Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Strategies and Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven
Published: 2011-06-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses GAO's report on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Terrorist safe havens provide security for terrorists, allowing them to train recruits and plan operations. U.S. officials have concluded that various terrorist incidents demonstrate the dangers emanating from terrorist safe havens, such as the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, planned, in part, from safe havens in Pakistan, and the attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009, planned from safe havens in Yemen. The discovery of Osama Bin Laden in a compound in Pakistan, from which, according to U.S. officials, he played an active role in al Qaeda focused on attacking the United States, makes this hearing particularly timely. The testimony today focuses on (1) U.S. national strategies related to addressing terrorist safe havens, (2) terrorist safe havens identified by the Department of State (State) and the threats emanating from these havens, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe havens.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: We found that U.S. national strategies emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to terrorists and that, since 2006, State has annually identified terrorist safe havens in its "Country Reports on Terrorism." The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as a key national security concern in several U.S. government strategic documents. For example, National Security Strategies released in 2002, 2006, and 2010 emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to terrorists. The current "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," which was last updated September 2006, also stresses the importance of eliminating terrorist safe havens. The document identifies eliminating terrorist safe havens as a priority action against which all elements of national power--including military, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement--should be applied. According to National Security Staff officials, an updated "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism" is currently being drafted and its release is expected in the coming months. However, these officials stated that denying safe haven to terrorists will remain an important element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Since 2006, State has identified existing terrorist safe havens in a dedicated chapter of its "Country Reports on Terrorism." According to U.S. agencies, a variety of groups that pose threats to the United States operate in countries identified by State as terrorist safe havens. For example: (1) Pakistan: Various terrorist organizations operate in Pakistan. First, al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden was located in a compound in Pakistan from which U.S. officials have stated he was actively involved in planning attacks against the United States. The Pakistani Taliban have claimed responsibility for several attacks against U.S. interests, including an attack on the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar in April 2010. (2) Yemen: The foreign terrorist organization al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is based in Yemen. In response to the killing of Osama Bin Laden, AQAP issued a press release vowing revenge against the United States. (3) Somalia: Al-Shabaab is a foreign terrorist organization active in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for several bombings and shootings throughout Somalia, as well as the July 2010 suicide bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda, which killed more than 70 people. The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress required the President to submit reports outlining U.S. government efforts to deny or disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws--the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. The IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that includes an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools the U.S. government uses to disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by terrorist safe havens, and recommended that State update the report annually, to the extent feasible, in its "Country Reports on Terrorism." In response to these provisions, State submitted a report to Congress in April 2006, which it has updated annually as part of its "Country Reports on Terrorism." These reports include a section on U.S. strategies, tactics, and tools that identifies several U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In the "Country Reports on Terrorism" released in August 2010, State identified several U.S. efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens, including programs such as State's Regional Strategic Initiative and Antiterrorism Assistance programs. However, State's August 2010 "Country Reports on Terrorism" does not fully identify U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss the report GAO is releasing today on  U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Terrorist safe havens provide  security for terrorists, allowing them to train recruits and plan operations.  U.S. officials have concluded that various terrorist incidents demonstrate  the dangers emanating from terrorist safe havens, such as the November  2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, planned, in part, from safe havens in  Pakistan, and the attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009,  planned from safe havens in Yemen. The discovery of Osama Bin Laden in  a compound in Pakistan, from which, according to U.S. officials, he played  an active role in al Qaeda focused on attacking the United States, makes  this hearing particularly timely.
My testimony today focuses on (1) U.S. national strategies related to  addressing terrorist safe havens, (2) terrorist safe havens identified by the  Department of State (State) and the threats emanating from these havens,  and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has identified efforts to  deny terrorists safe havens.
In our report, we found that U.S. national strategies emphasize the  importance of denying safe haven to terrorists and that, since 2006, State  has annually identified terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on  Terrorism. However, we also found that, although there are multiple  reporting requirements, the U.S. government has not provided to Congress  a comprehensive, governmentwide list of its efforts to address terrorist  safe havens. We made recommendations to both State and the National  Security Council to improve reporting on U.S. efforts to address terrorist  safe havens. State agreed with the importance of comprehensive  information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, but did  not agree that this information needs to be included in the Country  Reports on Terrorism. The National Security Council reviewed the report  but provided no comments on the recommendation.
subsections: section_title: U.S. National Strategies Emphasize the Importance of Denying Safe Havens to Terrorists
paragraphs: The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as a key  national security concern in several U.S. government strategic documents.  For example, National Security Strategies released in 2002, 2006, and 2010  emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to terrorists. The current  National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which was last updated  September 2006, also stresses the importance of eliminating terrorist safe  havens. The document identifies eliminating terrorist safe havens as a  priority action against which all elements of national power—including  military, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement—should  be applied. According to National Security Staff officials, an updated  National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is currently being drafted  and its release is expected in the coming months. However, these officials  stated that denying safe haven to terrorists will remain an important  element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
In addition to national strategies, plans issued by various U.S. agencies,  such as the Departments of Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), and State/U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as the National  Intelligence Strategy issued by the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence, include language emphasizing the importance of addressing  safe havens. Figure 1 shows excerpts from these documents, which  discuss terrorist safe havens. However, other agencies that are involved in  U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens do not include specific  language on safe havens in their strategic plans. For example, the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—which contributes to the law  enforcement element of U.S. national power—does not specifically  address safe havens in its strategic plan but does have a goal to “protect  the homeland from dangerous people,” which includes objectives related  to effective border control. “Wherever al-Qa’ida or its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven … we will  meet them with growing pressure … These efforts will focus on information-sharing, law  enforcement cooperation, and establishing new practices to counter evolving  adversaries. We will also help states … build their capacity for responsible governance  and security through development and security sector assistance.”
subsections: section_title: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
paragraphs: “The War on Terror … involves the application of all instruments of national power and  influence to kill or capture the terrorists; deny them safehaven and control of any nation;  prevent them from gaining access to WMD; render potential terrorist targets less  attractive by strengthening security; and cut off their sources of funding and other  resources they need to operate and survive.” “One of the most  important resources  to extremists is safe  haven. Safe havens  provide the enemy  with relative freedom  to plan, organize,  train, rest, and  conduct operations.” “The most intractable  safe havens exist  astride international  borders and in regions  where ineffective  governance allows their  presence; we must  develop the means to  deny these havens to  terrorists.” “Failed states and  ungoverned spaces offer  terrorist and criminal  organizations safe haven  and possible access to  weapons of mass  destruction (WMD).” “Deny safe havens to  criminal organizations  involved in drug-related  terrorist activities.”
State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates policies  and programs of U.S. agencies to counter terrorism overseas. According to  State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism works with all  appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure integrated and  effective counterterrorism efforts that utilize diplomacy, economic power,  intelligence, law enforcement, and military power. These elements include  those in the White House, DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, the Department of the  Treasury (Treasury), USAID, and the intelligence community. For  instance, State funds programs to build the capacity of U.S. foreign  partners to counter terrorism financing implemented by agencies such as  DHS, Treasury, and DOJ.
section_title: Since 2006, State Has Annually Identified Terrorist Safe Havens Posing Risks to U.S. National Security
paragraphs: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)  requires State to include a detailed assessment in its annual Country  Reports on Terrorism with respect to each foreign country whose  territory is being used as a terrorist sanctuary, also known as a terrorist  safe haven. State defines terrorist safe havens as “ungoverned, under- governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical areas where  terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S. national security interests are  able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and  operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity,  political will, or both.” Since 2006, State has identified existing terrorist  safe havens in a dedicated chapter of its Country Reports on Terrorism.  As shown in figure 2, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens in its August  2010 report.
Terrorist safe havens pose a threat to U.S. national security. The National  Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11  Commission) noted that safe haven in Afghanistan allowed al Qaeda the  operational space to gather recruits and build logistical networks to  undertake planning for the attacks on September 11, 2001. State reports  that denying safe haven is central to combating terrorism, which it cited as  the United States’ top security threat. According to U.S. agencies, a variety  of groups that pose threats to the United States operate in countries  identified by State as terrorist safe havens. For example:    Pakistan: Various terrorist organizations operate in Pakistan. First, al  Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden was located in a compound in Pakistan  from which U.S. officials have stated he was actively involved in  planning attacks against the United States. Additionally, according to  State, al Qaeda also uses the Federally Administered Tribal Areas  (FATA) to launch attacks in Afghanistan, train and recruit terrorists, and  plan global operations. State also reports that the Pakistani Taliban has  used the FATA to plan attacks against civilian and military targets across  Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban have claimed responsibility for several  attacks against U.S. interests, including an attack on the U.S. Consulate  in Peshawar in April 2010. Moreover, according to the National  Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Pakistani Taliban has repeatedly  threatened to attack the U.S. homeland and claimed responsibility for  the failed vehicle bombing in New York City’s Times Square in May 2010.  In addition, according to State, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba—the group  responsible for attacks in Mumbai, India, in November 2008, which killed  at least 183 people—continues to plan operations from Pakistan and  views American interests as legitimate targets.
Yemen: The foreign terrorist organization al Qaeda in the Arabian  Peninsula (AQAP) is based in Yemen. According to the NCTC, AQAP is  pursuing a global agenda. For example, the group attempted to bomb a  plane headed to the United States on December 25, 2009. AQAP also  claimed responsibility for the attempted package bombings of cargo  planes in October 2010. More recently, in response to the killing of  Osama Bin Laden, AQAP issued a press release vowing revenge against  the United States. In addition, members of AQAP have been named  Specially Designated Nationals by the United States government. In  July 2010, the United States designated Anwar al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen  and key leader for AQAP, for supporting acts of terrorism and for  acting for or on behalf of AQAP.
Somalia: Al-Shabaab is a foreign terrorist organization active in  Somalia. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for several bombings  and shootings throughout Somalia, as well as the July 2010 suicide  bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda, which killed more than 70 people.  State reports that rank-and-file members of al-Shabaab are  predominantly interested in issues within Somalia, rather than pursuing  a global agenda. However, NCTC and State note that al-Shabaab’s core  leadership is linked ideologically to al Qaeda and that some members  of the group previously trained and fought with al Qaeda in  Afghanistan. In 2009, the Deputy Director of Intelligence at the NCTC  testified that a number of young Somali-American men traveled to  Somalia, possibly to train and fight with al-Shabaab, including one who  conducted a suicide bombing attack. While noting there is no specific  evidence that the Americans previously trained in Somalia planned to  conduct attacks inside the United States, the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) has expressed concern that this threat remains a  possibility. In August 2010, the FBI arrested two U.S. citizens and  indicted 12 others, including five U.S. citizens, on charges of providing  support to al-Shabaab.
section_title: The U.S. Government Has Not Fully Addressed Reporting Requirements to Identify Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven
paragraphs: The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to  identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress required the  President to submit reports outlining U.S. government efforts to deny or  disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws—the IRTPA and the National  Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010.
The IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that  includes an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools the U.S. government  uses to disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by terrorist  safe havens, and recommended that State update the report annually, to  the extent feasible, in its Country Reports on Terrorism. In response to  these provisions, State submitted a report to Congress in April 2006, which  it has updated annually as part of its Country Reports on Terrorism.  These reports include a section on U.S. strategies, tactics, and tools that  identifies several U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In the  Country Reports on Terrorism released in August 2010, State identified  several U.S. efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens, including  programs such as State’s Regional Strategic Initiative and Antiterrorism  Assistance programs.
However, State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism does not  fully identify U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven. For example:    Some State-funded efforts are not included: Selected State strategic  documents identify efforts funded by State that may contribute to  denying terrorists safe haven—such as Foreign Military Financing  activities and USAID development assistance—that were not included  in the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. In addition, agency  officials identified additional State-funded efforts that may contribute  to addressing terrorist safe havens—such as activities funded through  State’s Peacekeeping Operations and State-funded DHS training to  combat money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—but were not  included in the report.
Efforts funded by other U.S. agencies are not included: For example,  according to DOD officials, the Department’s Afghanistan and Iraq  Security Forces Funds and Section 1206 program efforts to train and  equip the security forces abroad address terrorist safe havens but are  not included in State’s report. Additionally, according to DOJ and  Treasury, their training programs to build the capacity of foreign  partners to counter terrorism financing address terrorist safe havens,  but they are also not included in State’s report.
In the IRTPA, Congress noted that it should be the policy of the United  States to implement a coordinated strategy to prevent terrorists from using  safe havens and to assess the tools used to assist foreign governments in  denying terrorists safe haven. State’s report is incomplete without a  comprehensive overview of its own contributions and those of its various  interagency partners to address terrorist safe havens.
To enhance the comprehensiveness of State’s reporting on U.S. efforts to  deny safe haven to terrorists, we recommended that State include a  governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens when it  updates the report requested under the IRTPA. In response, State  concurred that reporting on U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens  should be more comprehensive. However, State did not agree that such a  list should be part of its annual Country Reports on Terrorism, citing the  fact that they have completed other reporting requirements related to  counterterrorism. We maintain that the provisions in the IRTPA  recommend annual updates related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe  havens be included in the Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, while  it is possible that other reports produced by State address IRTPA  provisions, the antiterrorism report cited by State in its comments does  not constitute a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist  safe havens as the report does not include the contributions of key  agencies, such as DOD.
In addition to the provisions in the IRTPA, Congress demonstrated an  ongoing interest in the identification of U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe  havens in the NDAA for FY 2010. The conference report accompanying the  act noted that existing executive branch reporting on counterterrorism  does not address the full scope of U.S. activities or assess overall  effectiveness. The NDAA for FY 2010 requires the President to submit to  Congress a report on U.S. counterterrorism strategy, including an  assessment of the scope, status, and progress of U.S. counterterrorism  efforts in fighting al Qaeda and its affiliates and a provision to create a list  of U.S. counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of terrorist safe  havens. The required report is intended to help Congress in conducting  oversight, enhance the public’s understanding of how well the government  is combating terrorism, and assist the administration in identifying and  overcoming related challenges. As of March 2011, no report had been  submitted to Congress. While National Security Staff officials taking the  lead on the report stated they were working on a draft, they were unsure  when it would be completed.
To address this reporting gap, we recommended that the National Security  Council, in collaboration with relevant agencies as appropriate, complete  the requirements of the NDAA of FY 2010 to report to Congress on a list of  U.S. efforts related to the denial of terrorist safe havens. The National  Security Council reviewed our report but provided no comments on the  recommendation.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may  have at this time.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This statement is based on our body of work examining U.S.  counterterrorism policies and efforts, particularly those regarding terrorist  safe havens and reported in GAO-11-561 to be released today. To address  our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national strategies, key  congressional legislation, State’s Country Reports on Terrorism, and  other documents related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens.  Additionally, we discussed U.S. strategies and efforts related to terrorist  safe havens with U.S. officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury,  USAID, the National Security Staff, and the intelligence community. We  also spoke to subject matter experts from academia, government, and  nongovernmental organizations. We performed our work in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence we obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this statement, please contact Jacquelyn Williams- Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov or Charles  Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Jason Bair, Assistant Director;  Christy Bilardo, Kathryn Bolduc, Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, Eileen  Larence, Mary Moutsos, John Pendleton, and Elizabeth Repko made key  contributions in preparing this statement.
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