Managing Sensitive Information: Actions Needed to Ensure Recent Changes in DOE Oversight Do Not Weaken an Effective Classification System
Published: 2006-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In recent years, the Congress has become increasingly concerned that federal agencies are misclassifying information. Classified information is material containing national defense or foreign policy information determined by the U.S. government to require protection for reasons of national security. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) DOE's training, guidance, and oversight ensure that information is classified and declassified according to established criteria and (2) DOE has found documents to be misclassified.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOE's Office of Classification's systematic training, comprehensive guidance, and rigorous oversight programs had a largely successful history of ensuring that information was classified and declassified according to established criteria. However, an October 2005 shift in responsibility for classification oversight to the Office of Security Evaluations has created uncertainty about whether a high level of performance in oversight will be sustained. Specifically, prior to this shift, the Office of Classification had performed 34 inspections of classification programs at DOE sites since 2000. These inspections reviewed whether DOE sites complied with agency classification policies and procedures. After the October 2005 shift, however, the pace of this oversight was interrupted as classification oversight activities ceased until February 2006. So far in 2006, one classification oversight report has been completed for two offices at DOE's Pantex Site in Texas, and work on a second report is under way at four offices at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. More oversight inspections evaluating classification activity at eight DOE offices are planned for the remainder of 2006. In addition, according to the Director of the Office of Security Evaluations, the procedures for conducting future oversight are still evolving--including the numbers of sites to be inspected and the depth of analysis to be performed. If the oversight inspections planned for the remainder of 2006 are completed, it will demonstrate resumption in the pace of oversight conducted prior to October 2005. However, if these inspections are not completed, or are not as comprehensive as in the past, the extent and depth of oversight will be diminished and may result in DOE classification activities becoming less reliable and more prone to misclassification. On the basis of reviews of classified documents performed during its 34 oversight inspections, the Office of Classification believes that very few of DOE's documents had been misclassified. The department's review of more than 12,000 documents between 2000 and 2005 uncovered 20 documents that had been misclassified--less than one-sixth of 1 percent. DOE officials believe that its misclassification rate is reasonable given the large volume of documents processed. Most misclassified documents remained classified, just not at the appropriate level or category. Of greater concern are the several documents that should have been classified but mistakenly were not. When mistakenly not classified, such documents may end up in libraries or on DOE Web sites where they could reveal classified information to the public. The only notable shortcomings we identified in these inspections were the inconsistent way the Office of Classification teams selected the classified documents for review and a failure to adequately disclose these procedures in their reports. Inspection teams had unfettered access when selecting documents to review at some sites, but at others they only reviewed documents from collections preselected by site officials. Office of Classification reports do not disclose how documents were selected for review.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In recent years, the Congress has become increasingly concerned that  federal agencies are misclassifying information. Classified information is  material containing national defense or foreign policy information  determined by the U.S. government to require protection for reasons of  national security. Access to classified information generally requires a  security clearance. The number of classified documents is unknown  because there is no requirement to account for most of them; however,  some estimates put their number in the hundreds of millions. In just the  past 5 fiscal years for which data are available (2000 to 2004), federal  agencies created more than 110 million new classified documents. From  2000 through 2005, the Department of Energy (DOE) classified about  234,000 documents, including a record 62,281 documents in 2004 and  about 58,000 documents in 2005. DOE is responsible for most of the U.S.  government’s information about nuclear weapons and technology.  Managing classified information is one of the most important  responsibilities that an agency has because underclassifying, wrongly  declassifying, and overclassifying sensitive information can all endanger  national security. While it is obvious that underclassifying or wrongly  declassifying a document can lead to the improper release of vital  information, overclassifying can also have damaging consequences. For  example, the 9/11 Commission Report concluded that policies designed  to protect government information have led to overclassification, which  has inhibited information sharing among federal agencies.
According to officials at the National Archives’ Information Security  Oversight Office, which is responsible for setting federal government  policy for managing classified information, an effective classification  management program is based on a strong system of internal controls,  including training, guidance, and oversight. From the 1950s until 2005,  DOE’s Office of Classification and its predecessor offices provided  expertise as well as systematic training, extensive guidance, and effective  oversight. As part of DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance  Assurance, the Office of Classification provided training at DOE  headquarters, field sites, and program offices in how to identify, mark, and  protect classified information and documents. This office also developed  an extensive collection of classification guides, or manuals, specifying  precisely which information must be classified. However, in October 2005,  DOE shifted responsibility for oversight from the Office of Classification  to the Office of Security Evaluations—another office within the Office of  Security and Safety Performance Assurance—which is primarily  responsible for the oversight of physical security at DOE sites containing  nuclear materials.
This report assesses the extent to which (1) DOE’s training, guidance, and  oversight ensure that information is classified and declassified according  to established criteria and (2) DOE has found documents to be  misclassified.
To assess the extent to which DOE’s training and oversight ensure  information is classified and declassified appropriately, we analyzed the  policies and procedures used at various DOE sites and national  laboratories to determine if authorized classifiers and declassifiers had up- to-date training and guidance. Where applicable, we assessed the  reliability of the data and found them sufficiently reliable for the purposes  of this report. In addition, to better understand DOE’s training program, its  process for certifying classifiers and declassifiers, as well as the  department’s classification and declassification procedures, we completed  DOE’s core training for classifying and declassifying documents. We also  met with officials responsible for managing classification activities in DOE  headquarters units and managers at six DOE sites: two in Albuquerque and  one in Los Alamos, New Mexico; one in Aiken, South Carolina; and two in  Oak Ridge, Tennessee. To assess the extent to which DOE has found  documents to be misclassified, we analyzed the 34 classification  inspections by DOE’s Office of Classification and its predecessor offices,  between 2000 and 2005. We did not independently review classified  documents because the technical expertise required to make valid  judgments about the classification of nuclear weapons and technology was  not available to us outside DOE. We also met with officials from the  Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives and  Records Administration to obtain their views on the elements of a  successful classification program as well as their evaluations of how DOE  manages classified information. We conducted our work from April 2005  to May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The U.S. government classifies information that it determines could  damage the national security of the United States if disclosed publicly.  Currently, all classified information falls under two authorities, one for  national defense and foreign relations, the other for nuclear weapons and  technology. Beginning in 1940, classified national defense and foreign  relations information has been created, handled, and safeguarded in  accordance with a series of executive orders. Executive Order 12958,  Classified National Security Information, as amended, is the most  recent. It establishes the basis for designating National Security  Information (NSI). It demarcates different security classification levels,  the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to  cause exceptionally grave damage (Top Secret), serious damage (Secret),  or damage (Confidential). It also lists the types of information that can be  classified and describes how to identify and mark classified information.  In 2005, about one quarter of DOE classification decisions concerned NSI.
The advent of nuclear weapons during World War II, led to a new category  of classified information. In 1946, the Congress enacted the Atomic Energy  Act, which established a system for governing how U.S. nuclear  information is created, handled, and safeguarded. Nuclear information  categorized as Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) is  not governed by Executive Order 12958. RD is defined as data concerning  the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; production of  special nuclear material; and use of special nuclear material in the  production of energy. This includes information about nuclear reactors  that produce plutonium and tritium, radioactive isotope separation  techniques, and the quantities of nuclear materials involved in these  processes. FRD relates primarily to data regarding the military use of  nuclear weapons. Examples of FRD include weapons stockpile data,  weapon yields, the locations of nuclear weapons, and data about weapons  safety and storage. Like NSI, classified nuclear information also has three  classification levels: Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential.
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI) is an exceptional category,  which may fall under either of the two classification authorities. NNPI is  deemed by both DOE and the Department of Defense (DOD) to be  sufficiently sensitive to merit special protections and may be classified  under the Atomic Energy Act or Executive Order 12958, depending on its  subject and details.
subsections: section_title: Some Controlled Information Remains Unclassified
paragraphs: Two categories of nuclear information can be withheld from the public  without being classified: Unclassified NNPI and Unclassified Controlled  Nuclear Information (UCNI). Unclassified NNPI and UCNI are information  the government considers sufficiently sensitive to withhold from public  release, but not so sensitive as to warrant designation as RD, FRD, or NSI.  UCNI is a category created under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act,  which enables DOE officials to share information with state and local law  enforcement and emergency services personnel who, while lacking  security clearances, may have a legitimate need to know operational  details about, for example, planned shipments of special nuclear materials.
section_title: Documents Can Be Classified in Whole or in Part
paragraphs: According to the current executive order, documents containing only NSI  must be “portion marked,” for instance, classified paragraph-by-paragraph.  For example, a document containing NSI may have paragraphs classified  as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, along with others that are  unclassified. However, documents containing any RD or FRD are  classified in their entirety at the level of the most sensitive information in  the document. Portion marking of documents containing RD and FRD is  not required by the Atomic Energy Act and is discouraged by DOE policy.
section_title: Requirements Vary for Declassifying Documents
paragraphs: Executive Order 12958, as amended, states that NSI shall be declassified  as soon as it no longer meets the standards for classification. The point at  which information is to be declassified is set when the decision is made to  classify it, and it is linked to an event, such as a completed mission, or to a  period of time. Classified records that are older than 25 years and have  permanent historical value are automatically declassified unless an  exemption is granted because their contents still remain sensitive and  their release could harm national security. Agencies have adopted  processes to facilitate declassification in compliance with the executive  order.
Unlike documents containing NSI, documents containing RD or FRD are  not reviewed automatically for possible declassification. The reason for  this is that these two categories are mostly scientific and technical and  may not become less sensitive with the passage of time. In fact, such data  may be useful to nations and terrorist groups that are trying to build  nuclear weapons. At a time of increased concern about nuclear  proliferation, some of the oldest and simplest nuclear technology can be  useful for making weapons of mass destruction. For this reason,  documents about nuclear weapons and technologies from the 1940s and  1950s remain especially sensitive and worthy of protection.
section_title: DOE Guidance on Classification
paragraphs: DOE implements the executive order and classification statutes by issuing  departmental regulations, directives, and extensive use of classification  guides. DOE’s directive, Identifying Classified Information, is the  department’s comprehensive guide to classifying, declassifying, marking,  and protecting information, documents, and material. The directive also  establishes policies and procedures, such as departmentwide training and  certification requirements for staff authorized to classify or declassify  information, and for periodic self-assessments. Classification guides are  manuals specifying precisely which DOE information must be classified,  how it should be categorized (NSI, RD, or FRD), and at what level (Top  Secret, Secret, or Confidential) it should be protected. DOE has a detailed  and comprehensive set of classification guides that are integral to efficient  functioning of the department’s classification activities. The department  limits the use of “source documents” for the purpose of making  classification decisions. Source documents may be used to classify  documents containing NSI, but only when there is no guidance available.  For example, if a DOE classifier is evaluating a new document with the  same information found in another document already classified as Secret,  then this new document may also be classified as Secret. RD and FRD  documents can never be used as source documents.
section_title: DOE Training, Guidance, and Oversight Programs Have Been Effective over Time, but a Recent Change in Oversight Responsibility Has Created Uncertainty
paragraphs: DOE’s Office of Classification’s systematic training, comprehensive  guidance, and rigorous oversight programs had a largely successful history  of ensuring that information was classified and declassified according to  established criteria. DOE’s training requirements and classification  guidance are essential internal controls that provide a strong framework  for minimizing the risk of misclassification. However, since responsibility  for classification oversight was shifted from the Office of Classification to  the Office of Security Evaluations in October 2005, the pace of oversight  was interrupted—creating uncertainty about how oversight will be  performed and whether it will continue to be effective.
subsections: section_title: DOE’s Classification Training and Guidance Programs Are Systematic and Comprehensive
paragraphs: Systematic training requirements are an important element of DOE’s  framework for maximizing the proper classification of documents. Only  staff that have successfully completed training are authorized to classify or  declassify documents. Staff must be recertified as classifiers and/or  declassifiers every 3 years, in order to retain their authority. Staff are  typically trained as “derivative classifiers” and, in some cases, as  “derivative declassifiers” as well. They are limited in their authority to  those areas in which they have special knowledge and expertise and are  only authorized to classify (or declassify) documents “derivatively”—that  is, only if the document in question contains information a DOE or other  U.S. government agency classification guide specifically requires be  classified or declassified. There are currently about 4,600 derivative  classifiers in DOE, nearly all of whom do classification work only as a  collateral duty. For example, most derivative classifiers in DOE are  scientists, engineers, or other technically trained people who work in  programs or areas involving classified information that need staff who can  properly classify the documents these programs produce. Relatively few  DOE staff (just 215 as of May 2006) are authorized to declassify  documents. Because a declassified document may become publicly  available, derivative declassifiers are among the most experienced  derivative classifiers. Only original classifiers, of which there are currently  25 throughout the DOE complex, are authorized to classify previously  unclassified information. All DOE original classifiers are either very  senior, full-time classification professionals, such as the director and  deputy director of the Office of Classification, or one of the department’s  top-level political appointees, such as the Administrator, National Nuclear  Security Administration.
DOE has developed an extensive collection of more than 300 classification  guides, or manuals, specifying precisely which DOE information must be  classified, how it should be categorized, and at what level (Top Secret,  Secret, or Confidential) it should be protected. The Office of Classification  oversees the regular updating of all classification guides used in DOE and  must ultimately approve the use of every guide. DOE prohibits  classification decisions based on source documents for documents  containing RD and FRD and permits their use only when no guidance is  available for documents containing NSI from other federal agencies. The  Information Security Oversight Office considers the use of classification  guides to be a best practice because they provide a singular, authoritative  voice that is less open to individual interpretation or confusion than  source documents and so using these guides are less likely to result in  errors. According to the Information Security Oversight Office, DOE’s use  of classification guides is among the most extensive in the federal  government. Classification guides are integral to the efficient functioning  of the department’s classification program. Some classification guides are  more general in nature, such as those dealing with physical security, and  are used widely throughout DOE. Others, known as “local guides,” are  used at a few or even a single site because they provide guidance specific  to a single DOE program or project. For example, a classification guide  used by contractors working on a decontamination and clean-up project at  a site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, provides specific guidance on nuclear  waste and storage unique to this site.
DOE has also implemented an extensive and rigorous oversight program.  From 2000 through 2005, the Office of Classification and its predecessor  offices have conducted on-site inspections of classification activities at 34  DOE field offices, national laboratories, and weapons manufacturing  facilities. In calendar years 2004 and 2005, the Office of Classification  conducted an average of 10 oversight inspections a year. Classification  activities were evaluated in depth in eight different functional areas,  including site-provided classification training, self-assessment efforts, and  overall senior management support for (and awareness of) classification  activities. To this end, before a team of 3 to 10 Office of Classification  inspectors arrived, it would send the site’s classification officer a “data  call” requesting detailed and specific answers to dozens of questions about  the procedures and practices of the site’s classification program. For  example, to ascertain how effectively classification guidance was being  used, requests were made for information about what guidance was in use  at the site; the names of authorized classifiers who had guides; whether  there were any local (site-specific) guides in use, and if so, when were they  last validated by Office of Classification officials. Similarly detailed  requests for information were requested about each of the other  classification program elements. Having such detailed information in hand  prior to arrival at the site allowed inspection teams to undertake a  comprehensive evaluation in just 2 to 5 days because they could focus  more on validating the information provided in the data call than on  undertaking the time-consuming task of gathering data themselves. The  Office of Classification staff’s expertise in classification matters is  augmented with subject area experts. For example, to ensure the  inspection team had adequate expertise to make valid assessments of  classification decisions about nuclear weapons design at Los Alamos  National Laboratory, a staff member with nuclear weapons design  experience was assigned to the team. Moreover, in many cases, members  of the inspection team had more than 20 years of classification experience.  As a result of the extensive information provided by the data call, and the  level of experience of the inspection team, generally the team submitted a  draft inspection report to the site’s classification officer before leaving. It  is DOE policy that any findings requiring immediate correction resulted in  the creation of a corrective action plan, which had to be completed within  60 days of the inspection. DOE officials told us progress on implementing  corrective action plans was reported to the Office of Classification  quarterly.
In September 2005, the Information Security Oversight Office reviewed  DOE’s classification program just prior to the shift in responsibility for  classification oversight. Officials at the Information Security Oversight  Office found DOE’s program to be much better than the average federal  agency. They singled out DOE’s training program and extensive use of  classification guidance as especially impressive. One official called DOE’s  program for ensuring that all staff authorized to classify and declassify  documents were recertified every 3 years “outstanding.” Another official  called DOE’s extensive use of classification guides a “best practice.”  Overall, Information Security Oversight Office officials were impressed  with DOE’s classification program, noting that robust oversight is a very  important part of an effective program for managing classified  information.
section_title: Continued Effectiveness of Classification Oversight Is Uncertain
paragraphs: Since responsibility for classification oversight was shifted from the Office  of Classification to the Office of Security Evaluations, the pace of  oversight was interrupted—creating uncertainty about how oversight will  be performed and whether it will continue to be effective. The Office of  Security Evaluations is the DOE office responsible primarily for the  oversight of physical security at DOE sites, with a special emphasis on  Category 1 sites (sites containing special nuclear materials). Since October  2005, the Office of Security Evaluations has completed one inspection of  two offices at the Pantex Site in Texas and another inspection of four  offices at the Savannah River Site is under way. In April 2006, Office of  Security Evaluations officials provided us plans for performing additional  oversight inspections for the remainder of 2006. These plans included  inspections evaluating classification activity at eight DOE offices at three  additional sites. Classification oversight has been incorporated into larger  oversight efforts on physical security at DOE sites.
Classification oversight ceased from October 2005 until February 2006  when the Office of Security Evaluations began its inspection of two offices  at the Pantex Plant, a nuclear weapons manufacturing facility in Texas.  Before the shift in responsibility, DOE officials did not conduct any risk  assessment of the likely effects on the classification oversight program of  the shift for three reasons: (1) they did not consider the shift to be a  significant organizational or management challenge because the upper- level management remained the same; (2) the Office of Security  Evaluations would continue to draw on many of the same experienced  Office of Classification staff who have been performing classification  oversight for many years; and (3) responsibility for other key internal  controls for managing classification activities, namely training and  guidance, would remain with the Office of Classification. The director of  the Office of Security Evaluations and the acting deputy director of the  Office of Classification told us that the goal of shifting responsibility for  classification oversight from one office to the other was to consolidate all  oversight functions in one area. The idea arose in the course of a periodic  reassessment of the organization of the Office of Security and Safety  Performance Assurance—the larger organization of which these and  several other offices are part—and a judgment by senior DOE  management that one group should do all the oversight. The Office of  Security Evaluations seemed the most logical place to locate classification  oversight, according to senior DOE management. DOE officials also told  us that the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance was not  the only part of DOE affected by this drive to consolidate functions in  single offices, and there was no intent to downgrade oversight.
According to the Director of the Office of Security Evaluations, the  procedures for conducting future oversight are still evolving—including  the numbers of sites to be inspected and the depth of analysis to be  performed. The office currently plans to evaluate classification activities at  14 offices within five DOE sites in calendar year 2006, integrating  classification oversight into its regularly scheduled inspections of  Category 1 sites with inspections at a few non-Category 1 sites. The  director of the Office of Security Evaluations said the goal is to visit each  of DOE’s 10 Category 1 sites every 2 years. However, this schedule has  been recently delayed as the office has been tasked by senior DOE  management to perform security reviews in other areas of DOE  operations. Now that classification oversight is a component within the  much larger oversight agenda of the Office of Security Evaluations—one  focused on the physical security of DOE’s most sensitive sites—it raises  uncertainty about whether classification oversight will have a diminished  priority than when it was solely an Office of Classification responsibility.  However, if all of the visits planned for 2006 are completed, then the Office  of Security Evaluations will be conducting oversight at a pace similar to  what was done prior to October 2005.
As classification oversight is now the responsibility of the Office of  Security Evaluations—and will be reported as one component in a much  larger report on the overall security of DOE sites—it is unclear if the new  format will have the same depth of analysis or be as comprehensive,  detailed, and useful as the format used by the Office of Classification. The  Office of Security Evaluations reports are bigger and have a much higher  profile with senior DOE management than reports by the Office of  Classification. As such, they are written to convey information to a  broader and less technically oriented audience. Each element of security is  rated as “effective performance” (green), “needs improvement” (yellow),  or “significant weakness” (red). To accommodate this shift, the format for  reporting the results of inspections of classification activities has changed  to fit into this larger, well-established Office of Security Evaluations  reporting format. These reports have relatively brief executive summaries  but are supplemented by several appendixes, one for each component of  site security. The executive summary includes the highlights of the  inspection, an overall evaluation of security at the site, the formal findings  (that is, deficiencies uncovered), and a brief scope and methodology  section (which includes a listing of the personnel participating in the  inspection). It is uncertain if the results of the inspection of classification  activities will be included in the executive summary, or if this depends on  whether the results are particularly noteworthy. Not all aspects of an  inspection will be mentioned in the summary section, and most of what is  reported on classification and other topics will be in their respective  appendixes. The Office of Security Evaluation’s full report will be  classified because it will contain information on the vulnerabilities in site  security. However, according to the Office’s director, the appendix on  classification will likely be unclassified.
Since the shift in responsibility, the Office of Security Evaluations has  completed one classification inspection of two offices at the Pantex Site;  and the new procedures for oversight are still evolving. It is uncertain  whether the reporting on classification oversight will be as detailed,  specific, and, ultimately, as useful as it was prior to the October 2005 shift  in responsibility. While the overall reporting format for the Office of  Security Evaluations reports is firmly in place, the director of the office  told us that the details of how to assess the effectiveness of the  classification program is still evolving. Initially, the Office of Security  Evaluations plans to gather similarly detailed and comprehensive  information from the sites it inspects using the same “data call” as the  Office of Classification; the data call requests detailed and specific  answers to dozens of questions about the procedures and practices of the  site’s classification program. The director of the Office of Security  Evaluations stressed—and the deputy director of the Office of  Classification agreed—that they plan to have the information reported in  the classification appendix written in language similar to that in Office of  Classification reports, and findings and recommendations for  improvement will be conveyed in language no less specific and  “actionable” than in the previous reports. Nonetheless, until the Office of  Security Evaluations performs several classification inspections and  establishes its own record of accomplishment in overseeing DOE  classification activities, it is not clear whether oversight will be as effective  as it was before the shift in responsibility. Without continued  effectiveness, DOE classification activities could become less reliable and  more prone to misclassification.
section_title: DOE Internal Reviews Found Very Few Documents Have Been Misclassified, but Document Selection Procedures Are Not Consistent and Lack Transparency
paragraphs: On the basis of reviews of over 12,000 classified documents totaling nearly  a quarter million pages at 34 sites between 2000 and 2005, DOE officials  have found that very few documents are misclassified. Office of  Classification inspectors found 20 documents had been misclassified, an  error rate of about one-sixth of 1 percent. At more than two-thirds of the  sites (25 of 34) inspectors found no classification errors. The most  misclassified documents that these inspectors found at any site were five,  at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in May 2005. Four of these  documents were classified, but not at the proper level or category. A fifth  document containing nuclear weapons information should have been  classified but was unclassified and found in the laboratory’s technical  library. (See table 1.)
Most misclassified documents remained classified, just not at the  appropriate level or category. Of greater concern would be documents that  should be classified but mistakenly are not. When mistakenly not  classified, such documents may end up in libraries or on DOE Web sites  where they could reveal sensitive RD and FRD to the public. When  documents are not classified but should be, these errors can only be  uncovered through some form of oversight, such as the document reviews  that occurred in preparation for, and during, Office of Classification  inspections. For example, during an inspection at the Sandia National  Laboratories in March 2005, Office of Classification inspectors reviewed  more than 170 unclassified documents in the laboratory’s holdings and  found 2 documents that contained classified information. Without  systematic oversight, these kinds of errors are unlikely to be discovered  and corrected.
While DOE’s extensive document reviews provided depth and rigor to its  oversight inspections, two notable shortcomings in this process were (1)  the inconsistent way that inspectors gained access to the many documents  they would review and (2) the failure to adequately disclose these  procedures in their reports. At the six DOE sites we visited, the  procedures that the Office of Classification inspection teams used to  obtain documents varied widely. For example, at the Los Alamos National  Laboratory, inspectors were granted unfettered access to any storage vault  and library, and they themselves chose the documents for review. Once  in the vault or library, inspectors used the document indexes or  interviewed the librarians to decide which documents and topics were  recently classified or declassified. The inspectors requested the  documents of most interest, or they browsed in the collection and pulled  files randomly from the shelves. By contrast, at the NNSA Service Center  in Albuquerque, site officials selected documents from several different  locations, and then inspectors chose from among them. By not being able  to select their own samples, Office of Classification inspectors limited  their independence—which could possibly undermine the credibility of  their findings. Because DOE does not have a complete inventory of its  classified documents, it cannot select a strictly random sample.  Nonetheless, DOE officials acknowledged they could improve their  selection procedures to make them more consistent and random.  Furthermore, in the 34 inspection reports we analyzed, Office of  Classification inspectors did not disclose to the reader key facts about  how information was gathered, what limitations they agreed to, and how  this affected their findings. According to Standards for Internal Control  in the Federal Government, independent inspections should properly  document and report on the processes they use in their evaluations. The  Office of Classification’s reports provided no detail about how documents  were chosen. Such detail would increase public confidence that DOE’s  classification oversight is transparent and robust.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since the 1950s, the DOE’s Office of Classification and its predecessor  organizations have developed strong systems of internal controls for  managing classified information. At the core of these systems are (1)  DOE’s requirement that staff authorized to classify documents must  complete training and be periodically recertified, (2) its comprehensive  guidance, and (3) its program of regular and rigorous oversight to ensure  that DOE sites are following agency classification policies. These training,  guidance, and oversight programs have provided a proven framework that  has contributed to DOE’s success in managing classified information.  However, the recent reduction in oversight activity following a shift in  responsibilities raises questions about whether this framework will  continue to be as strong. If the oversight inspections planned for the  remainder of 2006 are effectively completed, it will demonstrate  resumption in the pace of oversight conducted prior to October 2005.  However, if these inspections are not completed, or are not as  comprehensive, then the extent and depth of oversight will be diminished  and may result in DOE classification activities becoming less reliable and  more prone to misclassification. In addition, by implementing more  random selection procedures for identifying classified documents to  review—and by disclosing these procedures clearly in their reports—DOE  has the opportunity to assure both itself and the public that its oversight is,  indeed, effective. DOE is the agency most responsible for safeguarding the  nation’s nuclear secrets, and its classification and declassification  procedures are especially vital to national security. At a time when risks of  nuclear proliferation are increasing, it is imperative that DOE build on its  past successes in order to continue to be effective.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that DOE classification activities remain effective and  result in documents that are classified and declassified according to  established criteria, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the  following three actions:  ensure that the classified information oversight program provides  oversight to a similar number of DOE sites, as it did before October 2005,  and provides a similar depth of analysis;  strengthen the review of classified documents by applying selection  procedures that more randomly identify documents for review; and   disclose the selection procedures used for documents for review in future  classification inspection reports.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on the draft of this report, DOE agreed with the findings  and recommendations of the report. DOE was pleased that its  classification program is being recognized as particularly effective in  protecting information vital to national security. However, while DOE  agreed with our recommendation that steps be taken to ensure that the  classification oversight program provide oversight to a similar number of  sites at a similar depth of analysis, it asserted that it is in fact already  taking the needed actions and has, overall, “retained the effective  framework previously established by the Office of Classification.”  Although we are encouraged by DOE’s efforts, until the agency establishes  a record of accomplishment under the new organizational structure, it will  not be clear whether oversight will be as effective as it has been in the  past.
DOE also concurred with our recommendations to strengthen the review  of classified documents by applying selection procedures that more  randomly identify documents for review and disclose these procedures in  future reports and outlined steps it will take to implement these two  recommendations.
Comments from DOE’s Director, Office of Security and Safety  Performance Assurance are reprinted in appendix II. DOE also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the  Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional  committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Summary of DOE Classification and Control Policies
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE) classifies and declassifies information  under authorities granted by the Atomic Energy Act, first passed in 1946,  and under presidential executive orders governing national security  information. These authorities and corresponding implementing directives  provide for three classification levels: Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential.  DOE uses three categories to identify the different types of classified  information: Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, and National  Security Information. In addition to classified information, certain types of  unclassified information are sensitive and require control to prevent public  release. The markings used and the controls in place depend on the  statutory basis of the unclassified control system and vary in DOE, from  Official Use Only information to Unclassified Controlled Nuclear  Information. At a practical level, unclassified information is controlled or  not controlled, depending on its sensitivity, any overriding public interest  requiring release, or operational considerations involving the benefit of  control versus the cost of control (for example, it must be shared with  uncleared state or local government officials).
The information presented below is a summary of the various levels and  categories used by DOE to classify and control information.
subsections: section_title: Levels of Classification
paragraphs: All classified information and documents are classified at one of three  levels, listed in descending order of sensitivity: Top Secret (TS), Secret (S),  or Confidential (C).
section_title: Categories of Classified Information
subsections: section_title: Restricted Data (RD)
paragraphs: Classified under authority of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as  amended.
Defined in the AEA as all data concerning:  the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; and  the production of special nuclear material. Examples include:   (1) Production reactors (2) Isotope separation (gaseous diffusion, gas  centrifuge, laser isotope separation).
The use of special nuclear materials in the production of energy.
Examples include: (1) naval reactors, and (2) space power reactors.
But not information declassified or removed from the RD category.
Documents are not portion marked–an entire document is classified at the  level of the most sensitive information contained in the document.
section_title: Formerly Restricted Data (FRD)
paragraphs: Classified under authority of the AEA of 1954, as amended.
Information that has been removed from the RD category because DOE  and the Department of Defense have jointly determined that the  information (1) now relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic  weapons and (2) can be adequately safeguarded as defense information.  Examples include:    weapon stockpile quantities,    weapons safety and storage,    weapon yields, and    weapon locations.
Documents are not portion marked.
section_title: National Security Information (NSI)
paragraphs: Classified under the authority of Executive Order 12958, as amended.
Information that pertains to the national defense or foreign relations of  the United States and classified in accordance with the current executive  order as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential.    NSI documents may be classified up to a 25 year limit unless containing  information that has been approved for exemption from  declassification under Executive Order 12958, as amended, and based  on an approved declassification guide.
For example, DOE treats certain nuclear-related information that is not  RD or FRD, such as security measures for nuclear facilities, as exempt  from declassification until such facilities are no longer in use. Many of  these facilities have been in use for over 50 years.
Documents are portion marked by paragraph.
Confidential Foreign Government Information – Modified Handling  Authorized (C/FGI-MOD)
An agency must safeguard foreign government information under  standards providing a degree of protection at least equivalent to that  required by the government or international organization that furnished  the information. If the FGI requires a level of protection lower than that  for Confidential, the United States can, under Executive Order 12958  section 4.1(h), classify and protect it as C/FGI-MOD, which provides  protection and handling instructions similar to that provided to United  States Official Use Only. Before C/FGI-MOD was created, the only legal  way for such information to be controlled was at the Confidential level,  which resulted in over-protection, increased security cost, and operational  complexity.
section_title: Classification Markings
paragraphs: Each classified document must be marked to show its classification level  (and classification category if RD or FRD), who classified it, the basis for  the classification, and the duration of classification (if NSI). Lack of a  category marking indicates the classified document is NSI. A document  containing only NSI must be portion marked.
An RD document, for example, will be marked TSRD (Top Secret  Restricted Data), showing the classification level and category. RD  documents are similarly marked SRD (Secret Restricted Data), or CRD  (Confidential Restricted Data). A document should never simply be  marked “RD.” The same rules apply to FRD information (TSFRD, SFRD,  and CFRD).
A classified document that is not RD or FRD is an NSI document. NSI  documents are marked as TSNSI (Top Secret National Security  Information), SNSI (Secret National Security Information), or CNSI  (Confidential National Security Information); or simply Top Secret, Secret,  or Confidential.
section_title: Unclassified but Controlled Information (UCI)
subsections: section_title: Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)
paragraphs: Controlled under authority of the AEA of 1954, as amended.  the design of nuclear material production facilities or utilization  facilities;    security measures for protecting such facilities, nuclear material  contained in such facilities, or nuclear material in transit;    The design, manufacture, or utilization of any atomic weapon or  component if it has been declassified or removed from the RD  category.
UCNI markings – A document containing UCNI must be marked at the top  and bottom of each page with “Unclassified Controlled Nuclear  Information” or “UCNI” and include, on the front of the document, a  marking that identifies the Reviewing Official making the determination,  the date of the determination, and the guidance used.
section_title: Official Use Only (OUO)
paragraphs: Unclassified information that may be exempt from public disclosure  under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that is not  otherwise subjected to a formally implemented control system.
A decision to control information as OUO does not mean that such  information is automatically exempt from disclosure if requested under  the FOIA. That determination is made by a FOIA Authorizing Official only  when the document is requested. The OUO marking merely serves as a  warning that the document reviewer considers the information to be  sensitive and indicates why by including on the document the FOIA  exemption that the document reviewer thinks applies.
OUO markings – Documents determined to contain OUO information are  and when they do, they state which FOIA exemption applies. This  classification guide is then cited on the OUO stamp.)
section_title: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI)
paragraphs: NNPI concerns all classified and controlled unclassified information  related to the naval nuclear propulsion program. This marking  supplements existing classification and control systems and is not a  separate category outside of the authorities provided under the AEA or  Executive Order 12958 for, as an example, classified NNPI. The use of  “NNPI” is an additional marking applied to some of the previously defined  categories of information to indicate additional controls for protection or  access.
subsections: section_title: Classified Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (C-NNPI)
paragraphs: Classified under the authority of the AEA of 1954, as amended, or  Executive Order 12958, as amended.
All classified information concerning the design, arrangement,  development, manufacture, testing, operation, administration, training,  maintenance, and repair of propulsion plants of naval nuclear powered  ships and prototypes, including associated shipboard and shore-based  nuclear support facilities.
Markings can be RD or NSI.
C-NNPI documents containing RD information are marked TSRD, SRD,  or CRD.
C-NNPI NSI documents are typically marked Secret NOFORN (“not    Documents containing information classified under the authority of the  AEA are not portion marked.
section_title: Unclassified Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (U-NNPI)
paragraphs: Controlled in accordance with Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction  C5511.32B and protected pursuant to export control requirements and  statutes.
All unclassified but controlled information concerning the design,  arrangement, development, manufacture, testing, operation,  administration, training, maintenance, and repair of propulsion plants of  naval nuclear powered ships and prototypes, including associated  shipboard and shore-based nuclear support facilities.
U-NNPI documents will be marked and controlled as NOFORN (not  releasable to foreign nationals).
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition, Nancy Crothers, Robin Eddington, Doreen Feldman, William  Lanouette, Greg Marchand, Terry Richardson, Kevin Tarmann, and Ned  Woodward made significant contributions to this report.