Defense Management: DOD Needs to Improve Program Management, Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful Non-lethal Weapons
Published: 2009-04-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Nonlethal weapons (NLW) provide an alternative when lethal force is undesirable. The Department of Defense (DOD) defines NLW as those that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. DOD created the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program in 1996 to have centralized responsibility for the development of NLW and coordinate requirements among the services. GAO was asked to review the status of NLW programs within DOD and the military services by identifying the extent to which (1) DOD and the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program have developed and fielded NLW since the program's inception; (2) DOD has established and implemented policy, doctrine, and training for NLW; and (3) DOD has conducted testing and evaluation prior to fielding NLW. GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and service plans, guidance, and doctrine and interviewed officials associated with NLW development.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The joint non-lethal weapons program has conducted more than 50 research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million since 1997, but it has not developed any new weapons and the military services have fielded 4 items stemming from these efforts that only partially fill some capability gaps identified since 1998. Three major factors contribute to the program's limited progress in fully addressing capability gaps. First, DOD did not prioritize departmentwide non-lethal capability gaps until 2007 and still does not fully address these gaps. Second, DOD has not consistently incorporated logistics and supportability considerations early in the development process. As a result, DOD may miss opportunities to allocate resources more effectively. Third, DOD has exercised limited general oversight of the NLW program which has resulted in gaps in key program guidance as well as limited measurement of progress and performance. For example, DOD's road map of ongoing and projected NLW capabilities and efforts could be used to discharge oversight responsibilities, but the road map lacks guidance about how to allocate resources and evaluate performance. Further, DOD has no single organization with visibility over all spending, and available budget information may not fully capture all spending associated with the development of non-lethal capabilities. DOD has begun to incorporate ideas about non-lethal capabilities into policy, doctrine, and training but has not yet clearly articulated what constitutes acceptable risk for fatality, fully developed weapons employment policies for the use of force in overseas warfighting or homeland applications, or ensured that warfighters and domestic responders are fully trained in NLW use. Until these issues are resolved, doctrine and training for non-lethal weapons may be limited, and the warfighter or domestic responder may have fewer options other than resorting to lethal force. DOD lacks a clear methodology for estimating the human effects of non-lethal weapons and does not fully test and evaluate many non-lethal weapons because they have been fielded under urgent operational requirements that abbreviate normal DOD testing standards. Testing can be bypassed for commercial items because DOD officials can use contractor test data instead of conducting their own tests. Therefore, when NLW are fielded, commanders are uncertain about acceptable risk on targets and bystanders and cannot accurately predict their effects. DOD has begun to develop elements of a risk assessment methodology to address human effects testing; for example, it has drafted a Risk of Significant Injury scale, which broadly categorizes levels of health care capabilities required to reverse NLW effects. However, DOD has not completed a risk assessment methodology that would provide information to commanders so that they may then make a determination about its acceptability in their operating environment.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The armed forces expect to encounter a shifting military environment,  including greater mixing of enemy combatants with noncombatants, in  which there are likely to be situations where lethal force is undesirable.  Increasing non-lethal options widens the range of effects the joint force is  able to achieve without using deadly force. In order to be flexible enough  to deal with the rapidly changing threat environment, in 2002 the services  and combatant commanders described a family of non-lethal capabilities  as a high-priority need that must be satisfied immediately. Such  capabilities may include applying targeted munitions, destruction of  enemy command and control, and electronic jamming, all of which may  have non-lethal effects. Non-lethal capabilities may also include non-lethal  weapons (NLW), which the Department of Defense (DOD) defines as  “weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to  incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent  injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the  environment.”
Congress has long been interested in DOD management and organization  of NLW programs. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 1996, Congress found that “the role of the United States military in  operations other than war has increased …. Weapons and instruments that  are non-lethal in application yet immobilizing could have widespread  operational utility and application.” Congress further noted that “the use of  non-lethal weapons in operations other than war poses a number of  important doctrine, legal, policy, and operations questions, which should  be addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner.” Congress  urged DOD to “provide improved budgetary focus and management  direction to the non-lethal weapons program,” and directed the Secretary  of Defense to “assign centralized responsibility for development (and any  other functional responsibility the Secretary considers appropriate) of  non-lethal weapons technology to an existing office within the Office of  the Secretary of Defense or to a military service as the executive agent.”
In July 1996, DOD published a directive to establish policies and assign  responsibilities for the development and employment of non-lethal  weapons. DOD assigned principal oversight to the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), and  designated the commandant of the Marine Corps as the Executive Agent  for the DOD Non-Lethal Weapons Program. In 1997, DOD created the Joint  Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) to perform day-to-day  management activities and other coordination duties on behalf of the  Executive Agent. Over the past 12 years, the JNLWD has reported  receiving funding of about $462 million, of which it had reported spending  at least $386 million. This includes funding for more than 50 NLW  development efforts as well as related support activities such as exercises  and experimentation. The military services may also independently  pursue service-unique research efforts as well as procure, operate, and  maintain NLW and train personnel on their use. During the same 12-year  period, DOD budget data showed that funding for the military services  totaled at least $355 million for NLW, the majority of which was for  procurement of existing commercially developed products.
The Army and Marine Corps have published strategies that direct  commanders to consider the use of NLW in scenarios across a range of  military operations – especially in such areas as military operations other  than war and military operations in urban terrain. Recently, in its  Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and its 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review DOD has also cited a need for non-lethal  capabilities in order to defeat terrorist networks  and secure sites  containing weapons of mass destruction so that materials cannot be  removed.
You asked us to review the status of NLW programs within DOD and the  military services. In response to your request, our objectives for this rep were to identify the extent to which (1) DOD and the Joint Non-Lethal  Weapons Program have developed and fielded non-lethal weapons or  capabilities since the program’s inception; (2) DOD has established and  implemented policy, doctrine and training, and applied them throughout  the spectrum of military operations to guide the NLW programs it has  undertaken since 1997; and (3) DOD has conducted testing prior to fielding its NLW in support of military operations.
To identify the NLW programs DOD has undertaken since 1997 and  evaluate how they were managed, we compiled and analyzed NLW  program budget information from the directorate and the services and  reviewed DOD’s fiscal year 2009 budget submissions. We also reviewed  DOD and JNLWD management guidance as well as DOD acquisition  management criteria and federal internal control standards. Although we  were able to identify spending for the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program,  because of gaps in available service and other data we are not assured that  we identified all NLW funding. To determine the extent to which DOD has  established and implemented policy, doctrine, and training, we reviewed  and analyzed joint and service directives and other publications and  conducted interviews with cognizant officials in DOD, the Department of  Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice. To determine the  extent to which NLW have undergone testing and evaluation, we  compared the results of independent human effects assessment review  panels with DOD test and evaluation guidance, compared DOD’s  prefielding testing requirements with the documentation that recorded the  tests actually performed, and compared service urgent and standard  fielding requirements. In addition, we reviewed DOD acquisition policy  and related risk management guidance and reviewed the status of test and  evaluation management plans and relevant documentation. Except where  noted, we limited our discussion of technology development to those  items that were specifically designed to conform to the DOD definition of  NLW.
We conducted our review from March 2008 through April 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidenceobtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. The scope and method review are described in further detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Defense considered appropriate. Since that time, the joint non-lethal  weapons program, with the Commandant of the Marine Corps assigned executive agent, has assumed a role in the requirements development  process as well as research, development, test and evaluation.
subsections: section_title: Structure and Managem thal of the Joint Non-Le Weapons Program
paragraphs: DOD Directive 3000.3 assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics principal oversight for th Non-Lethal Weapons Program, including joint service program  coordination to help highlight and prevent duplication of program  development, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special  Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict under the Under Secretary Defense for Policy, has policy oversight for the development and  employment of non-lethal weapons.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps is the executive agent for the DOD  Non-Lethal Weapons Program. The executive agent serves as the prim DOD/U.S. Coast Guard point of contact for non-lethal weapons and is  tasked to coordinate, integrate, review, and recommend, the Join Lethal Weapons program to the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and coordinate requirements  among the services. Such action is to be taken in consultation with the  services, combatant commanders, DOD agencies, and U.S. Coast Guard. Within the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ command, the Joint Non- Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) was established to perform the day- to-day management of the NLW program. The JNLWD’s director repor the executive agent and, in addition to overseeing joint development  efforts which are led by a designated service, monitors the status of  service-unique NLW programs. The directorate consists of three divisio — Concepts and Requirements, Technology, and Acquisition — and a  support branch. The JNLWD provides program research and de funds but the services are responsible for acquisition program  management in accordance with applicable instructions and regulations. The services also established a joint coordination and integration groupcomprised of representatives from each service as well as U.S. Special  Operations Command and the U.S. Coast Guard, whose principal role is to  advise on and assist in NLW sy structure of the program is illustrated in figure 1.
section_title: Requirements Development Process
paragraphs: Joint  planning to a capabilities-based model, DOD implemented JCIDS in 2 as the department’s principal process for identifying, assessing, and  prioritizing joint military capabilities.
section_title: DOD Acquisition Process
paragraphs: The requirements and acquisition systems interlock to create products  that are intended to meet DOD’s needs. DOD’s oversight of its systems  acquisitions is described in a set of documents that provide the policies  and guidance for departmental efforts to acquire service capabilities and  systems.  As figure 2 illustrates, the acquisition process consists of five  phases, and at certain points the designated individual with overall  responsibility for the program (known as the milestone decision authority)  reviews the status of the effort and decides whether to approve entry into  the next phase of the acquisition process. The materiel solution analysis  phase begins with the Materiel Development Decision review, “at which  point the Joint Staff shall present the JROC recommendations and the  DOD component presents the  including:  the preliminary concept of operations, a description of the needed  capability, the operational risk, and the basis for determining that non- materiel approaches will not sufficiently mitigate the capability gap.” The  Technology Development phase begins at Milestone A, when the Milestone  Decision Authority has approved a material solution and a Technology  Development Strategy and has documented the decision in an Acquisition  Decision Memorandum. Its purpose is to “reduce technology risk,  determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated  into a full system, and to demonstrate  on  prototypes.” The Technology Development Strategy documents a number  of things, including “a preliminary acquisition strategy, including overall  cost, schedule, and performance goals for the total research and  development program,” and exit criteria for the Technology Development  phase.
The Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase begins at  Milestone B, when the Milestone Decision Authority approves the  Acquisition Strategy and the Acquisition Program Baseline and documents  the decision in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum. Its purposes  include: to develop a system or an increment of capability; complete full  system integration… develop an affordable and executable manufacturing  process; ensure operational supportability with particular attention to  minimizing the logistics footprint… ensure affordability… and  demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility. This  phase includes a System Capability and Manufacturing Process  Demonstration, which ends when “the system meets approved  requirements and is demonstrated in its intended environment …  manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated in a pilot line  environment; industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and the  system meets or exceeds exit criteria and Milestone C entrance  requirements.” Successful developmental test and evaluation is also  required during this effort. Test and evaluation are used to assess  improvements to mission capability and operational support based on user  needs. This phase concludes with Milestone C, where the Milestone  Decision Authority must commit to the program or decide to end the  effort.
The purpose of the Production and Deployment phase is to “achieve an  operational capability that satisfies mission needs,” utilizing operational  test and evaluation to determine the effectiveness and suitability of the  system. Criteria for entrance into this phase include: “acceptable  performance in developmental test and evaluation and operational  assessment… an approved Initial Capabilities Document (if Milestone C is  program initiation); an approved Capability Production Document  (CPD)… acceptable interoperability; acceptable operational  supportability; and demonstration that the system is affordable throughout  the life cycle, fully funded, and properly phased for rapid acquisition.”  The Operations and Support phase is used “to execute a support program  that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance  requirements, and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner  over its total life cycle.” Criteria for entrance into this phase include “an  approved CPD; an approved ; and a  successful Full-Rate Production Decision.” Life-cycle sustainment  includes considerations such as “supply; maintenance; transportation;  sustaining engineering… environment, safety, and occupational health;  supportability; and interoperability.”
section_title: Testing and Evaluation
paragraphs: The fundamental purpose of testing and evaluation is the same for military  and commercial products. Testing is the main instrument used to gauge  the progress being made when an idea or concept is translated into an  actual product. According to DOD guidance, a test is any procedure  designed to obtain, verify, or provide data for the evaluation of research  and development; progress in accomplishing development objectives; or  performance and operational capability of systems, subsystems,  components, and equipment items. Evaluation refers to what is learned  from a test. The test and evaluation process provides an assessment of  the attainment of technical performance, specifications, and system  maturity to determine whether systems are operationally effective,  suitable, and survivable for intended use. Testing and evaluation is used at  a variety of levels, including basic technology, components and  subsystems, and a complete system or product. The fundamental purpose  of testing and evaluation is to provide knowledge to assist in managing the  risks involved in developing, producing, operating, and sustaining systems  and capabilities. In both DOD and commercial firms, product testing is  conducted by organizations separate from those responsible for managing  product development.
Standard fielding processes require extensive testing for new programs.  For example, the Army’s process to certify weapons for normal fielding  requires several different kinds of assessment before a weapon can be  fielded. Environmental and air worthiness statements are required. Results  of user safety reviews, inspections, and analyses are also required, in  addition to a safety confirmation from the Army Test and Evaluation  Command. The Army Test and Evaluation Command must also provide an  operational test report. Operational test and evaluation is conducted to  estimate a system’s operational effectiveness and operational suitability.  The testing agency will identify needed modifications; provide information  on tactics, doctrine, organizations and personnel requirements; and  evaluate the system’s logistic supportability. Thorough and complete  testing not only provides assurance that weapons achieve the desired  results intended by design, but also allows decision makers in charge of  fielding determinations some level of confidence that their selections will  perform as advertised. By contrast, an urgent or abbreviated fielding  decision allows much of this testing to be bypassed when there is an  established and immediate operational need, and then usually only user  safety testing is required. For example, one Marine Corps policy states that  abbreviated acquisition programs—which the policy identifies as generally  small, low cost and low risk programs—are not required to undergo  operational testing. Furthermore, another Marine Corps policy states that  with appropriate commanding general authority, all testing can be waived,  allowing weapons to be fielded in limited quantities to meet urgent  operational requirements. Testing for commercial-off-the-shelf items can  be even more limited than testing for those that are urgently fielded. DOD  guidance states that—in order to take advantage of reduced acquisition  time and to ensure that testing is not redundant and is limited to the  minimum effort necessary to obtain the required data—“testing can be  minimized by 1) obtaining and assessing contractor test results; 2)  obtaining usage and failure data from other customers of the item; 3)  observing contractor testing; 4) obtaining test results from independent  test organizations (e.g., Underwriter’s Laboratory); and 5) verifying  selected contractor test data.” Agency officials must determine that a  contractor’s test results are sufficient before making the decision to use  those test results instead of conducting their own tests.
In 1998 the JNLWD contracted The Pennsylvania State University to  convene the Human Effects Advisory Panel, a group of scientists who  provide assessment of NLW. The panel issued recommendations on the  following subjects:    A quantitative definition of “non-lethal” and other associated terms,  including incapacitation.
An assessment of DOD’s methods to generate and verify human effects.    An evaluation of DOD’s methodology to generate and validate data.    An evaluation of data to support NLW effect analysis.
The Human Effects Advisory Panel report concluded that there was a  knowledge gap between the expectations of the warfighter and the  information provided by the scientific community’s simulation tools. In  response to the panel’s recommendations, the JNLW Integrated Process  Team Chairman directed that the Human Effects Process Action Team be  formed and requested membership from all of the services. The Human  Effects Process Action Team was chartered to study the deficiencies in the  process of understanding NLW human effects and to recommend policy  changes that will help resolve these issues. The team examined current  processes for evaluating NLW human effects and made three primary  recommendations to DOD: (1) establish an independent board to review  the human effects assessments accompanying NLW systems and to ensure  that all reasonable assessments have been performed based on available  technology and resources; (2) create a NLW Human Effects Center of  Excellence to serve as the NLW program managers one-stop resource for  information on human effects testing; and (3) adopt a risk assessment  approach to evaluating the NLW human effects data due to the  uncertainties involved with the science of human effects characterization.  The first two recommendations have been implemented.
In 2001, the Human Effects Center of Excellence was created via a  memorandum of agreement between the Air Force Research Laboratory  and the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program. The center was founded to  provide assistance and advice to program managers concerning likely  effects of non-lethal technologies and the risks associated with those  effects. The center also serves as a central location for non-lethal human  effects data and provides recommendations on which laboratories or field  activities can collect scientifically derived information when such  information is not already available. The Human Effects Review Board  was established in 2000 to independently review non-lethal human effects  research and analyses associated with specific NLW systems or  technologies. The board consists of representatives from the services’  offices of the Surgeons General, the Medical Officer of the Marine Corps,  and the services’ Safety Officers and includes legal and DOD policy  participation. The board provides NLW program managers and milestone  decision authorities with an independent measure of health risks and  recommendations for mitigating potential risks.
section_title: DOD Research and Development Efforts Have Yielded Few Products to Address Non-Lethal Weapon Needs
paragraphs: The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program has conducted more than 50  research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million since  1997, but it has not developed any new weapons, and the military services  have fielded 4 items stemming from these efforts that only partially fill  some capability gaps identified since 1998. Among the contributing  factors, we found that DOD did not prioritize departmentwide non-lethal  capability gaps until 2007 and still does not have efforts under way to fully  address these gaps, that DOD did not give consistent consideration to  logistics and supportability in its NLW development process; and that DOD  exercises limited general oversight of the program.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Only Partially Addressed Its Capability Gaps
paragraphs: The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program is sponsoring efforts that address  about two-thirds of DOD’s NLW capability gaps, but even those efforts  provide incomplete solutions, according to the current joint capability  assessment. Under the JCIDS process, formal capability assessments are  to be used for identifying gaps in military capabilities and potential  material and nonmateriel solutions for filling those gaps. Using this  approach, the JNLWD, which sponsored the 2008 Joint Capabilities  Document for Joint Non-Lethal Effects, identified 36 capability gaps that  represented specific tasks where needs were not met by existing or  planned systems. The tasks were categorized as either counter-personnel  or counter-materiel, and included numerous variations, such as stopping a  vehicle or vessel, suppressing individuals, and denying individuals access  to an area, all under varying conditions. The gaps were then prioritized  by service and combatant command representatives. The resulting list  represented the areas in which Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program  research and development initiatives, service acquisition decisions, and  other related resource investments are most needed to satisfy the needs of  joint force commanders. Table 1 shows the 36 tasks that were analyzed  and found to represent gaps in DOD’s NLW capability, as well as their  relative priorities.
While DOD is now building on the results of this process to determine how  to fill the capability gaps, most of the gaps were already broadly identified  11 years ago. The list of 36 gaps is consistent with needs that were  acknowledged in DOD’s 1998 Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons as  well as its 2002 Mission Needs Statement for a Family of Non-Lethal  Capabilities. Though the JNLWD and the services have been working on  non-lethal capabilities since 1997, most of these gaps in non-lethal  capabilities still exist today. Table 2 compares non-lethal capability needs  that DOD has identified prior to the ongoing capability-based assessment  process.
During the recent capability-based assessment, several NLW efforts were  examined, including the 4 programs that have completed the development  process and been fielded by one or more of the military services. These  programs are    40 mm non-lethal crowd dispersal cartridge,    modular crowd control munition,    portable vehicle arresting barrier, and    vehicle lightweight arresting device.
Of these, 3 are variations of or munitions for existing weapons, and the  portable vehicle arresting barrier was in an early stage of development  when the JNLWD began funding the program.
Even when combined with the 12 additional efforts that are ongoing as of  March 2009, these programs will not completely eliminate the capability  gaps they were designed to address. Existing joint efforts will not fully  satisfy all of the tasks, conditions, and standards that DOD analyzed in the  process of identifying NLW capability gaps. Based on our analysis of the  JNLWD’s program information worksheets and other documents, we  found that there are efforts under way to address the top two-thirds of the  list of 36 gaps, although we note that there was no comprehensive source  that identified each ongoing effort and linked it to the capability gap(s) it  addressed. Appendix III provides further detail on the gaps that lack a  corresponding effort to address them. Table 3 shows a list of current NLW  programs and the priorities of the gaps they are supposed to address.
Even though the programs listed in table 3 are intended to address about  two-thirds of the capability gaps, they (along with systems already fielded)  still only partially meet DOD’s NLW needs, based on the latest joint  capability assessment. For example, a vehicle stopper that uses spikes  and netting may not cause a quickly moving car to come to a complete  stop before it reaches a checkpoint. Therefore, those capability gaps will  not be fully addressed and will remain identified gaps. By not assessing  and describing the extent to which efforts are expected to satisfy  capability gaps, for example, in forums where information on ongoing and  proposed programs is presented, the JNLWD has missed an opportunity to  fully meet the warfighters’ highest-priority needs for non-lethal  capabilities. The military services may also fund their own separate  development efforts to address service-unique needs, but with few  exceptions have not done so. According to both service and joint program  officials, this reflects the low priority that services place on funding non- lethal weapons development. In addition, service NLW proponents have  said that the existence of joint funding has made service funding more  difficult to obtain. With little progress made toward filling the capability  gaps with fielded equipment, joint force commanders continue to lack  sufficient non-lethal capabilities.
section_title: DOD Has Not Given Timely and Consistent Consideration to Logistics and Supportability
paragraphs: The Joint Coordination and Integration Group, by joint service agreement,  is responsible in coordination with the JNLWD for cataloging and tracking  progress of programs to include logistics sustainment and logistics  requirements planning and ensuring that program managers in the military  services conduct appropriate integrated logistic support planning and  execution. However, DOD has not given timely and consistent  consideration to NLW logistics and supportability because fielded NLW  items, which have generally been urgently requested, commercially  purchased, or both, have not been subject to the logistics requirements of  the normal acquisition process. Moreover, the JNLWD does not make the  best use of its own tools for assessing the status and progress of NLW  efforts.
Specific logistics planning procedures vary by service. For example, under  Navy acquisitions policies, program managers are required to complete an  independent logistics assessment before a research and development  effort may advance through the acquisition process to the point, known as  Milestone B, at which an acquisition program is formally initiated.  However, only 6 ongoing joint directorate-funded NLW efforts have passed  Milestone B, of which 4 have reached Milestone C, by which point  operational supportability with particular attention to minimizing the  logistics footprint should be ensured. Another 18 efforts were terminated  for various reasons (one after passing milestone B), and two were  advanced concept technology demonstrations, which were not required to  follow the normal acquisition process while the demonstrations were  under way. One of the advanced concept technology demonstrations  pursued directed-energy technology research to develop a NLW that uses  millimeter waves to produce an intense heating sensation on the surface of  skin, causing an immediate response and movement by target personnel.  This effort, which cost about $35.5 million, yielded two prototypes known  as Active Denial Systems 1 and 2. The second prototype weighs more than  9 tons, and has been mounted on a heavier vehicle than the first prototype  to accommodate additional armor and air-conditioning (see fig. 3).  Because of its weight, it is not easily used for missions requiring mobility.  This system also needs about 16 hours to cool down to its operating  temperature of 4 degrees Kelvin (-452 degrees Fahrenheit), making it  difficult to use on short notice unless the compressor is kept continuously  running. In addition, the Marine Corps considered this system’s gyrotron,  waveguides, super-conducting magnets, antenna, and some other major  subsystems too complex to allow extensive field repair, so its utility could  be further reduced. Combat damage to the antenna could create a logistics  problem as it is a large item making storage and replacement difficult. The  Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program sponsored a Concept Exploration  Program for crowd-control technologies which published an analysis of  multiple concepts in 2003. The report evaluated eight systems using a  variety of criteria, including logistics, and found that the Active Denial  System received the lowest benefit:cost score of these. JNLWD officials  have made multiple attempts to field the Active Denial System under the  rubric of an urgent operational need despite the logistics problems noted  above and even though, if it is deployed, its mobility could be further  limited where highway overpasses are present. In December 2008, the joint  NLW program executive agent terminated efforts to deploy Active Denial  System 2 overseas.
The manner of purchase and fielding can also affect whether NLW  undergo full suitability and supportability evaluations. The fielding process  normally provides an opportunity to scrutinize items that a service has  procured and intends to provide to its personnel. They receive a formal  certification that they are safe, meet performance requirements, and are  logistically supportable when used within stated operational parameters.  However, nine NLW systems were purchased from commercial vendors  and fielded under urgent processes which allow services to certify  materiel on a limited basis in order to rapidly support an operational need.  In some cases, logistics weaknesses that might have been uncovered by  the normal fielding process were not discovered during the abbreviated  analysis that takes place prior to fielding. For example, the FN-303 Less- Lethal Launching System program, which DOD spent about $2 million to  evaluate, was terminated because the weapon was too heavy and  ergonomically cumbersome, the weapon and ammunition magazine was  too fragile, and the weapon required compressed air canisters in order to  launch its non-lethal munitions. However, several dozen FN-303s were  fielded to units even though their utility was limited by the availability of  the canisters and the infrastructure to replenish them (see fig. 4).
In addition, human electro-muscular incapacitation is an ongoing program  that was initiated in fiscal year 2005. One such device, the TASER® X-26  (see fig. 5), has already been fielded to units—both domestically and  overseas—as part of the multiple-item Non-Lethal Capability Set.  According to NLW training course materials, however, the TASER® X-26E  will not be deployed near flammable materials or liquids, as the arcing  from the probes could ignite flammable material. In addition, if it is  exposed to significant moisture, operators should dry the weapon  thoroughly and wait at least 24 hours before proceeding. We believe that  these factors could limit the range of environments in which the X-26E  (which, like the X-26, has already been fielded) could be employed.
We believe that the JNLWD is missing the opportunity to provide sufficient  visibility to logistics concerns in part because it does not make optimum  use of available tools to catalog and track progress and in part because  most of the efforts it funds have not advanced to the stage where these  concerns are paramount. The directorate’s program information  worksheet, for example, is one of the means that the directorate uses to  gather information from program managers about ongoing and proposed  efforts, but it does not include a specific space for the program manager to  describe logistics supportability goals and how they will be met. The  JNLWD uses the program information worksheet to develop an Investment  Decision Support Tool, in which the directorate ranks proposed efforts  overall and according to five subcategories: cost, schedule, operational  contribution, and technology and human effects readiness levels. In our  review of available worksheets, we found that there was not necessarily a  direct link between the operational contribution score and logistics  concerns. For example, the Active Denial System and Mobility Denial  System have both received operational contribution scores of 100 despite  their supportability problems. Further, requirements for logistics analysis  in preparation for a Milestone B decision are often not yet applicable,  since 10 of the efforts that the JNLWD was funding as of March 2009 had  not yet advanced to that step. An Army official told us that his senior  leadership is beginning to require this earlier in the process for Army  programs. Without giving full and early consideration to logistics and  supportability issues, DOD increases the risk that developmental efforts  may not meet service requirements and obtain service funding beyond  research and development into acquisition and fielding. While the joint  program funds technology research, it is the services that pay to procure,  operate, and maintain equipment. DOD also increases its risk of fielding  items under urgent processes that are infeasible, difficult to sustain, or  both. While DOD has procedures to try to field needed capabilities quickly,  these procedures are designed to maximize utility to the warfighter. To the  extent that these procedures result in fielding cumbersome or fragile  equipment, they may not achieve that goal. Without building these  considerations into the earliest stages of development or consideration of  commercial off-the-shelf items, DOD may miss opportunities to allocate  resources more effectively.
section_title: DOD Exercises Limited Oversight of the NLW Program
paragraphs: DOD’s oversight of the Joint NLW Program, for which the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) has  principal oversight responsibility, and for which the Commandant of the  Marine Corps has been assigned as Executive Agent, has been limited.  This has resulted in gaps in the timeliness and utility of key program  guidance as well as limited measurement of progress and performance. A  well-managed program, according to federal internal control standards,  sets clear and consistent objectives, monitors performance, and ensures  that findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. Further  complicating DOD’s oversight, no single organization has visibility over all  spending categories and available budget information may not fully  capture all spending associated with the development of non-lethal  capabilities.
subsections: section_title: NLW Program Guidance Is Incomplete and Outdated
paragraphs: Both AT&L and the Executive Agent have broad responsibilities for  oversight and management of DOD’s NLW program. Although DOD’s NLW  policy directive does not specify how AT&L should carry out its oversight  of the NLW program, AT&L’s general oversight responsibilities, including  the development of acquisition-related plans, strategies, guidance, and  assessments, and the principles of good program management are  delineated in other DOD directives. According to the 2002 joint service  memorandum of agreement, meanwhile, the Executive Agent is supposed  to draft, staff, publish, and maintain a master plan that defines the vision,  goals, and objectives of the program and includes an overarching  framework for research, development, and acquisition as well as modeling  and simulation and experimentation plans.
However, these plans, along with other key program documents, are  outdated and some are currently being revised, as noted in table 4.
The Memorandum of Agreement is an agreement among the service chiefs  of staff, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Commander of the  U.S. Special Operations Command to implement procedures for the NLW  program. The 2002 memorandum is outdated, for example, in its lack of  provision for oversight of science and technology programs, which the  Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program began to fund in fiscal year 2005.  Army and Navy officials have identified science and technology oversight  as an issue to be addressed.
The Joint NLW Program Master Plan’s purpose is to define the vision,  goals, and objectives of the program and it includes an overarching  framework for research, development and acquisition as well as modeling  and simulation and experimentation plans. It is supposed to be updated  biennially. The JNLWD started to update this plan but decided to await the  2003 release of JCIDS to accommodate its requirements. During this same  time frame, the directorate was tasked to develop the NLW Capabilities  Roadmap, to which it has turned its efforts. The Roadmap is designed to  assist in the planning process and to support DOD leaders in making  informed decisions regarding resources, priorities, and policies for NLW  capabilities. While the existing version describes current efforts and lists  anticipated milestones for them, it lacks some elements that could be  helpful to decision makers. For example, the Roadmap does not provide  guidance on how to allocate resources among priority areas, nor does it  relate funding to overall DOD policy and strategy or provide guidance  about how to evaluate program performance. Program officials recognized  that the Roadmap had limitations and began to revise the initial version as  soon as it was approved. As of March 2009, the Roadmap is still being  revised.
A key AT&L official said that NLW program oversight is exercised through  participation in the semiannual meetings of two departmentwide NLW  groups: the Joint Coordination and Integration Group and the general  officer-level Integrated Product Team. The former advises on and assists  in NLW system acquisition while the latter coordinates and integrates joint  requirement and priorities and approves consolidated plans and programs.  In addition, AT&L officials meet quarterly with the JNLWD Director and  participate in other activities, such as the development of the Roadmap, as  necessary. Notwithstanding the participation in meetings, however,  strategic program direction rests on documents that have been delayed or  that lack important elements necessary to make effective decisions. As a  result, there is limited strategic direction for the program to guide its day- to-day efforts.
While DOD’s NLW program lacks the visibility of other programs with  higher priorities and larger budgets, sound program management and  oversight practices should apply. Without a greater degree of participation  in setting program priorities and reviewing and reporting on performance  by AT&L, DOD will not have the level of necessary information needed to  make informed decisions about the effective and efficient management of  the NLW program.
section_title: DOD Lacks Clear Criteria to Assess Whether Programs Should Continue to Receive Funding
paragraphs: We identified 6 cases in which the joint non-lethal weapons program did  not make timely decisions about when to discontinue its research efforts  when several years have passed without substantive progress. Although  not designed specifically for NLW efforts, DOD’s Financial Management  Regulation sets a goal of 6 years (within the future years defense program)  for a program to advance through advanced technology development into  the acquisition process. Based on our analysis of JNLWD programs, three  active development efforts and three terminated efforts reached or  exceeded this time frame (see table 5).
For example, the Airburst Non-Lethal Munition has been under  development for the Army since 1999 (at a cost of nearly $15 million) and  has yet to be fielded. In another example, the Mobility Denial System— which relied on slippery foam to limit vehicle traction—continued for 8  years (at a cost of about $10 million) before being terminated because it  did not meet combat developers’ needs and its extensive water  requirement was considered a logistics burden. Although the Active Denial  concept demonstration only lasted 5 years, active denial technology  research projects have been underway since at least 1997, at a combined  cost of $55.2 million. According to a JNLWD official, the criteria used to  determine when to cancel a program are formulated by the program  sponsor, program manager, and joint representatives. They reflect  technical, programmatic, and policy objectives to be accomplished, and  program decisions are made based on the program’s achievement of these  tasks with recommendations from the Joint Coordinating and Integration  Group. However, as each program is addressed individually, there are no  standard termination criteria that are applied to all NLW programs.
The directorate uses an Investment Decision Support Tool to evaluate  proposed NLW programs as well as active development programs, scoring  them on a scale of 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). The directorate uses this  tool to assist in deciding if certain programs are worthy of JNLWD  attention and funding, and its results are briefed to service representatives.  However, according to a JNLWD official, the scores programs receive on  the tool do not directly correlate to the priority for investments because  the tool does not incorporate all factors that decision makers need to  consider. For instance, the tool does not include the relative degrees of  service and combatant command support, past technical performance, or  technological feasibility. Appendix IV presents further detail on all of the  JNLWD-sponsored programs currently under development and their most  recent total scores on the investment decision support tool. While such a  tool may be useful to decision makers, a method that incorporates all of  the factors needed to make an informed decision, such as logistics and  supportability and exit timeframes and criteria, would be a more effective  instrument in allocating limited resources. By continuing to fund over long  periods of time programs that have not demonstrated their intended  capability or have logistics and supportability challenges, the directorate is  encumbering resources that might better be used toward the development  of other non-lethal weapons programs and capabilities.
section_title: NLW Program Funding Lacks Centralized Visibility
paragraphs: Further complicating DOD’s ability to oversee its NLW program is the fact  that no single organization has visibility over all spending categories, and  available budget information may not fully capture all spending associated  with the development of non-lethal capabilities. To identify funding for all  DOD NLW programs, the JNLWD could only provide us full budgetary  figures for its own programs for science and technology or research,  development, test and evaluation. Directorate officials are not assigned  oversight over service-unique programs and so could not determine  exactly how much the services and other DOD components (such as U.S.  Special Operations Command) are spending on their own NLW programs.  Conversely, the interservice coordinating groups may not provide all  necessary information, as the representatives review and approve the  approximately 70 percent of the JNLWD budget that goes to research and  development, but do not receive a detailed breakdown of the remaining  costs. These include such items as studies and analysis, contract support,  and salaries for liaisons to the services and combatant commands.
We examined budget documents to ascertain what DOD invested for NLW  and we found that—in addition to the JNLWD—all four military services,  U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense have spent money on NLW programs in some capacity during at  least some of the last 12 years, but documentation did not always show  which non-lethal programs were being funded, nor was it always evident  what year the money was being spent. Based on this limited  documentation, we identified funding for the military services and other  organizations that totaled about $355 million from 1997 through 2008. The  JNLWD provided data showing that funding for JNLWD programs totaled  about $462 million, giving DOD a total of $817 million budgeted for that  time period.
The reliability of our estimate of total spending was also affected because  DOD budgets do not isolate the portion of weapon procurement budgets  that should be attributed to non-lethal effects. Several lethal weapon  systems may have non-lethal capabilities. For example, the Army’s Spider  Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternative system can use non-lethal munitions  to deter, rather than destroy, enemy personnel. However, none of the  $172.1 million budgeted for the Spider through fiscal year 2009 was listed  as part of the NLW program. Table 6 lists several examples of normally  lethal weapon programs that have the capability to be used in a non-lethal  manner or use non-lethal munitions.
We also found that part of what the military services categorized as non- lethal weapons spending included items that were not necessarily  developed as NLW. For example, non-lethal capability sets, which account  for about $122 million, are being procured and distributed to units  overseas as well as to National Guard troops stationed in units in U.S.  states and territories, and are packed in several modules that may be  tailored according to mission, for example, checkpoint guards. However,  the sets contain such items as riot gear (face shields, shin guards, flex  cuffs, etc.) that are not, by DOD’s own definition, non-lethal weapons.  Rather, they could more accurately be described as personal protective  equipment. Because of definition considerations such as this, we found  determining the exact amounts of NLW-related spending to be  problematic. DOD plans to spend about $789 million on non-lethal  weapons from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. The complex nature of  categorizing lethal versus non-lethal weapons and programs makes it all  the more important for DOD to have a much clearer understanding of all  the programs and investments it is making in NLW. DOD officials told us  that they are trying to reach consensus among the services on defining  what constitutes a non-lethal weapon in order to more accurately  categorize them for budgetary and other purposes. The inability to easily  track all money spent specifically on non-lethal capabilities—be they  lethal weapons that have non-lethal capabilities or programs that contain  items that are not NLW by definition—puts JNLWD and service officials at  a distinct disadvantage as they will not have all the information they need  to make informed budget decisions. Without adequate oversight, including  program direction and visibility of all costs and individual program efforts,  the directorate, the services, and DOD at large lack assurance that they are  making the most effective use of departmentwide resources and meeting  warfighters’ needs.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Developed Policy and Doctrine for Use and Training in Non-Lethal Weapons Capabilities
paragraphs: DOD has begun to incorporate ideas about non-lethal capabilities into  policy, doctrine, and training, but gaps in key policy decisions limit the  effectiveness of doctrine changes and subsequent training. DOD has not  yet clearly defined the accepted level of risk for fatality, nor has it fully  developed weapons employment policies for overseas warfighting or  homeland applications or ensured that warfighters and domestic  responders are fully trained in NLW use. Without resolving these policy  problems, DOD’s ability to integrate NLW concepts into doctrine and  subsequently train personnel in those operations is limited.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Begun to Incorporate Non-Lethal Capabilities into Policy, Doctrine, and Training
paragraphs: DOD published a directive in 1996 establishing policy and assigning  responsibilities for the development and employment of non-lethal  weapons. According to this directive, non-lethal weapons, doctrine, and  concepts of operation are to be designed to reinforce deterrence and  expand the range of options available to commanders. Non-lethal weapons  are also meant to enhance the capability of U.S. forces to discourage,  delay, or prevent hostile actions; limit escalation; take military action in  situations where use of lethal force is not the preferred option; better  protect the forces; temporarily disable equipment facilities and personnel;  and help decrease the postconflict costs of reconstruction. DOD has begun  to incorporate non-lethal weapons into existing doctrine and concept  publications. The joint staff and the services have issued several dozen  doctrine publications that cited a need for non-lethal capabilities and  began to discuss the importance of developing capabilities that may be  applied across the range of military operations, such as for Peace  Operations, Urban Operations, and Civil Support. These organizations  have also updated publications that describe a need to include NLW as  part of the overall use of force continuum within planning for such diverse  missions as command and control for joint land and maritime operations  and joint counterdrug operations.
In addition to mentioning the need for NLW capabilities in policy and  doctrine, the services and combatant commands also have begun to  incorporate non-lethal weapons into their plans and procedures. U.S.  Northern Command has developed concept of operations plans for  Defense Support to Civil Authorities/Homeland Defense missions. The  military services have issued a joint tactics, techniques and procedures  manual and updated the manual in 2007. They have also issued service- specific guidance. For example, the Air Force has a manual tailored to the  particular needs of Air Force security forces and the Army has published a  field manual on civil disturbance operations. The Marine Corps has  developed mission-essential tasks and individual training standards in  support of NLW use and recently issued specific use policy for human  electromuscular incapacitation devices such as TASER®. Beginning in  1998, the Marine Corps was designated as the lead service for the  Interservice Non-lethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course—the source  for formal NLW instructor training for all of the services—and has also  deployed mobile training teams to help facilitate on-site NLW training in  Iraq.
Although DOD has begun to incorporate NLW concepts throughout its  body of operational doctrine, our analysis indicated that most references  are limited, recognizing the value of such a capability, the need for it, or  both, but not providing additional guidance about how such capabilities  should modify existing operational concepts. For example, the joint  doctrine publication, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, includes two  paragraphs that describe the potential flexibility offered by non-lethal  weapons but offers no other operational perspective or guidance in the  150-page publication. This may limit the utility of information on non- lethal weapons in existing doctrine. One reason for this is that we found  gaps in DOD’s policy and guidance for NLW. DOD recognizes that policy  tends to drive doctrine and doctrine, in turn, influences training and the  execution of operations. Therefore, weaknesses in policy make it  difficult to effectively produce or augment the doctrine and training.
section_title: Gaps Remain in NLW Policy, Doctrine, and Training for Overseas and Homeland Operations
paragraphs: While DOD has clearly articulated a policy that non-lethal weapons shall  not be required to have a zero probability of producing fatalities or  permanent injuries, it has not (1) fully articulated what constitutes  acceptable risk, (2) fully explained how employment doctrine should vary  by scenario, or (3) provided specialized training to enable operators to  make effective use of NLW in various contingencies, particularly within  the United States. DOD has not reached consensus on how to answer  these questions.
subsections: section_title: Level of Acceptable Risk Is Not Clear
paragraphs: The directive that establishes DOD policies and assigns responsibilities for  the development and employment of non-lethal weapons states that NLW  are designed and employed to minimize, rather than eliminate, fatalities.  As such, NLW may have lethal effects and therefore carry some level of  risk that is not precisely defined. For example, non-lethal is described in a  joint functional concept as the degree to which the joint force is able to  create desired effects using incapacitating, nonfatal capabilities. In  addition, DOD stated as part of the capabilities-based assessment that  increasing non-lethality widens the range of effects the joint force is able  to achieve without using deadly force, or in the case of defense support to  civil authorities, that the avoidance of casualties is imperative. An early  assessment by the Human Effects Advisory Panel posited that acceptable  risk was 1 percent suffering permanent damage (of which half were  lethal), 98 percent incapacitation, and no effect on 1 percent of the  population, but senior NLW program officials said that those figures were  never considered authoritative and that acceptable risk had not been  quantified.
DOD has also not fully clarified what constitutes acceptable risk short of  fatality. Current DOD policy defines NLW as weapons that are explicitly  designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate, and are intended to  have “relatively reversible” effects. Based on the results of the capability- based assessment, the JNLWD has modified its definition of NLW to  include weapons, devices, and munitions that are explicitly designed and  primarily employed to “immediately incapacitate” targeted personnel or  material, and that are intended to have “reversible” effects. These changes  have not yet been incorporated into overarching DOD policy, although  JNLWD officials have said that they are understood within DOD. However,  publications are not fully synchronized throughout the department; for  example, Army doctrine states that the use of NLW should “temporarily  incapacitate.” Furthermore, it states that NLW use must not result in  unnecessary suffering” without defining this term in the context of NLW  effects. Each of these definitions has different implications for NLW  development and employment, because as the “dose” of a weapon  increases, so does its potential both to achieve the desired effect and to  produce permanent injury. Thus, a NLW that is more successful with  respect to onset – that is, immediately incapacitates — could be less so  with respect to duration – that is, proves irreversible.
Once DOD does finalize a new common definition, though, uncertainty  about acceptable results of the use of NLW may still create unrealistic  expectations. For example, the Marine Corps prepared an urgent needs  statement to support its request to field a laser dazzler, in which it noted  that the flares then in use caused injury and one fatality. The Marine Corps  requesters wanted a capability that would avoid that outcome. The  uncertainty of outcome may lead to expectations that non-lethal actually  means never lethal, and moreover may not even cause any kind of serious  injury. According to a senior NLW program official, the term “non-lethal”  itself sets up false expectations, and DOD should establish a concerted  strategic communications program to disabuse those who may be the  target of such weapons as well as military users of the idea that “non- lethal” is risk-free. DOD’s interservice NLW training course materials also  cite the possibility that political or military leaders might form an incorrect  perception that NLW will allow wars and military operations other than  war to be prosecuted without casualties. Other federal agencies, whose  personnel may use NLW within the United States, manage expectations  differently. For example, the Department of Justice uses the term “less- lethal” so as not to create the expectation that certain weapons never  produce fatal results. The Department of Homeland Security uses both  terms. Congress also defined NLW in a way that may reinforce  expectations. In the statute directing DOD to establish centralized  responsibility for the establishment of NLW technology it defined a “non- lethal weapon” as a weapon or instrument the effect of which on human  targets is less than fatal.
DOD has not been able to provide further clarification on acceptable risk  primarily because there is no departmentwide consensus on what  constitutes acceptable risk. DOD officials have been discussing the  development of a methodology for characterizing acceptable risk that can  be applied more specifically to individual non-lethal weapons or devices.  They told us that they are nearing agreement within the department on this  methodology. However, as of February 2009, the methodology had not  been formally approved. The lack of a consistent and clear methodology  regarding risk levels can hinder efforts to write formal requirements for  material solutions to identified capability gaps, without which new  products cannot progress through the acquisition process, and can  complicate efforts to field NLW that are purchased from commercial  vendors, to use them, or both. Until NLW terminology is clarified and fully  disseminated, it could continue to create unrealistic expectations that  could complicate the efforts of material developers, result in inconsistent  rules of engagement, and make operational commanders more hesitant to  employ any available NLW. Moreover, until DOD clarifies its policy on how  to assess the risk of fatality or permanent injury it is willing to accept, it  will be very difficult to develop, deploy, train for, and use any NLW that  have the potential either to be lethal or create detrimental political effects.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Explained How NLW Employment Should Differ by Scenario
paragraphs: Our analysis of DOD’s policy and doctrine showed that DOD personnel  lack clear guidance about how to employ NLW across the range of military  operations, both overseas and domestically. This could be relevant, for  example, for a range of missions that involve force but occur in a  nominally “peacetime” scenario, or in ambiguous situations across the  spectrum of conflict. NLW may be used to determine intent: a warning  NLW, such as the laser dazzler, might be used to induce an approaching  vehicle, individual, or group to stop, and failure to stop is then assumed to  mean hostile intent against which lethal force may be used. However, our  review and analysis of existing doctrine showed that it does not provide  adequate guidance for employing NLW in ambiguous situations, such as  when a vehicle or pedestrian is approaching a checkpoint and intent is not  obvious. In some cases, servicemembers might not be able to determine  intent until an individual is within a short distance. While there are NLW  such as the laser dazzler that can allow troops to attempt to provide  warnings over long distances, the existing suite of NLW that can  incapacitate an individual is only effective at close range, so  servicemembers have limited options. They could use blunt-force  munitions or electro-muscular incapacitation devices, both of which are  generally ineffective beyond a short range; or wait for an individual to  approach to within the range at which these work, at which point effective  self-defense may no longer be possible. These policy and weapons  employment considerations are important to the warfighter because they  represent a balance between safety/risk for U.S. service personnel and  safety/risk to individuals or groups targeted by NLW. They are also  important to provide context for the application of the standing rules of  engagement that apply to military operations, for use where U.S. forces  face hostile forces, hostile acts, or demonstrated hostile intent.
Concepts of operations for use of DOD forces within the United States  consider the avoidance of civilian casualties imperative, and the standing  rules for use of force state that, normally, force is to be used only as a last  resort and the force used should be the minimum necessary. Deadly  force is to be used only when all lesser means have failed or cannot  reasonably be employed, which implies that all other options must be  exhausted first. By contrast, overarching DOD non-lethal weapons policy  states that the existence of NLW in no way constitutes an obligation their employment and that the United States retains the option for   DOD has not issued new guidance or immediate use of lethal weapons. instituted training that reconciles these two stances; for example Nation Guard Bureau guidance for the domestic employment of NLW contains little more than a restatement of passages from the DOD directive on non- lethal weapons. DOD also has not directed that any specific pieces of  al  equipment that could produce lethal effects be excluded from the  capability sets that have been fielded in the United States. For example,  non-lethal capability sets containing TASER® have been fielded to  National Guard units in every state. TASER® is controversial because of  concerns about injuries and fatalities that occurred in the course of its u se  in law enforcement. The Marine Corps proscribed use of these weaponsuntil it published a policy specific to TASER®, and the Army compone U.S. Central Command decided not to train troops in their use.
Furthermore, the joint staff has issued doctrine that states the  employment of non-lethal weapons in certain supporting operations will  also be governed by their political impact, For such operations, weapons  employment policies would need to be developed and disseminated so  that the existing rules of engagement and rules for the use of force could  be adequately tailored to minimize detrimental political effects resulting  from the use of NLW. In particular, DOD policy for employment of  directed-energy NLW such as the Active Denial System is incomplete. The  Under Secretary for Policy deemed the system politically untenable for  detainee operations but has not yet issued employment policy for other  missions. While the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has  approved the Active Denial System in principle, a former senior policy  official wrote that DOD would continue to require the development of  definitive concepts of operation; rules of engagement; and tactics,  techniques, and procedures before the Active Denial System could be  deployed. While the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program executive agent in  December 2008 terminated efforts to deploy the existing Active Denial  System overseas, DOD continues to try to find ways to deploy the system  in the United States, possibly at the southern border.
Unresolved questions about acceptable risk and proper employment  guidance can also have an impact on the quality of training that  warfighters and domestic responders receive. DOD’s Interservice Non- Lethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course provides scenario-based  training that can be applied under the standing Rules for the Use of Force  and Rules of Engagement that apply to all services, but it cannot integrate  realistic training for specific situations into its curriculum unless  appropriate policy has been developed. Because currently available NLW  have short ranges, reaction time is limited and warfighters will need to  make quick decisions, possibly in rapidly changing circumstances. While  DOD can and does produce mission-specific rules of engagement, gaps in  policy and doctrine limit the training that can be provided prior to  deployment. Until these issues are resolved, doctrine and training for non- lethal weapons may be limited, and the warfighter or domestic responder  may have fewer options other than resorting to lethal force.
section_title: Testing and Evaluation for NLW Programs Lack Human Effects Guidance and Are Not Uniformly Applied across All Programs
paragraphs: Testing NLW for effects on targets and bystanders is a difficult  technological undertaking, in part because human effects testing needs to  be done using modeling and surrogates which may not accurately reflect  human responses. Further, almost all NLW have been fielded to date using  abbreviated processes because of urgent needs, and as a result, NLW have  generally not undergone the same level of effects testing to meet standard  fielding requirements. One of the components lacking in DOD’s approach  to testing NLW is a consistent methodology for assessing the risks of  various human effects. While DOD has begun to develop elements of a risk  assessment methodology, this methodology cannot be completed until  human effects testing requirements are standardized in DOD policy.  Testing and evaluation that include human effects testing measures could  improve planning and commanders’ ability to avoid unintended effects of  NLW use.
subsections: section_title: Human Effects Testing and Evaluation Is Technologically Difficult for NLW
paragraphs: The complicated nature of testing the outcomes of NLW use centers on the  testing of the effects of these weapons on targets and bystanders— typically referred to as human effects testing. The test and evaluation  process provides an assessment of the attainment of technical  performance, specifications, and system maturity to determine whether  systems are operationally effective, suitable, and survivable for intended  use. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets  principally through blast, penetration and fragmentation, NLW are  intended to prevent the target from functioning and their effects are  intended to be reversible. Testing of human effects would measure the  NLW’s likelihood and degree of causing irreversible effects on human  targets and bystanders. There are, however, several limitations to human  effects testing. Although technology is improving to better test for and  predict NLW human effects, DOD policies limit the use of human  subjects for testing and the nature of nonlethality, which is aimed at  producing reversible effects, poses challenges to testing accuracy. DOD  policy states that “the rights and welfare of human subjects in research  supported or conducted by the DOD Components shall be protected.”  Therefore, when possible, human effects are derived from animal and  computer-based models in substitution for direct effects on human  subjects. We acknowledge the importance of ensuring the protection of  human test subjects but also recognize that the test measures designed  and put in place to operate within these restrictions—such as surrogate  (i.e., test dummies) and animal tests—face unique challenges to produce  accurate and timely test results.
Furthermore, according to a DOD human effects testing official, the  confidence intervals associated with non-lethal effects testing are typically  low. For example, the Human Effects Center of Excellence reports that  testing non-lethal munitions requires accurate accounting for projectile  properties such as its mass, impact velocity, shape, target size, and impact  location. However, potential for injury on the target varies depending on  the weight and size of the target and the accuracy of the NLW projectiles— which are often hard to predict and test for. According to the Human  Effects Advisory Panel, there is a knowledge gap between the  expectations of the warfighter and the information that is being provided  by models and simulation tools from the scientific community. Testing  accuracy is inherently limited when extrapolations are based on subjects  other than human subjects. The Advanced Total Body Model is an example  of a simulation tool used to predict the risks associated with blunt impact  weapons and was designed to test for effects upon various body parts  (e.g., ribs, abdomen, head-neck). However, simulation tools are not  capable of testing for all possible effects derived from a NLW. A broken  rib, for example, could result in a punctured lung which may cause death.  According to officials at the Human Effects Center of Excellence, other  sources used to test and collect data for non-lethal effects are animals that  share similar human characteristics. For example, they said chinchillas  have similar inner ear structures to humans and are used to test for ear  damage caused from acoustic NLW such as flash bang grenades. However,  functional and anatomical differences between human and animal subjects  may limit the generalizability of test results to human populations. If  suitable testing that models NLW effects on humans is not conducted, then  it becomes unclear how and when to use non-lethal weapons given the  lack of assurance concerning the effects on the targets and bystanders.
section_title: DOD Lacks Standardized Policy for Human Effects Testing and a Complete Risk Assessment Methodology
paragraphs: Current DOD testing policies do not address testing of NLW effects on  human targets and bystanders. DOD has started to draft a policy that— once approved—would establish guidance and procedures for the  characterization of target human effects in support of the development of  NLW acquisition programs, but this policy has not yet been agreed on  within DOD, formally approved, or implemented. Therefore, with the  exception of laser-related weapons, human effects testing is currently not  required, including the use of simulation tools and other methods. JNLWD  officials told us that all NLW programs that receive JNLWD funding must  be reviewed by the Human Effects Review Board before every major  acquisition milestone. Service-funded programs are not required to  undergo the same review; however, JNLWD officials said they encourage  it. Army officials told us that they conduct human effects testing for non- urgently fielded NLW. Further limiting the amount of human effects testing  being conducted is the fact that, to date, almost all NLW have been fielded  using abbreviated processes to meet urgent operational requirements.  When there is an established and immediate operational need, an urgent or  abbreviated fielding decision allows DOD to bypass most testing, other  than user safety testing, that is normally conducted for weapons fielded  through the standard process. For example, the Army’s Urgent Material  Release process requires a safety assessment, but Army officials told us  that this safety testing is for the user of the weapon only, and does not test  for the safety of the target or bystanders. Marine Corps policy states that  with appropriate commanding general authority, weapons may be fielded  in limited quantities to meet urgent operational requirements, even if all  safety requirements are not met. A Marine Corps official told us that a  commander’s willingness to accept safety risks associated with an NLW’s  rapid acquisition given the urgent need of the weapon in the field is  ultimately what drives NLW deployment. He said that the most  complicating factor of streamlining and regulating the acquisition process  for NLW from beginning to end is managing this balance between urgency  and safety.
DOD testing for commercial-off-the-shelf items can be even more limited  than for those urgently fielded because agency officials can use contractor  test data instead of conducting their own tests. The Defense Acquisition  Guidebook recognizes the importance of oversight and government  involvement in testing performed by contractors. Anytime agency  officials decide to use contractor test results without adequate oversight  or involvement in the testing, there is an increased risk that the testing was  biased, the testing environment was not relevant for the weapon’s  intended operational use, or the test results were inaccurately  represented. One example of a commercial item where use of contractor  test data had the potential to lead to unpredictable results was the  TASER®. In 2002, the Human Effects Review Board reviewed the  TASER® M26 model and submitted an approved but limited fielding  recommendation. The recommendation was largely based on anecdotal  data and field experience gathered over the last 20 years from police  enforcement activities where TASER® was predominantly used on male  targets. The Human Effects Review Board was concerned by the lack of  unbiased, peer-reviewed scientific evidence of TASER® effects and  effectiveness that is necessary to support a stronger endorsement. In 2003,  the Army’s safety office at Picatinny Arsenal issued a safety certification to  support the urgent fielding of the TASER® M26 model. However, the Army  did not field the M26 model and instead fielded an even more advanced  version of TASER®—the X26E model—that produces a 5 percent increase  in muscle contraction compared to the approved M26 because it uses a  waveform that is different from that of any preexisting models. Although  the Human Effects Review Board did evaluate testing results for the  TASER® X26 model in 2008 and determined that the human effects  research conducted was sufficient, DOD increased the risks of unintended  effects by reviewing testing data after the weapon was already being used  in the field. Although testing the effects of NLW is technologically  challenging, JNLWD recognizes that human effects, effectiveness, and risk  must be quantified in order to support legal, treaty, and policy reviews and  to ensure warfighter confidence in new technologies.
DOD has begun to develop elements of a risk assessment methodology,  but the methodology will not be complete until human effects testing  requirements are standardized in DOD policy. In its Risk Management  Guide for DOD Acquisition, DOD recognizes that risk management is  critical to acquisition program success. In particular, DOD notes the need  to define a program by satisfying the user’s need within acceptable risk.  According to this guide, the purpose of addressing risk in programs is to  help ensure that program cost, schedule, and performance objectives are  achieved at every stage in the program’s life cycle and to communicate to  all stakeholders the process for uncovering, determining the scope of, and  managing program uncertainties. Although DOD policy does state that  NLW shall not be required to have a zero probability of producing fatalities  or significant injuries, our review found that the policy does not articulate  a methodology for what constitutes acceptable risk of fatality and  significant injuries across DOD and the services. Without a better  understanding of acceptable risk, NLW developers and designers have no  way of knowing whether the risk levels associated with the effects  produced from NLW are in compliance with standards and whether NLW  developments are progressing sufficiently to meet the needs of the  warfighter.
Although DOD has not established standardized acceptable levels of risk  of fatality and significant injuries, DOD has a draft policy in development  for a Risk of Significant Injury scale that characterizes the amount of  treatment necessary to reverse the effects of an NLW (see fig. 6). The Risk  of Significant Injury scale broadly categorizes three levels of health care  capabilities required to reverse the effects of NLW once they are used on  targets, but it does not take into account the risk probabilities of injury for  each category for a given weapon or target. In other words, the Risk of  Significant Injury scale does not assess the likelihood that non-lethal  effects could cause a score of 0, 1, or 2 within the scale, and thus does not  provide information about what probability to expect for each category of  injury. The Human Effects Process Action Team concluded in 2000 that  the Human Effects Review Board should make adopting a risk assessment  approach to evaluating the NLW human effects data a priority because of  the uncertainties involved with the science of human effects  characterization. The team—directed by a Marine Corps lieutenant general  and composed of each service’s acquisition executive and surgeon  general—stated that a risk assessment methodology would allow the  human effects of NLW to be expressed along with a measure of the  confidence in the data. Hypothetically, if testing showed that a NLW  carries a 15 percent risk for permanent injuries, a risk assessment  methodology would allow a risk level (e.g., low-to-moderate or moderate- to-high) to be assigned. A commander can then use this as a basis for a  decision on whether to accept that risk.
DOD has not yet established a risk assessment methodology for human  effects testing that is capable of identifying the potential risks associated  with the use of NLW. Without a risk assessment methodology, NLW human  effects are not fully understood and cannot accurately be predicted, which  may result in unexpected effects upon targets and bystanders and cause  political consequences. DOD recognizes that part of a successful risk  management strategy includes sufficient testing and evaluation measures,  and DOD also recognizes the importance of assessing operational  effectiveness. Nevertheless, testing and evaluation that include human  effects testing measures could improve planning and commanders’ ability  to avoid unintended effects of NLW use.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD’s Non-Lethal Weapons Program is intended to provide U.S. armed  forces with flexibilities for dealing with the rapidly changing threat  environment, especially when using lethal force is undesirable. However,  key aspects of this program, such as assessing the extent to which priority  capability gaps will be addressed, focusing on supportability and  operational utility in the field, and providing oversight and full funding  visibility, have been limited. These problems have contributed to the  program’s overall limited progress in fielding suitable NLW. New weapons  requirements and development are often understandably affected by  technology hurdles and a preference to field an item that will partially  meet needs quickly rather than wait indefinitely for a perfect solution.  However, we note that 12 years have passed since DOD established the  JNLWD and that the services were working on NLW development efforts  even before that. Better planning, management, and oversight of NLW  developmental efforts to incorporate early consideration of technology  readiness, suitability, and supportability could improve the rate of  progress. While individual services may attempt to satisfy some service- unique gaps on their own, the measure of a successful joint program will  be whether it can successfully foster joint development. Without clearer  policy on acceptable risk to both warfighters and potential targets, in both  overseas and domestic scenarios, doctrine and training for NLW will  continue to be limited. Finally, conducting suitable testing and evaluation  is complicated in an environment where acceptable alternatives to human  testing – animal tests and modeling and simulation – are themselves both  limited and inherently difficult to extrapolate to humans. Although DOD  recognizes that it needs to develop a risk assessment methodology and has  taken steps toward that end, it still lacks the means to predict levels of risk  concerning non-lethal effects on targets and bystanders. As a result of all  these factors, DOD’s NLW program has had limited success in planning,  developing, overseeing, and testing effective and efficient weapons. Unless  these factors are addressed, the ability of U.S. forces to conduct  operations across the full range of potential lethality where and when  needed will be hindered, and they will continue to lack the means to  escalate force while still achieving non-lethal effects.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following eight  actions:    To help DOD better match program priorities to identified capability gaps,  the Secretary of Defense should direct the JNLWD, in consultation with  the services and combatant commanders, to assess and document the  extent to which NLW efforts at the technology development stage and  beyond (including procurement and operations and maintenance) address  the highest-priority Joint Staff-validated capability gaps.
To help DOD better incorporate logistics and supportability  considerations, the Secretary of Defense should direct the JNLWD, in  consultation with the services and combatant commanders, to ensure that  appropriate logistics and supportability planning is integrated into  development efforts at the earliest possible stage, including both DOD- developed and commercial weapons and capabilities. Incorporating  changes to—and using information already gathered for—the JNLWD’s  Investment Decision Support Tool might assist the directorate and DOD in  establishing clear criteria and ensuring progress in this area.
To help the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics in its role in overseeing DOD’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons  Program, the Secretary of Defense should take the following actions:    Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics, in consultation with the Executive Agent, to ensure that  NLW strategic guidance that sets out goals, objectives, and a  framework for research, development, and acquisition—including  science and technology efforts—is established and routinely updated.
Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics to oversee the development of performance evaluation  criteria to guide decisions on how and for how long to allocate  resources to research and development efforts. In addition to  established DOD financial management regulations, DOD could use  existing tools, such as the Investment Decision Support Tool, to help  develop and implement these measures.
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics to develop and execute a methodology for monitoring all  NLW-related funding and programs across DOD and designate a  central focal point within that office to coordinate the effort with the  JNLWD.
To help DOD more fully incorporate non-lethal concepts and capabilities  into its existing and new policy and doctrine for operations overseas and  in the homeland,  the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy to articulate a methodology and develop a time frame for  determining acceptable risk with respect to lethality and permanent  injury for operators, targets, and bystanders due to the use of specific  types of NLW, and  the Secretary of Defense should direct the Joint Staff, in consultation  with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Services, to  provide clearer weapons employment guidance that can be used to  modify or augment existing rules of engagement or rules for the use of  force for both warfighters and domestic responders on how non-lethal  weapons should be used under certain conditions, and incorporate this  guidance into training curricula.
To help DOD conduct more thorough testing and evaluation of non-lethal  weapons and aid end users’ ability to plan by knowing what to expect from  NLW before using the weapon, the Secretary of Defense should direct the  JNLWD and the military services to finalize and implement a risk  assessment methodology for human effects testing of NLW and develop a  timeline for implementing the methodology.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with five of  our recommendations, partially concurred with the other three, and  described actions it is taking or will take to implement all of the  recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD  also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the  draft as appropriate. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security  also reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that DOD assess and document  the extent to which non-lethal weapons efforts at the technology  development stage and beyond address the highest-priority capability gaps  and stated that they will incorporate a methodology for accomplishing this  into the NLW Capabilities Roadmap and into the overall Joint Non-lethal  Weapons program management process.
With respect to our recommendation that DOD integrate logistics and  supportability planning into NLW development efforts at the earliest  possible stage, DOD agreed and stated that it would elevate consideration  of logistics and supportability during program reviews and by using other  existing tools, as appropriate.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that it ensure that NLW strategic  guidance that sets out goals, objectives, and a framework for research,  development, and acquisition is established and routinely updated. DOD  stated that to implement this recommendation, in addition to completing  updates to DOD Directive 3000.3 and the Joint Services Memorandum of  Agreement, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) is  working with the JNLWD to develop a new version of the Non-lethal  Weapon Capabilities Roadmap and plans to be more active in the NLW  Joint Integrated Product Team.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that it develop and execute a  methodology for monitoring all NLW-related funding and programs across  DOD and designate a central focal point to coordinate the effort with the  JNLWD. DOD stated that AT&L will coordinate with the directorate to  develop and implement a methodology for monitoring NLW and funding  and progress across the department in order to provide a more effective  foundation for decision making.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation that DOD finalize and  implement a risk assessment methodology for human effects testing of  NLW and develop a timeline for implementing the methodology. DOD  stated that in addition to implementing a risk assessment framework  across technology development programs, the JNLWD has begun to  develop a human effects characterization guidance document that will  become standard across DOD.
We believe that these steps will improve management and operations of  the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program and encourage DOD to fully  implement them as soon as possible.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L to oversee the  development of performance evaluation criteria to guide decisions on how  and for how long to allocate resources to research and development  efforts. DOD agreed that enhanced performance evaluation criteria could  better guide resource allocation decisions, but does not believe that new  measures are needed. Nevertheless, DOD stated that the JNLWD, with  oversight from AT&L and the Joint Integrated Product Team, would  improve existing evaluation criteria to more effectively guide resource  allocation decisions.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD articulate a  methodology and develop a time frame for determining acceptable risk  with respect to lethality and permanent injury for operators, targets, and  bystanders because of the use of specific types of NLW. DOD agreed with  the need for a methodology and time frame for assessing the risks inherent  in employing non-lethal weapons. DOD stated that as we mentioned in our  draft report, the Risk of Significant Injury methodology will help address  our recommendation and that DOD intends for this methodology to be the  basis for the human effects characterization guidance document in  development. DOD stated that it does not believe that such a methodology  should articulate thresholds for acceptable risk and that such  determinations should be left to military commanders with the advice of  legal advisors. DOD also stated that it does not believe an acceptable risk  methodology should include the risk to operators of a weapon because  such risks are already addressed in the existing acquisition process. We  agree that military commanders (with the appropriate legal advice) should  make the determination of acceptable risk when employing any weapon— including NLW. Our intent was to highlight that in order to make these  decisions, military commanders require accurate information on what  effects a NLW should be expected to have. By finalizing and fully  incorporating the risk of significant injury methodology and guidance into  NLW efforts and properly implementing them, DOD should be able to  arrive at the kind of consistent and accurate information needed. To the  extent the acquisition process includes risk to the operator of a NLW, we  would expect that this information would be provided to commanders in  the same context as risk to targeted individuals and bystanders.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD provide  clearer weapons employment guidance that can be used to modify or  augment existing rules of engagement or rules for the use of force for both  warfighters and domestic responders on how NLW should be used, and  incorporate this guidance into training curricula. DOD agreed with the  necessity of doctrine that more clearly addresses NLW employment, but  stated that such doctrine should be integrated into existing policy  documents rather than creating separate employment guidance. To the  extent that clear guidance on the employment of NLW overseas and in the  United States can be incorporated into existing or supplemental  documents, we agree this should allow DOD to clarify how NLW are  intended to be employed in the wide range of operational circumstances,  enhance the broad understanding of the use-of-force continuum, and  facilitate the modification of training curricula. We continue to believe  that, in whatever form it is presented, DOD should provide the clearest  possible guidance. As we discussed in our report, policy and doctrine tend  to drive training, and the clearer they are, the better the training that can  be provided.
Although not addressing a specific recommendation, DOD expressed  concern that we did not sufficiently acknowledge the positive steps taken  and important contributions made by its investments in NLW, and cited  the contribution of the Non-Lethal Capability Sets in supporting  Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in providing U.S. forces  with valuable escalation-of-force options. We acknowledged the fielding of  the Non-Lethal Capability Sets in our draft report. We also acknowledge  that DOD has made progress in adapting the way it conducts operations by  expanding the use and potential use of NLW, and also that several of the  commercial-off-the-shelf items fielded under urgent requests have proven  valuable and timely to the warfighter. Moreover, we recognize that the  Non-Lethal Capability Sets have been requested by Army units and that the  Army Chief of Staff directed a requirement that all brigade combat teams  be issued these sets. However, DOD officials, including some who are part  of the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program, have pointed out to us that  range limitations of current munitions and other Non-Lethal Capability Set  items are important factors driving the JNLWD’s and services’ current  development efforts. We continue to believe that in order to achieve the  kinds of operational flexibility DOD seeks, including saving lives, greater  effort is required to align policies, doctrine, technology, and logistics.
DOD also expressed the view that we had not accurately portrayed its  efforts with respect to the Active Denial System. DOD states that it  intended the Active Denial System to be a concept demonstration and did  not intend to develop a fully integrated, production-ready system.  Although we acknowledged in our draft report that the Active Denial  System was a concept demonstration, we observed that the level of  resources the JNLWD devoted to the Active Denial System in comparison  to its other efforts indicated a significant investment in a capability that  was intended to eventually meet warfighters’ needs. Our use of the Active  Denial System in our report was primarily in the context of illustrating  specific findings. For example, we noted missteps with regard to the effort  to deploy Active Denial System 2 as a way of illustrating gaps in DOD’s  emphasis on fully developing logistics and supportability plans at the  earliest possible stage of development.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  developed or fielded non-lethal weapons (NLW) or capabilities since the  NLW program’s inception, we obtained and analyzed the lists of  developmental efforts and fielded items from the directorate and the  services, and compared these with the lists in the joint services’ manual on  NLW tactics, techniques, and procedures. We interviewed program  management officials from the directorate as well as Marine Corps  Systems Command, the Army Program Executive Office for Close Combat  Systems, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Under Secretary  of the Air Force for Acquisition, and U.S. Coast Guard headquarters. We  attended the spring and fall 2008 meetings of both the joint coordination  and integration group and integrated product team group, and reviewed  briefings prepared to support prior years’ meetings. We reviewed the  products of the capabilities-based assessment conducted under JCIDS (for  example the Functional Area Analysis, Functional Needs Analysis, and  Joint Capabilities Document for Non-Lethal Capabilities) as well as the  program information worksheets and investment decision support tool  that the directorate uses to help it analyze priorities in light of identified  gaps. To identify DOD non-lethal weapon program funding since 1997, we  compiled and analyzed non-lethal weapon program budget information  from the directorate and the services, reviewed DOD’s fiscal year 2009  budget submissions and future years defense program data. We also  reviewed DOD and Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate management  guidance as well as DOD acquisition management criteria and federal  internal control standards. Our use of the budget data was to provide  context for our discussion. We concluded that the figures were sufficient  to provide context for our discussion. However, since NLW funding  information is not centralized, we were not assured that the identified  funding amount allocated to NLW programs was comprehensive.
To determine the extent to which DOD has established and implemented  policy and doctrine, we reviewed and analyzed joint and service directives  and other publications, and conducted interviews with cognizant officials  in DOD, including the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,  Arlington, Virginia (both Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,  Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs; and Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and  Interdependent Capabilities); National Guard Bureau, Operations (J34),  Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics, Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Deputy  Commandant of the Marine Corps, Plans, Policies, and Operations,  Arlington, Virginia; and Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico,  Virginia. In addition, we held teleconferences with officials from U.S.
Northern Command headquarters and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine  Command Headquarters. We also interviewed Department of Homeland  Security officials with the Science and Technology Division, Customs and  Border Protection, and U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, all in Washington,  D.C. Also in Washington we interviewed Department of Justice officials  within the National Institute of Justice. To determine the extent to which  DOD has established and implemented NLW training, we also met with  officials at the Army Non-lethal Scalable Effects Center at the U.S. Army  Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the Marine  Corps, Inter-Service Non-lethal Individuals Weapons Instructor Course at  Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and reviewed training materials including  the training course manual.
To determine the extent to which NLW have undergone testing and  evaluation, we first reviewed overarching acquisition policy—which  includes both DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System and  DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System—to  ascertain test and evaluation guidelines for programs such as weapons  that must be procured. We also reviewed the Risk Management Guide for  DOD Acquisition and DOD test and evaluation guidance. We then  compared the results of independent human effects assessment review  panels with DOD test and evaluation guidance, compared DOD’s  prefielding testing requirements with the documentation that recorded the  tests actually performed, and compared Service urgent and standard  fielding requirements. Service-specific fielding policy such as Army  Regulation 700-142, Type Classification, Material Release, Fielding, and  Transfer and Marine Corps Order 5000.23, Policy for the Fielding of  Ground Weapon Systems and Equipment Policy provided information  about what testing was required prior to fielding under various  circumstances. For the few NLW fielded, we reviewed the status of test  and evaluation master plans and relevant documentation as well as Human  Effects Review Board assessments to determine if adequate testing was  completed prior to fielding. In addition to meeting with DOD and services’  test and evaluation officials, we also interviewed officials at the Human  Effects Center of Excellence to discuss NLW testing in detail. Except  where noted, we limited our discussion of technology development to  those items that were specifically designed to conform to the DOD  definition of non-lethal weapons.
To conduct our work, we interviewed officials in the following DOD  organizations at the stated locations:    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in Arlington, Virginia    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition Technology, and  Logistics in Arlington, Virginia    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense and  America’s Security Affairs in Arlington, Virginia    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, Special Operations  – Low Intensity Conflict in Arlington, Virginia    Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation in Arlington, Virginia    Joint Staff, (J8) Force Application Engagement Division in Arlington,    U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida    U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida    U.S. Northern Command via teleconference    National Guard Bureau, Operations (J34) in Arlington, Virginia    Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate in Quantico, Virginia    Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Assistant Secretary for Acquisition  (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Technology, and Engineering),  Science and Technology Division, in Arlington, Virginia    Air Force Security Forces Center in San Antonio, Texas    Human Effects Center of Excellence personnel with the Air Force  Research Laboratory in San Antonio, Texas    Department of the Army Headquarters (G3/G8) in Arlington, Virginia  We conducted our review from March 2008 through April 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Capability Gaps Not Being Addressed by Non-Lethal Efforts under Development
section_title: Appendix IV: Non-Lethal Programs under Development That Were Evaluated by the Investment Decision Support Tool
paragraphs: Appendix IV: Non-Lethal Programs under  Development That Were Evaluated by the  Investment Decision Support Tool Mk 19 Short Range Non-Lethal Munition  Airburst Non-Lethal Munition, Low Velocity  Vehicle Lightweight Arresting Device Single Net Solution /  Remote Deployment Device  Optical Warning Distraction and Suppression (OWDS)
Mobile Active Denial System (ADS)  66mm Light Vehicle Obscuration Smoke System Grenades  Human Electro Muscular Incapacitation X-26 (TASER®)  uirement could be met by leveraging the U.S. Marine Corps’ Ocular Interruption and U.S. Navy’s  Unambiguous Warning Device programs. OI has a schedule to reach a Milestone B decision in 2009 .  uested in the latest Program Objectives Memorandum.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant  Director; Sandra Burrell; Scott Clayton; Grace A. Coleman; James  Driggins; David F. Keefer; Gregory Marchand; Sally Newman; Rae Ann  Sapp; Rebecca Shea; and Jena Whitley made key contributions to this  report.