State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved
Published: 2007-10-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 1988, the Department of State (State) has ordered over 270 evacuations from overseas posts due to civil strife, terrorist incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and disease outbreaks. To prepare for evacuation, overseas posts rely on a variety of guidance, plans, and training, such as Emergency Action Plans (EAP). GAO was asked to assess State's (1) guidance and plans to prepare for evacuation, (2) training and exercises to prepare post staff for crisis, and (3) efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned into guidance and training. GAO examined State and Department of Defense (DOD) documents, spoke with State and DOD officials, conducted a survey of 243 overseas posts, and completed 22 structured interviews with State personnel.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Using its guidance and training, State has carried out numerous evacuations in the recent past--notably the safe evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens and family members from Lebanon. However, GAO found areas where State can improve its guidance, plans, and training to prepare for and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens. For example, posts do not find State's primary guidance particularly useful in preparing for evacuation. In addition, while State requires posts to update EAPs annually, almost 40 percent of posts surveyed have not updated their plans in 18 months or longer. Post-produced estimates of American citizens in a country are best guesses and more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only somewhat accurate. We also found weaknesses in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD that could limit these agencies' ability to effectively work together during a large-scale evacuation. While State provides crisis management training to post staff, GAO found gaps in training related to preparing for evacuations. Over one-quarter of posts reported that Emergency Action Committee (EAC) members have not received training necessary to meet their emergency responsibilities. In addition, officials from several posts reported that newer staff have not received training for their EAC roles. Although posts reported that crisis management exercises are an important training tool, post staff said exercises should be more practical and reflect scenarios more likely to occur at post. State's evacuation preparations are constrained by the lack of a systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned. Almost 60 percent of posts evacuated in the past 5 years said they did not produce an evacuation "after action" report, as required. Further, State has no entity to ensure posts are producing after action reports and no formal review process to analyze and incorporate lessons learned from these reports into guidance and training. Although State has developed some documents on evacuation lessons learned and distributed them to all U.S. overseas posts, the documents are sometimes vague and can be overlooked by posts due to the volume of material they receive. Limited institutional memory of prior evacuations at posts reinforces the need for a process to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned from evacuations to all post staff.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of State (State) operates overseas posts all over the  world, some in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-prone regions where threats  against post staff, dependents, or private American citizens can result in  State-ordered evacuations. Evacuations can occur in response to various  types of crises, including civil strife, terrorist incidents, natural disasters,  conventional war threats, and disease outbreaks. They can range from the  more common and relatively simple departures of post staff and  dependents on regularly scheduled commercial flights to the more rare,  complex, and massive sea and air lift of thousands of American citizens on  U.S. government-chartered and U.S. military ships and planes. According  to State officials, since 1988, State has ordered more than 270 evacuations  from overseas posts. Based on a survey we conducted, 1 in 5 overseas  posts reported they had experienced some type of evacuation of post staff  and dependents in the past 5 years.
To plan and prepare for possible evacuation, overseas posts rely on a  variety of guidance, plans, and training. Emergency Action Committees  (EAC) at overseas posts are responsible for assisting the ambassador in  planning and preparing for crises, including the possible evacuation of  post staff, dependents, and American citizens, with support from State  offices in Washington, D.C. State’s primary guidance is the Emergency  Planning Handbook (EPH), which contains policies and procedures for  crisis management, including planning, preparing for, and conducting  evacuations. In addition, all posts are required to create and annually  update an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) that includes planning for  potential, post-specific emergencies, using the EPH as a guide. State’s  Foreign Service Institute (FSI) trains overseas-bound staff in crisis  management and conducts crisis management exercises (CME) at all  overseas posts every 1 to 2-1/2 years to improve crisis preparedness.
Due to your concerns regarding threats against overseas posts that have  resulted in evacuations, we reviewed State’s efforts to plan, prepare for,  and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens.  In this report, we (1) assess State’s guidance and plans to prepare for  possible evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens; (2)  assess the training, drills, and exercises used to prepare staff at overseas  posts for crises, including possible evacuation; and (3) evaluate State’s  efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons learned from previous  evacuations into modifications of guidance and training. As part of this  review, we collected information on State’s and the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) efforts to evacuate American citizens from Lebanon in  July 2006. To address questions specifically about the Lebanon evacuation,  we briefed members of your staff on April 30, 2007, and issued a separate  report on the Lebanon evacuation in June 2007.
To meet these three objectives, we examined State and DOD documents  related to evacuation planning, preparations, training, and execution. We  spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and traveled to  Cyprus, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, where we met with State and DOD  officials responsible for planning and implementing evacuations, including  the July 2006 evacuation from Lebanon. In addition, we conducted a  survey of all 243 EACs at State’s overseas posts; 86 percent of these  committees responded to our survey. We requested that the post’s EAC  members collectively complete the survey. We also conducted 22  structured interviews with State employees who had experienced a variety  of evacuation-related events over the last 5 years. We performed our work  from June 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Appendix I provides a more detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Evacuations occur in response to diverse crises and differ considerably in  scope, size, and complexity; large-scale evacuations of American citizens  are rare. To pre-empt the need for or, if necessary, facilitate, evacuations  of American citizens, State has tools for warning American citizens about  potential crises. It also provides varying degrees of assistance to  Americans wishing to leave a country. A number of State units, including  the affected post, are involved in planning for and implementing an  evacuation, which typically takes the form of an authorized or ordered  departure of staff and dependents; State ends a departure of post staff and  dependents by terminating the authorization or order.
subsections: section_title: Evacuations Occur in Response to Diverse Crises and Differ Considerably in Scope, Size, and Complexity
paragraphs: State evacuates staff, dependents, or private American citizens in response  to various crises, including civil strife, terrorist incidents, natural disasters,  conventional war threats, and disease outbreaks. For example, according  to information compiled by State, of the 89 evacuations over the past 5  years, almost half were clustered in the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan  (see fig. 1). Twenty-three of these evacuations were due to the impending  U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003; the remaining evacuations in the Middle  East, Turkey, and Pakistan were due primarily to terrorist threats or  attacks. Ten other evacuations in Southeast Asia resulted from the  outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the spring of  2003, and nine in the Caribbean were due to hurricanes. During 2006 and  2007, State evacuated 11 posts for various reasons, including civil unrest,  elections that could lead to civil unrest, a coup attempt, a U.S. embassy  bombing, a hurricane, and war.
Evacuations differ considerably in scope, size, and complexity and can  involve (1) authorized departure of post staff and dependents, (2) ordered  departure of post staff and dependents, or (3) assisted departure of  American citizens. When authorizing departure, State grants permission to  nonemergency post staff and all dependents to voluntarily depart the  country at U.S. government expense. In contrast, when State orders  departure, State directs nonemergency post staff and all dependents to  leave the country. The number and type of post staff and dependents  actually departing a country can vary greatly depending on the size of the  post, the nature of the crisis, and the type of departure. For example,  evacuations can range from massive, complex events like the safe  extraction of almost 15,000 Americans and family members from Lebanon  in the summer of 2006, to the relatively small-scale evacuation from  Conakry, Guinea, in February 2007 during a period of civil strife. The latter  involved flying a few dozen people (dependents of embassy staff, State  employees temporarily deployed to the embassy, and private American  citizens) to a nearby city in another West African country, where U.S.  embassy personnel assisted the evacuees in obtaining commercial flights  back to the United States or an alternate approved safe haven.
While authorized departures and ordered departures of post staff and  dependents typically occur several times a year, according to State and  DOD officials large-scale evacuations of private American citizens are  rare. Based on the information State compiled, the department has  implemented 271 authorized and ordered departures from overseas posts  since 1988. According to the results of our survey, approximately 20  percent of posts reported that they had experienced an authorized  departure within the past 5 years, and about 10 percent reported  experiencing an ordered departure within this period.
section_title: State Has Tools for Warning American Citizens and Provides Varying Degrees of Assistance to Americans Wishing to Leave a Country
paragraphs: State has several tools for helping American citizens during crises  overseas, including evacuation. These tools include (1) travel warnings,  (2) registration and warden systems, and (3) varying degrees of assistance  to Americans wishing to leave a country. State issues travel warnings to  urge Americans considering trips abroad to stay away from potentially  dangerous areas. For example, as of July 2007, State had current travel  warnings for 27 countries. The reasons for these warnings include the  threat of terrorism, civil strife, violent crime, and targeted attacks against  U.S. citizens. Almost 45 percent of posts reported that State has issued a  travel warning for their country within the past 5 years.
State also encourages, but cannot require, U.S. citizens to register with the  department when traveling abroad. According to State officials, this  allows State to have better information on the number and location of  American citizens in a country should a crisis arise. In the event of a crisis,  wardens—which consist of business contacts, hotel representatives,  nongovernmental organization officials, or other individuals connected to  communities of Americans in the country who have agreed to serve as a  liaison between the post and the parties they have agreed to contact— forward messages from the post to these parties. These messages, often  conveyed via phone trees in the past but now typically sent via mass e- mails, text messages, or faxes, contain information about potential  security threats or urgent directives such as where and when to gather in  the event of an evacuation. Almost three-quarters of posts reported issuing  a threat or security warning within the past 5 years.
Although State cannot order American citizens to leave a country due to a  crisis, State officials said they provide varying degrees of assistance to  Americans wishing to leave. State officials told us American citizens  typically leave on commercially available flights; the U.S. government does  not generally arrange transportation for departing American citizens. State  sometimes assists by creating greater availability of commercial transport,  such as by requesting U.S. flag carriers to schedule more flights.  Infrequently, when commercial transportation is not available, State  officials contract transportation for American citizens. More serious  crises may require the assistance of DOD; according to data compiled by  State, DOD has provided assistance on only four occasions in the past 5  years. For example, during a period of civil unrest in a Caribbean country  in 2004, DOD provided military assistance to help embassy personnel and  their families depart the country. On very rare occasions, large numbers of  American citizens depart the country on U.S. government-contracted and  U.S. military transportation.
section_title: A Number of State Units Are Involved in Planning for and Implementing Evacuations
paragraphs: A number of State units are involved in planning for and implementing the  authorized or ordered departure of staff and dependents and assisting  American citizens who wish to leave (see fig. 2). In Washington, D.C., State  headquarters provides guidance and training to prepare for evacuations. A  Crisis Management Support unit coordinates crisis response with other  State units and U.S. government agencies, supports taskforces that assist  posts in handling crises, and trains headquarters staff in evacuation  procedures and policy. Several State bureaus also are involved in  preparations for possible evacuations and implementing evacuations.  These include the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which generates  emergency guidance and oversees planning for crises; the Bureau of  Human Resources, which includes a Family Liaison Office that assists  evacuated spouses and dependents; the Consular Affairs Bureau, which  responds to the needs of American citizens abroad; and the Bureau of  Administration, which is responsible for chartering flights or other  transportation out of the country, if needed. In addition, FSI in Arlington,  Virginia, provides training for staff before they leave for their first overseas  post or rotate to a new post, and conducts periodic CME training at each  post.
Overseas, posts also are responsible for preparing for crises, including a  potential evacuation of staff, dependents, and private American citizens in  the country. For example, the post’s EAC develops an EAP to prepare for  crises; the plan includes trip wires that can be used to determine when to  authorize or order the departure of staff and dependents. Each post also  prepares an estimate of the number and location of private American  citizens present in the country and practices responding to crises that  could lead to an evacuation through CMEs and other drills.
During a crisis, the ambassador can request that State headquarters  approve a departure of post staff and their families and is expected to  recommend post evacuations on a timely basis when circumstances  warrant it. These evacuations may be approved “when it is of national  interest to require the departure of some or all employees and/or their  eligible family members, or if there is imminent danger to the life of the  employee or the lives of the immediate family of the employee.” The  formal decision on evacuating post staff and dependents is made by the  Under Secretary for Management in an Action Memorandum. The decision  is communicated to the relevant overseas post via an approval cable, or if  necessary, by other means. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which is  responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of  U.S. foreign policy, also plays a role in this decision.
Beyond security concerns, other factors such as staff morale or political  considerations can affect an ambassador’s decision regarding whether to  request evacuation of post staff and dependents. For example, according  to State officials, an ambassador may be reluctant to disrupt the lives of  staff and their families, particularly those staff who would have to remove  their children from school. The officials also said an ambassador may be  hesitant to authorize or order people to leave due to concern that a  drawdown of staff and dependents could send a signal to the host country  that the United States no longer considers the country safe for its  employees and their families. Former and current State officials noted that  these factors can sometimes create tension between State headquarters in  Washington, D.C., which often is focused primarily on security concerns  and therefore in favor of evacuation, and leadership at post, which may be  more reluctant to initiate an evacuation.
While a post is in evacuation status, there is generally a change in the  composition of staff and an increased workload, both of which can affect  staff morale. Some staff, whom the ambassador considers critical for  addressing the crisis, assisting American citizens in the crisis, or keeping  the post up and running, remain at the post. In addition, non-U.S. staff also  generally remain at the post. These staff, referred to as locally employed  staff, are typically from the country in which the post is located, although  they can also be from third countries. Locally employed staff range from  professional office staff to drivers, groundskeepers, and others. These  remaining U.S. and local staff are often joined by U.S. government officials  from State and other agencies who are sent to the post temporarily to help  manage the crisis. The changed work environment, including the absence  of family members, the crisis-related workload that can involve long  hours, and the addition of new co-workers can affect staff morale both  positively and negatively. According to State officials, the crisis  atmosphere can create a special bond among the remaining post staff. In  addition, these staff may feel freer to dedicate more time to their work  knowing they will not be neglecting their families, who also are safely  removed. On the other hand, State officials said that staff remaining at the  post can experience extreme stress and feel isolated without the support  of their families.
When the ambassador, in consultation with State officials at headquarters,  determines that it is safe for departed staff and families to return to a post,  the Under Secretary for Management concludes an authorized or ordered  departure by terminating the authorization or order. If an authorized or  ordered departure is not terminated within 6 months, the post switches to  “unaccompanied” status. Since such posts have experienced prolonged  crises, State deems them more dangerous and Foreign Service officers  rotate there for just 1 year instead of the more typical 2 to 4 years.  Unaccompanied status means that there are restrictions on whether  spouses, children, or any other dependents can stay at the post. There can  be several gradations of unaccompanied status. For example, Abidjan,  Côte D’Ivoire, is currently a partially unaccompanied post, where spouses  and preschool-aged children are allowed; however, State does not  consider the post safe enough for school-aged children who generally  travel to and from school and other activities on their own. A post can  continue on unaccompanied status for some time. Three posts in one  Persian Gulf country were placed on ordered departure in April 2004 and  switched to unaccompanied status in August 2004; all three remain  unaccompanied as of April 2007.
section_title: Deficiencies in State’s Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post Efforts to Prepare for a Possible Evacuation
paragraphs: Deficiencies in State’s guidance and plans can hinder post efforts to  prepare for a possible evacuation of post staff, dependents, and American  citizens. State’s primary crisis management guidance, the EPH, has limited  usefulness in preparing overseas posts for evacuation. In addition, posts  are not comprehensively reviewing and updating their EAPs in order to  plan and prepare for potential evacuation. Post-produced estimates of  American citizens in country are frequently inaccurate best guesses, and  weaknesses in a State and DOD MOA need to be corrected to prepare for  large-scale evacuations.
subsections: section_title: State’s Emergency Planning Handbook Has Limited Usefulness in Preparing Overseas Posts for Possible Evacuation
paragraphs: The EPH contains State’s emergency policies and procedures and is State’s  primary crisis management guidance. State officials said the EPH was  revised in November 2005 to minimize boilerplate language and simplify its  presentation. However, we found in our survey conducted from January  2007 to April 2007 that posts do not consider the EPH particularly useful in  preparing for the possibility of evacuation. In our survey to posts’ EACs,  we asked respondents to rate the usefulness of eight resources a post  could use to prepare for the possibility of evacuation. Among these eight  resources, posts rated the EPH last in terms of being “very useful” in  preparing for the possibility of evacuation. Almost 60 percent of  respondents rated the EPH, at best, only “somewhat useful” in preparing  for the possibility of evacuation.
In addition, a number of State officials reported that the EPH, which is  hundreds of pages long, was too generic, formulaic, and voluminous, all of  which inhibits its usefulness in preparing for possible evacuation. For  example, one post reported that the EPH had too much boilerplate  language, which concealed important information, and another reported  that the EPH was a large, unwieldy document with no easy index and  information that was not easy to access. One senior State official told us  that the EPH was not helpful during a major evacuation because it was  quickly rendered irrelevant by fast-moving events.
Moreover, the EPH is missing some elements that could be useful to  prepare for the possibility of large-scale evacuation of American citizens.  For example, while the EPH provides guidance on communicating with  the media in various crisis situations, we found it has no specific guidance  for addressing the public through the media during a mass evacuation of  American citizens from a war zone. In addition, it does not contain  guidance, such as lessons learned, best practices, or tips from experienced  consular officers, on producing accurate estimates of the number of  American citizens in country for F-77 reports.
The handbook is also a post’s principal reference for preparing and  revising its EAP. However, over half of posts reported that the EPH was, at  best, only “somewhat useful” in developing the post’s EAP. For example,  some posts reported that the EPH is too general and cumbersome to use  to develop an EAP.
section_title: State Is Not Comprehensively Reviewing and Updating Emergency Action Plans
paragraphs: Posts are required to create and periodically update an EAP that includes  planning for crises and “trip wires” used to determine when to authorize  post staff and dependants to leave, order them to leave, close down the  post, or initiate the evacuation of American citizens. According to State  guidance, all posts are required to conduct a comprehensive review and  update of their EAPs once a year. However, we found almost 40 percent of  posts who gave a date reported that it has been 18 months or longer since  they most recently updated their EAP. When EAPs are not  comprehensively reviewed and updated on a timely basis, important  logistical information that is critical during an evacuation may not be  available to post. For example, State officials told us that updated contact  lists of local government officials in an EAP are particularly important for  the Consular Section at post in the event that American citizens need  assistance to evacuate from a country.
Moreover, some posts have not updated trip wires in their EAPs to cover  likely threats. According to State officials, each post is required to develop  trip wires (an event such as the closure of the main road from an embassy  to a country’s only airport) that can trigger a post response (such as  evacuation of post staff and dependents). Posts reported that (1) protest  and demonstrations, (2) natural disasters, and (3) terrorism are the top  three most likely threats at their posts. Figure 3 illustrates posts’ responses  to the survey question, “Which three of the following threats are the most  likely to occur at your post?”
However, almost 25 percent of posts reported that they do not know  whether their trip wires cover likely threats or, at best, their trip wires  leave some likely threats unaddressed. Trip wires in a post’s EAP need to  be reviewed and updated to ensure that likely threats at post are covered.
In addition, State guidance encourages posts to plan and coordinate with  other foreign missions during crises, such as evacuations. However,  almost 60 percent of posts reported that they do not have standing  arrangements with foreign missions on evacuation planning and  coordination or do not know if such arrangements are in place. The  importance of working with other foreign missions in planning, preparing,  and coordinating an evacuation was highlighted by the July 2006  evacuation from Lebanon. State officials said that good coordination with  other foreign missions was an important contributor to the success of the  evacuation. Close coordination and communication with other foreign  missions can also be important for smaller evacuations. For example, a  State official reported that during an evacuation of about 400 American  citizens from West Africa in 2004, the post extensively coordinated and  communicated with foreign missions because all American citizens were  evacuated on foreign government-arranged aircraft.
section_title: Estimates of American Citizens in Countries Abroad Are Frequently Inaccurate and Not Based on a Particular Methodology
paragraphs: State’s estimates of the number of American citizens in countries abroad  are frequently inaccurate. Posts are supposed to provide an estimation of  the number of private American citizens in a country in F-77 reports, based  in part on traveler registration. These reports play a central role in State  and DOD’s planning for and conducting evacuations of American citizens.  However, we found that more than three-quarters of posts reported that  the last F-77 at post was, at best, only somewhat accurate in its estimation  of the American citizen population. In addition, of those posts able to  provide an estimate of the nature of the inaccuracies, over two-thirds  reported that the F-77 report tends to underestimate the American citizen  population.
Several factors may complicate the estimation of American citizens in  country. First, according to State officials, countries can experience wide  fluctuations in their American citizen populations at certain times of the  year (such as the summer tourist season, religious festivals, or  pilgrimages) and it can be challenging to estimate the location of American  citizens in country. Second, State encourages American citizens to register  with the department whenever they travel internationally, and State relies  on registration numbers to generate estimates of American citizens in  country. However, State officials said that American citizens often do not  register and cannot be compelled to register. Third, State officials also said  it is difficult to estimate the number of dual nationals. For example,  according to a State official, there are a number of Saudis in Saudi Arabia  who were born in the United States when their parents were studying or  traveling abroad. These Saudis are eligible for U.S. citizenship and may  choose to obtain U.S. passports at any time, depending on the situation in  their country.
In addition, State officials said sometimes dual nationals with passports  are not captured in any U.S. citizen entry data received from the host  government. Dual nationals may use their non-American passports to enter  foreign countries to avoid host country-imposed fees or to maintain a non- American profile in country. Even when a post can make estimates of the  number of dual nationals in country, it can be difficult to predict when and  if they would evacuate from a country. Dual nationals often have close ties  with friends and relatives in country, which can influence their decision on  when to evacuate.
According to State officials, the estimates posts produce in the F-77 are  best guesses and not based on a particular methodology. Based on our  review of F-77 reports, the reports typically do not contain the source data  used to generate estimates or explanations from consular officers on how  they used these data to generate estimates. Considering the complications  of producing accurate estimates of American citizens in country, consular  officers need to document the processes and data sources used to produce  their estimates. If processes and data sources used were documented,  consular officers would have an understanding of how prior estimates  were generated using available information. According to a State official,  State is in the process of updating the instructions for producing F-77  reports to include frequently asked questions (FAQ) on preparing  estimates of American citizens. However, in our review of the FAQs, we  found only basic guidance with little detail on how to produce estimates or  how to address the complexities of estimating a diverse and changing  American citizen population overseas.
In addition to the above challenges to producing an accurate estimate,  some posts are not updating their F-77 reports on a timely basis.  According to State guidance, posts are to submit F-77 reports annually.  However, over one-quarter of posts reported that their F-77 was updated  18 months or longer ago or that they do not know when the F-77 was  updated. The F-77 plays a central role in evacuation and other crisis  management planning and provides the figures that State and DOD rely on  when planning for and conducting evacuations of American citizens. If the  F-77 reports are not updated on a timely basis, State and DOD risk  planning and preparing for evacuations with out-of-date information.
section_title: State and DOD’s Memorandum of Agreement to Prepare for Large-scale Evacuation Has Weaknesses
paragraphs: When State requires assistance with a large-scale evacuation (e.g., during  the 2006 evacuation from Lebanon), it may request help from DOD.  Guidance for coordination between State and DOD is included in an MOA  meant to define the roles and responsibilities of each agency in  implementing such large-scale evacuations. According to the MOA, State is  responsible for the protection and evacuation of all U.S. citizens abroad  and is generally responsible for evacuating U.S. citizens. However, State  may request assistance from DOD to support an evacuation. Once DOD  assistance has been requested, DOD is responsible for conducting military  operations to support the evacuation in consultation with the U.S.  ambassador. During an evacuation, the MOA calls for coordination  between State and DOD through a liaison group responsible for  evacuation planning and implementation.
However, we found weaknesses in the MOA (and its amendments) that  could reduce State and DOD’s ability to quickly and effectively work  together during a crisis. The MOA does not address the logistical  capabilities and limitations of each department, such as DOD’s substantial  capability to contract and track large volumes of aircraft and ships. In  addition, unlike EAPs at post, the MOA does not reference contact lists  (which could be updated on a regular basis) that could expedite practical  communications between State and DOD personnel in a crisis. Moreover, a  majority of posts reported that they have had little or no training or  preparations for a potential large-scale evacuation with DOD. Since large- scale DOD-assisted evacuations occur infrequently and posts have minimal  training with DOD for such evacuations, explicit guidance between State  and DOD is needed to speed communication and coordination between  the departments. The lack of readily available, hands-on information  needed to quickly arrange logistics could limit State and DOD’s ability to  quickly coordinate and collaborate during a large-scale evacuation.
For example, as we reported previously, weaknesses in the MOA and  other factors, such as State and DOD having different institutional cultures  and systems, resulted in miscommunication between State and DOD and  possible delays in chartering ships and planes to evacuate American  citizens from Lebanon in July 2006. A State official in charge of logistics  said State personnel did not know DOD’s chain of command, and it took  time to determine whom to contact at DOD for transportation logistics.  State officials found a DOD organization chart online, but it did not have  names and contact information. Consequently, State may have lost time  during the evacuation trying to determine whom to contact within DOD.
section_title: There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provides to Post Staff
paragraphs: While State provides general crisis management training to overseas- bound staff, there are gaps in this training as it relates to preparing for and  implementing evacuations. For example, insufficient EAC training and  infrequent drills can hurt posts’ readiness to act in the event of an  evacuation. In addition, while CMEs are recognized as useful, posts  reported that they could be more relevant and practical. Further, FSI crisis  management training at its campus in Arlington, Virginia, for new and  returning Foreign Service officers covers a variety of topics, including  evacuation, and uses a variety of tools; however, it does not regularly  include input from colleagues with evacuation experience. State is  beginning to implement new training tools that allow for more relevant,  frequent, and inclusive training.
subsections: section_title: Insufficient EAC Training and Drills Can Hurt Posts’ Readiness for Evacuations
paragraphs: As mentioned earlier, EAC members at overseas posts are responsible for  assisting the ambassador in planning and preparing for crises, including  possible evacuation. Almost 90 percent of posts reported that the EAC has  enough staff to meet its assigned emergency responsibilities. According to  the EPH, a “robust training program” for staff manning overseas posts “is  essential for emergency preparedness,” including possible evacuation.  Despite this guidance, we found that insufficient training of EAC members,  coupled with infrequent drills for post staff, can hurt posts’ readiness to  act in the event of an evacuation. The EAC is required to conduct at least  one tabletop exercise per year to ensure that all members understand  their roles and responsibilities, are familiar with the EAP, and to identify  out-of-date or flawed information in it. However, we found that EAC  members at several posts are not receiving the training needed to be  prepared to assist the ambassador in the event of an evacuation or other  crisis.
About 24 percent of posts reported that EAC members are only somewhat  aware or not aware of their responsibilities and need to make more  preparations for evacuation under the EAP. For example, officials from  several posts reported that newer staff have not received training  necessary to meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. EAC  members at one post reported that their newer EAC colleagues are not  familiar with retrieving and using evacuation-related information in the  EAP and could use more training in this area. Over 75 percent of posts  reported that EAC members receive training or rehearse their assigned  emergency action functions on the EAC at most once a year, if at all. One  post reported that no formal training of EAC members or tabletop  exercises have been conducted at the post since April 2003. Even when  exercises are conducted, not all EAC members are fully engaged. For  example, a Regional Security Officer who has led several training  exercises stated that there is little participation from other EAC members  and as a result, they are not prepared to make decisions in a crisis. He  added that other EAC members should be prepared to make such  decisions because the regional security officer often is engaged in specific  tasks during crises and does not make all the decisions related to  addressing them.
In addition, over one-quarter of posts reported that EAC members have  not received training necessary to meet their assigned emergency  responsibilities. For example, one post noted that the frequent turnover at  unaccompanied posts, where staff serve for only 1 year, means that EAC  members at these posts need training to make them better equipped to  work as a team. Another post suggested that EAC members should be  better trained on how to coordinate crisis response with U.S. government  agencies other than State. A third post, which had received a large influx  of temporary duty staff to assist with the evacuation of American citizens  from Lebanon in the summer of 2006, commented that its human resource  officer needs training in coordinating temporary duty staffing. Without  such training, posts trying to address the needs of temporary staff and  deploy them where they would be most useful risk diverting resources  from the evacuation effort itself.
The EAC also is tasked with preparing and conducting briefings, drills,  exercises, and other crisis preparedness functions for the post as a  whole. For example, the EAC is supposed to conduct drills that test the  post’s emergency notification system and the consular warden system,  which is used to notify American citizens in the country in the event of a  crisis. However, over 40 percent of posts reported that they had never  used drills or exercises to test parts of their EAP related to drawing down  post staff and dependents, and almost half of posts reported that they had  never used drills or exercises to test parts of their EAP related to  evacuation of private American citizens. In addition, even though the EPH  recommends that posts consider involving host country response services  in the training and drills conducted, less than a third of posts reported that  host government officials have participated in evacuation drills or  exercises to test the post’s EAP.
section_title: Crisis Management Exercises Considered Useful but Could Be More Relevant to Posts
paragraphs: While CMEs are widely recognized as an important tool, they could be  made more relevant to posts. CMEs are simulations meant to prepare staff  at overseas posts for handling crises, including evacuations. According to  the EPH, these exercises are supposed to be conducted at each post every  2 to 2-1/2 years, and every year at 1-year (unaccompanied) posts. FSI  designs the exercise scenarios and hires contractors to conduct them at  the posts. FSI officials said the training typically lasts 2 days, starting with  an overview of the EPH and EAP followed by several crisis simulations for  all post staff on the first day and continuing on the second day with longer  and more involved simulations for EAC members. Over 70 percent of posts  reported that they have used these exercises to refine their EAP, and more  than three-quarters of this group reported that the exercise was very or  extremely useful in doing so. Staff from a few posts characterized the  exercises as realistic and timely, and FSI officials cited several instances in  which the exercises improved crisis preparedness in a concrete manner,  such as by prompting post staff to identify a location for their alternate  command center.
State guidance directs that scenarios in CMEs be post-specific and drafted  with post input. However, staff from some posts described the exercises  either as not practical or relevant, too long, tying up too many resources,  or “too far-fetched.” For example, staff at one post said the exercises  focused on a catastrophic but unlikely scenario, such as a weapons of  mass destruction attack, rather than smaller-scale, more likely events,  such as an ordinary bomb blast. Staff at another post pointed out that such  catastrophic scenarios are inappropriate because they involve post staff  making decisions that would normally be made at a much higher level in  Washington, D.C. The Defense Attaché at this post said it would be helpful  if after action reports were collected on crises that have actually occurred,  and if CMEs could be designed to simulate those scenarios. The post’s  management counselor added that FSI should do a better job of gathering  ideas on how to improve CMEs, and that one way to make the exercises  more realistic would be to have the post’s more experienced staff develop  them and the more junior staff run through them. This would allow the  junior staff to prepare for possible crises, during which they may have to  fill in for more senior colleagues who may be absent. Some post staff  reported that more practical, frequent, and less formal, hands-on exercises  would be helpful, for example, “so people can learn who does what, and  when.”
Staff at one post cited examples of shorter, more practical exercises, or  “mini CMEs,” lasting only a few hours each that they had found useful. For  example, these included an exercise focused on bird flu, which preceded  an actual case of bird flu in the country, and one in which they practiced  text messaging their colleagues to warn of a car bomb at the embassy so  people would know not to go back to the building after returning from  lunch. Staff at this post also have used their crisis management training  time to discuss lessons learned after an event. The event in this case was a  large-scale evacuation of American citizens, during which this post served  as a temporary safe haven for the evacuees. In a cable describing this  CME, the ambassador wrote that it “enabled us to ‘Monday-morning  quarterback’ our recent experiences while they were still fresh in our  collective minds, and before transfer season robbed us of considerable  institutional knowledge.” He also said that the exercise allowed EAC  members to consider lessons learned and “allowed the crisis management  trainer to hear firsthand many of the difficulties overcome, which are  details that often slip through the cracks in the final wrap-up versions of  after action reports.”
According to a State document on evacuations, locally employed staff  should be involved in all stages of emergency planning. The EPH also  encourages posts to include locally employed staff in crisis management  training. Further, a majority of posts reported that input from local staff is  “very useful” in preparing for the possibility of an evacuation. A number of  State officials with evacuation-related experience said that these staff,  who generally remain at the post during a crisis, often at great risk to  themselves, have played critical roles during evacuations because of their  contacts with the host government and fluency in the local language.  According to FSI, local staff are included in the first day of crisis  management training.
section_title: Regular Input from Staff with Evacuation Experience Could Improve FSI Crisis Management Training
paragraphs: Crisis management training at FSI in Arlington, Virginia, for new and  returning overseas staff covers a variety of topics. However, those  portions of the training we attended, which covered evacuation-related  information, were limited to tabletop exercises and ad hoc input from  participants who happen to have experienced evacuations or other crises.  FSI trains State and other U.S.-government staff for their postings  overseas. It provides courses for new Foreign Service officers about to be  sent to their first post and for more experienced staff rotating to new  posts. It also provides courses targeted to specific positions, such as  ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission, or Community Liaison officers  (CLO). All these courses have crisis management segments, which last  anywhere from a few hours to a few days, and cover evacuation-related  information, including a brief description of the EPH, EAP, EAC, the  warden system, and the post’s obligations to private American citizens,  among other evacuation-related information. As a result, all staff receive  some training to prepare for possible evacuation before being sent  overseas. The training we attended included lectures accompanied by  PowerPoint presentations. Two of the three course segments we attended  also included tabletop exercises with hypothetical crisis scenarios  involving escalating trip wires and role playing as part of a mock EAC.
While the material presented in the courses provided some useful  information, such as descriptions of the EPH, EAP, and EAC, some of the  most practical, as well as engaging, parts of these course segments— comments from participants who happened to have been through  evacuations—were included by chance rather than being formally  incorporated into the program. For example, a participant in one class  who had been evacuated twice from Jakarta, Indonesia provided much  more specific information than the instructor was able to provide  regarding the importance of contact information for evacuating family  members. Fifty percent more posts rated advice from experienced  colleagues as “very useful” in preparing for the possibility of evacuations  compared to the number that rated crisis management training at FSI  “very useful.” Given this finding, FSI crisis management training could be  improved by incorporating guest speakers who have been through  evacuations (either as evacuees, critical staff remaining at post, or  temporary staff sent to help with the crisis). A consular official at the  embassy in Beirut who worked through the 2006 evacuation of American  citizens from Lebanon told us such training would be valuable and she  would like to contribute to it.
section_title: State Beginning to Implement New Training Tools
paragraphs: State is beginning to implement training tools through which staff with  evacuation experience can share their insights with colleagues, and it is  experimenting with new mechanisms to allow more frequent and inclusive  training. For example, the Consular Affairs Bureau recently conducted two  workshops in the aftermath of Hurricanes Wilma and Katrina that featured  staff with experience evacuating American citizens from hurricanes. In  addition to State employees, the first hurricane workshop included  officials from other U.S. government agencies, the private sector, and  other entities, so participants could learn what the roles of these entities  were in the evacuations and discuss any challenges in coordination. The  second workshop primarily included State employees but was conducted  via videoconference, which allowed local staff from affected posts to  participate. According to the Director of Consular Affairs’ Office of  American Citizen Services, these staff are especially valuable because they  tend to remain at a post much longer than rotating U.S. staff and therefore  have long institutional memories and a wealth of experience. The Consular  Affairs Bureau also is in the process of developing training based on  lessons learned from staff involved in the 2006 evacuation of American  citizens from Lebanon.
FSI is beginning to use new tools as well, including conducting some  exercises via videoconference. For example, it has used  videoconferencing to conduct exercises tailored to specific upcoming,  potentially crisis-prone events, such as major sporting events held in  overseas cities. It also has conducted videoconference-based exercises  from hubs in several countries that have allowed staff from outlying posts  to participate without having to travel to the training location. While posts  in some developing countries may lack the needed infrastructure to  participate in videoconferencing and differing time zones can create  scheduling problems, this technology can allow for more frequent, on- demand exercises with greater participation from staff at all posts as well  as locally employed staff. In addition, a State official involved in training  said FSI would consider other options for improving CMEs, including  possibly reevaluating their 2-day structure and introducing online training.
section_title: State’s Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, and Incorporate Lessons Learned Constrains Preparation for Evacuation
paragraphs: State lacks a systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate  lessons learned from previous evacuations, which constrains posts’ efforts  to prepare and plan for future evacuations. The majority of posts do not  complete after action reports detailing lessons learned following an  evacuation, and there is no State entity responsible for ensuring their  production. Evacuation-related after action reports do not have a  standardized format, and these reports could include lessons learned on  recurring staff and morale issues. State has no systematic mechanism to  ensure lessons learned included in after action reports are analyzed and  incorporated into modifications of training and guidance. Although State  headquarters has disseminated some ad hoc guidance based on lessons  learned from prior evacuations, the guidance is sometimes vague and may  be overlooked by posts due to the high volume of material they receive.  Post staff have limited institutional knowledge of earlier evacuations,  which points to a need for a more comprehensive process that captures  and disseminates lessons learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.
subsections: section_title: Most Posts Did Not Complete an After Action Report Following an Evacuation, and There Is No State Entity to Ensure Its Production
paragraphs: Following an authorized or ordered departure, posts are required to  complete an after action report that includes lessons learned.  Furthermore, State guidance for cables terminating authorized or ordered  departure directs that posts submit an after action report within 15 days.  Despite this explicit guidance, almost 60 percent of posts that have  experienced an authorized or ordered departure in the past 5 years  reported that they have not produced an after action report. As a result,  State does not have the opportunity to assess most posts’ evacuation  experiences. It is therefore difficult for State to determine common  themes or trends among evacuations. There may also be similarities  among posts that do produce after action reports that would not be truly  representative of post evacuations as a whole.
According to State officials, there is no single entity at State responsible  for ensuring that posts produce after action reports following an  evacuation. We were told of specific cases where valuable lessons were  learned during a recent post evacuation, but this information remained  generally unknown because State has not systematically collected after  action reports. For example, one evacuation was due to civil unrest where  several hundred Americans were evacuated from an African country. The  official told us the warden system collapsed during the crisis; wardens  either fled the violence, could not get to their phone lists, or could not  charge their cell phones and make calls. The post had purchased a  computer program that allowed it to send text messages over cell phones  en masse. The official said this capability was critical to getting messages  out to American citizens, and the system undoubtedly saved lives. The  official further stated that the ability to text message is crucial in a crisis  and should be a standard tool for assisting American citizens. While some  posts also are implementing this communication tool, the lessons learned  from using this technology during an actual crisis may have been lost  because the official did not report the lessons learned to State  headquarters. In another example, a post in Asia went to authorized  departure during the SARS epidemic. An official who served at the post  during the epidemic said that before the event, there had not been much  thought on how posts would deal with a worldwide epidemic, but the  experience increased the post’s preparedness for such an event. However,  the official said the post did not produce an after action report detailing  lessons learned during this event.
section_title: Evacuation After Action Reports Lack a Standard Format
paragraphs: Though required after action reports are to include lessons learned,  policies to be clarified, resource needs, training needs, and an assessment  of host government actions, their lack of a standard template may cause  key information to be missed and make the information hard to use and  assess. We reviewed about a dozen after action reports and found that  while they were well-organized and presented information in a logical  manner, they generally varied in style and presentation. For example,  some after action reports we reviewed presented information as a  narrative, in which the author described the event and reported  observations. Other after action reports we reviewed presented  information on what went well, followed by what could be improved or  recommendations for action. A single post also may produce multiple  reports from different State entities at that post, such as one report for  lessons learned by Consular Affairs and another report from the  management officer. The lack of a standard template that highlights key  information to guide posts in their reporting makes it possible that posts  may omit important information. For example, an ambassador at a post  involved in a recent evacuation noted that many challenges posts  encounter during evacuation are not included in after action reports.
section_title: After Action Reports Could Include Staffing and Morale Lessons Learned
paragraphs: State’s guidance to posts does not include providing lessons learned in  response to recurring staffing and morale issues, such as the process of  deciding whom to evacuate and what happens at a post after  nonemergency staff and family members have left. Problems involving  staff and morale can occur at posts during evacuations and may affect the  ability of posts to effectively carry out operations during and after a crisis.
According to State officials, a challenge during evacuations is determining  which personnel will be designated as “emergency” and required to stay at  post and which staff will be designated “nonemergency” and told to  leave. There often are tensions over who leaves and who stays. For  example, some post staff have appealed their designation as  “nonemergency” in the hope of staying. While certain senior and security- related positions would likely be designated “emergency” positions in any  situation, one State official said that decisions regarding emergency  personnel are often made based on individual employees’ ability to handle  crises or their family situation rather than their position. As a result,  making these decisions and communicating them to employees often  requires considerable skill and tact. State officials said that decisions  regarding the reasons for evacuations are sometimes not transparent, and  a State official said post staff can be suspicious of why certain personnel  were designated to leave. The State official said staff may be concerned  that an evacuation is really an attempt to “right size” a post. After action  reports could provide lessons learned on how to improve personnel  decisions in order to minimize damage to staff morale and allow the post  to function smoothly both during the crisis and when the departing staff  return.
Locally employed staff at two posts and one State official said another  concern is that local staff, who are generally from the host country or a  third country and typically remain at a post during an evacuation, may be  nervous over job security, since their supervisors are leaving the post.  They also may be unprepared for carrying out their duties in the absence  of a familiar supervisor. A State document to posts recommends posts  address local staff supervision issues before departure and establish a  clear chain of command for remaining personnel. However, a State official  said post staff who are evacuated often do not explain to local staff who  they will report to or what their new responsibilities will be. In addition,  State officials said that local staff may fear for their personal safety during  a crisis, after nonemergency staff and dependents depart. A State official  and a State document emphasized that it is important to keep local staff as  informed as possible about an unfolding crisis, what actions the post is  taking and why, and what their roles should be. After action reports could  provide lessons learned on how to best keep local staff informed about an  unfolding crisis and what their new roles will be when nonemergency staff  and dependents leave.
Further, two State officials with extensive overseas experience told us that  after nonemergency staff and dependents leave the post, the role of the  CLO, who is responsible for addressing staff morale and related issues,  remains important. However, the CLO typically departs the post with  family members. These officials said post morale can drop substantially  when family members depart and staff can suffer burnout, working  exceedingly long hours. A State document to posts recommends that posts  retain as many CLO functions as possible after nonemergency staff and  dependents have left. After action reports could provide lessons learned  on the role of the CLO in maintaining staff morale and could include best  practices, such as the designation of a temporary or backup CLO after the  CLO departs.
section_title: State Has No Systematic Mechanism to Analyze and Incorporate Evacuation Lessons Learned
paragraphs: State has no systematic mechanism to ensure lessons learned from after  action reports are analyzed and incorporated into modifications of State  training and guidance. According to State officials, there is no entity at  State responsible for systematically reviewing and analyzing the  evacuation lessons learned contained in after action reports, and no entity  responsible for determining whether modifications to State evacuation  guidance and training are necessary. As a result, lessons learned from  evacuation-related events are not being comprehensively analyzed, and  lessons learned are not systematically incorporated into guidance and  training. Under the current system, the majority of posts reported they  have not received, or do not know if they received, written guidance from  State headquarters on earlier evacuations.
Although State headquarters has disseminated some ad hoc guidance  based on lessons learned from evacuated posts, the guidance can be  overlooked and is sometimes vague. State headquarters issued two  lessons-learned cables to all posts following the evacuation of almost  15,000 American citizens from Lebanon in the summer of 2006. State also  has issued cables on lessons learned from evacuations related to  hurricanes and avian flu. However, the current system involves  distributing cables on lessons learned together with numerous cables on  other subjects, and posts easily can overlook these important lessons due  to the volume of cables received. In addition, cables do not always include  actions posts should take to prepare for evacuation. As a result, the  lessons from these sources can be inconsistent and vague.
section_title: Post Staff Have Limited Institutional Knowledge of Earlier Evacuations
paragraphs: Posts reported that advice from colleagues experienced in evacuations is  one of the most useful tools in preparing for evacuations. However, State’s  policy of changing staff assignments at overseas posts every 1 to 3 years  limits the knowledge gained from evacuations, since staff who  experienced an evacuation at a post soon move on. The most frequent  rotations occur at unaccompanied posts, which are often in dangerous and  unstable areas. According to State officials, staff at unaccompanied posts  often are less experienced than other posts, and staff generally change  every year. Additionally, midlevel positions at many hardship posts  continue to be staffed by junior officers who lack experience and have  minimal guidance.
According to State officials, the number of positions at unaccompanied  posts is at its highest level in history. State officials said less experienced  staff can be stationed at unaccompanied posts for several reasons; they  have less seniority in State’s posting process, they often do not have  families and are less affected by unaccompanied status, or they may seek  out placements at unaccompanied posts because such postings may  enhance their career development. For example, State recently made  service in a hardship post a prerequisite for promotion to the senior  Foreign Service. This may result in a trend toward less experienced  personnel serving shorter terms at unaccompanied posts that could be  vulnerable to future crises and potential evacuations. Since post staff have  limited institutional memory of prior evacuations, particularly at  unaccompanied posts, it is important to have a process that captures and  disseminates lessons learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: State’s diplomatic mission requires its staff and dependents to work in  posts all over the world, including in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-prone  regions from which staff and dependents might have to be evacuated. In  recent years, evacuations have occurred on a regular basis—over the past  5 years, State has authorized or ordered the evacuation of an average of  one overseas post every 3 weeks. Private American citizens also are  present in increasing numbers all over the world, sometimes in unstable,  dangerous, or crisis-prone regions where they might need evacuation  assistance. To meet these challenges, State has made a concerted effort to  prepare staff to manage the wide variety of crises they might face. For  example, State has developed crisis management guidance, plans, and  training such as the EPH, EAP, and instruction in Washington, D.C., and at  post. State also has been proactive in seeking to improve its ability to  prepare for and implement evacuations.
However, while we found no major adverse impacts, we did find  deficiencies in State’s guidance and plans and gaps in its training to plan,  prepare for, and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and  American citizens. In addition, State lacks a systematic process to collect,  analyze, and incorporate lessons learned from previous evacuations. As a  result, State misses opportunities to assess its performance and make  modifications to improve its evacuation guidance and training. Further,  the memorandum of agreement governing State and DOD’s division of  responsibility has weaknesses that could hamper communication and  cooperation between the two departments. State should improve its  planning, preparations for, and management of evacuations through  updating its guidance and plans and improving the training for overseas  staff with emergency responsibilities. With thousands of U.S. government  personnel and their families working at U.S. posts and ever-increasing air  travel of private American citizens living and traveling overseas,  evacuations will continue, and large-scale operations such as the  evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon could happen again.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of  evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens from  overseas posts, we recommend the Secretary of State    designate an entity within State to (1) ensure that EAPs are prepared  annually, (2) ensure that posts generate standardized evacuation after  action reports with lessons learned, and (3) systematically collect and  analyze these reports to assess State’s performance and recommend  modifications to State guidance, plans, training, and exercises, if    direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report documenting  the processes and data sources used to produce their estimates, as well as  lessons learned on generating estimates for that particular country; review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members to meet  assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning and preparing for  possible evacuation, and identify areas for improving training, particularly  for less experienced EAC members; and    strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing them and  incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the post into exercise  scenarios.
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of  large-scale evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens  from overseas posts when State requires DOD assistance, we recommend  the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense  review the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments) to ensure  it expedites practical communication and coordination between the two  departments before and during a large-scale evacuation, particularly in  areas regarding logistical capabilities and limitations of each department  (such as capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report and our survey results to the Secretaries  of State and Defense for their review and comment. We received written  comments from the Departments of State and Defense that are reprinted  in appendixes III and IV. State concurred with three of our five  recommendations and partially concurred with two. State also provided us  with technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD  partially concurred with the recommendation regarding the MOA between  State and DOD (and its amendments), which was the only  recommendation relevant to DOD, and did not comment on any other  aspect of the report.
Specifically, State concurred with our recommendations that the Secretary  of State    direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report documenting  the processes and data sources used to produce their estimates, as well as  lessons learned on generating estimates for that particular country; review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members to meet  assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning and preparing for  possible evacuation, and identify areas for improving training, particularly  for less experienced EAC members; and   strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing them and  incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the post into exercise  scenarios.
State partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  State designate an entity within State to ensure that EAPs are prepared  annually. In its response, State said that this task is already covered under  existing State regulations and added that the department is currently  deploying a new software application that should facilitate keeping EAPs  up to date. While we welcome these efforts, it is not clear that they are  adequate to ensure that EAPs are updated on an annual basis. State  concurred with the rest of this recommendation, which asks the Secretary  of State to designate a central entity to ensure that posts generate  standardized evacuation after action reports with lessons learned and  systematically collect and analyze these reports to assess State’s  performance and recommend modifications to State guidance, plans,  training, and exercises, if necessary.
Both State and DOD partially concurred with our recommendation  regarding the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments). While  both agencies agreed to review the document, they misunderstood part of  our recommendation. We did not recommend that a contact list be added  to the MOA. Furthermore, State and DOD said they believed existing  interagency communication channels are adequate for managing and  implementing large-scale evacuations. In addition, DOD expressed  concern that explicitly specifying general capabilities and limitations in  the MOA could adversely affect ongoing military operations. In response,  we have modified the recommendation to clarify that the Secretary of  State and the Secretary of Defense review the MOA (and its amendments)  to ensure it expedites practical communication and coordination between  the two departments before and during a large-scale evacuation,  particularly in areas regarding logistical capabilities and limitations of  each department (such as capabilities to contract and track passenger  aircraft and ships).
State also questioned whether the survey results, as we presented them in  our report, accurately reflect posts’ assessment of the usefulness of  existing crisis planning resources and whether survey results contradict  anecdotal comments/criticisms regarding FSI training. We obtained a high  response rate to our survey of overseas posts; the survey results are a  statistically valid reflection of posts’ views on the guidance and training  available to plan and prepare for potential evacuation. The survey results  and findings derived from them are both factually correct and  methodologically valid. The survey was developed based on a review of  State documentation and interviews with State officials and was reviewed  with State officials from Crisis Management Support, Consular Affairs,  Diplomatic Security, and the regional bureaus. Survey methodology  experts at GAO were directly involved in the collection, analysis, and  review of survey results, as well as the findings and conclusions derived  from those results.
We are sending copies of this report to interested Congressional  Committees and to the Secretaries of State and Defense. We will also  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact Jess  T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the Department of State’s (State) efforts to plan, prepare for,  and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens  from overseas posts, we (1) assessed State’s guidance and plans to prepare  for possible evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens;  (2) assessed the training, drills, and exercises used to prepare staff at  overseas posts for crises, including possible evacuation; and (3) evaluated  State’s efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons learned from  previous evacuations into modifications of guidance and training. We  employed several methodologies to address these three objectives. We  conducted a survey of all Emergency Action Committees (EAC) at State  embassies and consulates worldwide. In addition, we conducted  structured interviews with State employees who had experienced a variety  of evacuation-related events over the last 5 years. We also examined State  and Department of Defense (DOD) documents regarding efforts to plan,  prepare for, and manage evacuations. We met with State and DOD officials  overseas in Cyprus, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia; in Washington, D.C.; and  at U.S. Transportation Command headquarters at Scott Air Force Base in  Illinois.
As part of our efforts to collect information on all three objectives, we  conducted a survey of all 243 EACs at State embassies and consulates  (posts) worldwide. EACs are responsible for crisis management at post  and therefore are best qualified to discuss crisis management activities,  including preparing for and implementing evacuations. The survey  consisted of 49 questions covering a range of topics on how posts plan,  prepare for, and implement evacuations, as well as how lessons learned  are reported. The survey was sent to the principal officer at each post  (typically the deputy chief of mission or consul general). We requested  that the survey be completed collectively by members of the post’s EAC,  and completed surveys were intended to reflect the views of the EAC as a  whole. We received 210 completed surveys, for an overall response rate of  86 percent. State posts are divided into six different geographical bureaus.  The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs had the highest response rate  for any geographical bureau at 92 percent, and the Bureau of Near Eastern  Affairs had the lowest response rate at 73 percent. The survey was  distributed by the heads of the State regional bureaus to posts under their  supervision via e-mail as a Word attachment on January 30, 2007, and  recipients were requested to complete the survey within 2 weeks. On  February 15, 2007, the regional bureaus sent targeted e-mail reminders to  posts that had not yet responded. We contacted all remaining posts that  had not yet responded by telephone, starting on February 28, 2007.  Completed surveys were accepted until April 4, 2007.
The survey was developed based on a review of State documentation and  interviews with State officials. We conducted face-to-face pretests with  two former State regional security officers as well as two current State  officials who had recently served on an EAC. We also reviewed the survey  in a meeting with State officials from Crisis Management Support,  Consular Affairs, Resource Management, Human Resources, Diplomatic  Security, and the regional bureaus. We conducted the review and pretests  to make sure that (1) the questions were clear and unambiguous, (2)  terminology was used correctly, (3) the survey did not place an undue  burden on agency officials, (4) the information could feasibly be obtained,  and (5) the survey was comprehensive and unbiased. We made changes to  the content and format of the survey after the meeting with State officials  and after each of the four pretests, based on comments received.
The majority of questions in the survey were close ended, which allowed  us to develop statistics that are representative of the entire universe of  Emergency Action Committees. The survey also allowed for some open- ended responses. Commentary from open-ended questions is reflected in  the body of the report, but is not summarized statistically. Survey  percentages reported do not include nonresponses to each question in our  survey. Of responses analyzed in this report, there were relatively few  nonresponses to individual questions. Survey questions, results, and  number of respondents per question are presented in an electronic  supplement, which may be accessed at GAO-08-24SP.
We conducted 22 structured interviews, via e-mail and in person, with  State personnel who had served on an EAC and experienced a draw down  or evacuation within the last 5 years. Eighteen responded to our e-mail  with the structured interview questions. We also conducted four  structured interviews in person. The purpose of the structured interview  was to collect detailed qualitative information related to evacuations  through open-ended questions, such as training, guidance, policies,  implementation, morale, and lessons learned. We pretested the structured  interview in-person with two State officials currently serving on an EAC  who had experienced at least one evacuation. We made changes to the  content and format of the structured interview based on comments from  the pretests.
To identify candidates for structured interviews, we sent a brief  questionnaire, along with the survey, to all 243 EACs. The questionnaire  and survey were pretested at the same time to check for clarity and  usefulness. We made changes to the content and format of the  questionnaire based on comments we received. We received  approximately 100 completed questionnaires with respondents indicating  a willingness to participate in a structured interview via e-mail. We  reviewed the completed questionnaires and selected interview candidates  in order to obtain a wide variety of experiences. All six State geographical  bureaus were represented in the structured interviews. Structured  interview respondents had experienced many different crisis situations,  including natural disasters, disease epidemics, war threats, and civil  unrest. The respondents had experienced authorized departure, ordered  departure, assisting private American citizens in evacuations, serving as a  transit point for evacuees, departing posts during evacuations, and  traveling to posts to serve as temporary employees while the post was in  evacuation status. The respondents held different positions at posts; such  as ambassador, deputy chief of mission, regional security officer,  management officer, Consular Affairs chief, public affairs officer, general  services officer, U.S. Agency for International Aid country director, and  Peace Corps country director.
To review State and DOD’s planning, preparation for, and managing of  evacuations, we examined State and DOD documents, including State’s  Emergency Planning Handbook, numerous post Emergency Action Plans,  several post-produced F-77 reports of potential evacuees, the  Memorandum of Agreement between State and DOD on the Protection and  Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals and Designated other Persons  from Threatened Areas Overseas, and various other State cables and  documents related to evacuations, including situation reports, lessons- learned cables, and other documents discussing lessons learned.
In the United States, we met with numerous State and DOD officials to  assess how State and DOD plan, prepare for, and manage evacuations. In  Washington, we met with the Under Secretary of State for Management;  the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs and other officials  from the Consular Affairs Bureau; officials from State’s regional bureaus;  and from State’s bureaus of diplomatic security, administration, resource  management, and political military affairs. We also met with Crisis  Management Support officials, who support State taskforces during a  crisis and train staff in evacuation policy and procedures, and toured  State’s Operations Center, where taskforces are located. In addition, we  met with officials from State’s Foreign Service Institute, which conducts  crisis management training.
To review how State and DOD implement staff draw downs and  evacuations of American citizens, and make observations on these  agencies’ successes and challenges in doing so, we traveled to Lebanon,  Cyprus, and Saudi Arabia, where we met with U.S. embassy and host  country officials involved in staff draw downs and evacuations. State  officials in Lebanon and Cyprus implemented one of the largest  evacuations of American citizens in U.S. history. The consulate in Jeddah  and the embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, have each experienced three  evacuations in the past 5 years.
To assess how State interacts with DOD during DOD-assisted evacuations  or draw downs, we met with DOD officials in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Transportation  Command’s Military Sealift Command. We also traveled to Scott Air Force  Base in Illinois to meet with officials at U.S. Transportation Command  headquarters and its Air Mobility Command. In addition, we spoke by  telephone with Central Command officials in Tampa, Florida.
We performed our work from June 2006 to July 2007 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 under Authorized and Ordered Departure Authoritya
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State letter  dated October 2, 2007.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  State notes an “apparent contradiction” between our reference to  lengthy and cumbersome State guidance and a recommendation that  State “provide additional, more comprehensive guidance on specific  aspects of crisis management to the field.” Our report contains no such  recommendation. According to the audit work we conducted, as  detailed in appendix I, we found the Emergency Planning Handbook  (EPH) to be both “too generic” and “voluminous,” as well as lacking in  information useful in preparing for and implementing a large-scale  evacuation of American citizens.  2.  We disagree with State’s assertion that some of the conclusions in this  report are at variance with the actual survey data collected by GAO  about the usefulness of existing crisis planning resources. The survey  results and findings derived from them are both factually correct and  methodologically valid. Survey methodology experts at GAO were  directly involved in the collection, analysis, and review of survey  results, as well as the findings and conclusions derived from those  results.  3.  State has mischaracterized our statement. In our report, we stated that,  based on survey results, posts do not consider the EPH particularly  useful in preparing for the possibility of evacuation. Half of overseas  posts rated the EPH as “somewhat useful” in preparing for an  evacuation. This, along with the 9 percent who said the EPH was “not  very useful” or “not at all useful,” as well as comments by a number of  State officials that it was too generic, formulaic, and voluminous,  indicate that while the EPH is of some utility, there is a definite  opportunity to improve the EPH when it comes to helping posts  prepare for an evacuation.  4.  State has attempted to reinterpret our survey results by combining the  responses for “somewhat useful” and “very useful” for various tools;  this obscures the point that the EPH could be improved. Please see the  analysis as detailed in comment 3 above.  5.  We did not imply that it would be possible for posts to generate a  definitive number of Americans in any given country at any given  moment; we understand that the F-77 is an estimate of American  citizens and estimates vary in terms of accuracy. We reported that  more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best,  only somewhat accurate in its estimation of the American citizen  population.  6.  We have modified the text in the report to reflect that State cannot  require American citizens to register with the department.  7.  We disagree with State’s assertion that our survey data contradict  anecdotal comments/criticisms regarding FSI training and that the  survey results are “positive.” In our report, the survey results and  findings derived from them are both factually correct and  methodologically valid. We obtained a high response rate to our survey  of Emergency Action Committees (EAC) at overseas posts; the survey  results are a statistically valid reflection of posts’ views on the  guidance and training available to plan and prepare for potential  evacuation.  8.  We agree that 74 percent of the respondents answered “yes” to the  question of whether EAC members have received training necessary to  meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. However, the  responses to our survey came from EACs, whose members are  responsible for assisting the ambassador in planning and preparing for  crisis, including possible evacuation. We are concerned that more than  a quarter of EACs have reported that their members have not received  training necessary to meet their emergency responsibilities;  insufficient training for EAC members can hurt posts’ readiness to act  in the event of evacuation.  9.  We agree that crisis management exercises (CME) are generally  considered useful; in our report we have identified areas where CMEs  can be improved, such as by having posts play a greater role in  designing them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at  the post into exercise scenarios.  10. While we appreciate State’s concurrence with establishing additional  procedures to ensure that Emergency Action Plans (EAP) are updated,  we did not make a separate recommendation to this effect. This is a  misstatement of the first part of our first recommendation, which asks  the Secretary of State to designate an entity within State to ensure  EAPs are prepared annually.  11. We did not recommend that a standing contact list be added to the  memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD. In  addition, we have modified our recommendation to clarify that State  and DOD should review the MOA (and its amendments) to ensure it  expedites practical communication and coordination between the two  departments before and during a large-scale evacuation, particularly in  areas regarding logistical capabilities and limitations of each  department (such as capabilities to contract and track passenger  aircraft and ships).
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense letter  dated October 2, 2007.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We did not recommend that a contact list be added to the  memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD. In  addition, we have modified our recommendation to clarify that State  and DOD should review the MOA (and its amendments) to ensure it  expedites practical communication and coordination between the two  departments before and during a large-scale evacuation, particularly in  areas regarding logistical capabilities and limitations of each  department (such as capabilities to contract and track passenger  aircraft and ships).  2.  We have modified our recommendation to address DOD’s concern that  explicitly specifying general capabilities and limitations in the MOA  could adversely affect ongoing military operations. The intent of the  recommendation is to have State and DOD review the MOA (and its  amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and  coordination between the two departments before and during a large- scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical capabilities  and limitations of each department.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant Director;  Ian Ferguson; Jonathan Fremont; Kay Halpern; Catherine Hurley; Monica  Wolford; and Joe Carney made key contributions to this report.