Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future Force
Published: 2005-06-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Army has embarked on a major transformation of its force. Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS), a $108 billion effort to provide warfighters with the vehicles, weapons, and communications needed to identify and respond to threats with speed, precision, and lethality. Establishing reliable, robust communications and networking capabilities is key to FCS's success. Each of the systems integral to the FCS communications network--the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), and the System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE)--rely on significant advances in current technologies and must be fully integrated to realize FCS. Given the complexity and costs of this undertaking, GAO was asked to review each of these key development efforts to identify any risks that may jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Each of the programs for developing FCS's communications network is struggling to meet ambitious sets of user requirements and steep technical challenges within highly compressed schedules. As currently structured, the programs are at risk of not delivering intended capabilities for the first spiral of FCS, slated to start in fiscal year 2008. The JTRS Cluster 1 program--a program to develop radios for ground vehicles and helicopters--began development with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable requirements. As currently designed, the radio will only have a transmission range of only 3 kilometers--well short of the required 10 kilometers--and will not meet security requirements for operating in an open networked environment. The program's struggle to mature and integrate key technologies has contributed to significant cost and schedule growth. A recent review of the program concluded that the current program structure is not executable, and in April 2005, DOD directed the Army to stop work and notify the contractor that it was considering terminating the contract. Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios--miniaturized radios, including those that soldiers carry--is even more technically challenging given their smaller size, weight, and power needs. The smallest of these radios weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84 pounds for Cluster 1 radios. Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid protest have further slowed program progress. The Army is considering options for restructuring the program to meet the needs of FCS and address the technical issues encountered in the Cluster 1 program. The Army does not expect to fully mature the technologies for WIN-T--communications equipment that supports an expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with JTRS radios--when production begins in March 2006. Moreover, the compressed schedule assumes nearly flawless execution and does not allow sufficient time for correcting problems. Significant interdependencies among the critical technologies further increase overall program risk. The program was directed to deliver networking and communications capabilities sooner to meet near-term warfighting needs and synchronize with the restructured FCS program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN-T capabilities sooner to address FCS needs remains undetermined. According to Army network system integration officials, SOSCOE--the operating software to integrate the communications network--may not reach the necessary technical maturity level required to meet program milestones. In addition, top-level FCS requirements are still evolving and have not been translated into more detailed specifications necessary for writing SOSCOE software.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: To counter the complex set of battlefield threats that have emerged since  the Cold War, the Army has embarked on a major transformation of its  force. Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS)  program, a large and difficult effort to develop a suite of new manned and  unmanned ground and air vehicles, sensors, and munitions linked by a  new information network, with a total cost of at least $108 billion. FCS will  depend on this network to provide Army warfighters and commanders  with the high-quality data and real-time communications needed to  identify and respond to threats with speed, precision, and lethality. Indeed,  the network’s performance is what makes the FCS concept work— superior information enables the FCS vehicles to be lethal and survivable  despite weighing a fraction of what today’s vehicles weigh. Continuously  providing the quality and volume of information necessary for the force to  operate seamlessly together places significant demands on the network  components. The components must generate high power, work at long  range, and be reliable while conforming to the tight physical constraints of  the small FCS systems.
Four key systems are integral to the FCS communications network:    Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1, which is developing  radios for ground vehicles and helicopters;    JTRS Cluster 5, which is developing small radios, including those that    Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), which is developing  a high-capacity communications network for higher-level command  units; and    System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), which  is being developed as part of the FCS program and is the operating  software that integrates the communications network.
If JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE do not work as intended, battlefield  information will not be sufficient for FCS units to operate effectively. JTRS  Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 radios and new advanced networking waveforms  are expected to provide the warfighter with a high-capacity, high-speed  information link to access maps and other visual data, communicate on- the-move via voice and video with other units and levels of command, and  obtain data directly from battlefield sensors. WIN-T is expected to provide  military commanders access to intelligence, logistics, and other data  critical to making battlefield decisions and supporting battlefield  operations. Collectively, JTRS and WIN-T are estimated to cost over $34  billion to develop and produce, above the $108 billion cost of FCS.  SOSCOE is the interface that allows all the systems to communicate with  one another. The Army plans to begin fielding the full set of FCS systems  to brigade-size units in 2014. However, the Army also plans to field FCS  capabilities to the current force incrementally through spirals. The first  FCS spiral is scheduled for the 2008-2010 timeframe and emphasizes  enhanced communications and network capabilities.
Because JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE all rely on significant advances in  current technologies and capabilities and must be fully integrated to  realize FCS, there are substantial risks to this effort. Given the complexity  of this undertaking and the size of the investment, you asked us to review  each of these key development efforts to identify any risks that may  jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS’s communications and  networking capabilities.
We conducted our review from January 2004 through May 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. To  assess the development risks of each system, we obtained and reviewed  relevant documents, including program acquisition reports, technology  readiness assessments, test and evaluation plans, cost performance  reports, and other information. We also met with various program and  agency officials and obtained in-depth briefings on the system  development efforts. More details about our scope and methodology are in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Over the last decade, the Army has begun to transform its warfighting  capabilities to more effectively counter a broad and complex set of  potential threats. According to Army officials, the transformation is the  most comprehensive change in the Army in over a century, and will affect  all aspects of its organizations, training, doctrine, leadership, and strategic  plans as well as its acquisitions. Through this transformation, the Army  expects to establish a force that provides both the lethality and  survivability of today’s heavily armored units and the deployability and  responsiveness of today’s lighter combat units. As envisioned, the future  force will operate very differently than forces have in the past. It will  function in smaller, more agile and deployable modular brigade combat  teams (composed of roughly 3,000 to 4,000 personnel) that can react  quickly to changing missions and circumstances. To be effective, force  components—soldiers, platforms, weapons, and sensors—must be “net- centric,” that is, closely linked and able to operate seamlessly together.
The transformation involves two major, interrelated acquisitions: (1)  development of new advanced communications and networking systems— computers, software, and a wireless tactical internet—to acquire,  exchange, and employ timely information throughout the battlespace and  (2) development of a new generation of battlefield vehicles, weapons, and  sensors. The Army has taken initial steps toward transformation through  its Digitization and Stryker programs. Under the Digitization program, the  Army installed computers, software, and interfaces to communications  systems on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and other vehicles in  selected units that enable both in-theater and higher commands to share  battlefield data with lower-level units. The Stryker program introduced a  new family of vehicles expected to make units more lethal, mobile, and  survivable than today’s light forces. In addition, the Army has initiated a  major restructuring of its force into modular brigade combat teams— brigade-sized units that will have a common organizational design.
FCS is the culminating stage in the Army’s ongoing transformation to a  lighter, more agile and capable force. It is a large and complex  development effort to provide a networked family of weapons and other  systems for the future force. Establishing reliable, robust communications  and networking capabilities is essential to FCS. Without these capabilities,  the lighter, more decentralized units would be vulnerable to enemy attack.
Currently, the armed forces have limited communications and networking  capabilities on the battlefield, making it necessary to patch together or  reroute information through multiple radio, data terminal, and network  systems to get critical information to the warfighter and commanders.  Current “dial-up speed” data rates further delay forces’ ability to identify,  assess, and respond to time-critical targets. FCS’s networked on-the-move  communications for voice, data, video, and imagery are expected to be a  revolutionary improvement over current communications capabilities (see  table 1).
The FCS communications and networking capabilities are being designed  around five components:    Platforms and sensors: Under FCS, the Army is developing new  warfighting systems, including manned and unmanned aerial and  ground vehicles that will provide and use intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance information.
Applications: Software applications will support battlefield command  functions, including command and control, logistics support, training,  and modeling and simulation.
Network services: SOSCOE will be the network-centric operating  system, or middleware, that enables the integration of separate FCS  communications software packages, independent of their location and  the technology used to develop them. The Army likens the SOSCOE  architecture to Microsoft Windows, but many times larger. SOSCOE  represents about 10 percent of the more than 30 million lines of FCS  software code.
Transport systems: Transport systems—primarily JTRS and WIN-T— will provide wireless communication capabilities to transport  information within the FCS network and the broader DOD-wide  network.
Standards: Standards implement DOD-wide policies and doctrine  developed by offices such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Networks and Information Integration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Two critical objectives of these standards are net-centric operations  and inter-service interoperability.
Figure 1 shows a representation of the five FCS network components.
JTRS is a software-reprogrammable radio that is intended to operate with  many different legacy radio systems and provide the warfighter with  additional communications and networking capabilities—including  seamless interoperability and increased data throughput—to  simultaneously access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice  and video with other units and levels of command, and obtain information  directly from battlefield sensors. A key component of JTRS is developing  waveforms to operate with legacy radios as well as new waveforms to  provide advanced networking capabilities, such as the Wideband  Networking Waveform. The Wideband Networking Waveform represents a  new, critical capability for DOD. The development of the Wideband  Networking Waveform is intended to address many of the current  limitations associated with DOD tactical wireless networking, including  line-of-sight limitations that cause many network partitions, unique  network monitoring systems, and predefined security enclaves that require  hardware for each security level. The waveform is expected to provide  data rates of 5 megabits per second or more-–hundreds of times faster  than existing communications systems-–and facilitate the routing of large  amounts of information among users anywhere in the battlespace.
DOD has structured the JTRS development effort into several programs  clustered by requirements. The JTRS Cluster 1 program is developing  radios for ground vehicles and helicopters to equip the current force as  well as FCS. The program is expected to cost $15.6 billion to develop and  acquire over 100,000 Cluster 1 radios. The JTRS Cluster 5 program is  developing handheld and manpack radios for soldiers as well as several  smaller varieties of radios for use in weight- and power-constrained  platforms—such as Unattended Ground Sensors and Intelligent Munitions  Systems. The program is expected to cost $8.5 billion to develop and   acquire over 300,000 Cluster 5 radios.
The WIN-T program is developing communications equipment that  supports an expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with  JTRS radios to connect warfighters and command centers, including joint,  allied, and coalition forces, providing commanders with access to on-the- move communications—that is, continuously updated, real-time  multimedia information from dispersed locations throughout the theater.  It will replace existing communications networks that have limited  capacity to support on-the-move communications. Leveraging advanced  commercial technologies that enable mobile communications, the WIN-T  system includes data routing and switching hardware, computers, video  and teleconferencing equipment, high-capacity line-of-sight radios and  satellite terminals—all of which make up a tactical operation center’s  communications element. WIN-T is being developed in three blocks, with  each block adding capabilities. Based on current plans, Block 1 is  projected to cost approximately $10 billion; Blocks 2 and 3 have yet to be  funded.
The SOSCOE software will reside within each FCS platform’s integrated  computer system and provide a number of services for the users of the  integrated computer system. These services include interoperability  services, information assurance services, and communications services.  SOSCOE will enable integrated management of the network and will allow  systems within the network to access sources of information. The Army  estimates that SOSCOE software development will be completed in 2011.  The Army plans to field the SOSCOE software in increments to align with  the overall FCS software builds and planned FCS spirals.
When FCS began system development in May 2003, the JTRS and WIN-T  programs were under way with schedules that aligned with FCS planned  fielding. However, the Army restructured the FCS program in July 2004 to  address development risks. The restructuring added 4 years to develop the  platform systems and established an evaluation unit to demonstrate FCS  capabilities. Even though the restructuring provided additional time to the  program, it also emphasized developing FCS capabilities in spirals and  accelerating the development of the network into the current force. The  Army now plans to test and field its FCS capabilities incrementally  between 2008 and 2014 through four spirals. A 2-year period of testing will  precede the actual fielding of capabilities in each spiral. The Army has  defined the initial spiral of FCS around the capabilities needed by the  current force, to include the main components of the communications  network--JTRS Cluster 1 and 5 radios and the wideband waveforms, some  form of WIN-T communications capability, and SOSCOE. The capabilities  for the other FCS spirals will be defined over time. Figure 2 shows the FCS  spirals’ timeline.
section_title: JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite Knowledge, Resulting in Cost and Schedule Problems
paragraphs: The JTRS Cluster 1 program began system development and  demonstration in 2002 with an aggressive schedule, immature  technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable requirements. These  factors have contributed to significant cost and schedule problems that the  program has not recovered from. The program has not been able to mature  the technologies needed to produce radios that generate sufficient power  as well as meet platform size and weight constraints and has been forced  to make design changes to accommodate evolving security requirements.  Because of cost, schedule, and performance problems, in December 2004,  the Army proposed restructuring the program by adding $458 million and  24 months to the development schedule. However, recently DOD directed  that work on the Cluster 1 radios be stopped while an assessment is  completed to determine the future of the program. In addition, because of  increased concern about the contractor’s ability to develop the radios, the  Army notified the contractor that it was considering contract termination.  At this point it is not clear what the outcome will be and what impact this  will have on the future of the program. As a result, it is unlikely JTRS  Cluster 1 radios will be available for the first FCS network spiral, slated to  begin in fiscal year 2008. FCS and other users dependent on Cluster 1  radios, such as Army helicopters, will have to rely on legacy radios to fill  the gap.
subsections: section_title: Accelerated Schedule Incompatible with System Immaturity
paragraphs: Prior to the start of system development in 2002, the JTRS Cluster 1  schedule was accelerated 27 months to meet the Army’s plan to modernize  its helicopters with various technological upgrades including advanced  communications. Cluster 1 proceeded into the system development and  demonstration phase with none of the program’s 20 critical technologies  sufficiently matured and with requirements not clearly defined—contrary  to best practices and DOD guidance. Although many of the technologies  had been used in other radio applications, significant technical advances  were nonetheless required for developing key components of the radio.  The program’s acquisition strategy, for example, highlighted technology  risks associated with the following requirements:    Wideband Networking Waveform: As the core of the JTRS networking  capability, the Wideband Networking Waveform is to operate across a  wide range of radio frequency spectrum, 2 megahertz (MHz) to 2  gigahertz (GHz), and provide increased routing and networking  capabilities. The Wideband Networking Waveform must also be  compliant with the Software Communications Architecture, which  demands a modular approach to waveform design, imposing much  greater processing and memory requirements.  This is especially  critical for FCS, as the waveform is to provide what has been called the  backbone or main conduit of the FCS network.
Security: The JTRS radio set is intended to operate applications at  multiple levels of security. For it to do so, developers not only have to  be concerned with traditional radio security issues but also must be  prepared to implement the features required for network and computer  security. This will require development of new technologies, obtaining  certification through a rigorous process by the National Security  Agency, and accommodating an expected growth in security  requirements.
Interference mitigation: Prior to JTRS, tactical radios were largely  designed for single channel and single band operations. Because JTRS  radio sets will operate multiple channels—-as many as eight  channels—-simultaneously within the same radio set, developers must  ensure that communications over one channel do not interfere with  communications over another, because such interference would  degrade the quality of service and limit the radio’s high data rate  capability.
The accelerated acquisition strategy compressed the development cycle  and allowed little time for testing prior to key development decisions. For  example, the schedule called for making the initial production decision for  selected platforms immediately following an early operational assessment  of a partially functioning prototype of the JTRS radio in surrogate vehicles  (see fig. 3). This is in contrast to the knowledge-based approach captured  in best practices, which advocates making production decisions based on  an assessment of production-representative prototypes in a realistic  environment. Historically, programs that must define requirements,  develop technology, and design products concurrently have experienced  cost increases and schedule delays. While the Army recognized the risk of  moving forward with immature technologies, it expected that emerging  technologies in radio software technology would enable it to develop the  critical technologies and integrate them into the product quickly.
Despite the Army’s expectations to leverage current and emerging radio  technologies, the critical technologies for the JTRS Cluster 1 radio have  generally not matured. The program is also struggling to derive detailed  specifications for Cluster 1 requirements. Despite the lack of mature  technologies and detailed specifications, the Army held the program’s  critical design review—the point at which design stability is to be achieved  and demonstrated—in December 2003. However, with the requirements  still evolving, the program expects to make several costly hardware and  software design modifications. For example:    The current processing and memory capacity of the Network INFOSEC  Unit, which contains the operating software, is insufficient to support  full systems operation, including waveform processing, enhanced  security, and power management. The program plans to double the  Network INFOSEC Unit’s capacity from 256 megabytes of memory to  512 megabytes, which will require changes to the hardware design.
The National Security Agency has recently determined that the current  design is not sufficient to meet security requirements to operate in an  open networked environment. Specifically, particular versions of JTRS  radios will be used by allied and coalition forces, requiring the Army to  release specific source code of the software architecture to these  forces. To address the release, the National Security Agency has  required changes to the security architecture. While the program has  not finalized or funded the changes, the current plan is to separate the  networking and radio functions into two separate processors.
section_title: Size, Weight, and Power Requirements for Key Platform Users Have Presented a Significant Challenge for Cluster 1
paragraphs: A key technical challenge in developing the Cluster 1 radio is meeting the  size, weight, and power requirements for ground vehicles and helicopters.  To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform,  including transmission range, the Cluster 1 radio requires significant  amounts of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight,  and power consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the  result of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the radio are not overheated  by the electricity needed to power the additional memory and processing.  Thus far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet size,  weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission  range is only 3 kilometers—well short of the 10-kilometer range required  for the Wideband Networking Waveform. As a consequence, more  unmanned aerial vehicles may be needed to relay information. Intended  ground vehicle users have accepted a deviation in the design—to have  some of the radio’s hardware mounted separately outside the vehicle— with the expectation that the contractor will develop a better solution later  on. However, deviations were not accepted for the helicopters because it  would necessitate major design changes to the aircraft and adversely  affect the aircraft modernization schedules. Unlike ground vehicles,  aviation platforms are limited in their ability to compromise on size,  weight, and power issues because of the difficulty in maintaining  equilibrium while airborne. The Cluster 1 radio’s size, weight, and peak  power consumption exceeds helicopter platform requirements by as much  as 80 percent (see fig. 4).
To meet the JTRS size, weight, and power requirements and realize the full  capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform, significant  technology advances in power amplification and cooling are essential. The  Army has initiated science and technology development efforts to address  these issues, but it will take time to evolve the technologies to an  acceptable level of maturity. In addition to conducting other research, the  Army is evaluating technologies associated with a communications and  navigation system that was being developed as part of the Comanche  helicopter program. The Army approved further development of this  system and plans to integrate it into the JTRS system and conduct a  demonstration of its capabilities later this year. However, the Army will  not be able to deliver Cluster 1 radios to support the helicopter fielding  schedules and will have to purchase legacy radios instead.
The FCS program is exploring solutions to meet a key transportability  requirement that FCS vehicles must be limited to 19 tons in order to be  airlifted by a C-130 transport aircraft. To meet this transportability  requirement, the program recently proposed significant size and weight  reductions for vehicle components, including communications equipment.  While Cluster 1 currently has no size, weight, and power requirements for  the systems to be fielded in FCS, the JTRS radios may require further  redesign to meet FCS’s aggressive weight requirements. Such a reduction  would likely have a significant impact on the design of JTRS radios for the  FCS vehicles.
section_title: Cluster 1 Has Experienced Significant Cost and Schedule Growth
paragraphs: Since the program entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor  has overrun cost estimates by $93 million-–nearly 28 percent above what  was planned (see app. II). Although the program attempted to stabilize  costs by adding approximately $200 million to the contract in January  2004, costs continued to grow steadily thereafter. In addition, the  contractor has increasingly fallen behind schedule and has had to devote  more resources than originally planned. In January 2005, the prime  contractor estimated that the total costs for the Cluster 1 radio and  waveform development would be $531 million more than what was  originally budgeted, reaching about $898 million at completion. However,  according to program officials, since contract award, the prime contractor  has not demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost management  techniques, and it is difficult to estimate with any confidence what the  overall program is likely to cost. Key issues driving the cost growth are  unanticipated complexity associated with developing the hardware,  Wideband Networking Waveform, and other software. As a result, the unit  costs for early prototypes have increased from the prime contractor’s  original proposal. According to one DOD official, until the requirements’  specifications are stabilized, cost and schedule problems are likely to  continue. For example, according to the Defense Contract Management  Agency, meeting the design changes for security requirements is expected  to cost an estimated $80 million.
section_title: Future of Cluster 1 is Uncertain
paragraphs: In light of the technical problems and cost growth, the Army in December  2004 delayed the initial production decision, which was scheduled for the  third quarter of fiscal year 2005, and proposed to add $458 million and 24  months to the program. Before carrying out this restructure, the Office of  the Secretary of Defense directed the Army in January 2005 to stop work  on portions of the Cluster 1 development and focus on preparing for an  early operational assessment of the radio, which was intended to test the  basic functionality of pre-engineering development models of the radio. In  April 2005, however, the Army suspended the operational assessment and  notified the contractor that it was considering contract termination. This  action was taken based on initial findings of an assessment of the Cluster 1  program conducted by a newly established JTRS Joint Program Executive  Office, which concluded that the current program structure is not  executable and the contractor’s ability to develop the radio is  questionable.
At this point it is not clear whether the contract will be terminated and  what impact a termination would have on the future of the program. The  Joint Program Executive Office is expected to complete its assessment of  the program, and a Defense Acquisition Board review will be held at the  end of fiscal year 2005 to determine the future of the program. Program  officials anticipate a new program acquisition strategy will evolve, with  greater emphasis on developing the radio in blocks. If development  resumes, it is anticipated that there will be start-up delays—3 to 12  months, according to agency officials—associated with restaffing the  contractor’s development team and bringing the team up the learning  curve.
Adding to the program’s uncertainty is the impact of pending requirements  on program cost and schedule. According to agency officials, the program  will likely be tasked with new requirements from key stakeholders. For  example:    To meet FCS requirements for accessing intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance data on the battlefield, FCS will need a new network  data link operating in the radio frequency range above 2 GHz.  According to the Army, developing the new network data link is  expected to cost approximately $170 million. Furthermore, additional  costs are likely because the new network data link may require  changes to the already challenging JTRS Cluster 1 radio design—which  operates over a large 2 MHz to 2 GHz range—to operate at an even  higher frequency. An analysis of alternatives is currently under way to  determine how best to meet this requirement. According to FCS  officials, a decision on the new network data link is needed by the end  of the year to keep the FCS program on track.
To comply with the standards of the Global Information Grid, DOD has  directed all systems to transition to the use of Internet Protocol  Version 6 in the future. Cluster 1, which has been designed with  Version 4, not only will need to upgrade but will need additional  hardware and software to ensure Version 4 and Version 6 systems can  interoperate. Reconciling security requirements for Version 6 is also  expected to be a challenge.
Given the many program uncertainties, it is unlikely that JTRS radios will  be available to support intended users: the first increment of the FCS  network slated for fiscal year 2008, Stryker Brigade Combat Team ground  vehicles, and helicopters. The Army plans to purchase legacy radios,  which have limited capabilities, for the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams  and helicopters. According to Army officials, FCS is planning to  experiment with early prototypes of JTRS radios and the Wideband  Networking Waveform, but they will not know when the fully capable  Cluster 1 radios would be available until after the program is restructured  at the end of fiscal year 2005. In addition, because of ongoing military  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has purchased a large  number of legacy radios over the past few years. The fielding of so many  new radios to the current force may call into question the affordability of  replacing them prematurely with JTRS sets. The Army is assessing JTRS  fielding plans in light of the additional investments in legacy radios and  JTRS Cluster 1 cost, schedule, and technical problems.
section_title: Technical Challenges and Program Changes Have Impeded Cluster 5 Progress
paragraphs: As with the Cluster 1 program, radio size, weight, power, and data- processing requirements have presented significant technical challenges  for the JTRS Cluster 5 program, which is developing a series of radios  much smaller than those for the Cluster 1 program. Several programmatic  changes and a contract award bid protest have contributed to disruptions  in the progress of the Cluster 5 program. As a result, the Cluster 5 program  is no longer synchronized with the FCS program. The Army is currently  assessing the feasibility of accelerating the development of selected small  form Cluster 5 radios. However, in light of the unresolved technical issues  with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has  initiated an assessment to restructure the Cluster 5 program into  increments. In the event that Cluster 5 radios are not available, the Army  plans to use surrogate radios for the initial spiral of FCS. In addition, users  depending on the Cluster 5 radios, such as the Army’s Land Warrior  program, have decided to move forward with surrogate radios.
subsections: section_title: Technical Challenges Have Impeded Cluster 5 Program Progress
paragraphs: Meeting requirements for Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than  for Cluster 1 because of their smaller size, weight, power, and large data- processing requirements. For example, a one-channel handheld version of  the Cluster 5 radios has a maximum weight specification of 2 pounds and a  volume of 40 cubic inches (see table 2). A two-channel manpack radio has  weight and volume of 9 pounds and 400 cubic inches, respectively. A one- channel small form radio weighs about 1 pound and occupies 40 cubic  inches. In comparison, a Cluster 1 two-channel radio weighs 84 pounds  and occupies 1,732 cubic inches. Despite their extreme size and weight  limitations, Cluster 5 radios are still required to store multiple waveforms.  For instance, manpack radios will be required to store at least 10  waveforms, handheld sets 6 waveforms, and the small form sets 2  waveforms.
The Cluster 5 program began system development and demonstration with  immature technologies, especially those related to the handheld and  smaller variants because of the limited size, weight, and power allowances   (see fig. 5). According to the Army, the requirements for two-channel small  form radios—wideband radio frequency capabilities up to 2500 MHz,  thermal management and packaging, and complex security architecture— all introduce unique technological challenges. Cluster 5 program officials  had expected to leverage technology from the Cluster 1 program.  However, the Cluster 1 technologies have not matured as anticipated.  Program officials stated that backup technology will be identified as a part  of a risk mitigation plan.
The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies as  follows:    Microelectronics: Microelectronics addresses the processes for  producing and packaging the electronic circuits and systems that make  up the Cluster 5 radios. Miniaturization technology and  microelectronics components are critical to the feasibility of Cluster 5  radios because of their extremely small size.
Environmental protection: Environmental protection describes the  technologies, tools, or design considerations necessary to protect the  radios from potentially harsh effects of the operational environment,  including, for example, lightning, short-duration force impacts, or  radioactive contaminants.
Power management: One of the greatest challenges in designing and  implementing the Cluster 5 radios is the management and conservation  of the limited amount of available battery power. Power management  refers to the set of technologies that facilitate a reduction in energy  consumption or an increase in battery capacity with the goal of  obtaining longer operating time and a reduced battery size and weight.
Multichannel architecture: Multichannel JTRS radios are required to  provide multiple, independent channels to simultaneously transmit and  receive information using different waveforms. The compact size of the  Cluster 5 radios and requirement for simultaneous multichannel  operation present a co-site interference mitigation challenge.
Antennas: Cluster 5 JTRS radios are required to transmit and receive  multiple waveforms over the large frequency range 2 MHz to 2.5 GHz  and are further required to transmit and receive two separate  waveforms simultaneously with a maximum of three antennas.  The  requirements impose unique technical challenges for both antenna and  radio designs.
Security: Cluster 5 security framework must support Multiple Single  Levels of Security to allow the processing of information with different  classifications and categories. It also must support an over-the-air  download capability of waveforms, which will entail large software  files. It has yet to be demonstrated in a relevant environment.
The Cluster 5 radios are required to store and operate the Wideband  Networking Waveform. This will provide high data rates and networking  capabilities for mobile forces. The full Wideband Networking Waveform  requires significant amounts of memory and processing power, which may  not be available for the Cluster 5 radios. According to the program office,  the principal challenge in operating the Wideband Networking Waveform  on Cluster 5 radios stems from the significantly smaller size, weight, and  power requirements when compared with those for Cluster 1, as well as  safety and heat considerations for the soldier. Because of the difficulties in  overcoming these challenges, the Cluster 5 program is seeking to ease the  waveform’s requirements and reduce the power demands of the software.
The Cluster 5 program is also developing another new, wideband  waveform called the Soldier Radio Waveform. Although less powerful than  the Wideband Networking Waveform, it is expected to provide the needed  network services for battery-powered radios with limited power and  antenna size such as the handheld and the small form varieties. Cluster 5  radios with the Soldier Radio Waveform will enable squad-level  communications and interoperability with other radios and work on a  network based on the Wideband Networking Waveform. The Soldier Radio  Waveform is expected to be available in 2008. However, the development  of this waveform is being managed as a science and technology effort by  the Army’s Communications-Electronics Research Development and  Engineering Center until it is matured and can be transitioned into the  JTRS program. To support the first FCS spiral in the 2008-2010 timeframe,  the Army has acknowledged that it may have to use an early version of the  Soldier Radio Waveform and a surrogate radio to operate the waveform.  Compounding the challenges in developing the waveform is the Army’s  assessment that developing the Soldier Radio Waveform’s network  manager is high risk and has yet to be funded.  Without the network  manager functionality, the Soldier Radio Waveform will not be able to  interface with the Wideband Networking Waveform.
A number of JTRS Cluster 5 technologies are interdependent (see fig. 6)  that, in our opinion, can exacerbate the technical and program risks of  moving forward with immature technologies. For example, power  management is dependent upon microelectronics, multichannel  architecture, antennas, and security. A lag in the development of any of  these technologies could result in a lag in the development of power  management.
Because of the criticality of the size, weight, and power challenge faced by  all variants of the JTRS radios, the program office is pursuing various  solutions to the problem. The program, for example, hopes to benefit from  the Army’s science and technology research on developing wideband  power amplifiers and advanced passive cooling technology.
section_title: Cluster 5 Schedule No Longer Synchronized with FCS Schedule
paragraphs: Several programmatic changes have significantly affected the Cluster 5  schedule, and the program has focused on delivering manpack radios for  the near term and handheld and small form radios later. However, the  availability of small form JTRS radios is of greater importance to FCS  because they are needed for the planned fielding of three core systems in  FCS spiral 1. The Army has concluded that the small form radios may not  be able to meet the FCS schedule and may need to use surrogate radios to  support the first FCS spiral.
In May 2003, the responsibility for developing the JTRS handheld and  manpack radios was shifted from the Special Operations Command to the  Army because of difficulties in resolving differences over requirements  and funding among the services. At the same time, the Acting Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics noted that  the Cluster 5 capabilities would have to be delivered in at least two spirals  and set an expectation that the Army would deliver prototype handheld  and manpack radios in the third quarter of fiscal year 2005 and low rate  initial production would begin by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006.
In May 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive approved the Cluster 5  program for the system development and demonstration phase of  acquisition. The Army Acquisition Executive moved the Cluster 5  handheld radios to spiral 2, and it delayed the delivery of the spiral 1  prototype manpack radios to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005 and the  low-rate initial production manpack radios to the first quarter of fiscal  year 2007. The Army awarded the Cluster 5 contract in the middle of July  2004, but had to issue a stop-work order to the contractor by the end of  July because of the filing of a bid protest by the losing contractor. The bid  protest was not upheld, but the program was delayed another 3 months  while the protest was decided.
In authorizing the May 2004 Cluster 5 program’s entry into the system  development and demonstration phase, the Army Acquisition Executive  noted the criticality of the JTRS Cluster 5 radio and directed that a review  be conducted to assess the plans for the spiral 2 portion of the program. At  a minimum, the review was to assess development schedule  synchronization, technical performance expectations, integration and  performance risks, waveform development, maturity, baseline, and  program affordability. The review was scheduled for the spring of 2005.  However, because of the ongoing cost, schedule, and technical problems  with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has  begun a broader assessment of the Cluster 5 program. On the basis of the  initial findings of the assessment, development work on the Cluster 5  spiral 1 radios has been suspended because the office determined that key  waveforms being developed as part of the Cluster 1 program would not be  delivered to Cluster 5 when needed. According to the JTRS Joint Program  Executive Office, a restructuring of Cluster 5 spiral 1 and 2 is being  developed, and it will identify more well defined and executable  increments.
While the Cluster 5 manpack and handheld radios are important  deliverables, of greater urgency for the first spiral of FCS is the availability  of the small form Cluster 5 radios. These radios will be embedded in a  variety of sensors and weapons systems. In fact, three FCS core systems— Unattended Ground Sensors, Intelligent Munitions Systems, and the Non  Line of Sight Launch System—need Cluster 5 small form radios to support  their planned inclusion in the first FCS spiral scheduled for the 2008-2010  timeframe. The Army has concluded that the schedule for the small form  radios is not synchronized with the FCS schedule and has asked the  contractor for a plan to accelerate deliveries. The Army has acknowledged  that it may have to use surrogate radios, which have limited capabilities, if  the Cluster 5 small form radios are not available to support the initial  fielding of the three FCS core systems. In addition, other users depending  on the Cluster 5 radios, such as the Army’s Land Warrior program, have  decided to move forward with surrogate radios.
section_title: Ambitious WIN-T Acquisition Approach Puts Program At Risk of Cost and Schedule Growth
paragraphs: The WIN-T program entered the system development and demonstration  phase with only 3 of its 12 critical technologies close to full maturity. None  of the critical technologies will be fully mature at the time production  begins in March 2006. Because there are significant interdependencies  among critical technologies, any delay in maturing an individual  technology further increases overall program risk. WIN-T has gone  through a number of program changes, including shifts in the program’s  focus. In the fall of 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved  the Army’s proposal to combine the work of two contractors to facilitate  early delivery of WIN-T capabilities to the warfighter while continuing to  focus on the restructured FCS program. A decision has recently been  made not to accelerate the program or develop capabilities sooner.  It  remains unclear what WIN-T capabilities will be provided to the first FCS  spiral.  The changes, along with existing technical challenges, put the  program at risk of cost and schedule overruns and failure to achieve  performance objectives.
subsections: section_title: Uncertainties about Technology Development Persist
paragraphs: During WIN-T’s 32-month systems development and demonstration  schedule, the program must mature 9 of its 12 critical technologies.  Although risk mitigation plans were developed in mid-2003 for the 9  immature technologies, a program review sponsored by the Army in July  2004 concluded that the plans lacked sufficient detail. Eight backup  technologies have been identified, but they are less robust and only 3 are  close to full maturity. Relying on these substitutes may degrade network  performance resulting in reduced operational capability.
Contrary to best practices under knowledge-based development, the  program will continue technology development concurrently with the  product development and demonstration phase (see fig.7). The tightly  compressed schedule also assumes nearly flawless execution and may not  allow sufficient time for correcting problems. For example, the combined  testing to demonstrate system performance and operational functionality  is slated to occur just 1 month after critical design review. With immature  technologies, it will be difficult, at best, to demonstrate the system’s  design stability and determine whether the system can be produced  affordably and work reliably. In fact, WIN-T program officials may be  unable to conclude a reliable operational capability of on-the-move  communications until the system is demonstrated in an operational  environment early in fiscal year 2009—long after production begins.
The significant interdependencies among WIN-T’s critical technologies  exacerbate the technical and program risks of moving forward with  immature technologies. For example, the on-the-move satellite  communications technologies rely on wideband waveforms, antennas, and  other technologies to achieve their performance objectives. Therefore, a  lag in the development of any of these technologies may result in a lag in  the overall development of mobile communications technologies—a  critical component of the operational concept for WIN-T.
section_title: Dependence on External Programs May Hinder the System’s Performance
paragraphs: Not only is the program faced with technical challenges, but its  dependence on other programs puts the WIN-T program at risk. WIN-T’s  ability to significantly improve upon current communications capabilities  relies on demonstrating integrated network operations and the ability to  work on the move. The WIN-T system depends on other programs to  provide needed capabilities. Although separate from the WIN-T program,  changes or delays in these external programs may impair WIN-T’s ability  to perform.
For WIN-T, unmanned aerial vehicles are fundamental to the program as  they route information and extend transmission range that ground systems  are constrained by—preserving network reliability, connectivity, and  mobile throughput. Citing their capacity to fly at high altitudes, program  officials have identified two platforms to support WIN-T, the Extended  Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or the High Altitude  Airship. However, one is not adequately funded for a dedicated  communications capability, and the other is still in the concept  development phase. Therefore, a study is under way to assess the  consequence of not having unmanned aerial vehicles and its resulting  effect on the network. It is unclear whether the issue will be resolved in  time for the upcoming development test/operational test event. The  program plans to use a surrogate plane, but it is unknown whether this  will adequately assess network reliability and critical on-the-move  communications.
Central to the WIN-T operational effectiveness is the development of a  software-programmable radio and wideband waveforms. Together, the  radio and waveforms are expected to allow warfighters to receive large  volumes of data while moving around the battlefield at increasing speeds.  However, given the uncertainty of whether a JTRS radio would be  available to support WIN-T, the program plans to develop its own high- capacity radio, operating above the 2 GHz radio frequency range. To meet  FCS requirements, the WIN-T radio is expected to run above 2 GHz with  two new waveforms—a net-centric waveform and a high-capacity  waveform--and the existing Global Broadcast Service waveform. In  particular, these waveforms enable distribution of intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance data to provide a more detailed picture  of the battlefield. To address the need for waveforms operating above 2  GHz, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is conducting an assessment to  identify solutions. However, the results of the study may not be available  by the critical design review.
section_title: Program Has Undergone Several Strategy Changes
paragraphs: Since the WIN-T program was conceived nearly 5 years ago, the program  strategy has shifted several times. Originally, the program focused on  designing a network that would meet current force needs. In 2002, the  program was realigned to focus on a network that would support future  force needs. Two contractors were to work independently on designing  the future force network architecture, and the program office would select  the better of the two. The contractors were given significant flexibility in  designing the network architecture and developing system performance  specifications. Two years later, with the global war on terrorism and  military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, WIN-T was directed to focus  on developing and fielding network capabilities to meet both current and  future force needs. To expedite completion of the architecture’s design,  the Army eliminated competition between the two contractors in  September 2004. Army officials believe that the combined team provides a  stronger technical solution by taking the best elements of each  contractor’s proposed architecture and maintains some competition  because over 50 percent of the work will still be competed among          sub-contractors. In fact, the contractors working together completed the  network architecture by January 2005—a year earlier than previously  planned. According to Army officials, the early completion of the network  architecture allows other Army programs, particularly FCS, to stabilize  their network designs earlier than planned.
In conjunction with the WIN-T program’s shift in focus to address both  current and future force needs, the Army fielded a separate program, in  2004, a beyond-line-of-sight communications network to units deployed in  Iraq: the Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral (JNTC-S). Although an  improvement over past capabilities, JNTC-S is stationary —units must  come to a standstill and set up their satellite equipment to communicate.  In contrast, WIN-T is expected to maintain satellite connection— regardless of distance, weather conditions, or terrain—-while units are in  motion. Currently, the Army is assessing how best to transition JNTC-S to  WIN-T. In addition, the Army is assessing whether the WIN-T program can  be modified to address the restructured FCS plan to field communications  and networking capabilities in spirals. Army officials concede that, based  on available technologies and resources, WIN-T block 1 performance  requirements may need to be scaled back to meet the FCS spiral 1 time  frame. For example, the data rate requirements for block 1 WIN-T—which  calls for an unprecedented data throughput rate of 256 kilobits per second  while units are moving at 25 miles per hour—may need to be reduced.
Although the Army has decided not to accelerate development of WIN-T, it  is unclear when plans to migrate from the JNTC-S program and address  FCS needs will be completed.
section_title: SOSCOE Development at Risk because of Software Maturity and Evolving Requirements
paragraphs: The Army assesses SOSCOE as high-risk. SOSCOE software may not reach  the necessary technical maturity level required to meet FCS milestones. In  addition, FCS system-level requirements are still being defined, which  could affect the SOSCOE design. Consequently, it is unclear whether  SOSCOE will be sufficiently developed to support the initial fielding of  FCS beginning in fiscal year 2008.
subsections: section_title: SOSCOE Software Availability and Maturity are High-Risk
paragraphs: Because SOSCOE software will tie together FCS systems, support battle  command applications, and enable interoperability with current and future  forces, it is the fundamental building block upon which a substantial  portion of FCS will be built. Thus, delays in SOSCOE software  development could affect FCS’ ability to meet production and fielding  milestones. Since the start of system development, the Army has assessed  SOSCOE software availability and maturity as high-risk. According to  program officials, SOSCOE development does not require “cutting edge”  software technology. However, there are some aspects of particular  service families that are more challenging than others and result in an  overall SOSCOE development effort that varies in complexity. The key to  SOSCOE development is the “threading model,” which is intended to allow  an interface between different subsystem operating systems. The high risk  is derived from the fact that SOSCOE may not reach the necessary  technical maturity level required to meet program milestones.
The SOSCOE risk mitigation strategy is to develop and deliver the  software in increments to provide the functionality required by SOSCOE  users when they need it. Specifically, the SOSCOE software is scheduled  for delivery in a series of seven software builds between the end of 2005  and 2011. FCS functionality will increase with each successive software  build. The Army will need about one-half of the SOSCOE software in time  for the fielding of the initial FCS capability in fiscal year 2008. If the  software risks materialize, the SOSCOE build plan may have to be  modified, deferring some functionality to later software builds.
section_title: FCS Program Requirements Are Still Evolving
paragraphs: Higher-level FCS specifications are still evolving nearly 2 years after the  program started development. As in most engineering efforts, FCS  requirements are first defined at a general or high level. Once these are  defined, more detailed specifications that flow down to the subsystem  level are derived. It is the specifications that provide the details necessary  to design subsystems like SOSCOE. In the case of FCS, very few  specifications have flowed to SOSCOE, as higher-level specifications are  still being defined. The lack of specific requirements flow-down could  affect the SOSCOE software build needed to support the first FCS spiral.
In addition, program officials are concerned that SOSCOE will have  difficulty meeting emerging requirements without significant cost and  schedule impacts. Costs are likely to grow as SOSCOE is reworked to  meet new requirements, or applications software is reworked to  accommodate the limitations of SOSCOE. Further, if design assumptions  underlying SOCOE during the spiral 1 and 2 builds are wrong, because of  incomplete technical information, requirements for future software builds  might not be met or the software could require extensive rework, resulting  in cost and schedule problems.
section_title: FCS Restructuring Reduced SOSCOE Development Concurrency
paragraphs: As part of the original FCS schedule, a DOD-level Network Maturity  Milestone Decision was scheduled for 2008 to assess demonstrated  communications and networked functions. The demonstration was to  verify the performance of FCS software, including SOSCOE. The purpose  of the demonstration would have been to provide confidence that all  networked operations software would meet initial operational capability  objectives and to use the results of the milestone decision to initiate long- lead production for the network equipment. However, the restructuring of  the overall FCS program allowed the reduction of the high concurrency in  the SOSCOE development and fielding schedule. The development  schedule has now been extended to 2011. The DOD-level assessment of  demonstrated network capabilities will be deferred until the formal FCS  production milestone decision in 2012.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although DOD and the military services have produced the best armed  forces in the world, their effectiveness in carrying out military operations  has been hampered by communications and networking systems that lack  interoperability and have limited capacity to transfer information where  and when it is needed. The Army’s efforts to develop JTRS, WIN-T, and the  SOSCOE as components of the network are essential to overcoming these  limitations. However, to achieve the desired capabilities, not only must  each program be successfully executed, but because the programs are  interdependent, they must be closely synchronized. In particular, the  successful fielding of FCS capabilities is critically dependent on the  outcome of the JTRS and WIN-T programs. If they do not work as  intended, there will not be sufficient battlefield information for the future  force to operate effectively.
As currently structured, the JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE programs are at  risk of not delivering intended capabilities when needed, particularly for  the first spiral of FCS. They continue to struggle to meet an ambitious set  of user requirements, steep technical challenges, and stringent timeframes.  While the Army’s restructuring of the FCS program last year into spiral  increments was a positive step, the first spiral may not demonstrate key  networking capabilities. The first spiral of FCS should provide a  meaningful demonstration of the networking capabilities that can then  serve as a basis to support further development of the future force. In  particular, demonstrating the capability of the Wideband Networking  Waveform is important, given that the design of FCS vehicles and systems  in later spirals is predicated on this capability. It is reasonable that such a  demonstration should include JTRS with the Wideband Networking  Waveform, WIN-T, and basic capability from SOSCOE.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Since (1) an enhanced Army communications network is critical for a  successful transformation to FCS and (2) JTRS, including the advanced  wideband waveforms, WIN-T, and SOSCOE are the key pillars of the  communications network, the timing of the first FCS spiral should be  based on when the pacing capabilities to be provided by JTRS and WIN-T  will be demonstrated. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense:    establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and    synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with such schedules for JTRS,  WIN-T, and SOSCOE; and    develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an  evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production  decisions.
In addition, in light of the delays in JTRS Cluster 1 and the criticality of the  Wideband Networking Waveform for FCS, we recommend the Secretary of  Defense assess whether a greater priority should be placed on  demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio  prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of the   Cluster 1 development program.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In its letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred with our  findings and three of our recommendations and partially concurred with a  fourth recommendation. (DOD’s letter is reprinted in app III.) As part of its  comments, DOD provided some information on actions it has begun to  take to address each of our recommendations. While these actions should  help strengthen the management of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE, we remain  concerned that a demonstration of FCS’s communications and networking  capabilities will not be known for some time. Until these capabilities are  demonstrated, investment in FCS platforms and systems carries  substantial risk.  DOD also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated where appropriate.
Regarding our first recommendation—that the Secretary of Defense  establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE  capabilities—DOD concurred, noting (1) that its newly established JTRS  Joint Program Executive Office is evaluating the condition of each JTRS  product line and will make recommendations to ensure effective control  of cost, schedule, and performance and (2) that the Army is managing  risks associated with WIN-T and SOSCOE and the Office of the Secretary  of Defense is applying the appropriate level of oversight. While the actions  being taken by DOD and the Army will help, it remains unclear whether  they will be sufficient to ensure JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE—the critical  components of the enhanced communications network—are successfully  executed. We remain concerned that the requisite knowledge needed to  effectively manage program development risks has not been sufficiently  developed. A low-risk fielding schedule for each of the components should  set the pace for the Army’s transformation to FCS.
Regarding our second recommendation—that the Secretary of Defense  synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with the fielding schedules for JTRS,  WIN-T, and SOSCOE—DOD partially concurred, but stated that “the  Army’s strategy for spiraling out FCS technology is not constrained to any  one particular element of the program. The strategy aims to make  available mature and military useful system capability in increments,  leveraging opportunities to integrate new and mature technology with  current force capability.” DOD further stated that “the FCS spirals will  make use of technologies as they become available or leverage the use of  surrogate applications where they apply.” DOD also noted that the Army  did not define the first FCS spiral around the main components of the  communications network, but around the capabilities needed by the  current force. While we agree with DOD that mature and military useful  capabilities should be fielded as expeditiously as possible, we believe that  the first spiral should demonstrate meaningful capabilities for FCS.  In  particular, we believe that the first spiral of FCS should demonstrate  critical networking capabilities, and that its schedule be predicated on  demonstrating core capabilities, such as the JTRS Wideband Networking  Waveform. Progress made on these capabilities should guide the future  investments, such as on ground vehicles that depend on network  performance. In addition, reliance on surrogate applications has the  potential to result in costly replacement of the surrogate applications once  the target applications are fully mature.
Regarding our third recommendation—that the Secretary of Defense  develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an  evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production  decisions—DOD concurred, stating that FCS will initially field a mix of  both new and legacy communications and network capabilities, and that  iterative operational test and evaluation will be stressed to ensure strong  capability verification and validation. DOD also noted that network  maturity will be assessed at each spiral’s production decision.  While it is  appropriate to assess network maturity at each spiral’s production  decision, to measure progress in developing the FCS communications  network, these assessments will need to culminate in a full demonstration  that the network will perform as intended before committing to produce  equipment for FCS units of action.
Finally, regarding our fourth recommendation—that the Secretary of  Defense assess whether a greater priority should be placed on  demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio  prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of the Cluster  1 development program—DOD concurred, noting that the newly  established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is assessing the JTRS  Cluster 1 development path and that the development of the Wideband  Networking Waveform will be included in the assessment.
As agreed with your office, unless you announce its contents, we will not  distribute this report further until 30 days after the date of this letter.  At  that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority  Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that  have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will also send  copies to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available  at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff  have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2811,  or Assistant Director John Oppenheim at (202) 512-3111. Major  contributors to this report were Ridge Bowman, Subrata Ghoshroy, Karen  Sloan, Hai Tran, Paul Williams, and Candice Wright.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the development risks associated with the Joint Tactical  Radio System-Tactical (JTRS) Cluster 1, JTRS Cluster 5, and WIN-T  programs, we obtained briefings on acquisition plans, analyzed documents  describing the maturity of critical technologies, and interviewed project  and product officials from the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical  (WIN-T) Program Management Office, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. To  determine the status of JTRS waveforms, we obtained briefings on  wideband waveform development efforts and interviewed officials from  the JTRS Joint Program Office, Arlington, Virginia. We also reviewed  selected acquisition reports, technology readiness assessments, test and  evaluation plans, defense acquisition executive summaries, and acquisition  decision memorandums for individual programs. To obtain information  related to the planned use of JTRS Cluster 1 radios in rotary wing  platforms, we interviewed officials from the Program Executive Office,  Aviation, Arlington, Virginia. To obtain information related to JTRS   Cluster 1 contract performance data, we interviewed Defense Contract  Management Agency officials in Anaheim, California, and obtained cost  performance reports and other cost analysis documentation.
To assess cost and schedule performance for JTRS Cluster 1 and  waveform development for the period between August 2003 and January  2005, we used cost and schedule variances reported in contractor cost  performance reports.  Results were presented in graphical form to  determine the period’s trends. We also obtained likely cost at the  completion of the prime contract from the reports.  We confirmed that the  prime contractor’s earned value management system had been validated  by the Defense Contract Management Agency. The cost and schedule  results include both prime and subcontractors. The development of the  waveforms was included in our analysis of Cluster 1 because, although the  effort is managed separately under the Joint Program Office, it is being  executed under the same contract.
To determine the development risks associated with the System of  Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), we obtained  briefings on fielding plans, analyzed documents describing SOSCOE  software availability and maturity, and interviewed project officials from  the Project Manager for FCS Network Systems Integration, Fort  Monmouth, New Jersey. We also attended FCS in-process reviews and a  board of directors meeting in St. Louis, Missouri, organized by the  Program Manager, Unit of Action.
To obtain the perspective of organizations that provide policy guidance,  oversight, and technology support for the JTRS, WIN-T, and Future  Combat Systems (FCS) programs, we interviewed officials from the Office  of the Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration,  Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,  Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and, the Army’s  Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering  Center, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
Our review was conducted from January 2004 through May 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance
paragraphs: Since Cluster 1 entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor has  overrun cost estimates by almost $93 million-–nearly 28 percent above  what was planned. We used contractor cost performance reports to assess  the prime contractor’s progress toward meeting the Army’s cost and  schedule goals during the period August 2003-January 2005. The  government routinely uses such reports to independently evaluate the  prime contractor’s performance. Generally, the reports detail deviations in  cost and schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.  Deviations are referred to as variances. Positive variances—activities  costing less or completed ahead of schedule—are considered as good  news, and negative variances—activities costing more or falling behind  schedule—as bad news.
Although the program attempted to stabilize cost growth by adding  approximately $200 million to the contract in January 2004, the cost  variance continued to decline steadily thereafter. Key issues driving the  cost growth are unanticipated complexity associated with developing the  hardware, Wideband Networking Waveform, and other software. As a  result, the unit costs for early prototypes have increased from the prime  contractor’s original proposal. In January 2005, the prime contractor  estimated that the total costs for the Cluster 1 radio and waveform  development would be $531 million more than was originally budgeted,  reaching about $898 million at completion (see fig. 8). However, the  program office noted that, since contract award, the prime contractor has  not demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost management techniques.
Cluster 1 has also experienced unfavorable schedule variance. Figure 9  indicates that the contractor increasingly fell behind schedule during the  period August 2003-January 2005. If a program is not only overrun in costs,  but is also behind schedule, additional costs can be expected because of  potential schedule slippage or from acceleration of the effort to finish on  time. The schedule variance stabilized briefly after the program  rebaselined in January 2004, but then it continued to increase again.  By  January 2005, the value of planned work that the contractor was behind  schedule was about $25 million. Delays in software build completions,  software/hardware integration, and the delivery of key technologies to the  waveform developers have contributed to schedule problems.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense