Russian Nuclear Submarines: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification
Published: 2004-09-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Norway, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States participate in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program, a multilateral effort that seeks to reduce the environmental impacts of Russia's military activities through technology development projects. AMEC has primarily focused on Russia's aging fleet of nuclear submarines. Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required GAO to review AMEC, including its relationship to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. In accordance with the act, GAO (1) assessed the extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR program, (2) identified AMEC member countries' financial contributions to the program, (3) assessed AMEC's future program objectives, and (4) evaluated DOD's proposal to expand its technology development activities to Russia's Pacific region.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated that AMEC projects would support the goals of the CTR program. However, we found that only one of eight AMEC projects designed to support CTR's objective of dismantling Russia's ballistic missile nuclear submarines has done so. This project involved development of a prototype 40-metric ton container to store and transport spent (used) nuclear fuel from Russia's dismantled submarines. Despite AMEC's limited contribution to CTR, DOD officials, including CTR representatives, said that most of the projects can be used to support dismantlement of other types of Russian nuclear submarines. In addition, U.S. and foreign officials cited other benefits of U.S. participation in AMEC, including promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives, particularly with Norway, and facilitating military-to-military cooperation with Russia. From 1996, when the program was established, to April 2004, AMEC member countries had contributed about $56 million to the program. The United States has been the largest contributor, providing about $31 million, or about 56 percent of the total. However, the overall U.S. contribution has decreased from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2004 as U.S. funded projects have been completed and as other AMEC member countries have increased their assistance. In May 2004, AMEC developed a draft strategic plan to guide its future efforts. The plan, which is currently being reviewed by AMEC partners, proposes improving the security of Russia's nuclear submarine bases and securing spent nuclear fuel from dismantled submarines. However, securing bases could be contrary to U.S. policy, which preclude assistance to most operational Russian military sites that contain nuclear weapons, including certain naval facilities. DOD wants to expand its dismantlement technology development efforts to Russia's Pacific region, but has not adequately analyzed the condition of Russia's decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Pacific and their impact on the environment. Furthermore, DOD has not identified specific projects that would be needed beyond those already done in the Arctic region.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union over a decade ago, little was  known about the extent of contamination of the Arctic environment  because of the secrecy of the former Soviet Union regarding its military  activities in the area. However, in 1993, the Russian government released a  report describing over three decades of Soviet-era dumping of radioactive  waste in the ocean as well as radioactive contamination from nuclear  submarine accidents. As a result, radioactive contamination and  environmental concerns generated by the former Soviet Union’s military  presence in the Arctic region received increased attention from the  international community, including the United States. Among the greatest  concerns are the handling and storage of radioactive waste and spent  (used) nuclear fuel from Russia’s fleet of 249 ballistic missile and general  purpose nuclear submarines. This fleet includes at least 116  decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Arctic region and 76  decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Pacific region. Some of these  decommissioned submarines are in poor condition, and one sank in 2003  off the coast of Norway as it was being towed to a shipyard in Russia for  dismantlement. Figure 1 shows the submarine before it sank.
About 60 percent of Russia’s decommissioned submarines still have spent  nuclear fuel on board. Vast amounts of spent nuclear fuel—and liquid and  solid radioactive waste from the submarines—are also being stored  temporarily on special service ships and in coastal shipyards in Russia.
While many of Russia’s aging nuclear submarines present environmental  problems, ballistic missile submarines also present a military and nuclear  proliferation threat. The United States has been working with Russia since  the mid-1990s to dismantle decommissioned Russian ballistic missile  nuclear submarines through the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR). Administered by DOD’s  Defense Threat Reduction Agency, CTR funds the dismantlement of  Russia’s ballistic missile nuclear submarines to help Russia meet its  commitments under arms reduction treaties with the United States. The  United States does not consider Russia’s general purpose nuclear  submarines to be a military or nuclear proliferation threat and,  consequently, does not fund their dismantlement.
As of March 2004, CTR had funded dismantlement of 27 Russian ballistic  nuclear submarines, and CTR plans to partially dismantle up to an  additional 15 submarines by 2013. Specifically, although CTR will continue  to remove the spent fuel from the ballistic missile submarines’ nuclear  reactors, seal the reactors, and remove and eliminate the missile launcher  compartments from all submarines that it dismantles, it will no longer fund  the cutting up of the submarines’ bows and sterns. DOD is turning over this  part of the dismantlement process to Russia because, according to DOD, it  does not directly contribute to threat reduction because the bows and  sterns do not have a military value. CTR-funded dismantlement activities  are taking place at four Russian shipyards—three in the Arctic region and  one in the Pacific region.
Figure 2 shows the location of CTR dismantlement sites and Russia’s  nuclear submarines.
To help reduce the environmental impacts of Russia’s military activities in  the Arctic region, the United States, Norway, and Russia established the  Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation program (AMEC) in 1996. The  United Kingdom joined AMEC in 2003. Norway initiated AMEC and  requested that the United States participate in the program to address what  Norway perceived as significant environmental problems located on its  border with Russia. Norway is one of the world’s leading seafood exporters  and was concerned that these problems would adversely affect its fishing  industry.
AMEC has implemented its program primarily by funding projects to  develop technologies to support the dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear  submarines. AMEC has focused on projects such as storing and  transporting radioactive waste from the submarines. The actual  dismantlement of Russian submarines is being funded by a number of  countries. In 2002, DOD requested congressional approval to expand its  environmental technology development activities to Russia’s Pacific  region, but the Congress has not acted upon that request.
From AMEC’s inception, U.S. participation has been hindered by the lack of  liability protection. Without liability protection, the United States, its  contractors, and their employees could be held financially responsible for  an accident or incident that might occur while performing work on AMEC- funded projects in Russia. In the absence of liability protection for the  AMEC program, the United States has, for the most part, tied its  participation in AMEC projects to DOD’s CTR program liability protocol:  the CTR program has liability protection for all the work that it performs in  Russia under an agreement signed in the early 1990s. In 1998, the Congress  made $5 million available to AMEC from CTR funds and directed DOD to  include within AMEC “cooperative activities on environmental matters in  the Arctic region with the military departments and agencies of other  countries, including the Russian Federation.”
Eight AMEC projects were identified by DOD and U.S. AMEC program  officials as designed to be complementary and supportive of CTR program  objectives. These projects have formed the core of U.S. participation in the  AMEC program. An additional 11 projects have been implemented since  the program’s inception to support other AMEC objectives. (For a complete  list of all AMEC projects, underway and completed, see app. I.) In response  to §327 (c), the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999,  DOD submitted a plan to the Congress which, among other things,  addressed the relationship of AMEC projects to the CTR program.
Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004  required GAO to review AMEC, including the relationship of the program to  DOD’s CTR program. In accordance with the act, we (1) assessed the  extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR program, (2)  identified participating countries’ financial contributions to AMEC,   (3) assessed AMEC’s future program objectives, and (4) evaluated DOD’s  proposal to expand its technology development activities to Russia’s  Pacific region.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed AMEC program  documents and met with AMEC members from Norway, Russia, the United  Kingdom, and the United States. We also met with representatives from  Japan to discuss their views about partnering with DOD on technology  development activities in the Pacific. We obtained data on AMEC’s mission,  project implementation, and costs from DOD, the Department of Energy  (DOE), the Department of State, and the Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA). We also attended an AMEC meeting of the principals in April 2004 in  Svalbard, Norway, at which high-level officials from each member country  discussed program plans and project implementation. We also attended a  separate meeting of AMEC technical representatives that focused on the  development of a draft “strategic plan” to guide the program in the future.  More details on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix II.  We conducted our work from January through August 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: AMEC provides a forum for Norway, Russia, the United States, and the  United Kingdom to collaborate in addressing military-related  environmental concerns in the Arctic region. The AMEC Declaration and  “Terms of Reference” established the framework and organization for  sharing information and technology and implementing projects. The  Declaration focuses AMEC activities on radioactive and chemical  contamination issues resulting from past military activities in the Arctic  region and stresses cooperation between the military organizations.
AMEC’s “Terms of Reference” establishes the organizational structure and  possible ways of financing the AMEC program. It identifies representatives  (principals) from each member country’s respective department or  ministry of defense. These representatives approve their countries’  participation in AMEC activities and are responsible for obtaining  resources from their respective governments to ensure that AMEC  objectives are achieved. An AMEC steering group recommends specific  projects to the representatives from each country, prioritizes approved  work, provides project management, and determines which member  country will take the lead on each project.
DOD’s Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and  Environment provides policy oversight for U.S. participation in AMEC.  Within the United States, the Department of the Navy, which was named as  the executive agent in 1998, manages the AMEC national program office.  All contracting functions are managed by the Naval Facilities Engineering  Command. Although DOD is the lead U.S. agency for AMEC, the  Departments of Energy and State and EPA provide technical and policy  support.
section_title: AMEC Projects Have Provided Limited Support for DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, but Projects May Be Useful for Other Purposes
paragraphs: In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated that AMEC projects  would support the goals of the CTR program. However, our analysis of  these projects shows that only one of the eight projects established to  support CTR objectives of dismantling Russia’s ballistic missile nuclear  submarines did so. The remaining seven projects were either completed  too late, terminated or suspended, or implemented at shipyards or sites not  directly associated with CTR’s dismantlement program. Despite their  limited impact on the CTR program, most of these projects can be used to  support dismantlement of Russia’s general purpose nuclear submarines,  according to DOD officials. Furthermore, U.S. and foreign representatives  asserted that AMEC has achieved other important benefits and that  continued U.S. participation in the program is critical because the United  States provides significant technical support.
subsections: section_title: One of Eight AMEC Projects Had a Direct Impact on CTR’s Efforts to Dismantle Russia’s Ballistic Nuclear Submarines
paragraphs: Only one of eight AMEC projects established to support and complement  CTR’s program for the dismantlement of Russia’s ballistic missile nuclear  submarines has directly benefited the program. According to a program  plan that DOD submitted to the Congress in 1999, AMEC was being  conducted in close cooperation with the CTR program so that the two  programs would benefit each other. The program plan stated that AMEC  projects supported CTR submarine dismantlement activities. Some of the  projects were expected to provide design and engineering support, while  other projects were designed to fill gaps in the CTR program.
According to CTR officials, however, only one AMEC project, the  development of a prototype 40-metric ton container used to store and  transport spent nuclear fuel from dismantled Russian ballistic missile  nuclear submarines, was able to meet CTR program objectives. U.S.  expenditures for this project totaled about $2.9 million, and the Navy chose  EPA’s Office of International Programs to manage the project. The  containers helped solve an immediate problem—finding adequate storage  capacity for the spent nuclear fuel removed from the submarines. CTR and  EPA officials told us that the storage containers solved a “bottleneck,”  enabling CTR to remove more spent fuel and facilitate dismantlement  efforts. According to DOD and EPA, when serially produced the AMEC  container costs 80 percent less than the cost of a Russian manufactured  storage container. CTR has purchased 25 containers and plans to purchase  an additional 35 to transport and store the spent fuel from dismantled  ballistic nuclear submarines in Russia. Russia is also using the containers  to store and transport spent nuclear fuel from general purpose nuclear  submarines. Figure 3 shows an AMEC-designed storage container.
Regarding the other seven AMEC projects that were established to support  or complement the CTR program, we found the following:  A project, also managed by EPA, to develop a storage pad to hold the  storage containers was completed too late to support CTR’s  dismantlement efforts associated with a Russian shipyard that had been  used as a CTR dismantlement site. According to AMEC and EPA  officials, the storage pad’s completion was delayed due to problems  identifying and obtaining all required Russian clearances and licenses to  operate the storage pad; in the intervening time Russia decided it would  no longer dismantle ballistic missile submarines at the shipyard. As a  result, the storage pad is not used to support the CTR program but will  be used for temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel from Russia’s  general purpose nuclear submarines. U.S. expenditures for this project  totaled $2.9 million.
One project, involving development of technology to prevent corrosion  inside the spent nuclear fuel storage containers, was terminated before  completion because the CTR program withdrew its support and did not  provide liability protection. In April 2002, CTR directed AMEC to  develop and manufacture a spent nuclear fuel storage container  dehydration system. The dehydration system was needed to extract  water from the storage containers to inhibit corrosion and increase the  containers’ service life. However, in December 2003, the CTR program  terminated AMEC’s participation in the project and selected a U.S.  contractor, instead of working through AMEC, to design a larger  dehydration system. U.S. expenditures for this project totaled $396,000.
Two projects involving solid radioactive waste treatment and solid  radioactive waste storage were implemented at a site where CTR is not  dismantling ballistic missile nuclear submarines. These projects were  designed to assist the Russian navy manage the large volume of waste  generated by dismantlement of nuclear submarines. The waste  treatment project identified, among other things, technologies that  could reduce the volume of solid waste from decommissioned nuclear  submarines and make it easier and more economical to store the  material. The second project supported the development and  production of 400 steel containers for the Russian navy to transport and  store solid radioactive waste. Prior to the project, no Russian-designed  and manufactured container had ever been certified to transport solid  radioactive waste. According to the AMEC project manager, the projects  introduced Russian representatives to western business practices,  including improved contract management techniques. U.S. expenditures  for these projects, which have been completed and consolidated at a  mobile solid waste treatment facility built at a Russian shipyard, totaled  about $12 million, including the cost of the facility.
AMEC’s project to develop a demonstration radiation detection system  to protect the health and safety of workers who dismantle submarines  does not directly benefit the CTR program. The demonstration system is  installed at the interim storage pad site, which is not being used to  support the CTR program. U.S. AMEC and CTR officials were uncertain  if the radiation detection system would be deployed at any of the CTR  dismantlement sites in Russia. CTR officials said that while they support  projects that protect workers’ heath and safety, they would not have  funded this project and are uncertain how it promotes CTR  dismantlement goals. U.S. expenditures for this project totaled $1.7  million.
A related project that supplied about 125 DOE surplus dosimeters  (radiation detection devices) to the Russian navy was described as a  failure by the AMEC project manager. He told us that the navy would not  use these dosimeters due to, among other things, technical concerns  and had put the equipment in storage for a couple of years. We brought  this matter to the attention of a U.S. AMEC official who subsequently  contacted the Russian AMEC representative and was informed that the  dosimeters would be distributed. In July 2004, Russia’s representative to  AMEC notified DOD that the dosimeters were now being used.
Finally, an AMEC project to develop a mobile liquid waste processing  facility that could be used in remote locations in Russia was suspended  because CTR did not support it. A CTR official told us that CTR never  endorsed the project because adequate capacity for liquid radioactive  waste treatment already existed at the facilities where submarines were  being dismantled. As a result, CTR would not extend liability protection  for the project. EPA, which was chosen by the Department of the Navy  to manage the project, still has about $700,000 in unspent project funds  that were transferred from the Navy beginning in 1999. EPA officials told  us that the funds must be reprogrammed by December 31, 2004, unless  the Navy provides an extension, or they will be returned to the U.S.  Treasury.
U.S. AMEC officials told us that ultimately several of the projects that were  established to meet CTR objectives did not do so because of changing  requirements and plans. However, they asserted that the projects were  planned with the full cooperation and approval of the CTR program and the  appropriate Russian government agencies.
CTR officials told us they have no further need for AMEC assistance in  carrying out their plans to continue dismantling Russian ballistic missile  nuclear submarines until 2013. These officials asserted, however, that  AMEC plays a useful role in helping address environmental issues and  technology development and that this role should be continued. Although  only one AMEC project that was established to support CTR did so, these  officials believed that most of these projects can be used to support  dismantlement of Russia’s general purpose submarines. The storage pad,  for example, can hold spent nuclear fuel from all types of Russian nuclear  submarines and will facilitate the shipment of the fuel to the centralized  storage facility at Mayak. Similarly, the steel containers for solid waste are  already being used to store radioactive waste from dismantled general  purpose submarines, according to U.S. and Russian officials. A DOE official  told us that Russia also plans to use the steel containers to store waste  from older ballistic missile submarines that are not scheduled to be  dismantled with CTR assistance. Figure 4 shows the storage pad, and figure  5 depicts the solid waste steel containers funded by AMEC.
section_title: U.S. and Foreign Officials Believe That AMEC Has Benefits Beyond Projects Supporting CTR
paragraphs: Despite AMEC’s limited impact on the CTR program, U.S. and foreign  officials told us that AMEC has achieved other benefits as well and that  continued U.S. participation in the program is critical. DOD and  Department of State officials said that one of AMEC’s most important  benefits is promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives, particularly with  Norway, a long-standing NATO ally, and with other nations in the Arctic  region. The U.S. Ambassador to Norway told us that while AMEC is a very  modest program in terms of expenditures, Norway views it as (1) a  critically important part of the U.S-Norwegian bilateral relationship, and  (2) an effective multilateral effort to address one of its primary policy  concerns—environmental protection in the Barents Sea region. The  participation of the United States and the United Kingdom gives Norway  political clout and technical expertise that Norway would not have working  on a bilateral basis with Russia. Norwegian officials from the ministry of  defense and ministry of foreign affairs reinforced these views. The U.S.
Ambassador to Russia also gave us his views about AMEC. In a May 24,  2004, letter to GAO, he noted that AMEC’s accomplishments include the  construction of the solid waste treatment and storage facility where there  are a large number of Russian nuclear submarines awaiting dismantlement.  Furthermore, he recommended that the United States continue to  participate in AMEC and consider expanding the program to Russia’s  Pacific fleet.
U.S. and foreign officials also asserted that another important aspect of  AMEC is that it facilitates military-to-military cooperation with Russia.  Officials noted that AMEC has enabled military personnel from the United  States, Norway, and United Kingdom to visit Russian naval facilities that  they had previously been unable to visit. According to these officials,  access to the facilities enables AMEC to better understand the  environmental conditions and technologies required to assist with  dismantlement efforts. Russia’s AMEC representative told us that AMEC is  a useful way to improve communications among the member countries’  military organizations. He also noted, however, that Russia would find  other ways to promote cooperation on environmental security issues if  AMEC did not exist.
DOE officials told us that AMEC has produced tangible benefits in its  efforts to plan an emergency exercise in the Murmansk region in late 2004.  The exercise, which will be conducted as an AMEC project, entails staging  an accident involving spent nuclear fuel from a Russian nuclear submarine.  Participants in the exercise will include representatives from the Russian  navy and emergency responders from various Russian organizations,  including the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, Ministry of Defense, and  the Institute for Nuclear Safety. In addition, nuclear emergency  management personnel from neighboring countries as well as the  International Atomic Energy Agency are expected to participate. According  to DOE officials, this exercise will be the first time that DOE can simulate  an accident involving spent nuclear fuel from a Russian submarine.
section_title: AMEC Member Countries Have Contributed About $56 Million to the Program
paragraphs: From 1996 to April 2004, AMEC member countries contributed about $56  million to the program. The United States has been the largest contributor,  providing about $31 million or about 56 percent of the total, with Russia,  Norway, and the United Kingdom contributing the remainder. Within the  U.S. government, although DOD has provided over 90 percent of all funds,  DOE and EPA have also contributed. U.S. contributions have declined from  1999 to 2004 as U.S.- funded projects have been completed and as other  member countries increased their contributions. According to DOD  officials, U.S. contributions to AMEC are planned to be about $3 million per  year from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011.
subsections: section_title: The United States Has Been the Leading Contributor to AMEC, Providing More Than One-Half of Total Program Funds
paragraphs: From 1996 until April 2004, AMEC member countries contributed about $56  million to the program. Figure 6 provides a breakout of AMEC members’  contributions.
As figure 6 shows, the United States has contributed the greatest amount of  any AMEC member country—about 56 percent of the total. According to  available data, Russia contributed about $13 million; Norway contributed  about $12 million; and the United Kingdom provided about $100,000  because it only recently joined AMEC.
Norway’s contributions were initially limited because it did not have an  agreement with Russia that provided liability protection for the Norwegian  government or its contractors who would be providing assistance through  AMEC. In May 1998, Norway signed an agreement with Russia that  included liability protection, and since then Norway has contributed funds  to several projects, including the development of a radiation detection  system and steel storage containers for solid radioactive waste. Norway  plans to contribute an additional $8 million to AMEC over the next few  years, and Norwegian officials told us that they are committed to an  equitable sharing of costs with the other AMEC member countries.
Russia’s contributions to AMEC were used to support, among other things,  development of the storage container for spent nuclear fuel, the interim  storage pad, and the solid waste treatment and storage technologies. A U.S.  AMEC official told us that he reviewed Russia’s itemized list of project  costs and was satisfied that the costs were a fair representation of Russia’s  financial contributions. However, Russia’s future contributions are  uncertain. A Russian representative to AMEC told us that Russia will  continue to contribute financially to projects but noted that there are  limited resources available. Other member countries told us that Russia  would probably make mostly “in kind” contributions to the program,  including labor and materials for specific projects.
The United Kingdom, which joined AMEC in June 2003, has contributed  about $100,000 for preliminary planning related to projects focusing on  buoyancy and the safe towing of nuclear submarines. The United Kingdom  has pledged an initial contribution of $9 million to AMEC in order to fund a  preliminary group of projects.
section_title: DOD Has Provided the Majority of U.S. Funds to AMEC
paragraphs: DOD has provided the majority of U.S. funding to AMEC—about $28  million, or 91 percent of the total U.S. contribution. DOE and EPA have  provided the remaining funds, about $2.6 million and $200,000, respectively.  Figure 7 depicts the breakdown of U.S. funds for AMEC by each agency.
U.S. funds have been used to support a variety of AMEC activities. About  $24 million of the U.S. contributions to AMEC were used to fund projects,  such as the storage container for spent nuclear fuel from ballistic missile  submarines and the storage pad. The remainder funded program  management (about $5.4 million), studies (about $1.0 million), and  meetings (about $0.5 million). Figure 8 provides a breakdown of these  amounts.
section_title: U.S. Program Contributions to AMEC Have Declined
paragraphs: The overall U.S. contribution to AMEC decreased from fiscal year 1999 to  fiscal year 2004, as U.S.-funded projects have been completed and as other  AMEC member countries have increased their assistance. During the  period when U.S. contributions started to decline, Norway and Russia  increased their contributions. As figure 9 shows, U.S. funding peaked at  almost $6 million in fiscal year 1998 when large scale projects such as the  spent nuclear fuel storage container and storage pad were moving into  implementation. Since fiscal year 2001, U.S. contributions have steadily  declined and in fiscal year 2004, DOD allocated $2.5 million to AMEC.
AMEC program officials stated that in the future, member countries expect  to share equally in AMEC project costs. U.S. AMEC officials stated that U.S.  annual assistance to AMEC will be $3 million annually from fiscal year 2006  to fiscal year 2011, the latest date for which projections have been made.  This projection was based on prior years’ contributions as well as matching  other members’ planned contributions.
section_title: AMEC Plans to Significantly Expand Its Role and Redirect Its Focus to Include Nuclear Security Issues
paragraphs: AMEC’s draft strategic plan, which is currently being reviewed by AMEC  partners, envisions helping to secure Russian submarines, submarine  bases, shipyards, and spent nuclear fuel and represents a significant  expansion and redirection of AMEC’s objectives. AMEC’s proposal to  improve submarine base security may be contrary to U.S. policy. In  addition, according to DOE officials, spent fuel from Russian submarines is  a low priority as a nuclear proliferation threat compared to other  radioactive sources, such as abandoned electrical generators containing  large amounts of strontium-90. Regardless of AMEC’s plans, U.S.  participation in AMEC faces an uncertain future because the United States  lacks liability protection to participate in AMEC projects in Russia.
subsections: section_title: AMEC Plans to Expand Its Role into Securing Nuclear Materials from Russian Submarines
paragraphs: In May 2004, AMEC developed a draft strategic plan to guide its future  efforts through 2015 that represents a significant expansion and redirection  of its program. According to the draft plan, recent world events  demonstrate the need to focus on emerging issues related to safety and  security, with an emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear threat  reduction, and environmental sustainability. The draft plan states that  spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes generated during  dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear submarines are unprotected, presenting  a significant proliferation risk. As a result, AMEC proposes giving priority  to projects that will help secure spent nuclear fuel and other material that  presents a radiological hazard and proposes addressing security problems  at Russian shipyards, naval bases, support vessels, and other facilities  associated with the dismantlement process. AMEC’s draft plan calls for  focusing on the following program areas:   nuclear security issues in support of the Group of Eight (G-8) Global   management of hazardous waste generated as a result of military   environmental sustainability, safety, and security of military activities  and installations.
According to AMEC officials, AMEC’s future direction will be closely  aligned with the priorities established by the G-8 Global Partnership plan to  combat the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. In 2002,  the G-8 announced this new initiative. The United States and the other G-8  members— Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United  Kingdom plus the European Union—pledged $20 billion over the next 10  years to fund nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union. One of  the key areas identified by the G-8 is nuclear submarine dismantlement. All  of the G-8 countries, according to the Department of State, are contributing  to the dismantlement of Russia’s decommissioned general purpose nuclear  submarines. Other non-G-8 Global Partnership countries are also  participating in this effort. AMEC program partners—the United Kingdom  and Norway—have declared that they intend to use the AMEC program as  one means of fulfilling their G-8 Global Partnership obligations. According  to AMEC officials, future project development should include ways to  reduce the security risks posed by all types of Russian nuclear submarines.
With the G-8 priorities in mind, AMEC’s nuclear security working group,  which helped develop the draft strategic plan, proposed several areas of  possible engagement, including:   evaluating state-of-the-art technology to enhance security at Russian  naval bases and shipyards,  improving security of ships known as “service vessels” that are used to  store spent nuclear fuel from dismantled nuclear submarines,   consolidating radiological sources to improve their security, and   coordinating and increasing security of fueled submarines in transit.
Regarding the security of Russian naval bases, the working group proposed  evaluating, among other things, whether radar systems designed to detect  low-profile targets, sonar systems designed to detect subsurface threats,  and systems designed to detect small quantities of nuclear materials would  improve security. AMEC technical staff would then develop  recommendations and present them to AMEC’s representatives for  consideration as follow-on projects. To improve the security of service  vessels, the working group proposed incorporating protective measures,  including radiation detectors, motion detectors, and closed circuit  televisions. The working group also suggested reviewing a Russian study  that focuses on consolidating radiological sources at several facilities.  Based on this review, AMEC may suggest additional technical areas to be  included in the study to improve its usefulness as a way to improve  security. Finally, the working group proposed training personnel and  developing procedures to produce a vulnerability assessment for, among  other things, bases, shipyards, and radioactive waste storage facilities.
section_title: AMEC’s Draft Plan Has Not Been Coordinated with DOE and DOD Nuclear Nonproliferation Offices
paragraphs: To date, AMEC’s draft plan to address security issues associated with  Russia’s nuclear submarines and support facilities has not been  coordinated with DOD’s CTR policy office, DOD’s Office of  Nonproliferation Policy, or DOE’s National Nuclear Security  Administration—the organization primarily responsible for securing  nuclear materials in Russia. U.S. AMEC officials told us that coordinating  AMEC’s draft plan with other U.S. government agencies at an earlier stage  would have been useful because of the program’s planned expansion to  include nuclear security. The draft plan was developed by an AMEC  technical guidance group and is now being reviewed by AMEC  representatives from the United Kingdom, Norway, and Russia. According  to DOD, the next step will be to meet with AMEC partners in September  2004 to finalize their comments and to review project proposals. U.S.  AMEC plans to submit the final draft of the strategic plan to the U.S.  interagency coordination process later in 2004. Once the interagency  coordination is completed, the plan will go to the representatives of the  AMEC partners for final approval.
A DOD Nonproliferation Policy official told us that he had not seen AMEC’s  draft strategic plan. According to a CTR policy official, many of the  proposed areas of engagement identified by the nuclear security working  group were unnecessary because they would apply to protecting fuel  within nuclear submarines, which is less vulnerable to theft or diversion. In  addition, he noted that one proposed engagement—the review of security  measures for Russian naval bases and shipyards— could be contrary to  U.S. interagency guidelines established in 2003 that preclude the delivery of  security-related assistance to most operational military sites in Russia that  have nuclear weapons, including certain navy facilities. For example, the  U.S. policy precludes assistance for improving security at operational sites  where submarines loaded with nuclear weapons are docked.
DOE officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration, who are  primarily responsible for securing nuclear material in Russia, expressed  concerns about AMEC’s proposed expansion to include nuclear security.
These officials, which included the Director of the Office of Global  Radiological Threat Reduction, told us that securing spent nuclear fuel  from dismantled Russian nuclear submarines is a low priority, based on  available information. DOE takes a risk-based approach to threat  reduction by considering the quantity, form, transportability, and  surrounding security threats posed by high-risk radiological materials.  Based on these criteria, DOE has concluded that spent fuel from Russian  submarines does not present a sufficiently high risk to warrant the  commitment of resources. Rather, DOE places a higher priority on the  highest-risk radiological materials, such as sealed radiological sources  found in radioisotope thermo-electric generators, which contain strontium- 90; blood irradiators; sterilization facilities; and large radiological storage  locations. As a result, DOE officials stated that DOE does not wish to  participate in securing spent nuclear fuel.
DOE is funding a study that will prepare site-specific analyses of spent  nuclear fuel inventories and terrorism vulnerability assessments for  Russian nuclear submarine dismantlement sites. This study is expected to  be complete in September 2004. The Director of the Office of Global  Radiological Threat Reduction told us that DOE would use the information  from the study to further evaluate the risks posed by spent nuclear fuel. He  asserted, however, that securing spent nuclear fuel from nuclear  submarines is primarily an environmental issue—not a proliferation  concern. Furthermore, he stated that AMEC’s proposed nuclear security  plan, if implemented, could have significant policy implications for all U.S.  nonproliferation programs. For example, countries, including Russia, could  request DOE assistance for securing spent nuclear fuel from dismantled  nuclear submarines. If DOE agreed to provide this assistance, its resource  requirements could dramatically increase because of the amount of spent  nuclear fuel in the submarines and at coastal storage facilities.
section_title: Future U.S. Participation in AMEC Is Hampered by Lack of Liability Protection
paragraphs: Regardless of AMEC’s future plans, U.S. participation in AMEC faces an  uncertain future because the United States does not have liability  protection for AMEC projects in Russia other than those that were  undertaken in support of CTR. From 1996 to 2002, U.S. AMEC officials  worked with the other AMEC member countries to obtain liability  protection through a separate agreement. According to DOD officials, this  effort was suspended because the State Department is negotiating liability  protection for a broad range of U.S. programs with Russia. These  negotiations have not been concluded, and therefore U.S. AMEC, which  does not have liability protection, has limited participation in new  projects.
In the interim, U.S. AMEC officials have explored other options to acquire  liability protection. For example, U.S. AMEC has continued to request  approval from CTR to extend liability protection for the mobile liquid waste  treatment facility project. However, CTR has rejected the request because  the project does not support CTR objectives. In addition, according to CTR  officials, the program does not require any additional AMEC assistance and  it will not extend liability protection for future AMEC projects. In the  interim, U.S. AMEC officials were able to acquire limited liability  protection to participate in two new projects led by the United Kingdom:  (1) the safe towing of decommissioned nuclear submarines and (2)  improving the buoyancy of decommissioned nuclear submarines. U.S.  AMEC officials have received State Department approval to provide limited  assistance to these projects using the United Kingdom’s bilateral agreement  with Russia as the basis for liability protection. U.S. AMEC plans to transfer  funds to a United Kingdom contractor to perform a feasibility study  associated with the two projects. According to U.S. AMEC officials, the  United Kingdom has offered to sign all future contracts with Russia that  will “hold the United States harmless of any liability.” An agreement to  implement this proposed solution to the liability problem had not been  completed at the time of our review.
section_title: DOD Has Not Adequately Justified Its Proposed Initiative to Expand Its Technology Development to Submarine Dismantlement Activities into Russia’s Pacific Region
paragraphs: In response to Russia’s request for assistance to address environmental  problems resulting from military activities in the Pacific, DOD plans to  expand its technology demonstration efforts to that region by developing a  program similar to AMEC. However, DOD has neither adequately analyzed  the condition of Russia’s radioactive waste problems resulting from, among  other things, decommissioned and dismantled nuclear submarines in the  Pacific nor their impact on the environment. Furthermore, DOD has not  identified specific projects that would be needed beyond those already  being done for the Arctic region. Finally, Japan, which is assisting Russia  dismantle submarines in the Pacific, has no current plans to join DOD in a  technology development program.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Proposed Expanding Its Technology Development Efforts but Has Not Adequately Analyzed the Environmental Risks or Projects That Would Be Needed
paragraphs: In November 1998, Russia requested DOD’s assistance to establish an  organization similar to AMEC in Russia’s Pacific region to address  environmental problems. Russia proposed 17 technical cooperation  projects to develop and manufacture such things as a mobile ecological  laboratory, a marine unit for ocean oil spill cleanup, and a transportable  unit for radioactive waste water treatment. DOD began exploring ways to  establish a cooperative program with Russia that had the potential to  expand into regional cooperation with Japan and possibly other countries  in the region. According to DOD officials, Congress needed to authorize  expansion of the program into the Pacific region before projects could be  implemented. Within DOD’s fiscal year 2003 defense authorization bill,  DOD sought to obtain congressional approval to amend AMEC’s enabling  legislation to expand the program to the Pacific region. However, no  congressional action was taken on the proposal. DOD proposed new  legislation within the fiscal year 2004 defense authorization bill to develop  a separate cooperative program in the Pacific region, but no congressional  action was taken on that initiative either.
Although DOD has asserted that the expansion of cooperative efforts is  necessary because of serious environmental contamination in the Pacific  region, its proposal is not based on an adequate analysis of the region’s  environmental conditions. Furthermore, DOD has not developed a  comprehensive plan that identifies priorities, resource requirements, or  timeframes for accomplishing the proposed expansion. Some U.S.  environmental experts have noted that a master plan is needed in the Far  East to prioritize tasks. Such a master plan is currently being developed to  assist G-8 submarine dismantlement efforts in the Arctic region. This  master plan, which is funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and  Development, is expected to help donor countries improve coordination  and reduce the likelihood of duplication of assistance efforts.
DOD and State Department officials told us that while the problems in the  Pacific are generally known, they have not been thoroughly documented  and analyzed compared to conditions in the Arctic, which has been the  focus of international assistance. However, they said that available  information indicates that conditions in the Pacific pose environmental  risks. For example, there are environmental problems associated with  Russia’s decommissioned and dismantled nuclear submarines, and there  are inadequate and unprotected storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and  radioactive waste. A 1994 report prepared by Greenpeace documented the  radioactive waste situation in the Russian Pacific Fleet, including waste  disposal problems, submarine decommissioning and safety, and the  security of naval fuel. There have also been more recent attempts to  document environmental risks posed by Russia’s nuclear submarines in the  Pacific region. For example, in 2003, a study by the International Institute  for Applied Systems Analysis, which was funded by AMEC, found that a  release of radioactivity from an accident aboard a Russian nuclear  submarine in the Russian Pacific region could, under certain conditions,  reach the United States in 3 to 5 days.
DOD has taken steps to develop more comprehensive data on  environmental conditions in the Pacific region. It awarded a contract to a  Russian organization to study the status, characteristics, radiation  potential, and risks of submarine dismantlement in the Pacific. The study  will include a discussion of sources of radioactive contamination and  nonradioactive contamination, problems associated with monitoring and  environmental remediation, and sources of hazard and risk. In addition, it  will focus on (1) developing a methodology for prioritizing tasks based on  safety needs, threats, and risks; (2) developing a risk-based high-priority  list of urgent tasks; and (3) proposing a structure and design for a strategic  plan for future actions. Once the study is completed, DOD plans to develop  a plan for the proposed Pacific initiative.
In the interim, DOD has created a list of projects that were developed  under AMEC for the Arctic region that may be applicable to the Pacific.  These projects include (1) ensuring the buoyancy of decommissioned  nuclear submarines, (2) providing handling for spent nuclear fuel, and (3)  developing processing technologies for solid radioactive waste. According  to DOD, additional projects would have to be developed in consultation  with Russia and would need to take into account different climatic  conditions in the Pacific. For example, the Pacific region encompasses  areas with humid summers that could affect the type of equipment used. In  addition, projects would also have to make allowances for the poorly  developed infrastructure found in Russia’s Far East. These factors could  increase the complexity and costs associated with the projects.
section_title: Japan Is Dismantling Russia’s Nuclear Submarines in the Pacific but Does Not Plan to Establish a Technology Development Program with DOD
paragraphs: According to DOD officials, DOD envisions partnering with Japan to  develop a master plan that will specify projects based on assessments of  the environmental conditions in the Pacific region. In addition, DOD has  invited Japan to participate in the ongoing DOD-funded assessment of the  environmental risks posed by decommissioned nuclear submarines in the  Pacific.
Officials from Japan’s Embassy to the United States and Japan’s Ministry of  Foreign Affairs told us that Russia’s decommissioned nuclear submarines  in the Pacific pose environmental and security concerns. These officials  were particularly concerned that radioactive contamination from nuclear  submarines could damage Japan’s fishing industry. However, according to  an official from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan has no current  plans to join DOD in a technology development program in the Pacific  region. The official told us that although Japan is interested in AMEC- sponsored technologies—and how they might be applied to submarine  dismantlement in the Pacific—Japan prefers to work under the auspices of  the G-8 Global Partnership. Japan has committed more than $200 million to  the Global Partnership. Within the committed amount, Japan plans to  allocate about $100 million for projects related to dismantlement of  Russia’s nuclear submarines and other environmental projects in Russia. In  December 2003, Japan began assisting the Russian dismantlement of a  general purpose nuclear submarine, and the project is expected to be  completed later this year. The project is expected to cost about $7.4  million, including upgrades to the military facility where dismantlement is  taking place. Japan may fund the dismantlement of 26 additional Russian  nuclear submarines over the next several years.
AMEC representatives from the United Kingdom and Norway told us that  their countries are not interested in funding a technology development  program in the Pacific region. However, they asserted that a regional  approach, similar to AMEC, might be useful to assist with submarine  dismantlement efforts in that region.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With the completion of projects related to the CTR program, U.S.  participation in AMEC is at a crossroads. AMEC is heading in a new  direction that represents a significant expansion from its original  environmental charter. AMEC officials have not adequately justified the  expansion of the program to secure spent nuclear fuel and other material  and to address security problems at Russian shipyards, naval bases,  support vessels, and other facilities associated with the dismantlement  process. Regardless of AMEC’s plans, however, the U.S. role will be limited  until the liability issue with Russia is resolved.
The proposed expansion of AMEC’s goals to include improving security  around naval bases where Russia is decommissioning and dismantling  nuclear submarines is a low priority objective and may be inconsistent with  U.S security policy. DOE, which is responsible for securing nuclear  materials in Russia, does not believe that spent nuclear fuel and other  associated radioactive materials from Russia’s nuclear submarines pose a  high priority threat and therefore have told us they would not fund any  initiatives in this area. Furthermore, improving security around Russian  submarine bases may be inconsistent with U.S. policy, which generally  precludes providing security upgrades around operational Russian naval  facilities.
In addition, DOD’s interest in expanding its technology development  activities to Russia’s Pacific fleet of nuclear submarines is not based on an  analysis that demonstrates the need to do so, although efforts are  underway to study the environmental risks. Previously developed  technologies for Russia’s Arctic fleet could potentially be applied to  dismantling Russia’s nuclear submarines in the Pacific, and there is no  assessment concluding that additional projects are needed. Furthermore,  Japan, which is most concerned about contamination from aging or  damaged nuclear submarines in the Pacific, has begun dismantling Russian  submarines in the Pacific under the auspices of the G-8 program and has  not requested DOD’s assistance in technology development. If further  analysis in the Pacific shows that environmental conditions warrant  assistance, DOD officials stated that congressional approval for this  initiative will be required.
Finally, we believe that better oversight is needed to ensure that project  funds are spent on a timely basis. The approximately $700,000 in unspent  funds transferred from the Department of the Navy to EPA almost 5 years  ago for the mobile liquid waste project raises concerns about the adequacy  of financial and management controls being exercised over the program.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that the United States’ continued participation in AMEC  supports—and is consistent with—overall U.S. assistance efforts in Russia,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the  Secretaries of Energy and State, take the following actions:  determine whether AMEC’s role should be expanded to include  activities such as improving security around Russian nuclear submarine  bases and  ensure that AMEC’s efforts are well defined, closely coordinated, and  complementary with other U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs  managed by the Departments of Defense and Energy.
Regarding DOD’s proposed Pacific initiative, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense:  assess whether technology development activities should be expanded  to include submarine dismantlement in that region, and if determined it  is necessary, request congressional approval for this expansion to the  Pacific region; and   determine what form U.S. participation in such a technology  development program would take, such as a bilateral effort or a  multilateral organization similar to AMEC.
Furthermore, we recommend that the Administrator, Environmental  Protection Agency determine, in consultation with the Secretary of the  Navy, if the funds that were designated for AMEC-related activities are still  needed for the purpose intended. If not, we recommend that the  Administrator and the Secretary determine whether to reprogram the funds  for other AMEC-related activities or to propose rescinding the funds.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided the Departments of Defense and Energy and EPA with draft  copies of this report for their review and comment. DOE had no comments  and EPA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DOD provided written comments, which are presented as  appendix III.
DOD concurred with all of our report’s recommendations. However, in  commenting on our draft report, DOD raised several concerns and  observations, including: (1) AMEC’s primary role is not to support the  Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) but to minimize the  ecological security risks associated with military activities in the Arctic; (2)  DOD’s program plan submitted to the Congress in 1999 did not state that  AMEC projects would support the goals of the CTR program; (3) our report  did not adequately capture AMEC’s impact on and relationship to other  U.S./multinational programs such as the G-8 Global Partnership initiative;  (4) AMEC’s draft plan is a work in progress and is currently undergoing  coordination with partner countries; and (5) our report does not capture  the trend that shows increased partner country funding. Our response to  DOD’s comments on the report is as follows.
In our view, our draft report properly characterized AMEC’s role and gave  the program credit for achieving technology benefits and promoting U.S.  foreign policy objectives. As we stated in the draft report, AMEC was  established to help reduce the environmental impacts of Russia’s military  activities in the Arctic region. However, we also noted that U.S.  participation in AMEC was hindered by the absence of liability protection.  Given this lack of liability protection, the United States has, for the most  part, tied its participation in AMEC projects to DOD’s CTR liability  protocol. We noted, however, in the draft report that a number of AMEC  projects are not linked to the CTR program.
It is unclear to us why DOD asserted in its comments that its 1999 program  plan does not state that AMEC was expected to support CTR projects. In  fact, DOD’s program plan clearly states on page 7 that “All AMEC activities  currently underway in Russia are in support of CTR Ballistic Missile  Submarine Dismantlement projects and thus are governed by CTR  Implementing Agreement of August 26, 1993, between DOD and the  Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation, addressing strategic  offensive arms elimination.”   In addition, we disagree with DOD’s assertion  that we did not adequately portray AMEC’s relationship to other  U.S./multinational programs, including the G-8 Global Partnership  initiative. Our draft report recognized that AMEC’s future direction would  be closely aligned with priorities established by the G-8 Global Partnership.  We also noted that AMEC program partners have declared their intention to  use AMEC as one way to fulfill their G-8 Global Partnership obligations.  Furthermore, we recognized in the draft report that AMEC’s strategic plan  is a draft document and is being coordinated with partner countries.
Regarding member countries’ contributions to AMEC, our report addresses  this matter as well. We stated in our draft report that overall U.S. funding  decreased from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2004 as U.S.-funded projects  have been completed and as other AMEC member countries have increased  their assistance. However, in response to DOD’s comment, we added this  information to the highlights page of the report.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in  consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State, determine whether  AMEC’s role should be expanded to include activities such as improving  security around Russian nuclear submarine bases. However, DOD stated  that AMEC’s planned expansion will not include submarine base security  but will focus on activities such as the G-8 Global Partnership initiative and  ecological security. DOD stated that improving security around Russian  nuclear submarine bases was part of a draft strategic plan that is currently  being coordinated with member countries and it is inappropriate to portray  any elements of the draft plan as anything other than a plan in progress.
We are encouraged that DOD now states that it will not engage in activities  to improve the security at Russian nuclear submarine bases—activities that  could be contrary to U.S. policy. However, we believe it is important to note  that AMEC was considering improving submarine base security as part of  its draft strategic plan. In our view, if AMEC provided assistance to improve  the security of Russia’s submarine bases, it would have represented a  significant departure from the program’s original environmental security  objectives.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into  the report as appropriate. Below, we summarize several of these technical  comments and provide our response.
DOD incorrectly asserted in its technical comments that our draft report  did not address two aspects of section 324 of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 that required us to review AMEC: (1)  the extent to which the AMEC program supports the G-8 Global  Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass  Destruction Initiative and (2) the current and proposed technology  development and demonstration role of AMEC in U.S. nonproliferation  efforts. As we previously noted, our draft report provides information on  the relationship between AMEC and the G-8 Global Partnership, noting that  the future direction of AMEC will be tailored to support G-8 Global  Partnership goals. The draft report also identified the various technology  demonstration projects that have been proposed and implemented,  including recent projects focusing on the safe towing and improved  buoyancy of decommissioned nuclear submarines. These projects are  expected to support G-8 nonproliferation goals as well as U.S. security  interests.
DOD also asserted that we had mischaracterized AMEC’s contribution to  CTR as “limited” because we did not factor into our analysis the financial  benefits resulting from the prototype 40-metric ton spent nuclear fuel  storage container developed by AMEC. DOD claims that the cost savings  from these containers has essentially paid for the AMEC program. As  stated in the draft report, the AMEC containers cost less to produce than  the container Russia developed to store the spent nuclear fuel and we have  revised the report to more accurately indicate the amount of savings per  container as noted in DOD’s comments. However, we believe that DOD has  not understood the larger point of our analysis. While we recognize in the  report that the storage container project has proven beneficial, the other  seven projects that were established to support CTR objectives have had  limited impact on the CTR program. In our view, one project, regardless of  its benefit, does not compensate for the shortfalls of the other projects in  supporting CTR program objectives.
DOD stated that the report does not capture the draft nature of the AMEC  strategic plan and does not properly explain the coordination process  among partner countries. We disagree with this assertion. We properly  identified the plan as a draft document throughout the report. Furthermore,  the draft report contained information about the coordination process that  DOD officials provided to us on July 14, 2004. However, we have  incorporated additional information in the report about coordination  timeframes to reflect DOD’s comments.
In its technical comments, DOD also stated that U.S. participation in AMEC  faces an uncertain future due to changing program direction, and not  because it lacks liability protection. We disagree with this assertion. U.S.  AMEC officials told us that U.S. participation in new AMEC projects was  hampered due to the lack of liability protection. These officials never  indicated during the course of our review that changing program  requirements were impacting the program. In fact, they stated in a positive  vein that future U.S. participation in AMEC would be tied to the G-8 Global  Partnership initiative, which was aligned with U.S. national security  interests.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security  Administration; the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; the  Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional  committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can be  reached at 202-512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report  were Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers, Robin Eddington, Glen Levis, and  Jim Shafer.
section_title: List of AMEC Projects
paragraphs: The following table lists AMEC projects under way, completed, newly  started, or terminated.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR  program, we obtained and analyzed AMEC project files, reviewed pertinent  supporting documentation, including project justifications, and discussed  each project with program and project managers from the Departments of  Defense and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and  Brookhaven National Laboratory. Department of State officials also  provided their views about the projects. Of particular importance was an  AMEC program plan that DOD submitted to the Congress in response to  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. In the plan,  DOD provided information on AMEC projects’ relationship to the CTR  program. We used this plan as the basis for determining how AMEC  projects supported the CTR program. During our review, we also  interviewed DOD’s Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and  Environment, who is responsible for establishing U.S. policy for AMEC, to  obtain his views on the impact of AMEC projects and the program’s overall  benefits. In April 2004, we attended a meeting of the AMEC principals in  Svalbard, Norway, to obtain additional information about the AMEC  program, including project implementation. During the meeting, we  interviewed the principals and their staff from the United Kingdom,  Norway, and Russia. These principals included the Commander of U.S.  Navy Installations, the Head of Environmental Safety of the Russian Armed  Forces, the Deputy Director General of Norway’s Security Policy  Department, and a representative from the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy  responsible for environmental issues. We also interviewed U.S. embassy  officials in Oslo, Norway, including the U.S. Ambassador. The U.S.  Ambassador to Russia provided his perspectives about AMEC in a letter to  us dated May 24, 2004. We also interviewed officials from Norway’s federal  audit agency (Riksrevisjonen) and the Bellona Foundation, a Norwegian  nongovernmental organization that focuses on environmental issues in the  Arctic.
To identify AMEC financial contributions, including those from the United  States, we obtained data from the AMEC program office in DOD, which is  responsible for tracking all financial activities related to U.S. participation  in AMEC. In addition, the AMEC program office, at our request, obtained  financial data from Norway and Russia. The United Kingdom’s data were  provided to us by the AMEC Steering Group Co-Chairman. We obtained  responses to a series of questions focused on data reliability covering  issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the  accuracy and completeness of the data from a United Kingdom AMEC  official. Although we did not interview AMEC officials from Russia and  Norway, we discussed in detail the Russian and Norwegian financial data  with U.S. AMEC officials. Based on the United Kingdom responses and  these discussions with U.S. AMEC officials, we concluded that the data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
With regard to the U.S. contributions to AMEC, we reviewed the data and  posed a number of questions to the AMEC program office to determine the  reliability of the financial data. Specifically, we (1) met with AMEC  program officials to discuss these data in detail; (2) obtained from key  officials responses to a series of questions focused on data reliability  covering issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and  the accuracy and completeness of the data; and (3) added follow-up  questions whenever necessary. Based on this work, we determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on the  work we performed to assure the data’s reliability.
To assess AMEC’s future program objectives, we examined documents  prepared by AMEC and interviewed officials responsible for developing the  draft strategic plan. Specifically, in May 2004, we attended a meeting of  AMEC’s Technical Guidance Group in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, where the  plan was formulated. While at the meeting we discussed AMEC’s future  plans with (1) the United Kingdom’s AMEC Steering Group Co-Chairman  (representing the Royal Navy), (2) representatives from Norway’s Ministry  of Defense and Norway’s Defense Research Establishment, (3) a  representative from Russia’s Armed Forces Environmental Safety  organization, and (4) the AMEC Steering Group Co-Chairman from DOD. In  addition, we used the draft strategic plan to analyze AMEC’s long-term  goals and objectives, including its proposal to include nuclear security as a  new program objective. We also discussed AMEC’s nuclear security focus  with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cooperative  Threat Reduction Policy, DOD’s Office of Nonproliferation, and DOE’s  National Nuclear Security Administration. At DOE, we interviewed the  Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of Defense Nuclear  Nonproliferation; Director, Office of Global Threat Reduction; and the  Acting Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of International Material  Protection and Cooperation. We also discussed these matters with a  Brookhaven National Laboratory official who is leading a DOE-sponsored  study on the risks associated with spent nuclear fuel from dismantled  Russian nuclear submarines.
We obtained and analyzed pertinent program files maintained by DOD to  evaluate DOD’s plan to expand its technology development activities to the  Pacific region. We also obtained available studies and reports prepared by  Greenpeace International and the International Institute for Applied  Systems Analysis that identified the conditions and risks posed by  radioactive contamination. We supplemented this information with  interviews with knowledgeable officials from Vanderbilt University and the  Department of State. The official from Vanderbilt University is responsible  for managing an AMEC-funded project on radioactive contamination in the  Far East. We also interviewed an official from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign  Affairs to obtain information about Japan’s views of the environmental  problems associated with radioactive waste generated by Russia’s nuclear  submarines.
We conducted our review from January through August 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
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