Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed
Published: 2008-07-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, criminal organizations transport hundreds of tons of illegal drugs from South America to the United States through a 6 million square mile "transit zone" including Central America, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. Since fiscal year 2003, the United States has provided over $950 million to support counternarcotics efforts in transit zone countries, which historically lacked the capacity to interdict drugs. GAO was asked to examine (1) how the United States has assisted transit zone countries in disrupting drug trafficking and (2) what factors have impeded these efforts. GAO analyzed relevant data, met with U.S. and foreign officials, and visited selected countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. government assistance has improved international counternarcotics cooperation with the eight major drug transit countries GAO reviewed, except Venezuela. First, assistance programs have helped partner nations gather, process, and share information and intelligence leading to arrests and drug seizures. Second, they have enabled these nations to participate in counternarcotics operations--both at sea and on land--by providing assets (such as interceptor boats and vehicles), logistical support, and training for police units. Third, U.S. assistance has helped strengthen the capacity of prosecutors to work more effectively on drug-related cases. Assessing the impact of such a wide variety of programs is difficult because some are indirectly related to drug interdiction, and because results reporting has been limited and inconsistent. Despite gains in international cooperation, several factors, including resource limitations and lack of political will, have impeded U.S. progress in helping governments become full and self-sustaining partners in the counternarcotics effort--a goal of U.S. assistance. These countries have limited resources to devote to this effort, and many initiatives are dependent on U.S. support. Programs to build maritime interdiction capacity have been particularly affected, as partner nations lack fuel and other resources needed to operate and maintain U.S.-provided boats. Limited political support, particularly in Venezuela, and corruption have also hindered U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented a Container Security Initiative (CSI) that targets and scans containers for weapons of mass destruction and terrorist contraband. But CSI has not routinely been used for illicit drug detection, despite its applicability for this purpose.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The importation of illegal drugs, primarily cocaine, from countries in  South America, continues to threaten the health and well-being of  American citizens. Criminal drug trafficking organizations transport these  drugs into the United States through a 6 million square mile “transit zone,”  encompassing Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean island nations, the  Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. The U.S.  Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) reports that these  organizations have smuggled between about 460 and 1,030 metric tons of  cocaine through the transit zone to the United States annually since 2003.  In recent years, ONDCP has reported that about 90 percent of that cocaine  has come to the United States through Central America and Mexico, while  approximately 10 percent was trafficked through the Caribbean.
One of the three priorities in the United States’ National Drug Control  Strategy is to disrupt the illicit drug market by eradicating drug crops,  interdicting illicit drugs in the transit zone, and attacking drug trafficking  organizations. As we have previously reported, countries in the transit  zone have historically lacked the resources and institutional capacity to  conduct counternarcotics operations. As a result, the United States has  assisted nations in the region to strengthen their law enforcement, judicial,  military, and other sectors. According to the Department of State’s (State)  International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, U.S. assistance is  intended to help nations become “full and self-sustaining partners” in the  international counternarcotics effort. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal  year 2007, the United States provided over $950 million to directly or  indirectly support counternarcotics activities in transit zone countries,  excluding Mexico.
As requested, we examined U.S. counternarcotics assistance to selected  countries in the transit zone since 2003. Specifically, we examined: (1)  how U.S. agencies have assisted these countries in their efforts to disrupt  drug trafficking and what results this assistance has yielded, and (2) the  factors that have impeded counternarcotics efforts in these countries.
To address these objectives, we analyzed program data and  documentation relating to counternarcotics efforts in eight countries  within the transit zone designated by the President as major drug transit  countries—the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,  Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela—from 2003 through 2007. We did  not include Mexico because we reported on U.S. counternarcotics  assistance to that country in 2007. We met with U.S. government officials  from ONDCP; the Departments of Defense (Defense), Homeland Security  (DHS), Justice (Justice), and State; and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID). We also met with officials at the Joint Interagency  Task Force-South and U.S. Southern Command in Florida and traveled to  four major drug transit countries (the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  Guatemala, and Panama) to meet with U.S. embassy officials, host  government officials, and local program beneficiaries. While in country,  we visited a number of project sites relating to maritime operations, port  security, intelligence gathering, drug crop eradication, alternative  development, and other activities. We also reviewed estimates of illicit  drug flow and data on seizures and disruptions of drug trafficking  operations. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to  provide an overall indication of the magnitude and nature of the illicit drug  trade and interdiction efforts since 2003.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to July 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more complete  discussion of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Virtually all the cocaine destined for the United States originates in the  Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and travels through the  transit zone. The United States provides significant counternarcotics  assistance toward reducing coca cultivation, disrupting cocaine  production, and preventing cocaine from reaching the United States. Drug  traffickers move cocaine and other drugs to the United States through two  main vectors or “corridors.” In recent years, approximately 90 percent of  cocaine moving toward the United States has gone through the Central  American/Mexican corridor and then over the border to the United States.  The remainder, roughly 10 percent, transits the Caribbean and enters the  United States through Florida, Puerto Rico, and other eastern locations.  (See fig. 1.) More than 25 countries lie within the transit zone. The  President has designated eight of these as “major drug transit countries”  based on the estimated volume of illicit drugs that pass through their  territory each year. These countries are the Bahamas, the Dominican  Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela.
subsections: section_title: Transit Zone Drug Trafficking Tactics
paragraphs: Drug trafficking organizations and associated criminal networks are  extremely adaptive. They shift routes and operating methods quickly in  response to pressure from law enforcement organizations or rival  traffickers. They ship drugs through the transit zone primarily by sea,  though their methods have become more evasive in recent years. They  typically use go-fast boats and fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine from  Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to the United States.  Go-fast boats are capable of traveling at speeds over 40 knots, are difficult  to detect in open water, and are often used at night. When drug traffickers  travel in daylight, they often use boats painted blue, or that can be quickly  covered with a blue tarpaulin, thereby becoming virtually impossible to  see. Even when detected, go-fast boats can often outrun conventional  ships deployed in the transit zone. Traffickers also use “mother ships” in  concert with fishing vessels to transport illicit drugs into open waters and  then distribute the load among smaller boats at sea. In addition, traffickers  use evasive maritime routes and change them frequently. Some boats  travel as far southwest as the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific Ocean  before heading north toward Mexico, while others travel through Central  America’s littoral waters, close to shore, where they can hide among  legitimate maritime traffic. In addition, the Joint Interagency Task Force- South (JIATF-South), under Defense’s U.S. Southern Command, has  reported an increase in suspicious flights—particularly departing from  Venezuela. In addition, traffickers fly loads of cocaine to remote,  ungoverned spaces—such as northern Guatemala, near the Mexican  border—and abandon the planes. Planes, however, generally carry much  smaller loads than most maritime vessels used for drug trafficking.  Traffickers also are using increasingly sophisticated concealment  methods. For example, they have built fiberglass semisubmersible craft  that can avoid both visual- and sonar-detection, hidden cocaine within the  hulls of boats, and transported liquefied cocaine in fuel tanks.
According to Defense’s Office of Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation,  and Global Threats, these shifts in drug trafficking patterns and methods  have likely taken place largely in response to U.S. and international  counternarcotics efforts in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean, although  measuring causes and effects is imprecise. In addition, according to  Defense, drug trafficking organizations and associated criminal networks  commonly enjoy greater financial and material resources (including  weapons as well as communication, navigation, and other technologies)  than do governments in the transit zone.
section_title: U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy
paragraphs: The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy’s goal is to reduce illegal drug  usage in the United States. One priority is to disrupt the illegal drug trade  abroad—including in the transit zone—by attacking the power structures  and finances of international criminal organizations. This involves seizing  large quantities of cocaine from transporters, disrupting major drug  trafficking organizations, arresting their leaders, and seizing their assets.  The strategy also calls for the United States to support democratic  institutions and the rule of law in allied nations, strengthen these nations’  prosecutorial efforts, and prosecute foreign traffickers. According to  State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the goal of U.S.  counternarcotics assistance to other countries is to help their  governments become full and self-sustaining partners in the fight against  drugs.
ONDCP produces the National Drug Control Strategy, establishes  policies, priorities, and objectives for the nation’s drug control program,  and evaluates, coordinates, and oversees the counternarcotics efforts of  executive branch agencies, including assistance to countries in the transit  zone. State/INL manages and funds law enforcement assistance, including  programs implemented by a variety of other U.S. agencies, such as DHS’s  Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration  and Customs Enforcement. State also administers security assistance  programs generally implemented by Defense, including Foreign Military  Financing and International Military Education and Training programs,  which are intended to strengthen the overall capacity of foreign forces to  address security threats, including violence and instability associated with  drug trafficking. Defense, primarily through its Office of Counternarcotics,  Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, provides guidance and  oversight, as well as funds for counternarcotics and related security  activities in the transit zone. DEA works to disrupt drug trafficking  operations and dismantle criminal organizations, bringing leaders to  prosecution either in the United States or in other countries; it maintains  offices in countries throughout the transit zone. USAID also supports the  U.S. counternarcotics effort indirectly through its rule of law and  alternative development programs.
Table 1 shows assistance provided by State, DEA, Defense, and USAID to  support counternarcotics-related programs and activities in transit zone  countries for fiscal years 2003 through 2007.
As part of the “Merida Initiative,” the President has asked the Congress to  provide $1.1 billion in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to train and equip  Mexican and Central American security forces to combat criminal  organizations. Of this amount, $950 million would be dedicated to Mexico,  and $150 million would be dedicated to Central American countries. This  proposal is under consideration by the Congress. The Administration’s  proposal is for all programs to be administered by the State Department,  although other U.S. agencies may be involved in implementation.
section_title: Overall, U.S. Assistance Has Enhanced International Cooperation in Disrupting Illegal Drug Markets
paragraphs: Since 2003, through U.S.-supported international counternarcotics  programs, the United States and the eight major drug transit countries we  reviewed, except Venezuela, have enhanced their cooperation in  combating drug trafficking, primarily through improvements in  investigations and intelligence gathering, maritime and land-based  operations, and prosecutions of drug traffickers. Measuring the results of a  wide variety of assistance programs across many countries over time is  difficult as U.S. agencies have compiled limited and inconsistent  performance data. Nevertheless, the improvements attained through these  programs have contributed to the U.S. strategy of disrupting the illicit drug  market through drug seizures, arrests, prosecutions, and drug crop  eradication, according to information provided by State and DEA.
subsections: section_title: Intelligence-Gathering and Investigations
paragraphs: Actionable intelligence is a critical component of interdiction, and the  United States often requires access to raw information and sources from  partner nations to develop this intelligence. State/INL, DEA, and Defense  have helped all eight partner nations we reviewed develop organizations  and methods for gathering, analyzing, and sharing intelligence and  information that have led to arrests and seizures of drugs and assets.  These efforts have included establishing vetted and specialized  investigative units; strengthening investigative authority of local law  enforcement; and installing data networks within and among countries to  compile, analyze, and share information.
DEA and State/INL have established vetted investigative units, staffed by  local law enforcement officers, in all of the major drug transit countries  we reviewed. These units have worked closely with U.S. officials to  develop successful investigations. The United States provides these units  with operational support, from money to pay agents and confidential  sources to vehicles and surveillance equipment. For example, in the  Dominican Republic, a vetted unit within the counternarcotics police used  a U.S.-supported wire intercept program to conduct more than 730 wiretap  operations in fiscal year 2007. The program provided daily support to  numerous major investigations in the United States and abroad, including  the investigation of eight priority target organizations. In Ecuador, DEA  estimates that one vetted investigative unit has been responsible for   70 percent of all drug seizures in that country. In Jamaica, according to  State, intelligence-driven operations coordinated with DEA and the vetted  unit targeted major drug traffickers, and collaboration between Jamaican  and international law enforcement agencies have resulted in significant  seizures of cocaine and arrests of midlevel and major traffickers— including kingpins—and the dismantling of their organizations, in Jamaica,  the United States, the Bahamas, and Colombia. Since late 2004, almost all  significant bilateral investigations with Jamaica have included a wire  intercept component using DEA-funded facilities. In the Bahamas,  according to State, intelligence gathering and surveillance equipment  provided by State/INL enabled local law enforcement to dismantle two  Bahamas-based drug trafficking organizations in 2006.
DEA has also helped governments draft legislation to broaden the scope of  investigative tools available to law enforcement organizations. For  example, Guatemala’s Organized Crime Bill, put into effect in 2007,  authorizes wire intercepts and undercover operations, and allows drugs to  be delivered under controlled circumstances in order to identify the  traffickers involved—referred to as controlled delivery. DEA also  encouraged legislation in Jamaica to authorize wire intercepts and  fingerprinting of suspects. Similarly, legislation in Venezuela enhanced  police investigative powers in 2005 by allowing controlled deliveries.
In addition, with U.S. technical and financial assistance, several countries  are operating information centers to collect, analyze, and disseminate  statistical and case-related data to aid local and foreign law enforcement  officials in criminal investigations. In the Dominican Republic, for  example, the DEA-sponsored Caribbean Center for Drug Information  serves as a clearinghouse for narcotics-related intelligence for countries  throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. According to DEA,  Caribbean countries are both frequent contributors to and beneficiaries of  the center’s intelligence analysis services. In addition, Defense funded the  installation of a computer network in countries throughout the transit  zone, including in six of the eight countries we reviewed, called the  Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System, through which  participating countries share information in real time regarding aircraft  and vessels suspected of transporting drugs. Defense also posts liaisons  throughout the region who facilitate the exchange of actionable  intelligence between the United States and host nation counterparts to  assist in planning counternarcotics operations.
section_title: Maritime and Land-Based Operations
paragraphs: The United States generally cannot intercept shipments of drugs and their  precursors and apprehend traffickers in the sovereign territory of another  nation without the consent, and often the active participation, of that  country’s government. The United States has reached cooperative  agreements with several partner nations that expand U.S. authority and  U.S. ability to conduct interdiction operations in the transit zone. In  addition, assistance provided by State/INL, Defense, and U.S. law  enforcement agencies has enabled the countries we reviewed to undertake  or participate in land-based police, military, and other counternarcotics  operations involving seizures, arrests, and eradication.
subsections: section_title: Maritime Operations
paragraphs: State/INL, Defense, and the Coast Guard have provided partner countries  with equipment, such as new and refurbished boats; infrastructure, such  as docks and piers; and training for maritime, littoral, and riverine patrol  and interdiction operations. With this support, several countries have  participated in short- and long-term maritime interdiction operations with  the United States and other countries since 2003. For example, in the  Bahamas, State/INL donated several “fast response” boats, which the  Bahamian police force has deployed throughout the country for use with  U.S. helicopters and personnel under Operation Bahamas, Turks and  Caicos. According to State, these boats have been used in interdiction  missions, participating in the seizure of go-fast drug smuggling boats.
Since 2003, the United States has also entered into maritime law  enforcement cooperation agreements or procedures with four of the eight  major drug transit countries we reviewed, affording U.S. forces improved  access to suspect vessels in international and territorial waters. (See app.  II for a listing of maritime law enforcement agreements with transit zone  countries.) For example, in 2003, the Dominican Republic entered into a  bilateral agreement granting the United States permanent over-flight rights  for counternarcotics operations. In 2006, the United States and Ecuador  negotiated operating procedures to facilitate interdiction of suspect  Ecuadorian-flagged vessels. According to State, in fiscal year 2007, these  new procedures enabled the United States to board seven Ecuadorian  flagged vessels and remove about 26 metric tons of cocaine. In addition,  according to State, under the terms of maritime agreements, Guatemala  and Panama have provided valuable support for international interdictions  by permitting the Coast Guard to fly suspected drug traffickers to the  United States. This has allowed U.S. assets to remain on station and  continue pursuing drug interdiction and homeland security missions. In  Panama, according to State, the Coast Guard’s 2007 seizure of over 32  metric tons of cocaine—including the single largest maritime drug seizure  in U.S. history—was directly related to cooperative efforts executed under  provisions of the bilateral agreement between Panama and the United  States. Bilateral maritime agreements have proven valuable in the other  major drug transit countries, as well. Even Venezuela, which has ceased to  cooperate with the United States on many counternarcotics initiatives,  continues to honor the provisions of its ship-boarding agreement,  authorizing the United States to board Venezuelan flagged vessels on the  high seas suspected of being engaged in narcotics trafficking.
In addition, in Ecuador, the United States operates a counternarcotics  forward operating location to support host nation and interagency drug  detection and monitoring efforts in the transit zone. Facilities such as this  permit the United States and allied nations to deploy interdiction assets  closer to cocaine departure points in the source zone. According to U.S.  officials at the forward operating location in Manta, Ecuador, this facility  supported over 1,150 counternarcotics missions in 2007 by providing  logistical support for U.S. aircraft that detect and monitor narcotics  trafficking.
section_title: Land-Based Operations
paragraphs: In several countries, State/INL, in collaboration with DEA and DHS  agencies, has helped finance the operations of special law enforcement  units to target drug traffickers at airports, seaports, and other transit  checkpoints using X-ray equipment, canines, and other methods and  technologies. For example, since 2003, Jamaican authorities have arrested  thousands of departing passengers at the country’s two international  airports on drug charges, aided by the use of drug detection equipment  provided by the United States and Great Britain. With funding from State  and USAID, DHS has deployed advisors and specialized teams for both  short- and long-term details to provide training and technical assistance in  such areas as customs documentation, airport/border/seaport interdiction  operations, mail processing, container examination, security, firearms, and  officer safety.
In addition, due to Ecuador’s close proximity to drug-producing regions of  Colombia, Defense, State/INL, and DEA have provided extensive support  for police and military counternarcotics operations there. According to  State/INL, it and DEA have provided nearly all the logistical support for  Ecuador’s counternarcotics police, including construction or  refurbishment of facilities and the provision of vehicles and equipment.  State reported in 2007 that U.S.-supported canine units, which were  deployed at airports and checkpoints, were involved in nearly all of  Ecuador’s drug interdictions. During 2007, the counternarcotics police  conducted a series of interdiction operations throughout the country,  which resulted in the largest amount of land-based seizures in the  country’s history. With logistical support from Defense and State/INL, the  Ecuadorian armed forces conducted nine operations in 2006 and 17 in  2007, which led to the discovery and destruction of 47 camps used by the  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 36 hectares of coca plants, as  well as a number of cocaine producing laboratories.
In Guatemala, which has recently experienced a growth in illicit opium  poppy cultivation, State/INL and Defense have provided aerial  reconnaissance, transportation, and other logistical support for several  large-scale, manual eradication missions. In 2007, Guatemalan authorities  destroyed nearly 450 hectares of poppy—over half of the estimated area of  cultivation.
section_title: Prosecution
paragraphs: Dismantling drug trafficking organizations requires the criminal  prosecution of key traffickers. State/INL and USAID have supported  judicial reforms within some partner nations intended to make judicial  systems more fair, impartial, and efficient, and have strengthened the  capacity of prosecutors to work effectively within those systems on drug- related cases. For example, in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic,  State/INL and USAID sponsored training of police, prosecutors, and judges  on the application of new criminal procedure codes.
State/INL has also supported national task forces in several countries to  prosecute drug-related crimes. In Guatemala, State/INL has worked with  the country’s Attorney General to support three task forces dealing with  narcotics, corruption, and money-laundering cases. In 2004, the  anticorruption prosecutor in Guatemala brought cases against over 380  individuals, including many high-ranking former public officials, army  officers, and police. In Venezuela, until 2005, State/INL provided extensive  logistical support, and DEA provided advice and supervision, to help  develop the professional investigative and operational capability of the  Prosecutors’ Drug Task Force, which was composed of three dozen vetted  prosecutors and investigators from three agencies. According to State  and DEA, the work of this task force resulted in multiton seizures of drugs,  the arrest of numerous traffickers (including at least one kingpin), and  asset seizures.
In many cases where prosecution in the United States is warranted and  legal, partner nations have also transferred or extradited drug-related  defendants. For example, in 2007, Haiti’s President authorized the  narcotics police to cooperate with DEA and U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) personnel in locating, arresting, and removing nine high- level drug trafficking defendants. Also, according to State, the Dominican  Republic and Jamaica have been particularly cooperative with the U.S.  Marshals Service in locating, extraditing, and deporting defendants.
section_title: Measuring Results Is Difficult, but Cocaine Interdiction in the Transit Zone Reflects International Cooperation
paragraphs: While State/INL, DEA, and others have reported the results of their  assistance programs, they have not done so in a comprehensive and  consistent manner among partner nations and over time. Reports we  reviewed showed that some programs have helped disrupt drug markets  through seizures and arrests. Other programs, such as alternative  development, justice reform, and security service capacity building, are  less directly related to drug interdiction operations but are designed to  have longer-term and more systemic results, which are more difficult to  measure.
subsections: section_title: Assistance Programs Are Diffuse, and Results Are Not Reported Comprehensively and Consistently
paragraphs: The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal  agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving  their goals and to communicate their results to the Congress. The act  requires agencies to set multiyear strategic goals in their strategic plans  and corresponding annual goals in their performance plans, measure  performance toward the achievement of those goals, and report on their  progress in their annual performance reports. These reports are intended  to provide important information to agency managers, policymakers, and  the public on what each agency accomplished with the resources it was  given. Moreover, the act calls for agencies to develop performance goals  that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and to establish  performance measures that adequately indicate progress toward achieving  those goals. Our previous work has noted that the lack of clear,  measurable goals makes it difficult for program managers and staff to link  their day-to-day efforts to achieving the agency’s intended mission.
U.S.-funded transit zone counternarcotics assistance encompasses a wide  variety of initiatives across many countries, but State/INL and other  agencies have collected limited information on results. Records we  obtained from State/INL and DEA, including State’s annual International  Narcotics Control Strategy Reports and End Use Monitoring Reports,  provide information on the outcomes of these initiatives but do not do so  comprehensively. For example, in our review of State’s International  Narcotics Control Strategy Reports for 2003 to 2007, we identified over  120 counternarcotics initiatives in the countries we reviewed, but for over  half of these initiatives, the outcomes were unclear or not addressed at all  in the reports. Table 2 depicts the range of U.S.-supported  counternarcotics efforts in the countries we reviewed, including those  described in State or DEA records as having negligible or unsatisfactory  outcomes.
State has attempted to measure the outcomes of counternarcotics  programs in its annual mission performance reports, which report on a set  of performance indicators for each country. However, these indicators  have not been consistent over time or among countries. In our review of  mission performance reports for four major drug transit countries  covering fiscal years 2002 through 2006, we identified 86 performance  indicators directly and indirectly related to counternarcotics efforts;  however, over 60 percent of these indicators were used in only one or two  annual reporting cycles, making it difficult to discern performance trends  over time. Moreover, nearly 80 percent of these performance indicators  were used for only one country, making it difficult to compare program  results among countries.
section_title: Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions Reflect Cooperation with Partner Nations
paragraphs: Program specific information we reviewed indicates that these U.S.  counternarcotics assistance programs, along with other efforts, have  contributed to an active international interdiction effort in the transit zone.  Data reported by the U.S. interagency counternarcotics community  indicate that, since 2002, the United States and its partner nations have  removed, through seizures and disruptions, between 22 and 38 percent of  the estimated amount of cocaine flowing through the transit zone,  excluding Mexico (see table 3).
U.S. agencies have supported a wide variety of programs that relate to the  counternarcotics effort indirectly, and results are therefore difficult to  assess. These programs generally focus on root causes of drug-related  crime, as well as strengthening the overall rule of law and security of  partner nations. Since these programs are not directly associated with  interdiction efforts and outcomes, and some are long-term efforts, their  results and effect on the overall success of counternarcotics efforts are  even more difficult to assess.
State/INL has funded programs, including training and public awareness  campaigns, which address some of the underlying causes of drug  trafficking, such as local drug consumption and corruption. Some  programs are also aimed at strengthening institutions, such as public  health, educational, and financial accountability organizations, which can  help prevent drug-related crime by fostering a culture that does not  tolerate drug consumption and corruption. Very limited data were  available in State reports to discern trends in either corruption or drug  consumption that could be attributable to these programs. However, in  several countries, State/INL has reported an increased willingness among  local law enforcement entities to prosecute public officials.
Several USAID programs combat narcotics trafficking indirectly in  vulnerable populations by addressing underlying social problems, such as  crime, inadequate public services, and lack of economic opportunities. In  Jamaica, according to State/INL, anticrime and community policing  programs contributed to a 16 percent reduction in crime in 2006, but the  crime rate rose again in 2007. Development programs in Ecuador have  helped stabilize communities along the border with Colombia most likely  to become involved in drug trafficking by providing social services and  productive infrastructure, including water and sanitation systems, bridges,  roads, and irrigation canals. These programs have also helped strengthen  local governments and promote citizen participation in a number of  municipalities and parishes. While these programs have focused national  and international development assistance on these vulnerable  communities, their effect on the drug trade in the Colombian border  region of Ecuador has not been evaluated.
Defense and DHS have implemented many programs aimed at building the  overall capacity and professionalism of military and security organizations  through international cooperation. Defense officials in both Ecuador and  Panama told us they considered all U.S. cooperative programs with the  security forces of those countries to be counternarcotics-related because  they help counter the threats posed by trafficking organizations, including  incursions by the irregular armed forces of neighboring Colombia.  However, because many defense assistance programs in partner nations  do not have specific goals related to interdiction, it is difficult to assess the  effectiveness of the programs for counternarcotics. Similarly, State/INL  has funded training programs through DHS agencies to help improve  overall immigration, customs, and coast guard operations.
section_title: Several Factors Impede the Effectiveness of the Counternarcotics Efforts
paragraphs: Several factors relating to U.S. assistance programs have impeded  international counternarcotics efforts in the transit zone. Partner nations  have limited resources to devote to counternarcotics efforts, and many  U.S.-supported counternarcotics initiatives are not self-sustaining but,  rather, are dependent on continued U.S. funding. Limited political support  of U.S.-funded initiatives, as well as corruption, have also kept these  nations from becoming full partners in the international counternarcotics  effort—a goal of U.S. assistance, according to State. In addition, the effect  of U.S. cargo container security assistance for the counternarcotics effort  has been limited.
subsections: section_title: Many Partner Nations Cannot Sustain U.S. Supported Initiatives
paragraphs: The inability of transit zone countries to patrol their shores effectively and  conduct other maritime operations presents a major gap in drug  interdiction. In many of the countries we reviewed, State has reported that  partner nations cannot operate U.S.-provided maritime assets for  counternarcotics missions due to a lack of operations and of maintenance  resources. Some examples are as follows:  In the Dominican Republic, the United States has provided a wide range of  new and refurbished boats, including interceptor and patrol craft, that the  Dominican Navy has been unable to employ due to a lack of fuel, fuel  filters, and other routine maintenance supplies. Also, several U.S. vessels  that were transferred to the Dominican Navy as excess defense articles are  in poor condition due to a lack of preventive maintenance and funds for  repairs. State reported in 2006 that the Navy’s maintenance command  lacked necessary equipment, parts, and training.
In Haiti, State/INL and the U.S. Coast Guard provided substantial support  to the Haitian coast guard, including interceptor boats, vessel overhauls  and retrofitting, infrastructure improvements, and training and equipment.  However, according to State, a lack of necessary equipment, maintenance,  fuel, and logistical support has continued to impair the Haitian coast  guard’s ability to conduct maritime operations and combat drug trafficking  effectively.
In Guatemala, State/INL provided the counternarcotics police force with  two fiberglass boats—one located on the Caribbean Coast and the other  on the Pacific Coast—for limited counternarcotics operations. In 2007,  State reported that both boats were inoperable because the police had not  maintained the engines.
In Jamaica, the United States donated several patrol vessels capable of  intercepting go-fast boats. State reported in 2006 that the vessels had only  limited operational capability because they were not in good working  order.
In Panama, the U.S. Coast Guard donated a 180-foot cutter. However,  Panama’s National Maritime Service, which is highly dependent on U.S.  support for operations and maintenance resources, has been unable to  keep the vessel seaworthy.
U.S. agencies have not always planned for the sustainability of the  counternarcotics-related assets they provided to partner nations.  According to State officials we spoke to, when receiving these assets,  country officials have typically signed agreements accepting the long-term  responsibility of operating and maintaining them, including providing the  necessary staff, as well as fuel, parts, and other maintenance resources,  unless these are provided for by the United States. However, the long-term  cost of operating and maintaining the assets and the source of funding are  not typically included in such agreements, according to these officials.
In 2007, Defense began providing additional boats to partner nations,  including Panama, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and the Bahamas,  under its Enduring Friendship program, for use in maritime security  operations. However, Defense has not developed plans to address long- term sustainability of these assets over their expected 10-year operating  life. These interceptor boats were accompanied by support equipment  such as trucks and trailers for on-land mobility; radios; infrared cameras;  as well as training and a limited maintenance program, at a cost of  between $6 million and $11 million for each country. However, Defense  did not make provisions to ensure that the partner countries can fuel the  donated boats and maintain them beyond an initial short-term  maintenance contract period. For the boats provided to the Dominican  Republic, for example, the agreement between Defense and the Dominican  Republic did not specify the estimated costs or funding source of  operating the boats and related equipment. The agreement indicated the  United States may provide some additional support for repair parts,  contingent upon the availability of funds. The ability to provide the  necessary resources to operate these assets over the long-term is a  concern, according to the U.S. and partner nation officials we spoke to in  the Dominican Republic and Panama. According to the Coast Guard  attaché in the Dominican Republic, although the Dominican Navy has  added these and other boats to its fleet in recent years, it has not increased  its budget for fuel since 2002, and the cost of fuel has since doubled.  Similarly, according to a senior official of the Panamanian National  Maritime Service, it has been operating under a static budget and fuel  allotment, even as the number of assets and staff under its control has  increased. State/INL officials in both Panama and the Dominican Republic  told us that these countries have not effectively used the interceptor boats  for counternarcotics purposes.
In addition, the personnel operating the interceptor boats have limited  maritime interdiction skills. Training included in the assistance package  focused on operation and maintenance of boats and included some  training in first aid, navigation, and communications but only limited  training on interdiction tactics. The memorandum of understanding  between Defense and the Dominican Republic for this program indicated  that Defense may provide some additional training, contingent upon the  availability of funds, but did not specify the training likely to be needed for  conducting counternarcotics operations or its cost.
In some cases, however, State/INL has recognized the long-term  sustainability challenges associated with providing capital assets and has  planned and budgeted for operations and maintenance costs, thus helping  to ensure the assets will be used effectively for counternarcotics  operations. For example, State reported that it has funded maintenance  contracts in the Bahamas that provide a means for keeping U.S.-provided  boats operational for drug interdiction missions. Also, State/INL helps  sustain U.S.-funded initiatives along the Ecuador-Colombian border by  funding a large spare parts program, as well as maintenance training for  the heavy trucks and other vehicles it has provided, and by budgeting for  gas and maintenance costs over the long term. State/INL has also funded  contractors to maintain the electrical and plumbing systems in the police  buildings constructed for the police in Ecuador.
According to State, the counternarcotics police of several partner nations  are dependent on logistical and operational support of State/INL and DEA,  as the following examples show:  In the Dominican Republic, the police force’s effectiveness in  counternarcotics affairs is almost completely attributable to equipment,  training, and close support provided by DEA and State/INL over several  years. State also reported that the financial intelligence unit, begun with  U.S. support in 2003, lacks the resources and institutional support to  perform effectively and has reported no real successes in implementing its  money-laundering legislation since the unit was established.
In Ecuador, State/INL and DEA provide almost all logistical and  operational support to the Ecuadorian National Police Anti-Drug Division.
In Haiti, the lack of government resources makes the national police  largely dependent upon DEA and State/INL for logistical and advisory  support.
section_title: Some Countries’ Limited Political Support Impairs U.S. Counternarcotics Initiatives
paragraphs: According to State, a few governments in the region have demonstrated  limited political support for U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In particular,  Venezuelan cooperation has declined dramatically in recent years, and in  2006 and 2007 State reported that Venezuela had failed “demonstrably” to  make substantial efforts in the war on drugs. In 2005, the Venezuelan  President accused DEA of espionage and planning a coup, and the  government eventually withdrew from both U.S.-supported vetted units  and has refused counternarcotics cooperation with the United States.
State has also reported that Jamaica has shown limited political support  for some U.S. counternarcotics-related initiatives. For example, the United  States helped develop a corporate reform strategy for the Jamaican  constabulary forces, but it was never implemented due to a combination  of internal resistance to change and a lack of power to ensure  implementation of the strategy’s recommendations. In addition, the  government of Jamaica has not enacted an initiative to permit extended  data-sharing between U.S. and Jamaican law enforcement agencies  concerning money-laundering cases.
In Ecuador, even though the government has generally supported U.S.- funded counternarcotics initiatives, political developments may threaten  future international cooperation in maritime operations. Ecuador’s  President has stated that he no longer supports a U.S. military presence in  Ecuador and that his government will not renew the agreement allowing  the United States to operate its forward operating location there when the  agreement expires in November 2009.
section_title: Corruption Undermines Interdiction Efforts
paragraphs: The United States relies on the cooperation of partner nations’ law  enforcement and security agencies in the transit zone to conduct  successful counternarcotics operations. But, corruption in these agencies  limits the extent to which U.S. law enforcement agencies can involve their  counterparts in investigations. According to data compiled by  Transparency International, a civil society organization that monitors  corruption issues worldwide, corruption is a major problem in transit zone  countries. Its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks countries from 0  (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) based on a series of indicators. Seven  of the eight countries in our review received a score of 3.3 or lower  (compared with a score of 7.2 for the United States and 8.7 for Canada).  The eighth country, the Bahamas, was not reviewed. (See table 4.)
In addition, U.S. officials have noted instances of official corruption— particularly among military and police units—that have limited the  opportunities for and scope of cooperation with the United States and, in  some cases, undermined specific interdiction operations. Some examples  of this official corruption are as follows:    Guatemala disbanded its antinarcotics police unit in 2002 in response to  reports of widespread corruption within the agency and its general lack of  effectiveness in combating the country’s drug problem. The government  reassigned most of the unit’s law enforcement agents to the national  civilian police, and the U.S. government suspended major joint operations  in light of these circumstances. With U.S. assistance, Guatemala  established a successor antinarcotics police force but, in 2005, in a joint  operation with DEA, the Chief and Deputy of this agency were arrested in  the United States for corruption. Later that year, DEA suspected that  members of the antinarcotics force stole 475 kilograms of cocaine from an  evidence storage facility. Further, according to DEA, Guatemalan  antinarcotics agents misused intelligence leads provided by DEA to extort  investigative targets.
In Haiti, in 2003, State reported strong evidence of Haitian law  enforcement officials leaking information on planned operations and  trafficking drugs. DEA reported that planes under surveillance for drug  shipments were met and off-loaded by heavily armed uniformed police  officials with vehicles that transported the drugs. In 2007, the Haitian  government removed both the National Police Director of Administration  and Director of Logistics for suspected corruption.
In the Dominican Republic, the government removed 24 judges from office  for improperly handing out favorable sentences to known traffickers in  2006. Corruption has also hampered Dominican-based, money-laundering  investigations, according to DEA.
In Panama, in 2005, the head of a police counternarcotics unit was  arrested and charged with corruption. In 2007, after years of lackluster  counternarcotics cooperation from the National Maritime Service, the  former head of this organization was also arrested on corruption charges.
In the Bahamas, State reported in 2003 that it was reluctant to include  Bahamian defense personnel in Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos  and to share sensitive law enforcement information with them due to  corruption concerns.
In Ecuador, in 2002, the Deputy Chief of Operations of the Ecuadorian  Army was arrested for facilitating the transshipment of drugs through  cargo containers by providing trafficking organizations with false security  seals.
section_title: Cargo Container Security Programs Have Had Limited Effect on the Counternarcotics Effort
paragraphs: According to DEA, drug smuggling on containerized cargo ships poses a  significant threat to U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Both State/INL and DHS  have provided cargo security assistance to countries in the transit zone.  However, most of State/INL’s initiatives have not been effective, and DHS  has not routinely used its program of targeting and scanning cargo  containers overseas to detect illicit drugs.
State/INL has supported counternarcotics initiatives at cargo container  ports in four of the eight countries we reviewed, and in three of those  countries State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports  indicate that these initiatives were largely ineffective. For example, in  Guatemala, although State/INL has provided technical assistance,  logistical support, and training for the country’s port security program for  several years, State reported in 2006 that the program had little  interdiction success, and seizures were very low. In the Bahamas,  State/INL supported a canine unit of the Bahamian Customs Department  to help detect drugs shipments at the Freeport container port but  discontinued the assistance in 2004 due to high maintenance costs and its  failure to produce expected results. In Venezuela, the United States funded  a sophisticated container inspection facility at a large port known to be an  embarkation point for multiton shipments of cocaine, but the Venezuelan  government has not put it into operation.
DHS, through CBP, has implemented the Container Security Initiative  (CSI) overseas, which may have potential for greater use in  counternarcotics operations. CBP initiated CSI under its existing authority  in January 2002 to assist selected overseas ports in targeting suspicious  containers and scanning their contents. The program subsequently  received specific congressional authorization in 2006. By 2007, CSI  operated in 58 ports, including seven in the transit zone. CBP officers  stationed at foreign ports collaborating with host-country partners use  intelligence and automated risk assessment information to target  shipments and identify those that may contain weapons of mass  destruction or other terrorist contraband. DHS has generally not used the  technology to detect and interdict illicit drug shipments, though CSI  technology can help detect illicit drugs. In fact, the automated targeting  system that CSI uses to help target containers for inspection was originally  designed for this purpose. The first time the CSI scanning equipment was  used in the port of Caucedo in the Dominican Republic, operators  detected a shipment of cocaine that was packed amidst canned fruit.
Ultimately, several metric tons of cocaine were seized, and suspected  traffickers were arrested.
CBP officials we spoke with noted that including routine container  screening for drugs in CSI’s scope of operations would be difficult and  could conflict with achievement of CBP’s counterterrorism objectives.  They indicated that CSI’s budget and staffing are based on its  counterterrorism-related workload, and targeting drugs would require  additional research and analysis resources. They said that, without more  funding, DHS would have to shift its priorities away from counterterrorism  activities. Furthermore, they said that expanding existing agreements with  CSI participating countries would entail difficult and sensitive  negotiations. According to these officials, proposing that CSI should  search for illicit drugs could undermine the international political support  for CSI and other CBP counterterrorism initiatives because additional  container screening could cause transshipment delays and related  economic costs and involve other concessions that participating countries  may not be willing to accept.
However, CBP officials acknowledged that they have not formally  assessed the feasibility of conducting additional container targeting and  inspection in selected major drug transit countries. In particular, CBP has  neither calculated the related costs, including human resource  requirements, nor has it consulted with State and Justice on the related  diplomatic and security risks or the potential law enforcement benefits.  Senior officials we spoke to at State/INL, DEA, and ONDCP indicated that  it would be useful to examine the feasibility of a limited expansion of CSI  on an interagency basis.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. agencies, primarily State, DEA, Defense, DHS, and USAID, have  supported initiatives that have fostered cooperation with partner nations  in the transit zone, enabling these nations to engage in the  counternarcotics effort in ways that the United States alone could not.  Through these initiatives, U.S. law enforcement has been able to extend  the scope and effectiveness of its drug interdiction activities by (1) gaining  access to critical information and intelligence, (2) participating in seizure  and eradication operations within the territory or jurisdiction of partner  nations, and (3) bringing suspected drug traffickers to justice.
The absence of comprehensive and consistent reporting on the results of  these initiatives makes it difficult to monitor their outcomes over time,  assess their relative effectiveness, and make resource allocation decisions  based on results. However, available information concerning results  indicates that the United States has not made significant progress toward  its goal of assisting governments to become full and self-sustaining  partners in the international counternarcotics effort. Partner nations are  dependent on U.S. logistical, financial, and advisory support, and without  this support many U.S. initiatives are not sustainable. U.S. agencies have  funded initiatives and invested in assets, particularly for maritime  operations, without planning for the long-term operations and  maintenance of these assets, and partner nations have not utilized many of  them to their maximum capacity.
U.S. assistance in cargo container security has been largely ineffective for  the international counternarcotics effort. However, DHS has invested in  cargo container security programs overseas that in at least one instance  helped detect illicit drugs being shipped in the transit zone. DHS has raised  a number of concerns about using CSI routinely for this purpose, but has  not assessed the feasibility of this program as another tool in the U.S.  counternarcotics strategy.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To link U.S.-funded initiatives in transit zone countries to the priority of  disrupting illicit drug markets and the goal of assisting nations to become  full and self-sustaining partners in the international counternarcotics  effort, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the  Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security,  the Attorney General, and the Administrator of USAID, report the results  of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives more comprehensively and  consistently for each country in the annual International Narcotics  Control Strategy Report.
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the  Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security,  and the Attorney General, (1) develop a plan to ensure that partner nations  in the transit zone can effectively operate and maintain all  counternarcotics assets that the United States has provided, including  boats and other vehicles and equipment, for their remaining useful life and  report this plan to the Congress for the fiscal year 2010 appropriations  cycle and (2) ensure that, before providing a counternarcotics asset to a  partner nation, agencies determine the total operations and maintenance  cost over its useful life and, with the recipient nation, develop a plan for  funding this cost.
To help maximize cargo container security assistance, we recommend that  the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of  State and the Attorney General, determine the feasibility of expanding the  Container Security Initiative to include routine targeting and scanning of  containers for illicit drugs in major drug transit countries in the transit  zone, and report the results to the Congress. Factors to be assessed should  include the cost, workload and staffing ramifications, the potential  benefits to international counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, the  political support of CSI participating countries, statutory authority, and  any risks associated with such an expansion.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to Defense, DHS, Justice/DEA, ONDCP,  State, and USAID for their comment. DHS, Justice/DEA, ONDCP, and State  provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes III  through VI. All agencies provided technical corrections, which we  incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
State generally agreed with the report’s conclusions, but disagreed with  our recommendation on results reporting. State noted that it has already  developed performance measures to reflect progress in achieving broad  counternarcotics goals and development goals in general, though they do  not necessarily capture program-specific results. We modified our  recommendation to emphasize the need for more systematic reporting of  program-specific results that would link U.S. counternarcotics efforts to  State’s broader performance goals and measures. State also noted that  there is substantial variation in assistance programs in particular countries  in terms of program types and funding levels. However, we observed that  many programs in several countries are similar in nature and lend  themselves to the comparison of results among countries. Developing a  method of reporting these results more comprehensively and consistently  across years and among country programs in the International Narcotics  Control Strategy Report would address our concern.
State partially agreed with our recommendation on sustainability planning  and indicated that its project designs, agreements with recipient countries,  and monitoring mechanisms are appropriate for addressing sustainability  concerns, given the unpredictability of recipient countries’ long-term  priorities and budgetary resources. Furthermore, State commented that it  has limited ability to influence the coordinated sustainability planning of  other agencies and has no influence over Defense’s Enduring Friendship  program. Given past experience, we question whether providing assets is  justifiable without more specific and detailed plans that give better  assurances that the recipient country and participating agencies are  committed to funding specified operations and maintenance costs. State is  in a unique position as the lead foreign affairs agency to ensure that all  participating U.S. agencies involved in providing counternarcotics assets  agree on a discrete sustainability plan. State, in particular, can influence  Defense’s sustainability planning when it approves security assistance  programs, such as Enduring Friendship. Section 1206 of the National  Defense Authorization Act of 2006, under which Enduring Friendship was  authorized, requires State and Defense to jointly approve all projects and  coordinate their implementation.
State fully supports any consultation needed to determine the feasibility of  expanding DHS’s container security assistance program.
DHS did not concur with our recommendation to study the feasibility of  expanding the CSI program. According to DHS, expanding CSI to include  narcotics interdiction would unnecessarily broaden the program’s  strategic goals and is inconsistent with its mandate to secure the  international supply chain from high-risk shipments with a potential risk  of terrorism and acts of terrorism. CSI’s mandate does not prohibit  leveraging the program’s resources for other agency missions. In addition,  the CSI Strategic Plan for 2006-2011 states that, “at some point in the  future, consideration should be given to potential expansion of the  program from focusing on terrorism alone to encompassing other  activities known to support terrorism, such as smuggling narcotics,  violations of intellectual property rights and currency violations.” A logical  first step would be for relevant stakeholders to study the feasibility of  enlisting CSI as a counternarcotics tool, formally assessing the program’s  statutory authority, among other factors. DHS also noted that 90 percent  of cocaine moves through Mexico, but that no CSI ports are located in  Mexico. However, as we reported, approximately 90 percent of the  cocaine flowing toward the United States has gone through the Central  American/Mexican corridor, in which four CSI ports are located.
ONDCP accepted our recommendation that it assist other agencies in  developing performance measures and sustainability plans for U.S.- provided counternarcotics assets. In addition, ONDCP strongly concurred  with the recommendation to determine the feasibility of expanding CSI.
DEA said that, while it is difficult to measure the outcome of all U.S.  counternarcotics efforts, it has tracked statistical data to ensure that it is  achieving its strategic goals and assists State and ONDCP in developing  overall performance measures for U.S. counternarcotics programs.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the Attorney  General; the Administrator of USAID; the Director of ONDCP; and  interested congressional committees. We also will make copies available  to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff members who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our review encompassed U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives during  2003 through 2007, in countries in the Caribbean Sea and Central America,  as well as Ecuador and Venezuela. We specifically focused our efforts on  eight countries designated by the President as “major drug transit  countries.” Those countries include the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic,  Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela. Although  Mexico is also a major transit country, we excluded it from our review  because we reviewed U.S. counternarcotics assistance to that country in  2007.
To identify U.S.-funded assistance programs and initiatives, we reviewed  the Department of State’s (State) International Narcotics Control  Strategy Reports (INCSR), Mission Performance Plans for fiscal years  2003 through 2007, and end use monitoring reports, as well as work plans,  activity reports, and country summaries provided by the Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA). We also met with Washington, D.C.- based representatives of the White House’s Office of National Drug  Control Policy (ONDCP); the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (State/INL); the Department  of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Criminal  Division; the Departments of Defense’s (Defense) Office of Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation  and Global Threats; the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office  of Counternarcotics Enforcement, Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP); and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We  also met with cognizant officials at the U.S. Southern Command in Miami,  Florida, and the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South in Key West,  Florida. We included among the initiatives we reviewed those cooperative  endeavors that may not have had any identifiable costs associated with  them, including support for legislative reform in partner nations and  efforts to reach agreements that enhance international cooperation in  interdiction, including bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements and  agreements to establish forward operating locations.
To document the cost of U.S. counternarcotics support, we focused on  fiscal years 2003 through 2007 by reviewing and analyzing program  funding data from the various departments and agencies in Washington,  D.C., including State and Defense, USAID, and DEA for background  purposes. While we performed some checks on the data, we did not  perform a full reliability assessment of them. We believe the data provide a  reasonable indication of spending on counternarcotics-related activities,  but we recognize that the data the agencies gave us included funding for  some activities that go beyond counternarcotics assistance and may  include some U.S. interdiction-related activities.
To assess program results and factors that have impeded counternarcotics  efforts, we reviewed State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy  Reports and Mission Strategic Plans for fiscal years 2002 through 2007,  End Use Monitoring reports, and other relevant State documents. At DEA,  we reviewed Significant Action Reports and “blue notes”—reports to the  agency’s Administrator on selected significant drug interdiction and other  activities—as well as all available “rightsizing reports” and all country and  work plans for the eight major drug transit countries in our review. We  also reviewed evaluations, midterm and final reports, and other program  documents for those activities which USAID officials and State/INL  documents had identified as related to the international counternarcotics  effort. In addition, we reviewed Transparency International’s Corruption  Perception Index to evaluate the level of corruption in these countries.  The index is based on the results of surveys of business people and  citizens and analysis by country experts. It ranks countries by the degree  of corruption perceived to exist in each country rather than by actual  corruption, which is difficult to measure directly. In a previous GAO  report, we determined that Transparency International’s data were  sufficiently reliable to provide a broad gauge of corruption and  demonstrate that levels of corruption vary among countries.
To obtain more detailed information on program results and impediments,  we traveled to four of the eight major drug trafficking countries in our  review: the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama. We  chose these four countries based on: (1) the size of the U.S. assistance  program; (2) the location within the various geographic regions of the  transit zone, including Central America, South America, and the Caribbean  Islands; (3) designation as a major money-laundering country; (4) posting  of senior embassy officials representing State/INL, DEA, DHS, ICE, and  CBP, and Defense; and (5) implementation of major USAID rule of law and  alternative development initiatives. During our visits we obtained  information from U.S. embassy officials, host government officials, and  local program beneficiaries. While in country, we visited a number of  project sites relating to maritime operations, port security, intelligence  gathering, drug crop eradication, alternative development, and other  activities.
To identify trends in cocaine flow, seizures, and disruptions, we reviewed  data from the Interagency Assessment on Cocaine Movement from 2002  through 2007, with limited updated data provided by ONDCP. In the  course of previous work, we discussed how cocaine flow data were  developed with officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the  Central Intelligence Agency, Crime and Narcotics Center. In addition, we  discussed how seizure and disruption data were developed with officials  from ONDCP. Overall, the data have limitations, due in part to the illegal  nature of the drug trade and the time lag inherent in collecting meaningful  data. Notwithstanding the limitations of the drug production and seizure  data, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to provide an  overall indication of the magnitude and nature of the illicit drug trade  since 2003. We supplemented this data with information about trends in  drug trafficking, interdiction, and cooperation with transit zone countries  obtained from officials at JIATF-South.
Finally, the information and observations on foreign law in this report do  not reflect our independent legal analysis but are based on interviews with  cognizant officials and secondary sources.
section_title: Appendix II: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements
paragraphs: The United States has signed Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement  agreements with 25 countries in the transit and source zones. According to  Coast Guard officials, these agreements have improved cooperation with  nations in the region and increased the United States’ and, in particular,  the Coast Guard’s capability to board suspect vessels and detain suspected  drug traffickers. These bilateral agreements typically have six provisions  to them. The United States and the other countries negotiate each  provision separately, which means that some countries may agree to some  provisions and not others. The six parts provide for the following:    Ship-boarding provisions establish an expedited process for U.S. law  enforcement agencies to obtain authorization from the competent  authority of a designated country to board and search a vessel flying its  flag and suspected of being engaged in illicit traffic outside the territorial  waters of any nation. In certain limited circumstances, U.S. vessels may  stop, board, and search suspicious vessels flying the flag of a designated  country without having specific permission.
Ship-rider provisions permit countries to place law enforcement officials  on each other’s vessels.
Pursuit provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies, under very  limited circumstances, to pursue aircraft and vessels in a country’s  airspace and territorial waters. In particular, the provisions permit U.S.  law enforcement agencies to stop, board, and search a suspect vessel if the  country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to respond  immediately.
Entry-to-investigate provisions allow the U.S. law enforcement agencies,  under very limited circumstances, to enter a country’s airspace or  territorial waters to investigate aircraft or vessels suspected of illicit drug  trafficking. Specifically, the provisions permit U.S. law enforcement  agencies to board and search a suspect vessel if the country does not have  a vessel or aircraft available to respond immediately.
Over-flight provisions permit the U.S. law enforcement aircraft to fly over  the country’s territorial waters, with appropriate notice to the country’s  coastal authorities.
Relay order-to-land provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies to  relay an order to land from the host country to the suspect aircraft.  Moreover, an additional International Maritime Interdiction Support  clause permits U.S. law enforcement agencies, principally the Coast  Guard, to transport suspected drug traffickers through that country to the  United States for prosecution and provides for expedited access to that  country’s dockside facility to search suspect vessels. Since 2003 the United  States has entered into support clauses with five countries.
Table 5 lists the law enforcement agreements, including the international  maritime interdiction support clause, that the United States has negotiated  with countries in the transit and source zones.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland  Security’s letter dated June 27, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  A decision on whether to enlist CSI as a counternarcotics tool should  be based on a reasoned study of its feasibility by relevant stakeholders,  formally assessing the program’s statutory authority among other  factors. ONDCP and State support this recommendation.  2.  CSI’s mandate does not prohibit leveraging the program’s resources for  other agency missions. In addition, DHS/CBP notes in the CSI Strategic  Plan for 2006-2011 that, “at some point in the future, consideration  should be given to potential expansion of the program from focusing  on terrorism alone to encompassing other activities known to support  terrorism, such as smuggling narcotics, violations of intellectual  property rights and currency violations.”  3.  As noted in our report, seven CSI ports are located the Caribbean and  Central America. Four of those ports (Balboa, Colon, and Manzanillo  in Panama and Puerto Cortes in Honduras), are located on the central  American isthmus and, as such, are included in the “Central  American/Mexican Corridor,” through which nearly 90 percent of  cocaine destined for the United States moves. (See fig. 1.)  4.  As DHS notes in its letter, the United States has “unique and  unparalleled cooperation and information sharing between the CBP  officers at the foreign seaports and the host government customs  personnel.” CSI’s way of working with host country partners may serve  as a model for combating corruption and gaining the political support  necessary to make U.S. efforts successful.  5.  We are not recommending that CSI target maritime containers  destined for other countries. Rather, we are recommending that, in  addition to the factors CSI currently uses to target containers for  inspection, DHS study the feasibility of using potential narcotics  trafficking as one of the targeting factors.  6.  We added information on CBP’s advisory program.  7.  The focus of our review was on U.S. initiatives to assist selected major  drug transit zone countries and we intentionally did not address many  U.S. interdiction operations DHS described. We have reported  previously on CBP’s activities. See GAO, Drug Control: Agencies Need  to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop  Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO-06- 200 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005); and GAO, Drug Control:  Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit Zone  Interdiction Efforts, GAO-02-13 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2002).
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated June 25, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We modified our recommendation to emphasize the need for State to  report the results of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives more  comprehensively and consistently for each country in its annual  International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Such information  would complement and aid interpretation of the broad performance  measures State includes in its performance plan.  2.  While the broad performance measures State has developed are  important, they do not capture results of specific assistance programs,  and, without other information, their usefulness in managing  counternarcotics programs is limited. Reviewing program-specific  results in a particular country over time or comparing results among  countries with similar programs can help identify patterns and lessons  learned that may be useful in evaluating and managing these programs  more effectively. Furthermore, without consistently reported program- specific results information, State cannot assess the extent to which  the results of specific programs have contributed to overall progress  reflected in State overall performance measures.  3.  While we agree that assistance programs vary, we observed that many  programs in several countries are similar and comparable.  4.  Past experience with U.S.-provided assets has shown that State’s  monitoring of nation’s commitment alone has not been sufficient to  ensure that such assets are utilized effectively. We question whether  such U.S. investments are justifiable without stronger up-front  assurances, beyond an agreement, that recipient countries or  sponsoring U.S. agencies can afford the long-term operations and  maintenance costs and are committed to providing those resources.  We continue to believe that explicit sustainability plans are needed  that include a projection of total asset ownership costs that have been  considered and agreed upon by all relevant parties with adequate  contingency plans in case assumptions change about sustainability and  commitment.  5.  State is in a unique position as the lead foreign affairs agency to ensure  that all participating U.S. agencies involved in providing  counternarcotics assets agree on a discreet sustainability plan. State,  in particular, can influence Defense’s sustainability planning when it  approves security assistance programs, such as Enduring Friendship.
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, under  which Enduring Friendship was authorized, requires State and Defense  to jointly approve all projects and coordinate their implementation.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, A. H. Huntington, III, Assistant  Director; Joseph Carney; Miriam A. Carroll; and James Michels made key  contributions to this report.