NASA Human Space Exploration: Delay Likely for First Exploration Mission
Published: 2017-04-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
NASA is working towards a November 2018 launch date for the first test flight of its three related human space exploration programs: the Orion crew vehicle, the Space Launch System, and the Exploration Ground Systems. However, we found that all three programs face challenges and have little time or money set aside to address potential issues—likely delaying the launch date.
We recommended that NASA report to Congress on whether the launch date is still achievable, and potentially propose a new date, to help ensure that Congress has current information to inform fiscal year 2018 budget and funding decisions.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: NASA is undertaking a trio of closely related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit: the SLS vehicle; the Orion capsule, which will launch atop the SLS and carry astronauts; and EGS, the supporting ground systems. NASA's current exploration efforts are estimated to cost almost $24 billion—to include two Orion flights and one each for SLS and EGS—and constitute more than half of NASA's current portfolio development cost baseline. All three programs are necessary for EM-1 and are working toward a launch readiness date of November 2018. In a large body of work on this issue, including two separate July 2016 reports, GAO has found that these programs have a history of working to aggressive schedules.
The House Committee on Appropriations report accompanying H.R. 2578 included a provision for GAO to assess the acquisition progress of the Orion, SLS, and EGS, programs. This report assesses the extent to which these programs have risks that affect their progress toward meeting their commitments for EM-1. To do this work, GAO assessed documentation on schedule and program risks and interviewed program and NASA officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: With less than 2 years until the planned November 2018 launch date for its first exploration mission (EM-1), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) three human exploration programs—Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)—are making progress on their respective systems, but the EM-1 launch date is likely unachievable as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays. All three programs face unique challenges in completing development, and each has little to no schedule reserve remaining between now and the EM-1 date, meaning they will have to complete all remaining work with little margin for error for unexpected challenges that may arise. The table below lists the remaining schedule reserve for each of the programs.
The programs all face challenges that may impact their remaining schedule reserve. For instance
the Orion program's European Service Module is late and is currently driving the program schedule;
the SLS program had to stop welding on the core stage—which functions as the SLS's fuel tank and structural backbone—for months after identifying low weld strengths. Program officials stated that welding resumed in April 2017 following the establishment of a corrective action plan;
the EGS program is considering performing concurrent hardware installation and testing, which officials acknowledge would increase complexity; and
each program must integrate its own hardware and software individually, after which EGS is responsible for integrating all three programs' components into one effort at Kennedy Space Center.
Low cost reserves further intensify the schedule pressure. Senior NASA officials said they are analyzing the launch schedule and expect that the EM-1 date will have to slip, but they have yet to make a decision on the feasibility of the current date or report on their findings. With budget discussions currently ongoing for fiscal year 2018, the last year prior to launch, Congress does not yet have insight into the feasibility of the EM-1 launch date, or the repercussions that any cost increase or delays could have in terms of cost and schedule impacts for NASA's entire portfolio. Unless NASA provides Congress with up-to-date information on whether the current EM-1 date is still achievable, as of the time the agency submits its 2018 budget request, both NASA and Congress will continue to be at risk of making decisions based on less than the entire picture and on likely unachievable schedules.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: NASA should confirm whether the current EM-1 date is still achievable no later than as part of its fiscal year 2018 budget submission, and propose a new, realistic EM-1 launch readiness date, if warranted, and report its findings to Congress. NASA concurred with both recommendations and agreed that EM-1 will be delayed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is developing  the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) and its first exploration- class heavy-lift launch vehicle—the Space Launch System (SLS)—in over  40 years, along with the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) program that  provides the necessary ground support equipment. While NASA intends  for the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs to provide an important capability  for human exploration missions, the agency’s more recent attempts to  develop vehicles to transport humans beyond low-Earth orbit have  ultimately been unsuccessful. Prior programs have been canceled after  facing acquisition problems and funding-related issues. NASA’s current  exploration efforts are estimated to cost almost $24 billion—to include two  Orion flights and one each for SLS and EGS—and constitute more than  half of NASA’s current portfolio development cost baseline. All three  programs are necessary for the first integrated test flight, Exploration  Mission 1 (EM-1), and are working toward a launch readiness date of  November 2018.
GAO has designated NASA’s management of acquisitions as a high-risk  area for more than two decades. In February 2017, we found that the  agency has maintained progress in reducing risk on major projects after  previously struggling with poor cost estimation, weak oversight, and risk  underestimation. However, we also found that while the Orion, SLS, and  EGS programs are generally better positioned for success than past  crewed vehicle efforts, management weaknesses—including overly  ambitious schedules, unreliable cost estimating, limited reserves, and  operating for extended periods of time without definitized contracts—have  increased the likelihood that the programs will incur schedule delays and  cost overruns, particularly when coupled with the technical risks that are  inherent in any human spaceflight development.
As we have found in our prior work, the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs  have encountered cost and schedule challenges. The House Committee  on Appropriations included a provision in its 2015 report for GAO to  review the acquisition progress of NASA’s human exploration programs,  including Orion, SLS, and ground systems. This report assesses the  extent to which the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs have risks that affect  progress toward meeting their schedule and cost commitments for EM-1.
To assess the programs’ progress against their EM -1 cost and schedule  commitments, we compared current program status data against the  programs’ cost and schedule baselines. To assess the risks for the Orion,  SLS, and EGS programs, we obtained and reviewed quarterly reports and  the programs’ risk registers and met with relevant program and contractor  officials regarding program risks and impacts in order to understand the  programs’ risks, the potential impacts, and program mitigation plans. To  evaluate the programs’ performance in preparing for EM-1, we reviewed  program plans and schedules and compared that data and information to  quarterly program status reviews and program update briefings to assess  whether program components and software were progressing as  expected. We also compared current program data against program  budget information to assess funding needs and cost growth. To assess  the availability of the programs’ cost and schedule reserves, we analyzed  its budget documentation and interviewed program management from all  three programs to discuss the programs’ budget and reserve postures.  For more information on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to April 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directed NASA to develop a Space  Launch System, to continue development of a crew vehicle, and prepare  infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center to enable processing and launch  of the launch system. To fulfill this direction, NASA formally established  the SLS program in 2011. Then, in 2012, the Orion project transitioned  from its development under the Constellation program—a program that  was intended to be the successor to the Space Shuttle but was canceled  in 2010 due to factors that included cost and schedule growth—to a new  development program aligned with SLS. To transition Orion from  Constellation, NASA adapted the requirements from the former Orion  plan with those of the newly created SLS and the associated ground  systems programs. In addition, NASA and the European Space Agency  (ESA) agreed that ESA would provide a portion of the service module for  Orion. Figure 1 provides details about the heritage of each SLS hardware  element and its source as well as identifies the major portions of the  Orion crew vehicle.
The EGS program was established to renovate portions of the Kennedy  Space Center to prepare for integrating hardware from the three  programs as well as launching SLS and Orion. EGS is made up of nine  major components, including: the Vehicle Assembly Building, Mobile  Launcher, software, Launch Pad 39B, Crawler-Transporter, Launch  Equipment Test Facility, Spacecraft Offline Processing, Launch Vehicle  Offline Processing, and Landing and Recovery. See figure 2 for pictures  of the Mobile Launcher, Vehicle Assembly Building, Launch Pad 39B, and  Crawler-Transporter.
NASA established an agency baseline commitment—the cost and  schedule baselines against which the program may be measured—for  each program. NASA has committed to be ready to conduct one test  flight, EM-1, no later than November 2018. During EM-1, the SLS vehicle  is scheduled to launch an uncrewed Orion to a distant orbit some 70,000  kilometers beyond the moon. All three programs—SLS, Orion, and  EGS—must be ready on or before this launch readiness date to support  this integrated test flight. While the SLS and EGS program cost and  schedule baselines are tied to the uncrewed EM-1 mission, the Orion  program’s cost and schedule baselines are tied to a second, crewed  mission—EM-2. See table 1 for program baseline information.
All three programs are entering the integration and test phase of the  development life cycle—which our prior work has shown to be when  problems are commonly found and schedules tend to slip. In general,  programs have schedule and cost reserves in order to address  challenges that arise during development. Funded schedule reserve is  extra time, with the money to pay for it, in the program’s overall schedule  in the event that there are delays or unforeseen problems. Cost reserves  are additional funds that can be used to mitigate problems during the  development of a program. For example, cost reserves can be used to  buy additional materials to replace a component or, if a program needs to  preserve schedule, cost reserves can be used to accelerate work by  adding extra shifts to expedite manufacturing and save time.
section_title: Ongoing Delays Foreshadow a Likely Schedule Slip as NASA Reassesses the Launch Readiness Date
paragraphs: With less than two years until the committed November 2018 launch  readiness date for EM-1, the three human exploration programs—Orion,  SLS, and EGS—are making progress, but schedule pressure is  escalating as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays. All  three programs face development challenges in completing work, and  each has little to no schedule reserve remaining to the EM-1 date— meaning they will have to complete all remaining work with minimal delay  during the most challenging stage of development. This includes  completing design, production, and integration work at each program as  well as integrating the hardware and software from the three programs in  preparation for launch. Integration and testing is the phase where  problems are most likely to be found, and the amount of potential  problems is increased due to the two levels of integration—each  inherently complex program must be integrated individually and then as  an interdependent, combined enterprise. Because all three programs  must be ready for launch to occur, a redesign of a single program’s  component, a test failure, or a significant hardware or software integration  issue in any one area could delay the launch readiness date for all three  programs.
The schedule pressure is intensified by the low levels of cost reserves  held by all three programs to mitigate problems during development. In  some cases, however, even if the programs held higher levels of cost  reserves, using them to gain back schedule would be difficult because— at this late stage of development—work has become more sequential and  there are fewer opportunities for workarounds, which the programs have  relied on until now to preserve schedule. With little to no schedule or cost  reserves remaining as the programs finalize production and enter  integration and testing activities, the EM-1 launch readiness date is in a  precarious position. While NASA officials told us they are assessing  factors that could contribute to an EM-1 schedule slip, they have not  committed to a timeline for completing that assessment or proposing an  amended launch schedule, if needed. Therefore, it is unclear when  Congress will be informed of NASA’s findings and any impact those  findings might have on NASA’s fiscal year 2018 budget request.
Since we last reported on the human exploration programs in July 2016,  the programs have made progress toward completing development,  including the following:
Orion: After changing the heatshield design following a December  2014 test flight in which NASA determined that not all aspects of the  original monolithic design would meet the more stringent requirements  for EM-1 and EM-2 when the capsule will be exposed to greater  temperature variance and longer durations, the Orion program and  contractor reported that production of heatshield blocks is underway  and production quality is very high. Orion officials also stated that the  risks associated with the ESM main engine—a heritage in-space  maneuvering engine from the Space Shuttle program—have been  largely addressed. The program was concerned with the state of  internal components given their age; however, the engines have  completed rounds of acceptance and vibration testing following  replacement of valves and other components. In addition, the program  and contractor stated that they have addressed all probable causes of  crew module airbag anomalies from the December 2014 test flight.  These bags are designed to inflate upon touchdown in the ocean to  properly orient the crew module; however, some did not properly  inflate or leaked due in part to the bags inflating before they were  outside of the vehicle, which placed the bags under stress. While the  root cause for the failures remains unknown, given the mitigation  steps being taken, program officials now have high confidence in the  system’s performance going forward.
SLS: Program officials stated that the solid rocket boosters have  completed the second of two planned qualification tests and that the  program has also implemented a design change to address an issue  where the solid rocket propellant might loosen from the insulation on  the inside of the booster casing, which may increase the risk of  booster failure. The program office is performing analysis to ensure  the mitigation meets expected safety margins. The program is  producing test and flight unit core stage hardware and, according to  program officials, has made progress manufacturing panels which will  be bolted together to create the intertank section of the core stage.  They also stated that early attempts to bend some of the thick  materials necessary for the core stage led to unrepairable cracks, but  the contractor has updated its processes, which has allowed recently  produced panels to pass inspections. The program has also begun  integrated structural testing of its EM-1 in-space propulsion stage,  Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter, and Orion Stage Adapter.
EGS: Program officials stated that work for the Crawler Transporter  and Launch Vehicle Offline Processing facility is complete. In addition,  all 10 of the platforms that will allow access to the integrated SLS and  Orion vehicles during final assembly in the Vehicle Assembly Building  have been installed, according to EGS officials. Additionally, they  have started verification and validation, the process by which the  program assesses whether systems are capable of meeting their  intended purpose and are being developed according to agency  requirements, at the Multi-Payload Processing Facility—where  spacecraft fueling will be performed. Program officials stated that 8 of  the 20 pieces of launch equipment and accessories—for example,  umbilical connections from the launch tower to the vehicle—have  been built, finished testing, and are ready for installation onto the  Mobile Launcher.
The magnitude of the schedule delays that the programs have  experienced amid this progress, however, foreshadows a likely schedule  slip for the November 2018 EM-1 launch readiness date. In addition, each  program is facing risks that will likely consume what little schedule  reserve exists, and low cost reserves limit mitigation options to achieve  the planned launch readiness date. These ongoing challenges include the  following:  Orion: The Orion program has no schedule reserve to EM-1 and the  delivery of the European Service Module (ESM) and completion of flight  software are the primary and secondary critical paths—or the path of  longest duration through the sequence of activities that determines the  earliest completion date—for both Orion and EM-1 as a whole. In  December 2015, Orion officials stated that the program had zero  schedule reserve to EM-1 and we reported in July 2016 that the program  had already experienced several ESM development delays that impacted  the ESM delivery, and that further delays could cause the EM-1 launch to  slip. As of the ESM’s critical design review in summer 2016, ESA has  delayed ESM delivery to the Orion program from January 2017 to April  2017, and senior NASA officials stated the delivery will likely slip to  August 2017 or later. Program officials stated that the delays are largely  due to NASA, ESA, and the ESA contractor underestimating the time and  effort necessary to address design issues for the first production ESM  and the availability of parts from suppliers and subcontractors. For  example, the contractor found welding failures in the ESM’s propulsion  tanks, and a number of parts deliveries have been late.
Orion program officials told us that following delivery from ESA, they will  need the service module for 12 months for integration with the crew  module and testing prior to providing the completed Orion spacecraft to  the ground systems at Kennedy Space Center. This means if ESA’s  delivery date of the service module slips to August 2017, the Orion  program will not be ready to deliver Orion to Kennedy Space Center until  August 2018. NASA officials stated that they would not be able to  maintain a launch readiness date of November 2018 if Kennedy Space  Center receives the Orion spacecraft after July 2018. As a result, the  November 2018 launch readiness date is likely unachievable unless  NASA identifies further mitigation steps to accommodate delays.
In addition, the Orion program faces a number of other technical  challenges including software delays and hardware design, but has  limited cost reserves to address them until fiscal year 2018 when more  cost reserves will be available. As we found in July 2016, the Orion  program continues to employ most of its available budget to fund current  work and holds most of its cost reserves in fiscal years 2019 and 2020.  Program officials told us that the Orion program is schedule-constrained  at this point, meaning that even if additional funding were available, it  could not alleviate all schedule pressure to EM-1.
SLS: The SLS program currently reports having the most program-level  schedule reserve of the three programs—approximately 80 days— however, schedule pressure is mounting as the program completes  production and integration and test events grow near. Development of the  core stage—which functions as the SLS’s fuel tank and structural  backbone—is the program’s critical path, meaning any delay in its  development reduces schedule reserves for the whole program. A  number of important events must successfully take place before the core  stage, or the vehicle at large, are ready for EM-1. First, the contractor is  scheduled to complete production of the core stage flight unit and deliver  it to Stennis Space Center for testing by September 2017. However,  officials stated that they have exhausted schedule reserve for this delivery  date to address “expected unknowns” with hardware processing due to  this being the first time they have built the core stage. Further, according  to officials, welding on the core stage was stopped for months due to low  weld strength in the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks caused by a  program and contractor decision to change the weld tool configuration  during fabrication. The altered configuration produced different welds that  the program has had to confirm are within specification. While officials  indicate that they now have a corrective action plan in place, and welding  resumed in April 2017, they did not provide detail on the impact to  program schedule reserve.
Once production of the core stage flight unit is complete, the program  plans to deliver it to Stennis Space Center for testing. At Stennis Space  Center, the core stage will be filled with cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen  for the first time—a considerable process on its own, as officials stated  they were finding and mitigating hydrogen leaks for the entire life of the  Shuttle program—and will undergo a “green run” test. During the green  run, the core stage flight model—integrated with four RS-25 engines—will  be fired for about 500 seconds to test a flight-like engine-use profile.  Following this, the program has 20 days of reserves—less any delivery  delays and delays from issues that arise during testing—from the  completion of the green run test until it must be shipped to Kennedy  Space Center to begin integration with the boosters, upper stage, and  Orion as well as all EGS equipment. Should further challenges arise  during final production and testing, the program’s 80 days of reserve will  likely be reduced.
As we found in July 2016, NASA baselined the SLS program with cost  reserves of less than 2 percent, even though guidance for Marshall Space  Flight Center—the NASA center with responsibility for the SLS program— establishes standard cost reserves for launch vehicle programs of 20  percent when the baseline is approved. NASA has not changed its cost  reserve posture for this program since that time, meaning the program  still has limited cost reserves to address risks and challenges.
EGS: EGS program officials stated they used the majority of the 6 months  of schedule reserve the program had when we reported in July 2016 to  address, among other issues, complications at the Launch Equipment  Test Facility and with the Mobile Launcher’s ground support equipment  installation. The program now has 28 days of schedule reserve, which  program officials stated is being held for integrated operations before EM- 1, and zero days remaining for any further delays for EGS-specific  projects. Without any schedule margin remaining for the EGS-specific  projects, the program will be challenged to complete its remaining work  that includes umbilical testing, ground support equipment and umbilical  installation, and verification and validation testing. These efforts all carry  schedule risks with expected delays that, if not mitigated, total 14 months.  Program officials stated that they are actively trying to mitigate these  schedule risks; however, they acknowledged that some mitigation tactics  they are considering—such as performing some portion of these efforts  concurrently—increase the complexity of these efforts. In addition, EGS  officials indicated they are planning to consolidate some verification and  validation testing to streamline the test flow, which they said would  increase schedule risk but not technical risk. The program is also  considering implementing additional work shifts to create additional  schedule margin. The internal EGS delays and the cascading delays from  Orion and SLS that EGS may have to absorb—as the program  responsible for final integration of the three programs—contribute to  NASA likely not achieving the November 2018 launch readiness date.
Similar to Orion and SLS, we previously found in July 2016 that the EGS  program is operating with limited cost reserves to address future  construction and software risks. For example, we found that when  NASA approved the program’s baseline, the program had cost reserves  of only 4 percent. While Kennedy Space Center—which is responsible for  the EGS program—does not have cost reserve guidance in place,  guidance from other NASA centers establishes higher levels of cost  reserves at this stage of development. Further, according to EGS  officials, the program used all of its fiscal year 2017 reserves in recent  years, and has limited reserves in fiscal year 2018, hindering EGS’s  ability to address any remaining challenges.
GAO’s work on acquisition best practices has shown that success in  development efforts such as these programs depends on establishing an  executable business case based on matching requirements and  resources before committing to a new product development effort. In our  prior reviews of NASA’s human exploration programs, we have found that  all three programs have been using aggressive schedules and that SLS  and EGS have low reserve levels compared to NASA standards. We  have also previously found that both SLS and Orion cost and schedule  estimates—which inform their cost and schedule baselines—were  unreliable when compared to best practices.
In July 2016, we recommended that the NASA administrator direct the  Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to re-evaluate  SLS and EGS cost reserves as it finalized its schedule and plans for EM- 1 during a planned build-to-synchronization review—in summer 2016—in  order to take advantage of all available time and resources and maximize  the benefit of available cost reserves, and to verify that the November  2018 launch readiness date remained feasible. This review was  intended to demonstrate that the integrated launch vehicle, crew vehicle,  and ground systems will perform as expected to meet EM-1 objectives.  NASA concurred with our recommendation and as of January 2017,  senior NASA officials told us that they have reordered integration activities to try to meet the EM-1 launch schedule, but further analysis  indicates that they will have to delay the launch readiness date. These  officials stated that no decision has been made and NASA has not  committed to a timeline in which to report its findings. Fiscal year 2018 is  the last year before the November 2018 EM-1 launch readiness date.  With fiscal year 2018 budget discussions ongoing, until it receives  updated EM-1 schedule information, the Congress will be in the position  of determining NASA’s appropriations based on a launch readiness date  that is likely not achievable.
Should NASA determine it is likely to exceed its cost estimate baseline by  15 percent or miss a milestone by 6 months or more, NASA is required to  report those increases and delays—along with their impacts—to the  Congress. Given that these three human space exploration programs  represent more than half of NASA’s current portfolio development cost  baseline, a cost increase or delay could have substantial repercussions  for not only these programs but NASA’s entire portfolio. A principle of  federal internal controls is that managers should externally communicate  the necessary quality information to achieve an entity’s objective and  address related risks. If NASA’s ongoing assessment of the November  2018 EM-1 launch readiness date reveals that a new, more realistic, date  is warranted, prolonging any decisions regarding the extent of delays and  cost overruns—no matter the magnitude—until after deliberations on  NASA’s fiscal year 2018 budget request would increase the risk that both  NASA and the Congress continue making decisions potentially involving  hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars based on schedules that may no  longer be feasible.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Human spaceflight and exploration programs are complex and require  significant time and effort to design and develop hardware and software.  While the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs are working toward a target  EM-1 launch readiness date of November 2018, the threats to each  program’s schedule continue to mount, and the schedule reserve of each  program is either very limited or nonexistent. In addition, as the target  EM-1 launch readiness date nears—now less than two years away—the  flexibility of the schedule to allow for replanning is likewise reduced. To  this point, the programs have replanned program-level efforts and  scheduled concurrent work despite the risks involved, and NASA is  replanning integration efforts at the enterprise-level in an attempt to find  additional schedule margin. However, beyond that, the programs have  little to no cost reserves remaining to deal with challenges that may arise.  By continuing to work toward this deadline, these programs are  positioned to make potentially risky decisions in attempting to meet a  schedule that is likely unachievable. Until NASA completes an analysis of  factors that could contribute to an EM-1 schedule slip and reports on the  feasibility of either its current or revised schedule, program managers will  remain under pressure to achieve a goal that may be untenable, and the  Congress will continue to base important budget decisions on an unclear  picture of the time and money needed to support future human space  exploration efforts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to ensure that the Congress is able to make informed resource  decisions regarding a viable EM-1 launch readiness date, we recommend  that the NASA Administrator or Acting Administrator direct the Human  Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following two  actions:
Confirm whether the EM-1 launch readiness date of November 2018  is achievable, as soon as practicable but no later than as part of its  fiscal year 2018 budget submission process; and
Propose a new, more realistic EM-1 date if warranted and report to  Congress on the results of its EM-1 schedule analysis.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: NASA provided written comments on a draft of this report. In the written  comments, NASA concurred with both recommendations and stated that  maintaining the November 2018 launch readiness date is no longer in the  best interest of the programs. Further, NASA stated that it is reassessing  the launch readiness schedule and anticipates proposing a new date by  September 2017. These comments are reprinted in Appendix II. NASA  also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as  appropriate.
In its response, NASA stated that “many of the specific concerns  referenced in the report are no longer concerns, and new ones have  appeared and caution should be used in referencing the report on the  specific technical issues, but the overall conclusions are valid.” We agree  with NASA that the situation with these programs is dynamic and that  risks and challenges change over time. However, in commenting on the  report, NASA did not provide us with evidence that they have overcome  specific technical issues that we highlight. Further, in at least the instance  of the European Service Module, the situation has deteriorated for the  program since we sent the draft copy of the report to NASA for comment.  At the time we sent the report for comment, the delivery date for the  service module was April 2017, and officials anticipated it could slip to  August 2017 or later. The delivery date is now September 2017 with a  risk of an additional 2-month delay. We continue to believe that NASA is  facing several technical issues across all three programs that will  contribute to a delay for Exploration Mission-1.
We are sending copies of this report to NASA’s Acting Administrator and  to appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration’s (NASA) Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion),  Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)  programs have risks that affect their progress towards meeting their  Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) cost and schedule commitments, we  compared current program status information against program cost and  schedule baselines. To assess the risks for the Orion, SLS, and EGS  programs and the extent to which those risks may impact cost and  schedule commitments, we obtained and reviewed quarterly reports and  the programs’ risk registers, which list the top program risks and their  potential cost and schedule impacts, including mitigation efforts to-date.  We interviewed program and contractor officials on technical risks,  potential impacts, and risk mitigation efforts underway and planned. To  evaluate the program’s performance in preparing for EM-1, we reviewed  program plans and schedules and compared them to actual program  performance data found in quarterly program status reviews and program  update briefings to assess whether program components and software  were progressing as expected. We also compared current program data  against program budget information to assess funding needs and cost  growth. To determine the programs’ cost and schedule posture and to  assess the availability of the programs’ cost and schedule reserves  approaching EM-1, we analyzed its budget documentation, interviewed  program officials from all three programs with insight into the programs’  budget and schedule and discussed how reserves were being used to  mitigate known risks. Our work was performed at Johnson Space Center  in Houston, Texas; Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama;  Kennedy Space Center in Titusville, Florida; Lockheed Martin Space  Systems Company in Houston, Texas; and NASA headquarters in  Washington, DC.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to April 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Cristina T. Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, LaTonya Miller (Assistant  Director), Molly Traci (Assistant Director), Juli Digate, Susan Ditto, Laura  Greifner, Carrie Rogers, Ryan Stott, Roxanna T. Sun, and Marie Ahearn  made key contributions to this report.