Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports
Published: 2013-09-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Foreign ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports are critical to the U.S. economy, but can be exploited by terrorists. Within DHS, CBP and the Coast Guard are responsible for maritime security. Through CSI, CBP identifies and examines U.S.-bound cargo that may conceal WMD, and through C-TPAT, CBP partners with international trade community members to secure the flow of U.S.-bound goods. Under the IPS program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign ports to assess compliance with security standards. GAO was asked to review DHS's maritime security programs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed the foreign ports that pose the greatest risk to the global supply chain and focused its maritime container security programs to address those risks, and (2) actions DHS has taken to help ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs. GAO analyzed DHS risk models and maritime security program strategies, met with program officials, and visited six foreign countries selected on the basis of participation in CSI, varied cargo shipment risk levels, and other factors.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports and cargo, but not all components have applied risk management principles to assess whether maritime security programs cover the riskiest ports. The U.S. Coast Guard uses its risk model to inform operational decisions for its International Port Security (IPS) program and annually updates its assessment. In contrast, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has not regularly assessed ports for risks to cargo under its Container Security Initiative (CSI) program. CBP's selection of the initial 23 CSI ports was primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound containers, but beginning in 2003, CBP considered more threat information when it expanded the number of CSI ports. CBP has not assessed the risk posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States for its CSI program since 2005. In 2009, CBP developed a model that ranked 356 potential expansion ports for a related program on the basis of risk, but it was never implemented because of budget cuts. By applying CBP's risk model to fiscal year 2012 cargo shipment data, GAO found that CSI did not have a presence at about half of the ports CBP considered high risk, and about one fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower risk locations. Since the CSI program depends on cooperation from sovereign host countries, there are challenges to implementing CSI in new foreign locations, and CBP's negotiations with other countries have not always succeeded. For example, CBP officials said it is difficult to close CSI ports and open new ports because removing CSI from a country might negatively affect U.S. relations with the host government. However, periodically assessing the risk level of cargo shipped from foreign ports and using the results to inform any future expansion of CSI to additional locations, as well as determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports, would help ensure that CBP is allocating its resources to provide the greatest possible coverage of high-risk cargo to best mitigate the risk of importing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other terrorist contraband into the United States through the maritime supply chain.
DHS has taken steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs, but faces host country political and legal constraints. The Coast Guard has implemented a risk-informed model that prioritizes the countries to visit and assist. Also, the Coast Guard and CBP have made arrangements with foreign government entities to mutually recognize inspections of each other's ports and maritime supply chains through the IPS and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) programs. CBP has also utilized technological improvements to target some U.S.-bound cargo shipments remotely from the United States to reduce CSI staff in foreign countries. However, CBP faces political and legal constraints in host countries. For example, according to CBP and government officials in one country, a national law precludes the transmission of electronic scanned images other than to host government Customs officials. As a result, CSI officials must be present at each CSI port in that country to view the scanned images. Further, in some ports, CBP has made efforts to expand the scope of its CSI targeting to include contraband other than WMD, but that is subject to approval by the host governments.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results to inform any future expansion of CSI and determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Foreign ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports are  critical to the U.S. economy but can also be exploited by terrorists.  According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the majority of U.S.  imports arrive by ocean vessel, and much of that is transported in cargo  containers. Cargo containers are an important segment of the global  supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers—and can  present significant security concerns. For example, a 2012 risk  assessment by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) found that  attacks could cause major disruptions to the maritime supply chain. DHS  officials believe that the likelihood of terrorists smuggling weapons of  mass destruction (WMD) into the United States in cargo containers is  relatively low; however, the consequences of such an event could be  catastrophic. Although there have been no known incidents of cargo  containers being used to transport WMD, ensuring the security of cargo  containers remains an important role for the federal government given  that criminals have exploited containers for other illegal purposes, such  as smuggling weapons, people, and illicit substances. To balance the  government’s need to help secure the global supply chain while also  promoting the efficient and secure movement of goods, the White House  issued the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security in January  2012, which emphasizes a risk-informed approach for DHS’s cargo  security programs across all modes of transportation. This strategy  builds on a number of strategic efforts to strengthen the global supply  chain. While DHS’ cargo security programs cover all modes of  transportation, the focus of this report is on DHS’s maritime security  programs.
In the federal government, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  and the Coast Guard, both within DHS, are two key agencies responsible  for maritime security issues. In particular, CBP is responsible for, among  other things, assessing the overall security of the supply chain and  reducing the vulnerabilities associated with U.S.-bound cargo container  shipments; and the Coast Guard is responsible for, among other things,  assessing the effectiveness of security measures in foreign ports and  vessels that trade with the United States.
In performing its container security responsibilities, CBP has developed a  layered, risk management approach that includes two security  programs—the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade  Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. Under the CSI  program, CBP places officials (targeters) at select foreign seaports to use  intelligence and risk assessment information to determine whether U.S.- bound cargo container shipments from those ports are at risk of  containing WMD or other terrorist contraband. To aid in this process, CBP  targeters use the Automated Targeting System (ATS)—an enforcement  and decision support system that incorporates a set of rules to assess  information provided by supply chain parties, such as importers—to  identify high-risk shipments. C-TPAT is a voluntary program in which CBP  officials work with private companies, referred to as partners, to review  the security of their international supply chains and improve the security  of their shipments to the United States. In return, C-TPAT partners  receive various incentives to facilitate the flow of legitimate cargo, such as  reduced scrutiny of their shipments.
In addition to the CBP container security programs, the Coast Guard  operates the International Port Security (IPS) program in which Coast  Guard officials, in conjunction with foreign officials, visit and assess the  implementation of security measures in foreign ports against established,  international port security standards to help ensure the security of  maritime commerce. In addition, CBP and the Coast Guard have  separately entered into arrangements with foreign counterpart agencies  to validate and mutually recognize each others’ port security practices to  more efficiently address maritime and supply chain security.
Since September 11, 2001, Congress has passed various laws to  address concerns about the security of maritime cargo container  shipments in the global supply chain. The Maritime Transportation  Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) called for the establishment of a program to  evaluate and certify secure systems of international transportation,  including standards and procedures for screening and evaluating cargo  containers prior to loading them onto vessels and for securing and  monitoring cargo while in transit. One MTSA provision requires DHS to  assess the effectiveness of the antiterrorism measures maintained at  ports from which foreign vessels depart to the United States, or in any  other port the Secretary of Homeland Security believes may pose a risk to  international maritime commerce. The Secretary delegated this  responsibility to the Coast Guard, which initiated IPS in 2004 to carry out  this responsibility. To further address container security concerns,  Congress passed, and the President signed, the Security and  Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act in 2006, which included  provisions that codified the CSI and C-TPAT programs.
Given the importance of maritime transportation to the economy, the wide  spectrum of security threats, and the constrained budget environment,  you asked that we review DHS’s maritime supply chain security  programs. In particular, this report addresses the following questions:
To what extent has DHS assessed the risks to the global supply chain  associated with foreign ports and focused its maritime security  programs to address those risks?
What actions has DHS taken to help ensure the efficiency and  effectiveness of its maritime supply chain security programs?
To address the first question, we identified how DHS’s components  assess risk to the supply chain associated with foreign ports and  countries. Specifically, we (1) gathered information on the criteria used to  determine high-risk locations and the key stakeholders involved in  developing any models or methodologies used to do so, (2) reviewed the  methodology used to construct any models, and (3) determined the  sufficiency of the models to identify high-risk locations. In particular, we  reviewed the Coast Guard’s IPS model for determining operational  decisions, the methodology CBP used to select CSI ports, and the model  developed by CBP and the Department of Energy (DOE) for potentially  expanding cargo-scanning operations at foreign ports. To the extent  possible, we compared the relative risk of foreign ports generated by  these models with the location of CSI ports to determine the degree of  correlation. As part of this process, we combined fiscal year 2012 data on  the number of U.S.-bound shipments from foreign ports with data from the  models and narrowed the list of ports based on a minimum of 1,000 U.S.- bound shipments—a step CBP took when developing its model in  conjunction with DOE. We assessed the reliability of the models by  interviewing staff responsible for development of the methodologies and  the data and reviewing documentation related to the development,  application, and reviews of the models. We concluded that the models  and data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. In  addition, we interviewed CBP, Coast Guard, DOE, and Department of  State officials about the process used for identifying high-risk locations,  the stakeholders involved in this process, and the status of these efforts.  We compared this information with SAFE Port Act requirements, key  elements for a risk management approach, and the principles laid out in  the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. We also reviewed  our prior work on risk management practices and compared our analysis  of CBP’s actions with those practices.
To address the second question, we focused primarily on the CSI, C- TPAT, and IPS programs. Specifically, we analyzed CBP efforts to  implement the fiscal year 2012 through 2017 CBP Office of Field  Operations Strategic Plan and associated strategies in the CSI and C- TPAT Strategy Action Plans. We reviewed DHS documentation, such as  the 2013 DHS Annual Performance Report and budget documents.  Further, we reviewed CSI and C-TPAT performance measurement data  and analyzed CSI staffing data from fiscal years 2009 through fiscal years  2012—the 4 most recent years for which data were available—to review  the extent to which CSI staffing models have increased efficiency. In  addition, we analyzed fiscal year 2012 Coast Guard foreign port visit data  and foreign country risk data to determine the extent to which the Coast  Guard uses the results of its risk assessments to help determine the  amount of resources needed when visiting foreign countries’ ports. We  reviewed documentation related to the data sources, such as the 2013  DHS Annual Performance Report, and obtained written responses from  knowledgeable agency officials regarding any issues with completeness,  accuracy, and management of the data. We determined that these CBP  and Coast Guard data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  review. We visited six geographically dispersed foreign countries that  participate in the CSI program—two each in Latin America (Panama and  Argentina), Asia (Japan and Singapore), and Europe (the Netherlands  and England)—that also provided a range of coverage regarding (1)  cargo container shipment risk levels, (2) volume of cargo containers  shipped to the United States, (3) the proportion of transshipped  containers, and (4) participation in mutual recognition arrangements  (MRA) with CBP or the Coast Guard. We interviewed DHS, Department  of State, and foreign government officials in the countries we visited, and  also met with other maritime supply chain stakeholders, such as officials  from private industry and the World Customs Organization, to discuss  implementation of DHS’s maritime security programs, how these  programs are integrated, the specific maritime security threats each  program targets, and the impact of these programs on the security of  U.S.-bound cargo container shipments. We worked with relevant officials  at the U.S. embassies in the foreign countries we visited to help us  determine which foreign government and industry officials to interview.  The results from our visits to these six countries cannot be generalized;  however, the visits provided us with first-hand observations on cargo  security screening and targeting practices at the ports visited, and  insights regarding how DHS implements its overseas maritime container  security programs and the impact of these programs. In addition, we  contacted officials from the seven partners that have signed an MRA with  CBP and obtained the views of cognizant officials representing four of  these partners. While the results of these meetings cannot be generalized  to all seven MRA-signatory partners, they provided insights regarding the  impact of the MRAs on DHS and other maritime security programs.  Further, we interviewed the DHS Acting Director of Transportation &  Cargo, Transborder Policy, to discuss implementation of the National  Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security and how it affects maritime  container security programs. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials  responsible for the IPS program to discuss development and  implementation of the Coast Guard IPS risk model and mutual recognition  efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Vulnerabilities of Maritime Cargo Containers in the Global Supply Chain
paragraphs: Ports are critical gateways for the movement of commerce through the  global supply chain. According to CBP data, in fiscal year 2012, about  11.5 million cargo container shipments arrived from more than 650  foreign ports—meaning roughly 31,000 maritime container shipments  arrived each day that year. The facilities, vessels, and infrastructure  within ports, and the cargo passing through them, all have vulnerabilities  that terrorists could exploit. Every time responsibility for cargo in  containers changes hands along the supply chain there is the potential for  a security breach. While there have been no known incidents of  containers being used to transport WMDs, criminals have exploited  containers for other illegal purposes, such as smuggling weapons,  people, and illicit substances. Figure 1 illustrates the notional key points  of transfer involved in the global supply chain—from the time that a  container is loaded with goods at a foreign factory to its arrival at the U.S.  seaport and ultimately the U.S. importer.
DHS has taken steps to secure the global supply chain, including the  cargo in oceangoing containers destined for the United States. DHS’s  strategy includes focusing security efforts beyond U.S. borders to target  and examine high-risk cargo and vessels before they enter U.S. seaports.  DHS’s strategy is based on a layered approach of related programs that  attempt to focus resources on potentially risky foreign ports, vessels, and  cargo container shipments while allowing other cargo container  shipments to proceed without unduly disrupting the flow of commerce into  the United States. DHS’s maritime security programs support the National  Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, which emphasizes risk  management and coordinated engagement with key stakeholders who  also have supply chain roles and responsibilities. Figure 2 shows DHS’s  key maritime security programs and the various segments in the global  supply chain where these programs are focused.
CSI is a program that aims to identify and examine U.S.-bound cargo  container shipments that could pose a high risk of concealing WMDs or  other terrorist contraband by reviewing advanced cargo information about  the shipments. As part of the CSI program, CBP officers are stationed at  select foreign seaports to identify high-risk U.S.-bound container cargo  shipments before they are loaded onto U.S.-bound vessels. As of July  2013, there were 58 CSI ports in 32 countries that, collectively, account  for over 80 percent of the container shipments imported into the United  States. In addition to the CSI ports where CBP placed targeters, CBP  also entered into arrangements with Australia and New Zealand to  remotely target U.S.-bound cargo container shipments from the United  States. A complete listing of the countries that participate in the CSI  program can be found in appendix I.
CBP officers stationed at foreign CSI ports are to conduct the following  activities:
Target U.S.-bound container shipments. As we previously reported,  CBP targeters use ATS and other information to electronically review  information about U.S.-bound shipments departing from the foreign  port—a process CBP refers to as screening. CBP targeters review  the ATS risk scores and additional information to identify high-risk  shipments with a potential nexus to terrorism—a process referred to  as targeting. The CBP targeters make a final determination about  which containers are high risk and will be referred to host government  officials for examination.
Request examinations of high-risk container shipments.
According to our work and updates provided by CBP officials, CBP  targeters work with host country government officials to mitigate high- risk container shipments. Actions may include resolving  discrepancies in shipment information, scanning cargo containers’  contents with radiation detection or imaging equipment (as shown in  fig. 3), or conducting physical inspections of the containers’ contents.
According to our prior work and updates provided by CBP officials, C- TPAT aims to secure the flow of goods bound for the United States by  developing a voluntary public-private sector partnership with stakeholders  of the international trade community. C-TPAT partners agree to adhere  to the program’s eight established minimum security criteria in areas such  as physical security, personnel security, and information technology. C- TPAT partners also agree to provide CBP with information regarding their  security processes and procedures and allow CBP to validate or verify  that these security measures are in place. In return, C-TPAT partners  receive various incentives, such as reduced examinations based upon  lower risk scores.
In addition to the CBP programs, the Coast Guard also has an  internationally focused maritime security program, the IPS program.  Under the IPS program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign ports to  evaluate their antiterrorism security measures against established  International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code standards. In  addition, the Coast Guard collects and shares best practices with foreign  countries and engages in efforts to help facilitate a comprehensive and  consistent approach to maritime security in ports worldwide. Coast Guard  officials reported that from its inception in April 2004 through June 2013,  IPS program officials have visited port facilities in 151 countries and  overseas protectorates engaged in maritime trade with the United States.  According to its visits and the information provided by the foreign  countries as part of those visits, the Coast Guard determines whether the  countries have effectively implemented the ISPS Code and are  maintaining effective security measures in their ports. If the Coast Guard  finds that a country is not maintaining port security measures, the Coast  Guard can impose conditions of entry on vessels arriving at the United  States from that country.
The Coast Guard uses the results of the port risk assessments to help  decide which foreign vessels to board or inspect through its Port State  Control program, according to the U.S. Coast Guard International Port  Security Program: Annual Report 2012. While the Port State Control  program does not directly affect container security, as part of this  program, the Coast Guard uses risk-based criteria to identify which  foreign vessels entering U.S. ports and waterways it considers to be at  risk of noncompliance with international or domestic regulations, and  performs compliance examinations of these vessels. The risk-based  criteria include the vessel’s management, the flag state that the vessel is  registered under, the vessel’s recognized security organization, and the  vessel’s security compliance history resulting from previous examinations.
Through mutual recognition arrangements with foreign partners, the  security-related practices and programs taken by the Customs or  maritime security administration of one partner are recognized and  accepted by the administration of another. Both CBP and the Coast  Guard have entered into such arrangements. For example, CBP can  expand the reach of its supply chain security programs through MRAs.  According to the World Customs Organization, mutual recognition allows  Customs administrations to target high-risk shipments more effectively  and expedite low-risk shipments by, for example, reducing redundant  examinations. The World Customs Organization distinguishes between  mutual recognition of Customs controls and mutual recognition of  authorized economic operator (AEO) programs:
Mutual recognition of Customs controls (Customs-to-Customs  MRAs): This is achieved when, for example, the Customs  administrations of two countries have confidence in and accept each  other’s procedures for targeting and inspecting cargo shipped in  containers.
Mutual recognition of AEO programs (AEO MRAs): This occurs  when Customs administrations agree to recognize one another’s AEO  programs and security features and to provide comparable benefits to  members of the respective programs.
In the United States, C-TPAT is the designated AEO program and  businesses participating in the program are AEOs. According to C-TPAT  documentation, CBP has developed an AEO MRA process involving four  phases: (1) a comparison of the program requirements to determine if the  programs align on basic principles; (2) a pilot program of joint validation  visits to determine if the programs align in basic practice; (3) the signing  of an MRA; and (4) the development of mutual recognition operational  procedures, primarily those associated with information sharing. MRAs  are based on close working relationships between Customs  administrations, which allow for the exchange of information, intelligence,  and documents in an effort to assist countries in the prevention and  investigation of Customs offenses.
The Coast Guard can also enter into MRAs that recognize international  maritime security practices of other foreign governments. For example,  the Coast Guard has a process in place to recognize the port inspection  procedures of other countries.
Although DHS’s maritime security programs support the National Strategy  for Global Supply Chain Security and the strategy’s risk-informed security  approach, the SAFE Port Act included requirements that pilot projects be  established to test the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound  cargo containers at foreign ports. Subsequently, the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act)  required, among other things, that by July 2012, 100 percent of U.S.- bound cargo containers be scanned at foreign ports with both radiation  detection and nonintrusive inspection (imaging) equipment before being  placed onto U.S.-bound vessels.
In June 2008 and in October 2009, we found that CBP faced numerous  challenges in implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement at the  pilot ports. In October 2009, we recommended, among other things, that  CBP conduct feasibility and cost-benefit analyses of implementing the  100 percent scanning requirement and provide the results to Congress  along with any suggestions of cost-effective alternatives to implementing  the 100 percent scanning requirement, as appropriate. CBP partially  concurred with the recommendations but did not implement them.  According to CBP officials, CBP does not plan to conduct these analyses  related to achieving the 100 percent scanning requirement because the  pilot project has been reduced in scope and currently there are no funds  to conduct such analyses. In February 2012, we reported that the  scanning challenges continued, and CBP achieved 100 percent scanning  of U.S.-bound cargo containers at only one foreign pilot port where it was  being attempted—Port Qasim, Pakistan. In May 2012, the Secretary of  Homeland Security announced a 2-year extension of the deadline—until  July 2014—for implementing the requirement that cargo containers not  enter the United States unless they are scanned at foreign ports prior to  being loaded on vessels. In its report to Congress that same month,  DHS stated that it recognizes the need to proceed with its container  security programs in a manner that maximizes the security of maritime  cargo and facilitates its movement. DHS added that it plans to continue  working with other federal agencies and international partners to develop  technology and enhance risk management processes, in addition to  continuing its existing container security programs. According to the  January 2013 National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security  Implementation Update, DHS is working to identify potential alternatives  to 100 percent scanning, and a senior DHS official told us that DHS’s  layered security strategy will be a key component of the alternative.
section_title: DHS Has Developed Models to Assess Foreign Port Risks, but CBP Has Not Assessed Whether Its CSI Locations Remain Valid
paragraphs: The Coast Guard and CBP, DHS components with maritime security  responsibilities, have developed models to assess the risks of foreign  ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports. The Coast Guard  uses the model it developed to inform operational decisions for its IPS  program and updates its assessment annually. In contrast, in 2009, CBP  developed a risk model to begin the process of expanding its efforts to  scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container shipments, but the model was  never implemented. As a result, it does not know whether the ports  included in CSI remain valid.
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard Has Developed a Model to Regularly Assess Risks of Foreign Ports and Inform Operational Decisions
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has developed a risk-informed model as part of its IPS  program to regularly assess the potential threat foreign ports pose to the  maritime supply chain and make operational decisions regarding foreign  ports’ security measures. According to the 2012 IPS program annual  report, this risk model includes four components, summarized below, that  help the Coast Guard focus IPS program resources.
Country threat. The Coast Guard uses security and commerce data as  well as measures on government decision making, such as the  prevalence of corruption, to assess the likelihood of terrorists using a  foreign port to import WMDs or other contraband into the United States.  In particular, the Coast Guard relies on CBP trade information, the U.S.  Department of State’s Security Environment Threat List, World Bank  reports, and other data to determine whether countries represent a  normal, medium, or high security risk.
Foreign port assessment. MTSA, as amended by the SAFE Port Act,  requires the Coast Guard to reassess countries’ ports every 3 years, and  during these visits, IPS officials use two data checklists, one that  assesses government performance and one that assesses facilities’  performance. The government performance checklist measures how  well a government gathers and assesses information on security threats,  and reviews and approves port facility security plans, among other things.  The facilities performance checklist measures port security measures  implemented to prevent unauthorized cargo and people from entering the  port. Such security measures include, for example, perimeter security and  access procedures for port facility employees and visitors.
Country responsiveness. The IPS model includes measures of the  political, economic, and social conditions in a country to help determine  whether countries are likely to efficiently utilize Coast Guard assistance.  The model incorporates information on corruption, inflation, and “people  measures,” such as infant mortality rates and literacy rates.
Country wealth. The IPS model includes a measure of national income  to determine if the country can afford to maintain security measures on its  own or whether it is likely to require foreign assistance.
According to the 2012 IPS program annual report, the Coast Guard  combines these components into a single risk model and uses the results  to make informed decisions on how to engage each country with the IPS  program, including (1) how often to visit ports, (2) how many staff to  assign to a particular visit, and (3) whether the country requires  assistance. Specifically, the Coast Guard visits foreign ports in higher-risk  countries more frequently (and with more IPS officials) than in ports in  lower-risk countries, which we discuss later in this report. In addition, the  IPS annual report states that the Coast Guard uses the country threat  component of the IPS risk model to help determine which foreign vessels  to board as part of its Port State Control program. The Coast Guard  updates its risk model annually. While elements of the Coast Guard’s risk  model could be used to inform maritime container security efforts, there  are limits regarding how it can be applied to maritime supply chain  security because the IPS program is focused on assessing port security.  Unlike the CBP risk model described below, the Coast Guard’s model is  not designed to assess the risk of maritime cargo shipments imported  from foreign ports (e.g., transshipped cargo).
section_title: CBP Considered Risk in Establishing Some CSI Ports, but Has Not Assessed Whether CSI Currently Covers the Riskiest Ports
subsections: section_title: CBP Selected Initial CSI Ports Largely on the Basis of Volume and Used More Risk Factors when Expanding CSI Locations
paragraphs: In 2002, CBP selected the initial 23 CSI ports largely on the basis of the  volume of U.S.-bound container cargo, but increased the number of risk  factors in selecting additional ports as it expanded the CSI program  beginning in 2003. Specifically, according to CBP documentation,  volume was a key criterion for assessing which foreign ports represented  the greatest threat to the United States. Figure 4 shows the large number  of containers shipped through the Port of Singapore, one of the original  CSI ports.
After selecting these initial 23 ports, CBP subsequently added 35 ports to  the CSI program from 2003 through 2007 on the basis of additional  criteria, such as strategic threat factors and diplomatic or political  considerations. Through these expansion efforts, in 2007 CBP reached its  goal of staffing 58 CSI ports that, collectively, cover over 80 percent of  U.S.-bound container shipments. We reported in 2008 that CBP did not  have plans to add other ports to the CSI program because, according to  CBP, the costs associated with expanding the program would outweigh  the potential benefits.
In 2009, CBP developed a risk model in conjunction with DOE to begin  the process of expanding its efforts to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound  container shipments for a related program, but the model was never  implemented. In particular, in April 2009, the Secretary of Homeland  Security approved the “strategic trade corridor strategy” as an approach  to expanding CBP’s efforts to scan U.S.-bound container cargo beyond  the original pilot locations. As part of this expansion effort, CBP  developed a model—assisted by DOE—to rank potential foreign ports on  the basis of risks associated with countries and maritime commerce, as  well as the number and percentage of high-risk, U.S.-bound shipments  processed. Specifically, DOE provided the country threat and shipping  lane information from the model it used to identify and prioritize foreign  ports for participation in the Megaports Initiative, and CBP provided the  high-risk shipment data from ATS. CBP and DOE completed their initial  analyses in February 2009, which identified 356 potential expansion ports  ranked by risk, and CBP narrowed the list down to 187 ports by  considering only ports that had at least 1,000 shipments per year to the  United States. CBP collaborated with DOE, the Department of State, and  the intelligence community to prioritize 22 ports for expansion of 100  percent scanning efforts on the basis of such factors as the model’s risk  ranking and the volume of U.S.-bound cargo container shipments. CBP  ultimately did not pursue this strategy, given cargo security program  budget cuts and the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to extend  the deadline for 100 percent scanning until July 2014.
The results of the 2009 strategic trade corridor prioritization model show  that the CSI program is operating at some of the riskiest foreign ports, but  it also operates at ports that are less risky. Since the model focused on  U.S.-bound maritime containerized cargo, its results could be used as a  proxy measure to assess whether CSI ports coincide with those foreign  locations that pose the greatest risk to the global supply chain. We  combined the risk rankings for the 356 ports in the 2009 model with fiscal  year 2012 U.S.-bound shipment data and excluded ports with fewer than  1,000 U.S.-bound shipments per year, which narrowed the list to 138  ports. Comparing the CSI ports with the results shows that CSI did not  have a presence at about half of the ports CBP considered higher risk,  and about one-fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower-risk locations.  Specifically, of the 61 current CSI ports, 57 had at least 1,000 U.S.-bound  shipments in fiscal year 2012. Of these 57 CSI ports, 27 were within the  top 50 riskiest ports, 18 ports were between the 51st and 100th riskiest  ports, and 12 ports were not among the top 100 riskiest ports. Of the  remaining 4 CSI ports, 3 had fewer than 1,000 U.S.-bound shipments and  1 port was not ranked in the 2009 risk model. According to CBP officials,  CBP has not established CSI locations in 15 of the top 50 riskiest ports  either because host governments have not been cooperative regarding  CBP cargo examination requests or CBP was not able to negotiate an  arrangement with host governments to establish CSI operations, as  discussed below.
CBP officials stated that factors have changed since the model was  developed in 2009, and they do not consider all of the same ports to be  high risk at this time. For example, one potential expansion port the  model classified as higher risk in 2009 now ships fewer containers to the  United States, and CBP officials reported that they would not currently  consider including this port in the CSI program. Further, according to  CBP’s fiscal year 2012 budget submission, CBP considered closing  several CSI ports while maintaining CSI operations in strategically  important ports. Given this information, and the fact that the number and  location of CSI ports has generally not changed since 2009, the CSI  program’s current locations may not be in alignment with the highest-risk  ports.
Because the CSI program depends on the willingness of sovereign host  countries to participate in the program, there are challenges to  implementing CSI and CBP efforts to negotiate with other countries to  expand the CSI program, and these efforts have not always been  successful. CBP and the Department of State point to challenges in  implementing CSI in high-risk countries, such as CBP officer safety,  funding concerns, and the willingness of host country governments to  facilitate requested cargo examinations of U.S.-bound shipments. CBP  officials stated that CBP is not pursuing the strategic trade corridor  strategy, but they noted that since the beginning of the CSI program, CBP  has made efforts to negotiate to establish CSI ports within four countries  that have ports representing potential significant risks. These efforts were  not successful in three countries for political reasons. For example, the  legislature in one of these countries did not approve the placement of CSI  in its country. However, according to CBP officials, CBP has signed a  declaration of principles to place CSI in an additional foreign country and  estimates that CSI will be operational within this country by the end of  fiscal year 2014.
CBP has not assessed the risk of foreign ports that ship cargo to the  United States for its CSI program since completing the CSI expansion  analysis in 2005. CBP officials stated they have not performed any such  risk assessments since 2005 because CBP does not have any specific  expansion plans for the CSI program. However, our work indicates that  CBP may expand CSI. In particular, CBP’s fiscal year 2013 and 2014  budget requests noted that CBP may expand CSI in the future to  additional countries of strategic interest, if feasible; and CBP officials told  us that CBP is finalizing negotiations with a foreign government to expand  CSI to an additional port, as discussed above.
We acknowledge that CBP may face challenges in including foreign ports  that ship the riskiest cargo to the United States in its CSI program, but  expanding CSI without assessing the security risk posed by foreign ports  is contrary to agency policy. In particular, according to the CSI Statement  of Policy and Intent signed by the CBP Commissioner in April 2011, CBP  is to prioritize CSI expansion locations in accordance with the National  Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, which states that the federal  government should take a risk-informed approach to secure the global  supply chain. Further, the SAFE Port Act provides that DHS/CBP is to  assess the costs, benefits, and other factors associated with designation  of a CSI port, including the level of risk for the potential compromise of  containers by terrorists, or other threats as determined by DHS; the  volume of cargo being imported to the United States directly from, or  being transshipped through, the foreign seaport; and the results of the  Coast Guard’s IPS assessments.
In addition to not completing a risk assessment to help inform potential  CSI expansion, CBP has also not assessed the risk of its current CSI  ports—some of which have participated in CSI for more than a decade— to determine if they remain valid on the basis of risk. CBP officials stated  that they have not conducted such an assessment because a couple of  factors make it difficult to close CSI ports and reallocate resources to  prospective new CSI ports. In particular, the officials stated that (1)  removing CSI from a country might negatively affect political relations with  the host government, and (2) uncertain CSI funding in future years could  make it difficult for CBP to make plans to close lower-risk CSI ports and  open new CSI ports at higher-risk locations. Specifically, CBP officials  estimate that it could take about 1 year to close a CSI port and 2 years or  more to open a new port, and, given budget uncertainties, CBP has not  pursued such efforts.
It is unclear if the political and cost challenges CBP officials identified  would affect any reallocation of CSI resources to prospective new CSI  ports, but these challenges do not preclude CBP from assessing the risk  of its current CSI locations. Regarding the impact of changes to the CSI  program on political relations, CBP officials stated they routinely speak to  host government officials during CSI evaluations about how to strengthen  the program, but these officials said that the discussions have not  specifically included the impact on relations with the host government of  removing lower-risk ports from the CSI program. Further, it is unclear if  reallocating resources from current CSI ports to higher-risk ports would  ultimately increase costs because some costs—such as staffing costs  and office space leases—could be lower in some of the new locations  than costs in the lower-risk ports it would be leaving. Moreover, the DHS  National Infrastructure Protection Plan and our Risk Management  Framework state that risk assessments, the effectiveness of measures  to deal with risks, and the costs of those measures are to inform  decisions. Our framework also states that agencies should periodically  evaluate the cost-effectiveness of their programs and that mechanisms  for altering a program should be in place based on current risk data. In  addition, the DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan states that  effective protective programs seek to use resources efficiently by focusing  on actions that offer the greatest mitigation of risk for any given  expenditure. The plan also states that risk management includes a  feedback loop that continually incorporates new information, such as  changing threats or the effect of actions taken to reduce or eliminate  identified threats, vulnerabilities, or consequences.
We recognize that it may not be possible to include all the higher-risk  ports in CSI because CSI requires the cooperation of sovereign foreign  governments and because of concerns regarding the security of U.S.  personnel that may be staffed in those countries. Nevertheless, given that  CBP is no longer pursuing implementation of 100 percent scanning, it is  important that CBP apply the risk management principles discussed  above to CSI—a risk-informed program—to more effectively mitigate the  threat of high-risk cargo before it is shipped to the United States.  Periodically assessing the risk level of cargo shipped from foreign ports  and using the results of these risk assessments to inform the CSI  locations would help ensure that CBP is allocating its resources to  provide the greatest possible coverage of high-risk cargo to best mitigate  the risk of importing WMDs or other terrorist contraband into the United  States through the maritime supply chain.
section_title: DHS Has Taken Steps to Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Its Maritime Container Security Programs, but Faces Constraints
paragraphs: DHS, through the Coast Guard and CBP, has taken a number of steps to  improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs  to reduce global supply chain risks. In this regard, the Coast Guard’s  actions have primarily been focused on the IPS program. CBP has  continued its efforts to expand or refine its C-TPAT and CSI programs,  but faces host country political and legal constraints.
subsections: section_title: The Coast Guard Has Worked to Reduce Global Supply Chain Risks by More Efficiently and Effectively Using IPS Resources
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has worked to use resources more effectively and  reduce risks at foreign ports and from U.S.-bound vessels through its IPS  program by implementing a risk-informed model that prioritizes the  countries to visit and provide with assistance. When the Coast Guard first  implemented the IPS program in 2004, it was required by MTSA to  assess the effectiveness of antiterrorism measures maintained in ports  where U.S. vessels call or from which vessels depart for the United  States. As a result, the Coast Guard focused on completing initial visits of  foreign ports to determine ISPS Code compliance, but did not have a  methodology to prioritize follow-up visits and help countries increase their  level of port security. To accomplish these goals, in 2005, the Coast  Guard began developing its IPS risk model to assess the risks of foreign  ports and prioritize assistance, which it fully integrated into IPS operations  in 2011. The Coast Guard classifies countries as normal, medium, or high  security risks and completes port security checklists during foreign port  visits.
According to the 2012 IPS program annual report, the Coast Guard uses  the results of its risk assessments to help determine the amount of  resources needed to visit foreign countries’ ports, board foreign vessels,  and track port security improvements. Specifically, the Coast Guard uses  the risk model results to more efficiently and effectively allocate resources  to help ensure that visits to foreign ports in higher-risk countries occur  more frequently (and with more IPS officials) than to ports in lower-risk  countries. Table 1 provides information on Coast Guard IPS program  visits, by country risk level, for fiscal year 2012.
IPS program officials we met with that are responsible for assessing ports  in Africa and Southeast Asia stated that this risk-informed approach helps  the Coast Guard more efficiently use its resources. Further, the IPS  program has enabled the Coast Guard to measure foreign countries’ port  security based on improvements its officials observe when completing  foreign port visits. According to the 2012 IPS program annual report, port  assessment scores have improved worldwide since the Coast Guard  initiated the IPS program in 2004. The Coast Guard attributes this  success, in part, to implementation of the IPS risk model.
According to the 2012 IPS program annual report, the Coast Guard also  uses the results of the IPS model to allocate foreign assistance. The risk  model includes (1) country threat information; (2) port visit results; (3) a  determination of which countries are most likely to benefit from assistance  to improve port security, such as port security training; and (4) the  individual country’s ability to best use assistance funds and sustain  security efforts, as discussed earlier in this report. The 2012 report also  states that Coast Guard officials are to use this information to direct  resources to those foreign countries where they believe the return on  investment will be greatest. Further, this report states that the Coast  Guard uses the results of the IPS risk model to help determine which  foreign vessels to board as part of its Port State Control program. The  risk-based screening tool the Coast Guard uses to select vessels to board  assigns point values to various risk factors, such as country threat data  from the IPS risk model. In addition, the Coast Guard boards foreign  vessels that have recently stopped in higher-risk ports (i.e., countries that  have not substantially implemented the ISPS Code).
In addition to prioritizing resources through its IPS risk model, the Coast  Guard has worked with foreign governments to mutually recognize each  other’s maritime security programs, which can more efficiently use IPS  resources and reduce risks. For example, in September 2012, the Coast  Guard signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the European  Union that establishes a process for mutually recognizing security  inspections of each other’s ports. The European Union has developed  regulations for the consistent implementation of the ISPS Code by its  member states and established a process for verifying the effectiveness  of its member states’ maritime security measures. This process includes  European Union inspections of member states’ ports that result in reports  that (1) identify any nonconformities with the regulations and (2) make  recommendations to address any nonconformities.
Under the MOU procedures, the Coast Guard recognizes a successful  European Union inspection of its member states’ ports in the same  manner as it would recognize a successful country visit by Coast Guard  IPS inspectors. Coast Guard IPS officials stated that they have  collaborated with their European counterparts to develop standard  operating procedures for these port inspections and they were used in a  recent joint inspection of a container facility in Felixstowe, the United  Kingdom. According to DHS documents and Coast Guard IPS officials in  Europe, by signing this MOU, the Coast Guard plans to reassign some  IPS officials from Europe to Africa, where certain countries are having  more difficulties in implementing effective antiterrorism measures in their  ports. Coast Guard IPS officials reported, however, that a trade-off of  signing the MOU is that its IPS officials will not have the same  opportunities to have face-to-face interactions and share port security  information and practices directly with their European Union counterparts  as in the past. Despite this trade-off, the Coast Guard IPS officials stated  that entering into such arrangements increases efficiencies and noted  that they intend to negotiate additional MOUs with other foreign  governments that have strong port inspection programs.
section_title: CBP Has Worked to More Efficiently Use Resources and Expand Its C-TPAT Membership
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Taken Steps to More Efficiently Use Resources by Negotiating MRAs
paragraphs: CBP has worked with foreign partners to mutually recognize each other’s  AEO programs to more efficiently use resources while continuing to  reduce risks to the global supply chain. According to the World Customs  Organization, as of June 2013, there were 25 AEO programs worldwide,  other than C-TPAT, with which CBP could enter into an MRA. As part of  the evaluation of a foreign partner’s capacity for entering into an MRA,  CBP conducts joint validations with the other partner to ensure that a  partner’s AEO program has security standards that are equivalent to  those required by the C-TPAT program. CBP officials stated that CBP  does not pursue mutual recognition with a Customs administration that  does not have an equivalent AEO program in place because doing so  could compromise the security of U.S.-bound container shipments. As of  July 2013, CBP had signed MRAs with seven foreign Customs  administrations—New Zealand in 2007, Canada and Jordan in 2008,  Japan in 2009, the Republic of (South) Korea in 2010, and the European  Union and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office  (Taiwan) in 2012—and is in the process of negotiating MRAs with five  other partners. CBP officials stated that they expect to complete MRA  negotiations with one partner by the end of fiscal year 2013 and that they  generally complete one or two MRAs each year.
To help foreign countries establish AEO programs, CBP officials stated  that the C-TPAT program provides training and technical assistance for  foreign Customs agencies that request technical assistance. As of April  2013, CBP officials reported that C-TPAT has provided assistance to  about 70 foreign countries and noted that this assistance improves global  supply chain security. Further, CBP officials told us that the goal of this  assistance is to establish AEO-MRAs with foreign Customs agencies as a  means to increase efficiencies in supply chain security efforts. According  to CBP officials, by relying on MRA partners to validate supply chain  security procedures overseas, CBP is able to operate more efficiently by  reducing the costs associated with conducting security validations. For  example, in 2010, CBP completed a study on AEO validation visits  conducted on its behalf in Japan and Canada by the respective host  governments. On the basis of cost data from prior validation visits, CBP  estimates the C-TPAT program saved over $290,000 and over 1,500 staff  hours by accepting the 90 validations completed by the Japanese and  Canadian governments during 2009 and 2010. Further, according to  CBP officials, mutual recognition leads to a common understanding of  global supply chain security standards, resulting in greater program  efficiency and a streamlined validation process by reducing the number of  redundant validations. As a result, mutual recognition enables CBP to  focus its resources on higher-risk supply chains. CBP officials also stated  that AEO program officials are in a better position to conduct validations  of companies within their respective AEO programs because these  officials are proficient in the local language and are more familiar with the  companies’ supply chains.
MRAs can increase efficiencies in the C-TPAT program, but CBP faces  challenges in implementing MRAs. According to C-TPAT data, since  2009, CBP has accepted over 480 validations conducted by staff from  foreign governments that have signed MRAs with the United States.  Further, these data show that the number of validations conducted by  MRA partners has increased significantly each year from 2009 (26)  through 2012 (285), and CBP officials stated that they expect the number  of validations to continue to increase because the European Union and  Taiwan—two of the United States’ largest trading partners—are expected  to conduct more validations in 2013. While MRAs have resulted in  increased efficiencies, CBP and foreign government officials we met with  identified challenges in implementing MRAs. For example, CBP and  foreign government officials we met with stated that exchanging data  across information technology systems can be difficult, and government  officials from one foreign partner stated that differences in privacy laws  between partners can create additional hurdles to information sharing. As  a result, it may take time for the benefits to be evident to the AEO  partners. Specifically, private sector trade officials in one country we  visited reported that they had not yet realized the benefits of the MRA  through reduced inspections of their shipments at U.S. ports. In addition,  World Customs Organization officials we met with said that it may be  difficult to document the benefits of MRAs through reduced inspections  because U.S. agencies other than CBP also have their own inspection  procedures for imported cargo that are not part of any MRA. For example,  according to CBP, the Food and Drug Administration has its own  inspection process. As a result, MRA participants’ shipments could still be  slowed. According to CBP officials, CBP is working with other federal  agencies to harmonize the inspection process at ports of entry and  accelerate inspection decision making to address this issue.
CBP has entered into AEO-MRAs with other partners, but does not have  plans to negotiate Customs-to-Customs MRAs. Under a Customs-to- Customs MRA, joint activities, such as identifying cargo for examination,  would not require the placement of CBP targeters in foreign ports under  programs like CSI. CBP officials said they do not have plans to negotiate  Customs-to-Customs MRAs because they are much more difficult to  achieve than AEO-MRAs, in part, because of the difficulties in ensuring  Customs practices are applied consistently. For example, CBP officials  said that Customs-to-Customs MRAs would need to include a broader  validation of foreign Customs administrations’ practices. World Customs  Organization officials we met with concurred that achieving mutual  recognition of Customs controls is difficult and noted that the focus of  Customs administrations worldwide is on negotiating AEO-MRAs rather  than Customs-to-Customs MRAs.
CBP has also made efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of  its C-TPAT program—and thus the security of the global supply chain— by increasing the number and category of C-TPAT members. For  example, CBP has increased C-TPAT membership by conducting  outreach events to increase awareness of the C-TPAT program and  incentives. From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, the number of C-TPAT  members increased by 15 percent—from 8,882 to 10,425. According to  the 2013 DHS Annual Performance Report, as of fiscal year 2012, C- TPAT members account for more than 50 percent of all U.S. cargo  imports (by value), which exceeds CBP’s performance target goal of 45  percent. Further, as part of C-TPAT’s membership expansion efforts, the  program is considering adding two supply chain sectors—exporters and  distribution centers. CBP officials reported that C-TPAT selected these  sectors because they can have a direct impact in securing the global  supply chain. Moreover, according to the 2012 C-TPAT Strategy Action  Plan, increased membership in the C-TPAT program could allow U.S.  ports of entry to operate more efficiently because CBP officials at these  ports would be able to focus CBP’s targeting and inspection resources on  a smaller percentage of high-risk shipments.
Although expansion of C-TPAT membership should increase program  efficiencies systemwide, CBP faces challenges in increasing C-TPAT  effectiveness because of staffing challenges. In particular, while the C- TPAT program has continued to expand in size and scope in recent  years, staffing within the program has decreased. Specifically, according  to CBP officials, as of July 2013, the C-TPAT program had 155 staff,  down from a peak of 196 staff in January 2011. CBP plans to take several  steps to address this staffing challenge. For example, CBP officials  reported that as of July 2013, C-TPAT is working with CBP’s Office of  Human Resources to hire 11 additional Supply Chain Security  Specialists. Furthermore, according to fiscal year 2014 CBP budget  documentation, CBP plans to extend the C-TPAT revalidation cycle to  once every 4 years as mandated by the SAFE Port Act rather than  accelerating the revalidation schedule to once every 3 years as CBP had  previously done. Moreover, C-TPAT officials reported that CBP  anticipates a reduction in foreign validation visits by its specialists through  the implementation of MRAs.
An additional challenge to C-TPAT program effectiveness is that C-TPAT  partners’ compliance rates with program security requirements decreased  from almost 100 percent in fiscal year 2008 to about 95 percent in fiscal  year 2012. According to CBP documentation, the overall compliance rate  decreased after CBP strengthened C-TPAT security criteria and  increased program oversight. CBP reported that C-TPAT is working with  C-TPAT partners to explain the enhanced security criteria to ensure they  understand the validation requirements. CBP officials said that they  expect this will lead to improvements in C-TPAT partners’ compliance  with the security requirements.
section_title: CBP Revised CSI in Response to Budget Cuts, but Efficiencies and Effectiveness Are Limited by Political and Legal Factors
subsections: section_title: CBP Revised CSI Targeting Approaches to Address Budget Cuts
paragraphs: As a result of reduced program budgets in recent years, CBP has  implemented CSI changes to take advantage of improvements in  technology and more efficiently use its CSI targeters, but efficiencies are  limited by host country political and legal factors. Specifically, CSI  program expenditures declined by more than $50 million from fiscal years  2008 through 2012, and this cut led to changes in how CBP has staffed  its CSI ports. As shown in figure 5, CBP employs a variety of approaches  in targeting and examining U.S.-bound containerized cargo imported from  CSI countries. These targeting approaches are explained below.
National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C) support. In April 2005, we  recommended that CBP revise the CSI targeting approach to consider  what functions need to be performed at CSI ports and what functions can  be performed in the United States. CBP agreed with this  recommendation and, in January 2009, began transferring some CSI staff  from overseas ports to perform targeting remotely from the NTC-C.  According to CBP officials, NTC-C staff are less costly than overseas  staff. Under this revised targeting approach, NTC-C targeters review  U.S.-bound shipments from foreign ports in 6 CSI countries. For those  shipments that NTC-C targeters determine to be high risk or suspect,  NTC-C targeters request that host government Customs officials  complete examinations and electronically provide the results to NTC-C  staff. Further, according to CSI officials, NTC-C targets all shipments ATS  categorizes as lower risk in an additional 6 CSI countries so that CSI  targeters in those 6 countries can concentrate their reviews on the higher- risk shipments. According to CBP officials, implementation of this  targeting approach allows CBP to staff high-volume ports with fewer CSI  targeters. Our analysis of CSI staffing data shows that staffing of CBP  targeters that support CSI at the NTC-C increased by 56 percent from  fiscal years 2009 through 2012—from 27 to 42. Changes in CBP’s  staffing of in-country targeters are discussed below.
Regional hub model. In 2011 and 2012, CBP implemented a regional  hub model whereby CSI targeters are stationed at one port but target for  multiple ports within the same country to reduce staff and thereby  increase efficiencies. Under this targeting approach, host government  Customs officials at remote ports complete the container examinations  and electronically provide the results to CSI targeters at the regional hub.  According to CBP host government officials, implementation of the  regional hub is possible because of improvements in technology that  allow for better and more timely transmission of image scans. Of the 13  countries with multiple CSI ports, 3 employ the regional hub model— England, France, and Italy. CBP officials reported that since implementing  the regional hub model, CBP has reduced the number of CSI targeters in  these 3 countries by 45 percent—from 20 in October 2011 to 11 as of  April 2013. According to both CBP targeters stationed in England and  their British counterparts, implementation of the regional hub model has  not affected the quality or number of scans of U.S.-bound container  shipments.
Although implementation of the regional hub model increases efficiencies,  CBP officials stated that they do not have plans to implement the regional  hub model in other countries in the near future because of host country  political and legal reasons. For example, CBP officials told us that CBP  considered implementing the regional hub model in one country;  however, the host government preferred to maintain the face-to-face  interaction between the CSI targeters and their host government  counterparts at each CSI port as a means to improve information  exchanges and increase collaboration. Further, according to CBP and  government officials in one country, a national law precludes the  transmission of electronic scanned images other than to host government  Customs officials. As a result, CSI targeters must be present at each CSI  port in order to view the scanned container images.
In-country CSI targeters. Where possible, CBP has shifted from the  initial CSI targeting approach that was heavily dependent on the  placement of targeters at foreign ports to an approach that takes  advantage of improvements in technologies for transmitting image scans,  as addressed earlier. Specifically, from fiscal years 2009 through 2012,  CBP reduced the number of CSI targeters stationed at foreign ports by 50  percent—from 153 to 77. However, as noted above, CBP increased the  number of CSI targeters stationed at the NTC-C during the same time  period. CBP maintains in-country targeters in 20 of the 34 CSI countries.  A key benefit of maintaining CSI targeters at these ports is the  relationship built with host government counterparts. CSI targeters in all 6  foreign countries we visited and host government officials in 5 of the 6  countries we visited told us that personal relationships and trust that are  established between CSI targeters and host country government officials  from having the CSI targeters in country are fundamental to the success  of the CSI program. In particular, the CSI targeters and host government  officials in these 5 countries agree that the physical presence of CSI staff  increases information sharing and improves collaboration. Further, host  country Customs officials in 3 of the 6 countries we visited stated that the  presence of CSI targeters contributed to the development or  enhancement of their countries’ cargo targeting programs.
According to our review of CBP performance data, changes in staffing  levels in recent years have not negatively affected the effectiveness of the  CSI program. In particular, CBP tracks two performance measures—(1)  the percentage of U.S.-bound cargo container shipments that are  reviewed by CSI targeters and (2) the percentage of U.S.-requested  cargo examinations that are completed by host countries. According to  CBP data from fiscal years 2009 through 2012, CSI targeters met their  target goal of reviewing 100 percent of the U.S.-bound cargo shipments.  Moreover, the percentage of U.S.-requested examinations of U.S.-bound  cargo shipments completed by host countries increased from 93 percent  in fiscal year 2009 to 98 percent in fiscal year 2012, although CBP did not  meet the target goal of 100 percent. CBP reported that CSI relies on the  voluntary cooperation of host nation Customs officials and that CBP  works with the host ports to resolve examination issues as they arise in  an effort to increase the percentage of U.S.-bound shipments that are  examined.
CBP has made efforts to expand the scope of CSI targeting beyond  WMD, where possible, in an effort to increase the effectiveness of the CSI  program. While the priority focus of CSI is to prevent WMD and other  terrorist contraband from entering the United States through cargo  containers, the April 2011 CSI Statement of Policy and Intent prioritized  expanding the scope of CSI beyond WMD, among other things. In  particular, according to the CSI Strategy Action Plan, as well as CSI  program officials with whom we met, CBP is negotiating with government  officials in foreign countries where CBP has CSI targeters to expand the  focus of CSI’s targeting efforts beyond WMD to include other contraband,  such as illicit drugs, illegal weapons, and counterfeit goods (intellectual  property right violations). The CBP officials we met with noted, however,  that expanding the scope of CSI targeting efforts beyond WMD is  ultimately at the discretion of the host governments with whom CBP has  negotiated guidelines for CSI program operations. While two of the six  CSI countries that we visited allow CSI staff to target U.S.-bound cargo  container shipments for contraband other than WMD, the remaining four  countries generally limit targeting and examinations to cargo containers  suspected of containing WMD. Government officials from one of these  four countries stated it is CBP’s responsibility to scan containers for other  suspected contraband, such as illicit drugs, once the containers arrive in  the United States. Customs officials from another one of these four  countries stated they do not have the resources to devote to scanning  U.S.-bound containers that may be at risk for containing contraband other  than WMD. According to CBP officials, though, expanding the scope of  targeting at foreign ports by its CSI targeters has not resulted in additional  costs to CBP in terms of numbers of targeters or funding.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Reducing risks to the global maritime supply chain is critical because  foreign ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports are vital to  the U.S. economy. DHS has made progress in reducing some maritime  supply chain risks through its various maritime container security  programs. The Coast Guard has developed a port security risk model that  it annually updates and uses to assess port facility security, inform  operational decisions, and direct resources. In contrast, CBP has not  assessed the risks of foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States to  determine whether its existing CSI locations remain valid since 2005.  Although there have been no known incidents of cargo containers being  used to transport WMD, the maritime supply chain remains vulnerable to  attacks. We recognize that it may not be possible to include all of the  higher-risk ports in CSI because CSI requires the cooperation of  sovereign foreign governments. However, DHS and GAO risk  management practices state that agencies should periodically evaluate  the effectiveness of their programs and that mechanisms should be in  place for altering a program based on current risk data. Periodically  assessing the risk level of cargo shipped from foreign ports and using the  results of these risk assessments to inform any future expansion of CSI to  additional locations as well as determining whether changes need to be  made to existing CSI ports would help ensure that CBP is allocating its  resources to provide the greatest possible coverage of high-risk cargo to  best mitigate the risk of importing WMD or other terrorist contraband into  the United States through the maritime supply chain.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure the effectiveness of the CSI program, we recommend  that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S.  Customs and Border Protection to periodically assess the supply chain  security risks from all foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States  and use the results of these risk assessments to (1) inform any future  expansion of CSI to additional locations and (2) determine whether  changes need to be made to existing CSI ports and make adjustments as  appropriate and feasible.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In August 2013, we requested comments on a draft of this report from the  Departments of Homeland Security and State.  Both departments  provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report,  as appropriate. In addition to its technical comments, DHS provided an  official letter for inclusion in the report, which can be seen in appendix II.   In its letter, DHS stated it concurred with the recommendation and plans  to develop a process for conducting periodic assessments of the supply  chain security risks from all ports that ship cargo to the United States and  use information from the assessments to determine if future expansion or  adjustments to CSI locations are appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of State  and Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other  interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on  GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512- 9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Staff acknowledgments are provided in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Information on Foreign Ports That Coordinate Maritime Cargo Container Security Efforts with U.S. Customs and Border Protection
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on the foreign ports that either  participate directly in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program or  that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) otherwise coordinates  with to review and secure U.S.-bound cargo container shipments. As of  July 2013, CBP was coordinating targeting of U.S.-bound cargo container  shipments with 61 foreign ports. Table 2 lists these ports according to the  date the ports began conducting operations with CBP and also provides  information on, among other things, the volume of U.S.-bound shipments  passing through the seaport in fiscal year 2012 and the targeting  approach employed.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant  Director), Josh Diosomito, and Paul Hobart made key contributions to this  report. Also contributing to this report were Charles Bausell, Frances  Cook, Stanley Kostyla, and Lara Miklozek.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and  Sustainability Challenges. GAO-13-37. Washington, D.C.: October 31,  2012.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of  Its Cargo Targeting System. GAO-13-9. Washington, D.C.: October 25,  2012.
Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime  Transportation Security Act. GAO-12-1009T. Washington, D.C.:  September 11, 2012.
Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but  Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning.  GAO-12-422T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012.
Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and  Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.:  July 15, 2011.
Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record.  GAO-11-140R. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container  Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational  Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended.  GAO-10-887. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade  Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements,  but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.:  September 10, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist  DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to  Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington,  D.C.: October 30, 2009.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to Promote  Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges  Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has  Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges  Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign  Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance  Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25,  2008.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.  GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny  with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. Washington,  D.C.: March 11, 2005.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require  Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,  D.C.: July 25, 2003.