Defense Acquisitions: Future Ground-Based Vehicles and Network Initiatives Face Development and Funding Challenges
Published: 2011-10-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: After the Army canceled the Future Combat System in June of 2009, it began developing modernization plans, including developing a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and additional network capability. At the same time, the Army was considering options on how to improve its light tactical vehicles. This statement addresses potential issues related to developing (1) the new GCV, (2) a common information network, and (3) the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in a constrained budget environment. The statement is based largely on previous GAO work conducted over the last year in response to congressional requests and results of other reviews of Army modernization. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed program documentation, strategies, and test results; interviewed independent experts and Army and Department of Defense (DOD) officials; and witnessed demonstrations of current and emerging network technologies. DOD reviewed the facts contained in this statement and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Delivering a feasible, cost-effective, and executable GCV solution presents a major challenge to the Army, with key questions about the robustness of the analysis of alternatives, the plausibility of its 7-year schedule, and cost and affordability. DOD and the Army have taken steps to increase oversight of the program, but resolving these issues during technology development will remain a challenge. For example, the Army has already reduced some requirements and encouraged contractors to use mature technologies in their proposals, but the 7-year schedule remains ambitious, and delays would increase development costs. Independent cost estimates have suggested that 9 to 10 years is a more realistic schedule. Over the next 2 years during the technology development phase, the Army faces major challenges in deciding which capabilities to pursue and include in a GCV vehicle design and determine whether the best option is a new vehicle or modifications to a current vehicle. The Army's new information network strategy moves away from a single network development program to an incremental approach with which feasible technologies can be developed, tested, and fielded. The new strategy has noteworthy aspects, such as using periodic field evaluations to assess systems that may provide potential benefit and getting soldier feedback on the equipment being tested. However, the Army has not articulated requirements, incremental objectives, or cost and schedule projections for its new network. It is important that the Army proceed in defining requirements and expected capabilities for the network to avoid the risk of developing individual capabilities that may not work together as a network. With the cancellation last week of its ground mobile radio and continuing problems in developing technology to provide advanced networking capability, the Army will still need to find foundational pieces for its network. The Army is reworking earlier plans to develop and acquire the JLTV and is planning to recapitalize some of its High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMWWV). These efforts have just begun, however, and their results are not yet assured. To reduce risk in the JLTV program, the services relied on multiple vendors during technology development to increase their knowledge of the needed technologies, determine the technology maturity level, and determine which requirements were achievable. As a result, the services identified trades in requirements to drive down the cost of the vehicle. For example, the services found that JLTV could not achieve both protection level and transportability goals, so the services are accepting a heavier vehicle. A potential risk for the services in allowing industry to build vehicles for testing is that the prototypes may not be mature; the Army will need to keep its options open to changes that may result from these tests. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have articulated a significant future role for their Up-Armored HMMWV fleets, yet the fleets are experiencing reduced automotive performance, the need for better protection as threats have evolved, and other issues. The Army is planning to recapitalize a portion of its Up-Armored HMMWV fleet to increase automotive performance and improve blast protection. The Marine Corps' plans to extend the service life of some of its HMMWVs used in light tactical missions are not yet known.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any recommendations with this statement; however, consistent with previous work, this statement underscores the importance of developing sound requirements and focusing up front on what modernization efforts will deliver and at what cost.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Army’s  recent initiatives to acquire ground-based combat and tactical vehicles  and an information network capability. In the wake of the June 2009  decision to cancel the Future Combat System, which included a new  class of manned ground vehicles anchored by an advanced information  network, the Army began developing plans for a new Ground Combat  Vehicle (GCV) and an incremental tactical network capability. At about  the same time, the Army began considering ways to improve its light  tactical vehicles and developed the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)  program with the U.S. Marine Corps. My statement today, based largely  on work we have conducted over the last year in response to requests  from this subcommittee and results of other reviews of Army  modernization, will address potential issues that the Army faces as it  prepares to make significant decisions on its GCV, network, and light  tactical vehicle programs in this constrained budget environment.
To assess the GCV program, we analyzed program documentation, such  as the Initial Capabilities Document and the Technology Development  Strategy; interviewed Army and Department of Defense (DOD) officials;  and interviewed independent experts and reviewed their analyses. We  analyzed the Army networking and management strategy, and compared  that strategy with DOD acquisition policy and best practices. We also  observed demonstrations of current and emerging networking equipment,  analyzed evaluation results, obtained soldier feedback, and met with  Army and DOD officials who are involved in defining the tactical network.  To assess JLTV, we analyzed documentation, interviewed Army and  Marine Corps officials, and analyzed how the Mine Resistant Ambush  Protected (MRAP) vehicle program, including the MRAP-All Terrain  Vehicle (M-ATV), has influenced the JLTV program. We also obtained  and reviewed JLTV test results and interviewed test officials. To assess  the High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)  recapitalization plan, we analyzed both services’ respective plans for  future recapitalization efforts, reviewed past efforts, and interviewed Army  and Marine Corps officials.
We conducted work on these Army programs as part of performance  audits from December 2010 to October 2011, in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army’s ground-based military operations generally use two kinds of  vehicles: combat vehicles designed for a specific fighting function and  tactical vehicles designed primarily for multipurpose support functions.  Most combat vehicles move on tracks—including the Abrams tank and  the Bradley Fighting Vehicle—but some move on wheels, such as the  Stryker. Tactical vehicles generally move on wheels, including the  HMMWV and the JLTV.
Most major defense acquisitions follow a structured acquisition process,  which normally consists of three discrete phases: (1) technology  development; (2) engineering and manufacturing development; and (3)  production and deployment. Programs are expected to meet certain  criteria at milestone decision points for entry into each phase. For  anticipated major defense acquisition programs, like the GCV and the  JLTV, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics (USD/ATL) generally serves as the Milestone Decision  Authority. The Milestone Decision Authority is responsible for approving  the programs’ entry into the defense acquisition system, approving entry  into subsequent phases, and documenting the various approvals through  acquisition decision memorandums.
The Army’s GCV program is intended to modernize the current ground  combat vehicle fleet, replacing a portion of the Bradley Infantry Fighting  Vehicles currently in inventory. In February 2010, the Army issued a  request for proposals for the technology development phase of the GCV  before completing the required analysis of alternatives (AOA), citing  schedule urgency. In May 2010, the Army convened a “Red Team” to  assess the risk of achieving the GCV schedule. The Red Team issued its  report in August 2010, citing major risk areas including schedule,  technical maturity, and affordability of the system. The Army rescinded  the original request for proposals and issued another in late 2010. The  milestone A decision was expected in April 2011, but did not occur until  August 2011 (see fig. 1). In August, the Army awarded technology  development contracts to two contractor teams. A third contractor team  submitted a proposal but did not receive a contract award and has filed a  bid protest with GAO that is still being considered.
The Army has been defining a strategy to develop, demonstrate, and field  a common tactical information network across its forces. Generally, such  a network is expected to act as an information superhighway to collect,  process, and deliver vast amounts of information such as images and  communications while seamlessly linking people and systems. The  Army’s current strategy is to better understand current Army networking  capabilities, determine capabilities needed, and chart an incremental path  forward. The Army plans regular demonstrations as the network grows  and its capability improves.
The Army and Marine Corps generally define light tactical vehicles as  capable of being transported by a rotary wing aircraft and with a cargo  capacity of equal to or less than 5,100 pounds. Light tactical vehicles  represent about 50 percent of the Army’s tactical wheeled vehicle fleet  and currently consist of the HMMWV family of vehicles. The Army’s  HMMWV program also provides vehicles to satisfy Marine Corps, Air  Force, and other requirements. The JLTV is expected to be the next  generation of light tactical vehicles and is being designed to provide the  advances in protection, performance, and payload to fill the capability gap  remaining between the HMMWV and MRAP family of vehicles. JLTV is  being designed to protect its occupants from the effects of mines and  improvised explosive devices without sacrificing its payload capability or  its automotive performance, which has not been the case with the other  tactical wheeled vehicles.
The Army’s recent history with its acquisition programs was the subject of  a review by a panel chartered by the Secretary of the Army. In its January  2011 report, the panel noted that the Army has increasingly failed to take  new development programs into full-rate production. From 1990 to 2010,  the Army terminated 22 major defense acquisition programs before  completion. While noting many different causes that contribute to a  program’s terminations, the panel found that many terminated programs  shared several of the same problems, including weak trade studies or  analyses of alternatives; unconstrained weapon system requirements;  underestimation of risk, particularly technology readiness levels;  affordability reprioritization; schedule delays; and requirements and  technology creep. The panel made a number of recommendations to help  make the Army’s requirements, resourcing, and acquisition processes  more effective and efficient.
section_title: Army Faces Major Challenges to Identify a Feasible, Cost- Effective, and Executable GCV Solution
paragraphs: Over the next 2 years during the technology development phase, the  Army faces major challenges to identify a feasible, cost-effective, and  executable solution that meets the Army’s needs. Among these are  making choices on which capabilities to pursue and include in a GCV  vehicle design and determining whether the best option is a new vehicle  or a modified current vehicle. In our March 2011 testimony, we identified  key questions about GCV pertaining to how urgently it is needed,  robustness of the analysis of alternatives, plausibility of its 7-year  schedule, cost and affordability, and whether mature technologies would  be used. Since that time, the Army has moved the CGV program into the  technology development phase. DOD and the Army have taken positive  steps to increase their oversight of the program; however, the timely  resolution of issues surrounding the areas previously identified will be a  major challenge.    Urgency of need: The Army’s recent combat vehicle capability  portfolio review confirmed the Army’s need for GCV as a Bradley  Infantry Fighting Vehicle replacement and USD/ATL approved the  GCV acquisition program. USD/ATL agreed that the Army has a  priority need for a GCV but the number of caveats in the approval  decision (as discussed below) raises questions about the soundness  of the Army’s acquisition plans and time lines.    Analysis of alternatives: After initially bypassing completion of the  AOA process, the Army subsequently conducted an AOA but was  directed by USD/ATL to conduct more robust analyses, throughout  the technology development phase, to include design and capability  trades intended to reduce technical risks and GCV production costs.  We have reported that a robust AOA can be a key element in  ensuring a program has a sound, executable business case prior to  program initiation and that programs that conduct a limited AOA  tended to experience poorer outcomes—including cost growth. The  Army is expected to include sensitivity analyses in the AOA to explore  trade-offs between specific capabilities and costs. These analyses will  be supported by assessments of existing combat vehicles to  determine whether they are adequate alternatives to a new vehicle, or  whether some of the designs or capabilities of existing vehicles should  be incorporated into a new GCV. Concurrently, the GCV contractor  teams will conduct design trades and demonstrate technologies, the  results of which will also be fed back into the AOA updates.    Plausibility of 7-year schedule: The Army’s plan to deliver the first  production vehicles in 7 years still has significant risk. Since GCV was  originally conceived in 2009, the Army has already reduced some  requirements and encouraged interested contractors to use mature  technologies in their proposals. However, the schedule remains  ambitious and USD/ATL has stipulated that the Army will need to  demonstrate that the schedule is both feasible and executable.  According to an independent Army program evaluator, the next 2  years of technology development will require many capability and  requirements trades in order to better define an acceptable solution at  the same time that technology risks for that solution are to be  identified and mitigated. Concurrent activities can lead to poor results,  calling into question whether the 7-year schedule is executable. The  independent cost estimate submitted for the milestone A review  featured higher GCV development costs with the assumption that the  Army would need 9 or 10 years to complete the program, instead of  the assumed 7 years.    Cost and affordability: Cost continues to be a challenge, as an  independent cost estimate was at least 30 percent higher than the  Army’s estimate for GCV procurement. USD/ATL has directed that  continued program approval depends on the Army’s ability to meet the  $13 million procurement unit cost target. As for affordability, with the  expectation that less funding will be available in coming years, the  Army has made some trades within the combat vehicle portfolio.  According to Army officials, the Army plans to proceed with GCV as  currently planned, but several other combat vehicle programs—such  as anticipated upgrades for the Bradley, Abrams, and Stryker  vehicles—are being reshaped or delayed.    Use of mature technologies: The Army encouraged interested  contractor teams to use mature technologies in their GCV proposals.  Due to the current bid protest, we do not have insight into what the  contractor teams proposed in terms of specific critical technologies or  their maturity. A DOD official stated, and we agree, that it will be  important that technologies be thoroughly evaluated at the preliminary  design review before the decision to proceed to the engineering and  manufacturing development phase.
section_title: Ambitious Army Information Network Strategy Has Noteworthy Aspects but Unresolved Issues Could Affect Long- Term Implementation
paragraphs: The Army has taken a number of steps to put together a more realistic  strategy to develop and field an information network for its deployed  forces than the network envisioned for the Future Combat System  program. However, the Army is proceeding without defining requirements  for the network and articulating clearly defined capabilities. As a result,  the Army runs the risk of developing a number of stovepipe capabilities  that may not work together as a network, thus wasting resources. The  Army has moved away from its plan for a single network development  program under Future Combat System to an incremental approach with  which feasible technologies can be developed, tested, and fielded. This  planned approach reflects lessons learned and changes the way the  Army develops, acquires, and fields network capabilities. Under this new  approach, numerous programs will be developed separately and  coordinated centrally, and network increments will be integrated and  demonstrated in advance of fielding rather than the previous practice of  ad hoc development and integration in the field. A key aspect of the  implementation of the new approach will be aligning the schedules of the  separate programs with the Army’s planned, semiannual field events,  called network integration evaluations, where emerging technologies are  put in soldiers’ hands for demonstration and evaluation.
Several key aspects of the Army’s Network Strategy include:  In our March 2011 testimony, we pointed out that roles and  responsibilities for network development were not clear. Since then,  senior Army leadership issued a directive detailing the collective roles,  responsibilities, and functions of relevant Army organizations involved  with the network modernization effort.    The Army is currently working to establish a comprehensive  integrated technical baseline for the network and addressing  prioritized capability gaps. With this baseline, the Army expects to  build on elements of the network already in place with an emphasis on  capturing emerging technologies that deliver capability incrementally  to multiple units at the same time. This represents a significant  departure from the previous practice of fielding systems individually  and often to only one element of the operational force at a time (for  instance, companies, battalions, or brigades).    The network integration evaluations are a key enabler of the Army’s  new network strategy and assess systems that may provide potential  benefits and value to the Army while identifying areas requiring  additional development. The evaluation process provides the Army an  opportunity to improve its knowledge of current and potential network  capability. Additionally, it provides soldier feedback on the equipment  being tested. For example, members of the Army’s network test unit,  the Brigade Modernization Command, indicated that a number of  systems tested should be fielded and other systems that should  continue development.
Several issues will need to be resolved as the Army implements its  network strategy. For example,    The Army has not yet announced requirements nor has it established  cost and schedule projections for development and fielding of its  network. Since the Future Combat System termination, the Army does  not have a blueprint or framework to determine how the various  capabilities it already has will fit together with capabilities it is  acquiring to meet the needs of the soldier. Even with an incremental  approach, it is important for the Army to clearly articulate the  capabilities the system is attempting to deliver. Without this  knowledge, the Army runs the risk of acquiring technologies that may  work in a stand-alone mode but do not add utility to the broader  network strategy.    The network integration evaluation provided an extensive amount of  data and knowledge on the current Army network and candidate  systems for the network. However, since the network integration  evaluation serves as an evaluation instrument, it is important to have  test protocols that capture objective measures and data on the  network’s performance. Two independent Army test oversight  agencies, reflecting on the evaluation results, expressed concern over  not having proper instrumentation for the overall evaluations; in  particular, not having the necessary instrumentation to conduct  operational tests on large integrated networks and not having clear  network requirements.    Army officials are developing a strategy to identify, demonstrate, and  field emerging technologies in an expedited fashion. To date, the  Army has developed an approach to solicit ideas from industry and  demonstrate the proposed technologies in the network integration  evaluation. However, the Army is still formulating its proposed  approach for funding and rapidly procuring the more promising  technologies.    Development of the Joint Tactical Radio System ground mobile radio,  a software-defined radio that was expected to be a key component of  the network has recently been terminated. In a letter to a  congressional defense committee explaining the termination, the  acting USD/ATL stated that the termination was based on growth in  unit procurement costs. He added that it is unlikely that Joint Tactical  Radio System ground mobile radio would affordably meet  requirements and may not meet some requirements at all. The radio  performed poorly during the network integration evaluation and was  given a “stop development and do not field” assessment by the test  unit. Based on the assessment that a competitive market had  emerged with the potential to deliver alternate radios to meet the  capability at a reduced cost, the acting USD/ATL also established a  new program for an affordable; low-cost; reduced size, weight, and  power radio product. At this point, it is not yet clear when and how that  program will proceed or how these new radios will be able to fit within  the Army’s network strategy.    The Army plans for the future tactical network to feature the use of the  wideband networking and soldier radio waveforms and, in our March  2011 testimony, we reported that the Army has had trouble maturing  these waveforms for several years and they are still not at acceptable  levels of maturity. Although both waveforms experienced limited  successes during the recent network integration evaluation testing,  Army officials indicate that the wideband networking waveform  continues to be very complex, and not fully understood, and there  may be substantial risk maturing it to its full capability requirement.  With the termination of the ground mobile radio, it is unclear how  waveform maturation will continue.    Although the network integration kit—expected to be a fundamental  part of the Army’s information network—was found to have marginal  performance, poor reliability, and limited utility, the USD/ATL  approved procurement of one additional brigade set of network  integration kits. The decision made potential fielding of the kits— radios, waveforms, integrated computer system, and software— contingent on user testing that successfully demonstrates that it can  improve current force capabilities. The network integration kit again  performed poorly during the recent network integration evaluation and  received a “stop development and do not field” assessment. Army  network officials have indicated that a senior Army leadership  memorandum will be forthcoming that will cancel further network  integration kit development and fielding. Earlier, the Army concluded  that the network integration kit was not a long-term, viable, and  affordable solution.
section_title: Services to Rely on Industry to Provide Potential Solutions for Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Needs
paragraphs: To reduce risk in the JLTV program, the Army and Marine Corps entered  a technology development phase with multiple vendors to help increase  their knowledge of the needed technologies, determine the technologies’  maturity level, and determine which combination of requirements were  achievable. The contractors delivered prototype vehicles in May 2010 and  testing to evaluate the technical risks in meeting the proposed  requirements, among other things, was completed on the vehicles in June  2011. Because of the knowledge gained through the technology  development phase, the services have worked together to identify trades  in requirements to reduce weight and to drive down the cost of the  vehicle. A different outcome may have resulted if the services had  proceeded directly to the engineering and manufacturing development  phase, as had been considered earlier.
Based on the technology development results, the services concluded  that the original JLTV requirements were not achievable and its cost  would be too high. For example, the services found that JLTV could not  achieve both protection levels and transportability, with weight being the  issue. As a result, the services have adjusted the JLTV transportability  requirement to a more achievable level and the Army and Marine Corps  have decided that they would rely on HMWWVs for other missions initially  intended for JLTV. In fact, the Army has chosen to proceed with even  higher protection levels than planned earlier for JLTV. The Army now  plans to have protection levels equal to the M-ATV, including underbody  protection, while the Marine Corps will continue with the original  protection level, similar to the MRAP family of vehicles except for the  underbody protection, but plans to conduct more off-road operations to  avoid mines and roadside bombs. As for armor protection, the services  have found that development of lightweight, yet robust armor has not  proceeded as rapidly as hoped and production costs for these new  technologies are significantly higher than for traditional armor.
The services have established an average procurement cost target of  $350,000. A key component of the average procurement cost is the  average manufacturing unit cost which includes the cost of labor,  materials, and overhead to produce and assemble the product. Achieving  the average procurement cost target of $350,000 would require an  average manufacturing unit cost of $250,000 to $275,000. While one  recent technology development projection of a fully armored JLTV  average procurement cost exceeded $600,000, the program office now  estimates that, by implementing requirements trades and the cost savings  from those trades, industry can meet the average manufacturing unit cost  and average procurement cost targets. Nevertheless, meeting the JLTV  cost targets will be a challenge and will also likely depend on what type of  contract the services award. The services’ current JTLV plan is to award  a multiyear procurement contract with sizable annual quantities, once a  stable design is achieved.
Originally, the services planned to follow a traditional acquisition  approach for JLTV and enter the engineering and manufacturing  development phase in January 2012. According to the Army program  manager for light tactical vehicles, the services now plan to use a  modified MRAP acquisition model in which industry would be asked to  build a set of vehicles that would subsequently be extensively tested prior  to a production decision. The Army has stated that industry had  demonstrated several competitive prototypes whose performance and  cost has been verified and believes that industry can respond with  testable prototypes within about 1 year. Many details of the new strategy  have yet to be worked out but a milestone B review is anticipated in April  2012. While this approach is seen as saving time and money, it will forgo  the detailed design maturation and development testing process typically  done early in the engineering and manufacturing development phase. A  key risk is the potential for discovering late that the vehicles are still not  mature.
subsections: section_title: HMWWV Recapitalization Effort
paragraphs: Both the Army and the Marine Corps have articulated a significant role for  the Up-Armored HMMWV in combat, combat support, and combat service  support roles beyond fiscal year 2025 but their fleets are experiencing  reduced automotive performance, loss of transportability, higher operation  and sustainment costs, and the need for better protection as the threats  have evolved. The Army plans to recapitalize a portion of its Up-Armored  HMMWV fleets by establishing requirements, seeking solutions from  industry through full and open competition, and testing multiple prototype  vehicles before awarding a single production contract. The Army’s  emerging effort—the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program— aims to modernize vehicles to increase automotive performance, regain  mobility, extend service life by 15 years, and improve blast protection.  The initial increment of recapitalized vehicles for the Army is expected to  be about 5,700, but depending on the availability of funds, the quantity for  the Army could increase. The Army plans a two-phased acquisition  strategy for recapitalizing the Up-Armored HMMWV that includes  awarding contracts to up to three vendors for prototype vehicles for  testing and a production contract to a single vendor. The production  decision is scheduled for late fiscal year 2013. The Army is anticipating a  manufacturing cost of $180,000 per vehicle, not including armor, based  on the cost performance of similar work on other tactical platforms  managed by the Army.
According to the Marine Corps developers, the Marine Corps has  concluded a recapitalized HMMWV will not meet requirements for is fleet  of 5,000 light combat vehicles. However, it will conduct research to find  the most effective way to sustain the balance of the fleet—about 14,000  vehicles—until 2030.  The Marine Corps plans to leverage components  and subsystems from the Army-sponsored HMMWV recapitalization  program. Detailed information on this effort is not currently available.  Marine Corps and Army officials have said they intend to cooperate on  the recapitalization effort and are sharing information on their individual  plans to help maximize value for the available funding.
As the services proceed to implement their new JLTV and HMMWV  strategies, they have identified a point in fiscal year 2015 (see fig. 2)  where a decision will be made on whether to pursue JLTV only or both  programs. By then, the technology and cost risks of both efforts should be  better understood.
section_title: Concluding Remarks
paragraphs: The Army continues to struggle to define and implement a variety of  modernization initiatives since the Future Combat System program was  terminated in 2009. The most recent example of this is the termination of  the ground mobile radio, which will require the Army to develop new plans  for relaying information to the soldier. The pending reductions in the  defense budgets are having a significant impact on Army acquisition  programs and the Army is already reprioritizing its combat vehicle  investments. As plans for GCV move forward, it will be important for  DOD, the Army, and the Congress to focus attention on what GCV will  deliver and at what cost and how that compares to other needs within the  combat vehicle portfolio. Beyond combat vehicles, DOD and the services  will also be facing some tough decisions in the future on the tactical  wheeled vehicle programs and the affordability of both the JLTV and the  HMWWV recapitalization effort.
Over the last few years, the Army has been conducting capability portfolio  reviews which have proven to be very helpful in identifying overlaps and  setting priorities. The reviews were highlighted in the Army Acquisition  Review and have been important in getting the Army to think more  broadly and to look beyond the individual program. On both JLTV and  GCV, as the requirements have been examined more closely, the  services are finding that they can make do with less in terms of  capabilities than originally anticipated and projected unit costs have been  reduced significantly. It is important that the Army continue to use and  improve on its capability portfolio review processes going forward and to  consider a broad range of alternatives.
Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to answer any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future questions about this statement, please contact me at (202)  512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include William R. Graveline, Assistant Director; William C. Allbritton;  Morgan DelaneyRamaker; Marcus C. Ferguson; Dayna Foster; Danny  Owens; Sylvia Schatz; Robert S. Swierczek; Alyssa B. Weir; and Paul  Williams.
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