Information Technology: FBI Has Largely Staffed Key Modernization Program, but Strategic Approach to Managing Program's Human Capital Is Needed
Published: 2006-10-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently began a 6-year, $425 million program called Sentinel to replace and expand on both its failed Virtual Case File (VCF) project and its antiquated, paper-based, legacy system for supporting mission-critical intelligence analysis and investigative case management activities. Because of the FBI's experience with VCF and the importance of Sentinel, GAO was requested to address a number of program management issues associated with acquiring Sentinel via a prime development contractor. This report focuses on one of these issues: whether the FBI is adequately providing for the program's human capital needs. The findings are based on GAO's review of relevant program documentation, interviews with program officials, and human capital management guidance.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To its credit, the FBI has moved quickly to staff its Sentinel program office. During the last year, it created a staffing plan for Sentinel, which defines the positions needed for the program, and it has filled most of the positions in the plan, primarily by using contract staff (77 percent). However, a few key program management positions remain to be filled. More importantly, the Sentinel staffing plan addresses only the program office's immediate staffing needs. It does not provide for the kind of strategic human capital management focus that GAO's research and evaluations have shown to be essential to the success of any organizational entity. For example, the staffing plan was not derived using a documented, data-driven methodology and does not provide for inventorying the knowledge and skills of existing staff, forecasting future knowledge and skill needs, analyzing gaps in capabilities between the existing staff and future workforce needs, (including consideration of expected succession needs), and formulating strategies for filling expected gaps. Exacerbating this situation is that the FBI is not proactively managing Sentinel human capital availability as a program risk; it has not included human capital in the program's risk inventory nor has it developed and implemented a proactive risk mitigation strategy, even though program documents cite human capital as both a challenge and a risk. According to program officials, they plan to manage their human capital needs in the same way as when they initially staffed the program office, in part because the bureau's IT system life cycle management policies and procedures do not require them to do otherwise. Unless the FBI adopts a more strategic approach to managing human capital for the Sentinel program and treats human capital as a program risk, the chances of delivering required intelligence and investigative support capabilities in a timely and cost-effective manner are reduced.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In early 2005, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began Sentinel, an  estimated 6-year, $425 million program to acquire and deploy an  information technology (IT) system to replace and expand on both its  failed Virtual Case File (VCF) project and its antiquated, paper-based,  legacy system for supporting mission-critical intelligence analysis and  investigative case management activities. Among the reasons we and  others have cited for VCF’s failure were the limitations in the project’s  human capital capabilities, including the lack of continuity in key positions  and shortfalls in requisite program management knowledge, skills, and  abilities.
Because of the FBI’s experience with VCF and the importance of Sentinel  to the bureau’s mission operations, you asked us to address a number of  Sentinel acquisition management issues. As agreed with your offices, we  are reporting first on whether the FBI is adequately providing for the  program’s human capital needs. To address this objective, we reviewed  FBI policies and procedures, program plans, current staffing profiles, and  we interviewed appropriate program officials. Details on our objective,  scope, and methodology are included in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The FBI serves as the primary investigative unit of the Department of  Justice. The FBI’s mission responsibilities include investigating serious  federal crimes, protecting the nation from foreign intelligence and terrorist  threats, and assisting other law enforcement agencies. Approximately  12,500 special agents and 18,000 analysts and mission support personnel  are located in the bureau’s Washington, D.C., headquarters and in more  than 450 offices in the United States and more than 50 offices in foreign  countries. Mission responsibilities at the bureau are divided among the  following five major organizational components:  Intelligence: Collects and analyzes information on evolving threats to the  United States and ensures its dissemination within the FBI, to law  enforcement, and to the U.S. intelligence community.
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence: identifies, assesses,  investigates, and responds to national security threats.
Criminal Investigations: Investigates serious federal crimes, including  those associated with organized crime, violent offenses, white-collar  crime, government and business corruption, and civil rights infractions.  Probes federal statutory violations involving exploitation of the Internet  and computer systems for criminal, foreign intelligence, and terrorism  purposes.
Law Enforcement: provides law enforcement information and forensic  services to federal, state, local, and international agencies.
Administration: manages the bureau’s personnel programs, budgetary and  financial services, records, information resources, and information  security.
subsections: section_title: Information Technology Is Instrumental to FBI Mission Operations
paragraphs: To execute its mission responsibilities, the FBI relies on IT, and this  reliance has continued to grow. The bureau operates and maintains  hundreds of computerized systems, networks, databases, and applications,  such as:  the Combined DNA Index System, which supports forensic examinations; the National Crime Information Center and the Integrated Automated  Fingerprint Identification System, which helps state and local law  enforcement agencies identify criminals; the Automated Case Management System (ACS), which manages  information collected on investigative cases; the Investigative Data Warehouse, which aggregates data in a standard  format from disparate databases to facilitate content management and  data mining; and the Terrorist Screening Database, which consolidates identification  information about known or suspected international and domestic  terrorists.
Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001,  the FBI shifted its mission focus to detecting and preventing future  attacks, which ultimately led to the FBI’s commitment to reorganize and  transform. According to the bureau, the complexity of this mission shift,  along with the changing law enforcement environment, strained its  existing IT environment. As a result, the bureau accelerated the IT  modernization program that it began in September 2000. This program,  later named Trilogy, was the FBI’s largest IT initiative to date, and  consisted of three parts: (1) the Information Presentation Component to  upgrade FBI’s computer hardware and system software, (2) the  Transportation Network Component to upgrade FBI’s communication  network, and (3) the User Application Component to upgrade and  consolidate FBI’s five key investigative software applications. The heart of  this last component became the Virtual Case File (VCF) system, which was  intended to replace the obsolete Automated Case Support system, FBI’s  primary investigative application.
While the first two components of Trilogy experienced cost overruns and  schedule delays, both are nevertheless currently still operating. However,  VCF never became fully operational. In fact, the FBI terminated the  project after Trilogy’s overall costs grew from $380 million to $537 million,  the program fell behind schedule, and pilot testing showed that  completion of VCF was infeasible and cost prohibitive. Among reasons we  and others cited for VCF’s failure were poorly defined system  requirements, ineffective requirements change control, limited contractor  oversight, and human capital shortfalls due to, for example, no continuity  in certain management positions and a lack of trained staff for key  program positions.
The FBI reports that it has almost 500 systems, applications, databases,  and networks that are in operation, undergoing enhancement, or being  developed or acquired. In particular, it has identified 18 new or  enhancement projects that support its intelligence, investigative, and  analyst activities. Included in these is the Sentinel program.
section_title: Sentinel: A Brief Description
paragraphs: The Sentinel program succeeds and expands VCF and is intended to meet  FBI’s pressing need for a modern, automated capability for investigative  case management and information sharing to help field agents and  intelligence analysts perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently.  The program’s key objectives are to: (1) successfully implement a system  that acts as a single point of entry for all investigative case management  and that provides paperless case management and workflow capabilities,  (2) facilitate a bureau-wide organizational change management program,  and (3) provide intuitive interfaces that feature data relevant to individual  users. Using commercially available software and hardware components,  Sentinel is planned to provide a range of system capabilities and services,  including:  investigative case management, leads management, and evidence  management;   document and records management, indexed searching, and electronic  links to legacy FBI systems and external data sources; training, statistical, and reporting tools; and   security and application management.
The FBI plans to acquire Sentinel in four phases, each of which will span  12 to 18 months. While the specific content of each phase is to be  proposed by and negotiated with the prime contractor, the general  content of each phase is as follows:    Phase 1: Includes a Web-based portal that will provide a data access tool  for ACS and other legacy systems and includes the definition of a service- oriented architecture to support delivery and sharing of common services  across the bureau.
Phase 2: Includes the creation of case document and records management  capabilities, document repositories, improved information assurance,  application workflow, and improved data labeling to enhance information  sharing.
Phase 3: Includes updating and enhancing system storage and search  capabilities.
Phase 4: Includes implementing a new case management system to replace  ACS.
Overall, the FBI estimates that the four phases will cost about $425 million  and take 6 years to complete. For fiscal year 2005, the FBI reprogrammed  $97 million in appropriated funds from various sources to fund Sentinel  work and submitted a $100 million budget estimate for fiscal year 2007.
To manage the acquisition and deployment of Sentinel, the FBI established  a program management office within the Office of the Chief Information  Officer. The program office is led by a program manager and consists of  the eight primary units described here (see fig. 1). Human capital decision  making is vested with the program manager (or deputy program manager  in his absence.)
Program Management Office Staff: General Counsel provides legal advice;  dedicated Contracting Officer manages program support and development  contracts on behalf of the Program Management Office; and office staff  manages day-to-day operations.
Communications and Liaison Team: Prepares communications for the user  community regarding Sentinel content and progress, media releases, and  program briefings for stakeholders through FBI channels. Also, prepares  information and reports for congressional stakeholders and testimony for  the Director, Deputy Attorney General, and Attorney General regarding the  program.
Organizational Change Management Team: Prepares user community for  adapting to new technology and associated work process changes and  cultural shifts and serves as the user community’s representative and  information conduit to the program office.
Business and Administrative Support Unit: Provides support and oversight  services, including support for human capital management, information  and physical security, budget and investment management, contract  support, audit, cost estimation, financial management, earned value  management, and property management.
Program Integration Unit: Prepares program baselines and plans, including  milestones, and tracks progress against them; also, documents baseline  changes. Manages the configuration management process, schedules  program reviews, and provides major reports and updates regarding the  program to bureau management and stakeholders.
System Development Unit: Focuses on system design and development  and related technical aspects of the program, such as design, development,  and testing to ensure that technical solutions meet system and user  requirements. Performs technical analyses of new requirements and  changes to the enterprise architecture.
Transition Unit: Manages the phased roll-out of system capabilities,  including headquarters and field site preparation, user training, and  changeover in user support to the Operations and Maintenance Unit.
Operations and Maintenance Unit: Oversees and supports deployed system  capabilities.
To support the program office, the FBI has also issued task orders under  existing contracts for program management support and services.
section_title: Prior Assessments of FBI’s IT Human Capital Management Have Raised Concerns
paragraphs: In 2005, we testified that the FBI’s efforts to establish a strategic approach  to managing its IT human capital remained a work in progress, and that  completing these efforts posed a significant challenge for the bureau. In  addition, we reported that the CIO had yet to create a strategic approach  to managing IT human capital. As we said at that time, such an approach  includes an assessment of the core competencies and essential knowledge,  skills, and abilities needed to perform key IT functions, as well as an  inventory of existing workforce capabilities and a gap analysis between  defined needs and existing capabilities. The approach also provides for  defining strategies and actions for filling identified gaps, such as the  appropriate mix of hiring, training, and contract activities. It also  establishes performance and accountability mechanisms, such as time  frames, resources, roles and responsibilities, and performance measures  associated with executing the strategies and actions.
In September 2005, the National Academy of Public Administration  reported that the bureau had developed a strategic human capital plan  and had initiatives under way to improve its human capital system.  However, it also reported that the bureau’s programs, activities, and  actions were unlikely to produce a successful human capital program.  Specifically, human capital improvement efforts were not carried out in a  systematic, coordinated, and strategic manner; human capital management  responsibility and authority were shared among different individuals;  implementation of initiatives that involved contractors was not effectively  coordinated; and implementation of plans and decisions was not always  sustained. The Academy concluded that the bureau is likely to miss its  staffing targets, due in part to insufficient workforce planning.
section_title: Sentinel Short-Term Staffing Needs Largely Met, but Strategic Approach to Managing Program Human Capital Needs Is Lacking
paragraphs: To its credit, the FBI has moved quickly to staff its Sentinel program  office, following what the Sentinel program manager describes as a  meticulous series of actions to determine staffing needs, develop position  descriptions, review resumes and reassess program needs. During the last  year, it has also filled most of the positions in the plan primarily by using  contractors. Nevertheless, a few key positions remain unfilled. Moreover,  the staffing plan addressed only the program’s immediate staffing needs; it  does not provide for the kind of strategic human capital planning and  management that our research has shown to be critical to the success of  any organization, such as inventorying the knowledge and skills of existing  staff, forecasting knowledge and skill needs over the life of the program,  and formulating explicit strategies for filling gaps. Exacerbating this lack  of a strategic approach to human capital management is that the program’s  inventory of risks does not include human capital as a program risk, and  thus steps are not planned to proactively address these risks. Program  officials told us that they are satisfied with Sentinel workforce  management efforts, and, although challenges lie ahead, they are confident  that the FBI can address the program’s evolving human capital needs. In  contrast, other program documentation cites human capital as a program  challenge and risk. In our view, the FBI’s approach to managing human  capital in the Sentinel program is reactive and introduces the risk of not  having skilled personnel available. A more proactive approach would  increase the bureau’s ability to deliver Sentinel’s needed functionality and  promised mission benefits on time and within budget.
subsections: section_title: FBI Has Leveraged Contractors to Quickly Meet Most of Its Short- Term Sentinel Staffing Needs but Several Key Positions Are Unfilled
paragraphs: To its credit, the FBI has moved quickly to staff its Sentinel program  office. During the last year, it created a staffing plan for Sentinel that is to  serve as the program’s primary human capital planning document.  Basically, this staffing plan defines the program’s immediate workforce  requirements and identifies key program functions, positions, skills, and  staffing levels that the FBI says it currently needs to begin executing the  program. The staffing plan is intended to be a “living” document, meaning  that the FBI intends to update it as required to reflect significant changes  in the program office’s roles and responsibilities and staffing needs  throughout the life of the program. These officials also stated that they  developed the plan with the assistance of a contractor, and that it reflects  their meticulous efforts to analyze staffing needs (skills and levels),  develop position descriptions, review resumes, and reassess program  needs. Further, they said that it is based on more than 100 years of  combined program management experience and knowledge and that these  efforts complied with bureau policies and procedures.
Using the plan, program officials told us that they collaborated with the  FBI Human Capital Office to fill defined positions with transfers from  other FBI units and other federal agencies, and by hiring from outside the  government. In doing so, the officials said that their approach was to fill  program leadership positions with government staff and to fill the rest  with government and contractor staff. Further, FBI officials said that they  had initially focused on positions associated with near-term program  management activities, such as program planning, requirements  management, and contract solicitation and award. For government  positions, program officials received support from the Human Capital  Office in posting job announcements and processing applications. The  program officials worked directly with existing contractors to fill contract  positions. According to officials, they were able to address their initial  staffing needs quickly because of the priority the Sentinel Program  Manager, who is directly responsible for human capital decisions, devoted  to recruitment and staffing efforts during the program’s planning stages,  the availability of the FBI’s Human Capital Office to assist them, and the  ability to draw from existing contract vehicles.
Of the program’s 78 positions, 60 are to be filled by contractors (77  percent). This level of reliance on contractors for program management is  appreciably higher than it was for another major IT program that we  recently reviewed . For example, the ratio of government-to-contractor  staffing on the Department of Homeland Security’s US VISIT program was  about 50-50. According to Sentinel officials, their reliance on contractors  for program management is a common practice in intelligence programs.  While we are not aware of any generally accepted standards governing the  desired mix of government versus contractor personnel performing  program management functions, acquisition experts have recently raised  over-reliance on contractors in performing program management  functions as an emerging issue in the federal government.
To date, the program office reports that it has filled 63 of 78 identified  positions (81 percent). According to program officials, they are actively  recruiting 5 of the 15 unfilled positions and plan to hire the remaining 10 in  later phases of the program, when the need for these positions becomes  more relevant. Among the 15 vacancies is the lead test engineer position,  which is important for ensuring the testability of defined system  requirements early in the program. According to program officials, the  unfilled positions have had no negative impact on the program’s schedule  or deliveries to date. (See fig. 2 for a complete list of the program office’s  positions, including those still unfilled.)
section_title: FBI Has Not Adopted a Strategic Approach for Managing Sentinel’s Human Capital
paragraphs: The success of any IT program depends on effectively leveraging people,  processes, and tools to achieve defined outcomes and results. To  effectively leverage people, they must be treated as strategic assets. As we  previously reported, a strategic approach to human capital management  enables an organization to be aware of and prepared for its current and  future human capital needs, such as workforce size, knowledge, skills, and  training. To be effective, our research shows that such a strategic  approach includes using data-driven, fact-based methods to (1) assess the  knowledge and skills needed to execute a program; (2) inventory existing  staff knowledge and skills; (3) forecast the knowledge and skills needed  over time; (4) analyze the gaps in capabilities between the existing staff  and future workforce needs, including consideration of evolving program  and succession needs caused by turnover and retirement; and (5)  formulate strategies for filling expected gaps, including training, additional  hiring, and the appropriate use of contractors. (See fig. 3 for an overview  of this process). Through effective human capital management,  organizations can effectively mitigate the serious risks associated with not  having highly qualified employees.
The Sentinel program has yet to determine and follow such a strategic  approach to managing its human capital needs. In particular, in addressing  its near-term staffing needs, FBI officials did not use a documented, fact- based, data-driven methodology to assess needs and existing capabilities,  nor did it perform a gap analysis of the number of staff required and the  specific skills and abilities needed to develop, maintain, and implement  Sentinel. As previously stated, officials told us that they relied on their  collective years of experience in managing IT projects and the assistance  of a contractor to create the staffing plan, and that they reviewed resumes  of candidates to fill the positions in the staffing plan. These efforts have  not produced program life cycle strategies for retention of key staff,  succession planning for key positions, long-term hiring of new staff,  replenishment of workforce losses due to foreseeable attrition, or training  of existing staff. The staffing plan also fails to specify the desired mix of  government and contractor staff for the program.
As we reported in 2005, the Chief Information Officer planned, at that  time, to hire a contractor with human capital expertise to help identify  gaps between existing skills and abilities and those needed to successfully  modernize the bureau’s entire IT organization. In commenting on a draft of  this report, the CIO stated that, in July 2005, he began a three-phase  strategic human capital planning initiative, the purpose of which is to  provide the CIO with the means to meet the bureau’s IT human capital  needs for the 21st century. The three phases are (1) development of a  competency model and an inventory of existing staff knowledge and skills,  (2) an analysis of gaps between staff needs and existing capabilities, and  (3) development and implementation of strategies to fill critical gaps. The  FBI reports that they are close to completing the first phase, but that much  work remains to be done. At the same time, the Sentinel program is well  under way. Moreover, while the CIO stated that the Sentinel staffing plan  will dovetail with this three-phase initiative, program officials told us that  it was not clear to them how, or whether, the program’s staffing efforts  were aligned with or part of other human capital efforts under way at the  bureau.
Nevertheless, program officials told us that they do not see a need to  change their approach to managing Sentinel human capital because they  believe that the approach used to initially staff-up the program office had  served them well. Officials told us they will reassess their human capital  needs for future phases of the project to ensure the right complement of  staff and skills mix is available for each phase. In addition, they said that  the bureau’s life cycle management policies and procedures do not require  such a strategic approach to managing human capital for IT programs. Our  analysis of the bureau’s system life cycle management directive and  program management handbook confirmed that they do not contain  policies, procedures, or guidance for doing so. In our view, not addressing  Sentinel human capital more strategically and proactively increases the  risk of not delivering required system capabilities and expected mission  value on time and within budget.
section_title: FBI Is Not Treating Human Capital as a Program Risk for Sentinel
paragraphs: Risk management is a continuous, forward-looking process that is  intended either to prevent program cost, schedule, and performance  problems from occurring or to minimize the impact if problems do occur  by proactively identifying risks, implementing risk mitigation strategies,  and measuring and disclosing progress in doing so.
To its credit, the FBI has established a risk management process for  Sentinel that includes a risk management plan and an inventory of risks  that are to be proactively managed to mitigate the probability of their  occurring and their impacts if they do occur. However, this risk inventory  does not include any human capital-related risks. According to program  officials, the inventory does not include human capital risks because they  do not see a need to include them. Available Sentinel program  documentation and other statements by program officials, however,  suggest otherwise. For instance, the Sentinel staffing plan states that  adequate staffing is a critical factor in the program office’s ability to  successfully execute its responsibilities, and that staff recruitment will be  a difficult challenge given the competition for skilled IT professionals with  security clearances in the Washington Metropolitan Area. Moreover, the  FBI’s fiscal year 2007 budget submission for Sentinel (Exhibit 300)  identifies the availability of human capital for the prime contractor as a  program risk, and in commenting on a draft of this report, the CIO stated  that human capital risks exist. In addition, officials identified various  hiring challenges, such as that two-thirds of applicants fail the bureau’s  security screening process and that the time it takes to execute the hiring  process can be lengthy. Moreover, they said that they will face on-going  hiring issues due to attrition and staff rotations. For instance, several  contractor staff had recently left the program—although the CIO said that  this was normal attrition—and the bureau filled the positions within 30  days. Also, 4 of the program office’s 19 government staff are on temporary  duty and will rotate to other tours of duty, including the program manager,  whose 2-year detail at the FBI expires in 2007 (although the possibility  exists for a one-year extension).
In our view, not identifying human capital as a program risk and managing  it as such on a major IT program like Sentinel increases the chances that  promised system capabilities and benefits will not be delivered on time  and within budget.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The success of any IT program depends on effectively leveraging people,  processes, and tools to achieve defined outcomes and results. To  effectively leverage people, they must be treated as strategic assets and  managed as such. Notwithstanding the FBI’s considerable efforts to  quickly staff-up the Sentinel program office, it has not adopted the kind of  strategic management approach needed to effectively leverage Sentinel  human capital throughout the life of the program, in part because the FBI’s  IT program management policies and procedures do not require it.  Moreover, the program’s risk management inventory does not include the  availability of Sentinel human capital, and thus it is not recognized and  managed as a serious program risk. Given the pressing need to deliver  mission-critical investigative and intelligence IT support to FBI agents and  analysts and the importance of strategic human capital management to  programs like Sentinel, it is essential that this program risk be proactively  mitigated. Unless the FBI adopts a more strategic and proactive approach  to managing Sentinel human capital and treats it as a program risk, the  chances of the program delivering required intelligence and investigative  capabilities and mission value in a timely and cost effective manner are  diminished.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen the FBI’s management of its Sentinel program and to better  ensure that the program delivers required capabilities and expected  benefits on time and within budget, we make the following two  recommendations:    The FBI Director should have the bureau’s CIO establish IT program  management policies and procedures for strategically managing IT  programs’ human capital needs and ensure that these policies and  procedures are fully implemented on all major IT programs, including  Sentinel.
The FBI Director should have the CIO treat and manage both Sentinel  program office and prime contractor human capital availability as program  risks and periodically report to the Director on the status and results of  efforts to mitigate these risks.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report signed by the CIO and  reprinted in appendix II, the FBI agreed with our recommendations and  stated that while progress has been made to lay a foundation for improved  IT human capital management across the bureau, much work remains. In  this regard, the FBI described steps completed, under way, and planned  relative to managing human capital on the Sentinel program and across the  FBI IT organization. For instance, the FBI stated that the CIO’s office  invested 3 months in developing a staffing plan for Sentinel that analyzed  staffing needs in light of lessons learned from other IT projects, analyzed  resumes of both government and contactor staff, and used contractor staff  until government staff could replace them. In addition, FBI stated that it  has initiated Project Management Professional certification and training  efforts and begun a strategic human capital planning initiative that is to  provide a repeatable and strategic approach to managing IT human capital  resources across its IT organization. We support these steps as they are  consistent with our findings and recommendations. The bureau also  provided other technical comments and updated information, which we  have incorporated, as appropriate, in the report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of  the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Ranking Minority  Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as well  as to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate  Committee on the Judiciary, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on  Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and  Related Agencies, and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House  Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments  of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies. We are also  sending copies to the Attorney General; the Director, FBI; the Director,  Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. In  addition, the report will also be available without charge on GAO’s Web  site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you have any questions about matters discussed in this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-3439 or by e-mail at hiter@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs Office  may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this  report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objective was to determine whether the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) has adequately provided for the human capital needs  of its Sentinel program. To address our objective, we focused on three  areas: FBI’s efforts to date in staffing the Sentinel program office, the  bureau’s plans to address gaps between the program’s human capital  needs and existing FBI capabilities, and the extent to which FBI is  proactively treating and managing human capital as a program risk.
To evaluate whether the FBI is adequately providing for the Sentinel  program’s human capital needs, we compared the bureau’s efforts against  relevant criteria and best practices, including our own framework for  strategic human capital management. These criteria promote the use of  data to determine key performance objectives and goals in identifying  current and future human capital needs, including the appropriate number  of employees, the key competencies and skills mix for mission  accomplishment, and the appropriate deployment of staff across the  organization. They also advocate strategies for identifying and filling  human capital gaps and performing succession planning, as well as being  the basis for efforts intended to mitigate human capital-related program  risks.
To accomplish these steps, we requested key staffing-related documents  from the FBI, including (1) the organization chart for the Sentinel program  office, including filled positions and vacancies and the source of the  resources filling those positions (i.e., internal FBI, contractors, outside  hires); (2) FBI’s assessment of workforce needs—including positions,  roles and responsibilities, and core competencies—to adequately perform  system acquisition activities (i.e., configuration management,  organizational change management, risk management, contractor tracking  and oversight, and solicitation); (3) a current skills inventory and  identification of gaps and shortfalls in human capital available to meet  workforce needs and plans to address these shortfalls; and (4) FBI’s  inventory of program risks, including risks associated with human capital  or workforce planning. In addition, we reviewed the number and mix of  contractor and government positions needed to staff the Sentinel program  office and analyzed where the FBI stands in filling these positions. We  reviewed the evidence provided, including FBI’s Life Cycle Management  Directive Version 3.0 and the FBI Project Management Handbook Version  1.0, and compared it to our criteria to determine if the bureau’s plans and  efforts to date comport with best practices and relevant guidance. Further,  and in order to verify our analyses, we interviewed appropriate FBI  officials and Sentinel program office personnel.
We performed our work at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., from  September 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following people made key  contributions to this report: Paula Moore, Assistant Director; JC Ceaser;  Neil Doherty; Nancy Glover; Dan Gordon; Kevin Walsh; and Kim Zelonis.