Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed
Published: 2009-12-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation's borders against crimes and potential terrorist threats, with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the FBI, having key information sharing roles. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) local and tribal officials in border communities received useful information from their federal partners, (2) federal agencies supported state fusion centers'--where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing--efforts to develop border intelligence products, and (3) local and tribal agencies were aware of the suspicious activities they are to report. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures; contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 20 agencies in border communities and five fusion centers (based on geographic location and size); and interviewed DHS and FBI officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Officials from 15 of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies in the border communities GAO contacted said they received information directly from at least one federal agency in the vicinity (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI) that was useful in enhancing their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Nine of the 20 agencies reported receiving information from all three federal agencies. Overall, where federal officials had discussed local and tribal officials' information needs and had established information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with them--consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices--the majority of the local and tribal officials reported receiving useful information. However, most local and tribal officials that reported federal agencies had not discussed information needs and had not established partnerships with them also said they had not received useful information. By more fully identifying the information needs of local and tribal agencies along the borders and establishing information sharing partnerships, federal agencies could be better positioned to provide local and tribal agencies with information that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Federal officials at two of the five state fusion centers we visited were supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence products or reports that contained information on border crimes and potential terrorist threats, as discussed in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. DHS recognizes that it needs to add personnel to other fusion centers in border states to, among other things, support the creation of such products, and is developing plans to do so, but cited funding issues and competing priorities as barriers. The creation of border intelligence products--such as those developed by two of the fusion centers we visited--represent potential approaches that DHS and the FBI could use to identify promising practices that other fusion centers could adopt. Identifying such practices is important because of the central role the federal government places on fusion centers to facilitate the sharing of information. Also, DHS had not obtained feedback from local and tribal officials on the utility and quality of the border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped to develop. Additional efforts to obtain such feedback would support DHS and FBI efforts to improve the utility and quality of future products. Officials from 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted said that federal agencies had not defined what suspicious activities or indicators rise to the level of potential terrorist threats and should be reported to federal agencies or fusion centers. Recognizing this problem, federal agencies are participating in national efforts to standardize suspicious activity reporting. Until such efforts are implemented, defining suspicious activity indicators and current reporting processes would help better position local and tribal officials along the borders to identify and report incidents indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorist threats.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified terrorism as  one of the primary threats the United States faces on the northern and  southwest international land borders, along with illegal immigration and  drug trafficking, among others. In many border communities, the  individuals who are best positioned to observe suspicious activities that  may be related to these threats and report the activities to the federal  government are local and tribal law enforcement officers, particularly in  communities with a minimal federal presence. Therefore, it is critical that  federal agencies with key responsibilities for securing the nation’s  borders—including DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Department of  Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—share information  with local and tribal officials in border communities that enhances their  situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats.
Since information sharing weaknesses were a major contributing factor to  the nation’s lack of preparedness for the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, the federal government has called for a number of information  sharing initiatives. One theme common to many of these efforts is for  federal agencies to share information on terrorism-related matters with  local and tribal law enforcement agencies—including those in border  communities—to enhance their situational awareness of potential terrorist  threats. The initiatives also recognize that an improved information  sharing environment is to be constructed on a foundation of trusted  partnerships at all levels of government based on a shared commitment to  detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism.  Further, most states and some local governments have established fusion  centers that address gaps in terrorism-related information sharing that the  federal government cannot address alone and provide a conduit for  information sharing within the state. Finally, since late 2007, the federal  government has been working with state and local law enforcement  agencies to establish a nationwide process for reporting suspicious  activities that may be related to terrorism.
Our prior work on the importance of including state, local, and tribal  entities in information sharing has shown that this sharing continues to be  a significant challenge for the federal government. In January 2005, we  designated information sharing for homeland security a high-risk area  because the government had continued to face formidable challenges in  analyzing and disseminating this information in a timely, accurate, and  useful manner. We reported that information is a crucial tool in fighting  terrorism and that its timely dissemination is critical to maintaining the  security of our nation. This area remained on the high-risk list for our  January 2009 update. As a result of this designation, we continuously  monitor federal information sharing efforts.
Recognizing that local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border  communities are important partners in our first line of defense against  criminals and terrorists entering the United States, you asked us to assess  information sharing between federal agencies and local and tribal law  enforcement agencies in border communities. Specifically, our work  addressed to what extent  local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are  receiving information from their federal partners that enhances the  agencies’ situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist  threats; federal agencies are assisting fusion centers’ efforts to develop border  intelligence products that enhance local and tribal agencies’ situational  awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats; and  local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are  aware of the specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism  they are to report and to whom, and the process through which they  should report this information.
To identify criteria for answering these questions, we analyzed relevant  laws, directives, policies, and procedures related to information sharing,  such as the October 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing and  the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Commission Act). The 9/11 Commission Act provides for the  establishment of a State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative at  DHS and contains numerous provisions that address the federal  government’s information sharing responsibilities to state and local fusion  centers, including those that serve border communities.
To examine the information sharing that occurs between local and tribal  law enforcement agencies in border communities and federal agencies  that have a local presence in these communities (CBP’s Border Patrol,  ICE, and the FBI), we conducted site visits to five states that are  geographically dispersed along the northern and southwest borders  (Arizona, Montana, New York, Texas, and Washington). Within these  states, we met with county sheriffs, local police chiefs, and tribal police  chiefs from a total of 23 law enforcement agencies and asked them about  the information they received from federal agencies in their localities. We  also asked them about whether federal officials had discussed local and  tribal officials’ information needs and had established information sharing  partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with them— consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best  practices described in GAO reports. After our visits, we sent follow-up  questions to all 23 local and tribal agencies we visited in order to obtain  consistency in how we requested and obtained information for reporting  purposes. Three agencies did not respond to our follow-up efforts and  were excluded from our analysis. Thus, our analysis and reporting is based  on our visits and subsequent activities with the 20 local and tribal agencies  that responded to our follow-up questions. We also met with local  representatives of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their  perspectives on the information sharing that occurred, and compared this  information to that provided by local and tribal agencies in order to  identify barriers to sharing.
To assess the extent to which federal agencies assisted fusion centers in  developing border intelligence products, as discussed in the 9/11  Commission Act, we reviewed products developed by fusion centers to  determine the extent to which they provided border security–relevant  information. We also met with and conducted subsequent follow-up  conversations with fusion center directors and other senior fusion center  officials in the five states we visited to obtain their views on the  importance of developing such products and about the level of support  federal agencies were providing in developing these products. We asked  each of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted  whether they received border intelligence products from their state’s  primary fusion center and, if so, we discussed their views on the  usefulness of such products. We also interviewed senior officials from  DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)—the office responsible for  coordinating the federal government’s support to fusion centers—and  headquarters components of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss  their efforts to support fusion centers’ development of border intelligence  products, identify promising practices for developing such products, and  obtain feedback from local and tribal officials on the usefulness of the  products.
Finally, to determine the extent to which local and tribal agencies in  border communities were aware of the suspicious activities they are to  report, we asked officials from the 20 agencies what, if any, information  federal agencies or fusion centers had provided them on the kinds of  suspicious activities that could be indicators of or precursors to terrorism  and what processes they had in place for reporting information on these  activities. We also reviewed the Findings and Recommendations of the  Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project  to determine the extent to which the federal government recognizes the  role of suspicious activity reporting for detecting and mitigating potential  terrorist threats. We also examined indicators of various suspicious  activities the FBI and fusion centers developed to determine if they  contained border-specific content. We interviewed DOJ officials who were  leading the national initiative to standardize suspicious activity  reporting—as well as those from headquarters components of DHS and  the FBI—to discuss the status of the national initiative and whether  border-specific indicators were needed and are being considered as part of  this initiative.
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of agencies in border  communities to contact, the information we obtained at these locations  may not be generalized across the wider population of law enforcement  agencies in border communities. However, because we selected these  border communities based on the variety of their geographic location,  proximity to federal agencies, and other factors, the information we  gathered from these locations provided us with a general understanding of  information sharing between federal agencies and state, local, and tribal  law enforcement agencies along the border. Appendix I provides more  details about our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 through  December 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Information Sharing Roles of Key Federal and State Entities
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and subsequently enacted laws— including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004  and the 9/11 Commission Act—assigned DHS responsibility for sharing  information related to terrorism and homeland security with its state,  local, and tribal partners, and authorized additional measures and funding  in support of carrying out this mandate. DHS designated I&A as having  responsibility for coordinating efforts to share information that pertains to  the safety and security of the U.S. homeland across all levels of  government, including federal, state, local, and tribal government  agencies. In June 2006, DHS tasked I&A with the responsibility for  managing DHS’s support to fusion centers. I&A established a State and  Local Fusion Center Joint Program Management Office as the focal point  for supporting fusion center operations and to maximize state and local  capabilities to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorist and homeland  security threats. The office was also established to improve the  information flow between DHS and the fusion centers, as well as provide  fusion centers with access to the federal intelligence community.
Two DHS components—CBP and ICE—have responsibilities for securing  the nation’s land borders against terrorism and other threats to homeland  security. Specifically, CBP’s Border Patrol agents are responsible for  preventing the illegal entry of people and contraband into the United  States between ports of entry. This includes preventing terrorists, their  weapons, and other related materials from entering the country. Border  Patrol’s national strategy calls for it to improve and expand coordination  and partnerships with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to  gain control of the nation’s borders. ICE is charged with preventing  terrorist and criminal activity by targeting the people, money, and  materials that support terrorist and criminal organizations. According to  the agency’s 2008 annual report, ICE recognizes the need for strong  partnerships with other law enforcement agencies, including those on the  local level, in order to combat criminal and terrorist threats.
The FBI serves as the nation’s principal counterterrorism investigative  agency, and its mission includes protecting and defending the United  States against terrorist threats. The FBI conducts counterterrorism  investigations through its field offices and Joint Terrorism Task Forces.  In addition, each FBI field office has established a Field Intelligence  Group, which consists of intelligence analysts and special agents who  gather and analyze information related to identified threats and criminal  activity, including terrorism. Each group is to share information with other  Field Intelligence Groups across the country, FBI headquarters, and other  federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies to fill  gaps in intelligence.
Fusion centers serve as the primary focal points within the state and local  environment for the receipt and sharing of information related to terrorist  and homeland security threats. In March 2006, DHS released its Support  and Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers. In this plan,  DHS describes its responsibility to effectively collaborate with its federal,  state, and local partners to share information regarding these threats. To  facilitate the effective flow of information among fusion centers, DHS,  other federal partners, and the national intelligence community, the plan  calls for DHS to assign trained and experienced operational and  intelligence personnel to fusion centers and includes the department’s  methodology for prioritizing the assignments. The plan also notes that  identifying, reviewing, and sharing fusion center best practices and lessons  learned is vital to the success of DHS’s overall efforts. Accordingly, it  recommends that DHS develop rigorous processes to identify, review, and  share these best practices and lessons learned. In December 2008, DHS  issued a document entitled Interaction with State and Local Fusion  Centers Concept of Operations. According to the document, each DHS  component field office whose mission aligns with the priorities of the  fusion center is to establish a relationship with that center. This  relationship should include but not be limited to routine meetings and  consistent information sharing among DHS and state and local personnel  assigned to each center.
The FBI’s role in and support of individual fusion centers varies depending  on the level of functionality of the fusion center and the interaction  between the particular center and the local FBI field office. FBI efforts to  support fusion centers include assigning special agents and intelligence  analysts to fusion centers, sharing information, providing space or rent for  fusion center facilities in some locations, and ensuring that state and local  personnel have appropriate security clearances as well as access to FBI  personnel.
section_title: Statutory Provisions and National Strategies Governing Information Sharing
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, several statutes have been enacted into law  designed to enhance the sharing of terrorism-related information among  federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, and the federal government has  developed related strategies, policies, and guidelines to meet its statutory  obligations. Regarding border threats, the 9/11 Commission Act contains  several provisions that address the federal government’s efforts to share  information with state and local fusion centers that serve border  communities. For example, the act provides for the Secretary of DHS to  assign, to the maximum extent practicable, officers and intelligence  analysts from DHS components—including CBP and ICE—to state and  local fusion centers participating in DHS’s State, Local, and Regional  Fusion Center Initiative, with priority given to fusion centers located along  borders of the United States. The act provides that federal officers and  analysts assigned to fusion centers in general are to assist law  enforcement agencies in developing a comprehensive and accurate threat  picture, and to create intelligence and other information products for  dissemination to law enforcement agencies. In addition, federal officers  and analysts assigned to fusion centers along the borders are to have, as a  primary responsibility, the creation of border intelligence products that   (1) assist state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in efficiently  helping to detect terrorists and related contraband at U.S. borders;   (2) promote consistent and timely sharing of border security-relevant  information among jurisdictions along the nation’s borders; and   (3) enhance DHS’s situational awareness of terrorist threats in border  areas. The act further directed the Secretary of DHS to create a  mechanism for state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers to provide  voluntary feedback to DHS on the quality and utility of the intelligence  products developed under these provisions.
Also, in October 2007, the President issued the National Strategy for  Information Sharing. According to the strategy, an improved information  sharing environment is to be constructed on a foundation of trusted  partnerships at all levels of government, based on a shared commitment to  detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism.  The strategy identifies the federal government’s information sharing  responsibilities to include gathering and documenting the information that  state, local, and tribal agencies need to enhance their situational  awareness of terrorist threats and calls for authorities at all levels of  government to work together to obtain a common understanding of the  information needed to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks.  Specifically, the strategy requires that state, local, and tribal law  enforcement agencies have access to timely, credible, and actionable  information and intelligence about individuals and organizations intending  to carry out attacks within the United States; their organizations and their  financing; potential targets; activities that could have a nexus to terrorism;  and major events or circumstances that might influence state, local, and  tribal actions. The strategy also recognizes that fusion centers are vital  assets that are critical to sharing information related to terrorism, and will  serve as primary focal points within the state and local environment for  the receipt and sharing of terrorism-related information.
section_title: Past GAO Work on Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Efforts
paragraphs: In October 2001, we reported on the importance of sharing information  about terrorist threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, and lessons learned.  Specifically, we identified best practices in building successful information  sharing partnerships that could be applied to entities trying to develop the  means of appropriately sharing information. Among the best practices we  identified were (1) establishing trusted relationships with a wide variety of  federal and nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide  potentially useful information and advice; (2) agreeing to mechanisms for  sharing information, such as outreach meetings and task forces; and (3)  institutionalizing roles to help ensure continuity and diminish reliance on a  single individual.
Since we designated terrorism-related information sharing a high-risk area  in January 2005, we have continued to monitor federal information sharing  efforts. Also, as part of this monitoring, in April 2008, we reported on our  assessment of the status of fusion centers and how the federal government  is supporting them. Our fusion center report and subsequent testimony  highlighted continuing challenges—such as the centers’ ability to access  information and obtain funding—that DHS and DOJ needed to address to  support the fusion centers’ role in facilitating information sharing among  federal, state, and local governments. We also recognized the need for the  federal government to determine and articulate its long-term fusion center  role and whether it expects to provide resources to help ensure their  sustainability, and we made a recommendation to that effect to which DHS  agreed. At the time of this review, DHS was in the process of implementing  the recommendation.
section_title: Most Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted Found Information from Federal Partners Useful for Situational Awareness, but Adopting Further Measures Could Close Other Information Sharing Gaps
paragraphs: In general, local and tribal officials in the border communities we  contacted who reported to us that they received information directly from  the local office of Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI said it was useful for  enhancing their situational awareness of crimes along the border and  potential terrorist threats. Overall, where information sharing among  federal, local, and tribal agencies along the borders occurred, local and  tribal officials generally said they had discussed their information needs  with federal agencies in the vicinity and had established information  sharing partnerships with related mechanisms to share information with  federal officials—consistent with the National Strategy for Information  Sharing—while the agencies that reported not receiving information from  federal agencies generally said they had not discussed their needs and had  not established partnerships.
subsections: section_title: Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Received Information from Their Federal Partners Found It Useful in Enhancing Their Situational Awareness of Border Crimes and Potential Terrorist Threats
paragraphs: Officials from three-quarters (15 of 20) of the local and tribal law  enforcement agencies in the border communities we contacted said they  received information directly from the local office of at least one federal  agency (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI), and 9 of the 20 reported receiving  information from the local office of all three of these federal agencies.  However, 5 of the 20 reported that they did not receive information from  any of these three agencies, in part because information sharing  partnerships and related mechanisms to share information did not exist.  We discuss information sharing partnerships and other factors that affect  information sharing between federal agencies and local and tribal agencies  in border communities later in this report. Figure 1 shows the number of  local and tribal agencies that reported receiving information directly from  the local office of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI.
Overall, the local and tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted that  received information from federal agencies in the vicinity found it useful in  enhancing their situational awareness of border crimes and potential  terrorist threats.
subsections: section_title: Border Patrol
paragraphs: Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 14 of 20 border communities  we contacted said they received a range of information directly from local  Border Patrol officials, including incident reports and alerts regarding  specific individuals with potential links to criminal activity—such as illegal  immigration and drug trafficking—as well as border-related threat  assessments and reports of suspicious activity. According to the local and  tribal officials, they received this information through direct outreach or  visits, phone calls, and e-mails, as well as through issued alerts and  bulletins. Of the 14 local and tribal officials that reported receiving  information from Border Patrol officials in the vicinity, 12 said it was  useful and enhanced their situational awareness of criminal activities and  potential terrorist threats along the border and 2 did not take a position  when asked about the information’s usefulness. For example, one tribal  police department official reported that Border Patrol provides an area  assessment that specifically targets the illicit smuggling of humans and  contraband in and around the tribal lands, and depicted the threat posed  by illegal activity occurring in the area. The official said that this  assessment helped the department identify and emphasize those areas on  which to focus. Local and tribal officials from the remaining 6 border  communities we contacted said they did not receive any information  directly from Border Patrol officials in the vicinity, in part because  information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share  information did not exist.
Border Patrol officials in the communities we visited said they shared  information related to various types of crimes with their local and tribal  partners, including information related to illegal immigration and drug  trafficking. The officials said this information is shared primarily through  established information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms,  including joint border operations and task forces, such as Integrated  Border Enforcement Teams. The officials noted that they generally did  not have specific terrorism-related information to share with local and  tribal agencies, but that the information they share is intended to enhance  situational awareness of border crimes that terrorists could potentially  exploit, such as illegal immigration.
Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 10 of 20 border communities  we contacted said they received information from ICE officials in the  vicinity, including specific persons of interest they should be on the  lookout for, as well as information on drug smuggling and drug cartel  activities, human smuggling, and other crimes. The officials said such  information is important because it provides information that is pertinent  to their immediate area. These agencies reported receiving information by  e-mail or in person, as well as through participation in task forces, such as  Border Enforcement Security Task Forces. For example, in one  southwest border location, law enforcement officials said that the  department receives information about potential criminal activities in their  jurisdiction from ICE based on joint investigations it has conducted with  the agency.
Of the 10 local and tribal officials that reported receiving information from  local ICE officials, 8 said it was useful and enhanced their situational  awareness of criminal activities and potential terrorist threats along the  border and 2 did not take a position when asked about the information’s  usefulness. Officials from the remaining 10 local and tribal agencies we  contacted said they did not receive any information from local ICE  officials, in part because information sharing partnerships and related  mechanisms to share information did not exist.
According to ICE headquarters officials, in addition to sharing information  at the local level, ICE has significantly expanded its interaction with state,  local, and tribal law enforcement officials through automated systems that  allow these officials to access and search certain DHS and ICE law  enforcement and investigative information.
section_title: The FBI
paragraphs: Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 13 of 20 border locations we  contacted said they received a range of information directly from local FBI  officials, including intelligence assessments and bulletins, threat  assessments and terrorism-related alerts, and information on criminal  activity. Of the 13 local and tribal officials that reported receiving  information from local FBI officials, 12 said it was useful and enhanced  their situational awareness of potential terrorist threats along the border  and 1 did not take a position when asked about the information’s  usefulness. Local and tribal officials in 7 of the 20 border locations we  contacted said they did not receive any information directly from local FBI  officials, in part because information sharing partnerships and related  mechanisms to share information did not exist.
FBI officials in the border communities we visited said that they  understood the desire of local and tribal law enforcement agencies to  receive terrorism-related information that is specific to the border or to  their geographic area in particular. However, the officials explained that in  many cases, such information is classified, so the FBI can only share it  with officials that have a need to know the information and have the  requisite security clearances, as well as secure systems, networks, or  facilities to safeguard the information. FBI officials also said that  information related to ongoing investigations is generally only shared with  local officials that participate in an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, since  sharing the information outside the task force could jeopardize the  investigations. Finally, the officials said that at times, terrorism-related  information that is specific to the border simply may not exist. Local and  tribal law enforcement officials we met with recognized that the FBI has  limits on what it can share—including information that is classified—and  said they had no intention of interfering with ongoing investigations.  However, they also thought the FBI could better communicate when these  limits were in effect and when the agency simply had no information to  share. We discuss the importance of establishing information sharing  partnerships to facilitate discussions between the parties and minimize  expectation gaps later in this report.
According to FBI officials at the locations we contacted, information that  is not related to ongoing investigations is shared with local and tribal  agencies through a variety of mechanisms, including task forces (e.g., Safe  Trails Task Forces) and working groups; periodic outreach meetings the  FBI conducts with local and tribal agencies to both share and solicit  information; and through ongoing information sharing partnerships. FBI  headquarters officials noted that each FBI field office—through its Field  Intelligence Group—is to routinely assess the terrorism and criminal  threats and risks in its geographic area of responsibility and report the  results to FBI headquarters.
The officials said that the assessments incorporate border-specific issues  when appropriate, such as the illegal entry of possible terrorists,  identification of human smuggling organizations, and the smuggling of  weapons and other material which could be employed in terrorist attacks.  However, the officials said that the results of the assessments are  classified and are generally not shared with local and tribal officials,  although in some cases selected information is declassified and distributed  through alerts and bulletins.
Further, according to FBI headquarters, much of the FBI’s information  sharing with other law enforcement entities occurs at the officer or  investigator level, often without the specific knowledge of the state and  local personnel we interviewed for this report. The FBI also emphasized  that most Indian Reservations and tribal law enforcement agencies are  located in remote areas of the United States—100 miles or more away  from an FBI office—where information sharing between FBI agents and  tribal law enforcement occurs on an ad hoc basis usually focused on  investigations of crimes occurring on Indian reservations. We recognize  that information sharing can occur at the officer or investigator level and  on an ad hoc basis. However, as discussed later in this report, limiting  information sharing to the officer and investigator level will not ensure  that information sharing partnerships are established between agencies.  Rather, discussions at senior levels—including the county sheriffs, local  police chiefs, and tribal police chiefs we met with—could help ensure  continuity in information sharing and diminish reliance on any one  individual, which is a best practice in building successful information  sharing partnerships.
FBI headquarters also noted that in addition to sharing information  directly with local and tribal officials in border communities, the FBI  disseminates information to these officials through information systems— such as the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online and eGuardian system—and  the FBI’s participation in state and local fusion centers and other  interagency task forces and intelligence centers throughout the country  (e.g., High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Investigative Support Centers).  The FBI noted that it is through these venues that the FBI also  accomplishes its information sharing responsibilities to other federal,  state, and local partners.
section_title: More Fully Identifying Information Needs Could Help Federal Agencies in Border Communities Ensure That Local and Tribal Agencies Receive Useful Information
paragraphs: The National Strategy for Information Sharing identifies the federal  government’s information sharing responsibilities to include gathering and  documenting the information that state, local, and tribal agencies need to  enhance their situational awareness of terrorist threats. Figure 2 shows  the number of the local and tribal agencies in the border communities we  contacted that reported discussing their information needs with federal  officials in the vicinity.
Overall, where local and tribal law enforcement officials in border  communities had discussed their information needs with federal officials  in the vicinity, they also reported receiving useful information from the  federal agencies that enhanced their situational awareness of border  crimes and potential terrorist threats. Specifically:    Officials from 7 of the 11 localities that had discussed their information  needs with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity also reported receiving  useful information from them.
Officials from each of the 9 localities that had discussed their information  needs with ICE officials in the vicinity reported receiving useful  information from them.
Officials from each of the 8 localities that had discussed their information  needs with FBI officials in the vicinity reported receiving useful  information from them.
Local and tribal officials in the border communities we contacted said they  shared their information needs with federal officials through a variety of  methods, including regularly scheduled meetings, periodic outreach  performed by federal agencies, ad hoc meetings, and established working  relationships. For example, one police chief along the southwest border  said that he discussed his need for real-time information about border  crimes that could affect his area with local federal agency officials. He  noted that after he held these discussions, the federal officials took steps  to provide his department with this type of information.
Nevertheless, as shown in figure 2 above, officials from about one-half of  the local and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted  reported that federal officials had not discussed information needs with  them, as called for in the National Strategy for Information Sharing. Our  discussions with local and tribal officials revealed that where the needs  were not discussed, local and tribal agencies also were less likely to have  received information from federal agencies than in the localities where  needs were discussed. Specifically:    Officials from 4 of the 7 localities that had not discussed their information  needs with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity also reported not  receiving information from them, while the other 3 had received  information from Border Patrol.
Officials from each of the 9 localities that had not discussed their  information needs with ICE officials in the vicinity also reported not  receiving information from them.
Officials from 7 of the 11 localities that had not discussed their  information needs with FBI officials in the vicinity also reported not  receiving information from them, while the other 4 reported receiving  information from the FBI.
While the data above show that federal agencies shared information with  local and tribal officials in several cases where information needs had not  been discussed, identifying these needs could better support federal  agency efforts to provide local and tribal agencies with useful information  that is relevant to their jurisdiction.
A primary reason why federal agencies had not identified the information  needs of local and tribal agencies in many of the border communities we  visited was because the methods federal agencies used to solicit the needs,  while effective for some localities, were not effective for others.  Specifically, Border Patrol and ICE officials said that the information  needs of these agencies were generally identified through outreach  meetings or through working relationships with local and tribal law  enforcement officers. Where these interactions did not exist, the federal  agencies generally had not identified the information needs of local and  tribal agencies. Also, according to a local police chief, while information  needs may be discussed between local officers and federal agents on an ad  hoc basis, his department cannot rely on these interactions to ensure that  federal agencies have identified the overall information needs of the  department.
According to FBI headquarters officials, in developing field office area  assessments, Field Intelligence Group personnel are required to gather  information on terrorism and criminal threats and risks from local and  tribal law enforcement agency officials, wherein the information needs of  these agencies would be identified. FBI headquarters also noted that  through outreach meetings and participation in task forces and working  groups, FBI field offices continually evaluate the information needs of  their local and tribal partners, as well as their own, and take actions to  identify and fill any information gaps. Despite these efforts, less than one- half of the local and tribal agencies we contacted reported discussing their  information needs with FBI officials in the vicinity.
By more consistently and more fully identifying the information needs of  local and tribal agencies in border communities, as called for in the  National Strategy for Information Sharing, federal agencies could be better  positioned to provide these local and tribal agencies with useful  information that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes  and potential terrorist threats.
section_title: Most Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Received Information from Federal Agencies in Their Localities Had Established or Were Developing Partnerships and Related Mechanisms That Facilitated Information Sharing
paragraphs: The National Strategy for Information Sharing recognizes that effective  information sharing comes through strong partnerships among federal,  local, and tribal partners. In addition, the current strategic plans of DHS  and the FBI both acknowledge the need to establish information sharing  partnerships with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to help  the agencies fulfill their missions, roles, and responsibilities. Figure 3  shows the number of local and tribal agency officials in the border  communities we contacted that reported having established or were  developing an information sharing partnership with Border Patrol, ICE,  and the FBI officials in the vicinity.
Overall, where local and tribal law enforcement officials in border  communities had established or were developing information sharing  partnerships with federal officials in the vicinity, they also reported  receiving information from the federal agencies that enhanced their  situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats.  Specifically:    Officials from 13 of the 14 localities that had or were developing an  information sharing partnership with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity  also reported receiving information from them.
Officials from 10 of 13 localities that had an information sharing  partnership with ICE officials in the vicinity also reported receiving  information from them, while the other 3 were not receiving information  from ICE.
Officials from each of the 11 localities that had an information sharing  partnership with FBI officials in the vicinity also reported receiving  information from them.
The local and tribal agencies that had developed partnerships with federal  agencies in the vicinity had established a variety of mechanisms to share  information, including regularly scheduled meetings, periodic outreach  performed by federal agencies, ad hoc meetings, task forces and working  groups, established working relationships, phone calls, e-mails, and issued  alerts and bulletins. In some locations, Border Patrol and local law  enforcement officials worked together in operational efforts that provided  opportunities for federal and local officials to develop information sharing  partnerships. For example, Operation Border Star in Texas—a state-led,  multiagency effort focused on reducing crime, such as illegal immigration  and drug trafficking, in targeted regions along the Texas–Mexico border— draws resources from local law enforcement agencies, the Texas  Department of Public Safety, and others to support Border Patrol. Also, in  upstate New York, a county sheriff’s department conducted joint patrols  with Border Patrol, which extended into Canada. The patrols are designed  to prevent the illegal entry of individuals into the United States and the  smuggling of contraband. These operations provide an opportunity for  officers from all of the agencies to work together and facilitate  information sharing.
Most of the local and tribal officials that had developed information  sharing partnerships with ICE officials reported establishing them through  personal contacts made either while working on various task forces  alongside ICE personnel or between agents and officers in both agencies.  For example, one tribal police chief said that his department has a  memorandum of understanding with ICE, which allows the tribal police to  perform certain ICE duties in the enforcement of customs laws and  facilitates information sharing between the agencies.
Nevertheless, as shown in figure 3 above, officials from several local and  tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted reported that they  had not established information sharing partnerships with Border Patrol,  ICE, or FBI officials in the vicinity. Where partnerships were not  established, local and tribal agencies also were less likely to have received  information from federal agencies than in the localities where partnerships  were established. Specifically:    Officials from each of the 5 localities that did not have an information  sharing partnership with local Border Patrol officials in the vicinity also  reported they had not received information from them.
Officials from each of the 7 localities that did not have an information  sharing partnership with ICE officials in the vicinity also reported they had  not received information from them.
Officials from 7 of the 9 localities that said they did not have an  information sharing partnership with FBI officials also reported they had  not received information from them FBI.
The local and tribal officials that did not have a partnership with federal  officials and were not receiving information said that effective  mechanisms for sharing information—a best practice in building  successful information sharing partnerships—had not been established.  One reason why the officials said established mechanisms were not  effective was because they did not have enough resources or funding to  participate in the regular meetings or forums that Border Patrol, ICE, and  FBI officials in the vicinity used to share information, establish face-to- face contact, and build trusting relationships. For example, an official  from one local police department said he was aware of Border Patrol’s  efforts to share information through such meetings, but the department  did not have the resources needed to participate, since doing so would  leave the office short one out of eight patrol officers. Officials at another  location said they no longer received invitations to Border Patrol  meetings.
Similarly, local and tribal officials in other localities said they did not have  enough resources to send individuals to participate in outreach meetings  that FBI officials said were used to share information, because in some  cases the meetings were held more than 100 miles away. A local county  sheriff also said that the FBI’s meetings were initially productive but  interest faded because of the lack of useful information that was shared  during the meetings. An FBI official from another locality noted that FBI  officials are sometimes limited in what they can discuss during these  meetings if the local and tribal representatives in attendance do not have  the appropriate security clearances or do not have a need to know about  the information. These examples illustrate the importance of establishing  partnerships to facilitate discussions between the parties and minimize  expectation gaps regarding the availability of and limits in sharing  information.
Border Patrol, ICE, and FBI officials also said that information is shared  with local and tribal agencies through multiagency task forces, such as  ICE Border Enforcement Security Task Forces and FBI Joint Terrorism  Task Forces. However, local and tribal officials—especially those in small  departments in rural border communities—said these mechanisms to  share information were not effective for them, because they did not have  enough resources to dedicate personnel to the task forces.
Police chiefs and other senior local and tribal officials recognized that ad  hoc discussions between officers and investigators are also mechanisms  federal agencies in the vicinity use to share information with local and  tribal agencies. The officials noted, however, that limiting information  sharing to the officer and investigator level is not sufficient to ensure that  senior-level department officials are aware of the information, which in  turn could be disseminated to other personnel within the department. For  example, a police chief in a local community along the southwest border  said that he does not need the FBI to brief his entire department, but the  FBI should at least brief the police chief. Best practices in building  information sharing partnerships call for institutionalizing information  sharing through discussions at senior levels to ensure continuity in sharing  and diminishing the reliance on single individuals.
We recognize that developing and maintaining information sharing  partnerships with the numerous local and tribal law enforcement agencies  along the borders is a significant challenge, and that Border Patrol, ICE,  and the FBI have made progress in this area. However, additional efforts  by these federal agencies to periodically assess the extent to which  partnerships and related mechanisms to share information exist, fill gaps,  and address barriers to establishing such partnerships and mechanisms,  could help ensure that information is shared with local and tribal law  enforcement agencies that enhances their situational awareness of border  crimes and potential terrorist threats.
section_title: Federal Agencies Are Supporting Some Fusion Center Efforts to Develop Border Intelligence Products, but Additional DHS Personnel and Other Measures Could Strengthen Future Efforts
paragraphs: Federal agencies at two of the five fusion centers we visited were  supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence products  that enhanced local and tribal agencies’ situational awareness of border  crimes and potential terrorist threats. DHS recognizes that it needs to add  personnel to fusion centers in border states to support the creation of  such products, and is developing related plans, but cited funding issues  and competing priorities as barriers to deploying such personnel. Further,  additional DHS and FBI actions to (1) identify and market promising  practices from fusion centers that develop border intelligence products  and (2) obtain feedback from local and tribal officials on the utility and  quality of the products and use the feedback to improve those products  would strengthen future fusion center efforts to develop such products.
subsections: section_title: DHS and FBI Personnel at Two of the Five Fusion Centers We Visited Were Supporting Efforts to Develop Border Intelligence Products to Enhance Local and Tribal Agencies’ Situational Awareness of Border Crimes and Potential Terrorist Threats
paragraphs: Federal personnel at two of the five fusion centers we visited—the Arizona  Counterterrorism Information Center and the New York State Intelligence  Center—were routinely contributing to border intelligence products that  were designed to enhance local and tribal law enforcement agencies’  situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats.  Fusion center officials in these states emphasized that the physical  presence of federal personnel at the fusion center—including intelligence  analysts from I&A, Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI—was critical to  developing the border products, in part because their presence facilitated  regular meetings with center personnel and access to federal information  systems.
According to local and tribal officials in the border communities we  contacted in Arizona and New York, the border intelligence products they  received generally enhanced their situational awareness of border-related  crimes that could have a nexus to terrorism, such as drug trafficking and  illegal immigration. However, the border products usually did not contain  terrorism-related information that was specific to the border because such  information did not exist or a link between a border crime and terrorism  had not been established, according to fusion center officials. The two  fusion centers also routinely generated terrorism information products  that were provided to local and tribal agencies throughout the state to  enhance their situational awareness of terrorist threats. Officials from the  two fusion centers said that any terrorism-related information that is  specific to the border would be included in both the border product and  terrorism product. Below is additional information about the border  intelligence products developed by the two fusion centers:   Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center: The center issues a border- specific product (the “Situational Awareness Bulletin”) twice a week with  input from the state’s Department of Public Safety and numerous federal  agencies, including DHS’s I&A, Border Patrol, and ICE, and the FBI. The  center initiated the bulletin in 2008 to enhance the situational awareness  of local law enforcement officials along the Arizona border as drug-related  violence on the Mexican side of the border increased. The bulletin now  provides information about all types of crimes occurring in the vicinity of  the border, as well as incidents from around the country and around the  world. Topics have included immigration issues, burglaries at public safety  offices, suspicious activities around critical infrastructure, stolen military  uniforms, and stolen blank vehicle certificates of title.
New York State Intelligence Center: The center’s Border Intelligence Unit  issues a border-specific report quarterly with input from the New York  State Police and numerous federal agencies, including DHS’s I&A, Border  Patrol, and ICE, and the FBI. The report is intended to compile  information on all types of crimes along the entire border between New  York and Canada into one product for the convenience of local and tribal  law enforcement agencies. This report covers crimes—such as illegal  immigration and drug trafficking—and includes the results of joint federal  and state operations conducted along the border. The report also contains  news and updates on policies related to border security. According to  center officials, the report grew out of recognition that various federal  component agencies have offices that cover the border territory and could,  therefore, collectively provide consistent intelligence information that  would be helpful in enhancing the situational awareness of law  enforcement agencies in border communities throughout the state. The  Border Intelligence Unit also issues bulletins with actionable information  on border-related crimes on an as-needed basis.
In addition to the benefits that officials from the two fusion centers cited  from having on-site input and collaboration from representatives of three  DHS components, the FBI, and other agencies, the majority of local and  tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted found the border  intelligence products to be useful. Specifically, six of the seven local and  tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted in Arizona and New York  were receiving border intelligence products from the fusion center in their  state and all six found that the products were useful or met their  information needs. For example, one local law enforcement official said  that his agency receives the quarterly border report developed by the New  York fusion center and that he finds it useful as it sometimes contains  issues directly related to his jurisdiction. The remaining locality did not  comment on why the products were not received.
According to officials from the other three fusion centers we visited, the  presence of additional federal personnel would support their efforts to  develop border intelligence products that help to provide local and tribal  law enforcement agencies along the borders with situational awareness of  potential terrorist threats. For example:    Washington Fusion Center: The Washington state fusion center is  colocated with the local Joint Terrorism Task Force, which facilitates  access to FBI information, and has representatives from DHS’s I&A and  ICE. According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, as of August 2009,  the agency was in the process of assigning a full-time representative to the  fusion center. The fusion center director noted that this official, once  integrated into the center’s report development process, would contribute  greatly towards producing a border intelligence product. The fusion center  director added that the border intelligence product would focus on all  border crime issues, including any suspected terrorist activity.
Montana All Threat Intelligence Center: The Montana All Threat  Intelligence Center is colocated with the local Joint Terrorism Task Force,  which facilitates access to FBI information. According to the fusion center  director, a CBP analyst has supported the center part-time, though most of  the time that person is working at the CBP office located 90 miles away. In  August 2009, Border Patrol headquarters officials said that a full-time  representative had been assigned to the fusion center. The fusion center  director said that he expected an analyst from I&A to be assigned to the  fusion center, but was unsure when that would happen. According to the  director, additional federal personnel and their ability to analyze border- related information would enhance the fusion center’s efforts to routinely  produce a border intelligence product.
Texas Intelligence Center: The Texas Intelligence Center is located within  the Texas Department of Public Safety, and currently has representatives  from I&A, ICE, and the FBI. Although the center prepares and  disseminates a number of products, including a daily brief covering,  among other issues, significant arrests, seizures and homeland security, it  does not prepare an intelligence product that focuses on border issues.
Officials at the center said that the state’s Border Security Operations  Teams located along the border distribute information on border security  issues to local and tribal agencies. According to the officials, the center  will consider developing a border intelligence product once personnel  from other appropriate agencies, such as Border Patrol, are in place at the  fusion center.
section_title: DHS Plans to Deploy Additional DHS Personnel to Support Fusion Center Efforts to Develop Border Intelligence Products, but Cited Funding Issues and Competing Priorities as Barriers
paragraphs: The director of I&A’s State and Local Fusion Center Program Management  Office—the office responsible for managing the relationship between I&A  and fusion centers—acknowledged the value of having personnel from  DHS components physically present at fusion centers, not only for state  and local law enforcement but for federal agencies as well. The director  noted that deploying DHS analysts to fusion centers is critical to  developing trusted partnerships, which in turn will facilitate collaboration  and information sharing among federal, state, local, and tribal officials.  But to date, the director explained that the office has not received the  funding needed to deploy the personnel to other centers and has other  competing priorities.
DHS has had a plan for deploying personnel from its component agencies  to fusion centers since June 2006, when the DHS Secretary signed the  Support Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers. The plan  calls for embedding DHS personnel with access to information,  technology, and training in fusion centers to form the basis of a  nationwide homeland security information network for collaboration and  information sharing. According to the director of I&A’s State and Local  Fusion Center Program Management Office, in part because of limited  resources, the department is taking a risk-based approach to determining  where to deploy officers and analysts. As such, the department considers  several factors in addition to available funding, including population  density, the number of critical infrastructure facilities, and the results of  fusion center assessments the office conducts to determine the readiness  of the center to use the department’s resources. Senior I&A officials noted  that the department places some priority on deploying DHS personnel to  state and local fusion centers located in border states, but that other  factors also have to be considered under the department’s risk-based  approach.
According to DHS, as of September 2009, I&A had deployed 41 intelligence  analysts to state, local, and regional fusion centers. DHS plans to have a  total of about 70 I&A analysts at fusion centers by the end of fiscal year  2010 and an equal number of officers and analysts from DHS component  agencies (e.g., Border Patrol and ICE). Figure 4 shows DHS personnel that  were assigned to fusion centers in the 14 land border states as of August  2009.
According to CBP headquarters officials, the agency has only a limited  number of Border Patrol intelligence analysts, and is currently working  with I&A to identify priority fusion centers. Officials from ICE’s Office of  Intelligence also said that the agency is working with I&A to develop a  strategy to enhance ICE participation at state and local fusion centers.  Further, although the 9/11 Commission Act included an authorization for  $10 million for each of the fiscal years 2008 through 2012 for DHS to carry  out the State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative—including the  assignment of CBP, ICE, and other DHS stakeholder personnel to fusion  centers—DHS did not specifically request funding for the initiative and no  funds were appropriated for fiscal years 2008 or 2009 for this specific  purpose. Rather, for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, DHS reprogrammed funds  from other activities to support the fusion center initiative. According to  the director of I&A’s State and Local Fusion Center Program Management  Office, DHS requested funding for the initiative in its fiscal year 2010  budget.
Although the 9/11 Commission Act did not address FBI participation at  fusion centers, FBI intelligence analysts and special agents were dedicated  to fusion centers in 8 of the 14 land border states as of September 2009, in  addition to FBI personnel at Joint Terrorism Task Forces or Field  Intelligence Groups that were colocated with these fusion centers. The  FBI noted that it has committed millions of dollars over the years to  ensure that its classified computer system and other databases and  equipment were deployed to support FBI personnel assigned on a full- or  part-time basis to fusion centers. According to the FBI, the bureau has  worked with DHS to develop uniform construction standards and security  protocols specifically designed to facilitate the introduction of federal  classified computer systems in fusion centers. Further, the FBI noted that  it has deployed the eGuardian system—an unclassified counterterrorism  tool—to fusion centers and other entities.
section_title: Identifying and Sharing Promising Practices from Fusion Centers That Develop Border Intelligence Products and Soliciting Feedback on Their Usefulness Would Support Other Fusion Center Efforts to Develop Such Products
paragraphs: The creation of border intelligence products—such as those developed by  the Arizona and New York fusion centers—represent potential approaches  that other border state fusion centers could use to target products for local  and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities. I&A has a  framework in place to identify and collect promising practices at fusion  centers nationwide, as called for in the department’s March 2006 Support  Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers and the  December 2008 Interaction with State and Local Fusion Center Concept of  Operations. Specifically, the implementation plan for fusion centers  recommended that rigorous processes be used to identify, review, and  share information regarding promising practices and lessons learned.  Consistent with that recommendation, the concept of operations identifies  leveraging promising practices for information sharing and revising  existing processes when necessary and advisable as one of the guiding  principles of interaction with fusion centers.
However, as of July 2009, I&A had not yet identified or explored promising  practices related to fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence  products. According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division,  such analysis has potential value but has not yet occurred because the  division has been focusing on developing its own products and providing  other support to fusion centers. While it is understandable that I&A  would focus on its own activities, DHS could benefit from identifying  promising practices related to fusion center border intelligence products  because of the importance the federal government places on fusion  centers to facilitate the sharing of information. By identifying such  practices, DHS would be better positioned to leverage existing resources  and help ensure that local and tribal agencies in border communities  receive information that enhances their situational awareness of potential  terrorist threats.
Also, DHS had not obtained feedback on the utility and quality of the  border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped  to develop. The 9/11 Commission Act requires DHS to (1) create a  voluntary feedback mechanism for state, local, and tribal law enforcement  officers and other consumers of the intelligence and information products  developed by DHS personnel assigned to fusion centers under the act and  (2) provide annual reports to committees of Congress describing the  consumer feedback obtained and, if applicable, how the department has  adjusted its own production of intelligence products in response to that  consumer feedback. However, DHS’s December 2008 and August 2009  reports to Congress did not describe the feedback obtained on the  intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers helped to  produce—including border intelligence products—or adjustments made in  response to the feedback.
DHS recognizes that it needs to take additional actions to obtain feedback  from local and tribal law enforcement officers who are consumers of the  intelligence products that I&A produces. For example, in mid-2009, I&A  hired a contractor to initiate feedback pilot projects, including one  currently underway to evaluate and implement processes for gathering  and evaluating feedback responses. However, these projects are designed  to solicit feedback on products developed by I&A and do not specifically  include products that DHS personnel in fusion centers help to develop,  including border intelligence products. Therefore, these projects may not  support I&A efforts to obtain feedback under the 9/11 Commission Act on  products that DHS personnel in fusion centers help to develop.
DHS’s August 2009 report to Congress generally illustrates the value in  obtaining feedback on intelligence products. For example, in one instance,  the report notes that a state fusion center expressed concerns that the  perspectives of three southwest border state fusion centers were not  included in an assessment that I&A headquarters produced on border  violence. The feedback resulted in teleconferences and other I&A actions  to ensure that state and local perspectives are included in future  assessments of border violence. Similarly, obtaining feedback on the  border intelligence products that DHS analysts in fusion centers help to  produce would support other fusion center efforts to develop such  products and the department’s efforts to adjust its own production of  intelligence products in response to that consumer feedback.
The two fusion centers we contacted that were creating border  intelligence products with the support of DHS personnel (Arizona and  New York) had established their own mechanisms for obtaining feedback  from local and tribal consumers of the products. Specifically, the fusion  centers attached feedback forms to the border products, but have received  low response rates, according to center officials. As a result, the fusion  centers took other actions to solicit feedback on the border products, such  as through direct outreach with local and tribal consumers of the  information. Officials from both fusion centers said that the feedback has  generally been positive and that the border products have been modified  in response to this feedback. According to the officials, since these  products are developed by the fusion centers, the centers do not routinely  provide related feedback to DHS on the value of the contributions of its  staff and intelligence input. However, the fusion centers’ efforts to obtain  feedback on the border intelligence products—in addition to using  feedback forms—demonstrate the feasibility of DHS taking additional  actions to collect feedback on the products and report its findings to  congressional committees under the 9/11 Commission Act. DHS agrees  that it could take additional actions to collect this feedback, which could  be done as part of the department’s ongoing feedback pilot projects.
By working with fusion centers to obtain feedback on the border  intelligence products developed, DHS could better support fusion center  efforts to maintain and improve the utility and quality of information  provided to local and tribal law enforcement agencies along the borders.  This information could also be useful to I&A in modifying its own border  intelligence products to better meet the needs of fusion centers, assist the  department in making decisions on how to best utilize its limited  resources at fusion centers, and be responsive to its statutory reporting  requirements.
section_title: Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted Could Better Support National Counterterrorism Efforts If They Were More Aware of the Suspicious Activities They Are to Report
paragraphs: Detecting the warning signs of potential terrorist activities and sharing the  information with the proper agencies provides an opportunity to prevent a  terrorist attack. However, most of the local and tribal officials in the  border communities we contacted did not clearly know what suspicious  activities federal agencies and fusion centers wanted them to report, how  to report them, or to whom. The federal government is working with state  and local entities to develop a standardized suspicious activity reporting  process that, when implemented, could help address these issues. In the  meantime, providing local and tribal officials with suspicious activity  indicators that are associated with criminal activity along the borders  could assist the officials in identifying potential terrorist threats.
subsections: section_title: Most Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted Did Not Know What Suspicious Activities Federal Agencies and Fusion Centers Wanted Them to Report or How to Report Them
paragraphs: According to an October 2008 intergovernmental report on suspicious  activities, fundamental to local and tribal law enforcement agencies’  efforts to detect and mitigate potential terrorist threats is ensuring that  front-line personnel recognize and have the ability to document behaviors  and incidents indicative of criminal activity associated with international  terrorism. Unlike behaviors, activities, or situations that are clearly  criminal in nature—such as car thefts, burglaries, or assaults—suspicious  activity reporting involves suspicious behaviors that have been associated  with terrorist activities in the past and may be predictive of future threats  to public safety. Examples include surveillance, photographing of  facilities, site breaches or physical intrusion, cyber attacks, and the  probing of security.
To varying degrees, federal agencies and fusion centers provided local and  tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted with alerts,  warnings, and other information that enhanced the local and tribal  agencies’ situational awareness of potential terrorist threats. As an  additional tool, the FBI and fusion centers in two of the five states we  contacted had developed lists of suspicious activities—in the form of  reference cards or brochures—to help local and tribal agencies determine  what behaviors, activities, or situations are indicators of potential terrorist  activities and should be reported for further analysis. However, officials  from 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies we contacted said they did not  recall being provided with a list of the suspicious activities or indicators  that rise to the level of potential terrorist threats and should be reported,  while officials from 7 of the 20 agencies said they had received such  indicators from either the FBI, the state fusion center, or another entity.  According to the October 2008 intergovernmental report on suspicious  activities, local law enforcement agencies are critical to efforts to protect  local communities from another terrorist attack. The report also notes that  to effectively conduct these duties, it is critical that the federal  government ensure that local law enforcement personnel can recognize  and have the ability to document behaviors and incidents indicative of  criminal activity associated with domestic and international terrorism.
While federal agencies and fusion centers had taken steps to disseminate  or discuss terrorism-related indicators with local and tribal officials—such  as through mass mailings and during outreach meetings and law  enforcement conferences—these actions did not ensure that local and  tribal agencies were aware of them, in part because the mechanisms used  to share information were not always effective, as discussed earlier in this  report. As a result of not being aware of the suspicious activity indicators,  local officials in three border communities we contacted said they did not  clearly know what information federal agencies and fusion centers wanted  them to collect and report. Increased awareness of these indicators would  better position local and tribal agencies along the border to identify and  report behaviors and incidents indicative of criminal activity associated  with terrorism.
Also, in about half of the border communities we contacted, local and  tribal agency officials were not aware of the specific processes they were  to use to report terrorism-related suspicious activities or to whom this  information should be reported because federal agencies had not yet  defined such processes. Absent defined processes, the local and tribal  officials had independently developed policies and procedures for  gathering and reporting suspicious activities and they provided varying  responses regarding how and to whom they would submit suspicious  activities that may have a nexus to terrorism. Responses included  reporting suspicious activities to a fusion center, the FBI, or another  federal agency. Several local and tribal officials we contacted said they  would report this information to the local federal official—e.g., Border  Patrol, ICE, or the FBI—with whom they had developed a relationship. By  defining reporting processes, federal, local, and tribal agencies would be in  a better position to conduct more efficient collection and analysis of  suspicious activities and share the results on a regional or national basis.  Also, internal control standards call for management to ensure that there  are adequate processes for communicating with and obtaining information  from external stakeholders that may have a significant effect on the  agency achieving its goals and that information should be recorded and  communicated to the entities who need it in a form and within a time  frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities.
At the national level, the federal government is working with state and  local law enforcement entities on the National Suspicious Activity  Reporting Initiative to standardize the reporting of suspicious activities  that may be related to terrorism. The long-term goal of the initiative is to  develop and implement consistent national policies, processes, and best  practices by employing a standardized, integrated approach to gathering,  documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about  suspicious activity that is potentially related to terrorism. One of the  immediate goals of the initiative is to help ensure that suspicious activity  reports with a potential connection to terrorism are expeditiously  provided by local and tribal law enforcement agencies to the FBI. As of  September 2009, related pilot projects were ongoing at fusion centers in 12  major cities. According to the DOJ official who is overseeing the initiative,  an evaluation of the pilots will be completed by late 2009, but fully  implementing the initiative across the country could take up to 2 years.
Until the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is fully  implemented, additional federal agency efforts to establish defined  processes for local and tribal officials in border communities to report  suspicious activities could help ensure that information is collected and  shared with the most appropriate entity.
section_title: Suspicious Activity Indicators That Are Associated with Criminal Activity along the Borders Could Assist Local and Tribal Officials in Identifying Potential Terrorist Threats
paragraphs: According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division, senior  intelligence officials at fusion centers in two of the five border states we  contacted, and other subject matter experts—including federal and state  officials who were involved in developing suspicious activity indicators for  local and tribal agencies in border communities—the suspicious activity  indicators could be more useful if they also contained terrorism-related  behaviors, activities, or situations that were more applicable to the border  or border crimes and were periodically updated to reflect current threats.  Officials from three of the local law enforcement agencies we contacted  also suggested that border-specific indicators would help them link  potential terrorism-related activities to crimes they are more likely to  encounter along the border, such as illegal immigration and currency  smuggling. However, our review of the suspicious activity indicators being  utilized by the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative and those  that were developed by the FBI and fusion centers generally did not  include indicators that were specific to the border.
According to the DOJ official who was overseeing the implementation of  the national initiative, the primary suspicious activity indicators that were  validated by the law enforcement and intelligence community for use in  the major city pilot projects were designed to be general and applicable to  local and tribal officials located anywhere in the country. The official  noted that the automated system that is being used by law enforcement  agencies to record the suspicious activities during the pilot projects was  designed to accommodate “sub-lists” that contain indicators that are  applicable to specific sectors, such as the critical infrastructure sector.  The official said that there was not a sub-list for border-specific indicators,  but that he saw the potential for developing such a list. The official said  that I&A would be the entity with the requisite expertise for developing  such a list.
In April 2009, I&A deployed an intelligence analyst from its Border  Security Division to DHS’s Homeland Security Intelligence Support Team  to develop terrorism indicators that are specific to the southwest border.
According to the director of the Border Security Division, the analyst is  looking for trends and patterns in terrorism-related incident reports that  are generated by local and tribal law enforcement officials along the  southwest border. The director said that I&A has not yet determined a  final date for developing the suspicious activity indicators since there is a  lot of information that has to be analyzed. The official noted that I&A is  considering deploying another intelligence analyst to the northern border  to perform similar analyses.
According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division, in his former  position as a border analyst in the intelligence community, he worked with  CBP and ICE to develop border-related indicators that were potential  precursors to terrorist activities. The official noted the importance of  periodically updating and consistently disseminating these indicators of  terrorism-related behaviors, activities, or situations that reflect current  border threats. According to Border Patrol and ICE headquarters and field  personnel, neither agency had developed suspicious activity indicators  that were specific to the borders.
Additional DHS and FBI actions to develop, periodically update, and  consistently disseminate indicators of terrorism-related activities that  focus on border threats could help to maximize the utility of suspicious  activity indicators as a counterterrorism tool in border communities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As discussed in the National Strategy for Information Sharing, state, local,  and tribal government officials are critical to our nation’s efforts to  prevent future terrorist attacks. Because these officials are often in the  best position to identify potential threats that exist within their  jurisdictions, they must be partners in information sharing that enhances  situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. In  border communities, this partnership is particularly important because of  the vulnerability to a range of criminal activity that exists along our  nation’s borders. Therefore, a more robust effort by federal agencies to  identify the information needs of local and tribal law enforcement  agencies along the borders and periodically assess the extent to which  partnerships exist and related mechanisms to share information are  working—and fill gaps and address barriers where needed—could better  enable federal agencies to provide useful information to their local and  tribal partners that enhances situational awareness.
The work of state-run fusion centers is also critical to the nation’s efforts  to prevent terrorist attacks. Fusion centers in the border states we visited  demonstrated a range of practices related to developing border  intelligence products that could serve as a model for other fusion centers.  By identifying and sharing these promising practices, DHS and the FBI  could help strengthen the work of fusion centers nationally in addition to  enhancing situational awareness of local and tribal law enforcement. Also,  by working with the centers to obtain feedback on border intelligence  products, DHS and the FBI could enhance the utility of those products that  fusion centers share with local and tribal law enforcement agencies.
Finally, until a national suspicious activity reporting process is in place,  more consistently providing local and tribal officials in border  communities with information on the suspicious terrorism-related  activities they should report—including those related to border threats— and establishing processes for reporting this information could help  ensure that critical information is reported and reaches the most  appropriate agency to take action.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border  communities receive information from local federal agencies that  enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential  terrorist threats, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  and Director of the FBI, as applicable, require Border Patrol, ICE, and FBI  offices in border communities to take the following two actions: (1) more  consistently and fully identify the local and tribal agencies’ information  needs and (2) periodically assess the extent to which partnerships and  related mechanisms to share information exist, fill gaps as appropriate,  and address barriers to establishing such partnerships and mechanisms.
To promote future efforts to develop border intelligence products within  fusion centers, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  and the Director of the FBI collaborate with fusion centers to take the  following two actions: (1) identify and market promising practices used to  prepare these products and (2) take additional actions to solicit feedback  from local and tribal officials in border communities on the utility and  quality of the products generated.
To maximize the utility of suspicious activity indicators as a  counterterrorism tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security and the Director of the FBI collaborate with fusion centers to  take the following two actions: (1) take steps to ensure that local and  tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are aware of the  specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism that they are to  report and the process through which they should report this information  and (2) consider developing, periodically updating, and consistently  disseminating indicators of terrorism-related activities that focus on  border threats.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: On November 10, 2009, we provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ  for comment. In its written response, DHS noted that CBP, ICE, and I&A  are continuing and expanding efforts to share information. DHS agreed  with all of our recommendations in this report.
Specifically, DHS agreed with our recommendation related to the need for  Border Patrol and ICE to (1) more fully identify the information needs of  local and tribal agencies along the borders and (2) periodically assess the  extent to which partnerships and related mechanisms to share information  exist. For example, CBP agreed that a systematic and standardized  process to disseminate information and receive feedback is vital to  situational awareness for local and tribal law enforcement partners who  are within the immediate areas adjacent to the border. CBP noted that  Border Patrol plans to develop a list of individuals who will serve as  liaisons to local and tribal agencies and also develop a list of local and  tribal contacts. According to CBP, the Border Patrol liaisons will then  make initial efforts to assess the information needs of the law enforcement  partners and take other actions to determine and publish guidance on  information sharing.  To ensure that information shared is useful, Border  Patrol plans to conduct annual surveys of its partners. Border Patrol  envisions that this standardized process will be in place by the end of  fiscal year 2010.  When implemented, the Border Patrol’s actions should  meet the intent of our recommendation. ICE also agreed with the  recommendation and plans to work with CBP and the FBI to enhance  local and tribal law enforcement agencies’ situational awareness, but ICE  did not provide details on the specific actions it will take. I&A provided, or  otherwise highlighted, additional information on the current status of  information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies as it pertains  to border security.
DHS also agreed with our recommendation related to the need for DHS  and the FBI to collaborate to (1) identify and market promising practices  used to prepare border intelligence products within fusion centers and (2)  take additional actions to solicit feedback from local and tribal officials on  the utility and quality of the products generated.  According to I&A—the  DHS component that has the lead in addressing this recommendation—the  department has initiated the creation of a broad Joint Fusion Center  Program Management Office, which represents a departmentwide effort  that seeks to more closely coordinate support to fusion centers with  department component agencies, including CBP and ICE.  I&A also noted  that its intelligence specialists that are in fusion centers also act as  conveyers of information about promising practices to develop border  information products.  Finally, I&A noted that the department hosts the  Lessons Learned and Best Practices Web site that can be utilized to  promote future efforts to develop border intelligence products within  fusion centers. While these actions could potentially support DHS efforts  to identify and market promising practices used to prepare border  intelligence products within fusion centers, I&A did not provide any  specific information on the extent to which such practices have been  identified and marketed. I&A’s comments also did not address what  actions, if any, are ongoing or planned to solicit feedback from local and  tribal officials on the utility and quality of the products generated. ICE also  agreed with the recommendation and noted that it will work with the FBI  to implement it, but ICE did not provide details on the specific actions it  will take.
Finally, DHS agreed with our recommendation related to the need for DHS  and the FBI to collaborate to (1) ensure that local and tribal law  enforcement agencies in border communities are aware of the suspicious  activities related to terrorism they are to report and the process for  reporting this information and (2) consider developing and disseminating  indicators of terrorism-related activities that focus on border threats. ICE  agreed with the recommendation but deferred to I&A on the  implementation specifics.  I&A provided additional information on the  status of the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative and efforts  to test and evaluate related policies, procedures, and technology.  According to I&A, the evaluation phase of the initiative at participating  sites concluded at the end of September 2009 and a final report will be  issued that will document lessons learned and best practices. I&A noted  that the initiative will then be transitioned from a preoperational  environment to a broader nationwide implementation. However, as  discussed in our report, the DOJ official who is overseeing the initiative  noted that the nationwide implementation could take up to 2 years.  Therefore, our recommendation is intended for DHS and the FBI to take  interim actions until the national initiative is fully implemented, such as  more consistently providing local and tribal officials in border  communities with information on the suspicious terrorism-related  activities they should report—including those related to border threats— and establishing processes for reporting this information.
The full text of DHS's written comments is reprinted in appendix II.  DHS  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report  where appropriate.
On December 8, 2009, DOJ’s Audit Liaison Office, within the Justice  Management Division, stated by e-mail that the department will not be  submitting technical or formal comments on the draft report.
As agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report  until 30 days from its date, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition,  this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which (1)  local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are  receiving information from their federal partners that enhances the  agencies’ situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist  threats; (2) federal agencies are assisting fusion centers’ efforts to develop  border intelligence products that enhance local and tribal agencies’  situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats; and  (3) local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are  aware of the specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism  they are to report and to whom, and the process through which they  should report this information.
To identify criteria for answering these questions, we analyzed relevant  laws, directives, policies, and procedures related to information sharing,  such as the October 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing and  the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Commission Act). The 9/11 Commission Act provides for the  establishment of a State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative at  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and contains numerous  provisions that address the federal government’s information sharing  responsibilities to state and local fusion centers, including those that serve  border communities.
To examine the information sharing that occurs between local and tribal  law enforcement agencies in border communities and federal agencies  that have a local presence in these communities—U.S. Customs and  Border Protection’s Border Patrol and U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—we  conducted site visits to five states that are geographically dispersed along  the northern and southwest borders (Arizona, Montana, New York, Texas,  and Washington). Within these states, we selected a nonprobability sample  of 23 local and tribal law enforcement agencies to visit based on one or  more of the following characteristics:  locations known to be or suspected of being particularly vulnerable to  illegal entry or criminal activity;  land ports of entry with heavy inbound passenger traffic;  locations in proximity to areas at the border where there is little or no  continuous federal border enforcement presence;  locations that include Native American tribal communities with lands that  abut the border;  locations where federal, state, and local communities have in the past, or  are currently working with federal agencies to support border security  either informally or through pilot programs for sharing information;  locations in proximity to federal agencies at the border; and    geographically dispersed locations along the northern and southwest land  borders.
We met with county sheriffs, local police chiefs, and tribal police chiefs  from the 23 law enforcement agencies and asked them about the  information they received from federal agencies in their localities. We also  asked whether federal officials had discussed local and tribal officials’  information needs and had established information sharing partnerships  and related mechanisms to share information with them—consistent with  the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices described  in GAO reports.
After our visits, we sent follow-up questions to all 23 local and tribal  agencies we visited in order to obtain consistency in how we requested  and obtained information for reporting purposes. Three agencies did not  respond to our follow-up efforts and were excluded from our analysis.  Thus, our analysis and reporting is based on our visits and subsequent  activities with the 20 local and tribal agencies that responded to our  follow-up questions. We also met with local representatives of Border  Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their perspectives on the information  sharing that occurred, and compared this information to that provided by  local and tribal agencies in order to identify barriers to sharing and related  causes.
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of agencies in border  communities to contact, the information we obtained at these locations  may not be generalized across the wider population of law enforcement  agencies in border communities. However, because we selected these  border communities based on the variety of their geographic location,  proximity to federal agencies, and other factors, the information we  gathered from these locations provided us with a general understanding of  information sharing between federal agencies and state, local, and tribal  law enforcement agencies along the border.
To assess the extent to which federal agencies assisted fusion centers in  developing border intelligence products, as discussed in the 9/11  Commission Act, we reviewed products developed by fusion centers to  determine the extent to which they provided border security–relevant  information. We also met with and conducted subsequent follow-up  conversations with fusion center directors and other senior fusion center  officials in the five states we visited (Arizona, Montana, New York, Texas  and Washington) and obtained their views on the importance of  developing such products and about the level of support federal agencies  were providing in developing these products. We asked each of the 20  local and tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted whether they  received border intelligence products from their state’s primary fusion  center and, if so, we discussed their views on the usefulness of such  products.
We also interviewed senior officials from DHS’s Office of Intelligence and  Analysis—the office responsible for coordinating the federal government’s  support to fusion centers—and headquarters and field components of  Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their efforts to support fusion  centers’ development of border intelligence products, identify promising  practices for developing such products, and obtain feedback from local  and tribal officials on the usefulness of the products. We also reviewed  applicable documents that address fusion centers, including the 9/11  Commission Act, the National Strategy for Information Sharing, fusion  center guidelines, and DHS planning documents and reports.
Finally, to determine the extent to which local and tribal agencies in  border communities were aware of the suspicious activities they are to  report, we asked officials from the 20 agencies what, if any, information  federal agencies or fusion centers had provided them on the kinds of  suspicious activities that could be indicators or precursors to terrorism  and what processes they had in place for reporting information on these  activities. In general, suspicious activity is defined as observed behavior or  incidents that may be indicative of intelligence gathering or preoperational  planning related to terrorism, criminal, espionage, or other illicit  intentions. We also reviewed the Findings and Recommendations of the  Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project  to determine the extent to which the federal government recognizes the  role of suspicious activity reporting for detecting and mitigating potential  terrorist threats. We compared the processes for reporting suspicious  activities with GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government.
We also examined indicators of various suspicious activities the FBI and  fusion centers developed to determine if they contained border-specific  content. We interviewed Department of Justice officials who were leading  the national initiative to standardize suspicious activity reporting—as well  as those from headquarters components of DHS and the FBI—to discuss  the status of the national initiative and whether border-specific indicators  were needed and are being considered as part of this initiative.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 through  December 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Eric Erdman, Assistant Director;  Frances Cook; Cindy Gilbert; Kristen Hughes; Christopher Jones; Thomas  Lombardi; Ronald Salo; Edith Sohna; Adam Vogt; and Maria Wallace made  key contributions to this report.