Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the Advising Mission
Published: 2011-08-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Developing capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces is a key component of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan and, in 2009, the Army began augmenting brigade combat teams (BCT) with advisor personnel to advise the host nation security forces in these countries. House Armed Services Committee report 111-491 directed GAO to report on the Army's plans to augment BCTs to perform advising missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report (1) identifies the key characteristics of the augmented BCT concept; (2) assesses the extent to which the Army has provided augmented BCTs, and what challenges, if any, these units have faced; and (3) assesses the extent to which requirements for augmented BCTs have impacted overall Army personnel requirements, including the Army's ability to provide advisor personnel. GAO examined augmented BCT doctrine and guidance, analyzed advisor requirements, reviewed after- action reviews and lessons learned from augmented BCTs, and interviewed Army, theater command, and augmented BCT officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Army guidance identifies key characteristics of the augmented BCT concept, such as how advisors are to be organized, commanded, and supported. For example, BCT commanders are to organize the advisors into teams, with other necessary resources being provided to the teams by the brigade. The theater commander determines the specific numbers and types of advisors based upon the operational environment and mission requirements. BCTs are envisioned to exercise command of advisor teams and provide support such as specialized personnel, equipment, and transportation and security. However, it is recognized that BCTs may have other priorities and must balance the demand for resources between the advising mission and other missions. The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater commanders' requests, but units have faced some challenges because commanders did not always set clear priorities between the advising mission and other missions or define specific requirements for how the BCTs should support the advising mission. For example, theater commanders did not require that advisor teams include specialized personnel, such as logisticians or intelligence officers. Because the BCTs already have high demand for these personnel, the brigades are challenged to meet the advisors' requirements for those same personnel. As a result, some advising teams told GAO that they were limited in their ability to advise in some specialty areas or that they may be advising Iraqi and Afghan security forces in functional areas where the advisors have little or no experience. Also, theater commanders' requests did not always specify command relationships. As a result, in some cases, advisors were reassigned to the control of a division or a brigade that they had not trained and deployed with, which disrupted the unity of command envisioned under the augmented BCT concept. The use of augmented BCTs has decreased the total number of advisor personnel required for the advising mission, but increased requirements for field grade officers, already in short supply. According to Army officials, as a result of these shortages, the Army has faced challenges meeting the requirement to provide field grade advisors at least 45 days prior to the brigades' mission rehearsal exercise. In many cases, advisors did not join the brigades until after the exercise, hindering their integration into the BCTs and complicating efforts to establish support and command structures. Some officials suggested that it would be helpful if at least two or three of the highest-ranking advisors arrived significantly earlier than currently required in order to facilitate integration. Moreover, GAO found that augmented BCTs are organizing their advisors into smaller numbers of larger teams than envisioned in the theater commander requirements. As a result, augmented BCTs may not need the number and rank of advisors currently required by those requests.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that theater commands assess and refine, as appropriate, advisor requirements and define advisor support and command structures. GAO also recommends that the Army provide certain advisor personnel to brigades earlier in pre-deployment training. DOD concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Key components of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan include  developing capable host nation security forces and facilitating the  transition of security responsibility to the host nations. Prior to 2009, the  Department of Defense (DOD) relied on hundreds of small training and  transition teams (collectively known as “transition teams”) made up of  personnel from all of the military services to advise and mentor Iraqi and  Afghan security forces. However, filling the personnel requirements of the  transition teams was difficult for the Army and the use of these teams led  to command and control challenges, since they operated separately from  major combat units.
To help alleviate these difficulties, in 2009, the Army shifted its approach  and, in coordination with theater commanders, began replacing many of  the individual transition teams with brigade combat teams (BCT)  augmented by advisor personnel, referred to in this report as “augmented  BCTs.” Under this concept, the Army envisioned that augmenting  brigades would enable them to execute the advising mission, as well as  their combat missions. Among the intended benefits of this strategy was  the intent to make it easier for the Army to fill the requirements for  trainers, since the number of individually sourced advisors for the  augmented brigades would be smaller than the number of individually  sourced personnel needed for all of the transition teams. In addition, it  would also achieve unity of command over the advising mission, with both  the mission and the advisor personnel being under the command and  control of the brigades.
The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a proposed  bill for the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.  5136) directed us to report on the Army’s plans to augment BCTs to  perform advising missions and on the use of such augmented brigades to  support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To address this requirement,  this report: (1) identifies the key characteristics of the Army’s concept for  augmenting BCTs with personnel to support advising missions; (2)  assesses the extent to which the Army has provided augmented BCTs for  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what challenges, if any, these  units have faced in implementing the concept; and (3) assesses the  extent to which the requirements for augmented BCTs have impacted  overall Army personnel requirements, including the Army’s ability to  provide advisor personnel to BCTs in required time frames.
To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed doctrine and guidance from  the Army and theater commanders, examined the training requirements  and program of instruction for the advising mission, and analyzed the  manning requirements for augmented BCTs, with specific focus on the  leadership augment. We also reviewed selected mission briefs, after  action reviews, task organization, and lessons learned from deployed and  redeployed augmented BCTs, dating back to 2009. Additionally, we  examined personnel data, also dating back to 2009. Finally, we met with,  among others, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Department of the Army, U.S. Central Command, Army Human  Resources Command, Army Forces Command, U.S. Forces—Iraq, U.S.
Forces—Afghanistan, and various redeployed and deployed augmented  BCTs and division headquarters in the United States, Iraq, and  Afghanistan.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 through August  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains  additional information about our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Security force assistance—the effort to develop capable host nation  security forces—is a key component of the U.S. efforts to create  sustainable security in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The goal of this mission  is to build partner capability and improve the security situation such that,  over time, U.S. forces and partnered foreign security forces can  collectively set the conditions to defeat common threats and ultimately  achieve strategic success. The Army’s field manual on security force  assistance recognizes that this is not a new mission but also states that in  the current operational environment, security force assistance is no  longer an additional duty but is now a core competency of the Army. It is  part of the full spectrum of military operations, meaning it can be  conducted across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general  war. The field manual also notes that security force assistance can  include both advising and partnering to develop competent and capable  foreign security forces.    Advising. Advising is the primary type of security force assistance and  is the use of influence to teach, coach, and advise while working by,  with, and through the foreign security force. Advising helps foreign  security forces conduct independent decision making and operations,  and advisors may also provide foreign security forces with direct  access to joint and multinational capabilities, such as air support,  artillery, medical evacuation, and intelligence.    Partnering. In partnering, the U.S. attaches units to host nation units  at various levels in order to leverage the strengths of both U.S. and  foreign security forces. Partnered units should establish combined  cells for intelligence, operations, planning, and sustainment. While  effective coordination is always required and initial efforts may require  completely fused efforts, foreign security forces should eventually  build the capability and capacity to conduct all efforts autonomously.
Advising and partnering, while complementary, are distinct activities that  can be performed simultaneously, sequentially, or in combination. U.S.  units, such as Army BCTs, are partnering with the Iraqi and Afghan  security forces. Examples include U.S. battalions conducting combined  route clearance missions or manning combined checkpoints with host  nation military units in their area of operations. The Army’s field manual  notes that as a foreign security force’s capabilities mature, the echelon  and degree of partnering decrease. For example, a U.S. Army battalion  may initially partner with a foreign security force battalion, but as the  foreign security force matures, a U.S. Army battalion may partner at a  higher echelon such as with a foreign security force division while the  U.S. battalion’s subordinate companies may partner with the foreign  security force battalions.
Like partnering, advising also can occur at various echelons of the foreign  security force with the echelon of focus changing as foreign security  forces mature. However, brigades have only recently assumed the  advising mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, prior to 2009 and  2010, respectively, the advising mission was conducted primarily with  transition teams. These transition teams did not exist as units in any of  the services’ force structures and were instead comprised of company-  and field-grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers who were  centrally identified and individually selected based on rank and specialty.  For the Army alone, the number of individually sourced advisors— individually sourced advisors are those identified by Army Human  Resources Command and assigned to transition teams—required to fill  the transition teams in Iraq and Afghanistan at any one time totaled about  8,000 personnel. As we have previously reported, the demand for these  leaders created challenges for the services because the leaders were  generally pulled from other units or commands, which then were left to  perform their missions while undermanned. In addition, the transition  teams operated externally to the major combat units in their area of  operations and reported to a different command structure, which led to a  lack of unity of command that complicated coordination and  communication between the transition teams and the combat units.
The Army developed the concept of augmenting BCTs with specialized  personnel to execute the advising mission, in part, as a means of  alleviating these challenges. The replacement of transition teams with  augmented BCTs was intended to mitigate strain on the Army by reducing  the number of personnel who would have to be individually sourced by  the Army Human Resources Command for the security force assistance  advising mission, since the advisors would be able to leverage the  capabilities of the existing BCTs for support functions, thus requiring  fewer specially sourced individuals for the mission. Augmented BCTs also  were intended to improve command and control over the mission by  placing both the mission and personnel assigned to the mission under a  single brigade commander.
section_title: The Army Has Identified the Key Characteristics of the Augmented BCT Concept
paragraphs: 6GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and Infrastructure Should  Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans, GAO-09-380T (Washington, D.C.:  February 12, 2009). capabilities that should be considered when defining augment  requirements, and the need to support advisor personnel with resources  from the BCT.    Task organization: The BCT commander organizes the advisor  augment personnel into advisor teams based on advising mission  requirements in his area of operations. These advisor teams may be  formed from organic resources from the brigade, external  augmentation, or a combination of these.    Command and control: The BCT commander has command and  control authority over the advisor personnel and advisor teams. The  Army handbook notes the advantage of the advisor teams being  under the command of the augmented BCT commander, with this  unity of command resulting in a unity of effort and purpose.    Augmentation requirements: The field manual provides a basic  conceptual design for augmentation, which can include personnel  capabilities such as combat advisors, military police, or legal  personnel. According to the field manual, the theater commander is to  determine the precise mix of forces and augment capabilities— including the specific numbers and types of advisors—required for  augmented BCTs in his area of operations, based upon the  operational environment and mission requirements. As advising tasks  change in response to the evolving needs of the host nation security  force, the theater commander can re-tailor the augmentation (i.e., the  specific numbers and types of advisors) provided to successive BCTs,  accordingly.    BCT support of advisors: The field manual notes that the advisor  teams may need resources from the brigade for support functions,  such as specialized personnel, equipment, transportation, and  security. This would allow the advisor teams to stay focused on  advising. The handbook acknowledges, though, that the brigades may  have other mission priorities in addition to security force assistance.  Although the augmented BCTs are specially resourced with advisor  personnel to advise, assist, and mentor the Iraqi and Afghan security  forces, the brigades still must balance the security force assistance  advising mission with other brigade missions.
The security force assistance field manual also addresses the training  that should be received by soldiers assigned to security force assistance  missions. The Army has tasked the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade to  provide advisor augment personnel with specialized advisor training on  topics such as language and culture, host nation government and security  forces, cross-cultural communication, and rapport building as part of their  pre-deployment training. The program also includes leadership  engagement scenarios where advisor team leaders engage with role  players in simulated exchanges and opportunities for the advisors and  brigade and battalion leadership to conduct combined planning exercises  with simulated host nation security force leadership. The final stage of  pre-deployment training for the augmented BCT is the mission rehearsal  exercise, through which the advisor personnel and the BCT are expected  to exercise the augmented BCT concept as an integrated unit. In  addition to participating in combat and advising mission exercises, the  scenario is intended to enable the BCT and its advisors the opportunity create advisor teams and establish the key command and control and  support structures necessary for executing the mission in theater.
section_title: Army Is Deploying Augmented BCTs to Iraq and Afghanistan, but Some Challenges Exist
paragraphs: The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater  commanders’ requests; however, these units have faced challenges  because theater commanders’ guidance did not always clearly define how  these units were to perform key aspects of the augmented BCT concept  and theater commanders’ requests did not include some requirements  needed to support the advising mission, given the brigades’ resource  limitations. As a result, brigade commanders have faced challenges  determining how to prioritize their resources when supporting multiple  missions in addition to the advising mission and providing specialized  personnel, equipment, transportation, and security for the advisors. In  addition, augmented BCTs and their assigned advisor personnel have  sometimes lacked the unity of command envisioned under the Army’s  augmented BCT concept.
subsections: section_title: The Army Has Deployed Augmented BCTs to Iraq and Afghanistan Based on Theater Commanders’ Requests
paragraphs: In 2009 and 2010, U.S. Central Command, on behalf of theater  commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, submitted requests for augmented  BCTs for ongoing operations. In May 2009, the theater commander for  Iraq requested forces for the augmentation of Iraq-bound BCTs with 48  field grade officers specially trained as advisors to execute the security  force assistance advising mission. Likewise, in March 2010, the theater  commander for Afghanistan submitted a request for forces for augmented  BCTs that would each be augmented with a package of 48 advisor  personnel—24 field grade officers and 24 non-commissioned officers.
Both requests envisioned that the 48 advisor personnel would be  organized into 24 two-man advisor teams and that the teams would  receive all necessary support—including additional specialized personnel,  equipment, and transportation and security support—from the brigades.
The Army has been able to deploy augmented brigades to Iraq and  Afghanistan since August 2009 and June 2010, respectively, in  accordance with theater commanders’ requests. As of June 2011, there  were six augmented BCTs operating in Iraq and nine in Afghanistan. The  Army intends for all future BCTs deploying to Afghanistan to be  augmented BCTs.
section_title: Augmented BCTs Have Faced Challenges Allocating Resources across Multiple Missions and Supporting Advisor Teams
paragraphs: Augmented BCTs have faced challenges allocating resources across  missions and providing support to enable the advising mission because  theater commanders did not always set clear priorities, ultimately leading  to challenges for these units. Specifically, augmented BCTs have  sometimes had difficulty allocating resources between the advising  mission and other missions, such as counterinsurgency operations;  advisor teams have sometimes lacked the appropriate specialized  personnel and equipment to conduct the advising mission; and advisor  teams have not always received consistent transportation and security  support from augmented BCTs to enable the advising mission. Each of  these challenges is discussed below.
Army guidance for security force assistance recognizes that augmented  BCT commanders consider the extent of threats, combined with resource  limitations, in order to set priorities, which would include determining the  degree to which BCT resources can be allocated to support the advising  mission. For example, augmented BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan must  balance their requirements to support the advising mission with other  operational requirements, such as counterinsurgency operations,  partnering with host nation security forces, or performing missions such  as conducting checkpoints. Army officials told us that, in the absence of  other guidance from theater commanders, in kinetic combat  environments, such as Afghanistan, augmented BCT commanders  naturally prioritize the combat mission and direct their resources that way.  According to Army officials, the augmented BCT concept was initially  intended to be introduced to an operating environment after major combat  operations were concluded. This would make more of the resources of  the augmented BCTs available to support the advising mission. When  augmented BCTs first deployed to Iraq in 2009, the Iraqi Security Forces  were assuming greater responsibility for combat operations and Iraqi  forces have had the primary responsibility for security since 2010. Iraq  theater command officials told us that advising the Iraqi Security Forces is  the primary effort of U.S. military forces in Iraq, including augmented  BCTs. In contrast, U.S. military forces in Afghanistan are still conducting  counterinsurgency operations in a combat environment and the theater  commander in Afghanistan has not specified the priority of the advising  mission for the augmented BCTs, relative to counterinsurgency  operations. The Afghanistan theater commander’s request for augmented  BCTs noted that these BCTs would be responsible for both advising and  counterinsurgency operations, but provided no guidance as to how the  brigades should balance resources and make trade-offs between the two  different mission sets. Augmented BCTs in both theaters, though, had  challenges balancing resources between the advising mission and other  missions.
The theater commanders’ requests for both Iraq and Afghanistan  envisioned the BCTs executing the advising mission by organizing their  advisors into 24 two-man teams drawing additional support from the BCT.  According to officials from several of these augmented BCTs, though, the  brigades do not have enough organic resources to support 24 dispersed  teams while still preserving enough of their resources to conduct other  missions. For instance, officials from one augmented Stryker brigade— Stryker brigades are significantly larger than other brigades—told us that  the brigade could only organize into a maximum of 12 to 15 dispersed  advisor teams using a company as the basis for support while still  addressing other mission requirements. Given their resource limitations  and the need to carry out other missions, augmented BCT officials told us  that they organized their advisors into a smaller number of teams often  consisting of more than two advisors. For example,  In Iraq, one augmented BCT that deployed with 43 advisors organized  them into five different advisor teams, while another augmented BCT  organized its 46 advisors into eight teams.  In Afghanistan, one augmented BCT organized the 44 advisors that it  deployed with into 15 teams, while another augmented BCT  organized its 48 advisors into nine advisor teams.
According to some of these officials, organizing the advisors in this  manner was intended to enable the brigade to better support the advising  mission while still retaining the capacity to meet other mission  requirements. However, we found that some of the augmented BCTs that  we visited faced challenges supporting their advisor teams, regardless of  the number of teams they had.
The Army’s augmented BCT concept and the theater commanders’  augmented BCT requests assumed that any specialty personnel required  by the advisor teams—such as logisticians and intelligence personnel— would be pulled from the brigade. The theater commanders’ requests for  advisors therefore do not include requirements for the advisors to have  any specialized capabilities, despite the fact that advisors are frequently  advising Iraqi and Afghan security forces in specialized areas. In contrast,  the transition teams were often comprised of personnel with specialist  capabilities in areas such as intelligence, logistics, or communications.  According to the security force assistance field manual, the composition  of the advisor teams is subject to objectives (e.g., the type of training to  be provided) and conditions (e.g., the security environment), and BCT  commanders tailor advisor teams to match those objectives and  conditions. For example, the BCT commander, in coordination with the  advisor personnel, could identify specialized personnel from the BCT who  would be assigned to support the advisors. Because such personnel are  also in high demand within the brigade, though, the brigade is expected to  make trade-offs and prioritize its missions, including the advising mission.  However, in the absence of advisor teams receiving specialized  personnel from the brigade or the advisors themselves being specialists,  some advising teams lacked specialized capabilities. For example, some  advising teams told us that they were limited in their ability to advise in  certain specialty areas and that advisor personnel may be advising Iraqi  and Afghan leadership in functional areas where they have little or no  experience. In one case, a field grade officer advisor in Iraq who had no  prior intelligence experience was tasked with helping the Iraqis set up an  intelligence fusion center.
Since advisor teams are not regularly receiving specialized personnel  from the brigades, Army and augmented BCT officials told us that  including advisors with specialty capabilities as part of the augmented  BCT advisor requirements would be very beneficial for the advising  mission. The Army has gathered feedback from nine augmented BCT  commanders and the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, among others, that  identified the need for logisticians to be a part of the advisor packages.  The Army’s feedback also identified the need for military police, military  intelligence, and other specialties in augmentation packages. In order to  mitigate the challenges that the augmented BCTs face with shortages of  specialist personnel, the Army currently has an effort underway to  examine the advisor requirements and determine the need to tailor them  to include more specialized capabilities. The results of this effort have not  been finalized, though, so its impact cannot yet be determined.
The theater commanders’ requests for the augmented BCTs assumed  that the advisors would get all of their equipment from the BCTs. As was  the case with specialized personnel, the theater commanders’ requests  did not establish specific advisor equipment requirements for the Army to  fill, with the exception of some individual weapons and other small items.  As a result, some augmented BCTs experienced challenges providing  personal and operational equipment to the advisors both prior to and after  deploying to theater since all advisor equipment had to come from the  brigades’ existing stocks. For example, augmented BCT and advisor  officials told us that, prior to deploying, the advisors joining the brigades  expected to have equipment such as personal computers with both  unclassified and classified capabilities as well as office space to work  from, but that some of the brigades had difficulties providing these things  without limiting the access of others in the brigade.
Theater command and augmented BCT officials told us that, once in  theater, advisors sometimes lacked personal equipment, such as  navigation equipment, personnel locators, and cell phones. Additionally,  augmented BCTs sometimes lacked the operational equipment  necessary to support advisor teams at dispersed locations. Iraq theater  command officials told us that some augmented BCTs had submitted  requests for additional communications equipment to support advisor  teams at dispersed locations because the brigades did not deploy with  the number of communications systems necessary to support all of the  advisor teams that needed to operate separately from the brigade. In  instances where additional operational equipment for advisors was not  available, equipment shortages for advisors could impact the way that  brigades organized for the advising mission. For example, officials from  one augmented BCT in Iraq told us that the brigade only had seven  command and control communications nodes, which limited the number  of dispersed locations where the brigade could operate. While the brigade  mitigated that limitation as much as possible by co-locating units and  advisor teams, the shortage of key communications equipment, in part,  limited the brigade’s ability to support a larger number of advisor teams.
The theater commanders’ requests for the augmented BCTs envisioned  that the advisor teams would get their required support from the brigades  to which they were attached, but did not define the minimum level of  support that the brigades were to provide to the advisor teams.  Augmented BCT officials and advisors told us that the augmented BCTs  are responsible for making determinations regarding the allocation of  support to the advisor teams, balancing those needs against the needs of  other missions. According to augmented BCT officials, advisor teams  often operate away from larger combat units or established bases and  could therefore require up to a platoon or company of soldiers for support.  In the absence of guidance on the level of support that the augmented  BCTs were to provide, the level of support that the augmented BCTs we  visited provided to their advisor teams varied, depending on the operating  environment and the priorities of the BCT commander. For example,    Officials from an augmented BCT that had redeployed from Iraq told  us that, once in theater, the BCT received a requirement to secure a  number of joint checkpoints with the Iraqi Security Forces, which  limited its ability to provide transportation and security assets to the  number of advisor teams that it had initially planned to support.    Advisors from an augmented BCT in Afghanistan told us that the  advising mission was a low priority for the brigade and that the  brigade and its battalions had too many other requirements to provide  support to the advisor teams. Instead, the advisor teams relied on  nondedicated support from a separate military police company  operating in the area.    Advisors from an augmented BCT in Afghanistan told us that there  was no official allocation of support resources within the brigade and,  in some cases, the support was haphazard and came from other units  outside the brigade.
Transportation and security support is considered to be critical for the  augmented BCT advisors’ ability to execute the advising mission. Some  advisors told us that the level of dedicated transportation and security  support they received from the brigade directly impacted their ability to  meet with host nation security forces in order to build relationships and  advise the host nation security forces.
section_title: Augmented BCTs and Advisors Have Sometimes Lacked Unity of Command
paragraphs: Augmented BCTs and their advisor personnel sometimes lacked the unity  of command envisioned under the Army’s augmented BCT concept  because theater commanders did not always provide clear guidance on  command and control structures for the advisors. As a result, in some  cases, advisors were reassigned to be under the control of a division or a  brigade other than the one that they trained and deployed with. According  to Army guidance on security force assistance, advisor teams require a  clearly defined and structured chain of command under which to operate,  which alleviates confusion regarding who tasks or monitors the teams’  progress and ensures that advisor teams are supported. The Army  augmented BCT concept envisions the advisor teams being under the  command of the augmented BCT commander, with this unity of command  facilitating the integration of all aspects of the augmented BCT mission.
This was intended to address a challenge with the prior transition teams,  which operated independently from major combat units and were  overseen by higher headquarters at the division or theater level. Iraq  theater command, Army, and augmented BCT officials told us that the  unity of command is one of the primary benefits of the augmented BCT  concept.
The theater commander’s request for augmented BCTs for Iraq included  direction on the intended command and control structure of the advisors,  but the request for augmented BCTs for Afghanistan did not address this  topic. Although the operational commander on the ground may tailor the  force as deemed necessary to meet mission requirements—including  changing command and control structures—the successful  implementation of the augmented BCT concept hinges significantly on  leveraging the resources of the BCT to support the advisors and  synchronizing the advise and assist mission as part of the overall mission  of the BCT. In addition, augmented BCTs we met with in both Iraq and  Afghanistan had planned and trained for their advising mission consistent  with the intention that advisors will act as a synchronized force with  established support and command and control relationships and with the  advisor teams being a part of the BCT. For example, advisors and  officials at the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade told us that augmented  BCT and advisor training focuses on the advisor role as being part of the  BCT. Augmented BCT officials also told us that their final mission  rehearsal exercises typically included scenarios that allowed the BCT,  including advisors, to exercise their support and command and control  relationships.
Absent guidance from theater commanders on advisor command and  control, we found several instances, particularly in Afghanistan, where  advisor personnel were diverted away from the augmented BCT with  which they had deployed. In such instances, division commanders  assumed control of the advisor teams and managed them as a division  resource, similar to how the prior transition teams were managed. Those  advisor teams were sometimes tasked for other advising missions not  linked to the augmented BCT to which they were initially attached, or for  other assignments, such as serving on division headquarters staff. For  example, in the operating area of one division in Afghanistan,    The division commander assumed control of all 48 advisors from a  National Guard augmented BCT and created three division level  teams, each focused on different areas of the security force  assistance mission. That National Guard BCT was then assigned  advisor teams from another augmented BCT and the National Guard  also provided additional field grade officers to allow the BCT to meet  advising requirements in its area of operations, since it had lost its  original advisor personnel.    The division commander tasked a five-man advisor team from one of  the augmented BCTs to mentor the brigade of a North Atlantic Treaty  Organization partner and some individual advisor personnel to serve  as liaisons to the division.
Changes to the established command relationships between the brigades  and advisors after the units deploy can cause a range of challenges for  augmented BCTs and advisors. These include questions about how or if  the advisors’ mission continues to fit with their parent augmented BCT;  how or if the advisors will continue to be supported by their parent  augmented BCT, particularly if the advisors and the BCT are operating in  different areas; and what the chain of command is for the advisors.
section_title: Use of Augmented BCTs Has Alleviated Some Personnel Strains while Increasing Requirements for Field Grade Officers
paragraphs: Advisor requirements for augmented BCTs have decreased the total  number of individually sourced advisor personnel required for the advising  mission, but have increased Army personnel requirements for field grade  officers, already in short supply. According to Army officials, as a result of  field grade officer shortages, the Army has faced challenges meeting the  requirement to provide field grade advisors to the augmented BCTs at  least 45 days prior to the brigades’ mission rehearsal exercise. Since  augmented BCTs have been forming fewer advisor teams than initially  intended by theater commanders’ requests, augmented BCTs may not  need to be sourced with as many total advisor personnel or such large  numbers of field grade advisors.
subsections: section_title: Shift to Augmented BCTs Has Decreased the Total Number of Advisors and Alleviated Personnel Strain on Some Ranks, but Increased the Demand for Field Grade Officers
paragraphs: Moving from transition teams to augmented BCTs to advise the Iraqi and  Afghan security forces, driven, in part, by the need to address some of  the challenges the Army faced in filling requirements for transition teams,  has decreased the total number of advisors required for the advising  mission and alleviated the strain on certain ranks, but increased the strain  on others. Specifically, the shift to augmented BCTs has:    Decreased the total number of advisors required for the advising  mission because, rather than relying completely on transition teams  comprised of individually sourced personnel to man the advisor  teams, the augmented BCT concept envisions advisor teams led by  advisor augments (who are individually sourced) and further manned  by pulling additional personnel from the brigade, as needed;    Alleviated the strain on the Army’s pool of company grade officers  (e.g., Captains) and non-commissioned officers (e.g., Sergeants 1st  class) because these ranks were required in greater numbers on the  transition teams than the augmented BCTs; and  Increased requirements for field grade officer advisors, since the  ranks of the advisors required for augmented BCTs are generally  higher than the ranks of transition team personnel—particularly in  Iraq, where all advisors are field grade officers. For example,  according to Army Human Resources Command data, augmented  BCT advisor requirements increased demand for deployable field  grade officers by 463 in fiscal year 2010 and by 398 in the first two  quarters of fiscal year 2011.
Deployable field grade officers were already in short supply prior to the  introduction of the augmented BCT requirements. For example, taking  into account requirements for augmented BCT advisor personnel, Army  Human Resources Command data showed that the Army had shortages  of 2,469 majors and 1,297 lieutenant colonels as of June 2011. To  manage these shortages, the Army has prioritized the units and  commands for sourcing personnel such that filling advisor requirements  for augmented BCTs is among the highest sourcing priorities. As a result,  Army Human Resources Command data showed that, as of October  2010, 97 percent of all advisor requirements for augmented BCTs were  ultimately filled. However, the high priority for the augmented BCT advisor  requirements, combined with the field grade officer shortages, has, at  times, resulted in the understaffing of field grade ranks in other  commands and units, such as U.S. Army Europe, Army Training and  Doctrine Command, and units in South Korea, among many others.
section_title: Army Has Been Challenged in Providing Advisors to the Augmented BCTs within Specified Time Frames
paragraphs: While the Army has been able to fill most requirements for augmented  BCT advisor personnel, it has not always been able to provide advisors to  the units within specified time frames. Army officials have told us that  Army execution orders for augmented BCTs require that advisors join the  augmented BCTs at least 45 days prior to the units’ mission rehearsal  exercise. Army and augmented BCT officials have told us that early  advisor arrival is critical to integrating the advisors into the unit, building  advisor teams, and establishing key support and command and control  relationships between the advisor teams and the BCT. Similarly,  according to Army guidance, building the advisor teams as early as  possible facilitates cohesion and trust. Given the shift in how the advising  mission is being handled—from stand-alone transition teams operating  independently to advisors who are integrated with and reliant on a BCT— these exercises help the augmented BCTs become comfortable with their  structure and facilitate their missions once they are in theater.
However, Army Human Resources Command has had difficulty providing  the field grade officer advisors to the units being augmented in  accordance with the 45-day time line because they were challenged by  shortages of deployable field grade officers and changes in unit theater  arrival and mission rehearsal exercise dates for operational reasons,  which may shorten the time that Army Human Resources Command has  to identify personnel who meet the requirements. Many of the augmented  BCTs we met with did not receive the total number of advisor personnel  that they would deploy with until after the mission rehearsal exercise. For  example, one augmented BCT that we visited in Afghanistan told us that,  prior to its exercise, it had received only six of its 24 non-commissioned  officer advisors and none of its 24 field grade officer advisors, while  another augmented BCT we visited in Afghanistan had received only one  of its 22 field grade officer advisors that it ultimately deployed with prior to  the exercise. In both instances, the units were limited in their ability to  organize for and exercise the advising mission because they lacked the  field grade officers necessary to lead the advisor teams. While recent  Iraq-bound units have not received all of their advisors by the specified  report date, the deployed augmented BCTs that we visited in Iraq had  received most of their advisors—40 of 43 in one instance and 42 of 46 in  the other—prior to their mission rehearsal exercises.
Some officials suggested that, given the challenge of providing all the  advisors to the augmented BCTs within specified time frames, it would be  helpful if at least two or three of the highest-ranking advisors arrived  significantly earlier than currently required to help integrate the advisors  into the BCT’s mission and structure. For example, officials from some  augmented BCTs as well as the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade  suggested that the ideal would be for the highest-ranking advisors to  arrive at the unit by the time that key brigade leadership planning events  begin, such as the brigade’s Leader Training Program. These events  typically occur as early as 90 days prior to the final mission rehearsal  exercise. That would enable those leaders to represent the advising  mission during brigade mission planning and to help mitigate some of the  challenges related to integrating advisors, particularly late-arriving  advisors, into the brigade. We met with an augmented BCT that received  one of its highest-ranking advisors well before the 45-day window and in  time for the brigade’s major leadership events. As a result, this advisor  was able to integrate into the brigade’s leadership and provide inputs on  the advising mission into the brigade’s mission planning. The advisor was  also able to set up a structure for the other advisor personnel to integrate  into when they arrived, develop the advisor teams, and facilitate the  provision of equipment to advisors.
section_title: The Number and Size of Advisor Teams May Impact the Number and Rank of Advisors Needed for the Advising Mission
paragraphs: Theater requests for the augmented BCTs assumed that (1) each BCT’s  48 advisors would form the base of 24 advising teams, and (2) all of the  field grade officer advisors would be team leaders or deputy team  leaders. However, as discussed above, augmented BCTs are sometimes  operating with a smaller number of advisor teams that are comprised of a  larger number of advisors. This could affect the necessary numbers and  rank structure of advisor personnel since, with a smaller number of  advisor teams being formed, the augmented BCTs may not need to be  sourced with as many advisors. Further, since not as many advisors are  serving as team chiefs or deputy team chiefs, BCTs may not need such  large numbers of field grade officers. Army and augmented BCT officials  have told us that rank is an important factor for advisors in establishing  credibility with the Afghan and Iraqi officers that they are advising.  However, with larger advising teams, the higher rank structure may be of  less importance as all advisors may not have the leadership roles within  the advisor teams that were envisioned when the rank structure  requirements were initially established. Further, several augmented BCT  officials told us that capable company grade officers, particularly when  they are introduced by and lent the weight of the brigade and battalion  leadership, can establish the necessary credibility with host nation  leaders. Moreover, the augmented BCTs in Afghanistan are executing the  advising mission with half as many field grade officers as augmented  BCTs in Iraq—the request for augmented BCTs in Iraq required 48 field  grade officers, versus 24 field grade officers in the request for augmented  BCTs in Afghanistan. Given the identified field grade officer shortages  that the Army is facing, re-assessing current requirements for field grade  officer advisors is important to ensure that the Army is not being strained  unnecessarily.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Developing capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces is a key component  of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shifting from the use of  individual transition teams comprised of advisors that operated somewhat  independently to augmenting BCTs with advisor personnel that are an  integral part of the BCT is a significant change in the way Army units  perform the advising mission. As the Army continues to deploy  augmented BCTs and theater commanders gain operational experience  with these types of units, some challenges are emerging that suggest  further refinements are needed to achieve greater unity of command and  other benefits envisioned by the Army in moving to the augmented BCT  concept. By reassessing needs and clarifying key requirements such as  the appropriate number, rank, and capabilities of advisor personnel; the  level of resources and support that the BCT should provide; and how the  BCT should prioritize and balance demands associated with the advising  mission with the demands of other BCT missions, the Army and theater  commanders will enhance the ability of the BCTs to more effectively  command and support the advisors. In addition, assessing and validating  the appropriate composition of the advisor augment will ensure that the  Army is providing the right mix of personnel needed for the advising  mission. Lastly, integrating advisor personnel into the BCT is an important  element of the augmented BCT concept and requires advisor and other  BCT personnel to train together. Arranging for key leaders from the  advisor augment to arrive in sufficient time to participate in leadership  planning events would facilitate integration of the advisors and enable the  units to maximize the benefits of the time spent in training.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance the ability of the augmented BCTs to support the advising  mission and to facilitate the integration of advisor personnel into pre- deployment training, GAO is making the following three  recommendations.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with  Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central Command, direct that theater  commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan:    Assess their needs for how advisor teams should be structured and  supported and, based on this assessment, ensure that any future  requests for augmented BCTs clearly define related requirements,  including the number of advisors, ranks of advisors, capabilities of  advisors, and equipment for advisors.    Clearly define, in guidance to divisions and augmented BCTs, the  relative priority of the advising mission; the minimum level of  transportation and security support to be provided to the advisors; and  command and control relationships for augmented BCTs and their  advisors, including the level of command that has tasking authority  over and support responsibilities for the advisors.
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army revise existing guidance to  require that the highest-ranking field grade officer advisors join the  augmented BCTs in time to be present for major brigade leadership  planning events, such as the Leader Training Program.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  three recommendations. Overall, DOD stated that it believes that the  information being sought in GAO’s first two recommendations related to  more clearly defining requirements for advisors and the advising mission  is being provided through established processes. The full text of DOD’s  written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense,  in consultation with Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central Command,  direct that theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan assess their  needs for how advisor teams should be structured and supported and,  based on this assessment, ensure that any future requests for augmented  BCTs clearly define related requirements, including the number of  advisors, ranks of advisors, capabilities of advisors, and equipment for  advisors. In its comments, DOD stated that combatant commanders have  provided and will continue to provide detailed requests for the advising  mission. DOD stated that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army has directed  that commanders provide assessment of their needs regarding advisor  team structure and support. DOD, therefore, stated that it saw no need for  the Secretary of Defense to direct these actions. In our report, we  acknowledge that the Army currently has an effort underway to examine  the advisor requirements. As theater commanders revise their  requirements to reflect the Army’s effort, we would expect that future  requests for advising capabilities would more clearly define specific  requirements, such as specialized advisor capabilities that are needed.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense, in consultation with Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central  Command, direct that theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan  clearly define the relative priority of the advising mission, the minimum  level of transportation and security support to be provided to the advisors,  and command and control relationships for augmented BCTs and their  advisors. In its comments, DOD stated that, as presented, our  recommendation may be too prescriptive and, in of itself, impractical to  implement. Specifically, DOD stated that our recommendation suggests  that the priority of the vast number of mission requirements under the  commander’s responsibility are static and can be determined void of any  external factors. DOD stated that the recommendation’s intent is captured  within existing departmental practices. DOD noted that the Department’s  approach to determining mission priorities is based upon a thorough  understanding of its strategic objectives within the area of operations.  Based upon this understanding, DOD stated the commander gives his  guidance through mission objectives and subsequent creation of  operational plans. It noted that the commander’s ability to employ these  plans, and thus identify mission priorities and allocation of resources,  remains situation specific and environmentally dependent. DOD further  stated that, for similar reasons, the command and control relationships  within the BCT are situation dependent and are tailored based upon the  commander’s requirements.
We agree that DOD has an approach for developing operational plans  and that commanders establish mission priorities and allocate resources  based on specific situations and operating environments. We also agree  that command and control relationships are situation dependent and need  to reflect commanders’ requirements. As we state in our report, the Army  has worked with theater commanders to define the key characteristics of  augmented BCTs while leaving commanders the discretion to tailor the  force as needed, and has provided guidance, accordingly. We do not  agree, though, that our recommendation is too prescriptive or impractical  to implement. Specifically, during our review, we found that in some  cases, theater commanders did more clearly define some aspects of the  advising mission, while in other cases they did not. In those latter cases,  the lack of clarity led to some challenges, including with establishing  priorities and command and control relationships. For example, as we  state in our report, Iraq theater command officials made it clear that  advising the Iraqi Security Forces was the primary mission of U.S. forces  there, but the Afghanistan theater command has not established the  relative priority for the advising mission. Likewise, we found that the  theater commander’s request for augmented BCTs for Iraq included  direction on the intended command and control structure of the advisors,  but that the request for augmented BCTs for Afghanistan did not address  this topic. Clarifying key requirements for augmented BCTs, including  how the BCTs should prioritize and balance demands of the advising  mission with the demands of the other BCT missions, will enhance the  ability of the BCTs to more effectively command and support the advisors.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army  revise existing guidance to require that the highest-ranking field grade  officer advisors join the augmented BCTs in time to be present for major  brigade leadership planning events. DOD stated that the Department of  the Army agrees that maximum benefit is achieved when the entire  augment of advisors is available and prepared to participate in both pre- deployment planning and training events. However, due to the nature of  advisor force requirements, DOD’s comments noted that there will be  instances where the entire augment is not available to participate. DOD  stated that the Army will maximize coordination, prioritization, and  integration of highest-ranking advisors to ensure participation in  deployment planning and training events.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of  Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. This report will be available at no  charge on GAO’s Web site, http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9619 or by e-mail at pickups@gao.gov. Contact  information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs  may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who have made  major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Army has developed its concept for  augmenting brigade combat teams (BCT) with additional personnel to  support security force assistance missions we reviewed Army guidance,  such as the Army field manual for security force assistance and the  Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance Handbook.  We also reviewed advisor and augmented BCT training materials from  the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade. Further, we analyzed the 2009 and  2010 requests for forces for augmented BCTs that were submitted by  U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) for ongoing operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan to document advisor personnel requirements for augmented  BCTs. We interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  CENTCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command, Joint Staff,  Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command  (FORSCOM), U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), and the  Army Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Maneuver Center  of Excellence regarding the development of the augmented BCT concept,  including how the BCTs were to be augmented, how command and  control structures were intended to function, and what advantages, if any,  the concept afforded the Army and theater commanders. We interviewed  officials at the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, as well as advisor  augments with redeployed and currently deployed augmented BCTs in  Iraq and Afghanistan in order to discuss the structure and content of the  advisor training program for advisor augments. We interviewed officials at  the Joint Readiness Training Center, as well as officials with redeployed  and currently deployed augmented BCTs, in order to discuss the mission  rehearsal exercise and its functionality for the augmented BCT.
To determine the extent to which the Army has provided augmented  BCTs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and what challenges, if any,  these units have faced in implementing the concept, we reviewed Army  unit deployment schedules, after action reviews and lessons learned from  redeployed augmented BCTs, and mission briefings from deployed  augmented BCTs and division commanders, dating back to 2009. We  also analyzed the above-mentioned requests for forces submitted by  CENTCOM for augmented BCTs to document advisor personnel and  equipment requirements for augmented BCTs and guidance provided by  theater commanders on augmented BCT and advisor task organization,  advisor support, advisor command and control, and augmented BCTs  roles, missions, and priorities. Additionally, we reviewed key documents  related to the advising mission and priorities from theater commanders in  Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, we conducted interviews with a range  of deployed and redeployed BCTs that had served or were serving as  augmented BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. We interviewed augmented  BCT officials and advisor personnel regarding augmented BCT task  organization, advisor team formation, the integration of advisors into the  brigade, the suitability of advisor personnel capabilities, the ability of the  brigade to support advisor teams, the equipping requirements for advisor  augments, and the guidance received by the brigade on the augmented  BCTs’ roles and missions. In addition, we met with theater command- and  division-level officials in Iraq and Afghanistan to discuss the execution of  the augmented BCT mission in their respective theaters and areas of  operation, and management of and guidance provided to augmented  BCTs on the advising mission. We also interviewed officials at  Headquarters Department of the Army, CENTCOM, FORSCOM, and  162nd Infantry Training Brigade for their perspectives on how the  augmented BCT concept is being executed in theater and any related  challenges.
To determine the extent to which requirements for augmented BCTs have  impacted overall Army personnel requirements, including the Army’s  ability to provide advisor personnel to BCTs in required time frames, we  examined data provided to us by HRC regarding Army shortfalls faced in  certain officer ranks currently and in coming years. We also discussed  with HRC officials how this data was calculated, including the details of  how they determined the fill rate for advisor requirements, overall Army  field grade officer shortages, and extent to which requirements for  augmented BCTs increased overall Army requirements for field grade  officers. We found this data to be reliable for the purpose of determining  the impact of advisor requirements on overall Army personnel  requirements. To gain an understanding of the extent to which BCTs are  experiencing late arrival of advisor augment personnel, we conducted  analysis of advisor fill rate and arrival time data provided by HRC,  FORSCOM and augmented BCTs, dating back to 2009, and comparing  such data against the arrival timelines laid out in the requests for forces  for each theater. We also met with officials from Headquarters  Department of the Army, HRC, FORSCOM, Joint Forces Command,  Office of the Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness, 162nd  Infantry Training Brigade, and redeployed and currently deployed  augmented BCTs to discuss the impact of advisor personnel  requirements on overall Army personnel requirements, the Army’s ability  to provide authorized numbers of augment personnel within the specified  arrival time frames, and any challenges faced as a result of the late arrival  of advisor augments to the BCTs to which they have been assigned.
Table 1 below identifies the organizations, offices, commands, and units  that we contacted during our review, including the units and commands  we met with in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To perform its review, we reviewed an illustrative, non-generalizable  sample of redeployed and deployed augmented BCTs. We met with three  of the four augmented BCTs that had returned from Iraq and the only  augmented BCT that had returned from deployment in Afghanistan at the  time that we selected our sites for visits. We also met with deployed  augmented BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as theater commands  and deployed division commands. We selected deployed BCTs for visits  based on where they were in their deployments (we aimed for BCTs that  were at the midpoints of their deployments so that they had been in  theater long enough to be familiar with their missions, but not yet at the  point where they were preparing to redeploy). We worked with theater  commands in Iraq and Afghanistan to arrange visits or meetings with  deployed BCTs that fit our criteria, making adjustments as needed  because of security, transportation, or weather issues. Ultimately, we met  with personnel from two augmented BCTs and two divisions in Iraq and  personnel from five augmented BCTs and two divisions in Afghanistan.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 through August  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were James Reynolds (Assistant Director), Grace Coleman, Kasea  Hamar, Jonathan Mulcare, and Maria Storts.