Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles
Published: 2009-10-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As of July 2008, about 75 percent of casualties in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were attributed to improvised explosive devices. To mitigate the threat from these weapons, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) program in February 2007, which used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field the vehicles. In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense affirmed MRAP as DOD's most important acquisition program. To date, about $22.7 billion has been appropriated for the procurement of more than 16,000 MRAP vehicles. This testimony today describes the MRAP acquisition process, the results to date, lessons learned from that acquisition, and potential implications for improving the standard acquisition process. It is mostly based on the work we have conducted over the past few years on the MRAP program. Most prominently, in 2008, we reported on the processes followed by DOD for the acquisition of MRAP vehicles and identified challenges remaining in the program. To describe DOD's approach for and progress in implementing its strategy for rapidly acquiring and fielding MRAP vehicles, we reviewed DOD's plans to buy, test, and field the vehicles and discussed the plans with cognizant department and contractor officials. To identify the remaining challenges for the program, we reviewed the results of testing and DOD's plans to upgrade and sustain the vehicles
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD use of a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP vehicles was successful. The program relied only on proven technologies and commercially available products; established minimal operational requirements; and undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the vehicles. To expand limited production capacity, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts were awarded to nine commercial sources, with DOD agreeing to buy at least 4 vehicles from each. Subsequent orders were based on a concurrent testing approach with progressively more advanced vehicle test results and other assessments. To expedite fielding of the vehicles, the government retained the responsibility for final integration in them of mission equipment packages including radios and other equipment. DOD also made MRAP its highest priority acquisition, which helped contractors and others more rapidly respond to the need and meet production requirements, in part by early investing of their own capital to purchase steel and other critical components in advance of orders. Schedule and performance results for MRAP were very good overall. In July 2008, nearly all testing was completed; the Marine Corps had placed orders for 14,173 MRAPs; and, as of May 2008, 9,121 vehicles had been delivered. As of July 2009, 16,204 vehicles have been produced and 13,848 vehicles fielded in two theaters of operation. Total MRAP production funding was about $22.7 billion, mostly through supplemental appropriations. In terms of lessons learned, MRAP's success was driven by several factors, including quick action to declare its acquisition DOD's highest priority and giving it a DX rating, which allowed access to more critical materials than was otherwise available. The availability of supplemental appropriations was also essential. However, while neither of these factors are practically transferable to other programs, decisions to 1) use only proven technologies, 2) keep requirements to a minimum, 3) infuse significant competition into contracting, and 4) keep final integration responsibility with the government all led to positive outcomes and may be transferable. Challenges to MRAP remain in its reliability, mobility, and safety, which required some modifying of designs and postproduction fixes, and adapting how vehicles were used. Also, long term sustainment costs are not understood and the services are only now deciding how MRAP fits them in the longer term. GAO's multiple best practices reports have underscored the need for the use of mature technologies, well understood requirements, systems engineering knowledge, and incremental delivery of capabilities to enable quicker deliveries. Finally, a broader lesson learned is that it is time to invest the time, money, and management skills in the science and technology community to enable the effectiveness we expect from the acquisition community.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss rapid acquisition programs within  the Department of Defense (DOD), with a focus on our work on the Mine  Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles as a case study example. As  of July 2008, about 75 percent of casualties in combat operations in Iraq  and Afghanistan were attributed to improvised explosive devices. To  mitigate the threat from these weapons, the DOD initiated the MRAP  program in February 2007, which used a tailored acquisition approach to  rapidly acquire and field the vehicles. In May 2007, the Secretary of  Defense affirmed MRAP as DOD’s single most important acquisition  program. To date, about $22.7 billion has been appropriated for the  procurement of more than 16,000 MRAP vehicles.
My statement today describes the MRAP acquisition process, the results to  date, lessons learned from that acquisition, and potential implications for  improving the standard acquisition process. It is mostly based on the work  we have conducted over the past few years on the MRAP program. Most  prominently, in 2008, we reviewed and reported on the processes followed  by DOD for the acquisition of MRAP vehicles and identified challenges  remaining in the program.  In that report, to describe DOD’s approach for  and progress in implementing its strategy for rapidly acquiring and fielding  MRAP vehicles, we reviewed DOD’s plans to buy, test, and field the  vehicles and discussed the plans with cognizant department and  contractor officials. To identify the remaining challenges for the program,  we reviewed the results of testing and DOD’s plans to upgrade and sustain  the vehicles. We conducted that performance audit from June 2007 to July  2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In February 2005, Marine Corps combatant commanders identified an  urgent operational need for armored tactical vehicles to increase crew  protection and mobility of Marines operating in hazardous fire areas  against improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, and  small arms fire. In response, the Marine Corps identified the solution as  the up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle. Over the  next 18 months, however, combatant commanders continued to identify a  requirement for more robust mine-protected vehicles. According to the  acquisition plan, in November 2006, the Marine Corps awarded a sole  source indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract and  subsequently placed orders for the first 144 vehicles to respond to the  urgent requirement while it conducted a competitive acquisition for the  balance of the vehicles.  In February 2007, the Assistant Secretary of the  Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition approved MRAPs entry  into production as a rapid acquisition capability. In September of 2007, the  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  designated MRAP as a major defense acquisition program with the Marine  Corps Systems Command as the Joint Program Executive Officer.  Quantities to be fielded quickly grew from the initial 1,169 vehicles for the  Marine Corps identified in the 2005 urgent need statement to the current  approved requirement of over 16,000 vehicles split among the Army,  Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Command, plus  others for ballistic testing.
Three versions of the MRAP vehicle were acquired for different missions:    Category I, the smallest version of MRAP, is primarily intended for  operations in the urban combat environment, and can carry up to 7  personnel.
Category II is a multi-mission platform capable of supporting security,  convoy escort, troop or cargo transport, medical, explosive ordnance  disposal, or combat engineer operations, and carries up to 11  personnel.
Category III, the largest of the MRAP family, is primarily intended for  the role of mine and IED clearance operations, and carries up to 13  personnel.
MRAP vehicles were purchased without mission equipment—such as  communications and situational awareness subsystems—that must be  added before the vehicles can be fielded to the user. The military services  buy the subsystems for their vehicles and provide them as government  furnished equipment to be installed at a government integration facility  located at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in Charleston,  South Carolina.
section_title: Acquisition Strategy Was Tailored and Had Special Priority
paragraphs: DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field  MRAP vehicles. The program established minimal operational  requirements, decided to rely on only proven technologies, and relied  heavily on commercially available products. The program also undertook a  concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the most  survivable vehicles as quickly as possible. To expand limited existing  production capacity, the department expanded competition by awarding  IDIQ contracts to nine commercial sources. To evaluate design,  performance, producibility, and sustainability, DOD committed to buy at  least 4 vehicles from each vendor. According to program officials,  subsequent delivery orders were based on a phased testing approach with  progressively more advanced vehicle test results and other assessments.  To expedite the fielding of the vehicles, the government retained the  responsibility for final integration of mission equipment packages  including radios and other equipment into the vehicles after they were  purchased. DOD also designated the MRAP program as DOD’s highest  priority acquisition, which helped contractors and other industry partners  to more rapidly respond to the urgent need and meet production  requirements. Finally, some of the contractors involved in the acquisition  responded to the urgency communicated by the department by investing  their own capital early to purchase needed steel and other critical  components in advance of orders. The decision on the part of the  contractors to purchase components in advance of orders was not  required under their contracts and was done at their own risk.
DOD leadership took several steps to communicate the importance of  producing survivable vehicles as quickly as possible, for example  In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense designated MRAP as DOD’s  single most important acquisition program and established the MRAP  Task Force to integrate planning, analysis, and actions to accelerate  MRAP acquisition.
The Secretary also approved a special designation for MRAP—a DX  rating— that requires related contracts to be accepted and performed  on a priority basis over other contracts without this rating.
The Secretary of the Army waived a restriction on armor plate steel,  which expanded the countries from which DOD could procure steel.
DOD allocated funds to increase steel and tire production capacity for  MRAP vehicles as these materials were identified as potential limiting  factors for the MRAP industrial base.
DOD recognized that no single vendor could provide all of the vehicles  needed to meet requirements quickly enough and invited vendors to offer  their non-developmental solutions. The request for proposal made clear  that the government planned to award one or more IDIQ contracts to  those vendors that were determined to be the best value to the  government. The Marine Corps awarded IDIQ contracts to nine vendors  and issued the first delivery orders in early 2007 for 4 vehicles from each  vendor for initial limited ballistic and automotive testing. One vendor  could not deliver test articles in the time required and the Marine Corps  terminated that contract at no cost to the government. According to  program officials, vehicles from another vendor did not meet minimum  requirements and the Marine Corps terminated the contract for  convenience.
Conventional DOD acquisition policy dictates that weapons be fully tested  before they are fielded to the user. However, the need to begin fielding  survivable vehicles as quickly as possible resulted in a phased approach  designed to quickly identify vehicles that met the requirement for crew  protection so they could be rapidly fielded. This approach resulted in a  high degree of overlap between testing and fielding of the MRAP vehicles;  orders for thousands of vehicles were placed before operational testing  began and orders for thousands more were placed before it was  completed. Figure 1 shows the concurrent nature of the overall test plan.
The Director, Operational Test & Evaluation approved the MRAP Test and  Evaluation Master Plan in 2007. Candidate vehicles underwent ballistic  and automotive testing beginning in March 2007. The test plan included  three phases of developmental tests (DT) of increasing scope as well as  initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). Phase I included a limited  evaluation by users. Phase II further evaluated vehicles at the desired level  of performance against the ballistic threat, added more endurance miles to  the automotive portion of the test, and included mission equipment such  as radios and other electronic systems. Phase III raised the bar for ballistic  performance to the emerging threat and assessed non-ballistic protection  to include near-lightning strikes, high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, and  nuclear, biological, and chemical decontamination tests. The automotive  portion of the test increased endurance to 12,000 miles per vehicle.
Developmental and operational tests were conducted from March 2007  through June 2008. Each of the six MRAP variants have also undergone  IOT&E. All vehicles were rated operationally survivable and operationally  effective with limitations by the Army Evaluation Center. These limitations  were comprised of vehicle size, weight, mobility, and weapon dead space.  All vehicles were also rated operationally suitable with limitations. These  limitations were due to logistic shortfalls, payload restrictions, and  restricted fields of view.
section_title: MRAP Schedule and Performance Results Have Been Very Good
paragraphs: Schedule and performance results for the MRAP have been very good  overall. At the time of our review in July 2008, nearly all of the  developmental and operational testing had been completed; the Marine  Corps, the buying command for the MRAP, had placed orders for 14,173  MRAPs; and, as of May 2008, a little more than a year after the first  contracts were awarded, 9,121 vehicles had been delivered.  As of July  2009, 16,204 vehicles have been produced and 13,848 vehicles have been  fielded in two theaters of operation. Total procurement funding for the  MRAP vehicles, mostly through supplemental appropriations, was about  $22.7 billion. According to DOD officials, the MRAP is providing safe,  sustainable, and survivable transport for troops in the theater. It  recognizes that MRAPs have limitations, particularly in the area of off-road  mobility and transportability. Nonetheless, MRAPs are considered  outstanding vehicles for specific missions.
Twenty-one months elapsed from the time the need was first identified in  February 2005 until the sole source IDIQ contract was awarded and  subsequent orders were placed for the first 144 vehicles in November 2006.  Three months elapsed between the award of the sole source contract and  the delivery of vehicles under the orders placed pursuant to the contract in  February 2007—about the same time the IDIQ contracts were awarded to  multiple vendors for more vehicles. Testing of vehicles delivered under  orders placed pursuant to the newly awarded contracts began one month  later in March 2007.  Initial operational capability was accomplished in  October 2007 or about 33 months after the need was first identified.
Ultimately, MRAP vendors have successfully increased their production  rates to meet the delivery requirement (see fig. 2). Production began in  February 2007 with one vendor producing 10 vehicles. By March 2008—a  little more than a year after the contracts were awarded—6,935 vehicles  had been produced.
According to DOD officials, the MRAP provides survivable, safe, and  sustainable vehicles for troops in theater. It is recognized that MRAPs have  limitations, particularly in the area of off-road mobility and  transportability. Nevertheless, MRAPs met minimum requirements for  specific missions. Based on an earlier survey of over 300 soldiers  interviewed in the field, warfighters were satisfied with MRAP overall,  which offers significant improvement in survivability. MRAP vehicles were  seen as well suited for combat logistics patrols, route clearance  missions, raids, quick reaction forces, and other missions requiring large,  dismounted force. MRAP vehicles were seen as not well suited for  mounted patrols in constrained urban areas or extensive operations in off- road operations.
section_title: Many Lessons Learned, Many Challenges Remain
paragraphs: As with any acquisition of this nature, there are lessons to be learned. On  the positive side, it appears that quick action by the Secretary of Defense  to declare the MRAP program DOD’s highest priority and give it a DX  rating allowed the government and the contractors access to more critical  materials than otherwise would have been available. The availability of  funding mostly through supplemental appropriations was essential.  In  addition, the decisions to 1) use only proven technologies, 2) keep  requirements to a minimum, 3) infuse significant competition into the  contracting strategy, and 4) keep final integration responsibility with the  government are all practices that led to positive outcomes. Challenges  remain in the form of reliability, mobility, and safety, which have required  some modifying of the designs, postproduction fixes, and adapting how  vehicles were to be used. Also, long term sustainment costs for MRAP are  not yet well understood and the services are only now deciding how  MRAP will fit into their longer term organizations.  This combination of  actions executed to address the urgent need for accelerating the delivery  of MRAP vehicles to theater was innovative and effective.
Major vendors and key subcontractors responded to the urgency  communicated by the department. According to vendor officials from four  of the companies, they collectively invested a substantial amount of their  own capital in anticipation of MRAP work. For example, some vendors  purchased steel and other critical components in advance of delivery  orders for MRAP vehicles in order to meet projected time lines. In other  cases, vendors purchased or developed new facilities for MRAP  production. Multiple vendors also formed teaming arrangements to meet  the increase in vehicle delivery demands.  As stated above, these actions  on the part of the contractors were not required under their contracts and  were done at their own risk.
On the down side, because of unique designs, operating procedures, and  maintenance for multiple vehicles from multiple vendors, vehicle  maintenance and support has been somewhat complicated. To ease  maintenance and support concerns in the near term, the MRAP program  office established a centralized training entity where maintainers would be  cross-trained on multiple vendors’ vehicles. Longer term, a key challenge  for DOD will be to effectively manage maintenance personnel and vehicle  repair parts without sacrificing vehicle operational availability. Also, long  term sustainment costs for MRAP are not yet projected and budgeted. The  Services are only now deciding how to fit MRAP vehicles into their  organizational structures. Another lesson, based on operational use of the  MRAP vehicles, was their lack of maneuverability and off-road capability.  As a result, DOD is in the process of acquiring an all terrain version of the  MRAP to address the more difficult terrain and road conditions in  Afghanistan. While most of the vehicles met ballistic requirements, other  issues were identified (reliability, mobility and handling, and safety).  These issues required some modifying of the designs, postproduction  fixes, or adapting how vehicles were to be used. Testing of proposed  solutions to more advanced threats continues. The program office  continues to enhance MRAP vehicle system performance through  capability insertion initiatives executed via engineering change proposals.  Such changes are verified through testing. This testing will be an ongoing  process as additional upgrades are applied.
section_title: Broader Lessons and Implications from the MRAP Acquisition
paragraphs: What were the keys in DOD meeting the urgent requirement for fielding  MRAP in a timely manner? First, DOD kept the requirements simple, clear,  and flexible and did not dictate a single acceptable solution. Second, DOD  made sure that only mature technologies and stable designs were used by  setting a very short and inflexible schedule. DOD acting as integrator of  government furnished equipment after initial delivery eliminated some risk  and uncertainty. Third, MRAP was also given the highest possible  acquisition priority and the participating contractors responded in positive  ways to meet the needs. Fourth, full and timely funding for the acquisition  was a definite plus. The question is, can this formula be applied to all of  DOD’s major acquisitions and the broader acquisition process? The first  two keys—simple requirements and mature technologies—certainly can  be and, in fact, recent changes to the department’s acquisition policies and  acquisition reform legislation passed by the Congress should enable these  practices to be implemented easier than in the past. However, the MRAP  program also owes it success to the third and fourth key practices as  well—a DX rating as the highest priority acquisition in the department and  nearly unlimited funding to meet the urgent need—that are not scalable to  the broader acquisition process. Not every program can be a highest  priority and acquisition funds are constrained.
While the MRAP acquisition benefited from all of the practices mentioned  above, the biggest differentiator between that rapid acquisition and other  more common acquisitions in DOD was that it established requirements  that could be achieved with existing technologies. Recent studies by the  Defense Science Board, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment  Panel (DAPA), and GAO all indicate that the department can and should  acquire and deliver weapon systems that fulfill urgent warfighter needs to  the field much more quickly. The DSB study recommends a dual  acquisition path that allows for a “rapid” acquisition process for urgent  needs and “deliberate” acquisition processes for others. It recommends a  new agency, proposed as the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency, that  would be focused on speed, utilizing existing technologies, and acquisition  flexibility to achieve the “75 percent solution” quickly. The DAPA Panel  report, among other things, recommended that the acquisition process  should never exceed 6 years from its beginning to initial operational  capability of the acquired weapon system. It stated that mature  technologies and achievable requirements are critical to the success of  such time certain development efforts.
GAO has issued multiple reports under our “best practices” body of work  that underscore the need for faster development cycles and the need for  mature technologies, well understood requirements, systems engineering  knowledge, and incremental delivery of capabilities to enable quicker  deliveries. As early as 1999, we concluded that successful product  developments separated technology development from product  development, invested time and money in ensuring that their technology  base was vibrant and cutting edge, and eliminated technology risk from  acquisitions. We noted that the DOD’s science and technology (S&T)  organization would need to be organized and structured differently,  provided more funding to take new technologies to higher levels of  maturity, and would have to coordinate better with the department’s  acquisition community to achieve the synergies necessary to reduce cycle  times. We made recommendations along those lines. We believe that the  “game changer” today in achieving rapid acquisition is the technology  base. Finally, a broader lesson learned is that it may be time to invest the  time, money, and management skills in the S&T community to enable the  effectiveness we expect from the acquisition community.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any of your questions.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.