Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps
Published: 2007-11-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination, planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. GAO was asked to report on State's efforts to improve (1) interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private research centers.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating the framework's use. However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies' roles and responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners. However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC) comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to international crises and has worked with several agencies to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to State's difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of training available to SRC volunteers, other agencies' inability to secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004, State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers, civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers' compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and management would require congressional action. Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States has determined that weak and failing states pose  The United States has determined that weak and failing states pose  significant threats to its national security and is committed to helping  significant threats to its national security and is committed to helping  countries prevent or emerge from conflict. According to the Defense  countries prevent or emerge from conflict. According to the Defense  Science Board, since the end of the Cold War the United States has begun  Science Board, since the end of the Cold War the United States has begun  stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months, with  stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months, with  each operation typically lasting 5 to 8 years. Following problems with  each operation typically lasting 5 to 8 years.
The Defense Science Board defines stabilization and reconstruction as the period  following the cessation of high-intensity conflict. See DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2004 Summer Study on Transition to  and from Hostilities (Washington, D.C.: December 2004). countries or regions. NSPD-44 directed the Secretary of State to  coordinate and lead U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction  operations. The Secretary of State delegated the implementation of this  directive to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and  Stabilization (S/CRS). In addition, the directive established a National  Security Council (NSC) committee to lead interagency efforts to improve  planning and coordination for reconstruction and stabilization operations  and to develop a strong civilian response capability. The committee is co- chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and NSC.
In this report, we review S/CRS’s efforts to improve (1) interagency  planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations,  and (2) the deployment of civilians to these operations.
To complete our work, we reviewed the legislation that created S/CRS,  National Security Presidential Directives, the National Security Strategy of  the United States, the Foreign Affairs Manual, S/CRS planning guidance,  plans for several ongoing stabilization and reconstruction operations,  budget requests, and funding allocations. In addition, we interviewed  officials from eight executive agencies, including the Departments of  Agriculture, Commerce, Defense (DOD), Homeland Security, Justice,  State, and the Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID); former senior S/CRS officials; and experts from  U.S. government and private research centers. We asked agency officials  about their agencies’ roles and responsibilities for planning and executing  stabilization and reconstruction operations, the development of a  proposed framework for planning and executing such operations, and the  development of new capabilities for deploying U.S. federal government  personnel to overseas crises. Finally, we reviewed related GAO reports.  We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed  description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Following problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the fall of 2003,  an internal State report concluded that the U.S. government had no  standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or manage stabilization and  reconstruction operations; and the United States had relied on ad hoc  processes for planning and executing these efforts. State recommended  the establishment of a new office to provide a centralized, permanent  structure for planning and coordinating the civilian response to  stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Accordingly, in August 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced the  creation of S/CRS to coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and resource  responses to complex emergencies, failing and failed states, and post- conflict environments. Such efforts could involve establishing security,  building basic public services, and supporting economic development. The  Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 granted statutory authorization  for S/CRS within the Office of the Secretary of State.
In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to improve the  coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and  stabilization operations. NSPD-44 assigned the Secretary of State  responsibility for planning and coordinating U.S. government stabilization  and reconstruction operations in countries and regions at risk of, in, or in  transition from conflict or civil strife. The Secretary, in turn, delegated  implementation of the directive to the Coordinator for Reconstruction and  Stabilization. NSPD-44 identifies the specific roles, responsibilities, and  coordination requirements of U.S. government agencies that would likely  participate in stabilization and reconstruction operations. It also requires  State to lead the development of a civilian response capability, including  the capacity to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and  effectively to overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44 established the NSC Policy  Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations,  which is co-chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and  Stabilization and NSC, and is comprised of representatives from other  executive agencies.
section_title: State’s Interagency Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clear Guidance, and Interagency Support
paragraphs: S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning  and coordinating U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations. NSC has  adopted two of three elements of the framework—the Interagency  Management System and procedures for initiating its use. One element—a  guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations—is still in  progress. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to  any operation. In addition, guidance on roles and responsibilities for  State’s bureaus and offices is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an  agreed-upon definition of a stabilization and reconstruction operation  poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. In addition, some  interagency partners have shown limited support for the framework and  S/CRS. Some partners described the proposed interagency planning  process as cumbersome and time consuming. S/CRS is taking steps to  strengthen the framework’s effectiveness by addressing agencies’  concerns and providing training to interagency partners, but differences  between the planning capacities and procedures of U.S. government  civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination.
subsections: section_title: S/CRS Has Led the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
paragraphs: S/CRS has led an NSC interagency group to create a framework for  developing specific reconstruction and stabilization plans under NSPD-44.  Sixteen U.S. agencies participated in NSC interagency working groups  tasked with developing the framework, including DOD. The framework is  intended to guide the development of U.S. planning for reconstruction and  stabilization operations by facilitating coordination across federal  agencies and aligning interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and  tactical levels. Key elements of the framework include  the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority and  highly complex crises and operations,   a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization operations,    procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS and  the planning guide.
IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high- priority and highly complex crises and operations. IMS is a system for  guiding communication and coordination between Washington  policymakers and Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and military planners. In  March 2007, NSC approved IMS and, with the Cabinet Secretaries and  Deputy Secretaries, would determine whether IMS is required for a  specific operation. If IMS is used, it would consist of three interagency  groups: a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), an  Integration Planning Cell (IPC), and an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) (see  fig. 1).
CRSG would be responsible for developing and integrating U.S.  government policies, integrating civilian and military plans, and mobilizing  civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction operations. It would  be comprised of the NSC policy coordination committee responsible for  the country or region and would be supported by a secretariat comprised  of staff from multiple agencies that develop the plans in conjunction with  Chiefs of Mission and the U.S. military. CRSG also would mobilize  resources, monitor and evaluate implementation, and coordinate with  international partners.
IPC would be responsible for integrating U.S. civilian agencies’ plans with  military operations. IPC members would include civilian agency staff with  country-specific, functional, or planning expertise. IPC would be located  at the headquarters of the military combatant command responsible for  planning military operations but would report to the CRSG rather than the  combatant commander. IPC would not be formed when planning and  implementing operations that do not require military actions.
ACT would be deployed to the U.S. embassy, if one exists, to set up,  coordinate, and conduct field operations and provide implementation  planning and civilian-operations expertise to the Chief of Mission and  military field commanders. ACT could be supported by Field Advance  Civilian Teams (FACT) to help implement reconstruction and stabilization  programs at the provincial or local levels.
The second element of the framework, the planning guide, has not been  approved by NSC because State is rewriting the guide to address  interagency concerns. Although NSC is not required to approve the  planning guide, S/CRS officials stated that NSC approval would strengthen  the framework’s overall standing among interagency partners. Without  NSC approval, the framework lacks the authority needed for interagency  use. The planning guide divides planning for stabilization and  reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation, strategy  development, and implementation planning (see fig. 2). As currently  envisioned, the guide states that goals and objectives at each level should  be achievable; have well-defined measures for determining progress; and  have goals, objectives, and planned activities that are clearly linked. At the  first level of planning, policy formulation, Washington-based policymakers  would articulate the overall goal or desired outcome the United States  plans to achieve. At the second level, strategy development, the same  Washington policymakers, in conjunction with the relevant Chiefs of  Mission, would define the major objectives and essential tasks necessary  to achieve the overarching policy goal, the resources necessary for  completing each objective, and the implementing agency or bureau. At the  third level, implementation planning, the agencies, bureaus, and overseas  posts responsible for implementing the programs and tasks for achieving  the objectives would develop work plans, resource requirements, and  metrics for monitoring progress.
The third element, which the NSC approved in March 2007, establishes  procedures for using the framework when agencies are responding to an  actual or imminent crisis or engaging in long-term scenario-based  planning. Factors that may trigger a U.S. response to a crisis include the  potential for significant military action in the near-term; actual or  imminent state failure; events with significant potential to undermine  regional stability and development progress, such as coups, economic  collapse, or severe environmental damage; large-scale displacement of  people; and impending or actual genocide, ethnic cleansing, or massive  and grave human-rights violations. Planning for crisis responses may be  initiated by the NSC (including the Cabinet Secretaries, Deputy  Secretaries, or Policy Coordination Committees) or by a direct request  from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. Long-term  scenario planning may be conducted for crises that may emerge within 2  to 3 years. NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional Assistant Secretaries of  State may request the initiation of long-term scenario-based planning  based on five criteria: (1) the potential impact on U.S. national security  and foreign-policy objectives; (2) the regional impact or scale of  humanitarian needs; (3) the potential for significant U.S. military  involvement; (4) the probability of a crisis occurring, as indicated by U.S.  government agencies, the United Nations, or other international  organizations; and (5) the ability of the affected country or neighboring  countries to respond to a crisis.
As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any  stabilization and reconstruction operation. S/CRS and interagency  partners have used draft versions of the planning guide to plan operations  in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo, but implementation of the resulting plans has  been limited. Only the plan for Haiti was implemented. The plan for Sudan  was not implemented because it was completed just as the government of  Sudan and opposition groups signed a peace accord. Interagency planning  for potential operations in Kosovo is ongoing.
According to State officials, the administration is using interagency  processes created in NSPD-1 National Security Council System for  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. NSPD-1 established the process for  coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and  implementation of national security policies, which includes the  interagency Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and policy  coordination committees. In May 2004, the President issued NSPD-36 to  direct U.S. operations in Iraq following the transfer of sovereignty to the  Iraqi government. This directive made State responsible for the direction,  coordination, and supervision of all U.S. government employees, policies,  and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of an area military  commander or seconded to an international organization. According to the  directive, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command—under the  authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense—continues to  be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military  operations in Iraq, including U.S. efforts in support of training and  equipping Iraqi security forces. In April 2006, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad  and the U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq developed their first joint  campaign plan for Iraq and issued a revision to their joint plan in July 2007.
section_title: Guidance Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities and a Common Definition for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations
paragraphs: We found that NSPD-44, related State and administration guidance, and  the planning framework collectively do not provide clear direction in three  key areas. First, S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities conflict with those  assigned to State’s regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission in the Foreign  Affairs Manual. Second, guidance is inconsistent regarding S/CRS’s  responsibilities for conflict prevention efforts, which could compromise  the office’s ability to fulfill its mandate. Third, the lack of a common  definition for reconstruction and stabilization operations poses an  obstacle to interagency collaboration.
First, S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities conflict with those of State’s  regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. In October 2005, we reported that  collaborating agencies must agree on how to lead collaborative efforts.  According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, each regional bureau is  responsible for U.S. foreign relations with countries within a given region,  including providing overall direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S.  activities in the region. In addition, Chiefs of Mission have authority over  all U.S. government staff and activities in their countries. As S/CRS  initially interpreted NSPD-44, S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities included  leading, planning, and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction  operations; these responsibilities conflict with those of the regional  bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. S/CRS officials stated that they expected  the next version of the Foreign Affairs Manual to include a clearly  defined and substantive description of the office’s roles.
Second, guidance varies regarding S/CRS’s responsibility for preventing  conflicts. NSPD-44 and the memo announcing S/CRS’s creation include  conflict prevention as one of the office’s responsibilities. However,  S/CRS’s authorizing legislation and the State memo aligning S/CRS with  the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) do not explicitly include  conflict prevention as a responsibility. Ambiguity about S/CRS’s  prevention role could result in inadequate prevention efforts. A DOD  official in the Global Strategic Partnerships office stated that responsibility  for prevention is not currently assigned to anyone, and the work might not  be done without such an assignment.
Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and stabilization  operations poses an obstacle to effective collaboration under the  framework. In our October 2005 report, we found that collaborative efforts  require agency staff to define and articulate a common outcome or  purpose. While the framework includes definitions for reconstruction and  stabilization, it does not define what constitutes stabilization or  reconstruction operations or explain how these operations differ from  other types of military and civilian foreign assistance operations, such as  counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism operations, and standard  development assistance. In addition, while S/CRS has developed a list of  basic terms related to reconstruction and stabilization, staff from other  bureaus and agencies had different definitions of these terms. As a result,  it is not clear when agencies and bureaus are expected to apply the  framework. S/CRS staff said that it is difficult to clearly define  reconstruction and stabilization and difficult to determine when a  response to a crisis constitutes a reconstruction or stabilization operation.  Prior GAO work shows that the lack of a clear definition can pose an  obstacle to improved planning and coordination of reconstruction and  stabilization operations. In our previous report on DOD’s stability  operations approach, GAO found that the lack of a clear and consistent  definition of stability operations caused confusion among military  planners and limited progress in strengthening stability-operations  capability.
section_title: Civilian Interagency Partners Have Concerns about S/CRS and the Planning Framework
paragraphs: State and other U.S. civilian agencies have concerns about the planning  framework for three key reasons. First, some civilian interagency partners  are concerned that S/CRS is assuming their traditional roles and  responsibilities. Staff from one of State’s regional bureaus believed that  S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with the Regional  Assistant Secretary’s responsibility for leading an operation and  coordinating with interagency partners. USAID staff noted how their  agency had planned and coordinated reconstruction operations in the past  and questioned why S/CRS now had these roles. Although most agency  staff and outside experts we interviewed agreed that interagency  coordination should improve, some USAID and State employees  questioned why NSC was not given the primary role for planning and  coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations or for  implementing NSPD-44.
USAID and regional bureau staffs also said some aspects of the planning  framework were unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant since interagency  teams had already devised planning processes for ongoing operations in  accordance with NSPD-1. For example, planning for U.S. assistance to  Sudan and Darfur before 2005 was led by State’s Bureau of African Affairs.  In 2005, S/CRS applied an early version of the planning guide to ongoing  efforts in Sudan. USAID staff involved in both the regional bureau-led  planning and S/CRS-led planning stated they were frustrated that S/CRS  staff were not well-versed in Sudan policy and had to be educated before  planning could occur. Other staff said S/CRS should focus more on filling  the gaps in planning and operational mechanisms and focus less on policy  development.
Concerns about roles and responsibilities have led to confusion and  disputes about who should lead policy development and control resource  allocation. As a result, some of State’s regional bureaus have resisted  applying the new interagency planning process to particular  reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS staff said one regional  bureau discouraged the office’s involvement in a country that S/CRS  identified as appropriate for the framework; another bureau is generally  reluctant to allow S/CRS to participate in its efforts in the region. In  addition, State and other agency staff said S/CRS had conflicts with DFA  over which office controlled resource allocation for these operations.  These disputes made it difficult for S/CRS to coordinate and plan  reconstruction and stabilization operations using the framework.
Second, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have  provided limited support for S/CRS and its planning framework. In our  October 2005 report, we stated that committed leadership from all levels  of an organization is needed to overcome the barriers that exist when  working across agency boundaries. Staffs from various State offices said  senior officials did not communicate strong support for S/CRS or the  expectation that State and interagency partners should follow its  framework for planning and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization  operations. In addition, S/CRS was not selected to lead planning for recent  high-priority operations. When the office was created in 2004, S/CRS and  other State officials agreed that it would not focus efforts in Afghanistan  and Iraq because these operations had existing processes, and  policymakers feared that the scope of those operations would overwhelm  S/CRS. However, S/CRS has not been given key roles for operations that  emerged after its creation, such as the ongoing efforts in Lebanon and  Somalia, which several officials and experts stated are the types of  operations S/CRS was created to address. These officials and experts  stated that S/CRS has a large responsibility but little authority and no  resources to achieve it.
Third, interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the  draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the  results it produces. Officials who participated in the planning for Haiti  stated that the process provided more systematic planning, better  identification of interagency goals and responsibilities, and better  identification of sequencing and resource requirements. However, some  officials involved in planning operations for Haiti and Sudan stated that  using the framework was time consuming, involved long meetings and  extra work hours for staff, and was cumbersome to use because it was  overly focused on process details. Staff also said that, in some cases, the  planning process did not improve outcomes or increase resources,  particularly since S/CRS has few resources to offer. Other officials were  frustrated when S/CRS processes were applied to interagency planning  efforts that they believed were already functioning. As a result of these  concerns, officials from some offices and agencies expressed reluctance to  work with S/CRS on future reconstruction and stabilization plans.
section_title: State Is Taking Steps to Revise and Strengthen the Framework
paragraphs: State is taking steps to strengthen the framework by revising and updating  its draft planning guide based on feedback from other agencies and  participants. S/CRS said it would commit to ensuring that the S/CRS- facilitated planning process is not duplicative or overly burdensome  relative to its results and intends to provide assistance to State regional  bureaus. S/CRS also said the revisions would provide more details about  the framework’s implementation at the field level and metrics to assess  progress.
State officials also said S/CRS’s realignment under DFA would strengthen  S/CRS’s control over reconstruction and stabilization resources. On March  12, 2007, the Secretary of State aligned S/CRS with DFA, while still  maintaining a direct reporting relationship between S/CRS and the Office  of the Secretary. DFA is charged with reorganizing U.S. foreign assistance  and has authority over all State and USAID foreign-assistance funding and  programs. However, it is not clear how the change will affect S/CRS’s role  and the use of the framework. DFA has procedures and tools to guide the  development of operational plans for foreign assistance, and its staff said  some of those processes would likely be applied to S/CRS planning.
According to S/CRS officials, S/CRS and DFA have recently developed a  more productive working relationship than they had in the past. For  example, the two organizations recently settled a dispute over funds State  could receive from DOD under section 1207 of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. This act authorized the Secretary of  Defense to transfer up to $100 million per year in fiscal years 2006 and  2007 to State to be applied to stabilization and reconstruction operations.  According to State and DOD staff, in 2006 only $10 million was transferred  to State due to a dispute between S/CRS and DFA over which office  controlled the money. However, according to the March 2007 memo  aligning S/CRS with DFA, S/CRS would be responsible for overseeing the  transfer and use of these funds.  S/CRS provided documents that indicated  that State had obligated approximately $99.7 million of the $100 million  available under section 1207 for fiscal year 2007. This funding was applied  to ongoing stabilization and reconstruction operations in Haiti, Nepal,  Columbia, Yemen, and Somalia; to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism  Partnership; and to infrastructure, economic development, rule of law  programs, and counterterrorism activities in the Philippines, Indonesia,  and Malaysia. In addition, S/CRS participated in DFA’s review of U.S.  assistance to some countries for fiscal year 2008 and, as S/CRS acquires  new staff, it plans to assume responsibility for the budget process of  countries in DFA’s “rebuilding” category.
Although S/CRS has not finished updating the framework guide or  determined its role under DFA, it has taken other steps to strengthen the  use of the framework and prepare interagency partners to coordinate  effectively. For example, S/CRS offers Foreign Service Institute courses to  train interagency participants in planning stabilization and reconstruction  operations, leading and managing interagency coordination for such  operations, and applying tools for early warning and conflict assessment.  S/CRS reported that 352 federal employees participated in its training  courses in 2006 and 452 employees participated in 2007. The majority of  participants were from State, DOD, and USAID, although S/CRS reported  that staff from seven other agencies also attended classes. Course  instructors said it was difficult to attract participants from other agencies  and described advertising to those agencies as ad hoc, in part because the  Foreign Service Institute does not have an up-to-date list of contacts.  S/CRS staff said they were exploring other strategies for recruiting course  participants, such as identifying key agency leaders who agree that their  staffs should attend. S/CRS also has developed tools and information to  strengthen reconstruction and stabilization operations, such as  information on guiding concepts and terms and tools for early warning and  prevention, assessing best practices, and applying lessons learned.
section_title: Differences between Military and Civilian Planning Pose Obstacles to Coordination
paragraphs: Although S/CRS made efforts to strengthen both coordination and the  commitment of key DOD officials to the goals of S/CRS, several  differences in military and civilian planning capacities and procedures  pose obstacles to effective coordination. First, differences in planning  capacities and resources make coordination difficult. In our report on  DOD’s stability operations approach, we found that DOD and non-DOD  organizations do not fully understand each other’s planning processes, and  non-DOD organizations have limited capacity to participate in DOD’s full  range of planning activities. State officials noted its planning differs from  DOD’s; State is more focused on current operations and less focused on  the wide range of potential contingency operations for which DOD must  plan. State does not have a large pool of planners who can deploy to  DOD’s combatant commands. DOD officials noted that their efforts to  include non-DOD organizations in planning and exercise efforts were  stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies can offer. State  officials indicated it does not have DOD’s capacity to staff operations and  planning; both DOD and State staff doubted that civilian capacity and  resources would ever match the levels desired.
Second, State generally does not receive DOD military plans as they are  being developed, which restricts its ability to harmonize reconstruction  and stabilization efforts with military plans and operations as required by  NSPD-44. DOD does not have a process in place to share, when  appropriate, information with non-DOD agencies early in plan  development without specific approval from the Secretary of Defense.  DOD’s hierarchical approach limits interagency participation while plans  are being developed by the combatant commands at the strategic,  operational, and tactical levels. NSPD-44 working groups are developing a  process for reviewing military plans, when appropriate, but are not yet  ready to use it.
Third, agency staff and outside experts have found that differences in  organizational structure, terminology, and information systems pose  obstacles to effective coordination between military and civilian agencies.  For example, S/CRS found that differences between civilian agencies’  headquarters and field organization and the strategic, operational, and  tactical organization of the military can make coordination more difficult.  The Administration’s July 2007 report to Congress stated it was developing  common standards and systems, including blogs and other technologies,  to address inconsistencies in U.S. information management systems and to  support interagency collaboration and communication.
In our stability operations report, we recommended that the Secretary of  Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide  implementation guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and  encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans;  develop a process to share planning information with non-DOD agencies  early in the planning process, as appropriate; and orient DOD and non- DOD personnel in each agency’s planning processes and capabilities. In  commenting on the report, DOD said it partially agreed with our  recommendations but did not indicate the steps it would take to  implement them.
section_title: State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining Rapid Deployment Corps
paragraphs: State has begun developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to  international crises but has not addressed key details for establishing and  maintaining these units. First, State created two units within the  department—the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response  Corps (SRC)—and has collaborated with several other U.S. government  agencies to create similar units. State and other agencies, however, face  challenges in establishing these units, including (1) difficulties in achieving  planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training opportunities for  State’s SRC volunteers, (2) agencies’ inabilities to secure resources for  operations not viewed as part of their core missions, and (3) the possibility  that deploying volunteers could result in their home units having  insufficient staff. Second, in May 2007, State began an effort to establish  the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would be made up of U.S.  civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and  reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers, police officers, judges,  and public administrators, that are not readily available within the U.S.  government.  If deployed, reservists would become federal employees.   State, however, does not yet have congressional authority to establish the  CRC or to provide the planned benefits package for CRC personnel.  In  addition, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC  would be deployed.  Further, State has estimated the costs for establishing  and keeping CRC ready to deploy, including costs for recruiting, training,  equipping CRC personnel, but these estimates do not include the costs of  deploying CRC personnel to other countries or sustaining them once  deployed.
subsections: section_title: State, USAID, and the Department of the Treasury Have Developed Some Internal Capacity to Deploy Staff Rapidly in Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
paragraphs: To meet NSPD-44 requirements for developing a strong civilian response  capability, State and other U.S. agencies developed internal mechanisms  to reassign personnel in support of stabilization and reconstruction  operations. S/CRS has taken the lead in expanding State’s internal capacity  to respond to conflict by creating ARC and SRC. S/CRS also collaborated  with several other U.S. government agencies to initiate the development of  ARC and SRC units within those agencies.
In 2006, State developed ARC within S/CRS to deploy during the initial  stage of stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS has 15  temporary staff positions for ARC; ARC staff serve 1-year rotations. In  October 2007, 10 of the 15 authorized positions were staffed. ARC staff  deploy to unstable environments to assess countries’ or regions’ needs and  help plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response. Since  2006, ARC staff have deployed to seven locations:  (1) Sudan, to help  implement the Darfur Peace Agreement; (2) Eastern Chad, to monitor the  displacement of civilians resulting from the conflict in Darfur; (3)  Lebanon, to assist with the evacuation of American citizens and to  coordinate assistance immediately following the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict;  (4) Kosovo, to help plan for a follow-on to the United Nations Mission to  Kosovo; (5) Liberia, to coordinate reforms of the security sector; (6) Iraq,  to assist with integrating new Provincial Reconstruction Team members;  and (7) Haiti, to plan the implementation and oversight of programs to  improve security, local government capacity, and economic opportunity in  Cité Soleil. According to S/CRS, regional bureau staff, and State’s Office of  the Inspector General, ARC involvement and performance in these  operations has been positive. When not deployed, ARC members engage in  training and other planning exercises and work with other S/CRS offices  and State bureaus on related issues to gain relevant expertise.
SRC would deploy during the second stage of a surge to stabilization and  reconstruction operations. SRC works to support activities of ARC when  additional staff or specialized skills are required. Unlike ARC, SRC does  not have not dedicated staff positions. Rather, when not deployed, current  employees on the SRC roster serve in other capacities throughout State.
Currently, SRC is composed of about 90 State employees and 210 State  retirees. In July 2007, NSC approved S/CRS plans to increase SRC to a  roster of 500 volunteers government-wide by fiscal year 2008, and to a  roster of 2,000 volunteers government-wide by fiscal year 2009. If called  upon, SRC members would be available for deployment within 60 days and  could be deployed for up to 6 months. According to S/CRS staff, the office  aims to have up to one-quarter of this standby corps ready for deployment  at any one time. However, to date, S/CRS has deployed SRC members to  only two ongoing operations: one to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace  Agreement and one to Chad to support refugees from Eastern Darfur.
Although S/CRS has started working with other U.S. agencies to establish  units similar to ARC and SRC, these efforts are in very early stages.  Currently, only USAID and the Department of the Treasury have  established mechanisms for responding rapidly to stability and  reconstruction missions. USAID uses the Office of Foreign Disaster  Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives to respond to conflict  situations. In addition, USAID has started developing its own internal  surge capacity and has identified 15 staff available for immediate  deployment to crises. USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and  Humanitarian Assistance developed a proposal to create a civilian reserve  office to respond to stabilization and reconstruction operations and  requested funds to hire, train, equip, and deploy more than 50 staff  specifically for this purpose. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of  Technical Assistance has ongoing programs around the world and intends  to build the capacity to lead long-term stability operations. In addition,  the Office of Technical Assistance developed the First Responder Initiative  in 2004, which includes approximately 30 staff who are willing to deploy  rapidly to conflict areas in support of stabilization and reconstruction  operations.
section_title: State and Other Agencies Face Challenges That Limit Their Efforts to Establish and Deploy Rapid Response Units
paragraphs: State and other agencies face challenges in establishing their rapid  response capabilities. These challenges include (1) difficulties in achieving  planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training opportunities for  State’s SRC volunteers, (2) agencies’ inability to secure resources for  operations not viewed as part of their core missions, and (3) the possibility  that deploying agency staff and SRC volunteers would result in staff  shortages in their home units.
S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting for ARC and  training SRC members. S/CRS plans to increase the number of authorized  staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary positions to 33 permanent  positions, which State included in its 2008 budget request. However,  according to S/CRS staff, it is unlikely that State will receive authority to  establish all 33 positions. Although S/CRS has not had difficulty recruiting  SRC volunteers, it does not presently have the capacity to ensure they are  properly trained for participating in stabilization and reconstruction  operations. ARC staff and SRC volunteers would be required to complete  five courses offered jointly by S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute.  According to S/CRS staff, the Foreign Service Institute does not currently  have the capacity to train the 1,500 new volunteers S/CRS plans to recruit  in 2009. S/CRS is studying ways to correct the situation.
Although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and  reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff  available for rapid responses to overseas crises. Most agencies’ missions  are domestic in nature.  Nonetheless, domestic policy agencies, including  the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, operate overseas  programs.  However, officials from these agencies said international  programs are viewed as extensions of their domestic missions.  As a  result, it is difficult for these agencies to secure funding for cadres of on- call first and second responders.
Finally, State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can leave  home units without sufficient staff and, as a result, they must weigh the  value of deploying volunteers against the needs of their units. For  example, when not deployed to stabilization and reconstruction  operations, current State SRC volunteers serve normal duty rotations at  overseas posts or within State’s various bureaus and offices within the  United States. According to State’s Office of the Inspector General, S/CRS  has had difficulty getting State’s other units to release the SRC volunteers  it wants to deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction  operations. The home units of the volunteers do not want to become  short of staff or lose high-performing staff to other operations. Other  agencies reported a reluctance to deploy staff overseas or establish on-call  units because doing so would leave fewer workers available to complete  the offices’ work requirements. Some civilian agencies recently agreed to  identify, train, and deploy employees to stabilization and reconstruction  operations provided that State fund the efforts. According to S/CRS staff,  however, the training and deployment of non-State ARC and SRC would  not begin until fiscal year 2009.
section_title: S/CRS Has Made Efforts to Establish CRC
paragraphs: In 2004, S/CRS developed an initial concept for CRC, which would be  deployed in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. CRC  would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences  useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil  engineers, police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are not  readily available within the U.S. government. Reservists would serve 4- year terms of voluntary service and, if called upon, would deploy for  rotations of up to 1 year. Reservists would remain in their daily jobs until  called upon for service and would be ready for deployment within 30 to 60  days. Deployed CRC personnel would be classified as full-time term  federal employees, with the authority to speak for the U.S. government  and manage U.S. government contracts and employees. Volunteers would  receive training upon joining CRC and would be required to complete  annual training. In addition, they would receive training specific and  relevant to an operation immediately before deployment.
According to S/CRS staff, NSC has approved plans to develop a roster of  2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 2009; however, a BearingPoint study  commissioned by S/CRS found that CRC would require at least 3,550  volunteers to respond to CRC goals. The BearingPoint study also noted  that decisions about CRC’s roster size would likely evolve over time. In  addition, a panel of experts convened by the Congressional Research  Service concluded that the proposed roster may represent only a portion  of what is likely required. The panel noted that simultaneously deploying  CRC to two large and one small operation, as defined by BearingPoint,  could require deploying the entire CRC roster. S/CRS staff said the office  would assess whether to expand the roster in subsequent years.
section_title: CRC Lacks Congressional Authority in Key Areas and a Clearly Defined Mission
paragraphs: State cannot spend any funds for the CRC until Congress has authorized  the CRC’s establishment. In 2007, Congress granted State the authority to  reallocate up to $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to  support and maintain CRC. However, the legislation specified that no  money may be obligated without a subsequent act of Congress. Legislation  that would authorize CRC is pending in both the Senate and the House of  Representatives, but as of October 2007, neither chamber had taken action  on the bills.
In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key elements of  the planned compensation package for deployed volunteers. Under  current plans, deployed volunteers would become full-time term federal  employees and would receive compensation and benefits similar to those  received by Foreign Service employees. Such compensation and benefits  would include    salary commensurate with experience;    danger, hardship, and other mission-specific pays, benefits, and  recruitment bonuses for hard-to-fill positions;   overtime pay and compensatory time;  leave accrual and payment for unused leave upon service completion; federal health, life, and death benefits, and medical treatment while  deployed;   dual compensation for retired federal workers; and  the ability to count deployed time toward retirement benefits.
The pending legislation would address some of the compensation  authorities needed by State to offer the full proposed benefits package to  CRC personnel. Specifically, it would authorize State to provide the same  compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to  members of the Foreign Service. However, the proposed legislation does  not address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive  hiring status for other positions within State or whether the time deployed  would count toward government retirement benefits. In addition, deployed  personnel would not have re-employment rights similar to those for  military reservists. Currently, military reservists who are voluntarily or  involuntarily called into service have the right to return to their previous  place of employment upon completion of their military service  requirements. However, the pending legislation to authorize CRC does  not include similar rights for deployed CRC personnel. S/CRS staff said  that the Civilian Reserve Task Force would assess whether re-employment  rights are necessary based on the experience of recruiting the first 500  personnel.
Further, S/CRS is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a  defined set of potential missions in which CRC would participate.  According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation in the House and Senate  that would authorize CRC, reservists would deploy to specific  nonhumanitarian stabilization and reconstruction missions when called  upon by the President. However, as with the planning guide and IMS, there  is no agreed-upon definition for what constitutes a stabilization and  reconstruction mission. S/CRS staff said they are still working through the  conceptual differences between these and other types of operations, such  as for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, but that under its current  approach, CRC could be deployed to almost any operation in a conflict  zone.
section_title: State Has Estimated Some Costs for CRC
paragraphs: Although State has estimated some costs for establishing and sustaining  CRC at home, the estimates do not include the costs of deploying CRC  personnel to other countries or sustaining them once deployed.
As shown in table 1, State has identified about $135 million in estimated  costs for establishing and sustaining CRC at home during fiscal years 2008  and 2009.  In comparison, Bearing Point’s study estimated that a 3-year  startup period would cost approximately $341 million. Under current State  plans, these funds would come from the fiscal year 2007 reallocation  authority and from State’s fiscal year 2009 budget. The administration did  not request any funds for CRC in fiscal year 2008.
If Congress authorizes the CRC, State plans to obligate approximately $26  million of the $50 million authority in fiscal year 2007 supplemental funds  to market the program and recruit, screen, and enroll the first 500 CRC  personnel, including 350 with expertise in rule of law issues ($7.7 million);  train the first 500 personnel ($5.1 million); purchase equipment such as  armored vehicles, police weapons, electronics, cots, tents, and body armor  ($2.3 million); administer CRC, such as establishing a home office and a  U.S. Deployment Center, and hiring 37 new government staff and  contractor positions to manage CRC’s day-to-day administrative functions  ($6.4 million); and compensate CRC personnel when they are being  trained ($4.2 million).
State currently estimates that it will cost about $109 million to expand the  CRC to 2,000 personnel in fiscal year 2009 (see table 1). In this phase, State  would hire up to 26 additional administrative staff and provide training for  the new CRC volunteers. As of October 2007, the Office of Management  and Budget had not yet approved State’s request for $109 million. The  actual funding request for 2009 may differ from these estimates.
S/CRS estimates that the annual costs for sustaining at home a 2,000- volunteer CRC would be up to $47 million.  According to S/CRS staff, these  annual costs include the activities needed to ensure that CRC personnel  are ready to deploy.  However, they do not include costs for deploying  CRC personnel outside the United States or sustaining them once  overseas.  Deployment and overseas sustainment costs could include  security costs, which may be high in a conflict zone; salaries and  allowances; operation and infrastructure costs, including for facilities; and  life support, such as food, lodging, and medical support.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Government personnel and outside experts in national security issues  agree that the U.S. government must improve its capacity to plan for and  execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. To address these  issues, S/CRS and its interagency partners have worked to develop a new  interagency planning and coordination framework and rapid response  corps of civilian government and nongovernment personnel. Since the  framework has never been fully applied, an understanding of its benefits  and drawbacks remains unknown. However, concerns about roles and  responsibilities and the value of the framework have slowed its  acceptance by interagency partners. Although there is no requirement that  NSC approve all elements of the framework, without such approval it will  be difficult to ensure that U.S. government agencies collaborate and  contribute to interagency planning efforts to the fullest extent possible.
S/CRS has not completed developing plans to fully establish and maintain  CRC, but is seeking authorization to begin recruitment of CRC volunteers.  Although State received authority to reallocate up to $50 million for CRC,  a separate act of Congress is required to authorize CRC before State may  obligate that or future funding. S/CRS has developed a plan for using this  funding to train, equip, and keep ready to deploy up to 2,000 CRC  personnel by fiscal year 2009.  However, costs of deploying CRC personnel  to operations outside of the United States or of sustaining them at their  new posts are not included.  In addition, S/CRS has not yet specified types  of missions for which the CRC would be used. Moreover, failure to provide  full benefits and re-employment rights could affect State’s ability to recruit  and retain personnel for CRC.  These are critical elements for Congress to  consider when debating the long-term commitment associated with  authorizing CRC and the future oversight of CRC operations and  effectiveness.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen interagency planning and coordination of stabilization and  reconstruction operations, we recommend that the Secretary of State  clarify and communicate specific roles and responsibilities within State for  S/CRS and the regional bureaus, including updating the Foreign Affairs  Manual.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary, with the assistance of  interagency partners, finish developing the framework and test its  usefulness by fully applying it to a stabilization and reconstruction  operation.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To better understand the long-term fiscal and oversight commitments that  would accompany authorizing CRC, when considering whether to grant  such authority, the Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of  State, in consultation with other relevant agencies, to report on the  activities and costs required for its development; the administrative  requirements and annual operating costs once it is established, including  for sustainment at home, deployment, and sustainment once deployed; the  types of operations for which it would be used; and potential obstacles  that could affect recruitment, retention, and deployment of personnel.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We received written comments on a draft of this report from the  Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State (see appendixes II and  III).  In addition, State, DOD, and USAID submitted a joint statement to the  draft report, which is included as part of State’s comments.  The  Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Defense, Justice, and  State and USAID also provided technical comments, which were  incorporated into the report, as appropriate.  The Departments of  Homeland Security and the Treasury were provided copies of the draft  report but did not comment.
Commerce stated the report was a good overview of the new process for  planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations, but  did not comment on the report’s recommendations and matter for  Congressional consideration.
State said it partially concurred with our recommendations.  It said that  while it had no objections to the recommendations, it believes the  progress made toward developing a civilian R&S capability was  underreported.  State said that the data GAO presented preceded a  tremendous period of growth and change for the interagency process.  In a  joint statement, State, DOD, and USAID reiterated the draft report did not  reflect the achievements made over recent months, including the IMS,  ARC, SRC, and CRC. The joint statement did not comment on the report’s  recommendations or matter for Congressional consideration.
When providing technical comments, USDA, Justice, USAID each stated  strong support for the new planning and coordination framework, and that  they would continue to work with S/CRS to improve civilian deployment  capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction operations.  USAID further  stated that more work is needed to clarify roles and responsibilities,  particularly in the relationships between S/CRS and DFA, and between  S/CRS and USAID.
We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect changes  that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork.  We completed  our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our draft report  discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC approved in  March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms.  Our draft report did not  include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC because those  details were not provided until October 2007.  We incorporated this new  information into our final report, as well as other information from written  and technical comments from six agencies.  Our findings, conclusions, and  recommendations reflect the status of the planning framework and CRC as  of October 2007.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date.  At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of  Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and  the Treasury and to the Administrator for USAID. We will also make  copies available to others on request.  In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-4128 or at christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address both of the objectives of our review, we examined U.S.  government documents and research and conducted more than 50  interviews with staff from 31 offices and bureaus at eight U.S. agencies  with roles in reconstruction and stabilization operations (see table 2). We  also interviewed staff members and reviewed reports and documents from  eight U.S. government and independent research organizations.
To determine the Department of State’s (State) efforts to improve  interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction  operations, we interviewed current and former staff from the Office of the  Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and reviewed  documentation on its development, roles, and responsibilities. Documents  reviewed include Presidential Decision Directive 56, National Security  Presidential Directives 1 and 44, Section 408 of the Consolidated  Appropriations Act of 2005, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and internal  State reports and memos. We also reviewed documentation from and held  discussions with S/CRS, State’s regional and program bureaus, other  agencies, and public and private research institutions on the development  of the new planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction  operations. Topics reviewed and discussed included mechanisms for  triggering the process, roles and responsibilities of various actors, the  Interagency Management System, the new planning template, and  monitoring and evaluation requirements. We also discussed planning  efforts and, where possible, reviewed resultant plans for stabilization and  reconstruction operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo with S/CRS, staff  from State’s relevant regional bureaus, and the U.S. Agency for  International Development. Finally, we participated in five training  courses on stabilization and reconstruction planning developed and taught  by S/CRS staff in conjunction with the Foreign Service Institute.
To determine State’s efforts to improve the deployment of civilians to  these operations, we reviewed documents and interviewed State and other  agencies’ staffs about the existing internal capacity each has for  supporting stabilization and reconstruction operations and the actions  they are taking to develop rapid deployment units and capabilities. We  reviewed the development of the Active Response Corps, Standby  Response Corps, and Civilian Reserve Corps by interviewing State staff  from S/CRS, regional bureaus, select program bureaus, and the Office of  the Inspector General. We reviewed BearingPoint’s study for creating and  maintaining the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) and S/CRS plans for  implementing the study’s recommendations, we examined proposals and  assessments prepared by the U.S. Institute for Peace, the Institute for  Defense Analyses, and the Congressional Research Service, and we  reviewed pending legislation in the Senate and House of Representatives  that would authorize CRC. Finally, we discussed S/CRS’s civilian reserve  concept with staffs from other agencies including the Departments of  Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and the Treasury, and the U.S.  Agency for International Development, as well as with private research  institutions, including the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic  and International Studies, and the RAND Corporation.
We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
subsections: section_title: GAO Response to State’s Comments
paragraphs: We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect changes  that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We completed  our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our draft report  discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC approved in  March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft report did not  include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC because those  details were not provided until October 2007. We incorporated this new  information into our final report, as well as other information from written  and technical comments from six agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and  recommendations reflect the status of the planning framework and CRC as  of October 2007.  We also have specific comments to points raised by State  (see below).   1.  While we are aware of the efforts S/CRS and regional bureaus have  made in the countries cited, we note that S/CRS involvement in most of  them includes the deployment of a small number of staff or the  allocation of section 1207 funds, which we recognized in the report.  We also note in the report that S/CRS applied its draft planning guide  to operations in Haiti and Sudan, and we note the outcomes of those  plans. We also report that interagency staff involved in those efforts  had different points of view on the merits of the planning process, that  the planning guide is still in development, and that S/CRS is revising  the planning guide based on partners’ concerns.  2.  We chose to discuss CRC separately because of the potential costs  associated with its development and sustainment. However, we  acknowledge within the report that State views civilian response  mechanisms—ARC, CRC, and SRC—as the fourth major element of the  framework.  3.  We have changed the text in our report to reflect State’s comment.  4.  We reported on the basic structures of the IMS. We note that it is  designed to ensure coordination between Washington and the field,  and between the civilian and military sectors of government. However,  since IMS has never been used, it is premature to state whether it is an  effective tool. We found, however, that different documents outline  different roles and responsibilities for S/CRS. While State and S/CRS  have taken some steps to clarify S/CRS’ role, some interagency  partners stated more must be done. For example, when providing  comments on a draft of our report, USAID stated it would like more  definition on the relationships between S/CRS and DFA, and S/CRS  and USAID. State would seem to agree with this assessment since it  plans to use exercises to identify gaps and clarify roles and  responsibilities. Although we are encouraged that State plans to take  these actions, we believe the true test of IMS’s effectiveness will come  when it is applied to an actual operation.  5.  We reported on the procedures for triggering the use of IMS and, once  finalized, the planning guide. As with IMS, the true test of the  effectiveness of these procedures will come when it is used for an  actual operation.  6.  We reported on the ongoing development of the draft planning guide,  including its features; its use for planning operations in Haiti, Sudan  and Kosovo; and revisions S/CRS is making based on partners’  concerns. We also note that although NSC need not approve this  element, such approval would add credibility to the guide and the  framework, as a whole.  7.  Based on these comments and technical comments from State, we  updated information on State’s plans for establishing CRC, including  startup costs, annual costs, and authorizing legislation. We  acknowledge that NSC approved a plan to establish by 2009 a roster of  2,000 CRC reservists who would deploy to stabilization and  reconstruction operations. Although we constrain our discussion to  higher-level considerations, we are encouraged by the list of  achievements State says it recently made; however, we note that a  number them are still in the draft or conceptual stage of development.  In addition, we removed from the final report discussion on the  punitive actions State could take against volunteers who refused to  deploy.  8.  We did not state that lists of possible locations for deployment of CRC  volunteers should be maintained. Our finding and conclusion pertain  to the lack of clarity for the type of operations for which CRC would  be used. As stated in the report, State has not clarified how  stabilization and reconstruction operations differ from other  operations, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, or  traditional development assistance programs. Having a clear definition  of the types of operations CRC volunteers could deploy to would  enable State to better define the skill mix it needs for the CRC roster. It  would also provide a basis for Congressional oversight and a valuable  check against potential misuse.  9.  We updated our discussions or ARC and SRC based on information  provided in these and other technical comments. We are encouraged  that S/CRS has developed these courses—five of which GAO staff  attended. However, based on our findings, we are concerned that  S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute may not have the capacity to  provide full training to 3,000 SRC and CRC volunteers in fiscal year  2009.  10. We adjusted the report to reflect this new information. We note that  approximately $80 million of the $99.75 million was obligated in the  final month of the fiscal year.  11. We do not challenge States interpretation that the legislation implicitly  authorizes S/CRS to engage in conflict prevention activities. Our point  was to show that ambiguities between the sources of S/CRS authorities  can lead to confusion among partners over S/CRS’s true roles and  responsibilities.  12. Although agencies may have official positions that they support S/CRS  and the new framework, our fieldwork revealed that many individuals  within State’s regional and program bureaus and other agencies have  not yet accepted it.  13. We disagree with the assertion that our report does not reflect changes  that occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We completed  our initial audit work in August 2007, and in October 2007 we obtained  and incorporated additional information from agencies written and  technical comments on a draft of our report. Our report reflects the  status of the framework and development of civilian response  capabilities as of October 2007.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual contact named above, Judith McCloskey,  Assistant Director; Sam Bernet; Lynn Cothern; Marissa Jones; and Sona  Kalapura made key contributions to this report. Technical assistance was  provided by Joseph Brown, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Mark  Dowling, Holly Dye, Francisco Enriquez, Timothy Fairbanks, Etana  Finkler, Bradley Hunt, Marisela Perez, Nina Pfeiffer, and Jeremy Sebest.