Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the Munition Requirements Determination Process
Published: 2001-04-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To determine the number and type of munitions needed, the military annually evaluates its munition requirements using a multiphase analytical process. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to ensure that the requirements determination process yields accurate numbers and the types of munitions needed to defeat threats specified in the Defense Planning Guidance. Although DOD has made progress and has identified specific areas still requiring attention, there is no clear plan with time frames for resolving key issues. Some of these issues have only been partially completed and others are in the early stages of evolution. Specifically, target templates have not been completed and munitions effectiveness data has not been updated, nor have decisions been made on more detailed warfighting scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Consequently, the reliability of the services' munitions requirements remain uncertain and could affect munitions planning, programming, budgeting, and industrial production base decisions. Until these issues are resolved and a revised Capabilities-Based Management Requirements instruction is issued, the accuracy of the munitions requirements will remain uncertain.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The military services’ budget for conventional munitions is about   $4.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 and is projected to increase annually until  fiscal year 2005 when the budget is expected to be about $5.4 billion. To  determine the number and type of munitions needed, the services annually  evaluate their munition requirements using a multiphase analytical  process. The accuracy of this process is critical as its outcome defines the  numbers and types of munitions necessary to defeat potential threats;  affects munitions planning, programming, and budgeting decisions; and  influences industrial production base decisions. Since 1994, the  Department of Defense Inspector General has issued 17 reports and we  have issued 3 reports identifying weaknesses and expressing concerns  about the accuracy of the process used by the Department of Defense to  determine these requirements. The Department of Defense has  acknowledged the weaknesses and is working to achieve a more accurate  process for determining these requirements.
As requested, we assessed the Department of Defense’s progress in  improving the requirement determination process. Specifically, this report  addresses (1) the extent to which actions have been taken to improve the  process and (2) those areas where additional actions are needed. The  scope and methodology of our work are described in appendix I. This is  the second in a series of reports that addresses ammunition management  issues.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The military services annually determine their current and future munition  procurement requirements in accordance with the Defense Planning  Guidance. Historically, the Defense Planning Guidance has directed the  military services to arm a given force structure to win two nearly  simultaneous major theaters of war. In recent years, the Department of  Defense has engaged in a number of military operations that vary in size  and circumstance from a major theater of war; consequently, the current  National Military Strategy and the Defense Planning Guidance call for the  services to prepare for a number of small-scale contingency  operations in  addition to the two major theaters of war.
The conditions under which small-scale operations are fought may differ  from conditions in a major theater war, which may increase the services’  requirements for highly technical precision munitions designed to limit  loss of life and expensive military assets. The increased use of precision  munitions in recent conflicts reduced inventories and raised questions  about whether adequate attention had been paid to the impact of small- scale contingencies on the ability of U.S. forces to respond and sustain  operations for the two major theaters of war. Of the approximately   $4.2 billion of munitions the services are planning to procure in fiscal year  2001, 46 percent (or $1.9 billion) will be used to procure precision  munitions designed to reduce the number of conventional munitions  needed to defeat enemy targets while at the same time limiting loss of  expensive weapons systems and life. By fiscal year 2005, the services are  planning to increase their procurement of precision guided munitions by  about 5 percent.
subsections: section_title: Requirements Process
paragraphs: In 1994, to generate consistent munition requirements Department-wide,  and to ensure that the military services have both an adequate supply and  the appropriate types of munitions to address changing mission needs, the  Department of Defense standardized the process by which the services  determine their munition requirements. In 1997, the Department of  Defense issued Instruction 3000.4, which sets forth policies, roles and  responsibilities, time frames, and procedures to guide the services as they  develop their munition requirements. This instruction is referred to as the  Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements process and is the  responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics.
The instruction describes a multiphased analytical process that begins  when the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy develops, in consultation  with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, and  the warfighting Commanders in Chief, policy on munition requirements for  the Defense Planning Guidance. The Defense Intelligence Agency uses the  Defense Planning Guidance and its accompanying warfighting scenarios as  well as other intelligence information to develop a threat assessment. This  assessment contains estimates and facts about the potential threats that  the United States and allied forces could expect to meet for each of the  two major theaters of war scenarios. The warfighting Commanders in  Chief, responsible for the major theaters of war scenarios, in coordination  with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, use the threat assessment to allocate each  service a share of the identified targets by phases of the war.
Next, the services develop their combat requirements using battle  simulation models and scenarios to determine the number and mix of  munitions needed to meet the Commanders in Chief’s objectives  separately by each major theater of war scenario. To develop these  requirements, the services draw upon and integrate data and assumptions  from the Defense Planning Guidance requirements, warfighting scenarios,  and target allocations, as well as estimates of repair and return rates for  enemy targets and projected assessments of damage to enemy targets and  installations. Other munition requirements include munitions (1) needed  for forces not committed to support combat operations, (2) to provide a  post-major theater of war combat capability, and (3) to train the force,  support service programs, and peacetime requirements. These  requirements, in addition to the combat requirement, comprise the  services’ total munitions requirement. The total munitions requirement is  then balanced along with projected inventory and affordability to  determine how many of each munition the services will procure within  their specified funding limits and used to develop the services’ Program  Objectives Memorandum and Presidential budget submission.
section_title: Prior Audits Note Problems
paragraphs: Despite Department efforts to standardize the process and generate  consistent requirements, many questions have been raised about the  accuracy or reliability of the requirements determination process.  Between the Department of Defense Inspector General and our agency, 20  reports have been issued that state that systemic problems — such as  questionable and inconsistently applied data, inconsistency of processes  among and between services, and unclear guidance — have inflated the  services’ requirements for certain categories of munitions. A list of these  reports is included in appendix II. The Department acknowledged these  weaknesses and recognized that inflated requirements can negatively  affect munitions planning, programming, and budget decisions, as well as  assessments of the size and composition of the industrial production base.  As a result, the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000-2005,  dated April 1998, directed that a Capabilities-Based Munitions  Requirements working group develop recommendations to improve the  accuracy of the process. In October 1998, the group recommended several  corrective actions to address weaknesses identified by both the Inspector  General and our agency.
section_title: Actions Being Taken to Improve the Process
paragraphs: Coordinated threat assessment
Revised repair rates for damaged targets and target damage
Modified the target allocation process
Revised risk assessments  Based on the recommendations of the Capabilities-Based Munitions  Requirements working group, the Department has improved several key  components of the requirements determination process. Process  improvements include Department-wide coordination of the threat  assessment, updated projections as to the amount of time it takes a  potential enemy to repair and return damaged targets to the battlefield and  target damage assessments, modifications to the target allocation process,  and a risk assessment that includes the impact of small-scale contingency  operations. The Department expects these improvements to correct  weaknesses in the process that can result in over- or understated munition  requirements.
subsections: section_title: Coordinated Threat Assessment
paragraphs: The Defense Intelligence Agency develops an annual threat assessment  that identifies potential threats that the United States and allied forces  could expect to meet for each of the two major theaters of war scenarios.  The Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements instruction directs that  the Commanders in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff use the threat  assessment to allocate targets to each of the services. The Department has  identified weaknesses in this area and taken steps to strengthen this  assessment.
Defense Intelligence Agency officials stated that in the past, the services  could, based on input from their own intelligence sources or direction  from the warfighting Commanders in Chief, develop an independent threat  analysis that could result in the services planning to destroy the same  targets and, consequently, overstating munitions requirements. To resolve  this issue, the working group directed that the Defense Intelligence  Agency fully coordinate the threat assessment with the services and  throughout the Defense intelligence communities. In accordance with this  directive, the Defense Intelligence Agency coordinated the most recent  threat assessment that describes the threat for the fiscal year 2002-2007  planning cycle. By adopting a coordinated threat assessment, the  Department expects to be better able to ensure that the services’ munition  requirements will be more accurate.
section_title: Revised Repair Rates and Assessments
paragraphs: Repair rates are a projection of the amount of time it takes a potential  enemy to repair and return a target to the battlefield and determine the  number of attacks needed to destroy a target, which directly influences  munition quantities. Since the services use these rates as input into their  warfighting simulation models to determine their munition requirements,  these rates should be current and reflect a country’s existing repair  capability. In response to a Department of Defense Inspector General  review of this process, the Department has taken steps to address the  quality of its data on projected repair rates.
A Department of Defense Inspector General audit of service  requirements for specific categories of munitions reported that the  services used repair rates that overstated the requirement for these  munitions. According to an official from the Joint Staff, the services were  using repair rates for countries from the Cold War era that were able to  repair and return damaged property to the battle more quickly than could  countries used in today’s war planning scenarios. To address this issue, in  December 1999, the Defense Intelligence Agency updated and  standardized the repair rates the services used in their battle simulation  models, and the Department expects these actions will address the issue  of overstated requirements.
Battle damage assessments are more critical to munitions requirement  planning with the increased use of precision guided munitions and  changes in warfighting. Previously, munitions were fired from a range that  allowed a visual damage assessment, but precision guided munitions are  often fired miles from the target, which eliminates the ability to visually  assess whether the target has been damaged or destroyed. Knowing in  advance the probability that a specific munition will destroy the target is  necessary to accurately determine the number and mix of munitions that  will be required.
To improve battle damage assessments, the Defense Intelligence Agency  developed battle damage assessment factors that measure (1) whether a  target was hit, (2) the extent of the damage, and (3) whether the objective  was met. These factors are more predictive if the munition has a guidance  system that provides damage information to the launch site. According to  a Navy official, using the newly developed battle damage assessment  factors for the fiscal year 2002-2007 requirements planning cycle  significantly reduced the requirement for certain categories of naval  munitions. According to an official from the Joint Staff, these assessments  have also reduced the potential for overstated munition requirements for  the services’ air components.
section_title: Improved Target Allocation Process
paragraphs: Allocating targets to the services is one of the most critical steps in the  requirement determination process as it defines the services’ role in the  war fight and determines the number and type of munitions for which the  services need to plan. In accordance with the Capabilities-Based  Munitions Requirements instruction, the warfighting Commanders in Chief  are required to allocate targets to the services for their area of  responsibility. This is an area that has proven problematic in reaching an  agreement among the services, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided  direction to strengthen the process.
In response to a Department of Defense Inspector General audit critical  of the Central Command’s allocation process, a 1999 pilot project was  initiated that transferred the U.S. Central Command’s target allocation role  to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, in coordination with the services,  developed a methodology to allocate targets. According to officials at the  Joint Staff and the Central Command, the methodology was intended to  better align the Commanders in Chief’s near-term objectives (which  generally cover a 2-year period) and the services’ long-term planning  horizon (which is generally 6 years). Another benefit of the pilot was that  the Joint Staff could validate the services’ munition requirements by  matching requirements to target allocations.
The Army, the Navy, and a warfighting Commander in Chief objected to  the pilot’s results and criticized the methodology used to allocate the  targets because it allocated significantly more targets to the Air Force and  fewer targets to the Army. Army officials objected that the methodology  did not adequately address land warfare, which is significantly different  than air warfare. The Navy did not concur with the results, citing the lack  of recognition for the advanced capabilities of future munitions. U. S.  Central Command officials disagreed with the results, stating that a  change in methodology should not in and of itself cause the allocation to  shift. In July 2000, citing substantial concerns about the pilot, the Under  Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology suspended the target  allocation for fiscal year 2000 and directed that the services use the same  allocations applied to the fiscal year 2002-2007 Program Objectives  Memorandum.
In August 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff structurally changed the threat  allocation process to address the services’ and the warfighting  Commander in Chief’s objections. The warfighting Commanders in Chief  will now prepare a near-term target allocation using a methodology  developed by the Joint Chiefs. Each warfighting Commander in Chief will  develop two allocations—one for strike (air services) forces and one for  engagement (land troops) forces for his area of responsibility. The first  will allocate specific targets to strike forces under the assumption that the  air services can eliminate the majority of enemy targets. The second  allocation will assume that less than perfect conditions exist (such as bad  weather), which will limit the air services’ ability to destroy their assigned  targets and require that the engagement force complete the mission. The  Commanders in Chief will not assign specific targets to the engagement  forces, but they will estimate the size of the expected remaining enemy  land force. The Army and the Marines will then be expected to arm  themselves to defeat those enemy forces. The Joint Staff will use the  Commanders in Chief’s near-year threat distribution and extrapolate that  information to the last year of the Program Objectives Memorandum for  the purpose of the services’ munitions requirement planning. The  Department expects that these modifications should correct over- or  understated requirements and bridge the gap between the warfighting  Commanders in Chief’s near-term interest and objectives and the services’  longer planning horizon.
section_title: Department Is Making Its Risk Assessment More Comprehensive
paragraphs: Until recently, the Department lacked an assessment of the impact of  small-scale contingencies on munition requirements, and uncertainties  existed regarding the impact on service abilities to meet the requirements  of the two major theaters of war. However, the Department has taken  action to better address this issue.
In October 1999, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed that  the Joint Staff coordinate an assessment of the risk associated with  current and projected munition inventories available for two major  theaters of war and inventories depleted by a challenging sequence of  small-scale contingency operations. According to an official from the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, the increased use of precision guided munitions during the  contingency operation in Kosovo prompted several Department studies  that addressed whether the military services have sufficient munitions to  fulfill the two major theaters of war requirement. However, initial studies  focused on the difference between the services’ two theaters of war  requirement and the actual number of munitions procured, but did not  demonstrate the impact of shortfalls of specific munitions on the services  ability to respond to two major theaters of war.
The assessment, completed in April 2000, which focused on inventories of  precision guided munitions, concluded that small-scale contingencies  would have a negligible impact on the Commanders in Chief’s ability to  meet the two major theaters of war requirement. An official from the Joint  Staff stated that the study’s conclusion was based on the assumption that  in a major theater war, precision guided munitions might be used during  the early phases of the war for critical targets and then other, less accurate  munitions could be substituted. However, according to an Air Force  official, the assessment did show that small-scale contingency operations  negatively affect inventories of some precision munitions, which may limit  the Commanders in Chief’s flexibility in conducting two major theater  wars. Department officials added that the assessment should give the  services information they need to plan for inventories of specific  munitions that would be affected more than others during contingency  operations.
The Department is incorporating the actions that have been taken to  improve the process into a revised Capabilities-Based Munitions  Requirements instruction that it expects to issue in the spring 2001 and to  be used to determine the services’ fiscal year 2004-2009 requirements.
section_title: Unresolved Issues Affect Reliability of Munition Requirements Process
paragraphs: Munitions effectiveness data
Warfighting scenarios  Notwithstanding the corrective actions the Department has taken or has  underway to improve the process, other key components have either not  been completed or not been decided upon. The Department has not  completed a database listing detailed target characteristics for large  enemy installations based on warfighting scenarios and has not developed  new munitions effectiveness data to address deficiencies the services and  the Commanders in Chief have identified. Completion dates for these tasks  have been exceeded or not established. Additionally, the Department has  not determined whether to create more detailed warfighting scenarios in  the Defense Planning Guidance or to rate scenarios in terms of their  probability. Such an action could increase reliability of the requirement  determination process and ensure consistency in the services’ analyses in  support of their requirements. The Department is in the process of  incorporating the completed actions into a revised Capabilities-Based  Munitions Requirements instruction to be issued in the spring 2001 and  used by the services to determine their fiscal year 2004-2009 munitions  procurement requirements. However, the Department has no clear plan of  action for resolving these issues or a time frame for their completion. Until  the remaining tasks are completed and incorporated into the process,  questions are likely to remain regarding the accuracy of the munition  requirements process as well as the Department’s ability to identify  munitions most appropriate to defeat potential threats.
subsections: section_title: List of Targets Is Overdue
paragraphs: According to Department officials, the Department lacks a common  picture of the number and types of targets on large enemy installations as  identified in the warfighting scenarios and as a result, the services have  been identifying targets on enemy installations differently. According to an  official from the Joint Staff, the Department has been concerned that this  lack of common target characteristics could over- or understate  requirements for certain munition categories. To resolve this issue, the  Joint Chiefs instructed the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination  with the warfighting Commanders in Chief, to develop target templates  that would provide a common picture of the types of potential targets on  enemy installations. According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials,  the services and the Commanders in Chief could also use this information  to attack these targets with munitions that would minimize damage to the  installation, reduce reconstruction costs after a conflict, and allow U.S.  forces to use it if needed. An official from the Joint Staff stated that while  the Defense Intelligence Agency was to complete the target templates by  August 31, 2000, it has yet to do so and a specific completion date has not  been established.
section_title: Munitions Effectiveness Data Not Yet Updated
paragraphs: How effective a munition is against a target can predict the number of  munitions necessary to defeat it. According to an official at the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,  funding to maintain the manual containing this information has historically  been limited. The Department recognizes that munitions effectiveness data  is a critical component for requirements planning and that outdated  information could over- or understate munition requirements. To address  this shortfall, the Department provided $34 million in fiscal year 2001 to  update and publish munitions effectiveness data for use by the services in  their battle simulation models. At the time of our review, the Department  did not know when this project would be completed.
section_title: Department Undecided on Specificity Needed in Warfighting Scenarios
paragraphs: The Defense Planning Guidance contains an appendix of warfighting  scenarios that detail conditions that may exist during the conduct of the  two major theaters of war; these scenarios are developed with input from  several sources, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff,  and the services. This appendix provides a common base line from which  the services determine their munition requirements. However, according  to several Department officials, the warfighting scenarios in the Defense  Planning Guidance need to include more detail. Specifically, these officials  stated that information about the potential constraints under which the  war will be fought and casualty and asset loss guidance can affect the  types and numbers of munitions the services plan to procure. Some  Department officials stated that the Defense Planning Guidance used to  contain specifics on the conduct of the war fight; however, when the  Department adopted the Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements  instruction, the detail was eliminated in favor of broader guidance.
Conversely, other Department officials disagree with the need for  increased guidance. According to an official from the Office of Secretary  of Defense, Requirements and Plans, additional guidance and specificity is  not necessary because the services should use the scenarios in the  Defense Planning Guidance to plan their force structure rather than their  munition requirements. Some Air Force and Army officials agree, stating  that the Defense Planning Guidance provides sufficient guidance for  munition planning for the mandatory two major theaters of war scenarios.  The chief of the Army Combat Support War Reserve Branch suggested that  specific guidance would only be necessary if the Army was required to  plan for small-scale contingencies with restrictions on the conduct of the  war fight. However, according to some Department officials, while the  Defense Planning Guidance provides the services a basis for their force  structure, it is also an integral part of the requirements determination  process. From this vantage point, Department officials suggest that if  small-scale contingency operations are becoming a part of an overall  military strategy then the Defense Planning Guidance should reflect this by  incorporating more detailed guidance on the conduct of such operations.  By providing additional guidance on the conduct of the war fight, such as  limiting loss of weapon systems and lives, the services would be better  able to plan their munition requirements to ensure the stated conditions  were met.
In addition to lacking sufficient specificity on warfighting scenarios, the  Defense Planning Guidance does not rank the scenarios by the probability  of their occurrence. In 1998, we reported that the services were using the  warfighting scenario that supported additional requirements for specific  munitions. In addition, the requirement for a specific Army munition was  inflated partly because the Army disregarded the Defense Planning  Guidance scenarios and instead used two scenarios it had developed  independently. Consequently, the requirement for the munition was tripled  and the Army’s justification for the requirement was inconsistent with the  Commanders in Chief’s objectives and the Army’s doctrine.
To ensure that the services plan for the most likely scenario in the Defense  Planning Guidance and not use unlikely events to support certain  munitions, the Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements working group  requested that the Defense Intelligence Agency develop probability factors  for the various warfighting scenarios. While the Defense Intelligence  Agency has developed these factors, at the time of our review, the  Department was still debating whether to prioritize the scenarios.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The Department is working to ensure that the requirements determination  process results in accurate numbers and types of munitions necessary to  defeat threats as specified in the Defense Planning Guidance. While the  Department has made progress and has identified specific areas still  requiring attention, there is no clear plan with time frames for resolving  key issues. Some of these issues have only been partially completed and  others are in the early stages of evolution. Specifically, target templates  have not been completed and munitions effectiveness data has not been  updated, nor have decisions been made regarding more detailed  warfighting scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Consequently, the  reliability of the services’ munitions requirements remain uncertain and  could adversely affect munitions planning, programming, budgeting, and  industrial production base decisions. Until these issues are resolved and a  revised Capabilities-Based Management Requirements instruction is  issued, the accuracy of the munitions requirements will remain uncertain.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that additional actions are taken to improve the munitions  requirements determination process we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics to take the lead in establishing a plan for resolving  outstanding issues. Such a plan should include time frames for resolving  the outstanding issues, metrics for measuring progress, and milestones for  implementing the proposed changes. Specific areas needing attention  include    completing target templates,    publishing the updated munitions effectiveness data,  resolving the issues involving the level of detail to include in the Defense  Planning Guidance and whether to attach probability data to the  warfighting scenarios,  incorporating all improvements to the munitions requirement process in a  revised Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements instruction, and    establishing a time frame for reassessing munitions requirements once all  improvements have been implemented.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Director of Strategic and Tactical Systems in the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics provided  written comments to our report, which are included in appendix III. The  Department concurred with the report and outlined actions underway  addressing all aspects of the report’s recommendations such as resolving  the issues involving the level of detail to include in the Defense Planning  Guidance and whether to attach probability data to the warfighting  scenarios, incorporating all improvements to the munitions requirement  process in a revised Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements  instruction, and establishing a time frame for reassessing munitions  requirements once all improvements have been made. The Department  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the  Acting Secretary of the Army, Joseph W. Westphal; the Acting Secretary of  the Air Force, Lawrence J. Delaney; the Acting Secretary of the Navy,  Robert B. Pirie, Jr.; the Director, Office and Management and Budget,  Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,  Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson.
Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff has any questions  concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which actions have been taken to improve the  munition requirements determination process, we reviewed the  Department’s Instruction 3000.4, Capabilities-Based Munitions  Requirements to ascertain roles and oversight responsibilities and to  identify required inputs into the process. We reviewed the Defense  Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000-2005 and the update for fiscal  years 2001-2005 to determine what instruction the Department provided to  guide the services as they determine their munition requirements. To  identify factors that affect the accuracy of the requirements determination  process, we reviewed 20 Department of Defense Inspector General and  GAO reports relating to the Department’s munitions requirements  determination process. We also reviewed the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council memorandums to determine the focus of the Joint  Staff’s study on the impact of small-scale contingency operations on  inventories of specific munitions. We met with service officials to  determine how each service develops its munition requirements and  obtained data on the assumptions and inputs that go into its simulation  models. We also obtained information on how each service reviews the  outcome of its munitions requirement process. In addition, we obtained  information on the Commanders in Chief’s Operating Plan, Integrated  Priority List, and other planning data necessary to assist the services with  their requirements planning.
To address those areas needing additional action, we met with Department  and service officials to obtain their views on the impact of how the  unresolved issues could affect the accuracy of the requirements  determination process. In addition, we obtained documentation pertaining  to the areas still needing action. We met with senior officials and  performed work at the Offices of Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.;  the Joint Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.; and the Defense Intelligence  Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. We also interviewed  senior officials from Army Combat Support War Reserve Branch,  Washington D.C.; Navy Requirements Planning, Naval Air Acquisition  Program, and Naval Surface Fire Support, Washington, D.C.; Air Force  Munitions Requirements Weapons Division, Crystal City, Virginia; U.S.  Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii; U.S. Central Command, McDill Air  Force Base, Tampa, Florida; and U.S. Force Korea, Seoul, Korea. We  performed our review from December 1999 through November 2000 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General and General Accounting Office Reports
paragraphs: Summary of the DOD Process for Developing Quantitative Munitions  Requirements, Department of Defense Inspector General, Feb. 24, 2000.
Air Force Munitions Requirements, Department of Defense Inspector  General, Sept. 3, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor  Weapon Acquisitions (GAO/NSIAD-99-105, July 22, 1999).
U. S. Special Operations Command Munitions Requirements,  Department of Defense Inspector General, May 10, 1999.
Marine Corps Quantitative Munitions Requirements Process,  Department of Defense Inspector General, Dec. 10, 1998.
Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to be Reassessed  (GAO/NSIAD-99-32, Dec. 9, 1998).
Navy Quantitative Requirements for Munitions, Department of Defense  Inspector General, Dec. 3, 1998.
Army Quantitative Requirements for Munitions, Department of Defense  Inspector General, June 26, 1998.
Management Oversight of the Capabilities-Based Munitions  Requirements Process, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 22,  1998.
Threat Distributions for Requirements Planning at U.S. Central  Command and U.S. Forces Korea, Department of Defense Inspector  General, May 20, 1998.
Army’s and Marine Corps’ Quantitative Requirements for Blocks I and  II Stinger Missiles, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 25,  1996.
U.S. Combat Air Power – Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction  Capabilities Could Save Billions, Department of Defense Inspector  General, May 13, 1996.
Summary Report on the Audits of the Anti-Armor Weapon System and  Associated Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General,  June 29, 1995.
Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory,  Production, and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 23, 1995).
Acquisition Objectives for Antisubmarine Munitions and Requirements  for Shallow Water Oceanography, Department of Defense Inspector  General, May 15, 1995.
Army’s Processes for Determining Quantitative Requirements for   Anti-Armor Systems and Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector  General, March 29, 1995.
The Marine Corps’ Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements  for Anti-Armor Munitions for Ground Forces, Department of Defense  Inspector General, Oct. 24, 1994.
The Navy’s Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for  Anti-Armor Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General,   Oct. 11, 1994.
The Air Force’s Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for  Anti-Armor Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General,  June 17, 1994.
Coordination of Quantitative Requirements for Anti-Armor Munitions,  Department of Defense Inspector General, June 14, 1994.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgment
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Patricia Sari-Spear made key  contributions to this report.