Southwest Border: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness of Land-based Surveillance Technology
Published: 2017-07-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: CBP deploys land-based surveillance technologies to help monitor and secure the border and apprehend individuals who attempt to cross the border illegally. GAO has reported on the progress and challenges DHS and its components have faced implementing its border security efforts.
This statement addresses (1) the status of CBP efforts to deploy land-based surveillance technologies along the southwest border and (2) CBP's efforts to measure the effectiveness of these technologies.
This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies from 2011 through 2016, selected updates conducted in 2017, and ongoing work for this subcommittee related to border surveillance technology. For ongoing work and updates, GAO analyzed technology program documents; interviewed DHS, CBP, and U.S. Border Patrol officials; and conducted site visits to Arizona and Texas to observe technologies.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made progress deploying surveillance technology along the southwest U.S. border under its 2011 Arizona Technology Plan (ATP) and 2014 Southwest Border Technology Plan. The ATP called for deployment of a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras in Arizona, and the 2014 Plan incorporates the ATP and includes deployments to the rest of the southwest border, beginning with areas in Texas and California. As of July 2017, CBP completed deployment of select technologies to areas in Arizona, Texas, and California. For example, CBP deployed all planned Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) systems, and 15 of 53 Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems to Arizona. CBP also deployed all planned MSC systems to Texas and California and completed contract negotiations to deploy RVSS to Texas.
CBP has made progress implementing some, but not all of GAO's recommendations related to managing deployments of its technology programs. In 2014, GAO assessed CBP's implementation of the ATP and recommended that CBP: (1) apply scheduling best practices; (2) develop an integrated schedule; and (3) verify cost estimates for the technology programs. DHS concurred with some, but not all of the recommendations and has taken actions to address some of them, such as applying best practices when updating schedules, but has not taken action to address others, such as developing an integrated master schedule and verifying cost estimates with independent estimates for the IFT program. GAO continues to believe that applying schedule and cost estimating best practices could better position CBP to strengthen its management efforts of these programs.
CBP has also made progress toward assessing performance of surveillance technologies. GAO reported in 2014 that CBP identified some mission benefits, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety, but had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended (and CBP concurred) in 2011. GAO has ongoing work examining DHS's technology deployments and efforts to assess technology performance, which GAO plans to report on later this year.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made recommendations to DHS to improve its management of plans and programs for surveillance technologies. DHS has generally agreed. DHS has taken actions or described planned actions to address some of these recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations could strengthen CBP's management efforts and will continue to monitor CBP's efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) efforts to acquire and deploy land-based surveillance  technology and the extent that DHS measures the effectiveness of these  deployed technologies to secure U.S. borders. The southwest border  continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, and DHS  reported apprehending about 409,000 illegal entrants and making about  14,000 seizures of drugs along the southwest border in fiscal year 2016.  Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) U.S. Border  Patrol (Border Patrol) is the federal agency with primary responsibility for  securing the national borders between U.S. ports of entry. CBP has  divided geographic responsibility for the southwest border among nine  Border Patrol sectors.
DHS has deployed a variety of land-based surveillance technologies,  which Border Patrol uses to assist its efforts to secure the border and to  apprehend individuals attempting to cross the border illegally. In  November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), which  was responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection  system using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network  (SBInet). Under the SBInet program, CBP acquired 15 fixed-tower  systems at a cost of nearly $1 billion, which are deployed along 53 miles  of Arizona’s 387-mile border with Mexico. In January 2011, in response to  internal and external assessments that identified concerns regarding the  performance, cost, and schedule for implementing the systems, the  Secretary of Homeland Security announced the cancellation of further  procurements of SBInet surveillance systems, though CBP continued  operating the existing SBInet systems. That same month, CBP introduced  the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (ATP). The ATP  includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide security  for the Arizona border. In June 2014, CBP developed a separate plan that  incorporates the ATP, and includes the rest of the southwest border—the  Southwest Border Technology Plan. Under the Southwest Border  Technology Plan, CBP has plans to extend land-based surveillance  technology deployments to the remainder of the southwest border,  beginning with selected areas in Texas and California.
Over the years, we have reported on the progress DHS has made and  challenges it faces in implementing its border security efforts. My  statement discusses (1) the status of CBP efforts to deploy land-based  surveillance technology and (2) CBP’s efforts to measure the  effectiveness of these technologies.
This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from 2011  through 2016 that examined DHS efforts to secure the U.S. border. It  also includes selected updates on DHS’s efforts to address our previous  recommendations related to the ATP and our ongoing work for this  subcommittee on border surveillance technologies. Our reports and  testimonies incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from  officials from various DHS components. More detailed information about  our scopes and methodologies, including which DHS components we  interviewed for the work, can be found in our published reports and  testimonies.
For the updates on our ATP work and our ongoing work, we reviewed  documents from DHS on actions it has taken to address findings and  recommendations made in the prior reports on which this statement is  based. For updates on the status of selected land-based surveillance  technology programs, we reviewed CBP and DHS documents and  examined cost and schedule data for each technology program. We also  interviewed program managers responsible for the overall activities of  these programs, including actions to design, acquire, deploy, and test the  technology systems, and manage government and contractor efforts. As  part of our ongoing work related to the deployment of land-based  technology along the southwest border, we conducted site visits to  Arizona in November 2016 and April 2017 and to south Texas in March  2017. During these site visits, we observed border surveillance operations  and interviewed CBP officials who operate and utilize these technologies.
All of our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Made Progress Deploying Surveillance Technology along the Southwest Border, but Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Management of Its Programs
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Made Progress toward Completing Milestones for Technology Deployment
paragraphs: Since 2014, we have reported multiple times on the progress CBP has  made deploying technologies under the ATP. We reported in May 2016  that CBP had initiated or completed deployment of technology to Arizona  for six programs under the ATP. In addition to deploying technologies  under the ATP, CBP’s 2014 Southwest Border Technology Plan extended  technology deployments to the remainder of the southwest border,  beginning with selected areas in Texas and California. As of July 2017,  CBP completed deployment of select technologies to sectors in Arizona,  Texas, and California. For example, in our April 2017 assessment of  DHS’s major acquisitions programs, we reported that CBP completed  deployments of 7 Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems to the Nogales  Border Patrol station within the Tucson sector in Arizona, and was  working to deploy the remaining 46 towers to other sectors in Arizona.  As of July 2017, CBP reported deploying an additional 8 IFT systems, for  a total of 15 of 53 planned towers. CBP has also made changes to the  IFT program. Specifically, rather than expanding IFT capabilities to the  Wellton Border Patrol station within the Yuma sector in Arizona as  originally planned, CBP now plans to replace 15 existing SBInet fixed- tower systems with IFT systems. CBP also reported that it had  completed Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) and Mobile  Surveillance Capability (MSC) deployments to Arizona as planned under  the ATP, and deployed 32 MSC systems to Texas and California.  Additionally, CBP completed contract negotiations with the RVSS  program for follow-on contract option periods to deploy RVSS to two  stations in the Rio Grande Valley sector in Texas. The deployment status  of the IFT, RVSS, and MSC technologies is shown below in table 1. We  will plan to report on the deployment status of southwest border  surveillance technology, among other topics, in a forthcoming report.
section_title: CBP Has Made Progress in Implementing GAO’s Prior Recommendations, but Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Management of Its Programs
paragraphs: In March 2014, we assessed CBP’s efforts to develop and implement the  ATP. Specifically, we recommended that CBP, among other things, (1)  apply scheduling best practices; (2) develop an integrated schedule; and  (3) verify life-cycle cost estimates. DHS concurred with some of our  recommendations and has taken actions to address some of them, which  we discuss below.
Program Schedules. In March 2014, we found that CBP had a schedule  for deployment for each of the ATP’s seven programs, and that four of the  programs would not meet their originally planned completion dates.  Specifically, we found that the three highest-cost programs (IFT, RVSS,  and MSC) had experienced delays relative to their baseline schedules, as  of March 2013. We also reported that CBP had at least partially met the  four characteristics of reliable schedules for the IFT and RVSS schedules  and partially or minimally met the four characteristics for the MSC  schedule. Scheduling best practices are summarized into four  characteristics of reliable schedules—comprehensive, well-constructed,  credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules are periodically updated and  progress is monitored). We assessed CBP’s schedules as of March  2013 for the three highest-cost programs and reported in March 2014 that  schedules for two of the programs at least partially met each  characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion), and the schedule for the other program at least minimally met each characteristic (i.e.,  satisfied a small portion of the criterion). For example, the schedule for  the IFT program partially met the characteristic of being credible in that  CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk  analysis did not include the risks most likely to delay the program or how  much contingency reserve was needed. For the MSC program, the  schedule minimally met the characteristic of being controlled in that it did  not have valid baseline dates for activities or milestones by which CBP  could track progress. We recommended that CBP ensure that scheduling  best practices are applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC program  schedules. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that CBP  planned to ensure that scheduling best practices would be applied, as  outlined in our schedule assessment guide, when updating the three  programs’ schedules.
In response to our March 2014 recommendation regarding applying  scheduling best practices, CBP provided us with updated program  schedules for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs. Based on our  assessment of updated program schedules for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC  that CBP had completed as of January 2017, CBP has made significant  improvements in the quality of the programs’ schedules, but the  programs’ schedules had not met all characteristics of a reliable  schedule. For example, CBP has improved the quality of its products for  analyzing and quantifying risk to the programs’ schedules; however, CBP  could improve the documentation of these analyses and the prioritization  of the programs’ risks. While CBP has taken positive steps, we continue  to believe that by ensuring that all scheduling best practices are applied,  CBP could help ensure the reliability of its programs’ schedules and  better position itself to identify and address any potential delays in its  programs’ commitment dates.
Integrated Master Schedule. In March 2014, we also found that CBP  had not developed an Integrated Master Schedule for the ATP in  accordance with best practices. Rather, CBP had used separate  schedules for each program to manage implementation of the ATP, as  CBP officials stated that the ATP contained individual acquisition  programs rather than integrated programs. However, collectively these  programs are intended to provide CBP with a combination of surveillance  capabilities to be used along the Arizona border with Mexico, and  resources are shared among the programs. We recommended in March  2014 that CBP develop an Integrated Master Schedule for the ATP.  CBP  did not concur with this recommendation and maintained that an  Integrated Master Schedule for the ATP in one file undermines the DHS- approved implementation strategy for the individual programs making up  the ATP, and that the implementation of this recommendation would  essentially create a large, aggregated program, and effectively create an  aggregated “system of systems.” DHS further stated at the time that a key  element of its plan has been the disaggregation of technology  procurements. As we reported in March 2014, this recommendation was  not intended to imply that DHS needed to re-aggregate the ATP’s seven  programs into a “system of systems” or change its procurement strategy  in any form. The intent of the recommendation was for DHS to insert the  individual schedules for each of the ATP’s programs into a single  electronic Integrated Master Schedule file in order to identify any resource  allocation issues among the programs’ schedules. We continue to believe  that developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for  planned technologies could allow CBP insight into current or programmed  allocation of resources for all programs as opposed to attempting to  resolve any resource constraints for each program individually.
Life-cycle Cost Estimates. In March 2014, we also reported that the life- cycle cost estimates for the technology programs under the ATP reflected  some, but not all, best practices. Cost-estimating best practices are  summarized into four characteristics—well documented, comprehensive,  accurate, and credible. Our analysis of CBP’s estimate for the ATP and  estimates completed at the time of our March 2014 review for the two  highest-cost programs—the IFT and RVSS programs—showed that these  estimates at least partially met three of these characteristics: well  documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms of being credible,  these estimates had not been verified with independent cost estimates in  accordance with best practices. We concluded that verifying life-cycle  cost estimates with independent estimates in accordance with cost- estimating best practices could help better ensure the reliability of the  cost estimates, and we recommended that CBP verify the life-cycle cost  estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost  estimates and reconcile any differences. DHS concurred with this  recommendation, but stated then that it did not believe that there would  be a benefit in expending funds to obtain independent cost estimates and  that if the costs realized to date continued to hold, there may be no  requirement or value added in conducting full program updates with  independent cost estimates.
We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to verify the life-cycle  cost estimates with the benefits to be gained from verification with  independent cost estimates. As part of our updates on CBP’s efforts to  implement our 2014 recommendations, CBP officials told us that in fiscal  year 2016, DHS’s Cost Analysis Division (CAD) would begin piloting  DHS’s independent cost estimate capability on the RVSS program.  According to CBP officials, this pilot is an opportunity to assist DHS in  developing its independent cost estimate capability. CBP selected the  RVSS program for the pilot because the program was at a point in its  planning and execution process where it can benefit most from having an  independent cost estimate performed, as these technologies are being  deployed along the southwest border beyond Arizona. According to CBP  officials, DHS’s Cost Analysis Division completed its independent cost  estimate for the RVSS program in August 2016, and in February 2017  CBP had completed its efforts to verify the RVSS program cost estimate  with CAD’s independent cost estimate, which is part of the CAD pilot.   However, as of July 2017, CBP has not yet provided us with the final  reconciliation of the independent cost estimate and the RVSS program  cost estimate, as we recommended in 2014. CBP officials have not  detailed similar plans for the IFT. We continue to believe that  independently verifying the life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and RVSS  programs and reconciling any differences, consistent with best practices,  could help CBP better ensure the reliability of the estimates.
section_title: CBP Has Made Progress Assessing Performance of Surveillance Technologies, but Has Not Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of Its Technologies
paragraphs: We reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits of its  surveillance technologies to be deployed along the southwest border,  such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. However, the  agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all  surveillance technologies to be deployed, as we recommended in  November 2011. Further, we also reported in March 2014 that CBP did  not capture complete data on the contributions of these technologies,  which in combination with other relevant performance metrics or  indicators, could be used to better determine the impact of CBP’s  surveillance technologies on CBP’s border security efforts and inform  resource allocation decisions. We found that CBP had a field within its  Enforcement Integrated Database for data on whether technological  assets, such as SBInet surveillance systems, and non-technological  assets, such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to the  apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other  contraband; however, according to CBP officials, Border Patrol agents  were not required to record these data. This limited CBP’s ability to  collect, track, and analyze available data on asset assists to help monitor  the contribution of surveillance technologies, including its SBInet system,  to Border Patrol apprehensions and seizures and inform resource  allocation decisions. We recommended that CBP require data on asset  assists to be recorded and tracked within its database, and once these  data were required to be recorded and tracked, that it analyze available  data on apprehensions and technological assists—in combination with  other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate—to  determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border  security efforts. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has  implemented one of them. Specifically, in June 2014, CBP issued  guidance informing Border Patrol agents that the asset assist data field  within its database was now a mandatory data field. Therefore, agents  are required to enter any assisting surveillance technology or other  equipment.
Further, as part of our updates on CBP’s efforts to implement our 2014  recommendations, we found that in May 2015, CBP had identified a set of  potential key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be  deployed under the ATP. However, CBP officials stated at that time that  this set of performance metrics was under review as the agency  continued to refine the key attributes for metrics to assess the  contributions and impacts of surveillance technology on its border security  mission. In our April 2016 update on the progress made by agencies to  address our findings on duplication and cost savings across the federal  government, we reported that CBP had modified its time frame for  developing baselines for each performance measure and that additional  time would be needed to implement and apply key attributes for metrics.  According to CBP officials, CBP expected these performance measure  baselines to be developed by the end of calendar year 2015, at which  time the agency planned to begin using the data to evaluate the individual  and collective contributions of specific technology assets deployed under  the ATP. Moreover, CBP planned to use the baseline data to establish a  tool that explains the qualitative and quantitative impacts of technology  and tactical infrastructure on situational awareness in specific areas of the  border environment by the end of fiscal year 2016. Although CBP had  initially reported it had expected to complete its development of baselines  for each performance measure by the end of calendar year 2015, as of  March 2016, it was adjusting the actual completion date, pending test and  evaluation results for recently deployed technologies to the southwest  border.
In our April 2017 update on the progress made by agencies to address  our findings on duplication and cost savings across the federal  government, we reported that CBP had provided us a case study that  assessed technology assist data, along with other measures such as  field-based assessments of capability gaps, to determine the  contributions of surveillance technologies to its mission. This is a helpful  step in developing and applying performance metrics. However, the case  study was limited to one border location and the analysis was limited to  select technologies. To fully implement our recommendation, CBP should  complete its efforts to fully develop and apply key attributes for  performance metrics for all technologies deployed and begin using the  data to evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific  technologies, fully assess its progress in implementing planned  technologies, and determine when mission benefits have been fully  realized. Until CBP completes this effort it will not be well positioned to  fully assess its progress in implementing the ATP and determining when  mission benefits have been fully realized.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this  testimony are Jeanette Espinola (Assistant Director), Yvette Gutierrez  (Analyst in Charge), Charlotte Gamble, Ashley Davis, Claire Peachey,  Marycella Mierez, and Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: 2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-17-491SP. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017.  2017 Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition  and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing  Progress. GAO-17-346SP. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2017.
Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology, Unmanned Aerial  Systems and Other Assets. GAO-16-671T. Washington, D.C.: May 24,  2016.  2016 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-16-375SP. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2016.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management,  but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure. GAO-16-338SP.  Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.
Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess  Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.:  March 1, 2016.
GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules.  GAO-16-89G. Washington, D.C.: December 2015.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement  and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington,  D.C.: May 13, 2015.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Addressing Gaps in Oversight and  Information is Key to Improving Program Outcomes. GAO-15-541T.  Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal  Actions Needed to Improve Accountability. GAO-15-171SP. Washington,  D.C.: April 22, 2015.  2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-15-404SP. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-411T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed  to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368.  Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and  Assessment Efforts. GAO-13-653T. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013.
Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S.  Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing,  Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan.  GAO-12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.:  November 4, 2011.
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for  Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. GAO-09-3SP.  Washington, D.C.: March 2009.
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