  voter registration systems.  Local election officials told us that, in  comparison to manual systems, their automated systems saved time and  effort by allowing them to more easily perform a number of routine tasks.   Some jurisdictions operated their own local voter registration system, and  others shared a jurisdiction-wide system with other government offices in  the jurisdiction.
section_title: Jurisdictions With Their Own Systems
paragraphs: We estimate that 61 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had their own computerized voter registration system.
GAO Telephone Survey of Jurisdictions On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 61 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide had their own computerized voter registration  system.  Local election officials we visited noted that their systems  allowed them to retain possession and control of their voter registration  lists at all times, and to perform several functions, such as  checking for duplicate registrations within their jurisdiction,  updating registration records,  generating forms and letters to send to registrants, and  compiling and producing reports.
Some automated systems provided additional capabilities and features.   Several local election jurisdictions used systems that scanned an  applicant’s signature from the application into the voter registration  system.  The automated system used by one very large jurisdiction  interfaced with the jurisdiction’s system for election tallying, and with  geographic street reference files, which were used for assigning registrants  to a precinct.
Some jurisdictions used an automated system that was part of the central  computer system that ran applications in support of other county  functions.  Officials at one medium-sized jurisdiction told us that with their  automated system they could perform all of the routine election-related  tasks.  However, jurisdictions that shared with the county system could  have problems based on the capacity limits of the county’s servers, and the  need for extra security to maintain the integrity of the election-related  functions of the system.  We visited one medium-sized jurisdiction that was  in the process of implementing its own voter registration system.  A local  election official in that jurisdiction said that they were “being kicked off the  county’s system” because their computer needs had outgrown the system.
Sharing Information With States and Other Jurisdictions On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 75 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide used or shared information with a statewide  computerized voter registration system.  Of the jurisdictions we visited that  had automated systems, many shared registration information with the  state election office.  Some shared information electronically, providing  registration lists to the state periodically.  For example, one medium-sized  jurisdiction we visited provided the state a computerized file of their  registration list every 6 months.
Some local election officials in the jurisdictions that we visited noted that  there were limitations in their capacity to share information on a real-time  basis.  Officials in one medium-sized jurisdiction said that while they  provided the state a computerized file of their registration list, the  jurisdiction had no automated method for checking the registration list  against those of other jurisdictions to identify potential duplicates.  In May  2001, their state conducted a study of multiple registrations by matching  computerized voter registration files using registrants’ names and dates of  birth.  The study identified as many as 10 percent of the people on that  jurisdiction’s registration list that might also have been registered to vote in  another jurisdiction in the state.
In two very large jurisdictions in one state we visited, the state operated a  statewide database that contained information provided by all of the state’s  jurisdictions, its motor vehicle authority, and its Bureau of Vital Statistics.   The state system provided the jurisdictions with query capability.  Local  election officials said that, through queries, they could identify registrants  on their list, who might also be on the registration list of another  jurisdiction in the state, who were officially reported to have died, or who  had moved.  However, officials there noted that the jurisdictions were not  directly on-line with the system.
section_title: Statewide Automated Voter Registration Systems
paragraphs: We visited several jurisdictions that were linked to a statewide voter  registration system.  In most of these jurisdictions, states had provided  software allowing on-line access to a central voter database.  The local  officials told us of a number of advantages the statewide system provided  them.  Specifically, they noted the reduced potential for duplicate  registrations in the state and the ability to electronically receive  applications submitted at motor vehicle authorities.
Reducing Multiple Registrations Within the State In one state with a statewide voter registration system, we met with local  officials who said that their system significantly reduced the potential for  multiple registrations in the state.  When a citizen reregistered in a new  jurisdiction in the state, his or her registration was automatically cancelled  in the former jurisdiction of residence.  Local election officials in another  state said their statewide system automatically flagged potential multiple  registrations before transmitting applications to the appropriate local  election official.  These officials also noted that their statewide voter  registration system was linked to the motor vehicle authority and flagged  potential multiple registration applications submitted from that source.
Coordination With Motor Vehicle Authorities Some of the statewide systems in jurisdictions that we visited were linked  to motor vehicle authorities.  Such a linkage decreased the potential for  losing application information in the process of transferring it from the  application site to the local election office.  Local election officials in one  small jurisdiction told us the motor vehicle authority transmitted the  application to the state office, which then transmitted the application to the  jurisdiction in which the applicant lived.  At another small jurisdiction the  officials told us that, for each application, the motor vehicle authority  created a record in the state-operated voter registration database and the  local election officials retrieved the application information that applied to  their residents.
section_title: Information Sharing With Other States
paragraphs: On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 74 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide used information from local jurisdictions in other  states to help maintain their registration lists.  Some local election officials  we visited told us that they shared voter registration information with other  states and jurisdictions from time to time.  For example, in a large  jurisdiction we visited, of the 5,299 voters removed from the registration  list in 2000, 1,571 were as a result of notifications from other states about  the individuals moving to a new state.  Officials in the jurisdiction showed  us notices from a Florida and a Utah jurisdiction informing them about  voters who had recently moved and should be removed from their  registration list.  Some agreements to share information were established  by neighboring states or jurisdictions.  For example, a local election official  in the District of Columbia told us that they were beginning to exchange  voter registration lists with surrounding states, after having compared  registration lists with several nearby counties in 1997.  In contrast, states  could also choose not to share information.  For example, election officials  in one state we visited were statutorily prohibited from providing voter  registration lists to other states, since only candidates and certain other  designated individuals were allowed to view lists of registered voters.
section_title: Voter Registration List Maintenance
paragraphs: NVRA and State Election Codes Provided for Registration   Officials Relied on Information From Numerous Sources to Maintain   Officials Had Varying Degrees of Confidence in Their Lists  Statewide Systems Provided Benefits, but Required Resources and  Coordination to Develop and Maintain In addition to processing new applications, election officials maintained  lists of registered voters, which involved the continual updating and  deleting of information from the registration list, using information from  numerous sources to keep voter registration lists accurate and current.   Election officials reported difficulties in obtaining accurate and timely  information from these sources and expressed varying degrees of  confidence in the accuracy and currency of their registration lists.   Statewide voter registration systems offered the potential to assist election  officials with establishing and maintaining registration lists.
subsections: section_title: Federal Law and State Election Codes Provided For Registration List Maintenance and Provided for Cancellation of Registration Under Certain Circumstances
paragraphs: In passing NVRA, the federal government attempted to establish uniformity  in certain list maintenance processes.  NVRA required states to conduct a  uniform and nondiscriminatory “general program” that makes a reasonable  effort to remove ineligible voters from the list.  NVRA permitted removing  the names of individuals upon  written confirmation of a change of address outside the election   a change of address along with failure to respond to confirmation  mailings and failure to vote in any election within two subsequent  general federal elections,  the request of the registrant,  death,  mental incapacity as provided for in state law, and   criminal conviction as provided for in state law.
One of the purposes of NVRA was to ensure that once an individual was  registered to vote, he or she remained on the voting list as long as he or she  remained eligible to vote in the same jurisdiction.  NVRA’s list maintenance  provisions specifically prohibited removing a name from the voter  registration list solely for failure to vote or for a change of address to  another location within the same election jurisdiction.
The state election codes for all 50 states and the District of Columbia  specifically provided for registration list maintenance and required  cancellation of registrations under certain circumstances.  An examination  of the state statutes cited in our nationwide survey of state election  officials showed that “purge” or registration cancellation requirements  varied from state to state but were primarily based upon change of  residency, death, criminal conviction, and mental incapacity.  Most of the  states examined required in certain cases that registered voters be  informed of changes made to their registration status.  See appendix IV for  selected statutory requirements for list maintenance for the 21 states we  visited.
section_title: Election Officials Relied on Information From Numerous Sources to Maintain Their Registration Lists
paragraphs: Local election officials at the jurisdictions we visited used a number  sources of information and a variety of procedures to remove the names of  registrants no longer eligible to vote.  Local election officials used  information obtained from these sources to both systematically verify the  registration list and conduct ongoing identification efforts aimed at  removal of ineligible registrants.  However, officials noted difficulties with  obtaining accurate and current information to perform list maintenance.   Figure 19 shows an example of a list maintenance process and some of the  numerous sources of information that local election officials could use to  maintain accurate and current registration lists.
Election officials used various means to systematically verify their  registration lists and identify voters who were no longer eligible to be  registered, either because they moved or because they failed to respond to  certain confirmation mailings. These means included mass mailings,  comparing their entire voter registration list against information from the  U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address (NCOA) program, and  conducting door-to-door canvassing.
Some of the jurisdictions we visited relied on mass mailings of  nonforwardable election-related material to confirm registrants’ eligibility.   For example, officials in one large jurisdiction mailed a nonforwardable  sample ballot to every registered voter before each election.  If the ballot  was returned as undeliverable, the officials sent forwardable mailings  asking the registrant to confirm his or her address.  Registrants who  responded either remained on the registration list or, if their current  address was outside the election jurisdiction, were removed from the  registration list.  Those who did not respond were designated inactive  within the registration system.  Within NVRA provisions, an inactive  registrant can be removed from the registration list if he or she has not  voted during the period of time between the date of the required  confirmation notice and the second general election for federal office  which occurs after the date of the notice.  Some other jurisdictions we  visited also conducted mass mailings using the same basic process.   However, they used different mailing materials, such as voter registration  confirmation cards or voter guides, conducted the mailings with different  frequencies (i.e., every 2 years or 5 years) and/or targeted the mailings to  those registrants who failed to vote in two federal elections.
Mass mailings, because they typically included every registered voter on  the list, were costly compared to other verification checks that targeted  particular groups of registrants, such as those who had moved.  Also, the  results were incomplete, since many people who had moved did not always  confirm their change of address.  According to FEC, from 1999 through  2000, local election officials mailed a nationwide total of 18,892,331  confirmation notices to persons who were reported to have moved outside  the local election jurisdiction, and there was a 23-percent response rate to  these notices.
U.S. Postal Service’s National Change of Address Program We estimate that 70 percent of jurisdictions nationwide used information from the U.S. Postal Service to help maintain accurate voter registration lists.
GAO Telephone Survey of Jurisdictions On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 70 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide used U.S. Postal Service information to help  maintain accurate voter registration lists.  Election officials used the U.S.  Postal Service’s computerized NCOA files to match against their  registration lists to identify those registrants who had moved.  Some  officials we visited said they relied on private vendors to perform the  match; others contracted with the U.S. Postal Service to compare voter  files with postal records.
The change of address program relied on registrants completing a change- of-address form to allow for the forwarding of mail.  The NCOA files did not  identify all people who moved because some did not submit a change of  address form, nor did the files capture information about other sources of  removal, such as deaths or criminal convictions.  Some local election  officials we visited expressed concerns that postal information did not  always match information from their jurisdictions.
Two of the jurisdictions we visited used their required annual census as a  means of verifying their registration lists.  In one small jurisdiction,  registrants who did not respond to the town’s annual census and had not  voted in 2 years were placed in inactive status and notified of this change in  status.  If they remained inactive for another 2 years, they were removed  from the registration rolls and notified of their removal.  In another small  jurisdiction, registrants were designated inactive if they did not respond to  the town census and were removed from the rolls after no response to two  subsequent confirmation letters.
subsections: section_title: Verifying Individual Registration Status
paragraphs: Election officials received information from a variety of sources to make  individual changes to registration lists, including from state motor vehicle  authorities, directly from the registrant, and from a variety of other  sources, such as county and state courts.
To help maintain accurate voter registration lists, we estimate the following: To help maintain accurate vot  Sixty-four percent of jurisdictions nationwide used information from motor vehicle authorities.
Ninety-three percent of jurisdictions nationwide used information from registrants.
GAO Telephone Survey of Jurisdictions Officials at many of the jurisdictions we visited said they received  information from motor vehicle authorities on changes registrants made to  their voter registration information.  On the basis of our telephone survey,  we estimate that 64 percent of jurisdictions nationwide used information  from motor vehicle authorities to help maintain accurate voter registration  lists.  Motor vehicle authorities conveyed information about changes to a  registrant’s information to election officials in a variety of ways, and some  officials said timeliness was often a problem.
On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 93 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide used information received directly from  registrants to help maintain their registration lists.  Registrants could have  their names removed from the list at their request.  They could also request  changes to their registration information, such as name or address.  Some  local election officials said that although registered voters were required to  inform them of any change of address, the registrants frequently failed to  do so.  The officials told us they believed registrants were not aware of this  requirement and that the problem was escalating due to the increasing  transience of the population.  The mobility of the population created a  challenge for local election officials in one very large jurisdiction we visited  where it is estimated that approximately 15 to 20 percent of the  jurisdiction’s population moves each year.
Officials used a variety of other sources to identify registrants made  ineligible by death, criminal conviction, or mental incompetence.
Local election officials obtained information about the deaths of registrants  from sources such as state and county departments of health or vital  statistics, the state election office, and newspaper obituaries.  Most of the  officials with whom we met said they received lists of death notices from  their state’s department of health and removed those listed from their  registration lists.  Officials in some jurisdictions complained that this  process was not always timely.  Some said they had not received a death  listing for several months; others said it was sometimes more than 1 year.
Some officials also reviewed newspaper obituaries and used them as a  basis for removing registrants from their registration lists.  In three small  jurisdictions we visited, the local election official was also responsible for  issuing death certificates, as the local election official was the clerk of the  jurisdiction.  Officials in some jurisdictions expressed concern that they  often do not find out about registrants who die in other states.  In some  jurisdictions we visited, registrants were removed from the registration  lists on the basis of a death notification from a family member.  In others,  the individual reporting the death of a registrant had to provide a copy of  the death certificate for the name to be removed from the list.
Officials from most of the jurisdictions we visited said that they relied on  information from the court system to identify convicted felons.  However,  some of those officials also said that the court system did not always notify  them of criminal convictions or releases.  For example, in one large  jurisdiction we visited, officials said that they received no information on  convictions from the court system.  Some jurisdictions said they  occasionally received information on convicted felons within their  jurisdiction, but timeliness was often an issue.  For example, one large  jurisdiction said they had not received any information on felony  convictions in over a year.  Some of the jurisdictions we visited received no  information of felons convicted outside of their counties or states.
If the court system provided information about criminal convictions, local  election officials in some states had to interpret and spend time and effort  researching a particular individual’s case to determine whether voting  rights had been restored.  For example, in Delaware, those convicted of  certain offenses, such as murder, manslaughter, felony sexual offenses, or  certain public corruption offenses, may not have voting rights restored.   Any other person who is disqualified as a voter may vote 5 years after  expiration of sentence, including probation or parole, or upon being  pardoned, whichever occurs first.  Thus, election officials in Delaware  would need to investigate a particular individual’s offense and sentence to  determine whether he or she was eligible to vote.
Officials at some of the jurisdictions we visited said they did not routinely  receive information from the courts on persons who, as a result of mental  incompetence, were no longer eligible to vote.  Officials in one large  jurisdiction in a statewide system said that the election office did not  normally receive information about mental incompetence.  Officials in a  few jurisdictions said that the only information on mental incompetence  was the affidavit the voter signed on the registration form affirming he or  she was not mentally incompetent.  Where mental incompetence was an  eligibility restriction, several officials said they had not removed or could  not remember removing anyone from their rolls for this reason.  An official  in one large jurisdiction said such a disqualification had not happened in 27  years.  Local election officials from two jurisdictions said that should they  receive information from the courts on a state mental capacity restriction,  they would send a confirmation letter to the registrant.  Officials in other  jurisdictions said they had no process for removing registrants for this  criterion.
section_title: Local Election Officials Expressed Varying Degrees of Confidence in the Accuracy and Currency of Their Lists
paragraphs: The maintenance of registration lists depended not only on the actions of  election officials, but also on the timely receipt of accurate information  from numerous sources.  Some local election officials expressed concern  about the accuracy and currency of their voter registration rolls, while  others felt that as a result of NVRA, the voter registration lists were more  accurate.
Some local election officials were not able to access information on a  timely basis.  On the basis of our telephone survey, we estimate that 84  percent of jurisdictions nationwide checked death records and 76 percent  of jurisdictions nationwide checked ineligibility due to a criminal  conviction initially and/or on a continual basis.  However, we estimate that  only 40 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had the ability to make death  record checks on a “real-time” or immediate basis. Similarly, only 33  percent of jurisdictions nationwide had the ability to make criminal  conviction checks on a real-time basis. “Currently, we are required to keep voters who have moved and a third party, primarily the  post office, has notified us that they do not live at that residence.  We cannot cancel them off  our voter rolls.  We have to carry them on an inactive roll.  In the jurisdiction, we have about  200,000 of those people on the inactive roll that we have to supply to those poll workers. Yet,  in looking at our database, about 100 of those actually show up and vote.”
Despite concerns, some election officials felt that NVRA had increased the  accuracy of the voter rolls because registration lists were updated more  frequently.  They also noted that because NVRA increased the opportunities  and locations at which to register, the registration workload had stabilized  over the year.  Officials in one small jurisdiction noted that NVRA had  greatly helped them to purge inactive voters from registration lists  following confirmation mailings.  Officials said their list is now “more pure”  in terms of having more “real” registered voters.
Information about the accuracy and currency of voter registration lists  nationwide was difficult to obtain, and even more difficult to find was  information on the extent of the effect of errors on voter registration lists.   Errors and inaccuracies, such as multiple registrations or ineligible voters  appearing on the list, could occur as a result of different reasons.  However,  when explicitly asked about problems with list maintenance in the  November 2000 election, most local election officials did not indicate that  they had any problems.
section_title: Statewide Voter Registration Systems Provided Benefits, but Required Resources and Coordination to Develop and Maintain
paragraphs: Thirteen states and the District of Columbia operated statewide voter  registration systems, which covered all local jurisdictions.  Several other  states were implementing such systems, while others operated systems  with some local jurisdictions on-line.  Local election officials we visited  described benefits that statewide voter registration systems provided.   However, the implementation and maintenance of such systems required  significant resources and the coordination of many jurisdictions.
subsections: section_title: Benefits of Statewide Voter Registration Systems
paragraphs: Local election officials in jurisdictions we visited that had statewide  registration systems described several benefits of their system.  These  benefits included  real-time access to information about registrants from other  jurisdictions in the state, and potentially in other states;  the reduction of duplicate registrations across the state; and  the potential for instant transmittal of registration applications and  information from state motor vehicle authorities and other intake  offices to the appropriate election official.
FEC described several benefits for list maintenance to operating an  automated statewide voter registration system.  These benefits included  capabilities to  “handily” remove names of registrants by reason of death, felony  conviction, and mental incompetence;  run the statewide list against NCOA files to identify persons who have  moved and left a forwarding address with the U.S. Postal Service;  receive cancellation notices electronically from motor vehicle  authorities, or from other election jurisdictions throughout the nation;  perform internal checks to guard against multiple or improper   handle any or all of the mailings required under NVRA, such as  acknowledgement notices, confirmation notices, and verification  mailings; and  generate much of the data that FEC required under provisions of NVRA.
section_title: Limitations of a Statewide System
paragraphs: Statewide voter registration systems had the potential to assist election  officials with establishing and maintaining registration lists.  However,  implementing a statewide system required resources, time, and the  coordination of multiple jurisdictions.  Also, a statewide system could not  ensure the accuracy of a state’s voter registration lists because data may  not have been received or entered correctly, or inaccurate data may have  been entered.
The development and implementation of a statewide voter registration  system would not necessarily be an inexpensive or short process.  FEC  estimated that the process could take 2 to 4 years or longer, and that the  costs to implement such systems over the past 2 decades have ranged from  under $1 million to over $8 million for the first year.  In Maryland, the State  Board of Elections and its contractor have worked on the statewide voter  registration system since 1998 and expect to finish by the end of 2001 at a  cost of $3 to $4 million.  In Michigan, the statewide voter registration  system was developed within the $7.6 million that was appropriated for the  program, with more than half of the funds going to local units of  government.  Most local election officials we visited that were linked to  statewide systems were very pleased with their system.  However, officials  in one very large jurisdiction in a state without a statewide system  indicated that they would prefer to maintain a county-based system  because of funding concerns.  The jurisdiction currently shares computer  capacity with a countywide computer system, and the county pays the bill  for processing requirements.  With a statewide system, the official said that  the jurisdiction “would have to foot the bill for operating and maintenance  costs.”  Ultimately, some states have implemented statewide systems, and  have found the system to be beneficial, while others have felt the  investment may not be worth the price.
An integrated statewide system required the coordination of all  jurisdictions within a state.  Coordination could be affected by the size of  the state, the number of local election jurisdictions within the state, the  variations of the automated systems the jurisdictions operated  independently, and the cooperation of local election officials within the  state.  For example, some large states such as Pennsylvania, New York,  Illinois, and New Jersey did not have statewide systems.  Less than half of  the counties in Texas are linked to the statewide system operated by that  state.  States with numerous local election jurisdictions, such as townships  and cities, also typically did not operate statewide systems.  A local  election official in a state with several jurisdictions said that when the state  was implementing their integrated system, one official was so reluctant  that she did not take the system hardware out of the box until the “state  forced her to.”
Finally, a statewide voter registration system could not ensure the accuracy  of a state’s voter registration lists because data may not have been received  or entered correctly, or inaccurate data may have been entered.  For  example, Alaska, despite the implementation of a statewide voter  registration system, reported that it has at least 11 percent more active  registered voters than voting age population.  Maintaining accurate voter  registration lists depended on the timely receipt of accurate information  from multiple sources.  In none of the local election jurisdictions that we  visited, did officials say that they received comprehensive, timely  information from all of the sources they used to update their registration  list.  Even with an integrated system, these jurisdictions would still require  processes to obtain more timely and accurate data.  For example, a  statewide voter registration system would not be able to remove from the  lists the names of registrants who have died if timely death records were  not available.  Further, adequate quality assurance processes for the data  would also need to be developed as data entry errors can and will occur.   One jurisdiction we visited addressed this issue by printing out all  registration record changes in the voter registration system on a daily basis  to be checked against the paper forms initiating the changes.
section_title: Challenges
paragraphs: Local election officials nationwide processed registration applications and,  using various systems and sources of information, compiled and  maintained lists of registered voters to be used throughout the election  process.  In summary, the following are the challenges election officials  identified for voter registration:  Officials faced challenges in processing incomplete applications,  identifying ineligible individuals and those who had applied to register  more than once, and minimizing the number of individuals who showed  up at polling places but had never been registered to vote.  In particular,  officials faced challenges coordinating the events necessary to process  registration applications submitted at motor vehicle authorities.   Increasing the use of technology options, such as electronically  transmitting applications from motor vehicle authorities to election  offices, expanding voter education, and improving the training of motor  vehicle authority staff were identified as means of addressing these  challenges.
Obtaining accurate and timely information from numerous sources to  update voter registration lists was a challenge noted by election  officials.  These officials relied on local, state, and federal sources to  provide accurate and current information about changes to registration  lists.  Information did not always match their records, was received late,  or was never received at all.  Jurisdictions varied in capability and  opportunity to share information with other jurisdictions and states.  In  none of the local election jurisdictions that we visited, did officials say  that they received comprehensive, timely information from all of the  sources they used to update their registration list.
Finally, integrating technology, process, and people to accept  registration applications and compile registration lists, to ensure all  eligible citizens who intended to register were able to do so, was  identified by officials as a challenge.  Election officials processed  registration applications, and using various technologies and systems  compiled lists of registered voters to be used throughout the election  process.  They faced challenges with inaccuracies, such as multiple  registrations, ineligible voters appearing on the list, or eligible voters  who intended to register not being on the list.  Local election officials  expressed varying levels of confidence in the accuracy of their voter  registration lists.
section_title: Absentee and Early Voting
paragraphs: The narrow margin of victory in the November 2000 general election raised  concerns about absentee voting in the United States.  Headlines and  reports have questioned the fairness and effectiveness of the absentee  voting process by featuring accounts of large numbers of mail-in absentee  ballots being disqualified and by highlighting opportunities for mail-in  absentee voting fraud.
A growing number of citizens seem to be casting their ballots before  election day.  However, the circumstances under which these voters vote  and the manner in which they cast their ballots differ because there are 51  unique election codes.  Due to the wide diversity in absentee and early  voting requirements, administration, and procedures, citizens face different  opportunities for obtaining and successfully casting ballots before election  day.  In particular, the likelihood that voters’ errors in completing and  returning mail-in absentee ballots will result in their ballot being  disqualified varies, even, in some instances, among jurisdictions within the  same state. However, states do not routinely collect and report absentee  and early voting data.  Thus, no national data currently are maintained  regarding the extent of voting prior to election day, in general. More  specifically, no data are maintained regarding the number of mail-in  absentee ballots that are disqualified and therefore not counted.  In  addition, election officials face a variety of challenges in administering  absentee and early voting, including establishing procedures to address  potential fraud; addressing voter error issues, such as incomplete  applications and ballots; handling late applications and ballots; and  managing general workload, resource, and other administrative  constraints.
In this chapter, we will describe (1) the frequency and availability of voting  before election day, (2) the mail-in absentee voting process and challenges  faced by election officials in conducting this type of voting, and (3) the  types of in-person absentee and early voting programs available and the  challenges encountered by election officials in administering these efforts.
subsections: section_title: Voting Before Election Day
paragraphs: Although most voters cast their ballots at their precincts on election day,  every state and the District of Columbia has procedures by which voters  can cast their ballots prior to election day. Generally, any voting that occurs  before election day has been called "absentee" voting because the voters  are absent from their precinct on election day. Registered voters may  obtain their ballots prior to election day in one of two ways—through the  mail or in person. States do not routinely collect and report data on the  prevalence of voting before election day.  Using Census data, we estimate  that, in the November 2000 general election, about 14 percent of voters  nationwide cast their ballots before election day.  Of these voters, about 73  percent used mail-in ballots and about 27 percent voted in person (as seen  in figure 20).  This represents an increase from the 1996 presidential  election in which we estimate a total of about 11 percent of voters cast  ballots before election day.  Many of the election officials in the  jurisdictions we visited reported that voting before election day had been  increasing in the past few years. For example, in one jurisdiction, voting  before election day has increased in the past few years from 50 percent in  the 1996 election to a little over 60 percent of the total ballots cast in the  November 2000 general election.  In another jurisdiction, where the state  had passed legislation making voting before election day easier and more  convenient, this type of voting increased from about 26 percent of all  ballots cast in the November 1996 general election to about 60 percent for  the November 2000 general election.
As shown in figure 21, the total percentage of individuals voting before  election day in the November 2000 general election varied among the states  from about 2 percent in West Virginia to about 52 percent in Washington.  In 31 states, less than 10 percent of voters cast their ballots before election  day.  However, in 6 states over 25 percent of the voters cast their ballots  before election day, including 1 state with more than half of the voters  casting their ballots in this manner.
Some states require voters to meet one of several criteria to be eligible to  vote before election day, such as being disabled, elderly, or absent from the  jurisdiction on election day.  However, as seen in figure 22, as of July 2001,  18 states have initiated "no excuse" absentee voting in which any voter who  wishes to do so may vote absentee. These voters may vote a mail-in ballot  or vote in person as established by state requirements, without first having  to provide a reason or excuse.  In addition, some states have initiated "early  voting" in which local election jurisdictions may establish one or,  particularly in larger jurisdictions, several locations at which any voter may  cast his/her ballot in person a number of days before election day, based on  state statutory requirements.
One of the primary purposes of absentee and early voting is to increase  voter participation. For example, being able to vote before election day  provides greater accessibility to voting for certain voters, such as those  who are disabled, living internationally, traveling extensively, or residing in  distant rural communities with long commutes to work.  In addition,  allowing voters to vote before election day can make voting more  convenient, particularly in states that allow no-excuse absentee or early  voting.  Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited stated that no- excuse absentee and/or early voting had increased overall voting before  election day, particularly when these programs first became available.  Election officials were less certain about any positive effects these efforts  have had on overall voter participation.  For example, several jurisdictions  that offer no-excuse absentee and/or early voting stated that they have had  a greater shift of voters from election day to absentee and early voting than  overall increases in voter participation.  However, election officials in  Oregon have reported that their efforts to conduct entire elections by mail  have resulted in some significant increases in voter participation.
Election officials disagree regarding whether the additional accessibility  and convenience gained from the increased availability and use of mail-in  absentee voting and all vote-by-mail elections outweigh the increased  opportunities for voter fraud.  This disagreement represents a clear  example of how election officials often must weigh opportunities to  increase access to voting against the elevated potential risks to integrity in  the voting process.  Election officials generally did not have similar  concerns regarding increases in early and no-excuse, in-person absentee  voting—possibly due to the resemblance of these processes and  procedures to election day voting.  However, regardless of the effects on  overall voter participation and election officials’ concerns regarding  increased opportunities for fraud, many election officials agreed that  voters liked the convenience of no-excuse and early voting.
section_title: Conducting Mail-in Absentee Voting
paragraphs: Different State Requirements to Vote, but Basic Steps Similar  Manner, Frequency, and Deadlines for Applying Vary Across States  Ballot Casting Differs Across States and Jurisdictions  Processes for Qualifying Ballots Vary, but Similar Challenges Exist  Voter Education Efforts Are Diverse The basic steps for mail-in absentee voting are similar. Registered voters  apply for and receive their ballots; voters complete and return their ballots  and related materials; and local election officials review ballot materials  prior to counting them.  However, the circumstances under which voters  are allowed to vote by a mail-in absentee ballot, the manner and deadlines  for applying and casting these ballots, and the processes by which these  ballots are reviewed, differ widely across states and even, in certain  instances, within the same state.  In addition, local election officials face  several challenges in administering this type of voting.  While election  officials have established procedures to address certain potentials for  fraud, some officials expressed concerns regarding their ability to fully  address this issue.  In addition, election officials identified several other  key challenges in the mail-in absentee voting process. These issues include  responding to voter error issues, such as incomplete applications and  ballots; handling late applications and ballots; and dealing with general  workload issues related to processing large numbers of applications and  ballots in a timely manner, including addressing postal concerns such as  delivery, priority, and timeliness.
subsections: section_title: States Had Different Requirements to Vote Mail- in Absentee, but the Basic Steps in the Process Were Similar
paragraphs: All 50 states and the District of Columbia have some statutory provisions  allowing registered voters to vote by mail, but not every registered voter is  eligible to do so.  Some states allow all registrants to vote with a mail-in  absentee ballot, but other states require that registrants provide certain  reasons or excuses. Examples include being   absent from the state or county on election day;  a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a dependent;  permanently or totally disabled;  ill or temporarily disabled;  over a certain age, such as 65;  an observer of a religious holiday on election day;  at a school, college, or university;  employed on election day in a job for which the nature or hours prevent  the individual from voting at their precinct, such as an election worker;  and  involved in emergency circumstances, such as the death of a family  member.
On the basis of Census data, we estimate that about 10 percent of voters  nationwide cast their circumstances differed under which voters in  different states were allowed to vote by a mail-in absentee ballot, the basic  steps in the process were similar.  As seen in figure 23, the basic process of  mail-in absentee voting includes the following steps:  Registered voter applies for a mail-in absentee ballot.  Local election officials review the applications and, if the voter meets  the established requirements, sends the voter a mail-in absentee ballot.
The voter votes and returns the ballot in accordance with any  administrative requirements (such as providing a signature or other  information on the ballot/return envelope, often referred to as the  affidavit envelope).
Local election officials or poll workers review the information on the  ballot/return (i.e., affidavit) envelope and subsequently “qualify” or  “disqualify” the ballot for counting based on compliance with  administrative requirements, such as signatures.
section_title: The Manner, Frequency, and Deadlines for Applying for Mail-in Absentee Ballots Varied Across States
paragraphs: The manner in which registered voters were to apply, how frequently they  were to apply, and when they were to apply to vote a mail-in absentee  ballot varies based on state requirements.  Depending on these  requirements, registered voters may fax, call, write, or visit their local  election official to obtain an application or learn what information is  required to request a mail-in absentee ballot.  All jurisdictions we visited  had a standard state or jurisdiction application form available from local  election officials for registered voters to obtain a mail-in absentee ballot.   Figure 24 shows an example of the application forms used.  In addition,  several states we visited allowed voters to apply for an absentee ballot by  using a variety of other means, such as a letter or telegram sent to local  election officials. In addition, some jurisdictions have a variety of  application forms, which are used based on the circumstances under which  voters qualify to vote by a mail-in absentee ballot.
In addition to providing absentee ballot applications in response to voter’s  requests, some jurisdictions made absentee ballot applications available at  voter registration locations, such as state motor vehicle licensing and  public service agencies, and other public locations, such as libraries.  Mail- in absentee ballot applications were also available on-line in many states.   For example, Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Texas all  have state election Web sites that provide mail-in absentee ballot request  forms, which can be downloaded, printed, and returned to the appropriate  local election office by mail, fax, or in person.  See figure 25 for an example  of a mail-in application form available on a local jurisdiction’s Web site.
Some local election officials took an even more proactive approach to  providing applications for mail-in absentee voting. For example, elections  officials in one large jurisdiction sent an absentee voting application and a  letter explaining the procedures for absentee voting to all registered voters  who were eligible to vote absentee, so that they did not need to request an  application. These included registrants who were 60 or older, disabled, or  poll workers who would not be working in their precinct on election day.   As another example, all California jurisdictions sent every registered voter  an absentee ballot application as part of their sample ballot package. Since  California does not require an excuse to vote absentee, registered voters  who wished to vote in this manner simply needed to complete the  application and return it to their local elections office.
State requirements varied regarding how frequently a voter had to apply for  a mail-in absentee ballot.  Depending upon the state, voters may have been  required to apply for each election in which they wished to vote by mail,  apply once for all or certain elections held during a year, or apply for  “permanent” absentee status, in which a mail-in ballot is automatically sent  for at least 5 years or for all future elections until the voters request to have  their absentee status revoked. appendix V provides a summary of the state  statutory provisions permitting permanent mail-in absentee voting.  As  shown in appendix V, voters may have to meet certain state qualifications,  such as permanent disability, to qualify for a permanent mail-in absentee  ballot application.  For example, in New York and California, a person  could apply for permanent absentee voter status due to a permanent illness  or disability by checking a box on the absentee ballot application.   However, in Washington, for example, no excuse was needed for  permanent absentee status.  In the jurisdiction we visited in this state,  about 50 percent of the registered voters were permanent absentee voters,  and absentee ballots represented about 62 percent of all ballots cast in the  November 2000 general election Differences existed in state statutory requirements regarding the deadline  for requesting a mail-in absentee ballot.  In the states we visited, the  deadline for returning completed mail-in absentee ballot applications  ranged from 1 day to 7 days before the election.  Some states, such as  California and Colorado, had a procedure for registered voters to obtain an  emergency ballot after the deadline to apply for a mail-in ballot had passed.
To exercise this option, voters were required to have a circumstance that  came up after the absentee application period had closed that prevented  them from voting at their precincts on election day. For example, Illinois  has a strict set of criteria for emergency voting. Under one circumstance, a  voter admitted to the hospital not more than 5 days before the election is  entitled to personal delivery of a ballot if a doctor signs an affidavit  attesting that the voter will not be released on or before election day.
subsections: section_title: Some Jurisdictions Provided More Assistance to Mail-in Absentee Applicants With Incomplete Applications Than Did Others
paragraphs: Once local election officials receive mail-in absentee ballot applications or  requests, they are to review them to determine if they meet state  requirements for mail-in absentee voting. These requirements may include  whether the applicant is a registered voter, the application includes all the  information required (e.g., applicant’s signature, witness), and the  applicant meets the state’s approved eligibility requirements for absentee  voting.  If all the required information is not provided on the application  (such as name, address, birth date, and/or voter signature), most  jurisdictions we visited had standard letters that were to be sent to voters  requesting them to provide the missing information. In one jurisdiction,  election officials said that state law requires that all jurisdictions in the  state notify applicants of the status of their request, particularly if they are  unable to process it.  In contrast, election officials in a very large  jurisdiction stated that they do not provide any feedback to applicants with  problem applications, unless the voters contact them regarding the their  application’s status. Officials from another very large jurisdiction stated  that, when applications were missing information, the officials would send  out the absentee ballot along with a request for the applicants to provide  the missing information with the absentee ballot, rather than delay when  the voter receives their ballot.  However, officials from most other  jurisdictions we visited stated they would not send voters their absentee  ballot until the voters had provided all the required application  information.  In addition, officials from most jurisdictions stated that they  only provide feedback to the applicants if there is a problem with the  applications.  Otherwise, the voters received the absentee ballots, once  they were available, as their confirmation that their request was received.
Election officials in several jurisdictions stated that they attempted to  make more direct contact with voters as the application deadline  approached. For example, election officials in both small and very large  jurisdictions said they attempted to contact voters regarding problems with  their applications by telephone if there was insufficient time to allow for a  letter to be sent. However, election officials in one medium-sized  jurisdiction said that they did not attempt to contact any voters by  telephone because they would only take such actions or provide such  assistance that they could provide to all voters, not just some portion of  them.  In contrast, an election official in one large jurisdiction personally  resolved problem applications. For example, this official drove to a nursing  home before the November 2000 general election to obtain a signature on a  mail absentee ballot application from a 99-year-old woman whose daughter  had mistakenly signed the application.
section_title: Officials Faced Several Challenges in Successfully Processing Applications
paragraphs: Officials in November 2000 faced a variety of challenges in successfully  processing applications for mail-in absentee ballots, including voter errors  and voter’s not understanding the process, late applications, and workload  difficulties.  Local jurisdiction officials described voters’ failure to provide  critical information, such as a signature and/or valid residence or mailing  addresses, as a principal challenge to successfully processing applications.  On the basis of our telephone survey nationwide, we estimate that   47 percent of jurisdictions encountered problems with voters failing to  properly complete their applications, such as providing a signature;   44 percent of jurisdictions encountered problems with voters failing to  provide an adequate voting residence address; and  39 percent of jurisdictions encountered problems with voters failing to  provide an adequate mailing address.
We estimate that 47 percent of jurisdictions nationwide experienced W ti problems with voters not properly completing applications, such as not providing a signature.  We also estimate that 39 and 44 percent of jurisdictions had problems with voters failing to provide adequate mailing or voting residence addresses, respectively.
In addition, jurisdictions faced challenges with voters who did not fully  understand the mail-in absentee voting process.  For example, on the basis  of our telephone survey of jurisdictions, we estimate that 51 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide encountered problems processing applications  because citizens did not register to vote before applying for a mail-in  absentee ballot.  Also, local election officials said that political parties in  one large jurisdiction sent all their members forms to request absentee  ballot applications. After some voters filled out the forms and then received  absentee ballot applications, they called the local elections office to tell  them they did not want to vote absentee.  In another jurisdiction, some  voters sent in more than one ballot application for themselves.
We estimate that 51 percent of jurisdictions nationwide experienced W ti problems processing applications because citizens did not register to vote before applying for a mail-in absentee ballot.
In addition, jurisdictions experienced problems with receiving applications  after the deadline. We estimate that 54 percent of jurisdictions nationwide  experienced problems with receiving applications late.  An official in a  medium-sized jurisdiction stated that their "primary difficulty in absentee  voting is getting voters to respond in a timely fashion to meet mailing  deadlines.”
We estimate that 54 percent of jurisdictions nationwide experienced W ti problems with receiving late applications.
We estimate that local election officials nationwide received about 14.5  million applications for absentee mail-in ballots (plus or minus 3 million)  for the November 2000 general election. As seen in figure 26, the number of  absentee ballot applications can result in large volumes of absentee ballot  packages being mailed to voters.  Election officials in both small and large  jurisdictions said they considered processing applications a workload  challenge for their staff.  For example, election officials in a very large  jurisdiction stated that they received over 640,000 applications for absentee  ballots. Officials in a large jurisdiction, as a result of applications received,  sent out about an average of 2,000 absentee ballots each day for several  weeks before the election. Officials from a small jurisdiction stated that  processing absentee voting materials was time-consuming and expensive,  and expressed concerns that they would face significant challenges if the  number of absentee ballot applications increased.  In addition, several local  election officials specifically mentioned the large number of absentee  ballot applications received the day of the absentee ballot application  deadline, particularly the increased volume of faxed absentee ballot  applications received on the last day to be an administrative challenge.
Officials from two very large jurisdictions specifically mentioned that they  hoped their recently instituted early voting programs would reduce the  number of voters using mail-in absentee ballots and, thereby, reduce the  workload burden and other challenges in processing mail-in absentee  applications.
In addition, some of the jurisdictions that we visited had deadlines for  absentee ballot applications that were very close to election day—as little  as 1 to 5 days before election day.  Such jurisdictions faced challenges in  ensuring that all ballot applications received by the deadline could be  processed and the ballots mailed back to voters with sufficient time for the  ballots to be voted and returned. Some officials from such jurisdictions  expressed doubt that voters would be able to return their ballots by the  election night deadline if they received the ballots 5 days or less before the  deadline. For example, one jurisdiction had an mail-in absentee application  deadline of the Saturday before election day, clearly a short amount of time  to mail the voter the ballot and have it returned by election night.  To  address these deadline issues, some officials stated that they used  overnight mail to speed up ballot distribution as the deadline approached.   When allowed by state law, some jurisdictions also encouraged voters, at  their own expense, to return voted ballots by overnight mail.  In addition,  several local election officials indicated that their states were considering  legislative changes, such as allowing more time between primaries and  general elections, to provide for more time for the mail-in absentee  process.
section_title: The Manner in Which Mail- in Absentee Ballots Were Cast Differed Across States and Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Once local election officials obtained any additional needed information  and approved the application, they mailed an absentee ballot to the  registered voter. Once registered voters receive their absentee ballots, it  was their responsibility to vote and return their ballot.  As on election day,  the type of voting methods used for mail-in absentee voting varied from one  jurisdiction to another, even within the same state.
We estimate that most jurisdictions nationwide used either optical scan or W ti paper ballots for mail-in absentee voting.
Nationwide, for the November 2000 general election, we estimate that over  half of the local jurisdictions, about 61 percent, used the same method for  mail-in absentee voting as they used on election day for the November 2000  general election.  Moreover, we estimate that 89 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide that used election day methods that lent themselves to mail-in  voting (i.e., punch card, optical scan, and paper ballots) used the same  voting equipment for both types of voting.  Overall most jurisdictions  nationwide used either optical scan or paper ballots for mail-in absentee  voting during the November 2000 general election.  Specifically, as seen in  figure 27, nationwide for mail-in absentee voting, we estimate the  following: about 44 percent of election jurisdictions used optical scan ballots;   about 45 percent of election jurisdictions used paper ballots; and  about 13 percent of election jurisdictions used punch card ballots.
Some jurisdictions using either punch card or paper ballots as of November  2000 indicated that they are considering or have already made plans to  change to optical scan ballots for mail-in absentee voting.  One jurisdiction  indicated that it was keeping its punch card equipment for mail-in absentee  ballots, but was planning to change to a styrofoam-backed ballot to reduce  the occurrence of pregnant or dimpled chads.  For more information  regarding characteristics of these voting methods, see chapter 1 of this  report.
In addition to voting the ballot, absentee voters must complete additional  information on the ballot or return envelope, often referred to as the  affidavit envelope, in accordance with their state’s administrative  requirements.  Typically, the absentee voter’s signature, and, possibly, name  and address, were required on the absentee ballot or return envelope. In  addition, as shown in appendix V, in an effort to ensure that the appropriate  person completes the ballot, five states require that the voter’s signature be  witnessed; one state requires that the signature be notarized; and seven  states require that the statement be witnessed or notarized.
Frequently, the voted ballot was to be sealed within a series of envelopes.   For example, as seen in figure 28, the ballot was to be sealed within a  secrecy envelope. The secrecy envelope containing the ballot was to be  subsequently sealed in the return envelope on which the voter was to  provide the required administrative identifying information (e.g.,  signature).  In some jurisdictions, the entire package is then further sealed  in an additional envelope provided by the election office in which to return  the ballot.
Once the ballot and accompanying materials are completed, the voters are  to return their voted ballots to their local election jurisdiction’s office. State  requirements vary regarding the manner in which absentee ballots may be  returned.  Some states, such as Oklahoma and Texas, required that these  ballots only be returned by mail, and other states, such as New York and  New Mexico, allowed the voter return the voted ballot by personally  delivering it. In addition, some states we visited, such as Michigan, Illinois,  and California, allowed for the voted ballot and accompanying materials to  be delivered in person by the voter or by a family member of the voter to  the local elections office and/or the voter’s precinct on election day.  In an  effort to ensure integrity of the process, some states require the voter to  provide written authorization in order for the family member to deliver the  ballot.  By contrast, California allows any authorized representative to  return a voter’s absentee ballot during the last 7 days of an election, up to  and including election day.
subsections: section_title: Most States Require Absentee Ballots to Be Received by Election Day
paragraphs: State deadlines for receiving absentee ballots from civilians living within  the United States range from the Friday before election day to 10 days after  election day.  However, as seen in figure 29, most states require absentee  ballots to be returned no later than election day, unless the voter meets  certain special circumstances, such as being in the active military or  residing overseas.  In the nine states and the District of Columbia where a  mail-in absentee ballot may be returned after election day, all but one  required the envelopes to be postmarked on or before election day.  See  appendix V for each state’s specific deadlines for receiving mail-in absentee  ballots.  Several local election officials recommended that a standard,  nationwide deadline for receiving mail-in absentee ballots should be set for  federal elections.
In some jurisdiction election officials stated that they consider postal  problems a significant challenge for mail-in absentee voting within the  United States. Generally, these jurisdictions reported that they had  experienced some problems with postal deliveries and/or the priority given  to the delivery of election and balloting materials, such as applications.  However, officials expressed fewer concerns about postal delivery and  timeliness in the jurisdictions we visited for domestic delivery than for  overseas delivery. In one jurisdiction, election officials said that election  day was designated as a holiday and, as such, they had trouble receiving  mail delivery of absentee ballots on election day, the last day they could be  received.  Officials from a very large jurisdiction reported that, generally,  postal delivery problems do not occur repeatedly in the same area of their  jurisdiction.  However, one jurisdiction reported consistent delivery delays  after the U.S. Postal Service centralized its operations.  Election officials  worked with the Postal Service to mitigate this problem.
Several other election officials provided additional examples of having  worked closely with the local Postal Service offices to develop workable  solutions regarding delivery and timeliness issues.  In many jurisdictions  we visited, absentee voting materials were printed in colored or specially  marked envelopes to assist Postal Service employees in identifying and  facilitating delivery.  Rather than waiting for postal delivery, several other  jurisdictions sent election employees to local post offices several times a  day to pick up absentee ballots as the deadline approached and/or arrived.   In addition, officials at some locations we contacted had suggestions for  changes in their procedures to mitigate postal delivery challenges.  For  example, on official suggested requiring additional information on the  voter’s absentee ballot application, such as an e-mail address and/or a  telephone number, to facilitate processing applications with incomplete  information, rather than having to rely solely on correspondence through  the Postal Service.
In addition, some jurisdictions allowed voters to use overnight mail, at their  own expense, to return voted absentee ballots, which was particularly  useful to voters as the deadline approached.  Other jurisdictions stated that  they were required by state law to only accept ballots through mail delivery  by the U.S. Postal Service.  Some of these officials agreed that a change in  state laws allowing receipt of absentee ballots from overnight carriers, at  the voter's expense, would be helpful in addressing the problem of  absentee ballots from some voters that arrive too late to be counted.
Generally, jurisdictions pay for postage-related costs for mail-in absentee  voting, such as the costs to mail ballot applications and ballots to voters.   As deadlines approached, some jurisdictions even incurred overnight  delivery costs in an attempt to provide absentee balloting materials to  voters in a timely fashion. Voters often must pay for the postage to return  applications and ballots to local election offices.  Some local election  officials expressed concerns regarding growing postal costs to provide  election-related materials, such as absentee applications and ballots, to  voters. From our mail survey, we estimate that about half of the  jurisdictions nationwide (54 percent) would like for the federal government  to assist them with postage for election related materials.  As another  alternative, several election officials suggested having special postage rates  for election related materials, particularly absentee balloting materials.  In  some instances, states have begun to assume all or some of the postage  costs for absentee voting materials for statewide elections.  In addition,  some jurisdiction officials said that they provided voters with postage-paid  return envelopes for absentee ballots. In some instances, these envelopes  were provided through fiscal support from the state.  Other officials  suggested that they would like to provide such services to voters but did  not have the funds to be able to do so.  One jurisdiction official stated that  the state or federal government should, at a minimum, assume the costs  incurred by voters to return absentee ballots by mail, which could be  interpreted, in his opinion, as a poll tax.  Further, a few jurisdiction officials  commented that U.S. Armed Forces personnel and overseas citizens do not  have to pay postage to return their voted absentee ballots in some  jurisdictions and questioned whether this service should be extended to all  voters.  Election officials in two jurisdictions said that, although the  jurisdictions indicated the required postage in the corner of the return  envelope, they would assume the costs if the voter did not pay.
section_title: Oregon and Some Local Jurisdictions Have Conducted All Vote-by-Mail Elections
paragraphs: In addition to mail-in absentee voting, some jurisdictions have conducted  entire elections by mail.  The state of Oregon conducted its first general  election using all voting by mail in November 2000.  All registered voters in  the state were mailed a ballot and allowed to return the ballots by election  day through the mail, or by personally delivering them to the elections  office or various manned, drop-off sites located throughout the jurisdiction.   Oregon reported some increases in voter turnout for the November 2000  general election as well as other statewide elections.  For example, voter  turnout in an all vote-by-mail primary in 1995 rose to 52 percent, up from 43  percent previously.  In a vote-by-mail special election for U.S. Senator,  voter turnout was 65 percent, representing a record for special elections.   In addition, some jurisdictions have conducted all voting by mail for certain  elections or in certain precincts in which the number of registered voters  are very small.
section_title: Officials Have Established Procedures for Preventing Mail- in Absentee Fraud, but General Concerns Remain in Some Jurisdictions
paragraphs: While jurisdictions have procedures to address certain potentials for fraud  in mail-in absentee voting, some local election officials expressed concerns  regarding their ability to fully address this issue, particularly regarding an  absentee voter being unduly influenced or intimidated while voting. Based  on our telephone survey of jurisdictions, we estimate that less than 1 to 5  percent of jurisdictions nationwide experienced special problems with  absentee voting fraud during recent elections.  In general, absentee voting  fraud concerns tend to fall into three categories, including (1) someone  other than the appropriate voter casting the mail-in absentee ballot, (2)  absentee voters voting more than once, and (3) voters being intimidated or  unduly influenced while voting the mail-in absentee ballot.
Local election jurisdictions use a number of procedures to ensure the  appropriate voter completes a mail-in absentee ballot.  For example, from  GAO’s telephone survey of jurisdictions, we estimate that nationwide   55 percent of the voting jurisdictions check a voter’s signature on the  absentee ballot materials with the signature originally provided on the  voter’s registration documents (as illustrated in figure 30);  55 percent of jurisdictions check a voter’s signature on the absentee  ballot materials with the signature originally provided on the application  for a mail-in absentee ballot; and/or  36 percent of jurisdictions require a voter’s signature on the absentee  ballot materials to be witnessed or notarized.
All of the jurisdictions we visited used either one of these or other  procedures, and most jurisdiction officials did not identify this type of  fraud as a major concern.  In particular, Oregon officials expressed  confidence in their procedures designed to reduce the potential for  someone other than the registered voter voting the mailed ballot.  Oregon  officials compared signatures on mailed ballot materials to voter  registration materials.  The officials said that this signature comparison  provides even greater security against this type of fraud than many  jurisdictions’ election day procedures in which voters may not have to  show identification or have their signatures checked before casting a  ballot.  However, even with the described procedures in place, a few  jurisdiction officials said that they ultimately have no way of knowing with  absolute certainty that only the appropriate person requests and casts an  absentee mail ballot.
Likewise, local election jurisdictions in November 2000 employed several  procedures to prevent voters from voting more than once. From GAO’s  telephone survey of jurisdictions, we estimate that, before election day, 64  percent of jurisdictions nationwide checked the absentee ballot  applications against their voter records to determine whether a voter had  previously applied for a mail-in ballot for that election before providing a  voter an absentee ballot.  On election day, we estimate that 78 percent of  the jurisdictions nationwide checked election day poll books, lists, or logs  to determine whether a voter had requested, been sent, or already voted an  absentee ballot. For example, as seen in figure 31, one jurisdiction used bar  coding on mail-in absentee applications to identify voters who have been  sent absentee mail ballot packages.  This information is to be scanned into  the system used to generate election day poll books, so that voters who  have been sent a mail-in absentee ballot can be identified if they attempt to  vote on election day.  We also estimate that 46 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide checked absentee ballots received against election day poll  books, lists, or logs to determine if an absentee voter voted on election day  before counting the absentee ballot. In addition, we estimate that 10  percent of jurisdictions nationwide employ other methods to ensure an  absentee voter only votes once during an election.  For example, poll  workers on election day can check on-line database containing absentee  voting information to verify that voters had not voted before election day.   All of the jurisdictions we visited used either one of these or other  procedures, and most jurisdiction officials did not identify this type of  fraud as a major concern.
Officials from some jurisdictions stated that a potential for abuse continues  to exist with mail-in voting through voters possibly being intimidated or  unduly influenced in their homes when casting their mail-in ballot.  This  more general fraud concern is, to some extent, inherent in the process and,  thus, more difficult to address and causes more concern among some  officials.  For example, an election official from one very large jurisdiction  stated he experienced a situation with absentee ballot fraud allegations  during a recent local election. He was informed that people were going  door-to-door in low-income neighborhoods to obtain and complete  absentee ballot applications and ballots. Because of these types of  allegations, he stated that absentee voting by mail is the area that concerns  him the most about the elections process. Generally, he said these  problems are more likely to occur in smaller elections, such as primaries or  local elections, where such efforts have the greatest potential to have an  effect on the actual outcome of the election.  However, smaller elections,  such as primaries, can still have significant impacts on the outcome of  general elections in certain circumstances for certain races.  This official  stated that, at a minimum, he would like to see state law designate people’s  homes as polling places while they are completing their absentee ballot.  This type of law would make electioneering illegal while a person is casting  his or her mail absentee ballot.  In addition, one jurisdiction officials stated  that political parties attempt to increase turn out for their party by sending  ballot applications to voters directly.  These efforts result in the election  officials not knowing for certain who filled out the application and,  subsequently, the ballot, or if it was even completed per the voter’s wishes.
Besides the general procedures for preventing mail-in absentee fraud, a  number of jurisdictions have taken specific measures to prevent such  abuses in high-risk places, like nursing homes.  For example, several  jurisdictions send a team of election workers, at times consisting of  members from both major parties, to nursing homes to give out ballots,  assist voters, and deliver the voted ballots back to the elections office.   Another location placed restrictions on the number of absentee ballots that  a single person could sign as a witness.  One election official in a small  jurisdiction stated that she personally knows and has provided specific  training to the nursing home employees who witness and assist nursing  home patients in voting.
In addition, in almost all of jurisdictions we visited, the mail-in absentee  ballot package provided to voters included statements and/or reminders,  such as within the oath or other materials, regarding the possible legal  consequences of providing inaccurate or fraudulent information on the  balloting materials.  Several jurisdiction officials commented that, in the  few instances in which they identify or suspect mail-in absentee voter  fraud, they refer the case to the local district attorney’s office for possible  prosecution.
section_title: Processes for Qualifying Mail-in Absentee Ballots Varied, but Local Election Officials Face Similar Challenges
paragraphs: Although states establish the requirements for qualifying mail-in absentee  ballots to be counted, local election officials must implement and, at times,  interpret these requirements.  Most frequently, election officials disqualify  mail-in absentee ballots due to voter error in completing the balloting  materials or the ballots arriving after the deadline.  However, due to  differences in procedures and requirements, the likelihood that voters’  errors in completing and returning mail-in ballots will result in their ballots  being disqualified varies, even, in some instances, among jurisdictions  within the same state.  In addition, this qualification process results in local  election officials facing similar workload challenges in processing mail-in  absentee ballots as they faced in reviewing applications.
subsections: section_title: The Process for Qualifying Mail- in Absentee Ballots Varied, at Times, Even Among Jurisdictions Within the Same State
paragraphs: Generally, once the election officials receive the absentee ballots, the  ballots were to be secured until state requirements allow the officials to  review them. As with many other aspects of voting, the process for  qualifying absentee ballots for counting varied across voting jurisdictions,  even within the same state.  In some jurisdictions, absentee ballots are  reviewed centrally by election officials or special absentee voting boards.   In other jurisdictions, absentee ballots are sent to the precincts in which  the voters would have voted on election day and reviewed by poll workers.   Regardless of who conducts this effort, the accompanying documents (e.g.,  affidavit envelopes) are reviewed to determine whether all the required  information is complete and state requirements are met.  Absentee ballots  may be disqualified from the count for a number of reasons.  For example,  as seen in figure 32, the voter may have failed to appropriately sign the  affidavit or ballot envelope, or provide other information as required by the  jurisdiction.  Absentee ballots may also be disqualified if the jurisdiction  receives them after the deadline.
While the states establish the requirements for mail-in absentee voting,  local jurisdictions’ interpretation of the requirements and the resulting  practices may vary within the same state—with some jurisdictions holding  strictly to the letter of the law, and others applying more flexibility in  qualifying ballots.  The following examples demonstrate this variety:  In one state, officials in three counties said that they accepted any ballot  that showed a signature anywhere or return envelope to compare with  registration documentation, although officials in two other counties  disqualified any ballot when the envelope did not strictly meet all the  technical requirements.
In another state, officials in two jurisdictions told us that there is no  discretion in accepting ballots—either they meet the technical  requirements completely or they do not meet them and are not  accepted.  On the other hand, officials in another jurisdiction told us  that if a returned ballot envelope lacked some information, such as an  address, that is available on the return address, the ballot would be  accepted.
In another state, officials in one jurisdiction strictly followed the ballot  receipt deadline and did not count any absentee mail ballots received  after the Friday before election day.  In contrast, officials in another  jurisdiction told us that ballots received after Friday but before 8:00 PM  on election day were counted.
section_title: Disqualified Absentee Ballots Were Generally Due to Voter Error or Arriving Late
paragraphs: We estimate that less than 2 percent of the total mail-in absentee ballots received for the November 2000 election were disqualified; about two-thirds were disqualified because the ballots arrived late or because the envelopes or forms accompanying the ballots not being properly completed, such as having missing or incorrect voters' signatures.
As with processing absentee ballot applications, officials from several  jurisdictions cited voter error in completing absentee balloting materials,  such as envelopes, as a major problem. States do not routinely collect and  report data on the number of mail-in absentee ballots that are disqualified.   We estimate that 230,000 (plus or minus 50,000) absentee ballots were  disqualified nationwide in the November 2000 election and that the national  disqualification rate for absentee ballots was 1.7 percent.  We estimate  that 64 percent of all disqualified absentee ballots were rejected because  the ballots arrived late or the envelopes or forms accompanying the ballots  were not completed properly (e.g., missing the voter’s signature or  containing an incorrect voter’s signature). Another 35 percent were  rejected for one of the following reasons: no postmark or date; late  postmark or date; voter not registered or not qualified; improper witness,  attestation, or notarization; a previous vote in the election; and other.
In general and as with absentee ballot applications, the principal challenges  to successfully processing absentee ballots, according to local officials, are  caused by voters’ failure to provide critical information. The errors include  such things as the ballot envelope lacking a voter’s signature, witness’  signature and/or notarization, or the voter not providing a valid address  within the local jurisdiction. For example, in one very large jurisdiction  about one-third of the ballots disqualified were because the voter’s  signature was missing or the envelope was improperly completed.  In  addition, election officials in one jurisdiction estimated that about 80  percent of the ballots disqualified were due to being returned after the  deadline. The other major challenge the officials mentioned was receiving  the ballot after the required deadline.
Some jurisdictions have attempted to address problems with voters  returning ballots unsigned or otherwise incomplete.  In California, a  number of counties have begun to put brightly colored stickers with arrows  pointing to the signature line or fluorescent colored inserts reminding the  voter to sign the envelope. In addition, in several jurisdictions election  officials pre-print labels on the absentee ballot envelopes to minimize the  amount of information the voter has to provide. Officials from the counties  taking these steps reported a reduced number of voters submitting  unsigned or incomplete absentee ballots.  In a further effort to address  these challenges, one large jurisdiction implemented a project for the  November 2000 general election in which trained volunteers physically  took unsigned absentee ballot envelopes, with the ballots still enclosed, to  the voters to obtain their signatures.  This reduced the number of unsigned  ballots from 500 in previous general elections to 50 in November 2000.  In  addition, to obtain a necessary signature, one jurisdiction indicated that it  returned unsigned mail-in absentee ballot envelopes, with the ballots still  enclosed, to the voters through the mail, when time allowed before the  deadline.  Other jurisdictions said that they are considering doing so as  well.
Furthermore, our telephone survey results indicated that notifying voters  about whether their ballots were received and counted was not a standard  practice.  We estimate that 29 percent of jurisdictions nationwide notified  absentee voters when their ballots are disqualified and, in so doing,  provided the reason for the disqualification.  Several of the jurisdictions we  visited stated that they are required by state law to notify voters whose  mail-in absentee ballots were disqualified.  These jurisdictions often use a  standard letter to do so, which details the reasoning behind the  disqualification.  This feedback represents one way in which election  officials can educate voters regarding proper completion of the mail-in  absentee balloting materials.
We estimate that 29 percent of jurisdictions nationwide notified absentee W ti voters when their ballots were disqualified and, in so doing, provided the reason for the disqualification.
In addition, some election officials said that they plan to begin maintaining  data on the number of disqualified mail-in absentee ballots, the reason for  the disqualification, and the type of absentee voter (e.g., military, overseas  civilian, domestic civilian) whose ballot is being disqualified. Election  officials stated that they had not previously tracked this data because they  were not required to report this data to their state elections office.
section_title: Several Officials Said They Experienced Workload Challenges in Processing Absentee Ballots
paragraphs: Each of the millions of mail-in absentee ballots received by local election  officials had to be qualified before being counted. We estimate that  nationwide local election officials received about 13 million mail-in  absentee ballots (plus or minus 2.7 million) for the November 2000 general  election.  Officials from several local election jurisdictions considered the  mail-in absentee voting process a challenge because of the workload  involved in reviewing the sheer volume of ballots.  For example, officials  from one very large jurisdiction stated that the sheer volume of mail-in  ballots received creates a greater potential for errors.
section_title: All Mail-in Absentee Ballots Were Counted, But the Process Varied Even Within the Same State
paragraphs: Once mail-in absentee ballots are qualified, the ballots are counted.  After  the November 2000 general election, some voters expressed doubt that  local jurisdictions count absentee ballots at all if they would not change the  outcome of the election, especially if they were received during extended  deadlines after election day. On the basis of our telephone survey, we  estimate that between 98 and 100 percent of counties nationwide include  absentee ballots in their certified vote totals. All officials in each of the  counties we visited confirmed that all ballots are included in certified  totals, although ballots arriving during extended deadlines may not be  included in totals announced on election night.
The process for counting absentee ballots varies across voting  jurisdictions.  As with qualifying the ballot, some jurisdictions counted  absentee ballots centrally by election officials or special absentee voting  boards, while others had absentee ballots counted by poll workers at the  voters’ respective precincts.  For more information on the counting of  absentee ballots, see chapter 5 of this report.
section_title: Jurisdictions Used a Variety of Efforts to Educate Voters Regarding Mail-in Absentee Voting
paragraphs: Crucial to the successful casting of mail-in absentee ballots is the voter’s  knowledge of application and casting, such as necessary signatures and  deadlines.  Although voters have the ultimate responsibility for  understanding and complying with state and local requirements for mail-in  absentee voting, the process is complicated.  If absentee voters did not fully  understand and, subsequently, comply with the absentee voting  requirements in their state, their votes may not have been counted.  Thus,  for each election, local election officials said they needed to educate voters  regarding how and when to cast a valid mail-in absentee ballot.  The  information officials needed to provide to voters included deadlines for  submitting applications and ballots, any requirements that registrants must  meet to vote the mail-in absentee ballot, how often the registrants must  apply for an absentee ballot, and any administrative requirements, such as  signatures and witnesses.
Local election officials used a variety of means to provide this necessary  information.  Almost all local election offices we visited prepared press  releases and/or asked the media to inform the public how and when to vote  absentee by mail.  Several locations we visited had informational fliers  developed by the state or local jurisdictions, which were provided to voters  on request or were available at local election offices, voter registration  locations (e.g., motor licensing agencies), or public offices (e.g., libraries).  Some jurisdictions relied on various organizations, such as political parties  and other election watchdog organizations, to inform their respective  constituents on the requirements concerning absentee voting.  In addition,  the officials in one jurisdiction we visited appealed directly to its eligible  absentee voters to encourage them to vote an absentee ballot in the  November 2000 general election.  These officials believed that the  November 2000 ballot in their jurisdiction was particularly complex and  decided it would be beneficial for their eligible absentee voters,  particularly those over age 62, to vote an absentee ballot rather than trying  to vote the ballot at their precincts.
In addition, most states and many counties had Web sites that provided  information on mail-in absentee voting.  Generally, these Web sites had very  detailed information regarding mail-in absentee voting, including  information on the requirements, how to apply, what information is  required in completing the absentee voting application, the deadline for  applying, and how often an application has to be completed.  Some Web  sites even include an absentee ballot application, which can be printed and  mailed to the appropriate local election office.
Voter educational materials provided on or with the mail-in absentee  applications and/or ballots from the jurisdictions we visited contained  instructions and/or information necessary for voters to successfully obtain  and cast an absentee ballot.  Some jurisdictions also included a number of  user-friendly, reminders and notices to assist absentee voters in properly  completing their absentee ballots and envelopes.  For example, some  jurisdictions, in addition to providing instructions on how to mark the  ballot, provided absentee voters with reminders and additional notices  highlighting information that was key to successfully completing and  returning the absentee ballot. These notices included reminding voters to  use a number two pencil on an optical scan ballot (or even providing the  pencil), seal their ballots in the secrecy envelopes, and sign the appropriate  envelope.  Several election officials made or planned changes to improve  voter education on mail absentee voting, such as clarifying or simplifying  voter instructions in absentee mail materials.
Although a variety of methods is used to provide necessary information for  voters to vote by mail-in absentee, we estimate that only 15 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide actively sought feedback from voters regarding  the absentee process, based on our mail survey of jurisdictions, for the  November 2000 general election.
section_title: Conducting In-Person Absentee and Early Voting
paragraphs: Thirty-nine States and the District of Columbia Allow In-Person   Programs Differ, but Challenges Similar to Election Day  Voter Education Efforts Vary Between Jurisdictions There is no clear distinction in state statute between in-person absentee  and early voting.  Basically, these programs offer voters the opportunity to  obtain and cast a ballot in person during a certain period of time prior to  election day.  However, the length of the early or in-person voting period,  location(s) at which voters may vote, and statutory requirements and  paperwork required to vote in-person absentee or early differ among states.   For example, in-person absentee voters generally must complete an  application before voting similar to voters that vote mail-in absentee  ballots, while early voters are not always required to do so.  Generally, local  election officials were comfortable with their procedures to ensure that an  early or in-person voter only voted once during an election.  However,  election officials still faced several challenges similar to those encountered  on election day when conducting in-person absentee and early voting, such  as having adequate staffing, supplies (including ballots), and locations for  voting.
subsections: section_title: Thirty-nine States and the District of Columbia Allowed In-person Absentee or Early Voting
paragraphs: For the November 2000 general election, in addition to mail-in absentee  ballots, over  three-quarters of the states and the District of Columbia  allowed some or all registered voters to obtain and cast ballots in person  before election day.  We estimate that about 4 percent of voters cast their  ballots this way for the November 2000 general election. It is difficult to  differentiate between in-person absentee and early voting programs in state  statutes.
As with mail-in absentee voting, states may or may not require voters to  provide a reason or excuse for casting an absentee ballot in person.  Most  frequently, in-person absentee voting programs allow voters to obtain their  ballot, complete any paperwork required, and vote their absentee ballot at  their local election office.  For example, in one jurisdiction in Virginia, in- person absentee voting is conducted at the local election jurisdiction’s  office during normal business hours during the 45 days before the election.  To cast an in-person absentee ballot, registered voters were to go to the  office and complete an in-person absentee application on which they  provide one of several reasons or excuses defined in state statute. These  reasons could include being a student at an institution of higher learning,  being absent for business or vacation, being unable to go to their precinct  due to illness, having a religious obligation, working 11 of the 13 hours the  polling precincts are open, or being a caretaker of a confined family  member.  During the visit, election officials approve the application and  give the applicant a ballot, which the voter casts before leaving the office.   Thus, to vote in-person absentee in Virginia, registered voters must  go to their local election office,  complete an application, and  meet certain requirements (i.e., provide an excuse).
Some states also have initiated “early voting” as a unique form of in-person  voting in which local election jurisdictions may establish one or, possibly,  several polling places a number of days before election day where any  voter may cast their vote in person without having to provide an excuse.   Voters were not required to cast their ballot at a particular polling place;  rather, registered voters can vote at whatever location is most convenient  for them.  For example, in Texas, local jurisdictions are allowed to  establish several “early voting” polling places at schools, libraries, shopping  malls, or other locations that essentially function in the same manner as  any election day polling place.  Election workers staffed these early voting  locations for each day they were open and, generally, followed whatever  voting procedures would be used on election day.  For example, voters at  these early voting locations show up and vote their ballots without having  to fill out an application, provide a reason for voting early, or complete any  additional paperwork or provide any information other than what would  normally be required on election day. Thus, to vote early in Texas,  registered voters  may be allowed to vote at any of several early voting locations,  do not have complete an application, and  do not have to meet any requirements (i.e., provide an excuse).
In the November 2000 general election, in one jurisdiction in Texas, about  44 percent of the ballots were cast by voters at early voting locations,  representing about a 10-percent increase from the previous presidential  election in 1996.
As seen in figure 33, 39 states and the District of Columbia have developed  various types of early and in-person voting programs, some of which are  more similar to the Texas and Colorado programs and others closer to the  Virginia program.  For example, California and Arkansas, allow in-person,  early voting without a reason or excuse, which may be conducted at more  than one location; however, both states require early voters to complete an  application before voting—an additional step that is not required on  election day nor at early voting locations in Texas and Colorado.  Other  states, such as North Carolina and New Mexico, allow for no-excuse, early  voting in person, but only at the local election jurisdictions’ offices; these  states also require voters to apply to vote early.  There is no clear  distinction in state statute between in-person absentee voting and early  voting.  However, in effect, in-person absentee voting and early voting  programs stretch an election from a single day into an election period  ranging from 1 to over 40 days.
section_title: Voting Programs Varied Among States and Jurisdictions, Challenges Similar to Election Day
paragraphs: In-person absentee and early voting programs vary considerably from one  state to another. Variations include the number and type of locations at  which this type of voting is conducted, duration of the in-person or early  voting period, and voting methods used.  However, local election officials  faced many of the same challenges in administering their in-person and  early voting programs.  These challenges, such as obtaining sufficient poll  workers, ballots and supplies, and locations, were similar to the challenges  faced in administering election day voting.
subsections: section_title: Location and Time Frame for Casting Early and In-Person Absentee Voting Ballots Varied by State Statute
paragraphs: The location(s) and time periods in which voters may cast in-person  absentee or early ballots differ based on the requirements established by  each state. The number of locations vary from one to an unspecified  number to be established at the discretion of local election officials.  For  example, in one very large jurisdiction in Texas, 25 early voting locations  were established throughout the jurisdiction for the November 2000  general election.  The in-person absentee and early voting period also  varies, ranging from 1 day to 45 days before election day.  Appendix V  summarizes the various in-person absentee and early voting programs  established in state statutes as of July 2001.  In addition to differences  among states, in-person absentee and early voting may even vary from one  jurisdiction to another within the same state.  For example, in Texas, larger  jurisdictions may establish numerous early voting locations, such as at  schools and libraries, which are open for extended hours, even some  weekends. In contrast, smaller jurisdictions may hold early voting only at  the local election official’s office during regular business hours.
section_title: Type of Voting Methods Used for Early Voting Similar to Those Used on Election Day
paragraphs: We estimate that most jurisdictions used optical scan or paper ballots for in-person absentee and early voting, as they do with mail-in absentee voting.
As with the type of voting methods used for election day and mail-in  absentee voting, the type of ballots used for in-person absentee or early  voting also varies from one jurisdiction to another, even within the same  state. Nationwide, we estimate that two-thirds of the local jurisdictions,  about 67 percent, used the same method for in-person absentee and early  voting as they used on election day for the November 2000 general election.   We further estimate that most jurisdictions used either optical scan or  paper ballots for in-person absentee or early voting during the November  2000 general election.  Specifically, as seen in figure 34, we estimate that  nationwide  42 percent of election jurisdictions used optical scan ballots;   35 percent of election jurisdictions used paper ballots; and  14 percent of election jurisdictions used punch card ballots.
Unlike voting a mail-in absentee ballot, absentee in-person and early voting  includes the use of DREs and lever equipment, which voters of a mail-in  ballot could not use for logistical reasons. As seen in figure 34, we estimate  that 14 percent of election jurisdictions used direct recording electronic  machines, and 1 percent of election jurisdictions used lever machines for  early or in-person absentee voting.
Several election officials indicated that they are considering or planning to  change to DRE equipment for early and/or in-person absentee voting.  For  more information regarding the characteristics of these voting methods,  see chapter 1 of this report.
section_title: Officials Had Procedures For Ensuring In-Person and Early Voters Vote Only Once
paragraphs: Most jurisdictions we visited that allow early or in-person absentee voting  at numerous voting locations, used a direct on-line, electronic link to their  registration records to ensure an absentee in-person or early voter votes no  more than once. Whether the early or in-person absentee voter is required  to fill out an application and/or show a voter identification card is  established by state law. In on jurisdiction, election officials or poll  workers check the voter’s signature in the poll book or on the application  against the registration record to confirm the voter’s identity.  In some  states, the voter’s voting record is checked to determine if he or she has  voted previously in the election–even as recently as a few minutes earlier  on the same day.  For example, typically, in jurisdictions we visited that  established more than one early voting location, once poll workers give a  voter a ballot, the voter’s voting record was updated automatically on the  registration or election management system to which all early voting  locations had direct, on-line access.
In addition, as with mail-in absentee voting, the poll books used on election  day note every voter who has voted early.  However, one jurisdiction we  visited held early voting that ended on the day before election day.  The  election day poll books in this jurisdiction identified voters who had been  sent a mail-in absentee ballot, but not early voters, because of the  jurisdiction’s need to begin printing the books before the close of early  voting.  In this case, it is possible that an individual could have voted early  and again on election day.  However, these election officials said they track  which registered voters have voted on their election management system  by giving each voter credit for having voted during the election.  According  to election officials in this jurisdiction, after the election when they  attempted to give voters credit for voting election day, their on-line election  management system would alert them to any people casting two ballots  because they had already been given credit for early voting.  According to  these officials, any cases of duplicate voting would have been provided to  the district attorney’s office for possible prosecution.  The officials said  that in the few instances when this has occurred over the past 10 years, it  was generally an older individual who was confused about the election  process, rather than an individual intending to commit voter fraud.
section_title: Election Officials Said They Faced Challenges Similar to Election Day in Conducting In- Person Early Voting
paragraphs: In our discussions with election officials about early and in-person  absentee voting, the officials raised a number of challenges or concerns  specific to this type of voting. The issues generally fell into three  categories: obtaining poll workers, ballots and other supplies, and suitable  early voting locations. Officials from several jurisdictions cited having  difficulty obtaining and/or training the poll workers who were needed to  work over the period required for early voting (as much as over 40 days).   One jurisdiction said that they did not have enough staff to support early  voting at the election office and conduct other election day preparations at  the same time, especially in the days just before election day.  In particular,  election officials from one very large jurisdiction with numerous early  voting locations stated that their biggest challenge for each election is  obtaining sufficient staff to handle the number of voters who vote on the  last day of the early voting period.  In fact, the lines and waits for certain  elections and locations have been longer for voters on the last day of early  voting than on election day.
Officials from a number of jurisdictions cited ensuring that early voting  locations had enough ballots and supplies as a challenge. For example, one  medium-sized jurisdiction in Texas that used a punch card voting method  needed to have enough copies of every ballot style voted in their  jurisdiction, at every satellite location, to support all the voters who could  come in to vote, because voters are not assigned to a particular location  like they are on election day.  For the November 2000 general election, this  included 26 different ballot styles.  By contrast, two very large jurisdictions,  which use a DRE touch screen voting method, had all the ballot types  electronically stored within each unit, but still needed to have enough other  election-related supplies to support their operations through the entire  early voting period.
Officials from a few jurisdictions had concerns with getting enough  adequate polling locations, such as locations that were sufficiently large,  had digital lines for electronically connecting to the registration system,  and were conveniently located. For example, officials in one large  jurisdiction stated that they had problems establishing early voting  locations that were convenient to all voters, and that some early voting  locations were too small for the crowds that came at peak times.
Another challenge faced by jurisdictions that conduct early voting is the  limited amount of time between finalizing and printing the ballots and  accompanying materials.  For example, in one jurisdiction early voting  begins 17 days before election day.  Thus, election officials essentially have  17 fewer days to prepare for elections.
section_title: Officials Undertook a Variety of Voter Education Efforts
paragraphs: For each election, state and local election officials are to provide  information to voters about when and where to vote early or absentee in- person, including the time during, dates on, and locations at which to vote,  among other information.  As with by-mail absentee voting, most  jurisdictions we visited that offered in-person absentee or early voting  prepared press releases and/or asked the media to inform the public when  and where to vote early or absentee in-person.  In addition, most states  and/or counties had Web sites that provide information on such voting.  In  some jurisdictions, political parties and other election organizations  provided information to voters on in-person absentee and early voting.  In  one very large jurisdiction, election officials, in conjunction with the  vendor of the jurisdiction’s voting equipment, advertised their early voting  program on a billboard at the juncture of the county’s two major freeways.
section_title: Challenges
paragraphs: In summary, election officials identified the following challenges in the  absentee and early voting process:  Preventing mail-in absentee voting fraud.  Our telephone survey of  jurisdictions and discussions with local election officials revealed that  officials had established procedures to address certain potentials for  fraud, such as someone other than the registered voter completing the  ballot or voters casting more than one ballot in the same election.   However, some mail-in absentee voting fraud concerns remained,  particularly regarding absentee voters being unduly influenced or  intimidated while voting.
Addressing voter error issues, such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete  application and ballot materials, and receiving late applications and  ballots.  Our telephone survey of jurisdictions and discussions with local  election officials showed that voters’ failures to provide critical  information, such as signatures and addresses, or jurisdictions receiving  applications and ballots after state statutory deadlines represent  principal challenges to successfully processing mail-in absentee  applications and qualifying ballots for counting.
Processing large numbers of mail-in absentee applications and ballots in  a timely manner.  Local election officials indicated that large volumes of  mail-in absentee applications and ballots represent workload and  administrative challenges.  In particular, officials expressed concerns  regarding the timely processing of applications received close to the  deadlines and the enhanced potential for errors in processing large  volumes of applications and ballots.  In addition, officials identified  some concerns with postal costs, delivery, and/or timeliness.  However,  officials expressed fewer concerns about postal delivery and timeliness  for domestic delivery than for overseas delivery.
Obtaining adequate staffing, supplies (including ballots), and locations  for conducting early voting.  As on the election day, local election  officials indicated that the principal challenges in conducting in-person  absentee and early voting were having enough workers and locations for  the entire early voting period, as well as having all ballot styles available  at a single location.
section_title: Conducting Elections
paragraphs: Despite the numerous responsibilities that involve coordinating people,  preparing and using voting technologies, and following election rules and  processes, the behind-the-scenes efforts of election officials generally  attract little public notice.  Election officials ordinarily find themselves in  the spotlight only when citizens experience difficulties on election day.   Long lines at the polls, voters’ names missing from the registration lists, a  complicated ballot, voting machine malfunctions preventing vote casting,  or, as was the case in the 2000 presidential election in Florida, hotly  contested election results, may focus public attention on the otherwise  unnoticed details of election administration.
This chapter describes those activities that election administration officials  identified to us as important to planning and conducting an election. This  chapter also outlines the challenges those officials encountered in the  November 2000 election.
subsections: section_title: Overview of Election Administration
paragraphs: Conducting an election involves activities that must be concluded prior to  the election and on election day itself.  As illustrated in figure 35, election  officials are responsible for a wide range of activities, all necessary to  ensure that all eligible citizens may freely cast their votes in private and  have them counted in federal, state, and local elections.
The ways that local jurisdictions perform what can be an enormously  complicated civic duty vary widely across the country for several reasons.  First, states have different laws and regulations that govern elections; some  states exercise a relatively high degree of control over local elections while  others allow local jurisdictions to operate with more autonomy.  For  example, some states have statewide election systems so that every voting  jurisdiction uses the same procedures for administering elections,  including registering voters, processing absentee ballots, using common  voting equipment, and tallying votes. Oklahoma, for example, standardizes  most aspects of local and statewide elections. In other states, local  jurisdictions run elections with less direction from the state, which means  local officials may exercise a larger degree of autonomy in conducting  elections.  For instance, in Pennsylvania, local election officials told us  there are 67 counties and consequently 67 different ways of handling  elections.  Figure 36 illustrates these differences.
Other states are somewhere in between Oklahoma and Pennsylvania on the  continuum of greater to lesser state direction of local elections.  Virginia,  for example, requires local jurisdictions to follow many standardized  election procedures, but leaves their implementation largely to local  jurisdictions.
Second, the type of voting technology used by a jurisdiction influences how  election officials plan and conduct an election.  Usually it is local election  officials who choose the voting technology to be used in their precincts,  often from a list of state certified options, but in some states, state law  prescribes the use of common voting technology throughout the state.  The  types and uses of voting technology are extensively described in chapter 1.   Depending on their jurisdiction’s type of voting equipment, election  officials face different challenges in ballot preparation, voter education,  poll worker training, and setting up the polls. “the logistics of preparing and delivering voting supplies and equipment to the county’s  4,963 voting precincts, recruiting and training 25,000 election day poll workers, preparing  and mailing tens of thousands of absentee ballot packets daily and later signature verifying,  opening and sorting 521,180 absentee ballots, and finally, counting 2.7 million ballots is  extremely challenging.”
In contrast, one small jurisdiction we visited had only 2,843 registered  voters, 5 voting precincts, and 28 poll workers.  As illustrated in figure 37,  the magnitude of key tasks for election officials in the large jurisdiction is a  thousand times larger than for the small jurisdiction.
Fourth, jurisdictions face different burdens in preparing for election day  because where some have relatively homogeneous populations, others  service highly heterogeneous publics, with diverse histories, cultures, and  languages.  In some jurisdictions, large segments of the population speak  languages other than English. In these jurisdictions, ballots must be  prepared in those languages.  In November 2000, Los Angeles County, for  instance, provided ballots in Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese,  Japanese, and Tagalog, as well as English. On the basis of a consent decree  with the Justice Department, Bernalillo County, New Mexico, will provide  certain types of voting assistance in the Navajo language, including  translation of the ballot.  Election officials said, in the future, they  anticipate having to provide ballots in other Native American languages,  some of which have no written form.
And finally, the voting jurisdictions themselves may develop their own  election day traditions and cultures.  For example, jurisdictions generally  seek to ensure that only eligible voters can cast their ballots on election  day.  However, the procedures adopted to determine whether a citizen who  appears at the polls is eligible to vote differ.  Jurisdictions may place  different emphasis on preventing ineligible people from voting than they do  on facilitating voting for eligible voters. States have different legal  requirements for verifying voters’ identities, and localities develop different  procedures for handling questions about eligibility that arise on election  day. In some jurisdictions, voters identified themselves by stating their  names and addresses to the poll workers, who also matched the signature  on the voter application with the voter registration records.  Other  jurisdictions require voters to present a valid photo identification card and  require the signature on their application to vote to match the signature on  their voter registration card.  In other jurisdictions presenting some form of  identification, such as a hunting or fishing license, is sufficient to verify  one’s identity. Still other jurisdictions require no identification other than  the voter stating his or her name.
section_title: Preparing for Election Day
paragraphs: Recruiting and Training Poll Workers Was Major Problem for Many   Selecting Polling Places That Met Standards Was Not Always Possible   Designing Ballots That Were Clear to Voters Was More Challenging  for Long, Complex Ballots  Educating Voters Can Help Reduce Election Problems   Preparing and Delivering Equipment and Supplies Was Logistical  In some jurisdictions, preparing for the presidential election began as early  as 10 months before the November 2000 general election.  Despite  differences among local voting jurisdictions, five key tasks have emerged  from our interviews with election officials as integral to preparing for  elections.  Prior to election day, officials must recruit and train a sufficient  number of poll workers with appropriate skills to open, operate, and close  polling places.  Suitable polling places located in the voting precincts must  be reserved.  Election officials are responsible for designing and producing  multiple versions of ballots, which may vary not only by voting precinct but  by address within a voting precinct.  Many jurisdictions educate voters  about the ballot, the voting technology they will use, and where to vote.  In  the days leading up to election day, voting equipment and supplies,  prepared weeks in advance, must be delivered to thousands of polling  places.
According to the results of our mail survey of local election officials,  nationwide 57 percent (plus or minus 4 percent) of voting jurisdictions  said they encountered major problems in conducting the November 2000  election. During our on-site visits, election officials described in greater  detail the problems and challenges they faced and the ways they addressed  these challenges.  These challenges include   labor shortages among the ranks of qualified poll workers, exacerbated   limited access to a shrinking number of appropriate polling places;   complicated ballots or new voting technology unfamiliar to voters; and   limited resources for voter education.
subsections: section_title: Recruiting and Training Poll Workers Was Major Problem for Many Jurisdictions
paragraphs: We estimate that 51 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide reported that it  was somewhat or very difficult to find a sufficient number of poll workers.
Elections in all states could not take place without an army of poll workers  who run the polls on election day. Poll workers are the frontline of  democracy. They are the public face of elections for most citizens, whose  voting experience is largely informed by their interaction at the polls with  poll workers. Although these workers are usually employed for only one  day, the success of election administration partly hinges upon their ability  to perform their jobs well.  Therefore, recruiting and training qualified poll  workers becomes one of the most crucial tasks that election officials face  in most locations. On the basis of our mail survey, we estimate that 51  percent of jurisdictions nationwide had a somewhat or very difficult time  getting enough poll workers. Of these jurisdictions, 27 percent had  difficulty obtaining enough poll workers, and 23 percent had difficulty  obtaining enough required Democrat or Republican poll workers.  These  problems were the most frequently identified by the jurisdictions in  preparing for elections. Factors that can work in concert to complicate an  already difficult task for election officials include an aging work force, low  pay, little or no training, and limited authority to hold poll workers  accountable for their job performance.  To meet these challenges, some  election officials said that they have developed specific recruiting and  training strategies.
Some poll workers are elected; some are appointed; and some are  volunteers.  For example, Pennsylvania law specifies that poll workers be  elected to the position.  One official in a small jurisdiction told us that “We  beg people to do it.”  Political parties often play a key role in identifying  poll workers.  For example, Illinois statutes require leading political parties  to nominate all election judges needed at the polls on election day.  Many  jurisdictions require that poll workers from each of the two major parties  staff each precinct.  For example, New York law requires that each polling  place must be staffed with four election inspectors equally divided between  the major political parties.
Poll workers have different titles, levels of pay, training requirements, and  responsibilities, depending on state law and the organization and traditions  of the local jurisdiction.  Jurisdictions assign their poll workers different  responsibilities in the polling place and call them by different titles,  including clerks, wardens, election judges, inspectors, captains, and  precinct officers. Often jurisdictions have a chief poll worker. Virtually all  the jurisdictions we visited provide some compensation to poll workers for  their service on election day, ranging from $55 a day for clerks to $150 a day  for a coordinator. These amounts differ by jurisdiction and level of  responsibility within the polling place.  Jurisdictions also differ in the  training that they provide and require for poll workers prior to the election.   Most of the election officials we talked to said that they offer some training  for poll workers, and some said that the training is mandatory.  One  jurisdiction requires that each poll worker be certified as an inspector by  the county board after attending an official training class and passing a  written test.  Some jurisdictions only require training for individuals who  have not previously served as poll workers. Other jurisdictions require only  that the lead poll workers be trained before each election.
In addition to the number, pay, and training of poll workers, jurisdictions  differ in the levels of authority and responsibility they grant to poll  workers.  Poll workers may have significant autonomy over the operation  of the polling place and decisions, being the final authority on interpreting  guidance in areas such as deciding who can vote and determining voter  intent.  In other jurisdictions, poll workers have limited discretion and  function primarily as clerks and facilitators, referring decisions back to  elections headquarters. “ inspectors serve 17 or 18 hours, a very long day.  Because many of our inspectors are  senior citizens, between the age of 70 and 80-plus years, such conditions are difficult on  them physically, as well as creating the potential for errors at the end of election day.  Since  compensation for this job is only $80 to $135 per day, depending upon the election district, it  is not sufficient to attract a younger workforce.”
subsections: section_title: Low Pay, Long Hours Often Created Problems in Recruiting Enough Poll Workers
paragraphs: Election officials often face a plethora of problems recruiting and training  their poll workers.  Some election officials simply cannot recruit enough  poll workers; others have a stable but aging workforce, and still others  cannot recruit reliable workers with the requisite skills.  Particular  recruitment problems vary.  Election officials from several jurisdictions  mentioned that they have problems getting enough poll workers in the  manner specified by law.  For example, in a jurisdiction that requires  election of poll workers, election officials told us that they rarely have  enough poll workers running for the positions.  Several election officials  noted that often the political parties do not provide enough poll worker  nominations to cover the needs of the jurisdiction, despite a legal  requirement that they provide all the poll workers.  One official in a small  jurisdiction that typically votes for candidates of one party said that they  often could not find enough poll workers from the other party.
Several officials said that their election workforce was aging and they were  having difficulty recruiting younger workers. The pool of potential poll  workers may be shrinking because a greater proportion of the population  have full time employment and poll worker pay is inadequate to attract  employed or more skilled workers.  One official remarked that  volunteering is characteristic of an older generation.  Another official said  that “hat they  used to consider as a fun and  interesting day and an American duty has become ‘heavy duty.’” The length  of the day is a complaint of many poll workers.  In one large jurisdiction,  election officials asked poll workers to provide feedback on their  experience in the November 2000.  One poll worker responded that it was  “bsolutely, positively too long a day.  I am 26 years old and very athletic  and still went home at night and fell asleep with my clothes on.  With the  majority of helpers either older or disabled, I have no idea how they  survived the day.”
section_title: Poll Workers With Specialized Skills Were Often Difficult to Find
paragraphs: Another problem is addressing the specialized labor needs unique to  particular polling sites, according to several local election officials.  Some  polling places required poll workers to have specific language skills; other  locations needed poll workers who were able to learn the technical skills  necessary to operate voting equipment.  Finding qualified bilingual  workers, specifically workers fluent in Asian languages, is one very large  jurisdiction’s biggest recruiting problem.  Some places had trouble finding  poll workers with the skills to use computers and newer technologies.  One  election official wrote that “it is increasingly difficult to find folks to work  for $6 an hour.  We are relying on older retired persons – many who  can’t/won’t keep up with changes in the technology or laws.  Many of our  workers are 70+.”  Officials in one very large jurisdiction said they have no  scarcity of people willing to serve, but finding people to meet specialized  needs is the issue.
section_title: Officials Reported Problems With Reliability of Some Available Poll Workers
paragraphs: Because election officials have little ability to hold poll workers  accountable for how well they do their jobs on election day, they try to find  reliable workers, but must sometimes take whomever they can find.   Officials we talked to cited a number of examples from the November 2000  election.  An election official in a medium-sized jurisdiction said that not  only did she have difficulty finding a sufficient number of poll workers, but  also that she was not satisfied with the performance of some of the  workers she did recruit.  Some officials said that problems with  performance and an aging poll worker labor pool can overlap.  As an  example, one official said she had to let an elderly worker go because the  person could no longer reconcile the ballot roster at the end of the day.  An  election official in a large jurisdiction said that the worst part of his job was  signing letters to older poll workers thanking them for their years of service  and telling them that their services would no longer be needed. Because  workers are in short supply, some election officials stated that they found  themselves on the horns of a dilemma, choosing between finding enough  workers versus hiring skilled and reliable workers.
One major problem for election officials is absenteeism on election day.  As  one official from a very large county told us, “our biggest fear concerning  election workers is whether they will show up on election day.”  In the  November 2000 election, one very large jurisdiction had 20 percent of its  poll workers cancel or not show up on election day.  Some jurisdictions  tried to plan around poll worker absenteeism by recruiting and training  more than they needed, but still had insufficient poll workers on election  day.  As one official from a medium-sized jurisdiction said, “e are usually  able to recruit more poll workers than needed.  However, because of no- shows, we came up short on election day. No one has an abundance of  good poll workers.”
section_title: Minimal Training May Not Have Adequately Prepared Poll Workers for Election Day
paragraphs: We estimate that 87 percent of jurisdictions nationwide provided some  training for poll workers. Poll worker training courses generally span a few  hours time and focus on the key processes that poll workers should follow,  including how to operate voting equipment. Although most of the  jurisdictions we visited required some poll worker training, election  officials cited instances where poll workers who had attended either still  did not understand what they were to do or chose not to follow specific  instructions on how to run the polls.  For example, to handle unregistered  voters in one very large jurisdiction, the poll workers were instructed to  provide those voters with questionable credentials a provisional ballot.   However, some poll workers failed to follow these rules and turned away  some voters from the polling place.  Poll worker training in the sites we  visited rarely included discussion of the interpersonal skills that poll  workers should employ when dealing with frustrated citizens or with each  other.
section_title: Concerned Officials Developed Recruiting and Training Strategies
paragraphs: Some jurisdictions have developed strategies for addressing the particular  challenges associated with poll worker recruitment and training.  Officials  in the jurisdictions we visited described both measures that their  jurisdictions have adopted and ones that they would like to institute if they  had the funding and legal authority to do so.  Many election officials told us  that increasing poll worker pay would be an important step in efforts to  solve poll worker recruitment problems.
Recruiting Strategies Targeted Youth, Civil Servants, Businesses,  and Civic Groups To recruit more poll workers, jurisdictions have special recruitment  programs in place.
Student Poll Worker Programs: Some jurisdictions have been  participating in student poll worker programs.  For example, in its 1999- 2000 legislative session, Colorado passed legislation that allowed junior  and senior high school students, ages 16 and older, to serve as election  judges as long as they also met other criteria, such as being  recommended by a school official and having a parent’s or guardian’s  permission.  Students must pass the same training courses as  nonstudent election judges.  Other states also allow for the use of  student judges.  In the 2000 general election, one very large jurisdiction  used 969 students from 91 schools as election judges.  This number  included 453 bilingual students.
State and County Employees as Poll Workers: Civil servants were  recruited to serve as poll workers in a number of jurisdictions. One very  large jurisdiction had a County Poll Worker Program that permitted  county employees to volunteer as poll workers.  Those employees  participating received their county pay for election day, plus either a $55  or $75 stipend, and $25 for attending the training. For the November  election, 1,400 county employees worked as poll workers.  Our mail  survey results showed that 21 percent of jurisdictions nationwide used  workers from local governments or schools to help staff the polls in the  November 2000 general election.  Election officials in one medium-sized  jurisdiction we visited said they used 25 to 30 state employees as  election judges in November 2000.  These state employees received their  regular pay in addition to the poll worker compensation.
Adopt-a-Poll Programs: Some jurisdictions have developed a program  to let businesses or community groups adopt a poll and use their  employees or volunteers to staff that polling place.  Election officials in  a very large jurisdiction encouraged companies and service  organizations to adopt a poll. Participating organizations provided the  poll workers, who were allowed to wear shirts with the logo of the  company or organization.  In another large jurisdiction, volunteers from  a charity organization adopted a poll and donated their poll worker pay  to the charity.  In this case, staffing a poll was both an exercise of civic  duty and a fundraising event.
Split Shifts for Poll Workers: To make the poll worker’s day more  manageable, some jurisdictions are allowing poll workers to serve only  half of the election day, rather than asking them to commit to a 12 to 18  hour day.  Election officials from one jurisdiction that uses split shifts  said that poll workers are very pleased with the option of working only  part of a day.  Additionally, they said that they have had less trouble  recruiting poll workers since they don’t have to work an entire election  day.
In addition to these recruiting strategies, jurisdictions have proposals that  are pending necessary legislative changes and funding.  Several  jurisdictions told us that their state has legislation pending that would  allow serving as a poll worker to satisfy jury duty requirements.  Officials in  several jurisdictions expressed the view that an election holiday at the state  or national level would, among other things, make more citizens who are  employed full time free to serve at the polls.  Our mail survey results  indicate that 29 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide favor establishing  election day as a national holiday; 19 percent support providing federal  employees time off to assist at the polls; but only 5 percent favor extending  voting hours or holding Saturday voting.
Officials Turned to Training Efforts to Improve Poll Worker  Performance To prepare poll workers for election day, many jurisdictions have focused  on improving poll worker training.  Although training may be required,  some poll workers do not attend and are still allowed to work. To  encourage attendance at training sessions, some jurisdictions offer  attendees a stipend in addition to their nominal poll worker pay.
Localities have pursued a variety of approaches for improving training  classes.  For example, one very large jurisdiction hired experts in adult  education to improve the quality of their training courses. Some states  provide localities with training resources.  For example, in Washington and  West Virginia, the states produce standard training materials, relieving the  local voting jurisdiction from the cost of producing such materials, and  offering a consistent curriculum for poll workers.
Some jurisdictions tailored the content of the training sessions to focus on  changes that have occurred in the election system or on problematic tasks  that poll workers are likely to encounter on election day.  For example,  when introducing a new voting technology, one very large jurisdiction  produced a video to train poll workers in the use of their new optical scan  counters.  When introducing its touchscreen DRE voting equipment,  another very large jurisdiction had the equipment vendor provide the  training video and materials.  To prepare poll workers for situations they  may encounter on election day, several jurisdictions had poll workers  participate in simulated precinct operations in their training class.
Recruiting and training poll workers are major concerns for election  officials.  When asked what their three top priorities would be if federal  funds were available for election administration, over half of the election  officials from the jurisdictions that we visited told us that they would use  the money to increase poll worker pay and/or to improve poll worker  training.
section_title: Selecting Polling Places That Met Standards Was Not Always Possible
paragraphs: We estimate that 9 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide had a major problem obtaining enough polling places accessible to voters with disabilities.
Election officials are responsible for obtaining a sufficient number of  polling places that meet basic standards. To meet the needs of the voting  population, the polling places should be available on election day and  easily accessible to all voters, including voters with disabilities.  They  should also have a sufficient infrastructure to support voting machines and  provide basic comforts for voters and poll workers alike.  This  infrastructure includes electricity, communication lines, heating, and  cooling units.  Many public and private facilities are used as polling places,  including schools, churches, community buildings, malls, and garages.   Specific legal requirements relating to the number, location, and  characteristics of polling places can vary from state to state.
For nearly two-thirds of the jurisdictions nationwide, we estimate that  obtaining polling places did not pose a major problem.  Our mail survey  results also indicate that only 5 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide said  they had a major problem obtaining enough polling places and 9 percent  said that they had a major problem obtaining enough polling places  accessible to voters with disabilities. However, in our site visits many  election officials did identify difficulties they had securing polling places.   According to election officials, low rental fees, the disruption of business  that ordinarily takes place at a facility, and the possibility of damage to  facilities are the primary reasons that fewer and fewer locations are willing  to serve as polling places.  In many jurisdictions, officials said that they still  had jurisdictions that were not fully accessible to voters with disabilities.   To address this challenge, some officials have consolidated precincts or  created a “super precinct,” a single, centralized location where all voters  cast their ballots no matter what the geographic boundaries of their  assigned precinct.  Some jurisdictions have adopted election day holidays,  which help resolve some problems of using schools as polling places when  students are present.  Additionally, officials said they have taken steps to  provide alternatives to voters with disabilities when the polling places are  not fully accessible.
subsections: section_title: Some Jurisdictions Failed to Find Enough Polling Places That Met Standards
paragraphs: Among jurisdictions where reserving polling places is an ongoing problem,  officials may be faced with the problem of accepting polling places that do  not meet all of the basic standards in order to have enough places to  conduct the election.  For example, election officials in different  jurisdictions said that they used polling places in the November 2000  election that did not fully meet requirements that polling places  limit the number of voters who may vote in one location,  be located within the precinct they serve or be centrally located within   be accessible to voters with disabilities, or  provide the infrastructure necessary to support election activities.
Finding locations that are handicapped-accessible is a particular concern  for local election officials; in many places, officials have not located  enough polling places that meet the needs of voters with disabilities and  the elderly.  Our onsite work on the November 2000 election found that  polling places are generally located in schools, libraries, churches, and  town halls, as well as other facilities.  Although the extent to which any  given feature may prevent or facilitate access is unknown, we estimate  that, from the parking area to the voting room, 16 percent of all polling  places have no potential impediments. Fifty-six percent have one or more  potential impediments but offer curbside voting, and 28 percent have one  or more potential impediments and do not offer curbside voting.  Although  efforts have been made to improve voting accessibility for people with  disabilities, state and local election officials we surveyed cited a variety of  challenges to improving access. Facilities used as polling places are  generally owned or controlled by public or private entities not responsible  for running elections, complicating attempts to make them more  accessible.  Places in older, denser cities have particular difficulties  locating not only buildings that are accessible but that also have accessible  parking facilities.  For example, in one very large jurisdiction we found that  of the 1,681 polling places used in the November 2000 election, only 440  were handicapped accessible.  Even fewer, 46, had handicapped parking.
A scarcity of available polling places also led some officials to accept  facilities that did not meet other specifications.  Officials in a large  jurisdiction told us they had to settle for substandard buildings, some of  which were being renovated, that did not have electricity or heating.   Additionally, the officials told us that every year the department of  elections buys heaters for some buildings that serve as polling locations. A  small jurisdiction faced a temporary problem with the school gymnasium  that the town uses as its super precinct–a single polling location for all  precincts. During the 2000 primary election, the gym was undergoing  significant renovation, and half of the space usually available for elections  was closed off.  Additionally, temporary electricity, communication lines,  and toilet facilities had to be added for the election.  Because the  construction was completed before the general election, the jurisdiction  did not have these problems in November 2000.
Election officials expressed concern that it is not only difficult to retain  current polling places but also challenging to find replacements.  Some  jurisdictions lack funds to pay a large enough stipend to a facility to  provide an incentive for its owners to offer it for use as a polling place.  In  one case, according to the election official, the stipend was so small that it  may not have even covered the owner’s electricity costs.  Election officials  may be hampered by laws that restrict them from spending public funds to  modify private facilities to make the spaces ready for the elections or to  repair damage to those facilities that result from their use as a polling  place.    Schools are often used as polling places.  But space constraints and  security considerations raised by having nonstudents entering the school  grounds during school hours have led some schools to withdraw their  facilities as polling places.
section_title: Lacking Access to and Control of Facilities Presented Problems for Some Officials
paragraphs: Election officials do not generally have control over polling places. Some  must rely on building managers or custodians to unlock the buildings and  ready the space for election day.  Because the polls typically open so early  in the morning, custodians may not have opened the space so that the poll  workers could enter on time.  For example, officials in both a large and a  medium-sized jurisdiction reported that poll workers were delayed because  buildings were not unlocked and accessible at the appointed time on  election day.
Before every election, some jurisdictions provide information to voters  about their polling place location.  For example, one medium-sized  jurisdiction mailed out polling place location information to every  household.  Many jurisdictions may also describe the location of the voter’s  polling place in print, radio, and television announcements.  Canceling  locations after they have been publicized presents difficulties for election  officials who must find substitute locations and then try to notify the voters  of the last minute change.  For example, in one very large jurisdiction, five  locations canceled after the sample ballot, which lists the precinct the  voter is assigned to, was mailed.  The jurisdiction had to mail out 110,500  post cards to the affected voters notifying them of their new polling place.
section_title: Officials Developed Strategies to Compensate for Lack of Adequate Facilities
paragraphs: To compensate for the lack of an adequate number of facilities, election  administration officials have pursued or proposed the following actions:  Consolidated Precincts: To ease the difficulty of finding polling places  for each voting precinct, some jurisdictions are consolidating several  precincts into a single location. One small jurisdiction crafted a super  precinct with all six precincts in one polling place.  This solution offers  the advantages of providing a known, central location easy for voters to  find and alleviating the pressure to provide poll workers for each polling  place.  By using this super precinct, the jurisdiction is able to provide  handicapped access and parking to all its voters.  Additionally, the  county clerk, who is the chief election official, is on site to resolve any  issues over voters’ eligibility to vote.  Rather than creating a super  precinct, some jurisdictions are consolidating voting precincts. One  large and one medium jurisdiction consolidated several precincts  resulting in fewer polling places.  One of these jurisdictions has 45  polling places with as many as 4 precincts per polling place; the other  has 270 polling locations for 576 precincts.
Revised State Limits on Number of Voters Per Precinct: In some cases  the election officials’ proposed strategies for dealing with these  problems involve changing state laws that prescribe the number of  registered voters per precinct.  By increasing the number of registered  voters per precinct, officials hope to decrease the number of required  polling locations. California introduced legislation to increase the  number of voters in each precinct from 1,000 to 1,250, which would  reduce the number of polling places needed.  This solution would also  reduce the number of poll workers needed on election day.  However, as  one election official observed, an unintended consequence of  condensing precincts may be longer lines at polling places, which makes  voting a more time-consuming and difficult activity.
School Holidays on Election Day: Traditionally, schools have served as  polling places.  However, several election officials mentioned that they  are increasingly difficult to obtain because of security concerns and  competition for space when students are present.  In one large  jurisdiction, election officials, in cooperation with school boards, have  made election day a student holiday.  The schools, which account for  two-thirds of the polling places, are then available as polling locations  with teachers present, alleviating some of the security concerns.   Similarly, a medium-sized jurisdiction persuaded three of its four school  districts to schedule a student holiday on election day.
All-Mail Voting: Oregon is the only state that has adopted mail voting  for all its elections statewide.  Election officials told us that one of the  positive effects of their move to all-mail voting is that election  jurisdictions no longer have to contend with the logistical problem of  securing polling places or hiring poll workers.  Other jurisdictions use  all-mail voting on a more limited scale.  For example, one medium-sized  jurisdiction has mail-only precincts for sparsely populated areas.  In  another medium-sized jurisdiction, officials said they also permit  smaller election jurisdictions, such as a water district, to opt to hold a  special election entirely by mail.
section_title: Designing and Producing Ballots That Were Clear to Voters Was More Challenging For Long, Complex Ballots
paragraphs: We estimate that 42 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide indicated that the federal government should subsidize the operational costs of elections (e.g. printing ballots or paying poll workers).
Despite the controversy over the “butterfly ballot” and other ballot  problems in the aftermath of Florida’s 2000 election, few election officials  we spoke with reported experiencing major difficulty with ballot design for  the November 2000 general election. We estimate that only 2 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide thought that confusing ballot design was a major  problem.  However, we emphasize that this is the view of election officials  and not voters. Election officials are responsible for designing ballots that  meet both statutory requirements and the requirements of the particular  voting equipment and that are easy for voters to understand. Officials we  met with did identify a number of challenges they faced in ballot design.   They noted that designing usable, easily understood ballots that meet the  constraints of particular voting equipment can become much more difficult  in jurisdictions where the ballot is printed in multiple languages, or a large  number of offices or initiatives are on the ballot.
Many states have statutory requirements that affect the design and layout  of ballots. The specific statutory requirements and the level of detail  specified differ by state.  Many states prescribe specific features of ballot  design.  For example, some states require that ballots provide for rotation  of candidates so that the no candidate of a particular party consistently has  the advantage of appearing first on the ballot.  State law in other states  dictates that voters be offered a ballot that allows them to vote a straight- party ticket.  Some states identify the order of races and ballot issues.  For  example, Washington law specifies that state ballot issues appear before all  offices on the ballot.  In New York, state law even includes specifications  relating to the size of the print and the size of the checkboxes for the ballot.   States also differ in the degree of state oversight of ballot design.  In some  statewide systems, such as those in Oklahoma, ballot design is done  primarily at the state level for state and federal offices.  In Massachusetts,  the state designs and prints all ballots for state elections.  In other states,  such as Virginia, local officials develop ballots, but the State Board of  Elections must approve them. Other states have no statutes that provide  instruction on ballot design, leaving ballot design in the hands of local  officials without state oversight.
The voting technology that a jurisdiction uses is the major factor that  influences ballot design and defines the tasks that election officials face as  they prepare the ballot.  As we discussed in chapter 1, different voting  machines require different types of ballots and each different type has its  own constraints.   For example, the size of ballot, type of paper, and other  features of the ballot must follow physical characteristics of the voting  machine.  Figure 38 illustrates two punch card ballots and identifies some  of the characteristics that caused problems with the ballots for the  November 2000 election.
Figure 39 shows an optical scan ballot and a ballot for a pushbutton DRE  voting machine.
Election officials must determine all the ballot styles needed for every  precinct in the jurisdiction.   They must “define the election,” which entails  identifying all races, candidates, and issues such as statewide referenda or  local tax levies in a particular election.  Additionally, officials must  determine how many variations of the ballot they need to produce.  A  voting jurisdiction, which is generally a county, is comprised of precincts.   Voters in the same precinct may vote a different ballot because boundaries  of certain election districts, such as congressional districts and special  districts, may vary within the precinct.  Therefore, voters in the same  precinct may vote different ballot styles, depending on where the voter  lives.
Jurisdictions design their ballots to meet the special needs of their  constituents in various ways.  Certain jurisdictions may require that ballots  be prepared in multiple languages.  Others prepare audio versions of their  ballot for sight-impaired voters. For example, one very large jurisdiction,  which uses touch screen DRE machines, provides an audio option to allow  blind voters to cast their ballots in privacy without outside assistance.  No  matter the ballot style or unique aspects of ballot design, all ballots must  include instructions to voters on how to complete their ballots.
Once election officials determine everything that must appear on the ballot,  they must construct detailed layouts for a particular type of ballot used for  their election equipment.  In many jurisdictions, the ballot layout is  completed in-house.  Some jurisdictions have computer programs that they  use for ballot layout.  In other places, election officials rely on voting  equipment vendors, printers, or other outside contractors to fit the  candidates and issues onto the ballot.
subsections: section_title: Officials Reported Voters Confused by Some Ballots
paragraphs: Although most officials did not identify ballot design as a major problem  area, some officials reported the design of the ballot created problems and  confusion for some voters in the November 2000 election.  These problems  generally varied by the type of voting equipment used by the jurisdiction.   On the ballot for a medium-sized jurisdiction that used lever machines, the  list of names for president was so long that it extended into a second row.   Election officials said that listing candidates in a second row confused  some voters.  In a small optical scan jurisdiction, officials said that their  voters seemed to have problems with the write-in section of their ballot.   Voters selected a choice from the candidates listed on their ballots and then  also wrote in the candidate's name in the write-in section.  The officials  believe that this confusion on the part of the voters accounted for much of  their county’s 5 percent overvote for president. In one small jurisdiction,  officials said that they had to use both sides of their optical scan ballot  because of the number of issues on the ballot.  They said that two-sided  ballots generally created some voter confusion.  Some voters did not flip  their two-sided ballot over and only voted on one side.
In one very large punch card jurisdiction election officials said that after  the difficulties with the butterfly ballot in Florida were publicized, they also  received complaints that the butterfly ballot for their punch card machines  was confusing.  Additionally, they said that approximately 1,500 voters put  their punch cards into the machine upside down, thereby negating their  vote. In a jurisdiction that uses a full-face electronic DRE machine, officials  had to use a small print size, difficult for some voters to read, to ensure that  their ballot could (1) include all of the races and candidates, (2) meet the  legal requirement that the full text of all ballot issues appear, and (3) have  all text in English and Spanish.  Additionally, because many voters had not  received advanced information on the issues on the ballot, they took more  time in the voting booth; thus, waiting times at polls became lengthy.
section_title: Production of Paper and Punch Card Ballots Added an Extra Layer of Difficulty
paragraphs: The preparation of paper and punch card ballots requires an extra step in  the production process.  These types of ballots must be printed or  produced separately from the voting machine, which introduces the  potential for other problems.  In a medium-sized jurisdiction that uses  punch card ballots, officials said the printer trimmed ballots too closely,  and the ballots had to be redone.  Locations that use punch card machines  provide a ballot book that fits onto the machine and identifies for the voter  the correct location to punch.  The paper ballot book and the punch card  must be correctly aligned in the machine.  Small deviations can result in  erroneous punches. Officials in optical scan jurisdictions also reported  ballot production problems. For example, officials said that a printing error  on the ballots caused the counting machines to reject the ballots in one  medium-sized jurisdiction.  A small ink dot in the ballot coding section  made the ballots unreadable by the machines.
section_title: Officials Did Not Have Many Options for Ballot Design
paragraphs: Election officials told us that they anticipated that long lists of candidates  or changes in their traditional ballot format would lead to ballots that  would confuse some voters.  However, they often had limited alternatives,  given everything they had to fit on the ballot for the November 2000  election.   Some officials attempted to mitigate the impact of confusing  ballot features by focusing voter education on these features.  For example,  officials in a large jurisdiction anticipated that they would have a problem  with their three-column ballot design and the straight-party ballot option.   If voters wanted to vote a straight party ticket in the November 2000  election, they had to mark the ballot in four different places, which was a  departure from the usual way ballots were voted.  These officials said that  they tried to avert a problem for the voters by emphasizing this change in  the ballot in voter education efforts before the election.
Some other jurisdictions have adopted longer range efforts to limit the  length and complexity of ballots. To minimize the length of the ballot,  officials in South Carolina recommended the creation of two different  ballots–one for candidates and one for ballot issues. Washington pursued a  similar course of action, scheduling state elections in the off-years of the  presidential election cycle.
Jurisdictions identified other ideas to improve ballot design that are still in  the proposal stage.  Officials in one jurisdiction said they would like to use  professional design consultants to create ballots that are easy to use and  understand. Another jurisdiction is proposing to pretest ballots with  selected groups of voters to identify and resolve design flaws before the  election.  Given the many problems of voter confusion with ballot design  identified in the detailed reviews of ballots cast in Florida, many are  interested in applying the principles of the field of information design to  developing usability standards for ballot design. Some jurisdictions are  planning to acquire new voting equipment and the characteristics of the  ballots associated with different equipment will play a big role in their  decision.  One official in a very large jurisdiction told us that they would  not even consider optical scan equipment because the amount of paper that  would be required for their complex ballots would be prohibitive.
section_title: Educating Voters Can Help Reduce Problems in Conducting Elections
paragraphs: We estimate that over a third of the jurisdictions nationwide believed that federal government should provide monetary assistance for voter education programs.
To educate voters on how to translate their choices of candidates and  issues into votes on election day, jurisdictions employ a range of activities.   Jurisdictions place varying degrees of emphasis on educating voters on  election processes and procedures.  Some officials publish a sample ballot  in local newspapers; others publish voter guides, mail out sample ballots  and election information to every registered voter, and fund public service  announcements.  Officials told us that the introduction of new voting  technologies or other significant changes in the way elections are  conducted increases the need for educating voters on how the changes will  affect the way they vote.  A lack of funds is the primary challenge that  election officials said they face in expanding their efforts to educate voters  about elections. On the basis of our mail survey, we estimate that over a  third of the jurisdictions nationwide believed that the federal government  should provide monetary assistance for voter education programs.
subsections: section_title: Emphasis Placed on Informing Voters Differed Across Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Virtually all jurisdictions we visited provide some information to assist  voters in knowing how, when, and where to vote.  However, there is wide  variation in the amount and type of information provided and in the  importance elections officials attach to voter education.  In one small  jurisdiction, for example, an election official told us, “eople have been  voting here the same way all their lives.  They don’t need voter education.”  However, in many jurisdictions, election officials consider more extensive  voter education campaigns to be an important way to minimize voter errors  on election day.  Some jurisdictions use multiple media for providing  information to the public before election day, and other jurisdictions would  like to provide more extensive voter education, but lack resources to do so.
section_title: Some Jurisdictions Use Multiple Media to Disseminate Voter Information
paragraphs: Jurisdictions provide voter education through print and electronic media,  public demonstrations of the voting process, and public forums.  In our  mail survey of jurisdictions, we asked local election officials to identify  ways they provided information to voters for the November 2000 election.   Making information available at the election office and printing election  information in the local newspaper were by far the most common ways of  providing information to voters. Our mail survey results indicate that about  91 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide made sample ballots available at  the election office; 74 percent printed sample ballots in the local  newspaper; and 82 percent printed a list of polling places in the local paper.   In contrast, between 18 and 20 percent of jurisdictions nationwide  indicated they placed public service ads on local media, performed  community outreach programs, and/or put some voter information on the  Internet.  Mailing voter information to all registered voters was the least  used approach. Thirteen percent of the jurisdictions mailed voting  instructions; 7 percent mailed sample ballots; and only 6 percent mailed  voters information on polling locations.
All election officials we visited provide information to the public at the  elections office and answer inquiries from citizens.  Most jurisdictions also  provide information on elections to the public by publishing sample ballots,  candidate lists and positions, registration deadlines, polling place location,  and times the polls open and close. Fewer jurisdictions mail information on  the election directly to voters.  Some states mail voter guides, which  provide detailed explanations of ballot issues and describe all the  candidates for state and federal office to registered voters.  Some local  jurisdictions have developed voter guides and other information on the  election to help educate voters.  Jurisdictions we visited provided an array  of different types of voter information and aids.  In one large jurisdiction,  election officials distributed business cards with instructions on how to  complete optical scan ballots on one side and dates of elections on the  other. A very large jurisdiction provided voters a demonstration that  included instructions on punch card voting and sample ballots.  Some of  the materials alert voters to common mistakes that they should avoid.  Voter education materials are often both distributed before the election and  available at the polls on election day.  Figure 40 provides examples of  materials jurisdictions used to inform voters in the November 2000  election.
Other forums for educating voters include discussions sponsored by  organizations such as churches and civic and advocacy groups.  Election  officials in several jurisdictions said they frequently spoke to civic and  educational organizations about the voting system.  One large jurisdiction  has an NVRA coordinator with responsibility for outreach to community  groups, and another jurisdiction has an Election Ambassador Program  aimed at citizens 18 to 35 years old.  The Internet provides another medium  for communicating voting process information to voters.  All but three of  the jurisdictions we visited have established a Web site as an additional  means of educating voters. Many of the Web sites simply provide general  information about elections and the requirements for participation.  Others  permit the voter to search a database to find information, such as the  location of the voter’s polling place.  A number of sites have forms the voter  can get and print, but none permits the voter to actually submit the form  electronically.   Some jurisdictions may also operate telephone information  hotlines so those voters may call in to obtain information about their  polling place location.  For example, Delaware has a computerized  telephone system answering calls at election headquarters.  The system  handled over 11,000 calls on election day in November 2000.  Many of the  calls were from voters using the polling place locator feature.  Use of such  a system frees up the time of election officials to field questions from poll  workers.
Some jurisdictions rely on civic organizations, such as the League of  Women Voters, to supplement their voter education efforts.  In some  locations, such groups provide almost all voter education.  In one very large  jurisdiction, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, watchdog organization provides  voter education before election day.  On election day, the group operates a  voting control center from its offices to respond to questions and field  complaints from citizens, election board officials, and party  representatives.  In another large jurisdiction, officials said that they relied  on the League of Women Voters and the media to provide the community  with voter education information.
To familiarize citizens with the mechanics of voting, some jurisdictions  conduct nongovernmental elections for groups such as unions and schools.   For example, local election officials in one large jurisdiction will, on  request, run local high school elections such as those for student council  officers. The officials follow the same procedures as they would in a  general election—developing the ballots and using the same voting  machines used in the general election.  Officials in other jurisdictions also  conduct nongovernmental elections at the request of community groups as  an educational tool.
section_title: Introduction of New Technology Increased the Need for Voter Education
paragraphs: When election jurisdictions changed the equipment they use for voting,  there was a particular need for voter education to help citizens understand  how the new equipment would change the way they cast their ballots.  Two  of the jurisdictions we visited had developed extensive voter education  programs in connection with introducing new voting technology. One large  jurisdiction introduced new optical scan voting equipment that was used in  November 2000.  As a part of planning the transition, election officials  significantly increased voter education to ease the transition.   Consequently, voting error decreased in this jurisdiction in the November  2000 election.  A very large jurisdiction was the first jurisdiction in the  country to move completely to touchscreen DRE machines. The vendor  supplying the new voting technology also provided $80,000 for voter  education.  Among other things, their education program included the  development of videotapes and billboards.  The vendor also published a  voter guide with the county.
Many jurisdictions would like to provide more extensive voter education  tailored to the needs of particular elections.  However, voter education  programs compete with other needs for scarce local resources in  conducting an election.  Officials in two large jurisdictions said that they  could not mail sample ballots to registered voters because of the postal  costs they would incur.  Spending for voter education is considered  discretionary.  Some local officials must first take care of mandatory items  such as equipment, supplies, poll workers and polling places.  Many  officials said that they see voter education as an area where federal funds  could be particularly helpful.  When asked what their priorities would be  were federal funds to become available for election administration, two- thirds of these election officials identified increasing voter education  among the top three spending priorities.
section_title: Preparing and Delivering Supplies and Equipment Was Often a Logistical Challenge
paragraphs: Supplies and equipment are generally prepared before the election and  either delivered to each polling location or picked up by poll workers.  Although no election official mentioned this task as a major problem, it is  crucial to administering a successful election. The logistics of preparing  supplies and machines for election day can be daunting, particularly for  larger jurisdictions.  As discussed in chapter 1, the type of voting equipment  a jurisdiction uses influences the equipment testing routines required  before election day as well as the kind of ballots and supplies that are  needed.
Officials typically put all supplies needed by voters and poll workers in a  supply box which, in many jurisdictions, doubles as a ballot box.   Generally, officials assemble a supply box for every precinct which  typically includes (1) voter registration books or lists; (2) signs to identify  the polling places; (3) voter education materials; and (4) instructions for  poll workers that explain how to open, operate, and close the polls.  The  supply boxes may also contain incidentals such as bibles, American flags,  and other items; for example, one jurisdiction’s box included a 50-foot  length of string to mark an electioneering-free zone around the polls.    Additionally, supply boxes can have forms, such as voter challenge forms  and voter assistance requests; tally sheets to count blank, spoiled,  absentee, and properly voted ballots; and a ballot box.  The boxes may  include color-coded envelopes or other dividers to separate different kinds  of ballots.  All boxes are checked by an election official to ensure that they  contain the correct supplies.  A lock or security tab must secure the supply  boxes.
In addition to preparing the supply boxes, election officials must prepare  and deliver the voting equipment, except in jurisdictions that use paper  ballots.  Depending on the size of the jurisdiction and the types of  equipment, the logistics of delivering the voting machines will vary.  For  example, in one very large jurisdiction, the election board hires a fleet of  trucks to distribute the supplies and equipment to nearly 5,000 precincts  for election day. The election board in a medium-sized jurisdiction hires a  contractor who stores and delivers the equipment.  The machines are  prepared and tested while they are still in the warehouse, and then the  contractor delivers them to the appropriate polling place. Jurisdictions  using lever machines have different logistical problems.  Lever machines  weigh 700 to 900 pounds apiece, depending on the construction material.   Prior to election day election officials in one jurisdiction delivered 464 of  these lever machines to 327 election districts.  A small jurisdiction that uses  lever machines avoids delivering heavy lever machines by storing the  machines at the polls.
section_title: Election Day Activities
paragraphs: Setting Up the Polling Place Required Different Steps  Determining Voter Eligibility Often Created the Biggest Election Day  Our site visits with election officials indicated that these officials were  generally satisfied with the way the November 2000 general election was  conducted within their jurisdiction.  However, few of them reported  keeping data or evaluating the way in which the election was conducted.  Therefore, it is likely that the election officials’ views about how well the  election was run at the polling place level were shaped by anecdotal  information that was voluntarily supplied or by public complaints.  In our  mail survey, jurisdictions nationwide identified determining voter eligibility  at the polls and communication inadequacies as the key problems they  faced on election day.  Election officials we visited noted that the problems  they face with registration, absentee voting, and other preparations for  election day often manifest themselves on election day.
Election day marks the point at which election officials delegate much of  the actual operation of the election to poll workers, who become the public  face of the election to most citizens.  Entrusting an election to temporary  workers requires a leap of faith for some election officials.  One election  official told us that he could spend a year planning for an election,  preparing for every possible contingency, meeting all required deadlines,  and ensuring all materials were in their proper places.  However, on the day  of the election, the fate of his professional reputation rested in the hands of  strangers, and at the end of the day he would learn how well he had done  his job during the preceding year.
Poll workers carry out many important tasks on election day.  In a number  of jurisdictions, election administrators have developed detailed checklists  that direct poll workers in opening, running, and closing the polls.  From  our mail survey, we estimate that 74 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide  provided poll workers with checklists of procedures to follow on election  day. The checklists we saw in different jurisdictions varied significantly in  detail.
subsections: section_title: Setting Up the Polling Place Required Different Steps
paragraphs: Before the polls open on election day, election officials must ensure that  the people, processes, and technology to conduct the election are in place.   Election officials did not identify the setting up of the polling place as a  major problem although they did encounter routine glitches on election day  in November 2000.
To set up the polling place and begin preparing the site for the voters, poll  workers in some jurisdictions arrive at the polling place as early as 5:45  a.m.  In other places the polls are set up the night before election day.   Opening the polls entails swearing in the officials, setting up the machines,  unpacking the supply box, setting up voting booths, testing equipment, and  completing paperwork such as confirming that the correct ballot styles and  number of blank and demonstrator ballots have been delivered, and  posting signs.
There are many different ways polls are set up.  The type of voting  technology influences the types and sequence of tasks poll workers  perform.  For example, in a small jurisdiction that uses paper ballots, the  lead poll worker is responsible for picking up the supply box the day before  the election.  He or she must be the first person to enter the polling place  the next day, and the supply box must be opened in the presence of the  other poll workers in the morning before the polls open on election day.
In contrast, in a very large jurisdiction, which uses precinct-count optical  scan machines (in which the ballots are counted at the polls), the supply  box contains the ballots and is locked inside the machine.  Election  warehouse employees deliver the machines to the polling places the night  before election day.  The election judge and at least one other poll worker  go to the polling place to unpack supplies and prepare and test the optical  scan vote-counting machine.  When they complete these tasks, they secure  the polling place until the next morning.
One very large jurisdiction uses touchscreen DRE machines that are  portable voting devices.  On election eve, the poll workers set up the  machines in each polling place.  The lead poll worker must test the  separate devices at home that will be used to activate the DREs. Election  morning, the lead poll worker powers up the machines and runs the self- test to ensure the system is operating properly.  The first voter of the day  activates the machines for all subsequent voters.
Although election officials did not say that setting up the polls created  major problems for them, they did remark that they always have last  minute problems to deal with, such as absent poll workers and polling  places canceling on the day of the election.  But election officials said that  they have contingency plans for most of these problems.  For example, in  one small jurisdiction, the polls cannot open until all the poll workers are  present.  In this jurisdiction, each polling location has alternative poll  workers in case a designated poll worker cannot be present on election  day.  However, in the November 2000 election, one polling location opened  45 minutes late because an alternate who lived a great distance from the  polling place had to be summoned at the last minute.
The schematic diagram in figure 41 illustrates the way that poll workers in  one jurisdiction were instructed to position the voting booths, election  judges’ tables, signage, and the ballot box in each polling place.  This  diagram also shows the path the voter takes upon entering the polling  place.
State law determines the hours that polling places open and close for all  jurisdictions within the state, as shown in table 21 in appendix VI. When the  polls open and voters enter the polling place, they will generally follow the  path laid out in figure 41.  The particular steps and stops on the way to  casting a ballot differ, but in most cases, voters must check in at an official  table and a poll worker must verify that they are registered and otherwise  eligible to vote. When eligibility has been verified, the voter receives a  ballot or an authorization to use a voting machine and proceeds to the  voting booth.  Once the voter’s choices have been recorded on the ballot,  the voter must make sure the ballot is cast.  For punch card and paper  ballots, the voter must take the ballot to the ballot box or ballot counter; for  lever and DRE voting machines, the voter casts the ballot on the machine.   At each step, there is the potential for problems or voter confusion.
section_title: Determining Voter Eligibility Often Created the Biggest Election Day Problem
paragraphs: We estimate that 30 percent of jurisdictions considered dealing with unregistered voters at the polls to be a major problem and 20 percent considered other voter eligibility issues to be major problems at the polls.
From the perspective of election officials that we contacted, the biggest  problems on election day stem from resolving questions about voter  eligibility.  Provisional ballots, court orders, and affidavits were used in  some jurisdictions to resolve voter eligibility problems.  High numbers of  voters with these eligibility issues create challenges on election day,  particularly by creating frustration for voters, long lines, and problems  communicating between the polls and election headquarters as poll  workers work to resolve the problems.
subsections: section_title: Provisional Ballots and Court Orders Were Used to Resolve Voter Eligibility Problems
paragraphs: Election jurisdictions have different requirements for establishing that the  voter is eligible to vote at a particular polling place on election day.  As  noted in figure 42, different states have different requirements for checking  the voter’s identity.
Although many jurisdictions have stringent requirements for identifying  voters and confirming their eligibility to vote, many others have very  limited procedures. Twenty-three states require or authorize poll workers  to inspect proof of the voter's identity, such as a driver's license or a birth  certificate, before allowing him or her to vote.  Thirty-eight states and the  District of Columbia require a voter signature at the polls.  Sixteen of these  states provide for verification of the voter's signature based, for example,  on a comparison with the voter's signature on a registration application.
Before a voter receives a ballot, his or her eligibility must be confirmed.  Typically, the poll worker examines the registration list for the person’s  name.  As discussed in chapter 2 of this report, jurisdictions produce poll  books or lists of registered voters in a number of different ways.  If the  name appears on the list and other identification requirements are met, the  voter is given a ballot and proceeds to vote.
If the voter’s name does not appear on the registration list, jurisdictions  have different procedures for dealing with the question of the voter’s  eligibility.  Twenty states plus the District of Columbia utilize some form of  provisional ballot. Provisional balloting is typically identified by (1) the  provision of a ballot to voters whose names are not on the precinct level  voter registration list, (2) the identification of such ballot as some type of  special ballot, and (3) the post election verification of the voter’s  registration status before the vote is counted.  Provisional balloting  measures go by differing names among the states including, provisional  ballot, challenged ballot, ballot to be verified, special ballot, emergency  paper ballot, and escrow ballot.  Five states use a form of affidavit ballot  whereby upon completion of an affidavit the vote is cast and counted  without the confirmation of such registration prior to the counting of the  ballot.  Table 22 in appendix VI details the provisions in the laws of  different states for provisional voting and other procedures to address  voters whose names do not appear on the registration list.
Our mail survey showed that over three-quarters of the jurisdictions  nationwide had at least one procedure in place to help resolve eligibility  questions for voters who did not appear on the registration list at the  polling place. Poll workers will often first try to reconcile this type of  problem by contacting election headquarters and verifying their  registration list against the more current master registration list. If election  headquarters cannot provide a definitive answer about a voter’s eligibility,  many jurisdictions allow the individual to vote some type of provisional  ballot.  Several election officials told us that provisional ballots are a great  help in conducting elections.  One director of elections said that in order to  keep the polling places operating smoothly, no person who asks to vote is  denied a ballot.  In this jurisdiction, poll workers are instructed to give a  provisional ballot to persons whose names do not appear in the poll book.   The provisional ballot will not be counted if the person is not a registered  voter.  In the 2000 general election, this jurisdiction distributed 18,000  provisional ballots to voters, and about half of these ballots were rejected,  primarily because the person casting the ballot was not registered.  This  jurisdiction, unlike most, posted the names of those persons whose ballots  were rejected and, therefore, not counted in the election.  Voters whose  ballots were rejected could appeal the decision.
The procedures and specific instructions that jurisdictions develop to  permit provisional voting differ across jurisdictions.  For example, in some  jurisdictions, the voter must sign a sworn statement to cast a provisional  ballot, but not in others. Figure 43 shows a provisional flow chart that  officials in one very large jurisdiction developed to spell out for poll  workers and voters the specific steps that have to be taken to vote a  provisional ballot.
Figure 44 illustrates the special envelope or sleeve that one very large  jurisdiction uses for provisional ballots.  In this jurisdiction, the voter must  place his or her punch card provisional ballot in the sleeve, fill in the  required information, and sign the ballot.
Our mail survey results indicate that nationwide only 12 percent of  jurisdictions reported turning away from the polls persons who desired to  vote but whose names did not appear on the list of registered voters.
section_title: High Numbers of Voters With Eligibility Questions Created Challenges on Election Day
paragraphs: Several election officials we visited in jurisdictions that did not have  provisional voting said that introducing provisional voting would be an  important step in helping assure that all eligible voters were permitted to  vote at the polls on election day.  Additionally, they said that the option of  provisional voting could also help minimize other problems that interfere  with the smooth operation of the polling place.  According to the election  officials we spoke with, resolving a high number of voter eligibility  questions contributed to two other election day problems: communications  between polling places and election headquarters and long lines at polling  places.  To help resolve these problems, election officials have proposed or  taken the following steps:  Adding Telephone Lines: Some jurisdictions have added telephone lines  both in the election headquarters office and at polling places to alleviate  some of the communication problems.  Other jurisdictions are providing  poll workers cell phones to ensure that they have access to telephones  to call headquarters.  One of the most promising solutions to this  problem is to provide poll workers direct access to central registration  files.
Electronic Poll Books: If funds were available, officials in one very large  jurisdiction said they would buy electronic poll books that can be  directly linked to the central registration files.
section_title: Conducting Voting Varied Widely
paragraphs: We estimate that communication between the polls and the central election  office was a major problem for 17 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide and long lines at polling places was a major problem for 13 percent.
There is tremendous variability in the tasks performed throughout election  day among jurisdictions.  Not only is this variability dictated by the voting  system, but also by the culture and traditions that have emerged in each  jurisdiction. Typically, many of the tasks required to successfully conduct  voting are handled routinely.  However, election officials identified long  lines and inadequate communication links as major challenges.
section_title: Steps to Voting After Eligibility Is Established
paragraphs: Once officials have ascertained the voter is eligible to vote, they give the  voter the appropriate ballot or authorize the voter to use the voting  machine containing the appropriate ballot.  Some precincts have multiple  versions of the ballot because some voters in the same precinct for the  presidential election live in different jurisdictions for other races.   In one  medium-sized jurisdiction, the different ballot styles were color-coded so  that the poll workers could quickly identify the appropriate ballot for the  voter.
Once a voter completes the ballot, how he or she casts the ballot depends  on the type of voting system.  In precincts that count paper, punch card,  and optical scan ballots centrally, typically the voter will carry the ballot to  an election official, who deposits the ballot in the ballot box.  Where there  are precinct-level counters for punch cards or optical scan ballots, voters  place their ballots in the automatic feed slot of the counting machine.  The  precinct-level counting machine tells the voter if there is an error on the  ballot, such as an undervote, an overvote, or a damaged ballot, giving the  voter an opportunity to correct the ballot.  To cast a ballot using electronic  voting systems or lever machines, the voter pushes a “cast vote” button or  pulls a lever to register the vote.  Figure 45 illustrates how a voter would  cast an electronic vote on a touch screen DRE machine that resembles an  ATM.
Voters can change their votes on the DRE machine until they push the  “vote” button. Many jurisdictions using other voting equipment, such as  optical scan or punch card machines, permit voters who request them, a  second or third replacement ballot if they have spoiled the previous one.   Our mail survey results indicate that nationwide, 71 percent of jurisdictions  allowed voters to correct their ballots or get new ones if the original is  spoiled.  However, the voter must realize that he or she has made a mistake  and ask for a new ballot. Once the ballot is cast, some jurisdictions require  a checkout procedure, and some simply give the voter an “I voted” sticker.
subsections: section_title: Tasks Accomplished Throughout the Day by Most Poll Workers
paragraphs: Election officials perform many other tasks throughout the day to ensure  that the elections run smoothly and that voters move expeditiously through  the polling place.  Culture and tradition influence how the polling places  carry out these tasks on election day.  Some polling places are more  indulgent, while others more rigorously follow required procedures. For  example, jurisdictions using DRE machines require the voter to push a  button to record his or her vote, but if the voter exits before properly  recording the vote, various jurisdictions follow different procedures.   Election officials in a large jurisdiction using DRE machines told us that if  the voter leaves the voting machine without pushing the green “vote”  button, the poll worker at the machine is to void the vote.  In contrast, in a  different jurisdiction, the election official said the poll worker may reach  discreetly under the curtain and press the “vote” button, thus recording the  vote.  In another jurisdiction, if a voter leaves without hitting the “cast vote”  button, then the poll worker can cast the vote only if two poll workers, a  Democrat and Republican, are present.
For many places, an election is not only a civic event but also an occasion  for socializing.  In small voting jurisdictions, the poll workers often share  potluck meals with one another.  Neighbors and friends not only vote, but  also visit at the polls.  In contrast, many large jurisdictions manage their  polling places in a business-like fashion, and voters want to get in and out  of the polls as quickly as possible.
While the polls are open, poll workers are responsible for making sure that  no one violates electioneering laws; for example, by passing out campaign  literature at the polling place.  In one jurisdiction, a string is included in the  supply box to mark off the “electioneering free zone” outside the polling  place.  Periodically, the poll workers check to ensure that no one has left  campaign or other materials in the voting booths, that the instruction cards  are still posted and intact, and that the voting equipment is still functioning  properly.
Poll workers also monitor voters in the polling place and provide  assistance and information as needed. Our mail survey results indicate that  nationwide, 51 percent of jurisdictions instructed poll workers to ask  voters if they had any questions about operating the voting equipment or  casting their votes before voting.  This assistance may include helping  handicapped voters.  In one jurisdiction, if voters call in advance, they may  arrange for curb side voting, in which case the town clerk and another poll  worker deliver ballots to the voter’s vehicle.
Although many jurisdictions are required to have voting instructions on  every machine, poll workers also provide other types of voter education.   As illustrated in figure 46, poll workers can explain how to complete ballots  before the voter enters the voting booth.
Most of the jurisdictions we visited identified several types of assistance  that are offered to voters at the polls, although the amount and type of  voter education at the polls varied.  Of the voting jurisdictions nationwide,  our mail survey results indicate that 84 percent made written instructions  available for voters to review before voting, and 37 percent provided  demonstrations on how to vote through a videotape or in person.  At some  polling places, poll workers hand the voter an instruction card to take in  the voting booth with them.  When introducing a new technology, one  jurisdiction dedicated a voting machine for teaching purposes, allowing  voters to familiarize themselves with the equipment before actually voting.   Other places have continuously running video for voter education.
section_title: Long Lines and Inadequate Communication Links Pose Major Challenges
paragraphs: Long voter wait times are a problem that election officials try to avoid.  Our  mail survey results indicate that 13 percent of jurisdictions in the United  States considered long lines at the polling places to be a major problem in  the November 2000 election.  These results also indicate that 88 percent of  jurisdictions did not collect information on the average time that it took  voters to vote in November 2000; thus, the cause of long wait times remains  unclear.  However, some jurisdictions reported to us anecdotally that the  length of time voters must wait is affected by ballots that include many  races and issues.  Underestimating voter turnout also may contribute to  long wait times.  Some jurisdictions reported their ballot was so long that it  took voters a long time in the voting booth to read it and vote.  As a result,  lines backed up, and some voters had to wait for over an hour to cast their  votes. Officials in a very large jurisdiction said that their voters  experienced long wait times, in part because redistricting caused confusion  among voters, who often turned up at the wrong polling places.
Election officials cited inadequate communication links from the polling  places to headquarters as a problem.  For instance, officials from a  medium-sized jurisdiction told us that their phones were inadequate to  handle the large volume of calls coming into the office so poll workers  found it difficult to get through with their questions. For the November  2000 election, some jurisdictions dealt with the problem of inadequate  communication links by installing more phone lines or using cell phones.   One small jurisdiction distributed cell phones to poll workers whose  polling places did not have phone lines. A large jurisdiction provided all  polling places a cell phone.  In another large jurisdiction, even though more  phone lines were installed in election headquarters offices and additional  staff were added to answer questions from precincts and voters, the phone  system was overloaded and down at various points during election day.
Overall, election officials reported a high degree of satisfaction with how  the November 2000 general election was conducted in their jurisdiction.
However, jurisdictions did not comprehensively collect and report on their  performance.  According to our mail survey, four-fifths of the jurisdictions  nationwide did not seek feedback from voters on how well voter  registration, absentee voting, polling place locations and times, voting  equipment, polling place procedures, or other areas were administered.
Some jurisdictions conducted selective evaluations of their elections.  For  example, some jurisdictions maintained information on overvotes and  undervotes, but many did not.  In one large jurisdiction, election officials  conducted a survey of poll workers after the election to obtain their views  of problems encountered on election day.  In one medium-sized  jurisdiction, officials performed an evaluation of their voting procedures.   Many jurisdictions maintained logs of voter complaints.  An election  official from a large jurisdiction said that they do not need to solicit  feedback from the voters because they receive enough unsolicited  feedback.
section_title: Challenges
paragraphs: In summary, election officials face many challenges as they pursue their  goal of planning and conducting an election that permits eligible citizens to  cast their ballots without difficulty on election day. The following are the  key challenges that election officials faced as they planned and conducted  the November 2000 general election and their views on how these  challenges might be addressed.
Local election officials were generally satisfied that the election of  November 2000 was conducted well in their jurisdictions.  However,  many also identified major problems that they faced, particularly in  recruiting qualified poll workers who, for nominal pay, would commit to  a long election day, and in handling a range of problems associated with  determining voter eligibility at polling places on election day.
There is wide diversity in how elections are conducted within and  across states. Often these differences reflect local needs and customs.   Local election officials frequently told us that “one size does not fit all.”   However, local election officials acknowledge that standardization of  certain aspects of election administration may be appropriate at the  state and even the federal level.  Based on our mail survey, we estimate  that over 14 percent of local election officials nationwide are supportive  of federal development of voluntary standards for election  administration similar to the voluntary standards now available for  election equipment. An additional 26 percent support federal  development of mandatory standards for election administration.
Few local election officials systematically collected information on the  performance of the people, processes, and equipment on election day or  conducted post-election assessments to help them understand the  impact of some problems on the election.  For example, few of the  jurisdictions surveyed voters to obtain their views on how easy it was to  understand the ballots or other voting procedures. Additionally, few  states routinely ask for information on or compare the problems and  performance of local election jurisdictions.  However, some local  election officials believe that greater sharing of information on best  practices and systematic collection of standardized information on  elections can help improve election administration across the United  States and within states. Some also suggested this would be an  appropriate role for a national election administration office and  clearinghouse.
If federal funds are made available for election reform, local officials  believe that such funds should not be limited to equipment replacement  but that they should have the option to use funds for other  improvements to election administration, such as increasing poll worker  pay or voter education.  They also believe that they should be able to use  such funds to help with what they believe are their most pressing needs.   In the jurisdictions we visited, officials identified purchasing new  equipment or software (for registration, absentee voting, or election day  voting), increasing voter education, and poll worker pay to be their top  priorities for the use of federal funds.
section_title: Counting the Votes
paragraphs: The polls close on election day.  The votes are counted, and final election  results are reported.  It sounds simple, but the presidential election in  Florida in November 2000 revealed just how difficult the vote counting  process can be as the state scrambled to provide an accurate count of the  votes cast. Problems with vote counting can occur because of the way  people—election officials or voters--interact with technology. For example,  in New Mexico, an election official in one county incorrectly programmed  the software used to count votes. The result was that more than 20,000  votes cast for President were not included in the initial counts, and the final  vote totals could not be determined until the problem was resolved. In  another example, the Clerk for Cook County, Illinois reported that a defect  in the some of the templates used for punch card votes may have  accounted for one-third of the 123,000 ballots with errors in the November  2000 election.
subsections: section_title: Overview of the Vote Counting Process
paragraphs: The Methods Used to Count Votes Varied Among the Jurisdictions but   The Greatest Vote Counting Challenges Occur, Not When the Margin  of Victory Is Wide or Ballots Are Properly Marked, but When  Elections Are Close or Voters Mark Their Ballots in Ways That  Prevent the Vote Counting Equipment from Reading and Counting the  Vote The methods used to count votes vary among jurisdictions, depending on  the type of voting method or methods used, the type of ballots being  counted, and whether some or all ballots are counted at the precinct or at a  central location.  However, all vote-counting methods have certain steps in  common. Following the close of the polls, election officials and poll  workers generally take a number of basic steps to count or tabulate votes,  including  securing voting machines and ballots so that no additional votes can be   accounting for all ballots, reconciling any differences between the total  number of ballots on hand at the beginning of the day with the number  of voters who signed in at the polling place, the number of ballots  distributed, and/or the number of ballots cast;  qualifying and counting mail absentee ballots and provisional ballots  (i.e., ballots issued to voters whose voter registration could not be  confirmed at the polling place);  securely transferring—electronically, physically, or both—ballots and  election results (if ballots are counted at the polling place) to a central  location;  canvassing the votes, which includes reviewing all votes by precinct,  resolving problem votes, and counting all valid votes (absentee and  other preelection day; regular election day, provisional election day) for  each candidate and issue on the ballot and producing a total vote for  each candidate or issue;  certifying the vote, in which a designated official certifies the final vote  totals for each candidate and each issue on the ballot, within a specific  timeframe;   conducting any state-required recounts and responding to any requests   responding to allegations regarding a contested election.
Vote counting is not necessarily completed on election day or even on the  day after.  For example, nine states and the District of Columbia allow  absentee ballots to be counted if they arrive after election day.  To be  counted, however, all of them but one require that the absentee ballot be  postmarked on or before election day.  Canvassing the vote—when election  officials combine totals for each type of vote and the votes from each  voting precinct into a total vote for each candidate and issue on the  ballot—usually occurs one or more days after election day.  With regard to  certification of the vote, some states have a specific deadline following an  election, and others do not.  The election board or official may order a  recount or partial recount.  Most state codes contain specific provisions for  conducting a recount, which may be mandatory if there is a tie vote or if the  vote for a specific office falls within a certain margin of victory, such as  one-half of 1 percent. If there is no recount, or when the recount has been  resolved, the local results are totaled, certified, and reported to the state’s  chief election official.
The greatest vote counting challenges occur not when the margin of victory  is wide or ballots are properly marked, but when elections are close or  voters mark their ballots in ways that prevent the vote counting equipment  from reading and counting the vote.  This can occur, for example, when  voters circle a candidate’s name on an optical scan ballot instead of filling  in the oval, box, or arrow beside the candidate’s name.  In close elections  where there are a large number of ballots that vote counting equipment  cannot read, questions may arise about the accuracy of the vote count, and  recounts may be required or election results contested.
section_title: How Local Jurisdictions Count Votes For Each Precinct
paragraphs: Local Election Jurisdictions May Need to Count Several Different  Types of Votes That Were Cast at Different Times Using Different  Voting Methods  Votes May Be Counted at the Precinct, at a Central Location, or at a   The Counting of Each Type of Vote May Be Done by Some Type of  Vote Tabulating Machine, by Hand Count, or a Combination To determine the final vote count, local election jurisdictions may need to  count several different types of votes that were cast at different places  using different voting methods.  These types of votes include  votes cast at individual polling places by registered voters who appear in  the registration lists for that precinct,  votes cast at individual polling places by voters who do not appear in the  registration lists for that precinct and whose eligibility to vote cannot be  determined at the polling place,  absentee votes cast by mail before election day, and  absentee and early votes cast in person before election day.
Each of these types of votes may be counted at the precinct, at a central  location, or at a combination of the two. In one medium-sized jurisdiction,  absentee votes exceeded the number of votes cast at the voting precincts  on election day in November 2000.  Absentee ballots may be counted  centrally, while the votes cast at the polling place by eligible voters may be  counted centrally or at the precinct.
The results of our national mail survey indicate that many jurisdictions  count votes both centrally and at the precinct. We estimate that about 52  percent of the local election jurisdictions nationwide counted votes  centrally and about 58 percent counted votes at the precinct.  Of the  optical scan jurisdictions, about 56 percent counted votes centrally, and  about 51 percent counted votes at the precinct.
We estimate that nationwide, of those jurisdictions that counted votes at a  central location, about 70 percent of all jurisdictions and 90 percent of optical scan jurisdictions programmed their equipment to reject or separate ballots that the equipment could not read.
The counting of each type of vote may be done by some type of vote  tabulating machine, by hand-count, or a combination. According to our  analysis of available data on voting jurisdictions, about 2 percent of the  approximately 186,000 precincts nationwide are in jurisdictions that hand- count paper ballots. The remaining 98 percent of the precincts use some  type of vote-counting equipment.  The 27 local election jurisdictions we  visited illustrate the wide variation among election jurisdictions. Twelve of  the these jurisdictions used one voting method for casting election day  ballots and a different method for casting absentee or early voting ballots.  Ten jurisdictions used ether DRE or lever equipment on election day. With  DRE and lever equipment, voters cast their ballots directly on the  equipment; they do not use individual paper ballots.  Thus, DRE and lever  jurisdictions use a different type of voting method that uses some type of  individual paper ballot for mail absentee voting.  Fourteen jurisdictions  used the same voting method for election day and absentee and early  voting ballots—all were jurisdictions in which voters cast their votes on  individual punch cards or paper ballots.  Eighteen of the 27 jurisdictions  counted ballots cast on election day at the precinct, and 10 of the 27  counted absentee ballots at the precinct.  In one jurisdiction, absentee  ballots were qualified for counting at the precincts, but counted centrally.   One jurisdiction counted mail absentee ballots centrally, but counting other  preelection day ballots at the precinct.  Details for each jurisdiction are  shown in table 23 in appendix VII.
The way in which votes are counted on each type of voting equipment is  described in detail in chapter 1.  Here we focus on the ways in which  election jurisdictions used those technologies.
subsections: section_title: Counting Votes at a Central Location
paragraphs: After voting, the voter deposits his or her ballot in a ballot container placed  in the polls.  The ballot may remain in a secrecy envelope or slip from the  secrecy envelope as it is deposited into the ballot container.  After the polls  close, the ballots are transported to a central-count location where they are  fed into a tabulator and counted by precinct.  After the completion of the  tabulation process, the election workers responsible for managing the  counting center use the tabulator to generate a report, which lists the  voting results by precinct and by candidate.  Figure 47 shows a central- count tabulation machine.
Nationwide, of those jurisdictions that used central vote counting  equipment in November 2000, about 70 percent programmed the vote  counting equipment to reject or separate ballots that the equipment could  not read.  Almost 90 percent of jurisdictions that used central-count optical  scan equipment did this.  Where central counting was used, voters did not  have an opportunity to correct ballots that could not be read by the  counting equipment.
section_title: Counting Votes at the Precinct
paragraphs: Votes may be counted at the precinct. Hand-counted paper ballots are  usually counted at the voting precinct. Lever and DRE equipment is  designed to automatically tabulate the votes cast on each machine at the  precinct. Generally, punch card jurisdictions use central counting  equipment. However, punch cards may be counted at the precinct in some  cases.
One advantage of precinct counting is that the counting equipment at each  precinct can be configured to notify voters of errors they have made on  their ballots that would prevent any of their votes from being counted.  This  includes overvotes—voting for more than the allowed number of  candidates for an office—and undervotes—voting for no candidates or  fewer than the permitted number of candidates for an office.  DRE and  lever equipment can be programmed to prevent voters from casting  overvotes.  DRE equipment can also be programmed to alert voters to  undervotes.
A jurisdiction may have had the precinct count technology available, but  could not use it in the November 2000 election.  For example, Cook County,  Illinois, which includes Chicago, had the technology for their punch card  ballots but were prohibited by state law from using it.  All five of the punch  card jurisdictions we visited used central counts, where the punch cards  were collected from the precincts and sent to a central-count location.   About half of optical scan jurisdictions used precinct counts in November  2000.
Generally, in jurisdictions that count ballots by hand at the precinct,  election workers remove ballots from the ballot container and tally the  valid votes.  We visited two small jurisdictions that counted votes by hand.   As described by local election officials in one of these jurisdictions, each  precinct filled out a certificate of results once the counting was complete.   The certificate showed how many votes each candidate received. Poll  workers also must record the number of unused, spoiled, challenged, and  absentee ballots on a separate form.  When the poll workers have  completed the certificate, they posted a copy of the precinct results outside  the precinct and sent another to the county clerk’s office.
With lever machines and DREs, voters do not receive individual paper  ballots to mark.  Poll workers take counts at the precinct from lever  machines.  For lever machines, the votes cast by each voter trigger  mechanically controlled tumblers, which are concealed in a sealed  compartment at the back of the machine.  After the polls close, poll  workers open the sealed compartment and record the vote totals shown on  the tumblers.  After recording the vote results, the machine is resealed to  prevent tampering.  Some lever machines can print a paper copy of the vote  totals shown on the tumblers.  To get the printed copy, a poll worker must  pull a sheet of roll paper over the tumblers and rub the number indicated  for each candidate in each contest and for each issue. Figure 48 shows the  back of such a machine and the sheet of paper with the vote totals.
With DREs, the votes cast by the voter are stored in the unit’s memory  component after the voter indicates that he or she has completed the voting  process, usually by pressing a “Vote” button or screen.  After the close of  the polls, the poll workers responsible for managing the precinct use the  unit to generate a report, which lists the voting results.  Different methods  may be used to transmit the results.  For example, in one medium-sized  jurisdiction, the DRE cartridges were delivered to the various municipal  clerks’ offices, where the voting results were transmitted electronically to  the county clerk’s office. In a large jurisdiction, the DRE cartridges were  transported to one of seven counting centers.  The results were transmitted  over the county’s secure data network to the registrar’s office.
With precinct-based optical scan equipment, the voter removes the ballot  from the secrecy envelope and feeds it into a tabulator placed in the polls.   “Read heads” engineered in the tabulator identify the votes cast on the  ballot and electronically record them in a memory component housed in  the tabulator.  After passing over the read heads, the ballot is channeled  into a storage bin, where it remains until the close of the polls.  After the  close of the polls, the election workers responsible for managing the  precinct use the tabulator to generate a report that lists the voting results.   Figure 49 shows a precinct-count optical scan machine.
section_title: Securing Voting Equipment and Ballots
paragraphs: Voting Equipment Can Be Locked and Ballots Sealed so That the  Voting Results May Not Be Altered Once the Precinct Has Closed  Poll Workers May Use Some Method to Ensure That All Ballots Are  Accounted for at Precinct Closing Once a precinct has closed, voting equipment can be locked and ballots  sealed so that the voting results may not be altered.  When this is done  depends on whether votes are counted at the precinct or centrally.  In  jurisdictions in which all votes are counted centrally and in precinct-count  jurisdictions in which absentee and provisional votes are counted centrally,  poll workers can lock voting equipment and secure ballots shortly after the  polls close.  In jurisdictions in which only absentee and provisional ballots  are counted at the precincts, one or more precinct counters may remain  unlocked so that poll workers may use them to count these ballots after the  polls close.
The procedures for securing and locking voting equipment varies by the  type of voting equipment used.  For example, for optical scan equipment,  poll workers may read an “end” ballot into the optical scan counter at the  precinct, which instructs the equipment to accept no more ballots and  locks it, at which point the counter begins tallying the vote.  For DREs and  some optical scan equipment, poll workers may use a key to initiate the  program that tabulates the total votes counted for each candidate and issue  from the ballots read by the equipment.  This procedure can lock the vote  reading mechanism in the equipment.  Poll workers can lock lever  machines so that no additional votes can be recorded.  However, in  precincts at which absentee and provisional votes are counted, an optical  scan counter or a DRE may remain unlocked so that it may be used to  count these votes.
subsections: section_title: Reconciling Total Ballots With Total Voters
paragraphs: In conjunction with securing voting machines and ballots at the precinct,  poll workers may use some method of ensuring that all ballots are  accounted for at closing. Jurisdictions can also employ one or more  methods to reconcile the number of blank ballots on hand at the voting  precinct at the end of election day (including any supplemental ballots  provided during the day) with the number of ballots issued or the number  of voters who signed in.  This reconciliation may take place before or after  the votes are counted at a precinct.  In jurisdictions that use central count,  this reconciliation can occur at the precinct before poll workers transport  the ballots to the central tabulation center.  Figure 50 shows a form that  poll workers used at one of the jurisdictions we visited for reconciling the  ballot count.
We estimate that about 88 percent of jurisdictions nationwide compared the number of ballots cast with the number of voters who signed in at the voting precinct in the November 2000 election.
Our mail survey of local election jurisdictions indicates that most  jurisdictions nationwide compared the number of ballots cast to the  number of voters who signed in to vote on election day.  Specifically, we  estimate that in November 2000 about 88 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide compared the number of ballots cast to the number of voters  who signed in to vote on election day.  We estimate that about 64 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide compared the total number of ballots cast,  spoiled, and unused to the original supply of ballots.  Nationwide, we  estimate that about 78 percent of optical scan jurisdictions did such a  comparison.  However, only about 1 in 10 DRE jurisdictions noted took  this step.  This difference may be due to the differences between voting  technologies that use individually marked paper ballots and those that do  not.  Except for voters who cast a provisional ballot, jurisdictions that use  DRE or lever equipment had no paper ballots for voters to complete.   About 6 percent of jurisdictions used some other type of procedure.
A medium-sized punch card jurisdiction we visited provided an example of  other types  of procedures used to reconcile ballots and voters.  There,  election officials said that election judges counted the number of ballots in  the ballot box after the polls closed and compared the total with the  number of ballots cast.  If there was a discrepancy, the ballots were  recounted and the applications checked to make sure they were numbered  correctly.  If the count was a ballot short, it was noted.  If the count was a  ballot over, a ballot was randomly withdrawn from the box and placed in an  envelope for excess ballots.  Two election judges took the ballots in a  locked transfer case to the counting center.  The ballots were machine  tabulated and a count provided.  If the count did not match the judges’  count, the ballots were retabulated by a different machine.  If the count still  did not match, the ballots were sent to a discrepancy team where they were  hand counted again.  After this, the ballots were once again machine  tabulated.  These processes were from guidelines provided by the state  election board.
section_title: Counting Absentee and Provisional Ballots
paragraphs: Jurisdictions May Use Different Equipment to Count Absentee or  Provisional Ballots Than Regular Ballots Cast at the Voting Precinct  Absentee or Provisional Ballots May Also Be Counted  at a Different  Place Than Regular Ballots Cast at the Voting Precinct Both mail absentee and provisional ballots must first be qualified as eligible  for counting.  For mail absentee ballots, this may include checking  postmarks, voter signatures, or other required items on the outer envelope  containing the ballot envelope.  For provisional ballots, this means  determining that the voter was registered and eligible to vote in the  precinct in which the provisional ballot was cast.  Absentee and provisional  ballots may be counted at a different place using different types of vote  counting equipment than those cast at the voting precinct on election day.   Different equipment may also be used to record the votes.
subsections: section_title: Counting Absentee Ballots
paragraphs: There were considerable variations in how absentee ballots were counted;  for example, by hand at the precinct or by machine at the precinct or  centrally.  One large jurisdiction we visited used DRE equipment at the  polling place in November 2000 but paper ballots for absentee ballots.   These paper ballots were counted by hand at the precinct and the votes  entered into a DRE unit at the precinct by poll workers.  Two other DRE  jurisdictions we visited also used DRE equipment at the polling place but  counted both absentee and provisional ballots at a central place, using  optical scan equipment.  However, in one of these jurisdictions, voters  casting early voting ballots used an optical scan machine that notified  voters if their ballot could not be read, allowing them an opportunity to  correct errors.  Absentee ballots were initially counted at a central location  after a review by an absentee board.  Voting results stored on cartridges  from the optical scan equipment from both absentee and early voting  ballots were tabulated at a central location, using software customized for  each election.
section_title: Counting Provisional Ballots
paragraphs: Jurisdictions used different methods to allow a person to vote when his or  her name did not appear on the official voter registration list and their voter  registration could not be confirmed at the voting precinct.  In such cases,  jurisdictions in some states provided voters with a provisional ballot.   Provisional ballots were generally kept separate from other ballots and  researched by election officials to determine the voter’s eligibility to vote.   Only those ballots cast by voters whose eligibility had been confirmed were  generally counted.  However, provisional ballots were not always counted.   In a small jurisdiction we visited, for example, if a voter was not listed in  the voting precinct’s list of registered voters, local election officials  searched for the person’s name by computer using a statewide database of  voter registration records.  If the voter’s name still could not be found, the  voter was permitted to fill out an “escrow” ballot, this jurisdiction’s term  for provisional ballots.  However, these provisional votes are not counted  unless the election is close enough that the provisional votes, if all cast for  the same candidate, would be sufficient to change the outcome of the  election for one or more offices on the ballot.  If the number of provisional  ballots were sufficient to change the outcome, the ballots would only be  counted after additional research was completed to verify the voter’s  registration status.
In one large jurisdiction, election officials said that, partly to avoid  confrontation with people on election day, they provided provisional  ballots to individuals who appeared at the front desk of the central election  office and stated that they were registered to vote and wished to vote.  If a  person’s registration was confirmed, his or her vote was counted with all  the rest.  Election officials tracked the number of provisional ballots that  could not be counted because they found that the person was not  registered.  In the November 2000 election, 1,302 provisional ballots in this  jurisdiction were rejected from the count—less than one-half of 1 percent  of the total 299,776 votes cast in the election.
section_title: Canvassing the Vote— Reviewing the Accuracy of the Initial Vote Count
paragraphs: A Canvass of the Election Results Is Usually Conducted a Day or Two  After Election Day by the Jurisdiction’s Canvass Board or an Official,  at Which Time All the Precinct Results Are Tabulated Together  Eight of 27 Election Jurisdictions Selected for Our Site Visits  Reported Problems With the Vote Counting Equipment, Involving  Either Technical Difficulties or Human Error That Caused Problems  in Obtaining an Accurate Count Once the polls close and the votes are transported to a central location  where they are counted, or voting results are transmitted from the polling  place to a central location, the canvassing process may begin.  Canvass is  the term used in many states to describe the process of vote counting,  including aggregating the votes from all precincts to obtain the  jurisdictional totals, and from all jurisdictions to obtain statewide totals.  A  recanvass is a repetition of the canvass.  A canvass of the election results is  usually conducted a day or two after election day by the jurisdiction’s  canvass board or an official.  Once the canvass is completed, the final vote  counts are certified, the official results issued, and the canvass board or  other official certifies the vote count by a specific date after the election.   Dates vary by state.
subsections: section_title: Canvassing Process
paragraphs: The canvassing process varies widely, as illustrated by several examples  from our site visits.  The process may be conducted by a canvassing board,  board of elections staff, or bankers and lawyers hired for the canvass. It  may include provisional ballots in the canvassed totals.  The process can  involve some hand counts, a comparison of results from individual voting  machines to precinct totals or totals reported to the state, or a comparison  of hand counts of absentee votes to the machine counts for absentee votes.   Regardless of how canvassing is done, its principal purpose is to produce  an accurate vote count.
In one medium-sized jurisdiction, the election canvass process consisted of  an internal audit conducted by the canvass board.  Canvass board duties  included processing absentee ballots, checking postmarks, verifying  signatures, opening envelopes, and sorting ballots.  The canvass was  required by state law to ensure the accuracy of election results.  The  canvass board certified special elections or primary elections on the tenth  day after the election and general election results on the fifteenth day after  the election.  During the canvass process, absentee and provisional ballots  not counted on election night were researched to validate their eligibility to  be counted. In addition, the canvassers conducted an audit and  reconciliation of the number of signatures indicated by the poll inspector  on the poll roster with the number of ballots tabulated by the counter.  The  canvass was completed with the certification and issuance of official  election results.
In another medium-sized jurisdiction, officials noted that the voting  machines were canvassed after the polls close.  All of the paper ballots,  including affidavit ballots, which is this jurisdiction’s term for provisional  ballots, and emergency ballots were returned to the Board of Elections.  If  required, affidavit ballots and absentee ballots were researched.  The paper  ballots were counted and the results tallied.  The ballots were counted  during the 7 days after the election at the county court house office.   Officials said the lever machine totals were recanvassed by Board of  Elections staff, including one Democrat and one Republican.
In a large jurisdiction, bankers and lawyers were hired for the canvass and  worked together in separate banker or lawyer teams; each team did its own  vote tally sheet.  Bankers did not review the tally until the lawyers were  done.  Write-in votes for candidates were added as adjustments to DRE  machine tabulations.  The teams verified the information on the tally sheets  by comparing information from each DRE machine’s paper tape to printed  results collected by the State Election Director’s office.  Absentee votes  were tallied by hand and then compared to the machine’s reported count  for absentee votes.  This was done to confirm the accuracy of the hand- counted absentee vote totals entered into one of the DRE machines at each  precinct. The Chancery Court certified the canvass in the county.  The  canvass process began the Thursday following election day.  Two judges  from different political parties are to resolve any challenges to the vote  count.
section_title: Testing the Vote Counting Equipment
paragraphs: As discussed in the section on voting technology, pre- and post-election  tests were widely performed on voting equipment, at precincts and central  counting locations, to make sure the equipment was operating properly, to  check for accuracy, and to guard against tampering.  In addition to testing  the voting equipment, a manual recount may be routinely performed on a  small percentage of ballots, as a check on the validity and accuracy of the  machine count.  Accuracy operational tests are most difficult with DRE and  lever equipment, where there is no ballot document and the count is  recorded at the voting booth on each individual machine.  A thorough  preelection test would require hundreds of simulated votes to be placed on  each machine.
Election officials in the 27 sites we visited were generally satisfied with the  performance of the vote casting and tabulating equipment used in the  November 2000 election.  Officials in 18 jurisdictions reported no problems  with vote counting; 8 sites reported problems; and 1 site provided no  response.  The problems reported by the 8 sites mostly concerned the vote  counting equipment, involving either technical difficulties or human error.  Other problems mentioned included reconciling hand and machine counts  with poll books and the counting of absentee and provisional ballots. Some  of the technical difficulties included  punch cards that stuck together and could not be read by the counting  machines that were fed stacks of cards at a time;  punch card counting machines that froze up during the count;  5,000 regular and absentee punch card ballots that had to be remade  because they could not be machine read;  slight variances in the punch card ballots produced by two different  card vendors that made it difficult to use the machines that counted the  punch cards;  optical scan equipment that stopped working because it became clogged  with paper dust due to the size of the ballot and the number of ballots  received; and  integrating the operations of two different DREs that were being tested  in the same jurisdiction.
Some of the human errors that contributed to problems in counting the  vote included  incorrect marks by voters on optical scan ballots that could not be   programming errors in the software used to tally optical scan ballots.
Among those jurisdictions that reported no problems, officials from one  site mentioned some growing pains with remote tallying.  One reported that  checks and balances used throughout the day prevented counting  problems, and another reported no problems since switching to DRE  equipment.  The remaining sites identified a “smooth election” or simply no  problems in counting the vote.
section_title: Issues Associated with the Canvassing Process
paragraphs: State Guidance on What Is a Proper Mark on a Ballot and How to  Interpret Variations From Proper Ballot Marks Varied  Some States Are Voter Intent States, and Election Officials Are  Tasked With Determining How a Voter Intended to Cast a Vote When a  Question About the Ballot Arises  Other States Do Not Try to Interpret Voter Intent, but Instead Rely  Solely on Specific Voter Actions In the canvassing process, election officials generally must consider issues  regarding ballots that have not been marked properly—for example, an  optical scan ballot in which the voter has circled a candidate’s name,  instead of completing the oval, box, or arrow next to the candidate’s name.   State guidance on what is a proper mark on a ballot and how to interpret  variations from proper ballot marks vary.  Each type of voting equipment  presents different issues.
subsections: section_title: Proper Ballot Marking
paragraphs: What constitutes a proper mark on a ballot can differ based on the type of  voting method used. With DRE and lever equipment, voters record their  vote directly on the equipment.  Because there is no separate ballot, there is  generally no need for a specification of what constitutes a properly marked  ballot. With paper, optical scan, and punch card ballots, there is the  possibility that such a determination would need to be made. With these  methods, a voter must make the proper mark or punch to indicate which  candidate or issue he or she is voting for.  If the mark is not made correctly,  it can result in an improperly marked ballot that may be subject to review.   Depending on the requirements in the jurisdiction, these problem ballots  may be reviewed to determine a voter’s intent; in other jurisdictions, they  will not.
subsections: section_title: State Guidance on What Constitutes a Proper Ballot Mark
paragraphs: On the basis of our survey of state election directors, 30 states and the  District of Columbia reported that they had a state law or other provision  that specified what is a proper ballot marking for each voting method.   Definitions regarding what constitutes a proper ballot marking for paper,  punch card, and optical scan ballots varied by state, where they existed,  and for the type of machine.  Some statutes did not contain specific  definitions of proper ballot markings, but instead referred to instructions  on the ballot or to requirements of the voting method.  For example, in  Maine “the voter must mark the ballot as instructed in the directions on the  ballot to indicate a vote for the name of each nominee for whom the voter  wishes to vote.”  In Iowa "the instructions appearing on the ballot shall  describe the appropriate mark to be used by the voter. The mark shall be  consistent with the requirements of the voting system in use in the  precinct.”
Other states had statutory provisions that were more specific regarding the  type of marks that would count as a valid vote.  For paper ballots, for  example, Michigan was specific about the type of proper marks that should  be counted as a valid vote, requiring that a cross, the intersection of which  is within or on the line of the proper circle or square, or a check mark, the  angle of which is within a circle or square, is valid.
Some states also provided specific instructions on how optical scan ballots  should be marked. For example, Alaska requires that the mark be counted  if it is substantially inside the oval provided, or touching the oval so as to  indicate clearly that the voter intended the particular oval to be designated.   In Nebraska, to vote for a candidate, “the registered voter shall make a  cross or other clear, intelligible mark in the square or oval to the left of the  name of every candidate, including write-in candidates, for whom he or she  desires to vote.”
For states that use punch card ballots, the definitions varied from general  instructions on what should constitutes a proper ballot mark under all  types of voting methods, as previously described, to more specific  instructions.  For example, in Massachusetts, the instructions state “a voter  may vote by punching holes in a data processing card.”  In Texas, in any  manual count, the instructions state a punch card ballot may not be  counted unless “(1) at least two corners of the chad are detached; (2) light  is visible through the hole; (3) an indentation on the chad from the stylus or  other object is present and indicates a clearly ascertainable intent of the  voter to vote; or (4) the chad reflects by other means a clearly ascertainable  intent of the voter.”
section_title: Variations from Proper Ballot Marking
paragraphs: The problem of trying to interpret variations from proper ballot marking  was clearly evident in the November 2000 presidential election in Florida.   Issues arise with paper, optical scan, and punch card ballots, not when the  ballots are marked properly for the type of ballot used, but when there are  variations from proper marking. In our survey of state election directors, 25  states and the District of Columbia reported that they had a state law or  other provision that specified for variations from proper ballot markings.
In addition, some states are voter intent states, and election officials are  tasked with determining how a voter intended to cast a vote when a  question about the ballot arises.  Other states do not try to interpret voter  intent but instead rely solely on specific voter actions.  Some states had  general statutory provisions that they provided general provisions that  covered all types of voting methods.  For example, California law requires  that each voting method have procedures adopted for use with that method  and each set of procedures addresses this issue in detail.  In California,  these procedures are set out in a separate voting procedures manual.  Some  states had specific guidance for different types of voting methods.
subsections: section_title: State Guidance for Paper Ballots
paragraphs: Some states had specific instructions on how to interpret variations from  proper markings on paper ballots.  Minnesota law contains detailed  specifications as to where the mark “X” on the ballot can be placed and still  be a valid vote, and regarding the use of marks other than the mark “X.”   New Jersey law is also specific as to where the mark is placed and the type  of mark to make on the ballot.  Marks must be substantially in the square to  the left of the candidate’s name and must be substantially a cross, plus, or  check.
section_title: State Guidance for Optical Scan Ballots
paragraphs: State law differed among some states for interpreting variations from  proper marking on optical scan ballots.  In Illinois, a voter casts a proper  vote on a ballot sheet by making a mark in a designated area.  A mark is an  intentional darkening of the designated area on the ballot sheet, and shall  not be an “X,” a check mark, or any other recognizable letter of the  alphabet, number, or other symbol which can be recognized as an  identifying mark.  On the other hand, Wisconsin requires that a mark be  counted if a voter marks a ballot with a cross or other marks within the  square to the right of the candidate’s name, or any place within the space in  which the name appears, indicating an intent to vote for that candidate.
section_title: State Guidance for Punch Card Ballots
paragraphs: Some state laws are specific on how to count punch card ballots, but these  laws can vary by state.  For example, under a recent amendment to Ohio  law, effective August 2001, a chad with three corners attached to a ballot  and detached at one corner must not be counted as a vote.  Under a  recently passed Nevada law, effective October 2001, a chad with three  corners attached to the ballot and one detached must be counted as a vote.
Other punch card states provided general or no guidance for interpreting  variations from proper marking directive or procedures.  In Arizona,  according to the Secretary of State’s procedures manual for inspection  boards, board members are to remove hanging chads prior to tabulating the  ballots; “hanging chad” means hanging by one or two corners.  In Oregon, a  Secretary of State directive provides the instruction to “remove loose chad  to insure that voters’ choices are accurately reflected in the count,” but  there were no specific instructions about how many corners must be  hanging to be counted.
section_title: Voter Intent
paragraphs: We estimate that nationwide about 32 percent of local election jurisdictions had no written instructions, either from the state or local jurisdiction, on how to interpret voter intent, such as stray marks on ballots or partially punched punch card boxes.
As discussed earlier, states have varying requirements for the counting of  improperly marked ballots.  Even if a state has specified how a ballot  should be marked, there are often variations from those ballot markings  that are allowed to be counted.   Beyond counting ballots with specified  variations from proper ballot markings, many states specifically require  election officials to count ballots if the “intent of the voter” can be  determined.  In our survey of state election directors, 31 states and the  District of Columbia reported that they make some determination of voter  intent.
State statutes specifically address voter intent in a number of different  contexts, including the count of all votes, absentee votes, write-in votes,  manual recounts, and others. Certain states apply either an “intent of the  voter” standard or an “impossible to determine the elector’s choice”  standard in the review of ballots.  For example, Vermont law states that “in  counting ballots, election officials shall attempt to ascertain the intent of  the voter, as expressed by his markings on the ballot.” Illinois law states  that “if the voter marks more candidates than there are persons to be  elected to an office, or if for any reason it is impossible to determine the  voter’s choice for any office to be filled, his ballot shall not be counted for  such office….”  Although many states allow for a determination of voter  intent, it is difficult to describe how this determination is being made in  each of the states, because the responsibility is often delegated to local  election officials.
section_title: Sources of Available Guidance Identified by Local Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Below the state level, we asked the local election jurisdictions in our  national mail survey if they had specific instructions on how to interpret  voter intent, such as stray marks on paper ballots, dimples, or partially  punched chads on punch card ballots. Our mail survey results indicate  about 30 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide had written state  instructions, about 15 percent had instructions developed by the  jurisdictions, and about 23 percent had both.  Optical scan jurisdictions  were the most likely to have any one of the three types of instructions and  DRE jurisdictions the least likely. Overall, we estimate that about 32  percent of jurisdictions nationwide had no written instructions and about  92 percent of DRE jurisdictions  had no written instructions.
In addition, during our visits to 27 election jurisdictions, we asked election  officials if they had a definition of what constitutes a vote. We also asked  the officials if they had written instructions on how to handle those ballots  that could not be machine counted, such as those with hanging chads.
Instructions, when they existed, were often detailed and specific to a  location. The most notable differences were in the punch card  jurisdictions.
subsections: section_title: Punch Card Ballots
paragraphs: With regard to punch card ballots, jurisdictions we visited reported various  ways to handle problem ballots.  For example, in one medium-sized  jurisdiction, election officials told us if the punch card ballot contained a  dimple with a pinhole, employees were instructed to put the original ballot  over a pink (or duplicate) ballot, hold it up to the light, and punch where  they saw light.  The employee also turned over the ballot and looked for  bumps, which indicated the voter inserted the ballot backwards.  If a ballot  contained bumps on the backside, the ballot could be duplicated properly  by election officials so that it could be read by the vote counting  equipment.
In another medium-sized jurisdiction, a vote on a punch card was defined  as any removed chad plus any chad that freely swung by one side.  The  person scanning the ballot was to inspect it for improperly punched chads  by running the ballot through his or her fingers.  In one very large  jurisdiction, the ballot inspection teams were given a pair of tweezers and  told to remove any chads remaining on the punch card. In another very  large jurisdiction election workers were to remove a chad if it was broken  on three sides and connected to the punch card by no more than two sides.
One medium jurisdiction used persons called “scanners” to go over the  ballots before they were counted. Each ballot was inspected for improperly  punched chads by running the ballot cards between the scanners fingers.  Very loose chads would be removed through this process. If the chad did  not come off and freely swings by one side, it could be removed.  Problem  ballots, such as those that were unreadable because of incompletely  removed punches or incorrect punches, which can alter the counting  results or create problems with the computer processing, were given to  “makeover scanners.”  Ballots that needed to be reviewed and possibly  remade by the make-over scanners were placed in the ballot transfer case,  either on top of the rest of the materials, or sideways in the stack of ballots,  so that they were easily recognizable.  For example, a ballot with an  improper punch, such as those made with a pen or pencil, were sent to the  “make-over scanners” to be remade.
In one medium-sized jurisdiction, all ballot cards were inspected, marked  with a precinct, and had the chad removed regardless of whether the ballot  was regular or irregular.  Careful attention was directed to finding a loose  “chad” (partially punched) and bent or torn cards.  If a “chad” was loose  (attached by two corners or less), it was considered an attempt to vote for  that choice and the “chad” was completely removed to enable the ballot  tabulator to properly count that vote. Ballot cards were inspected for bends  or tears that would prevent the ballot tabulator from counting the votes.  Those that were imperfect were placed with irregular ballots.  Each ballot  card was also checked for punch positions that were circled or crossed out  that would have indicated that the voter had changed their vote on the  ballot card.  Any ballot card with pen or pencil marks, tape, glue, or grease  was placed with the irregular ballot cards.
section_title: DRE Ballots
paragraphs: Although DRE equipment is designed to minimize voter error, problems  can also occur with this voting method as well.  However, the problems, do  not generally involve the interpretation of improperly marked ballots, but  rather with voter error in using the DRE equipment. As with the other  voting methods, the jurisdictions may deal with the problems raised in  different ways.  For example, many DREs require the voter to push a cast- vote button before leaving the booth or the vote is not recorded.  However,  some voters forget to push this button and leave the polling place. One  medium-sized jurisdiction required that an election official reach under the  voting booth curtain and push the cast-vote button without looking at the  ballot to cast the vote.  However, a large jurisdiction required that the  election official shall invalidate such ballots and reset the machine for a  new voter.  After pressing the final cast vote button on DRE equipment,  voters cannot alter their votes. Election officials told us of small children  being held by parents who kicked the final vote button, located at the lower  right of the machine, before the parent had completed their ballot. In such  cases, the voter may not be permitted to complete the ballot using some  alternative method.
section_title: Certification of the Final Vote Count
paragraphs: When the Results Are to be Certified and by Whom Varied Among the   Rather Than a Single Event, the Certification Process Can Occur in  The media may report election results on election night and declare  winners, but those returns are not official. In most states, the election  returns posted on election nights are unofficial results.  The results of an  election are not final until the results have been certified.  Different states  have different methods of certifying the final results.
subsections: section_title: Who Certifies the Vote
paragraphs: In an Election Administration Survey performed by the National  Association of State Election Directors in December 2000, respondents  from different states replied that different individuals or boards are to  certify the election returns. The responses on who is to certify  the vote  included, depending on the state, the Secretary of State, the Director of  Elections, the Governor, the State Board of Canvassers, the State Board of  Elections, or the State Board of Certifiers.  The response from  Pennsylvania cited the Secretary of the Commonwealth as the person who  is to certify the election returns.  In Tennessee, the response was that the  Secretary of State, the Governor, and the Attorney General all are to certify  the election returns.
section_title: Calendar Days Allowed for State Certification
paragraphs: When the election must be certified also varied among the states, with  some states having no state deadline for vote certification.  Some  respondents replied that the time that the state has to certify the returns  was expressed as a number of days after the election. For example, Texas  and Washington have 30 days to certify; Iowa has 27; New Mexico has 21;  Hawaii, Michigan, and Illinois have 20; North Dakota has 17; Alabama and  Idaho have 15; and Colorado has 14.  Some states have extensions and  caveats. For example, Louisiana requires certification in 12 days unless the  last day falls on a holiday or weekend. Other respondents replied that the  time to certify was expressed as a time period, including  the third Monday following the election for Arizona,  the first day of the next month for Kansas,  the fourth Monday after the election for Nebraska,  5 p.m. on the Friday following the election for Oklahoma,   the fourth Monday in November for Utah,  no later than December 1 for Wisconsin, and  the second Wednesday following the election for Wyoming.
The response from Alaska was that there was no actual statutory deadline  to certify the election results.  Maryland also reported having no specific  time in which to certify the election returns, but the statewide canvassers  convene within 35 days after the election.  Rhode Island reported that the  requirement on the time to certify the election results was simply sufficient  time for the candidates to be sworn in.
section_title: Certification Process
paragraphs: During our site visits, we also found differences in the how local election  jurisdictions certified their results. Rather than a single event, the  certification process can occur in steps, as shown in the following  examples.
At one very large jurisdiction, the Board of Elections completed the  certification process.  After all the votes had been counted and recorded,  the Board of Elections held a public hearing during which the votes for  each office were announced.  A five-day appeal period followed.  The Board  of Elections signed the official count of the votes, certified the results, and  sent the results to the state election director.  According to local election  officials, the certification was to occur within 20 days of the date of the  election by state law.  The officials said that it is difficult to meet that  deadline, given all the hand counting and recounting required.
In one large jurisdiction we visited, each of 10 counting centers had a  modem to electronically transmit the voting results to Election  Headquarters in the Department of Elections building.  Optical scan  equipment counted the absentee ballots at the Central Counting Board in a  convention center.  The Central Counting Board transmitted the absentee  voting results to elections headquarters using a dedicated phone line.  The  Board of Canvass certified the final count and submitted it to the county,  which in turn submitted it to the Board of State Canvassers, which had 20  days to certify the results.
In another large jurisdiction, the County Election Board met on election  night to certify the election to the state for state and federal candidates.   One person was assigned to read the memory packs from the optical scan  equipment for each precinct into the equipment as they were received.   When all memory packs had been read into the equipment, a precinct  report was printed.  The report was proofread against the total printout  tapes from every precinct.  When this task was completed, the certification  report was printed and proofread.  Two copies of the certification report  were printed and signed by the County Election Board secretary and  members, and the Election Board seal was affixed. The county kept one  copy, and the other was mailed to the Secretary of State on the day after the  election.  The Secretary of State certified the results after 5 p.m. on the  Friday after the election.
In one small jurisdiction, the County Board of Elections prepared a county- wide tally sheet for the results from all nine precincts. The county-wide  tally sheet numbers were transcribed to a state form, which was secured  using tabs and taken by courier to the State Board of Elections in the state  capital. The county-wide tally sheets were provided to the Chairmen of the  Republican and Democratic Parties, to the General Registrar, and a copy  was provided for the Minute Book and the County Office. The sheets are  certified by the local county Board of Elections, and the board members  signed the county-wide tally sheet.
section_title: Recounts
paragraphs: Forty-seven States and the District of Columbia Have Provisions for a   Election Officials from 42 of the 513 Responding Jurisdictions in Our  Mail Survey Said That They Had One or More Recounts for Federal or  Statewide Office Between 1996 and 2000  According to Officials in the 42 Jurisdictions, None of the Recounts  Changed the Original Outcome of the Election When the margin of victory is close, within a certain percentage or number  of votes, issues may arise about the accuracy of the vote count, and  recounts may be required and/or requested.  When this occurs, each  jurisdiction must recount the votes for the office or issue in question.  Each  jurisdiction must adhere to different guidelines to ensure an accurate and  timely recount of election results.  Depending on state law and the type of  voting method in each jurisdiction, the recount process differs.
subsections: section_title: Recount Law
paragraphs: Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have provisions for a  recount. The exceptions are Hawaii, Mississippi, and Tennessee. Illinois  only allows a discovery recount that does not change the election results.   Seventeen states have provisions that call for a mandatory recount, often  when there is a tie or the margin between the candidates is a small  percentage or number of votes, such as when the difference between the  candidates is less than a certain percent or number of votes.  For example,  the criterion for a mandatory recount in South Dakota and Alaska is a tie  vote.  The margin for a mandatory recount in Arizona is one-tenth of 1  percent, or 200 votes. In Michigan, the margin is 2,000 or fewer votes.  The  recount may be conducted before or after the certification, and the recount  may be an administrative process or to may be a judicial process or both.   The Secretary of State, a state election board, local election officials, or  court-appointed counters may conduct the recount, also depending on the  state.  To determine the recount provisions in each state, we analyzed state  statutes and surveyed state election directors and the election director for  the District of Columbia. Table 24 in appendix VII provides the conditions  for a mandatory recount, whether requested recounts are permitted, and  who is responsible for conducting the recount in each of the 50 states and  the District of Columbia.
section_title: Recount Results
paragraphs: When the margin of victory is very close, recounts can occur, and flaws in  the vote counting system may become apparent. In the November 2000  presidential election, the winner’s margin was less than one-half of 1  percent in four states—Florida, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and Iowa. From  1948 through 2000, the winning margin in 31 presidential elections in 22  states has been less than 1 percent.
In response to a question in our mail survey, election officials from 42 of  the 513 responding jurisdictions said that they had a recount for federal or  state office between 1996 and 2000. The recounts occurred in 16 states.  Because some of the recounts were for the same office and some  jurisdictions had more than one recount, the 42 jurisdictions reported  recounts for 55 offices.  For example, one county in Florida conducted a  recount both for a state office in 1998 and President in 2000.  Additional  details on these jurisdictions are provided in appendix VII in table 25.
In addition to the presidential election in Florida in November 2000,  jurisdictions reported that they had recounts for the U.S. Senate contests,  governor, state representatives, judges, state board of education,  superintendent of schools, the register of deeds, state controller, state  secretary or commissioner of labor, and state secretary or commissioner of  agriculture.
Election officials most often identified a requirement in state law as the  reason that a recount occurred, such as the margin between the candidates  being within a given percentage or number of votes.  Other reasons noted  were candidate request, secretary of state order, and court order.  Officials  in a few jurisdictions could not recall why they performed the recount.  Figure 51 shows the reasons for which officials in these 42 jurisdictions  said the recounts were conducted. The officials who reportedly authorized  the recounts are shown in figure 52, and the board or official who actually  conducted the recount is shown in figure 53.
The jurisdictions were split in their responses as to whether the recount  occurred before  or after  certification.  Of the jurisdictions, 26 responded  that the recount occurred before certification, and 19 responded that the  recount occurred after certification. Eight jurisdictions didn’t know if they  recounted the votes before or after certification, and three did not respond.
All but one recount involved recounting all precincts.  The exception  involved a recount of just absentee ballots in one jurisdiction. However,  absentee ballots were included in all of the recounts.  According to election  officials, 27 of the reported recounts involved optical scan ballots that were  recounted using vote-counting equipment.  Hand recounts were done in 8  cases, some included paper ballots or optical scan ballots.  Paper tapes  were reconciled to totals from direct recording equipment in 11 cases.   Punch cards were recounted by machine in 6 cases. One recount involved  a lever machine.
However, in the end, it did not matter who requested or ordered the  recount, the office that was at stake, who conducted the recount, the  method used for the recount, or whether it occurred before or after  certification.  According to officials in the 42 jurisdictions, none of the  recounts changed the original outcome of the election.  Additional details  on some of these recounts are provided in appendix VII.
section_title: Contested Elections
paragraphs: Contested Elections Can Occur When a Party Alleges Misconduct or  Fraud on the Part of the Candidate, the Election Officials, or the  Voters  CRS Identified Five House of Representative Elections That Were  Contested in the Period 1996 to 2000, and None Changed the Original  Outcome of the Election  Two Jurisdictions From Our Sample of 513 Election Jurisdictions  Identified Two Contested Elections for National or Statewide Office  Between 1996 and 2000, and Neither Contested Election Changed the  Original Outcome of the Election Although recounts are to be conducted when the margin of victory is close  and the accuracy of the vote count is questioned, they can also occur as a  result of an election that is contested.  Contested elections can occur when  a party alleges misconduct or fraud on the part of the candidate, the  election officials, or the voters.
subsections: section_title: Federal Contested Elections Act
paragraphs: The Constitution provides that “ach House  shall be the  Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members…”   (Art. I, sec. 5).  Within this constitutional framework, the Federal Contested  Elections Act of 1969 governs contests for the seats in the House of  Representatives.  By contrast, the Senate does not have codified provisions  for its contested election procedures.  The act essentially sets forth the  procedures by which a defeated candidate may contest a seat in the House  of Representatives.  The contest is first heard by the Committee on House  Administration, which can conduct its own investigation of the contested  election and report the results.  Then the whole House, after discussion and  debate, can dispose of the case by privileged resolution by a simple  majority vote.
Based on House precedent, certification of the election results is  important, since the official returns are evidence of the regularity and  correctness of the state election returns.  The certification process places  the burden of coming forward with evidence to challenge such  presumptions on the contestants. The contestant has the burden of  proving significant irregularity which would entitle him or her to a seat in  the House. Fraud is never presumed but must be proven by the  contestant.
section_title: House Contested Elections
paragraphs: The Congressional Research Service (CRS) identified 102 contested  elections for the House of Representatives from 1933 to 2000.  According  to CRS, the vast majority of these cases was resolved in favor of the  candidate who was originally declared the victor.  Since the Federal  Contested Elections Act of 1969 was enacted, most cases have been  dismissed because the contestant failed to sustain the burden of proof  necessary to overcome a motion to dismiss.
CRS identified five House of Representative elections that were contested  in the period 1996 to 2000.  The House of Representatives adopted the  House Committee motion to report dismissing the election contests in  three cases, and the contestants withdrew the challenges in the other two.
In three cases, the House Committee did not find for the contestant and  adopted resolutions dismissing the election contests, which were passed  by House vote.  In one case, Anderson v. Rose, H.Rep. 104-852 (1996) in the  7th District of North Carolina, the contestant presented credible allegations  that spotlighted serious and potentially criminal violations of election laws.  However, the House Committee found that they were not sufficient to  change the outcome of the election if proven true.  In another case, Haas v.  Bass, H.Rep. 104-853 (1996) in the 2nd District of New Hampshire, the  contestant claimed that the other candidate failed to file an affidavit  attesting to the fact that he was not a subversive person as defined by New  Hampshire law.  However, the House Committee found that the law the  contestant relied upon had been declared unconstitutional by the U.S.  Supreme Court and repealed by the New Hampshire legislature prior to the  election.  In the third case, Dornan v. Sanchez, H.Rep. 105-416 (1998) in the  46th District of California, the contestant alleged noncitizen voting and  voting irregularities, such as improper delivery of absentee ballots, double  voting, and phantom voting.    The Task Force on Elections found clear and  convincing evidence that 748 invalid votes were cast in the election, but it  was less than the 979-vote margin in the election.
In two cases, the contestants withdrew the challenges.  In one case,  Munster v. Gejdenson, 104th Congress (no report filed) in the 2nd District of  Connecticut, the contestant claimed vote counters made errors of  judgment.  In the second case, Brooks v. Harman, 104th Congress (no  report filed) in the 36th District of California, the contestant claimed the  812-vote margin of victory was based on illegal ballots, including votes  from nonresidents, minors, and voters illegally registered at abandoned  buildings and commercial addresses.
section_title: Other Contested Elections
paragraphs: In our survey of 513 jurisdictions, we asked them if they had a contested  election for federal or statewide office during the period 1996 to 2000.  Two  jurisdictions reported contested elections for a federal office, and neither  contest changed the outcome of the election.  None of the jurisdictions  reported a contested election for statewide office during that time period.
The first contested election was the 1996 U.S. senate contest in Louisiana,  Landrieu v. Jenkins. The jurisdiction reported that candidate Jenkins  contested the election, raising questions of voter integrity.  Allegations  included people voting twice, people voting using the names of the  deceased, people voting using the identity of others, vote buying, political  machine influences, election official conspiracy, and machine tampering  and malfunctions.  According to the jurisdiction, the contest went first to  the Louisiana state legislature, then to the U.S. Congress, which  investigated the issue.  Retired FBI agents investigated the allegations by  interviewing election officials and testing voting machines.  The  investigation was completed within 6 months.  The contest did not change  the outcome of the election.
The second contested election was the Florida presidential contest in  November 2000, Bush v. Gore. The jurisdiction reported that the narrow  margin in the contest triggered a recount, and then voter integrity was also  questioned. Both the Republican and Democratic parties and candidates  contested the election.  Allegations included voters who cast duplicate  ballots, voters who were ineligible to vote because of felonies, voters who  were not U.S. citizens, people who voted in the name of voters deceased  before the election, people who voted using the identity of others, and  people who voted but were not registered to vote.  There were also  allegations that the polls closed too early and that law enforcement officers  detained voters on their way to the polls. The contested presidential  election in Florida was ultimately resolved by the United States Supreme  Court in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The Court, in determining  whether manual recount procedures adopted by the Florida Supreme Court  were consistent with the obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate  treatment of the electorate, found a violation of the Equal Protection  Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
section_title: Challenges
paragraphs: Most jurisdictions did not report any problems in counting the vote, but  when they did, it usually involved either technical or human error that  affected the voting equipment.  The challenge for voting officials is  developing an awareness of and planning for addressing such errors.   Having multiple checks on the people involved and the processes  followed can help prevent human errors.  Although technical errors  cannot always be anticipated, an awareness of the types of errors that  have occurred in other jurisdictions and contingency planning for them  can help when they do occur.
A challenge for many jurisdictions is how to determine voter intent for  improperly marked optical scan, paper, and punch card ballots that  counting equipment could not read and count or that those who hand  counted the paper ballots could not clearly interpret.  An issue in the  recount of presidential votes in Florida in 2000 was the variation in the  interpretation of improperly marked ballots in different jurisdictions.   Our data suggest that similar issues could arise in other states.
The process for initiating and conducting recounts and contested  elections varied by jurisdiction.  Regardless of the processes used, the  challenge is the same—to complete the recount or determine the  contested election in a fair, accurate, and timely manner.
section_title: Voting Methods: Looking Back at the November 2000 Election and Forward to New Options
paragraphs: Voting methods can be thought of as tools for accommodating the millions  of voters in our nation’s more than 10,000 local election jurisdictions. These  tools are as simple as a pencil, paper, and a box, or as sophisticated as  computer-based touchscreens. However, to be fully understood, all these  methods need to be examined in relation to the people who participate in  elections (both voters and election workers) and the processes that govern  their interaction with each other and with the voting method.
This chapter focuses on the technology variable in the people, process, and  technology equation. It describes the various voting methods used in the  November 2000 election in terms of their accuracy, ease of use, efficiency,  security, testing, maintenance, and cost; provides cost estimates for  purchasing new voting equipment for local election jurisdictions; and  describes new voting equipment and methods that are currently available  or under development.
subsections: section_title: Use of Voting Methods Varied Widely by Jurisdiction
paragraphs: Each of the five voting methods was used extensively in the United States  in the November 2000 election. Punch card and optical scan equipment  were most widely used, together accounting for about 60 to 70 percent of  the total. Figure 54 shows the distribution of voting methods in the United  States by counties, precincts, and registered voters. As figure 54 shows, the  results vary according to whether they were reported by county, precinct,  or registered voter, but no matter how the data were reported, optical scan  and punch card equipment were the most common voting methods used.
Figures 55 to 59 show the distribution of various voting methods by  counties, and figures 60 to 64 show the distribution of the various voting  methods by MCDs, such as the cities, towns and townships. These  breakouts also show that the two most used methods were optical scan and  punch cards.
section_title: Integration of People, Processes, and Technology Design Leads to Variations in Voting Equipment Characteristics
paragraphs: People and Process Affect Equipment Accuracy  Ease of  Use Depends on Friendliness of Voting Equipment  Voting Equipment’s Efficiency Is Not Consistently Measured  Security of Voting Equipment Is Generally an Area of Mixed   State and Local Jurisdictions Generally Tested Voting Equipment  Type and Frequency of Equipment Maintenance Performed Varied   Equipment Costs Vary by Unit Cost, Jurisdictions’ Size, and  Voting equipment can be examined according to a range of characteristics,  including accuracy, ease of use, efficiency, security, testing, maintenance,  and cost. Because all these characteristics affect election administration,  all should be considered in any assessment of voting equipment. Further,  all these characteristics depend on the integration of three variables:  (1) the equipment itself, (2) the people who use and operate the voting  equipment, and (3) the processes and procedures that govern people’s use  of the equipment.
Accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency can all be considered performance  characteristics, and measuring these performance characteristics can help  determine whether voting equipment is operating as intended, or whether  corrective action is needed. Accuracy refers to how frequently the  equipment completely and correctly records and counts votes; ease of use  refers to how understandable and accessible the equipment is to a diverse  group of voters, and election workers; and efficiency refers to how quickly  a given vote can be cast and counted. By measuring and evaluating how  accurate, easy to use, and efficient voting equipment is, local election  jurisdictions can position themselves to better ensure that elections are  conducted effectively and efficiently.
However, jurisdictions cannot consider voting equipment’s performance in  isolation. To protect the election and retain public confidence in its  integrity, other characteristics should also be considered. Ensuring the  security of elections is essential to public confidence, and properly testing  and maintaining voting equipment is required if its optimum performance is  to be achieved. Finally, the overriding practical consideration of the  equipment’s lifecycle cost versus benefits, which affects and is affected by  all the characteristics, must be considered.
Generally, our survey of vendors showed little difference among the basic  performance characteristics of DRE, optical scan, and punch card  equipment. However, when local election jurisdictions’ experiences with  the equipment are considered, performance differences among voting  equipment become more evident. These differences arise because a real- world setting—such as an election in which equipment is operated by  actual voters, poll workers, and technicians—tends to result in  performance that differs from that in a controlled setting (such as in the  manufacturer’s laboratory). This difference demonstrates the importance  of the effect of people and process on equipment performance.
On the basis of the results of our mail survey and visits to 27 local election  jurisdictions, we found that while most jurisdictions did not collect actual  performance data for the voting equipment that they used in the November  2000 election, jurisdiction election officials were nevertheless able to  provide their perceptions about how the equipment performed. For  example, our mail survey results indicate that 96 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide were satisfied with the performance of their voting equipment  during the November 2000 election. Table 2 shows the percentage of  jurisdictions satisfied with equipment performance during the November  2000 election, by type of voting equipment.
Figure 65 shows a relative comparison of certain characteristics— accuracy, ease of use, efficiency, and security—of the various types of  voting equipment used in the November 2000 election. The comparison  reflects the results of our survey of voting system vendors and of 513 local  election jurisdictions. In our survey of jurisdictions, we grouped those that  used punch card, lever, and hand-counted paper ballots, and placed them in  an “other” category. In our vendor survey, we excluded lever equipment  because it is no longer manufactured and, of course, hand-counted paper  ballots, for which no equipment is needed.
Confidence intervals were calculated at the 95 percent confidence level. Unless otherwise  noted, all estimates from our mail survey have a confidence interval of plus or minus 4  percentage points or less.
Overall, from both the vendor and jurisdiction perspective, DREs are  generally easier to use and more efficient than the other types of  equipment. In the area of security, DRE and optical scan are relatively  equal, and in the area of accuracy, all equipment is relatively the same.
The differences among voting equipment reported by local election  jurisdictions can be attributed, in part, to the differences in the equipment  itself. However, they also can be attributed to the people who use the  equipment and the rules or processes that govern its use. For example, how  voters interact with DREs differs from how they interact with optical scan,  punch card, or lever machines. In each case, different opportunities exist  for voter misunderstanding, confusion, and error, which in turn can affect  the equipment’s performance in terms of accuracy, ease of use, and  efficiency. Further, all voting equipment is influenced by security, testing,  maintenance, and cost issues, each of which also involves people and  processes. Thus, it is extremely important to define, measure, evaluate, and  make decisions about equipment choices within the context of the total  voting system—people, processes, and technology.
We estimate that 96 percent of jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with the performance of their voting equipment during the November 2000 election. We estimate that only about 48 percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on the accuracy of their voting equipment for the election.
subsections: section_title: Accuracy of Voting Equipment Is Affected by People and Process
paragraphs: Ensuring that votes are accurately recorded and tallied is an essential  attribute of any voting equipment. Without such assurance, both voter  confidence in the election and the integrity and legitimacy of the outcome  of the election are at risk.
Our vendor survey showed virtually no differences in the expected  accuracy of DRE, optical scan, and punch card voting equipment,  measured in terms of how accurately the equipment counted recorded  votes (as opposed to how accurately the equipment captured the intent of  the voter). Vendors of all three types of voting equipment reported  accuracy rates of between 99 and 100 percent, with vendors of DREs  reporting 100-percent accuracy.
In contrast to vendors, local election jurisdictions generally did not collect  data on the accuracy of their voting equipment, measured in terms of how  accurately the equipment captures the intent of the voter.  Overall, our mail  survey results revealed that about 48 percent of jurisdictions nationwide  collected such data for the November 2000 election. Table 3 shows the  percentage of jurisdictions that collected data on accuracy by type of  voting equipment.
Further, it is unclear whether those jurisdictions that reported collecting  accuracy data actually have meaningful performance data.  Of those local  election jurisdictions that we visited that stated that their voting equipment  was 100-percent accurate, none was able to provide actual data to  substantiate these statements.
Similarly, the results of our mail survey indicates that only about 51 percent  of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on undervotes, and about 47  percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on overvotes for the  November 2000 election. Table 4 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that  collected data on undervotes and overvotes by type of equipment.
In contrast, less than half of the 27 jurisdictions that we visited indicated  that they collected data for undervotes, overvotes, or both. For those that  did, the percentage of undervotes was slightly higher for punch cards than  for DRE and optical scan. For overvotes, the percentages for both optical  scan and punch cards were relatively similar, generally less than 0.5  percent. However, election officials in one jurisdiction that used optical  scan equipment reported an overvote rate of 4.9 percent, and officials in  one jurisdiction that used punch card equipment reported an overvote rate  of 2.7 percent.
Although voting equipment may be designed to count votes as recorded  with 100-percent accuracy, how frequently the equipment counts votes as  intended by voters is a function not only of equipment design, but also of  the interaction of people and processes. These people and process factors  include whether, for example,  technicians have followed proper procedures in testing and maintaining   voters followed proper procedures when using the equipment,   election officials have provided voters with understandable procedures   poll workers properly instructed and guided voters.
To illustrate this point, officials from a very large jurisdiction stated that  1,500 voters had inserted their punch cards in the recording device upside  down, thus causing the votes to be inaccurately recorded. Fortunately,  officials stated that they detected the error and remade and counted the  ballots. Election officials further stated that they remake, on average, about  1,100 ballots for every election because voters improperly insert their  ballots into the recording device. Similarly, at a small jurisdiction that we  visited where optical scan equipment was used, officials reported that  some voters incorrectly marked the ovals or used a nonreadable pen to  mark the ballot, resulting in partially read ballots. In another medium-sized  jurisdiction that we visited, the ballot section permitting write-in votes  confused voters. Voters selected a candidate on the ballot and then wrote  the candidate’s name in the write-in section of the ballot, thus overvoting  and spoiling the ballot. The election officials stated that they believed that  this misunderstanding contributed to the jurisdictions’ almost 5 percent  overvote rate. In each of these cases, the way that the voter completed the  ballot caused the vote to be recorded inaccurately, even though the voting  equipment correctly counted the votes as recorded.
In addition, the accuracy of voting equipment can be affected by the  procedures that govern how voters interact with the technologies.  Differences in these procedures can have noticeable effects on the  prevalence of undervotes and overvotes, for example. In particular, we  found that some precinct-count optical scan voting equipment can be  programmed to return a voter’s ballot if the ballot is overvoted or  undervoted. Such programming allows the voter to make any changes  necessary to ensure that the vote is recorded correctly. However, not all  states allow this. For example, election officials in one Virginia jurisdiction  stated that Virginia jurisdictions must accept ballots as cast.
section_title: Ease of Use Depends on Friendliness of Voting Equipment
paragraphs: The extent to which voters can easily use voting equipment largely depends  on how voters interact, physically and intellectually, with the equipment.  This interaction, commonly referred to as the human/machine interface (or  in the case of voting technology, the voter/machine interface), is a function  both of the equipment design and of the processes established for its use.  For example, how well jurisdictions design ballots and educate voters on  the use of voting equipment can affect how easy voters find the equipment  to use. Ease of use (i.e., the equipment’s user friendliness) is important not  only because it influences the accessibility of the equipment to voters but  because it also affects the other two performance measures discussed  here—accuracy (i.e., whether the voter’s intent is captured) and the  efficiency of the voting process.
Our vendor survey showed that, in general, most voting equipment is  limited in its ability to accommodate persons with special physical needs or  disabilities. Most vendors, for example, reported that their equipment  accommodates voters in wheelchairs; however, vendors of DRE equipment  reported providing accommodations for more types of disability than other  vendors. For instance, many of the DREs offer accommodations for voters  who are blind, such as Braille keyboards or an audio interface. In addition,  at least one vendor reported that its DRE accommodates voters with  neurological disabilities by offering head movement switches and “sip and  puff” plug-ins. Table 5 summarizes vendor-reported accessibility options  by voting equipment type and device.
Our work on the accessibility of voting equipment to persons with  disabilities during the November 2000 election found that most voting  equipment presents some challenges to voters with disabilities. For  example, persons in wheelchairs may have difficulty reaching and  manipulating the handles on lever machines or reaching and pressing the  buttons/screens on DREs. In addition, persons with dexterity impairments  may find it difficult to hold the pencil or pen for optical scan, apply the  right amount of pressure to punch holes in punch cards, press the  buttons/screens on DREs, or manipulate the levers on lever machines.  Similarly, for all the voting methods, voters with visual impairments may  have difficulty reading the text. Consistent with our vendor survey,  however, election officials and representatives of disability organizations  told us that DREs can be most easily adapted (with audio and other aids) to  accommodate the widest range of disabilities.
We estimate that jurisdictions nationwide that used DREs were generally more satisfied than those that used optical scan or punch cards with how easy their voting equipment was for voters and election workers to use.
Differences are apparent in local election jurisdictions’ perceptions of how  easy their voting equipment was for the voters to use, with jurisdictions  using DREs being generally more satisfied with how easy their equipment  was for voters to use and to correct mistakes (see table 6).
Likewise, the results of our mail survey reveal that 83 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with how easy it was for election  workers to operate and set up the voting equipment on election day. Again,  jurisdictions that used DREs expressed a higher rate of satisfaction (see  table 7).
Figure 66 summarizes jurisdictions’ satisfaction with the various types of  voting equipment on ease of use by voters, ability to correct mistakes, and  ease of operation and setup for election workers.
Another key component of the voter/machine interface for voting  equipment is the design of the ballot, which is generally a state and/or  jurisdictional decision for each election. For example, in a medium-sized  jurisdiction that used lever machines, the list of names for president was so  long that it extended into a second column. According to jurisdiction  officials, this layout confused voters because they were not used to seeing  the ballot this way. Similarly, at a small jurisdiction that used optical scan  equipment, officials stated that they had to use both sides of the ballot,  which was confusing to voters who did not think to turn over the ballot and  vote both sides. In addition, the well-known Florida “butterfly” ballot was  confusing to many voters, because candidates’ names were printed on each  side of the hole punches, with arrows pointing to alternating candidates.  For example, the first candidate in the left column was paired with the first  hole; the first candidate in the right column with the second hole; the  second candidate in the left column with the third hole; and so on. Voters  found the arrows confusing and hard to follow. Such situations illustrate  the importance of ensuring a friendly voter/machine interface.
section_title: Voting Equipment’s Efficiency Is Not Consistently Measured
paragraphs: Efficiency is important because the speed of casting and tallying votes  influences voter waiting time, and thus potentially voter turnout. Efficiency  can also influence the number of voting machines that a jurisdiction needs  to acquire and maintain, and thus the cost. Efficiency can be measured in  terms of how quickly the equipment can count votes, the number of people  that the equipment can accommodate within a given time, and the length of  time that voters need to wait. Like the other characteristics discussed so  far, the efficiency of voting equipment (i.e., how many ballots can be cast in  a given period of time) is a function of the interaction of people, processes,  and technology.
As our vendor survey showed, efficiency metrics vary for the DRE, optical  scan, and punch card equipment because of the equipment itself. With  DREs, the vote casting and counting functions are virtually inseparable,  because the ballot is embedded in the voting equipment. In contrast, with  optical scan and punch cards, the ballot is a distinctly separate medium  (i.e., a sheet of paper or a computer card), which once completed is put  into the vote counting machine. As a result, vendors reported that the  efficiency of optical scan and punch cards is generally measured in terms  of the speed of count (i.e., how quickly the equipment counts the votes on  completed ballots). In contrast, DRE vendors reported that because DREs  count the votes as soon as the voter pushes the button to cast the vote (i.e.,  instantaneously), efficiency is measured in terms of the number of voters  that each machine accommodates on election day.
Complicating any measurements of efficiency is the fact that optical scan  and punch card equipment’s efficiency differs depending on whether  central-count or precinct-based equipment is used. Central-count  equipment generally counts more ballots per hour because it is used to  count the ballots for an entire jurisdiction, rather than an individual polling  site. For central-count optical scan equipment, vendors reported speed of  count ranges from 9,000 to 24,000 ballots per hour. For precinct-count  optical scan and punch card equipment, vendors generally did not provide  specific speed of count data, but they stated that one machine is generally  used per polling site. For DREs, vendors reported that the number of voters  accommodated per machine ranges from 200 to 1,000 voters per machine  per election day.
We estimate that during the November 2000 election, only 26 percent ( W ti of jurisdictions nationwide collected actual performance data on counting speed, and 10 percent collected data on voter wait time. We estimate that more than 80 percent were satisfied with count speed and voter wait time. ±5)
The results of our mail survey and visits to 27 local election jurisdictions  revealed that most jurisdictions did not collect actual performance data on  the efficiency of the voting equipment that they used in the November 2000  election. For example, from our mail survey, we found that only 26 percent  (± 5 percentage points) of local election jurisdictions nationwide collected  information on the speed at which their equipment counted votes, and only  10 percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected information on the average  amount of time that it took voters to vote. Despite the absence of  performance data on efficiency, officials in jurisdictions that we visited  reported some perceptions about how the respective voting equipment  performed.
Overall, our mail survey results reveal that 91 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide reported that they were satisfied with the speed at which their  equipment counted votes. Further, 84 percent of jurisdictions nationwide  reported that they were satisfied with the amount of voter wait time at the  polling place during the November 2000 election. Figure 67 summarizes  jurisdictions’ satisfaction with speed of count of voting equipment and  voter wait time, by equipment type.
section_title: Security of Voting Equipment Is Generally an Area of Mixed Attention
paragraphs: Effectively securing voting equipment depends not only on the type of  equipment but on the procedures and practices that jurisdictions  implement and the election workers who execute them. Effective security  includes, at a minimum,   assigning responsibility for security,   assessing security risks and vulnerabilities and implementing both  manual and technology-based security measures to prevent or counter  these risks, and  periodically reviewing the controls to ensure their appropriateness.
The results of our mail survey indicate that most jurisdictions nationwide  have implemented some of these important elements of security, but not  all. Figure 68 summarizes jurisdictions’ implementation of security  controls.
Assigning responsibility: Our mail survey results indicate that 89 percent of  jurisdictions assigned responsibilities to one or more individuals for  securing voting equipment for the November 2000 election. From our visits  to 27 local election jurisdictions, we learned that individuals assigned  responsibility for securing voting equipment were generally election  administrator’s staff, county warehouse staff, or county clerks before  election day, and poll workers or county clerks at the polling site on  election day.
Assessing risks and implementing controls: Similarly, our mail survey  results indicate that 87 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had  implemented security controls to protect their voting equipment during the  November 2000 election. However, only 60 percent of jurisdictions had ever  assessed security threats and risks, such as modification or loss of  electronic voting data, loss or theft of ballots, or unauthorized access to  software.
From our visits to 27 jurisdictions, we learned that the controls  implemented generally included physical controls for securing the voting  equipment and ballots. For example, officials from one large jurisdiction  stated that they provided 24-hour, 7-day-per-week security for voting  equipment in a controlled access facility that included a security  surveillance system linked to the Sheriff’s Department. In another large  jurisdiction officials reported that they stored voting equipment in a  warehouse that required a four-digit passcode to enter. In contrast,  however, officials from a small jurisdiction reported that they stored their  lever machines at the polling places all year, with no control over how the  equipment is secured.
Election officials in jurisdictions we visited also reported that they have  implemented access controls to limit the number of people who can  operate their election management system and/or their vote tabulation  equipment. For example, officials from one large and one medium-sized  jurisdiction reported that they safeguarded their election management  software by using a firewall and access controls.
In addition, the vendors we surveyed reported that voting equipment has  been developed with certain embedded security controls, although these  controls vary. In general, these controls include the following:  Identification (ID) names and passwords control access to the voting  equipment and software and permit access only to authorized users.
Redundant storage media provide backup storage of votes cast to  facilitate recovery of voter data in the event of power or equipment  failure.
Encryption technology scrambles the votes cast so that the votes are not  stored in the same order in which they were cast. If vote totals are  electronically transmitted, encryption technology is also used to  scramble the vote count before it is transmitted over telephone wires  and to unscramble it once it is received.
Audit trails provide documentary evidence to recreate election day  activity, such as the number of ballots cast (by each ballot  configuration/type) and candidate vote totals for each contest.
Hardware locks and seals protect against unauthorized access to the  voting equipment once it has been prepared for the election (e.g., vote  counter reset, equipment tested, and ballots prepared).
Table 8 shows security controls by type of voting equipment for the  systems we surveyed.
Generally, DRE and optical scan equipment offer more security controls  than punch cards. DRE and optical scan equipment are fairly comparable in  terms of the security controls that they offer; DREs generally offer more  redundant storage media, which provides backup storage of votes cast to  facilitate recovery of voter data in the event of power or equipment failure.  However, both optical scan and punch card equipment use a paper ballot,  which could be recounted in the case of equipment failure. In addition,  punch card equipment generally does not have hardware locks and seals.
Reviewing controls: The results of our survey indicate that about 81  percent of jurisdictions nationwide periodically review the steps taken to  ensure that these are sufficient. However, most jurisdictions that we visited  indicated that they did not periodically review controls.
section_title: State and Local Jurisdictions Generally Tested Voting Equipment
paragraphs: To ensure that voting equipment performs as intended on election day, it  must be tested, both before it is accepted from the manufacturer and  before it is used. Although effective testing does not guarantee proper  performance, it can greatly reduce the chances of unexpected equipment  problems and errors. Further, the people who plan and conduct the tests,  as well as the processes and procedures that govern the conduct of tests,  are central to effective testing.
Generally, voting equipment testing can be viewed as consisting of five  stages. The initial three stages—qualification, certification, and  acceptance—are typically conducted before the purchase and acceptance  of the voting equipment by the jurisdiction. After the voting equipment has  been purchased, jurisdictions typically conduct two additional stages of  testing to ensure that the voting equipment operates properly before each  election—readiness and verification testing. Each of these five stages of  testing includes similar steps: defining the equipment requirements to be  tested, planning the tests (e.g., determining what level of tests to be  performed), executing the tests, documenting the test results, and  completing the tests (e.g., ensuring that the test criteria have been met).   (Figure 69 provides a simplified model of the voting equipment testing  process.)
Qualification testing validates the compliance of the voting equipment with  the requirements of FEC’s voting system standards (applicable to punch  card, optical scan, and DRE voting equipment) and with the vendor’s  equipment design specifications for the equipment. These tests are  conducted by independent test authorities accredited by the National  Association of State Election Directors (NASED). Vendors are expected  to resubmit their voting equipment to the qualification test process  whenever they modify the equipment.
The majority of states (38) have adopted the FEC standards, which means  that the majority of states require voting equipment used in their  jurisdictions to be NASED qualified. However, because the standards  were not published until 1990 and the qualification testing program was not  established until 1994, many jurisdictions may be using voting equipment  that did not undergo qualification testing. This may be particularly true for  those jurisdictions that use punch card equipment; only one punch card  machine is on NASED’s list of qualified voting equipment. However, in our  survey of states and the voting equipment they used in the November 2000  election, we identified 19 different types of punch card equipment being  used by jurisdictions. Further, the FEC standards do not address lever  machines. In contrast, the results of our mail survey revealed that 49  percent (plus or minus 7 percentage points) of jurisdictions nationwide  that use DREs and 46 percent (plus or minus 7 percentage points) of  jurisdictions nationwide that use optical scan equipment use voting  equipment had been qualified by NASED.
We estimate that 39 percent (±4.33) of jurisdictions nationwide used voting equipment that was NASED qualified. About half of those using DRE or optical scan equipment used equipment that was NASED qualified. Also, 90  percent used equipment that had been certified by the state.
Certification testing validates compliance of the voting equipment with  state-specific requirements and can also be used to confirm that the  presented voting equipment is the same as the equipment that passed  NASED qualification testing. Certification tests are generally conducted  by the states and can be used to establish a baseline for future evaluations.
Although states establish certification test requirements, FEC recommends  that state certification tests not duplicate NASED qualification tests and  that they include sufficient functional tests and qualitative assessments to  ensure that the voting equipment operates in compliance with state law.  Further, FEC recommends that states recertify voting equipment that has  been modified to ensure that it continues to meet state requirements.  However, it is not clear that this recertification always occurs. For  example, one state election director cited repeated problems with local  jurisdictions and vendors modifying their voting equipment after state  certification. In fact, the election director stated that in some cases,  vendors modified equipment without even notifying the local jurisdiction.
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia reported that they have  certification programs to identify voting equipment that may be used in the  state. Of these 46, 38 require certification testing. Four states—Alaska,  Mississippi, North Dakota, and Utah—do not require that voting equipment  used in these states be NASED qualified and do not perform certification  testing of voting equipment. Our mail survey results show, however, that 90  percent of jurisdictions used state-certified voting equipment in the  November 2000 election. Table 9 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that  use state-certified voting equipment.
Acceptance testing checks that the voting equipment, as delivered by the  vendor, meets the requirements specified by the states and/or local  jurisdictions. State or local jurisdictions conduct acceptance tests, which  can be used to establish a baseline for future evaluations.
Many of the jurisdictions that we visited had recently procured new voting  equipment, and most of these jurisdictions had conducted some form of  acceptance testing. However, the processes and steps performed and the  people who performed them varied by jurisdiction and by equipment type.  For example, in a very large jurisdiction that had recently purchased DRE  equipment, election officials stated that testing consisted of a visual  inspection, power-up, opening of polls, activation and verification of  ballots, and closing of polls. In contrast, officials in one large jurisdiction  stated that they relied entirely on the vendor to test the equipment. In  jurisdictions that used optical scan equipment, acceptance testing  generally consisted of running decks of test cards. For example, officials  from another large jurisdiction stated that they tested each voting machine  with the assistance of the vendor using a vendor-supplied test deck.
Readiness tests, often referred to as logic and accuracy tests, check that  the voting equipment is properly functioning. Jurisdictions normally  conduct readiness tests in the weeks leading up to election day—often  while the equipment is still at the warehouse—to verify that the voting  equipment has been properly prepared for the election (e.g., that ballots  have been properly installed in voting devices).
Our mail survey results indicate that 94 percent of jurisdictions nationwide  conducted readiness (logic and accuracy) testing before the November  2000 election. Figure 70 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that  conducted readiness testing by equipment type.
Although most jurisdictions nationwide performed readiness testing, the  actual testing activities varied by the type of equipment and by jurisdiction.  For example, jurisdictions that used DREs performed readiness testing by  running diagnostic tests that the equipment is designed to perform, using  vote simulation cartridges, and by conducting mock elections; jurisdictions  that used optical scan and punch cards generally relied on the use of test  decks. In a large jurisdiction that used DREs, the election officials stated  that the county’s readiness tests included checking the battery, paper tapes,  machine labels, curtain rods, and the memory cartridge against the ballot  and the equipment; performing voting tests, such as voting for each  candidate; and testing the write-in capabilities. At the conclusion of the  tests, election officials checked the counters and the memory tapes to  ensure that the results matched the testers’ entries. In a very large  jurisdiction that used punch cards, election officials stated that they  conducted a public test on the Monday before election day with a test deck  of 55 cards that included numerous configurations for valid ballots,  overvoted ballots, and undervoted ballots. One of the most comprehensive  tests was conducted in a very large jurisdiction. This jurisdiction tested the  integration of all its voting equipment. Officials conducted a mock election  that included testing the precinct-based optical scanner, the central-count  optical scanner used for absentee ballots, DREs used for early voting, and  the election management system. For this test, they prepared each type of  equipment and had each type of equipment transmit vote totals created  using test decks to the election management system to ensure that it  prepared the results correctly.
Effectively testing voting equipment depends not only on the voting  equipment itself, but also on the procedures developed by the jurisdiction  and the people that implement them. For example, in one large county, an  election official misprogrammed software on the optical scan equipment  used to tally early and absentee votes, which affected all ballots with a  straight party vote in the November 2000 election. About a third, or 66,000,  of the ballots cast in the county were cast early or absentee. Of these, over  20,000 voters had cast a ballot with a straight party vote. According to  county officials, although the equipment detected the straight party vote, it  did not properly distribute the vote to each of the party candidates. That is,  if a voter checked a straight party vote for Democrat, the optical scan  equipment detected the vote but did not properly add a vote for the  Democratic candidates on the ballot. Although county officials agreed that  this problem should have been detected during readiness testing, they  stated that the confirmation of the results of the test deck had been  incomplete. According to county officials, test personnel verified only that  the system accurately detected the straight party vote and did not verify  whether the tallies resulting from the test deck were correct. Further, the  county had no written procedures to ensure that the software was properly  tested. Fortunately, county officials detected the software problem during  the vote tallying process. However, if the problem had gone undetected,  over 20,000 properly cast votes would not have appeared in the official vote  totals.
We estimate that 94 percent of jurisdictions nationwide conducted readiness testing before the November 2000 election, and 95 percent of jurisdictions nationwide conducted verification testing before the election.
subsections: section_title: Verification Testing
paragraphs: The purpose of verification testing is to verify that the voting equipment is  operating properly before the election. This testing is typically conducted  by poll workers or election officials at the poll site on election day unless a  central-count configuration is used.
Our mail survey results show that 95 percent of jurisdictions nationwide  conducted verification testing before the November 2000 election. Figure  71 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that conducted verification testing  by type of voting equipment.
Verification tests generally vary by type of technology. For jurisdictions  that use optical scan and DREs, verification testing generally includes  generating a zero tape that verifies that the equipment is ready to start  processing ballots. Zero tapes typically identify the specific election, the  equipment’s unit identification, the ballot’s format identification, and the  contents of each active candidate register by office (showing that they  contain all zeros). In addition to running the zero tapes, jurisdiction  officials indicated that they also check the security seals on the machines  to ensure that they have not been tampered with, compare the ballot on the  machine with the sample ballot for the polling place, and check the  protective counter number on the voting machine before voting begins.   Figure 72 shows a zero tape.
Jurisdictions that use punch cards also need to test the vote recording  device. For example, in a medium-sized jurisdiction, election officials  stated that before opening the polls, the poll workers inspected each ballot  page in the ballot book and compared each to the specimen ballot for the  precinct. Further, these officials and officials in another medium-sized  jurisdiction stated that poll workers checked that the punch positions for  each vote recording device worked properly.
Similarly, for those jurisdictions that we visited that use lever machines,  verification testing includes making sure the public counters are set to zero  and checking the security seals, the protective counters on the machines,  the paper rolls, and the ballot labels to ensure that the names of the parties,  office titles, candidate names, and ballot proposals match the sample ballot  displayed at the polling place.
section_title: Jurisdictions Varied in Type and Frequency of Voting Equipment Maintenance Performed
paragraphs: As with security and testing, proper maintenance is important to ensure  that voting equipment performs as intended and problems are prevented.  According to voting equipment vendors, routine maintenance for most  voting equipment generally includes inspecting the voting equipment for  damage; testing and recharging batteries, if applicable; and cleaning the  equipment before the election. Not effectively maintaining voting  equipment could contribute to equipment failures or malfunctions, which  in turn could cause voters to wait longer and could cause vote and tally  errors.
Our mail survey results indicate that about 80 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide performed routine or manufacturer-suggested maintenance on  their voting equipment before the November 2000 election. For those  jurisdictions that we visited, the maintenance activities performed were  generally consistent with those recommended by the vendors for their  respective voting equipment, such as inspecting and cleaning the machines,  testing and recharging batteries, and replacing malfunctioning parts.  However, despite performing regular maintenance, jurisdiction officials  stated that they had experienced equipment failures during the November  2000 election. In most cases, officials characterized these failures as not  significant because they were resolved on-site through repairs or  replacements.
The specific maintenance procedures that jurisdictions performed varied  because of differences in the physical characteristics of the equipment.   Table 10 shows examples of maintenance procedures, by equipment type.
Our mail survey shows that a significantly higher percentage of  jurisdictions nationwide using DRE and optical scan equipment had  performed maintenance than had jurisdictions using lever and punch card  equipment. Figure 73 presents summary information on jurisdictions that  conducted maintenance, by equipment type.
Our visits to 27 local election jurisdictions also revealed variations in the  frequency with which jurisdictions perform routine maintenance. For  example, some jurisdictions perform maintenance before an election, while  others perform maintenance regularly throughout the year. For example,  officials in a medium-sized jurisdiction that uses DREs, stated that they test  the batteries monthly. Likewise, officials from a very large jurisdiction  reported that its warehouse staff worked year-round to repair Votomatic  units and booths.
Our site visits also showed that local jurisdictions have experienced few  problems with equipment maintenance. Only one large jurisdiction  reported that it had experienced problems with obtaining replacement  parts for its optical scan equipment.
section_title: Equipment Costs Vary Because of Differences in Unit Costs and Jurisdictions’ Size and Equipment Configuration
paragraphs: The cost to acquire, operate, and maintain voting equipment over its useful  life varies, not only on a unit cost basis but also on a total jurisdiction basis,  depending on such decisions as whether ballots will be counted at poll sites  or centrally, who will perform maintenance, and how frequently  maintenance will be performed.
Our vendor survey showed that voting equipment costs vary among types  of voting equipment and among different manufacturers and models of the  same type of equipment. For example, DRE touchscreen unit costs ranged  from $575 to $4,500. Similarly, unit costs for precinct-count optical scan  equipment ranged from $4,500 to $7,500. Among other things, these  differences can be attributed to differences in what is included in the unit  cost as well as differences in the characteristics of the equipment. Table 11  shows equipment costs by unit, software, and peripheral components.
In addition to the equipment unit cost, an additional cost for jurisdictions is  the software that operates the equipment, prepares the ballots, and tallies  the votes (and in some cases, prepares the election results reports). Our  vendor survey showed that although some vendors include the software  cost in the unit cost of the voting equipment, most price the software  separately. Software costs for DRE, optical scan, and punch card  equipment can run as high as $300,000 per jurisdication. The higher costs  are generally for the more sophisticated software associated with election  management systems. Because the software generally supports numerous  equipment units, the software unit cost varies depending on the number of  units purchased or the size of the jurisdiction. Other factors affecting the  acquisition cost of voting equipment are the number and types of  peripherals required. In general, DREs require more peripherals than do  optical scan and punch cards. For example, some DREs require smart  cards, smart card readers, memory cartridges and cartridge readers,  administrative workstations, and plug-in devices (for increasing  accessibility for voters with disabilities). Touchscreen DREs may also offer  options that affect the cost of the equipment, such as color versus black  and white screens. In addition, most DREs and all optical scan and punch  cards require voting booths, and most DREs and some precinct-based  optical scan and punch card tabulators offer options for modems. Precinct- based optical scan and punch card tabulators also require ballot boxes to  capture the ballots after they are scanned.
Once jurisdictions acquire the voting equipment, they must also incur the  cost to operate and maintain it. Our visits to 27 local election jurisdictions  indicated that annual operation and maintenance costs, like acquisition  costs, vary by the type and configuration of the voting equipment and by  the size of the jurisdiction. For example, jurisdictions that used DREs  reported a range of costs from about $2,000 to $27,000. Similarly, most  jurisdictions that used optical scan equipment reported that operations and  maintenance costs ranged from about $1,300 to $90,000. Most punch card  jurisdictions reported that operations and maintenance costs ranged from  $10,000 to over $138,000. The higher ends of these cost ranges generally  related to the larger jurisdictions. In fact, one large jurisdiction that used  optical scan equipment reported that its operating costs were $545,000, and  one very large jurisdiction that used punch cards reported operations and  maintenance costs of over $600,000. In addition, the jurisdictions reported  that these costs generally included software licensing and upgrades,  maintenance contracts with vendors, equipment replacement parts, and  supply costs. Figure 74 shows the ranges of operations and maintenance  costs, by type of voting equipment.
For decisions on whether to invest in new voting equipment, both initial  capital costs (i.e., cost to acquire the equipment) and long-term support  costs (i.e., operation and maintenance costs) are relevant. Moreover, these  collective costs (i.e., lifecycle costs) need to be viewed in the context of the  benefits the equipment will provide over its useful life. These benefits  should be directly linked to the performance characteristics of the  equipment and the needs of the jurisdiction.
section_title: Estimated Costs of Purchasing New Voting Equipment for Local Election Jurisdictions in the United States
paragraphs: Estimated Costs of Buying Central-Count Optical Scan Voting   Estimated Costs of Buying Precinct-Based Optical Scan Voting   Estimated Costs of Buying Touchscreen DRE Voting Equipment Election jurisdictions used five basic types of voting methods in the  November 2000 election—hand-counted paper ballots and lever machines,  punch card, optical scan, and DRE voting equipment. In some cases, the  same method was used for all votes cast—mail absentee, in-person  absentee, early, normal election day, and provisional election day. Others  used different methods for different types of votes. For example, any  jurisdiction that used lever or DRE equipment normally used some  different method of counting mail absentee ballots, because neither  method uses individual paper ballots that could be mailed to absentee  voters.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, any of these voting methods can  produce accurate, reliable vote counts if the people, processes, and  technology required to accomplish this task are appropriately integrated.  However, in considering new voting equipment, most jurisdictions have  focused on two types of equipment—optical scan and DRE. Optical scan  equipment can be used for counting ballots at a central location or a  counter can be located at each precinct where voters cast their votes. A  central-count configuration is generally less expensive, particularly in  larger jurisdictions, because fewer pieces of equipment are needed.  However, with a central-count configuration, voters cannot be notified of  any mistakes they made in filling out their ballots and offered an  opportunity to correct them. Optical scan counters located at voting  precincts can be programmed to notify voters if they have voted for more  candidates for an office than permitted (overvotes) or have not voted for a  specific office (undervotes). Such voters can then be offered an  opportunity to correct their ballot, if they wish. For example, the voter may  wish to correct any overvotes but deliberately chose not to vote for any  candidates for a specific office. Properly programmed, DRE voting  equipment does not permit the voter to overvote and can also notify the  voter of any undervotes.
Jurisdictions may have different requirements for evaluating the purchase  of new voting equipment. For example, large jurisdictions with long ballots  with multiple offices and initiatives that must be printed in multiple  languages will have requirements different from the requirements in small  jurisdictions with short ballots printed only in English. Some equipment  has more features to accommodate those with disabilities than others. For  example, with most types of voting equipment, ballots with larger print or  magnifying glasses can be offered to voters with impaired sight. Currently,  however, only certain models of touchscreen DRE equipment can be  configured to accommodate most persons with disabilities, such as  persons who are blind, deaf, paraplegic, or quadriplegic.
We developed cost estimates for three approaches to replacing existing  voting equipment—central-count optical scan equipment; precinct-count  optical scan equipment; and touchscreen DRE equipment that could  accommodate persons with disabilities, except those who are quadriplegic.  The cost estimate for each approach used a set of assumptions that may  overestimate the needs and costs for some jurisdictions and underestimate  the needs and costs for other jurisdictions. These assumptions and  limitations are discussed in more detail in the text that accompanies each  estimate. Our estimated purchase costs range from about $191 million for  central-count optical scan equipment to about $3 billion for touchscreen  DRE units, where at least one of which in every precinct was a unit  equipped to enable most voters with disabilities to cast their votes on DRE  units in secrecy.
Our estimates used vendor cost data provided in August 2001, and these  costs are subject to change. With the exception of central-count optical  scan units for jurisdictions with fewer than 25,000 registered voters, these  cost estimates did not include software or other necessary support items.  Our estimates generally included only the cost to purchase the equipment  and do not contain software costs associated with the equipment to  support a specific election and to perform related election management  functions, which generally varied by the size of the jurisdiction that  purchased the equipment. Also, our estimates did not include operations  and maintenance costs, because reliable data were not available from the  jurisdictions. The cost of software and other items could substantially  increase the actual cost to purchase new voting equipment. Actual costs for  any specific jurisdiction would depend upon the number of units  purchased, any quantity discounts that could be obtained, the number of  reserve units purchased, and the cost of software and other necessary  ancillary items.
subsections: section_title: Estimated Costs of Buying Central-Count Optical Scan Equipment
paragraphs: In a central-count optical scan system, ballots are transported from the  precincts to a central location for counting. Our estimates used vendor cost  data provided in August 2001. Actual cost per unit may be more or less than  those used in our estimates. Vendors provided data on three central-count  optical scan units. The least expensive unit costs $20,000, including a  personal computer, card reader, and software. The vendor recommends 1  unit for each 25,000 registered voters. This is the unit we used in our cost  estimates for election jurisdictions with 25,000 or fewer registered voters.  We had data on two high-speed central-count units that we used for  jurisdictions with more than 25,000 registered voters. The $24,000 unit had  a counting capacity of 9,000 ballots per hour and the $55,000 unit had a  capacity of 24,000 ballots per hour. Prices did not include software costs,  which varied by the number of registered voters in the jurisdiction, and  ranged from $15,000 to $300,000 per jurisdiction. For jurisdictions with  more than 25,000 registered voters, we estimated costs assuming that each  jurisdiction would have one $55,000 unit and one $24,000 unit. None of our  estimates included such associated costs as the cost of purchasing  individual “privacy booths” for voters to mark their ballots or the cost of  ballots and other supplies. In addition, our estimates for central-count  systems did not include separate units for subcounty minor civil divisions  that have responsibility for conducting elections in some states. The  number of registered voters in these subcounty election jurisdictions— more than 7,500—varied widely. Some had fewer than 100 registered  voters; others have 40,000 or more. The cost estimate shown in table 12  would be considerably higher if we assumed that each election jurisdiction  within a county purchased central counters.
Given the assumptions we used, we estimated that it would cost about $191  million to purchase 2 central-count optical scan units for 3,126 counties  election jurisdictions in the United States, plus 1 reserve unit for each  jurisdiction with more than 25,000 registered voters. We developed  separate cost estimates for replacing each type of voting method used in  the November 2000 general election.
Of the 3,126 counties, 2,072, or about two-thirds, had 25,000 or fewer  registered voters. We estimated it would cost just about $83 million to  purchase two $20,000 units—one for election day and one for absentee  ballots—for each of these jurisdictions. Each unit would include a personal  computer, card reader, and software. Because each individual unit should  accommodate the entire vote counting needs of these jurisdictions, we did  not include an estimate for reserve units for these smaller jurisdictions. We  assumed that the second machine could function as the reserve for these  election jurisdictions.
For the 1,054 election jurisdictions with more than 25,000 registered voters,  we estimated that it would cost about $109 million to buy 2 central-count  optical scan machines for election jurisdictions plus 1 reserve unit per  jurisdiction. The election day unit would cost $55,000 and have a counting  capacity of 24,000 ballots per hour. The absentee ballot and reserve units  would cost $24,000 each and have a counting capacity of 9,000 ballots per  hour. The cost per unit does not include software or other associated costs.  It is important to remember that within each of the categories we used— small and large—there is wide variation in the numbers of registered  voters. Some of the small jurisdictions had fewer than 3,000 registered  voters. Some of the large jurisdictions had more than 500,000. The largest  election jurisdiction in the nation had more than 4 million registered voters.  Thus, our assumptions would not necessarily match the needs of individual  jurisdictions. For example, the capacity of the 2 central-count units used in  the estimate for small jurisdictions would exceed the needs of jurisdictions  with fewer than 5,000 registered voters. Similarly, the capacity of the 2  central-count units used in the estimate for large election jurisdictions  would probably exceed the needs of jurisdictions with 100,000 registered  voters. However, for the largest jurisdictions, these same two central-count  units would probably have insufficient capacity to count votes in 1 or 2  days. We have assumed that each election jurisdiction with more than  25,000 voters would have one of the $24,000 units in reserve, should either  of the other 2 units break down. The estimate in table 12 included the 36  election jurisdictions in Oregon. We assumed that Oregon would use a  central-count system because Oregon used mail ballots for all ballots cast  in the November 2000 general election.
section_title: Estimated Costs of Buying Precinct-Based Optical Scan Equipment
paragraphs: Purchasing optical scan equipment that is placed in each voting precinct is  more expensive than purchasing central-count optical scan equipment  because each election jurisdiction usually has multiple precincts. We  estimated that it would cost about $1.3 billion to purchase an optical scan  unit for each of 185,622 precincts in the country, excluding Oregon.  Although the cost per unit is much less, the number of units is much higher.  According to vendor-provided data, optical scan units for precincts range  from $4,500 to $7,500 each. None of the prices included software. For our  estimate, we assumed that each precinct would have a $6,500 optical scan  unit—neither the least nor most expensive available. Each unit could be  programmed to alert voters to errors (overvotes and undervotes) on their  ballots. Each unit would also record and total the votes cast for each  candidate and each issue on the ballot at the precinct at which it was  placed. With this option, we also assumed that each election jurisdiction  would have a central-count optical scan unit for counting absentee ballots  within the jurisdiction. Placing a central-count optical scan unit within  each subcounty election jurisdiction—more than 7,500—would increase  the cost estimates shown in table 13. The unit costs used for the estimates  do not include software, which ranges from $15,000 to $300,000 per  jurisdiction, depending upon the number of registered voters in the  jurisdiction. The estimated costs also do not include training, supplies  (such as ballots), or other costs associated with operating and maintaining  the units. Finally, although we could determine the types of voting methods  used within 36 election jurisdictions that used mixed methods, we could  not make this determination at the precinct level for 3,472 precincts in  these jurisdictions. Therefore, the cost estimates for any specific type of  voting method, such as punch cards, may not include all precincts that used  that method.
Actual costs would depend upon the number of units purchased, any  quantity discounts that could be obtained, the number of reserve units  purchased, and the cost of software and other necessary ancillary items.
section_title: Estimated Costs of Buying Touchscreen DRE Equipment
paragraphs: DRE equipment is available in two basic types. With full-face DRE  equipment, the entire ballot is placed on the machine, with buttons beside  each candidate or issue choice on the ballot. However, it may be difficult to  design an easily readable ballot for a full-face DRE machine that includes  many candidates and issues or that must be printed in multiple languages.  The second type of DRE machine is the touchscreen, analogous to a bank  ATM machine. DRE machines range in price from $2,000 to $6,000  depending upon the features offered. These prices did not include costs  that can substantially increase per unit cost, such as for software and in  some cases such essential equipment as card readers and smart cards for  each machine. Our estimate used a touchscreen machine that cost $3,995  for each unit equipped for the disabled and $3,795 for each unit not so  equipped. The equipped unit for the disabled can accommodate all disabled  voters except those who are quadriplegic. The unit cost includes the vote  count cartridge but does not include software, which ranges from $15,000  to $300,000 per jurisdiction, depending upon the number of registered  voters in the jurisdiction.
One reason that touchscreen DRE equipment is generally more costly than  precinct optical scan equipment is that more units are required. Voters do  not vote on precinct optical scan units—they mark their ballots at the  voting place and then feed their individual ballots into the precinct counter  to be read and counted. However, as with lever equipment, voters actually  cast their ballots on DRE units. Thus, the cost of purchasing DRE  equipment is affected by the number of voters who use each DRE unit  during the course of an election day. Some states have statutory standards  for the maximum number of voters per voting machine. We used two  assumptions—1 unit for each 250 registered voters per precinct and 1 unit  for each 500 registered voters per precinct. We also assumed that there  would be at least 1 unit equipped for the disabled at every precinct—or a  minimum of 185,622 units. Because there were no data available on the  number of registered voters in each precinct in Alaska, North Dakota, and  Wisconsin, our estimate provides a single disabled equipped unit for each  precinct in those states. Consequently, our estimates may understate the  total number of touchscreen units needed.
Using 250 voters per DRE unit, we estimated that 763,196 DRE units would  be required to replace all voting equipment in the United States (see table  14). This includes more than 24,000 reserve units, assuming reserves were  3 percent of the estimated average number of units needed in each election  jurisdiction. The estimated total cost of purchasing these units is $3 billion,  including one $20,000 central-count optical scan unit for each of the 2,072  election jurisdictions that had 25,000 or fewer registered voters and one  $24,000 central-count optical scan unit for each of the 1,054 election  jurisdictions that had more than 25,000 registered voters (excluding  Oregon). The central-count units were for counting absentee ballots in  each election jurisdiction. As shown in table 15, purchasing 1 unit for each  500 registered voters per precinct reduces the estimated number of  touchscreen units needed, including reserves, to 388,198 and the cost to  around $1.6 billion, including the central optical scan counters for each  jurisdiction. Again, software is a substantial additional cost, approximately  $46 million ($15,000 per jurisdiction) to $927 million ($300,000 per  jurisdiction). Purchasing software separately for each of the more than  7,500 subcounty election jurisdictions—cities, townships, villages—would  cost more. For example, if the average software cost for each of 7,500  jurisdictions were $20,000, the additional cost would be $150 million.  Actual costs for any specific jurisdiction would depend upon the number of  units purchased, any quantity discounts that could be obtained, the number  of reserve units purchased, and the cost of software and other necessary  ancillary items. Notes for tables 14 and 15 are found at the end of table 15.
section_title: New Models of Voting Equipment Are Available and a New Method Is Being Proposed
paragraphs: New DRES Are Similar to Existing DREs, With Added Features to   New Optical Scan Equipment Is Very Similar to Those Currently   Feasibility of Telephone-Based Voting is Being Proposed Explored On the basis of vendors surveyed, we identified five new models of voting  equipment—four DRE touchscreens and one optical scan. We also  identified two proposals for a new method of voting—telephone-based  voting. None of these were used in the November 2000 election.
subsections: section_title: New DRE Models Are Generally Similar to Current Models, With Added Features to Improve Usability and Security
paragraphs: Four new DRE models are available that build on the advanced features  already present in the most recent of the DREs used in the November 2000  election and offer several new options. In general, these new options are  intended to improve the DREs’ ease of use and security characteristics.  Other characteristics, such as accuracy, efficiency, and cost, are generally  not affected. The new options include the following:  A “no-vote” option helps avoid unintentional undervotes (offered by  three of the four new DREs). These DREs’ touchscreens provide the  voter with the option to select “no vote (or abstain)” on the display  screen if the voter does not want to vote on a particular contest or issue.  A recover spoiled ballots option allows voters to recast their votes after  their original ballots are cast. In this scenario, every DRE at the poll site  is connected to a local area network. A poll official would void the  original “spoiled” ballot through the administrative workstation that is  also connected to the local area network. The voter could then cast  another ballot.
Voice recognition capability allows voters to make selections orally.  Printed receipts for each vote option provides a paper printout or ballot  each time a vote is cast. Vendors claim that this feature provides voters  and/or election officials an opportunity to check what is printed against  what is recorded and displayed. It is envisioned that procedures would  be in place to retrieve the paper receipts from the voters so that they  could not be used for vote selling. One of the new DREs also has an  infrared “presence sensor” that is used to control the receipt printer in  the event the voter is allowed to keep the paper receipt; if the voter  leaves without taking the receipt, the receipt is pulled back into the  printer.
section_title: Characteristics of New Optical Scan Model Are Similar to Those Currently Available
paragraphs: Our survey also identified one vendor that proposed a new model of its  existing precinct-based optical scanner. According to the vendor, the  primary advantage of this new model is that it is lighter and quieter than the  previous model, and it has expanded memory capabilities. However, this  model’s accuracy, ease of use, efficiency, and security characteristics do  not generally differ from those of comparable existing optical scan devices.  The new model is slightly more expensive than the existing model.
section_title: Feasibility of Telephone- Based Voting Is Being Explored
paragraphs: Our survey identified two vendors that are exploring the feasibility of a new  method of voting in which voters would record their votes using a touch- tone telephone; the votes would be transmitted in real time over public  telephone lines and recorded electronically at a central location. According  to one of the vendors, this method of voting could be based at poll sites  and/or remote locations. In either case, the voter interacts with the  telephone in essentially the same way. As with the new DREs, telephone- based voting is generally concerned with improving a voter’s ease of using  the equipment. A general description follows of the vendors’ respective  approaches to implementing this method of voting.
Vendor A (poll-site or remote voting): Once a voter was authenticated (the  vendor did not say how this would be done, although for poll-site voting it  could be done by traditional means), he or she would be provided with an  ID and a list of the candidates or issues, each with corresponding unique  code numbers. For poll-site voting, the poll-site worker would hand these  code numbers to the voter and provide necessary instructions; for remote  voting, the codes would be mailed before election day to the voter. The  voter would use the touch-tone telephone feature to key in the ID number  to gain access and then enter the code numbers for each selection. After  each selection, a recorded message would be sent to the voter to confirm  the selection. The voter could make any necessary changes and would have  access to live assistance if necessary. For poll-site voting, the vote would be  recorded on a PC at the polling site, which would send the information to  an election data center over the telephone once the polls closed. For  remote voting, the vote would be sent directly to the data center. According  to the vendor, the system would provide multiple languages and interactive  voice recognition technology to accommodate persons with disabilities.
Vendor B (poll-site voting for persons with disabilities): Once the voter was  authenticated (again the vendor did not specify how, although traditional  approaches could be used), the person would be provided with an ID and  directed to a poll worker, who would dial up the system and input the ID.  Once the ID number was input, a recording would ask, “Is your candidate  ready to vote?” At this point, the poll worker would hand the phone (which  could include a headphone set) with button panel to the voter. The voter  would then be prompted to request a language of preference and would be  directed through the voting sequence. The voter could vote by using the  touch-tone keys on the telephone or by speaking responses. After the voter  selected a candidate or issue, the system would provide feedback to  confirm the selection. The telephone also would read a summary of the  results and allow the voter to revise any previous selections. Once the voter  finished, the system would hang up, and the ballot would be recorded on a  central system.
section_title: Challenges
paragraphs: The challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using voting technologies  are not unlike those faced by any technology user. As discussed throughout  this section, these challenges include the following:  Having reliable measures and objective data to know whether the  technology being used is meeting the needs of the jurisdiction’s user  communities (both the voters and the officials who administer the  elections). Looking back to the technology used in the November 2000  election, our survey of jurisdictions showed that the vast majority of  jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their respective  technologies. However, this satisfaction was mostly based not on hard  data measuring performance, but rather on the subjective impressions  of election officials. Although these impressions should not be  discounted, informed decisionmaking on voting technology investment  requires more objective data.
Ensuring that necessary security, testing, and maintenance activities are  performed. Our survey of jurisdictions showed that the vast majority of  jurisdictions perform these activities in one form or another, although  the extent and nature of these activities vary among jurisdictions and  depend on the availability of resources (financial and human capital)  that are committed to them.
Ensuring that the technology will provide benefits over its useful life  commensurate with lifecycle costs (acquisition as well as operations  and maintenance) and that these collective costs are affordable and  sustainable. Our survey of jurisdictions and discussions with  jurisdiction officials showed that the technology type and configuration  that jurisdictions are employing vary depending on their unique  circumstances, such as size and resource constraints, and that reliable  data on lifecycle costs and benefits are not available.
Ensuring that the three elements of people, process, and technology are  managed as interrelated and interdependent parts of the total voting  system. We must recognize that how well technology performs is not  only a function of the technology design itself, but also of the people  who interact with the technology and the processes governing this  interaction.
section_title: Broad Application of Internet Voting Faces Formidable Technical and Social Challenges
paragraphs: The growing use of the Internet for everyday transactions, including  citizen-to-government transactions, has prompted considerable  speculation about applying Internet technology to elections. Such  speculation was recently fueled by the vote counting difficulties of the  November 2000 election, which sparked widespread interest in the reform  of elections (particularly the technology used to record and count votes).  However, well before the November 2000 election, some groups had  already begun considering the pros and cons of Internet voting.
In addition to the growing popularity of the Internet, interest in Internet  voting was spurred by claims that it would increase the convenience of  voting (particularly for those with limited mobility) and add speed and  precision to vote counts. Further, it has been claimed by Internet voting  proponents that the convenience of Internet voting could increase voter  turnout. As a result, academics, voting jurisdiction officials, state election  officers, and others have been examining Internet voting for some time.  Although opinion is not unanimous, consensus is emerging on some major  points:   Security is the primary technical challenge for Internet voting, and  addressing this challenge adequately is vital for public confidence.
Internet voting as an additional method of voting at designated poll sites  may be technically feasible in the near term, but the benefits of this  approach are limited to advancing the maturity of the technology and  familiarizing voters with the technology.
The value of Internet voting is uncertain because reliable cost data are  not available and its benefits are in dispute.
Voter participation and the “digital divide” are important issues, but  controversy reigns over their implications.
subsections: section_title: As the Internet Has Evolved, Its Uses and Challenges Have Expanded
paragraphs: The Internet originated in the late 1960s through government-funded  projects to demonstrate and perform “remote-access data processing,”  which enabled researchers to use off-site computers and computer  networks as if they were accessible locally. Although these networks were  initially intended to support government and academic research, when  their public and commercial value was realized, they were transformed into  the medium known today as the Internet. Over time, these networks were  privatized, and additional networks were constructed; the spread of  networks along with advances in computing technology fostered the  Internet’s growth. The development of the World Wide Web and “browser”  software and advancements in the processing capability of personal  computers greatly facilitated public use of the Internet. In the early 1990s, a  major surge occurred in Internet use that continues unabated today.  According to the Department of Commerce, the number of Internet users in  the United States rose to about 117 million in the year 2000. (The  population of the United States is over 281 million.)
Promoting the easy sharing of information was a prime motivation for the  Internet. To this end, systems and software followed open rather than  proprietary standards, and software tools were put into the public domain,  so that anyone could copy, modify, and improve them. This approach is a  source of both strength and weakness. Openness and flexibility  contributed to the rapid evolution and spread of Internet information and  technology. But this openness and flexibility, and the vast web of  interconnections that resulted, are also the source of widespread and  growing security problems. This interconnectivity has also led to growing  concerns about individual privacy. Information that may previously have  been publicly available in principle has become easily available in practice  to almost anyone, and even private information can be accessed if security  protections break down. Another growing concern is that the availability of  Internet technology is producing a “digital divide”: two classes of people  separated by their ability to access the Internet and all that it offers. In  investigating this question, both we and the Department of Commerce  found greater home usage of the Internet by more highly educated and  wealthier individuals.
For Internet-based voting, the generic Internet issues—security, privacy,  and accessibility—are entwined with issues relating to the unique nature of  voting (such as ballot secrecy). Another important issue is the practical  consideration of the costs of Internet voting versus its benefits.
section_title: Internet Voting Can Be Categorized Into Three Types
paragraphs: Poll-site Internet Voting  Kiosk Voting  Remote Internet Voting When Internet voting is discussed, the popular image is of citizens voting  on-line from any computer anywhere in the world. However, other possible  scenarios have been suggested for applying Internet technology to  elections. Such groups as the Internet Policy Institute and the California  Internet Voting Task Force have pointed out that various approaches to  Internet voting are possible, ranging from the use of Internet connections  at traditional polling stations to the ability to vote remotely from anywhere.  An intermediate step along this range is an option referred to as “kiosk  voting,” in which voters would use conveniently located voting terminals  provided and controlled by election officials.
Some voting experts see the three types of Internet voting as evolutionary,  because the issues become more complex and difficult as elections move  from poll sites—where limited numbers of voting devices are physically  controlled by election officials—to sites where voting devices are not  under such direct control, and the number of devices is much greater (see  figure 75).
subsections: section_title: Poll-Site Internet Voting
paragraphs: In poll-site Internet voting, Internet-connected computers either replace or  reside alongside conventional dedicated poll-site equipment. In its most  limited configuration, in which voters vote only at their traditional assigned  polling places, poll-site Internet voting is little more than another type of  voting equipment. An expanded configuration would permit voters to vote  at any polling place within their jurisdiction, thus expanding their voting  options—as well as increasing the complexity of the system required to  support these options.
In poll-site Internet voting at assigned polling places, poll workers would  authenticate voters as they traditionally do; that is, they would follow the  local procedures for ensuring that the voter was who he or she claimed to  be and that the voter was registered in that precinct. However, if a voter  wished to use an Internet device to vote, a poll worker would also assign  the voter a computer-recognizable means of identification—a password or  personal identification number (PIN), for example. At the Internet voting  device, the voter would identify himself or herself to the system using the  identification assigned; the voter would then be presented with an  electronic ballot on which to vote. When the voter submitted the ballot  electronically, it would be encrypted and sent via the Internet to the  jurisdiction’s central data center, where the vote would be decrypted, the  voter ID separated from the vote, and the vote and voter ID stored  separately. Through software checks, the system would check the validity  of the ballot and ensure that it had not been altered in transit. The system  would also send an acknowledgment to the voter that the vote was  received. However, the acknowledgment would not indicate how the voter  voted, because the system would have separated that information from the  voter’s identity to preserve the secrecy of the ballot.
An extended version of poll-site Internet voting would allow voters to vote  at other poll sites within a jurisdiction, rather than limiting them to their  traditional assigned sites. These poll sites could be either within the same  precinct or beyond the precinct within the voting jurisdiction. In any case,  poll workers would have to be able to authenticate voters from a larger  population than they do now that is, the voters in the entire precinct or  voting jurisdiction, rather than simply those assigned to an individual poll  site. Further, the election officials would have to present voters with the  appropriate ballot style for which they were eligible to vote (corresponding  to their local precinct). Figure 76 summarizes the process for poll-site  voting.
Of the various types of Internet voting, poll-site Internet voting requires the  least change to current election processes. For example, traditional means  can be employed for poll watching and physical security. For voting at  assigned poll sites, voter authentication could also be done traditionally.  However, if jurisdictions offer more options for polling places, the voter  authentication system becomes more complex.
Poll-site Internet voting in general does not offer advantages over  traditional voting technology. The California Internet Task Force described  poll-site Internet voting as primarily useful for testing technology that  would allow voters to cast ballots from sites other than their assigned  polling places.
In the November 2000 federal election, poll-site Internet voting was tested  in nonbinding pilot projects in four counties in California to ascertain voter  satisfaction and acceptance of the technology. Voters who chose to  participate, as well as election officials, generally reacted positively to the  tests. However, some voters had security concerns, and some jurisdictions  questioned the cost-effectiveness of expanding the pilots.
section_title: Kiosk Voting
paragraphs: An extension of poll-site Internet voting is the proposal to establish  Internet voting sites at convenient public places, such as libraries and  community centers. In this scenario, jurisdictions would provide Internet  voting equipment but generally not staff the voting sites. If the voting sites  were unstaffed, the voting equipment would require protection against  tampering, and advance voter authentication would have to be  implemented.
In kiosk Internet voting, voters would have to be authenticated and  provided with a means of identification (such as a password or PIN), just as  in poll-site Internet voting. How this process would take place would  depend on whether the voting sites were staffed by poll workers. In this  scenario, poll workers could use the same means of voter authentication  used for the expanded poll-site voting. In an unstaffed setup, voters would  have to authenticate themselves in advance. For advance authentication,  the voter would contact the authentication authority before the election,  and the means of identification would be sent to the voter, similar to the  way absentee ballots are requested and mailed out in a conventional  election system.
Once the voter received the means of identification, the rest of the voting  process would be the same as for extended poll-site Internet voting. Figure  77 summarizes this kiosk voting process. Steps differing from the process  described in figure 76 are shown in heavily outlined boxes.
Retaining some of the features of traditional poll-site voting, this option  adds some of the features of remote voting. As in traditional poll-site  voting, the equipment is under the control of election officials. (For  unmanned voting kiosks, some form of security is usually proposed to  avoid tampering, such as camera surveillance or security guards.)  However, as in remote voting, procedures and technology must be in place  for voter authentication in the absence of poll workers. Kiosk voting is  currently a purely conceptual alternative; no jurisdiction has yet tried to  demonstrate the concept.
section_title: Remote Internet Voting
paragraphs: In its ultimate form, remote Internet voting allows voters to cast ballots  from any Internet-connected computer anywhere in the world. This form of  Internet voting would allow maximum convenience to those voters with  access to networked computers. However, because neither the actual  machines used for voting nor the network environment could be directly  controlled by election officials, this option would present election systems  with the greatest technological challenge.
Proposals for remote Internet voting, as well as for kiosk voting, usually  assume that voters will submit requests for Internet voting in advance and  that means of identification will be sent to these voters before the election.  In addition to the means of identification, the jurisdiction would also have  to take steps to ensure that voters secured the platform on which they  proposed to vote. Some have suggested that the jurisdiction would have to  send out software for the voter to install, such as a dedicated operating  system and Web browser; such software would have to accommodate  many platforms and system configurations.
Once the voter had secured the computer by the means prescribed by the  jurisdiction, the rest of the voting process would be similar to that  described earlier. One difference, however, would be that after voting,  voters would have to reconfigure their computers to return them to their  previous state (for example, they might need to reset their network settings  to those needed to connect to their Internet service providers). In cases  where voters wished to vote from computers they did not own (at schools  or businesses, for example), this process could be problematic. Figure 78  summarizes the process for remote Internet voting. Steps that differ from  the processes in figures 76 and 77 are shown in heavily outlined boxes.
Like any form of remote voting, including the mail-in absentee voting used  in most states today, remote Internet voting lacks some of the safeguards  associated with voting within the controlled environment of a traditional  polling place; that is, election officials cannot guarantee that the ballot is  kept secret and that voters are not coerced. Likewise, traditional citizen  poll watching is impossible, because voting takes place in private settings.
Remote Internet voting has been used for private elections for several  years, but only recently have attempts been made to use Internet  technology for public elections in which candidates were running for  federal office. To date, no jurisdiction has attempted to use remote Internet  voting in a binding general election, although some political parties have  used remote Internet voting in binding primary elections. In addition, the  Department of Defense (DOD) conducted a pilot project to allow military  service members, their dependents, and citizens stationed overseas to send  binding absentee ballots over the Internet rather than by mail. The DOD  pilot, however, differed in a number of aspects from what a jurisdiction-run  remote Internet election would be. In the DOD pilot, the ballots were not  sent to an electronic data center for tallying, but rather were sent to various  local jurisdictions, where officials printed the ballots out and processed  them like paper absentee ballots. Further, responsibility for voter  authentication was delegated to DOD, so the local jurisdictions did not  have to perform that step or issue computer-readable means of  identification.
In some of the primary elections that allowed for remote Internet voting,  results were mixed. Many voters were comfortable with the process, but  some also expressed concerns about security. Disputes about Internet  accessibility also led to a lawsuit in the case of the 2000 Arizona  Democratic primary. Further, a range of problems surfaced, from the  technical (some computers and Web browsers were incompatible with the  election system) to the procedural (additional telephone help lines had to  be added).
section_title: Major Issues Confront Internet Voting
paragraphs: The standards by which new election technologies, such as Internet voting,  should be judged combine practical considerations (such as cost and  benefits) with generally recognized requirements for free and fair elections:  (1) the secrecy of the ballot should be ensured; (2) only authorized persons  should be able to vote; (3) no voter should be able to vote more than once;  (4) votes should not be modified, forged, or deleted without detection;  (5) votes should be accurately accounted for and verifiable; and (6) voters  should not be denied access to the voting booth.
For Internet voting to reasonably meet these requirements, a number of  issues need to be resolved. These issues have been raised by groups and  individuals with voting expertise, including election officials, citizens  groups, voting technology vendors, and academics. Among these issues, we  have identified those that have received the widest discussion and are  generally agreed to be of primary importance; these can be placed into four  general categories: ballot secrecy/voter privacy, security, accessibility, and  cost versus benefits.
subsections: section_title: Ballot Secrecy and Voter Privacy
paragraphs: Although ballot secrecy and voter privacy are closely related, they can be  distinguished and are treated differently in practice in many forms of  elections. Ballot secrecy refers to the content of the vote; voter privacy  refers to the voter’s ability to cast a vote without being observed. In poll- site voting, protecting voter privacy is generally ensured by election  officials and observers. However, in voting that does not take place at poll  sites, including traditional mail-in absentee balloting, election officials  cannot safeguard voter privacy, although they can and do take steps to  protect ballot secrecy.
subsections: section_title: Ballot Secrecy and Voter Privacy are Difficult to Ensure in Remote Voting
paragraphs: In any form of voting that takes place away from a poll site (including  conventional mail-in absentee voting), safeguards are imposed to protect  ballot secrecy at the receiving end (the election office) and in transit, but it  is not practical to impose such safeguards at the origin (the voter’s  location). The current mail-in absentee balloting process offers some  procedural assurances that election officials cannot trace votes back to  individuals. That is, the voter returns the absentee ballot in two envelopes:  the outer envelope includes identifying information about the voter and is  signed, but the internal one has no identifying information that links the  ballot to the voter. When absentee ballots arrive at the election office,  election workers separate the inner envelopes from the outer ones and  randomize them before the ballots are inspected. This procedure ensures  secrecy at the receiving end (as long as more than one absentee ballot is  received). It does not ensure ballot secrecy or voter privacy at the origin or  in transit. With absentee balloting, like remote Internet voting, practical  solutions are not available to ensure that voters are not spied on or coerced  by a third party.
The digital process proposed by the California Voting Task Force for  transmitting ballots over the Internet is generally patterned after the mail-in  absentee ballot process. The process aims to preserve ballot secrecy and  integrity through the use of encryption technology working with various  forms of authentication, such as digital certificates. Encryption  technology would act as the “envelopes” preserving the secrecy and  integrity of the ballot, and the electronic voter authentication would be  automatically stripped from the ballot before the votes were tabulated. As  in the mail-in absentee ballot process, the voter authentication and the  actual ballot would be stored separately and randomized to preserve ballot  secrecy. Assuming that these technologies work as designed, this means of  transmitting and receiving the ballot would protect the ballot’s secrecy. As  in mail-in absentee balloting, voters would be responsible for protecting  their own physical privacy.
Like other forms of remote voting, then, proposed implementations of  remote Internet voting would not protect voters’ physical privacy (leaving  open the risk that voters may be coerced—through threats, bribery, and  other forms of pressure); however, unlike paper-based voting, remote  Internet voting also introduces threats to electronic privacy. For example,  voters who access the Internet through a local area network (such as at an  office, school, or library) might have their privacy compromised by a  network administrator who could access the voter’s computer while the  ballot was in an unencrypted state. In one of the Internet voting pilots  where remote voting was allowed, voters relied heavily upon computers at  offices and public libraries. Because these computers were tied into central  networks, the potential for compromise was present. Reducing the  likelihood of such breaches of privacy require that substantial legal  penalties be imposed on such activities.
Finally, any connection to the Internet brings with it the possibility that  hackers or malicious software could target the connected computer for  attack. Software is available now that allows users to remotely monitor  other people’s activities over the Internet, without necessarily being  detected or causing any obvious harm. Such snooping allows hackers to  look for transactions of interest to them. As transactions increase in  significance, their attraction to hackers increases. The challenge and high  stakes of an Internet election are very likely to attract not only snooping,  but also determined efforts at disruption and fraud.
The process described for transmitting and receiving ballots would be used  in all the forms of Internet voting proposed, not just remote voting. This  process does not address protection of voters’ privacy while they are  generating ballots. However, in poll-site Internet voting as in other poll-site  voting, election officials can institute procedures to protect voters’ physical  privacy at the poll site. Similarly, in kiosk voting, election officials could  also establish procedures to protect against coercion.
section_title: What Is the Consensus on This Issue?
paragraphs: Of the three types of Internet voting, remote Internet voting is recognized  as least protective of ballot secrecy and voter privacy. On the assumption  that techniques such as digital certificates and encryption are effective  safeguards for transmission and reception, poll-site Internet voting  provides the most privacy safeguards, covering origination, transmission,  and reception; kiosk Internet voting could safeguard transmission and  reception and (depending on the setup) provide some safeguards on  origination; and remote Internet voting could safeguard transmission and  reception, but not origination.
Some experts consider that the safeguards now available would be  effective for protecting ballot secrecy during transmission and reception.  However, other voting experts believe that although digital certificates and  encryption could in theory provide the transmission and reception  safeguards described, these technologies are not yet mature enough to do  so in any large-scale implementation of Internet voting, particularly remote  voting. These experts note that as encryption algorithms improve, so do the  encryption-cracking tools and the power of the computers that run them.
Further, even with perfect technology, they note that the human factor can  undermine the goal. Digital certificates and encryption depend on  passwords or keys, which can be stolen or voluntarily revealed.
A further practical difficulty is the cost and technological challenge of  creating the infrastructure required for a large-scale implementation of  digital certificates. Systems would have to be set up to positively identify  voters, issue digital certificates, and manage the exchange and verification  of certificates. In the DOD Voting Over the Internet pilot, the system  depended on the public key infrastructure that was already in place on  DOD’s systems for electronic certificate registration and management  services.
In addition, for remote Internet voting, some experts believe that any large- scale solution would have to address the problem of maintaining ballot  secrecy across different Internet browsers and computing platforms (that  is, computers running various versions of Windows, Macintosh, and Linux  operating systems). This problem would require continual attention as  operating systems themselves evolve and change; it was not solved in the  remote pilot elections in November 2000. In one of these pilots, the vendor  that ran the Internet voting software discovered during the election that its  voting encryption software was not supported by older Internet browsers.  The vendor also reported that several Macintosh users had problems  casting their votes on-line and were advised to vote in person.
Beyond the cost and technological problems are the social problems that  some experts foresee arising from more widespread use of remote voting.  Some voting experts believe that remote voting would encourage organized  voter coercion by such groups as employers, unions, nursing homes, and  others. One election expert has also noted that the laptops now prevalent  in campaign organizations could be used to turn out the vote in favorable  precincts, removed from the scrutiny of election officials or poll watchers.
The risk of fraud in remote Internet voting has been likened to that in mail- in absentee balloting. In a 1998 report, the Florida Department of Law  Enforcement concluded that “The lack of ‘in-person, at-the-polls’  accountability makes absentee ballots the ‘tool of choice’ for those inclined  to commit voter fraud.” Some experts suggest that remote Internet voting  could compound this problem significantly.
Election officials can provide reasonable assurance to voters of the secrecy  of their ballots when these officials control the voting equipment. However,  when elections are remote, this assurance fades, and when Internet  technology is introduced, local election officials can have very little control  over the technology. Even with encryption, election officials would not be  able to guarantee that the voter’s computer or the jurisdiction’s election  servers or communication link would not be compromised. Further, given  the vulnerability of the Internet to manipulation, it may ultimately be  difficult to convince voters that their votes over the Internet will remain  secret.
section_title: Security
paragraphs: The primary issue for Internet voting is security-that is, ensuring that the  voting technology (and related data and resources) is adequately  safeguarded against intentional intrusions and inadvertent errors that  could disrupt system performance or compromise votes. In Internet voting,  the familiar security threats of the Internet are compounded by the  particular security requirements of elections-that is, primarily the secret  ballot, but also their low tolerance for fraud and disruption.
subsections: section_title: General Internet Security Threats Pose Risks to Internet Voting
paragraphs: Because the Internet is being increasingly used to transmit proprietary or  privacy-sensitive information—health care records, business documents,  engineering drawings, purchase orders, credit information—it has become  an increasingly tempting target for attackers. Security experts contend that  significant efforts are needed to define, develop, test, and implement  measures to overcome the security challenge posed by the increasing  complexity, interconnectivity, and sheer size of the evolving Internet.
Although complete summary data are not available (many computer  security incidents are not reported), the number of reported Internet- related security incidents is growing. For example, the number of incidents  handled by Carnegie Mellon University’s CERT Coordination Center  increased from 1,334 in 1993 to 8,836 during the first two quarters of 2000.  Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that its  caseload of computer intrusion-related cases is more than doubling every  year. The fifth annual survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute  in cooperation with the FBI found that 70 percent of respondents  (primarily large corporations and government agencies) had detected  serious computer security breaches within the last 12 months and that  quantifiable financial losses had increased over past years.
These Internet security hazards are especially significant in the context of  voting, because voting is an especially significant form of electronic  transaction. For remote Internet voting, the problem of malicious software  (such as computer viruses, worms, or “Trojan horses”) is acute-that is,such  software could be introduced into computers without voters being aware  of its presence. Hackers could thus alter ballots, spy on citizens’ votes, or  disrupt Web sites, preventing voters from voting. The accessibility and  speed that are the hallmarks of the Internet—the very attributes that make  Internet voting attractive—are also attractions for malicious or  mischievous individuals and organizations that might wish to attack on-line  elections. Recent software attacks (such as the ILOVEYOU virus in May  2000, the 1999 Melissa virus, the 2001 Code Red worm, and the Nimda  worm of September 2001) illustrate the disruptive potential of such  malicious software. In addition, inadvertent errors by authorized computer  users could have equally serious consequences if the election systems were  poorly protected.
Hackers could attack not only the computer on which voting was taking  place, but also the communication links between the voters and the  election system. Commercial Web sites have been brought down by a  technique known as a “denial of service” attack, in which the attacker  overloads a Web site with requests for information, jamming the  communication lines and preventing legitimate users from interacting with  the site. A more refined version of this type of attack, developed recently, is  referred to as a distributed denial of service attack. In this type of assault,  software programs called worms, which propagate through the network  without user intervention, are installed on several computers without the  knowledge or consent of their owners. The hacker basically penetrates  several computers and turns them into agents, using them to target Web  sites. These types of attacks spread quickly and are very difficult to trace.  The public became aware of these attacks in February 2000, when Web  sites owned by eBay, E*Trade, CNN, and Yahoo were assaulted and their  operations affected.
Denial of service attacks would be especially threatening to remote  Internet voting, since they could prevent voters from voting. In poll-site  voting, however, the election system could mitigate the denial of service  problem, because voting devices could be disconnected from the network  until the attack was over, votes could be stored and transmitted later, or  other voting technologies could be used.
All types of Internet voting are at risk from malicious software attacks.  Remote voting is riskiest; in poll-site and potentially kiosk voting, in which  the voting equipment is under the control of election officials, the danger of  such attacks is reduced, although not eliminated. Poll-site voting does  permit remedies that are not available with remote voting (e.g., controlling  the computers used for voting, disconnecting machines from the network if  an attack or other disruption occurs, and offering alternative means of  voting); some of these remedies would also be available for kiosk voting.  Other kinds of remedies for all types of Internet voting would include  measures such as system redundancies and backup systems; contingency  plans would also need to be designed into any Internet voting system.
section_title: Internet Voting Requires Higher Security Standards Than Other On-Line Transactions
paragraphs: Internet voting systems face greater security challenges than other Internet  systems, because voting requires more stringent controls than other  electronic transactions. In particular, elections could not tolerate the level  of fraud that occurs in other electronic transactions, such as on-line  banking and commerce. (One study reported that 6 million Internet users  claimed that they had been victimized by credit-card-related fraud in e- commerce transactions.)
Compounding the problem of fraud for Internet voting is a security  requirement that is unique among on-line transactions: ballot secrecy.  Under current election laws, the requirement for ballot secrecy prevents  election systems from associating voters with their ballots or providing  confirmation of how they voted. As a result, audit trails in public elections  are specifically designed not to associate the voter with a ballot; for  Internet voting, this would mean that voters could not be issued electronic  receipts confirming that their votes were cast as they intended. In  contrast, in both e-commerce and on-line banking, receipts providing  transaction details for verification are routinely used to protect consumers  from error.
To date, there is no way to authenticate every voter’s identity on-line. This  raises the problem of devising means to ensure that electronic ballots are  not cast by individuals who are not registered to vote, who are ineligible  to vote, or who have already voted (whether on-line or by other means).  Although this problem is mostly avoided with the poll-site approach to  Internet voting, it emerges with any system in which voting takes place at  sites that are not monitored by election officials.
section_title: What Is the Consensus on This Issue?
paragraphs: It is generally agreed that system security is the biggest obstacle to Internet  voting. In view of the Internet’s multiple vulnerabilities, security experts  question whether the Internet is ready to offer the level of security  necessary to ensure the integrity of an election. Two experts assert that the  Internet can never be used for secure elections, because the Internet,  which was designed to facilitate information accessing and sharing, is  inherently insecure. The proposals for poll-site and kiosk Internet voting, in  which voting equipment is under the control of election officials, are  largely motivated by the desire to avoid some of the security problems  associated with remote Internet voting.
Some experts believe that security mechanisms may evolve one day to the  point that they could form the framework for secure Internet voting  solutions. In our interviews with several Internet voting vendors, one  vendor stated that its product had adequate security measures in place now  that would make it possible to conduct a secure public election with  remote voting over the Internet. However, some security experts dispute  this statement, pointing out that security breaches are being experienced  every day by the most technologically sophisticated companies in our  country. Most technology experts agree that today no organization is  immune from security breaches over the Internet.
The vendors that we contacted are exploring solutions to these challenging  security issues. Like any security system, these solutions will involve  design trade-offs between the ease of voters using the system and the  protection afforded by it, as well as between protection and cost. Because  our nation’s election system has rigorous security requirements, the  expectation is that considerable complexity and cost would be introduced  by whatever solution is devised.
In general, the election community agrees that remote Internet voting is not  now practical; a few suggest that it may never be. Most agree that Internet  voting at designated poll sites is feasible; although the security issues are  still significant, technological and procedural solutions could probably be  devised to allow Internet voting at poll sites.
section_title: Accessibility
paragraphs: The accessibility of the polls is fundamental to the right to vote. All eligible  voters, including those with disabilities, should have equal access to voting,  and election systems should be easy for all voters to use. The ease of use  aspect of accessibility is important not only to minimize voter confusion  and thus error, but also because voting technology that is easy to use is  more likely to capture the intent of the voter. Election systems should  strive to minimize the opportunities for errors that invalidate or misdirect  votes.
In the context of Internet voting, the digital divide takes on particular  importance. If access to the Internet continues to be divided along  socioeconomic lines, remote Internet voting would likely benefit only the  more privileged classes in American society. For voting, the need to  minimize the effect of socioeconomic divisions is particularly pressing,  because it is a fundamental principle of American democracy that elections  should be free and fair. Any system that is perceived to offer unfair  advantage to certain classes of people could undermine public confidence  in elections and in the governments they produce.
subsections: section_title: Accessible Internet Voting Software Would Not Solve All Accessibility Problems for Voters With Disabilities
paragraphs: As we have reported, Internet voting presents increased participation  opportunities for voters with disabilities as well as implementation  challenges. Because Web software can be accessible to voters with  disabilities, Internet voting could potentially provide voters with  disabilities the convenience of voting from remote locations, such as their  homes, thereby promoting voter participation. We identified the following  as possible advantages of Internet voting for voters with disabilities:  Voters would have more flexibility to vote when they want and from  convenient locations if remote Internet voting were allowed.
Blind individuals might be able to vote independently with special  equipment and a Web site designed to provide universal access.
However, we also reported concerns expressed about the Internet’s  security and reliability, as well as the lack of widespread Internet access.  Some of the disadvantages include the following:  Voters who are accustomed to traditional methods might resist the  Internet method.
Voters who lacked a convenient connection to the Internet would not  have equal access to voting.
Blind voters may need special equipment to allow them to use the  Internet.
Some disability advocates believe that although alternative voting methods,  like Internet voting, do expand options for voters with disabilities, they do  not provide the same voting opportunities afforded the general public and  thus should not be viewed as permanent solutions to the problem of  inaccessible polling places. Moreover, although the Internet is potentially  accessible to people with disabilities, they are in fact less likely to have  access to the Internet than the general population. According to the  Department of Commerce, people with disabilities are only half as likely  to have access to the Internet as those with no disability: about 22 percent  of the persons with disabilities are on-line compared to about 42 percent of  the general population. And while just under 25 percent of people with no  disability have never used a personal computer, close to 60 percent of  people with a disability fall into that category. Different types of disabilities  also lead to different rates of access. Among people with a disability, those  who may require special equipment to use computers (such as those who  have impaired vision and problems with manual dexterity) have lower rates  of Internet access and are less likely to use a computer regularly than  people who need no special equipment, such as those with hearing  difficulties. According to Commerce, this difference holds in the aggregate,  as well as across age groups.
section_title: Ease of Use Must Be Addressed in All Forms of Internet Voting
paragraphs: Because experience so far with any kind of public election using Internet  technology is limited, knowledge concerning ease of use and Internet  elections is similarly limited. However, information that is available  suggests that problems with ease of use would arise in Internet elections as  in all voting methods and technologies, and voters who are unfamiliar with  computers are most likely to have difficulty.
For example, in the nonbinding pilot projects on poll-site Internet voting  run by a few jurisdictions in the November 2000 elections, voters chose  whether or not to participate, so it is believed that most participants were  already familiar with computers and the Internet. Thus, when these voters  were surveyed concerning ease of use, most expressed satisfaction. One  jurisdiction reported that 100 percent of voters surveyed were satisfied  with the ease of the Internet voting implementation; however, another  jurisdiction also reported anecdotally that two senior citizens who  attempted to use the system became so frustrated with using the computer  mouse that they abandoned the attempt within a minute of sitting down.  Another of the jurisdictions running a pilot also reported that voters who  had never used a computer had difficulties with the keyboard and mouse.
Further, even voters who were familiar with computers ran into problems.  One jurisdiction reported that several voters did not read directions and  had difficulty performing the steps needed for authentication. Also, in one  nonbinding primary in which remote Internet voting was tested, several  survey respondents commented on their reluctance to download and install  the security software, whose function they did not understand. In the DOD  Internet absentee ballot pilot, organizers also commented that participants  were not familiar with digital certificates.
section_title: Increasing Voter Participation Confronts the Digital Divide
paragraphs: Removing obstacles that prevent or discourage eligible voters from voting  is one aspect of accessibility; actively encouraging eligible voters to vote is  another. The term generally used in discussions of this aspect of  accessibility is “voter participation.” This issue may be as important to the  Internet voting debate as security concerns.
The goal of increasing accessibility/voter participation has been cited in  arguments both for and against remote Internet voting. Some social  scientists contend that remote Internet voting would improve the  convenience of voting by removing the need for voters to go in person to  poll sites at particular hours, and that this convenience would attract  voters to exercise their right to vote. Proponents of remote Internet voting  argue that Internet voting would thus increase voter participation,  particularly among underrepresented groups, such as young people; people  with limited mobility (such as the elderly and the physically challenged);  and voters living overseas, including military personnel.
On the other hand, in the long term, Internet voting could decrease voter  participation, because it could undermine confidence in the security and  fairness of the election process. That is, if the electorate lost confidence  that Internet voting was secure or grew to believe that Internet voting  unfairly favored certain classes of voters, the resulting disillusionment  could discourage voters from participating.
Some evidence that increased convenience could increase participation is  found in the Oregon experience with mail-in voting, which resulted in  significant increases in turnout. In 1995, when Oregon held the nation’s first  all-vote-by-mail statewide congressional primary election, turnout in  Oregon primaries rose to 52 percent, up from 43 percent previously. In the  special election for U.S. Senator that followed these primaries, the turnout  was 65 percent, a record for special elections.
For more direct evidence that remote Internet voting could encourage  participation, proponents cite the increased turnout seen in the Arizona  2000 Democratic presidential primary. In this primary, which provided for  remote voting, the Democratic party saw an increase in voter participation  of over 600 percent in comparison with both the 1992 and 1996 presidential  primaries. This surge exceeded increases in every state that had  Democratic and/or Republican primary elections during that year (although  some other states, which did not provide Internet voting, also showed  impressive surges: 419 percent in Rhode Island, 260 percent in  Massachusetts, and 200 percent in Georgia). A study done at Northern  Arizona University concluded that the availability of Internet voting  contributed to Arizona’s increase in political participation, along with other  factors, such as the contested primary and media attention focusing on the  availability of Internet voting. The study further concluded that  participation would have been greater if all technical glitches had been  anticipated and corrected before voting began (some voters who ran into  technical difficulties ended up by not casting any kind of ballot).
Some suggest that after the novelty of Internet voting is dissipated, this  increase in participation will subside. They argue that Internet voting is  likely to be similar to previous election reforms (such as early voting,  motor voter registration, and absentee balloting), which have had very  little, if any, effect on participation. Some voting experts have suggested  that information and mobilization are much more important than  convenience in increasing voter participation.
A slightly different argument is made about the participation of young  voters in remote Internet voting. The argument here is that the 18 to 24 age  group, which is least likely to vote (according to FEC), is also the age group  whose access to and familiarity with the Internet is highest. Thus, that age  group, it is argued, would be most likely to respond to the opportunity to  use remote Internet voting.
For older voters, on the other hand, particularly those with no exposure to  computers, Internet voting could actually discourage participation. The  Internet usage rate for people 50 and over was about 30 percent in 2000,  compared to about 42 percent for the general population. Thus, poll-site  Internet voting (if it were the only option) might be discouraging to such  voters, as the anecdotal evidence from the pilot voting projects suggests.  Remote and kiosk voting would be even less likely to attract such voters.
Even if remote Internet voting did result in increased turnout, many voting  experts believe that such an increase would be likely to appear in some  voter groups more than others (in particular, those who have Internet- connected computers in their homes). Thus, Internet voting could serve to  widen the gap that already exists in the way different socioeconomic  groups are represented at the polls. Less privileged groups could be  disadvantaged by the new technology.
section_title: What Is the Consensus on This Issue?
paragraphs: There is little suggestion that poll-site Internet voting would have a  significant effect on accessibility and participation, any more than any  other form of voting device. The experience with pilots shows, however,  that ease of use issues arise especially for voters unfamiliar with computers  and are present even for those who do use computers.  Kiosk voting  remains a concept only, with no real-world pilots or testing.  Therefore, few  have commented on the issues of accessibility, ease of use, and  participation.  The arguments on accessibility and participation all  concentrate on remote Internet voting—both those in favor and those  against. (Ease of use tends to be discussed only in terms of its effect on  convenience-that is, if security requirements are too difficult or too much  trouble for voters, the convenience of Internet voting is undermined.)   Consensus does not exist on accessibility for those with disabilities.  Although remote Internet elections could in theory be made accessible for  this group and thus could increase their opportunities to vote, in practice  Americans with disabilities are among those groups who have the least  access to computers and the Internet.
On the question of voter participation, there is little evidence, and thus  consensus, that the availability of remote Internet voting would succeed in  bringing substantial increases in voter turnout. However, as there is also  little evidence against this proposition, most agree that further study and  debate are warranted. Further, whether any increase in participation that  resulted from remote Internet voting would benefit the democratic process  or only the well-off is likewise in dispute.
section_title: Cost Versus Benefits
paragraphs: Before committing to any new technology, jurisdictions faced with multiple  competing needs, investment options, and budget constraints will want to  assess the technology’s potential cost and benefits.
subsections: section_title: Assessing Cost and Benefits Requires Estimates of Costs and Understanding of Benefits
paragraphs: The ACE Project partners are the International Foundation for Election Systems, the  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and the United Nations  Department of Economic and Social Affairs. analysis should be performed. According to the ACE project, the analysis  should incorporate the elements described in table 16.
Little of the information needed for an analysis of the kind described in  table 16 is currently available for Internet voting of any type. In the absence  of such information, most of the Internet voting debate consists of  hypotheses concerning possible outcomes and benefits. Arguments have  been offered both that Internet voting would save jurisdictions money and  that Internet voting would cost more than current elections. Some Internet  voting proponents have said that remote Internet voting could have the  benefit of increasing voter participation and thus decreasing the cost per  voter. They contend that remote Internet voting would permit jurisdictions  to save money by using fewer printed ballots, storage facilities, polling  places, and poll workers. Others, however, have noted that substantial  costs would be incurred in implementing security solutions. One security  expert has said that the initial investment for Internet voting will be  substantial and not affordable to many jurisdictions.
Because of the different types of Internet voting being proposed (poll site,  kiosk, and remote), it is unclear whether introducing Internet voting  technology to the electoral process would increase or decrease costs.  Some argue that the cost would depend on the voting expenses and  equipment the technology replaced. However, most scenarios envision  Internet voting to be used concurrently with existing voting methods.
We were unable to acquire information on costs from the jurisdictions  involved in the pilots, because in most cases the vendors incurred the  costs, not the jurisdictions. We were able to acquire cost data on the DOD  absentee ballot pilot project, but DOD warned against equating its cost  with that of owning and operating an Internet voting system. Rather, the  project was described as a “proof-of-concept research and development  project.” DOD reported that the project cost $6.2 million. In the project, 84  electronic ballots were transmitted over the Internet, and 74 were counted  (10 were not counted because paper ballots from those voters had already  been delivered and deposited in sealed ballot boxes). DOD provided no  cost estimates for a final operational system.
Four of five vendors currently providing Internet voting solutions, however,  provided us with information on costs for poll-site voting solutions; only  one of these vendors provided us with a cost estimate for remote voting.
One Internet vendor estimated that his organization could host a poll- site Internet voting configuration for approximately $300 to $1,500 per  day (including 12 computer voting stations with all associated hardware  and software); the vendor did not provide any cost estimates for support  services. Moreover, the vendor stated that certain variables would affect  this cost estimate, such as the length of the election, level of security,  and ballot complexity.
Another Internet vendor declined to give a cost estimate because any  estimate would depend on a number of variables unique to a  jurisdiction, such as its existing technology and networking  infrastructure, number of devices required, technical proficiency of in- house staff, and other customer specifications.
Two other vendors provided us with “cost per vote” estimates. One  vendor stated that it could provide a poll-site Internet voting solution for  approximately $3 per vote. This system would provide 4 Internet voting  stations (computers) per precinct, each of which could support 300  voters. Another vendor stated that it could provide poll-site Internet  voting for $1.70 per voter and remote Internet voting for 10¢ to 50¢ per  voter. This vendor was the only one willing to give a cost estimate for  remote Internet voting.
Some of the vendors we spoke with stated that an Internet voting solution  could be more cost effective if the costs could be spread out and shared.  They proposed that jurisdictions could use computers used for Internet  voting for other purposes (e.g., in schools) when they were not being used  for election functions. However, some security experts have expressed  concerns that this approach would compromise the use of the computers  for elections, because they might become infected with malicious software.
section_title: What Is the Consensus on This Issue?
paragraphs: We could arrive at no consensus on costs from the information currently  available beyond the general recognition that potentially sizable up front  infrastructure costs would be incurred. Some experts acknowledge that the  Internet and the associated technology are evolving so rapidly that it is  difficult to reliably estimate costs at this time. There is likewise no  consensus on the suggestion that jurisdictions might mitigate their costs by  using equipment acquired for Internet voting for purposes other than  elections. Except for DOD’s pilot project, cost information was unavailable  for the pilots.
As acknowledged by some experts who have commented on this topic,  given that most proposals to use Internet technology for voting in the near  term envision poll-site voting, and given that most suggestions for possible  cost savings envision remote voting, it appears that Internet technology  offers no near-term promise of significant cost savings.
section_title: Other Issues
paragraphs: In addition to the major issues we have discussed, a number of other issues  have been raised in discussions of Internet voting; however, extensive  information for these issues is not available, and so we do not address them  in detail. For some, discussion has been largely at the level of speculation.  Further, some issues cannot be resolved not only because of the  uncertainties about the form of Internet voting, but also because of ongoing  rapid changes in information technology.
For example, it has been suggested that election officials would need to  find new means of communicating with voters (for instance, sending out  sample ballots); providing voter assistance; recruiting and training poll  workers; identifying polling places (which would have to have Internet  connections); storing and maintaining equipment; and designing ballots,  among other processes. The times for elections may be lengthened (to  avoid network traffic problems, to allow time for voters to overcome  technical difficulties, and to permit Internet voting systems to recover from  disruptions such as system failures or denial of service attacks). The  Internet Policy Institute also points out that “for Internet voting to gain  acceptance, new ways of testing, certifying and developing standards for  election systems will have to be explored.”28, 29 Election officials would also have to examine laws concerning elections for  their application to Internet voting, and they may find that some need to be  changed to allow implementation of such a system. For example, state laws  may prescribe certain types of acceptable voting equipment or certain  ratios of equipment to voters. Further, election officials might recommend  new laws to address the new possibilities for election fraud and  improprieties opened up by Internet voting. (Examples of such laws would  be prohibitions against buying, stealing, selling, or giving away digital  signatures for the purpose of fraudulent voting; hacking voting systems or  individual votes; interfering with voting systems by reducing or eliminating  access to the system; or invasion of privacy by attacking a ballot or Web  site with the intent to examine or change votes).
Report of the National Workshop on Internet Voting, March 2001.
No Internet voting equipment and software standards are currently in place. However,  FEC has released for comment a draft of its voting systems standards, which outline some  Internet voting standards.
Democratic Party made efforts to increase minority participation, and the  election was allowed to proceed.
Some of the issues raised are not unique to Internet voting, but rather are  applicable to any kind of electronic, computer-based voting. It is suggested,  for example, that the use of computers for voting requires new ways to  maintain public confidence in the integrity of the ballot count; traditional  confidence measures are not effective for computer-based voting. Trust in  electronic voting technology depends on persuading the public to place  trust in technical experts. For Internet voting, the trust issue is particularly  important, because Internet security threats are significant and well  known.
section_title: Challenges
paragraphs: Although the nature and significance of the challenges vary somewhat  depending on the type of Internet voting in question (poll site, kiosk, or  remote), broad application of Internet voting in general faces several  formidable social and technological challenges. These challenges were  explicitly highlighted and discussed in depth in this chapter. They include  providing adequate ballot secrecy and voter privacy safeguards to  protect votes from unauthorized disclosure and to protect voters from  coercion;  providing adequate security measures to ensure that the voting system  (including related data and resources) is adequately safeguarded against  intentional intrusions and inadvertent errors that could disrupt system  performance or compromise votes;   providing equal access to all voters, including persons with disabilities,  and making the technology easy to use; and  ensuring that the technology is a cost-beneficial alternative to existing  voting methods, in light of the high technology costs  and security  requirements, as well as the associated benefits to be derived from such  investments.