Foreign Affairs: Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective Protection
Published: 2001-08-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Internally displaced persons--those forced to flee their homes because of armed conflict and persecution but who remain within their own country--are among the most at-risk, vulnerable populations in the world. Although some protections have been provided to internally displaced persons, international organizations have been unable to fully meet their needs in most locations, partly because of the danger in operating in conflict zones, the presence of personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in budgetary resources, but also because international organizations have not taken a proactive approach toward protection. Also, international relief workers have not received training on how to incorporate protection considerations and interventions into their assistance activities. In the three countries GAO visited, international organizations do not coordinate their protection actions within the countries in which they operate. Without such coordination, international organizations are unable to share basic information on the location of their protection officers and effective approaches to protection interventions. The U.N. Security Council is one forum in which these matters can be addressed in the context of underlying political and security factors. The U.S. government has no overall policy or lead office to coordinate its efforts for dealing with internally displaced persons. Instead, government activities aimed at this effort are dispersed among different agencies and offices. Some Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development officials believe that providing assistance to the internally displaced in this way is labor and time intensive, lacks accountability, and leads to duplication of activities. Although State is required to provide Congress with an annual report on human rights violations, these reports include only limited information on the treatment of internally displaced persons. Moreover, the country reports do not have a standardized format for providing information on the internally displaced and their human rights conditions which would allow concerned parties to access the information readily. Increased and more systematic reporting that provided some focus on internally displaced persons would identify a significant problem and would provide the U.S. government and international and nongovernmental organizations' officials with country-level data to craft a cohesive program and policy response.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Internally displaced persons--those forced to flee their homes because of  armed conflict and persecution but who remain within their own country—  are among the most at-risk, vulnerable populations in the world.  They  typically differ from refugees only by the fact that they have not crossed an  international border as refugees have.  Governments are responsible for  protecting and aiding their own citizens; however, some cannot do so or  actively persecute groups of their citizens, thus creating a displacement  crisis.  When this happens, international organizations, such as the U.N.  High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee for the  Red Cross, acting in response to international humanitarian and human  rights law help protect and assist the estimated 20 million internally  displaced persons in over 50 countries.   The charters of these  organizations, and their governing bodies, acknowledge the sovereignty of  each state to deal with internally displaced persons as an internal matter  but also recognize the obligation of international organizations to help  address humanitarian and human rights crises.
The U.S. government, which spends about $2.5 billion annually in  humanitarian aid, provides assistance to the internally displaced,  principally through the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for  International Development.  State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and  Migration provides grants to international organizations that work with the  internally displaced, while the Agency for International Development’s  Bureau for Humanitarian Response provides similar grants and also direct  assistance.  These bureaus, as well as the U.S. Missions to the United  Nations in New York, Geneva, and Rome, are responsible for working with  the international organizations to ensure U.S. interests are met.
Because of your concerns about human rights violations and other issues  related to displaced persons, you asked us to assess (1) whether  international organizations’ efforts have adequately protected internally  displaced persons and what impediments these agencies face, (2) whether  international organizations have met the food and other assistance needs of  displaced populations, and (3) whether the U.S. government has a  coordinated and effectively managed program to help protect and assist  internally displaced persons.
To assess the level of protection and assistance international organizations  provided to the internally displaced, we surveyed field-level officials from  the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent  Movement, and nongovernmental organizations that conduct activities in  48 of the more than 50 countries with internally displaced populations.  Our  survey provided field level views on what international organizations and  the U.S. government are doing to provide physical security for the  internally displaced and supply them with basic necessities--food, water,  and shelter.  The criteria we applied in our assessment of these activities  was based on standards set forth in the 1998 publication, Guiding  Principles on Internal Displacement.  We supplemented the survey  information with (1) meetings with U.S. government, United Nations, Red  Cross Movement, and nongovernmental organization officials at the  headquarters, regional, and country levels and (2) case study fieldwork in  Burundi, Colombia, and southern Sudan.  Collectively, these countries have  1.5 million to 2.5 million internally displaced persons.  (See app. I for a  complete description of our scope and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The U.N. Secretary-General’s Representative on Internally Displaced  Persons estimates that there are 20 million internally displaced persons in  the world, scattered across more than 50 countries. (Fig. 1 depicts the  countries with internally displaced persons from which we received  surveys.)  However, lack of access to some of these populations due to  insecure environments and governments’ assertions of sovereignty  prevents international organizations from obtaining accurate accounts of  the numbers, locations, or physical conditions of a large percentage of  displaced persons.  Further complicating the issue of internal displacement  is the lack of a universally accepted definition for “internally displaced  persons,” including criteria for determining when a person no longer  should be considered displaced.
Since the end of the Cold War, the number of internally displaced persons  has grown steadily (and now surpasses the number of refugees), as has the  international community’s awareness of their plight.  By all accounts,  internally displaced persons suffer extreme deprivation; are subject to  threats to their physical security during flight and while displaced; and are  unlikely to have adequate shelter, health care, and the ability to earn a  livelihood.   Mortality rates among internally displaced populations are  much higher than among stable populations, especially among the more  vulnerable segments of the populations—children, the elderly, and  pregnant women.  Women and girls are especially vulnerable to sexual  assault, rape, and discrimination in receiving assistance.  Psychological and  social distress due to violence and the breakdown of family and community  structures is endemic in internally displaced populations.  (Fig. 2 depicts a  community of internally displaced persons in Burundi who are receiving  assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development.)
The plight of the internally displaced generally did not begin to draw the  attention of the international community until 1992, when the U.N.  Commission for Human Rights requested that the Secretary-General  appoint a special representative to study the problems of the internally  displaced and devise solutions to improve their situation.  Despite a  subsequent series of reports, books, briefings, and U.N. resolutions  identifying shortcomings in and recommending solutions for the  international community’s response, little progress was made in addressing  the needs of internally displaced persons throughout most of the 1990s.   Prompted into action after strong criticism from the U.S. Representative to  the United Nations in early 2000, international organizations began a period  of reassessing their policies, programs, and coordinating mechanisms.
section_title: Many Internally Displaced Persons Lack Protection
paragraphs: Field-level officials of international organizations in 48 countries who  responded to our survey reported that some modest success had been  achieved in extending protection interventions to internally displaced  persons.  Nonetheless, international organizations’ officials also reported  that they have not been able to secure adequate protection for internally  displaced persons in most countries we surveyed.  Several obstacles  prevent international organizations from protecting displaced populations,  including the limitations of working in active war zones, attacks on and  death threats to aid workers, and government assertions of sovereignty  that block the organizations’ access to displaced persons.   While these  limitations hamper their work, international organizations often have not  taken proactive measures they could have taken to protect internally  displaced persons, such as being more assertive on protection matters,  implementing training programs on protection issues for relief workers,  and establishing country-level coordination mechanisms.
subsections: section_title: International Organizations Are Unable to Secure Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons
paragraphs: International organizations have generally not been able to secure for  internally displaced persons the fundamental rights set forth in the  Guiding Principles.  The vulnerability of internally displaced persons is  reflected by our survey responses, which indicates they are at risk of direct  physical attack in 90 percent of the countries and at risk of forced  migration, sexual assault, and conscription or forced labor in many  countries.  Figure 3 provides data on various types of protection threats  faced by internally displaced persons.
According to human rights officials, based on existing international  humanitarian and human rights law, international organizations act to help  ensure the internally displaced have protection and are afforded the  fundamental right to be free from the threats noted in Figure 3.  In some  instance (such as in Kosovo), organizations are explicitly mandated by the  United Nations and their governing boards to provide protection and  assistance to internally displaced persons.  To  accomplish this, the  organizations undertake protection activities in almost all countries we  surveyed.  For example, as shown in figure 4, in 63 percent of the countries,  the organizations reported that to a great or very great extent they are  engaging and meeting with both government and opposition forces to try to  get them to respect the rights of internally displaced persons.  In 79 percent  of the countries, international organizations indicated they are to some  extent providing the displaced with information about a voluntary return to  their homes.   In 90 percent of the countries, international organizations  said they are, to a small extent or greater, establishing systems to document  human rights violations of the displaced.
Overall, however, the extent of protection activities is limited, and in many  countries some protection activities are not being carried out at all.  A  senior official of the International Committee of the Red Cross told us that  there is not a single country in the world that can serve as a successful  model for the protection of internally displaced persons.  From providing  core protection actions, such as providing a visible in-country presence of  international staff to help protect the displaced, to replacing lost personal  documentation and preserving the right to asylum, to alerting the displaced  about threats, international organizations have taken limited action.  Figure  4 shows the extent to which protection interventions identified in the  Guiding Principles had taken place in the 48 countries from which we  received survey responses.  Only 1 of the 14 protection interventions— engaging both government and opposition forces—was being undertaken  to a great or very great extent in at least half the countries.  Conversely, 7 of  the 14 interventions were not being undertaken in half the countries.
section_title: External Factors Obstruct Protection Efforts
paragraphs: Several factors inhibit the international community’s response on  protection matters.  The danger of operating in conflict zones and the  personal security risks to aid workers are major limitations to involvement  in protection matters. (In 75 percent of countries in our survey,  humanitarian organizations indicated that personal security fears impact  their ability to provide protection or assistance to internally displaced  persons.)  State sovereignty is also a significant factor, as many countries,  such as Algeria, Burma, and Turkey, bar international involvement with  their internally displaced populations.  In August 2000, the Group of 77, a  group of more than 130 developing countries, blocked the U.N.’s Economic  and Social Council from endorsing a U.N. approach to dealing with  internally displaced persons for fear that humanitarian intervention and  protection of human rights would infringe upon their countries’  sovereignty.
Finally, scarce or declining budgetary resources provided by the  international donor community inhibit agencies from expanding their  protection (and assistance) activities.  According to officials of these  organizations, it is difficult to get the funding they request for refugees and  other specifically mandated programs; and there is increasing donor  fatigue because of humanitarian crises that have been ongoing for years  without resolution.  Given this environment, officials said it is even more  difficult to get funding for internally displaced persons, who outnumber  refugees by nearly 2 to 1 and where no international organization has an  absolute right to intervene to protect and assist them.  Table 1 shows the  amount of funds international organizations’ requested from international  donors in 2000 and the shortfall from their budget requests.
section_title: International Organizations Are Cautious in Challenging Governments
paragraphs: According to numerous relief and human rights officials we spoke with,  their organizations and their representatives at the country level are often  reluctant to speak out and challenge governments on protection matters  for fear of jeopardizing relationships and continued access for ongoing  relief or development programs.  In Sudan, for example, U.N. officials told  us some of its offices were often reticent about pressing the Khartoum  government on its restrictive flight clearance process in the south  (impeding emergency relief efforts) due to concern of putting at risk U.N.  development activities in the north.  Also, in Burundi, the U.N.’s  Humanitarian Coordinator (the lead U.N. official in country) was criticized  by U.N. agency, nongovernmental organization, and U.S. government  officials for weak leadership: the Coordinator was said to be more  interested in maintaining good relations with the government than in  serving as the main advocate for humanitarian and internally displaced  persons’ concerns. Furthermore, U.N. Resident Coordinators  from several  countries were unwilling to respond to our survey on internally displaced  persons despite assurances of confidentiality because of their concern  about antagonizing the host government if their participation in the survey  became known.
According to Department of State officials, in some internal displacement  circumstances, international organizations have little leverage to affect the  conduct of governments toward their citizens.  In those cases, international  forums, such as the U.N.’s Security Council or Economic and Social  Council, offer the best opportunity to address issues of internal  displacement within the context of underlying political and security  factors.  For example, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United  Nations advocated increased assistance and protection for the internally  displaced in the U.N. Security Council and in other forums.  As a result,  U.N. officials said this raised the awareness of the plight of the internally  displaced, prompted other governments to respond, and prompted an  assessment of international organizations’ policies, programs, and  coordinating mechanisms on the internally displaced.
subsections: section_title: Gaps in Field Presence and Protection Coverage
paragraphs: Organizations with the mandate and staff expertise to provide protection— the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for  Human Rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross—are  often not present to take a proactive role in the protection of internally  displaced populations, according to representatives from these  international organizations and protection experts.  Despite a March 2000  policy pronouncement by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to  become more engaged with the internally displaced, we found the number  of internally displaced persons assisted and country programs in place  declined in the last year (from 5 to 4 million and from 13 to 11,  respectively), although the total number of worldwide displacements are  reported to have remained relatively stable.  According to State  Department officials and other knowledgeable observers, the U.N. High  Commissioner for Human Rights has few officials working directly in the  field and currently lacks the capability to intervene in human rights  situations.  As for the International Committee of the Red Cross, it has a  specific protection mandate during armed conflict, but it generally does not  conduct protection activities for displaced populations caught up in  nonconflict circumstances.  Table 2 shows the number of countries where  these organizations said they have a staff presence and engage in  protection activities.
During our fieldwork, we observed in two of the three countries we visited,  that despite the presence of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced  persons, agencies did not have protection officers to monitor conditions or  had assigned only two or three officers for this purpose.  Protection  experts acknowledge that a simple visible field presence is sometimes the  most effective means to prevent harm to internally displaced persons. (Fig.  5 shows International Committee of the Red Cross staff accompanying  Rwandan civilians fleeing ethnic fighting in 1994.) In our three case study  countries, only the International Committee of the Red Cross in Colombia  provided a robust staffing presence of significant size (54) to help monitor  conditions and provide protection activities.  In Burundi and southern  Sudan, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees did not have a protection  presence even though there were refugees repatriating into internally  displaced communities.  In Burundi, none of the agencies were engaged in  protection activities directed toward internally displaced persons, although  geographically nearly half the country is experiencing internal  displacement.  According to officials from these organizations, the number  of protection officers working in these countries is not sufficient given the  level of threat against internally displaced persons.  Table 3 shows the  number of protection officials assigned in Burundi, Colombia, and southern  Sudan in 2000 to 2001.
International organizations do not have mechanisms at the country level to  promote and coordinate actions that could help protect the internally  displaced.  Unlike international organizations’ efforts to provide assistance  (e.g., food aid and health care) to internally displaced persons where there  are established working groups to share information and plan and  coordinate action, there are no counterpart coordination mechanisms for  protection concerns.  For example, in our three case-study countries, we  were told that there was little to no discussion among international  organizations concerning protection issues.  There were no focal points to  raise the profile of protection or ensure its place on the agenda of those  organizations working in the field.  Officials engaged in protection  activities in these countries told us that because there are no established  mechanisms to share information, there is a lack of (1) basic information  on where protection officers are posted, (2) common thinking and  approaches to protection, and (3) knowledge about what protection  interventions work or do not work.
We noted that in countries where international organizations have not  assigned staff to monitor for protection concerns, the organizations do  provide relief assistance and are often in direct contact with displaced  persons and are knowledgeable about their conditions.  However,  according to U.N. and other international organization officials, they have  not established working groups or other mechanisms in these countries  that could alert the international staff about potential dangers to the  internally displaced or provide advice about how to record and report on  abuses they witness in their routine of providing assistance.
section_title: Protection Considerations Not Incorporated Into Assistance Programs
paragraphs: Officials in the field who provide assistance to internally displaced persons  lack knowledge about how to incorporate protection considerations and  techniques into their assistance activities.  As was shown earlier in figure 3,  79 percent of the countries in our survey indicated that no action is taken to  set up and manage camps for internally displaced persons to prevent  attacks, such as ensuring vulnerable female-headed households are not  isolated to remote areas in the camp.  Relief officials told us there is little  consideration given to protection concerns when designing programs--their  focus is on providing assistance as quickly as possible.  Forty percent of the  countries in our survey also indicated that no training had been received on  how to undertake protection actions for internally displaced persons,  although officials we spoke with stated they would strongly welcome such  training.
During our fieldwork, we found numerous examples of how relief agencies  both incorporated and failed to incorporate protection measures into the  design and implementation of their programs.  These examples include:  In southern Sudan, protection considerations were taken into account  when water bore holes were drilled in locations that drew internally  displaced populations away from conflict zones into more secure areas.
In Burundi, when relief workers did not take into consideration the  timing of bulk food deliveries during periods of intense fighting (as  opposed to dispersed deliveries in locations outside the battle zone), the  result was armed attacks and theft of supplies by combatants.
In both Colombia and southern Sudan, the provision of assistance to  internally displaced persons, while equally vulnerable local populations  were ignored (as opposed to provision of some aid to both  communities), led to conflict between the two groups.
Recognizing that the state of training for internally displaced persons  issues has been deficient, in March 1998 the U.N.’s Inter-Agency Standing  Committee ordered the development of a comprehensive training program  focused on protection issues for the international organizations working  with the displaced.  The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees was tasked  with developing the training module for protection but did not do so until  the end of 2000.  To date, no training has occurred.
section_title: Protection Interventions Can Have Positive Impact
paragraphs: Despite the overall poor state of protection for internally displaced  persons, we learned that practical actions, as advised by the Handbook for  Applying the Guiding Principles were successful in the countries we  visited.  Even in highly insecure environments, reasonable advocacy on the  part of senior officials and the presence of human rights observers and  monitors can have positive effects.  For example,  In Colombia, International Committee for the Red Cross protection  officers negotiated with rebel and paramilitary groups to relocate  internally displaced individuals and families away from areas where  death threats were being issued; they also successfully negotiated with  these groups to resolve kidnappings and prevent executions by death  squads.
In Burundi, the U.S. Ambassador sent demarches (diplomatic messages)  to the highest level of the Burundi government in mid-2000 challenging  government troops who were intimidating patients in rural health clinics  near the capital Bujumbura.  This helped end the troops’ harassment and  occupation of the rural health clinics, which were used heavily by  displaced populations.
In southern Sudan, the government and factional commanders  increased the risk to internally displaced persons by requiring that food  drops and the provision of aid be provided in strategic locations at  specific times to coincide with their strategies.  The relief organizations  tailored methods to circumvent these requirements and safely  accomplish their relief goals. (Fig. 6 shows a food airdrop in southern  Sudan.)
section_title: Immediate Assistance Needs Reported Being Met, But Longer-Term Needs Remain a Challenge
paragraphs: Overall, international organizations believe they have been generally  successful in meeting the emergency food needs for those internally  displaced persons to whom they have access.  However, in numerous  countries with active emergencies and hostile, insecure environments,  such as in Burundi, and southern Sudan, large numbers of internally  displaced persons were outside the reach of international organizations’  relief efforts, according to relief experts to whom we spoke and observed  during our case study fieldwork.  Other emergency assistance provisions  such as health care, water and sanitation, and shelter were also generally  being provided to displaced populations, although to a lesser extent,  according to relief officials with whom we spoke.  According to our survey,  54 percent of countries reported that basic needs, such as food, water, and  health care, are being met to a great or very great extent.  Figure 7 provides  the results of our survey on the extent to which assistance interventions  identified in the Guiding Principles have taken place.  In Colombia, for  example, largely through the combined efforts of the International  Committee of the Red Cross and the World Food Program, the emergency  needs (food, shelter, and health care) of the internally displaced were  reported being met during the first 90 days of displacement.
subsections: section_title: Gaps in Assistance Programming
paragraphs: Although international organizations were generally able to meet the initial  emergency needs of the internally displaced, we found a number of  programming gaps in the overall response scheme.  First, international  organizations were less effective in meeting the assistance needs of  internally displaced persons after the initial displacement phase.  In  southern Sudan, for example, we were told that internally displaced  persons who relocated to nonconflict areas were generally not receiving  assistance from international organizations.  Gaps in assistance areas we  identified include providing clothing, education, and income-generation  training and opportunities; psychological and social assistance for  traumatized persons; and nonfood items, such as kitchen utensils, tools,  and personal hygiene items.  Figure 8 provides information from our survey  of country-level officials on why internally displaced persons were not  receiving assistance.  Foremost among the obstacles were problems in  assistance logistics and distribution.
Also, internally displaced persons who were congregated in camps or  identifiable communities were more likely to have their assistance needs  met.  In contrast, those displaced persons who were dispersed throughout  the countryside, such as in Burundi, or merged into urban communities,  such as in Colombia, were generally not receiving assistance, according to  U.N. officials with whom we spoke.  International organizations have  difficulty identifying and obtaining access to these populations, as some  internally displaced persons purposely keep a low profile for fear of  discrimination or retribution at the hands of the government or rebel  groups.  Figure 9 provides officials views on whether the source of  protection threat to internally displaced persons comes from the  government, nonstate actors (such as rebel groups), or both.
Internally displaced persons were thought to be generally less likely to  receive assistance the more time had lapsed since their initial  displacement.  According to relief and development experts we spoke with,  there is a tendency among donors and aid agencies to provide short-term  relief assistance rather than longer-term development or life-sustaining  assistance.  This funding and program trend particularly affects internally  displaced persons, since most internal displacement situations are long- standing in nature.  Similarly, assistance to internally displaced persons is  negatively affected by international organizations’ difficulty in transitioning  or redirecting their programs from the immediate relief phase to the longer- term rehabilitation/development phase.
Finally, the volatile nature of complex emergencies often results in sudden  surges of mass displacement.  In two of our case study countries—Burundi  and Sudan-- fighting accompanied by drought had resulted in the sudden  movement of thousands to tens of thousands of people within the last few  years.  According to relief officials, international organizations do not have  adequate food reserves to respond immediately to these quick surges in  displacement populations.  For example, according to World Food Program  officials, the organization only had a 1 month reserve of food for Sudan,  and only 40 percent of its food appeal for Burundi had been met.  During  our fieldwork in central Burundi, we were told of rising levels of  malnutrition caused by displacement and drought, and relief officials were  fearful that a failure in the upcoming harvest could lead to significant food  shortages.  According to U.N. officials, it takes a lead time of 5 to 6 months  before requested food aid is delivered in-country.
section_title: U.S. Government Lacks an Overall Policy and a Lead Office for Internally Displaced Persons
paragraphs: The U.S. government addresses the needs of the internally displaced by  providing funds to international organizations and by directly  implementing programs.  However, the U.S. government does not have an  overall policy or agency-specific guidelines for dealing with internally  displaced persons, nor has the Department of State designated a lead office  to help coordinate and direct the U.S. government’s response for internally  displaced persons.  According to State officials, the lack of a lead office has  been identified as a problem and discussed within the department, but no  policy decisions have been taken to address this issue.  Some State and  Agency for International Development (USAID) officials said that as a  result of a lack of policy and a lead office, the U.S. government has  difficulty coordinating and managing its programs to aid the internally  displaced.  A study by the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning and  an assessment by the former director of the USAID’s Office of Foreign  Disaster Assistance concluded that the absence of a U.S. policy for  internally displaced persons has resulted in limited awareness, overlapping  bureaucratic mandates, and fragmented and duplicative efforts.  The  reports noted the multifaceted nature of displacement crises and that U.S.  efforts were undermined by the absence of a single, responsible office  managing the interrelated assistance, protection, advocacy, peace  processes, and international cooperation components.   Both studies  concluded that U.S. humanitarian interests would be better served with  clear policy direction and senior leadership within the federal bureaucracy  on internal displacement issues.
subsections: section_title: Difficulty Managing U.S. Government Policy Response
paragraphs: We identified six offices within State and USAID that directly assist  internally displaced persons, plus several other agencies and offices that  are involved in such related functions as intelligence gathering and  representing U.S. interests in international organizations.  The Department  of State’s Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugees and USAID’s  Bureau for Humanitarian Response are the two main sources of U.S.  assistance to internally displaced persons.  Based upon our discussions  with officials from these agencies and a review of program documents, we  found that there is duplication of effort and little coordination among the  various agencies.  For example, in Colombia, we learned that the World  Food Program received funds from four different U.S. funding sources—  State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration; USAID’s Office of  Transition Initiatives; the Department of Agriculture; and Plan Colombia— to support the same type of food assistance programs.  However, the  evidence shows that this funding was provided without coordination and  knowledge about whether this would be complementary or duplicative.   Furthermore, these offices were not able to determine how much of the  $2.5 billion the U.S. government spends annually on humanitarian  assistance goes to internally displaced persons, because agencies do not  track how much money they spend on internal displacement.
According to State and USAID program officials with whom we spoke,  there are numerous drawbacks to not having a lead office or interagency  working group to direct policy and activities related to internally displaced  persons activities.  Some of these drawbacks are listed as follows:  Responding to crises is inefficient.  It takes longer and is labor intensive  to launch a response to an internal displacement crisis, as planning  meetings are ad hoc and usually staff generated.
There is no lead office or person to settle policy disputes among various  agencies.  For example, in Sudan, State and USAID had unresolved  disagreements over aid policies and the content of assistance inputs to  refugees and internally displaced persons, resulting in confusion among  the nongovernmental organization implementing partners about which  groups should be provided assistance.
It is unclear whom to consult within the U.S. government.  It is difficult  for regional bureaus and other programming offices to take a proactive  role for their countries or areas of responsibility.  In the critical area of  providing protection for internally displaced persons, we were told that  good intelligence information exists about protection threats against  internally displaced persons, but without a lead office to receive the  information and direct it, the information does not pass smoothly to the  organization needing it, as was the case in Kosovo and Rwanda.
There is no senior-level representation or single voice to consider and  address internally displaced persons’ issues during political-military  crises deliberations within the highest level of the U.S. government.
There is no clear locus of accountability for internal displacement issues  within the U.S. government, especially on policy issues.
According to the acting Assistant Secretary of State for Population,  Refugees, and Migration, there are pros and cons to designating a lead  office, some of which were pointed out in the interagency review.   Primarily, the issue of internally displaced persons involves human rights,  diplomacy, political-military affairs, humanitarian concerns, and  designating a lead office either within State or USAID could skew the U.S.  approach toward one of these concerns.  Without a thorough review of all  concerns and the related organizational structure of several departments, it  would be difficult to determine if a designated lead would improve the  situation.  He said that the current administration is addressing the issue  through improved coordination and cooperation among the offices  involved.  Furthermore, there is a coordinating committee led by the  National Security Council that could be used to address specific situations.   However, he said that if problems arose in coordinating a U.S. government  response to internally displaced persons, the administration might consider  designating a lead office.
section_title: Funding for Internally Displaced Persons
paragraphs: There is no overall policy on the funding priority for internally displaced  persons within the U.S. government.  The Department of State’s Bureau of  Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian  Affairs each has general legislative authority to address the assistance and  protection needs of persons in need, such as provisions authorizing  contributions to international organizations, assistance to victims of  disasters and complex emergencies, help for victims of human rights  abuses, and aid to those needing food assistance.  But the legislation does  not specifically refer to internally displaced persons.   Thus, according to  Department of State officials, the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and  Migration does not see itself as the initial source of the U.S. government  response to the internally displaced and has not requested appropriations  for these populations.  Similarly, USAID officials told us that internally  displaced persons are not a direct focus of development assistance monies  provided under the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act.  Officials from both  agencies told us that they interpret their current statutory authorities as  putting a priority on funding for refugees, development, or emergency  programs.  Therefore, they manage their funds to meet these legislative  priorities with no overall direction to coordinate their efforts on internally  displaced persons.
section_title: Reporting on Internally Displaced Persons Is Insufficient
paragraphs: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the State  Department to report annually to the Congress on the status of  internationally recognized human rights.  Although internally displaced  persons are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations, the  Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices  do not contain much information on the subject. These reports generally  serve as an authoritative source and a basis for advocacy by U.S. diplomats  both bilaterally and in international forums.
Our examination of several country reports in State’s Country Reports on  Human Rights Practices for 2000 and a Brookings Institution analysis of  1996 and 1997 reporting, indicated that State generally provides only a  cursory account of internally displaced persons.  In eight country reports  we examined for 2000, three country reports provided some information on  specific incidents of displacement, three reports noted that internal  displacement exists and made estimates of the populations affected; but  two reports made no mention of internal displacement issues, although  such issues existed.  The country reports neglected or provided insufficient  information on the protection and assistance problems that internally  displaced persons face or the conduct of the government and opposition  groups toward these populations.  For example, the country report for  Afghanistan noted only that drought and conflict were causing an increase  in internal displacement. Furthermore, there is no standard format for  reporting on internal displacement that would allow for systematic data  gathering and analysis.  Unlike a standard format for reporting on refugee  issues, discussion of internal displacement issues are dispersed throughout  various sections, for example, freedom of movement, respect for political  rights, and torture, making identification of internally displaced persons  reporting difficult in the lengthy country reports.  In addition, the reports  use various terms to refer to internally displaced persons—“IDPs,”  “forcibly displaced,” and “village re-evacuation”—increasing the difficulty  in identifying internal displacement issues and sometimes blurring the  distinction between internally displaced persons and refugees.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although some protection has been provided to internally displaced  persons, international organizations have been unable to meet the  protection needs of internally displaced persons in most locations, partly  because of the danger of operating in conflict zones, the presence of  personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in budgetary  resources, but also because international organizations have not taken a  proactive approach toward protection.  Also, international relief workers  have not received training on how to incorporate protection considerations  and interventions into their assistance activities, and in the three countries  we visited, international organizations do not coordinate their protection  actions within the countries in which they operate.  Without such  coordination, international organizations are unable to share basic  information about the location of their protection officers and effective  approaches to protection interventions.   The U.N. Security Council is one  forum where these matters can be addressed in the context of underlying  political and security factors.
The U.S. government has no overall policy or lead office to coordinate its  efforts for dealing with internally displaced persons.  Instead, government  activities aimed at this effort are dispersed among different agencies and  offices.  Some State and USAID officials believe that providing assistance  to the internally displaced in this way is labor and time intensive, lacks a  locus of accountability, and leads to duplication of activities.  Although the  Department of State is required to provide the Congress with an annual  report on human rights violations, these reports include only limited  information about the treatment of internally displaced persons.  Moreover,  the country reports do not have a standardized format for providing  information about the internally displaced and their human rights condition  that would allow concerned parties to access the information readily.   Increased and more systematic reporting that provided some focus on  internally displaced persons would identify what we found to be a  significant problem and would provide U.S. government and international  and nongovernmental organizations’ officials with country-level data to  craft a cohesive program and policy response.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen the international response to the plight of the internally  displaced, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent  Representative of the United States to the United Nations (1) work to  advance more proactive policies and programs to protect and assist  internally displaced persons and (2) seek with other member states to  strengthen international organizations’ protection efforts by encouraging  them to implement a training program for international organizations and  to form country-level protection working groups. We also recommend that  the Secretary of State include a focus on internal displacement issues in  State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State, USAID, the United Nations, and the Red Cross Movement provided  written comments on a draft of this report.  (See app. III to VI)   Both State  and the United Nations emphasized that lack of resources seriously  undermines international efforts to address the protection and assistance  needs of the internally displaced.  This report recognizes that shortfalls in  funding for internally displaced persons programs have had a negative  impact on the international response; nevertheless, we believe our  recommendations can be implemented by international organizations  within existing resources.
State said this report is useful in drawing attention to the phenomenon of  internal displacement and identifying areas of concern that the State  Department and USAID are working to address.  State agreed with our  recommendations to work toward more proactive programs to protect  internally displaced persons and in-country training programs and working  groups for protection.  Concerning our recommendation for improved  reporting on internal displacement in its annual Country Reports on  Human Rights Practices, State said that it recognizes the importance of  reporting on issues related to internally displaced persons and stated that  such information is found throughout the report.  State said it strives to use  systematic language when referring to internally displaced persons, and it  will continue its efforts to report on internally displaced persons.
USAID stated that the report identifies issues of concern that it is actively  working to address.  USAID agreed with our recommendation to work with  other countries and international organizations to advance programs that  protect and assist internally displaced persons.  Regarding the report’s  discussion about the lack of an overall policy and a lead office for  addressing the issue of internal displacement, USAID noted that its efforts  are directed by the Foreign Assistance Manual, which states that  “AID/OFDA has responsibility for assisting people displaced within their  own country as a result of natural or man-made disasters.”  State said that  there are pros and cons to designating a lead humanitarian office.
The United Nations and the Red Cross Movement noted that steps are  being taken to improve coordination among international agencies at the  headquarter level and that initiatives such as the U.N.’s Senior Inter-Agency  Network on Internally Displaced Persons are examining the institutional  arrangements within and between the United Nations, the Red Cross  Movement, and nongovernmental organizations.  We recognize that some  coordinating activities have been recently initiated; however, as discussed  in this report, we believe particular focus should be placed on improving  country-level coordination mechanisms, especially in the area of  protection.
The World Food Program, the World Health Organization, the High  Commissioner for Refugees, the Brookings Institution, and the Norwegian  Refugee Council provided technical comments on this report, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this letter.  We will then send copies of this report to the  Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on  International Relations, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S.  Agency for International Development, the U.N. Secretary General, and the  President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red  Crescent Movement.  We will also then send copies to others who are  interested and make copies available to others on request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions  about this report.  Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are  listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: At the request of the Chairman and the Ranking minority member of the  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, we assessed (1) whether  international organizations have adequately protected internally displaced  persons, and if not, what impediments these agencies face; (2) whether  international organizations have met the food and other assistance needs of  displaced populations; and (3) whether the U.S. government has a  coordinated and effectively managed program to help ensure the  protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons.
To assess whether international agencies have adequately provided  protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, we interviewed  officials and analyzed policy, program, and budgetary documents from the  U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the U.N. High  Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human  Rights, the World Food Program, the U.N. Development Program, the U.N.  Children’s Fund, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the  International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.  We  met with officials and reviewed reports pertaining to humanitarian and  internal displacement issues from numerous think tanks and  nongovernmental organizations, including the Brookings Institution’s  Project on Internal Displacement, the U.S. Committee for Refugees,  InterAction, and the Norwegian Refugee Council.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government coordinates and  manages its efforts to ensure protection and assistance to internally  displaced persons, we interviewed officials and analyzed policy and  program documents from the Department of State’s Office of Policy  Planning; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; the  Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues; and the U.S. Missions to the  United Nations in New York City and Geneva, Switzerland. We also  analyzed a judgmental sample of country reports from the Department of  State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000 to determine  the extent to which the issue of internal displacement is addressed.  We  met with officials and analyzed program documents for the U.S.  International Agency for Development’s (USAID) Bureau of Humanitarian  Response, including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Office of  Transition Initiatives, and the Office of Food for Peace.
We also developed a field-level survey that was completed by U.N. Resident  and Humanitarian Coordinators and officials from the Red Cross  Movement and nongovernmental organizations.  The survey solicited  information on demographics, the effectiveness of international programs,  and program management of aid and protection efforts for internally  displaced persons.  The survey asked for information based upon criteria  set forth in the normative framework of protection and assistance  principles outlined in the 1998 U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal  Displacement and included modifications based upon recommendations  from relief and protection experts from the United Nations, the Red Cross  Movement, and think tanks.
We sent an electronic copy of the survey directly, and through points of  contact at the headquarters of the United Nations, the Red Cross  Movement, and nongovernmental organizations, to field-level officials in  more than 50 countries.  A total of 120 usable surveys from 48 countries  were returned from the various organizations; an additional 10 surveys  were received but could not be used because key questions were not  answered. The number of surveys returned from each country varied from  one to eight.  To provide equal weight to the opinions coming from each  country, we computed a countrywide average response for each item.    Thus, the unit of analysis was the 48 countries, rather than the 120 surveys.
For questions that asked for a “yes” or “no” answer, the countrywide  answer was coded “yes” if 50 percent or more of the respondents from the  country responded “yes.”  Countrywide mean ratings were also computed  for questions that asked for the extent to which aid/protection concerns  were being addressed (rating scale: 1 = Not applicable/Not at all, 2 = Small  extent, 3 = Moderate extent, 4 = Great extent, 5 = Very great extent).  The  countrywide means were rounded (and collapsed to three categories) so  that the percentage of countries at each point on the extent scale could be  ascertained.  If the countrywide mean was 1.00 to 1.49, the aid/protection  intervention was judged to be not occurring at all.  If the mean was 1.50 to  3.49 or 3.50 to 5.00, the intervention was characterized as occurring to a  small/moderate extent or a great/very great extent, respectively.  Because  we were unable to determine the total number of countries or officials that  received the survey in each country, we were unable to project the findings  with a specified degree of precision to the population of all countries with  internally displaced persons.
We also performed fieldwork in our case study countries of Burundi,  Colombia, and southern Sudan to determine the effectiveness of  international organizations’ responses to the protection and assistance  needs of internally displaced persons.  These three countries are  experiencing long-standing internal displacement crises, with large  population movements and programs operated by the U.N. system, the Red  Cross Movement, nongovernmental organizations, and the U.S.  government.  During our fieldwork, we met with officials from these  organizations responsible for providing protection and assistance to the  internally displaced.  We also met with other donor governments and their  aid agencies, with host government and opposition groups involved in the  displacement crisis, and with internally displaced persons who were  recipients of international assistance.  We observed first-hand assistance  programs designed to assist displaced populations and attended  coordination meetings by country teams.  Due to security concerns, we  were unable to travel within southern Sudan; however, we met with agency  and nongovernmental organization officials in Nairobi and Lokichoggio,  Kenya, who conduct relief activities in southern Sudan both within and  outside the U.N.-sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan program.
We performed our review from September 2000 through June 2001 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan
subsections: section_title: Burundi
paragraphs: Burundi is a poor, densely populated country in East Africa.  More than 90  percent of the country’s 6.6 million population is dependent on subsistence  agriculture for survival.  Over 3 million people—half the population— needed food assistance in 2000 because of drought or war.  Burundi’s  majority ethnic Hutu and minority ethnic Tutsi populations have struggled  against each other for economic and political power for 30 years, with a  small number of Tutsi elite having dominated the country’s politics and  military since independence in 1962.
Periodic military crackdowns slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people  during the 1970s and 1980s.  The victims were overwhelmingly Hutu.  The  first democratic election in 1993 elected a Hutu president.  However,  elements within the Tutsi-dominated military assassinated the President in  1993, triggering a wave of violence.  A 1996 coup eliminated the rest of the  democratically elected government, and the Tutsi elites shifted back into  power.  An insurgency by Hutu rebels and a counterinsurgency campaign  by the government have claimed tens of thousands of lives and caused  mass internal displacement in an ongoing civil war that continues today.
The military has pursued a regroupment policy starting in 1996, requiring  an estimated 350,000 persons (mostly Hutus) to live in forced regroupment  camps, to prevent those living in the countryside from supporting the  rebels.  The camps had inadequate sanitation and insufficient access to  water, food, shelter, and medicine, according to the U.S. Committee for  Refugees.  International organizations could not reach many of the  government’s forced regroupment camps due to inadequate infrastructure  or because they were prevented from doing so by security forces.
The government’s and the rebels’ human rights record are poor, according  to the Department of State’s human rights report.  Combatants on both  sides deliberately uprooted civilian populations and targeted displacement  camps for attack.  Government forces and rebels committed large-scale  atrocities against civilians.   According to Amnesty International, the armed  forces and rebel groups have continued to show complete disregard for  human life, acting with little or no accountability.  Scores of civilians were  killed in ambushes.  Humanitarian workers were also killed and attacked.   On numerous occasions, rebel groups killed unarmed civilians in reprisal  for alleged collaboration with the government or for failing to support  them.
The U.S. government has made humanitarian relief its priority response in  Burundi.  Inadequate harvests during the last three seasons due to conflict  and drought have caused severe malnutrition in several provinces.  USAID- funded programs implemented by nongovernmental organizations and U.N.  agencies primarily focused on life-sustaining activities such as food  security assistance (provision of livestock, seeds, and tools), health care,  and supplementary nutrition programs.  In fiscal year 2001, the U.S.  government provided an estimated $5.8 million in food aid and another $3  million to combat HIV/AIDS and promote human rights and democracy.  In  addition, the U.S. government is a significant contributor to the programs  of the World Food Program and the U.N.’s Children Fund in Burundi.   Figure 10 shows a USAID-assisted family.
section_title: Colombia
paragraphs: The roots of the conflict in Colombia go back to a power struggle between  liberals and conservatives in the late 1940s.  Between 1947 and 1957, the  fighting claimed more than 300,000 lives and forced more than 1 million  Colombians to abandon their homes, according to the International  Committee of the Red Cross.  In subsequent years, rural defense groups  sprung up in various parts of the country.  Some of them turned into  guerilla groups with strong Marxist leanings.  In later years, paramilitary  groups appeared.  The addition of a flourishing drug trade combined to  create a complex and violent civil conflict that has resulted in the  cumulative displacement of millions of people.
Attempts to end the violence over the years have produced neither  substantive agreements nor a decrease in the levels of violence.  In 1999,  the Colombian government launched Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion,  multiyear strategy designed to support the peace process, an antinarcotics  strategy, democratization, and the provision of humanitarian assistance.
However, the Colombian government faces serious challenges, as armed  paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotic traffickers exert influence  over more than one-third of the country’s municipalities.   Furthermore, the  government’s human rights record is poor.  According to the Department of  State’s human rights reporting, government forces commit serious abuses,  including extrajudicial killings.  Members of security forces collaborate  with paramilitary groups that committed abuses, in some instances  allowing them to pass through roadblocks, sharing information, or  providing ammunition and supplies.
Paramilitary groups and guerillas were responsible for the vast majority of  political and other killings, according to the Department of State’s human  rights report.  Throughout the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured,  and threatened civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an  orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes, thereby  depriving guerrillas of civilian support and allowing paramilitary forces to  challenge the guerrilla groups for control of narcotic cultivations and  strategically important territories. The two main guerrilla groups—the  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National  Liberation Army (ELN)—are reported by the Department of State to  regularly attack civilian populations and commit massacres and summary  executions.  They are also reported to have killed religious and medical  personnel.
Plan Colombia is being supported by the U.S. government with a $1.3  billion assistance package that was approved in June 2000.   In addition to  drug eradication and interdiction efforts, U.S funding is supporting (1)  democracy programs and the peace process, (2) reduction of opium and  cocoa cultivation through alternative development, and  (3) assistance to  internally displaced persons.  USAID programs were focused on providing  assistance to internally displaced persons in the reestablishment, or post- flight, stage of displacement.  This phase of displacement represents a  major gap in the international community’s response in Colombia.  USAID- funded activities focused on secondary cities bearing the brunt of internally  displaced populations and included food-for-work community projects,  income generation and long-term economic opportunities, primary  education, and shelter.  State-funded activities of the World Food Program  and the Pan American Health Organization focused on areas of capacity- building to improve health care delivery to displaced persons and  supplementary feeding programs for women and children.  Figure 11 shows  Colombian women engaged in an income generation project.
section_title: Sudan
paragraphs: Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been at war nearly  its entire independent existence. The conflict started just before  independence in 1955, when the ruling north refused to share power with  the south.  This phase of the conflict, which lasted 17 years and claimed  several hundreds of thousands of lives, ended in 1972 with the signing of a  peace agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  However, fighting resumed in  1983 when southern black troops in the national army created the  Sudanese People’s Liberation Army and demanded a change of government  in the capital, Khartoum, and a fair share of the resources for all regions in  the country.  In addition to the conflict between the regular army and the  Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, fighting has raged between various  militias allied with these two parties.
The civil war, which is estimated to have resulted in the death of 2 million  persons, and the internal displacement of several million more has  continued into its 18th year. There has been no significant progress toward  peace in years and Department of State officials believe the current  situation is likely to go on indefinitely. Neither side appears to have the  ability to win the war militarily, although oil revenues have allowed the  government to invest increasingly in military hardware.  Presently, the  government controls virtually all of the northern two-thirds of the country  but is limited to garrison towns in the south.
The drive for oil and territorial control over newly operational oil fields is  now central to the conflict that has long been rooted in racial, cultural,  religious, and political differences.  Government forces have pursued a  scorched earth policy aimed at removing populations from around a newly  built oil pipeline and other oil production facilities. These forces have  killed and injured civilians, destroyed villages, and driven out inhabitants in  order to create an unoccupied security zone, according to Department of  State reporting.  The government has also blocked or harassed  humanitarian relief operations.
The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army has been guilty of property theft  from nongovernmental organizations and U.N. agencies operating in the  south, according to the Department of State.  Militia factions have  manipulated humanitarian aid programs to gain food for their troops and  have conscripted new soldiers from camps housing refugees and internally  displaced persons.  The militias are also guilty of committing serious  human rights abuses.  According to Amnesty International, militia forces  frequently change sides depending on their perceived interests or the  supply of arms. The government pursues a policy of providing support and  weapons to the various militia commanders and encouraging interfactional  fighting.  It is estimated that more people have died as a result of  interfactional fighting between militias than in armed encounters with  government forces.
Since 1991, the United States has provided $1.2 billion in humanitarian  assistance to Sudan.  Because the government of Sudan is involved in gross  human rights violations and support of international terrorism, the United  States provides only humanitarian assistance in government-controlled  areas but both development and humanitarian assistance in opposition- controlled areas. USAID programs provide emergency food and nonfood  aid (blankets, kitchen items, and plastic sheeting) in areas of displacement  and resettlement. With increased emergency needs related to the many  active conflict zones and large simultaneous displacements, USAID is  providing life-sustaining assistance to extremely vulnerable populations.   Most assistance is provided through Operation Lifeline Sudan, which is a  consortium of U.N. agencies and more than 40 international  nongovernmental organizations.  In fiscal year 2001, the U.S. government  provided an estimated $4 million in direct program assistance, in addition  to U.S. contributions to the programs of international organizations, such  as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. Children’s  Fund.
section_title: Comments From the U.S. Department of State
section_title: Comments From the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Comments From the United Nations
section_title: Comments From the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Patrick Dickriede, Norman Thorpe, Jack  Edwards, Ernie Jackson, Zina Merritt, and Rona Mendelsohn made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: Ordering Information
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