Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens
Published: 2011-06-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Denying safe haven to terrorists has been a key national security concern since 2002. Safe havens allow terrorists to train recruits and plan operations against the United States and its interests across the globe. As a result, Congress has required agencies to provide detailed information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In this review, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed U.S. officials and analyzed national security strategies; State reporting; and country-level plans for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism" but does not assess them with the level of detail recommended by Congress. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) requires State to include in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism" a detailed assessment of each foreign country used as a terrorist safe haven. It also recommends that State include, to the extent feasible, details in the report such as actions taken to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is used as a safe haven. Since 2006, State has identified terrorist safe havens in its "Country Reports on Terrorism." In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens, including the southern Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. However, none of the assessments in State's August 2010 report included information on one of the four elements recommended by Congress--the actions taken by countries identified as having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction through their territories. Also, about a quarter of the assessments in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism lacked information on another element recommended by Congress--the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist safe havens to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Including this information in State's reports could help better inform congressional oversight related to terrorist safe havens. The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. In IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, Congress required the President to submit reports identifying such efforts. State responded to IRTPA with a 2006 report and subsequent annual updates to its "Country Reports on Terrorism." However, efforts identified in State's August 2010 report include only certain efforts funded by State and do not include some State and other U.S. government agency funded efforts, such as those of the Departments of Defense and Justice. For example, our discussions with agency officials and analysis of agency strategic documents identified at least 14 programs and activities not included in State's reporting that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Yemen. According to officials from the National Security Staff, the National Security Council is responsible for producing the report required by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. As of March 2011, the report, which was due in September 2010, was not completed. According to agency officials, compiling such a list is challenging because it is difficult to determine if a given activity addresses terrorist safe havens or contributes to different, though possibly related, foreign policy objectives. While we recognize this challenge, a more comprehensive list that includes the efforts of all relevant agencies could provide useful information to Congress to enhance oversight activities, such as assessing U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying terrorists safe haven.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends State and the National Security Council (NSC) improve reporting on assessments of and U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. State concurred with our recommendation on assessments. State partially concurred with our recommendation on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, citing other reports it completes related to counterterrorism. However, the additional reports cited by State do not constitute a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. The NSC reviewed our report but did not provide comments on its recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, denying safe haven to  terrorists is an essential component of the U.S. strategy to defeat al Qaeda  and its affiliates. In its August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, the  Department of State (State) declared denying safe haven to terrorists  central to combating terrorism, which it cited as the United States’ top  security threat. Terrorist safe havens provide security for terrorists,  allowing them to train recruits and plan operations. U.S. officials have  concluded that various terrorist incidents demonstrate the dangers  emanating from terrorist safe havens, such as the November 2008 attacks  in Mumbai, India, planned, in part, from safe havens in Pakistan, and the  attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009, planned from safe  havens in Yemen.
This report provides information on U.S. efforts to address physical  terrorist safe havens since 2005. Specifically, we assess the extent to  which (1) State has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its  Country Reports on Terrorism, and (2) the U.S. government has identified  efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting  requirements.
To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national  security strategies, key congressional legislation, and planning documents  related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Additionally, we  discussed U.S. strategies, programs, and activities related to terrorist safe  havens with U.S. officials from the Departments of Defense (DOD),  Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State, and the Treasury  (Treasury); the Office of Management and Budget; the National Security  Staff; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the  intelligence community. We also spoke to subject matter experts from  academia and governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
To evaluate the extent to which State has identified and assessed terrorist  safe havens, we reviewed U.S. agency reports, such as State’s annual  Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, we evaluated assessments of  terrorist safe havens included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on  Terrorism against criteria recommended by Congress in the Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Further, we  interviewed U.S. agency officials to determine the process and criteria  used to identify and assess terrorist safe havens, and spoke with subject  matter experts to obtain their views on the characteristics of and threats  posed by terrorist safe havens identified by State.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has identified efforts to  deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements, we  reviewed agency budget documents, agency reports, and interagency  strategies against provisions included in IRTPA. For a more detailed  analysis of U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven, we selected three  countries identified as having terrorist safe havens by State’s August 2010  Country Reports on Terrorism—the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. For  these safe havens, we examined country-specific strategies, such as  mission strategic and resource plans, and discussed efforts that may  contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens with U.S. officials. We also  considered information obtained during our previous reviews of U.S.  efforts to address terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.  To obtain a more in-depth understanding of specific programs and  activities, we traveled to Kenya (where State’s Somalia unit is based) and  the Philippines, where we met with U.S. government personnel involved in  efforts to address terrorist safe havens in Somalia and the southern  Philippines. We planned to travel to Yemen but were unable to do so due  to the unstable security environment during the time of our review.  Programs and activities identified are meant to serve as examples of U.S.  efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens, not an  exhaustive list of efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Our analysis  does not include intelligence-related programs and activities. See appendix  I for more information on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: The Value of Safe Haven to Terrorist Groups
paragraphs: According to State, a terrorist safe haven is an area of relative security that  can be exploited by terrorists to undertake activities such as recruiting,  training, fundraising, and planning operations. The National Commission  on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) noted that  the physical safe haven in Afghanistan allowed al Qaeda the operational  space to gather recruits and build logistical networks to plan the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Concluding that the dangers posed  by terrorist safe havens were significant, the 9/11 Commission  recommended that the U.S. government identify and prioritize terrorist  safe havens, as well as develop strategies to address them.
section_title: U.S. Strategic Documents Related to Terrorist Safe Havens
paragraphs: The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as a key  national security concern in a number of U.S. government and agency  strategic documents. For example, National Security Strategies released  in 2002, 2006, and 2010 emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to  terrorists. In addition, plans issued by various U.S. agencies, such as DOD,  DOJ, State, and USAID, as well as the National Intelligence Strategy  issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, include  language emphasizing the importance of addressing terrorist safe havens  (see fig. 1). “Wherever l-Q’id or it terroriffilite ttempt to eabli safe hven … we will  meet them with growing pressure … Thee effort will focus on informtion-ring, lw  enforcement coopertion, nd eablihing new prctice to conter evolving  dversarie. We will o help te … build their ccity for reponle governnce  nd ecrity throgh development nd ecrity ector assnce.”
subsections: section_title: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
paragraphs: “The Wr on Terror … involve the ppliction of ll intrment of ntionl power nd  inflence to kill or cptre the terrori; deny them safehven nd control of ny ntion;  prevent them from gining ccess to WMD; render potentil terrorit trget less  ttrctive trengthening ecrity; nd ct off their rce of fnding nd other  rerce they need to operte nd survive.” “One of the mot  importnt rerce  to extremi safe  hven. Safe hven  provide the enemy  with reltive freedom  to pln, orgnize,  trin, ret, nd  condct opertion.” “The mot intrctable  safe hven exiastride interntionorder nd in region  where ineffective  governnce llow their  preence; we must  develop the me to  deny thee hven to  terrori.” “Filed te nd  ngoverned ce offer  terrorind criminl  orgniztion safe hven  nd possle ccess to  wepon of mass  detrction (WMD).” “Deny safe hven to  criminl orgniztion  involved in drg-relted  terrorictivitie.”
State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates policies  and programs of U.S. agencies to counter terrorism overseas. According to  State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism works with all  appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure integrated and  effective counterterrorism efforts that utilize diplomacy, economic power,  intelligence, law enforcement, and military power. These elements include  those in the White House, DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, USAID, and  the intelligence community. The Office of the Coordinator for  Counterterrorism’s role is to provide supervision of international  counterterrorism activities, including oversight of resources. Its guiding  principles reflect the goals of the National Strategy for Combating  Terrorism, including denying safe haven to terrorists.
section_title: Legislative Reporting Requirements
paragraphs: Congress has enacted several laws that require the submission of reports  to Congress on issues related to the denial of terrorist safe havens. See  table 1 for selected legislation.
In response to reporting requirements, State annually releases the Country  Reports on Terrorism. State’s August 2010 report includes a strategic  overview of terrorist threats and a country-by-country discussion of  foreign government counterterrorism cooperation. In addition, it includes  chapters on weapons of mass destruction terrorism, state sponsors of  terrorism, designated foreign terrorist organizations, and terrorist safe  havens. According to State, the Country Reports on Terrorism aims to  enhance understanding of the terrorist threat, as well as serve as a  reference tool to inform policymakers, the public, and U.S. foreign  partners about U.S. efforts, progress, and challenges in the campaign  against international terrorism. While released by State’s Office of the  Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Country Reports on Terrorism  incorporates the views of the National Counterterrorism Center and  National Security Staff, as well as other key agencies involved in  addressing international terrorism.
section_title: The Country Reports on Terrorism Identifies Existing Terrorist Safe Havens but Does Not Assess these Safe Havens as Recommended by Congress
paragraphs: State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual Country Reports  on Terrorism, but does not assess these safe havens with the level of  detail recommended by Congress. IRTPA requires State to include a  detailed assessment in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism of each  country whose territory is being used as a terrorist sanctuary, also known  as a terrorist safe haven. The act further recommends that these  assessments include, to the extent feasible, details regarding the  knowledge of and actions taken to address terrorist activities by countries  whose territory is being used as a terrorist safe haven. While State has  identified existing terrorist safe havens since 2006, its assessments of  these safe havens do not always include the details recommended by  Congress. For instance, none of the assessments in State’s August 2010  report included information on the actions taken by countries identified as  having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass  destruction through their territories. Including this information in State’s  reporting could help inform congressional oversight related to terrorist  safe havens.
subsections: section_title: State Has Reported on Existing Terrorist Safe Havens Since 2006
paragraphs: IRTPA requires State to include a detailed assessment in its annual  Country Reports on Terrorism with respect to each foreign country  whose territory is being used as a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist  organizations. To fulfill this requirement, State first identifies and then  assesses existing terrorist safe havens. Since 2006, State has identified  existing terrorist safe havens in a dedicated chapter of its Country Reports  on Terrorism. In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens. See  figure 2 for the terrorist safe havens identified.
section_title: Interactive instructions:
paragraphs: The online version of this map is interactive. Hover your mouse over each text box to read State’s August 2010  assessment of why each identified country or region is considered a terrorist safe haven.
To view these assessments in the offline version, please see appendix II.
State has made few changes to the terrorist safe havens identified in its  report since the April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, which  identified 15 terrorist safe havens. Since that report, State has removed  two terrorist safe havens—the Afghan-Pakistan Border and Indonesia— from the Country Reports on Terrorism. State officials explained that the  Afghan-Pakistan Border was removed in 2009, but Afghanistan and  Pakistan are each still identified as terrorist safe havens to highlight the  different safe haven issues facing each country. State officials said that  Indonesia was removed in 2008 because the country passed  counterterrorism legislation and captured several members of the terrorist  group Jemaah Islamiyah.
section_title: State’s Safe Haven Assessments Do Not Include All Details Recommended by Congress
paragraphs: IRTPA includes congressional findings that the planning of complex  terrorist operations requires safe haven from government and law  enforcement interference and that terrorists remain focused on finding  such safe havens. Further, IRTPA states that it is the sense of Congress  that it should be U.S. policy to identify foreign countries that are being  used as terrorist sanctuaries and assess current U.S. tools being used to  assist foreign governments to eliminate these safe havens. Accordingly,  IRTPA requires State to include detailed assessments of terrorist safe  havens in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism. IRTPA also states  that these detailed assessments should include, to the extent feasible, a  variety of provisions, including information regarding knowledge of and  actions to address terrorist activities taken by countries whose territory is  being used as a terrorist safe haven. See table 2 for a list of these details.
In its Country Reports on Terrorism, State includes a terrorist safe havens  chapter with assessments of each terrorist safe haven it identifies to  explain why that country or region has been classified as a terrorist safe  haven. However, our analysis of the assessments in State’s August 2010  report determined that, while State included information on each  identified terrorist safe haven, State did not assess them with the level of  detail recommended by Congress. For instance, our evaluation determined  that while State generally included information on the extent of  knowledge by the government of the country with respect to terrorist  activities, it did not include any information in its assessments about the  actions countries took to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in  weapons of mass destruction in and through their territories.
We also analyzed the “country reports” chapter of State’s August 2010  report and found that some of the information not included in the  assessments in the terrorist safe haven chapter was contained in the  country reports chapter. For instance, the country report for Yemen  contained information regarding the Yemeni government’s actions to  cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, like the terrorist  safe haven assessments, none of these country reports contained  information regarding the actions that countries took to prevent the  proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and  through their territories. Table 3 shows the number of safe havens for  which State included the recommended details.
State officials agreed that details related to the trafficking of weapons of  mass destruction through terrorist safe havens were not included in its  August 2010 report. These officials stated that time constraints and a  limited number of staff present challenges to including these details in the  terrorist safe haven assessments. Despite these challenges, officials told us  that, after reviewing our analysis, they will gather—and believe they will  be able to include—details regarding weapons of mass destruction in the  Country Reports on Terrorism to be released in 2011. In previous  reporting, we have found that assessments can be used to define  requirements and properly focus programs to combat terrorism.  Moreover, in IRTPA, Congress has said that it should be U.S. policy to  assess U.S. efforts to assist foreign governments to address terrorist safe  havens. As such, including all of the details recommended by Congress in  the safe haven assessments in State’s Country Reports on Terrorism  could help improve congressional understanding and inform congressional  oversight related to terrorist safe havens.
section_title: The U.S. Government Has Not Fully Addressed Reporting Requirements to Identify Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven
paragraphs: The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to  identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress required the  President to submit reports outlining U.S. government efforts to deny or  disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws, IRTPA and the National Defense  Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. While reports produced in response  to IRTPA contain some information on U.S. efforts to address terrorist  safe havens, none provides a comprehensive, governmentwide list of U.S.  efforts. According to agency officials, compiling a list of U.S. efforts is  challenging because of difficulties determining which U.S. efforts  specifically address terrorist safe havens. However, a more comprehensive  list of U.S. efforts would enhance oversight activities, such as assessing  U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying safe haven to  terrorists.
subsections: section_title: Country Reports on Terrorism Has Not Fully Identified U.S. Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven
paragraphs: IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that includes  an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools of the U.S. government for  disrupting or eliminating the security provided to terrorists by terrorist  safe havens. IRTPA also recommended that State update the report  annually, to the extent feasible, in its Country Reports on Terrorism.  IRTPA notes that it is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of  the United States to implement a coordinated strategy to prevent terrorists  from using safe havens and to assess the tools used to assist foreign  governments in denying terrorists safe haven.
In response to IRTPA provisions, State submitted a report to Congress in  April 2006, which it has updated annually as part of its Country Reports on  Terrorism. These reports include a section on U.S. strategies, tactics, and  tools that identifies several U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In  the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, State identified several  U.S. efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens, including programs such  as State’s Regional Strategic Initiative, Rewards for Justice, and  Antiterrorism Assistance programs. See table 4 for the list of U.S. efforts  identified in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism.
However, State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism did not  include some U.S. efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe  havens according to our review of related budget information, strategic  documents, and discussions with U.S. officials. Specifically, the list of U.S.  efforts to address terrorist safe havens in the Country Reports on  Terrorism did not include (1) all of the programs and activities State funds  to address terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and activities funded by  agencies other than State, such as DOD, DOJ, and Treasury that may  contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens.
subsections: section_title: Some State-Funded Efforts Are Not Included
paragraphs: State’s budget information, strategic documents, and discussions with  State officials indicate that some State-funded efforts that may contribute  to addressing terrorist safe havens were not included in the August 2010  Country Reports on Terrorism.
First, budget information in State’s Foreign Assistance Coordination and  Tracking System (FACTS) identifies programs and activities to eliminate  safe havens that were not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports  on Terrorism. State identified in its budget database budget accounts  that fund programs and activities for eliminating safe havens. However,  certain activities funded by four of these accounts were not included in  State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. For example,  activities in Chad, a Trans-Saharan country, funded by the development  assistance budget account were identified in FACTS as eliminating safe  havens, as were some activities in Pakistan funded through the Economic  Support Fund. However, neither of these budget accounts was included in  State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism.
Second, selected State strategic documents identify additional efforts  funded by State that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven but  were not included in the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. For  the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen, we reviewed each country’s fiscal  year 2012 mission strategic and resource plan (MSRP), submitted in April  2010, which included program funding information for goals related to  addressing terrorist safe havens for fiscal years 2009 through 2015. (For  more information on these three countries, see appendix IV.) Our review  identified several examples of State-funded efforts that may contribute to  addressing terrorist safe havens but were not included in State’s August  2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. For example, the Yemen MSRP  indicates that the State-funded Foreign Military Financing program  contributed to addressing safe havens in Yemen by funding activities to  support border security and counter piracy. In addition, the MSRP for the  Philippines included Foreign Military Financing program activities to  sustain progress in developing the Philippine Defense Department  capability to address terrorist safe havens. However, this program was not  included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover,  USAID development assistance in the Philippines focuses on mitigating  conflict, increasing economic opportunities, strengthening health services,  and improving education, which, according to the country’s MSRP, can  inhibit terrorists from exploiting those living under marginal conditions.  Development assistance was not included in State’s August 2010 report.
Third, according to State officials, additional efforts undertaken by State,  but not identified in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism,  may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, State  officials indicated that activities funded through State’s Peacekeeping  Operations account contributed to addressing the terrorist safe haven in  Somalia because it helped the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia  keep the terrorist group al-Shabaab from gaining control of the country’s  capital city, Mogadishu. In addition, State’s International Narcotics and  Law Enforcement Affairs funded a DOJ International Criminal  Investigative Training Assistance Program effort in the Philippines that  may contribute to addressing the terrorist safe haven in that country by  providing police development and capacity building programs in areas  used by terrorists for illicit travel. Similarly, officials indicated that State- funded Immigrations and Customs Enforcement training for Filipino and  Yemeni officials to combat money laundering and bulk cash smuggling  may contribute to addressing the safe havens in their countries. State- funded Peacekeeping Operations, the International Criminal Investigative  Training Assistance Program, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement  training programs were not included in State’s August 2010 Country  Reports on Terrorism.
In total, our analysis identified nine examples of State-funded efforts in the  Philippines, four examples in Somalia, and nine examples in Yemen not  included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism that may  contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. Table 7 in appendix V  describes U.S. efforts funded by State to address terrorist safe havens as  identified by agency officials or MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and  Yemen and indicates which of these efforts were included in State’s  August 2010 report.
Agency officials explained that compiling a list of U.S. efforts, such as the  one in State’s Country Reports on Terrorism, is challenging because of  difficulties determining which U.S. efforts specifically address terrorist  safe havens. According to State and USAID officials, counterterrorism  programs and activities may simultaneously contribute to multiple foreign  policy goals. For example, according to State officials, U.S. programs  assisting refugees on the Somali border may be considered as combating  violent extremism or denying terrorists safe haven. Similarly, USAID  officials explained that governance programs in Yemen aim to help local  governments meet community needs, but in doing so may contribute to  addressing terrorist safe havens in Yemen by shrinking the terrorists’  operating spaces in those communities. However, documents authored  and databases managed by State contain information on additional U.S.  efforts to address terrorist safe havens that would be feasible to include in  State’s reporting.
section_title: Efforts Funded by Other U.S. Agencies Are Not Included
paragraphs: Our discussions with officials from various agencies and our review of  MSRPs from the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen indicate that State’s  reports also do not include efforts funded by agencies other than State  that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens.
First, officials from DOD, DOJ, and Treasury indicated that their agencies  fund efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens.  Officials from DOD indicated that DOD-funded activities to build capacity  of foreign partners’ security forces to combat terrorism are key DOD  efforts to address terrorist safe havens. For example, some DOD train and  equip activities funded through the department’s Global Train and Equip  “Section 1206” and country-specific funding accounts, such as the  Afghanistan and Iraq Security Forces Funds, contribute to addressing  terrorist safe havens. For example, DOD has used Section 1206 funding to  conduct train and equip programs to build the capacity of security forces  in Yemen and the Philippines to conduct counterterrorism operations. U.S.
Coast Guard officials indicated that some coastal security training and  technical assistance activities funded largely by DOD and implemented by  the U.S. Coast Guard may also contribute to addressing terrorist safe  havens in Yemen and the Philippines.
Second, our review of MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen  indicated that additional efforts funded by agencies other than State and  not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism may  contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, the safe  haven-related goal in the fiscal year 2012 MSRP for the Philippines  indicated that efforts will be made through the DOD Joint Special  Operations Task Force–Philippines to enhance counterterrorism  capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The safe haven-related  goal in Yemen’s fiscal year 2012 MSRP indicated that DOJ’s Federal  Bureau of Investigation legal attachés participate in activities that  empower Yemeni law enforcement officials to better identify and  prosecute suspected terrorists. These efforts were not included in State’s  August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism.
In total, our analysis identified seven examples of non-State-funded efforts  in the Philippines, one example in Somalia, and five examples in Yemen  that were not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on  Terrorism that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens, as  shown in table 5.
IRTPA calls for a report on the activities of the U.S. government to address  terrorist safe havens, and a stated intention of the Country Reports on  Terrorism is to provide policymakers with an overview of U.S.  counterterrorism efforts. As such, State’s report is incomplete without  including the contributions of its various interagency partners to address  terrorist safe havens. As this information is included in State documents,  and State approves certain activities funded by other agencies such as  DOD’s Section 1206 and 1205 programs, it is feasible for State to include  this information in its annual report.
section_title: The National Security Council Has Not Completed the Required Report Identifying U.S. Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven
paragraphs: In addition to the provisions in IRTPA, Congress demonstrated an ongoing  interest in the identification of U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens in  the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. The  conference report accompanying the act noted that existing executive  branch reporting on counterterrorism does not address the full scope of  U.S. activities or assess overall effectiveness. The National Defense  Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 requires the President to submit a  report to Congress on the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, including an  assessment of the scope, status, and progress of U.S. counterterrorism  efforts in fighting al Qaeda and its affiliates and a list of U.S.  counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of terrorist safe havens. The  act required the President to produce this report by September 30, 2010,  and every September 30th until September 30, 2012. According to the act,  the report is to be submitted in an unclassified form to the maximum  extent practicable and accompanied by a classified appendix, as  appropriate. According to the conference report accompanying the act,  the required report would help Congress in conducting oversight, enhance  the public’s understanding of how well the government is combating  terrorism, and assist the administration in identifying and overcoming  related challenges.
According to the President’s National Security Staff, the National Security  Council has been assigned responsibility for completing the report  required under the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010.  However, officials on the national security staff—who are taking the lead  in drafting the report—stated that while they were working on a draft, no  report had been submitted to Congress as of March 2011. They were  unsure when the report—including information requested by Congress to  assist it in assessing the success of counterterrorism efforts to deny  terrorists safe haven—would be completed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given that dismantling terrorist safe havens is a top U.S. national security  priority, it is important that accurate assessments of and comprehensive  information on terrorist safe havens and U.S. efforts to address them is  available. Congress has expressed its desire to receive this type of  information in order to better understand the status of efforts related to  terrorist safe havens and to better assess U.S. efforts to address them.  While some reports have been provided to Congress on these issues,  critical details recommended by Congress are not included in these  documents, such as complete assessments of the actions taken by  countries identified as terrorist safe havens to address terrorist activities.  Further, despite multiple requests from Congress, neither State nor the  National Security Council has compiled a list of U.S. efforts to address  terrorist safe havens that includes the contributions of all relevant U.S.  agencies. Providing this type of information to Congress could better  define the nature of the threats posed by terrorist groups, as well as the  status of and challenges faced by U.S. efforts to address them. Without this  information, Congress and other decision makers may lack facts essential  to assessing progress toward the U.S. goal of denying terrorists safe haven,  making decisions on the allocation of resources, and conducting effective  oversight.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the information provided to Congress and other decision  makers, we make the following three recommendations:  1.  The Secretary of State should include in the Country Reports on  Terrorism detailed assessments of identified terrorist safe havens  using the provisions recommended by Congress in IRTPA. 2.  The Secretary of State, in collaboration with relevant agencies as  appropriate, should include a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts for  addressing terrorist safe havens when it updates the report requested  under IRTPA. 3.  The National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant agencies  as appropriate, should complete the requirements of the National  Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 to report to Congress on  a list of U.S. efforts related to the denial of terrorist safe havens.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury,  USAID, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security  Council, and members of the intelligence community for their review and  comment. State and DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted  in appendix VI and VII respectively. In addition, DOD, DHS, DOJ, State,  and the Office of Management and Budget provided technical comments,  which we have incorporated as appropriate. The National Security Council  reviewed the report but did not provide comments on its  recommendations.
State concurred with our recommendation that it include detailed  assessments of terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism,  and noted it will implement this recommendation in its updated report to  be released in 2011. Related to our recommendation for State to include a  governmentwide list of efforts to address terrorist safe havens when it  updates the report requested under the IRTPA, State concurred that  reporting on U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens should be more  comprehensive. However, State did not agree that such a list should be  part of its annual Country Reports on Terrorism, citing the fact that it  completes other reports related to counterterrorism. However, in the  IRTPA, Congress recommended that this information be included in the  Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, while it is possible that other  reports produced by State address IRTPA provisions, the antiterrorism  assistance report cited by State in its comments does not constitute a  governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, as it  does not include the contributions of key agencies such as DOD. We  maintain that such a list could assist decisionmakers in assessing progress  toward the U.S. goal of denying terrorist safe havens and conducting  effective oversight.
DHS concurred with our report, noting its acknowledgement of several  DHS training efforts to address terrorist safe havens in selected countries.  DHS also stated it will continue to support, as appropriate, State and other  relevant agency efforts to improve reporting on terrorist safe havens.
We are sending copies of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury,  USAID, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security  Council, and the intelligence community. In addition, the report will be  available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report provides information on U.S. efforts to address physical  terrorist safe havens since 2005. Specifically, we assess the extent to  which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and assessed  terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S.  government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent  with reporting requirements.
To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national  security strategies, key congressional legislation, and planning documents  related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Additionally, we  discussed U.S. strategies, programs, and activities related to terrorist safe  havens with U.S. officials from the Departments of Defense (DOD),  Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State), and the Treasury  (Treasury); the Office of Management and Budget; the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID); the National Security Staff; and the  intelligence community. We focused on these agencies because they are  involved in efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens.  We also spoke to 13 subject matter experts from academic, governmental,  and nongovernmental organizations. We selected experts who met at least  four of the following criteria: (1) knowledge of and experience in one or  more of the following areas: (a) identification of terrorist safe havens or  failed states, (b) factors that contribute to terrorist safe havens, or (c)  process of terrorist recruitment or radicalization; (2) knowledge and  experience regarding key safe havens; (3) travel to at least one key safe  haven country or region; (4) writing and publishing of articles on key safe  haven countries, regions, or issues; and (5) knowledge of and experience  in government, for-profit organizations, nonprofit organizations, academia,  or journalism.
To evaluate the extent to which State has identified and assessed terrorist  safe havens, we reviewed U.S. agency reports, such as State’s annual  Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, we evaluated assessments of  terrorist safe havens included in the chapter specific to terrorist safe  havens in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism against  criteria recommended, to the extent feasible, by Congress in the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). To evaluate  the assessments, two analysts independently analyzed the terrorist safe  havens assessments against details included in IRTPA. Those analysts then  discussed and resolved any differences in the results of their analyses; a  supervisor reviewed and approved the final results of the analysis. We also  interviewed U.S. agency officials to determine the process and criteria  used to identify, assess, and prioritize these terrorist safe havens, and  spoke with subject matter experts to obtain their views on the  characteristics of and threats posed by terrorist safe havens identified by  State.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has identified efforts to  deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements, we  evaluated national counterterrorism and security strategies; agency budget  and planning documents, including reports from State’s Foreign  Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS); and agency  reports against requirements included in IRTPA. Although we did not  independently audit the funding data in the FACTS database, and are not  expressing an opinion on them, based on our examination of the  documents received and our discussions with cognizant agency officials,  we concluded that the FACTS data we obtained were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this engagement. We also examined country-specific  strategies related to addressing terrorist safe havens by interviewing U.S.  agency officials and reviewing mission strategic and resource plans  (MSRP) for three countries identified as having terrorist safe havens—the  Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. We selected these countries based on  consideration of the following criteria: (1) identification of a country or  area as a terrorist safe haven by State in its August 2010 Country Reports  on Terrorism, (2) priority placed on a particular safe haven as expressed  U.S. officials and subject matter experts, (3) consideration of related GAO  work, and (4) congressional interest. Our analysis does not include  intelligence-related efforts. We also considered information obtained  during our previous reviews of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens  in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. To obtain a more in-depth  understanding of specific programs and activities, we traveled to Kenya  (where State’s Somalia unit is located) and the Philippines, where we met  with U.S. government personnel involved in efforts to address terrorist  safe havens in Somalia and the southern Philippines. We planned to travel  to Yemen, but were unable to do so due to the unstable security  environment during the time of our review. To supplement our  understanding of U.S. efforts related to denial of terrorist safe haven in  Yemen we spoke with officials based in Washington, D.C., from DOD,  State, USAID, and the intelligence community. We compiled our list of U.S.  efforts to address terrorist safe haven in the Philippines, Somalia, and  Yemen based on: (1) the efforts identified by cognizant U.S. officials as  those contributing to addressing terrorist safe havens and (2) programs  and activities associated with MSRP goals related to addressing terrorist  safe havens. Programs and activities identified are meant to serve as  examples of U.S. efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe  havens not as an exhaustive list of efforts to address terrorist safe havens.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments as Included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism
paragraphs: Appendix II: Terrorist Safe Haven  Assessments as Included in State’s August  2010 Country Reports on Terrorism “The Government of Afghanistan, in concert with the International Security Assistance  Force and the international community, continued its efforts to eliminate terrorist safe  havens and build security, particularly in the country’s south and east where the main  Taliban based insurgents threatened stability. Many insurgent groups, including Taliban  elements, the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, al-Qa’ida (AQ), and Lashkar-e- Tayyiba, continued to use territory across the border in Pakistan as a base from which to  plot and launch attacks within Afghanistan and beyond. Narcotics trafficking, poppy  cultivation, and criminal networks were particularly prevalent, constituting a significant  source of funding for the insurgency as well as fueling corruption within Afghanistan. AQ  leadership in Pakistan maintained its support to militants conducting attacks in  Afghanistan and provided funding, training, and personnel to facilitate terrorist and  insurgent operations. Anti-Coalition organizations continued to operate in coordination  with AQ, Taliban, and other insurgent groups, primarily in the east.”  “Columbia’s borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Brazil include rough  terrain and dense forest cover. These conditions, coupled with low population densities  and historically weak government presence, create potential safe havens for insurgent  and terrorist groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  The FARC, retreating in the face of Colombian military pressures, thus operated with  relative ease along the fringes of Colombia’s borders, and also uses areas in neighboring  countries along the border to rest and regroup, procure supplies, and stage and train for  terrorist attacks with varying degrees of success. The FARC elements in these border  regions often engaged the local population in direct and indirect ways, including  recruitment and logistical assistance. This appeared to be less so in Brazil and Peru  where potential safe havens were addressed by stronger government responses. Ecuador  and Panama have responded with a mix of containment and non-confrontation with  Colombian narco-terrorist groups, although some confrontations do occur depending on  local decisions and cross-border relations.”  “Iraq was not a terrorist safe haven in 2009, but terrorists, including Sunni groups like al-  Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), and Ansar al-Islam (AI), as well as Shia extremists and other groups,  viewed Iraq as a potential safe haven. Together, U. S. and Iraqi security forces continued  to make progress against these groups. The significant reduction in the number of  security incidents in Iraq that began in the last half of 2007 continued through 2009, with a  steady downward trend in numbers of civilian casualties, enemy attacks, and improvised  explosive device (IED) attacks. AQI, although still dangerous, experienced the defection  of members, lost key mobilization areas, suffered disruption of support infrastructure and  funding, and was forced to change targeting priorities. A number of factors have  contributed to the substantial degradation of AQI. The alliance of convenience and mutual  exploitation between AQI and many Sunni populations has deteriorated. The Baghdad  Security Plan, initiated in February 2007, along with assistance from primarily Sunni tribal  and local groups, has succeeded in reducing violence to late 2005 levels and disrupted  and diminished AQI infrastructure, driving some surviving AQI fighters from Baghdad and  Anbar into the northern Iraqi provinces of Ninawa, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. New  initiatives with tribal and local leaders in Iraq have led Sunni tribes and local citizens to  reject AQI and its extremist ideology. The continued growth, professionalism, and  improved capabilities of the Iraqi forces have increased their effectiveness in rooting out  terrorist cells. Iraqis in Baghdad, Anbar and Diyala Provinces, and elsewhere have turned  against AQI and were cooperating with the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces to  defeat it.”  “The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) maintained an active presence in northern Iraq, from  which it coordinated attacks into Turkey, primarily against Turkish security forces, local  officials and villagers who opposed the organization. In October, the Turkish Parliament  overwhelmingly voted to extend the authorization for cross-border military operations  against PKK encampments in northern Iraq. Iraq, Turkey, and the United States continued  their formal trilateral security dialogue as one element of ongoing cooperative efforts to  counter the PKK. Iraqi leaders, including those from the Kurdistan Regional Government,  continued to publicly state that the PKK was a terrorist organization that would not be  tolerated in Iraq. Turkish and Iraqi leaders signed a counterterrorism agreement in  October.”  “Hizballah remained the most prominent and powerful terrorist group in Lebanon, with  deep roots among Lebanon’s large Shia community, which comprises at least one third of  Lebanon’s population. The Lebanese government continued to recognize Hizballah, a  U.S.- designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, as a legitimate “resistance group” and  political party. Hizballah maintained offices in Beirut and military-style bases elsewhere in  the country and was represented by elected deputies in parliament. AQ associated  extremists also operated within the country, though their presence was small compared to  that of Palestinian groups operating in Palestinian refugee camps who were not aligned  with AQ. The camps are officially controlled by the Lebanese government. While the  Lebanese Armed Forces do not have a day-to-day presence in the camps, they have at  times conducted operations in the camps to combat terrorist threats.”  “Despite increased efforts by Pakistani security forces, al-Qa’ida (AQ) terrorists, Afghan  militants, foreign insurgents, and Pakistani militants continued to find safe haven in  portions of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North-West Frontier  Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan. AQ and other groups such as the Haqqani Network  used the FATA to launch attacks in Afghanistan, plan operations worldwide, train, recruit,  and disseminate propaganda. The Pakistani Taliban (under the umbrella moniker Tehrik- e-Taliban or TTP) also used the FATA to plan attacks against the civilian and military  targets across Pakistan. Outside the FATA, the Quetta-based Afghan Taliban and  separate insurgent organizations such as Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin used the areas in  Baluchistan and the NWFP for safe haven. Islamist Deobandi groups and many local  tribesmen in the FATA and the NWFP continued to resist the government’s efforts to  improve governance and administrative control. Despite the August death of the Pakistani  Taliban’s leader Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistani military operations throughout the FATA  and NWFP, the Pakistani Taliban, AQ, and other extremist groups remained dangerous  foes to Pakistan and the international community. Despite international condemnation for  its November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) continued to plan regional  operations from within Pakistan. LT is an extremely capable terrorist organization with a  sophisticated regional network. It continued to view American interests as legitimate  targets. While the Government of Pakistan has banned LT, it needs to take further action  against this group and its front organizations, which find safe haven within Pakistan.”  “A small number of al-Qa’ida (AQ) operatives remained in East Africa, particularly  Somalia, where they posed a serious threat to U.S. and allied interests in the region.  These elements were disrupted in late 2006 and early 2007 as a result of Ethiopian  military actions and again by the death of AQ operative Saleh Nabhan in September  2009. Somalia remained a concern given the country’s long, unguarded coastline, porous  borders, continued political instability, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, all of which  provide opportunities for terrorist transit and/or safe haven and increased the regional  threat level. AQ remains likely to make common cause with Somali extremists, most  notably al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has expanded its area of control during its protracted  insurgency against the Transitional Federal Government and particularly since the  withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in early 2009. The group controlled most of southern  Somalia at year’s end.”  “Terrorist operatives have sought safe haven in areas of the southern Philippines,  specifically in the Sulu archipelago and Mindanao. Philippine government control and the  rule of law in this area is weak due to rugged terrain, poverty, and local Muslim minority  resentment of central governmental policies. In addition to Jemaah Islamiya (JI) fugitives  and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists, the New People’s Army and Rajah Solaiman  Movement also operated in the southern Philippines.”  “In Southeast Asia, the terrorist organizations Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Abu Sayyaf  Group (ASG) have sought safe haven in the vicinity of the Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu  Archipelago, which encompasses the maritime boundaries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and  the Philippines. The area’s thousands of islands make it a difficult region for authorities to  monitor, while a range of licit and illicit activities that occur there – worker migration,  tourism, and trade, for example – pose another challenge to identifying and countering the  terrorist threat. Although Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have improved their  efforts to control their shared maritime boundaries, the expanse nevertheless remains  difficult to control. Surveillance is improved but remains partial at best, and traditional  smuggling and piracy groups have provided an effective cover for terrorist activities, such  as movement of personnel, equipment, and funds.”
Trans-Sahara (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania,  and Niger) “The primary terrorist threat in this region was al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  AQIM was based primarily in northeastern Algeria but factions also operated from a safe  haven in northern Mali, from which they transited areas of the Maghreb and Sahel,  especially Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. AQIM continued to conduct small scale ambushes  and attacks on Algerian security forces in northeastern Algeria, but in 2009 the group was  not able to conduct the “spectacular” attacks that were more common a few years ago  such as their bombing of the UN and Algerian government buildings. AQIM factions in  northern Mali used the safe haven to conduct kidnappings for ransom and murder of  Western hostages and to conduct limited attacks on Malian and Mauritanian security  personnel. AQIM derived financial support from the ransoms it collected, which were used  to sustain the organization and plan further terrorist operations. AQIM routinely demanded  the release of their operatives in custody in the region and elsewhere as a condition of  release of hostages. Regional governments sought to take steps to counter AQIM  operations, but there was a need for foreign assistance in the form of law enforcement  and military capacity building in order to do so.”
Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Paraguay, and  Brazil) “No corroborated information showed that Hizballah, HAMAS, or other Islamic extremist  groups used the Tri-Border Area (TBA) for military-type training or planning of terrorist  operations, but the United States remained concerned that these groups use the region  as a safe haven to raise funds. Suspected supporters of Islamic terrorist groups, including  Hizballah, take advantage of loosely regulated territory and the proximity of Ciudad del  Este, Paraguay and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil to participate in a wide range of illicit activities  and to solicit donations from within the sizable Muslim communities in the region. The  Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan governments have long been concerned with arms  and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, trafficking in persons, and the  manufacture and movement of contraband goods through the TBA. Concerns about the  region moved the three governments to invite the United States to participate in the Three  Plus One Group on Tri-Border Area Security, which focuses on practical steps to  strengthen financial and border controls and enhance law enforcement and intelligence  sharing. Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay have made notable strides in launching  initiatives to strengthen law enforcement institutions and cooperation, including  developing financial intelligence units, broadening border security cooperation,  augmenting information sharing among prosecutors responsible for counterterrorism  cases, and establishing trade transparency units.”  “Corruption within the Venezuelan government and military, ideological ties with the  FARC, and weak international counternarcotics cooperation have fueled a permissive  operating environment for narco-traffickers. Other than some limited activities, such as the  bombing of remote dirt airstrips on the border, there is little evidence that the government  of Venezuela is moving to improve this situation in the near future. The FARC, as well as  Colombia’s second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), regularly  used Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup, engage in narcotics trafficking, as well as  to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans to finance their operations.”  “The security situation in Yemen continued to deteriorate. As Saudi security forces have  clamped down on terrorism and foreign fighters have returned from Afghanistan and  Pakistan, Yemen’s porous borders have allowed many terrorists to seek safe haven within  Yemen. Al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY) announced its merger with al-Qa’ida (AQ) elements in  Saudi Arabia in January 2009, creating al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The  creation of AQAP coincided with fewer attacks within Yemen, possibly due to the desire of  its leadership to use Yemen as a safe haven for planning of future attacks and recruitment  because the central government lacks a strong presence in much of the country. The  absence of effective counterterrorism legislation contributed to Yemen’s appeal as a safe  haven and potential base of operations for terrorists. The Yemeni government’s response  to the terrorist threat was intermittent, and its ability to pursue and prosecute suspected  terrorists remained weak for most of the year due to a number of shortcomings, including  the stalling of draft counterterrorism in Parliament. The government’s response improved  dramatically in December with security forces taking strong action against a number of  terrorist cells. Even with this turn of events, the government was often distracted by the  “Sixth War” of the Houthi rebellion in the Sa’ada governorate in the north of the country  and political unrest in southern Yemen.”
section_title: Appendix III: Terrorist Safe Havens That Pose the Greatest Threats to U.S. National Security
paragraphs: We spoke with 13 subject matter experts with knowledge related to  terrorist safe havens. We asked these experts to determine which five  terrorist safe havens identified in the State’s August 2010 Country Reports  on Terrorism posed the greatest risk to U.S. national security (see table  6).
Although included in State’s August 2010 report, none of our experts  identified Colombia’s border region, northern Iraq, the southern  Philippines, the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral, the Tri-Border area, and  Venezuela as among the top five terrorist safe havens posing the greatest  risk to U.S. national security.
section_title: Appendix IV: Profiles of Selected Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism
paragraphs: Profiles on the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen can be found on the  following pages.
Economy: The Philippines’ 2010  gross domestic product was  estimated at about $353 billion, which  represented a 7.3 percent growth rate  that year.  This growth was spurred  by consumer demand, exports, and  investments; yet because of high  population growth rate and unequal  distribution of income, poverty  worsened.
U.S. strategy in the Philippines combines security and development  assistance to address several policy objectives, including counterterrorism,  economic growth, and the development of responsive democratic  institutions. To address the terrorist groups that find safe haven on the  islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the United States has deployed  military personnel to train and assist the Philippine armed forces and to  engage in civil-military operations to change the conditions that allow  terrorist safe havens.
U.S. assistance to the Philippines has been more than $120 million in each of  the past three years, and $135 million has been requested for fiscal year 2011.  About 60 percent of this assistance has supported development programs in  Muslim areas of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago with the aim of reducing  the economic and political conditions that foster extremist ideologies and  activities. U.S. military assistance is aimed primarily at Muslim insurgents and  has supported intelligence gathering, operations planning, and  communications support; supplied modern equipment; and provided U.S.  special operations advisors to assist two Philippine Regional Combatant  Commands in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
subsections: section_title: Terrorist Groups in the Philippines
paragraphs: Cognizant U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to  addressing terrorist safe havens in the Philippines, including lawlessness,  corruption, and poor economic conditions.    Lawlessness in the southern Philippines: According to State’s  Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Philippine government control  and the rule of law are weak due to rugged terrain, poverty, and local  Muslim minority resentment of central government policies.    Corruption of local leaders and police: Officials told us that  corruption, as well as the limited capacity of the Philippine police, is  a major challenge to denying terrorists safe haven. Corruption is  rampant in the Philippine police, the group that implements law  enforcement approaches to denying safe haven.    Poor economic conditions: Officials noted that poor economic  conditions in the Philippines contribute to an environment that  allows terrorist groups to increase recruitment. Economic  development programs are essential to reduce the conditions that  allow for terrorists to build safe havens in the Philippines. violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribl violence.
section_title: Programs and Activities to Address Terrorist Safe Haven in Somalia
paragraphs: U.S. strategy in Somalia is described as “dual-track”—providing continued  support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and also  recognizing the potential role of other actors in ending conflict and  establishing basic governing institutions. Efforts include, among other things,  degrading the abilities of al-Shabaab—a designated foreign terrorist  organization based in Somalia—and increasing the capacity of the TFG while  also increasing engagement and support for Somaliland, Puntland, and local  administrative entities and civil society groups. The administration has  requested almost $85 million for State and the U.S. Agency for International  Development assistance for fiscal year 2011 to continue conflict mitigation,  governance, and economic growth programs in Somalia.
In addition, the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism is the  current State strategy for long-term engagement and capacity building in East  Africa to combat evolving terrorism threats in, and emanating from, the Horn  of Africa and along the Swahili Coast. The Partnership for Regional East  African Counterterrorism aims to, among other things, contain and reduce  the operational capacity of terrorist networks in Somalia; deter and reduce  the appeal of and support for violent extremism across East Africa; and  improve and expand border security in East Africa, particularly around  Somalia.
section_title: Terrorist Groups in Somalia
paragraphs: U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to addressing  terrorist safe havens in Somalia, including limited access to the country as  well as the lack of a central government.    Limited access: U.S. officials told us that because the United States  does not have an embassy in Somalia and few personnel are allowed  to travel there for safety reasons, implementing programs in the  country is complicated. For example, the absence of U.S. diplomatic  presence makes monitoring the implementation of security assistance  activities difficult.    Lack of a central government: Officials stated that a lack of a central  government in Somalia limits the number of credible partners with  which U.S. agencies can work to implement assistance programs.  According to officials, this void legally constrains agencies’ ability to  use resources from some security assistance programs, such as  Global Train and Equip “Section 1206” and Foreign Military  Financing, to undertake assistance activities in Somalia.
According to the National  Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), al- Shabaab is not monolithic in its  goals. State reports that many rank  and file members of al-Shabaab are  interested in issues within Somalia,  rather than pursuing a global agenda.  However, NCTC and State note that  members of al-Shabaab’s core  leadership is linked ideologically to al  Qaeda and that some members of the  group previously trained and fought  with al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Government: Yemen is a republic  with a legal system based on Islamic  law, Turkish law, English common  law, and local tribal customary law.  Ali Abdullah Saleh, who served as the  president of the Yemen Arab  Republic (North Yemen) from 1978 to  1990, has been the president of  Yemen since May 1990.
U.S. strategy in Yemen, as articulated by the White House, takes a  comprehensive approach, including both security assistance to counter al  Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and development assistance to  address the environment that allows AQAP to exist. According to State  testimony, this strategy has two parts: (1) strengthening the Yemeni  government’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from violent  extremists within its borders, and (2) mitigating Yemen’s economic crisis and  deficiencies in government capacity, provision of services, transparency, and  adherence to the rule of law.
The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget requests $106 million for Yemen. The  United States is also engaged with international partners to provide  assistance to Yemen. In 2006, an international donors’ conference in London  pledged $5.2 billion for Yemen, although, according to State, a significant  portion of this funding has yet to be provided. At a Friends of Yemen (an  international coordination group) meeting in September 2010, the  international community called for the creation of a development fund for  Yemen and more coordination of international aid. the Department of Justice’s  (DOJ) Overseas and  Prosecutorial Development  Assistance and Training program.
Cognizant U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to  addressing terrorist safe havens in Yemen, including the limited capacity of  Yemeni security forces, inconsistent cooperation of the Yemeni government,  and instability in Yemen.    Limited capacity of Yemeni security forces: Officials noted that  Yemeni security forces have limited, but improving, capacity. This  creates a problem for addressing terrorist safe havens, according to  officials, because it limits the ability of the Yemeni government to  control territory that AQAP may want to use as a safe haven.
Inconsistent cooperation with the government of Yemen: According  to State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, the Yemeni  government’s response to terrorism was intermittent. The report also  cites the absence of effective counterterrorism legislation as  contributing to Yemen’s appeal as a safe haven for terrorists.
Instability in Yemen: Officials told us that instability in Yemen  creates challenges to addressing safe haven. Specifically, they cited  unstable conditions in northern and southern Yemen and political  unrest resulting from the 2011 uprisings against President Saleh’s  rule.
section_title: Appendix V: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in Selected Countries
paragraphs: We identified nine examples of State-funded efforts in the Philippines, four  examples in Somalia, and nine examples in Yemen not included in State’s  August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism that may contribute to  addressing terrorist safe havens. We compiled our list of U.S. efforts to  address terrorist safe haven in the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen based  on: (1) the efforts identified by cognizant U.S. officials as those  contributing to addressing terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and  activities associated with MSRP goals related to addressing terrorist safe  havens. Table 7 describes U.S. efforts funded by State to address terrorist  safe havens as identified by agency officials or MSRPs for the Philippines,  Somalia, and Yemen and indicates which of these efforts were included in  State’s August 2010 report.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Jason Bair, Assistant Director;  Christy Bilardo; Kathryn Bolduc; Lynn Cothern; Martin de Alteriis; Mary  Moutsos; Elizabeth Repko; and Celia Thomas made key contributions to  this report. Tonita Gillich, Julia Jebo, Eileen Larence, Heather Latta, Marie  Mak, Sarah McGrath, John Pendleton, Nina Pfeiffer, and Jena Sinkfeld  provided additional support.