Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy, Funding Priorities, and Risks for Selected Equipment
Published: 2003-12-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO was asked to assess the condition of key equipment items and to determine if the services have adequate plans for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing them. To address these questions, we selected 25 major equipment items, and determined (1) their current condition, (2) whether the services have mapped out a program strategy for these items, (3) whether current and projected funding is consistent with these strategies, and (4) whether these equipment items are capable of fulfilling their wartime missions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Many of our assessments of 25 judgmentally selected critical equipment items indicated that the problems or issues we identified were not severe enough to warrant action by the Department of Defense, military services, and/or the Congress within the next 5 years. The condition of the items we reviewed varies widely from very poor for some of the older equipment items like the Marine Corps CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter to very good for some of the newer equipment items like the Army Stryker vehicle. The problems we identified were largely due to (1) maintenance problems caused by equipment age and a lack of trained and experienced technicians, and (2) spare parts shortages. Although the services have mapped out program strategies for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing most of the equipment items we reviewed, some gaps exist. In some cases, such as the KC-135 Stratotanker and the Tomahawk missile, the services have not fully developed or validated their plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the items. In other cases, the services' program strategies for sustaining the equipment are hampered by problems or delays in the fielding of replacement equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to budget cuts. For 15 of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, there appears to be a disconnect between the funding requested by the Department of Defense or projected in the Future Years Defense Program and the services' program strategies to sustain or replace the equipment items. For example, we identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded requirements, as reported by the services, totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft--the CH-47D helicopter, F-16 fighter aircraft, C-5 transport aircraft, and CH-46E transport helicopter. The 25 equipment items we reviewed appear to be capable of fulfilling their wartime missions. While we were unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess wartime capability because of ongoing operations in Iraq, the services, in general, will always ensure equipment is ready to go to war, often through surging their maintenance operations and overcoming other obstacles. Some of the equipment items we reviewed, however, have capability deficiencies that could degrade their wartime performance in the near term.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Many of the weapons and support equipment items in the Department of  Defense’s inventory were purchased in the 1970s and 1980s, and are likely  to reach the end of their expected useful lives in this decade unless major  modernizations are made. Equipment age as well as delays in fielding  replacement systems can adversely affect maintenance costs, and  ultimately, equipment readiness and wartime capabilities. The added  effects of simultaneous military deployments and recent increases in  operating tempo place additional stress on equipment that is, in some  cases, more than 30 years old.
The department is faced with the challenges of both sustaining and  transforming the current military force structure, including replacing aging  equipment. The costs associated with meeting these challenges are likely to  be significant. For example, a 2001 Joint Chiefs of Staff analysis of the  funding needed to sustain the current force structure concluded that a  procurement budget of $100 billion to $110 billion would be required  annually. The President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request included a total of  about $72.7 billion for Defense procurement, an amount significantly less  than that identified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the  Congressional Budget Office estimated that the investment needed to  develop and purchase new Defense equipment would likely increase from  $137 billion in fiscal year 2004 to a peak of about $223 billion in fiscal year  2013 if cost risk is considered. The impending reconstitution of equipment  resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom will also require billions of dollars.  Competing for these funds for sustainment and modernization are the  Department of Defense’s efforts to transform its current force structure  into a force that maintains or improves its lethality but deploys faster, is  lighter, and relies on information rather than brute force to defeat its  adversary.
You asked us to assess the condition of key equipment items and to  determine if the services had adequate plans to address identified  deficiencies. Specifically, you asked that we determine which items  warranted immediate attention by the department and/or the Congress. You  also asked us to identify whether the department’s procurement plans and  projected budgets are sufficient to sustain or improve these equipment  items. To address these objectives, we determined:  the current condition of key military equipment items;  whether the services have mapped out a long-range program strategy for  sustaining, modernizing, or replacing these equipment items consistent  with the current condition and expected service life;  whether current and projected funding for these equipment items  through fiscal year 2009 is consistent with the services’ program  strategies for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing the equipment; and  whether these equipment items are generally capable of fulfilling their  wartime missions.
As agreed with your offices, we worked with the military services to  judgmentally select 25 equipment items that are key in terms of meeting the  strategy outlined in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. We  selected approximately two weapons equipment items, two support  equipment items, and two munitions from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and  Marine Corps. We relied extensively on input from the military services  and prior GAO work to select equipment items that have been in use for a  number of years and are critical to supporting the services’ missions. The  25 equipment items we selected were those that the military services  agreed were critical to meeting current capability requirements and defined  as essential to meet the strategy laid out under the Quadrennial Defense  Review. Our assessments apply only to the 25 equipment items we  reviewed. Consequently, the results of our assessments cannot be  projected to the entire inventory of Department of Defense equipment.
Our analysis of the condition of these 25 equipment items focused on a  number of key metrics, including equipment age, performance, and use  from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2002. To assess condition, we obtained  data on equipment age and expected service life and other specific service  performance indicators such as mission capable rates, utilization rates,  and various other metrics. While we limited our observations and  assessments to equipment in the active duty inventory, the readiness data  and other metrics we collected from the military services also includes  equipment in the guard and reserve forces. Our review of the program  strategy for these equipment items focused on the extent to which the  services have developed or updated their plans for the sustainment,  modernization, or recapitalization of the equipment items to the end of the  items’ useful service lives in order to meet mission requirements. Our  review of the funding for these equipment items focused on the extent to  which the services’ requests for sustainment, modernization, and  recapitalization funds in the current and historical defense budgets and the  projected funding envisioned in the Future Years Defense Program reflect  their long-range program strategies. The Future Years Defense Program  reflects the department’s official projection of the forces and resources  needed to support the programs approved by the Secretary of Defense for  the prior year, current year, biennial budget years, and the following  four years. According to Department of Defense officials, the Future Years  Defense Program takes the services’ priorities into consideration,  balancing future investment and risk. Our review of the wartime capability  of the selected equipment items focused on the extent to which each of the  equipment items is capable of fulfilling its wartime mission. Because of  ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited access to the deployed units and  equipment performance indicators during these operations, we were  unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess wartime capability for  all of the 25 equipment items we reviewed. Therefore, our assessments of  wartime capability are limited to anecdotal evidence obtained primarily  through discussions with military service officials, program managers, and  equipment operators and maintainers. In some cases we were able to  obtain specific data regarding wartime capability for specific equipment  items; however, data availability was not consistent across all of the  military services.
We met with officials from all four of the military services, one selected  combatant command, and several major commands. We also visited  selected units and maintenance facilities to observe the equipment items  during operation or under maintenance, and discussed condition and  wartime capability issues with program managers and equipment operators  and maintainers.
To determine which equipment items require immediate attention by the  department, the military services, and/or the Congress, we developed an  assessment framework based on three criteria: (1) the extent of the  existence of a problem or issue, (2) the severity of the problem or issue,  and (3) the estimated time frame within which the problem or issue needs  to be addressed. To assess the relative ranking of the 25 equipment items,  we used a traffic light approach—red, yellow, or green—to indicate the  existence, severity, and urgency of the problem as follows:  indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to warrant  action by the Department of Defense, the military services, and/or the  Congress within the next 1-3 years;  indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to  warrant action by the Department of Defense, the military services  and/or the Congress within the next 3-5 years; and  indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or  issues at the time of our review, or that any existing problems or issues  we identified are not of a severe enough nature that we believe warrant  action by the Department of Defense, the military services and/or the  Congress within the next 5 years.
While we attempted to obtain consistent metrics for each of the other three  categories across all four of the military services, data availability varied  significantly by service and type of equipment. Our assessments, therefore,  are based on the data available to us from multiple sources.  Our assessments represent the problems and issues we identified at the  specific point in time that we conducted our work, and can change quickly  given current events. Although our assessments for each of the  four categories—condition, program strategy, funding, and wartime  capability—are largely qualitative in nature, our analyses are based on data  and information provided by the military services and discussions with  military service officials and program managers for the individual  equipment items. We do not provide color-coded assessments for the  wartime capability of each equipment item in this report because, as  previously mentioned, we were unable to obtain adequate data to perform  a definitive assessment of wartime capabilities.
For a complete description of our methodology, see appendix I.  Appendix II contains our detailed assessments for each of the  25 equipment items. We performed our review from September 2002  through October 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined a  strategy to sustain and transform the military force structure that has been  in place since the mid-1990s. In this review, the Department of Defense  (DOD) committed to selectively recapitalize older equipment items to meet  near-term challenges and to provide near-term readiness. DOD recognized  that the older equipment items critical to DOD’s ability to defeat current  threats must be sustained as transformation occurs. DOD also recognizes  that recapitalization of all elements of U.S. forces since the end of the Cold  War has been delayed for too long. DOD procured few replacement  equipment items as the force aged throughout the 1990s, but it recognizes  that the force structure will eventually become operationally and  technologically obsolete without a significant increase in resources that are  devoted to the recapitalization of weapons systems.
The annual Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contains DOD’s plans for  future programs and priorities. It presents DOD estimates of future funding  needs based on specific programs. Through the FYDP, DOD projects costs  for each element of those programs through a period of either 5 or 6 years  on the basis of proposals made by each of the military services and the  policy choices made by the current administration. The 2003 FYDP extends  from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007, and the 2004 FYDP extends from  fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009. Congress has expressed concerns that  the military modernization budget and funding levels envisioned in the  FYDP appear to be inadequate to replace aging equipment and incorporate  cutting-edge technologies into the force at the pace required by the QDR  and its underlying military strategy.
section_title: Overall Condition of Selected Equipment Items Varies Widely
paragraphs: As shown in table 1, of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, we assessed  the current condition of 3 of these equipment items as red, 11 as yellow,  and 10 as green. We were not able to obtain adequate data to assess the  condition for the Marine Corps Maverick Missile because the Marine Corps  does not track readiness trend data, such as mission capable or operational  readiness rates, for munitions as they do for aircraft or other equipment.
Rotary wing lift helicopters, specifically the CH-46E and the CH-47D  helicopters, had the lowest condition rating among the equipment items we  reviewed, followed by fixed wing aircraft. Although we assessed the  condition as green for several equipment items such as the Army’s Abrams  tank and the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, and the Marine  Corps Light Armored Vehicle-Command and Control Variant, we identified  various problems and issues that could potentially worsen the condition of  some equipment items in the near future if not attended to. Specifically, for  the Abrams tank, and similarly for the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical  Truck, Army officials cited supply and maintenance challenges at the unit  level such as repair parts shortages, inadequate test equipment, and lack of  trained technicians that could impact the tank’s condition in the near  future. While the Marine Corps has a Light Armored Vehicle-Command and  Control Variant upgrade program under way, Marine Corps officials caution  that any delays in the upgrade program could affect future readiness.  According to service officials and prior GAO reports, the services are  currently able to alleviate the effects of these problems, in many cases,  through increased maintenance hours and cannibalization of parts from  other equipment.
The military services use a number of metrics to measure equipment  condition. Examples include mission capable rates for aircraft, operational  readiness rates for equipment other than aircraft, average age, and  utilization rates (e.g., flying hours). The equipment items we assessed as  red did not meet mission capable or operational readiness goals for  sustained periods, were older equipment items, and/or had high utilization  rates. For example, 10 of 16 equipment items for which readiness data were  available did not meet mission capable or operational readiness goals for  extended periods from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. The  average age of 21 of the equipment items ranged from about 1 year to  43 years.
Some equipment items for which we assessed the condition as yellow  also failed to meet mission capable or operational readiness goals and were  more than 10 years old. However, offsetting factors, such as how frequently  the equipment items did not meet readiness goals or by what percentage  they missed the goals, indicated less severe and urgent problems than  items we assessed as red. Other equipment items may have had high  mission capable rates, but because of overall age and related corrosion  problems, we assessed these equipment items as yellow to highlight the  fact that these items could potentially present problems if not attended to  within the next 3-5 years.
The equipment items for which we assessed the condition as green  generally met mission capable and operational readiness goals. While three  of these equipment items—the Army Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical  Truck, the Air Force F-16, and the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle- Command and Control Variant—did not meet mission capable or  operational readiness goals, we assessed the condition as green because  the condition problems identified were less severe than the items we  assessed as red or yellow. For example, an equipment item may have been  slightly below the goal but only for non-deployed units, or the fleet-wide  goals may have been met for the equipment item overall, although the  specific model we reviewed did not meet the goals. In addition, although  the rates for an equipment item may be slightly below its goal, it may be  able to meet operational requirements. We also considered any upgrades  that were underway at the time of our review that would extend the service  life of the equipment.
Maintenance problems were most often cited by the Army and Marine  Corps officials we met with as the cause for equipment condition  deficiencies for the equipment items we reviewed. Equipment operators  and maintainers that we met with believed equipment degradation was the  result of maintenance problems in one of two categories—parts or  personnel. The parts problems include availability of parts or logistics and  supply system problems. Availability problems occur when there are parts  shortages, unreliable parts, or obsolete parts due to the advanced age of the  equipment items. Logistics and supply system problems occur when it  takes a long time to order parts or the unit requesting the parts has a low  priority. In June, July, and August of 2003, we issued six reports  highlighting deficiencies in DOD’s and the services’ management of critical  spare parts. We also issued a report on problems DOD and the services  are having dealing with corrosion for military equipment and that they had  not taken advantage of opportunities to mitigate the impact of corrosion on  equipment. Maintenance problems due to personnel include (1) lack of  trained and experienced technicians and (2) increases in maintenance  man-hours required to repair some of these aging equipment items. We  reported in April 2003, for example, that DOD has not adequately  positioned or trained its civilian workforce at its industrial activities to  meet future requirements. Consequently, the Department may continue to  have difficulty maintaining adequate skills at its depots to meet  maintenance requirements.
section_title: Services Have Mapped Out Long-Range Program Strategies for Sustaining and Modernizing Most Equipment Items but Some Gaps Exist
paragraphs: In most cases, the services have developed long-range program strategies  for sustaining and modernizing the 25 equipment items that we reviewed.  However, some gaps exist because the services either have not validated  their plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the  equipment items, or the services’ program strategies for sustaining the  equipment are hampered by problems or delays in the fielding of  replacement equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to  budget cuts.
The two equipment items for which we assessed the program strategy as  red are the KC-135 Stratotanker and the Tomahawk Cruise Missile because,  although the services may have developed long-range program strategies  for these equipment items, they have not validated or updated their plans  for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing these items. In the case of the  KC-135 Stratotanker, the Air Force has embarked on a controversial,  expensive program to replace the tanker fleet, but as we have reported, it  has not demonstrated the urgency of acquiring replacement aircraft and it  has not defined the requirements for the number of aircraft that will be  needed. Similarly, for the Tomahawk missile, the Navy has not identified  how many of these missiles it will need in the future, thereby significantly  delaying the acquisition process.
We assessed the program strategy for eight of the services’ program  strategies as yellow, some of them because they will be affected by delays  in the fielding of equipment to replace the items in our review. According to  service officials, as the delivery of new replacement equipment items is  delayed, the services must continue using the older equipment items to  meet mission requirements. Consequently, the services may incur  increased costs due to maintenance that was not programmed for  equipment retained in inventory beyond the estimated service life. For  example, the planned replacement equipment for the Marine Corps CH-46E  helicopter (i.e., the MV-22 Osprey) has been delayed by about 3 years and is  not scheduled to be fielded until 2007. DOD has also reportedly cut the  number of replacement aircraft it plans to purchase by about 8 to 10 over  the next few years, thus the Marine Corps will have to retain more CH-46E  helicopters in its inventory. Program management officials have requested  additional funds to repair airframe cracks, replace seats, and move to light- weight armor to reduce aircraft weight, engine overhauls, and avionics  upgrades to keep the aircraft safe and reliable until fielding of the  replacement equipment. According to Marine Corps officials, the CH-46E  program strategy has also been hampered by the 5-year rule, which limits  installation of new modifications other than safety modifications into the  aircraft unless 5 years of service are left on the aircraft. Procurement of the  replacement equipment for the Marine Corps’ Assault Amphibian Vehicle  has also been delayed (by 2 years), and it is not scheduled for full fielding  until 2012. The program strategy for the Assault Amphibian Vehicle  includes upgrades, but for only 680 of the 1,057 vehicles in the inventory.
We also assessed the program strategy for some equipment items as yellow  if they were vulnerable to budget cuts. For example, according to Navy  officials, the Navy frigates’ modernization program is susceptible to budget  cuts because the frigates’ future role is uncertain as the Littoral Combat  ship is developed. In addition, the program strategy for the frigates is  questionable because of the uncertainty about the role frigates will play.  Specifically, Navy frigates are increasingly used for homeland defense  missions, and their program strategy has not been updated to reflect that  they will be used more often and in different ways. The Army’s CH-47D  helicopter is also vulnerable to budget cuts. The Army plans to upgrade 279  CH-47D helicopters to F models under its recapitalization program; the  upgrade includes a purchase of CH-47F model helicopters planned in fiscal  year 2004. The fiscal year 2004 budget for this purchase has already been  reduced. Program managers had also planned to purchase 16 engines, but  funding was transferred to requests for higher priority programs.
We assessed the program strategy for the remaining 15 equipment items as  green because the services have developed long-range program strategies  for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing these items consistent with their  estimated remaining service life. For example, the Army has developed  program strategies for all tracked and wheeled vehicles in our sample.  Likewise, the Air Force has developed program strategies for most fixed  wing aircraft in our sample throughout the FYDP. In the case of munitions,  with the exception of the Navy Tomahawk Cruise Missile and Standard  Missile-2, the services have developed program strategies for sustaining  and modernizing the current missile inventory in our sample.
section_title: Requested Funding Does Not Reflect the Services’ Long-Range Program Strategies
paragraphs: In many cases, the funding DOD has requested or is projecting for  future years in the FYDP for the equipment items we reviewed does not  reflect the military services’ long-range program strategies for equipment  sustainment, modernization, or recapitalization. According to service  officials, the services submit their budgets to DOD and the Department  has the authority to increase or decrease the service budgets based upon  the perceived highest priority needs. According to DOD officials, for  future years’ funding, the FYDP strikes a balance between future  investment and program risk, taking into consideration the services’ stated  requirements as approved by DOD. As shown in table 1, we assessed the  funding for 15 of the 25 equipment items as red or yellow because the  department’s requested funding did not adequately reflect its long-range  program strategies for modernization, maintenance, and spare parts. For  example, as shown in table 2, we identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded  requirements totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft equipment  items we reviewed.
The most significant funding shortfalls occurred when parts, equipment  upgrades, and maintenance were not fully funded or when replacement  equipment items were not fielded as scheduled. The equipment items for  which we assessed the funding as yellow had funding shortfalls of a lesser  extent than the red items. Although we assessed the funding as green for  the remaining nine equipment items, program managers raised concerns  about the availability of operation and maintenance funds in future years,  and stated that insufficient operation and maintenance funds could  potentially result in more severe condition problems and increased future  maintenance costs.
According to service officials, funding shortfalls occurred when parts,  equipment upgrades, or maintenance were not fully funded or funds were  reduced to support higher priority service needs. As we have previously  reported, DOD increases or decreases funds appropriated by Congress as  funding priorities change. Other shortfalls occur when units subsequently  identify maintenance requirements that were not programmed into the  original budget requests. In addition, when replacement equipment items  are not fielded as scheduled, the services must continue to maintain these  aging equipment items for longer than anticipated. Equipment items  considered legacy systems such as the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter  may not receive funding on the basis of anticipated fielding of replacement  equipment in the near future. The gaps between funding for legacy systems  (which are heavily used and critical to the services’ mission) and funding  for future replacement equipment result when fielding of the new  equipment has been delayed and budgets have been reduced for  maintenance of legacy systems. Funding for these legacy systems may also  be a target for funding reductions to support higher service priority items.
According to the program managers for some of the equipment items we  reviewed (including the Army Abrams tank, Heavy Expanded Mobility  Tactical Truck, and Navy EA-6B Prowler), as the services retain aging  equipment in their inventories longer than expected, maintenance  requirements increase, thus increasing operation and maintenance costs.  Program managers raised concerns about the availability of sufficient  operation and maintenance funding to sustain these aging equipment items  in the future. Also, program managers stated that present sustainment  funds (i.e., operation and maintenance funds) may only cover a  small percentage of the equipment’s requirements, and they frequently rely  on procurement funds to subsidize equipment improvements common to  multiple equipment items. However, once production of the equipment  item has been completed and procurement funds are no longer available  for use, program managers must compete with the rest of the service for  limited operation and maintenance funds. Program managers expressed  concerns that operation and maintenance funds are not currently available  to fund equipment improvements and noted operation and maintenance  funds may not be available in the future.
section_title: Equipment Is Generally Capable of Fulfilling Wartime Missions despite Some Limitations
paragraphs: Based on our analysis of equipment condition, the performance of the  equipment items in recent military conflicts, and discussions with service  officials, program managers, and equipment operators and maintainers, we  found that most of the equipment items we reviewed are capable of  fulfilling their wartime missions despite some limitations.  In general, the  services will always ensure equipment is ready to go to war, often through  surges in maintenance and overcoming obstacles such as obsolete parts,  parts availability, and cannibalization of other pieces of equipment. Some  of these equipment items (such as the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter and  all Air Force aircraft except the B-2) were used in Operation Desert Storm  and have been used in other diverse operations such as those in Kosovo  and Afghanistan. With the exception of the Army Stryker and GMLRS, all of  the equipment items we reviewed were used recently in Operation Iraqi  Freedom.
The services, in general, ensure that equipment is ready for deployment by  surging maintenance operations when necessary. Only one equipment item,  the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter, could not accomplish its intended  wartime mission due to lift limitations. However, Marine Corps officials  stated that they were generally satisfied that the CH-46E met its mission in  Operation Iraqi Freedom despite these limitations. Of the remaining  equipment items we reviewed, including all Air Force fixed-wing aircraft,  all tracked and wheeled vehicles, and most munitions, service officials  believe that most of these items are capable of fulfilling their wartime  missions.
According to service officials and program managers, while final Operation  Iraqi Freedom after action reports were not available at the time of our  review, initial reports and preliminary observations have generally been  favorable for the equipment items we reviewed. However, these officials  identified a number of specific concerns for some of these equipment items  that limit their wartime capabilities to varying degrees. For example, only  26 out of 213 Marine Corps Assault Amphibian Vehicles at Camp Lejeune  had been provided enhanced protective armor kits prior to Operation Iraqi  Freedom. According to Marine Corps officials at Camp Lejeune, lack of the  enhanced protective armor left the vehicles vulnerable to the large caliber  ammunition used by the Iraqi forces. According to Navy officials,  warfighting capabilities of the Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft will be  degraded if their capabilities are not upgraded and the outer wing panels  are not replaced. Fleet commanders expressed concerns about potentially  deploying some ships we reviewed with only one of three weapons systems  capable of being used. However, program managers stated that plans were  in place to reduce the vulnerability of these ships by fielding two  compensating weapons systems.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although the military services are generally able to maintain military  equipment to meet wartime requirements, the ability to do so over the next  several years is questionable especially for legacy equipment items.  Because program strategies have not been validated or updated and  funding requests do not reflect the services’ long-range program strategies,  maintaining this current equipment while transforming to a new force  structure as well as funding current military operations in Iraq and  elsewhere will be a major challenge for the department and the services.  We do not believe, however, that the funding gaps we identified are  necessarily an indication that the department needs additional funding.  Rather, we believe that the funding gaps are an indication that funding  priorities need to be more clearly linked to capability needs and to long- range program strategies.
The military services will always need to meet mission requirements and to  keep their equipment ready to fulfill their wartime missions. However, this  state of constant readiness comes at a cost. The equipment items we  reviewed appear to have generally fulfilled wartime missions, but often  through increased maintenance for deployed equipment and other  extraordinary efforts to overcome obstacles such as obsolete parts,  parts availability, and cannibalization of other pieces of equipment. The  reported metrics may not accurately reflect the time needed to sustain and  maintain equipment to fulfill wartime missions. Substantial equipment  upgrades or overhauls may be required to sustain older equipment items  until replacement equipment items arrive.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: While our review was limited to 25 equipment items and represents a  snapshot at a particular point in time, the department should reassess its  current processes for reviewing the condition, program strategy, and  funding for key legacy equipment items. Specifically we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army,  Air Force, and the Navy, reassess the program strategies for equipment  modernization and recapitalization, and reconcile those strategies with the  services’ funding requests to ensure that key legacy equipment, especially  those items needed to meet the strategy outlined in the September 2001  Quadrennial Defense Review, are sustained until replacement equipment  items can be fielded. In reconciling these program strategies to funding  requests, the Secretary of Defense should highlight for the Congress, in  conjunction with the department’s fiscal year 2005 budget submissions, the  risks involved in sustaining key equipment items if adequate funding  support is not requested and the steps the department is taking to address  those risks. As part of this process the department should identify the key  equipment items that, because of impaired conditions and their importance  to meeting the department’s military strategy, should be given the highest  priority for sustainment, recapitalization, modernization, or replacement.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: If the Congress wants a better understanding of the condition of major  equipment items, the department’s strategy to maintain or recapitalize  these equipment items, and the associated funding requirements for certain  key military equipment needed to meet the strategy outlined in the QDR,  the Congress may wish to consider having the Secretary of Defense provide  an annual report, in conjunction with its annual budget submissions, on   (1) the extent to which key legacy equipment items, particularly those that  are in a degraded condition, are being funded and sustained until  replacement equipment items can be fielded; (2) the risks involved in  sustaining key equipment items if adequate funding support is not  requested; and (3) the steps the department is taking to address those risks.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense  partially concurred with our recommendation that it should reassess the  program strategies for equipment modernization and recapitalization, and  reconcile those strategies to the services’ funding requests. However, the  department did not concur with our other two recommendations that it  should (1) highlight for the Congress the risks involved in sustaining key  equipment items if adequate funding support is not requested and the steps  the department is taking to address those risks, and (2) identify the  equipment items that should be given the highest priority for sustainment,  recapitalization, modernization, or replacement. The department’s written  comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III.
In partially concurring with our first recommendation that it should  reassess the program strategies for equipment modernization and  recapitalization, and reconcile those strategies to the services’ funding  requests, the department agreed that, while the overall strategy outlined in  the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review may be unchanged,  events over time may dictate changes in individual program strategies, that  requires an order to meet the most current threat. The department stated,  however, that through its past Planning, Programming, and Budgeting  System and the more current Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and  Execution processes, the department had and continues to have an annual  procedure to reassess program strategies to ensure equipment  maintenance, modernization, and recapitalization funding supports the  most recent Defense strategy. While we acknowledge that these budget  processes may provide a corporate, department-level review of what is  needed to accomplish the national defense mission, the department’s  budget and the information it provides to the Congress do not clearly  identify the funding priorities for individual equipment items.  For example,  although the funding to sustain the department’s major equipment items is  included in its Operation and Maintenance budget accounts, these budget  accounts do not specifically identify funding for individual equipment  items.  We continue to believe that the department, in conjunction with the  military services, needs to develop a more comprehensive and transparent  approach for assessing the condition of key legacy equipment items,  developing program strategies to address critical equipment condition  deficiencies, and prioritizing the required funding.
The department did not concur with our second recommendation that, in  reconciling the program strategies to funding requests, it should highlight  for the Congress, in conjunction with its fiscal year 2005 budget  submissions, the risks involved in sustaining key equipment items if  adequate funding support is not requested and the steps the department is  taking to address those risks. Specifically, the department stated that its  budget processes and the annual Defense budget provide the Congress a  balanced program with all requirements “adequately” funded and that the  unfunded requirements identified by the program managers or the services  may not be validated at the department level. While we agree that the  department’s budget may identify its highest funding priorities at the  department wide level, it does not provide the Congress with an  assessment of equipment condition deficiencies, unfunded requirements  identified by the services, and the potential risks associated with not fully  funding the services’ program strategies.  In this report, we identify a  number of examples of equipment condition deficiencies and  inconsistencies between the program strategies and the funding requests to  address those deficiencies that were not fully addressed in the  department’s budget documents. We believe that the Congress, in its  oversight of the department’s major equipment programs, needs to be  better informed of specific equipment condition deficiencies, the long- range strategies and required funding to address those deficiencies, and the  risks associated with not adequately funding specific equipment  modernization and recapitalization requirements.
The department also did not concur with our recommendation that it  should identify for the Congress the key equipment items that, because of  impaired condition and their importance to meeting the department’s  military strategies, should be given the highest priority for sustainment,  recapitalization, modernization, or replacement. In its comments, the  department stated that, in developing the annual Defense budget, it has  already allocated resources according to its highest priorities. The  department further stated that key items that are vital to accomplishing the  department’s mission are allocated funding in order to meet the  requirements of the most current Defense strategy, and that there is no  need to restate these priorities with a list. Similar to our rebuttal to the  department’s response to our second recommendation as discussed above,  we do not believe that the department’s annual budget provides the  Congress with sufficient information on the most severe equipment  condition deficiencies and the funding priorities for addressing those  deficiencies. We believe that a separate analysis, in conjunction with the  department’s budget submissions, that highlights the most critical  equipment condition deficiencies, the planned program strategies for  addressing those deficiencies, and the related funding priorities is needed  to provide the Congress with the information it needs to make informed  budget decisions.
The department also noted in its written comments that our report  identifies the CH-47D, CH-46E, KC-135, EA-6B, Standard Missile-2, and the  Tomahawk missile as equipment items with problems and issues that  warrant action within the next 1 to 3 years.  The department stated that it  would continue to reassess these equipment items as it goes through its  resource allocation process.
Lastly, the department provided technical comments concerning our  assessments of specific equipment items in appendix II, including the   KC-135 Stratotanker, Assault Amphibian Vehicle, MV-22, Tomahawk Cruise  Missile, and the CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter.  We reviewed and  incorporated these technical comments, as appropriate.  The revisions that  we made based on these technical comments did not change our  assessments for the individual equipment items.  In some cases, the data  and information the department provided in its technical comments  resulted from program and funding decisions that were made subsequent  to our review.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of  the Marine Corps; and other interested parties. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-8365 if you or your staffs have any  questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are  included in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the level of attention required by the Department of Defense,  the military services, and/or the Congress for each of the 25 equipment  items we reviewed, we performed an independent evaluation of the  (1) equipments’ current condition; (2) services’ program strategies for the  sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the equipment items;  (3) current and projected funding levels for the equipment items in relation  to the services’ program strategies; and (4) equipments’ wartime  capabilities. Based on our evaluation of the condition, program strategy,  and funding for each of the 25 equipment items, we used a traffic light  approach—red, yellow, or green—to indicate the severity and urgency of  problems or issues. We established the following criteria to assess the  severity and urgency of the problems.   indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to warrant  action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress within the  next 1-3 years. We selected this time frame of 1-3 years because it  represents the time frame for which DOD is currently preparing annual  budgets.  indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to  warrant action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress  within the next 3-5 years. We selected this time frame of 3-5 years  because it represents the near-term segment of DOD’s Future Years  Defense Plan.  indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or  issues at the time of our review, or that any existing problems or issues  we identified are not of a severe enough nature that we believe warrant  action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress within the  next 5 years. We selected this time frame of 5 years because it  represents the longer-term segment of DOD’s Future Years Defense  Plan.
We also reviewed the wartime capability of the selected equipment items,  focusing on the extent to which each equipment item is capable of fulfilling  its wartime mission. Because of ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited  access to the deployed units and related equipment performance data, we  were unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for each of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, as we did for  each of the other three assessment areas.
To select the 25 equipment items we reviewed, we worked with the military  services and your offices to judgmentally select approximately two  weapons equipment items, two support equipment items, and  two munitions items from the equipment inventories of each of the  four military services—Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. We relied  extensively on input from the military services and prior GAO work to  select equipment items that have been in use for a number of years and are  critical to supporting the services’ mission. We based our final selections  on the equipment items that the military services believed were most  critical to their missions. The 25 equipment items we selected for review  include 7 Army equipment items, 6 Air Force equipment items, 7 Navy  equipment items, and 5 Marine Corps equipment items. Our assessments  apply only to the 25 equipment items we reviewed, and the results of our  assessments cannot be projected to the entire inventory of DOD  equipment.
To assess equipment condition, we obtained and analyzed data on  equipment age, expected service life, and the services’ equipment condition  and performance indicators such as mission capable rates, operational  readiness rates, utilization rates, failure rates, cannibalization rates, and  depot maintenance data for each of the equipment items we reviewed. The  specific data that we obtained and analyzed for each equipment item varied  depending on the type of equipment and the extent to which the data were  available. The scope of our data collection for each of the equipment items  included both the active and reserve forces. We also met with the services’  program managers and other cognizant officials from each of the four  military services for each of the 25 equipment items. In addition, we visited  selected units and maintenance facilities to observe the equipment during  operation or during maintenance and to discuss equipment condition and  wartime capability issues with equipment operators and maintainers. Our  observations and assessments were limited to equipment in the active duty  inventory.
To assess the program strategy for these equipment items, we reviewed the  services’ plans for future sustainment, modernization, recapitalization, or  replacement of the equipment items in order to meet the services’ mission  and force structure requirements. We met with the services’ program  managers and other military service officials to discuss and assess the  extent to which the services have a strategy or roadmap for each of the  25 equipment items, and whether the program strategy is adequately  reflected in DOD’s current budget or the Future Years Defense Plan.
To assess equipment funding, we obtained and analyzed data on historical,  current, and future years’ budget requests for each of the 25 equipment  items we reviewed. We also reviewed the services’ budget requests,  appropriations, and obligations for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003  to determine how the funds that had been requested and appropriated for  each of the equipment items were used. In addition, we reviewed the  Future Years Defense Program for fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007 and  for fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 to determine if the projected funding  levels were consistent with the services’ program strategies for  sustainment, modernization, recapitalization, or replacement of the  selected equipment items. We also met with the services’ program  managers for each of the 25 equipment items to identify budget shortfalls  and unfunded requirements. We did not independently validate the  services’ requirements. We were unable, however, to obtain specific  information from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff  on the long-term program strategies and funding priorities for these  equipment items because officials in these offices considered this  information to be internal DOD data and would not make it available to us.
To review the wartime capability of each equipment item, we discussed  with military service officials, program managers, and equipment operators  and maintainers the capabilities of the equipment items to fulfill their  wartime missions and the equipments’ performance in recent military  operations. Because of ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited access to  the deployed units and related equipment performance data, we were  unable to collect sufficient data to definitively assess wartime capability  or to assign a color-coded assessment as we did with the other three  assessment areas. We also reviewed related Defense reports, such as after  action reports and lessons learned reports, from recent military operations  to identify issues or concerns regarding the equipments’ wartime  capabilities.
We performed our work at relevant military major commands, selected  units and maintenance facilities, and one selected defense combatant  command. Our access to specific combatant commands and military units  was somewhat limited due to their involvement in Operation Iraqi  Freedom. The specific military activities that we visited or obtained  information from include the following:  U.S. Army, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;  U.S. Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology, Washington, D.C.;  U.S. Army Forces Command Headquarters, Atlanta, Ga.;  U.S. Army, 1st Calvary Division, 118th Corps, Ft. Hood, Tx.;  U.S. Army, Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Precision  Fire and Missile Project Office, Huntsville, Al.;  U.S. Army, Tank and Armament Automotive Command, Warren, Mi.;  U.S. Army, Cost and Economic Analysis Center, Pentagon,   U.S. Army, Pacific, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii; and  U.S. Army, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii;  U.S. Air Force, Headquarters, Plans and Programs Division,   U.S. Air Force, Combat Forces Division, and Global Mobility Division,   U.S. Air Force, Munitions Missile and Space Plans and Policy Division,   U.S. Air Force, Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Ga.;  U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Directorate of Requirements and  Plans, Aircraft Division, and the Installation and Logistics Division,  Langley Air Force Base, Va.;  U.S. Air Force, Pacific, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii;  U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk Naval Base, Va.;  U.S. Navy, Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk Naval Base, Va.;  U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Va.;  U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;  U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet, Naval Amphibious Base,   U.S. Navy, Naval Air Forces, Naval Air Station North Island, Coronado,   U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Calif.;  U.S. Navy, Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station  Whidbey Island, Wash.;  U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard,   U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Air Station  Patuxent River, Md.;  U.S. Navy, Naval Air Depot, Naval Air Station North Island, Calif.; and  U.S. Navy, Avondale Shipyard, Avondale, La.;  U.S. Marine Corps, Systems Command, Quantico, Va.;  U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Weapons Branch, Pentagon, Washington,   U.S. Marine Corps, Tank Automotive and Armaments Command,  Warren, Mich.;  U.S. Marine Corps, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton,   U.S. Marine Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.;  U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Research Lab, Washington, D.C.;  U.S. Marine Corps, AAAV Technology Center, Woodbridge, Va.; and  U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii.
We also obtained and reviewed relevant documents and reports from DOD  and the Congressional Budget Office, and relied on related prior GAO  reports. We performed our review from September 2002 through October  2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
section_title: Assessments of Selected Equipment Items
paragraphs: For the 25 equipment items, each assessment provides a snapshot in time  of the status of the equipment item at the time of our review. The profile  presents a general description of the equipment item. Each assessment  area contains a highlighted area indicating the level of DOD, military  service, and/or congressional attention each equipment item needs, in our  opinion, based on our observations of each equipment item, discussions  with service officials, and reviews of service-provided metrics.
subsections: section_title: Army
subsections: section_title: Abrams Tank
paragraphs: First delivered in the early 1980s, the Abrams is the Army’s main battle tank  and destroys enemy forces using enhanced mobility and firepower.  Variants of the Abrams include the M1, M1A1, and M1A2. The M1 has a  105mm main gun; the M1A1 and M1A2 have a 120 mm gun, combined with a  powerful turbine engine and special armor. There are 5,848 tanks in the  inventory, and the estimated average age is 14 years. The M1 variant will be  phased out by 2015. The M1 and M1A2 variant are being upgraded to the  M1A2 Systems Enhancement Program (SEP) by July 2004.
We assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as green because it  consistently met its mission capable goal of 90 percent from fiscal year  1998 through fiscal year 2002. Although the Abrams met its mission capable  goal, supply and maintenance operations at the unit-level are a challenge  because of repair parts shortages, unreliable components, inadequate test  equipment, and lack of trained technicians. There are concerns that the  future condition of the Abrams could deteriorate in the next 5 years due to  insufficient sustainment funds. The lack of funds could result in an  increase of aging tanks and maintenance requirements.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the Abrams as green because the  Army has developed a long-term strategy for upgrading and phasing  out certain variants of aging tanks in its inventory. The Army’s  Recapitalization Program selectively implements new technology upgrades  to reduce operations and support cost. Additionally, the Army is phasing  out the M1A2 from its inventory by 2009, and procuring 588 M1A2 SEPS.  The SEP enhances the digital command and control capabilities of the  tank. The Army also developed a program for improving the Abrams M1A2  electronics called the Continuous Electronic Evolution Program, which is  part of the SEP. The first phase of this program has been approved and  funded. According to an Army official, the next phase is expected to start in  approximately 5 years.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the Abrams as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to  sustain and modernize the Abrams tank inventory. The Army reduced the  recapitalization budget by more than 50 percent for the M1A2 SEP, thereby  decreasing the number of upgrades from 1,174 to 588. Unfunded  requirements for the Abrams tank include the vehicle integrated defense  systems, safety and environmental fixes, and an improved driver’s viewer  system. Without adequate funding, obsolescence may become a major  issue once tank production ends and procurement funds are no longer  available to subsidize tank requirements. Procurement funding for the  M1A2 SEP will be completed by 2003 and deliveries completed by 2004.  According to an Army official, the Abrams procurement funding provides  approximately 75 percent to 80 percent of the tank requirements due to  commonality among the systems.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the Abrams, a detailed pre-war assessment prepared by the  program manager’s office indicated that the tank is not ready or able to  sustain a long-term war. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Abrams  tank was able to successfully maneuver, provide firepower, and protect the  crew. Losses were attributed to mechanical breakdown and  cannibalization. The detailed assessment by the program manager’s office,  however, indicated that limited funding, war reserve spare part shortages,  and supply availability could impact the tank’s ability to sustain a long-term  war.
section_title: AH-64A/D Apache Helicopter
paragraphs: The Apache is a multi-mission aircraft designed to perform rear, close, deep  operations and precision strikes, armed reconnaissance and  security during day, night, and adverse weather conditions. There  are approximately 728 Apache helicopters in the Army’s inventory—418  AH-64A models and 310 AH-64D models. The fleet average age is about  12 years.
We assessed the condition of the Apache as yellow because the Apache AH- 64D model failed to meet the mission capable goal of 75 percent  approximately 50 percent of the time, from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal  year 2002; however, according to officials, the Apache mission capable  rates have consistently exceeded the 75 percent goal in calendar year 2003.  Aviation safety restrictions were cited as the reason why the Apache failed  to meet mission capable goals. A safety restriction pertains to any defect or  hazardous condition that can cause personal injury, death, or damage to the  aircraft, components, or repair parts for which a medium to high safety risk  has been determined. These restrictions included problems with the  (1) aircraft Teflon bushings, (2) transmission, (3) main rotor blade  attaching pins, (4) generator power cables, and (5) the removal,  maintenance and inspection of the Auxiliary Power Unit Takeoff Clutch.
The Army’s Recapitalization Program includes modifications that are  intended to address these safety restrictions.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the Apache as green because the  Army has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and upgrade  the aging Apache fleet. The Army’s Recapitalization Program addresses  costs, reliability, and safety problems, fleet groundings, aging aircraft, and  obsolescence. The Army plans to remanufacture 501 AH-64A helicopters to  the AH-64D configuration. The goal is to reduce the fleet average age to  10 years by 2010, increase the unscheduled mean time between removal by  20 percent for selected components, and generate a 20 percent return on  investment for the top 10 cost drivers. The Army is on-schedule for fielding  the Apache AH-64D.
section_title: Funding
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the Apache, Army officials did not identify any specific  concerns. These officials indicated that the Apache successfully fulfilled its  wartime missions in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In  Operation Iraqi Freedom, the AH-64D conducted combat operations for  both close combat and standoff engagements. Every mission assigned was  flown and accomplished with the Apache AH-64D. The Longbow  performance has been enhanced by targeting and weapon systems  upgrades that have improved the Longbow performance over the AH-64A.
section_title: Stryker
paragraphs: The Stryker is a highly deployable-wheeled armored vehicle that employs  10 variations—the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), Mortar Carrier (MC),  Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), Commander Vehicle (CV), Medical  Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV), Anti-Tank  Guided Missile Vehicle (ATGM), and Fire Support Vehicle (FSV), the Mobile  Gun System (MGS), and the Nuclear Biological and Chemical  Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV). There are 600 Stryker vehicles in the  Army’s inventory, and the average age is less than 2 years. The Army plans  to procure a total of 2,121 Stryker vehicles through fiscal year 2008.
We assessed the condition of the Stryker as green because it has  successfully achieved the fully mission capable goal of 95 percent, based  on a 3-month average from April 2003 through July 2003. The Congress  mandated that the Army compare the operational effectiveness and cost of  an infantry carrier variant of the Stryker and a medium Army armored  vehicle. The Army compared the cost and operational effectiveness of the  Stryker infantry carrier against a medium armored vehicle. The Army  selected the M113A3, and the comparison shows the Stryker infantry  carrier vehicle is more survivable and provides better overall performance  and mobility when employed in combat operations than the M113A3.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the Stryker as green because the  Army developed a long-term program strategy for procuring a total of 2,121  vehicles through fiscal year 2008, which will satisfy the total requirement.  Of the 600 currently in the inventory, 449 are at 2 brigades—a 3rd brigade of  the 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st brigade of the 25th Infantry Division,  both of which are located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The other 151 are at  fielding sites, training centers, and the Army Test and Evaluation Center.  The remaining 1,521 will be procured through fiscal year 2007 with  expected deliveries through fiscal year 2008. The next brigade scheduled to  receive the Stryker is the 172nd Infantry Brigade at Forts Richardson and  Wainwright, Alaska. The remaining Stryker Brigades Combat Teams to be  equipped with the Stryker are the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk,  Louisiana; 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii;  and 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National  Guard.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the Stryker as green because current and  projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to  sustain the Stryker program. The program is fully funded to field the  six Stryker brigade combat teams. Approximately $4.1 billion has been  allocated for all six combat teams through fiscal year 2009. The Secretary  of Defense has authorized the procurement of the first three brigades, but  the fourth brigade cannot be procured until the Secretary of Defense  solidify to Congress that the results of the Operational Evaluation  mandated by Congress indicated that the design for the interim brigade  combat team is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The  evaluation was completed in May 2003 and results are being finalized.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the Stryker, the Army did not identify any specific concerns  regarding the system being able to meet its wartime mission. The Stryker  has not yet been used in any conflict situation. In May 2003, GAO reported  that the Army Test and Evaluation Command concluded that the Stryker  provided more advantages than the M113A3 in force protection, support for  dismounted assault, and close fight and mobility, and was more survivable  against ballistic and non-ballistic threats.
section_title: CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter
paragraphs: The CH-47 helicopter is a twin-engine, tandem rotor helicopter designed for  transportation of cargo, troops, and weapons. The Army inventory consists  of 426 CH-47D models and 2 CH-47F models. The CH-47F Improved Cargo  Helicopter is a remanufactured version of the CH-47D and includes a new  digital cockpit and a modified airframe to reduce vibration. The overall  average age of the CH-47 is 14 years old. The Army plans to convert 76 D  model aircraft to the F model between fiscal years 2005 and fiscal year  2009.
We assessed the condition of the Chinook as red because it consistently  failed to meet the Army’s mission capable goal of 75 percent from fiscal  year 1998 to fiscal year 2002. Actual mission capable rates ranged from  61 percent to 69 percent. Army officials attributed the failure to meet the  75 percent mission capable goal to aging equipment, supply shortages, and  inexperienced technicians. Maintaining aircraft has become increasingly  difficult with the CH-47D failing to meet the non-mission capable  maintenance goal of 15 percent, increasing from 27 percent in fiscal year  1998 to 31 percent in fiscal year 2002.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the Chinook as yellow because the  Army has developed a long-term strategy for upgrading and replacing the  Chinook, but the strategy is not consistent with the Army’s funding  priorities. There has been a delay in the plan to upgrade 279 D models to  F models between fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2017 under the Army’s  Recapitalization Program, reducing the number of CH-47F helicopters  planned in the fiscal year 2004 budget by five due to unexpected funding  constraints. These budgetary constraints also delayed the Army’s plans to  purchase 16 engines because funding was transferred to support other non- recurring requirements. Readiness may be adversely affected if these  engines are not procured because unit requisitions for these engines will  not be filled and aircraft will not be fully mission capable.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the Chinook as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s requirements for  sustaining and upgrading the Chinook helicopter. At present, the Army has  identified unfunded requirements totaling $316 million, with $77 million  needed to procure the five CH-47Fs and the 16 engines for which the funds  had been previously diverted. The remaining $239 million would support  other improvements including common avionics system, rotor heads,  crashworthy crew seats, and engine modifications. The Army will resolve  some or all of these requirements with projected funding of $3 billion to  support the CH-47 program through fiscal year 2017.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the Chinook, Army officials indicated that it successfully  fulfilled its wartime mission for Operation Iraqi Freedom despite current  condition problems. These officials stated that the deployed units were  able to overcome these condition problems because the deployed aircraft  were provided a higher priority than non-deployed aircraft for spare parts.  As a result, the estimated mission capable rates for deployed aircraft  increased to about 86 percent during the operation.
section_title: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT)
paragraphs: The HEMTT provides transport capabilities for re-supply of combat  vehicles and weapon systems. The HEMTT’s five basic configurations  include the cargo truck, the load handling system, wrecker, tanker, and  tractor. The HEMTT entered into the Army’s inventory in 1982. The current  inventory totals about 12,500 and the average age is 13 years.
We assessed the condition of the HEMTT as green because mission capable  rates have been close to the Army’s 90 percent goal, averaging 89 percent  between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2002. Moreover, the overall supply  availability rates have exceeded the 85 percent goal from May 2002 to  October 2002, averaging between 96 percent and 99 percent, respectively.  In some instances, however, meeting the operational goals has been  continually challenging because of aging equipment, heavy equipment  usage, and the lack of trained mechanics. The lack of trained mechanics  may also impact the Army’s future ability to meet the specified mission  capable goals. In addition, a detailed pre-war assessment by the program  manager’s office indicated that concerns regarding shortages of spare parts  would significantly degrade the HEMTT readiness rates.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the HEMTT as green because the  Army has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and  modernizing the HEMTT inventory. The Army’s plans include procuring  1,485 new tankers and wreckers through fiscal year 2007, which will satisfy  the Army’s stated requirement. The Army also plans to rebuild some of the  existing vehicles through the HEMTT Extended Service Program. This  program, scheduled to be complete in fiscal year 2012, will insert  technology advancements and will provide continuous improvements to  the vehicle. Although there has been a reduction in the Army’s budget for  the Extended Service Program, the plan is to continue rebuilding trucks in  smaller quantities and at a slower pace. The Army’s Forces Command has  implemented a Vehicle Readiness Enhancement Program that serves as an  interim maintenance program for the HEMTT awaiting induction into the  Extended Service Program.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the HEMTT as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to  sustain and modernize the HEMTT inventory. Specifically, the Army has  unfunded requirements of $10.5 million as of fiscal year 2003, of which  $3.9 million is for spare parts and $6.6 million is for war reserves. In  addition, the Army reduced the Recapitalization Program by $329 million.  The Army had planned to upgrade 2,783 vehicles currently in the inventory;  however, 1,365 will not be upgraded as a result of the reductions in the  Recapitalization Program. Consequently, according to Army officials,  maintenance and operating and support costs will likely increase.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the HEMTT, Army officials indicated that it has successfully  fulfilled its wartime requirements during recent combat operations.  Based on the program manager’s preliminary observations, the HEMTT  performed successfully during Operation Iraqi Freedom. A detailed pre-war  assessment by the program manager’s office indicated that the HEMTT was  ready for war, but could experience sustainment problems due to a  shortage of war reserve spare parts. The program manager’s office is  currently assessing the condition of the active and war reserve equipment  used in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
section_title: Patriot Missile (PAC-3)
paragraphs: The PAC-3 missile is considered a major upgrade to the Patriot system.  Sixteen PAC-3 missiles can be loaded on a launcher versus four PAC-2  missiles. The Army plans to buy 2,200 PAC-3 missiles. The Army had a  current inventory of 88 PAC-3 missiles as of July 2003. The average age of  the PAC-3 missile is less than 1 year.
We assessed the condition of the PAC-3 missile as green because  approximately 89 percent of the missiles in the inventory were ready for  use as of July 2003. Specifically, of the 88 PAC-3 missiles currently in the  inventory, 78 were ready for use and 10 were not. In addition, the Army has  not experienced any chronic or persistent problems during production. The  PAC-3 missile completed operational testing and was approved for full  production of 208 missiles in 2003 and 2004.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the PAC-3 missile as green because  the Army has developed a long-term strategy for sustaining the PAC-3  inventory, including procurement of 2,200 missiles that will satisfy the total  requirement. The Army plans to purchase 1,159 PAC-3 missiles through  fiscal year 2009. The remaining 1,041 missiles will be procured after fiscal  year 2009. During the low-rate initial production, the Army procured 164  PAC-3 missiles from 1998 to 2002 at $1.7 billion. The Army has completed  the low-rate initial production and has been granted approval for full  production of 208 PAC-3 missiles beginning in fiscal year 2003, at a total  estimated cost of $714 million.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the PAC-3 missile as green primarily because  current and projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated  requirements to sustain the PAC-3 inventory. The program manager’s office  has not identified any funding shortfalls for the missile. Funding has been  approved for the production of 1,159 PAC-3 missiles through fiscal year  2009 at an average production rate of nearly 100 missiles per year. The total  production cost of the 1,159 PAC-3 missiles equates to $4.3 billion. The  remaining 1,041 missiles will be procured after fiscal year 2009.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the PAC-3 missile, Army officials indicated that it successfully  fulfilled its wartime mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom, successfully  hitting enemy targets within two missile shots. The PAC-3 has also  completed the operational testing phase and has been approved for  full production.
section_title: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)
paragraphs: The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Dual Purpose Improved  Convention Munition (GMLRS-DPICM) is an essential component of the  Army’s transformation. It upgrades the M26 series MLRS rocket and is  expected to serve as the baseline for all future Objective Force rocket  munitions. The Army plans to procure a total of 140,004 GMLRS rockets.  There are currently no GMLRS rockets in inventory, but it was approved in  March 2003 to enter low rate initial production to produce 108 missiles.
We assessed the condition of the GMLRS as green because the system has  demonstrated acceptable performance during the System Development  and Demonstration Phase, and was approved to enter low rate initial  production in March 2003.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the GMLRS as green because the  Army has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining the  GMLRS inventory, including procurement of a total of 140,004 missiles that  will satisfy the total requirement. Of this total, the Army plans to procure  18,582 missiles by fiscal year 2009. The remaining 121,422 will be procured  after fiscal year 2009. The Army approved low rate initial production for a  total of 1,920 missiles through fiscal year 2005. The initial operational  capability date is scheduled for 2nd quarter fiscal year 2006. The Army has  also preplanned a product improvement to the GMLRS-DPICM called the  GMLRS—Unitary. This improvement is in the concept development phase  and is scheduled to begin a spiral System Development and Demonstration.  The Army has not decided how many of the 1,920 initial production rockets  will include the guided unitary upgrade.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the GMLRS as green because current and  projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to  sustain the GMLRS Munitions program. The GMLRS program is fully  funded and properly phased for rapid acquisition. The Army plans to  purchase a total of 140,004 GMLRS rockets for $11.7 billion. Of the  140,004 GMLRS rockets, the Army plans to procure 18,582 through fiscal  year 2009 for $1.7 billion. The remaining 121,422 rockets will cost the Army  approximately $10 billion. In March 2003, the system met all modified low  rate initial production criteria to enter the first phase to produce 108  rockets for $36.6 million. Phases II and III will procure the remaining 1,812  rockets during fiscal year 2004 (786 rockets) and fiscal year 2005 (1,026  rockets) for $220.4 million.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the GMLRS, Army officials did not identify any specific  capability concerns. The GMLRS-DPICM is expected to achieve greater  range and precision accuracy. The upgraded improvement will reduce the  number of rockets required to defeat targets out to 60 kilometers or  greater, and reduce collateral damage. It is also expected to reduce  hazardous duds to less than 1 percent.
section_title: Air Force
subsections: section_title: F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft
paragraphs: The F-16 is a compact, multi-role fighter with air-to-air combat and  air-to-surface attack capabilities. The first operational F-16A was delivered  in January 1979. The Air Force currently has 1,381 F-16 aircraft in its  inventory, and the average age is about 15 years. The F-16B is a two-seat,  tandem cockpit aircraft. The F-16C and D models are the counterparts to  the F-16A/B, and incorporate the latest technology. Active units and many  reserve units have converted to the F-16C/D. The Air Force plans to replace  the F-16 with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter beginning in 2012.
We assessed the condition of the F-16 as green because mission capable  rates have been near the current goal of 83 percent with mission capable  rates for all of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC) F-16s ranging  from 75 percent to 79 percent during the past 5 years. Although these rates  are below the goal, officials said they were sufficient to provide flying  hours for pilot training, and to meet operational requirements. In fiscal year  2002, the planned utilization rate, (i.e., the average number of sorties per  aircraft per month) for ACC aircraft was 17.5 sorties per month, and the  actual utilization was 17.7 sorties. Although the average age of the F-16 is  about 15 years, there are no material deficiencies that would limit its  effectiveness and reliability. Known and potential structural problems  associated with aging and accumulated flying hours are being addressed  through ongoing depot maintenance programs.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the F-16 as green because the  Air Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and  replacing the F-16 inventory. The program should ensure that the aircraft  remains a viable and capable weapons system throughout the FYDP.  Subsequently, the Air Force intends to begin replacing the F-16 with the  Joint Strike Fighter (F-35), which is already in development.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the F-16 as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements  to sustain and replace the F-16 inventory. There are potential shortfalls in  the funding for depot maintenance programs and modifications during the  next 3-5 years. Although funding has been programmed for this work,  unexpected increases in depot labor rates have been significant, and  additional funding may be required to complete the work. For fiscal year  2004, the Air Force included $13.5 million for the F-16 in its Unfunded  Priority List.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the F-16, the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its recent  wartime missions. F-16 fighters were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991  in support of Operation Desert Storm, and flew more sorties than any other  aircraft. The F-16 has also been a major player in peacekeeping operations  including the Balkans since 1993. Since the terrorist attack in September  2001, F-16s comprised the bulk of the fighter force protecting the skies over  the United States in Operation Noble Eagle. More recently, F-16s played a  major role in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom, and have  performed well in combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which the F-16  once again provided precision-guided strike capabilities and suppression of  enemy air defenses. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force  deployed over 130 F-16s that contributed significantly to the approximately  8,800 sorties flown by Air Force fighter aircraft.
section_title: B-2 Spirit Bomber
paragraphs: The B-2 is a multi-role heavy bomber with stealth characteristics, capable  of employing nuclear and conventional weapons. The aircraft was  produced in limited numbers to provide a low observable (i.e., stealth)  capability to complement the B-1 and B-52 bombers. Its unique stealth  capability enables the aircraft to penetrate air defenses. The Air Force  currently has 21 B-2 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is about 9  years. The first B-2 was deployed in December 1993, and currently all B-2s  in the inventory are configured with an enhanced terrain-following  capability and the ability to deliver the Joint Direct Attack Munition and the  Joint Stand Off Weapon.
We assessed the condition of the B-2 as yellow because the B-2 did not  meet its mission capable goal of 50 percent. Officials said that the aircraft  itself is in good condition, but it is the maintainability of its stealth  characteristics that is driving the low mission capable rates. Officials  pointed out that despite low mission capable rates the B-2 has been able to  meet requirements for combat readiness training and wartime missions.  For example, four B-2 aircraft were deployed and used during Operation  Iraqi Freedom, and maintained a mission capable rate of 85 percent.  Mission capable rates have improved slightly, and officials said that recent  innovations in low observable maintenance technology and planned  modifications are expected to foster additional improvement.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the B-2 as green because the Air  Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining the  B-2 inventory. Program plans appear to ensure the viability of this system  through the Future Years Defense Plan. Procurement of this aircraft is  complete. The Air Force plans to maintain and improve its capabilities,  ensuring that the B-2 remains the primary platform in long-range  combat aviation.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the B-2 as green because current and projected  funding is consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements to sustain the  B-2 inventory. The programmed funding should allow execution of the  program strategy to sustain, maintain, and modify the system through the  Future Years Defense Plan. The B-2 is of special interest to the Congress,  which requires an annual report on this system, including a schedule of  funding requirements through the Future Years Defense Plan. No items  specific to the B-2 were included in the Air Force’s fiscal year 2004  Unfunded Priority List.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the B-2, the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its wartime  missions despite current condition weaknesses. The Air Force  demonstrated the aircraft’s long-range strike capability by launching  missions from the United States, striking targets in Afghanistan, and  returning to the States. More recently, the Air Force deployed four B-2  aircraft to support Operation Iraqi Freedom, where they contributed to the  505 sorties flown by bombers during the conflict. The B-2 Annual Report to  the Congress states that the B-2 program plan will ensure that the B-2  remains the primary platform in long-range combat aviation.
section_title: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft
paragraphs: The C-5 Galaxy is the largest of the Air Force’s air transport aircraft, and  one of the world’s largest aircraft. It can carry large cargo items over  intercontinental ranges at jet speeds and can take off and land in relatively  short distances. It provides a unique capability in that it is the only aircraft  that can carry certain Army weapon systems, main battle tanks, infantry  vehicles, or helicopters. The C-5 can carry any piece of army combat  equipment, including a 74-ton mobile bridge. With aerial refueling, the  aircraft’s range is limited only by crew endurance. The first C-5A was  delivered in 1969. The Air Force currently has 126 C-5 aircraft in its  inventory, and the average age is about 26 years.
We assessed the condition of the C-5 as yellow because it consistently  failed to meet its mission capable goal of 75 percent; however, mission  capable rates have been steadily improving and, in April 2003, active duty  C-5s exceeded the goal for the first time. Program officials pointed out that,  although the total fleet has never achieved the 75 percent goal, there has  been considerable improvement over time, with the rate rising from about  42 percent in 1971 to about 71 percent in 2003. The Air Force Scientific  Advisory Board has estimated that 80 percent of the airframe structural  service life remains. Furthermore, Air Force officials said that the two  major modification programs planned, the avionics modernization program  and reliability enhancement and re-engining program, should significantly  improve mission capable rates.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the C-5 as green because the Air  Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and  modernizing the aging C-5 inventory. The Air Force has planned a  two-phase modernization program through the future years defense  program that is expected to increase the aircraft’s mission capability and  reliability. The Air Force plans to modernize the C-5 to improve aircraft  reliability and maintainability, maintain structural and system integrity,  reduce costs, and increase operational capability. Air Force officials stated  that the C-5 is expected to continue in service until about 2040 and that,  with the planned modifications, the aircraft could last until then. As an  effort to meet strategic airlift requirements, the Air Force has contracted to  buy 180 C-17s, will retire 14 C-5s by fiscal year 2005, and may retire  additional aircraft as more C-17s are acquired.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the C-5 as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements  to sustain and modernize the aging C-5 inventory. According to officials, the  program lost production funding because of problems during the early  stage of the program. Currently 49 aircraft are funded for the avionics  program through the Future Years Defense Plan. For fiscal year 2004, the  Air Force included $39.4 million in its Unfunded Priority List to restore the  program to its prior timeline.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the C-5, Air Force officials indicated that the aircraft has  successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. The Air Force has not  noted any factors or capability concerns that would prevent the C-5 from  effectively performing its wartime mission.
section_title: KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft
paragraphs: The KC-135 is one of the oldest airframes in the Air Force’s inventory, and  represents 90 percent of the tanker fleet. Its primary mission is air  refueling, and it supports Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied aircraft.  The first KC-135 was delivered in June 1957. The original A models have  been re-engined, modified, and designated as E, R, or T models. The E  models are located in the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. The  total inventory of the KC-135 aircraft is 543, and the average age is about  43 years.
We assessed the condition of the KC-135 as yellow because it maintained  mission capable rates at or near the 85 percent goal despite the aircraft’s  age and potential corrosion of its structural components. Although the  aircraft is about 43 years old, average flying hours are slightly over a third  of its expected life of 39,000 hours, and an Air Force study projected the  KC-135 would last until about 2040. All KC-135s were subjected to an  aggressive corrosion preventive program and underwent significant  modifications, including replacement of the cockpit. Nevertheless, citing  increases in the work needed during periodic depot maintenance, costs,  and risk of the entire fleet being grounded, the Air Force decided to  accelerate recapitalization from 2013 to about 2006.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the KC-135 as red because the Air  Force has developed a long-term program strategy to modernize the aging  KC-135 tanker fleet, but it has not demonstrated the urgency of acquiring  replacement aircraft and has not defined the requirements for the number  of aircraft that will be needed. As we stated in testimony before the House  Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Projection Forces, the  department does not have a current, validated study on which to base the  size and composition of either the current fleet or a future aerial refueling  force. The Air Force has a large fleet of KC-135s (about 543), which were  flown about 300 hours annually between 1995 and September 2001. Since  then utilization is about 435 hours per year. Furthermore, the Air Force has  a shortage of aircrews to fly the aircraft it has. In Operation Iraqi Freedom,  a relatively small part of the fleet was used to support the conflict  (149 aircraft). Without a definitive analysis, it is difficult to determine if  recapitalization is needed and what alternatives might best satisfy the  requirement.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding of the KC-135 as red because current and future  funding is not consistent with the Air Force stated requirements to sustain  and modernize the KC-135 tanker fleet. The Air Force has not addressed  recapitalization funding in the current defense budget or in the Future  Years Defense Plan. The Air Force plans to begin acquiring new aircraft  almost immediately, but does not want to divert funding from other  programs to pay for them. The Air Force proposed a unique leasing  arrangement with Boeing that will provide new tankers as early as 2006.  There remains controversy over the lease terms, aircraft pricing, and how  the Air Force will pay for the lease.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the KC-135, Air Force officials indicated that the aircraft has  successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions despite current condition  problems. The KC-135 comprised 149 of the 182 tanker aircraft the Air  Force used during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and those aircraft flew almost  6,200 sorties and offloaded over 376 million pounds of fuel. The KC-135  maintained a mission capable rate above the current goal of 85 percent  during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
section_title: Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM)
paragraphs: The CALCM is an accurate long-range standoff weapon with an adverse  weather, day/night, and air-to-surface capability. It employs a global  positioning system coupled with an inertial navigation system. It was  developed to improve the effectiveness of the B-52 bombers and became  operational in January 1991. Since initial deployment, an upgraded avionics  package, including a larger conventional payload and a multi-channel  global positioning system receiver, has been added on all of the missiles.  The CALCM total inventory is about 478, and the average age is about  15 years.
We assessed the condition of the CALCM as green because the CALCM has  demonstrated high reliability. The Air Force has not noted any chronic  factors or problems that limit the effectiveness or reliability of the missile.  However, according to officials, the diagnostics test equipment needs to be  upgraded because it is old and was designed to support less sophisticated  missiles. Currently, the Air Force uses the same test equipment for both the  conventional and nuclear weapons.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the CALCM as green because the Air  Force has a long-term program strategy for sustaining and modernizing its  current inventory of cruise missiles. The Air Force does not have any future  plans to convert or purchase any additional nuclear missiles. The Joint  Chief of Staff must authorize the use of the conventional weapons and  approve the program in order to procure additional missiles. As the  inventory is depleted, the conventional weapon will be replaced with other  systems with similar capabilities, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff  Missile, which is currently under development. The Joint Air-to-Surface  Standoff Missile will not be a one-for-one replacement for the conventional  missile.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the CALCM as green because current and  projected funding is consistent with the Air Force stated requirements to  sustain and modernize its cruise missile inventory. Procurement of the  cruise missile is complete, and no funding has been provided for research  and development or procurement in the fiscal year 2003 budget.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the CALCM, Air Force officials indicated that it successfully  fulfilled its recent wartime missions. These officials indicated that the  cruise missile played a significant role in the initial strikes during Operation  Iraqi Freedom. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 153 missiles were  expended, and the version that is designed to penetrate hard targets was  first employed.
section_title: Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
paragraphs: The Joint Direct Attack Munition is a guidance tail kit that converts existing  unguided bombs into accurate, all-weather “smart” munitions. This is a  joint Air Force and Navy program to upgrade the existing inventory of 2,000  and 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs by integrating them with a  guidance kit consisting of a global positioning system-aided inertial  navigation system. In its most accurate mode, the system will provide a  weapon circular error probable of 13 meters or less. The JDAM first  entered the inventory in 1998. The total projected inventory of the JDAM is  about 92,679, and the current average age is less than 5 years. Future  upgrades will provide a 3-meter precision and improved anti-jamming  capability.
We assessed the condition of the JDAM as green because it consistently  met its reliability goal of 95 percent. The munitions are used as they  become available; therefore, no maintenance is involved. Although the Air  Force does not monitor the condition of munitions, they keep track of each  component of the guidance kit, which is tracked for serviceability. The kit  is under a 20-year warranty. The munitions are purchased serviceable and  are tested before used by the operational units. In addition to high  reliability, the JDAM can be purchased at a low cost and are being delivered  more than three times as fast as planned.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the JDAM as green because the Air  Force has a long-term program strategy for sustaining and maintaining its  production of the munitions. The Joint Direct Attack Munition  requirements are driven by assessments of war readiness and training  requirements. Currently, Boeing is in full production and is increasing its  production to about 2,800 per month for the Air Force and Navy, an  increase from approximately 700–900 a month. The second production line  is up and running.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the JDAM as green because current and  projected funding is consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements to  sustain and maintain production of the munitions. The President’s fiscal  year 2003 budget provided funding for the procurement of the system  through the future years defense plan. Air Force officials stated that the  munitions have all the funding it needs; however, it is limited by the  production capability of its contractor, Boeing.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the JDAM, Air Force officials indicated that it has successfully  fulfilled its recent wartime missions. The weapon system played a role in  operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. According to the Air Force,  the weapon has operationally proven to be more accurate, reliable, and  effective than predicted. The Air Force has not noted any factors or  capability concerns that would prevent the Joint Direct Attack Munitions  from effectively fulfilling its wartime mission.
section_title: Navy
subsections: section_title: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer
paragraphs: Navy Destroyers are multi-mission combatants that operate offensively and  defensively, independently, or as part of carrier battle groups, surface  action groups, and in support of Marine amphibious task forces. This is a  62-ship construction program, with 39 in the fleet as of 2003. The average  age of the ships is 5.8 years, with the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) coming into  service in 1991. The follow-on program is the DD(X), with initial  construction funding in 2005 and delivery beginning 2011.
We assessed the condition of the DDG-51 as yellow because work  programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not  accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock  period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the  industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work  package during dry-dock periods. Those items are then deferred to the next  scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous  maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance affects corrosion issues,  particularly the ship’s hull. Engineering and combat systems have priority  for resources with desirable, though not necessarily essential, crew quality  of life improvements deferred to a later time. The Navy balances risk  between available resources and deferring maintenance to make the most  cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or with minimal  safety or combat system deficiencies.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the DDG-51 as yellow because the  Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and  upgrading the DDG-51 fleet; however, budget cuts in the Navy’s  shipbuilding program affect upgrades to the warfighting systems and may  lead to potential problems in the industrial base when transitioning from  DDG to DD(X) ships. Navy officials noted that these budget cuts prevent  them from buying the latest available technologies. These technologies are  usually in warfighting systems, such as command and control and system  integration areas. Management of the transition period from DDG to DD(X)  shipbuilding between 2005 and 2008 will be key to avoid problems from  major fluctuations in the workload and workforce requirements.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the DDG-51 as yellow because current  and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s statement  requirements to sustain and upgrade the DDG-51 fleet. Lack of multiyear  budget authority creates budget inefficiencies because the Navy is required  to spend supplemental and 1-year funds within the year in which it is  appropriated. The Navy attempts to reduce ship maintenance costs by  leveling the maintenance workload for ship contractors, which provides  the Navy and contractors greater flexibility and predictability. The lack of  multiyear budgeting and the need to spend supplemental and 1-year funds  in the current year limits that effort. Ports are not equipped or manned to  accomplish the volume of work required in the time-span necessary to  execute 1-year appropriations. In some cases, differences between the  Navy estimate of scheduled maintenance costs and the contractor bid to do  the work requires cuts to the ship’s planned work package, further  contributing to the deferred maintenance backlog.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the DDG-51, Navy officials raised a number of capability  concerns. Specifically, these officials indicated that the DDG-51 has  successfully fulfilled its recent wartime mission, but with some limitations  such as communications shortfalls and force protection issues. Although  the DDG-51 class is the newest ship in the fleet with the most up to date  technologies, fleet officers said there is insufficient bandwidth for  communications during operations. Navy officials cited effective  management of available communications assets rather than the amount of  available bandwidth as the more immediate challenge. In the current threat  environment, force protection issues remain unresolved. The use of the  Ridged Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) during operations at sea without on- board crew-served weapons and hardening protection concerns  commanders. The small caliber of sailors’ personal and crew-served  weapons limits their effectiveness against the immediate and close-in  threat from small boat attack.
section_title: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate
paragraphs: Navy FFG-7 Frigates are surface combatants with anti-submarine warfare  (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities. Frigates conduct escort for  amphibious expeditionary forces, protection of shipping, maritime  interdiction, and homeland defense missions. There are 32 FFGs in the  fleet, with 30 programmed for modernization. The average age of the fleet  is 19 years. The FFGs are expected to remain in the fleet until 2020.
We assessed the condition of the FFG-7 as yellow because work  programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not  accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock  period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the  industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work  package during dry-dock periods. These items are then deferred to the next  scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous  maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance affects corrosion issues,  particularly the ship’s hull. Engineering and combat systems have priority  for resources with desirable, though not necessarily essential, crew quality  of life improvements deferred to a later time. The Navy balances risk  between available resources and deferring maintenance to make the most  cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or with minimal  safety or combat system deficiencies. There is the additional burden of  maintaining older systems on the frigates.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the FFG-7 as yellow because the  Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and  modernizing the FFG-7 fleet; however, the program is susceptible to budget  cuts. The modernization program is essential to ensure the frigates’  continued viability. There is also uncertainty about the role frigates will  play as the Littoral Combat Ship is developed.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the FFG-7 as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to  sustain and modernize the FFG-7 fleet. Uncertainty about modernization  program funding and budget inefficiencies created by the lack of multiyear  budget authority and the requirement to spend supplemental and 1-year  funds when they are appropriated. The Navy attempts to reduce ship  maintenance costs by leveling the maintenance workload for ship  contractors, which provides the Navy and contractors greater flexibility  and predictability. The lack of multiyear budget authority and the need to  spend supplemental and 1-year funds in the current year in which they are  appropriated limits that effort. Ports are not equipped or manned to  accomplish the volume of work required in the time span necessary to  execute 1-year appropriations. In some cases, differences between the  Navy estimate of scheduled maintenance costs and the contractor bid to do  the work requires cuts to the ship’s planned work package, further  contributing to the deferred maintenance backlog.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the FFG-7, Navy officials identified a number of capability  concerns including communications shortfalls and potential vulnerabilities  to air warfare. The frigate’s ability to operate in a battle group environment  is limited by insufficient bandwidth and lack of command circuits for  communications requirements. The Navy shut down the frigate’s missile  launcher because of excessive maintenance costs. Ship commanders in the  fleet expressed concern about potentially deploying with only one of three  compensating systems for anti-air warfare missions, the on-board 76-mm  rapid-fire gun (CWIS-1B, Close-In Weapons System). Officials in the  program manager’s office stated fielding plans were in place for the other  two systems, the MK53 Decoy Launch System, called NULKA, and the  Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). These systems will help mitigate the  frigate’s vulnerability after shutting down the missile launcher. The frigate’s  value to surface groups operating independently of carriers is as a  helicopter platform.
section_title: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft
paragraphs: The F/A-18 is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft expected to fly in the  fleet to 2030. There are six models in the current inventory of 875: A, 178; B,  30; C, 405; D, 143; E, 55; and F, 64. Average age in years is: A, 16.4; B, 18.0; C,  10.6; D, 10.1; E, 1.7; and F, 1.5. The Navy plans to eventually replace the  F/A-18 with the Joint Strike Fighter.
We assessed the condition of the F/A-18 as yellow because it consistently  failed to meet mission capable and fully mission capable goals of  75 percent and 58 percent, respectively. Squadrons that are deployed or are  training for deployment generally exceed these goals. Maintaining the  aircraft is increasingly difficult because of personnel shortfalls, increased  flying requirements, and lack of ground support equipment. Navy depot  personnel indicated that the availability of spare parts remains the largest  issue in repairing and returning aircraft to the fleet.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the F/A-18 as yellow because the  Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and  maintaining the F/A-18 fleet; however, it lacks a common baseline  capability for all aircraft. Navy officials stated managing the configuration  of the various versions of the aircraft is challenging. Each version of the  aircraft has different repair parts, unique on-board equipment, and  specially trained maintainers and pilots. To increase the service life of the  aircraft, the Navy initiated the Center Barrel Replacement (CBR) program.  CBR replaces those parts of the F/A-18 fuselage that have the greatest  stress placed on them from landing on aircraft carriers. The Navy is also  initiating a Navy/Marine Tactical Air Integration program that combines  low flying-hour / low carrier-landing aircraft for carrier use and high flying- hour / high carrier-landing aircraft for shore basing. If CBR is adequately  funded and the Tactical Air Integration initiative proceeds, the F/A-18 will  remain a viable system into the future.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the F/A-18 as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to  sustain and maintain the F/A-18 fleet. The Navy intends to fly the F/A-18A-D  models until 2020 and the E/F models to at least 2030. Funding for ground  support equipment for the A–D models was eliminated, leaving operators  and program managers to find resources elsewhere. Program dollars are  often drawn back, pushing modernization to the out years. This is a  problem for the CBR program that is $72 million short in the current Future  Years Defense Plan. Navy personnel state that the CBR program must be  fully funded to meet the number of aircraft required to support the Tactical  Air Integration initiative and standards in the new Fleet Response Plan.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the F/A-18, Navy officials indicated that the aircraft has  successfully fulfilled its wartime missions despite current condition  problems. The A-D models, along with the E/F models coming into the  inventory, provide a multi-capable aircraft for the many roles the war  fighting commanders require. These multi-role capabilities were  demonstrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom with the F/A-18 performing  air, ground attack, and refueling missions. Navy officials stated that they  will do whatever is necessary to accomplish the mission, but raised  concerns that maintenance costs are increasing due to current conditions  problems. Specifically these officials stated that increased maintenance  man hours per aircraft sortie, increased cannibalization rates, and  decreased readiness rates are creating more stress on the aircraft and the  personnel who fly and maintain them.
section_title: EA-6B Prowler Aircraft
paragraphs: The EA-6B is an integrated electronic warfare aircraft system combining  long-range, all-weather capabilities with advanced electronic  countermeasures. Its primary mission is to support strike aircraft and  ground troops by jamming enemy radar, data links, and communications.  The current inventory is 121 with an average age of 20.7 years. The  follow-on aircraft is the E/A-18G Growler Airborne Electronic Attack  aircraft, a variant of the F/A-18 E/F.
We assessed the condition of the EA-6B as yellow because it consistently  failed to meet the mission capable goal of 73 percent. However, squadrons  training for deployment or those that are deployed generally exceed this  goal. Fatigue life expenditure (FLE), the predictable rate of wear and  deterioration of wing center sections and outside wing panels, is a critical  problem and has caused aircraft to be temporarily grounded or placed  under flying restrictions to mitigate risk to the aircraft. Wing center  sections are that part of the plane where the wings and fuselage attach.  Outer wing panels are that part of the wing that fold up when the plane is  onboard carriers. The Navy is aggressively managing the problem and has  programs in place to replace these items in the near term.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the EA-6B as yellow because the  Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading the EA-6B  fleet; however, aircraft capability requirements may not be met in the  future. The Improved Capability 3rd Generation (ICAPIII) upgrade is a  significant technology leap in jamming capabilities over the current  second-generation capability. ICAPIII will counter threats through 2015 and  provides an advanced jamming capability, accurate target location, and full  circle coverage. By 2007, 30 percent of the fleet will be ICAPIII equipped.  The Navy plans for the follow-on EA-18G Growler to join the fleet between  2008 and 2012. The Navy purchase plan calls for 90 aircraft with over two- thirds (65 aircraft) procured by 2009.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the EA-6B as red because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to  sustain and upgrade the EA-6B fleet. The Navy relies upon additional  congressional appropriations rather than requesting funds to meet program  requirements. In fiscal year 2003, the Congress appropriated an additional  17 percent ($40 million) over DOD’s request for the EA-6B. The Navy is not  funding modernization programs to the stated requirements. The Navy’s  requirement for the ICAPIII electronic attack upgrade is 42 systems,  although the Navy is only funding 35 systems. According to the program  manager, funding for replacing the EA-6B’s outside wing panels is still  uncertain.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the EA-6B, Navy officials indicated that the aircraft has  successfully fulfilled its wartime missions with some limitations. Potential  funding shortfalls and capability limitations may affect the aircraft’s ability  to perform its mission. Only 98 out of 108 aircraft in the Navy’s EA-6B  inventory are available to the fleet. Current EA-6B capabilities can meet the  threat, although without an increase in the number of ICAPIII capable  aircraft, the Navy may not be able to meet future threats. According to  Navy officials, there is an impending severe impact on warfighting  capabilities if the Navy does not receive fiscal year 2003 procurement  funding for outside wing panels as requested. Specifically, the combination  of the expected wear and tear on the panels and the normal aircraft  attrition rate could reduce the total EA-6B inventory by 16 in 2005.
section_title: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship
paragraphs: The LPD-4 ships are warships that embark, transport, and land elements of  a Marine landing force and its equipment. There are currently 11 in the  inventory with an average age of 35 years. These ships are expected to  remain in the fleet until 2014. The San Antonio-class LPD-17 (12-ship  construction program, LPD-17 through LPD-28) will eventually replace the  LPD-4.
We assessed the condition of the LPD-4 as yellow because work  programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not  accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock  period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the  industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work  package during dry-dock periods. These items are then deferred to the next  scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous  maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance increases corrosion problems,  particularly for the ship’s hull. There are consistent problems with the  engagement system for on-board weapons and the hull, mechanics, and  electrical (HME) systems associated with the ship’s combat support  system. The age of the LPD-4 fleet directly contributes to the deteriorating  condition of the ships, particularly the hydraulic systems. The Navy  balances risk between available resources and deferring maintenance to  make the most cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or  with minimal safety or combat system deficiencies.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the LPD-4 as green because the Navy  has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and replace  amphibious dock ships and improve support to Marine amphibious forces.  The Extended Sustainment Program was initiated because of delay in  delivery of the new LPD-17 class ships. The program will extend the service  life of 6 of 11 ships for an average of 7.3 years to the 2009–2014 time frame.  The program consists of 37 prioritized work items endorsed by the Navy.  The follow-on LPD-17 ship construction program incorporates innovative  design and total ownership cost initiatives; however, no modernization or  upgrades are planned in the construction timeline from 1999 to 2013.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the LPD-4 as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to  sustain and replace amphibious dock ships. The age and decommissioning  schedule for the ships means funding priorities are placed elsewhere. The  Navy is seeking cost savings through efforts to level the industrial base in  ports and provide predictability and management flexibility for  programmed maintenance work. A significant limitation in that effort is the  inability to use multiyear budgeting and the need to spend supplemental  and 1-year funds in the year of appropriation. Ports are often not equipped  and manned to accomplish the volume of work required in the time-span  necessary to execute 1-year budgets.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the LPD-4, Navy officials did not identify any specific  capability concerns. These officials indicated that the LPD-4 fulfilled its  recent wartime missions of transporting and moving Marines and their  equipment ashore.
section_title: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile
paragraphs: The Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) is a medium to long-range, shipboard  surface- to-air missile with the primary mission of fleet area air defense and  ship self-defense, and a secondary mission of anti-surface ship warfare. The  Navy is currently procuring only the Block IIIB version of this missile.  While the actual number in the inventory is classified, the Navy plans to  procure 825 Block IIIB missiles between fiscal years 1997 and 2007.  Currently, 88 percent of the inventory is older than 9 years. A qualitative  evaluation program adjusted the initial 10-year service life out to 15 years.
We assessed the condition of the Standard Missile–2 as red because it failed  to meet the asset readiness goal of 87 percent and only 2 of 5 variants  achieved the goal in fiscal year 2002. The asset readiness goal is the missile  equivalent of mission capable goals. The percent of non-ready for issue  missiles (currently at 23 percent of the inventory) will increase because of  funding shortfalls.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the Standard Missile-2 as yellow  because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for  upgrading the Standard Missile-2 inventory; however, the Navy’s strategy  mitigates risk with complementary systems as the SM-2 inventory draws  down and upgrades to counter known threats are cut from the budget. In  2002, the Navy cancelled production of the most capable variant at the  time, the SM-2 Block IVA. Currently, the most capable missile is the SM-2  Block IIIB, which is the only variant in production. This missile will be the  main anti-air warfare weapon on board Navy ships into the next decade.  Improved Block IIIB missiles will be available in 2004. The SM-6 Extended  Range Active Missile (ERAM) is programmed for initial production in 2008  and will be available to the fleet in 2010.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the Standard Missile-2 as red because  current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated  requirements to upgrade the Standard Missile-2 inventory. There is a  $72.6 million shortfall for maintenance and a shortfall of approximately  $60 million for procurement in the current Future Years Defense Plan.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the Standard Missile-2, Navy officials indicated that it  successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some limitations.  Block IIIB and improved Block IIIB missiles successfully counter the  threats they were designed to counter. However, the most capable variant  in the current inventory cannot handle the more sophisticated known air  threats. The Navy lost a capability to intercept extended range and ballistic  missiles when development of the Block IVA variant was cancelled. The  improved Block IIIB missiles will mitigate some risk until the SM-6 ERAM  is deployed in 2010. Further, Navy officials stated that the Navy accepts an  element of risk until the SM-6 is deployed because the threat is limited in  both the number of missiles and the scenarios where those missiles would  be employed. Officials also described the Navy’s anti-air warfare capability  as one of complementary systems and not singularly dependent on the  SM-2 missile. The Navy successfully increased the deployment of these  missiles to the fleet for the recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but  the growing shortage of ready-for-issue missiles in future years could  severely limit the Navy’s ability to meet future requirements.
section_title: Tomahawk Cruise Missile
paragraphs: The Tomahawk Cruise Missile is a long-range, subsonic cruise missile used  for land attack warfare, and is launched from surface ships and  submarines. The current inventory is 1,474 missiles, with an average age of  11.88 years and a 30-year service life. During Operation Iraqi Freedom,  788 Tomahawk’s were expended. The follow-on Tactical Tomahawk  (TACTOM) is scheduled to enter the inventory in 2005.
We assessed the condition of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as green  because it consistently met asset readiness goals in recent years. The asset  readiness goal is classified.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as red  because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for  upgrading the Tomahawk Cruise Missile inventory; however, the future  inventory level will not be determined until funding questions are resolved.  During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 789 Tomahawks were expended with a  remaining inventory of 1,474. The replenishment missiles are all  programmed to be the new Tactical Tomahawk missile. Even when funding  is appropriated and executed this fiscal year, the first available date for  new missiles entering the inventory will be late 2005–2006. A  remanufacturing program planned for 2002–2004 is upgrading the  capabilities of older missiles. There are 249 missiles remaining to be  upgraded.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as red because  current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated  requirements to replenish the inventory and new production is unresolved.  Inventory replenishment funding was authorized by the Congress and, at  the time of our review, was in conference to resolve differences between  the two bills.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile, Navy officials indicated that it  has successfully fulfilled its wartime missions during recent operations in  Afghanistan and Iraq. Improved Tomahawks came into the inventory in  1993 and provided enhanced accuracy on targets. The newest variant, the  Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM), is scheduled to come into the inventory in  2005 and improves the missile with an upgraded guidance system and in- flight re-programming capability. This upgrade program is also expected to  lower the missile’s production unit and life-cycle support costs.
section_title: Marine Corps
subsections: section_title: AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter
paragraphs: The AH-1W Super Cobra provides en route escort and protection of troop  assault helicopters, landing zone preparation immediately prior to the  arrival of assault helicopters, landing zone fire suppression during the  assault phase, and fire support during ground escort operations. There are  193 aircraft in the inventory with an average age of 12.6 years.
We assessed the condition of the AH-1W as yellow because it consistently  failed to meet its mission capable goals from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year  2002. Although Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune AH-1W maintainers  cited insufficient spare parts and cannibalization as problems, overall,  operators were always positive in their comments about the condition of  the AH-1W. Condition concerns will be remedied in the near term by the  AH-1W upgrade program that is proceeding as scheduled with an October  1, 2003, anticipated start date.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the AH-1W as green because the  Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading  the AH-1W helicopter to the AH-1Z, achieving 85 percent commonality with  the UH-1Y helicopter fleet. Estimated savings of $3 billion in operation and  maintenance costs over the next 30 years have been reported. Additionally,  the upgrade program will enhance the helicopter’s speed, maneuverability,  fuel capacity, ammunition capacity, and targeting systems.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the AH-1W as green because current and  projected funding is consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated requirements  to sustain and upgrade the AH-1W fleet. Although we assessed funding as  green, Marine Corps officials at Camp Pendleton cited the need for  additional funding for spare parts and noted that cost overruns have  occurred in recent years for the AH-1W upgrade program.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the AH-1W, Marine Corps officials indicated that it  successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some limitations.  Specifically, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps operators at  Camp Pendleton stated that the AH-1W’s ammunition and fuel capacity was  insufficient for some operations, such as Afghanistan. The AH-1Z upgrade  program, however, will address these concerns.
section_title: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter
paragraphs: The Sea Knight helicopter provides all weather, day/night, night-vision  capable assault transport of combat troops, supplies and equipment during  amphibious and subsequent operations ashore. There are 226 aircraft in the  inventory. The CH-46E is more than 30 years old. The MV-22 Osprey is the  planned replacement aircraft for the CH-46E.
We assessed the condition of the CH-46E as red because it consistently  failed to meet mission capable goals between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal  year 2002. The operational mean time between failures decreased from  1.295 hours to 0.62 hours during the course of our review. Marine Corps  officials cited concern over the aircrafts age and the uncertainty about the  fielding of the MV-22 to replace the Sea Knight. Marine Corps officials  called the current maintenance programs critical to meeting condition  requirements.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the CH-46E as yellow because the  Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and  replace the CH-46E fleet. The sustainment strategy, dated August 19, 2003,  outlines the service’s plans to sustain the CH-46E until retirement in 2015 or  longer. However, according to press reports, DOD has decided to reduce  the purchase of replacement systems by about 8 to 10 aircraft over the next  few years. If DOD buys fewer replacement systems, the service will have to  adjust the sustainment strategy to retain additional CH-46E aircraft in its  inventory longer.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the CH-46E as red because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated  requirements to sustain and replace the CH-46E fleet. Marine Corps  officials asserted continued funding for maintaining the CH-46E is  essential. The fiscal year 2004 budget request included a request for  funding of safety improvement kits, long-range communications upgrade,  aft transmission overhaul, and lightweight armor. The Navy lists CH-46E  safety improvement kits as a $4 million unfunded requirement.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the CH-46E, Marine Corps raised a number of specific  capability concerns. Specifically, these officials stated that the intended  mission cannot be adequately accomplished due to lack of payload. The  CH-46E has lost 1,622 pounds of lift since its fielding over 35 years ago due  to increased weight and can only carry a 12-troop payload on a standard  day. More recently, Marine Corps officials rated the performance of the  CH-46E during Operation Iraqi Freedom as satisfactory despite these lift  limitations.
section_title: Assault Amphibian Vehicle- Personnel (AAV)
paragraphs: The AAV is an armored, fully-tracked landing vehicle that carries troops in  water operations from ship to shore through rough water and surf zone, or  to inland objectives ashore. There are 1,057 vehicles in the inventory. The  Marine Corps plans to replace the AAV with the Expeditionary Fighting  Vehicle (formerly the AAAV—Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle).
We assessed the condition of the AAV as yellow because of its age and the  fact that the Marine Corps plans to upgrade only 680 of the 1,057 AAVs  currently in the inventory. Furthermore, the planned upgrade program will  only restore the vehicle to its original operating condition rather than  upgrading it to perform beyond its original operating condition. We could  not base our assessment of the condition on readiness rates in relation to  the readiness rate goals because the Marine Corps did not provide  sufficient trend data. Marine Corps officials at Pacific Command stated that  the heavy usage of the AAV during Operation Iraqi Freedom and the long  fielding schedule of the replacement vehicle present significant  maintenance challenges. However, we assessed the condition yellow  instead of red based on favorable comments about the current condition of  the AAV from operators and maintainers.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the AAV as yellow because the  Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for overhauling  the AAV; however, the program only restores the vehicle to its original  operating condition and does not upgrade the vehicles beyond original  condition. The Marine Corps initiated a Reliability, Availability and  Maintenance/Rebuild to Standard (RAM/RS) upgrade program in 1998 to  restore capabilities and lengthen the expected service life of the AAV to  sustain the vehicles until the replacement system, the Expeditionary  Fighting Vehicle (formerly the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle), can  be fielded. The RAM/RS is expected to extend the AAV service life an  additional 10 years. These vehicles will be needed until the replacement  vehicles can be fielded in 2012. However, the procurement of the  replacement vehicles has reportedly already been delayed by 2 years.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the AAV as yellow because current and  projected funding is not consistent with the Marine Corps’ requirements to  upgrade the AAV inventory. Requested funding rose from $13.5 million in  fiscal year 1998 to $84.5 million in fiscal year 1999 as the Marines initiated  the RAM/RS program. The requested funding level declined to $66.2 million  by fiscal year 2002. The Marine Corps identified a $48.9 million unfunded  program in the fiscal year 2004 budget request to extend RAM/RS to more  vehicles. Marine Corps officials are concerned reconstitution of the  vehicles from Operation Iraqi Freedom will not include funding for vehicles  returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom for the RAM/RS program.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the AAV, Marine Corps officials indicated that it has  successfully fulfilled its wartime missions but with some limitations. While  these officials cited the AAV as integral to ground operations during  Operation Iraqi Freedom, they noted specific stresses placed on the  vehicles. For example, AAVs deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom traveled,  on average, over 1,000 miles each, a majority of those miles under combat  conditions. Those conditions added about 5 years worth of miles and wear  and tear to the vehicles over a 6- to 8-week period. In addition, prior to  Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps officials at Camp Lejeune  highlighted problems they encountered with obtaining enhanced armor kits  to protect the vehicles from the .50 caliber ammunition that was used by  Iraqi forces. At the time of our review, only 26 of 213 AAVs at Camp Lejeune  had been provided the enhanced armor kits. Marine Corps officials at  Camp Lejeune believed the lack of kits was due to insufficient funding.
section_title: Light Armored Vehicle- Command & Control (LAV-C2)
paragraphs: The LAV-C2 variant is a mobile command station providing field  commanders with the communication resources to command and control  Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) units. It is an all-terrain, all-weather  vehicle with night capabilities and can be made fully amphibious within  three minutes. There are 50 vehicles in the inventory with an average age of  14 years.
We assessed the condition of the LAV-C2 as green because the Marine  Corps has initiated a fleet-wide Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to  extend the service life of the vehicle from 20 years to 27 years. The LAV-C2  SLEP includes enhancements to communications capabilities. Marine  Corps officials cautioned that any delays in SLEP could affect future  readiness. While we assessed the condition as green, we noted the  operational readiness rate for the command and control variant was  90.5 percent, below the 100 percent goal but higher than the operational  readiness rate of 85 percent for the entire fleet.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the LAV-C2 as green because the  Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading  the LAV-C2 inventory. The program funded in the current FYDP will  enhance communications capabilities and power systems and may afford  commonality with Unit Operation Center and helicopter systems. The  Marines Corps intend for the upgraded LAV-C2 to provide a prototype to  establish baseline requirements for future capabilities and a successor  acquisition strategy. Marine Corps officials stated the C2 upgrade program  needs to be supported at all levels.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the LAV-C2 as green because current and  projected funding is consistent with Marine Corps stated requirements to  upgrade the LAV-C2 inventory. Marine Corps officials have requested  $72.2 million in the current FYDP to support major LAV-C2 technology  upgrades. Marine Corps officials at Pacific Command recommended  increased funding for procurement of additional vehicles, citing the current  inventory deficiency as critical.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the LAV-C2, Marine Corps officials indicated that it has  successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. Marine Corps reports  regarding the operations in Afghanistan cited LAVs in general as the most  capable and dependable mobility platform despite the fact that the number  of available C-17 transport aircraft limited the deployment of the vehicles.  Initial reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom also indicate that the LAV-C2  performed successfully.
section_title: AGM-65E Maverick Missile
paragraphs: The Maverick missile is a precision-guided, air-to-ground missile  configured primarily for the anti-tank and anti-ship roles. It is launched  from a variety of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters and there are laser and  infrared-guided variants. The Maverick missile was first fielded in 1985.
We assessed the condition of the Maverick missile as not applicable  because the Marine Corps does not track readiness data such as mission  capable or operational readiness rates for munitions as they do for aircraft  or other equipment.
subsections: section_title: Program Strategy
paragraphs: We assessed the program strategy for the Maverick missile as green  because the Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for  replacing the Maverick missile with more capable missiles. Maverick  missile procurement ended in 1992 and the infrared variant will no longer  be used in 2003. According to Marine Forces Pacific Command officials, a  joint common missile is being developed and scheduled for initial  operational capability in 2008. The new missile will be a successor to the  Maverick, Hellfire, and TOW missiles. Marine Corps officials stated a joint  reactive precision-guided munition for both fixed- and rotary-winged  aircraft as a potential successor to Maverick and Hellfire missiles will be  submitted to the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee for evaluation in  fiscal year 2003.
section_title: Funding
paragraphs: We assessed the funding for the Maverick missile as green because current  and projected funding is consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated  requirements to replace the Maverick missile inventory. Since fiscal year  1998, the Marine Corps limited funding for the Maverick to the operation  and maintenance accounts.
section_title: Wartime Capability
paragraphs: While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime  capability of the Maverick missile, Marine Corps officials indicated that it  has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some  limitations. Specifically, these officials stated that the Maverick missile  lacks an all-weather capability. Marine Corps officials cited increased risks  due to sensor limitations of the laser variant that restricts the missile’s use  to low threat environments. Although the Maverick fulfilled its wartime  mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps officials stressed  that its success was due to the fact that this was the optimal environment  for the Maverick—desert environment and a lack of low cloud cover. In any  other type of environment, however, the Maverick’s use is limited.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Richard Payne, Donna Rogers,  Jim Mahaffey, Patricia Albritton, Tracy Whitaker, Leslie Harmonson, John  Beauchamp, Warren Lowman, Ricardo Marquez, Jason Venner, Stanley  Kostyla, Susan Woodward, and Jane Lusby made key contributions to this  report.
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs