Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters
Published: 2006-05-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. history. Despite a large deployment of resources at all levels, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate. GAO has a body of ongoing work that covers the federal government's preparedness and response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Due to widespread congressional interest, this review was performed under the Comptroller General's authority. It examined (1) the extent to which pre-Katrina plans and training exercises reflected the military assistance that might be required during a catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, (2) the military support provided in response to Katrina and factors that affected that response, and (3) the actions the military is taking to address lessons learned from Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophe.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts but many lessons are emerging. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and exercises did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example, the government's National Response Plan made little distinction between the military response to a smaller regional disaster and its response to a catastrophic natural disaster. In addition, DOD's emergency response plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. The plan did not: account for the full range of assistance that might be provided by DOD, divide tasks between the National Guard and the federal responders, or establish response time frames. National Guard state plans were also inadequate and did not account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe, and they were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover, plans had not been tested with a robust exercise program. None of the exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic hurricane. As a result, a lack of understanding exists within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in the event of a catastrophe, the timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the active-duty and National Guard forces. Despite the lack of planning, the military took proactive steps and responded with about 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active federal personnel. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, DOD relied heavily on the Guard during the initial response. Active duty forces were alerted prior to landfall and key capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. Several factors affected the military's ability to gain situational awareness and organize and execute its response, including a lack of timely damage assessments, communications difficulties, force integration problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, and unexpected logistics responsibilities. Without detailed plans to address these factors, DOD and the federal government risk being unprepared for the next catastrophe. DOD is examining the lessons learned from its own reviews and those of the White House and the Congress, and it is beginning to take actions to address the lessons and prepare for the next catastrophe. It is too early to evaluate DOD's actions, but many appear to hold promise. However, some issues identified after Katrina such as damage assessments are long-standing problems that were identified by GAO after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. They will be difficult to address because they are complex and cut across agency boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require sustained attention from the highest management levels in DOD, and across the government.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: When Hurricane Katrina made its final landfall along the  Louisiana/Mississippi border on August 29, 2005, it quickly became one of  the largest natural disasters in the history of the United States. Despite a  massive deployment of resources and support from both military and  civilian agencies, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate.  As local, state, and federal governments responded in the days following  Katrina, confusion surfaced as to what responsibilities the military has  and what capabilities it would provide in planning and responding to a  catastrophic event. As recovery operations continue, the nation is quickly  approaching the 2006 hurricane season, and faces other natural and man- made threats that could result in a catastrophe at any instant.
About 9 months prior to Katrina’s landfall, the National Response Plan  (NRP) was issued to frame the federal response to domestic emergencies  ranging from smaller, regional disasters to incidents of national  significance. The plan generally calls for a reactive federal response  following specific state requests for assistance. However, the NRP also  contains a catastrophic incident annex that calls for a proactive federal  response when catastrophes overwhelm local and state responders. The  NRP generally assigns the Department of Defense (DOD) a supporting role  in disaster response, but even in this role, DOD has specific planning  responsibilities. For example, the NRP requires federal agencies to  incorporate the accelerated response requirements of the NRP’s  catastrophic incident annex into their own emergency response plans.
Within DOD, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which  was issued in June 2005, envisions a greater reliance on National Guard  and Reserve forces for homeland missions. The military response to  domestic disasters typically varies depending on the severity of an event.  During smaller disasters, an affected state’s National Guard may provide a  sufficient response but larger disasters and catastrophes that overwhelm  the state may require assistance from out-of-state National Guard or  federal troops. For Katrina, the response was heavily reliant on the  National Guard, which is consistent with DOD’s Strategy for Homeland  Defense and Civil Support. This represents a departure from past  catastrophes when active-duty forces played a larger role in the response.
During disaster response missions, National Guard troops typically  operate under the control of the state governors. However, the National  Guard Bureau has responsibility for formulating, developing, and  coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army and Air National  Guard personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication between  the United States Army, the United States Air Force, and the National  Guard in U.S. states and territories. Although the Chief of the National  Guard Bureau does not have operational control of National Guard forces  in the states and territories, he has overall responsibility for National  Guard Military Support to Civil Authorities programs. The United States  Northern Command also has a support to civil authorities mission.  Because of this mission, Northern Command was responsible for  commanding the federal military response to Hurricane Katrina.
Over the years, we have completed a number of reviews related to disaster  preparedness and response. Our past work has shown that both DOD and  National Guard forces play key roles in the wake of catastrophic  disasters. Our recent Katrina testimony and statement, along with White  House and congressional reports, have highlighted deficiencies in the  NRP’s implementation and thoroughness. For example, the Secretary of  the Department of Homeland Security did not implement the NRP’s  Catastrophic Incident Annex during Katrina. In addition, the plan’s  catastrophic incident supplement, which was supposed to have listed  specific proactive actions agencies would take in response to a  catastrophe, had not been approved during the 9 months between the  plan’s issuance and Katrina’s landfall.
We currently have a large body of ongoing work to address preparation,  response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to hurricanes Katrina  and Rita. Due to the widespread congressional interest in these subjects,  our work is being completed under the Comptroller General’s authority.  This report presents the results of our review of the military response to  Hurricane Katrina, which examined (1) the extent to which pre-Katrina  plans and training exercises reflected the military assistance that might be  required during a catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, (2) the support  that the military provided in responding to Katrina and factors that  affected that response, and (3) the actions the military is taking to address  lessons learned from Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophic  event.
To address our first two objectives, we traveled to the affected areas,  interviewed officials who led the response efforts, and collected,  compared, and analyzed data from numerous military organizations that  provided support to the Hurricane Katrina response operations. We also  reviewed the military responses to prior catastrophes and analyzed  disaster planning documents and exercise reports. To determine the  actions that the military is taking to address lessons learned from Katrina  and to prepare for the next catastrophic event, we collected and analyzed  after action and lessons learned documents from a wide range of military  and civilian organizations, and we interviewed responsible officials and  reviewed available documentation on DOD’s actions to address lessons  learned and prepare for the next catastrophic event. A detailed discussion  of our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We determined  the reliability of the military response data we obtained by interviewing  DOD officials knowledgeable about the data and corroborating the  information with information gathered from other DOD and military  service organizations. We conducted our review from September 2005  through April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: The National Response Plan
paragraphs: The National Response Plan (NRP) was issued in December 2004 to  establish a single, comprehensive framework for the management of  domestic incidents, including natural disasters. The NRP is the federal  government’s plan to coordinate its resources and capabilities across  agencies and integrate them with other levels of government, as well as  private sector organizations, for prevention of, preparedness for, response  to, and recovery from natural disasters, terrorism, or other emergencies.  According to the plan, the NRP serves as the foundation for the  development of detailed supplemental plans and procedures to effectively  and efficiently implement federal assistance for specific types of incidents.
The heart of the NRP is its base plan, which outlines planning  assumptions, roles and responsibilities, and incident management actions.  The NRP also contains 15 emergency support function annexes, which  describe the mission, policies, structure, and responsibilities of federal  agencies in an incident. Appendix II contains a table that shows  organizational responsibilities for the 15 emergency response functions. It  shows that DOD does not have sole primary responsibility for any  emergency function, and its role is primarily that of a supporting agency.  While multiple agencies support each emergency support function, DOD is  the only agency with supporting responsibilities for all 15 emergency  support functions. The NRP also contains seven incident annexes  describing responsibilities, processes, and procedures for specific types of  incidents. One of these annexes addresses catastrophic incidents.
section_title: Catastrophic Incidents
paragraphs: The catastrophic incident annex establishes the strategy for implementing  an accelerated, proactive response when a catastrophic incident occurs.  The NRP defines a catastrophic incident as any natural or manmade  incident that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or  disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment,  economy, national morale, or government functions.
In terms of its combined casualties, damage, and disruption to the  population, environment, and economy, Hurricane Katrina was clearly a  catastrophe and it was arguably the most devastating natural disaster in  United States’ history. More than 1,300 people lost their lives; damage  stretched over a 90,000 square mile area; more than a million people were  driven from their homes; buildings, bridges, roads, and power and  communications infrastructure were destroyed or severely damaged; and  millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the environment. We may never  fully know the financial cost of Hurricane Katrina but one projection has  put it at more than $200 billion.
section_title: Military Support
paragraphs: During disasters and catastrophes, the military may provide support at two  different levels. First, the military may provide support at the state level  through its National Guard personnel and units. The governor of a state  may call the National Guard forces within that state to active duty in  response to a local or statewide emergency. In these cases, the state pays  the salaries of the National Guard members. Under an existing Emergency  Management Assistance Compact that establishes a framework for mutual  assistance, governors may also call their National Guard forces to active  duty in a state status and then send them to another state that is facing a  disaster. The governor of the affected state, through the state’s adjutant  general, commands both the National Guard forces from the affected state  and the out-of-state National Guard forces that may flow into the affected  state under emergency management assistance compacts. National Guard  troops also respond to disasters under Title 32 of the United States Code.  Under Title 32, National Guard troops continue to report to the governor  of the affected state but they receive federal pay and benefits. In response  to Hurricane Katrina, National Guard forces were generally activated in a  state active-duty status and then eventually placed in Title 32 status.
The military can also respond to disasters at the federal level. The federal  military response can consist of active component or Reserve or National  Guard personnel. Active component troops that deploy to disaster areas  remain under the control of the President and the Secretary of Defense,  but they usually deploy in response to a request from an affected state.  The President can also send Reserve and National Guard troops to a  disaster area in a federal status under Title 10 of the United States Code.  However, federal laws place certain limitations on the use of federal  troops. For Hurricane Katrina, the federal military response consisted of  active component troops and Reserve volunteers.
The use of the military for disaster relief is authorized by the Robert T.  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Under  procedures to implement the Stafford Act, the military provides support to  civil authorities through a specific request process. However, under its  immediate response authority, which is outlined in DOD directives, a local  military commander can assist civil authorities or the public without prior  approval if the action is necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering,  or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.
section_title: Military Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: On March 25, 2003, DOD established the office of the Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Homeland Defense to oversee homeland defense activities  for DOD, under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,  and as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff. This office develops policies, conducts analysis, provides advice,  and makes recommendations on homeland defense, support to civil  authorities, emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management  matters within the department. Specifically, the assistant secretary assists  the Secretary of Defense in providing policy direction to the United States  Northern Command and other applicable commands to guide the  development and execution of homeland defense plans and activities.  This direction is provided through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense also  serves as the DOD Domestic Crisis Manager. In this capacity, he  represents the department on all homeland-defense-related matters with  all levels of government, ranging from state and local officials to the  Department of Homeland Security and the Executive Office of the  President.
In 2002, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the  United States, DOD established the United States Northern Command with  a dual mission of homeland defense and civil support. Northern Command  receives policy direction on both missions from the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Homeland Defense. Northern Command’s civil support  activities are triggered by the President or the Secretary of Defense,  generally in response to requests for federal assistance. Following a  catastrophic incident, DOD may provide extensive lifesaving and  sustaining support to civil authorities. However, DOD may also provide  smaller scale support for other incidents such as wild fires, floods,  tornados, blizzards, or other disasters. The United States Joint Forces  Command generally provides Northern Command the military resources  and forces it needs to assist civil authorities.
The National Guard Bureau is the federal military coordination,  administrative, policy, and logistical center for the Army and Air National  Guard and serves as the channel of communication between the United  States Army, the United States Air Force, and the National Guard in 54  states and territories. The Bureau is responsible for formulating,  developing, and coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army  and Air National Guard personnel. However, the Bureau does not have  operational control over National Guard forces that are operating in either  a state or federal status.
The governor is the commander in chief of all National Guard units within  the state’s jurisdiction that are not in active federal service. Command is  normally exercised through the state’s adjutant general. During military  support to civil authority operations, the National Guard Bureau provides  policy guidance and facilitates assistance, when needed, by locating and  coordinating out-of-state National Guard assistance. However, the actual  execution of mutual assistance agreements between the states does not  involve the National Guard Bureau.
section_title: Past GAO Work
paragraphs: Over the years, we have completed a number of reviews related to disaster  preparedness and response, and a list of our related reports and  testimonies is included at the end of this report. Two reports that we  issued in 1993 following Hurricane Andrew are of particular note. In the  first, we identified problems related to inadequate damage assessments  and coordination. In the second, we also addressed coordination issues. In  both, we suggested that to improve DOD’s ability to respond to  catastrophic events, the Congress might wish to consider amending Title  10 of the United States Code to allow reserve component units to be  involuntarily activated to provide military assistance during catastrophes.
section_title: Pre-Katrina Preparations Did Not Fully Address the Military Capabilities Needed during a Catastrophic Natural Disaster
paragraphs: Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and training exercises involving  the military were insufficient, and did not incorporate lessons learned  from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities that  could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster. The military  had responded to numerous natural disasters and catastrophes in the past  but these prior experiences were not reflected in key planning documents  or in the disaster exercises that had been conducted prior to Hurricane  Katrina. For example, the NRP contained few details about the specific  military capabilities that would likely be needed in a natural disaster, even  if the natural disaster were catastrophic. DOD’s emergency response plan  also did not fully address the military capabilities that could be needed to  respond to a catastrophic natural disaster. DOD’s primary planning  document, Functional Plan 2501, was inadequate because it did not  address the functions DOD could be asked to perform as a supporting  agency for all 15 NRP emergency support functions. National Guard state  plans, which had been sufficient for past smaller disasters, were also  insufficient for large-scale catastrophes and did not adequately account for  the outside assistance that could be needed during a catastrophe.  Moreover, disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a robust  exercise program. As a result of the inadequate plans—and the lack of  realistic exercises to test those plans—a lack of understanding existed  within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the  types of assistance and capabilities that the military might provide, the  timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the active- duty and National Guard components.
subsections: section_title: Disaster Experience Was Not Reflected in the NRP’s Planned Use of Military Capabilities during Catastrophes
paragraphs: Disaster plans in place prior to Hurricane Katrina did not adequately  delineate military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a  catastrophic event. Over the years, the military has been frequently called  upon to provide assistance in the aftermath of hurricanes and other  disasters. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the largest disaster-relief deployment  of military forces was in 1992 when Hurricane Andrew swept across south  Florida. The military also provided extensive support to civil authorities  following other catastrophes, such as the 1989 earthquake in the San  Francisco area and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The  National Guard has even more experience, albeit typically with smaller- scale disasters. In fiscal year 2001, the National Guard responded to 365  requests for disaster assistance following hurricanes, floods, fires, ice  storms, tornadoes, and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and  Pentagon.
None of these prior disasters compared to the devastation wrought by  Katrina, and the military was not prepared for what would be needed in  her wake. Overall, plans proved to be insufficient because they did not  identify the military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a  catastrophic natural disaster of this magnitude. The NRP, which guides  planning of supporting federal agencies, lacks specificity as to how DOD  should be used and what resources it should provide in the event of a  domestic natural disaster. For example, the NRP makes little distinction  between the military response to smaller, regional disasters and the  military response to large-scale, catastrophic natural disasters, even  though past disasters have shown that the military tends to play a much  larger role in catastrophes. The NRP states that DOD has significant  resources that may be available to support the federal response to an  incident of national significance, but it lists very few specific DOD  resources that should be called upon even in the event of a catastrophic  natural disaster. Given the substantial role the military is actually expected  to play in a catastrophe—no other federal agency brings as many  resources to bear—this lack of detailed planning represents a critical  oversight.
The NRP contains a catastrophic incident annex that addresses the need  for accelerated, proactive federal responses during catastrophic incidents.  The annex contains principles and guidelines but few details about the  anticipated proactive federal response. The details were to be contained in  the NRP’s catastrophic incident supplement and in detailed supplemental  plans and procedures. A draft version of the NRP catastrophic incident  supplement was released in September 2005, but it still has not been  finalized. It contained a 12-page execution schedule with many details  about the tasks that many agencies are expected to accomplish in  response to a catastrophic event. However, despite extensive deployments  of military capabilities for past catastrophes like Hurricane Andrew, the  draft supplement lists very few specific tasks that DOD should perform  during a catastrophe. The only specific DOD actions it addresses are  deploying a coordinating officer and team to the affected region, making  bases available as operational staging areas, and preparing for medical  evacuation missions. The additional detailed planning was left for DOD to  develop.
The NRP represents a planning framework, not the detailed planning that  would be necessary to support the plan. In addition to designating primary  agencies for each of its 15 emergency support functions, the NRP  designates an emergency function coordinator. The coordinator, which is  also a primary agency, is responsible for coordinating all activities related  to catastrophic incident planning. Since the NRP generally places DOD in  a supporting role rather than in a coordinator role, DOD relied on other  agencies to take the lead in coordinating the overall response within each  functional area. However, according to DOD officials, coordinated  emergency support function plans were generally not completed when  Katrina struck. Lacking coordinated plans to clearly identify the  capabilities that other agencies would provide during a catastrophe, DOD  was forced to anticipate which capabilities the primary agencies and other  supporting agencies would provide as it developed the details in its  supporting plan. After evaluating the use of military capabilities during  Hurricane Katrina, the White House report recommended, among other  things, that DOD plan and prepare to have a significant role during  catastrophes, and develop plans to lead the federal response for events of  extraordinary scope and nature.
section_title: DOD’s Supporting Plan Lacked Details About the Military Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters
paragraphs: While the military’s approach to planning is well defined, prior to  Hurricane Katrina, DOD did not develop a detailed plan to account for the  full range of tasks and missions the military could need to provide in the  event of a catastrophe. DOD planners typically use one of three different  types of plans for its missions. From most to least detailed, they are  operations plans, contingency plans, and functional plans. Combatant  commanders, like Northern Command, have some discretion to determine  what type of planning is necessary for their assigned missions. For its  emergency response plan to provide defense assistance to civil authorities  during disasters or catastrophes, DOD opted to use its least detailed type  of plan, the functional plan. Functional plans are generally used to address  peacetime operations in permissive environments. DOD’s plan is called  Functional Plan 2501. Even though functional plans are less detailed than  the two other types of plans, according to DOD’s joint planning guidance,  a functional plan must be adequate and feasible. Adequate means that the  scope and concept of the plan satisfy the specified task and accomplish  the intended mission, and feasible means the plan accomplishes the  assigned tasks with resources that are available within the time frames  contemplated.
While Functional Plan 2501 was adequate for most disasters, it was not  adequate or feasible for a catastrophe. The existing plan was nearly 9  years old, and was undergoing revision when Katrina struck. It had not  been updated since the Northern Command was established in 2002, nor  was it aligned with the recently published NRP. Just as the NRP did not  differentiate between military tasks in a disaster and a catastrophe,  Northern Command’s Functional Plan 2501 lacked the details necessary to  address issues that emerge in a catastrophe but not in smaller-scale  disasters. The plan did not account for the full range of tasks and missions  the military could need to provide in the event of a catastrophe, despite  the NRP requirement that agencies incorporate the accelerated response  requirements of the NRP’s catastrophic incident annex into their  emergency response plans. It did not anticipate that DOD, as a supporting  agency for the 15 emergency support functions outlined in the NRP, could  be called upon by the primary agencies to assume significant  responsibilities for those functions—from search and rescue to  communications to transportation and logistics.
In addition, DOD’s plan had little provision for integrating active and  reserve component forces. In general, a feasible plan would anticipate the  personnel and resources that might be required in response to a  catastrophic event. This would include the emergency support function  tasks to which DOD was committed in a supporting role. Resources likely  to be employed in a catastrophic event include reserve component forces– the National Guard and Reserves—and yet the plan did not fully address  the division of tasks between National Guard resources under the  governors’ control and federal resources under Presidential control. The  2005 DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support called for  focused reliance on reserve component capabilities for civil support  missions, but Functional Plan 2501 did not envision the large-scale  employment of National Guard and Reserve assets and did not outline a  concept of operations using National Guard/Reserve capabilities. It did not  address key questions of integration, command and control, and the  division of tasks between National Guard resources under state control  and federal resources under U.S. Northern Command’s control. Moreover,  the functional plan did not establish time frames for the response.
Functional Plan 2501, created in 1997, was written without the benefit of  numerous strategies, directives, and publications that directly bear upon  military support to civil authorities. For example, the 2005 DOD Strategy  for Homeland Defense and Civil Support identified the need for improved  communications capabilities in domestic incidents, but Functional Plan  2501 does not specifically address this issue. Furthermore, the strategy  envisions effective surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in support  of homeland defense operations and again, the functional plan does not  sufficiently address this capability. In contrast, the Northern Command  has more detailed and operationally specific plans for other homeland  defense missions, like its response missions following a terrorist attack.  Understandably, development of these plans was given priority after the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While specifics about these plans  are classified for national security reasons, DOD officials told us that many  of the capabilities and procedures used in these plans could be adopted  for civil support operations conducted after natural disasters.
section_title: National Guard Plans Were Also Inadequate
paragraphs: Two related problems were evident with respect to the National Guard’s  planning prior to Katrina. First, the National Guard Bureau and Northern  Command had not planned a coordinated response. Second, at the state  level, the plans of the National Guard in Louisiana and Mississippi were  inadequate for a catastrophic natural disaster.
The National Guard civil support plans were not integrated with DOD’s  Functional Plan 2501. While the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does  not have operational control of National Guard personnel in the states and  territories, he does have overall responsibility for military support to civil  authorities programs in the National Guard. However, the bureau had not  coordinated in advance with the governors and adjutants general in the  states and territories to develop plans to provide assistance for  catastrophic disasters across the country. Specifically, the bureau had not  identified the types of units that were likely to be needed during a  catastrophe or worked with the state governors and adjutants general to  develop and maintain a list of National Guard units from each state that  would likely be available to meet these requirements during catastrophic  natural disasters. In addition, the Northern Command and the National  Guard Bureau had not planned which disaster response missions would be  handled by National Guard members and which would be handled by  reservists and active component members.
Prior to Katrina, the Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans were  not synchronized with DOD’s plans, and they were also inadequate for a  catastrophe of Katrina’s magnitude. Like DOD’s Functional Plan 2501, the  Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans were adequate for smaller  disasters but insufficient for a catastrophe, and did not adequately account  for the outside assistance that could be needed during a catastrophe. For  example, Joint Forces Headquarters Louisiana modified its plan and  reassigned disaster responsibilities when thousands of Louisiana National  Guard personnel were mobilized for federal missions prior to Hurricane  Katrina. However, the Louisiana plan did not address the need to bring in  thousands of military troops from outside the state during a catastrophe.  Similarly, Mississippi National Guard officials told us that even their 1969  experience with Hurricane Camille, a category 5 storm that hit the same  general area, had not adequately prepared them for a catastrophic natural  disaster of Katrina’s magnitude. For example, the Mississippi National  Guard disaster plan envisioned the establishment of commodity  distribution centers but it did not anticipate the number of centers that  could be required in a catastrophic event or following a nearly complete  loss of infrastructure.
section_title: Exercise Programs Did Not Adequately Test Disaster Plans
paragraphs: Disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a robust exercise  program. The Homeland Security Council has issued 15 national planning  scenarios—including a major hurricane scenario—that provide the basis  for disaster exercises throughout the nation. While DOD sponsors or  participates in no less than two major interagency field exercises per year,  few exercises led by the Department of Homeland Security or DOD  focused on catastrophic natural disasters and none of the exercises called  for a major deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic  hurricane. According to DOD officials, DOD has been involved in only one  catastrophic hurricane exercise since 2003—Unified Defense 2004. This  exercise, which simulated a nuclear detonation along with a category 4  hurricane, revealed problems with situational awareness and operational  control of forces that still had not been resolved when Katrina made  landfall in August 2005. In addition, although DOD has periodically held  modest military support to civil authorities exercises, the exercises used  underlying assumptions that were unrealistic in preparing for a  catastrophe. For example, DOD assumed that first responders and  communications would be available and that the transportation  infrastructure would be navigable in a major hurricane scenario. Finally,  the First U.S. Army conducted planning and exercises in response to six  hurricanes in 2005. These exercises led to actions, such as the early  deployment of Defense Coordinating Officers, which enhanced disaster  response efforts. However, DOD’s exercise program was not adequate for  a catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude.
As a result of the inadequate plans and exercises, when Hurricane Katrina  struck, a lack of understanding existed within the military and among  federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and  capabilities that the military might provide, the timing of this assistance,  and the respective contributions of the National Guard and federal military  forces.
section_title: The Military’s Response to Hurricane Katrina was Massive but Faced Several Challenges
paragraphs: Even though there was a lack of detailed planning, the military mounted a  massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly  assisted recovery efforts, but several factors affected this response. During  the response to Katrina, a number of interrelated factors affected the  military’s ability to leverage its resources to gain situational awareness and  effectively organize and execute its response efforts. Some factors that  affected the military response were: a lack of timely damage assessments,  communications difficulties, problems integrating the use and capabilities  of active-duty and National Guard forces, uncoordinated search and  rescue efforts, and challenges with the significant logistics functions that  FEMA unexpectedly turned over to DOD.
subsections: section_title: The Military Response Was Massive
paragraphs: The military response to Hurricane Katrina reached more than twice the  size of the military response to the catastrophic Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  Military officials began tracking Hurricane Katrina when it was an  unnamed tropical depression and took steps to proactively respond as the  storm strengthened to a category 5 hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. Prior  to landfall, anticipating the disruption and damage that Hurricane Katrina  could cause, the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi activated their  National Guard units. In addition, National Guard officials in Louisiana  and Mississippi began to contact National Guard officials in other states to  request assistance. By the time Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005,  the military was positioned to respond with both National Guard and  federal forces. For example, commands had published warning and  planning orders and DOD had already deployed Defense Coordinating  Officers to all the potentially affected states. After landfall, the governors  and National Guard officials in Louisiana and Mississippi requested  additional support from other states. The governor of Louisiana also  requested federal military assistance to help with response and recovery  efforts.
Figure 1 shows the buildup of forces as the military supported response  and recovery operations with engineering, communication, and military  police units as well as helicopter search-and-rescue and ship crews, and  personnel with many other critically needed capabilities. Active-duty  forces were alerted prior to landfall and the initial buildup of active-duty  forces shown in figure 1 reflects the deployment of key active-duty  capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces. Growing  concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy  large active-duty ground units beginning on September 3, 2005, 5 days after  Katrina’s landfall.
Figure 1 also indicates that the military response, which began prior to  Katrina’s landfall on August 29, 2005, peaked at more than 70,000 troops— over 50,000 National Guard and over 20,000 active federal personnel. This  reliance on the National Guard was based on DOD’s Strategy for  Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which was issued in June 2005. The  strategy called for a focused reliance on the National Guard and Reserves  for civil support missions because, among other things, they have key civil  support capabilities and are located in 3,200 communities throughout the  nation. The reliance on the National Guard and Reserves represents a  departure from past catastrophes when active-duty forces played a larger  role in the response. For example, during the military response to  Hurricane Andrew, the National Guard provided less than 20 percent of  the more than 30,000 military responders.
Most of the National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina came from  outside Louisiana and Mississippi, with the National Guard Bureau acting  as a conduit to communicate requirements for assistance in Louisiana and  Mississippi to the adjutants general in the rest of the country. The  adjutants general of other states, with the authorization of their state  governors, then sent their National Guard troops to Louisiana and  Mississippi under emergency assistance agreements between the states.  Requirements for out-of-state National Guard or federal assistance were  increased because thousands of National Guard personnel from  Mississippi and Louisiana were already mobilized for other missions and  thus unavailable when Hurricane Katrina struck their states. The National  Guard troops that had been mobilized from within the affected states were  able to quickly deploy to where they were needed because they had  trained and planned for disaster mobilizations within their states. The  deployment of out-of-state forces, though quick when compared to past  catastrophes, took longer because mobilization plans were developed and  units were identified for deployment in the midst of the crisis. By Monday,  September 5, 2005 (a week after Katrina made landfall), over 13,800 out-of- state National Guard troops were in Louisiana assisting with response and  recovery efforts. However, when the Superdome bus evacuations began on  Thursday, September 1, 2005, only about 1,600 out-of-state National Guard  troops were in Louisiana, fewer than the number of Louisiana National  Guard members who were mobilized for other missions and unavailable  when Katrina made landfall. At the peak of the military’s response, nearly  40,000 National Guard members from other states were supporting  operations in Louisiana and Mississippi—an unprecedented domestic  mobilization.
In the days after the hurricane passed, considerable confusion surrounded  the employment of military support and many questioned why more  federal ground troops were not sent sooner. According to senior DOD  officials involved in executing DOD’s response to Katrina, DOD was aware  that the situation warranted significant military support and they noted  that the department took steps to proactively deploy federal military  capabilities from all the services to the region. For example, DOD  deployed a joint task force, medical personnel, helicopters, ships from  Texas, Virginia, and Maryland, and construction battalion engineers. Many  of these capabilities were providing assistance or deploying to the area  within hours of Katrina’s landfall. Given the current DOD homeland  defense strategy, which calls for “focused reliance” on the reserve  components for civil support missions, DOD officials told us that they also  began working with the National Guard Bureau to ensure the mobilization  of National Guard forces from across the country. As the situation  unfolded during the week, concerns about the magnitude of the disaster  led to discussions about the need to deploy additional active-duty forces to  supplement the National Guard forces. After visiting the region and  meeting with the Louisiana Governor on Friday, September 2, 2005, the  President, on the next day, ordered the deployment of over 7,000 active- duty ground troops to the region.
Data concerning the military response were not always fully documented  in the midst of the Hurricane Katrina crisis, but it is clear that the military  had a huge impact on response and recovery operations. Data from the  active-duty military task force that headed the federal response indicate  that the military  flew thousands of helicopter sorties, rescuing tens of thousands of  people and carrying thousands of tons of cargo, including sandbags to  repair breeches in the levees around New Orleans;    delivered millions of meals ready to eat, gallons of water, and pounds    searched hundreds of thousands of houses in the affected regions;    provided medical treatment to tens of thousands of civilians; and    conducted mosquito spraying missions over more than 1 million acres.
section_title: Several Factors Affected the Military Response
paragraphs: Despite the significant contribution of its massive response, a number of  interrelated factors affected the military’s ability to leverage its resources  to gain situational awareness and effectively organize and execute its  response efforts. Without detailed plans to address each of the following  factors, the military risks being unprepared for the next catastrophe that  strikes the United States.
subsections: section_title: Comprehensive Damage Assessments Were Not Completed Promptly
paragraphs: Hurricane Katrina response efforts were hampered by the federal  government’s failure to fully use its available assets to conduct timely,  comprehensive damage assessments in Louisiana and Mississippi. The  failure to quickly assess damage and gain situational awareness had also  been a problem during Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The NRP notes that  following a disaster, state and local governments are responsible for  conducting initial damage assessments, but it also notes that state and  local officials could be overwhelmed in a catastrophe. The NRP addresses  this incongruous situation, where state and local officials who may be  overwhelmed have critical functions to perform during the initial stages of  disaster recovery efforts, by stating that the federal government should  provide a proactive response when state and local officials are  overwhelmed during a catastrophe. However, the NRP does not specify  the proactive means or capabilities the federal government should use to  conduct damage assessments and gain situational awareness when the  responsible state and local officials are overwhelmed.
The military has significant capabilities to conduct damage assessments  using reconnaissance aircraft and satellite imagery, but our analysis shows  that neither the NRP nor DOD’s Functional Plan 2501 specifically called  for the proactive use of these assets to meet the NRP catastrophic incident  annex’s requirement for a proactive response to catastrophic incidents. In  addition, DOD did not initially receive significant requests for these  capabilities. At FEMA’s request, DOD initially provided three helicopters  to assist in damage assessments. About 4 days after Katrina’s landfall, the  military began providing imagery data from some of its reconnaissance  assets to its forces and civilian agencies. However, the process for sharing  information proved difficult for several reasons. Some information was  classified due to its source and could not be shared directly with civilian  agencies. In addition, some agencies were not able to access some of the  available information because the data files were too large to download to  the agency computers. A National Guard Hurricane Katrina after-action  review reported that the adjutants general (in Mississippi and Louisiana)  required real time imagery that the military community should have been  able to provide, but did not.
Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and the military’s  extensive reconnaissance capabilities were not effectively leveraged as  part of a proactive federal effort to conduct timely, comprehensive  damage assessments, the military began organizing and deploying its  response without fully understanding the extent of the damage or the  required assistance. According to military officials, available  reconnaissance assets could have provided additional situational  awareness. In contrast, DOD officials told us that almost immediately after  Hurricane Rita struck Louisiana and Texas in September 2005,  considerable surveillance assets were made available to assess damage,  primarily because of lessons learned from Katrina.
section_title: Communications Difficulties Affected the Military Response
paragraphs: Hurricane Katrina caused significant damage to the communication  infrastructure in Louisiana and Mississippi, which further contributed to a  lack of situational awareness for military and civilian officials. Katrina  destroyed or severely degraded many commercial landline and cellular  telephone systems, and emergency radio systems were oversubscribed,  making it difficult to establish necessary connections between officials  and responders at the local, state, and federal levels. As a result, it was  difficult for officials to gain situational awareness. Even when local  officials were able to conduct damage assessments, the lack of  communications assets caused delays in the transmitting of the results of  the assessments. Communications problems, like damage assessment  problems, have been long-standing problems that were also highlighted  following Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
The military, other agencies, and public companies all have extensive  communications assets and capabilities, but the Department of Homeland  Security has responsibility for coordinating the communications portion  of disaster response operations under the NRP. However, neither the NRP,  the Department of Homeland Security, nor DOD fully identified the  extensive military communication capabilities that could be leveraged as  part of a proactive federal response to a catastrophe. In addition, DOD’s  emergency response plan, Functional Plan 2501, addressed internal  military communications requirements, but it did not address the  communication requirements of communities affected by a catastrophic  natural disaster. It also did not address coordination with civilian  responders. Typically, military equipment cannot communicate with  civilian police, fire, and emergency medical systems unless it is augmented  with specialized equipment. While the military and civilian agencies  deployed mobile communication vans that were able to connect different  communications systems that are normally incompatible, the placement of  these vans was not coordinated and some areas had multiple systems  while other areas had no systems at all. Because state and local officials  were overwhelmed and the Department of Homeland Security and DOD  waited for requests for assistance rather than deploying a proactive  response, some of the military’s available communication assets were  never requested or deployed.
In addition to the coordination challenges, communications challenges  arose within the military response. Some deployed National Guard assets  were underutilized because the states that sent the assets placed  restrictions on their use. The equipment was sent solely to support the  sending states’ units and thus was unavailable for priority use. As a result,  a number of mobile communications vans were collocated at a single site  while other areas remained without communications. In addition, some  National Guard responders were short of equipment. For example, one  National Guard unit deployed to the area of operations with only 5 percent  of its communications personnel and 50 percent of its communication  equipment. As a result of these problems, military forces lacked good  communication between headquarters units and troops on the ground.  While subordinate military commanders are trained to complete their  missions even when they do not have communications with their  headquarters, this lack of communication made it difficult for senior  military leaders to determine which missions had been completed, which  were still ongoing, and what new missions may have surfaced.
section_title: The Military Encountered Problems Integrating Its Response
paragraphs: The integration of the military response to Hurricane Katrina was affected  by inadequate planning and by a key mobilization statute that limited  DOD’s reserve component members from being involuntarily ordered to  active duty for disaster response. The military did not adequately plan for  the integration of large numbers of deployed troops from different  commands during disaster response operations. For example, a Louisiana  plan to integrate military responders from outside the state called for the  reception of not more than 300 troops per day. However, in the days  following Hurricane Katrina, more than 20,000 National Guard members  from other states arrived in Louisiana to join the response effort, and on  one single day—September 5, 2005—more than 8,500 National Guard  members from other states arrived in Louisiana to join the Katrina  response effort.
One critical issue that needs to be resolved in any large, integrated  operation is the decision concerning command and control of the forces.  This issue had not been resolved prior to Hurricane Katrina and was a  subject of discussion during the critical first days after Katrina made  landfall. Ultimately, the military took a pragmatic approach to deconflict  the operation with separate active-duty and National Guard chains of  command. The federal forces—the active component and mobilized  Reserve volunteers—were under the command and control of Northern  Command’s Joint Task Force-Katrina, while the National Guard forces,  including those from other states, were under the command and control of  the governors in Mississippi and Louisiana. While response operations  were coordinated across the several chains of command, they were not  integrated, which led to some inefficiencies and duplication of effort. For  example, many responding military units from outside the states were  assigned missions within established geographic boundaries, but the  Louisiana and Mississippi National Guard units had functional missions  that cut across these geographic boundaries. Furthermore, in New  Orleans, the geographic boundaries were not the same as the city district  boundaries. This made coordination with local responders more difficult.  Despite the lack of prior planning to address integration issues, many  efforts were made to integrate the response. For example, active military  representatives were assigned to state emergency operations centers and  the commander of the active forces traveled daily throughout the affected  region coordinating and collaborating with National Guard, and federal,  state, and local civilian officials.
Because the military had not specifically planned nor decided which parts  of the military response would be handled by the National Guard and  which parts would be handled by the active component and mobilized  reservists, many of the force flow decisions and integration efforts were ad  hoc in the midst of the crisis. Because military plans and exercises had not  provided a means for integrating the response, no one had the total picture  of the forces on the ground, the forces that were on the way, the missions  for which forces had been allocated, and the missions that still needed to  be done. For example, National Guard commanders in Mississippi and  Louisiana were not prepared to receive the division headquarter elements  that were sent from Indiana and Kansas to command the out-of-state  National Guard forces that were arriving in the two states from around the  country.
A key mobilization statute also affected the integration of the military  response. Title 10 of the United States Code currently limits a unit or  member of a reserve component from being involuntarily ordered to  federal active duty for disaster response. While this restriction applies to  both National Guard and Reserve forces, National Guard forces were  mobilized under both state active duty and Title 32 for Hurricane Katrina.  No similar provisions exist to specifically mobilize Reserve forces for  disaster response, although it is conceivable that if the President declares  a national emergency, reserve component forces could become available  for involuntary activation. As a result, all the Reservists who responded to  Hurricane Katrina were volunteers, and Reservists constituted a relatively  small portion of the response when compared to the National Guard and  active component portions of the response.
If the military continues to rely on Reserve volunteers it will have difficulty  fully executing DOD’s 2005 civil support strategy that calls for a focused  reliance on both the National Guard and the Reserves.  The strategy notes  that the National Guard is particularly well suited for civil support  missions because it is routinely exercised with local law enforcement and  first responders, experienced in supporting neighboring communities in  times of crisis, and accessible in state active duty and Title 32 status.  However, the strategy also emphasizes the use of the Reserves for  domestic missions. The strategy specifically states that “the nation needs  to focus particular attention on better using the competencies of National  Guard and Reserve” organizations, and notes that Reserve forces currently  provide many key capabilities. The process of lining up volunteers can be  time-consuming and is more appropriate for mobilizing individuals than it  is for mobilizing entire units or capabilities that may be needed during a  catastrophe.
In 1993, after Hurricane Andrew, the military was facing a drawdown in  force size and increasing mission requirements, and we issued two reports  related to disaster assistance that addressed the Title 10 limitation. One of  the reports said that, to improve DOD’s response to catastrophic events,  the Congress may want to consider amending Title 10 of the United States  Code to allow reserve component units to be involuntarily activated to  provide disaster assistance. Such a change would have provided DOD with  more flexibility in the use of its total force. However, the limitation has  remained in place. While the mobilization restriction did not limit the  military’s ability to respond to Hurricane Katrina, it could limit DOD’s  ability to respond to future catastrophes if large portions of the active-duty  and National Guard forces are unavailable due to other mission  requirements.
section_title: Search and Rescue Plans and Efforts Were Not Coordinated
paragraphs: While tens of thousands of people were rescued after Katrina through the  efforts of military, civil government, and private rescuers, the lack of  clarity in search and rescue plans led to operations that, according to  aviation officials, were not as efficient as they could have been. The NRP  addressed only part of the search and rescue mission, and the National  Search and Rescue Plan had not been updated to reflect the NRP. Under  the United States National Search and Rescue Plan, which was issued in  1999, the Coast Guard ordinarily has responsibility for providing or  arranging maritime search and rescue services, and the Air Force  ordinarily has responsibility for providing or arranging nonmaritime  search and rescue services in the continental United States. The plan also  calls on DOD to support civil search and rescue efforts when the efforts do  not interfere with DOD’s primary military duties, and it states that DOD  and Coast Guard commands should provide their facilities for civil search  and rescue to the fullest extent practicable. While the NRP acknowledges  the existence of the National Search and Rescue Plan, the NRP does not  specifically address how the Coast Guard and the Air Force organizational  responsibilities in the National Search and Rescue Plan coincide with the  NRP’s urban search and rescue annex. That annex lays out organizational  responsibilities for search and rescue during a disaster, but it focuses on  ground rescues. While the NRP includes DOD and the Coast Guard among  the many supporting agencies, it lists the Department of Homeland  Security’s Emergency Preparedness and Response and FEMA as the  primary and coordinating agencies for urban search and rescue.
As a result of the lack of clear search and rescue guidance, the aviation  portion of military search and rescue operations was not fully integrated  with the helicopter search and rescue operations of the Coast Guard and  other rescuers. At least two different locations were assigning search and  rescue tasks to military helicopter pilots operating over New Orleans and  no one had the total picture of the missions that had been resourced and  the missions that still needed to be performed. In accordance with the  National Search and Rescue Plan, the Air Force established a Joint Search  and Rescue Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, to manage  Hurricane Katrina search and rescue missions; however, this center was  not set up until September 4, 2005, 6 days after Katrina’s landfall.  Furthermore, the center did not have radar coverage over New Orleans.  After Katrina made landfall, search and rescue helicopters operating in the  New Orleans area were receiving their tasks from either the Coast Guard,  which was based at Belle Chase, Louisiana, or from a task force led by the  Louisiana National Guard, which was operating at the Superdome.  According to Louisiana National Guard officials, they worked with the  Coast Guard to deconflict the aviation operations, but the search and  rescue efforts that were being directed from the two sites were not  integrated. For example, some military aircraft received their direction  from the task for at the Superdome, while others received their direction  from the Coast Guard or the Joint Task Force that was in command of the  active troops on the ground. Neither the Coast Guard nor the Louisiana  National Guard had visibility of all the aircraft operating over the city of  New Orleans in the initial days after Katrina made landfall. According to  military officials, better integration of search and rescue efforts could  reduce duplications of effort for search and rescue aircraft.
section_title: DOD Assumed an Unanticipated Logistics Role
paragraphs: Another factor that affected the military response was the large and  unanticipated logistics role it was asked to assume when FEMA became  overwhelmed. Under the NRP, FEMA is responsible for coordinating  logistics during disaster response efforts but during Hurricane Katrina,  FEMA quickly became overwhelmed. Supplies that had been positioned  prior to Katrina’s landfall were quickly exhausted. As a result, FEMA  placed orders for more than 9 million meals-ready-to-eat and then, 4 days  after landfall, asked DOD to assume a significant portion of its logistics  responsibilities. Specifically, FEMA gave DOD responsibility for  procurement, transportation, and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel, and  medical supplies and it authorized DOD to spend up to $1 billion to  accomplish this mission. According to DOD officials, all of the 9 million  meals that FEMA had ordered were shipped to the region by September 4,  2005. However, because FEMA lacked the capability to maintain  visibility—from order through final delivery—of the supplies and  commodities it had ordered, DOD had difficulty gaining visibility over the  supplies and commodities when it assumed FEMA’s logistics  responsibilities. As a result of its lack of visibility over the meals that were  in transit, DOD had to airlift 1.7 million meals to Mississippi to respond to  a request from the Adjutant General of Mississippi, who was concerned  that food supplies were nearly exhausted.
We recently issued a report that examined how the food provided by  foreign nations was managed, and we have additional work planned to  look at the entire logistics process to best determine how the federal  government can provide support in the future.
section_title: DOD Has Begun Taking Actions to Address Catastrophic Disaster Response Problems, Some of Which are Complex and Long-standing
paragraphs: DOD is aware of disaster response problems described in this report and is  beginning to take actions to address the lessons learned from Hurricane  Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophic event. The department  has been conducting its own lessons-learned reviews and is also  examining the lessons and recommendations in reports from a White  House review panel, congressional oversight committees, and other  sources. As a result, DOD is taking some actions to address catastrophic  disaster response problems. While it is too early to fully evaluate the  effectiveness of these ongoing and planned actions, many appear to hold  promise for improving future responses. However, the issues identified  during the aftermath of Katrina are often complex, cross agency  boundaries, and are, in some cases, long-standing. Substantial  improvement to the military’s disaster and catastrophe response will  require sustained attention from management at the highest levels of DOD  and from key officials across the government.
subsections: section_title: Military Lessons Learned Are Emerging
paragraphs: DOD has collected lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina from a  variety of sources. Within the department, DOD has a formal set of  procedures to identify, capture, and share information collected as a result  of operations in order to enhance performance in future operations. Even  in the midst of the Hurricane Katrina response operation, officials from  various military organizations were collecting information on lessons  learned and this continued well after most operations had ceased. For  example, communications issues that had surfaced were studied by both  active and National Guard commands that had responded to Hurricane  Katrina. DOD also formed a task force to study the response and is  compiling and analyzing various military and other lesson learned reports  to help design an improved response to future natural catastrophic events.  In addition, the DOD Inspector General’s Office and the service audit  agencies are reviewing aspects of the Hurricane Katrina response.
Other organizations have also been gathering lessons learned. According  to DOD officials, they have reviewed White House and congressional  reports identifying lessons to be applied or challenges to be addressed in  future response operations. While the assessments were different, many  common themes emerged and are similar to the issues we describe in this  report. For example, a February 2006 White House report also recognized  the significant role that the military plays in catastrophes, and it even  recommended that DOD work with the Department of Homeland Security  to identify those extraordinary circumstances when it is appropriate for  DOD to temporarily lead the federal response. That report also noted the  lack of a unified command structure for active and National Guard forces  and suggested that DOD work on ensuring integration of those forces in  future responses. It further recommended that DOD seek ways to leverage  Reserve members’ civilian skills in disaster relief efforts. In addition, an  over 500-page congressional report found numerous issues with the  Katrina response, including the lack of integration of National Guard and  active-duty forces, which hampered the military response.
section_title: DOD Is Taking Initial Steps to Improve Future Military Response to Catastrophes
paragraphs: To address the challenges highlighted in these lessons learned reports,  DOD is currently planning numerous actions to improve its ability to  respond to a catastrophic event. For example, DOD officials stated that  the department is currently updating its emergency response plan and  intends to use a contingency plan rather than a less detailed functional  plan to guide its military support to civil authority missions. Recognizing  the urgency of preparing for catastrophic events, the department hopes to  complete many of its initial steps by June 1, 2006, the start of the next  hurricane season. Since details about many of the department’s actions  were still emerging as we completed our review we were unable to fully  assess the effectiveness of DOD’s actions. However, many actions appear  to offer promise for improving future responses. Several additional  examples of DOD’s planned efforts follow.
To improve situational awareness and assist in damage assessment  after a catastrophe, DOD is working on a plan to coordinate and  synchronize surveillance and reconnaissance requests and assets.
To improve integration of responders, DOD is planning several steps,  including (1) expanding its training programs to accommodate  planners from other agencies and (2) conducting new homeland  defense and civil support exercises.
To improve coordination between National Guard and active forces,  and, specifically, avoid duplication of effort by military forces during an  incident, NGB officials will work with the states to build a database of  current and planned state-to-state agreements for sharing National  Guard forces.
DOD also has an organizational realignment underway that military  officials believe should improve the response to future disasters and  catastrophes. This realignment gives a single Army organization, the Fifth  United States Army, responsibility for domestic disaster response. When  Katrina made landfall in August 2005, disaster responsibilities within the  Army were split between two organizations. Under the change, the Fifth  Army becomes a subordinate (U.S. Army, North) to the Northern  Command and will focus on homeland defense and disaster response.  According to military officials, Army, North, is establishing two command  posts that will be capable of deploying within 18 hours as joint task forces  for catastrophes anywhere in the United States. The command posts will  be available when Army, North, reaches its full operating capability in  October, 2006. Furthermore, to improve interagency coordination,  specially trained defense coordinating elements are being established and  co-located within each of FEMA’s 10 regional offices. Army, North, also  has a number of training and planning efforts underway to improve its  support to civil authorities.
section_title: Complex and Long- standing Issues Will Require Sustained Management Attention to Resolve
paragraphs: While DOD’s efforts to address the Katrina lessons learned appear to be  steps in the right direction, some of the issues DOD is facing are complex  and long-standing and cut across agency boundaries. As a result,  substantial improvement will occur only if the actions receive sustained  management attention at the highest levels, both within DOD and within  the other responsible agencies. Many of the problems encountered during  the Katrina response were also reported after Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  For example, in a 1993 report, we found that the practice of assigning  responsibility for conducting damage assessments to state and local  officials under the Federal Response Plan was not suitable for  catastrophic situations and it contributed to the lack of timely damage  assessments during Hurricane Andrew. Our report also found supply  distribution delays caused by a lack of visibility over FEMA-ordered  supplies, and found confusion over the command and control  relationships, which had not been fully resolved prior to Andrew’s landfall.  Due to the complexity and long-standing nature of these problems, DOD’s  planned and ongoing actions must receive sustained top-management  attention in order to effect needed improvements in the military’s ability to  support civil authorities.
Part of DOD’s challenge in moving forward is the complexity of the  problems, especially given the uncertainty of potential events and the  sheer number of organizations at all levels of government that are  involved. Coordinating improvements across the various parts of the  military, alone, will be a challenge. The National Guard and active-duty  forces have complicated chains-of-command, especially in peacetime  when the National Guard typically serves the state governors. Other issues  require close coordination with state and local governments. For example,  conducting damage assessments, a critical early step in developing an  appropriate response to an event, can involve many different agencies at  all levels of government. Damage assessments are normally to be  conducted by local or state officials during a disaster. However, local and  state officials who are overwhelmed in a catastrophe are unlikely to be  able to conduct timely and comprehensive damage assessments.  Paradoxically, without timely, comprehensive damage assessments federal  responders may not realize the extent to which local and state official are  overwhelmed. While the issues are complex, they are also urgent, and  experience has illustrated that the military has critical and substantial  capabilities that are needed in the wake of catastrophic events.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Clearly, Hurricane Katrina was one of the most devastating natural  disasters in our nation’s history, and because of its size and strength, it will  have long-standing effects for years to come. By their nature, major  catastrophic events involve extraordinary levels of casualties, damage, or  disruption that will likely immediately overwhelm state and local  responders—circumstances that make sound planning for catastrophic  events all the more crucial. Prior disasters and the actual experience of  Hurricane Katrina show that the military is likely to contribute substantial  support to state and local authorities. More detailed planning would  improve officials’ understanding of the support the military could be  expected to provide following a catastrophic incident, including the types  of capabilities that might be provided, the actions that might be taken  proactively and in response to specific requests, and the integrating of the  National Guard and active-duty response. Further, while the limited  participation of Reserve members after Katrina did not affect response  efforts, under current law, DOD’s ability to respond to future catastrophes  may be limited if it cannot involuntarily mobilize reserve component  members—particularly if large portions of the active and National Guard  forces are unavailable due to other mission requirements. The devastation  of Katrina and the issues it revealed serve as a warning that actions are  needed to clearly identify the military capabilities that will be required  from the National Guard, Reserve, and active forces as part of a proactive  federal response following a catastrophic natural disaster. Without urgent  and detailed attention to improve planning, the military and federal  government risk being unprepared for the next catastrophe.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that DOD take the following four actions:  First, given the expected heavy reliance on the military during  catastrophes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide the  Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with proposed  revisions to the NRP that will fully address the proactive functions the  military will be expected to perform during a catastrophic incident, for  inclusion in the next NRP update.
Second, in view of the fast approaching 2006 hurricane season and other  natural and man-made threats that could result in a catastrophe at any  instant, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish milestones  and expedite the development of detailed plans and exercises to fully  account for the unique capabilities and support that the military is likely to  provide to civil authorities in response to the full range of domestic  disasters, including catastrophes. The plans and exercises should  specifically address the    use of reconnaissance capabilities to assess damage,    use of communications capabilities to facilitate support to civil  authorities,  integration of active component and National Guard and Reserve  forces,    use of search and rescue capabilities and the military’s role in search  and rescue, and  role the military might be expected to play in logistics.
Third, since National Guard troops can join response efforts as part of the  federal response or as part of the state response under mutual assistance  agreements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief  of the National Guard Bureau to work with the state governors and  adjutants general to develop and maintain a list of the types of capabilities  the National Guard will likely provide in response to domestic natural  disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements along with the  associated units that could provide these capabilities. In addition, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of the National  Guard Bureau to make this information available to the Northern  Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and other organizations with  federal military support to civil authority planning responsibilities.
Finally, based on the above action by the National Guard Bureau to  identify the National Guard units that are likely to respond to domestic  disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements, we also  recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish milestones and  identify the types of scalable federal military capabilities and the units that  could provide those capabilities in response to the full range of domestic  disasters and catastrophes covered by DOD’s defense support to civil  authorities plans.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In a 1993 report we suggested that the Congress may want to consider  removing the statutory restriction on DOD’s authority to involuntarily  activate Reserve units for catastrophic disaster relief. In view of the  significant military downsizing that has occurred since we first raised this  matter and the need to actively engage the total force in order to meet  missions at home and abroad, we continue to believe that the Congress  should consider lifting or modifying the mobilization restriction—10 U.S.C.  §12304 (c)(1)—that limits reserve component participation in catastrophic  natural disasters.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated the report was  thorough and made a significant contribution to DOD’s plans to improve  the department’s support to civil authorities during domestic disaster  incidents. In addition to partially concurring with our recommendations,  DOD’s made several comments about the report that fell into two broad  categories, DOD’s role during domestic disaster response and its pre- Katrina planning and exercise schedule.
First, DOD believed the report called for a greater DOD role during  domestic disaster response but noted that it must strike a balance between  its warfighting role overseas and the need to support civil authorities at  home. While DOD said it would continue to work as part of a unified  interagency effort, it said that the goal is to enhance the domestic disaster  response capacities of other agencies. Until that goal is achieved, DOD will  be prepared to respond even more rapidly with more resources to another  catastrophe in the United States. We recognize the need to balance DOD’s  overseas warfighting mission and its domestic response missions. In the  report, we note DOD’s role is primarily that of a supporting agency under  the NRP, and that the nature of the military response will vary depending  on the nature of the emergency. However, given the military’s capabilities,  its response and level of support to civil authorities is likely to be more  significant during large disasters and catastrophes.
Second, DOD said that the title of the report is misleading because it does  not recognize DOD’s extensive planning and exercise schedule prior to  August 29, 2005, such as specific preparations in response to six 2005  hurricanes. We added additional information about these efforts. However,  we continue to believe that the title accurately reflects the report’s  findings and recommendations. As stated in the report, DOD had  periodically held modest military support to civil authorities exercises but  the exercises used underlying assumptions that were unrealistic in  preparing for a catastrophe. We also note that DOD’s comments  acknowledge the need to improve its plans and exercises. In fact, DOD’s  comments acknowledged the need to conduct at least one fully integrated  major exercise with the Department of Homeland Security each year  rather than the separate exercises that have been conducted in the past.
DOD also commented on our four recommendations, partially concurring  with each of them. With respect to our first recommendation—to revise  the NRP to fully address the proactive functions that the military will be  expected to perform during a catastrophic incident—DOD  said that  proactive military functions can be identified in all 15 major disaster  scenarios and said it is working with the Department of Homeland  Security to revise the NRP. While DOD stated that the long-term focus of  the U.S. government should be to develop more robust domestic disaster  capabilities within the Department of Homeland Security, it acknowledged  that DOD will need to assume a more robust response role in the interim  period, and when other responders lack the resources and expertise to  handle a particular disaster.
With respect to our second recommendation that concerned the  development of detailed plans and exercises, DOD listed a number of steps  it is taking to improve its disaster response planning and exercises and  said that consistent with its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil  Support the active component should complement, but not duplicate, the  National Guard’s likely role as an early responder. The DOD comments  also said that planning and exercises should include local, state, and  federal representatives and should stress the responders with the highest  degree of realism possible—to the breaking point if possible. However, the  comments said that logistics planning and execution is the clear  responsibility of FEMA and individual states, and DOD would remain  ready in a supporting role. We agree with DOD that effective disaster plans  and exercises require stressing scenarios with the active participation of  representatives from all levels of government. We also agree that FEMA  and states have logistics responsibilities. However, we continue to believe  that DOD should plan and prepare to assume additional emergency  support function responsibilities during catastrophes when other  responders may be overwhelmed.
DOD also partially concurred with our third recommendation—that the  Chief of the National Guard Bureau work with the state governors and  adjutants general to develop and maintain a list of the types of capabilities  the National Guard will likely provide in response to domestic natural  disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements, along with the  associated units that will provide these capabilities. DOD said that it was  not feasible to identify the specific units that would provide these  capabilities and requested that we modify our recommendation to say  units that “could” provide these capabilities rather than units that “will”  provide those capabilities. We agree and have adjusted our  recommendation. In addition, DOD listed steps the U.S. Northern  Command is taking to better understand the capabilities of National Guard  units and it stated that the National Guard is creating a database to  facilitate planning its employment in support of the homeland. As part of  the database implementation, the National Guard Bureau has identified a  need to place a contractor in each of its Joint Force Headquarters-State  locations.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that it identify  the types of scaleable federal military capabilities and units that will  provide those capabilities in response to the full range of domestic  disasters and catastrophes covered by DOD’s defense support to civil  authorities plans. DOD noted that it has developed scalable capability  packages in conjunction with pre-scripted requests for assistance and  Northern Command’s Contingency Plan 2501, which is scheduled to be  signed in the spring of 2006. However, because DOD’s forces can be used  to meet many different types of missions, DOD requested that we modify  our recommendation to say identify the types of scaleable federal military  capabilities and units that “could” (rather than “will”) provide those  capabilities. We agree and have adjusted our recommendation.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in  appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,  and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Northern Command; the Chief  of the National Guard Bureau; the Director of the Defense Logistics  Agency; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other  interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributors to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we interviewed officials from DOD, the  National Guard, the military services, and defense agencies that  participated in the response to Hurricane Katrina. In addition, we  reviewed military time lines, after-action reports, lessons learned studies,  briefings, congressional testimonies, and other documents. During our  review, we met with and obtained information from officials in the  following organizations.
subsections: section_title: Office of The Secretary Of Defense
paragraphs: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, Arlington, Va.  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Arlington, Va.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the General Counsel,  Arlington, Va.  Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy,  Arlington, Va.  Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Material  Readiness, Arlington, Va.  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Arlington,  Va. McHale-Mauldin Hurricane Katrina Task Force, Arlington, Va. Joint  Staff Director of Military Support, National Military Command Center,  Arlington, Va.
section_title: DOD Agencies
paragraphs: Defense Logistics Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Va.  Office of the Inspector General, Logistics Management Division, Arlington,  Va.  Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
section_title: Commands
paragraphs: U.S. Strategic Command, Joint Functional Component Command for  Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Bolling Air Force Base,  Washington, D.C.  U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,  Colo.  U.S. Joint Forces Command, Atlantic Fleet Compound, Norfolk, Va.  U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.
section_title: Military Services
subsections: section_title: U.S. Army
paragraphs: U.S. Army Forces Command, Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Ga.  First U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Ga.  Fifth U.S. Army/ Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Tex.  U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Ga.  Surface Distribution and Deployment Command, Alexandria, Va.             2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Tex.  13th Corps Support Command Fort Hood, Tex.  82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C.
section_title: U.S. Navy
paragraphs: Fleet Forces Command, Naval Station Norfolk , Norfolk, Va.  Joint Force Maritime Component Command, Naval Station Norfolk,  Norfolk, Va.  2nd Fleet, Naval Station Norfolk, Norfolk, Va.  USS Iwo Jima  USS Truman  USS Bataan  Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C.  First Naval Construction Division, Little Creek Amphibious Base, Norfolk,  Va.  Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Norfolk, Va.
section_title: U.S. Marine Corps
paragraphs: Headquarters Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations Department,  Arlington, Va.  Marine Corps Forces Command, Naval Station Norfolk, Norfolk, Va.  2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.  24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
section_title: U.S. Air Force
paragraphs: Operations Group, Arlington, Va.  National Security Emergency Preparedness, Arlington, Va.  Joint Force Air Component Command, 1st Air Force, Tyndall Air Force  Base,  Panama City, Fla.  Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.  Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.
section_title: Task Forces
paragraphs: Joint Task Force Katrina, New Orleans, La.  Task Forces Pelican and Eagle, Louisiana National Guard, Camp  Beauregard, La.
section_title: National Guard
paragraphs: National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Va.  Louisiana National Guard, Baton Rouge, La.  Louisiana National Guard, Carville, La.  Assistant Adjutant General, Mississippi Army National Guard, Gulfport,  Miss.  186th Air Refueling Wing, Mississippi Air National Guard, Meridian, Miss.  172nd Airlift Wing, Mississippi Air National Guard, Jackson, Miss.  Joint Forces Headquarters, Indiana National Guard, Indianapolis, In.  38th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Indianapolis, In.  Joint Forces Headquarters, Kansas National Guard, Topeka, Ks.  35th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.  Joint Force Headquarters, Jackson, Ms.
To assess the extent to which pre-Katrina plans and training exercises  reflected the military assistance that might be required during a  catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, we analyzed planning and  directive documents related to military support to civil authority, such as  the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, and the Military  Support and Assistance to Civil Authorities directives, and state plans.  In analyzing these documents and others, we determined the extent to  which they addressed a mechanism for the integration of forces and  established a process to identify and communicate the military capabilities  available to civil authorities or those that could be sent by DOD following  a disaster or catastrophic event. We also reviewed after-action reports  from training exercises to determine whether assumptions for the  exercises were realistic in light of recent catastrophic disasters, to  establish the level of military involvement in recent disaster planning  exercises, and to determine whether the training scenarios exercised  available military capabilities. We discussed our analysis with officials  from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland  Defense, Northern Command, the National Guard Bureau, and others to  determine the extent to which the directives, plans, and lessons from  exercises adequately supported the military’s response to civil authority  after Hurricane Katrina.
To examine the support that the military provided in responding to Katrina  and factors that affected that response, we obtained briefings and reports  describing the military’s response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and  Mississippi. We compared and contrasted data collected and resolved  discrepancies through interviews with officials from DOD, state National  Guard forces, Joint Task Force Katrina, and service, and state officials. We  specifically examined the time line of the military’s response, the size and  nature of the forces that responded, and the challenges faced in  supporting civil authorities. To compare this response to prior military  responses, accounting for differences in storms, we analyzed testimony  and reports about the military’s response to other natural disasters. We  analyzed relevant documents and lessons learned reports from the military  to specifically examine the damage assessment, logistics, communication,  search and rescue, and security/law enforcement response to determine if  previously identified concerns had been addressed prior to Hurricane  Katrina.
Additionally, to determine what actions, if any, the military is taking to  address lessons learned from Katrina, we collected and analyzed briefings  and lessons learned reports from organizations participating in the  response. We discussed recommended actions from lessons learned  reports and how the military plans to improve its response to future  disasters with officials from DOD and the National Guard Bureau.
We conducted our work from September 2005 through April 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: NRP Emergency Support Function Responsibilities
paragraphs: Department of Housing and Urban Development  DHS = Department of Homeland Security.
FEMA = Federal Emergency Management Agency.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense letter  dated May 5, 2006, and its attachments.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  See the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section, which begins  on page 36.  2.  Many of the actions DOD cites were not completed when we ended  our review, and several are still not completed, so we cannot evaluate  their effectiveness. We continue to believe that “DOD is beginning to  take action” is accurate.  3.  Our report distinguishes between disasters and catastrophes and  emphasizes the need to plan for extensive use of DOD capabilities  during catastrophes, when other responders are overwhelmed.  Our  report does not call for expanded use of DOD capabilities during  disasters.  4.  See the comments on our first recommendation in the “Agency  Comments and Our Evaluation” section.  5.  See the comments on our second recommendation in the “Agency  Comments and Our Evaluation” section.  6.  See the comments on our third recommendation in the “Agency  Comments and Our Evaluation” section.  7.  USTRANSCOM is one of the agencies that would be included in our  recommendation that the National Guard Bureau make the  information available to “other organizations with federal military  support to civil agency planning responsibilities.”  8.  See the comments on our fourth recommendation in the “Agency  Comments and Our Evaluation” section.  9.  We have addressed this comment in the report.  10. Our report makes reference to DOD’s use of reconnaissance assets  during Hurricane Rita.  11. While we have added additional information about DOD’s integration  efforts, these additional efforts do not diminish our finding that  integration problems led to inefficiencies and duplication of effort.  12. Although aviation officials expressed safety concerns to us, we agree  that the fact that military search and rescue efforts were conducted  under extreme conditions without any aviation accidents constitutes a  considerable accomplishment, so we have revised our search and  rescue section.  13. We evaluated these technical comments and incorporated them as  appropriate.  14. Our report recognizes that the military forces, which responded to  Hurricane Katrina, were operating within existing regulatory and  policy guidelines, such as the NRP, DOD’s Strategy for Homeland  Defense and Civil Support, and the current mobilization authorities,  and the report recommends adjustments to some of these guidelines.   15. The focus of this report was the preparation for and response to  Hurricane Katrina, not Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. However, where  appropriate, we have incorporated information about lessons learned  from Katrina, such as the use of reconnaissance assets to assess  damage from Hurricane Rita.  16. We modified the report to show that commands had issued planning  and warning orders prior to Katrina’s landfall. However, our report  emphasizes the need for deliberative, advanced planning in addition to  crisis action planning.   17. We continue to believe that the solution to long-standing damage  assessment problems requires military involvement.  18. The First Army comments provide additional information about the  aviation picture over New Orleans, but as stated in the report, search  and rescue tasks were being assigned from two sites that were not  integrated. This led to some duplication of effort.  19. Military officials told us that many of their troops worked directly   with local officials and performed whatever tasks were most needed.  They said that many of these tasks were not captured in official  statistics or mission assignments.  20. We agree that some operational overlap was inevitable, but limitations  in planning led to inefficiencies and some duplication of effort.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals also  made contributions to this report: John Pendleton, Assistant Director;  Krislin Bolling; Ann Borseth; Alissa Czyz; Amy Dingler; Michael Ferren;  Richard Geiger; Kenya Jones; Tina Kirschbaum; Patricia Lentini; Brian  Mateja; Thomas Mills; Elizabeth Morris; Robert Poetta; Gina Saylor;  Natalie Schneider; Frank Smith; Leo Sullivan; and Steve Woods.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for  Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington D.C.:  November 10, 2004.
Reserve forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas  and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T.  Washington D.C.: April 29, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for  Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing  States for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington D.C.: August 13, 2001.
subsections: section_title: Federal Response
paragraphs: Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown  but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO-01-9. Washington D.C.:  January 26, 2001.
Military Operations: DOD’s Disaster Relief Assistance in Response to  Hurricane Mitch. GAO/NSIAD-99-122R. Washington D.C.: March 29, 1999.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
section_title: Command and Control
paragraphs: Disaster Management: Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic  Disasters. GAO/RCED-93-186. Washington D.C.: July 23, 1993.
Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to  Improve the Nation’s Response Strategy. GAO/T-RCED-93-46. Washington  D.C.: January 27, 1993.
Disaster Assistance: DOD’s Support for Hurricane Andrew and Iniki  and Typhoon Omar. GAO/NSIAD-93-180. Washington D.C.: January 18,  1993.
section_title: Recovery
paragraphs: Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD’s and Interior’s Orders to  Support Military Operations. GAO/T-RCED-93-46. Washington D.C.:  January 27, 1993.