Wildland Fire Rehabilitation and Restoration: Forest Service and BLM Could Benefit from Improved Information on Status of Needed Work
Published: 2006-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2001, Congress and federal agencies, including the Forest Service and Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), have recognized the importance of rehabilitating and restoring lands unlikely to recover on their own after wildland fires. However, while funding has increased for fire prevention, suppression, and first-year emergency stabilization, it has decreased for rehabilitation (work up to 3 years after fires) and restoration (work beyond the first 3 years). GAO was asked (1) how the Forest Service and BLM plan postfire rehabilitation and restoration projects, (2) how much needed rehabilitation and restoration work they have completed for recent wildland fires, and (3) what challenges the agencies face in addressing their needs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Forest Service and BLM use similar procedures to identify rehabilitation and restoration needs, but differ in how they plan and fund related projects. Given the variety of ecosystems they manage, Forest Service field staff have the discretion to locally prioritize projects, and the agency addresses them through various programs with appropriations from multiple accounts. In contrast, BLM has a standard process for planning needed rehabilitation projects and, through a single account, funds projects for up to 3 years after fires. For restoration projects--that is, work needed beyond 3 years after a fire--BLM requires them to be addressed through other programs such as rangeland management. With available information, it is not possible to reliably determine how much needed rehabilitation and restoration work has been completed for recent Forest Service and BLM fires. The Forest Service does not know how much work has been completed because it does not collect nationwide data. BLM reported that, according to its data, it has completed most of its rehabilitation work, but the agency does not collect data on postfire restoration work, which is done through other programs. GAO surveyed Forest Service and BLM officials to determine how much needed work has been completed, but the information provided in the survey was not sufficiently reliable to report. Forest Service and BLM officials face different challenges to addressing their rehabilitation and restoration needs. Forest Service officials cited factors such as competing priorities within constrained budgets and controversy over certain activities. Agency officials said that controversy over harvesting burned timber can be exacerbated by the limited scientific research available to guide such decisions. BLM officials cited challenges to achieving long-term success when seeding burned areas. The agency is taking several steps to improve success rates.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the past 5 years, wildland fires have burned millions of acres of federal  land, breaking records in size, costing billions of dollars to suppress, and  drawing greater attention to the risks associated with wildland fires. Many  fires occur naturally, and some ecosystems are adapted to fires, relying on  them to maintain their health. However, wildland fires can sometimes  leave behind a burned landscape that threatens human safety, property,  and ecosystems. In areas of steep terrain, postfire rainstorms can cause  mudslides that bury homes, destroy roads, and clog streams. Wildland  fires also can create postfire environments that are ideal for the growth of  noxious or invasive weeds. If these weeds replace native plant species,  threatened or endangered wildlife species can lose their habitat. When  fires result in such adverse effects, land managers may conduct emergency  stabilization, rehabilitation, and restoration activities to mitigate the  effects and to prevent further damage. The U.S. Department of  Agriculture’s Forest Service and the Department of the Interior’s land  management agencies are responsible for such activities on federal land.  Combined, the Forest Service and Interior manage about 630 million acres,  or 94 percent, of the nation’s federal land, including forests, rangelands,  and other lands.
In 2001, in response to one of the worst fire seasons in over 50 years, the  Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, in collaboration with state  governors, adopted a 10-year strategy to address federal, state, local, and  tribal management of wildland fires. One of the four goals adopted in the  strategy was to restore fire-adapted ecosystems through rehabilitation and  restoration efforts, combined with scientific research and monitoring. In  support of this goal, Congress began providing funds in fiscal year 2001 to  the Forest Service and Interior specifically for postfire rehabilitation and  restoration.
In 2003, as a step toward coordinating their approaches to postfire  management, the Forest Service and Interior adopted the following  common definitions for emergency stabilization, rehabilitation, and  restoration:    Emergency stabilization activities are conducted within 1 year of a fire  to address threats to life, property, or resources. Such activities may  include seeding and mulching to prevent soil erosion.
Rehabilitation activities, conducted within 3 years of a fire, address  damage to minor facilities such as picnic facilities, or to lands unlikely to  recover to a desired condition on their own. Such activities may include  repairing roads or trails, planting trees, and restoring wildlife habitat.
Restoration activities are a continuation of rehabilitation activities  beyond the initial 3 years, or the repair or replacement of major facilities,  such as a visitor center.
Although the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)— the agency that manages the most land within Interior—are both  responsible for managing postfire work on federal lands, the task is  different for the two agencies. The Forest Service conducts emergency  stabilization, rehabilitation, and restoration activities under multiple  programs such as its watershed improvement and reforestation programs,  while BLM conducts emergency stabilization and rehabilitation activities  under distinct postfire programs that do not address restoration needs.  Forest Service land encompasses a wide variety of ecosystems— ecological communities such as old-growth forests, alpine meadows, and  marsh wetlands—and watersheds that provide drinking water and timber,  while most of BLM’s land consists of rangeland (although BLM also  manages about 55 million acres of forests and woodlands). These land  characteristics influence the agencies’ work. For example, the Forest  Service’s rehabilitation and restoration activities commonly include  reforestation, road work, trail work, and weed control, but also can  include activities ranging from surveying boundaries to securing  archaeological sites. On the other hand, BLM’s rehabilitation activities  include primarily weed control, grass and shrub seeding, and fence repair  or replacement.
Since 2001, Congress and the agencies have taken actions that recognize  the importance of rehabilitation and restoration activities, including  directing funds toward these activities and developing strategy documents.  However, while resources for fire prevention, suppression, and emergency  stabilization have increased, fewer resources have been focused on the  long-term rehabilitation and restoration of lands burned by fires. Between  fiscal year 2001 and 2005, annual appropriations to the Forest Service and  Interior for fire prevention, suppression, and emergency stabilization  increased by about 26 percent (15 percent adjusted for inflation), but  rehabilitation and restoration appropriations (directed in law or  committee reports) declined steeply, from $246 million in fiscal year 2001  to $37 million in fiscal year 2005—a decrease of about 85 percent (86  percent adjusted for inflation). In this context, you asked us to determine  (1) how the Forest Service and BLM identify and plan postfire  rehabilitation and restoration activities; (2) how much needed  rehabilitation and restoration work the agencies have completed for  wildland fires that occurred between 2000 and 2004; and (3) what  challenges the agencies face in addressing their postfire needs, and any  actions they are taking in response.
In conducting our work, we met with Forest Service and BLM officials;  reviewed agency documents about postfire rehabilitation and restoration  programs, projects, and funding procedures; and discussed challenges the  agencies face in addressing needed rehabilitation and restoration work.  We visited seven forests and three BLM units in western states, where  rehabilitation and restoration efforts are concentrated, to interview agency  officials and observe postfire conditions and rehabilitation and restoration  projects. We also administered a Web-based survey to agency officials for  276 randomly sampled fires that occurred between 2000 and 2004 and  burned over 500 acres each. For each of the fires in our sample, we  surveyed agency officials in the field about any needed rehabilitation and  restoration projects they identified, whether the projects were completed,  factors preventing their completion, and any effects of not completing  needed projects. However, when we collected source documents to  validate responses for 10 percent of the completed surveys, we found that  the data provided were not sufficiently reliable to report. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I. We  performed our work from May 2005 through May 2006 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Although wildland fires are inevitable natural disturbances that have  helped shape ecosystems over time, they can be unpredictable and  destructive as well. Fires can kill trees and other vegetation, alter wildlife  habitat and soils, and destroy roads, buildings, campgrounds and other  infrastructure. Fires can also leave lands denuded of vegetation and  vulnerable to severe erosion and mudslides, which can contaminate  municipal water supplies and compromise water quality in streams and  lakes. In addition, the open landscapes left by fires can create  opportunities for invasive plants to become established or expand,  crowding out native plants and the animals that depend on them. When  wildland fires have adverse effects on natural resources, and federal land  managers believe the lands are unlikely to recover to a desired condition  on their own, they may conduct rehabilitation or restoration work to aid or  accelerate recovery. Similarly, when wildland fires damage developed  features such as roads, trails, buildings, fences, or campgrounds, land  managers may identify needed work to repair or replace them, as shown in  figures 1 and 2. Rehabilitation and restoration projects include, for  example, repairing or maintaining roads and trails, controlling noxious and  invasive weeds, replanting forests or grasslands, repairing or replacing  fences, restoring fish or wildlife habitat, rebuilding burned facilities,  replacing boundary markers, and stabilizing archaeological sites.
In some cases, land managers may determine that no rehabilitation or  restoration projects are needed because a fire did not have adverse effects  on any resources or infrastructure, or because the burned lands are likely  to recover on their own. Under historical conditions, many forest and  rangeland ecosystems have adapted to wildland fire, and the vegetation,  insects, fish, and wildlife in such systems benefit from the kind of fires  that occur there, surviving and regenerating after fires occur. Fires can  benefit resources by recycling soil nutrients, renewing vegetation growth,  adding material to streams that improves spawning habitat for fish, and  sustaining ecological functions. For example, when ponderosa pine forests  are adapted to wildland fires, frequent less-intense fires remove brush and  small trees, which allows the large trees to survive and grow.
Recognizing the need to restore historic vegetation conditions to help  reduce the risks of wildland fires, as well as the need to address adverse  effects that can result from fires, in 2001 and 2002, federal agencies, states,  and others developed a 10-year strategy and implementation plan. The  strategy established four broad goals for wildland fire management: (1)  improving fire prevention and suppression for those areas that need it; (2)  reducing hazardous fuels, by mechanically thinning forests and using  controlled burns; (3) restoring fire-adapted ecosystems and rehabilitating  burned areas; and (4) promoting community assistance to help conduct  fire management activities. The implementation plan established measures  for showing progress toward each of the goals.
Around the same time, in fiscal year 2001, Congress began providing funds  to the Forest Service and Interior specifically for postfire rehabilitation  and restoration. The funding was greatest in 2001, and decreased after  that, particularly for the Forest Service. To administer these funds and  address its rehabilitation and restoration needs, the Forest Service relies  on existing staff and programs, such as watershed improvement and  recreation programs. On the other hand, BLM has a specific rehabilitation  program and some dedicated staff to administer its funds. BLM’s program  initially included both emergency stabilization and postfire rehabilitation  work, but since 2004 has been separated into two programs. BLM’s  rehabilitation program covers work up to 3 years after a fire and does not  provide for subsequent postfire restoration work. The Forest Service  manages its rehabilitation and restoration work through nine regional  offices, and offices overseeing 155 national forests and 20 national  grasslands across the nation. Each forest and grassland is divided into  several ranger districts. BLM manages its rehabilitation program through  state offices in 12 western states, including Alaska, that oversee field and  district offices.
Both the Forest Service and BLM manage their lands for multiple uses,  including timber production, wildlife, recreation, and wilderness purposes.  Under the National Forest Management Act, the primary law governing the  land management planning activities of national forests in the Forest  Service, all national forests must have land and resource management  plans for the lands they manage. Generally, these plans describe desired  future conditions for lands and resources in various geographic areas  within the forest, and identify strategies to maintain or achieve those  conditions. Similarly, BLM field offices develop resource management  plans under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act for the lands  they manage. Like the national forests’ plans, BLM plans identify specific  desired outcomes and allowable uses and actions to achieve those  outcomes. Generally, neither agency’s plans identify strategies or actions  specifically related to postfire recovery.
When agency officials identify needed projects—including postfire  rehabilitation and restoration projects—they must ensure that the projects  are consistent with these land management plans. In addition, if a project  could have environmental impacts, the agencies are required to conduct  an analysis of the potential impacts. Under the National Environmental  Policy Act of 1969, agencies generally evaluate the likely effects of projects  they propose using a relatively brief environmental assessment or, if the  action would be likely to significantly affect the environment, a more  detailed environmental impact statement. One purpose of this analysis is  to ensure that agencies have detailed information available to inform their  decision making. The agencies give the public an opportunity to comment  on draft environmental assessments and impact statements. Also, the  Forest Service and BLM have established procedures for administrative  appeal of their decisions. As a general rule, once the administrative  appeals process is complete, the public can litigate the relevant project  decision in federal court.
section_title: Forest Service and BLM Differ in How They Plan Needed Rehabilitation and Restoration Work
paragraphs: The Forest Service and BLM use similar procedures to determine whether  any rehabilitation or restoration work is needed after a wildland fire, but  they differ in how they plan, prioritize, and fund needed work. These  differences reflect the distinct approaches the Forest Service and BLM  have adopted for managing postfire rehabilitation and restoration. The  Forest Service has no national guidance for postfire rehabilitation and  restoration, in part because it does not have a discrete program for such  activities. Instead, the agency addresses its rehabilitation and restoration  needs through existing programs, including its watershed, forest  management, recreation, rangeland management, wilderness, and  construction programs, among others. Forest Service regions and forests  have discretion to determine how to plan, prioritize, and fund needed  rehabilitation and restoration work in the context of these programs. To  fund such work, the agency draws from several different appropriations.  On the other hand, BLM has a distinct program for postfire rehabilitation,  and has issued national guidance for the program. Following this  guidance, agency officials use a standard process to plan, prioritize, and  fund rehabilitation work, nearly all of which is paid for with funds  specifically designated for rehabilitation under the wildland fire  management appropriation. BLM’s rehabilitation program covers postfire  work up to 3 years after a fire, and any subsequent restoration work must  be addressed by other ongoing BLM programs, such as the wildlife and  noxious weeds programs.
subsections: section_title: Forest Service Regions and Forests Have Discretion to Plan Projects Using Varied Procedures
paragraphs: The Forest Service has no national guidance on how to identify, prioritize,  and fund postfire rehabilitation and restoration work. According to a  headquarters official, the agency has not developed guidance in part  because appropriations specifically designated for these activities—about  $12.8 million for fiscal year 2005 and $6.2 million for fiscal year 2006—did  not warrant development of a manual. Instead, the agency provides its  regions and forests with wide latitude to use varied procedures that  accommodate their diverse ecosystems, priorities, and unique  circumstances.
The Forest Service allocates the appropriations designated for  rehabilitation and restoration to its regions annually based on each  region’s proportion of Forest Service acreage severely burned over the  previous 5 years. The regions, in turn, allocate these funds to forests,  usually applying a prioritization system to select among project proposals  and funding requests submitted by forests. In addition, Forest Service  regions and forests use appropriations available for activities such as  reforestation and construction to help pay for related rehabilitation and  restoration work. According to agency officials, relying on these other  funds gives regions and forests the flexibility to determine their priorities  while considering needs on burned lands as well as in other areas, and to  accommodate needs that arise after unpredictable events in addition to  fires, such as hurricanes. The Forest Service does not keep track of how  much rehabilitation and restoration work is funded through these  programs.
According to agency officials, the first step in planning postfire  rehabilitation and restoration projects is for forest and district-level staff  to determine whether any such work is needed, by comparing postfire  conditions with prefire and desired conditions. Typically, immediately  after a wildland fire is contained, field officials assemble an  interdisciplinary team made up of specialists such as foresters, wildlife  biologists, hydrologists, botanists, and soil scientists, among others, to  conduct an on-the-ground evaluation of the burned area. Officials use this  evaluation along with satellite photographs of the burned area, for  example, to assess a fire’s effects on the land and resources. Finally,  agency officials compare these postfire conditions with historical photos  and data on prefire conditions, and with descriptions of desired conditions  detailed in forest plans and other guidance documents.
Agency officials told us that, in many cases, no rehabilitation or  restoration work is needed. According to the officials, there are various  reasons that natural recovery may be sufficient, and active rehabilitation  and restoration efforts may not be needed. For example, some fires burn  in areas adapted to wildland fires and leave natural resources no worse off  than before the fire, or benefit resources, for example, by stimulating  vegetation growth or increasing denning and foraging habitat. When fires  also do no damage to infrastructure such as fences or campground  facilities, there is usually no need for any active rehabilitation or  restoration, according to agency officials. In other cases, agency officials  said rehabilitation or restoration may not be needed if the burn is not  severe; the burned area is inaccessible due to topography, legal access, or  other issues; or the fire burned in a management area where such work is  precluded, such as a wilderness or roadless area.
Often, forest officials determine that postfire rehabilitation or restoration  is needed to repair damage to resources or infrastructure, or to prevent  further damage from occurring after postfire rainstorms. The officials  must then determine what projects are needed. Many Forest Service  regions have no specific guidance for this step, and officials rely on the  guidance available in program handbooks and legislation. For example,  the trails management handbook includes guidance for planning projects,  such as how to assess trail conditions against height, width, and other trail  construction standards, depending on whether the trail is designated  primarily for use by hikers or by pack animals as well. In addition, some  laws include requirements or provisions that guide agency officials’  actions when planning projects. For example, for projects significantly  affecting the environment, the National Environmental Policy Act requires  agency officials to evaluate the environmental impacts of the proposed  project and alternatives to the project in an environmental impact  statement. Implementing regulations for the act require the agency to  provide opportunities for the public to comment on the draft statement. In  accordance with other laws, agency officials assess whether any cultural  resources, such as archaeological sites, will be affected by their proposed  actions, and whether any threatened or endangered species—or their  habitat—will be affected.
Once forest officials determine that rehabilitation or restoration work is  needed, they have various approaches to documenting a need for the  work, depending in part on legislative requirements, as well as the  severity, complexity, and extent of the fire’s effects; available funding;  anticipated level of controversy; and established regional or forest  procedures. In some cases, forests prepare rehabilitation and restoration  planning documents that describe and analyze all needed projects for a  given fire, and cover time periods up to 9 years or longer. According to  agency officials, such plans are useful when a wildland fire has  widespread, severe, or complicated effects over a large territory and  officials anticipate needing extensive analysis and planning efforts to  determine project needs, costs, and time frames. Agency officials told us  they also use comprehensive formal plans when they expect their actions  to be controversial, so that the rationale for their decision is clearly  documented. On the other hand, sometimes agency officials do not  prepare such planning documents because they do not have enough  funding or they believe the funds are better spent elsewhere. They may  instead prepare separate shorter plans in each of the program areas  affected, or create a simple spreadsheet listing needed projects and  estimated costs, for example. In other cases, officials do not prepare any  planning documents even if they believe rehabilitation or restoration work  is needed, because they do not expect to receive funding to cover the  costs of the work.
The Pacific Northwest region, unlike other Forest Service regions, issued  standardized guidance for its postfire rehabilitation and restoration  activities in December 2005, to be used by forests in the region beginning  in 2006. The guidance established a uniform process to be followed by all  forests in the region when assessing rehabilitation and restoration needs  after wildland fires or other disturbances. It is intended to be instructional  as well as to ensure consistency among forests’ project proposals, so that  regional officials can compare them equitably when deciding how to  allocate funds.
Generally all of the regions follow similar processes to prioritize and fund  projects, although the specifics vary widely. Typically, forests submit  project proposals and requests for postfire rehabilitation and restoration  funding to regional officials annually. In most regions, officials prioritize  the proposed projects, often according to a predetermined set of criteria,  and fund the highest-priority projects. Many regions include projects that  will protect human safety among the top priorities, but beyond this  similarity, priorities differ from region to region. For instance, the  Southwestern region places a higher priority on repairing and replacing  infrastructure needed for forest management, because such infrastructure  will not recover naturally. Reforestation in the Southwestern region is  lower priority, according to agency officials, because over time, the trees  will grow back naturally. Also, agency officials at one forest in the region  told us that efforts to plant seedlings in the forest’s dry climate tend to  have high failure rates especially during periods of drought. On the other  hand, the Northern region emphasizes restoration of natural resources,  including reforestation. Northern region officials said that in their region,  without active reforestation efforts, less desirable species of trees would  become dominant in some locations, perpetuating an undesirable cycle of  fires. In some regions, officials consider the forests’ priorities as well. For  example, many forests consider boundary-marking projects among their  lowest priorities, but for forests where logging operations are conducted  adjacent to or on Forest Service land, such projects are important to  protect against trespass. While most regions follow similar processes from  year to year, some regional officials told us that in years when their  funding allocations were relatively low—enough to fund only one or two  projects, for example—they did not use a formal procedure to solicit and  fund project proposals because the amount of funding did not warrant  such an effort.
In addition to rehabilitation and restoration funds, some regions allocate  portions of other funds to help forests pay for projects that are not funded  with rehabilitation and restoration funds. For example, the Southwestern  region uses 50 percent of its share of the reforestation trust fund to pay for  needs after wildland fires in the region, and directs moneys from the roads  and trails fund to eligible rehabilitation and restoration projects. Some  agency officials said that these funds, distributed at the discretion of  regional officials, can be particularly important for forests with smaller  budgets that provide little flexibility to accommodate unpredictable  expenses.
When funding is not available from the region, forests use funds for  programs such as watershed management, wildlife, and road construction  to pay for related rehabilitation and restoration projects. The budget  process for these funds begins up to 2 years in advance of when the funds  are actually needed, so agency officials must plan ahead, and any  rehabilitation and restoration projects funded through this process must  compete with normal program needs for funding. Once the budget process  is complete, there are ways to fund rehabilitation and restoration projects  even if they were not in the original budget request. Sometimes funded  projects are less costly than anticipated, and the resulting savings can be  directed toward needed rehabilitation or restoration projects that were not  in the budget. Alternatively, forest officials may determine that some  unexpected postfire rehabilitation or restoration needs are higher priority  than certain projects already in the budget, and direct the budgeted  projects’ funds to the rehabilitation or restoration work, deferring the  work originally planned.
Some Forest Service officials said they rely on sources of funding other  than appropriations specifically designated for rehabilitation and  restoration to pay for a significant portion of needed work. For example,  in 2003, the first year after the Biscuit fire in Oregon, Forest Service  officials told us they spent a total of about $7 million on rehabilitation and  restoration work; about $2 million, or 29 percent, of the total was  rehabilitation and restoration funding, while the remaining 71 percent of  funds came from other sources. To complete needed work, Forest Service  officials said that in addition to appropriations specifically designated for  rehabilitation and restoration, they use appropriations designated for  activities such as watershed improvement, road maintenance and repair,  and recreation management, as well as receipts from salvage timber sales  and funding from other sources such as states and private parties.
section_title: BLM Follows a Standard Process to Plan Rehabilitation Projects
paragraphs: BLM has a standard process to identify, plan and fund any needed postfire  rehabilitation projects, guided by Department of the Interior policy and a  draft BLM handbook. The handbook prescribes specific procedures, time  frames, and rules for identifying, planning, and funding rehabilitation  work. BLM’s postfire recovery program, unlike the Forest Service’s  program, is limited to rehabilitation and does not include restoration. BLM  pays for nearly all of its postfire rehabilitation work with rehabilitation  funds within its wildland fire management appropriation, and funding for  such work is available for only 3 years after a fire. According to Interior  policy, any restoration needs remaining after this time are to be  incorporated into ongoing programs of work in resource programs such as  the wildlife, noxious weeds, and rangeland management programs.
The first step in planning postfire rehabilitation work is for agency  officials in the field to assess whether any rehabilitation work is needed.  BLM headquarters officials encourage field officials to do this immediately  after a fire, at the same time they are assessing the need for emergency  stabilization projects. As with the Forest Service, BLM field officials  typically assemble an interdisciplinary team of specialists to conduct an  on-the-ground evaluation of the burned area and compare the condition of  the burned land to prefire and desired conditions. Generally, agency  officials told us they rely on historical knowledge to determine prefire  conditions, and on resource management plans and other planning  documents, as well as professional judgment, to determine desired  conditions.
In addition to its resource management plans, many BLM field offices have  preapproved plans that outline the postfire work they would do if a  wildland fire occurred on their lands. These plans, called Normal Fire  Rehabilitation Plans, are prepared for a specified management area in  advance of any fires, and describe typical projects that would be  implemented under normal conditions after a fire. The plans detail the  criteria for selecting each type of project and for determining when such  projects are not needed, and provide guidance for developing a site- specific rehabilitation plan following a wildland fire. The handbook  recommends that field offices develop Normal Fire Rehabilitation Plans to  facilitate more efficient and timely approval of emergency stabilization  and rehabilitation plans.
In many cases, agency officials said they decide that no active  rehabilitation activities are needed. For example, BLM officials told us that  almost 10 million acres of land burned in Alaska between 2000 and 2004,  but that little or no rehabilitation was needed because, for example, the  lands were adapted to wildland fire. In other cases, agency officials said  no rehabilitation was needed because the fire had no negative impacts and  the site could recover naturally. When lands are adapted to wildland fire or  a fire has no negative impacts, there may be enough plants remaining that  the site can recover naturally as long as it is protected from further  disturbances, according to the officials.
In cases where rehabilitation work is needed, the BLM handbook requires  agency officials to identify and estimate costs for all rehabilitation projects  needed during the 3 years following the fire, and document these elements  in a plan. The plan is required, among other things, to describe each  project, how it is compatible with approved land-use plans, and how it is  related to damage or changes caused by the wildland fire. In addition, the  plans must include a provision for monitoring the projects to determine  whether they meet their objectives. Besides requirements about the plan,  the handbook provides guidance about which activities meet the definition  of postfire rehabilitation and qualify for rehabilitation funds. This guidance  is particularly important, according to agency officials, because BLM only  recently separated its emergency stabilization program and funding from  its rehabilitation program. In addition, field staff work with BLM state  rehabilitation coordinators to clarify any questions they have while  preparing rehabilitation plans. The plans must be completed before the  end of the fiscal year during which the fire occurred, which, in some  locations, means that agency officials typically have 1 to 3 months to  complete their plans. Also, like the Forest Service, BLM must ensure that it  meets the requirements of relevant laws, such as the National  Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act, among others.
Once rehabilitation plans are complete, field officials submit them to  agency officials in state offices and headquarters for approval. These  officials review the plans to ensure that all proposed projects meet  eligibility requirements for rehabilitation funding, and to assess the cost- effectiveness of the proposed projects. For projects that do not meet the  eligibility requirements or are judged to be too costly, state and  headquarters officials return the plan to field officials for revisions and  resubmission. In addition, reviewing officials may return a plan if projects  seem inappropriate or imprudent for other reasons—for example if  officials believe a proposed seeding technique will be ineffective for the  context in which it is proposed.
Approval of rehabilitation plans is only the first step; the proposed  projects must still be selected for funding. Funding for rehabilitation  projects is allocated 1 year at a time, in a departmentwide process in  which BLM’s projects must compete with projects from the other Interior  agencies. At the start of each fiscal year, a team representing all of  Interior’s land management agencies meets to allocate the department’s  rehabilitation funding. So far, Interior has been able to fund all needed  projects that meet eligibility requirements, according to BLM officials. As a  result, agency officials told us they pay for nearly all rehabilitation  projects with rehabilitation funds. In the future, if there are more funding  requests than available funding, the interagency team plans to assess the  projects against a set of prioritization criteria and fund only the highest- priority categories of projects. The criteria, not yet finalized by the  interagency team, may include factors such as whether the proposed  project incorporates partners and addresses resource objectives.
Once projects are funded for a given year, BLM officials in the field begin  implementing them. At the end of each of the first 2 years covered by the  plan, officials must complete an accomplishment report recording the  projects completed during the year and their costs, as well as a monitoring  summary for the completed projects reporting whether they were  successful and whether additional projects are needed. For any remaining  work, officials must submit a funding request. After the final year, BLM  requires officials to submit a closeout report to headquarters detailing the  projects completed, their cost, whether they were successful, and any  lessons learned.
section_title: Forest Service Lacks Data on Rehabilitation and Restoration Work; BLM Lacks Data on Restoration Work
paragraphs: With available information, neither the agencies nor we could reliably  determine how much needed rehabilitation and restoration work has been  completed for Forest Service and BLM fires that occurred between 2000  and 2004. The Forest Service does not know how much rehabilitation and  restoration work has been completed because it does not maintain  comprehensive data on such work. The agency only tracks rehabilitation  and restoration work accomplished using appropriations specifically  designated for such activities under the wildland fire management  account, and does not collect data on such work paid for with other funds.  BLM officials reported completing most needed rehabilitation work for  fires between 2000 and 2004, but said they do not know how much  restoration work is needed or completed because they do not track data  on postfire restoration. We could not independently verify all of BLM’s  rehabilitation data because these data are commingled with the agency’s  emergency stabilization data for fires before 2004. Because the Forest  Service had no national data and we could not verify BLM’s data, we  administered a survey to officials from both agencies to obtain information  about how much rehabilitation and restoration work has been completed.  However, we determined that the information provided in the survey was  not sufficiently reliable to report because when we assessed a sample of  responses, we found that in a significant number of cases, supporting  documents were either unavailable or they did not substantiate the  answers provided in the survey.
subsections: section_title: Forest Service Lacks Data to Know Whether High- Priority Needs Are Being Addressed
paragraphs: Forest Service officials acknowledged that they could not tell us what  portion of the agency’s nationwide rehabilitation and restoration needs  have been addressed because they do not track such information on a  national level. Field staff are only required to report accomplishment  information for rehabilitation and restoration projects funded specifically  with rehabilitation and restoration moneys, even though much of this  work is funded through other agency programs. They are not required to  report information about how much rehabilitation and restoration work is  needed, although staff in some regions do so; they also are not required to  report information about rehabilitation and restoration work completed  using other funds. Consequently, there is no centralized source of  information about all rehabilitation and restoration needs and  accomplishments nationwide. According to a headquarters official, the  Forest Service does not require forest officials to collect data on  rehabilitation and restoration work because the agency does not manage  such work under a single program; instead, the work cuts across multiple  programs. Furthermore, the official said the Forest Service does not  maintain data on needed work because agency officials do not expect  there to be sufficient funding to pay for all of it.
Because the Forest Service does not have comprehensive data on  rehabilitation and restoration needs and accomplishments nationwide, we  administered a survey to agency officials in the field to collect this  information, but determined that the information provided in the survey  was not sufficiently reliable to report. The survey asked for qualitative  information about rehabilitation and restoration needs and  accomplishments for a random sample of fires that occurred between 2000  and 2004 and burned over 500 acres. After administering the survey, we  requested supporting documents to validate a sample of responses.  However, we found that a significant portion of the responses were not  adequately supported. For example, in some cases, respondents  mistakenly reported information about emergency stabilization projects  rather than rehabilitation and restoration projects. In other cases, no  documentation was provided to support survey responses, or the  information in the documents contradicted the survey responses.  Consequently, we determined that the data provided in the survey could  not be reliably reported.
An interregional group of Forest Service officials reached a similar  conclusion about the agency’s rehabilitation and restoration data when it  attempted to collect and report related information. The group—tasked  with developing an agencywide strategy for postfire recovery in 2004— found that they could not identify the agency’s total rehabilitation and  restoration needs and accomplishments because the agency did not  maintain consistent, reliable data about such needs. The group noted that  the Forest Service has a fire management database with the capacity to  track rehabilitation and restoration needs and accomplishments, and that  headquarters officials originally used the system to determine priorities  and funding allocations. However, they said that field staff rarely enter  data into the system because headquarters officials no longer use it this  way, now that they delegated the task of prioritizing and funding projects  to the regions. Some regions have developed their own systems to track  regionwide data, but because the systems are not consistent, the data  cannot accurately be combined or compared across regions. The  interregional group recommended that if agencywide consistency is  needed for data on rehabilitation and restoration, the Forest Service  should consider identifying the minimum data necessary and modifying  existing or emerging systems to incorporate such information.
In our visits to seven national forests and telephone interviews with  officials from all of the Forest Service regions, agency officials reported  that varied amounts of rehabilitation and restoration work have been  completed. For some fires, agency officials said they had completed all or  almost all needed rehabilitation and restoration work, while for others,  they told us that a significant amount of work remains to be done. For  example, agency officials reported that almost all of the needed  rehabilitation and restoration work is complete for the Diamond Point fire,  which burned nearly 150,000 acres in the Payette National Forest in Idaho  during the summer of 2000. According to one official, the only work that  has not been completed for that fire is work that will not be needed until  15 or 20 years after the fire, such as clearing hiking trails when dead trees  fall in the future. Similarly, agency officials reported completing all or  almost all needed rehabilitation and restoration work for the 3,000-acre  Thorn fire in the Wallowa-Whitman National Forest in 2000, and the  18,000-acre Fridley fire in the Gallatin National Forest in 2001, among  others. In contrast, agency officials reported that a significant portion of  needed rehabilitation and restoration work remains for the Bitterroot fires  of 2000, which burned about 300,000 acres, as well as for the Bullock and  Aspen fires of 2002 and 2003, which burned a total of about 115,000 acres  in the Coronado National Forest. For the 2002 Red Waffle fire, which  burned about 5,000 acres in the Custer National Forest, agency officials  told us that almost none of the needed work had been completed. These  examples suggest that, for at least some fires, a significant portion of  needed rehabilitation and restoration work has not been completed.  However, without comprehensive data, neither we nor agency decision  makers know how common this situation is across the nation.
Furthermore, while we found that a substantial portion of needed work  remains undone for some fires, it is unclear whether more should be done  at this point because the Forest Service has no clear time frames for  completing such work. Some Forest Service officials told us that, although  they had not yet completed all of the rehabilitation and restoration work  they believed was needed, they were not concerned because they planned  to complete the work over the course of 5 or 10 years after the fire. Few of  the agency officials we interviewed reported adverse effects that had  already resulted from not completing projects. However, some officials  expressed concern about future effects, such as compromised water  quality and loss of forest habitat, that could result if needs were left unmet  over the long term.
Given constrained budgets and competing priorities, a headquarters  official explained that the Forest Service does not expect forests to  complete every needed rehabilitation and restoration project; instead,  forests are expected to complete the high-priority projects. However,  agency officials do not know whether they have addressed the highest  priority projects nationwide, because they do not track this information,  either. In our interviews with officials in the field, we found that regions  have addressed their priorities to varying degrees from year to year and  region to region. For example, in 2004, the Intermountain region was able  to fund the top 14 of its 20 priority categories, while the Southwestern  region was only able to fund the top 2 of its 9 priority categories using  rehabilitation and restoration funds. As a result, the Southwestern region  identified about $5.2 million in unfunded needs that year, including about  $2.3 million in high-priority needs, according to an agency official.  However, in fiscal year 2005, because the Southwestern region received  about $7 million in rehabilitation and restoration funds—an increase of  more than $6 million over the previous year—the region was able to  address its backlog, agency officials told us. For fiscal year 2006, the  region was allocated under $1 million and expects once again to only  address projects in its top 1 or 2 priority categories, leaving what agency  officials estimate to be millions of dollars in needs unfunded. While some  regional officials tracked such information, others did not, and none of the  regions routinely reported such information to headquarters.  Consequently, Forest Service officials make management and funding  decisions without knowing, on a national scale, whether the agency is  keeping pace with its high-priority rehabilitation and restoration needs.
section_title: BLM Officials Report Completing Most Rehabilitation Work, but Do Not Know Whether Restoration Needs Are Being Addressed
paragraphs: BLM officials told us that, according to agency data, most rehabilitation  work needed for fires that occurred between 2000 and 2004 has been  completed. The agency requires field staff to report all rehabilitation needs  to headquarters in rehabilitation plans and budget requests. BLM officials  in each state office assemble and review the data on budget requests and  allocations for all of the district and field offices within the state. Once  rehabilitation work is funded, agency officials said there are only a few  factors—such as unusual weather or other unanticipated events—that  prevent the work from being completed. Consequently, agency officials  infer that nearly all needed work that has been funded through fiscal year  2005 has been completed. In addition, BLM tracks nationwide data on the  total number of acres that have been rehabilitated, and reviews the data  for any anomalies, correcting errors when found. The agency reports this  information to Congress each year in its budget request as well as in its  annual report on public lands. Further, one agency official reported that  BLM is currently revising its performance measures, and is planning to  report the percentage and number of acres identified in rehabilitation  plans as needing rehabilitation treatments that actually received the  treatments. The agency has begun to informally collect these data in fiscal  year 2006 to prepare for reporting the information in the future.
While BLM collects data on nationwide rehabilitation needs and  accomplishments, we could not independently verify the data because, for  fires before 2004, the agency’s rehabilitation and emergency stabilization  data are commingled. In an effort to collect this information, we  administered a survey to agency officials in the field. The survey we  administered to BLM officials asked for qualitative information about  rehabilitation needs and accomplishments for a random sample of BLM  fires that occurred between 2000 and 2004 and burned over 500 acres.  However, like the Forest Service survey, when we compared a sample of  responses to supporting documents, we found that a significant portion of  responses were not adequately supported. Specifically, we found that  respondents sometimes reported information about emergency  stabilization work rather than rehabilitation work. While we recognize that  this could be a result of the relatively recent separation between the two  programs in 2004, we determined that the data provided in the survey were  not reliable.
In our visits to three BLM field locations and interviews with BLM officials  from four state offices, agency officials consistently reported completing  all or almost all rehabilitation work that was needed for fires that occurred  between 2000 and 2004. For example, in Idaho, BLM officials told us that  all of the agency’s rehabilitation work identified as needed in the state  during this time period has been funded, and that nearly all of the funded  work has been completed. Several officials told us that the only  incomplete work is that needed beyond the first 3 years after a fire, which  is defined as restoration work. Agency officials in Oregon, Utah, and  Nevada also reported completing nearly all needed rehabilitation work,  with few exceptions—such as work that was hindered by uncontrollable  events like weather, or work needed beyond 3 years after a fire.
Although BLM keeps close track of its postfire rehabilitation needs and  accomplishments nationwide, and reports completing most of this work,  the agency’s rehabilitation program does not fund or track any restoration  work—that is, work needed more than 3 years after a fire. Instead, Interior  policy calls for any restoration needs to be addressed by other agency  programs, such as the wildlife, noxious weed, or rangeland management  programs. However, BLM officials we talked with did not know whether  these other programs were addressing postfire restoration needs. Several  BLM officials indicated that continued monitoring beyond the 3-year  period is important in some cases to determine the effectiveness of  projects that have been completed. One BLM analysis of postfire projects  from 1999 to 2003 concluded that time and funding limits on monitoring  prevented field officials from determining the success or failure of some  projects. In some cases for which projects were known to be only partially  successful, agency officials said that if they could identify and address the  issue right away—for example, by seeding native plants so that invasive  species could not expand—they could avoid losing their original  investment.
section_title: Forest Service and BLM Officials Cite Different Challenges to Rehabilitating and Restoring Their Lands
paragraphs: Forest Service and BLM officials reported different challenges to their  efforts to rehabilitate or restore their lands after fires. Forest Service  officials cited a lack of funding, transfers of funding for fire suppression,  and erratic funding levels from year to year as hindering their  rehabilitation and restoration efforts. In addition, some Forest Service  officials told us that controversy around certain types of postfire activities,  market forces, and insufficient workforce made it difficult to address  needed rehabilitation and restoration work. For BLM, headquarters and  field officials told us that while they have completed most of their  projects, they face challenges in achieving long-term success with some  projects. Many of BLM’s seeding and planting projects fail or are only  partially successful when new plants do not become established because  of drought, soil conditions, or planting techniques, for example. To  address this issue, BLM officials said they are now monitoring  rehabilitation treatments more comprehensively to learn why treatments  are effective or not, and have begun developing standard monitoring  protocols, a database to track project information and success rates, and a  Web-based information-sharing network that will allow staff to share  lessons learned.
subsections: section_title: Forest Service Reports Funding and Other Issues Hinder Its Rehabilitation and Restoration Efforts
paragraphs: According to Forest Service officials, various factors related to funding  hindered their postfire rehabilitation and restoration efforts. Specifically,  agency officials reported that a lack of dedicated funds, the transfer of  funds to pay for fire suppression, and the low priority of one project  compared with others competing for the same funds prevented completion  of some projects. Regarding the lack of dedicated funds, several officials  we interviewed cited the downward trend in funding for postfire  rehabilitation and restoration, and commented that funding for other  programs had not increased to compensate. According to a regional  official, in 2004, forests in the Northern region identified about $46 million  in rehabilitation and restoration needs attributable to the previous year’s  fires, but the region had only about $3 million in rehabilitation and  restoration funds to allocate to the forests. Officials in several regions told  us that, although their projects had been approved for rehabilitation and  restoration funding, much of the funding was transferred to pay for fire  suppression. For example, after 307,000 acres burned in the Bitterroot  National Forest in Montana, forest officials identified and received funding  for about $30 million in rehabilitation and restoration work in 2002.  However, according to these officials, later that year most of the funding— about $26 million—was transferred to pay for fire suppression elsewhere.  Consequently, the forest did not have enough funding to pay for all of the  work, and as of March 2006, much of it still had not been done. According  to agency officials, the situation was made worse because they had made  assurances to the public, which expected the Forest Service to complete  the work they planned.
In other cases, agency officials told us they were not able to complete  some rehabilitation and restoration projects because they were lower  priority than other needed work on the forest. For example, after a  wildland fire at the Custer National Forest in Montana, officials told us  that they needed to thin the forest to reduce the risk of a future fire  causing severe damage. However, this fuels reduction project, located far  from any communities, was not selected for funding at the regional level,  and it was not funded by the forest because the forest’s budget could only  accommodate the highest-priority fuels reduction projects—where  communities would be threatened if a wildland fire started.
In addition, during our field visits, officials told us that erratic funding  levels hindered their ability to address postfire rehabilitation and  restoration needs. Specifically, agency officials said that the amount of  rehabilitation and restoration funding headquarters allocated to the  regions has fluctuated dramatically from year to year, making it difficult to  plan budgets. For example, the Southwestern region received about  $600,000 in fiscal year 2004, about $6.8 million in 2005, and about $900,000  in 2006. Based on 2004 funding levels, forests in the region did not expect  to receive substantial funding in 2005. When about $6.8 million became  available, however, some Southwestern forests could not spend all of the  money before the end of the year because they had not hired additional  seasonal staff, prepared contracting or planning documents, or otherwise  established the necessary infrastructure to spend the funds and implement  needed work.
Agency officials reported that factors unrelated to funding also hindered  their ability to address needed postfire rehabilitation and restoration  work. Even if there were unlimited funding, some officials told us they  would be limited by the size of their staff or other operational constraints,  such as the length of their field season. For example, in 2005, the Apache- Sitgreaves National Forest received about $2.4 million for needed  rehabilitation and restoration after the Rodeo-Chediski fire. However,  because of their limited staff and the time required to complete the  contracting process, which they only initiated in February when they  learned that they would receive the funding, forest officials said they were  not able to spend all of the funds. Exacerbating the challenge, the Forest  Service was implementing a new procurement system at the time, which  officials said took additional time to learn. In other cases, agency officials  anticipated workforce and operational limitations, and accounted for them  by developing long-range plans with annual workloads that could be  accommodated within such limitations. However, because these plans  covered longer time periods, planned work was still incomplete several  years after a fire. For example, at the Coronado National Forest in  Arizona, officials planned to spread the needed work out over a period of  10 years or more, scheduling a feasible workload each year, given  projected staff and infrastructure constraints.
Forest Service officials also noted that controversy about postfire  activities presented challenges. General dissonance about the role of  natural recovery versus managed recovery, as well as disagreement about  specific decisions, such as whether to use chemical herbicides and  whether to harvest burned timber as part of restoration efforts, created  challenges for agency officials and sometimes prevented projects from  being completed. Forest managers use herbicides to, for example, control  the spread of invasive weeds or eradicate vegetation that competes with  young seedlings planted to reforest burned lands. Its use is controversial,  however, because herbicides can be harmful to native vegetation, wildlife,  water, and soils. Harvesting burned timber is also controversial.  Supporters say that the timber should be harvested to capture its  economic value and remove its potential to fuel future fires, while critics  say the burned trees should be left for wildlife habitat and to avoid any  impacts that could be caused by harvesting operations.
Because of the controversy surrounding these issues, agency officials said  they often invested more time and resources in developing defensible  documents to support their decisions, which sometimes delayed project  implementation. Also, appeals and litigation of such decisions sometimes  caused projects to be delayed. For example, after a 2001 wildland fire at  the Tahoe National Forest in California, the Forest Service spent a year  preparing a plan, finalized in 2002, that proposed harvesting and selling  burned timber both outside and within a roadless area to help finance  needed rehabilitation work. The agency began harvesting timber outside  the roadless area and had virtually completed doing so by July 2004.  However, in response to a lawsuit, a federal district court issued a  preliminary injunction in August 2004, prohibiting the Forest Service from  harvesting timber inside the roadless area. In February 2006, the agency  settled the case, agreeing not to harvest timber in the roadless area. By  that point—4-1/2 years after the fire—agency officials said that the value  of the timber had declined to the point that it was no longer feasible to sell  it.
Faced with repeated decisions about harvesting burned timber, some  Forest Service officials expressed concern that there is insufficient  scientific evidence to support one action or another, and further noted  that little research is being done to address the question. In a 2004 report  entitled “Strategy for Post-Fire Recovery,” an interregional group of Forest  Service officials noted that there is “very limited scientific information on  long-term effects of uncharacteristically severe fires, the effectiveness of  post-fire rehabilitation and restoration treatments, or the impacts of post- fire timber harvesting.” Without such information, they concluded, “Policy  choices are often based on ideology and emotion rather than objective  scientific information.” According to one Forest Service scientist, there is  an urgent need for more information on salvage logging—especially  information about the effects of logging operations under various  conditions and in different geographic locations because such effects vary  widely depending on the type and extent of logging, site conditions, and  climatic conditions. Moreover, such research is needed to improve the  models used by agency decision makers to predict the potential impacts of  proposed actions such as locations and rates of erosion because,  currently, none of them account for the effects of salvage logging on the  postfire environment.
The 2002 Biscuit fire in Oregon, which has been a focal point for recent  debates about harvesting burned timber, has also drawn attention to the  role of scientific research. After the fire, a study was published stating that  removing dead and dying trees from the Biscuit fire area would reduce the  risk of recurring large-scale fires in the area. Forest Service officials  decided to offer 12 sales of burned timber as part of a larger recovery  plan, one purpose of which was to reduce the risk of such fires. The sales  were controversial and were the target of legal challenges, but the timber  was ultimately harvested in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, a study was published  concluding that salvage logging after the Biscuit fire may have been  counterproductive to forest recovery goals in part because, during the  logging operations, some seedlings were destroyed. Release of the study  spurred additional controversy and media attention. In response, the  study’s authors issued a statement saying that “the controversy over the  topic of postfire logging is indicative of how little is known about its  effects.” In a congressional hearing on the topic, other scientists and  researchers told members of Congress that there is not a lot of peer- reviewed science on this issue, and a sustained commitment to such  research is needed. Several bills pending before Congress contain  provisions for research, pilot projects, and monitoring, related to the  effects of postfire harvest.
In addition to controversy, Forest Service officials told us that factors  related to market forces also hinder their efforts to harvest burned timber  after fires. For example, sometimes the trees burned in wildland fires are  too small to be of any commercial value. Other times, a long distance to  the nearest timber mill or difficult access to the burned timber reduces the  cost-effectiveness of a project for the timber purchaser, especially because  burned timber loses value over time as it deteriorates. In some locations,  the small number of nearby timber mills can limit competitive bidding. For  example, at the Eldorado National Forest in California, the Forest Service  offered burned timber for sale in 2005 but received no bids on most of the  sales because the only timber company close enough to harvest the trees  was already busy with timber from previous sales. Agency officials said  they were concerned that if too much time passed, the timber would lose  value and the sale would no longer be economically viable. In the fall of  2005, they lowered the price of the timber and completed the sales. While  agency officials acknowledged that market forces had sometimes hindered  their ability to sell burned timber, they said this had not always been the  case, and it was difficult to predict whether or how such forces might  affect a sale.
To address challenges related to the controversy over salvage logging and  in recognition of the shortage of related scientific research available, the  Forest Service has begun to conduct such research in the past several  years—for example, through its wildland fire research and development  program. In addition, the Joint Fire Science Program—a partnership of six  federal agencies, including the Forest Service—has called for and funded  some research proposals in this area. In its October 2005 announcement,  the program specifically sought proposals from agency and university  scientists “that evaluate the effects and effectiveness of postfire  management activities, including but not limited to burned area  emergency stabilization, rehabilitation, restoration treatments, and  postfire removal of woody material (e.g., salvage logging, biomass  utilization).” In May 2006, the program funded several studies in this area.  For example, one Forest Service researcher received funding to study the  effects of different salvage-logging techniques at a few sites and develop  some guidelines for use by land managers. While we commend the Forest  Service for taking these initial steps, it will require a long-term  commitment to the issue to accumulate research that provides sufficient  information about the effects of salvage logging under various conditions,  including diverse geographic locations and ecosystem types, and different  burn severities, logging techniques, soil conditions, species types, and  other features.
To address challenges related to funding, Forest Service officials said they  changed the formula for allocating rehabilitation and restoration funds to  regions in fiscal year 2006, so that funding levels would be more stable  from year to year, but did not request additional rehabilitation and  restoration funds from Congress because of competing program priorities.  The new formula for allocating funds considers the amount of lands  burned in each region over the previous 5 years, in contrast to the old  formula, which considered only the lands burned during the prior year.  This way, if acres burned in a region fluctuate dramatically from year to  year, funding levels do not follow the erratic pattern. Also, the new system  considers only severely burned acres rather than also considering the total  number of acres burned in each region, as did the old formula. According  to agency officials, severely burned lands are more likely to need  rehabilitation or restoration than are lands burned at moderate or low  severity. Finally, agency officials plan to exclude wilderness acres  beginning in fiscal year 2007 because, in many cases, wilderness lands  need little or no active rehabilitation or restoration projects because they  are managed to recover naturally. Agency officials said they have not  requested more rehabilitation and restoration funding from Congress  because, given the current environment of constrained budgets, they did  not expect an overall increase in the agency’s budget and did not want to  sacrifice other critical programs’ budgets. Also, the officials explained that  by receiving relatively more funding for other programs, they maintained  more flexibility to determine how to spend the funds. This way, if postfire  rehabilitation or restoration work was the highest-priority work for a  forest, it could direct its regular program funds to pay for it. On the other  hand, if the forest had other higher-priority work needs, such as  rehabilitating lands after a hurricane or repairing roads to meet basic  safety standards, it could fund these needs.
section_title: BLM Cites Challenges to Ensuring Success of Completed Seeding and Planting Projects
paragraphs: Although BLM officials reported completing most of the agency’s needed  rehabilitation projects, some officials expressed concern that these  completed projects were not always successful. BLM officials in several  states told us that many of their seeding and planting projects did not  successfully establish new vegetation because the seeds did not germinate,  or germinated but later died. For example, after a 2002 wildland fire in  Idaho, BLM officials seeded about 4,400 acres of land, but 3 years later,  most of the plants had not survived. Field office officials speculated that  this was due to several factors, including drought, competition from  invasive weeds such as cheatgrass, poor seed viability, and an insufficient  number of seeds. In an initial attempt to understand the extent of its  planting challenge, a BLM official reviewed rehabilitation monitoring  reports submitted after fires occurring from 1999 through 2003, and found  that a significant portion of the projects were described as failures or as  only partially successful. BLM officials qualified these results, emphasizing  that success is a subjective standard, and cited a need for improved  standards and guidance for determining and reporting success of  rehabilitation projects. Nevertheless, the officials acknowledged that the  low success rate should be a cause for concern.
According to BLM officials, a variety of factors can cause planting and  seeding projects to fail or to be only partially successful. For example,  BLM officials we interviewed frequently singled out lack of precipitation  as a key factor causing projects to fail. In some BLM locations, agency  officials told us that months can go by with little or no precipitation, and  many species will not germinate without moisture. Also, there are  technical factors that can influence a project’s degree of success.  Sometimes seeds do not grow when initially planted because they are not  viable or the variety selected is not appropriate for the environment in  which they are planted. Other times, it is because the seeds are damaged  during application, or planted too late in the season or too deep in the soil.  Alternatively, seeds may successfully germinate, but the seedlings later die  because, for example, there are not enough available nutrients or moisture  in the soil. The BLM official who reviewed recent rehabilitation- monitoring reports highlighted the poor success rates of sagebrush- planting projects that relied on aerial seeding, a technique to distribute  seeds by aircraft (see fig. 3). For the aerial-seeding projects, agency  officials estimated that more than half either failed or were only partially  successful. Another study concluded that aerially seeding sagebrush  following select Idaho fires was “not a reliable, effective seeding method,”  at least in the sites studied. Sagebrush shrubs were not established on 23  of the 35 projects in the study.
When postfire seeding or planting projects are not successful, invasive  weeds can spread, crowding out native species, increasing fire frequency,  and displacing wildlife habitat. This is because after a wildland fire burns  in a forest or rangeland, an opening is left for plants to grow, and if land  managers do not successfully establish plants in such an opening  immediately, invasive species—which multiply rapidly and compete  aggressively with other plants for nutrients, water, and sunlight—often fill  the void. Once they have arrived, invasive plants are hard to eradicate.  Some invasive plants, such as cheatgrass, have increased the frequency of  wildland fires in western grasslands because they add to fuel loads,  become dry early in the summer when wildland fires are most common,  and can grow back after fires. In some locations where cheatgrass has  invaded ecosystems that cannot handle frequent, intense fires, native  plants and animals have been nearly eliminated. In other cases, failure of  seeding or planting projects can directly result in a loss of wildlife habitat.  For example, wildlife such as the sage grouse, pronghorn antelope, and  mule deer are dependent on sagebrush for their survival, so when  sagebrush projects fail, these animals lose their habitats.
BLM officials are aware of and concerned about the success rate of  postfire planting and seeding projects. In an effort to learn more about and  improve the effectiveness of these projects, BLM has taken several  actions. Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, BLM began requiring field staff to  monitor all rehabilitation projects for effectiveness, and document the  assessment in a closeout report completed at the end of the third year of  rehabilitation activities. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, monitoring work  was funded through the emergency stabilization program under the  wildland fire operations account. According to a BLM official, this was to  ensure that funding would be available for monitoring. In fiscal year 2006,  however, BLM began to use rehabilitation funds to pay for monitoring  rehabilitation projects, in accordance with agency policy. In addition, in  response to a previous GAO recommendation, BLM is working with the  Forest Service and the United States Geological Survey to develop  standard monitoring protocols, so that agencywide monitoring data will be  comparable and can facilitate learning. With consistent monitoring  protocols, agency officials expect to be able to isolate some of the  common factors that cause seeding projects to fail under various  conditions. For example, they hope to identify seed types and planting  techniques that work best in arid climates, with certain types of soils, or in  competition with particular invasive weeds. In response to another GAO  recommendation, BLM, the Forest Service, and the United States  Geological Survey are also working together to develop a data system that  can serve as a repository of information and lessons learned through  implementing and monitoring rehabilitation projects. The agencies have  implemented a pilot to test the data system in Nevada, and they expect to  begin development of the nationwide system in fiscal year 2008.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Faced with millions of acres of burned federal lands, the Forest Service  and BLM have a daunting task in identifying and addressing postfire  rehabilitation and restoration needs. Given the enormity of the task and  the scarcity of funding to address needed rehabilitation and restoration  work, the Forest Service has chosen to give its regions and forests the  discretion to decide what, if any, rehabilitation or restoration work is  warranted, given competing priorities. While we agree that a degree of  freedom is appropriate, so that the agency can accommodate diverse  ecosystems and unique circumstances, the Forest Service must balance  this freedom with its obligation to be accountable to the public and  Congress. Without complete information on the magnitude of its  rehabilitation and restoration needs relative to its capacity to address  them, the Forest Service can neither make informed funding decisions nor  show Congress and the public whether it is keeping pace with the most  critical postfire work. Because the Forest Service already has a system to  capture and report some data on rehabilitation and restoration  accomplishments, expanding its use might be a straightforward way to  provide a more complete picture of the agency’s high-priority  rehabilitation and restoration needs relative to its accomplishments.
For its part, BLM has acknowledged that one limitation of its rehabilitation  program is its 3-year time constraint, which precludes any subsequent  restoration work from being implemented under the program. In some  cases, the time constraint also limits the agency’s ability to monitor  rehabilitation projects long enough to ascertain whether they are  successful, a critical shortfall given BLM’s challenge with success rates. In  recognition of this limitation, agency officials have said—and we agree— that the program could be improved by extending management and data- tracking efforts beyond the initial 3 years to better understand whether  long-term restoration needs are being addressed.
With millions of acres of burned lands, the Forest Service and BLM face  significant challenges in addressing rehabilitation and restoration needs.  While there are no quick fixes for these challenges, there are some actions  the agencies could take to smooth the way. BLM has already taken the first  steps toward improving its understanding about how frequently its  rehabilitation projects fail and why. The Forest Service could improve the  foundation from which it makes decisions about postfire work that may be  controversial, including postfire timber harvests, by conducting additional  research in this area, so that such decisions can be informed by ample  scientific evidence rather than the limited number of studies currently  available.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help Congress and the Forest Service make more informed funding  decisions, and to help the Forest Service better address its high-priority  postfire rehabilitation and restoration needs, we recommend that the  Secretary of Agriculture direct the Forest Service to take the following two  actions:    Track and report to Congress all high-priority rehabilitation and  restoration work needed and accomplished, regardless of funding source.
Conduct additional research on the beneficial and harmful effects of  postfire projects, including but not limited to, postfire timber harvests.
To help ensure that long-term postfire restoration needs are addressed on  BLM lands, we also recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct  BLM to address postfire restoration needs that persist more than 3 years  after a fire by establishing a procedure to transfer any incomplete work— including monitoring—from the rehabilitation program to other ongoing  programs, and by tracking and reporting to Congress the status of all  needed and completed postfire restoration work in those programs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We received comments on a draft of this report from the Forest Service  and Interior. The Forest Service, in comments provided via email,  generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. With respect to  our recommendation to conduct additional research on the effects of post- fire projects, the Forest Service noted that it will need to set priorities for  this work. While we recognize that the Forest Service must balance  competing priorities when allocating its resources, we continue to believe  that such research warrants particular emphasis because of the  heightened controversy surrounding some postfire projects, including  postfire timber harvests, and the relative shortage of available scientific  information in this area. The Forest Service also provided additional  comments, which we have incorporated in this report where appropriate.  Interior, in a written letter reproduced in appendix II, concurred with the  report’s findings and recommendations.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of  Agriculture, Secretary of the Interior, Chief of the Forest Service, and  Director of BLM. We also will make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our study were to determine (1) how the Forest Service  and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) identify and plan postfire  rehabilitation and restoration activities; (2) how much needed  rehabilitation and restoration work the agencies have completed for  wildland fires that occurred between 2000 and 2004; and (3) the challenges  the agencies face in addressing their needs, and any actions they are  taking in response.
subsections: section_title: Planning Rehabilitation and Restoration Activities
paragraphs: To learn how the Forest Service and BLM identify and plan postfire  rehabilitation and restoration activities, we reviewed agency documents  and interviewed officials in headquarters, regional and state offices, and  local units. We collected and reviewed documents on policies, procedures,  and practices relevant to rehabilitation and restoration activities in both  agencies. These included interagency agreements, such as one establishing  common definitions for rehabilitation and restoration, as well as  departmental, agency headquarters, and regional or state guidance for  nonemergency rehabilitation and restoration activities. We reviewed  relevant portions of agency manuals and handbooks, documents detailing  procedures for identifying needed postfire activities, as well as any  documents describing prioritization and funding approval processes. For  select fires, we reviewed environmental impact statements, needs  assessments, rehabilitation plans, and other relevant planning documents.  When we adjusted dollars for inflation, we used the gross domestic  product (chained) price index, with 2001 as the base year.
We also visited regions and states with large numbers of acres burned by  wildland fire—excluding Alaska, where the agencies conducted little or no  rehabilitation or restoration work after wildland fires. For the Forest  Service, we visited the Northern, Pacific Northwest, Pacific Southwest,  and Southwestern regions to interview officials that manage lands in  Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,  Washington, and parts of Idaho. In each of the four regions, we visited one  or two forests and interviewed forest- and district-level staff. In addition,  we contacted officials in Forest Service headquarters and all of the  agency’s regions by telephone to discuss how the Forest Service identifies,  plans, and funds postfire rehabilitation and restoration activities. For BLM,  we visited Idaho and Oregon to interview officials in BLM’s state and field  offices there. We also contacted, by telephone, officials in BLM’s  headquarters and Utah and Nevada state offices to discuss how they  identify and plan rehabilitation activities.
section_title: Amount of Needed Rehabilitation and Restoration Work That Has Been Completed
paragraphs: To determine how much needed rehabilitation and restoration work the  Forest Service and BLM have completed, we collected available national,  regional, state, and local data on project needs and accomplishments,  interviewed Forest Service and BLM officials at all levels to ascertain their  subjective assessments of the extent to which they had addressed postfire  rehabilitation and restoration needs, and reviewed relevant agency  reports. We also met with field staff to discuss proposed and completed  projects for select fires and conducted detailed reviews of these needs and  accomplishments using a structured data collection instrument. In  addition, we conducted a Web-based survey of agency officials in the field,  but after checking a sample of survey responses against supporting  documents, we determined that the information provided in the survey  was not sufficiently reliable to report.
subsections: section_title: Survey Design
paragraphs: We selected a stratified random sample of 276 fires from the population of  BLM and Forest Service fires that burned more than 500 acres and  occurred between 2000 and 2004. The sample was stratified by agency and  by year (2000-2002 and 2003-2004), so that results could be generalized for  each stratum as well as in the aggregate. To identify the universe of these  fires, we combined two separate lists of fires obtained from the Forest  Service and BLM. We excluded fires that occurred in Alaska because  Forest Service officials reported little, and BLM officials reported no,  postfire rehabilitation activity in Alaska during this period.
Our survey asked agency officials to provide qualitative information about  needed projects, the portion of those projects completed, factors that  hindered their ability to complete needed projects, and any effects  associated with not completing projects. We surveyed Forest Service  officials about both rehabilitation and restoration projects, but we  surveyed BLM officials only about rehabilitation projects because BLM’s  postfire programs do not include restoration. Also, to account for BLM  projects implemented before BLM separated its emergency stabilization  projects from its rehabilitation projects in 2004, we requested that agency  officials use the current interagency definitions of emergency stabilization  and rehabilitation when providing information about all rehabilitation  projects.
To identify potential survey questions, we interviewed Forest Service and  BLM officials at headquarters and in the field, and reviewed agency  documents and other reports. We took several quality assurance steps to  minimize nonsampling errors, which can be introduced, for example,  when respondents do not understand questions or do not have the  information required to answer questions. Social science survey specialists  designed draft questionnaires, and we conducted six pretests with agency  officials in the field. After each pretest, we conducted an interview to  determine (1) the extent to which respondents interpreted questions and  response categories consistently, (2) whether respondents had the  necessary information to answer the questions, and (3) how long it took  individuals to complete the survey. In addition, we asked headquarters  officials with national responsibility for postfire work in each agency to  review our draft questionnaires and provide comments. Based on the  results of these pretests and comments, we made multiple revisions to the  survey.
To determine to whom to send our survey, we contacted forest  supervisors or natural resources directors in the Forest Service, and state  office rehabilitation coordinators in the BLM, and asked them to identify  the field staff most knowledgeable about rehabilitation and restoration for  each fire in our sample. In a few cases—where we lacked timely contact  information or the person we initially contacted referred us to someone  else—we asked agency field officials to forward the survey to the  appropriate person.
section_title: Survey Administration and Data Verification
paragraphs: We administered the survey via the internet for 8 weeks between  November 21, 2005, and January 13, 2006, and at the close of our  administration period, we had received a total of 256 responses for an  overall response rate of 93 percent. After the survey, we checked the  survey data and verified the data analysis programming. We also verified  select responses for 10 percent of surveys that we randomly selected from  those that had been completed. Specifically, we verified responses to  questions about the proportion of projects completed for a particular fire  and the funding sources used to pay for such projects by contacting  respondents and requesting supporting documents—such as project plans,  accomplishment reports, and contracts—to compare their survey  responses with information in the documents. Our verification revealed  that a significant portion of responses were not supported by the  documentation we received. As shown in table 1, we found that in 6 of the  26 cases, none of the responses we checked were fully supported; in  another 6 cases, only some of the responses were supported; and in 14  cases, all were supported.
For example, sometimes responses were not supported because  respondents had mistakenly reported information about emergency  stabilization activities or funding, rather than rehabilitation and  restoration activities or funding. Other times, respondents had either  erroneously transferred the information from supporting documents to  our survey, or had no documentation to support their answers. Overall,  this outcome indicates that there is a degree of nonsampling error in our  survey results that is not quantifiable, but which we determined is too  great to ensure sufficient reliability.
section_title: Challenges to Addressing Needs
paragraphs: To determine what challenges the Forest Service and BLM face in  addressing postfire rehabilitation and restoration needs, and what actions,  if any, they are taking in response, we relied on interviews with agency  officials and agency documents. In our interviews with agency officials at  all levels, we asked about challenges at the program level as well as the  project level, and about actions the agencies are taking to address such  challenges. During our visits to the field, we also observed rehabilitation  or restoration project sites and discussed challenges officials faced in  successfully completing those and other projects. We reviewed Forest  Service and BLM reports describing agencywide challenges as well as  select reports detailing challenges to addressing rehabilitation or  restoration needs for a specific fire. To better understand some challenges  agency officials reported, and some actions they are taking in response to  challenges, we conducted additional interviews with agency research  scientists, biologists, and ecologists, and reviewed relevant agency studies.
We conducted our work from May 2005 through May 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of the Interior
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David P. Bixler, Assistant  Director; Carl Barden; Mark Braza; Sandy Davis; Christine Feehan; Rich  Johnson; Alison O’Neill; Anthony Padilla; and Judy Pagano made key  contributions to this report.