Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; Effect on Mission Performance Appears Mixed
Published: 2006-09-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The marine transportation system is a critical part of the nation's infrastructure. To facilitate the safety and efficiency of this system, the Coast Guard maintains aids-to-navigation (ATON), such as buoys and beacons, and conducts domestic icebreaking in the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence Seaway, and northeast coast. To conduct these missions, the Coast Guard has a fleet of more than 200 vessels, ranging from 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders and 140-foot domestic icebreakers to 21-foot boats. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many of these assets took on additional responsibilities for security patrols and other homeland security duties. Although some assets have been recently acquired, many others are reaching or have exceeded their design service lives, raising concerns about how well and for how much longer these older assets may be able to carry out their missions. In response, GAO examined (1) recent trends in the amount of time these assets have spent performing missions; (2) asset condition and its effect on mission performance; and (3) the actions taken by the Coast Guard to continue to achieve the missions of these assets. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, interviewed Coast Guard officials, and made site visits to various locations around the country. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Coast Guard provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Many ATON vessels and domestic icebreakers have operated more hours in recent years than in previous years, with the increase coming mainly in homeland security missions. Domestic icebreakers are now used more for homeland security than for icebreaking, reflecting their availability at times of the year when no icebreaking is needed. While not designed for homeland security, the assets can perform such duties acceptably, according to the Coast Guard. Most ATON vessels are used primarily for ATON activities. Newer ATON assets receive the greatest use on other missions, reflecting their greater multi-mission capabilities. Trends are mixed with regard to asset condition and mission performance. Available evidence, such as the amount of maintenance conducted, suggests condition is declining for some assets, though not precipitously. Coast Guard officials said some assets, while being operated for more hours, are still largely being operated within planned limits. Against this backdrop, indicators for measuring performance show mixed results: some have declined, while others have not. The current measure for asset condition is not clearly linked to mission performance, but the Coast Guard is working on developing a measure that links the two. Actions the Coast Guard has taken to continue to achieve the missions of these assets include revising maintenance approaches and developing a new analytical tool for deciding which projects provide the most capability for the dollars invested. The Coast Guard continues to acquire some new vessels to replace aging ones, but proposals to rehabilitate or replace other aging vessels have not been implemented, largely because of other funding priorities. The Coast Guard also studied the feasibility of contracting out some activities. While some possibilities for outsourcing were identified in the study, the Coast Guard has identified potential disadvantages to outsourcing these activities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The marine transportation system, which allows for the transportation of  The marine transportation system, which allows for the transportation of  people and goods on the water, is a vast and critical part of the nation’s  people and goods on the water, is a vast and critical part of the nation’s  infrastructure. The system includes coastal ports and shipping channels;  infrastructure. The system includes coastal ports and shipping channels;  25,000 miles of navigable inland and coastal channels and waterways like  25,000 miles of navigable inland and coastal channels and waterways like  the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, Columbia and Snake rivers; and shipping on  the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, Columbia and Snake rivers; and shipping on  the Great Lakes. Ninety-five percent of the United States’ overseas trade  the Great Lakes. Ninety-five percent of the United States’ overseas trade  tonnage moves by water, and the cargo moving through the U.S. marine  tonnage moves by water, and the cargo moving through the U.S. marine  transportation system contributes hundreds of billions of dollars to the  transportation system contributes hundreds of billions of dollars to the  U.S. gross domestic product. This system also enables the swift  U.S. gross domestic product. This system also enables the swift  mobilization and supply of America’s military as well as providing  mobilization and supply of America’s military as well as providing  recreational value to millions of boaters, fishermen, and cruise passengers.  recreational value to millions of boaters, fishermen, and cruise passengers.
The Coast Guard is responsible for, among other things, providing a safe,  The Coast Guard is responsible for, among other things, providing a safe,  efficient, and navigable waterway system, and it carries out this role  efficient, and navigable waterway system, and it carries out this role  through its aids-to-navigation (ATON) and domestic icebreaking missions.  through its aids-to-navigation (ATON) and domestic icebreaking missions.  In its ATON mission, the Coast Guard establishes and maintains over  In its ATON mission, the Coast Guard establishes and maintains over  53,000 navigational aids, such as buoys and beacons, to assist mariners  53,000 navigational aids, such as buoys and beacons, to assist mariners  and prevent disasters, collisions, or wrecks. To carry out this mission, the  and prevent disasters, collisions, or wrecks. To carry out this mission, the  Coast Guard uses a diverse fleet of more than 200 vessels ranging from  Coast Guard uses a diverse fleet of more than 200 vessels ranging from  225-foot buoy tenders to 21-foot boats that can be transported on trailers  225-foot buoy tenders to 21-foot boats that can be transported on trailers  by truck. In its domestic icebreaking mission, the Coast Guard breaks ice  by truck. In its domestic icebreaking mission, the Coast Guard breaks ice  in the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway, and the northeast U.S. coast.  in the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway, and the northeast U.S. coast.
The Coast Guard is also responsible for operating and maintaining the nation’s fleet of  polar icebreakers. We did not examine those polar icebreaking assets as part of this review. mission, the Coast Guard largely relies on 11 65-foot and 9 140-foot  icebreaking cutters.
While some of these vessels have come on line in the past few years, many  are old and are reaching or have exceeded their designed service lives.  Their age has raised concerns within the Coast Guard as to how well and  for how much longer they will be able to carry out their missions. In  addition, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many ATON and  icebreaking vessels took on additional responsibilities for security patrols  and other homeland security activities. In this context, this report  examines (1) the recent trends in the amount of time ATON and domestic  icebreaking assets have spent performing various missions and the impact  of these trends on their primary missions; (2) the condition of the ATON  and domestic icebreaking assets and the impact of their condition on  performing their primary missions; and (3) the actions the Coast Guard  has taken to continue to achieve the missions of its ATON and domestic  icebreaking assets.
To address the first two objectives, we analyzed a variety of Coast Guard  data and records, focusing on fiscal years 2001 through 2005. We also  made site visits to assets located on the West and East Coasts, Gulf Coast,  Great Lakes, and inland rivers and met with the assets’ crews to obtain  their views on the condition of their assets. These assets were selected to  provide diversity in terms of type, age of asset, and geographic location.  To address the third objective, we met with Coast Guard officials at  headquarters to discuss recent acquisitions and specific management  actions they have taken or are in the process of taking. We also obtained  and reviewed information and documents on the Coast Guard’s plans to  rehabilitate or replace the assets or study outsourcing to carry out  missions. More details on our scope and methodology can be found in  appendix I of this report. We conducted our work between July 2005 and  August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The US Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within the  Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard has responsibilities  that fall under two broad missions—homeland security and non–homeland  security. (See table 1.)
One of the Coast Guard’s strategic goals is maritime mobility, that is, to  facilitate maritime commerce, eliminate interruptions and impediments to  the movement of goods and people, and maximize access to and  enjoyment of the water. The two non-homeland security missions through  which the Coast Guard achieves this goal are aids–to-navigation (ATON)  and domestic icebreaking, which is part of ice operations.
Aids-to-Navigation Mission  Through its ATON mission, the Coast Guard promotes safe waterways and  an efficient Marine Transportation System. The Coast Guard has statutory  responsibility to operate and maintain a system of maritime aids to  facilitate navigation and to prevent disasters, collisions, and wrecks. To  fulfill this mission, the Coast Guard operates over 53,000 aids. These aids- to-navigation are like road signs of the waterways and are placed along  coasts and navigable waters as guides to mark safe water and to assist  mariners in determining their position in relation to land and hidden  dangers. These aids consist of both floating aids, such as buoys, and fixed  aids, such as lights or signs mounted on pilings. See figure 1 for an  example of a buoy and fixed aid-to-navigation.
The Coast Guard uses several types of vessels to place and service its aids-  to-navigation such as buoy tenders, construction tenders, and boats that  make up its ATON fleet. These vessels are used to perform both periodic  routine maintenance of aids and discrepancy response, when, for example,  a light is extinguished or a buoy is moved from its intended location. The  assets are shown in table 2.
subsections: section_title: Domestic Icebreaking Mission
paragraphs: Domestic icebreaking is a key component of the Coast Guard’s ice  operations mission, which facilitates the safe and efficient navigation on  lakes, rivers, channels, and harbors during the winter season. The Coast  Guard has statutory icebreaking responsibilities that are additionally  addressed by an executive order that directs the Coast Guard to break ice  in channels and harbors in order to keep them open to navigation. Like  plowing snow-covered roads, the Coast Guard keeps areas of water open  as much as is reasonably possible for commercial traffic in winter. It also  performs icebreaking for search and rescue and prevention of flooding by  ice. To conduct this mission, the Coast Guard uses assets that are specially  designed with strengthened hulls. The key icebreaker types the Coast  Guard uses are shown in table 3.
The Coast Guard classifies its vessel assets, such as those used in the  ATON and domestic icebreaking missions, as cutters (assets 65 feet long  or longer with adequate accommodations for crew to live on board) or  boats (assets less than 65 feet in length that usually operate near shore and  on inland waterways). For purposes of this report, the three main asset  groups are ATON cutters, ATON boats, and domestic icebreakers.
section_title: Icebreaking and ATON Assets Show Significant Increases in Time Spent on Homeland Security Missions since 2001
paragraphs: Since 2001, the Coast Guard’s domestic icebreakers and ATON cutters  have experienced significant increases in the time spent conducting  missions related to homeland security. Most of this increase has come in  the Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission, which  involves such activities as conducting security patrols and escorting  vessels. The increase was greatest for domestic icebreakers, which  continue to be used more for homeland security missions than for  icebreaking because of their availability during months when no  icebreaking is needed. By contrast, ATON cutters and boats still spend  most of their time on ATON-related activities, reflecting the year-round  nature of the ATON mission. Some newer ATON cutters with greater  multi-mission capabilities, however, continue to have a more diverse  workload. Coast Guard officials said icebreakers and ATON vessels, while  less than ideal for carrying out security missions, can perform these  missions adequately.
subsections: section_title: Domestic Icebreakers Show the Largest Increase in Time Spent on Homeland Security Missions
paragraphs: During fiscal years 2001 through 2005, the domestic icebreakers divided  their time between several of the Coast Guard’s 11 missions, but PWCS  activities accounted for roughly half of all resource hours during fiscal  years 2002 through 2005. PWCS activities grew quickly from 15 percent of  total resource hours in fiscal year 2001 to 53 percent in fiscal year 2002,  and they have remained at 44 percent or more of total hours through fiscal  year 2005. At the same time, icebreaking hours began at 41 percent in  fiscal year 2001 and then dropped down to 13 percent in 2002, but ended at  26 percent in fiscal year 2005. The vast majority of this increase in PWCS  has occurred in the New York City area with smaller increases in other  East Coast ports. As figure 2 shows, the increase came about largely by  adding to the total number of hours these assets were operated. The total  number of resource hours for these assets grew from about 12,000 hours  in fiscal year 2002 to a high of about 20,000 the following year.
The increase in PWCS hours for domestic icebreakers mainly reflects their  availability during those months when no icebreaking needs to be done.  Icebreaking needs are typically greatest from December 15 to April 15.  Coast Guard officials said that because icebreakers do not have a primary  summertime mission, using them to conduct PWCS missions during slack  periods has not limited the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct routine  icebreaking missions. Icebreaking hours, however, did see some marked  shifts during this period—most notably a decrease in fiscal year 2002  followed by a substantial increase in fiscal year 2003. The decrease in 2002  appears related to two main factors: a mild winter, during which the Great  Lakes region was virtually free of ice throughout December and most of  January, and a change in the way the Coast Guard accounted for its use of  icebreakers. The Coast Guard does not record resource hours under two  mission categories simultaneously, and prior to the attacks on September  11, 2001, resource hours used to break ice while escorting a vessel with  hazardous cargo would only have been recorded as ice operations. After  the attacks, these same hours could be logged either as PWCS or  icebreaking at the discretion of the vessel’s commanding officer. The  increase in ice operations hours for fiscal year 2003 reflected an unusually  severe winter in the Great Lakes.
Increased workloads have placed some icebreakers above the maximum  number of recommended operating hours for the assets. The maximum  recommended operating level, called an “underway hours limit,” reflects  maximum use established from planning documents, missions, and  maintenance requirements, and historic use. In particular, the 65-foot  small harbor tug fleet exceeded their underway hours limit from fiscal  years 2001 to 2003 by increasingly more hours, starting with being   10 hours over the underway limit in 2001 and progressing to nearly   2,000 hours over the underway limit in 2003. In contrast, the 140-foot  icebreaking tugs were operated within their underway hours limit from  2001 to 2005.
Coast Guard officials said domestic icebreakers, while not their vessel of  choice for maritime security missions, can perform all PWCS missions  adequately except for shore side patrols. The Coast Guard’s 87-foot  coastal patrol boats are the preferred assets for PWCS missions.  Commissioned since 1998, these boats can travel at up to 25 knots and  have a system that allows the crew to launch and recover small boats.  Relative to these vessels, domestic icebreakers show both advantages and  disadvantages (see table 4). Icebreakers are more capable of operating in  cold weather, and their substantial size provides a significant presence on  the waterways, but they are slower, less able to launch small boats, and  pose increased training challenges for training crews in law enforcement.
section_title: Increase in Homeland Security Missions Is Less Extensive for ATON Assets
paragraphs: ATON assets also experienced an increase in use for homeland security  missions after September 11, 2001, but to a much lesser degree than for  domestic icebreakers. Overall, ATON assets were used for several of the  Coast Guard’s missions during fiscal years 2001 through 2005, but ATON  remained the primary mission, accounting for more than 85 percent of the  fleet’s total resource hours for fiscal years 2001 to 2005. Time spent in  PWCS activities increased from 4 percent of total resource hours in fiscal  year 2001 to 10 percent in fiscal year 2002; since then, PWCS mission  hours have steadily decreased (see fig. 3). Overall, PWCS activities  accounted for 6 percent of resource hours during the period.
When resource hours are analyzed more closely by type of ATON asset,  there are significant differences in the amount of hours used for the PWCS  mission. The increase in PWCS resource hours came primarily from  cutters (vessels ranging in length from 65 to 225 feet). Overall, ATON  activities account for about 79 percent of total resource hours for the  cutters, compared with about 90 percent for ATON boats (vessels less   65 feet in length). ATON boats were the only vessels that did not have as  much of an increase in PWCS resource hours immediately after the attacks  on September 11, 2001, though their use in PWCS activities did rise in  fiscal year 2003. Among the ATON cutters, the newer cutters have greater  multiple mission capabilities and consequently tend to be used more often  in other missions. For example, ATON cutters acquired between 1944 and  1976 performed an average of 4 of the Coast Guard’s 11 missions during  fiscal years 2001 through 2005, while the 225-foot seagoing buoy tender,  which the Coast Guard completed the acquisition of in 2004, was used in  all 11 of the Coast Guard’s missions in fiscal years 2004 through 2005.
section_title: Available Evidence Indicates Condition of Assets Varies Greatly and Mixed Impact on Mission Performance
paragraphs: The available evidence does not give a consistent picture of how usage  trends may be affecting the condition of these assets and, ultimately, the  Coast Guard’s ability to meet performance goals for icebreaking and  ATON missions. We analyzed three types of evidence related to  condition—the Coast Guard’s primary measure for reporting asset  condition, overall trends in maintenance expenditures on each type of  asset, and a body of anecdotal evidence gathered primarily through  interviews with Coast Guard personnel and site visits to various  installations. The Coast Guard’s primary condition measure shows some  assets meeting the operating standard and others falling below it.  However, the current measure for asset condition is not clearly linked to  mission performance, but the Coast Guard is working on developing a  measure that links the two. Trends in maintenance costs and the anecdotal  evidence we gathered tend to indicate that asset conditions are declining,  though not substantially beyond what Coast Guard officials said they  would expect for vessels of this age. Performance indicators for the  icebreaking and ATON missions likewise show mixed results, with the  Coast Guard meeting some performance goals and not meeting others. In  part, these mixed results can be explained by the many other factors  besides asset condition, such as the severity of weather in any given year.
subsections: section_title: Current Condition Measure Is Limited and Does Not Show a Clear Pattern in Asset Condition
paragraphs: For icebreaking and ATON cutter assets, the Coast Guard’s key summary  measure of condition shows mixed results. This measure—percent of time  free (POTF)—of major casualties has been mixed. The Coast Guard’s  standard is 72 percent or better. Measured against this standard for fiscal  years 2000 through 2004, the various types of icebreakers and ATON  cutters vary considerably. As table 5 shows, some assets, such as the   65-foot small harbor icebreaking tugboat and the 65- and 75-foot river buoy  tenders met the standard nearly every year, while others such as the   140-foot icebreaking tugboat and the 75-foot, 100-foot, and 160-foot inland  construction tenders met it either not at all or only once during the 5-year  period. Fiscal year 2004 was the worst of the 5 years, with only two of the  eight types of cutters meeting the standard.
The Coast Guard’s condition measure for these assets, while instructive,  needs to be viewed with some caution. As we have reported in our  analysis of the condition of the Coast Guard’s legacy deepwater assets, the  measure captures only major equipment casualties, which degrade mission  capabilities but does not capture minor equipment casualties that may also  degrade mission capabilities. As such, this measure may underestimate  the decline in asset condition. The Coast Guard has acknowledged the  limitations of this measure and is working on a replacement for it, which  will better determine specific mission impacts.
The POTF condition measure applies to cutters; the Coast Guard only  recently started tracking POTF data for assessing condition trends on  ATON small boats. During the fiscal year 2000 through 2004 period we  reviewed, the Coast Guard did not have a centralized system for tracking  the condition of these boats. Its internal assessment of the condition of the  boats was based on two approaches, as follows:    For standard boats, which are purchased by Coast Guard headquarters  and have similar capabilities and equipment for all boats of a particular  type, the Coast Guard assessed condition by determining the boats’  remaining service lives through a process referred to as ship structure  and machinery evaluation boards (SSMEB). The SSMEB, which is  conducted 10 years after a boat is commissioned and is repeated at   5-year intervals, applied to two of the six types of ATON boats we  reviewed.
For nonstandard boats, which are purchased by individual Coast Guard  units for individual needs, the Coast Guard’s assessment was based on  anecdotal information from district boat managers, maintenance  managers, annual boat inspection reports, and site visits. This approach  was used on four of the six types of boats we reviewed.
Using these approaches, the Coast Guard characterized most of these  asset types as in fair to poor condition. By contrast, however, when the  Coast Guard assembled POTF data for a portion of these boats in fiscal  year 2005, the data did not support this assessment. The boats analyzed  had average scores above the Coast Guard’s goal of 72 percent. (App. III  provides further details on condition measures for each of the ATON and  domestic icebreaking assets.)
section_title: Increasing Maintenance Costs Indicate Possible Condition Issues
paragraphs: For our second measure—trends in maintenance expenditures—the  picture with regard to condition is more consistent than for our first  measure: maintenance expenditures for domestic icebreaking and ATON  cutters are increasing, even after taking inflation into account. We  analyzed three types of maintenance costs:    Scheduled maintenance costs, which are planned for in advance and  include such things as repainting the vessel;    Unscheduled maintenance costs, which are for unforeseen  emergencies; and    Engineering Logistic Center (ELC) costs, which include fleetwide  projects that require engineering assistance (such as checking for  watertight integrity) and therefore cannot be handled at the unit level.  These projects, such as replacing a generator, help sustain capability  but do not enhance it, according to Coast Guard officials.
While there are some asset-by-asset variations, total maintenance costs for  domestic icebreakers and ATON cutters increased during the period we  examined (fiscal years 2001 through 2005). As figure 4 shows, total  annual maintenance costs for domestic icebreakers nearly doubled, from  slightly more than $3 million to slightly more than $6 million. The increase  came primarily in two of the three categories in most years—scheduled  maintenance costs and ELC costs. Although maintenance costs are also  affected by the amount of funding available in any given year, according to  Coast Guard officials, maintenance managers have discretion to move  some funds to those assets most in need of maintenance money. Coast  Guard officials have also said that these costs are indicative of condition  issues. For example, an ELC official said that the increase in ELC costs  was related to condition because the money was used for the overhaul of  domestic icebreakers. In addition to the amount of funding available in  any given year, these maintenance costs can also be impacted by a variety  of other factors such as the pace of operations. For example, maintenance  costs can be expected to increase as the pace of operations increases.
Total annual cost increases for ATON cutters showed a similar trend, more  than doubling from over $13 million to over $32 million during the 5-year  period (see fig. 5). For ATON cutters, cost increases were greatest in ELC  maintenance and unscheduled maintenance. As with icebreakers, Coast  Guard officials considered these expenditures to be related to asset  condition.
section_title: Evidence Gathered from Interviews, Site Visits, and Other Records also Indicate Condition Issues
paragraphs: Evidence we gathered during our discussions with maintenance personnel,  our visits to various Coast Guard installations, and our review of other  Coast Guard records also pointed to declining condition of a number of  these assets. However, according a program manager who previously  served as a commanding officer on an icebreaker, for some of the older  assets, the decline in condition of those assets has not been beyond what  would be expected of assets 20 years or more in age. During our  interviews and site visits, Coast Guard personnel reported to us that crew  members have had to spend increasingly more time and resources to  troubleshoot and resolve maintenance issues on older domestic  icebreaking and ATON assets. They indicated that because the systems  and parts are outdated compared with the technology and equipment  available today, it can be challenging and time consuming to diagnose a  maintenance issue and find parts or determine what corrective action to  take. For example, the propulsion control system on the 140-foot  icebreaking tugs uses circuit cards that were state-of-the-art when the tugs  were commissioned in the late 1970s to 1980s but are no longer  manufactured today and have been superseded by computer control  systems (see fig. 6). Coast Guard personnel said the lack of a readily  available supply of these parts has forced maintenance personnel to order  custom made parts or refurbish the faulty ones, increasing the time and  money it takes to address maintenance problems. Finding knowledgeable  individuals to identify problems with outdated equipment is difficult, they  said, which further complicates maintenance. Crews of other assets we  visited also confirmed the difficulty of diagnosing problems and obtaining  replacement parts for other critical subsystems such as the main diesel  engines.
Since at least 2002, the Coast Guard has been on record as saying these  assets are in decline. In a mission needs analysis issued that year, the  Coast Guard concluded that its domestic icebreaking and ATON assets  were affected in varying degrees with respect to safety, supportability,  environmental compliance, and habitability, and that addressing these  issues would require replacing or rehabilitating the assets. The analysis  noted that the need to replace or rehabilitate inland buoy tenders and   45-foot buoy boats had been identified as early as 1993 but had not yet  been addressed. It also noted that the 21-foot trailerable aids-to- navigation boats and the 55-foot aids-to-navigation boats—most of which  have yet to be replaced—had been extended beyond their projected  service lives.
When we asked Coast Guard officials if current usage patterns were  precipitating the decline of these assets, they said that overages can have  an impact on some assets, especially those with more complex systems  and subsystems. The officials said that exceeding planned usage limits  may leave less time to maintain these systems. They said that the  deterioration of an asset and its systems from usage consistently above the  limits would be reflected in periodic engineering assessments, known as  SSMEBs, of the assets. In our site visits, we did learn of one example in  which increased use of assets for security-related purposes may be  affecting condition. The example involves the 140-foot icebreakers, which  currently are being used extensively for security-related activities when  they are not engaged in icebreaking activity. According to Coast Guard  personnel, these icebreakers were designed to operate at maximum power  for icebreaking; however, maritime security missions typically require  several hours of idling, which is detrimental to the engine. Extended  periods of idling, they said, causes oil discharge and sludge build up in the  engine and mufflers. Thus, running assets in ways for which they were not  designed could result in faster degradation of their condition.
section_title: Performance Indicators for Icebreaking and ATON Missions Show Mixed Results
paragraphs: Against this backdrop of condition indicators, the Coast Guard’s measures  of performance for domestic icebreaking and ATON missions show mixed  results, with several indicators showing that mission performance has  been improving or largely unchanging, while at least one other indicator  indicates a decline.
For domestic icebreaking, the Coast Guard’s performance indicator is  the number of days that ice leads to closures of waterways in the Great  Lakes region—the region in which most domestic icebreaking activity  occurs. The Coast Guard’s performance goal is to have 2 or fewer  closure days during average winters. During fiscal years 2001 through  2005 the Coast Guard met this goal every year but 1. The exception was  fiscal year 2004, when waterways were closed for 4 days. According to  Coast Guard officials, however, vessel condition was not a factor in  waterway closures; instead, they were related to an icebreaker’s being  diverted to free a stuck vessel and to a response to a commercial  aircraft crash.
For ATON, the Coast Guard’s primary performance indicator is the  number of collisions, allisions, and groundings. Since these events  can cause deaths and injuries, environmental and property damage,  and lead to waterway closures that limit commercial and recreational  activity, a decline in this measure is an improvement. During fiscal  years 2001 through 2005, this measure declined—a positive  development (see fig. 7).
While the Coast Guard’s primary ATON performance indicator was  showing improvement, however, an important secondary measure was  showing an adverse effect. This indicator, which measures the  probability that an aid to navigation or a system of aids-to-navigation is  performing its specified function at any randomly chosen time and is  expressed as a percentage of total time, is the leading performance  measure used in managing the ATON program, according to Coast  Guard officials. This measure has steadily declined since fiscal year  2002 (see table 6), and since a smaller percentage means fewer aids are  available, a decline in this measure is an adverse development. Coast  Guard officials said some of this decline was attributable to the  condition of ATON cutters and boats for servicing the navigational  aids, but they were not able to estimate how much of the decline could  be attributed to this cause.
In other work, we have noted that the Coast Guard’s performance  indicators can be affected by multiple factors and that there are challenges  to using such measures in linking resources to results. The ability to meet  icebreaking goals, for example, can be affected by the severity of the  winter. In fact, when the Coast Guard met its goal for waterway closures  in fiscal year 2005, Coast Guard officials attributed the result in part to less  severe average ice conditions than in previous years. Similarly, the ability  to keep navigational aids in working order can be adversely affected by  such uncontrollable factors as the severity of a hurricane or winter storm  season.
The Coast Guard has launched a number of initiatives designed to address  challenges in linking resources to results of these missions. These  initiatives followed program assessments conducted by the Office of  Management and Budget, which completed an assessment of the ATON  program in 2002 and the domestic icebreaking program in 2004. For the  ATON program, the assessment determined that the program did not  demonstrate results and recommended that the program have specific  long-term performance goals that focus on outcomes. The assessment of  the domestic icebreaking program determined that the program was  effective, but that more ambitious performance targets needed to be set.   In response to these findings, the Coast Guard has worked to set long-term  performance targets and develop new measurement frameworks to align  with OMB’s recommendations.
section_title: To Continue to Achieve the Missions of Its ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, the Coast Guard Has Taken Actions, Made Proposals, and Studied Outsourcing Possibilities
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has considered or proposed a wide variety of actions to  continue to achieve the missions that its domestic icebreaking and ATON  assets perform and is moving ahead with several of them. Actions under  way include developing new ways to measure asset condition, manage  boat and cutter maintenance, and make choices about which maintenance  projects to conduct. The Coast Guard has also acquired some new buoy  tenders and a new icebreaker, though the bulk of its icebreaking and  ATON fleet remains at or beyond projected service lives. Coast Guard  officials stated that to determine whether and when to replace or  rehabilitate aging assets, factors such as the assets’ condition and trends in  maintenance costs, among other things, are taken into account. Proposals  to systematically rehabilitate or replace these assets have been denied or  deferred by DHS or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),  apparently due to competition from initiatives such as the $24-billion  Deepwater project for replacing or renovating other Coast Guard vessels  and aircraft. In response, the Coast Guard has separated the proposals into  smaller parts and is trying to fund some projects from within the Coast  Guard’s budget. Finally, the Coast Guard studied what mission activities  make the best business case for outsourcing of functions to the private  sector, but states that potential disadvantages to outsourcing exist such as  loss of capabilities and inability to retain personnel.
subsections: section_title: Actions Have Been Taken to Manage Assets and Acquire Some New Ones
paragraphs: Three main steps to manage assets are under way, and several acquisitions  have been completed in both the icebreaking and ATON fleets.
subsections: section_title: Coast Guard Is Developing a More Robust Condition Measure
paragraphs: The Coast Guard is working on the development of a new measure to  track an asset’s condition. As mentioned above, the Coast Guard’s  previous measure, percent of time free of major casualties, did not capture  the extent to which equipment casualties degraded mission capabilities.  Called “percent of time fully mission capable,” this new measure is  intended to more directly link a cutter’s condition to its mission capability.  Developed after our examination of the condition of deepwater assets, this  measure will be used for ATON and domestic icebreaking assets as well.  For the new measure, the Coast Guard is developing codes that rank the  degree of importance of each piece of a cutter’s equipment to each mission  that the cutter could perform. The Coast Guard plans to use these codes in  casualty reports, providing engineers and operators with information  about the impact of equipment casualties on each possible mission. This  information will then be used in calculating the condition measure for  each cutter class and mission. This information would allow Coast Guard  officials to determine, for example, the degree of icebreaking capability of  its domestic icebreaking fleet at any given time. Coast Guard officials said  they expect final approval of this measure this year.
section_title: Coast Guard Is Implementing New Approaches to Manage ATON Boat and Cutter Maintenance
paragraphs: The Coast Guard is implementing a centralized boat maintenance initiative  to improve the management of its boat fleet, which includes many ATON  boats. In contrast to the previous approach in which local boat operators  managed boat maintenance and oversaw the spending of maintenance  funds, the new initiative places management of boat maintenance and  expenditures with naval engineers. According to the Coast Guard, the key  advantages of this initiative include standardized maintenance practices  for the boats, better oversight of maintenance funding, and enhanced  tracking and analysis of casualties. In addition, it should improve the  tracking of the condition of the Coast Guard’s small boat fleet, which has  lacked a centralized tracking system. Known as Centralized Boat  Maintenance Management, this initiative is expected to be rolled out Coast  Guard-wide by fiscal year 2008 if adequate resources and personnel are  available.
Since 2002, the Coast Guard has also been gradually implementing a  maintenance approach called “condition based maintenance” for select  subsystems and parts of its newer coastal and seagoing buoy tending  cutters. Under this approach, the condition of a part or subsystem, such  as the main diesel engine, is evaluated or assessed at regular intervals to  determine whether it needs to be replaced or have maintenance  performed. Parts or systems would be replaced or receive maintenance  only if their condition showed excessive wear or did not perform at an  acceptable level. Under the previous approach, maintenance occurred at  time-based intervals even if the part showed no excessive wear or  performed acceptably. The key advantage of the change, according to  Coast Guard officials, is reduced costs. For example, the Coast Guard  estimated that it reduced drydock costs related to maintaining newer  coastal and seagoing buoy tenders $2 million in fiscal year 2005. The Coast  Guard is considering expanding the use of this maintenance approach to  other subsystems of the newer buoy tending assets and the new Great  Lakes icebreaker commissioned in 2006.
section_title: Coast Guard Is Developing a Tool to Better Prioritize Upgrades and Maximize Asset Capabilities
paragraphs: In 2002, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop a long-term  strategy to set and assess levels of mission performance. We found this  was an important step to take because it links investments to asset  capabilities and mission priorities so that the Coast Guard can better  decide how limited budget dollars should be spent. The Coast Guard has  been working to apply the principles behind such a strategy to (1) better  prioritize the projects needed to upgrade assets such as aging ATON and  domestic icebreakers and (2) obtain the greatest overall mix of capabilities  for its assets within its budget in order to maximize mission performance.  The tool it is developing is called the Capital Asset Management Strategy  (CAMS).
CAMS is designed to analyze the capability trade-offs for upgrades and  maintenance projects across asset classes, allowing the Coast Guard to  determine which combination of projects will provide the most capability  for the dollars invested. These analyses take into account such factors as  asset condition, the asset’s importance to specific missions, and the  relative importance of missions. The Coast Guard continues to refine  CAMS and expects to have it in full use beginning with the budget for  fiscal year 2009. The recommendations stemming from CAMS are intended  to augment the information currently provided to decision makers in the  budget development process.
section_title: Coast Guard Acquired Some New Assets
paragraphs: Since the 1990s, the Coast Guard has been able to replace buoy tenders  with new assets that represent about 15 percent of its current ATON fleet.  From 1996 to 2004, the Coast Guard commissioned 14 new 175-foot coastal  buoy tenders and 16 new 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders to replace an  aging fleet of 11 coastal and 27 seagoing buoy tenders that were built  between 1942 and 1971. The new buoy tenders have improved capabilities  such as the following:    A computerized positioning system that automates the task of holding  the vessel in place while working on a navigational aid. Previously, this  task had to be done manually, requiring the crew to constantly monitor  and maintain the vessel’s position, sometimes for up to 10 hours at a  time. The system relieves the crew of this task and reduces safety  concerns associated with crew fatigue.
Bow and stern thrusters to enhance the vessels’ maneuverability and  improve the crew’s ability to maintain position.
Hydraulic chain stoppers and winches to reduce the number of crew  members required to do the work and enhance safety (see   fig. 8).
Accommodations that allow for dual gender crews, increasing the  Coast Guard’s ability to allow women to serve on the vessels.
These and other features also allow the newer buoy tenders to carry out  other missions, according to a Coast Guard official involved in their design  and acquisition. Their size, stability, and maneuverability are useful for  such missions as search and rescue, homeland security, and law  enforcement, and they have specific capabilities for dealing with other  duties as skimming oil or mounting machine guns for security patrols.
With their sizeable fuel tanks and storage capacity, they can also serve as  logistics support platforms to restock vessels involved in drug interdiction  and other activities. For 7 weeks in 2005, for example, one tender served  as a supply platform for a Coast Guard vessel conducting drug interdiction  patrols. According to Coast Guard officials, this enabled the patrol vessel  to remain on patrol in the area for a longer period of time than it would  have otherwise with its limited fuel and storage capacities.
Besides the buoy tenders, the Coast Guard commissioned a new 240-foot  multimission icebreaker in 2006 to replace a 62-year-old icebreaker and an  aging buoy tender on the Great Lakes. The new icebreaker has enhanced  icebreaking capabilities and the same ATON capabilities as the newer  seagoing buoy tenders, enabling it to work on navigational aids in ice  conditions as well as during other times of the year when no icebreaking is  needed.
section_title: Additional Proposals to Rehabilitate or Replace Aging Assets Remain Largely Unfunded
paragraphs: Despite the new acquisitions, more than half of the assets in the domestic  icebreaking and ATON fleet have reached or are nearing the end of their  service lives. Coast Guard officials stated that they use a process that  considers information such as how close the assets are to the end of their  design life, the condition of the assets as determined by periodic  assessments, and trends in maintenance costs, among other things to  determine whether to rehabilitate or replace these aging assets. This  information is used to identify the asset types that are most in need of  replacement or major maintenance, and therefore should be given greater  consideration in maintenance planning and budgeting.
In 2002, the Coast Guard proposed options for systematically rehabilitating  or replacing 164 cutters and boats in these fleets. According to Coast  Guard officials, these options were proposed after determining that the  age, condition, and cost of operating these assets would diminish the  capability of the Coast Guard to carry out ATON and domestic icebreaking  missions over time without rehabilitation or replacement of some or all of  the assets. In 2004, it completed a preliminary analysis of four approaches,  including the status quo—that is, maintaining the existing fleet. This  analysis provided an estimate of the total life-cycle costs for each  approach over a 33-year period from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2037.  (See table 7 for a description of each approach.) Estimated costs ranged as  high as $8.5 billion; however, Coast Guard officials emphasized that these  estimates were preliminary and are not reliable. As a result, we are not  reporting these numbers in detail.
No funds have been allocated to pursue this project further, apparently  due to competing funding requests for replacing or rehabilitating other  Coast Guard assets. According to a Coast Guard program official, although  resource proposals to carry out this project were made during the budget  planning processes for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, the requests were  either deferred or denied by DHS or the Office of Management and Budget.  Coast Guard officials involved in the program said they were not aware of  the exact reasons why the requests were terminated or deferred. The  officials said that the funding demands from other major Coast Guard  programs already underway (such as the Deepwater program for replacing  or rehabilitating aircraft and cutters with greater at-sea capability) that  likely had higher priority in the competition for limited resources  combined with the large scope and size of the proposed project, may have  prevented the project from being funded.
Without specific funding to move the project forward, the Coast Guard has  attempted to break the project into smaller components and pursue  potential funding from within the Coast Guard’s budget, focusing on the  assets most in need of maintenance or replacement. In February 2006, the  Coast Guard began a project to replace its fleet of 80 trailerable aids-to-  navigation boats with new boats that have enhanced capabilities to do  ATON work as well as other missions. The enhanced capabilities include  equipment to lift navigational aids out of the water for service, more deck  space for working on these aids, an elevated work platform for working on  aids that are high in the water, and faster speeds to reduce transit times.  The Coast Guard intends for the new boats to be more multimission  capable. For example, their added speed and deck space will help with  search and rescue missions, and they will have gun mounts for use in law  enforcement or maritime security missions.
According to a Coast Guard official, this acquisition would cost  approximately $14.4 million if all 80 boats are purchased and would bring  on new boats over a 5-year period as funds allow. The Coast Guard  official responsible for the project said the Coast Guard intends to make  the purchases using a funding stream appropriated for the maintenance of  nonstandard boats that can be allocated to the boats with the most  pressing maintenance or recapitalization needs. Availability of these funds,  however, depends on the condition and maintenance needs of other  nonstandard boats; if this funding has to be applied to meet other needs,  such as unanticipated problems, it may not be available for purchasing  these boats.
Separate from this effort to acquire new trailerable boats, the Coast Guard  has made a request as part of the budget process to begin rehabilitating  aging river buoy and construction tenders. This project, which will focus  on rehabilitating the systems within the engine rooms of the assets, is  estimated to cost approximately $75 million. The Coast Guard plans to  include this project in future budget requests. Coast Guard officials  indicated that they were submitting this request because these assets were  determined to be in the worst condition.
section_title: Study Identified Outsourcing Possibilities but May Face Disadvantages to Implement
paragraphs: In 2004, the Coast Guard examined possibilities for outsourcing missions  in response to an OMB assessment of the ATON program. As a result of  that assessment, Coast Guard and OMB officials agreed to study which  ATON activities make the best business case for being performed by  contractors outside of the Coast Guard with minimal impact on the Coast  Guard’s ability to carry out its other missions. The subsequent study,  completed in April 2004, found that inland construction tenders spent  most of their resource hours on the ATON mission with minimal impact or  use in other missions and provided one of the best opportunities for  further study of outsourcing. However, the study did not quantify the  potential benefits that could be derived from outsourcing these activities.
In August 2006 the Coast Guard completed an analysis as to whether  ATON functions could feasibly be outsourced, and which parts, if any,  were inherently governmental in nature. The objective of this analysis  was to compare the Coast Guard's inland construction and river buoy  tender operating costs with representative private sector marine industry  costs and make recommendations regarding the feasibility to  commercially support and operate the inspection, servicing, and  contingency response capability of the ATON mission and assets.
According to Coast Guard officials, the results will be incorporated into  future acquisition plans for replacing the current capabilities represented  by inland construction tenders and river buoy tenders. This Coast Guard  analysis was finalized after we had completed our audit work. Therefore,  we were unable to obtain and review the study in time for the final  preparation of this report.
Although possibilities for outsourcing were identified, outsourcing also  carries potential disadvantages, according to Coast Guard program  officials. Potential disadvantages they mentioned include the following:    Outsourcing could lead loss of “surge” capability—that is, the capacity  to respond to emergencies or unusual situations. In part, this capability  may be needed within the ATON or icebreaking mission itself, such as  when a hurricane or ice destroys or damages a large number of  navigation aids. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard officials  stated that because the Coast Guard had ATON assets such as  construction tenders, crews were able to begin working immediately to  repair damaged aids and get the waterways open to maritime traffic  again. This “surge” capability may also be needed for other missions,  such as occurs when ATON assets can be used to support search and  rescue efforts. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example,  some ATON assets provided logistical support for first responders or  transported stranded individuals.
Outsourcing may disrupt the Coast Guard’s personnel structure and  weaken the agency’s ability to attract and retain personnel.  Specifically, they are concerned that outsourcing would likely reduce  opportunities that provide important experience for personnel to  advance in their careers and eliminate positions that typically have  more predictable work schedules than positions in some of the other  Coast Guard’s missions.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has been using its domestic icebreaking vessels and its  ATON assets to a lesser extent, to accommodate the need for additional  homeland security activities in the post-September 11 environment, and it  is doing so thus far largely without curtailing ATON or domestic  icebreaking activities or unduly straining these assets past their designed  workloads. The available evidence also indicates that despite some decline  in the condition of some asset types, the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its  aids-to-navigation and domestic icebreaking missions, as indicated by  mixed outcomes of its key mission performance measures, has not shown  clear trends of decline. Efforts by Coast Guard personnel to troubleshoot  operational problems and to take other steps to keep assets operating  appear to be one reason mission performance has not been further  affected, and many other factors, such as the harshness of a winter or the  severity of storm damage on navigation buoys and beacons, can also affect  performance results. For the present, however, the impact of these  additional mission responsibilities does not appear to be a cause for alarm.
That said, the future of these assets bears close watching. The fact that  many of the assets have or will be approaching the end of their design  service lives could mean the need for rehabilitated or new assets may  become more pressing in the future. Another issue is whether current  operations, both in level and types of usage, are adding to these costs and  incidents beyond what the Coast Guard would normally expect. For  example, operating domestic icebreakers beyond their underway hours  limit—could potentially accelerate the level of decline. If this is the case,  using these assets to meet security missions could be meeting the Coast  Guard’s immediate needs but accelerating the need for replacement or  rehabilitation. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard’s  attempt to systematically rehabilitate or replace its ATON and domestic  icebreaking fleet was proposed at a time when competing demands likely  caused postponements of requests for the needed funds. These competing  demands, reflected largely in the Coast Guard’s expensive and lengthy  Deepwater asset replacement program, will continue for some time, as will  other pressures on the federal budget. The Coast Guard is moving to  improve the process it uses to set budget priorities through actions such as  its new tool to link asset condition and funding decisions to better identify  the projects that will provide the most capability with the limited funds  that are available. Given that many of these actions are recent and need a  chance to work, it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness. However,  even as the Coast Guard takes steps to determine how best to replace or  rehabilitate its assets, limited budgetary resources combined with other  competing asset replacement programs already in process will likely  continue to challenge the Coast Guard to find sufficient resources to carry  out the options identified.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of  Homeland Security and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as  appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the  appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Homeland  Security; the Commandant of the Coast Guard; and other interested  parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines the time spent by the U.S. Coast Guard’s domestic  icebreaking and ATON assets on various missions, the condition of these  assets, and the actions the Coast Guard has taken to continue to achieve  the missions of these assets. Our work focused on three key questions:   (1) What are the recent trends in the amount of time these assets have  performed various missions? (2) What is the condition of the Coast  Guard’s ATON and domestic icebreaking assets and how has their  condition impacted the performance of their primary missions? (3) What  actions has the Coast Guard taken to continue to achieve the missions of  its ATON and domestic icebreaking assets?
In identifying trends in the amount of time spent on missions and the  impact of these trends, we analyzed data from the Coast Guard’s Abstract  of Operations (AOPS) database, which tracks resource hours for each  asset. For each asset type within our scope, we examined trends in the  number of resource hours spent between fiscal years 2001 and 2005  conducting each of the Coast Guard’s missions. To determine the  reliability of this data, we (1) reviewed the results of previous reliability  assessments we have conducted of this data for other work and   (2) confirmed with the AOPS program manager that the data and the  manner in which it is managed has not changed since the previous  assessment that would affect its reliability. We determined that the data  was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We supplemented  our analysis of these resource hours with documentation from interviews  with asset program managers and crews of ATON and domestic  icebreaking assets.
In assessing the condition of the assets during fiscal years 2001 to 2005, we  analyzed what Coast Guard officials identified as the best available  condition measures. We obtained concurrence from the Office of Naval  Engineering and the Office of Cutter Forces that the appropriate measures  to use for the condition of assets were percent of time free of major  casualties, scheduled/unscheduled/Engineering Logistics Center  maintenance costs, and estimated deferred maintenance costs. To  determine the reliability of this data, we (1) reviewed the results of  previous reliability assessments we have conducted of this data for other  work and (2) examined responses the Coast Guard provided to a  questionnaire we sent requesting updated information on the  administration and oversight of the databases. We determined that the  data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We  supplemented our analysis of these measures with documentation from  internal Coast Guard reports, as well as from interviews of asset program  managers at Coast Guard headquarters and crewmembers of the assets  located in the field. In addition to talking with crewmembers, we directly  observed the condition of various assets during our site visits to Alameda,  Calif; Bayonne, N.J.; Buchanan, Tenn; Baltimore, Md; Mobile, Ala; Seattle,  Wash; Sault St. Marie, Mich; and Atlantic Beach, N.C. These assets were  selected to provide diversity in terms of type and age of asset and  geographic location. In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard officials  with the Area Commands in Alameda, Calif., and Portsmouth, Va., as well  as in Districts 5 and 13.
To determine the actions that the Coast Guard has undertaken to continue  to achieve the missions of its ATON and domestic icebreaking assets, we  interviewed officials with the Coast Guard’s Engineering and Logistics  Center, Engineering and Logistics Directorate, Office of Naval  Engineering, Office of Boat Forces, and Office of Cutter Forces. To obtain  information on newer assets the Coast Guard has acquired, we also made  site visits to interview personnel and observe the assets in San Francisco,  Calif.; Atlantic Beach, N.C.; Baltimore, Md.; Cheboygan, Mich.; and Mobile,  Ala. To determine what proposals the Coast Guard has made to  rehabilitate or replace its ATON and domestic icebreaking assets, we  reviewed Coast Guard project documents and interviewed officials at  Coast Guard headquarters. We did not, however, verify the accuracy of the  cost estimates provided for those proposals. Finally, to determine the  work the Coast Guard has done to study the outsourcing of ATON and  domestic icebreaking mission activities and the potential impact of  outsourcing those activities, we interviewed Coast Guard officials at  headquarters as well as officials and crew members in the field. We also  reviewed the completed business case analysis of outsourcing  opportunities for ATON mission activities.
We performed our review from July 2005 to August 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005
paragraphs: Appendix II provides information on the number of resource hours Coast  Guard ATON and domestic icebreaking assets have spent on various Coast  Guard missions during fiscal years 2001 through 2005. The Coast Guard  maintains information, on a program-by-program basis, about how  resources, such as vessels, boats, and aircraft, are used. Each hour that  these resources are used is called a resource hour. Resource hours are  accumulated and reported by quarter and represent the time spent by the  Coast Guard’s major assets to conduct its programs. The table 8 shows by  asset type, the hours ATON and domestic icebreaking assets have spent on  each of Coast Guard’s missions for each fiscal year, from 2001 through  2005. The percentage of each asset types’ total fiscal year resource hours  that these hours represent is shown in parenthesis.
section_title: Appendix III: Condition Measure of ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 2000 to 2005
subsections: section_title: Condition Measure for ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Cutters
paragraphs: Appendix III provides information on the condition of the Coast Guard’s   ATON and domestic icebreaking assets. The Coast Guard’s key summary  measure of condition—percent of time free (POTF)—of major casualties  shows a mixed picture of condition for ATON and domestic icebreaking  cutters. However, the measure captures only major equipment casualties,  which degrade mission capabilities but does not capture minor equipment  casualties that may also degrade mission capabilities. As such, this  measure may underestimate the decline in asset condition. The Coast  Guard has acknowledged the limitations of this measure and is working on  a replacement for it. Because the Coast Guard is in the process of  developing a new condition metric and did not have fiscal year 2005 data  available, our analysis covers fiscal years 2000 through 2004. See table 9  for individual POTF figures for the ATON and domestic icebreaking cutter  assets for fiscal years 2000 through 2004.
section_title: Condition Measure for ATON Boats
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has less data for ATON boats, with POTF figures  available for only fiscal year 2005. Based on these figures most boats  appear to be in fair to poor condition. In addition to these figures, the  Coast Guard has performed an internal assessment of condition using two  approaches, one for standard and another for nonstandard boats. For  standard boats the Coast Guard assessed condition through a process  referred to as ship structure and machinery evaluation boards (SSMEB).  While, for nonstandard boats the Coast Guard assessed condition by  obtaining anecdotal evidence from district managers, maintenance  managers, annual boat inspection reports, and site visits. This internal  assessment, however, seems to further support our original finding that  the Coast Guard’s POTF figure may be underestimating condition. As you  will see in table 10 below, while the 45-foot buoy boat and 21-foot  trailerable aids-to-navigation boat had POTF percentages above 90  percent, their internal assessment of condition was rated at poor.
section_title: Appendix IV: Maintenance Trends of ATON Cutter and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005
subsections: section_title: Maintenance Trends
paragraphs: Appendix IV provides information on the maintenance costs spent on the  Coast Guard’s ATON cutter and domestic icebreaking assets during fiscal  years 2001 to 2005. Maintenance cost data for domestic icebreakers and  ATON cutters shows a consistent increasing trend. The cost figures are  broken out by scheduled (planned maintenance), unscheduled  (unforeseen maintenance), and Engineering Logistic Center (ELC)  (fleetwide projects that require engineering assistance) amounts, which  allow for a more specific analysis as to the type of increase being incurred.  Table 11 shows the individual maintenance cost data, adjusted for inflation  using 2005 dollars, for ATON cutters and domestic icebreakers for fiscal  years 2001 through 2005.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice  Issues, (202) 512-9610, or CaldwellS@gao.gov.
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the above, individuals making key contributions to this  report include Chuck Bausell, Melanie Brown, Steve Calvo, Michele Fejfar,  Geoffrey Hamilton, Christopher Hatscher, Stephanie Sand, Stan Stenersen,  Gladys Toro, and Friendly Vang-Johnson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are  Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816.  Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery  Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:  July 31, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and  Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information  Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.  GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006  Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and  Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January  31, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport  Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:  January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime  Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:  December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective  Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:  September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and  Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.  GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New  Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year  2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting  Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target  Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,  D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security.   GAO-04-315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime  Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be  Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require  Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,  D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation  Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New  Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in  Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports.   GAO-02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
Coat Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are  Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816,  Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2006.