Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces
Published: 2006-12-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining these problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq and DOD's increasing use of contractors to support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on review under the Comptroller General's statutory authority. Specifically, GAO's objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces since our 2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and interviewed military and contractor officials both at deployed locations and in the United States.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since the mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces. Also, while DOD's new guidance is a noteworthy step, a number of problems we have previously reported on continue to pose difficulties for military personnel in deployed locations. For example, DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. For example, when Multi-National Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed to bases in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being performed. While a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in more demanding contracting environments in deployed locations presents unique difficulties. Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing procedures to systematically collect and share its institutional knowledge using contractors to support deployed forces. As a result, as new units deploy to Iraq, they run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to build on the efficiencies others have developed during past operations that involved contractor support. Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or professional military education. The lack of training hinders the ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight personnel to manage and oversee contractors in deployed locations. Despite DOD's concurrence with our previous recommendations to improve such training, we found no standard to ensure information about contractor support is incorporated in pre-deployment training.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and  services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale of contractor support  the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on today in locations such as Iraq  and elsewhere throughout Southwest Asia has increased considerably  from what DOD relied on during previous military operations, such as  Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and in the Balkans. Moreover,  DOD’s reliance on contractors continues to grow. The Army alone  estimates that almost 60,000 contractor employees currently support  ongoing military operations in Southwest Asia. By way of contrast, an  estimated 9,200 contractor personnel supported military operations in the  1991 Gulf War. Similarly, the spending on contractors supporting  deployed forces is significant. For example, spending on DOD’s single  largest contract supporting U.S. forces in Southwest Asia—the Army’s  Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)—was about $15.4 billion  between 2001 and 2004. Today, contractors provide deployed U.S. forces  with communication services; interpreters who accompany military  patrols; base operations support (e.g., food and housing); weapons  systems maintenance; intelligence analysis; and a variety of other support.  Many of these contractors live and work side by side with their military  counterparts and share many of the same risks and hardships.
Since 1997, we have reported on DOD’s management and training  shortcomings related to its use of contractor support to deployed forces.  In June 2003, we issued our first comprehensive review of DOD’s  management and oversight of contractor support to deployed forces,  focusing our efforts in the Balkans and Southwest Asia. We reported that  (1) DOD used contractors for a wide range of services; (2) DOD and the  services had not identified essential services provided by contractors or  developed backup plans for those services; and (3) guidance and contract  language and oversight varied within DOD and the services, creating  challenges that might hinder the efficient use of contractors. We made  several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve DOD’s  guidance, training, and contractor visibility at all levels of command,  recommendations that DOD broadly agreed with. Moreover, we have  established that clear policies, procedures, criteria, and management  oversight are needed to help agencies use resources effectively and  efficiently to meet organizational and program objectives. However, our  audit work on related subjects since 2003 indicated that DOD continued to  face difficulties regarding its use of contractors to support deployed  forces.
Because of continued congressional interest in DOD’s use of contractors  to support deployed forces, we prepared this report under the Comptroller  General’s statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.  Specifically, our objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has  improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting  deployed forces since our last comprehensive review of this issue in 2003.  We focused our efforts in Iraq and elsewhere in Southwest Asia.
To address our objective, we met with and obtained documentation from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and service  headquarters officials to review changes to key DOD and service guidance  and obtain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts in addressing  the issues raised in our 2003 report. We visited select DOD components  based on their responsibilities for contract management, such as the  Defense Contract Management Agency, and various service commands in  the United States, including the Army Materiel Command, to discuss their  roles in managing and overseeing contractors in deployed locations. We  also interviewed staff officers from six combat units that had been  deployed to Iraq between 2003 and 2006 to discuss their experiences with  contractors at deployed locations. We traveled to Iraq and Kuwait to meet  with deployed combat units, installation commanders, headquarters  personnel, and other military personnel responsible for contracting and  contract management at deployed locations. In addition, we met with 26  U.S. and foreign contractors providing a variety of services to DOD at  deployed locations to discuss their perspectives on contracting and  contract management issues. We conducted our review from August 2005  through October 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Details on our scope and methodology are contained in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the early 1990s, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to meet  many of its logistical and operational support needs during combat  operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance missions,  ranging from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and operations in the  Balkans (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) to Afghanistan and Iraq. Factors that  have contributed to this increase include reductions in the size of the  military, an increase in the number of operations and missions  undertaken, and DOD’s use of increasingly sophisticated weapons  systems. Depending on the service being provided by contractors,  contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, host country nationals, or  third country nationals. Contracts supporting weapons systems, for  example, often restrict employment to U.S. citizens, while contracts  providing base operations support frequently employ host country or third  country nationals.
Contracts supporting deployed forces typically fall into three broad  categories—theater support, external support, and systems support.  Theater support contracts are normally awarded by contracting agencies  associated with the regional combatant command, for example, the U.S.  Central Command or service component commands, such as the U.S.  Army Central Command, or by contracting offices at deployed locations  such as in Iraq. Contracts can be for recurring services—such as  equipment rental or repair, minor construction, security, and intelligence  services—or for the one-time delivery of goods and services at the  deployed location. External support contracts are awarded by commands  external to the combatant command or component commands, such as the  Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Under  external support contracts, contractors are generally expected to provide  services at the deployed location. LOGCAP is an example of an external  support contract. Finally, systems support contracts provide logistics  support to maintain and operate weapons and other systems. These types  of contracts are most often awarded by the commands responsible for  building and buying the weapons or other systems.
The individual services and a wide array of DOD and non-DOD agencies  can award contracts to support deployed forces. Within a service or  agency, numerous contracting officers, with varying degrees of knowledge  about how contractors and the military operate in deployed locations, can  award contracts that support deployed forces. According to DOD  estimates, in 2005 several hundred contractor firms provided U.S. forces  with a wide range of services at deployed locations. Figure 1 illustrates the  broad array of contractor services being provided in Iraq and the DOD  agency that awarded each contract.
The customer (e.g., a military unit) for these contractor-provided services  is responsible for identifying and validating requirements to be addressed  by the contractor as well as evaluating the contractor’s performance and  ensuring that contractor-provided services are used in an economical and  efficient manner. In addition, DOD has established specific policies on  how contracts, including those that support deployed forces, should be  administered and managed. Oversight of contracts ultimately rests with  the contracting officer who has the responsibility for ensuring that  contractors meet the requirements set forth in the contract. However,  most contracting officers are not located at the deployed location. As a  result, contracting officers appoint contract oversight personnel who  represent the contracting officer at the deployed location and are  responsible for monitoring contractor performance. How contracts and  contractors are monitored at a deployed location is largely a function of  the size and scope of the contract. Contracting officers for large-scale and  high-value contracts such as LOGCAP have opted to have personnel from  the Defense Contract Management Agency monitor a contractor’s  performance and management systems to ensure that the cost, product  performance, and delivery schedules comply with the terms and  conditions of the contract. Defense Contract Management Agency officials  delegate daily oversight responsibilities to individuals drawn from units  receiving support from these contractors to act as contracting officer’s  representatives for specific services being provided. For smaller contracts,  contracting officers usually directly appoint contracting officer’s  representatives or contracting officer’s technical representatives to  monitor contractor performance at the deployed location. These  individuals are typically drawn from units receiving contractor-provided  services, are not normally contracting specialists, and serve as contract  monitors as an additional duty. They cannot direct the contractor by  making commitments or changes that affect price, quality, quantity,  delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract. Instead, they act as  the eyes and ears of the contracting officer and serve as the liaison  between the contractor and the contracting officer. Table 1 provides  additional information on the contract management roles and  responsibilities of key DOD personnel.
section_title: While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long- standing Problems Continue to Hinder DOD’s Management and Oversight of Contractors at Deployed Locations
paragraphs: A number of long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD’s  management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Although  DOD has issued departmentwide guidance on the use of contractors to  support deployed forces and some DOD components have taken some  actions to improve management and oversight of contractors, there is no  DOD-wide effort in place to resolve these long-standing problems. These  problems include a lack of visibility over the totality of contractor support  at deployed locations; a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel; the  failure to collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of  contractors at deployed locations; and limited or no training of military  personnel on the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment  training or professional military education.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Some Noteworthy Steps to Improve Its Policy and Guidance on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces, but Lack of High-Level Action Hinders Implementation
paragraphs: In June 2003, we recommended that DOD take steps to improve its  guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces. Our  report noted the lack of standardized deployment language in contracts  that support or may support deployed U.S. forces. Since then, in June  2005, DOD amended its acquisition regulations, the Defense Federal  Acquisition Regulation Supplement, by providing DOD-wide policy and a  contract clause to address situations that may require contractors to  accompany U.S. forces deployed outside the United States. Our 2003  report also noted a lack of DOD-wide guidance regarding DOD’s use of  and responsibilities to contractors supporting deployed forces. Since then,  DOD has taken steps to improve its guidance by issuing the first DOD-wide  instruction on contractor support to deployed forces. Specifically, in  October 2005, DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41, entitled Contractor  Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces, which states,  among other things, that it is DOD policy to    coordinate any proposed contractor logistic support arrangements that  may affect Combatant Commanders’ operational plans and operations  orders with the affected geographic Combatant Commands,    ensure contracts clearly and accurately specify the terms and conditions  under which the contractor is to perform and describe the specific support  relationship between the contractor and DOD, and    maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying with the force  and contract capability information in a joint database.
DOD Instruction 3020.41 provides guidance on a wide range of contractor  support issues. For example, the instruction provides guidance on when  contractors can be used to provide security for DOD assets, when medical  support can be provided to contractors, and commanders’ responsibilities  for providing force protection and security to contractors. In addition, the  instruction references a number of existing policies and guidance that may  affect DOD’s responsibilities to contractors supporting U.S. forces at a  deployed location. However, the instruction does not address a number of  problems we have raised in previous reports. For example, although the  instruction addresses the need for visibility over contractors, it does not  address the need to provide adequate contract oversight personnel, to  collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of contractors at  deployed locations, or to provide pre-deployment training on the use of  contractor support.
While issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41 represents a noteworthy  improvement to DOD’s guidance on the use of contractor support to  deployed forces, we found little evidence that DOD components are  implementing the guidance. Moreover, Congress has concerns over  implementation of the instruction as evidenced by a provision in the  Conference Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2007 requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit to  Congress a report on the department’s efforts to implement the  instruction. DOD Instruction 3020.41 assigns responsibility for  monitoring and managing the implementation of the instruction to the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness  (within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics). However, the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness is responsible for several  policy areas including supply chain management and transportation  policy. A number of assistant deputy under secretaries serve as functional  experts responsible for these areas. For example, the Assistant Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation Policy) serves as the principal  advisor for establishing policies and providing guidance to DOD  components for efficient and effective use of DOD and commercial  transportation resources. However, no similar individual is responsible  primarily for issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces,  including implementation of the instruction. According to senior officials  within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics  and Material Readiness, given the multiple issues the office is responsible  for, addressing contractor support to deployed forces issues is a lower  priority.
Consequently, at the time of our review we found that few measures had  been taken by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for  Logistics and Material Readiness to ensure that DOD components were  complying with DOD Instruction 3020.41. For example, a senior official  with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence told us  that the office was not aware of its responsibility under the instruction to  develop and implement, as required, procedures for counterintelligence  and security screenings of contractors, until our inquiry regarding their  compliance with that requirement. Similarly, a senior Joint Staff official  involved in the issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41 expressed concerns  that only some of the senior officials who needed to know about the  instruction had been made aware that it was issued.
Instead, we found that working groups of subject matter experts within  the Joint Staff and the services have begun to address the instruction’s  requirements. For example, in May 2006 a working group began to draft a  new joint publication that provides guidance on meeting the requirements  of DOD Instruction 3020.41, as well as addresses other contractor support  issues. As another example, beginning in April 2006 the Joint Staff  Directorate of Logistics organized a joint contingency contract  management working group consisting of representatives from each of the  military services, the Joint Staff, and various DOD components that meets  periodically to discuss issues related to implementing the instruction’s  requirement to maintain by-name accountability of contractor personnel  supporting deployed forces. However, joint contingency contract  management working group officials told us they have no formal charter  designating their responsibilities and that they therefore lack the authority  to direct DOD components to implement the instruction’s requirements.
Working group officials told us they are limited in how much they can  accomplish without more direct involvement by senior officials within the  Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. For example, they told us that they  will likely need someone at the general officer level to act as an advocate  for their ongoing efforts to implement the instruction’s requirements and  address other contractor support issues. Moreover, a number of senior  officials, including a general officer responsible for logistics for Multi- National Force-Iraq and a senior official from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, told us  that a focused effort within the Office of the Secretary of Defense is  needed to coordinate efforts to improve DOD’s management and oversight  of contractors supporting deployed forces.
We have previously reported on the benefits of establishing a single point  of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and integrate various  DOD efforts to address concerns with antiterrorism and the  transformation of military capabilities. For example, DOD recognized the  need for a single DOD entity to implement and improve the department’s  antiterrorism guidance. In 1996, following the Khobar Towers bombing,  the Downing task force investigated the incident and made  recommendations on how to prevent or minimize the damage of future  attacks. One of the central conclusions of the Downing task force was that  DOD needed a stronger centralized approach to antiterrorism. To  implement this approach, the task force said, a single DOD entity should  be designated as responsible for antiterrorism. Further, this entity, among  other things, should develop and issue physical security standards, inspect  compliance with these standards, manage resources on both a routine and  emergency basis, and assist field commanders with antiterrorism matters.  The task force found in its review that the lack of a single DOD entity  responsible for antiterrorism had had an adverse impact on the posture of  forces in the field. In response to the task force’s recommendation, the  Secretary of Defense established an office within the Joint Staff to act as  the focal point for antiterrorism. Among other things, this office has:    established antiterrorism training standards for all levels of command, and  instituted outreach programs to collect and distribute antiterrorism  lessons learned.
section_title: Limited Visibility over All Contractor Support Continues to Hinder DOD’s Management and Oversight of Contractors at Deployed Locations
paragraphs: Although DOD has long recognized the importance of having visibility over  all contractor support at deployed locations, the department continues to  be able to provide senior leaders and military commanders with only  limited visibility over those contractors. This limited visibility continues to  hinder the management and oversight of contractors in deployed  locations, including Iraq. In the absence of DOD-wide efforts to address  these issues, some DOD components at deployed locations and in the  United States have taken their own steps to improve visibility.
subsections: section_title: DOD Continues to be Unable to Provide Military Commanders at Deployed Locations and Senior Leaders with Visibility over All Contractor Support
paragraphs: DOD continues to lack the ability to provide military commanders and  senior leaders with visibility over all contractor support at deployed  locations, including the range of services being provided to U.S. forces and  the number of contractor personnel at deployed locations. Although most  of the contract oversight personnel we met with had visibility over the  individual contracts for which they were directly responsible, including  the number and location of contractor personnel, this information was not  aggregated by DOD and was not provided to commanders at higher levels.  Many officials responsible for managing and overseeing contractors that  support deployed forces at various levels of command in Iraq told us there  was no office, database, or other source that could provide them  consolidated information on all contractor support at a deployed location.  The following are examples of what commanders in Iraq told us:    senior commanders within Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National  Corps-Iraq told us they had no source to go to that could provide them  with a comprehensive summary of contractor services currently being  provided U.S. forces in Iraq;  the base commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda, a major  logistics hub in Iraq with about 10,000 contractor personnel, told us he  only had limited visibility of the number of contractors at his installation  and the support they were providing; and    a battalion commander from a Stryker brigade told us he was unable to  determine the number of contractor-provided interpreters available to  support his unit.
Moreover, we found that major commands and higher headquarters do not  maintain a source of information that could provide improved visibility  over all contractors at deployed locations, as illustrated by the following  examples:  the Army Materiel Command and Air Force Materiel Command were  unable to readily provide us with comprehensive information on the  number of contractors they were using at deployed locations or the  services those contractors were providing to U.S. forces,    contracting officials at U.S. Central Command told us that they do not  maintain centralized information on the contractor support within their  area of operation, and    Air Force headquarters officials determined the Air Force had about 500  civilians deployed to Iraq but could not readily identify how many of these  individuals were contractor personnel as opposed to DOD civilians.
DOD has long recognized the importance of providing visibility over  contractors supporting deployed forces. As discussed in our 2003 report,  DOD has required since 1990 that DOD components maintain visibility  over contractors providing essential services to U.S. forces and the  services they provide. However, in 2003 we reported that DOD  components were not meeting this requirement and that they lacked  visibility over all contractor support to forces deployed to the Balkans and  Southwest Asia. Further, a 2004 Joint Staff review of contract management  at deployed locations found commanders continued to have insufficient  visibility over contractors operating in deployed locations and  recommended that DOD provide the combatant commander the capability  to maintain visibility over contractor personnel and contract capabilities.  In addition, DOD has been unable to provide Congress with information  on the totality of contractor support in Iraq, including numbers of  contractors and the costs of the services they provide.
section_title: Limited Visibility Continues to Hinder DOD’s Management and Oversight of Contractors in Iraq
paragraphs: Limited visibility over contractor support poses a variety of problems for  military commanders and senior leaders responsible for contract  management and oversight in deployed locations such as Iraq. With limited  visibility over contractors, military commanders and other senior leaders  cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on  contractors as an asset to support their operations. Further, they cannot  build this reliance on contractors into their assessments of risks  associated with the potential loss of essential services provided by  contractors, an issue we discussed extensively in our 2003 report.
We spoke with several senior military leaders in Iraq who told us their lack  of visibility over contractor support in Iraq hindered their ability to  incorporate contractors into their planning efforts. For example, a general  officer responsible for logistics for Multi-National Force-Iraq told us that  acquiring visibility over all contractor support in Iraq was a top priority  because Multi-National Force-Iraq did not have the information needed to  include the presence of contractors in its planning activities. A number of  Multi-National Force-Iraq officials told us that when they began to develop  plans to consolidate forward operating bases in Iraq, they discovered that  while they could determine the number and type of military units on those  bases, they had no means of obtaining similar information about  contractors, including the number of contractor personnel on each base  and the support the military was providing them. According to a senior  Multi-National Force-Iraq official, without this information, Multi-National  Force-Iraq ran the risk of overbuilding or underbuilding the capacity of the  consolidated bases to accommodate the number of individuals expected to  be stationed there. Because Multi-National Force-Iraq lacked a source to  draw upon for information regarding the extent of contractor support in  Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq issued a fragmentary order in April 2006 to  base commanders in Iraq to conduct a census of contractors residing on  the installations. However, at the time of our review, this effort had only  yielded partial results which an Army official familiar with the census  effort told us would not meet the initial goals of the fragmentary order.
Limited visibility over contractors and the services they provide at a  deployed location can also hinder military commanders’ abilities to fully  understand the impact that their decisions can have on their installations.  For example, when commanders make decisions to restrict access of host  country nationals to an installation, this can result in the loss of some  contractor-provided services, such as construction or the delivery of  supplies that may be dependent upon the use of host country nationals.  Similarly, one of the more frequent concerns contractors in Kuwait and  Iraq related to us was the impact that base commanders’ decisions to  change policies regarding badging requirements and other base access  procedures had on their ability to provide services to those bases.
Decisions affecting such functions as force protection and base operations  support also rely on commanders having an accurate picture of the  contractor assets they have in their area of operations and an  understanding of the number of contractor personnel they have to  support. As we reported in 2003, military commanders require visibility  over contractor support at deployed locations because they are  responsible for all the people in their area of operations, including  contractor personnel. Given the security situation in Iraq, knowledge of  who is on their installation helps commanders account for all individuals  in the event of a mortar attack or other hostile action. For example, Army  officials assisting the movement of contractors into and out of Iraq  described to us the difficulties DOD faced determining the identity of a  contractor who was taken hostage and then killed by the insurgency in  Iraq. We also met with several military commanders who told us that a  lack of visibility over contractors on their installations complicated their  efforts to provide contractors with support such as food and housing.  Several officials told us they regularly had contractor personnel  unexpectedly show up in Iraq and request support, but were unable to  verify what DOD-provided support those contractor personnel were  entitled to. As a result, DOD and its components may be providing  unauthorized support to contractors. For example, at one of the joint  contingency contract management working group sessions GAO attended,  an Army Materiel Command official noted that the Army estimates that it  loses about $43 million every year providing free meals to contractor  employees who are also receiving a per diem allowance for food.
section_title: Some Steps Have Been Taken to Address the Issue of Visibility
paragraphs: In spite of DOD’s continued lack of capability to provide commanders with  the information they need regarding the extent of contractor support at a  deployed location, we found that some steps have been taken to provide  commanders with improved visibility over the contracts they were directly  responsible for. For example:  In early 2006, the commanding general of Multi-National Force-Iraq  ordered his major subordinate commands in Iraq to provide a head count  of non-DOD civilians on their installations, including contractor personnel  for contracts exceeding $5 million per year. The information, captured in a  database managed by Multi-National Force-Iraq, was needed to provide  the general with a current count of all tenant organizations operating from  the various forward operating bases in Iraq.
Multi-National Corps-Iraq started a similar effort in February 2006 to  provide the commanding general with detailed contract management  information on recurring services contracts such as for the maintenance of  certain aircraft, communications support, and power generation.
Also in 2006, the corps support command at Logistical Support Area  Anaconda created a database to track recurring services contracts that  support the installation.
While these individual efforts improved visibility over a specific set of  contractors, we found that no organization within DOD or its components  has attempted to consolidate these individual sources of information that  could help improve its visibility over all contractor support in Iraq. Several  DOD officials in Iraq familiar with the individual efforts described above  told us that while a number of databases have been created to capture  information on contractors in theater, the information is not aggregated at  a higher level because no one is responsible for consolidating this  information. In most cases, these efforts were initiated by individual  commanders and there is no assurance that they would continue when  new units with new commanders deployed to replace them in the future.
Individual contractors we spoke with had excellent visibility over the  number and location of their employees at specific deployed locations. For  example, the contractors could readily provide us with information on the  number of employees they had in Iraq in support of deployed U.S. forces  and the specific installation to which those contractors were deployed.  This information was typically reported on a daily or weekly basis from  the contractor in Iraq to their corporate headquarters in the United States  or elsewhere, as well as to the U.S. government agency that had awarded  the contract. However, we found this information was not centrally  collected. As discussed previously, there are several hundred contractor  firms that support deployed forces, including in Iraq, and contracts are  awarded by numerous contracting offices both within DOD and from other  U.S. government agencies. With such a large and diverse pool of  contractors at deployed locations, it is impractical for individual  commanders to obtain this information from contractors on their own. For  example, several military officials involved in efforts to improve visibility  over contractors in Iraq told us that while they were generally able to  obtain information from contractors with large numbers of employees,  such as the LOGCAP contractor, it was extremely difficult to identify as  well as collect information from all the numerous smaller contractors,  who sometimes consisted of only one or two individuals.
As discussed above, in October 2005 DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41,  which included a requirement that DOD develop or designate a joint  database to maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying  with the force and a summary of the services or capabilities they provide.  Currently, no such DOD-wide database exists. However, Army Materiel  Command and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,  Logistics, and Technology have taken the initiative to develop a database  that could provide improved visibility over all contractors supporting U.S.  forces in deployed locations and enable military commanders to  incorporate contractor support into their planning efforts. According to  Army officials, this database is intended to collect information not only on  the overall number of contractors supporting forces in a deployed location  but also on the organization or system they are supporting and other  contract information that could be used by commanders to better manage  contractors at deployed locations. The Army’s goal is to require that all  contractors supporting deployed forces use this database, and in turn,  create the central source of information to provide commanders with  visibility over all contractor support at deployed locations. However, as of  the time of our review, the Army was still in the process of implementing  the database, and it is uncertain when the process will be completed. For  example, we found that only a few contractors were using the database,  and Army officials acknowledged it does not currently capture all  contractors providing support at deployed locations. According to Army  and Joint Staff officials familiar with these efforts, it is likely that DOD will  designate this database as the joint database for contractor visibility as  required by DOD Instruction 3020.41. However, a number of issues must  first be resolved. For example, efforts are still underway to get all the  services to agree to enter their data into this database. Further, there is  disagreement within the Army staff regarding whether the Deputy Chief of  Staff responsible for logistics or personnel has responsibility for the  contractor visibility database. Several officials we met with who are  involved with these efforts told us that while the Army Materiel Command  has made significant progress in developing the database, ultimate  resolution of these issues will require action by the Office of the Secretary  of Defense because the Army Materiel Command lacks the necessary  directive authority to resolve them on its own.
section_title: DOD Still Does Not Have Adequate Contract Oversight Personnel in Place to Oversee and Manage Contractors Supporting U.S. Forces in Deployed Locations
paragraphs: Having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor  performance is critical to ensuring that DOD receives the best value for  the billions of dollars spent each year on contractor-provided services  supporting forces deployed to Iraq and elsewhere. However, inadequate  numbers of personnel to oversee and manage contracts that support  deployed U.S. forces is another long-standing problem that continues to  hinder DOD’s management and oversight of contractors in Iraq. In 2004,  we reported that DOD did not always have enough contract oversight  personnel in place to manage and oversee its logistics support contracts  such as LOGCAP. In addition, in 2005 we reported in our High-Risk Series  that inadequate staffing contributed to contract management challenges in  Iraq. While we could find no DOD guidelines on the appropriate number  of personnel needed to oversee and manage DOD contracts at a deployed  location, several contract oversight personnel told us DOD does not have  adequate personnel at deployed locations to effectively oversee and  manage contractors, as illustrated by the following examples:    An Army Contracting Agency official told us that due to a downsizing of its  overall contracting force and the need to balance that force among  multiple competing needs, the Army is struggling to find the capacity and  expertise to provide the contracting support needed in Iraq.
An official with the LOGCAP Program Office told us that, as the United  States was preparing to commence Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the  office did not prepare to hire additional budget analysts and legal  personnel in anticipation of an increased use of LOGCAP services.  According to the official, had adequate staffing been in place early on, the  Army could have realized substantial savings through more effective  reviews of the increasing volume of LOGCAP requirements.
Officials responsible for contracting with Multi-National Force-Iraq told us  they did not have enough contract oversight personnel and quality  assurance representatives to allow Multi-National Force-Iraq to award  more sustainment contracts for base operations support in Iraq.
The contracting officer’s representative for a contract providing linguist  support in Iraq told us that he had only one part-time assistant, limiting his  ability to manage and oversee the contractor personnel for whom he was  responsible. As he observed, he had a battalion’s worth of people with a  battalion’s worth of problems but lacked the equivalent of a battalion’s  staff to deal with those problems.
We also found a number of organizational and personnel policies of  various DOD agencies responsible for contract management and oversight  contributed to inadequate numbers of personnel to oversee and manage  contracts that support deployed forces. The following are some examples:    A 2004 Joint Staff review of the Defense Contract Management Agency’s  responsiveness and readiness to support deployed forces in the event of  war found that the agency had not programmed adequate resources to  support current and future contingency contract requirements,  compromising its readiness to execute its mission. The review further  found that Defense Contract Management Agency manpower shortages  were aggravated by internal policies that limit the availability of personnel  to execute those missions.
During its 2003 deployment to Iraq, a unit with the 4th Infantry Division  reported that the divisional contracting structure did not adequately  support the large volume of transactions that were needed in an austere  environment. For example, the unit reported problems with the quality of  services provided by host country nationals, which were exacerbated by a  lack of contracting officer’s representatives to properly oversee the  performance of contracting terms.
An official with the Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia told us that  as of January 2006 the agency had only 18 of the 33 staff it was authorized  and that this number of personnel was not enough to support the agency’s  mission. In contrast, he told us that other commands, such as Army  Contracting Agency, Korea, were authorized more than 130 staff even  though they were responsible for significantly fewer obligated funds.
Without adequate contract oversight personnel in place to monitor its  many contracts in deployed locations such as Iraq, DOD may not be able  to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting their contract  requirements efficiently and effectively at each location. For example, a  Defense Contract Management Agency official responsible for overseeing  the LOGCAP contractor’s performance at 27 installations in Iraq told us he  was unable to personally visit all 27 locations himself during his 6-month  tour in Iraq. As a result, he was unable to determine the extent to which  the contractor was meeting the contract’s requirements at each of those 27  sites. Moreover, he only had one quality assurance representative to assist  him. The official told us that in order to properly oversee this contract, he  should have had at least three quality assurance representatives assisting  him. The contracting officer’s representative for an intelligence support  contract in Iraq told us he was also unable to visit all of the locations that  he was responsible for overseeing. At the locations he did visit he was able  to work with the contractor to improve its efficiency. However, because  he was not able to visit all of the locations at which the contractor  provided services in Iraq he was unable to duplicate those efficiencies at  all of the locations in Iraq where the contractor provided support. As we  previously reported in 2000 and 2004, when contract oversight personnel  are able to review the types and levels of services provided by contractors  for both economy and efficiency, savings can be realized. Conversely,  without adequate contract oversight personnel in place to manage and  oversee contractors, DOD continues to be at risk of being unable to  identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner.
The inability of contract oversight personnel to visit all locations they are  responsible for can also create problems for units that are facing  difficulties resolving contractor performance issues at those locations. For  example, officials from a brigade support battalion told us they had  several concerns with the performance of a contractor that provided  maintenance for the brigade’s mine-clearing equipment. These concerns  included delays in obtaining spare parts and a disagreement over the  contractor’s obligation to provide support in more austere locations in  Iraq. According to the officials, their efforts to resolve these problems in a  timely manner were hindered because the contracting officer’s  representative was located in Baghdad while the unit was stationed in  western Iraq. In other instances, some contract oversight personnel may  not even reside within the theater of operations. For example, we found  the Defense Contract Management Agency’s legal personnel responsible  for LOGCAP in Iraq were stationed in Germany, while other LOGCAP  contract oversight personnel were stationed in the United States.  According to a senior Defense Contract Management Agency official in  Iraq, relying on support from contract oversight personnel outside the  theater of operations may not meet the needs of military commanders in  Iraq who are operating under the demands and higher operational tempo  of a contingency operation in a deployed location.
Although the problems discussed above concern contract management  and oversight at deployed locations, the lack of adequate contract  oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, not limited to deployed  locations. We first designated DOD contract management as a high-risk  area in 1992, and it remains so today due, in part, to concerns over the  adequacy of the department’s acquisition workforce, including contract  oversight personnel. We subsequently reported that although DOD had  made progress in laying a foundation for reshaping its acquisition  workforce, it did not yet have a comprehensive strategic workforce plan  needed to guide its efforts. Yet having too few contract oversight  personnel presents unique difficulties at deployed locations given the  more demanding contracting environment compared to the United States.  For example, the deputy commander of a corps support command told us  that contracting officer’s representatives have more responsibilities at  deployed locations than in the United States. Similarly, several officials  responsible for contract management and oversight told us that the  operational tempo for contract oversight personnel is significantly higher  at deployed locations than in the United States.
section_title: DOD Is Not Systematically Collecting or Sharing Institutional Knowledge on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces
paragraphs: Despite the fact the DOD and its components face many of the same types  of difficulties working with contractors in Iraq that they faced in prior  military operations, DOD still does not systematically ensure that  institutional knowledge gained from prior experience is shared with  military personnel at deployed locations. We have previously reported that  DOD could benefit from systematically collecting and sharing its  institutional knowledge across a wide range of issues to help ensure that it  is factored into planning, work processes, and other activities. With  respect to DOD’s use of contractors to support deployed forces, in 1997  we recommended that DOD incorporate lessons learned from the Bosnia  peacekeeping mission and other operations in the Balkans to improve the  efficiency and effectiveness of the Army’s LOGCAP contract—a  recommendation DOD agreed with. Similarly, in 2004 we recommended  that DOD implement a departmentwide lessons-learned program to  capture the experience of military units and others that have used logistics  support contracts—a recommendation DOD also agreed with.
In its responses to the recommendations made in our 1997 and 2004  reports, DOD stated it would investigate how best to establish procedures  to capture lessons learned on the use of contracts to support deployed  forces and would make this information available DOD-wide. However as  of 2006, DOD still had not established any procedures to systematically  collect and share DOD’s lessons learned on the use of contracts to support  deployed forces. Moreover, we found no organization within DOD or its  components responsible for developing those procedures. By way of  comparison, we have previously reported that when DOD created a Joint  Staff office responsible for acting as a focal point for the department’s  antiterrorism efforts, that office was able to develop outreach programs to  collect and share antiterrorism lessons learned and best practices.
While some DOD organizations such as the Joint Forces Command’s Joint  Center for Operational Analysis and the Army’s Center for Army Lessons  Learned are responsible for collecting lessons learned from recent military  operations, we found that neither organization was actively collecting  lessons learned on the use of contractor support in Iraq. Similarly, Army  guidance requires that customers receiving services under LOGCAP  collect and share lessons learned, as appropriate. However, we found no  procedures in place to ensure units follow this guidance. Further, our  review of historical records and after-action reports from military units  that deployed to Iraq found that while units made some observations on  the use of contractor support, DOD had done little to collect those lessons  learned or make them available to other units that were preparing to  deploy. Moreover, in some instances, officials from units we met with  told us that their current procedures actually preclude the collection and  sharing of institutional knowledge, such as lessons learned. For example,  officials with the 3rd Infantry Division, as well as a corps support group  that deployed to Iraq, told us that their computers were wiped clean and  the information archived before they redeployed to the United States,  which hindered opportunities for sharing lessons learned with incoming  units.
When lessons learned are not collected and shared, DOD and its  components run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to  build on the efficiencies and effectiveness others have developed during  past operations that involved contractor support. For example, the deputy  commander of a corps support command responsible for much of the  contractor-provided logistics support in Iraq told us that without ensuring  that lessons learned are shared as units rotate into and out of Iraq, each  new unit essentially starts at ground zero, creating a number of difficulties  until they familiarize themselves with their roles and responsibilities.  Similarly, lessons learned using logistics support contracts in the Balkans  were not easily accessible to military commanders and other individuals  responsible for contract oversight and management in Iraq, an issue we  also identified in 2004. For example, during our visit to Iraq we found that  a guidebook developed by U.S. Army, Europe on the use of a logistical  support contract almost identical to LOGCAP for operations in the  Balkans was not made available to military commanders in Iraq until mid- 2006. According to one official, U.S. Army Central Command was aware of  this guidebook in Iraq as early as late 2003; however, the guidebook was  not made available to commanders in Iraq until 2006. According to the  official, if the guidebook had been made available sooner to commanders  in Iraq it could have helped better familiarize them with the LOGCAP  contract and build on efficiencies U.S. Army, Europe had identified.  Similarly, U.S. Army, Europe included contract familiarization with its  logistical support contractor in mission rehearsal exercises of units  preparing to deploy to the Balkans. However, we found no similar effort  had been made to include familiarization with LOGCAP in the mission  rehearsal exercises of units preparing to deploy to Iraq.
Failure to share other kinds of institutional knowledge on the use of  contractor support to deployed forces can also impact military operations  or result in confusion between the military and contractors. Several  officials we met with from combat units that deployed to Iraq as well as  contractors supporting U.S. forces in Southwest Asia told us that  redeploying units do not always share important information with new  units that are rotating into theater, including information on contractors  providing support to U.S. forces at the deployed location. Such  information could include the number of contractors and the services they  provide a unit or installation, existing base access procedures, and other  policies and procedures that have been developed over time. In addition,  representatives from several contractor firms we met with told us that  there can be confusion when new units rotate into Iraq regarding such  things as the procedures contractors should follow to access an  installation or in dealing with contractors. In some instances, such  confusion can place either contractors or the military at risk. For example,  a contractor providing transportation services in Iraq told us that a unit  responsible for providing convoy security that had just deployed to Iraq  had not been informed of the existing procedures for responding to  incidents involving the contractor. The existing procedures required the  unit to remain with the contractor until its equipment could be recovered.  However, following an actual incident in which a vehicle rolled over, there  was confusion between the contractor and the unit as to what the required  actions were.
section_title: Military Commanders and Contract Oversight Personnel Continue to Receive Limited or No Information on Contractor Support in their Pre- Deployment Training
paragraphs: DOD does not routinely incorporate information about contractor support  to deployed forces in its pre-deployment training of military personnel,  despite the long-standing recognition of the need to provide such  information. Military commanders continue to deploy with limited or no  pre-deployment training on the contractor support they will rely on or on  their roles and responsibilities with regard to managing those contractors.  Similarly, contract oversight personnel typically deploy without prior  training on their contract management and oversight responsibilities and  are often only assigned those responsibilities once arriving at a deployed  location. Many DOD and service officials at various levels of command  told us that ultimately the key to better preparing military personnel to  effectively work with contractors in a deployed location is to integrate  information on the use of contractors into DOD’s institutional training  activities.
subsections: section_title: Several GAO Reports Have Discussed, and DOD Has Acknowledged, the Need to Provide Better Pre-deployment Training on Contractor Support to Deployed Forces
paragraphs: We have been discussing the need for better pre-deployment training on  the use of contractors to support deployed forces since the mid-1990s.  Specifically, we reported that better training was needed because military  commanders are responsible for incorporating the use of contractor  support while planning operations. In addition, as a customer for  contractor-provided services, military commanders are responsible for  identifying and validating requirements to be addressed by the contractor  as well as evaluating the contractor’s performance and ensuring the  contract is used in an economical and efficient manner. Further, better  training was needed for contract oversight personnel, including  contracting officer’s representatives, because they monitor the  contractor’s performance for the contracting officer and act as the  interface between military commanders and contractors.
Accordingly, we have made several recommendations that DOD improve  its training. Some of our prior recommendations highlighted the need for  improved training of military personnel on the use of contractor support at  deployed locations, while others focused on training regarding specific  contracts, such as LOGCAP. In each instance, DOD concurred with our  recommendation. Figure 2 shows the recommendations we have made  since 1997.
In addition, according to DOD policy, personnel should receive timely and  effective training to ensure they have the knowledge and other tools  necessary to accomplish their missions. For example, a March 2006  instruction on joint training policy issued by the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff stated in part that DOD components are to ensure their  personnel and organizations are trained to meet combatant commanders’  requirements prior to deploying for operations. It further identified  management of contractors supporting deployed forces as a training issue  to be focused on. Nevertheless, we continue to find little evidence that  improvements have been made in terms of how DOD and its components  train military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use of  contractors to support deployed forces prior to their deployment.
section_title: Military Commanders Continue to Receive Limited or No Pre- deployment Training to Plan For and Manage Contractors at Deployed Locations
paragraphs: As we have previously reported, limited or no pre-deployment training on  the use of contractor support can cause a variety of problems for military  commanders in a deployed location. With limited or no pre-deployment  training on the extent of contractor support to deployed forces, military  commanders may not be able to adequately plan for the use of those  contractors in a deployed location. Several military commanders— including the major general responsible for logistics for Multi-National  Force-Iraq, the deputy commander of a corps support command, a base  commander, and commanders of combat units deployed to Iraq—told us  that their pre-deployment training did not provide them with sufficient  information regarding the extent of contractor support they would be  relying on in Iraq. Although some of these officials were aware of large  contracts such as LOGCAP, almost all of them told us they were surprised  by the large number of contractors they dealt with in Iraq and the variety  of services that contractors provided. As a result, they could not  incorporate the use of contractors into their planning efforts until after  they arrived in Iraq and acquired a more complete understanding of the  broad range of services provided by contractors. Similarly, several  commanders of combat units that deployed to Iraq told us their pre- deployment training included limited or no information on the contractor- provided services they would be relying on or the extent to which they  would have to provide personnel to escort contractor personnel. They  were therefore unable to integrate the need to provide on-base escorts for  third country and host country nationals, convoy security, and other force  protection support to contractors into their planning efforts. As a result,  the commanders were surprised by the substantial portion of their  personnel they had to allocate to fulfill these missions; personnel they had  expected to be available to perform other functions.
Limited or no pre-deployment training for military commanders on the use  of contractor support to deployed forces can also result in confusion  regarding their roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing  contractors. As discussed above, military commanders are responsible for  incorporating the use of contractor support in their operations planning  and, in some instances, for evaluating a contractor’s performance.  However, many officials responsible for contract management and  oversight in Iraq told us military commanders who deployed to Iraq  received little or no training on the use of contractors prior to their  deployment, leading to confusion over their roles and responsibilities. For  example:    Staff officers with the 3rd Infantry Division told us they believed the  division was poorly trained to integrate and work with contractors prior to  its deployment. According to these officers, this inadequate training  resulted in confusion among the officers over the command and control of  contractors.
Army Field Support Command officials told us many commanders voiced  concerns that they did not want to work with contractors and did not want  contractors in their area of operations. According to the officials, these  commanders did not understand the extent of contractor support in Iraq  and how to integrate LOGCAP support into their own planning efforts. The  officials attributed this confusion to a lack of pre-deployment training on  the services LOGCAP provided, how it was used, and commanders’ roles  and responsibilities in managing and overseeing the LOGCAP contractor.
Several Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us that  although they were only responsible for managing and overseeing the  LOGCAP contractor, military commanders came to them for all  contracting questions because they had not been trained on how to work  with contractors and did not realize that different contractors have  different contract managers.
In addition, some contractors told us how crucial it was that commanders  receive training in their roles and responsibilities regarding contractors  prior to their deployment because, although they do not have the authority  to, commanders sometimes direct contractors to perform activities that  may be outside the scope of work of the contract. We found some  instances where a lack of training raised concerns over the potential for  military commanders to direct contractors to perform work outside the  scope of the contract. For example, one contractor told us he was  instructed by a military commander to release equipment the contractor  was maintaining even though this action was not within the scope of the  contract. The issue ultimately had to be resolved by the contracting  officer. As another example, a battalion commander deployed to Iraq told  us that although he was pleased with the performance of the contractors  supporting him, he did not know what was required of the contractor  under the contract. Without this information, he ran the risk of directing  the contractor to perform work beyond what was called for in the  contract. As Army guidance makes clear, when military commanders try to  direct contractors to perform activities outside the scope of the contract,  this can cause the government to incur additional charges because  modifications would need to be made to the contract and, in some cases,  the direction may potentially result in a violation of competition  requirements.
We found that many military commanders we spoke with had little or no  prior exposure to contractor support issues in deployed locations,  exacerbating the problems discussed above. Many of the commanders we  met with from combat units deployed to Iraq told us this was their first  experience working with contractors and that they had had little or no  prior training or exposure to contract management. According to officials  responsible for contract management and oversight in Iraq as well as  several contactor representatives we met with, it can take newly deployed  personnel, including military commanders, several weeks to develop the  knowledge needed to effectively work with contractors in a deployed  location. For complex contracts such as LOGCAP, these officials told us  that it can take substantially longer than that. This can result in gaps in  oversight as newly deployed personnel familiarize themselves with their  roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing contracts.
section_title: Contract Oversight Personnel Continue to Receive Limited or No Pre-deployment Training to Effectively Monitor Contractor Performance
paragraphs: We also found that contract oversight personnel such as contracting  officer’s representatives continue to receive limited or no pre-deployment  training regarding their roles and responsibilities in monitoring contractor  performance. Although DOD has created an online training course for  contracting officer’s representatives, very few of the contracting officer’s  representatives we met with had taken the course prior to deploying to  Iraq. In most cases, individuals deployed without knowing that they would  be assigned the role of a contracting officer’s representative until after  they arrived at the deployed location, precluding their ability to take the  course. Moreover, some of the individuals who took the course once  deployed expressed concerns that the training did not provide them with  the knowledge and other tools they needed to effective monitor contractor  performance. Other officials told us it was difficult to set aside the time  necessary to complete the training once they arrived in Iraq. DOD’s  acquisition regulations require that contracting officer’s representatives be  qualified through training and experience commensurate with the  responsibilities delegated to them. However, as was the case with military  commanders, we found that many of the contract oversight personnel we  spoke with had little or no exposure to contractor support issues prior to  their deployment, which exacerbated the problems they faced given the  limited pre-deployment training.
We found several instances where the failure to identify and train contract  oversight personnel prior to their deployment hindered the ability of those  individuals to effectively manage and oversee contractors in Iraq, in some  cases negatively affecting unit morale or military operations. The following  are examples of what we found:    The contracting officer’s representative for a major contract providing  intelligence support to U.S. forces in Iraq had not been informed of his  responsibilities in managing and overseeing this contract prior to his  deployment. As a result, he received no training on his contract oversight  responsibilities prior to deploying. Moreover, he had no previous  experience working with contractors. The official told us that he found  little value in DOD’s online training course and believed this training did  not adequately prepare him to execute his contract oversight  responsibilities, such as reviewing invoices submitted by the contractor.
According to officials from a corps support group deployed to Iraq, the  group deployed with 95 Army cooks even though their meals were to be  provided by LOGCAP. However, prior to deploying, the unit had neither  identified nor trained any personnel to serve as contracting officer’s  representatives for the LOGCAP contract. According to unit officials, they  experienced numerous problems with regard to the quality of food  services provided by LOGCAP, which impacted unit morale, until  individuals from the unit were assigned as contracting officer’s  representatives to work with the contractor to improve the quality of its  services.
According to officials with the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command,  quality assurance representatives responsible for assessing the  performance of a linguist support contractor did not speak Arabic. As a  result, it was unclear how they could assess the proficiency of the  linguists. Some units that used interpreters under this contract told us they  experienced cases where they discovered that their interpreters were not  correctly translating conversations.  Intelligence officials with a Stryker brigade told us a lack of contractor  management training hindered their ability to resolve staffing issues with a  contractor conducting background screenings of third country nationals  and host country nationals. Shortages of contractor-provided screeners  forced the brigade to use their own intelligence personnel to conduct  these screenings. As a result, those personnel were not available to carry  out their primary intelligence-gathering responsibilities.
The frequent rotations of contract oversight personnel, who can deploy for  as little as 3-4 months, can also hinder DOD’s management and oversight  of contractors in a deployed location. Several contractors told us the  frequent rotation of contracting officer’s representatives was frustrating  because the contractors continually had to adjust to the varying extent of  knowledge those personnel had regarding the contractor support they  were responsible for. Moreover, several contractors told us that frequent  rotations meant that by the time contract oversight personnel had  familiarized themselves with their responsibilities they were preparing the  leave the country. If these personnel were replaced by individuals who  were not familiar with the contract or had not received training in their  roles and responsibilities, problems could occur. For example, a  contractor providing food services in Iraq told us that while the contract  specified a 21-day menu rotation, some of the newly deployed contracting  officer’s representatives assigned to monitor the contract directed the  contractor to modify the menu rotation, which affected the contractor’s  inventory of food stores and ran the risk of directing the contractor to  perform work outside the scope of the contract.
Many contractors told us that a consistent level of pre-deployment training  would help to ensure some continuity as individuals rotate into and out of  deployed locations. In addition, several contractors, as well as military  officials responsible for contract management and oversight, told us that  the length of deployment for contracting officer’s representatives is too  short and that by the time individuals have acquired the knowledge to  effectively monitor a contract, they are preparing to redeploy. For  example, senior Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us  that the current 6-month deployments of contract oversight personnel  monitoring the LOGCAP contract in Iraq were too short to make the most  efficient use of personnel who had developed the expertise to effectively  manage that contract. As a result, senior Defense Contract Management  Agency officials told us they are considering extending the length of  deployment for their contract oversight personnel assigned to monitor the  LOGCAP contract from 6 months to 1 year.
We found that contract oversight personnel who had received training in  their roles and responsibilities prior to their deployment appeared better  prepared to manage and oversee contractors once they arrived at a  deployed location. For example, the program office for the Army’s C-12  aircraft maintenance contract developed a 3-day training course that all  contracting officer’s representatives for this contract are required to take  prior to deploying. This training provides contracting officer’s  representatives with information regarding recurring reporting  requirements, processes that should be followed to resolve disputes with  the contractor, and the variety of technical and administrative  requirements these individuals should be familiar with to monitor the  contractor’s performance. Officials familiar with this training course told  us that they found the course to be very helpful in providing contracting  officer’s representatives with the knowledge and tools necessary to  effectively execute their responsibilities. As a result, the program office  developed a similar course for another of its aviation maintenance  contracts. Similarly, Defense Contract Management Agency officials  responsible for overseeing LOGCAP told us they are developing a  standardized process for evaluating the contractor’s performance in Iraq,  which includes ensuring units deploying to Iraq identify and train contract  oversight personnel for the LOGCAP contract.
section_title: Officials Believe Integrating Information on the Use of Contractors into DOD’s Institutional Training Activities Could Improve the Management and Oversight of Contractors
paragraphs: Our review of DOD and service guidance, policies, and doctrine found no  existing criteria or standards to ensure that all military units incorporate  information regarding contractor support to deployed forces in their pre- deployment training. According to a official with the Army’s Training and  Doctrine Command, while some steps have been taken to create elective  courses on issues related to contractor support to deployed forces, it is  important that all DOD components incorporate this information into their  existing institutional training so that military personnel who may interact  with contractors at deployed locations have a basic awareness of  contractor support issues prior to deploying. Moreover, most of the  military commanders and officials responsible for contract management  and oversight we met with in deployed locations told us that better  training on the use of contractors to support deployed forces should be  incorporated into how DOD prepares its personnel to deploy. Some  officials believed that additional training should address the specific roles  and responsibilities of military personnel responsible for managing and  overseeing contractors in deployed locations. For example, the base  commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda told us there should be a  weeklong pre-deployment course for all base commanders specific to  contractor support to deployed forces. Similarly, the commander of a unit  operating Army C-12 aircraft stated that the contracting officer’s  representative training developed by the program office, as discussed  above, should not only be required for all contract oversight personnel but  also for military commanders of units operating the aircraft.
Other officials believed that their pre-deployment preparations, such as  mission rehearsal exercises, should incorporate the role that contractors  have in supporting U.S. forces in a deployed location. However, we found  that most units we met with did not incorporate the role of contractor  support into their mission rehearsal exercises. Moreover, we found no  existing DOD requirement that mission rehearsal exercises should include  such information, even for key contracts such as LOGCAP. Several  officials told us that including contractors in these exercises could enable  military commanders to better plan and prepare for the use of contractor  support prior to deploying. For example, when a Stryker brigade held its  training exercise prior to deploying to Iraq, the brigade commander was  surprised at the number of contractors embedded with the brigade.  Initially, he wanted to bar all civilians from the exercise because he did  not realize how extensively the brigade relied on contractor support. By  including contractors in the exercise, their critical role was made clear  early on and the brigade’s commanders were better positioned to  understand their contract management roles and responsibilities prior to  deploying to Iraq. In addition, officials responsible for the LOGCAP  contract told us they were undertaking efforts to include basic information  on how to work with LOGCAP into the mission rehearsal exercises of  units deploying to Iraq.
Many officials we met with in the United States and at deployed locations  told us that ultimately the issue of better preparing military commanders  and contract oversight personnel for their contract management and  oversight roles at deployed locations lies with including training on the use  of contractors as part of professional military education. Professional  military education is designed to provide officers with the necessary skills  and knowledge to function effectively and to assume additional  responsibilities. However, several officials told us that the need to educate  military personnel on the use of contractors is something the military has  not yet embraced. As corps support command officials observed, the  military does a good job training logisticians to be infantrymen, but does  not require infantrymen to have any familiarity with contracting or the  roles and responsibilities they may have in working with contractors at a  deployed location.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD’s reliance on contractor support to deployed forces has grown  significantly since the 1991 Gulf War and this reliance continues to grow.  In Iraq and other deployed locations, contractors provide billions of  dollars worth of services each year and play a role in most aspects of  military operations—from traditional support roles such as feeding  soldiers and maintaining equipment to providing interpreters who  accompany soldiers on patrols and augmenting intelligence analysis. The  magnitude and importance of contractor support demands that DOD  ensure military personnel have the guidance, resources, and training to  effectively monitor contractor performance at deployed locations. In prior  reports, we made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening  DOD’s management and oversight of contractor support at deployed  locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those  recommendations. However, DOD has failed to implement some of our  key recommendations, in part because it has not yet institutionally  embraced the need to change the way it prepares military personnel to  work with contractors in deployed locations. While we found no  contractor performance problems that led to mission failure, problems  with management and oversight of contractors have negatively impacted  military operations and unit morale and hindered DOD’s ability to obtain  reasonable assurance that contractors are effectively meeting their  contract requirements in the most cost-efficient manner.
The difficulties DOD faces regarding contractor support to deployed  forces are exacerbated by the fragmented nature of contracting, with  multiple agencies in multiple locations able to award and manage  contracts that may all provide services to a particular military unit or  installation. However, DOD’s actions to date have largely been driven by  individual efforts to resolve particular issues at particular moments. A lack  of clear accountability and authority within the department to coordinate  these actions has hindered DOD’s ability to systematically address its  difficulties regarding contractor support—difficulties that currently affect  military commanders in Iraq and other deployed locations and will likely  affect commanders in future operations unless DOD institutionally  addresses the problems we have identified. When faced with similar  challenges regarding the department’s antiterrorism efforts, DOD  designated an office within the Joint Staff to serve as a single focal point to  coordinate its efforts, which helped improve its protection of military  forces stationed overseas. Moreover, the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has established  dedicated organizations to coordinate efforts to address departmentwide  problems in areas such as supply chain management. Unless a similar,  coordinated, departmentwide effort is made to address long-standing  contract management and oversight problems at deployed locations, DOD  and its components will continue to be at risk of being unable to ensure  that contractors are providing the services they are required to in an  effective and efficient manner.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s management and oversight of contractors at deployed  locations, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a  focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and  with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to  improve contract management and oversight. The entity that functions as  the focal point would act as an advocate within the department for issues  related to the use of contractors to support deployed forces, serve as the  principal advisor for establishing relevant policy and guidance to DOD  components, and be responsible for carrying out actions, including the  following six actions:    oversee development of the joint database to provide visibility over all  contractor support to deployed forces, including a summary of services or  capabilities provided and by-name accountability of contractors;    develop a strategy for DOD to incorporate the unique difficulties of  contract management and oversight at deployed locations into DOD’s  ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of its acquisition  workforce;  lead and coordinate the development of a departmentwide lessons-learned  program that will capture the experiences of units that have deployed to  locations with contractor support and develop a strategy to apply this  institutional knowledge to ongoing and future operations;    develop the requirement that DOD components, combatant commanders,  and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have access to key  information on contractor support, including the scope and scale of  contractor support they will rely on and the roles and responsibilities of  commanders in the contract management and oversight process, (2)  incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to identify and  train contract oversight personnel in their roles and responsibilities, and  (3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors to increase  familiarity of units preparing to deploy with the contractor support they  will rely on;    develop training standards for the services on the integration of basic  familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces into their  professional military education to ensure that military commanders and  other senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor support  have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage contractors;  and  review the services’ efforts to meet the standards and requirements  established above to ensure that training on contractor support to  deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the services.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  recommendation. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also  provided several technical comments which we considered and  incorporated where appropriate.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  appoint a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and  with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to  improve contract management and oversight. DOD further stated that the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness  established the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Program Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as the office of primary  responsibility for issues related to contractor support. However, DOD  noted in its comments that the office is not yet fully staffed.
While we commend the department for taking the initiative to establish  this office and believe that it is appropriately located within the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,  it is not clear that this office would serve as the focal point dedicated to  leading DOD’s efforts to improve contract management and oversight. In  our recommendation, we identified several actions that such a focal point  would be responsible for implementing. In concurring with those  recommended actions, DOD offered additional information on the steps it  intended to take in order to address the recommended actions. However,  none of these steps included information on the roles and responsibilities  of the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program  Support) in implementing and overseeing these corrective actions. For  example, in concurring with our recommendation that the focal point  develop requirements to ensure that mission rehearsal exercises include  key contractors, DOD specified corrective actions that the Joint Staff, the  Defense Acquisition University, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense  would take. However, it is not clear what role the office of the Assistant  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) would have in  meeting this requirement, nor is it clear that this office would be the entity  responsible for ensuring the requirement is met, as stated in our  recommendation.
As noted in the report, a lack of clear accountability and authority within  the department to coordinate actions intended to improve contract  management and oversight has hindered DOD’s ability to systematically  address its difficulties regarding contractor support in the past. We  continue to believe that a single focal point with clearly defined roles and  responsibilities is critical if DOD is to effectively address these long- standing problems and we therefore encourage the department to clearly  identify the roles and responsibilities of the office of the Assistant Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) in implementing and  overseeing each of the corrective actions discussed in our  recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202)  512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors include David A. Schmitt, Assistant  Director; Vincent Balloon, Carole F. Coffey, Grace Coleman, Laura  Czohara, Wesley A. Johnson, James A. Reynolds, Kevin J. Riley, and Karen  Thornton.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting  deployed forces, we met with DOD, Joint Staff, and service headquarters  officials to obtain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts in  addressing the issues raised in our June 2003 report. We also reviewed  changes to key DOD and DOD component policies and other guidance. In  some instances, guidance was not available. For example, guidance was  not available on the appropriate number of personnel needed to monitor  contractors in a deployed location. In those instances, we relied on the  judgments and views of DOD officials and contract oversight personnel  who had served in deployed locations as to the adequacy of staffing. We  visited select DOD components and various military contracting  commands in the United States based on their role and responsibility in  managing and overseeing contracts that support deployed U.S. forces.  Because there was no consolidated list of contractors supporting deployed  forces available, we asked DOD officials at the components and  commands we visited to identify, to the extent possible, the extent of  contractor support to their deployed U.S. forces. We focused our efforts  on contractors supporting military operations in Iraq and elsewhere in  Southwest Asia because of the broad range of services contractors provide  U.S. forces in support of the Global War on Terrorism.
We held discussions with military commanders, staff officers, and other  representatives from five Army divisions and one Marine Expeditionary  Force as well as various higher headquarters and supporting commands  that deployed to Iraq or elsewhere in Southwest Asia during the 2003-2006  time frame to discuss their experiences working with contractors and the  challenges they faced managing and overseeing contractors in a deployed  location. Specifically, we met with unit officials responsible for such  functions as contracting and contract management, base operations and  logistical support, and force protection and intelligence. These units were  selected because, for the most part, they had recently returned from  Southwest Asia and unit officials had not yet redeployed or been  transferred to other locations within the United States. We also met with  representatives from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for  International Development to discuss the extent to which they have  visibility over contractors supporting their activities in Iraq. In addition,  we traveled to deployed locations within Southwest Asia, including Iraq, to  meet with deployed combat units and to discuss the use of contractor  support to deployed forces with various military commanders, installation  commanders, headquarters personnel, and other military personnel  responsible for contracting and contract management at deployed  locations.
We met with 26 U.S. and foreign contractors who provide support to DOD  in Southwest Asia to discuss a variety of contracting and contract  management issues. For example, we held discussions with contractors to  obtain an understanding of the types of services they provide deployed  U.S. forces and the difficulties they have experienced providing those  services to DOD in a deployed location. The contractors we met with  reflected a wide range of services provided to deployed forces, including  theater support, external support, and systems support, and represented  both prime contractors and subcontractors.
We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:    Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, VA; Houston, TX;    Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, Washington, DC    Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, DC    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,    U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL    U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:    J-3 Operations, Washington, DC    J-4 Logistics, Washington, DC    J-7 Operational Plans and Interoperability, Washington, DC    J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, Washington, DC  Department of the Army:    Headquarters, Washington, DC    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 Personnel    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 Logistics    Army Contracting Agency, Fort McPherson, GA; Fort Drum, NY; Fort    Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, VA    Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL    Program Executive Office, Aviation    Program Executive Office, Missiles & Space    Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, IL    Program Office, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program    Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ    Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, MI    Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, VA    Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA    Combined Armed Support Command, Fort Lee, VA    Stryker Brigades, Fort Lewis, WA    3rd Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat Team     1st Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat Team    Task Force Olympia    593rd Corps Support Group    U.S. Army Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA    3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA    703rd Brigade Support Battalion    10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY  Department of the Navy:    Headquarters, Washington, DC    Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition    1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA  Department of the Air Force:    Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH    Program Office, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, Tyndall Air    Department of State, Washington, DC    U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC    CACI International, Arlington, VA    Dimensions International, Inc. Sterling Heights, MI    DUCOM, Inc., Sterling Heights, MI    DynCorp International, Irving, TX    General Dynamics Land Systems, Fort Lewis, WA    Kellogg, Brown and Root, Houston, TX; Arlington, VA    L-3 Communications Corp.
L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support, Reston, VA    Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control, Dallas, TX    Mantech International, Chantilly, VA    M7 Aerospace, San Antonio, TX    PWC Logistics, Kuwait    Readiness Management Support, Panama City, FL    SEI Group, Inc., Huntsville, AL    Triple Canopy, Inc., Herndon, VA  The overseas activities and contractors we visited, by country, were:    Camp Victory, U.S. Military    Multi-National Force-Iraq    Multi-National Corps-Iraq    Defense Contract Management Agency    4th Infantry Division   Kellogg, Brown and Root    L-3 Communications Corp.
L-3 Communications ILEX Systems, Inc.    L-3 Government Services, Inc.
International Zone, U.S. Military    Multi-National Force-Iraq    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,    Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Regional Division    Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan International Zone, Contractors    L-3 Communications Corp.
L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support    Private Security Company Association of Iraq   Logistics Support Area Anaconda, U.S. Military    Logistics Support Area Anaconda Garrison Command    3rd Corps Support Command    Aerial Port of Debarkation operations    Program Management Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles   Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Contractors    AAI Corporation    DynCorp International    General Atomics Aeronautical Systems    General Dynamics Land Systems    L-3 Communications Corp.
Camp Arifjan, U.S. Military    Coalition Forces Land Component Command    Area Support Group, Kuwait    Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia    Army Field Support Brigade, Southwest Asia    Army Materiel Command   U.S. Embassy, Kuwait City    Ahmadah General Trading & Contracting Co.    British Link Kuwait    Combat Support Associates    Computer Sciences Corporation  IAP World Services  ITT Industries    Kellogg, Brown and Root    Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co.    Tamimi Global Co.
Kellogg, Brown and Root    Prime Projects International  We conducted our review from August 2005 through October 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees  Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S.  Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose. GAO-06- 999R. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private  Security Providers. GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security  Providers. GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD’s and Interior’s Orders to  Support Military Operations. GAO-05-201. Washington, D.C.: April 29,  2005.
Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further  Improve the Management of the Army’s LOGCAP Contract. GAO-05-328.  Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005.
Military Operations: DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support  Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight. GAO-04-854. Washington,  D.C.: July 19, 2004.
Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed  Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans. GAO-03-695.  Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003.
Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost  in the Balkans. GAO/NSIAD-00-225. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2000.
Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil  Augmentation Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 1997.