Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges
Published: 2009-06-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In recent years, violence along the U.S.-Mexico border has escalated dramatically, due largely to the Mexican government's efforts to disrupt Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO). U.S. officials note the violence associated with Mexican DTOs poses a serious challenge for U.S. law enforcement, threatening citizens on both sides of the border, and U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials generally agree many of the firearms used to perpetrate crimes in Mexico are illicitly trafficked from the United States across the Southwest border. GAO was asked to examine (1) data on the types, sources, and users of these firearms; (2) key challenges confronting U.S. government efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stem the flow of them into Mexico; (3) challenges faced by U.S. agencies collaborating with Mexican authorities to combat the problem of illicit arms; and (4) the U.S. government's strategy for addressing the issue. GAO analyzed program information and firearms data and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Available evidence indicates many of the firearms fueling Mexican drug violence originated in the United States, including a growing number of increasingly lethal weapons. While it is impossible to know how many firearms are illegally smuggled into Mexico in a given year, about 87 percent of firearms seized by Mexican authorities and traced in the last 5 years originated in the United States, according to data from Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). According to U.S. and Mexican government officials, these firearms have been increasingly more powerful and lethal in recent years. Many of these firearms come from gun shops and gun shows in Southwest border states. U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials stated most firearms are intended to support operations of Mexican DTOs, which are also responsible for trafficking arms to Mexico. The U.S. government faces several significant challenges in combating illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stemming their flow into Mexico. In particular, certain provisions of some federal firearms laws present challenges to U.S. efforts, according to ATF officials. Specifically, officials identified key challenges related to restrictions on collecting and reporting information on firearms purchases, a lack of required background checks for private firearms sales, and limitations on reporting requirements for multiple sales. GAO also found ATF and Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the primary agencies implementing efforts to address the issue, do not effectively coordinate their efforts, in part because the agencies lack clear roles and responsibilities and have been operating under an outdated interagency agreement. Additionally, agencies generally have not systematically gathered, analyzed, and reported data that could be useful to help plan and assess results of their efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico. U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some assistance to Mexican counterparts in combating arms trafficking, but these efforts face several challenges. U.S. law enforcement assistance to Mexico does not target arms trafficking needs, limiting U.S. agencies' ability to provide technical or operational assistance. In addition, U.S. assistance has been limited due to Mexican officials' incomplete use of ATF's electronic firearms tracing system, an important tool for U.S. arms trafficking investigations. Another significant challenge facing U.S. efforts to assist Mexico is corruption among some Mexican government entities. Mexican federal authorities are implementing anticorruption measures, but government officials acknowledge fully implementing these reforms will take considerable time, and may take years to affect comprehensive change. The administration's recently released National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy includes, for the first time, a chapter on combating illicit arms trafficking to Mexico. Prior to the new strategy, the U.S. government lacked a strategy to address arms trafficking to Mexico, and various efforts undertaken by individual U.S. agencies were not part of a comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing the problem. At this point, it's not clear whether ONDCP's "implementation plan" for the strategy, which has not been finalized, will include performance indicators and other accountability mechanisms to overcome shortcomings raised in our report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In recent years, violence along the U.S.-Mexico border has escalated  dramatically as the administration of President Felipe Calderon has sought  to combat the growing power of Mexican drug trafficking organizations  (DTO) and curb their ability to operate with impunity in certain areas of  Mexico. The Mexican government’s efforts to disrupt DTO operations has  put pressure on criminal organizations fighting to maintain control over  lucrative routes they depend on to funnel drugs to the United States, and  arms and cash from the United States into Mexico. In 2008, the number of  individuals killed in violent incidents in Mexico exceeded 6,200, more than  twice as many as in 2007, with around 1,500 killed in the first 3 months of  2009 alone.
As illicitly trafficked firearms have fueled the drug trafficking violence,  Mexican officials have come to regard illicit firearms as the number one  crime problem affecting the country’s security, and U.S. officials note the  violence associated with Mexican DTOs poses a serious challenge for U.S.  law enforcement, threatening the safety of citizens on both sides of the  border, particularly given the increased level of criminal activity in the  southwestern United States and concerns that it could grow. According to  the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 2009 National Drug Threat  Assessment, Mexican DTOs represent the greatest organized crime threat  to the United States, controlling drug distribution in at least 230 U.S. cities,  and gaining strength in markets they do not yet control. In response to this  growing threat, in March 2009, the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) announced it planned to increase resources on the U.S.-Mexico  border, including more personnel and greater use of available  technologies, among other elements.
In response to your request that we review U.S. efforts to stem the flow of  arms trafficking into Mexico, we examined (1) what data are available on  the types, sources, and users of these arms; (2) key challenges that  confront U.S. government efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the  United States and to stem the flow of these arms across the Southwest  border into Mexico; (3) challenges faced by U.S. agencies collaborating  with Mexican authorities to combat the problem of illicit arms; and (4) the  U.S. government’s strategy for addressing the issue.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed program and  project status reports, and related information. To obtain a better  understanding of the scope and progress of various U.S. agencies’  programs related to arms trafficking, we met with cognizant officials from  DOJ’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); DHS’s  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border  Protection (CBP); the Department of State (State); and other agency  officials supporting U.S. efforts to combat arms trafficking, including the  Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Drug Enforcement Administration  (DEA), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). We  visited and met with officials from three major Southwest border cities— San Diego, California, and El Paso and Laredo, Texas—and their Mexican  counterpart cities to explore the challenges faced by law enforcement  officials to stem the flow of arms smuggling across the border. We also  traveled to Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico, to meet with U.S. embassy  and consulate officials responsible for implementing programs to combat  arms trafficking and Mexican government officials responsible for related  activities. We did not review Mexican firearms laws, and to the extent that  we comment on these in this report, we relied on secondary sources. We  also reviewed ATF, ICE, and CBP data on seizures of southbound firearms  and cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico. We determined the data  provided to us by various U.S. agencies on these topics were sufficiently  reliable to provide an overall indication of the magnitude and nature of the  illicit firearms trade. We conducted this performance audit from July 2008  to June 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains  additional details about our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since his inauguration in December 2006, President Felipe Calderon has  mobilized the Mexican military and law enforcement in a series of large  scale counternarcotics operations throughout the country. These efforts  have targeted areas, particularly along the U.S.-Mexican border, where  DTOs have exerted most influence. By pursuing and detaining the leaders  of these criminal organizations, Mexican authorities have disrupted DTOs’  internal power structures and territorial control. The DTOs have  countered government pressure with increased violence against law  enforcement entities. The government’s efforts to disrupt drug trafficking  operations also appear to have intensified conflicts among DTOs over  access to lucrative trafficking routes to the United States. The result has  been an escalation of drug-related assassinations, kidnappings, and other  violent crimes. While the majority of the casualties have been individuals  involved in the drug trade in some way, victims also include law  enforcement officers, journalists, and innocent bystanders. Gun violence  in Mexico has increased dramatically in the last 2 years, with the number  of drug-related murders more than doubling from around 2,700 in 2007 to  over 6,200 in 2008. The drug-related murder rates for the first quarter of  2009 remain high and thus the yearly total for 2009 will likely be close to  the 2008 level. See figure 1.
Growing criminal activity in Mexico, particularly in communities across  the Southwest border, has raised concerns that the violence might spill  over to the United States. Since 2006, DOJ’s annual National Drug Threat  Assessment has reported Mexican DTOs and criminal groups are the most  influential drug traffickers and the greatest organizational threat to the  United States. Law enforcement reporting indicates Mexican DTOs  maintain drug distribution networks or supply drugs to distributors in at  least 230 U.S. cities. See figure 2. Mexican DTOs control most of the U.S.  drug market and are gaining strength in markets they do not yet control.  President Obama has expressed concern about the increased level of  violence along the border, particularly in Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, and  has called for continued monitoring of the situation to guard against  spillover into the United States.
Since the 1970s, the United States has collaborated with Mexican  authorities and provided assistance to Mexico to combat transnational  crimes associated with drug trafficking, including illicit firearms  smuggling. However, counterarms trafficking efforts have been a modest  component of broader bilateral law enforcement cooperation. U.S. and  Mexican officials also told us that, in the past, the Mexican government  considered illicit arms trafficking a problem that originated in the United  States and thus needed to be dealt with by U.S. authorities. However, the  Mexican government has taken on a greater focus in combating arms  trafficking in recent years. For example, Mexico’s Secretary of Public  Security noted, “the arms issue … is a subject that was not considered  when discussing drug trafficking, however today it is part of the dialogue  we have with our colleagues from the United States.” Moreover, Mexican  officials told us they now regard illicit firearms as the number one crime  problem affecting the country’s security, and they are intent on working  with their U.S. counterparts to address the threat posed by weapons  smuggling.
DOJ’s ATF and DHS’s ICE are the two primary agencies combating illicit  sales and trafficking of firearms across the Southwest border. For over 40  years, ATF has implemented efforts to combat arms trafficking within the  United States and from the United States to other countries as part of its  mission under the Gun Control Act, and it is the only entity within the  U.S. government able to trace firearms recovered in crime in Mexico. ATF  also conducts inspections of FFL gun dealers to ensure they comply with  applicable federal firearms laws and regulations. Through Project  Gunrunner—ATF’s key effort to address arms trafficking to Mexico—the  agency has conducted investigations to identify and prosecute individuals  involved in arms trafficking schemes and has provided training to Mexican  law enforcement officials on firearms identification and tracing  techniques, among other efforts. According to ICE, for over 30 years,  ICE—and previously the U.S. Customs Service—has implemented efforts  to enforce U.S. export laws, and ICE agents and other staff address a range  of issues, including combating the illicit smuggling of money, people,  drugs, and firearms. Examples of ICE’s arms trafficking-related activities  include its efforts to raise public awareness through the dissemination of  posters and brochures to educate FFLs and firearms purchasers about U.S.  laws related to firearms and smuggling, as well as ICE’s more recent effort  to expand seizures of firearms destined for Mexico on the U.S. side of the  border. ICE enhanced its efforts on arms trafficking to Mexico through  Operation Armas Cruzadas, announced in 2008. Table 1 provides more  information on ATF and ICE efforts to combat arms trafficking.
Several other U.S. agencies also play a role in stemming the flow of illicit  firearms across the Southwest border into Mexico, including the following:    DHS’s CBP is charged with managing, securing, and controlling the  nation’s borders with a priority mission of keeping terrorists and their  weapons out of the United States. It also has a responsibility for securing  and facilitating trade and travel while enforcing hundreds of U.S.   regulations, including immigration and drug laws; as such, CBP is involved  in intercepting contraband firearms to Mexico.
DOJ’s U.S. Attorneys serve as the nation’s principal litigators under the  direction of the U.S. Attorney General. U.S. Attorneys handle criminal  prosecutions and civil suits in which the United States has an interest,  including cases against individuals who violate federal criminal laws  related to firearms trafficking. Since each U.S. Attorney exercises wide  discretion in the use of resources to further the priorities of local  jurisdictions, the caseload distribution related to firearms trafficking  varies between districts.
DOJ’s DEA is responsible for the enforcement of U.S. controlled  substances laws and regulations and bringing to justice key individuals  and organizations involved in the production or distribution of controlled  substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States.  In carrying out its mission, the DEA also coordinates and cooperates with  U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials in efforts to combat criminal  violence and thus shares intelligence on DTO activities, including weapons  violations.
State’s INL advises the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S.  government agencies on policies and programs to combat international  narcotics and crime. INL programs support State’s strategic goals to  reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States and to minimize the  impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens. INL  oversees funding provided to assist Mexico in its fight against organized  crime under the Merida Initiative. Merida is a U.S. interagency response to  transborder crime and security issues affecting the United States, Mexico,  and Central America. The Initiative seeks to strengthen partner countries’  capacities to combat organized criminal activities that threaten the  security of the region, including arms trafficking.
DOJ’s Criminal Division attorneys serve as DOJ’s primary legal experts on  firearms related issues and contribute to the nation’s prosecutorial efforts  from the headquarters level. Criminal Division prosecutors are charged  with developing and implementing strategies to attack firearms trafficking  networks operating in the United States and abroad. These prosecutors  prosecute important firearms related cases, formulate policy, assist and  coordinate with local U.S. Attorneys Offices on legal issues and  multidistrict cases, and work with numerous domestic and foreign law  enforcement agencies to construct effective and coordinated enforcement  strategies.
ONDCP, whose principal purpose is to establish policies, priorities, and  objectives for the nation’s drug control program, produces a number of  publications including a National Southwest Border Counternarcotics  Strategy, which this year includes a component on combating arms  trafficking.
section_title: Available Evidence Suggests Most Firearms Recovered in Mexico Come from U.S. Gun Dealers, and Many Support DTOs
paragraphs: Available evidence indicates many of the firearms fueling Mexican drug  violence have come from the United States, including a growing number of  increasingly lethal weapons. Many of these firearms came from gun shops  and gun shows in Southwest border states, such as Texas, California, and  Arizona, according to ATF officials and trace data. U.S. and Mexican  government officials stated most guns trafficked into Mexico are  facilitated by and support operations of Mexican drug trafficking  organizations.
subsections: section_title: Available Information Suggests Most Firearms Recovered in Mexico Come from the United States and Are Increasingly More Powerful and Lethal
paragraphs: According to U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials  and data from ATF on firearms seized in Mexico and traced from fiscal  year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, a large portion of the firearms fueling the  Mexican drug trade originated in the United States, including a growing  number of increasingly lethal weapons. As is inherently the case with  various types of illegal trafficking, such as drug trafficking, the extent of  firearms trafficking to Mexico is unknown; however, according to ATF, a  large number of guns are seized from criminals by the military and law  enforcement in Mexico, and information on many of these guns is  submitted to ATF for the purposes of tracing their origins and uncovering  how the guns arrived in Mexico. ATF maintains data on the firearms that  are seized in Mexico and submitted for a trace, and, from these firearms  trace requests, ATF officials told us, they are often able to detect  suspicious patterns and trends that can help identify and disrupt arms  trafficking networks on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border.
Using ATF’s eTrace data, which currently serves as the best data we found  available for analyzing the source and nature of firearms trafficked and  seized in Mexico, we determined over 20,000, or 87 percent, of firearms  seized by Mexican authorities and traced from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal  year 2008 originated in the United States. Figure 3 shows the percentages  of firearms seized in Mexico and traced from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year  2008 that originated in the United States. Over 90 percent of the firearms  seized in Mexico and traced over the last 3 years have come from the  United States.  United States.
Around 68 percent of these firearms were manufactured in the United  States, while around 19 percent were manufactured in third countries and  imported into the United States before being trafficked into Mexico. ATF  could not determine whether the remaining 13 percent foreign sourced  arms had been trafficked into Mexico through the United States, due to  incomplete information.
While the eTrace data only represents data from gun trace requests  submitted from seizures in Mexico and not all the guns seized, it is  currently the only systematic data available, and the conclusions from its  use that the majority of firearms seized and traced originated in the United  States were consistent with conclusions reached by U.S. and Mexican  government and law enforcement officials involved personally in  combating arms trafficking to Mexico. In 2008, of the almost 30,000  firearms that the Mexican Attorney General’s office said were seized, only  around 7,200, or approximately a quarter, were submitted to ATF for  tracing. U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials  indicated Mexican government officials had not submitted all of the  firearms tracing information due to bureaucratic obstacles between the  Mexican military and the Mexican Attorney General’s Office and lack of a  sufficient number of trained staff to use eTrace. For instance, at one point,  State officials told us, the Government of Mexico had only one staff person  collecting gun information and entering it into eTrace. Further, as ATF  pointed out, not all guns seized in the United States are submitted by U.S.  entities to ATF for tracing either, due to some of the same type of  bureaucratic and resource challenges faced in Mexico. Consistent with the  results of eTrace data, U.S. law enforcement officials who had worked on  arms trafficking in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican border told us their  experience and observations corroborated that most of the firearms in  Mexico had originated in the United States. Furthermore, U.S. and  Mexican government and law enforcement officials also stated this  scenario seemed most likely, given the ease of acquiring firearms in the  United States; specifically, they told us they saw no reason why the drug  cartels would go through the difficulty of acquiring a gun somewhere else  in the world and transporting it to Mexico when it is so easy for them to do  so from the United States.
subsections: section_title: Firearms Seized in Mexico Are Increasingly More Powerful and Lethal
paragraphs: While existing data does not allow for an analysis of trends of all firearms  seized in Mexico, according to U.S. and Mexican government officials, the  firearms seized in Mexico have been increasingly more powerful and lethal  in recent years. For example, around 25 percent of the firearms seized in  Mexico and traced in fiscal year 2008 are high-caliber and high-powered  such as AK and AR-15 type semiautomatic rifles, which fire ammunition  that can pierce armor often used by Mexican police (see table 2).
Moreover, U.S. and Mexican government officials told us they have  encountered an increasing number of the higher caliber, high-powered  weapons, particularly in the past 2 years in seizures resulting from  operations against drug cartels. A video clip of the types of firearms  recovered near the Southwest border and in Mexico is available at  http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-709 . In addition, U.S. government  officials told us there had been a decrease in some of the smaller, lower- powered guns, such as the .22 caliber pistol and rifle. Mexican and U.S.  government officials told us that the guns used by the drug cartels often  overpower Mexican police and rival that of the military. See figure 4.
In addition, there have been some examples of military grade firearms  recovered in Mexico. Some of these recovered firearms, ATF officials  noted, were guns commercially available in the United States that were  altered to make them more lethal. For instance, AK-type and AR-15 type  semiautomatic rifles have been altered to make them fully automatic, like  machine guns used by the U.S. and Mexican militaries. Seventy machine  guns were submitted for tracing to ATF between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal  year 2008, which represents a small percentage, 0.30 percent, of the total  number of 23,159.
A small number of the firearms seized in Mexico have been traced back  to legal sales of weapons from the United States to Mexico or a third  country, according to ATF. For instance, firearms traced back to the  Government of Mexico, from 2004 to 2008, constituted 1.74 percent, or 403  firearms, of the total number of trace requests made during that time. This  included 70 .223 caliber AR-15-type semiautomatic rifles and one machine  gun. In addition, 39 guns were recovered in 2008 that had been sold legally  by the United States to a third party country, including 6 guns each from  Germany, Belize, and Guatemala and 1 from El Salvador. These 39 guns  included 21 semiautomatic pistols, and nothing larger or more powerful  than the Colt 45. According to U.S. law enforcement officials we met with,  there have not been any indications of significant trafficking of firearms  from U.S. military personnel or U.S. military arsenals. According to ATF  data for fiscal years 2004-2008, of the 23,159 guns seized in Mexico and  traced, 160 firearms, or 0.70 percent, were found to be U.S. military arms.
section_title: Many Firearms Trafficked into Mexico Come from Gun Shops and Gun Shows in Southwest Border States
paragraphs: From fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, most of the firearms seized in  Mexico and traced came from U.S. Southwest border states. In particular,  about 70 percent of these firearms came from Texas, California, and  Arizona. Figure 5 provides data on the top source states for firearms  trafficked to Mexico and traced from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008.
Most of the firearms seized in Mexico and successfully traced come from  gun shops and pawn shops, according to ATF gun trace data. According to  ATF, there are around 6,700 retail gun dealers—gun shops and pawn  shops—along the Southwest border of the United States. This represents  around 12 percent of the approximately 55,000 retail gun dealers  nationwide. These gun dealers, or FFLs, can operate in gun shops, pawn  shops, their own homes, or out of gun shows. From fiscal year 2004 to  fiscal year 2008, of those firearms ATF was able to trace back to a retail  dealer, around 95 percent were traced back to gun shops and pawn  shops—around 71 to 79 percent from gun shops and 15 to 19 percent from  pawn shops, according to ATF. In addition to these firearms that are  successfully traced back to a retail dealer, some ATF officials told us,  based on information from their operations and investigations, many  seized guns also come from private sales at gun shows, though it is  impossible to know this exact number due to the lack of records kept for  such purchases, which is discussed further below.
The illicit purchase of firearms in the United States happens in various  ways depending upon where the purchase takes place.
Gun shops and pawn shops. Firearms purchased at gun shops and pawn  shops for trafficking to Mexico are usually made by “straw purchasers,”  according to law enforcement officials. These straw purchasers are  individuals with clean records who can be expected to pass the required  background check and who are paid by drug cartel representatives or  middlemen to purchase certain guns from gun shops. Because the straw  purchasers are legitimately qualified to purchase the guns, they can be  difficult to identify by gun shop owners and clerks, absent obvious clues  that would signify that a straw purchase is happening. For instance, ATF  officials were tipped off to straw purchases when older women purchased  multiple AK-type semiautomatic rifles, or individuals who seemed to know  little about guns made purchases off of a written shopping list. In far fewer  cases, ATF officials stated, corrupt gun shop owners or staff facilitate  these illicit purchases. ATF officials told us they have not estimated what  percentage of firearms trafficked to Mexico result from such illegal actions  on the part of the gun shop owners or staff, but ATF has identified gun  shop personnel who sold guns they knew would be trafficked to Mexico,  as well as instances where gun shop personnel have altered their records  to mask the disappearance of guns from their inventory after being sold  illegally.
Gun shows. According to ATF officials, individuals can use straw  purchasers as they would at gun shops to acquire guns from gun shops  with booths at gun shows. In addition, individuals can also purchase guns  at gun shows from other individuals making sales from their private  collections. These private sales require no background checks of the  purchaser and require no record be made or kept of the sale. ATF officials  told us this prevents their knowing what percentage of the problem of  arms trafficking to Mexico comes from these private sales at gun shows.
section_title: Most Guns Trafficked to Mexico Support DTOs, According to U.S. and Mexican Government Officials
paragraphs: U.S. and Mexican government officials stated most guns trafficked into  Mexico are facilitated by and support operations of Mexican DTOs.  According to ATF officials, once the gun is acquired in the United States,  typically a middleman or someone representing the drug cartel will  transport or pay another individual to transport the firearm or firearms  into Mexico. Firearms are generally trafficked along major U.S. highways  and interstates and through border crossings into Mexico. The firearms  are normally transported across the border by personal or commercial  vehicle because, according to U.S. and Mexican government officials, the  drug cartels have found these methods to have a high likelihood of  success. (We will discuss the challenges to seizing illicit southbound  firearms at the border in the second objective of this report.) Once in  Mexico, the firearms are generally deposited in border towns or trafficked  along major highways to their destinations. The transporter drops off the  firearm or firearms at a set location for pick up and use by members of a  drug cartel. Figure 6 displays the primary trafficking routes from the  United States into Mexico.
ATF and Mexican government officials told us they have found in Mexican  arms trafficking investigations that a small number of firearms illicitly  trafficked into Mexico from the United States are for hunters, off-duty  police officers, and citizens seeking personal protection. Officials from  ATF, ICE, and the Government of Mexico told us most of the guns seized  and traced come from seizures Mexican military or law enforcement make  in their war with the drug cartels. Government of Mexico data showed  almost 30,000 firearms were seized in Mexico in 2008. Government of  Mexico officials told us almost all of them were seized in operations  against the drug cartels.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Combat Illicit Sales of Firearms and to Stem the Flow of These Arms across the Southwest Border Face Key Challenges
paragraphs: U.S. efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and to  prevent the trafficking of these arms across the Southwest border into  Mexico confront several key challenges. First, relevant law enforcement  officials we met with noted certain provisions of some federal firearms  laws present challenges to their efforts to address arms trafficking.  Second, we found poor coordination and a lack of information sharing  have hampered the effectiveness of the two key agencies—ATF and ICE— that implement various efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico.  Third, a variety of factors, such as infrastructure limitations and  surveillance by drug traffickers at the border, hinder U.S. efforts to detect  and seize southbound firearms at U.S.-Mexico border crossings. Finally,  agencies lack systematic gathering and recent analyses of firearms  trafficking data and trends that could be used to more fully assess the  problem and plan efforts, and they were unable to provide complete  information to us on the results of their efforts to seize firearms destined  for Mexico and to investigate and prosecute cases.
subsections: section_title: Some Federal Firearms Laws Present Challenges to U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico, according to Law Enforcement Officials
paragraphs: U.S. agencies implement efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico  within current applicable federal firearms laws. In enacting federal  firearms laws such as the Gun Control Act of 1968, Congress has sought to  keep firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess  them and to assist law enforcement in efforts to reduce crime and  violence, without placing an unnecessary burden on law-abiding citizens  who may acquire, possess, or use firearms for lawful activity.
Furthermore, Congress stated that in enacting the Gun Control Act of 1968  that the law was not intended to discourage or eliminate the private  ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.  However, ATF officials stated certain provisions of some federal firearms  laws present challenges to their efforts to combat arms trafficking to  Mexico. For example, they identified key challenges related to (1)  restrictions on collecting and reporting information on firearms purchases,  (2) a lack of required background checks for private firearms sales, and  (3) limitations on reporting requirements for multiple sales.
Restrictions on collecting and reporting information on firearms  purchases. FFLs are required by federal law to maintain records of firearm  transactions and to provide information on the first retail purchaser of a  firearm to ATF in response to a trace request within 24 hours. ATF has  stated that information obtained through the firearms trace process is  critical to its efforts to identify individuals involved in firearms trafficking  schemes and to detect trafficking patterns. In addition, ATF documents  and officials noted the trace of a firearm recovered in crime in Mexico  often leads to the initiation of an arms trafficking investigation or provides  agents with information to assist with an investigation. However, the U.S.  government is prohibited by law from maintaining a national registry of  firearms. As a result, ATF must take a number of steps to trace a crime  gun, including, as applicable, contacting the importer, manufacturer, and  wholesaler of the firearm in order to identify the FFL retailer who sold the  firearm to the first retail purchaser. Key law enforcement officials stated  restrictions on establishing a federal firearms registry lengthen the time  and resources required by ATF to complete a crime gun trace and can limit  the success of some traces. ATF officials added that information ATF is  able to maintain on certain firearms purchases, such as information on  some multiple firearms purchases, enables ATF to more quickly trace  those firearms if they turn up in crime because the information is already  entered into a searchable database.
According to ATF, from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, it took the  agency an average of about 14 days to complete a trace of a firearm  recovered in Mexico to the first retail purchaser. However, officials stated  investigative leads obtained from trace results are most useful within the  first few days following a firearm seizure, in part because the sort of  conspiracies often associated with firearms trafficking tend to change  personnel frequently and, as a result, an individual found to be responsible  for the purchase of a particular firearm may no longer have ties to the  principal gun trafficker directing the scheme.
DOJ documents and ATF officials also noted secondary firearms— firearms resold following the first retail purchase from an FFL, or “used  guns”—are commonly trafficked to Mexico. Federal law permits the  private transfer of certain firearms from one unlicensed individual to  another in places such as at gun shows, without requiring any record of  the transaction be maintained by the unlicensed individuals, an FFL, or  other law enforcement authority. Secondhand firearms may also be sold  to and purchased from FFL pawnshops. Although pawnshops maintain  records of any secondhand firearm transfers, ATF cannot directly trace  the firearm from the first retail sale at an FFL to the pawnshop. Through  the firearms trace process, ATF can follow the records of a firearm from  the manufacturer or importer to the first retail sale at an FFL; however, if  the firearm was resold from one individual to another or through a  pawnshop, there is a break in the chain of records, and ATF must then  consult with the last recorded purchaser of the firearm to determine the  continuing disposition of the firearm. As a result, ATF officials stated that,  while ATF may be able to trace a firearm to the first retail purchaser, it  generally has no knowledge of any secondhand firearms purchases from  gun shows or pawnshops—where many traffickers buy guns—without  conducting further investigation, which may require significant additional  resources and time.
Lack of required background checks for private firearms sales. Federal  firearms law prohibits certain persons from possessing or receiving  firearms. A 1993 amendment to the Gun Control Act (the Brady Handgun  Violence Prevention Act) required background checks be completed for all  nonlicensed persons seeking to obtain firearms from FFLs, subject to  certain exceptions. These background checks provide an automated  search of criminal and noncriminal records to determine a person’s  eligibility to purchase a firearm. However, private sales of firearms from  one individual to another, including private sales at gun shows, are not  subject to the background checks requirement and, therefore, do not  require the seller to determine whether the purchaser is a felon or other  prohibited person, such as an illegal or unlawful alien. DOJ documents  and ATF officials stated that, as a result, many firearms trafficked to  Mexico may be purchased through these types of transactions by  individuals who may want to avoid background checks and records of  their firearms purchases.
Limitations on reporting requirements for multiple sales. Under the  federal multiple sale reporting requirement, an FFL that sells two or more  handguns within 5 business days to an individual must report information  on the transaction to ATF. The federal reporting requirement was  established to cover multiple sales of handguns, following studies showing  that handguns sold in multiple sales to the same individual purchaser were  frequently used in crime. ATF has identified multiple sales or purchases of  firearms by a nonlicensee as a “significant indicator” of firearms  trafficking, and officials noted the federal multiple sale reporting  requirement helps expedite the time required by ATF to complete a crime  gun trace. ATF officials added that information ATF received from FFLs  on multiple sales has provided critical leads for some investigations of  arms trafficking to Mexico. However, the requirement does not apply to  purchases of long guns. As a result, although according to ATF data  about 27 percent of firearms recovered in Mexico and traced from fiscal  year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 were long guns, ATF does not have  information in its multiple sales database on any long guns recovered in  crime in Mexico that may have been purchased through a multiple sale. In  addition, law enforcement officials noted traffickers are aware of how to  avoid the federal reporting requirement by spreading out purchases of  handguns at different FFLs. For example, traffickers can effectively  purchase two or more guns within 5 business days without having such  purchases reported as long as they purchase no more than one gun at any  individual FFL.
section_title: Lack of Coordination Hampers ATF and ICE Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico
paragraphs: Some officials we met with from ATF and ICE—the two primary agencies  combating arms trafficking to Mexico—noted the agencies have worked  well together on various efforts to address the issue; however, we found  ATF and ICE have not consistently coordinated their efforts to combat  arms trafficking. ATF has stated it aims to address arms trafficking to  Mexico in collaboration with domestic and Mexican law enforcement  partners, including Mexican government entities, as well as U.S. agencies  such as ICE and DEA. Specifically, a 2007 ATF document outlining its plan  for Project Gunrunner stated ATF would incorporate ICE, CBP, and other  participating agencies in joint initiatives, to expand information sharing  and coordinated operations. According to ICE, its BEST initiative was  largely developed to facilitate cooperation and bring together resources of  ICE, CBP, and other U.S. and Mexican law enforcement entities to take a  comprehensive approach to address border violence and vulnerabilities.  However, an outdated interagency agreement and jurisdictional conflicts  have led to instances of poor coordination between the two agencies.  Officials from both agencies in Washington and in the field cited examples  of inadequate communication on investigations, unwillingness to share  information, and dysfunctional operations. As a consequence, it is unclear  whether ATF and ICE are optimizing the use of U.S. government resources  and minimizing duplication of efforts to address the issue.
ATF and ICE officials we interviewed had differing views of their  respective roles and responsibilities for addressing arms trafficking to  Mexico. ATF officials stated ATF’s relative experience on firearms issues  and broad range of relevant authorities under which it operates—including  its role in tracing crime guns and regulating the firearms industry—make it  the logical U.S. agency to lead efforts to combat arms trafficking to  Mexico. For example, ATF enforces provisions of federal firearms laws  related to    prohibited persons in possession of a firearm,    knowingly giving or selling a firearm to a prohibited person,    a lawful purchaser acquiring a firearm on behalf of an unlawful purchaser  (known as a “straw purchase”),   dealing in firearms without a license,  and  the unlawful interstate transfer of firearms in certain instances.
Although ICE officials acknowledged ATF had more years of experience  on firearms issues, they told us they viewed ATF’s role as focused on  firearms trafficking on the U.S. side of the border, while ICE has the  primary role in cases involving firearms smuggled across the U.S. border  into Mexico. ICE enforces provisions related to the illegal export or  smuggling of goods, including firearms and ammunition, from the United  States into Mexico in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and its  implementing regulations, the International Trafficking in Arms  Regulations; the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of  2005; and the Export Administration Act and its implementing  regulations, Export Administration Regulations; among other  authorities.
In the locations we visited during our audit work, officials cited examples  of how unclear roles and responsibilities have hindered communication  and cooperation during some operations. Examples are as follows:    Several officials told us they felt the agencies were not taking sufficient  advantage of each other’s expertise to more effectively carry out  operations, such as ATF’s expertise in firearms identification and  procedures for conducting surveillance at gun shows, and ICE’s  experience dealing with export violations and combating money  laundering and alien smuggling, which ICE officials noted also may be  relevant to cases of arms trafficking.
Information on intelligence related to arms trafficking to Mexico was not  being shared by the agencies at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC),  which was established to facilitate coordinated intelligence gathering and  dissemination among member agencies related to Southwest border  efforts to address drug, alien, and weapons smuggling. The 9/11  Commission Report asserted intelligence sharing is critical to combat  threats to the United States and that intelligence analysts should utilize all  relevant information sources. According to ATF, its “gun desk” at EPIC  was established as a conduit or clearinghouse for weapons-related  intelligence from federal, state, local, and international law enforcement  entities, including weapons seizure information from ICE, CBP, and  Mexican authorities. ICE stated its Border Violence Intelligence Cell  (BVIC) was established at EPIC to coordinate weapons smuggling  investigations and other related efforts with partner agencies and facilitate  timely information sharing and analysis. However, ATF officials we met  with at EPIC told us that, although they thought it was important for the  two agencies’ efforts to be integrated at EPIC, they had minimal  interaction with BVIC staff. Additionally, senior ICE officials at  headquarters told us that, in the past, ATF has taken information shared by  ICE and used it to lead its own investigations; as a result, ICE has  subsequently been reluctant to share information with ATF at EPIC.  Although CBP had a representative assigned to the gun desk during our  site visit in January 2009, the ATF official in charge of the gun desk stated  ICE did not have a representative at the gun desk as of May 1, 2009. After  reviewing a draft of this report, ATF and ICE officials at headquarters  noted ICE had requested permission from ATF to assign a representative  to the gun desk in the past 6 months, and ATF permitted the assignment at  the end of May; they stated an ICE analyst had been assigned to the gun  desk as of June 1, 2009, which may contribute to improved coordination  between the two agencies at EPIC in the future.
The agencies have not coordinated and collaborated on some covert  operations, potentially compromising the effectiveness of these efforts.  For example, ATF officials stated that, in some cases, ICE did not follow  standard procedures ATF has established for conducting operations at gun  shows. ATF officials told us of one case in which ICE did not coordinate  with ATF on an operation at a gun show, which led to an ICE agent  unknowingly conducting surveillance on an ATF agent who was pursuing  a suspect trafficker. ICE officials stated that, in another case, ATF had  conducted “controlled delivery” covert operations in an attempt to identify  organizations receiving illicit weapons in Mexico, without coordinating  with ICE. The ICE officials said ATF did not notify them of their  operations, including preclearing the controlled export of the weapons,  which could have put ATF’s operation in conflict with ICE, CBP, or  Mexican government law enforcement and raised the risk that weapons  smuggled to Mexico as part of the operations would end up in the wrong  hands and be used in crime.
In some cases, ATF and ICE refused to provide required documentation to  assist each other in arms trafficking investigations, according to ICE  officials. ICE officials stated, in some cases, ATF officials would not  provide necessary statements for cases ICE was investigating that  involved interstate firearms violations. As a result, the officials said they  would not provide a required immigration certificate to ATF for arms  trafficking cases ATF was investigating that involved an immigration  violation.
Although ICE established BEST teams to facilitate interagency  coordination and an integrated approach to address border issues, ATF  and ICE officials indicated ATF has had minimal participation on the  BEST teams. ICE officials stated that, as of May 2009, ATF was working  with 4 of the 10 Southwest border BEST teams. ATF stated in February  2009 it had not permanently assigned any agents to BEST teams, but some  ATF agents had been available on an as-needed or part-time basis to assist  with BEST efforts to stop the illegal export of weapons from the U.S. A  senior ATF official subsequently told us resource constraints prevented  ATF from fully participating in the Southwest border BEST teams, but the  official said ATF recently agreed to assign one ATF agent to each of the  Southwest border BEST teams that are located where ATF also has a field  office.
ATF, ICE, State, and other relevant officials we met with at the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City agreed on the potential usefulness of creating an  interagency, bilateral operational arms trafficking task force to conduct  joint operations and investigations including both U.S. and Mexican  government officials. However, ATF and ICE could not agree on who  would take the lead, or whether they would co-lead, the effort. Senior ICE  officials told us ICE preferred not to co-lead an interagency task force  with ATF unless ATF could provide an equivalent level of resources, and  ATF had relatively fewer resources in Mexico. The officials also said ICE  wanted to minimize coordination meetings that would be required with an  interagency task force. While a senior ATF official stated ATF and ICE  agreed at an April conference in Mexico to create an interagency task  force including both agencies that would be led by the Mexican  government, senior ICE officials said the interagency task force would be  led by ICE, and ICE is also moving forward with its own plans to create  several bilateral taskforces comprising relevant ICE and Mexican officials  at key locations in Mexico, without ATF involvement.
ATF and ICE officials acknowledged the need to better coordinate their  efforts to leverage their expertise and resources, and to ensure their  strategies are mutually reinforcing, particularly given the recent expanded  level of effort to address arms trafficking. In our past work, we have found  that in an interagency effort where interagency collaboration is essential,  it is important that agencies have clear roles and responsibilities and that  there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies. Officials from both  agencies stated ATF and ICE are in the process of updating a 1978 MOU  that existed between ATF and Customs (before the 2003 creation of ICE),  and the agencies are working to improve coordination and cooperation.  ATF officials said the new MOU will more clearly define the agencies’  statutory jurisdictions and reflect changes in some laws since the previous  MOU was created. A draft copy of the MOU we obtained also included  some guidelines for coordinating investigations and resolving interagency  conflicts. A senior ATF official suggested that, in the future, it would be  helpful if ICE and ATF officials in charge of field offices could develop  more detailed standard operations procedures for their respective  locations, based on the MOU. However, ATF and ICE have not reached  formal agreement on the MOU to date, and officials said they have not  established other formal coordination mechanisms to facilitate high-level  information sharing and integrate strategies for addressing arms  trafficking to Mexico.
section_title: Various Factors Limit the Potential to Detect and Seize Southbound Weapons at U.S. Mexican Border
paragraphs: We conducted site visits to three locations along the U.S.-Mexico border  (Laredo/Nuevo Laredo, San Diego/Tijuana, and El Paso/Juarez) and to  Monterrey and Mexico City, Mexico, between September 2008 and January  2009. In March 2009, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new  Southwest border security initiative that will expand screening technology  and add personnel and canine teams that can detect weapons and  currency for southbound inspections at ports of entry, among other  efforts. Although we have not reviewed these new plans, our review of  operations found various factors limit the potential for southbound  inspections to reduce the flow of arms at the Southwest border.
While ATF and ICE play important roles in investigating cases of arms  trafficking to Mexico, CBP is responsible for the ports of entry at the U.S.- Mexico border, and its efforts include intercepting southbound illicit  firearms at the border. Although CBP reported that from fiscal year 2005  to fiscal year 2008 some weapons were seized as a result of southbound  inspections along the U.S.-Mexico border, in general, such inspections  have yielded relatively few seizures. According to agency officials we met  with, in general, southbound inspections of vehicles and persons have not  been a high priority for the U.S. government and have resulted in relatively  few weapons seizures.  For example, in fiscal year 2008, CBP reported 35  southbound weapons seizures occurred at 10 of the 25 land ports of entry  along the Southwest border, involving a total of 70 weapons.  The other  15 ports of entry did not report any southbound weapons seizures.
Efforts to increase southbound weapons seizures at the Southwest border  are limited by several factors, including resource and infrastructure  limitations, drug traffickers’ surveillance capabilities, and the limitations  of Mexican government efforts.
Resource and infrastructure limitations. Although CBP officials stated  CBP does not track the overall number of southbound inspections  conducted at Southwest border crossings, officials stated such inspections  have generally been periodic and ad hoc, depending on available resources  and local intelligence. For example, at one border crossing we visited,  CBP officials stated law enforcement agencies typically conducted about  one to two southbound operations per month. Officials noted southbound  border crossings generally lack the infrastructure available at northbound  crossings for screening vehicles and persons, such as overhead canopies,  inspection booths, X-ray units, and other technologies. CBP officials we  met with at the San Ysidro border crossing from San Diego to Tijuana,  Mexico, noted there are 24 northbound lanes at that crossing, with  inspection booths and screening technologies that enable them to process  about 110,000 vehicles and pedestrians crossing from Mexico into the  United States every day with an average 1-1.5 hour wait per vehicle.  However, the officials said there are only 6 southbound lanes, none of  which have the inspections infrastructure northbound lanes have, and the  majority of vehicles cross into Mexico without stopping on either side of  the border. Because of the lack of southbound infrastructure at this border  crossing, officials said they use orange cones and concrete barriers to  designate inspection areas during southbound operations (see fig. 7).
To increase southbound inspections, law enforcement officials told us  significant additional resources for personnel, equipment, and  infrastructure along the Southwest border would be required beyond what  is already spent conducting northbound screenings. For example, as of  March 2009, Laredo, Texas, was the only CBP location along the  Southwest border with a permanent team of individuals available to  conduct southbound inspections at local border crossings. CBP noted  that, under the new security initiative, it plans to conduct more regular  southbound operations, in collaboration with other law enforcement  entities. However, officials stated some border crossings lack the  additional space that would be required to expand southbound  infrastructure in order to accommodate primary and secondary screening  areas while limiting the impact on traffic. For example, we visited one  border crossing in El Paso, Texas, that is adjacent to park land not owned  by CBP, which CBP officials said would preclude any efforts to expand  southbound infrastructure at that crossing. Officials added that the new  Southwest border security initiative will include efforts to survey existing  southbound infrastructure to assess needs for functionality and worker  safety, but they said any efforts to expand southbound infrastructure  under the new security initiative would be long-term, since projects  generally take 7-10 years.
Drug traffickers’ surveillance capabilities. Law enforcement officials  stated they typically only have about 45 minutes to an hour to conduct a  southbound inspections operation before drug traffickers conducting  surveillance at the border detect the operation and tell potential  traffickers to wait for the operation to end before attempting to cross. As a  result, officials said inspections are typically conducted during random  brief intervals over a certain time period, such as 2 to 3 days.
Limited Mexican southbound operations. Although Mexican customs  aims to inspect 10 percent of vehicles crossing into Mexico on the Mexican  side of the border, they have generally inspected much less than that to  date. U.S. and Mexican officials noted, Mexican customs typically has  focused more on inspections of commercial vehicles for illicit goods,  which result in the payment of a fine, than on inspections for illicit  weapons. Officials said this variance was due to several factors, including  Mexico’s general lack of capacity for detecting illicit weapons, as well as  concerns about corruption and the risks faced by Mexican officials  involved in a seizure of illicit firearms. However, the Mexican government  is taking some steps to improve inspections, such as enhancing  background checks and vetting staff involved in inspections, and putting in  place new processes, equipment, and infrastructure to improve the  security, efficiency, and effectiveness of inspections.
DHS’s new Southwest border security initiative has the potential to  mitigate some of the limitations we found with existing border operations.  We did not review efforts under the new initiative, and it is too early to tell  whether and to what extent these recent efforts may effectively stem the  flow of illicit weapons at the U.S.-Mexico border. Additionally, even if  southbound operations were significantly expanded along the Southwest  border, they might still result in a relatively small percentage of the  weapons intended for Mexico being seized. For example, in comparison,  even with the level of screening that is currently conducted on vehicles  and persons coming into the United States from Mexico, the U.S.   interagency counternarcotics community has noted only a portion of illicit  drugs crossing into the United States from Mexico are seized at the  border.
section_title: Agencies Lack Complete Data to Help Plan and Assess Results of Efforts to Address Arms Trafficking to Mexico
paragraphs: With the exception of information maintained by ATF on traces of  firearms seized in Mexico, in general, U.S. agencies were not able to  provide comprehensive data to us related to their efforts to address arms  trafficking to Mexico. We found agencies lack recent systematic analysis  and reporting of aggregate data related to arms trafficking, which could be  used to better understand the nature of the problem and to help plan and  assess ways to address it. Additionally, while agencies provided some  information on efforts to seize firearms, and initiate and prosecute cases  of arms trafficking to Mexico, they were not able to provide complete and  accurate information related to results of their efforts to address  trafficking to Mexico specifically.
As mentioned previously, ATF maintains some data on firearms that are  seized in Mexico and submitted for a trace, which can be used to help  characterize arms trafficking patterns and trends. For example, ATF has  used this information to identify primary trafficking routes from the  United States to Mexico and to identify types of firearms frequently  recovered in crime in Mexico. ATF also provided data we requested on the  number of traces that were linked to a multiple handgun sale and on  firearms that had been reported lost or stolen. However, ATF was unable  to provide data to us on the number of arms trafficking to Mexico cases  involving straw purchasers or unlicensed sellers because the agency does  not systematically track this information. ATF was also unable to provide  information we requested on the number of traces completed for firearms  recovered in Mexico that were linked to FFL gun dealer sales at gun shows  from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, although the agency began a new  effort to track this information in its firearms tracing system in June 2008.  Multiple sales, straw purchasers, trafficking by unlicensed sellers, and gun  shows have been cited in prior ATF reports and by ATF officials as  sources or indicators for firearms trafficking in general and to Mexico in  particular.
For example, in 1999 and 2000, the Department of the Treasury and ATF  released three reports that included analyses of firearms trafficking trends  based on ATF investigations. The reports included information such as  primary reasons for initiating firearms trafficking investigations, sources  of illegal firearms, types of traffickers identified in investigations, and  trafficking violations commonly associated with investigations. Law  enforcement agencies and the National Academy of Sciences have stated  the type of information related to arms trafficking included in the reports  can be used by Congress and implementing agencies to more accurately  assess the problem and to help target and prioritize efforts.  One of the  three reports, released in February 2000, stated it was to be the first in an  annual series. However, it has not been updated, and similar analyses and  reporting have not been completed since the three reports were released.
Senior ATF officials stated ATF had not recently compiled reports  including an analysis of aggregate data on firearms trafficking due to a  provision in their appropriation that was in place from fiscal year 2004 to  fiscal year 2007 that restricted the sharing of this type of information.  The officials stated an update would be useful and, since the  appropriations restrictions were relaxed in 2008, ATF was considering  such an update in the future, though no funding was requested for this  activity in ATF’s fiscal year 2010 budget.
ICE officials also acknowledged the importance of compiling this type of  information, and they noted that, for the first time in March 2009, ICE,  CBP, and DHS intelligence staff had compiled an assessment providing an  overview of southbound weapons smuggling trends, such as primary  smuggling routes and destination states for firearms in Mexico. The  assessment included an analysis of 212 southbound weapons seized by  CBP and ICE in the Southwest border states in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal  year 2008, as well as data from the Mexican government on firearms  seizures in Mexico between 2006 and 2008 and data from ATF on a portion  of traces ATF completed for firearms recovered in Mexico in 2007 and  2008. However, the assessment notes that it “does not provide an all  inclusive picture of…firearms smuggling” from the United States to  Mexico. ICE stated it worked closely with ATF intelligence staff in  developing the assessment. Nevertheless, the senior ATF intelligence  official cited by ICE as its primary ATF contact for the assessment told us  while ATF answered specific questions from ICE, such as regarding ATF’s  firearms trace process, ATF was not asked to provide comprehensive data  and analysis or significant input into the assessment’s overall findings and  conclusions. In addition, although ICE officials stated that the assessment  had been completed in March 2009, senior ATF officials we met with in  April, including the Chief of ATF’s National Tracing Center, had just  received a copy for the first time. We found the assessment only includes a  subset of trace statistics we were able to obtain from ATF on firearms  recovered in crime in Mexico and traced over the last 5 years. The senior  ATF intelligence official told us that it would make sense for future  assessments to be developed jointly, in order to leverage more  comprehensive data and analysis available from both agencies; however,  he noted that until both agencies improve their interagency coordination,  developing a joint assessment was unlikely.
Law enforcement agencies also reported tracking some information  related to results of their efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico to  date, such as data on firearms seizures and cases initiated, but they lack  complete data on results of their efforts to combat arms trafficking to  Mexico specifically and have not systematically reported information on  results of their efforts. Examples follow:    Firearms seizures. Law enforcement agencies could not provide complete  data on the number of firearms seizures they made involving arms  trafficking to Mexico. ATF reported to us it acquired 8,328 firearms in the  four Southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and  Texas) in fiscal year 2008 as evidence in support of criminal investigations  (through abandonment, purchase, or seizure), related to its Southwest  border enforcement efforts. However, a senior ATF official stated the  agency is not able to readily retrieve data on whether a firearm was  headed north or south, or, for example, whether an agent determined a  firearm was being trafficked to Mexico or was seized for some other  reason. In addition, seizures of firearms in other states that may relate to  arms trafficking to Mexico are not reflected in the above number.  Similarly, ICE reported to us it seized a total of 1,767 firearms in those  same states in support of criminal investigations related to its Southwest  border enforcement efforts in fiscal year 2008, including 152 firearms  designated as having transited through or being destined for Mexico. ICE  officials said agents have not consistently indicated in ICE’s data tracking  system when a seizure relates to Mexico, so the latter number is likely less  than the actual number of firearms seized related to Mexico. They added  that seizures of firearms in other states that may relate to arms trafficking  to Mexico also would not be reflected in the data. Additionally, while CBP  reported to us it seized a total of 70 southbound firearms at official land  ports of entry along the Southwest border in fiscal year 2008, it noted not  all southbound weapons seizures necessarily relate to arms trafficking,  such as in instances when an individual is arrested at the border due to an  outstanding warrant and the individual also had a weapon.
Cases initiated. Law enforcement agencies could not provide complete  data on cases they initiated involving arms trafficking to Mexico. ATF  reported to us it initiated 280 cases nationwide related to arms trafficking  to Mexico in fiscal year 2008. However, a senior ATF official stated some  cases involving weapons that were exported to another country, such as  Guatemala, and were later recovered in crime in Mexico would not be  included in the above number, because the intermediate location would be  recorded as the destination country in ATF’s data tracking systems;  therefore, the number provided is likely fewer than the actual number of  cases. The official also noted ATF’s data systems do not capture  information on reasons for initiating cases, such as whether a case was  initiated based on information provided from a confidential informant or  based on findings from an FFL inspection. ICE reported to us it initiated  103 cases involving Mexico-related weapons smuggling in fiscal year 2008.  However, ICE officials stated some cases that do relate to arms trafficking  to Mexico are not included in the data since ICE agents have not  consistently indicated whether a case is related to Mexico in ICE’s data  tracking system. They also noted their data systems do not capture  information on specific reasons for initiating cases, such as whether a case  was initiated following a highway interdiction on the U.S. side of the  border or based on information provided from a confidential informant.  However, ICE was able to provide a breakdown to us of cases by referring  agency. For example, ICE reported 15 of the cases involving weapons  smuggled to Mexico were initiated following a weapons seizure by CBP at  an official port of entry, and 16 were initiated following a referral from  ATF.
Prosecutions. Agencies were also unable to provide complete data on  prosecutions of cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico. Officials from  DOJ’s Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) stated their national  database for tracking criminal cases does not have a category specific to  Mexico arms trafficking cases. They said there is not a simple way to  determine which cases involve arms trafficking to Mexico since cases may  involve various defendants and charges, and no charges are specific to  arms trafficking to Mexico. They added that, to date, most of the cases  U.S. Attorneys Offices have prosecuted relating to arms trafficking to  Mexico have been referred to U.S. Attorneys by ATF. ATF reported to us  it referred 73 cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico for prosecution in  fiscal year 2008. ATF officials stated although their data systems track  the outcome of all cases, including firearms trafficking cases in general, or,as another example, for cases related to Southwest border violence (which  may involve arms trafficking as well as other related offenses) they do not  readily track the outcome of arms trafficking to Mexico cases specifically.  However, based upon further review and analysis, ATF was able to  generate some information for us on the outcome of the 73 cases:  specifically, as of September 30, 2008, 22 cases were pending a  prosecutorial decision, 46 had been accepted for prosecution, and 5 had  not been accepted for prosecution. In addition, ATF reported 47 of the  cases had been indicted, and 33 had resulted in convictions. While ICE  was not able to provide data on the number of cases involving arms  trafficking to Mexico that it referred for prosecution, it reported 66 cases  involving Mexico-related weapons smuggling had been indicted, and 47  had resulted in convictions in fiscal year 2008. ICE officials noted some  narcotics, money laundering, or human trafficking cases may also result in  charges related to weapons smuggling that are not reflected in this data.  They said compiling more complete and precise data related to  prosecutions of cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico would require  extensive documentary review and analysis.
section_title: U.S. Assistance Limited by a Lack of Targeting Resources at Needs and Concerns over Corruption among Some Mexican Government Officials
paragraphs: U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some technical and  operational assistance to Mexican counterparts to combat arms trafficking  to Mexico. However, these efforts have been limited in scope and  hampered by the incomplete use of ATF’s eTrace system and a lack of  targeting resources at needs. In addition, concerns about corruption  among some Mexican government officials limit the United States’ ability  to establish a full partnership with Mexican government entities in  combating illicit arms trafficking to Mexico.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Provide Some Assistance to Mexican Counterparts in Combating Arms Trafficking, but Overall Efforts Are Limited and Not Targeted to Needs
paragraphs: U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some assistance to Mexican  counterparts in combating arms trafficking. As noted previously in this  report, U.S. law enforcement agencies conduct their work in Mexico in  cooperation with Government of Mexico counterparts under the Treaty on  Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United  Mexican States for Mutual Legal Assistance. ATF agents in Monterrey, for  instance, have built working relationships with federal, state, and local law  enforcement, as well as the Mexican military, in the Monterrey area. This  type of outreach has given the United States the opportunity to provide  Mexican government counterparts some technical and operational  assistance on firearms trafficking.
Technical assistance. ATF has provided training sessions on firearms  identification, developing arms trafficking investigations, and the use of  eTrace. For instance, according to ATF, from fiscal years 2007 through  2008, ATF trained 375 law enforcement officials on the use of eTrace, at a  cost of just under $10,000. Government of Mexico officials told us the  training was extremely helpful in improving the skills of the officers who  received it. However, only a small percentage of officers received the  training, and more training is needed, Government of Mexico officials told  us. In addition, ATF has provided some equipment to Mexican government  counterparts, such as providing forensics equipment to the State Crime  Lab of Nuevo Leon in Monterrey, Mexico.
Operational assistance. ATF currently has 3 agents in Mexico, and ICE  has 12, though ICE agents are required to work on a wide variety of issues  and, at the time of our field work in Mexico, none was exclusively  dedicated to arms trafficking issues. In May 2009, ICE officials told us that  one ICE agent in Mexico would now be dedicated to arms trafficking.  Where they can, these ATF and ICE agents work with their Mexican  counterparts to assist at crime scenes and to gain access to firearms  information necessary to conduct gun traces. As part of this, ATF has  worked with Mexican law enforcement to collect gun data for submission  to eTrace. Once they have received the data on the guns through eTrace,  ATF’s National Tracing Center in West Virginia conducts the gun traces  and returns information on their findings to the submitting party. In  addition, ATF uses that trace information to launch new investigations or  inform existing ones. ATF officials told us these investigations are the  means by which ATF shuts down arms trafficking networks.
However, despite these efforts, overall ATF and ICE assistance has been  limited, according to Mexican and U.S. government officials. For example,  due to ATF’s resource limitations, it has provided only a portion of the  training ATF officials told us is needed to federal, state, and local law  enforcement and to the Mexican military. In addition, though ATF and ICE  have provided operational assistance in investigations, and though ATF  has assisted in the collection of firearms information for submission to  ATF’s eTrace when Mexican law enforcement and military seize firearms,  ATF and ICE have been significantly limited in what assistance they can  provide. For instance, there are several firearms seizures in Mexico every  week, but in a country as large as Mexico, neither ATF nor ICE have  enough staff in multiple locations to assist with the vast majority of gun  seizures that take place.
Also, U.S. assistance has been limited due to the incomplete use to date of  eTrace by Mexican government officials. The inputting of firearms  information into eTrace provides an important tool for U.S. law  enforcement to launch new, or to further existing, arms trafficking  investigations in the United States, which can lead to the disruption of  networks that traffic arms into Mexico, according to ATF officials. In  addition, the data inputted into eTrace currently serves as the best data we  found available for analyzing the source and nature of the firearms that are  being trafficked and seized in Mexico. However, because Mexican  government officials have only entered a portion of the information on  firearms seized, the eTrace data only represents data from these gun trace  requests, not from all the guns seized. U.S. and Mexican government and  law enforcement officials told us Mexican government officials’ failure to  submit all of the firearms tracing information could be attributed to  several factors, including the following:    Mexican officials only recently began to fully appreciate the long-term  value to Mexico of providing gun trace information to ATF;  the Mexican military serves as the central repository for all seized guns in  Mexico, while the Mexican Attorney General’s office is responsible for  maintaining information on seized firearms, and coordinating access to the  guns in order to collect necessary information has presented some  challenges, according Mexican government officials; the Mexican Attorney General’s office is understaffed and has not had  sufficient resources to clear the eTrace backlog, according to U.S. and  Mexican government officials;   only some of the Mexican Attorney General’s office staff had received  ATF-provided training on identification of firearms and on using the  eTrace system; and   eTrace has been provided only in an English language version.
Recent trends in submissions of trace requests to ATF’s National Tracing  Center indicate Mexican government officials have begun to input more  information using eTrace. ATF officials attribute this increased use of  eTrace by Mexican government officials to the training and outreach the  agency has provided over that period of time, and they hope this number  will continue to grow as Mexican government officials become more  aware of the long-term benefits to Mexico of submitting firearms trace  requests, participate in ATF firearms identification and eTrace training,  and devote more resources to gathering the firearms information and  entering it into eTrace.
Nonetheless, the ability of Mexican officials to input data into eTrace has  been hampered because a Spanish language version of eTrace has still not  been deployed across Mexico. In September 2008, ATF and State officials  told us eTrace would soon be deployed across Mexico. However, ATF  officials told us that to date the eTrace system is still being adapted to  include all planned changes—such as the ability to enter more than one  last name for a suspect or other party and to enter addresses that are  differently configured from those in the United States—and that they were  not sure when Spanish eTrace would be deployed across Mexico. U.S. and  Government of Mexico officials told us it was important to complete the  development of Spanish eTrace and immediately deploy it across Mexico  because providing it and the necessary training for it to all relevant parties  in Mexico would likely improve Mexican government officials’ use of the  system.
In addition, according to U.S. law enforcement and embassy officials, no  needs assessments regarding arms trafficking were conducted in advance  of Merida Initiative funding and, as a result, some needs that have been  identified have not been addressed. The United States has recently  provided significant funding for assistance to the Government of Mexico  under the Merida Initiative; however, the Initiative currently provides  general law enforcement and counternarcotics assistance to Mexico but  has not focused on arms trafficking. State told us that the initial allocation  of assistance was more general in order to enable it to be provided to get  the money out for use in Mexico more quickly. Going forward, State told  us that with additional time they could potentially develop and seek  funding for more specific programs or efforts to assist Mexico in  combating arms trafficking. State’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in  Mexico City administers Merida Initiative funding for Mexico and had  been able to use some of the Initiative’s monies in support of ad hoc arms  trafficking initiatives conducted by U.S. law enforcement agencies and  other U.S. entities at the embassy. However, there were specific needs  identified by Mexican and U.S. government officials that were not being  met, including the following:    Mexican government officials we met with consistently stated their  agencies needed training from U.S. law enforcement on firearms  trafficking. They said ATF had provided some training that was very useful  to their agencies, including training on identifying firearms, discovering  trafficking trends, or developing firearms trafficking cases and that their  agencies did not have their own courses on the issue. However, there had  only been a few training sessions and only a small percentage of Mexican  government officials to date had received the training. ATF, ICE, and  embassy officials agreed more training was needed but said they had  minimal resources to devote to address the problem. NAS officials at the  embassy told us they were able to take some of the Merida Initiative  money for building general capacity and use it to support some training  with an arms trafficking application. However, these amounts were small,  and the money was not designated in such a way that an arms trafficking  curriculum or training program could be developed on a large scale and  funded through Merida Initiative monies. Both U.S. and Mexican  government officials told us designing and providing a comprehensive  training program could be very helpful in boosting Mexican law  enforcement capacity to combat arms trafficking.
Mexican government officials, as well as U.S. law enforcement and  embassy officials, told us another currently unmet need was the  development of a bilateral, interagency investigative task force for arms  trafficking. While the embassy uses a law enforcement working group to  share general, nonoperational information on a whole range of law  enforcement issues in Mexico, there was no group of U.S. and Mexican  law enforcement officials working jointly at an operational and  investigative level on combating arms trafficking. Mexican and U.S.  government and embassy officials told us that such a task force would  include a group of vetted Mexican law enforcement and government  officials working jointly with U.S. counterparts in relevant law  enforcement agencies, such as ATF, ICE, and others, on identifying,  disrupting, and investigating arms trafficking on both the Mexican and U.S.  sides of the border. Such types of vetted units, called Special  Investigative Units, work with DEA on counternarcotics operations in  Mexico. DEA officials we met with told us that these units are time,  energy, and resource intensive, but that they are essential for success in  their efforts. However, there is no dedicated money that can be used for  establishing and maintaining such a group for combating arms trafficking.  NAS officials we met with in Mexico City who were administering funds  for the Merida Initiative told us they had been able to provide some  funding for various projects that had an arms trafficking application.  However, funding a standing bilateral, interagency task force would  require significant money that would need to be consistently available year  to year. As such, these officials told us that, to date, they had not been able  to use Merida Initiative funding to develop and maintain such an arms  trafficking task force. In addition, NAS officials said that when the  embassy had supported the possibility of creating such a task force, ATF  and ICE each insisted on leading such an effort and refused to work under  the other’s leadership, preferring instead to run their own agency units  with the Mexican government. Embassy officials told us they were unsure  whether any such units would be created in the future without significant  dedicated funding and agreement.
section_title: Concerns about Corruption among Some Mexican Officials Have Hampered U.S. Efforts to Provide Assistance
paragraphs: Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderon has recognized  the need to address the problem of organized crime and the corruption it  creates throughout Mexican government and society. Calderon’s  administration has reached out to the United States for cooperation and  U.S. assistance in an unprecedented way. However, U.S. assistance to  Mexico has been limited due to concerns about corruption among  Mexican government entities, according to Mexican and U.S. government  officials.
According to Mexican government officials, corruption pervades all levels  of Mexican law enforcement—federal, state, and local. For example, some  high ranking members of federal law enforcement have been implicated in  corruption investigations, and some high publicity kidnapping and murder  cases have involved corrupt federal law enforcement officials.  Furthermore, corruption is more of a problem at the state and local levels  than federal, according to U.S. and Mexican government officials. The  Mexican military, however, is generally considered to be less vulnerable to  corruption than law enforcement, according to U.S. and Mexican  government officials. As a result, the Calderon administration has used the  military extensively to disrupt drug cartel operations and seize illicit  firearms and to assist or replace local law enforcement when they are  overwhelmed or deemed corrupt. For example, in late 2008, President  Calderon’s administration terminated around 500 officers on Tijuana’s  police force and brought in the military to fill the gap until new officers  who had been sufficiently vetted could be hired and trained.
U.S. government and law enforcement officials told us that corruption  inhibits their efforts to ensure a capable and reliable partnership with  Mexican government entities in combating arms trafficking. For instance,  U.S. law enforcement officials we met with along the Southwest border  and in Mexico told us they attempt to work with Mexican counterparts in  law enforcement, the military, and Attorney General’s Office whenever  possible. However, incidents of corruption among Mexican officials  compel them to be selective about the information they share and with  whom they share it. For example, in 2006, the Government of Mexico  reported that it had dismissed 945 federal employees and suspended an  additional 953, following aggressive investigations into public corruption.
Similarly, CBP officials told us that, on the border, collaboration between  Mexican and U.S. counterparts has been limited due to concerns about  corruption among Government of Mexico customs officers. In fact, in one  major border crossing location, CBP officers told us they had not been in  contact with their Mexican customs counterparts and would not know  who they could trust if they were. The Mexican military has been brought  in to work along the border, due to the corruption within Mexican  customs, according to Mexican and U.S. government officials. The  Government of Mexico is implementing anticorruption measures,  including polygraph and psychological testing, background checks, and  salary increases for federal law enforcement and customs officers, and has  implemented reforms to provide some vetting for state and local officers  as well. However, these efforts are in the early stages and may take years  to affect comprehensive change, according to Mexican and U.S.  government officials.
section_title: United States Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico
paragraphs: While U.S. law enforcement agencies have developed initiatives to address  arms trafficking to Mexico, none have been guided by a comprehensive,  governmentwide strategy. Strategic plans for ATF and ICE raise the issue  of arms trafficking generally or overall smuggling to Mexico, but neither  focuses on arms trafficking to Mexico or lays out a comprehensive plan for  addressing the problem. In our past work, we have identified key elements  that constitute an effective strategy, including identifying needs and  objectives and the resources necessary to meet them, as well as  establishing mechanisms to monitor progress toward objectives. In June  2009, the administration released its 2009 National Southwest Border  Counternarcotics Strategy, which, for the first time, contains a chapter on  arms trafficking to Mexico. We reviewed the strategy, and it contains some  key elements of a strategy, such as setting objectives, but lacks others,  such as performance measures for monitoring progress toward objectives.  ONDCP officials said an appendix with an “implementation plan” for the  strategy will be added in late summer of 2009 that will have some  performance measures for its objectives. However, at this point, it is not  clear whether the implementation plan will include performance  indicators and other accountability mechanisms to overcome  shortcomings raised in our report. In addition, in March 2009, the  Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new DHS Southwest border  security effort to significantly increase DHS presence and efforts along the  Southwest border, including conducting more southbound inspections at  ports of entry, among other efforts. However, it is unclear how the new  resources that the administration has recently devoted to the Southwest  border will be tied to the new strategy and implementation plan.
subsections: section_title: Strategic Plans for Agencies Are Not Focused on Arms Trafficking to Mexico
paragraphs: Strategic plans for ATF and ICE raise the issues of arms trafficking in  general and overall smuggling to Mexico, but neither plan focuses on arms  trafficking to Mexico or lays out a comprehensive plan for how the  agencies would address the problem. In addition, the Merida Initiative  does not include provisions that would constitute a strategy to combat  arms trafficking.
ATF’s current strategic plan for fiscal years 2004-2009 does not mention  arms trafficking to Mexico. The strategic plan lays out the strategic goal to  “enforce Federal firearms laws in order to remove violent offenders from  our communities and keep firearms out of the hands of those who are  prohibited by law from possessing them.” As part of this objective, the  plan identifies one tactic to “partner with law enforcement agencies and  prosecutors at all levels to develop focused strategies that lead to the  investigation, arrest, and prosecution of…domestic and international  firearms traffickers…and others who attempt to illegally acquire or misuse  firearms.” However, the strategic plan neither lays out how ATF will go  about implementing the tactic or achieving the goal, nor does it include  any performance metrics to measure performance and monitor progress.  ATF officials told us that they are currently developing their new fiscal  year 2010 strategic plan, which will include more information relevant to  arms trafficking to Mexico; however, as ATF’s fiscal year 2010 strategic  plan was in draft form and subject to change, we could not determine  whether the final version will contain key elements, such as needs  assessments, clear definition of roles and responsibilities, or metrics to  measure progress. “Working with its domestic and international law-enforcement partners, ATF will deny the  “tools of the trade” to the firearms-trafficking infrastructure of the criminal organizations  operating in Mexico through proactive enforcement of its jurisdictional areas in the  affected border States in the domestic front, as well as through assistance and cooperative  interaction with the Mexican authorities in their fight to effectively deal with the increase  in violent crime.”
ATF included certain action items, which provided some specific tasks for  ATF to accomplish its strategic goals under Project Gunrunner. Some  examples of action items include the following:    The United States and Mexico establishing a point of contact for each ATF  border field division who will meet regularly with the Mexican Attorney  General’s Office’s representative to coordinate investigative and firearms- trafficking issues.
ATF and other DOJ components, such as DEA, U.S. Marshals Service, and  FBI; and DHS components, such as ICE, operating along the border  implementing investigative strategies and for developing intelligence  relating to trafficking into Mexico.
The United States and Mexico forming a consultative group of attorneys  and law enforcement officials from both countries to address legal issues  and policies involving firearms trafficking and enforcement strategies.
The United States exploring the availability of funding to provide  technology and equipment to assist the government of Mexico in  upgrading its firearms forensics analysis and tracing capabilities.
While this ATF Project Gunrunner document does contain useful strategic  goals and specific action items to achieve those goals, key elements are  missing, such as mechanisms that could measure and ensure progress  toward these goals. “The mission of Armas Cruzadas is for U.S. and Mexican government agencies to  synchronize bi-lateral law enforcement and intelligence-sharing operations in order to  comprehensively identify, disrupt, and dismantle trans-border weapons smuggling  networks. The goals include (1) establishing a bilateral program to stop weapons  smuggling; (2) coordinating operations; (3) developing intelligence about arms trafficking  networks; (4) strengthening interagency cooperation; (5) promoting intelligence  information exchange; and (6) implementing points of contact for information exchange.”
To meet these goals, ICE detailed some action items, which included    creating a border violence intelligence cell;    developing a vetted arms trafficking group;  implementing a weapons virtual task force; reinvigorating the ICE Border Liaison Program; and  leveraging investigation, interdiction, and intelligence.
While ICE’s fact sheet does contain relevant strategic goals and specific  action items to achieve those goals, key elements of a strategy are missing  as well, such as mechanisms to ensure progress toward the strategic goals.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Customs and Border Protection
paragraphs: In CBP’s current strategic plan, there are no goals specific to arms  trafficking to Mexico. The primary focus of CBP’s plan is on preventing  dangerous people and goods from getting into the United States, and the  issue of preventing arms from going across the border into Mexico is not  addressed.
In other reports and publications, CBP mentions items it has seized on the  border, including drugs, illicit currency, and even prohibited plant  materials and animal products, but the agency does not mention illicit  firearms. However, CBP officials told us they have an important role to  play in combating arms trafficking to Mexico and will continue to increase  their efforts to combat arms trafficking with new initiatives, including  some in coordination with and support of operations involving ICE and  other U.S. law enforcement agencies.
section_title: The Merida Initiative
paragraphs: The Merida Initiative does not include provisions that would constitute a  strategy to combat arms trafficking. While a bill in Congress to authorize  the Merida Initiative included a “sense of Congress” that an “effective  strategy to combat ... illegal arms flows is a critical part of a United States  … anti-narcotics strategy,” a subsequent appropriations act, which makes  reference to Merida, included no details on which agency or agencies  should be responsible for developing and implementing such a strategy.  And, as mentioned previously in the report, State has not dedicated  funding for the Merida Initiative that targets illicit arms trafficking.
The U.S. Embassy in Mexico, where the Merida Initiative funding is  administered, also maintains a Mission Performance Plan to guide its  efforts each fiscal year. This plan lays out goals of working with  Government of Mexico partners on law enforcement issues including  transborder issues, such as smuggling of arms. However, there are neither  detailed performance measures, nor are there mechanisms to ensure  collaboration across agencies on the issue of combating arms trafficking  to Mexico.
section_title: Several Key Elements Are Essential to an Effective Strategy
paragraphs: We have previously identified several key elements of an effective  strategy. These elements include    defining roles and responsibilities for each party to meet those objectives    ensuring sufficient funding and resources necessary to accomplish  implementing mechanisms to facilitate coordination across agencies; and   monitoring progress toward objectives and identifying needed  improvements.
We have found that having a strategy with elements such as these has the  potential for greatly enhancing agency performance. For example,  managers can use performance information to identify problems in  existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and to develop  corrective actions.
section_title: New National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy Includes Chapter on Arms Trafficking, but It Does Not Contain Some Key Elements of an Effective Strategy
paragraphs: In June 2009, the administration released its 2009 National Southwest  Border Counternarcotics Strategy, which, for the first time, contains a  chapter on arms trafficking to Mexico.  By law, the Office of National  Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is required to issue a new strategy every 2  years.  The previous version of this document, from 2007, did not include  any strategy to combat illicit arms trafficking to Mexico.  According to  ONDCP officials, initially, this new version did not include arms trafficking  either, but in February, a working group, co-led by ATF and ICE, began  working on an arms trafficking piece. “U.S. law enforcement organizations and intelligence agencies operate a variety of  intelligence collection and analysis programs which are directly or indirectly related to  weapons smuggling. The Department of Defense provides analytical support to some of  these programs with regard to captured military weapons and ordnance. In order to  provide better operational access and utility to law enforcement agencies, the U.S.
Government will capitalize upon the existing law enforcement interagency intelligence  center, EPIC, to reinforce rapid information sharing methods for intelligence derived from  Federal, State, local and Government of Mexico illicit weapons seizures. Absent statutory  limitations, plans should be made to move to a real-time data sharing methodology.”
While the arms trafficking chapter of the strategy contains some key  elements of a strategy, such as setting objectives, it lacks others, such as  providing detailed roles and responsibilities for relevant agencies or  performance measures for monitoring progress toward objectives.   However, ONDCP officials said an appendix with an “implementation  plan” for the strategy will be added in late summer of 2009 that will have  more detailed actions for each agency to take, as well as some  performance measures for each item under the objectives.  Furthermore,  ONDCP officials said there will be annual reporting that addresses  performance towards the plan’s goals within the National Drug Control  Strategy’s annual reporting to Congress. However, at this point, it is not  clear whether the implementation plan will include performance  indicators and other accountability mechanisms to overcome  shortcomings raised in our report. In addition, in March 2009, the  Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new DHS Southwest border  security effort to significantly increase DHS presence and efforts along the  Southwest border, including conducting more southbound inspections at  ports of entry, among other efforts. However, it is unclear how the new  resources that the administration has recently devoted to the Southwest  border will be tied to the new strategy and implementation plan.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Combating arms trafficking has become an increasing concern to U.S. and  Mexican government and law enforcement officials, as violence in Mexico  has soared to historic levels, and U.S. officials have become concerned  about the potential for increased violence brought about by Mexican DTOs  on the U.S. side of the border. However, while this violence has raised  concern, there has not been a coordinated U.S. government effort to  combat the illicit arms trafficking to Mexico that U.S. and Mexican  government officials agree is fueling much of the drug-related violence.
Agencies such as ATF and ICE have made some efforts to combat illicit  arms trafficking, but these efforts are hampered by a number of factors,  including the constraints of the legal framework in which law enforcement  agencies operate, according to agency officials, and poor coordination  among agencies. In addition, agencies have not systematically and  consistently gathered and reported certain types of data on firearms  trafficking that would be useful to the administration and Congress to  better target resources to combat arms trafficking to Mexico. Gaps in this  data hamper the investigative capacity of law enforcement agencies.  Further, a Spanish language version of ATF’s eTrace has been in  development for months but has yet to be finalized; the lack of this new  version of eTrace has impeded the use of eTrace by Mexican law  enforcement officials, which limits data that could be used in  investigations on both sides of the border and results in incomplete  information on the nature of firearms trafficked and seized in Mexico.  Quick deployment of eTrace across Mexico and training of the relevant  officials in its use could increase the number of guns submitted to ATF for  tracing each year, improving the data on the types and sources of firearms  trafficked into Mexico and increasing the information that law  enforcement officials have to investigate and build cases.
U.S. and Mexican government officials in locations we visited told us that,  while they have undertaken some efforts to combat illicit arms trafficking,  they are concerned that without a targeted, comprehensive, and  coordinated U.S. government effort, their efforts could fall short. In June  2009, the administration released its 2009 National Southwest Border  Counternarcotics Strategy, containing a chapter on arms trafficking to  Mexico. We reviewed the strategy’s chapter on arms trafficking and found  that the chapter does contain some key elements of a strategy, such as  setting objectives, but it lacks others, such as providing detailed roles and  responsibilities for relevant agencies or performance measures for  monitoring progress toward objectives. ONDCP officials said they will  develop an implementation plan for the strategy in late summer of 2009  that will have more detailed actions for each agency to take, as well as  some performance measures for each item under the objectives. However,  at this point, it is not clear whether the implementation plan will include  performance indicators and other accountability mechanisms to overcome  shortcomings raised in our report. Furthermore, in March 2009, the  administration announced more resources for the Southwest border,  including more personnel and equipment for conducting southbound  inspections.  However, it is unclear how the new resources that the  administration has recently devoted to the Southwest border will be tied  to the new strategy and implementation plan.
The current level of cooperation on law enforcement issues between the  United States and Mexico under President Calderon’s administration  presents a unique opportunity to work jointly to combat illicit arms  trafficking. Taking advantage of this opportunity will require a unified,  U.S. government approach that brings to bear all the necessary assets to  combat illicit arms trafficking.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the U.S. Attorney General prepare a report to  Congress on approaches to address the challenges law enforcement  officials raised in this report regarding the constraints on the collection of  data that inhibit the ability of law enforcement to conduct timely  investigations.
To further enhance interagency collaboration in combating arms  trafficking to Mexico and to help ensure integrated policy and program  direction, we recommend the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of  Homeland Security finalize the Memorandum of Understanding between  ATF and ICE and develop processes for periodically monitoring its  implementation and making any needed adjustments.
To help identify where efforts should be targeted to combat illicit arms  trafficking to Mexico, we have several recommendations to improve the  gathering and reporting of data related to such efforts, including that  the U.S. Attorney General direct the ATF Director to regularly update  ATF’s reporting on aggregate firearms trafficking data and trends; the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in light  of DHS’s recent efforts to assess southbound weapons smuggling trends,  direct ATF and ICE to ensure they share comprehensive data and leverage  each other’s expertise and analysis on future assessments relevant to the  issue; and  the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure  the systematic gathering and reporting of data related to results of these  efforts, including firearms seizures, investigations, and prosecutions.
To improve the scope and completeness of data on firearms trafficked to  Mexico and to facilitate investigations to disrupt illicit arms trafficking  networks, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary  of State work with the Government of Mexico to expedite the  dissemination of eTrace in Spanish across Mexico to the relevant  Government of Mexico officials, provide these officials the proper training  on the use of eTrace, and ensure more complete input of information on  seized arms into eTrace.
To support the 2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, we  recommend the ONDCP Director ensure that the implementation plan for  the arms trafficking chapter of this strategy (1) identifies needs and clearly  defines objectives for addressing those needs, (2) identifies roles and  responsibilities for meeting objectives that leverage the existing expertise  of each relevant agency, (3) ensures agencies are provided guidance on  setting funding priorities and providing resources to address those needs,  (4) establishes mechanisms to facilitate coordination across agencies, and  (5) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine and report on progress  toward objectives and identifies needed improvements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland  Security, Justice, and State and to the Office of National Drug Control  Policy. DHS and State provided written comments, which are reproduced  in appendixes III and IV.
DHS generally agreed with our recommendations; however, DHS raised  questions regarding our interpretation of certain data and the relationship  between ICE and ATF. We disagree that our presentation of the data is  misleading, and the evidence in the report clearly demonstrates  coordination problems between ICE and ATF.
State agreed with our recommendation that the U.S. Attorney General and  the Secretary of State work with the Government of Mexico to expedite  the dissemination of eTrace in Spanish across Mexico to the relevant  Government of Mexico officials, provide these officials the proper training  on the use of eTrace, and ensure more complete input of information on  seized arms into eTrace. In addition, State added that the agency is funding  a $5 million Forensics Laboratories project with the Government of  Mexico’s Office of the Attorney General (PGR) for the successful  investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. This funding, State said,  will be used to provide state-of-the-art equipment and training, which  directly support DOJ and DHS efforts in the disruption of firearms.
DOJ provided no formal departmental comment on the draft of this report.  However, ATF and DEA provided technical comments, which we  incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
DHS and ONDCP also provided technical comments on our report, which  we incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees and to the Attorney General, the Secretaries of Homeland  Security and State, and the Director of the Office of National Drug Control  Policy. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments  are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify data available on types of firearms trafficked to Mexico and the  sources of these arms, we consulted U.S. and Mexican government  databases, as well as research prepared by nongovernmental entities. We  relied primarily on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and  Explosives (ATF) data compiled by its National Tracing Center (NTC)  since it contained the most detailed information on the types of illicit  firearms seized in Mexico and where they had originated. NTC data on  firearms seized in Mexico, however, is not comprehensive. The data is  based chiefly on trace information submitted through ATF’s eTrace  system. As mentioned earlier in this report, over the last 5 years, about  one-quarter to one-third of the illicit firearms seized in Mexico had  information submitted through eTrace, and not all of these were  successfully traced. Notwithstanding its limitations, NTC data was  sufficiently reliable to permit an analysis of where the firearms seized in  Mexico that could be traced had been manufactured and whether they had  been imported into the United States before arriving in Mexico. For those  arms that were traced to a retail dealer in the United States before being  trafficked to Mexico, NTC data also contained information on the states  where they had originated. Based on the trace data and discussions with  ATF and other law enforcement officials, we were able to develop an  analysis of the type of retail transactions involved in the initial marketing  of the firearms in the United States before they were trafficked to Mexico.
NTC trace data also contained information allowing identification of the  types of firearms (e.g., caliber and model) that were most commonly  seized in Mexico and subsequently traced. We corroborated this  information in extensive discussions with U.S. and Mexican law  enforcement officials. However, as noted earlier in the report, because  firearms seized in Mexico are not always submitted for tracing within the  same year they were seized, it was not possible for us to develop data to  track trends on the types of firearms trafficked or seized. Similarly, we  were unable to obtain quantitative data from U.S. or Mexican government  sources on the users of illicit firearms in Mexico. However, there was  consensus among U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials that most  illicit firearms seized in Mexico had been in the possession of organized  criminal organizations linked to the drug trade. The involvement of  criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking in the trafficking of  illicit firearms into Mexico was confirmed by law enforcement intelligence  sources.
To learn more about trends in illicit firearms seizures in Mexico, we  obtained data from the Mexican Federal Government’s Planning, Analysis  and Information Center for Combating Crime—Centro Nacional de  Planeación, Análisis e Información para el Combate a la Delincuencia— (CENAPI) on seizures from 2004 to the first quarter of 2009. To determine  the geographical distribution of firearms seized in Mexico, we obtained  data from CENAPI on seizures by Mexican federal entity—31 states and  the Federal District of Mexico City. We did not assess the reliability of data  provided by CENAPI, but we considered this data generally acceptable to  provide an overall indication of the magnitude and nature of the trends in  arms seizures since 2004.
To identify key challenges confronting U.S. government efforts to combat  illicit sales of firearms in the United States and to stem the flow of these  arms across the Southwest border into Mexico, we interviewed cognizant  officials from the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) ATF, Executive Office for  U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), and the Drug Enforcement Administration  (DEA); the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Immigration  and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP); and the Department of State (State) regarding their relevant efforts.
We reviewed and analyzed DOJ and DHS documents relevant to U.S.  government efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico, including  funding data provided to us by ATF, CBP, and ICE; the 1978 Memorandum  of Understanding (MOU) between CBP and ATF and a draft version of a  revised MOU between ATF and ICE; data from ATF, CBP, and ICE on  firearms seizures; data from ATF and ICE on efforts to investigate and  prosecute cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico; and agency reports  and assessments related to the issue. We also reviewed relevant prior GAO  reports, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports and  memorandums, and reports from DOJ’s Office of Inspector General related  to ATF’s efforts to enforce federal firearms laws. We reviewed provisions  of federal firearms laws that agency officials identified as relevant to U.S.  government efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico, including the  Gun Control Act of 1968, the National Firearms Act of 1934, and the Arms  Export Control Act of 1976. We did not review Mexican firearms laws and  to the extent that we comment on these in this report, we relied on  secondary sources.
To explore challenges faced by U.S. agencies collaborating with Mexican  authorities to combat illicit arms trafficking, we visited U.S.-Mexico border  crossings at Laredo and El Paso, Texas, and San Diego, California. In these  locations, we interviewed ATF, CBP, DEA, and ICE officials responsible  for overseeing and implementing efforts to stem the flow of illicit arms  trafficking to Mexico and related law enforcement initiatives. We observed  U.S. government efforts to develop and share intelligence related to arms  trafficking to Mexico at the El Paso Intelligence Center. We also  conducted fieldwork in Mexico City, Monterrey, Nuevo Laredo, and  Tijuana, Mexico. In Mexico, we met with ATF, CBP, DEA, ICE, and State  officials working on law enforcement issues at the U.S. embassy and  consulates. We interviewed Mexican government officials engaged in  efforts to combat arms trafficking from the Attorney General’s Office  (Procuraduría General de la República), including CENAPI; the Ministry  of Public Safety (Secretaria de Seguridad Pública); the Ministry of  Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional); and Customs (Servicio de  Administración Tributaria). Since we did not conduct fieldwork in a  generalizeable sample of locations along the Southwest border and in the  interior of Mexico, our observations in these locations are illustrative but  may not be representative of all efforts to address the issue.
To assess the U.S. government’s strategy for addressing the issue of arms  trafficking to Mexico we reviewed strategic planning, internal guidance,  policy, and procedures documents for relevant agencies and departments.  Following the March 2009 decision to include a chapter on arms  trafficking in the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, we met  with Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) officials to discuss  development of this document, and obtained a general overview. ONDCP  officials also arranged for one of our team members to review the draft  document.
Finally, to assess the reliability of data provided by ATF, CBP, and ICE on  funding for efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico, seizures of  southbound firearms, and cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico, we  reviewed and discussed the sources of the data with agency officials. We  determined the program and project information provided to us were  sufficiently reliable to provide an overall indication of the magnitude and  nature of the illicit firearms trade and of the completeness of data agencies  have related to their efforts to address the issue. Any financial data we  reported were for background purposes only.
section_title: Appendix II: Geographic Distribution of Firearms Seized and Traced
paragraphs: Western Hemisphere Subcommittee staff requested that we compare data  on firearms seizures in Mexico and ATF firearms trace data to determine if  ATF’s trace data reflected the geographic distribution of firearms seizures  in that country. Our analysis indicates that there is a strong positive  correlation between the data we obtained from CENAPI on seizures by  Mexican federal entity—that is, 31 states and the Federal District of  Mexico City—for calendar year 2008, and ATF’s firearms trace data linked  to specific Mexican federal entities for fiscal year 2008. Eight of the top 10  Mexican federal entities for firearms seizures in 2008, according to  CENAPI data—Baja California, Chihuaha, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan,  Oxaca, Tamaulipas, and the Federal District of Mexico City—also showed  up among the top 10 Mexican federal entities where firearms traced by  ATF were seized. Figure 8 shows that the Mexican federal entities where  most firearms are seized are very similar to those submitting the most  firearms trace requests.
subsections: section_title: Methodology
paragraphs: In order to determine the geographic distribution of firearms seized in  Mexico, we obtained data from CENAPI on seizures, by Mexican federal  entity. According to CENAPI data, a total of 29,824 firearms were seized in  Mexico in 2008. In order to ascertain the geographic distribution of  firearms seized in Mexico that were traced by ATF, we obtained data from  ATF linking firearms traced to the Mexican federal entities where they  were seized. In fiscal year 2008, ATF traced 7,198 firearms seized in  Mexico. Of these, 6,854 were linked to specific states or the Federal  District. However, 344 firearms were traced in fiscal year 2008 that could  not be linked to a specific state where they may have been seized. We  excluded these from our analysis.
We ranked the Mexican states and Federal District by the number of  firearms seized according to the data provided by CENAPI, and we ranked  them a second time according to the trace data provided by ATF. We then  compared the two sets of data using a correlation analysis. See figure 9  below. The correlation coefficient for the data was 0.85, indicating a  strong positive correlation. We also performed a correlation analysis for  the raw data—that is, the number of firearms seized in Mexico, and the  number of firearms traced by ATF, by Mexican federal entity. The  correlation coefficient for those two sets of data was 0.79. We also  examined the ratio of arms seized to arms traced and this ranged from .03  to 1.78. Figure 9 shows a strong positive correlation between the number  of firearms seized in Mexico and the number of firearms traced by ATF, by  Mexican federal entity.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland  Security’s letter dated June 9, 2009.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We disagree that our use of the 87 percent statistic is misleading. Our  report clearly states that the number of firearms traced by ATF  represents a percentage of the overall firearms seized in Mexico. More  importantly, ATF trace data for each year since 2004 identified that  most of the firearms seized in Mexico and traced came from the United  States. Our recommendation to the U.S. Attorney General and the  Secretary of State to expedite further enhancement of eTrace and  work with the Government of Mexico to expand its use is designed to  shed further light on the origin of guns seized in Mexico. 2.  We have added additional information to the text of the report to  clarify ATF’s role in DHS’s recent assessment. While ICE stated it  worked closely with ATF intelligence staff in developing the  assessment, the senior ATF intelligence official ICE cited as its  primary ATF contact for the assessment told us that ATF provided  some information to ICE for its assessment, but ATF was not asked to  provide comprehensive data and analysis or significant input into the  assessment’s overall findings and conclusions. We found the  assessment only includes a subset of trace statistics we were able to  obtain from ATF on firearms recovered in crime in Mexico and traced  over the last 5 years. The senior ATF intelligence official told us that it  would make sense for future assessments to be developed jointly, in  order to leverage more comprehensive data and analysis available  from both agencies; however, he noted that until both agencies  improve their interagency coordination, developing a joint assessment  was unlikely. 3.  We did not comment in the report on whether any of ICE’s databases  enable the agency to capture, track, and provide statistical information  on all ICE investigations, as well as associate seizures and  enforcement actions against individuals linked to criminal behavior.  However, as we noted in the report, ICE was unable to provide  comprehensive statistical information specifically on cases involving  arms trafficking to Mexico.  4.  Contrary to DHS’s assertion that ICE and ATF enjoy an excellent  working relationship in their efforts to combat arms trafficking to  Mexico, ATF, ICE, and State officials we met with along the Southwest  border, in Mexico, and at headquarters cited problems with ATF and  ICE working well together. These officials included senior officials at  ICE’s Office of International Affairs in Washington, from ICE’s Attaché  office in Mexico City, and from ICE’s office at the U.S. Consulate in  Tijuana, Mexico. 5.  It was not within the scope of our audit to review specific ICE  investigations or their disposition, and we did not comment on this in  our report. Our report noted that, in general, ICE was not able to  provide comprehensive data to us related to its efforts to address arms  trafficking to Mexico. For instance, ICE was not able to provide  complete data on the seizure of firearms destined for Mexico, the  number of cases it initiated related to arms trafficking to Mexico, or  the disposition of cases ICE submitted for prosecution. Also, DHS’s  recent assessment of southbound weapons smuggling trends, which  could be used to better understand the nature of the problem and to  help plan and assess ways to address it, notes that it “does not provide  an all inclusive picture of…firearms smuggling” from the United States  to Mexico. In addition, as we noted in comment 2, it only contains a  subset of the data we were able to obtain from ATF relevant to the  issue. 6.  As noted in the report, GAO has found that one of the key elements  that should be part of any strategy is clearly identifying an agency’s  objectives and establishing mechanisms for determining progress  toward those objectives. Neither CBP’s strategic plan, nor other CBP  reports and publications, make mention of illicit firearms, focusing  instead on other CBP efforts screening people and goods entering the  United States. However, our report noted that CBP is involved in new  Southwest border initiatives announced by DHS to significantly  increase DHS presence along the border, including conducting more  southbound inspections at ports of entry, among other efforts.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated June 5, 2009.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  State agreed with our recommendation that the U.S. Attorney General  and the Secretary of State work with the Government of Mexico to  expedite the dissemination of eTrace in Spanish across Mexico to the  relevant Government of Mexico officials, provide these officials the  proper training on the use of eTrace, and ensure more complete input  of information on seized arms into eTrace. In addition, State added  that the department is funding a $5 million Forensics Laboratories  project with the Government of Mexico’s Office of the Attorney  General (PGR) for the successful investigation and prosecution of  criminal cases, and we incorporated this information into the report.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Juan Gobel, Assistant Director;  Joe Carney; Virginia Chanley; Matt Harris; Elisabeth Helmer; Grace Lui;  and J. Addison Ricks provided key contributions to this report.  Technical  assistance was provided by Joyce Evans, Theresa Perkins, Jena Sinkfield,  and Cynthia Taylor.