Environmental Satellites: Focused Attention Needed to Mitigate Program Risks
Published: 2012-06-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses two satellite acquisition programs within the Department of Commerces National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) programs are meant to replace current operational satellites, and both are considered critical to the United States ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As requested, this statement summarizes our two reports being released today on (1) the status, plans, and risks for JPSS and (2) the status, schedule management process, and risk management process within the GOES-R program. We found that the JPSS cost and GOES-R contractor cost data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Further, while we found that the GOES-R schedule and management reserve data were not sufficiently reliable, we reported on the datas shortcomings in our report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on two  satellite acquisition programs within the Department of Commerce’s  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Joint  Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational  Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) programs are meant to replace  current operational satellites, and both are considered critical to the  United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for  weather forecasting.
As requested, this statement summarizes our two reports being released  today on (1) the status, plans, and risks for JPSS and (2) the status,  schedule management process, and risk management process within the  GOES-R program. In preparing this testimony, we relied on the work  supporting those reports. They each contain a detailed overview of our  scope and methodology, including the steps we took to assess the  reliability of cost and schedule data. As noted in those reports, we found  that the JPSS cost and GOES-R contractor cost data were sufficiently  reliable for our purposes. Further, while we found that the GOES-R  schedule and management reserve data were not sufficiently reliable, we  reported on the data’s shortcomings in our report. All of our work for the  reports was performed in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has used both polar-orbiting and  geostationary satellites to observe the earth and its land, oceans,  atmosphere, and space environments. Polar-orbiting satellites constantly  circle the earth in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage  of conditions that affect the weather and climate. As the earth rotates  beneath it, each polar-orbiting satellite views the entire earth’s surface  twice a day. In contrast, geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position  relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space.
Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment  and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable.  Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems,  satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and  forecasting weather and climate. For example, polar-orbiting satellites  provide the data that go into numerical weather prediction models, which  are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including  forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes, and geostationary  satellites provide the graphical images used to identify current weather  patterns. These weather products and models are used to predict the  potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency  managers can help mitigate its effects. Polar satellites also provide data  used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and  drought conditions, as well as long-term data sets that are used by  researchers to monitor climate change.
subsections: section_title: Events Leading to the JPSS Program
paragraphs: For over forty years, the United States has operated two separate  operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite series, which is managed by  NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, which is  managed by the Air Force. Currently, there is one operational Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite and two operational Defense  Meteorological Satellite Program satellites that are positioned so that they  cross the equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon.  In addition, the government is also relying on data from a European  satellite, called the Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite  program.
With the expectation that combining the Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite program and the Defense Meteorological Satellite  Program would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a  May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to  converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program—the  National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System  (NPOESS)—capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.  However, in the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS  encountered significant technical challenges in sensor development,  program cost growth, and schedule delays. Specifically, within 8 years of  the contract’s award, program costs grew by over $8 billion, and launch  schedules were delayed by over 5 years. In addition, as a result of a 2006  restructuring of the program, the agencies reduced the program’s  functionality by decreasing the number of originally planned satellites,  orbits, and instruments.
Even after this restructuring, however, the program continued to  encounter technical issues, management challenges, schedule delays,  and further cost increases. Therefore, in August 2009, the Executive  Office of the President formed a task force, led by the Office of Science  and Technology Policy, to investigate the management and acquisition  options that would improve the program. As a result of this review, the  Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced in  February 2010 that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly acquire  NPOESS; instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite  system. Specifically, NOAA and NASA would be responsible for the  afternoon orbit, and DOD would be responsible for the early morning  orbit. The partnership with the European satellite agencies for the  midmorning orbit would continue as planned.
When this decision was announced, NOAA immediately began planning  for a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit—called JPSS—and  DOD began planning for a new satellite program in the morning orbit— called the Defense Weather Satellite System. NOAA transferred  management responsibilities to its new satellite program, defined its  requirements, and transferred contracts to the new program. Specifically,  NOAA established a program office to guide the development and launch  of the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)that was developed under NPOESS and managed by the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as well as the two  planned JPSS satellites, known as JPSS-1 and JPSS-2. NOAA also  worked with NASA to establish its program office to oversee the  acquisition, system engineering, and integration of the satellite program.  By 2011, the two agencies had established separate—but co-located— JPSS program offices, each with different roles and responsibilities.
In addition, DOD established its Defense Weather Satellite System  program office, started defining its requirements, and modified contracts  to reflect the new program. These efforts, however, have been halted. In  early 2012, in response to congressional direction, DOD decided to  terminate the program because it still has two satellites to launch within  its legacy Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. DOD is currently  identifying alternative means to fulfill its future environmental satellite  requirements.
We have issued a series of reports on the NPOESS program—and the  transition to JPSS—highlighting technical issues, cost growth, key  management challenges, and key risks of transitioning from NPOESS to   In these reports, we made multiple recommendations to, among  JPSS.other things, improve executive-level oversight and develop realistic time  frames for revising cost and schedule baselines. NOAA has taken steps  to address our recommendations, including taking action to improve  executive-level oversight, but as we note in our report being released  today, the agency is still working to establish cost and schedule  baselines.
section_title: Overview of the GOES Program
paragraphs: In addition to polar-orbiting satellites, NOAA operates GOES as a two- satellite geostationary satellite system that is primarily focused on the  United States. The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that  NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned to replace existing weather  satellites that will likely reach the end of their useful lives in about 2015.
NOAA is responsible for overall mission success for the GOES-R  program. The NOAA Program Management Council, which is chaired by  NOAA’s Deputy Undersecretary, is the oversight body for the GOES-R  program. However, since it relies on NASA’s acquisition experience and  technical expertise to help ensure the success of its programs, NOAA  implemented an integrated program management structure with NASA for  GOES-R. Within the program office, two project offices manage key  components of the GOES-R system. NOAA has entered into an  agreement with NASA to manage the Flight Project Office, including  awarding and managing the spacecraft contract and delivering flight- ready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground Project Office, managed  by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground System contract and satellite data  product development and distribution.
NOAA has made a number of changes to the program since 2006,  including the removal of certain satellite data products and a critical  instrument (the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite), and a reduction in  the number of satellites from four to two. NOAA originally decided to  reduce the scope and technical complexity of the GOES-R program  because of the expectation that total costs, which were estimated to be  $6.2 billion, could reach $11.4 billion. Recently, NOAA restored two  satellites to the program’s baseline, making GOES-R a four-satellite  program once again. In February 2011, as part of its fiscal year 2012  budget request, NOAA requested funding to begin development for two  additional satellites in the GOES-R series. The program estimates that  the development for all four satellites in the GOES-R series is to cost  $10.9 billion through 2036. The current anticipated launch date for the  first GOES-R satellite is planned to be in October 2015, with the last  satellite in the series planned for launch in calendar year 2024.
In September 2010, we reported that as a result of delays to planned  launch dates for the first two satellites in the GOES-R series, NOAA might  not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all  times, which could lead to a gap in satellite coverage if an existing  satellite failed prematurely. document plans for the operation of geostationary satellites that included  the implementation procedures, resources, staff roles, and time tables  needed to transition to a single satellite, an international satellite, or other  solution.
We recommended that NOAA develop and  NOAA has since developed a continuity plan that generally includes the  key elements we recommended. As a result, NOAA has improved its  ability to fully meet its mission-essential function of providing continuous  satellite imagery in support of weather forecasting.
section_title: The JPSS Program Has Made Progress, but Faces Changing Requirements, Critical Steps in Sensor Development, and Looming Data Gaps
paragraphs: NOAA and NASA have made progress on the JPSS program since it was  first formed in 2010, but are modifying requirements to limit program  costs. After establishing a JPSS program office and transferring contracts  to NASA, the program successfully launched the NPP satellite on October  28, 2011. After this launch, NASA began the process of activating the  satellite and commissioning the instruments, a process that was  completed in March 2012. NOAA is receiving data from the five sensors  on the NPP satellite, and has begun calibration and validation. NOAA’s  satellite data users began to use validated products from one sensor in  May 2012, and NOAA expects that they will increase the amount and  types of data they use in the following months. In addition, NOAA  established initial requirements for the JPSS program in September 2011.  Key components include acquiring and launching JPSS-1 and JPSS-2,  developing and integrating five sensors on the two satellites, finding  alternate host satellites for selected instruments that would not be  accommodated on the JPSS satellites, and providing ground system  support.
NOAA also developed a cost estimate for the JPSS program, which it  reconciled with an independent cost estimate. Specifically, from January  to December 2011, the agency went through a cost estimating exercise  for the JPSS program. At the end of this exercise, NOAA validated that  the cost of the full set of JPSS functions from fiscal year 2012 through  fiscal year 2028 would be $11.3 billion. After adding the agency’s sunk  costs of $3.3 billion, the program’s life cycle cost estimate totaled $14.6  billion. This amount is $2.7 billion higher than the $11.9 billion estimate  for JPSS when NPOESS was disbanded in 2010.
Although NOAA has established initial requirements for the program,  these requirements could—and likely will—change in the near future, in  order to limit program costs. In working with the Office of Management  and Budget to develop the president’s fiscal year 2013 budget request,  NOAA officials stated that they agreed to fund JPSS at roughly $900  million per year through 2017, to merge funding for two climate sensors  into the JPSS budget, and to cap the JPSS life cycle cost at $12.9 billion  through 2028. Because this cap is $1.7 billion below the expected $14.6  billion life cycle cost of the full program, our report being released today  discusses NOAA’s plans to remove selected elements from the satellite  program. These included NOAA potentially discontinuing the  development of certain sensors, plans for a network of ground-based  receptor stations, planned improvements in the time it takes to obtain  satellite data from JPSS-2, and plans to install a data processing system at two Navy locations. Recently, NOAA briefed us on updated  plans to address this cost cap by changing the way the agency  approached operations and sustainment, and restructuring the free-flyers  project.
The removal of these elements from the JPSS program will affect both  civilian and military satellite data users. The loss of certain sensors could  cause a break in the over 30-year history of satellite data and would  hinder the efforts of climatologists and meteorologists focusing on  understanding changes in the earth’s ozone coverage and radiation  budget. The loss of ground-based receptor stations means that NOAA may not be able to improve the timeliness of JPSS-2 satellite data from  80 minutes to the current 30 minute requirement, and as a result, weather  forecasters will not be able to update their weather models using the most  recent satellite observations. Further, the loss of the data processing  systems at the two Navy locations means that NOAA and the Navy will  need to establish an alternative way to provide data to the Navy.
subsections: section_title: Development of the First JPSS Satellite Has Begun, but Critical Steps Remain
paragraphs: The major components of the JPSS program are at different stages of  development, and important decisions and program milestones lie ahead.  NASA’s JPSS program office organized its responsibilities into three  separate projects: (1) the flight project, which includes sensors,  spacecraft, and launch vehicles; (2) the ground project, which includes  ground-based data processing and command and control systems, and  (3) the free-flyer project, which involves developing and launching the  instruments that are not going to be included on the JPSS satellites  (including a data collection system used to transmit ground-based  observations from remote locations, such as ocean-based buoys; a  search and rescue system, and a total solar irradiance sensor).
Within the flight project, development of the sensors for the first JPSS  satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors are experiencing  technical issues and the impact of these issues has not yet been  determined. For example, the program plans to address communication  issues that could affect a key sensor’s ability to provide data in every  orbit, but they have not identified the potential cost and schedule impact  of this issue. The ground project is currently in operation supporting NPP,  and NOAA is planning to upgrade selected parts of the ground systems to  increase security and reliability. The free-flyer project is still in a planning  stage because NOAA has not yet decided which satellites will host the  instruments or when these satellites will launch. One of these projects  has recently completed a major milestone and one project has its next  milestone approaching. Specifically, the flight project completed a  separate system requirements review in April 2012, while the ground  project’s system requirements review is scheduled for August 2012.
section_title: NOAA Has Not Established Plans to Mitigate the Risk that the Polar Satellite Constellation Is Becoming Increasingly Unreliable
paragraphs: Since its inception, NPOESS was seen as a constellation of satellites  providing observations in the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon  orbits. Having satellites in each of these orbits ensures that satellite  observations covering the entire globe are no more than 6 hours old,  thereby allowing for more accurate weather predictions. Even after the  program was restructured in 2006 and eventually terminated in 2010,  program officials and the administration planned to ensure coverage in  the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon orbits by relying on DOD  satellites for the early morning orbit, the European satellite program for  the midmorning, and NOAA’s JPSS program for the afternoon orbit.
However, recent events have made the future of the polar satellite  constellation uncertain:
Early morning orbit—As discussed earlier in this statement, in early  fiscal year 2012, DOD terminated its Defense Weather Satellite  System program. While the agency has two more Defense  Meteorological Satellite Program satellites—called DMSP-19 and  DMSP-20—to launch and is working to develop alternative plans for a  follow-on satellite program, there are considerable challenges in  ensuring that a new program is in place and integrated with existing  ground systems and data networks in time to avoid a gap in this orbit.
DOD officials stated that they plan to launch DMSP-19 in 2014 and  DMSP-20 when it is needed. If DMSP-19 lasts 6 years, there is a  chance that DMSP-20 will not be launched until 2020. Thus, in a best- case scenario, satellites from the follow-on program will not need to  be launched until roughly 2026. However, civilian and military satellite  experts have expressed concern that the Defense Meteorological  Satellite Program satellites are quite old and may not work as  intended. If they do not perform well, DOD could be facing a satellite  data gap in the early morning orbit as early as 2014.
Midmorning orbit—The European satellite organization plans to  continue to launch MetOp satellites that will provide observations in  the midmorning orbit through October 2021. The organization is also  working to define and gain support for the follow-on program, called  the Eumetsat Polar System-2nd Generation program. However, in  2011, NOAA alerted European officials that, because of the  constrained budgetary environment, they will no longer be able to  provide sensors for the follow-on program. Due to the uncertainty  surrounding the program, there is a chance that the first European  follow-on satellite will not be ready in time to replace the final MetOp  satellite at the end of its expected life. In that case, this orbit, too,  would be in jeopardy.
Afternoon orbit—There is likely to be a gap in satellite observations  in the afternoon orbit that could last well over one year. According to  our analysis, this gap could span from 17 months to 3 years or more.  In one scenario, NPP would last its full expected 5-year life (to  October 2016), and JPSS-1 would launch as soon as possible (in  March 2017) and undergo on-orbit checkout for a year (until March  2018). In that case, the data gap would extend 17 months. In another  scenario, NPP would last only 3 years as noted by NASA managers  concerned with the workmanship of selected NPP sensors. Assuming  that the JPSS-1 launch occurred, as currently scheduled, in March  2017 and the satellite data was certified for official use by March  2018, this gap would extend for 41 months. Of course, any problems  with JPSS-1 development could delay the launch date and extend the  gap period. Given the history of technical issues and delays in the  development of the NPP sensors and the current technical issues on  the sensors, it is likely that the launch of JPSS-1 will be delayed.  While the scenarios in our analysis demonstrated gaps lasting  between 17 and 53 months, NOAA program officials believe that the  most likely scenario involves a gap lasting 18 to 24 months.
Figure 1 depicts the polar satellite constellation and the uncertain future  coverage in selected orbits.
According to NOAA, a data gap would lead to less accurate and timely  weather prediction models used to support weather forecasting, and  advanced warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges,  and floods—would be diminished. To illustrate this, the National Weather  Service performed several case studies to demonstrate how its weather  forecasts would have been affected if there were no polar satellite data in  the afternoon orbit. For example, when the polar satellite data were not  used to predict the “Snowmaggedon” winter storm that hit the Mid-Atlantic  coast in February 2010, weather forecasts predicted a less intense storm,  slightly further east, and producing half of the precipitation at 3, 4, and 5  days before the event. Specifically, weather prediction models under- forecasted the amount of snow by at least 10 inches. The agency noted  that this level of degradation in weather forecasts could place lives,  property, and critical infrastructure in danger.
The NOAA Administrator and other senior executives acknowledge the  risk of a data gap in each of the orbits of the polar satellite constellation  and are working with European and DOD counterparts to coordinate their  respective requirements and plans; however, they have not established  plans for mitigating risks to the polar satellite constellation. NOAA plans to  use older polar satellites to provide some of the necessary data for the  other orbits. However, it is also possible that other governmental,  commercial, or international satellites could supplement the data in each  of the three orbits. For example, foreign nations continue to launch polar- orbiting weather satellites to acquire data such as sea surface  temperatures, sea surface winds, and water vapor. Also, over the next  few years, NASA plans to launch satellites that will collect information on   If there are viable options from external  precipitation and soil moisture.sources, it could take time to adapt NOAA systems to receive, process,  and disseminate the data to its satellite data users. Until NOAA identifies  these options and establishes mitigation plans, it may miss opportunities  to leverage alternative satellite data sources.
section_title: GOES-R Has Completed Early Milestones, but Delays and Schedule Weaknesses Increase Uncertainty for Remaining Development and Launch Date
paragraphs: While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing its design,  many key milestones were completed later than planned. The program  demonstrated progress towards completing its design in part by  completing its set of preliminary design reviews, which indicated  readiness to proceed with detailed design activities. The program and its  projects are also making progress towards the final design for the entire  GOES-R system, which is expected to be completed at the program’s  critical design review planned for August 2012. However, many key  design milestones were completed later than the dates established for  them in December 2007 (when the flight and ground project plans were  established, prior to entering the program’s development phase), and  were also later than the dates established following award of the  contracts for the instruments, spacecraft, and ground system  components. For example, the program’s preliminary design review was  completed 19 months later than planned, and its critical design review is  expected to be completed 13 months later than planned.
The program has also revised planned milestone dates for certain  components by at least 3 months—and up to 2 years—since its originally  estimated dates. Changes in planned completion dates have occurred for  all five flight project instruments, as well as in major components of the  ground project. Figure 2 summarizes these changes in planned  completion dates.
GOES-R has also encountered a number of technical challenges, some  of which remain to be fully addressed. For example, in early 2011 the  program discovered that the ground project development schedule  included software deliveries from flight project instruments that were not  properly integrated—they had not yet been defined or could not be met.  To address these problems and avoid potential slippages to GOES-R’s  launch date, project officials decided to switch to an approach where  software capabilities could be delivered incrementally. While the revised  plan was to reduce schedule risk with greater schedule flexibility, the plan  was also expected to cost an additional $85 million and introduce other  risks associated with the incremental development such as additional  contractor staff and software development and verification activities that  require government oversight and continuous monitoring.
So far, NOAA has been able to address certain delays and technical  challenges with an available contingency reserve, in which a portion of  the program’s budget is allocated to mitigate risks and manage problems  as they surface during development, and has not changed its 2007 cost  estimates for the development of the first two program satellites.  However, contractors’ cost estimates for major project components have  increased by $757 million, or 32 percent, between January 2010 and  January 2012. Given the recent increases in contract costs, the program  plans to determine how to cover these increased costs by reducing  resources applied to other areas of program development and support,  delaying scheduled work, or absorbing additional life cycle costs.  Furthermore, as a result of changes in budget reserve allocations and  reserve commitments, the program’s reserves have declined in recent  years from $1.7 billion to $1.2 billion. Between January 2009 and January  2012, the program reported that its reserves fell from 42 percent of  remaining development costs to 29 percent.
NOAA’s ability to effectively limit milestone delays and component cost  increases depends in part on having an integrated and reliable  programwide schedule—called an integrated master schedule—that  defines, among other things, necessary detailed tasks, when work  activities and milestone events will occur, how resources will be applied,  how long activities will take, and how activities are related to one another.  GOES-R has a programwide integrated master schedule that is created  manually once a month directly from at least nine subordinate contractor  schedules.
We analyzed four of these subordinate contractor schedules and  discovered instances where certain best practices had been implemented  in the schedules, as well as weaknesses in each schedule when  compared to nine scheduling best practices. When viewed in  conjunction with manual program-level updates, we concluded that the  program-level schedule may not be fully reliable. A full set of analysis  results is listed in table 1.
Selected schedule weaknesses existed across each of the four schedules  analyzed. For example, each of the contractor schedules either did not  include information on allocation of resources or allocated too much work  to many of its resources. In addition, none of the contractors had  completed usable schedule risk analyses that included risk simulations.  Particularly important is the absence of a valid critical path throughout  all the schedules. Establishing a valid program-level critical path depends  on the resolution of issues with the respective critical paths for the  spacecraft and Core Ground System components. Without a valid critical  path, management cannot determine which delayed tasks will have  detrimental effects on the project finish date.
The program office has taken specific positive actions that address two of  the scheduling weaknesses we identified. First, the program implemented  a tool that tracks deliverables between the flight and ground projects. This  initiative is intended to address a program-recognized need for better  integration among the program components. Second, the program  conducted a schedule risk analysis designed to identify the probability of  completing a program on its target date. This initiative, while not  addressing risk analyses for component schedules, is intended to  address a program-recognized need to conduct a schedule risk analysis.  In addition, GOES-R officials also stated that they are in the process of  creating an automated process for updating their integrated master  schedule sometime in 2012 and our analysis did find improvements  between July 2011 and December 2011 to weaknesses in each of the  four contractors’ schedules.
While the program has taken positive steps to improve its scheduling,  weaknesses that have the potential to cause delays nonetheless still exist  as the instruments, spacecraft, and ground project components complete  their design and testing phases. For example, according to program  officials, the Geostationary Lightning Mapper shipment date remains at  risk of a potential slip due to redesign efforts. The current projected  delivery for this instrument is August 2013, leaving only 1 month before it  is on the critical path for GOES-R’s launch readiness date. As another  example, the schedule reserve for the first satellite in the GOES-R series  is being counted on to complete activities for the second satellite in the  series. As a result, delays to certain program schedule targets for the first  satellite could impact milestone commitments for the second satellite.
The schedule risk analysis conducted by the program indicated that there  is a 48 percent confidence level that the program will meet its current  launch readiness date of October 2015. Program officials plan to consult  with the NOAA Program Management Council to determine the  advisability of moving the launch readiness date to a 70 percent  confidence level for February 2016. Even these confidence levels may  not be reliable, since the establishment of accurate confidence estimates  depends on reliable data that, in turn, results from the implementation of a  full set of scheduling best practices not yet in place in the program.
Delays in GOES-R’s launch date could impact the continuity of GOES  satellite coverage and could produce milestone delays for subsequent  satellites in the series. Program documentation indicates that there is a  37 percent chance of a gap in the availability of two operational GOES- series satellites at any one time given the current October 2015 launch  readiness date and an orbital testing period, assuming a normal lifespan  for the satellites currently on-orbit. Any delays in the launch readiness  date for GOES-R, which is already at risk due to increasing development  costs and use of program reserves, would further increase the probability  of a gap in satellite continuity. This could result in the need for NOAA to  rely on older satellites that are not fully functional.
section_title: Implementation of Recommendations Should Help Mitigate Risks of the Two Programs
paragraphs: Both the JPSS and GOES-R programs face risks going forward during  their development; implementing the recommendations in our  accompanying reports should help mitigate those risks. In the JPSS  report being released today, we recommend that NOAA establish  mitigation plans for risks associated with pending satellite data gaps in  the afternoon orbit as well as potential gaps in the morning and  midmorning orbits. NOAA agreed with our recommendation and noted  that the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service— a NOAA component agency—has performed analyses on how to mitigate  potential gaps in satellite data, but has not yet compiled this information  into a report. The agency plans to provide a report to NOAA by August  2012.
To improve NOAA’s ability to execute GOES-R’s remaining planned  development with appropriate reserves, improve the reliability of its  schedules, and address identified program risks, we are recommending in  our report being released today that NOAA
Assess and report to the NOAA Program Management Council the  reserves needed for completing remaining development for each  satellite in the series.
Assess shortfalls in schedule management practices, including  creating a realistic allocation of resources and ensuring an unbroken  critical path from the current date to the final satellite launch.
Execute the program’s risk management policies and procedures to  provide more timely and adequate evaluations and reviews of newly  identified risks, and provide more information, including documented  handling strategies, for all ongoing and newly-identified risks in the  risk register.
Add to the program’s critical risk list the risk that GOES-S  milestonesthat this risk and the program-identified funding stability risk are  adequately monitored and mitigated.  may be affected by GOES-R development, and ensure  In commenting on a draft of our GOES-R report, NOAA agreed with three  of our four recommendations. It partially concurred with the fourth  recommendation to fully further execute the program’s risk management  policies and procedures and to include timely review and disposition of  candidate risks. NOAA stated that it did not consider the “concerns” listed  in its risk database to be risks or candidate risks and that the risk  management board actively determines whether recorded concerns  should be elevated to a risk. However, the GOES-R program is not  treating concerns in accordance with its risk management plan, which  considers these to be “candidate risks” and requires their timely review  and disposition, as evidenced by the many concerns in the database that  were more than 3 months old and had not been assessed or  dispositioned. Unless NOAA follows its risk management plan by  promptly evaluating “concerns,” it cannot ensure that it is adequately  managing the full set of risks that could impact the program.
In summary, after spending about $3.3 billion on the now-defunct  NPOESS program, NOAA officials have established a $12.9-billion JPSS  program and made progress in launching NPP, establishing contracts for  the first JPSS satellite, and enhancing the ground systems controlling the  satellites and processing the satellite data. In the coming months,  program officials face changing requirements, technical issues on  individual sensors, key milestones in developing the JPSS satellite, and  important decisions on the spacecraft, launch vehicles, and instruments  that are not included on the JPSS satellite. In addition, NOAA has not  established plans to mitigate the almost certain satellite data gaps in the  afternoon orbit or the potential gaps in the early and mid-morning orbits.  These gaps will likely affect the accuracy and timeliness of weather  predictions and forecasts and could affect lives, property, military  operations, and commerce. Until NOAA identifies its mitigation options, it  may miss opportunities to leverage alternative satellite data sources.
Completing many of GOES-R’s early design activities is an  accomplishment for this complex program, but this accomplishment has  been accompanied by milestone delays and increased contractor cost  estimates for GOES-R’s components. The unreliability of GOES-R’s  schedules adds further uncertainty as to whether the program will meet its  commitments. NOAA has taken steps to improve schedule reliability, but  until the program implements and uses a full set of schedule best  practices throughout the life of the program, further delays to program  milestones may occur. Moreover, until all contractor and subcontractor  information is included in the program’s integrated master schedule and  regular schedule risk assessments are conducted, program management  may not have timely and relevant information at its disposal for decision  making, undercutting the ability of the program office to manage this high- risk program.
Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, Ranking Member Tonko, Ranking  Member Miller, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes my  prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that  you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please  contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov.  Other key contributors include Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director), Paula  Moore (Assistant Director), Shaun Byrnes, Kate Feild, Nancy Glover,  Franklin Jackson, Fatima Jahan, and Josh Leiling.
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