Performance Budgeting: OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool Presents Opportunities and Challenges For Budget and Performance Integration
Published: 2004-02-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating federal programs during budget formulation. The subcommittee asked GAO to discuss our recent report, Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool for the Fiscal 2004 Budget (GAO-04-174) and strategies for improving PART and furthering the goals envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: PART helped structure OMB's use of performance information for internal program and budget analysis and stimulated agency interest in budget and performance integration. Moreover, it illustrated the potential to build on GPRA's foundation to more actively promote the use of performance information in budget decisions. OMB deserves credit for inviting scrutiny of its federal program performance reviews and sharing them on its Web site. Much of PART's potential value lies in its program recommendations but follow through will require sustained commitment by agencies and OMB. OMB devoted considerable effort to developing PART, but diagnosing problems and rating programs are only the beginning of PART's ambitious agenda. Implementing change and providing oversight takes time; OMB needs to be mindful of this as it considers capacity and workload issues in the PART. As is to be expected in the first year of any reform, PART is a work in progress and we noted in our report where OMB might make improvements. Any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity of the U.S. government will require exercising some judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that we found inconsistencies in OMB staff interpreting and applying PART. PART provides an opportunity to more efficiently use scarce analytic resources, to focus decision makers' attention on the most pressing policy issues, and to consider comparisons and trade-offs among related programs by more strategically targeting PART assessments based on such factors as the relative priorities, costs, and risks associated with related clusters of programs and activities. PART assessments underscored long-standing gaps in performance and evaluation information throughout the federal government. By reaching agreement on areas in which evaluations are most essential, decision makers can help ensure that limited resources are applied wisely. The relationship between PART and the broader GPRA strategic planning process is still evolving. Although PART can stimulate discussion on program-specific performance measurement issues, it is not a substitute for GPRA's strategic, longer-term focus on thematic goals, and department- and governmentwide crosscutting comparisons. Although PART and GPRA serve different needs, a strategy for integrating the two could help strengthen both. Federal programs are designed and implemented in dynamic environments where competing program priorities and stakeholders' needs must be balanced continually and new needs addressed. PART clearly serves OMB's needs but questions remain about whether it serves the various needs of other key stakeholders. If PART results are to be considered in the congressional debate it will be important for OMB to (1) involve congressional stakeholders early in providing input on the focus of the assessments; (2) clarify any significant limitations in the assessments and underlying performance information; and (3) initiate discussions with key congressional committees about how they can best leverage PART information in congressional authorization, appropriations, and oversight processes.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss performance budgeting and the  Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Program Assessment Rating  Tool (PART). Since the 1950s, the federal government has attempted  several governmentwide initiatives designed to better align spending  decisions with expected performance—what is commonly referred to as  “performance budgeting.” The consensus is that prior efforts—including  the Hoover Commission, the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System  (PPBS), Management by Objectives, and Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB)—did  not succeed in significantly shifting the focus of the federal budget process  from its long-standing concentration on the items of government spending  to the results of its programs. However, the persistent attempts reflect a  long-standing interest in linking resources to results.
In the 1990s, Congress and the executive branch laid out a statutory and  management framework that provides the foundation for strengthening  government performance and accountability, with the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) as its centerpiece. GPRA is  designed to inform congressional and executive decision making by  providing objective information on the relative effectiveness and efficiency  of federal programs and spending. A key purpose of the act is to create  closer and clearer links between the process of allocating scarce resources  and the expected results to be achieved with those resources. We have  learned that this type of integration is critical from prior initiatives that  failed in part because they did not prove to be relevant to budget decision  makers in the executive branch or Congress. GPRA requires both a  connection to the structures used in congressional budget presentations  and consultation between the executive and legislative branches on agency  strategic plans; this gives Congress an oversight stake in GPRA’s success.
This administration has made the integration of performance and budget  information one of five governmentwide management priorities under the  President’s Management Agenda (PMA).  Central to this initiative is the  PART. OMB developed PART as a diagnostic tool meant to provide a  consistent approach to evaluating federal programs and applied it in  formulating the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request. PART covers  four broad topics for all “programs” selected for review: (1) program  purpose and design, (2) strategic planning, (3) program management, and  (4) program results (i.e., whether a program is meeting its long-term and  annual goals) as well as additional questions that are specific to one of  seven mechanisms or approaches used to deliver the program.
GPRA expanded the supply of performance information generated by  federal agencies, although as the PART assessments demonstrate, more  must be done to develop credible performance information. However,  improving the supply of performance information is in and of itself  insufficient to sustain performance management and achieve real  improvements in management and program results. Rather, it needs to be  accompanied by a demand for that information by decision makers and  managers alike. PART may mark a new chapter in performance-based  budgeting by more successfully stimulating demand for this information—  that is, using the performance information generated through GPRA’s  planning and reporting processes to more directly feed into executive  branch budgetary decisions.
My statement today focuses on six points:  PART helped structure OMB’s use of performance information for its  internal program and budget analysis, made the use of this information  more transparent, and stimulated agency interest in budget and  performance integration. Moreover, it illustrated the potential to build  on GPRA’s foundation to more actively promote the use of performance  information in budget decisions.
Much of the potential value of PART lies in the related program  recommendations and associated improvements, but follow through  will require sustained commitment by agencies and OMB. OMB’s efforts  in developing PART have been considerable, but diagnosing problems  and applying ratings are the beginning not the end of PART’s ambitious  agenda. Identifying solutions, implementing changes, and providing  oversight takes time, and OMB needs to be mindful of this as it  considers the capacity and workload issues in the PART.
As is to be expected in the first year of any reform, PART is a work in  progress and we noted in our report where OMB might make  improvements. Any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into  account the complexity of the U.S. government will require some  exercise of judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that we found some  inconsistencies in OMB staff interpreting and applying PART.
PART provides an opportunity to more efficiently use scarce analytic  resources, to focus decision makers’ attention on the most pressing  policy issues, and to consider comparisons and trade-offs among related  programs by more strategically targeting PART assessments based on  such factors as the relative priorities, costs, and risks associated with  related clusters of programs and activities. The first year PART  assessments underscored the long-standing gaps in performance and  evaluation information throughout the federal government. By reaching  agreement on areas in which evaluations are most essential, decision  makers can help ensure that limited resources are applied wisely.
The relationship between PART and its process and the broader GPRA  strategic planning process is still evolving. Although PART can stimulate  discussion on program-specific performance measurement issues, it is  not a substitute for GPRA’s strategic, longer-term focus on thematic  goals and department- and governmentwide crosscutting comparisons.  Although PART and GPRA serve different needs, a strategy for  integrating the two could help strengthen both.
Federal programs are designed and implemented in dynamic  environments where competing program priorities and stakeholders’  needs must be balanced continually and new needs must be addressed.  While PART clearly serves the needs of OMB in budget formulation,  questions remain about whether it serves the various needs of other key  stakeholders. If the President or OMB wants the PART and its results to  be considered in the congressional debate, it will be important for OMB  to (1) involve congressional stakeholders early in providing input on the  focus of the assessments; (2) clarify any significant limitations in the  assessments as well as the underlying performance information; and (3)  initiate discussions with key congressional committees about how they  can best take advantage of and leverage PART information in  congressional authorization, appropriations, and oversight processes.   Moreover, Congress needs to consider ways it can articulate its  oversight priorities and performance agenda.
My statement is based on our recently published report on OMB’s PART.  This subcommittee along with several other requesters asked GAO to  review the application of PART in its first year, its relationship to GPRA  planning and reporting requirements, and its strengths and weaknesses as  an evaluation tool.  We conducted our work in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Strengths and Weaknesses of PART in Its First Year of Implementation
paragraphs: Through its development and use of PART, OMB has more explicitly  infused performance information into the budget formulation process;  increased the attention paid to evaluation and to performance information;  and ultimately, we hope, increased the value of this information to decision  makers and other stakeholders. By linking performance information to the  budget process, OMB has provided agencies with a powerful incentive for  improving both the quality and availability of performance information.  The level of effort and involvement by senior OMB officials and staff clearly  signals the importance of this strategy in meeting the priorities outlined in  the PMA. OMB should be credited with opening up for scrutiny—and  potential criticism—its review of key areas of federal program  performance and then making its assessments available to a potentially  wider audience through its Web site.
As OMB and others recognize, performance is not the only factor in funding  decisions. Determining priorities—including funding priorities—is a  function of competing values and interests. Accordingly, we found that  while PART scores were generally positively related to proposed funding  changes in discretionary programs, the scores did not automatically  determine funding changes. That is, for some programs rated “effective” or  “moderately effective” OMB recommended funding decreases, while for  several programs judged to be “ineffective” OMB recommended additional  funding in the President’s budget request with which to implement  changes. In fact, the more important role of PART was not its use in making  resource decisions, but in its support for recommendations to improve  program design, assessment, and management.
As shown in figure 1, we found that 82 percent of PART’s recommendations  addressed program assessment, design, and management issues; only 18  percent of the recommendations had a direct link to funding matters.
OMB’s ability to use PART to identify and address future program  improvements and measure progress—a major purpose of PART—depends  on its ability to oversee the implementation of PART recommendations. As  OMB has recognized, following through on these recommendations is  essential for improving program performance and ensuring accountability.  Currently, OMB plans to assess an additional 20 percent of all federal  programs annually. As the number of recommendations from previous  years’ evaluations grows, a system for monitoring their implementation will  become more critical. However, OMB does not have a centralized system to  oversee the implementation of such recommendations or evaluate their  effectiveness.
The goal of PART is to evaluate programs systematically, consistently, and  transparently. OMB went to great lengths to encourage consistent  application of PART in the evaluation of government programs, including  pilot testing the instrument, issuing detailed guidance, and conducting  consistency reviews. Although there is undoubtedly room for continued  improvement, any tool is inherently limited in providing a single  performance answer or judgment on complex federal programs with  multiple goals.
Performance measurement challenges in evaluating complex federal  programs make it difficult to meaningfully interpret a bottom-line rating.  OMB published both a single, bottom-line rating for PART results and  individual section scores. It is these latter scores that are potentially more  useful for identifying information gaps and program weaknesses. For  example, one program that was rated “adequate” overall got high scores for  purpose (80 percent) and planning (100 percent), but poor scores in being  able to show results (39 percent) and in program management (46 percent).  In a case like this, the individual section ratings provided a better  understanding of areas needing improvement than the overall rating alone.  In addition, bottom-line ratings may force raters to choose among several  important, but disparate goals and encourage a determination of program  effectiveness even when performance data are unavailable, the quality of  those data is uneven, or they convey a mixed message on performance.
Any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity  of the U.S. government will always require some interpretation and  judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that OMB staff were not fully  consistent in interpreting complex questions about agency goals and  results. In addition, the limited availability of credible evidence on program  results also constrained OMB’s ability to use PART to rate programs’  effectiveness.
Many PART questions contain subjective terms that are open to  interpretation. Examples include terminology such as “ambitious” in  describing sought-after performance measures. Because the  appropriateness of a performance measure depends on the program’s  purpose, and because program purposes can vary immensely, an ambitious  goal for one program might be unrealistic for a similar but more narrowly  defined program. Without further guidance, it is unclear how OMB staff can  be expected to be consistent.
We found inconsistencies in how the definition of acceptable performance  measures was applied. Our review surfaced several instances in which  OMB staff inconsistently defined appropriate measures—outcome versus  output—for programs. Agency officials also told us that OMB staff used  different standards to define measures as outcome-oriented. Outputs are  the products and services delivered by the program whereas outcomes  refer to the results of outputs. For example, in the employment and training  area, OMB accepted short-term outcomes, such as obtaining high school  diplomas or employment, as a proxy for long-term goals for the  Department of Health and Human Services’ Refugee Assistance program,  which aims to help refugees attain economic self-sufficiency as soon as  possible. However, OMB did not accept the same employment rate measure  as a proxy for long-term goals for the Department of Education’s Vocational  Rehabilitation program because it had not set long-term targets beyond a  couple of years. In other words, although neither program contained long- term outcomes, such as participants gaining economic self-sufficiency,  OMB accepted short-term outcomes in one instance but not the other.
The yes/no format employed throughout most of the PART questionnaire  resulted in oversimplified answers to some questions. Although OMB  believes it helped standardization, the yes/no format was particularly  troublesome for questions containing multiple criteria for a “yes” answer.  Agency officials have commented that the yes/no format is a crude  reflection of reality, in which progress in planning, management, or results  is more likely to resemble a continuum than an on/off switch. We found  several instances in which some OMB staff gave a “yes” answer for  successfully achieving some but not all of the multiple criteria, while others  gave a “no” answer when presented with a similar situation. For example,  OMB judged the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) Water Reuse and  Recycling program “no” on whether a program has a limited number of  ambitious, long-term performance goals, noting that although DOI set a  long-term goal of 500,000 acre-feet per year of reclaimed water, it failed to  establish a time frame for when it would reach the target. However, OMB  judged the Department of Agriculture’s and DOI’s Wildland Fire programs  “yes” on this question even though the programs’ long-term goals of  improved conditions in high-priority forest acres are not accompanied by  specific time frames.
The lack of program performance information also creates challenges in  effectively measuring program performance. According to OMB, about half  of the programs assessed for fiscal year 2004 lacked “specific, ambitious  long-term performance goals that focus on outcomes” and nearly 40  percent lacked sufficient “independent, quality evaluations.” Nearly 50  percent of programs assessed for fiscal year 2004 received ratings of  “results not demonstrated” because OMB decided that program  performance information, performance goals, or both were insufficient or  inadequate. While the validity of these assessments may be subject to  interpretation and debate, our previous work has raised concerns about  the capacity of federal agencies to produce evaluations of program  effectiveness as well as credible data.
section_title: The Relationship between GPRA and PART
paragraphs: PART was designed for and is used in the executive branch budget  preparation and review process. As a result, the goals and measures used in  PART must meet OMB’s needs. By comparison, GPRA—the current  statutory framework for strategic planning and reporting—is a broader  process involving the development of strategic and performance goals and  objectives to be reported in strategic and annual plans and reports. OMB  said that GPRA plans were organized at too high a level to be meaningful  for program-level budget analysis and management review. OMB  acknowledges that GPRA was the starting point for PART, but as I will  explain, it appears that OMB’s emphasis is shifting such that over time the  performance measures developed for PART and used in the budget process  may also come to drive agencies’ strategic planning processes.
The fiscal year 2004 PART process came to be a parallel competing  structure to the GPRA framework as a result of OMB’s desire to collect  performance data that better align with budget decision units. OMB’s most  recent Circular A-11 guidance clearly requires both that each agency  submit a performance budget for fiscal year 2005 and that this should  replace the annual GPRA performance plan. These performance budgets  are to include information from the PART assessments, where available,  including all performance goals used in the assessment of program  performance done under the PART process. Until all programs have been  assessed using PART, the performance budget will also include  performance goals for agency programs that have not yet been assessed.  OMB’s movement from GPRA to PART is further evident in the fiscal year  2005 PART guidance stating that while existing GPRA performance goals  may be a starting point during the development of PART performance  goals, the GPRA goals in agency GPRA documents are to be revised, as  needed, to reflect OMB’s instructions for developing the PART  performance goals. Lastly, this same guidance states that GPRA plans  should be revised to include any new performance measures used in PART  and that unnecessary measures should be deleted from GPRA plans.
Although there is potential for complementary approaches to GPRA and  PART, the following examples clearly illustrate the importance of carefully  considering the implications of selecting a unit of analysis, including its  impact on the availability of performance data. They also reveal some of  the unresolved tensions between the President’s budget and performance  initiative—a detailed budget perspective—and GPRA—a more strategic  planning view. Experience with the PART highlighted the fact that defining  a “unit of analysis” useful for both program-level budget analysis and  agency planning purposes can be difficult. For example, disaggregating  programs for PART purposes could ignore the interdependence of  programs recognized by GPRA by artificially isolating programs from the  larger contexts in which they operate. Agency officials described one  program assessed with the PART—Projects for Assistance in Transition  from Homelessness—that was aimed at a specific aspect of homelessness,  that is, referring persons with emergency needs to other agencies for  housing and needed services. OMB staff wanted the agency to produce  long-term outcome measures for this program to support the PART review  process. Agency officials argued that chronically homeless people require  many services, and that this federal program often supports only some of  the services needed at the initial stages of intervention. GPRA—with its  focus on assessing the relative contributions of related programs to  broader goals—is better designed to consider crosscutting strategies to  achieve common goals. Federal programs cannot be assessed in isolation.  Performance needs also to be examined from an integrated, strategic  perspective.
One way of improving the links between PART and GPRA would be to  develop a more strategic approach to selecting and prioritizing areas for  assessment under the PART process. Targeting PART assessments based  on such factors as the relative priorities, costs, and risks associated with  related clusters of programs and activities addressing common strategic  and performance goals not only could help ration scarce analytic resources  but also could focus decision makers’ attention on the most pressing policy  and program issues. Moreover, such an approach could facilitate the use of  PART assessments to review the relative contributions of similar programs  to common or crosscutting goals and outcomes established through the  GPRA process.
section_title: The Importance of Congressional and Other Stakeholder Involvement
paragraphs: We have previously reported that stakeholder involvement appears  critical for getting consensus on goals and measures. In fact, GPRA  requires agencies to consult with Congress and solicit the views of other  stakeholders as they develop their strategic plans. Stakeholder  involvement can be particularly important for federal agencies because  they operate in a complex political environment in which legislative  mandates are often broadly stated and some stakeholders may strongly  disagree about the agency’s mission and goals.
The relationship between PART and its process and the broader GPRA  strategic planning process is still evolving. As part of the executive branch  budget formulation process, PART must clearly serve the President’s  interests. Some tension about the amount of stakeholder involvement in  the internal deliberations surrounding the development of PART measures  and the broader consultations more common to the GPRA strategic  planning process is inevitable. Compared to the relatively open-ended  GPRA process, any budget formulation process is likely to seem closed.
Yet, we must ask whether the broad range of congressional officials with a  stake in how programs perform will use PART assessments unless they  believe the reviews reflect a consensus about performance goals among a  community of interests, target performance issues that are important to  them as well as the administration, and are based on an evaluation process  that they have confidence in.  Similarly, the measures used to demonstrate  progress toward a goal, no matter how worthwhile, cannot serve the  interests of a single stakeholder or purpose without potentially  discouraging use of this information by others. Accordingly, if PART is to  be accepted as other than one element in the development of the  President’s budget proposal, congressional understanding and acceptance  of the tool and analysis will be important.
Congress has a number of opportunities to provide its perspective on  performance issues and performance goals, such as when it establishes or  reauthorizes a new program, during the annual appropriations process, and  in its oversight of federal operations.  In fact, these processes already  reflect GPRA’s influence. Reviews of language in public laws and  committee reports show an increasing number of references to GPRA- related provisions. What is missing is a mechanism to systematically  coordinate a congressional perspective.
In our report, we have suggested steps for both OMB and the Congress to  take to strengthen the dialogue between executive officials and  congressional stakeholders. We have recommended that OMB reach out to  key congressional committees early in the PART selection process to gain  insight about which program areas and performance issues congressional  officials consider warrant PART review. Engaging Congress early in the  process may help target reviews with an eye toward those areas most likely  to be on the agenda of the Congress, thereby better ensuring the use of  performance assessments in resource allocation processes throughout  government. We have also suggested that Congress consider the need to  develop a more systematic vehicle for communicating its top performance  concerns and priorities; develop a more structured oversight agenda to  prompt a more coordinated congressional perspective on crosscutting  performance issues; and use this agenda to inform its authorization,  appropriations, and oversight processes.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The PART process is the latest initiative in a long-standing series of reforms  undertaken to improve the link between performance information and  budget decisions. Although each of the initiatives of the past appears to  have met with an early demise, in fact, subsequent reforms were  strengthened by building on the legacy left by their predecessors. Prior  reforms often failed because they were not relevant to resource allocation  and other decision making processes, thereby eroding the incentives for  federal agencies to improve their planning, data, and evaluations.
Unlike many of those past initiatives, GPRA has been sustained since its  passage 10 years ago, and evidence exists that it has become more relevant  than its predecessors.  PART offers the potential to build on the  infrastructure of performance plans and information ushered in by GPRA  and the law’s intent to promote the use of these plans in resource allocation  decision making. GPRA improved the supply of plans and information,  while PART can prompt greater demand for this information by decision  makers. Potentially, enhancing interest and use may bring about greater  incentives by agencies to devote scarce resources to improving their  information and evaluations of federal programs as well.
Increasing the use and usefulness of performance data is not only  important to sustain performance management reforms, but to improve the  processes of decision making and governance. Many in the U.S. believe  there is a need to establish a comprehensive portfolio of key national  performance indicators. This will raise complex issues ranging from  agreement on performance areas and indicators to getting and sharing  reliable information for public planning, decision making, and  accountability. In this regard, the entire agenda of management reform at  the federal level has been focused on shifting decision making and agency  management from process to results. Although the PART is based on  changing the orientation of budgeting, other initiatives championed by  Congress and embodied in the PMA are also devoted to improving the  accountability for performance goals in agency human capital  management, financial management, competitive sourcing, and other key  management areas.
In particular, we have reported that human capital—or people—is at the  center of any serious change management initiative. Thus, strategic human  capital management is at the heart of government transformation.  High- performing organizations strengthen the alignment of their GPRA strategic  and performance goals with their daily operations. In that regard,  performance management systems can be a vital—but currently largely  unused tool—to align an organization’s operations with individual day-to- day activities.  As we move forward to strengthen government performance  and accountability, effective performance management systems can be a  strategic tool to drive internal change and achieve desired results.
The question now is how to enhance the credibility and use of the PART  process as a tool to focus decisions on performance. In our report, we  make seven recommendations to OMB and a suggestion to Congress to  better support the kind of collaborative approach to performance  budgeting that very well may be essential in a separation of powers system  like ours. Our suggestions cover several key issues that need to be  addressed to strengthen and help sustain the PART process. We  recommend that the OMB Director take the following actions:  Centrally monitor agency implementation and progress on PART  recommendations and report such progress in OMB’s budget  submission to Congress. Governmentwide councils may be effective  vehicles for assisting OMB in these efforts.
Continue to improve the PART guidance by (1) expanding the  discussion of how the unit of analysis is to be determined to include  trade-offs made when defining a unit of analysis, implications of how the  unit of analysis is defined, or both; (2) clarifying when output versus  outcome measures are acceptable; and (3) better defining an  “independent, quality evaluation.”
Clarify OMB’s expectations to agencies regarding the allocation of  scarce evaluation resources among programs, the timing of such  evaluations, as well as the evaluation strategies it wants for the PART,  and consider using internal agency evaluations as evidence on a case-by- case basis—whether conducted by agencies, contractors, or other  parties.
Reconsider plans for 100 percent coverage of federal programs and,  instead, target for review a significant percentage of major and  meaningful government programs based on such factors as the relative  priorities, costs, and risks associated with related clusters of programs  and activities.
Maximize the opportunity to review similar programs or activities in the  same year to facilitate comparisons and trade-offs.
Attempt to generate, early in the PART process, an ongoing, meaningful  dialogue with congressional appropriations, authorization, and  oversight committees about what they consider to be the most  important performance issues and program areas that warrant review.
Seek to achieve the greatest benefit from both GPRA and PART by  articulating and implementing an integrated, complementary  relationship between the two.
In its comments on our report, OMB outlined actions it is taking to address  several of these recommendations, including refining the process for  monitoring agencies’ progress in implementing the PART  recommendations, seeking opportunities for dialogue with Congress on  agencies’ performance, and continuing to improve executive branch  implementation of GPRA plans and reports.
Our recommendations to OMB are partly directed at fortifying and  enhancing the credibility of the PART itself and the underlying data used to  make the judgments. Decision makers across government are more likely  to rely on PART data and assessments if the underlying information and the  rating process are perceived as being credible, systematic, and consistent.  Enhanced OMB guidance and improved strategies for obtaining and  evaluating program performance data are vital elements.
The PART process can be made more sustainable if the use of analytic  resources at OMB and the agencies is rationalized by reconsidering the goal  of 100 percent coverage of all federal programs. Instead, we suggest a more  strategic approach to target assessments on related clusters of programs  and activities. A more targeted approach stands a better chance of  capturing the interest of decision makers throughout the process by  focusing their attention on the most pressing policy and program issues on  how related programs and tools affect broader crosscutting outcomes and  goals. Unfortunately, the governmentwide performance plan required by  GPRA has never been engaged to drive budgeting in this way.
Improving the integration of inherently separate but interrelated strategic  planning and performance budgeting processes can help support a more  strategic focus for PART assessments. GPRA’s strategic planning goals  could be used to anchor the selection and review of programs by providing  a foundation to assess the relative contribution of related programs and  tools to broader performance goals and outcomes.
Finally, refining the PART questionnaire and review process, and improving  the quality of data are important, but the question of whose interests drive  the process is perhaps paramount in our system. Ultimately, the impact of  PART on decision making will be a function not only of the President’s  decisions, but of congressional decisions as well.
Much is at stake in the development of a collaborative performance  budgeting process. Not only might the PART reviews come to be  disregarded absent congressional involvement, but more important,  Congress will lose an opportunity to use the PART process to improve its  own decision making and oversight processes.
This is an opportune time for the executive branch and Congress to  carefully consider how agencies and committees can best take advantage  of and leverage the new information and perspectives coming from the  reform agenda under way in the executive branch. Ultimately, the specific  approach or process is not important. We face a long-term fiscal imbalance,  which will require us to reexamine our existing policies and programs. It is  all too easy to accept “the base” as given and to subject only new proposals  to scrutiny and analysis. The norm should be to reconsider the relevance or  “fit” of any federal program, policy, or activity in today’s world and for the  future.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to  answer any questions you or the other members of the Committee may  have at this time.
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Paul L. Posner,  Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, at (202) 512-9573. Individuals  making key contributions to this testimony included Denise M. Fantone  and Jacqueline Nowicki.
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