Military Personnel: Army Needs a Requirement for Capturing Data and Clear Guidance on Use of Military for Civilian or Contractor Positions
Published: 2015-06-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To mitigate the effects of budget uncertainty, the Army uses borrowed military personnel to perform tasks previously performed by civilians or contractors. Under Army Regulation 570-4, this use is generally restricted to a limited time and to duties deemed military essential or filling critical requirements, and can be in or outside of a soldier's military occupation. Due to the sequestration of budgetary resources in fiscal year 2013, the Army expected an increased use of these personnel, suspended some requirements in the Army regulation, and required monthly usage reports.
House Report 113-102 included a provision for GAO to review the Army's use of borrowed military personnel. This report examines the extent to which the Army, during fiscal years 2013 and 2014, (1) used borrowed military personnel, and what is known about any readiness and training impacts and (2) considered costs when making decisions for this use. GAO reviewed relevant DOD and Army documents, analyzed cost data, and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO visited selected installations and while not generalizable, information obtained from these site visits provided insight into the use of borrowed military personnel.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army does not know the extent to which it used borrowed military personnel during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 because (1) it is unable to distinguish borrowed military personnel from the larger category of special duty personnel in its monthly special duty reports and (2) the Army did not collect complete and accurate data on special duty use through its reporting mechanisms at that time. In addition, because of these shortcomings in its data on borrowed military personnel, the Army does not know the extent to which the use of borrowed military personnel affected readiness and training. An Army regulation requires borrowed military personnel assignments normally should be limited to 90 days, but temporary guidance provided during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 was unclear with respect to any limitation in length. The Army did not track the actual amount of time soldiers served in this temporary status, thereby limiting its ability to monitor this usage. Further, borrowed military personnel were used in various capacities outside of their Military Occupational Specialty including as lifeguards, grounds maintenance personnel, and gym attendants because the Army did not provide specific guidance on what functions it considered appropriate to fill with borrowed military personnel. The Army's monthly reporting requirement on use of borrowed personnel expired at the beginning of fiscal year 2015, so the Army does not now have a requirement to monitor this usage even though Army officials said this usage of borrowed military personnel would continue. Without a continued requirement and clear guidance for identifying and monitoring the extent to which borrowed military personnel are used, the Army risks allocating its resources inefficiently and ineffectively and may be unable to identify any potential problems with this use of personnel, including any impacts on training and readiness.
The Army did not consider full costs in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 when deciding to use borrowed military personnel and the Army did not provide the oversight that was necessary to ensure that commanders documented and reported the full costs of using borrowed military personnel in these years. This is important because the full costs of borrowed military personnel can be greater than civilian personnel performing the same function. GAO reviewed special duty data reported in February 2014, and found that none of the 13 commands and installations reviewed reported the full costs for all military, civilian, and contractor personnel. In March 2013, in addition to Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, the Secretary of the Army directed installations using borrowed military personnel to report the full costs of military personnel in accordance with DOD's cost-estimating policy. However, the Army did not provide sufficient oversight to help ensure commanders documented and reported the full costs of borrowed military personnel. Without Army oversight to help ensure the full costs for the use of borrowed military personnel are considered, documented, and reported, the Army will not have a comprehensive picture of these personnel costs, which may negatively affect its ability to make informed strategic decisions about workforce requirements.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Army establish a requirement and guidance for monitoring the use of borrowed military personnel and improve oversight of cost reporting. DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with one. DOD also raised a definitional issue which GAO addresses in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The term “borrowed military personnel” generally refers to military  personnel used to perform work previously performed by government  civilians or contracted services. According to the Department of Defense  (DOD), borrowed military personnel have been used for decades as a  management tool to, in part, mitigate the effects of budget uncertainty.In  February 2013, the acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness testified that the prospect of across-the-board cuts associated  with sequestration prompted DOD components to implement hiring  freezes and release term and temporary civilians. Hence, military senior  leaders turned to borrowed military personnel to help ensure work was  performed. However, in the February 2013 testimony, the Under  Secretary added that borrowing or repurposing military personnel is  contrary to DOD workforce management policies and adversely impacts   recruitment, accession, retention, and readiness. In addition, the Under  Secretary indicated that DOD would attempt to prevent the use of  borrowed military personnel, but the realities of the fiscal environment at  that time would leave commanders with no choice but to use borrowed  military personnel.
In March 2013, the President ordered the sequestration of budgetary  resources, which resulted in a $37 billion reduction in DOD’s discretionary  budget for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. Spending reductions under  sequestration affected DOD’s civilian workforce and many programs and  functions, which we reported would require DOD to accept some risk in  maintaining the readiness of military forces. Committee noted that in an April 2013 testimony before the committee,  the Secretary of the Army predicted that the Army could use as many as  8,000 borrowed military personnel.
GAO-14-529.
GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001). other needs of the department. Also, in May 2013, we found that DOD  had not taken a holistic approach to its workforce requirements to achieve  the appropriate balance using all three components—military, civilian, and  contractor—of its total workforce, and to prioritize the achievement of a  workforce sufficiently sized and of the appropriate mix to carry out DOD’s  mission over costs. We recommended that DOD revise its workforce  policies and procedures to address the determination of the appropriate  workforce mix. DOD partially concurred, stating that it had issued updated  guidance related to its military, civilian, and contractor manpower  management and did not believe additional direction was necessary at  the time of the report. As of April 2015, DOD has not taken actions to  implement this recommendation. Further, in June 2014, we reported on  DOD’s implementation of furloughs for its civilians, where we found that  clarifying guidance from DOD was issued in 2013 to help ensure that  borrowed military personnel were not used to compensate for lost work  resulting from the civilian furlough, and no evidence was found at that  time to indicate that borrowed military personnel were used in this  manner.
The House Armed Services Committee reportthe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 noted that  the use of borrowed military personnel outside of a servicemember’s  Military Occupational Specialty may pose risks to readiness and training  and included a provision for us to review the use of borrowed military  personnel. This report examines the extent to which (1) the Army used  borrowed military personnel for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and what is  known about any impacts on training and readiness during that period,   accompanying a bill for  and (2) the Army considered costs when making decisions to use  borrowed military personnel for fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
Through discussions in March 2014 with officials from the Navy, the  Marine Corps, and the Air Force we did not obtain any indication that they  were using military personnel for civilian or contractor positions.  Furthermore, the House Armed Services Committee report noted that the  Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force stated in  April 2013 testimony before the committee that they did not anticipate  using large numbers of military personnel for this purpose. Therefore, we  focused our review on the Army’s use of borrowed military personnel. In  addition, we limited our review to fiscal years 2013 and 2014, which  reflects the period immediately before, during, and after sequestration  was ordered in March 2013.
To determine the extent to which the Army used borrowed military  personnel for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and what is known about any  readiness and training impacts, we reviewed DOD, Army, and local  installation policies and guidance regarding the use of special duty  personnel, which includes borrowed military personnel and another  category of special duty personnel. We also obtained and analyzed data  reported to the Army by installations and commands on special duty  personnel use during these years. To assess the reliability of the data, we  performed electronic testing of key data elements, reviewed related  documentation, and conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials.  We identified problems with the data that we will discuss in this report.  We also visited five installations—Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort  Stewart, Georgia; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Rucker, Alabama; and U.S.  Army Pacific Command, Hawaii—to interview personnel involved in  determining the use, tracking and reporting, cost, and impacts on  readiness and training of borrowed military personnel. We selected these  installations and commands to reflect a range of reported use of special  duty personnel, which included borrowed military personnel, from  February 2014 through July 2014, because this was the most recent data  available to us. While not generalizeable, the information obtained from  these visits provided insights into the factors that affect use of borrowed  military personnel at the local level. We also interviewed officials within  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and the Army Installation Management  Command. We reviewed certain historical statutory requirements for  reporting on the impact of using borrowed military personnel on readiness  and our prior reports on readiness reporting. We also reviewed the  Army’s monthly special duty reports for any specific discussion of the  impact of readiness from using borrowed military personnel. We  interviewed readiness officials located at the installations and commands  we visited. We also interviewed readiness officials within the Office of the  Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of the Army.
To determine the extent to which the Army considered costs when  making decisions to use borrowed military personnel for fiscal years 2013  and 2014, we obtained and analyzed cost data for 13 installations and  commands for February 2014 included in the Army’s special duty reports,  which includes borrowed military personnel, generated by the Office of  the Secretary of the Army and Army commands and installations. As  noted earlier, we identified problems with the data that we discuss in this  report. We reviewed DOD and Army guidance for collecting and reporting  full cost data on special duty personnel. Further, we compared this  guidance with criteria for assessing and tracking costs, such as those  included in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, as  well as findings and conclusions from our prior reports on assessing the  full cost of military and civilian personnel and the contracted workforce.In addition to interviewing officials identified above, we interviewed  officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to June 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. More information on our scope  and methodology can found in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD does not have a common definition of borrowed military personnel.  However, Army Regulation 570-4 defines borrowed military personnel as  one part of the larger category of use named “special duty.” Special duty  comprises borrowed military personnel and troop diversion, and is the  performance of a duty by personnel with an organization other than the  unit to which they are permanently assigned. Borrowed military personnel  is defined as the use of military personnel from an Army unit to perform  duties within certain activities where an approved civilian personnel  requirement exists but for which no personnel position has been  authorized. Troop diversion—such as performing military funeral  honors—is the use of soldiers not meeting the borrowed military  personnel definition, to perform recurring duties with an organization or  unit other than that to which they are assigned, while continuing to be  administered and accounted for by the unit of assignment.
As a result of the drawdown of military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,  coupled with sequestration and budget reductions, the Army has faced  reductions in its civilian and contractor support workforces. According to  Army officials, soldiers are selected for borrowed military personnel duty  for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to being in a reduced  training cycle, separating from the Army, or not being able to perform their  regular duty. Army Regulation 570-4 outlines the conventional process  by which special duty personnel, including borrowed military personnel,  may be utilized, including duration and use limitations. For example, the  regulation limits the duty period to 90 days and states that soldiers may  only be used to fulfill existing approved personnel requirements.
The Offices of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army issued  additional implementing memorandums to Senior Commanders and  Senior Managers governing the use and accountability of borrowed  military personnel in February and March 2013. These memorandums  provided temporary exceptions to some of the requirements outlined in  Army Regulation 570-4.  For example, in March 2013, citing the effects  of the pending sequestration and to satisfy mission critical demands, the  Secretary of the Army issued a memorandum suspending certain policies  on the use of soldiers performing special duty. The memorandum  included suspending the 90-day limitation on special duty, including  borrowed military personnel, and providing senior commanders and  senior managers the authority to approve special duty outside a soldier’s  Military Occupational Specialty “when required to meet an urgent or  extraordinary Army need or to perform a mission critical function.” These  policies remained suspended until October 1, 2014. The memorandum  also required commands to report on the use of special duty, including  the use of borrowed military personnel. Table 1 provides a timeline and  summary information on selected memorandums and guidance issued  since 2012. These memorandums were selected for their relevance to  special duty and borrowed military personnel.
In August 2014, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Force  Management, Manpower and Resources stated in a memorandumthe exception to policies on special duty, including borrowed military  personnel, would not be in effect for fiscal year 2015 and beyond.  Terminating the exception means returning to DOD’s and the Army’s  conventional policies on special duty, including Army Regulation 570-4,  starting at the beginning of fiscal year 2015.
section_title: The Army Does Not Know the Extent It Used Borrowed Military Personnel or if Its Use Impacted Training and Readiness during Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014
paragraphs: The Army does not know the extent to which it used borrowed military  personnel during fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 because it is  unable to distinguish borrowed military personnel from the larger category  of special duty in its monthly special duty reports, and the Army did not  collect complete and accurate data on special duty use, including  borrowed military personnel use, through its reporting mechanisms at that  time. In addition, because of these shortcomings in its data on borrowed  military personnel, the Army does not know the extent to which the use of  borrowed military personnel impacted readiness and training. Our  analysis of the special duty data and the information we obtained from  discussions with Army officials indicate that the Army’s use of borrowed  military personnel varied throughout the military service with respect to  the length of time Army personnel were assigned to such duties and the  types of positions filled in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
subsections: section_title: The Army Does Not Know the Extent to Which It Used Borrowed Military Personnel
paragraphs: The Army does not know the extent to which it used borrowed military  personnel during fiscal years 2013 and 2014, because it is unable to  distinguish borrowed military personnel from a larger category of special  duty in its monthly special duty reports. For example, in July 2014, Army  commands reported a total of 6,957 special duty personnel to the  Secretary of the Army’s Office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs. We  requested that the Army provide the total number of borrowed military  personnel used in that month; however, Army officials were unable to  provide these data. Army officials said that while they assume borrowed  military personnel constituted a large share of the special duty total, they  could not provide a precise number for this month or any month because  they were unable to distinguish borrowed military personnel from special  duty personnel.
The Secretary of the Army’s March 2013 memorandum temporarily  suspended certain policy constraints on the use of special duty and  required Army commands and subordinate units to provide monthly  special duty utilization reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs starting in April 2013. The memorandum  included a template that displayed the type of information to be included  in the monthly special duty reports. The information to be reported  includes the unit to which the soldier is assigned, the soldier’s Military  Occupational Specialty, the soldier’s grade, the start and planned end  dates for the special duty, and the position in which the duty is being  performed.
Our analysis of the template used by the reporting units found that it did  not include identifiers that would enable the Army to distinguish borrowed  military personnel from other special duty data.  Further, the Army does  not have other data-collection tools or methods that could distinguish  these data. An Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and  Reserve Affairs official said that the Army has traditionally managed  borrowed military personnel as part of its management of special duty  and therefore any identifiers or data-collection tools the Army has  developed have been oriented toward collecting information at the special  duty level rather than distinguishing the subcategory of borrowed military  personnel within special duty. Standards for Internal Controls in the  Federal Government state that control activities can help ensure that  management’s directives are carried out. Control activities are the  mechanisms used to enforce management directives, and include the  review of information systems to ensure completeness and accuracy of all  data. identifiers in the monthly special duty report template, that distinguishes  borrowed military personnel from other special duty personnel, the Army  cannot determine the extent to which borrowed military personnel were  used.
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
section_title: Army Reports on the Use of Special Duty, Which Include Borrowed Military Personnel, Are Not Complete and Accurate, Hindering Army Visibility into Training and Readiness Impacts
paragraphs: Army reports on the use of special duty, which includes borrowed military  personnel, are not complete and accurate due to insufficient guidance  from the Army, and thus the Army does not have visibility into the training  and readiness impacts of this use. We reviewed Army reports on the use  of special duty personnel, including borrowed military personnel, from  April 2013 through July 2014 and found that all of the reports were  incomplete. We then compared these reports against a list of  commands we identified from interviews that had used special duty  personnel during this period. Specifically, we found that none of the  reports contained data from all of the commands that we found from  interviews had used borrowed military personnel, and even when the  report included data from a command, we identified instances where the  data the command reported were likely incomplete. For example, an  Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) official stated that the command  had used several thousand borrowed military personnel in every month  since the reporting requirement started in April 2013, but FORSCOM data  were not included in the special duty reports for the months of April 2013,  June 2013, and July 2013. In addition, U.S. Army Pacific Command had  consistently reported special duty personnel use from April 2013 through  February 2014 and then did not report in March 2014. Army Pacific  Command officials said that they used borrowed military personnel in  March 2014 but were unable to report in that month. An Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs official said that  some special duty reports may not have special duty personnel  information from some commands because the commands did not have  special duty personnel to report for that month. However, the official also  noted that commands often failed to report in months when they used  special duty personnel. Further, we found that even when a command  reported special duty personnel use, the data in some instances may  have been incomplete and inaccurate. For example, the May 2014  special duty report showed 9 special duty personnel for U.S. Army Pacific  Command, while the command reported an average of over 250 special  duty personnel in previous months.
We also found that there were problems with the completeness of the  data collected by the installations and commands and reported to the  Army. Specifically, there were varying and changing interpretations by  Army installation officials with regard to what should be included in the  monthly special duty reports. For example, the Army reported a total of  833 special duty personnel used at Fort Hood in its February 2014 special  duty report. However, during our visit to Fort Hood in May 2014, Army  officials said that the number of special duty personnel dropped from 833  in February to 435 in May 2014. They explained that in May 2014 they  revised their interpretation of special duty personnel to no longer include  soldiers being used as part of white cycle taskings, and this was largely  why the number decreased. Officials stated that the revisions were made  because the duties are something that they have to perform, and that  special duty personnel are already out of their training cycle. Such a  change makes it impossible to assess trends in the use of special duty  personnel, which includes borrowed military personnel, solely by  examining monthly special duty reports.
Because installations and commands did not report complete and  accurate data, Army reporting of special duty personnel use, including  borrowed military personnel, in its monthly special duty reports is also not  accurate. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state  that agencies should identify, record, and distribute pertinent information  to the right people in sufficient detail and that decision makers need  complete and consistent data in order to carry out their responsibilities.
The March 2013 Army memorandum that directed Army commands to  report monthly on the use of special duty did not specifically assign  responsibilities for  oversight of the collection and analysis of these data.  In addition, the monthly special duty reporting requirement is no longer in  effect for fiscal year 2015. With the elimination of the reporting  requirement in the memorandum, the Army was left without a requirement  to collect these data. However, Army officials said that they expect to use  borrowed military personnel in fiscal year 2015 and beyond. During the  time in which the monthly reporting requirement was in effect, Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs officials stated  that they did not take steps to help ensure the completeness and  accuracy of special duty data, including borrowed military personnel data,  reported by installations and commands, nor did they attempt to identify  and resolve data discrepancies outside of duplicate entries. These  officials stated that when reporting problems were raised, they met with  commands to provide better insight into the data being sought and to  stress the importance of timely reporting. The officials explained,  however, that they are not assigned responsibilities for ensuring the  completeness and accuracy of borrowed military personnel data and  instead rely on the commands and subordinate units to perform these  responsibilities because these organizations had much better insight into  and understanding of the information being reported. The officials further  stated that the Office of the Secretary of the Army appeared to be  satisfied with the reports because they had not received any negative  feedback from that office.
Furthermore, Army Regulation 570-4, which again governs the use of  special duty personnel including borrowed military personnel, is unclear  with respect to specifying responsibilities for overseeing the collection of  data on borrowed military personnel. This regulation does not provide  guidance on the collection and reporting of data on the use of special duty  personnel. For example, there is no requirement in this regulation for  Army units to report on the number of special duty personnel, including  borrowed military personnel, being used for any specific period. Without  such a requirement in its regulations, the Army will not likely be in a  position to know the extent of the use of these personnel nor can the  Army predict or track current usage trends.
The Army also is not in a position to know the extent to which the use of  these personnel impacts training and readiness because it does not know  the full extent to which it used borrowed military personnel in fiscal years  2013 and 2014, and currently does not have a   tool to collect data on  borrowed military personnel use. Further, DOD has diminished visibility of  impacts because the Army had not included information on borrowed  manpower impacts in its quarterly readiness reports to Congress as was  previously required by section 482 of Title 10 of the United States Code.  We previously found the need for Congress and DOD to have accurate  and relevant readiness information in these reports in order to make  informed decisions about the use of military forces, and the related  resource needs. In July 2013, we found that in its quarterly readiness  reports that covered the period from April 2012 through March 2013, DOD  addressed most but not all of the required reporting elements. For  example, the U.S. Code required DOD to report on 26 elements including  borrowed manpower. In analyzing DOD’s reports, we found that DOD  addressed 18 of the 26 elements, partially addressed 3 elements, and did  not report on 5 elements. Borrowed manpower was one of the 5 elements  on which DOD did not report. Further, at that time the Secretary of the  Army’s March 2013 memo required the Army to report on the readiness  impacts of using borrowed military personnel but did not include such  data.
An official in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated the use of borrowed military  personnel appears to have a minimal impact on readiness and training,  and this assessment is based on the low number of borrowed military  personnel included in the monthly special duty reports for fiscal years  2013 and 2014. The official explained that the Army has a total of over  500,000 military personnel and the Army, in its monthly special duty  reports, which includes borrowed military personnel, indicated a monthly  average of about 6,000 special duty personnel, or about 1 percent of the  total Army military personnel population, at that time.
At all five of the Army installations we visited, officials stated that they  have established processes to minimize any borrowed military personnel  impacts on unit readiness and training. They stated that senior  commanders are selective in the number of soldiers they approve for  borrowed military personnel duty. As previously discussed, senior  commanders took measures to minimize borrowed military personnel use  by deciding to resource a position or function partially or not at all.  Furthermore, officials stated additional precautions were taken to ensure  that soldiers approved for borrowed military personnel were drawn from  units that were not engaged in training or any effort that contributes to  sustaining or achieving readiness requirements. For instance, officials at  the five installations we visited said that they limit the tasking of borrowed  military personnel to units and individuals engaged in the reset phase of  the Army’s training and readiness model, in which the operational unit  works to achieve readiness prior to being deployed. These officials said  that soldiers are typically available for borrowed military personnel duty  for no more than 90 days during the reset phase after allowing for a  period to recover from deployment and to perform other duties required of  soldiers at their home station. These officials added that it is during this  90-day period that soldiers are generally assigned to borrowed military  duty.
Army officials at the installations we visited stated that they also attempt  to minimize the impact on individual units by drawing personnel for  borrowed military duty from the largest number of units possible and  tasking the units in an equitable manner. For example, Fort Hood’s  guidance on borrowed personnel states that the tasking of units will be  performed on a percentage basis and will consider factors that include the  units’ authorized strength levels. Fort Bragg officials said that they  continually monitor readiness levels and that tasking for borrowed military  personnel takes into account whether a unit has a shortage of soldiers  with certain Military Occupational Specialties. Further, officials at the  Army Pacific Command stated that they assess the number and skill  levels of personnel of all of the units located at the installation and use  this information before making decisions on which units to draw soldiers  for borrowed military personnel from.
We acknowledge that these processes may serve to help minimize the  impacts borrowed military personnel has on readiness and training.  However, the Army is not in a position to know the extent of these  impacts and without this knowledge any processes established to  address these impacts will have diminished and uncertain utility.   Moreover, Army officials agreed that a low amount of reported usage of  borrowed military personnel does not preclude having isolated instances  of training and readiness impacts to some individual units. For example,  during our review of unmanned aerial system pilot training, Army soldiers  in discussion groups stated they had missed training and performed  borrowed military personnel duties such as lawn care, janitorial services,  and guard duty. Unmanned aerial systems are a growing asset, and  training is critical to meeting mission needs.
Leading management practices recognize performance-oriented approach to human-capital management is crucial  for maximizing the value of human capital as well as managing risk. A  fundamental building block for measuring the effectiveness of human- capital approaches is collecting and analyzing data. In addition,  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  oversight helps ensure that an organization has the high-quality  information it needs to accomplish its goals. However, the Office of the  Secretary of the Army has not provided sufficient oversight regarding how  the special duty data needs to be collected and reported to help ensure  the completeness and accuracy of borrowed military personnel data,  including tracking trends over time. An Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs official said Army guidance does not  require the tracking and collection of borrowed military personnel data  because the Army has not identified any significant problems regarding  this use of personnel. However, without a requirement and oversight to  help ensure that the use of borrowed military personnel is tracked and  reported and that the data collected are complete and accurate, the Army  will continue to have limited information and may be unable to identify any  potential problems with this use of personnel, including the full extent of  any effects on training and readiness. Further, without a method to  identify borrowed military personnel from the special duty data it will  continue to have the kind of limited information on the use of borrowed  military personnel it had during the suspension period, thereby  diminishing its ability to accomplish strategic human-capital management  objectives.
GAO-02-373SP.
section_title: Army Guidance Limits the Length of Service for Special Duty, Including Borrowed Military Personnel; However Actual Duration of Service Was Not Tracked during Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014
paragraphs: Army memorandums, which temporarily suspended the conventional  Army policies during sequestration and beyond, are unclear with respect  to the appropriate length of service for the use of soldiers as special duty  personnel, including borrowed military personnel, and the Army reports  indicate duration of service varied across the Army during fiscal years  2013 and 2014. Army Regulation 570-4, which ordinarily governs the  use of special duty, states that when commanders determine special duty  is required to meet an urgent military need, it will be limited to 90 days,  after which the soldier must be returned to duties in his or her primary  Military Occupation Specialty or career-progression Military Occupation  Specialty. The regulation further states that requests for extensions will  not be granted.
However, certain parts of this regulation were temporarily suspended. In a  March 2013 memorandum, the Secretary of the Army suspended the  90-day limitation and provided senior leaders the authority to approve  special duty outside a soldier’s Military Occupational Specialty “when  required to meet an urgent or extraordinary Army need or to perform a  mission critical function.” As previously discussed, the template attached  to the memorandum also required commands to include the soldier’s start  date and anticipated end date for the special duty. An Assistant Secretary  of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs official said that the office  notified Army commands and installations that, starting in March 2014,  they were to include in their monthly reports the number of days that a  soldier performed the special duty during the month and the number of  days a soldier was assigned to be on continuous special duty. According  to the official, these efforts were intended to implement Office of the  Secretary of Defense memorandumspersonnel on a short-term, emergency basis to satisfy demands of  mission critical importance. However, the memorandums were unclear   that allowed for the use of military  because they did not clarify how long individual military personnel may be  assigned to perform such short-term non-military-essential tasks. For  example, the memorandums did not set a limit for the number of days an  individual can serve on special duty, nor did they define certain terms  used, such as “temporary” or “short-term,” by specifying a number or  range of days.
Our review of monthly special duty reports found instances where soldiers  were scheduled to be on these duties for more than 90 days, including  instances of at least 365 days. For example, the February 2014 special  duty report indicated that a soldier assigned as a gate guard at Fort Hood  started the assignment on March 1, 2013, with an anticipated end date of  March 1, 2014, for a total of 365 days. Further, the May 2014 report  indicated that a soldier assigned as a gate guard at Fort Bragg performed  the duty for 30 days during the month of May, and was assigned to  special duty for an additional 180 days.
Our analysis of Army special duty personnel data for the month of May  2014 also shows that there was variation in the length of the reported  times that soldiers were assigned to special duty, including borrowed  military personnel duty. Army reported data show that the duration a  soldier was assigned to this duty could have lasted anywhere from 1 day  to 25 months. In addition, in May 2014, 2,470 out of 6,981 soldiers, or  about a third of those who were reported to be scheduled for special duty,  including borrowed military personnel duty, for approximately 1 year or  longer.
In addition, the duration of scheduled borrowed military personnel duty  varied across the installations we visited. For example, at Fort Bliss  soldiers were assigned as gate guards for 90 days, while soldiers at Fort  Bragg and Fort Campbell were assigned to similar positions for 180 and  360 days, respectively.
One of the reasons that borrowed military personnel duty duration varied  was that it was managed at the unit commander level. Army officials  explained that the senior commander approved all borrowed military  personnel, but commanders at the unit level had discretion on the number  of soldiers rotating into the assigned borrowed military personnel   positions and duration of borrowed military personnel assignments. After  approving the use of borrowed military personnel, a particular unit was  tasked by the senior commander to perform a function or fill a position for  a prescribed period. It was then up to the unit commander to decide the  manner in which the commander would use his personnel to meet this  requirement. According to Army officials, some unit commanders rotated  their soldiers into a position every day, others rotated their soldiers every  week, and others may have not rotated their soldiers at all, leaving one  soldier to fill the position over the entire period of the borrowed military  personnel assignment. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and  Reserve Affairs officials said they did not perform any analysis of the  special duty reports with respect to tracking the duration of borrowed  military personnel assignments.
The officials stated that the reason they did not perform any analysis in  this area is because the Army was operating under a suspension to the  policy that limited borrowed military personnel to 90 days. Officials  indicated that since the suspension was in place during the period of  reporting, any analysis on the duration of borrowed military personnel  duty would have been superfluous. In addition, officials explained that no  trend analysis was performed on the data because they did not trust the  quality of the data enough to perform the analysis. Further, at all five  installations we visited, Army officials stated that they did not track the  actual amount of time a soldier had performed in a borrowed military  personnel capacity. For example, Fort Stewart officials stated that while  they may have known how long the soldier was expected to perform in a  borrowed capacity, they did not track the actual amount of time the soldier  had been in borrowed military personnel status. Army officials at Fort  Bragg and Fort Hood said they did not track actual borrowed military  personnel duty because there was no requirement to do this and because  they have not identified any problems regarding the duration of duty.
In addition, at four of the five installations we visited, we met with soldiers  who had served or were currently serving in a borrowed capacity. While  we are not able to use this information to draw any conclusions or make  any projections about borrowed military personnel, some soldiers at two  of the installations said that the length of time they actually served as  borrowed military personnel exceeded the amount of time they had been  expected to serve or that their assignments were extended for a second  or third period of duty.
Some Army installations have taken steps to mitigate the impact of the  length of time a soldier is serving in a borrowed military personnel status.  For example, Army installations, including Fort Stewart, used the red,  amber, green training and readiness concept, which has a goal to  maximize training and readiness effectiveness by rotating units’ access to  training and resources and is linked to the unit’s operational cycle. While  the model is designed primarily to enable units’ ability to concentrate on  readiness and training, Army officials explained that it also limits the  amount of time a soldier is away from his or her unit to perform borrowed  military personnel duty. According to these officials, every unit falls within  a certain readiness cycle, coded red, amber, or green, for a 90-day  period. When a unit is in its green cycle, it is being trained with full access  to resources as if it is preparing to deploy. If a unit is in the amber cycle,  the unit is training part-time with a focus on proficiency at the platoon,  squad, and crew level. If a unit is in the red cycle, the unit is not actively  training and is tasked with maintaining the installation. Army officials said  it is during the red cycle that the majority of special duties, including  borrowed military personnel duties, are carried out by a unit and, given  that each cycle lasts 90 days, this generally limits the amount of time  soldiers serve on borrowed military personnel duty.
In August 2014, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Management, Manpower and Resources stated in a memorandum that  the exception to policies on special duty would not be in effect for fiscal  year 2015 and beyond. Terminating the exception means that  conventional DOD and Army policies on special duty, including Army  Regulation 570-4—which limits borrowed military personnel duration to 90  days in most circumstances—are in effect as of the beginning of fiscal  year 2015. However, this regulation does not include guidance or a  requirement to track and report the actual amount of time a soldier serves  on special duty in general or on borrowed military personnel duty in  particular.  Further, the Army did not track the actual amount of days a  soldier served on special duty during fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year  2014, and an official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs said the office does not plan to  track duration in current or future years because there is no requirement  to do so.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  control activities help ensure that management’s directives are carried  out, and as a part of these control activities an agency should effectively  manage the organization’s workforce to achieve results, which includes  having a specific workforce planning strategy that allows for identification  of current and future human-capital needs. According to the standards,  monitoring the activities of an organization provides management  information about the performance of its internal controls.  Without  procedures for tracking the amount of time soldiers are on borrowed  military personnel duty, the Army diminishes its ability to know the  duration soldiers are being used for this capacity and specifically whether  the duration exceeds the 90 day limitation. On a broader note, without  knowing how long soldiers are actually on borrowed duty, the Army limits  its ability to efficiently and effectively utilize its military personnel, which  could impact its strategic planning for current and future human-capital  needs.
section_title: Reported Types of Positions Filled by Soldiers in Borrowed Military Status Varied within the Army during Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014
paragraphs: The reported types of positions filled by soldiers through the use of  borrowed military personnel varied across installations. According to  Army Regulation 570-4, which ordinarily governs the use of special duty  personnel, including borrowed military personnel, borrowed military  personnel can be used to fill higher-priority positions when no resources  have been allocated to fill such positions. The guidance states that  “whenever special duty is necessary, it should be made as beneficial as  possible to the soldier by matching the individual’s occupational specialty  to the needs of the requirement.”  However, the Secretary of the Army, in  his March 2013 memorandum temporarily suspending certain policy  constraints, stated that senior commanders and senior managers had the  authority to approve borrowed military personnel “outside the scope of the  Soldier’s primary Military Occupational Specialty … when required to  meet an urgent or extraordinary Army need or to perform a mission  critical function.”
As previously discussed, the use of soldiers in a borrowed military  personnel status on an installation was determined by the senior  commander of that installation, and was decided on a case-by-case  basis. At all five of the installations we visited, Army officials stated that  they had their own process for identifying borrowed military personnel  requirements at the local level, prioritizing the requirements, and staffing  the requirements to what the installation deemed an appropriate level.  Senior commanders at all of the installations we visited said that they had  the latitude to approve borrowed military personnel resources to fully or  partially address personnel shortfalls in a particular function, defer the  decision to a later date, or not provide borrowed military personnel at all.  Army officials stated that decisions to use borrowed military personnel  were made on a periodic basis when the senior commander met with a  board of advisors and the commander reviewed borrowed military  personnel requests coming from many activities and functions located at  the installation. Army officials at one installation stated that they also  frequently made ad hoc decisions on single requests to use a small  number of borrowed military personnel, perhaps as few as one. In  addition, these officials stated that they used borrowed military personnel  in various capacities including as gate guards, lifeguards, grounds  maintenance, and gym attendants.
In addition, Army officials said that every installation had different  requirements and characteristics, and these differences are one of the  reasons why there was no guidance that prioritized functions and  positions needing borrowed military personnel. For instance, officials said  that the difference in physical infrastructure of bases created different  environments that must be managed at the local level. Larger  installations, such as Fort Hood, had more gates and a larger on-base  population than smaller installations, such as Fort Stewart. The different  number of gates and the different population means that Fort Hood had to  assign different numbers of soldiers as gate guards. Similarly, Army  installation officials stated that Fort Bragg has 13 different gym facilities  run by the Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation division, while Fort  Stewart has 5 gym facilities. Fort Bragg officials stated that the reason is  that Fort Bragg’s older infrastructure relies on smaller facilities that have  not been consolidated.
Senior commanders further explained that prioritizing borrowed military  personnel duties across the entire Army was not feasible given the many  and often vastly different positions and functions being filled by soldiers.  Another reason for variation in the use of borrowed military personnel was  the use of personnel with the right skills and abilities to perform a duty  that is considered critical. For example, Army Medical Command officials  at Fort Hood said that they had requested borrowed military personnel  that have medical specialization to fill medical positions that were vacant  due to natural attrition and because that shortfall of duty hours was being  covered by other employees working overtime. In order to alleviate the  impact of overtime pay on the budget, officials requested the use of  borrowed military personnel.
We found that the temporary suspension of policies governing special  duty allowed the assignment of borrowed military personnel duties for  performance by soldiers that did not always correlate to the soldiers’  Military Occupational Specialty. Army officials stated that even when  borrowed military personnel duties were outside the Military Occupational  Specialty, they were still deemed to be part of a soldier’s general duties.  They further explained that, beyond the Military Occupational Specialty, a  soldier has basic duties that include the requirement to maintain order  and cleanliness of the living space that they occupy, and the duties that  are integral to a soldier working as a soldier, such as standing guard.  Officials at all of the installations we visited noted that soldiers historically  conducted these basic soldier duties prior to the large-scale deployments  after the events of September 2001.
We reviewed the monthly special duty reports and determined that they  did not capture whether the assigned borrowed military personnel task  was within a soldier’s Military Occupational Specialty. Army officials  stated that since the suspension of policy was in place, there was no  reason to track this information, and explained that  the reporting of a  soldier’s Military Occupational Specialty and duty description would allow  the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and  Reserve Affairs to assess this relationship. To gain some insight, we  requested three of the largest installations we visited (Fort Bragg, Fort  Hood, and Fort Stewart) to identify from the Army’s February 2014 special  duty report which soldiers served in a capacity within or outside their  Military Occupational Specialty. Army data show that for the three  installations, on average 38 percent of soldiers were performing special  duty within their Military Occupational Specialty and 62 percent of soldiers  were performing duty that was not related to their specialty. For the month  of February 2014, Fort Stewart had the lowest percentage (7 percent) of  soldiers serving within their specialty, and Fort Hood had the highest (56  percent). (See fig. 1.)
section_title: Officials from Selected Installations Did Not Consider Full Costs in Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014 When Deciding to Use Borrowed Military Personnel, and Army Oversight of Cost Reporting Was Limited
paragraphs: Officials from Army installations we visited did not consider the full costs  of using borrowed military personnel during fiscal years 2013 and 2014.  In addition, the Army did not provide the oversight that was necessary to  ensure that commanders documented and reported the full costs of using  borrowed military personnel in these years.
subsections: section_title: Officials at Installations We Visited Reported That They Did Not Consider Full Costs during Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014 When Making Decisions on Using Borrowed Military Personnel
paragraphs: Officials at Army installations in our review did not consider the full costs  of using borrowed military personnel during fiscal years 2013 and 2014.  The March 2012 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness memorandum directed commanders to consider the full  costs of personnel in accordance with DOD cost guidance. Specifically,  the Under Secretary’s memorandum directed that decisions to use  military personnel for non-military-essential tasks must consider costs and  determine the full costs of personnel.
Army officials from the installations we visited provided a number of  reasons for why the full costs of using borrowed military personnel were  not considered. For instance, officials at every installation we visited  stated that the full costs of soldiers were not a factor in determining  whether to utilize military personnel for borrowed military personnel  because the funding was not available to pay for civilians or contractors to  perform the needed functions. Also, officials responsible for borrowed  military personnel decision making at the installations we visited stated  that costs were not a factor because the costs of the soldier were already  paid for at the service-wide level, and therefore the installations were able  to use the soldier without incurring additional costs. Officials stated that,  in contrast, hiring a civilian or contractor employee, although generally  less expensive than the cost of a military personnel performing that same  duty, would require additional financial resources from the installation.
Further, an official who oversees borrowed military personnel assigned to  a medical unit at one installation we visited stated that although the use of  borrowed military personnel can be relatively more costly to the Army  than using civilian or contractor employees, the unit to which they are  assigned is able to utilize the soldier to perform more tasks over a longer  work period than a civilian because the soldier is not limited to their  position description or statement of work, as civilian employees or  contractor personnel would be. However, this official added that this could  be to the detriment of the soldier’s morale and these additional tasks and  work hours may not be included in the borrowed military personnel  description.
Our analysis of the data provided to us by the Army indicates that the full  cost of borrowed military personnel can, in some instances, be greater  than the costs that may be incurred if the same functions were performed  by civilians. For example, Army officials stated that temporarily assigning  soldiers to perform gate guard duty was among the most common uses of  borrowed military personnel at Army installations. Specifically, the  reports for the installations that reported both the use and rank of soldiers  as gate guards identified that the most frequently reported rank of a  soldier assigned to gate guard duty was a specialist or corporal (E-4).  Army reports for the three installations that reported both the use and  grade level of civilians as gate guards also showed that the most  frequently reported civilian gate guard was at the GS-5 level on the   General Schedule. In fiscal year 2014, a civilian gate guard’s pay and  benefits, which may not reflect full costs, would have ranged from $3,420  to $4,446 per month, whereas the full cost of a corporal or specialist  assigned to gate guard duty would have averaged $7,816 per month of  duty.
In addition, Army officials identified lifeguard duty as an example of a type  of position in which military personnel perform duty outside of a soldier’s  Military Occupational Specialty and that was prevalent across multiple  installations. In reviewing the Army’s data, we found that the most  frequently reported soldier performing lifeguard duty was also a specialist  or corporal (E-4), and the average civilian lifeguard was an NF-01 on the  Nonappropriated Funds Schedule. Our analysis found that a civilian  lifeguard’s wages would have ranged from $1,430 to $2,423 per month,  which may not reflect full costs, while the full cost of an E-4 borrowed for  lifeguard duty would have been $7,816 in fiscal year 2014. These  examples are based on average costs of military and civilian personnel.  Other factors, such as locality pay, overtime, and training requirements,  may further affect the actual costs. Moreover, according to DOD’s cost- estimating guidance, the full cost of personnel includes not just  compensation and benefits (such as basic pay, basic allowance for  housing, health care, retirement contributions, fringe benefits, and  contract costs) but also other personnel-related costs to the agency such  as recruitment, advertisement, and training, among other things. In cases  which the full cost of civilians performing gate guard and lifeguard duties  do not exceed $3,908, then the average full cost of military personnel  performing those duties may be double or more than the costs of civilian  personnel conducting those activities. In addition, we recognize that from  the installations’ perspective, this use of borrowed military personnel can  be viewed as a “cost avoidance” because using borrowed military  personnel avoids additional costs that would be incurred if civilians were  to be hired or contracted to fill these positions.
section_title: The Army Did Not Provide Sufficient Oversight to Help Ensure Commanders Documented and Reported Comprehensive Data during Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014 on the Full Cost of Using Borrowed Military Personnel
paragraphs: The Army did not provide sufficient oversight to help ensure commanders  at installations documented or reported costs in monthly special duty  reports when making decisions to use borrowed military personnel. In  addition to the March 2012 memorandum directing commanders to  consider the full costs of personnel in accordance with DOD’s cost- estimation guidance, the Secretary of the Army issued a memorandum  in March 2013, directing installations to document the costs of borrowed  military personnel. Specifically, the memorandum directed installations to  (1) document the full costs of special duty, to include borrowed military  personnel, in accordance with DOD cost-estimating guidance, using an  enclosed reporting template, and (2) document military personnel as the  only available personnel or conduct a cost analysis of available personnel  options. The memorandum further directed senior commanders to  report special duty personnel data, including the full costs of borrowed  military personnel, to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower  and Reserve Affairs beginning in April 2013, using a template included in  the memorandum.report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2014 noted that the use of borrowed military personnel could  result in unsustainable costs, and the committee expressed an  expectation DOD would calculate the cost of using military personnel in  lieu of civilian personnel or contractor support in accordance with the  DOD guidance.
Further, the House Armed Services Committee  According to DOD’s cost-estimating guidance, the full costs of personnel  refer to labor and other costs associated with military and civilian  personnel and contractor support. Army guidance initially required  installations and commands to report only the full costs of military  personnel. However, according to Army officials, over time, the full costs  of civilian personnel and contractor costs were integrated into the  reporting template. However, we reviewed data reported in February  2014, and none of the 13 commands and installations whose data we  reviewed comprehensively reported the full cost of special duty personnel  data, including borrowed military personnel, to the Army. Of the 13  commands and installations, we found that 7 reported military costs, 1  reported civilian costs, and none reported contractor costs. Further, 8  installations reported partial cost data—including incomplete data,  erroneous formulas, or entering the civilian pay grade of the position— rather than full costs, which did not properly inform the Army on the full  costs of civilian personnel. We also found that the problems with data  reporting evident in the February 2014 report were consistent with those  in other reporting cycles through April 2014, when cost data reporting  ended. As a result, we have determined the full cost data included in the  Army’s special duty reports to be unreliable. Figure 2 shows the extent to  which full personnel cost data were reported by installations and  commands in our review for February 2014.
Officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated that one reason installations may  not report full costs is because it was difficult for commands to  successfully calculate full cost of personnel comparisons due to the  complexities involved. Specifically, officials reported that a soldier may be  replacing a contractor, and contract cost information may not be available  locally.
Further, we found that special duty cost data, including borrowed military  personnel data, were not fully and uniformly collected and reported. DOD  cost-estimating guidance provides installations with guidance for  estimating full personnel cost comparisons of military, civilian, and  contractor support. Full cost elements outlined in the guidance include  direct costs (such as basic pay, basic allowance for housing, health care,  retirement contributions, fringe benefits, and contract costs) as well as  other costs such as recruitment, advertising, and training, among other  things. However, according to an official from the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, no other  guidance or instructions were issued describing how to complete the  template provided with the March 2013 memorandum from the Office of  the Secretary of the Army, and additional guidance to the commands on  how to better assess the full costs of civilian personnel and contractors  would have been beneficial. For example, the template did not include  information on how to document and report the cost data.  The official  added that data reported to the office did not provide much detail and  there were opportunities for human error. Specifically, the official stated  that as commands provided cost data, they were “breaking the links and  erasing formulas” in the reporting spreadsheet, which resulted in invalid  data being reported. In addition, the official noted that commanders may  not have had civilian or contractor cost data available to report. The  official stated that, as a result, the office was aware of receiving cost  information from commands and installations that varied by scope and  type.
In September 2013, we found that the DOD personnel cost-estimating  guidance provided limited guidance on estimating certain costs, such as  administrative and overhead costs. We found that some potential users  had developed their own cost-estimating methodology, while others had  requested more guidance, which had not been included in DOD’s most  recent instruction. Specifically, in July 2013, DOD issued updates to its  January 2010 guidance for estimating the full cost of personnel to  address some of the limitations users identified. However, due to  insufficient guidance and established business rules, we concluded that  without more developed guidance that established a clear set of ground  rules or standards, cost estimators must make their own assumptions,  which could lead to inconsistent estimates, as well as impair DOD’s and  congressional decision makers’ visibility over the costs of accomplishing  work by the different workforces. As a result, we recommended that  DOD further develop guidance for cost elements that users identified as  challenging to calculate, such as general and administrative, overhead,  advertising and recruiting, and training. DOD partially concurred with this  recommendation, stating that the department would continue to review  the methodology for full cost elements and issue clarifying guidance when  necessary or appropriate. As of April 2015, DOD has not developed  additional guidance for calculating the full costs of personnel. Given the  continued challenges, we continue to believe that fully implementing our  recommendation to further develop guidance for cost elements would  help ensure commanders consistently estimate and report the full costs of  personnel and plan strategically when making decisions to use borrowed  military personnel.
An official in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated that the office was receiving  incomplete and disparate special duty information from the installations  and commands and it became increasingly apparent that the information  was not useful. This official further explained that as a result, starting in  March 2014 these organizations were no longer expected to report on the  special duty personnel, including borrowed military personnel. This  official, however, also recognized that eliminating the reports limits their  oversight of borrowed military personnel costs. As of the beginning of  fiscal year 2015, there were still no requirements to document and report  borrowed military personnel data, including full costs of military personnel.  However, Army officials said that they expect to continue to use borrowed  military personnel in 2015 and beyond. Until the Army provides additional  oversight, which could include directing commanders to maintain records  for considering the full costs of borrowed military personnel when making  decisions to use these personnel and providing feedback when  documentation is incomplete, commanders are likely to continue limited  and inconsistent reporting on costs associated with the use of borrowed  military personnel. Furthermore, without oversight of the full costs for the  use of borrowed military personnel, collected in a uniform manner across  commands, the Army will not have a comprehensive picture of these  personnel costs, which may negatively affect its ability to make informed  strategic decisions about workforce requirements.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While the temporary suspension of policy constraints on the use of  special duty personnel, including borrowed military personnel, has  expired, budget uncertainty coupled with future projected declines in  DOD’s military, civilian, and contractor services personnel present a  number of challenges for DOD and specifically the Army, as Army  personnel constitute the bulk of DOD’s workforce. Given that the Army  expects to continue using borrowed military personnel, there are several  areas in which it could act to improve its oversight and visibility of this use  as it moves forward. For example, without a requirement to ensure that  borrowed military personnel data are uniformly collected, tracked, and  reported, and that the information gathered is complete and accurate, the  Army may be unable to identify problems with the use of borrowed  military personnel or be in the position to know the impacts that the use of  borrowed military personnel has on readiness and training. In addition,  without tracking the duration of the use of borrowed military personnel,  the Army will have difficulty ensuring that its workforce is being used most  effectively. Furthermore, without clear guidance that provides parameters  for determining the appropriate positions of borrowed military personnel,  the Army lacks reasonable assurance in the long run that soldiers are  being used in the most efficient and effective manner and risks  detrimental effects on soldiers’ skills within their Military Occupational  Specialty. Finally, without sufficient oversight to ensure that commanders  consider, document and report the full costs of using borrowed military  personnel, the Army risks allocating resources in a way that ultimately  could exacerbate the challenges it already faces in this period of ongoing  budget uncertainty.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better position the Army to determine the extent to which it is  continuing to use borrowed military personnel and to enhance the Army’s  ability to utilize its total workforce efficiently and effectively as it moves  forward, we are making the following four recommendations to the  Secretary of the Army:
Establish a requirement for collecting, tracking, and reporting data on  the use of borrowed military personnel and provide guidance to  ensure that data collected are complete and accurate; if other special  duty data are included, ensure that the tool contains a method to  distinguish borrowed military personnel from other special duty data.
Issue guidance that includes procedures for tracking the amount of  time soldiers are used as borrowed military personnel.
Revise Army Regulation 570-4 to include guidance to senior  commanders for approving the use of soldiers for positions or  functions outside their occupational specialty on a rotational basis for  an enduring period.
Establish oversight mechanisms that include directing commanders to  maintain records for considering the full costs of borrowed military  personnel when making decisions to use these personnel, and  directing the Army to review these records and full costs reported by  installations and commands to help ensure that these costs are  considered, documented, and reported in a uniform manner.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Army concurred with three  recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation. The  Army also stated that there are fundamental differences between OSD  and Army definitions of borrowed military personnel that they believed  caused a misunderstanding of the Army’s use of borrowed military  personnel. The Army’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in  appendix II. The Army also provided technical comments, which we  considered and incorporated where appropriate.
We disagree with the Army’s statement that we misunderstood how the  Army defines borrowed military personnel. Specifically, the Army stated  that the OSD definition is the use of military personnel to replace or  convert functions that were previously performed by civilians or  contractors. According to the Army, their definition includes all soldiers  being tasked outside of the unit to which they are assigned in order to  perform a higher priority mission in another unit. We did not find an OSD  definition of borrowed military personnel in DOD guidance, and  specifically note in our report that there is no department-wide definition  of borrowed military personnel. As we state in our report, Army  Regulation 570-4 defines borrowed military personnel as one part of the  larger category of use named “special duty.” According to the Army’s  regulation, special duty is comprised of borrowed military personnel and  troop diversion, and is the performance of a duty by personnel with an  organization other than the unit to which they are permanently assigned.  Further, the regulation defines borrowed military personnel as the use of  military personnel from an Army unit to perform duties within certain  activities where an approved civilian personnel requirement exists but for  which no personnel position has been authorized. Troop diversion—such  as performing military funeral honors—is the use of soldiers not meeting  the borrowed military personnel definition, to perform recurring duties with  an organization or unit other than that to which they are assigned. For the  purposes of this report, our focus was not on the larger category of  special duty as the Army defines it, but on the use of military personnel to  conduct functions that were previously performed by civilians or  contractors.
In its cover letter, the Army acknowledged the data quality issues  presented in our report. The Army noted that after the extensive usage of  special duty that was anticipated never materialized, management of the  special duty program was returned to the appropriate level of command.  Our report found that the Army does not know the extent to which  borrowed military personnel were used during fiscal years 2013 and 2014  because 1) it is unable to distinguish its use of borrowed military  personnel from the larger category of special duty, and 2) the Army did  not collect complete and accurate data during this time period. The Army  further stated that it was concerned that our report asserted the Army is  not in a position to know the extent to which borrowed military personnel  impacts training and readiness as every unit commander is empowered  and required to report training and readiness in monthly status reports.  Our report notes that due to the shortcomings with Army data on  borrowed military personnel the Army does not know the extent of the use  of borrowed military personnel impacts training and readiness. Also, our  report noted DOD has diminished visibility of impacts because the Army  had not included information on borrowed military personnel impacts in its  quarterly readiness reports to Congress as was previously required by  statute. The Army added that they are considering requiring that the unit  status reports to Army headquarters capture the total man hours used for  special duty. We continue to believe that because the Army does not  capture data on the extent to which it uses borrowed military personnel,  the Army does not have a basis to measure the impacts that borrowed  military personnel have on training and readiness.
Regarding our first recommendation that the Secretary of the Army  establish a requirement for collecting, tracking, and reporting data on the  use of borrowed military personnel, the Army concurred. The Army stated  that it has an existing process for oversight and reporting of the use of  soldiers replacing or converting functions previously performed by  contractors and plans to develop a similar policy to address oversight on  soldiers used to perform functions previously performed by civilians.  However, as noted in our report, we found that Army data on use of  special duty, including borrowed military personnel were not complete or  accurate and these data included the use of military personnel that  performed work previously performed by both civilians and contractors.  Therefore, the Army’s stated plan to develop an oversight process that is  modeled after a process that we determined did not produce complete  and accurate data raises a concern that DOD’s efforts will not address the  intent of the recommendation. We also continue to believe that it is  important to be able to distinguish borrowed military personnel data from  the larger category of special duty. We believe that the Army’s oversight  will be improved by collecting, tracking, and reporting complete and  accurate information on the use of borrowed military personnel.
Regarding our second recommendation that the Secretary of the Army  issue guidance to track the amount of time soldiers are used as borrowed  military personnel, the Army concurred. However, in concurring with the  recommendation, the Army explained that it would be unreasonable to  require tracking because Army Regulation 570-4 allows for the use of  soldiers for training purposes or for temporary functions and requiring the  tracking of soldiers would be overly burdensome. The Army also stated  that its current policy already appropriately limits the duration of use.  However, the Army recognizes that soldiers performing work outside their  military occupational specialties for extended periods of time negatively  impacts a soldier’s career, readiness and morale. Even in cases that  provide beneficial learning opportunities for soldiers, if a soldier is  assigned to such duties for an extended duration, it may negatively  impact career progression, readiness and morale. We understand that  tracking the amount of time soldiers are on borrowed military duty may  result in additional effort for the Army. However, without instituting  guidance on tracking duration of borrowed military personnel use, the  Army cannot ensure that borrowed military personnel use does not  exceed the 90-day limit as explicitly stated in Army guidance.
Regarding our third recommendation that the Secretary of the Army  revise Army Regulation 570-4 to include guidance to senior commanders  for approving the use of soldiers for positions or functions outside their  occupational specialty on a rotational basis for an enduring period, the  Army partially concurred. The Army stated that it has issued guidance  establishing the appropriate use of military manpower and is in the  process of incorporating this guidance into a revised Army Regulation  570-4. The Army explained that the new guidance requires that special  duty assignments be used to enhance individual and unit training  strategies. As noted in our report, senior commanders stated that current  guidance provides them discretion to approve the use of borrowed  military personnel outside occupational specialties and explained they  would not have approved the use unless it was clearly necessary and  deemed to be a high priority. However, we found instances where  soldiers were approved to serve as lifeguards, grounds maintenance  personnel, and gym attendants. It is unclear whether the new guidance  will include direction to officials who have responsibilities to approve the  use of borrowed military personnel. While we are encouraged by the  Army’s plans to provide guidance on when special duty assignments,  such as borrowed military duty, are appropriate, we continue to believe  that the implementation of our recommendation will provide the Army with  greater assurance that military personnel are appropriately assigned to  these duties.
Regarding our fourth recommendation that oversight mechanisms be  established to help ensure that the full costs of borrowed military  personnel are considered when making decisions on using these  personnel, the Army concurred. However, the Army stated it already has  a process requiring that a cost analysis take place. The Army further  stated that the complex process of conducting the cost analysis should  not be conducted at the field level but instead the Army will issue policy to  elevate responsibility to the headquarter level to perform a thorough and  comprehensive review. We are encouraged by the Army’s stated  approach and believe that such a review may prove beneficial. However,  our recommendation focused on local commanders because it is at the  local commander level that decisions to use borrowed military personnel  are executed. Therefore, we continue to believe that commanders should  conduct costs analysis at the local level. Further, if the Army finds it  beneficial to conduct additional analyses at the headquarters level we  believe that the results of these analyses should be shared with local  commanders to ensure that they have complete information to guide their  use of borrowed military personnel.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  parties; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness; and the Secretary of the Army. In addition, this  report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or at farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent that the Army used borrowed military personnel,  we obtained summarized special duty reports from the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs,  including borrowed military personnel for the period April 2013 through  February 2014, and the detailed special duty reports reflecting individual  command totals for February, March, April, May, and July 2014. We  requested the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower  and Reserve Affairs to provide data on the total number of borrowed  military personnel. However, the Army could not provide us borrowed  military personnel totals because they are unable to distinguish borrowed  military personnel data from the other special duty data in these reports.  The June 2014 report was not completed by the Army, therefore we are  missing data for that month. We analyzed the reports to determine the  commands that reported special duty personnel and the number of  special duty personnel reported by each command. We analyzed two of  the complete monthly special duty reports, February and May 2014, to  determine which commands reported; the number of special duty  personnel reported by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); and  the number of special duty personnel reported by commands outside of  FORSCOM. The February report was chosen for analysis because it was  the only detailed report provided by the Army with cost data, and it was  the final report issued prior to a format change. The May report was  chosen because it was the most current, and more complete than  previous months. We then performed additional analysis on the special  duty reports to determine the functions being performed by special duty  personnel, the length of time individuals were assigned to carry out the  functions, and in certain instances the number of personnel assigned to a  specific function.
To understand reporting requirements, processes, and reporting  accuracy, we interviewed key Army officials at the Office of the Assistant  Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and at site visits to Fort  Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort  Rucker, Alabama; and U.S. Army Pacific Command, Hawaii. These sites  were selected based on the amount of special duty personnel reported to  the Army, including both high and low use. While not generalizable, the  information obtained from these site visits provided perspectives about  the factors that affect use of borrowed military personnel at the local level.
To assess the reliability of the Army special duty report data, including  borrowed military, we performed electronic testing of key data elements,  reviewed related documentation, and conducted interviews with  knowledgeable officials. We found that there are no documented  procedures for the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and  Reserve Affairs providing reporting directions to the commands. The  Office of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs relies  on the subordinate commands to identify and define the positions that  make up special duty, with little guidance—there are no controls in place  to ensure that all of the data are collected, and there are no edit checks or  other quality-control procedures to ensure that the data are entered  correctly. Additionally, Army officials stated that the quality of the data is  questionable and trend analyses drawn from the reports would be faulty.  These issues indicate the data are unreliable for the Army’s use of the  data, but for the purposes of this report, we found the data sufficiently  reliable for reporting types of positions. We identified problems for the  Army’s use of the data and determined that the data were not sufficiently  accurate and complete for our purposes in reporting the number of  special duty personnel and the amount of time for each by the Army, and  we therefore concluded the data were not sufficiently reliable for these  purposes. However, we report some analyses from these data in this  report because the data have factored into the Army’s decision-making  processes regarding the effect of special duty, the overall extent of  special duty, and how soldiers are being used in borrowed capacities.
We interviewed and obtained documentation, such as local instructions  and policies, from cognizant officials at each site visit regarding the  process governing the use of special duty personnel, including borrowed  military personnel, at each installation or command. We also interviewed  individual unit commanders and soldiers knowledgeable about how  soldiers are selected and utilized for borrowed military personnel duties.  We then met with five individual soldiers at each of three of the five site- visit installations to obtain a nongeneralizable understanding of soldier  experiences performing borrowed military personnel duties. The soldiers  were selected by installation officials based on criteria we provided that  included the soldier’s home unit, rank, and the duration of special duty.  However, due to scheduling conflicts at two of the installations we visited,  we were not able to meet with soldiers there who had recently  experienced borrowed military personnel duty to discuss their  experiences.
We also obtained additional data on borrowed military positions that are  within or outside their Military Occupational Specialty and whether the  positions were previously filled by military, civilian, or contractor personnel  from the three FORSCOM installations we visited—Fort Bragg, Fort  Stewart, and Fort Hood. We provided each installation with its own data  that were extracted from the February 2014 FORSCOM special duty  report, and asked each installation for data on whether the borrowed  personnel worked in a position that had previously been filled by military  personnel, civilian personnel, or contractor personnel and whether or not  each borrowed military personnel listed was working within his or her  Military Occupational Specialty. We then assessed the reliability of this  information by checking the total number of entries against the number  we had provided (the numbers were identical), testing for values that  were outside the designated range (only Fort Stewart returned values  outside of those requested at a rate of 6 percent), and looking for  information outside of logical boundaries (e.g., a military police officer  performing law-enforcement duties should be listed with the military police  Military Occupational Specialty). We found the data to be sufficiently  reliable for our analyses concerning the totals reported, percentages, and  comparison to the Army’s information for these three installations. We  then compared the information to the Army’s May 2014 special duty  report. For both variables we calculated the percentages and totals.
To determine the extent to which the Army knows of any readiness and  training impacts that resulted from using borrowed military personnel for  fiscal years 2013 and 2014, we reviewed Department of Defense (DOD)  and Army guidance on the tracking and reporting of readiness and  training issues. We also reviewed past GAO reports on readiness impacts  and readiness reporting. In addition, we interviewed officials in the Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness within  the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the Secretary of the  Army, Army Readiness Division; and Office of the Secretary of Army for  Readiness and Reserve Affairs to obtain their perspectives on borrowed  military personnel and its impacts on readiness and training. In addition,  we obtained borrowed military personnel information from the Army  Readiness Division, compared it with information from Office of the  Secretary of the Army for Readiness and Reserve Affairs and interviewed  officials in both organizations to obtain an understanding of the  differences between the information tracked and reported by both  organizations. We also interviewed readiness officials during our site  visits to get their perspectives on how borrowed personnel affect the  readiness and training of organizational units located at their respective  installations.
In addition, at all five installations we visited, we met with Army officials  that were knowledgeable about readiness and training issues of  operational units at their respective installations and that use and review  local unit status reports that describe the status of readiness of these  units  In addition, we interviewed and obtained documentation from  cognizant officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and the Army Installation  Management Command. During our site visits, we interviewed key  personnel involved in the use, tracking and reporting, cost, and impacts  on readiness and training of borrowed military personnel. Further, we  reviewed DOD, Army, and local installation policies and guidance  regarding the use of special duty personnel, including borrowed military  personnel.
To determine the extent to which the Army considered costs when  making decisions to use borrowed military personnel, we reviewed  guidance documents, including memorandums from the Offices of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management, Secretary of  the Army, and Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and  Reserve Affairs. These documents inform the Army, commands, and  installations of the methods and circumstances by which military  personnel costs should be considered and reported for the use of  borrowed military personnel. We obtained and analyzed Department of  Defense Instruction 7041.04, as well as special duty cost data reported  by installations and commands for February 2014, which was the only  month of data available that included cost information. To assess the  reliability of the full cost data included in the Army’s special duty reports  and to better understand how the data are collected, analyzed, and  reported, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Office of the  Secretary of Defense’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation, Office of the Army General Counsel, and Office of the  Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. As  noted, we found the reported cost data to not be sufficiently reliable. We  conducted site visits to understand local policies and practices regarding  the collection, analysis, and reporting of special duty cost data to the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve  Affairs. For the same reasons as for the data described above, we  concluded that the cost data were not sufficiently reliable for reporting  cost information. However, we used this month of cost information to  illustrate examples of special duty costs that the Army has reported.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to June 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Vincent Balloon, Assistant  Director; Beverly Schladt, Assistant Director; Carol Petersen; Jack  Sheehan; Michael Silver; Amie Steele; Spencer Tacktill; John Van  Schaik; Allen Westheimer; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Michael Willems  made key contributions to this report.