Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce Through Retirement
Published: 2005-03-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The President's vision for space exploration (Vision) directs the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to retire the space shuttle following completion of the International Space Station, planned for the end of the decade. The retirement process will last several years and impact thousands of critically skilled NASA civil service and contractor employees that support the program. Key to implementing the Vision is NASA's ability to sustain this workforce to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement. Because of the potential workforce issues that could affect the safety and effectiveness of operations through the space shuttle's retirement, GAO was asked to identify (1) the progress of efforts to develop a strategy for sustaining the space shuttle workforce through retirement and (2) factors that may have impeded these efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing a detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space shuttle's retirement. The program has taken preliminary steps, including identifying the lessons learned from the retirement of programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program, to assist in its workforce planning efforts. Other efforts have been initiated or are planned, such as enlisting the help of human capital experts and revising the acquisition strategy for updating the space shuttle's propulsion system prime contracts; however, actions taken thus far have been limited. NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle operations has also taken some preliminary steps to begin to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on its workforce, such as working with a consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its workforce. However, its ability to progress with these efforts is reliant on NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the remainder of the program. Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy, however, will be important given the potential impact that workforce problems would have on NASA-wide goals. For example, a delay to the space shuttle's schedule due to workforce problems would delay the agency's ability to proceed with space exploration activities. NASA and its prime contractor for space shuttle operations have already indicated that they could face challenges sustaining their critically skilled workforces if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is not apparent. In addition, governmentwide fiscal realities call into question whether funding will be available to support the use of incentives, such as retention bonuses, that could help NASA sustain its space shuttle workforce. Several factors hamper the Space Shuttle Program's ability to develop a detailed long-term strategy to sustain the critically skilled workforce necessary to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement. For example, because of the program's near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight, other efforts, such as assessing hardware and facility needs that will ultimately aid the program in determining workforce requirements, are being delayed. In addition, program officials indicated that they are faced with uncertainties regarding the implementation of future aspects of the Vision and lack the requirements needed on which to base their workforce planning efforts. Despite these factors, our prior work on strategic workforce planning has shown that there are steps, such as scenario planning, that successful organizations take to better position themselves to address future workforce needs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: On January 14, 2004, the President articulated a new vision for space  exploration (Vision) for the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA). Part of the Vision includes the goal of retiring the  space shuttle following completion of the International Space Station  (ISS), planned for the end of the decade. The space shuttle, NASA’s  largest individual program, is an essential element of NASA’s ability to  implement this Vision, because it is the only launch system presently  capable of transporting the remaining components necessary to complete  assembly of the ISS. NASA currently projects that it will need to conduct  an estimated 28 flights over the next 5 to 6 years to complete assembly of  and provide support to the ISS. However, because of the tragic loss of the  Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew in February 2003, NASA will do so  with an overriding focus on ensuring safety of operations.
The safety of the space shuttle is largely contingent on NASA’s ability to  sustain the critically skilled workforce necessary to support space shuttle  operations through retirement. Moving forward, this will be a concern, as  the process of retiring the space shuttle will last several years and impact  thousands of critically skilled NASA civil service and contractor  employees that support the program. This workforce has been the focus of  many reviews in the past, which have highlighted significant issues  concerning the depth of critical skills available to the program and other  cultural, organizational, and safety issues that impact the program’s ability  to safely support space shuttle operations. These reviews recommended,  among other things, that NASA assess the quantity and quality of its space  shuttle workforce in terms of experience and special skills; transform its  culture; and take steps to strengthen its safety organization.
As agreed with your offices, we reviewed the status of NASA’s efforts to  position itself to sustain the critically skilled space shuttle workforce  necessary to support space shuttle operations through retirement.  Specifically, we identified (1) the progress of NASA’s efforts to develop a  strategy for sustaining a critically skilled space shuttle workforce through  retirement and (2) factors that may have impeded these efforts.
To perform our work, we interviewed various NASA officials, including  Space Shuttle Program, Human Resources, and Safety officials. We  obtained and analyzed NASA documents related to human capital  management, such as human capital plans, policies and procedures for  workforce planning, and information on NASA’s workforce analysis tools.  Further, we obtained and reviewed Space Shuttle Program documents  related to the program’s retirement, such as its lessons learned reports. In  addition, we interviewed officials from NASA’s prime contractor for space  shuttle operations, United Space Alliance, and obtained and reviewed  contractor documents related to its workforce and support of space  shuttle operations. We also gathered information from human capital  experts and reviewed GAO human capital reports and guidance regarding  strategic workforce planning. Complete details of our scope and  methodology can be found in appendix I. We performed our work from  April 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Prior to retiring the program, NASA will need to first return the space  shuttle to flight and execute the remaining missions needed to complete  assembly of and provide support for the ISS. At the same time, NASA will  need to begin the process of closing out or transitioning to other NASA  programs the space shuttle’s assets, such as its workforce, hardware, and  facilities, which are no longer needed to support the program. The process  of closing out or transitioning the program’s assets will extend well  beyond the space shuttle’s final flight (see fig. 1).
Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the  Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle Program rely on its most  important asset—its workforce. The space shuttle workforce consists of  approximately 2,000 civil service and 15,600 prime contractor personnel,  including a large number of engineers and scientists. In addition to these  personnel, there are a large number of critical, lower level subcontractors  and suppliers throughout the United States who support the program. The  program’s workforce is responsible for conducting such things as space  shuttle payload processing, mission planning and control, ground  operations, and for managing the space shuttle’s propulsions systems.  While each of the NASA centers support the Space Shuttle Program to  some degree, the vast majority of this workforce is located at three of  NASA’s Space Operations Centers—Johnson Space Center, Kennedy  Space Center (KSC), and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) (see fig. 2).
The space shuttle workforce and NASA’s human capital management has  been the subject of many GAO and other reviews in the past. These  reviews showed that the space shuttle workforce had suffered from  agency downsizing in the mid 1990s and that NASA faced challenges  recruiting and training new employees, sufficiently staffing its workforce  with qualified workers, and dealing with an aging workforce and signs of  overwork and fatigue in its remaining workforce. In the past, NASA  officials said that these challenges posed significant flight safety risks for  the program. While the Space Shuttle Program had taken some steps to  address these issues, sustaining critical skills in many key areas such as  subsystems engineering remained a problem. In addition, in 2003 the  Columbia Accident Investigation Board noted that years of workforce  reductions and outsourcing negatively impacted NASA’s experience and  systems knowledge base. Further, the Columbia Accident Investigation  Board noted that safety and mission assurance personnel were eliminated  and careers in safety lost organizational prestige. Additional studies  highlighted recent trends affecting the science and engineering labor pool  from which employers like NASA draw from. For example, the National  Science Board reported in 2004 that worldwide competition for individuals  with science and engineering skills was increasing, while the potential  pool of individuals with these skills was decreasing. NASA’s former  Administrator has testified that this situation poses a significant challenge  to the agency’s ability to maintain a world-class workforce, because it  relies on a highly educated and broad science and engineering workforce  to accomplish its mission.
Over the past few years, GAO and others in the federal government have  underscored the importance of human capital management and strategic  workforce planning. For example, we designated strategic human capital  management as a governmentwide, high-risk area in 2001, 2003, and 2005,  and continue to highlight it as a major management challenge specifically  for NASA. Strategic Management of Human Capital was also placed at the  top of the President’s Management Agenda, and the Office of  Management and Budget and Office of Personnel Management have made  efforts to improve governmentwide human capital management and  strategic workforce planning. Recognizing the need for guidance related  to strategic human capital management, GAO has issued various reports  that outline a strategic human capital approach and provided tools, such  as a Model of Strategic Human Capital Management and Human Capital  Self Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, that agencies can use to  aid in addressing this challenge.
In response to an increased focus governmentwide on strategic human  capital management, NASA has taken several steps to improve its human  capital management. These include steps such as devising an agencywide  strategic human capital plan, developing workforce analysis tools to assist  in identifying critical skills needs, and requesting and receiving additional  human capital flexibilities to help the agency compete successfully with  the private sector in attracting and retaining employees and to reshape and  redeploy its workforce to support its mission.
GAO’s prior work on strategic human capital management has shown that  workforce planning is needed to ensure that the right people with the right  skills are in the right place at the right time. Workforce planning addresses  two critical needs: (1) aligning an organization’s human capital program  with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals and   (2) developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining  staff to achieve programmatic goals. Although approaches to such  planning may vary according to an organization’s specific needs and  mission, our work suggests that, irrespective of the context in which  workforce planning is done, such a process should address five key  elements. These include (1) involving top management, employees, and  other stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing the  strategic workforce plan; (2) determining the critical skills and  competencies that will be needed to achieve the future programmatic  results; (3) developing strategies tailored to address critical skills and  competency gaps that need attention; (4) building the capability needed to  address administrative, educational, and other requirements important to  supporting workforce strategies; and (5) monitoring and evaluating the  agency’s progress toward its human capital goals and the contribution that  human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic goals.
section_title: Progress toward Developing a Strategy to Sustain the Space Shuttle Workforce Is Limited
paragraphs: The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing  a detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the  space shuttle’s retirement. While NASA recognizes the importance of  having in place a strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce to  support the space shuttle’s operations, it has only taken preliminary steps,  such as identifying lessons learned from the retirement of programs  comparable to the space shuttle, to do so. Other efforts have been initiated  or are planned, such as enlisting the help of human capital experts and  revising the acquisition strategy to update the space shuttle’s propulsion  system prime contracts; however, actions taken thus far have been limited.  NASA’s prime contractor for space shuttle operations has also taken some  preliminary steps, but its ability to progress with these efforts is reliant on  NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the  remainder of the program. Making progress toward developing a detailed  strategy, however, will be important given the potential impact that  workforce problems would have on NASA-wide goals.
subsections: section_title: The Space Shuttle Program Has Taken Preliminary Steps toward Developing a Strategy for Sustaining a Critically Skilled Workforce
paragraphs: To begin its planning efforts for the space shuttle’s retirement, the  program identified the lessons learned from the retirement of programs  comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV Rocket  Program, the Navy Base Realignment and Closure activity, and the NASA  Industrial Facility closure. Among other things, the lessons learned reports  highlight the practices used by other programs when making personnel  decisions, such as the importance of developing transition strategies and  early retention planning to the success of the space shuttle’s retirement.  (See app. II for a summary of NASA’s reports to date on the lessons  learned that are applicable to the retirement of the space shuttle.) Program  officials said that this preliminary effort is the first step in an approach  they expect to take to plan for retiring the space shuttle. According to  these officials, they plan to use the information collected from this  preliminary effort to guide in the development of a management plan for  retiring the space shuttle. This management plan is expected to include  such things as the overall plan, processes, schedule, and roles and  responsibilities related to retiring the space shuttle. To inform this  management plan, the program expects sometime around mid-2005 to  assess its hardware and facility needs through retirement to determine  whether to maintain, closeout, or transition assets to other NASA  programs—such as space exploration activities. Once these hardware  and facility assessments have been completed, the program plans to  conduct an assessment of its workforce needs. Officials said that they  must understand the program’s hardware and facility needs before they  can conduct an assessment of its workforce needs through retirement.
section_title: While Other Efforts Have Been Initiated or Are Planned, Limited Actions Have Been Taken
paragraphs: In addition to the Space Shuttle Program’s preliminary work to prepare for  sustaining its workforce through retirement, the program has contracted  with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to assist it in  planning for the space shuttle’s retirement and transitioning to future  programs. Specifically, NAPA is to (1) benchmark the best practices of  public and private sector organizations that have dealt with workforce  issues resulting from the retirement, transition, or elimination of programs  comparable to the space shuttle, such as in number of employees affected;  (2) assess and review the workforce aspects of the program’s retirement  strategy throughout the course of its development to ensure that it is  addressing the problem adequately; and (3) to the extent possible, assist  the program in devising innovative strategies for mitigating the impact of  the space shuttle’s retirement on the workforce. According to NAPA  officials, it has conducted preliminary benchmarking efforts and is  awaiting further direction from NASA for its next steps with regard to this  task. Although the additional tasks NAPA is to undertake have been  identified, it has yet to undertake efforts associated with these tasks.  Because NAPA will be reviewing NASA’s management plan for retiring the  space shuttle as it is developed, the majority of its efforts will not be  undertaken until NASA begins to plan more earnestly for sustaining its  critically skilled workforce through the program’s retirement, which,  according to NASA, will likely occur after the space shuttle’s return to  flight.
In addition, because the Space Shuttle Program is heavily reliant on its  contractor workforce to support the space shuttle’s operations, NASA  officials said that they could include provisions in future Space Shuttle  Program contracts that require contractors to take steps to prepare for  sustaining their workforces through the space shuttle’s retirement.  However, the program has yet to do so. For example, in September 2004  the Space Shuttle Program exercised the final 2-year option of its Space  Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). At this point, NASA did not require  that United Space Alliance take any steps to prepare for sustaining its  workforce, such as by submitting a critical skills retention plan. A senior  NASA official recognized the need for United Space Alliance to devise  such a plan, and said that this type of requirement would likely be  included as part of the new contract NASA intends to award to United  Space Alliance in 2006, once workforce requirements for the remainder of  the program have been determined.
Separate from the SFOC, the Space Shuttle Propulsion Office at MSFC has  begun devising an acquisition strategy for updating its propulsion system  prime contracts to take into account the Vision’s goal of retiring the space  shuttle following completion of the ISS. Although at the time of our review  this acquisition strategy was not yet complete, officials said that the  updated contracts will likely include a requirement for the contractor to  submit a critical skills retention plan. This plan would outline the  strategies the contractor plans to implement to sustain the critical skills  necessary to support the program through retirement. In addition, officials  said that they could take advantage of the award fee provisions available  in the space shuttle’s propulsion prime contracts to incentivize contractors  to put in place strategies for sustaining a critically skilled workforce  through retirement and monitor their success in doing so.
section_title: NASA’s Prime Contractor for Space Shuttle Operations Has Taken Preliminary Steps to Prepare for the Space Shuttle’s Retirement
paragraphs: United Space Alliance has taken preliminary steps to begin to prepare for  the space shuttle’s retirement and its impact on the company’s workforce.  For example, the company has begun to define its critical skills needs to  continue to support the Space Shuttle Program; has devised a  communication plan; contracted with a human capital consulting firm to  conduct a comprehensive study of its workforce; and continues to monitor  indicators of employee morale and workforce stability. While these efforts  are underway, contractor officials said that further efforts to prepare for  the space shuttle’s retirement and its impact on their workforce are on  hold until NASA first makes decisions that impact the space shuttle’s  remaining flight schedule and thus the time frames for retiring the  program and transitioning its assets. Once these decisions have been made  and United Space Alliance’s contract requirements have been defined,  these officials said that they would then be able to proceed with their  workforce planning efforts for the space shuttle’s retirement, a process  that will likely take 6 months to complete.
section_title: The Potential Impact of Workforce Problems and Other Challenges the Space Shuttle Program Faces Highlight the Need for Workforce Planning
paragraphs: Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a  critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the program’s retirement  will be important given the potential impact that workforce problems  could have on NASA-wide goals. According to NASA officials, if the Space  Shuttle Program faces difficulties in sustaining the necessary workforce,  NASA-wide goals, such as implementing the Vision and proceeding with  space exploration activities, could be impacted. For example, workforce  problems could lead to a delay in flight certification for the space shuttle,  which could potentially result in a delay to the program’s overall flight  schedule, thus compromising the goal of completing assembly of the ISS  by 2010. In addition, officials said that space exploration activities could  slip as much as 1 year for each year that the space shuttle’s operations are  extended because NASA’s ability to progress with these activities is reliant  on funding and assets that are expected to be transferred from the Space  Shuttle Program to other NASA programs.
One workforce issue that has already been identified that could impact the  program’s ability to support space shuttle operations through retirement is  an inadequate safety workforce. For example, Safety and Mission  Assurance Directorate officials at KSC indicated that they already face  difficulties in maintaining a sufficient number of safety personnel to  support the Space Shuttle Program. An analysis done by the Safety and  Mission Assurance Directorate at KSC shows that it lacks an adequate  number of employees to fully perform all of its required functions for the  Space Shuttle Program, which increased due to additional safety  requirements put in place following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident.  Due to this analysis, some additional workforce was added to provide  support in this area. Although the Safety and Mission Assurance  Directorate now believes that it can meet its inspection schedule, officials  said that should the Directorate be unable to complete all of its required  inspections, they would deny the space shuttle’s certification for flight  readiness. This would delay the program’s flight schedule.
NASA officials told us they expect to face various challenges in sustaining  the critically skilled workforce necessary to support the space shuttle’s  operations through its retirement, including retaining the current  workforce, many of whom may want to participate in or will be needed to  support future phases of implementing the Vision, and providing a  transition path to other programs for the workforce that is needed to  support the Space Shuttle Program through retirement. Additional  challenges that could affect the program’s ability to support space shuttle  operations include:  Impact on the prime contractor for space shuttle operations. United  Space Alliance may not be able to offer a long-term career path to its  employees beyond the space shuttle’s final flight. This problem results  from the company having been established specifically to perform  ground and flight operations for the Space Shuttle Program. As such,  its future following the space shuttle’s retirement remains uncertain.  Given this uncertainty, contractor officials stated that they will likely  face difficulty recruiting and retaining employees to continue  supporting the space shuttle as it nears retirement because of the  perceived lack of long-term job security. In addition, they said that the  lack of job security may be reflected in poor morale, inattention to  details, errors, accidents, absences, and attrition. In addressing  problems that may result from this challenge, United Space Alliance  has the ability to outplace some employees who work with the Space  Shuttle Program to its parent companies. However, contractor officials  said that other steps it may have to take to address workforce issues,  such as paying retention bonuses, are likely to require funding above  normal levels.
Governmentwide budgetary constraints. Throughout the process of  retiring the space shuttle, NASA, like other federal agencies, will have  to contend with urgent challenges facing the federal budget that will  put pressure on discretionary spending—such as investments in space  programs—and require it to do more with fewer resources. As a result,  the Space Shuttle Program’s ability to make use of tools that require  additional funding—such as certain aspects of NASA’s new workforce  flexibilities like recruitment or retention bonuses—may be limited.  Further, GAO has reported that NASA has had difficulties in accurately  estimating the costs of its programs. Given this, the agency may not be  able to provide a sound and accurate business case to support the use  of such tools. Workforce planning efforts that identify gaps in critical  skills based upon expected future needs and support the use of  strategies to address these gaps could provide the information needed  to support a sound business case.
section_title: Several Factors Have Impeded Efforts to Develop a Long-Term Strategy to Sustain a Critically Skilled Space Shuttle Workforce
paragraphs: While the Space Shuttle Program is still in the early stages of planning for  the program’s retirement, its development of a detailed long-term strategy  to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by several factors. These  include (1) the program’s primary near-term focus on returning the space  shuttle to flight and (2) uncertainties with respect to implementing the  Vision. Space Shuttle Program officials assert that these factors limit the  steps they are able to take at this time to plan for the program’s future  workforce needs. However, our prior work on strategic workforce  planning has shown that there are steps that successful organizations take  to better position themselves to address future workforce needs, even  when faced with uncertainties.
subsections: section_title: Near-Term Focus on Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Has Left Future Workforce Needs Unaddressed
paragraphs: Since the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the program has focused on its  near-term goal of returning the space shuttle to flight. While this focus is  understandable given the importance of the space shuttle’s role in  completing assembly of the ISS, it has led to the program delaying efforts  to determine future workforce needs. For example, in developing the  management plan for retiring the space shuttle, program officials said that  the majority of the assessments the program is to complete to support  decisions regarding whether to maintain, closeout, or transition the  program’s assets will not be undertaken until after the space shuttle has  returned to flight. According to these officials, one reason for this delay is  that personnel needed to conduct the assessments are currently focused  on supporting return to flight activities. Because the workforce  assessment will not be conducted until after the program determines its  hardware and facility requirements, its future workforce needs will likely  remain unidentified until well after the space shuttle has returned to flight.
section_title: Uncertainties with Respect to Implementing the Vision Limit the Space Shuttle Program’s Ability to Identify Future Workforce Needs
paragraphs: While the Vision has provided the Space Shuttle Program with the goal of  retiring the space shuttle by 2010 upon completion of the ISS, the program  lacks well-defined objectives or goals on which to base its workforce  planning efforts. For example, NASA has not yet determined the final  configuration of the ISS or the type of vehicle that will replace the space  shuttle and be used for space exploration. These decisions are important  because they affect the time frames for retiring the space shuttle. Once  made, these decisions will also provide important information that  officials have said will be used to guide Space Shuttle Program retirement  planning efforts, including efforts to determine whether to maintain,  closeout, or transition the program’s facilities, hardware, and workforce as  they are no longer needed to support the program. Lacking this  information, officials have said that their ability to progress with detailed  long-term workforce planning is limited.
section_title: Despite Uncertainties, the Space Shuttle Program Could Follow a Strategic Human Capital Management Approach to Plan for Sustaining Its Critically Skilled Workforce
paragraphs: Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that  successful organizations in both the public and private sectors follow a  strategic human capital management approach, even when faced with an  uncertain future environment. For example, following a strategic human  capital management approach can help an organization to (1) prepare its  workforce to meet present and future mission requirements, (2) plan for  future human capital needs in an uncertain environment, and (3) address  future human capital issues that could jeopardize the accomplishment of  goals. As part of this approach, strategic workforce planning begins with  establishing a strategic direction and setting goals to guide planning efforts  for the organization early on in the planning process. When this is not  possible due to an uncertain future environment, scenario planning is one  approach that can be used as part of a strategic workforce planning  process.
Scenario planning is used to describe different future environments that  an organization may face and can provide a basis for developing and  planning strategies to meet the challenges posed by those scenarios rather  than planning to meet the needs of a single view of the future. For  example, following the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, and  during the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S.  Coast Guard undertook scenario planning to guide its short-term  operational and human capital planning efforts due to uncertainties. For  the Space Shuttle Program, scenario planning could guide workforce  planning efforts because it can be undertaken despite uncertainties the  program faces and without having definitive requirements for program  hardware and facility needs through retirement. Scenario planning could  also provide the space shuttle program with flexibility in its workforce  planning efforts because it does not rely on information provided by  hardware and facility assessments and could be undertaken by NASA  personnel not currently focused on returning the space shuttle to flight.  The information provided by scenario planning could then be used by  program officials to support workforce assessments once decisions about  the programs hardware and facility needs have been made.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: This is one of the most challenging periods in the history of the Space  Shuttle Program. Not only must NASA demonstrate that the space shuttle  can safely fly again, it must begin the process of retiring its largest  program while preparing for the uncertain future of space exploration. The  necessity to plan for sustaining a critically skilled space shuttle workforce  at this time is critical given the impact that expected workforce problems  would have on the program and other larger NASA goals. While the Space  Shuttle Program acknowledges that sustaining its critically skilled  workforce through the program’s retirement is important, the absence of a  detailed long-term strategy for doing so makes it unclear how the program  will actually accomplish this. By delaying steps to address future  workforce needs until other decisions have been made, the program is not  taking advantage of valuable time that it could use to better position itself  to implement workforce strategies to address expected future challenges  and sustain a critically skilled workforce through retirement. Approaches  to workforce planning that take in to account uncertainties and provide  the program with flexibility in determining future workforce requirements  would be particularly relevant to the Space Shuttle Program given the  issues that must be resolved before the program can proceed with more  detailed workforce planning efforts.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better position the agency to sustain a critically skilled space shuttle  workforce through retirement, we recommend that the Acting  Administrator direct the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space  Operations to implement an approach, as part of its preliminary planning  efforts, for identifying the program’s future workforce needs that takes  into account various future scenarios the program could face. The  program should then use this information to develop strategies for meeting  the needs of its potential future scenarios. The information collected and  strategies devised during scenario planning will then be readily available  to be incorporated into the program’s detailed workforce planning efforts  once any uncertainties have been resolved.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written and oral comments on a draft of this report, NASA indicated  that it concurred with our findings, conclusions, and recommendation.  NASA reiterated that its primary near-term focus is on safely returning the  space shuttle to flight, but stated that the agency is laying the foundation  needed to move forward with a comprehensive approach for transitioning  the Space Shuttle Program through its Integrated Space Operations  Summit process. NASA plans to use this process to provide the agency  with an independent view of the respective issues surrounding the mission  execution and transition of the Space Shuttle Program and its assets.  According to NASA, the information provided by this process will allow  the agency to review the risks and opportunities related to a number of  alternate scenarios that the Space Shuttle Program might support within  the Vision.
We are encouraged that NASA is laying the foundation needed for  transitioning the Space Shuttle Program. NASA has the opportunity to use  the Integrated Space Operations Summit process, specifically the alternate  future scenarios for the Space Shuttle Program that it will provide, to  proceed with identifying the program’s future workforce needs based  upon such scenarios. As our recommendation stated, this information  could then be readily available to support the program’s detailed  workforce planning efforts once any uncertainties have been resolved.  NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix III.
NASA also provided technical comments, which we addressed throughout  the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier, we  will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date. At that  time, we will send copies to NASA’s Acting Administrator and interested  congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Key contributors to this  report are acknowledged in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the progress that the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) and United Space Alliance have made toward  developing a strategy for sustaining their critically skilled workforces  through the space shuttle’s retirement, we:    Obtained and analyzed NASA documents and briefing slides related to  human capital management, including NASA’s Strategic Human Capital  Plan and Implementation Plan, NASA center Strategic Human Capital  Implementation Plans, NASA’s Workforce Plan for Use of the NASA  Flexibility Act of 2004 Authorities, policies and procedures for  workforce planning, and information on NASA’s integrated human  capital management tools—such as its Competency Management  System, Workforce Integrated Management System, and workforce  analysis tools.
Obtained and reviewed NASA documents and briefing slides related to  the space shuttle’s operations and retirement, including reports  identifying the “lessons learned” from the Air Force Titan IV Rocket  Program, Navy Base Realignment and Closure activity, NASA Industrial  Facility closure, and the Boeing A/V-8B and F/A-18 production line  transition, and plans and projected schedules for future space shuttle  flights and manifests.
Interviewed United Space Alliance officials regarding their support of  space shuttle operations and involvement with space shuttle retirement  planning efforts. We also obtained and analyzed documents related to  United Space Alliance’s workforce, including demographic data,  workforce strategies, and critical skills identification.
Reviewed previous GAO reports on NASA, the Space Shuttle Program,  and on human capital and workforce planning best practices. We also  reviewed human capital reports and guidance from the Office of  Personnel Management and the Office of Management and Budget, and  interviewed officials from the National Academy of Public  Administration regarding human capital management. In addition, we  reviewed a report issued by the National Science Board on issues  facing the U.S. science and engineering workforce.
Interviewed NASA and United Space Alliance officials and received  written and oral responses to questions regarding the space shuttle  workforce, its demographics, space shuttle operations, and space  shuttle retirement planning efforts; NASA operations and management;  NASA and United Space Alliance human capital and workforce  planning practices; the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004; NASA Safety and  Mission Assurance activities; and space shuttle contracts, including the  Space Flight Operations Contract.
To identify any factors that may have impeded efforts to develop a strategy  for sustaining a critically skilled workforce through retirement, we:  Interviewed NASA and United Space Alliance officials to obtain an  understanding of the challenges they face in planning for the space  shuttle’s retirement and in addressing workforce issues that may arise  as a result of the decision to retire the space shuttle.
Obtained and analyzed NASA and United Space Alliance responses to  questions that asked for information regarding their goals and  strategies for retiring the space shuttle, the processes they expect to  follow to achieve these goals, and the tools and strategies they might  use to address workforce issues through the space shuttle’s retirement.
To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials responsible  for space shuttle operations at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; and  at three NASA centers designated as Space Operations Centers, including  Johnson Space Center (JSC), Texas; Kennedy Space Center (KSC),  Florida; and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Alabama. These  centers were chosen because they maintain primary responsibility for  conducting space shuttle operations and are the centers at which the vast  majority of the space shuttle workforce is located. The offices we met with  at each of these centers included Safety and Mission Assurance and  Human Resources. Additional information was attained from the Space  Shuttle Program Office at JSC; the Space Shuttle Processing Directorate  and Space Shuttle Strategic Planning Office at KSC; the Space Shuttle  Propulsion Office, Customer and Employees Relations Directorate, and  Space Transportation Directorate at MSFC; and the Offices of Space  Operations, Exploration Systems, and Procurement at NASA  Headquarters.
We conducted our review from April 2004 to March 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to the Space Shuttle Program
paragraphs: To prepare for the space shuttle’s retirement, NASA identified the lessons  learned from the closeout or retirement of programs comparable to the  space shuttle, including the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program, the Navy  Base Realignment and Closure activity, and the NASA Industrial Facility  closure. NASA’s reports capture lessons learned that might be applicable  to the Space Shuttle Program’s retirement planning. NASA’s highlights  from these studies are shown in table 1.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Wesley A. Johnson, Robert  Lilly, James Morrison, Shelby S. Oakley, and T.J. Thomson made key  contributions to this report.