Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities
Published: 2009-09-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) began developing and rapidly fielding a global Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of elements that include radars, interceptors, and command and control systems. These elements are envisioned to be linked together to defend against a broad range of ballistic missile threats. In 2009, DOD began a broadly scoped review of missile defense policy and strategy intended to reassess the BMDS and set direction for the future. In response to congressional interest in missile defense requirements and operations, GAO reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the types and quantities of elements and interceptors it needs and (2) established the units to operate elements that have been put into use. GAO reviewed key analyses, studies, plans, and other documents from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the services, combatant commands, and Joint Staff; and interviewed officials from across DOD.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD lacks the comprehensive analytic basis needed to make fully informed decisions about the types and quantities of elements and interceptors it needs. Such an analytic basis would include a comprehensive examination of the optimal mix of elements and interceptors needed to meet all of DOD's ballistic missile defense requirements. DOD studies prepared to date were completed for specific purposes, such as addressing regional threats. However, none of the studies have taken a comprehensive approach that addressed the full range of requirements. The Joint Staff conducted studies, for example, to identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain ballistic missile defense elements designed to defend against short-to-intermediate-range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have analyzed their ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific regions, and the services have studied requirements for specific elements. Without a full assessment of its overall requirements, DOD lacks the information it needs to make the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for ballistic missile defense. DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into operational use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be fielded with a full complement of organized and trained personnel. To rapidly field missile defenses, however, DOD has in some cases put ballistic missile defense elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military services had created units and trained servicemembers to operate them. Three of the eight elements were modifications to existing systems, like the Navy's Aegis ships, so units already existed to operate these modified elements. The five remaining elements--the midcourse defense system designed to defend the United States from long-range threats; the high-altitude, theater missile defense system; a powerful radar placed on a sea-based, movable platform; ground-based radars currently fielded in Japan and Israel; and the command and control system designed to link the BMDS together--were put into use before operational units were fully established. As a result, DOD has faced a number of challenges. For example, the Army faced personnel shortfalls to operate the midcourse defense system. These shortages affected the Army units' ability to support ongoing research and development activities and ultimately resulted in operational readiness concerns. MDA and the military services are taking steps to establish the needed forces, but this may take years for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that operational units be in place before new elements are made available for use. Looking ahead, several new elements are in development, like the radars and interceptors currently being considered for deployment in Europe, and emerging threats could again cause DOD to press those capabilities into use. Unless fully trained units are in place to support missile defense elements when they are made operational, DOD will continue to face uncertainties and operational risks associated with the elements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized the  development and fielding of a globally integrated, interconnected, and  layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of “elements”  that include radars, interceptors, and command and control systems,  which together are to be capable of addressing all ranges of threatening  ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. With the submission of the fiscal  year 2010 defense budget to Congress, DOD announced its intention to  strike a new balance between developing new ballistic missile defense  capabilities and fielding what it believes to be proven and effective  weapon systems. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) $7.8 billion budget  request for fiscal year 2010 emphasized the fielding of specific BMDS  elements to defend against near-term threats from rogue states and threats  to U.S. forces and population centers abroad. For example, the Secretary  of Defense announced that DOD’s budget request added $900 million to  more rapidly acquire and field the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense  (THAAD) and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) elements and  their associated interceptors, while reducing investments in some  developmental programs designed to address longer-term threats. As the  military services increasingly take responsibility from MDA for these and  other elements as they transition from research and development to  operations, the cost to the services for operating and maintaining ballistic  missile defense elements is likely to grow; typically, such costs account for  70 percent of a weapon system’s life-cycle costs.
To assist the subcommittee in its review of DOD’s approach to acquiring,  fielding, and operating ballistic missile defenses, you asked us to review  DOD’s overall requirements to perform worldwide ballistic missile defense  missions. We focused on the types and quantities of ballistic missile  defense elements (including inventories of interceptors) and the  organizations, personnel, and training needed to operate these elements.  Specifically, in addressing its overall force structure requirements, we  reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the types and  quantities of ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors that it  needs for performing ballistic missile defense missions and (2) established  the units to operate elements that have been put into use. To determine  the extent to which DOD has identified the types and quantities of ballistic  missile defense elements and interceptors that it requires, we identified,  obtained, and reviewed key MDA and Joint Staff studies identifying  ballistic missile defense requirements. We performed our analysis by  comparing DOD’s analytical and funding approaches for ballistic missile  defense against criteria for establishing a knowledge-based approach to  acquiring major weapon systems, which provides evidence that  warfighting requirements are valid and can be met with chosen concepts  that are developed and produced within existing resources. The  documentation we reviewed also included direction and guidance from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and MDA; MDA plans  for developing ballistic missile defenses; and direction from the Deputy  Secretary of Defense outlining the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process.  To determine the extent to which DOD has established the units needed to  operate ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into use, we  identified, reviewed, and assessed MDA development plans and fielding  schedules, Joint Staff orders, and U.S. Strategic Command processes and  plans for evaluating the operational performance of ballistic missile  defense capabilities. The scope of our analysis included those ballistic  missile defense elements that have been delivered to the combatant  commands for operational use as of July 2009. For both objectives, we  interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint  Staff, MDA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. We also obtained documentation  from key geographic combatant commands to understand their  operational requirements for ballistic missile defense elements and service  forces, the processes for establishing these requirements, and any  challenges they have had or expect to encounter in obtaining the  capabilities and forces that they need for operations. The combatant  commands we visited were U.S. Strategic Command and the four  geographic combatant commands—U.S. Central Command,   U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific  Command—that have participated in U.S. Strategic Command’s advocacy  efforts to identify desirable characteristics and capabilities for the BMDS.  We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 2002, the President reinforced ballistic missile defense as a national  priority and directed DOD to proceed with plans to develop and put in  place an initial capability beginning in 2004. To expedite the delivery of an  operationally capable BMDS, in 2002 the Secretary of Defense established  MDA, granted the agency expanded responsibility and authority to develop  globally integrated capabilities, directed it to manage all ballistic missile  defense systems then under development, and transferred those systems  controlled by the military services to the agency. The systems transferred  from the services and the new systems whose development MDA initiates  are all considered to be ballistic missile defense elements.
Since its creation in 2002, MDA has developed, fielded, and declared ready  for operations an increasingly complex set of ballistic missile defenses  designed to defend the United States, deployed forces, allies, and friends  from limited ballistic missile attacks. By leveraging existing service  weapon systems and developmental concepts, MDA fielded an initial  defensive capability beginning in 2004 to defend the United States from a  limited, long-range ballistic missile attack. This initial defensive capability  included the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system of interceptors and  fire control systems, Upgraded Early Warning Radars, sea-based radars  installed aboard Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and an early version of the  Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)  element. MDA first made these elements available for operations in April  2005 by establishing the initial BMDS operational baseline. DOD first put  these elements to operational use by activating them in 2006 in response to  North Korean ballistic missile activity. Since that time, DOD has added  some elements to the operational baseline while declaring others ready for  contingencies. Table 1 identifies the fielding locations and dates that MDA  first delivered operational elements to the combatant commands as of   July 2009.
As table 1 indicates, DOD has designated lead services for seven of the  eight elements that have been delivered to the combatant commands for  operational use; MDA currently plans to retain control of the eighth  element delivered to date—C2BMC—and not transition it to a single lead  service. Lead military services are expected to provide the rest of the  military force structure—the organizations, personnel, and training— required for operations as the elements become more technically mature.
Lead military services are also expected to begin funding operational and  support costs as elements transition from MDA to the services.
To develop ballistic missile defense capabilities, MDA both modified  existing service weapon systems to perform ballistic missile defense  missions and developed new elements, many based on previously existing  concepts, expressly for ballistic missile defense purposes. For example,  MDA developed the Upgraded Early Warning Radar and Aegis BMD  elements as modifications to existing service weapon systems, whereas  MDA developed the Ground-based Midcourse Defense and THAAD  elements based on developmental programs transferred to MDA in 2002.  MDA has spent about $56 billion since 2002 to develop these assets.  Additionally, MDA’s fiscal year 2010 budget request proposes to develop  more advanced Aegis BMD interceptors capable of addressing  intermediate-range ballistic missile threats, enhance the C2BMC element’s  capabilities, and undertake other developmental initiatives, including  research into ascent phase technologies. These developments are likely  to affect both element quantities and service force structure requirements  as MDA begins to field these capabilities.
MDA, under the direction and oversight of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, is responsible for evaluating  ballistic missile defense capabilities to determine which elements are  ready to perform military operations, giving the Secretary of Defense the  option of activating elements for operational use. Under MDA’s approach,  an element is first available for crisis and contingency operations when it  has achieved Early Capability Delivery, based upon MDA’s assessment of  element-level tests and its determination that the element’s employment  will not degrade other operational ballistic missile defenses. According to  MDA’s current approach, an Early Capability Delivery declaration is the  first point at which an element is made available for operational  employment in defense of the United States and U.S. allies. Subsequently,  MDA declares when an element is added to the operational baseline by  declaring that it has achieved Partial Capability Delivery, and is capable of  day-to-day operations, or Full Capability Delivery meaning that the  element is able to sustain operations over longer periods. In May 2009,  MDA updated its approach to making capability declarations so that it  considers not only the agency’s own developmental assessments, but also  a U.S. Strategic Command-led assessment of the element’s capabilities and  limitations under operational conditions. MDA’s first capability review  under this new approach is expected to occur later in 2009.
Oversight of MDA is executed by the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Because MDA is not subject to  DOD’s traditional joint requirements determination processes and because  it utilizes flexible acquisition practices, DOD developed alternative  oversight mechanisms. For example, in 2007 the Deputy Secretary of  Defense established the Missile Defense Executive Board, which is to  provide the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics or Deputy Secretary of Defense, as necessary, with a  recommended ballistic missile defense strategic program plan and feasible  funding strategy for approval. In September 2008, the Deputy Secretary of  Defense also established the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process, and  directed the board to use the process to oversee the annual preparation of  a required capabilities portfolio and develop a program plan to meet the  requirements with Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation;  procurement; operations and maintenance; and military construction in  defensewide accounts.
DOD is currently undertaking a review of its approach and requirements  for ballistic missile defenses. In the Duncan Hunter National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Congress required DOD to  prepare a review of the ballistic missile defense policy and strategy of the  United States. Among other matters, the congressionally mandated review  is to address the full range of ballistic missile threats to the United States,  deployed forces, friends, and allies; the organization, discharge, and  oversight of acquisition for ballistic missile defense programs; roles and  responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies,  combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military departments  in such programs; DOD’s process for determining the force structure and  inventory objectives for ballistic missile defense programs; the near-term  and long-term affordability and cost-effectiveness of such programs; and  the role of international cooperation on missile defense in the ballistic  missile defense policy and strategy of the United States. Congress required  DOD to provide a report on its review by January 31, 2010.
This report is one in a series of reports we have issued on ballistic missile  defense that have identified key acquisition, management, and operational  challenges associated with the development of the BMDS. In August 2009  we published a report identifying actions that DOD needs to take to  improve planning and to increase the transparency of total costs for the  proposed European Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar  elements. In March 2009, we issued our sixth annual assessment of  DOD’s progress in developing the BMDS; this report concluded that  although MDA had shown the benefits of its flexible acquisition practices  by fielding and improving upon an initial ballistic missile defense  capability since 2005, this approach also has limited the ability of DOD and  congressional decision makers to measure MDA’s progress on cost,  schedule, testing, and performance. In September 2008, we found that  although DOD had begun preparing for BMDS operations and support,  difficulties in transitioning these responsibilities from MDA to lead  services had complicated long-term planning to operate and support the  elements over their life cycle. In July 2008, we reported that DOD had  taken some steps to address the combatant commands’ ballistic missile  defense needs, but had yet to establish an effective process for identifying  and addressing the overall priorities of the combatant commands when  developing ballistic missile defense capabilities. We reported in May 2006  that DOD had begun preparations to operate ballistic missile defenses,  such as identifying lead services, but had not established the criteria that  must be met before the BMDS can be declared operational.
section_title: DOD Identified Its Initial Ballistic Missile Defense Needs but Has Not Determined Its Overall Ballistic Missile Defense Requirements
paragraphs: DOD has identified its needs for establishing an initial and evolving  ballistic missile defense capability, but lacks the comprehensive analytic  basis needed to make fully informed decisions about the overall mix of  elements and interceptors that it requires. A knowledge-based decision- making approach can help to provide the comprehensive analytic basis  needed to establish missile defense policies and strategies and determine  funding priorities. For ballistic missile defense, such an approach would  require full examination of the optimal type and quantity of various  ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors needed to meet all of  DOD’s requirements—a complex task due to the many factors that should  be considered, including the evolving nature of the threat and emerging  technologies. For example, the same mix of Aegis BMD ships and THAAD  batteries provides different defensive coverage depending on whether the  elements are acting autonomously or are integrated with another X-band  radar. However, DOD’s assessments of missile defense requirements  prepared to date were limited in scope primarily because they were  prepared for specific purposes. The Joint Staff, for example, conducted  studies to identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain  ballistic missile defense elements designed to defend against short-to- intermediate-range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have  analyzed their ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific  regions, and the services have studied requirements for specific elements.  Without a comprehensive analytic basis that identifies the full range of  operational type and quantity requirements for ballistic missile defense  elements, DOD may not be acquiring the optimized mix of elements and  interceptors that would provide the most effective missile defense.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Identified the Types and Quantities of Ballistic Missile Defense Elements Needed for an Initial and Evolving Defensive Capability
paragraphs: MDA identified how many and what type of ballistic missile defense  elements were needed to begin fielding an initial set of capabilities in 2004  and to evolve the BMDS over time. Directed by the President in 2002 to  begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities in 2004, MDA  undertook the major early assessments that established DOD’s initial and  evolving ballistic missile defensive capability, which formed the  foundation of the current BMDS. According to a February 2004 MDA  briefing, the initial defensive capability prepared in response to the  President’s policy direction included the Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade, the  Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar, up to 20 ground-based interceptors  located in Alaska and California, command and control in Colorado, and  sea-based radars deployed aboard Aegis ships. Additionally, based on the  President’s policy direction and direction from the Secretary of Defense,  also issued in 2002, MDA planned to expand the initial capability over  time. To do so, MDA conducted internal studies and developed plans in  2002, 2003, and 2004 that identified the quantities of elements and  interceptors it needed for research and development purposes and to  defeat long-range ballistic missiles from rogue states. As of February 2005,  these studies resulted in plans for fielding 48 ground-based interceptors to  address the long-range ballistic missile threat, with 36 of the interceptors  planned for fielding in Alaska, 2 in California, and 10 in Europe. The  studies also resulted in plans to establish a network of sensors—including  radars aboard Aegis ships and land-based radars in North America, Asia,  and Europe. Additionally, MDA planned to build up to 48 THAAD  interceptors and 101 Aegis BMD interceptors by the end of calendar year  2011 as part of its efforts to develop and field capabilities to defeat short-,  medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. However, these initial  plans did not define DOD’s overall requirements for ballistic missile  defense elements and interceptors. In particular, MDA’s analyses were  primarily focused on addressing the requirements of an initial and evolving  ballistic missile defense capability and were not intended to address all of  DOD’s operational requirements for performing ballistic missile defense  missions worldwide.
section_title: Determining the Quantity of Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and Interceptors Required for All Missions Involves Many Factors
paragraphs: Establishing requirements for ballistic missile defense involves balancing  several interrelated factors. A comprehensive analytic basis would include  determining the optimum types and numbers of ballistic missile defense  elements and interceptors for performing missile defense missions  worldwide. However, optimizing the quantities of each element and  interceptor involves many factors, including the integration of various  types of ballistic missile defense elements, various risk assessments, the  potential contributions of friends and allies, optimizing elements that can  address multiple threats, and the evolving nature of the threat and  emerging technologies. Our prior work shows that a knowledge-based  decision-making process can help to provide the comprehensive analytic  basis needed for establishing funding priorities, including determining the  affordability of DOD’s missile defense policies and strategies. A  knowledge-based decision-making process includes providing decision  makers with evidence that warfighting requirements are valid, that they  can be met with the chosen weapon system designs, and that the chosen  designs can be developed and produced within existing resources.
subsections: section_title: Integrated Elements Are More Effective Than Elements Operating Independently
paragraphs: Optimizing the numbers and types of each element and interceptor needed  involves looking across the BMDS to see how the different elements can  best work together as an integrated system. According to the Director of  MDA, the integration of the many ballistic missile defense elements into a  system makes the BMDS more effective than would the individual  elements operating independently. Integration may include improving  systems integration among elements, adding a different type of  interceptor, adding a sensor, or a combination of these and other options  in order to increase a defended area. For example, figure 1 illustrates how  the same mix of Aegis BMD ships and THAAD batteries provides vastly  different defensive coverage depending on whether the elements are  acting autonomously (smaller coverage) or are integrated with a radar  (larger coverage). Increased integration could therefore affect  requirements, perhaps lessening the quantity of elements needed to defend  an area. However, Air Force officials told us that the cost of integrating  elements could be high enough in some circumstances that it may be more  efficient to purchase additional elements and interceptors.
Assessments of the threat and other risk assessments are also factors  affecting overall requirements for the types and quantities of missile  defense elements and interceptors. According to the Director of MDA,  optimizing the size and type of the ballistic missile defense force requires  an operational risk assessment of the adversary’s ballistic missile arsenal  that would have to be engaged. It also requires understanding the  capabilities and limitations of BMDS elements needed to counter these  threats, an understanding that continues to improve with additional  testing. For example, the required number of ground-based interceptors  needed to defend the United States from long-range threats would be  affected if additional testing were to reveal an increase or decrease in the  expected capability of that type of interceptor. Office of the Secretary of  Defense and U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that risk  assessments should also consider the extent to which different kinds of  elements and interceptors provide redundant coverage. Air Force officials  added that redundant capabilities should be considered when optimizing  force structure, stating that even if there were a single element that could  provide defensive coverage for an entire region, an optimized force  structure may include additional elements so that the area would still be  defended if the original element were incapacitated.
section_title: Allied Contributions Can Affect Quantity Requirements
paragraphs: The extent to which the United States can depend upon contributions  from friends and allies also can affect the determination of DOD’s  optimized ballistic missile defense force structure. For example, U.S.  Central Command officials told us that coordination with friends and allies  on ballistic missile defenses and their purchase of ballistic missile defense  elements and interceptors may allow the command to reorient its forces to  fill other gaps. Similarly, U.S. Pacific Command told us that close ballistic  missile defense cooperation with Japan has improved overall ballistic  missile defense protection in the command’s area of responsibility,  allowing the command to expand protection of critical assets. The  Director of MDA testified before Congress in June 2009 that if cooperative  efforts with Russia were successful in integrating some radar facilities, it  could enhance the ability of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and  California. Finally, in regard to the proposed ballistic missile defense sites  in Europe, DOD and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have  been exploring ways to link U.S. missile defense assets with NATO’s  missile defense efforts. In April 2008, NATO declared its intention to  develop options for a comprehensive missile defense architecture to  extend coverage to all allied territory and populations not otherwise  covered by the proposed U.S. system.
section_title: Some Elements Are Designed to Defend against Multiple Threats or Perform Different Missions
paragraphs: A key factor affecting the requirements for some elements is that they are  designed to address multiple types of ballistic missile threats. For  example, potential choices about whether to use the interceptors based in  Europe as a reserve to defend the United States or to use them to intercept  all incoming long-range threats regardless of the intended target could  significantly affect how many ground-based interceptors would be needed  overall. Similarly, the Aegis BMD element was designed to provide search  and track capabilities to help the Ground-based Midcourse Defense  element defend the United States, and as a stand-alone element capable of  defending deployed U.S. forces and population centers abroad from  shorter-range threats. In addition, Navy and U.S. Pacific Command  officials told us that Aegis ships are also in high demand to perform other  maritime missions, such as antisubmarine warfare. As a result, the use of  Aegis ships as ballistic missile defense weapon systems may constrain the  ability of combatant commanders to use those ships for other purposes  without increasing the size of the available force structure. In coming  years, as the Aegis BMD element takes on new roles to intercept   longer-range missiles that are targeting the United States, regional  combatant commanders who rely on the Aegis ships for multiple missions  may be further constrained in how they deploy those assets. Consequently,  even as the Aegis BMD element becomes more capable, requirements for  Aegis force structure may increase in order to satisfy the multiple  missions.
section_title: Changes in Threat and Evolving Missile Defense Technology Will Likely Affect Future Requirements
paragraphs: The evolving nature of the threat and emerging technologies also have  implications for the quantity requirements for ballistic missile defense  elements and interceptors. For example, MDA reported to Congress in  July 2009 that the requirement for emplaced ground-based interceptors  was reduced, in part, because the original intelligence estimate of the  number of missiles that the ground-based interceptors were intended to  counter was later assessed to be off by 10 to 20 missiles. Similarly,  improvements in BMDS capabilities affect requirements. For example, the  Director of MDA testified before Congress in May 2009 that new ascent  phase capabilities will eliminate the need for the Multiple Kill Vehicle  program and would reduce overall the number of ballistic missile defense  interceptors needed to defeat an attack.
section_title: DOD’s Analyses to Date Have Been Limited in Scope
paragraphs: Our review of DOD’s analyses of its type and quantity requirements for  ballistic missile defenses show that the studies prepared to date have been  limited in scope and did not create the comprehensive analytic basis for  making programwide decisions about policies, strategies, and investments.  MDA’s initial analyses were completed for the purpose of establishing an  initial and evolving set of ballistic missile defense capabilities, not to  determine DOD’s overall operational requirements. Similarly, we found  that the assessments of ballistic missile defense quantity requirements  conducted by other DOD organizations were prepared for specific  purposes:    The Joint Staff conducted two analyses beginning in 2006 that identified a  minimum baseline need to double the number of THAAD and Aegis BMD  interceptors planned in the fiscal year 2008 budget as well as a need for an  additional THAAD battery and an upgraded AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar  with self-defense capability. The Joint Staff focused on THAAD and Aegis  BMD interceptor inventory requirements because production decisions for  additional interceptors needed to be made in DOD’s fiscal year 2010 future  years’ funding plan in order to avoid the possibility of closing down  production. Combatant commands were also voicing a demand for these  capabilities in order to protect deployed U.S. forces and population  centers abroad. The Joint Staff characterized the studies as an “initial  mark on the wall” because the studies made assumptions that tended to  drive down the identified quantities in the baseline. For example, the  studies did not factor in quantities needed for spares, training, testing, or  in transit; assumed the lack of enemy countermeasures; and assumed that  ballistic missile defense command and control systems would work  perfectly under operational conditions. Acknowledging these limitations,  Members of Congress and DOD officials nevertheless have cited the Joint  Staff studies as identifying the requirement for boosting THAAD and Aegis  BMD quantities and affecting DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget request.
The geographic combatant commands regularly assess their individual  requirements for ballistic missile defense forces, but these analyses are  limited in scope to each command’s unique area of responsibility, as  assigned by the President. For example, U.S. Central Command officials  told us that their requirements for ballistic missile defenses are driven by  the need to protect against short- to medium-range threats from within the  command’s own theater. U.S. Northern Command officials told us that  their requirements for ballistic missile defense forces are driven primarily  by the command’s need to protect against long-range strikes from states  outside of their area of responsibility. U.S. Northern Command conducted  an independent three-phase study on where to field ground-based  interceptors that included looking at the operational benefits of an  interceptor site located in the eastern United States in order to augment  the planned European Interceptor Site. However, this study did not  address whether MDA’s budgeted requirement of ground-based  interceptors—which at the time of the study included 44 interceptors in  the United States and 10 in Europe—was sufficient to meet the command’s  requirement.
The military services have also started to perform assessments on ballistic  missile defense quantity requirements, but these assessments have been  limited in scope and do not attempt to optimize the number of ballistic  missile defense elements and interceptors worldwide. For example, in  2007, the Navy completed a study assessing its requirement for making  Aegis ships capable of performing the ballistic missile defense mission.  Based on the study’s findings, the Navy concluded that the entire Aegis  fleet should have this capability and that ballistic missile defense was a  core Navy mission. However, the Navy neither attempted to assess the  requirements for the number and type of interceptors to be used aboard  these ships, nor scoped the assessment to try to vary the mix of other  elements and interceptors in order to optimize the number of Aegis BMD  ships. For example, the Navy did not vary the number of THAAD, Patriot  Advanced Capability-3, AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, or other elements  in order to see if that affected the requirement for Aegis BMD ships. The  Army also recently undertook a short-turnaround study to identify  whether it is a better option to maintain the THAAD battery procurement  plan outlined in the fiscal year 2010 budget or to buy fewer batteries and  instead develop and field a more capable THAAD interceptor. The Army  study intends to explore different options for gaining the same capability  that a new interceptor could provide, including placing THAAD  interceptors forward of the battery and operating them remotely, as well  as the use of sea- and land-based Aegis BMD interceptors. However, Army  officials told us that while the study is looking at several combat  scenarios, it is not intended to establish the global quantity requirements  for THAAD or establish a global optimum mix of joint BMDS elements and  interceptors.
section_title: DOD Has Opportunities to Establish What Type and How Many Elements and Interceptors Are Needed for All Missions and to Refine Ballistic Missile Defense Policy
paragraphs: Having prepared various but limited assessments of ballistic missile  defense quantity requirements to support an initial and evolving ballistic  missile defense capability, DOD now has the opportunity to build upon  these studies to better define its overall requirements for ballistic missile  defense elements and interceptors. The newly established BMDS Life  Cycle Management Process, which DOD has started using to prepare an  annual capabilities portfolio and program plan to meet requirements, has  broadened the participation of stakeholders from across DOD in  developing the annual budget proposal for ballistic missile defense  capabilities development, operations, and support. The Life Cycle  Management Process is designed to allow DOD to balance long-term and  near-term needs by reviewing ballistic missile defense capability  developments as a portfolio. However, to date the Missile Defense  Executive Board, which oversees the process, has not commissioned a  broad-based analysis of DOD’s overall requirements, and instead has  depended on more limited analyses of quantity requirements to inform its  deliberations over the missile defense budget. For example, in preparing  DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget proposal, and again in beginning to prepare  for the fiscal year 2011 proposal, the board relied on the Joint Staff’s  limited analysis of THAAD and Aegis BMD requirements. The Joint Staff is  completing additional studies focused on the impact of countermeasures  on ballistic missile defenses and plans on studying how ballistic missile  defense and air defense can be integrated. However, according to Joint  Staff officials, these studies do not assess ballistic missile defense  requirements in their entirety. As part of the congressionally mandated  review of ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, DOD expects to  examine, among other things, the appropriate balance among elements to  defend against ballistic missiles of all ranges; the role of allied  contributions; and options for defending Europe from Iranian ballistic  missile defense attack. The review is required to be completed by January  2010 and is expected to inform future budget requests. Given its broad  charter and short time frame, the review is not expected to include an  underpinning, comprehensive analysis of all requirements. However, the  policy and strategy review could potentially lead to revised ballistic  missile defense requirements.
section_title: Force Structure Not Fully in Place for Some Units Operating Ballistic Missile Defense Elements
paragraphs: DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of the  eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into operational  use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be fielded with a  full complement of organized and trained personnel. To defend against  potentially catastrophic threats posed by rogue states armed with ballistic  missiles, however, DOD has in some cases put ballistic missile defense  elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military  services had created units and trained servicemembers to operate them.  DOD had in place operational units to operate the three elements that  were based on existing service weapon systems, such as Aegis ships and  Air Force early warning radars that were upgraded to take on ballistic  missile defense capabilities. However, the five remaining elements that  have been put into operational use represent new capabilities designed  expressly for ballistic missile defense purposes and for which new  operational units had to be created. As a result, early fielding meant that  units were not fully in place and required, in some cases, that personnel be  temporarily assigned or borrowed from other organizations when the  elements are put into operational use to address these potential threats.  For example, the Army has faced personnel shortfalls to operate the  Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, which necessitated  augmentation with personnel from the Army National Guard to overcome  operational readiness concerns. These personnel shortages primarily  resulted from the need for Army units to participate in MDA research and  development activities, which are important to improving the element’s  capabilities. MDA and the military services are taking steps to establish the  forces needed for operations, but this may take years for some elements.  DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting elements into early use,  but has not set criteria requiring that operational units be in place before  new elements are made available for use. In the future, emerging threats or  crises could again require DOD to press developmental capabilities into  use. However, until DOD reconsiders its approach to making elements  available for operational use before the units are fully organized, manned,  and trained to perform all of the missions they will be expected to  execute, the combatant commanders will lack certainty that the forces can  operate the elements as expected.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense Has Focused on Early Fielding of Capabilities
paragraphs: DOD’s approach to ballistic missile defense development differs from its  standard weapons development process in order to stress the early  fielding of new capabilities. DOD practices for developing military  capabilities typically require that major weapon systems complete  developmental activities and then be fielded with a full complement of  organized and trained personnel so that servicemembers are capable of  operating the systems on behalf of the combatant commands. DOD  customarily prepares planning documents that identify organizational,  personnel, and training requirements that must be established before a  new weapon system can be declared operational for the first time. These  requirements typically include an assessment of the military specialties  needed; identification of personnel requirements; and the development of  individual, unit, and joint training programs. The individual services also  typically require the establishment of an operational unit that is manned  with trained servicemembers before new weapon systems are used  operationally. According to Army officials, the Army declares new weapon  systems to be initially operational only after units have been activated and  soldiers have completed collective training requirements for operating the  systems. Navy and Air Force practices also emphasize establishing the  organizations, personnel, and training needed to operate a weapon system  before it is declared operational.
DOD adopted a unique acquisition approach for ballistic missile defense  capabilities in order to meet the President’s direction to begin fielding in  2004 an initial capability to defend against ballistic missiles that may carry  weapons of mass destruction. In establishing MDA, the Secretary of  Defense directed it to use prototype and test assets to provide early  capability, if necessary, and improve the effectiveness of deployed  capabilities by continuing research and development activities and  inserting new technologies as they become available. Further, the  Secretary gave MDA the flexibility to field ballistic missile defense systems  in limited numbers when available, and to base production decisions on  test performance. Although the Secretary directed that the services  provide forces to support ballistic missile defense operations, he also  canceled the services’ requirements documentation prepared for   then-developmental programs—such as THAAD and Ground-based  Midcourse Defense—because the service-generated requirements were not  consistent with the BMDS developmental objectives. Additionally, the  Secretary directed that BMDS development would not be subject to DOD’s  traditional joint requirements determination processes and would utilize  certain flexible acquisition practices until a mature ballistic missile  defense capability had been developed and was ready to be handed over to  a military service for production and operation. Consequently, the services  initially had little basis on which to determine force structure  requirements for some ballistic missile defense elements, even as MDA  began to develop elements and add them to the BMDS operational  baseline.
section_title: Units Are in Place to Operate Existing Systems That Were Modified for Ballistic Missile Defense
paragraphs: Our analysis determined that the units operating the existing service  systems that were modified for ballistic missile defense have been  organized, manned, and trained to execute their ballistic missile defense  capabilities. Such systems make up three of the ballistic missile defense  elements that DOD first put into operational use by activating them in 2006  in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile threat:    Upgraded Early Warning Radars. Air Force early warning radars, such as  those at Beale Air Force Base and Royal Air Force Base Fylingdales,  United Kingdom, were first developed and operated in the Cold War. As  these radars have been modified for ballistic missile defense missions, the  Air Force assigned responsibility to the 21st Space Wing for operating the  Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar, while the United Kingdom has  agreed to provide forces to operate and maintain the Fylingdales radar.  The Air Force has provided stand-alone training equipment to train and  qualify site personnel at the two Upgraded Early Warning Radars that DOD  has already declared operational, and has certified that operational crews  are fully trained at these radar sites. The Air Force has made similar  preparations to begin operating a third Upgraded Early Warning Radar,  located at Thule, Greenland, later in 2009.
Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade. In accepting the transfer of the Cobra Dane  Radar Upgrade from MDA, which was approved by the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in February 2009, the  Air Force agreed to continue to manage the radar on behalf of its multiple  missions and stakeholders, while MDA agreed to fund missile defense  mission-specific operations and maintenance training and to assist the Air  Force in identifying mission-specific operations costs. MDA also is  providing maintenance support through fiscal year 2013, when  maintenance support becomes an Air Force-funded responsibility.
Aegis BMD. Aegis BMD-capable ships are operated by the Navy, and the  Navy supports those ships through existing service-based infrastructure  and processes. Servicemembers have been initially qualified on the  ballistic missile defense mission through existing Navy commands and  according to Navy practices. The Navy updated its training and personnel  requirements and relied on established procedures to certify the  performance of Aegis crews to perform the full range of Aegis BMD  missions.
section_title: Units Operating Newly Developed Ballistic Missile Defense Elements Have Not Been Fully Organized, Manned, and Trained for All Tasks
paragraphs: Our analysis determined that DOD has not yet put into place operational  units that are fully organized, manned, and trained to execute all of their  ballistic missile defense responsibilities for the remaining five ballistic  missile defense elements, which were designed expressly for ballistic  missile defense and thus required DOD to create new units. In order to  address existing and emerging threats, DOD used flexible acquisition  practices to make these elements available for operational use before the  services were fully ready to operate them. However, without fully  established organizations, personnel, and training, these units faced  challenges in dealing with the rapid fielding of elements, the ongoing  research and development activities involving fielded elements, and the  lack of an established force structure for operating the BMDS command  and control system.
subsections: section_title: Rapid Fielding of Elements Has Challenged Operational Units
paragraphs: Operational units have faced challenges resulting from the rapid fielding of  elements before the units have had all of the necessary organizations,  personnel, and training in place. For example, the Army had only a few  months after being named lead service to organize and train a detachment  for managing the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which MDA fielded in  Japan and added to the BMDS operational baseline in September 2006. In  contrast, the Army generally requires years to organize an operational unit,  establish personnel requirements, and train servicemembers for operating  a new weapon system. The rapid fielding required the Army to deploy  soldiers without a complete and approved force structure for sensor  management operations when MDA added the radar to the baseline. For  example, the Army did not yet have a program to train Army soldiers; to  mitigate this shortfall, MDA provided the first group of Army sensor  managers with an orientation of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar and of  the radar management software then in use. A U.S. Army Space and  Missile Defense Command official told us that the initial servicemembers’  orientation lacked the requirements, curriculum, training devices,  standards, and evaluations that are generally expected to be in place as  part of an initial qualification training course when the Army fields a new  weapon system. As a result of the Army’s initiative, the initial sensor  managers developed their own tactics, techniques, and procedures for  managing the radar before the Army had in place a training course to  qualify servicemembers in sensor management. Since that time, the Army  has established a training course, which has graduated a sufficient number  of servicemembers projected to meet combatant command needs.
Despite the Army’s successes in training servicemembers, DOD still faces  interrelated organizational and personnel challenges for the sensor  management of the second AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which MDA  fielded in Israel and made available for contingency operations in  November 2008. At the time DOD fielded the radar, the Europe-based  Army unit responsible for sensor management operations lacked both the  organizational structure and sufficient personnel to perform these  functions on a continual basis. Rather, the unit was organized and  manned to perform air and missile defense operations on behalf of   U.S. European Command, including command and control operations of  Patriot air and missile defense forces, and air and missile defense  operational and exercise planning. To minimize the potential risk to the  unit’s primary missions as it performed the newly assigned sensor  management operations, the Air Force has deployed servicemembers, at  U.S. European Command’s request, and will deploy them throughout 2009  to augment the unit. However, these deployments have not fully addressed  the stress to the unit. In March 2009, the Commander, U.S. European  Command, testified that the unit’s increasing requirements were “a moving  target” and would demand considerable flexibility to identify and resource  them in the near- to mid-term. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense  Command officials told us that the Army has established an operational  unit in its force structure planning system to provide sensor management  for the second AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar; however, the officials  added that the Army has not activated the unit because DOD has not  determined whether the radar will be permanently fielded in Israel.
The Sea-based X-Band Radar was first declared available for contingencies  in 2008, and has been made operational for brief periods, without the full  Navy force structure in place. Unlike Aegis BMD, which is based on  existing Navy ships and support systems, the Sea-based X-Band Radar is a  new system. In March 2007 the Navy agreed in principle to become the  lead service for the Sea-based X-Band Radar, which could transfer to the  Navy as early as 2011. However, to transfer to the Navy, the Sea-based   X-Band radar element must pass a Navy inspection; and the combatant  commands must determine not only that the element can perform all of its  assigned missions, but also that the operator crew understands its current  capabilities and limitations. Additionally, the Navy has agreed to the  transfer of the element as long as funds for operating it are also  transferred to the Navy; however, as we testified in March 2009, the  transfer agreement does not specify how these funds will be transferred to  the Navy in the long term. Further, the Navy had yet to determine  personnel requirements for the radar. To mitigate the potential risk of an  incomplete force structure before the radar transfers, MDA has provided  contractor personnel to support day-to-day operations, as needed.
MDA also declared the THAAD element to be available for contingencies  in September 2008, and the Secretary of Defense activated the element in  the Pacific region twice during 2009, before the Army had the opportunity  to fully establish the unit that will operate the first THAAD battery. The  Army activated a unit of 99 soldiers in 2008 to operate the first THAAD  battery, but does not expect to complete the training and organizational  activities needed to fully establish the unit and declare an initial  operational capability until late in fiscal year 2010. As a result,   U.S. Pacific Command and other combatant commands are operating the  element during contingencies with a unit composed of a mix of MDA  personnel, contractors, and Army soldiers. According to MDA’s August  2008 assessment of the element’s capabilities and limitations at the time it  was declared available for contingencies, the nonstandard unit lacks  experience in tactical operations, has not completed collective training,  and requires significant external support. Despite these force structure  limitations, a U.S. Pacific Command official told us that the command  requires THAAD in the event of a crisis. Further, Army and MDA officials  told us that Army’s approach to prepare forces to operate THAAD has  been closely coordinated with MDA’s schedule to acquire the element.  Army officials added that the Army modified its approach from standard  Army practices to more rapidly achieve an initial operational capability.  However, Army officials told us that until the Army fully establishes the  force structure to operate THAAD, the combatant commands may  overestimate the Army’s preparedness to deploy an operational unit to  defend U.S. forces and population centers during a drawn out contingency.  As a result, the benefit of rapidly fielding THAAD could be offset by the  risks associated with depending on a unit that does not have the full  complement of organized and trained personnel.
section_title: Operational Units Have Faced Challenges Caused by Ongoing Research and Development Activities
paragraphs: Operational units have also faced challenges resulting from ongoing  research and development activities for which the units have not been  organized, manned, and trained. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense  Command officials told us that involving operational units in BMDS  research and development activities can be beneficial because it allows  the lead service and operational personnel to directly affect an element’s  development. Like other BMDS elements, the Ground-based Midcourse  Defense element was put into operational use to address existing threats,  but is also simultaneously being tested and refined by MDA. Consequently,  the Army units responsible for operating the element are also responsible  for sending operational crews to participate in MDA-sponsored tests of  new capabilities, such as upgraded versions of the Ground-based  Midcourse Defense element’s fire control software. However, like most  other Army units, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense units are not  organized, manned, and trained for tasks such as the testing associated  with research and development activities. As a result, the Commanding  General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, concluded in  May 2009 that the units’ mismatch between the available crews and  mission responsibility was creating an adverse impact on their operational  readiness and performance of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense  mission. Lacking additional crews and funding, the Commanding General  determined that the units’ operational requirements would preclude them  from fully contributing to MDA’s developmental efforts, which in turn  would have a negative impact on both the operational crews’ readiness  and the efforts to rapidly develop the Ground-based Midcourse Defense  element. To address this mismatch, the Army has agreed to temporarily  activate Army National Guard soldiers to augment the units’ personnel.  However, the Army has not solved the long-term mismatch between  operational requirements and available personnel, and has requested that  U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command evaluate and present  alternatives for meeting the long-term requirements that the mission  entails.
Ongoing research and development, as well as upgrades to elements, also  create uncertainty about the preparedness of some operational units to  operate elements under realistic conditions. For example, as new versions  of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element’s fire control software  are installed, Army soldiers operating the software typically complete their  initial qualification training, and crews are certified, according to standard  Army practices. However, in August 2008, following the Army’s  participation in an MDA test using high-fidelity modeling and simulation  capabilities, U.S. Northern Command determined that the existing training  equipment provided by MDA did not adequately simulate how other  ballistic missile defense elements interact with the fire control system. As  a result, the Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command, stated that the  Army’s operational crews would no longer be certified on the fire control  software until the crews had access to training systems that better  reflected the operational behavior of BMDS elements. Since that time,  MDA has installed an upgraded training system for Army operators to use.  U.S. Northern Command officials stated to us that the upgraded training  system is an improvement over the prior capability, and the Army units  were using the upgraded system to train servicemembers on the next  version of the fire control software. Officials from the 100th Brigade, U.S.  Strategic Command, and MDA told us that MDA delayed declaring the  upgraded fire control capability to be operational until the units had an  opportunity to train on the upgraded operational system. However, as of  July 2009 the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, had not determined  whether the upgraded training capabilities were sufficient to certify the  crews for operations.
section_title: DOD Plans for Establishing the Force Structure for the BMDS Command and Control Element Are Unclear
paragraphs: MDA retains lead responsibility for the command and control element, or  C2BMC, unlike the other ballistic missile defense elements, which are  being made part of the military services’ force structure. According to  MDA, retaining responsibility of C2BMC helps the agency control the  configuration of the element as it is upgraded to more capable versions.  Therefore, none of the services have been required to create units, train  personnel, or provide servicemembers to the combatant commands to  operate the C2BMC element. However, unlike the services, MDA lacks the  responsibility for providing forces to support military operations. As a  result, the combatant commands have had to identify and organize C2BMC  operators from within their existing resources by drawing upon  servicemembers who are already deployed to the commands for other  warfighting responsibilities.
MDA has provided personnel and training to support the combatant  commands’ C2BMC operational requirements, but additional steps are  needed to ensure that the combatant commands’ needs are met. The  C2BMC element is the integrating element that makes the BMDS a global  system by providing combatant commanders with communications links,  real-time battle information to make decisions, and a planning capability  to optimize the fielding of ballistic missile defense forces on a global scale.  It is also used to perform sensor management of the AN/TPY-2 forward- based radar, and future C2BMC versions are expected to have the  capability to control additional sensors. To help meet the combatant  commands’ operational needs, MDA has trained hundreds of  servicemembers who were already assigned to the combatant commands;  through the end of 2008, MDA trained more than 200 personnel at   U.S. Pacific Command and the Navy Pacific Fleet, 250 personnel at   U.S. Northern Command, and more than 175 personnel at U.S. Strategic  Command. MDA also deploys its own personnel to 26 locations around the  world to help the combatant commands and other users operate the  element. However, according to U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense  Command officials, the inability to identify and request additional  personnel from the services to operate the C2BMC element creates a  potential personnel shortfall in combatant commanders’ operations  centers, which may become acute during a crisis when there are not  enough personnel to effectively perform all required activities. Officials  from U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the   U.S. Pacific Command-based Army unit using the C2BMC element also  told us that the detachment responsible for managing the AN/TPY-2  forward-based radar can become overtaxed by the responsibility to  operate the C2BMC element for other functions and purposes.
Though none has been designated the lead service for the C2BMC element,  the Army, Navy, and Air Force have started preparing to support the  organizational, training, and personnel requirements to operate ballistic  missile defense command and control and battle management systems.  Such requirements could grow as MDA continues to add functions to the  C2BMC element. Although the services have not established personnel  requirements for operating the C2BMC system, DOD officials told us that  future versions of the software may require crews of up to five personnel  per shift. Moreover, at present MDA trains only individual  servicemembers, not crews, to operate the C2BMC system. Furthermore,  as of July 2009, the services’ effort to establish requirements for the  C2BMC element is in its very early stages. Until the services determine  their respective requirements for manning and training for the C2BMC  element, operational risks and impacts will persist.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Evaluate Operational Capabilities and Limitations, but Potential Risks Remain When Elements Are First Declared Operational
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to evaluate the operational capabilities and  limitations of ballistic missile defenses when they are first made available  for operations. DOD recognized the potential operational risk of using  developmental ballistic missile defense elements for military operations  following the fielding of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar to Japan in  2006. In 2006, we also recommended that DOD develop operational criteria  for evaluating ballistic missile defense elements before the Secretary of  Defense declares the elements operational. We found that without such  criteria, the Secretary of Defense lacked a baseline against which to  objectively assess the combatant commands’ and services’ preparations to  conduct ballistic missile defense operations. Moreover, we found that  lacking clear criteria, DOD may have difficulty determining whether the  return on its significant development investment in the BMDS can be  realized. Since our report was issued, U.S. Strategic Command’s functional  component for integrated missile defense has developed and begun  evaluating ballistic missile defense elements against operational criteria to  help the combatant commands and element operators understand the  capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense elements as they are  added to the BMDS operational baseline. However, these criteria were not  designed to evaluate the extent to which the services had fully established  the organizations, training, and personnel needed to operate ballistic  missile defense elements.
In May 2009, MDA updated its BMDS Master Plan to more fully consider  the extent to which the services are developing the organizations,  personnel, and training needed for operations when declaring that an  element has achieved Early Capability Delivery, which is the first point  where the element is made available for operational employment in  defense of the United States or U.S. allies. MDA’s plan incorporates  reviews of the elements’ performance under the commands’ operational  criteria before the MDA Director makes capability delivery declarations.  The updated plan also states that MDA will support service and combatant  command requirements for new equipment training, unit training, and  certification, and that MDA will provide appropriate training facilities and  support. These steps could help coordinate the services’ force structure  development with MDA’s capability delivery schedule in the future.  However, MDA’s updated plan does not require that organizations,  personnel, and training of the operational unit be in place before MDA  makes an Early Capability Delivery declaration, or before the Secretary of  Defense subsequently activates the element.
The tension between the early fielding of ballistic missile defense  capabilities and the desirability of preparing units to operate these  capabilities was reflected in the views expressed by officials from across  DOD during our review. Officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense told us that MDA’s flexibility to shift resources when developing  and fielding ballistic missile defenses has allowed DOD to employ ballistic  missile defense capabilities more quickly than if the services had been  responsible for their development. Such flexibilities continue to reflect the  urgency and national priority of the ballistic missile defense mission.  However, they stated that it was appropriate to consider a ballistic missile  defense element to be part of the respective service’s force structure when  MDA declared that the element had achieved Early Capability Delivery.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, and Army  officials emphasized the need to establish a lead service early in  development and to provide adequate lead time to establish an operational  force structure before operating elements. For example, Army officials  told us that the Army has established the operational units needed to  perform ballistic missile defense missions, but agreed that the previous  lack of coordination with MDA on the timing of fielding missile defense  elements and declaring them operational has been problematic. Navy  officials told us that the Navy does not recognize distinctions among  MDA’s capability delivery declarations; the Navy does not consider a  ballistic missile defense element to be operational until the element has  been fully incorporated into the Navy force structure. A U.S. Pacific  Command official told us that some crises could require DOD to put  developmental capabilities to operational use, adding that shifting  emphasis to the establishment of the services’ force structure could delay  the availability of ballistic missile defense capabilities to the combatant  commanders. However, the official agreed that it was reasonable for DOD  to ensure that the services had fully established the units’ organizations,  personnel, and training needed to operate ballistic missile defenses before  the elements were declared available for operations, provided that such  assurances reflected a broader shift in DOD’s policy goals from fielding  systems quickly to the more deliberate development of capabilities that  can be readily operated over sustained periods.
Better linkage between force structure development and element fielding  plans is important because the currently configured BMDS is the starting  point for additional capabilities and elements that await future  deployment. For example, MDA plans to field and declare operational  additional AN/TPY-2 forward-based radars; although the Army now has in  place the units to operate these radars in its force structure plans, the  Army requires time to activate these units and prepare them for  operations. Similarly, although both the Army and the Air Force have  started planning to operate the proposed European Interceptor Site and  European Midcourse Radar elements, which would be fielded in Europe to  defend against ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East, both  services will require time to prepare the operational units in order to be  ready when MDA completes the development and fielding of these  systems. Additionally, DOD’s fiscal year 2010 missile defense budget  proposal shifts emphasis toward developing new ascent phase capabilities,  which are expected to intercept ballistic missiles before they can release  countermeasures to defeat U.S. defenses. As DOD makes this shift, MDA  and the services will need to closely coordinate their efforts in order to  avoid the challenges that affected the operations of elements that have  been previously fielded.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors of various types are in  demand from the geographic combatant commands, but DOD faces a high  price tag to develop, acquire, operate, and support ballistic missile defense  capabilities over the long term. Thus far, decisions regarding the shape  and structure of the BMDS have been made based on policy first  established in 2002 and on limited analyses of force structure options.  DOD’s analyses to date have helped the department understand some of  its requirements and inform its policies, but these analyses are incomplete  and have not covered the full range of ballistic missile defense missions.  DOD’s ongoing review of its ballistic missile defense policy and strategy  provides a good opportunity for DOD to reassess its ballistic missile  defense priorities and needs. However, the review is moving forward  without the benefits that a comprehensive assessment of DOD’s quantity  requirements would provide. Lacking the solid foundation of a   knowledge-based, comprehensive analytic basis for making decisions,  which includes careful assessments of DOD’s overall ballistic missile  defense quantity requirements, DOD will continue to lack crucial data it  needs to make the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions  for ballistic missile defense.
Making BMDS elements available for operational use before units were  fully established reflected DOD’s sense of urgency to rapidly field defenses  against potentially catastrophic threats. However, now that some ballistic  missile defenses are in place, the risk of putting additional elements in use  before operational units are fully established must be weighed against the  marginal benefits, absent an imminent threat. Looking forward,  reassessing this approach is important because DOD has several elements  in development that may be fielded in coming years, including additional  forward-based radars, the interceptors and radars that are planned for  fielding in Europe, and new elements associated with ascent phase  intercept.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To establish the foundation needed to make effective policy, strategy,  budgetary, and acquisition decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense take the following two actions:    Direct the preparation and periodic updating of a comprehensive analysis  of the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense elements and  interceptors that are required for performing ballistic missile defense  missions worldwide. The analysis should consider the integration of  elements; risk assessments of the threat, capabilities and limitations of the  BMDS, and redundancy requirements; allied contributions; the  employment of elements that can perform multiple types of ballistic  missile defense missions and other missions; and any other relevant  factors identified by the department.
Use this analysis as a foundation for evaluating DOD’s ballistic missile  defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future budget requests  as well as its overall ballistic missile defense policy and strategy direction.
To reduce the potential risks associated with operating ballistic missile  defense elements with insufficient force structure, we further recommend  that the Secretary of Defense require, in the absence of an immediate  threat or crisis, that operational units be established with the  organizations, personnel, and training needed to perform all of their  ballistic missile defense responsibilities before first making elements  available for operational use.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred  with one and concurred with two of our recommendations. DOD’s  comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical  comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to prepare and  periodically update a comprehensive analysis of the types and quantities  of ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors that are required for  performing ballistic missile defense missions worldwide. In its comments,  DOD validated the need for a comprehensive and recurring analysis. DOD  indicated that the ongoing ballistic missile defense review will develop the  strategic themes and analytic bases to be used in future analyses. DOD  also noted the interrelationships between ballistic missile defense and air  defense, and that a comprehensive assessment must include these  defenses. Moreover, DOD stated that decisions related to ballistic missile  defenses must factor in the priorities of other government agencies, like  the State Department. In our recommendation, we stated that DOD should  consider any other relevant factors it identifies, and the inclusion of air  defense and priorities of other government agencies can reasonably be  seen as such relevant factors. DOD intends to perform a detailed  assessment for ballistic missile defense requirements during each  Quadrennial Defense Review cycle and once in the intervening years.  Overall, we generally agree with DOD’s suggested approach to implement  our first recommendation; such steps, if taken, would meet its intent.
In its response to our second recommendation that DOD use the  comprehensive analysis as a foundation for future ballistic missile defense  budget requests as well as setting policy and strategy direction, DOD  concurred and indicated that this analysis would be used to shape ballistic  missile defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future budget  requests, and to shape overall ballistic missile defense policy, strategy, and  future deployment options. However, until DOD conducts this detailed  assessment of its overall ballistic missile defense quantity requirements, it  will continue to lack crucial data needed to make policy, strategy, and  budgetary decisions.
DOD concurred without comment with our third recommendation to  require, in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that operational  units be established with the organizations, personnel, and training needed  to perform all of their ballistic missile defense responsibilities before first  making elements available for operational use. Our recommendation  recognizes that facing an immediate threat or crisis, DOD may need to  field elements without first fully establishing operational units. However,  now that some ballistic missile defenses are in place, we continue to  believe that DOD must carefully weigh the risk of putting additional  elements in use before operational units are fully established against the  marginal benefits of rapid fielding.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Chiefs of Staff and  Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, this report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: During this review, we evaluated the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  assessments, prepared since 2002, of the types and quantities of ballistic  missile defense elements required for ballistic missile defense missions,  and DOD’s efforts to establish the units to operate elements that have been  put into use through July 2009. To determine the extent to which DOD has  identified the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense elements that  it requires, we identified, obtained, and reviewed key guidance, studies,  and analyses from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Missile Defense  Agency (MDA), the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, other combatant  commands, and the military services. These documents included  memorandums from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DOD  Directive 5134.9, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), dated October 9, 2004,  which established MDA and directed the development of the Ballistic  Missile Defense System (BMDS); Office of the Secretary of Defense budget  guidance establishing the goals and objectives of the BMDS; and direction  from the Deputy Secretary of Defense establishing the Missile Defense  Executive Board and BMDS Life Cycle Management Process. We obtained  and reviewed classified briefings summarizing MDA studies, including the  September 26, 2002, Missile Defense Agency Response to Defense  Planning Guidance Tasking; the October 26, 2004, briefing titled Missile  Defense Capability; and the March 23, 2007, European Site Technical  Rationale. We confirmed with MDA officials that these studies constituted  the key initial MDA analyses outlining the types and quantities of elements  and interceptors constituting the BMDS. We also obtained and reviewed  unclassified briefings summarizing MDA’s 2002-2004 plans to establish an  initial and evolving defensive capability against ballistic missile threats. To  understand the Joint Staff’s roles and contributions to determining DOD’s  quantity requirements for ballistic missile defense elements and  interceptors, we obtained and reviewed briefings summarizing the Joint  Staff’s studies of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) and Terminal  High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) quantity requirements, including the  2006 Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Capability Mix Study and the  subsequent Ballistic Missile Defense Joint Capability Mix II and  Ballistic Missile Defense Joint Capability Mix Sensitivity Analysis  studies. To understand how these studies were used to develop MDA’s  fiscal year 2010 budget request, we obtained and reviewed key  memorandums from the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense. We also obtained and reviewed guidance approved by the Deputy  Secretary of Defense establishing the Joint Staff’s and U.S. Strategic  Command’s roles to develop analytical studies that are to be used as the  basis for developing annual BMDS budget proposals. From U.S. Strategic  Command, we obtained and reviewed Strategic Command Instruction  538.3, Warfighter Involvement Process, dated June 2008, and the 2007  Prioritized Capabilities List to help us to understand the command’s role  in identifying and advocating for BMDS quantity requirements. We also  used the U.S. Strategic Command documentation to identify key  geographic combatant commands with ballistic missile defense  requirements. These commands are U.S. Central Command, U.S. European  Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. We then  obtained and reviewed briefings and other documents to understand the  extent to which these commands had identified quantity requirements for  ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors. We also identified and  reviewed Army and Navy analyses to identify the quantities of key  elements. We analyzed DOD’s various studies by comparing them with  criteria for establishing a knowledge-based approach to acquiring major  weapon systems, which we established based on our prior work on  knowledge-based acquisition and on DOD documentation. We also met  with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, MDA  headquarters and element program offices, key geographic combatant  commands, U.S. Strategic Command, and each of the military services to  discuss DOD’s efforts to establish type and quantity requirements for  ballistic missile defense force structure, their respective roles and  responsibilities in preparing such analyses, and the challenges of doing so.
To determine the extent to which the military services have established  the units needed to operate ballistic missile defense elements, we  performed our work at each of the military services, MDA, the Office of  the Secretary of Defense, and key combatant commands. During our work  at each of the services, we adopted an element-by-element approach to  review the progress made by each service:    To review the extent to which the Air Force has established units for  operating the Upgraded Early Warning Radars and the Cobra Dane Radar  Upgrade, we obtained and reviewed Air Force plans for declaring the  Beale and Fylingdales radars operational. We obtained Air Force  memorandums declaring whether the radars had met Air Force  operational criteria for being considered initially operational. We also met  with officials from the Air Force Air Staff and Air Force Space Command,  and submitted questions to Air Force Space Command, which provided us  with written responses. We also reviewed an agreement between the Air  Force and MDA describing each organization’s roles and responsibilities  upon the transfer of the Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade from MDA to the Air  Force.
To review the extent to which the Navy has established the force structure  for Aegis BMD and Sea-based X-Band Radar elements, we obtained and  reviewed Navy certifications of the Aegis BMD capability and the Pacific  Fleet’s December 2008 draft Sea-based X-Band Radar Concept of  Operations. We also reviewed an agreement between MDA and the Navy  describing each organization’s roles and responsibilities for providing  operational forces for the Sea-based X-Band Radar until the radar  transfers to the Navy. We also met with Navy officials from the Office of  the Chief of Naval Operations and from the Office of the Commander,  Pacific Fleet.
To review the extent to which the Army has established units with the  required organizations, training, and personnel for the Ground-based  Midcourse Defense, THAAD, and AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar elements,  we reviewed documentation establishing each of the Army units covered  by our review. We obtained and reviewed Army doctrine for THAAD and  Ground-based Midcourse Defense operations and the Army’s 2009-2013  and 2010-2015 force structure plans. We obtained and reviewed key   U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command documentation regarding  a command initiative to review and update the force structure for   Ground-based Midcourse Defense. We met with officials from the Army  staff, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 100th Missile  Defense Brigade, 49th Missile Defense Battalion, Forward-based X-Band  Radar Detachment, 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and  357th Air Defense Artillery Detachment.
In addition to our work at the services, we also met with officials from  MDA to discuss the agency’s perspectives and contributions to the ballistic  missile defense force structure, particularly for the Command, Control,  Battle Management, and Communications element. We submitted  questions to each element program office and received written responses.  We also obtained and reviewed key documents from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, including the BMDS 2007 Transition and Transfer  Plan, which was published in February 2008. We established criteria for  assessing the services’ efforts to establish units with the required  organizations, personnel, and training by reviewing our prior work on  planning for ballistic missile defense operations, and by obtaining and  reviewing key DOD and service documents. These included Chairman,  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3170.01G, Joint Capabilities Integration  and Development System; Army Regulation 71-11, Total Army Analysis;  Army Regulation 71-32, Force Development and Documentation— Consolidated Policies; and Air Force Instruction 10-601, Capabilities- Based Requirements Development. We obtained and reviewed documents  outlining MDA’s process and criteria for declaring elements to be available  for operational use; these included MDA’s Ballistic Missile Defense  (BMDS) Master Plan, version 9.1, which was signed in May 2009, and  prior versions of this plan; integrated master schedules; and other MDA  guidance. We determined when MDA had first delivered capabilities to the  combatant commands for operational use by reviewing MDA’s initial  operational baseline, dated April 2005, and subsequent memorandums  issued by the MDA Director to update this baseline or declare elements to  be available for contingency operations. We met with officials from  U.S. Strategic Command and from the four geographic combatant  commands that have identified ballistic missile defense priorities:   U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern  Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. We also met with officials from  U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for  Integrated Missile Defense, who provided us with the component’s most  recently completed Force Preparation Campaign Plan that outlines the  command’s approach and operational criteria for assessing ballistic  missile defense element performance.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;  David Best; Colin Chambers; Tara Copp Connolly; Nicolaas C. Cornelisse;  Susan Ditto; and Kevin L. O’Neill, Analyst-in-Charge, made significant  contributions to this report.