Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations
Published: 2007-10-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States has become increasingly involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations as evidenced in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44, establishing governmentwide policy for coordinating, planning, and implementing U.S. stabilization and reconstruction assistance to affected foreign entities. This testimony addresses stabilization and reconstruction issues related to (1) State Department (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to enhance its capabilities and planning, and (3) State efforts to develop civilian capabilities. GAO's statement is based on its May 2007 report on DOD stability operations and preliminary observations related to State's interagency planning framework and civilian response capabilities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework has yet to be fully applied to any operation. The National Security Council has not approved the entire framework, guidance related to the framework is unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted it. For example, some interagency partners stated that the framework's planning process is cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it produces. While steps have been taken to address concerns and strengthen the framework's effectiveness, differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies may pose obstacles to effective coordination. DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder DOD's ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. Among its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy, planning construct and joint operating concept with a greater focus on stability operations, and each service is pursuing efforts to improve capabilities. However, inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of these improvement efforts. Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises, but significant challenges must be addressed before they will be fully capable. State and other agencies face challenges in establishing two of these units--the Active Response Corps and Standby Response Corps--because of staffing and resource constraints and concerns that stabilization and reconstruction operations are not core missions for each parent organization. Congress has not yet enacted legislation necessary for State to obligate funds for the third unit, the Civilian Reserve Corps, staffed solely with non-federal volunteers. Further, State has not fully defined the types of missions these personnel would be deployed to support.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here today to discuss the goals, opportunities, and  challenges to improving an integrated government approach to stability  and reconstruction operations, which is becoming an increasingly  important aspect of our national security. Stabilization and reconstruction  operations may include efforts to reestablish security, strengthen  governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve social and economic well- being in foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from  conflict or civil strife. These operations have increasingly become a  central operational mission for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the  Department of State (State), highlighted by experiences in the Balkans,  Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Defense Science Board’s 2004  Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities noted that since the  end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in either a  stability or reconstruction operation every 18 to 24 months, these  operations typically last 5 to 8 years, and they are costly in terms of human  lives and dollars.
In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential  Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which established the overall governmentwide  policy related to interagency efforts for stabilization and reconstruction  efforts. The purpose of NSPD-44 is to promote the security of the United  States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for  stabilization and reconstruction assistance to foreign states and regions.  NSPD-44 assigned the responsibility for coordinating and leading  integrated federal efforts to plan for and conduct stabilization and  reconstruction activities to the Secretary of State. It further stated that the  Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of  Defense to ensure harmony with any planned or ongoing U.S. military  operations across the spectrum of conflict. State and DOD have  emphasized that success in stabilization and reconstruction efforts will  depend heavily upon the ability to develop an integrated, interagency  approach, and they have initiated steps to facilitate this shift in focus.
Our testimony today will address (1) Department of State efforts to  improve interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and  reconstruction operations, (2) Department of Defense efforts to enhance  stability operations capabilities and plans, and (3) State efforts to develop  a civilian response capability.
Our testimony is based on recently completed or ongoing work that  addresses DOD and State efforts to enhance and better integrate stability  and reconstruction capabilities. In May 2007, we issued a report to  Representative Christopher Shays, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on  National Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Oversight and  Government Reform, on the DOD’s approach to stability operations and  interagency planning and made several recommendations for executive  action. We are also completing work for Representative Shays and this  subcommittee on State’s interagency planning framework and civilian  response capacities, and we have prepared a draft report summarizing our  results. We are reviewing State’s comments on our draft report and are  developing recommendations to address the problems cited in this  statement. For both our prior report and ongoing work, we obtained and  analyzed National Security Presidential Directives; DOD, State, and other  relevant agencies’ internal policies; planning guidance; operational plans;  budget requests and funding allocations for stability and reconstruction  efforts. We met with cognizant officials from the Departments of Defense,  State, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice and the  Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and  private research centers. We also met with various officials and military  planners from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and  U.S. Pacific Command and, collectively, 14 component commands. While  NSPD-44 also charges State with coordinating U.S. stabilization and  reconstruction efforts with foreign governments, multilateral  organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, these areas lie outside  the scope of our review. Our work was conducted from October 2005  through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Both State and DOD recognize the need to improve stability and  reconstruction capabilities of the United States, and the importance of  coordinating military activities with those of other U.S. government  agencies and international partners. Following the problems with  reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the Fall of 2003, State noted that the U.S.  government had no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or  manage stabilization and reconstruction operations and had relied on ad  hoc processes for planning and executing these efforts. State  recommended that a new office be established to provide a centralized  and permanent structure for planning and coordinating the civilian  response to stabilization and reconstruction operations.
In August 2004, the Secretary of State announced the creation of the Office  of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to  coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and resource responses to  complex emergencies, failing and failed states, and post conflict  environments. Such efforts could involve establishing security, building  basic public services, and economic development. The Consolidated  Appropriations Act of 2005 granted statutory authorization for S/CRS  within the Office of the Secretary of State.
In November 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support  for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)  Operations, which established the Department’s policy for stability  operations. In its directive, DOD recognizes that stability operations is a  core U.S. military mission, but that many stability operations are best  performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals and that  DOD’s participation may be in a supporting role. However, it also states  that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to  establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.
In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to promote the security  of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and  implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance. NSPD-44  assigned the Secretary of State the responsibility to coordinate and lead  U.S. government efforts to plan for, prepare and conduct stabilization and  reconstruction operations in countries and regions at risk of, in, or in  transition from conflict or civil strife. The Secretary, in turn, delegated  implementation of the directive to S/CRS. NSPD-44 identifies roles,  responsibilities, and coordination requirements of U.S. government  agencies that would likely participate in stabilization and reconstruction  operations. It also requires that State lead the development of civilian  response capability, including the capacity to ensure that the United States  can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44  established the NSC Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction  and Stabilization Operations to manage the development, implementation,  and coordination of stabilization and reconstruction national security  policies.
section_title: State’s Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities, and Interagency Support
paragraphs: S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning  and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. The NSC has  adopted two of three elements of the framework—the Interagency  Management System (IMS) and procedures for initiating the framework’s  use. One element—a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction  operations—has not been completed. As of October 2007, the framework  has not been fully applied to any operation. In addition, NSPD-44, the  Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and  inconsistent guidance on roles and responsibilities for S/CRS and other  State bureaus and offices; the lack of a common definition for stability and  reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency  collaboration; and some partners have shown limited support for the  framework and S/CRS.
subsections: section_title: S/CRS Is Leading the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
paragraphs: S/CRS is leading an NSC interagency group of 16 agencies to create a  framework for developing specific stabilization and reconstruction plans  under NSPD-44. The framework is intended to guide the development of  U.S. planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations by facilitating  coordination across federal agencies and aligning interagency efforts at  the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Key elements of the  framework include an IMS, a guide for planning specific stabilization and  reconstruction operations, and procedures for initiating governmentwide  planning.
The IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high- priority and highly complex crises and operations. In March 2007, the NSC  approved the IMS, which would guide coordination between Washington,  D.C. policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and military planners. If  used, IMS would include three new interagency groups for responding to  specific crises: a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group, an  Integration Planning Cell, and an Advance Civilian Team. The Country  Reconstruction and Stabilization Group would be responsible for  developing U.S. government policies that integrate civilian and military  plans and for mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and  reconstruction operations. The Integration Planning Cell would integrate  U.S. civilian agencies’ plans with military operations. The Advance Civilian  Team would be deployed to U.S. embassies to set up, coordinate, and  conduct field operations and provide expertise on implementing civilian  operations to the Chief of Mission and military field commanders. These  teams would be supported by Field Advance Civilian Teams to assist  reconstruction efforts at the local level.
The second element of the framework, which the NSC approved in March  2007, establishes procedures for initiating the use of the framework for  planning a U.S. response to an actual crisis or in longer-term scenario- based planning. Factors that may trigger the use of the framework include  the potential for military action, actual or imminent state failure, the  potential for regional instability, displacement of large numbers of people,  and grave human rights violations. The use of the framework for planning  crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC or by a direct request from  the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. The NSC, Chiefs of  Mission, and Regional Assistant Secretaries of State may request the  framework’s initiation for longer-term scenario planning for crises that  may occur within 2 to 3 years.
The third element, the planning guide, has not been approved by the NSC  because State is rewriting the draft planning guide to address interagency  concerns. Although NSC approval of the draft planning guide is not  required, S/CRS officials stated that NSC approval would lend authority to  the framework and strengthen its standing among interagency partners.  The draft planning guide divides planning for stabilization and  reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation, strategy  development, and implementation planning. The guide states that the goals  and objectives at each level should be achievable, be linked to planned  activities, and include well-defined measures for determining progress.
As of October 2007, the administration had not fully applied the  framework to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. While IMS  was approved by the NSC, the administration has not yet applied it to a  current or potential crisis. The administration also applied earlier versions  of one component of the framework—the planning guide—for efforts in  Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo. According to State officials, the administration  has been using NSPD-1 processes to manage and plan U.S. operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan in the absence of an approved framework.
section_title: Framework Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities, Common Definitions, and Interagency Support
paragraphs: In completing the framework, State must resolve three key problems.
First, NSPD-44, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide  unclear and inconsistent guidance on the roles and responsibilities of  S/CRS and State’s bureaus and offices, resulting in confusion and disputes  about who should lead policy development and control resources for  stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Foreign Affairs Manual  does not define S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities, but it does define  responsibilities for State’s regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. Each  regional bureau is responsible for providing direction, coordination, and  supervision of U.S. activities in countries within the region, while each  Chief of Mission has authority over all U.S. government staff and activities  in the country. However, according to S/CRS’s initial interpretation of  NSPD-44, it was responsible for leading, planning, and coordinating  stabilization and reconstruction operations. Staff from one of State’s  regional bureaus said that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that  conflicted with the Regional Assistant Secretary’s responsibility for  leading an operation and coordinating with interagency partners. More  recently, according to S/CRS officials, S/CRS has taken a more facilitative  role in implementing NSPD-44.
Second, the lack of a common definition for stability and reconstruction  operations may pose an obstacle to effective interagency collaboration  under the framework. The framework does not define what constitutes  stabilization or reconstruction operations, including what specific  missions and activities would be involved. In addition, the framework does  not explain how these operations differ from other types of military and  civilian operations, such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and  development assistance. As a result, it is not clear when, where, or how  the administration would apply the framework. In our October 2005  report, we found that collaborative efforts require agency staff to define  and articulate a common outcome or purpose. Prior GAO work shows  that the lack of a clear definition can pose an obstacle to improved  planning and coordination of stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Third, some interagency partners and State staff expressed concern over  the framework’s importance and utility. For example, some interagency  partners and staffs from various State offices said that senior officials did  not communicate strong support for S/CRS or the expectation that State  and interagency partners should use the framework. S/CRS has not been  given key roles for operations that emerged after its creation, such as the  ongoing efforts in Lebanon and Somalia, which several officials and  experts stated are the types of operations S/CRS was created to address.  In addition, USAID staff noted that some aspects of the planning  framework were unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant because  interagency teams had already devised planning processes for ongoing  operations in accordance with NSPD-1. Further, some interagency  partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the draft planning  guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the results it produces.  Although officials who participated in planning for Haiti stated that the  process provided more systematic planning, some involved in the  operations for Haiti and Sudan said that the framework was too focused  on process. Staff also said that in some cases, the planning process did not  improve outcomes or increase resources, particularly since S/CRS has few  resources to offer. As a result, officials from some offices and agencies  have expressed reluctance to work with S/CRS on future stabilization and  reconstruction plans.
section_title: DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations, But Faces Significant Challenges to Improve Capabilities and Planning
paragraphs: DOD has taken several positive steps toward developing a new approach  to stability operations but has encountered challenges in several areas. As  discussed in our May 2007 report, since November 2005, the department  issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and  developed a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for  stability operations. However, because DOD has not yet fully identified  and prioritized stability operations capabilities as required by DOD’s new  policy, the services are pursuing initiatives that may not provide the  comprehensive set of capabilities that combatant commanders need to  accomplish stability operations in the future. Also, DOD has made limited  progress in developing measures of effectiveness as required by DOD  Directive 3000.05, which may hinder the department’s ability to determine  if its efforts to improve stability operations capabilities are achieving the  desired results. Similarly, the combatant commanders are establishing  working groups and other outreach efforts to include non-DOD  organizations in the development of a wide range of military plans that  combatant commanders routinely develop, but these efforts have had a  limited effect because of inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit  sharing of planning information, and differences in the planning  capabilities and capacities of all organizations involved. Finally, although  DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, DOD does not have a  process to ensure that lessons learned are considered when plans are  reviewed. As a result, DOD heightens its risk of either repeating past  mistakes or being unable to build on its experiences from past operations  as it plans for future operations.
subsections: section_title: DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations
paragraphs: Among the many improvement efforts under way, DOD has taken three  key steps that frame its approach to stability operations. First, in  November 2005, DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which formalized  a stability operations policy that elevated stability operations to a core  mission, gave such operations priority comparable to combat operations,  and stated that stability operations will be explicitly addressed and  integrated across all DOD activities, including doctrine, training,  education, exercises, and planning. The directive also states that many  stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S.  civilian personnel, but that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to  perform all tasks necessary to maintain order when civilians cannot do so.  The directive assigned approximately 115 specific responsibilities to 18  DOD organizations. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy is responsible for, among other things, identifying DOD-wide  stability operations capabilities, and recommending priorities to the  Secretary of Defense, and submitting a semiannual stability operations  report to the Secretary of Defense.
A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to  broaden its military planning guidance beyond DOD’s traditional emphasis  on combat operations for joint operations to include noncombat activities  to stabilize countries or regions and prevent hostilities and postcombat  activities that emphasize stabilization, reconstruction, and transition  governance to civil authorities. Figure 1 illustrates the change in DOD  planning guidance.
As shown in figure 1, military planners in DOD’s combatant commands  will now be required to plan for six phases of an operation, which include  new phases focused on (1) shaping efforts to stabilize regions so that  conflicts do not develop and (2) enabling civil authorities. These are also  the phases of an operation that will require significant unity of effort and  close coordination between DOD and other federal agencies.
A third step taken by DOD that frames the approach to stability operations  was the publication, by Joint Forces Command, of the Military Support to  Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations  Joint Operating Concept. This publication will serve as a basis for how  the military will support stabilization, security, transition, and  reconstruction operations in foreign countries in the next 15 to 20 years.
The military services also have taken complementary actions to improve  stability operations capabilities. For example, the Marine Corps has  established a program to improve cultural awareness training, increased  civil affairs planning in its operational headquarters, and established a  Security Cooperation Training Center. Navy officials highlighted service  efforts to (1) align its strategic plan and operations concept to support  stability operations, (2) establish the Navy Expeditionary Combat  Command, and (3) dedicate Foreign Area Officers to specific countries as  their key efforts to improve stability operations capabilities.
section_title: Specific Challenges Hinder DOD’s Ability to Develop Capabilities and Encourage Interagency Participation in Combatant Command Planning Efforts
paragraphs: We have identified four specific challenges that if not addressed, may  hinder DOD’s ability to develop the full range of capabilities needed for  stability operations, or to facilitate interagency participation in the routine  planning activities at the combatant commands.
DOD has not identified and prioritized the full range of capabilities  needed for stability operations. At the time of our review, DOD had made  limited progress in fully identifying and prioritizing capabilities needed for  stability operations, which was required by DOD Directive 3000.05. In the  absence of DOD-wide guidance, a variety of approaches were being used  by the combatant commands to identify stability operations capabilities  and requirements.
We identified two factors that limited DOD’s progress in carrying out the  capability gap assessment process. First, at the time of our review, DOD  had not issued its 2007 planning guidance to the combatant commanders  that reflect the new 6-phase approach to planning previously discussed in  this testimony. This planning guidance forms the basis on which  combatant commanders develop operational plans and identify needed  capabilities. Second, there was significant confusion over how to define  stability operations. For example, Air Force officials stated in their   May 22, 2006, Stability Operations Self-Assessment that the absence of a  common lexicon for stability operations functions, tasks, and actions  results in unnecessary confusion and uncertainty when addressing  stability operations. This lack of a clear and consistent definition of  stability operations has caused confusion across DOD about how to  identify stability operations activities and the end state for which  commanders need to plan.
Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant commands to  identify requirements, and the different approaches taken by the services  to develop capabilities, the potential exists that the department may not be  identifying and prioritizing the most critical capabilities needed by the  combatant commanders, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  has not been able to recommend capability priorities to the Secretary of  Defense. The department recognizes the importance of successfully  completing these capability assessments, and in the August 2006 report on  stability operations to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary  stated that the department has not yet defined the magnitude of DOD’s  stability operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the scope of  these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the department.
DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness.
DOD Directive 3000.05 required numerous organizations within DOD to  develop measures of effectiveness that could be used to evaluate progress  in meeting their respective goals outlined in the directive. Our past work  on DOD transformation reported the advantages of using management  tools, such as performance measures, to gauge performance in helping  organizations successfully manage major transformation efforts.  Performance measures are an important results-oriented management tool  that can enable managers to determine the extent to which desired  outcomes are being achieved. Performance measures should include a  baseline and target; be objective, measurable, and quantifiable; and  include specific time frames. Results-oriented measures further ensure  that it is not the task itself being evaluated, but progress in achieving the  intended outcome.
Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however, as  of March 2007, we found that DOD achieved limited progress in  developing measures of effectiveness because of significant confusion  over how this task should be accomplished and minimal guidance  provided by the Office of Policy. For example, each of the services  described to us alternative approaches it was taking to develop measures  of effectiveness, and three services initially placed this task on hold  pending guidance from DOD. Officials in the combatant commands we  visited were either waiting for additional guidance or stated that that there  were no actions taken to develop measures of effectiveness. Without clear  departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of effectiveness  and milestones for completing them, confusion may continue to exist  within the department, and progress on this important management tool  may be significantly hindered.
DOD has not fully established mechanisms that would help it achieve  consistent interagency participation in the military planning process.  The combatant commanders routinely develop a wide range of military  plans for potential contingencies for which DOD may need to seek input  from other agencies or organizations. Within the combatant commands  where contingency plans are developed, the department is either  beginning to establish working groups or is reaching out to U.S. embassies  on an ad hoc basis to obtain interagency perspectives. But this approach  to coordinate with embassies on an ad-hoc basis can be cumbersome,  does not facilitate interagency participation in the actual planning process,  and does not include all organizations that may be able to contribute to the  operation being planned.
Three factors hinder interagency participation in DOD’s routine planning  activities at the combatant commands. First, DOD has not provided  specific guidance to the commands on how to integrate planning with non- DOD organizations. Second, DOD does not have a process in place to  facilitate the sharing of planning information with non-DOD agencies  because department policy is to not share DOD contingency plans with  agencies or offices outside of DOD unless directed by the Secretary of  Defense. Third, DOD and non-DOD organizations, such as State and  USAID, lack an understanding of each other’s planning processes and  capabilities and have different planning cultures and capacities.
DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, but planners are not  consistently using this information as they develop future contingency  plans. Lessons learned from current and past operations are being  captured and incorporated into various databases, but our analysis shows  that DOD planners are not using this information on a consistent basis as  plans are revised or developed. Three factors contribute to this  inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning: (1) DOD’s guidance for  incorporating lessons learned into plans is outdated and does not  specifically require planners to include lessons learned in the planning  process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned databases is  cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not evaluate the  extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans. As a  result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of the lessons-learned systems  and may repeat past mistakes.
In our May 2007 report, we recommended that DOD provide  comprehensive guidance to enhance their efforts to (1) identify and  address capability gaps, (2) develop measures of effectiveness, and   (3) facilitate interagency participation in the development of military  plans. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense in coordination  with the Secretary of State develop a process to share planning  information with interagency representatives early in the development of  military contingency plans, and more fully incorporate stability operations- related lessons learned into the planning process. DOD partially agreed  with our recommendations but did not state what specific steps, if any, it  plans to take to implement them. Therefore, we included a matter for  congressional consideration suggesting that Congress consider requiring  the Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually on  the specific steps being taken to address our recommendations and the  current status of its efforts.
section_title: State Is Establishing Three Civilian Corps but Must Address Staffing Issues and Seek Additional Congressional Approvals
paragraphs: Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy  rapidly to international crises. State has established two internal units  made up of State employees—the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the  Standby Response Corps (SRC). In May 2007, State began an effort to  establish the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would be made up of  nonfederal civilians who would become full-time term federal employees.  State and other agencies face difficulties in establishing positions and  recruiting personnel for the ARC and training SRC volunteers; securing  resources for international operations not viewed as part of the agencies’  domestic missions; and addressing the possibility that deployed volunteers  could result in staff shortages for the home unit. For the CRC, State needs  further congressional authorization to establish the Corps and provide  compensation packages. Further, State is moving the civilian reserve  concept forward without a common interagency definition of stabilization  and reconstruction operations.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Have Partially Staffed Active and Standby Response Corps; Civilian Reserve Corps Still a Concept
paragraphs: To meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian response  capability, State and other U.S. agencies are developing three corps of  civilians to support stabilization and reconstruction operations. Table 1  summarizes the three civilian corps.
In 2006, State established the ARC within S/CRS, whose members would  deploy during the initial stage of a U.S. stabilization and reconstruction  operation. These first responders would deploy to unstable environments  to assess countries’ or regions’ needs and help plan, coordinate, and  monitor a U.S. government response. Since 2006, S/CRS has deployed ARC  staff to Sudan, Eastern Chad, Lebanon, Kosovo, Liberia, Iraq, and Haiti.  When not deployed, ARC members engage in training and other planning  exercises and work with other S/CRS offices and State bureaus on related  issues to gain relevant expertise.
Members of the SRC would deploy during the second stage of a  stabilization and reconstruction operation and would supplement ARC  staff or provide specialized skills needed for the stabilization and  reconstruction operation. When not deployed, SRC employees serve in  other capacities throughout State. Through October 2007, S/CRS has  deployed SRC members to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace  Agreement and to Chad to support Darfur refugees who had migrated into  the country.
S/CRS has worked to establish Active and Standby Response Corps in  other U.S. agencies that could be drawn upon during the initial stage of a  stabilization and reconstruction operation. Currently, only USAID and the  Department of the Treasury have established units to respond rapidly to  stability and reconstruction missions and have identified staff available for  immediate deployment to a crisis. In July 2007, the NSC approved S/CRS  plans to establish a governmentwide SRC with 500 volunteers by fiscal  year 2008 and 2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 2009.
In 2007, State received authority to make available funds to establish a  CRC. This corps’ staff would be deployed to support stabilization and  reconstruction operations for periods of time longer than the Active and  Standby Response Corps. The CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians  from the private sector, state and local governments, and  nongovernmental organizations who have skills not readily available  within the U.S. government. These reservists would remain in their  nonfederal jobs until called upon for service and, when deployed, would  be classified as full-time term federal employees. They would have the  authority to speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government  contracts and employees. These personnel would receive training upon  joining CRC and would be required to complete annual training. In  addition, they would receive training specific and relevant to an operation  immediately before deployment.
section_title: The Administration Faces Several Challenges in Establishing the Three Civilian Corps
paragraphs: Based on our work to date, State and other agencies face the following  challenges in establishing and expanding their Active and Standby  Response Corps.
S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting personnel  for ARC and training SRC volunteers. S/CRS plans to increase the  number of authorized staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary positions  to 33 permanent positions, which State included in its 2008 budget request.  However, according to S/CRS staff, it is unlikely that State will receive  authority to establish all 33 positions. Further, S/CRS has had trouble  recruiting ARC personnel, and as shown in Table 1, S/CRS has only been  able to recruit 11 of the 15 approved ARC positions. State also does not  presently have the capacity to train the 1,500 new SRC volunteers that  S/CRS plans to recruit in 2009. S/CRS is studying ways to correct the  situation.
Many agencies that operate overseas have limited numbers of staff  available for rapid responses to overseas crises because their missions  are domestic in nature. Officials from the Departments of Commerce,  Homeland Security, and Justice said that their agencies or their  appropriators do not view international programs as central to their  missions. As a result, it is difficult for these agencies to secure funding for  deployments to active stabilization and reconstruction operations,  whether as part of a cadre of on-call first and second responders or for  longer-term assistance programs.
State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can result in  staff shortages in their home units; thus, they must weigh the value of  deploying volunteers against the needs of these units. For example,  according to State’s Office of the Inspector General, S/CRS has had  difficulty getting State’s other units to release the SRC volunteers it wants  to deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Other  agencies also reported a reluctance to deploy staff overseas or to establish  on-call units because doing so would leave fewer workers available to  complete the offices’ work requirements.
State also faces several challenges in establishing the CRC. In 2007,  Congress granted State the authority to make available up to $50 million of  Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds in the fiscal year 2007  supplemental to support and maintain the CRC. However, the legislation  specified that no money may be obligated without specific authorization  for the CRC’s establishment in a subsequent act of Congress. Legislation  that would authorize the CRC is pending in both the Senate and the House  of Representatives, but as of October 2007, neither chamber had taken  action on the bills.
In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key elements of  a planned compensation package for CRC personnel. Proposed  legislation would allow State to provide the same compensation and  benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to members of the Foreign  Service, including health, life, and death benefits; mission-specific awards  and incentive pay; and overtime pay and compensatory time. However, the  proposed legislation does not address whether deployed CRC personnel  would have competitive hiring status for other positions within State or  whether the time deployed would count toward government retirement  benefits. In addition, deployed CRC personnel would not have  reemployment rights similar to those for military reservists. Currently,  military reservists who are voluntarily or involuntarily called into service  have the right to return to their previous places of employment upon  completion of their military service requirements.
Further, S/CRS is moving the CRC concept forward without a common  interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction operations.  According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation that would authorize  CRC, reservists would deploy to nonhumanitarian stabilization and  reconstruction missions. However, S/CRS has not defined what these  missions would be and how they would differ from other foreign  assistance operations. A common interagency definition of what  constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction operation is needed to  determine the corps’ structure, the missions it would support, and the  skills and training its volunteers would need.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: State and DOD have begun to take steps to enhance and better coordinate  stability and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges  may hinder their ability to successfully integrate planning for potential  future operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to  conduct them. Specifically, without an interagency planning framework  and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, achieving unity of effort in  stabilization and reconstruction operations, as envisioned by NSPD-44,  may continue to be difficult to achieve. Also, unless DOD develops a better  approach for including other agencies in the development of combatant  commander military contingency plans, DOD’s plans may continue to  reflect a DOD-centric view of how potential conflicts may unfold.  Moreover, better guidance on how DOD should identify and prioritize  capability gaps, measure progress, and incorporate lessons learned into  future planning is needed to ensure that DOD is using its available  resources to address the highest priority gaps in its stability operations  capabilities. Finally, unless State develops and implements a sound plan to  bolster civilian capabilities to support stability and reconstruction  operations and establish a capable civilian reserve corps, DOD may  continue to be heavily relied upon to provide needed stability and  reconstruction capabilities, rather than leveraging expertise that resides  more appropriately in civilian agencies.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our  prepared remarks. We would be happy to answer any questions you may  have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please call Janet A. St. Laurent   at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov or Joseph A. Christoff at   (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Other key contributors to this statement were Robert L.  Repasky, Assistant Director; Judith McCloskey, Assistant Director; Sam  Bernet; Tim Burke; Leigh Caraher; Grace Coleman; Lynn Cothern; Marissa  Jones; Sona Kalapura; Kate Lenane; and Amber Simco.
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