Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs
Published: 2010-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to develop and field new capabilities more quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006, Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised explosive devices alone. GAO and others have reported funding, organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DOD's processes for meeting warfighters' urgent needs. The Senate Armed Services Committee asked GAO to determine 1) the extent to which DOD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes, and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes. To conduct this review GAO looked at three urgent needs processes--joint, Army, and the Marine Corps processes--visited forces overseas that submit urgent needs requests and receive solutions, and conducted 23 case studies.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the processes address critical deficiencies or to measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not established an effective management framework for those processes. GAO found that DOD's guidance for its urgent needs processes is dispersed and outdated. Further, DOD guidance does not clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all phases of those processes or incorporate all of the expedited acquisition authorities available to acquire joint urgent need solutions. Data systems for the processes lack comprehensive, reliable data for tracking overall results and do not have standards for collecting and managing data. In addition, the joint process does not include a formal method for feedback to inform joint leadership on the performance of solutions. In one case, a solution for a joint request was fielded for 18 months without meeting warfighter needs. In the absence of a management framework for its urgent needs processes, DOD lacks tools to fully assess how well its processes work, manage their performance, ensure efficient use of resources, and make decisions regarding the long-term sustainment of fielded capabilities. In conducting field work in Iraq as well as 23 case studies, GAO found several challenges that could hinder DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent warfighter needs. First, not all personnel involved in the initial development and review of urgent needs documentation receive adequate training. DOD policy states that deploying personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to the needs of the combatant commander; however, officers responsible for drafting, submitting, and reviewing Army and joint urgent needs requests are not likely to receive such training. Hence, once in theater, they often face difficulties processing the large volume of requests, in a timely manner. Second, in 11 of 23 cases GAO studied, challenges obtaining funding were the primary factor that increased the amount of time needed to field solutions. Funding has not always been available for joint urgent needs in part because the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not assigned primary responsibility for implementing the department's rapid acquisition authority. Congress provided OSD with that authority to meet urgent warfighter needs, but OSD has played a reactive rather than proactive role in making decisions about when to invoke it. In addition, DOD can reprogram funds appropriated for other purposes to meet urgent needs requests, but authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds has been delegated to the services and combatant commands. Prior GAO work has shown that strong leadership from OSD over resource control is critical, and midlevel agencies such as the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which is responsible for facilitating urgent needs requests, including funding, cannot guide other agencies at a high enough level to promote effective interagency coordination. Finally, GAO found that attempts to meet urgent needs with immature or complex technologies can result in significant delays.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The dynamic nature of the enemy and tactical conditions encountered by  forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted the Department of Defense  (DOD) to rapidly identify and field new capabilities as quickly as possible  in order to prevent mission failure or loss of life. Warfighters have  requested new capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance technology; technology to counter improvised explosive  devices (IED); and command and control equipment for their operations.  With the shift in priority for overseas operations from Iraq to  Afghanistan—a theater that may pose more complex long-term  challenges—deployed or soon-to-deploy units will likely continue to  request critical capabilities to help them accomplish their missions.  Warfighters currently rely on several processes, such as the Army, Marine  Corps, and joint urgent needs processes, to request such critical  capabilities.
The Army’s urgent needs process was established in 1987 but has been  expanded since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism and  currently receives an average of almost 300 requests per month. The  Marine Corps established its process in 2003. In 2002, Congress directed  the Secretary of Defense to create a process to rapidly meet the urgent  needs of combatant commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 2004, the  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established the Joint Rapid  Acquisition Cell (JRAC)  to overcome institutional barriers and provide  timely, effective support to facilitate meeting the urgent material and  logistics requirements which combatant commanders certify as  operationally critical. Until 2008, OSD directed that the JRAC report to the  Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) and the Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller), for monitoring and tracking joint urgent needs,  facilitating the identification and resolution of issues, and providing  regular status reports to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.  Since 2008, the Under Secretary realigned the JRAC within the Office of  the Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and the cell  resides currently under the Director, Rapid Fielding.
Congress provides funding for joint urgent needs related to countering  improvised explosive devices through the Joint Improvised Explosive  Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), to which it has appropriated nearly  $16 billion through fiscal year 2009. In our prior work, we have raised  concerns about JIEDDO’s management and operations and found that the  organization lacks full visibility over all counter-IED initiatives throughout  DOD, faces difficulties with transitioning its counter-IED initiatives to the  military services, and lacks criteria for counter-IED training initiatives it  will fund which affects its training investment decisions. We have  recommended that DOD improve its visibility over all DOD’s counter-IED  efforts, work with the military services to develop a complete transition  plan for initiatives, and define criteria for funding training initiatives.
The possibility of similar issues involving DOD’s process for meeting joint  urgent needs that are not necessarily related to IEDs has raised  congressional concerns about making similar resource investments in the  JRAC at this time. In October 2008, Congress directed DOD to commission  a study to assess the effectiveness of the department’s processes for the  generation of urgent operational need requirements, and the acquisition  processes used to fulfill such requirements. In July 2009, the Defense  Science Board issued its report and made several findings regarding  organizational, funding, acquisition, and oversight issues. In addition to  our work on JIEDDO, we have also reported on challenges in the Army’s  and Marine Corps’ processes to address urgent force protection needs,  such as truck armor. Further, we reported on DOD’s challenges to field  Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.
In light of Congress’ continuing interest in the joint and military services’  urgent needs processes to address requests for force protection  capabilities, you asked us to review DOD’s processes. Our objectives for  this review were to determine 1) the extent to which DOD has a means to  assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes and 2) what  challenges, if any, have affected the overall responsiveness of DOD’s  urgent needs processes.
To conduct this review, we visited forces conducting operations in the  U.S. Central Command’s theater of operations and gathered information  on how they identify, document, and submit urgent needs to their chain of  command, and on the fielding and assessment of solutions in the theater.  We reviewed existing policy and guidance applicable to joint, Army, and  Marine Corps urgent needs processes, and compared them to our  standards for internal control in the federal government. We analyzed  joint, Army, and Marine Corps data management systems in order to  review the data collected on the time frames between decision points and  to determine the responsiveness of each process in providing solutions to  urgent warfighter needs. While our assessment of databases and systems  used to process urgent needs requests showed that some data elements  were accurate and supported by sufficient documentation, we found that  other items for reporting specific urgent needs requests were incomplete,  and not sufficiently reliable for reporting specific results here, or to  support accurate, useful management reports related to overall results. As  a result, we conducted our own case study reviews to assess DOD’s  responsiveness to urgent needs for a select sample of requests. We used  data elements from the information systems that we had determined were  sufficiently reliable to support the selection of case study candidates from  the universe of joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs requests. We  selected a nonprobability sample of 23 cases—11 joint, 6 Army, and 6  Marine Corps—for review based on criteria that included the variety of  needs, high visibility and priority of the needs, and needs submitted in  more than one process. For each case study, we interviewed responsible  officials at the appropriate joint or service organizations and collected key  documentation related to seven phases of the process we identified:  initiation of a request from a warfighting unit, endorsement of a need by  theater command, validation by command-level leadership, approval of a  solution at the headquarters level, identification and execution of a  funding strategy, awarding of a contract, and production and initial  fielding of urgent need solutions. We interviewed DOD and military service  officials who are responsible for or are participants in the urgent needs  processes, and we collected guidance and documentation on each process  and the associated milestones and decision points. Although the Navy and  Air Force each have their own urgent needs processes, the Army and  Marine Corps have been the principle providers of U.S. ground forces  conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and their respective  processes as well as the joint process have received the majority of  warfighter urgent needs requests. Therefore, we have focused our review  on those three processes. We conducted this performance audit from June  2008 through March 2010 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Established System for Weapon System Acquisition
paragraphs: DOD’s strategy for planning, executing, and funding its weapon system  acquisition programs relies on three principal decision-making systems.  First, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)  is a requirements system used to assess gaps in warfighting capabilities  and recommend solutions to resolve those gaps. Second, the Defense  Acquisition System is used to manage the development and procurement  of weapon systems and other equipment. Third, the Planning,  Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process is used to allocate  resources and is intended to provide a framework from which the  department can articulate its strategy; identify force size, structure, and  needed equipment; set program priorities; allocate resources to individual  programs; and assess program performance. All three of these systems can  incur lengthy time frames. For example, the requirements system can take  an average of up to 10 months to validate a need. The acquisition system  involves large budgets and generally meets materiel warfighter needs in 2  or more years, with some systems taking decades to develop and procure.  The budgeting process is calendar driven, taking nearly 2 years from  planning to the beginning of budget execution. We have previously  reported on challenges the department faces within each of these  systems.
section_title: DOD Procedures for Rapidly Acquiring and Fielding Equipment to the Theater
paragraphs: Each of the military services has established processes to address urgent  warfighter needs. Our review focuses primarily on the following:    The Army established its Operational Needs Statement process in 1987  to provide a way for unit commanders to identify urgent needs for new  materiel or new capabilities. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  G3/5/7 oversees the process. Prior to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,  the Army received about 20 requests per year. From September 2006 to  February 2010 the Army’s database shows 6,712 Operational Needs  Statements containing 21,864 urgent needs requests that have been or  are being processed to support operations in those two theaters. The  Army’s process supports deployed units, deploying units, and units  conducting their assigned missions, and responds to a variety of urgent  needs, from new capabilities to shortfalls of existing equipment in  theater, to requests for training equipment for mobilizing units in the  United States. Operational field commanders also use the Army’s  process to document the urgent need for a materiel solution to correct  a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts upon mission  accomplishment. In September 2006, the Equipment Common  Operating Picture, an automated processing tool for Army urgent  needs, became operational. This data management tool is a classified,  Web-based application for processing urgent needs from the unit  submitting the request through all phases of the process. According to  the user’s guide, the tool was designed to simplify requests, consolidate  existing sources of information, and significantly speed the approval  process while providing situational awareness to all involved in a  request.
The Marine Corps created its Urgent Universal Needs Statement  process in November 2003 to meet the immediate operational needs of  deployed forces or forces preparing to deploy. The Marine Corps  Combat Development Command oversees this process. The command  establishes guidance and direction, and provides oversight to ensure  solutions are effectively and efficiently delivered to the warfighter.  The Marine Corps received 574 requests through the process between  December 2001 and November 2009. In August 2007, the Marine Corps’  Virtual Universal Urgent Needs Statement data management system for  processing urgent needs requests became operational. The Corps  developed this system as a result of a Lean Six Sigma continuous  improvement initiative to replace the manually updated Combat  Development Tracking System.
In addition to the military services’ urgent needs processes, The Bob  Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (the Fiscal  Year 2003 NDAA) directed the Secretary of Defense to create a process to  rapidly meet the urgent needs of combatant commands and the Joint  Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, Section 806 of the act required the Secretary  of Defense to prescribe procedures for the rapid acquisition and  deployment of items that are currently under development by DOD or  available from the commercial sector, and that are urgently needed to  react to an enemy threat or to respond to significant and urgent safety  situations. According to the legislation, the procedures should include a  process for demonstrating, rapidly acquiring, and deploying items that  meet the needs communicated by the combatant commanders and the  Joint Chiefs of Staff. In September 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense  directed the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) and the Under Secretary  of Defense (Comptroller) to create the Joint Rapid Action Cell (JRAC),  later renamed the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, to facilitate meeting the  urgent material and logistics requirements which combatant commanders  certify as operationally critical. Subsequently, in November 2004, the  Deputy Secretary of Defense provided guidance on the procedures, roles,  and responsibilities of the JRAC and on the identification and validation of  urgent operational needs. The Deputy Secretary’s memo defines urgent  operational needs as urgent, combatant commander-prioritized  operational needs that, if left unfilled, could result in loss of life and/or  prevent the successful completion of a near-term military mission. The  memo defines immediate warfighter needs as urgent operational needs  requiring a timely materiel or nonmateriel solution in 120 days or less that,  if left unfilled, could result in loss of life and/or prevent the successful  completion of a near-term military mission. An executive director leads  JRAC and reports to the Director, Rapid Fielding, within DDR&E and  under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). JRAC’s Core  Group consists of full-time professional staff and part-time senior  executives and military officers from the offices of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller), DOD General Counsel, and Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff. An Advisory Group supports the Core Group and includes  pertinent Under or Assistant Secretaries based on the specific need.
Just weeks before the Deputy Secretary issued the November 2004  guidance, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2005 (the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA) was enacted.  It amended  section 806 of the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA by providing the Secretary of  Defense with a rapid acquisition authority to respond to combat  emergencies. Under that authority, when the Secretary of Defense, without  delegation, determines in writing that equipment is urgently needed to  eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat  fatalities, the Secretary is to use procedures developed under this section  to accomplish the rapid acquisition and deployment of the needed  equipment. The amendment states that whenever the Secretary makes the  above determination, the Secretary shall designate a senior official to  ensure that the needed equipment is acquired and deployed as quickly as  possible, with a goal of awarding a contract within 15 days. Also, under the  amendment, the Secretary is to authorize the senior official to waive  certain provisions of law, policy, directive, or regulation that would  unnecessarily impede the rapid acquisition and deployment of the needed  equipment. The amendment also stated the “authority of this section may  not be used to acquire equipment in an amount aggregating more than  $100,000,000 during any fiscal year.” In addition, the amendment stated  that “or acquisitions of equipment under this section during the fiscal  year in which the Secretary makes the determination [that equipment is  urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has  resulted in combat fatalities] with respect to such equipment, the  Secretary may use any funds available to the Department of Defense for  that fiscal year.”
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued an instruction in  July 2005 establishing policy and procedures to facilitate the assessment,  validation, sourcing, resourcing, and fielding of operationally driven  urgent, combatant command needs during the same fiscal year that a  request is made. According to the instruction, combatant commanders  involved in ongoing operations identify joint urgent needs as life- or  combat mission-threatening needs based on unforeseen military  requirements that must be resolved in days, weeks, or months. Under the  instruction, a joint urgent need must be considered inherently joint in  nature; for example, the need is theaterwide and/or spans multiple military  services. Joint urgent needs must also fall outside of DOD’s established  guidance for weapon systems acquisition and the military services’  established urgent operational needs processes. JRAC has applied its  guidance to process joint urgent needs meeting these criteria. The  instruction delegates shared oversight responsibility of the process to the  Joint Staff J-8 Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment;  the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Deputy Comptroller for  Program and Budget; and JRAC within the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (AT&L). Data for joint urgent needs are managed through the  CENTCOM Requirements Information Manager database system, which  the command added to a preexisting Web site it managed in 2005. The  database includes 283 joint urgent needs requests from August 2004  through February 2010.
section_title: Urgent Needs Requests Across DOD Progress Through Similar Decision Points
paragraphs: The Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs processes have some  distinctions in guidance, terminology, and data systems; however they  share similar decision points. Although each of these urgent needs  processes is distinct, we identified seven broad phases that we used to  track the progression of each request over time and to compare  performance across the Army’s Operational Needs Statement process, the  Marine Corps’ Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, and the Joint  Urgent Operational Needs processes. These phases are: initiation, theater  endorsement, command validation, headquarters approval, funding,  contract award, and initial fielding. Urgent needs requests that result in  fielded solutions typically move through the process as follows:  Initiation: Any of the three urgent needs processes can begin when  either a warfighter in the theater of operations or an official at the  theaterwide or combatant command level identifies a need and an  officer with a rank of Colonel or higher submits the request into the  relevant Army, Marine Corps, or joint process. The request could be for  either a known, specific piece of equipment or for an unknown materiel  or nonmateriel solution based on a description of a capability gap.
Theater Endorsement: Theater command leadership reviews, endorses,  and forwards a request for component or combatant command  validation. For example, a joint urgent needs request from a warfighter  in Iraq would be reviewed and endorsed by the theater commands such  as Multi National Force-West, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, or Multi  National Force-Iraq.
Command Validation: Endorsed urgent needs requests from Iraq or  Afghanistan are elevated to the appropriate commandwide  leadership—U.S. Central Command, U.S. Army Forces Central, or U.S.  Marine Corps Central Command— for validation or rejection.
Headquarters Approval: Validated Army urgent needs requests are sent  to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army G3/5/7  directorate, while Marine Corps urgent needs are sent to the Marine  Corps Requirements Oversight Council for its headquarters approval.  The combatant commander sends joint urgent needs to the Joint Chiefs  of Staff, who send the need to JRAC concurrently in order to alert it of  the impending request. Upon headquarters approval, JRAC assigns the  requests for capabilities related to countering improvised explosive  devices to JIEDDO. For all other joint urgent needs, JRAC designates a  military service to sponsor the procurement and fielding of a solution.
Funding: The military service or joint sponsor applies funds to the  program office to begin the procurement of approved solutions. When  funds are not already available, the services may obtain funding for an  urgent need through the annual budget process, by reprogramming  funds from other programs during the current fiscal year, or by  requesting the Secretary of Defense to invoke the department’s rapid  acquisition authority. For joint urgent needs requests, JRAC may assist  in identifying available funding as needed. In previous years, sponsors  have also requested funding for urgent needs through the wartime  supplemental appropriation.
Contract Award: The appropriate military service or joint program  office develops and executes an acquisition strategy in order to procure  the solution. Among other options, a new contract may be awarded  using competitive procedures or as a sole source, as provided in the  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), or an existing contract could be  amended or modified.  The rapid acquisition authority may be  available for the acquisition and deployment of some equipment.
Production and Initial Fielding: The program office manages the  production and fielding of solutions to the theater. Some solutions may  be readily available from current DOD inventory or from commercial  vendors, while others may require modifications to existing equipment  or substantial efforts to research, develop, and produce new  technologies.
Combatant commanders have sometimes made strategic or tactical  changes that eliminate the need for a solution. Also, an urgent needs  request could be addressed by existing equipment that was previously  unavailable until changes in the combatant commander’s plans and  priorities resulted in the availability of the equipment in the theater. In  addition, a joint urgent needs request that meets the criteria of another  urgent needs process may be rerouted; for example, counter-IED  capability gaps may be redirected to JIEDDO for resolution.
section_title: Funding For Urgent Needs Was Formerly Made Available Through the Iraq Freedom Fund
paragraphs: Beginning in fiscal year 2003, Congress began appropriating funds to the  Iraq Freedom Fund. Over 4 years, from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year  2008, OSD provided approximately $442.54 million from the Iraq Freedom  Fund to DOD components seeking to fund solutions to joint urgent needs,  as shown in table 1.
In fiscal years 2005-2008, JRAC administered funds appropriated to the  Iraq Freedom Fund to assist sponsors in funding solutions to 31, or about  30 percent of an estimated 102 approved joint urgent needs not related to  countering improvised explosive devices. Beginning in fiscal year 2008,  funding for joint urgent needs began to decline from less than $34 million  to nothing in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. When funds are not provided by  one of the services or other DOD components, after the department’s  annual budget has been approved, OSD can fund urgent needs, among  other ways, by invoking the rapid acquisition authority granted by  Congress and/or by utilizing the department’s existing authority to  reprogram or transfer.
section_title: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Provide Solutions to Emerging Battlefield Threats but DOD Is Unable to Fully Assess the Effectiveness of Those Processes or of Fielded Solutions
paragraphs: Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are  more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than its traditional  acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the urgent  needs processes are addressing critical deficiencies or to measure the  effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not  established an effective management framework for those processes.  GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  provides a general framework for management control of agencies’  operations.  In implementing this framework, management is responsible  for developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices to fit their  agency’s operations and to ensure that those controls are built into and are  an integral part of operations. Internal control, which is synonymous with  management control, helps government program managers achieve  desired results. However, we found that DOD’s guidance for its joint  urgent needs processes is fragmented and outdated, in addition to lacking  other important internal controls. As a result, the department does not  have the tools it needs to fully assess how well its processes are working  to address critical warfighter needs, to manage their performance, to  ensure the efficient use of resources, and to make decisions regarding the  long-term sustainment of a fielded combatant command capability.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Guidance for the Joint Urgent Needs Process Is Fragmented and Outdated
paragraphs: Existing guidance for the joint urgent needs process is fragmented among  several documents and is outdated, which is inconsistent with federal  internal control standards that prescribe the establishment of a clearly  defined organizational structure that provides a framework to achieve  agency objectives. We found that guidance for DOD’s urgent needs  processes is widely dispersed among several memoranda from the  Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under  Secretary of Defense (AT&L), and an instruction from the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, OSD’s guidance describing how joint  urgent needs should be processed is contained in memoranda issued in  September and November 2004, and March 2005. In addition, the Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an instruction in July 2005 establishing  the policies and procedures for warfighters in the theater and combatant  commanders to identify, review, and approve joint urgent needs. As a  result, the guidance does not frame a cohesive common operating picture  that explains how the process should function.
Further, neither the November 2004 memo nor the Chairman’s instruction  have been updated since their creation, although significant changes in the  urgent needs process have occurred since both were issued. Once  received and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a joint urgent need is  handed off to JRAC for disposition through additional phases of the  process that address funding, acquisition, and fielding as outlined in  Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda. The Deputy Secretary of  Defense memo from November 15, 2004, outlined procedures for JRAC to  follow in facilitating joint urgent needs and included a provision directing  that the guidance remain in effect for 3 years after it had been approved, at  which time a determination will be made as to the continued existence of  JRAC. However, OSD has not released additional guidance or amended the  current guidance to address this provision, and JRAC continues to operate  and facilitate the urgent needs process, more than 5 years after the  guidance was issued.
According to GAO’s Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool,  one of the steps management can take to ensure consistency with internal  controls is to periodically evaluate the organization structure and make  changes as necessary in response to changing conditions. Neither the  November 2004 memo nor the Chairman’s instruction have been updated  to incorporate guidance regarding how the rapid acquisition authority is to  be implemented. Among other things, the operational guidance for the  joint urgent needs process could delineate for potential requestors the  advantages of using the authority, the circumstances under which a  request for the use of the authority should be contemplated, what factors  might persuade the Secretary that a given request is a good candidate for  the use of the authority, as well as how and when the use of waivers would  be appropriate under the rapid acquisition authority. This kind of  information could be useful to officials assigned the responsibility of  processing urgent need requests and finding funds for those requests.
In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense memo defines immediate  warfighter needs as urgent operational needs requiring a timely solution  within 120 days or less. According to JRAC officials, because they have  found it difficult to complete all phases of the joint process and field a  solution in 120 days, in practice, they have modified this time frame by  extending it to between 120 days to 2 years. The modification of this time  frame occurred informally, and has not been documented in guidance.  Also, it remains unclear whether OSD approval is required to change the  time frame or whether authority is delegated to JRAC to make this change,  which affects the standard for timeliness in meeting urgent warfighter  needs. Additionally, the November 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense  memorandum defines differently the terms urgent operational need and  immediate warfighter need. Officials relate that, in practice, there is no  longer a distinction between the two and both have been subsumed in the  term joint urgent operational need, and are treated as one and the same.  JRAC staff completed a Lean Six Sigma study of the joint urgent needs  process. According to JRAC officials, they plan to use the findings of that  study to guide improvements to the process. However, because this effort  is still ongoing, it is unclear to what extent any actions taken as a result of  this study will address the issues we have identified. As a result of its  current organizational structure and lack of comprehensive, updated  guidance, DOD cannot be assured that the objectives of the joint urgent  needs process are being achieved as effectively as possible.
section_title: DOD’s Guidance Does Not Clearly Define Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Urgent needs guidance for the joint process does not clearly define the  roles and responsibilities of OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military  services in implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all phases. Federal  internal control standards call for clearly established areas of authority,  responsibility, and appropriate lines of reporting for federal programs. For  example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction directed the  creation of the Budget Office Director’s Board within the Joint Staff to  adjudicate funding during the same fiscal year that a request is made for  solutions for joint urgent needs. According to the Chairman’s instruction,  the board is responsible for reviewing and approving recommendations to  fund joint urgent needs, and to direct the reprogramming of funding from  military services’ or agencies’ budgets to do so. However, this board has  never convened, and JRAC has assumed responsibility for identifying  funding to procure solutions to joint needs. The November 2004 Deputy  Secretary of Defense memorandum states that the JRAC is to assist in  resolving issues impeding the resolution of joint urgent needs, but the  memorandum does not give JRAC the authority or responsibility for  identifying funding for solutions. Rather, the guidance states that the  military services, defense agencies, and combatant commands are  responsible for funding solutions.
Further, the Chairman’s instruction and the November 2004 Deputy  Secretary of Defense memorandum are inconsistent regarding the scope of  solutions for joint urgent needs. For example, the Chairman’s instruction  includes criteria for the scope of solutions to joint urgent needs,  stipulating that they should not involve the development of a new  technology or capability. The instruction further states that the  acceleration of a new technology in progress or the minor modification of  an existing system to adapt to a new or similar mission is within the scope  of solutions to joint urgent needs. However, the November 2004  memorandum that governs the process after the Joint Chiefs of Staff  approves the need does not prescribe such a limitation on the scope of  solutions. According to JRAC officials, they have nonetheless received  approved joint urgent needs where the proposed solutions are currently  on hold due to their technological complexity. In the absence of clearly  defined roles and responsibilities, the department faces difficulty in  ensuring that the joint process is implemented efficiently and effectively  and in identifying the appropriate personnel who are accountable for  operations, stewardship of resources, and achieving results.
section_title: DOD Guidance for the Joint Process Does Not Describe the Rapid Acquisition Authority
paragraphs: With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, military services that  sponsor solutions to joint urgent needs may use the rapid acquisition  authority to expedite the acquisition and fielding of solutions. However,  this authority is not defined or incorporated in DOD’s guidance for the  joint urgent needs process. Internal control standards cite the importance  of policies and procedures that enforce management’s directives, and  become integral to an agency’s accountability for stewardship of  government resources and achieving effective results. Once joint urgent  needs are approved by the Joint Staff and passed on to JRAC for  disposition, JRAC assigns military services to sponsor the acquisition and  fielding of solutions to address those needs. Upon the Secretary of  Defense’s approval, the military services may use the rapid acquisition  authority created by the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA. That legislation states  that the Secretary of Defense is to use procedures developed under the  authority of that legislation to rapidly acquire and deploy urgently needed  equipment to eliminate a combat deficiency that has resulted in combat  fatalities and, if necessary, to waive laws, policies, directives, or  regulations addressing the solicitation and selection of sources and the  award of the contract, in order to rapidly acquire and deploy the  equipment. As a result of DOD not including the rapid acquisition  authority in its guidance, program managers may not be aware of all  procedures available to them for fielding solutions quickly to the theater.
section_title: DOD’s Guidance for the Urgent Needs Processes Does Not Include Standards for Collecting and Managing Data
paragraphs: The online data management systems of the joint and Army urgent needs  processes lack comprehensive, complete, and reliable information on the  achievement of key process phases, as well as the ability to generate  reports to track key dates and activities because DOD guidance has not  established standards for the collection and management of urgent needs  data. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control cites the significance of  accurately documenting events and creating and maintaining records as  evidence of the execution of agency activities. In addition, those  standards call for the proper classification of transactions and events that  includes appropriate organization and formatting of information from  which reports and statements are prepared. Relevant, reliable, and timely  communications and effective information technology management are  critical to achieving useful, reliable, and continuous recording and  communication of information. However, the milestone data located in the  joint and Army databases are often incomplete and unreliable. Although  both joint and Army systems generally contain documentation to support  completion of milestones at the early phases of the processes such as  theater command endorsement and headquarters leadership approval,  once a request is delegated to the acquisition community for procurement  and fielding, visibility into subsequent actions is largely lost. For example,  the joint system rarely contains detailed information and support  documentation regarding the funding, contract award, or production and  fielding of solutions. Additionally, the Army database does not contain  information regarding acquisition milestones following the approval of a  funding strategy. As a result, data limitations can prevent managers and  decision makers of the urgent needs processes from assessing the overall  responsiveness and effectiveness of their processes.
Further, Army policy instructs system managers to close out requests 120  days after the scheduled fielding date if no information regarding actual  fielding is received. This may result in the closure of some requests  without confirmation of whether or not solutions were actually fielded.  Although the joint system contains the most detailed qualitative data of  any of the three systems we reviewed, the dates cited for specific  milestones do not reflect the dates on which those milestones were  achieved, and instead reflect the dates the milestones were recorded in the  joint system’s electronic record. Consequently, the dates regarding the  funding, acquisition, and fielding of solutions are vague or inaccurate, and  the database usually lacks documentation to support the dates listed.  Additionally, the joint and Army systems lack a capability to produce  either management summary reports or complete historical information  regarding the completion of phases, which prevents DOD from measuring  responsiveness over time and initiating process improvements.  Furthermore, managers of the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs  processes lack visibility into other urgent needs data systems across the  department, which limits their ability to determine if possible solutions to  their urgent needs might have already been developed through other  processes. Finally, none of the data systems we reviewed include  information regarding the effectiveness of fielded solutions. As a result,  DOD process managers are unable to identify potentially systemic  problems that could otherwise be mitigated by process improvements and  updates.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and JRAC are exploring information-sharing  concepts and data exchange capabilities among DOD’s urgent needs data  systems with the modification of DOD’s Knowledge Management Database  System to improve visibility into urgent needs requests across the  department. However, these improvements are in the very early stages,  and according to DOD officials it is uncertain when these efforts will be  completed. Therefore, DOD’s urgent needs database systems will continue  to lack various characteristics and capabilities that would enable process  managers to better assess the performance of their processes in  responding to warfighter requests.
section_title: DOD’s Guidance Does Not Include a Formal Method for Providing Feedback on How Well Fielded Solutions Are Meeting Warfighter Needs
paragraphs: The joint urgent needs process does not include a formal method for joint  decision makers to receive feedback on how well fielded solutions have  met the urgent needs for which they were requested. The Army assesses  the performance of solutions that are fielded through its urgent needs  process as well as those solutions from the joint process that the Army  sponsors, and the Marine Corps is working to develop a similar  performance assessment process. However neither service’s assessment  process includes a mechanism for providing actionable performance  feedback to joint decision makers. Internal control standards emphasize  the importance of routine feedback and performance monitoring when  assessing process effectiveness, and they direct agencies to assess the  quality of performance over time. Such assessments can occur during  normal operations and include regular management and supervisory  activities.
While the Army makes information from its assessment process available  to joint decision makers, the information is narrowly focused on issues  specific to Army personnel and processes, and as such does not provide  DOD, JRAC, or Joint Chiefs of Staff with feedback assessing the extent to  which those solutions met the joint urgent needs of the combatant  command or whether given solutions should be sustained for the long  term and acquired in the future through DOD’s established requirements,  budgeting, and acquisition process. We have previously reported that the  department’s established requirements process, JCIDS, has not met its  objectives to identify and prioritize warfighting needs from a joint  capability perspective. In 2008, we reported that capabilities continue to  be driven primarily by the individual services and that DOD may be losing  opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities. In responding to  our 2008 report, DOD stated that identifying and prioritizing joint  capabilities occurs through multiple processes within and outside JCIDS,  including the joint urgent needs process. However, without a joint  warfighter perspective on performance, there is not sufficient information  to adequately assess whether a capability should transition to an  acquisition program, particularly when the sponsoring service would like  to phase out or terminate support of the capability.
Joint Chiefs of Staff officials recognize the need for performance feedback  on joint solutions; however, its previous attempt to establish a process for  collecting performance feedback was unsuccessful. In 2007, the Joint  Chiefs of Staff attempted to craft a feedback loop as part of an update to  the Chairman’s instruction for joint urgent needs. The draft revision failed  to obtain DOD-wide approval and was canceled—in part due to  disagreement over the feedback process outlined in the draft instruction.  According to Joint Staff and JRAC officials, the combatant commands  contended that their resources were focused on planning and managing  contingency operations, and that providing feedback was a military  service responsibility under Title 10. Conversely, according to officials the  military services believed that since solutions addressed joint urgent  needs, feedback should be provided by the user, the combatant command.  Nevertheless, in 2008, the Joint Staff reinitiated its effort to revise the  Chairman’s instruction and establish a feedback mechanism for joint  urgent needs solutions. The draft revision was in coordination within the  department at the time of our report.
In May 2009, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed U.S. Central  Command to establish a joint requirements liaison office as a pilot  program within its Afghanistan joint task force to assist in processing  Army and joint urgent needs statements. At the time of our report the  program had not begun operations, and it was unclear whether it would  collect performance feedback on joint solutions as part of its operations.  Without adequate feedback information from the theater that addresses  how well fielded solutions address the risks to warfighters and to their  missions and whether solutions will be necessary for the future, DOD  cannot assess the performance of the joint urgent needs process in  meeting immediate and future warfighter needs. Feedback provided by  commanders in the field would better enable Joint Staff and military  service officials to determine if solutions are effective, and whether they  need to be sustained, adopted as a formal acquisition program, or  suspended. In one case, DOD fielded a solution to a joint need for an  airborne counter-improvised explosive device for more than 18 months,  although it did not meet the warfighters’ needs. Joint officials stated that  the service did not track the operational effectiveness of the solution,  called Angel Fire, and failed to provide feedback after initial fielding. The  Angel Fire system provided a daytime-only solution, and did not meet the  warfighter’s request for a 24-hour surveillance capability. The warfighter  then rescinded the urgent needs request in December 2008 and the Angel  Fire aircraft were scheduled for removal from the theater to the United  States. Internal controls prescribe that ongoing monitoring should occur in  the course of operations to support timely actions when problems occur  or require follow-up. Feedback information can help prevent the  inefficient use of resources when participants spend time and funding on a  solution that is ineffective.
section_title: DOD Has Not Integrated Its Joint Urgent Needs Procedures in its Departmentwide Policies
paragraphs: We also found that DOD’s acquisition policy makes no reference to urgent  needs or how program managers should respond to these needs. The  department’s acquisition policy is articulated in two principal documents:  DoD Directive 5000.01 which describes management principles and  mandatory policies and procedures for managing all acquisition programs,  and DoD Instruction 5000.02 which describes the operation of the  Defense Acquisition System. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook,  published by DOD, complements these two policy documents and  provides best business practices for the acquisition community. According  to the Guidebook, the objective of the Defense Acquisition System is to  rapidly acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable  improvements to mission capability at a fair and reasonable price, and that  the fundamental principles and procedures that the department follows in  achieving those objectives are described in DoD Directive 5000.01 and  DoD Instruction 5000.02. However, we reviewed these documents and  found no discussions about or references to the joint urgent needs  process. As a result of DOD’s acquisition policy not referencing to urgent  needs guidance, program managers may be unaware of the range of  options that may be available for responding to urgent warfighter needs  and be unable to assess when use of the urgent needs process may be  appropriate.
section_title: Army Guidance for Its Urgent Needs Process Lacks Several Elements
paragraphs: Until very recently, Army Regulation 71-9, the guidance for force  development and materiel requirements that governs the Army urgent  needs process, had not been updated, predating Operation Iraqi Freedom  and Operation Enduring Freedom. To support these operations, the Army  expanded the scope of its urgent needs process in late 2003 beyond  providing solutions to address capability gaps identified by the warfighter  as an urgent need to including requests for items already available to units  deploying for nonstandard missions. For example, an artillery unit  deploying as an infantry unit will need fewer howitzers, but will need a  greater number of armored vehicles. Other equipment may be necessary  for counter-insurgency operations, but these items are not included in the  unit’s authorized list of equipment known as its Modified Table of  Organization and Equipment.
Before the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army headquarters staff  processed less than 10 urgent needs requests per year, but this figure  escalated significantly in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq and has  continued to increase to about 290 per month in 2009. The volume of  requests and the speed of change have strained the Army’s urgent needs  process. During our review, we found that Army Regulation 71-9 was  ambiguous regarding time frames for approving urgent needs requests, did  not sufficiently define roles and responsibilities, and did not sufficiently  recognize or distinguish between how urgent needs requests for new  warfighter capabilities should be processed from more routine requests  for equipment that is readily available. In a 2007 report, the Army Audit  Agency also addressed these deficiencies and recommended corrective  actions.
The Army issued updated guidance for its urgent needs process on  December 28, 2009, as we were completing our report. Headquarters staff  now has a goal to provide an “initial response” within 14 days of receiving  a request, and in total there is a 120-day goal for reviewing requests, but  that goal can be changed to 30 days where “the urgency of warfighter  needs dictate a more rapid response.” While the updated guidance does  provide more detail regarding roles and responsibilities, the Army still  lacks standard operating procedures for Army headquarters officials to  follow when processing urgent needs requests. Furthermore, while the  updated guidance recognizes the dual use of the urgent needs process to  address capability gaps and requests for items already available to units  deploying for nonstandard missions, it does not distinguish how these  different types of requests for solutions should be processed.  Consequently, Army leadership continues to lack a means of assuring that  its process is meeting warfighter needs as efficiently and effectively as  possible and is consistent with internal control standards.
section_title: Challenges Associated with Training and Funding Can Prolong the Fielding of Solutions to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs
paragraphs: During our field work in Iraq as well as our analysis of 23 urgent needs  case studies, we found several challenges that hinder DOD’s ability to  respond to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible. We reviewed  the joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes across each of  their seven phases and found that, with the exception of the Active Denial  System, the urgent needs in all of our case studies were met by the initial  fielding of solutions within 2 years of theater endorsement—which is  within JRAC’s modified time frame. The highest potential for extended  response times occurred in the initiation and funding phases due to  insufficient training, the lack of timely funding decisions, and other  factors. Our case study analysis also demonstrated that attempts to meet  urgent needs with immature technologies or with solutions that are  technologically complex can lead to longer time frames for fielding  solutions to urgent needs.
subsections: section_title: Not All Personnel Involved in the Urgent Needs Process Receive Adequate Training
paragraphs: Army personnel who utilize the joint and Army urgent needs processes do  not receive adequate training on how to select which process to use to  request a solution for an urgent need and how to submit and review  requests. To acquire needed equipment, units may submit requests for  theater-provided equipment or pursue new capabilities through the Army’s  rapid equipping force process which equips operational commanders with  commercial off-the-shelf and existing solutions, or the Army’s Tank- automotive and Armaments Command’s weapons loan program, in  addition to one of the three urgent needs processes. According to Army  theater command officials, some warfighters who need to request a critical  capability do not know how to select the process most appropriate for  their situation, and officers responsible for reviewing and processing the  documentation in the theater do not receive adequate training on how the  processes should function, which may result in inefficiencies and delays in  fielding solutions to critical needs.
In addition, the Army has expanded the scope of its urgent needs process  beyond the requests for new solutions to address capability gaps, to  address equipment shortfalls resulting from units deploying in  nonstandard roles. For example, an artillery unit may be deployed to  perform a force protection mission, requiring a different mix of equipment  than what is authorized to carry out its artillery mission. As we have  previously reported, units are currently being deployed in nonstandard  roles, and this has caused challenges across the force, in part because  deploying units in nonstandard roles often encounter unanticipated  equipment needs. According to Army requirements officials, the result  has been a dramatic increase in the volume of urgent needs requests from  10 per year prior to September 11, 2001, to about 290 per month in 2009.  However the Army has not increased the number of staff available from  prewar levels to provide support at headquarters despite the rising volume  of requests. With the expansion of the scope of the urgent needs process,  the Army found an increasing number of invalid requests because users do  not understand what type of equipment can be requested through this  process. According to Army requirements officials, about 97 percent of the  Army urgent needs statements are requests for the reallocation of  equipment already available. They estimated over 557,000 pieces of  equipment have been requested through the Army process alone. Further,  theater command officials stated that the increased number of requests  has also contributed to processing backlogs of urgent needs in theater,  when the requests might have been more quickly addressed by theater- provided equipment or by the weapons loan program. Army officials stated  that prior to deployment, replacement personnel are informed that a user’s  guide and help desk are available for the Army’s Equipment Common  Operating Picture data system used to process Army urgent needs  requests. Theater command officials said uncertainty over how to address  needs often results in officers submitting a larger number of urgent needs  requests early in a unit’s deployment. This uncertainty, combined with  confusion regarding the different sources and processes available to  address capability gaps or equipment shortfalls, can result in the  inefficient use of resources and prolonged amounts of time needed to  request and receive critical capabilities.
According to DOD’s strategic plan for transforming training, deploying  personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to the  needs of the combatant commander across the full spectrum of  operations.  The prevailing principle of this strategic plan states that no  one should experience a task in a real-world operation without having  previously experienced that task in training or education. However, during  our field work in Iraq we found that the requirements officers who prepare  urgent needs requests at the brigade level—where most urgent needs  requests originate—are not well trained in the processes. Marine Corps  officials told us that they provide insufficient predeployment training on  preparing and reviewing urgent needs documentation for their own and  joint processes, and Army officials told us that Army requirements officers  responsible for drafting and submitting urgent needs requests at the  brigade level do not receive formal training on these processes prior to  deployment. According to theater command officials, requirements  officers deploying overseas must learn the process on the job. Frequent  rotations of force management officers at the division level responsible for  reviewing brigade-level requests further increase the likelihood of  extended time frames for approving urgent needs and fielding solutions, as  the already steep learning curve recurs each time a new reviewing official  is deployed into the theater. We found that lack of knowledge about how  and under what circumstances to prepare an urgent needs request,  especially among recently deployed personnel, may cause reviewing  officers to initially reject requests. In turn, some reviewing officers, who  themselves have not received adequate training, may reject urgent needs  applications based on personal preferences. As a result, reviewers may  receive multiple resubmissions of requests related to the same urgent  need, increasing the overall amount of time needed to field solutions to the  theater. Although information that would have allowed us to determine  what factors contributed to the time frames for processing urgent needs in  the theater was unavailable, in the 13 case studies for which we were able  to obtain documentation, we observed that the time between the creation  of a joint urgent need document and theater command-level endorsement  varied widely from as few as 6 days to as many as 446 days.
Moreover, senior force management officers in theater at the division level  or higher who are responsible for reviewing and processing urgent needs  requests may have received limited exposure to the urgent needs process  as part of force management training.  In some cases, force management  officers in theater, who are trained in the organization and execution of  requirements determination, force structuring, and combat development,  are employed in the urgent needs review process either on a part-time or  full-time basis. However, the formal urgent needs process training they  receive is limited to an hour-and-a-half introductory segment within a 14- week course. In addition, officials responsible for the force management  training course stated that the course focuses on duties performed in the  United States, rather than those that will be required as part of a deployed  task force. Further, the division-level training segment on the urgent needs  process has only been included in the course since 2005 and officers who  completed the 14-week course prior to 2005 are exempt from repeating it.  According to Army training officials, no provision has been made to  update force management officers on the urgent needs elements of the  course or to train them on the joint urgent needs process. As a result, most  force management officers arriving in theater to review and process urgent  needs requests at the division level or higher, like their counterparts at the  brigade level, must learn about reviewing and processing urgent needs on  the job, and likewise this pattern tends to repeat itself with each rotation  of new forces to the theater.
The previous commander of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq recognized in  2008 that warfighters in the theater needed assistance in requesting critical  capabilities. On September 16, 2008, he wrote a memorandum to the  Deputy Secretary of Defense that recommended the establishment of a  joint requirements liaison office in theater to assist the warfighter in  identifying capability or equipment shortfalls and in preparing Army and  joint urgent needs statements. On April 20, 2009, the Deputy Secretary of  Defense responded by directing the Commander, U. S. Central Command;  in coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Under Secretaries  of Defense (for Personnel and Readiness, and Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics); and the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, to create a  pilot joint requirements liaison program in Afghanistan to assist in the  identification of capability and equipment needs via the military services’  and joint urgent needs processes. Officials in theater said that these liaison  offices would function at the division level or higher; however, since most  urgent needs requests are generated at lower levels, the joint requirements  liaison office will not eliminate the need to address the lack of training at  both the division and brigade levels. We have reported in the past that  military personnel have received limited or no training on key operational  functions—such as using and managing deployed contractors—as part of  their predeployment training or professional military education.  Similarly, improved training on the appropriate use of the urgent needs  process and how to craft urgent needs documentation can improve the  overall timeliness of addressing capability gaps and delivering solutions to  help ensure that warfighters receive critical capabilities as quickly as  possible.
section_title: Funding Has Not Always Been Available to Field Urgent Needs Solutions in Part Because OSD Has Not Taken Actions to Ensure Timely Funding Decisions
paragraphs: After urgent needs requests have been approved by service headquarters  or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the funding needed to field solutions to  those needs has not always been provided in a timely manner. Although  urgent needs can be funded in a variety of ways, the funding phase for  some urgent needs requests—through the joint process in particular—is  often lengthy. This is due in part because OSD has not designated any one  organization with primary responsibility for determining when to  implement the department’s statutory rapid acquisition authority or to  execute other timely funding decisions.
In 11 of our 23 case studies—7 joint, 3 Army, and 1 Marine Corps— obtaining funding was a challenge that increased the amount of time  needed to field solutions to the theater. In a representative example from  our case studies (which comprised a nonprobability sample, and thus are  not representative of urgent needs requests as a whole), it took 474 days to  field communications equipment to warfighters in Afghanistan after the  request was endorsed by theater command. During that time, JRAC  delayed assigning a sponsor for that joint urgent need for 131 days  because it was unable to resolve which service would fund the solution.  JRAC officials told us that, although the services and components assigned  to sponsor joint urgent needs solutions have never refused to fill that role,  assigned sponsors sometimes allow requests to wait—up to 2 years—until  the next budget cycle. In one of the more extreme cases we found, it took  509 days for the Army to field a solution to a joint urgent need for mobile  explosive scanning equipment. Within that time, the Army took 293 days  after the solution was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reprogram  the necessary funding and an additional 4 months to award a contract for  the equipment. In another joint case, it took almost a year after theater  endorsement to field an aerial surveillance capability known as Angel Fire.  Of that time, approximately 5 months was spent awaiting funding—in  addition to 2 months the Marine Corps spent pursuing its own funding  strategy prior to approval of the joint request. The Marine Corps began  efforts to fund Angel Fire in July 2006, with the intent of seeking full  funding from JIEDDO. However, a Deputy Secretary of Defense decision  prevented JIEDDO from funding the purchase of platforms, such as  vehicles or aircraft, so this urgent need request was split into two—$19.5  million for the development of surveillance sensors and platform  integration submitted through the joint process and approximately $15  million for aircraft and services through the Marine Corps process.  Funding of approximately $34.5 million was finally arranged in February  2007.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned JRAC the responsibility of  helping to resolve issues that could prevent timely and effective  warfighting support but did not give JRAC the authority to allocate funding  for solutions. As a general rule, JRAC forwards approved solutions aimed  at countering IEDs to JIEDDO, which receives funding through its own  direct appropriation. According to JRAC officials, 123 or approximately  55 percent of the estimated 225 joint urgent needs requests it has received  since 2004 have been related to IEDs. JRAC delegates the other 45 percent  of approved joint solutions for critical needs, such as intelligence  surveillance and recognizance, biometerics, communications, and force  protection, to the military services, geographic combatant commands such  as U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or other  DOD components who sponsor the funding and fielding of solutions. In  addition to the department’s annual budget process and congressional  appropriations dedicated to efforts to counter IEDs, DOD may rapidly  fund non-counter IED joint urgent needs by invoking the rapid acquisition  authority granted by Congress, by using the department’s authority to  reprogram funds except as otherwise precluded by law, or by using any  applicable statutory authority to transfer funds from another  appropriation. OSD has, however, allowed the military services or other  DOD components to make most of the decisions about when to initiate  these funding options.
subsections: section_title: OSD Has Not Actively Pursued the Use of Its Rapid Acquisition Authority
paragraphs: OSD has not frequently used the rapid acquisition authority that Congress  made available specifically for rapidly fulfilling warfighters’ operational  needs. In amending the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA, the Fiscal Year 2005  NDAA provided the Secretary of Defense a rapid acquisition authority.   Under this authority, OSD can use any funds available to the Department  of Defense for that fiscal year to accomplish the rapid acquisition and  deployment of equipment that is urgently needed to eliminate a combat  capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities.
Our review of the Secretary of Defense’s use of rapid acquisition authority  over the past 5 years shows that DOD has used that authority four times to  obligate $170 million for three projects, as shown in table 2.
OSD plays a reactive, rather than proactive, role in the use of its rapid  acquisition authority, while many approved urgent needs requests aimed  specifically at preventing combat fatalities wait for funding. Rather than  identifying cases eligible for funding through the rapid acquisition  authority at a high level, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued an  implementing memorandum for its rapid acquisition authority that  directed JRAC to recommend cases for the use of this authority to the  Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), based on requests from the military  departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, Under  Secretaries of Defense, and other OSD directorates, agencies, and  activities. Consequently, the services are in a position to limit the number  of funding requests for urgent needs that reach OSD. Moreover, JRAC  officials we spoke with said that the services have shown little interest in  requesting the use of rapid acquisition authority to begin funding joint  urgent needs because the acquisition strategy and funding of existing  programs could be disrupted, preferring instead either to reprogram funds  themselves or, in most cases, to await funding through DOD’s annual  budget for overseas contingency operations. As a result, OSD is  effectively taken out of the process of deciding which urgent needs  request should be considered for funding through the rapid acquisition  authority. As previously noted, obtaining initial funding was the primary  challenge to rapidly fielding solutions for 11 of the 23 cases we studied. By  not employing its rapid acquisition authority more frequently, OSD may  not have enabled the acquisition of as many urgent needs solutions as it  otherwise could have.
In a December 2007 action memorandum requesting the support of OSD  and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in stabilizing JRAC’s leadership, staffing, and  funding, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command noted that, at  that time—over 2 months into fiscal year 2008—the Command was aware  of 38 joint urgent needs from fiscal year 2007 that remained unresolved  because of funding shortages. Further, the Deputy Commander predicted  that JRAC would be unable to address urgent warfighting needs that had  already been submitted or were emerging in fiscal year 2008.
To help resolve funding shortages, the Deputy Commander recommended  in 2007 that OSD and the Joint Staff provide JRAC with, among other  things, executive leadership and funds to support the combatant  commands and the warfighter. Our prior work has demonstrated that,  given the long-standing and deeply entrenched nature of the department’s  financial management challenges, combined with the numerous competing  DOD organizations—each operating with varying, often parochial views  and incentives—strong leadership from the Secretary of Defense over  resource control is critical. Without greater high-level participation in the  decision-making process over when to invoke, or not to invoke, its rapid  acquisition authority, OSD will continue to play a reactive, rather than  proactive, role in the timely use of DOD resources to meet urgent  warfighter needs.
section_title: OSD Has Not Provided Leadership Over Reprogramming Appropriated Funds to Meet Joint Urgent Needs
paragraphs: Apart from the Secretary’s rapid acquisition authority, DOD has a  reprogramming authority, but the military services are reluctant to  reprogram funds from their respective budgets to fund solutions to joint  urgent needs, and OSD has not exercised its authority to do so. The  Secretary of Defense—and in some cases the military departments and  defense agencies—have the authority to reprogram funds for purposes  other than those originally specified by Congress without prior  congressional approval as long as the reprogrammed amount remains  below established dollar thresholds. Reprogrammed funds may be used to  initiate a new procurement program, subprogram, or modification as long  as the estimated cost is less than $20 million for the first 3 years. DOD may  also use reprogrammed funds to start a new research, development,  testing, and evaluation program, project, or subproject if the estimated  cost for the first 3 years is less than $10 million. In cases where the amount  of funding needed exceeds established thresholds, DOD may seek  congressional approval. In fiscal year 2009, for example, JRAC—as  facilitator of the urgent needs process, including funding—-reviewed and  worked with Joint Staff, the military services, JIEDDO, and the combatant  commands to prioritize urgent needs DOD-wide. This effort resulted in a  congressionally approved end-of-year reprogramming action of $624  million from Army and Defense-Wide Operation and Maintenance  accounts that could be reapplied to the Other Procurement, Army  procurement account to obtain force protection capabilities for  warfighters in Afghanistan.
However, in the absence of a high-level authority with primary  responsibility to execute such reprogramming or transfer decisions, JRAC  has faced challenges consistently securing cooperation from the services  or other components to initiate other reprogramming actions to make  funds needed to field joint urgent needs available in a timely manner.  Military service officials we spoke with said that they are reluctant to use  their own funds to initiate acquisition of a joint urgent need without first  receiving assurance that funding will be replaced during the next budget  cycle. According to those officials, without such assurance, the acquisition  strategy of existing programs could be disrupted. Our prior work on  interagency collaboration has shown that top-level leadership—such as  that provided by OSD and its Deputy or Under Secretaries—is a necessary  element for sustaining collaboration among federal agencies, including  among DOD components, particularly when effective interagency  coordination is needed to better leverage resources.  This work has also  found that midlevel agencies, such as JRAC, can not guide policies at a  high enough level to promote effective interagency cooperation.
Although JRAC was initially created with direct reporting responsibility to  the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), the Under Secretary realigned  JRAC in March 2008 to report to the Director of the Rapid Reaction  Technology Office, within the Office of the Director for Defense Research  and Engineering (DDR&E). In July 2009, JRAC and the Rapid Reaction  Technology Office were both realigned under the Director of Rapid  Transition to accomplish the responsibilities of DDR&E, which were  expanded to include oversight of the Systems Engineering Development  Test and Evaluations functions. Currently, the JRAC resides under the  Director, Rapid Fielding. According to JRAC officials, the most recent  realignment will help the department better anticipate emerging threats  and ensure the technology needed to counter urgent threats is mature  before the threat fully materializes, as well as improve the synergy  between the requirements, acquisition, and research communities.  However, JRAC’s most difficult challenge, according to its Director,  continues to be prioritizing needs and quickly identifying the resources  needed to execute a solution, which is the responsibility of the DOD  components.
Referring to JRAC as “mission essential” for effective coordination with  the services, JIEDDO, and other agencies addressing urgent warfighter  needs, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command has called for a  permanent organizational structure led by a senior leader capable of  coordinating, influencing, and directing actions. We and others have found  that establishing a senior executive council is a best practice that can  provide an implementation team—such as JRAC—access to senior  leadership while reinforcing the team’s accountability for successfully  implementing the program. An executive council can set policies, ensure  that decisions are made quickly, resolve conflicts that arise, review and  approve plans, and monitor and report progress back to top leaders of the  organization. Members of such a council, which could include both  political and career executives within the organization, would work with  the department Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and other high-level  appointees to develop a leadership direction and communicate the  leadership’s position.
Without a departmentwide approach to addressing its funding challenges,  DOD will continue to struggle to field timely solutions to problems that  create risk to warfighter lives or mission failure. Further, extended time  frames in identifying and securing funding for solutions to joint urgent  needs and challenges to JRAC’s mission will persist. Conversely, a JRAC  with support from an interagency executive council with the means to  better leverage funding from across DOD, all under the oversight of top- level DOD officials, would be in an improved position to provide timely  solutions to meet the urgent needs of warfighters while assuring effective  use of DOD resources.
section_title: Technological Immaturity or Complexity of Potential Solutions Can Lead to Longer Response Times
paragraphs: In 14 of 23 case studies we conducted (8 joint, 2 Army, and 4 Marine  Corps), technological immaturity or complexity was a factor that led to  longer time frames for fielding solutions to urgent needs. In the 8  technologically challenged joint urgent needs cases we found, solutions  for 2 requests—both related to the Active Denial System—were never  fielded because the capability was technologically immature and could not  be adequately sized or adapted for operational use in a wartime  environment and under changing theater conditions. Solutions for the  remaining 6 technologically challenged joint urgent needs were eventually  fielded, but the average response time from theater endorsement to  fielding ranged from 320 to 497 days with an average of 393 days. In one of  the more protracted cases, the Combined Joint Task Force–82 in  Afghanistan endorsed a request on October 20, 2007, for an improvised  explosive device detection system capable of detecting devices that were  buried underground. However, following JRAC’s request that JIEDDO  accept responsibility for providing a solution, 497 days passed before  JIEDDO began initially fielding a solution because additional time was  required to develop the experimental Husky Mounted Detection System. In  a recent DOD Inspector General report, the Inspector General determined  that JIEDDO decided to produce the system in large numbers before  determining its operational effectiveness and suitability. Nevertheless,  while these cases exceeded the original 120-day fielding target expressed  in both Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD guidance, they fall within the 2-year  time frame used by JRAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Guidance for the Army process does not address the technological  complexity or maturity of a potential solution to an urgent need. Guidance  for the Marine Corps process states that capability gaps and solutions to  urgent needs are not restricted to commercially available equipment or  technologies and may require the rapid development of new capabilities.  Conversely, when Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to prescribe  procedures for the rapid acquisition and deployment of urgently needed  items in the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA, it specified that those items should be  either currently under development by DOD or already available from the  commercial sector. Further, DOD guidance on the scope of its joint urgent  needs process states that urgent operational solutions should not involve  the development of a new technology or capability. However, the  acceleration of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration or the  minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar  mission is within the scope of the joint process.
According to JRAC and military service sponsors for solutions to joint  urgent needs, requests are becoming increasingly more technologically  complex. As of June 2, 2009, JRAC indicated that approximately 20 joint  urgent needs were sufficiently impacted by technological development  concerns that their projected fielding date is uncertain. For example, one  urgent need request asked for explosive ordinance disposal suits and  helmets equipped with night vision capability. The Multi-National Force  Iraq submitted the request in May 2005. Initially, the Army worked with the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and  Low Intensity Conflicts to develop a prototype to meet the warfighter’s  need, but this effort proved unsuccessful. In March 2007, U.S. Central  Command consolidated the initial urgent need with two additional urgent  needs requests it had received from the theater for bomb suit helmets with  night vision capability. In April 2007, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and JRAC  validated and approved the urgent need request and assigned it to  JIEDDO, which has thus far been unable to develop a successful  prototype.
We have reported on the department’s success in fielding MRAPs in  response to an urgent need, and stated that, among several factors  contributing to the success of the program were that 1) DOD kept the  requirements simple, clear, and flexible and did not dictate a single  acceptable solution, and 2) the department made sure that only mature  technologies and stable designs were used by setting a very short and  inflexible schedule. In addition, the Defense Science Board reported  recently that any rapid response to an urgent need must be based on  proven technology and robust manufacturing processes because attempts  to squeeze new technology development into an urgent time frame create  risks for delays and ultimately may not adequately address an existing  capability gap. The board stated in its report that, in order to achieve  initial deployment of a solution in weeks or months, technology must be  sufficiently mature and likely filled by commercial or government off-the- shelf products, or foreign government sources. Further, the board stated  that needs that cannot be met with mature technology should be handed  to the defense science and technology community as a high priority for  further development. Sponsors for joint solutions we spoke with  expressed concerns that the maturity of the technology associated with  approved urgent needs solutions is often overstated, ultimately requiring  further integration, development, and testing before the solutions can be  successfully acquired and produced. The board advocated a triage process  to differentiate between different urgent needs and determine whether an  urgent need should be addressed through expedited acquisition  procedures or the department’s traditional acquisition system.
Both of the services’ processes include procedures for reviewing whether  a potential solution that requires the development of a new technology  should be sustained for the long term, across the service, as a formal  acquisition program. Army and Marine Corps officials involved in their  respective urgent needs processes stated that they prefer urgent needs  requests that cite capability gaps rather than specific solutions in order to  provide the warfighter with flexibility to utilize creative solutions that may  be inexpensive and readily available but unknown to the warfighter. CJCSI  3470.01 is unclear about who should be responsible for applying the  technological maturity criteria, and based on our case studies it remains  unclear who is responsible during the review, endorsement, and approval  phases to apply the criteria, remove those urgent needs that fall outside of  the scope of the process, and recommend a different approach. Based on  the results of our case studies, we found that attempts to meet urgent  needs with technologically complex or immature technologies risk  prolonging the fielding of solutions, and could result in fielding a  capability too late to effectively address rapidly changing theater  conditions. As we state earlier in this report, DOD lacks clearly defined  roles and responsibilities for managing DOD’s urgent needs processes in  general. As a result, the department faces difficulty in ensuring that the  joint process is implemented efficiently and effectively and in identifying  the appropriate personnel who are accountable for operations,  stewardship of resources, and achieving results.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Due to rapidly changing battlefield threats in Iraq and Afghanistan,  Congress has recognized DOD’s need to be more nimble in its response to  warfighter requests for urgently needed capabilities than the department’s  usual acquisitions process allows. Similarly, DOD’s leadership has  recognized the importance of rapidly procuring solutions to meet  warfighter needs during contingency operations. Although the  establishment of the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs  processes improved capabilities available to the warfighter, without  improvements to the management framework to incorporate additional  internal control standards, DOD risks fielding solutions that are either too  late to do good or that do not successfully meet warfighter needs. In the  absence of consolidated and updated departmentwide guidance  permanently establishing its joint urgent needs process, and clearly  delineated roles, responsibilities, and authorities of various stakeholders,  the department will continue to face challenges implementing the process,  monitoring the process to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in each of its  phases, and evaluating results. In addition, unless DOD’s joint urgent  needs guidance and acquisition policy clearly communicate the availability  of the rapid acquisition authority that the services and the JRAC can use to  meet urgent needs, the services could continue to miss opportunities to  quickly field urgently needed solutions to the theater of operations and  inadvertently increase costs by unnecessarily prolonging the acquisition  process. Furthermore, without more comprehensive, complete, and  reliable data that can be used to accurately track and document key  process milestones, as well as to create reports for management review,  DOD will continue to lack the ability to oversee and track the progress of  individual requests or to determine which phases of the process, if any,  might need adjustments to prevent unnecessary delays. Finally, a formal  mechanism for soliciting and collecting feedback from servicemembers in  theater is essential for determining how well fielded solutions are meeting  warfighter requests as well as ensuring that the resources invested in the  urgent needs process are achieving the desired results.
For the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs processes, challenges  in the initiation and funding phases, in particular, can significantly  increase the number of days—or weeks, or months—that elapse between  the time a warfighter submits an urgent request and the time a solution is  fielded. When the personnel responsible for documenting and reviewing  urgent needs requests do not receive needed training before arriving in the  theater of operations, they can become quickly overwhelmed by the  volume of requests, leading to backlogs, errors, and delays. Unless DOD  takes steps to ensure that both unit requirements officers and senior force  management officers responsible for processing urgent needs requests  receive training on appropriate uses of the service and joint processes, as  well as how to craft related documentation, before they arrive in theater,  warfighter requests are likely to continue to face delays early in those  processes. More consistent predeployment training would be an important  step toward ensuring that warfighters receive critical capabilities as  quickly as possible. Moreover, in the absence of OSD leadership on  recommending when to use the rapid acquisition authority Congress  provided the department specifically for the purpose of funding solutions  to urgent needs, some requests that have been validated as urgent may  continue to experience increasing time frames during the funding phase of  the process. Until OSD begins to play a proactive, rather than a reactive  role in the use of its rapid acquisition authority, urgent requests that have  been assigned to one of the services or components for funding are likely  to continue to compete with longer-term service programs and, in some  cases, wait until the next annual budget process to be funded from the  base budget for the next fiscal year. Similarly, without a means to secure  cooperation from the services and other DOD components to reprogram  and transfer funds to meet joint urgent needs, JRAC will continue to face  challenges in providing timely solutions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following nine  actions:  To improve the department’s ability to fully assess how well the urgent  needs processes are addressing critical warfighter deficiencies and to  measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, military services,  and other DOD components, as necessary, take the following actions to  permanently establish the joint urgent needs process and to improve  consistency with federal internal control standards:    Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, and  other DOD components, as necessary, through the issuance of new or  updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, to identify who is  accountable for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all  phases of the process—including applying the technological maturity  criteria.  Include rapid acquisition authority procedures available to officials  responsible for meeting joint urgent need requests.
Develop and implement standards for accurately tracing and  documenting key process milestones such as funding, acquisition,  fielding, and assessment, and for updating data management systems to  create activity reports to facilitate management review and external  oversight of the process.
Develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel, for  the military services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff  and JRAC on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs.
To better inform DOD personnel of the options for acquiring capabilities  to meet warfighters’ needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  amend DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02 to reflect that  officials responsible for acquisition of urgently needed equipment may  need to consider using joint urgent processes, including rapid acquisition  authority.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Secretary of the  Army to amend the urgent needs process guidance in Army Regulation 71- 9 to include distinct performance standards that distinguish how different  types of urgent needs, such as nonstandard mission equipment shortages  and new capabilities, should be processed, and to develop and implement  standard operating procedures for headquarters officials to use when  processing urgent needs requests.
To better address training challenges the department faces in preventing  process delays and improving its ability to more quickly field solutions to  the theater, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Army to update training procedures to include instruction  for unit requirements officers regarding the development of joint and  Army urgent need statements in order to ensure that these personnel are  prepared to effectively draft urgent requirement documents upon arrival in  theater.
To more rapidly field urgent needs solutions aimed at eliminating  deficiencies that have resulted in combat fatalities, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense amend its implementing memorandum for the  department’s rapid acquisition authority to designate an OSD entity, such  as the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L, with primary responsibility  for recommending to the Secretary of Defense when to implement the  department’s statutory rapid acquisition authority—as provided in Pub. L.  No. 108-375—as urgent needs are validated by the Joint Staff.
To expedite the funding needed to field approved solutions to joint urgent  needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense create an executive  council to include the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),  the Director of JRAC, the Comptrollers of each of the military services,  and other stakeholders as needed, and appoint a chair for the purpose of  making timely funding decisions as urgent needs are validated by the Joint  Staff.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with four of  our recommendations and partially concurred with five other  recommendations. Technical comments were provided separately and  incorporated as appropriate. The department’s written comments are  reprinted in appendix III.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to clearly define roles,  responsibilities, and accountability through the issuance of new or  updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. The department stated  that it is developing new DOD policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is  updating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)  3470.01 Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational  Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, to clearly define roles and  responsibilities of all DOD components.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to include rapid acquisition  authority procedures available to officials responsible for meeting joint  urgent need requests in the issuance of new or updated OSD and Joint  Chiefs of Staff guidance. In its response, the department noted that it is  developing additional DOD policy to facilitate the use of rapid acquisition  authority and has issued guidance to Service Acquisition Executives to  ensure the use of rapid acquisition authority is considered when necessary  to address urgent needs. While we agree that the proposed action is a good  step towards addressing our recommendation, we also believe, as we  recommended, that DOD should include these procedures in the new  urgent needs policy it is also developing in order to better inform program  managers of all procedures available to them for fielding solutions quickly  to the theater and to follow internal control standards that cite the  importance of policies and procedures that enforce management’s  directives and integrate accountability for achieving effective results.
DOD concurred with our recommendations to develop and implement  standards for accurately tracing and documenting key process milestones  and for updating data management systems; and to develop an established,  formal feedback mechanism or channel for the military services to use.  The department stated that it is developing new DOD policy and the Joint  Chiefs of Staff is updating the Chairman’s instruction to establish  requirements for oversight and management of the fulfillment of urgent  needs from initiation, operational assessment, fielding, and ultimate  disposition. DOD stated further that visibility of actions of the DOD  components to fulfill urgent needs is expected to be incorporated into new  DOD policy and should improve the ability for OSD to provide oversight of  the fulfillment of urgent needs and satisfaction of the warfighter’s  requirements. We agree that new and updated policy is a good first step to  addressing these deficiencies. However, it is not clear from DOD’s  response if the updated policies will directly establish standards for  collecting accurate data and updating data systems, and include a method  for obtaining feedback from the warfighter. Unless these components are  part of DOD’s revised policies, DOD will still fall short of being able to  fully oversee and manage the urgent needs processes and will remain  inconsistent with internal control standards.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to amend DOD Directive  5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02 to reflect that officials responsible  for acquisition of urgently needed equipment may need to consider using  joint urgent processes, including rapid acquisition authority. The  department noted that it is developing new DOD policy to establish  responsibilities for oversight and management of the fulfillment of urgent  needs and the utilization of rapid acquisition authority. DOD stated further  that this policy development is expected to result in a DOD directive that  will be separate from the DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction  5000.02. While we agree that DOD’s effort to develop new policy for the  urgent needs process is a positive step, as stated in our report, the DOD  acquisition directive and instruction represent the overarching guidance  for the Defense Acquisition System. As such, we continue to believe that  these documents should also be amended to better inform program  managers of the range of options available to respond to urgent warfighter  needs.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to amend the Army’s  urgent needs process guidance in Army Regulation 71-9 to include distinct  performance standards that distinguish how different types of urgent  needs should be processed, and to develop and implement standard  operating procedures. The department stated that, in December 2009, the  Army updated its regulation and partially addressed our  recommendations. DOD stated further that upon issuance of additional  DOD policy and an update to the Chairman’s instruction, additional  changes to the Army regulation and other DOD components policies may  be required. We are aware of the Army’s update to its regulation and  reviewed it prior to issuance of our draft to DOD. Based on our review, we  found that the updated regulation did not address the lack of distinct  performance standards and standard operating procedures. Therefore, we  continue to support our recommendation to further amend the regulation  to address these issues.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to update the Army’s  training procedures regarding the development of joint and Army urgent  need statements. The department noted that the proposed direction by the  Secretary of Defense should be to all military department secretaries as  well as the heads of other DOD components because our findings based  upon the assessment of the Army’s urgent needs processes are applicable  across the department. DOD acknowledged that training and improved  instructions for all DOD component personnel involved in the generation  of urgent needs requirements and their fulfillment would improve the  department’s ability to respond to the warfighter’s urgent needs. The  department stated further that it is developing additional DOD policy that  will direct DOD components to develop procedures for urgent operational  needs and the implementation steps of these procedures will be monitored  by OSD to ensure they are accomplished and include the training we  recommended. While our evaluation focused specifically on Army  practices, we agree that if the Secretary has determined deficiencies in  training present a capability gap across DOD in the urgent needs process,  updated training procedures for all department personnel involved in the  process are appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to amend its  implementing memorandum for the department’s rapid acquisition  authority to designate an OSD entity with primary responsibility for  recommending when the authority should be implemented. The  department stated that it is developing additional DOD policy to facilitate  the use of rapid acquisition authority and has issued guidance to Service  Acquisition Executives to ensure the use of rapid acquisition authority is  considered when necessary to address urgent needs. DOD noted further  that it is continuing to evaluate the need for legislative changes to enhance  rapid acquisition authority. While we recognize DOD’s efforts to develop  additional policy, issue guidance, and evaluate potential legislative  changes, we continue to support our recommendation that the Secretary  designate an OSD entity to recommend when this authority should be  implemented. During our evaluation, we found that unless OSD plays a  proactive role in identifying cases eligible for this authority rather than a  reactive role, requests for urgent needs may not be funded in a timely  manner due to other competing service priorities.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to create an executive  council to make timely funding decisions as urgent needs are validated by  the Joint Staff. The department noted that it is developing additional DOD  policy that is expected to clarify processes for funding urgent needs, and  intends to use established senior governance councils to achieve the goal  of the recommendation rather than establish a new council. We did not  evaluate the roles and missions of these existing senior governance  councils as to the extent they consistute the appropriate body to address  funding solutions for urgent needs. We agree in principle with the intent to  utilize existing councils to make timely funding decisions for urgent needs  as long as those councils have the authority to directly address our  recommendation and their membership includes those offices we cited.  The department also recommended we change language in our report  from “. . . as solutions are validated by the Joint Staff to “. . . as needs are  validated by the Joint Staff” because the Joint Staff does not validate  solutions but the requirements, or needs. We incorporated this language in  our final report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will be available at  no charge on GAO’s Web site http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8365 or by e-mail at SolisW@GAO.GOV. Contact information  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who have made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has a  means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes we  conducted site visits, reviewed key documentation, and interviewed  relevant DOD, joint, and military service officials. During this review we  focused on urgent wartime needs submitted through the joint, Army, and  Marine Corps urgent needs processes as these are the processes most  frequently used, and commanders used the Air Force and Navy urgent  needs processes much less frequently. Air Force officials stated they had  one active request under their urgent needs process when we began our  review, and Navy officials stated they had eight active requests under their  urgent needs process when we began our review. We visited forces  conducting operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility  and gathered information on how they identify, document, and submit  urgent requests through the urgent needs processes, and on the fielding  and assessment of solutions in the theater. We conducted site visits to  joint, Army, and Marine Corps offices responsible for the respective urgent  needs processes, as well as offices of officials who participate in reviewing  urgent needs requests and developing funding strategies and solutions to  be fielded. We reviewed existing policy and guidance applicable to joint,  Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes, and compared them to  our standards for internal control in the federal government. We also  compared actual practices, tools, and data systems used to manage the  joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes to our internal  control standards. We assessed the reliability of the databases and  information systems used to process urgent needs requests by 1)  interviewing knowledgeable officials, 2) reviewing data system guidance  and procedures when they were available, and 3) conducting limited  electronic testing that included comparing values from source  documentation with data elements in the data systems. While our  assessment of databases and systems used to process urgent needs  requests showed that some data elements were accurate and supported by  sufficient documentation, we found that other items for reporting specific  urgent needs requests were incomplete, and not sufficiently reliable for  reporting specific results here, or to support accurate, useful management  reports related to overall results. As a result, we determined that we would  conduct case studies of selected urgent needs requests to provide insights  related to this, and the following objective. We used data elements from  the information systems that we had determined were sufficiently reliable  to support the selection of case study candidates from the universe of  joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs requests.
To determine what challenges, if any, have affected the overall  responsiveness of DOD’s urgent needs processes we analyzed joint, Army,  and Marine Corps data management systems in order to review the data  collected on the time frames between decision points and determine how  timely and effective each process was for providing solutions to urgent  warfighter needs. To conduct this analysis we selected a nonprobability  sample of cases to review from a universe of 49 Joint Urgent Operational  Needs, 4,054 Army Operational Needs Statements, and 524 Marine Corps  Universal Urgent Need Statements. Our selected cases included 11 joint, 6  Army, and 6 Marine Corps for a total of 23 urgent needs cases reviewed.  To ensure that the case studies reflect the current DOD urgent response  processes as much as possible, we selected cases that were submitted  after the latest iteration of updates in each process. We considered urgent  needs requests initiated in the Marine Corps process after September 1,  2006; initiated in the Army process after October 1, 2006; and initiated in  the joint process after August 1, 2006. We then eliminated 1) requests for  which solutions have not been fielded and 2) requests for items that the  Army already procures. We selected cases for which solutions have not  been produced in order to explore aspects of the process based on their  visibility, cost, and scope. We selected cases in order to represent distinct  types of needs such as: Command and Control; Force Protection;  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Counter-Improvised  Explosive Device; Logistical Support; and Miscellaneous (such as  nonlethal weapons or other items not so easily categorized). We also  selected cases where duplication of effort appeared possible, and urgent  needs requests that commanders in Iraq or Afghanistan identified as high  priority. Assessments of the selected cases were based on a comparison of  the time required to achieve key objectives in completing the urgent needs  process against stated goals and interviewing knowledgeable officials  regarding the relative ease or difficulty in accomplishing these objectives,  as well as end users in theater regarding the sufficiency of fielded  solutions. In order to allow for comparison across the joint and service  urgent needs processes, we constructed a chronology of each urgent need  beginning with initiation of the urgent needs process and culminating with  the initial fielding of a solution in theater, if applicable. Since each urgent  needs process within DOD is distinct and uses differing terms and  procedures, we used a consistent approach to demonstrate progression  between key events and decision points across time lines from initiation of  an urgent need request to initial fielding of a solution However, in  collecting data for our case studies, we found that documentation  regarding the initial theater recognition of an urgent need was inconsistent  and often unavailable. For further details and the results of our case  studies see appendix II.
We interviewed officials from the Department of Defense; the Joint Chiefs  of Staff; all four of the military services; two selected combatant  commands; and military activities participating in ongoing military  operations. The specific offices and military activities we interviewed and  obtained information from include the following:    Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, Arlington, Va.;    Office of the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for  Innovation & Technology Transition, Arlington, Va.;    Joint Rapid Action Cell, Arlington, Va.    Rapid Reaction Technology office, Arlington, Va.
Defense Information Systems Agency, Falls Church, Va.    U.S. Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Roslyn, Va.    U.S. Army Headquarters, Arlington, Va.;    Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Operations    Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, Force Development    U.S. Army, 224th Military Intelligence Battalion    Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics,  and Technology), Crystal City, Va.
U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich.    U.S. Army, 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade, Headquarters, Camp  Liberty, Victory Base Complex, Baghdad, Iraq.
U.S. Army, 18th Airborne Corps, 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade,  Fort Bragg, N.C.
U.S. Army, 15th Military Intelligence Battalion, Joint Base Balad, Iraq.    U.S. Army, Army Requirements and Resourcing Board Council of  Colonels.
U.S. Army, Program Executive Office for Ammunition, Picatinny  Arsenal, N.J.
U.S. Army, Communications Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth,  N.J.
U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Central Command, Tampa, Fla.    U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Capability Development Command,  Quantico, Va.
U.S. Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,  Development and Acquisition, Rapid Capability Development and  Deployment, Arlington, Va.
U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Requirements  Division, Arlington, Va.
U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Va.
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and  Assessment Directorate (J8), Capabilities and Acquisition Division,  Arlington, Va.
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Crystal City, Va.
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, Va.
U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Fla.    Multi-National Corps-Iraq; Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.    Commander, Multi-National Forces-West, Al Asad Air Base, Anbar  Province, Iraq.
Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.    Multi-National Division-Central, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.    Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Science and Technology (MND S&T); Camp  Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.
U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to March 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Case Studies of Selected Urgent Need Requests
paragraphs: We selected 23 urgent need requests as case studies to illustrate issues  that may impact the amount of time required to provide solutions to the  warfighter. We reviewed 6 Army, 6 Marine Corps, and 11 joint requests.  Although each of these urgent needs processes is distinct, we identified  seven broad phases that we used to track the progression of each request  over time and to compare performance across the Army’s Operational  Needs Statement process, the Marine Corps’ Urgent Universal Needs  Statement process, and the Joint Urgent Operational Needs processes.  These phases are: initiation, theater endorsement, command validation,  headquarters approval, funding, contract award, and initial fielding. Figure  1 illustrates these phases.
For each of our 23 case studies, we tracked the progress of an urgent need  request beginning with the initiation of an urgent needs process and  culminating with the initial fielding of a solution, if any. Each of the figures  that follow represents the case studies we selected, describing an  identified need or capability gap, the proposed solution, and a brief  description of challenges, if any, affecting the ability of the urgent needs  process(es) in question to rapidly field a response to that request, and a  photograph. Although each urgent needs request is unique some of the  requests we reviewed were closely related. Where appropriate we  combined these case studies in our discussion below. Challenges, if any,  to providing a solution for an urgent needs request were identified in  discussions with agency officials and supported by our review of the  request’s progress through each phase of the process. Further information  on our methodology can be found in appendix I. Issues associated with  funding and technical complexity were the most frequent challenges  affecting the response or causing delays.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information please contact William Solis, (202) 512-8365 or  solisw@gao.gov.
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Cary B. Russell (Assistant  Director), Susan Ditto, Larry Junek, Ron La Due Lake, Lonnie McAllister,  Jason Pogacnik, Paulina T. Reaves, Matthew Tabbert, and John E. Trubey  made key contributions to this report.