Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Safeguards and Other Measures to Halt the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and Material
Published: 2006-09-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system has been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was adopted in 1970. Safeguards allow IAEA to verify countries' compliance with the NPT. Since the discovery in 1991 of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq, IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system. In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology that could be used for nuclear weapons programs. This testimony is based on GAO's report on IAEA safeguards issued in October 2005 (Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93 [Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005]). This testimony is also based on previous GAO work related to the Nuclear Suppliers Group--a group of more than 40 countries that have pledged to limit trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to only countries that are engaged in peaceful nuclear activities--and U.S. assistance to Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union for the destruction, protection, and detection of nuclear material and weapons.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards, including conducting more intrusive inspections, to seek assurances that countries are not developing clandestine weapons programs. IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country's nuclear activities. This is a radical departure from the past practice of only verifying the peaceful use of a country's declared nuclear material. However, despite successes in uncovering some countries' undeclared nuclear activities, safeguards experts cautioned that a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program. In addition, there are a number of weaknesses that limit IAEA's ability to implement strengthened safeguards. First, IAEA has a limited ability to assess the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are not NPT members--India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Second, more than half of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol, which is designed to give IAEA new authority to search for clandestine nuclear activities, into force. Third, safeguards are significantly limited or not applied to about 60 percent of NPT signatories because they possess small quantities of nuclear material, and are exempt from inspections, or they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Finally, IAEA faces a looming human capital crisis caused by the large number of inspectors and safeguards management personnel expected to retire in the next 5 years. In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has helped to constrain trade in nuclear material and technology that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. However, there are a number of weaknesses that could limit the Nuclear Suppliers Group's ability to curb proliferation. For example, members of the Suppliers Group do not always share information about licenses they have approved or denied for the sale of controversial items to nonmember states. Without this shared information, a member country could inadvertently license a controversial item to a country that has already been denied a license from another member state. Since the early 1990s, U.S. nonproliferation programs have helped Russia and other former Soviet countries to, among other things, secure nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, and eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material. However, these programs face a number of challenges which could compromise their ongoing effectiveness. For example, a lack of access to many sites in Russia's nuclear weapons complex has significantly impeded the Department of Energy's progress in helping Russia secure its nuclear material. U.S. radiation detection assistance efforts also face challenges, including corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and inadequate maintenance of some equipment.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the International Atomic Energy  Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards program and other measures to halt the  spread of nuclear weapons and material. Revelations about the  clandestine nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, and Libya, as well as  clandestine nuclear trafficking networks, have significantly increased  international concerns about the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  Since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came  into force in 1970, IAEA’s safeguards system has been a cornerstone of  U.S. and international efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.  The NPT expanded IAEA’s original inspection responsibilities by requiring  signatory non-nuclear weapons states—countries that had not  manufactured and detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967—to  agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards on  all nuclear material used in peaceful activities. Most countries have  negotiated an agreement with IAEA, known as a comprehensive  safeguards agreement.
Safeguards allow the agency to independently verify that non-nuclear  weapons states that signed the NPT are complying with its requirements.  Under the safeguards system, IAEA, among other things, inspects all  facilities and locations containing nuclear material, as declared by each  country, to verify its peaceful use. However, the discovery in 1991 of a  clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq confirmed the need for a  broader and more effective approach to safeguards. As a result, IAEA  began to strengthen its safeguards system in the mid-1990s to provide  assurance that non-nuclear weapons states were not engaged in  undeclared nuclear activities.
In addition to IAEA’s strengthened safeguards program, other U.S. and  international efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation have  included the Nuclear Supplier’s Group—a group of more than 40 countries  that have pledged to limit trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and  technology to only countries that are engaged in peaceful nuclear  activities—and U.S. assistance to Russia and other states of the former  Soviet Union to, among other things, secure nuclear material and  warheads.
My remarks will focus on our report on IAEA safeguards issued in October  2005. I will also address issues related to previous GAO work on the  Nuclear Suppliers Group’s restrictions on nuclear trade and U.S.  assistance to Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union for the  destruction, protection, and detection of nuclear weapons and material.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: IAEA is an independent organization affiliated with the United Nations. Its  governing bodies include the General Conference, composed of  representatives of the 138 IAEA member states, and the 35-member Board  of Governors, which provides overall policy direction and oversight. The  Secretariat, headed by the Director General, is responsible for  implementing the policies and programs of the General Conference and  Board of Governors. The United States is a permanent member of the  Board of Governors.
IAEA derives its authority to establish and administer safeguards from its  statute, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and  regional nonproliferation treaties, bilateral commitments between states,  and project agreements with states. Since the NPT came into force in  1970, it has been subject to review by signatory states every 5 years. The  1995 NPT Review and Extension conference extended the life of the treaty  indefinitely, and the latest review conference occurred in May 2005.  Article III of the NPT binds each of the treaty’s 184 signatory states that  had not manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1,  1967 (referred to in the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states) to conclude  an agreement with IAEA that applies safeguards to all source and special  nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the state’s  territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out anywhere under its control.
The five nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT—China,  France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United  States—are not obligated by the NPT to accept IAEA safeguards. However,  each nuclear weapons state has voluntarily entered into legally binding  safeguards agreements with IAEA, and has submitted designated nuclear  materials and facilities to IAEA safeguards to demonstrate to the non- nuclear weapon states their willingness to share in the administrative and  commercial costs of safeguards. (App. I lists states that are subject to  safeguards, as of August 2006.)
India, Israel, and Pakistan are not parties to the NPT or other regional  nonproliferation treaties. India and Pakistan are known to have nuclear  weapons programs and to have detonated several nuclear devices during  May 1998. Israel is also believed to have produced nuclear weapons.  Additionally, North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 and briefly accepted  safeguards in 1992 and 1993, but expelled inspectors and threatened to  withdraw from the NPT when IAEA inspections uncovered evidence of  undeclared plutonium production. North Korea announced its withdrawal  from the NPT in early 2003, which under the terms of the treaty,  terminated its comprehensive safeguards agreement.
IAEA’s safeguards objectives, as traditionally applied under  comprehensive safeguards agreements, are to account for the amount of a  specific type of material necessary to produce a nuclear weapon, and the  time it would take a state to divert this material from peaceful use and  produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA attempts to meet these objectives by  using a set of activities by which it seeks to verify that nuclear material  subject to safeguards is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other  proscribed purposes. For example, IAEA inspectors visit a facility at  certain intervals to ensure that any diversion of nuclear material is  detected before a state has had time to produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA  also uses material-accounting measures to verify quantities of nuclear  material declared to the agency and any changes in the quantities over  time. Additionally, containment measures are used to control access to  and the movement of nuclear material. Finally, IAEA deploys surveillance  devices, such as video cameras, to detect the movements of nuclear  material and discourage tampering with IAEA’s containment measures.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in 1975 after India tested a  nuclear explosive device. In 1978, the Suppliers Group published its first  set of guidelines governing the exports of nuclear materials and  equipment. These guidelines established several requirements for  Suppliers Group members, including the acceptance of IAEA safeguards at  facilities using controlled nuclear-related items. In 1992, the Suppliers  Group broadened its guidelines by requiring countries receiving nuclear  exports to agree to IAEA’s safeguards as a condition of supply. As of  August 2006, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had 45 members, including the  United States. (See app. II for a list of signatory countries.)
section_title: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards Program, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed
paragraphs: IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards by more aggressively  seeking assurances that a country is not pursuing a clandestine nuclear  program. In a radical departure from past practices of only verifying the  peaceful use of a country’s declared nuclear material at declared facilities,  IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all  aspects of a country’s nuclear activities. The first strengthened safeguards  steps, which began in the early 1990s, increased the agency’s ability to  monitor declared and undeclared activities at nuclear facilities. These  measures were implemented under the agency’s existing legal authority  under comprehensive safeguards agreements and include (1) conducting  short notice and unannounced inspections, (2) collecting and analyzing  environmental samples to detect traces of nuclear material, and (3) using  measurement and surveillance systems that operate unattended and can  be used to transmit data about the status of nuclear materials directly to  IAEA headquarters.
The second series of steps began in 1997 when IAEA’s Board of Governors  approved the Additional Protocol. Under the Additional Protocol, IAEA  has the right, among other things, to (1) receive more comprehensive  information about a country’s nuclear activities, such as research and  development activities, and (2) conduct “complementary access,” which  enables IAEA to expand its inspection rights for the purpose of ensuring  the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Because the  Additional Protocol broadens IAEA’s authority and the requirements on  countries under existing safeguards agreements, each country must take  certain actions to bring it into force.
For each country with a safeguards agreement, IAEA independently  evaluates all information available about the country’s nuclear activities  and draws conclusions regarding a country’s compliance with its  safeguards commitments. A major source of information available to the  agency is data submitted by countries to IAEA under their safeguards  agreements, referred to as state declarations. Countries are required to  provide an expanded declaration of their nuclear activities within 180 days  of bringing the Additional Protocol into force. Examples of information  provided in an Additional Protocol declaration include the manufacturing  of key nuclear-related equipment; research and development activities  related to the nuclear fuel cycle; the use and contents of buildings on a  nuclear site; and the location and operational status of uranium mines. The  agency uses the state declarations as a starting point to determine if the  information provided by the country is consistent and accurate with all  other information available based on its own review.
IAEA uses various types of information to verify the state declaration.  Inspections of nuclear facilities and other locations with nuclear material  are the cornerstone of the agency’s data collection efforts. Under the  Additional Protocol, IAEA has the authority to conduct complementary  access at any place on a site or other location with nuclear material in  order to ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities,  confirm the decommissioned status of facilities where nuclear material  was used or stored, and resolve questions or inconsistencies related to the  correctness and completeness of the information provided by a country on  activities at other declared or undeclared locations. During  complementary access, IAEA inspectors may carry out a number of  activities, including (1) making visual observations, (2) collecting  environmental samples, (3) using radiation detection equipment and  measurement devices, and (4) applying seals. In 2004, IAEA conducted 124  complementary access in 27 countries.
In addition to its verification activities, IAEA uses other sources of  information to evaluate countries’ declarations. These sources include  information from the agency’s internal databases, open sources, satellite  imagery, and outside groups. The agency established two new offices  within the Department of Safeguards to focus primarily on open source  and satellite imagery data collection. Analysts use Internet searches to  acquire information generally available to the public from open sources,  such as scientific literature, trade and export publications, commercial  companies, and the news media. In addition, the agency uses  commercially available satellite imagery to supplement the information it  receives through its open source information. Satellite imagery is used to  monitor the status and condition of declared nuclear facilities and verify  state declarations of certain sites. The agency also uses its own databases,  such as those for nuclear safety, nuclear waste, and technical cooperation,  to expand its general knowledge about countries’ nuclear and nuclear- related activities. In some cases, IAEA receives information from third  parties, including other countries.
subsections: section_title: IAEA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Safeguards, but Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Programs is Not Assured
paragraphs: Department of State and IAEA officials told us that strengthened  safeguards measures have successfully revealed previously undisclosed  nuclear activities in Iran, South Korea, and Egypt. Specifically,  IAEA and Department of State officials noted that strengthened  safeguards measures, such as collecting and analyzing environmental  samples, helped the agency verify some of Iran’s nuclear activities. The  measures also allowed IAEA to conclude in September 2005 that Iran  was not complying with its safeguards obligations because it failed to  report all of its nuclear activities to IAEA. As a result, in July 2006, Iran  was referred to the U.N. Security Council, which in turn demanded that  Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities or face possible  diplomatic and economic sanctions.
In August 2004, as a result of preparations to submit its initial  declaration under the Additional Protocol, South Korea notified IAEA  that it had not previously disclosed nuclear experiments involving the  enrichment of uranium and plutonium separation. IAEA sent a team of  inspectors to South Korea to investigate this case. In November 2004,  IAEA’s Director General reported to the Board of Governors that  although the quantities of nuclear material involved were not  significant, the nature of the activities and South Korea’s failure to  report these activities in a timely manner posed a serious concern.  IAEA is continuing to verify the correctness and completeness of South  Korea’s declarations.
IAEA inspectors have investigated evidence of past undeclared nuclear  activities in Egypt based on the agency’s review of open source  information that had been published by current and former Egyptian  nuclear officials. Specifically, in late 2004, the agency found evidence  that Egypt had engaged in undeclared activities at least 20 years ago by  using small amounts of nuclear material to conduct experiments  related to producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In  January 2005, the Egyptian government announced that it was fully  cooperating with IAEA and that the matter was limited in scope. IAEA  inspectors have made several visits to Egypt to investigate this matter.  IAEA’s Secretariat reported these activities to its Board of Governors.
Despite these successes, a group of safeguards experts recently cautioned  that a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program.  IAEA faces a number of limitations that impact its ability to draw  conclusions—with absolute assurance—about whether a country is  developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. For example, IAEA  does not have unfettered inspection rights and cannot make visits to  suspected sites anywhere at any time. According to the Additional  Protocol, complementary access to resolve questions related to the  correctness and completeness of the information provided by the country  or to resolve inconsistencies must usually be arranged with at least 24- hours advanced notice. Complementary access to buildings on sites where  IAEA inspectors are already present are usually conducted with a 2-hour  advanced notice. Furthermore, IAEA officials told us that there are  practical problems that restrict access. For example, inspectors must be  issued a visa to visit certain countries, a process which cannot normally be  completed in less than 24 hours. In some cases, nuclear sites are in remote  locations and IAEA inspectors need to make travel arrangements, such as  helicopter transportation, in advance, which requires that the country be  notified prior to the visit.
A November 2004 study by a group of safeguards experts appointed by  IAEA’s Director General evaluated the agency’s safeguards program to  examine how effectively and efficiently strengthened safeguards measures  were being implemented. Specifically, the group’s mission was to evaluate  the progress, effectiveness, and impact of implementing measures to  enhance the agency’s ability to draw conclusions about the non-diversion  of nuclear material placed under safeguards and, for relevant countries,  the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The group  concluded that generally IAEA had done a very good job implementing  strengthened safeguards despite budgetary and other constraints.  However, the group noted that IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared  activities remains largely untested. If a country decides to divert nuclear  material or conduct undeclared activities, it will deliberately work to  prevent IAEA from discovering this. Furthermore, IAEA and member  states should be clear that the conclusions drawn by the agency cannot be  regarded as absolute. This view has been reinforced by the former Deputy  Director General for Safeguards who has stated that even for countries  with strengthened safeguards in force, there are limitations on the types of  information and locations accessible to IAEA inspectors.
section_title: A Number of Weaknesses Impede IAEA’s Ability to Effectively Implement Strengthened Safeguards
paragraphs: There are a number of weaknesses that hamper IAEA’s ability to  effectively implement strengthened safeguards. IAEA has only limited  information about the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are not  members of the NPT—India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. India,  Israel, and Pakistan have special agreements with IAEA that limit the  agency’s activities to monitoring only specific material, equipment, and  facilities. However, since these countries are not signatories to the NPT,  they do not have comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA, and  are not required to declare all of their nuclear material to the agency. In  addition, these countries are only required to declare exports of nuclear  material previously declared to IAEA. With the recent revelations of the  illicit international trade in nuclear material and equipment, IAEA officials  stated that they need more information on these countries’ nuclear  exports. For North Korea, IAEA has even less information, since the  country expelled IAEA inspectors and removed surveillance equipment at  nuclear facilities in December 2002 and withdrew from the NPT in January  2003. These actions have raised widespread concern that North Korea  diverted some of its nuclear material to produce nuclear weapons.
Another major weakness is that more than half, or 111 out of 189, of the  NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol into force, as  of August 2006. (App. I lists the status of countries’ safeguards agreements  with IAEA). Without the Additional Protocol, IAEA must limit its  inspection efforts to declared nuclear material and facilities, making it  harder to detect clandestine nuclear programs. Of the 111 countries that  have not adopted the Additional Protocol, 21 are engaged in significant  nuclear activities, including Egypt, North Korea, and Syria.
In addition, safeguards are significantly limited or not applied in about 60  percent, or 112 out of 189, of the NPT signatory countries—either because  they have an agreement (known as a small quantities protocol) with IAEA,  and are not subject to most safeguards measures, or because they have not  concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Countries  with small quantities of nuclear material make up about 41 percent of the  NPT signatories and about one-third of the countries that have the  Additional Protocol in force. Since 1971, IAEA’s Board of Governors has  authorized the Director General to conclude an agreement, known as a  small quantities protocol, with 90 countries and, as of August 2006, 78 of  these agreements were in force. IAEA’s Board of Governors has approved  the protocols for these countries without having IAEA verify that they met  the requirements for it. Even if these countries bring the Additional  Protocol into force, IAEA does not have the right to conduct inspections  or install surveillance equipment at certain nuclear facilities. According to  IAEA and Department of State officials, this is a weakness in the agency’s  ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities or transshipments of nuclear  material and equipment through the country. In September 2005, the  Board of Governors directed IAEA to negotiate with countries to make  changes to the protocols, including reinstating the agency’s right to  conduct inspections. As of August 2006, IAEA amended the protocols for 4  countries—Ecuador, Mali, Palau, and Tajikistan.
The application of safeguards is further limited because 31 countries that  have signed the NPT have not brought into force a comprehensive  safeguards agreement with IAEA. The NPT requires non-nuclear weapons  states to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA  within 18 months of becoming a party to the Treaty. However, IAEA’s  Director General has stated that these 31 countries have failed to fulfill  their legal obligations. Moreover, 27 of the 31 have not yet brought  comprehensive safeguards agreements into force more than 10 years after  becoming party to the NPT, including Chad, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia.
Last, IAEA is facing a looming human capital crisis that may hamper the  agency’s ability to meet its safeguards mission. In 2005, we reported that  about 51 percent, or 38 out of 75, of IAEA’s senior safeguards inspectors  and high-level management officials, such as the head of the Department  of Safeguards and the directors responsible for overseeing all inspection  activities of nuclear programs, are retiring in the next 5 years. According  to U.S. officials, this significant loss of knowledge and expertise could  compromise the quality of analysis of countries’ nuclear programs. For  example, several inspectors with expertise in uranium enrichment  techniques, which is a primary means to produce nuclear weapons  material, are retiring at a time when demand for their skills in detecting  clandestine nuclear activities is growing. While IAEA has taken a number  of steps to address these human capital issues, officials from the  Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the U.N. System Organizations  in Vienna have expressed concern that IAEA is not adequately planning to  replace staff with critical skills needed to fulfill its strengthened  safeguards mission.
section_title: The Nuclear Suppliers Group Has Helped Stem Nuclear Proliferation, but Lack of Information Sharing on Nuclear Exports Between Members Could Undermine Its Efforts
paragraphs: The Nuclear Suppliers Group, along with other multilateral export control  groups, has helped stop, slow, or raise the costs of nuclear proliferation,  according to nonproliferation experts. For example, as we reported in  2002, the Suppliers Group helped convince Argentina and Brazil to accept  IAEA safeguards on their nuclear programs in exchange for expanded  access to international cooperation for peaceful nuclear purposes. The  Suppliers Group, along with other multilateral export control groups, has  significantly reduced the availability of technology and equipment  available to countries of concern, according to a State Department official.  Moreover, nuclear export controls have made it more difficult, more  costly, and more time consuming for proliferators to obtain the expertise  and material needed to advance their nuclear program.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group has also helped IAEA verify compliance with  the NPT. In 1978, the Suppliers Group published the first guidelines  governing exports of nuclear materials and equipment. These guidelines  established several member requirements, including the requirement that  members adhere to IAEA safeguards standards at facilities using  controlled nuclear-related items. Subsequently, in 1992, the Nuclear  Suppliers Group broadened its guidelines by requiring that members insist  that non-member states have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material and  facilities as a condition of supply for their nuclear exports. With the  revelation of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, the Suppliers Group also  created an export control system for dual-use items that established new  controls for items that did not automatically fall under IAEA safeguards  requirements.
Despite these benefits, there are a number of weaknesses that could limit  the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s ability to curb nuclear proliferation.  Members of the Suppliers Group do not share complete export licensing  information. Specifically, members do not always share information about  licenses they have approved or denied for the sale of controversial items  to nonmember states. Without this shared information, a member country  could inadvertently license a controversial item to a country that has  already been denied a license from another Suppliers Group member state.
Furthermore, Suppliers Group members did not promptly review and  agree upon common lists of items to control and approaches to controlling  them. Each member must make changes to its national export control  policies after members agree to change items on the control list. If agreed- upon changes to control lists are not adopted at the same time by all  members, proliferators could exploit these time lags to obtain sensitive  technologies by focusing on members that are slowest to incorporate the  changes and sensitive items may still be traded to countries of concern.
In addition, there are a number of obstacles to efforts aimed at  strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export  control regimes. First, efforts to strengthen export controls have been  hampered by a requirement that all members reach consensus about every  decision made. Under the current process, a single member can block new  reforms. U.S. and foreign government officials and nonproliferation  experts all stressed that the regimes are consensus-based organizations  and depend on the like-mindedness or cohesion of their members to be  effective. However, members have found it especially difficult to reach  consensus on such issues as making changes to procedures and control  lists. The Suppliers Group reliance on consensus decision making will be  tested by the United States request to exempt India from the Suppliers  Group requirements to accept IAEA safeguards at all nuclear facilities.  Second, since membership with the Suppliers Group is voluntary and  nonbinding, there are no means to enforce compliance with members’  nonproliferation commitments. For example, the Suppliers Group has no  direct means to impede Russia’s export of nuclear fuel to India, an act that  the U.S. government said violated Russia’s commitment. Third, the rapid  pace of nuclear technological change and the growing trade of sensitive  items among proliferators complicate efforts to keep control lists current  because these lists need to be updated more frequently.
To help strengthen these regimes, GAO recommended in October 2002,  that the Secretary of State establish a strategy that includes ways for  Nuclear Suppliers Group members to improve information sharing,  implement changes to export controls more consistently, and identify  organizational changes that could help reform its activities. As of June  2006, the Nuclear Suppliers Group announced that it has revised its  guidelines to improve information sharing. However, despite our  recommendation, it has not yet agreed to share greater and more detailed  information on approved exports of sensitive transfers to nonmember  countries.
Nevertheless, the Suppliers Group is examining changes to its procedures  that assist IAEA’s efforts to strengthen safeguards. For example, at the  2005 Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary meeting, members discussed  changing the requirements for exporting nuclear material and equipment  by requiring nonmember countries to adopt IAEA’s Additional Protocol as  a condition of supply. If approved by the Suppliers Group, the action  would complement IAEA’s efforts to verify compliance with the NPT.
section_title: U.S. Bilateral Assistance Programs Are Working to Secure Nuclear Materials and Warheads, Detect Nuclear Smuggling, Eliminate Excess Nuclear Material, and Halt Production of Plutonium, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Reducing the formidable proliferation risks posed by former Soviet  weapons of mass destruction (WMD) assets is a U.S. national security  interest. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States, through a  variety of programs, managed by the Departments of Energy, Defense  (DOD), and State, has helped Russia and other former Soviet countries to  secure nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear  material, eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material,  and halt the continued production of weapons-grade plutonium. From  fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2006, the Congress appropriated about  $7 billion for nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, U.S. assistance  programs have faced a number of challenges, such as a lack of access to  key sites and corruption of foreign officials, which could compromise the  effectiveness of U.S. assistance.
DOE’s Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program  has worked with Russia and other former Soviet countries since 1994 to  provide enhanced physical protection systems at sites with weapons- usable nuclear material and warheads, implement material control and  accounting upgrades to help keep track of the quantities of nuclear  materials at sites, and consolidate material into fewer, more secure  buildings. GAO last reported on the MPC&A program in 2003. At that  time, a lack of access to many sites in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex  had significantly impeded DOE’s progress in helping Russia to secure its  nuclear material. We reported that DOE had completed work at only a  limited number of buildings in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, a  network of sites involved in the construction of nuclear weapons where  most of the nuclear material in Russia is stored. According to DOE, by the  end of September 2006, the agency will have helped to secure 175  buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the former  Soviet Union and 39 Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites. GAO is currently  re-examining DOE’s efforts, including the progress DOE has made since  2003 in securing nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other  countries and the challenges DOE faces in completing its work.
While securing nuclear materials and warheads where they are stored is  considered to be the first layer of defense against nuclear theft, there is no  guarantee that such items will not be stolen or lost. Recognizing this fact,  DOE, DOD, and State, through seven different programs, have provided  radiation detection equipment since 1994 to 36 countries, including many  countries of the former Soviet Union. These programs seek to combat  nuclear smuggling and are seen as a second line of defense against nuclear  theft. The largest and most successful of these efforts is DOE’s Second  Line of Defense program (SLD). We reported in March 2006 that, through  the SLD program, DOE had provided radiation detection equipment and  training at 83 sites in Russia, Greece, and Lithuania since 1998. However,  we also noted that U.S. radiation detection assistance efforts faced  challenges, including corruption of some foreign border security officials,  technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and  inadequate maintenance of some equipment. To address these challenges,  U.S. agencies plan to take a number of steps, including combating  corruption by installing communications links between individual border  sites and national command centers so that detection alarm data can be  simultaneously evaluated by multiple officials.
The United States is also helping Russia to eliminate excess stockpiles of  nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium). In February  1993, the United States agreed to purchase from Russia 500 metric tons of  highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from dismantled Russian  nuclear weapons over a 20-year period. Russia agreed to dilute, or blend- down, the material into low enriched uranium (LEU), which is of  significantly less proliferation risk, so that it could be made into fuel for  commercial nuclear power reactors before shipping it to the United  States. As of June 27, 2006, 276 metric tons of Russian HEU—derived  from more than 11,000 dismantled nuclear weapons—have been  downblended into LEU for use in U.S. commercial nuclear reactors.  Similarly, in 2000, the United States and Russia committed to the  transparent disposition of 34 metric tons each of weapon-grade plutonium.  The plutonium will be converted into a more proliferation-resistant form  called mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel that will be used in commercial nuclear  power plants. In addition to constructing a MOX fuel fabrication plant at  its Savannah River Site, DOE is also assisting Russia in constructing a  similar facility for the Russian plutonium.
Russia’s continued operation of three plutonium production reactors  poses a serious proliferation threat. These reactors produce about 1.2  metric tons of plutonium each year—enough for about 300 nuclear  weapons. DOE’s Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production  program seeks to facilitate the reactors’ closure by building or  refurbishing two fossil fuel plants that will replace the heat and electricity  that will be lost with the shutdown of Russia’s three plutonium production  reactors. DOE plans to complete the first of the two replacement plants in  2008 and the second in 2011. When we reported on this program in June  2004, we noted that DOE faced challenges in implementing its program,  including ensuring Russia’s commitment to shutting down the reactors, the  rising cost of building the replacement fossil fuel plants, and concerns  about the thousands of Russian nuclear workers who will lose their jobs  when the reactors are shut down. We made a number of  recommendations, which DOE has implemented, including reaching  agreement with Russia on the specific steps to be taken to shut down the  reactors and development of a plan to work with other U.S. government  programs to assist Russia in finding alternate employment for the skilled  nuclear workers who will lose their jobs when the reactors are shut down.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee  may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gene Aloise at  (202) 512-3841 or Joseph Christoff at (202) 512-8979. R. Stockton Butler,  Miriam A. Carroll, Leland Cogliani, Lynn Cothern, Muriel J. Forster, Jeffrey  Phillips, and Jim Shafer made key contributions to this testimony. Beth  Hoffman León, Stephen Lord, Audrey Solis, and Pierre Toureille provided  technical assistance.
section_title: Appendix I: Countries’ Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, as of August 2006
paragraphs: Although North Korea concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA in 1992, it  announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003.
section_title: Appendix II: Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as of June 2006
section_title: Appendix III: Additional Information on U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs
paragraphs: Secures radiological sources no longer needed in the U.S. and locates, identifies,  recovers, consolidates, and enhances the security of radioactive materials outside the  U.S.
Global Nuclear Material Threat Reduction  Eliminates Russia’s use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear facilities;  returns U.S. and Russian-origin HEU and spent nuclear fuel from research reactors  around the world; secures plutonium-bearing spent nuclear fuel from reactors in  Kazakhstan; and addresses nuclear and radiological materials at vulnerable locations  throughout the world.
Provides replacement fossil-fuel energy that will allow Russia to shutdown its three  remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors.
Develops and delivers technology applications to strengthen capabilities to detect and  verify undeclared nuclear programs; enhances the physical protection and proper  accounting of nuclear material; and assists foreign national partners to meet safeguards  commitments.
Provides meaningful employment for former weapons of mass destruction weapons  scientists.
Provides material protection, control, and accounting upgrades to enhance the security  of Navy HEU fuel and nuclear material.
Provides material protection, control, and accounting upgrades to nuclear weapons,  uranium enrichment, and material processing and storage sites.
Enhances the security of proliferation-attractive nuclear material in Russia by supporting  material protection, control, and accounting upgrade projects at Russian civilian nuclear  facilities.
Develops national and regional resources in the Russian Federation to help establish  and sustain effective operation of upgraded nuclear material protection, control and  accounting systems.
Negotiates cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation and other key countries to  strengthen the capability of enforcement officials to detect and deter illicit trafficking of  nuclear and radiological material across international borders. This is accomplished  through the detection, location and identification of nuclear and nuclear related materials,  the development of response procedures and capabilities, and the establishment of  required infrastructure elements to support the control of these materials.
HEU Transparency Implementation project  Monitors Russia to ensure that low enriched uranium (LEU) sold to the U.S. for civilian  nuclear power plants is derived from weapons-usable HEU removed from dismantled  Russian nuclear weapons.
Disposes of surplus domestic HEU by down-blending it.
Surplus U.S. Plutonium Disposition project  Disposes of surplus domestic plutonium by fabricating it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for  irradiation in existing, commercial nuclear reactors.
Supports Russia’s efforts to dispose of its weapons-grade plutonium by working with the  international community to help pay for Russia’s program.
subsections: section_title: Site Security Enhancements
paragraphs: Provides training and equipment to assist Russia in determining the  reliability of its guard forces.  Enhances the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons storage  sites through the use of vulnerability assessments to determine specific  requirements for upgrades. DOD will develop security designs to address  those vulnerabilities and install equipment necessary to bring security  standards consistent with those at U.S. nuclear weapons storage  facilities.
Nuclear Weapons Transportation   Assists Russia in shipping nuclear warheads to more secure sites or  dismantlement locations.  Assists Russia in maintaining nuclear weapons cargo railcars. Funds  maintenance of railcars until no longer feasible, then purchases  replacement railcars to maintain 100 cars in service. DOD will procure 15  guard railcars to replace those retired from service. Guard railcars will be  capable of monitoring security systems in the cargo railcars and  transporting security force personnel.  Provides emergency response vehicles containing hydraulic cutting tools,  pneumatic jacks, and safety gear to enhance Russia’s ability to respond to  possible accidents in transporting nuclear weapons. Meteorological,  radiation detection and monitoring, and communications equipment is  also included.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy  Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United  States. GAO-06-558T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and  Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation  Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and  Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed. GAO- 06-93. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in  Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign  Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium  Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown is  Uncertain. GAO-04-662. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed  to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03- 482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.
Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export  Control Regimes. GAO-03-43. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.  GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian  Highly Enriched Uranium. GAO-01-148. Washington, D.C.: December 15,  2000.
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