DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues
Published: 2010-11-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In light of longstanding problems with delays and backlogs, Congress mandated personnel security clearance reforms through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires, among other things, that executive agencies meet objectives for the timeliness of the investigative and adjudicative phases of the security clearance process. Since 2005, the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list due to timeliness delays and GAO continued that designation in 2007 and 2009 also due to concerns about quality. Based on prior and ongoing work, this statement addresses DOD's progress in (1) reducing the timeliness of initial personnel security clearances at DOD and (2) building quality into the processes used to investigate and adjudicate security clearances. GAO reviewed Performance Accountability Council timeliness data and has begun a preliminary analysis of available DOD data, examined key clearance reform documents, and conducted interviews with DOD and the Performance Accountability Council officials about timeliness and efforts to improve the quality of investigations and adjudications. GAO plans to continue examining the timeliness and quality of personnel security clearances in DOD. This work will help inform the Comptroller General's high risk update decision in January 2011.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD, which comprises the vast majority of clearances, has made significant progress in reducing delays in making personnel security clearance decisions and meeting statutory timeliness objectives since GAO first designated DOD's personnel security clearance program as a high risk area in 2005. In 2007, GAO found that initial clearances for DOD industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete. With the passage of IRTPA in 2004, timeliness requirements were established in law and executive branch agencies were required to make decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances within an average of 120 days. In 2008, GAO found that DOD had made significant improvements in reducing delays, with the fastest 80 percent of clearances taking an average of 87 days to complete. As of December 2009, IRTPA's timeliness objective is for each federal agency to process the fastest 90 percent of initial security clearances within an average of 60 days, including a period of not longer than 40 days to complete the investigative phase and 20 days to complete the adjudicative phase. DOD met the 60 day IRTPA timeliness objective for initial personnel security clearances, as well as the 20 day objective for the timeliness of adjudications, for each of the first, second, and third quarters of fiscal year 2010, according to data provided by the Performance Accountability Council. GAO's ongoing work continues to examine the timeliness of personnel security clearances in DOD. DOD has taken a number of positive steps to integrate quality into its investigative and adjudicative processes, including issuing guidance and developing tools to measure quality. For example, in November 2009, the Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) issued guidance to outline the requirements that adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel security clearance adjudication rationales. Similarly, in March 2010, the USD(I) issued guidance to clarify when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. In addition, DOD created two electronic quality assessment tools--the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE) and the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR)--to track the quality of investigative and adjudicative documentation. These tools are embedded in DOD's Clearance Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), a system used by all non-intelligence DOD Central Adjudication Facilities. Although these are positive developments that can contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process, these tools have not been fully implemented. GAO's ongoing work continues to examine the implementation of these tools and other efforts to ensure that momentum is sustained.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss DOD’s efforts to  improve timeliness and quality of its security clearance process. Personnel  security clearances allow government and industry personnel to gain  access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can  in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security.  The recent unauthorized leak this past year of about 500,000 pages of  classified documents posted to the internet related to the ongoing wars in  Afghanistan and Iraq is an example of the inherent risks involved when  granting an individual a security clearance. As you know, there continues  to be a high demand for security clearances. For example, prior to  September 11, 2001, we reported that DOD processed about 200,000  security clearances annually. For fiscal year 2008, we reported that DOD  approved personnel security clearances for approximately 630,000  military, civilian, and industrial personnel. Government-wide, the federal  government processed nearly 900,000 clearance cases annually for the  period covering fiscal years 2006 through 2009. DOD accounts for the vast  majority of all initial security clearances making it a formidable challenge  to those responsible for deciding who should be granted a clearance.
In light of long-standing concerns regarding delays in processing  clearances and other issues, Congress has taken a number of actions to  help ensure the continued focus on improving the personnel security  clearance processes governmentwide. For example, with the passage of  the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004,  Congress set objectives and established requirements for improving the  clearance processes, including requirements related to timeliness,  reciprocity, and an integrated, secure database to house clearance  information. Further, IRTPA required annual reports to Congress about  personnel security clearance reform, including timeliness. In addition, the  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 stipulates that by  February 1 of each year, the president will report on, among other things,  the number of contractors and employees of the U.S. government who  hold a security clearance, the amount of time it takes the intelligence  community to make a security clearance determination, and metrics for  investigative and adjudicative quality. Through these annual reports and  numerous oversight hearings, Congress has provided valuable oversight  over reform efforts. Specifically, this committee alone has held six prior  hearings on this issue over the past five years.
In 2005, we designated the Department of Defense’s (DOD) personnel  security clearance program as a high-risk area due to delays in processing  security clearances. We maintained the high-risk designation in 2007  because of continued delays and additional concerns about incomplete  clearance documentation in the investigation and adjudication phases of  the security clearance process. In 2009, despite significant improvement  in reducing delays, we continued to designate this program as a high-risk  area due to more stringent timeliness requirements established by IRTPA  that were to take effect in December 2009, as well as continuing problems  with incomplete clearance documentation. More specifically, in  December 2009, IRTPA set new timeliness goals for executive branch  agencies, requiring decisions on at least 90 percent of initial clearance  decisions within an average of 60 days and permits the executive branch  to exclude the slowest 10 percent from the reported average. With regard  to incomplete documentation, we noted that building quality throughout  DOD’s processes was important. For example, the lack of quality could  increase the risk of adjudicators missing patterns of behavior in  subsequent clearance renewals, undermine reciprocity, increase the risk  of unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and reduce the  assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place.
Executive agencies have also demonstrated a commitment to personnel  security clearance reform. For example, in 2007, the Director of National  Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))  established the Joint Reform Team to coordinate governmentwide efforts  to achieve timeliness goals established in IRTPA and improve the  processes related to granting security clearances. In 2008, the Joint  Reform Team—comprised of entities within the Office of Management and  Budget (OMB), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of the  Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and USD(I)—developed a plan to  transform the clearance process and in the following year, developed an  Enterprise Information Technology Strategy to support the reformed  process. In June 2008, the president issued Executive Order 13467,  establishing a Suitability and Security Clearance Performance  Accountability Council—commonly known as the Performance  Accountability Council—as the head of the governmentwide governance  structure for driving implementation and overseeing clearance reform  efforts and appointing OMB’s Deputy Director for Management as the  chair. This governance structure was put in place, in part, to sustain the  momentum of clearance reforms. (See Figure 1 for key events related to  security clearance reform.)
During the past five years, we have conducted numerous reviews that have  enabled us to gain a historical view of the progress that has been made in  clearance reform efforts. Specifically, since we first placed DOD’s  personnel security clearance program on our list of high-risk government  programs and operations, we have testified on clearance-related issues in  12 prior hearings and issued four reports with 14 recommendations,  including recommendations that DOD has implemented to issue guidance  that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports  as the basis for granting clearances and recommendations that OMB has  implemented to report on the time required to complete all initial  clearance applications—not just the average of the fastest 90 percent of  initial clearances—in the executive branch’s IRTPA-required annual  reports. In response, DOD and the Performance Accountability Council  have already taken steps to implement several of our recommendations  aimed at further improving DOD’s security clearance program. Through  our ongoing work, we plan to continue to examine the timeliness and  quality of personnel security clearances in DOD and the extent to which  DOD has met our criteria for removal of an issue from our high-risk list.  This work will help determine whether DOD’s personnel security  clearance program should remain on or be removed from our 2011 high- risk list that the Comptroller General will announce in January 2011. A list  of our related GAO products is provided at the end of this statement.
As requested, my statement today will address DOD’s progress in  1) reducing the timeliness of initial personnel security clearances and  2) building quality into personnel security clearance investigation and  adjudication processes. My statement draws on both our ongoing and  prior work on the personnel security clearance process. To assess the  extent to which DOD has made progress in reducing the timeliness of  initial personnel security clearances, we analyzed IRTPA timeliness  objectives and reviewed quarterly data provided by the Performance  Accountability Council’s Subcommittee on Performance Measurements  and Management, chaired by the DNI, which covered the first, second, and  third quarters of fiscal year 2010. We also interviewed knowledgeable DNI  officials about the accuracy and completeness of the data they provided  and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.  At the time of this testimony, we had not completed our independent  assessment of the DOD timeliness for fiscal year 2010 because not all data  were available. However, we have begun a preliminary analysis of first,  second, and third quarter data for fiscal year 2010 provided by the Defense  Personnel Security Research Center. We anticipate completing this  analysis after obtaining and analyzing DOD’s fourth quarter fiscal year  2010 data. To assess the extent to which DOD has made progress in  building quality into personnel security clearance investigation and  adjudication processes, we interviewed DOD officials who are  knowledgeable about quality tools and their implementation plans. We  also reviewed DOD guidance that addresses quality and the  implementation of quality tools. Our review was performed from October  2010 through November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our objectives.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Significant Progress in Reducing the Time for Processing Initial Personnel Security Clearances for DOD Personnel
paragraphs: DOD has made significant progress in reducing delays in personnel  security clearance decisions and in meeting statutory timeliness objectives  since we first designated DOD’s personnel security clearance program as a  high-risk area in 2005. In 2007, we found that initial clearances for DOD  industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete. With the  passage of IRTPA in 2004, timeliness requirements were established in law  under which executive branch agencies were initially required to make  decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances within an average of  120 days. We found that by 2008, DOD had made significant improvements  in reducing delays. For example, in examining fiscal year 2008 data, we  reported that the average of the fastest 80 percent of initial DOD  clearances, including military, civilians, and industry personnel, took an  average of 87 days to complete, well below what was required by law.  However, despite these improvements, we continued to designate this  program as a high-risk area due to more stringent timeliness objectives  that were to take effect in December 2009. IRTPA required the  Performance Accountability Council to develop a plan under which, to the  extent practical, each authorized adjudicative agency would be required to  make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a  personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days from the date of  receipt of the completed application by an authorized investigative  agency. Although the government is required to only report on the  average of the fastest 90 percent of cases, we previously identified that the  absence of comprehensive reporting limits full visibility over the  timeliness of initial clearance decisions. Consistent with GAO’s  recommendation, the government now reports on the remaining 10  percent.
Our ongoing work has shown that DOD has continued to improve its  timeliness and DOD reports that it is meeting the new statutory timeliness  requirements. According to data provided by the Performance  Accountability Council, DOD initial personnel security clearances met the  60 day IRTPA overall timeliness objective and the 20 day objective for the  timeliness of adjudications for each of the first, second, and third quarters  of fiscal year 2010, as shown in Table 1. Over this same period, average  timeliness for the fastest 90 percent of DOD industry personnel security  clearances ranged from 64 days to 69 days. In addition, DOD reported  meeting the IRTPA 40 day timeliness objective for investigations in the  third quarter of fiscal year 2010. However, timeliness data for  investigations is a reflection of OPM as the investigative service provider  for DOD.
DOD’s Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office adjudicates clearances for industrial personnel.  When the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office identifies issues with these cases that may  potentially affect the adjudicative decision, they sumit the cases to the Defense Office of Hearings  and Appeals. The time it takes the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office to arrive at the initial  decision is included in DOD timeliness. However, timeliness information is not reported for cases sent  to the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals.  ”DOD other” includes 1) all secret and confidential clearances and initial top secret clearances  adjudicated y the DOD Central Adjudication Facilities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the  Washington Headuarters Services and 2) the initial Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance  cases adjudicated on their ehalf y elements of the intelligence community, such as the Defense  Intelligence Agency.
Although DOD has made significant progress in reducing delays in making  personnel security clearance decisions, it is important that DOD sustain  this progress. Reducing delays in the security clearance process will  enable DOD to reduce risks to national security, expedite the start of  classified work, hire the best-qualified workers, and decrease the  government’s cost of national security-related contracts.
section_title: Positive Steps Have Been Taken to Address Quality and Enhance Visibility Over the Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: We are also encouraged by a number of recent developments that are  intended to enhance visibility over the quality of the security clearance  process. In our prior work, we have stated that timeliness alone does not  provide a complete picture of the clearance process and we emphasized  the need for attention to quality. However, we found an uneven attention  to quality within DOD’s process; specifically, we found missing  documentation in reports prepared by OPM that DOD adjudicators had  used to make clearance decisions. In May 2009, for example, we estimated  that 87 percent of OPM investigative reports provided to DOD at three  Central Adjudication Facilities in July 2008 were missing required  documentation. Because neither OPM nor DOD measured the  completeness of their investigative reports or adjudicative files, we  reported that both agencies were limited in their ability to explain the  extent to which, or the reasons why, some documents were incomplete.  Incomplete documentation may increase the time needed to complete the  clearance process, increase the overall costs of the process, and reduce  the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD  from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. We emphasized  that building quality throughout DOD’s process could promote positive  outcomes, such as facilitating reciprocity with other agencies.
DOD has taken a number of positive steps to integrate quality into its  investigative and adjudicative processes and demonstrated the  commitment of senior leadership to reforming the personnel security  process within DOD. For example, according to DOD officials, DOD  recently initiated the creation of a Performance Accountability Directorate  within USD(I)’s Directorate of Security to provide oversight and  accountability for the DOD Central Adjudication Facilities that process  DOD adjudicative decisions. Most importantly, DOD has also issued  guidance and developed tools to measure quality. For example:  Guidance. DOD has taken steps to issue guidance on adjudication  standards. On November 8, 2009, the USD(I) issued guidance on  adjudication standards that outline the minimum documentation  requirements adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel  security clearance adjudication rationales in the Joint Adjudication  Management System. These standards are for cases with significant  derogatory information and for Single Scope Background Investigations  that are missing standard investigative scope items but were still  adjudicated. In response to our recommendation, the USD(I) issued  additional guidance on March 10, 2010 that clarifies when adjudicators  may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting  clearances. This guidance provides standards that can be used for the  sufficient explanation of missing or incomplete scope items.
Tools. DOD has taken steps to measure the frequency with which  documentation for investigations and adjudications meets federal  standards. DOD developed two tracking tools—the Rapid Assessment of  Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE) and the Review of Adjudication  Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR)— to assess the quality  of investigative and adjudication documentation. These tracking tools are  embedded capabilities in DOD’s Clearance Adjudication Tracking System  (CATS), which is used by all non-intelligence DOD Central Adjudication  Facilities. Although these are positive steps, it is too early to assess the  effectiveness of these tools as they have not yet been fully deployed.
The RAISE tracking tool will document the instances of missing case  information or unresolved case issues for records of investigation  provided by OPM. In July 2010, DOD issued guidance requiring that  each DOD Central Adjudication Facility that utilizes the Clearance  Adjudication Tracking System use the RAISE tracking tool on all  incomplete national security investigations and on random samples of  other clearance cases accounting for 7 percent of their respective  Single Scope Background Investigations and 14 percent of both their  Periodic Reinvestigations and National Agency Check with Local  Agency Check and Credit Check investigations. The results are to be  reported to the DNI who, as Security Executive Agent of the  Performance Accountability Council, will arbitrate disagreements  between OPM and DOD and clarify policy questions. DOD deployed  the RAISE tracking tool to four Central Adjudication Facilities  between July and October 2010 and plans to complete deployment to  the remaining Central Adjudication Facilities by the beginning of  calendar year 2011.
The RADAR tracking tool will enable DOD to independently evaluate  the quality of adjudicative decisions against the adjudicative standards.  The USD(I) has directed DOD Central Adjudication Facilities to  provide adjudication case records to the Defense Personnel Research  Center for analysis. The USD(I) plans to use results of the RADAR  tracking tool assessments to monitor Central Adjudication Facilities’  compliance with documentation policies, communicate performance  to the Central Adjudication Facilities, identify potential weaknesses  and training needs, increase compliance, and establish trend data.  DOD has completed a pilot program for the use of the RADAR tracking  tool and has begun its implementation for the Army, Defense Industrial  Security Clearance Office, and Navy Central Adjudication Facilities in  September 2010. Further, implementation is scheduled for the Air  Force and Washington Headquarters Services by November 2010.
Beyond these steps, DOD has participated in the development and  tracking of quality metrics through the Performance Accountability  Council. On March 17, 2010, the leaders of the reform effort—the OMB,  OPM, DNI, and DOD—along with GAO, briefed this Subcommittee’s  chairman and ranking member on the status of security clearance reform  efforts. Subsequent to this briefing, this Subcommittee requested that the  Joint Reform Team and GAO engage in an effort to develop metrics to  measure the quality of security clearance investigations and adjudications  in order to address GAO’s concerns about quality. In May 2010, the leaders  of the reform effort provided this Subcommittee with 15 metrics assessing  the timeliness and quality of investigations, adjudications, reciprocity, and  automation. According to Joint Reform Team officials, these metrics were  communicated to executive agencies in June 2010. Given the role of the  executive branch and the need for GAO to remain independent in carrying  out its auditing responsibilities, decisions related to performance  measures and their effective implementation are fundamentally an  executive branch management responsibility. However, we are  encouraged by the Joint Reform Team’s collaborative efforts to develop  these quality measures. We have previously reported that successful  performance measures should meet nine criteria. For example,  successful measures should clearly link to agency goals, have measurable  targets, and be reasonably free from bias. GAO has been examining the  Performance Accountability Council metrics and our preliminary  observations show that many of the quality metrics appear to address  attributes of a successful performance measure, such as being objective,  quantifiable, and are linked to reform effort goals. We view the quality  metrics as a positive step towards identifying specific quantifiable targets  linked to goals that can be measured objectively and used by leaders and  others to gauge progress and assess the quality of the personnel security  clearance process. Although these are positive developments that can  contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process, these measures  have not yet been fully implemented and we are continuing to examine  these efforts as part of our ongoing work.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are strongly encouraged by the progress  that the Performance Accountability Council, and in particular, DOD, has  made over the last few years to implement recommendations, reduce  overall timeliness, and take steps to integrate quality into its processes. As  I have already noted, based on Performance Accountability Council data,  DOD has reported that it is meeting IRTPA timeliness requirements for the  first three quarters of fiscal year 2010, which represents significant and  noteworthy progress. Moreover, the progress that has been made with  respect to the overall governmentwide reform efforts would not be  possible without committed and sustained leadership of Congress and by  the senior leaders involved in the Performance Accountability Council.  Their continued oversight and stewardship of the reform efforts is the  cornerstone to sustaining momentum and making future progress.  Although DOD has taken steps to develop and implement quality  assessment tools, these tools have not yet been fully implemented.  Therefore, it is important that management focus is sustained to ensure  that these efforts are implemented and continuously evaluated. We are  continuing to track timeliness and monitor the implementation and results  of DOD’s quality assessment tools. This work will help inform the  Comptroller General’s high-risk update decision in January 2011.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond at this time to any questions that you or members of the  Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at  (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  testimony are Liz McNally, Assistant Director; James Ashley; Joseph M.  Capuano; Sara Cradic; Cindy Gilbert; Linda Keefer; James Krustapentus;  Greg Marchand; Richard Powelson; and Jillena Roberts.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Privacy: OPM Should Better Monitor Implementation of Privacy-Related  Policies and Procedures for Background Investigations, GAO-10-849.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and  Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide  Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T. Washington,  D.C.: October 1, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce  Delays But Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain  Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed  to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, D.C.:  May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 22,  2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness  and Quality. GAO-09-261R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.
Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Regarding Security  Clearance Reform. GAO-08-965R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T.  Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Related to the  Quality and Timeliness of Clearances. GAO-08-580R. Washington D.C.:  March 25, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts  to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T.  Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found For Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed To  Improve The Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record  Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security  Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances  for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance  Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.  GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.  GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January  2005.
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