Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed to Shape Army's Combat Systems for the Future
Published: 2009-03-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Future Combat System (FCS) program is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. By law, GAO is to report annually on the FCS program. Also, law requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to hold a milestone review of the FCS program, now planned for 2009. This report addresses (1) what knowledge will likely be available in key areas for the review, and (2) the challenges that lie ahead following the review. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analysis, attended demonstrations and design reviews, and interviewed DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army will be challenged to demonstrate the knowledge needed to warrant an unqualified commitment to the FCS program at the 2009 milestone review. While the Army has made progress, knowledge deficiencies remain in key areas. Specifically, all critical technologies are not currently at a minimum acceptable level of maturity. Neither has it been demonstrated that emerging FCS system designs can meet specific requirements or mitigate associated technical risks. Actual demonstrations of FCS hardware and software--versus modeling and simulation results--have been limited, with only small scale warfighting concepts and limited prototypes demonstrated. Network performance is also largely unproven. These deficiencies do not necessarily represent problems that could have been avoided; rather, they reflect the actual immaturity of the program. Finally, there is an existing tension between program costs and available funds that seems only likely to worsen, as FCS costs are likely to increase at the same time as competition for funds intensifies between near- and far-term needs in DOD and between DOD and other federal agencies. DOD could have at least three programmatic directions to consider for shaping investments in future capabilities, each of which presents challenges. First, the current FCS acquisition strategy is unlikely to be executed within the current $159 billion cost estimate and calls for significant production commitments before designs are demonstrated. To date, FCS has spent about 60 percent of its development funds, even though the most expensive activities remain to be done before the production decision. In February 2010, Congress will be asked to begin advancing procurement funds for FCS core systems before most prototype deliveries, critical design review, and key system tests have taken place. By the 2013 production decision, Congress will have been asked for over $50 billion in funding for FCS. Second, the program to spin out early FCS capabilities to current forces operates on an aggressive schedule centered on a 2009 demonstration that will employ some surrogate systems and preliminary designs instead of fully developed items, with little time for evaluation of results. Third, the Army is currently considering an incremental FCS strategy--this is to develop and field capabilities in stages versus in one step. Such an approach is generally preferable, but would present decision makers with a third major change in FCS strategy to consider anew. While details are yet unavailable, it is important that each increment be justified by itself and not be dependent on future increments.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Future Combat System (FCS) program—which comprises 14  integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network needed  for a brigade combat team—is the centerpiece of the Army’s efforts to  transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force and  according to the Army, the greatest technology and integration challenge it  has ever undertaken. The Army seeks to develop and then integrate  dozens of new technologies in the FCS program and ultimately create a  force in which people, platforms, weapons and sensors are linked  seamlessly together in a system-of-systems.
The Army started the FCS program in May 2003 without having fully  defined the individual systems, their functions, or how they would  interact. The Army moved ahead without determining whether the concept  could be successfully developed with existing resources—without proven  technologies, a stable design, and available funding and time. The Army  currently projects the program will cost $159 billion, although the Army  has indicated that cost increases are likely. The program is also using a  unique partner-like arrangement with a lead system integrator (LSI), the  Boeing Company, to manage and produce the FCS. For these and other  reasons, the program is recognized as being high risk and in need of  special oversight. Accordingly, in 2006, Congress mandated that the  Department of Defense (DOD) hold a milestone review (also called go/no- go review) following the FCS preliminary design review, which is now  tentatively scheduled for May 2009. Congress directed that the review  include an assessment of whether (1) the needs are valid and can best be  met with the FCS concept, (2) the FCS program can be developed and  produced within existing resources, and (3) the program should continue  as currently structured, be restructured, or be terminated. Congress  required the Secretary of Defense to review and report on specific aspects  of the program, including the maturity of critical technologies, program  risks, demonstrations of the FCS concept and software, and a cost  estimate and affordability assessment.
Given the cost, scope, and technical challenges, section 211 of the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires GAO to report  annually on the FCS program. The objectives of this report are to  determine (1) to what extent knowledge will likely be available to DOD,  the Army, and the Congress in the key areas of technology, design,  demonstrations, network performance, and cost and affordability to  support the 2009 milestone review and (2) the challenges that a program  (or programs) to furnish the Army with future capabilities will face  following the milestone review.
In conducting our work, we reviewed documents pertaining to the FCS  program, including the Operational Requirements Document, the  Acquisition Strategy Report, technology assessments, and modeling and  simulation results; attended meetings at which DOD and Army officials  reviewed program progress; and held discussions with key DOD and Army  officials on various aspects of the program. Officials from DOD and the  Army have provided us access to sufficient information to make informed  judgments on the matters in this report. In addition, we drew from our  body of past work on weapon system acquisition practices and conducted  our own analyses in key areas such as cost and technology. We conducted  this performance audit from March 2008 to March 2009 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. Appendix I further discusses our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army’s Future Force, which  is intended to transform the Army into a more rapidly deployable and  responsive force that differs substantially from the large division-centric  structure of the past. The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and  will employ revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new  technology. The Army envisions a new way of fighting that depends on  networking the force, which involves linking people, platforms, weapons,  and sensors seamlessly together in a system-of-systems. If successful, the  FCS system-of-systems concept would integrate individual capabilities of  weapons and platforms, thus facilitating interoperability and open system  designs. This concept would represent a significant improvement over the  traditional approach of building superior individual weapons that must be  retrofitted and netted together after the fact.
The Army is reorganizing its current forces into modular brigade combat  teams, each of which is expected to be highly survivable and the most  lethal brigade-sized unit the Army has ever fielded. The Army expects FCS- equipped brigade combat teams to provide significant warfighting  capabilities to DOD’s overall joint military operations. The Army is  implementing its transformation plans at a time when current U.S. ground  forces continue to play a critical role in ongoing conflicts in Iraq and  Afghanistan. The Army has instituted plans to spin out selected FCS  technologies and systems to current Army forces throughout the  program’s system development and demonstration phase.
FCS is to be composed of advanced, networked air and ground-based  combat and maneuver sustainment systems, unmanned ground and air  vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. (See fig. 1.) The soldier is  the centerpiece of the system-of-systems architecture and is networked  with 14 FCS core systems and numerous other enabling systems referred  to as complementary programs. FCS is expected to be networked via a  command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance architecture, including networked communications,  network operations, sensors, battle command systems, training, and both  manned and unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities that  will enable improved situational understanding and operations at a level of  synchronization heretofore unachievable. With that, FCS brigade combat  teams are expected to be able to execute a new tactical paradigm based on  the quality of firsts—the capability to see first, understand first, act first,  and finish decisively. Fundamentally, the FCS concept is to replace mass  with superior information—allowing the soldier to see and hit the enemy  first rather that to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit.
The Army is using a management approach for FCS that centers on an LSI  to provide significant management services to help the Army define and  develop FCS and reach across traditional Army mission areas. Because of  its partner-like relationship with the Army, the LSI’s responsibilities  include requirements development, design, and selection of major system  and subsystem contractors. The team of Boeing and its subcontractor,  Science Applications International Corporation, is the LSI for the FCS  system development and demonstration phase of acquisition, which is  expected to extend until 2017. The FCS LSI is expected to act on behalf of  the Army to optimize the FCS capability, maximize competition, ensure  interoperability, and maintain commonality in order to reduce life-cycle  costs, and for overall integration of the information network. Boeing also  acts as an FCS supplier in that it is responsible for developing two  important software subsystems. Army officials have stated they did not  believe the Army had the resources or flexibility to use its traditional  acquisition process to field a program as complex as FCS under the  aggressive timeline established by the then-Army Chief of Staff. The Army  will maintain oversight and final approval of the LSI’s subcontracting and  competition plans.
subsections: section_title: Legislative Requirements for FCS Milestone Review
paragraphs: The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007  mandated that the Secretary of Defense carry out a Defense Acquisition  Board milestone review of FCS not later than 120 days after the system-of- systems preliminary design review, which is now tentatively scheduled for  May 2009. The legislation is consistent with our 2006 report on FCS  wherein we recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish a  Defense Acquisition Board milestone review following the Army’s design  review. Moreover, we recommended that this should be a go/no-go review  of the FCS program based on its ability to meet knowledge markers  consistent with DOD acquisition policy and best practices and  demonstrate the availability of funds necessary to meet program costs.  According to the law, DOD’s 2009 milestone review of FCS should include  an assessment for each of the following:  (1) whether the warfighter’s needs are valid and can be best met with  the concept of the program;  (2) whether the concept of the program can be developed and  produced within existing resources; and  (3) whether the program should  (a) continue as currently structured;  (b) continue in restructured form; or  (c)  be terminated.
Furthermore, the Congress stipulated that the Secretary make specific  determinations when making the assessment concerning the future course  of the FCS program. The original language contained six criteria the  Secretary was to use when answering the three assessment questions. In  our 2008 report on the FCS program, we recommended that the Secretary  establish objective and quantitative criteria that the FCS program will have  to meet in order to justify its continuation and gain approval for the  remainder of the acquisition strategy. Subsequently, the Duncan Hunter  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 amended and  expanded the existing requirements and added four new criteria. These  changes expand the scope of supporting information the Congress  mandated to be included with the DOD milestone review report.  For example, the 2009 Act requires the Secretary, when making his  assessment of the program, to determine whether actual demonstrations,  rather than simulations, have shown that the software for the program is  on path to achieve threshold requirements on cost and schedule. Appendix  III contains the legislative requirements for the 2009 milestone review. For  the purposes of our analysis, we aggregated the congressional criteria into  four key areas: technology maturity, requirements/design, demonstrations  (FCS concept and network), and cost.
In 2008, we found that the progress made by FCS, in terms of knowledge  gained, was commensurate with a program in early development but was  well short of a program halfway through its development schedule and its  budget. In view of these findings, we recommended, in part, that the  Secretary of Defense establish criteria that the FCS must meet in the 2009  milestone review in order to justify continuation along with identifying  viable alternatives to FCS.
In response to this recommendation, and to facilitate the Secretary’s  assessment of the status of FCS and to decide the program’s future, the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics  issued an acquisition decision memorandum in August 2008 to the  Secretary of the Army outlining the information the Army must provide.  The Under Secretary established criteria for supporting information in five  program areas: program execution, unmanned systems, manned ground  vehicles, network, and test/experimentation/demonstration. The Under  Secretary has established specific criteria within each of the five areas, as  shown in Appendix IV. For example, in the area of program execution, the  Army must demonstrate that the FCS, Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS),  and Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T) programs’  development, build, and test schedules are aligned and executable. The  Under Secretary’s memorandum also instructed the Army to mature its  acquisition approach to deliver initial increments of FCS capability to  infantry brigade combat teams rather than the originally planned heavy  brigades. For the FCS core program, the Under Secretary stated that the  Army shall pursue an incremental or block approach to acquiring FCS  capability.
Along with the mandated 2009 milestone review of FCS, the Congress has  required the DOD and the Army to perform analyses and report separately  on two core systems of the FCS system-of-systems. Specifically, the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration  is to report on an analysis of the FCS communications network and  software. This report, due not later than September 30, 2009, will include  assessments of issues such as network vulnerability to enemy attack,  electronic warfare, jamming, and adverse weather. (See app. V.)
section_title: Significant Knowledge Gaps Persist in Key Areas
paragraphs: Compared with the criteria to be used for the milestone review, the FCS  program has significant knowledge gaps. Specifically, the program has yet  to show that critical technologies are mature, design issues have been  resolved, requirements and resources are matched, performance has been  demonstrated versus simulated, and costs are affordable. The Army will be  challenged to convincingly demonstrate the knowledge necessary to  warrant an unqualified commitment to FCS at the 2009 milestone review.   Four of the critical technologies have not yet achieved minimally  acceptable maturity levels despite being in development for at least 6  years. The schedule to complete the remaining preliminary design reviews  is aggressive, and it seems clear from the results of the initial system-level  preliminary design reviews that numerous performance trade-offs will be  needed to close gaps between FCS requirements and designs. Actual  demonstrations (versus modeling and simulation) of the FCS concept,  including its critical survivability aspects, have been limited to date;  demonstrated network performance is particularly limited with many key  questions yet to be answered. Finally, FCS costs appear likely to increase  again at a time when available funds may decline.
subsections: section_title: Major Risks Remain in the Maturation of FCS Technologies
paragraphs: In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue,  DOD is required by congressional direction to make a determination of  whether each critical technology for the program is at least TRL 6. The  Army has struggled to attain this level of maturity, despite being a lower  standard than preferred by DOD policy and falling short of best practices.  At TRL 6, a representative model or prototype exists and is tested in a  relevant environment—a maturity level well beyond TRL 5 where the  technology demonstrates functionality in a laboratory environment but  does not have the physical form or fit of the finished product. Appendix VI  contains a complete listing and description of TRLs. Army technology  officials stated the purpose of TRL 6 demonstrations is to build confidence  the concept is technically feasible, and TRL 6 actually means extensive  testing remains before TRL 7 can be achieved. Maturing technologies to  TRL 7 (prototype possessing the form, fit, and function of the finished  product that is demonstrated in a realistic environment) prior to starting  product development is a best practice and a DOD policy preference.  Against these standards, all FCS technologies should have achieved TRL 7  as the program proceeded into the system development and  demonstration phase in May 2003. Even if the Army does demonstrate TRL  6 in 2009, extending technology development this late into the acquisition  process puts FCS at risk for experiencing problems that may require large  amounts of time and money to fix.
The Army anticipates that all the critical technologies will reach TRL 6 by  the milestone review, but this projection deserves closer examination and  perspective. The Army may be unable to demonstrate technology maturity  as quickly as it plans. Based on Army assessments from January 2009,  three of the 44 FCS critical technologies were rated TRL 7 and 37 were  rated TRL 6. The remaining technologies are expected to complete TRL 6  demonstrations prior to the system-of-systems preliminary design review,  but some of those scheduled demonstrations are slipping. Appendix VII  contains a list of all FCS critical technologies with their 2007 and 2008 TRL  ratings and Army projections for attaining TRL 6.
Thirteen of the technologies that the Army rated at TRL 6 are awaiting  validation from technology review authorities—independent teams  convened by the FCS program manager and from the Director, Defense  Research and Engineering. These reviews could actually downgrade  maturity levels if demonstration results do not support the Army’s TRL  designation. This occurred in 2007 with the mid-range munition’s terminal  guidance. In 2008, independent reviewers cautioned the Army about the  maturity levels of three technologies: (1) JTRS ground mobile radio, (2)  Mobile Ad-hoc Networking Protocols, and (3) Wideband Networking  Waveforms. According to Army officials, the Army had claimed these  technologies had demonstrated TRL 6; however, the independent  reviewers suggested the Army consider providing additional justification  to strengthen the case for a TRL 6. Consequently, it is not clear whether  independent reviewers will concur with the Army’s assertion that these  technologies have demonstrated TRL 6 maturity. Table 1 illustrates both  the actual progress the Army has made maturing FCS critical technologies  and projected progress through the production decision.
As we have shown in the past, accepting lower technology levels in  development frequently increases program schedule and cost. In the case  of FCS, the downgrade in TRLs is particularly troublesome because TRL 6  represents a significant development step over TRL 5. Army engineers  maintain that anything beyond TRL 6 is a system integration matter and  not necessarily technology development. Leading commercial firms treat  adapting the technologies to the space, weight, and power demands of  their intended environment—in essence, TRL 7—as part of technology  development. Even if one accepts the lower standard of TRL 6 at program  start, the integration of these technologies into systems and subsystems  should have taken place in the first half of development, which DOD refers  to as “system integration.” As a complex, networked system-of-systems,  FCS will have unprecedented integration issues. Yet, FCS system  integration will have to occur in the second half of development, where it  will compete for resources that are intended to be for demonstration of  the system.
As we have previously reported, advancing technologies to TRL 6 has been  especially challenging. The Army’s history of maturing FCS technologies  does not inspire confidence that it will be able to execute the optimistic  and challenging integration plans involved with advancing technologies to  a TRL 7 before the production decision in 2013.
Technologies critical to FCS survivability are illustrative of the program’s  technology maturity issues. FCS survivability involves a layered, network- centric approach that consists of detecting the enemy first to avoid being  fired upon; if fired upon, neutralizing the incoming munition before it hits  an FCS vehicle; and finally, having sufficient armor to defeat those  munitions that make it through the preceding layers. Each of these layers  depends on currently immature technologies to provide the aggregate  survivability needed for FCS vehicles. Many of the technologies intended  for survivability have experienced developmental delays. As a key  component of FCS survivability, the short range active protection system  is intended to neutralize incoming munitions and help protect vehicles  from threats such as rocket-propelled grenades. Initially, Army  requirements for the system included the ability to defeat long-range anti- armor threats, such as antitank missiles. However, Army officials have  decided to delay demonstration of this capability until 2011 or 2012. The  Army held a short-range active protection system demonstration in the  latter part of 2008 and declared that the system had reached TRL 6. The  results of these demonstrations are pending validation from technology  review authorities. It is important to note that the Army plans to continue  active protection system technology development and demonstration for  some time to ensure that it is an operationally effective and safe capability.  This is challenging because the active protection system is to provide 360- degree protection for the relatively lightly-armored FCS manned ground  vehicles by using, among other things, sensors, processors, rocket motors,  and a counter-munition warhead to counter multiple threats.
Lightweight hull and vehicle armor technology for FCS vehicles is also  problematic because it will not be sufficiently advanced to provide  military usefulness for several years. The Army is developing armor- related critical technologies in a phased approach. The initial phase of  armor development only recently demonstrated TRL 6. The results of  these demonstrations are also pending validation from technology review  authorities. The Army intends for that initial version to satisfy threshold  (or minimally acceptable) survivability requirements and plans to use it  only in prototypes of manned ground vehicles. The second phase of armor  is expected to meet objective (or desired) survivability requirements but is  not scheduled to reach TRL 5 until fiscal year 2011. Even then, Army  engineers do not believe that armor design will meet weight requirements.  The third phase will be used for low-rate production vehicles and is  scheduled to demonstrate TRL 6 in 2012. This armor is expected to satisfy  objective threat requirements and be 25 percent lighter than the second  armor iteration. The Army plans to mature the fourth and final phase of  armor to a TRL 6 in fiscal year 2014. The Army also plans to make  manufacturing technology investments in the armor area in order to  reduce its production costs.
section_title: Trade-offs Needed to Close Gaps between FCS Requirements and Designs
paragraphs: For the 2009 milestone review, Congress has directed DOD, for each  system and network component of the program, to assess key design  knowledge and risks, based on system functional reviews, preliminary  design reviews, and technical readiness levels. Now tentatively scheduled  for May 2009, the system-of-systems preliminary design review is a major  technical review to assess whether the full suite of FCS systems and  information network are ready for detailed design and that the FCS  detailed performance requirements can be obtained within cost, schedule,  risk, and other system constraints.
The Army has continued to gain knowledge about FCS development, but  design knowledge expected to be available at the time of the 2009  milestone review may not provide confidence that FCS design risks are at  acceptable levels. Key design risks include the Army’s ability to  accomplish all system-level design work in the time remaining before the  2009 system-of-systems preliminary design review, demonstrate that  emerging system designs match detailed requirements, and mitigate  recognized technical risks to acceptable levels. This challenge has its roots  in the fact that the Army started FCS development in 2003 without  establishing firm requirements and preliminary designs to meet those  requirements; that is, demonstrating a match between customer needs and  available resources. Consequently, the Army is still seeking to stabilize  FCS designs at a time when the program is already past the mid-point of  development phase—the point when a program following best practices  and DOD policy would normally conduct a critical design review  demonstrating a stable, producible design capable of meeting performance  requirements. Having passed that mid-point, FCS is now far out of  alignment with current DOD policy, which requires a program to show a  match between requirements and resources at or shortly after  development start.
Over the past year, the Army has continued the process of setting and  refining requirements in order to establish system designs. At the system- of-systems level, requirements are relatively stable. At the individual  system level, requirements continue to evolve. The Army scheduled a  series of 15 system-level preliminary design reviews, with the first held in  2007 and the last expected to occur in March 2009, in order to assess  whether individual systems are ready to proceed into detailed design.  Although the Army plans to conduct all system design reviews by the end  of March 2009, the schedule to close out all the reviews may take some  time, and requirements and design trade-offs will be necessary. Several  examples are illustrative:
The preliminary design review for the Multi-Function  Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle occurred in December  2007 and noted critical design problems regarding vehicle weight  reduction. The Army did not close the weight issue until some 10  months later, in October 2008.
The Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle had its preliminary design  review in October 2008 and has now entered into detailed design.  Operational requirements call for the vehicle to operate for 6 hours  between battery changes within a temperature range of minus 25  degrees and 120 degrees. However, the vehicle does not meet those  requirements at any temperature. Even with optimum operating  temperature, mission length is no longer than 5.4 hours.  Additionally, the vehicle cannot satisfy operational requirements  for storage at temperatures of 60 degrees below zero because its  motor lubricant decomposes and battery becomes useless.
Consequently, the Army now plans to remove the batteries and  provide for special storage.
During the first part of the network preliminary design review held  in November 2008, the Army recognized that there are significant  gaps between the FCS requirements and the emerging network  design. These include the JTRS handheld radio; ground mobile  radio; and airborne, maritime, and fixed-station radios; the WIN-T  increment 3; and the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier  Radio Waveforms. The Army has not yet been able to obtain  validation of its TRL 6 rating for JTRS ground mobile radio; the  mobile, ad-hoc networking protocols; and Wideband Networking  Waveforms. According to Army officials, if additional funding is  provided and developments are fully successful, they will not fully  meet FCS requirements until about 2017 or 2018. The Army  conducted the second part of its network preliminary design  review in January 2009. The results were not available for inclusion  in this report.
For several months, the Army has been conducting a series of technical  reviews of various aspects of the FCS manned ground vehicle  requirements and designs. Those efforts culminated at the manned ground  vehicle preliminary design review in January 2009. The results of that  review were not available in time for inclusion in this report.
According to Army assessments, key risks remain within several areas:  software development and integration, network and transport, manned  and unmanned platforms, and average unit production cost. Many risks  involve the likelihood that requirements may be unachievable when or as  expected. The assessment of these risks will be a key determinant in the  overall feasibility of the FCS concept and the ability to execute the FCS  acquisition strategy going forward. FCS is also working to address  significant areas of high risk such as network performance and scalability,  immature network architecture, and synchronization of FCS with the JTRS  and WIN-T programs. JTRS and WIN-T are also having difficulty with  technology maturation and are at risk of being delayed or delivering  incomplete capabilities to FCS.
In a 2007 acquisition memorandum, DOD stated that its acquisition policy  was to adjust requirements and technical content to deliver as much as  possible of planned capability within budgeted cost. At the same time, it  directed the services to establish Configuration Steering Boards in order  to review all requirements changes and any significant technical  configuration changes that have the potential to result in cost and  schedule impacts. Despite this direction, the Army has not established a  steering board for FCS. DOD officials told us that such a board would be  useful for providing input to FCS requirements and design trade-offs.
section_title: Army Has Not Yet Convincingly Demonstrated FCS Concept
paragraphs: In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue,  Congress required DOD to make a determination on whether actual  demonstrations, rather than simulations, have shown that the concept of  the program will work. FCS brigade combat teams are expected to be able  to execute a new tactical paradigm based on what the Army refers to as  “the quality of firsts”—the capability to see first, understand first, act first,  and finish decisively. Because this paradigm depends on the aggregate  performance of interdependent FCS systems versus the performance of  any single system, it is essential that this concept be proven through  demonstrations. While modeling and simulation are essential to assessing  the performance of FCS, they must be anchored in actual demonstrations.
DOD will be challenged to meet the congressional direction to  demonstrate (versus simulate) that the FCS warfighting concept will work  by the time of the 2009 milestone review. At this point in the program, the  FCS concept has been simulated but has not been convincingly  demonstrated in any sort of field event. This stems from the fact that  technologies have not finished development and prototype systems with  the essential network components are not ready to be built yet. In  preliminary field demonstrations, some people, sensors, and platforms  have been connected and information was transferred from one to the  other. Basic capabilities of the unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, as  well as some of the unattended sensors and munitions, have been  demonstrated. The manned ground vehicles have demonstrated some of  their mobility and lethality capabilities. There have been some technology  demonstrations of early versions of the lightweight armor and an active  protection system, but the feasibility of the FCS survivability concept  remains uncertain. Nothing approaching a demonstration of the “quality of  firsts” paradigm has yet been attempted nor will it be before the 2009  milestone review.
The Defense Acquisition Board has established criteria for the 2009  Review including several in a category entitled  “Test/Experimentation/Demonstration.” (See app. IV.) However, none of  the criteria address the issue of demonstrating that the FCS concept will  work. Instead, the criteria call for the demonstration of some early FCS  prototypes and the completion of some events such as a 2008 joint service  experiment. The Defense Acquisition Board criteria also include several  that call for delivery of certain early prototypes and others that call for  demonstration of selected capabilities. Without questioning the value of  these individual criteria, it is not clear what they will tell decision makers  about the value or demonstration of the FCS concept as a whole.
section_title: Demonstrations of FCS Network Performance Very Limited
paragraphs: In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue,  Congress required DOD to make several determinations, including (1)  whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have shown that  the software for the program is on a path to achieve threshold  requirements on cost and schedule; (2) whether the program’s planned  major communications network demonstrations are sufficiently complex  and realistic to inform major decision points; (3) the extent to which  manned ground vehicle survivability is likely to be reduced in a degraded  communications network environment; (4) the level of network  degradation at which FCS manned ground vehicle survivability is  significantly reduced; and (5) the extent to which the FCS  communications network is capable of withstanding network attack,  jamming, or other interference.
In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration is required to submit a report to Congress on the  FCS communications network and software. That report is to be  submitted by September 30, 2009 and is to include an assessment of the  communications network that will specifically address areas such as  vulnerability to network attack, electronic warfare, adverse weather, and  terrain; dependence on satellite communications support; and operational  availability and performance under degraded conditions. The report is also  to include assessments of the communications network’s test schedule  and Army efforts to synchronize funding, schedule, and technology  maturity of critical networking programs with FCS. Appendix V contains  the comprehensive criteria from the legislation directing this review.
These assessments of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the FCS  network will be important in determining if the FCS concept is feasible.  However, as we reported last year, the Army had an understanding of  network requirements and how to build the network, but many challenges  and work remained before the network would reach maturity. Hence,  network development and demonstration is at a very early stage and  therefore, the network assessments will most likely be based on analysis  and simulations rather than demonstrated results. Even if software  development proceeds on schedule and technical risks of key network  elements, such as JTRS and WIN-T are successfully retired, the uncharted  nature of the FCS network makes predicting its eventual performance  difficult. Army test officials are assessing network scalability, which  relates to increasing the number of radios, or nodes, on the network,  through limited testing. However, the number of nodes used in testing to  date has been limited, using only 30 nodes, while a brigade combat team  may require as many as 5,000 nodes. Considering that mobile, ad-hoc  networks have limited scalability, and performance decreases as more  nodes are added, the ultimate FCS network performance is difficult to  predict.
To date, actual demonstrations of FCS software have been limited to the  early spin out tests and experiments, and it is not yet known whether the  information network is technically capable of delivering the quality of  service needed to make the FCS warfighting concept possible. At the time  of the FCS milestone review in 2009, the extent of network demonstration  is expected to be very limited. For example, in 2008, the Army  demonstrated, among other basic capabilities, sensor control, terrain  analysis, and unmanned platform planning and operations. Other limited  demonstrations are scheduled on a regular basis. For example, in the 2008  joint service experiment, several portions of the FCS network—including  an early version of the system-of-systems common operating environment,  the unattended sensors, and Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System—were  evaluated in terms of their basic operation and interoperability with other  systems. The first major demonstration of the FCS network is the limited  user test scheduled for fiscal year 2012, which will be at least a year after  the critical design review and only about a year before the start of low-rate  initial production for the core FCS program. This event comes after the  vehicle designs on manned ground platforms have been established. One  of the key objectives of that test will be to identify the contributions and  limitations of the network regarding the ability of the FCS brigade combat  team to conduct missions across the full spectrum of operations. However,  the fully automated battle command system is not expected to be available  until 2013 when the Army expects 100 percent of the network capabilities,  including software, to be available.
As a key part of the overall FCS communications network, it is uncertain  whether FCS software requirements can be achieved within cost and  schedule estimates. The first of 4 software builds has been delivered and  qualified, and build 2 is still in development, with a planned delivery in  2010. As we have reported earlier, FCS software estimates continue to  grow, and the total estimate for the network and platforms is projected to  total over 100 million lines of computer code, which is more than triple the  size the program estimated in 2003. Army officials have identified 16 risks  in the software arena, or specific areas where there is a risk of not  achieving goals within cost and schedule estimates, including system-of- systems common operating environment, network management/quality of  service, network security/information assurance, distributed fusion  management, and estimated effective source lines of code. According to  Army officials, software development costs are capped at approximately  $2.6 billion. As a result, Army officials stated that they have had to defer  some planned FCS capabilities to later software builds. Yet, development  experience to date, coupled with the risks yet to be resolved, raise  questions as to whether the necessary software can be developed within  cost and schedule estimates. Alternatively, the Army may have to reduce  or eliminate FCS requirements.
section_title: FCS Costs Are Expected to Increase Again and Affordability Is Still in Doubt
paragraphs: In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue,  Congress required DOD to make a determination on (1) what the cost  estimate for the program is, including spin outs, and an assessment of  confidence levels for that estimate; and (2) what the affordability  assessment for the program is, given projected Army budgets, based on  that cost estimate.
For the 2009 milestone review, DOD and the Army are expected to provide  the updated program cost estimate and an affordability assessment for the  FCS program. The Army has indicated that the most recent cost estimate  for the program is no longer valid, but it has not yet completed an official  updated estimate. While full details are not yet available, the Army is  considering plans to request additional funds for FCS beyond the current  cost estimate of $159 billion. Those plans would involve additional  development costs of about $2 billion and procurement costs of about $17  billion over the current cost estimate. Where the Army has offset some  cost increases in the past with reductions in program content, we are not  yet aware of any similar actions to offset the expected cost increases.  According to DOD officials, DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group is  expected to prepare an updated independent cost estimate for the  milestone review. Previous estimates from the group have been  significantly higher than the Army’s, particularly regarding the cost to  develop software. DOD officials also stated that DOD’s Program Analysis  and Evaluation group may be tasked to provide input for an FCS  affordability assessment. These assessments are intended to cover all of  the costs, including those for the spin outs, which will be necessary to  fully field the FCS program. This would be the first complete cost estimate  that will include spin outs and other costs. The Army now projects that the  costs of its revised FCS spin out initiative will be about $21 billion beyond  the core FCS program costs of $159 billion. In addition to FCS-specific  costs, complementary program costs are separate from FCS and represent  significant additional commitments from the Army and other services.  Several of these complementary programs have funding issues of their  own. For example, the JTRS and the WIN-T programs are not yet fully  funded to develop the full capabilities currently required by the FCS  program.
Ultimately, FCS’s affordability will hinge on two factors: the actual cost of  the program and the availability of funds. Heretofore, there has not been a  sound basis for preparing a firm cost estimate. The preliminary design  review process should provide a better foundation for one. Yet, such an  estimate would have the confidence of a program in early development,  with many risks and unprecedented challenges to meet. As it stands, FCS  commands the largest portion of the Army’s acquisition budget and, as  currently planned, will continue to do so for many years. The Army  continues to indicate its willingness to accept the high risks of the  program and make trade-offs in both requirements and other programs to  accommodate its growing costs. Since the program began, costs have  increased from $92 billion to $159 billion, which only covers the cost to  equip one-third of the Army’s active forces. Indicative of the tension  between program costs and available funds, the Army recently proposed  deferring upgrades to current systems such as the Abrams Tank and  Bradley Fighting Vehicle to free up funds for FCS. This tension seems only  likely to worsen, as indications are that FCS costs are about to increase  again at the same time competition for funds—both between near-term  and far-term needs within DOD and between defense and other needs  within the federal government—is intensifying. The Army’s position has  been that it will reduce FCS capabilities to stay within available  development funds but at some point, reductions in FCS capability— whether driven by money or technical feasibility—will fall below an  acceptable level. That level appears as yet indefinable.
section_title: Oversight Challenges Will Continue Beyond the Milestone Decision
paragraphs: The 2009 milestone review will not only require DOD to decide if FCS is  technically feasible and militarily worthwhile, it will provide the  opportunity to structure the emerging program so that it complies with  current acquisition policy and is knowledge-based—thus more conducive  to oversight. On several scores, the current FCS program falls short. Its  acquisition strategy is more schedule-driven than it is knowledge–based  and is unlikely to be executable, with a significant amount of development  and demonstration yet to be completed. The timing of upcoming  commitments to production funding puts decision makers in the difficult  position of making production commitments without knowing if FCS will  work as intended. For example, the Army plans for FCS core production  to directly follow the early NLOS-C production, which may be premature  based on design maturity and demonstrations expected to be done up to  that point. Likewise, the Army’s schedule for providing early FCS  capabilities to current forces is hurried, as spin out systems may not be  fully demonstrated before the Army commits to their production. Finally,  the Army’s potential adoption of an incremental approach to FCS  acquisition could represent another major restructure of the program.  While an incremental approach is generally preferable, it would represent  the fourth different strategy for the FCS program that DOD and the  Congress will be asked to evaluate and oversee.
subsections: section_title: FCS Acquisition Strategy Is Not Knowledge-Based and May Not Be Executable Within Estimated Resources
paragraphs: We have previously reported that to date, the FCS program has advanced  through acquisition milestones without having achieved the level of  knowledge preferred by best practices and DOD’s own policies and a  commensurate level of information needed for oversight, given the scope  of the program and the risks it entails. The issuance of DOD’s 2008  acquisition instruction underscores the wide variance between policy and  the FCS acquisition strategy. Ideally, requirements trades would already  have been made and a high-confidence design established. This would  position the program to move toward maturity as evidenced by such  measures as successful completion of subsystem critical design reviews,  maturity of critical manufacturing processes, planned corrective actions to  hardware and software deficiencies, and adequate developmental testing.  At this point, however, FCS has yet to establish a firm system-of-systems  design and is several years from any large-scale testing at the system-of- systems level. The milestone review represents an opportunity to judge  FCS on critical knowledge markers and set it on a more reasonable course  with opportunities for effective and meaningful oversight from the Army,  DOD, and the Congress. Under its current acquisition strategy, the FCS is  neither knowledge-based nor does it lend itself to meaningful oversight.  Figure 2 compares a knowledge-based approach to developing a weapon  system (consistent with DOD policy) with the approach taken for FCS.  Best practices for successful product development include three  knowledge points (KP). Knowledge Point 1 should occur at development  start and is attained when technologies and resources match requirements;  KP 2 should occur at the mid-point between development and production  and is attained when the product design performs as expected; and KP 3  should occur at production start and is attained when production can meet  cost, schedule, and quality targets. Ideally the preliminary design review  occurs at or near the start of development and the critical design review  occurs mid-way through development.
As shown in figure 2 above, FCS technology development and system  development and demonstration phases will overlap by several years. The  Army has scheduled only 2 years between the critical design review in  2011 and the production decision in 2013. This leaves little time to gain  knowledge between the two events, and is particularly important because  the critical design review is the point at which a program begins building  fully-integrated, production-representative prototypes whose testing will  prove the design’s maturity and form the basis for the low-rate production  decision. Instead, FCS will rely on less mature prototypes and the decision  to proceed into production will be made without a mature design. As a  result of the current acquisition approach, the FCS program may not be  executable given the amount of development budget remaining and the  development work that remains to be done, as illustrated in figure 3  below.
At the preliminary design review, the program expects to have all critical  technologies mature to TRL 6, system-level requirements nearing  completion, and a preliminary design available to reconcile technologies  with requirements. Using DOD policy as a reference, this is about the point  at which the FCS program should be ready to begin. Should the program  be approved to continue on its present course at the 2009 milestone  review, the Army would have to complete development—in essence, the  entire system development phase—with 40 percent of its financial and  schedule resources remaining. This is not to judge either the value of the  work done to date or the rate of progress, but rather to underscore where  the program really is in terms of the development process. Accordingly,  ahead of FCS remains what is typically the most expensive part of system  development: completing the detailed system and network designs and  building prototypes and using them to demonstrate that the system will  work. In the case of FCS, there are the added challenges of integrating  multiple technologies and showing that the system of systems as a whole  will work, including the unprecedented network.
The late completion of the system development activities that will  demonstrate whether FCS can deliver the promised capability is at odds  with the early requests for production funds. Additional maturation of  critical technologies, followed by the challenging prospect of integrating  FCS subsystems and systems, lies ahead. Design work is ongoing and  many designs remain to be matured and verified. A key indicator of the  Army’s progress in this area will be the percentage of design drawings that  will be released to manufacturing at the critical design review, currently  scheduled for fiscal year 2011. The Army is currently fabricating key FCS  prototypes, many of which are scheduled for delivery in the 2010 time  frame. After they are delivered, much additional engineering work will  remain to be conducted as part of a disciplined test, fix, and retest  approach. For example, several prototypes will be built based on  preliminary versus final designs, and will not have all key technologies  integrated. In this sense, they will not be representative of production  items. Many of the results of these demonstrations, and other key test and  evaluation results, will not be available until late in the program, creating  difficulty in applying knowledge gained from previous tests into  subsequent tests. For example, a key system-of-systems test scheduled  before the low-rate production decision is the limited user test 3 in 2012 to  assess brigade combat team network capabilities. This test will be the first  large-scale FCS test that will include a majority of the developmental  prototypes and a large operational unit and occurs only one year before  the low-rate initial production decision for the core FCS program. This test  is important because the Congress has required a broad network  demonstration to be conducted before starting low-rate production of the  core FCS program. This demonstration is also expected to occur in fiscal  year 2012 as part of the limited user test. Finally, the Army will have to  develop and mature production processes for a wide range of FCS  systems.
Our work has shown that development costs for programs with mature  technologies at the start of system development increased by a modest  average of 4.8 percent over the original estimate, whereas development  costs for programs with immature technologies increased by 34.9  percent. Our work has also shown that most development cost growth  occurs after the critical design review. Specifically, of the 28.3 percent cost  growth that weapon systems average in development, 19.7 percent occurs  after the critical design review. In the case of FCS, the Army’s strategy is  schedule-driven and calls for beginning low-rate production in 2013 and  initial operational capability in 2015, which leaves little time to overcome  the remaining technological and engineering challenges the program faces  prior to committing to production. Thus, it is likely that under the current  schedule, additional cost growth would be incurred as the Army works  through these remaining challenges.
According to DOD officials, the Systems and Software Engineering group,  within DOD’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization, has  been tasked to conduct a systems engineering review of FCS that will  include an evaluation of risks associated with the FCS acquisition strategy,  test plans, software, and key complementary programs. According to the  Systems and Software Engineering group, the assessment will also cover  the FCS system engineering plan for reasonable exit criteria associated  with critical design review and production readiness. The reporting  objectives for this effort include, among other things, clearly illustrating  the risks and challenges of proceeding to critical design review as planned.  The Systems and Software Engineering group’s review is expected to  provide input to address three of the required congressional  assessments—FCS requirements/design, concept demonstration, and  software demonstration—and should provide critical information on the  amount of FCS development and demonstration work yet to be completed  and its expected cost and schedule.
section_title: Timing of Currently Planned Funding Commitments Puts Decision Makers in Difficult Position
paragraphs: Funding commitments for production begin before FCS capabilities are  demonstrated and even before the critical design review is held. This puts  decision makers in a difficult position, particularly when considering that  FCS is to deliver more than a better set of equipment—it embodies a new  concept of combat. Procurement funding for core FCS production  facilities will be requested for fiscal year 2011, the budget for which will be  presented to Congress in February 2010—several months after the  milestone review and before the stability of the FCS design is assessed at  the critical design review. In fact, based on results of system-level  preliminary design reviews conducted to date, the Army could still be  working to close action items resulting from the system-of-systems  preliminary design review when it requests funding for FCS core  production facilities. Further, when Congress is asked to approve funding  for low-rate initial production of core FCS systems, the Army will not yet  have proven that the FCS network and the program concept will work. A  key demonstration of the FCS network, limited user test 3, is currently  scheduled for later in 2012, after the Congress will have received the fiscal  year 2013 budget submission. This is illustrated further in figure 4 below.
section_title: Early NLOS-C Production May Portend Risks for FCS
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2003, the Army has been required by Congress to develop  and field the NLOS-C early in order to provide a self-propelled indirect fire  capability. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2008  required the Army to deliver eight NLOS-C prototypes by the end of  calendar year 2008 and to field early production versions of the system by  fiscal year 2010. These systems are to be in addition to those needed for  developmental and operational testing. The Army determined that a set of  18, a full battalion’s worth, would be needed to meet the intent of the act’s  language in terms of the early production units. Although the NLOS-C is  one of eight FCS manned ground vehicles, it is proceeding about 5 years  ahead of the other vehicles.
The Army began procuring long-lead production items for the NLOS-C  vehicle in 2008 to meet the requirement for the early production versions.  According to program officials, an urgent need to build Mine-Resistant  Ambush Protected vehicles diverted subcontractor resources away from  the NLOS-C efforts. Officials further indicated that technological  challenges associated with a lack of completed production facilities and  specialized tooling also contributed to delays. The Army accepted delivery  of the first two NLOS-C prototypes in fiscal year 2008 and the remaining  six vehicles in the following two years. A Defense Acquisition Board  decision to begin low-rate production for the additional set of 18 NLOS-C  vehicles was expected in December 2008. Details of that decision were not  available for inclusion in this report. If approved, the Army expects  delivery of six early production units per year in fiscal years 2010 through  2012. None of these early NLOS-C vehicles will meet FCS threshold  requirements nor will they be operationally deployable. Rather, they will  be used as training assets for the Army Evaluation Task Force.
In order to meet the early fielding dates, the Army will begin production of  the NLOS-C vehicles with immature technologies and designs. Several key  technologies, such as lightweight armor, the active protection system, and  the JTRS radios will not be fully mature for several years. Much  requirements definition work remains for all the manned ground vehicles,  including the NLOS-C. Software development is in its early stages. Design  work on the manned ground vehicles also remains to be done, including  work on the chassis and mission modules. Significant challenges involving  integrating the technologies, software, and design will follow. To the  extent that these aspects of the manned ground vehicles depart from the  early production cannons, costly rework of the cannons may be necessary  if they will ever be used for other than training purposes.
The Army’s efforts and financial investments made on the NLOS-C vehicles  could create additional pressure to proceed with FCS core production,  prior to achieving a solid basis of knowledge on which to move forward.  Production on the cannon is beginning 5 years in advance of the  production decision on the FCS core systems. By the time of that decision,  in fiscal 2013, the Army plans to have invested about $12 billion in FCS  procurement funds and more than $50 billion for FCS overall. In addition,  the Army also plans to invest millions in production facilities in which to  build the vehicles. These activities all contribute to starting up the manned  ground vehicle industrial base. If the FCS strategy goes according to plan,  FCS core production would directly follow NLOS-C production, with long  lead items for the FCS core program providing a transition. That may be  premature based on the expected design maturity and demonstrations  expected to be done to that point.  DOD has attempted to make a  distinction between NLOS-C and the core FCS program, but the linkages  continue to exist in the FCS acquisition strategy. If decision makers were  to consider delaying FCS core production because it was not ready, a gap  could develop when early NLOS-C production ends. Sustaining the  industrial base could then become an argument against an otherwise  justified delay.
section_title: FCS Spin Outs Will Not be Proven Prior to Production
paragraphs: The Army initiated spin out development in 2004, when it embarked on an  effort to bring selected FCS capabilities to current force heavy brigade  combat teams while development of the core FCS program remained  under way. In 2006, the Army established the Army Evaluation Task Force  to use, evaluate, and train with the spin out capabilities, and the Task  Force began its testing under that brigade construct in early 2008. In mid- 2008, the Army changed its focus from fielding spin out equipment to  heavy brigades and instead to field the equipment to infantry brigade  combat teams beginning in fiscal year 2011. Army officials stated that this  change occurred because infantry brigades are the optimal forces to fight  in an urban environment, are being used in combat more than other types  of forces, and are the most vulnerable forces. Accordingly, the Army now  proposes to have 43 infantry brigade combat teams fully equipped with  spin out equipment by 2025 at a total cost of $21 billion, with over $5  billion to be provided in fiscal years 2010 to 2015. DOD officials have  reviewed the Army’s revised FCS spin out plans, but they have not yet  made a decision to approve those plans.
The switch to infantry brigades led the Army to abandon its previous plan  for a series of three spin outs and instead pursue a two-phased effort  termed “early” and “threshold” with respective planned production  commitment dates of fiscal years 2010 and 2013.  The early spin out items  are not expected to meet all FCS threshold requirements nor will the  threshold spin out items have the same network and battle command  capabilities as in the core FCS program.  The early spin out will include:
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,
Urban and Tactical Unattended Ground Sensors, early versions of the system-of-systems common operating  two types of Joint Tactical Radios,  integrated computer system,  environment and battle command software,
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle,
Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and
Ground Soldier System.
The second phase of spin outs will include improved versions of the above  systems as well as add the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment  vehicle, Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Armed Robotic Vehicle— Assault (Light), and Centralized Controller.
With the advent of the new structure, the Army moved its initial spin out  production decision from January 2009 to December 2009. However,  testing to date has not made a convincing case for this production  commitment for several reasons. First, the Army has conducted only one  test focused on the infantry brigade combat team structure. The two initial  spin out tests—a technical field test in early 2008 to verify technical  aspects of the capabilities and force development test and evaluation in  May 2008 to validate requirements and training associated with those  capabilities—occurred prior to the restructure and therefore employed  heavy brigade combat team constructs. While Army officials have  indicated that the force development test results have applicability to the  infantry brigades, the test’s major objective in terms of construct was to  confirm the organizational structure and equipment distribution for a spin  out-equipped heavy brigade combat team. The third test in July 2008, a  preliminary limited user test to assess maturity, interoperability, and  contribution of spin out systems, did utilize the infantry brigade structure.  However, because of the restructure, that test was a shortened 2-day  version of an event originally planned as a much longer effort focused on  the heavy brigade combat team.
Additionally, testing completed to date employed spin out systems that are  not in the form that will be fielded. In fact, four of the systems planned for  the early spin out have only been tested in surrogate or non-production  representative forms (not in a mature or final configuration). The Ground  Soldier System has not yet been included in any testing. Table 2 shows the  versions of the prototypes used in each of the three tests to date.
Using surrogate and non-production representative systems is problematic  because it does not conclusively show how well the spin out systems can  address current force capability gaps in situational awareness, force  protection, and lethality. Moreover, they limit the ability to translate spin  out tactical operations from heavy brigade to infantry combat teams and  from spin outs to the core FCS. In fact, DOD’s current acquisition policy  requires that systems meet approved requirements and are demonstrated  in their intended environments using the selected production- representative articles before the engineering and manufacturing  development phase—which precedes the production phase—can end.  Army test officials and equipment users told us, and test reports for the  2008 spin out tests confirm, that the surrogates and non-production  representative systems limited the ability to gauge system performance,  forced adjustments in testing, and made it difficult to know whether  beneficial lessons were learned in testing. Officials from the Army’s  independent testing organization, the Army Test and Evaluation  Command, stated that prototype JTRS radios impact the ability to evaluate  overall system effectiveness regarding such factors as range and reliability.   They also noted that radio performance can impact tactics used by the  testing unit. Army officials who actually participated in the testing  expressed similar views, and noted that the surrogates limited tactical  operations. As a result, they said, the Army is immature tactically in terms  of what it knows about spin out operations.
The three tests scheduled for 2009 will continue to include surrogate and  non-production representative systems. As in past tests, surrogates will  take the place of JTRS handheld radios in all three tests. As noted by Army  testers, this surrogate radio has limited basic functionality and will impact  the evaluation of performance for systems used in conjunction with it,  including the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System and unattended ground  sensors. According to Army officials, they will not have production  representative versions of this radio to test until initial operational test and  evaluation in fiscal year 2011. In addition, JTRS ground mobile radios used  in 2009 testing are to consist of a mix of non-production and production  representative models, but the composition will be heavily weighted  toward the non-production representative models. Of the 16 total radios  planned for use in the limited user test, only 4 are expected to be the  production representative version. Additionally, Army officials told us that  if these radios are delayed, they will not be able to properly operate and  evaluate the needed networking capabilities.
The schedule for completing 2009 testing is tight, and the issues identified  in the 2008 testing may not be resolved prior to the spin out production  decision. According to Army and DOD officials, the Army Evaluation Task  Force has proven extremely useful in identifying system issues and  suggesting design changes. While the Army is working to improve spin out  systems in accordance with the Task Force’s testing observations and  recommendations, it does not plan to prove out all final designs prior to  the production decision. For example, the Army is redesigning the Tactical  Unattended Ground Sensor because 2008 testing showed that it had issues  with range, battery life, and hardware reliability. However, the Army does  not expect to have the final version of the redesigned sensor available  until February 2010, after the initial spin out production decision has been  made. The Army is also redesigning the Urban Unattended Ground Sensor  in accordance with testing feedback because that sensor had issues with  battery life, user set-up time, and display of data. A final version of that  sensor will not be available until February 2010. Additionally, the JTRS  ground mobile radio may not be able to achieve its schedule for a  production decision, which would impact the FCS spin out initiative.
The Army may be unable to thoroughly assess spin outs’ military utility for  current forces because testing planned for 2009 is very compressed and  leaves little time for analysis before the production decision. Under the  revised spin out structure, the Army expects to conduct technical field,  force development, and limited user tests in a back-to-back period from  July through September 2009. This schedule allows the Army only 12  weeks to conduct all the tests, assess tests results, and incorporate lessons  learned from one test to the next. Additionally, the limited user test, the  last test in the series before the production decision and arguably the most  important in terms of demonstrating system interoperability and overall  spin out military utility, is planned to conclude at the end of September.  That means the Army only has 8 to12 weeks to assess those test results  before DOD will make the expected December 2009 production decision.  By comparison, the Army needed 8 months to produce its test report on  the 2008 technical field test. A DOD testing official told us that, because of  the testing schedule, the Army would be unable to analyze test results  adequately before making decisions. Army officials acknowledged that the  schedule is extremely compressed and noted that any delay in maturity or  receipt of hardware and/or software would impact the test schedule. They  also indicated that, because of the aggressive schedule, it might be  necessary to change the order of the tests and hold the force development  test after the limited user test.
section_title: Potential Incremental Acquisition Approach for FCS Would Represent Another Major Restructuring
paragraphs: Army officials informed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics that they are considering an incremental or  block acquisition approach to FCS. Citing the need to set a path to a  stable, executable baseline for FCS—one with appropriately scoped  requirements—FCS program officials believe that by adopting an  incremental or block approach, they may be better able to mitigate risks in  four major areas. These areas include: immaturity of requirements for  system survivability, network capability, and information assurance;  limited availability of performance trade space to maintain program cost  and schedule given current program risks (schedule risks,  weight/survivability, cost growth); program not funded to Cost Analysis  Improvement Group estimates and impact of congressional budget cuts;  and continuing challenges in aligning schedules and expectations for  multiple concurrent acquisitions (such as JTRS and WIN-T).
Subsequent to the mid-2008 Defense Acquisition Board meeting, where the  Army presented its case for its consideration of an incremental or block  approach for FCS acquisition, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a memorandum directing  the Army to, among other things, pursue this initiative. Moreover, the  memorandum stipulated that the incremental approach to acquire FCS  must be prioritized to meet the warfighter’s most critical operational needs  and present a stable, executable program. The Army has been conducting  an analysis to define an incremental approach, which is expected to  address organizational structure, platforms, warfighter needs, and unified  battle command. This analysis will be coupled with DOD assessments of  FCS design maturity (including technology readiness levels, network and  platform readiness, and associated risks and costs) and program maturity  (including program execution feasibility, program scope, resource  availability, and program alternatives). The Army was expected to present  the analysis results and incremental FCS program plan to the DOD in late  2008 or early 2009, but that had not occurred at the time of this report.  According to a DOD official, the adoption of an incremental approach may  affect both the FCS core program and the spin out initiative. For the core  FCS program, adoption of an incremental approach may involve a phased  development and demonstration of individual FCS performance  requirements and/or a phased fielding of individual components of the  FCS family of systems. For the spin out initiative, the Army is considering  if and when it should spin out FCS capabilities to the Heavy and Stryker  Brigade Combat Teams.
Restructuring the FCS program around an incremental approach has the  potential to alleviate the risks inherent in the current strategy. It also  represents an opportunity to apply the policy and thus provide decision  makers more information before key program commitments, like  production funding, are made.  Taking an incremental approach to new  acquisitions, versus attempting to acquire full capability in one step, has  been preferred by DOD policy and best practices since before FCS began  in 2003.  The December 2008 policy adds several key features that would  benefit a restructured FCS program.  These include: establishment of configuration steering boards that are tasked to  review all requirements changes and any significant technical  configuration changes that have the potential to result in cost and  schedule impacts to the program; a post-preliminary design review assessment to be conducted  where the results of the PDR and the program manager’s  assessment are considered to determine whether remedial action is  necessary to achieve the program’s objectives; a critical design review, which is an opportunity to assess design  maturity by measures such as completion of subsystem critical  design reviews, the percentage of software and hardware product  specifications and drawings completed, planned corrective actions  to hardware and software deficiencies; adequate developmental  testing, the maturity of critical manufacturing processes, and an  estimate of system reliability based on demonstrated reliability  rates; a post-critical design review, which assesses the program  manager’s report on the critical design review to determine  whether the program can meet its approved objectives or if  adjustments should be made; and before production, a demonstration that the system meets  requirements in its intended environment using a production- representative article, manufacturing processes have been  effectively demonstrated in a pilot line environment, and industrial  capabilities are reasonably available.
On the other hand, the newness of the incremental approach could  complicate oversight at this important juncture. For example, its approval  will lag behind the congressional schedule for authorizing and  appropriating fiscal year 2010 funds. Also, a new approach to FCS could  affect the scope of the milestone review. Evaluation of the new approach  will involve a number of factors, including whether:  the incremental approach adequately addresses program risks and  unresolved questions on the feasibility of the FCS concept and its  information network;  the initial increment of FCS capability is justifiable on its own,  without being dependent on future increments; each increment, including the first, will comply with current DOD  policy as it applies to a new program starting at the preliminary  design review stage; and  the Army’s overall investment plan and resources for FCS  increments, spin outs, and its current forces is sound and  affordable.
Should an incremental approach to FCS be pursued, one consideration  will be the future role of the Army’s contracting relationship with the LSI.  We have previously reported the uniquely close relationship that exists  between the Army and the LSI. While this has advantages, it also has  disadvantages.  In the past two years, the role of the LSI, originally limited  to development, has grown relative to production. It is expected to be the  prime contractor for production of spin outs, the NLOS-C, and at least the  low-rate production of the FCS core systems. The specific role the LSI will  play in production of spin outs, NLOS-C, and FCS core production remains  somewhat unclear. Statements of work for the production contracts have  not yet been negotiated. According to the program officials, the LSI will  contract with the first tier subcontractors, which will in turn contract with  their own subcontractors. Thus, the production role of the LSI is likely to  be largely in oversight of the first tier subcontractors versus fabricating  systems or subsystems. The LSI is also responsible for defining and  maintaining a growth strategy for integrating new technologies into the  FCS brigade combat teams. Combined with a likely role in sustainment,  the LSI will remain involved in the FCS program indefinitely.
Recently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics issued a directive to pursue alternate arrangements for any  future FCS contracts. The Under Secretary found that the fixed fee was  too high and the fee structure allows industry to receive most of the  incentive fee dollars prior to demonstrating integrated FCS system-of- systems capability. The Under Secretary also directed that the Army  conduct a risk-based assessment to examine contracting alternatives for  FCS capability. This assessment is to evaluate opportunities for  procurement breakout of the individual platforms/systems that comprise  FCS and how the government’s interests are served by contracting with  the LSI as compared to contracting directly with the manufacturers of the  items.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The 2009 milestone review is the most important decision on the Future  Combat System since the program began in 2003. If the preliminary design  reviews are successfully completed and critical technologies mature as  planned in 2009, the FCS program will essentially be at a stage that statute  and DOD policy would consider as being ready to start development.  In  this sense, the 2009 review will complete the evaluative process that began  with the original 2003 milestone decision.  Further, when considering that  the current estimate for FCS ranges from $159 billion to $200 billion when  the potential increases to core program costs and estimated costs of spin  outs are included, 90 percent or more of the investment in the program lies  ahead. Even if a new, incremental approach to FCS is approved, a full  milestone review that carries the responsibility of a go/no-go decision is  still in order, along with the attendant reports and analyses that are  required inputs. In the meantime, establishing a configuration steering  board, as suggested in DOD policy, may help bridge the gaps between  requirements and system designs and help in the timely completion of the  FCS preliminary design reviews.
At this point, there are at least three programmatic directions, or some  combination thereof, that DOD could take at the milestone review to  shape investments in combat systems for the Army, each of which  presents challenges. First, the FCS program as currently structured has  significant risks and may not be executable within remaining resources.  Second, although an incremental approach may improve the Army’s  prospects for fielding some capability, each increment must stand on its  own and not be dependent on future increments. Third, spin outs to  current forces currently rely on a rushed schedule that calls for making  production decisions before production-representative prototypes have  clearly demonstrated a useful military capability. The role of the LSI in the  FCS production phase will be a factor that will have to be considered for  any program that emerges from the milestone review.
There is no question that the Army needs to ensure its forces are well- equipped. The Army has vigorously pursued FCS as the solution, a concept  and an approach that is unconventional, yet with many good features.  The  difficulties and redirections experienced by the program should be seen as  revealing its immaturity, rather than as the basis for criticism.  However, at  this point, enough time and money have been expended that the program  should be evaluated at the 2009 milestone review based on what it has  shown, not on what it could show.  The Army should not pursue FCS at  any cost, nor should it settle for whatever the FCS program produces  under fixed resources. Rather, the program direction taken after the  milestone review must strike a balance between near-term and long-term  needs, realistic funding expectations, and a sound plan for execution.  Regarding execution, the review represents an opportunity to ensure that  the emerging investment program be put on the soundest possible footing  by applying the best standards available, like those contained in DOD’s  2008 acquisition policy, and requiring clear demonstrations of the FCS  concept and network before any commitment to production of core FCS  systems.
Any decision the Army makes to change the FCS program is likely to lag  behind the congressional schedule for authorizing and appropriating fiscal  year 2010 funds. Because of this, Congress needs to preserve its options  for ensuring it has adequate knowledge on which to base funding  decisions.  Specifically, it does not seem reasonable to expect Congress to  provide full fiscal year 2010 funding for the program before the milestone  review is held nor production funding before system designs are stable  and validated in testing.
section_title: Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: The Congress should consider taking the following two actions:  restricting the budget authority to be provided for FCS in fiscal  year 2010 until DOD fully complies with the statutory FCS  milestone review requirements and provides a complete budget  justification package for any program that emerges, and not approving any production or long lead item funds for the core  FCS program until the critical design review is satisfactorily  completed  and demonstrations using prototypes provide  confidence that the FCS system-of-systems operating with the  communications network will be able to meet its requirements.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the investment program that emerges from the 2009  milestone review be conformed with current DOD acquisition  policy, particularly regarding technology maturity, critical design  reviews, and demonstrating production-representative prototypes  before making production commitments; direct the Secretary of the Army to convene, following the  preliminary design reviews and in time to inform the 2009 FCS  milestone review, an FCS Configuration Steering Board to provide  assistance in formulating acceptable trade-offs to bridge the gaps  between the FCS requirements and the system designs; ensure that if an incremental approach is selected for FCS, the first  increments are justifiable on their own as worthwhile capabilities  that are not dependent on future increments for their value,  particularly regarding the order in which the information network  and individual manned ground vehicles will be developed; ensure that FCS systems to be spun out to current forces have  been successfully tested in production-representative form before  they are approved for initial production; and  reassess the appropriate role of the LSI in the FCS program,  particularly regarding its involvement in production.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD concurred with all our recommendations and provided comments on  two. Regarding our recommendation on testing spin out systems, DOD  commented that any production decision for FCS systems going to the  current force will be informed by an operational assessment or user test of  the systems. Although the Army plans to conduct such testing prior to the  spin out low-rate initial production decision in late 2009, that testing will  employ surrogate and non-production representative systems. We  maintain that any systems planned for production should be production- representative and thoroughly tested in a realistic environment. DOD  noted that such testing was more in line with what is required for the full- rate production decision versus the initial low-rate decision. The testing  standards we apply reflect the best practice and DOD policy of having  production-representative prototypes tested prior to a low-rate production  decision. This approach demonstrates the prototypes’ performance and  reliability as well as manufacturing processes—in short, that the product  is ready to be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality goals. In  fact, current DOD policy states that development “shall end when the  system meets approved requirements and is demonstrated in its intended  environment, using the selected production-representative article;  manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated in a pilot line  environment; industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and the  system meets or exceeds exit criteria and   entrance requirements.”
Regarding our recommendation about reassessing the role of the LSI, DOD  stated that the FCS contractual arrangement is not an LSI contract as  defined by law. According to the Duncan Hunter National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the FCS prime contractor “shall be  considered to be a lead systems integrator until 45 days after the Secretary  of the Army certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees  that such contractor is no longer serving as the lead systems integrator.”  Army officials have stated that they are unaware of the Army preparing  any such certification for the defense committees. Regardless of how the  prime contractor is characterized, it was originally envisioned by the Army  as an LSI, and its unusually close relationship with the Army on the FCS  program still warrants additional oversight.
Regarding our matters for congressional consideration, DOD expressed  concern over the impact to FCS acquisition execution with the fiscal year  2010 budget authority limitations that we suggested Congress consider. We  believe a restriction is necessary as congressional committees will be  asked to provide funds for fiscal year 2010 before the FCS milestone  review, currently scheduled for July 30, 2009, is held. The review will lead  to a decision on whether the program should continue as currently  structured, continue in restructured form, or be terminated. The scope and  significance of those decisions create the possibility that the Army’s fiscal  year 2010 budget plans for FCS could differ significantly from the request  that Congress will consider. A restriction need not amount to a denial or  reduction of funds, but rather creates an opportunity for Congress to  review any change in Army plans before releasing funds for FCS for the  entire fiscal year.
We received other technical comments from DOD, which have been  addressed in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and  Budget. Copies will also be made available at no charge on the GAO Web  site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any questions  concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  The major contributors are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To develop information on to what extent knowledge will likely be  available to DOD and the Congress in the key areas of technology, design,  demonstrations, network performance, and cost and affordability to  support the 2009 milestone review, and the execution challenges that a  post-milestone review FCS program presents to DOD and the Congress,  we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of Defense’s Cost  Analysis Improvement Group; the Secretary of Defense’s Program Analysis  and Evaluation; Director Defense Research and Engineering; the Joint  Staff; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information  Integration); the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; the Director of  Operational Test and Evaluation; the Future Force Integration Directorate;  the Army Evaluation Task Force, the Army Test and Evaluation Command;  the Director of the Combined Test Organization; the Program  Manager,  Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); and the Project Manager,  Future Combat System Spin Out.
We reviewed relevant Army and DOD documents, including the Future  Combat System’s Operational Requirements Document, the Acquisition  Strategy Report, the Selected Acquisition Report, critical technology  assessments and technology risk mitigation plans, and spin out test  results.
We attended system-level preliminary design reviews, board of directors  reviews, and system demonstrations. In our assessment of the FCS, we  used the knowledge-based acquisition practices drawn from our large  body of past work as well as DOD’s acquisition policy and the experiences  of other programs.
We certify that officials from DOD and the Army have provided us access  to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters in  this report. We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials  from the Army and the Secretary of Defense and made several changes as  a result. We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 to March  2009 in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Legislative Requirements for 2009 FCS Go/No-Go Review
paragraphs: Section 214 of Public Law 109-364 mandated that the Secretary of Defense  perform a milestone (go/no-go) review of the Future Combat Systems  acquisition program. The following depicts that legislation in its entirety as  amended by section 211 of Public Law 110-417. (a) MILESTONE REVIEW REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the  preliminary design review of the Future Combat Systems program is  completed, the Secretary of Defense shall carry out a Defense Acquisition  Board milestone review of the Future Combat Systems program. The  milestone review shall include an assessment as to each of the following:  (1) Whether the warfighter’s needs are valid and can be best met  with the concept of the program.  (2) Whether the concept of the program can be developed and  produced within existing resources.  (3) Whether the program should—  (A) continue as currently structured;  (B) continue in restructured form; or  (C) be terminated.  (b) DETERMINATIONS TO BE MADE IN ASSESSING WHETHER  PROGRAM SHOULD CONTINUE.—In making the assessment required by  subsection (a)(3), the Secretary shall make a determination with respect  to each of the following:  (1) Whether each critical technology for the program is at least  Technical Readiness Level 6.  (2) For each system and network component of the program, what  the key design and technology risks are, based on System  Functional Reviews, Preliminary Design Reviews, and Technical  Readiness Levels.  (3) Whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have  shown that the concept of the program will work.  (4) Whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have  shown that the software for the program is on a path to achieve  threshold requirements on cost and schedule.  (5) Whether the program’s planned major communications  network demonstrations are sufficiently complex and realistic to  inform major program decision points.  (6) The extent to which Future Combat Systems manned ground  vehicle survivability is likely to be reduced in a degraded Future  Combat Systems communications network environment.  (7) The level of network degradation at which Future Combat  Systems manned ground vehicle crew survivability is significantly  reduced.  (8) The extent to which the Future Combat Systems  communications network is capable of withstanding network  attack, jamming, or other interference.  (9) What the cost estimate for the program is, including all spin  outs, and an assessment of the confidence level for that estimate.  (10) What the affordability assessment for the program is, given  projected Army budgets, based on the cost estimate referred to in  paragraph (9).  (c) REPORT.—The Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense  committees a report on the findings and conclusions of the milestone  review required by subsection (a). The report shall include, and display,  each of the assessments required by subsection (a) and each of the  determinations required by subsection (b).  (d) RESTRICTION ON PROCUREMENT FUNDS EFFECTIVE FISCAL  2009.—  (1) IN GENERAL.—For fiscal years beginning with 2009, the  Secretary may not obligate any funds for procurement for the  Future Combat Systems program.  (2) EXCEPTIONS.—Paragraph (1) does not apply with respect  to—  (A) the obligation of funds for costs attributable to an  insertion of new technology (to include spin out systems)  into the current force, if the insertion is approved by the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics; or  (B) the obligation of funds for the non-line-of-sight cannon  system.  (3) TERMINATION.—The requirement of paragraph (1) terminates  after the report required by subsection (c) is submitted.
section_title: Appendix IV: 2009 Defense Acquisition Board In-Process Review Criteria
section_title: Appendix V: Other Related Legislation
paragraphs: Section 212 of Public Law 110-417 requires the Assistant Secretary of  Defense (Networks and Information Integration) to report by September  30, 2009 on its analysis of FCS communications network and software. The  specific issues to be addressed are listed below.
An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications  network and software to enemy network attack, in particular the  effect of the use of significant amounts of commercial software in  FCS software.
An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications  network to electronic warfare, jamming, and other potential enemy  interference.
An assessment of the vulnerability of the FCS communications  network to adverse weather and complex terrain.
An assessment of the FCS communication network’s dependence  on satellite communications support, and an assessment of the  network’s performance in the absence of assumed levels of  satellite communications support.
An assessment of the performance of the FCS communications  network when operating in a degraded condition …and how such a  degraded network environment would affect the performance of  FCS brigades and the survivability of FCS Manned Ground  Vehicles.
An assessment, developed in coordination with the Director of  Operational Test and Evaluation, of the adequacy of the FCS  communications network testing schedule.
An assessment, developed in coordination with Defense,  Operational Test & Evaluation, of the synchronization of the  funding, schedule, and technology maturity of the WIN-T and JTRS  programs in relation to the FCS program, including any planned  FCS spin outs.
section_title: Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels
paragraphs: Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration and adopted by DOD to  determine whether technologies were sufficiently mature to be  incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior work has found TRLs to be  a valuable decision-making tool because they can presage the likely  consequences of incorporating a technology at a given level of maturity  into a product development. The maturity level of a technology can range  from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes that can be tested in a realistic  environment (TRL 7), to an actual system that has proven itself in mission  operations (TRL 9). According to DOD acquisition policy, a technology  should have been demonstrated in a relevant environment or, preferably,  in an operational environment (TRL 7) to be considered mature enough to  use for product development. Best practices of leading commercial firms  and successful DOD programs have shown that critical technologies  should be mature to at least a TRL 7 before the start of product  development.
section_title: Appendix VII: FCS Critical Technology Ratings and Projections for Achieving TRL 6
subsections: section_title: Software programmable radio
paragraphs: JTRS Handheld, manpack, small form fit    Army, Joint, multinational interface  Intrusion detection--IP network  Mobile ad hoc networking protocols  15  Multi-Spectral sensors and seekers    Air (rotary wing/UAV)--to--ground    Air (fixed wing)--to--ground (interim/robust solutions)
Ground--to--ground (mounted)
Ground--to--air (mounted)
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, major contributors to this  report were Assistant Director William R. Graveline, Marcus C. Ferguson,  William C. Allbritton, Noah B. Bleicher, Dr. Ronald N. Dains, Tana M.  Davis, John Krump, Carrie W. Rogers, and Robert S. Swierczek.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Review of Future Combat Systems Is Critical  to Program’s Direction. GAO-08-638T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-08-467SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Is a Critical Juncture for the Army’s Future  Combat System. GAO-08-408. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore the  Importance of Oversight. GAO-07-672T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat  System. GAO-07-376. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat  System’s Success. GAO-06-564T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case is Needed for Future  Combat System’s Successful Outcome. GAO-06-367. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key  for Future Combat System’s Success. GAO-06-478T. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects  for Success. GAO-05-428T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features,  Risks, and Alternatives. GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004.
Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program.  GAO-03-1010R. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,  2001.