Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being Addressed, but State's Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be Improved
Published: 2004-07-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of State supports foreign governments' efforts to eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, State's Office of Aviation has maintained aircraft and provided support for the aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police. However, eradication aircraft are often shot at from the ground requiring helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each mission. In 2003, the Office of Aviation fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of coca, a record amount. GAO examined (1) how the threat to the spray planes has changed since 2001, (2) what actions State has taken to address any operational safety concerns, and (3) what resources State provided for the expanding program during fiscal years 2001-04 and how it planned and budgeted for the program's growth.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month. But in late 2002 and during 2003, the number of hits increased--peaking at 73 in January 2003 and averaging more than 26 per month--and, in 2003, two spray aircraft crashed and two were forced to land because of ground fire. Moreover, the number of flying hours for spray aircraft more than doubled--from about 5,450 hours in 2001 to over 11,300 hours in 2003. In general, this meant the aircraft were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire, although other factors came into play. In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits, the Colombian National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation gunships that already accompanied every mission. Also, since January 2003, State has taken several actions to help reduce exposure to the threat of ground fire by making greater use of information about armed insurgents' proximity to spray targets. Since fiscal year 2001, State has significantly increased resources for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding for the program doubled from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001 to $100 million for fiscal year 2003. In addition, from fiscal year 2001 to May 2004, personnel in Colombia who were directly involved with the program increased from 179 to 298, and the number of aerial eradication aircraft increased from 22 to 35. However, State does not prepare budgets that address all of the Office of Aviation's program requirements. Consequently, State often moves funds from one program to another, which may adversely affect those programs. In addition, State does not plan for the longterm costs of the aerial eradication program, such as aircraft replacement. As a result, State has postponed requesting funds for new aircraft.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the early 1970s, the United States has supported Colombia’s efforts to  reduce drug trafficking activities and stem the flow of illegal drugs,  principally cocaine and heroin, entering the United States. Recognizing the  severity of illicit drug activities and the links between drug trafficking, the  cultivation of coca and opium poppy, and the violence affecting Colombia,  the Colombian government announced a $7.5 billion plan in October 1999,  known as Plan Colombia. This plan proposed, among other things, to  reduce the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by  50 percent over 6 years. To assist Colombia’s efforts, the United States has  substantially increased funding and material support to Colombia since  2000, providing more than $3.3 billion through fiscal year 2004.
The Department of State supports foreign governments’ efforts to locate  and eradicate illicit drug crops through its Bureau for International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL); its Narcotics Affairs  Sections (NAS) in particular countries; and the Office of Aviation, which  oversees a contract with DynCorp Aerospace Technology. In recent years,  the Office of Aviation, with DynCorp’s assistance, has maintained and  operated aircraft and provided logistical and training support for the aerial  eradication program of the Colombian National Police.
In 2003, the Office of Aviation fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of  coca, a record amount, and 2,987 hectares of opium poppy. Largely as the  result of these efforts, the estimated number of hectares under coca or  opium poppy cultivation in Colombia has declined by about one-third over  the past 2 years. However, the program operates in a hostile environment— eradication aircraft are often shot at from the ground—that requires  helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each  eradication mission. In August 2003, the Director of the Office of Aviation  expressed his concern that the increased operational tempo had strained  the resources and staffing available and he could not continue to ensure the  operational safety of the aerial eradication program.
You requested that we determine (1) how the threat to the aerial  eradication spray planes has changed since 2001, (2) what actions State has  taken to address any operational safety concerns, and (3) what resources  State provided for the expanding program during fiscal years 2001-04  (through May 2004) and how it planned and budgeted for the program’s  growth. To address these objectives, we reviewed overall program and  budgeting documents and interviewed cognizant officials at State/INL in  Washington, D.C. We also interviewed Office of Aviation and DynCorp  officials about operational procedures and reviewed relevant documents,  including site inspections and accident reports, at the Office of Aviation’s  main operating base, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; the U.S. Embassy in  Bogotá, Colombia; and the Office of Aviation and DynCorp office at El  Dorado Airport in Bogotá. We also discussed operational procedures with  NAS, Office of Aviation, and DynCorp personnel in Bogotá and met with  managers, pilots, and mechanics and observed eradication operations at  three sites in Colombia. We also reviewed how the data provided to us by  State and DynCorp were compiled and determined that they were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our  review from November 2003 through June 2004 in accordance with  generally accepted government accounting standards. (See app. I for a  more complete discussion of our scope and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine and 40 percent of the  heroin entering the United States. To assist the Colombian government in  its efforts to implement Plan Colombia and reduce the cultivation and  trafficking of illegal drugs, the United States has pursued a strategy  emphasizing interdiction, aerial eradication, and alternative development.  The strategy has resulted in a 33 percent reduction in the amount of coca  cultivated in Colombia over the last 2 years—from 169,800 hectares in 2001  to 113,850 hectares in 2003; similarly, opium poppy cultivated also declined  by 33 percent—from 6,540 hectares in 2001 to 4,400 hectares in 2003.  Nevertheless, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration, cocaine  prices nationwide have remained relatively stable—indicating that cocaine  is still readily available—and Colombia dominates the market for heroin in  the northeastern United States.
Despite improvements in Colombia’s security situation in 2003—for  example, according to statistics compiled by the Colombian government,  the murder rate declined 20 percent that year—insurgent and paramilitary  groups still control large parts of the countryside. According to State, the  insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s  territory east and south of the Andes. As illustrated in figure 1, this area  includes the primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. These groups— the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation  Army, and paramilitary forces such as the United Self Defense Forces of  Colombia—are involved in every facet of narcotics trafficking and are on  State’s list of terrorist organizations.
State has supported foreign governments throughout the world to locate  and eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, State’s efforts have focused  on the aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police,  although it provides logistical support to Bolivia and Peru and may be  called upon to support drug eradication efforts in Afghanistan.
NAS at the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá oversees and manages the Colombian  program. The Office of Aviation, which has a main operating base at Patrick  Air Force Base, Florida, implements the program with contractor  assistance from DynCorp. DynCorp personnel at Patrick provide  administrative support, perform major maintenance on aircraft, and give  initial pilot training. In Colombia, the Office of Aviation and DynCorp  maintain a headquarters office at El Dorado International Airport in Bogotá  and up to three operational sites at various Colombian police or military  bases around the country. From these sites, three types of spray aircraft— the OV-10, the T-65, and the AT-802—fly missions to fumigate the coca and  poppy fields in Colombia. DynCorp provides pilots, mechanics, and other  operations and maintenance personnel.
The aerial eradication program operates in an often-hostile environment  that requires helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to  accompany each aerial eradication mission. Eradication spray planes and  the supporting helicopters are often shot at from the ground. Missions have  been canceled or redirected because NAS, Office of Aviation, or  government of Colombia officials considered the targeted locations too  dangerous.
U.S. officials have had long-standing concerns about the threat posed to  aerial eradication activities and, in particular, the safety of operations in  Colombia. In August 2000, the Office of Aviation requested an independent  evaluation of its aviation operations and safety by the Inter-Agency  Committee for Aviation Policy. Based on its review of operations at two  forward operating locations in Colombia and the offices in Bogotá and at  Patrick Air Force Base, the committee concluded that the Office of  Aviation program was safe but made numerous suggestions and  recommendations to enhance safety and security. In September 2001, we  reported that the Office of Aviation had taken action on or implemented  most of the committee’s suggestions and recommendations. We also made  recommendations for improvement, which State acted on.
Nevertheless, in March 2002, the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá reported that in  spite of all of the embassy’s precautions, a contractor, possibly an  American, will inevitably be hurt or killed. In June 2003, the Director of  the Office of Aviation noted that the Office of Aviation was performing a  very difficult mission in an increasingly hostile environment. In September  2003, a spray aircraft crashed because of ground fire and, for the first time,  the pilot was killed. In total during 2003, one helicopter and four spray  aircraft either crashed or were severely damaged because of ground fire. In  an October 2003 report, DynCorp noted that the threat to the program’s  aircraft and pilots was causing increasing concern about pilot safety and  personnel morale.
Another key component of the Colombian-U.S. counternarcotics strategy  was forming a Colombian Army Counternarcotics Brigade. Although the  brigade’s primary mission is to plan and conduct interdiction operations  against cocaine producers and traffickers, the brigade also is supposed to  provide security for the eradication program in some of the insurgent- controlled areas of the country. As part of its contract, DynCorp trains  pilots and mechanics and helps maintain and operate the U.S.-provided  helicopters for the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, which supplies the  airlift capability for the counternarcotics brigade.
section_title: Ground-Fire Hits on Spray Aircraft Increased Significantly in 2003
paragraphs: Although the Office of Aviation has reported ground fire on its aerial  eradication aircraft for years, the number of ground-fire hits began to  increase in late 2002. In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire  hits on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month. But the number of  ground-fire hits reported from October 2002 through 2003 increased  significantly to an average of more than 26 per month. The number of hits  peaked at 73 in January 2003, and 46 hits were reported in March 2003.  Although the number of monthly ground-fire hits generally declined after  March 2003, the total number for 2003 was more than the previous 2 years  combined—313 versus 288 in 2001 and 2002. During the first 5 months of  2004, the total number of hits declined considerably to 48 compared with  168 during the same period in 2003. Figure 2 shows the number of ground- fire hits on spray aircraft from January 2001 through May 2004.
In addition, during the period 2001-03, the operational tempo of the aerial  eradication program more than doubled in terms of flying hours for the  spray aircraft. In general, this meant the spray aircraft and accompanying  helicopters were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire;  although other factors also came into play, such as the proximity of  eradication areas to insurgent locations. According to the Office of  Aviation, spray aircraft flew about 5,450 hours in 2001, nearly 9,400 hours in  2002, and more than 11,300 in 2003. The increase in flying hours in 2002 and  2003 largely occurred as the Colombian government, headed by President  Uribe, took a more aggressive approach to aerial eradication. In the  19 months prior to President Uribe’s inauguration in August 2002, spray  aircraft flew about 9,700 hours or 510 hours per month. From August 2002  through May 2004, the eradication program’s spray aircraft flew more than  18,450 hours, or about 839 hours a month—during 2003 alone, the program  averaged more than 940 flying hours a month. During the first 5 months of  2004, the pace slowed—spray aircraft flew about 2,000 hours compared  with about 4,900 hours during the same period in 2003. Nevertheless, Office  of Aviation officials report that the number of hectares of coca sprayed in  2004 remains high—62,000 through mid-June—because the spray aircraft  are based close to large coca fields and the AT-802 spray planes, which are  capable of carrying more herbicide than the OV-10, have flown more  frequently than during the first 5 months of 2003. Figure 3 illustrates the  spray aircraft’s monthly flying hours for January 2001 through May 2004.
According to U.S. Embassy/Bogotá and Colombian officials, the primary  reason for the increase in ground-fire hits in late 2002 was the aerial  eradication program’s success in reducing the illicit drug producers’ ability  to cultivate coca and opium poppy. To combat this success, U.S.  Embassy/Bogotá officials reported that the insurgents began   organizing and massing ground fire in front of the spray aircraft’s flight  path to force the planes to fly though a barrage of bullets and   using a greater variety of weapons against aerial eradication aircraft,  including some larger caliber weapons capable of penetrating armor and  hitting the aircraft at higher altitudes.
section_title: State Has Taken Several Actions to Address Operational Safety Concerns
paragraphs: State/INL and NAS have taken several actions to reduce the risk to the  aircraft on aerial eradication missions. Since January 2003, these actions  have primarily focused on improving the processes and procedures for  collecting and analyzing intelligence information that the U.S. Embassy  collects on insurgent locations and capabilities. Other actions include  coordinating spray operations more closely with the Colombian Army and  the Colombian National Police and ensuring that eradication aircraft are  protected to the extent possible from ground fire.
In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits on aerial  eradication aircraft in late 2002 and early 2003, the Colombian National  Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each  eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation  gunships that already accompanied every mission, and the NAS Director  directed spray operations away from areas where the hits were occurring.  In addition, throughout 2003 and early 2004, State/INL and NAS took  several actions to make greater use of intelligence information regarding  the ground threats to the eradication aircraft.
In January 2003, State/INL approved a NAS request to hire two  personnel as intelligence/security advisors. Their duties include  collecting and sharing threat information with U.S. Embassy, DynCorp,  and appropriate Colombian National Police and military officials to plan  aerial eradication operations. These two individuals began work in  August 2003. However, they did not have all the necessary security  clearances to handle certain U.S. Embassy intelligence information.  Nevertheless, they collected information from a variety of Colombian  military and police sources that was used in planning operations. To  address their lack of security clearances, in September 2003, the NAS  Director tasked another NAS employee to coordinate intelligence within  the U.S. Embassy until the two individuals receive their security  clearances.
In early 2003, the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá began reviewing its protocol for  gathering, utilizing, and sharing intelligence information to help ensure  that aerial eradication mission planners have the best available threat  assessment information. A revised protocol was approved in June 2003.  It defines intelligence requirements and sources, frequency of  intelligence updates, intelligence dissemination, and the use of  intelligence in planning missions at forward operating locations.  According to NAS and other U.S. Embassy personnel, the revised  protocol improved information sharing within the embassy and among  the embassy, DynCorp, and the Colombian military and police.
In September 2003, in accordance with the revised intelligence protocol,  the NAS Director began approving the areas where eradication missions  are planned. She reviews the intelligence information available and will  not allow missions in areas where insurgents are thought to be or where  large caliber weapons have been reported. Missions are not flown in  those areas until intelligence information reports that the areas are  relatively safe.
In October 2003, the Office of Aviation authorized DynCorp to hire six  personnel to gather and analyze intelligence for use in planning  eradication missions. According to DynCorp officials, they experienced  delays in filling these positions because of uncertainties regarding its  contract with State/INL. The first position was filled in March 2004,  and, as of June 2004, all six positions had been filled.
In November 2003, Colombian military and police at one operational site  instituted daily threat briefings before the next day’s aerial eradication  missions. According to U.S. Embassy and DynCorp officials, DynCorp  obtained the briefings primarily because the eradication unit was  collocated with the Colombian military. At the time of our visit in  January 2004, the DynCorp site manager said that eradication aircraft  flying missions from this site had not incurred any ground-fire hits for  2 months.
In addition, in late 2003, the NAS Director also approved an annual  eradication program plan showing when and where eradication missions  will occur throughout 2004 and what aircraft will be used on each of the  missions. For each target area, the plan details when intelligence on the  threat posed by insurgents and others should be collected, and when the  Colombian Army Counternarcotics Brigade may be needed to conduct  ground operations in support of eradication missions. According to NAS  and other U.S. Embassy officials, the plan was coordinated with the  Colombian military to complement its planned military actions for 2004  and, as a result, has strengthened the Colombian Army’s commitment to  support the aerial eradication program.
Moreover, to enhance the spray airplanes’ ability to withstand ground fire,  the Office of Aviation has ensured that the aircraft are protected to the  extent possible. All the spray aircraft have always had protective armor  around the cockpit and covering vulnerable fuel and oil lines. In addition,  State activated the ejection seats in the OV-10 when it acquired the aircraft  from the Department of Defense. The AT-802 spray planes are undergoing  additional modifications to further protect the pilot. Finally, the helicopters  also have added armaments to better protect them from ground fire.
To further reduce risks, NAS, Office of Aviation, and DynCorp officials told  us that eradication mission planners, site managers, or individual pilots can  cancel flights at any time without fear of reprisal if they feel the particular  mission may not be safe because of possible ground fire, maintenance  problems, or other safety concerns. During our visits to three operational  sites, we attended meetings with DynCorp pilots and mechanics where  NAS and Office of Aviation officials emphasized this point. Further, in  separate discussions with some of the pilots and mechanics, they  confirmed to us that they could opt out of a flight at any time without fear  of reprisal.
section_title: Resources for Aerial Eradication Increased, but State’s Planning and Budgeting Process Does Not Provide for All Needs
paragraphs: As the aerial eradication program in Colombia grew, State/INL substantially  increased the resources it provided. Funding for the aerial eradication  program in Colombia increased from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001  to over $100 million in fiscal year 2003. Estimated funding for fiscal year  2004 and proposed funding for fiscal year 2005 continue this upward trend.  In addition, the number of personnel directly associated with the program,  particularly in Colombia, increased; and the number of available spray  aircraft and helicopters also increased. However, State/INL does not plan  for the long-term costs of maintaining the aerial eradication program and  does not prepare a specific budget for the Office of Aviation that accounts  for all of its program needs. Nevertheless, Office of Aviation and DynCorp  managers said that the resources for day-to-day operations provided during  the period were sufficient, and that safety was never compromised.
subsections: section_title: Program Funding Increased
paragraphs: Funding provided through the Office of Aviation and NAS for the aerial  eradication program in Colombia has risen every year since 2001. As shown  in table 1, funding provided through the Office of Aviation increased  10 percent from 2001 to 2003, from $38 million to $41.8 million, and is  planned to increase an additional 20 percent for fiscal year 2005. Overall,  the Office of Aviation funds are used for the direct costs of DynCorp, which  provides aircraft maintenance and logistical support and many of the pilots  for the eradication program. NAS funds for the aerial eradication program  increased more than fivefold, from about $11 million in fiscal year 2001 to  more than $58 million in fiscal year 2003. NAS provides funds to support  DynCorp operations and for aircraft fuel, herbicide, and related support.  Most of this increase occurred to support the increased flying hours,  additional eradication aircraft, and multiple operating sites. Such increases  are planned to continue in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, as funding proposed  for fiscal year 2005 rises to more than $70 million.
section_title: Program Staffing Increased
paragraphs: Office of Aviation and DynCorp staff in Colombia directly associated with  the aerial eradication program increased from 179 at the end of fiscal year  2001 to 298 at the end of fiscal year 2003. The former NAS Director told us  that he supported increasing the number of Office of Aviation staff in  Colombia because doing so allowed more direct oversight of the program  as operations significantly expanded. The Office of Aviation Director also  stated that increasing the staff in Colombia allowed the office to better  ensure the safety and security of program operations and enhanced its  ability to oversee contractor operations. Table 2 illustrates the number of  staff assigned to the Office of Aviation by location.
During fiscal years 2001-03, the number of DynCorp personnel supporting  the Office of Aviation at Patrick Air Force Base increased from 159 to about  190. DynCorp officials were unable to provide exact numbers of staff who  were part of the eradication program versus those who supported other  Office of Aviation programs because many personnel are involved in more  than one program.
As illustrated in table 3, the number of DynCorp staff in Colombia directly  supporting the aerial eradication program increased from 176 in 2001 to 281  staff in 2003 and has further increased to 287 staff as of May 31, 2004. These  numbers include pilots and mechanics who rotate in and out of Colombia.  These personnel work 15 days in Colombia and then are relieved for   13 days by another group of pilots and mechanics who work 15 days. This  rotation overlap allows time for departing pilots and mechanics to brief the  newly arrived personnel.
section_title: Number of Aircraft Increased
paragraphs: From the end of fiscal year 2001 through May 2004, the number of spray  aircraft and helicopters supporting aerial eradication in Colombia  increased from 22 to 35, with 12 additional spray aircraft and 1 additional  helicopter assigned. The Office of Aviation uses three types of aircraft to  spray coca and poppy fields in Colombia—the OV-10, the T-65, and the AT- 802. The OV-10 is a Vietnam-era observation plane that was retrofitted to  carry herbicide and fly eradication missions. The T-65 and AT-802 are  newer aircraft designed for crop dusting and are widely used in the United  States. Although the Office of Aviation has 24 spray aircraft for use in  Colombia—11 OV-10s, 5 T-65s, and 8 AT-802s, some are usually at Patrick  Air Force Base for scheduled maintenance or training and at Kirtland Air  Force Base, New Mexico, for mountain-flying training. The exact number  of aircraft in Colombia varies throughout the year depending on  maintenance and training requirements.
The Office of Aviation also uses helicopters to support eradication  missions. On any given mission, spray aircraft are accompanied by at least  5 helicopters. Two Office of Aviation helicopter gunships and 2 or 3  Colombian National Police gunships provide protection from insurgent  fire, and 1 search and rescue helicopter is available to rescue  crewmembers in the event of an emergency. Table 4 illustrates the number  of Office of Aviation aircraft available for the aerial eradication program.
section_title: State/INL’s Planning and Budgeting Process Does Not Provide for All of the Office of Aviation’s Needs
paragraphs: State/INL does not develop a specific budget for the Office of Aviation  addressing all of its programs and does not plan for the long-term costs of  the Office of Aviation’s programs, such as providing for replacement  aircraft. As a result, State/INL sometimes uses funds from other programs  to pay for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Although Office of  Aviation and DynCorp managers said that the resources provided in fiscal  years 2001-04 (through May) were sufficient to carry out the increased  eradication activities safely, they noted that they did not always know how  much funding would be available or when, and that this has led to last- minute decisions and informal workarounds to avoid suspending or  curtailing eradication operations.
This situation is not new. In 1998, we reported that State and the U.S.  Embassy/Bogotá were not adequately prepared to manage increases in  aerial eradication. Specifically, when U.S. support for aerial eradication  increased in 1997, the unanticipated costs associated with the increase led  to the reallocation of funds from other NAS programs. At the time,  NAS/Bogotá reported that it reallocated $11 million from other activities,  including interdiction, demand reduction, and efforts designed to  strengthen law enforcement institutions in Colombia.
The situation continues. DynCorp officials told us that it nearly suspended  the eradication program because of a shortage of funds in 2002. But  because of delays in training Colombian Army helicopter mechanics and  pilots, DynCorp used funds allocated for that program to continue the  aerial eradication program. Further, DynCorp officials told us they also  have had to delay ordering needed parts because of the lack of funds. Some  of these parts—especially those for the older aircraft, such as the OV-10  spray planes and UH-1N helicopters that accompany the spray planes—are  in short supply and could be difficult to acquire. If the parts are not  available when needed, the aircraft cannot operate.
Office of Aviation’s funding comes from several State/INL sources,  including the Andean Counterdrug Initiative account, the International  Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, and supplemental  appropriations. However, although some of the Andean Counterdrug  Initiative funds are designated for the Office of Aviation, the funds are  divided among multiple country budgets and managed by each country’s  NAS. As a result, the Office of Aviation has to request those funds from the  respective NAS Director, which may adversely affect those programs. In  fiscal year 2003, State/INL reprogrammed more than $5 million from  programs in Bolivia, Peru, and Pakistan to fund the Office of Aviation  program in Colombia. In addition, the NAS Director in Colombia told us  that sometimes other funding priorities—such as the narcotics interdiction  program—conflicted with Office of Aviation program needs and delayed  funding for the aerial eradication program.
Furthermore, State/INL often does not receive funds for its programs,  including the aerial eradication program, until months after the start of the  fiscal year. For instance, fiscal year 2004 funds were not available until mid- June 2004 because of the time needed to address congressional inquiries  about how State/INL proposed to use the funding. State/INL officials said  they have used prior year funds or moved funds from one project to  another to satisfy the most critical needs until all funds are available. These  officials stated that the safety of their operations has not been  compromised but added that the uncertainty over funding availability has  caused an administrative burden.
In June 2004, our report on federal aircraft fleet management also noted  weaknesses in State/INL’s planning process. We reported that State/INL  had not developed a long-term fleet acquisition plan or performed a cost- benefit analysis that considered long-range aircraft replacement, mission  support, and other related costs. In addition, INL had not performed a life- cycle cost analysis of its aircraft, estimated future long-term mission  requirements, or identified the aircraft best-suited to meet those  requirements. As a result, according to State/INL officials, State has  delayed requesting funding for additional aircraft.
Finally, in October 2003, a State/INL internal review team began examining  the Office of Aviation’s programs. The review team has noted that the  Office of Aviation has operated effectively in five countries with high safety  and operational success rates. Given its aged aircraft, complex logistics  requirements, and aggressive flight schedule, the team commended Office  of Aviation staff for their professionalism and continued success under  trying circumstances. However, the team also has identified many of the  same concerns that we have raised—from generally poor strategic planning  to inadequate management and financial tools. The team has noted that  State/INL focuses on short-term planning to meet new missions and  changing requirements, with little input from the Office of Aviation.
State/INL officials have begun to address the shortcomings. For example,  State/INL and the Office of Aviation are preparing a strategic plan to  identify long-term mission costs for all of the Office of Aviation programs.  As part of this strategy, State/INL and the Office of Aviation have developed  a critical flight safety plan that includes projected costs to maintain the  Office of Aviation’s current aircraft and acquire additional aircraft to  sustain the program. State/INL also intends to enhance the Office of  Aviation’s contract oversight capability through training and the hiring of  additional contract administrators and budget specialists.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The aerial eradication program in Colombia is a difficult mission in a  hostile environment. Since 2001, the demands on the program have  increased significantly and the Office of Aviation’s resources for the  program have more than doubled. However, State/INL’s planning and  budgeting process for the Office of Aviation did not keep pace with the  growth of the Office of Aviation and the increasing complexity of its  mission. The current process does not fully serve State/INL’s or the Office  of Aviation’s present-day needs. As a result, the Office of Aviation’s short-  and long-term funding requirements have often been addressed through ad  hoc decisions. In particular, not having a strategic plan that identifies long- range needs, mission support, and other costs has prevented State/INL  from assessing future requirements and planning and budgeting for them.
The Office of Aviation will likely continue its operations in Colombia for  the foreseeable future. Further, it may be called on to extend its operations  to other parts of the world as illicit drugs continue to provide income to  insurgents and terrorists who pose a security threat to the United States  and its allies. However, without a planning and budgeting process that  systematically addresses the short- and long-term requirements of the  Office of Aviation’s programs, State/INL cannot ensure that the Office of  Aviation’s requirements are appropriately prioritized, long-term resource  needs are addressed, and funding is sufficient.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve State/INL’s process for providing resources to the Office of  Aviation, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Assistant  Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  to develop and implement a strategic planning and budgeting process that  addresses all of the program requirements for the Office of Aviation,  including the aerial eradication program in Colombia. The strategic plan  and budget should address the day-to-day operational needs of the Office of  Aviation’s programs, aircraft fleet refurbishment and eventual replacement,  and the resources needed to meet these requirements. The plan should also  be systematically updated as part of State’s annual budget cycle.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II). It  stated that the report provides a useful summary of the technical, planning,  and budgeting issues that may affect the Office of Aviation’s programs in  Colombia. State also expressed concern that the report suggests that  State/INL does not manage and plan for its aviation program requirements.  However, it agreed that a more comprehensive long-term planning and  budgeting process is needed and has taken some initial steps to this end.
We did not say that State/INL does not manage and plan for the Office of  Aviation’s programs. Rather, we stated that State/INL does not prepare a  specific budget for the Office of Aviation that accounts for all of its  program needs. In fact, State notes that State/INL is beginning to  institutionalize a more formal planning and budgeting process for the  Office of Aviation to address this shortcoming. According to State,  State/INL completed an “initial cut” of an Office of Aviation Strategic Plan  in April 2004, and also recently prepared a Critical Flight Safety Program to  extend the life of its aircraft fleet and an Office of Aviation Reorganization  Plan to hire more staff for strategic planning, budgeting, and financial  analysis. State adds that it has incorporated the safety program and  reorganization plan in State/INL’s fiscal year 2006 performance plan and  budget request.
These are critical components of a more systematic planning and budgeting  process. We believe that if State/INL follows through with its approach that  it will allow the Office of Aviation to prioritize its programs and, when  funding is limited or not readily available, make systematic decisions about  how to proceed.
In addition, State/INL and Office of Aviation officials provided technical  comments that we have incorporated into this report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to  interested congressional committees and the Secretary of State. We will  also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report  will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov, or contact Al Huntington, Assistant  Director, at (202) 512-4140 or HuntingtonA@gao.gov. Other key  contributors to this report were Ron Hughes, Reid Lowe, and Jim Strus.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine how the threat to the aerial eradication program changed  since 2001, we reviewed cables, memorandums, and reports prepared by  the Department of State/Bureau for International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), the Office of Aviation, and the U.S.  Embassy/Bogotá, Colombia. We also discussed the threat issue with  officials responsible for program oversight and implementation from  State/INL; State’s Narcotics Affairs Sections (NAS), the Office of Aviation,  and other offices at the U.S. Embassy; and DynCorp Aerospace Technology.
To determine what actions State had taken to address any operational  safety concerns, we examined cables; memorandums; and related  documents, including site inspections and accident reports, prepared by  State/INL, the Office of Aviation, and the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá. We also  interviewed officials from State/INL, the Office of Aviation, DynCorp, and  the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá (including the current NAS Director and her  predecessor) to obtain their views on the actions taken.
Similarly, to determine the resources provided by State/INL to support the  aerial eradication program in Colombia during fiscal years 2001-04  (through May 2004), we reviewed and analyzed various cables,  memorandums, and other relevant documents related to budget, staffing,  and aircraft prepared by State/INL in Washington, D.C.; the Office of  Aviation and DynCorp at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; and the U.S.  Embassy/Bogotá. We interviewed cognizant U.S. officials in Washington,  D.C., and Colombia and at Patrick Air Force Base about the adequacy of  the resources provided to meet aerial eradication missions. We also  discussed resource availability with the DynCorp project manager at  Patrick Air Force Base.
We traveled to Colombia in January 2004. In Colombia, we met with NAS  and other cognizant U.S. Embassy officials and with Office of Aviation and  DynCorp managers at their offices at El Dorado International Airport,  Bogotá. We also visited three operational sites—Popayan, San Jose del  Guaviare, and Tumaco—where spray operations were occurring. We  interviewed DynCorp site managers, pilots, and mechanics at each  location. At Tumaco, we also interviewed Colombian Marine Corps officers  who coordinated eradication activities with U.S., DynCorp, and Colombian  police officials.
To determine the reliability of the data provided, we interviewed officials at  State/INL, the Office of Aviation, the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá, and DynCorp to  determine how they collected and verified the data. To check the reliability  of data on the number of ground-fire hits and flying hours, we compared  information from two different sources at the U.S. Embassy and found it  similar. Further, to determine the reliability of the funding data used in this  report, we examined State financial management activity reports and  compared some of these data with similar information from our prior  reports addressing Office of Aviation activities. However, we did not audit  the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them. Finally, to  satisfy ourselves that the numbers of personnel and aircraft were reliable,  we examined monthly reports prepared by the Office of Aviation and  DynCorp. We discussed how the reports were compiled and resolved a few  discrepancies concerning the numbers of personnel with cognizant  officials at Patrick Air Force Base and in Bogotá. Based on our examination  of the documents we received and our discussions with State and DynCorp  officials, we concluded that these data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
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