Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border
Published: 2010-05-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)--a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides agents and officers to support SBI. As requested, this statement summarizes (1) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on SBI's technology, known as SBInet (including such things as cameras and radars), and DHS's recent actions on SBInet; and (2) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, and the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its operational impact. This statement is based on products issued from 2007 through 2010, with selected updates as of April 2010. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports and funding and interviewed DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since the inception of SBInet, GAO has reported on a range of issues regarding design and implementation, including program challenges, management weaknesses, and cost, schedule, and performance risks; DHS has largely concurred with GAO's recommendations and has started to take some action to address them. For example, in October 2007, GAO testified that the project involving the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border had fallen behind its planned schedule. In a September 2008 testimony, GAO reported that CBP plans to initially deploy SBInet technology along the southwest border had slipped from the end of 2008 to 2011 and that SBInet would have fewer capabilities than originally planned. As of April 2010, SBInet's promised capabilities were still not operational. Limitations in the system's ability to function have contributed to delays. GAO has also reviewed CBP expenditure plans and found a lack of specificity on such things as planned activities and milestones. GAO made recommendations, including the need for future expenditure plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI program activities. While DHS has concurred with GAO's recommendations, and its expenditure plans have improved from year to year in detail and quality, the plans, including the one for fiscal year 2009, did not fully satisfy the conditions set out by law. Further, in September 2008, GAO made recommendations to address SBInet technological capabilities that were ambiguous or in a state of flux. DHS generally concurred with them. In January 2010, GAO reported that the number of new system defects identified over an 17 month period while testing was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of defects being fixed, not indicative of a maturing system. Given the program's shortcomings, in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered an assessment of the program, and in March 2010, the Secretary froze a portion of the program's fiscal year 2010 funding. GAO plans to report in May 2010 on the SBInet solution and the status of its September 2008 recommendations. CBP has completed deploying most of its planned tactical infrastructure and has begun efforts to measure its impact on border security, in response to a GAO recommendation. As of April 2010, CBP had completed 646 of the 652 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest border. CBP plans to have the remaining 6 miles of this baseline completed by December 2010. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.6 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. In a September 2009 report, GAO recommended that to improve the quality of information available to allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure's contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, in April 2010, told GAO that the Homeland Security Institute had undertaken this analysis.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to submit this statement on the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program—a multiyear,  multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing  illegal immigration. Securing the nation’s borders from illegal entry of  aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass  destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, DHS  announced the launch of SBI to help address this challenge. The U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) supports this initiative by providing  agents and officers to patrol the borders, secure the ports of entry, and  enforce immigration laws. In addition, CBP’s SBI program is responsible  for developing a comprehensive border protection system using  technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure—fencing, roads,  and lighting—along the southwest border to deter smugglers and aliens  attempting illegal entry. Since fiscal year 2005, SBI has received funding  amounting to about $4.5 billion. Approximately $1.6 billion has been  allocated to SBInet and $2.6 billion to tactical infrastructure.
SBInet is to consist of surveillance technologies, such as sensors, cameras,  and radars, as well as command, control, communications, and  intelligence (C3I) technologies, including software and hardware to  produce a Common Operating Picture (COP)—which, among other things,  presents a display of activities within specific areas along the border at  CBP command centers. SBInet technology is to be initially deployed in  two geographic areas—referred to as Tus-1 and Ajo-1—that jointly span 53  miles of the Tucson sector. In September 2006, CBP awarded a 3-year  contract to the Boeing Company, with three additional 1-year options for  the development and deployment of SBI projects. In September 2009, CBP  extended its contract with Boeing for the first option year. As of December  2009, CBP had awarded 13 task orders to Boeing for a total amount of  approximately $1.2 billion. Table 1 is a summary of the task orders  awarded to Boeing.
In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, DHS  originally planned to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing  and 300 miles of vehicle fencing by December 31, 2008. Pedestrian fencing  is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing the border and vehicle  fencing consists of physical barriers meant to stop the entry of vehicles. In  September 2008, DHS revised its goal, committing instead to having 661  miles either built, under construction, or under contract by December 31,  2008. As of January 2010, DHS officials told us that due to engineering and  hydrology constraints, the agency revised its goal to 652 miles. Although  some tactical infrastructure exists in all the southwest border sectors,  most of what has been built through the SBI program is located in the San  Diego, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley sectors.
My statement is based on our extensive body of work on SBI over the last  3 years, including our most recent reports in September 2009 and January  2010 and selected updates we conducted in April 2010. All told, we have  issued 16 reports and testimonies that collectively address the SBI  program. As requested, our statement (1) summarizes the findings and  recommendations from our SBInet reports, and DHS’s recent actions on  the program; and (2) summarizes the findings and recommendations from  our reports on tactical infrastructure and describes the extent to which  CBP has deployed the SBI tactical infrastructure program and assessed its  operational impact. Detailed information on the scope and methodology  for each of the reports used to prepare this statement appears in the  respective reports. To update our September 2009 report, we reviewed  recently available DHS documents, including current program schedules,  status reports, and funding information. We determined that funding and  fencing mileage data provided by CBP were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this statement. We based our decision on an assessment of  each respective area by questioning cognizant DHS officials about the  source of the data and policies and procedures used to maintain the  integrity of these data. All of the work supporting this statement was  performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: SBInet Program Challenges, Management Weaknesses, and Cost, Schedule, and Performance Risks Exist
paragraphs: Since the inception of SBInet, we have reported on a range of issues  regarding program design and implementation. For example, in October  2007, we testified that DHS had made some progress in implementing  Project 28—the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest  border—but had fallen behind its planned schedule. In our February 2008  testimony, we noted that although DHS accepted Project 28 and was  gathering lessons learned from the project, CBP officials responsible for  the program said it did not fully meet their expectations and would not be  replicated. We also reported issues with the system that remained  unresolved. For example, the Border Patrol, a CBP component, reported  that as of February 2008, problems remained with the resolution of  cameras at distances over 5 kilometers, while expectations had been that  the cameras would work at twice that distance. In our September 2008  testimony, we reported that CBP had initially planned to deploy SBInet  technology along the southwest border by the end of 2008, but as of  February 2008, this date had slipped to 2011 and that SBInet would have  fewer capabilities than originally planned.
In September 2009, we reported that SBInet technology capabilities had  not yet been deployed and delays required the Border Patrol to rely on  existing technology for securing the border, rather than using the newer  SBInet technology planned to overcome the existing technology’s  limitations. As of April 2010, SBInet’s promised technology capabilities  are still not operational and delays continue to require Border Patrol to  rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using the  newer SBInet technology planned to overcome the existing technology’s  limitations. When CBP initiated SBInet in 2006, it planned to complete  SBInet deployment along the entire southwest border in fiscal year 2009,  but by February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016. The first  deployments of SBInet technology projects are to take place along 53  miles in the Tucson border sector, designated as Tus-1 and Ajo-1. As of  April 7, 2010, the schedule for Tus-1 and Ajo-1 had slipped from the end of  calendar year 2008 as planned in February 2008, and government   acceptance of Tus-1 was expected in September 2010 and Ajo-1 in the  fourth quarter of calendar year 2010.
Limitations in the system’s ability to function as intended as well as  concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in  environmentally sensitive locations have contributed to these delays.  Examples of these system limitations include continued instability of the  cameras and mechanical problems with the radar at the tower, and issues  with the sensitivity of the radar. As of January 2010, program officials  stated that the program was working to address system limitations, such  as modifications to the radar. As a result of the delays, Border Patrol  agents continue to use existing technology that has limitations, such as  performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. For example, on the  southwest border, Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such as  cameras mounted on towers that have intermittent problems, including  signal loss. Border Patrol has procured and delivered some new  technology to fill gaps or augment existing equipment.
We have also been mandated to review CBP’s SBI expenditure plans,  beginning with fiscal year 2007. In doing so, in February 2007, we reported  that CBP’s initial expenditure plan lacked specificity on such things as  planned activities and milestones, anticipated costs, staffing levels, and  expected mission outcomes. We noted that this, coupled with the large  cost and ambitious time frames, added risk to the program. At that time,  we made several recommendations to address these deficiencies. These  recommendations included one regarding the need for future expenditure  plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the  capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI  program activities. Although DHS agreed with this recommendation, to  date, it has not been fully implemented. In our June 2008 report on the  fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan, we recommended that CBP ensure that  future expenditure plans include an explicit description of how activities  will further the objectives of SBI, as defined in the DHS Secure Border  Strategic Plan, and how the plan allocates funding to the highest priority  border security needs. DHS concurred with this recommendation and  implemented it as part of the fiscal year 2009 expenditure plan. In  reviewing the fiscal year 2008 and 2009 expenditure plans, we have  reported that, although the plans improved from year to year, providing  more detail and higher quality information than the year before; the plans  did not fully satisfy all the conditions set out by law.
In addition to monitoring program implementation and reviewing  expenditure plans, we have also examined acquisition weaknesses that  increased the risk that the system would not perform as intended, take  longer to deliver than necessary, and cost more than it should. In  particular, we reported in September 2008 that important aspects of  SBInet were ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear  and uncertain what technological capabilities were to be delivered and  when. Further, we reported at that time that SBInet requirements had not  been effectively developed and managed and that testing was not being  effectively managed. Accordingly, we concluded that the program was a  risky endeavor, and we made a number of recommendations for  strengthening the program’s chances of success. DHS largely agreed with  these recommendations and we have ongoing work that will report on the  status of DHS’s efforts to implement them. We reported in January 2010  that key aspects of ongoing qualification testing had not been properly  planned and executed. For example, while DHS’s testing approach  appropriately consisted of a series of test events, many of the test plans  and procedures were not defined in accordance with relevant guidance,  and over 70 percent of the approved test procedures had to be rewritten  during execution because the procedures were not adequate. Among these  changes were ones that appeared to have been made to pass the test  rather than to qualify the system. We also reported at this time that the  number of new system defects identified over a 17 month period while  testing was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of  defects being fixed—a trend that is not indicative of a maturing system  that is ready for acceptance and deployment. Compounding this trend  was the fact that the full magnitude of this issue was unclear because  these defects were not all being assigned priorities based on severity.  Accordingly, we made additional recommendations and DHS largely  agreed with them and has efforts underway to address them.
Most recently, we concluded a review of SBInet that addresses the extent  to which DHS has defined the scope of its proposed SBInet solution,  demonstrated the cost effectiveness of this solution, developed a reliable  schedule for implementing the solution, employed acquisition  management disciplines, and addressed the recommendations in our  September 2008 report. Although we plan to report on the results of this  review later this month, we briefed DHS on our findings in December  2009, and provided DHS with a draft of this report, including conclusions  and recommendations in March 2010. Among other things, these  recommendations provide a framework for how the program should  proceed.
In light of program shortcomings, continued delays, questions surrounding  SBInet’s viability, and the program’s high cost vis-à-vis other alternatives,  in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered a department  assessment of the SBI program. In addition, on March 16, 2010, the  Secretary froze fiscal year 2010 funding for any work on SBInet beyond  Tus-1 and Ajo-1 until the assessment is completed and the Secretary  reallocated $50 million of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act  funds allocated to SBInet to procure alternative tested and commercially  available technologies, such as mobile radios, to be used along the border.  In March 2010, the SBI Executive Director stated that the department’s  assessment ordered in January 2010, would consist of a comprehensive  and science-based assessment of alternatives intended to determine if  there are alternatives to SBInet that may more efficiently, effectively and  economically meet U.S. border security needs. According to the SBI  Executive Director, if the assessment suggests that the SBInet capabilities  are worth the cost, DHS will extend its deployment to sites beyond Tus-1  and Ajo-1. However, if the assessment suggests that alternative technology  options represent the best balance of capability and cost-effectiveness,  DHS intends to immediately begin redirecting resources currently  allocated for border security efforts to these stronger options.
As part of our continuing support to the Congress in overseeing the SBI  program, we are currently reviewing DHS’s expenditure plan for the fiscal  year 2010 Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology  appropriation, which provides funding for the SBI program. Additionally,  we are completing a review of the internal control procedures in place to  ensure that payments to SBInet’s prime contractor were proper and in  compliance with selected key contract terms and conditions. Finally, we  are reviewing controls for managing and overseeing the SBInet prime  contractor, including efforts to monitor the prime contractor’s progress in  meeting cost and schedule expectations. We expect to report on the  results of these reviews later this year.
section_title: SBI Has Completed Deploying Most of Its Planned Tactical Infrastructure and Has Begun Efforts to Measure Its Impact on Border Security
paragraphs: In addition to monitoring SBInet implementation, we also reported on the  tactical infrastructure component of the SBI program. For example, in  October 2007, we reported that tactical infrastructure deployment along  the southwest border was on schedule, but meeting CBP’s fencing goal by  December 31, 2008, might be challenging and more costly than planned.  In September 2008, we also reported that the deployment of fencing was  ongoing, but costs were increasing, the life-cycle cost for fencing was not  yet known, and finishing the planned number of miles by December 31,  2008 would be challenging. We also reported on continuing cost  increases and delays with respect to deploying tactical infrastructure. In  September 2009, we reported, among other things, that delays co ntinued in  completing planned tactical infrastructure primarily because of challenges  in acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners.
GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact  of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009). of deployment and operations and future maintenance costs for the fence,  roads, and lighting, among other things, are estimated at about $6.5 billion.
CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained  agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but  despite a $2.6 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the  impact of tactical infrastructure. CBP measures miles of tactical  infrastructure constructed and has completed analyses intended to show  where fencing is more appropriate than other alternatives, such as more  personnel, but these analyses were based primarily on the judgment of  senior Border Patrol agents. Leading practices suggest that a program  evaluation would complement those efforts. Until CBP determines the  contribution of tactical infrastructure to border security, it is not  positioned to address the impact of this investment. In our September 2009  report, we recommended that to improve the quality of information  available to allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure’s  contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP  conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure  on effective control of the border.
DHS concurred with our recommendation and described actions recently  completed, underway, and planned that it said will address our  recommendation. In April 2010, SBI officials told us that the Homeland  Security Institute was conducting an analysis of the impact of tactical  infrastructure on border security. We believe that this effort would be  consistent with our recommendation, further complement performance  management initiatives, and be useful to inform resource decision making.
This concludes my statement for the record.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this statement, please contact Richard M. Stana  at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. In addition to the contact named above, Frances Cook,  Katherine Davis, Jeanette Espinola, Dan Gordon, Kaelin Kuhn, Jeremy  Manion, Taylor Matheson, Jamelyn Payan, Susan Quinlan, Jonathan Smith,  Sushmita Srikanth, and Juan Tapia-Videla made key contributions to this  statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Secure Border Initiative: Testing and Problem Resolution Challenges Put  Delivery of Technology Program at Risk. GAO-10-511T. Washington, D.C.:  Mar. 18, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and  Performance Limitations that Place Key Technology Program at Risk.  GAO-10-158. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the  Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-1013T.  Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the  Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896.  Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal  Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. GAO-09-274R. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,  2009.
Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. GAO-09-244R.  Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in  Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1086. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in  Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1148T. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 10, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges.  GAO-08-1141T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows  Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS  Accountability. GAO-08-739R. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Oversight  Needed to Improve Complex Service Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-08-765T.  Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment  Needed to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions  GAO-08-263. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying  Lessons Learned to Future Projects. GAO-08-508T. Washington, D.C.: Feb.  27, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet  Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management  Improvements Needed to Control Risks. GAO-07-504T. Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 27, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better  Support Oversight and Accountability. GAO-07-309. Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 15, 2007.
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