Amtrak: Acela's Continued Problems Underscore the Importance of Meeting Broader Challenges in Managing Large-Scale Projects
Published: 2005-05-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 1996, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) executed contracts to build high-speed trainsets (a combination of locomotives and passenger cars) as part of the Northeast High Speed Rail Improvement Project. Since that time, Amtrak has experienced multiple challenges related to this program, including recently removing all trains from service due to brake problems. Amtrak has struggled since its inception to earn sufficient revenues and depends heavily on federal subsidies to remain solvent. The April 2005 action to remove the Acela trainsets--Amtrak's biggest revenue source--from service has only exacerbated problems by putting increased pressure on Amtrak's ridership and revenue levels. This testimony is based on GAO's past work on Amtrak and focuses on (1) background on problems related to the development of the Acela program, (2) summary of issues related to lawsuits between Amtrak and the train manufacturers and the related settlement, (3) key challenges associated with the settlement, and (4) initial observations on possible challenges in Amtrak managing large-scale projects.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Significant issues and controversy have impacted the Acela program since its inception. According to Amtrak, what started out as a simple procurement of train equipment evolved into a complex high-speed rail program. Acela has encountered numerous difficulties due to such things as new technology and production delays. Even after Acela service began, unexpected problems were encountered, which required Amtrak to remove the trainsets from service, resulting in lost revenue. Concerns about the quality of the Consortium of train manufacturers' (Bombardier and Alstom) work and Amtrak's withholding of payments for the Acela trainsets resulted in the parties suing each other, each seeking $200 million in damages. Amtrak and the Consortium reached a negotiated settlement in March 2004. Although the settlement agreement protects Amtrak through certain warranties, loss of revenue resulting from removal of trains from service is not directly recoverable. Under the settlement, Amtrak is conditionally scheduled to assume maintenance functions from the Consortium in October 2006. Aside from the current problems, Amtrak faces other risks and challenges to the recent settlement, including obtaining technical expertise and providing sufficient funding for maintenance. Achieving a successful transition is critical to Amtrak given the importance of the Acela program. The recent brake problems may impact the transition through such things as delayed management training. As GAO reported in February 2004, Amtrak had difficulties managing the Northeast High Speed Rail Improvement Project and many critical elements of the project were not completed and the project goal of a 3-hour trip time between Boston and New York City was not attained. GAO has ongoing work addressing Amtrak management and performance issues that GAO plans to report on later this year.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the National Railroad Passenger  Corporation’s (Amtrak) Acela program and the overall management of the  corporation. Intercity passenger rail is at a critical crossroads regarding its  future in the United States. Amtrak has struggled since its inception to  earn sufficient revenues and depends heavily on federal subsidies to  remain solvent. The April 2005 action to remove the Acela trainsets—the  combination of locomotives and passenger cars—from service has only  exacerbated problems by putting increased stress on Amtrak’s ability to  maintain ridership and revenue levels and could make Amtrak’s financial  condition even more precarious. Amtrak’s Acela program accounted for  not quite one-fourth of the ridership and about 44 percent of revenue on  the Northeast Corridor—Amtrak’s busiest rail route—in fiscal year 2004.
My statement today addresses numerous issues of interest to the Congress  as it delves into Amtrak’s handling of this most recent incident involving  Acela, and more generally, the future of intercity passenger rail in this  country. I will cover four areas: (1) background on the problems Amtrak  experienced during the development of the Acela program, (2) a summary  of issues related to the lawsuits between Amtrak and the consortium of  train manufacturers (the Consortium), Bombardier and Alstom, and the  subsequent settlement, (3) key challenges associated with implementing  the settlement, and (4) possible broader challenges at Amtrak in managing  other large-scale projects. The information I will present is primarily based  on reports that we have issued over the last several years.
Significant issues and controversy have impacted the Acela program since  its inception. Among the issues that have impacted the Acela program are  the following: (1) potential difficulties due to new technology, (2) impacts  from new safety standards to accommodate high-speed rail, (3)  manufacturing and production delays, and (4) abbreviated testing of the  trains prior to placement in revenue service. The Acela trainsets are not an  “off-the-shelf” piece of equipment but rather a combination of both new  and existing technology. According to the Federal Railroad Administration  (FRA), this was the first time this particular combination of new and  existing technology had been designed as one unit. As such, the equipment  required considerable time to develop and test, and the probability of  expected and unexpected problems was high. Furthermore, the trainset  grew in weight and cost due to new safety regulations. The Consortium  also encountered production delays. With Amtrak under considerable  financial and time pressures to place the trainsets into service; therefore,  trainset testing was abbreviated. In addition to building the Acela trainsets,  the Consortium entered into a contractual arrangement with Amtrak to  manage the Acela facilities and maintain the trainsets, including training  and supervising Amtrak employees. Since the trainsets were placed into  revenue service in 2000, unexpected problems have been encountered that  have resulted in lost revenue and damaged the image of the Acela  program. For example, an equipment failure forced Amtrak to withdraw  the Acela trainsets from service for 2 months in 2002. As problems and  difficulties mounted, increased tension between Amtrak and the trainset  manufacturer led to legal action against each other.
Concerns about the quality of the Consortium’s work and Amtrak’s  withholding of payments for the Acela trainsets resulted in the parties  suing each other, each seeking $200 million in damages. Amtrak and the  Consortium reached a negotiated settlement in March 2004. In general,  under the settlement, the Consortium must complete modifications to the  trainsets and locomotives, achieve established performance requirements,  provide training to Amtrak staff, and provide and extend warranties. In  addition, Amtrak agreed to release a portion of previously withheld funds  and will conditionally assume facility management and trainset  maintenance responsibilities as soon as 2006, rather than in 2013, as  originally planned; if the Consortium satisfactorily completes its  commitments under the settlement agreement.
Our work evaluating the terms of the settlement led us to conclude that  Amtrak faces other risks and challenges to sustain the trainsets and keep  them operating. Achieving a successful transition is critical to the  financial well-being of Amtrak, given that the Acela program is such a  significant source of its revenue. The challenges include (1) completing  modifications and meeting performance requirements, (2) obtaining  technical expertise for maintenance and completing training, (3)  sufficiently funding maintenance and integrating responsibilities, and (4)  preparing a comprehensive implementation plan. Addressing and resolving  these challenges will not be easy. Although the settlement agreement  ensures that Amtrak will be protected by the extended trainset warranties  and Amtrak has several methods of financial recourse if the Consortium  does not honor warranties, loss of revenue resulting from removal of  trainsets from service is not directly recoverable. However, the full extent  of the legal liability has yet to be addressed by the parties. Amtrak officials  told us that their first priority is getting the trainsets back in service. In  addition, the recent brake problems may impact the transition of the  maintenance function to Amtrak through such actions as delaying  management training. Amtrak officials continue to believe the transition  will occur in October 2006, however.
Amtrak also faces challenges in managing other large-scale projects. As we  reported in February 2004, Amtrak had difficulties managing the Northeast  High Speed Rail Improvement Project (NHRIP), a multi-year, multi-billion  dollar project to electrify the tracks between Boston, Massachusetts, and  New Haven, Connecticut, acquire high-speed trains, and make capital  improvements. Among the problems we found were that (1) Amtrak’s  management of this project was not comprehensive but was focused on  the short term; (2) project management focused on separate components  of the project, such as electrification and acquisition of the high-speed  trains, and not on the project as a whole; and (3) Amtrak did not  sufficiently address major infrastructure improvements needed to attain  project goals. The overall results were that many critical elements of the  project were not completed, project costs and schedules increased  considerably, and the project goal of a 3-hour trip time between Boston  and New York City was not attained.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created Amtrak to provide intercity  passenger rail service because existing railroads found such service to be  unprofitable. Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile network, primarily over  freight railroad tracks, providing service to 46 states and the District of  Columbia. Amtrak owns about 650 miles of track, primarily on the  Northeast Corridor between Boston, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C.  In fiscal year 2004, Amtrak served about 25 million passengers, or about  68,640 passengers per day. According to Amtrak, about two-thirds of its  ridership is wholly or partially on the Northeast Corridor. The Northeast  Corridor is the busiest passenger rail line in the country, and some 200  million Amtrak and commuter rail travelers use the Corridor, or some part  of it, each year. On some portions of the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak  provides high-speed rail service (up to 150 miles per hour). The high-speed  Acela program is the centerpiece of Amtrak’s intercity passenger rail  system, with its financial contributions to the company exceeding that of  all other routes combined.
Acquisition of the Acela trainsets occurred as part of NHRIP. NHRIP, and  its predecessor the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, date back to  the late 1970’s and represented a multiyear, multibillion collection of  capital improvements to the Northeast Corridor that included electrifying  the line between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston, Massachusetts,  improving tracks, signals, and other infrastructure, and acquiring high- speed trains. These efforts were designed to achieve a 3-hour trip time  between New York City and Boston. As of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter  railroads, and others had spent about $3.2 billion on the project.
In 1996, Amtrak executed contracts with train manufacturers Bombardier  and Alstom to build 20 high-speed trainsets and 15 electric high- horsepower locomotives; construct three maintenance facilities; and  provide maintenance services for the Acela trainsets. The trainsets,  locomotives, and facilities contracts totaled $730 million. Bombardier and  Alstom, referred to as the Consortium, created the Northeast Corridor  Management Service Corporation (NecMSC) to manage the facilities and  maintain the trainsets, including supervising Amtrak maintenance  employees. Amtrak pays NecMSC a per-mile rate—that is, a fixed rate for  each mile the Acela trains travel—on a monthly basis to provide  management and maintenance services at three maintenance facilities.
Amtrak’s Acela program has undergone a number of events since its  inception, which has included the execution of the original contracts in  1996, delivery of the first trainset in October 2000, and the filing of  lawsuits by both Bombardier and Amtrak in November 2001 and 2002,  respectively(see fig. 1). The trainsets were also withdrawn from service for  several weeks in August 2002. In March 2004, Amtrak and Bombardier  signed an agreement to settle the lawsuits, which calls for Amtrak to  conditionally assume trainset maintenance in October 2006, assuming  conditions of the settlement have been met. The last warranties for the  trainsets expire in 2021.
section_title: Significant Issues Have Impacted Acela Program Since Its Inception
paragraphs: Significant issues and controversy have impacted the Acela program since  its inception. What started out as a relatively simple procurement of train  equipment evolved into a complex high-speed rail program, according to  an Amtrak official. The Acela trainset is a complex piece of equipment  with state-of-the-art electronics and was considered new technology for  the United States. As such, it required additional time to develop and test,  and the probability of expected and unexpected problems was high.
Among the issues that the Acela program has encountered since its  creation are the following:    Potential difficulties due to new technology. Instead of purchasing “off- the-shelf” technology—that is, train equipment that was already designed,  engineered, and in use—Amtrak decided to acquire “new” technology. An  FRA official told us some components on the Acela trainset (such as  power components and the tilt mechanism) were similar to that used on  train equipment in other parts of the world but much of the technology on  Acela trainsets was new. In addition, many of the components, whether  new or existing technology, had never been used together. Further, this  official said that because the components in the Acela trainsets had never  before been designed as one unit, Acela was not an off-the-shelf  technology train. Although Acela trainsets were essentially new  technology and could be expected to require additional time to develop  and test, Amtrak developed an ambitious schedule that called for shipment  of the first trainset 32 months—just over 2½ years—after the notice to  proceed was issued. According to an Amtrak official, the calendar and  electrification delivery date drove the planning for the trainsets. Amtrak  worked backwards from these due dates to try and fit project work into  the timeline.
Impacts from new safety standards to accommodate high-speed rail.  During the 1996 to 2000 time frame, the same time period when the Acela  trainsets were being acquired and manufactured, FRA, in consultation  with Amtrak, was developing safety regulations related to high-speed rail  operations. These included new rules covering track safety (to  accommodate speeds of up to 200 miles per hour), passenger car safety,  and train control. According to FRA officials, Amtrak was intimately  involved in developing these standards to accomplish its vision of high- speed rail operations on the Northeast Corridor. FRA officials also noted  that passenger car safety regulations did not exist prior to the mid-1990’s.  Developed for safety purposes, these standards had a significant impact on  the Acela trainsets. For example, the passenger car safety regulations  required a crash energy management system in passenger cars that was  designed to increase the strength of both car ends and side posts. FRA also  prohibited the operation of high-speed trains (up to 150 miles per hour) in  a push-pull manner. FRA officials acknowledged that the crash energy  system increased the weight of the Acela trainsets but said such a system  resulted in safer trains. Amtrak told us that prohibiting push-pull operation  caused them to obtain 20 additional power cars for Acela at a cost of  about $100 million.
Manufacturing and production delays. The Acela program experienced a  significant share of manufacturing and production delays. Under FRA’s  1994 master plan for NHRIP, developed in response to the Amtrak  Authorization and Development Act, delivery of enough high-speed trains  to initiate limited 3-hour service between Boston and New York City was  expected by 1999. However, due to design and manufacturing delays, the  first Acela trainsets were delivered about a year late, and revenue service  using the trainsets did not begin until December 2000. Manufacturing and  production delays began early in the procurement process. For example,  our review of Consortium progress reports indicated that as early as  October 1996, only months after the original contract was signed, change  orders and design changes (mainly related to car interiors) were being  made that were causing delays in production. In addition, train weight was  increasing, a condition that continued to plague the trainsets throughout  production. Amtrak attempted to require the Consortium to prepare  recovery plans to keep the program on schedule, but we found little  evidence of such plans in documents we reviewed. Regardless, these plans  did not prevent the trainsets from being delivered about a year late.
Abbreviated testing prior to placement in revenue service. Amtrak’s Acela  trainsets also appeared to have had abbreviated testing prior to being  deployed into revenue service. A fuller testing of the trainsets may have  better identified the range of potential problems and defects that could be  experienced prior to placing the trainsets in service. The maximum testing  any one Acela trainset received was about 35,000 miles of testing —20,000  miles at the Transportation Test Center (Center) in Pueblo, Colorado, and  15,000 miles on the Northeast Corridor between 1999 and 2000. However,  an FRA official believed testing of the trainsets was rushed and that  additional testing at the Center should have been conducted. This official  cited testing of Amtrak’s AEM-7 electric locomotive as an example of the  testing that is normally done on new equipment. This locomotive, which  was a new locomotive that entered service in the early 1980’s, was tested  for 165,000 miles at the Center prior to placement in service. An FRA  official also acknowledged that there were no minimum federal testing  requirements for new high-speed trainsets, like Acela, only that such  equipment comply with existing safety regulations. However, this official  believed Amtrak was under both financial and time pressures to place the  trainsets in service, in part because of delays in trainset production.
Since placement into revenue service in 2000, the Acela has experienced a  number of unexpected problems. One occurrence was in August 2002  when Amtrak was forced to withdraw the trains from service to address  unexpected equipment problems (yaw damper brackets). The trainsets  were not returned to complete service until October 2002. According to  Amtrak, this withdrawal cost the corporation a net $17 million in lost  revenue. In April 2005, Amtrak once again experienced unexpected  problems with the trainsets due to equipment problems (cracks in brake  assemblies). Again, the trainsets have been withdrawn from service and  Amtrak has stated that it may be months before the trains are returned to  service. Although Amtrak is placing substitute equipment into service, it  can be expected that there will be revenue loss as well as damage to  Amtrak’s image.
section_title: Legal Suits between Amtrak and the Acela Manufacturer Led to Settlement Agreement in March 2004
paragraphs: As the procurement proceeded, tensions grew between Amtrak and the  Consortium. Concerns about the quality of the Consortium’s work and  Amtrak’s withholding of payments for the Acela trainsets resulted in the  parties suing each other, each seeking $200 million in damages. In  November 2001, Bombardier filed a suit alleging that Amtrak improperly  withheld payments, failed to provide accurate information on  infrastructure conditions, and changed design specifications during  contract performance. In November 2002, Amtrak filed a suit alleging that  the Consortium failed to meet trainset performance requirements. In  addition, Amtrak alleged that the engineering was deficient, workmanship  was poor, program management and quality control were inadequate, and  the Consortium did not meet contract delivery schedules.
Amtrak and the Consortium reached a negotiated settlement in March  2004, ending their legal dispute surrounding the Acela trainsets. As part  of the settlement, Amtrak agreed to release a portion of the previously  withheld funds to the Consortium and conditionally assume facility  management and trainset maintenance responsibilities as soon as October  1, 2006, rather than in 2013, as originally planned. In general, under the  settlement, the Consortium must complete modifications to the trainsets  and locomotives; achieve established performance requirements for  reliability, speed, and comfort; provide training to Amtrak staff; and  provide and extend warranties (see fig. 2). The Consortium is also  responsible for the transfer of technical information, rights to third-party  contracts, parts information, permits, and licenses to Amtrak. In addition,  the settlement requires that the Consortium provide technical services and  information technology updates even after the transition date. Amtrak is  required to create a transition plan, hire staff to manage the facilities and  maintain the trainsets, and determine a parts procurement plan for the  trainsets.
section_title: Acela Program Still Faces Considerable Challenges
paragraphs: Independent of the Acela brake problem being discussed today, Amtrak  faces other risks and challenges to sustain the trainset and keep it  operating efficiently. Achieving a successful transition is critical to the  financial well-being of Amtrak given that the Acela program is such a  significant source of its revenue. A successful transition of maintenance  and management responsibilities for the Acela trainsets depends on  whether Amtrak and the Consortium can address the numerous  challenges. Key challenges include:    Achieving trainset modifications and performance requirements. The  Consortium must complete an extensive list of modifications to the  trainsets, some of which are complex, before Amtrak will assume  maintenance responsibilities. Although the Consortium has closed three- fourths of the items, they are behind schedule on completing the work on  some remaining items. Amtrak has identified certain modifications that  potentially may not be completed by October 1, 2006, and has concerns  that other modifications may affect service reliability. The Consortium is  also responsible for ensuring that the trainsets continue to meet reliability,  speed, and comfort performance requirements. The trainsets have not yet  met the minimum reliability performance requirement of traveling an  average 17,500 miles between service failures. According to Amtrak, the  period of time when the trainsets are out of service to resolve the brake  problems will not likely be included in the measurement of this standard.
Obtaining technical expertise for maintenance and completing training.  Amtrak must secure a workforce with the technical expertise needed to  maintain the trainsets. To achieve this, Amtrak is developing a new High  Speed Rail Division to assume management and maintenance  responsibilities, and it plans to hire at least 50 percent of NecMSC’s  current staff to benefit from their knowledge and expertise. The  Consortium and Amtrak must also develop and implement training  programs needed to maintain the complex trainsets after the transition.  The trainsets are technically complex and require considerable expertise  to identify and make needed repairs and to troubleshoot difficult  maintenance problems. According to Amtrak officials, ensuring that  technicians are properly trained is one of the most critical points of the  transition. As a result of the current brake problem, Amtrak is reevaluating  its training materials. Based on the latest progress report (March 2005),  troubleshooting training is slightly behind schedule, and Amtrak officials  told us that management training has been temporarily delayed due to the  brake problem. Under the transition plan, training is scheduled to be  completed by October 1, 2005.
Sufficiently funding maintenance and integrating responsibilities. Once the  transition occurs, Amtrak will be responsible for maintenance costs to  ensure continued trainset performance, including procuring parts and  performing overhaul maintenance. Amtrak has experienced problems in  the past with delays in completing the maintenance necessary to provide  its conventional service; and if these problems continue, they could affect  trainset performance and availability for revenue service. At the time of  our review, Amtrak had not determined the level of funding necessary to  provide regular maintenance and overhauls to the trainsets. Amtrak  officials stated that despite the uncertainty of maintenance costs once the  transition occurs, they estimate that the costs of managing the  maintenance in-house will be no greater than the costs of paying NecMSC  to perform the work. We believe the uncertain amount of future  maintenance costs and possible lack of adequate funds may have a greater  impact than anticipated. Amtrak must also successfully integrate the new  maintenance responsibilities into its current organization. Development of  a new division requires strategic planning, communication, and  performance management. This may prove difficult for Amtrak as our past  and ongoing work has shown its shortcomings in managing large-scale  projects.
Preparing a comprehensive implementation plan. Creating a  comprehensive implementation plan that provides a blueprint of important  steps; milestones; contingency plans if milestones are not met; measures  for achieving results; and funding strategies will be important for a  successful transition. Amtrak has created a critical path schedule for  monitoring the status and completion of open items related to the  settlement and holds regular meetings, both internally and with the  Consortium, to discuss progress and issues that arise. Although Amtrak  has taken actions to address the key challenges related to the settlement,  these actions did not represent a comprehensive implementation plan, and  we recommended in our December 2004 report that Amtrak develop such  a plan that encompasses all aspects of the transition in order to ensure a  successful transition. We also said that such a plan should include  contingency plans, if milestones are not met. In light of recent events, we  believe a comprehensive plan that identifies contingency actions could  provide the steps necessary to help prevent postponement of the  transition. Amtrak officials do not believe the current brake problems will  impact the October 2006 transition date, however.
Although the settlement agreement ensures that Amtrak will be protected  by the extended trainset warranties and Amtrak has several methods of  financial recourse, if the Consortium does not honor warranties, loss of  revenue resulting from removal of trainsets from revenue service is not  directly recoverable. For example, the settlement agreement included the  extension of “bumper to bumper” trainset warranties on all trainsets for  the next 5 months, until October 1, 2005. In addition, modifications to the  trainsets that are currently under way or planned will be under warranty  for 2 years after they are completed to Amtrak’s satisfaction. Amtrak also  has several methods of financial recourse, if the Consortium does not  honor warranties, including letters of credit that Amtrak may draw down.
However, the full extent of the legal liability associated with the April 2005  brake problem has yet to be addressed by the parties. Amtrak officials told  us that their first priority is getting the trainsets back in service. Amtrak is  considering a number of possible actions regarding the brake problem,  including assessing liquidated damages.
section_title: Challenges In Managing Other Large-Scale Projects
paragraphs: As we reported in February 2004, Amtrak did not effectively manage the  entire NHRIP project, of which Acela was a part. Among the problems we  found were that (1) Amtrak’s management of this project was not  comprehensive but was focused on the short term; (2) project  management focused on separate components of the project, such as  electrification and acquisition of the high-speed trains, and not the project  as a whole; and (3) did not sufficiently address major infrastructure  improvements needed to attain project trip-time goals. We also found that  Amtrak lacked a comprehensive financial plan for the project and that  Amtrak did not fully integrate stakeholder interests (commuter rail  authorities and state governments), even though work that involved  stakeholders was critical to achieving project goals. The overall results of  this poor management was that many critical elements of the project were  not completed, project costs and schedules increased considerably, and  the project goal (3-hour trip time from Boston to New York City) was not  attained. While there have been many benefits from the NHRIP, including  faster trip times between Boston and New York City, Amtrak’s  management of this project clearly demonstrates that Amtrak had  difficulty keeping such a large-scale project focused, on-time, and on- budget.
We also have ongoing work for this committee on Amtrak’management  and performance issues that we plan to report on later this year.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer  any questions you or the Members of the Subcommittee might have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information, please contact JayEtta Z. Hecker at  heckerj@gao.gov or at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key  contributions to this statement include Kara Finnegan Irving, Bert Japikse,  Richard Jorgenson, and Randall Williamson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Intercity Passenger Rail: Issues Associated with the Recent Settlement  between Amtrak and the Consortium of Bombardier and Alstom, GAO-05- 152 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1, 2004).
Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak’s Management of Northeast Corridor  Improvements Demonstrates Need for Applying Best Practices, GAO-04-94  (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2004).
Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak Needs to Improve Its Decisionmaking  Process for Its Route and Service Proposals, GAO-02-398 (Washington,  D.C.: Apr. 12, 2002)
Intercity Passenger Rail: Potential Financial Issues in the Event That  Amtrak Undergoes Liquidation. GAO-02-871 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20,  2002).
Financial Management: Amtrak’s Route Profitability Schedules Need  Improvement, GAO-02-912R (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
Intercity Passenger Rail: Congress Faces Critical Decisions in Developing  a National Policy, GAO-02-522T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).
Intercity Passenger Rail: The Congress Faces Critical Decisions About the  Role of and Funding for Intercity Passenger Rail Systems, GAO-01-820T  (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2001).
Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak Will Continue to Have Difficulty  Controlling Its Costs and Meeting Capital Needs, GAO/RCED-00-138  (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000).
Intercity Passenger Rail: Issues Associated With a Possible Amtrak  Liquidation, GAO/RCED-98-60 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 1998).
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