U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges
Published: 2006-05-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities--led by the State Department (State)--are designed to counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual understanding between nations. GAO was asked to examine (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic approach to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what challenges remain to be addressed.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data for fiscal years 2004 and 2006, overseas operations budgets have increased, with the largest percentage increases going to regional bureaus with significant Muslim populations. However, the number of authorized overseas positions in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at all. As part of the Secretary of State's newly announced transformational diplomacy initiative, the department intends to reposition staff to better align with policy priorities. Since 2002, State has initiated three public diplomacy activities focused on the Muslim world--a media campaign, a youth-oriented magazine, and a group of youth-focused exchange programs--but these initiatives have been largely terminated or suspended. However, several exchange programs continue to target youth in the Muslim world. In addition, posts in the Muslim world use a range of standard programs and tools which the Under Secretary plans to supplement with several new initiatives. GAO's fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan that brings all these elements together. These findings were reinforced by State's own post-level review. State established a new strategic framework for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2006, calling for, among other things, marginalizing extremists and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures. However, posts have not been given written guidance on how to implement this strategy. Such guidance is a critical first step to developing in-depth communication plans in the field. Posts in the Muslim world face several challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers and language capabilities. For example, we found that 30 percent of language designated public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world were filled by officers without the requisite language skills. State has begun to address many of these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of many of these efforts. Further, State lacks a systematic, comprehensive means of sharing best practices in public diplomacy, which could help transfer knowledge and experience across posts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, foreign public opinion polls  conducted by the State Department (State) and firms such as Zogby  International have shown that negative attitudes toward the United States  have generally grown worse in many countries around the world. One  particular concern has been a marked worsening of such negative attitudes  in the Muslim world—an audience of key strategic interest in the United  States’ war on terrorism. State’s public diplomacy programs and activities  are designed to counter such negative sentiments through ongoing  attempts to communicate with elites and mass audiences overseas. These  efforts include crisis management and daily news operations designed to  explain U.S. foreign policy positions and actions; strategic information  programs designed to more broadly engage, inform, and influence target  audiences; and long-term activities, such as exchanges, to promote  relationship building and mutual understanding.
As a follow-up to our April 2005 public diplomacy report, we reviewed  State’s current public diplomacy initiatives designed to reach out to  countries with significant Muslim populations and determined how such  initiatives are being implemented at the post level. Specifically, we  examined: (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has  directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic  approach to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what program  challenges remain to be addressed.
To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed State officials from the  Under Secretary’s office, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,  the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Public  Affairs, and the Bureau of Resource Management. We also interviewed  officials in State’s Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asian  Affairs, African Affairs, and East Asian and Pacific Affairs. We collected  and analyzed data on the allocation of public diplomacy staff and selected  program costs by regional bureau. We also convened a roundtable of  nongovernment Muslim experts in Washington, D.C., who were identified  by various U.S. government officials and others as knowledgeable of U.S.  efforts to engage Muslim audiences, to discuss key program challenges,  obstacles, and potential solutions.
We conducted fieldwork in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt to review the  implementation of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in countries of particular  strategic interest to the United States.  In each country, we met with a  broad cross section of U.S. embassy officials, British Council and embassy  staff, and local focus groups to discuss public perceptions of the United  States, program implementation efforts, effectiveness measurement  efforts, and program challenges. Additionally, we conducted phone  interviews with State Public Affairs officers in Indonesia and Turkey to  supplement the information we collected at the three posts we visited. The  combined population of these countries is approximately 680 million, or 45  percent of the total population of the 58 countries and territories in the  Muslim world.
The focus of our review was public diplomacy activities designed to  communicate information about the United States to target audiences  overseas. Thus, we did not review State-led reform initiatives, such as the  Middle East Partnership Initiative. Aside from State, we examined U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts to tell America’s  assistance story and Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to support  State’s public diplomacy activities. In addition, we collected funding and  program information on U.S. international broadcasting but did not seek to  evaluate the effectiveness of Radio Sawa and the Alhurra satellite  television network—the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ (BBG) two  primary initiatives aimed at Arab audiences. GAO is reviewing these  broadcast initiatives separately.
We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The overall goal of U.S. public diplomacy efforts is to understand, inform,  engage, and influence the attitudes and behavior of global audiences in  ways that support the United States’ strategic interests. U.S. public  diplomacy efforts are implemented by several entities, including State,  DOD, USAID, and BBG, and function under the broad guidance of the  White House and the National Security Council.  Funding is concentrated  in State and BBG, which together received approximately $1.2 billion for  public diplomacy in fiscal year 2005. USAID and DOD have relatively small  public diplomacy budgets.
subsections: section_title: State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts
paragraphs: State’s public diplomacy operations are guided by the Under Secretary for  Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the Bureaus of  Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and  Public Affairs. The department’s regional and functional bureaus also  contain public diplomacy offices, which report to the relevant assistant  secretary. The Under Secretary has direct authority over the three public  diplomacy bureaus but does not have line authority over public diplomacy  operations in other regional or functional bureaus. In overseas missions,  Foreign Service public diplomacy officers (including Public Affairs,  Cultural Affairs, Information, Information Resources, and Regional English  Language officers) operate under the authority of the chief of mission and  report to their regional bureau managers in Washington, D.C.
section_title: Public Diplomacy Budget and Programs
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2005, State dedicated $597 million to pubic diplomacy and  public affairs. According to the department’s performance plan, its  investment in public diplomacy and public affairs continues to increase,  particularly for efforts targeting audiences in the Middle East. Exchange  programs received the majority of fiscal year 2005 funding, $356 million,  which was a 12.4 percent increase over fiscal year 2004. These programs  include international visitors, citizen exchanges, the Fulbright academic  exchange program, and English-language teaching. State’s information  programs received roughly $68 million in fiscal year 2005 to fund programs  such as the U.S. speakers program, mission Web sites, and American  Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United  States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees. The  remaining public diplomacy funds go to State’s regional bureaus to pay for  the salaries of locally engaged staff overseas, among other purposes.  Appendix III provides a summary of selected programs managed by each  bureau along with a description of staff positions.
USAID, DOD, and BBG also support the U.S. government’s communication  efforts in the field. USAID reports that it has established an overseas  network of more than one hundred Development Outreach and  Communications officers, who work with Public Affairs officers to  promote America’s assistance story. DOD has also become involved in  public diplomacy and is developing a strategy for “military support for  public diplomacy” to identify ways it can effectively support State’s  operations. For example, DOD Military Information Support Teams have  been dispatched to selected posts, at the request of the Ambassador, to  assist with outreach efforts. Finally, U.S. international broadcasting, led by  the BBG, is a major contributor to the United States’ efforts to  communicate directly with foreign audiences. Between fiscal years 2004  and 2006, the BBG expects to spend nearly $240 million on its Middle East  Broadcasting Network, which includes Alhurra satellite television network  and the Arabic-language Radio Sawa.
section_title: Definition of the Muslim World
paragraphs: According to State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the  Muslim world is composed of 58 countries and territories with significant  Muslim populations, many of which are members of the Organization of the  Islamic Conference. These countries have a combined population of more  than 1.5 billion and are located in Africa, Asia, and Europe (see app. II).  Figure 1 shows their locations.
State’s public diplomacy investment in these 58 countries and territories  has increased in recent years. According to department data, State  provided funds for 179 speakers to travel to these countries in fiscal year  2005, up from 157 in fiscal year 2004. Additionally, the department funded  nearly 5,800 exchange participants from these countries in fiscal year 2005,  up from about 5,100 in fiscal year 2004. The department spent nearly $115  million on exchange and information programs in these countries in fiscal  year 2005.
section_title: State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the Muslim World, but Programs Generally Remain the Same
paragraphs: State devotes significant public diplomacy program and staffing resources  to regions with large Muslim populations. Beginning in 2002, State  introduced three key initiatives focused on reaching younger and broader  Muslim audiences to supplement the standard exchange and information  programs used by most embassies; these initiatives have been largely  terminated or suspended. Nevertheless, posts in the Muslim world continue  to generally employ the same exchange, cultural, and information  programs used throughout the world. In fiscal year 2006, the Under  Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs introduced several new  initiatives designed to help officers in the field improve their advocacy of  U.S. foreign policy and enhance their ability to quickly respond to breaking  news stories, while other initiatives, some of which are specific to Muslim  audiences, are still in development.
subsections: section_title: Resources Directed to Regions with Significant Muslim Populations
paragraphs: In our 2003 report on public diplomacy, we reported that the department  had increased its overall spending on public diplomacy since the terrorist  attacks of September 11, with the largest relative increases going to regions  with large Muslim populations. Specifically, we noted that while State’s  Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs received the largest overall share  of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest percentage increases in  such resources occurred in regions with significant Muslim populations. As  table 1 shows, this pattern has continued over the past 3 years, with total  spending on overseas public diplomacy increasing 21 percent between  fiscal years 2004 and 2006. The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs  continues to receive the largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy  resources, with the largest percentage increases in resources going to  regions with countries with large Muslim populations including  South Asia  (39 percent), East Asia and Pacific (28 percent), and the Near East (25  percent).
Table 1 provides data on public diplomacy funding and staffing for each of  State’s regional bureaus. The table also shows the number of countries with  significant Muslim populations in each region, according to State’s Bureau  of Educational and Cultural Affairs, along with the population of these  countries.
In our 2003 report, we noted that authorized officer positions overseas had  significantly expanded, with the most notable increases occurring in State’s  Near East (27 percent increase) and South Asia (15 percent increase)  bureaus. However, current data show that staff numbers have stayed  largely the same over the past 3 years with increases of 3 percent or less. In  January 2006, Secretary Rice announced plans to reposition officers as part  of her transformational diplomacy initiative. State officials said that the  department will initially reposition approximately 75 Foreign Service  officers this year from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to India,  China, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. According to  these officials, over one-third of the positions that will be relocated are  public diplomacy positions.
section_title: Muslim-Specific Initiatives Have Been Short-lived
paragraphs: State has developed three programs specifically designed to reach Muslim  audiences: the Shared Values media campaign, the Arabic-language Hi  magazine, and the youth-oriented Partnerships for Learning exchange  strategy.  These initiatives have been largely suspended or terminated, but  State continues to focus many of its exchange programs on younger  audiences.
subsections: section_title: Shared Values Initiative
paragraphs: In 2002, State launched the Shared Values Initiative to highlight the  common values and beliefs shared by Muslims and Americans,  demonstrate that America is not at war with Islam, and stimulate dialogue  between the United States and the Muslim world. The initiative, which cost  about $15 million, centered on a paid television campaign, which was  developed by a private sector advertising firm and attempted to illustrate  the daily lives of Muslim Americans. This multimedia campaign also  included a booklet on Muslim life in America, speaker tours, an interactive  Web site to promote dialogue between Muslims in the United States and  abroad, and other information programs. The initial phase of the Shared  Values Initiative was aired in six languages in Pakistan, Indonesia,  Malaysia, and Kuwait, as well as on pan-Arab media. State estimates that  288 million people were exposed to these messages, but television stations  in several countries, including Egypt and Lebanon, refused to air the  programs for political and other reasons.
In 2003, the report by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab  and Muslim World, commonly referred to as the Djerejian report, credited  the campaign for having a solid research basis but criticized it for taking far  longer to develop than similar private sector advertising campaigns. The  report also noted that some embassies were reluctant to promote the ads.  A department analysis of foreign reaction to the Shared Values Initiative  concluded that media outlets in many countries found the campaign to be  propaganda and unlikely to succeed as long as U.S. foreign policy remained  unchanged. While some posts continue to host events on Muslim life in  America, the Shared Values Initiative’s centerpiece television campaign  aired only for the holy month of Ramadan in the winter of 2002-03 and was  subsequently discontinued. Additionally, the interactive Web site, “Open  Dialogue,” is no longer in operation.
section_title: Hi Magazine and Web Site
paragraphs: Following the demise of the Shared Values Initiative, State launched the  Arabic-language Hi magazine in July 2003 with an annual budget of $4.5  million. Designed to highlight American culture, values, and lifestyles, Hi  was directed at Arab youth in the Middle East and North Africa and was  expected to influence Arab youth to have a more positive perception of the  United States. Hi was produced by a private sector magazine firm, and  State estimated its circulation to be about 50,000 in the Arab world. One  official in Egypt, however, said that of the 2,500 copies the embassy  distributed monthly to newsstands in Cairo, often as many as 2,000 copies  were returned unsold (see fig. 2). State officials in Washington noted that,  as a matter of practice, these copies were subsequently redistributed to  public institutions in Egypt, such as schools and libraries. According to  embassy officials, they were unable to sell many copies of Hi because it  was so new and relatively expensive. In December 2005, State suspended  publication of Hi magazine pending the results of an internal evaluation,  which was prompted by concerns over the magazine’s cost, reach, and  impact, according to State officials. State expects this evaluation to be  completed by May 2006. According to one official, an initial assessment of the magazine found that most readers access Hi via its Web sites, which  remain in operation.
In 2002, State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs developed an  exchange initiative specifically for youth from Muslim communities called  Partnerships for Learning, which provided an organizing theme to help  guide the department’s exchange investments. Designed to reach a  “younger, broader, deeper” audience in the Muslim world, one senior State  official called Partnerships for Learning, “the heart of our extensive  engagement with the Arab and Muslim world.” According to a senior State  official, the Partnerships for Learning program was terminated as an  organizing theme in late 2005 with the appointment of the latest Under  Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Nevertheless,  department officials said that its exchange programs will continue to focus  on younger audiences. These officials stated that the department is  exploring other program models to engage the greatest number of  undergraduate students while increasing cost effectiveness. Similarly, State  told us that the Partnerships for Learning concept continues to infuse  almost all of its citizen exchange programs.
Between 2002 and 2005, the department estimates that nearly $150 million  was spent on exchanges supporting the Partnerships for Learning theme.  This figure includes new programs developed to implement this theme and  funds spent on existing exchange programs that targeted a younger, more  diverse, and less elite audience in the Muslim world.  The two major new  programs developed by the department were the Youth Exchange and  Study (YES) program and the Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate  Studies (PLUS) program. Between 2003 and 2005, the YES program  provided scholarships to more than 600 high school students from the  Muslim world to study in the United States. Similarly, since 2004 the PLUS  program has brought more than 170 students from the Middle East, North  Africa, and South Asia to the United States for 2 years of academic study at  an American college or university. The YES and PLUS programs, with a  combined budget of $25 million, remain active in fiscal year 2006. The  department has not yet conducted a formal evaluation of the YES and PLUS  programs.
section_title: Public Diplomacy Efforts at Selected Posts Rely on Standard Programs and Tools
paragraphs: Officials at the three posts we visited—Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt—said  that they use a broad range of programs available to them, similar to the  mix of programs used throughout the world, including information,  exchange, and cultural programs. Table 2 provides a breakdown of selected  activities at each post. In addition to these programs, these officials said  that they spend a significant amount of time on news and crisis  management, such as responding to media inquiries and coordinating  media events. In Pakistan, for example, we observed the acting public  affairs officer coordinate media events related to the Secretary of State’s  visit and arrange interviews for the Ambassador regarding U.S. relief  efforts in the wake of the October 2005 South Asian earthquake.
Academic and professional exchanges were an important public diplomacy  tool at each post we visited. In fiscal year 2005, State obligated more than  $12 million for such exchanges in these countries. All of the posts we  visited had an active Fulbright exchange program, managed by the  embassy in Nigeria and by binational commissions in Pakistan and Egypt.  In Nigeria, the embassy has participated in the Partnerships for Learning- YES program since 2003 and has sent about 35 Nigerian high school  students and their teachers to study in Iowa through this program.  According to the Public Affairs officer in Nigeria, the embassy has shifted  resources to assure that 50 percent of exchange participants are Muslim,  reflecting their overall proportion of Nigeria’s population. Additionally, the  Public Affairs officer in Islamabad is working to develop a database of  Pakistani exchange alumni to enable the embassy to maintain better  contact with this audience.
Posts have also made use of information programs such as speakers,  magazines, information resource centers, and, to a limited extent,  American Corners. Data from State’s Bureau of International Information  Programs show that the bureau funded 5 speakers in Nigeria, 18 in  Pakistan, and 7 in Egypt in fiscal year 2005. These speakers discussed  topics such as the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Muslim life and religious  tolerance in America, and U.S. foreign policy. In addition, these posts take  advantage of “target of opportunity” speakers—American experts who  already happen to be in the region. Each post we visited also distributes a  U.S.-funded magazine in local languages, such as the Hausa Magama in  Nigeria and the Urdu Khabr-o-Nazar in Pakistan. Further, these posts  operate small reference libraries within the embassy compound, known as  Information Resource Centers. According to officials in Egypt, the  embassy’s resource center receives more than 1,000 visitors per month, on  average, while security concerns in Pakistan have limited the numbers of  visitors to its center.  Additionally, the embassy in Nigeria has established  10 American Corners, with plans to open more in the near future. While  there are no American Corners in Egypt or Pakistan, embassy officials in  those countries told us they are currently seeking local partners to host  such a facility.
Finally, other agencies have played a limited role in supporting the  mission’s overall public diplomacy efforts in the countries we visited.  USAID has hired Development Outreach and Communication officers in  Nigeria and Egypt and was in the process of hiring an officer in Pakistan in  October 2005. DOD has sent two Military Information Support Teams to  Nigeria to help publicize the department’s humanitarian assistance  programs in the country. In addition, U.S. broadcasting reaches audiences  in Nigeria and Pakistan through Voice of America’s (VOA) Hausa, English,  and Urdu services, and the Arabic Radio Sawa and Alhurra satellite  television network reach some audiences in Egypt. Finally, in November  2005, VOA announced the launch of a new half-hour television program in  Urdu to be broadcast on GEO-TV, a commercial station in Pakistan.
section_title: Recent Initiatives Focus on Improving State’s Policy Advocacy and News Management Operations
paragraphs: During the past 6 months, State has launched a number of initiatives  designed to broadly improve its ability to explain U.S. foreign policy  decisions and respond to breaking news both within and outside the  Muslim world. These initiatives, created in Washington, D.C., impact field  operations to the extent that Ambassadors and other spokespersons at  posts will be better positioned to advocate U.S. foreign policy decisions  and actions and effectively react to developing news stories. These  initiatives include the following:  A Rapid Response Unit established in the Bureau of Public Affairs to  produce a daily report on stories driving news around the world and  give the U.S. position on those issues. This report is distributed to U.S.  cabinet and subcabinet officials, Ambassadors, public affairs officers,  regional combatant commands, and others.  “Echo Chamber” messages to provide U.S. Ambassadors and others  with clear guidance so they are better able to advocate U.S. policy on  major news stories and policy issues.  These policy-level statements are  posted to State’s internal Web site and can be broadly accessed by post  staff around the world. These statements are also made available to  VOA’s policy office for use in crafting editorials reflecting the views of  the U.S. government.
Establishing a regional public diplomacy hub in Dubai, a key media  market, this summer. The hub, which will operate out of commercial  office space to facilitate public access, will be staffed with two to three  spokespersons whose full-time job will be to appear on regional media  outlets, with a focus on television given its broad reach, to advocate U.S.  policies. According to State officials, a regional center is needed since  embassy public affairs staff focus on bilateral issues and no one in the  department is specifically responsible for transregional media  operations.
In addition to these initiatives, several other efforts are under way. These  efforts include empowering the American Muslim community to speak out  for the United States, creating an Office of Public/Private Partnerships to  stimulate private sector involvement, and developing enhanced technology  to expand the use of new communication venues in order to better reach  target audiences.
section_title: Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate Guidance, but Improvements Are Planned
paragraphs: Our review of mission performance plans for the countries we visited  found that they lacked key strategic planning elements recognized by GAO  and the private sector as vital to effectively communicating with target  audiences. Among the missing elements are core messages and themes,  target audience segmentation and analysis, details on program strategies  and tactics, in-depth research and evaluation to inform strategic  communication decisions, and a fully developed communication plan to tie  everything together. In 2005, State established a strategic framework for  U.S. public diplomacy efforts; however, these early efforts lack guidance  from Washington to the field on strategies and tactics. In addition, posts are  not required to develop in-depth analysis to better inform and support their  program decisions or country-specific communication plans to help inform  and guide their implementation efforts.
subsections: section_title: Posts Lack Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy
paragraphs: GAO and other groups, including the Defense Science Board, have  suggested that State adopt a strategic approach to public diplomacy by  modeling and adapting private sector communication practices to suit its  purposes (see app. IV). Key best practices identified in GAO’s September  2003 report are shown in figure 3.
Based on our review of mission performance plans and on fieldwork in  Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt, we found that posts’ public diplomacy  programming generally lacked these important elements of strategic  communications planning. In particular, posts lacked a clear theme or  message and specific target audiences were generally not identified. Posts  also failed to develop detailed strategies and tactics to direct available  public diplomacy programs and tools toward clear, measurable objectives  in the most efficient manner possible. Further, research and evaluation  efforts to inform all facets of strategic communications are limited by the  relatively small budget in Washington, D.C., allocated to such efforts and a  general lack of expertise in the field with regard to commissioning and  conducting such studies. Finally, posts lack detailed, country-level  communication plans to tie everything together. These findings are  reinforced by a worldwide review of fiscal year 2007 mission performance  plans conducted by State’s Bureau of Resource Management in 2005. In  particular, State determined that post efforts were generally not directed at  specific target audiences, lacked specific and reasonable communication  objectives and strategies, and often failed to provide outcome and impact  measures of program success.
subsections: section_title: Post Efforts Not Directed Toward a Core Message or Theme
paragraphs: Private sector communication best practices suggest the need for a core  message or theme, which can be developed on a worldwide, regional, or  country-by-country basis, and should be consistently applied to and woven  through all program activities and events. The posts we visited did not have  a core message or theme to direct their communication efforts. We found  that post efforts focused on general program goals established in  Washington, D.C., which are found in the mission performance plans. For  public diplomacy, these goals are promoting mutual understanding,  advancing American values, and influencing international public opinion.  According to State officials, these goals can be interpreted in many  different ways and have limited practical utility for developing a targeted  communication strategy. As one senior embassy official in Nigeria noted,  these goals are “amorphous” in nature and “hard to quantify” in practice.  Specifically, posts noted the following communication goals in their fiscal  year 2006 mission performance plans:  Nigeria—Influencing International Public Opinion:  Nigeria’s fiscal  year 2006 mission performance plan simply states that the post intends  to move the opinions of Northern Nigerians to mirror those of the rest of  the Nigerian population, which is largely supportive of U.S. values and  principles.
Pakistan—Promoting Mutual Understanding:  Pakistan’s mission  performance plan states that the post will seek to enhance the image of  the United States in Pakistan and increase the depth of understanding  among Pakistanis of how American society, culture, and values shape  the objectives behind and reasons for U.S. policies towards Pakistan.
Egypt—Advancing American Values:  Egypt’s mission performance  plan notes that the post will use information activities, exchanges, and  local information programming to bolster awareness among Egyptians  of values shared with Americans and increase Egyptian public  understanding of American society.
The Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan told us that, while specific  messages have been developed at post, there are in fact too many  competing messages (such as the United States is a great place to live, the  United States is a great place to visit, American cultural diversity and  democracy are good things), and the post needed to do a better job of  defining and clarifying its message. A senior embassy official in Nigeria  echoed this point by stating that his post needed a core message that could  be coordinated across State, USAID, DOD, and other supporting agencies.
section_title: Target Audiences Have Not Been Clearly Defined
paragraphs: Private sector best practices suggest that analyzing target markets in depth  and segmenting these markets are critical to developing effective  information campaigns. The posts we visited generally had not used these  practices to help refine and focus their communication efforts. In its  worldwide review, State’s Resource Management Bureau found that some  posts had done a poor job of answering the basic question of whether to  direct their communication efforts at a mass audience or opinion leaders.  The reviewers concluded that posts should focus on opinion leaders in the  130 less developed countries with poor communications infrastructure  (many countries with significant Muslim populations fall in this group),  while posts in roughly 40 other countries with adequate communications  infrastructures should focus on reaching the general public. As a first step,  the reviewers recommended that posts in the former group undertake an  inventory of opinion leaders they wished to influence. This “key influencers  analysis” could be segmented into various groups such as youth; women;  opinion and editorial writers; professors; and ethnic, religious, and  business leaders, who could serve as message multipliers. In 2004,  Washington sought to supplement mission performance planning activities  by asking posts worldwide to prepare an analysis of key influencers.  According to senior officials in Washington, D.C., only about one-half of  posts worldwide ever submitted the requested analysis. Among the posts  we visited, only Nigeria was able to produce a copy of an influence  analysis, which we found to be rudimentary in nature and not fully  responsive to the guidance provided by Washington, D.C.
The posts we visited generally neither focused on important subcategories  such as urban versus rural, men versus women, and religious versus  nonreligious, nor did they segment based on the level or intensity of  opposition (ranging from “soft” to “hard”) toward the United States.  However, posts have attempted to reach a “younger, broader, and deeper”  audience through exchange programs such as YES, which targets high  school students. Also, some efforts are under way to target exchange  program alumni, locals who have studied in or visited the United States,  and expatriates living in the United States who could serve as goodwill  ambassadors for the United States.
In contrast to post practices, we noted that the British Council, which  maintains a presence in all three countries we visited, relies on a four tier  audience system, which is used worldwide to target their outreach efforts.   Also, the Defense Science Board has reported that target audiences in the  Muslim world can be divided into five categories, ranging from hard  opposition to hard support. Their report notes that identifying audiences  that are “winnable” in terms of increased public support is critical to  successful strategic communication and requires borrowing from  campaign and private sector methodologies and conducting political-style  attitudinal research and identifying the highest priority support groups that  can most likely be influenced.
section_title: Strategies and Tactics Lack Detail
paragraphs: The private sector uses sophisticated strategies to integrate complex  communication efforts involving multiple players. Our review of mission  performance plans revealed that only limited attention had been given to  developing detailed public diplomacy strategies and tactics to guide their  implementation of an array of public diplomacy programs and tools. While  such strategies can include message amplification tactics or the use of  third-party spokespersons to increase the credibility of delivered  messages, the mission performance plans we reviewed were noteworthy  for their brevity and lack of detail on such strategies. For example, the  Nigerian post’s goal paper on public diplomacy and public affairs runs just  over two pages. These two pages serve as the road map for implementing  the post’s public diplomacy efforts, which involve several agencies,  assorted programs and projects, and substantial program funds. The plan  devotes one sentence to describe its strategy to achieve its performance  goal and three sentences to describe the tactics that will be used to  implement the strategy.
On occasion, the strategies and tactics outlined in mission performance  plans were or will be supplemented by additional planning efforts. In  Pakistan, we noted that the Public Affairs officer had drafted a summary  level plan to guide the efforts of the public affairs section. In Egypt, the  Public Affairs officer told us that the Chief of Mission has directed his  section to develop an “Islamic strategy” for Egypt to include details on  working with religious leaders, integrating English language teaching  efforts, working with local universities, and so on.
In its review, State’s Resource Management Bureau also found that posts  had generally not developed meaningful strategies and tactics that would  lead to quantifiable results. The reviewers suggested that posts adopt a  more rigorous and measurable outreach strategy focused on opinion  leaders in countries where a mass audience cannot easily be reached. As  defined earlier, the first step entails identifying the opinion leaders the post  would like to influence. Second, posts should identify a “critical mass” of  opinion leaders who must be reached and influenced in order to have a  significant impact on the target audience. Third, posts should develop  programs and initiatives designed to reach these specific individuals, with  the goal of persuading and motivating opinion leaders to spread the  message. The reviewers suggested that exchange programs could be  reinforced with targeted strategic information programs. Public Affairs  officers were briefed on these findings in 2005, and mission performance  plan guidance has been updated to incorporate most of these  recommended elements.
section_title: Research and Evaluation Efforts Are Limited
paragraphs: Private sector best practices highlight the value of a research driven  approach to designing, implementing, evaluating, and fine-tuning strategic  communications efforts. Given the relatively small budgets devoted to  research and evaluation efforts, posts had access to a limited amount of  information to help guide their strategic communication activities.   Valuable research can include such topics as: (1) audience attitudes and  beliefs; (2) root causes driving negative sentiments and beliefs; (3) country- specific social, economic, political, and military environments; (4) local  media and communication options; and (5) diagnosis of deeper  performance issues and possible program fixes.
Because the posts we visited did not have the budgets or required expertise  to conduct this type of research or program evaluation on their own, they  relied on the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and evaluation staff in  Washington, D.C., to conduct such studies for them. However, only a  limited range of research and evaluation data is available to posts. Most of  this data is not tailored to a specific country and it was unclear whether  available research and evaluation results are incorporated in post planning  and evaluation activities. Available research and evaluations products  include the following:  Broad public opinion polling data: Conducted by State’s Bureau of  Intelligence and Research, these polls document that local populations,  to a significant degree, hold negative views toward the United States.  Such polls serve a valuable role in identifying the depth of the public  perception problem but are of limited utility in diagnosing the source of  the problem or the specific impact that U.S. public diplomacy efforts  have had on alleviating such negative perceptions.
Root cause polling data:  In particular, State’s Bureau of Intelligence and  Research released an opinion analysis in March 2003 based on a series  of surveys examining the root causes of anti-American sentiments in 10  Muslim-majority countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey,  Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia).   Significantly, the 2003 analysis notes that “the belief that the U.S. is  hostile toward Muslim countries was the single largest component of  anti-American sentiments in all 10 countries, outweighing even the  publics’ view of how the United States treats their own country.”  This  type of insight can provide the basis for identifying and developing a  core message or theme—one of the key private sector best practices  discussed earlier. Our roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts  noted that this view is grounded in Muslim concerns over U.S. foreign  policies and actions in the Muslim world. All of our panelists agreed that  U.S. foreign policy is the major root cause behind anti-American  sentiments among Muslim populations and that this point needs to be  better researched, absorbed, and acted upon by government officials.   According to our panelists, these core issues include the Arab/Israeli  conflict, the war in Iraq, U.S. support for antidemocratic regimes in the  region, perceptions of U.S. imperialism, and U.S. support for  globalization, which is viewed as hurting Muslims.
Program evaluations:  While State has traditionally focused its  evaluation activities on exchanges, the department has established an  evaluation schedule that includes ongoing assessments of key public  diplomacy programs and initiatives, including the English ACCESS  Microscholarship program, Hi magazine, American Corners, and a  contract with the Performance Institute to examine State’s performance  measurement framework for public diplomacy. Planned evaluations  include media training and outreach and the U.S. speakers programs.  These evaluations are conducted by staff in the Bureau of Educational  and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs,  and the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources in the Under  Secretary’s office.
Additionally, other forms of research are not being fully utilized. In  particular, the Central Intelligence Agency sponsored a series of public  diplomacy planning papers in 2005 for six countries of strategic national  interest to the United States (China, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Nigeria, and  Venezuela). These papers included detailed country profiles and issue  analyses, recommended public diplomacy strategies for each country, and  served as the focus of two conferences that sought to promote dialogue  among academic and agency experts regarding how to improve and refine  U.S. public diplomacy efforts in each country. However, we found that  State officials in both Egypt and Nigeria were not familiar with this  exercise or the papers produced for their host countries.
section_title: Country-Level Communication Plans Lacking
paragraphs: Private sector best practices suggest that a detailed, country-specific  communication plan serves to pull together the complex data and analysis  required for a feasible plan of action that can be monitored and improved  as needed based on performance feedback. However, none of the posts we  visited had such a detailed communication plan. Prior to 1999, when public  diplomacy efforts were managed by the former U.S. Information Agency  (USIA), detailed communication plans were developed on a country-by- country basis. These plans included details on core messages and themes,  target audiences, and research on key opinion leaders, audience attitudes,  and the local media environment. With the integration of the USIA into  State in 1999, these country plans were eliminated, leaving the mission  performance plans as the focal point for such information. As suggested by  several post officials, the country plans prepared by USIA were superior to  the mission performance planning process since they focused on public  diplomacy (a program driven function that is distinct from the policy focus  predominant in other department operations) and provided a detailed road  map to guide program implementation efforts.
In marked contrast to State, we noted that USAID’s new Development  Outreach and Communications officers are developing country-level  communication plans. These plans are based on guidance prepared by  public affairs staff in Washington, D.C., pertaining to roles and  responsibilities, coordination requirements, communication tips and  techniques, and the development of a long-term communication strategy.  This guidance notes that “having a thoughtful communication strategy that  is understood by the key leadership of the Mission is integral to  communicating most effectively.”  The guidance suggests that a good  communication strategy should adequately describe the Mission’s public  relations goals, should be linked to a specific time frame and resource  request, and should identify the Mission’s communication strengths and  weaknesses, key themes and messages, priority audiences, and the best  means to reach them. Most importantly, the messages must be repeated  over and over again to ensure that they are heard.
section_title: Strategic Framework Lacks Implementing Guidance
paragraphs: In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.  public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1) support  the President’s Freedom Agenda with a positive image of hope; (2) isolate  and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote understanding regarding  shared values and common interests between Americans and peoples of  different countries, cultures, and faiths. The Under Secretary noted she  intends to achieve these goals using five tactics—engagement, exchanges,  education, empowerment, and evaluation—and by using various public  diplomacy programs and other means.  This framework represents a  noteworthy start; however, the department has not yet developed written  guidance that provides details on how the Under Secretary’s new strategic  framework should be implemented in the field.
Our past reports have detailed the difficulties the White House and the  department have encountered in developing any type of written  communication strategy. In our 2003 report and again in our 2005 report,  we noted several attempts by State and the National Security Council to  develop a communication strategy for the interagency community. In 2004,  the National Security Council and the department created the Muslim  World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee to develop an interagency  strategy to marginalize extremists. The committee collected information  from embassies around the world to help develop a draft outreach strategy,  but it was ultimately not released to posts pending further guidance from  the new Under Secretary. On April 8, 2006, the President established a new  Policy Coordinating Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic  Communication.  This committee, to be led by the Under Secretary, is  intended to coordinate interagency activities.  According to department  officials, one of the committee’s tasks will be to issue a formal interagency  public diplomacy strategy.  It is not clear how long this effort will take or  when a strategy will be developed.
section_title: Post Planning and Evaluation Improving but Certain Elements Still Lacking
paragraphs: While the department has not yet issued guidance on how to implement the  strategic framework established by the Under Secretary, officials in  Washington acknowledged the need to improve message delivery at the  post level and have begun to implement a more rigorous approach to  program planning and evaluation. Based on prior reports by GAO and  others, the department has begun to institute a “culture of measurement,”  which should significantly impact the rigor and sophistication of its  strategic planning and evaluation efforts. Beginning 2 years ago, the  department sought to establish this culture through a variety of means,  including the creation of an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources  within the office of the Under Secretary; the creation of a Public Diplomacy  Evaluation Council to share best practices; the creation of a unified office  of program evaluations; and the development of an expanded evaluation  schedule, which places a new emphasis on assessing the department’s  strategic information programs.
The department also plans to institutionalize the use of the “logic model”  approach endorsed by GAO and others, which could have a significant  impact on the department’s program design, implementation, and  evaluation efforts. The logic model calls for program managers to define  their key inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact.  The head of the  Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council has briefed field staff on the logic  model using the illustration in figure 4.
The logic model will be implemented via a performance measurement  framework contract led by the Performance Institute.  Implementation  details, guidance, training, and so on will be developed by the Performance  Institute in coordination with key State stakeholders. Major elements of the  model should be in place by September 2006, with full implementation  expected by the 2009 mission performance plan cycle.
In January 2006, the department issued guidance on preparing mission  performance plans that embodies its desire to increase the rigor and  sophistication of post strategic planning and evaluation efforts. Issued for  the fiscal year 2008 planning cycle, this guidance calls for more strategic  thinking and planning than was required in the past, noting that “there are  increased expectations for measurement and specificity in planning for  public diplomacy and this leads to requests for more sophisticated  information from the field.” The guidance calls for identification of specific  target audiences, key themes and messages, detailed strategies and tactics,  and performance outcomes that can be measured with a reasonable degree  of precision and clearly demonstrate the ultimate impact of U.S. public  diplomacy efforts. If fully implemented, this guidance should begin to  address the shortcomings we found in mission performance plans in  Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. However, such guidance will not be  implemented for another 2 years, raising significant concerns about what  the department intends to do now to address strategic planning shortfalls.
While Washington’s guidance is designed to significantly improve the  strategic decisions summarized in mission performance plans, it does not  require that missions prepare in-depth analyses to better inform and  support their strategic program decisions. Such analyses include country- situation papers, in-depth audience research, media analyses to understand  how people receive information and who the key media providers are, and  details on how related agency programs and planning efforts should be  integrated to achieve common communication objectives. Finally, this  guidance does not require that missions develop a separate communication  plan to incorporate Washington and post-conducted analyses and planned  strategies and tactics. The lack of a country-level communication plan  increases the risk that planning will remain largely conceptual and fall  short in terms of effectiveness at the tactical level. Also, country-level  communication plans could be prepared and updated as needed, apart  from the mission performance planning cycle, particularly as the new  guidance for mission performance plans will not take effect until fiscal year  2008.
section_title: Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts in the Muslim World
paragraphs: Public diplomacy officers struggle to balance security with public access  and outreach to local populations. The public diplomacy corps in the field  faces several human capital challenges, such as the lack of a sufficient  number of officers, lack of staff time, shortened tours of duty, and limited  language proficiency. While State has taken steps to address these  challenges, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of some of these  efforts, and officers at the three posts we visited told us that many of these  issues remain unresolved. In addition, State lacks an effective means to  share embassy best practices that could help address some of these  challenges.
subsections: section_title: Embassy Must Balance Security and Public Outreach
paragraphs: Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public  access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between safety  and mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, then- Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “Safety is one of our top priorities…  but it can’t be at the expense of the mission.” While posts around the world  have faced increased threats, security concerns are particularly acute at  many posts in countries with significant Muslim populations. As figure 5  illustrates, the threat level for terrorism is rated as “critical” or “high” in 80  percent of posts in the Muslim world, compared with 34 percent of posts  elsewhere.
Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly  accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and  Libraries. According to one State official, in 1990 the majority of posts had  such publicly accessible facilities; now, however, few do. In Pakistan, for  example, all of the American Centers have closed for security reasons, with  the last such facility, in Islamabad, closed in February 2005. These same  concerns have prevented the establishment of a U.S. presence elsewhere.  Officials in Nigeria said they would like to open a facility in the north of the  country to serve the region’s 70 million predominantly Muslim inhabitants,  but security and budgetary concerns prevent them from doing so—one  senior embassy official in Nigeria said that nothing they can do from the  capital, Abuja, would be as effective as having a permanent presence in the  north. As a result, embassies have had to find other venues for public  diplomacy programs, and some activities have been moved onto embassy  compounds.
Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to reduce  the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report concluded  that “security concerns often require a ‘low profile’ approach during events,  programs or other situations, which, in happier times, would have been  able to generate considerable good will for the United States.” This  constraint is particularly acute in Pakistan, where the embassy has had to  reduce certain speaker and exchange programs. For example, an official in  Peshawar, Pakistan, said that consulate staff handpicked students for a  9/11 Commission Report reading group because the consulate could not  widely publicize the program. While several officials in Pakistan described  the reading group as a success, its reach was limited due to security  concerns.
Furthermore, precautions designed to improve the security of American  facilities have had the ancillary effect of sending the message that the  United States is unapproachable and distrustful, according to State  officials. Concrete barriers and armed escorts contribute to this  perception, as do requirements restricting visitors’ use of cell phones and  pagers within the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan, visitors to  the embassy’s Information Resource Center have fallen to as few as one per  day because many visitors feel humiliated by the embassy’s rigorous  security procedures. In Egypt, one of the ambassador’s priorities is  remodeling the embassy in order to make it more inviting to visitors.
subsections: section_title: State Has Developed Initiatives to Respond to Security Concerns
paragraphs: State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly  accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including American  Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United  States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees.  According to State data, there are currently approximately 300 American  Corners throughout the world, including more than 90 in the Muslim world,  with another 75 planned (more than 40 of which will be in the Muslim  world). Several recent studies on public diplomacy have recommended the  expansion of the American Corners program, but its effectiveness has not  been evaluated. While one State official told us that American Corners are  the best solution given the current security environment, others have  described them as public diplomacy “on the cheap.” The American Corner  we visited in Nigeria was confined to a single small room housing a limited  reference library and a small selection of donated books (see fig. 6); at a  meeting with a focus group of Nigerians in Abuja who had participated in  U.S. sponsored exchanges, no one present was familiar with the American  Corner. Other posts we visited have had difficulty finding hosts for  American Corners, as local institutions fear becoming terrorist targets.
Information Resource Centers, small reference libraries for limited  audiences created to replace some of the functions of American Centers’  open libraries, most of which have closed, are another attempt to balance  security and access. State’s Bureau of International Information Programs  operates more than 170 such centers worldwide. Because they are located  within the embassy compound, however, public access to these facilities is  often limited. For example, in Abuja, the center is open only to students  and other specific demographic groups, and access is granted by  appointment only; officials in Islamabad reported similar restrictions. The  head of the center in Abuja said that accessibility was one of his primary  challenges.
State has also made departmentwide efforts to expand public outreach  beyond external facilities, and individual posts are devising creative  solutions to this challenge. In Nigeria, several embassy staff, including the  Ambassador, often travel together to cities lacking a permanent American  presence; according to embassy officials, these “embassy on the road”  tours typically last 3 or 4 days and can involve dozens of individuals.  Additionally, in Pakistan we observed an embassy-funded American  Discovery Center, a small kiosk providing information on America, placed  in a local school. There are over 180 such kiosks in schools across  Pakistan, although one embassy official remarked that as many as half of  these schools have restricted access to the kiosk for a variety of reasons.
Addressing concerns over the United States’ decreased outreach  capabilities, Secretary Rice recently announced plans to deploy more  diplomats in areas with a limited U.S. presence by increasing the number of  American Presence Posts. There are currently 8 such posts, which are  staffed by one Foreign Service officer and are intended to extend the U.S.  diplomatic presence beyond foreign capitals and reach out to “emerging  communities of change.” We visited one such post in Alexandria, Egypt,  which contained a publicly accessible reading room, offered free computer  access, and hosted frequent cultural events. One advantage of the  American Presence Posts over American Corners, according to the  principal officer in Alexandria, was that the post was able to maintain  control over the facility.
Another means of reaching large audiences in high-threat posts while  minimizing security concerns is through international broadcasting.   However, in a 2003 survey conducted by GAO, almost 30 percent of public  diplomacy officers in the field said that transmission strength was  ineffective in helping to achieve public diplomacy goals in their country.  Officials we spoke with in Pakistan and Egypt said this challenge still  exists, suggesting that poor signal strength for U.S. broadcasts in their host  countries limits the impact of broadcasting. The administration’s fiscal year  2007 budget request includes a request to increase U.S. broadcasting to  countries in the Muslim world while reducing broadcasts elsewhere,  particularly in Europe and Eurasia.
section_title: Staffing Challenges at Posts in the Muslim World: Tour Length, Time, and Language Capability
paragraphs: Insufficient numbers of public diplomacy staff and staff time hinder  outreach efforts at posts in the Muslim world. Additionally, tours of duty  tend to be shorter in the Muslim world than elsewhere, which negatively  impacts continuity at a post, as well as the ability to cultivate personal  relationships. Further, we found that public diplomacy officers at many  posts cannot communicate effectively with local populations in local  languages, hampering overall U.S. public diplomacy efforts. To address  these challenges, State has taken several steps, both at the department and  post level, highlighted by the Secretary’s transformational diplomacy  initiative, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this initiative.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Staffing and Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Efforts
paragraphs: While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an  increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy  officials told us that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the  capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State data, the  department had established 834 public diplomacy positions overseas in  2005, but 124, or roughly 15 percent, were vacant. Compounding this  challenge is the loss of public diplomacy officers to temporary duty in Iraq,  which, according to one State official, has drawn down field officers even  further. Staffing shortages may also limit the amount of training public  diplomacy officers receive. According to the U.S. Advisory Commission on  Public Diplomacy, “the need to fill a post quickly often prevents public  diplomacy officers from receiving their full training.”
In addition, public diplomacy officers at post are burdened with  administrative tasks and thus have less time to conduct public diplomacy  outreach activities than previously. One senior State official said that  administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and internal reporting,  compete with officers’ public diplomacy responsibilities. Another official in  Egypt told us that there was rarely enough time to strategize, plan, or  evaluate her programs. In addition, State officials in Washington  acknowledged that additional requirements for posts to improve strategic  planning and evaluation of their public diplomacy programs would need to  be accompanied by additional staff with relevant expertise.
section_title: Short Tours of Duty in the Muslim World
paragraphs: Staffing challenges in public affairs sections at posts in the Muslim world  are exacerbated by shorter tours of duty and fewer officers bidding on  public diplomacy positions than in the non-Muslim world. According to  data provided by State, the average tour length at posts in the Muslim world  is 2.1 years, compared with 2.7 years in the non-Muslim world. Figure 7  shows the average tour length by region. Furthermore, as a result of the  security concerns mentioned above, tours at many posts in the Muslim  world are for only 1 year, without family members. Of State’s 20 so-called  unaccompanied posts, 15 are in the Muslim world.
Shorter tours contribute to insufficient language skills and limit officers’  ability to cultivate personal relationships, which, according to a senior  public diplomacy officer, are vital to understanding Arabs and Muslims.  Another senior State official, noting the prevalence of one-year tours in the  Muslim world, told us that Public Affairs officers who have shorter tours  tend to produce less effective work than officers with longer tours. In  Pakistan, we were told that the Public Affairs officer views himself as a  “management consultant,” in part because of his short tour in Islamabad.  Furthermore, the department’s Inspector General observed that the rapid  turnover of American officers in Pakistan was a major constraint to public  diplomacy activities in the country.
In addition, public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world have received  fewer bids than public diplomacy positions elsewhere. An analysis of data  from State’s summer 2005 posting cycle shows that public diplomacy  positions in the Muslim world received fewer than half the average number  of bids of non-Muslim posts—averaging 3.7 bids per position at posts in the  Muslim world, compared with 8.9 bids per position elsewhere. As a result  of the lower number of bids for public diplomacy positions in the Muslim  world, it has been harder to fill these positions.
section_title: Language Deficiencies Pronounced in the Muslim World
paragraphs: Many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world do not meet the  language requirements established for their positions by State. According  to data provided by State, in countries with significant Muslim populations,  30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions are filled by  officers without the requisite proficiency in those languages, compared  with 24 percent elsewhere. In Arabic language posts, about 36 percent of  language-designated public diplomacy positions are filled by staff unable to  speak Arabic at the designated level. In addition, State officials told us that  there are even fewer officers who are willing or able to speak on television  or engage in public debate in Arabic. The Information Officer in Cairo  stated that his office does not have enough Arabic speakers to engage the  Egyptian media effectively. Figure 8 shows the percentage of public  diplomacy positions in the Muslim world staffed by officers meeting  language requirements.
As a result, many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world cannot  communicate as well with local audiences as their position requires.  According to the Djerejian report, “The ability to speak, write, and read a  foreign language is one of the recognized prerequisites of effective  communications. Foreign Service officers who are fluent in Arabic  immediately convey a sense of respect for and interest in the people to  whom they speak, and fluency prevents the distortion of translation.”   State’s Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs has said  that communicating in other languages is a public diplomacy challenge and  that encouraging Americans to speak foreign languages is a priority for  public diplomacy.
section_title: State Has Taken Several Steps to Address These Human Capital Challenges
paragraphs: State has recently made several efforts to address its human capital  challenges; in particular, following the Secretary of State’s comment that  public diplomacy is the job of the entire embassy, officials in Washington  have encouraged posts to expand their embassy employee speaker  programs. By increasing the number of American officers speaking to  foreign audiences, posts have attempted to compensate for the loss of  public diplomacy staff and the diminished amount of time public diplomacy  officers have available for outreach. We observed these efforts in Abuja,  Islamabad, and Peshawar, where the embassies have developed mission  speaker bureaus, which are lists of embassy staff willing to speak to local  audiences on a variety of topics related to America. In Egypt, however, the  department’s Inspector General noted that non-public diplomacy officers  rarely engage in public outreach, missing a valuable opportunity to further  increase understanding of U.S. policies, culture, and values.
The Secretary of State also recently proposed changes in staff incentives as  part of her call for transformational diplomacy. New requirements for  career advancement would include service in at least one hardship post,  fluency in two or more languages, and expertise in two or more regions. In  addition, the Secretary has announced plans to reposition staff in all career  tracks, starting in summer 2006, from posts in Europe and Washington,  D.C., to India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. It  is too early to evaluate the impact of these efforts.
Recognizing a persistent national foreign language deficit, in January 2006  President Bush announced plans for a National Security Language Initiative  to further strengthen national security by developing foreign language  skills. The President’s original request for this initiative was $114 million  in fiscal year 2007, split between State, DOD, the Department of Education,  and the Director of National Intelligence—State’s share of this funding is  about $27 million, according to department officials. State’s efforts will  focus on critical languages spoken in the Muslim world, such as Arabic,  Farsi, Turkish, and Urdu, among others. Under this initiative, State will  provide opportunities for U.S. high school students, undergraduates, and  graduate students to study these and other languages abroad and will  strengthen foreign language teaching in the United States through  exchanges and professional development. State has also established a  facility in Tunis for advanced Arabic language instruction, including  courses to train staff to appear on Arabic-language television and radio.
section_title: State Lacks Systematic Means for Communicating Best Practices
paragraphs: While individual posts have devised innovative approaches to overcome  the challenges their public diplomacy programs face, State generally lacks  a systematic, comprehensive means of communicating these practices and  transferring knowledge and experience across posts. For example, in  Nigeria, we noted the embassy practice of taking a team, headed by the  Ambassador, on coordinated outreach efforts to key cities in the country  where the United States currently lacks a diplomatic presence. The Deputy  Chief of Mission noted frustration with the post’s inability to share this and  other practices with posts that might benefit from lessons learned in  Nigeria.
Existing means of sharing best practices among public diplomacy officers  tend to be regional in scope, ad hoc in nature, or underutilized in practice.  These mechanisms include annual Public Affairs officer conferences in  each region, anecdotal submissions in State’s RESULTS database, and  weekly newsletters issued by regional public diplomacy offices. While  some officers stated that the regional Public Affairs officer conferences  were helpful for sharing these practices, one official noted that no formal  reports were generated at these conferences and that there has only been  one global conference. The department maintains a database of public  diplomacy program results, which is based on anecdotes submitted by  officers in the field following speaker, exchange, or other public diplomacy  programs. While it is a potential tool for retaining institutional memory at  State, some State officials said that anecdotes were not systematically  entered into the database. Others suggested that this database be modified  to enable officers to flag best practices to make them easier to locate in the  future. In March 2006, State officials told us that the Under Secretary’s  office was working on a Web-based system for officers in the field and in  Washington, D.C., to share ideas and expected this system to be operational  within the next month.
A strengthened, institutionalized system for sharing best practices could  improve the retention of institutional memory at State. However, given the  constraints on public diplomacy officers’ time, any means of sharing best  practices should not create an additional reporting burden on officers in  the field. Furthermore, whichever method State chooses to communicate  best practices, it should ensure that the practices are not self-submitted but  rather reviewed by a third party for appropriateness.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In recent years, State has shifted public diplomacy resources to the Muslim  world, but three of its new initiatives specifically designed to reach Muslim  audiences have been short-lived. Lacking specifically targeted programs,  posts in Muslim-majority countries continue to use the same information  and exchange programs available to posts throughout the world. GAO and  others have suggested the adoption of private sector best practices as a  means to improve the department’s communication efforts in Washington  and at the post level. These practices call for the use of central messages or  themes, target audience segmentation and analysis, in-depth audience  research and evaluation, and the preparation of detailed communication  plans to pull these various elements together. Communication efforts at the  posts we visited generally lacked these strategic elements. State has taken  several steps to address this problem, including the development of a  strategic framework with goals and tactics, the creation of a  transformational diplomacy initiative to implement some of these best  practices, and the issuance of updated guidance to improve fiscal year 2008  mission performance plans. These are all positive steps. However,  Washington still lacks written guidance to implement the strategic  framework developed by the current Under Secretary. In addition, posts  have not prepared in-depth analyses or detailed communication plans to  support their strategic communication decisions. Compounding this lack of  strategic planning and evaluation are challenges related to staffing and  security at posts in the Muslim world. State currently lacks a systematic  mechanism for sharing best practices, which could help address some of  these challenges.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the delivery of public diplomacy messages to Muslim audiences  around the world, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the  Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to take  the following two actions:  To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. outreach efforts,  develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to  implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim world  and incorporates the strategic communication best practices discussed  in this report. This guidance should be developed in consultation with  the White House, affected government agencies, and outside experts  who have a practical knowledge of what is needed to translate private  sector best practices into practical steps which can be taken in the field.  To accompany this guidance, we recommend that State develop a  sample country-level communication plan that posts can tailor to local  conditions.
To meet the challenges facing public diplomacy officers in the field,  including the need to balance security with outreach and short tours of  duty at certain posts, strengthen existing systems of sharing best  practices in order to more systematically transfer knowledge among  embassies around the world.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The State Department provided written comments on a draft of this report  (see app. V). State concurred with the report’s findings and conclusions.  State also indicated that it has begun to address the recommendations  contained in this report. State said it is developing an integrated strategic  plan that includes elements of private sector best practices. State also said  it is developing a sample country-level communication plan and  constructing a Web-based system for conveying best practices. State did  not indicate when the strategic plan or sample country-level  communication plans will be completed. We modified our findings  regarding State’s exchange programs, noting their continued focus on  younger audiences. In addition, State provided technical comments, which  have been incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of  Congress and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to  others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or  fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations  and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine what public diplomacy resources and programs the State  Department (State) has directed to the Muslim world, we reviewed State  budget requests, annual performance and accountability reports, and other  documents. We also interviewed officials from State’s Office of the Under  Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; the Office of Policy,  Planning, and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs,  International Information Programs, and Public Affairs; the Bureau of  Resource Management; and regional bureaus. We also observed training  classes for new public diplomacy officers at State’s Foreign Service  Institute. We obtained and analyzed documents on public diplomacy  budgets and program descriptions from these offices and bureaus. To  assess the reliability of State’s data, we reviewed documentation related to  the data sources and discussed the data with knowledgeable State officials.  We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. We also compared data on the populations of countries in the  Muslim world from the United Nations, World Bank, and CIA World  Factbook, and found them sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
We based our definition of the Muslim world on State’s Bureau of  Educational and Cultural Affairs’ list of 58 countries and territories with  significant Muslim populations. These countries are spread across the  Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and have a combined population of  more than 1.5 billion people. Appendix II lists these countries.
To assess whether posts adopted a strategic approach to implementing  public diplomacy, we reviewed Washington-produced mission performance  planning guidance prepared by the Office of Policy, Planning, and  Resources (located within the Office of the Under Secretary for Public  Diplomacy and Public Affairs), the results of a fiscal year 2005 review of  mission performance plans conducted by the Bureau of Resource  Management, public opinion polling results prepared by the Bureau of  Intelligence and Research, and related strategic planning and evaluation  documents prepared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and  the Bureau of International Information Programs. In Egypt, Nigeria, and  Pakistan, we reviewed fiscal year 2005 mission performance plans and  related strategic planning and evaluation documentation, and, to discuss  the scope and adequacy of each post’s strategic planning and evaluation  efforts, also met with a wide range of embassy officials including the  Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission, public affairs section staff,  political and economic officers, regional affairs officers, and U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID) and Department of Defense (DOD)  officials. To discuss a range of strategic planning, research, and evaluation  issues in Washington, we met with representatives from the Office of  Policy, Planning, and Resources; the Bureau of Resource Management; the  Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Bureau of Educational and  Cultural Affairs; and the Bureau of International Information Programs. We  also discussed private sector communication best practices with a  representative from Business for Diplomatic Action.
To identify the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the  Muslim world and what State has done to address these challenges, we  reviewed recent studies and reports on public diplomacy. In addition:  We met with officials from State’s Office of the Under Secretary for  Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and the Office of Policy, Planning,  and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs,  International Information Programs, and Public Affairs; and regional  bureaus in Washington, D.C.
We met with U.S. embassy officers and foreign government, academic,  and nongovernmental organization representatives in Nigeria, Pakistan,  and Egypt to learn about and observe challenges facing public  diplomacy efforts at posts abroad. We also spoke with U.S. embassy  officials in Indonesia and Turkey by telephone. We selected these  countries based on their strategic importance to the United States, their  proportion of the total population of the Muslim world, their geographic  distribution, and their mix of public diplomacy programs.
We analyzed State data on staffing, language requirements, bids for  public diplomacy positions, and threat ratings from 2005. To assess the  reliability of these data, we surveyed agency officials responsible for  collecting and analyzing these data. We determined the data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
In September 2005, we convened a roundtable of Muslim experts in  Washington, D.C., to discuss program challenges and potential  solutions. Participants included experts in public opinion and public  affairs, foreign journalists, and representatives from think tanks and  academia.
We did not review covert strategic communications efforts managed by  DOD or the intelligence community. We limited our review of USAID to the  agency’s efforts to communicate its assistance efforts and did not review  the assistance efforts themselves.  We limited our review of DOD to its  support of State’s public diplomacy activities. We did not review State-led  reform initiatives such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative but focused  instead on public diplomacy activities designed to communicate  information about the United States to target overseas audiences. For the  BBG, we collected funding and program information but did not seek to  evaluate the effectiveness of Radio Sawa and the Alhurra satellite  network—the BBG’s two primary initiatives aimed at Arab audiences. We  are reviewing these broadcast initiatives separately.
We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim Populations
paragraphs: 60 (Continued From Previous Page)
section_title: Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions and Selected Programs
subsections: section_title: Positions
paragraphs: Public Affairs Officer (PAO): The PAO is the senior public diplomacy  adviser in the embassy. He/she coordinates all aspects of mission public  affairs ensuring that public diplomacy resources are deployed in support of  mission goals. The PAO also supervises the public affairs section including  the work of the information/press section and the cultural section.
Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO): The CAO manages the embassy’s  educational and professional exchange programs, including the Fulbright  program. He/she also carries out cultural programs that highlight American  society and achievements and administers the speaker program that brings  U.S. experts to address targeted audiences in the host country.
Information Officer (IO): The IO is the embassy spokesperson and  primary point of contact for information about the United States and  mission affairs. The IO advises senior management on media relations and  public affairs strategies and manages the distribution of information to  members of the target audience.
Information Resource Officer (IRO):  Generally librarians by training,  IROs are responsible for embassies’ Information Resource Centers (IRC)  and American Corners. They are also responsible for supporting IRC  programs and training local IRC staff. There are approximately 20 IROs at  missions around the world.
Regional English Language Officer (RELO):  Worldwide, State has 17  experienced TEFL/TESL professionals, known as RELOs. RELOs help  embassies design strategies to support English teaching and work with  various partners to organize in teacher training seminars and workshops  and offer general guidance.
section_title: Programs
paragraphs: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Programs  Fulbright Program: Flagship U.S. government exchange program for  graduate students, professors, researchers, professionals, and  secondary level teachers to teach, study, and conduct research.  Americans are hosted by schools or universities around the world, and  foreign participants by U.S. secondary schools, colleges, or universities.
International Visitors (IV): 3-week visits to the United States by rising  leaders in diverse fields. IVs travel in groups or as individuals and  experience American cultural life and society along with professional  interchange with U.S. counterparts.
Voluntary Visitors (VV): Programs for foreign nationals already  traveling to the United States, including professional appointments and  domestic travel support. VVs can partly be funded by an embassy.
Office of Citizen Exchanges professional and institutional exchange  programs: Exchanges designed to link private sector American  expertise and resources with priority institutions to engage youth  influencers and promote civil society, democracy, youth leadership, and  volunteerism, among other topics.
Humphrey Program: Midlevel professionals from developing countries  come to the United States for a year of academic study and professional  experience.
English Language Teaching: Targeted English language programs in  specific regions and countries of the world, coordinated with the  embassy. Programs include the English ACCESS Microscholarship  program, English Language Fellow program, English Language  Specialist program, and E-Teacher program.
Rhythm Road:  Professional jazz and urban music groups who tour  countries with limited exposure to American culture, playing concerts  and talking about their music and American society.
Feature Film Service: Films provided to posts by the Motion Picture  Association of America and other organizations for festivals, screenings  by Ambassadors, and other programmatic usage by post public affairs  sections.
Cultural Ambassadors: Utilizes world-renowned American cultural  figures to reach out to young people around the globe.
Cultural Envoys and Cultural Visitors: Cultural Envoys aims to utilize  the talents of average Americans to engage with young people abroad.  Cultural Visitors is designed to bring young “idea” leaders in the arts and  humanities to the United States for internships.
Arts Exchanges in International Issues: An annual grants competition  designed to identify American partner organizations to conduct  exchange programs in priority countries, utilizing cultural and artistic  media and programs to address priority U.S. foreign policy goals.
Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation: Assists less developed  countries in preserving their cultural heritage and demonstrates U.S.  respect for other cultures.
International Partnership Among Museums: An institutional linkage  program carried out with the American Association of Museums,  selecting American museums to partner with a museum abroad to  develop a collaborative program built around a theme.
International Cultural Property Protection: Carries out the Convention  on Cultural Property Implementation Act, which protects cultural  patrimony of signatory nations.
National Security Language Initiative: Program activity will include  in-country language training for U.S. Fulbright students in Arabic,  Turkish, and Indic languages; summer intensive language programs  abroad for undergraduate beginning students and  intermediate/advanced training for undergraduate and graduate  students; expansion of the Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching  Assistant Program to bring 300 native speakers of critical languages to  teach in U.S. universities and schools; and a new component to the  teacher exchange program to assist U.S. teachers of critical need  languages to study abroad.
Study of the U.S.: Promotes better understanding of the United States  through Summer Institutes for foreign university faculty, reference  collections, and the Currents in American Scholarship series.
EducationUSA: Promotes higher education abroad by supporting  overseas advising centers and collaborating with U.S. educational  organizations to strengthen international exchange.
Bureau of International Information Programs  U.S. Speakers: American subject-matter experts travel to a host country  to address selected audiences on a range of policy issues and various  aspects of American society.
American Corners: Public diplomacy outposts in host-country  organizations, such as libraries and universities, that provide access to  information about the United States through book collections, the  Internet, and local programming to the general public.
Information Resource Centers: Computer-based knowledge platforms  at embassies and consulates that provide information about U.S.  policies and American society to targeted sectors of the host-country  population.
Digital video conferences: Two-way video/phone dialogues between  U.S. subject-matter experts and their counterparts in a host country.
USINFO:  Authoritative, up-to-date Web site providing information on  U.S. policy and American issues directed at foreign readers. Available in  English and six world languages.
Washington File: Daily compilations of news articles and official texts  intended for foreign audiences. Available on the USINFO Web site.
Electronic Journals: Web-based monthly publications focused on  themes supporting mission performance plan goals. Available in several  languages, Electronic Journals can be downloaded and printed for local  distribution.
Infocentral: On-line resource for U.S. government spokespersons and  embassy officers who need information on policy issues, access to press  clips, and cleared guidance.
Mission Web sites: Each embassy maintains its own Web site with links  to the State Department and other sources of information about the  United States and U.S. policy.
Issue Briefs: Background information on policy topics, available at the  Infocentral Web site, intended for use only by U.S. officials who need to  articulate and explain policy positions.
Paper Shows: Exhibitions of 35-40 panels featuring photographic and  documentary images and text on significant American personalities,  issues, and events. Paper shows are produced in several languages and  displayed in museums, libraries, theaters, and other public places  worldwide.
Bureau of Public Affairs Programs  Foreign Press Centers: Support centers for foreign journalists in  Washington, D.C.,  New York, and Los Angeles providing facilitative  assistance, interviews with U.S. officials, and information resources.
Office of Broadcast Services: Provides television and radio to overseas  posts, runs American Embassy Television Network, and assists foreign  TV crews making film documentaries in the United States on subjects of  interest to the U.S. government.
Media reaction: Summary compilations of foreign editorial and op-ed  reactions to issues of interest to the United States, available daily on the  Web.
section_title: Private Sector Best Practices
paragraphs: GAO and other groups have called for a transformation in how U.S. public  diplomacy efforts are conducted. One key element of this proposed  transformation is the perceived need to adopt and adapt strategic  communication best practices from the private sector.
GAO suggested in its September 2003 report on State public diplomacy  efforts that the department examine private sector public relations efforts  and political campaigns’ use of sophisticated strategies to integrate  complex communication efforts involving multiple players. GAO’s  roundtable with public relations firms from the private sector revealed that  the key strategic components of such efforts include establishing the scope  and nature of the problem, identifying the target audience, determining the  core message, and defining both success and failure. The panel emphasized  the importance of synchronizing these activities in a systematic way, so  that communication efforts are mutually reinforcing in advancing the  campaign’s overall objectives. They noted that without a carefully  integrated plan, the various elements are at risk of canceling each other out  and possibly damaging the overall campaign. Figure 9 illustrates the steps  in the process.
subsections: section_title: Business for Diplomatic Action
paragraphs: Testimony by the President of Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA)  provides a suggested strategic road map for the government to follow,  building on private sector best practices.  BDA suggests that U.S. public  diplomacy efforts be redesigned following a five step plan: (1) listen, ask  questions, and analyze; (2) participate in foundation building process for a  comprehensive communication strategy; (3) introduce a “positioning  concept” for the United States in a post-9/11 world; (4) develop a  comprehensive communication plan; and (5) put someone in charge.   Under step one, BDA notes that “there are knowledge gaps with regard to  issues of anti-American sentiment and public diplomacy programming.”   Under step two, BDA suggests that a task force of public and private sector  parties explore the significance and implications of the research data  collected under step one. Under step three, a “positioning concept” for the  United States would be developed, capturing a point of view, a promise,  and a personality. Step four requires the development of a comprehensive  communication plan which can take the form of a multiaudience grid  listing existing attitudes, desired attitudes, barriers standing between  existing and desired attitudes, and the best means to address and remove  these barriers. BDA notes that answers to these questions will vary by  target audience (e.g., Muslim parents, Muslim youth, Chinese business  leaders, etc.), but all must be translations of the “positioning concept”  agreed to in step three. Finally, someone must be in put in charge to ensure  that all activities, behaviors, and messages are aligned to the new  positioning concept.
section_title: Defense Science Board
paragraphs: In its September 2004 report on strategic communications, the Defense  Science Board makes a case that borrowing and adapting private sector  communication practices is a critical step toward revitalizing U.S. public  diplomacy efforts.  The report notes that the United States approaches  modern warfare with cutting-edge strategies, tactics, and weapons,  designed to be effective against modern foes, and constantly updated. By  contrast, the report argues, U.S. current strategic communication planning  and execution is mired in diplomatic and marketing tactics of yesteryear.  The United States has no clearly defined strategic framework, themes, or  messages.  The report goes on to note that building an effective strategic  communication culture that borrows the most effective private sector  marketing and political campaign techniques will be at the core of  rebuilding and reinventing the way the United States listens, engages, and  communicates with the world.
The report notes that achieving this goal will involve the following three  key steps:  As in a successful political campaign, the United States must clearly  define what success means in terms of its benefits for all target  audiences. All constituents must understand what success means for  them in personal terms. A carefully defined set of themes and messages  must reinforce targeted audiences’ perceived and personal benefits.
The United States must communicate what its vision for the future  promises on individual terms, not national or pan-national religious  terms. The United States should personalize the benefits of its defined  future, for example, personal control, choice and change, personal  mobility, meritocracy, and individual rights (in particular, women’s  rights).
As with most effective private sector and political marketing campaigns,  the United States must understand what target populations must be  reached and influenced to achieve success. And the United States must  understand what it takes to move them. More importantly, it must target  audiences that can be moved—pragmatically and strategically picking  its target audiences.
section_title: Comments from the State Department
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Diana Glod, Assistant Director;  Michael ten Kate; Robert Ball; Mehrunisa Qayyum; Richard Bakewell; and  Joe Carney made significant contributions to this report. Martin de Alteriis,  Elaine Vaurio, and Ernie Jackson provided technical assistance.