Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures
Published: 2005-01-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As the Department of Defense (DOD) prepares for the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round, questions continue to be raised about the transfer and environmental cleanup of unneeded property arising from the prior four BRAC rounds and their impact on cost and savings and on local economies. This report, which is being issued to the defense authorization committees that have oversight responsibility over defense infrastructure, describes DOD's progress in implementing prior BRAC postclosure actions. It addresses (1) the transfer of unneeded base property to other users, (2) the magnitude of the net savings accruing from the prior rounds, (3) estimated costs for environmental cleanup of BRAC property, and (4) the economic recovery of communities affected by base closures.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of September 30, 2004, DOD had transferred about 72 percent of 504,000 acres of unneeded BRAC property to other entities. This amount represents an increase over the 42 percent that GAO previously reported in April 2002 and is primarily attributable to two large property transfers. When leased acreage is added to the transferred property, the amount of unneeded BRAC property in reuse rises to 90 percent. Transfer of the remaining acreage has been delayed primarily because of environmental cleanup requirements. DOD data show that the department had generated an estimated $28.9 billion in net savings or cost avoidances from the prior BRAC rounds through fiscal year 2003 and expects to save about $7 billion each year thereafter. These savings reflect money that DOD would likely have spent to operate military bases had they remained open. Although the savings are substantial, GAO found that the estimates are imprecise because the military services have not updated them regularly despite GAO's prior reported concerns on this issue. This issue needs to be addressed in the 2005 round. Further, the estimates do not reflect all BRAC-related costs, such as $1.9 billion incurred by DOD and other federal agencies for redevelopment assistance. While estimated costs for environmental cleanup at BRAC sites remain within the range of prior estimates, these costs may increase if unknown or undetermined future cleanup liabilities, such as additional unexploded ordnance or other harmful contaminants, emerge. Through fiscal year 2003, DOD had spent about $8.3 billion on BRAC environmental cleanup. It expects to spend another $3.6 billion to complete the cleanup work. While most nearby communities have recovered or continue to recover from base closures, they, as well as other communities, have felt some impact from the recent economic downturn where the strength of the national, regional, or local economy can affect recovery efforts. Yet, key economic indicators--unemployment rates and average annual real per capita income growth rates--show that BRAC communities are generally faring well when compared with average U.S. rates. Of 62 communities that GAO studied, 69 percent had unemployment rates equal to or lower than the U.S. average and 48 percent had income growth rates higher than the national average.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: While the Department of Defense (DOD) is currently preparing for the  2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round, it continues its work on  completing actions, such as the environmental cleanup and transfer of  unneeded property, arising from the base realignments and closures from  the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds. By the end of the 6-year  implementation period of the last round in fiscal year 2001, the  department had significantly reduced its domestic infrastructure through  the realignment and closure of hundreds of bases in these rounds and had  reportedly generated billions in net savings or cost avoidances during the  process. Although these closure and realignment actions have been  completed, DOD continues the process of cleaning up environmentally  contaminated former base sites and transferring unneeded property to  other users; questions continue to be raised concerning progress with  these actions as well as cost and savings estimates for these rounds. At the  same time, the communities surrounding the former defense bases have  often faced long-term challenges in the economic recovery process arising  out of these prior closure rounds.
This report is the third in a series of reports that details the progress DOD  has made in implementing the closures and realignments in the prior  BRAC rounds. We performed our work on the basis of the authority of the  Comptroller General to evaluate U.S. governmental programs and are  reporting the results to you because of your oversight role of DOD’s  infrastructure and the BRAC initiative. In our last update in 2002, we  concluded that most former unneeded base properties had not yet been  transferred to other users, the closure process was generating substantial  savings (although the savings estimates were imprecise), the total  expected environmental cleanup costs were still within range of the cost  estimates made in 1996, and most communities surrounding closed bases  were faring well economically in relation to key national economic  indicators. In this report we updated those findings by addressing  (1) DOD’s progress in transferring unneeded base property to other users,  (2) the magnitude of the estimated net savings accruing from the prior  four BRAC rounds, (3) DOD’s costs to date and estimated future costs for  environmental cleanup on former base property, and (4) the economic  recovery of communities affected by base closures.
To update this information, we compared recent data on overall property  transfers, BRAC costs and savings, environmental cleanup costs, and key  economic indicators for BRAC-affected communities with previously  reported data. In performing our work, we also interviewed DOD and  military service officials to clarify issues and obtain additional  documentation. We determined that the data we received from DOD and  other government agencies were sufficiently reliable for meeting our  reporting objectives. We conducted our work between November 2003 and  October 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Further details on the scope and methodology are described in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: To enable DOD to close unneeded bases and realign others, Congress  enacted legislation that instituted BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and  1995. A special commission established for the 1988 round made  realignment and closure recommendations to the Senate and House  Committees on Armed Services. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds,  special BRAC Commissions were set up, as required by legislation, to  make specific recommendations to the President, who in turn sent the  commissions’ recommendations and his approval to Congress. The four  commissions generated 499 recommendations—97 major closures and  hundreds of smaller base realignments, closures, and other actions. Of the  499 recommendations, 451 required action; the other 48 were modified in  some way by a later commission. DOD was required to complete BRAC  realignment and closure actions for the 1988 round by September 30, 1995,  and for the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds within 6 years from the date the  President forwarded the recommended actions to Congress. DOD reported  that as of September 30, 2001, it had taken all necessary actions to  implement the recommendations of the BRAC Commissions for the  four rounds. As a result, DOD estimated that it had reduced its domestic  infrastructure by about 20 percent.
While DOD has closed or realigned bases as recommended by the various  BRAC Commissions, other actions, such as the cleanup of environmentally  contaminated property and the subsequent transfer of unneeded property  to other users, were allowed to continue beyond the 6-year  implementation period for each round. Once DOD no longer needs BRAC  property, the property is considered excess and is offered to other federal  agencies. As shown in figure 1, any property that is not taken by other  federal agencies is then considered surplus and is disposed of through a  variety of means to state and local governments, local redevelopment  authorities, or private parties.
The various methods as noted in figure 1 to convey unneeded property to  parties external to the U.S. government are targeted, in many cases, to a  particular end-use for the property. For example, under a public benefit  conveyance, state and local governments and local redevelopment  authorities acquire surplus DOD property for such purposes as schools,  parks, and airports for little or no cost. Under an economic development  conveyance, property is transferred for uses that promote economic  recovery and job creation. Conservation conveyances, which were  recently introduced in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2003, provide for the transfer of property to qualified not- for-profit groups for natural resource and conservation purposes. Property  can, in other cases, also be conveyed to nonfederal parties through the  other cited methods as shown in figure 1 without regard, in many cases, to  a particular end-use. Property can, for example, be sold or special  congressional legislation can dictate transfer to a particular entity.
In the early years of BRAC, DOD was projecting higher revenue from  land sales than it subsequently experienced. DOD had originally projected  about $4.7 billion in revenue from such sales for the four closure rounds;  however, according to the fiscal year 2005 budget, total land sales and  related revenue were about $595 million for those rounds. The decrease in  expected sales is attributable primarily to national policy changes and  legislation that emphasize assisting communities that are losing bases.  Nonetheless, in recent years the Navy has expressed a renewed interest in  the sale of BRAC property with the sale of some unneeded property at the  former Tustin Marine Corps Air Station in California for $208.5 million.  Moreover, the Navy has also indicated that it intends to sell portions of the  former Naval Station Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico. To what extent  sales will play more of a role in disposing of unneeded property arising  from the 2005 BRAC round remains to be seen.
Reducing excess infrastructure and generating savings for the department  were the key reasons for conducting the prior BRAC rounds. The net  savings for implementing BRAC actions are arrived at by deducting the  costs necessary to implement those actions from the estimated savings  generated by the resulting reduction in excess infrastructure.  These savings are most often cost avoidances—costs that DOD might have  incurred if BRAC actions had not taken place. Some of the savings are  one-time (e.g., canceled military construction projects), but most often  represent an avoidance of recurring spending (e.g., personnel reductions).  In this respect, eliminating or reducing recurring base support  (e.g., physical security, fire protection, utilities, property maintenance,  accounting, payroll, and a variety of other services) costs at closed and  realigned bases is a major component of BRAC savings. The value of these  recurring savings has become the largest and most important portion of  BRAC’s overall estimated savings.
DOD must comply with cleanup standards and processes under applicable  laws, regulations, and executive orders in conducting assessments and  cleanup of its unneeded base property. The time needed to accomplish  cleanup activities can extend many years beyond the 6 years allowed  under BRAC legislation for ceasing military operations and closing bases.  The status of cleanup efforts can also affect the transfer of title from DOD  to other users. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,  Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) provides the framework for  responding to most contamination problems resulting from hazardous  waste disposal practices, leaks, spills, or other activity that has created a  public health or environmental risk. DOD performs its cleanups in  coordination with regulatory agencies and, as appropriate, with other  potentially responsible parties, including current property owners. While  CERCLA had originally authorized property transfers only after cleanup  actions had been taken, the act was amended in 1996 to expedite transfer  of contaminated property under certain conditions under a so-called early  transfer authority. While use of this authority does allow for the possible  concurrent cleanup and reuse of the property, the requirement remains  that contaminated sites must be cleaned up to ensure that transferred  BRAC property is not harmful to human health or the environment and  that it can support new use.
subsections: section_title: Prior GAO Reports Have Addressed BRAC Issues
paragraphs: We have reported on base closure issues from the prior BRAC rounds on  several occasions (see app. VI). Although some of our reports have  focused on concerns about implementation actions at a specific location,  in December 1998 and April 2002 we issued two broader BRAC status  reports addressing DOD-wide closure issues. These reports discussed the  magnitude and precision of cost and savings estimates, the progress of  environmental cleanup and property transfer, and the impact on  communities and their recovery. We also issued reports in July and  August 2001 that updated closure-related implementation data and  reaffirmed the primary results of our prior work. A brief summary of  these reports is as follows:  In our December 1998 report, we concluded that BRAC actions were on  track. Cost and savings estimates were substantial but not precise because  the services had not routinely updated their savings estimates, as they had  their cost estimates. Environmental cleanup was progressing, but it was  costly and time consuming. Property disposal was progressing slowly  because of factors that were not completely under DOD’s control and that  were difficult to manage, such as identifying recipients for the property  and associated transfer planning and addressing environmental concerns.  Most communities where bases had closed were recovering, and a  majority was faring well economically relative to key national economic  indicators.  In our July 2001 report, we concluded that estimated BRAC net savings  had reportedly increased to $15.5 billion from the $14 billion we reported  in our December 1998 report. Accumulated savings began to surpass  accumulated costs in fiscal year 1998. We observed that BRAC savings  were real and substantial, but limitations existed in DOD’s effort to track  costs and savings that affect the precision of its estimates.  In our August 2001 report, we concluded that BRAC closing and  realignment actions were essentially completed, but the subsequent  transfer of unneeded base property was only partially completed.  Environmental cleanup was progressing but would require many years to  fully complete. Most communities were recovering from the economic  impacts of base closures because of several factors, such as a strong  national or regional economy and federal assistance programs.  In our April 2002 report, we concluded that most (about 58 percent)  former unneeded base property had not yet been transferred to other  users, the closure process was generating substantial savings (about  $16.7 billion, although the savings estimates were imprecise), the total  expected environmental cleanup costs were still within range of the cost  estimates made in 1996, and most communities surrounding closed bases  were faring well economically in relation to key national economic  indicators.
section_title: Most Unneeded BRAC Property Had Been Transferred
paragraphs: As of September 30, 2004, nearly 72 percent (364,000 acres) of the  approximately 504,000 acres of unneeded BRAC property from the prior  rounds had been transferred to other federal or nonfederal entities. When  leased land is added to this acreage, the amount of unneeded BRAC  property that is in reuse increases to 90 percent. The remaining  untransferred property (140,000 acres) has not been transferred primarily  because of environmental cleanup issues. DOD has used and continues to  use several methods to transfer property and expedite its reuse.
subsections: section_title: Transfer of Unneeded BRAC Property Is More Than Two-Thirds Complete
paragraphs: Of the approximately 504,000 unneeded acres available for disposal  external to DOD, 72 percent had been transferred to either federal or  nonfederal entities, while 28 percent, including leased acreage, remains in  DOD’s inventory. DOD has made progress in transferring property in the  aggregate since our 2002 report, having increased the transfer rate from  42 percent to 72 percent (see fig. 2). The transfers of property at the Naval  Air Facility in Adak, Alaska, and the Sierra Army Depot, California, are the  largest transfers since our April 2002 report, accounting for a combined  total of nearly 129,000 acres. A breakdown of the current status of  unneeded BRAC property shows that (1) 52 percent had been transferred  to nonfederal entities, (2) 20 percent had been transferred to other federal  agencies, (3) 18 percent had been leased but not transferred, and  (4) 10 percent was untransferred and is awaiting future disposition  (see fig. 3).
Even though DOD has 140,000 acres of its BRAC property remaining to be  transferred, much of this land is in long-term lease with other users.  Altogether, the services have nearly 91,000 acres (65 percent) of their  untransferred property under lease, leaving 49,000 acres (35 percent) that  has not been transferred and not in reuse. The department expects that  this property will eventually be transferred to nonfederal users. Leased  property, while not transferred to the user, can afford the user and DOD  some benefits. Communities, for example, can opt for leasing, while  awaiting final environmental cleanup, as an interim measure to promote  property reuse and job creation. And, DOD can often gain an advantage, in  some cases, as the communities assume responsibility and pay for  protecting and maintaining the property. By adding leased acres to the  number of transferred acres, the amount of unneeded BRAC property in  reuse rises to 90 percent.
section_title: Most Property Transfer Delays Are Due to Environmental Cleanup Issues
paragraphs: As we have reported in the past, environmental cleanup constraints have  and continue to delay the services from rapidly transferring unneeded  BRAC property. Army data show that about 82 percent of its approximate  101,000 untransferred acres has some kind of environmental impediment,  such as unexploded ordnance (UXO) or some level of chemical  contamination that requires cleanup before transfer can take place. Navy  data show that about 65 percent of the Navy’s almost 13,000 untransferred  acres could not be transferred because of environmental reasons.  Likewise, about 98 percent of the Air Force’s approximately 24,000  untransferred acres is due to environmental cleanup issues. Table 1 shows  those BRAC installations with untransferred acreage that had substantial  estimated costs for fiscal year 2004 and beyond for completing  environmental cleanup actions. The estimated completion costs for these  BRAC installations account for nearly 60 percent of DOD’s future BRAC  environmental cleanup estimates for the previous rounds. Further detail  on environmental costs for BRAC property is included in the next section  of this report.
section_title: DOD Is Using Several Methods to Expedite Property Transfer
paragraphs: As previously discussed, DOD has several options available to expedite the  transfer of its unneeded property for further reuse by other entities. The  following provides a brief summary of the various methods that have been  used to transfer BRAC property to nonfederal users:    Public benefit conveyances: As noted earlier, this method is used to  transfer property primarily to state and local governments specifically for  an exclusive and protected public use, usually at little or no cost. This type  of conveyance is sponsored by a federal agency that is closely aligned with  its intended use. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration  handles public benefit conveyances of BRAC airfields and facilities, and  the National Park Service sponsors public benefit conveyances for new  public parks and recreation facilities. Nearly 18 percent of the BRAC  acreage transferred to nonfederal users in the prior rounds was  accomplished through this method.
Economic development conveyances: As noted earlier, this method is used  to transfer property to local redevelopment authorities for the purpose of  creating jobs and promoting economic activity within the local  community. Under this transfer method, many communities could receive  property at fair market value or below, and at no cost to those in rural  areas. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000  required all future economic development conveyances to be no cost and  permitted those currently in-force to be converted to no-cost conveyances  if certain conditions were met. According to DOD and community  officials, this method had gained in popularity with the adoption of the no- cost provision, which, in addition to saving money for the new user,  virtually eliminated the delays resulting from prolonged negotiations over  the fair market value of the property and accelerated economic  development and job creation. We note, however, the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 included a provision stipulating that  DOD is to seek to obtain fair market value for BRAC-related transfers of  property in the upcoming 2005 round. Although the BRAC law still allows  DOD to transfer properties for economic development at no cost under  certain circumstances, the general requirement for the 2005 round to seek  fair market value may impact the use of this method of conveyance. Nearly  32 percent of the BRAC acreage transferred to nonfederal users in the  prior rounds was accomplished through economic development  conveyances.
Conservation conveyances: This method was used by DOD for the first  time in September 2003 to transfer property for natural resource and  conservation purposes. Under this method, the Army transferred almost  58,000 acres from the Sierra Army Depot, California, to the Honey Lake  Conservation Team, which is made up of two nonprofit organizations—the  Center for Urban Watershed Renewal and the Trust for Public Lands—and  two private-sector companies. This is the largest single transfer of surplus  BRAC property that the Army has undertaken. Nearly 22 percent of the  BRAC acreage transferred to nonfederal users in the prior rounds was  accomplished through this method.
Other conveyances: Unneeded BRAC property can also be transferred  through special legislation, reversion, lease termination/expiration, or  sales. Congress can, through special legislation, determine the terms and  conditions for transferring specific BRAC properties. For example,  through special congressional legislation, the Navy transferred over  47,000 acres of its 71,000-acre Adak, Alaska, Naval Air Facility to a local  redevelopment authority in March 2004 through the Department of the  Interior in exchange for other land that the Navy needed. Almost  19 percent of BRAC acreage was transferred to nonfederal users through  special legislation. DOD data show that only 3 percent of the nonfederal  conveyances were reversions. Additionally, the termination or expiration  of a lease on BRAC property for nonfederal users accounted for about  4 percent of the transfers, while negotiated and public sales accounted for  only 4 percent of the property transfers.
Figure 4 summarizes the acreage transfers by the various conveyance  methods.
In most cases, unneeded property on a BRAC base is divided into parcels  and transferred in this manner according to intended reuse plans. Thus,  most of the individual actual transfers are for less than 2,000 acres.  However, in some cases, the amounts can be larger. For example, the  transfers of Naval Air Facility Adak, Alaska (about 71,000 acres), and  Sierra Army Depot, California (about 58,000 acres), are two large transfers  that have occurred since our April 2002 report. Table 2 shows the transfer  methods used to convey the 5 largest tracts of BRAC property for each  service across the prior rounds to date.
DOD has the authority to transfer unneeded BRAC property, even if all  environmental cleanup actions have not been completed, through a special  authority granted by Congress called early transfer authority. The  authority must be used in conjunction with one of the conveyance  methods, such as an economic development conveyance, authorized to  transfer BRAC property. The department credits early transfer authority  for allowing it to put BRAC property into reuse much faster by conveying  the property through one of its transfer authorities while concurrently  meeting cleanup obligations.
We initially reported in 2002 that several factors were working against the  widespread application of this authority, to include community adversity  to taking risks, absence of ready to implement reuse plans, and lack of  support from local and state regulators. Furthermore, we cited that  exercising the authority might require DOD to commit more funds, in the  short term, than what is available to meet environmental cleanup  requirements. Regardless of when or how BRAC property is transferred,  liability for cleanup in compliance with applicable federal and state  regulatory requirements remains with DOD. Cleanup of property subject to  the early transfer authority does not necessarily have to be conducted  exclusively by DOD. DOD can share cleanup actions with the transferee,  or the transferee can conduct and pay for cleanup actions. DOD can also  enter into agreements with a transferee, usually a local redevelopment  authority, for the privatization of cleanup efforts. In either case, the  department funds the cleanup and generally retains liability for future  costs associated with the discovery of additional environmental  contamination associated with prior DOD activities.
As the early transfer process has evolved over its short history, the use of  the authority has increased. The Army has transferred almost 8,300 acres;  the Navy has transferred over 9,500 acres; and the Air Force has  transferred over 700 acres using early transfer authority. These figures  represent more than twice the combined acreage (about 8,225 acres) that  we reported in 2002 as being transferred under this authority.
section_title: BRAC Net Savings Are Substantial but Imprecise
paragraphs: According to DOD financial data, the four prior BRAC rounds generated  an estimated $28.9 billion in net savings through fiscal year 2003.  Moreover, DOD expects to accrue additional annual recurring savings or  cost avoidances of about $7 billion in fiscal year 2004 and thereafter. As  we have previously reported, however, the cost and savings projections  that DOD uses to estimate net savings are imprecise because the military  services have not regularly updated their savings projections and DOD’s  accounting systems do not track estimated savings. Moreover, DOD has  not incorporated all base closure-related costs in its estimates, thus  tending to overestimate savings. On the other hand, the estimated net  savings could be greater than DOD has reported because some costs  attributed to the closures, such as environmental cleanup, may have  occurred even if the bases remained open. DOD has a legal obligation to  conduct environmental cleanup irrespective of closing or realigning an  installation.
subsections: section_title: BRAC Net Savings Estimates Remain Substantial
paragraphs: Our analysis of DOD data shows that the department had accrued an  estimated $28.9 billion in net savings or cost avoidances through fiscal  year 2003 for the four prior BRAC rounds. This amount, which includes  costs and estimated recurring savings from fiscal years 2002 and 2003,  represents an increase over the $16.7 billion in net savings accrued as of  fiscal year 2001 that we cited in our 2002 report. In calculating net savings,  DOD deducts the costs of implementing BRAC actions for the four closure  rounds from the estimated savings. As figure 5 shows, the cumulative  estimated savings surpassed the cumulative costs to implement BRAC  actions in 1998, and the net savings have grown and will continue to grow  from that point, even though some costs (e.g., environmental cleanup)  have been incurred after that time and some costs will continue well  beyond 2003.
Our analysis shows that the rate of net savings accumulation increased  because the cumulative BRAC costs flattened out just before the 6-year  implementation period for the last round ending in fiscal year 2001. Most  expenses associated with closures and realignments were incurred  through fiscal year 2001; most of the expenses beyond fiscal year 2001  were primarily for environmental cleanup. Through fiscal year 2003, the  cumulative costs to implement the four prior round actions amounted to  about $23.3 billion (see fig. 5). As shown in figure 6, approximately  one-third ($7.8 billion) of this amount was spent for operations and  maintenance, such as the maintenance and repair to keep facilities and  equipment in good working order, as well as civilian severance and  relocation costs. A little more than one-third ($8.3 billion) was spent on  environmental cleanup and compliance activities, for example, to reduce,  remove, and recycle hazardous wastes and remove unsafe buildings and  debris from closed bases. Finally, a little less than one-third ($6.7 billion)  was used for military construction, including renovating existing facilities  and constructing new buildings at military bases that were not closed to  accommodate relocating military units and various functions.
According to DOD data, BRAC cumulative savings or cost avoidances will  rise steadily for an indefinite period as BRAC actions are completed. As  figure 7 shows, DOD estimates that it accrued BRAC savings of  $52.2 billion through fiscal year 2003 as a result of eliminating or reducing  operation and maintenance costs, including base support costs, and  eliminating or reducing military and civilian personnel costs. Of this  amount, about half ($26.8 billion) can be attributed to savings from  operation and maintenance activities, such as terminating or reducing  physical security, fire protection, utilities, property maintenance,  accounting, civilian payroll, and a variety of other services that have  associated costs. An additional $14.7 billion in estimated savings resulted  from military personnel reductions.
Moreover, DOD expects to accrue an estimated $7 billion in annual  recurring savings in fiscal year 2004 and beyond for the four BRAC rounds.  This amount represents an increase of approximately $486 million from  our prior reporting in 2002 and is attributable to inflation over that time  period.
section_title: Precision of Cost and Savings Estimates Is Limited
paragraphs: The savings and cost estimates used by DOD to calculate the net savings at  its BRAC-affected bases are imprecise, primarily because the military  services have not periodically updated their savings estimates and DOD  does not include all costs associated with BRAC closures in its estimates.  Further, net savings may be larger than DOD estimates because some  environmental and construction costs associated with ongoing  environmental and facility recapitalization programs at BRAC-affected  bases would have at least partially offset future costs at those locations if  they were not closed or realigned.
subsections: section_title: BRAC Savings Estimates Were Not Updated Periodically
paragraphs: The results of our prior work showed that the military services, despite  DOD guidance that directs them to update savings estimates in their  annual budget submissions, had not periodically updated these estimates,  thereby contributing to imprecision in overall BRAC estimated net savings  figures. Moreover, a fundamental limitation exists in DOD’s accounting  systems, which, like other accounting systems, are not oriented toward  identifying and tracking savings. Other reasons cited by service officials  are that updating savings has not been a high priority and that it is a labor- intensive process that could be costly. Nonetheless, the periodic updating  of estimates is important, especially in view of the upcoming 2005 BRAC  round, in order to increase their accuracy for DOD and congressional  decision makers.
As early as 1998, DOD reported it had plans to improve its savings  estimates for the implementation of future BRAC rounds. In addition, in  our April 2002 report, we recommended that DOD develop a DOD-wide  systematic approach for the periodic updating of initial closure savings  estimates, along with an oversight mechanism to ensure these updates are  accomplished for the upcoming 2005 BRAC round. We continue to believe  this recommendation remains valid. DOD has not yet acted on our  recommendation, but DOD officials told us that they intend to implement a  system to better track savings for implementing the upcoming round  actions.
section_title: BRAC Costs Are Not Comprehensive
paragraphs: Prior BRAC round costs are not comprehensive because they do not  include certain costs related to BRAC activities that are incurred either by  DOD or by other governmental agencies. For example, DOD’s calculation  of one-time estimated net savings does not include BRAC-related  economic assistance costs, most of which are incurred by federal agencies  other than DOD. As of September 30, 2004, federal agencies reported that  they had spent about $1.9 billion (an increase from the $1.5 billion in our  2002 report) to assist BRAC-affected communities and individuals for such  purposes as base reuse planning, airport planning, job training,  infrastructure improvements, and community economic development.  These activities include the following:    About $611 million was provided by the Department of Commerce’s  Economic Development Administration to assist communities with  infrastructure improvements, building demolition, and revolving fund  loans.
About $760 million was provided by the Federal Aviation Administration  to assist with converting former military airfields to civilian use.
About $223 million was provided by the Department of Labor to help  communities retrain workers who lost their jobs. The Department of Labor  has not provided additional funding since we last reported in 2002.
About $280 million was provided by DOD’s Office of Economic  Adjustment to help communities plan and implement the reuse of BRAC  bases.
While these costs represent a relatively small percentage (about 7 percent)  of the overall net savings estimate through 2003, it does demonstrate the  imprecision of the overall BRAC savings estimate. However, our analysis  of DOD and other federal agencies’ data shows that this percentage will  most likely diminish over time as the net savings continue to grow.
section_title: Cost Avoidances May Be Greater Than Estimated
paragraphs: While the noninclusion of certain costs, as noted above, has the tendency  of overstating savings or cost avoidances, DOD’s difficulty in providing  precise estimates is further complicated by the fact that some BRAC  actions could produce savings that are not captured in its net savings  estimates. For example, the inclusion of BRAC environmental cleanup  costs in calculating net savings has the effect of overstating costs and  understating net savings for DOD because the department has a legal  obligation to conduct environmental cleanup irrespective of closing or  realigning an installation. A similar case can be made for military  construction projects in the BRAC program. While DOD had expended  significant BRAC funds (about $6.7 billion through fiscal year 2003) on  military construction at its receiving bases, it would have likely incurred  many of these costs over time under its facilities capital improvement  initiatives if the closing bases had remained open.
section_title: Environmental Cleanup Cost Estimates Have Remained Near Prior Projected Estimates but May Change
paragraphs: Our analyses of DOD data show that although environmental cleanup cost  estimates at BRAC sites are within the range of prior projections, they may  fluctuate because of unknown or undetermined future environmental  cleanup responsibilities or improved cleanup techniques. DOD expected to  spend an estimated $3.6 billion in fiscal year 2004 and beyond to complete  environmental cleanup on BRAC properties, bringing the total BRAC  environmental costs to $11.9 billion, which is still within prior estimates.  The estimates of future projected liabilities have decreased since last year  as a result of reported focused management oversight and review of  restoration costs and schedules, completion of more cleanup actions, and  reevaluation of some sites. However, the estimated liabilities may change  due to unforeseen or undetermined environmental liabilities, such as the  discovery of additional UXO or contaminants, which may exist on BRAC  properties. Moreover, revisions to cleanup standards or the intended reuse  of the land not yet transferred could prompt the need to change cleanup  requirements, which would in turn affect costs.
subsections: section_title: Environmental Cleanup Costs Have Remained Near Prior Projected Estimates
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that the total estimated environmental cleanup cost of  about $11.9 billion for the prior BRAC rounds is within the range of prior  program estimates. The cost estimate is slightly higher than DOD’s  previous estimate of $10.5 billion in 2002 and $11.3 billion in 1996. DOD  had obligated approximately $8.3 billion in BRAC environmental cleanup  and compliance costs through fiscal year 2003, and it estimates that future  costs for fiscal year 2004 and beyond will now amount to $3.6 billion.
The $3.6 billion estimate for future BRAC environmental liabilities is about  $1 billion less than DOD had previously projected for fiscal year 2003 and  beyond. The decrease is attributable primarily to about $761 million that  DOD spent on environmental cleanup and compliance in fiscal year 2003  and to a number of actions taken by the services. For example, the Air  Force reportedly applied more focused management oversight and review  of estimated restoration costs and schedules to the Air Force Restoration  Information Management System, accounting for a $174.7 million  decrease; the Navy reduced its estimates based largely on conservative  project execution rates, accounting for a $137.4 million decrease; and the  Army recharacterized some of its cleanup sites, accounting for a  $56.5 million reduction.
However, DOD acknowledged in its 2003 Performance and Accountability  Report that the total future environmental liability estimates for remaining  BRAC sites may need to be adjusted because the DOD Inspector General  questioned the reliability of DOD environmental cost estimates, primarily  citing incidents of a lack of supporting documentation for the estimates  and incomplete audit trails.
section_title: Unforeseen or Undetermined Environmental Hazards May Change Future Cleanup Costs
paragraphs: Estimating the costs of future environmental cleanup on BRAC properties  is complicated by the possibility that these properties might contain  unknown or emerging environmental hazards, which could change  cleanup costs. For example, costs could change as the result of the  discovery of additional UXO or of previously unregulated chemical  contaminants or waste in the ground or groundwater. Estimates of future  liabilities may also change if certain federal environmental standards  change, the intended use of yet-to-be-transferred BRAC property is  revised, or cleanup techniques are improved.
As of the end of fiscal year 2003, DOD stated that about 78 percent of  cleanup activities on BRAC sites with identified hazardous waste were  reportedly complete and met the CERCLA standards. However, there are  questions about the extent of additional potential cleanup costs associated  with UXO and perchlorate contamination on various DOD sites, including  BRAC installations. The following provides an update on DOD’s activities  concerning these particular hazards:    UXO: While clearing BRAC property of UXO for further reuse has  presented a difficult and costly challenge for the department, DOD is  making progress through its Military Munitions Response Program. This  program is designed to address UXO hazards not only on BRAC property  but all DOD property, with the exception of operational ranges. Through  fiscal year 2003, the department had addressed UXO problems on 148 of  the 196 BRAC sites (76 percent) on 32 BRAC installations where UXO was  identified. It completed UXO cleanup on 126 of the total sites (64 percent),  and it is currently working on the other 22 sites that were addressed.  While all sites were identified prior to fiscal year 2001, DOD had not yet  completed establishing program goals or developing metrics to track  projects, assess risks, and prioritize the remaining cleanup sites. The Navy  estimates that its BRAC UXO cleanup costs for fiscal year 2004 and  beyond will be about $32.3 million and will involve 2,353 acres. Similarly,  the Army estimates that its remaining UXO cleanup costs will approach  $496 million on 21,000 acres, with the largest costs (about $266 million on  4,500 acres) forecasted at the former Fort Ord base in California. The Air  Force estimates that it will spend nearly $2.3 million on UXO cleanup  costs affecting 180 BRAC acres, of which $2 million will likely be spent on  the cleanup of the former Carswell Air Force Base, Texas.
Perchlorate: Perchlorate is a chemical munitions constituent that is  present on some BRAC bases and which may cause adverse health effects  by contaminating drinking water. Health experts have not conclusively  determined what amount of perchlorate poses a health risk for humans,  and no federal standard exists for allowable levels of perchlorate in  drinking water. Nonetheless, the existence of perchlorate does pose a  potential future liability for DOD, but that liability would depend on the  standard that may be set in the future as well as the extent of its presence  on BRAC installations and the intended reuse of the property. However, it  should be noted that this issue could affect open as well as closing bases.  In September 2003, DOD required the military components to assess the  extent of perchlorate occurrence at active and closed installations and at  its formerly used defense sites. In addition, DOD invested $27 million to  conduct research on the potential health effects, environmental impacts,  and treatment processes for perchlorate. In a report directed by Congress,  DOD was required to identify the sources of perchlorate on BRAC  properties and describe its plans to clean up perchlorate contamination on  these sites. DOD officials stated that they assessed 14 sites, which did not  include any BRAC property already transferred or deeded to other entities.  The department issued its assessment in July 2004 and concluded that  while it had adopted a perchlorate sampling policy that includes  untransferred BRAC properties, DOD stated it will commit to integrating  perchlorate remediation into its cleanup program once a regulatory  standard is established.
section_title: Most Communities Have Recovered or Are Recovering from the Economic Impact of BRAC
paragraphs: Most communities have recovered or are recovering from the impact of  base closures, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some  negative impact from the national economic downturn of recent years.  DOD data indicate that the percentage of local DOD civilian jobs that were  lost at the bases and have been replaced by reuse has increased since our  2002 report. Moreover, recent economic data show that affected BRAC  communities are faring well when compared to national economic  indicators. Although the average unemployment rate increased for most of  the 62 BRAC communities we reviewed in 2002, nearly 70 percent had  unemployment rates lower than the national average. In addition,  48 percent of communities had annual real per capital income growth  rates above the U.S. average, as compared with the 53 percent stated in  our last report. The growth rate declined for 74 percent of all BRAC  communities as compared to our 2002 report. As we have reported in the  past, the recovery process has not necessarily been easy with the strength  of the national, regional, and local economies having a significant bearing  on the recovery of any particular community facing a BRAC closure.
subsections: section_title: Percentage of Local Jobs Replaced Has Increased
paragraphs: The redevelopment of base property is widely viewed as an important  component of economic recovery for BRAC-affected communities. While  not the only determinant of economic recovery for surrounding  communities, it can, nevertheless, be an important catalyst for recovery  efforts. The closure or realignment of military bases creates job losses at  these facilities, but subsequent redevelopment of the former bases’  property provides opportunities for creating new jobs.
As DOD last reported, as of October 31, 2003, almost 72 percent (92,921)  of the 129,649 DOD civilian jobs lost on military bases as a result of  realignments or closures in the prior BRAC rounds had been replaced at  these locations. This is 10 percent higher than the 62 percent (79,740) we  reported in 2002 and over time, the number of jobs created will likely  increase as additional redevelopment occurs. See appendix II for a  detailed listing of jobs lost and created at major BRAC locations during the  prior four rounds.
section_title: Unemployment Rates Compare Favorably with National Average
paragraphs: Unemployment rates in BRAC-affected communities continue to compare  favorably with the national average. Since 1997 (after completion of the  implementation periods for the first two rounds in 1988 and 1991) and  through the implementation periods of the last two rounds (1993 and  1995), about 70 percent of the 62 BRAC-affected communities have  consistently been at or below the national unemployment rate (see fig. 8).
According to our analysis of the annual unemployment rates for the  7-month period ending July 31, 2004, most of the 62 BRAC-affected  communities compared favorably with the national average and were  consistent with the results we reported in 2002. During this period, 43 of  the 62 communities (69 percent) affected by base closures had  unemployment rates at or below the average 7-month national rate of  5.8 percent. This is one less community than in our 2002 report when  44 communities (71 percent) had average unemployment rates lower than  the (then) average 9-month national rate of 4.6 percent. For all BRAC  communities with higher-than-average calendar year 2004 unemployment  rates through July 2004, four had double-digit rates: Merced County,  California (Castle Air Force Base), 15.8 percent; Mississippi County,  Arkansas (Eaker Air Force Base), 13.0 percent; Salinas, California  (Fort Ord Army Base), 11.1 percent; and Iosco County, Michigan  (Wurtsmith Air Force Base), 10.2 percent. Salinas, California, is the one  addition to the other three communities that we also cited in our 2002  report for having double-digit unemployment rates. Appendix III provides  additional detail on the average unemployment rates for the 62  communities.
section_title: Average Annual Real Per Capita Income Growth Rates Show Mixed Results
paragraphs: Annual real per capita income growth rates for BRAC-affected  communities exhibit mixed results. The latest available data (1999-2001  time frame) show that 30 (48 percent) of the 62 communities we studied  had an estimated average real per capita income growth rate that was  above the national average of 2.2 percent. This is a decline from our 2002  report in which 33 communities (53 percent) matched or exceeded the  national rate of 3.03 percent during the 1996-1999 time frame. Additionally,  our current analysis shows that of the 32 communities below the national  average, 6 communities (10 percent) had average annual per capita income  growth rates that were close to the national average (defined as within  10 percent), while the remaining 26 communities (42 percent) were  below the national average growth rate. Forty-six (74 percent) of the  62 communities had lower per capita income growth rates than when we  last reported on them in 2002. Three communities—Merced, California  (Castle Air Force Base); Austin-San Marcos, Texas (Bergstrom Air Force  Base); and Carroll County, Illinois (Savanna Army Depot)—had negative  growth rates. By comparison, our 2002 report showed that no  communities experienced a negative growth rate. Appendix IV provides  additional detail on the average annual real per capita income growth rates  for the 62 communities.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: As DOD prepares to undertake another round of base realignments and  closures in 2005, we note that the department has made progress in  completing postrealignment and closure actions from the prior four  rounds since our last update in 2002. Seventy-two percent of former base  property has been transferred and about 90 percent is in reuse if leased  property is considered. And, as reported in the past, environmental  cleanup requirements present the primary challenge to transferring the  remaining property. Although we are making no recommendations in this  report, we believe that our April 2002 report recommendation  underscoring the need for a DOD-wide systematic approach for the  periodic updating of savings estimates, along with an oversight mechanism  to ensure these updates are accomplished for the 2005 BRAC round  recommendations, remains valid. More specifically, we recommended that  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,  in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller and  Chief Financial Officer), develop (1) a DOD-wide systematic approach for  the periodic updating of initial closure savings estimates and (2) an  oversight mechanism to ensure that the military services and components  update such estimates in accordance with the prescribed approach. While  DOD has stated its intent to do so, it has not acted on this  recommendation.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)  provided technical comments on a draft of this report that were  incorporated as appropriate. DOD concurred with the need to improve the  department’s procedures for accounting for savings from the 2005 BRAC  round, as we had previously recommended in our April 2002 report. DOD’s  comments are included in this report as appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and  the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-8412, or my Assistant Director, James  Reifsnyder, at (202) 512-4166 if you or your staff have any questions  concerning this report. Key reports related to base closure implementation  issues are listed in appendix VI. Staff acknowledgements are provided in  appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the reliability of data received from the Department of Defense  (DOD), Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, and other federal  agencies and used in this report, we reviewed available Inspector General  and internal audit reports, internal reviews and studies, and contractor  and consultant studies related to these databases. We also reviewed  available reports of congressional hearings or copies of congressional  testimony related to the data and summaries of ongoing or planned audits,  reviews, and studies of the systems or the data and requested  documentation related to quality practices inherent in the data systems,  such as edit checks, data entry verification, and exception reports. Finally,  we interviewed department and agency officials knowledgeable about  their information systems to assess the reliability of those systems and the  data they provide. Based on these steps and the steps discussed in the  following paragraphs, we determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this report.
To determine DOD’s progress in transferring unneeded base property to  other users, we reviewed base realignment and closure (BRAC) property  disposition plans and actual property transfers as of September 30, 2004,  and compared them with similar data presented in our April 2002 report.  We discussed property transfer reporting systems with each service to  validate the reliability of the data reported to DOD. We also categorized  the property disposition data into the various transfer methods (e.g.,  economic development conveyances) used to gain a sense of the  predominant method being used. With regard to the untransferred acreage,  we determined the primary impediments to property transfers by  examining data for those former bases where unneeded BRAC property  had not yet been transferred as of September 30, 2004. We also collected  data and obtained the military services’ views on the use of the so-called  early transfer authority in which property can be transferred under certain  conditions before an environmental cleanup remedy is in place.  Furthermore, we collected and analyzed data on the use of no-cost  economic development conveyances to transfer property and stimulate its  reuse. Finally, because leasing is often used as an interim measure to make  property available to users while awaiting property transfer, we collected  and analyzed data related to leased property.
To determine the magnitude of the net savings from the four prior BRAC  rounds, we reviewed DOD’s annual BRAC budget submissions and  interviewed BRAC and financial officials from the services and the Office  of the Secretary of Defense. To ascertain the extent to which cost and  savings estimates have changed over time, we compared the data  contained in DOD’s fiscal year 2005 BRAC budget submission and related  documentation with similar data in DOD’s fiscal year 2002 submission,  which was the latest budget documentation available when we produced  our last update report in April 2002. Through this comparison, we  identified where major changes had occurred in the various cost and  savings categories within the BRAC account and interviewed DOD  officials regarding the rationale for the changes. To gain a sense of the  accuracy of the cost and savings estimates, we relied primarily on our  prior BRAC reports and reviewed reports issued by the Congressional  Budget Office, DOD, DOD Inspector General, and service audit agencies.  We also reviewed the annual military service budget submissions for fiscal  years 2002 through 2005 to determine how frequently changes were made  to the cost and savings estimates. In assessing the completeness of the  cost and savings data, we reviewed the component elements considered  by DOD in formulating overall BRAC cost and savings estimates. Because  DOD did not include in its estimates federal expenditures to provide  economic assistance for communities and individuals affected by BRAC,  we collected these data from the Department of Labor, the Federal  Aviation Administration, the Department of Commerce (Economic  Development Administration), and DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment.  Also, we reviewed the cost estimates for environmental cleanup activities  beyond fiscal year 2003 because they had the effect of reducing the  expected annual recurring savings for the four rounds.
To assess the economic recovery of communities affected by the BRAC  process, we assessed the same communities that we analyzed in our April  2002 report where more than 300 civilian jobs on military bases were  eliminated during the prior rounds. We used unemployment and real per  capital income growth rates as measures to analyze changes in the  economic condition of communities over time and in relation to national  averages. We used unemployment and real per capita income as key  performance indicators because (1) DOD used these measures in its  community economic impact analysis during the BRAC location selection  process and (2) economists commonly use these measures in assessing the  economic health of an area over time. While our assessment provides an  overall picture of how these communities compare with the national  averages, it does not necessarily isolate the condition, or the changes in  that condition, that may be attributed to a specific BRAC action.
We performed our review from November 2003 through October 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Civilian Jobs Lost and Created at Major BRAC Locations during the Prior Four BRAC Rounds
paragraphs: The closure or realignment of military bases creates job losses at these  facilities, but subsequent redevelopment of the former bases’ property  provides opportunities for creating new jobs. The data presented in table 3  include civilian jobs lost and created at major base realignments and  closures during the prior four BRAC rounds, as of October 31, 2003. The  data do not include the job losses that may have occurred elsewhere in a  community, nor do they capture jobs created from other economic activity  in the area.
section_title: Appendix III: Average Unemployment Rates of BRAC-Affected Areas Compared with the U.S. Average Rate
paragraphs: As figure 9 shows, 18 (75 percent) of the 24 BRAC-affected localities  situated west of the Mississippi River had unemployment rates equal to  or less than the U.S. average rate of 5.8 percent during January through  July 2004. The other 6 locations had unemployment rates greater than the  U.S. rate.
As figure 10 shows, 26 (66 percent) of the 38 BRAC-affected localities  situated east of the Mississippi River had unemployment rates that were  less than or equal to the U.S. rate of 5.8 percent during January through  July 2004. The other 12 locations had unemployment rates that were  greater than the U.S. rate.
section_title: Appendix IV: Average Annual Real Per Capita Income Growth Rates of BRAC-Affected Areas Compared with the U.S. Average Rate
paragraphs: As figure 11 shows, 11 (46 percent) of the 24 BRAC-affected localities  situated west of the Mississippi River had average annual real per capita  income growth rates that were greater than the U.S. average growth rate of  2.2 percent during 1999 through 2001. The other 13 locations had rates that  were below the U.S. average rate, of which 2 locations experienced a  negative growth rate.
As figure 12 shows, 19 (50 percent) of the 38 BRAC-affected localities  situated east of the Mississippi River had average annual real per capita  income growth rates that were greater than the U.S. average growth rate  during 1999-2001. The other 19 locations had rates that were below the  U.S. average rate, of which 1 had a negative growth rate.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: Key Prior GAO Reports on DOD’s Base Realignments and Closures
paragraphs: Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the  Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760.  Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming  Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2004.
Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve  Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.
Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior  Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2002.
Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains  Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds.  GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.
Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and  Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.
Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds.  GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.
Military Bases: Closure and Realignments Savings Are Significant, but  Not Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations  for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.:   April 14, 1995.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection  Process for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173.  Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1993.
Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed  Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.:   May 15, 1991.
Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and  Closure Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.:  November 29, 1989.
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Nancy Benco, Paul Gvoth,  Warren Lowman, Tom Mahalek, Dave Mayfield, Charles Perdue, Stephanie  Stokes, and Dale Weinholt made key contributions to this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
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