Unaccompanied Alien Children: Actions Needed to Ensure Children Receive Required Care in DHS Custody
Published: 2015-07-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, DHS apprehended more than 200,000 UAC, and the number of UAC apprehended in fiscal year 2014 (about 74,000) was more than four times larger than that for fiscal year 2011 (about 17,000). On the journey to the United States, many UAC have traveled thousands of miles under dangerous conditions.
The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 included a provision for GAO to, among other things, review how DHS cares for UAC. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which DHS has developed policies and procedures to (1) screen all UAC as required and (2) care for all UAC as required. GAO reviewed TVPRA and other legal requirements, DHS policies for screening and caring for UAC, fiscal year 2009 through 2014 apprehension data on UAC, and 2014 Border Patrol UAC care data. GAO also randomly sampled and analyzed case files of Mexican UAC whom Border Patrol apprehended in fiscal year 2014. GAO interviewed DHS and HHS officials in Washington, D.C., and at Border Patrol and OFO facilities in Arizona, California, and Texas selected on the basis of UAC apprehension data.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued policies and procedures to evaluate, or screen, unaccompanied alien children (UAC)—those under 18 years old with no lawful immigration status and no parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide care and physical custody—as required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA). However, CBP's Border Patrol agents and Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers who screen UAC have not consistently applied the required screening criteria or documented the rationales for decisions resulting from screening. Specifically, under TVPRA, DHS is to transfer UAC to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), but may allow UAC from Canada and Mexico to return to their home countries, that is, to be repatriated, if DHS determines that UAC (1) are not victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons, (2) are not at risk of trafficking upon return, (3) do not have a fear of returning due to a credible fear of persecution, and (4) are able to make an independent decision about returning. GAO found that agents made inconsistent screening decisions, had varying levels of awareness about how they were to assess certain screening criteria, and did not consistently document the rationales for their decisions. For example, CBP policy states that UAC under age 14 are presumed generally unable to make an independent decision, but GAO's analysis of CBP data and a random sample of case files from fiscal year 2014 found that CBP repatriated about 93 percent of Mexican UAC under age 14 from fiscal years 2009 through 2014 without documenting the basis for decisions. Providing guidance on how CBP agents and officers are to assess against UAC screening criteria could better position CBP to meet legal screening requirements, and ensuring that agents document the rationales for decisions would better position CBP to review the appropriateness of these decisions.
DHS has policies in place to implement UAC care requirements, such as providing meals, and GAO's observations and interviews at 15 CBP facilities indicate that CBP generally provided care consistent with these policies at the time of GAO's visits. However, DHS does not collect complete and reliable data on care provided to UAC or the length of time UAC are in DHS custody. GAO analyzed available data on care provided to nearly 56,000 UAC apprehended by Border Patrol in fiscal year 2014 and found that agents documented 14 of 20 possible care actions for fewer than half of the UAC (the remaining 6 actions were documented for more than 50 percent of the UAC). Also, OFO has a database to record UAC care, but officers at most ports of entry do not do so. Developing and implementing processes to help ensure agents and officers record UAC care actions would provide greater assurance that DHS is meeting its care and custody requirements. Further, the interagency process to refer and transfer UAC from DHS to HHS is inefficient and vulnerable to errors because it relies on e-mails and manual data entry, and documented standard procedures, including defined roles and responsibilities, do not exist. DHS and HHS have experienced errors, such as assigning a child to two shelters at once, and holding an empty bed for 14 days at a shelter while HHS officials had placed the child elsewhere. Jointly developing a documented interagency process with defined roles and responsibilities could better position DHS and HHS to have a more efficient and effective process to refer, transfer, and place UAC in shelters.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS, among other things, provide guidance on how agents and officers are to apply UAC screening criteria, ensure that screening decisions are documented, develop processes to record reliable data on UAC care, and document the interagency process to transfer UAC from DHS to HHS. DHS concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: During fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) apprehended more than 200,000 unaccompanied alien  children (UAC)—individuals younger than 18 years old with no lawful  immigration status and no parent or legal guardian in the United States  available to provide care and physical custody. In fiscal year 2014, in  particular, DHS apprehended more than four times the number of UAC  (about 73,700) than in fiscal year 2011 (about 17,100). On the journey to  the United States, many UAC have traveled hundreds or thousands of  miles under dangerous conditions, such as atop trains or on foot through  deserts. In addition, during the journey, UAC are vulnerable to sexual  exploitation, human trafficking, and other crimes. For example, the  nongovernmental organization Appleseed reported in 2011 that along the  travel route, the possibility of UAC abuse—being robbed, assaulted, or   At the height of the increase  sexually violated—is real and ever-present.in UAC apprehensions during spring and summer 2014, the White House  directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a unified,  interagency response, led by DHS’s Federal Emergency Management  Agency (FEMA), to provide humanitarian services to UAC, including  housing, care, medical treatment, and transportation.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 delegated the apprehension,  detention, transfer, and repatriation of UAC to DHS. Within DHS, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol and Office of  Field Operations (OFO), as well as U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE), apprehend, process, temporarily detain, and care for  UAC who attempt to illegally enter the United States. ICE’s Office of  Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) is generally responsible for  transferring UAC, as appropriate, to the Department of Health and Human  Services (HHS), or repatriating UAC to their countries of nationality or last  habitual residence. HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) works  with DHS to place UAC in shelters, takes custody from DHS of UAC who  are not repatriated, and identifies qualified sponsors in the United States  who will take custody of the children once they leave the shelters and are  awaiting immigration proceedings. ORR has cooperative agreements  with shelters throughout the United States to temporarily house UAC until  shelter staff identify sponsors.
A variety of legal requirements apply to how DHS, in conjunction with the  Department of State (State) and HHS, must treat UAC. In particular, the  Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA)  requires that these departments establish policies and programs to  ensure that UAC in the United States are protected from traffickers and    others seeking to victimize or engage such children in harmful activity. Further, under TVPRA, DHS is required, in conjunction with State, HHS,  and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop policies and procedures  to ensure that UAC are safely repatriated to their countries of origin.  DHS personnel evaluate—or screen—UAC for possible victimization and  to determine whether they are eligible under TVPRA to be repatriated to   In addition, the  their countries of origin, or must be transferred to ORR.1997 Flores v. Reno Settlement Agreement (Flores Agreement) requires  that DHS meet specified standards of care for UAC while in DHS custody,  including providing drinking water and food, as appropriate, as well as  access to toilets and sinks.
The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 included a  provision for us to examine how DHS screens and cares for UAC.objectives were to determine the (1) extent to which DHS developed and  implemented policies and procedures to ensure that all UAC are  screened as required; (2) extent to which DHS and State developed and  implemented policies and procedures to ensure that UAC are cared for as  required while in DHS custody and during repatriation; and (3) costs  associated with apprehending, transporting, and caring for UAC in DHS  and HHS custody during fiscal years 2009 through 2014.
To address the first objective, we reviewed CBP’s policies, procedures,  and training materials for screening UAC, including the March 2009  memorandum on implementation of TVPRA requirements and CBP’s  Form 93—the primary tool Border Patrol agents and OFO officers use to  screen UAC and document the resulting assessments. In addition, we analyzed CBP’s human trafficking and UAC virtual learning course and  assessed CBP training efforts against TVPRA requirements and training  best practices. We also analyzed fiscal year 2009 through 2014 Border  Patrol and fiscal year 2012 through 2014 OFO UAC apprehension data— the most recent years for which complete UAC data were available—to  determine the outcome of the screening process for UAC from Canada  and Mexico, as well as UAC from other countries. In addition, we  obtained and analyzed Border Patrol data on UAC who claimed fear of  returning to their country of origin for fiscal year 2014, the most recent  year for which data were available. We assessed the reliability of the data  by, for example, reviewing the data for missing data or obvious errors and  interviewing CBP officials responsible for ensuring data quality. We found  Border Patrol’s and OFO’s apprehension data to be sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of determining whether CBP transferred UAC to an HHS  shelter or repatriated them to their countries of origin.
Because neither Border Patrol nor OFO had complete information on  screening decisions stored in an aggregate manner in its database, we  randomly sampled and analyzed case files of Mexican UAC whom Border  Patrol apprehended in fiscal year 2014. Further, we visited 11 Border Patrol facilities and four land ports of entry (POE) in three regions— Arizona, southern California, and south Texas—from July 2014 through  October 2014 to, among other things, observe DHS screening operations  and interview Border Patrol agents, OFO officers, and Mexican consular  officials regarding implementation of UAC screening policies and  procedures. During our visit to south Texas, we observed Border Patrol  agents screen 8 UAC. The results from our visits to these three regions  cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided us with first-hand  observations on how agents and officers screen UAC at these locations  and insights into the implementation of CBP’s policies and procedures. In  addition, we interviewed CBP officials to discuss CBP’s UAC screening  policies, procedures, and training. We compared CBP’s UAC screening  practices discussed during these visits and interviews and the screening  information obtained from our analyses of CBP information with TVPRA  screening requirements, CBP policies, and standards in Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government. In addition, we reviewed  reports on the screening of Mexican UAC completed in 2011 by the  nongovernmental organization Appleseed, and in 2014 by the United  Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). We reviewed the  reports’ methodologies and discussed the reports with both organizations,  as well as with CBP. We determined that the conclusions in these reports  were valid and reasonable for use in our report.
To address the second objective, we reviewed CBP and ICE policies,  procedures, and training documents regarding how their personnel are  required to care for UAC, such as CBP’s March 2009 memorandum and  human trafficking virtual learning course, ICE’s September 2014 directive  related to operations at its holding facilities, and ICE training for its field  office juvenile coordinators, who are responsible for coordinating the  placement of UAC with ORR. We compared these against TVPRA and  Flores Agreement requirements related to care.
During our visits to 15 CBP facilities in Arizona, California, and Texas  from July 2014 through October 2014, we observed care provided to UAC  and interviewed Border Patrol, OFO, and ICE officials regarding how they  care for UAC in these locations. The results from our visits are specific to  the care observed at facilities in these three regions at a specific point in  time and cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided us with first- hand observations of the care provided to UAC and the conditions of  facilities in which UAC are held during various operating conditions,  including surge and normal operations. In addition, we analyzed Border  Patrol data on the care of 55,905 UAC in Border Patrol custody from  January 2014 through September 2014. Border Patrol officials told us  they could not provide us with complete care data prior to fiscal year 2014  because they did not fully implement their data system until then. To  assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed Border Patrol officials  in headquarters, and in Arizona, Texas, and California, who are  responsible for managing or entering the data, and examined the data for  completeness and potential errors. We determined that these Border  Patrol data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining how  consistently agents used Border Patrol’s automated system to document  UAC care across eight specific elements, and the frequency and types of  potential errors, if any, in the data. We also examined available Border  Patrol, OFO, and ICE data on dates and times of custody, and reviewed  reports that ICE submits to the Department of Justice concerning UAC  who were in custody longer than 72 hours. The reliability of these data is  discussed later in this report. For information on whether UAC were  eligible for or received federal benefits, see appendix I.
To determine the effectiveness of the process to transfer UAC from DHS  to HHS, we examined e-mails between HHS and Border Patrol from July  6 to 8, 2014, and from November 17 to 19, 2014. We chose these dates  so we could analyze communications during a month of higher UAC  apprehensions (July) and a lower month of apprehensions (November).  We also observed and discussed the interagency transfer process in  Arizona, Texas, and California, and interviewed DHS policy, FEMA,  Border Patrol, OFO, ICE, and HHS officials in headquarters about the  interagency process. To understand the repatriation process, we  analyzed all 30 DHS-negotiated local repatriation arrangements with  Mexico, as well as a 2004 memorandum of understanding with Mexico,  and evaluated these arrangements against TVPRA requirements for  repatriation of UAC to contiguous countries of the United States. We also  interviewed Border Patrol, OFO, and ICE officials, and Mexican consular  officials in Arizona, Texas, and California, and State officials in  Washington, D.C. We compared DHS repatriation-related agreements  with TVPRA requirements for contiguous country agreements.
To address the third objective, we obtained and analyzed financial data  from CBP and ICE for fiscal year 2014. Because CBP and ICE did not  collect data on UAC costs prior to 2014, we analyzed available financial  data collected using UAC project codes from February through  September 2014 to determine DHS’s UAC costs during that time period.We reviewed policies and procedures for tracking UAC costs and  interviewed CBP and ICE officials. Additionally, we analyzed UAC  transportation cost estimates developed by ICE to determine the  estimated UAC transportation costs from fiscal years 2009 through 2013.  These estimates were derived using fiscal year 2013 average costs and  applied throughout fiscal years 2009 through 2013. We assessed the  reliability of the cost data by, for example, reviewing costs for obvious  errors and interviewing CBP and ICE officials responsible for ensuring  cost data quality. We found CBP’s and ICE’s project code cost data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining a minimum UAC cost  for apprehending, transporting, and caring for UAC while in DHS custody.  We also found ICE’s transport cost data to be sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of determining an estimate of ICE’s UAC transport costs for  fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
According to ORR officials, actual cost per bed varies based on shelter type, location,  actual number of beds, and actual number of days for which beds were contracted. obligations.average monthly funded bed capacity data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of reporting average cost per bed for basic shelters. On the  basis of information provided by HHS, we are unable to report on the  average cost per bed for secure and therapeutic shelters because the  annual cost and bed capacity data were not comparable across these  shelter types. As a result, we focused on average cost per bed in basic  shelters.
We also determined that ORR’s basic shelter costs and  We conducted this performance audit from May 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more information on our  scope and methodology, see appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DHS Processes to Screen, Care for, and Transfer UAC
paragraphs: Interviewing and screening. After Border Patrol, OFO, or ICE  apprehends UAC, a CBP or ICE official interviews each child and collects  personal information such as the child’s name, country of nationality, and  age. DHS officials evaluate each child to determine if he or she meets  certain criteria signifying that additional steps may have to be taken to  ensure the child is safe from harm—a process known as screening.  According to CBP policy, Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to  use CBP Form 93 and Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible  Alien, among other forms, to document that they collected personal  information about each UAC and that each child is screened as required.  In addition, TVPRA requires that, except in exceptional circumstances,  UAC are transferred to the care and custody of HHS within 72 hours of  determining a child is a UAC. However, TVPRA also provides special  rules for UAC from Canada and Mexico who are apprehended at a land  border or POE. On a case-by-case basis for UAC from Canada and  Mexico, DHS may allow the child to withdraw his or her application for  admission and return to his or her country of nationality or last habitual  residence—referred to as repatriation for purposes of this report—without  further removal proceedings if the officers screen the UAC within 48  hours of being apprehended and determine that  1.  the UAC is not a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons,2.  there is no credible evidence that the UAC is at risk of being trafficked  3.  the UAC does not have a fear of returning to his or her country owing  to a credible fear of persecution, and  4.  the UAC is able to make an independent decision to withdraw the  application for admission to the United States and voluntarily return to  his or her country of nationality or last habitual residence.
For Mexican and Canadian UAC who do not meet all four of these  screening criteria, TVPRA requires DHS to follow the same process  established for UAC from other countries and transfer them to HHS within  72 hours of determining they are UAC, absent exceptional  circumstances. Figure 1 shows CBP’s screening process for UAC.
Care and custody. While UAC are in DHS custody, DHS is required to  meet certain minimum requirements for care and custody, as stipulated  by TVPRA, the Flores Agreement, and DHS regulations. DHS must meet  the following requirements for care and custody, at a minimum: maintain custody of UAC in the least restrictive setting appropriate to  the children’s age and special needs, provided that such setting is  consistent with the need to protect the juveniles’ well-being and that of  others, as well as with any other laws, regulations, or legal  requirements; provide safe and sanitary facilities for UAC, as well as adequate  temperature control and ventilation; provide UAC with access to drinking water and food as appropriate,  emergency medical care, and toilets and sinks; generally separate UAC from unrelated adults and adequately provide specialized training for care and custody of UAC to DHS  personnel who have substantive contact with UAC; and  transfer UAC to HHS within 72 hours of apprehension, except in  exceptional circumstances.
Transfer of UAC. When ORR receives notice that DHS plans to transfer  custody of UAC, ORR searches its database of shelters throughout the  United States to locate one with space for a child before DHS transfers  custody of UAC. When ORR confirms that space at a shelter has been  reserved for an unaccompanied alien child, the office is to coordinate with  Border Patrol, OFO, and ERO to transport the child to the assigned  shelter. ERO provides long-distance travel for UAC within the United  States via commercial airlines, charter aircraft, or bus. In some areas,  CBP transports UAC to shelters that are within the local commuting area.
For UAC repatriated to Mexico or Canada, CBP is generally responsible  for transporting UAC to POEs, where UAC custody is transferred to  Mexican or Canadian officials.
section_title: DHS Apprehended Over 200,000 UAC during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014
paragraphs: DHS apprehended more than 5 million adult and juvenile aliens during  fiscal years 2009 through 2014, of which approximately 201,700 (4  percent) were UAC. Table 1 shows the number of UAC apprehensions by  DHS component during fiscal years 2009 through 2014.
Over 90 percent of DHS’s apprehensions of UAC during fiscal years 2009  through 2014 were made by Border Patrol agents along the southwest  border of the United States with Mexico. Of the 186,233 UAC whom  Border Patrol apprehended, over 75 percent were apprehended in two  Border Patrol sectors—about 52 percent in Rio Grande Valley, Texas,  and about 25 percent in Tucson, Arizona. OFO apprehended 10,447 UAC  during fiscal years 2012 through 2014.locations of UAC apprehensions by CBP during fiscal years 2009 through  2014.
section_title: CBP Has Developed Policies and Procedures for Screening UAC, but Has Not Consistently Implemented TVPRA Requirements
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Developed Policies and Procedures, Including a Standardized Tool, to Help Ensure Screening of UAC as Required
paragraphs: In March 2009, CBP issued a memorandum containing policies and  procedures that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are required to  follow when screening UAC regardless of nationality. Consistent with  TVPRA requirements, the memorandum states that Border Patrol and  OFO are to transfer all UAC from countries other than Canada or Mexico  to HHS shelters. In addition, the memorandum establishes separate  procedures to screen UAC from Canada and Mexico to determine  whether they should be transferred to an HHS shelter or allowed to return  to these two countries. Specifically, agents and officers are required to  assess the four criteria set forth in TVPRA for each unaccompanied  Canadian or Mexican child when determining whether to allow that child  to voluntarily return to these countries (that is, to be repatriated).
Further, CBP’s March 2009 memorandum requires that Border Patrol  agents and OFO officers use CBP’s Form 93 to document that they  conducted the required screening for all UAC against criteria set forth in  TVPRA. For example, the Form 93 directs interviewing agents and  officers to ask questions to determine whether the children have a fear of  returning to their country of nationality or last habitual residence and if the  UAC may be victims of trafficking. Form 93 also provides agents and  officers with indicators of potential human trafficking. In addition, agents  and officers are to use the Form I-213 to document, among other things,  key results of the screening process, such as any claims of fear  expressed by the UAC. According to our observations and interviews with  Border Patrol agents and OFO officers at 13 of the 15 CBP facilities and  POEs we visited, agents and officers generally interview UAC and  complete these forms at computer terminals in open areas of the  facilities. Although CBP agents and officers are to complete a Form 93  for all UAC, the children’s responses are only statutorily required for the  purpose of determining whether to permit Canadian and Mexican UAC to  voluntarily return, as TVPRA requires DHS to transfer all non-Canadian  and non-Mexican UAC to an HHS shelter. Table 2 describes the purpose  of these forms and their roles in the screening process.
On the basis of the information Border Patrol agents and OFO officers  gather during the interviews and, in particular, on the basis of the  children’s responses to questions on the Form 93, agents and officers are  to determine whether to allow UAC from Canada and Mexico to return to  their countries of origin. Table 3 shows the number of Canadian and  Mexican UAC who were apprehended by CBP from fiscal years 2012  through 2014 and repatriated or transferred to HHS.
section_title: CBP Transferred Most Non-Canadian and Non- Mexican UAC to HHS as Required, but OFO Repatriated Some Who Were Apprehended at Airports
paragraphs: Our analysis of UAC apprehension data for fiscal years 2009 through  2014 shows that CBP transferred the majority of non-Canadian and non- Mexican UAC to HHS, as required by TVPRA and CBP’s March 2009  memorandum. Specifically, CBP’s data indicate that Border Patrol  transferred 99 percent of such UAC whom agents apprehended from  fiscal years 2009 through 2014, and OFO transferred about 93 percent of  such UAC apprehended at land POEs from fiscal years 2012 through   Further, officials at 13 of the CBP facilities and land POEs we  2014.visited stated that non-Mexican UAC are always transferred to HHS,  indicating that the officials were aware of the policy. In addition, for all 5  non-Mexican UAC we observed being interviewed by Border Patrol  agents during our visits, we noted that agents determined that these UAC  were to be transferred to HHS, as required.
Although CBP transferred the majority of non-Canadian and non-Mexican  UAC apprehended at land borders and land POEs to HHS, OFO did not  transfer all such UAC apprehended at air POEs as required by TVPRA.  Specifically, our analysis of CBP data shows that OFO repatriated about  45 percent (459 of 1,037) of such UAC apprehended at air POEs from  fiscal years 2012 through 2014. OFO headquarters officials stated that  they were aware that all non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC are to be  transferred to HHS, including those apprehended at air POEs, and initially  stated that the officers at air POEs had entered incorrect data into OFO’s  automated system, such as coding an accompanied child as an  unaccompanied child. We analyzed a nongeneralizable random sample  of Form I-213s for 19 cases in which OFO apprehended non-Canadian  and non-Mexican UAC at air POEs and repatriated them. In general, we  found that the documentation indicated that these were not data entry  errors. Rather, the documentation indicated that these UAC who were  repatriated, for example, had attended or were seeking to attend school  without the correct visa, or seeking employment without the proper visa.
On the basis of our analysis, OFO officials stated that officers who screen  UAC at air POEs may not fully understand TVPRA requirements or recall  the details of their training on TVPRA because OFO officers at these  locations apprehend far fewer UAC than those at land POEs. In addition,  OFO officials stated that some of the cases in the database where OFO  returned non-Mexicans and non-Canadians (162 of 459) were refusals of  admission based on the child’s request to be admitted into the United  States under the Visa Waiver Program. According to OFO officials and  CBP guidance, UAC may be allowed to return to their home countries in  this circumstance, but are first screened to assess the risk of trafficking or  credible fear.officials stated that the officers had given thoughtful consideration to the  outcomes of the UAC and generally contacted the children’s parents and  worked through the appropriate consular office before repatriating them.  However, OFO officials acknowledged that TVPRA requires OFO to  transfer all non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC to HHS shelters,  regardless of the type of POE. These officials stated that developing face- to-face training for OFO officers at air POEs focused on TVPRA  requirements would help improve those officers’ knowledge of the  requirements. As of April 2015, OFO officials and attorneys from CBP’s  Office of Chief Counsel stated that they had begun discussing developing  such a training based on our data analysis. However, they did not provide  documentation of specific actions they have taken or plan to take to  address the issues we identified. Developing and implementing training  for OFO officers at airports who have substantive contact with UAC could  better position those officers to comply with TVPRA requirements.
section_title: CBP Has Not Consistently Implemented Its Screening Policies for Mexican UAC and Cannot Ensure It Is Meeting TVPRA Requirements
paragraphs: CBP has policies for screening Mexican UAC. However, CBP has not  consistently implemented these policies related to assessing (1) UAC’s  ability to make independent decisions, (2) UAC’s credible fear of  persecution, (3) whether UAC were victims of a severe form of trafficking,  and (4) any credible evidence of UAC’s risk of being trafficked upon  return to their countries.
Ability to make an independent decision. It is unclear if Border Patrol  agents and OFO officers are assessing whether Mexican UAC can make  an independent decision, as required by TVPRA, because (1) the Form  93 does not include indicators or questions on how to implement the  requirement regarding independent decisions, and (2) Border Patrol  agents did not consistently document, as required, the basis for their  determinations of independent decision-making ability among Mexican  UAC.
First, the Form 93 instructs the agent or officer interviewing UAC to  determine whether they meet any of the TVPRA criteria and provide  signatures attesting to this determination. However, the form does not  provide indicators or suggested questions for agents and officers to use  to assess, in accordance with CBP policy, whether UAC from Canada  and Mexico are able to make an independent decision to withdraw their  application for admission to the United States and return to their countries  of origin.should generally consider UAC who are 14 years of age or older to be  able to make an independent decision about returning to their countries of  nationality or last habitual residence and UAC under the age of 14 to be  generally unable to make an independent decision. The memorandum  also lists a number of exceptions. For example, it states that these age  presumptions may be overcome based on factors such as the child’s  intelligence, education level, and familiarity with the U.S. immigration  process.
CBP’s 2009 memorandum states that agents and officers  On the basis of our interviews with Border Patrol agents and OFO officers  in Arizona, Texas, and California in July, September, and October 2014,  respectively, we found that not all agents and officers were aware that  CBP’s 2009 memorandum states that UAC under the age of 14 are  presumed generally unable to make an independent decision. Further,  Border Patrol agents and OFO officers at 5 of the 15 facilities we visited  stated that they repatriate UAC under the age of 14 if the Mexican  consulate is able to locate a family member in Mexico, and other Border  Patrol officials stated that they seek approval from the Mexican consulate  before returning any Mexican UAC. However, it is not the responsibility of  the Mexican government to assess whether Mexican UAC who enter the  United States merit international protection outside of Mexico. Rather,  TVPRA provides DHS with the authority to make the determination as to  whether a Mexican UAC can make an independent decision to withdraw  his or her application for admission and return to Mexico when the UAC  has met specified screening criteria, and provides no role for the Mexican  government with respect to this decision. Further, our analysis of CBP  apprehension data indicates that agents and officers may not have  understood or followed CBP policy regarding the ability of UAC younger  than 14 years old to make an independent decision. Specifically, we  found that CBP repatriated about 95 percent of all Mexican UAC whom  agents and officers apprehended during fiscal years 2009 through 2014,  and 93 percent of Mexican UAC under the age of 14 during this time  period. Further, eight of nine Border Patrol sectors along the southwest  border repatriated at least 80 percent of Mexican UAC under age 14 from  fiscal years 2009 through 2014. In addition, from fiscal years 2012  through 2014, OFO repatriated about 50 percent of Mexican UAC and 65  percent of Canadian UAC under age 14.
According to CBP headquarters officials, the Form 93 is a sufficient tool to  conduct screening and Border Patrol officials and, in particular, these  officials stated that the signatures on the Form 93 confirm that agents and  officers considered whether the UAC were able to make an independent  decision about whether to return to Canada or Mexico. CBP officials also  stated that agents and officers use their training and experience to make  independent decision determinations and are capable of making these  determinations without a set of specific questions on the Form 93.  However, based on our interviews and our review of CBP apprehension  data, it is unclear if agents and officers assessed Canadian and Mexican  UAC’s ability to make an independent decision before signing the Form  93 because there was no written documentation of this assessment other  than the signatures.
In addition, other organizations have also identified limitations to CBP’s  implementation of the independent decision-screening requirement. For  example, a June 2014 UNHCR report identified concerns that CBP as a  whole was not assessing whether Mexican UAC are able to make an  independent decision to withdraw their applications for admission to the  United States and return to Mexico. Specifically, UNHCR found that there  are no questions or instructions built into CBP’s process for CBP officials  to assess UAC’s ability to make the decision to return to Mexico.  Further, UNHCR reported that, when presented with hypothetical  examples of a child who is not able to make an independent decision  about returning home and questioned about whether they would handle  the processing of such a Mexican differently, a number of agents  responded that the children would be returned to Mexico like the other  Mexican UAC. In addition, the nongovernmental organization Appleseed  reported in 2011 that its interviews with Border Patrol agents and OFO  officers in the field indicated that no uniform guidelines or standards  existed on how to ascertain whether a child is capable of making an  independent decision to return to Mexico, and that this absence of  direction led to inconsistent practices across different regions of the  southwest border. Further, Appleseed reported that the repatriated  Mexican UAC it interviewed seemed to have little understanding of what  might happen to them if they did not agree to return to Mexico. CBP  officials responsible for outreach with these organizations stated that  while they have had discussions with nongovernmental organizations  about the Form 93 and UAC screening, there were no plans, as of April  2015, to revise the form to include additional indicators or questions  related to the ability of UAC to make an independent decision.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that  agencies should design and implement continuous built-in components of  operations—in this case, indicators or questions agents and officers  should ask related to independent decision making—to provide  reasonable assurance of meeting agency missions, goals, and  objectives. Revising the Form 93 to include indicators or questions that agents and officers should ask to better assess a child’s ability to make  an independent decision would help ensure agents and officers obtain the  necessary information to determine whether UAC can independently  make a decision to withdraw their application prior to repatriation, in  compliance with TVPRA requirements and CBP policy.
Second, although CBP repatriated most Mexican UAC under the age of  14 from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, we found that Border Patrol  agents did not consistently document the basis for their decisions, as  required. CBP’s 2009 memorandum specifically instructs agents and  officers to document the basis for all determinations regarding  independent decisions on the Form I-213. Our analysis of a random  sample of 180 Border Patrol case files of UAC apprehended in fiscal year  2014 showed that agents did not document the rationales for their  conclusions related to UAC’s independent decision-making ability.  Specifically, on the basis of our review of Forms I-213 from our sample of  cases, which included children of all ages, we estimate that none of the  15,531 forms for Mexican UAC nationwide from fiscal year 2014 included  documentation of the agents’ basis for their determinations regarding the  UAC’s ability to make an independent decision. In particular, in one  case we reviewed, the Border Patrol agent documented that the  unaccompanied alien child was “emotionally distraught” and “unable to  speak clearly,” but determined that the child should be allowed to return  to Mexico. Because the agent did not document the reason for deciding  that the child should be repatriated, it was unclear whether or how the  agent took into account the child’s physical and mental state, which,  according to the 2009 memorandum, is one factor to consider when  assessing UAC’s ability to make an independent decision. In addition, two  of the five Border Patrol agents we observed conducting interviews in the  Rio Grande Valley sector told us that the Mexican UAC they interview and  repatriate generally have not understood the options available to them  that would allow them to remain in the United States while they await  removal proceedings. As discussed above, a child’s familiarity with the  U.S. immigration process is to be a factor that agents and officers  consider when determining the ability of the UAC to make an independent  decision.
A Border Patrol headquarters official responsible for the UAC program  stated that agents typically document the basis for the independent  decision assessment only if the agent determines that the  unaccompanied alien child is unable to make an independent decision  because agents have typically not documented the decision in the past.  Further, he stated that this course of action follows the spirit of the 2009  UAC policy memorandum. CBP officials also stated that agents and  officers may not have adequately documented screening decisions  because they were more focused on working to transfer custody of UAC  to HHS as quickly as possible, particularly during the summer of 2014.  However, the 2009 memorandum specifically states that Border Patrol  agents and OFO officers are to document the basis for all determinations  regarding independent decisions. Moreover, our review of Form I-213s  from our sample of cases included apprehensions that occurred  throughout fiscal year 2014, which accounts for time periods with high  and low apprehension rates as well as sectors that did not experience a  surge in UAC. Ensuring that Border Patrol agents document the basis for  their determinations regarding independent decision making would better  position CBP to ensure that such determinations are appropriate.
Credible fear of persecution. We found that Border Patrol agents and  OFO officers are not making consistent decisions about whether Mexican  UAC have a credible fear of persecution if they return to Mexico.  According to TVPRA and CBP’s 2009 policy memorandum, CBP is to  transfer to HHS all Canadian and Mexican UAC who have a fear of  returning to their countries because of a credible fear of persecution. To  implement this policy, agents and officers are to ask four credible fear  determination questions on the Form 93, which solicit information from  the UAC about why they left their home countries, if they have any fear of  returning, or if they believe they would be harmed if returned. However,  we found that agents’ and officers’ understanding varies as to what types  of fear expressed by UAC and what types of responses to these fear  questions should warrant transferring the UAC to HHS. In particular, our  analysis of Border Patrol case files showed that agents made different  screening decisions when presented with similar responses to the  credible fear questions.claimed fear because her grandmother had abused her, and the agent  transferred the child to HHS. However, in two other cases we reviewed,  sisters told the interviewing agent that their aunt had mistreated them and  the agent repatriated these UAC. In another case, a child claimed that he  was fearful of gangs and transnational criminal organizations in his  hometown and the interviewing agent decided to transfer him to HHS.  However, one child claimed fear of gangs and another claimed fear of  violence in Mexico, and the interviewing agents decided to repatriate both  of these UAC.
We did not discuss UAC screening at two facilities we visited in Arizona. At the third  remaining facility, CBP officials stated that they had never determined that a Mexican  unaccompanied alien child had credible fear. some agents and officers these DHS officials interviewed stated that they  needed to ask more questions than those on the Form 93 to know if fear  claimed by UAC warranted protection (that is, being transferred to HHS).  In addition, according to a June 2014 UNHCR report, more than half of  the 96 CBP officials interviewed by the UNHCR officials in 2012 and 2013  stated that it was not their job to assess a child’s fear of returning to his or  her country; instead, UNHCR reported that CBP officials said that they  process the case so that the child’s claim can be heard by an appropriate  adjudicator. However, some CBP officials told UNHCR officials that their  definition of fear is that it must be fear of persecution or harm inflicted  directly by the government and that UAC who fear gangs or cartels do not  have fear of government persecution and are therefore returned home.
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. persecution would better help them assess and protect Mexican UAC  consistent with TVPRA requirements and CBP policy, as well as  consistently across the agency.
Victim of trafficking. CBP’s implementation of the TVPRA requirement  related to assessing whether UAC are at risk of a severe form of  trafficking in persons also has limitations. First, the Form 93 and the 2009  memorandum do not provide instructions on how agents and officers are  to apply the questions and indicators on the Form 93 to assess a child’s  trafficking risk. Second, Border Patrol agents did not document the  rationales for some of their decisions related to whether Mexican UAC  were victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons.
Regarding CBP’s trafficking guidance, we found inconsistencies in the  information Border Patrol agents obtained from UAC for the same  trafficking questions. The Form 93 provides examples of trafficking  indicators and 12 questions to assist agents and officers in their  assessments of whether UAC from Canada and Mexico have been  trafficked. For example, one trafficking question on the Form 93 asks  Border Patrol agents and OFO officers to determine if the UAC are  engaged in labor. We analyzed a random sample of 180 Form 93s for  Mexican UAC apprehended by Border Patrol in fiscal year 2014. On the  basis of our analysis, we estimate that Border Patrol agents found 3  percent of these UAC were engaged in labor—a trafficking indicator— because they were acting as smugglers. However, we estimate that in  another 4 percent of the apprehensions during this time period, the  Border Patrol agents identified the UAC as smugglers but recorded on the  Form 93 that they were not engaged in labor. According to Border Patrol  agents in south Texas, agents have previously identified smugglers who  were trafficking victims, and documenting that UAC are smugglers can be  an important step in assessing if CBP should allow the children to return  to Mexico. According to our review of the case files, Border Patrol agents  did not always document whether Mexican UAC were smugglers. As a  result, we do not know whether agents’ inconsistent classification of UAC  smugglers as engaged in labor was a pervasive issue. However, given  the potential consequences of child trafficking, it is important for agents to  consistently apply the Form 93 trafficking questions for all UAC.
In addition, we found instances where interviewers did not apply the  trafficking indicator from the Form 93 correctly. For example, according to  the form, one indicator of trafficking is when a child is isolated from  others, and the agent or officer is prompted to ask if the child has been  able to freely contact friends or family. However, we estimate that, in 4  percent of the cases, Border Patrol agents incorrectly documented  whether the UAC were able to contact someone while in custody at the  Border Patrol station after they had been apprehended (instead of during  their journey).charge of the UAC program, to determine if the child is a victim of  trafficking, the interviewing agent would need information on whether the  child was allowed to contact friends or family before, not after,  apprehension.
According to a Border Patrol headquarters official in  Other groups have also reported that CBP has not provided Border Patrol  agents and OFO officers with sufficient guidance on how to implement the  Form 93 screening tool with regard to trafficking. For example, Appleseed  reported that the form lacks depth or detail sufficient to draw out the  information for an agent to evaluate whether a child has been trafficked.  In addition, UNHCR reported that the form does not provide the  necessary guidance for the interviewing agents and officers in a clear,  accurate, and user-friendly manner. For example, UNHCR found that  one agent, who was observed conducting screening, did not understand  that some trafficking questions applied to the period of time before an  unaccompanied alien child’s apprehension. UNHCR reported that, with  some guidance on the substance of what the agent is screening for, the  agent could more effectively screen UAC for protection needs.
According to CBP officials, agents and officers are not authorized to make  trafficking determinations, as agents refer UAC who may be victims of  trafficking to either ICE or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.  These officials also stated that the trafficking questions on the Form 93  are intended as good questions to prompt UAC responses, but that  agents and officers ultimately use their training and experience to make  trafficking decisions. Although agents and officers must use their  discretion, prior to repatriating a UAC from Mexico or Canada, CBP policy  and TVPRA require them to assess whether the UAC has been a victim  of a severe form of trafficking in persons or is at risk of being trafficked  upon return, and we found inconsistencies in how agents applied the  trafficking questions designed to conduct that assessment. Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that effective  communications should occur in a broad sense, with information flowing  down, across, and up the organization to help ensure the agency meets  its objectives.responsible for developing detailed practices to fit the agency’s  operations and ensure that the practices are built into, and an integral  part of, operations. Developing and implementing guidance on how  Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to implement the TVPRA  requirement to transfer to HHS all Canadian and Mexican UAC who are  victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons—such as the purpose of  each trafficking question on the Form 93 and how to interpret UAC’s  responses to the questions—would better ensure agents and officers can  make consistent and informed screening decisions.
Further, these standards state that management is  Second, Border Patrol agents did not document the rationale for some of  their decisions related to whether Mexican UAC were victims of a severe  form of trafficking in persons, as required. According to the Form 93, if a  trafficking indicator is present during the screening process, the  interviewing Border Patrol agent or OFO officer is to ask age-appropriate  questions that will help identify the key elements of a trafficking scenario.  Moreover, agents and officers are to use the Form I-213 to document the  circumstances involving any potential trafficking. On the basis of the  sample of Form 93s that we reviewed, we project that 7,832 of the about  15,500 (50 percent) Mexican UAC whom Border Patrol apprehended in  fiscal year 2014 had at least one trafficking indicator present. However,  agents determined that these 7,832 UAC were not trafficking victims but  did not document any follow-up questions the agents may have asked or  UAC responses to those questions to alleviate any trafficking concerns.
For example, we estimate that in 45 percent of cases, the Border Patrol  agent indicated that the child did not have possession of his or her  identification documents but determined the child was not a trafficking  victim. In the cases we reviewed, the agent did not document any  responses to follow-up questions he or she may have asked, even though  the Form 93 instructs the interviewing agent or officer to determine who  has control of the documents. According to Border Patrol agents in one  sector, not having an identification document should not be an indicator of  someone being trafficked. However, the Form 93 states that the lack of  possession or control of documents is a trafficking indicator and provides  a suggested question specific to that situation. In other cases, Border  Patrol agents determined UAC did not appear to be victims or potential  victims of trafficking even though agents documented that there were  trafficking indicators for these children, such as being isolated from  others, engaging in labor, having restricted movements, being threatened  with harm, being recruited for one purpose but forced to engage in some  other job, or providing coached responses. As a result, it is unclear  whether Border Patrol agents correctly applied CBP’s policies.
CBP officials stated that they may not have adequately documented  screening decisions during the surge of UAC in the summer of 2014  because they were more focused on working to transfer custody of UAC  to HHS as quickly as possible. Also, Border Patrol officials stated that it is  not necessary to document responses to follow-up questions because (1)  agents have latitude to use their judgment based on training and  experience to make trafficking assessments based on the totality of  responses to the trafficking questions; (2) agents and supervisors discuss  the circumstances of each case, as appropriate; and (3) supervisors  review and approve agents’ screening decisions. While an agent’s  judgment is an important aspect of the screening process, it is unclear if  agents are following TVPRA and CBP policy requirements to only  repatriate Mexican UAC if CBP determines they have not been victims of  a severe form of trafficking in persons. Moreover, on the basis of our  review of Form 93s from our sample of cases, we estimate that Border  Patrol agents did not complete the trafficking section of the Form 93 for 7  percent (1,077) of Mexican UAC they repatriated in fiscal year 2014.  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that  internal controls and all transactions and other significant events need to  be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily  available for examination.trafficking indicators whom Border Patrol repatriated, asking follow-up  questions of UAC when trafficking indicators are present and  documenting UAC responses would better position CBP to ensure that  UAC who may be victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons are not  repatriated. Further, recording the rationale for agents’ decisions to  repatriate UAC who demonstrate a trafficking indicator would allow CBP  to better assess on an agency-wide basis whether agents’ decisions were  justified and consistent with TVPRA requirements and CBP policy.
Given the rate of Mexican UAC with  Credible evidence of risk of being trafficked upon return. The Form  93 states that the trafficking questions will assist agents and officers in  determining if the UAC may be victims of trafficking, but the form does not  include indicators or questions for assessing whether there is credible  evidence that the UAC are at risk of being trafficked upon return to their  countries of origin—a screening requirement under TVPRA and CBP  policy. CBP officials stated that the guidelines established in Form 93  outline indicators and suggested questions that could help show that UAC  are victims of trafficking whether they are going to be repatriated or were  subject to it prior to apprehension. However, none of the 12 trafficking  questions prompts the interviewing agents and officers to ask the UAC  about, for example, conditions in their homes or countries of origin that  could help them assess whether the child would be a potential victim if  repatriated. In addition, agents and officers at five facilities we visited  stated that they focus on indicators of current trafficking victims—such as  signs of abuse or fear of an adult in their group—rather than indicators of  potential trafficking should the child return to his or her country of origin.  Further, during our observations of five UAC interviews, Border Patrol  agents did not ask any questions pertaining to the risk of a child being  trafficked upon return to his or her country of origin. CBP officials also  stated that before CBP would allow a Mexican unaccompanied alien child  to return, Mexican consulate officials interview each child and question  him or her regarding possible abuse or trafficking. If any of these factors  are present, consulate officials notify CBP. However, Mexican consulate  officials in two of the three states we visited stated that they do not  influence CBP’s TVPRA screening decisions. Moreover, as previously  stated, it is not the responsibility of the Mexican government to assess  whether Mexican UAC who enter the United States merit international  protection outside of Mexico.
Other organizations have reported on similar limitations in CBP’s Form  93. For example, a June 2014 UNHCR report found that the form did not  provide instruction on whether UAC are potential trafficking victims.  UNHCR reported that indicators for when a child may be at risk of being  trafficked if returned to his or her country may be different from indicators  of current trafficking victims, and that CBP agents and officers may need  to ask different questions. UNHCR officials reported a lack of awareness  among CBP officials about how to identify UAC who might be at risk of  trafficking if returned to their countries of nationality. Similarly, Appleseed  reported in 2011 that the Form 93 trafficking questions do not probe what  Mexican UAC can expect to encounter if they are returned to Mexico.
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. ensure agents and officers obtain the necessary information to address  all TVPRA screening criteria and protect UAC.
section_title: CBP Does Not Have Assurance That Agents and Officers Have Completed Required UAC Training
paragraphs: CBP does not know the extent to which Border Patrol agents and OFO  officers, who have substantive contact with UAC, have completed  required UAC training. TVPRA requires DHS to provide specialized  training to all personnel who have substantive contact with UAC.  According to CBP officials, in October 2012, CBP combined two virtual  learning courses—one on TVPRA requirements and another on the care  of UAC—and made the course mandatory. Since that time, Border Patrol  agents and OFO officers have been required to complete this training  annually. The course aims to familiarize agents and officers with the  provisions of TVPRA, the screening of UAC, and other issues pertaining  to the processing and care of UAC. However, our analysis indicates that  CBP does not have reliable data on whether agents and officers  completed the training. In particular, CBP officials stated that CBP’s  training system tracks the number of agents and officers who have  completed the course but it does not reflect the total number of those who  should have taken the course. Furthermore, we interviewed CBP training,  Border Patrol, and OFO officials regarding how agents and officers  document completion of UAC training, and reviewed additional  information these officials provided about these data. These officials  stated that CBP’s training system does not contain accurate data on  which agents and officers are required to take the mandated training or  those who did not take it. Further, tracking completion of the UAC training  course is a long-standing issue, as the DHS Office of Inspector General  (OIG) reported in September 2010 that CBP has not developed a tracking  system to verify that personnel responsible for processing and detaining  UAC have completed the mandatory annual training.
CBP officials stated that it is the responsibility of local supervisors to  ensure that all of their agents and officers who have substantive contact  with UAC complete required training. According to CBP training officials,  some agents and officers may be exempt from the training for a particular  year, for example, if they are on a detail assignment overseas or on  extended administrative leave. Also, Border Patrol and OFO  headquarters officials stated that some supervisors are better than others  at monitoring their agents’ and officers’ training requirements and may  prioritize operational assignments over required training. For example,  Border Patrol officials reported that the increase in apprehensions in fiscal  years 2013 and 2014 could have led to below-optimal training completion  percentages. Similarly, OFO officials stated that some officers were  unable to complete the UAC training because operational needs took  precedence. However, TVPRA requires all federal personnel who have  substantive contact with UAC to receive specialized training, and  completion of the annual UAC virtual learning course is a CBP  requirement. Further, a March 2008 Border Patrol memorandum states  that employees should be given adequate time to complete the course— about 1 hour in length—during their normal tour of duty. In addition,  according to best practices in assessing training efforts, agencies should  develop tracking and other control mechanisms to ensure that all  employees receive appropriate training. Determining which agents and  officers are required to complete the annual UAC training, and ensuring  that they have done so, as required, would help CBP to meet training  requirements under TVPRA and CBP policies and guidance.
section_title: CBP and ICE Have Developed Policies That Are Consistent with UAC Care Requirements, but Could Improve Data Collection, Interagency Coordination, and Repatriation Efforts
subsections: section_title: CBP and ICE Policies Generally Reflect Care Requirements for UAC, and CBP Follows These Policies in Practice
paragraphs: CBP and ICE have policies in place to implement the Flores Agreement  and care for UAC, and CBP generally follows these policies. Under the  Flores Agreement, DHS is generally required to, among other things,  ensure the safety and well-being of the UAC; separate UAC from  unrelated adults; adequately supervise UAC to protect them from others;  and provide access to food, water, toilets, and sinks. CBP and its  components, Border Patrol and OFO, have several policy documents that  provide guidance for how agents and officers are to implement the Flores  Agreement requirements to care for UAC. These documents are  generally consistent with and address Flores Agreement requirements to  care for UAC, and in some cases include more rigorous care  requirements. For example, the Flores Agreement requires adequate  supervision of UAC, but Border Patrol policy requires direct and constant  supervision of UAC. ICE also has several policies that provide guidance  on UAC care; these policies address all required elements of care, and in  some cases include more rigorous care requirements.
At the 15 CBP facilities (11 Border Patrol and 4 OFO) we visited in July,  September, and October 2014, we interviewed officials responsible for  caring for UAC and observed the extent to which agents and officers at  each facility were addressing the following eight required elements of  care in Border Patrol and OFO policies: place UAC in the least restrictive setting appropriate for their age and  separate UAC from unrelated adults and by gender, directly supervise UAC,  keep facilities adequately ventilated and at appropriate temperatures, provide access to working and sanitary toilets and sinks, provide drinking water, provide food regardless of time in custody, provide access to medical treatment.
In addition, at the 11 Border Patrol facilities we visited, we evaluated the  implementation of the following UAC care elements specific only to  Border Patrol policy: provide clean blankets and mattresses,  conduct physical checks of UAC hold rooms at regular intervals, and provide access to telephones.
We did not include ICE facilities in this analysis because UAC are rarely held in ICE  facilities for more than a short period of time as they await transportation to an ORR  shelter, according to ICE officials. seven of the eight elements of care at the time of our visits.according to our observations and interviews at the 11 Border Patrol  facilities, agents were generally providing care consistent with the three  Border Patrol-specific requirements at the time of our visit. Figure 5  shows a typical Border Patrol holding room in a station in south Texas.  The photograph on the left shows a toilet and sink in the rear of the  holding cell behind a half wall, and the photograph on the right shows a 5- gallon water jug that provided UAC with access to drinking water.
In July 2014, we visited CBP facilities in Arizona, at which time Border  Patrol, OFO, ORR, and FEMA officials, among others, were caring for  more than 900 UAC at the Nogales Placement Center (NPC). According  to CBP officials, DHS had transferred most of these children to Arizona  from south Texas—where Border Patrol agents and OFO officers had  apprehended them—because CBP holding facilities in south Texas were  overflowing with UAC and HHS shelters did not have the capacity at the  time to accept all of the UAC whom agents and officers were  apprehending each week. Figure 6 shows part of the NPC, including a  number of portable toilets. At the NPC, we observed Border Patrol agents  and OFO officers helping U.S. government public health volunteers  provide basic care to UAC, including helping children as young as 2 and 3  years old eat and bathe. At the time of our visit, Border Patrol officials in  Arizona were supplementing food supplied by a FEMA contractor with  food purchased separately using Border Patrol funding. We also  observed toiletries, toys, and other supplies that Border Patrol agents and  OFO officers told us had been purchased with personal funds. In addition,  we observed Border Patrol agents and OFO officers playing games with  UAC.
For the remaining required element of care for Border Patrol and OFO— the requirement to separate UAC from unrelated adults and by gender— officials told us and we observed that mitigating circumstances made it  challenging to meet the policy requirements at all times. Specifically,  officials at 7 of 15 CBP facilities did not always meet the requirement to  separate UAC from unrelated adults and by gender at the time of our  visits. At these 7 facilities, we observed or were told that female and  young male UAC would at times be placed in hold rooms with families.  Border Patrol and OFO personnel told us that because of limited space in  most of these facilities, they made decisions on how to segregate adults  and children based on risk level. For example, some agents and officers  stated that because of facility layouts, open areas are not a safe solution  for lack of space, and determined that female and young male UAC were  safer in hold rooms with families than in open areas with no physical  barriers between UAC and adult males.
The DHS OIG has reported that CBP has generally met care  requirements, but identified some isolated problems. Specifically, in  2010, the DHS OIG reported that CBP’s care of UAC met the  requirements of the Flores Agreement. Inspections by OIG from July,  August, and October 2014 also found that most facilities that OIG officials  visited were adhering to care requirements, but there were isolated  problems with the quantity of food provided, sanitation, and the  temperature of facilities found during the July 2014 inspections. The  subsequent inspections in August and October 2014 found that CBP had  addressed these isolated problems. However, other organizations have  reported on inconsistent compliance with the requirements for UAC care.  For example, DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties conducted  an investigation of selected Border Patrol and OFO facilities in south  Texas during July 2014—during the height of the increase in UAC  apprehensions—and found issues pertaining to sanitation and holding  room conditions. Specifically, in October 2014, DHS Office for Civil Rights  and Civil Liberties officials told us that, according to preliminary findings,  some facilities had unsanitary conditions in holding room restroom areas,  and some of the holding rooms lacked bathroom tissue, drinking cups,  and readily available food.
In addition, as of April 2015, a complaint was filed in court concerning   CBP’s adherence to specific provisions of the Flores Agreement related  to care; in particular, plaintiffs have alleged that CBP has not met the  requirement to hold UAC in facilities that are safe and sanitary and that  are consistent with the concern for the particular vulnerability of minors.
Motion to Enforce Settlement of Class Action, Flores v. Reno, No. 85-4544 (C.D. Cal.  Feb. 2, 2015).
section_title: DHS Does Not Collect Complete or Reliable Data on Care of UAC or Their Time in the Department’s Custody
paragraphs: Within DHS, CBP and ICE have not collected complete or reliable data  documenting (1) the care provided to UAC while in DHS custody and (2)  the length of time UAC are in DHS custody.
Documentation of care provided to UAC. CBP does not collect  complete or reliable data on actions Border Patrol agents and OFO  officers take to care for UAC; therefore, DHS does not have reasonable  assurance that it is meeting its care requirements for UAC. Since 2008,  Border Patrol and OFO have required agents and officers to document  certain care actions for UAC, such as physical checks and meals.  However, in 2010, DHS OIG found that Border Patrol and OFO were not  documenting care as required and recommended that CBP develop  uniform documentation requirements for UAC care. Border Patrol and  OFO have taken some steps to develop and implement automated data  systems that can record and maintain data on UAC care. In particular, in  2012 and 2013, Border Patrol issued policies requiring all sectors and  stations to fully capture information on UAC care in its automated system,  which allows agents to record care provided to UAC across 20 different  actions that agents might take.
In fiscal year 2014, Border Patrol fully implemented the automated  system, which also allows agents to document the physical movements of  UAC, including when UAC are transferred to another station. We analyzed available record-level data on care provided to 55,844 UAC  apprehended by Border Patrol agents nationwide from January through  September 2014, and found that data were not complete or reliable  because agents did not routinely or accurately record actions in the  system, as required by Border Patrol policy. Our analysis of data  showed inconsistent data entry across sectors. For example, data  showed the following:
Agents documented 14 of the 20 care actions for less than half of the  55,844 UAC (the remaining 6 actions were documented for more than  50 percent of the UAC).
Agents at 31 of 92 (34 percent) Border Patrol facilities nationwide did  not document meals provided for at least half of the UAC in custody.
Agents at one station along the U.S. southwest border did not  document meals provided for 9,201 of 13,574 UAC (68 percent) in  custody. Of the 9,201 UAC that had no meal documented, 72 percent  were in custody at that station for 12 hours or more.
Agents at 50 of 92 facilities (54 percent) did not document physical  checks for at least half of the UAC in custody; those at 19 of 92  facilities did not document physical checks for any UAC in custody.
Agents at one station along the southwest U.S. border did not  document physical checks for 4,694 of 5,229 (90 percent) UAC in  custody. For the 4,694 UAC for whom agents did not document a  physical check, 3,663 (78 percent) were in custody at that station for  12 hours or more.
There were 94 total facilities nationwide that had custody of at least 1 unaccompanied  alien child from January through September 2014. However, 2 of the facilities are not  included in this set of analyses because the records from those facilities were not  completed. multiple entries were errors.may not have adequately recorded care actions because they were more  focused on working to transfer custody of UAC to HHS as quickly as  possible. Border Patrol officials in headquarters and California also told  us that the multiple entries are likely a result of user error caused by lack  of training or accidental entry, and officials in California and Texas told us  that system error, such as the system freezing or not updating quickly,  may also play a role. For example, data showed the following:   Border Patrol officials stated that agents
Sixty-two percent (34,703) of the records we reviewed contained at  least 1 likely error, and for each of those case files, the typical case  had 12 likely errors.
Seventy of 94 facilities in the data had at least one care action  recorded multiple times for a single child within a 10-minute period. At  29 of these 70 facilities, at least 25 percent of the actions recorded  were likely errors, and at 10 of these 70 facilities, at least half of the  actions recorded were likely errors. For example, 56 percent of all  care actions that agents in the Rio Grande Valley sector documented  consisted of the same action entered more than once within a 10- minute period. In particular, 49 percent of these likely errors were  recorded within 2 minutes or less of one another.
In 1 case in the Rio Grande Valley sector, a meal for the same child  was recorded 11 times within 11 minutes.
In fiscal year 2012, OFO implemented an automated database that allows  officers to record care actions such as meals and medical care. However,  unlike Border Patrol, as of April 2015, OFO did not yet have a policy  requiring officers to use the automated database to record care provided  to UAC, and OFO headquarters officials stated that officers at most POEs  do not use the automated database. For example, at a POE we visited in  south Texas, OFO officers told us that they document most custodial  actions in the narrative of Form I-213 as opposed to recording care  actions in the database. In contrast, at least one large land POE along the  southwest U.S. border has been using the database to document care  provided to UAC; however, OFO headquarters and port officials were  unable to view data from the database for this POE until September 2014,  when OFO upgraded its database to provide this capability. OFO officials  said they have discussed developing a data review process and making  use of the automated database mandatory, but officials did not have an  expected implementation date or documentation of any plans as of  February 2015.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  agencies should document transactions and events as they occur and in  an accessible manner, and that management should review   Because agents and officers do  documentation to assess performance.not routinely document their actions taken to care for UAC, Border Patrol  and OFO have limited data available to ensure they are meeting the  requirements for care of UAC as set forth in TVPRA, the Flores  Agreement, and agency policy. Furthermore, data that Border Patrol and  OFO have collected since fiscal year 2014 are not reliable or available.  Requiring OFO officers to record UAC care actions in an automated  manner and ensuring that Border Patrol agents record UAC care actions  in their automated system, as required, would help CBP to assess and  better ensure compliance with all care requirements.
Documentation of UAC time in DHS custody. Border Patrol generally  collects complete and reliable information on the dates and times during  which UAC come into and leave its custody, but OFO and ICE do not  collect such information. Therefore, DHS cannot accurately determine  how long UAC have been in OFO and ICE custody, and if the length of  time in custody before transfer to HHS is within the 72-hour limit  established by TVPRA.
Border Patrol’s policy instructs agents to record the times that UAC enter  custody—or are “booked in”—and leave their custody—or are “booked  out.” Border Patrol’s system provides automated date and time stamps for  each action that agents enter into the system when UAC are in their  custody. Our analysis of fiscal year 2014 data shows that Border Patrol  agents used the “transfer” field in over 99 percent of cases to document  when UAC left Border Patrol custody. Using this system, agents can also  differentiate the type of transfer, including UAC transfers to another  Border Patrol facility or a POE, ICE, or HHS shelter. As a result, Border  Patrol can produce regular reports to identify the number of UAC who  have been in DHS custody greater than 72 hours. According to CBP  officials, this information is disseminated to FEMA, DHS senior  leadership, and additional stakeholders.
OFO’s data system automatically generates a book-in date and time  when officers enter a UAC apprehension in the system. In July 2014,  OFO officials told us that their system did not have a field to record when  UAC left OFO custody. OFO has a “time out” field in its system, but as of  April 2015, officers are not required to use it. OFO officials told us they  have discussed requiring a book-out date and time; however, they do not  have time frames or documentation of any plans for implementation of the  updates.
An ICE user manual describes how to book in and book out subjects,  including UAC, and ICE officials stated that they cover the proper use of  these fields during monthly conference calls and annual training.  However, ICE does not have a policy that requires officers to record  book-in or book-out dates and times for UAC in its custody. Further, ICE  headquarters officials told us officers often enter book-out dates and  times into the system a day or more after UAC have been transferred to  HHS because officers may wait to enter the data until after they travel  back to their office. Therefore, ICE officials stated that this delayed data  entry affects the precision of the book-out times recorded in the system  and makes them unreliable. Further, officials in one ICE field office told us  that they do not use the book-out field when a UAC leaves ICE custody.  In addition, ICE officials told us that they use book-in and book-out  records to count time in ICE custody, but they recognize that the  limitations in the data make these calculations imprecise.
The Flores Agreement requires information on all UAC who were placed  in removal proceedings and remained in DHS custody more than 72  hours in the prior 6-month period, among other things, to be submitted to  plaintiffs’ counsel twice yearly.reports compiled by ICE and submitted to plaintiffs’ counsel by DOJ  showed that a total of 1,280 UAC were in DHS custody for more than 72  hours. However, our analysis of the reports revealed data quality issues.  For instance, the date of DHS’s transfer of the UAC to ORR is missing for  13 percent of the 1,280 cases, so the time in DHS custody for these  children was not fully documented in the reports. Further, our analysis  identified that the apprehension date for 19 percent of UAC apprehended  by Border Patrol was recorded incorrectly by ICE in these reports. ICE  ERO officials told us that because ICE’s data system does not provide  reliable data on time in custody, the reports are compiled manually using  weekly reports from ICE field offices—a method that ICE officials told us  is also prone to data entry errors.
From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  agencies should document transactions and events as they occur and in  an accessible manner, and that management should review  documentation to assess performance.  Requiring officers to accurately  record book-in and book-out times would help ensure that OFO and ICE  have data necessary to determine UAC’s time in custody, and would  better equip DHS to provide accurate data in reports to DOJ and ensure  that it is complying with requirements to limit UAC’s time in custody to 72  hours, apart from the case of exceptional circumstances.
section_title: Interagency Process to Refer and Transfer UAC from DHS to HHS Shelters Is Inefficient and Does Not Have Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
ICE, which sends it on to ORR from certain locations, or directly to ORR  officials in headquarters who are responsible for identifying available  shelter beds. ORR officials check their data system to find available beds.  Once ORR has identified and assigned a shelter bed for a child, an ORR  official sends an e-mail to CBP or ICE, often with a list of several children  who have been placed in shelters. After CBP or ICE officials examine the  e-mails to identify which UAC are in their respective custody, they  coordinate to transport the child to the shelter. Figure 7 depicts the  referral and placement process as of April 2015, and identifies points in  the process where DHS and HHS officials told us that potential errors or  miscommunications have, at times, affected the efficiency of the referral  and placement process.
UAC referral and placement process relies on e-mails and manual  data entry. ORR officials in headquarters, as well as Border Patrol, OFO,  and ICE officials in Arizona, Texas, and California, told us that the referral  and placement process is inefficient and time and resource intensive.  Each agency uses its own data system to manage and track UAC, and  because the data systems do not automatically communicate information  with one another, the agencies rely on e-mails and duplicative manual  data entry when coordinating the placement of UAC in shelters. In some  cases, ORR sent e-mails concerning the shelter placements for multiple  UAC to an entire Border Patrol sector, and the POEs within it, making the  e-mails time-consuming to search. For example, in September 2014, we  observed a team of Border Patrol agents in Texas who had been  reassigned from other duties to search through placement e-mails for all  UAC in the sector to determine if any UAC in their custody had been  placed in a shelter. HHS headquarters officials stated that ORR sends  shelter placement information to the recipients indicated by DHS. Table 4  shows that this increase in apprehensions resulted in higher numbers of  UAC transferred to HHS.
The reliance on e-mail and associated manual data entry also makes the  referral and placement process vulnerable to error and possible delay in  the transfer of UAC from DHS to HHS. We analyzed e-mail exchanges  between ORR and Border Patrol in the Rio Grande Valley sector to place  593 UAC in shelters during a 3-day period in July 2014, during the influx  of UAC, and 135 UAC during a 3-day period in November 2014, after the  influx had ended. We identified miscommunications between agencies, as  well as errors during both time periods, including UAC who had to be  redesignated to different shelters after initial placements and UAC who  were assigned to multiple shelters simultaneously. For example, in the  e-mails we examined, we found that ORR staff recorded one UAC’s  personal information incorrectly, which resulted in a Texas shelter holding  an empty bed for 14 days while the child had been already placed in a  shelter in Pennsylvania. The incorrect entry of this child’s personal  information also meant that ORR and DHS had to exchange multiple e- mails to resolve the discrepancy between their records.
DHS components use different methods to refer UAC to HHS. DHS  and ORR have identified the lack of compatible data systems as a  challenge in the UAC referral and shelter placement process and, in fiscal  year 2014, began exploring ways to automate communications to address  inefficiencies. In summer 2014, ORR began allowing CBP and ICE to  enter information directly into ORR’s UAC data system when referring  UAC for placement in shelters. As of March 2015, ICE was using ORR’s  system, while Border Patrol was developing an alternative approach, and  OFO was using the process described in figure 5.
According to ORR officials, as well as ICE officials in Rio Grande  Valley and San Diego, ICE inputs referral information directly into  ORR’s system. However, ICE officials stated that using ORR’s system  directly has increased data entry requirements without reducing  reliance on e-mail and phone communication. ICE officials also told us  that, despite the increased data entry requirements, they are  continuing to use ORR’s system.
Border Patrol and ORR officials stated that efforts are under way to  automate most of the steps in the referral process between these  agencies. However, as of May 2015, Border Patrol is not entering  referral information directly into ORR’s data system because Border  Patrol officials said they do not want agents to have to enter the same  data into its two separate systems (as ICE is doing) or train all of the  agents on how to operate ORR’s system. Border Patrol and ORR  have been unable to move forward with a fully automated referral and  placement process because DHS has not accredited the security of  ORR’s data system. In March 2015, CBP officials stated that DHS is  waiting to begin its security accreditation process until HHS accredits  ORR’s system. ORR officials told us in January and April 2015 that  they are also working to update their data system to meet HHS  security requirements. In the interim, Border Patrol and ORR are  developing a temporary automated process that allows Border  Patrol’s system to automatically fill out the referral form when agents  create a new apprehension record. Agents are to send an encrypted  referral form to ORR via e-mail, and ORR is to import the information  directly into its system without ORR staff having to manually enter it.  Border Patrol officials said that eliminating the duplicate data entry in  the referral process will increase efficiency for Border Patrol.  According to Border Patrol officials, automating most of the referral  process will decrease UAC processing time by 5 minutes per case,  which would have saved a total of about 5,000 hours of agents’ time  during fiscal year 2014. Border Patrol officials stated that they would  like to pilot the alternative system in one sector in May 2015 before  fully implementing it in all sectors, but did not have a time frame for  when they would have a fully automated way to communicate with  ORR’s data system because of the security accreditation requirement.
OFO headquarters officials said that they were unaware that their  officers could access ORR’s system and are not involved in or  planning any efforts to link OFO’s data system with ORR’s system. In  May 2015, ORR officials stated that there are no efforts under way  with OFO to link the two data systems. OFO headquarters officials  said they have not received feedback from the field about the current  referral process. However, OFO officials in the Rio Grande Valley told  us that the placement process has cost them time and resources. For  example, one POE on the U.S. southwest border set up a port-wide e- mail specifically for ORR placements, which all officers on duty check  regularly and which officials reported took significant amounts of time.  However, we observed that these port officials continued to handle  large quantities of e-mails despite having no UAC in custody at the  time of our visit in September 2014. These officials also reported that  placement errors had caused them to transport children to shelters  that would not accept them, and that they were not always informed of  travel itineraries.
Roles, responsibilities, and procedures are not documented. The  roles and responsibilities of DHS components are not consistent during  the referral and placement process, and DHS points of contact for ORR  vary across Border Patrol sectors and ICE and OFO areas of operation.  For example, the ICE San Diego field office coordinates placements with  ORR on behalf of all Border Patrol stations and POEs in its area of  operations, except for two stations in the El Centro sector. However, in  the Rio Grande Valley and Tucson stations and POEs, CBP handles  referral and placement communications with ORR. Border Patrol officials  stated that they have a designated UAC coordinator for every sector  along the southern border who is responsible for UAC placement and  other tasks. However, ORR sends sector-wide placement e-mails on  multiple UAC; CBP officials in the Rio Grande Valley, which has the  highest volume of UAC apprehensions, told us that Border Patrol agents  and OFO officers spend significant amounts of time searching e-mails for  critical information.
Also, in e-mail exchanges we analyzed, ORR officials sent one e-mail  with placements for 7 UAC to the wrong ICE and CBP region. We also  found multiple instances in which different ORR officials sent duplicate  placement e-mails for the same UAC. The inefficiencies in the placement  process for UAC have been a long-standing challenge for DHS and HHS.  In 2005, the DHS OIG found that, despite an initial effort to create a  memorandum of understanding that would outline roles and  responsibilities, the two departments had not delineated their respective  organizational functions regarding UAC. In particular, the DHS OIG  reported that clear roles and responsibilities across DHS components  would help provide a point of contact for entities outside of DHS.  Moreover, in 2008, after the HHS OIG recommended that ORR develop a  memorandum of understanding with DHS on the shelter placement  process, ORR stated that it was coordinating with DHS on a joint  manual.departments never created such a manual.
However, ORR officials told us that, for unknown reasons, the  In addition, ORR officials told us that from 2013 to 2014, ORR and DHS  were developing a memorandum of understanding to outline agency  responsibilities in the UAC process, but efforts were set aside during the  increase in UAC apprehensions in fiscal year 2014 and efforts to develop  such a document have not been renewed. In 2013, DHS developed an  internal concept of operations to be used in the event of another large  increase in UAC apprehensions; however, DHS policy officials told us that  this document was never approved or implemented. As of January 2015,  DHS has been working under an interim concept of operations while a  DHS working group develops a land migration contingency plan that will  include procedures for potential future surges in UAC apprehensions.
However, according to DHS policy officials, the plan will not address  procedures and responsibilities for DHS components to refer and transfer  UAC to HHS during normal operating conditions.
DHS and HHS have participated in interagency efforts to handle and plan  for a potential surge in the apprehension of UAC who require transfer to  HHS. In June 2014, the DHS Secretary directed FEMA to take the lead in  managing interagency coordination for UAC issues as the head of the  Unified Coordination Group, which includes CBP, ICE, the Department of  Defense, and HHS. FEMA officials told us that, during the influx in 2014,  they identified the UAC placement process as a challenge and helped  facilitate ORR placement operations in Arizona as a temporary measure.  As of April 2015, FEMA leads the Unified Coordination Group, which has  created an emergency response plan for the Rio Grande Valley region  that outlines steps to rapidly increase federal capacity if the number of  UAC reaches extremely high levels again. However, the plan does not  address the interagency referral and placement process that is in place  during routine operations, nor does it address operations outside of the  Rio Grande Valley.
Best practices of high-performing organizations include fostering  collaboration both within and across organizational boundaries to achieve  results; moreover, federal programs contributing to the same or similar  results should collaborate to ensure that program efforts are mutually  reinforcing, and should clarify roles and responsibilities for their joint and  individual efforts. Further, agencies should work together to establish a  shared purpose and shared goals; develop joint strategies or approaches  that complement one another and work toward achieving shared goals;  and ensure the compatibility of the standards, policies, procedures, and  data systems to be used. We have reported on a range of mechanisms  agencies can use to implement these practices for collaboration. These  include interagency agreements and memorandums of understanding, as  well as collaboration technologies such as shared databases and web  portals that help facilitate collaboration. DHS and HHS have utilized some  of these mechanisms under emergency operations during the large  increase in UAC apprehensions in fiscal year 2014. However, DHS and  HHS do not have a documented interagency process that clearly defines  the roles and responsibilities of each DHS component and ORR for UAC  referrals and placements during normal operations. Having documented  procedures and defined roles and responsibilities could prevent  miscommunication and errors in disseminating placement decisions,  reduce time spent on the referral and placement process, and help  ensure that UAC are transferred from DHS to HHS within 72 hours under  normal operations.
section_title: DHS-Negotiated Repatriation Arrangements with Mexico Reflect Some but Not All TVPRA Requirements
paragraphs: DHS has entered into local arrangements with Mexican consulates to  ensure the safe and humane repatriation of Mexican nationals, including  UAC. However, these arrangements do not reflect minimum TVPRA  requirements for agreements with Canada and Mexico with respect to the  repatriation of UAC. TVPRA requires that State negotiate agreements  with contiguous countries for the repatriation of children. These  agreements are to be designed to protect children from severe forms of  trafficking in persons and must, at minimum, provide that (1) no child shall  be returned unless to appropriate officials, including child welfare officials  where available; (2) no child shall be returned outside of reasonable  business hours; and (3) border personnel of countries who are parties to  the agreements are to be trained in the terms of the agreements.
Officials from State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and Office of  the Legal Advisor told us that the department has not entered into  agreements regarding the repatriation of UAC with Mexico or Canada.  Instead, DHS has negotiated and signed repatriation arrangements at the  national and local levels with Mexico. According to officials, State has not  acted in a formal advisory capacity during the negotiation and  implementation of these arrangements in the past because they more  directly relate to DHS’s operations. A senior official in the Bureau of  Western Hemisphere Affairs told us that State’s role is generally to  facilitate cooperation between the government of Mexico and DHS, as  necessary. For example, bureau officials participate in a bilateral,  interagency repatriation technical working group, which meets every other  month to review repatriation practices. A senior official in the Bureau of  Western Hemisphere Affairs told us that through this group, they are able  to provide advice and input on DHS-negotiated arrangements and their  implementation, such as hours during which UAC can be repatriated. The  officials told us that they do not review the local repatriation arrangements  to determine if they satisfy TVPRA requirements, but stated that it would  be possible to provide such input through State’s role in the working  group.
In 2004, DHS negotiated a memorandum of understanding with Mexico to  ensure the safe and humane repatriation of all Mexican nationals,  including UAC. This document contains a set of principles and practices  that serve as the basis for 30 local repatriation arrangements negotiated  and agreed upon by DHS and Mexican consulates throughout the United  States from 2006 through 2009, which remain in effect. As these  arrangements and the memorandum of understanding represented the  primary agreements with Mexican officials for UAC repatriation, we  reviewed them to determine whether they reflected minimum  requirements for agreements with contiguous countries regarding UAC  repatriation. Our analysis of the memorandum of understanding and local  repatriation arrangements indicates that they reflect some, but not all,  repatriation requirements in TVPRA. Specifically, the memorandum states  that UAC should be returned during daylight hours, where possible to  appropriate family welfare officials, but it does not identify appropriate  officials or contain any provisions for the training of border personnel in  the arrangements.
Further, our analysis of the 30 DHS-negotiated local repatriation  arrangements shows that fewer than one-third contained provisions  directing that no UAC be returned unless to appropriate employees or  officials, for example, by providing titles of Mexican officials to whom  Mexican nationals are to be returned; and only one arrangement  identified child welfare representatives. In terms of prohibiting the return  of UAC outside of reasonable business hours, fewer than half of  arrangements identified the hours during which UAC could be returned to  Mexico. Among those that identified the hours, the allowable hours for  repatriation varied widely. In most cases, UAC could not be repatriated  later than 6 p.m., but according to one arrangement, UAC can be  repatriated until 10 p.m., and another permits UAC to be repatriated at  any hour. According to officials from DHS’s policy office, reasonable  business hours depend on the availability of Mexican government  officials, with whom DHS officials in the field coordinate, to accept UAC.  Last, none of the local repatriation arrangements addresses the  requirement that border personnel be trained in the terms of the  repatriation arrangements. As of February 2015, a DHS policy official said  that DHS was updating all 30 arrangements, but that the department did  not have plans to make any substantive changes to the provisions  affecting the return of UAC.
DHS policy officials told us that although the local repatriation  arrangements were not initially negotiated with the intent to fulfill TVPRA  requirements because many were negotiated before TVPRA was  enacted, the department considers these arrangements to broadly reflect  TVPRA requirements. However, the officials stated that TVPRA  repatriation requirements are not directly outlined in all local repatriation  arrangements and acknowledged that none of them addresses the  training requirement. The officials told us that they have not explicitly  included TVPRA requirements in the arrangements because they did not  deem it necessary to include specific U.S. legislative mandates in bilateral  arrangements. Further, DHS headquarters officials told us that they defer  to officials in the field when reviewing arrangements and do not generally  request changes to a provision unless U.S. or Mexican officials identify a  problem that needs to be addressed. However, given that DHS’s local  repatriation arrangements serve as the primary agreements governing the  repatriation of Mexican UAC, revising the arrangements to reflect  minimum requirements of TVPRA, in consultation with State, would help  better position DHS to ensure that minimum legislative requirements for  agreements designed to protect children from severe forms of trafficking  in persons are being met.
section_title: Total DHS Costs Associated with UAC Are Unknown, and HHS Costs Were Over $2 Billion for Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014
subsections: section_title: DHS Began Tracking Some Costs Associated with UAC in 2014
paragraphs: Total DHS costs associated with UAC apprehension, custody, and care  are unknown for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Prior to mid-fiscal year  2014, CBP did not collect data on costs specifically associated with UAC.  According to Border Patrol and OFO officials, differentiating UAC costs  from costs for accompanied children and adults is difficult because, for  example, certain duties such as interviewing UAC are considered part of  normal operations. Although ICE also did not collect costs specifically  associated with UAC prior to fiscal year 2014, ICE estimated its costs for  UAC custody, transfer, and repatriation were approximately $41 million  for fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
In May 2014, following the DHS Secretary’s memorandum establishing a  contingency plan for the large increase in apprehensions of UAC  occurring at that time, CBP and ICE implemented project codes to begin  tracking some UAC costs. Costs for these agencies from February  through September 2014 totaled approximately $97 million—$67 million  (69 percent) for CBP and about $30 million (31 percent) for ICE. Of  CBP’s UAC project code costs, about 44 percent was for contracted  services; about 23 percent was for construction, rent, and utilities for its  UAC processing centers; and about 22 percent was for personnel travel,  salaries, overtime, and benefits. Of ICE’s UAC project code costs, about  76 percent was to transport UAC and 18 percent was for ICE salaries,  benefits, and overtime. Table 5 shows UAC costs charged to DHS project  codes from February through September 2014.
To provide additional insight into CBP’s UAC costs, we analyzed project  code costs for each CBP office. Specifically, from March through  September 2014, CBP charged $67 million to the project codes—about  $46 million (69 percent) for Border Patrol, about $16 million (24 percent)  for the Office of Administration, about $3.5 million (5 percent) for OFO,  and about $1.5 million (2 percent) for other CBP offices. Of Border  Patrol’s UAC project code costs, about 70 percent was for contracted  services, including food, medical, sanitation, and decontamination, as well  as FEMA flight assistance with UAC transport during the large UAC  increase, and about 26 percent was for personnel travel, salaries,  overtime, and benefits. Of CBP’s Office of Administration’s UAC costs,  about 92 percent was for construction, rent, and utilities for UAC  processing facilities and about 8 percent was for contracted services,  such as temporary air conditioning, waste removal, and custodial  services. Of OFO’s UAC costs, about 76 percent was for personnel travel,  salaries, overtime, and benefits and about 18 percent was for equipment,  supplies, and materials. Table 6 shows additional details of the costs  charged to UAC project codes for CBP’s Border Patrol, Office of  Administration, OFO, and other offices from March through September  2014.
The project codes are generally used to capture UAC costs that CBP and  ICE officials can easily distinguish from costs for accompanied children  and adults; however, such UAC costs vary by type across DHS  components. For example, Border Patrol tracked costs for UAC custody,  care, and transportation such as food, medical services, showers, and  other contracts during the large UAC increase, as well as personnel  salaries, benefits, and travel expenses for those assigned to provide UAC  care and custody. Border Patrol also implemented a second project code  to track costs for law enforcement activities to interdict or disrupt the flow  of UAC into the United States. However, according to Border Patrol  officials, they do not track UAC costs for general activities (such as  overhead) because these costs cannot be easily differentiated from costs  for other detainees. For OFO, the project code captures costs incurred  specifically for UAC, including personnel overtime, procurements, and  other direct costs, such as temporary duty travel for personnel to assist  with the UAC increase. In general, according to OFO officials, their  project code does not capture UAC operational costs, such as employee  salaries and overhead, because OFO cannot easily distinguish these  costs from costs for adults and accompanied children. For ICE, the  project code captures costs for UAC care, transport, and detention as well  as personnel, such as salaries and travel to escort UAC. According to  CBP and ICE officials, CBP and ICE personnel are required to use the  project codes when UAC costs are easily distinguished from costs for  other detainees. However, OFO allows its program managers to decide  whether it is practical to use the UAC project code. Therefore, DHS costs  charged to the project codes represent the minimum UAC costs to the  department from February through September 2014.
section_title: HHS Total UAC Costs and Average Daily Cost per Bed in Basic Shelters Have Increased since Fiscal Year 2009
paragraphs: HHS ORR’s costs for its UAC program totaled over $2 billion from fiscal  years 2009 through 2014, with about $910 million (45 percent) of the  costs incurred during fiscal year 2014. ORR’s UAC program costs consist  of three categories: shelter costs, services to UAC, and administrative  costs. Shelter costs include care and custody of UAC and account for  about 84 percent of total program costs for fiscal years 2009 through  2014. Shelter costs vary by shelter type and location, and UAC length  of stay. Services to UAC include medical care, legal services, background  checks, and home assessment/post-release services provided by HHS or  HHS-contracted organizations, and account for about 12 percent of  overall program costs for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Administrative  costs include ORR UAC program staff salaries and benefits, as well as  travel and supplies, and account for about 4 percent of overall program  costs for fiscal years 2009 through 2014.
ORR’s UAC costs increased about 600 percent from fiscal year 2009 to  fiscal year 2014, primarily, because of the increase in the number of UAC  apprehended and transferred to ORR shelters. As shown in table 7, total  costs steadily increased during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, with a  sharper increase of about 142 percent from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year  2014.
In fiscal years 2012 and 2014, ORR incurred a total of over $260 million  in additional costs for temporary shelter beds to accommodate the  unexpected increases in UAC.additional shelter grants and memorandums of agreement with  Department of Defense facilities. Table 8 shows the total costs for UAC in  temporary beds during fiscal years 2012 and 2014.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Every year, DHS apprehends tens of thousands of UAC, some of whom  may be vulnerable to trafficking or other forms of abuse. TVPRA requires  that DHS establish policies and programs to ensure that UAC in the  United States are protected from traffickers and others seeking to  victimize or engage such children in harmful activity. Developing and  implementing training for OFO officers at airports, who have substantive  contact with UAC, could better position those officers to comply with  TVPRA requirements. DHS is also responsible for screening UAC and  either safely repatriating them or referring them to an HHS shelter.  Revising the Form 93 to include indicators or questions for all TVPRA  screening criteria that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to  assess before repatriating a child, and developing written guidance on  how they are to implement the trafficking and credible fear criteria, would  better ensure that agents and officers have the necessary information to  determine outcomes for UAC that are consistent and in accordance with  TVPRA requirements and CBP policy. In addition, ensuring that Border  Patrol agents consistently document the rationales for their decisions  regarding the independent decision and trafficking criteria would allow  CBP management to assess on an agency-wide basis whether these  decisions, which account for case-by-case factors, were justified and  consistent with TVPRA and CBP policy. Determining which agents and  officers are required to complete the annual UAC training and ensuring  that they have done so, as required, would help CBP to meet training  requirements under TVPRA and CBP policies and guidance.
In addition to screening responsibilities, Border Patrol agents and OFO  officers are also required under TVPRA, the Flores Agreement, and CBP  policy to protect and care for UAC while they are in DHS custody. In  doing so, requiring and ensuring that agents and officers routinely record  care actions provided to UAC in an automated manner, and accurately  record the length of time the children spend in DHS custody, would better  enable DHS managers to ensure they are caring for UAC in accordance  with the law, including the 72-hour limit for a child to be in DHS custody  once determined to be a UAC, except in exceptional circumstances.  Furthermore, developing a documented interagency referral and transfer  process with defined roles and responsibilities, as well as procedures to  disseminate placement decisions, for each agency involved could better  enable agencies to find shelters for UAC in an efficient and effective  manner, and with minimal errors. Additionally, as DHS revises the local  repatriation agreements it has with Mexico that govern the repatriation of  UAC, ensuring that the revised agreements reflect all provisions of  TVPRA concerning the repatriation process, in consultation with State,  could better ensure that Mexican children are repatriated safely.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure that DHS complies with TVPRA requirements for  training, screening, and transferring UAC to HHS, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S.  Customs and Border Protection to take the following six actions: develop and implement TVPRA training for OFO officers at airports  who have substantive contact with UAC;  revise the Form 93 to include indicators or questions that agents and  officers should ask UAC to better assess (1) a child’s ability to make  an independent decision to withdraw his or her application for  admission to the United States and (2) credible evidence of the child’s  risk of being trafficked if returned to his or her country of nationality or  last habitual residence; provide guidance to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers that  clarifies how they are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer  to HHS all Mexican UAC who have fear of returning to Mexico owing  to a credible fear of persecution; develop and implement guidance on how Border Patrol agents and  OFO officers are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer to  HHS all Canadian and Mexican UAC who are victims of a severe form  of trafficking in persons; ensure that Border Patrol agents document the basis for their  decisions when assessing screening criteria related to (1) an  unaccompanied alien child’s ability to make an independent decision  to withdraw his or her application for admission to the United States,  and (2) whether UAC are victims of a severe form of trafficking in  persons; and determine which agents and officers who have substantive contact  with UAC, complete the annual UAC training, and ensure that they do  so, as required.
To help ensure that CBP has complete and reliable data needed to  ensure compliance with care requirements under the Flores Agreement  and CBP policies, we recommend that the Commissioner of U.S.  Customs and Border Protection take the following two actions:  require that OFO officers record care provided to UAC in an  automated manner, and ensure that Border Patrol agents record care provided to UAC in  Border Patrol’s automated system, as required.
To help ensure that DHS has complete and reliable data needed to  ensure compliance with the UAC time-in-custody requirement under  TVPRA and for required reports on UAC time in custody under the Flores  Agreement, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take  the following two actions:  require OFO officers to record data in their automated system when  UAC leave OFO custody in order to track the length of time UAC are  in OFO custody, and  require ICE officers to record accurate and reliable data in their  automated system when UAC leave ICE custody in order to track the  length of time UAC are in ICE custody.
To increase the efficiency and improve the accuracy of the interagency  UAC referral and placement process, we recommend that the Secretaries  of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services jointly develop  and implement a documented interagency process with clearly defined  roles and responsibilities, as well as procedures to disseminate  placement decisions, for all agencies involved in the referral and  placement of UAC in HHS shelters.
To ensure that minimum legislative requirements to protect UAC from  severe forms of trafficking in persons are in repatriation agreements with  Mexico and are met, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, ensure that TVPRA  requirements for these agreements are reflected in local repatriation  arrangements as DHS renegotiates these arrangements with Mexico.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, HHS, DOJ, and State for their  review and comment. DHS and HHS provided formal, written comments,  which are reproduced in full in appendixes V and VI, respectively. DHS  and HHS also provided technical comments on our draft report, which we  incorporated as appropriate. DOJ and State did not have formal  comments on our draft report; DOJ provided technical comments, which  we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS concurred with our 12 recommendations and described actions  underway or planned to address them. In particular, DHS indicated,  among other things, that CBP will develop training on identifying and  screening UAC for OFO officers at airports who have substantive contact  with UAC, issue guidance to field personnel emphasizing TVPRA transfer  procedures for Mexican UAC who have fear of returning to Mexico owing  to a credible fear of persecution, and issue guidance clarifying TVPRA  transfer procedures for UAC who are nationals or habitual residents of  Canada or Mexico who are victims of a severe form of trafficking in  persons. In commenting on our draft report, DHS also stated that CBP  has established a working group to review and revise elements of the  TVPRA-related questions on the Form 93 to better assess a child’s ability  to make decisions and the risk of trafficking if the child is returned, as  appropriate. DHS also stated that CBP will explore adding a mechanism  in its automated system to document an unaccompanied alien child’s  ability to make an independent decision to withdraw his or her application  for admission to the United States. DHS indicated, among other things,  that OFO will work with CBP’s Office of Information and Technology to  make technological changes to its automated system to enable it to  record appropriate care actions for all UAC and record when UAC enter  into, and are transferred from, OFO’s custody. DHS also indicated that  ICE plans to develop guidance, including time frames for data entry, on  proper UAC book-in and book-out procedures for recording UAC’s time in  ICE custody in its automated system. Regarding our recommendation  that DHS and HHS jointly develop and implement a documented  interagency process for the placement and referral of UAC in HHS  shelters, DHS indicated that DHS’s Office of Policy will convene a  meeting with appropriate agency officials to initiate a plan for close  coordination, and that staff will work toward an institutionalized  coordinating framework. Regarding our recommendation that DHS, in  coordination with State, ensure that TVPRA requirements are reflected in  agreements with the government of Mexico, DHS indicated that the  departments have begun negotiations with Mexico on options for  including in the arrangements additional and specific references to  TVPRA requirements. DHS also noted, and we acknowledge, that the  extent to which proposed changes to the agreements are accepted will be  dependent on the binational negotiations with Mexico. These and other  actions that DHS indicated are planned or under way should help address  the intent of our recommendations if implemented effectively.
HHS concurred with our recommendation that DHS and HHS jointly  develop and implement a documented interagency process for the  placement and referral of UAC in HHS shelters. HHS stated that the  department will fully support efforts to document the interagency process  used in the UAC referral and placement process.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Health and Human  Services, and State, as well as the Attorney General of the United States.  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Eligibility of Unaccompanied Alien Children for Federal Public Benefits
paragraphs: With certain exceptions, unaccompanied alien children (UAC) are  generally not eligible to receive federal public benefits because these  children lack lawful immigration status in the United States and are not  considered qualified aliens. According to the Department of Health and  Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) officials,  UAC cannot receive federal benefits because they do not meet the  definition of a qualified alien as defined in the Personal Responsibility and  Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. ORR officials stated that,  as a result, UAC in HHS custody are not eligible for the Temporary  Assistance for Needy Families program, Supplemental Nutrition  Assistance Program, supplemental security income, Medicaid, or other  federal benefit programs. However, under specific statutory exceptions,  applicable to aliens generally, UAC may be eligible for certain federal  public benefits regardless of alienage, even though they do not meet the  definition of “qualified alien.” The exceptions are as follows: emergency medical assistance,  short-term noncash in-kind emergency disaster relief, public health assistance for immunizations and treatment of programs such as soup kitchens that deliver in-kind services at the  community level, and
U. S. Department of Agriculture’s school meals programs.
ORR officials stated that after UAC transition out of ORR custody and are  placed with sponsors, eligibility for federal benefits would generally  depend on whether or not the sponsors pursue immigration status on  behalf of the UAC. benefits provided to children after they leave ORR custody.
If ORR is unable to locate sponsors for UAC, the UAC remain in ORR shelters until they  turn 18 years of age and are then treated as adult aliens.
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to determine the (1) extent to which the Department  of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed and implemented policies  and procedures to ensure that all unaccompanied alien children (UAC)  are screened as required and (2) DHS and the Department of State  (State) developed and implemented policies and procedures to ensure  that UAC are cared for as required while in DHS custody and during  repatriation; and (3) costs associated with apprehending, transporting,  and caring for UAC in DHS and Department of Health and Human  Services (HHS) custody during fiscal years 2009 through 2014.
To determine the extent to which DHS developed and implemented  policies and procedures to ensure that all UAC are screened as required,  we reviewed U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) policies,  procedures, and training to screen UAC, including the March 2009  memorandum Implementation of the William Wilberforce Trafficking  Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), the CBP Form 93 UAC  Screening Addendum—the primary tool Border Patrol agents and Office  of Field Operations (OFO) officers use to make trafficking and credible  fear determinations, and document screening assessments—and CBP’s  human trafficking and UAC virtual learning course. Our scope did not  include the screening of UAC apprehended by U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) because ICE does not conduct TVPRA  screenings. We obtained available fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year  2014 Border Patrol and OFO data on the percentage of agents and  officers who completed the annual UAC training. On the basis of  interviews with CBP officials and written responses these officials  provided to explain how they document completion of UAC training, we  determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable to report training  completion rates. We assessed CBP training efforts against TVPRA  training requirements and training best practices. We also analyzed  fiscal year 2009 through 2014 Border Patrol and fiscal year 2012 through  2014 OFO UAC apprehension data—the most recent years for which  complete UAC data were available—to determine the outcome of the  screening process for UAC from Canada and Mexico, as well as UAC  from other countries. In addition, we obtained and analyzed Border  Patrol data on UAC who claimed fear of return to their country for fiscal  year 2014, the most recent year for which data were available. Further,  we analyzed Border Patrol’s, OFO’s, and ICE’s fiscal years 2009 through  2014 apprehension data to determine whether DHS transferred UAC to  an HHS shelter or repatriated them, as well as demographic trends, such  as the age, gender, and country of origin of UAC.reliability of the data by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as data  fields, the database schema, and database training materials; (2)  interviewing CBP officials responsible for ensuring data quality; (3)  reviewing the data for missing data or obvious errors; (4) comparing  selected data fields with information from UAC case files and HHS data;  and (5) tracing certain data fields to source documents. During our   We assessed the  assessment, we found some inconsistencies in the disposition, or  outcome, data field when conducting internal checks of the data. We  rounded this information to the nearest hundred for reporting purposes.  We found Border Patrol and OFO’s apprehension data to be sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of determining whether CBP transferred UAC to  an HHS shelter or repatriated them to their countries of nationality or last  habitual residence. We also found the DHS apprehension data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting UAC demographic trends,  such as age, gender, and country of nationality.
Further, we reviewed 21 OFO and 20 Border Patrol nongeneralizable,  randomly selected cases of non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC  apprehended at land borders and ports of entry (POE) during fiscal year  2014 that CBP databases indicated were repatriated to determine if the  disposition for each child was correct.
Because neither Border Patrol nor OFO has complete information on  screening decisions in its database stored in an aggregate manner, we  analyzed fiscal year 2014 case files of Mexican UAC Border Patrol  apprehended. We selected this population because Mexican UAC  apprehended by Border Patrol account for 90 percent of the Canadian  and Mexican UAC whom CBP apprehended that year. Specifically, we  drew a stratified random sample of 180 Mexican UAC from a study  population of 15,531 Mexican UAC who were recorded in Border Patrol’s  database as having been apprehended in fiscal year 2014. We selected  these 180 UAC with probabilities proportionate to the number of Mexican  UAC from two strata defined by the outcome of the UAC screening  process—repatriation to Mexico or transfer to an HHS shelter. With this  random sample, each member of the study population had a nonzero  probability of being included, and that probability could be computed for  any unaccompanied alien child. The sample size for the stratum of UAC  that Border Patrol repatriated to Mexico was 97 out of the 14,931 that the  Border Patrol database show were repatriated in fiscal year 2014. The  sample size for the stratum of UAC that Border Patrol transferred to HHS  was 84 of the 600 Mexican UAC who Border Patrol’s database showed  were transferred to HHS that year. In reviewing the case file information  for these UAC, we found that the outcome listed for one child did not  match the outcome information in the CBP database, and we excluded  that case. As a result, the sample for the stratum of UAC that Border  Patrol transferred to HHS decreased from 84 to 83 cases. We analyzed  case file information, including CBP Form 93s to determine if CBP  screening complies with relevant TVPRA requirements and CBP policies  and procedures. Because we followed a probability procedure based on  random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples  that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided  different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our  particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval. This is the  interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of  the samples we could have drawn. All percentage estimates from the  case file review have margins of error at the 95 percent confidence level  of plus or minus 10 percentage points or less. All numerical estimates  other than percentages in this report are presented along with their  margins of error at the 95 percent confidence level.
Further, we visited 11 Border Patrol facilities and four land POEs for a  total of 15 CBP facilities in three regions—Arizona (July 2014), south  Texas (September 2014), and southern California (October 2014)—to,  among other things, observe DHS screening operations and interview  Border Patrol agents, OFO officers, and Mexican consular officials  regarding implementation of UAC screening policies and procedures. We  selected Arizona and south Texas because they have historically had the  most UAC apprehensions by Border Patrol, while southern California has  had the most UAC encounters by OFO. The locations were also chosen  for geographic variability. During our visit to south Texas, we observed  the screening of 8 UAC by Border Patrol agents. The results from our  visits to these three regions cannot be generalized; however, the visits  provided us with first-hand observations on UAC screening practices, and  insights regarding how Border Patrol agents and OFO officers implement  screening policies and procedures. In addition, we interviewed  headquarters Border Patrol, OFO, and Office of Training and  Development officials to discuss CBP’s UAC screening policies,  procedures, and training. We compared CBP’s UAC screening efforts  discussed during these visits and interviews and the screening  information obtained from our analyses of CBP information with TVPRA  screening requirements and CBP policy, as well as standards in  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
In addition, we reviewed studies on the screening of Mexican UAC  completed by the nongovernmental organization Appleseed in 2011 and  the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in June  2014. Our analysis included reviewing the reports’ methodologies and  discussing the reports with both the organizations, as well as with CBP.  Further, we reviewed a September 2010 DHS Office of Inspector General  (OIG) report on the treatment of UAC in CBP custody, which discussed  CBP’s UAC training efforts. Our analysis included reviewing the report’s  methodology. We also met with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil  Liberties officials who conducted visits to south Texas CBP facilities in  July 2014 to investigate civil rights complaints submitted by UAC and  discussed their methodology and findings regarding the screening of  UAC. As a result of our review and analysis, we determined that the  conclusions in these studies and their results were valid and reasonable  for use in our report.
To determine the extent to which DHS and State developed and  implemented policies and procedures to ensure that UAC are cared for as  required while in DHS custody and during repatriation, we reviewed CBP  and ICE policies and procedures on how to care for UAC, which included  the March 2009 memorandum Implementation of the TVPRA, Border  Patrol’s June 2008 Hold Rooms and Short Term Custody memorandum,  and the August 2008 OFO Directive, Secure Detention, Transport, and  Escort Procedures. We also evaluated ICE policies, such as ICE Directive  11087.1, Operations of Holding Facilities, September 2014, among  others. We compared these against TVPRA and Flores Agreement  requirements related to care. Further, we reviewed DHS UAC training  documents, including CBP’s human trafficking virtual learning course and  ICE’s UAC and Field Office Juvenile Coordination training. In addition, we  reviewed September 2005 and September 2010 DHS Office of Inspector  General reports on DHS’s responsibilities for juveniles and the treatment  of UAC in CBP custody respectively, which discussed DHS and CBP’s  care of UAC.
During our site visits to Arizona, southern California, and south Texas, we  observed the care of UAC at 15 CBP facilities and discussed care of UAC  with officials at each facility. The results from our visits are specific to the  care observed at facilities in these three regions at a specific point in time  and cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided us with first-hand  observations of the care provided to UAC and the conditions of facilities in  which UAC are held during various operating conditions, including surge  and normal operations. To ensure that we observed and discussed care  systematically at each facility, we developed a care checklist with the  eight elements of care required by Border Patrol and OFO policy as well  as three additional elements required only by Border Patrol policy. We  evaluated these elements of care at each facility we visited based on the  totality of our observations and interviews. For example, we observed and  discussed with relevant officials the presence or absence of elements,  such as access to drinking water, food, toilets, and sinks. On the basis of  our observations and interviews, we determined that CBP had  implemented its care policies at these facilities if at least 80 percent of the  facilities we visited were generally providing care consistent with policy  requirements at the time of our visits. However, to assess CBP  implementation of the requirement that UAC be “held in the least  restrictive setting appropriate for their age and special needs,” we  evaluated our observations and interviews to determine whether there  was (1) no less restrictive environment available, and if there was a less  restrictive environment, why the child was not placed in the least  restrictive setting and (2) evidence that agents and officers considered  requisite factors, including the child’s age, special needs, and particular  vulnerability as a minor. However, we did not discuss every element at  each facility we visited in Arizona because we developed the checklist  after the visit to Arizona.
We analyzed several data sets of information on DHS’s care of UAC.  OFO and ICE do not collect data on the care of UAC in their custody in an  accessible format, so we analyzed only Border Patrol data on the care of  UAC in Border Patrol custody. We examined the Border Patrol policy on  documentation of care, OBP 50/10.9-C Use of the e3 Juvenile Detention  Module, April 2012, which requires agents to document all care of UAC in  their automated system, the e3 Detention Module. Border Patrol officials  told us they could not provide us with complete care data prior to fiscal  year 2014 because they did not fully implement their data system until  then. We analyzed data on the care of 55,905 UAC in Border Patrol  custody from January through September 2014. To assess the reliability  of these data, we interviewed Border Patrol officials in headquarters and  in Arizona, Texas, and California, who are responsible for managing or  entering the data, and examined the data for completeness and potential  errors. Because our initial analysis of the data showed potential errors,  and because Border Patrol officials told us that they were unsure about  the consistency with which agents in the field used Border Patrol’s  automated system, we determined that the Border Patrol custody data  were not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining if Border  Patrol agents cared for UAC as required. However, we determined that  the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining how  consistently agents used the automated system to document care of UAC  and the frequency and type of potential errors, if any, in the data. To  determine how consistently agents entered care information into Border  Patrol’s automated system, we analyzed the completeness of the custody  data by cross-checking the data with Border Patrol apprehension data  from January through September 2014. We measured if, and how often,  meals and welfare checks were entered for each child in custody. We  used meals and welfare checks because both actions are required by  policy for all UAC in custody, and must be performed at frequent enough  intervals that agents should perform each action at least once for every  child in custody, according to policy. We also analyzed how frequently  agents used each care action that is available in the system. We also  interviewed Border Patrol officials in Arizona, Texas, and California on  their use of the automated system.
In our initial data analysis, we found that agents were entering the same  care action multiple times in a short time period. Therefore, in our full data  analysis, we measured the frequency of these potential errors in the data  by measuring how often a care action was entered more than once within  a short time period. When agents entered an action more than once, they  did not record them simultaneously, and so we did not identify these  actions as duplicates and definite errors. However, these actions, such as  meals, phone calls, or showers, were unlikely to have taken place more  than once in a short time period. Therefore, we measured the frequency  with which actions were entered within three time intervals: 10 minutes, 5  minutes, and 2 minutes. We selected these intervals because, while it is  possible that an action could, on occasion, be performed more than once  within a 10-minute period, it is unlikely that any of the actions would be  performed more than once within a 2-minute interval. Thus, the 2-minute  interval most strongly suggests error. However, because the volume of  likely errors made it prohibitive for us to verify if each likely error was in  fact an error, our analysis identifies those actions that we determined to  be likely errors. We also interviewed Border Patrol officials in Texas,  California, and headquarters to understand why these likely errors may  be occurring. We compared these care efforts against the Flores  Agreement, DHS policies, and standards in Standards for Internal Control  in the Federal Government.
With regard to time in custody, Border Patrol provided us with the dates  and times that UAC were booked in to Border Patrol custody for UAC in  custody from January 2014 through September 2014, which also  contained information on book outs and transfers. OFO provided us with  the dates and times that UAC were booked in and ICE provided book in  dates, but neither DHS component was able to provide the dates and  times that UAC were booked out. Additionally, we examined  documentation about system requirements regarding time in custody for  all components, and interviewed Border Patrol, OFO, and ICE officials  about the reliability of the time-in-custody fields in their systems. On the  basis of our analysis of Border Patrol data, and interviews with Border  Patrol officials, we found Border Patrol time-in-custody data to be reliable.  On the basis of interviews with OFO and ICE officials, we found the OFO  and ICE time-in-custody data to be unreliable. As a result, we could not  report the time UAC spent in DHS custody.
We also reviewed reports listing the UAC that were in DHS custody  longer than the statutorily required 72 hours, which ICE compiles and  submits to the Department of Justice every 6 months to be submitted to  plaintiffs’ counsel as required by the Flores v. Reno Stipulated Settlement  Agreement. Our analysis of the reports from 2009 to 2013 showed  missing fields, dates that indicated children were in custody for less than  72 hours, and apprehension dates that occurred after the transfer to  HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Additionally, for UAC  apprehended by Border Patrol, we compared the dates of apprehension  documented in the reports with Border Patrol’s apprehension data and  found that many of the apprehension dates were entered incorrectly by  ICE in the reports. We also interviewed ICE officials in headquarters and  the field about the reports, and officials at the Department of Justice who  receive the reports. According to our analysis and our interviews, we  found the reports unreliable for determining the number of UAC that were  in DHS custody for longer than 72 hours. We compared these efforts  against the TVPRA requirement for transferring UAC and standards in  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
To determine the effectiveness of the process to transfer UAC from DHS  to HHS, we examined e-mails between ORR intake and Border Patrol in  the Rio Grande Valley sector to place UAC in shelters. We analyzed 111  e-mails to place 593 UAC from July 6 to 8, 2014, and 65 e-mails to place  135 UAC from November 17 to 19, 2014. We chose these dates so we  could analyze communications during the surge of UAC (in July) and after  the surge of UAC (November), and we chose the Rio Grande Valley  sector because (1) over 70 percent of all UAC apprehended by Border  Patrol in fiscal year 2014 were apprehended in that sector, and (2) Rio  Grande Valley officials had an in-box e-mail account set up for ORR  placement e-mails that allowed the officials to easily extract them. We  analyzed the e-mails for cancellations, redesignations, and multiple  placements and, on the basis of the rationales in the e-mails, identified  and categorized the reasons for cancellations, redesignations and  multiple placements. Our conclusions are not generalizable but provide  important insight into the placement process.
We observed and discussed the interagency transfer process in Arizona,  Texas, and California, and interviewed DHS Policy, Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA), Border Patrol, OFO, ICE, and ORR  officials in headquarters about the interagency process. In addition, we  reviewed September 2005 and September 2010 DHS OIG reports on  DHS’s responsibilities for juveniles and the treatment of UAC in CBP  custody respectively, which discussed roles and responsibilities for UAC  within DHS, and the interagency process to transfer UAC to HHS. Our  analysis included reviewing the reports’ methodologies. We also reviewed  a 2008 HHS OIG report on ORR’s efforts that discussed interagency  coordination with DHS for UAC and reviewed the report’s methodology.  Additionally, we analyzed plans developed by DHS to respond to a UAC  influx, which included provisions for interagency coordination, such as an  interim 2015 concept of operations developed for internal use by DHS.  We also reviewed an emergency response plan created by the Unified  Coordination Group, which includes both DHS and HHS. We compared  these efforts at interagency coordination, and information contained in the  IG reports about the prior efforts to coordinate, against best practices and   We also visited two HHS  mechanisms for interagency collaboration.shelters in Arizona and spoke with grantees and shelter employees at  these sites to better understand the transfer process.
To understand the repatriation process, we interviewed Border Patrol,  OFO, and Mexican consular officials in Arizona, Texas, and California, as  well as DHS policy and ICE officials in Washington and officials from the  Department of State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. We also  analyzed all 30 DHS-negotiated local repatriation arrangements and the  2004 memorandum of understanding between DHS and Mexico  regarding the repatriation of Mexican nationals. We compared provisions  for UAC in the arrangements with TVPRA requirements for the content of  agreements with contiguous countries regarding the repatriation of UAC.  Where there were not provisions in the arrangements specific to UAC, but  were provisions that would reasonably apply to UAC, we evaluated the  more general provisions against these TVPRA requirements; for example,  provisions that applied to all aliens being repatriated.
To identify costs associated with apprehending, transporting, and caring  for UAC in DHS custody, we obtained and analyzed financial data from  CBP and ICE for fiscal year 2014. Because CBP and ICE did not collect  data on UAC costs prior to fiscal year 2014, we analyzed available  financial data collected using UAC project codes from February through   To determine the  September 2014 to determine DHS’s UAC costs.extent to which UAC costs were identified, we reviewed policies and  procedures for tracking UAC costs and interviewed CBP and ICE officials.  Additionally, we analyzed UAC transportation cost estimates developed  by ICE to determine the estimated UAC transportation costs from fiscal  years 2009 through 2013. These estimates were derived by ICE using  fiscal year 2013 average costs and applied throughout fiscal years 2009  through 2013, adjusting for average annual inflation. We assessed the  reliability of the cost data by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as  financial statement audits and prior GAO work; (2) interviewing CBP and  ICE officials responsible for ensuring cost data quality; and (3) looking for  missing cost items or obvious errors. We determined that CBP’s and  ICE’s financial project code costs were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of determining a minimum UAC cost for apprehending,  transporting and caring for UAC while in DHS custody. We also  determined that ICE’s transport cost data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of determining an estimate of ICE’s UAC transport costs for  fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
To identify costs associated with UAC in HHS custody, we obtained and  analyzed financial summary data for HHS ORR’s UAC program.  Specifically, we analyzed UAC program cost data reported by ORR as of  April 23, 2015—the most recent data available—to determine the total  shelter, administrative, and UAC services costs. These data include  summary information on end-of-year obligations by cost category  compiled by ORR for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. We assessed the  reliability of the data by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as prior  GAO work; (2) comparing data against data in published sources, such as  ORR’s Annual Report to Congress; and (3) interviewing ORR officials  knowledgeable about the data. We asked the officials about the reliability  of their data—including questions about the purpose for which the data  were collected, the source of the data, and how the data were compiled.  We determined that ORR’s financial summary data for its UAC program  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting total program costs  based on end-of-year obligations.
To determine the average cost per bed for basic shelters, we analyzed  cost data for fiscal years 2009 through 2014 for UAC shelters by type of  shelter, which was compiled by ORR and reported as of April 23, 2015— the most recent data available. We also analyzed the average monthly  funded bed capacity for basic shelters reported by ORR as of April 7,  2015—the most recent data available. Since bed capacity fluctuates  throughout the year, we averaged the average monthly funded bed  capacity data to determine the average annual number of beds. We then  calculated the average annual cost per bed for basic shelters by dividing  the shelter costs by the average annual number of beds for basic  shelters. For the average daily costs, we divided the average annual cost  per bed by 365 days. According to ORR officials, actual cost per bed  varies based on shelter type, location, actual number of beds, and actual  number of days for which beds were contracted. We assessed the  reliability of the data by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as prior  GAO work; (2) comparing data against data in published sources, such as  ORR’s Annual Report to Congress; and (3) interviewing ORR officials  who were knowledgeable about the data. We asked them data reliability  questions, including questions about the purpose for which the data were  collected, the source of the data, and how the data were compiled. We  determined that ORR’s shelter costs and average monthly funded bed  capacity data for basic shelters were sufficiently reliable for the purposes  of reporting the average cost per bed for basic shelters. On the basis of  information provided by HHS, we are unable to report on the average cost  per bed for secure and therapeutic shelters because the annual cost and  bed capacity data were not comparable across these shelter types. As a  result, we focused on average cost per bed in basic shelters.
In addition to analyzing UAC costs for DHS and HHS, we analyzed grant  funding documentation for 5 of HHS ORR’s 34 UAC shelter grantees for  fiscal year 2013. We selected the 5 grantees to reflect a variety of  shelters based on the number of beds, dollar amount of the grant, type of  shelter, and geographic location. We analyzed the federal financial report  (White House Office of Management and Budget Standard Form 425)  filed at the end of fiscal year 2013 for each grant to determine the total  amount authorized and expended for each grantee. Further, we analyzed  each grantee’s funding application (White House Office of Management  and Budget Standard Forms 424 and 424A) to determine the budgeted  costs for each cost category. In some cases, a grantee may have had  multiple grants or multiple funding requests within a single grant, which  we included in our analysis. Additionally, we obtained data, reported by  ORR as of April 7, 2015—the most recent data available—for the total  number of beds by shelter type for fiscal year 2013 for each of the 5  grantees. We assessed the reliability of the data by comparing the data  with shelter types identified in source documentation and interviewing  ORR officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the maximum  funded bed capacity for each sampled grantee.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Summary Statistics for Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014
paragraphs: Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and  Border Protection’s (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol and Office of Field  Operations (OFO), and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE) apprehend, process, detain, and temporarily care for  unaccompanied alien children (UAC)—individuals less than 18 years old  with no lawful immigration status and no parent or legal guardian in the  United States available to provide care and physical custody. Border  Patrol apprehends UAC at U.S. borders between ports of entry (POE)  and OFO apprehends UAC at POEs. ICE apprehends UAC within the   Border Patrol  United States at locations other than borders or POEs.accounted for 186,233 (about 90 percent) of DHS’s UAC apprehensions  during fiscal years 2009 through 2014, and Border Patrol apprehended  over 75 percent of these UAC in two sectors—about 52 percent in Rio  Grande Valley, Texas, and about 25 percent in Tucson, Arizona. Figure 8  shows the number of UAC apprehensions by Border Patrol on a year-by- year basis in its Rio Grande Valley and Tucson sectors and all other  sectors for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Figure 8 also illustrates that  the Rio Grande Valley’s share of all Border Patrol apprehensions  continually increased and accounted for most of the increase in Border  Patrol apprehensions in the past 6 years.
OFO has apprehended fewer UAC than Border Patrol during fiscal years  2012 through 2014, and about one-third of OFO’s apprehensions  occurred in its San Diego, California, field office, which includes the San   As shown in figure 9, the number of UAC  Ysidro and Otay Mesa POEs.apprehensions in the Tucson, Arizona, and Laredo, Texas, field offices  continually increased each year from fiscal year 2012 through 2014.
As shown in table 10, most of the increase in DHS apprehensions of UAC  from fiscal year 2009 through 2014 has come from three Central  American countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. UAC from  Mexico continued to account for a significant number of apprehensions— between 12,000 and 19,000 a year—during this 6-year time period.  However, starting in fiscal year 2013, the total number of UAC from these  three Central American countries surpassed the number of UAC from  Mexico and, in fiscal year 2014, far surpassed the number of UAC from  Mexico.
During fiscal years 2009 through 2014, UAC from Guatemala, Honduras,  and El Salvador whom DHS apprehended were generally younger than  UAC from Mexico. Specifically, as shown in figure 10, over 25 percent of  UAC from Honduras and El Salvador, and 12 percent of UAC from  Guatemala, were younger than 14 years old compared with 8 percent for  UAC from Mexico.
Further, the percentage of younger UAC whom DHS apprehended has  increased in numbers and as a percentage of total apprehensions since  fiscal year 2009. For example, figure 11 shows that the percentage of  apprehended UAC under the age of 14 increased from 11 percent in  fiscal year 2009 to 23 percent in fiscal year 2014.
In addition, the composition of UAC males and females changed during  fiscal years 2012 through 2014. Specifically, as shown in figure 12, the  percentage of male UAC decreased from 82 percent in fiscal year 2012 to  70 percent in fiscal year 2014, while the percentage of female UAC  apprehended by DHS increased from 18 percent in fiscal year 2011 to 30  percent in fiscal year 2014.
section_title: Appendix IV: Costs for Unaccompanied Alien Children at Five Shelter Grantees
paragraphs: In addition to analyzing costs associated with apprehending and caring  for unaccompanied alien children (UAC) for the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services  (HHS), we analyzed financial records for 5 of HHS’s Office of Refugee  Resettlement’s (ORR) 34 UAC shelter grantees for fiscal year 2013. We  selected the 5 grantees to reflect a variety of shelters based on the  number of beds, dollar amount of the grant, type of shelter, and   Types of shelter costs include administrative;  geographic location.shelter personnel salaries, benefits, training and travel; operational  expenses, such as building maintenance and utilities; and services and  supplies provided to UAC, such as food, clothing, first aid, and education.  Additionally, some grantees incur costs associated with foster care, such  as foster parent reimbursements and training.
Table 11 shows budgeted costs by cost category for each of the 5  sampled grantees as well as consolidated actual costs based on each  grantee’s year-end financial status reports. As shown in the table, total budgeted and actual costs varied among the 5 grantees from about $3  million to about $86 million for fiscal year 2013. Labor costs (personnel  salaries and fringe benefits) for each grantee accounted for 58 to 66  percent of overall budgeted costs, and supplies such as clothing,  household, and educational materials accounted for 2 to 8 percent of  overall budgeted costs.
During fiscal year 2013, there were three “mega grantees” that operated  shelters in multiple states and had more than one type of shelter,  whereas other grantees operated only one type of shelter. As shown in  table 12, the number of beds per grantee varied from 30 to over 1,400 in  our sample. Shelter locations in our sample also varied from the larger  “mega grantees” concentrated in the southwest and Illinois to smaller  grantees in New York and Virginia.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant  Director); Tracy Abdo; Katherine Blair; Chuck Bausell, Jr.; Frances Cook;  Joseph E. Dewechter; Michele Fejfar; Eric Hauswirth; Paul Hobart; Susan  Hsu; Catherine Hurley; Connor Kincaid; Sasan J. Najmi; and Janet  Temko-Blinder made key contributions to this report.