Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts
Published: 2009-10-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Prior to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for coordinating the Department of Defense's (DOD) counter improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. JIEDDO was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD. This report, which is one in a series of congressionally mandated GAO reports related to JIEDDO's management and operations, assesses the extent to which 1) capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, 2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, 3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and 4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and met with DOD and service officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several counter-IED capability gaps that included shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition processes. For example, prior to JIEDDO's establishment, many different DOD entities focused on counter-IED issues, but coordination among these various efforts was informal and ad hoc. DOD's efforts to focus on addressing these gaps culminated in the creation of JIEDDO, but its creation was done in the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint organizations. Further, DOD did not systematically evaluate all preexisting counter-IED resources to determine whether other entities were engaged in similar efforts. JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. First, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts across DOD. Although JIEDDO is currently developing a management system that will track initiatives as they move through JIEDDO's acquisition process, the system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives--not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. Second, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process. With limited visibility, both JIEDDO and the services are at risk of duplicating efforts. JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning Joint IED defeat initiatives to the military services, in part because JIEDDO and the services have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. As a result, the services are mainly funding initiatives with funding for overseas contingency operations rather than their base budgets. Continuing to fund transferred initiatives with overseas contingency operations appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years since these appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next. This transition is also hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED jamming systems. As a result, JIEDDO may be investing in counter-IED solutions that do not fully meet existing service requirements. JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for joint training initiatives by listing new requirements; however, these guidelines also could be broadly interpreted. Without specific criteria for counter-IED training initiatives, DOD may find that it lacks funding for future initiatives more directly related to the counter-IED mission.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Improvised explosive devices (IED) continue to be the number one threat  to U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. During 2008, IEDs accounted for  almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. In 2009,  insurgents’ use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Iraq began to decline for the  second straight year since 2003, while in Afghanistan the number of  monthly IED incidents increased to more than 800 in July 2009. Through  fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to the Joint  IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address the IED threat. In addition,  other Department of Defense (DOD) components, including the military  services, have devoted at least $1.49 billion to the counter-IED effort.  Along with the escalation in Afghanistan, the IED threat is expanding  throughout the globe with over 300 IED events per month worldwide  outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, according to JIEDDO. There is  widespread consensus that this threat will not go away and that IEDs will  continue to be a weapon of strategic influence in future conflicts.
Prior to JIEDDO’s establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible  for coordinating DOD’s counter-IED efforts. DOD established JIEDDO and  directed it to focus (lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DOD actions in  support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective joint task  forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.  DOD’s  directive mandates that JIEDDO’s director serve as the DOD point of  coordination for initiatives across the full range of efforts necessary to  defeat the IED threat, integrate all counter-IED solutions throughout DOD,  and coordinate with other DOD components for ongoing midterm research  and development initiatives and long-term science and technology efforts.
In a series of reviews in response to direction in Senate Report 109-292, we  first reported in March 2007 on several issues related to JIEDDO’s  management and operations, including JIEDDO’s lack of a strategic plan  and the resulting effects on the development of its financial and human  capital management programs. We made several recommendations to the  Secretary of Defense to improve the management of JIEDDO operations,  stressing the development of JIEDDO’s detailed strategic plan.  Subsequently, we also reported on JIEDDO’s financial management  processes and internal controls and JIEDDO’s coordination of intelligence  support efforts. Due to concerns over JIEDDO’s performance and its  ability to effectively coordinate DOD’s response to IEDs, Congress, in the  Conference Report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense  Authorization Act, mandated that we review JIEDDO’s efforts in this  regard. In response, this review assesses the coordination of DOD’s  counter-IED efforts, specifically focusing on the extent to which (1)  capability gaps were initially identified in DOD’s effort to defeat IEDs and  how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, (2)  JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, (3) JIEDDO  has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military  services, and (4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED  training initiatives it will fund. In another ongoing engagement, we also are  examining what progress JIEDDO has made to improve its management of  internal processes.
To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified in  DOD’s effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to  the development of JIEDDO, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army  Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other current and former DOD  officials involved in the establishment of JIEDDO. We also examined  documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established  JIEDDO, and documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO’s evolution.  To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all  counter-IED efforts, coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded  initiatives to the military services, and defined what constitutes a counter- IED training initiative, we met with officials from organizations including  the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, Army Training and Doctrine  Command, Army National Training Center, Marine Corps Warfighting  Laboratory, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Training  Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, Joint Forces Command,  JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence, U.S. Central Command, Technical  Support Working Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and JIEDDO.  We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E and  JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01,  which established JIEDDO’s rapid  acquisition process, as well as other documents and briefings from  JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through August 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides additional  details on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Although the IED was not a new threat when first encountered during  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to DOD officials, U.S. forces  were not initially concerned with the IED as a “weapon of choice” until  IED attacks began to increase in Iraq at the end of major combat  operations. Terrorist and insurgent groups facing overwhelming  conventional forces had previously used IEDs in a variety of scenarios,  including the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, the ship-borne  attack against the USS Cole in 1999, and the airborne attacks of September  11th, 2001. In a 2006 report examining the requirements for truck armor,  we stated that the Army had previously identified the IED as a threat to  U.S. forces prior to the beginning of operations in Iraq.
Following the end of major combat in 2003 in Iraq, insurgents began to  rapidly adjust their tactics due to the overwhelming firepower and  accuracy of U.S. and coalition military forces in conventional warfare. As  U.S. forces began to respond to this asymmetric threat, a new tactic  emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the IED. Beginning in June  2003, IED incidents targeting coalition forces began to escalate from 22  per month to over 600 per month in June 2004. In June 2006, these  incidents reached more than 2,000 per month. At one point in 2006,  coalition forces in Iraq were experiencing almost 100 IEDs per day. The  initial IED attacks in Iraq used nonconventional tactics, techniques, and  procedures with a magnitude U.S. forces had not seen before. This threat  involved an enemy that takes advantage of and adapts to the environment  and is not restricted by conventional rules of engagement. For example,  insurgents began using tactics such as buried or camouflaged roadside  bombs, vehicle-borne IEDs (car bombs), and suicide bombers to attack  coalition forces. Not only was the enemy flexible, but these insurgents also  had the ability to rapidly respond to countermeasures.
Due to the magnitude and previously mentioned changes made by the  enemy in its tactics, techniques, and procedures, several counter-IED gaps  related to the IED threat were identified by DOD:  technology gaps—shortage of jammers, robots, and other technology,  almost none of which were geared towards homemade roadside bombs,    personnel gaps—lack of qualified personnel to analyze the threat and  collect and distribute information on intelligence, forensic evidence, latest  tactics, techniques, procedures, and other data,  training gaps—training on latest tactics, techniques, and procedures not  available, equipment often supplied without training or instructions, and  jammers interfered with communications equipment,  funding gaps—little to no dedicated funding for counter-IED efforts, and    DOD acquisition process gaps—no process for rapidly developing and  fielding new equipment.
section_title: DOD’s Efforts to Address Counter-IED Capability Gaps Culminated in the Creation of JIEDDO
paragraphs: DOD’s efforts to address counter-IED gaps culminated in the creation of  JIEDDO. Initially, many different DOD entities began focusing on counter- IED issues in an effort to address capability gaps. JIEDDO emerged  through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts, but its  development did not follow a formal process. In recognition of the lack of  official guidance for planning joint activities, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) is developing a formal process for establishing future joint  organizations. Despite steps taken to focus DOD’s counter-IED efforts,  most of the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO  continue to develop, maintain, and in many cases expand their own IED  defeat capabilities.
subsections: section_title: Many Different DOD Entities Began Focusing on Counter-IED Issues in an Effort to Address Capability Gaps
paragraphs: As IED attacks in Iraq reached nearly 300 per month by October 2003 and  over 400 per month by May 2004, many different DOD entities at the  service and joint levels began focusing on addressing capability gaps in the  areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in  counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition  processes. Many of these efforts were carried out by the Army and Marine  Corps, in addition to a number of joint and interagency efforts.
Army officials stated that within the Army, individual units throughout Iraq  began to focus on counter-IED efforts as IED incidents increased in Iraq.  Army units developed their own counter-IED tactics, techniques, and  procedures as insurgent tactics evolved, and soldiers began using an  increasingly wide range of electronic jammers in varying configurations to  counter remote-detonated IEDs. According to Army officials, the Army  also employed Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians to disable and  dispose of suspected IEDs. Army officials stated that these personnel  began relying on remote-controlled robots as the number of IED incidents  and the level of complexity of the devices increased, and Explosive  Ordnance Disposal technicians were initially among the few personnel  with counterexplosives training in-theater. To support these initial efforts,  according to Army officials, the Army relied on the Rapid Equipping Force  to quickly acquire counter-IED technology such as jammers and robots.  This organization was established in 2002 to identify and pursue off-the- shelf or near-term materiel solutions that could be acquired and fielded  quickly without having to rely on the Army’s normally lengthy acquisition  processes, Army officials stated. The Operational Needs Statement, a  process that enables commanders to request a materiel solution for an  urgent need, was another method of rapidly acquiring technology  solutions.
Marine Corps officials stated that initial Marine Corps counter-IED efforts  were centered on the Marine Corps Combat Development Command,  which was responsible for managing materiel requests, known as  Universal Needs Statements, from deployed personnel. This organization  began to receive a larger number of counter-IED-related requests as the  IED threat escalated, according to Marine Corps officials, increasing from  2 in 2002 to 8 in 2003, and 26 in 2004. Overall, 13 percent of all requests  during this 3-year period were counter-IED-related. According to Marine  Corps officials, in response, the organization established a counter-IED  cell in 2004 to focus exclusively on counter-IED-related requests. The cell  was later transferred to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and  expanded to include personnel with more specialized technical expertise.  Marine Corps officials stated that the Urgent Universal Needs Statement  was developed during this period as a means of providing commanders  with an expedited process for requesting critically needed capabilities,  including counter-IED solutions. Through this process, Marine Corps  officials stated that they have been able to develop and field equipment in  a significantly shorter time frame than the normal acquisition processes,  sometimes within several weeks.
At the joint and interagency level, a variety of organizations were engaged  in intelligence support and counter-IED technology acquisition. Early joint  efforts included the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, which was  established by the Army in 2003 to perform physical, biometric, and  tactical exploitation of evidence from IED attack scenes. Staffed by a  combination of Army, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel, the  organization provided Army, Marines, and Special Forces units with in- theater analyses of IED construction techniques and enemy tactics,  techniques, and procedures, and also collected biometric data, such as  fingerprints, in an effort to identify specific bomb makers. While the  organization often collected evidence from IED attack scenes itself, it also  collaborated with Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and drew on data  provided by these teams in their analyses. Since 2004, the Naval Explosive  Ordnance Disposal Technology Division has served as the administrative  sponsor and primary source of technical and engineering support for the  organization. According to an Army official, the Technical Support  Working Group was involved in developing counter-IED technology  solutions as part of the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff  Operations Center, which in turn was responsible for counter-terrorism  force protection efforts, including counter-IED efforts. The Terrorist  Explosive Device Analytical Center was established in 2003 to leverage  law enforcement, the intelligence community, and military capabilities to  perform technical and forensic analyses on recovered IED components in  the United States and provide actionable intelligence to field personnel.  Army officials told us that, in contrast to the Combined Explosives  Exploitation Cell, it focused on higher-level strategic issues rather than  tactical ones, and included personnel from the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, DOD, and the  intelligence community.
Army and Marine Corps officials stated that communication and  cooperation among these various efforts lacked overall coordination, with  multiple entities independently engaged in attempts to address various  facets of the larger IED problem. Although the Army had direct experience  with IEDs due to its presence in Iraq, according to an Army official, it had  no single coordinator for even its own IED defeat efforts. For example,  Army officials stated that coordination of counter-IED efforts between  Army units occurred in-theater at the working level as personnel facing  similar enemy tactics exchanged successful tactics, techniques, and  procedures, but little synchronization of Army-wide efforts was occurring.  Army and Marine Corps officials stated that some coordination between  the Army and the Marine Corps took place, for example, on the use of the  different electronic jamming systems used by each service, but  communication was carried out on an ad hoc basis and generally occurred  only in Iraq as commanders from both services attempted to overcome  IED-related threats. At the interagency level, counterterrorism force  protection efforts, including the Technical Support Working Group, were  coordinated by the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff  Operations Center. However, an Army official stated that this organization  was left with limited capabilities by 2003 as many of its resources had  been reallocated to the Department of Homeland Security after the attacks  of September 11, 2001.
section_title: JIEDDO Evolved through a Series of Attempts to Focus Counter-IED Efforts
paragraphs: As IED attacks increased following the invasion of Iraq, JIEDDO evolved  through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts. Figure 1  illustrates JIEDDO’s evolution as the IED threat increased from 2003 to  2007.
All of the actions, noted in the above timeline, were attempts to coordinate  counter-IED efforts and provide funding commensurate with the increased  scale of the effort. For example, in late 2003, recognizing the need for  closer coordination and greater focus on its counter-IED efforts, the Army  took the initial steps toward what would later become a joint-level  organization with the establishment of the Army IED Task Force.
According to an Army official, the IED Task Force consisted of a  coordinating cell in Washington and two field teams in Iraq, and was  largely focused on operational and training efforts in an attempt to address  both the lack of personnel in-theater with counter-IED training and the  need for better training on effective tactics, techniques, and procedures.  The field teams, including former Special Forces personnel, developed  effective tactics, techniques, and procedures, which they then relayed to  the Center for Army Lessons Learned. An IED cell was established at the  center to analyze these practices and incorporate lessons learned in the  training of outgoing troops to Iraq, while an Army official stated that the  coordinating cell in Washington provided leadership and facilitated  communication between the field teams, field commanders, and the  center. Army officials also stated that the IED Task Force fielded a limited  amount of counter-IED-related technology in cooperation with the Rapid  Equipping Force, including more sophisticated jamming equipment,  vehicle armor, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal robots. However, an  Army official stated that with an initial budget of $20 million and no formal  authority to coordinate counter-IED efforts outside of the Army, the IED  Task Force lacked both the funding and authority to undertake a large- scale, departmentwide effort.
In 2004, senior leaders began to believe that greater emphasis should be  placed on developing a technology solution rather than focusing on  training as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures, according to Army  officials. In June 2004, the commander of the CENTCOM wrote a  memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense requesting a Manhattan  Project-like effort to find a technical solution to the IED problem. In  response to the CENTCOM memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of  Defense created a Joint Integrated Process Team in July 2004. This team  was intended to identify, prioritize, and resource materiel and nonmateriel  solutions, and the Army IED Task Force was elevated to the joint level and  renamed the Joint IED Defeat Task Force, with a budget of $100 million.
In an attempt to enhance visibility over all DOD initiatives and to further  focus the counter-IED effort, in June 2005, DOD Directive 2000.19 elevated  the Joint IED Defeat Task Force to report directly to the Deputy Secretary,  gave it a budget of over $1.3 billion, and clarified its role as the focal point  for all efforts in DOD to defeat IEDs. The Joint Integrated Process Team  was transformed into an advisory group to the Joint IED Defeat Task  Force’s director, and a retired four-star general was recruited to head the  Task Force in an effort to raise its profile among other senior DOD  leaders, according to a former senior DOD official. However, a DOD  official stated that by 2006, the Joint IED Defeat Task Force had begun to  encounter difficulties attracting and retaining qualified personnel due to  its temporary status.
In late 2005, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense began working  with the Joint Staff and the Director of Administration and Management  to give the task force more permanence and to provide more manpower  continuity. Several solutions were proposed by the Director of  Administration and Management, including placing the task force within  the Joint Forces Command, making it a Staff Element within OSD, or  creating a Jointly Manned Entity under OSD. Consequently in February  2006, DOD Directive 2000.19E turned the joint task force into a permanent  joint entity and jointly manned activity of DOD—JIEDDO—with a budget  of nearly $3.7 billion, with the intention to provide the institutional  stability necessary to attract and retain qualified personnel, according to a  DOD official.
These various actions that led to the development of JIEDDO were done in  the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint  organizations. According to a former DOD official, JIEDDO developed  largely through informal communication among key individuals in various  services and agencies. For example, a former DOD official stated that after  the establishment of the Army IED Task Force, the Secretary of the Navy  became aware of its work and began meeting regularly with its director,  and these meetings eventually led to the idea of elevating the IED Task  Force to the joint level. Furthermore, DOD did not systematically evaluate  all preexisting counter-IED resources in order to determine whether other  entities were engaged in similar efforts within DOD, according to DOD  officials. Although the Technical Support Working Group, for example,  was already in existence at the time of the establishment of the Army IED  Task Force in 2003, an Army official stated that Army officials were under  pressure to find an immediate solution and that creating a new working  group or task force would be the most efficient approach to overcoming  the IED problem. In addition, an Army official stated that existing  organizations, such as the Technical Support Working Group, were too  focused on technology solutions, but even after the CENTCOM’s 2004  memorandum requesting a technology solution, as noted above, a DOD  official stated that the possibility of using preexisting counter-IED  resources rather than creating a new organization was not considered  when the decision to establish JIEDDO was made. Furthermore, according  to a DOD official, the Director of Administration and Management was not  tasked to evaluate potential organizational solutions until after the  decision to establish a permanent organization had already been made.
section_title: OSD Is Developing a Formal Process for Establishing Future Joint Organizations
paragraphs: In recognition of the increasing number of joint activities and the lack of  official guidance for planning them, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review  called for the development of a formal process for establishing joint  organizations in the future. In response, the Director of Administration  and Management is currently developing a Joint Task Assignment Process  with the goal of ensuring that future joint activities have the appropriate  authorities, responsibilities, resources, and performance expectations to  carry out their missions. This process will consist of four stages, during  which preexisting resources and capabilities will be fully evaluated, the  optimal organizational solution will be determined, and all stakeholders  will be identified and included in the process. OSD officials stated that  although the ultimate solution may range from a Memorandum of  Agreement between two existing organizations to a new defense agency,  creation of a new organization will be considered if no existing  organizations are determined to be capable of fulfilling the mission’s goals.  According to OSD officials, the process will be implemented through a  formal DOD directive and instruction, and all new joint activities will be  required to go through the process before being established. Although  development of the process is still ongoing, DOD officials stated that  implementation will likely take place in late 2009.
section_title: Many Efforts to Address the IED Threat Have Continued after the Creation of JIEDDO
paragraphs: Despite these steps taken to focus DOD’s counter-IED efforts, many of the  organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO continue  to develop, maintain, and expand their own IED defeat capabilities. For  example, the Army continues to address the IED threat through such  organizations as the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, established in 2006,  which coordinates Army responses to asymmetric threats such as IEDs.  The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command provides training support  and doctrinal formation for counter-IED activities, and the Research,  Development & Engineering Command conducts counter-IED technology  assessments and studies for Army leadership. Furthermore, an Army  official stated that the Center for Army Lessons Learned continues to  maintain an IED cell to collect and analyze counter-IED information.  Similarly, the Marine Corps continues to address the IED threat through  the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, whose Global War on Terror  Operations Division is the focal point for all Marine Corps IED  countermeasures. DOD officials also stated that the Marine Corps Combat  Development Command, the Training and Education Command, and the  Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned have all continued counter-IED  efforts beyond the creation of JIEDDO. According to DOD officials, at the  joint level, CENTCOM maintains its own counter-IED task force as part of  the Interagency Action Group, while Joint Forces Command continues to  support counter-IED training and maintain involvement with counter-IED  doctrine development. At the interagency level, the Technical Support  Working Group continues its research and development of counter-IED  technologies.
section_title: JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility over Counter-IED Initiatives throughout DOD
paragraphs: JIEDDO has taken steps to improve visibility over its counter-IED efforts  by, for example, involving the services in the joint counter-IED acquisition  process and hosting DOD counter-IED conferences. However, JIEDDO  and the services have limited visibility over all counter-IED initiatives  throughout DOD in that there is no comprehensive database of all existing  counter-IED initiatives. In addition, the services lack visibility over some  JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process.
subsections: section_title: JIEDDO and the Services Have Taken Steps to Improve Visibility over Their Counter-IED Efforts
paragraphs: Since JIEDDO’s establishment, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps  to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts. For example, JIEDDO,  the services, and several other DOD organizations compile some  information on the wide range of IED defeat initiatives existing throughout  DOD. JIEDDO also promotes visibility by giving representatives from the  Army Asymmetric Warfare Office’s Adaptive Networks, Threats and  Solutions Division, and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, the opportunity  to assist in the evaluation of IED defeat initiative proposals. Additionally,  JIEDDO maintains a network of liaison officers to facilitate counter-IED  information sharing throughout DOD. It also hosts a semiannual  conference covering counter-IED topics such as agency roles and  responsibilities, key issues, and current challenges. JIEDDO also hosts a  technology outreach conference with industry, academia, and other DOD  components to discuss the latest requirements and trends in the counter- IED effort. Lastly, the services provide some visibility over their own  counter-IED initiatives by submitting information to JIEDDO for its  quarterly reports to Congress.
section_title: No Comprehensive IED Defeat Initiative Database Exists throughout DOD
paragraphs: JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over all counter-IED  initiatives throughout DOD in that there is no comprehensive database of  all existing counter-IED initiatives. Tasked with leading, advocating, and  coordinating all DOD actions to defeat IEDs, JIEDDO is also required by  its directive to (1) integrate all IED defeat solutions throughout DOD and  (2) maintain the current status of program execution, operational fielding,  and performance of approved joint IED defeat initiatives. Another  document, JIEDDO’s internal standard operating procedure, requires it to  maintain visibility and awareness of all counter-IED initiatives. Despite  these requirements, JIEDDO does not maintain a comprehensive database  of all IED defeat initiatives existing throughout DOD, which has spent at  least $1.49 billion in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 on counter-IED activities  outside of JIEDDO. In a previous report, we recommended that JIEDDO  develop a database to capture all DOD counter-IED initiatives. In its  response to our report, JIEDDO acknowledged the need for such a  database and cited ongoing work in partnership with the Director, Defense  Research and Engineering, to develop one. JIEDDO is currently  developing a management system that will track its initiatives as they  move through JIEDDO’s acquisition process. However, this system will  only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives—not those being independently  developed and procured by the services and other DOD components.  Without incorporating service and other DOD components’ counter-IED  initiatives, JIEDDO’s efforts to develop a counter-IED initiative database  will not capture all initiatives throughout DOD.
Though they are required by DOD directive to ensure that JIEDDO  maintains visibility over their IED defeat initiatives, the services do not  have a central source of information for their own counter-IED efforts.  DOD officials stated that there is currently no requirement for each service  to develop a comprehensive database of all of its counter-IED initiatives.  Without centralized counter-IED initiative databases, the services are  limited in their ability to provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive  summary of all their existing initiatives. For example, the U.S. Army  Research and Development and Engineering Command’s Counter-IED  Task Force and the service counter-IED focal points—the Army  Asymmetric Warfare Office’s Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions  Division, and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab—maintain databases of  counter-IED initiatives, but, according to Army and Marine Corps officials,  these databases are not comprehensive of all efforts within their  respective service. Additionally, of these three databases, only the U. S.  Army Research and Development and Engineering Command’s database is  available for external use. Since the services are able to act independently  to develop and procure their own counter-IED solutions, several service  and joint officials told us that a centralized counter-IED database would be  of great benefit in coordinating and managing DOD’s counter-IED  programs.
Two other DOD components maintain counter-IED initiative information  repositories, but they also are not comprehensive of all counter-IED  efforts within DOD. At the combatant command level, CENTCOM  maintains a Web-based information management system to track incoming  requirements from its area of responsibility, but the system does not  capture nor list all available counter-IED technologies. Additionally,  DOD’s Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office’s Technical  Support Working Group maintains an information management system  that tracks counter-IED technologies resulting from industry responses to  broad agency announcements. However, this system is neither searchable  by other agencies nor comprehensive of all initiatives being pursued  across DOD.
section_title: The Services Lack Visibility over Some JIEDDO-Funded Initiatives
paragraphs: The services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that  bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process. In this process, JIEDDO brings in  representatives from the service counter-IED focal points to participate on  several boards to evaluate counter-IED initiatives, such as the JIEDD  Requirements, Resources, and Acquisition Board, and the Joint IED Defeat  Integrated Process Team. However, even with these boards, JIEDDO has  approved some counter-IED initiatives without vetting them through the  appropriate service counter-IED focal points because the process allows  JIEDDO to make exceptions if deemed necessary and appropriate.
Specifically, the process allows the Director of JIEDDO’s counter-IED  training center to make exceptions when training requirements and  training support activities need to be accelerated to meet predeployment  training requirements. For example, at least three counter-IED training  initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO’s counter-IED joint training center were  not vetted through the Army counter-IED focal point before being  approved for JIEDDO funding. These initiatives included a $9.5 million  upgrade to counter-IED training areas, a $19.1 million search rehearsal site  to replicate conditions in Iraq, and a $1.5 million initiative to augment the  number of personnel trained on IED signal jamming at an Army training  center. In addition to not having visibility over these initiatives, Army  officials later rejected the transition or transfer from JIEDDO of each of  these initiatives for fiscal year 2011. In particular, Army officials rejected  the search rehearsal site and signal jamming personnel augmentation  initiatives because the Army had already been pursuing similar efforts.  JIEDDO officials acknowledged that while it may be beneficial for some  JIEDDO-funded initiatives to bypass its acquisition process in cases where  an urgent requirement with limited time to field is identified, these cases  do limit service visibility over all JIEDDO-funded initiatives.
Army officials also cited examples where JIEDDO allowed certain science  and technology initiatives with high-technology readiness levels to bypass  the first stages of JIEDDO’s process to select initiatives. Officials from the  Army’s Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division stated that this  step limits the Army’s visibility over JIEDDO’s funding decisions. They  cited six initiatives that bypassed JIEDDO’s acquisition process, including  one designed to predetonate IEDs. While this method may shorten the  time required for procurement, it denies the service counter-IED  representatives at JIEDDO’s initiative vetting boards the opportunity to  review the initiatives.
JIEDDO also has bypassed its acquisition process by working directly with  individual service units and organizations to address specific counter-IED  capability gaps. For example, JIEDDO worked directly with the Army’s  Training and Doctrine Command to establish the Joint Training Counter- IED Operations and Integration Center without input from the Army’s  Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division. As a result, the Army  counter-IED focal point was initially unaware of the initiative and  expressed confusion about how the initiative would be integrated into the  Army’s overall counter-IED effort. Additionally, this training center was  not based on a theater-based urgent need. Furthermore, Army officials  voiced concerns about the implications of assigning a service  responsibility for what is essentially a joint training function. Additionally,  officials with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab described the  coordination and accountability challenges involved when JIEDDO’s  counter-IED training center works directly with a Marine unit to deliver  counter-IED equipment, making it difficult for the Marine counter-IED  focal point to monitor counter-IED activity and quantify the amount of  funding it receives from JIEDDO. Overall, service officials have said that  not incorporating their views on initiatives limits their visibility of JIEDDO  actions and could result in approved initiatives that are inconsistent with  service needs. This lack of visibility also creates the potential for  duplication of effort across the services and other DOD organizations.
section_title: JIEDDO Faces Difficulties with Transitioning Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military Services
paragraphs: Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services’ and  defense agencies’ ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives  approved for transition following JIEDDO’s 2- year transition timeline.  According to DOD’s Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for  transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget programs  for sustainment and further integration. However, JIEDDO’s initiative  transitions to the services are hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO’s  transition timeline and DOD’s base budget cycle as well as by instances  when service requirements are not fully considered during the  development and integration of jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives.
subsections: section_title: JIEDDO Has Taken Steps to Guide the Transition of Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military Services
paragraphs: JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services’ and defense agencies’  ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives approved for transition  following JIEDDO’s 2-year transition timeline. For example, in November  2007, JIEDDO developed an instruction with detailed guidance to formally  document, clarify, and improve procedures for transitioning JIEDDO- funded initiatives. JIEDDO has also taken steps to keep the services  informed of the status of upcoming initiative transitions. For example, it  holds a transition working group to provide the services and other  agencies with notification of upcoming initiative transitions. JIEDDO also  gives transition briefings to several boards and councils throughout DOD  to facilitate the transition of joint-IED defeat initiatives. It gives a quarterly  briefing to the Joint Staff’s Protection Functional Capabilities Board, a  permanently established body responsible for the organization, analysis,  and prioritization of joint warfighting capabilities within the protection  functional area. To ensure coordination of transition recommendations,  JIEDDO also provides annual briefings to the Joint Capabilities Board and  the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. JIEDDO also annually updates  the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s Senior Resource Steering Group on the  transition of initiatives valued greater than $25 million.
section_title: JIEDDO’s Initiative Transitions Are Hindered by Funding Gaps within the Services’ Budgets
paragraphs: JIEDDO and the services still have difficulty resolving the gap between  JIEDDO’s transition timeline and DOD’s base budget cycle, causing DOD  to rely on service overseas contingency operations funding to sustain  jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. In our 2008 report, we  recommended that DOD develop a more effective process to ensure funds  designated for sustainment costs are included in its budget cycle.  However, DOD still lacks a comprehensive plan to ensure that the services  have the proper funding to sustain an initiative following a transition.
According to DOD’s Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for  transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget programs  for sustainment. As described in its instruction, JIEDDO plans to fund  initiatives for 2 fiscal years of sustainment. After that, the initiative is  supposed to be either disposed of or passed to one of the services for its  continued sustainment through a transition or transfer. In a transition, one  of the services is expected to pick up sustainment costs for an initiative by  placing it into a base budget program as an enduring capability. In a  transfer, one of the services may sustain the initiative through funding for  current contingency operations. In comments on our prior report, JIEDDO  stated that it would work with DOD to develop a more effective process to  ensure that funds designated for sustainment costs are included in its base  budget cycle. However, since that report, service officials have stated that  JIEDDO’s process has not yet been improved and that JIEDDO’s transition  timeline may not allow the services enough time to request and receive  funding through DOD’s base budgeting process. As a result, DOD  continues to transfer most initiatives to the services for funding as  permanent programs, with service overseas contingency operations  appropriations, rather than with service base budget funding. According to  JIEDDO’s latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, JIEDDO  recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling $233 million to the  services for funding through overseas contingency operations  appropriations and the transition of only 3 initiatives totaling $4.5 million  into service base budget programs. Continuing to fund transferred  initiatives with overseas contingency operations appropriations does not  ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years, since these  appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next.
In addition to the small number of transitions and transfers within DOD,  the services often decide to defer indefinitely their assumption of funding  responsibility for JIEDDO initiatives following JIEDDO’s intended 2-year  transition or transfer point. According to the fiscal year 2011 JIEDDO  transition list, the Army and Navy deferred or rejected the acceptance of  16 initiatives that JIEDDO had recommended for transition or transfer,  totaling at least $16 million. Deferred or rejected initiatives are either  sustained by JIEDDO indefinitely, transitioned or transferred during a  future year, or terminated. When the services defer or reject the transition  of initiatives, JIEDDO remains responsible for them beyond the intended  2-year transition or transfer point, a delay that could diminish its ability to  fund new initiatives.
Lastly, JIEDDO has delivered training aids to the Army without ensuring  that it had the appropriate funds to sustain the equipment. As a result,  Army officials have stated that they are unable to quickly reallocate  funding from current programs to pay for these sustainment costs. For  example, JIEDDO provided counter-IED training aids, such as surrogates  for mine-resistant vehicles to support training at the Army’s combat  training centers, without first coordinating with the Army’s Combat  Training Center Directorate to plan for their future sustainment.  Consequently, this directorate had not planned for the $12.7 million  requirement to sustain the vehicle surrogates and other training  equipment. As a result of unplanned sustainment costs such as these, the  services could face unexpected, long-term sustainment requirements in  the future.
section_title: JIEDDO’s Initiative Transitions Are Hindered When Service Requirements Are Not Fully Considered
paragraphs: JIEDDO’s initiative transitions are also hindered when service  requirements are not fully considered during the development and  integration of jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. According to DOD’s  Directive, JIEDDO is required to integrate joint-funded counter-IED  initiatives throughout DOD. However, service officials stated that  transitioning JIEDDO-funded initiatives, such as counter-IED radio  jamming systems, is made more difficult when service requirements are  not fully considered throughout the systems’ evaluation process. In 2006,  DOD established the Navy as single manager and executive agent for  ground-based jamming systems for DOD. Under this arrangement, the  Navy oversees several boards to review and evaluate jamming system  proposals, including a program board at the general officer level and a  technical acceptance board at the field officer level. Though the services  participate on each of these boards, the counter-IED jamming program  board approved, with JIEDDO funding, two ground-based, counter-IED  jamming systems that did not fully meet the services’ needs. In the first  example, CENTCOM, in response to an urgent operational needs  statement originating from its area of operations, published a requirement  in 2006 for a portable IED jamming system for use in theater. In 2007,  JIEDDO funded and delivered to theater a near-term solution to meet this  capability gap. However, Army officials stated that the fielded system was  underutilized by troops in Iraq, who thought the system was too heavy to  carry, especially given the weight of their body armor. Since then, the joint  counter-IED radio jamming program board has devised a plan to field a  newer portable jamming system called Counter Remote Control IED  Electronic Warfare (CREW) 3.1. According to JIEDDO, CREW 3.1 systems  were developed by a joint technical requirements board that aimed to  balance specific service requirements for portable systems. While  CENTCOM maintains that CREW 3.1 is a requirement in-theater, and  revalidated the need in September 2009, officials from the Army and  Marines Corps have both stated that they do not have a formal  requirement for the system. Nevertheless, DOD plans to field the  equipment to each of the services in response to CENTCOM’s stated  operational need. It remains unclear, however, which DOD organizations  will be required to pay for procurement and sustainment costs for the  CREW 3.1, since DOD has yet to identify the source of final procurement  funding. In a second example, Army officials stated that they were not  involved to the fullest extent possible in the evaluation and improvement  process for a JIEDDO-funded, vehicle-mounted jamming system, even  though the Army was DOD’s primary user in terms of total number of  systems fielded. The system, called the CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer  (CVRJ), ultimately required at least 20 proposals for configuration changes  to correct flaws found in its design after the contract was awarded. Two of  the changes involved modifying the jammer so it could function properly  at high temperatures. Another change was needed to prevent the jammer  from interfering with vehicle global positioning systems. Army officials  stated that had they had a more direct role on the Navy-led control board  that managed configuration changes to the CVRJ, the system may have  been more quickly integrated into the Army’s operations. As this  transpired, the Army continued to use another jamming system, DUKE, as  its principal counter-IED electronic warfare system. Not ensuring that  service requirements are fully taken into account when evaluating and  developing counter-IED systems creates the potential for fielding  equipment that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could also  delay the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following  JIEDDO’s 2-year transition timeline.
section_title: JIEDDO Lacks Clear Criteria for Defining What Counter-IED Training Initiative It Will Fund
paragraphs: JIEDDO devoted $454 million in fiscal year 2008 to support service  counter-IED training requirements through such activities as constructing  a network of realistic counter-IED training courses at 57 locations  throughout the United States, Europe, and Korea. Although JIEDDO has  supported service counter-IED training, its lack of clear criteria for the  counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED  training investment decisions. According to its directive, JIEDDO defines a  counter-IED initiative as a materiel or nonmateriel solution that addresses  joint IED defeat capability gaps, but the directive does not specifically lay  out funding criteria for training initiatives. Since our last report, JIEDDO  has attempted to clarify what types of counter-IED training it will fund in  support of in-theater, urgent counter-IED requirements. In its comments to  our previous report, JIEDDO stated that it will fund an urgent in-theater  counter-IED requirement if it “enables training support, including training  aids and exercises.” JIEDDO also stated in its comments that it will fund  an urgent in-theater counter-IED requirement only if it has a primary  counter-IED application. Beyond JIEDDO, CENTCOM officials have  stated that they will process counter-IED capabilities only if they are  primarily related to countering IEDs.
Though JIEDDO has since published criteria for determining what joint,  counter-IED, urgent requirements to fund, it has not developed similar  criteria for the funding of joint training initiatives not based on urgent  requirements. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may  have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. For example, since fiscal  year 2007, JIEDDO has spent $70.7 million on role players in an effort to  simulate Iraqi social, political, and religious groups at DOD’s training  centers. JIEDDO also spent $24.1 million on simulated villages at DOD’s  training centers in an effort to make steel shipping containers resemble  Iraqi buildings. According to Army officials, these role players and  simulated villages funded by JIEDDO to support counter-IED training are  also used in training not related to countering IEDs. Lastly, according to  its 2008 annual report, JIEDDO used counter-IED funding to purchase  authentic Iraqi furniture and other items to create a realistic environment  for counter-IED search rehearsals. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to  clarify its criteria for training initiatives not based on urgent requirements  by requiring counter-IED training initiatives to be (1) counter-IED related,  (2) joint in nature, (3) derived from an immediate need, and (4) unable to  be funded by a service. As with JIEDDO’s urgent needs criteria for  training, these guidelines could also be broadly interpreted, as  demonstrated by the above examples. Without criteria specifying which  counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, JIEDDO may diminish its  ability to fund future initiatives that are more directly related to the  counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder coordination in managing its  resources, as decision makers at both the joint and service level operate  under unclear selection guidelines for which types of training initiatives  should be funded and by whom.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility and coordination of the wide  range of counter-IED measures throughout DOD, which presents  difficulties for DOD in efficiently using its resources to defeat IEDs. While  JIEDDO and the services have taken important steps to focus counter-IED  efforts, DOD remains challenged in its effort to harness the full potential  of its components towards an integrated effort to defeat IEDs. In addition,  difficulties remain in maintaining visibility over all counter-IED activities  throughout DOD, coordinating the transition of JIEDDO initiatives, and  clearly defining the types of training initiatives it will fund. If these issues  are not resolved, DOD’s various efforts to counter IEDs face the potential  for duplication of effort, unaddressed capability gaps, integration issues,  and inefficient use of resources in an already fiscally challenged  environment. As a result, DOD may not be assured that it has retained the  necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the long term.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making five recommendations to address the issues raised in this  report:    To improve JIEDDO’s visibility over all counter-IED efforts, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to  create their own comprehensive IED defeat initiative databases and work  with JIEDDO to develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED  initiatives.
To further provide DOD visibility over all counter-IED efforts in cases  where initiatives bypass JIEDDO’s rapid acquisition process, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to develop a  mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of  each initiative prior to its funding.
To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to work with  JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each  JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding  sources, and a timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD  base budget cycle.
To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to coordinate with the  services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service requirements  are fully taken into account when making counter-IED investment  decisions.
To better clarify what counter-IED training initiatives JIEDDO will fund,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to evaluate  counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate  theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this  direction into existing guidance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with three  of our recommendations and partially agreed with two other  recommendations. However, DOD expressed concerns that our report  focuses on counter-IED initiative challenges from a service perspective  rather than a combatant command urgency of need. While we recognize  JIEDDO’s mission and contribution in supporting urgent warfighter needs,  as DOD’s focal point for coordinating counter-IED efforts throughout the  department, JIEDDO is tasked with the integration of all IED defeat  solutions throughout DOD, which includes the integration of service  requirements during the development of counter-IED initiatives. DOD also  stated that our report focused on a handful of initiatives or efforts that  encountered friction during either the development phase or the  coordination process to transfer, transition, or terminate the program.  While we recognize JIEDDO’s progress to successfully transition some  initiatives to the services, the examples used in the report highlight the  challenges noted in our work and identify areas for improvement.  Furthermore, DOD generally agreed with our recommendations to address  these challenges.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO and the services to  develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives, DOD  concurred and noted that JIEDDO is supporting the Army Research  Development and Engineering Command’s effort to establish a JIEDDO- hosted network solution that establishes a common collaboration tool to  link these databases and provide comprehensive visibility across DOD for  all counter-IED efforts. However, this initiative does not describe how the  services will develop a comprehensive database for each of their own  counter-IED efforts. While we recognize that this ongoing effort is a step in  the right direction, until all of the services and other DOD components  gain full awareness of their own individual counter-IED efforts and  provide this input into a central database, any effort to establish a DOD- wide database of all counter-IED initiatives will be incomplete.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to develop a  mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of  initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process prior to its funding,  DOD concurred and stated that JIEDDO will take action to notify  stakeholders of all JIEDDO efforts or initiatives, whether or not initiatives  are required to go through the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat  Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP).  JIEDDO will also inform stakeholders and elicit their opinions on JIEDDO  developmental efforts in order to decrease duplication of efforts and allow  services greater lead time to review these efforts. DOD noted that this  process will be incorporated in the pending update of JCAAMP. We agree  that if implemented, these actions would satisfy our recommendation.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to develop a  comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded  initiative, including expected costs, identified funding sources, and a  timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD base budget  cycle, DOD concurred and noted that the Navy and Marine Corps are  working on efforts to improve the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives.  DOD also stated that it has developed recommended changes for DOD  Directive 2000.19E that will address coordinating the transition of counter- IED solutions. DOD noted that these changes will be staffed to DOD and  the services during the periodic update of DOD Directive 2000.19E. We  agree that if implemented, these actions would satisfy our  recommendation.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to coordinate with  the services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service  requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED  investment decisions, DOD partially concurred. DOD noted that JIEDDO  responds to in-theater requirements that have joint applications but may  not have service specific applications. DOD also stated that fully vetted  coordination with the services prior to funding an effort or initiative could  delay the fielding of material that would save lives. DOD therefore  suggested that this recommendation be incorporated with our second  recommendation to notify the services of all JIEDDO-funded initiatives or  the language to this recommendation be changed to reflect DOD’s  position. While we recognize the need to respond rapidly to support  warfighter needs and that our previous recommendations will help gain  awareness of JIEDDO-funded initiatives as they are being developed, we  continue to support our recommendation and reiterate the need for the  integration of service requirements and full coordination prior to funding  an initiative to ensure that these efforts are fully vetted throughout DOD  before significant resources are committed.
In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to evaluate counter- IED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate in- theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this  direction into existing guidance, DOD concurred with the intent but not  the language of this recommendation. DOD noted that the JCAAMP  provides the mechanism to identify, validate, and provide solutions for  combatant commanders and service training counter-IED capability gaps.  DOD also noted that it is currently developing a new DOD instruction on  counter-IED training guidance. According to DOD’s comments, the  instruction directs DOD components to implement counter-IED, mission- essential tasks across all levels of war into their training regiments at the  individual, collective, unit, and staff levels, and sustain relevancy through  interface with JIEDDO. While we recognize these actions may be a  positive step towards improving coordination of training initiatives  between JIEDDO and the services, neither the JCAAMP nor the instruction  cited in DOD’s response to this report contain the criteria by which  JIEDDO will fund counter-IED training initiatives. We, therefore, continue  to support our recommendation and reiterate the need for establishing  criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives JIEDDO will  fund.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or  your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)  512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified in  DOD’s effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to  the development of JIEDDO, we spoke with current and former senior  officials involved in the evolution of JIEDDO and examined existing  documentation. To assess initial DOD efforts to defeat IEDs and the early  evolution of JIEDDO, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army  Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other current and former DOD  officials involved in the establishment of JIEDDO. We also examined  documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established  JIEDDO, and documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO’s evolution.  To assess DOD’s efforts to implement a process for establishing new joint  organizations, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, Office of the Director of Administration and Management, to  examine documentation and conduct interviews on the implementation of  the Joint Task Assignment Process and its relevance to JIEDDO.
To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all  counter-IED efforts, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army  Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the  Army’s Research Development and Engineering Command, and  CENTCOM to discuss current efforts to gain visibility over all of DOD’s  counter-IED efforts. We also examined documentation including DOD  Directive 2000.19E and JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, which established  JIEDDO’s rapid acquisition process, as well as analyzed JIEDDO, service,  and other DOD counter-IED databases.
To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of  JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, we met with officials  from JIEDDO, the Army’s Combined Arms Center, the Army Asymmetric  Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and the Navy’s  CREW Office. We also examined documentation including JIEDDO  Instruction 5000.01, JIEDDO’s annual reports, and DOD Directive 5101.14,  which designated the Secretary of the Navy as the Executive Agent for  CREW and authorized the Secretary of the Navy to designate a Single  Manager for CREW.
To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has developed criteria for the  counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, we met with officials from  organizations including JIEDDO, the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence,  and CENTCOM. We also examined documentation including DOD  Directive 2000.19E and other relevant documents and briefings, such as  published criteria for accepting counter-IED Joint Operational Urgent  Needs from JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through August 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made  contributions to this report: Cary Russell, Assistant Director; Grace  Coleman; Kevin Craw; Will Horton; Ronald La Due Lake; James Lloyd;  Gregory Marchand; Lonnie McAllister; Jason Pogacnik; Michael  Shaughnessy; and Yong Song.