Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning
Published: 2007-05-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has frequently been involved in stability and/or reconstruction operations that typically last 5 to 8 years and surpass combat operations in the cost of human lives and dollars. A 2005 presidential directive requires DOD and State to integrate stability activities with military contingency plans. GAO was asked to address (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability operations capabilities, and challenges that have emerged in implementing its approach; (2) DOD planning for stability operations and the extent of interagency involvement; and (3) the extent to which DOD is applying lessons learned in future plans. To address these issues, GAO assessed DOD policy and planning documents, reviewed planning efforts at three combatant commands, and evaluated DOD's use of lessons learned. GAO is also conducting a related study of the Department of State's efforts to lead and coordinate stability operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability operations, but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned into future plans. These challenges may hinder DOD's ability to develop sound plans. Since November 2005, the department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and defined a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for the next 15-20 years. These steps reflect a fundamental shift in DOD's policy because they elevate stability operations as a core mission comparable to combat operations and emphasize that military and civilian efforts must be integrated. However, DOD has yet to identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations because DOD has not provided clear guidance on how and when to accomplish this task. As a result, the services are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed by combatant commanders to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of weaknesses in DOD's guidance. DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning efforts. At the combatant commands, DOD has established working groups with representatives from several key organizations, but these groups and other outreach efforts by the commanders have had limited effect. Three factors cause this limited and inconsistent interagency participation in DOD's planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations lack a full understanding of each other's planning processes, and non-DOD organizations have had a limited capacity to participate in DOD's full range of planning activities. Although DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, planners are not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency plans. At all levels within the department, GAO found that information from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into various databases. However, planners are not consistently using this information because (1) DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons into its plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this step, (2) accessing lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the ongoing war on terrorism, the United States government is  confronting a host of challenges requiring a capability to conduct what has  been termed stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction  operations in various countries around the world. The Department of  Defense (DOD) has defined “stability operations” as an overarching term  encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted  outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of  national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment,  provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure  reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Since the end of the Cold War,  DOD’s involvement in stability operations activities has been significant,  as evidenced by reconstruction and transition operations in Afghanistan  and Iraq, humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan, and security operations in  Bosnia and Kosovo. DOD’s increased role in these types of activities has  also required it to employ an increasing number of personnel with specific  skills and capabilities, such as those in civil affairs and psychological  operations units. This shift in DOD’s role was captured in The Defense  Science Board’s 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities,  which highlighted that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has  been involved in either a stability or reconstruction operation every 18 to  24 months, that these operations typically last 5 to 8 years, and that these  activities surpass combat operations in the cost of human lives and  dollars.
In December 2005, President George Bush issued National Security  Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) which directed U.S. government  agencies to increase efforts to better coordinate stability operations. NSPD  44 also states that, when relevant and appropriate, reconstruction and  stabilization contingency plans and missions will be coordinated with U.S.  military contingency plans to ensure harmonization with any planned or  ongoing U.S. military operations. The Department of State (State) and DoD  have highlighted that success in stabilization and reconstruction efforts  will depend heavily upon the ability to develop an integrated, interagency  approach, and have initiated steps to facilitate this shift in focus. But this  shift will require cultural changes throughout government that will take  years or perhaps decades to achieve, according to DOD and State officials.
In the near term, DOD’s combatant commanders routinely develop a wide  range of military contingency plans, many of which involve consideration  of stability operations capabilities. As discussed in this report, DOD’s  military planning efforts are being expanded to include actions intended to  stabilize regions before conflict develops, deliver humanitarian assistance,  or provide postconflict reconstruction support. In many cases, these  actions will require coordination with non-DOD organizations, such as  State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the  Department of Justice.
You asked us to examine DOD’s capabilities related to stability operations,  and the extent to which DOD integrates its military planning efforts with  other government agencies. In response to your request, this report  addresses (1) DOD’s approach to enhance stability operations capabilities  and challenges that have emerged in implementing this approach, (2) DOD  military planning for stability operations and the extent to which the  department’s planning mechanisms facilitate an interagency approach; and  (3) the extent to which DOD is applying stability operations-related  lessons learned from past operations as future plans are developed. As  agreed with your office, we have additional work underway to address  your request to examine the Department of State’s efforts to lead and  coordinate stabilization operations in conjunction with DOD, U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. agencies, and plan  to report on those issues separately.
To evaluate DOD’s approach to enhance stability operations capabilities,  and the challenges that have emerged in implementing this approach, we  obtained and analyzed relevant departmentwide polices and implementing  guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services, and  selected combatant commands, and we discussed with each organization  the challenges that exist in implementing DOD’s approach. We also  discussed DOD’s approach with Department of State and USAID officials  to obtain their perspectives on these issues. Within DOD, we analyzed  documentation and interviewed officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, the services, three  combatant commands (Central Command, European Command, and  Pacific Command) and fourteen of their related component commands. To  evaluate DOD’s stability operations planning and the extent to which the  department’s planning mechanisms encourage and facilitate an  interagency approach, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and portions  of selected planning documents that pertain to interagency coordination.  Our review did not include the planning for ongoing operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan. We also discussed the planning process and impediments to  interagency coordination with representatives from non-DOD agencies  assigned to the combatant commands to gain their perspectives,  understand the extent to which these agencies are represented, identify  their roles and responsibilities, and determine the extent to which they  participate in the DOD planning process. We did not, however, assess the  extent to which these roles and responsibilities, including those of DOD,  are appropriate. To determine the extent to which DOD planners are  applying lessons learned from past operations and exercises in planning,  we reviewed relevant DOD guidance, discussed with DOD officials the  consideration of lessons during planning, and analyzed information in  lessons-learned databases maintained by each service and Joint Forces  Command, and two non-DOD organizations. With the information from  both DOD and non-DOD sources, we developed a database with over 3,500  individual lessons and observations from 38 reports or studies, identified  strategic-level lessons learned related to stability operations using a  process of independent coding and review, and then grouped the selected  lessons into 14 major themes.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through March 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Additional information on our scope and methodology appears in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to DOD’s guidance, the immediate goal of stability operations  often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential  services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help  develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable  market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil  society. Stability operations include a continuum of activities that can  occur throughout the spectrum of conflict ranging from preconflict  stabilization to postconflict reconstruction and transition to effective  governance. DOD has identified six major activities, or major mission  elements, that U.S. military forces, civilian government agencies, and in  many cases multinational partners may need to engage in to stabilize an  environment and build sustainable host-nation capabilities. Figure 1  depicts these major mission elements.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the mission elements, or dimensions, of stability  operations range from establishing and maintaining a secure environment  to delivering humanitarian assistance, economic support, and establishing  effective forms of governance. As shown in the figure, DOD envisions one  key element—strategic communications—as encompassing all of the other  five mission elements. DOD guidance recognizes that many stability  operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian  professionals and that DOD’s participation may be in a supporting role.  However, this guidance also states U.S. military forces shall be prepared to  perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians  cannot do so.
NSPD-44 outlines the major roles and responsibilities throughout the  government for stability operations, including the responsibilities of the  National Security Council, State, non-DOD agencies, and DOD. In  November 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, which established the  department’s overall policy and assigned responsibilities within DOD for  planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability  operations. Table 1 highlights several key responsibilities established by  NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05.
Within DOD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is  responsible for developing stability operations policy options for the  Secretary of Defense and, according to DOD officials, provides oversight  for the implementation of DOD’s stability operations policy. Under DOD  Directive 3000.05, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the  Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, in coordination with  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy, shall each develop stability operations capabilities.  Commanders of the geographic combatant commands through the  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall identify stability operations  requirements within their areas of responsibility, shown in figure 2.  Combatant commands are also directed to engage other organizations in  stability operations planning, training, and exercises, in coordination with  the Joint Staff and the Office of Policy.
The department has recently announced that it plans to realign these areas  of responsibility to establish a new geographic combatant command for  the continent of Africa. As of February 2007, the details of this realignment  had not been finalized.
section_title: DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operations Capabilities, but Faces Challenges in Identifying Capability Gaps and Measures of Effectiveness
paragraphs: DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its  stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in  identifying capability gaps and developing measures of effectiveness,  which are critical to successfully executing this approach. Among the  many improvement efforts underway, the department has taken three key  steps that frame this new approach. Specifically, the department has:   (1) formalized a new stability operations policy that elevated stability  operations to a core mission and gave them priority comparable to combat  operations, and assigned numerous responsibilities to DOD organizations,  (2) expanded DOD’s planning construct to more fully address stability  operations, and (3) defined a new joint operating concept that will serve as  a basis for how the military will support stabilization, security, transition,  and reconstruction operations in the next 15 to 20 years. However, DOD  has made limited progress in identifying and prioritizing needed  capabilities, and in developing measures of effectiveness, which are  critical steps required by DOD’s new directive and important tenets of  performance-based management. Capability gaps are not being assessed  because the department has yet to issue adequate guidance on how to  conduct these assessments or set specific time frames to complete them.  Similarly, the department has made limited progress in developing  measures of effectiveness because current guidance does not clearly  articulate a systematic approach on how to develop measures of  effectiveness. Without a comprehensive assessment of stability operations  capability gaps and clear measures of effectiveness, the department may  not be appropriately prioritizing and developing the needed capabilities, or  measuring its progress toward achieving these goals.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Approach to Stability Operations Includes a New Policy, Planning Guidance, and a Joint Operating Concept
paragraphs: In the past 18 months, DOD has taken positive steps to improve stability  operations capabilities by establishing a new and comprehensive policy,  planning guidance, and joint operating concept. First, in November 2005,  DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which established DOD’s stability  operations policy and assigned responsibilities within the department for  planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability  operations. This directive reflects a fundamental shift in DOD’s policy  because it designates stability operations as a core mission that shall be  given priority comparable to combat operations and emphasizes that  integrated military and civilian efforts are key to successful stability  operations efforts. According to DOD officials, this publication is intended  to serve as a catalyst, pushing DOD to develop methods to enhance its  own capabilities and integrate the capabilities and capacities of the  defense, diplomatic, and development communities for achieving unity of  effort in stability operations. The policy emphasizes that integrating  civilian and military efforts is key to successful stability operations and  recognizes that stability operations will not always be led by the military,  and that DOD needs to be prepared to provide support to both government  and nongovernment organizations when necessary.
The directive assigns responsibility for approximately 115 tasks to 18  organizations in the department, such as the Under Secretaries for Policy  and Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant  Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The  directive states that stability operations skills, such as language  capabilities and regional area expertise, be developed and incorporated  into professional military education at all levels, and that information shall  be shared with U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and  forces, international organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and  the members of the private sector supporting stability operations,  consistent with legal requirements. The policy also states that military  plans shall address stability operations throughout all phases of an  operation or plan as appropriate, and that stability operations dimensions  of military plans be exercised and tested, when appropriate, with other  U.S. departments and agencies. In addition, the directive states that the  Under Secretary for Policy shall submit a semiannual report developed in  coordination with responsible DOD components to the Secretary of  Defense evaluating the department’s progress in implementing the  directive.
A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to  broaden its military planning guidance for joint operations to include  noncombat activities to stabilize countries or regions and prevent  hostilities; and postcombat activities that emphasize stabilization,  reconstruction, and transition governance to civil authorities. Figure 3  illustrates the change in DOD planning guidance.
As shown in Figure 3, previous Joint Staff planning guidance considered  four operational phases, including deter and engage the enemy, seize the  initiative, conduct decisive operations, and transition to peaceful  activities. The revised planning guidance now directs consideration of six  phases of an operation, which include shaping efforts to stabilize regions  so that conflicts do not develop, and expanding the dimensions of stability  operations that are needed in more hostile environments after conflicts  occur. This new planning guidance requires planners to consider the types  of activities that can be conducted to help a nation establish a safe and  secure environment, eliminating the need for armed conflict, and activities  to assist a nation in establishing security forces and governing  mechanisms to transition to self-rule. These are also the phases of an  operation that will require significant unity of effort and close  coordination between DOD and other federal agencies.
In December 2006, DOD took a third step in outlining its approach to  stability operations when the Joint Forces Command published the  Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction  Operations Joint Operating Concept. This operating concept describes  how the future Joint Force Commander will provide military support to  stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations within a  military campaign in pursuit of national strategic objectives in the 2014– 2026 time frame. The operating concept focuses on the full range of  military support that the future Joint Force might provide in foreign  countries across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order  to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due  to either a natural or man-made disaster. This publication provides a  conceptual framework for how future commanders can provide military  support in foreign countries to a full range of stabilization, security,  transition, and reconstruction operations, such as    assist an existing or new host nation government in providing security,  essential public services, economic development, and governance  following the significant degradation or collapse of the government’s  capabilities due to internal failure or as a consequence of the destruction  and dislocation of a war;    provide support to stabilize and administer occupied territory and care for  refugees in major combat operations fought for limited objectives that fall  short of forcibly changing the adversary regime;    support a fragile national government that is faltering due to serious  internal challenges, which include civil unrest, insurgency, terrorism and  factional conflict;    assist a stable government that has been struck by a devastating natural    provide limited security cooperation assistance to a state that is facing  modest internal challenges; and    provide military assistance and training to partner nations that increase  their capability and capacity to conduct stabilization, security, transition,  and reconstruction operations at home or abroad.
This publication is intended to complement both policy and planning  guidance by expanding the understanding of stability operations and by  providing leaders with a conceptual explanation of the strategic  considerations, solutions, risks and mitigations, and implications to  consider when planning a stability operation.
In addition to establishing a new policy, revising planning guidance, and  developing a new joint operating concept, DOD has taken other  complementary actions to address stability operations capabilities within  the department. For example, in order to follow up on initiatives identified  in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the department has published a  series of roadmaps on specific topics such as Building Partnership  Capacity. The Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap provides an action  plan to meet objectives focused on strengthening interagency planning and  enhancing both DOD and non-DOD capabilities in this area. Another step  taken by DOD was to work with the Department of State to develop a draft  planning guide for other federal agencies that is intended to assist these  organizations in the planning for reconstruction and stabilization  operations.
section_title: DOD Has Encountered Challenges in Identifying and Prioritizing Stability Operations Capabilities
paragraphs: DOD Directive 3000.05 tasked several organizations within the department  to take specific actions to identify and prioritize stability operations  capabilities, but the department has made limited progress in meeting this  goal. Specifically, the directive states that the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy shall identify DOD-wide stability operations capabilities and  recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff is tasked to identify stability operations capabilities  and assess their development. The Geographic Combatant Commanders,  responsible for contingency planning and commanding U.S. forces in their  regions, shall identify stability operations requirements. Finally, the  Secretaries of the Military Departments and Commander of U.S. Special  Operations Command are required to develop the required stability  operations capabilities and capacity in coordination with the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Officials from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s office stated  they intended to meet the requirement to identify capabilities and  recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense through an iterative  process known as capability gap assessments. Policy officials envisioned  that the geographic combatant commands would conduct theater-specific,  scenario-driven assessments of forces and capabilities required for  contingencies through DOD’s planning process. They also expected that  the geographic commands would compare the planned requirements for  stability operations with the current available forces and military  capabilities, and propose remedies for eliminating the gaps. DOD officials  described the Joint Staff’s role as to review each of the combatant  command assessments and provide guidance, including common  standards and criteria, to the combatant commands to assist them in  identifying their requirements. The combatant command requirements  were then expected to drive each service’s development of stability  operations capabilities and capacity.
As discussed below, as of March 2007, DOD has made limited progress in  identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities following this iterative  capability gap assessment process. At the three combatant commands that  we visited, we found that the identification of stability operations  requirements was occurring in a fragmented manner. At Central  Command, officials from the command’s assessment branch explained  that there has been increased emphasis on stability operations across the  command, especially for nonlethal activities, such as civil military  operations. Officials explained that organizations at the command level  routinely conduct capability assessments and turn in a list of shortfalls for  incorporation into the command’s consolidated integrated priority list that  the Combatant Command Commander submits annually to the Joint  Chiefs of Staff. They envision that in the future these lists will include  stability operations requirement shortfalls. Similarly, in the European  Command, various organizations are independently conducting  assessments within their respective areas. For example, within the  combatant command headquarters, training officials explained that they  were working on a consolidated and prioritized list of stability operations  training requirements, while at the Naval component command they are  evaluating each country within its region to identify the specific stability  operations requirements for that country. At the Pacific Command,  officials stated that they had not tasked any of their component commands  to identify stability operations requirements. However, component  command officials indicated that capability requirements would be  identified through routine processes, such as DOD’s required Joint  Quarterly Readiness Review.
Notwithstanding the lack of identification of specific requirements from  combatant commanders, each service is taking some steps to improve  stability operations capabilities, but each service is using a different  approach. For example, Marine Corps officials highlighted the  establishment of a program to improve cultural awareness training,  increased civil affairs planning in its operational headquarters, and the  establishment of a Security Cooperation Training Center as key efforts to  improve stability operations capabilities. Navy officials highlighted the  service efforts to align its strategic plan and operations concept to support  stability operations, the establishment of the Navy Expeditionary Combat  Command, and the dedication of Foreign Area Officers to specific  countries as their key efforts. Army officials highlighted the  establishment of an office dedicated to stability operations policy and  strategy, the development of Army doctrine related to stability operations,  and an ongoing process to address gaps in Army stability operations  capabilities and capacities. Army officials expect to approve an action plan  by the end of fiscal year 2007 that is intended to provide solutions for  improving its capabilities to conduct stability operations. Air Force  officials emphasized the service’s use of an analytical capabilities-based  planning model that has identified and begun to address specific shortfalls  related to stability operations.
Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant commands to  identify requirements, and the different approaches taken by the services  to develop capabilities, the potential exists that the department may not be  identifying and prioritizing the most critical capabilities needed by the  combatant commanders, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  has not been able to recommend capability priorities to the Secretary of  Defense. The department recognizes the importance of successfully  completing these capability assessments, and in the first semiannual  report on stability operations to the Secretary of Defense, the Under  Secretary stated that the department has not yet defined the magnitude of  DOD’s stability operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the  scope of these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the  department.
We identified two factors that are limiting DOD’s ability to carry out the  capability gap assessment process envisioned by the Office of Policy. First,  at the time of our review, DOD had not issued guidance or set specific  timeframes for the combatant commands to identify stability operations  capability requirements. Joint Staff officials explained that the combatant  commanders were expected to identify capability requirements based on  operational plans, and DOD has not issued its 2007 planning guidance to  the combatant commanders that reflect the new six-phase approach to  planning previously discussed in this report. Joint Staff officials  expressed concerns that if the combatant commands based their  requirements on existing plans that have not been updated to reflect new  planning guidance, the requirements would not reflect the more  comprehensive stability operations capabilities needed.
A second factor contributing to the limited progress in completing  capability gap assessments is confusion over how to define stability  operations. For example, Air Force officials stated in their May 22, 2006,  Stability Operations Self Assessment that the absence of a common  lexicon for stability operations functions, tasks, and actions results in  unnecessary confusion and uncertainty when addressing stability  operations. In March 2007 they reiterated that they still consider this lack  of a common lexicon an issue in identifying stability operations  capabilities. Central Command and Pacific Command officials equated  stability operations with activities conducted under the auspices of  Theater Security Cooperation, while European Command officials stated  that stability operations are what they do in every country they have a  presence. This lack of a clear and consistent definition of stability  operations has caused confusion across the department about how to  identify activities that are considered stability operations, and  commanders have difficulty identifying what the end state is for which  they need to plan. Officials with DOD’s Office of Policy have recognized  that confusion exists surrounding the definition of stability operations,  and stated they are taking actions to clarify it. For example, Office of  Policy officials cited a revised definition of stability operations that has  been incorporated into DOD’s September 2006 planning guidance  discussed previously in this report, and the office is considering a more  aggressive outreach program that will help DOD officials at all levels  better understand the definition and application of stability operations  concepts in identifying and addressing capability gaps. However, without  clear guidance on how and when combatant commanders are to develop  stability operations capability requirements, the combatant commanders  and the military services may not be able to effectively identify and  prioritize needed capabilities.
section_title: DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Developing Measures of Effectiveness
paragraphs: Past GAO work on DOD transformation reported the advantages of using  management tools, such as performance measures, to gauge performance  in helping organizations successfully manage major transformation  efforts. Good performance measures are an important results-oriented  management tool that allows DOD to determine the extent to which  individual goals contribute to progress in achieving the overall goal of  increasing stability operations capability. GAO’s previous work highlighted  that the elements of a performance measure should include a baseline and  target; be objective, measurable, quantifiable; and include a time frame.  Clear, well-developed and coordinated performance measures help ensure  that stakeholders are held responsible and accountable for completing  their tasks in a timely manner and to an agreed-upon standard. Results- oriented measures further ensure that it is not the task itself being  evaluated, but progress in achieving the intended outcome.
DOD has recognized the need for performance measures to evaluate its  progress in enhancing stability operations goals and objectives.  Specifically, DOD Directive 3000.05 requires each organization tasked  under the directive to develop measures of effectiveness to evaluate  progress in meeting its goals. According to Office of Policy officials the  intent for developing measures of effectiveness was to let stakeholders  take ownership in identifying the metrics and procedures for evaluating  their assigned tasks. These officials also explained that as each  organization develops a measure of effectiveness, the Office of Policy will  review the proposed measure, provide feedback, and assist the  stakeholders in refining the metrics to ensure that the measure is  adequate. Policy officials expect that some measures will be quantitative,  while others will be qualitative. This approach is based on the premise that  the directive did not intend to place a fixed methodology on the  stakeholders, would allow development of a process that was flexible  enough to evolve with future stability operations activities and  requirements, and would motivate change at the lowest level.
Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however, as  of March 2007 we found that limited progress has been made in developing  measures of effectiveness because of significant confusion over how this  task should be accomplished, and because of minimal guidance provided  by the Office of Policy. Specifically, in initial discussions with us, the Army  had indicated that it was working on an Action Plan for Stability  Operations, but had placed the process on hold pending guidance from  DOD. More recently, despite the lack of guidance, the Director of the  Army’s Stability Operations Division told us that it is taking steps to  finalize the Action Plan for Stability Operations and once it is approved  will track all of the responsibilities outlined in DOD 3000.05 through its  Strategic Management System. Army officials have also established May  2007 as an objective for developing and refining its performance-based  metrics. Air Force officials explained that they already conduct a biennial  review of Air Force Concepts of Operations that produces a stability  operations assessment and that the results of its 2005 review were  summarized and provided to DOD. Air Force officials indicated that in  their opinion, this satisfied the requirement to develop performance  measures for stability operations. As of March 2007, officials from the  Navy’s Office of Strategy and Concepts explained that the Navy has begun  efforts to implement a stability operations action plan that includes  developing metrics and measures of effectiveness, but have put the  process on hold pending metrics guidance from DOD. Similarly, the  Marine Corps’s Action Plan for Stability, Security, Transition, and  Reconstruction dated February 2007 shows that the Marine Corps is also  still waiting for additional guidance from DOD on developing measures of  effectiveness. Within the combatant commands, Pacific Command officials  explained that they were still waiting for guidance on implementing the  directive from the Office of Policy and had not tasked the component  commands with any implementing tasks, including developing metrics. At  Central Command a policy official told us that there had been no  development of measures of effectiveness relative to the directive. In DOD  headquarters, officials in the Office of Personnel and Readiness stated that  they expected the development of measures of effectiveness to be  problematic, for both themselves and the Office of Policy, and that they  were unsure how the measures would be developed for their office.
Officials from DOD’s office for stability operations stated they are aware  of the confusion surrounding the development of measures of  effectiveness and that in the next few months they plan to sponsor a  workshop to help train individuals on developing measures of  effectiveness. While these workshops can be a positive step, they will only  benefit those who participate. Without clear departmentwide guidance on  how to develop measures of effectiveness and milestones for completing  them, confusion may continue to exist within the department and progress  on this important management tool may be significantly hindered.  Moreover, without central oversight of the process to develop measures of  effectiveness, including those that address identifying and developing  stability operations capabilities, the department will be limited on its  overall ability to gauge progress in achieving stability operations goals and  objectives.
section_title: DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency Planning for Stability Operations
paragraphs: DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive plans related to  stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to  facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of  military plans developed by the combatant commanders. Recent military  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the overall war on  terrorism, have led to changes in national security and defense strategies  and an increased governmentwide emphasis on stability operations.  NSPD-44 states that lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and  departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1.  In some cases, per NSPD-44, the National Security Council may direct the  Department of State to lead the development of stabilization, security,  transition, and reconstruction plans for specific countries. However, the  combatant commanders also routinely develop a wide range of military  plans for potential contingencies for which DOD may need to seek input  from other agencies or organizations. Within the combatant commands  where contingency plans are developed, the department is either  beginning to establish working groups or is reaching out to U.S. embassies  on an ad hoc basis to obtain interagency perspectives. But this approach  can be cumbersome, does not facilitate interagency participation in the  actual planning process, and does not include all organizations that may  be able to contribute to the operation being planned for. Combatant  Commanders have achieved limited interagency participation in the  development of military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided specific  guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD  organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of  planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and non- DOD organizations lack an understanding of each other’s planning  processes and capabilities, and have different planning cultures and  capacities. As a result, the overall foundation for unity of effort in stability  operations—common understanding of the purpose and concept of the  operation, coordinated policies and plans, and trust and confidence  between key participants—is not being achieved.
subsections: section_title: Interagency Coordination is Necessary at Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels of Planning
paragraphs: As previously discussed, NSPD-44 states that the Secretary of Defense and  the Secretary of State will integrate stabilization and reconstruction  contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and  appropriate and will develop a general framework for fully coordinating  stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all  levels where appropriate. DOD Directive 3000.05 has placed significant  emphasis on the interagency nature of stability operations and the need  for a coordinated approach to integrate the efforts of government and  nongovernment organizations. Specifically, the Directive requires the  geographic combatant commanders to engage relevant U.S. departments  and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international  organizations, nongovernment organizations, and members of the private  sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as  appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and  the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Beyond this directive,  combatant commanders also have the overall responsibility to plan for a  wide range of military operations, such as potential military conflicts,  other operations to stabilize fragile governments or regions, or to respond  to unexpected events such as the Tsunami relief effort in 2005. As a result,  combatant commanders now have an expanding responsibility to  coordinate these planning efforts with representatives from various U.S.  agencies, organizations, other governments, and the private sector.
Combatant commanders develop military plans focused at three distinct,  yet overlapping, levels that help commanders at each level visualize a  logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks.  Figure 4 illustrates these levels, and the type of planning that occurs in  each.
As illustrated in figure 4, at the strategic level, planners prepare what is  known as the supported plan, which describes how a combatant  commander intends to meet the national or high-level goals for his  geographical area of responsibility. These plans assign responsibilities for  specific strategic goals to other organizations and subordinate commands,  but do not provide the details for how these goals will be accomplished.  Generally, component commands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air  Force forces assigned to the combatant commander) prepare operational  and tactical level plans, which are intended to provide an increasing level  of detail and fidelity to the plans and are referred to as supporting plans. It  is at this level of planning that planners develop specific details about  actions that will be taken and how resources will be applied to achieve the  objectives outlined in the strategic level plan. At the operational and  tactical levels, military planners need knowledge of the resources they can  rely on from other agencies for conducting operations and who will be on  the ground that they can coordinate with for information and integration  of activities.
To achieve a fully integrated strategic, operational, or tactical plan, DOD  planners require increased knowledge of the roles, responsibilities, and  capabilities that all agencies and organizations can contribute to  stabilization efforts. DOD policy officials responsible for developing  planning guidance have stated that interagency planning in military  operations can no longer be an afterthought, but is critical to realizing U.S.  interests in future conflicts. We found almost universal agreement  between all organizations included in our review that there needs to be  more interagency coordination in planning, and that these coordination  requirements differ at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of  planning. For example, officials agreed that at the strategic level, the many  organizations that can play a key role in stability operations should be  present to represent their respective organizations, and that those  representatives can help facilitate a mutual understanding of the overall  contributions, capabilities, and capacity of each organization. These  representatives can also develop a better understanding of DOD and the  process used to develop military plans. At the operational and tactical  level, DOD officials agreed that, ideally, they need consistent access to  interagency personnel from other government agencies that have been  authorized by their organizations to establish coordinating relationships  with the military. Specifically, European Command officials commented  that they would benefit from subject matter experts from non-DOD  organizations at the operational level who can (1) participate in the  planning process and (2) increase the probability that planned  contributions from non-DOD organizations in stability operations can  actually be provided. Similarly, Pacific Command officials stated that to  facilitate interagency coordination at the operational and tactical levels,  several issues such as liaison authority, willingness on the part of other  agencies to work with DOD, and coordinating mechanisms must be  addressed. The department has also recognized that nongovernmental  organizations should participate in DOD’s planning process, where  appropriate.
section_title: DOD Has Not Achieved Consistent Interagency Participation in the Military Planning Process
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to establish interagency coordination mechanisms  and to improve interagency participation in its planning efforts, but it has  not achieved consistent interagency representation or participation at the  strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning. At the strategic level,  DOD’s primary mechanism for interagency coordination within each  combatant command is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group  (JIACG). As shown in Table 2, the size and composition of these groups  varied within each combatant command we visited, but in general, they  have been comprised of a limited number of representatives from State,  USAID, the Department of Treasury, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and  the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The organization and functions of the JIACGs are evolving. At the time of  our review, each JIACG we examined had an overall function to improve  general coordination between DOD and the agencies represented in the  group and were not intended to be actively involved in DOD’s planning  efforts. At each command we visited, we found JIACG participants served  primarily as advisors and liaisons between DOD and their parent  organizations, had limited planning experience and training, and were not  consistently engaged in DOD’s planning process. However, officials  commented that the role of the JIACG was changing. Specifically, Central  Command officials expected that the JIACG within their command would  begin to assume a more active role in the planning process, but they did  not have specific details on how or when this would occur. At the Pacific  Command, the JIACG was being refocused by the commander from  coordinating counterterrorism activities to more of a “full spectrum”  approach that would include stability operations activities. At the  European Command, officials also expected the focus of the JIACG would  expand from a counterterrorism focus to a fuller spectrum of operations,  which, in their opinion, could include participating in the planning  process.
Below the strategic level, at the operational and tactical levels, some  service component commands are reaching out to country teams in  embassies within their areas of responsibility on an ad hoc basis to obtain  interagency perspectives during their planning efforts. But this approach  can be cumbersome because of the large number of countries that may be  affected by a regional plan. Generally, component command officials we  contacted agreed that the primary mechanism available to them for  interagency coordination was establishing personal relationships and  direct dealings with country teams and other embassy personnel. For  example, according to Naval Forces Europe, it is developing new  contingency plans, and one of its first steps in this effort is to identify the  key participants and resources available within its area of operations and  to develop individual relationships that will help it accomplish more. In  Central Command, both the Army and Navy component commands  commented that they work directly with the embassies in the area of  operations in order to interface with other agencies.
section_title: Limited Guidance, Information Sharing and Training Hinder Interagency Participation in the Development of Military Plans
paragraphs: Combatant Commanders have achieved limited interagency participation  in the development of military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided  specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non- DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of  planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and non- DOD organizations lack an understanding of each other’s planning  processes and capabilities, and non-DOD organizations have limited  capacity to fully engage in DOD’s planning efforts. At each combatant  command we visited, planners acknowledged the requirement to include  interagency considerations in planning, as required by recent DOD policy.  But command officials stated they did not have any guidance on how to  meet the requirement, or on the specific mechanisms that would facilitate  interagency planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For  example, numerous DOD publications and documents discuss the JIACG  organizations at each combatant command, but there is no published DOD  guidance that establishes policy governing the JIACGs or that outlines the  responsibilities for establishing and managing them. Officials from the  DOD and State also commented that the JIACG organizations were not  intended to be a coordinating body for military planning, and questioned if  this was an appropriate mechanism for integrating the planning efforts  between DOD and other agencies.
The second factor inhibiting interagency participation is that DOD does  not have a process in place to facilitate the sharing of planning  information with non-DOD agencies, when appropriate, early in the  planning process without specific approval from the Secretary of Defense.  Specifically, DOD policy officials, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that it is the department’s policy  not to share DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside of  DOD unless directed to do so by the Secretary of Defense, who determines  if they have a need to know. In addition, DOD’s planning policies and  procedures state that a combatant commander, with Secretary of Defense  approval, may present interagency aspects of his plan to the Joint Staff  during the plan approval process for transmittal to the National Security  Council for interagency staffing and plan development. This hierarchical  approach limits interagency participation as plans are developed by the  combatant commands at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  State officials also told us that DOD’s current process for sharing planning  information limits non-DOD participation in the development of military  plans, and inviting interagency participation only after the plans have been  formulated is a significant obstacle to achieving a unified government  approach in those plans. In their opinion, it is critical to include  interagency participation in the early stages of plan development at the  combatant commands.
Additionally, according to combatant command officials, non-DOD  personnel do not always have the necessary security clearances required  by DOD for access to the department’s planning documents or  participation in planning sessions. In its recent interim report to the  Secretary of Defense on DOD Directive 3000.05, DOD acknowledged the  current challenges in information sharing and predicts that DOD will  continue to face serious problems concerning the release and sharing of  information among DOD, other U.S. government agencies, international  partners, and other nongovernmental organizations. In the report DOD  attributed information-sharing issues to restrictions based on current  information-sharing policies and emphasized that to improve information- sharing capabilities senior leadership direction is required.
The third factor limiting the effectiveness of interagency coordination  efforts is that DOD and non-DOD organizations lack an understanding of  each other’s planning processes and capabilities, and have different  planning cultures and capacities. DOD and non-DOD officials repeatedly  emphasized in their discussions with us the cultural and capacity  challenges that the two communities face. Within DOD, officials discussed  a lack of formally trained DOD planners within the combatant commands.  For example, only two of the six planners at U.S. Army Europe were  formally trained, and another official noted that it takes a planner about a  year on the job to become proficient in what is generally a 2-year  assignment. Even if combatant command planners are experienced, they  may lack knowledge of interagency processes and capabilities. For  example, a Pacific Command planner stated that they had to guess about  interagency capabilities during planning. Senior Pacific Command officials  cited a need to educate DOD planners on U.S. government agencies  strengths and weaknesses and where expectations may exceed an  agency’s capabilities. Similarly, European command JIACG officials  commented that DOD needs to institutionalize the interagency education  piece at its schools for professional planners, and a European Command  planner stated that it is essential to understand what the various non-DOD  agencies do and what they need to know about DOD capabilities.
Our analysis of DOD’s lessons-learned databases from current and past  military operations provided details that specifically addressed the  training differences between DOD and non-DOD agencies and the limited  knowledge of each other’s capabilities. For example, the databases can  contain lessons learned such as: (1) DOD needs to develop knowledge of  other agencies and the capabilities they bring to operations, (2) significant  improvements could be made in military education by the development of  interagency programs of instruction, and (3) DOD should work to  aggressively include State in the process of project development.  Furthermore, DOD officials described what they believe is a significant  difference in the planning cultures of DOD and non-DOD organizations.  They stated that DOD has a robust planning culture that includes  extensive training programs, significant resources, dedicated personnel,  and career positions. Conversely, officials from the Joint Staff, the Office  of Policy, Joint Forces Command, and the combatant commands  explained that many agencies outside of DOD do not appear to have a  similar planning culture and do not appear to embrace the detailed  planning approach taken by DOD. In addition, these officials repeatedly  stated that their efforts to include non-DOD organizations in planning and  exercise efforts has been stymied by the limited number of personnel  those agencies have available to participate. DOD has attempted to  mitigate some of these challenges by sharing its planning resources to  projects such as the development of a draft joint planning concept with  State, offering DOD personnel to provide training to non-DOD  organizations, and encouraging non-DOD agencies to participate in  exercise planning. We did not examine the planning capability and  capacity of non-DOD organizations in this review, but we do have ongoing  work that is examining this issue in more detail.
The difference in planning between DOD and other U.S. departments and  agencies was also highlighted in the first semiannual report to the  Secretary of Defense on stability operations. In that report, the  Undersecretary of Defense for Policy states, “The difference between DOD  and other U.S. Departments and Agencies is that DOD plans and prepares  for current and future operations and other U.S. Departments and  Agencies plan and prepare for current operations. This is reflected in the  different planning processes across the U.S. Government and the relative  spending on training, education, and exercises.”
Officials from State offered similar perspectives on the planning  capabilities and capacities of non-DOD organizations. They stated that  State planning is different from military planning, with State more focused  on current operations, and less focused on the wide range of potential  contingency operations that DOD is required to plan for. As a result, State  does not allocate planning resources in the same way as DOD, and  therefore does not have a large pool of planners that can be deployed to  the combatant commands to engage in DOD’s planning process. These  officials agreed, however, that participating in DOD’s planning efforts as  plans are being formulated is necessary to achieve a unified government  approach in the military plans, and suggested alternative methods to  accomplish this goal. For example, State officials discussed a current  initiative to test methods to “virtually” include State planners in a DOD  contingency planning effort in the European Command using electronic  communication tools, and stated that State personnel could potentially  participate in a large number of planning efforts if this approach were  expanded. State officials also suggested that DOD policies may need to be  revised to authorize combatant commanders to reach back directly to  State and other government agencies as plans are being developed, instead  of through the hierarchical approach through the Joint Staff and the  National Security Council as previously discussed.
Without clear guidance to the combatant commanders on how to establish  adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency  participation in planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of  planning, a process to share planning information as plans are being  developed, and methods to orient and include professional planners from  key organizations in DOD’s planning process, the contributions and  capabilities of these organizations may not be fully integrated into DOD’s  plans, and a unified government approach may not be achieved.
section_title: Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes Contribute to Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Stability Operations Planning
paragraphs: DOD planners are not consistently using lessons learned from past  operations as they develop future contingency plans. NSPD-44 and DOD  policies highlight the importance of incorporating lessons learned into  operational planning. Lessons learned from current and past operations  are being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our  analysis indicates that DOD planners are not using this information on a  consistent basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors  contribute to this inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning:   (1) DOD’s guidance for incorporating lessons learned into plans is  outdated and does not specifically require planners to include lessons  learned in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons- learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process  does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated  into specific plans. As a result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of the  lessons-learned systems and may repeat past mistakes.
NSPD-44 and DOD guidance stress the importance of incorporating  lessons learned into operations and planning. Furthermore, the recently  released Joint Operating Concept for stability operations envisions that  the Joint Force will implement a continuous learning process that  incorporates lessons learned into ongoing and future operations through  constant observation, assessment, application, and adaptation of tactics,  techniques, and procedures. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution  System manual, which provides planners with the step by step process for  planning joint operations, states that a regular review of lessons  information can alert planners to known pitfalls and successful and  innovative ideas. Prior GAO work on DOD’s lessons learned noted that  effective guidance and sharing of lessons-learned are key tools to  institutionalize and facilitate efficient operations, and failure to utilize  lessons heightens the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to  build on the efficiencies others have developed during past operations.
subsections: section_title: Lessons Learned are Being Captured but Not Incorporated into Plans
paragraphs: DOD has established comprehensive joint lessons learned programs at all  levels within the department, and lessons learned from exercises and  operations are being captured. The department’s Joint Lessons Learned  Program is a federation of separate lessons-learned organizations  embedded within the Joint Staff, combatant commands, the Services and  Combat Support Agencies that focus upon capturing information, data,  and lessons based upon each command’s priorities. Each lessons-learned  organization within this program has developed its own processes,  systems, and information products for capturing, storing, and retrieving  lessons and observations based upon each organization’s requirements  and resources.
The various organizations in the Joint Lessons Learned Program focus on  capturing lessons learned at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  These lessons tend to be oriented toward a specific customer and are  disseminated through a variety of different products. For example, the  services tend to collect tactical- and operational-level lessons that they use  to address command and service-specific issues for resolution. Similarly,  the combatant commands have each developed their own theater-specific  command-level lessons programs related to joint, interagency, and  multinational matters and other matters involving interoperability. In  addition, each organization tailors its lessons-learned programs to meet  the individual command’s requirements and available resources. For  example, the U.S. Pacific Command’s program is: managed by one civilian  contractor; focuses it efforts on issues at the senior command leadership  level; and hosts a web-based repository that contains approximately 145  lessons documents. In contrast, the Center for Army Lessons Learned has  179 people on staff; focuses on all levels within the Army from the  individual soldier to the most senior leaders; uses a combination of active  collection techniques, such as sending out teams to interview soldiers and  observe operations; and has an electronic repository consisting of  approximately 157,000 documents.
Our lessons-learned analysis provides insights into the types of lessons  available to DOD planners and the volume of information that could be  useful to improve future stability operations planning. We grouped 1,074  lessons into 14 themes that reflect the full spectrum of strategic-level  issues surrounding stability operations, such as cultural sensitivity,  language skills, intelligence, communications systems, and reconstruction  activities. For example, the information in one theme we developed  related to DOD coordination and planning with other U.S. agencies and  non-U.S. government organizations highlights issues such as the need for  (1) the military to work more closely with other agencies during stability  operations, (2) DOD to develop knowledge of other agencies and the  capabilities they can contribute, and (3) commanders to ensure that  military sectors during operations correspond with civil geopolitical  boundaries. The information in another of our themes discussing civil  military operations highlights issues such as steps needed to improve  information operations, and how to address cultural differences during  information operations to reach specific audiences. A comprehensive  listing of our themes and an explanation for each can be found in appendix  II.
Despite the robust lessons-learned gathering process in place, we found  that DOD planners at the combatant and component commands in our  review did not consistently incorporate lessons as plans were developed  or revised. For example, two of the combatant commands that we visited  stated that they did not routinely use lessons as plans were developed.  Similarly, we found a range of how lessons learned were used in the  planning process at the component commands we visited. For example,  one Central Command component stated that lessons learned were part of  the component command’s planning process, but a Pacific Command  component commented that it generally did not utilize lessons learned as  it developed plans.
When we discussed the limited use of lessons learned with officials from  the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, they stated that  planners are generally aware of the need to check lessons learned as they  develop plans. However, the officials acknowledged that there are barriers  to the use of lessons learned, that the existing lessons learned systems  need updating, and questions do exist on whether the information  provided by the current systems is adequate. One official noted that Office  of Policy is developing a new Center for Complex Operations, which is  envisioned to facilitate the use of lessons by acting as a clearinghouse for  stability operations information. The Center is still in the planning phase,  and we were told that funding has been requested in the fiscal year 2007  supplemental budget request and in the fiscal year 2008 budget to  implement the plan.
section_title: Three Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Planning
paragraphs: We identified three factors that contribute to this inconsistent use of  lessons learned in the planning process. First, the guidance regarding  lessons learned in the Joint Staff’s manual for planning is outdated–the  relevant section of the manual has not been updated since July 2000 and  does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned in the  planning process. Specifically, this guidance states that the Joint Universal  Lessons Learned System should be contacted early in the planning process  and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas  of planning and execution based on actual operation and exercise  occurrences. However, this system does not exist and has not been  supported since 1997, nor does the update reference an existing system  that planners can access for joint lessons learned.
The second factor contributing to limited use of lessons learned in the  planning process is that accessing and searching lessons-learned  databases is cumbersome. For example, to conduct our analysis of DOD  lessons learned, we used five databases—four managed by each of the  services, and one managed by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis.  To obtain lessons-learned information from these sources, we had to:  separately access each database, become familiar with each system’s  functionality and search engines; repeat the same searches in each site for  stability operations–related terms; and review the results to find relevant  lessons. However, knowing how to navigate and search each of the  lessons-learned systems is not enough. We also had to familiarize  ourselves with and sort through the multitude of products generated to  find lessons that were applicable to our analysis. Planners we contacted  also told us they considered the databases difficult and time-consuming to  use. One combatant command official described the magnitude of the  challenge by noting that there is so much information within the program  that the biggest difficulty is turning the information into usable knowledge.  Additionally, the Joint Staff has acknowledged that the current system is  inefficient and of limited effectiveness in sharing lessons-learned data.
In an effort to address these issues, DOD has recently initiated an effort to  develop a Joint Lessons Learned Information System, which is intended to  standardize the collection, management, dissemination and tracking of  observations and lessons. The department is in the early stages of  developing this system, and plans that the system will establish  interoperable lessons databases that can be searched with an easy-to-use  search engine. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System  development strategy includes non-DOD agencies, and eventually non-U.S.  partners. However, while Joint Staff officials recognize the need for  stakeholder input to avoid continued inefficiency and limited effectiveness  in sharing lessons learned, they do not plan to include non-DOD  organizations until the later stages of the program’s development.
The third factor affecting the use of lessons learned is that the planning  review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are  incorporated into specific plans. During discussions with planners at the  various commands, we found no evidence of a formal mechanism to verify  that lessons were considered in plan development. Furthermore we found  conflicting views as to the need for a formal requirement. For example,  one combatant command planner believed that, despite the lack of a  formal mechanism, the command’s vetting process for plans ensured that  lessons would be incorporated, while at another combatant command a  planner stated that mechanisms for ensuring that lessons are used in  planning is broken because there is no formal requirement to utilize  lessons in plan development.
DOD has invested substantial resources to develop systems that capture  lessons from exercises, experiments, and operations, with the intent of  using these lessons to improve efficiency. However, in the case of  planning, the department has not developed mechanisms to ensure that  they are taking advantage of this resource. As a result, DOD heightens its  risk of either repeating past mistakes or being unable to build on the  efficiencies developed during past operations as it plans for future  operations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The DOD has a critical role in supporting a new national policy to improve  stability operations capabilities and to achieve a more unified  governmentwide approach to this demanding and important mission.  Recent operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, along with current operations in  Afghanistan and Iraq provide daily reminders of how complex and difficult  these missions are. The department has developed an approach to improve  its ability to execute stability operations, but it has achieved limited  progress in two key areas—identifying needed capabilities, and developing  measures of effectiveness—that are critical to successfully executing this  approach. Without clear guidance on how and when combatant  commanders are to develop stability operations capability requirements,  the capabilities needed to conduct stability operations may not be fully  developed or current service efforts to enhance capabilities may not be  addressing the most critical needs of the commanders. Similarly, without  clear departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of  effectiveness and milestones for completing them, confusion may continue  to exist within the department, and progress on this important  management tool may be significantly hindered.
DOD has recognized the need to achieve greater interagency participation  in the development of military plans, but it has not established an effective  mechanism to accomplish this goal. A governmentwide approach to  stability operations is dependent upon an integrated planning effort of all  organizations involved in them. Integrated planning can help fully leverage  the capabilities, contributions, and capacity of each organization, and  increase the potential for successful operations. The challenge now facing  the department is how to modify its planning approach to better integrate  non-DOD organizations into all levels—strategic, operational, and  tactical—of planning and to support State as the lead agency in stability  operations planning. Without improved guidance to military commanders  on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate interagency planning, an  approach to appropriately share planning information with non-DOD  organizations as plans are developed, and steps for overcoming  differences in planning culture and training and capacities among the  affected agencies, integrated interagency planning for stability operations  may continue to be stymied.
The consideration of lessons learned from past operations as new plans  are developed is not only a requirement stipulated by new stability  operations guidance, it is a requisite step to reducing the potential that  past mistakes will be repeated in future operations. Without clear and  complete guidance for planners, steps to increase the potential that  information system improvements will facilitate sharing of lessons learned  both within DOD and between all organizations that will participate in  planning for stability operations, and a focus on lessons learned as plans  are reviewed, the potential gains that can be achieved through systematic  consideration of lessons learned as future plans are developed may not be  realized.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To meet the goals of identifying and developing stability operations  capabilities and for developing tools to evaluate progress in achieving  these goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Policy to take the following two actions:    Provide comprehensive guidance, including a clear methodology and time  frames for completion, to the combatant commanders and the services on  how to identify and address stability operations capability gaps.
Provide comprehensive guidance to DOD organizations on how to develop  measures of effectiveness as directed by DOD Directive 3000.05, including  those measures related to identifying and developing stability operations  capabilities.
To achieve greater interagency participation in the development of  military plans that include stability operations, and increase the potential  for unity of effort as those operations are executed, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State take  the following three actions:    Provide specific implementation guidance to combatant and component  commanders on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate and  encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans  that include stability operations–related activities.
Develop a process to share planning information with the interagency  representatives early in the planning process.
Develop an approach to overcome differences in planning culture,  training, and capacities among the affected agencies.
To more fully incorporate lessons learned in the planning process, we  recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint  Chief’s of Staff working with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to take  the following actions:    Update the current planning guidance to    direct military planners to include lessons learned as they develop  plans, and  require that the plan review process include a step to verify that  lessons learned have been considered and adopted as appropriate.
Include non-DOD stakeholders in the development of the Joint Lessons  Learned Information System at an earlier point than currently planned.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Because it is unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD plans to take to  implement our recommendations, the Congress should consider requiring  the Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually to  the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on  Armed Services on the specific steps being taken and current status of its  efforts to (1) identify and prioritize needed stability operations  capabilities, (2) develop measures of effectiveness to evaluate progress in  achieving these capabilities, (3) achieve greater interagency participation  in the development of military plans, and (4) fully incorporate lessons  learned in the planning process. The Secretary’s report should also identify  challenges to achieving an integrated, interagency approach to stability  operations, and potential solutions for mitigating those challenges.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with  our eight recommendations but did not discuss what specific steps, if any,  it plans to take to implement our recommendations. (DOD’s comments  appear in their entirety in app. III.) State was also afforded an opportunity  to comment on this report, but declined to do so. In its written comments,  DOD highlighted traditional DOD methodologies and approaches to  developing capabilities, measures of effectiveness, coordinating with other  agencies and incorporating lessons learned that it believes are adequate to  address our recommendations. Although DOD is making progress in  achieving a greater focus on stability operations through its new directive,  our report notes it has made limited progress in certain areas, such as  establishing measures of effectiveness, due to the limited guidance  provided to DOD components. As a result, we continue to believe our  recommendations are warranted and that DOD should take specific steps  to address them. Because it is unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD  plans to take to implement our recommendations, we have added a matter  for congressional consideration suggesting that the Congress require the  Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually on the  specific steps being taken to address our recommendations and the  current status of its efforts. The report should also identify challenges to  achieving an integrated interagency approach to stability operations, and  potential solutions for mitigating those challenges.
DOD provided three overall comments to the report. First, DOD  commented that GAO began the field work for this report in October 2005,  one month prior to the issuance of DOD Directive 3000.05, and observed  that much of our field work was therefore conducted prior to activities  DOD undertook to implement the directive. The department is mistaken in  this observation. In October, 2005, we held our entrance conference with  DOD officials, but conducted the majority of our field work from January  2006 through March 2007. We believe the timing of our field work enabled  us to focus on the approach DOD was taking to implement the directive,  observe how key organizations began implementing this approach over a  1-year period, and highlight impediments that may impair DOD’s ability to  achieve the results intended by the directive—improved stability  operations capabilities. Therefore, we believe our work and related  recommendations are particularly relevant and important because they  address systemic issues associated with DOD’s approach and could assist  DOD organizations tasked with implementing the new directive.
Second, DOD commented that our report is directed exclusively at DOD;  that stability, security, transition, and reconstruction activities are  inherently interagency in nature; and that DOD can only implement  recommendations under its purview. While we agree that stability  operations are inherently interagency in nature, we disagree that our work  is focused exclusively on DOD. Specifically, our audit work included  discussions with State and USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and at  each of the combatant commands included in our review to gain their  views and perspectives. We have also included recommendations to  improve interagency participation in the development of military plans  that are directed to the Secretary of Defense because the military planning  process is conducted under the purview of the Secretary of Defense.  However, acknowledging that interagency participation in DOD planning  cannot be forced, we are recommending the Secretary of Defense  coordinate with the Secretary of State to implement these  recommendations. Furthermore, as we discussed with DOD officials  during the course of our review and stated in this report, we have other  work underway to evaluate State’s efforts to lead and coordinate  stabilization operations in conjunction with other U.S. agencies, and plan  to report on those issues separately.
Third, DOD commented that the identification and development of  stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations capabilities  are not so different from other DOD capabilities that they require a new or  separate methodology to identify and develop military capabilities and  plans. We disagree. As we discuss in this report, DOD has made limited  progress in identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities, the  identification of stability operations requirements was occurring in a  fragmented manner, and each service is using a different approach to  improve stability operations capabilities. To date, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy has not identified and prioritized needed stability  operations capabilities and military plans do not fully reflect an integrated,  interagency approach to stability operations. Therefore, we continue to  believe that our recommendations in these areas are still warranted, as  discussed below.
Regarding our recommendation that DOD provide comprehensive  guidance, including a clear methodology and time frames for completion,  to combatant commanders and the services on how to identify and  address stability operations capability gaps, DOD stated that existing,  mandated capability assessment methodologies already effectively address  stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations capability  needs at the combatant commands and the services. It also stated that  under this process, the combatant commands assess and communicate to  DOD the capabilities required to conduct these missions just as they do for  other assigned missions. However, as discussed in this report, we found  that the combatant commands included in our review had made limited  progress in identifying stability operations requirements because DOD had  not issued guidance or set specific time frames to complete this task, and  there was confusion over how to define stability operations. During the  course of our work, DOD refined the definition of stability operations,  which was a positive step, but has not clarified the guidance or set specific  time frames for identifying stability operations requirements. Because  combatant command officials indicated to us that the absence of guidance  and timeframes was a significant contributor to the lack of progress in  developing requirements, we believe our recommendation would assist the  department in accomplishing this task.
In response to our recommendation that DOD provide comprehensive  guidance to DOD organizations on how to develop measures of  effectiveness, the department stated that it already develops measures of  effectiveness in general, and a special process is not needed for stability  operations. We believe this response is not consistent with DOD Directive  3000.05, which requires each organization tasked under the directive to  develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in meeting their  respective goals listed in the directive. In addition, as discussed in this  report, and as acknowledged by officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense (Policy) in a progress report to the Secretary of  Defense, the department has made limited progress in developing  measures of effectiveness related to stability operations. We found this  limited progress was caused by significant confusion over how this task  should be accomplished, and because minimal guidance was provided by  the office of Policy. The department recognizes this confusion exits, and  as discussed in this report plans to establish workshops to assist  organizations in these efforts. We believe this is a positive step that should  be complemented with improved guidance that would be available to all  organizations tasked with this responsibility, and therefore continue to  believe our recommendation is appropriate and necessary.
In response to our recommendations that DOD coordinate with State and  provide specific implementation guidance to the combatant and  component commanders on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and  encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans,  and that the two departments develop a process to share planning  information, DOD provided the same response to both recommendations.  The department believes that National Security Presidential Directive 44  should, by itself, provide sufficient direction on the structures needed and  a process to share planning information. The department also stated it  would continue to include other agencies in planning and exercising for  stability operations. We believe the department’s response is inadequate  because NSPD-44 is a high-level directive that sets forth goals for  improved interagency participation in stability operations, but does not  contain details on mechanisms to achieve those goals. During the course  of our review we received consistent comments from DOD and State  officials that it is clear interagency participation in DOD planning is  needed, but it is very unclear to as to how to accomplish this goal.  Therefore, as detailed in this report, we found that interagency  participation in the development of military plans at the strategic,  operational, and tactical levels was very limited in every command  included in our review in part because DOD’s guidance did not provide  details on how to engage relevant agencies in planning or on the specific  mechanisms that would facilitate interagency planning, and because DOD  practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of planning information.  Combatant command officials cited significant limitations in current  coordinating groups, and various ad hoc methods were in place to gain  interagency perspectives on DOD planning efforts. State officials were  concerned that DOD practices limit the appropriate sharing of DOD  planning information as plans are developed, and it therefore had minimal  impact as plans are being constructed. These fundamental and systemic  issues will not be resolved with the guidance provided by NSPD-44. We  continue to believe that systemic solutions are needed and can be  achieved with improved guidance and more effective processes to  appropriately share planning information with interagency  representatives.
In response to our recommendation that DOD, in coordination with State,  develop an approach to overcome differences in planning culture, training,  and capacities among the affected agencies, DOD stated that it will  continue to work to understand and accommodate differences in these  areas, offer non-DOD organizations opportunities to participate in DOD  training courses, and detail DOD personnel to other agencies. We believe  these are positive steps and agree DOD should continue to pursue them.  However, our work indicates that these measures are not adequate to fully  address the magnitude of differences in the planning culture and capacity  between DOD and other agencies. As discussed in this report, State  officials believe that new and innovative practices need to be identified  and pursued, such as “virtual” collaborative planning between DOD and  State. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation for  DOD and State to work together to develop more comprehensive and  innovative solutions to overcome these differences is an important and  necessary step to take.
In response to our recommendations that DOD update its current planning  guidance to direct military planners to include lessons learned as they  develop plans, and to update current planning guidance to require that the  plan review process include a step to verify that lessons learned have been  considered and adopted as appropriate, DOD stated that the current  planning methodology takes into account lessons learned when  constructing or modifying a plan. As discussed in our report, this is not  always the case. In the course of our field work, we found sporadic use of  lessons learned in the planning process and a lack of formal guidance  directing consideration of lessons learned in both constructing and in  reviewing plans. According to DOD, taking lessons learned into account  during planning is at the heart of all effective military (or nonmilitary)  planning. However, the Joint Staff's manual on the Joint Operation  Planning and Execution System encourages, but does not direct planners  to review lessons learned as they develop plans. We agree that lessons  learned are being used by planners, but inconsistently. As a result we  believe that our recommendations should be implemented in order to  increase the potential that lessons are actually incorporated into plans as  appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that DOD include non-DOD  stakeholders in the development of the Joint Lessons Learned Information  System at an earlier point than currently planned, DOD agreed to invite  stakeholders to participate in the system at an earlier stage, but expressed  concerns that these stakeholders face shortfalls in capacity and resources  and therefore cannot ensure their interactive participation. We believe this  is a positive step and responsive to our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking  Minority Members, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign  Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. We are also  sending a copy to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and  Low Intensity Conflict, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and officials  in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific  Command. We will also make copies available to other interested parties  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-4402 or by e-mail at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To evaluate the Department of Defense’s approach to improving stability  operations and DOD’s identification of stability operations capabilities and  development of performance measures we obtained and analyzed DOD  Directive 3000.05, National Security Presidential Directive 44, the  Quadrennial Defense Review, the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap,  the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and  Reconstruction Operation Joint Operating Concept, and the Defense  Science Board studies on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within  DOD. We interviewed current and former officials at the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff and Services, three  Regional Combatant Commands (European Command, Pacific Command,  and Central Command), and U.S. Joint Forces Command. In these  interviews we reviewed relevant information and discussed implementing  guidance for completing responsibilities outlined in the Directive, the  interviewees’ understanding of their roles and responsibilities in  completing assigned tasks, progress in implementing the Directive,  challenges that have been encountered, and input provided for the first  report to the Secretary of Defense on implementing the Directive. Finally,  we reviewed the first report to the Secretary of Defense and discussed the  report’s findings with officials within the Office of the Under Secretary for  Policy.
To identify the extent to which DOD is planning for stability operations  and whether the department’s planning mechanisms encourage and  facilitate consideration of non-DOD capabilities, we reviewed and  analyzed NSPD-44, DOD Directive 3000.05, joint planning guidance and  manuals, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Building Partnership  Capacity Roadmap, and combatant command processes. We interviewed  officials at the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for  Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs,  and the United States Agency for International Development to obtain  other agencies’ perspectives regarding DOD’s planning process and the  inclusion of non-DOD perspectives in contingency plans. To understand  DOD’s planning process, mechanisms for interagency involvement in  planning, and impediments to interagency coordination, we met with  representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy as well as planners from three regional combatant commands,  which included the Pacific, European, and Central commands, members of  each combatant command’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group, and  fourteen combatant command component commands responsible for  contingency operation planning. We also reviewed examples of  interagency coordination contingency planning documents to gain an  understanding of the level of detail to which the commands planned  coordination efforts. We did not, however, assess the extent to which  these roles and responsibilities, including those of DOD, are appropriate.  Our review did not include the planning for ongoing operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan. DOD’s contingency plans are classified documents and a  complete review of the contingency plans was beyond the scope of this  audit, and as a result we did not develop a comprehensive list of  documents to draw a representative sample of contingency planning  documents related to interagency coordination. However, we worked with  combatant command officials to identify examples of planning documents  related to interagency coordination and the level of detail to which the  commands planned coordination with other agencies. We did not include  in our review any current or planned coordination between DOD and non- U.S.-government organizations, foreign governments, or international  organizations.
To determine the extent to which DOD planners are applying lessons  learned from past operations and exercises we reviewed relevant DOD  guidance, and discussed with DOD officials their consideration of lessons  learned during planning. In order to understand the requirements for  utilizing lessons learned in the planning process and the purpose and  scope of the Joint Lessons Learned Program, we analyzed DOD’s planning  guidance and manuals, lessons learned instructions for the Joint Lessons  Learned Program, and the services’ lessons learned guidance.
To assess the type and extent of strategic stability operations lessons  learned available, we identified organizations that produced studies or  reports that included lessons learned relevant to stability operations, both  within and outside DOD. To identify strategic level lessons within DOD’s  Joint Lessons Learned Program, we obtained access to the four armed  services lessons learned databases (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air  Force), the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and obtained stability  operations studies from the Defense Science Board. In order to identify  relevant non-DOD organizations conducting lessons-learned research, we  contacted individuals identified as subject matter experts in stability  operations and asked them to identify non-DOD agencies that published  reports and studies regarding stability operations that they recognized as  being leaders in the field. In this manner, several non-DOD organizations  were identified, including the Center for Strategic and International  Studies and the United States Institute of Peace. After obtaining search  results from the DOD lessons-learned databases and non-DOD  organizations, we reviewed the materials and selected analytical products  for further examination based upon whether the report or study included  original data collection and analysis related to the conduct of stability and  reconstruction in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, or the  operations of the Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa. We also excluded  reports and analysis focused primarily on combat operations, including  tactics, techniques, and procedures, after action-reports, and handbooks.  We reviewed over 200 reports or studies, and found 38 documents that met  these criteria. We entered all of the individual lessons and observations  from the 38 reports into a database resulting in over 3,500 individual  lessons and observations. Two GAO analysts independently reviewed the  individual lessons and observations using the following criteria for  inclusion.
subsections: section_title: Inclusive Criteria
paragraphs: We included lessons related to: U.S. forces performing or supporting local  governance functions in areas such as health care, utilities, infrastructure,  and law enforcement; and U.S. forces interacting with local civil  authorities to enhance the viability of these authorities and strengthen  their capacity to provide basic services to the local population.
section_title: Exclusive/Restrictive Criteria
paragraphs: Following the independent review, the team compared their individual  results and, when agreement between the independent reviewers could  not be reached, a third independent reviewer decided upon the inclusion  or exclusion of the lesson. This analysis resulted in 1,074 individual  lessons that met GAO’s criteria, which we reviewed for commonalities  from which we developed our 14 major themes. After developing the  themes, we categorized each lesson or observation, by consensus, into one  or more categories based upon the content of the lesson. We used these  themes and our knowledge of the lessons-learned systems and guidance as  a basis for discussions with combatant command and component  command planners regarding the use of lessons learned in the planning  process. We recognize that this analysis is not based upon an exhaustive  review of all reports and studies on the subject of stability operations.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through March 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Major Lessons-Learned Themes and Descriptions
paragraphs: Listed below are the 14 major themes that we developed after reviewing  and categorizing 1,074 lessons learned. We used our analysis to provide  insight into the types of stability operations lessons available to planners  and to facilitate our discussions with Department of Defense. Our coding  methodology often resulted in a lesson falling into one or more categories  based upon the content of the lesson. Furthermore, several categories,  such as Civil Military Operations and Provisional Reconstruction Teams,  were considered to be functional categories, or topical areas, and the  lessons were often included in another theme. The first column lists the  theme GAO developed. The second column provides a general description  of the types of lessons included within the theme. The third column lists  the total number of lessons coded into each theme. Our analytical  methodology was developed to support an insight as to the types of  lessons available and does not does imply a ranking of themes in terms of  importance or critical needs. A detailed discussion of our methodology is  included in appendix I.
Cultural sensitivity, awareness as it pertains to U.S.-to-host nation and host  nation-to-U.S. engagement before and during deployments.
Training of U.S. forces and the use of interpreters.
Functional category related to lessons concerning psychological operations,  civil affairs, public affairs, and information operations, which were viewed as  included within civil military operations. (Lessons in this category are often  included with one of the other themes that talk to a more specific issue.)
Processes and products, including: intelligence preparation of the battlespace;  operational security; counterintelligence; human intelligence.
Planning and coordination related to nonmilitary activities with other U.S.  agencies, non-U.S.-government organizations, and host nation governments.
While deployed, temporary changes in the primary role of U.S. forces to meet  immediate or unanticipated operational needs. For example, transition and  reconstruction activities.
Includes providing for the care, feeding, and security of military and U.S.  government or coalition civilian forces.
Addresses the question of who is in charge and how is the authority of  command being used.
Examples include Corps of Engineers and contracted construction. Transfers  of authority/responsibility of activities to host nation; election support.
Capability, capacity, and compatibility of U.S. military communication and  information systems in the theater of operation.
U.S., coalition, and host nation military coordination, planning, and capacity.  Instances showing how units are working together. This category addresses  military-to-military.
Military personnel authorization issues. Are units staffed with enough  personnel in the right grade with the right skills and military specialties all the  time, temporarily, or not at all?
What is being done to prepare before a unit needs to deploy. Includes: issues  of doctrine, training, and logistics; and lessons learned that will result in  changes to training and logistics to prepare for future operations.
Provisional Reconstruction Teams  Functional category related to lessons concerning Provisional Reconstruction  Teams. (Lessons in this category are often included with one of the other  themes that talk to a more specific issue.)
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Robert L. Repasky, Assistant  Director; T. Burke; Stephen Faherty; Susan Ditto; Ron La Due Lake; Kate  Lenane; Jonathan Carver; Maria-Alaina Rambus; and Christopher Banks  made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Reports
paragraphs: Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned  Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage  Sites to Future Operations Planning. GAO-07-639T. Washington, D.C.:  March 22, 2007.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned  Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage  Sites to Future Operations Planning. GAO-07-444. Washington, D.C.:  March 22, 2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting,  Security, and Capacity Challenges. GAO-07-426T. Washington, D.C.:  February 15, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-07-308SP. Washington,  D.C.: January 9, 2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and  Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and  Sustainable Progress. GAO-06-179T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing  Challenges. GAO-06-697T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing  Challenges. GAO-06-428T. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2006.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating  Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S.  Goals. GAO-05-742. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and  Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform  Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2004.
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services,  and Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited  Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy  Needed. GAO-04-403. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004.
Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-03-792R. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.