Military Compensation: DOD Needs More Complete and Consistent Data to Assess the Costs and Policies of Relocating Personnel
Published: 2015-09-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: PCS involves moving military personnel to new locations and is a key tool used by the military services to fill assignments both in the United States and overseas. In fiscal year 2014, DOD obligated $4.3 billion for approximately 650,000 servicemember PCS moves.
Senate Report 113-176 included a provision for GAO to report on aspects of the PCS program. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) PCS per-move costs have changed since 2001, (2) military personnel are meeting time-on-station requirements, and (3) OSD's September 2014 study on increasing time-on-station addressed the elements in Senate Report 112-196 and used approaches consistent with generally accepted research standards.
GAO analyzed PCS cost and move data for fiscal years 2001 through 2014 using fiscal year 2014 dollars; obtained and analyzed available time-on-station data; reviewed OSD's September 2014 report to Congress on increasing time-on-station; and interviewed OSD and service officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has experienced an overall increase in Permanent Change of Station (PCS) per-move costs since 2001. GAO's analysis of DOD budget data shows that average PCS per-move costs, after accounting for inflation, increased by 28 percent from fiscal years 2001 to 2014. However, GAO's review of the services' annual budget materials found that the services have not reported complete and consistent PCS data, thereby limiting the extent to which DOD can identify and evaluate changes occurring within the PCS program. For example, the services did not completely or consistently report budget data on non-temporary storage costs, temporary lodging expenses, or tour extension payments. Program changes and factors outside the program can affect PCS costs. The specific factors driving the growth in per-move costs are unclear, however, because DOD does not periodically evaluate whether the PCS program is efficiently supporting requirements to relocate personnel. DOD therefore is not in a position to identify and evaluate changes that may be occurring over time in PCS per-move costs, or to take steps to manage and control cost growth.
DOD does not have information for determining whether personnel are meeting time-on-station requirements. DOD guidance specifies time-on-station lengths for U.S. and overseas locations and also allows for personnel to move prior to reaching these lengths if they qualify for an exception or obtain a waiver. However, DOD does not have complete or consistent data on the reasons why PCS moves occur prior to reaching specified lengths, because the services (1) do not maintain required data on their usage of exceptions and (2) do not have a requirement to maintain data on their usage of waivers. Moreover, availability of service data on time-on-station lengths is limited and varies by service. For example, each service has different years of available data. In addition, one service provided time-on-station data for officers and enlisted personnel separately, and these data covered different time periods.
In its September 2014 report to Congress on increasing time-on-station, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) addressed the elements that were specifically identified in congressional direction. OSD also used approaches consistent with generally accepted research standards in preparing its report. Nonetheless, OSD could have included additional information, such as more explicitly discussing constraints and information about the model used to develop cost savings estimates, and thereby improved the utility of the report for decision makers. The report stated that DOD plans to take actions aimed at extending servicemembers' time-on-station, which OSD believes could reduce PCS costs. However, without more complete and consistent data on both PCS costs and the use of exceptions and waivers, DOD does not have the information it needs for evaluating whether the implementation of its planned actions will be effective in extending time-on-station lengths and reducing PCS costs.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD, in coordination with the services, take actions to report complete and consistent PCS budget data; conduct periodic evaluations of the PCS program; and address limitations on the availability of data on exceptions and waivers for PCS moves that occur prior to reaching minimum time-on-station lengths. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Permanent Change of Station (PCS) involves moving military personnel  to new locations and is a key tool used by the military services to fill  assignments both in the continental United States and overseas. When  making a PCS move, servicemembers are provided with allowances to  cover moving expenses for themselves and their dependents. In fiscal  year 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) obligated $4.3 billion,  representing 3.7 percent of its military personnel budget, for  approximately 650,000 servicemember PCS moves.
With the long-term fiscal challenges facing the U.S. government and the  potential for reductions in the defense budget due to sequestration, it will  be important for DOD to ensure that its compensation programs, including  PCS, are operating as effectively and efficiently as possible. In Senate  Report 112-196 accompanying a proposed bill for the Department of  Defense Appropriations Act, 2013, the Senate Appropriations Committee  directed DOD to provide a report laying out a plan for increasing tour  lengths (also referred to as time-on-station, which is the time between  PCS moves) as a way to reduce PCS moves and costs, among other  things. In September 2014, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)  reported the results of its study to Congress and concluded that extending  time-on-station on a voluntary basis would be preferable to instituting  across-the-board increases.
A Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying a proposed  bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015  included a provision for GAO to report on aspects of the PCS program,  including PCS costs, moves, and tour rotation. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) PCS per-move costs have changed since fiscal year  2001, and the factors that caused any changes; (2) military personnel are  meeting time-on-station requirements by either reaching minimum time- on-station lengths or receiving exceptions and waivers to make a PCS  move earlier than planned; and (3) OSD’s September 2014 study on  increasing time-on-station addressed the elements identified in Senate  Report 112-196 and used approaches consistent with generally accepted  research standards.
For our first objective, we obtained and analyzed data on PCS moves and  costs for fiscal years 2001 to 2014 from annual budget justification  materials published by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller) and the military services. We normalized PCS costs to fiscal  year 2014 constant dollars using deflators published in DOD’s National  Defense Budget Estimates for fiscal year 2014. We assessed the reliability of data on PCS moves and costs data by reviewing these data  for consistency across fiscal years and among the four services, and  discussing these data with officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller) and each of the services’ budget offices. As a  result of our assessment and these discussions, we determined that  DOD-wide summary data on PCS moves and costs were sufficiently  reliable for our purpose of reporting on the changes in PCS costs over  time. We also obtained more detailed PCS cost data from service budget  documents. We identified limitations in these detailed data for fiscal years  2001 through 2009. Specifically, we were unable to analyze detailed data  on specific types of costs (such as commercial air travel and household  goods shipments) by traveler type (such as officers and enlisted  personnel) because these data were generated using methods that the  services subsequently revised and because DOD’s process for recording  obligations changed in fiscal year 2009 to require that obligations be  recorded at the time PCS orders were issued, rather than at the time PCS  moves occurred. These data issues are discussed further in the report.  As a result, we focused our analysis of detailed PCS data on fiscal years  2010 through 2014, and we determined that these data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of our analysis to report on trends for specific  types of costs by traveler type. We assessed the information we collected  against DOD guidance that prescribes a budget and accounting  classification that is to be used for preparing budget estimates, including  the budget justification materials we reviewed. We also discussed with  military officials the factors that may have contributed to changes in PCS  moves and costs over time, and we identified any efforts the department  has made to evaluate those factors. We assessed these efforts against  criteria that outline how organizations should use data to evaluate the  success of their human capital approaches and use information to make  decisions and monitor programs.
For our second objective, we reviewed DOD and service guidance  establishing time-on-station requirements. We obtained and analyzed  available data from the military services on time-on-station lengths and  associated waivers and exceptions. To assess the reliability of the data,  we reviewed policies and procedures related to the databases in which  the services keep the information, and we interviewed agency officials  knowledgeable about these data. We found that available data on median  time-on-station lengths were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  analysis. However, because these data were inconsistent across the  services, as discussed later in this report, we were generally not able to  make direct comparisons among the services.
For our third objective, we analyzed OSD’s September 2014 report and  determined whether and how it incorporated each of the elements  specified in Senate Report 112-196. We also compared the approaches  used to plan, execute, and present the results of OSD’s report to  generally accepted research standards previously identified by GAO.  These generally accepted research standards are categorized into three  overarching areas—design, execution, and presentation—with specific  components for each of the areas that allowed us to determine whether a  standard was met. For this analysis, we also obtained and reviewed  supporting documentation, including a draft study prepared by the RAND  Corporation that OSD used to inform its report. We provide further  details on our scope and methodology in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to  September 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Categories of PCS Moves
paragraphs: The PCS program enables the military services to move personnel to  assignments at new locations, and it supports a wide range of national  security requirements and institutional needs. PCS moves are distinct  from deployments or temporary duty travel, and they are grouped into six  major categories (see table 1). DOD presents these six categories with  associated cost information in its military personnel budget justification  materials.
section_title: Expenses Associated with PCS Moves
paragraphs: Upon receiving orders requiring a PCS move, a servicemember arranges  the move, often with assistance from a local military transportation office.  The servicemember is entitled to reimbursement for certain travel and  transportation expenses associated with the move. These expenses are  authorized under Chapter 8 of Title 37 of United States Code and are  specified in DOD’s Joint Travel Regulations. Allowable expenses  include those related to, among other things, shipment of household  goods (that is, items associated with the home and personal effects of  servicemembers and dependents) and privately owned vehicles,  commercial air travel, and temporary lodging. A list of allowable expenses  is provided in table 6 in appendix III. Costs in excess of allowable  expenses are borne by the servicemember.
section_title: Time-on-Station Requirements
paragraphs: Required time-on-station lengths—the minimum period of time between  PCS moves, subject to certain exceptions—are specified in DOD and  service guidance. For overseas assignments, DOD’s Joint Travel  Regulations specifies time-on-station lengths that range from 12 to 36  months. For assignments within the continental United States, time-on- station lengths are specified in service guidance and are generally either  36 months (Navy and Marine Corps) or 48 months (Army and Air Force),  subject to certain exceptions. Time-on-station length may be reduced if  servicemembers qualify for an exception or obtain an approved waiver.
As such, time-on-station requirements can be met in two ways: (1) a  servicemember remains in a location for the specified minimum length of  time, or (2) a servicemember qualifies for an exception or obtains an  approved waiver to move prior to the specified minimum length of time.  Time-on-station lengths may vary by specific rank or position. For  example, the minimum time-on-station for Air Force lieutenants within the  continental United States is 36 months, but it is 48 months for other  officers. Also, Marine Corps officers assigned to certain acquisition- related positions have a minimum time-on-station of 36 months, and Army  drill sergeants have a time-on-station of 24 months, with an option to  extend to 36 months.
section_title: OSD’s Report to Congress on Extending Time-on- Station
paragraphs: In September 2014, OSD reported to Congress the results of a study on  increasing time-on-station lengths as a potential approach to reducing  PCS moves and costs. OSD’s report, which was prepared in response to  Senate Report 112-196, was based in part on research conducted by the  RAND Corporation. To inform its report to Congress, OSD tasked RAND  to study issues related to time-on-station. Among other things, RAND  worked with the Defense Manpower Data Center to survey  servicemembers on their perceptions of extending time-on-station  lengths. In July 2014, RAND provided OSD a draft of its study findings.  According to RAND officials, they plan to finalize their study and issue a  final report in 2015, but as of July 2015 they had not done so.
OSD stated that it did not agree with increasing time-on-station lengths  across the board and cited survey results showing that nearly 60 percent  of servicemembers were unwilling to voluntarily extend their time-on- station. At the same time, according to OSD, a significant minority of  servicemembers would favor extending their time-on-station under some  circumstances. Because these preferences were highly individual, OSD  concluded that it was practically impossible to identify the likely  preferences of a servicemember without a direct inquiry.
section_title: DOD Inspector General Report on PCS Efficiencies
paragraphs: In May 2014, the DOD Office of Inspector General reported on  opportunities for cost savings and efficiencies in the PCS program. The  report was conducted in response to a House report accompanying a  proposed defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2014. The Inspector  General’s report made seven recommendations for improved  management practices in the non-temporary storage, household goods  shipments, and air travel features of the PCS program. Service officials  told us that the Department has begun implementing changes in  response to the report, including altering policies for non-temporary  storage to reduce the incidence of continued payments by DOD for  storage units that had exceeded the entitlement period for retired and  separated servicemembers.
section_title: Roles and Responsibilities for the PCS Program
paragraphs: Management and oversight of the PCS program is a responsibility shared  among multiple offices, including the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),  and the military services, among others. The Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness is the Secretary of Defense’s senior policy  advisor on recruitment, career development, and pay and benefits— including central management of the PCS program. Within the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the  Defense Travel Management Office coordinates updates to the Joint  Travel Regulations that establish travel and transportation guidance for  the department. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) develops  and oversees execution of the Department’s annual budget, including  military personnel appropriations and obligations for PCS costs. The  Comptroller also publishes and maintains the DOD Financial  Management Regulation, which establishes financial management  requirements, systems, and functions for all DOD components—including  the preparation of budget materials. According to DOD officials, PCS  moves and costs are tracked within the services by offices responsible for  financial management and budget, and service time-on-station policies  are managed by offices responsible for personnel assignments and  human resources.
section_title: PCS Per-Move Costs Have Increased Since 2001, and DOD Has Not Evaluated the Factors Contributing to This Increase
paragraphs: DOD has experienced an overall increase in PCS per-move costs since  2001, but it does not have complete, consistent data on the program and  has not evaluated the specific factors contributing to per-move cost  growth. Our analysis of DOD budget data shows that average PCS per- move costs, after accounting for inflation, increased by 28 percent from  fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2014. The overall increase in per-move  costs varied across the six PCS move categories and the four military  services. In addition, detailed PCS data for fiscal years 2010 through  2014 show that PCS per-move costs were consistently higher for officers  than for enlisted personnel, due to differences in certain cost categories.  However, we found that the services have not reported complete,  consistent PCS data, thereby limiting the extent to which DOD can  identify and evaluate changes within the PCS program. Program changes  and other factors affect PCS costs, but the specific factors driving the  overall growth in per-move costs are unclear, and DOD does not know  whether the PCS program is efficiently supporting requirements to assign  personnel in new locations.
subsections: section_title: PCS Costs Increased While PCS Moves Declined from Fiscal Years 2001 to 2014
paragraphs: Our analysis of DOD budget documents shows that from 2001 to 2014  the department’s total PCS costs increased by 13 percent, from $3.8  billion to $4.3 billion, while the number of PCS moves declined by 12  percent, from 731,967 to 646,387. As a result, per-move costs increased  overall by 28 percent, from $5,238 to $6,727, during this period. Per- move costs generally increased through fiscal year 2009, peaking at  $7,308, and then generally decreased through fiscal year 2014 (see fig.  1). In fiscal year 2009 DOD began requiring the services to record  obligations at the time PCS orders were issued, rather than at the time  PCS moves occurred. As a result, the services’ actual fiscal year 2009  obligations included a one-time increase of $745.2 million.
section_title: Per-Move Costs Varied across Move Categories
paragraphs: From fiscal year 2001 through 2014, per-move costs varied across the six  PCS move categories (see fig. 2). The highest per-move cost was for  rotational travel ($13,336 on average), while the lowest per-move cost  was for accession travel ($2,289 on average). More detailed results of our  overall analysis of PCS move categories are presented in appendix II.
Accession and separation moves accounted for 58 percent of moves and  23 percent of PCS costs from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2014.  Service officials stated that they have limited ability to control the  numbers of these types of moves, which are primarily driven by changes  in end strengths, and therefore they viewed these moves as a non- discretionary expense. Similarly, they stated that training and organized  unit moves are a non-discretionary expense because these are driven by  training requirements, in the case of training moves, and by strategic  decisions on force positioning, in the case of organized unit moves.
Operational and rotational moves accounted for 34 percent of moves and  64 percent of costs. Service officials stated that these moves are the  primary categories over which the military services have discretionary  control—that is, some operational and rotational moves can be delayed to  a subsequent fiscal year if sufficient funds are not available. Both we and  the RAND Corporation have previously reported that DOD’s overseas  presence is the primary factor in rotational travel costs, and we have  recently reported that DOD’s overseas military presence represents an  area for potential cost savings. For example, permanent overseas  stationing—and associated rotational moves—may come at significantly  higher costs than alternative approaches, such as deploying domestically  stationed forces when needed. We recommended in 2012 that DOD  conduct a comprehensive reassessment of its presence in Europe,  including the costs of various alternatives. As of March 2015, DOD had  partially addressed this recommendation by refining its posture-planning  process to require specified cost information, such as rough order-of- magnitude costs for new posture initiatives.
section_title: Per-Move Costs Increased and Varied Across the Services
paragraphs: Per-move costs across the four services were higher in fiscal year 2014  than in fiscal year 2001, and average costs varied among them (see fig.  3). Per-move costs increased the most for the Marine Corps (42 percent),  and the least for the Air Force (23 percent). However, the Air Force had  the highest average per-move cost ($8,548), and the Marine Corps had  the lowest ($4,679). Air Force officials told us that they had not conducted  any analyses to investigate why Air Force PCS moves cost more than  those at the other services, but they suggested that this difference could  be explained by a difference in the proportion of officer and enlisted ranks  completing PCS moves. Our analysis shows that for fiscal years 2010  through 2014, the Air Force moved relatively more officers than did the  other services—officers accounted for 21 percent of the Air Force’s total  PCS moves, as compared with 10 percent of the Marine Corps’ total PCS  moves—the Marine Corps being the service that had the lowest  proportion of officer moves. However, the officials stated that they have  not conducted analyses to determine the factors contributing to the  differences in per-move costs that we identified.
section_title: PCS Costs Were Consistently Higher for Officers than for Enlisted Personnel Due to Differences in Certain Cost Categories
paragraphs: Our analysis of detailed cost data by service for fiscal years 2010 through  2014 shows that PCS costs were consistently higher for officers than for  enlisted personnel across all the services. During this time period,  average per-move costs were 134 percent higher for officers ($12,983 for  officers and $5,553 for enlisted personnel). The results of our analysis of  detailed PCS cost and move data are included in appendix III. This cost  difference was generally due to higher allowances for officers in certain  cost categories—that is, household goods shipments, travel expenses,  and dislocation allowances.
Household goods shipments, including expenses associated with  packing, transporting, storing, and unpacking home and personal  items, were 85 percent higher for officers than for enlisted personnel.  These expenses accounted for approximately 60 to 65 percent of the  costs of a PCS move. The costs of these shipments are based on the  weight of the goods shipped, and according to law and DOD  regulation, higher ranking personnel are provided a higher weight  allowance for household goods shipments. For example, the  household goods weight allowance for an officer in grade O-6 without  dependents is 18,000 pounds, and for an enlisted servicemember in  grade E-6 without dependents it is 8,000 pounds.
Dislocation allowances, payments made to partially reimburse  servicemembers for miscellaneous expenses incurred in relocating,were 49 percent higher for officers than for enlisted personnel. They  accounted for 13 percent of costs for officer moves and 9 percent for  enlisted servicemember moves.
Travel expenses, which include commercial airfare, reimbursements  for travel on another type of transportation, and per diem expenses,  were 29 percent higher for officers than for enlisted personnel. They  accounted for 12 percent of costs for officer moves and 21 percent for  enlisted servicemember moves.
Per-move costs from fiscal year 2010 through 2014 varied widely among  the services, including among the same ranks or move categories. For  example, the average per-move cost to transport or store privately owned  vehicles was $1,288 for an Army officer and $3,165 for a Marine Corps  officer. Dependent move costs also varied across ranks and services.  The Marine Corps had the highest average cost for dependent moves— $1,663 for dependents of officers and $1,410 for dependents of enlisted  personnel. The average costs for the same categories in the Air Force  were $535 and $614, respectively. Marine Corps officials stated that, due  to a service approach intended to improve the stability of military families,  the Marine Corps has seen an increase in personnel completing PCS  moves without their dependents so that military spouses can have  increased career stability and dependents can attend the same schools.  According to the officials, while not completely accounting for the cost  increases we observed, this policy change has increased PCS costs due  to the need to fund two separate PCS moves—one for the  servicemember and one for their dependents.
Certain per-move costs decreased significantly from fiscal years 2010  through 2014. For example, costs for Army officer moves decreased by  21 percent, and the cost of shipping or storing privately owned vehicles  for Marines decreased by 40 percent for officers and 27 percent for  enlisted personnel.
section_title: Services Do Not Report Complete and Consistent PCS Data
paragraphs: While aggregate totals for PCS moves and costs were available and  could be compared across the services, we found that data for specific  PCS cost categories are not reported to Congress completely or  consistently. More specifically, when we compared the data reported to  Congress in each of the services’ budget justification materials from fiscal  years 2010 to 2014, we found that the services did not report complete  and consistent data for non-temporary storage costs, temporary lodging  expenses, or tour extension incentive payments (see table 2).
For example, we found that only the Marine Corps reported both the costs  and the number of moves associated with non-temporary storage and  temporary lodging.costs of non-temporary storage and temporary lodging for the Army, the  Navy, or the Air Force over the period of our review. We determined that   As a result, we could not determine the per-move  the Marine Corps’ per-move cost for non-temporary storage increased  from $603 to $1,486 (147 percent) for officers and from $602 to $1,337  (122 percent) for enlisted personnel from fiscal years 2010 to 2014. In the  absence of data from the other services, it is difficult to determine whether  the increase in the Marine Corps’ per-move costs represents an outlier or  reflects a departmentwide trend. Furthermore, in 2014 the Office of the  DOD Inspector General reported on waste resulting from DOD’s  continuing to pay for retired and separated servicemembers’ non- temporary storage units that had exceeded the entitlement period. DOD  and service officials stated that changes are currently being implemented  to respond to the Inspector General report’s findings and resolve the  issue. Until this issue is resolved, the inconsistency of reporting for this  cost category may limit DOD’s ability to track whether these changes are  having the intended effect of reducing costs for non-temporary storage.
In addition, the services do not consistently include some costs  associated with PCS moves in their PCS budget. For example, we found  that the Army and the Air Force included tour extension incentive  payments as part of the special pays budget rather than the PCS budget  when reporting these costs to Congress as part of their budget  justification materials. The Navy and Marine Corps, on the other hand,  included these payments in both the special pays and PCS budgets, with  tour extension benefits related to transportation reported as part of the  PCS budget. incentivize delaying a PCS move returning the servicemembers from an  overseas location, and as such have a direct impact on the PCS budget.  Similarly, family separation allowance payments (payments provided to  servicemembers making a move for PCS, temporary duty, or deployment  without their dependents) are listed separately from PCS costs in the  services’ budget documents that we reviewed.
Servicemembers meeting the eligibility requirements for a tour extension incentive may  choose either (1) a monetary incentive in the form of a special pay or bonus; or (2) a  period of rest and recuperative absence and round-trip transportation to the contiguous  United States at government expense. establishing these priorities states that, because budgetary information is  used widely and regularly for management, DOD will place the highest  priority on improving its budgetary information and processes. Federal  accounting standards similarly emphasize the need for managers to have  relevant and reliable cost information to assist Congress and executives  in making decisions about allocating federal resources, authorizing and  modifying programs, and evaluating program performance. The standards  also state that information on costs should be reported consistently,  including standardizing terminology to improve communication among  federal organizations and users of cost information. DOD’s Financial  Management Regulation prescribes a budget and accounting  classification that is to be used for preparing budget estimates, including  the budget justification materials we reviewed.
Our analysis of detailed cost data reported in the services’ budget  materials for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 and DOD’s guidance on the  presentation of budget justification materials found that the services do  not report complete and consistent PCS cost and move data in their  budget materials because (1) DOD guidance does not always require  them to do so, (2) some services are not following existing DOD  guidance, and (3) some of the services are providing more detailed data  than is required by DOD guidance. For example,
DOD guidance specifies that no unit of measure (such as the number  of moves) is to be reported for non-temporary storage, and most of  the services do not report these data.
DOD guidance specifies that both moves and costs should be  reported for temporary lodging expenses. However, the Army, the  Navy, and the Air Force are not reporting the required data on the  number of moves associated with temporary lodging expenses.
DOD guidance specifies that tour extension payments be included in  the special pays budget rather than the PCS budget, although these  payments are also related to the PCS program. The Navy and the  Marine Corps reported some costs for tour extensions in the special  pays budget and other costs in the PCS budget.
The Marine Corps was the only service that reported move data for  non-temporary storage, and this level of detail is not required by DOD  guidance.
Because the services do not report complete and consistent data in their  PCS budgets, the resulting information is often not comparable and  prevents decisionmakers from having a comprehensive view of the costs  associated with PCS. Furthermore, without complete and consistent data  on PCS costs and moves, DOD’s ability to analyze the factors that  influence PCS costs, make informed decisions about the PCS program,  and measure the impact of any changes made may be limited. For  example, according to service officials, the services recently made  changes to the policy of providing storage space for servicemembers  completing an overseas PCS move in an effort to save costs, but without  complete and consistent PCS cost data DOD will be unable to determine  whether this policy change is having the intended effect.
section_title: Program Changes and Other Factors Affect PCS Costs, but the Specific Factors Driving Overall Per-Move Cost Growth Are Unclear
paragraphs: Changes to the PCS program can affect PCS costs, and multiple changes  have been made to the PCS program. For example, changes were made  to the DOD Personal Property System, which the United States  Transportation Command uses to coordinate the shipment of household  goods during a PCS move. The changes, which began in fiscal year  2009, included providing full value replacement and repair (rather than  partial value) for damaged or lost household goods at no additional cost  to the servicemember; on-line claims filing and direct claims settlement  between servicemembers and transportation service providers; and a  change from lowest cost to best value transportation services. Also, in  2008, the temporary lodging expense allowance was increased from $180  per day to $290 per day, and the maximum amount of time for which  servicemembers and dependents could be authorized reimbursement for  temporary lodging during a PCS move involving a major disaster or a  housing shortage caused by a sudden increase of servicemembers in a  specific area was increased from 20 days to 60 days.
OSD and service officials also cited factors outside the PCS program  affecting PCS costs, including end strength fluctuations, wartime  operational tempo, and higher fuel costs. Across the services, officials  consistently stated that the major influence on PCS costs was fluctuations  in end strengths, leading to an increased number of moves to train new  personnel and staff positions vacated by servicemembers leaving the  military. OSD officials stated that wartime operational tempo associated  with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan was a major reason for the  increase in PCS moves and the associated PCS cost growth, due in part  to moving personnel to locations in preparation for deployments. and service officials stated that PCS cost growth was also caused by  increases in fuel costs that occurred since fiscal year 2001, given the  large influence that fuel costs have on specific PCS costs such as air  travel and cargo shipments.
For example, DOD officials told us that units preparing to deploy are staffed to higher  levels during wartime than during peacetime, and this staffing requires moving more  personnel to fill these units.
2014. The Marine Corps also expanded the use of incentives to  encourage Marines to extend their overseas assignments. According to  the Marine Corps, this initiative reduced the number of rotational moves  by 10 percent from fiscal years 2013 to 2014.
Although PCS program changes, factors outside the PCS program, and  individual efficiency initiatives can affect PCS costs, it is unknown what  the collective impact of these factors has been on PCS per-move costs  since fiscal year 2001. That is because DOD has not conducted an  evaluation of the PCS program to determine whether it was efficiently  supporting requirements for assigning personnel to new locations while  reimbursing them for the costs of PCS moves. DOD officials did not know  when the last evaluation of the PCS program had been conducted.  Officials also stated that they believe they have limited ability to control  the factors that contribute to increases in PCS costs because PCS  budgets are often driven by requirements outside the PCS program, such  as the number of personnel stationed overseas.
DOD guidance requires that the services analyze the anticipated  increases or decreases in PCS costs resulting from any proposed  changes to PCS assignment policies, and GAO’s work on strategic  human capital management has found that high-performing organizations  periodically reevaluate their human capital practices to ensure that  resources are properly matched to the needs of the current  environment. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  state that an agency’s internal controls should provide reasonable  assurances that operations are effective and efficient, and that agencies  should examine and use the information to make decisions and monitor  programs. Without periodic evaluations of the efficiency of the PCS  program, DOD will not have an analytical basis for identifying changes in  PCS per-move costs over time and the specific factors associated with  such changes. It may also be difficult for DOD to identify opportunities  where efficiencies could be realized in the PCS program, without  significantly impacting program performance or servicemember morale.  This type of analysis could better position DOD to identify and take steps  for managing and controlling PCS cost growth.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have Information for Determining Whether Personnel Are Meeting Time-on- Station Requirements
paragraphs: DOD does not have information for determining whether personnel are  meeting time-on-station requirements. DOD guidance specifies time-on- station lengths for U.S. and overseas locations and also allows for  personnel to move prior to reaching these lengths if they qualify for an  exception or obtain a waiver. However, DOD does not have complete and  consistent data on the reasons why PCS moves occur prior to reaching  specified lengths, because the services (1) do not maintain required data  on their usage of exceptions, and (2) do not have a requirement to  maintain data on their usage of waivers. Moreover, service data on time- on-station lengths are limited.
subsections: section_title: DOD Does Not Have Complete and Consistent Data on the Reasons Why PCS Moves Occur before Personnel Reach Minimum Time-on-Station Lengths
paragraphs: DOD does not have complete and consistent data on the reasons PCS  moves occur before personnel reach minimum time-on-station lengths.  We found that the military services (1) do not maintain required data on  their usage of exceptions and (2) do not have a requirement to maintain  data on their usage of waivers.
DOD and service guidance allow servicemembers to move prior to  reaching the minimum time-on-station length for a variety of reasons, and  these early moves require servicemembers to either qualify for an  exception or obtain an approved waiver. DOD guidance requires the  military departments to maintain data on exceptions to help DOD  determine the effectiveness of assignment policies. DOD does not have  a similar requirement for maintaining data on waivers. Waivers are  granted on a case-by-case basis by senior officials and, according to  service officials, the approval of a waiver generally depends on whether  moving a servicemember before the minimum time-on-station length is in  the best interests of the service from the standpoint of operational  necessity. OSD (Personnel and Readiness) officials told us that although  the services are not required to maintain data on waivers, they expect the  services to be able to provide these data, along with exception data, if  requested. In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government state that program managers need data to determine  whether they are meeting their goals for accountability for effective and  efficient use of resources. Additionally, these data should be identified  and captured in a form and time frame that permits people to perform  their duties efficiently.
We found, however, that the services are generally not maintaining  complete and consistent data on exceptions or waivers. The Marine  Corps could not provide us data on the number of moves that did not  meet time-on-station length requirements, nor on the number of  exceptions or waivers. While the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force could  provide data on the number of moves that did not meet time-on-station  length requirements, they could not provide data showing that these  moves had an associated exception or waiver. DOD guidance specifies  that the military departments are required to maintain not only data on the  number of exceptions but also historical data that shall enable the military  services and DOD to determine the effectiveness of assignment policies  and the cost-effectiveness of statutory entitlements. and Readiness) officials stated that while they expect the services to  maintain data on exceptions and other data such as waivers for  availability in case they are needed to support analyses, they have not  requested or analyzed data from the services on exceptions or waivers. databases that are used for time-on-station data. Service officials stated  that other than the DOD requirement to maintain data on exceptions, they  do not have internal requirements for this information, and therefore do  not systematically capture these data in their personnel databases.
Without the services’ maintaining complete and consistent data on  exceptions and waivers, DOD is limited in its ability to determine the  effectiveness of assignment policies as noted in DOD guidance, such as  analyzing whether current assignment policies or other factors may be  causing PCS moves to occur before personnel reach their minimum time- on-station lengths. In addition, DOD does not know how many moves  occurring earlier than minimum time-on-station lengths are being  approved using specific types of exceptions or waivers, and whether  there are patterns in the use of exceptions or waivers for such moves. For  example, information on the use of exceptions and waivers could help to  identify personnel in particular locations or in specific military occupations  who are experiencing shorter than average time-on-station, and could  help determine whether management focus is needed to address issues  underlying these trends. Such information could provide insight into how  well personnel management policies, procedures, and internal controls  are working.
Exception and waiver data are also important for evaluating potential  policy changes, such as whether increasing minimum time-on-station  lengths would lead to an actual increase in time between PCS moves and  a reduction in PCS costs. As we observed earlier, for example, the Air  Force in 2009 increased minimum time-on-station lengths for locations  within the continental United States from 36 months to 48 months but did  not see a corresponding increase in actual time-on-station lengths.  Without exception and waiver data, it is difficult to determine why this  change did not have a significant impact on actual time-on-station  lengths.
section_title: Service Data on Time-on- Station Lengths Are Limited
paragraphs: The military services do not have a requirement to track time-on-station  length for their personnel, and their personnel information systems could  not readily generate time-on-station data. Consequently, the availability of  time-on-station data varied across the services. For example, each  service had different years of available data. In addition, one service  provided time-on-station data for officers and enlisted personnel  separately, and these data covered different time periods. Figure 4  depicts the extent to which the services were able to provide data related  to time-on-station.
The Army was not able to provide data on enlisted servicemembers for  2006 through 2008 continental U.S. assignments, or data on the median  time-on-station for enlisted servicemembers for 2006 through 2014  overseas assignments.
The data limitations affected our ability to determine the extent to which  military personnel met time-on-station lengths specified in guidance.  However, on the basis of available data, we were able to make the  following observations with regard to each service:
Army time-on-station: The Army data show that from 2009 through  2014 at least half of the enlisted and officer moves within the  continental United States occurred before the time-on-station  minimum, and officer personnel moves overseas generally occurred  after the time-on-station minimum.
Navy time-on-station: The Navy data show that from 2001 through  2014 at least half of enlisted personnel moves within the continental  United States occurred after the time-on-station minimum, while at  least half of the officer moves occurred before the minimum.
Air Force time-on-station: Of the four services, only the Air Force  made a major policy change to minimum time-on-station length—a  12-month increase, from 36 to 48 months, for locations in the  continental United States—implemented in 2009. Our analysis,  however, indicated that this policy change had only a minor effect on  actual times between moves. Between fiscal years 2009 and 2014,  median time-on-station increased from 50 months to 51 months for  enlisted personnel. During the same time period, median time-on- station for officer personnel decreased from 43 months to 37 months.
Marine Corps time-on-station: The Marine Corps data show that  from 2008 through 2014 at least half of the enlisted moves within the  continental United States occurred before the time-on-station length  minimum.
For more detail on our analysis of the services’ time-on-station data, see  appendix V.
section_title: OSD’s Report on Increasing Time-on- Station Addressed the Elements in Congressional Direction and Used Approaches Consistent with Generally Accepted Research Standards, but Could Have Contained Additional Information
paragraphs: In its September 2014 report on increasing time-on-station, OSD  addressed the elements that were specifically identified in congressional  direction. OSD also used approaches consistent with generally accepted  research standards in preparing its report. Specifically, the report’s  design, execution, and presentation of results were consistent with the  standards. Nevertheless, OSD could have included additional  information—such as a description of the model and underlying  assumptions used to identify cost savings associated with increasing  time-on-station—that would have improved the utility of the report for  decisionmakers.
subsections: section_title: OSD’s Report Addressed the Four Elements in Congressional Direction, but Additional Details Would Have Made the Report More Informative for Decision-Makers
paragraphs: OSD’s report addressed the four elements specified in Senate Report  112-196. These elements were as follows: (1) planning to increase tour  length (time-on-station); (2) analyzing the impact of increasing tour length  on families, quality of life, and job performance; (3) making  recommendations to mitigate certain impacts from increasing tour length;  and (4) identifying cost savings. Table 3 summarizes our assessment of  the extent to which the OSD report addressed each element.
Although OSD’s report addressed the elements specified in Senate  Report 112-196, the discussion for some of the elements in the report  was limited, and OSD did not include additional details that, in our view,  would have more fully informed congressional decision makers on the  department’s plan. For example, the report did not explain why OSD  chose the options for increasing time-on-station that it presented in the  report.
Additionally, the report’s discussion did not provide details on potential  cost savings that may be achieved. More specifically, the report did not  fully describe the model and underlying assumptions it used to identify  cost savings associated with increasing time-on-station, or the  methodological decisions made that may have affected the results  generated by the model. OSD’s report contained a footnote stating that  the results of a model created by RAND estimate average annual savings  in the range of $25 million to $30 million. The footnote stated that the  assumptions leading to this estimate include increasing the length of  overseas time-on-station by 1 year for 10 percent of the DOD population  who would be relocating. However, the RAND study indicated that the  model also predicted that these savings could rise to almost $45 million  annually if the time-on-station for 10 percent of the population who would  be relocating within the continental United States also were increased by  1 year. The OSD report did not provide additional information about the  model, such as a discussion about how the model derived the average- cost-per-move that it used to estimate savings. In our view, this additional  information would have been helpful to fully inform congressional decision  makers about OSD’s plans to increase time-on-station.
section_title: OSD’s Report Used Approaches Consistent with Generally Accepted Research Standards, but Aspects of the Design and Execution Could Have Been Improved
paragraphs: OSD’s September 2014 report used approaches consistent with generally  accepted research standards that we derived from our previous work,   These generally accepted  other research literature, and DOD guidance.research standards are categorized into three overarching areas—design,  execution, and presentation—with specific components for each of the  areas that allowed us to determine whether a standard was met. Our  assessment of OSD’s report included examining the report as well as  supporting and supplemental documentation, which included a  preliminary report submitted to Congress in March 2014, a RAND study  that OSD commissioned to help inform its report (OSD had a draft of the  RAND study when it was developing its report to Congress), and contract  documents related to the RAND study. We also interviewed officials from  OSD and RAND who had knowledge of the study. We determined that  the report’s design, execution, and presentation of results were generally  consistent with the research standards we identified, and, as a result, we  believe that the report’s key findings were reasonable.
We determined that the report and supporting documents used  approaches consistent with the standard for a well-designed report in that  the design and scope were clear and the assumptions were explicitly  identified, as well as reasonable and consistent. For example, the  assumptions that underpin the design were generally reasonable and  consistent. Although the major constraints were generally identified and  stated, some of the constraints could have been more explicitly  discussed. For example, the report and supporting documents did not  discuss constraints imposed by shortcomings presented when data were  unavailable. RAND officials told us that unavailability of data from the  military services, including information on exceptions and waivers,  prevented them from completing in-depth analyses of the effect of  increased tour lengths on factors such as career development. However,  a discussion of these constraints and their impact on the scope of  analysis was not included in the report or supporting documents.
We also determined that the OSD report and supporting documents used  approaches consistent with the standard for a well-executed report in that  the models used to support the analyses, the assumptions in the models,  and the data used were appropriate for the defined purposes of the study.  In addition, the OSD report notes limitations related to using models to  predict changes resulting from new policies—such as the difficulty of  forecasting the number of moves saved resulting from increasing time-on- station.
Although we determined that the OSD report and supporting documents  used approaches consistent with the standard for a well-executed report,  some aspects of the report could have been strengthened to better  explain the full context of the study’s results. For example, the report to  Congress did not include information related to RAND’s model and  modeling methodology. In addition, the potential impact of data limitations  related to the use of survey data could have been better explained. For  example, the RAND study relied in part on results from the Defense  Manpower Data Center’s Status of Forces Active Duty Survey of DOD  servicemembers, and the OSD report cites these results. Although we  have typically observed the response rate to the Status of Forces Active  Duty Survey to be low, neither RAND nor OSD included any discussion of  the response rate, or of the potential affect it may have had on the survey  results.
Finally, we also determined that the report and supporting documents  used approaches consistent with the standard for a well-presented report  in that the results were presented in a clear, timely, accurate, and concise  manner and were relevant to Congress. For example, the analysis was  well documented and the conclusions were logically derived from the  analysis. Although some of the analyses and results were not present in  the report to Congress, we determined that the analysis and results  contained in the associated RAND study were sufficient to meet the  standard.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Effective management of the PCS program is important to support DOD’s  ability to reassign military personnel to new locations, while reimbursing  servicemembers for the allowable expenses of moving their households.  In addition, efficient use of PCS budgetary resources, like other  components of military compensation, is important given the federal  government’s continuing fiscal challenges. As DOD officials continue to  manage potential budget reductions, including implementation of  sequestration, the PCS program is likely to be a continued focus for  finding efficiencies and cost savings. However, DOD does not have  consistent and complete data on PCS costs and moves and, therefore,  cannot publish this information in the services’ budget justification  materials and provide it to decisionmakers in Congress and DOD.  Furthermore, DOD does not conduct periodic evaluations of the PCS  program and is not in a position to identify and evaluate changes that may  be occurring over time in PCS per-move costs and the factors driving  such changes, nor is it in a position to take steps to manage and control  cost growth. In addition, DOD does not have complete and consistent  data on waivers and exceptions—information that is needed to determine  the military services’ performance in meeting time-on-station length  requirements. OSD stated in its September 2014 report to Congress that  it is planning to take actions aimed at extending servicemembers’ time- on-station—actions that OSD believes could reduce PCS costs. However,  in the absence of more complete and consistent data on both PCS costs  and the use of exceptions and waivers, DOD does not have the  information it needs for evaluating whether the implementation of its  planned actions are effective in extending time-on-station lengths and  reducing PCS costs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the availability of information needed for effective and efficient  management of the PCS program, including program costs and time-on- station requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take  the following four actions:
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination  with the military services, to improve the completeness and  consistency of PCS data in service budget materials. This action  should include revising existing guidance on the reporting of non- temporary storage costs, and clarifying existing guidance on the  presentation of other PCS data.
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  in coordination with the military services, to complete periodic  evaluations of whether the PCS program is efficiently supporting  DOD’s requirements for assigning military personnel to new locations  while reimbursing servicemembers for allowable expenses incurred  during PCS moves. These periodic evaluations should identify  changes in PCS per-move costs over time, factors driving such  changes, and steps that could be taken to manage and control cost  growth.
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  in coordination with the military services, to improve the completeness  and consistency of data on exceptions used for PCS moves that occur  prior to established time-on-station lengths. This action should include  clarifying existing guidance with regard to how the services collect,  maintain, and report data on exceptions for use in evaluating  performance in meeting time-on-station requirements and addressing  challenges related to the services’ abilities to collect, maintain, and  report exceptions data.
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  in coordination with the military services, to improve the completeness  and consistency of data on waivers used for PCS moves that occur  prior to established time-on-station lengths. This action should include  establishing guidance for the military services to collect, maintain, and  report data on waivers for use in evaluating performance in meeting  time-on-station requirements and addressing challenges related to the  services’ abilities to collect, maintain, and report waiver data.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, DOD concurred with three of our recommendations  and partially concurred with one. DOD’s comments are reprinted in  appendix VII. DOD also provided technical comments that we considered  and incorporated as appropriate.
In regard to our first recommendation—to improve the completeness and  consistency of PCS data in service budget materials—DOD concurred,  adding that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will  convene a working group with the military services to review and revise,  as necessary, the current budgetary reporting requirements for the PCS  program. This action could meet the intent of our recommendation if it  results in more complete and consistent PCS budget data; however, DOD  did not provide information on the timeline for convening the working  group.
In regard to our second recommendation—to complete periodic  evaluations of the efficiency of the PCS program—DOD partially  concurred, noting that it agreed with the recommendation except for the  use of the phrase “fully reimbursing servicemembers.” DOD suggested  that we remove the word “fully” to reflect that some travel allowances,  such as temporary lodging expense and temporary lodging allowance,  are not intended to fully reimburse servicemembers, but are expressly  intended to offset cost. Upon further consideration, we agree that both  temporary lodging and dislocation allowances are defined in guidance as  intended to partially offset costs incurred by servicemembers during a  PCS move. As a result, we have removed the word “fully” from the  recommendation. DOD’s comments did not provide information on the  timeline or specific actions it plans to take to implement our  recommendation. We continue to believe that without periodic evaluations  of the efficiency of the PCS program, DOD will not have an analytical  basis for identifying changes in PCS per-move costs over time and the  specific factors associated with such changes. It may also be difficult for  DOD to identify opportunities where efficiencies could be realized in the  PCS program, without significantly impacting program performance or  servicemember morale. Implementing our recommendation to complete  periodic evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness of the PCS  program could better position DOD to identify and take steps for  managing and controlling PCS cost growth.
In regard to our third and fourth recommendations—to improve the  completeness and consistency of data on exceptions and waivers used  for PCS moves that occur prior to established time-on-station lengths— DOD concurred. DOD’s comments did not provide information on the  timeline or specific actions it plans to take to implement our  recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness; the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller); the Secretaries of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy;  and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To evaluate the extent to which Permanent Change of Station (PCS)  costs have changed from fiscal years 2001 through 2014, and the factors  that caused any changes, we obtained and analyzed relevant Department  of Defense (DOD) and service budget materials containing information on  PCS moves and costs. These budget materials report the services’ actual  obligations for PCS costs, along with the associated number of  servicemember moves. For our analysis, we divided the cost of PCS  moves by the number of servicemembers who were moved in order to  calculate the per-move costs.
We identified criteria in DOD guidance that prescribes a budget and  accounting classification that is to be used for preparing budget  estimates, including the budget materials we reviewed, accounting standards that emphasize the need for managers to have  relevant and reliable cost information to assist Congress and executives  in making decisions about allocating federal resources. We assessed the  availability, reliability, and consistency of PCS cost and move data  against those criteria. We met with officials at the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the military services’ budget  offices to learn about how these data were generated, presented, and  used. We also discussed with these officials the reliability and  comparability of these data.
DODFMR, vol. 2A, chpt. 1 (Sept. 2014). the services use this index to adjust for inflation when preparing PCS  budget estimates to support the annual President’s budget request to  Congress.
We determined that summary PCS data for fiscal years 2001 through  2014 were reliable for the purposes of analyzing and comparing per-move  costs for the six major types of PCS moves and across the services.  However, we determined that detailed cost data published in the services’  budget materials prior to fiscal year 2010 were not sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of reporting trends in specific cost categories by officers and  enlisted personnel, because these data were generated using methods  that the services subsequently revised, and because DOD’s process for  recording obligations changed in fiscal year 2009 to require that  obligations be recorded at the time PCS orders were issued, rather than  at the time PCS moves occurred. We determined that the services’  detailed data for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of our analysis because (1) service officials confirmed  that this level of data would be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our   (2) these data are the actual obligations reported by each of the  analysis;services for PCS costs, which is what the services anticipate spending on  PCS during the period of availability for the appropriation; and (3) we  validated the totals of the services’ detailed data against the summary  data in the DOD-wide budget materials. We analyzed the detailed cost  data for these years to identify trends across traveler type (that is, officers  and enlisted personnel, and their dependents) and among specific cost  categories (that is, household goods shipments and temporary lodging  expenses). We were not able to calculate per-move costs for all the PCS  cost categories because of the lack of data on servicemember moves for  certain cost categories for certain services.
See 37 U.S.C. § 474, et seq. the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and service officials, and we asked them  to identify any program or policy changes that would have affected PCS  costs, as well as any external factors—such as decisions to change the  number of overseas locations—that may have influenced PCS costs  during this timeframe. We also reviewed the results of our analysis of  PCS moves and costs, identified specific areas of relatively large  increases or decreases over time, and discussed these changes with  OSD and service officials to obtain additional context for the changes we  identified.
To evaluate the extent to which military personnel are meeting time-on- station requirements by either reaching minimum time-on-station lengths  or receiving exceptions and waivers to make a PCS move earlier than  planned, we obtained and analyzed available data from the military  services on time-on-station lengths and associated waivers and  exceptions. We asked each of the services to provide the average and  median time-on-station for officer and enlisted personnel for operational  and rotational moves. We also asked for these data to be broken out by  rank and job specialty, and for data on the number of moves that required  waivers and exceptions. The services used existing databases—the  Army’s Total Army Personnel Database, the Navy’s Enlisted Assignment  Information System and Officer Assignment Information System, the Air  Force’s Military Personnel Data System, and the Marine Corps’ Total  Force Data Warehouse—to produce summary time-on-station data. To  assess the reliability of the databases, we reviewed policies and  procedures related to the respective databases, and we interviewed  agency officials knowledgeable about these data. Data the services  provided were not consistent, and we were generally not able to make  direct comparisons among the services. However, we determined that the  summary data were reliable for purposes of reporting on time-on-station  for each of the services. We also interviewed pertinent officials within the  Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness and the  military services to discuss time-on-station data and policies. We  reviewed DOD and service guidance related to time-on-station lengths,  exceptions, and waivers and evaluated current practices based on this  guidance. We also reviewed historical changes to the guidance dating  back to 2001 to identify adjustments that have been made to time-on- station lengths for assignments both overseas and in the United States.
To determine the extent to which OSD’s September 2014 report on time- on-station addressed the elements identified in Senate Report 112-196,  we used a scorecard methodology. We created a checklist of elements,  and two analysts independently compared the elements with the OSD  report to determine the extent to which the study met the congressional  direction. This scorecard methodology assigns a rating of “addresses” if  the report engaged with all elements of the relevant congressional  direction, even if specificity and details could be improved upon; a rating  of “partially addresses” if the report did not include all of the elements of  the congressional direction; and a rating of “does not address” when  elements of congressional direction were not explicitly cited or discussed,  or when any implicit references were either too vague or too general to be  useful. We also interviewed pertinent officials within OSD to discuss the  report.
To guide our assessment of the OSD report, we identified generally  accepted research standards for the design, execution, and presentation  of findings that define a sound and complete study, and we used a  scorecard methodology to determine the extent to which the report used  approaches consistent with these standards. To define the set of  standards, we reviewed and adapted generally accepted research  standards from prior GAO work that reviewed DOD mobility requirements  studies.overarching areas—design, execution, and presentation—with specific  components for each of the areas that determined whether or not a  standard was met (see appendix VI for a list of the standards we used).  Our analysis of the report also considered the report’s supporting  documentation, which included a preliminary report submitted to  Congress in March 2014, a RAND study that OSD contracted to help  write its report (OSD had the study in draft form when creating its report),  and contract documents related to the RAND study. Four specialists  within GAO’s Applied Research and Methods team with collective  backgrounds in the areas of economics, statistical modeling, survey  methods, and research methods then evaluated the OSD report and  supporting documentation against the defined standards. Based on the   The set of standards we defined were categorized into three  specialists’ preliminary reviews, the GAO team followed up with requests  for additional information and clarification from OSD and RAND. The  specialists then discussed and reconciled any disagreements within their  evaluations to determine the extent to which the report conformed to the  three overarching areas and components of the areas. For reporting  purposes, the specialists determined that qualitative assessment ratings,  rather than numeric ratings for each individual standard, provided the best  explanation of the nuances of the analysis and findings.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to  September 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Permanent Change of Station Moves and Costs for Move Categories
paragraphs: Our analysis of Permanent Change of Station (PCS) data for the six  Department of Defense (DOD) move categories shows that from fiscal  years 2001 through 2014 accession and separation moves constituted 58  percent of PCS moves and about 24 percent of PCS costs. At the same  time, operational and rotational moves accounted for 34 percent of PCS  moves and 66 percent of PCS costs. Training and organized unit travel  together constituted 8 percent of moves and costs (see fig. 5.).
As stated above, annual PCS per-move costs for operational and  rotational moves were higher, on average, than for accession and  separation moves. For example, an accession move over this time period  cost $2,296 on average, and a rotational move cost $13,238. Per-move  costs for training and organized unit moves were lower than per-move  costs for rotational and operational moves and higher than per-move  costs for accession and separation moves (see table 4).
Service officials stated that rotational travel is the most costly type of  move because it involves transoceanic travel, with personnel and cargo  moving longer distances than for other types of moves. In contrast,  accession moves—when personnel are moved to their first duty station— generally involve travel within the continental United States. Also,  servicemembers making an accession move are lower ranked and  typically younger, and therefore less likely to be accompanied by  dependents, than are servicemembers making other types of moves.  While servicemembers making separation moves are generally more  senior and older than servicemembers making accession moves, DOD  and service officials stated that the per-move costs for these moves are  similar to those for accession moves because many servicemembers  making a separation move choose to remain in the same geographic area  as their final duty station, and thus these moves incur minimal costs. DOD  officials stated that the post-9/11 build-up of the military forces and the  subsequent drawdown in recent years led to a large number of  accessions and separations, as servicemembers were recruited for and  subsequently separated from the military.
section_title: Appendix III: Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Per-Move Costs in Specific Cost Categories
paragraphs: Our analysis of detailed Permanent Change of Station (PCS) data for  fiscal years 2010 through 2014 shows differences in per-move costs for  officers as compared with enlisted personnel in specific cost categories  (see table 5). We calculated annual average costs by specific cost  category (which are described in table 6) and determined the percentage  change in the cost categories over this time period. We further separated  these cost data for officers and enlisted personnel in each service.  Detailed costs in certain categories were not available for some of the  services, and we discuss these data limitations in this report. Also, as  noted in this report, PCS per-move costs generally were decreasing  during this time period.
section_title: Appendix IV: Time-on-Station Exceptions Specified in Department of Defense Instruction 1315.18
subsections: section_title: Department of Defense Time-On-Station Exceptions
paragraphs: 1.  Servicemembers are reassigned to an overseas or sea tour  2.  Servicemembers in sea-intensive skills are assigned from shore to sea duty, are required to complete minimum of 2 years of  3.  Servicemembers are accessed, reassigned to a different duty station for initial skill training, or are separated.  4.  Servicemembers are reassigned to a different duty station for training or educational purposes.  5.  Moves resulting from major weapon-system change or unit conversion (for example, a change from one type of aircraft to  another, such as F-4 to F-15, or infantry to mechanized infantry). This exception shall not cover moves associated with replacing  a servicemember selected for a new weapon system or unit.  6.  Servicemembers are permitted the option to retrain into a new specialty and location in conjunction with reenlistment, in which  7.  Servicemembers are permitted the option to select another location in conjunction with an established program, to keep military  couples together, in which case a 1-year minimum shall apply.  8.  Servicemembers are assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or  a Defense Agency where the tenure is limited by statute or the provisions of this Instruction to a shorter tour.  9.  Servicemembers serving under DOD Directive 1100.9, Military Civilian Staffing of Management Positions in the Support Activities  which prescribes different assignments for management positions in the support activities.  10.  Servicemembers are reassigned under Exceptional Family Member Programs or for humanitarian reasons 11.  Servicemembers are reassigned to a different duty station in preparation for a unit deployment/move.  12.  Servicemembers who are being considered for reassignment are in their first enlistment.  13.  Servicemembers in professional skills, such as doctors and lawyers, serving in assignments designated by the Secretary  concerned for the purpose of validating professional credentials or for developing expertise in selected specialized skills before  being assigned to independent duty without supervision.  14.  Servicemembers disqualified for duty as a result of loss of security clearance, professional certification, nuclear certification, or  medical qualification to perform, and where it has been determined that no vacant position exists within the limits of the same  geographic location in which the Servicemember may serve pending re-qualification or re-certification.  15.  Members reassigned as prisoners including assignments to and from confinement or reassigned for the purpose of standing trial.  16.  Members reassigned from patient status.  17.  Members curtailed for the purpose of traveling outside of the travel restriction for pregnancy of the member or spouse, or  reassigned for the purpose of receiving adequate medical care, including curtailments of female members from unaccompanied  tours because of the lack of adequate obstetric care.  18.  Members involved in incidents that cause serious adverse publicity or embarrassment for the United States Government, that  may jeopardize the mission, or that indicate the member is a potential defector.  19.  Members or their dependents are threatened with bodily harm or death and circumstances are such that military and civilian  authorities are unable to provide for their continued safety. Appropriate investigative agencies (such as the Air Force Office of  Special Investigations or the Army Criminal Investigation Command) and judge advocate offices shall verify the threats and  circumstances.  20.  Members complete or are eliminated from a training or education program.  21.  Members reassigned on low cost moves, as defined in enclosure 2 in DOD Instruction 1315.18  22.  The Secretary of Defense waives completion of a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, and the action would otherwise  require a waiver of a time-on-station requirement.  23.  Members rendered as excess as a result of unit inactivation, base closure or consolidation, or organization or staffing changes.
The Exceptional Family Member Program is for active duty servicemembers who have family  members with special medical needs. When servicemembers are considered for assignment within  the United States, consideration is given as to whether needed services, such as specialized pediatric  care, are available through the military health system at the proposed location.
section_title: Appendix V: Time-on-Station Data and Trends for United States and Overseas Locations
paragraphs: This appendix discusses the availability of time-on-station data from the  military services and our analysis of time-on-station trends, by service, for  continental U.S. and overseas locations.
We requested time-on-station data from each of the services and  assessed the reliability of the data received. The availability of time-on- station data varied across services and ranks. The trends for available  data are summarized by service below. For ease of reporting, we refer to  assignments outside of the continental United States as overseas  assignments. For more information on our methodology, see appendix I.
The services provided us with data on the median and average time-on- station lengths. Based on our analysis of these data, we determined that  the averages were consistently higher than the medians. We discussed  our analysis with service officials and they told us this was likely due to  certain servicemembers remaining in one location for extended periods of   Based on our analysis and conversations with service officials, we  time.decided to report the median of these data, rather than the average. For  purposes of consistency, we rounded all data to the nearest whole month.
subsections: section_title: Army Time-on-Station
paragraphs: The Army provided us data on the median time-on-station for officer  personnel for assignments in the continental United States and overseas  for fiscal years 2006 through 2014 and for fiscal years 2009 through 2014  for enlisted personnel. For overseas assignments, the Army was not able  to separate out 12-, 24-, and 36-month tours for enlisted personnel, so we  were not able to report on these data. For consistency, we reported data  from fiscal years 2009 through 2014 when comparing enlisted and officer  personnel, and by available year when discussing the personnel  separately.
Data from the Army show that from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, at  least half of the enlisted personnel moves within the continental United  States occurred at or before 38 months. For officers, the Army data show  that at least half of the moves within the continental United States  occurred at or before 34 months (see fig. 6).
For overseas assignments, the Army reported that from fiscal years 2006  through 2014, at least half of the officer personnel time-on-station lengths  met or exceeded the minimum. Specifically, Army data show that most  officers on 12-month assignments moved at or after 13 months. For  officers on 24-month tours, data show that at least half moved at or after  25 months. At least half of officers on 36-month tours moved at or after  36 months.
section_title: Navy Time-on-Station
paragraphs: The Navy provided us data on the median time-on-station for officer and  enlisted personnel for assignments in the continental United States from  fiscal years 2001 through 2014. The Navy was not able to provide data  for overseas assignments.
Data obtained from the Navy show that from fiscal years 2001 through  2014, at least half of the enlisted personnel moves within the continental  United States occurred at or after the 36-month minimum specified in  guidance. For officers, at least half of the moves within the continental  United States occurred at or before 33 months (see fig. 7).
section_title: Air Force Time-on-Station
paragraphs: The Air Force provided us data on the median time-on-station for officer  and enlisted personnel for assignments both in the continental United  States and overseas. They also provided us data on average time-on- station for officers based on their career fields.
Air Force data show that from fiscal years 2003 through 2014, at least  half of the enlisted personnel moves within the continental United States  occurred at or after 44 months. For officers, the Air Force data show that  least half of the moves within the continental United States occurred at or  after 35 months (see fig. 8). These data include moves that occurred  prior to the Air Force’s increasing its minimum time-on-station  requirement from 36 months to 48 months in 2009. Despite this policy  change, actual time-on-station did not significantly change. Between fiscal  years 2009 and 2014, median time-on-station increased from 50 months  to 51 months for enlisted personnel. During the same time period, median  time-on-station for officer personnel decreased from 43 months to 37  months.
For overseas assignments, Air Force data show that from fiscal years  2003 through 2014 at least half of officers and half of enlisted personnel  on 12-month assignments moved at or after 12 months.  For 24-month  tours, at least half of officers moved at or after 24 months, and at least  half of enlisted personnel moves occurred at or after 24 months.
For 36- month tours, at least half of officers moved at or after 36 months and at  least half of enlisted moves occurred at or after 37 months.
Air Force data also show that time-on-station varied among officer career  fields. For example, from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, officers ranked  O-1 through O-3 with a title of Logistics Commander moved the most  frequently, while those with a specialty of Operations Management /  Command and Center moved least frequently. Officers ranked O-4  through O-6 with a title of Aerospace Medicine moved the most  frequently, while those with the Support Commander title moved least  frequently. Air Force officials told us that that time-on-station varied  among career fields because some career fields have fewer personnel,  which may lead to more moves—and shorter time-on-station lengths—in  order to keep positions filled.
section_title: Marine Corps Time-on- Station
paragraphs: The Marine Corps provided us data on the median time-on-station for  officer and enlisted personnel for assignments in the continental United  States for fiscal years 2008 through 2014. The Marine Corps could not  provide data separated by time-on-station length for personnel serving in  overseas assignments.
Data from the Marine Corps show that from fiscal years 2008 through  2014, at least half of the enlisted personnel moves within the continental  United States occurred at or before 32 months.  For officers, the Marine  Corps data show that at least half of the moves within the continental  United States occurred at or before 35 months (see fig. 9).
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Generally Accepted Research Standards Checklist Used to Assess the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s September 2014 Study
subsections: section_title: A. Design: Is the study is well designed?
paragraphs: Are the study’s objectives clearly stated?
Is the study’s scope clearly defined?
Are the assumptions explicitly identified?
Are the assumptions reasonable and consistent?
Are the assumptions varied to allow for sensitivity analyses?
Are major constraints identified and discussed?
Are the scenarios that were modeled reasonable ones to consider?
Do the scenarios represent a reasonably complete range of conditions?
B. Execution: Is the study well executed?
Is the study’s methodology consistent with the study’s objectives?
Are the study’s objectives addressed?
Were the models used to support the analyses appropriate for their intended purpose?
Were the data used valid for the study’s purposes?
Were the data used sufficiently reliable for the study’s purposes?
Were any data limitations identified, and was the impact of the limitations adequately explained?
Were any modeling or simulation limitations identified, explained, and justified?
Have the models used in the study been described and documented adequately?
C. Presentation of results: Are the results timely, complete, accurate, concise, and relevant to the client and stakeholders?
Do the results of the modeling support the report findings?
Does the report present an assessment that is well documented?
Are the study results presented in the report in a clear manner?
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this report  were Tom Gosling (Assistant Director); James Ashley; Timothy Carr;  Farrah Graham; Foster Kerrison; Amie Lesser; Amanda Manning; Ruben  Montes de Oca; Terry Richardson; Ben Sclafani; Michelle A. Vaughn;  Cheryl Weissman; and Michael Willems.