Human Rights: U.S. Government's Efforts to Address Alleged Abuse of Household Workers by Foreign Diplomats with Immunity Could Be Strengthened
Published: 2008-07-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2007, the Department of State (State) reported that some foreign diplomats may be abusing the household workers they brought to the United States on A-3 or G-5 visas. GAO was asked to (1) determine the number of A-3 or G-5 visa holders who have alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with immunity since 2000, (2) review the U.S. government's process for investigating these allegations, and (3) assess how State ensures that its policies for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas are implemented correctly and consistently. GAO analyzed documents, interviewed officials, and conducted fieldwork at four consular posts that issue large numbers of A-3 or G-5 visas.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO identified 42 household workers with A-3 or G-5 visas who alleged that they were abused by foreign diplomats with immunity from 2000 through 2008, but the total number is likely higher. The total number of alleged incidents since 2000 is likely higher for four reasons: household workers' fear of contacting law enforcement, nongovernmental organizations' protection of victim confidentiality, limited information on some cases handled by the U.S. government, and federal agencies' challenges identifying cases. For example, State has several offices that receive allegations of abuse by foreign diplomats, but no single office maintains information on all allegations. The U.S. government's process for investigating alleged abuse of household workers by foreign diplomats is complicated by three factors. First, immunity can pose constraints for law enforcement in collecting evidence. Second, the status of foreign diplomats can heighten their workers' sense of vulnerability, causing the workers to fear cooperating with investigators. Third, the length of time it takes to obtain a legal opinion from State on the permissibility of using certain investigative techniques can hamper investigations. According to State, although some techniques are clearly prohibited by international law (such as searching certain diplomats' residences), the permissibility of others under international law is less clear. In advising on the use of investigative techniques, State considers legal and policy issues, such as reciprocity--assessing how U.S. diplomats abroad might be affected by actions taken toward a foreign diplomat on U.S. soil. State may ask Justice to provide information to help determine the permissibility of certain techniques, but the process of obtaining this information can be difficult and time consuming for Justice. Although both State and Justice have discussed creating a process to avoid delays, no formal actions have, thus far, been taken to establish one. Weaknesses exist in State's process for ensuring correct and consistent implementation of policies and procedures for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas. GAO's review of employment contracts submitted at four consular posts by A-3 and G-5 visa applicants showed that they often did not include State's required components, such as a guarantee of the minimum or prevailing wage. GAO also found that officers at the four posts were unclear about or unfamiliar with certain aspects of State's guidance. Few of the officers were aware that they should inform A-3 and G-5 visa applicants of their rights under U.S. law during their interview. Some officers at the four posts also were uncertain about the reasons for refusing A-3 or G-5 visas. State is considering adding provisions to its guidance that would more clearly stipulate reasons for refusing these visas, such as if an A-3 or G-5 applicant seeks to work for a foreign diplomat who is linked to a pattern of employee disappearance, abuse allegations, or other irregularities. However, State has not reached internal agreement on these provisions and has set no timetable for doing so. State headquarters officials said they rely on individual posts to monitor implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures and do not routinely assess posts' compliance

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In June 2007, the Department of State (State) noted in its annual  Trafficking in Persons report that some foreign diplomats may have  abused individuals they had brought to the United States to work in their  households. State again highlighted this problem in a July 2007 note to all  Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions in the United States, stating that it had  recently learned of a number of allegations of trafficking in persons with  respect to household workers, including allegations of involuntary  servitude and physical abuse. A few of these cases have garnered  congressional and media attention, particularly because the accused  foreign diplomats held full diplomatic immunity and thus could not be  prosecuted in U.S. courts. For example, in 2002, a household worker  accused her employers, a high-ranking diplomat and his wife, of verbally,  physically, and sexually abusing her. She also alleged that they required  her to work 16 to 17-hour days without any payment and prohibited her  from leaving the home unaccompanied. She filed a civil lawsuit against her  employers, but because they held full diplomatic immunity, the case was  dismissed. The diplomat and his wife have since left the United States.  While this alleged incident involved a potential violation of U.S.  antitrafficking laws, abuse allegations by household workers against  foreign diplomats have ranged from potential wage and hour violations to  involuntary servitude. For the purposes of this report, we will use the term  abuse to include all such allegations.
Most of the household workers brought to the United States by foreign  diplomats arrive with A-3 visas—as employees of officials from foreign  embassies, consulates, or governments—or with G-5 visas—as employees  of foreign officials for international organizations, such as the United  Nations or the World Bank. On average, almost 3,500 individuals enter the  United States each year on A-3 and G-5 visas. Several U.S. government  agencies are involved in efforts to respond to alleged abuse of these visa  holders. State grants A-3 and G-5 visas, issues guidance on diplomatic law,  and maintains official records regarding the status and immunity level of  foreign diplomats in the United States, among other things. The  Department of Justice (Justice) investigates trafficking allegations and  prosecutes violations of criminal statutes. The Department of Homeland  Security (Homeland Security) investigates trafficking allegations and  grants T visas to some trafficking victims. These visas allow victims to  remain in the United States for up to 4 years, file for permanent residence,  and receive certain government services through the Department of Health  and Human Services. The Department of Labor (Labor) investigates  allegations of wage and hour violations.
In response to your request, we (1) sought to determine how many A-3 and  G-5 visa holders have alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with immunity  since 2000, (2) reviewed the U.S. government’s process for investigating  abuse allegations involving foreign diplomats with immunity, and   (3) described and assessed how State ensures correct and consistent  implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures.
To determine how many A-3 and G-5 visa holders have alleged abuse by  foreign diplomats with immunity, we interviewed U.S. government  officials and analyzed data provided by these officials on alleged incidents  that they have handled. We requested data on alleged incidents that  occurred from calendar years 2000 through 2008. We also met with  representatives of 10 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that provide  services to alleged victims of abuse by foreign diplomats and analyzed  data they provided on allegations. In addition, we conducted legal  research to identify relevant civil lawsuits. To review the U.S.  government’s process for investigating allegations, we analyzed State’s  policies for handling allegations of criminal activity by foreign diplomats  and interviewed U.S. government officials. To describe and assess how  State ensures correct and consistent implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa  policies and procedures, we analyzed State’s guidance and requirements  for adjudicating these visas, and interviewed State officials. We also met  with consular officers and reviewed A-3 and G-5 visa files at the U.S.  embassies in Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. We assessed  the reliability of data analyzed and found them to be sufficiently reliable  for purposes of this report. We conducted this performance audit between  October 2007 and July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (App.  I provides a detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and  methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Each year, State issues A-3 and G-5 visas to individuals whose employers  are foreign diplomats on official purposes in the United States. Most of  these individuals are hired to work for foreign diplomats in the District of  Columbia, Maryland, New York, or Virginia.  For fiscal years 2000 through  2007, 207 U.S. embassies and consular posts overseas issued 10,386 A-3  visas and 7,522 G-5 visas. The number of A-3 visas decreased during this  period by about 56 percent—from 1,780 in fiscal year 2000 to 999 in fiscal  year 2007—and the number of G-5 visas issued increased by 21 percent— from 877 in fiscal year 2000 to 1,057 in fiscal year 2007 (see fig. 1).
Figure 2 shows the 10 posts that issued the most A-3 and G-5 visas,  combined, for fiscal years 2000 through 2007. These 10 posts issued 40  percent of the total number of A-3 and G-5 visas issued during this period.  Manila issued the most A-3 and G-5 visas, accounting for almost 10 percent  of the total number of these visas issued overseas during this period.
U.S. laws provide certain protections for household workers, including  individuals brought to the United States on A-3 or G-5 visas, and State,  Justice, Homeland Security, and Labor work to respond to allegations of  abuse, exploitation, or trafficking of household workers by foreign  diplomats. (App. II lists the relevant offices within these departments and  their respective responsibilities.) The U.S. government considers  involuntary servitude of household workers, as defined under the  Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, to be a severe form of  trafficking in persons and a serious criminal offense. Specifically, the act  defines severe forms of trafficking in persons, in part, as the recruitment,  harboring, transportation, provision, or maintaining of a person for labor  or services through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of  subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.  Victims of severe forms of trafficking are offered certain accommodations  under the act. Household workers also are subject to U.S. laws and  covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, which is the law governing  minimum wages and overtime pay. Homeland Security can provide special  accommodations to individuals who show that their employers have  abused, exploited, or trafficked them, allowing the workers to legally  remain in the United States. These accommodations are continued  presence—which permits an alien to be present legally in the United  States and to seek work during the investigation—and T nonimmigrant  status—which permits a visa holder to remain in the United States for up  to 4 years, file for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence, and  apply for benefits from the U.S. government such as food stamps and  medical assistance. If they leave their employment situation without either  of these accommodations, A-3 and G-5 visa holders lose their legal  immigration status and could be deported.
Under international and domestic law, the U.S. government, including its  law enforcement authorities, extends privileges and immunities to certain  foreign diplomats. Employers of A-3 and G-5 visa holders may be entitled  to some degree of immunity (full or partial) or may have no immunity at  all. An employer with full diplomatic immunity is generally immune from  civil or criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Certain employers with partial  or “official acts” immunity, such as most individuals employed by  international organizations, are immune from civil or criminal jurisdiction  of U.S. courts for conduct performed under their official duties or  functions. State and the United Nations publish lists of current foreign  diplomats who hold diplomatic rank on their Web sites. Appendix III  identifies the respective privileges and immunities to which various  categories of foreign diplomats are entitled.
section_title: 42 A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders Have Alleged Abuse Since 2000; Total Number of Alleged Incidents Is Likely Higher
paragraphs: We identified 42 individual A-3 and G-5 visa holders who have alleged  abuse by foreign diplomats with some level of immunity in the United  States from 2000 through June 2008. However, the total number of alleged  incidents is likely to be higher for four reasons: household workers’ fear of  contacting law enforcement authorities, NGOs’ protection of victim  confidentiality, limited information on some allegations handled by the  U.S. government, and federal departments’ difficulties in tracking  household worker abuse allegations and investigations involving foreign  diplomats.
subsections: section_title: GAO Identified 42 A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders Who Have Alleged Abuse Since 2000
paragraphs: We identified 42 distinct A-3 or G-5 visa holders who, since 2000, have  alleged that foreign diplomats with some level of immunity abused  them. We confirmed that 17 of the incidents alleged by these A-3 or G-5  visa holders were handled by federal agencies. These 17 incidents can  be categorized as follows:    10 alleged incidents of human trafficking, which resulted in eight human    one investigation of alleged visa fraud;    one investigation of an alleged wage and hour violation; and  five alleged incidents identified by State, some of which may have resulted  in investigations, including   one human trafficking allegation;  two allegations of physical or verbal abuse; and two alleged wage and hour violations.
Most of the human trafficking investigations remain open. However, in one  of the human trafficking investigations, Justice determined that, absent  immunity, it would indict the foreign diplomat’s wife. State requested that  the diplomat’s home government waive immunity, which would allow  Justice to indict her. However, the diplomat’s home government declined  to waive immunity; thus, Justice could not indict. The diplomat and his  wife subsequently left the United States, and Justice has since closed this  case.
We identified the remaining 25 distinct alleged incidents through legal  sources, such as Westlaw, and interviews with NGOs who provided  services to the alleged victims, such as assistance in applying for T visas  and filing lawsuits against their employers. According to NGOs, 4 of these  25 alleged victims applied for and received T visas. In addition, we  determined that civil suits were filed in 9 of these 25 alleged incidents. In  most of these lawsuits, household workers sought, in part, to recoup  unpaid wages. According to NGOs, the courts dismissed three of the nine  lawsuits on the basis that the foreign diplomats had immunity. Of the  remaining six lawsuits, NGOs indicated that five were settled out of court,  and one resulted in a default judgment because the defendants failed to  respond. Although we could not confirm that any of these 25 alleged  incidents were investigated or handled by the U.S. government, NGOs told  us that they reported 12 of them to federal agencies. They did not report  the other 13 alleged incidents.
section_title: Number of Alleged Incidents Likely Higher Than the 42 We Identified
paragraphs: The total number of alleged incidents of household employee abuse by  foreign diplomats with some level of immunity is likely to exceed the total  we have identified for four reasons. First, as we have previously reported,  trafficking victims are a hidden population because trafficking is a  clandestine activity. Trafficking victims often are in a precarious position  and may be unwilling or unable to report to, or seek help from, relevant  authorities. Moreover, the Department of Health and Human Services  reported that victims live daily with inhumane treatment, physical and  mental abuse, and threats to themselves or their families back home.  Victims of human trafficking may fear or distrust the government and  police because they are afraid of being deported or because they come  from countries where law enforcement is corrupt and feared. In such  circumstances, reporting to the police or seeking help elsewhere requires  courage and knowledge of local conditions, which the victims might not  have. In addition, some victims may not be permitted to leave their  employers’ residences, which makes it much more difficult to report their  abuse to authorities.
Second, NGOs have provided services to alleged victims who did not want  to be identified or who did not want to identify their employers. NGOs we  contacted told us that, since 2000, they have received allegations from 66  A-3 or G-5 visa holders stating that they were abused by their employers.  However, in 31 of these alleged incidents, the worker and the diplomat  involved were not identified either because the worker was too afraid to  reveal his or her identity or because the organization agreed to protect the  client’s confidentiality.
Third, because of federal agencies’ need to protect sensitive information,  we received limited data on some alleged incidents handled by the U.S.  government, and thus did not include those incidents in our total count. In  most instances, federal agencies did not reveal the names or countries of  origin of the worker and foreign diplomat involved in alleged incidents  they had investigated or otherwise handled. It is law enforcement policy  not to disclose details of ongoing criminal investigations. Without this  information, however, we could not fully reflect federal agencies’ data in  our overall count of alleged incidents without potentially double counting  ones that had already been reported to us by NGOs. For example, although  Justice told us of 19 human trafficking investigations involving foreign  diplomats with immunity, we could only confirm that 8 of them were  included in our count of 42 distinct alleged incidents. Justice officials also  told us that there are likely multiple victims in some of the 19 trafficking  investigations they reported to us. Furthermore, while Homeland Security  identified nine A-3 and G-5 visa holders who received T visas from  Homeland Security’s Citizenship and Immigration Services, we did not  learn the names of their employers, and therefore could not confirm if they  held immunity.
Fourth, federal officials said they could not determine definitively the total  number of alleged incidents they had handled and could only estimate that  number by reviewing specific case files and consulting with  knowledgeable staff. Officials had difficulty identifying all alleged  incidents or investigations in their records or databases for several  reasons as explained below:    Justice, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Diplomatic Security  officials could not identify all investigations because their databases are  not designed or meant to facilitate searches based on characteristics of the  alleged perpetrators, such as whether they are foreign diplomats.
Justice officials told us that the ongoing investigations they identified,  primarily by canvassing knowledgeable staff, only went back as far as May  2005.
In addition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement could not identify  investigations before 2003, because it had difficulties capturing trafficking- in-persons data prior to its creation as part of Homeland Security in that  year.
State has several offices that receive allegations of abuse by foreign  diplomats, but no single office maintains information on all allegations.  According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, the Office of Protocol  establishes and maintains complete records of each reported case that  comes to its attention in which a foreign diplomat with immunity from  criminal jurisdiction has been accused of a crime in the United States.  State defines “accused of a crime” to mean cases in which Justice has  determined that, absent immunity, it would seek to indict. Therefore,  although the Office of Protocol receives reports of allegations from other  federal agencies, other State bureaus and offices, and some NGOs, it does  not systematically maintain records on other ongoing criminal  investigations, civil lawsuits that have been filed, or any other allegations.  Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Manual indicates that State’s Bureau of  International Organizations, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations  (USUN), each regional bureau, and Diplomatic Security will provide the  Office of Protocol and the Office of the Legal Adviser with reports on all  cases that come to their attention. However, there is no mechanism to  ensure that these reports are referred to and recorded by the Office of  Protocol and the Office of the Legal Adviser. We found that the Office of  Protocol was unaware of cases that USUN had handled, and the Office of  Protocol and the Office of the Legal Adviser were unaware of all cases that  Diplomatic Security had handled.
While Labor’s system tracks the 30,000 to 40,000 investigations of alleged  wage and hour violations it conducts each year, it does not specifically  identify those involving foreign diplomats. In addition, although Justice  and Homeland Security officials told us they have referred allegations of  wage and hour violations to Labor, they could not identify the specific  allegations. Labor officials told us that they were aware only of one  investigation of an alleged wage and hour violation, but that policy is for  field offices to inform headquarters of any allegations of wage and hour  violations received involving foreign diplomats.
section_title: Three Factors Complicate Investigations of Abuse by Foreign Diplomats
paragraphs: The U.S. government’s process of investigating foreign diplomats for  alleged abuse is complicated by three factors—(1) constraints posed by  immunity, (2) household workers’ heightened vulnerabilities due to their  employers’ status, and (3) the length of time it takes for Justice to obtain  State’s opinion on the use of specific investigative techniques in trafficking  investigations.
subsections: section_title: Immunity Poses Constraints for Investigations
paragraphs: When investigating foreign diplomats with immunity, law enforcement  agents face constraints that become particularly pronounced when the  alleged crime has taken place in the diplomat’s residence. Investigators’  options are most limited when a diplomat has full immunity and is  considered to have personal inviolability or when the diplomat’s residence  is considered inviolable. Diplomats who are personally inviolable cannot  be detained, and property that is considered inviolable (including vehicles  and residences) cannot be entered or searched without the diplomats’  consent. Although the residences of foreign diplomats with partial  immunity may be searched, these diplomats cannot be obliged to give  evidence concerning matters related to their official duties.
Officials at Justice, Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) told us that these limitations pose particular problems  when the allegation involves abuse of a household employee because the  worker’s mistreatment often occurs in the employer’s residence and is not  witnessed by individuals outside the employer’s family. For example, a  Justice official told us that these allegations can be among the most  difficult to investigate and prosecute because it is hard for investigators to  gather enough corroborating evidence. Investigators are prohibited from  observing working and living conditions in the home absent the diplomat’s  consent, and possible witnesses often include the diplomat’s family, who  also may have immunity. Instead, investigators often have to rely primarily  on interviewing the victim and talking to neighbors who may have  observed interactions between the diplomat and the household employee.  In some instances, the evidence collected through these methods is  considered insufficient to pursue prosecution. These constraints resulted  in at least one instance in which law enforcement officials closed an  investigation for lack of sufficient evidence after they determined that  constraints posed by immunity prevented investigators from talking to  witnesses inside a foreign diplomat’s home.
section_title: Diplomats’ Status Heightens Workers’ Vulnerabilities
paragraphs: The status of foreign diplomats under investigation can heighten their  household workers’ sense of vulnerability. For example, household  workers may be intimidated by their employers’ wealth, political  connections, or prominent positions in society. One Justice official told us  that abusive situations involving foreign diplomats’ household workers  have a striking power imbalance because workers often are poor,  uneducated, and fear retaliation, not only against themselves but also  against family members in their home country. This fear can inhibit  household workers from cooperating with investigations, further limiting  the investigators’ options for collecting evidence. NGOs told us that  foreign diplomats have used immunity as a weapon to frighten their  household workers and discourage them from escaping or taking actions  to improve their situation. Workers have alleged that their employers  threatened their family members back home, told them they would be  deported if they did not do as they were instructed, and stated they could  treat them as they chose because immunity allows them to do so with  impunity. As reported above, we also learned from some NGOs of a  number of allegations of household worker abuse by foreign diplomats  that were not reported to the U.S. government because the workers were  too afraid of potential consequences. In these instances, an investigation  could not even be initiated.
section_title: Lengthy Process for Determining the Permissibility of Using Investigative Techniques Can Hamper Trafficking Investigations
paragraphs: Justice requests State’s advice on how diplomatic immunity impacts the  legal permissibility of using certain investigative techniques, but the time- consuming process of obtaining State’s opinion can hamper investigations.  When Justice receives an allegation that a foreign diplomat has abused a  household worker, it reviews the facts and determines if they merit  opening a trafficking investigation. If Justice decides to open an  investigation (or learns that Immigration and Customs Enforcement or the  FBI has opened a new investigation), it contacts State to (1) confirm the  diplomat’s identity and level of immunity; (2) determine how State wants  to be kept informed of the investigation; and (3) obtain State’s opinion, if  necessary, on the use of certain investigative techniques. State officials  said that there is no formal requirement for Justice to consult with them  on whether certain investigative techniques are permissible, but that it is  appropriate and they welcome Justice to do so. According to Justice,  because U.S. courts take into account State’s interpretation of  international treaties and conventions, Justice requests State’s legal  interpretation on these matters. Although certain techniques, such as  searching the residence of a diplomat who has full immunity and  inviolability without the diplomat’s consent, are clearly prohibited, other  techniques may touch the diplomat’s “sphere of privacy.” According to  State officials, the permissibility of these techniques under international  law is less clear.
While State can readily confirm a diplomat’s identity, State’s process of  advising on which investigative techniques are legally permissible has, in  some instances involving unprecedented circumstances, taken several  months. In one instance, a victim agreed to a specific investigative  technique that could have allowed Justice to collect important evidence.  The victim’s lawyers postponed filing a civil suit on her behalf to avoid  alerting the diplomat involved that he was under investigation. State spent  6 months deliberating the issue, but did not advise Justice on whether use  of this technique was legally permissible. Justice did not use the technique,  the victim’s lawyers eventually filed suit, and the criminal investigation  remains open. In other instances, State has asked Justice to provide  specific information that it believes could help it formulate an opinion on  whether use of the technique is legally permissible. According to a Justice  official, obtaining some of this information can be difficult and time- consuming. Both Justice and State officials agreed that when the issue at  hand is relatively straightforward, they reach agreement quickly.
According to State, its internal process of reaching an opinion on the legal  advisability of investigative techniques can be time-consuming because  State takes both legal and policy considerations into account when  considering the advisability of using investigative techniques that fall into  the “gray area.” For example, the involvement of foreign diplomats can  raise sensitivities for the U.S. government. State may need to consider  reciprocity, such as how use of a specific technique might affect treatment  of U.S. diplomats abroad. Similarly, if the foreign diplomat’s country is a  close ally of the United States, State also will assess how relations with  that country might be affected by use of the investigative technique. The  process of addressing these questions through State’s supervisory chain of  command, which can go above the Assistant Secretary level, if necessary,  is lengthy, according to State officials. Once State makes a final  determination, a State official conveys to a Justice official the  department’s opinion on use of the investigative technique in the specific  case. This opinion covers both State’s legal determination and any policy  concerns the department may have. For example, a State official might say  that the department could probably defend the use of a technique legally,  but it would raise serious reciprocity concerns.
According to Justice, State’s policy considerations do not affect its  trafficking investigations, but the length of State’s deliberative process in  determining what is legally permissible can hamper them. The  investigative techniques in question are, according to Justice officials,  among the most useful for gathering corroborating evidence, but they are  unlikely to succeed unless they are implemented quickly. As one Justice  official explained, “time is the enemy of successful investigations,”  meaning that the longer it takes to get approval from State, the greater the  likelihood that the investigation will be compromised. For example, the  subjects might learn that they are under investigation or they might leave  the United States for their next assignment, further limiting the  opportunity to collect evidence. Homeland Security officials also told us  that any delays are detrimental to the preservation and collection of  physical and testimonial evidence.
To expedite the investigative process, Justice officials said that it would be  helpful for State to provide them with a list of investigative techniques  that, in State’s view, are not legally permissible when the subject of the  investigation has full or partial immunity. However, State prefers to  continue handling these investigations on a case-by-case basis. State  officials explained that, while they could make a list of techniques that are  clearly acceptable (such as asking the diplomat to agree to an interview)  or prohibited (such as searching the residence of a diplomat with full  immunity and inviolability), they would rather not indicate the legal  permissibility of other, less clear-cut techniques because they want to be  able to consider both the legal and policy implications of each case.  However, these officials added that they are aware of the need to provide a  more timely response to Justice. Officials from both agencies told us they  are considering developing an interagency process that would outline time  frames for discussing the use of investigative techniques, but they have,  thus far, not taken any formal actions toward creating one.
section_title: Weaknesses Exist in Implementation and Oversight of A-3 and G-5 Visa Policies and Procedures
paragraphs: At the four consular posts we visited, we found weaknesses in State’s  process for ensuring that its policies for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas are  implemented correctly and consistently, and some consular officers were  unfamiliar with or unclear about aspects of guidance relating to these  visas. Although State headquarters issues A-3 and G-5 policies and  procedures, it relies on individual posts to ensure they are implemented  correctly and consistently and has not instituted a process to spot-check  compliance.
subsections: section_title: GAO Found Weaknesses in the Implementation of A-3 and G-5 Visa Policies
paragraphs: Through our fieldwork, we identified instances in which A-3 and G-5  policies were not implemented correctly and consistently. State requires  that A-3 and G-5 visa applicants submit employment contracts signed by  both the employer and employee that include    a guarantee that the employee will be compensated at the state or federal  minimum wage or prevailing wage, whichever is greater;    a statement by the employee that he or she will not accept any other  employment while working for the employer;   a statement by the employer that he or she will not withhold the passport  of the employee; and   a statement indicating that both parties understand that the employee  cannot be required to remain on the premises after working hours without  compensation.
However, the contracts we reviewed did not include at least one of  State’s requirements 71 percent of the time at one post, 35 percent at the  second, 23 percent at the third, and 6 percent at the fourth.
In some cases, the contracts were clearly deficient in one or more areas.  For example, one contract we reviewed showed that the employee would  receive $5 per hour (below the minimum wage) and that the employee  would reimburse her employer for items received. This particular contract  also did not include a statement that the employee could not be required  to remain on the premises after working hours without compensation.
In other cases, the contracts included statements that appeared to comply  with State’s requirements, but also contained information that  contradicted these statements. For example, some contracts stated that  “the normal working hours of the second party  shall be at the  prevailing wage for a 40 hours  week.” However, these contracts also  showed that the employees would be paid well below the prevailing wage  for their occupation and intended destination.
Our review of employment contracts revealed other shortcomings and  raised questions about whether the employee would be paid fairly.
A-3 and G-5 visa applicants must submit contracts in English and a  language understood by the applicants to demonstrate they understand  their duties and rights regarding salary and working conditions. However,  at one post where consular officers told us that A-3 and G-5 visa applicants  rarely speak or read English, none of the contracts we reviewed was in a  language other than English.
We identified some contracts where the employee would be paid overtime  “in accordance with  embassy regulations.”
In another contract, the employee’s overtime hourly rate was lower than  her wage for normal working hours.
section_title: Some Consular Officers Unfamiliar with or Unclear about Aspects of A-3 and G-5 Policies and Procedures
paragraphs: At the four posts we visited, we also found that some consular officers  were unfamiliar with or unclear about certain aspects of State’s guidance  on A-3 and G-5 visas.
subsections: section_title: Requiring a Diplomatic Note
paragraphs: According to State’s guidance, A-3 and G-5 visa applications must be  accompanied by a diplomatic note from the appropriate foreign mission or  international organization that identifies the applicant’s employer and  confirms the employer’s official A or G status. Some consular officers  overseas told us that they believed a note was not required if they could  identify the employer and confirm his or her status through The Office of  Foreign Missions Information System (TOMIS), a database of foreign  diplomats posted to the United States, which, according to the Foreign  Affairs Manual, can be a useful tool for consular officers to confirm a  diplomat’s status. However, senior consular officials at State headquarters  told us that TOMIS may contain inaccurate or outdated information and  confirmed that a diplomatic note was in fact required.
section_title: Informing A-3 and G-5 Visa Applicants of Their Rights
paragraphs: State’s guidance also includes provisions encouraging consular officers to  help educate A-3 and G-5 visa applicants about their rights under U.S.  laws, but some officers we spoke with were unaware of these provisions.  Consular officers are required to interview all A-3 and G-5 visa applicants.  State recommends that officers use the interview to advise applicants in a  language they understand that the U.S. government considers involuntary  servitude of household workers to be a severe form of trafficking in  persons and a serious criminal offense and that victims of involuntary  servitude are offered protection under the Trafficking Victims Protection  Act. Officers are encouraged to make A-3 and G-5 applicants aware that  the telephone number for police and emergency services is 911, and that  there is a telephone hotline for reporting abuse of household workers and  other trafficking-related crimes. State also reminds consular posts that an  antitrafficking brochure titled “Be Smart, Be Safe” is available as a  handout to household worker applicants. However, while several officers  said they try to explain to A-3 and G-5 visa applicants that they have rights  under U.S. laws, the officers also were unaware of the telephone hotline,  State’s advice to refer workers to 911, or the brochure. None of the posts  we visited made copies of the “Be Smart, Be Safe” brochure available to  visa applicants, although two of them had created one-page informational  handouts for A-3 and G-5 visa applicants. At one of these posts, officers  generally did not speak with applicants about their rights but instead  relied on giving them the one-page handout. NGOs and alleged victims we  spoke with told us that measures to educate A-3 and G-5 visa applicants  are important. For example, one alleged victim said that U.S. embassies  abroad should tell domestic workers coming to the United States that they  have rights because, in her experience, one of the ways that employers  abuse their workers is to tell them that they are still under the laws of their  home country. She added that, specifically, embassies should give A-3 and  G-5 visa applicants information about whom to contact if they experience  physical or psychological abuse. Another worker, whose employer was  investigated and sent home for allegedly trafficking household workers,  told her attorneys that she knew to seek help because a consular officer  had told her about her rights under U.S. law when she applied for her A-3  visa.
section_title: Scanning Employment Contracts
paragraphs: Another area of the guidance that posts we visited were largely unaware of  was the March 2007 direction from State headquarters to electronically  scan copies of A-3 and G-5 employment contracts into the Consular  Consolidated Database, which contains information on visa applicants.  Two of the posts we visited had not scanned any of their contracts into the  database, one had scanned about half of the contracts we reviewed, and  the remaining one had only scanned a few. A State official in Washington  explained that scanning documents is useful because, in cases of alleged  abuse, accessing a copy of the contract provides evidence that the  diplomat had agreed to provide better working conditions. NGOs also  emphasized the importance of being able to access employment contracts.  For example, an NGO told us that in one case, a foreign diplomat gave his  worker a contract to present when applying for a G-5 visa that said that  she would receive $1,200 per month, but gave her a different contract  when she arrived in the United States that said she would receive only  $425 per month. The organization is now trying to locate a copy of the  original contract.
section_title: Criteria for Refusing A-3 and G-5 Visas
paragraphs: Finally, consular officers at the posts we visited were uncertain about the  reasons for which they could refuse A-3 and G-5 visas. State’s guidance  directs consular officers to determine that A-3 and G-5 visa applicants are  entering into true employer-employee relationships, in accordance with  required terms of their personal employment contracts. However, it does  not explicitly state if concerns about abuse or mistreatment are sufficient  grounds on which to refuse an A-3 or G-5 visa. At one post we visited,  consular officers told us they were comfortable refusing these visas,  particularly if there were indications that the worker might not be treated  well. They might refuse the visa if the applicant was under age 18 or if the  employer resisted requests by the consular officers to interview the  applicant alone. In an attempt to ensure better treatment of household  workers, that post instituted a policy of preferring individuals to have  worked for the sponsoring diplomat for 1 year before applying for an A-3  visa. While the consular officers at this post said they believed they had  considerable latitude to refuse A-3 or G-5 visas, other officers we spoke  with said that they did not. For example, the Deputy Chief of Mission at  one post told us that he “wished he could refuse more A-3 and G-5 visas,”  but that he was unsure of consular officers’ ability to deny A-3 and G-5 visa  applicants. Several consular officers echoed these comments, noting that,  without hard evidence that an applicant has been or could be mistreated, it  is difficult to deny an A-3 or G-5 visa. For example, a consular officer at  one post we visited told us that, in one case, she was concerned that the  applicant had never met her employer, but her supervisors told her that as  long as the applicant had a valid employment contract, she had to issue  the visa.
State is considering steps to address confusion about refusing A-3 and G-5  visas, but has not taken actions to implement them. Consular officials in  Washington told us that, while it is appropriate and even expected for  consular officers to refuse A-3 and G-5 visas if they believe that visa  applicants may be abused by their prospective employers, the officers  have “little to go on beyond the contract” and it is impossible to refuse a  visa based on something that has not happened or will not happen for  another 6 months. State is considering adding specific provisions to the  Foreign Affairs Manual outlining certain circumstances in which these  visas should be denied. These provisions might place a heavier burden on  lower-ranking foreign diplomats to document sufficient means to employ  household staff under the contractual requirements stipulated for A-3 and  G-5 visas. The provisions also might result in refusal of an A-3 or G-5 visa if  a particular diplomat is linked to a pattern of employee disappearance,  abuse allegations, or other irregularities. A State official told us the  department is drafting possible language for these additional provisions to  the Foreign Affairs Manual, but officials have not reached internal  agreement on final language and have no timetable for doing so. In  addition, officials in State headquarters do not currently alert consular  officers if they have information that could help in the adjudication of an  A-3 or G-5 visa based on a pattern of employee disappearance, abuse  allegations, or other irregularities because that information is not included  in State’s databases. For example, headquarters does not alert consular  officers to seek guidance if a foreign diplomat is under investigation for  trafficking or if a foreign diplomat has employed anyone who subsequently  received a T visa.
section_title: State Headquarters Does Not Routinely Assess Compliance with A-3 and G-5 Visa Policies and Procedures
paragraphs: Consular officials in Washington told us they rely on individual posts to  ensure correct and consistent implementation of A-3 and G-5 policies and  procedures and do not independently monitor compliance on a routine  basis. Supervisory officials at consular posts abroad review a selection of  visas that were issued or refused at that post each day. The reviews these  officials conduct may cover some of the A-3 and G-5 visas that were  adjudicated, but not all of them. Furthermore, officials conduct these  reviews through the Consular Consolidated Database, so they are unlikely  to review supporting documents for A-3 and G-5 visas, such as  employment contracts and diplomatic notes, which we found were usually  not scanned into the database. Consular officials at State headquarters  told us they provide advice to individual posts on an as-needed basis, but  generally rely on supervisory reviews to ensure compliance with State  policies and procedures because it is not their role or responsibility to  oversee the consular posts in this regard. As such, they do not routinely  and independently monitor compliance with A-3 and G-5 policies and  procedures.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The people who come to the United States on A-3 and G-5 visas are among  the most vulnerable who enter our borders legally. They are often poor,  uneducated, and unfamiliar with their rights under U.S. law. If they find  themselves in an abusive situation, their ability to hold their employers  accountable can be limited, particularly if their employers hold full  diplomatic immunity and inviolability. Although State has expressed  concerns that some foreign diplomats may be abusing their household  workers, it has not systematically collected and maintained information on  cases of alleged abuse that have come to its attention. In addition, State  has not always ensured that the visa policies and procedures in place to  provide protections for these most vulnerable individuals have been  correctly and consistently implemented, such as the policy requiring  certain elements within these workers’ employment contracts.  Furthermore, if officials at State headquarters have information linking a  particular diplomat to a pattern of employee disappearance, abuse  allegations, or other irregularities, they do not routinely alert consular  officers to seek guidance. Finally, the U.S. government’s process for  investigating trafficking of household workers by foreign diplomats has, in  some instances, been hampered by delays in coordination between State  and Justice on the use of investigative techniques. In addressing these  problems, the U.S. government can strengthen its commitment to  combating human trafficking within the United States.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the U.S. government’s process for preventing and responding  to allegations of household employee abuse by foreign diplomats, we are  making four recommendations.  1.  To ensure that the Office of Protocol and the Office of the Legal  Adviser are aware of all cases involving alleged abuse of household  workers by foreign diplomats that have come to the attention of the  department, we recommend that the Secretary of State (1) emphasize  to the relevant bureaus and offices the importance of the Foreign  Affairs Manual requirement to report all cases that come to their  attention and (2) direct the Office of Protocol and the Office of the  Legal Adviser to create a system for collecting and maintaining records  on these cases.  2.  To assist in timely handling of future investigations, we recommend  that the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of  Homeland Security establish an interagency process outlining agreed- upon policies and time frames for determining which investigative  techniques can be used in trafficking investigations involving foreign  diplomats.  3.  We recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Bureau of  Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Office of Protocol and the  Office of the Legal Adviser, to establish a system alerting consular  officers to seek guidance from State headquarters before issuing A-3 or  G-5 visas to applicants whose prospective employers may have abused  their household workers in the past. For example, if State  headquarters is aware that a foreign diplomat is under investigation for  alleged human trafficking, it could place an alert in the system advising  consular officers to request guidance should an individual apply for an  A-3 or G-5 visa to work for that diplomat.  4.  To better ensure correct and consistent implementation of A-3 and G-5  visa policies and procedures, particularly those that outline  requirements for employment contracts, we recommend that the  Secretary of State enhance oversight by establishing a system to spot- check compliance with these policies and procedures. This spot-check  system would allow headquarters to assess compliance without  dedicating the resources needed to review all A-3 and G-5 visas issued  in a given year and could be targeted at posts that issue high numbers  of A-3 or G-5 visas or that have identified difficulties interpreting  guidance on these visas classes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, Justice,  Homeland Security, Labor, and Health and Human Services for their  comments. State and Justice provided written comments on the draft,  which we have reprinted in appendixes IV and V, respectively.
State agreed with all four of our recommendations. Regarding the first  recommendation, State indicated that it will emphasize to the relevant  bureaus and offices the importance of reporting promptly and fully all  cases of alleged abuse of household workers by foreign diplomats. State  also noted that the Office of Protocol is now creating a system for  collecting and maintaining centralized records on these cases that would  allow for ready access to records of cases that involve individuals with  immunity. Regarding our second recommendation, State said that, while  most investigations go forward without consultations on investigative  techniques, it will be useful to establish a process to address novel and  difficult questions regarding investigative techniques.  In response to our  third recommendation, State said that it will place known abusers of  household workers in the Consular Lookout and Support System, a  database designed to screen visa applicants and maintain watch lists. State  will also upgrade consular officers’ access to TOMIS to provide improved  information regarding A-3 and G-5 cases. State responded to our last  recommendation by acknowledging the need for better compliance with  policies and procedures to ensure that A-3 and G-5 employment contracts  contain all required elements and are electronically scanned for future  reference in case of alleged abuse. State reiterated that it is primarily the  responsibility of senior consular managers at posts to ensure compliance  with visa adjudication procedures and practices in their consular sections,  but added that it will consider and review whether spot-checking  compliance from headquarters is appropriate and consistent with  judicious use of limited resources. As indicated in our fourth  recommendation, we believe that spot-checking is important for  enhancing oversight and could be targeted in such a way as to minimize  use of resources.
Justice generally agreed with our findings, particularly our finding that  obstacles to investigating allegations of household worker abuse are  compounded when employers have diplomatic immunity. Justice also  concurred with our second recommendation, highlighting the importance  of agreeing upon time frames for determining which investigative  techniques can be used, so that criminal investigations are not  compromised.
State, Justice, and Homeland Security provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate. For example, Homeland Security  asked to be included in the second recommendation, which was initially  directed to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. Specifically,  Homeland Security officials stated that Immigration and Customs  Enforcement should participate in the recommended interagency process  because the introduction of persons into the United States for the purpose  of exploitation is a primary law enforcement responsibility and area of  expertise of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. We agreed to include  the Secretary of Homeland Security in the second recommendation.
The Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services did not provide  comments on the draft report.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of  Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State, the  Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of  Labor, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) seek to determine how many A-3 and G-5 visa  holders have alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with immunity since 2000,  (2) review the U.S. government’s process for investigating abuse  allegations involving foreign diplomats with immunity, and (3) describe  and assess how State ensures correct and consistent implementation of       A-3 and G-5 visa polices and procedures. In this report, we define abuse to  include illegal activities ranging from wage and hour violations to human  trafficking.
To determine how many A-3 and G-5 visa holders have alleged abuse by  foreign diplomats from 2000 (when the U.S. government enacted the  Trafficking Victims Protection Act) through June 2008, we collected data,  interviewed officials from four U.S. government agencies and 10  nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and searched legal databases,  such as Westlaw, to identify civil lawsuits.
At the Department of State (State), we met with officials from the Office of  the Legal Adviser, Office of the Chief of Protocol, Diplomatic Security  Service, Office of Foreign Missions, Bureau of International Organizations  Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN), Office to  Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and Bureau of African Affairs.
At the Department of Justice (Justice), we met with officials from the  Human Smuggling and Trafficking Prosecution Unit within the Civil Rights  Division/Criminal Section (CRT/CS), Executive Office for United States  Attorneys, headquarters and field offices of the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), and one local Assistant United States Attorney’s  (AUSA) Office.
At the Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security), we met  with officials from Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Human  Smuggling and Trafficking Unit and Citizenship and Immigration Services  (CIS).
At the Department of Labor (Labor) we met with officials from the  Employment Standard Administration’s Wage and Hour Division  headquarters office and its New York City district office.
We identified and met with 10 NGOs that have provided legal services to  A-3 and G-5 visa holders through analysis of civil lawsuits filed on behalf  of A-3 and G-5 visa holders, referrals from NGOs, and a review of past and  recent media reports. These 10 NGOs have a broad range of experience  and expertise on cases involving victims of household worker abuse and  are all located in the Washington, D.C., and New York regions.
State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Labor provided data on the number  of incidents they have handled by canvassing current staff and reviewing  specific case files. To avoid double-counting the number of these alleged  incidents, we asked the departments to verify with each other the number  of investigations in which they had participated. Homeland Security also  provided us with the number of individuals who had received T visas and  identified themselves as A-3 or G-5 visa holders on their T visa  applications. We counted NGO-alleged incidents if we could determine the  name of the diplomat involved and confirm that he or she held immunity  or if we received enough information from a law enforcement source to  ensure that a diplomat with immunity was involved and that the alleged  incident was not duplicative with any other incident. Therefore, we believe  that the data we obtained from federal agencies and the NGOs are  sufficiently reliable for reporting the minimum number of incidents of  alleged abuse of A-3 and G-5 visa holders by their employers since 2000.
To review the U.S. government’s process for investigating abuse  allegations involving foreign diplomats with immunity, we reviewed State  documents including the Foreign Affairs Manual, cables sent to consular  officers on A-3 and G-5 visas, “Diplomatic and Consular Immunity  Guidance for Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities,” diplomatic notes  to Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions in the United States regarding conduct of  diplomatic agents in the United States, USUN’s diplomatic notes to  Permanent Missions and Permanent Observer Offices, and State’s 2007  document to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled “State’s  Initiatives to Promote Fair Treatment of Domestic Workers by Diplomatic  Personnel.” We also interviewed officials from State’s Office of the Chief  of Protocol, Office of the Legal Adviser, Diplomatic Security Service,  USUN, and Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. Because  federal law enforcement agencies have no written policies or procedures  specifically regarding abuse of household workers by foreign diplomats,  we relied on testimonial evidence to determine their processes for  handling alleged abuse of household workers by foreign diplomats. We  interviewed law enforcement officials from Justice including the FBI, the  Human Smuggling and Trafficking Prosecution Unit within CRT/CS, and  one AUSA Office. We also met with officials at the Human Smuggling and  Trafficking Unit within ICE. We interviewed one of the two U.S. Attorneys  assigned to prosecute two relevant cases. The second prosecutor did not  comment about the case, given the early stage of the review. At Labor we  reviewed a document describing the agency’s policy regarding household  workers employed by foreign nationals titled “Domestic Service Workers  Employed by Foreign Nationals,” and interviewed officials at the Wage and  Hour Division headquarters office and the Office of Enforcement Policy  and the New York City District Office. We also analyzed key sections of  international conventions, acts, and agreements on immunity to describe  in general terms the different levels of immunity and the protections  accorded under each one, specifically with regard to investigations of  alleged abuse or trafficking of household workers by foreign diplomats.  Finally, we interviewed NGOs and three alleged victims of abuse by  foreign diplomats.
To describe and assess how State ensures correct and consistent  implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa polices and procedures, we reviewed  documents, analyzed data provided to us by State, and interviewed State  officials in Washington, D.C.; New York; Lima, Peru; Manila, Philippines;  Doha, Qatar; and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. We reviewed the Foreign Affairs  Manual, State’s circular notes, training and guidance materials for  consular officers, and guidance for visa applicants on State’s public Web  site and consular posts’ Web sites. We interviewed officials from State’s  headquarters, including Consular Affairs and the Office of the Chief of  Protocol. We also interviewed consular officers and reviewed A-3 and G-5  applications at four consular posts: Lima, Peru; Manila, Philippines; Doha,  Qatar; and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In selecting these four consular posts, we  analyzed data provided to us by Consular Affairs on A-3 and G-5 visas  issued for fiscal years 2000 through 2007. Each of the 4 posts is among the  10 that issued the most A-3 and G-5 visas, combined, during this time  period. Together these four posts account for about 22 percent of all A-3  and G-5 visas issued abroad since 2000. The U.S. embassy in Manila issued  more A-3 and G-5 visas from fiscal year 2000 through 2007 than any other  overseas post. The total number of A-3 and G-5 visas issued in Manila  accounts for almost 10 percent of all A-3 and G-5 visas issued during this  period. The U.S. embassy in Lima issued the second highest number of A-3  and G-5 visas, about 5 percent of the total, and the U.S. embassies in  Riyadh and Qatar followed closely behind Lima, with about 4 percent and  3 percent, respectively, of all A-3 and G-5 visas issued during this period.
As part of our site visits or through telephone interviews, we interviewed  consular officers to determine the steps State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs  has taken to ensure that State’s policies and procedures for issuing A-3  and G-5 visas are implemented correctly and consistently. To examine the  procedures for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas, we reviewed documents  describing the requirements that household workers and U.S. consular  officers should meet during the visa application process. We did not  review or evaluate consular officers’ decisions to refuse or issue visas. We  worked with State officials to identify documentation that we could  review both at consular posts and in Washington, D.C.
To determine the extent to which A-3 and G-5 applications met  documentation requirements, we developed a checklist of State’s  requirements for A-3 and G-5 visa applicants and then assessed  applications at each post against this checklist, reconciling any differences  in our assessments. For one of the four posts, we were able to review all  available documentation for A-3 and G-5 visas adjudicated since March 1,  2007. (We selected this date because State issued updated guidance to  posts on the A-3 and G-5 visa class in March 2007.) For the other three  posts, we were able to review only a sample of available files and  documentation. Although the cases we reviewed from these posts are not  generalizable, we reviewed a randomly selected set of cases to minimize  any selection bias. Below is a more detailed explanation of our  methodology for selecting and reviewing files from each post:  In Lima, Peru, we reviewed 87 A-3 and G-5 visa files that had been  adjudicated between March 1, 2007, and February 26, 2008, and that had a  paper copy of the employment contract, the diplomatic note, or both.  While 53 additional A-3 and G-5 application files were not available for our  review in Lima, Consular Affairs in Washington, D.C., later agreed to  search the Consular Consolidated Database to determine whether any  documents for these 53 files had been scanned into it. These officials also  searched the database for scans of accompanying documents for any of  the 87 files in Lima for which we had seen only one of the required  documents. (For example, if we saw only a diplomatic note in a given file,  we asked if the related employment contract had been scanned into the  database.) The officials determined that documents that we had not  reviewed, related to 2 of the 87 files in Lima, had been scanned into the  database. They also determined that one or both of the required  documents for 5 of the 53 files that were not available for review at post  had been scanned into the database. We did not review these seven files.
In Manila, Philippines, we reviewed 61 A-3 and G-5 visa application files  from December 1, 2007, to March 15, 2008, including all available  documentation. Due to physical space constraints, this post only maintains  3 months of visa applications on file. In addition, the post had not been  scanning employment contracts or diplomatic notes into the Consular  Consolidated Database, so we were unable to review any files earlier than  December 2007.
For Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, we reviewed a total of 25 A-3 or G-5 visa files. At  post, we reviewed two application files, including all documentation  available for these A-3 or G-5 visa applications. Although we had requested  to review all files available since March 1, 2007, consular officials in  Washington, D.C., instructed the post to allow us to review files only if the  particular case was mentioned in the course of interviews at posts. These  officials later agreed to provide us redacted copies of 25 percent (or 23) of  the A-3 and G-5 visa files from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh between March  1, 2007 and February 29, 2008. We randomly selected these 23 files and  reviewed them in Washington.
In Doha, Qatar, we reviewed all 56 A-3 and G-5 visa application files that  were adjudicated between March 1, 2007, and February 28, 2008, including  all documentation available.
Although we were unable to review all requested A-3 and G-5 visa files at  the posts we visited, the information we obtained was sufficient for  addressing our third objective.
We conducted this performance audit between October 2007 and July 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Government Agencies’ Primary Responsibilities Related to Foreign Diplomats and A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders
paragraphs: We analyzed State’s roles and responsibilities related to A-3 and G-5 visa  holders, as well as foreign diplomats, and identified key State offices and  bureaus involved in these matters. Table 1 summarizes our analysis.
We also analyzed various federal agencies’ role in investigating and  prosecuting federal law violations related to abuse of household workers  by foreign diplomats with some level of immunity. Table 2 summarizes our  analysis.
section_title: Appendix III: Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities from Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction
paragraphs: We analyzed key sections of international conventions, acts, and  agreements on immunity to describe in general terms the different levels  of immunity and the protections accorded under each one, specifically as  they relate to investigations of alleged abuse of household workers by  foreign diplomats. We also consulted with the Department of State on our  analysis, which is summarized in table 3. This table represents only a  general description of these privileges and immunities and, as indicated in  the notes following the table, exceptions may apply for each general  category.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Cheryl Goodman, Assistant  Director; Elizabeth Singer; Sylvia Bascopé; Mary Moutsos; Debbie Chung;  Terry Richardson; Ray Rodriguez; Jim Strus; and Mattias Fenton made key  contributions to this report.