James Webb Space Telescope: Project Facing Increased Schedule Risk with Significant Work Remaining
Published: 2014-12-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: JWST is one of NASA's most complex and expensive projects, at an anticipated cost of $8.8 billion. With significant integration and testing planned until the launch date, the JWST project will need to address many challenges before NASA can conduct the science the telescope is intended to produce. GAO has made a number of prior recommendations to NASA, including in December 2012 that the project perform an updated joint cost and schedule risk analysis to improve cost estimates. NASA initially concurred with this recommendation, but it later indicated that the tracking of information it already had in place was sufficient and ultimately decided not to conduct another joint cost and schedule risk analysis.
GAO was mandated to assess the program annually and report on its progress. This is the third such report. This report assesses, among other issues, the extent to which (1) technical challenges are impacting the JWST project's ability to stay on schedule and budget, and (2) budget and cost estimates reflect current information about project risks. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed monthly and quarterly JWST reports, interviewed NASA and contractor officials, reviewed relevant policies, and conducted independent analysis of NASA and contractor data.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: With just under 4 years until its planned launch in October 2018, the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project reports it remains on schedule and budget. Technical challenges with JWST elements and major subsystems, however, have diminished the project's overall schedule reserve and increased risk. During the past year, delays have occurred on every element and major subsystem schedule—especially with the cryocooler—leaving all at risk of negatively impacting the overall project schedule reserve if further delays occur.
The project reports its overall schedule reserve is above its plan and standards. However, JWST is one of the most complex projects in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) history and has begun integrating and testing only two of the five elements and major subsystems. As such, maintaining as much schedule reserve as possible to navigate through almost 4 more years of integration and testing that remains, where prior work has shown problems are commonly found and schedules tend to slip, is critical. While the project has been able to reorganize work when necessary to mitigate schedule slips, this flexibility will diminish going forward. JWST is also facing limited short-term cost reserves to mitigate additional project schedule threats.
The JWST project and prime contractor's cost risk analyses used to validate the JWST budget are outdated and do not account for many new risks identified since 2011. GAO best practices for cost estimating call for regularly updating cost risk analyses to validate that reserves are sufficient to account for new risks. NASA officials said they conduct sufficient analysis to monitor the health of the budget. These efforts, however, do not incorporate potential impacts of risks identified since 2011 into estimates. While the project has subsequently agreed to conduct a cost risk analysis of the contract, it is important that they follow best practices, for example, by regularly updating that analysis. Doing so would provide the project with reliable information to gauge whether the contractor is at risk of future cost overruns.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Among other actions, NASA should follow best practices when updating its cost risk analysis to ensure reliability. In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA partially concurred with this recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The successful launch and operation of the James Webb Space  Telescope (JWST) is one of the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration’s (NASA) and the scientific community’s top priorities to  continue to advance human knowledge of the cosmos. It is intended to  revolutionize understanding of star and planet formation, advance the  search for the origins of the universe, and further the search for earth-like  planets. Projects of this scale, complexity, and technological  sophistication confront a myriad of unforeseen challenges in their  ambitious attempts to expand the limits of scientific accomplishment. With  significant integration and testing planned over the course of the next 4  years, the JWST project will need to address many challenges before the  telescope’s planned launch in October 2018. The success of JWST  hinges on the ability of NASA and its contractors to adjust and respond to  these challenges in a timely and cost-effective manner. With future NASA  missions and exploration depending on the success of JWST, its ultimate  outcome will have effects for many years into the future.
The on-time and on-budget delivery of JWST is a high congressional  priority. In November 2011, the conferees of the Joint Explanatory  Statement of the Committee of Conference for the Consolidated and  Further Continuing Appropriation Act, 2012, directed GAO to assess the  JWST program annually and to report to the Committees on  Appropriations on key issues relating to program and risk management,  achievement of cost and schedule goals, and program technical status.This report is our third in response to that mandate. For this report, we  assessed the extent to which (1) technical challenges are impacting the  JWST project’s ability to stay on schedule and budget, (2) budget and  cost estimates reflect current information about project risks, and (3) the  JWST project uses award fee contracts to motivate and assess contractor  performance.
Our approach included an examination of the cost, schedule, and  technical performance of the project since our last report in January 2014,  which focused on the cost and schedule baselines that were established  for the JWST program in 2011. We reviewed the project’s risk database,  monthly status reviews, and technical and other documentation; analyzed  the progress made against planned milestones; and held interviews with  program, project, and contractor officials on elements and major  subsystems. To assess the extent to which budget and cost estimates  reflect current information about project risks, we compared the prime  contractor’s past and present risk documentation; analyzed the project’s  cost reserve data; and interviewed project, program, and contractor  officials to obtain information on their cost estimating and cost reserve  management practices to compare against GAO best practices. To  assess the extent to which the JWST project uses award fee contracts to  motivate and assess contractor performance, we reviewed the project’s  contract documentation, contract files, and performance evaluation plans  for JWST’s two award fee contracts, as well as federal and NASA  acquisition regulations and guidance. See appendix I for a detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to December  2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: JWST is a large, deployable, infrared-optimized space telescope intended  to be the scientific successor to the Hubble Space Telescope. JWST is  designed for a 5-year mission to find the first stars and trace the evolution  of galaxies from their beginnings to their current formation. It is intended  to operate in an orbit approximately 1.5 million kilometers—or 1 million  miles—from the Earth. With its 6.5-meter primary mirror, JWST will be  able to operate at 100 times the sensitivity of the Hubble Space  Telescope. The JWST’s science instruments require extremely cold  temperatures, so a tennis-court-sized sunshield will be used to protect the  mirrors and instruments from the sun’s heat and allow them to observe  very faint infrared sources. The Hubble Space Telescope operates  primarily in the visible and ultraviolet regions of the electromagnetic  spectrum. The observatory segment of JWST includes several elements  (Optical Telescope Element (OTE), Integrated Science Instrument  Module (ISIM), and spacecraft) and major subsystems (sunshield,  cryocooler).
These elements and major subsystems are being developed through a  mixture of NASA, contractor, and international partner efforts. See  interactive graphic, figure 1. For more information on the JWST’s  organizational structure, see appendix III.
Given JWST’s complexity, it requires a multiyear integration and testing  schedule that includes five separate periods over the course of almost 7  years to build the observatory in preparation for launch. See figure 2 for  the planned integration and test flow for JWST.
For the majority of the work remaining, the JWST project will rely on three  contractors: Northrop Grumman, Exelis, and the Space Telescope  Science Institute (STScI). Northrop Grumman plays the largest role,  developing the sunshield, the OTE, the spacecraft, and a cooling  subsystem for the Mid-Infrared Instrument (MIRI). Northrop Grumman  performs most of this work under a prime contract with NASA, but its work  on the MIRI cooler is performed under a separate subcontract with the Jet  Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Exelis is manufacturing the test equipment,  equipping the test chamber, and assisting in the testing of the optics of  JWST. Finally, STScI will collect and evaluate research proposals from  the scientific community and will receive and store the scientific data  collected by those observations, both of which are services that they  currently provide for the Hubble Space Telescope. Additionally, for JWST,  STScI will develop and operate the ground system that manages and  controls the telescope’s observations on behalf of NASA.
MIRI—one of JWST’s four instruments in the ISIM—requires a dedicated,  interdependent two-stage cooler subsystem designed to bring the infrared  light detector within MIRI to the required temperature of 6.7 Kelvin (K),  just above absolute zero. This major subsystem is referred to as a  cryocooler. The cryocooler moves helium gas through 10 meters  (approximately 33 feet) of refrigerant lines from the spacecraft located on  the sun-facing surface of the JWST observatory to the colder, shaded  side where the ISIM is located. According to NASA officials, a cooler of  this configuration has never been developed or flown in space before.  See figure 3 for a depiction of the cryocooler on JWST.
Project officials stated that the MIRI cryocooler is particularly complex and  challenging because of the relatively great distance between the cooling  components and the need to overcome multiple sources of unwanted  heat through the regions of JWST before the subsystem can cool MIRI’s  detector. Specifically, the cooling components span temperatures ranging  from approximately 300K (about 80 degrees Fahrenheit, or room  temperature) where the spacecraft is located on the sun-facing surface to  approximately 40K (about -388 degrees Fahrenheit) within the ISIM.
subsections: section_title: Cost and Schedule Reserves for NASA Projects
paragraphs: Complex development efforts like JWST must plan to address a myriad of  risks and unforeseen technical challenges. To do this, projects reserve  extra time in their schedules—which is referred to as schedule reserve— and extra money in their budgets–which is referred to as cost reserve.  Schedule reserve is extra time in the project’s overall schedule that is  allocated to specific activities, elements, and major subsystems in the  event there are delays or to address unforeseen risks. Each JWST  element and major subsystem has been allocated schedule reserve.  When an element or major subsystem exhausts schedule reserve it may  begin to affect schedule reserves on other elements or major subsystems  whose progress is dependent on prior work being finished for its activities  to proceed. The element or major subsystem with the least amount of  schedule reserve determines the critical path for the project. Any delay to  an activity that is on the critical path will reduce schedule reserve for the  whole project, and could ultimately impact the overall project schedule.
Cost reserves are additional funds that can be used to address  unanticipated issues for any element or major subsystem. Cost reserves  are used to mitigate issues during the development of a project. For  example, cost reserves can be used to buy additional materials to replace  a component or, if a project needs to preserve schedule reserve, reserves  can be used to accelerate work by adding extra shifts to expedite  manufacturing and save time. NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center  (Goddard)—the NASA center with responsibility for managing JWST— has issued requirements that at project confirmation establish both the  level of cost and funded schedule reserves that projects must hold. After  this point, a specified amount of schedule reserve continues to be  required throughout the remainder of development.
section_title: History of Cost Growth, Low Project Reserves, and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: Prior to 2011, early technical and management challenges, contractor  performance issues, low level cost reserves, and poorly phased funding  levels caused JWST to delay work, which contributed to significant cost  and schedule overruns. After years of requirements changes, cost  growth, low reserve funding, deferred work, and launch delays, the Chair  of the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and  Related Agencies requested an independent review of JWST. NASA  commissioned the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel, which  issued its report in October 2010, and concluded that JWST was  executing well from a technical standpoint, but that the baseline funding  did not reflect the most probable cost with adequate reserves in each  year of project execution, resulting in an unexecutable project. Following  this review, the JWST program underwent a replan in September 2011  and Congress in November 2011 placed an $8 billion cap on the  formulation and development costs for the project. On the basis of the  replan, NASA rebaselined JWST with a life-cycle cost estimate of $8.835  billion that included additional money for operations and a planned launch  in October 2018. The revised life-cycle cost estimate included a total of  13 months of funded schedule reserve. In the President’s fiscal year 2013  budget request, NASA reported a 66 percent joint cost and schedule  confidence level for these cost and schedule baselines. A joint cost and  schedule confidence level, or JCL, is the process NASA uses to assign a  percentage to the probable success of meeting cost and schedule  estimates and is part of the project’s estimating process.
section_title: Previous GAO Reviews of JWST Project
paragraphs: In January 2014, GAO found that the JWST project was generally  executing to its 2011 revised cost and schedule baselines, but that the  most recent work was taking longer than planned. We noted that roughly  half of the project’s cost reserves for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 had  been committed before those years had even begun, which would  constrain JWST’s cost reserve spending in the near term. We reported  that while the cryocooler subcontractor was making technical progress,  cryocooler development remained an ongoing challenge as there were  still unresolved technical issues related to its performance, and its  schedule was both optimistic and unreliable. We also found that three of  the element and major subsystem schedules the project was using to  manage were unreliable and did not meet best practices, which called  into question the reliability of the integrated master schedule that is built  from those schedules. In 2012, we reported that the accuracy of the  project’s cost estimate was lessened because the summary schedule  used for the joint cost and schedule confidence level was not detailed  enough to determine how risks were applied to critical project activities.  We recommended that NASA conduct an updated joint cost and schedule  risk analysis to address the issues we identified and use more detailed  cost information to adjust its cost estimates. While NASA concurred with  our recommendation, officials subsequently stated that they did not plan  to conduct an updated joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis,  and that the project’s monthly analyses were sufficient for the project’s  needs. Thus, we expressed concern in our January 2014 report that  NASA’s continued lack of up-to-date cost estimates that incorporate new  risks which had emerged since 2011 would inhibit NASA’s ability to  effectively monitor its contractors’ progress. We proposed that Congress  consider requiring NASA to conduct an updated joint cost and schedule  confidence level analysis to address this concern.
section_title: Project Risk Heightened Due to Widespread Use of Schedule Reserve to Address Technical Issues
paragraphs: The JWST project has 11 months of schedule reserve remaining—more  than required by Goddard standards. In the case of JWST, however, the  most significant risks lie ahead in the remaining 4 years, as the project  must complete five integration and test periods, three of which have not  yet started. Essentially, the risk is defined by bringing all of the complex  JWST elements and major subsystems together, testing them, and  resolving problems when there is limited schedule left for resolution. All of  JWST’s five elements and major subsystems have just weeks of reserve  left before their schedules become pacing items on the project’s critical  path, potentially reducing the reserve further. More milestones  established annually for the various elements and major subsystems  have been delayed or deferred during fiscal year 2014 than in the  previous 3 years following the replan. For example, the MIRI cryocooler  deferred seven milestones until fiscal year 2015 as a result of  manufacturing and development delays. Schedule risks are further  heightened as the project entered fiscal year 2015 with approximately 40  percent of its cost reserves already committed, leaving fewer dollars  available to mitigate other threats to the project schedule.
subsections: section_title: Flexibility to Address Future Challenges Constrained by Schedule Reserve Loss Prior to Most Integration and Test Efforts
paragraphs: The JWST schedule reserve was diminished this year following the need  to address several significant technical challenges across the project’s  various elements and major subsystems, and as a result of the October  2013 government shutdown. Specifically, in the past 14 months, the  overall project schedule reserve declined from 14 months to 11 months.With less than 4 years until the planned launch in October 2018, the  project’s overall schedule reserve is above the Goddard standard and  JWST plan—which was set above the Goddard standard and included  more reserve than required—for schedule reserve at this point in the  project. The scale of JWST’s integration and test effort, however, is more  complex than most NASA or Goddard projects. For example, JWST has  five major integration and test periods to build the telescope, test the  optics, integrate the various elements and major subsystems, and ensure  they work properly together. While JWST’s total integration and test cycle  runs almost 7 years, the next longest integration and test cycle for a  current project managed by Goddard Space Flight Center is over 3 years  and the average length of integration and testing for all other current  Goddard projects, excluding JWST, is just over 2 years. The JWST  project has used over 20 percent of the schedule reserve it held in the  past 14 months with almost 4 years remaining for its integration and test  effort, where GAO’s prior work has shown and NASA has concurred  problems are commonly found and schedules tend to slip.
All individual element and major subsystem schedules have lost schedule  reserve since last year. While some use of schedule reserve is expected,  this widespread use has resulted in every JWST element and major  subsystem schedule being within weeks of becoming the critical path of  the project, before most have entered their integration and testing  periods. The proximity of all of the element and major subsystem  schedules to the critical path means that an issue on any of the schedules  may reduce the overall project schedule reserve further, which could then  put the overall project schedule at risk. As a result of this, the project has  less flexibility to choose which issues to mitigate. As an illustration, the  critical path has switched numerous times to several different schedules  as a result of using schedule reserve in the past year. See the different  amounts of schedule reserve remaining on all elements and major  subsystems, their proximity to the critical path and the total schedule  reserve for the critical path in figure 4.
Delays were also evident in key milestone slips where more than half of  the project-identified key milestones for fiscal year 2014 were completed  late or deferred to fiscal year 2015—the most in any year since the  replan. Seven of the 11 deferred milestones are related to the  development of the cryocooler. The other 4 are due to delays in reviews  or assembly for components of the sunshield and spacecraft and late  completion of some integration activities for the chamber to test the optics  of JWST in 2016. See figure 5 for a list of total milestones and their  status.
The project has mitigated a number of issues that could have further  impacted the status of schedule reserve by reorganizing work to obtain  efficiencies and maintain schedule or stem further losses. For example, a  component of the cryocooler had some planned acceptance testing  reorganized along with a reduction in the length of time of the testing to  accommodate delays. However, with further progression into subsequent  integration and test periods, flexibility will be diminished because work  during integration and testing tends to be more serial. This is particularly  the case with JWST given its complexity.
To some extent, projects have the ability to use cost reserves to maintain  schedule. For example, if work is taking longer than expected, a project  may be able to fund a second shift of work to speed it up and maintain  schedule. In the short term, however, this option may be limited for JWST  project officials because approximately 40 percent of the project’s fiscal  year 2015 cost reserves were already committed prior to the start of the  fiscal year. As such, one of the project’s top issues for fiscal year 2015 is  its cost reserve posture, which the project reported is less than desired  and will require close monitoring. The project’s cost reserve status for  fiscal year 2015 is slightly better than in fiscal year 2014 that we reported  on in January 2014, where the project successfully managed low  reserves without delaying work. This issue, however, will likely require  continued monitoring until fiscal year 2016 when more program level  reserves will be available to the project. With schedule losses having  already occurred on most elements and major subsystems across the  project prior to most of the project’s integration and testing efforts, the  fiscal year 2016 funding may arrive too late to prevent further schedule  delays and the risk of such delays impacting the launch date is  heightened.
section_title: Schedule Delays Driven by Significant Design and Manufacturing Challenges with Several Key Elements and Major Subsystems
subsections: section_title: Cryocooler
paragraphs: The project continues to face major technical challenges building the  cryocooler that have significantly delayed delivery of key components,  have made it the driver of the project’s overall schedule or the project’s  critical path, and required the use of a disproportionate amount of project  cost reserves. Since the 2011 replan, the cryocooler development has  experienced over 150 percent cost growth. Consequently, it was one of  the largest users of project cost reserves in fiscal year 2014 and is  contributing to the project’s limited cost reserve status for fiscal year  2015.
All three cryocooler components (the cold head assembly, the  compressor assembly, and the electronics assembly) fell significantly  behind the delivery dates established during the cryocooler’s April 2013  schedule replan. As we reported in January 2014, the schedule that was  adopted during the April 2013 cryocooler replan did not take into account  significant risks identified by the cryocooler subcontractor and was overly  optimistic—a sentiment that was shared by the cryocooler subcontractor  program manager. Moreover, the cryocooler design was not mature at  the time of the 2013 replan. The cryocooler subcontractor program  manager’s low confidence in the replanned schedule was validated in  2014, when design and manufacturing problems contributed to further  delays. In late 2013 and early 2014, implementation of a design change  to resolve a manufacturability issue resulted in a 4-month delay to the  cryocooler compressor assembly schedule. Additionally, as cryocooler  manufacturing efforts accelerated, the cryocooler subcontractor program  manager indicated that further delays occurred as a result of design  immaturity, manufacturing, and process issues. See figure 6 below for the  delays since the April 2013 replan to subcontractor Northrop Grumman’s  delivery of the various cryocooler components to JPL or Goddard Space  Flight Center.
As a result of NASA concerns with the sliding compressor assembly  delivery date, the schedule for that component was again replanned in  July 2014. However, the planned delivery date for the compressor  assembly has already begun slipping. According to the cryocooler  subcontractor program manager, the delivery schedule remains overly  optimistic and meeting it would have required perfect execution of the  remaining work. For example, according to project, JPL, and  subcontractor officials, the July replan’s February 2015 subcontractor  delivery date for the cryocooler compressor assembly was achievable  only under a best case scenario where the subcontractor’s manufacturing  issues did not persist. However, since July, issues such as a  manufacturing error and manufacturing process oversight have delayed  delivery until at least April 2015. For example, one delay occurred when a  subcontractor employee conducted unauthorized work on one of the  cryocooler compressors that led to a concern of possible compressor  contamination. Ultimately, the subcontractor determined that no  contamination occurred and the compressor was still usable—but not  before a 3 week halt in work on the specific compressor for the  investigation into the incident. JPL officials noted that the schedule impact  would only be 8 days as they would be rearranging hardware flow and  adding some holiday work to recover most of the time lost. Subsequently,  a separate manufacturing error on a compressor assembly component  resulted in 3 weeks of additional delay. In addition to these manufacturing  issues, according to the subcontractor program manager, the  subcontractor continues to encounter problems resulting from design  immaturity of certain parts of the compressor assembly as they pursue  the manufacturing effort.
Given the cryocooler subcontractor’s history of prior schedule delays and  continued performance challenges, the project recognizes the  cryocooler’s late delivery to JWST’s integration and testing schedules as  a top issue to the project and is planning mitigation strategies in  anticipation of further schedule slips—which would reduce the project’s  overall schedule reserve further. JPL’s analysis of subcontractor  performance trends on the compressor assembly schedule projects that  the subcontractor is very unlikely to meet the current April 2015 delivery  date and the compressor assembly is projected to be as late as  November 2015, if past performance trends continue. The cryocooler  used more schedule reserve than any JWST element or major subsystem  in the past year, expending 5 months. Currently, the cryocooler schedule  contains approximately 11 months of schedule reserve, of which 6 follow   Consequently, without modifications  spacecraft integration and testing.to the current integration and testing schedule, a subcontractor delivery of  the compressor assembly to JPL after August 2015 would begin depleting  the schedule reserve that follows spacecraft integration and testing.  Through the reordering and compression of JPL’s test schedule following  delivery of the compressor assembly, the project and JPL have  accommodated cryocooler schedule slips to date. In anticipation of further  delays to the cryocooler compressor assembly, the project and Northrop  Grumman are exploring impact mitigation strategies in the event of JPL’s  late delivery of the compressor assembly to spacecraft integration and  testing, which is to begin in February 2016.
The cryocooler subcontractor has, however, resolved other significant  challenges related to cryocooler design and valve leakage that, as we  have previously reported, have been the basis of prior delays. For  example, in 2014, a verification model for one of the cryocooler’s two  compressor types was successfully tested, which confirmed that the  design would achieve the temperatures required for the initial cooling  stage—a key technical issue we reported on in 2014. Additionally, the  project selected a valve for the cryocooler’s cold head assembly, the  component of the cryocooler that allows it to cool MIRI to the 6 degree  Kelvin temperature required for the instrument’s function.
section_title: Sunshield
paragraphs: Northrop Grumman experienced a significant manufacturing problem  during the construction of the large composite panel that forms part of the  sunshield’s primary support structure. This problem resulted in a loss of  overall project schedule reserve and put the sunshield on the project’s  critical path temporarily before it was overtaken by the cryocooler.  Specifically, after the initial panel was manufactured, Northrop Grumman  determined that it did not meet strength requirements. Because of the  weakness identified in the panel, Northrop Grumman and NASA took  some time to determine a root cause—moisture was absorbed into the  panel during the manufacturing process—and implemented corrective  actions for remanufacture of the panel. This total effort resulted in a loss  of 1.75 months of total project schedule reserve. JWST officials  expressed confidence in Northrop Grumman’s proposed remanufacture  plan, which involves the incorporation of a moisture barrier to the tool  upon which the panel is made to prevent moisture transfer. According to  contractor officials, the replacement panel, which was manufactured  using the modified process, was completed in October 2014 and a  second, smaller panel is to be completed by January 2015. As early as  2010, the project and Northrop Grumman understood that the  manufacturing process for the sunshield’s two composite panels would be  complex and took risk mitigation steps, such as expedited manufacturing  preparations, to address potential schedule impacts of this risk. Project  officials maintain that these mitigation steps prevented the panel  remanufacture from using the full 8 months of sunshield schedule  reserve.
The contractor has made progress, however, on the manufacture of other  components of the sunshield, such as the sunshield subsystem’s  membrane layers and other structural hardware. Northrop Grumman  successfully demonstrated the sunshield’s membrane deployment  concept by conducting a full deployment test of a full scale engineering  model of the membrane system in July 2014. Currently, one of the five  flight membrane layers has been manufactured and work has begun on  an additional two. Further, Northrop Grumman has completed  manufacturing of the main beams of the sunshield’s primary support  structure and tubes that assist in deploying the mid-boom structure.
section_title: ISIM and OTE Preparing for OTIS
paragraphs: The ISIM schedule has lost schedule reserve since our January 2014  report, and is a half month away from becoming the critical path of the  project. The ISIM has used 3 months of schedule reserve out of the 7.5  months it held in 2013, due in part to longer than expected integration and  testing for NIRCam and NIRSpec and to additional anticipated testing  time for the second and third cryovacuum tests. The first of three ISIM  cryovacuum tests—in which a test chamber is used to simulate the near  absolute zero temperatures in space—was completed in November 2013,  with two of the observatory’s four science instruments integrated. This  first test was considered a risk reduction effort that provided insight into  how to efficiently conduct the remaining two cryovacuum tests and how to  analyze test results. The disruption of this first test from the government  shutdown did result in some deferred testing, which increased the  planned duration for the subsequent cryovacuum test. The second  cryovacuum test, which included all four science instruments, began in  June 2014 and finished in October 2014. According to project officials, the  second ISIM cryovacuum test progressed as expected, with no technical  disruptions. However, the schedule to prepare ISIM for the approximately  3.5-month-long third cryovacuum test—scheduled to commence in late  July 2015—is considered very ambitious by NASA officials. Between the  second and third cryovacuum tests, additional testing must be carried out,  as well as the retrofitting of certain components, such as the near infrared  detectors on two of the instruments.
The OTE has also used schedule reserve during preparations for the  element’s integration with the ISIM. The OTE now has 4.5 months of  schedule reserve remaining of the 7 months it held in 2013, putting it in  the same position as ISIM in terms of currently held schedule reserve.  Contractors successfully completed structural integrity testing of the  OTE’s primary mirror backplane support structure that will hold the  observatory’s science instruments and its 18-segment primary mirror.  Additionally, for the 2015 readiness assessment of the chamber and test  equipment for the subsequent integrated OTE and ISIM—known as  OTIS—cryovacuum testing, the project is preparing a testing structure  that incorporates a two-segment primary mirror and a secondary mirror.  For this effort, the project took delivery of an engineering model of the  OTE backplane’s center section at Goddard Space Flight Center in July  2014 and completed the process of mounting the two primary mirror  segments.
section_title: Spacecraft
paragraphs: The spacecraft element also used 2.5 months of its schedule reserve  over the past year, putting it a half month from the critical path.  Specifically, the project reported that manufacturing challenges with the  spacecraft structure required the use of schedule reserve to  accommodate the delays. Despite these manufacturing challenges, the  spacecraft completed significant milestones this year. Specifically, in  January 2014, NASA assessed the spacecraft element as having  successfully completed its critical design review, a major milestone  indicating that the spacecraft’s design maturity was deemed appropriate  to support proceeding with full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration,  and test. While the review required actions to be taken, such as the effort  to further mature certain technologies, most of these have been  addressed, though work is ongoing on a few key spacecraft components.  Among the technologies requiring further maturation is a release  mechanism we reported on in January 2014, which was causing  excessive shock when engaged. This mechanism has been modified and  shock is now within an acceptable range, though testing is ongoing on the  modified design.
The project continues to address other technical risks and challenges as  it continues development and testing of the various JWST elements and  major subsystems. For more information on selected risks and  challenges, see appendix IV.
section_title: Project Lacks Current Cost Risk Analyses, Creating Uncertainty About Adequacy of Its Budget
paragraphs: The JWST project and prime contractor cost risk analyses have not been  updated since the project’s replan in 2011 and do not account for newer  risks. GAO best practices call for programs to regularly update cost risk  analyses to account for new risks. We planned to conduct an independent  updated cost risk analysis, but the prime contractor did not allow us the  access necessary to execute our planned methodology. The project did  subsequently agree to conduct its own cost risk analysis of the prime  contractor’s remaining work. If properly conducted, its analysis will  provide the project with the reliable information necessary to gauge  whether the contractor’s budget is on target or at risk of future cost  overruns.
subsections: section_title: Project and Prime Contractor Have Not Updated Risk Analyses to Account for New Risks
paragraphs: Neither NASA’s joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) analysis  nor Northrop Grumman’s cost risk analysis to support the prime contract  has been updated since 2011. Additionally, both NASA and Northrop  Grumman reported that they do not intend to update their risk analyses,  despite the fact that these analyses are 3 years old and almost 4 years  remain until launch. As we have reported previously, GAO’s best practice  criteria call for risk analyses to be updated regularly over the life of a  project in order to ensure an estimate’s accuracy over time and account  for actual costs and new project risks. Without regular updates to the  cost risk analysis, JWST decision makers and stakeholders for the project  cannot be certain that its existing cost estimates accurately portray the  project’s financial status. Updating these analyses is particularly important  in light of prior project optimism and newly discovered risks that threaten  the project’s cost and schedule reserves.
Although our previous work found that the JWST project’s 2011 JCL was  not fully reliable, the JWST project continues to rely on its original cost  estimate, which was confirmed by the JCL, to provide the basis of its  budget estimates and requests. Based on this estimate, the JWST project  is currently reporting that the project remains on schedule to launch in  October 2018 and within the $8 billion developmental cost cap designated  by Congress. The JWST project manager stated that the project conducts  a number of programmatic and analytical activities to monitor the health  of its cost and schedule that he believes provides him with accurate  information on the project’s status. In addition, the project conducted two  schedule risk analyses in response to a recommendation we made in  2014, but analyses have not been completed for all schedules. The  project stated one of its many methods of measuring cost and schedule  health is analysis of earned value management (EVM) data. However,  EVM analysis provides a cost and schedule projection based on past  performance that does not reflect the potential impact of future risks. The  2011 JCL was the last risk analysis performed to model impacts of future  risks on the project’s cost and schedule. In 2012 and 2014 we made both  a recommendation to NASA and provided a matter to Congress for  consideration related to the need to update the JWST JCL to address  weaknesses we found and to incorporate new risk information. However,  a new JCL has not been conducted to date and NASA has indicated it  does not intend to update the JCL for JWST.
As a result of the significant changes that have occurred over the last 3  years since the 2011 replan and lacking reliable cost estimates, we  determined that an updated cost risk analysis was warranted to provide  Congress with insight on JWST’s remaining work. The changes we  observed include risks that have been encountered both by JWST and  Northrop Grumman that were not included in their 2011 cost risk  analyses. For example, the highest risk for the JWST project in  September 2014 was the delivery date of the cryocooler to mission  integration and testing events, which was entered into the project’s risk  database in January 2013. By October 2014, this risk had become one of  the JWST project’s top issues and is threatening cost and schedule  reserves. Additionally, 67 percent of the risks present in April 2014 on  Northrop Grumman’s list of project risks were not present in September  2011. The JWST project’s budget system provides a means of quantifying  future threats to the project’s budget by estimating a threat’s potential  cost and likelihood of occurrence. However, our analysis of the system’s  data since the replan found that almost 70 percent of reserve spending  has not been anticipated as threats by the budget system. Without an  analytical framework that comprehensively captures future risks into  potential project costs, the project’s estimates do not represent a  comprehensive portrayal of the financial status of the project. As a  consequence, the project and Congress do not have all the data  necessary to be confident in the project’s projected budgetary needs.
To address the lack of updated information, GAO planned to conduct an  updated cost risk analysis on the Northrop Grumman prime contract,  given that it represents the most significant contractor work remaining on  the project. The methodology for this analysis, which has been cited as  an important tool by NASA’s cost estimating community, would have  provided an updated level of confidence associated with the project  meeting its cost estimate and allowed decision makers to determine if  additional cost reserves were warranted to mitigate future risks. However,  we were unable to execute our methodology because Northrop Grumman  declined to allow GAO to conduct an independent, unbiased analysis.  GAO best practices for cost estimating require anonymous interviews with  technical experts on a project to discuss the project’s risks. We were not  able to create this environment because while Northrop Grumman  officials were open to allowing us to conduct the analysis, they did not  allow us to interview employees without a manager present. Anonymity is  critical to the methodology in order to ensure the interviews are unbiased  and provide a comprehensive portrayal of project risks.
The JWST project and NASA disagreed with the approach of an  independent cost risk analysis conducted by an outside organization at  this point in the project. Additionally, neither believes that an organization  external to NASA can fully comprehend the project’s risks, and any such  analysis would be overly conservative due to the complexities of the risks.  As a result, they asserted that the results of any outside analysis would  not be representative of the real risk posture of the project. GAO’s best  practices call for cost estimates to be compared to independent cost  estimates in addition to being regularly updated. Without an independent  and updated analysis, both the committee members’ and NASA’s  oversight and management of JWST will be constrained since the impact  of newer risks have not been reflected in key tools, including the cost  estimate.
In response to our concerns, NASA indicated it would conduct its own  cost risk analysis for the committee members of the Northrop Grumman  contract. The project already had plans to use additional EVM analysis,  which the project does plan to use as a management tool, that  incorporates risks to provide a health check on the project’s cost  reserves. However, a NASA project official stated that data from the cost  risk analysis was for the purpose of providing cost information to  committee members, but the JWST project does not intend to use it to  manage the project. Additionally, the project has indicated that it will  consider updating the cost risk analysis in the future, but presently has  not committed to regularly updating the analysis. To maintain quality cost  estimates over the life of a project, best practices state that cost risk  analyses be updated regularly to incorporate new risks and be used in  conjunction with EVM analysis to validate cost estimates. If the project  does not follow best practices in conducting its cost risk analysis or use it  to manage the project, the resulting information may be unreliable and not  substantively provide insight into JWST’s potential costs to allow either  Congress or project officials to take any warranted action.
section_title: Contractors Have Been Responsive to Incentives, but Final Evaluation May Not Reflect Total Contract Performance
paragraphs: The JWST project has used NASA’s award fee structure to implement  incentives that align with conferee’s priorities for cost and schedule for  JWST and contractors have been responsive to these incentives, for  example by making changes to key practices to improve communication.  When completed, JWST’s prime contract will have spanned almost two  decades, during which there have been and could be future significant  variances in contractor performance and key management changes  among program officials. While NASA’s award fee guidance and its  procurement regulations require the development of explicit evaluation  factors to evaluate performance, evaluation criteria are not specified for  the final evaluation of total contract performance in the project’s  performance evaluation plans. Without clear criteria in award fee plans,  it is unclear how JWST officials will assess contractor performance over  the life of the contracts, as is required per NASA regulations—particularly  for the prime contract, which will include a significant cost overrun, three  launch delays, and almost 20 years of varying performance.
subsections: section_title: NASA’s Cost-Plus-Award- Fee Process to Assess Contractor Performance
paragraphs: Award fee contracts provide contractors the opportunity to obtain  monetary incentives for performance in designated areas, which can be  weighted differently at NASA’s discretion. For JWST’s award fee  contracts, these areas include cost, schedule, technical, and business  management and are established in the contracts’ performance  evaluation plans. Award fees are used when key elements of  performance cannot be defined objectively, and, as such, require the  project officials’ judgment to assess contractor performance. Table 1  provides a general outline of the performance evaluation process.
section_title: Contractors Responsive to NASA’s Use of Cost and Schedule Incentives
paragraphs: The JWST project has used NASA’s award fee structure to implement  incentives that align with conferee’s priorities for cost and schedule for  JWST. The JWST project has modified the fee structure for one of its two  cost-plus-award-fee contracts, the Northrop Grumman prime contract, to  enhance cost and schedule incentives. In December 2013, the JWST  project completed contract negotiations with Northrop Grumman to  incorporate the launch delay to October 2018. During negotiations, NASA  and Northrop Grumman agreed to replace a $56 million on-orbit incentive  fee with award fees to increase the available award fee for the entire  contract to almost a quarter of a billion dollars. While award fees for the  Northrop Grumman contract are intended to reward performance for cost,  schedule, and meeting technical requirements, the on-orbit incentive  would have been based on exceeding technical requirements. Both  JWST and Northrop Grumman officials stated restructuring the award fee  incentives gave NASA more flexibility to incentivize the contractor to  prioritize cost and schedule performance over exceeding technical  requirements. In addition, a $6 million schedule incentive fee was added  to the contract that would be paid to the contractor for achieving three key  deliveries ahead of schedule.modifications were intended to help ensure the Northrop Grumman  contract contained proper cost and schedule incentives.
According to NASA officials, these  For JWST’s two award fee contracts—Northrop Grumman and Exelis— NASA award fee letters of award fee periods from February 2013 to  March 2014 indicate that contractors have been responsive to interim  award fee period criteria provided by NASA. Also, contractor officials from  both award fee contracts confirmed that they pay close attention to this  guidance in prioritizing their work. For example, Northrop Grumman  officials reported that they had made specific changes to improve  communications in direct response to this guidance which was validated  by award fee letters from NASA.
section_title: History of Varied Performance Is Not Included in Criteria for Final Evaluation of Contractor Performance
paragraphs: The JWST project does not have sufficient award fee guidance for two of  its largest contracts, as required by the NASA Federal Acquisition  Regulation Supplement. Our finding is consistent with the NASA Office of  Inspector General findings that cost-plus-award-fee contracts did not  include explicit criteria related to the final evaluation.assessing Northrop Grumman’s prime contract do not specify that in the  final evaluation performance metrics for cost and schedule should reflect  performance prior to the replan. If performance prior to the replan is not  considered, the contractor could receive award fee that does not reflect  its performance over the life of the contract. To see how JWST’s cost- plus-award-fee contracts compare to NASA policy and guidance for both  contracts, see table 2.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As the JWST project enters fiscal year 2015 with under 4 years until  launch, project officials have made progress building significant pieces of  hardware, but continue to face numerous technical challenges that have  eroded schedule reserve for the first time since the 2011 replan. While  some use of schedule reserve is expected, JWST is a schedule-driven  program and preserving the reserve is critical. The project will have fewer  opportunities for the types of workarounds it has been able to incorporate  thus far because initiating work is often dependent on the successful and  timely completion of the prior work. Further, the project has limited funds  available in the short-term to use to preserve schedule. Effectively  managing and making targeted use of existing cost reserves to preserve  schedule reserve until fiscal year 2016, when more reserves are  available, is critical to maintaining the planned launch date in October  2018.
Three years after the 2011 replan, project officials and the prime  contractor have not recently assessed risks for the potential impact to  cost to ensure they are measuring progress against a valid baseline.  While the project reports that JWST remains on schedule and within its  developmental cost cap, this is based on outdated analysis and risks that  were present in 2011. Without incorporating the myriad of new and  sometimes significant risks into any assessment of cost risk, the project’s  cost risk posture cannot be independently validated. While NASA has  chosen to conduct a cost risk analysis of Northrop Grumman’s remaining  work itself, its quality hinges on whether NASA chooses to follow best  practices. Doing so would better ensure that the results of the analysis  would be reliable and would provide an accurate portrayal of status that  can then be used to ensure better informed decisions are being made  about project funding forward, at least for Northrop Grumman’s remaining  work. Furthermore, because JWST is one of NASA’s most expensive and  complex science projects and any issues can have significant impacts to  other science projects, going above and beyond what is required per  policy or guidance is one small step that could help demonstrate NASA’s  commitment to the success of JWST and to improving acquisition  management outcomes.
Effectively using the award fee evaluation process to thoroughly and fairly  assess contractor performance is critical given the size and long duration  of the JWST contracts, in particular its prime contract with Northrop  Grumman. Without clear guidance for both NASA officials and contractors  on how to conduct the final award fee evaluation and account for  performance over the life of the project, the final determination of all  award fees for two of JWST’s largest contracts may not accurately reflect  the contractor’s performance. Fairly assessing that performance over the  life of the contract is especially critical for JWST given the variance in  performance that Northrop Grumman has shown from contract award in  2002 to the present. Not doing so could result in Northrop Grumman  receiving a higher percentage of award fee than interim scores would  warrant.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following two  actions:  In order to provide additional information and analyses to effectively  manage the program and account for new risks identified after the  2011 replan, direct JWST project officials to follow best practices  while conducting a cost risk analysis on the prime contract for the  work remaining and ensure the analysis is updated as significant risks  emerge.
In order to ensure JWST’s award fee contracts’ final evaluations  thoroughly and fairly evaluate contractor performance over the life of  the contract and to provide clarity to the process that will be used for  the final evaluation, direct JWST project officials, in conjunction with  the performance evaluation board for JWST and the Goddard Space  Flight Center fee determining official, to modify performance  evaluation plans for its award fee contracts to ensure they  (a)  specify evaluation criteria that reflects total contract performance  in advance of the final evaluation, and  (b)  clearly describe the process the performance evaluation board  and fee determining official will use to evaluate contractor  performance in the final evaluation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: NASA provided written comments on a draft of this report. These  comments are reprinted in appendix V. In responding to a draft of this  report, NASA partially concurred with one recommendation and  concurred with another.
NASA partially concurred with our recommendation directing the JWST  project to follow best practices while conducting a cost risk analysis on  the prime contract for the work remaining and ensure it is updated as  significant risks emerge. In response to this recommendation, NASA  stated that the JWST program and project use a range of tools to assess  all major contractors’ performance and that the approach the project has  in place is consistent with best practices. NASA indicated that it will  continue to use the tools currently in place to manage JWST.  Furthermore, NASA noted the JWST project initiated a cost risk analysis  of the prime contract that is incorporating best practices and will update it  when required by NASA policy.
NASA policy did not require cost risk analyses when the JWST project  began, therefore the project is also not required to update such an  analysis. Policy notwithstanding, NASA and GAO’s best practices do  support conducting a cost risk analysis and updating it as product  development progresses. Specifically, NASA's cost estimating handbook  states that while the product is being designed, developed, and tested,  there are changes which can impact the estimate and the risk  assessment. It is critical to capture these changes to maintain a realistic  program estimate now and in the future. During this phase, programmatic  data may have just as much of an impact on the estimate and risk  assessment as technical data. We acknowledge in the report the JWST  project’s use of EVM data, but reiterate that it does not reflect the  potential impact of future risks. As our report notes, the JWST project has  only started two of the five integration and test periods and risks have  changed significantly since a cost risk analysis was last conducted on the  prime contractor's work. As the telescope is one of NASA's most complex  and expensive projects, both JWST and NASA officials have a  tremendous stake in the success of the JWST project. As a result, an  important best practice NASA can follow is to conduct a cost risk analysis  in the future so that realistic estimates are being communicated to  Congress, especially as new risks emerge in future testing. We  encourage JWST officials to rely not on policy direction but on good  management practices to spur them to update the cost risk analysis they  are conducting on the prime contractor's work as significant risks continue  to emerge.
NASA concurred with our recommendation directing the JWST project, in  conjunction with the performance evaluation board for JWST and the  Goddard Space Flight fee determining official, to modify its performance  evaluation plans for its award fees to ensure they (a) specify evaluation  criteria that reflects total contract performance in advance of the final  evaluation, and (b) clearly describe the process the performance  evaluation board and fee determining official will use to evaluate  contractor performance in the final evaluation. NASA indicated it will  revise the performance evaluations plans to clarify that criteria in the  existing plans applies to both interim periods and the final award fee  determination and will revise the plans to specify the process that will be  used to conduct the final evaluation and final determination. Once  complete, these actions should address our recommendation to clarify the  criteria and the process that will be used so a thorough and fair final  evaluation may occur that incorporates information from performance  over the life of each contract.
NASA also provided technical comments, which have been addressed in  the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and  interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to assess the extent to which (1) technical  challenges are impacting the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST)  project’s ability to stay on schedule and budget, (2) budget and cost  estimates reflect current information about project risks, and (3) the  project uses award fee contracts to motivate and assess contractor  performance.
To assess the extent to which technical challenges are impacting the  JWST project’s ability to stay on schedule and budget, we reviewed  project and contractor schedule and cost documentation, analyzed the  progress made against planned milestones established during the  project’s replan in 2011, and held interviews with program, project, and  contractor officials. We reviewed project monthly status reviews, quarterly  provided flight program reviews, information from the project’s risk  database, and other technical documentation to gain insights on the  project’s progress since our last report in January 2014. In addition, we  reviewed briefings and schedule documentation provided by project and  contractor officials. These documents included information on the  project’s technological challenges and risks, mitigation plans, timelines for  addressing these risks and challenges, and available schedule reserve.  We analyzed the project’s reported schedule reserve data across multiple  elements and major subsystems. We also interviewed project officials to  clarify information and to obtain additional information on element and  major subsystem level risks and technological challenges. Further, we  attended flight program reviews at the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) headquarters on a quarterly basis where the  current status of the program was briefed to NASA headquarters officials  outside of the project. Finally, we interviewed officials from Exelis, the Jet  Propulsion Laboratory, and different divisions of Northrop Grumman  Aerospace Systems concerning risks and challenges on the elements  and major subsystems, instruments, or components they were  developing.
To assess the extent to which budget and cost estimates reflect current  information about project risks, we reviewed project, contractor, and  subcontractor documentation and held interviews with officials from all of  these different organizations. We reviewed project monthly status  reviews, quarterly provided flight program reviews, and contractor  information on the potential cost to address identified risks. To identify  whether JWST’s current cost management practices were sufficient, we  reviewed its earned value management (EVM) and budget systems and  compared them to GAO best practices.To identify new risks that had  emerged since the 2011 replan, we conducted analysis to compare the  prime contractor’s current risk documentation to the risk documentation at  the time of the 2011 replan. Further, we analyzed the project’s cost  reserve data since the 2011 replan to identify where the project has  expended cost reserves and predicted threats, and conducted interviews  with contractors to discuss their cost reserve management practices. We  also examined and analyzed EVM data from several contractors to  identify trends in cost and schedule performance, entering both high-level  and subsystem-level monthly contractor EVM data into a GAO-developed  spreadsheet, which includes checks to ensure the EVM data provided  was reliable. We discussed our assessments of the project’s data and  analysis with JWST program and project officials from the Goddard  Space Flight Center.
To assess the extent to which the project uses award fee contracts to  motivate and assess contractor performance, we reviewed the project’s  documentation, conducted contract file reviews, examined performance  evaluation plans for two contractors, and reviewed the NASA Office of  Inspector General’s report on NASA’s use of award fees. examined the relevant portions related to award fees of the Federal  Acquisition Regulation (FAR), NASA FAR Supplement, and NASA Award  Fee Contracting Guide. We conducted interviews with project officials,  NASA Office of Procurement officials, the JWST fee determining official,  and contractor officials to obtain information on the project’s use of  contract incentives and implementation of award fee evaluations. We  evaluated the adequacy of JWST’s performance evaluation criteria and  processes by comparing the processes and criteria in the project’s  performance evaluation plans and other documentation to NASA’s  policies, regulations, and guidance. We interviewed project and NASA  headquarters officials to clarify information and obtain additional  information on NASA’s typical award fee processes and plans for  evaluating JWST’s contractors.
NASA, Office of Inspector General, NASA’s Use of Award Fee Contracts, IG-14-003  (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2013).
Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington,  D.C., Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, and Johnson  Space Center in Houston, Texas. We also visited the Jet Propulsion  Laboratory in Pasadena, California; Northrop Grumman Aerospace  Systems in Redondo Beach, California; the Defense Contract  Management Agency in Redondo Beach, California; and the Space  Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore, Maryland.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to December  2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Elements and Major Subsystems of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Observatory
section_title: Appendix III: Organizational Chart for the James Webb Space Telescope Program
paragraphs: Appendix III: Organizational Chart for the  James Webb Space Telescope Program The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is the contractor for the development of the cryocooler, but has  subcontracted most of the work to a different division of Northrop Grumman than the one that is  responsible for OTE, spacecraft, and sunshield development.
section_title: Appendix IV: Other Technical Issues for the James Webb Space Telescope
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Shelby S. Oakley, Assistant  Director; Karen Richey, Assistant Director; Jason Lee, Assistant Director;  Patrick Breiding; Laura Greifner; Samuel P. Harris; Jonathan Mulcare;  Kenneth E. Patton; Timothy N. Shaw; Sylvia Schatz; Jay Tallon; and  Ozzy Trevino made key contributions to this report.