Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain
Published: 2004-06-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq benefited from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and technologies, such as improvements in force networks and increased use of precision weapons, designed to address changes in the security environment resulting from the continuing terrorist threat and the advent of the information age. Based on the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1) assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying key barriers to continued progress.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons are clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations have been speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does not have detailed measures of these effects. Enhancements to networked operations, such as improved sensors and surveillance mechanisms, and more integrated command and control centers, have improved DOD's ability to share a broad view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force--reducing the time required for analysis and decision making in combat operations. However, recognizing that the full impact of these changes is unclear, DOD is conducting a series of case studies to better understand the effects of networked operations. Improvements in force networks have also been enhanced by the use of precision-guided weapons and associated technologies. These improvements not only provide commanders with greatly increased flexibility, such as the ability to conduct bombing operations in poor weather and from higher and safer altitudes, but also increase the accuracy of bombing operations. GAO's analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to targets increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and those in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding these improvements, certain barriers inhibit continued progress in implementing the new strategy. Four interrelated areas stand out as key: (1) a lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment, which reduces effectiveness by requiring operations to be slowed to manually reconcile information from multiple systems and limiting access to needed capabilities among military services; (2) continuing difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality analyses of bombing damages, which can slow ground advances and negate other improvements in the speed of operations; (3) the absence of a unified battlefield information system to provide standardized measures and baseline data on bombing effectiveness, which creates confusion about the success of new tactics and technologies, about assumptions used in battlefield simulation programs, and about procurement decisions; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all levels understand and adapt to the increased flow of information, more centralized management, and other changes in the operating environment brought about by the strategic changes.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have been  widely regarded as an unprecedented demonstration of combat power.  Relying predominately on air power, Operation Allied Force drove the  forces of Slobodan Milosovic out of Kosovo in 78 days during the spring of  1999. Operation Enduring Freedom, using a combination of air power and  special operations forces, drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in  175 days between October 2001 and March 2002. And, most recently, the  combination of air power and ground maneuver elements used in  Operation Iraqi Freedom drove Sadam Hussein from power in only 43 days  between March and May 2003. These operations have benefited from the  fielding of new strategies and technologies developed to deal with the new  security environment—now characterized by surprise and uncertainty as a  result of the evolving terrorist threat, and by the need to transition from  the industrial age into the information age. The Department of Defense’s  (DOD) new capabilities-based strategy seeks to contend with uncertainty  by improving DOD’s ability to act quickly and decisively across a wide  range of combat conditions. This strategy is being enabled by moves  toward more highly integrated force networks that combine information  superiority and advances in technologies for surveillance,  communications, precision weapons, and other areas to gain the  advantage and rapidly defeat the enemy.
On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we reviewed the  operational results of recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,  with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the strategic and  technological changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on  (1) assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in  force networking and in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying  key barriers to continued progress. We are addressing this report to you  because we believe it will be of interest to your committees as you address  DOD’s programs and funding. In performing our work, we reviewed DOD  policies, procedures, and reports related to implementation of the new  capabilities-based strategy; met with officials from throughout the  department; conducted a detailed analysis and reliability assessment of  bombing data; and discussed the results of our analysis with cognizant  officials. A more thorough description of our scope and methodology is  included in appendix I. We performed our work from April 2003 through  March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The close integration and coordination of ground combat forces and  bombing operations is essential to the exercise of lethal combat power on  the modern battlefield. As depicted in figure 1, military doctrine describes  targeting in terms of a cyclical process composed of six basic phases.
During this process, the joint force commander identifies the objectives  for military operations in support of the national objectives for the conflict  and any key limitations on operations—such as procedures for limiting  civilian collateral damage. The commander’s guidance then drives the  subsequent phases of the targeting cycle to include identifying and  analyzing potential targets and resources available to attack them,  obtaining formal permission for the strike, executing the strike, and then  assessing strike effectiveness and any need to reattack.
The success of this process is highly dependent on the speed and quality of  interaction among the people and systems conducting the various  activities at each phase. Trained ground control personnel must interact  quickly and covertly with manned and unmanned aircraft, electronic  sensors and space-based satellite imagery systems, or other intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms to spot the target and  accurately mark its location. Accuracy depends upon the ability of the  ground personnel to locate themselves, the target, and any friendly forces  nearby and accurately judge the distance between each. These elements  must be able to communicate the targeting information to command and  control centers that coordinate the actions of a variety of analysts and  others who assess the situation, plan the strike, communicate the  information back to the ground personnel, and analyze the effectiveness of  the attack.
DOD is working to improve the interaction of these elements by using  network-centric operating concepts. The term “network-centric” is used to  describe a broad class of approaches to military operations that are  enabled by networking the force. DOD’s approach involves developing the  sensors and other technologies to provide pervasive oversight of the  battlefield, and then linking them to all elements of the war-fighting force  through communications and other technologies. This allows the various  elements of the force to develop a shared situation awareness, a shared  knowledge and understanding of commanders’ intent, and the ability to  rapidly process and analyze information. The belief is that these  capabilities will increase combat power by better synchronization of  weapons effects in the battle space and greater speed in command  decision making. This strategic change is being accompanied by an array  of changes to doctrine, tactics, organization, and training to integrate the  network-centric concept into DOD’s culture.
Advances in networking the force are being complemented by advances in  precision weapons. Precision-guided weapons provide precise control of  bombs through the use of electrical equipment that help guide the weapon  in flight. These capabilities provide an advantage in accuracy over  conventional weapons that do not have the ability to adjust their trajectory  while in flight. The transition from unguided to guided weapons has  accelerated rapidly since Operation Desert Storm in 1991 where unguided  weapons were the norm. For example, as shown in figure 2, only about   8 percent of the weapons used during Operation Desert Storm were  guided, while this number increased to about 68 percent in Operation Iraqi  Freedom.
Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq provided a variety of  conditions for the development of these network-centric approaches. For  example, operations in Kosovo were conducted primarily by air over  rugged and undeveloped mountainous terrain. There were no direct  attacks by large massed ground forces, and the cover of forests and  villages allowed enemy forces to easily conceal their location. Similarly,  Afghanistan’s rugged and mountainous terrain and large number of caves  and bunkers also provided numerous opportunities to conceal Taliban and  al Qaeda forces. Light infantry and special operations forces were the  primary U.S. forces on the ground, with aircraft as their sole means of fire  support. In contrast, the terrain in Iraq is characterized by mostly broad  plains with mountainous regions along the borders and a largely desert  climate posing threats from dust and sand storms. Initial operations pitted  large massed forces against one another in more traditional ways of  fighting. However, the conduct of U.S. operations also relied heavily on  small, dispersed groups of special operations forces operating on  battlefields with no clear front and rear lines, as enemy forces blended in  and out of urban populations.
With the exception of Kosovo, these conflicts were also characterized  largely by pronounced U.S. air superiority, with little threat from enemy  air defenses. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, enemy  air defenses were so limited that U.S. forces were able to win near total air  supremacy early in the war. Similarly, air superiority was not a concern  during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to the conflict, military forces had  been working to set the conditions for air dominance through more than   3 years of bombing. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, however,  there were significant concerns about enemy air defense systems, causing  bombing operations to be carried out at high altitudes to avoid the threat.  Moreover, access to overseas bases was problematic in all three of these  operations, straining logistical support systems and complicating military  operations. For example, this lack of forward air basing infrastructure  within effective fighter range of land-locked Afghanistan required U.S.  forces to rely primarily on carrier-based aircraft to provide strike power  during the operations. These operations were also conducted in an  environment of pronounced concerns about limiting collateral damage to  civilian populations and infrastructure. Adversaries attempted to exploit  collateral damage in an effort to gain public sympathy for their cause and  cast a negative light on U.S. operations. U.S. forces adjusted the target  selection and approval process to minimize collateral damages, calling on  senior leaders to approve target selection in some cases. However,  attempts to minimize collateral damages can also create tension with  military objectives and complicate bombing operations.
section_title: Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision Weapons Central to Increased Combat Power
paragraphs: DOD officials cite improvements in networking the force and in the use of  precision weapons as primary reasons for the overwhelming combat  power demonstrated in recent operations. Network-centric operating  concepts, particularly in surveillance and command and control systems,  have created unprecedented battlefield situation awareness for  commanders and their forces, yet the full extent to which operations have  been affected is unclear. Technologies enhancing the use of precision- guided weapons have also provided military commanders with increased  flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations.
subsections: section_title: Networked Surveillance and Command and Control Systems Create Improved Situation Awareness
paragraphs: Network-centric operating concepts have improved battlefield situation  awareness for commanders and their forces. DOD has indicated that  technological improvements in information-gathering systems allow  commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Such  improvements provide for greater shared situation awareness, which, in  turn, speeds command and control. However, while it appears that  enhanced networking has speeded operations, the full impact on  operations is unclear because of the absence of detailed measures of their  effects.
subsections: section_title: Improvements to Information- Gathering Systems Allow for Unprecedented Ability to Monitor Battlefield
paragraphs: DOD officials and reports cite a variety of technological and other  improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  mechanisms as basic to the unprecedented ability of commanders and  forces to observe and monitor the battlefield. For example, surveillance  aircraft orbiting the battlefield—such as the E-3 Sentry airborne warning  and control system (for detecting enemy air and naval activities and  directing friendly fighters), the RC-135 and EP-3 aircraft (for locating  enemy radar and other electronic emissions), the E-8C Joint Surveillance  Target Attack Radar System (for detecting enemy ground activity), and the  U-2 (for high altitude, wide-area surveillance)—have been outfitted with  smaller, lower cost, and higher quality sensors and radars, improving their  ability to detect the enemy and provide high resolution imagery of the  battlefield. Another key is the development of unmanned aerial vehicles,  such as the Predator and the Global Hawk used extensively in Afghanistan  and Iraq. These aircraft carry cameras, sensors, or even weapons and are  used to constantly circle over the battlefield and provide continuous live  surveillance of the enemy without risk to human pilots. The Predator is  remotely piloted by operators on the ground, while the Global Hawk is  self-piloted, controlled by a preprogrammed onboard computer that  controls the aircraft from takeoff to landing.
These systems interact with ground personnel, such as special operations  forces or specially trained combat controllers, to locate and precisely  mark targets and assess bombing results. Technological advances now  enable these controllers to identify a target and determine its precise  location by using laser designators, which may be connected to a hand- held Global Positioning System receiver. Reports have cited the use of  these technologies interacting with aircraft flying at high altitudes to avoid  enemy air defenses, combined with new tactics for integrating special  operations forces with conventional units, as a breakthrough capability.  During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, special forces teams  used these technologies linked to piloted aircraft or unmanned Predator  drones—providing live battlefield video directly to nearby AC-130 gun  ships—to attack small groups of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters and other  fleeting targets. The Joint Forces Command report on missions conducted  during Operation Iraqi Freedom also cited the capabilities provided by  these advances.
section_title: Shared Situation Awareness Speeds Command and Control
paragraphs: DOD officials indicate that the improved ability to share a broad view of  the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force has  compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in  bombing operations, increasing lethality significantly. Before an actual  strike may begin, information on potential targets generally must be  routed through command and control centers where the target  information is analyzed; information is exchanged between a myriad of  commanders, analysts, and other elements of the force; and final approval  for the strike is granted. The ability to network these elements and rapidly  exchange information during this process—central to combat  effectiveness—-is enabled by improvements in computing power, digital  communications, and satellite data links in recent years. For example,  increases in computing power have enabled the networking of computers  from a multitude of personnel and locations, with near instantaneous  exchange of information through techniques such as file sharing, video  conferencing, and e-mailing. These capabilities are enhanced by digital  communications, which can be faster and more accurate than voice  communication. For example, digital systems allow a ground controller to  input the coordinates and other information needed for an attack into a  computer and transmit this information instantly to computers on board  an aircraft or at command and control centers.
The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks  has some limitations. For example, the Defense Science Board recently  reported that despite the successes in Afghanistan, there were difficulties  in passing coordinates from ground personnel to aircraft overhead due to  the unreliability and limited range of secure communications and the  absence of digital communications systems. As a result, instead of  instantaneously transmitting targeting information across digital systems,  ground controllers were required to pass Global Positioning System  coordinates by voice radio to aircrews. Aircrews then had to write the  coordinates on boards held on their knees, and then read them back for  confirmation. Once confirmed, aircrews needed to load the coordinates by  hand into the weapons, a process requiring as many as 51 computer  keystrokes and subject to error.
The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks  is also dependent upon satellite data links and availability of bandwidth.  Bandwidth is a term used to describe the rate at which information moves  from one electronic device to another—usually expressed in terms of bits  per second—-over phone lines, fiber optic cable, or wireless  telecommunications systems. Increases in this capacity have enabled the  rapid exchange of large visual and data files, giving commanders  increasing access to more real-time surveillance, intelligence, and  targeting information than in previous conflicts. For example, according to  the Joint Forces Command, U.S. forces in Iraq had access to 42 times the  bandwidth available in Desert Storm. However, despite this improvement  the Army and others have experienced continuing shortages in the  availability of bandwidth.
Despite some limitations, technological advances have also made it  possible to manage conflicts from command centers located far away from  the battlefield, using so-called reach back techniques, where some  commanders, analysts, and other support personnel remain at home  stations and communicate with commanders at the battlefield using the  networks described above. For example, during Operation Allied Force in  Kosovo the center used to direct air operations was located in Vicenza,  Italy. Images from Predator aircraft located over the battlefield in Kosovo  were transmitted by satellite communications to a ground station in  England, then by fiber optic cable to a facility in the United States for  analysis. The information was then transmitted to the District of Colombia  area, where it was up-linked to a satellite and transmitted back to  controllers aboard an airborne command and control aircraft in Kosovo.  The information was then provided to controllers, who provided the  information to aircraft poised to strike the targets (see fig. 3).
The reach back technique not only provides for more centralized control  of operations but also provides the opportunity for savings in logistical  support requirements. For example, in previous conflicts, command  centers—comprised of perhaps 1,500-2,000 commanders, analysts, and  others, and the equipment needed to do their jobs—had to be transported  into the war zone. This requirement created major demands on  transportation and other support elements during the early phases of an  operation and reduced the air and sealift available to move soldiers and  supplies. Now, networking permits commanders at the battlefield to reach  back to analysts and other staff located thousands of miles away for  guidance and support. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the joint  forces commander remained at U.S. Central Command headquarters in  Tampa, Florida, while air operations were directed from centers in Saudi  Arabia and Qatar. Electronic map displays at these locations provided near  continuous tracking of ground, air, and naval units, with Predator drones  and other aircraft feeding live video imagery from the battlefield.
section_title: Full Impact of Networking Is Unclear
paragraphs: While it seems clear that networking has speeded operations, the full  impact on operations is unclear because of the absence of detailed  measures of their effects. For example, U.S. Central Command officials  told us that while the targeting process was slowed by requirements for  additional command approvals for some targets, they believed that overall,  the targeting process was more efficient during Operation Iraqi Freedom  than previous conflicts. However, statistics were not maintained by the  Central Command to measure this improvement.
Several experiments and exercises provide some information on this issue.  For example, according to a recent DOD report to Congress, an Army  exercise in 1997 using computer simulation to determine the war-fighting  effectiveness of a digitized division-sized force found that the time  required to process calls for fire was reduced from 3 minutes to   30 seconds and that the planning time for attacks at the company level was  cut from 40 to 20 minutes. Similarly, a 1998 experiment involving  networked Army helicopter units and a range of Navy and Marine units to  counter a simulated attack by North Korean special operations boats  found that the average decision time was reduced from 43 to 23 minutes  and that shooter effectiveness measured in kills per shot was increased by  50 percent. DOD also reported that a special Air Force project in the mid- 1990s found that F15-C fighter aircraft networked with digital  communication packages increased their success rate in air-to-air combat  exercises by more than 150 percent over aircraft equipped with voice only  communications. The increase was attributed to the benefits of shared  situation awareness provided by the digital networks. According to DOD’s  report, pilots with voice only communications can only see enemy aircraft  in the radar zone directly in front of their aircraft, and they cannot see  supporting friendly aircraft to their rear. To attack enemy aircraft, the  voice only aircraft must hold verbal conversations with supporting aircraft  to understand the entire combat picture and develop a coordinated attack  plan. However, fighter aircraft networked with digital communications are  able to see the entire picture of enemy and friendly support aircraft  locations on their screens without the need for time-consuming  conversations. According to the report, this shared mental picture of the  battlefield reduces the cognitive load on the pilots, enabling them to  concentrate more on the battle, react quicker, and make synchronized,  mutually reinforcing decisions with their supporting aircraft.
These examples provide illustrations of the potential effects of network- centric operations. However, DOD’s report acknowledges that evidence of  its full impact is limited and often scattered, rather than focused and  systematic. Having a fuller, more precise understanding of the effects of  network-centric operations is important because of its potential impact on  issues such as the ability to model the speed of combat operations and the  resources needed to support them. An official from DOD’s Office of Force  Transformation told us that the office is conducting a series of case  studies of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and exercises at the National  Training Center and elsewhere to better understand these effects.
section_title: Precision Weapons Increase Flexibility and Accuracy
paragraphs: The development of technologies such as laser-guided and Global  Positioning System-guided precision weapons has provided military  commanders with increased flexibility and accuracy in bombing  operations, making them increasingly lethal.
subsections: section_title: Precision Weapons Provide Increased Flexibility
paragraphs: Precision weapons reduce limitations created by poor weather and  visibility, enable bombing operations from higher and safer altitudes, and  allow aircraft to be used in new ways. For example, bombing operations  have always faced limitations due to targets being obscured by bad  weather or other limitations on visibility. Traditionally, the process of  locating and marking a target was dependent on the controllers’ ability to  see the target, judge distances, and accurately find coordinates using  paper maps. Targeting objectives were marked using smoke grenades,  flares, or other such techniques. However, Global Positioning System- guided bombs help reduce these limitations by providing an all-weather  delivery capability enabled by satellite-aided navigation. The system is a  constellation of 24 orbiting satellites emitting continuous navigation  signals that handheld receivers on the ground can translate into time,  location, and velocity of targets. Time can be calculated to within a  fraction of a second, location to within 100 feet, and velocity within less  than a mile per hour. According to DOD officials, laser-guided bombs— which follow a narrow beam of pulsed energy trained on a target by  aircraft or operators on the ground—are more precise than Global  Positioning System-guided bombs, and have a capability for attacks on  moving targets that Global Positioning System-guided bombs do not.  However, laser-guided bombs are subject to limitations presented by rain,  clouds, or other visibility conditions since there must be a clear line of  sight between the laser designator and the target.
From Operation Allied Force to Operation Enduring Freedom, DOD  increased the use of Global Positioning System-guided bombs by about   45 percent and decreased the use of laser-guided bombs by about   32 percent. Conversely, between Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi  Freedom, DOD decreased the use of Global Positioning System-guided  bombs by about 13 percent and increased the use of laser-guided bombs  by about 10 percent. DOD officials stated that there is a need for both  laser-guided and Global Positioning System-guided bombs in today’s  environment and that the use depends on such factors as nature of the  target being struck, theater of operations, weather conditions, availability,  and cost. Frequently used guided munitions such as the Global Positioning  System Guided Bomb Unit 31 have a unit cost of about $21,100 to $28,400,  depending on the version used, while laser-guided bombs such as the  Guided Bomb Units 10/12/16 have unit costs ranging from $14,600 to  $23,000. Unguided bombs such as the 500-pound MK-82 and 1,000-pound  MK-83 have unit costs ranging from about $2,000 to $8,700.
The use of such precision-guided weapons has also made it possible for  bombing operations to be conducted from higher altitudes. This tactic  helps limit the threat to pilots and aircraft from air defense systems and  ground fire, and provides Global Positioning System-guided bombs with  more time to acquire and guide on the satellite signals. In Kosovo, where  air defense systems posed a significant threat to U.S. forces, pilots  conducted bombing missions at an altitude that was beyond the effective  reach of the Serbian enemy air defense systems. According to DOD  officials, they have continued to use this tactic in Afghanistan and Iraq  because of its effectiveness. In addition to high altitude operations, Global  Positioning System-guided weapons, such as the joint direct attack  munition used extensively in Iraq, can also be launched miles away from a  target. The operator can essentially launch the weapon and proceed on to  the next target, relying on the navigation system to guide the weapon to  impact. While conducting bombing operations from high altitudes is much  safer for pilots and aircraft, it also becomes more difficult to properly  identify and distinguish certain targets, particularly when the enemy  employs denial and deception tactics. For example, during Operation  Allied Force, Serbian forces made tank decoys out of milk cartons and  artillery pieces out of stovepipes.
DOD has also increased the numbers of aircraft capable of delivering  precision-guided munitions, allowing military planners to use aircraft in  new and different ways. According to a recent report, only about   20 percent of U.S. aircraft were equipped with the ability to put a laser- guided bomb on the target during the first Gulf War. However, nearly  every combat aircraft was capable of employing precision-guided  munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Bombers such as B-2s are now  capable of delivering large payloads of weapons in a single strike,  providing more flexibility in weapons availability. These capabilities  increase the ability to deliver more precision-guided weapons during each  flight. Moreover, they also increase operational effectiveness by allowing  the military to reduce flights by planning to strike multiple targets during  each flight, as opposed to the traditional approach of carrying out multiple  flights to attack one target.
section_title: Precision Weapons Improve Accuracy
paragraphs: Our analysis found that advances in precision weapons have improved the  accuracy of bombing operations. For example, we compared data on  bombing operations in Afghanistan maintained by the U.S. Central  Command with data on operations in Kosovo from our classified report on  Operation Allied Force. This analysis found that the percentage of attacks  resulting in damage or destruction to fixed targets increased by   12 percentage points from Kosovo to Afghanistan. Further, the percentage  of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to mobile targets increased  by 21 percentage points. DOD officials agreed that bombing accuracy  improved, and classified analyses conducted by both the Air Force and the  Navy support that conclusion. According to DOD officials, there is no  similar analysis of the accuracy of bombing operations during Operation  Iraqi Freedom.
While DOD officials agreed that precision-guided weapons have increased  the accuracy of bombing operations, they stated that it is important to  note that such improvements may also be influenced by other factors. For  example, differences in terrain, the relative numbers of fixed versus  mobile targets (which are harder to hit), and commanders’ guidance on  collateral damage can all influence the accuracy of bombing operations. In  addition, the experience and the training that military forces gained by  near continuous combat operations since the beginning of Operation  Allied Force in 1999 may also influence bombing accuracy. Such factors  must be considered when interpreting bombing statistics.
section_title: Key Barriers Inhibit Continued Progress in Implementing the New Strategy
paragraphs: Despite the improvements brought about by advances in networking and  precision weapons, DOD has identified a variety of barriers undermining  continued progress in implementing the new capabilities-based strategy.  For example, concerns were raised about shortages of digital  communications, commercial satellite capacity and bandwidth, and other  equipment. However, four interrelated areas stood out as key barriers to  continued progress: (1) the lack of standardized, interoperable systems  and equipment; (2) DOD’s continuing difficulty in obtaining timely, high  quality assessments of the effects of bombing operations; (3) the absence  of a unified battlefield data collection system to provide standardized  measures and baseline data on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing  operations; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help  personnel at all levels understand and adapt to changes in the operating  environment brought about by the move to a highly networked force using  advanced technologies.
subsections: section_title: Problems in Standardization and Interoperability Slow Operations and Reduce Effectiveness
paragraphs: The lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment during  joint operations was one of the most frequently reported problems we  found during our review. According to DOD officials and reports, this long- standing problem undermines many operating systems at DOD, including  systems used to provide shared situation awareness of the battlefield,  battle management command and control, and damage assessments of the  effects of bombing operations. For example, officials from the Joint  Forces and Special Operations Commands told us that during Operation  Iraqi Freedom, ground forces arrived in theater with several different, non- interoperable Blue Force Tracking systems. Blue Force Tracking systems  are devices carried by friendly ground units and vehicles that continuously  or periodically transmit their locations to a central database, allowing their  locations to be displayed on computer screens. Since there is no joint  standard for such tracking systems, the joint force commander is  responsible for resolving the interoperability problems created by the use  of disparate systems. To provide a common picture of the location of  ground forces using these systems, commanders had to develop a number  of creative solutions to bridge the differences between them and integrate  them into a coherent system—requiring considerable time and effort.
DOD officials also told us that the use of differing formats for processing  information creates similar problems. For example, each service and  unified command have their own instructions for performing operations  such as reporting on the results of bombing missions. A recent DOD report  found that during joint operations in Afghanistan, the Central Command  received mission reports using at least 23 different formats. This created  difficulty in receiving messages and required time-consuming manual data  manipulation and entry. Operations in Iraq also faced similar problems.  According to the Joint Forces Command report on Iraqi Freedom, the  process of evaluating the effects of attacks in Iraq was beset by a lack of  commonly understood operational level standards. Integration of  information was undermined by groups adopting their own standards and  reporting formats, resulting in difficulties in translating information and  coming to a mutual understanding because they were not able to make  specific comparisons between formats or to a common format. DOD has  published a number of joint publications to help standardize operations in  the joint environment. These publications provide general terms of  reference and descriptions of processes, such as the targeting process, for  use by personnel from the various services while operating in the joint  environment. However, according to DOD officials, these publications do  not provide enough detailed guidance, such as standardized formats for  reporting mission results, for the actual conduct of operations. As a result,  each unified command must develop its own implementing procedures,  with no system to ensure standardization among the commands. Further,  according to DOD officials, when the pace of operations increases to high  levels, there is a tendency for personnel to revert to using their own  familiar service procedures.
We have also reported that a variety of equipment—such as  reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, ground-based stations processing  intelligence data, ground targeting equipment, and digital transmission  systems used to transmit information between airborne and ground  personnel—is not interoperable across the services. Similar to the  examples cited above, the inability of these systems to operate effectively  together can limit access to communications and other needed capabilities  and confuse and slow targeting activities as less efficient alternatives must  be used to achieve the mission.
DOD recognizes that improved interoperability and standardization are  central to the transformation of its forces, and is attempting to address the  problem. However, the problem is complex and difficult to resolve  because military operations and acquisition systems have traditionally  focused on the services and the specific weapons platforms needed for  their specific missions—not on joint operations with interoperable  systems and equipment. DOD’s budget is organized by service and defense  agencies, as we and the Defense Science Board recently reported in  separate publications. Therefore, the process of defining and acquiring  the right capabilities is dominated by the services and defense agencies.  Joint force commanders’ views are considered in this process, but they  have a difficult time competing with individual service interests that  control the process. As a result, the acquisition of systems and equipment  often fails to consider joint mission requirements and solutions, and there  is no guarantee that fielded systems will operate effectively together.
DOD is addressing the need for more interoperability and standardization  in several ways. For example, DOD’s April 2003 Transformation Planning  Guidance requires the commander of the Joint Forces Command to  develop a plan to address DOD’s interoperability priorities. These  priorities include such efforts as development of a common operational  picture for joint forces; improved intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance capabilities; improvements to selected targeting linkages;  and improved reach back capabilities. The planning guidance also requires  the services and the Joint Forces Command to develop plans for achieving  the desired transformational capabilities, including an identification of the  initiatives taken to improve interoperability. DOD is also attempting to  reform the acquisition process to align it with a new capabilities-based  resource allocation process built around joint operating concepts. Instead  of building plans, operations, and doctrine around individual service  systems, DOD is attempting to explicitly link acquisition strategy to joint  concepts to provide integrated, interoperable joint war-fighting  capabilities. For example, in June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff issued Instruction 3170.01 that established the Joint Capabilities  Integration and Development System. This system provides new guidelines  and procedures for joint staff to review proposed acquisitions for their  contribution to joint war-fighting needs.
DOD is also developing the Global Information Grid to act as the  organizing framework for network-centric operations and help ensure  interoperability in information operations throughout DOD. Begun in the  late 1990s, this effort seeks to integrate the information processing,  storing, disseminating, and managing capabilities—as well as the  associated personnel and processes—throughout DOD into an integrated  network. DOD’s Chief Information Officer has described this network as a  private military version of the World Wide Web. The effort includes  programs to develop the policies and guidance needed to implement  network-centric concepts across DOD, as well as programs to provide the  technological improvements needed for the success of network-centric  operations. Parts of this effort, such as policy and procedural guidance,  bandwidth expansion, and improvements to reach back capabilities, have  begun or are in place. For example, definitions of requirements for  interoperable information technology that are used in developing the  Global Information Grid are cited as the authoritative guidance in the  requirements determination and acquisition areas—including the Joint  Capabilities Integration and Development System discussed previously.  However, according to officials involved in the effort, development of the  grid is still in its early stages and is planned to continue to the year 2010  and beyond.
While DOD appears committed to improving interoperability, DOD  officials state that such reforms require difficult cultural changes to fully  succeed. However, we previously reported that various problems have  undermined past reforms, including cultural resistance to change, stove- piped operations, difficulties in sustaining top management commitment  (the average tenure of top political appointees is only 1.7 years), and other  problems that continue to exist today. For example, in November 1997,  DOD announced the establishment of the Defense Reform Initiative, which  was a major effort to modernize DOD’s business processes and ignite a  “revolution” in business affairs at DOD. The initiative was overseen by the  Defense Management Council composed of senior defense leaders  reporting to the Secretary of Defense. However, by July 2000, we  reported that the initiative was not meeting its time frames and goals in a  number of areas. We concluded that the most notable barrier was the  difficulty in overcoming institutional resistance to change in an  organization as large and complex as DOD. Moreover, the effectiveness of  the Defense Management Council was impaired because members were  not able to put aside their particular services’ or agencies’ interests to  focus on departmentwide approaches.
Similarly, cultural impediments to change were also illustrated in our  March 2003 report on ground-based systems for processing intelligence  data. In that report, we stated that DOD’s system for certifying their  interoperability was not working effectively. In 1998, DOD began a  program to reduce the number of ground-based systems that process  intelligence data from various sensors and ensure that the remaining  sensors are interoperable with other DOD systems. DOD requires that  such information systems be certified, and to help enforce the certification  process, the department set up a review panel to periodically review such  systems and place those with interoperability problems on a “watch list.”  However, 5 years after the program was started, we reported that only 2 of  26 systems in the program had been certified and, despite this problem,  the systems had not been placed on the watch list. DOD officials cited a  number of reasons for the noncompliance, including that military services  sometimes allow service-unique requirements to take precedence over  joint interoperability requirements. DOD strongly agreed with our  recommendations to take several steps necessary to enforce its  certification process.
section_title: Timely Understanding of Battle Damages Remains a Difficult Problem
paragraphs: DOD’s difficulty in obtaining timely, high quality assessments of the effects  of bombing operations continues to be a difficult problem to overcome.  Problems with battle damage assessments have been repeatedly identified  since at least Operation Desert Storm in 1991. DOD has taken some steps  to address these problems, but they continue to reoccur. As a result, some  DOD officials have called for approaching battle damage assessments in  different ways.
subsections: section_title: Battle Damage Assessments Cannot Match Pace of Operations
paragraphs: Reports from DOD and others have identified repeated difficulties in  conducting battle damage assessments in operations in Iraq, as well as  other operations dating back at least to Operation Desert Storm in 1991.  Battle damage assessments are a critical component of combat operations.  Slow or inaccurate assessments can result in inefficient use of forces and  weapons, as targets must be struck repeatedly—-but sometimes  unnecessarily—to ensure their elimination as a threat. Inadequate damage  assessments also slow ground advances, as units and individuals face  uncertainty about enemy capabilities, which can ultimately increase their  risk of death or injury since they may have to close with the enemy to  understand the conditions ahead of them. However, DOD reported that  battle damage assessments during operations in Iraq could not keep up  with the pace of operations and failed to provide the information needed  for operational decisions. Reports on operations in Afghanistan also  identified similar problems during Operation Enduring Freedom. Our  report on Operation Desert Storm found that battle damage assessments  during that conflict were neither as timely nor as complete as planners had  assumed they would be. Battle damage assessments were performed on  only 41 percent of the strategic targets in our analysis, resulting in  potentially unnecessary additional strikes to increase the probability that  target objectives would be met.
The inability of damage assessment resources to keep up with the pace of  modern battlefield operations is due to several factors. According to DOD  officials, advances in network-centric operations and precision weapons  have increased the speed at which targets are generated and attacked. At  the same time, however, DOD does not have an occupational specialty for  battle damage analysts. This results in shortages of trained analysts when  resources are surged during operations, leaving unified commands to rely  on untrained and inexperienced personnel brought in from other areas and  trained on the job. For example, during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,  the Central Command experienced requirements for large manning  increases in its battle damage assessment capability. While the command  was ultimately able to increase its staff of analysts to about 60 (see fig. 4),  this was only a fraction of the estimated requirement. Typically, the  Central Command has about three to five full-time personnel assigned to  its battle damage assessment group.
Moreover, according to Central Command officials, even when they  obtained personnel they were often untrained. Operations were further  slowed, as these personnel were required to receive on-the-job training.  Battle damage assessment training is available at both the service and joint  levels. However, according to DOD officials, the absence of a formal  occupational specialty for battle damage assessment means there is little  incentive for personnel to seek the training. Further, even if trained,  analysts are required to use the instructions of the unified command in  charge of operations during actual conflicts. DOD officials told us that  there is no requirement for these instructions to be standardized, making it  more difficult for personnel from the services to quickly adapt to  operations. Finally, according to officials, DOD does not have a  comprehensive system to track personnel who have received battle  damage assessment training, further exacerbating problems in quickly  locating trained analysts during surge situations.
section_title: Attempts to Address the Battle Damage Assessment Problem Have Been Limited
paragraphs: In recognition of the continuing problems associated with battle damage  assessments, DOD has taken some steps to address these problems.  However, these attempts have been somewhat limited. For example, DOD  established the Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and Evaluation  program in August 2000 to investigate solutions to battle damage  assessment process problems. The program was focused on assessment  processes used by U.S. forces in Korea, but it also analyzed processes used  in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Program officials  developed a variety of enhancements that could improve the battle  damage assessment process. For example, program officials developed  improvements to the processes used in Korea to standardize disparate  systems and speed the flow of information between analysis and command  centers. To help address analyst training problems, they developed a  compact disc-based course to provide quick training for untrained  personnel assigned to fill shortages of analysts during conflicts. Further,  they also developed an agreement with a reserve organization to develop a  core of trained battle damage assessment analysts and to have those  personnel available to meet surge requirements for the Korean command.
However, according to program officials, acceptance of such approaches  is voluntary within DOD, and many have not been implemented outside  Korea. They are trying to gain additional support for adoption of their  enhancements. Program operations will be discontinued and a final report  issued by December 2004. In addition to this program, DOD officials told  us that a Combat Assessment Working Group was recently established at  the Joint Staff to discuss ways to address problems with the battle damage  assessment process. However, the group had not developed formal  recommendations at the completion of our audit work in March 2004.
section_title: Officials Call for Different Approaches to Assessing Battle Damage
paragraphs: Some DOD officials have called for more effort to be focused on assessing  battle damages from an “effects-based” framework. The effects-based  operational concept calls for an increased emphasis on conducting  military operations and assessing their effects, in terms of the military and  nonmilitary effects sought—rather than in terms of simply the destruction  of a given target or an adversary. According to a recent Defense Science  Board report, the emergence of this concept has been influenced by the  opportunity provided by precision weapons, shared situation awareness,  and other advances enabling the precise use of force, as well as the needs  presented by the nature of current military campaigns. Operations from  Kosovo to Iraq have been characterized by tension among multiple  strategic and operational objectives: destroy enemy infantry and air  defenses and drive the current regime from power, but do not injure  civilians or damage necessary infrastructure.
The use of an effects-based battle damage assessment approach would  mean that instead of the traditional focus only on damage or destruction  of a target, battle damage assessments should also attempt to determine  whether command objectives are being met by other influences in the  battlefield. For example, initial bombing attacks on nearby targets may  persuade enemy troops to abandon a target facility, eliminating the need  to bomb the target facility at all. According to the Joint Forces Command’s  report on Iraqi Freedom, commanders in Iraq attempted to use an effects- based approach to analyze military operations. However, when the speed  of operations exceeded their capability to analyze and assess how actions  were changing the Iraqi system, they reverted to the traditional focus on  simple attrition measures. Coalition forces reverted to counting specific  numbers of targets destroyed to determine combat progress, rather than  evaluating the broader effect created on the enemy. The command has  called for recognition of problems with battle damage assessments as a  major obstacle to effects-based operations, requiring a variety of changes  to resolve.
DOD officials also told us that the traditional focus on damage and  destruction results in leaders relying too much on visual imagery to assess  battle damages. This problem can cause leaders to delay battlefield  progress until full visual confirmation of the desired affect is confirmed.  According to these officials, given the increasingly reliable nature of  precision weapons, it may be possible in some cases to rely on predicted  or probabilistic effects, rather than full visual confirmation.
section_title: Absence of a Unified Battlefield Information System Confuses Measures of Effectiveness
paragraphs: DOD does not have a unified battlefield data collection system to provide  standardized measures and baseline data on the efficiency and  effectiveness of bombing operations. According to DOD officials, the  current system for collecting operational data is for the services and the  unified commands to maintain their own databases, which are often quite  extensive. Precisely how data is defined, gathered, and analyzed is at the  discretion of each individual component and addresses specific needs.  These unique requirements lead to different purposes for conducting  analyses, different data collection approaches, and different definitions of  key data elements.
For example, to better understand the impact of the tactical and  technological changes on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing  operations, we analyzed the number of attacks and bombs required to  damage or destroy a given target for operations in Kosovo and  Afghanistan. A number of DOD officials told us that advances in the  accuracy of bombing operations have raised the expectation that fewer  attacks and bombs are now required to damage or destroy targets. Instead  of traditional operations—where multiple sorties and multiple bombs  were required to destroy one target—some officials now believe one bomb  per target and multiple targets on one sortie should be the norm. The  results of our analyses tended to support the idea that it took fewer  attacks to damage or destroy targets in Afghanistan than in Kosovo.  However, we could not gain agreement from the services on the results of  these analyses because each had its own system for measuring operations,  and the measures also differed from the ones used in our analysis.
subsections: section_title: Different Approaches Used to Measure the Number of Attacks Needed to Destroy Targets
paragraphs: The question of how many attacks are required to damage or destroy a  target is basic to understanding battlefield effectiveness; however, we  found no consistency among the services and the unified commands as to  which of several basic measures should be used. Some group information  about attacks based on “sorties”—defined as the takeoff and landing of  one aircraft, during which one or more aim points may be attacked.  Others do not attempt to group information based on sorties, making  comparisons of information between databases difficult and confusing.  For example, because the Central Command was in charge of operations  in Afghanistan, we used its database to analyze bombing operations during  Operation Enduring Freedom and compare those with the results of our  classified review of Kosovo bombing operations. The Central Command’s  database provides information about aircraft attacks and damages to aim  points, since it is focused primarily on assessing battle damages. However,  it does not provide the information needed to analyze by sortie, since it  does not identify activities that took place between a given takeoff and  landing. To compare the Central Command’s data with our data on  Kosovo, we grouped the information on the basis of attacks. An attack was  defined as each time that a single aircraft dropped one or more weapons  on any single aim point. Based on this definition, our analysis found that it  took fewer attacks to damage or destroy both fixed and mobile targets  during operations in Afghanistan than during operations in Kosovo.
Similar comparisons could not be made with the Air Force’s and Navy’s  databases on Operation Enduring Freedom because their data are not  maintained based on this definition of an attack. Both services list data by  aircraft sortie. More specifically, each record in the Air Force’s database  corresponds to one delivery of a specific weapon type against an aim  point, with each weapon delivery linked to a particular sortie and mission  in the air tasking order. For the Navy’s analysis, which describes the  percentage of sorties that dropped weapons, each sortie can have one or  multiple attacks, defined as one run at a given target. Because both the Air  Force’s and the Navy’s analyses are primarily assessments of weapons and  not intended to measure battle damage information, the main focus is  assessing data for and based on specific weapon drops. As a result, they  contain no analysis that links the relationship between the number of  sorties flown and the corresponding damage.
section_title: Effects Also Measured Differently
paragraphs: A second basic element of effectiveness is whether or not bombing actions  resulted in the desired effects. The services and the Central Command also  differed in their approaches to measuring this element, further  complicating analysis. The Central Command’s database provides  information on effects based on battle damage assessments, since  measuring battle damage is the primary responsibility of the unified  commands. However, the service databases are geared toward measuring  the performance of specific systems.
The Air Force, for example, primarily focused its analysis of operations in  Afghanistan on a munitions effectiveness assessment. This analysis  measures the actual success of individual weapons against predicted  results and does not address battle damage assessments. The analysis  measures whether the bomb landed outside an area around the target  within which the bomb was predicted to hit, known as the circular error  probable. Air Force officials stated that it is possible for a weapon to be  scored a miss for Air Force munitions effectiveness assessment purposes,  but still cause significant damage to a target. According to the Air Force’s  analysis, the vast majority of munitions employed in Operation Enduring  Freedom performed significantly better than expected. This could mean  that the Air Force can adjust its planning and modeling assumptions to  lower the number of sorties expected to be required to destroy a target.
Similar to the Air Force’s analysis, the Navy measured effects based on  weapon hit rates. However, the Navy’s analysis assessed what fraction of  Navy bombs that were dropped impacted the intended target and had a  high order detonation, determined primarily by reviewing weapons system  videos. According to officials, if a weapon hit the target and had a high  order detonation, it was counted as a successful hit for analysis purposes.  The Navy’s analysis did not measure whether a weapon fell within the  planned circular error probable, nor did it measure battle damages.
section_title: Basic Target Characteristics Defined Differently
paragraphs: The services and the U.S. Central Command also differ in their treatment  of the basic question of how to define a target as fixed or mobile. This  distinction is important to considerations of effectiveness because it is  much harder to hit mobile than fixed targets. Moreover, mobile targets  may be becoming more numerous as adversaries attempt to use mobility  to avoid the effectiveness of precision weapons. Inconsistent definitions of  fixed and mobile targets result in different classifications of like targets  and disagreement among officials when attempting to measure the relative  effectiveness of bombing attacks against mobile and fixed targets.
The Navy’s analysis, for example, classifies mobile targets as “mobile” and  “moving.” According to the analysis, mobile targets are those that can  move between the time of launch and the time of impact, such as vehicles  and aircraft. Moving targets are those that are actually moving when they  are hit. Classification results are determined by a direct review of weapon  system video or documentation in mission reports. Unlike the analysis, the  Central Command’s database classifies all targets capable of moving as  mobile whether they are moving at the time of attack or not. The  classification of moving is not used because such information is more  detailed than is needed for battle damage assessment purposes.
In contrast, the Air Force’s database does not classify targets as fixed or  mobile. The database provides a description of the desired aim point, such  as the center of a runway or troops, but leaves it up to the user to define  which are mobile and which are fixed. There is a field for moving targets  in the database, but according to Air Force officials, very few records have  an entry in this field. Targets are only classified as moving when there is  available weapon system video to confirm that the target was moving at  the time the weapon was dropped. As a result of these differences, an  attack on a truck that is moving at the time of an attack would be  classified as mobile by the Central Command, as moving by Navy officials,  and as either mobile or moving to Air Force officials, depending on the  availability of weapon system video.
Fixed targets are also classified differently in some cases. For example,  according to Navy officials, there are several types of fixed targets. Troops  are classified as a fixed, area target because individual troops are not  targeted with aircraft but rather as an area occupied by troops. However,  buildings are classified as fixed, point targets where there is a specific  place to hit. In contrast, the Central Command classifies fixed targets only  as those that are not able to move, such as buildings.
section_title: Differences Can Cause Confusion in Operational Assessments and Financial Decisions
paragraphs: The absence of a baseline system to bridge definitional and other  differences and provide clear, consistent information about actual  bombing effectiveness creates confusion in several areas. For example,  this confusion was graphically illustrated when we provided the results of  our analyses to the services. The results tended to support the idea that it  took fewer attacks to damage or destroy targets in Afghanistan than in  Kosovo. However, we could not gain agreement from the services on the  results because our analyses were based on Central Command data that  differed from that in their own systems, as previously discussed. Similar  confusion occurred over the results of our March 2002 classified analysis  of bombing operations in Kosovo. DOD did not concur with our use of the  Air Force’s Mission Analysis Tracking and Tabulation System database to  analyze bombing operations, stating that no single database is completely  accurate and contains all information needed for the analysis. However,  that database was the most comprehensive available, developed  specifically as a primary database for tracking airframe and weapon  effectiveness during Operation Allied Force, and was used by DOD as the  basis for its January 2000 report to Congress on operations in Kosovo.  DOD cannot clearly resolve such confusion until baseline definitions of  effectiveness measures are reconciled and a unified database developed.
Further, reliable, consistent data on such issues is needed to make  procurement decisions on the number of bombs and other resources DOD  will need to procure for future conflicts. In this regard, we recently  reported that differences in battle simulation models and scenarios used  by the services and the unified commands were resulting in different  estimates of munitions needed for operations, and, ultimately, in reports of  munitions shortages. Clear, consistent, and up-to-date measures of the  effectiveness of precision weapons—such as the actual number of aircraft  and bombs required to achieve targeting objectives—could help resolve  such differences and improve procurement and other planning decisions.  In addition, as discussed earlier, precision weapons can be considerably  more expensive than traditional munitions. Without clear data on bombing  effectiveness, DOD cannot analyze the return on investment from the  trade-off of fewer, but more expensive, precision weapons versus the use  of more, but less expensive, traditional munitions.
section_title: Current Training Does Not Provide Realistic Preparation to Cope with Changing Operating Environment
paragraphs: Both the Joint Forces Command and the Defense Science Board found  that current training does not provide the realistic preparation needed to  cope with the emerging operating environment. DOD officials raised  concerns that the changing strategy and technological improvements have  created large increases in the pace of operations and volume of  information that have overwhelmed commanders and other personnel at  times. Further, advances in networking the force and other changes have  fostered a more centralized style of management, with senior leaders  increasingly involved in operations. At the same time, however, network- centric operating concepts are distributing information to lower and lower  organizational levels, raising the potential for increased autonomy for  small units and individual soldiers. According to DOD officials, personnel  at all levels, but particularly commanders, need realistic training to  understand this new environment and adapt to it to ensure that the new  capabilities are used to their fullest advantage.
subsections: section_title: Operations Characterized by Increasingly High Volume and Centralized Command and Control, but More Autonomy at Lower Levels
paragraphs: DOD officials told us that network-centric operations have advanced to  the point that the heavy flow of information and rapid pace of operations  may at times overload systems and personnel. This problem can create  confusion and inefficiency as systems for conducting battle damage  assessments or other operations become slow and clogged while sorting  and integrating large amounts of information, and officials are distracted  by having to devote precious time to sorting through hundreds of e-mail  messages or by attending increasingly frequent videoconferences.  Moreover, officials also believe that this problem may get worse as  commanders increasingly recognize the advantages of networked systems,  creating a need for even more information.
The officials also stated that increased networking is fostering a more  centralized style of command and control, which can create tension  between command staffs and operators in the field. For example,  according to officials, lawyers and senior civilian and military leaders at  headquarters locations remote from the execution of operations are  becoming increasingly involved in target selection and other operational  areas. Historically, one of the principal tenets of U.S. command and  control has been centralized direction, but decentralized execution of  operations to give subordinates on the scene sufficient freedom of action  to accomplish their missions. Increased centralization in the execution of  operations can result in senior commanders being bogged down in  operational details and subordinates on the scene losing initiative. This  development has been linked to the advances in technologies that provide  the opportunity for detailed views of the battlefield and frequent  videoconferences and other communications to be shared among a wide  array of officials that may be located thousands of miles away. This trend  is also influenced by increased concerns over sensitive issues such as the  avoidance of intrusions into the airspace of neighboring countries and  collateral damage to civilian structures. Such issues act as an incentive for  senior leaders to increase their involvement in lower and lower levels of  planning and operations.
While senior leaders are becoming increasingly involved in operations,  information is also being distributed to lower and lower organizational  levels, raising the potential for increased autonomy for small units and  individual soldiers. For example, one of the principal organizing and  operating tenets of network-centric operations is the concept called power  to the edge. This concept involves empowering individuals at the “edge” of  an organization—where it interacts with its operating environment—by  expanding access to information and eliminating unnecessary constraints  on action. According to department officials, adopting this concept  requires DOD to change the way it handles intelligence and other  information. For example, DOD’s current information systems are based  on data requirements that are focused on the needs of the organizations  supplying the data, with dissemination of the data based on a sequential  process with information pushed out to customers at the end. But DOD is  now moving to systems where broad arrays of information are placed on  networks before any unnecessary processing at the point of collection,  with total access for customers who can pull out the information that each  needs simultaneously. This provides more information to lower  organizational levels, enabling them to operate more autonomously with  less direct control by commanders. According to officials at the Joint  Forces Command, this concept helped DOD use smaller formations of  personnel with flexible command and control relationships to great  advantage during operations in Iraq.
section_title: Changing Operating Environment Requires Better, More Realistic Training
paragraphs: Consistent with DOD’s basic tenet that the force must train as it will fight,  DOD officials have called for improved, more realistic training to match  the scale and tempo of actual operations. For example, the Joint Forces  Command reported that the lack of realistic training undermined theater- level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management and other  operational level capabilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly,  the Defense Science Board reported that the changing operating  environment will have unintended human consequences that will require  personnel to adapt to increasing cognitive demands at even the most  junior levels, and to think and act more quickly. According to the Board,  current training will not adequately prepare DOD personnel to cope with  the increasing and constantly changing cognitive requirements.
DOD officials also cautioned that the joint operational effectiveness  experienced in Operation Iraqi Freedom was often the result of  procedures developed during 18 months of practice begun during  operations in Afghanistan and that such improvements are often fleeting— needing to be reinvented in the next contingency. The Joint Forces  Command called for development of an improved joint training capability  to institutionalize the operating procedures developed in Iraq and allow  commanders and staffs to experiment with and practice operational-level  processes. Moreover, service and DOD officials also noted that  expectations for the future need to be tempered with the understanding  that operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq were conducted with  other advantages—such as largely complete air superiority—that may not  be available in future conflicts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The development of networked surveillance and command and control  systems, precision weapons, and other advances has combined to have a  synergetic effect on U.S. military power—providing increased capabilities  for dealing effectively with enemies operating out of nontraditional  battlefields, as well as more traditional approaches to warfare.  Notwithstanding these advances, the full impact of these changes is still  emerging and is not fully understood. Moreover, the enemy is likely to  continue to evolve and adapt its approaches in response to the continued  evolution of U.S. tactics and capabilities. As a result, it is important to  continue developing and refining these capabilities. However, the legacy of  DOD’s traditional focus on service-specific operations is inhibiting the  continued evolution of the new capabilities. The lack of standardized,  interoperable systems and equipment interferes with the development of  force networks, slowing operations and reducing effectiveness. Difficulties  in quickly obtaining sufficient numbers of trained battle damage analysts  result in slowed assessments unable to keep up with the increased pace of  operations, inhibiting battleground progress and the utility of  improvements in other areas. Similarly, the absence of a unified battlefield  information system also confuses the clear understanding of  improvements to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations as a result  of changing capabilities, slowing the rate of adaptation to changing  battlefield conditions. Finally, the lack of realistic training limits the ability  of leaders to understand and systems to sense changes in the operating  environment—such as the increased pace of operations and flow of  information, the increased centralization of command, and the increased  potential for operational autonomy and self-direction of small units and  individual soldiers, as well as emerging concepts such as effects-based  operations—further inhibiting the ability to adapt.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure continuing evolution of the capabilities demonstrated in recent  conflicts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint  Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified commands, and the  military departments to take the following four actions:  identify the primary information required for bombing operations, such as  targeting and battle damage assessments, ensure that planned  interoperability enhancements provide the standardized definitions,  mission reporting formats, and other necessary instructions for this  information to be used by all unified commands during joint combat  operations, and determine whether this standardized information can  replace that used by the individual services;  formulate a plan to provide sufficient numbers of personnel trained in  battle damage assessment procedures when they are needed for combat  operations and include in the plan the following: incentives for personnel  to take the existing joint training on damage assessment, development of a  system to be used by the Joint Forces Command to track and mobilize  personnel who have received damage assessment training for use during  surge situations, and development of guidance on the appropriate use of  effects-based, probabilistic, and other nontraditional concepts in assessing  battle damages;    develop a unified battlefield information system that provides for the  identification and collection of data on key, standardized measures of  bombing operations needed to assess the basic efficiency and  effectiveness of such operations, for use by all unified commands; and    develop a joint operations training capability that provides commanders  and staffs with a realistic simulation of the increased pace of operations  and other emerging changes to the combat operating environment.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially  concurred with all our recommendations. DOD stated that the Joint Staff,  in coordination with the Joint Forces Command, is addressing our  recommendations for actions to improve standardization of information  used in bombing operations, develop a unified battlefield information  system, and develop realistic joint training to help personnel adapt to  changes in the operating environment in various ongoing initiatives.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to improve the battle  damage assessment process and stated that it is addressing the issues we  raised in the Joint Network Fires Capability Roadmap, the Joint Close Air  Support action plan, and other efforts. However, DOD believed that the  section of the report titled “Timely Understanding of Battle Damages  Remains a Difficult Problem” discusses battle damage assessments as if  that function was detached from the broader targeting process. That was  not our intent. As indicated on page 6 of the report, we agree that battle  damage assessments are an integral part of the broader targeting process.  The use of a separate section of the report to deal with that aspect of  targeting was meant only to highlight the long-standing problems with  battle damage assessments and the need to focus DOD’s attention on  corrective action. Officials from the U.S. Central Command, which was in  charge of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Joint Forces  Command report on lessons learned in Iraq both pointed to the need to  elevate recognition of problems in the battle damage assessment process  and address them. Continued improvement in the speed at which targets  are generated and attacked will only further increase the need for damage  assessments to keep pace with operations in the future.
DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; the Commandant of the  Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. The  report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (757) 552-8100. The major contributors to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in  networking the force and the use of precision weapons and identify the  key barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy, we  followed a three-phased approach.
To identify Department of Defense (DOD), military service, and unified  command policies and approaches to implementing the new strategy, we  obtained briefings, reviewed DOD and unified command directives and  regulations, the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan, lessons  learned reports, and prior reports by us and others. A bibliography of key  reports on issues related to our review is included. We also interviewed  officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Office of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff; the U.S. Central Command; the U.S. Joint Forces  Command; the U.S. Special Operations Command; headquarters offices of  the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and other offices as appropriate.
We accompanied this work with a detailed analysis of bombing data  developed for our March 2002 classified report on air operations in Kosovo  and bombing data on operations in Afghanistan provided by the U.S.  Central Command. Prior to conducting these analyses, we discussed the  appropriate databases to use, the time frames to measure, and other such  methodological issues with officials from the Central Command. We used  Central Command data because its commander was in charge of joint  operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. To determine whether bombing  accuracy and effectiveness had improved, we compared changes in the  percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to fixed and  mobile targets, the number of attacks and the number of bombs during a  given attack that were required to damage or destroy a given target, and  other such measures of operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. We then  provided the results of these analyses to officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense; the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U.S.  Central Command; the U.S. Joint Forces Command; the U.S. Special  Operations Command; and the Army, Navy, and Air Force for their review  and comment. We also obtained analyses of Operation Enduring Freedom  from the Navy and the Air Force for comparison purposes. We requested  data from the Army, but officials were unable to provide such data. We  also requested copies of any similar analyses of operations in Iraq, but  officials were unable to locate any such analyses. We did not conduct our  own detailed analysis of operations in Iraq because of the extremely  resource intensive and time-consuming nature of these analyses.
To assess the reliability of the Central Command’s database for Operation  Enduring Freedom, we (1) performed electronic testing for obvious errors  in accuracy and completeness; (2) reviewed related documentation,  including tracking target files to specific data entries, and interviewed  agency officials knowledgeable about the data; and (3) worked closely  with agency officials to identify any data problems. When we found  discrepancies such as missing or incorrect data, we brought them to the  command’s attention and worked with it to correct the discrepancies  before conducting our analysis. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes.
Following this analysis, we conducted a series of roundtable discussions  with officials from the offices of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of  Staff, unified commands, and the services contacted previously. We  conducted these discussions to gain a detailed understanding of the  results of our analyses and officials’ perspectives on the impact of the  changing strategy on operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and the  key barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy. We  focused our analysis on combat bombing operations. We did not attempt  to analyze whether larger operational and strategic objectives were  achieved.
section_title: Appendix II: DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other Technologies Used in Recent Operations
paragraphs: The RC-135 Rivet Joint is a reconnaissance aircraft that supports theater and national level consumers with near real-time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities. Its onboard sensor suite allows the crew to detect, identify, and locate signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum, which it can then forward to a wide range of consumers.
The U-2 provides continuous day and night, high-altitude, all-weather surveillance and reconnaissance in support of ground and air forces. The U-2 is capable of collecting multi-sensor photo, electro-optic, infrared and radar imagery, as well as collecting signals intelligence data, with imagery, real-time down linking of data anywhere in the world.
The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System is an airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft. Its radar and computer systems allow it to provide ground and air commanders with detailed information on ground forces to support attack operations and targeting.
The EP-3E (Aries II) is the Navy's only land based signals intelligence reconnaissance aircraft. Its sensitive receivers and high-gain dish antennas allow it to detect a wide range of electronic emissions from deep within targeted territory.
The E-3 Sentry is an airborne warning and control system aircraft that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control, and communications to command and control centers. Its radar and computer systems enable it to provide positions and tracing information on enemy aircraft and ships, and location and status of friendly aircraft and ships.
The Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle reconnaissance system composed of four aircraft with sensors, a ground control station, a satellite link, and some 82 personnel providing 24-hour operations. Its primary mission is interdiction and conducting armed reconnaissance against critical targets.
The Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle is a reconnaissance aircraft that provides battlefield commanders near real-time, high-reconnaissance imagery. Typically cruising at high altitudes for 24 continuous hours, it uses its cloud penetrating radar and other sensors to survey large geographic areas and relay imagery about enemy locations and resources to commanders. available)
Guided Bomb Units-10, 12, and 16 are laser-guided bombs. These bombs consist of guidance packages bolted to traditional free-fall bombs (2,000, 500, and 1,000 pounds, respectively), enabling the bombs to analyze laser energy shone on a target by an operator, and then to adjust the path of the bomb as it descends on a target.
The Joint Direct Attack Munitions Guided Bomb Unit-31/32 consists of a guidance tail kit attached to a traditional 2,000-pound free-fall bomb,  enabling it to be navigated in flight to the selected target using Global Positioning System satellite technology.
The Cluster Bomb Unit 87/B Combined Effects Munitions is a 1,000-pound unguided, air-delivered cluster bomb consisting of a cluster of about 200 bomblets that disperse over the target area and explode on impact.  This bomb is effective against armor, personnel, and material, enabling  a single payload attack against a wide variety of targets.
The Navstar Global Positioning System is a constellation of 24 orbiting satellites operated by the Air Force that provides navigation data to military and civilian users all over the world. The satellites orbit the earth every 12 hours, emitting navigation signals that are picked up by receivers and used to calculate time, location, and velocity.
A laser designator/rangefinder (U.S. Marine Corps AN/PAQ-3 pictured) is used to locate targets and guide laser-guided weapons to the target. Designators radiate a narrow beam of pulsed energy that is used to mark a spot on the target that is then picked up by acquisition devices mounted on aircraft or directly on laser-guided bombs.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Katherine Chenault, Steve Pruitt,  R.K. Wild, and Kristy Williams made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Bibliography
paragraphs: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Operation Iraqi  Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Lessons of  Afghanistan: A First Analysis. Washington, D.C.: 2002.
Center For Strategic and International Studies. The U.S. Military and the  Evolving Challenges in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: 2002.
Congressional Budget Office. The Army’s Bandwidth Bottleneck.  Washington, D.C.: 2003.
Congressional Research Service. Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied  Military Operations. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
Northrop Grumman Corporation, Analysis Center. Destroying Mobile  Ground Targets In An Anti-Access Environment. Washington, D.C.: 2001.
Northrop Grumman Corporation, Analysis Center. Future War: What  Trends in America’s Post-Cold War Military Conflicts Tell Us About  Early 21st Century Warfare. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense, Air Force Air Combat Command. Munitions  Effectiveness Analysis Final Report for Air Force Air-to-Surface  Munitions in Operation Enduring Freedom. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense, Air Force Task Force Enduring Look. Quick  Look Report #5-Coercive Airpower from the Enemy’s Perspective The  Collapse of the Taliban. Washington, D.C.: 2002.
U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command. Operation Iraqi  Freedom—By the Numbers. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
Center for Naval Analyses. Overview of Carrier-based Strike-Fighter  Operations in Operation Enduring Freedom. Alexandria, Virginia: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command. Operation Enduring  Freedom Interim Munitions Effectiveness Assessment. Washington, D.C.:  2002.
U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Science Board Task Force on  Training for Future Conflicts—Final Report. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Science Board Task Force on  Wideband Radio Frequency Modulation—Dynamic Access to Mobile  Information Networks. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test  and Evaluation. Operation Enduring Freedom Test Report. Suffolk,  Virginia: 2002.
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command. Joint Fires  Initiative—Operational-Level Management of Time-Sensitive Targeting.  Norfolk, Virginia: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command. Joint Lessons  Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations. Norfolk,  Virginia: 2004.
U.S. Naval Institute. What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?  Annapolis, Maryland: 2002.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. High Leverage Lessons Learned  from Operation Enduring Freedom—Phase II Report of the Defense  Science Board Task Force on Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons  Learned. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Organizational Lesson Learned  Review- Phase III Report, Defense Science Board Task Force on  Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned. Washington, D.C.: 2002.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Precision Targeting and Joint  Close Air Support, A Phase II Report of the Defense Science Board Task  Force on Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned. Washington,  D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science  Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force. Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science  Board Task Force on Enabling Joint Force Capabilities. Washington,  D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of Defense. Report to Congress: Network Centric  Warfare. Washington, D.C.: 2001.
U.S. Department of Defense. Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied  Force After-Action Report. Washington, D.C.: 2000.
U.S. Department of Defense. Report on Network Centric Warfare: Sense of  the Report. Washington, D.C.: 2001.
U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army  War College. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for  Army and Defense Policy. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 2002.
U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army  War College. Iraq and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and  Defense Policy. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 2003.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper  Air Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505. Washington, D.C.: May 2,  2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of  Systems That Process Intelligence Data. GAO-03-329. Washington, D.C.:  March 31, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks—Department of  Defense. GAO-03-98. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant  Commanders’ Needs Require Linkage. GAO-03-17. Washington, D.C.:  October 15, 2002.
DOD Financial Management: Integrated Approach, Accountability,  Transparency, and Incentives Are Keys to Effective Reform.   GAO-02-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2002.
Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in  Doctrinal Departures. GAO-01-784. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2001.
Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the Munitions  Requirements Determination Process. GAO-01-18. Washington, D.C.:   April 5, 2001.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Sustain Reform Initiatives and  Achieve Greater Results. GAO/NSIAD-00-72. Washington, D.C.: July 25,  2000.
Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign.  GAO/NSIAD-97-134. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1997.
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