Space Shuttle: Status of NASA's Efforts to Address Workforce Issues Related to the Space Shuttle's Retirement
Published: 2005-05-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space shuttle program is key to implementing the President's vision for space exploration, which calls for completing the assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) by the end of the decade. Currently, the space shuttle, which is to be retired after ISS assembly is completed, is the only launch system capable of transporting ISS components. To meet the goals of the President's vision and satisfy ISS's international partners, NASA is examining alternative launch vehicles and ISS configurations. Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the President's vision, will require NASA to rely on its most important asset--its workforce. Because maintaining a skilled workforce through retirement will be challenging, GAO was asked to discuss the actions NASA has taken to sustain a skilled space shuttle workforce and the challenges it faces in doing so--findings reported on in March 2005 (see GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce through Retirement, GAO-05-230).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While NASA recognizes the importance of sustaining a critically skilled workforce to support space shuttle operations, it has made limited progress toward developing a detailed long-term strategy to do so. At the time of our March 2005 review, the Space Shuttle Program had identified lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs, and United Space Alliance--NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle operations--had begun to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on its workforce. However, timely action to address workforce issues is critical given their potential impact on NASA-wide goals. Significant delays in implementing a strategy to sustain the space shuttle workforce would likely lead to larger problems, such as overstretched funding and failure to meet NASA program schedules. NASA and United Space Alliance acknowledge that sustaining their workforces will be difficult, particularly if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is not apparent. Fiscal challenges facing the federal government also make it unclear whether funding for retention tools, such as bonuses, will be available. Our March 2005 report identified several factors that have hampered the Space Shuttle Program's workforce planning efforts. For example, the program's near-term focus on returning the space shuttle safely to flight has delayed other efforts that will help the program determine its workforce requirements, such as assessing hardware and facility needs. Program officials also noted that due to uncertainties in implementing the President's vision for space exploration, requirements on which to base workforce planning efforts have yet to be defined. Despite these factors, our work on strategic workforce planning has shown that even when faced with uncertainty, successful organizations take steps, such as scenario planning, to better position themselves to meet future workforce requirements. Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has publicly recognized, at its Integrated Space Operations Summit, that human capital management and critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss how the National Aeronautics and  Space Administration (NASA) is positioning itself to sustain the critically  skilled space shuttle workforce through the retirement of the Space  Shuttle Program. NASA is in the midst of one of the most challenging  periods in its history. It must demonstrate that the space shuttle can safely  fly again, begin the process of retiring its largest program, and at the same  time prepare for the uncertain future of space exploration. These  challenges are further exacerbated by the complex task of maintaining the  right workforce to support the space shuttle program while ensuring that  the skills needed for future programs are not lost. Over the next several  years, thousands of NASA civil service and contractor employees who  support the Space Shuttle Program will be impacted by decisions made  about the remaining life of the program and implementation of exploration  goals. These include decisions about the final number of space shuttle  flights and about future programs, such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle  (CEV). As requested, my testimony today will discuss the actions that  NASA is taking to position itself to sustain its critically skilled space  shuttle workforce and the challenges that the agency faces in doing so— issues we reported on to Senators Inouye and McCain in March 2005.
In summary, we found that NASA had made limited progress in its  planning efforts for sustaining the space shuttle workforce through the  program’s retirement. At the time of our March 2005 report, the Space  Shuttle Program had taken preliminary steps, including identifying the  lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs, such as the  Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program. Further NASA’s prime contractor for  space shuttle operations—United Space Alliance (USA)—had taken some  initial steps to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle’s retirement on  its own workforce. However, its progress depends on NASA making  decisions that impact contractor requirements through the remainder of  the program. Timely action to address workforce issues, however, is  critical given the potential impact that they could have on NASA-wide  goals. Unaddressed, such issues would likely lead to schedule delays and  overstretched funding for both the Space Shuttle Program and the agency.  Both NASA and USA have acknowledged that sustaining their workforces  will be difficult as the space shuttle nears retirement, particularly if a  career path beyond the space shuttle’s retirement is not apparent to their  employees. In addition, the federal government is facing fiscal challenges.  Such challenges call into question whether funding for tools, such as  retention bonuses, will be available for the agency to use to aid in  retaining the space shuttle workforce.
In our report we identified several factors that have hampered the Space  Shuttle Program’s planning efforts. For example, because of the program’s  near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight, other efforts that  will ultimately aid in determining workforce requirements, such as  assessing hardware and facility needs, are being delayed. In addition,  program officials indicated that they face uncertainties regarding the  implementation of future aspects of the President’s vision for space  exploration (Vision) and have yet to define requirements on which  workforce planning efforts would be based. Despite these factors, our  prior work on strategic workforce planning has shown that, even when  faced with uncertainty, successful organizations take steps, such as  scenario planning, to better position themselves to meet future workforce  requirements.
In our March 2005 report, we recommended that the agency begin  identifying the Space Shuttle Program’s future workforce needs based  upon various future scenarios the program could face. The program can  use the information provided by scenario planning to develop strategies  for meeting the needs of its potential future scenarios. NASA concurred  with our recommendation, and NASA’s Assistant Associate Administrator  for the Space Shuttle program is leading an effort to address the  recommendation. Since we issued our report and made our  recommendation, NASA has taken action and publicly recognized, through  its Integrated Space Operations Summit, that human capital management  and critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it  progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: On January 14, 2004, the President articulated a new vision for space  exploration for NASA. Part of the Vision includes the goal of retiring the  space shuttle following completion of the International Space Station  (ISS), planned for the end of the decade. In addition, NASA plans to begin  developing a new manned exploration vehicle, or CEV, to replace the  space shuttle and return humans to the moon as early as 2015, but no later  than 2020, in preparation for more ambitious future missions. As this  Subcommittee is aware, NASA’s Administrator has recently expressed his  desire to accelerate the CEV development to eliminate the gap between  the end of the Space Shuttle Program, currently scheduled for 2010, and  the first manned operational flight of the CEV, currently scheduled for  2014. If the CEV development cannot be accelerated, NASA will not be  able to launch astronauts into space for several years and will likely have  to rely on Russia for transportation to and from the ISS. A 1996 “Balance  Agreement” between NASA and the Russian space agency, obligated  Russia to provide 11 Soyuz spacecraft for crew rotation of U.S. and Russia  crews. After April 2006, this agreement will be fulfilled and Russia no  longer must allocate any of the seats on its Soyuzes for U.S. astronauts.  Russian officials have indicated that they will no longer provide crew  return services to NASA at no cost at that time. However, NASA may face  challenges to compensating Russia for seats on its Soyuzes after the  agreement is fulfilled due to restrictions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
The space shuttle, NASA’s largest individual program, is an essential  element of NASA’s ability to implement the Vision because it is the only  launch system presently capable of transporting the remaining  components necessary to complete assembly of the ISS. NASA projects  that it will need to conduct an estimated 28 flights over the next 5 to 6  years to complete assembly of and provide logistical support to the ISS.  However, NASA is currently examining alternative ISS configurations to  meet the goals of the Vision and satisfy NASA’s international partners,  while requiring as few space shuttle flights as possible to complete  assembly.
Prior to retiring the space shuttle, NASA will need to first return the space  shuttle safely to flight and execute whatever number of remaining  missions are needed to complete assembly of and provide support for the  ISS. At the same time, NASA will begin the process of closing out or  transitioning its space shuttle assets that are no longer needed to support  the program —such as its workforce, hardware, and facilities—to other  NASA programs. The process of closing out or transitioning the program’s  assets will extend well beyond the space shuttle’s final flight (see fig. 1).
The planning window for the first flight is July 13 through July 31, 2005.
Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the  Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle Program rely on its most  important asset—its workforce. The space shuttle workforce consists of  about 2,000 civil service and 15,600 contractor personnel, including a  large number of engineers and scientists. While each of the NASA centers  support the Space Shuttle Program to some degree, the vast majority of  this workforce is located at three of NASA’s Space Operations Centers:  Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Marshall Space Flight  Center. Data provided by NASA shows that approximately one quarter of  the workforce at its Space Operations centers is 51 years or older and  about 33 percent will be eligible for retirement by fiscal year 2012.
The space shuttle workforce and NASA’s human capital management have  been the subject of many GAO and other reviews in the past that have  highlighted various challenges to maintaining NASA’s science and  engineering workforce. In addition, over the past few years, GAO and  others in the federal government have underscored the importance of  human capital management and strategic workforce planning. In  response to an increased governmentwide focus on strategic human  capital management, NASA has taken several steps to improve its human  capital management. These include steps such as devising an agencywide  strategic human capital plan, developing workforce analysis tools to assist  in identifying critical skills needs, and requesting and receiving additional  human capital flexibilities.
section_title: Progress toward Developing a Strategy to Sustain the Space Shuttle Workforce Is Limited
paragraphs: NASA has made only limited progress toward developing a detailed long- term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space shuttle’s  retirement. While NASA recognizes the importance of having in place a  strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce to support space  shuttle operations, it has only taken preliminary steps to do so. For  example, the program identified lessons-learned from the retirement of  programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV  Rocket Program. Among other things, the lessons learned reports highlight  the practices used by other programs when making personnel decisions,  such as the importance of developing transition strategies and early  retention planning.
Other efforts have been initiated or are planned; examples include the  following:    contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration to  assist it in planning for the space shuttle’s retirement and transitioning  to future programs and    began devising an acquisition strategy for updating propulsion system  prime contracts at MSFC to take into account the Vision’s goal of  retiring the space shuttle following completion of the ISS.
NASA’s prime contractor for space shuttle operations, USA, has also taken  some preliminary steps, but its progress with these efforts depends on  NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the  remainder of the program. For example, USA has begun to define its  critical skills needs to continue supporting the Space Shuttle Program,  devised a communication plan, contracted with a human capital  consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its workforce; and  continued to monitor indicators of employee morale and workforce  stability. Contractor officials said that further efforts to prepare for the  space shuttle’s retirement and its impact on their workforce are on hold  until NASA first makes decisions that impact the space shuttle’s remaining  number of flights and thus the time frames for retiring the program and  transitioning its assets.
subsections: section_title: The Potential Impact of Workforce Problems and Other Challenges the Space Shuttle Program Faces Highlight the Need for Workforce Planning
paragraphs: Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a  critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the program’s retirement  is important given the impact that workforce problems could have on  NASA-wide goals. According to NASA officials, if the Space Shuttle  Program faces difficulties in sustaining the necessary workforce, NASA- wide goals, such as implementing the Vision and proceeding with space  exploration activities, could be impacted. For example, workforce  problems could lead to a delay in flight certification for the space shuttle,  which could result in a delay to the program’s overall flight schedule, thus  compromising the goal of completing assembly of the ISS by 2010. In  addition, officials said that space exploration activities could slip as much  as 1 year for each year that the space shuttle’s operations are extended  because NASA’s progress with these activities relies on funding and assets  that are expected to be transferred from the Space Shuttle Program to  other NASA programs.
NASA officials told us they expect to face various challenges in sustaining  the critically skilled space shuttle workforce. These challenges include the  following:    Retaining the current workforce. Because many in the current  workforce will want to participate in or will be needed to support  future phases of implementing the Vision, it may be difficult to retain  them in the Space Shuttle Program. In addition, it may be difficult to  provide certain employees with a transition path from the Space  Shuttle Program to future programs following retirement.
Impact on the prime contractor for space shuttle operations. Because  USA was established specifically to perform ground and flight  operations for the Space Shuttle Program, its future following the  space shuttle’s retirement is uncertain. Contractor officials stated that  a lack of long-term job security would cause difficulties in recruiting  and retaining employees to continue supporting the space shuttle as it  nears retirement. In addition, steps that the contractor may have to  take to retain its workforce, such as paying retention bonuses, are  likely to require funding above normal levels.
Governmentwide budgetary constraints. Throughout the process of  retiring the space shuttle, NASA, like other federal agencies, will have  to contend with urgent challenges facing the federal budget that will  put pressure on discretionary spending—such as investments in space  programs—and require NASA to do more with fewer resources.
section_title: Several Factors Have Impeded Workforce Planning Efforts
paragraphs: While the Space Shuttle Program is still in the early stages of planning for  the program’s retirement, its development of a detailed long-term strategy  to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by several factors:    Near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight. Since the  Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the program has been focused on its  near-term goal of returning the space shuttle safely to flight. While this  focus is understandable given the importance of the space shuttle’s role  in completing assembly of the ISS, it has led to the delay of efforts to  determine future workforce needs.
Uncertainties with respect to implementing the Vision. While the  Vision has provided the Space Shuttle Program with the goal of retiring  the program by 2010 upon completion of the ISS, the program lacks  well-defined objectives or goals on which to base its workforce  planning efforts. For example, NASA has not yet determined the final  configuration of the ISS, the final number of flights for the space  shuttle, how ISS operations will be supported after the space shuttle is  retired, or the type of vehicle that will be used for space exploration.  These determinations are important because they impact decisions  about the transition of space shuttle assets. Lacking this information,  NASA officials have said that their ability to progress with detailed  long-term workforce planning is limited.
subsections: section_title: Despite Uncertainties, NASA Could Follow a Strategic Human Capital Management Approach
paragraphs: Despite these uncertainties, the Space Shuttle Program could follow a  strategic human capital management approach to plan for sustaining its  critically skilled workforce. Studies by several organizations, including  GAO, have shown that successful organizations in both the public and  private sectors follow a strategic human capital management approach,  even when faced with an uncertain future environment.
In our March 2005 report, we made recommendations aimed at better  positioning NASA to sustain a critically skilled space shuttle workforce  through retirement. In particular, we recommended that the agency begin  identifying the Space Shuttle Program’s future workforce needs based  upon various future scenarios the program could face. Scenario planning  can allow the agency to progress with workforce planning, even when  faced with uncertainties such as those surrounding the final number of  space shuttle flights, the final configuration of the ISS and the vehicle that  will be developed for exploration. The program can use the information  provided by scenario planning to develop strategies for meeting the needs  of its potential future scenarios. NASA concurred with our  recommendation, and NASA’s Assistant Associate Administrator for the  Space Shuttle program is leading an effort to address the recommendation.
Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has  taken action and publicly recognized that human capital management and  critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it moves  toward retiring the space shuttle. This recognition was most apparent at  NASA’s Integrated Space Operations Summit held in March 2005. As part  of the Summit process, NASA instituted panel teams to examine the Space  Shuttle Program’s mission execution and transition needs from various  perspectives and make recommendations aimed at ensuring that the  program will execute its remaining missions safely as it transitions to  supporting emerging exploration mission needs. The reports that resulted  from these examinations are closely linked by a common theme—the  importance of human capital management and critical skills retention to  ensure success. In their reports, the panel teams highlighted similar  challenges to those that we highlighted in our report. The panels made  various recommendations to the Space Flight Leadership Council on steps  that the program should take now to address human capital concerns.  These recommendations included developing and implementing a critical  skills retention plan, developing a communication plan to ensure the  workforce is informed, and developing a detailed budget that includes  funding for human capital retention and reductions, as well as establishing  an agencywide team to integrate human capital planning efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: There is no question that NASA faces a challenging time ahead. Key  decisions have to be made regarding final configuration and support of the  ISS, the number of shuttle flights needed for those tasks, and the timing  for development of future programs, such as the CEV—all in a constrained  funding environment. In addition, any schedule slip in the completion of  the construction of the ISS or in the CEV falling short of its accelerated  initial availability (as soon as possible after space shuttle retirement) may  extend the time the space shuttle is needed. But whatever decisions are  made and courses of action taken, the need for sustaining a critically  skilled workforce is paramount to the success of these programs. Despite  a limited focus on human capital management in the past, NASA now  acknowledges that it faces significant challenges in sustaining a critically  skilled workforce and has taken steps to address these issues. We are  encouraged by these actions and the fact that human capital management  and critical skills retention was given such prominent attention throughout  the recent Integrated Space Operations Summit process. The fact that our  findings and conclusions were echoed by the panel teams established to  support the Integrated Space Operations Summit is a persuasive reason for  NASA leadership to begin addressing these human capital issues early and  aggressively.
Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the  Subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li at  (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this  testimony included Alison Heafitz, Jim Morrison, Shelby S. Oakley, Karen  Sloan, and T.J Thomson.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.