Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel
Published: 2011-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Eliminating the threat of terrorist attacks continues to be a primary U.S. national security focus. According to the 9/11 Commission, constraining the mobility of terrorists is one of the most effective weapons in fighting terrorism. This report (1) describes key gaps the U.S. government has identified in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas, (2) evaluates how U.S. capacity-building efforts address those gaps, and (3) assesses the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps. To identify the key gaps, GAO reviewed governmentwide assessments of vulnerabilities in the international travel system. GAO reviewed the strategies and documentation of U.S. agencies funding and/or implementing foreign capacity-building efforts to prevent terrorist travel overseas, including those of the Departments of State (State)--which coordinates U.S. efforts overseas--Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also interviewed officials from the National Security Staff, of the National Security Council (NSC), which oversees counterterrorism policy. GAO met with these agencies and conducted field work in Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The U.S. government has identified four key gaps in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. U.S. government foreign capacity-building programs and activities address these gaps to varying degrees. For instance, as one of the U.S. efforts to enhance foreign partners' sharing of information about known and suspected terrorists, State's Terrorist Interdiction Program provides participating countries with hardware and software to develop, maintain, and use terrorist screening information. In fiscal year 2010, nearly 150 ports of entry overseas were using this program. With regard to addressing the use of fraudulent travel documents, GAO found the potential for overlap and duplication since seven components of three federal agencies are involved in providing training on fraudulent travel document recognition to foreign government officials, with no mechanism to coordinate such training. In two countries GAO visited, there was a lack of collaboration among agencies funding and implementing training on this topic. For example, in Pakistan, State and DHS were both planning to hold fraudulent travel document training for the same Pakistani agency during the same month without knowing of the other's plans. Regarding helping countries improve the security of their passport issuance, State and USAID have multiple efforts, including State's Bureau of Consular Affairs bringing delegations from foreign passport offices to the United States for briefings at passport-related agencies. Finally, the U.S. government has many efforts aimed at combating corruption overseas, such as encouraging countries to pass anticorruption laws. While these efforts are not aimed specifically at countries' passport and immigration agencies, they are intended to improve the effectiveness of all government functions. The U.S. government lacks performance measures to assess governmentwide progress in closing the key gaps in foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. None of the governmentwide or individual agency strategic documents GAO reviewed contained such measures. While components of State and DOJ have some performance measures related to information sharing, these measures do not provide decision makers with comprehensive information on governmentwide progress in enhancing foreign partners' capacity.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that (1) State develop a mechanism to improve coordination of various agencies' efforts to provide fraudulent travel document training to foreign partners, and (2) NSC develop a mechanism to measure, track, and report on overall progress toward the goal of enhancing foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. State concurred with the first recommendation. NSC did not comment on the draft report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Eliminating the threat of terrorist attacks continues to be a primary U.S.  national security focus. According to the 9/11 Commission, constraining  the mobility of terrorists overseas is one of the most effective weapons in  fighting terrorism and constraining terrorist travel internationally should  become a vital part of counterterrorism strategy. In 2006, the National  Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) released the National Strategy to  Combat Terrorist Travel, which established governmentwide goals for  preventing terrorist travel and identified enhancing the capacity of partner  nations as one of two pillars supporting that strategy. The attempted  attack on a Detroit-bound airliner on December 25, 2009, involving an  individual allegedly affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who  had traveled from Nigeria and transited through Amsterdam, highlights the  continued critical importance of U.S. foreign partners’ capacity to stop  terrorists before they travel to the United States.
This report evaluates the U.S. government’s efforts to close gaps identified  in the capacity of foreign partners to stop terrorists from traveling across  international borders. Specifically, this report (1) describes the key gaps the  U.S. government has identified in foreign countries’ capacity to prevent  terrorist travel overseas, (2) evaluates how U.S. foreign capacity-building  efforts address those gaps, and (3) assesses the extent to which the U.S.  government is measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps.
To address these objectives, we reviewed the National Strategy to  Combat Terrorist Travel and U.S. government assessments of  vulnerabilities in the international travel system that could be exploited by  terrorists. We also reviewed documentation on U.S. capacity-building  efforts to help countries prevent terrorist travel overseas, from the  Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS),  and Justice (DOJ); the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID); and the NCTC. For the purposes of this engagement, we define  terrorist travel as movements of known or suspected terrorists overseas,  crossing international borders outside of the United States by land, sea, or  air. We also interviewed knowledgeable officials in Washington D.C.,  including those from the White House National Security Staff and relevant  components of the intelligence community.
To obtain examples of U.S. efforts and more in-depth understanding of  specific programs, we conducted fieldwork in four countries selected  using criteria that included participation in U.S. capacity-building  programs designed to prevent terrorist travel, designation as a terrorist  safe haven, presence of key U.S. agency personnel at post, or coverage of  key regions to counterterrorism. Based on these criteria, we traveled to  Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. In each location, we met  with U.S. government personnel involved in capacity building to prevent  terrorist travel abroad to learn about the types of activities they undertake,  how they measure progress, and their reported results. We also met with  foreign government officials to learn about the challenges they face in  improving their ability to prevent terrorist travel abroad and their  perspectives on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to June 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more detailed  description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The vulnerability of the international travel system to terrorists crossing  international borders to perpetrate terrorist acts against countries’ citizens  became a major concern after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Subsequently, Congress passed a series of laws that called for various  measures to address weaknesses in U.S. and other countries’ foreign travel  systems. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004  directed the NCTC to submit to Congress a strategy for combating  terrorist travel. In 2006, the NCTC issued the National Strategy to  Combat Terrorist Travel. One of the strategy’s two pillars was to enhance  U.S. and foreign partner capabilities to constrain terrorist mobility  overseas. Among the pillar’s objectives were to suppress terrorists’ ability  to cross international borders and help partner nations build capacity to  limit terrorist travel.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established  the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) to serve,  in part, as a clearinghouse for all U.S. agency information on preventing  terrorist travel, and to submit annual assessments of vulnerabilities in the  foreign travel system that may be exploited by international terrorists.  Later, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of  2007 called for the HSTC to serve as the focal point for interagency efforts  to integrate and disseminate intelligence and information related to  terrorist travel. The 2007 Act directed DHS, with the cooperation of other  relevant agencies, to ensure that HSTC have no less than 40 full-time  positions, including, as appropriate, detailees from DHS, State, DOJ, DOD,  NCTC, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and  the Department of the Treasury. Presently, DHS’ U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) provides the director of the center, which  includes personnel from State, DHS, and the U.S. intelligence community.
NCTC and HSTC jointly issued the first terrorist travel vulnerability  assessment in 2005, and HSTC issued additional terrorist travel  vulnerability assessments in 2008 and 2009. The assessments synthesize  information and analyses from key stakeholders throughout the U.S.  government. Specifically, HSTC officials review intelligence and other  information from all relevant agencies; attend interagency working groups,  interagency intelligence meetings, and other coordination meetings related  to terrorist travel; review open source information from banks,  nongovernmental organizations, and multinational organizations; and  consult with agencies responsible for implementing programs. All relevant  agencies are given the opportunity to review and comment on the drafts.
Various U.S. agencies and subagencies are involved in providing capacity  building related to enhancing countries’ ability to prevent terrorist travel  abroad. As shown in figure 1, counterterrorism as a whole, including  preventing terrorist travel, is overseen at the policy level by the Office of  the Director of National Intelligence and by the National Security Council.  The Director of NCTC reports both to the President regarding executive  branch-wide counterterrorism planning, and to the Director of National  Intelligence regarding intelligence matters. NCTC follows the policy  direction of the President and the National Security Council. State, DHS,  DOD, and DOJ fund and/or implement the majority of the capacity- building programs. Within the Department of State, the Office of the  Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), in addition to funding and  implementing capacity-building programs, has a leading role in developing  coordinated strategies to defeat terrorists abroad and securing the  cooperation of international partners. S/CT works with all appropriate  elements of the U.S. government to ensure integrated and effective  counterterrorism efforts, and coordinates and supports the development  and implementation of all U.S. government policies and programs aimed at  countering terrorism overseas.
section_title: U.S. Government Assessments Have Identified Four Key Gaps in Foreign Countries’ Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel Overseas
paragraphs: As shown in table 1, the U.S. government has identified four key gaps in  foreign countries’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas.
HSTC and NCTC vulnerability assessments have identified sharing  information about known and suspected terrorists as one key gap in  foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel. For example, some  countries do not have their own database systems with terrorist screening  information or access to other countries’ terrorist screening information,  which contains biographical or biometric information about individuals  who are known or suspected terrorists. Even when countries have  terrorist screening information, they may not have reciprocal relationships  to share such information or other travel-related information, such as  airline passenger lists, with other countries, thereby limiting their ability to  identify and prevent the travel of known and suspected terrorists. In  addition, some countries do not have access to or fully use biometric  information, which provides a unique identifier for each person, such as a  fingerprint. For example, Pakistan has a centralized fingerprint database,  but it is not shared across all law enforcement agencies, making the  database less comprehensive and, as a result, more difficult for Pakistani  government officials to prevent potential terrorists from traveling.
A second key gap in foreign partners’ capacity relates to their ability to  address the use of fraudulent travel documents. For instance, in many  countries, fraudulent travel documents, including fraudulent passports and  visas, are easy to obtain, and could thereby be used by people who want to  travel under a false identity. In addition, some countries’ failure to  consistently report lost or stolen passports to the International Criminal  Police Organization (INTERPOL) or to access INTERPOL’s database that  stores information on lost and stolen passports, can facilitate the use of  legitimate passports by imposters. According to U.S. embassy officials in  Kenya we spoke with, this is a common occurrence in Kenya, where  individuals with a similar appearance to a Somali-American with a  legitimate travel document will fraudulently use this travel document for  illicit travel. Another common issue related to fraudulent travel documents  is using fraudulent “breeder documents,” such as birth certificates and  drivers’ licenses issued to support a person’s false identity, to obtain  genuine passports. The issue of fraudulent documents is further  compounded by the lack of a requirement for a visa to some countries. For  example, according to a former Pakistani official that had responsibilities  related to immigration enforcement, fraudulent British passports are the  most prevalent type of fraudulent travel document in Pakistan. Since  British citizens are not required to obtain visas to travel to many countries,  a terrorist could use one of these fraudulent passports to travel to many  countries without further background checks that would occur through a  visa adjudication process.
The third key gap identified in the NCTC and HSTC assessments is a lack  in some countries’ abilities to ensure the security of their passport  issuance systems. The passports from some countries are of low quality  and are therefore easily stolen or counterfeited. For example, 18 countries  still use passports that are not machine readable and almost half of  countries use passports without biometric information stored  electronically inside the passport. Such biometric information can include  facial and fingerprint data, and can be used to authenticate the identity of  travelers. In addition, once countries convert to biometric passports,  previously issued passports may be valid for up to 10 years from their  issuance dates.
A fourth key gap in some foreign countries’ capacity to prevent terrorist  travel is in combating corruption in passport issuance and immigration  agencies. Corruption in government agencies relevant to travel can  facilitate the illicit travel of terrorists or other criminals. For example,  corruption in passport issuance agencies can allow potential terrorists to  obtain genuine passports under a false identity or blank passports that can  be easily manipulated. U.S. embassy officials in Kenya told us that such  false passports can be obtained for just a few hundred dollars in some  cases. Further, corruption within countries’ immigration agencies, such as  border patrol or civil aviation officials with immigration duties, leaves a  country’s immigration system vulnerable to human smugglers and  traffickers who often have established relationships with these corrupt  officials. For example, according to U.S. embassy officials in Kenya, illicit  travel facilitators are known to stand outside the airport and indicate to  corrupt immigration officials through the window which individuals they  should let pass without checking their passports. In addition, according to  the HSTC terrorist travel vulnerability assessments, countries that are  known for having corrupt immigration officials are more likely to be used  by terrorists as transit countries so that the terrorists can avoid  interdiction.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Conduct Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Related to Three of the Four Key Gaps, but Coordination Could be Improved
paragraphs: U.S. government foreign capacity-building programs and activities address  to some degree most of the key gaps identified by the U.S. government in  foreign governments’ ability to prevent terrorist travel overseas. As shown  in table 2, three of the four key gaps—sharing information about known  and suspected terrorists, addressing the use of fraudulent travel  documents, and ensuring passport issuance security—have been the  subject of some programs and activities. However, with regard to U.S.  programs addressing the use of fraudulent travel documents, we found  potential for overlap and duplication of effort, as multiple agencies that  fund and implement numerous training courses do not always coordinate  their activities. While the U.S. government has many efforts aimed at  helping foreign countries to combat corruption, none focus on the fourth  gap of corruption related to passport issuance and immigration agencies.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Foreign Capacity- Building Efforts Address Sharing Information about Known and Suspected Terrorists
paragraphs: Multiple federal efforts are aimed at improving information sharing about  known and suspected terrorists. First, State/S/CT’s Terrorist Interdiction  Program (TIP) enables immigration officials in countries at risk of terrorist  activity to identify the attempted travel of known or suspected terrorists  through the provision of a computerized system called the Personal  Identification, Secure Comparison, and Evaluation System (PISCES). TIP  provides participating countries with the PISCES software, hardware, and  equipment to operate the software; any required maintenance and  expansion of the system; and training on how to use it. During fiscal year  2010, the PISCES system processed an estimated 150,000 travelers per day  entering or exiting 17 participating countries through ports of entry with  PISCES installations. In fiscal year 2010, State began to upgrade the  PISCES software with biometric capabilities that further enhance host  countries’ capacity to interdict terrorists attempting to travel under a false  identity.
Second, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement  Affairs (INL) has funded at least two projects to provide different types of  database systems to foreign law enforcement authorities to help them screen  for potential terrorist or criminal travelers. These projects are implemented  through the DOJ/Criminal Division’s International Criminal Investigative  Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), a broad law enforcement  development program that caters its program offerings to fit the host  country’s needs. First, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICITAP has provided the  State Police Information Network to Bosnian border officials to allow them to  link to INTERPOL databases to identify criminals who could then be denied  entry to the country. Second, ICITAP has provided a separate system, the  Total Information Management System, to Albania to enhance the country’s  capacity to screen for known terrorists. According to State, the governments  of Kosovo and Albania are discussing adapting certain elements of the Total  Information Management System for use in Kosovo as well.
Third, INL and State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation  have provided funding to DHS’ U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  to arrange trips for foreign officials to come to the United States to learn  about how CBP uses and analyzes terrorist screening information. These  trips are organized through the International Visitors Program, through  which CBP arranges briefings and visits to CBP operations in the United  States by foreign high-level customs and other law enforcement officials  who perform or manage functions similar to those encompassed within  CBP’s area of responsibility and expertise. In fiscal year 2010, CBP  organized 22 visits by foreign officials for this purpose.
Fourth, the United States enhances other countries’ ability to prevent  terrorist travel abroad by sharing terrorist screening information with  other countries. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD- 6), the Terrorist Screening Center within the DOJ’s Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) and the Terrorism Information Sharing Office within  State/S/CT negotiate agreements with foreign countries to systematically  share terrorist screening information, thereby enhancing both countries’  abilities to prevent terrorist travel abroad through immediate and  systematic access to information on known and suspected terrorists. Once  the United States has signed an HSPD-6 agreement with a foreign country,  the Terrorist Screening Center then shares the information agreed to with  the foreign partners. As of May 2011, the Terrorist Screening Center  shared terrorist screening information with 23 foreign countries. In  addition to the systematic information sharing on known and suspected  terrorists that occurs through HSPD-6 agreements, the Terrorist Screening  Center also has had approximately six one-time arrangements for sharing  terrorist screening information with countries hosting special events.
Fifth, DHS leads an interagency negotiating team, on which State/S/CT and  State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs also serve, that is  involved in renegotiating a 2007 agreement between the United States and  the European Union on the exchange of Passenger Name Records data.  Once a country has the capacity to analyze this type of information  provided by airlines on its passengers, the country is able to prescreen  airline passengers against terrorist screening information, thereby helping  them to prevent terrorists from traveling abroad. The European Union is  now considering developing such a system and CBP has hosted officials  from the European Union for briefings on how the United States analyzes  Passenger Name Records data.
According to State and DOJ officials, capacity-building efforts related to  information sharing about known and suspected terrorists face some  challenges. Some countries have expressed concerns about the privacy  and protections related to the sharing of sensitive terrorist screening  information. For example, European countries that have negotiated  HSPD-6 agreements with the United States have been concerned about  data protection, redress, and privacy policies and procedures in both  utilizing terrorist screening information from the United States and sharing  terrorist screening information with the United States because of  differences between U.S. and European laws. According to officials from  the Terrorist Screening Center, such differences can include the countries’  statutes of limitations that delineate how long they can keep derogatory  information. According to State officials, another related challenge is that  providing information to foreign countries involves a loss of control over  the information and creates the possibility that the information could be  compromised through internal corruption. To address both challenges, the  United States and the foreign governments negotiate on specific  information-sharing mechanisms and protections that are feasible and  acceptable to both sides.
section_title: Several U.S. Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Address the Use of Fraudulent Travel Documents but Some Efforts Lack Coordination
subsections: section_title: Multiple Agencies Fund and Implement Training Courses in Fraudulent Travel Document Recognition
paragraphs: Seven different U.S. government entities across three federal agencies are  involved in providing fraudulent travel document training to foreign  government officials, as shown in figure 2. In delivering the training,  agencies have similar objectives and often provide the training to the same  populations (e.g., immigration officials and law enforcement officials) to  develop their skills in recognizing the characteristics of altered,  counterfeit, or other fraudulent travel documents.
U.S. law enforcement officials working overseas from DHS/ICE and State’s  Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) provide the bulk of training in the  recognition of fraudulent travel documents to foreign immigration and law  enforcement officials. Specifically, attachés from DHS/ICE and in-country  representatives from State/DS provide such training under the dual  objectives of preventing terrorist travel and protecting U.S. interests. For  example, in fiscal year 2010, ICE attachés provided 360 training courses,  briefings, and outreach sessions on fraudulent travel document recognition  and State/DS staff posted overseas provided 458 related training courses.
In addition, State/S/CT and State/DS implement the Anti-Terrorism  Assistance (ATA) program, which focuses on building foreign law  enforcement officers’ counterterrorism capabilities. ATA provides  fraudulent travel document recognition training as part of achieving  program goals related to preventing terrorist travel abroad. In fiscal year  2010, 12 of the more than 350 courses provided by ATA were fraudulent  travel document recognition courses. These courses were provided to law  enforcement officials from 17 of the approximately 60 countries that  received ATA training in fiscal year 2010.
Other U.S. foreign capacity-building programs have implemented  fraudulent travel document recognition courses, although their missions  are not directly related to preventing terrorist travel abroad.
State/INL provides funding for U.S. law enforcement agencies,  including ICE, CBP, and the FBI, to implement the International Law  Enforcement Academies (ILEA), which provide a general law  enforcement training program that also includes some specialized  training on how to combat certain criminal activities, including  fraudulent travel documents. In fiscal year 2010, the ILEAs provided  two courses specifically on fraudulent travel document recognition to  law enforcement officials from 13 countries, as well as having training  on this topic provided by ICE as part of the general law enforcement  training offered at the ILEA in San Salvador that was delivered five  times that fiscal year. In addition, State/INL has provided funding to  multiple entities to provide training in fraudulent travel document  recognition. First, State/INL provides funding to CBP for related  training, such as for fraudulent travel document training provided to  Moroccan officials in fiscal year 2010 and for CBP’s International  Visitors Program, which, in fiscal year 2010, arranged six trips to the  United States for foreign officials to learn how to recognize fraudulent  travel documents. Also, State/INL has provided funding to the  Organization of American States to deliver training in fraudulent  document recognition throughout the Western Hemisphere and to the  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to develop a manual on how  to examine travel documents to determine their authenticity.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DHS funds  Aviation Security Sustainable International Standards Teams, which  build select countries’ aviation security through related training,  technical assistance, and overall security assessments, in cases when  these countries are having difficulty meeting International Civil  Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation security standards. In fiscal year  2010, as part of this effort, TSA funded one fraudulent travel document  training course in Liberia, which was taught by ICE and CBP, as part of  fulfilling that country’s needs to meet ICAO standards related to  detecting fraudulent travel documents.
CBP’s Office of International Affairs has funded some fraudulent travel  document recognition training related to its mission to enhance  international border security. In fiscal year 2010, CBP funded one  course in fraudulent document recognition for Mexican law  enforcement officials.
In addition to training provided by ICE attachés, ICE’s Office of  International Affairs funds some additional fraudulent travel document  recognition training courses, which involve ICE officials traveling from  Washington, D.C., to instruct the courses. In fiscal year 2010, ICE  funded four such training sessions for representatives from at least  nine countries.
Finally, the FBI has at times been involved in the provision of fraudulent  travel document recognition training to foreign law enforcement  officials, although it did not fund or implement any such training in fiscal  year 2010. In March 2011, the FBI organized a training session for  Indonesian officials in that country’s police, state intelligence, public  corruption commission, customs, immigration, military, and prosecutor’s  offices, a portion of which involved fraudulent travel document training  that was provided by ICE and State/DS.
section_title: Agencies Funding and Implementing Fraudulent Travel Document Training Sometimes Lack Coordination
paragraphs: Our past work on issues that cut across multiple agencies shows that  without a coordinated approach, programs can waste scarce funds and  limit the overall effectiveness of the U.S. government’s efforts. GAO has  found that, while collaboration among federal agencies can take different  forms, practices that generally enhance collaboration include agreeing  upon agency roles and responsibilities and identifying and addressing  needs by leveraging resources. GAO has further suggested that program  officials require sufficiently detailed information to enable them to carry  out their duties and responsibilities effectively, while collaborating when  necessary to increase their efficiency.
State/S/CT officials told us they were unaware of how many agencies and  subagencies are involved in providing fraudulent travel document training  to foreign officials, and they had not developed any mechanism to  encourage coordination among all the parties involved. At the country  level, we found that agency officials at two of the posts we visited did not  always collaborate on the delivery of fraudulent travel document  recognition training. As a result, some planned training was duplicative  and did not make an effective use of limited resources. For example,  during our March 2011 visit to Pakistan, we identified two agencies  planning to provide fraudulent travel document recognition training  courses in April 2011 to Pakistani officials from the same agency without  coordinating with one another. The ICE attaché planned one course that  had a full roster of students but lacked funding, while ATA was  simultaneously planning to hold two fully-funded fraudulent travel  document courses in the same month although they had no students  signed up for either course. Meanwhile, the ICE attaché had been certified  through a train-the-trainer course provided by ICE’s Forensic Document  Laboratory to be an instructor for fraudulent travel document recognition  courses. Since ATA program officials were unaware of the existence of  this local resource, the ATA program was still attempting to find two  instructors from ICE to travel to Pakistan to teach the courses they were  planning. In addition to potentially adding to program costs by not using  the locally available instructor, this lack of coordination also could have  unnecessarily increased demand on the Forensic Document Laboratory’s  resources. The Forensic Document Laboratory is one of the primary  sources of instructors for ATA courses in fraudulent travel documents.  Officials from the Forensic Document Laboratory in Washington, D.C.,  told us they provide train-the-trainer courses to make up for their lack of  sufficient staff to fulfill all the training requests from overseas programs  like ATA.
In Kenya, we found that representatives from two U.S. agencies, State and  DHS, deliver fraudulent travel document training but do not collaborate.  The ATA program, which is run by a contractor hired by State/DS in  Kenya, provided approximately one course per year from fiscal year 2007  to 2010 in fraudulent travel documents to police and security officers,  customs and immigration officers, forensic specialists, and training  officers. A representative of State/DS posted overseas also provides many  training courses in fraudulent travel documents for immigration officials.  The CBP attaché, who represents DHS at the post, has provided many  training courses on this topic to airport and border officials, as well as  speaking on the topics of fraudulent travel documents, imposter  recognition, and human trafficking to students in the Kenyan Immigration  Service’s basic training. Despite these three representatives providing this  similar training, a representative from one of the agencies stated that  although he coordinated with other countries providing similar training in  Kenya, he did not do so with other U.S. agencies.
section_title: Agencies Also Address the Use of Fraudulent Travel Documents through Capacity- Building Efforts Related to Lost and Stolen Passports
paragraphs: State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs attempts to build foreign partners’  capacity to address the issue of fraudulent travel documents by  encouraging countries to report lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL  and to access INTERPOL’s database to check against travelers arriving at  ports of entry to identify and interdict people misusing passports.  According to INTERPOL, as of June 2011, the total number of countries  contributing lost and stolen passport information was 158; and some of  these have connected border checkpoints to INTERPOL’s system for  automated checking against its database. To facilitate the interdiction of  people misusing lost and stolen passports, Consular Affairs also assisted in  the drafting of a set of global standards for national management of lost  and stolen passport data, which was provided to ICAO for adoption as a  part of the global travel document standards.
DHS’ Office of Policy has also played a role in enhancing other countries’  capacity to report information about lost and stolen passports. First, they  have participated in ongoing efforts to revise INTERPOL’s procedures for  the reporting of lost and stolen passport information to enhance the  capabilities and compliance of such reporting by INTERPOL members.  Similarly, to improve foreign partners’ ability to detect fraudulent travel  documents, DHS’ Office of Policy has provided technical assistance  towards the development of a pilot program to enhance the sharing of  information related to fraudulent document alert data between members  of the Group of Eight and INTERPOL.
section_title: State and USAID Undertake Efforts to Improve Foreign Governments’ Passport Issuance Security
paragraphs: Two agencies, State and USAID, have undertaken foreign capacity- building activities to improve other countries’ passport issuance security.  State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, with its mission of issuing secure U.S.  passports to traveling Americans, is involved in some efforts to enhance  foreign countries’ passport issuance security.
Consular Affairs has contributed to diplomatic efforts through ICAO to  promote other countries’ use of machine-readable passports and  passports with biometric features. For example, it was involved in the  development and promotion of ICAO’s standards for machine-readable  passports published in September 2006. These standards are related to  a requirement that countries use machine-readable passports by April  2010, and also provided specifications for biometric enhancements that  could be made to electronic passports.
Consular Affairs has also, since 2009, provided briefings to  representatives from over 50 passport issuance authorities on the  elements of secure passports. For example, in 2010, Consular Affairs  organized the training of a delegation from Turkey’s passport office in  Washington, D.C., which included briefings and organized tours of the  Washington Passport Agency and the U.S. Government Printing Office.
State/INL is funding Consular Affairs to provide passport antifraud  training to officials from foreign passport issuance agencies, which will  first be piloted in fall 2011. This training is designed to improve the  integrity of other countries’ passports and passport issuance by helping  them institute organizations, processes, and procedures for detecting  fraudulent passport applications as part of their adjudication and  issuance processes.
In addition, USAID provided technical assistance to the Paraguayan  Ministry of Interior and National Police to reform Paraguay’s identification  system, including its national identity cards and passports. According to  USAID, the prior identification system in Paraguay was not in compliance  with international security standards and was vulnerable to corruption.  Implementation of the new integrated national identity card and passport  system involved providing information technology improvements, as well  as training on how to collect citizens’ biometric data and on how to  manage the new system. Entries in the new national database now include  biometric identifiers, including fingerprints, photographs, and signatures,  all of which are automatically verified upon entry into the database for  their compliance with international standards. In addition, passports were  redesigned and upgraded to ICAO requirements, resulting in more secure  documents that are less susceptible to fraud.
section_title: The U.S. Government Has Anticorruption Efforts Overseas although Not Specifically Aimed at Passport Issuance and Immigration Agencies
paragraphs: While the U.S. government, through USAID and Millennium Challenge  Corporation (MCC) anticorruption foreign capacity-building programs and  State-led diplomatic efforts, has many efforts aimed at helping foreign  countries to combat corruption, no U.S. government effort focuses directly  on combating corruption in countries’ passport issuance and immigration  agencies.
USAID has developed a wide range of programs for fighting corruption,  often fit to the needs and opportunities of the recipient country. Some  USAID anticorruption programs focus on a few specific sectors, including  tax collection, customs collection, and the financial sector. In addition,  USAID also has programs that have a broader effect on combating  corruption, such as civil society programs to increase public awareness,  promote citizen involvement and participation, and encourage civil society  oversight of government; programs to decentralize powers to local  governments; rule of law programs to improve the justice sector and  thereby the ability to prosecute corruption cases; and programs to build  anticorruption agencies within foreign governments. While not specifically  targeting passport and immigration agencies, these broad anticorruption  programs may have a beneficial, indirect effect on these countries’ abilities  to combat corruption in passport issuance and immigration agencies,  thereby indirectly helping to prevent terrorist travel abroad.
Similarly, MCC has multiple anticorruption efforts across the 38 countries  to which the MCC provides assistance. These anticorruption efforts  include encouraging countries to: pass stronger anticorruption laws,  strengthen oversight institutions, open up the public policy-making  process to greater scrutiny, and increase corruption-related investigations  and prosecutions. Such efforts, although not directly focused on passport  issuance and immigration agencies, also may have a beneficial, indirect  effect on these countries’ abilities to combat corruption in these agencies,  thereby indirectly helping to prevent terrorist travel abroad.
In addition, State has been involved in diplomatic efforts to discourage  corruption in foreign countries. Multilaterally, State has advocated for the  implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption, which came  into force in December 2005 and provides a comprehensive set of  standards, measures, and rules that all countries can apply in order to  strengthen their legal and regulatory regimes to fight corruption. State has  encouraged and provided financial support for the development and  launch this year of a peer review process through which countries will  show how they are complying with their commitments under the UN  Convention. In many countries, as well as through regional workshops in  Africa, State engages in efforts to encourage or support countries in  combating corruption, such as through encouraging the investigation and  prosecution of corruption cases. While none of these efforts focus directly  on passport issuance or immigration agencies, their goal is to strengthen  overall the laws, institutions, and capacity to prevent and prosecute  corruption, which, according to State, intend to impact the integrity and  effectiveness of all government functions and agencies.
section_title: No Performance Measures to Gauge Governmentwide Progress in Closing Key Gaps in Foreign Partners’ Ability to Prevent Terrorist Travel Have Been Established
paragraphs: The U.S. government lacks performance measures to assess  governmentwide progress in closing the key gaps in foreign partners’  capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. Performance measurement  enables decision makers to make informed policy and budget decisions.  At the national level, U.S. counterterrorism strategies lack performance  measures related to capacity building to prevent terrorist travel. Similarly,  neither State, DOD, DHS, DOJ nor USAID has established such measures  to accompany their agencywide strategies. Components of some agencies  have relevant performance measures at the program level, but they cover  only one of the four key gaps. Without comprehensive measures that  encompass all U.S. government agency efforts, the U.S. government  cannot determine governmentwide progress in building foreign partners’  capacity to prevent terrorist travel.
subsections: section_title: Performance Measures Are Key Tools for Decision Makers but U.S. National Counterterrorism Strategies Lack Governmentwide Performance Measures Related to Foreign Capacity Building to Prevent Terrorist Travel
paragraphs: As we have previously reported, performance information is essential to  enable decision makers to make informed decisions. Specifying  performance metrics is one tool used in evaluating the effectiveness of  government efforts. Agencies can also use performance information to  make various types of management decisions to improve programs and  results. In addition, as we have also reported, many federal efforts  transcend more than one agency. Closing the gaps in foreign partners’  capacity to prevent terrorist travel is an example of such an issue, since it  involves efforts funded and implemented by several agencies. In such  situations, we have reported that it is important to have full information on  how cross-cutting goals will be achieved.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 highlighted  the importance of constraining terrorist travel and directed NCTC to  submit a strategy that combined terrorist travel intelligence, operations,  and law enforcement into a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, find  terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility domestically  and internationally. The resulting NCTC 2006 National Strategy to Combat  Terrorist Travel lists some U.S. government activities related to helping  partner nations build capacity to limit terrorist travel but contains no  performance measures to assess governmentwide progress.
Similarly, the National Security Council, which coordinates national  security and foreign policy among various U.S. government agencies,  issued the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in September  2006, which established the goal of disrupting terrorist travel  internationally through various means, including building international  capacity to secure travel and combat terrorist travel. In June 2011, the  President issued the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, which again  highlighted the importance of enhancing the capacity of foreign partners  to prevent terrorist travel across national borders.  However, these  unclassified strategies lack performance measures related to foreign  capacity building to prevent terrorist travel.
section_title: Individual Agency Strategies Do Not Contain Performance Measures Related to Foreign Capacity Building to Prevent Terrorist Travel Abroad, but Some Agency Components Track Efforts Related to One Key Gap
paragraphs: We examined individual agency strategies for the agencies funding and/or  implementing foreign capacity-building programs and activities related to  preventing terrorist travel, including for State, DHS, DOD, DOJ, and  USAID. We found that each agency’s strategy acknowledged the important  role the agency plays in combating international terrorism. However, none  of the agencies’ strategies contained performance indicators to measure  progress related to helping countries close the key gaps in their ability to  prevent terrorist travel.
Some agency components have made efforts to track the performance of  their specific program efforts aimed at improving information sharing  about known and suspected terrorists—one of the four key gaps. None of  the agencies have performance measures related to the other three key  gaps in foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel. Related to  information sharing, State’s S/CT and Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance  have performance indicators for TIP that address sharing information on  known and suspected terrorists. In fiscal year 2009, S/CT created the  performance indicator—the percentage of the highest priority countries  capable of screening for terrorists through TIP/PISCES that receive  biometric capabilities. The target for that performance indicator for fiscal  year 2010 was that 50 percent of the 17 countries currently supported by  TIP would have biometric capability. No fiscal year 2010 results have yet  been publicly reported for this measure. The Director of U.S. Foreign  Assistance’s performance measure for TIP is the number of ports of entry  supported by TIP. Figure 3 shows the increase in the number of ports of  entry supported by TIP, and the annual targets, from 2006 to the present.
State’s country-level plans also sometimes contain performance measures  for U.S. counterterrorism efforts in that country. For example, State has  performance measures in its 2012 mission strategic plans for Kenya and  Thailand. For Kenya, the performance measure is—the government of  Kenya should demonstrate capacity and resolve to prevent and respond to  threats of terrorism by, among other things, expanding TIP/PISCES  coverage to additional border crossings. For Thailand, the performance  measure is—Thailand should develop effective export control and border  security systems that meet international standards by installing new  software for TIP/PISCES at targeted airport locations and expanding the  program to new ports of entry.
Finally, DOJ/FBI also has two performance measures related to the  information sharing gap that assess the Terrorist Screening Center’s  efforts to share terrorist screening information with foreign partners. The  FBI has not set targets for either of these measures.
Overall, these relatively narrow agency-specific measures that exist do not  provide a comprehensive basis for assessing governmentwide progress in  building foreign partners’ capacity for two reasons. First, they necessarily  focus on specific program efforts, not governmentwide progress. Second,  they cover only one of the four key gaps in the capacity of foreign  countries to prevent terrorist travel overseas.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Inhibiting the movement of terrorists across international borders is a key  part of the U.S. strategy for protecting the United States and its interests  abroad. Although agencies have implemented significant new domestic  programs to prevent terrorists from entering the United States, events of  the past few years illustrate that the international travel system is only as  secure as its weakest link. As a result, the United States seeks to enhance  the capacity of its foreign partners to prevent terrorist travel overseas,  with agencies implementing a variety of programs and activities to close  key gaps in our foreign partners’ capacity. However, some of these  efforts—such as improving foreign partners’ capacity to prevent the use of  fraudulent travel documents—are not always well coordinated and create  the risk of duplication and overlap. In light of the limited resources  available to address these important issues, it is critically important to  ensure that such resources are used efficiently. Further, while more than 5  years have passed since the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel  linked our foreign partners’ capacity to constrain terrorist travel to our  own national security, the U.S. government still lacks an effective system  for measuring and reporting progress toward the goal of enhancing our  foreign partners’ capacity. As agencies implement the new National  Strategy for Counterterrorism, it is important to focus on measuring,  tracking, and reporting on governmentwide progress toward the goal of  enhancing foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel. Without  such information, the U.S. government cannot efficiently assess the  effectiveness of its efforts and planners and decision makers may lack  information vital to addressing foreign policy needs and leveraging U.S.  resources.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to institute a coordinated approach for delivering fraudulent  travel document recognition training overseas to ensure that U.S. agencies  prevent overlap and duplication; and given State’s role in working with all  appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure integrated and  effective international counterterrorism efforts, we recommend that:    State develop a mechanism for agencies involved in funding and  implementing fraudulent travel document recognition training at  overseas posts to coordinate the delivery of such training to foreign  partners.
To allow the U.S. government to determine the extent to which it is  building foreign partners’ ability to prevent terrorist travel abroad and to  make adjustments to improve its programs accordingly, we recommend  that:    The National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant agencies,  develop a mechanism to measure, track, and report on U.S. progress  across the government toward its goal of enhancing foreign partners’  capacity to prevent terrorist travel.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State, DHS, DOD, DOJ, the  Department of Transportation, USAID, NCTC, and the National Security  Staff of the National Security Council. DHS and State provided written  comments, which are reprinted in appendixes III and IV, respectively.  State, DHS, DOJ, and NCTC provided technical comments, which we  incorporated where appropriate. DOD, the Department of Transportation,  USAID, and the National Security Staff did not provide any comments on  the draft.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State agreed with our  recommendation that it should develop a mechanism to enhance  coordination among the agencies involved in funding and implementing  fraudulent travel document training overseas. State noted that efforts to  enhance such coordination have begun at the country level, and that  coordination in this area is also needed in terms of strategic, budget, and  program planning at the agencywide and interagency levels. In addition,  DHS, in its letter commenting on our report, indicated its commitment to  working with other relevant agencies to stop terrorists from traveling  across international borders, including through contributing to  coordinated efforts to prevent any overlap and duplication.
Regarding our recommendation to the National Security Council to work  with relevant agencies to develop a mechanism to measure, track, and  report on governmentwide progress toward its goal of enhancing foreign  partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel, the National Security Staff  did not provide any comment. However, in previous meetings with us, the  National Security Staff acknowledged the need for such a mechanism.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the  Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and  Transportation; the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International  Development; the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; the  National Security Staff of the National Security Council; and other  interested parties or interested congressional committees. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-7331 or at JohnsonCM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff members that made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we (1) identified the key gaps the U.S. government has  assessed in foreign countries’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas,  (2) evaluated how U.S. foreign capacity-building efforts address those  gaps, and (3) assessed the extent to which the U.S. government is  measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps.
Our work focused on the efforts of the Departments of State (State),  Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Justice (DOJ) to build  foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. Within these  agencies, we met with officials from several relevant components that are  contributing to the U.S. government goal of enhancing foreign partners’  ability to prevent terrorist travel, including: State’s Office of the  Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), Bureau of Diplomatic Security  (DS), and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  (INL); DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs  and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and  Office of International Affairs; and DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation  and Criminal Division. We focused on these agencies and components as a  result of our assessment of agency efforts noted in the National Strategy  to Combat Terrorist Travel, our review of information in previous and  ongoing GAO work in counterterrorism and aviation security, and  discussions with U.S. agency officials regarding the agencies with which  they collaborate.
To obtain examples of U.S. efforts and more in-depth understanding of  specific participation in U.S. capacity-building programs designed to  prevent terrorist travel overseas, we selected four countries in which to  conduct field work. We selected Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, and  Thailand, based on criteria that included: designation as a terrorist safe  haven, presence of key U.S. agency personnel at post, and coverage of key  regions to counterterrorism. In each location, we met with U.S.  government personnel involved in capacity building to prevent terrorist  travel abroad to learn about the key gaps in those countries’ abilities to  prevent terrorist travel overseas, the types of capacity-building activities  they undertake related to preventing terrorist travel, and how they  measure progress and report results. We also met with foreign government  officials in three of the four countries to learn about the challenges they  face in improving their ability to prevent terrorist travel abroad and th perspectives on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts.
To identify what the U.S. government has assessed to be the key ga foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel o verseas, we reviewed  the NCTC and Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center’s (HSTC) terrorist  travel vulnerability assessments from 2005, 2008, and 2009. Based on  interviews with the HSTC, we learned that these are the only  comprehensive U.S. government assessments of vulnerabilities within the  foreign travel system. We reviewed all three documents to identify the key  gaps because, according to HSTC officials, each assessment is not  comprehensive. Rather, they are additive, so the assessments tak together represent a full picture of the vulnerabilities. We performed our  review of these assessments by noting instances when certain gaps,  threats, vulnerabilities, or areas for improvement to the international  travel system generally or related to specific foreign countries were  discussed. For the purposes of this review, we considered gaps to be  threats, vulnerabilities, and areas for improvement mentioned in the  assessments. The parts of the assessments that identify vulnerabilities  limited to the U.S. travel system were not included within our analysis  since they did not relate to the scope of our review. To distinguish  between the key gaps identified in these reports and other vulnerabilities  e not key gaps, we reviewed the frequency with which  identified that wer each gap/vulnerability was mentioned in the reports. The HSTC confirmed  our summary of the key gaps and other vulnerabilities. We also consulte with agency officials at headquarters, the missions in our example  countries, and the intelligence community to identify examples of the key gaps in each country and corroborate our findings.
To evaluate how U.S. foreign capacity-building programs address those  gaps, we examined relevant documents including program descriptions,  and agency- and program-level strategic documents, including the 2012  Mission Strategic and Resource Plans. We conducted interviews with  agency officials from State, DHS, DOJ, DOD, the Department of  Transportation, and the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID), in Washington, D.C., and in our example countries where  officials were involved in relevant capacity-building programs. We also  interviewed officials from the NCTC and National Security Staff. To show  the level of different agencies’ involvement in the delivery of fraudulent  travel document recognition training to foreign officials, we requested  data from all relevant agencies on the number of such courses that they  funded and implemented in fiscal year 2010. We determined that these  data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring progress  in its efforts to enhance foreign partners’ ability to constrain terrorist  travel overseas, we analyzed relevant U.S. planning and evaluation  documents including the 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist  Travel, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the 2008  National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror, and the 2011  National Strategy for Counterterrorism. We also reviewed the relevant  agency strategic documents for State, DHS, DOD, DOJ, and USAID. The  State documents included the fiscal year 2012 strategic and resource plans  of the bureaus of S/CT, DS, INL and Consular Affairs as well as the fiscal  year 2012 Mission Strategic and Resource Plans of our example countries.  We determined that State’s data on performance indicators for the  Terrorist Interdiction Program were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To identify what have been the reported results of these efforts, we  reviewed relevant agency reports including: State’s Annual Report o n  Assistance Related to International Terrorism from fiscal year 2009,  strategic and resource plans of the bureaus of S/CT, DS, INL and Con Affairs as well as the Mission Strategic and Resource Plans of our exam countries, DOJ performance reports, and the DHS Annual Performance Report for fiscal years 2008–2010. We also discussed progress with  officials at headquarters and at the missions of our example countries.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Capacity-Building Efforts Related to the Vulnerabilities of Aviation and Border Security
paragraphs: Multiple agencies are involved in many programs and activities to build the  capacity of foreign countries to address vulnerabilities in their aviation and border security, as shown in table 3. Since countries can have b land and water borders, we include both land border and maritime  security programs under border security. For both aviation and border  security programs, we include only programs that include elements relating to preventing illicit passenger travel. We have not included other aviation or border security programs that focus only on preventing illicit  cargo shipments.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report include Jason Bair, Assistant Director;   Nina Pfeiffer; Heather Latta; Julia Jebo; Eileen Larence; Eric Erdman;  Kevin Copping; Amber Keyser; Martin De Alteriis; Mary Moutsos; and Lynn  Cothern. Additional support was provided by Thomas Lombardi, Jan  Montgomery, and Justin Schnare.