Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts
Published: 2007-01-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland fires has increased, often threatening human lives, property, and ecosystems. The cost of responding to wildland fires has also grown, especially as more homes are built in or near wildlands, an area called the wildland-urban interface. Past management practices, including a concerted federal policy in the 20th century of suppressing fires to protect communities and ecosystems, unintentionally resulted in steady accumulation of dense vegetation that can fuel large, intense, and often costly wildland fires. GAO was asked to identify actions that federal wildland fire agencies need to take to help contain federal wildland fire expenditures. GAO has identified these actions in three of its reports addressing fuel reduction and cost-sharing efforts and as part of an ongoing review of federal agencies' efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs for this committee. Specifically, GAO focused on examining agencies' efforts to (1) reduce accumulated fuels and address wildland fire problems, (2) share with nonfederal entities the costs of responding to multijurisdictional fires, and (3) contain the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Over the past 7 years, GAO has recommended a number of actions federal wildland fire agencies should take to improve their management of wildland fire activities, actions that could also help contain the rising federal expenditures for responding to wildland fires. These agencies--the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and land management agencies within the Department of the Interior--concurred with GAO's recommendations but have not completed, or in some cases have not yet begun, needed actions. GAO's ongoing review of federal agencies' efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs has also identified other actions that may be needed. Specifically, the agencies need to: (1) Develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the options and associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems. In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and the cost of suppression efforts, GAO recommended that a cohesive strategy be developed that identified the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing these fuels. In 2005 and 2006, because the agencies had not yet developed one, GAO reiterated the need for such a strategy but broadened its focus to better address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction efforts and wildland fire response. GAO also recommended that, as an interim step, the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining the steps and time frames needed for completing a cohesive strategy. As of January 2007, the agencies had not developed either a cohesive strategy or a tactical plan. (2) Clarify their guidance for sharing wildland fire suppression costs with nonfederal entities. In 2006, to address the rising costs of responding to fires that threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources, GAO recommended that the federal agencies provide more specific guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be used. The cost-sharing method used can have significant financial consequences for the entities involved--potentially amounting to millions of dollars. As of January 2007, the agencies were updating their guidance on possible cost-sharing methods and when each typically would be used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that the guidance is followed. (3) Establish clear goals, strategies, and performance measures to help contain wildland fire costs. Preliminary findings from GAO's ongoing work indicate that the effectiveness of agencies' efforts to contain costs may be limited because the agencies have not clearly defined their cost-containment goals, developed a strategy for achieving those goals, or developed related performance measures. For these efforts to be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program--such as protecting life and property--and to recognize that trade-offs will be needed to meet desired goals within the context of fiscal constraints.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the key actions that we believe  federal wildland fire management agencies—the Forest Service within the  Department of Agriculture and four agencies within the Department of the  Interior—need to complete to help contain the rising costs of preparing for  and responding to wildland fires. Increasing wildland fire threats to  communities and ecosystems, combined with rising costs of addressing  those threats—trends that we and others have reported on for many  years—have not abated. On average, the acreage burned annually by  wildland fires from 2000 to 2005 was 70 percent greater than the acreage  burned annually during the 1990s. Appropriations for wildland fire  management activities tripled from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1999 to  nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 2005. Although the agencies are still refining  their data, 2006 was an especially severe year, with almost 10 million acres  burned and what are likely to be the highest federal fire suppression  expenditures ever. A number of factors have contributed to more-severe  fires and corresponding increases in expenditures for wildland fire  management activities. These factors include an accumulation of fuels due  to past fire suppression policies; severe weather and drought in some  areas of the country; and growing numbers of homes built in or near  wildlands, an area often called the wildland-urban interface. In light of the  federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation,  attention has increasingly focused on ways to contain these growing  expenditures and to ensure that the agencies’ wildland fire activities are  appropriate and carried out in a cost-effective and efficient manner.
My testimony today includes findings from three of our recent reports,  plus preliminary findings from work under way, which together  summarize key wildland fire management weaknesses we have identified  over the last 7 years, as well as critical actions the agencies need to  complete if they are to effectively contain the rising costs of responding to  wildland fires. Specifically, my testimony focuses on three issues: the  agencies’ efforts to (1) reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems,  (2) share with nonfederal entities the costs of responding to fires that burn  or threaten to burn multiple jurisdictions, and (3) contain federal  expenditures of preparing for and responding to wildland fires. To  evaluate these issues, we reviewed selected reports that we have issued  since 2000, as well as those by other federal agencies or outside  organizations, that assessed federal wildland fire management. We  reviewed pertinent agency plans, policies, procedures, reports, and  financial documents, and we interviewed federal and nonfederal officials  to identify steps federal agencies have taken to address these areas and  the challenges remaining. We performed our work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards from May 2006 through  January 2007.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Wildland fires ignited by lightning are both natural and inevitable and play  an important ecological role on the nation’s landscape. In addition to  maintaining habitat diversity, releasing soil nutrients, and causing the  seeds of fire-dependent species to germinate, fire periodically removes  undergrowth, small trees, and vegetation that can otherwise build up and  intensify subsequent fires. However, various human land use and  management practices, including decades of suppressing wildland fires,  have altered the normal frequency of fires in many forest and rangeland  ecosystems, leading to uncharacteristically dense vegetation and atypical  fire patterns in some places. At the same time, more homes and  communities are being built in areas where fires can occur, increasing  risks to human life, property, and infrastructure. Experts estimate that  between 1990 and 2000, 60 percent of all new housing units in the United  States were built in the wildland-urban interface, and by 2000, about 38  percent of housing units overall were located in the wildland-urban  interface. Recent media reports indicate that this trend of growth in the  wildland-urban interface continues. Finally, agency analyses indicate that  climate change and related drought may also be responsible for significant  increases in the occurrence of, and costs of responding to, wildland fire.
Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost of  fighting them, have led federal agencies to fundamentally reexamine their  approach to wildland fire management. For decades, federal agencies  aggressively suppressed wildland fires and were generally successful in  decreasing the number of acres burned. In some areas of the country,  however, rather than eliminating severe wildland fires, decades of  suppression disrupted ecological cycles and began to change the structure  and makeup of forests and rangelands, increasing the land’s susceptibility  to fire. Increasingly, the agencies have recognized the key role that fire  plays in many ecosystems and the utility of fire itself as a tool in managing  forests and watersheds. The agencies worked together to develop the  Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy in 1995, which for the first time  formally recognized the essential role that fire plays in maintaining natural  systems. This policy was subsequently reaffirmed and updated in 2001. In  addition to noting the negative effects of past wildland fire suppression,  the policy also recognized that continued development in the wildland- urban interface has placed more values at risk from wildland fire while  increasing the complexity and cost of wildland fire suppression  operations.
To help address these trends, the policy directed agencies to consider  management objectives and the values at risk when determining how or  whether to suppress a wildland fire. Under this approach, termed  “appropriate management response,” the agencies may fight fires that  threaten communities or other highly valued areas more aggressively than  they fight fires in remote areas or in areas where natural fuel reduction  would be beneficial. In some cases, the agencies may simply monitor the  fire, or take only limited suppression actions, to ensure that it continues to  pose little threat to valued resources. Under current interagency policy,  local federal units must develop land management and fire management  plans that document approved fire management strategies for each acre of  burnable land and other important information about how the land will be  managed, including local values at risk, needed local fuel reduction, and  rehabilitation actions. Once a fire starts, land management and fire  management specialists are to identify and implement the appropriate  management response, in accordance with the unit’s approved land and  fire management plans.
Responding to wildland fires—which can burn across federal and  nonfederal jurisdictions—often requires coordination and collaboration  among federal, tribal, state, and local firefighting entities to effectively  protect lives, homes, and resources. Five federal agencies—the Forest  Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian  Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and  National Park Service within the Department of the Interior—fight  wildland fires. These federal agencies work together with nonfederal  firefighting entities to share personnel, equipment, and supplies and to  fight fires, regardless of which entities have jurisdiction over the burning  lands. Agreements developed and agreed to by cooperating entities,  commonly referred to as master agreements, govern cooperative fire  protection efforts and include general provisions for sharing firefighting  costs among responsible entities.
section_title: Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Problems
paragraphs: Agencies need a cohesive strategy that identifies the available long-term  options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and  responding to wildland fires if the agencies and the Congress are to make  informed decisions about an effective and affordable long-term approach  for addressing problems that have been decades in the making. We first  recommended that the agencies develop such a strategy for addressing  fuels in 1999. After we evaluated a number of related wildland fire  management issues, we reiterated our recommendation in 2005 and 2006  but also recognized that a comprehensive solution needs to address not  only reducing fuels but also an overall response to wildland fire. To  develop an effective overall strategy, agencies need to complete several  key tasks, which address weaknesses we previously identified.
Our 2005 report summarized several weaknesses in the federal  government’s management of fuel reduction and related wildland fire  programs and identified a number of actions to address these weaknesses.  Specifically, these weaknesses included the following: the agencies lacked  basic data, such as the extent and location of lands needing fuel reduction;  the agencies needed to identify and prioritize fuel reduction projects;  many federal land management units did not have fire management plans  that met agency requirements designed to restore fire’s natural role in  ecosystems consistent with human health and safety; and the agencies  were unable to assess the extent to which they were reducing wildland fire  risks, to establish meaningful fuel reduction performance measures, or to  determine the cost-effectiveness of these efforts because they lacked  needed data. We also identified a number of tasks the agencies needed to  complete to develop a cohesive strategy. These tasks included finishing  data systems that are needed to identify the extent, severity, and location  of wildland fire threats in our national forests and rangelands; updating  local fire management plans to better specify the actions needed to  effectively address these threats; and assessing the cost-effectiveness and  affordability of options for reducing fuels and responding to wildland fire  problems.
The agencies have made some progress on the three primary tasks we  identified as important to developing a wildland fire management strategy,  although concerns have been raised about when or whether the agencies  will successfully complete them. More specifically,    LANDFIRE, a geospatial data and modeling system, is being designed to  assist the agencies in identifying the extent, severity, and location of  wildland fire threats to the nation’s communities and ecosystems.  LANDFIRE data are nearly complete for most of the western United  States, with data for the remainder of the country scheduled to be  completed in 2009. The agencies will need to ensure, however, that  LANDFIRE data are kept current in order to reflect landscape-altering  events, such as large fires and hurricanes, and they do not yet have a plan  to do so.
In 2006, we reported that 95 percent of the agencies’ individual land  management units had completed fire management plans in accordance  with agency requirements promulgated in 2001. However, the agencies do  not require regular plan updates to ensure that new data (from  LANDFIRE, for example) are incorporated into the plans. Moreover, in the  wake of two court decisions—each holding that the Forest Service was  required to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact  statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to  accompany the relevant fire management plan—the Forest Service  decided to withdraw the two plans instead of completing them. It is  unclear whether the agency would withdraw other fire management plans  successfully challenged under NEPA; nor is it clear whether or to what  extent such agency decisions could undermine the interagency policy  directing that every burnable acre have a fire management plan. Without  such plans, however, current agency policy does not allow use of the  entire range of wildland fire response strategies, including less aggressive,  and potentially less costly, strategies.
The Fire Program Analysis (FPA) system is a computer-based model  designed to assist the agencies in cost-effectively allocating the resources  necessary to address wildland fires. FPA is being designed in two phases.  Phase I was intended to provide information for use in allocating  resources for the initial responses to fires and in developing estimates for  agencies’ fiscal year 2008 budgets. Phase II was to be focused on  additional activities, including fuel reduction and large-fire suppression. A  “midcourse review” of FPA, completed in 2006, however, has resulted in  recent endorsement by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council of what may  be significant design modifications to FPA—ones that may not fulfill key  project goals of (1) optimizing how resources are allocated, (2) linking fuel  reduction to future preparedness and suppression costs, (3) ensuring  comparability among different agencies’ analyses and resulting decisions,  and (4) enabling aggregation of local costs to identify national options and  related budgets. Agencies plan to have a prototype of phase II, reflecting  this design modification, completed by June 2007. According to a program  official, the prototype will enable project managers to assess and report to  the leadership council on the planned scope, schedule, and cost of FPA,  including whether or not they will meet the scheduled completion date of  June 2008. Further, gaps in the data collected for FPA may also reduce its  usefulness in allocating resources.
Although the agencies had made progress on these three primary tasks at  the time of our 2006 update, they had not developed either a cohesive  strategy identifying options for reducing fuels or a joint tactical plan  outlining the critical steps, together with related time frames, the agencies  would take to complete a cohesive strategy, as we recommended in our  2005 report. In February 2006, the agencies issued an interagency  document titled Protecting People and Natural Resources: A Cohesive  Fuels Treatment Strategy, but we found that the document did not  identify long-term options or associated funding for reducing fuels and  responding to wildland fires. During our update, officials from the Office  of Management and Budget stated that it would not allow the agencies to  publish long-term funding estimates until the agencies had sufficiently  reliable data on which to base the estimates. The agencies commented that  having such data would not be possible until LANDFIRE and FPA were  more fully operational. We continue to believe that until a cohesive  strategy can be developed, it is essential that the agencies create a tactical  plan for developing this strategy, so the Congress understands the steps  and time frames involved in completing the strategy.
section_title: Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of Suppression Costs between Federal and Nonfederal Entities
paragraphs: Federal agencies need to take steps to improve the framework for sharing  wildland fire suppression costs between federal and nonfederal entities.  Effective sharing of suppression costs among responsible entities can play  a role in helping to contain federal expenditures, especially with the  growing number of homes in areas at risk from wildland fire that may  require protection. We recommended in our 2006 report that federal  agencies work with relevant state entities to clarify the financial  responsibilities for suppressing fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across  multiple jurisdictions and provide more specific guidance as to when  particular cost-sharing methods should be used. As of January 2007, the  agencies were updating guidance on options for sharing costs and under  what circumstances each would typically be used, but it is unclear how the  agencies will ensure that such guidance is followed.
We found that federal and nonfederal entities used a variety of methods to  share the costs of fighting wildland fires affecting both federal and  nonfederal lands and resources. Agreements between federal and  nonfederal entities—known as master agreements—provide the  framework for those entities to share suppression costs for wildland fires  that burn or threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources.  These agreements typically list several available cost-sharing methods.  The agreements we reviewed, however, often lacked clear guidance for  officials to use in deciding which method to apply for a specific fire. Clear  guidance is important because local representatives of federal and  nonfederal firefighting entities responsible for protecting lands and  resources affected by the fire use this guidance in deciding which costs  will be shared and for what period. We found, however, that cost-sharing  methods were applied inconsistently within and among states, even for  fires with similar characteristics. For example, in one state we reviewed,  the costs for suppressing a large fire that threatened homes were shared  solely according to the proportion of acres burned within each entity’s  area of fire protection responsibility, a method that has traditionally been  used. Yet costs for a similar fire within the same state were shared  differently. For this fire, the state agreed to pay for certain aircraft and fire  engines used to protect the wildland-urban interface, while the remaining  costs were shared on the basis of acres burned. In contrast to the two  methods applied in this state, officials in another state used yet a different  cost-sharing method for two similar large fires that threatened homes,  apportioning costs each day for personnel, aircraft, and equipment  deployed on particular lands, such as the wildland-urban interface. The  type of cost-sharing method ultimately used can have significant financial  consequences for the entities involved, potentially amounting to millions  of dollars. Moreover, as we reported, federal officials expressed concern  that the existing cost-sharing framework insulated state and local  governments from the cost of providing wildland fire protection in the  wildland-urban interface, thus reducing the incentive for state and local  governments to adopt laws—such as building codes that require fire- resistant materials in areas at high risk of wildland fires—that in the long  run could help reduce the cost of suppressing wildland fires.
We recommended in our 2006 report that the federal agencies work with  relevant state entities to clarify the financial responsibility for fires that  burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple jurisdictions and develop more  specific guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be  used. The federal agencies generally agreed with our findings and  recommendations and agreed to improve the guidance on sharing  suppression costs. As of January 2007, the agencies were updating  guidance that can be used when developing master agreements between  cooperating federal and nonfederal entities, as well as agreements on how  to share costs for a specific fire. Agency officials said that this guidance  provides additional information about potential methods for sharing costs  and about the circumstances under which each cost-sharing method  would typically be used. It is unclear, however, how the agencies will  ensure that the guidance is followed. Further, because master agreements  are updated only every 5 years, it may take a number of years before the  new guidance is fully incorporated into master agreements between  cooperating entities.
section_title: Lack of Clear Goals and Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies’ Efforts to Contain Wildland Fire Costs
paragraphs: Preliminary findings from our ongoing work for the committee show that,  despite dozens of federal and nonfederal studies issued since 2000 that  consistently identified similar areas needing improvement to help contain  wildland fire costs, the agencies have made little progress in addressing  these areas. Areas identified as needing improvement to help contain  costs—in addition to reducing fuels and cost sharing discussed  previously—include acquiring and using firefighting personnel and  equipment, selecting appropriate strategies for responding to wildland  fires, and effectively managing cost-containment efforts. Although the  agencies have begun taking steps to address some of the areas previous  studies have identified as needing improvement, much work remains to be  done. For example:    Acquiring and using personnel and equipment. The agencies have  taken steps to improve their ability to track and deploy personnel and  equipment, but they have made little progress in completing the more  fundamental step of determining the quantity and type of firefighting  assets needed based on an analysis of values at risk and appropriate  suppression strategies. Further, although the Forest Service has identified  a series of improvements it plans to make in the acquisition process, it has  so far made little progress.
Selecting appropriate suppression strategies. The agencies have  also begun to improve analytic tools that assist land and fire managers  identify the appropriate suppression strategy for a given fire, but  shortcomings remain. Federal policies encourage the use of less intensive  suppression strategies when possible, strategies that may also be less  costly. Land and fire managers, however, may be reluctant to employ  anything less than full suppression because of concerns that a fire will  escape control. Currently, much of the information managers use to  estimate potential fire size, risks, and costs are based on their individual  experiences, which can vary widely. Researchers are developing a new  suite of tools that will analyze fuel conditions and predicted weather  conditions to model expected fire growth and behavior and provide better  information for managers making fire response decisions, but as of  January 2007, these new tools were still being developed and tested.
Managing cost-containment efforts. The steps the agencies have taken  to date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key elements  fundamental to sound program management, such as clearly defining cost- containment goals, developing a strategy for achieving those goals, and  measuring progress toward achieving them. First, the agencies have not  clearly articulated the goals of their cost-containment efforts. For cost- containment efforts to be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost- containment goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program—such  as protecting life, property, and resources. For example, the agencies have  established the goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost,  considering firefighter and public safety and values being protected, but  they have not defined criteria by which these often-competing objectives  are to be weighed. Second, although the agencies are undertaking a variety  of steps designed to help contain wildland fire costs, the agencies have not  developed, and agency officials to this point have been unable to  articulate, a clear plan for how these efforts fit together or the extent to  which they will assist in containing costs. Finally, the agencies are  developing a statistical model of fire suppression costs that they plan to  use to identify when the cost for an individual fire may have been  excessive. The model compares a fire’s cost to the costs of suppressing  previous fires with similar characteristics. However, such comparisons  with previous fires’ costs may not fully consider the potential for managers  to select less aggressive—and potentially less costly—suppression  strategies. In addition, the model is still under development and may take a  number of years to fully refine. Without clear program goals and  objectives, and corresponding performance measures to evaluate  progress, the agencies lack the tools to be able to determine the  effectiveness of their cost-containment efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The federal government is expending substantial effort and billions of  dollars in attempting to address our nation’s wildland fire problems. Yet  despite promises to do so, the agencies still cannot articulate how the  steps they are taking fit together to form a comprehensive and cohesive  strategy to contain costs or to address the many wildland fire management  problems we and others have reported over the last 7 years. Given the  interrelated nature of wildland fire issues, they cannot be addressed in  isolation but must be viewed from and addressed within a broader  perspective. Agencies need to understand how each issue affects the  others and determine the trade-offs required to effectively meet program  goals while containing program costs. Therefore, if the agencies and the  Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective and  affordable long-term approach to responding to these issues, agencies  need to first develop clearly defined program goals and objectives and a  strategy to achieve them, including identifying associated funding.  Because it will likely be at least 2009 before the agencies develop a  strategy for fuel reduction efforts that would meet standards required by  the Office of Management and Budget, we continue to believe that in the  interim, it is essential that the agencies create a tactical plan for  developing this strategy, so that the Congress understands the steps and  time frames involved with its completion. In doing so, the agencies need to  make very clear how the final design of FPA will meet the key program  goals enumerated here, how and when the agencies will complete all fire  management plans, and what schedule they envision for periodically  updating LANDFIRE data. At the same time, to help address the rising cost  of protecting the growing number of homes built in the wildland urban  interface—a cost that may be disproportionately borne by the federal  government—federal agencies also need to work with relevant state  entities to ensure that appropriate methods are used for sharing the costs  of suppressing fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple  jurisdictions.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may  have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)  512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. David P. Bixler, Assistant Director; Ellen W. Chu;  Jonathan Dent; Janet Frisch; Chester Joy; and Richard Johnson made key  contributions to this statement.
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