Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts
Published: 2009-10-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was created to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to JIEDDO. In addition, other DOD components, including the military services, have devoted at least $1.5 billion to the counter-IED effort--which does not include $22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. This testimony is based on a report that GAO is issuing today as well as preliminary observations from ongoing work that GAO plans to report in early 2010. In the report being issued today, GAO is recommending that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DOD, (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives, and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted actions to be taken.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its management of counter-IED efforts. For instance, GAO's ongoing work has found that JIEDDO has been improving the management of its efforts to defeat IEDs, including developing and implementing a strategic plan that provides an overarching framework for departmentwide efforts to defeat IEDs, as well as a JIEDDO-specific strategic plan. Also, as noted in the report GAO is issuing today, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts, and JIEDDO has taken several steps to support the ability of the services and defense agencies to program and fund counter-IED initiatives. However, several significant challenges remain that affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified in GAO's report being released today along with recommendations to address them. For example, one challenge is a lack of full visibility by JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department. In addition, JIEDDO faces difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint counter-IED initiatives to the services, due to gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. JIEDDO's initiative transitions also are hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during JIEDDO's acquisition process. JIEDDO also lacks clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiatives it will fund and, as a result, has funded training activities that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. Additionally, GAO's ongoing work has identified other oversight challenges. For example, JIEDDO lacks a means as well as reliable data to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts. GAO's work has identified several areas in which data on the effectiveness and progress of IED-defeat initiatives are unreliable or inconsistently collected. In some cases, data are not collected in-theater because the initiatives may not be designed with adequate data-collection procedures. Another challenge facing JIEDDO is its inconsistent application of its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, allowing initiatives to bypass some or all of the process's key review and approval steps. Further, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal controls to ensure DOD that it is achieving its objectives. For example, in July 2009, JIEDDO reported that its internal controls system had a combination of deficiencies that constituted a material weakness. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO's ability to meet its objectives. Finally, JIEDDO has not developed a process for identification and analysis of the risks it faces in achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources, and it has not assessed its performance over time or ensured that the findings of audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. As GAO completes its ongoing work it expects to issue a report with recommendations to address these issues.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss Department of Defense (DOD)  management and oversight of its effort to defeat improvised explosive  devices (IEDs). Such devices continue to be the number-one threat to  troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. During 2008, IEDs accounted for almost 40  percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. In 2009, insurgents’ use  of IEDs against U.S. forces in Iraq declined for the second straight year  since 2003, while in Afghanistan the number of monthly IED incidents  reached more than 800 in July 2009. Due to the magnitude of the IED  threat, DOD created the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in  January 2006 in an effort to focus its counter-IED efforts. JIEDDO is  responsible for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD efforts to  defeat IEDs. A primary role for JIEDDO is to provide funding to the  military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter- IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over  $16 billion to JIEDDO to address the IED threat. In addition, other DOD  components, including the military services, have devoted at least $1.5  billion to the counter-IED effort, not including $22.7 billion for Mine  Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Along with the escalation in  Afghanistan, the IED threat is increasingly expanding throughout the globe  with over 300 IED events per month worldwide outside of Iraq and  Afghanistan, according to JIEDDO. There is widespread consensus that  this threat will not go away and that the IED will continue to be a weapon  of strategic influence in future conflicts.
In response to congressional direction, GAO has issued a series of reports  on JIEDDO. This work has examined a broad spectrum of JIEDDO’s  operations including its ability to lead, advocate, and coordinate counter- IED efforts across DOD as well as establish itself as an accountable  organization that can effectively manage billions of dollars in funding. As  DOD looks to the future in deciding the appropriate role, organizational  placement, and degree of Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversight  for JIEDDO, addressing these types of issues will be critical. My testimony  today will discuss our observations in two main areas. First, I will describe  the steps that JIEDDO and DOD have taken to manage counter-IED  efforts. Second, I will highlight the challenges that affect DOD’s ability to  oversee JIEDDO.
In preparing this testimony, we relied on the report we are issuing today  regarding actions needed to improve visibility and coordination of DOD’s  counter-IED efforts. We met with officials from several DOD  organizations including JIEDDO, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, the  Army National Training Center, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,  the Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, Joint Forces  Command, the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence, U.S. Central Command  (CENTCOM), the Technical Support Working Group, and the Office of the  Secretary of Defense. We also examined documentation including DOD  Directive 2000.19E, which established JIEDDO, other documentation and  briefings relating to JIEDDO’s evolution, and JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01,  which established JIEDDO’s rapid acquisition process, as well as other  documents and briefings from JIEDDO, the Services, and other DOD  entities. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. In addition, we are providing preliminary  observations from our ongoing work regarding JIEDDO’s management of  its internal processes, its strategic planning, initiative development, and  internal controls. For this ongoing work, we conducted case studies of 56  of the 497 counter-IED initiatives listed in JIEDDO’s financial records as of  March 30, 2009, covering the top 20 initiatives in each of the three  categories of operations.  We compared historic documentation to criteria  specified in the JIEDDO directive and instructions. We collected,  reviewed, and analyzed JIEDDO and DOD counter-IED strategic plans and  guidance as well as documentation of JIEDDO actions for its counter-IED  initiatives. We met with officials in the office of the DOD Comptroller, the  OSD Office of the Director of Administration and Management, and  JIEDDO. In addition, to further evaluate JIEDDO’s initiative development  we reviewed its oversight and internal control processes. We are  conducting this work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards, and we expect to issue a report in early 2010.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq dating back to 2003, DOD  began identifying several counter-IED capability gaps including  shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel  with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and the  lack of an expedited acquisition process for developing new solutions to  address emerging IED threats. Prior DOD efforts to defeat IEDs included  various process teams and task forces. For example, DOD established the  Joint IED Defeat Task Force in June 2005, which replaced three temporary  organizations—the Army IED Task Force; the Joint IED Task Force; and  the Under Secretary of Defense, Force Protection Working Group. To  further focus DOD’s efforts and minimize duplication, DOD published a  new directive in February 2006, which changed the name of the Joint IED  Defeat Task Force to JIEDDO. This directive established JIEDDO as a  joint entity and jointly manned organization within DOD, directly under  the authority, direction, and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense,  rather than subjecting JIEDDO to more traditional review under an Under  Secretary of Defense within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
DOD’s directive further states that JIEDDO shall focus all DOD actions in  support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective Joint Task  Forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.  Specifically JIEDDO is directed to identify, assess, and fund initiatives that  provide specific counter-IED solutions, and is granted the authority to  approve joint IED defeat initiatives valued up to $25 million and make  recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for initiatives valued  over that amount. Beginning in fiscal year 2007, Congress, has provided  JIEDDO with its own separate appropriation, averaging $4 billion a year.  JIEDDO may then transfer funds to the military service that is designated  to sponsor a specific initiative. After JIEDDO provides funding authority to  a military service, the designated service program manager, not JIEDDO,  is responsible for managing the initiatives for which JIEDDO has provided  funds.
Since 2004, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123  has specified that federal agencies have a fundamental responsibility to  develop and maintain effective internal controls that ensure the prevention  or detection of significant weaknesses—that is, weaknesses that could  adversely affect the agency’s ability to meet its objectives. According to  OMB, the importance of internal controls is addressed in many statutes  and executive documents. OMB requires agencies and individual federal  managers to take systematic and proactive measures to develop and  implement appropriate, cost-effective internal controls for results-oriented  management. In addition, the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of  1982 establishes the overall requirements with regard to internal controls.  Accordingly, an agency head must establish controls that reasonably  ensure that (1) obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable  law; (2) all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or  misappropriation; and (3) revenues and expenditures applicable to agency  operations are properly recorded and accounted for to permit the  preparation of accounts and reliable financial and statistical reports and to  maintain accountability over the assets. Specific internal control standards  underlying the internal controls concept in the federal government are  promulgated by GAO and are referred to as the Green Book. The DOD  Comptroller is responsible for the implementation and oversight of DOD’s  internal control program.
section_title: JIEDDO and DOD Have Taken Steps to Improve the Management of Counter-IED Efforts
paragraphs: Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its  management and operation of counter-IED efforts in response to our past  work as well as to address congressional concerns. For example, in our  ongoing work, we have noted that JIEDDO has been improving its  strategic planning. In March 2007, observing that JIEDDO did not have a  formal written strategic plan, we recommended that it develop such a plan  based on the Government Performance and Results Act requirement  implemented by the OMB circular A-11 requirement that government  entities develop and implement a strategic plan for managing their efforts.  Further, in 2007, Congress initially appropriated only a portion of  JIEDDO’s requested fiscal year 2008 funding, and a Senate Appropriations  Committee report directed JIEDDO to provide a comprehensive and  detailed strategic plan so that additional funding could be considered. In  response, JIEDDO, in November 2007, issued a strategic plan that  provided an overarching framework for departmentwide counter-IED  efforts. Additionally, JIEDDO continues to invest considerable effort to  develop and manage JIEDDO-specific plans for countering IEDs. For  example, during the second half of 2008, the JIEDDO director undertook a  detailed analysis of three issues. The director looked at JIEDDO’s mission  as defined in DOD guidance, the implicit and explicit functions associated  with its mission, and the organizational structure needed to support and  accomplish its mission. The effort resulted in JIEDDO publishing its  JIEDDO Organization and Functions Guide in December 2008, within  which JIEDDO formally established strategic planning as one of four  mission areas. Actions taken in 2009 included developing and publishing a  JIEDDO-specific strategic plan for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, reviewing  JIEDDO’s existing performance measures to determine whether additional  or alternative metrics might be needed, and engaging other government  agencies and services involved in addressing the IED threat at a JIEDDO  semiannual conference. As a result of these actions, JIEDDO is steadily  improving its understanding of counter-IED challenges.
Additionally, as we note in our report being issued today, JIEDDO and the  services have taken some steps to improve visibility over their counter- IED efforts. For example, JIEDDO, the services, and several other DOD  organizations compile some information on the wide range of IED defeat  initiatives existing throughout the department. JIEDDO also promotes  visibility by giving representatives from the Army’s and Marine Corps’  counter-IED coordination offices the opportunity to assist in the  evaluation of IED defeat proposals. Additionally, JIEDDO maintains a  network of liaison officers to facilitate counter-IED information sharing  throughout the department. It also hosts a semiannual conference  covering counter-IED topics such as agency roles and responsibilities, key  issues, and current challenges. JIEDDO also hosts a technology outreach  conference with industry, academia, and other DOD components to  discuss the latest requirements and trends in the counter-IED effort.  Lastly, the services provide some visibility over their own counter-IED  initiatives by submitting information to JIEDDO for the quarterly reports  that it submits to Congress.
section_title: Several Challenges Affect DOD’s Ability to Oversee the Management of JIEDDO
paragraphs: While JIEDDO has taken some steps toward improving its management of  counter-IED efforts, several significant challenges remain that affect  DOD’s ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified  in the report we are issuing today and include a lack of full visibility by  JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD,  difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint  IED defeat initiatives to the military services once counter-IED solutions  have been developed, and a lack of clear criteria for defining what  counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. Additionally, our ongoing work  has identified other challenges including a lack of a means to gauge the  effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts, a lack of consistent application of  its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, and a lack of adequate  internal controls required to provide DOD assurance that it is achieving its  objectives. I will discuss each of these challenges in more detail.
subsections: section_title: JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility over Counter-IED Initiatives throughout DOD
paragraphs: DOD’s ability to manage JIEDDO is hindered by its lack of full visibility  over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and  various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own  counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a  comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which  limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department.  JIEDDO is required to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to  defeat IEDs. Also, JIEDDO is required to maintain the current status of  program execution, operational fielding, and performance of approved  Joint IED Defeat initiatives. Despite the creation of JIEDDO, most of the  organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort in existence prior to  JIEDDO have continued to develop, maintain, and in many cases, expand  their own IED defeat capabilities. For example, the Army continues to  address the IED threat through such organizations as the Army’s Training  and Doctrine Command, which provides training support and doctrinal  formation for counter-IED activities, and the Research, Development &  Engineering Command, which conducts counter-IED technology  assessments and studies for Army leadership. Furthermore, an Army  official stated that the Center for Army Lessons Learned continues to  maintain an IED cell to collect and analyze counter-IED information. The  Marine Corps’ Training and Education Command and the Marine Corps  Center for Lessons Learned have also continued counter-IED efforts  beyond the creation of JIEDDO. At the interagency level, the Technical  Support Working Group continues its research and development of  counter-IED technologies.
Despite these ongoing efforts and JIEDDO’s mission to coordinate all DOD  actions to defeat improvised explosive devices, JIEDDO does not maintain  a comprehensive database of all IED defeat initiatives across the  department. JIEDDO is currently focusing on developing a management  system that will track its initiatives as they move through its own  acquisition process. Although this system will help JIEDDO manage its  counter-IED initiatives, it will track only JIEDDO-funded initiatives, not  those being independently developed and procured by the services and  other DOD components. Without incorporating service and other DOD  components’ counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO’s efforts to develop a  counter-IED initiative database will not capture all efforts to defeat IEDs  throughout DOD.
In addition, the services do not have a central source of information for  their own counter-IED efforts because there is currently no requirement  that each service develop its own comprehensive database of all of its  counter-IED initiatives. Without centralized counter-IED initiative  databases, the services are limited in their ability to provide JIEDDO with  a timely and comprehensive summary of all their existing initiatives. For  example, the U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering  Command’s Counter-IED Task Force and the service counter-IED focal  points—the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office’s Adaptive Networks,  Threats and Solutions Division; and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab— maintain databases of counter-IED initiatives. However, according to  Army and Marine Corps officials, these databases are not comprehensive  in covering all efforts within their respective service. Additionally, of  these three databases, only the U.S. Army Research and Development and  Engineering Command’s database is available for external use. Since the  services are able to act independently to develop and procure their own  counter-IED solutions, several service and Joint officials told us that a  centralized counter-IED database would be of great benefit in coordinating  and managing the department’s counter-IED programs.
Furthermore, although JIEDDO involves the services in its process to  select initiatives, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded  initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process, called the JIEDDO  Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP). In  this process, JIEDDO brings in representatives from the service to  participate on several boards—such as a requirements, resources, and  acquisition board—to evaluate counter-IED initiatives, and various  integrated process teams. However, in its process to select counter-IED  initiatives, JIEDDO has approved some counter-IED initiatives without  vetting them through the appropriate service counter-IED focal points,  because the process allows JIEDDO to make exceptions if deemed  necessary and appropriate. For example, at least three counter-IED  training initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO’s counter-IED joint training  center were not vetted through the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office’s  Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Branch—the Army’s focal  point for its counter-IED effort—before being approved for JIEDDO  funding. Service officials have said that not incorporating their views on  initiatives limits their visibility of JIEDDO actions and could result in  approved initiatives that are inconsistent with service needs. JIEDDO  officials acknowledged that while it may be beneficial for some JIEDDO- funded initiatives to bypass its acquisition process in cases where an  urgent requirement with limited time to field is identified, these cases do  limit service visibility over all JIEDDO-funded initiatives.
In response to these issues, we recommended in our report that is being  issued today that the military services create their own comprehensive  IED defeat initiative databases and work with JIEDDO to develop a DOD- wide database for all counter-IED initiatives. In response to this  recommendation, DOD concurred and noted steps currently being taken  to develop a DOD-wide database of counter-IED initiatives. While we  recognize that this ongoing effort is a step in the right direction, these  steps did not address the need for the services to develop databases of  their initiatives as we also recommended. Until all of the services and  other DOD components gain full awareness of their own individual  counter-IED efforts and provide this input into a central database, any  effort to establish a DOD-wide database of all counter-IED initiatives will  be incomplete. We are also recommending that, in cases where initiatives  bypass JIEDDO’s rapid acquisition process, JIEDDO develop a mechanism  to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of each initiative  prior to its funding. In regard to this recommendation, DOD also  concurred and noted steps it plans to take such as notifying stakeholders  of all JIEDDO efforts or initiatives, whether or not JCAAMP processing is  required. We agree that, if implemented, these actions would satisfy our  recommendation.
section_title: JIEDDO Faces Difficulties Coordinating the Transition of Funding Responsibility for Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military Services
paragraphs: Although JIEDDO has recently taken several steps to improve its process  to transition IED defeat initiatives to the military services following the  development of new capabilities, JIEDDO still faces difficulties in this  area. JIEDDO’s transitions of initiatives to the services are hindered by  funding gaps between JIEDDO’s transition timeline and DOD’s budget  cycle as well as by instances when service requirements are not fully  considered during JIEDDO’s acquisition process. JIEDDO obtains funding  for its acquisition and development programs through congressional  appropriations for overseas contingency operations. JIEDDO typically  remains responsible for funding counter-IED initiatives until they have  been developed, fielded, and tested as proven capabilities. According to  DOD’s directive, JIEDDO is then required to develop plans for  transitioning proven joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget  programs of record for sustainment and further integration into existing  service programs once those initiatives have been developed. As described  in its instruction, JIEDDO plans to fund initiatives for 2 fiscal years of  sustainment. However, service officials have stated that JIEDDO’s 2-year  transition timeline may not allow the services enough time to request and  receive funding through DOD’s base budgeting process, causing DOD to  rely on service overseas contingency operations funding to sustain joint- funded counter-IED initiatives following JIEDDO’s 2-year transition  timeline.
According to JIEDDO’s latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, the  organization recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling $233  million to the services for funding through overseas contingency  operations appropriations and the transition of only 3 totaling $4.5 million  into service base budget programs. The potential need for increased  transition funds will continue given the large number of current initiatives  funded by JIEDDO. For example, as of March 30, 2009, JIEDDO’s initiative  management system listed 497 ongoing initiatives. In addition to the  small number of transitions and transfers that have occurred within DOD  to date, the services often decide to indefinitely defer assuming fundin responsibility for JIEDDO initiatives following JIEDDO’s intended 2-year  transition or transfer point. According to JIEDDO’s fiscal year 2011  transition list, the Army and Navy have deferred or rejected the  acceptance of 16 initiatives that JIEDDO had recommended for transition  or transfer, totaling at least $16 million. Deferred or rejected initiatives  are either sustained by JIEDDO indefinitely, transitioned or transferred  during a future year, or terminated. When the services defer or reject the  transition of initiatives, JIEDDO remains responsible for them beyond the  intended 2-year transition or transfer point, a delay that could diminish its  ability to fund new initiatives and leads to uncertainty about when or if the  services will assume funding responsibility in the future.
Furthermore, JIEDDO’s initiative transitions are hindered when service  requirements are not fully considered during the development and  integration of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two  counter-IED radio jamming systems. In the first example, CENTCOM,  whose area of responsibility includes both Iraq and Afghanistan,  responded to an urgent operational need by publishing a requirement in  2006 for a man-portable IED jamming system for use in theater. In 2007,  JIEDDO funded and delivered to theater a near-term solution to meet this  capability gap. However, Army officials stated that the fielded system was  underutilized by troops in Iraq, who thought the system was too heavy to  carry, especially given the weight of their body armor. Since then, the joint  counter-IED radio jamming program board has devised a plan to field a  newer man-portable jamming system called CREW 3.1. According to  JIEDDO, CREW 3.1 systems were developed by a joint technical  requirements board that aimed to balance specific service requirements  for man-portable systems. While CENTCOM maintains that CREW 3.1 is a  requirement in-theater, and revalidated the need in September 2009,  officials from the Army and Marine Corps have both stated that they do  not have a formal requirement for the system. Nevertheless, DOD plans to  field the equipment to each of the services in response to CENTCOM’s  stated operational need. It remains unclear, however, which DOD  organizations will be required to pay for procurement and sustainment  costs for the CREW 3.1, since DOD has yet to identify the source of  funding to procure additional quantities.
In the second example, Army officials stated that they were not involved  to the fullest extent possible in the evaluation and improvement process  for a JIEDDO-funded vehicle-mounted jamming system, even though the  Army was DOD’s primary user in terms of total number of systems fielded.  The system, called the CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer (CVRJ), was  initiated in response to an urgent warfighter need in November 2006 for a  high-powered system to jam radio frequencies used to detonate IEDs. The  development of this technology ultimately required at least 20 proposals  for configuration changes to correct flaws found in its design after  contract award. Two of the changes involved modifying the jammer so it  could function properly at high temperatures. Another change was needed  to prevent the jammer from interfering with vehicle global positioning  systems. Army officials stated that had they had a more direct role on the  Navy-led control board that managed configuration changes to the CVRJ,  the system may have been more quickly integrated into the Army’s  operations. As this transpired, the Army continued to use another jamming  system, DUKE, as its principal counter-IED electronic warfare system. Not  ensuring that service requirements are fully taken into account when  evaluating counter-IED initiatives creates the potential for fielding  equipment that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could later  delay the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following  JIEDDO’s 2-year transition timeline.
To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO funded initiatives, our report issued  today recommended that the military services work with JIEDDO to  develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO- funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding sources, and  a timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD base budget  cycle. We also recommended that JIEDDO coordinate with the services  prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service requirements are fully  taken into account when making counter-IED investment decisions. In  response to these recommendations, DOD concurred with our  recommendation to develop a comprehensive plan and noted steps to be  taken to address this issue. DOD partially concurred with our  recommendation that JIEDDO coordinate with the services prior to  funding an initiative, noting the department’s concern over the need for a  rapid response to urgent warfighter needs. While we recognize the need to  respond quickly to support warfighter needs, we continue to support our  recommendation and reiterate the need for the integration of service  requirements and full coordination prior to funding an initiative to ensure  that these efforts are fully vetted throughout DOD before significant  resources are committed.
section_title: JIEDDO Lacks Clear Criteria for Defining What Counter-IED Training Initiatives It Will Fund
paragraphs: JIEDDO’s lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it  will fund affects its counter-IED training investment decisions. JIEDDO  devoted $454 million in fiscal year 2008 to support service counter-IED  training requirements through such activities as constructing a network of  realistic counter-IED training courses at 57 locations throughout the  United States, Europe, and Korea. DOD’s directive defines a counter-IED  initiative as a materiel or nonmateriel solution that addresses Joint IED  Defeat capability gaps. Since our last report on this issue in March 2007,  JIEDDO has attempted to clarify what types of counter-IED training it will  fund in support of theater-urgent, counter-IED requirements. In its  comments to our previous report, JIEDDO stated that it would fund an  urgent theater counter-IED requirement if it “enables training support,  including training aids and exercises.” JIEDDO also stated in its comments  that it would fund an urgent-theater, counter-IED requirement only if it has  a primary counter-IED application.
Although JIEDDO has published criteria for determining what joint  counter-IED urgent training requirements to fund and has supported  service counter-IED training, it has not developed similar criteria for the  funding of joint training initiatives not based on urgent requirements. For  example, since fiscal year 2007, JIEDDO has spent $70.7 million on role  players in an effort to simulate Iraqi social, political, and religious groups  at DOD’s training centers. JIEDDO also spent $24.1 million on simulated  villages at DOD’s training centers in an effort to make steel shipping  containers resemble Iraqi buildings. According to Army officials, these role  players and simulated villages funded by JIEDDO to support counter-IED  training are also utilized in training not related to countering IEDs. As a  result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses  other than defeating IEDs, such as role players and simulated villages to  replicate Iraqi conditions at various service combat training centers.  Without criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives it will  fund, JIEDDO may diminish its ability to fund future initiatives more  directly related to the counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder  coordination in managing its resources, as decision makers at both the  joint and service level operate under unclear selection guidelines for  which types of training initiatives should be funded and by whom. We have  therefore recommended in the report being issued today that JIEDDO  evaluate counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to  evaluate theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and  incorporate this new guidance into an instruction. In commenting on our  recommendation, DOD partially concurred and expressed concerns  regarding our recommendation noting that JIEDDO’s JCAAMP and the  development of new DOD-wide guidance would address the issues we  note in our report. In response, while we recognize the steps taken by  DOD to identify counter-IED training gaps and guide counter-IED training,  these actions do not establish criteria by which JIEDDO will fund counter- IED training.
section_title: JIEDDO Lacks a Means to Gauge the Effectiveness of Its Counter-IED Efforts
paragraphs: JIEDDO has not yet developed a means for reliably measuring the  effectiveness of its efforts and investments in combating IEDs. The OMB  circular A-11 notes that performance goals and measures are important  components of a strategic plan and that it is essential to assess actual  performance based on these goals and measures.. JIEDDO officials  attribute difficulty in determining the effectiveness of its initiatives to  isolating their effect on key IED threat indicators from the effect of other  activities occurring in-theater at the same time, such as a surge in troops,  changes in equipment in use by coalition forces, local observation of  holidays, or changes in weather such as intense dust storms, which may  cause a decrease in the number of IED incidents.
JIEDDO has pursued performance measures since its inception to gauge  whether its initiatives and internal operations and activities are operating  effectively and efficiently, and achieving desired results. In December 2008  JIEDDO published a set of 78 specific performance measures for its  organization. The list included, for example, metrics to evaluate JIEDDO’s  response time in satisfying urgent theater requirements, the quality and  relevance of counter-IED proposals JIEDDO solicits and receives in  response to its solicitations, and the ratio of initiatives for which JIEDDO  completes operational assessments. However, JIEDDO has not yet  established baselines for these measures or specific goals and time frames  for collecting, measuring, and analyzing the relevant data.
Further, we have found several limitations with the data JIEDDO collects  and relies upon to evaluate its performance. Our ongoing work has  identified three areas in which the data JIEDDO uses to measure  effectiveness and progress is unreliable or is inconsistently collected.  First, data on effectiveness of initiatives based on feedback from  warfighters in-theater is not consistently collected because JIEDDO does  not routinely establish data-collection mechanisms or processes to obtain  useful, relevant information needed to adequately assess the effectiveness  of its initiatives. JIEDDO officials also said that data collection from  soldiers operating in-theater is limited because the process of providing  feedback may detract from higher priorities for warfighters. In response to  this data shortfall, JIEDDO managers began an initiative in fiscal year 2009  to embed JIEDDO-funded teams within each brigade combat team to  provide JIEDDO with an in-theater ability to collect needed data for  evaluating initiatives. However, because this effort is just beginning,  JIEDDO officials stated that they have not yet been able to assess its  effectiveness. Second, data on the management of individual initiatives,  such as data recording activities that take place throughout the  development of an initiative, are not consistently recorded and maintained  at JIEDDO. Officials attribute the poor data quality to the limited amount  of time that JIEDDO staff are able to spend on this activity. JIEDDO staff  are aware that documentation of management actions is needed to  conduct counter-IED initiative evaluations and told us that they plan to  make improvements. However, needed changes—such as routinely  recording discussions, analysis, determinations, and findings occurring in  key meetings involving JIEDDO and external parties and coding their  activities in more detail to allow differentiation and deeper analysis of  activities and initiatives—are yet to be developed and implemented. Third,  JIEDDO does not collect or fully analyze data on unexpected outcomes,  such as initiatives that may result in an increase in the occurrence or  lethality of IEDs. However, we believe that such data can provide useful  information that can be used to improve initiatives. For example, in  response to a general officer request in Iraq, the Institute for Defense  Analysis collected and analyzed IED incident data before and after a  certain initiative to determine its effect on the rate of IED incidents.  JIEDDO officials intended the initiative in question to result in the  reduction in IED attacks. However, the data collected contradicted the  intended result because the number of IED incidents increased in areas  where the initiative was implemented. These data could provide lessons  learned to fix the initiative or take another approach. We expect to provide  further information and recommendations, if appropriate, on JIEDDO’s  efforts to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts—including  issues involving data collection and reliability—in the report we will be  issuing in early 2010.
section_title: JIEDDO Has Not Consistently Applied Its Counter-IED Initiative Review and Approval Process
paragraphs: Although JIEDDO has established JCAAMP as its process to review and  approve proposals for counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO excludes some  initiatives from that process. JCAAMP was established in response to  DOD’s directive, which stated that all of JIEDDO’s initiatives are to go  through a review and approval process. This requirement is consistent  with government internal control standards, which identify properly  segregating key duties and responsibilities—including responsibility for  authorizing and processing transactions—as a fundamental control  activity. In reviewing 56 initiatives for case studies, we found that  JIEDDO excluded 26 of the 56 counter-IED initiatives from JCAAMP. For  example, JIEDDO excluded one initiative to enhance the counter-IED  training experience by funding role players who are to help create a  realistic war environment. However, another initiative with similar  purpose and objective was included in the JCAAMP process. As a result,  when initiatives are excluded from JCAAMP, internal and external  stakeholders do not have the opportunity to review, comment on, and  potentially change the course of the initiative in coordination with  competing or complementary efforts.
Additionally, although the remaining 30 of 56 initiatives we reviewed went  through JCAAMP, according to JIEDDO officials, we found that 22 of  those 30 initiatives did not comply with some of the steps required by  applicable DOD guidance. Applicable guidance includes JIEDDO’s  directive, instruction, and standard operating procedures, which together  identify a set of various decision points and actions, collectively intended  to control JIEDDO’s use of resources. For example, we found that, for 16  initiatives among the 22, JIEDDO released funding to the services without  obtaining required funding approval from either the Deputy Secretary of  Defense—as is required for initiatives over $25 million—or from the  JIEDDO Director, for initiatives up to $25 million.
The exclusion of initiatives from JCAAMP, coupled with noncompliance  with steps of the process required by applicable guidance, reduces  transparency and accountability of JIEDDO’s actions within JIEDDO, as  well as to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the services, and other DOD  components. Without management oversight at important milestones in  the approval and acquisition process, some funds appropriated for  JIEDDO may be used to support efforts that do not clearly advance the  goal of countering IEDs.
According to JIEDDO officials, systematic compliance with its process and  documentation has been a weakness that JIEDDO has attempted to  correct, and it continues to pursue improvements in this regard. During  the course of our work, officials from different JIEDDO divisions— including its accounting and budgeting, acquisition oversight, and internal  review divisions—said they saw significant improvement in discipline and  compliance with JIEDDO’s process for managing counter-IED initiatives  beginning in the last quarter of fiscal year 2009. As JIEDDO officials point  out, the improvements they cite have occurred relatively recently and have  not had time to demonstrate their full effect. Nonetheless, the findings in  our ongoing review, and in prior GAO reports, confirm that JIEDDO has  not had a systematic process in place to manage or document its activities  and operations for the majority of its operating life. In the report we plan  to issue in early 2010, we will present a more detailed assessment of  JIEDDO’s review and approval process and will make recommendations  as appropriate.
section_title: JIEDDO Lacks Adequate Internal Controls Required to Provide DOD Assurance That It Is Effectively Achieving Its Objectives
paragraphs: While JIEDDO has affirmed the importance of addressing shortcomings in  its internal control system and is taking action to this end, it still lacks  adequate internal controls to ensure that it is achieving its objectives. An  adequate system of internal controls supports performance-based  management with the procedures, plans, and methods to meet the  agency’s missions, goals, and objectives. Internal controls serve as the first  line of defense in safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors  and fraud, and they help program managers achieve desired results  through effective stewardship of public resources. However, in July 2009  JIEDDO reported to the OSD Comptroller that a material weakness exists  in JIEDDO’s internal control system and has existed since it was  established in January 2006. OMB defines a material weakness as a  deficiency or combination of deficiencies that could adversely affect the  organization’s ability to meet its objectives and that the agency head  determines to be significant enough to be reported outside the agency. For  example, in our ongoing work we have identified, and JIEDDO officials  have confirmed, that JIEDDO’s internal controls system has not: (1)  provided for the identification and analysis of the risks JIEDDO faces in  achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources; and (2)  assessed its performance over time and ensured that the findings of audits  and other reviews have been promptly resolved. Consequently, JIEDDO  has not developed a set of control activities that ensure its directives—and  ultimately its objectives—are carried out effectively. Without assurance  from JIEDDO that it has identified and addressed its control weaknesses,  OSD does not monitor JIEDDO’s progress and effectiveness and therefore  is unable to detect the extent to which JIEDDO has weaknesses.
Given the longstanding weaknesses in JIEDDO’s system of internal  controls, it is unable to assure the DOD Comptroller that the program is  achieving its objectives. The DOD Comptroller is responsible for the  development and oversight of DOD’s internal control program. In carrying  out its responsibilities, DOD Comptroller officials told us that they relied  solely on JIEDDO to internally develop and implement effective internal  control systems that address key program performance risks and monitor  effectiveness and compliance, and to report deficiencies or weaknesses in  its internal control system through a report called the annual assurance  statement, which is provided each year to the OSD Office of the Director  of Administration and Management. DOD uses additional techniques in  its general oversight of JIEDDO, such as the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s  review and approval of certain high-dollar counter-IED initiatives.  However, JIEDDO’s annual assurance statement is the key mechanism  DOD relies upon to comprehensively and uniformly summarize and  monitor internal control system status within its organizations—including  JIEDDO—and, more importantly, to report and elevate unresolved  deficiencies to higher levels within and outside of DOD for awareness and  action. However, DOD’s limited oversight system for JIEDDO has not fully  addressed control weaknesses present at JIEDDO since its first year of  operation. Further, JIEDDO did not detail these control weaknesses in  either of its first two annual statements of assurance in 2007 and 2008 or in  its third and most recent statement of assurance completed in July 2009.  The 2009 assurance statement established a 3-year timeline with  incremental milestones to develop and implement a complete internal  management control program by the end of fiscal year 2012. In our report  we plan to issue in early 2010, we will present a fuller assessment of  JIEDDO’s management control processes, and will make  recommendations as appropriate.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while JIEDDO has taken important steps to  improve its management of DOD’s counter-IED efforts, DOD continues to  face a number of challenges in its effort to gain full visibility over all  counter-IED activities, coordinate the transition of JIEDDO initiatives, and  clearly define the types of training initiatives it will fund. Additionally,  JIEDDO’s approval process for counter-IED initiatives poses significant  challenges to its ability to provide full transparency and accountability  over its operations. All of these challenges highlight the need for DOD to  evaluate the effectiveness of its current oversight of all counter-IED efforts  across the department, yet the consistent collection of reliable  performance data is one of JIEDDO’s greatest challenges. With improved  internal controls, JIEDDO will be in a better position to ensure that it is in  compliance with applicable law and its resources are safeguarded against  waste. If these issues are not resolved, DOD’s various efforts to counter  IEDs, including JIEDDO, face the potential for duplication of effort,  unaddressed capability gaps, integration issues, and inefficient use of  resources in an already fiscally challenged environment, and the  department will lack a basis for confidence that it has retained the  necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the long term.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to  answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future questions about this statement, please contact me on (202) 512- 8365 or SolisW@GAO.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include Cary Russell, Grace Coleman, Kevin Craw, Susan Ditto,  William Horton, Richard Powelson, Tristan To, Yong Song, and John  Strong.
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