Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That Air Force Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements
Published: 2010-05-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Air Force's maintenance depots provide critical support to ongoing operations around the world. Previously, the Department of Defense's (DOD) increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support, coupled with downsizing, led to a general deterioration in the capabilities, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of the military services' depots. In March 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) directed each service to submit a depot maintenance strategic plan and provided direction for the content of those plans. The Air Force issued two documents in response to this direction--a Strategy and a Master Plan. GAO used qualitative content analyses to determine the extent to which the Air Force's collective plan addresses (1) key elements of a results-oriented management framework and (2) OUSD's (AT&L) direction for the plan's content.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While the Air Force plan focuses efforts on weapon system and equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it clearly link information between the plan's two component documents. GAO's prior work has shown that seven elements of a results-oriented management framework are critical for comprehensive strategic planning. The plan fully addresses one of these elements by including a mission statement that summarizes the Air Force depots' major functions and operations, but it partially addresses or does not address the remaining six elements. For example, while the plan describes goals for the depots' mission-related functions, it does not provide time frames to achieve them. Additionally, the plan does not discuss any factors beyond the Air Force's control that could affect its ability to achieve the plan's goals nor does it identify how the Air Force will evaluate its programs and use the results of such evaluations to adjust the plan's long-term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of performance. Moreover, the content of the plan's two component documents are not clearly linked to one another. For example, the goals listed in the Strategy are not clearly repeated in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan includes goals that are unrelated to depot maintenance. Nor does the Master Plan clearly align its content to the five long-term goals described in the Strategy. The plan does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework and the plan's two documents are not clearly linked to one another in part because of weaknesses in oversight. Specifically, although OUSD (AT&L) established an oversight body, which included senior representatives from OUSD (AT&L) and the services, to review the services' plans, this body did not review the plan. Also, the Air Force did not establish an oversight mechanism to review its plan. The plan's weaknesses may limit the Air Force's ability to use its plan as a tool to meet future challenges. In addition, the Air Force plan is not fully responsive to OUSD's (AT&L) direction to the services that was designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to address 10 specific issues in four general areas: logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment. The plan partially addresses 8 of these issues and does not address the remaining two. For example, while the plan notes that the Air Force is partnering with local universities and technical schools to provide training to reengineer existing employees' skills, the plan does not address Air Force actions to identify new and emerging skill requirements, as directed. Furthermore, the plan does not discuss any benchmarks to evaluate the adequacy of investment funding, as directed. As discussed for the elements of a results-oriented management framework, the plan does not fully respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction for the plan's content in part because of weaknesses in oversight in both OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force. The plan's shortcomings may limit the Air Force's assurance that its depots are postured and resourced to meet future maintenance challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Air Force’s three maintenance depots provide equipment repair and  sustainment services that are critical to supporting ongoing operations  around the world. Prior to the onset of military operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) increased reliance on the  private sector for depot maintenance support—coupled with declining  budgets, downsizing, and consolidations as a result of previous Base  Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) decisions—led to a decline in  maintenance workloads for the depots and contributed to the general  deterioration of capabilities, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of military  depots. Downsizing efforts also affected the depots’ abilities to obtain  investments in facilities, equipment, and human capital to support their  long-term viability and to ensure that they remained a key resource for  repair of new and modified systems. In 2001, DOD identified performance- based logistics as its preferred support strategy, further increasing  reliance on contractors to support many of its weapon systems.
In 2003 and again in 2006, the House Armed Services Committee  encouraged DOD to develop a comprehensive depot maintenance  strategy. In March 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) issued DOD’s  depot maintenance strategic plan, which articulated the department’s  strategy for posturing and resourcing the depots to meet the national  security and materiel readiness challenges of the 21st century. In March  2007, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics  and Materiel Readiness, within OUSD (AT&L), directed each of the  services to conduct strategic planning for depot maintenance and submit  plans that focus on achieving DOD’s strategy. In response, the Air Force  published its Air Force Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan, known as the  Strategy, in April 2008. In addition, it published the Air Force Depot  Maintenance Master Plan, known as the Master Plan, in March 2009.  According to Air Force officials, these two documents collectively respond  to OUSD (AT&L)’s direction. DOD’s 2007 Depot Maintenance Strategy and  Implementation Plans also noted that the services would update their  depot maintenance strategic plans no later than 6 months after the  publication of an updated DOD depot maintenance strategic plan, which  will be published within 6 months of the publication of the February 2010  Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
Our prior work has shown that organizations conducting strategic  planning need to develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management  framework to provide an approach whereby program effectiveness is  measured in terms of outcomes or impact, rather than outputs, such as  activities and processes. Such a framework includes seven critical  elements: a comprehensive mission statement; long-term goals; strategies  to achieve the goals; use of metrics to gauge progress; identification of key  external factors that could affect the achievement of the goals; a  description of how program evaluations will be used; and stakeholder  involvement in developing the plan. In its March 2007 call for strategic  plans, OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to address many of these same  elements in their strategic plans. In addition, OUSD (AT&L) directed the  services to address 10 specific issues in four general areas: logistics  transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce  revitalization, and capital investment. OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that  the direction in these four areas was designed to provide the services’  plans with a framework to meet future challenges.
In September 2009, we issued a report on the Army’s and Marine Corps’  depot maintenance strategic plans. Subsequently, your office asked us to  review the Air Force’s and Navy’s depot maintenance strategic plans to  determine the extent to which these plans provide a comprehensive  strategy for meeting future requirements. As agreed with your office, this  report addresses two questions on the Air Force’s strategic plan for depot  maintenance: (1) To what extent does the Air Force’s strategic plan for  depot maintenance address key elements of a results-oriented  management framework? and (2) To what extent does the Air Force’s  depot maintenance strategic plan address OUSD (AT&L)’s direction that  was designed to provide a framework for the services to meet future  challenges? We are issuing a separate report on the Navy depot  maintenance strategic plan. The Related GAO Products section at the end  of the report lists additional publications on related topics.
We used the same set of methodological procedures to answer both  questions, and each type of procedure was performed simultaneously for  the two questions. Specifically, we reviewed the Air Force’s depot  maintenance strategic plan, which is composed of the Strategy and Master  Plan. We evaluated the Air Force’s plan using qualitative content analyses  to compare information in it against criteria from the seven elements of a  results-oriented management framework and the 10 issues listed in the  OUSD (AT&L) direction for depot maintenance strategic plans. To  conduct these analyses, we first developed a data collection instrument  that incorporated these two types of criteria. One team member then  analyzed the plan using this instrument. To verify preliminary observations  from this initial analysis, a second team member concurrently conducted  an independent analysis of the plan. We compared the two sets of  observations and discussed any differences. We reconciled the differences  with the assistance of analysts from the team that was evaluating the Navy  depot maintenance strategic plan. We met with Air Force officials to  confirm our understanding of the plan and sought additional information  where our preliminary analyses revealed that the plan partially addresses  or does not address criteria. We also interviewed and obtained  documentary evidence from relevant OUSD (AT&L) officials on its  oversight of the services’ plans. Additionally, we interviewed depot leaders  and strategic planning personnel during site visits at two of the three Air  Force depots to obtain first-hand information on issues the depots face.  We also obtained data on workload and personnel from the Air Force and  determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our report. More  detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in  appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through May 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based of our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Depot maintenance is the materiel maintenance or repair requiring  overhauling, upgrading, or rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or  subassemblies, and the testing and reclamation of equipment, regardless  of the source of funds for the maintenance or repair or the location at  which the maintenance or repair is performed. The Air Force maintains  three depots that are designed to retain, at a minimum, a ready, controlled  source of technical competence and resources to meet military  requirements. These depots work on a wide range of weapon systems and  military equipment. Table 1 describes the location, principal work,  workload, and number of personnel for each depot.
Depot maintenance activities are complex and require deliberate planning  in order to efficiently and effectively meet future requirements. Our prior  work has shown that organizations need effective strategic management  planning in order to identify and achieve long-term goals. We have  identified key elements that should be incorporated into strategic plans to  help establish a comprehensive, results-oriented management  framework:  1.  Mission statement: A statement that concisely summarizes what the  organization does, presenting the main purposes for all its major  functions and operations.  2.  Long-term goals: A specific set of policy, programmatic, and  management goals for the programs and operations covered in the  strategic plan. The long-term goals should correspond to the purposes  set forth in the mission statement and develop with greater specificity  how an organization will carry out its mission.  3.  Strategies to achieve the goals: A description of how the goals  contained in the strategic plan are to be achieved, including the  operational processes; skills and technology; and the human, capital,  information, and other resources required to meet these goals.  4.  Use of metrics to gauge progress: A set of metrics that will be applied  to gauge progress toward attainment of each of the plan’s long-term  goals.  5.  Key external factors that could affect goals: Key factors external to  the organization and beyond its control that could significantly affect  the achievement of the long-term goals contained in the strategic plan.  These external factors can include economic, demographic, social,  technological, or environmental factors, as well as conditions or events  that would affect the organization’s ability to achieve its goals.  6.  Program evaluations: Assessments, through objective measurement  and systematic analysis, of the manner and extent to which programs  associated with the strategic plan achieve their intended goals.  7.  Stakeholder involvement in developing the plan: Consideration of the  views and suggestions—solicited during the development of the  strategic plan—of those entities affected by or interested in the  organization’s activities.
In addition to our work on strategic planning, recent legislation has  focused attention on DOD’s and the military departments’ maintenance  strategies and plans. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2009 requires the Secretary of Defense to contract for a study, which  among other things, will address DOD’s and the military departments’ life- cycle maintenance strategies and implementation plans on a variety of  topics including: outcome-based performance management objectives,  workload projection, workforce, and capital investment strategies.  Additionally, the act requires that the study examine “the relevant body of  work performed by the Government Accountability Office.” OUSD (AT&L)  officials told us that they expect the final report from this study to be  delivered to Congress in December 2010.
section_title: The Plan Does Not Fully Address All Elements of a Results- Oriented Management Framework
subsections: section_title: Air Force Plan Does Not Fully Address Elements of a Results-Oriented Management Framework and Lacks Clear Linkages in Planning Documents
paragraphs: While the Air Force plan focuses Air Force efforts on weapon system and  equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the elements  of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it clearly link  information between the two planning documents. The Air Force plan fully  addresses one of the seven elements, partially addresses four elements,  and does not address the remaining two elements that our prior work has  shown to be critical in a comprehensive strategic plan. Table 2  summarizes the extent to which the Air Force’s depot maintenance  strategic plan addresses the elements of a results-oriented management  framework. Additionally, the plan’s documents are not clearly linked to  one another and the relationship between corresponding sets of  information in the documents is sometimes not transparent. As a result of  these weaknesses, the Air Force’s ability to use its plan as a decision- making tool to meet future challenges may be limited.
The plan’s depot maintenance mission statement fully addresses one of  seven elements of a results-oriented management framework. The  comprehensive mission statement summarizes the Air Force depots’  overarching purpose and addresses their major functions and operations.  In prior reports on strategic planning, we have noted that a mission  statement is important because it provides focus by explaining why an  organization exists and what it does. The Air Force depots’ overarching  purpose, as identified in the plan, is to “ensure that Air Force weapon  systems and equipment are operational and available to support the Air  Force’s mission.” This mission statement is results-oriented and  corresponds with the more general department-wide mission statement in  DOD’s Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans, which  states that the mission of DOD depots is to meet the national security and  materiel readiness challenges of the 21st century.
subsections: section_title: The Plan Partially Addresses Four Elements: Goals, Strategies, Metrics, and Stakeholder Involvement
paragraphs: The Air Force’s plan partially addresses four of the results-oriented  management framework elements: long-term goals; strategies to achieve  the goals; use of metrics to gauge progress; and stakeholder involvement  in developing the plan. With regard to the long-term goals, the plan  includes five:    maintain a responsive organic industrial base,    ensure a highly qualified, technically competent, and professional    provide facilities necessary to support existing and projected depot    maintain robust public- and private-sector capabilities by leveraging  partnering, and  transform depot processes through continuous process improvement and  logistics transformation.
While the plan includes these goals, it does not specify interim goals, and it  does not specify the time frames for monitoring and achieving the long- term goals. For example, the plan discusses the goal of leveraging public- private partnerships to maintain robust public- and private-sector  relationships and ensure access to complementary dual depot  maintenance capabilities; however, it does not identify interim goals or  time frames for achieving this partnering goal.
Similarly, the plan discusses the Air Force’s strategies to achieve its five  long-term goals, but does not address the resources that will be needed to  achieve them. For example, the plan identifies a strategy to achieve its  infrastructure goal. Specifically, the plan states that the Air Force will  make capital investments in its depots in order to provide them with the  state of the art, environmentally compliant, efficiently configured, and  properly equipped facilities to support existing and projected depot  maintenance workload. However, needed resources—such as capital,  equipment, and technology—are not specified to facilitate implementation  of this strategy.
While the plan includes some metrics, it does not discuss any metrics that  directly assess the degree to which the depots are achieving the plan’s  goals. The plan discusses general life-cycle performance metrics to assess  overall depot performance. Air Force officials told us that these metrics  indirectly gauge progress toward achieving each of the plan’s five long- term goals. For example, the plan discusses a quality defect rate metric,  which measures the variance between quality deficiency reports and the  quality defect rate standard, but the plan does not describe how the depots  would measure or use the metric to gauge progress toward achieving one  or more of the plan’s long-term goals. Air Force officials explained that a  performance problem indicated by any of its metrics would lead the Air  Force to monitor overall performance and then identify the relevant area  (e.g., workforce) contributing to the problem. These officials told us that  the Air Force would then adjust performance in the relevant area to  achieve the corresponding goal. However, this indirect process is not  discussed in the plan. Moreover, the plan does not discuss the desired  levels for each of these metrics.
While the Air Force involved many relevant stakeholders in the  development of its depot maintenance strategic plan, it did not involve  depot officials directly in all aspects of the process. The Air Force  developed its plan primarily by using inputs from the following  stakeholders:  the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations,  Environment, and Logistics;  the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition;  the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Logistics,  Installations and Mission Support; and    Air Force Materiel Command.
Air Force depot officials said they were not involved in all aspects of the  development of the plan, even though their depots are directly affected by  the plan. For example, depot officials indicated that they had limited or no  involvement in the development of the Strategy.
section_title: The Plan Does Not Address Two Elements: Key External Factors and Program Evaluations
paragraphs: The Air Force’s plan does not address two of the results-oriented  management framework elements: key external factors and program  evaluations. The plan does not identify any key factors external to the Air  Force and beyond its control that could significantly affect the  achievement of its five long-term goals. Our prior work on developing a  results-oriented management framework reported that external economic,  demographic, social, technical, or environmental factors may influence  whether an organization achieves its goals. Moreover, we noted that a  strategic plan should describe each such factor and indicate how it could  affect achievement of the plan’s goals. Even though the Air Force plan did  not describe any such factors, Air Force officials have acknowledged  elsewhere external factors that could affect depot maintenance. For  example, in 2007, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force  described the harsh environments the Air Force is currently operating in— including the heat and sand in Iraq’s deserts—during testimony before the  House Armed Services Committee. Further, obtaining technical data rights  from private-sector manufacturers is another example of external factors  not identified in the plan that could affect depot maintenance. Depot  officials told us that technical data are sometimes not directly available to  the depots and that without them their work is more challenging.
Similarly, the plan does not identify how the Air Force will evaluate its  programs and use the results of these evaluations to adjust the plan’s long- term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of performance. The  plan indicates that the Air Force must continuously validate and update its  depot maintenance strategic plan to meet operational depot maintenance  requirements; however, the plan does not describe the method to conduct  this process.
section_title: The Lack of Clear Linkage in the Plan’s Two Documents May Limit the Plan’s Usefulness
paragraphs: The content of the Air Force depot maintenance Strategy and Master Plan  are not clearly linked to one another, which may make the collective plan  difficult to use as a decision-making tool. OUSD (AT&L) instructed each  service to publish its depot maintenance strategic plan in a single depot  maintenance-specific document or as an integral part of one or more  documents having a broader scope. Air Force officials told us that they  intended the Strategy to provide the strategic vision for Air Force depot  maintenance and the Master Plan to complement the Strategy by providing  the details for executing the strategic vision.
We found that the linkage of information in the plan’s two documents was  not always clear. For example, the goals listed in the Strategy are not  clearly repeated in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan includes goals  that are unrelated to depot maintenance. For example, one goal the Master  Plan includes is to improve the strategic acquisition of capabilities to  ensure warfighters have the weapons and equipment needed to defend the  United States. In addition, the Master Plan does not clearly align its  content to the five long-term goals described in the Strategy. Although a  table in an appendix to the Master Plan provides some information  indicating how the content of the Strategy and Master Plan are aligned, the  appendix does not clarify how the two documents are linked to one  another or how they are used as a collective plan. An Air Force official  acknowledged the weaknesses in the linkages between the plan’s two  documents and said that they intend to ensure effective alignment of the  plan’s documents in future versions of the plan.
Additionally, Air Force officials told us that they chose not to include  information in the plan that was already contained in external documents.  For example, they told us that other Air Force documents (such as Air  Force budget documents and the servicewide strategic plan) address key  external factors that could affect the achievement of the plan’s goals. The  Air Force plan, however, does not refer to these external documents.  Without clear linkages between the two primary planning documents and  other related documents, the Air Force may have limited utility of its plan  as a decision-making tool to meet future challenges.
section_title: OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force Did Not Use Effective Oversight Mechanisms to Systematically Evaluate the Plan
subsections: section_title: OUSD (AT&L) Did Not Employ an Effective Oversight Mechanism to Evaluate the Plan
paragraphs: OUSD (AT&L) did not use an effective oversight mechanism to  systematically evaluate the Air Force’s plan to determine whether it fully  addresses all needed elements. DOD’s Depot Maintenance Strategy and  Implementation Plans states that the Depot Maintenance Working  Integrated Process Team would monitor the development and subsequent  execution of the services’ depot maintenance strategic plans on a  continuing basis. However, that team did not review any of the services’  plans. OUSD (AT&L) officials representing the Assistant Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy and Programs told us that, in  practice, the Integrated Process Team did not assume responsibility for  oversight of the plan, but instead monitored selected issues that the  services’ plans describe, such as the implementation of some specific  process improvement initiatives. The Maintenance Policy and Programs  officials told us that they reviewed the Air Force plan through a process  consisting of informal meetings and conversations with service  representatives. These OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that, through their  review, they found that the Air Force plan was a “good first start” but did  not address all needed elements. However, Air Force officials told us that  they were not informed that the plan did not fully address elements of a  results-oriented management framework nor were they asked to revise the  plan. Additionally, Maintenance Policy and Programs officials were unable  to provide us with documentation of their review of the Air Force plan.
section_title: The Air Force Lacked an Effective Oversight Mechanism to Systematically Evaluate the Plan
paragraphs: At the time the Air Force developed its plan, it lacked an effective  oversight mechanism to help ensure that its plan fully addresses the  elements of a results-oriented management framework and that the plan’s  two documents are clearly linked to one another. Air Force headquarters  officials responsible for the plan did not review the Strategy or the Master  Plan to ensure that these documents fully address the elements of a  results-oriented management framework. Furthermore, the Air Force  headquarters officials did not provide direction to the Air Force Materiel  Command (AFMC)—the office responsible for the Master Plan—on  strategic planning elements that should be incorporated in the Master  Plan. Also, AFMC officials told us that they received no instruction to  submit the Master Plan to another Air Force office or other oversight body  for review. Since the development of the current plan, the Air Force  developed the Depot Maintenance Strategic Planning Integrated Process  Team in June 2008 to improve its future depot maintenance strategic  plans. According to the team’s charter, this process will be used to validate  and update the depot maintenance strategic plan and help align the  Strategy and Master Plan with one another and with DOD’s Depot  Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans. Moreover, while the Air  Force conducts monthly reviews of depot maintenance programs and they  told us that these reviews help provide oversight of the plan’s  implementation, these reviews do not assess the progress in achieving the  plan’s long-term goals.
While Air Force officials responsible for the plan acknowledged some of  the plan’s incomplete information, they told us that they believe the plan  more fully addresses the results-oriented management framework  elements than our analysis reflects. According to these officials, although  the plan does not address some elements explicitly, they are implied in the  plan’s discussion of various initiatives and processes and experienced  professionals involved in Air Force depot maintenance would be able to  recognize these elements. However, because the plan does not explicitly  address these elements, they may not be clear to individuals not involved  in developing the plan.
section_title: The Plan Does Not Fully Respond to OUSD (AT&L)’s Direction Designed to Meet Future Challenges
paragraphs: While the Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan describes many  initiatives and programs important to the Air Force depots, it is not fully  responsive to OUSD (AT&L)’s direction to the services that was designed  to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges.  Specifically, the plan does not fully address logistics transformation, core  logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital  investment—the four areas that OUSD (AT&L) directed each service, at a  minimum, to include in its plan. Within these four general areas are 10  issues that OUSD (AT&L) also identified. The Air Force’s plan partially  addresses 8 and does not address the remaining 2. Table 3 summarizes our  evaluation of the extent to which the Air Force plan addresses each of the  10 issues.
As discussed for the elements of a results-oriented management  framework, OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force did not identify missing or  partially addressed issues because neither used effective oversight to help  ensure that OUSD (AT&L)’s direction for developing the plan was carried  out. Among other things, DOD’s Depot Maintenance Strategy and  Implementation Plans states that the DOD strategy will ensure that DOD is  postured to meet the national security and materiel readiness challenges  of the 21st century. However, at present, information missing from the Air  Force plan may limit the service’s assurance that its depots are postured  and resourced to meet future maintenance requirements.
subsections: section_title: The Plan Partially Addresses the Three Logistics Transformation Issues
paragraphs: The Air Force plan partially addresses each of the three logistics  transformation issues that OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to discuss  in their plans. In this area, OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to discuss  the future roles and capabilities of the depots, transformation actions, and  approaches for integrating various depot capabilities in their plans.
The plan generally discusses the future roles of the depots, but it does not  discuss projected future capabilities of the Air Force depots or how those  capabilities will be measured. The plan states that the general role of the  depots is to ensure Air Force weapon systems and equipment are  operational and available to support the Air Force’s missions. However,  the plan is silent on the depots’ future capabilities despite changes that  DOD had planned to make to the Air Force’s force structure. For example,  the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report noted that DOD  had planned to reduce the number of Air Force B-52 aircraft by about       40 percent to 56.
Additionally, the plan partially addresses actions the Air Force is taking to  transform its depots. For example, the plan discusses continuous process  improvement initiatives such as the High Velocity Maintenance program,  in which the Air Force expects to schedule depot maintenance for aircraft  more frequently but for shorter periods. However, the plan does not  discuss how the Air Force intends to change the structure or organization  of its depots to transform them to achieve the Air Force vision of the  depots’ future capabilities.
Moreover, the plan partially addresses the management approach for  integrating various depot maintenance capabilities, including public- and  private-sector sources, as well as joint, inter-service, and multinational  capabilities. To address public- and private-sector sources, the plan states  that partnering with the private-sector to ensure access to complementary  or dual depot maintenance capabilities is an integral element of the Air  Force strategy. However, the plan does not discuss the management  approach for integrating joint, inter-service, or multinational capabilities.  Because the plan does not discuss the approach for integrating these  capabilities, it is unclear if the Air Force is positioned to reduce  redundancies and take advantage of potential cost-saving measures.
section_title: The Plan Partially Addresses Both Core Logistics Capability Assurance Issues
paragraphs: The Air Force plan partially addresses both core logistics capability  assurance issues. For one of the two issues, the plan partially addresses  the OUSD (AT&L) direction to discuss actions taken or contemplated to  (1) identify core requirements upon program initiation, (2) ensure that  depot source of repair decisions are made upon program initiation,   (3) encourage the formation of public-private partnerships, and   (4) identify and rectify core capability deficiencies. The plan describes  tools the Air Force uses to identify core requirements including processes,  models, and guidance. For example, the plan states that the Air Force  uses the biennial core computation process and other tools to generate Air  Force core requirements. To address OUSD (AT&L)’s direction to discuss  depot source of repair decisions, the plan states that the Air Force uses the  strategic source of repair process, the source of repair assignment  process, and the depot maintenance inter-service processes. The plan  also discusses public-private partnerships and states that AFMC and the  depots intend to develop a standard process for public-private  partnerships to ensure compliance with DOD and Air Force directives on  public-private partnerships. To address OUSD (AT&L) direction to  discuss actions to identify and rectify core deficiencies, the plan notes that  if core target shortfalls exist, the depots will provide plans to mitigate the  risk but, the plan does not explain how the Air Force will do so.  Furthermore, the plan does not discuss concerns we have previously  reported on DOD’s biennial core computation process. For example, we  reported in 2009 that the Air Force used a method for calculating core  capability deficiencies that differed from the method used by the other  services and that officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense said  that the Air Force approach was not appropriate.
For the second of the two core logistics capability assurance issues,  estimating depot workload is partially addressed in the Air Force plan. To  address the depot maintenance workload estimating portion of this issue,  the plan describes a process in which Air Force organizations, such as the  Centralized Asset Management Office, provide input into the workload  review process. The plan goes on to state that the workload review  process determines future depot workload. However, the Air Force plan  does not discuss the OUSD (AT&L) direction to address the projected  effects of weapon system retirements or bed-down (i.e., the act or process  of locating aircraft at a particular base). However, the Air Force plans to  substantially reduce some portions of its fleet. In May 2009, the Air Force  announced that it would accelerate the retirement of 249 older aircraft,  including 112 F-15s and 134 F-16s. While these retirements will affect the  workload at the Air Force depots at Warner-Robins, Georgia, and Ogden,  Utah, the Master Plan issued 2 months earlier does not include any  information on the planned changes. Moreover, the plan does not discuss  new aircraft that will replace those being retired, the future workload  estimates associated with any potential replacement aircraft, or the  processes that will be used to determine which facilities will obtain any  new work.
section_title: The Plan Partially Addresses Two of the Workforce Revitalization Issues but It Does Not Address the Third Issue in This Area
paragraphs: The Air Force plan partially addresses both reengineering and  replenishment strategies but does not contain information on the OUSD  (AT&L)-directed workforce replenishment requirements. Regarding the  reengineering strategies issue, the plan discusses actions the Air Force is  taking to reengineer its existing employees’ skills to satisfy new capability  requirements, but it does not discuss actions the service is taking to  identify new skill requirements. To address reengineering existing  employees’ skills, the plan indicates that the depots are partnering with  local universities and technical schools to provide training. However, it  does not directly address the Air Force actions to identify new skill  requirements. Instead of providing details on new skill requirements, the  plan makes a general statement that the Air Force’s workforce skill  capabilities are continuously assessed to determine future training and  skill requirements. Likewise, it is silent on specific actions the Air Force is  taking to carry out this assessment.
The plan does not discuss the method the Air Force will use to forecast  workforce replenishment requirements, nor the quantitative data needed  to project annual hires as well as losses due to retirements and other  reasons. Although the plan discusses a manpower and capability program  that determines the required personnel for future work, the plan does not  follow the OUSD (AT&L) direction to discuss the methods or sources of  quantitative data the Air Force uses to determine turnover and the timing  of the turnover.
To address the replenishment strategies issues, the plan describes actions  the Air Force is taking to train employees, but it does not discuss how the  Air Force is recruiting new employees, nor does it discuss a  comprehensive management approach for establishing and implementing  an employee replenishment strategy. The plan discusses, for example, a  university and vocational school partnership program to train depot  employees. However, it is silent on the Air Force’s recruiting methods  (e.g., for hard to fill types of positions) and any servicewide employee  replenishment strategy.
The Air Force plan’s limited and missing information for the three issues in  the workforce revitalization area is noteworthy in the context of our  previous findings on the DOD depot maintenance workforce and in the  context of information in the OUSD (AT&L)’s document directing the  services to provide the plans. In 2003, we reported that DOD faced  significant management challenges in succession planning to maintain a  skilled workforce at its depot maintenance facilities. Among other  challenges, we reported that relatively high numbers of civilian workers at  maintenance depots were nearing retirement age. DOD’s Depot  Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans makes a similar point. It  states that DOD’s depot maintenance community, like the rest of the  federal government, faces increasing numbers of retirements as the “baby  boom” generation reaches retirement eligibility. It goes on to state that the  retirement-eligible population within the depot maintenance workforce  and forecasted annual retirements are expected to increase annually for  the remainder of the decade. This dynamic—coupled with the highly  skilled nature of some depot maintenance work and the length of time  required to train new employees—creates hiring, training, and retention  challenges. Without a discussion that acknowledges these and other such  workforce challenges, it is unclear how well the Air Force is positioned to  optimally address the challenges that its depots face.
section_title: The Plan Partially Addresses One Capital Investment Issue but Does Not Address the Other
paragraphs: The Air Force plan partially addresses the capital investment issue of  quantifying current capabilities but does not address the other issue— capital investment benchmarks. Neither the benchmarks for evaluating the  adequacy of investment funding nor the Air Force’s basis for selecting the  benchmarks are in the Air Force’s plan despite OUSD (AT&L)’s direction  to address this issue. Even though the plan does not address benchmarks,  it notes that the Air Force intends to continue making an annual capital  investment of at least 6 percent of revenue, as required by law, to sustain  depot infrastructure requirements. Moreover, an OUSD (AT&L) official  mentioned that the Air Force’s citing of the 6 percent capital investment  should be seen as addressing the benchmark issue.
The plan partially addresses the issues pertaining to the methods for  quantitatively articulating these concerns: current capabilities, current and  projected deficiencies, and the capabilities that planned investment will  provide. The plan notes that the Air Force targets its investments to the  highest priority needs to support the warfighter. While the plan also  discusses an infrastructure investment prioritization process, it does not  describe the method for prioritizing needed investments. Similarly, the  plan notes that the Air Force invests in facility restorations and  modernizations and discusses the Capital Purchase Program for  equipment, restoration, and modernization programs for facilities,  transformation initiatives, and military construction. However, the plan  does not present quantitative data on the projected funding (or shortfalls)  for facilities and equipment.
Capital investment in DOD depots has been an issue of concern in our  prior work. For example, in 2001, we reported that capital investments in  depot plant equipment had declined sharply in the mid-1990s as a result of  defense downsizing and depot closures and consolidations. As a result of  DOD’s lack of capital investment, its depots did not keep up with the latest  technologies. In subsequent years, funding levels increased as the services  recognized the need to modernize their depots.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that the primary intent of the OUSD  (AT&L)’s direction was to provide a framework for the services to meet  challenges in the future and that the issues identified in the four areas  specified in the direction were designed to address those challenges.  Further, DOD’s Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans  states that each service will conduct depot maintenance strategic planning  that focuses on achieving the DOD depot maintenance strategy and that  the DOD strategy will ensure that DOD is postured to meet the national  security and materiel readiness challenges of the 21st century. However,  the Air Force’s plan does not provide a comprehensive, results-oriented  management framework to efficiently and effectively inform the Air  Force’s future decisions, nor does it fully respond to OUSD (AT&L)’s  direction that was designed to provide a framework for the services to  overcome four general areas of future challenges. Furthermore, the limited  linkage of information in the Air Force’s two planning documents may  reduce the utility of the plan as a decision-making tool to meet future  challenges. A primary reason for not fully addressing these framework  elements and linkages in the plan was that OUSD (AT&L) and the Air  Force did not have effective oversight mechanisms in place to promptly  identify the incomplete information, communicate such findings to the  plan developers, and monitor the revision of the plan to ensure that the  limitations had been addressed. These concerns about the content,  linkage, and oversight resulted in a plan that missed an opportunity to  identify a more complete Air Force vision for the effective and efficient  operation of its depots in the future. For example, had the Air Force  identified and implemented systematic program evaluation and a thorough  set of metrics to directly assess goal achievement, it would have additional  tools for reacting in a timely manner to findings from the ongoing  congressionally mandated study on depot capabilities. Most importantly, a  comprehensive plan could have resulted in the Air Force having more  assurance that its depots are viably positioned and have the maintenance  workforce, equipment, facilities, and funds they need to meet current and  future requirements.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide greater assurance that Air Force depots will be postured and  resourced to meet future maintenance requirements, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the  following three actions to revise the Air Force’s depot maintenance  strategic plan:    Fully and explicitly address all elements needed for a comprehensive  results-oriented management framework, including those elements that we  have identified as partially addressed or not addressed in the current plan.    Demonstrate clear linkages among the depot maintenance strategic plan’s  component documents, should the Air Force decide to publish its revised  plan in multiple documents.
Fully and explicitly address OUSD (AT&L)’s direction that provides a  framework for the services to meet future depot maintenance challenges.
To strengthen the oversight mechanism for depot maintenance strategic  planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the  Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement procedures to review  revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure they fully  address all key elements of a results-oriented management framework,  explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans, and  periodically assess progress and corrective actions to the extent needed in  meeting the plans’ goals.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our four  recommendations to provide greater assurance that Air Force depots will  be postured and resourced to meet future maintenance requirements.
The department concurred with our recommendation to direct the  Secretary of the Air Force to revise the Air Force’s depot maintenance  strategic plan to fully and explicitly address all elements needed for a  comprehensive results-oriented management framework. DOD stated that  it will direct the Air Force and the other services to more clearly address  all elements needed for a results-oriented strategy in the next OUSD  (AT&L) request to services to update their depot maintenance strategic  plans.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of  the Air Force to revise the Air Force’s depot maintenance strategic plan to  demonstrate clear linkages among the plan’s component documents,  should the Air Force decide to publish its revised plan in multiple  documents. In its response, DOD stated that it will direct the Air Force and  the other services to more clearly demonstrate the linkages of the Air  Force plan to the DOD depot maintenance strategic plan in the next OUSD  (AT&L) request to the services to update their depot maintenance strategic  plans. While the department concurred with our recommendation, it did  not discuss directing the Air Force to more clearly demonstrate linkages  among the Air Force plan’s component documents, which was the focus of  our recommendation. Therefore, DOD may need to take further action to  explicitly direct the Secretary of the Air Force to more clearly demonstrate  linkages among the Air Force plan’s component documents, should the Air  Force decide to publish its revised plan in multiple documents.
The department also concurred with our recommendation to direct the  Secretary of the Air Force to revise the Air Force’s depot maintenance  strategic plan to fully and explicitly address OUSD’s (AT&L) direction that  provides a framework for the services to meet future depot maintenance  challenges. DOD stated that it will direct the Air Force and the other  services to explicitly address the OUSD (AT&L) direction for depot  maintenance strategic planning in the next OUSD (AT&L) request to the  services to update to their depot maintenance strategic plans.
Additionally, DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and  the Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement procedures to  review revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure they  fully address all key elements of a results-oriented management  framework, explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans,  and periodically assess progress and corrective actions to the extent  needed in meeting the plan’s goals. In its response, DOD stated that it will  direct the Air Force and the other services to explicitly address the  procedures noted in our recommendation. DOD also said that OUSD  (AT&L) would further develop a process to periodically assess progress  and corrective actions to ensure the Air Force and the other services are  meeting OUSD (AT&L) and their own plan’s goals.
DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated into  this report where applicable.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the  Secretary of the Air Force. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call  me at (202) 512-8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we addressed two questions: (1) To what extent does the Air  Force’s depot maintenance strategic plan address key elements of a  results-oriented management framework? and (2) To what extent does the  Air Force’s depot maintenance strategic plan address direction from the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and  Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) that was designed to provide a framework for  the services to meet future challenges? We limited the scope of our  analysis to the current Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan, which  includes both the April 2008 Air Force Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan  and the March 2009 Air Force Depot Maintenance Master Plan.
We used the same set of methodological procedures to answer both  questions and each type of procedure was performed simultaneously for  the two questions. For our analysis, we first reviewed relevant laws;  Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force regulations governing depot  maintenance; and depot maintenance-related reports issued by agencies  and organizations including GAO, DOD, the Logistics Management  Institute, and RAND. We then used qualitative content analyses to  compare the Air Force plan against criteria from the seven elements of a  results-oriented management framework and the 10 issues listed in the  OUSD (AT&L) direction for depot maintenance strategic plans. To  conduct these analyses, we first developed a data collection instrument  that incorporated these two types of criteria. One team member then  analyzed the plan using this instrument. To verify preliminary observations  from this initial analysis, a second team member concurrently conducted  an independent analysis of the plan. We compared observations of the two  analysts and discussed any differences. We reconciled the differences with  the assistance of analysts from the team that was evaluating the Navy  depot maintenance strategic plan. We subsequently met with Air Force  officials to confirm our understanding of the plan and sought additional  information where our preliminary analyses revealed that the plan  partially addresses or does not address the criteria. We also interviewed  and obtained documentary evidence from relevant OUSD (AT&L) officials  regarding its oversight of the services’ plans. We additionally interviewed  depot leaders and strategic planning personnel during site visits at two of  the three Air Force depots to obtain first-hand information on issues the  depots face. We also obtained data on workload and personnel from the  Air Force and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our  report.
The organizations we interviewed are listed in table 4.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through May 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report were Sandra B. Burrell, Assistant Director;  James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; Joanne Landesman; Brian Mazanec;  Michael Willems; and Elizabeth Wood.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That  Army and Marine Corps Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance  Requirements. GAO-09-865. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2009.
Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish Core  Capability at Military Depots. GAO-09-83. Washington, D.C.: May 14,  2009.
Depot Maintenance: DOD’s Report to Congress on Its Public-Private  Partnerships at Its Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence  (CITEs) Is Not Complete and Additional Information Would Be Useful.  GAO-08-902R. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2008.
Depot Maintenance: Issues and Options for Reporting on Military  Depots. GAO-08-761R. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2008.
Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Provide More Consistent Funding  Allocation Data to Congress. GAO-07-126. Washington, D.C.: November 30,  2006.
DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help  Ensure Viability of DOD’s Civilian Industrial Workforce. GAO-03-472.  Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.