Overseas Contingency Operations: Observations on the Use of Force Management Levels in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria
Published: 2016-12-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States has engaged in multiple efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria since declaring a global war on terrorism in 2001. Currently, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, U.S. forces are deployed under force management levels set by the administration. Force management levels and similar caps limit the number of U.S. military personnel deployed to a given region and have been a factor in military operations at least since the Vietnam War. Force management levels were also used to shape the drawdowns of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In June 2016, the President announced that the force management level for Afghanistan is 9,800. According to DOD, in September 2016 the United States authorized additional troops for Iraq and Syria, for a total of 5,262.
Today's testimony discusses some of the actions DOD has taken to maximize military capabilities while operating under force management levels in ongoing operations.
In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work related to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria since 2001.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Military officials planning for and executing operations under force management levels have taken various actions to maximize military capabilities deployed to countries under those limits, as discussed below:
Increased Engagement with Partner Nation Security Forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its engagement with partner nations through advise-and-assist missions that rely on partner nation security forces to conduct operations. While this action helps leverage U.S. resources, it can create complications for U.S. planners in terms of allocating capabilities and resources. In 2011, GAO reported that the Army and Marine Corps have faced challenges in providing the necessary field grade officers and specialized capabilities for advisor teams, as well as challenges regarding the effect on the readiness and training of brigades whose combat teams have been split up to source advisor teams. GAO made three recommendations related to advisor teams. DOD concurred and implemented two recommendations relating to improving the ability of advisor teams to prepare for and execute their mission.
Reliance on Airpower. DOD has relied on U.S. and coalition airpower to provide support to partner nation ground forces in lieu of U.S. ground combat capabilities. For example, since U.S. operations related to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began in August 2014, coalition members have dropped more than 57,000 munitions. Air-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems have also proved critical to commanders by providing them timely and accurate information. While effective, this reliance on air power is not without its costs or challenges. For example, the Secretary of Defense stated in February 2016 that the intensity of the U.S. air campaign against ISIS has been depleting U.S. stocks of certain weapons.
Increased Pace of U.S. Special Operations Deployments. DOD has increased its use of U.S. Special Operations Forces to increase its operational reach and maximize its capabilities under force management levels. However, the increased use of U.S. Special Operations Forces in operations has resulted in a high pace of deployments which can affect readiness, retention, and morale. GAO made 10 recommendations to DOD related to U.S. Special Operations Forces. DOD concurred or partially concurred and has implemented 7 recommendations relating to security force assistance activities and readiness of U.S. Special Operations Forces.
Increased Use of Contractors and Personnel on Temporary Duty. DOD relies on contractors to support a wide range of military operations and free up uniformed personnel to directly support mission needs. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq contractor personnel played a critical role in supporting U.S. troops and sometimes exceeded the number of deployed military personnel. However, the increased use of contractors and temporary personnel to provide support during operations has its challenges, including oversight of contractors in deployed environments. GAO made four recommendations to improve oversight of operational contract support. DOD concurred with all four, and has implemented three of them. GAO also made a recommendation that DOD develop guidance relating to costs of overseas operations, with which DOD partially concurred and which remains open.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO made 18 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. DOD has implemented 12 of them. Continued attention is needed to ensure that some recommendations are addressed, such as improving visibility in total Special Operations funding to determine whether opportunities exist to balance deployments across the joint force.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss some of the  actions the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to maximize military  capabilities while operating under force management levels in ongoing  operations. Currently, in Afghanistan and in the fight against the Islamic  State of Iraq and Syria, U.S. forces are deployed under force  management levels set by the administration. Force management levels  limit the number of U.S. military personnel deployed to a given region and  have been a factor in military operations at least since the Vietnam War.  Force management levels have also been used in the past to shape the  drawdown of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In June 2016, the  President announced the force management level for Afghanistan is  9,800. For Iraq and Syria, the Lead Inspector General for Overseas  Contingency Operations reported that, as part of Operation Inherent  Resolve, the United States authorized an additional 615 troops in  September 2016, bringing the total authorized forces in support of that  Operation to 5,262.,  While force management levels have long been used as a policy tool to  shape and direct the deployment of U.S. military forces, they can present  a unique challenge to military planners. Under joint doctrine, the joint  operational planning process consists of a set of logical steps to examine  the mission; develop, analyze, and compare courses of action; select the  best course of action; and produce a plan or order. The focus is on  defining the military mission and developing and synchronizing plans to  accomplish that mission. As Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation  Planning, states, “Planning begins with the end state in mind, providing a  unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused.” As  the process proceeds, the commander identifies the forces needed to  accomplish the concept of operations. Although force management levels may be part of the input as plans are developed, and may be taken into  account as existing plans are assessed and updated, they may also have  the effect of essentially reversing the planning order and establishing  resource limits that DOD planners and commanders need to adjust to or  work around as they develop and execute their plans.
My statement today discusses some of the actions DOD has taken to  maximize military capabilities when operating under a force management  level in its ongoing operations. This statement is based on our body of  work on DOD’s contractor oversight, its use of advise and assist teams,  key enablers in operations, and other GAO reports. To perform our prior  work, we analyzed DOD guidance and personnel and readiness data, and  we interviewed cognizant DOD officials involved in planning and  operations. The reports cited throughout this statement contain detailed  discussions of the scope of the work and the methodology used to carry it  out. The work on which this statement is based was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform audits to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: U.S. Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria
paragraphs: The U.S. government has engaged in multiple efforts in Afghanistan since  declaring a global war on terrorism in 2001 that targeted al Qaeda, its  affiliates, and other violent extremists. These efforts employ a whole-of- government approach that calls for the use of all elements of U.S.  national power to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates  and prevent their return. In March 2011, U.S. forces shifted their role from  carrying out combat operations to advising and assisting Afghan forces as  lead security responsibility was transitioned to Afghan forces.
U.S. government efforts for the global war on terrorism in Iraq began in  2003 with Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similar to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan,  U.S. military operations in Iraq shifted focus from combat and  counterinsurgency to that of an advising and training role for Iraqi security  forces. The U.S. and Iraqi governments signed an agreement in 2008 to  draw down U.S. forces in Iraq to a complete withdrawal no later than  December 31, 2011. In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)  emerged as a major force in Iraq and Syria. In September 2014, the  President announced the U.S. strategy to degrade and ultimate destroy  ISIS. Also in 2014, Congress passed and the President signed legislation  authorizing DOD to provide assistance, including training and equipment,  to vetted Syrian opposition forces to fight ISIS, among other purposes.  Similar legislation authorized assistance to military and other security  forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish  and tribal security forces or other local security forces with a national  security mission.
section_title: Use of Force Management Levels
paragraphs: Force management levels and similar caps are generally set by the  Executive Branch to limit or manage the number of military personnel  deployed at any one time to specific countries. Force management levels  can also be derived from various other sources. For example, we  reported that during the Balkan operations of the 1990s, DOD limited U.S.  troops to 15 percent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force in  Kosovo. Also, the overall number of U.S. forces may be limited by the  host nation to which they are deploying. Force management levels and  similar caps have been a factor in military operations for a long time— dating at least to the Vietnam War, during which troop ceilings were used  to manage the number of deployed U.S. forces. As such, operating under  limitations to the total number of deployed forces is something with which  DOD has become familiar.
The executive branch used force management levels to shape the  drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Iraq, U.S. forces drew  down from a peak of over 170,000 “boots on the ground” in November 2007 to their withdrawal at the end of 2011. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces  have drawn down from a peak of almost 100,000 in March 2011 to 9,300  as of the middle of 2016. In the current counter-ISIS fight in Iraq and  Syria, force management levels limited the initial deployment of forces  and have been increased over time to enable the deployment of  additional forces to carry out the mission.
section_title: Actions DOD Has Taken to Maximize Military Capabilities While Operating under Force Management Levels in Ongoing Operations
paragraphs: Military officials planning for and executing operations under force  management levels have taken various actions to maximize military  capabilities deployed to countries under those limits. For example, we  reported in 2013 that with the initial drawdown of forces in Afghanistan  starting in 2011, which occurred as U.S. forces shifted from carrying out  combat operations to advising and assisting Afghan forces, there were a  number of key areas that military planners and operational commanders  would have to consider regarding the military capabilities DOD retained in  Afghanistan to enable the success of Afghan partner forces. These would  include considerations regarding what types of key enablers—such as air,  logistics, intelligence, and medical evacuation support—were needed to  support Afghan National Security Forces. Similarly, as force management  levels in Afghanistan were further reduced to below 10,000 forces in early  2015, military planners and operational commanders faced more  fundamental issues about the structure of the U.S. presence in  Afghanistan. Among other things, planners had to consider how reduced  force levels would constrain resources for the advising mission, given for  example the increasing dedication of resources and personnel to base  force protection, the number of enduring base locations, and reduced  medical reach. As the force management level in Afghanistan has  continued to decline, these are the questions that military planners and  operational commanders continue to address through various actions.
Similarly, in the current counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria, planners  and commanders have been assessing how to maximize military  capabilities while providing the needed support for the mission they are  executing under current force management levels. Among the actions  DOD has taken to accomplish these goals in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria  is that of increasing its reliance on: (1) partner nation security forces; (2)  U.S. and Coalition airpower; (3) special operations forces; and (4)  contractor and temporary duty personnel.
subsections: section_title: Increased Engagement with Partner Nation Security Forces
paragraphs: One of the tools DOD has used to maximize the number of mission- focused personnel under a force management level to achieve its  objectives is to increase engagement with partner nation security forces  through a range of security cooperation efforts. For example, as part of  the overall transition of lead security from U.S. forces to Afghan National  Security Forces and the drawdown of U.S. forces after 2010, the U.S.  mission in Afghanistan shifted from a combat role to an advise-and-assist  mission. As a result, DOD has used a variety of approaches to provide  U.S. advisors to carry out the advise-and-assist mission. In early 2012,  the U.S. Army and Marine Corps began to deploy small teams of advisors  with specialized capabilities—referred to as Security Force Assistance  Advisory Teams—that were located throughout Afghanistan, to work with  Afghan army and police units from the headquarters to the battalion level,  and advise them in areas such as command and control, intelligence, and  logistics.
Relying on partner forces to conduct operations has both positive and  negative potential effects. On the positive side, limited U.S. capacity can  help to ensure partner forces take the lead, such as in Iraq, where Iraqi  Security Forces are leading the attack on Mosul as part of Operation  Inherent Resolve. However, as the Director of the Defense Intelligence  Agency stated, the Iraqi Security forces lack the capacity to defend  against foreign threats or sustain conventional military operations without  continued foreign assistance. For example, the recapture of the Iraqi city  of Sinjar in November 2015 and the Ramadi government center in  December 2015 depended on extensive coalition airstrikes and other  support. As a result, this can create complications for U.S. planners in  terms of allocating capabilities and resources within the force  management levels. In addition, in 2011 we reported on challenges DOD  has faced when supplying advise and assist teams, such as in providing  the necessary field grade officers and specialized capabilities. We also  found that splitting up brigade combat teams to source these advisor  teams had an effect on the readiness and training of those brigades. We  made three recommendations to the department to ensure that the  activities of individual advisor teams are more clearly linked to command  goals and to enhance the ability of advisor teams to prepare for and  execute their mission. DOD concurred with our recommendations and  has implemented two of them.
section_title: U.S. and Coalition Airpower
paragraphs: With a limited U.S. footprint under the current force management levels in  Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, DOD has relied on U.S. and coalition  airpower to provide support to partner ground forces in lieu of U.S. ground  combat capabilities. For example, U.S. Air Force Central Command  reported that since the 2011 drawdown began in Afghanistan, coalition  members have flown nearly 108,000 sorties and dropped approximately  16,500 munitions. Additionally, since U.S. operations related to ISIS  began in August 2014, coalition members have flown nearly 44,000  sorties and dropped more than 57,000 munitions. While effective,  according to senior DOD officials, this reliance on air power is not without  its costs or challenges. For example, according to the Secretary of  Defense in February 2016, the accelerating intensity of the U.S. air  campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria has been depleting U.S. stocks  of GPS-guided smart bombs and laser-guided munitions. As a result,  DOD requested an additional $1.8 billion in the fiscal year (FY) 17 budget  request to purchase more than 45,000 more of these munitions.  Furthermore, DOD is exploring the idea of increasing the production rate  of these munitions in the U.S. industrial base.
Similarly, airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)  systems have proved critical to commanders to support military  operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The success of ISR systems in  collecting, processing, and disseminating useful intelligence information has fueled growing a demand for more ISR support, and DOD has  increased its investments in ISR capabilities significantly since 2002.  According to a senior DOD official, as the United States reduces its  footprint in Afghanistan, it is imperative that U.S. intelligence collection  capabilities be constant and robust to support forces on the ground. With  respect to Iraq and Syria, according to this senior official, there is also a  need for significant ISR capabilities to develop and maintain situational  awareness of the security environment, particularly in the absence of a  large U.S. ground presence. As he noted, ISR platforms with full-motion  video capabilities have become fundamental to almost all battlefield  maneuvers, adversary detection, terrorist pattern-of-life development, and  force protection operations.
section_title: Increased Pace of U.S. Special Operations Deployments
paragraphs: In a force management level-constrained environment, DOD has  increased the use of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), who are  specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in  hostile or politically sensitive environments. As a result, these forces  increase the operational reach and capabilities of the limited number of  ground forces that can be deployed under a force management level.  However, SOF deployments in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and  Syria have placed significant demand on the force during this period. As  we reported in 2015, DOD has increased the size and funding of SOF  and has emphasized their importance to meeting national security  needs. Specifically, the number of authorized special operations military  positions, which includes combat and support personnel, increased from  about 42,800 in FY 2001 to about 62,800 in FY 2014. Funding provided  to U.S. Special Operations Command for special operations– specific  needs has more than tripled from about $3.1 billion in FY 2001 to about  $9.8 billion in in FY 2014, in FY 2014 constant dollars, including  supplemental funding for contingency operations. We made three  recommendations to the department to improve budget visibility for SOF  and to determine whether certain traditional SOF activities can be  transferred to or shared with conventional forces. DOD partially concurred  with our recommendations, and they remain open.
While DOD has taken some steps to manage the increased pace of  special operations deployments, we have reported that opportunities may  exist to better balance the workload across the joint force because  activities assigned to SOF can be similar to activities assigned to  conventional forces. Conventional forces have been expanding their  capabilities to meet the demand for missions that have traditionally been  given to SOF, such as stability operations, security force assistance, civil  security, and repairing key infrastructure necessary to provide  government services and sustain human life. For example, in 2012, we  reported that the services were taking steps and investing resources to  organize and train conventional forces capable of conducting security  force assistance based on identified requirements. We made two  recommendations: to improve the way in which the department plans for  and prepares forces to execute security force assistance, and to identify  and track security force assistance activities. DOD partially concurred  with and implemented both recommendations. Recently DOD began  establishing conventional forces, such as the Army’s regionally aligned  forces, with more extensive language and cultural skills, which are  capable of conducting activities previously performed primarily by SOF.
In a May 2014 report to Congress, DOD noted that SOF personnel have  come under significant strain in the years since September 11, 2001.  Both the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict and the commander of U.S. Special Operations  Command acknowledged in 2015 that SOF have sustained  unprecedented levels of stress during the preceding few years.  Specifically, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command  testified that continued deployments to meet the increasing geographic  combatant command demand, the high frequency of combat  deployments, the high-stake missions, and the extraordinarily demanding  environments in which these forces operate placed not only SOF but also  their families under unprecedentedly high levels of stress. According to  the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, the high pace of  deployments has resulted in both increased suicide incidents among the  force and effects on operational readiness and retention due to a lack of  predictability. The Commander’s statements are consistent with our  prior work, which has found that a high pace of deployments for SOF can  affect readiness, retention, and morale. In that work, GAO made several  recommendations to maintain the readiness of SOF to support national  security objectives and address human capital challenges. DOD  concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations and has  implemented them. The military services have also acknowledged  challenges that SOF face as a result of operational demands. For  example, in 2013 Air Force officials reported that a persistent special  operations presence in Afghanistan and elsewhere, increasing  requirements in the Pacific region, and enduring global commitments  would continue to stress Air Force special operations personnel and  aircraft.
section_title: Increased Use of Contractors and Personnel on Temporary Duty
paragraphs: In a force management level-constrained environment, DOD relies on  contractors to support a wide range of military operations and free up  uniformed personnel to directly support mission needs. During operations  in Afghanistan and Iraq, contractors played a critical role in supporting  U.S. troops with the number of contractor personnel sometimes  exceeding the number of deployed military personnel. According to DOD,  the level of contracted support has exceeded that required in previous  wars, and this level is not expected to change in future contingency  operations. For example, even as troop levels began to drop below  90,000 in Afghanistan in early 2012, U.S. Central Command reported that  the number of contractor personnel in country grew, peaking at 117,227.  As of mid-2016, U.S. Central Command reported that there were 2,485  DOD contractor personnel in Iraq, as compared with a force management  level of 4,087 U.S. troops in Iraq. DOD has used contractors as a force  multiplier, and with a limited force management level, such as in Iraq,  contractors have become an increasingly important factor in operations.
DOD uses contractors to provide a wide variety of services because of  force limitations on the number of U.S. military personnel who can be  deployed and a lack of required skills. The use of contractors can free up  uniformed personnel to conduct combat operations and provide expertise  in specialized fields. The services provided by contractors include  logistics and maintenance support, base support, operating  communications networks, construction, security, translation support, and  other management and administrative support.
While contractor support plays a critical role in operations, we have  previously reported on DOD’s long-standing challenges in overseeing  contractors in deployed environments, and the failure to manage contract  support effectively could undermine U.S. policy objectives and threaten  the safety of U.S. forces. For example, we reported in 2012 that DOD did  not always have sufficient contract oversight personnel to manage and  oversee its logistics support contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without an  adequate number of trained oversight personnel DOD could not be  assured that contractors could meet contract requirements efficiently and  effectively. We made four recommendations to improve oversight of  operational contract support. DOD concurred with our recommendations  and implemented three of them. Since DOD anticipates continued  reliance on contractors for future operations, it may face similar  challenges related to oversight in current and future operations, such as  Operation Inherent Resolve, particularly if force management levels limit  the number of military personnel available to conduct such oversight.
In addition to contractors, DOD also relies on personnel on temporary  duty (TDY) to augment subordinate unified commands and joint task  forces during contingency operations. Joint task forces, such as  Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, are  established for a focused and temporary purpose; however if the mission  is a continuing requirement, the task force may become a more enduring  organization. According to DOD, temporary personnel requirements for  short-duration missions should be supported through augmentation, TDY  tasking, augmented hiring of civilian personnel, or other temporary  personnel solutions. We have previously reported that the combatant  commands utilize augmentation to support staff operations during  contingencies. We have also reported that CENTCOM’s service  component commands, such as U.S. Naval Forces Central Command,  and theater special operations commands rely on temporary personnel to  augment their commands. We made one recommendation that DOD  develop guidance related to costs of overseas operations. DOD partially  concurred with our recommendation and it remains open. According to  DOD officials, TDY personnel are not counted toward force management  level limits. As such, in a constrained-force management level  environment, TDY personnel can be used by joint task forces to free up  their assigned personnel to meet mission requirements. However, to the  extent that force management levels are intended to shape the number of  forces deployed to a given country, the use of TDY personnel may not  provide a complete picture of U.S. forces engaged in operations.
Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions about this statement, please contact Cary  Russell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, at (202)  512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above,  James A. Reynolds, Assistant Director; Alissa Czyz; Lori Kmetz; Sean  Manzano; Marcus Oliver; Alice Paszel; Michael Shaughnessy; Mike  Silver; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Report numbers with an SU or RSU suffix are Sensitive but Unclassified,  and those with a C suffix are Classified. Sensitive but Unclassified and  Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances  and need to -know, upon request.
subsections: section_title: Afghanistan
paragraphs: Afghanistan Equipment Drawdown: Progress Made, but Improved  Controls in Decision Making Could Reduce Risk of Unnecessary  Expenditures. GAO-14-768. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2014.
Afghanistan: Changes to Updated U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework  Reflect Evolving U.S. Role. GAO-14-438R. Washington, D.C.: April 1,  2014.
Security Force Assistance: More Detailed Planning and Improved Access  to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan.  GAO-13-381. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2013.
Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. GAO-13-218SP. Washington, D.C.:  February 11, 2013.
Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DOD Decision Makers Need  Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess  Equipment. GAO-13-185R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Security Transition. GAO-12-598C. Washington,  D.C.: September 11, 2012.
Observations on U.S. Military Capabilities to Support Transition of Lead  Security Responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces.  GAO-12-734C. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and  Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T.  Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.
Interim Results on U.S.-NATO Efforts to Transition Lead Security  Responsibility to Afghan Forces. GAO-12-607C. Washington, D.C.: May  18, 2012.
Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide  Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Estimated Costs to Support Afghan National  Security Forces Underscore Concerns about Sustainability.  GAO-12-438SU. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2012.
Afghan Security: Renewed Sharing of Biometric Data Could Strengthen  U.S. Efforts to Protect U.S. Personnel from Afghan Security Force  Attacks. GAO-12-471SU. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan  Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps.  GAO-12-293R. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2012.
Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S.  Civilian Presence. GAO-12-285. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2012.
section_title: Iraq
paragraphs: Countering ISIS: DOD Should Develop Plans for Responding to Risks  and for Using Stockpiled Equipment No Longer Intended for Syria Train  and Equip Program. GAO-16-670C. Washington, D.C.: September 9,  2016.
Iraq: State and DOD Need to Improve Documentation and Record  Keeping for Vetting of Iraq’s Security Forces. GAO-16-658C. Washington,  D.C.: September 30, 2016.
Mission Iraq: State and DOD Have Not Finalized Security and Support  Capabilities. GAO-12-759RSU. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012.
Mission Iraq: State and DOD Face Challenges in Finalizing Support and  Security Capabilities. GAO-12-856T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012.
section_title: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
paragraphs: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Needed to  Improve DOD Guidance, Integration of Tools, and Training for Collection  Management. GAO-12-396C. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2012.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic,  Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.  GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Are Needed to  Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD’s ISR Enterprise.  GAO-11-465. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2011.
section_title: Special Operations Forces
paragraphs: Special Operations Forces: Opportunities Exist to Improve Transparency  of Funding and Assess Potential to Lessen Some Deployments.  GAO-15-571. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2015.
Special Operations Forces: DOD’s Report to Congress Generally  Addressed the Statutory Requirements but Lacks Detail. GAO-14-820R.  Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2014.
section_title: Operational Contract Support
paragraphs: Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Enhance the Collection,  Integration, and Sharing of Lessons Learned. GAO-15-243. Washington,  D.C.: March 16, 2015.
Contingency Contracting: Contractor Personnel Tracking System Needs  Better Plans and Guidance. GAO-15-250. Washington, D.C.: February  18, 2015.
Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate  Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning. GAO-13-212.  Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2013.
Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to  Better Prepare for Future Contingencies. GAO-12-1026T. Washington,  D.C.: September 12, 2012.
Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations  by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  GAO-12-854R. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 2012.
Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements  Needed in Afghanistan. GAO-12-290. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012.
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