Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance
Published: 2006-04-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In response to Hurricane Katrina, countries and organizations donated to the United States government cash and in-kind donations, including foreign military assistance. The National Response Plan establishes that the Department of State (DOS) is the coordinator of all offers of international assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for accepting the assistance and coordinating its distribution. In light of widespread congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies' accountability in receiving and distributing assistance to hurricane victims, this report is one of several initiated under the authority of the Comptroller General to review the federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina. It examines (1) the amount and use of internationally donated cash, and (2) the extent to which federal agencies have adequate policies and procedures to ensure proper accountability for the acceptance and distribution of that assistance.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Because the U.S. government had not received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance before, ad hoc procedures were developed to accept, receive and distribute the cash and in-kind assistance. Understandably, not all procedures would be in place at the outset to provide a higher level of accountability. The Administration recognized the need for improvement in its recent report on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. GAO was able to track the cash donations received to designated U.S. Treasury accounts or disbursed. In the absence of policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage $126 million in foreign cash donations to the U.S. government for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. As cash donations arrived, a National Security Council (NSC)-led interagency working group was convened to make policy decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told GAO they had identified and presented to the working group a number of items that the donated funds could be spent on. The NSC-led interagency working group determined that use of those donated funds, once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than the wider range of possible uses available if the funds were held and then accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. In October 2005, $66 million of the donated funds were spent on a FEMA case management grant, and as of March 16, 2006, $60 million remained undistributed in the DOS-designated account at the Treasury that did not pay interest. Treasury may pay interest on funds accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act. According to DOS, an additional $400 million in international cash donations could arrive. It is important that cash management policies and spending plan options are considered and in place to deal with the forthcoming donations so that the purchasing power of the donated cash is maintained for relief and reconstruction. FEMA and other agencies did not have policies and procedures in place to ensure the proper acceptance and distribution of in-kind assistance donated by foreign countries and militaries. In-kind donations included food and clothing. FEMA and other agencies established ad hoc procedures. However, in the distribution of the assistance to FEMA sites, GAO found that no agency tracked and confirmed that the assistance arrived at their destinations. Also, lack of procedures, inadequate information up front about the donations, and insufficient coordination resulted in the U.S. government agreeing to receive food and medical items that were unsuitable for use in the United States and storage costs of about $80,000. The procedures also allowed confusion about which agency was to accept and provide oversight of foreign military donations. DOD's lack of internal guidance regarding the DOS coordinating process resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived without DOS, FEMA, or DOD oversight.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005, devastating the Gulf coast of the  United States, causing billions of dollars in damage, and dislocating  thousands of residents. Government at all levels—local, state, and  federal—struggled to respond to the magnitude of the event. As the storm’s  devastation and destruction were viewed around the world, many foreign  countries offered both cash and in-kind donations, including foreign  military donations to the United States. For the first time in its history, the  U.S. government welcomed international offers of assistance to this  degree.
The framework for managing domestic events is the National Response  Plan (NRP). The NRP establishes that the Department of State (DOS) is  the coordinator of all offers of international assistance. In the aftermath of  the hurricane, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials  told us that they convened an interagency meeting to determine how the  international assistance would be managed. Shortly after this meeting the  DOS created a Hurricane Katrina Task Force. Through the task force, DOS  provided information about the offers to the FEMA, within the Department  of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOS communicated with the countries  offering assistance regarding what items would be accepted by the U.S.  government. FEMA utilized the Stafford Act to accept some of the  assistance. FEMA was responsible for coordinating the distribution of the  international assistance and ensuring that it was distributed as intended. In  carrying out these responsibilities, FEMA requested support from other  federal agencies, using a process known as mission assignment. In the  aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA requested that the Office of Foreign  Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an organization within the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID), manage all logistics/operations  support to coordinate the international in-kind assistance for FEMA. DOD  was involved in the receipt of foreign military donations.
The National Security Council (NSC) also had a role to play in the federal  response to the hurricane. In the NRP section that discusses the principal  organizational elements, issues that require policy adjudication or that fall  outside the Secretary of Homeland Security’s areas of authority---as defined  by the Homeland Security Act, the Stafford Act, and other relevant statues,  Executive Orders, and directives---are elevated for resolution through the  Homeland Security Council and the NSC system. In the case of Hurricane  Katrina, the NSC convened an interagency working group to decide how  the donated funds would be used.
FEMA had responsibility to safeguard the international assistance and to  ensure that it was used as intended. In other words, FEMA was  accountable to ensure that offers of assistance were acceptable for  consumption and use and, if so, were properly received and distributed.  Additionally in our opinion, when FEMA asks other agencies for assistance  through its mission assignment process, FEMA is to maintain adequate  oversight of the agencies’ management of the assistance, particularly since  FEMA will reimburse the agencies for providing assistance. The countries  that provided the United States with assistance did not stipulate specific  uses for their donations. Nevertheless, the United States often stipulates  conditions regarding how the assistance we provide to foreign countries  should be used, and for Hurricane Katrina DOS recognized that it had a  responsibility to maintain accountability and transparency with regard to  the use of the cash donations.
In light of widespread congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies’  accountability in receiving and distributing assistance to hurricane victims,  this report is one of several to review the events and aftermath surrounding  Hurricane Katrina initiated under the statutory authority provided to the  Comptroller General of the United States. Our objectives were to  determine (1) the amount of cash that was donated by foreign countries,  and the extent to which it had been used to assist in the relief efforts, and  (2) the extent to which those federal agencies with responsibilities  regarding the international assistance offered to the United States had  policies and procedures in place to ensure the appropriate accountability  for the acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations, including foreign  military donations.
To achieve these objectives, we reviewed legislation and other guidance,  including the NRP, and met with key officials from DOS, DHS, DOD,  USAID, Department of Treasury (Treasury), U.S. Department of Agriculture  (USDA), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department  of Health and Human Services. In addition, we collected and reviewed  relevant data, including lists of items offered and received, and letters of  acceptance from the agencies. We determined that the data used were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our  review from October 2005 through February 2006 in accordance with U.S.  generally accepted government auditing standards. For additional details  on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Historically, governments worldwide—including that of the United  States—have provided areas stricken by major disasters with aid in the  recovery process. Unlike many other countries, the U.S. government has  previously neither asked for nor accepted disaster assistance directly from  foreign countries, choosing instead to direct offers of assistance to  nongovernmental organizations such as the Red Cross. However, on August  29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and  Alabama, causing billions of dollars in damage, and 3 days afterward the  federal government, through the DOS announced worldwide assistance  would be accepted. As of December 31, 2005, 76 countries and  international organizations, such as UNICEF, donated $126 million in cash  to the U.S. government; various types of in-kind donations, such as food,  clothing, and blankets; and foreign military goods and services, such as the  use of ships and diving teams. Seven countries donated both cash and in- kind items.
There are several federal legislative and executive provisions that support  preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T.  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)  primarily establishes the programs and processes for the federal  government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states,  local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private  nonprofit organizations. FEMA has responsibility for administering the  provisions of the Stafford Act.
When and if natural disasters or terrorist attacks occur within the United  States, the National Response Plan (NRP), released in December 2004 by  DHS, provides federal agencies with a framework to coordinate federal  support to states and localities in need. The NRP works on a tiered request  system, according to which requests for assistance flow from localities to  states to the federal government when or if local and state resources are  exhausted. However, under the NRP, the federal government—DHS—can  in certain cases declare a catastrophic incident and provide assistance  without waiting for requests for assistance. According to the NRP, as events  occur and shortcomings are identified, FEMA is responsible for updating  the plan. In the NRP section that discusses the principal organizational  elements, issues that require policy adjudication or that fall outside the  Secretary of Homeland Security’s areas of authority---as defined by the  Homeland Security Act, the Stafford Act, and other relevant statues,  Executive Orders, and directives---are elevated for resolution through the  Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council system. In  the case of Hurricane Katrina, the NSC led an interagency working group to  decide how the donated funds would be used.
The Stafford Act also provides the President or his delegate with the  authority to accept and use gifts or donations in furtherance of the  purposes of the Stafford Act. FEMA, as the President’s delegate, utilized  this provision to accept international in-kind donations for the Hurricane  Katrina recovery efforts. FEMA, through its mission assignments to other  agencies, directed the use of the assistance to response efforts. Various  other agencies have gift authorities, including DOS and DOD. However, an  agency’s gift authority typically restricts the acceptance of gifts or  donations to those activities that are within the accepting agency’s mission.
For the purposes of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA—through the Stafford Act— accepted donations for the response and recovery efforts.
Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, the Secretary of  Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident  management, and the Secretary of State is charged with the responsibility  to coordinate international activities related to the prevention, preparation,  response, and recovery from a domestic incident within the United States.  Further, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security are to  establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and  coordination between their two departments. In the case of Hurricane  Katrina, DOS, through a Hurricane Katrina Task Force, coordinated the  acceptance of foreign monetary and nonmonetary assistance on behalf of  the U.S. government and DHS (FEMA), respectively. The Task Force  consisted of representatives from DOS and USAID/OFDA.
The NRP designates 15 Emergency Support Functions that identify specific  disaster responses and the organizations that have significant roles in  responding to the disasters. Two key annexes apply to international  disaster assistance. The International Coordination Support annex  provides guidance on carrying out responsibilities for international  coordination in support of the government’s response to an Incident of  National Significance. Under this annex, DOS is charged with coordinating  requests for foreign assistance based on needs conveyed by DHS or other  federal agencies. DOS facilitates communication with foreign governments  on behalf of the United States that can assist and/or support response,  mitigation, and recovery efforts and acts as an intermediary for requests  and foreign offers of assistance to the U.S. government. The NRP also  includes a Financial Management Annex. This annex requires federal  agencies to use proper federal financial principles, policies, and  regulations, and management controls to ensure proper accountability of  funds. To safeguard the assets, agencies can use the Comptroller General’s  Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government. These  standards provide federal agencies with the framework necessary to  establish internal controls and thus safeguard and monitor assets and  inventory to prevent waste, loss, or unauthorized use.
USDA and FDA were also involved in the Hurricane Katrina relief effort.  USDA is responsible for regulating the importation of animals and animal- derived materials to ensure that exotic animal and poultry diseases are not  introduced into the United States, as well as to ensure that imported meat,  poultry, or egg products are fit for human consumption. FDA regulates the  importation of foods (except for certain meats and poultry products),  drugs (human, animal, and biological), cosmetics, medical devices and  radiation emitting devices, as defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and  Cosmetic Act. For conventional operations, USDA and FDA are notified  by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to the import of food  items or medical supplies in order to ensure that the items are acceptable  for receipt in the United States.
The ad hoc processes to accept, receive, and distribute international  assistance varied depending on the type of assistance being offered.  However, whether the assistance was in the form of cash, or in-kind  donations, including foreign military donations, offers were supposed to be  initially coordinated through the DOS Hurricane Katrina Task Force.  However, we noted that not all foreign assistance was coordinated through  DOS. For example, an unknown quantity of in-kind assistance came to the  United States directly from foreign militaries.
On September 15, 2005, the President ordered a comprehensive review of  the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. The  administration released its report, The Federal Response To Hurricane  Katrina: Lessons Learned, on February 23, 2006. The report contained 125  recommendations, one of which requires DOS and DHS to lead an  interagency effort to develop procedures for reviewing, accepting, or  rejecting any offers of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic  incident, including a mechanism to receive, disburse, and audit any cash  assistance. Officials from DOS, FEMA, and DOD told us that by June 1,  2006, they will provide policies and procedures for managing international  assistance to the Homeland Security Council. Our report complements the  findings in the administration’s report.
section_title: Foreign Countries Donated Millions in Cash, But Policies, Procedures, and Plans Were Not in Place
paragraphs: In the absence of policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc  process to manage the cash donations flowing to the U.S. government from  other countries to address Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Through this  process, $126 million was donated to the U.S. government which DOS  recorded in a designated account at the U.S. Treasury to hold the funds. An  NSC-led interagency working group was established to make policy  decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told us they had  identified and presented to the working group a number of items that the  donated funds could be spent on. Once accepted by FEMA under the  Stafford Act, donated funds would be limited to use on activities in  furtherance of the Act. The working group wanted greater flexibility in the  use of the donated funds, and thus held the funds pending the group’s  determination as to which agency or agencies should ultimately accept and  use the monies. By September 21, 2005 about $115 million had been  received and in October 2005, $66 million of the donated funds were  accepted by FEMA and spent on a case management grant. As of March 16,  2006, $60 million remained undistributed in the DOS-designated account at  the Treasury that does not pay interest. As discussed previously,  undistributed funds accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act and  recorded at Treasury can receive interest. Because DOS expects  additional cash donations to be received, it is important that cash  management policies and spending plans are in place to deal with the  forthcoming donations so that the purchasing power of the donated cash is  maintained.
subsections: section_title: Ad Hoc Procedures Allowed Reasonable Accountability for Cash Donations
paragraphs: For offers of cash assistance, the DOS Hurricane Katrina Task Force  developed ad hoc procedures to track and account for amounts offered and  received as events evolved. Ad hoc procedures were necessary because  specific policies and procedures for handling international cash donations  to the federal government had not been developed. The DOS Hurricane  Katrina Task Force evaluated each monetary offer by working with foreign  donors to determine whether there were any specific restrictions or  conditions associated with the offers. In making their donations, foreign  donors did not generally place restrictions or conditions on amounts  pledged. DOS also encouraged governments and private foreign donors to  direct their cash contributions to the Red Cross and other organizations.  Additionally, DOS coordinated with other federal agencies to determine  whether any U.S. government sanctions imposed on a donating country  prevented the acceptance of its offer. Once an offer was accepted on  behalf of the U.S. government, DOS provided the donor with instructions  on how to wire transfer the funds to a designated Department of the  Treasury account maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York  specifically for DOS. In other cases, countries and private citizens wrote  checks to the U.S. government that were deposited and routed to the same  account following normal operating procedures. Figure 1 below shows the  process developed to receive cash donations.
As of December 31, 2005, DOS reported that $126 million had been donated  by 36 countries and international organizations. Our review noted that  although DOS’s procedures were ad hoc, they did ensure the proper  recording of international cash donations that have been received to date,  and we were able to reconcile the funds received with those held in the  designated DOS account at Treasury. DOS expects that additional  donations could come in from several countries including $400 million in  pledged oil products from a foreign country. DOS officials told us that the  foreign country’s governing body must approve the donation before this  pledge can be executed and that the country intends to monetize—convert  to cash—the oil products if and when its governing body approves the  donation.
section_title: Cash Donation Management Policies, Procedures, and Plans Not in Place
paragraphs: In the absence of international cash donation management policies,  procedures, and plans, an NSC-led interagency working group was  established to determine uses for the international cash donations. In  October 2005, $66 million of the donated funds had been accepted by  FEMA under the Stafford Act and used for a Hurricane Katrina relief grant.  As of March 16, 2006 the other $60 million from international donations  remained undistributed. We were told that the NSC-led interagency  working group did not transfer the funds to FEMA because it wanted to  retain the flexibility to spend the donated funds on a wider range of  assistance than is permitted under the Stafford Act. During this period and  while deliberations were ongoing, the funds were kept in a DOS account  that did not pay interest, thereby diminishing the purchasing power of the  donated funds and losing an opportunity to maximize the resources  available for relief. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA could have held the  funds in an account that can pay interest, but Treasury lacks the statutory  authority to credit these DOS-held funds with interest. If there are dual  goals of flexibility and maintaining purchasing power, there are a number  of options that could be considered.
Table 1 below shows the dates of key events in the receipt and distribution  of the international cash donations according to documentation received  and interviews with DOS and FEMA officials.
In early September 2005, FEMA officials had identified an account at the  U.S. Treasury for recording international cash donations and had  developed a number of potential uses for the donations that would help  meet relief needs of the disaster. By September 21, 2005, about $115 million  in foreign cash donations had been received. In its input to the NSC-led  interagency working group, dated September 22, 2005, DOS recognized that  every effort should be made to disburse the funds to provide swift and  meaningful relief to Hurricane Katrina victims without compromising  needed internal controls to ensure proper management and effective use of  the cash donations and transparency. FEMA officials told us that on  September 23, 2005, they had identified and proposed to the NSC-led  interagency working group that the international cash donations could be  spent on the following items for individuals and families affected by  Hurricane Katrina: social services assistance, medical transportation,  adapting homes for medical and handicap needs, job training and  education, living expenses, building materials, furniture, and  transportation. In responding to our draft report, a DHS official said that at  the next meeting of the interagency working group on October 7, 2005,  FEMA, at NSC’s request, presented a more detailed description of certain  potential activities, including a proposal to finance case management  services for households affected by Hurricane Katrina. On October 20,  2005, with the NSC-led interagency working group consensus, DOS  transferred to FEMA $66 million of the international donations for the  purpose of financing case management services for up to 100,000 such  households. These services will provide case workers to help individual  households define what their needs are and to obtain available assistance.  On October 28, 2005, FEMA awarded a $66 million 2-year case management  grant to the United Methodist Committee on Relief. With these funds, the  United Methodist Committee on Relief will lead and manage a national  consortium consisting of 10 primary organizations that will provide case  management services to victims of Hurricane Katrina.
As of February 2006, the remaining $60 million had not been released,  pending the NSC-led interagency working group determination as to which  agency or agencies should ultimately accept and use the remaining funds.  The NSC-led interagency working group set various parameters for using  the funds, including that the funds should be used for “bricks and mortar”  projects, such as buildings that provide tangible evidence of how  contributions were used. We were told that the NSC-led interagency  working group determined that use of those funds, once accepted by FEMA  under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than the wider range of  possible uses available if the funds were held until their ultimate use was  determined and then accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies.
DOS and FEMA officials told us that for the remaining $60 million in  donated funds, the NSC-led interagency working group was considering a  series of proposals received from various entities, both public and private.  At the time of our review, a member of the NSC-led interagency working  group told us they had agreed that the vital needs of schools in the area  would be an appropriate place to apply the donations and they were  working with the Department of Education to finalize arrangements to  provide funding to meet those needs. FEMA officials told us that under the  Stafford Act, they could use donated funds for projects such as rebuilding  schools, but projects for new school buildings are not consistent with  Stafford Act purposes unless replacing a damaged one. Also, according to a  DHS official, the Act would have required that receiving entities match  FEMA funds for these purposes. However, because of the devastation, the  entities would have difficulty matching FEMA funds, which in essence  limited FEMA from doing these types of projects. According to DHS, FEMA  considered whether it would be useful for donated funds to contribute to  the non-federal share for applicants having trouble meeting the non-federal  share, but would need legislative authority to use it to match federal funds.  We contacted NSC to further discuss these matters; however, NSC did not  respond to our requests for a meeting. On March 16, 2006, DOS and the  Department of Education signed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding  the use of $60 million of the international cash donations. We did not  review the details of this agreement.
Advance planning is very important given that outstanding pledges of $400  million or more that DOS officials indicated will likely be received. While  acknowledging that the U.S. government has never previously had occasion  to accept such large amounts of international donations for disaster relief,  going forward, advance planning is a useful tool to identify potential  programs and projects prior to the occurrence of an event of such  magnitude. The administration’s report The Federal Response To  Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, released on February 23, 2006,  recognized that there was no pre-established plan for handling  international donations and that implementation of the procedures  developed was a slow and often frustrating process. The report includes  recommendations that DOS should establish before June 1, 2006, an  interagency process to determine appropriate uses of international cash  donations, and ensure timely use of these funds in a transparent and  accountable manner, among others. DOS officials recognized that the ad  hoc process needed to be formalized and planned to develop such  procedures by June 1, 2006.
While the NSC-led interagency working group was reviewing various  proposals on the further use of the funds beyond the initial $66 million, the  remaining $60 million was being held in a DOS account at the U.S. Treasury  that does not pay interest. Treasury lacks the statutory authority to credit  these DOS-held funds with interest. Since these funds have not yet been  used, their purchasing power has diminished due to inflation. If these funds  had been placed in an account that could be credited with interest to offset  the erosion of purchasing power, the amount of funds available for relief  and recovery efforts would have increased while decision makers  determined how to use them. The U.S. government would be responsible  for paying the interest if these funds were held in an account at the  Treasury that can earn interest.
Although the Stafford Act does not apply to the donated funds maintained  in the DOS account at Treasury, the Stafford Act does provide that excess  donated funds may be placed in Treasury securities, and the related  interest paid on such investments would be credited to the account. This  Stafford Act provision applies only to donated funds that have been  accepted by FEMA. Had the foreign monetary donations been placed in Treasury securities, we estimate that by February 23, 2006, the remaining  funds for relief efforts would have increased by nearly $1 million.  Although Treasury lacks the authority to invest the foreign monetary  donations received by DOS, the FEMA account does permit the  government to protect the purchasing power of foreign monetary  donations.
As noted previously, outstanding pledges totaling over $400 million could  be received in the near future. Advanced planning and procedures for the  decision-making process in the disbursement of funds is important so that  this money can be utilized for disaster relief in a timely manner or be  placed in an account to earn interest for the benefit of relief and  reconstruction efforts while decisions are being made on how to spend the  funds. When developing policies, procedures, and plans to provide the  flexibility given by leaving the international donations in the DOS account,  it is important that consideration also be given to strategies that can help  maintain the purchasing power of the international donations. If the goal is  to maintain both their purchasing power and flexibility, then among the  options to consider are seeking statutory authority for DOS to record the  funds in a Treasury account that can pay interest similar to donations  accepted under the Stafford Act, or to allow DOS to deposit the funds in an  existing Treasury account of another agency that can pay interest pending  decisions on how the funds would be used.
section_title: Policies and Procedures Were Lacking in the Acceptance and Distribution of in-Kind Donations, Including Foreign Military Donations
paragraphs: The agencies having responsibilities regarding international assistance did  not have policies and procedures in place to ensure the acceptance and  distribution of in-kind donations, including foreign military donations,  received from 43 countries and international organizations. With little  guidance, DOS, FEMA, OFDA, and DOD created ad hoc policies and  procedures in an effort to provide the assistance to victims as quickly as  possible. However, we did note areas in which the ad hoc procedures were  missing internal controls to ensure sufficient agency oversight of the  assistance and to ensure that the assistance was used as intended. For  example, the lack of guidance, inadequate information up front about the  nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind assistance, and insufficient  advance coordination before acceptance resulted in food and medical  items, such as Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and medical supplies, that  arrived and did not meet USDA or FDA standards and thus could not be  distributed in the United States. Also, the ad hoc procedures allowed for  confusion about which agency—FEMA or DOD—accepted and was  responsible for oversight of foreign military donations.
subsections: section_title: Process Developed for Accepting, Receiving, and Distributing In-Kind Donations
paragraphs: For offers of in-kind assistance, FEMA worked in close coordination with  the DOS Task Force to determine whether it should accept the offers.  Specifically, FEMA provided the Task Force with a list of supplies the  agency could use to assist in recovery efforts. The Task Force compared  the offers of assistance against a list of needed supplies provided by  FEMA. As matches were identified by the Task Force, DOS relayed a  message to the donor that the offer would be accepted on behalf of the  United States for use in Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.
Once a message of acceptance was relayed to the foreign country or  international organization donating the in-kind assistance, the Office of  Foreign Disaster Assistance was tasked by FEMA with the responsibility of  providing logistical support for physical receipt of the donation.  USAID/OFDA coordinated with DOD–Northern Command to establish a  location that could be used to receive international donations. The location  had to be both accessible to numerous flights delivering supplies and in  close proximity to the areas devastated by Hurricane Katrina, and  USAID/OFDA and DOD–Northern Command determined that the Little  Rock Air Force Base best qualified for these criteria. Accordingly,  USAID/OFDA coordinated with foreign donors for in-kind donations to  arrive in Little Rock, Arkansas, where agency personnel would unload  donations and, upon request from FEMA, forward the donations to a  distribution point.
Figure 2 below shows the process developed for accepting, receiving, and  distributing in-kind donations.
section_title: Lack of Guidance Regarding the Tracking and Confirmation of Receipt for International Assistance
paragraphs: In the absence of guidance, USAID/OFDA created a database to track the  assistance as it arrived. We found, under the circumstances, that  USAID/OFDA reasonably accounted for the assistance, especially given the  lack of manifest information and the amount of assistance that was arriving  within a short time. Compounding difficulties in USAID/OFDA’s ability to  record the assistance as it arrived were planes that arrived from the North  Atlantic Treaty Organization for which the organization would not provide  reliable manifest information.
Internal controls, such as a system to track that shipments are received at  intended destinations, provides an agency with oversight, and for FEMA in  this case, they help ensure that international donations are received at  FEMA destination sites. On September 14, 2005, FEMA and USAID/OFDA  agreed that USAID/OFDA would track the assistance from receipt through  final disposition. However, the system USAID/OFDA created did not  include confirming that the assistance was received at the FEMA  distribution sites. In part, USAID/OFDA did not set up these procedures on  its own in this situation because USAID/OFDA had never distributed  assistance within the United States as its mission is to deliver assistance in  foreign countries. FEMA officials told us that they assumed USAID/OFDA  had these controls in place. FEMA and USAID/OFDA officials could not  provide us with evidence that confirmed that the assistance sent to  distribution sites was received. Without these controls in place to ensure  accountability for the assistance, FEMA does not know if all or part of  these donations were received at FEMA distribution sites. Had  USAID/OFDA created a system to track the items transported through  receipt at distribution sites and had FEMA overseen the USAID/OFDA  process, FEMA would be able to determine the extent to which all or part  of the foreign assistance was received at the FEMA distribution sites.
section_title: Lack of Guidance Resulted in the Arrival of Food and Medical Items that Could Not be Used
paragraphs: The lack of guidance, inadequate information up front about foreign offers  of in-kind assistance and insufficient advance coordination before agreeing  to receive it, resulted in food and medical items, such as MREs and medical  supplies, that came into the United States and did not meet USDA or FDA  standards and thus could not be distributed in the United States. The food  items included MREs from five countries. Because of the magnitude of the  disaster, some normal operating procedures governing the import of goods  were waived. According to USDA and FDA officials, under normal  procedures, entry documents containing specific information which are  filed with CBP, are transmitted to USDA and FDA for those agencies’ use in  determining if the commodities are appropriately admissible into the  United States. Based on U.S. laws and regulations, the agencies then  determine whether the items to be imported meet U.S. standards. CBP  authorized suspension of some normal operating procedures for the import  of regulated items like food and medical supplies without consultation or  prior notification to USDA or FDA. Thus, USDA and FDA had no  involvement in the decision–making process for regulated product  donations, including MREs and medical supplies before the United States  agreed to receive them.
FEMA notified USDA and FDA on approximately September 4, 2005, that  food and medical supplies were received by the U.S. government and  approved by CBP for entry into the United States. However, FEMA officials  told us that they did not accept MREs from one country even though these  MREs were shipped and stored in the warehouse along with the MREs from  the other countries. On approximately September 4, the items were either  in route or had already arrived at the staging area in Little Rock, Arkansas.  The USDA and FDA then sent personnel to Little Rock to inspect the  donations. Simultaneously, USAID/OFDA personnel, unaware that some of  these donations would not be eligible for distribution and trying to expedite  provision of relief supplies, forwarded approximately 220,000 MREs to  distribution points. When USAID/OFDA officials became aware that the  MREs they distributed were not approved by the USDA, they recalled the  items back to Little Rock, Arkansas, pending USDA inspection.
According to USDA inspectors, they determined that a number of the MREs  donated to the United States contained meat and poultry products from  countries that, based on U.S. regulations, were excluded from exporting  meat to the United States. According to USDA, the MREs from one country  were banned because of concerns regarding Bovine Spongiform  Encephalopathy (BSE) meat contamination, or because the MREs  originated in countries lacking food inspection systems equivalent to those  in the United States. In addition, FDA found that many of the medical  supplies received in Little Rock were not approved for use in the United  States because they were either labeled with instructions in a language  other than English or stored under conditions that were deemed  unsanitary. Both USDA and FDA, based on regulations intended to protect  public health, prevented distribution of some international donations.
Per FEMA guidance, USAID/OFDA received 359,600 rations of MREs that  could not be distributed within the United States. USAID/OFDA, on behalf  of FEMA, has been storing the MREs and medical supplies at a private  warehouse in Little Rock, Arkansas, until DOS and FEMA determine what  to do with them. As of February 1, 2006, FEMA and DOS had paid the  warehouse $62,000, with an additional $17,600 contract pending for the  month of February. In addition to the storage cost, there is an  unquantifiable cost in the diplomatic impact of rejecting foreign donations  after they have been received. DOS has arranged for some of the MREs to  be shipped to foreign countries in need and DOS officials told us that the  receiving countries will be paying the shipping costs. As of February 3,  2006, approximately 40 percent of the 359,600 rations of MREs have been  forwarded to two other countries. The DOS plans to forward an additional  21 percent to other countries by February 28, 2006. While the disposition  of the remaining 40 percent of the MREs and the medical supplies still  stored in the private warehouse is uncertain, DOS will continue to pay  storage fees. The following picture displays the numerous pallets of MREs  stored in Little Rock, Arkansas as of November 9, 2005.
The costs for FEMA’s receipt and later storage of the MREs and medical  supplies that were not distributed for the disaster were attributable in part  to the lack of policies and procedures needed to guide it through the  process of coordinating and accepting international in-kind assistance.  First, our review noted that FEMA’s list of items that could be used for  disaster relief that was provided to DOS was very general and did not  provide any exceptions, for example about contents of MREs. Also, DHS  commented on our report that FEMA repeatedly requested from DOS  additional information about the foreign items being offered to determine  whether or not they should be accepted and DOS did not respond. Had  FEMA supplied DOS officials with more detailed information early on  about what could be accepted and what could not be ultimately distributed,  and had DOS requested and received additional details from potential  donors on the nature and contents of the assistance such as MREs, they  might have prevented the unusable products from coming into the United  States. FEMA officials told us that in the event of another disaster of this  size, they would coordinate with USDA, FDA, and other agencies as  required to avoid similar problems.
section_title: Policies and Procedures Were Lacking in the Oversight of Foreign Military Donations
paragraphs: In the absence of policies and procedures, DOS, FEMA, and DOD created  ad hoc policies and procedures to manage the receipt and distribution of  foreign military goods and services; however, this guidance allowed for  confusion about which agency had oversight of these donations. Also, there  were no controls or procedures to assure that all foreign military donations  were vetted through the DOS process. The offers of foreign military  assistance included, for example, the use of amphibious ships and diver  salvage teams.
For foreign military donations, the DOS Hurricane Katrina Task Force  coordinated with FEMA and DOD, through Northern Command, to  determine whether the offer of assistance could be utilized. Northern  Command reviewed the offers of assistance and compared them against  the mission assignments it received from FEMA that included such tasks as  clearing ports and waterways of debris. If Northern Command believed the  foreign militaries’ offers of assistance could be utilized to accomplish a  mission assignment, the command coordinated the receipt of the  assistance with the foreign donor. Figure 4 below shows the process  developed for acceptance and receipt of foreign military assistance.
The ad hoc procedures, however, allowed confusion about which agency— DOD or FEMA—was to formally accept the foreign military assistance and  therefore, each agency apparently assumed the other had done so under  their respective gift authorities. It is unclear whether FEMA or DOD  accepted or maintained oversight of the foreign military donations that  were vetted through the DOS task force. A FEMA official told us that they  were unable to explain how the foreign military donations were used  because FEMA could not match the use of the donations with mission  assignments it gave Northern Command. Establishing accountability is an  important internal control activity to help ensure that there is an  organization to account for the goods and services and that they are used  as intended. While we have found no evidence to suggest that any of the  foreign military goods or services were not used as intended, establishing  and maintaining oversight provides more assurance that these donations  were used as intended.
Moreover, FEMA and Northern Command officials told us of instances in  which foreign military donations arrived in the United States that were not  vetted through the DOS task force. For example, we were told of foreign  military MREs that were shipped to a military base and distributed directly  to hurricane victims. Having policies and procedures in place would have  instructed federal officials to coordinate all foreign military offers of  assistance through the DOS task force which would work with FEMA and  DOD to determine the best use for the items. DOD officials acknowledged  the need for policies and procedures and are trying to establish policies and  procedures to manage international assistance. When we asked about  shipments that were not vetted through the task force, neither DOS, FEMA,  nor DOD officials could provide us information on the type, amount, or use  of these donations. As a result, we can not determine if these items of  assistance were safeguarded and used as intended.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: We recognize that since the United States government had never before  received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance,  DOS, FEMA, OFDA, and DOD needed to create ad hoc procedures to  manage the acceptance and distribution of the assistance as best they  could. Going forward, it will be important to have in place clear policies,  procedures, and plans on how international cash donations are to be  managed and used, which would enhance the accountability and  transparency of these funds. In addition, there is a need to consider  whether international donations should be treated on the same basis as  Stafford Act donations for the purpose of Treasury crediting interest to  such donations. Since this was the first time international donations were  accepted, this situation was not contemplated. If the goal is to maintain  both purchasing power and flexibility, then among the options to consider  are seeking statutory authority for DOS to record the funds in a Treasury  account that can pay interest, or to allow DOS to deposit the funds in an  existing Treasury account of another agency that can pay interest pending  decisions on how the funds would be used. In addition, focusing immediate  attention on the potentially forthcoming donations of $400 million, as well  as the $60 million in presently available funds, would be prudent.
With respect to the donations of food and medical supplies, we agree that  normal procedures should be waived to expedite recovery efforts when  necessary; however, food and medical supplies are essential in any disaster  and the health and safety of the public should be considered when  accepting food and medical assistance from the international community.  Moreover, the failure to track in-kind donations after they were loaded onto  trucks resulted in a lack of assurance that all of the international assistance  FEMA accepted was safeguarded, and used as intended. The need to have  proper knowledge, acceptance, and oversight of foreign military donations  is equally important.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: As mentioned previously, in February 2006, the administration issued its  report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina and the lessons learned  in that response. In the report, the administration made 125  recommendations, including several to improve the management of  international donations. Specifically, DOS and DHS are required to lead an  interagency effort to improve the management of international donations,  which includes developing procedures for reviewing, accepting, or  rejecting any offers as well as developing a mechanism to receive, disburse,  and audit any cash donations. To help ensure that the cognizant agencies  fulfill their responsibility to account for and effectively manage foreign  donations and maintain adequate internal controls over government  resources, we recommend that the Secretary, Department of Homeland  Security, in consultation with the Secretary, Department of State, establish  within the National Response Plan—or other appropriate plans—clearly  delineated policies and procedures for the acceptance, receipt, and  distribution of international assistance. As the agencies develop and  implement the administration’s recommendations, we believe they should  also incorporate the following actions and procedures into their guidance.
Develop policies, procedures, and plans to help ensure international  cash donations for disaster relief and assistance are accepted and used  appropriately as needed.
Consider cash management options as discussed in the conclusions  section above and place international cash donations in an account that  would pay interest while decisions are pending on their use to maintain  the purchasing power of those donations.
Maintain oversight of foreign donated in-kind assets by tracking them  from receipt to disbursement, to reasonably ensure that assistance is  delivered where it is intended.
Establish plans for the acceptance of foreign-donated items that include  coordinating with regulatory agencies, such as USDA and FDA, in  advance, in order to prevent the acceptance of items that are prohibited  from distribution in the United States, regardless of waivers that might  be established to expedite the importing of foreign assistance; these  plans should also include DOS obtaining information on acceptable or  unacceptable items in order to communicate to the international  community what is needed or what can not be accepted.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the  Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, take the following two actions:  Establish within the National Response Plan or other appropriate  plans—clearly delineated policies and procedures to ensure that foreign  military offers of assistance for domestic disasters are coordinated  through the DOS to ensure they are properly accepted and safeguarded  and used as intended.
Develop and issue internal DOD guidance to commanders on the  agreed-upon process to coordinate assistance through DOS.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We asked the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, State, and  Treasury to comment on our draft. We also asked USDA, FDA, and  USAID/OFDA to provide comments. DOD and DHS generally agreed with  our recommendations and provided written comments on a draft of this  report, included at appendixes II and III, respectively. We received  technical comments from DOS, DOD, USAID/OFDA, FEMA, FDA, and  USDA which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD agreed with the recommendations pertaining to it and suggested that  we adjust the wording of the recommendation that procedures be  developed to assure that foreign military donations be routed through DOS.  We adjusted the recommendation based on DOD’s suggestion. In its  technical comments, DOD also suggested specific information on the  process to coordinate international offers of assistance through DOS,  including ensuring that the offers match U.S. requirements, meet U.S.  standards, and are received at the right locations. These specifics may be  considered as the agencies develop policies, procedures, and plans for the  management of future international assistance.
DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and noted that, in some  cases, actions were already underway to address the recommendations.  Regarding our recommendation to develop policies, procedures, and plans  for international cash donations for disaster relief to assure they are  accepted and used appropriately as needed, DHS noted that, in  coordination with Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget, it is  already developing a system to manage such donations. DHS also agreed  with our recommendation regarding cash management options that would  maintain the purchasing power of the cash donations while decisions are  pending on their use. DHS added that this recommendation was consistent  with what FEMA did during Hurricane Katrina, pointing out that on  September 6, 2005, FEMA established an interest bearing account to hold  international funds and began identifying programs and needs that would  not be eligible for FEMA assistance but could benefit from monetary  donations. DHS also agreed that FEMA should maintain oversight of  foreign donated in-kind assets to the distribution points. DHS noted that  FEMA and USAID/OFDA agreed that it was USAID/OFDA’s responsibility to  track incoming international donations. We acknowledge this agreement,  but note in our report, however, that the in-kind donations were not  tracked to the final distribution points with confirmation that they arrived  and note that USAID/OFDA and FEMA could not provide evidence that this  had been accomplished. We clarified the report in this regard. DHS agreed  with our recommendation regarding the need to coordinate with regulatory  agencies such as USDA and FDA in advance to prevent the receipt of items  that could not be distributed in the United States. DHS noted that FEMA  coordinated with these agencies during Hurricane Katrina, and made  constant requests to DOS to obtain more information from the donors  about the donations to determine whether or not they could be properly  accepted. We agree that more specificity is needed about the nature and  content of items the United States can accept and foreign nations are  offering through DOS channels, such as MREs, and reflected DHS’s  comment in the final report. Without such information, it may not be  possible to undertake appropriate coordination with regulatory agencies  such as USDA and FDA and make a sound determination as to whether the  items should be accepted and could be used in the United States before  they arrive. DHS also agreed that all foreign military offers of assistance for  domestic disasters should be coordinated through DOS for official  acceptance or denial. However, we continue to believe that clear  procedures are needed regarding which agency—FEMA or DOD—accepts  and maintains oversight of such donations in advance. We adjusted our  draft report to reflect the apparent confusion over the acceptance of  foreign military donations.
We also received technical comments from DOS, DOD, USAID/OFDA,  FEMA, FDA, and USDA, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland  Security, Defense, and State and interested congressional committees. We  will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http:/www.gao.gov.
Please contact Davi M. D’Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or  dagostinod@gao.gov or McCoy Williams at (202) 512-9095 or  williamsm1@gao.gov if your staff have any questions concerning this  report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and  Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who  made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To meet our objectives for this report we relied on information gathered  through our visits and interviews with key personnel within the  Department of State’s (DOS) Hurricane Katrina Task Force; Office of the  General Counsel for the DOS; Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  Inspector General; Office of the General Counsel for Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA); FEMA Response Division; FEMA Recovery  Division; Office of the Chief Financial Officer for FEMA; FEMA/Financial  and Acquisitions Management Division; FEMA/Grants Management  Division; United States Agency for International Development  (USAID)/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); OFDA/Response  Alternatives for Technical Services; Office of the Assistant Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense;  Northern Command (NORTHCOM)/ Joint Staff Logistics; NORTHCOM/  Joint Staff Civil Affairs; NORTHCOM/Political Advisor; Department of  Treasury (Treasury)/Cash Accounting; Treasury/Chief Systems Integrity  Division; Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and United States  Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Food Safety and Inspection Service. We  conducted our work in Washington, D.C.; Little Rock, Arkansas; Colorado  Springs, Colorado, and New York, New York, from October 2005 through  February 2006, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. DOS and FEMA officials told us the National Security Council  (NSC) had established an interagency working group that had a role in  determining how the international cash donations were to be used. We  contacted NSC to discuss its role in managing the international cash  donations; however, NSC did not respond to our request for a meeting.
To determine the amount of cash that was donated by foreign countries and  the extent to which it has been used to assist hurricane victims, we  gathered information from interviews with DOS, FEMA, and Treasury. To  assess the reliability of foreign cash donations received by the U.S.  government from the date Hurricane Katrina hit the United States until  December 31, 2005, we talked with DOS, FEMA, and Treasury officials to  gain an understanding of the procedures followed in recording the funds.  We also validated $123,611,143, which is 97.8 percent of the Hurricane  Katrina collections reflected in the Department of Treasury records by  comparing to supporting documentation such as Treasury wire transfers  and DOS check receipt documents. We also traced the transfer of $66  million in funds from DOS to FEMA. We determined the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report. To obtain an  understanding of the oversight controls over FEMA’s-2 year case  management grant, we interviewed officials from FEMA/Grants  Management Division, the United Methodist Committee on Relief, and DHS  Office of Inspector General, as well as reviewed pertinent documents such  as the grant proposal and agreement. We also contacted the NSC to discuss  why an interagency working group and not FEMA was used to manage the  donated cash and the process by which they established the parameters  governing how the cash was to be used. NSC did not respond to our  requests for a meeting.
To determine the extent to which those federal agencies with  responsibilities regarding the international assistance offered to the United  States had policies and procedures in place to ensure the appropriate  accountability for the acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations,  including foreign military donations, we relied on information gathered  during interviews with officials from DOS, DHS, DOD, USDA, and FDA. We  reviewed the National Response Plan International Coordination Support  Annex and Financial Management Annex; Robert T. Stafford Act;  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5; Federal Food, Drug, and  Cosmetic Act; and 9 CFR 94.18 to determine the responsibilities of federal  agencies. We also obtained, reviewed, and analyzed the Memorandum of  Agreement between the Department of State and The Department of  Homeland Security; a FEMA-created international assistance flow chart  and processes document; a NORTHCOM-created international donations  flowc hart; USAID Commodity Dispatch Procedures; and FDA Import  Procedures to assist in understanding the roles of federal agencies. We  reviewed and analyzed summaries of international assistance received;  instructional and acceptance cables from the Department of State;  instructions provided to FEMA accountants for recording in-kind  donations; and USAID Commodity Dispatch Procedures for FEMA to call  forward international donations from the arrival site in Little Rock,  Arkansas. To assess the reliability of data provided, we talked with  knowledgeable agency officials about the data provided and reviewed  relevant documentation. We visited Smart Choice Delivery warehouse in  Little Rock, Arkansas to discuss and observe the international Meals- Ready-to-Eat that were stored in the facility. We obtained and reviewed the  contract between the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Smart  Choice Delivery. In addition, we interviewed representatives from the  American Red Cross and the United Nations International Children’s Fund  in order to understand the process and procedures of leading non- governmental agencies that are experienced in accepting non-monetary  donations.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Kay Daly, Kate Lenane, Charles Perdue,  Jay Spaan, Lorelei St James, Pamela Valentine, Cheryl Weissman, and  Leonard Zapata made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New Orleans  and Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6  Months After Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R. Washington, D.C.: March  28, 2006.
Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina  and Rita. GAO-06-461R. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of  Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06-443R.  Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2006.
Investigation: Military Meals, Ready-To-Eat Sold on eBay. GAO-06-410R.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:  FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant  Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington: D.C., February 13, 2006.
Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's  Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.,   February 1, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National  Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-335T. Washington, D.C.: January 25,  2006.
Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee  Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain  Project. GAO-06-322T. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance.  GAO- 06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Army Corps of Engineers: History of the Lake Pontchartrain and  Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project. GAO-06-244T. Washington, D.C.:  November 9, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting  for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. Washington, D.C.:  November 8, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery  Efforts. GAO-06-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of  the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-183T. Washington, D.C.:  October 20, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the National  Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. Washington, D.C.:   October 18, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to  Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance  Program. GAO-06-119. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005.
Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane  Projection Project. GAO-05-1050T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005.
Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation's Preparedness,  Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2005.