Democracy Assistance: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities
Published: 2009-09-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2006- 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which has primary responsibility for promoting democracy abroad, implemented democracy assistance projects in about 90 countries. The Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) and the private, nonprofit National Endowment for Democracy (NED) also fund democracy programs in many of these countries. Partly to lessen the risk of duplicative programs, State recently initiated efforts to reform and consolidate State and USAID foreign assistance processes. GAO reviewed (1) democracy assistance funding provided by USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal year 2008; (2) USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate their democracy assistance; and (3) USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact of its democracy assistance. GAO analyzed U.S. funding and evaluation documents, interviewed USAID, State, and NED officials in the United States and abroad, and reviewed specific democracy projects in 10 countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Data available from State show total democracy assistance allocations of about $2.25 billion for fiscal year 2008. More than $1.95 billion, or about 85 percent of the total allocation, was provided to field-based operating units, primarily country missions. Although complete data on USAID funding per country were not available, USAID mission data, compiled by State and USAID at GAO's request, show that in a sample of 10 countries, most democracy funds are programmed by USAID. In the 10 countries, annual funding per project averaged more than $2 million for USAID, $350,000 for State DRL, and $100,000 for NED. In fiscal year 2008, more than half of State funding for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and NED funding for democracy programs was highest for China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan. USAID and State DRL coordinate to help ensure complementary assistance but are often not aware of NED grants. To prevent duplicative programs, State DRL obtains feedback from USAID missions and embassies on project proposals before awarding democracy assistance grants. State DRL officials generally do not participate in USAID missions' planning efforts; some State and USAID officials told GAO that geographic distances between State DRL's centrally managed program and USAID's country mission-based programs would make such participation difficult. Several USAID and State DRL officials responsible for planning and managing democracy assistance told GAO that they lacked information on NED's current projects, which they believed would help inform their own programming decisions. Although NED is not required to report on all of its democracy assistance efforts to State and there currently is no mechanism for regular information sharing, NED told GAO that it has shared information with State and USAID and would routinely provide them with information on current projects if asked. USAID uses standard and custom indicators to assess and report on immediate program results; USAID also conducts some, but relatively infrequent, independent evaluations of longer-term programs. The standard indicators, developed by State, generally focus on numbers of activities or immediate results of a program, while custom indicators measure additional program results. USAID commissions a limited number of independent evaluations of program impact. USAID mission officials told GAO that they did not conduct many independent evaluations of democracy assistance because of the resources involved in the undertaking and the difficulty of measuring impact in the area of democracy assistance. In response to a 2008 National Research Council report on USAID's democracy evaluation capacity, USAID has reported initiating several steps--for example, designing impact evaluations for six missions as part of a pilot program.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. government supports democracy promotion activities in every  geographic region of the world, including many countries where political  and civil rights are limited. In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), the agency primarily  responsible for providing democracy assistance abroad, implemented  democracy activities in about 90 countries. The Department of State’s  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) and the  National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a nongovernmental,  nonprofit organization funded through a congressional appropriation, also  supported U.S.-funded democracy assistance programs in many of these  countries.
In 2006, citing the risk of conflicting or redundant efforts and wasted  resources among U.S. foreign assistance programs, State initiated efforts  to reform and consolidate State and USAID foreign assistance processes.  These efforts included establishing the Office of the Director of Foreign  Assistance (State/F) to, among other duties, coordinate State’s, USAID’s,  and other U.S. foreign assistance efforts. To help target U.S.  government resources more efficiently and effectively, State/F developed  the Foreign Assistance Framework with five strategic objectives, one of  which—”Governing Justly and Democratically” (GJD)—encompasses  democracy assistance. In 2008, acknowledging a need to improve the  effectiveness of its democracy assistance programs, USAID’s Office of  Democracy and Governance commissioned a study by the National  Research Council to improve methods for evaluating the effectiveness and  impact of these programs. In July 2009, the Secretary of State announced  plans for a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review—a  comprehensive assessment of current approaches to diplomacy and  development intended to, among other things, strengthen coordination  between State and USAID and provide recommendations on better  evaluating impacts of U.S. foreign assistance.
As directed by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, this  report provides an overview of U.S.-funded international democracy  assistance efforts. Specifically, this report (1) describes democracy  assistance funding provided by USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal year  2008; (2) examines USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate their  democracy assistance activities to ensure complementary programming;  and (3) describes USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact  of its democracy assistance activities.
In conducting our work, we analyzed funding, planning, and programmatic  documents and data describing U.S. democracy assistance activities  provided by USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal years 2006 through  2008. We conducted audit work in Washington, D.C., and in three  countries—Indonesia, Jordan, and Russia—with large democracy funding  levels and assistance from several U.S. entities; in these three countries,  we met with USAID and State officials responsible for democracy  assistance programs, officials from nongovernmental organizations that  implement these programs, and country government officials in two of the  three countries we visited. We also collected information on democracy  programs in seven additional countries—China, Democratic Republic of  Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nicaragua, and Pakistan; as a result, we  collected detailed information on U.S. democracy programs in a total of 10  geographically diverse countries with large GJD funding levels and where  multiple U.S. agencies or organizations provide democracy assistance. We  excluded Iraq and Afghanistan from our sample, despite the large  democracy assistance funding levels there, because of the unique  circumstances in those countries. To obtain the views of USAID mission  officials in our 10 sample countries regarding interagency coordination  and project monitoring and evaluation, we conducted an e-mail survey of  all 35 USAID technical officers with responsibility for managing active  democracy and governance grants in these countries, receiving 31  responses, from April to June 2009 (a response rate of 89 percent). We also  interviewed State DRL policy and program officers responsible for  managing the bureau’s democracy grants in the 10 countries. In describing  USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact of its democracy  assistance activities, we focused our analysis on USAID’s projects because  they typically represented the majority of U.S.-funded assistance and  because State DRL and NED generally do not conduct impact evaluations.  We reviewed USAID performance reports for active projects, USAID  missions’ strategic assessments of democracy and governance, and project  evaluations in the 10 countries. We also reviewed findings from the 2008  National Research Council study of USAID democracy assistance  evaluation; however, we did not assess the study or USAID actions in  response to the study. (See app. I for a detailed discussion of our  objectives, scope, and methodology.)
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to September  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Foreign Assistance Reform
paragraphs: In January 2006, to better align foreign assistance programs with U.S.  foreign policy goals, the Secretary of State appointed a Director of Foreign  Assistance with authority over all State and USAID foreign assistance  funding and programs. In working to reform foreign assistance, the  Director’s office, State/F, has taken a number of steps to integrate State  and USAID foreign assistance processes. These steps have included,  among others, integrating State and USAID foreign assistance budget  formulation, planning and reporting processes. As part of the reform,  State/F, with input from State and USAID subject matter experts,  developed the Foreign Assistance Framework, with its five strategic  objectives, as a tool for targeting U.S. foreign assistance resources;  instituted common program definitions to collect, track, and report on  data related to foreign assistance program funding and results; and created  a set of standard output-oriented indicators for assessing foreign  assistance programs. State/F also instituted annual operational planning  and reporting processes for all State and USAID operating units.  Moreover, State/F initiated a pilot program for developing 5-year country  assistance strategies intended to ensure that foreign assistance provided  by all U.S. agencies is aligned with top foreign policy objectives in a given  country. These integrated processes are supported by two data  information systems, known as the Foreign Assistance Coordination and  Tracking System (FACTS) and FACTS Info.
In July 2009, the Secretary of State announced plans to conduct a  Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, intended in part to  maximize collaboration between State and USAID. According to State, this  review will identify overarching foreign policy and development  objectives, specific policy priorities, and expected results. In addition, the  review will make recommendations on strategy, organizational and  management reforms, tools and resources, and performance measures to  assess outcomes and—where feasible—impacts of U.S. foreign assistance.  The review will be managed by a senior leadership team under the  direction of the Secretary of State and led by the Deputy Secretary for  Management and Resources, with the Administrator of USAID and the  Director of the Policy Planning serving as co-chairs and with senior  representation from State and USAID. Although State has not announced  a formal time frame for producing a final report of the review’s results, a  senior State official indicated that the process would likely produce initial  results in early 2010.
section_title: Democracy Assistance and the Foreign Assistance Framework
paragraphs: Under the Foreign Assistance Framework developed by State/F in 2006,  the strategic objective GJD has four program areas—”Rule of Law and  Human Rights,” “Good Governance,” “Political Competition and  Consensus-Building,” and “Civil Society”—each with a number of program  elements and subelements. State/F’s information systems, FACTS and  FACTS Info, track funding allocated for assistance in support of GJD and  these four program areas. Table 1 shows the four program areas and  associated program elements.
section_title: Funding Allocations for Democracy Assistance
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, funds allocated for the GJD strategic  objective were provided for democracy assistance programs in 90  countries around the world. Almost half of all democracy funding over this  period was spent in Iraq and Afghanistan; the next highest funded  countries, Sudan, Egypt, Mexico, Colombia, and Russia, accounted for  more than 25 percent of the remaining GJD funding allocated to individual  countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the 20 countries with the  largest GJD allocations, 8 have been rated by Freedom House, an  independent nongovernmental organization, as not free; 8 have been rated  as partly free; and 4 have been rated as free. Figure 1 illustrates the  worldwide distribution of GJD funding, and table 2 shows funding levels  and Freedom House ratings for the 20 countries with the largest   with the largest  allocations.  allocations.
section_title: Key Entities Involved in Providing U.S.-funded Democracy Assistance
paragraphs: USAID, State DRL, and NED fund democracy assistance programs in  countries throughout the world. USAID’s and State DRL’s foreign  assistance programs are funded under the Foreign Operations  appropriation and tracked by State as part of GJD funding, while NED’s  core budget is funded under the State Operations appropriation and is not  tracked as part of GJD foreign assistance funding.
U.S. Agency for International Development. In fiscal years 2006  through 2008, USAID democracy programs operated in 88 countries  worldwide. USAID’s Office of Democracy and Governance, based in  Washington, D.C., supports USAID’s democracy programs worldwide, but  these programs are primarily designed and managed by USAID missions in  the field. USAID democracy programs cover a large variety of issues  including media, labor, judicial reforms, local governance, legislative  strengthening, and elections. USAID programs are managed by technical  officers, typically based in missions in the field, who develop strategies  and assessments, design programs, and monitor the performance of  projects by collecting and reviewing performance reports from  implementing partners and conducting site visits, typically at least  monthly.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. State DRL  implements the Human Rights Democracy Fund, established in fiscal year  1998, providing grants primarily to U.S. nonprofit organizations to  strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights, and build civil  society mainly in fragile democracies and authoritarian states. In 2006  through 2008, State DRL’s programs operated in 66 countries worldwide.  According to State, State DRL strives to fund innovative programs focused  on providing immediate short term assistance in response to emerging  events. In addition, State DRL can also fill gaps in USAID democracy  funding (see app. II). Unlike USAID, State DRL manages its democracy  grant program centrally. State DRL’s Washington-based staff monitor these  grants by collecting and reviewing quarterly reports from grantees and  conducting site visits, typically through annual visits to participating  countries.
National Endowment for Democracy. In 1983, Congress authorized  initial funding for NED, a private, nonprofit, nongovernmental  organization. NED’s core budget is funded primarily through an annual  congressional appropriation and NED receives additional funding from  State to support congressionally directed or discretionary programs. The  legislation recognizing the creation of NED and authorizing its funding,  known as the NED Act, requires NED to report annually to Congress on its  operations, activities, and accomplishments as well as on the results of an  independent financial audit. The act does not require NED to report to  State on the use of its core appropriation; however, State requires NED to  provide quarterly financial reporting and annual programmatic reporting  on the use of the congressionally directed and discretionary grants it  receives from State. NED funds indigenous partners with grants that  typically last for about a year. NED monitors program activities through  quarterly program and financial reports from grantees and site visits,  performed on average about once per year, to verify program and  budgetary information. About half of NED’s total annual core grant  funding is awarded to four affiliated organizations, known as core  institutes. The remaining funds are used to provide hundreds of grants to  NGOs in more than 90 countries to promote human rights, independent  media, rule of law, civic education, and the development of civil society in  general.
section_title: Data Show Largest Allocations for USAID Democracy Assistance
paragraphs: State/F information systems show allocations of approximately $2.25  billion in GJD funding to operating units in fiscal year 2008, with about 85  percent of this amount allocated for State and USAID field-based  operating units, primarily country missions. The estimated average  annualized funding for democracy assistance projects active in our 10  sample countries as of January 2009 was $18 million for USAID, $3 million  for State DRL, and $2 million for NED. In fiscal year 2008, more than half  of State DRL funding for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by  China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and most NED funding for democracy  programs went to China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan.
subsections: section_title: Most Democracy Funding Allocated to Field-Based Operating Units
paragraphs: Data from State/ F information systems, which report GJD allocations by  operating unit, indicate that most GJD funding allocated in fiscal year 2008  went to country programs. The State/F systems show that, of more than  $2.25 billion allocated for GJD in fiscal year 2008, approximately $306  million, or almost 15 percent, went to operating units in Washington, D.C.,  including USAID and State regional and functional bureaus and offices  such as State DRL. More than $1.95 billion, or about 85 percent of the total  allocation, was allocated to field-based operating units, primarily country  missions. (See fig. 2 for the allocation of GJD funding by type of operating  unit, for fiscal year 2008. See app. IV for a list of Washington, D.C.-based  and field-based operating units that received GJD funds in fiscal years  2006-2008.)
Figure 3 shows the distribution of democracy assistance funding for the  four GJD program areas.
Although State/F information systems enable reporting of democracy  assistance allocations to operating units and by program area, these  systems do not include funding information by implementing entity for the  years we reviewed—fiscal years 2006 through 2008. Consequently,  State/F data on GJD funding allocations to implementing entities— including the portion of allocations to field-based operating units that is  programmed by each implementing entity—are not centrally located.  However, in response to our request for information on USAID democracy  assistance funding, State/F and USAID compiled data provided by USAID  missions on GJD funding allocated to USAID for most country-based  operating units for fiscal years 2006 through 2008. According to these  data, USAID implements the majority of the democracy funding provided  in most countries. In addition, State/F data show that the largest portion of  GJD funding in fiscal year 2008 was allocated for the Good Governance  program area (see fig. 3). (App. II shows amounts of USAID, State DRL,  and NED funding distributed to all countries in fiscal years 2006-2008 as  well as each country’s Freedom House rating.)
section_title: USAID Funded Most Democracy Assistance in 10 Sample Countries
paragraphs: Estimated average annualized funding for all active democracy assistance  projects in the 10 sample countries was about $18 million per year for  USAID (78 percent of the total estimated average annual funding for all  three entities), $3 million for State DRL, and $2 million for NED.  Annualized funding per project averaged more than $2 million for USAID;  more than $350,000 for State DRL; and more than $100,000 for NED.  Project length averaged 3 years for USAID, 2 years for State DRL, and 1  year for NED (see fig. 4).
According to award data for USAID, State DRL, and NED, USAID provided  the majority of funding for democracy assistance projects that were active  as of January 2009 in 9 of the 10 sample countries (see fig. 5). USAID  funding ranged from 10 to 94 percent, with a median of 89 percent, of the  three entities’ total democracy assistance funding in each country.
USAID’s country-based missions are typically responsible for developing  democracy assistance activities based on country-specific multiyear  democracy assistance strategies, which they develop in the field with input  from embassy officials as well as USAID and State offices in Washington,  D.C. Once the strategic plan is approved, individual programs are designed  to fit into the overall priorities and objectives laid out in the strategic plan.  This program design includes the procedures to select the implementer  and to monitor and evaluate program performance.  USAID missions  typically collaborate with the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance  to develop and carry out in-depth democracy and governance assessments  to help define these strategies. These assessments are intended to  identify core democracy and governance problems and the primary actors  and institutions in a country. For example, the USAID mission in Indonesia  conducted a democracy and governance assessment in June 2008, which  formed the basis for a new 5-year democracy and governance strategy for  2009 to 2014.  The assessment, which was commissioned by the USAID  Office of Democracy and Governance and conducted by an outside  contractor, involved consultation with more than 100 Indonesian  government officials, civil society representatives, local academics, and  other international donors involved in democracy and governance in  Indonesia.
USAID democracy activities vary in each country, according to the  operating environment, needs and opportunities. For example, as of  January 2009, USAID’s democracy assistance portfolio in Lebanon  amounted to $24.3 million on an annual basis. The majority of this  funding—65 percent—was awarded for Good Governance activities such  as assistance to the Lebanese Parliament, and programs to improve  service delivery through municipal capacity building. In Indonesia, about  70 percent of USAID funding for projects active in January 2009 was for  Good Governance–related assistance to help the Indonesian government  with a major effort to decentralize its government.  Conversely, in Russia,  where USAID does not work closely with the Russian government, over 50  percent of USAID funding supported Civil Society programs and only  about 13 percent of funding supported active projects in the area of Good  Governance.
USAID implements approximately half of the value of its democracy  programs using grants and implements the remaining half using contracts.  Worldwide, USAID democracy contract funding tends to be much higher  than USAID grant funding; in fiscal year 2008, democracy contract funding  averaged about $2 million per project and democracy grant funding  averaged almost $850,000 per project. However, USAID implements more  than twice as many projects with grants than with contracts; thus,  although USAID contracts are higher in funding, USAID democracy  funding is fairly evenly split between contracts and grants. In fiscal year  2008, about 53 percent of USAID democracy funding was implemented  through contracts and 47 percent was implemented through grants. Table  3 shows USAID’s average global funding for democracy contracts and  grants in fiscal year 2008.
section_title: State DRL and NED Funded Democracy Assistance Activities in Select Countries
paragraphs: State DRL funded democracy programs in more than 30 countries in a  variety of program areas in fiscal year 2008, spending 57 percent of its  funds in Iraq and 28 percent in China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea. Funds  managed by State DRL totaled $157 million in fiscal year 2008, $75 million  of which was allocated through a supplemental appropriation for  democracy programs in Iraq. Only a small portion of State DRL-managed  funding in that year—$13 million of $157 million—was discretionary; most  of the funding was congressionally directed for specific countries or  issues. In planning resource allocations as well as solicitations for  statements of interest and requests for proposals from NGOs, State DRL  staff members consult with USAID and State regional bureaus, and review  country mission strategic plans and operational plans, according to a State  DRL official. Proposals are reviewed by a 7-person panel, which includes  representatives from State DRL, USAID, and State regional bureaus.  According to a State DRL official, the bureau does not prepare country  strategies for its democracy grant program because funding levels are  relatively small for most countries and fluctuate from year to year.
NED funded democracy programs in more than 90 countries in fiscal year  2008, spending 28 percent of its funds on programs in China, Iraq, Russia,  Burma, and Pakistan. Unlike USAID and State DRL, NED allocates  democracy funds relatively evenly across many countries, with average  per-country funding of almost $1 million in fiscal year 2008. In fiscal year  2008, NED’s funding allocation for democracy programs totaled $118  million. NED makes programming decisions on specific projects in the  context of its current 5-year strategic plan, published in 2007, and an  internal annual planning document. For each region of the world, the  annual planning document identifies regional priorities and critical  sectors—such as human rights and freedom of information—in which to  target assistance. According to a NED official, NED solicits proposals from  NGOs every quarter. After grant proposals are received, NED conducts an  internal review and the proposals that are selected are presented to the  NED board of directors for approval.
Figure 6 shows the countries where State DRL and NED, respectively,  allocated the largest amounts for democracy programs in fiscal year 2008.  (Dollars in millions)
section_title: USAID and State DRL Coordinate to Help Ensure Complementary Programs but Often Are Not Aware of NED Projects
paragraphs: To help ensure complementary programming and avoid duplication in  their respective democracy assistance programs, State DRL invites USAID  missions to review State DRL proposals for democracy assistance  projects. In addition, State DRL officials sometimes participate in USAID  missions’ planning for democracy assistance projects. However, USAID  and State DRL officials are often not aware of NED democracy assistance  projects, and although NED is not required to report on all of its  democracy assistance projects, State DRL officials and USAID mission  officials said that information on all NED’s active projects would be useful  in ensuring coordinated assistance. USAID officials participate in  embassy working groups or committees that review democracy assistance  projects, among others, to ensure that projects are complementary.
subsections: section_title: USAID Missions and State DRL Take Steps to Coordinate Democracy Assistance Programming
paragraphs: State DRL—which manages its democracy grant program centrally,  without embassy-based staff—solicits feedback from USAID missions in  both the development of State DRL’s solicitations for democracy programs  and the resulting project proposals from NGOs. As part of State DRL’s  formal process for evaluating democracy assistance project proposals,  USAID and State regional bureau representatives participate in State  DRL’s project review panels and vote on proposals, conveying feedback  from USAID country missions and embassies as to whether project  proposals complement or duplicate ongoing democracy assistance efforts  of USAID and other State entities. USAID officials at the 10 missions we  contacted generally agreed that this process helps to ensure  complementary programming between State DRL and USAID. In just one  instance, a USAID mission official remarked that a review panel had  approved a State DRL proposal for civil society training that could  duplicate an existing USAID project. According to a State DRL official, the  review panels take into account the missions’ and embassies’ feedback but  may vote to approve a project on the basis of other factors.
In addition, State DRL officials are involved in some aspects of USAID  missions’ democracy assistance planning. State DRL officials who manage  the bureau’s democracy grants participate with USAID’s Office of  Democracy and Governance in providing input on democracy funding  levels as a part of the budget formulation process and have the  opportunity to review and comment on all country operational plans,  according to State officials. State officials also noted that State DRL as a  bureau is involved in many strategic discussions about democracy  assistance that is provided through bilateral programs; however, State  DRL officers generally are not involved in USAID missions’ planning for  democracy assistance projects. According to State DRL officials  responsible for grants in our 10 sample countries, increased integration  into USAID’s planning process would better inform State DRL  programming decisions and ensure better coordination between State and  USAID. State DRL officials noted that this would also increase the  opportunity for State DRL to share its expertise as the bureau responsible  for U.S. human rights and democracy policy. However, State DRL and  USAID officials commented that increasing the level of coordination  between State DRL’s staff and USAID missions in USAID’s planning  process could be challenging, because State DRL staff typically have  resources to travel to countries only once per year as part of their grant  oversight duties. According to USAID officials, USAID selects its projects  based on multiyear democracy assistance strategies developed at country- based missions; the development of individual USAID democracy  assistance projects and selection of implementing partners also generally  takes place at the missions. USAID mission officials also noted that their  review process for selecting implementing partners, which takes place in  the field, generally lasts 10 to 15 days. In addition, a State/F official  observed that for most countries, State DRL’s level of funding for its grant  program would likely be too small to justify the additional staff time  necessary for increasing their involvement in USAID’s mission-based  planning processes.
Despite the challenges related to State DRL involvement in USAID  planning, we found that USAID missions included State DRL staff in joint  planning activities for 2 of our 10 sample countries. For example, the  USAID mission in Russia invited a State DRL official to participate in an  interagency visit to the country in 2008 to review current U.S. democracy  assistance efforts and consider areas for future programming. The State  DRL official involved in the visit noted that this effort helped her identify  potential areas where State DRL could target its assistance to complement  USAID’s larger, longer-term democracy program. In China—the only  country in our sample where State DRL funds a larger portfolio of  democracy projects than does USAID—a State DRL official participated in  vetting proposals for a USAID Rule of Law project in China that began in  2006. State DRL official did not participate in planning the solicitation for  the proposals, and USAID did not invite State DRL to participate in its  planning or proposal vetting for subsequent Rule of Law projects in China.  More recently, State DRL and USAID staff met with embassy staff in  Beijing to collaborate on their respective democracy assistance programs.  However, according to a State DRL official, it is not clear what role State  DRL will have in USAID’s future strategic planning process for assistance  in China or in reviewing USAID’s future democracy project proposals  there.
The development of joint State-USAID country assistance strategies  (CAS), which State/F is piloting as part of its foreign aid reform efforts, is  expected to improve coordination of State and USAID foreign assistance,  according to State/F officials. However, as we reported in April 2009, the  CAS, unlike USAID’s country strategies, contains only high-level  information, which could limit its impact on interagency collaboration.  State piloted this new strategic planning process in 10 countries in fiscal  year 2008 and was reviewing the results of the pilot as of August 2009.  Consequently, according to State and USAID officials, it is not yet clear  what form the new process will take; it also is not clear whether or how  the process may affect interagency coordination of democracy assistance  efforts.
section_title: USAID and State DRL Are Often Not Aware of NED Projects
paragraphs: USAID and State DRL officials responsible for managing democracy  assistance in our 10 sample countries have often lacked basic information  about NED’s democracy projects, which they believe would be useful in  ensuring coordinated assistance. No mechanism currently exists for the  routine sharing of information on NED’s core-funded projects outside the  Europe and Eurasia region. In 4 of our 10 sample countries, USAID  mission officials told us that they were not aware of NED-supported  activities in the country, despite the presence of several active NED  projects. Several USAID mission officials stated that more knowledge of  NED’s projects would be useful for ensuring that U.S.-supported  assistance is well coordinated. State DRL officials responsible for planning  and managing democracy grants in 7 of the 10 sample countries also told  us that they were not aware of NED’s current projects, and State DRL  officials responsible for managing projects in 5 of these 7 countries said  that receiving timely information on NED’s projects would improve  coordination and help reduce the possibility of duplicative programming.  In particular, State DRL officials stated that knowledge of NED’s activities  in a given country would help inform their own planning decisions  regarding which projects to support.
State has access to NED’s annual report to Congress on its core grant  activities. However, State DRL officials noted that they cannot rely on this  report for complete information about NED’s activities, because the report  may exclude many projects that go into effect after the report is published.  Although NED is under no obligation to report to State on the projects it  funds with its core U.S. appropriation, NED also regularly provides  information on its core-funded and non-core-funded projects to State in  some instances. For example, in addition to annually reporting, NED  provides quarterly updates on both proposed and active projects in former  Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries to State’s Office of the  Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE).  EUR/ACE officials stated that they circulate information on NED’s  proposed and active projects to the relevant USAID missions and U.S.  embassies, as well as to Washington counterparts in DRL and regional  State and USAID bureaus, to keep them informed and that they also solicit  any feedback that might be useful to NED on an advisory basis only.  EUR/ACE officials noted that because EUR/ACE exists expressly to  coordinate all foreign assistance in its geographic regions, staff resources  are available to collect and disseminate this information; according to  these officials, other geographic State bureaus may not have access to  such resources.
NED officials told us that, although there is no mechanism for routine  information sharing on NED projects, NED provides information to State  and USAID when asked. NED officials also said that the organization does  not oppose sharing with State or USAID information on projects that the  NED board has approved. The officials stated that NED would be willing  to provide project information routinely if State or USAID deemed it  useful. However, NED and State officials also indicated that any attempt to  increase NED’s sharing of information with State DRL should be designed  to minimize additional administrative burden and avoid straining State  DRL’s available staff resources.
section_title: USAID and Embassy Officials Collaborate Regularly
paragraphs: USAID mission and embassy officials involved in democracy assistance in  our 10 sample countries collaborate regularly, typically through working  groups or committees at posts. For example, in Indonesia, an  anticorruption working group that includes USAID, Department of Justice,  and State officials from the embassy’s political and economic sections  meets monthly at the embassy. According to USAID officials, this group  has discussed various anticorruption-related programs to ensure that their  efforts are complementary. The embassy in Indonesia also convenes a  parliamentary working group, a counterterrorism and law enforcement  working group, and an ad hoc working group on elections involving many  of the same representatives. In addition, during our review of 10 sample  countries, USAID officials in Russia told us of a working group that meets  at the embassy to coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance, including  democracy assistance. Also, according to State officials, the embassies in  Lebanon and Kosovo have each established a staff position devoted to  coordinating U.S. assistance. The State officials noted that these staff  have facilitated interagency coordination among the various U.S. programs  involved in democracy assistance in these countries.
In addition to participating in embassy-based interagency working groups  and committees, mission officials also reported regularly collaborating,  both informally and formally, with State officials at posts such as political  and public affairs officers. In particular, in our survey of 31 USAID mission  officials responsible for managing democracy assistance projects, 25  officials identified collaboration with the embassy political section, 21  officials identified collaboration with the embassy public affairs section,  and 10 officials identified collaboration with the embassy law enforcement  section as being at least somewhat important to their current projects. Our  survey respondents also showed that State officials often reviewed USAID  democracy project proposals. Specifically, 13 respondents identified the  embassy political section as being somewhat, moderately, or very involved  in reviewing USAID’s democracy project proposals. Six respondents  identified the embassy public affairs section, and two respondents  identified the embassy law enforcement section, as being at least  somewhat involved in reviewing the proposals.
section_title: USAID Uses Standard and Custom Indicators to Assess and Report Democracy Assistance Results and Provides Some Independent Evaluations of Impacts
paragraphs: USAID uses standard indicators to report quantitative information on  immediate results of its democracy assistance programs and develops  additional custom indicators to assess specific projects. In addition,  USAID sometimes commissions longer-term independent evaluations of  program impact. USAID reported taking several actions to improve its  evaluation capacity in response to the 2008 National Research Council  study that the agency commissioned.
subsections: section_title: USAID Uses Standard and Custom Indicators to Assess Immediate Results of Democracy Assistance
paragraphs: USAID uses standard indicators to assess and report the outputs—that is,  numbers of activities and immediate results—of its democracy assistance  programs. State/F developed the standard indicators with input from  subject matter experts in DRL and USAID’s Office of Democracy and  Governance. The indicators, which are linked to State/F’s program  objectives, areas, and elements, are intended to facilitate the aggregating  and reporting of quantitative information common to foreign assistance  programs across countries. For the GJD program areas, there are 96  element-level standard indicators (see table 4 for examples). USAID uses  the standard indicators in performance reports that summarize project  activities, achievements, and difficulties encountered.
According to USAID officials, in addition to using these standard  indicators to measure program outputs, USAID uses custom indicators for  virtually every project to measure program outputs, outcomes, and  impacts that are not captured by the standard indicators. Some USAID  officials we spoke with informed us that they use project-specific custom  indicators that are more outcome focused than the standard indicators.  For example, USAID’s Jordan mission uses customized project indicators  associated with each GJD program area; for the program area Good  Governance, one such indicator is “improved capacity of the legislative  branch and elected local bodies to undertake their stated functions.” Of  the USAID technical officers we surveyed, more than two-thirds (22 of 31)  said that custom indicators were very useful for monitoring and evaluating  projects and assessing impact. USAID management officials also noted the  importance of custom indicators in assessing the impact of democracy  assistance projects.
section_title: USAID Conducts Some Independent Evaluations of Longer-Term Democracy Assistance Impact
paragraphs: To complement the data collected with the standard and custom  indicators, USAID also commissions some independent evaluations of the  longer-term impact of its democracy assistance, although such evaluations  are relatively infrequent. State/F’s and USAID’s March 2009 joint  guidelines for evaluating foreign assistance state that mission staff may  decide whether and when to commission evaluations, based on  management needs among other considerations.
Evaluations of USAID assistance efforts have decreased in frequency since  the mid-1990s. In 1995, USAID eliminated a requirement that every major  foreign assistance project undergo midterm and final evaluations;  according to USAID officials, the requirement was eliminated because the  evaluation requirement of every project was seen as too resource intensive  relative to the value added. As a result of this change in policy, the number  of evaluations across all areas of development assistance dropped from  approximately 340 in 1995 to about 130 in 1999, according to a 2001  review.
Our analysis of documentation from the 10 sample countries shows 7  independent evaluations commissioned in fiscal years 2006 through 2008.  Some USAID mission officials we met with noted that they conducted few  independent evaluations of democracy assistance because of the  resources involved in the undertaking and the difficulty of measuring   impact in the area of democracy assistance. For example, one technical  officer responded on our survey that “behavior change is difficult to  measure and change in democracy is not seen overnight. It is a long  process difficult to measure.” In addition, senior USAID officials we spoke  to in the three countries we visited stated that it is difficult to demonstrate  causality between projects and improvements in a country’s democratic  status. On the other hand, USAID mission officials in all of our 10 sample  countries stated that evaluations are useful to monitoring, evaluating, and  identifying lessons learned. In addition, in our survey six of eight technical  officers who responded on the usefulness of independent evaluations  responded that they are either very or moderately useful to monitoring and  evaluation.
USAID officials at headquarters as well as at several missions we  contacted told us that because of the infrequency of independent  evaluations, USAID missions use, as a proxy for such evaluations, internal  program assessments of a country’s need for democracy programming  (called sector and subsector assessments). More than half of the USAID  technical officers we surveyed said that they found these assessments  moderately or very useful in monitoring and evaluating their current  projects. The three overall sectorwide assessments that we reviewed— for Kosovo, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—follow  the assessment structure recommended in USAID guidance, which  emphasizes strategic recommendations rather than program performance  results. In line with that guidance, these assessments provide general,  high-level comments on program results, rather than evaluative  information, and do not include either evidence supporting the results  statements or references to evaluation documents. We also examined 10  subsector assessments (not subject to the sector assessment guidance).  Three of the 10 included significant information about the results of  specific programs, while others included no reference or only a brief  reference to the results or outcomes of specific USAID democracy  projects.
section_title: USAID Reported Preliminary Steps to Improve Evaluation Capacity
paragraphs: Recognizing the need for evaluations of its democracy assistance  programs’ impacts, in 2008 USAID commissioned a review of its program  evaluation practices and problems by the National Research Council.  According to the report’s findings:    USAID has lost much capacity to assess the impact and effectiveness of its  programs.
The number of evaluations undertaken by USAID has declined.
The evaluations undertaken generally focus on implementation and  management concerns and have not collected the data needed for sound  “impact” evaluations.
Most current evaluations do not provide compelling evidence of the  impacts of the programs. Most evaluations usually do not collect data that  are critical to making the most accurate and credible determination of  project impacts.
Most evaluations tend to be informative and serve varied purposes for  project managers.
The National Research Council report outlines techniques for improving  the monitoring and evaluation of projects, developing methodologies for  retrospective case studies, and other means of collecting and analyzing  data that will allow USAID to more reliably gauge impact and improve  strategic planning and programming decisions. Following the release of  the report, the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance formed an  internal initiative to formulate how to implement the report’s  recommendations. According to USAID data provided to GAO, as of June  2009, the office reports taking several actions in response to these  recommendations.  Table 5 shows the National Research Council’s  recommendations and USAID’s reported actions.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Democracy promotion is one of five strategic objectives for U.S. foreign  assistance. Given the need to maximize available resources to pursue this  important objective, coordination among the entities providing democracy  assistance is essential to ensure that these efforts are complementary and  not duplicative. USAID and State DRL have processes in place to facilitate  coordination of their programs—for example, State and USAID officials in  the field review State DRL project proposals to minimize duplication, and  USAID officials regularly participate in interagency meetings with embassy  officials to help ensure that their agencies’ democracy-related projects are  complementary. However, lacking access to current information about  NED’s activities, State and USAID officials are constrained in their efforts  to fully coordinate their activities with NED’s in the many countries where  they and NED each provide democracy assistance. Although NED is not  required to report to State on all of its activities, NED regularly shares  useful information with State regarding democracy projects in the former  Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and NED indicated its willingness to  also routinely provide information on its projects in other countries.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance coordination of U.S.-funded democracy assistance efforts, and  in support of the Department of State’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and  Development Review, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the  USAID Administrator, while recognizing NED’s status as a private  nonprofit organization, work jointly with NED to establish a mechanism to  routinely collect information about NED’s current projects in countries  where NED and State or USAID provide democracy assistance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: USAID, State, and NED provided written comments regarding a draft of  this report, which are reprinted in appendixes V, VI, and VII, respectively.   State also provided technical comments separately, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
In its written comments, USAID agreed with our recommendation, noting  that its country missions and Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and  Humanitarian Assistance would benefit from information on current NED  projects. USAID also noted that the current coordination mechanism in  State’s Europe and Eurasia Bureau appears to be effective and may serve  as a model for worldwide efforts. In our report, we highlight the important  role of that bureau’s Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to  Europe and Eurasia, which exists expressly to coordinate all foreign  assistance in its geographic regions, but note that other geographic State  bureaus may not have access to the resources available to this office.   USAID’s written comments suggested several additions to our report’s  description of the agency’s planning and evaluation processes; we  incorporated these suggestions as appropriate.
State also concurred with our recommendation. State responded that  improved coordination with NED could enhance the effectiveness of U.S.  democracy assistance and agreed to work with USAID and NED to assess  how to develop a cost-effective and sustainable process for doing so.   State also noted that coordination and information sharing have improved  in recent years as a result of foreign assistance reform efforts and that  State DRL includes relevant U.S. agencies in its planning and program  solicitation process.
NED concurred with our recommendation as well, noting that sharing  information about its programs with other providers of democracy  assistance helps avoid duplication of effort and also helps providers  develop their program-related strategies. NED stated that a mechanism for  collecting information on its current projects should be designed to  minimize additional administrative burden and avoid straining staff  resources on all sides. In addition, NED highlighted the monitoring and  evaluation efforts it undertakes and referred to its March 2006 report to  Congress, Evaluating Democracy Promotion Programs, which we also  cite in our report’s discussion of challenges associated with assessing the  impact of democracy assistance.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, the Acting Administrator of USAID,  and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available on GAO’s  Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions  about this report, please contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or  gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.   Individuals who made key contributions to this report are listed in  appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) describe democracy assistance funding  provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and  the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Labor and Human Rights  (State DRL), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in fiscal  year 2008; (2) examine USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate  their democracy assistance activities to ensure complementary  programming; and (3) describe USAID efforts to assess results and  evaluate the impact of its democracy assistance activities. To accomplish  our objectives, we analyzed funding, planning, and programmatic  documents describing U.S. democracy assistance activities provided by  USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal years 2006 through 2008. We  conducted audit work in Washington, D.C., and in three countries:  Indonesia, Jordan, and Russia. We also collected information on  democracy programs in the following seven additional countries: China,  Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nicaragua,  and Pakistan. In total, we collected detailed information on U.S.  democracy programs in 10 countries.
We selected these 10 countries to reflect geographic diversity and provide  examples of countries with significant levels of U.S. funding for the  strategic objective Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) and that  have multiple U.S. or U.S.-funded entities providing democracy assistance,  such as USAID, State DRL, and NED. However, this sample of 10 countries  is not intended to be representative of all countries receiving U.S.  democracy assistance. Moreover, we did not include Iraq and Afghanistan  in our sample, despite the very large levels of U.S. democracy assistance  funding provided there, because of the unique circumstances in these two  countries.
In the three countries we visited, we met with USAID officials responsible  for democracy assistance programs, selected non-governmental  organizations receiving USAID, State, and NED grants or contracts to  provide democracy assistance, and country government officials in  Indonesia and Jordan. For all 10 countries in our sample, we interviewed  the USAID Democracy and Governance directors at the USAID missions  (either in person or by telephone) and administered a survey to 31 USAID  technical officers with responsibility for managing active democracy and  governance grants in these countries. We also interviewed State DRL  policy and program officers responsible for managing the bureau’s  democracy grants in the 10 countries.
To obtain the views of USAID mission officials in our 10 sample countries  regarding interagency coordination and project monitoring and evaluation,  we conducted an e-mail survey of all 35 USAID technical officers with  responsibility for managing active democracy and governance grants in  these countries, receiving 31 responses, from April to June 2009 (a  response rate of 89 percent). Our survey included questions on  collaboration with other U.S. government agencies, overlap of USAID  programs with those of other agencies, cooperation with implementing  partners, site visit activities, and monitoring and evaluation practices. We  pretested our survey with seven technical officers in Indonesia, Jordan,  and Russia. In collecting and analyzing the survey data, we took steps to  minimize errors that might occur during these stages.
To describe the funding levels for U.S. democracy assistance for each  entity involved in these activities, we collected funding allocation data.  From State/F we collected and analyzed data on GJD funding allocations  to each operating unit from fiscal years 2006 through 2008, which was  generated using the FACTS Info database. Because State/F data systems  do not include GJD funding by implementing agency, State/F and USAID  compiled data at our request on GJD funding allocated to USAID for each  country operating unit for fiscal years 2006 through 2008. We also  obtained funding allocation data by country for fiscal years 2006 through  2008 directly from State DRL and NED. We also collected funding data on  all democracy-related Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) threshold  grants directly from MCC and available funding information on  democracy-related assistance provided by State’s Middle East Partnership  Initiative (MEPI) and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs (State INL).
To obtain information on active democracy programs in our 10 sample  countries, we contacted the USAID mission in each country to obtain a list  of all projects active during January 2009 and the corresponding funding  obligations for each project. In addition, we contacted State DRL and NED  to obtain lists and respective funding levels for all active projects in those  10 countries. To compare these projects with varying duration and funding  levels, we annualized the funding of each project and portfolio.
Specifically, we based the annualized funding of active projects on the  average monthly cost of each project (total project funding divided by the  length of the project in months), multiplied by 12; and we summed the  annualized funding for each project to obtain the annual value of the  USAID, State DRL, and NED portfolios.
To assess the reliability of the global funding information on U.S.  government democracy assistance from the F database, we checked that  the congressionally appropriated amount for GJD in fiscal years 2006  through 2008 matched the amounts provided to us by State/F. To assess  the reliability of the country-level data provided by State/F on GJD  allocations to USAID at country missions in fiscal years 2006-2008, we  compared these data to the information USAID missions provided to us  directly for our 10 sample countries. We also discussed with State/F how  they conducted this data call and data reliability issues. Regarding the  State DRL data we use in this report, State DRL officials noted that the  data provided on funding levels for each country are based on individual  grant awards. Correspondingly, to verify both the country-level and  project-level data, we compared State DRL’s data to information in copies  of grant agreements of all active State DRL projects in the three countries  we visited (Jordan, Russia, and Indonesia). To verify the reliability of the  USAID data on individual active democracy programs we received from  USAID missions for our 10 sample countries, we compared the dollar  totals of projects contained in the lists they provided us against data on a  set of 47 projects detailed by the 31 technical officers we surveyed. To  assess the reliability of the NED project-level data for the 10 sample  countries, we compared them to project-level data contained on the NED  Web site. We found that all data used in this report are sufficiently reliable  to present the general levels of democracy funding globally and in  individual countries and to present the relative size of project portfolios  between USAID, State DRL, and NED.
To assess coordination between USAID, State DRL, and NED, we  interviewed responsible officials from these three entities and selected  grantees and contractors during our field work in Indonesia, Jordan, and  Russia to obtain their views on the coordination mechanisms to ensure  complementary programming and avoid duplication. For the broader  sample of 10 countries, including the 3 countries we visited, we reviewed  project descriptions for all active democracy grants and contracts funded  by USAID, State DRL, and NED. We also included questions on  interagency coordination and examples of duplication in our survey of  USAID technical officers as well as interviews of USAID mission and State  DRL officials.
In assessing U.S. reporting and evaluation efforts, we focused our analysis  on USAID efforts and projects since they typically represented the  majority of U.S.-funded assistance. We interviewed agency and  organization officials, as well as selected implementing partners during  our field work in Indonesia, Jordan, and Russia to obtain their views on  reporting and evaluation efforts. In our survey of technical officers, we  included questions on reporting and evaluation practices. We reviewed  selected quarterly and final performance reports of USAID-funded  democracy projects in the 10 countries, which are required of USAID’s  implementing partners. We also reviewed democracy and governance  assessments for the 10 countries, which are conducted as part of USAID  missions’ strategy development and project planning efforts. We also  discussed the use of performance indicators with USAID, including  standard indicators required by State and custom project-specific  indicators developed by USAID missions and their implementing partners.  In addition, we reviewed USAID assessments to determine the extent to  which these assessments provide program results. Moreover, we reviewed  independent evaluations from our 10 sample countries completed in fiscal  years 2006 through 2008. We did not review State DRL and NED practices  for assessing results and evaluating impact, because their programs are  small and short term relative to USAID’s and because they generally do not  conduct independent evaluations of their activities’ impact. According to  State DRL officials, State DRL recommends that its grantees conduct  independent external evaluations as part of individual grant awards but  has not undertaken standard independent evaluations of democracy  assistance at the country or thematic level. NED commissions periodic  independent evaluations of clusters of programs but does not evaluate  every grant. In addition, we reviewed recent studies that discuss the  challenges associated with measuring impact of democracy assistance. In  particular, we complemented our findings from interviews and document  reviews with findings from the National Research Council study of USAID  evaluation capacity. We did not assess the quality or comprehensiveness  of this study; we also did not assess USAID’s actions since June 2009 in  implementing recommendations from this study, because these actions are  preliminary.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to September  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Country Funding Levels and Freedom House Ratings
paragraphs: Table 6 shows the USAID, State DRL, and NED democracy funding  allocated to each country from fiscal years 2006 through 2008. This table  demonstrates that USAID democracy funding is substantially larger than  State DRL and NED funding in most countries. Not including Iraq,  Afghanistan, and Pakistan, USAID has the majority of funding in 93  percent of countries where USAID has an active portfolio. However, State  DRL or NED provides democracy assistance in over 20 countries where  USAID funding is not provided. In addition, State DRL democracy funding  tends to be larger in countries with lower USAID funding, such as in China  and Iran, or where USAID funding for democracy assistance is not  provided, such as North Korea or Syria, consistent with State DRL’s focus  on filling in the gaps in USAID democracy funding.
In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, almost 30 percent of all GJD funds were  allocated for democracy activities in Iraq, which is the largest portion of  democracy assistance funds allocated to any country over this period. A  large and increasing portion of GJD funds are allocated to democracy  programs in Afghanistan as well. The percentage of GJD funds allocated to  Afghanistan rose from 6 percent in fiscal year 2006, 14 percent in fiscal  year 2007, to 24 percent in fiscal year 2008. In fact, in fiscal year 2008,  there were more GJD funds allocated to democracy programs in  Afghanistan than any other country. Together, GJD funds allocated to Iraq  and Afghanistan comprised over 40 percent of all GJD funds in fiscal years  2006 through 2008.
In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, total democracy assistance funding  increased by 29 percent. However, when excluding Iraq and Afghanistan,  which account for nearly half of all democracy spending, democracy  funding only rose 20 percent. In addition, not including funding for Iraq  and Afghanistan, the 10 countries with the highest GJD funding from fiscal  years 2006 to 2008 comprised almost half of the remainder of GJD funding  allocated to individual countries over that time period (see table 7).
section_title: Appendix III: Democracy Assistance Provided by MEPI, State INL, and MCC
paragraphs: The Department of State’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and  Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State  INL) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) provide  democracy assistance in a much narrower set of countries than USAID,  State DRL or NED programs.
MEPI, part of State’s Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, was launched in  December 2002 as a presidential initiative to promote reform, foster  democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, and serve as a tool to  address violent extremism. MEPI programs are focused in 17 countries  and are managed from MEPI’s office in Washington, D.C., as well as from  regional offices in Abu Dhabi and Tunis. MEPI programs are organized  generally into four areas, two of which—political participation and  women’s empowerment—are characterized as GJD assistance; MEPI  funding for these areas in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 totaled about  $110 million. Unlike USAID and State DRL programs, which are generally  focused on individual countries, MEPI programs are often cross-cutting  regional programs that cover a number of different countries.  Consequently, it is not possible to identify MEPI funding by country. In  addition to providing larger grants in response to specific solicitations,  MEPI provides a number of local grants each year directly to organizations  working at the community level. For instance, MEPI’s local grants program  in Jordan provides funds to less experienced NGOs to increase the NGOs’  capacity and help them become eligible for future funding from larger  donors such as USAID. Grant officers in the MEPI office in Washington,  D.C., monitor projects through reviews of grantee quarterly reports and  rely on staff in the regional offices and embassy-based MEPI coordinators  to conduct site visits and coordinate with related USAID assistance  programs.
subsections: section_title: State INL
paragraphs: State INL’s programs within the GJD framework focus on institution  building in the criminal justice sector. State’s FACTS database does not  break out State INL’s funding for GJD programs in every country;  however, according to a State INL official, the bureau managed $290  million in GJD funding worldwide in fiscal year 2008, directing the  majority of these funds to Afghanistan, Colombia, and Iraq. State INL’s  programs support reforms such as reform of criminal procedures codes  and promotion of adversarial and evidentiary trial principles; training and  technical assistance for judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys; and  anticorruption programs. A wide variety of U.S. law enforcement and  regulatory agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and international  assistance agencies implement State INL’s programs. For example, State  INL funds training of prosecutors through the Department of Justice’s  Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training.  Embassy Law Enforcement Sections oversee State INL programs  implemented in the field and they coordinate democracy assistance with  USAID through embassy-based interagency working groups.
MCC is a U.S. government corporation that provides assistance through  multiyear compact agreements with countries that demonstrate  commitment to reducing poverty and stimulating economic growth, in part  by strengthening their democratic institutions and processes. MCC also  funds “threshold programs,” intended to help countries that do not qualify  for compact assistance to achieve eligibility. During 2008, MCC had  programs providing democracy-related assistance, such as support for  anti-corruption and local governance, in 16 countries. Although these  threshold grants fit within State’s definition of GJD, State does not track  these activities or funding. USAID has primary responsibility for  overseeing the implementation of MCC’s threshold programs. USAID  monitors MCC threshold programs similarly to its own democracy and  governance programs, through quarterly and end-of-project reporting by  implementing partners and site visits by technical officers based in USAID  missions in the field. In addition, USAID submits quarterly reports on  threshold projects to MCC. According to USAID officials we met with in  Indonesia and Jordan, management of the MCC threshold projects by  USAID mission-based staff—former or current USAID democracy and  governance technical officers—facilitated effective coordination with  USAID’s democracy and governance programs.
MCC has threshold projects related to democracy in select countries that  are high in funding (see table 8). For example, in Indonesia, MCC funded a  2-year, $35 million threshold project, which represents a large amount of  funding when compared to annual funding of $28 million for the USAID  democracy and governance portfolio in Indonesia, $1.1 million for State  DRL’s grant program, and $1.6 million for the National Endowment for  Democracy.
section_title: Appendix IV: Listing of Field-Based and Washington, D.C.-Based Operating Units
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated September 17,  2009.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We have incorporated information provided in USAID’s letter  regarding its democracy strategic planning efforts into our report as  appropriate. 2.  As we state in our discussion of scope and methodology, we did not  review State DRL’s and NED’s evaluation efforts because their  programs are small and short-term relative to USAID’s and because  they generally do not conduct independent evaluations of their  activities’ impact. 3.  We have incorporated evaluation information provided in USAID’s  letter into our report as appropriate.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the National Endowment for Democracy
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Leslie Holen, Assistant Director;  Diana Blumenfeld; Howard Cott; David Dornisch; Reid Lowe; Grace Lui;  and Marisela Perez made key contributions to this report. Etana Finkler  provided technical support.