Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles Is Well Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to Be Clarified
Published: 2004-08-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In its transformation to a more responsive and mobile force, the Army plans to form 6 Stryker Brigade Combat teams equipped with a new family of armored vehicles known as Strykers. The Stryker--which provides transport for troops, weapons, and command and control--was required by the Army to weigh no more than 38,000 pounds and be transportable in theater by C-130 cargo aircraft arriving ready for immediate combat operations. The Army plans to equip its future force with a new generation of vehicles--Future Combat Systems--to also be transportable by C-130s. GAO was asked to assess (1) the current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition, including the most current Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates; (2) the status and results of Stryker vehicle tests; and (3) the ability of C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker vehicles within a theater of operations. This report also addresses the transportability of the Army's Future Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The acquisition of the Stryker vehicles is about two-thirds complete; with about 1,200 of 8 production vehicle configurations ordered and 800 delivered to units. In addition, limited quantities of two developmental vehicles--the Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle prototypes--have also been ordered for testing. Stryker program costs have increased about 22 percent from the November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion. Total program costs include acquisition costs--procurement, research, development, and test and evaluation--as well as military construction costs related to Strykers. The Army does not yet have reliable estimates of the Stryker's operating costs because of limited peacetime use to develop data. As of June 2004, testing of the eight production Strykers was mostly complete, with the vehicles meeting Army operational requirements with limitations. However, development and testing schedules of the two developmental Strykers have been delayed, resulting in an over 1-year delay in meeting the vehicles' production milestones and fielding dates. While the Army has demonstrated the required transportability of Strykers by C-130 aircraft in training exercises, in an operational environment, the Stryker's average weight of 38,000 pounds--along with other factors such as added equipment weight and less than ideal flight conditions--significantly limits the C-130's flight range and reduces the size force that could be deployed. These factors also limit the ability of Strykers to conduct combat operations immediately upon arrival as required. With the similar maximum weight envisioned for Future Combat System vehicles intended for the Army's future force, the planned C-130 transport of those vehicles would present similar challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. Army is transforming its force to one expected to be more  strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, and able to effectively operate  in all types of military operations. The first step in the Army’s  transformation was to form six Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams  equipped with a new family of 10 armored vehicle configurations known  as Strykers. Congressional appropriations for the Stryker vehicle program,  in then-year dollars totaled $4.5 billion from fiscal years 2000 through  2004. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2005 included $1.3  billion for the program, leaving $2.9 billion based on current estimates  needed to complete funding of the $8.7 billion estimated total cost of the  program. These program costs include acquisition costs-—procurement,  research, development, and test and evaluation—as well as related  military construction costs.
According to the Army’s operational requirements, Stryker vehicles are to  be transportable by C-130 aircraft within a theater of operation, arriving  ready for combat operations. The capability of C-130 transport is a key  performance requirement for the vehicles and is central to the Army’s  rationale for creating Stryker brigades. The C-130 is a four-engine, high- wing cargo aircraft that the U.S. Air Force primarily uses as a short-range  transporter. The first Stryker brigade became operational in October 2003,  at which time it was deployed to Iraq. Beginning in 2010, the Army plans to  begin the transition to its future force—the Objective Force—and to equip  this force with a new generation of vehicles known as Future Combat  Systems, which are also, according to operational requirements, to be  transportable in theater by C-130 air transport.
In your initial request, you asked us to review the Stryker vehicle’s  capabilities, performance, costs, and ability to meet operational and  mission requirements. You later asked us to assess the transportability of  Stryker vehicles on C-130 aircraft. We provided your offices our  preliminary observations on these issues in October and November 2003  and April 2004, and this report summarizes and updates the information  provided in those meetings. Our objectives were to determine (1) the  current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition, including the most current  Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates; (2) the status and  results of Stryker vehicle tests; and (3) the ability of C-130 aircraft to  transport Stryker vehicles within a theater of operations. We also address  transportability of the Army’s Future Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft.
To conduct our review of Stryker vehicle acquisition status, costs, and  testing results, we interviewed officials and analyzed documents from the  Army’s Stryker Program Management Office and Test and Evaluation  Command and reviewed Army and Department of Defense developmental,  operational, and survivability test reports. In our assessment of the ability  of C-130 airlift to transport Stryker vehicles, we reviewed a study of the C- 130 aircraft’s range and payload capabilities, and interviewed U.S. Army,  Air Force, and Transportation Command officials. We determined that the  data and documents we reviewed were sufficiently reliable to answer our  objectives. We performed our review from July 2003 through June 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A  more detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented later  in the report. A list of related GAO products appears at the end of this  report.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Stryker family of vehicles consists of 10 eight-wheeled armored  vehicles mounted on a common chassis that provide transport for troops,  weapons, and command and control. Stryker vehicles weigh on average  about 19 tons—or 38,000 pounds, substantially less than the M1A1 Abrams  tanks (68 tons) and the Bradley Fighting vehicle (33 tons), the primary  combat platforms of the Army’s heavier armored units. The C-130 cargo  aircraft is capable of tactical, or in-theater, transport of one Stryker  vehicle; the Army’s Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting vehicle exceed the  C-130 aircraft’s size and weight limits.
The Army’s original operational requirements for Stryker vehicles  included (1) the capability of entering, being transportable in, and exiting a  C-130 aircraft; (2) the vehicle’s combat capable deployment weight must  not exceed 38,000 pounds to allow C-130 transport of 1,000 miles; and (3)  the Stryker vehicles must be capable of immediate combat operations  after unloading. The Army’s most current operational requirements for  Stryker vehicles required the same vehicle weight and C-130 transport  capabilities without reference to C-130 transport of 1,000 miles. The Army  has similar operational requirements for its Future Combat Systems’  vehicles. The Army’s April 2003 Operational Requirements document for  the Future Combat Systems requires the vehicles’ essential combat  configuration to be no greater than 38,000 pounds and have a size suitable  for C-130 aircraft transport. A memorandum of agreement between the Air  Force and the Army issued in 2003, set procedures allowing C-130  transport of 38,000-pound Stryker vehicles aboard Air Force aircraft, but  required that the combined weight of the vehicles, other cargo, and  passengers shall not exceed C-130 operational capabilities, which vary  based on mission requirements, weather, airfield conditions, among other  factors.
Eight of the 10 vehicle configurations are being acquired production  ready—meaning they require little engineering design and development  work prior to production. Two of the 10 vehicle configurations, the Mobile  Gun System and the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle, are developmental  vehicle variants—meaning that a substantial amount of design,  development, and testing is needed before they can go into production.  Table 1 provides descriptions of the ten Stryker vehicles. Three of the  vehicles are shown in figures 1 to 3.
The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one mechanized infantry  brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first two of six planned  Stryker brigades. The first of these brigades, the 3rd Brigade, Second  Infantry Division, became operational in October 2003, at which time the  Brigade was deployed to Iraq. The second of the two Fort Lewis brigades  became operational in May 2004, and plans are for it to deploy to Iraq in  late 2004. The Army plans to form four more Stryker brigades from 2005  through 2008. The planned locations of the next four brigades are Fort  Wainwright/Fort Richardson, Alaska; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield  Barracks, Hawaii; and a brigade of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard.
section_title: Acquisition of Stryker Production Vehicles Is about Two-thirds Complete, Though Overall Program Costs Have Increased, and Operational Cost Estimates Are Not Yet Reliable
paragraphs: Acquisition of the eight Stryker production vehicle configurations is about  two-thirds complete with about 68 percent of the over 1,800-planned  production vehicles ordered, and a low rate of production for the two  developmental Strykers is scheduled for September 2004. Estimated  program costs have increased because of, among other reasons, increases  in the Army’s estimate for related military construction, such as for the  cost of building new Stryker vehicle maintenance facilities. However, the  Army does not yet have reliable estimates for the Stryker’s operating costs,  such as for vehicle maintenance, because of limited peacetime operational  experience with the vehicles.
subsections: section_title: About Two-thirds of Stryker Production Vehicle Acquisition Completed
paragraphs: The Army is pursuing three acquisition schedules for the Stryker  production and developmental vehicles. Since the November 2000 Stryker  vehicle contract award, the Army has ordered 1,231 production  vehicles—about 68 percent—of the 1,814 production vehicles the Army  plans to buy for the six Stryker brigades. Of the 1,231 vehicles ordered, 800  have been delivered to the brigades, including all of the production  vehicles for the first two Stryker brigades. The Army is currently fielding  Stryker production vehicles for the third of the six planned brigades. The  third brigade is to be fielded in Alaska.
Thus far, the Army has bought limited quantities of the developmental  vehicle variants—8 Mobile Gun System and 4 NBC Reconnaissance  vehicles—as prototypes and for use in testing at various test sites around  the country. Of 238 Mobile Gun Systems the Army plans to buy overall,  current plans are to buy 72 initially upon approval for low-rate initial  production scheduled for September 2004. The Army plans low-rate initial  production of 17 NBC Reconnaissance vehicles also in September 2004.  The Mobile Gun System is not scheduled to reach a full production  decision until September 2006 at the earliest, while the NBC  Reconnaissance vehicle is not scheduled to reach its full production  decision until 2007. Table 2 below shows the status of Stryker vehicle  acquisition as of April 2004.
section_title: Stryker Vehicle Program’s Costs Have Increased from Earlier Estimates
paragraphs: The Stryker vehicle program’s total costs increased, in then-year dollars,  from the original November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December  2003 estimate of $8.7 billion—or about 22 percent. The increases  occurred primarily due to revised estimates for the associated cost of  military construction, such as that needed to upgrade maintenance and  training facilities for a Stryker brigade, but were also due to lesser  increases in procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation  (RDT&E) costs for the vehicles—which together grew by about 8 percent  from the original November 2000 estimate.
In then-year dollars, the estimated cost of military construction accounted  for the largest increase in the Stryker program’s cost estimate. In  December 2003, the Army increased its estimate for military construction  by about $1.01 billion over the original November 2000 estimate, from $322  million to $1.3 billion. (See table 3.) As in all major Department of Defense  acquisition programs, military construction costs are included in the  program’s total costs. According to the Army, the military construction  cost estimate increased because the December 2003 estimate reflects (1)  the identification of all five sites scheduled to receive Stryker brigades and  (2) the total cost of upgrading or building maintenance and training  facilities at these installations to accommodate a Stryker brigade. When  the original estimate was made, only one site had been identified to  receive a Stryker brigade and that estimate identified just the cost of  maintenance facility upgrades.
The Stryker vehicle’s procurement costs increased by about $390 million.  The largest factor in the increase of procurement costs was the higher  than originally estimated costs of procuring add-on reactive armor,  including the additional costs to equip six Stryker brigades with add-on  armor, instead of four brigades as originally planned. Also, the cost of  RDT&E increased about $138 million, from $508 million to $645.6 million.  Most of the RDT&E cost increase is attributable to revised estimates for  the cost of test and evaluation, development, and system engineering for  the developmental vehicles. The average acquisition cost per vehicle  increased by about $0.79 million, from $3.34 million to $4.13 million. The  program costs and average acquisition cost per vehicle estimates reflect a  reduction in the number of Strykers planned from 2,131 to 2,096. (See  table 3 above.)
section_title: Limited Peacetime Operational Experience Makes Operating Cost Estimates Unreliable
paragraphs: The Army does not have reliable estimates of Stryker vehicle operating  costs because, with the first Stryker brigade’s deployment to Iraq, it lacks  sufficient peacetime operational experience with the vehicles. The Army  considers 3 years of actual peacetime operational cost data to be sufficient  for reliable estimates. Since none of the production vehicles have 3 years  of peacetime operating experience, reliable operating cost estimates will  not be available until 2005 at the earliest. With the Mobile Gun System and  NBC Reconnaissance vehicles still in development, it will be several years  before these vehicles are fully fielded and sufficient data are available for  reliable estimates of their operating costs.
According to the Army, current Stryker vehicle operating cost estimates,  shown in table 4 below, are engineering estimates based in part on  operating costs for another vehicle in the Army’s inventory—the M-113  armored personnel carrier. The estimates assume peacetime operations.
Vehicle operating costs include the cost for maintenance, repair, and the  cost of consumable and repairable parts. The Army calculates vehicle cost  per mile by tracking vehicle mileage and the actual costs of consumable or  replaceable parts used. However, the short time frame from fielding the  first Stryker brigade’s production vehicles—May 2002 through January  2003—and the brigades’ deployment to Iraq in October 2003, limited the  amount of time and miles the vehicles were in peacetime service.  Similarly, fielding of Stryker vehicles for the second brigade was  completed in January 2004. While the Army collected operational cost and  mileage data for both brigades, there were insufficient actual operating  costs and miles on the vehicles to make reliable estimates. Consequently,  until the Army can collect more actual peacetime operating cost data for  the production vehicles, it will not be able to determine actual vehicle  operating costs and make reliable operating cost estimates for these  vehicles. Similarly, reliable operating cost estimates for the Mobile Gun  System and NBC Reconnaissance vehicle will not be available until after  2006 when they are scheduled to begin full production and fielding.
section_title: Tested Production Vehicles Generally Met Requirements, but Testing and Acquisition Schedules for Developmental Vehicles Have Been Delayed
paragraphs: According to Army and OSD test reports, the tested Stryker production  vehicles met operational requirements with certain limitations and,  overall, support the key operational capabilities and force effectiveness of  the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The separate developmental testing  schedules of the Mobile Gun System and NBC Reconnaissance vehicles  have been delayed, resulting in delays in meeting planned production  milestone dates. Delay in the Mobile Gun System’s development was due  in part to shortfalls in meeting performance requirements of the vehicle’s  ammunition autoloader system. The NBC Reconnaissance vehicle’s  development schedule was delayed pending OSD approval of an updated  technology readiness assessment for the vehicle and its nuclear,  biological, and chemical sensor systems.
subsections: section_title: Following Testing, Army and OSD Indicate Stryker Production Vehicles Met Operational Requirements, with Limitations
paragraphs: Following the Army’s completion of live-fire tests and evaluation for seven  production vehicles in February 2004 and its ongoing test evaluation of the  eighth, the Army stated that the Stryker production vehicles met  operational requirements, with limitations; and OSD approved full  production.
The Army’s System Evaluation Report for the Stryker production decision  concluded that overall, the Stryker family of vehicles is effective, suitable,  and survivable, and supports the key operational capabilities and force  effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The report concluded  that the Stryker production vehicle configurations met operational  requirements with limitations. For example, in the area of lethality, the  report noted that four Stryker vehicle configurations have a remote  weapons station that provides effective protective and supporting fires for  dismounted maneuver. However, limitations of the remote weapons  station’s capability to provide accurate and continuous fires at night and  while moving reduce its effectiveness and lethality. Similarly, while the  Stryker vehicles contribute to force protection and meet survivability  requirements, there are inherent and expected survivability limitations as  in any armored vehicle system. Table 5 lists some of the operational  requirements of the vehicles and excerpts of selected performance  capabilities and limitations from the Army’s Stryker system evaluation  report.
The OSD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, found that six Stryker  production vehicles are operationally effective for employment in small- scale contingency operations and operationally suitable with certain  limitations. OSD found that the Engineer Squad vehicle is not  operationally suitable because of poor reliability. However, in its March  2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD determined that the operational  capabilities provided by the Engineer Squad vehicle supported its  continued production in light of planned fixes, operational work-arounds,  and planned follow-on testing. It also determined that corrective actions  are needed to address survivability and ballistic vulnerability limitations of  the vehicles, such as ensuring basic armor performance and reducing  exposure of Stryker personnel.
section_title: Mobile Gun System Development and Testing Schedule Ongoing but Delayed
paragraphs: Although developmental testing is ongoing, the development and testing  schedule of the Mobile Gun System has been delayed, resulting in more  than a 1-year delay in meeting planned production decision milestone  dates, with initial limited production to start in September 2004. The delay  in the Mobile Gun System’s development was due in part to shortfalls in  meeting performance requirements of the vehicle’s ammunition autoloader  system. At the time of our review, the Mobile Gun System was undergoing  additional testing to find a fix for the autoloader, in preparation for a low- rate production decision. The Mobile Gun System is scheduled for  production qualification testing through July 2004, production verification  testing starting in October 2005, and live-fire test and evaluation starting in  November 2005 through September 2006. The Army’s earlier Mobile Gun  System acquisition schedule was to complete developmental testing and  have a low-rate initial production decision in 2003 and begin full  production in 2005. Current Army plans are to buy limited quantities of  Mobile Gun System vehicles upon OSD approval of low-rate initial  production planned for September 2004. A full-rate production decision  for the Mobile Gun System is currently scheduled for late in 2006.
The Mobile Gun System has a 105mm cannon with an autoloader for  rapidly loading cannon rounds without outside exposure of its three- person crew. The principal function of the Mobile Gun System is to  provide rapid and lethal direct fires to protect assaulting infantry. The  Mobile Gun System cannon is designed to defeat bunkers and create  openings in reinforced concrete walls through which infantry can pass to  accomplish their missions. According to the Army’s Stryker Program  Management Office, the autoloader system was responsible for 80 percent  of the system aborts during initial Mobile Gun System reliability testing  because of cannon rounds jamming in the system. As of February 2004, the  Army was planning additional testing and working with the autoloader’s  manufacturer to determine a solution. A functioning autoloader is needed  if the Mobile Gun System is to meet its operational requirements because  manual loading of cannon rounds both reduces the desired rate of fire and  requires brief outside exposure of crew. In its March 2004 Stryker  acquisition decision, OSD required the Army to provide changes to the  Mobile Gun System developmental exit criteria within 90 days, including  the ability to meet cost and system reliability criteria.
section_title: NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle Development Schedule Delayed
paragraphs: Although its developmental testing is also ongoing, the development  schedule of the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle has also been delayed, and  its production is now scheduled to occur about two years later than  planned. The delay was primarily due to additional time needed to develop  and test the vehicle’s nuclear, biological, and chemical sensor systems. As  a result, low-rate initial production, previously scheduled for December  2003, will not occur until September 2004. A full-rate production decision,  which had previously been scheduled for June 2005, will not occur until  July 2007. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD required the  Army to provide within 90 days an updated technology readiness  assessment for the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle and its nuclear,  biological, and chemical sensor systems. At that time, OSD will make a  determination as to whether the vehicle is ready for production.
section_title: Army Demonstrated Required Stryker C- 130 Transportability, but Contrary to Congressional Expectations, Operational Limits Significantly Challenge Routine C- 130 Transport
paragraphs: Although the Army demonstrated during training events that Stryker  vehicles can be transported short distances on C-130 aircraft and unloaded  for immediate combat, the average 38,000 pound weight of Stryker  vehicles, other cargo weight concerns, and less than ideal environmental  conditions present significant challenges in using C-130s for routine  Stryker transport. Similar operational limits would exist for C-130  transport of the Army’s Future Combat Systems because they are also  being designed to weigh about 38,000 pounds.
In addition, much of the mission equipment, ammunition, fuel, personnel,  and armor a Stryker brigade would need to conduct a combat operation  might need to be moved on separate aircraft, increasing the numbers of  aircraft or sorties needed to deploy a Stryker force, adding to deployment  time and the time it would take after arrival to begin operations. Yet, the  Army’s weight requirement and C-130 transport requirements for the  vehicles, and information the Army provided to Congress in budget  documents and testimony, created expectations that Stryker vehicles  could be routinely transported by C-130 aircraft within an operational  theater.
subsections: section_title: Stryker’s C-130 Short- Distance Deployability Was Demonstrated in Operational Evaluations
paragraphs: In a December 2003 report on the first Stryker Brigade’s design  evaluation, we reported that the Stryker Brigade demonstrated the ability  to conduct tactical deployments by C-130 aircraft. At the National Training  Center in April 2003, we observed the brigade conduct a tactical  movement by moving a Stryker infantry company with its personnel,  supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via seven C-130 aircraft flying 35 sorties  from Southern California Logistics Airfield to a desert airfield on Fort  Irwin about 70 miles away. Figure 4 shows a Stryker vehicle being  offloaded from a C-130 at the National Training Center.
A team from the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of the Director for  Operational Test and Evaluation and the Army’s Test and Evaluation  Command also observed the Stryker vehicle’s deployment and recorded  the weight of the vehicles and the total load weight onboard the aircraft.  The average weight for the eight production vehicle configurations was  just less than 38,000 pounds, while the total load weight—including a 3- days’ supply of fuel, food, water, and ammunition—averaged more than  39,100 pounds. Table 6 shows the weight of eight-production vehicles and  their total load weight recorded at the time of the April 2003 National  Training Center deployment. We noted in our December 2003 report,  however, that while the tactical deployment of Stryker vehicles by C-130  aircraft was demonstrated, the Army had yet to demonstrate under various  environmental conditions, such as high temperature and airfield altitude,  just how far Stryker vehicles can be tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft.
section_title: Weight Presents Significant Challenges for C-130 Transport of Stryker Vehicles, Making Requirements and Expectations Difficult to Meet
paragraphs: The weight of Stryker vehicles presents significant challenges for C-130  aircraft transport because, as a general rule U.S. Air Force air mobility  planning factors specify an allowable C-130 cargo weight of about 34,000  pounds for routine flight. With most Stryker vehicles weighing close to  38,000 pounds on board, the distance—or range—that a C-130 aircraft  could fly is significantly reduced when taking-off in high air temperatures  or from airfields located in higher elevations. In standard, or nearly ideal,  flight conditions—such as day-time, low head-wind, moderate air  temperature, and low elevation—an armored C-130H with a cargo payload  of 38,000 pounds can generally expect to fly 860 miles from takeoff to  landing. Furthermore, according to a Military Traffic Management  Command’s Transportation Engineering Agency study of C-130 aircraft  transportability of Army vehicles, a C-130’s range is significantly reduced  with only minimal additional weight, and ideal conditions rarely exist in  combat scenarios. The C-130 aircraft’s range may be further reduced if  operational conditions such as high-speed takeoffs and threat-based route  deviations exist because more fuel would be consumed under these  conditions. Even in ideal flight conditions, adding just 2,000 pounds  onboard the aircraft for associated cargo such as mission equipment,  personnel, or ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft’s takeoff-to-landing  range to 500 miles. In addition, the more than 41,000-pound weight of the  Mobile Gun System would limit the C-130 aircraft’s range to a maximum  distance of less than 500 miles. Figure 5 shows the affects of cargo weight  on an armored C-130H aircraft’s flight range in nearly ideal flight  conditions.
The addition of armor to the Strykers would pose additional challenges.  With removable armor added to Strykers, the vehicles will not fit inside a  C-130. To provide interim protection against rocket-propelled grenades,  the Stryker vehicles of the brigade that deployed to Iraq in October 2003,  were fitted with Slat armor weighing about 5,000 pounds for each vehicle  (see fig. 6). By 2005, the Army expects to complete the development of  add-on reactive armor—weighing about 9,000 pounds per vehicle—for  protection against rocket-propelled grenades. With either type of armor  installed, a Stryker vehicle will not fit inside a C-130 aircraft cargo bay.  Regardless, with the added weight of the armor even in ideal flight  conditions, the aircraft would be too heavy to take off.
Furthermore, according to the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s  Stryker System Evaluation, in less than favorable flight conditions, the Air  Force considers routine transport of the 38,000-pound cargo weight of a  Stryker vehicle on C-130 aircraft risky, and such flight may not be  permitted under the Air Force’s flight operations risk management  requirements if other transport means are available. In two theaters where  U.S. forces are currently operating—the Middle East and Afghanistan, high  temperatures and elevation can reduce C-130 aircraft range if carrying a  38,000-pound Stryker vehicle. Table 7 shows the reduced C-130 aircraft  transport range due to daytime average summer temperatures of more  than 100 degrees Fahrenheit in Iraq and high temperatures and elevations  in Afghanistan. From two locations in Afghanistan (Bagram at 4,895 feet  elevation and Kabul at 5,871 feet elevation) during daytime in the summer,  a C-130 with a Stryker vehicle on board would not be able to take off at all.  In winter from these same locations, its flight range would be reduced to  610 miles departing from Bagram and to 310 miles departing from Kabul.  These same weight concerns would also apply to the Army’s Future  Combat Systems vehicles, which according to the Army’s operational  requirements should be no larger than 38,000 pounds and be transportable  by a C-130.
Additionally, the Mobile Gun System, expected to weigh over 41,000  pounds, is probably too heavy to transport a significant distance via C-130  aircraft. Furthermore, the C-130 aircraft cannot transport many of a  Stryker brigade’s vehicles at all. Stryker vehicles make up a little more  than 300 of the over 1,000 vehicles of a Stryker brigade, and many of the  brigade’s support vehicles, such as fuel trucks, are too large or heavy for  C-130 transport.
section_title: C-130 Airlift for Stryker Brigades Could Increase Force Deployment Time and Time Needed to Start Operations upon Arrival— a Key Operational Requirement and Expectation
paragraphs: Because a C-130’s range is limited by weight and a Stryker’s weight  exceeds limits for routine C-130 loading, a tactical movement of significant  distance of a Stryker brigade via C-130 aircraft in less than ideal conditions  could necessitate moving much of the mission equipment, ammunition,  fuel, personnel, and armor on separate aircraft. Such use of separate  aircraft for moving Stryker vehicles and associated equipment, personnel,  and supplies increases the force closure, or deployment, time and might  limit the deployed forces’ ability to be capable of immediate combat  operations upon arrival—one of the Army’s key operational requirements  for the Stryker vehicles—because aircraft would arrive at different times  and potentially different locations. In combination, a 38,000-pound Stryker  vehicle, and the associated equipment, personnel, or armor that would  have to be transported on separate aircraft are likely to increase the  number of aircraft or sorties that would be needed to deploy a Stryker  force. For example, if a decision were made to use a Stryker’s add-on  armor for a tactical mission, at about 9,000 pounds for each vehicle’s  armor, it would take at least one additional C-130 aircraft sortie to  transport the armor for about four vehicles. Or, because of potential limits  of the availability of C-130 lift assets, the size of a Stryker force and  number of Stryker vehicles that could be tactically deployed would have to  be reduced.
At the National Training Center in April 2003, we observed, upon landing,  an infantry company unload the vehicles from the C-130 aircraft,  reconfigure them for combat missions, and move onward to a staging area.  All Stryker variants except one reconfigured into combat capable modes  within their designated time standard. Once reconfigured, units of the  Stryker brigade also demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate  combat operations. However, this was a short-range movement with only  seven aircraft and did not require fitting armor on the vehicles. In an  operational mission, depending on the size of the Stryker force deployed,  using separate C-130 aircraft for transporting vehicles and associated  people and equipment could significantly increase force deployment time  because of the increased numbers of aircraft sorties needed. Upon arrival,  it would also increase the time needed to reconfigure and begin operations  because the vehicles, equipment, and personnel on different aircraft might  arrive at different times or at different airfield locations. In addition, if a  decision were made to use add-on armor for a mission, the armor would  need to be installed after arrival, adding an average of about 10 hours per  vehicle in reconfiguration time to install the armor.
The capability of transporting Stryker vehicles on C-130 aircraft, despite  its challenges and limitations, is a major objective of the Army’s  transformation to a lighter more responsive force. As such, the Army’s  weight and C-130 transport requirements for the vehicles, as well as  information the Army provided to Congress, created expectations that  Stryker vehicles could be routinely transported within an operational  theater by C-130 aircraft. For example, in several congressional hearings  since 2001, senior Army leadership testified that Stryker vehicles would be  capable of transport by C-130 aircraft. In addition, annual budget  justifications, which the Army submits to Congress for Stryker vehicle  acquisition, highlight the C-130 transport capability of Stryker-vehicle- equipped Brigade Combat Teams.
During our review, Army officials acknowledged the significant challenges  and limitations of meeting expectations for transporting Stryker vehicles— and beyond 2010, the Future Combat Systems—on C-130 aircraft in terms  of limited flight range, the size force that could be deployed, and the  challenges of arriving ready for combat. The officials, however, believe  that the capability to transport Stryker vehicles or the Future Combat  Systems’ vehicles on C-130 aircraft, even over short distances, offers the  theater combatant commanders an additional option among other modes  of intratheater transportation—such as C-17 aircraft, sealift, or driving  over land—for transporting Stryker brigades and vehicles in tactical  missions. In addition, the officials believe that the ability to transport  elements of a Stryker brigade as small as a platoon with four Stryker  vehicles— as a part of an operational mission of forces moving by other  means, greatly enhances the combatant commander’s war-fighting  capabilities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In less than 4 years from the November 2000 Stryker vehicle contract  award, the Army is well under way in fielding the eight production vehicle  configurations, and Stryker vehicles are already in use in military  operations in Iraq. However, program costs have increased, largely  because of the cost of military construction related to Stryker vehicle  needs, and delays in developing and testing the two remaining variants will  delay their fielding and use.
Furthermore, although the Army has successfully demonstrated that  Stryker vehicles can be transported on C-130 aircraft during training  events, routine use of the C-130 for airlifting Stryker vehicles, for other  than short-range missions with limited numbers of vehicles, would be  difficult in theaters where U.S. forces are currently operating. Therefore,  the intended capability of Stryker brigades to be transportable by C-130  aircraft would be markedly reduced. The Army’s operational requirements  and information the Army provided to Congress created expectations that  a Stryker vehicle weight of 38,000 pounds—and a similar weight for Future  Combat System vehicles—would allow routine C-130 transport in tactical  operations. Consequently, congressional decision makers do not have an  accurate sense or realistic expectations of the operational capabilities of  Stryker vehicles and Future Combat Systems.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the  Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, take the  following two actions:  1.  Provide to Congress information that    clarifies the expected C-130 tactical intratheater deployment  capabilities of Stryker brigades and Stryker vehicles and describes  probable operational missions and scenarios using C-130 transport  of Stryker vehicles that are achievable, including the size of a  combat capable C-130 deployable Stryker force;    describes operational capability limitations of Stryker brigades  given the limits of C-130 transport; and  identifies options for, and the feasibility of, alternative modes of  transportation—such as C-17 aircraft— for transporting Stryker  brigades within an operational theater.  2.  Provide the Congress similar clarification concerning the operational  requirements and expected C-130 tactical airlift capabilities of Future  Combat System vehicles, considering the limits of C-130 aircraft  transportability.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense  partially concurred with our recommendations.  The department also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where  appropriate.
DOD concurred that operational requirements for airlift capability for  brigade transport need clarification and stated that the ongoing Mobility  Capabilities Study, scheduled for completion in the spring of 2005, will  include an assessment of the intratheater transport of Army Stryker  Brigade Combat Teams and address the recommendations of this report.   In responding to our recommendation to provide information to Congress  concerning C-130 transport of Stryker-equipped brigades, the department  partially concurred and stated that the Army has studied C-130  transportability in depth.  While we agree that the Army has studied C-130  transportability of Stryker vehicles—including the limitations that we  point out in this report—their comments provide no assurance that this  information will be provided to Congress, and we believe Congress needs  this type of information to have an accurate sense of the operational  capabilities of Stryker brigades.  The department also partially concurred  with our recommendation to provide to Congress similar clarification  concerning the operational requirements and expected C-130 tactical  airlift capabilities of Future Combat System vehicles, considering the  limits of C-130 aircraft transportability.  The department noted in its  response that the Army is currently considering many factors, including C- 130 tactical airlift capability limits, as it reviews Future Combat Systems  Unit of Action capability requirements.  The department also stated that  the Mobility Capabilities Study would include intratheater transport of  Army units of action—the Army’s Future Combat Systems-equipped future  force.
Given the ongoing congressional interest in the implications of the Army’s  requirements for C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles and Future Combat  System ground vehicles, we agree that the information the Congress would  need, if addressed in the Mobility Capabilities Study and provided to  Congress, would meet the intent of our recommendations.  With the  Mobility Capabilities Study not scheduled for completion until the spring  of 2005, we will assess at that time the adequacy of the study’s assessment  of intratheater transport of Army Stryker- and Future Combat System- equipped units.  The Senate Armed Services Committee has directed GAO  to monitor DOD’s processes used to conduct the Mobility Capabilities  Study, and to report on the adequacy and completeness of the study to the  congressional defense committees no later than 30 days after the  completion of the study.
The appendix contains the full text of the department’s comments.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition and the  latest Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates, we analyzed  documents on Stryker vehicle acquisition plans, contract performance  requirements, and costs and interviewed officials from the Army Program  Executive Office/Stryker Program Management Office, Warren, Michigan.  To determine Stryker program costs, we reviewed the DOD approved  December 2003 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and interviewed  Stryker Program Management Office officials. For our analysis of Stryker  vehicle-operating costs, we reviewed the Army’s mileage cost estimates  and the Army’s methodology for calculating costs per mile. We did not  verify source information the Army used in its calculations.
To determine the status and results of Stryker vehicle tests, we reviewed  the results of Stryker vehicle developmental and survivability testing from  the Army Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia, and the  Army Developmental Test Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground,  Maryland. We also reviewed the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command,  Army Evaluation Center’s Stryker System Evaluation Report and OSD  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation’s Operational Test and  Evaluation and Live Fire Test and Evaluation Report for the Stryker family  of vehicles.
To determine the ability of C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker vehicles  within a theater of operations, we reviewed a Military Traffic Management  Command’s, Transportation Engineering Agency study of the C-130  aircraft’s range and payload capabilities and interviewed U.S. Army, Air  Force and Transportation Command officials. We notified U.S. Central  Command of our objective to review plans for C-130 aircraft transport of  Stryker vehicles within the command’s area of operations, but Central  Command officials determined that this was an Army issue, rather than a  combatant command’s issue.
Our review was conducted from July 2003 through June 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking  Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and  subcommittees that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for  DOD. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available  at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8365, or Assistant Director, George Poindexter, at (202)  512-7213. Major contributors to this report were Kevin Handley, Frank  Smith, and M. Jane Hunt.
section_title: Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features,  Risks, and Alternatives. GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004.
Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative  Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues  Remain for Future Brigades. GAO-04-188. Washington, D.C.: December  12, 2003.
Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program. GAO-03- 1010R. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003.
Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for  Army Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3  Infantry Carrier vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily  Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.
Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should  Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army’s  Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.:  March 28,  2003.
Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation  of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2002.
Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for  Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96.  Washington, D.C.:  November 16, 2001.
Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems  Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.:  May 21, 2001.
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and  investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its  constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and  accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO  examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;  and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help  Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s  commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of  accountability, integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
paragraphs: The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost  is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts  newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To  have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go  to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.”
subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Congressional Relations
section_title: Public Affairs