Space Acquisitions: DOD Continues to Face Challenges of Delayed Delivery of Critical Space Capabilities and Fragmented Leadership
Published: 2017-05-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
DOD space systems (e.g., satellites) support the military and others with a wide range of critical capabilities, including meteorology, missile warning, and secure communications.
But when it comes to acquiring these systems, DOD has historically struggled with ballooning costs, schedule overruns, and fragmented leadership.
This testimony provides a snapshot of the status of DOD space acquisitions, actions DOD has taken to address past concerns, and recommendations we and others have made. We also talk about the need for further corrective actions.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD's space systems provide critical capabilities that support military and other government operations and can take a long time to develop, produce, and launch. These systems can also be expensive to acquire and field, amounting to billions of dollars each year. Given the time and resource demands of DOD's space systems and the need to ensure taxpayer dollars are used effectively, especially in light of today's constrained government budget environment, it is essential that DOD manage system acquisitions carefully and avoid repeating past problems.
This statement focuses on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD space system acquisitions, (2) GPS, which is the only large DOD satellite program with systems currently in the development cycle, and (3) leadership for space acquisitions.
This statement highlights the results of GAO's work on space acquisitions over the past 8 years and presents preliminary observations from ongoing work on the Global Positioning System. For the ongoing work, GAO analyzed program documents and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Many major Department of Defense (DOD) space programs GAO reviewed have experienced cost and schedule increases. For example, costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program grew 118 percent and its first satellite was launched more than 3.5 years late. Costs for the Space Based Infrared System grew nearly 300 percent and its scheduled launch was delayed roughly 9 years. Both programs are now in the production phase during which fewer technical problems tend to surface. Satellite ground systems have also been challenged by cost and schedule growth. In fact, ground system delays have been so lengthy that satellites sometimes spend years in orbit before key capabilities can be fully utilized. The table below provides some examples of program status.
GAO's preliminary results from an ongoing review of the Global Positioning System (GPS) show that the satellites, ground systems, and user equipment continue to be on a high-risk path. The launch of the first GPS satellite has been delayed almost 4 years because of technical problems. Additionally, development challenges for the satellite's ground system have resulted in delays so significant that the Air Force has started two other ground system efforts as workarounds to mitigate risk of delayed GPS capability. Additionally, it remains unclear how DOD will overcome a number of challenges that create high risk to the timely fielding of upgraded GPS user equipment for the warfighter.
GAO has reported over the years that DOD's culture has generally been resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented responsibilities have made it difficult to coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. Although some changes in leadership have been made, such as providing the Secretary of the Air Force with additional space responsibilities, it is too early to gauge whether these changes are sufficient to provide leadership for balancing needs against wants, ensure coordination among the many organizations involved with space, and ensure that resources are directed where they are most needed. Given the long-standing fragmentation in space leadership and consequent challenges DOD faces in synchronizing its extensive space enterprise, discussions with DOD officials and experts indicate further-reaching changes, ranging from establishing a space acquisition agency to instituting a new military department for space, may deserve a closer look.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Past GAO reports have generally recommended that DOD adopt acquisition best practices to help ensure cost and schedule goals are met. DOD has generally agreed and taken some actions to address space acquisition problems; however, additional actions are still needed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) space system acquisitions. DOD’s space systems  provide critical capabilities that support military and other government  operations and can take a long time to develop, produce, and launch.  These systems can also be expensive to acquire and field, amounting to  billions of dollars each year. Given the time and resource demands of  DOD’s space systems and the need to ensure taxpayer dollars are used  effectively, especially in light of today’s constrained government budget  environment, it is essential that DOD manage system acquisitions  carefully and avoid repeating past problems.
My statement will focus on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD  space system acquisitions, (2) the Global Positioning System, which is  the only large DOD satellite program with systems currently in the  development cycle, and (3) leadership for space acquisitions.
This statement is based on GAO reports on space programs issued over  the past 8 years and recent work performed in support of our annual  weapon systems assessments. It is also based on space-related work in  support of our 2017 annual report on duplication, overlap, and  fragmentation across the federal government; and GAO updates on cost  increases, investment trends, and improvements in the last year. More  information on our objectives, scope, and methodology is available in our  related products.
In addition, the statement includes preliminary observations from our  ongoing work on the Global Positioning System (GPS). For this work, we  analyzed Air Force GPS quarterly reports, program acquisition baselines,  integrated master schedules, acquisition strategies, software  development plans, test plans, and other documents for GPS III, Next  Generation Operational Control System (OCX), Military GPS User  Equipment (MGUE), Contingency Operations (COps), and M-code Early  Use (MCEU) programs. We compared program acquisition strategies  against GAO’s criteria for best practices in systems development. We  also interviewed officials from the GPS III, OCX, MGUE, and COps  programs; the prime contractors for these four programs; the Defense  Contract Management Agency monitoring the programs; and where  applicable officials from the Office of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation; the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation;  each of the military services involved with the planning and procurement  of the MGUE program; and Air Force Space Command. DOD provided  technical comments on the preliminary findings contained in this  statement, which were incorporated as appropriate.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives. The ongoing work on which this statement is, in part,  based is being conducted in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Status of Major Defense Space Programs
paragraphs: DOD space systems support and provide a wide range of capabilities to a  large number of users, including the military services, the intelligence  community, civil agencies, and others. These capabilities include  positioning, navigation, and timing; meteorology; missile warning; and  secure communications, among others. Space systems can take a long  time to develop and often consist of multiple components, including  satellites, ground control stations, terminals, and user equipment. DOD  satellite systems are also expensive to acquire. Unit costs for current  DOD satellites can range from $500 million to over $3 billion. The ground  systems can cost as much as $5.5 billion and the cost to launch a satellite  can climb to well over $100 million.
Many major DOD space programs have experienced significant cost and  schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced  Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite  communications system, had grown 118 percent since its first estimate as  of our March 2017 review and its first satellite was launched over 3.5  years late. For the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a missile  warning satellite program, costs grew nearly 300 percent and the launch  of the first satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Both programs are now  in the production phase where fewer problems tend to surface, and where  there is typically less risk of cost and schedule growth. The only major  satellite program with systems in the development phase is the Global  Positioning System (GPS), which has seen an almost 4-year delay and  unit cost growth of 9 percent due to technical issues.
Cost and schedule growth has also been a challenge for satellites and  their ground systems. In fact, delays with ground systems have been so  lengthy, that satellites sometimes spend years in orbit before key  capabilities can be fully exploited. For example, as discussed below, the  command and control system for GPS III satellites, known as the Next  Generation Operational Control System, or OCX, is at least 5 years  behind schedule. Because of these delays, the Air Force has had to start  two separate back-up efforts to ensure the continuity of GPS capabilities  and to make anti-jamming capabilities available via Military Code, or M- code, until OCX is delivered. Additionally, over 90 percent of the  capabilities to be provided by Mobile User Objective System  communications satellites—the first of which launched in 2012 and with  five satellites now in orbit—are being underutilized because of problems  with integrating the space, ground, and terminal segments and delays in  fielding compatible user terminals. Figure 1 provides more details on the  current status of DOD’s major space programs.
Cost and schedule growth in DOD’s space programs is sometimes driven  by the inherent risks associated with developing complex space  technology; however, over the past 8 years we have identified a number  of other management and oversight problems that can worsen the  situation. These include making overly optimistic cost and schedule  estimates, pushing programs forward without sufficient knowledge about  technology and design, and experiencing problems in overseeing and  managing contractors, among others. Some of DOD’s programs in  operation, such as SBIRS, were also exceedingly ambitious, which in turn  increased technology, design, and engineering risks. While satellite  programs have provided users with important and useful capabilities, their  cost growth has significantly limited the department’s buying power—at a  time when more resources may be needed to protect space systems and  to recapitalize the space portfolio.
Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial  sector—has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to  address the problems we have identified.
As shown in table 1, our previous work on weapons acquisitions in  general, and space programs in particular, identified best practices for  developing complex systems, such as developing more realistic estimates  and ensuring technologies can work as intended before moving them into  more complicated phases of the acquisition process.
In 2016, we testified that DOD had implemented actions to address space  acquisition problems, and most of its major space programs had  transitioned into the production phase where fewer problems tend to  occur. These range from improvements to cost estimating practices and  development testing to improvements in oversight and leadership, such  as the November 2010 addition of the Defense Space Council, designed  to bring together senior leaders on important issues facing space. DOD  had also started fewer new programs and even those were less ambitious  than prior efforts, which helped to reduce the risk of cost and schedule  growth. Given the problems we have identified in the GPS program,  however, it is clear that more needs to be done to improve the  management of space acquisitions.
section_title: Ongoing Work Shows GPS Acquisitions Are Still High Risk
paragraphs: In 2015, we reported that the Air Force was experiencing significant  difficulties developing the GPS ground system, OCX, and consistently  overstated its progress to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  At the time of our 2015 work, the program needed $1.1 billion and 4 years  more than planned to deliver OCX due to poor acquisition decisions and a  slow recognition of development problems. The Air Force began OCX  development in 2010 prior to completing preliminary development reviews  in contrast with best acquisition practices. It accelerated OCX  development in 2012 to meet optimistic GPS III satellite launch  timeframes even as OCX development problems and costs grew, and  then paused development in 2013 to address problems and resolve what  it believed were root causes. After a rebaseline to the schedule in late  2015, further evidence that OCX still had unaddressed problems surfaced  in 2016 when the Air Force informed Congress the OCX program had  breached a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost threshold. We are continuing to  monitor OCX’s progress and challenges to determine if it is on the right  track as part of our ongoing GPS review.
In 2015, we also looked at the Air Force’s military GPS user equipment  (MGUE) program to develop for the military services GPS receiver cards  capable of receiving the M-code signal. M-code is a stronger and  encrypted, military-specific GPS signal which can help users operate in  jamming environments. We found that the Air Force had revised MGUE’s  acquisition strategy several times. Even so, the military services were  unlikely to have sufficient knowledge to make informed procurement  decisions starting in fiscal year 2018, because operational testing that  provides valuable information about MGUE performance would not be  complete until fiscal year 2019.
On a positive note, at the time of our 2015 review, the current GPS  constellation was proving to be much more reliable than the Air Force  predicted when we last reported on it in 2010, giving the Air Force some  relief in dealing with the delays with new GPS satellites. However, we  found that OCX contingency plans were still necessary for sustaining the  GPS constellation. We also found that initial M-code broadcast capability  would not be available until the current ground system, the Operational  Control System, or OCS, was modified in late-2019 at the earliest to  make up for OCX delays. Full M-code capability—which includes both the  ability to broadcast a signal via satellites and a ground system and user  equipment to receive the signal—will take at least a decade once the  services are able to deploy MGUE receivers in sufficient numbers.
Preliminary results from our ongoing review of GPS shows that the  satellites, ground systems, and user equipment are all still on a high risk  path; though satellite delays are still somewhat mitigated by the longer  than anticipated performance of older GPS satellites. More specifically,  the first GPS satellite is planned for launch in March 2018, over 3 years  before OCX Block 1 is scheduled to become operational. Block 1 is  needed to command and control the current and new generation of GPS  satellites, bring M-code into operations, and provide enhanced  cybersecurity capabilities. In light of delays with OCX, the Air Force has  spawned two additional development efforts—one to ensure continuity in  the ability to process GPS satellite positioning, navigation, and timing  signals (known as Contingency Operations or COps) and another to help  mitigate the delay in the ability to process the M-code signal (known as  M-Code Early Use or MCEU). However, these efforts will have limited  capabilities. Moreover, more than 11 years after launching the first M- code capable satellites, DOD has yet to deliver M-code capable MGUE  receivers. DOD will not have a full M-code capability until receivers are  deployed on sufficient numbers of weapons platforms and munitions to  support the warfighter, yet it is following a high risk path to deliver them.  Based on our preliminary results, risks specific to each GPS segment are  described below.
Satellites: Since our 2015 report, the satellite program has encountered  technical issues that have further delayed the first launch, which is almost  4 years later than the original estimate. Issues with failed and damaged  capacitors have been a recent driver for the delays to the first satellite.  Capacitors are components used to store and release electrical charges.  According to program officials, each satellite has over 500 capacitors of  the same design that experienced failures. The program discovered that  a subcontractor had not qualified the capacitors for use in the GPS  satellites and in response the program conducted qualification and  reliability testing. However, the reliability testing was conducted using an  incorrect circuit board, invalidating the test. The capacitor design was  successfully qualified in December 2016. The Air Force decided to  assume the risk of capacitor failure and proceed with the first satellite as- is, fitted with capacitors mostly from the questionable lot. The program  replaced the suspect capacitors in the second and third satellites, the  only other satellites that had the suspect parts.
OCX: The contractor’s performance over the past year suggests a 2-year  extended schedule approved in 2015 is insufficient. The contractor has  experienced code growth and high defect rates, and is operating under  significant schedule compression and concurrency, with minimal  schedule reserve to account for acquisition risk. Moreover, the  contractor’s current schedule estimates assume efficiencies from  software engineering improvements, such as increased testing  automation, that have not yet been demonstrated. These new processes  have required the contractor to manage cultural changes. Additionally,  the contractor almost doubled its staff to over 1,000 people to achieve the  extension. According to Air Force officials, the 2-year extension will likely  be extended by an additional 6 months.
MGUE Receivers: In view of the importance of M-code to warfighting,  statute generally prohibits DOD from obligating or expending funds for  GPS user equipment after fiscal year 2017 unless that equipment is  capable of receiving military code. In February 2017, the services  submitted implementation plans that identified systems they want to  upgrade with M-code, but these plans do not identify full resource needs.  As a result, it is still unclear when M-code capable receivers will be  fielded and at what cost. Though other weapon programs would normally  have a production decision scheduled by this point in the development  cycle, there is no scheduled production decision for the first increment of  receivers and there are only tentative implementation plans as receiver  cards are being verified by testing. Even after the MGUE program ends  with limited operational testing on test articles on four initial weapons  systems, the services may each have to conduct additional development  both on those systems and any other systems. As a result of this  uncertainty, the military services report that they have begun requesting  waivers for the statutory requirement. In addition, in March 2016 the  Army identified 25 functional gaps and technical issues that would hinder  its ability to adopt MGUE technology. In September 2016, the Air Force  responded with plans to address some of these functional gaps.  However, Army officials are concerned that not all gaps have been  addressed or will be addressed, which could impact its ability to field the  receiver cards. Total development and procurement costs across all  services remain unknown.
section_title: Fragmented Space Leadership Exacerbates Acquisition Problems
paragraphs: We have reported over the years that DOD’s culture has generally been  resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented  responsibilities have made it difficult to coordinate and deliver  interdependent systems. For example, in 2012 we found that although  some improvements in leadership have been made, there was no single  person or organization held accountable for balancing acquisition needs  against wants, ensuring coordination among the many organizations  involved with space systems acquisitions, and ensuring that resources  are directed where they are most needed. In October 2015, DOD re- designated the Executive Agent for Space role as the Principal DOD  Space Advisor (PDSA). In 2016 we determined it was too early to gauge  whether the PDSA has sufficient authority to consolidate space  leadership responsibilities.
Some examples of leadership and coordination issues we have identified  in our prior and ongoing work include:  In a February 2012 report, we found that the National Polar-orbiting  Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), which attempted  to converge defense and civil environmental monitoring requirements and avoid duplication through a tri-agency program office, was canceled in  2010, in part, because there was no single authority in charge of  resolving conflicts or setting priorities.
In a March 2016 report we found that, in assessing alternatives for future  weather systems, DOD consulted with a wide range of DOD stakeholders  in conducting the analysis of alternatives (AOA), but it did not effectively  coordinate with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  (NOAA) (on a case-by-case basis, NOAA represents DOD’s interests  with international partners regarding space-based environmental  monitoring data). NOAA was not involved in reviews of the AOA or  regular discussions with AOA study leadership. Without NOAA’s input,  the AOA study determined that the likelihood a critical gap would not be  filled was low, based on historical trends. As a result, DOD did not fully  assess solutions for cloud characterization and theater weather imagery  data needs. As of August 2016, DOD was still assessing what to do  about these gaps and the Air Force recently signed a memorandum of  agreement with NOAA that enables a broad range of mutually beneficial  support activities.
In our ongoing work on the Global Positioning System, Army officials  have also observed that the lack of a central point of authority and  accountability is hampering coordination on GPS user equipment. It is  unclear who is in charge of coordinating and prioritizing fielding efforts or  setting criteria for M-code waivers—be it the DOD Chief Information  Officer, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics (USD(AT&L)), or the Council on Oversight of the Department of  Defense Positioning, Navigation and Timing Enterprise (PNT Oversight  Council). This is significant because of the risk of duplicated efforts—and  rising costs— between services; and the lack of leadership influences  when and if services are pushed to procure M-code user equipment and  thus realize DOD’s goals for anti-jamming GPS capabilities.
In a July 2016 report, expert space officials told us that because  programs experience too much bureaucracy, it can take a minimum of 3  years to develop an acquisition strategy, issue a request for proposal,  conduct source selection, and award a contract. By then, technologies  and requirements can be obsolete. For example, one contractor told us  that it took over a year for the Air Force to develop a request for proposal  for a low-dollar, $2 million study. While USD(AT&L) officials emphasized  that DOD’s acquisition policy is very tailorable and that programs can  take advantage of its flexibility, Air Force officials said that this does not  play out in practice. They told us that oversight entities are reluctant to  waive or change steps out of fear they will be blamed later.
In a July 2016 report, we reported that space officials believe USD(AT&L)  is the only real decision-making authority for space-related topics.  Some senior officials report that this can have unexpected effects, such  as the Under Secretary having to make broader space architecture  decisions, which are larger issues that fall outside his responsibility.  Officials noted that such decisions fall to the Under Secretary by default  because there is no space-specific authority.
In Senate Report 114-49 accompanying S.1376, a bill for the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, the Senate Armed  Services Committee included a provision for GAO to review the  effectiveness of the current DOD space acquisition and oversight model  and to evaluate what changes, if any, could be considered to improve the  governance of space system acquisitions and operations. In 2016, we  found that DOD space leadership responsibilities are fragmented among  a number of organizations. We identified approximately 60 stakeholder  organizations across DOD, the Executive Office of the President, the  Intelligence Community, and civilian agencies. Of these, 8 organizations  have space acquisition management responsibilities; 11 have oversight  responsibilities; and 6 are involved in setting requirements for defense  space programs.
In October 2015, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the  Secretary of the Air Force as the Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA).  The PDSA, supported by an advisory body called the Defense Space  Council (DSC), is responsible for promoting a unified approach to space  issues, including acquisitions; overseeing the entire DOD space portfolio,  including all space policies, strategies, and plans across DOD; and  serving as an independent advisor on all space matters to top DOD  officials. PDSA officials stated that the PDSA role is expected to have  new responsibilities that will help it effectively consolidate space  leadership. Some of these responsibilities include reviewing all service  budgets for conformity with national security space policy, and giving  independent assessments and recommendations to top DOD officials  when there is no DSC consensus. However, because the position is  relatively new, it remains to be seen whether the PDSA will be effective in  unifying space leadership and authority.
The organization of space acquisitions and oversight has been studied in  depth over the last 20 years; however, DOD has not made some of the  significant changes to space leadership that were recommended by the  four most relevant studies that we identified in our July 2016 report. For  example, these studies made recommendations such as combining the  National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Air Force space acquisition  functions into a unified organization or establishing an Under Secretary of  Defense-level official with responsibility for planning and executing  national security space programs. Some of the acquisition problems  identified in past studies and GAO reports persist, such as insufficient  program manager empowerment and excessive reviews, which contribute  to inefficiencies. As we reported in July 2016, officials and experts we  spoke with stated that the challenges are magnified in space programs  because space technologies are frequently obsolete by the time they are  deployed. The officials and experts also stated that DOD space  acquisitions generally take too long due to fragmented leadership, a  redundant oversight bureaucracy, and difficulty coordinating among  numerous stakeholders. Many officials and experts stated that no one  seems to be in charge of space acquisitions and many remain skeptical  that the recently designated PDSA will have sufficient decision-making  authority to address these concerns. However, others—including from the  PDSA—stated a strong belief that the position will be able to effectively  consolidate fragmented leadership responsibilities.
In conclusion, given the long-standing fragmentation in space leadership  and consequent challenges faced by DOD in synchronizing its extensive  space enterprise, other, more significant reform measures may deserve a  closer look. Our past work has identified some suggested themes for  reform that include: (1) streamlining reviews; (2) delegating more  decision-making authority to lower levels; (3) increasing unity of national  security space decisions between DOD and the NRO; (4) achieving  lasting change that cannot be quickly undone and to allow time for the  changes to work; and (5) providing sufficient acquisition, execution, and  budget authority. Our work has also identified and examined several  potential approaches to reforming DOD space acquisitions that were  suggested and supported by DOD and expert officials. They include  allowing time for the recent PDSA change to work; combining military  space functions into one agency; combining Air Force and NRO space  acquisition functions into a space acquisition agency; and creating a new  military department for the space domain - a Space Force. Except for the  first option, these would likely involve significant short-term disruption to  DOD’s space organizational structure, roles, and responsibilities.  Moreover, their consequences would extend far beyond the acquisition  arena. Careful consideration of any such changes is therefore essential  for helping to ensure a better track record of providing warfighters with the  capabilities they need on time and within costs.
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of the  Subcommittee this concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any  questions you have.
section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina  Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Rich  Horiuchi, Assistant Director; Dr. Nabajyoti Barkakati, Chief Technologist;  Erin Cohen; Emily Bond; Jill Lacey; Katherine Lenane; Kristin Van  Wychen; Alyssa Weir; and Robin Wilson. Key contributors for the  previous work on which this statement is based are listed in the products  cited. Key contributors to related ongoing work include Dave Best,  Assistant Director; Patrick Breiding; Erin Carson; and Jonathan Mulcare.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-17-333SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2017.
Global Positioning System: Observations on Quarterly Reports from the  Air Force. GAO-17-162R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2016.
Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine if Recent Changes  Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight.  GAO-16-592R. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2016.
Defense Weather Satellites: DOD Faces Acquisition Challenges for  Addressing Capability Needs. GAO-16-769T. Washington, D.C.: July 7,  2016.
Defense Weather Satellites: Analysis of Alternatives is Useful for Certain  Capabilities, but Ineffective Coordination Limited Assessment of Two  Critical Capabilities. GAO-16-252R. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2016.
Space Acquisitions: Challenges Facing DOD as it Changes Approaches  to Space Acquisitions. GAO-16-471T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2016.
Space Acquisitions: GAO Assessment of DOD Responsive Launch  Report. GAO-16-156R. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2015.
Space Situational Awareness: Status of Efforts and Planned Budgets.  GAO-16-6R. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2015.
GPS: Actions Needed to Address Ground System Development Problems  and User Equipment Production Readiness. GAO-15-657. Washington,  D.C.: September 9, 2015.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to Adopt an  Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable  Incorporation of Lessons Learned. GAO-15-623. Washington, D.C.:  August 11, 2015.
Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to  Improve Procurements. GAO-15-459. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2015.
Space Acquisitions: Some Programs Have Overcome Past Problems, but  Challenges and Uncertainty Remain for the Future. GAO-15-492T.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2015.
Space Acquisitions: Space Based Infrared System Could Benefit from  Technology Insertion Planning. GAO-15-366. Washington, D.C.: April 2,  2015.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-15-342SP. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2015.
Defense Major Automated Information Systems: Cost and Schedule  Commitments Need to Be Established Earlier. GAO-15-282. Washington,  D.C.: February 26, 2015.
DOD Space Systems: Additional Knowledge Would Better Support  Decisions about Disaggregating Large Satellites. GAO-15-7. Washington,  D.C.: October 30, 2014.
Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but  Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs. GAO-14-382T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.
U.S. Launch Enterprise: Acquisition Best Practices Can Benefit Future  Efforts. GAO-14-776T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2014.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: Introducing Competition into  National Security Space Launch Acquisitions. GAO-14-259T.  Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2014.
The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive  Procurement. GAO-14-377R. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014.  2014 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-14-343SP. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2014.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-14-340SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2014.
Space Acquisitions: Assessment of Overhead Persistent Infrared  Technology Report. GAO-14-287R. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2014.
Space: Defense and Civilian Agencies Request Significant Funding for  Launch-Related Activities. GAO-13-802R. Washington, D.C.: September  9, 2013.
Global Positioning System: A Comprehensive Assessment of Potential  Options and Related Costs is Needed. GAO-13-729. Washington, D.C.:  September 9, 2013.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but  Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments are Optimized.  GAO-13-508T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2013.
Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. GAO-13-317R.  Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2013.
Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial  Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations. GAO-13-315. Washington,  D.C.: April 18, 2013.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-13-294SP. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge  Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822. Washington, D.C.:  July 26, 2012.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of  Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. Washington, D.C.:  March 21, 2012.
Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but  Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. GAO-11-590T.  Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011.
Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering  Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities. GAO-11-545.  Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2011.
Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to  Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs. GAO-11-404.  Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011.
Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading  Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. Washington, D.C.: September 15,  2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System  Components. GAO-10-55. Washington D.C.: October 29, 2009.
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