Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to DOD Installation Closure or Growth
Published: 2013-05-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Through BRAC and other growth initiatives, DOD has made significant changes to its force structure, affecting communities around DOD installations. To help transition toward a smaller, more agile force, DOD has requested new BRAC authority. House Report 112-479, accompanying the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to study the practices and strategies that communities have used to cope with installation closure or growth. This report (1) describes the practices and strategies communities have used in dealing with base closures and growth since 2005 and economic and population data in those communities and (2) presents information on communities' needs in adjusting to installation closure and growth. GAO interviewed DOD, service, and installation officials; interviewed and surveyed community representatives; reviewed relevant guidance; and visited select installations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The 21 communities surrounding the 23 Department of Defense (DOD) installations closed in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round have used strategies such as forming a local redevelopment authority and seeking federal grants to deal with the closures. Some economic data for these communities are comparable to national averages, with some variation. For instance, GAO found that 52 percent (11 of 21) of communities had unemployment rates lower than the national average of 8.9 percent, although the rates ranged from a low of 6.1 percent to a high of 16.8 percent. Sixty-two percent (13 of 21) of the closure communities had real per capita income growth rates higher than the national average of 0.14 percent for the period from 2006 through 2011. Since 2005, 23 other installations have experienced population increases that have resulted in net growth of about 191,000 military and civilian personnel (a 36 percent increase), and their corresponding communities have used several strategies to accommodate this growth, including forming a regional working group composed of representatives from affected jurisdictions.
Community representatives stated that DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) provides good support to communities facing base closure, but some representatives from communities surrounding closed Army installations stated that facilities were not maintained at a high enough level for reuse. An Army official told GAO that the Army makes an effort to maintain closed facilities in accordance with their planned usage and that local redevelopment authorities have unrealistic expectations of maintenance levels. DOD guidance states that the services have developed specific maintenance levels for facilities during the transition process. The Air Force and the Navy have published this specific guidance, but the Army has not and instead relies upon DOD's guidance, which does not describe specific levels of maintenance. Without clear guidance on the expected levels of maintenance for closed facilities, the communities may not have a clear understanding of what maintenance the Army will provide.
Community representatives indicated that OEA provides good support to communities facing base growth, but that additional data and a civilian point of contact at the installation could improve their ability to respond to future growth. DOD has issued guidance that states communities should be provided maximum advance information to plan, and service guidance states that services will give communities information including military and personnel changes. However, community representatives told GAO that they would like additional aggregate information on where servicemembers live while stationed at the installation to facilitate planning for the impact of installation growth. Installations currently do not provide communities with this information because they do not have a system to track it, but officials noted that existing systems could potentially be modified to provide it. Installation officials and community representatives also stated that establishing a long-term civilian point of contact at the installation would help the community effectively plan for growth. Accurate and timely information on personnel residence areas and a civilian point of contact at the installation could better facilitate communities' efforts to accommodate installation growth.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation that the Army issue guidance on maintenance levels to be provided during the base closure process. DOD partially concurred that it should establish procedures for sharing additional information with growth communities and designate a civilian point of contact at growth installations. GAO believes action by DOD prior to future installation growth will help forestall future challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over the past several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has made  significant changes to its force structure, through the movement of forces  needed to implement the recommendations from the 2005 Base  Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the redeployment of U.S. forces  in overseas locations back to the United States under the Global Defense  Posture Realignment, changes in the composition of forces and  realignment of those forces to accomplish a major Army reorganization  known as force modularity, and overall force structure increases due to  Army and Marine Corps Grow the Force initiatives. These types of  activities have had a significant impact on the local communities  surrounding major U.S. DOD installations experiencing either closure or  growth. We have previously reported that these DOD actions have led to  challenges for the local communities affected. For example, communities  surrounding closed installations have faced long-term challenges in the  economic recovery process arising out of base closures while  communities surrounding a growth installation face other challenges,  including a greater need for transportation, schools, and housing. We  have previously recommended that DOD provide communities  surrounding growth installations with better information early in the  process to allow them to more adequately plan for these changes, and in  response the services issued guidance for the timely, complete, and  consistent dissemination of planning information on changes in military  and civilian personnel and school-age children.
The Secretary of Defense stated in August 2012 that, after a decade of  war, DOD will again be drawing down its forces over the next five years,  moving toward a smaller, leaner, and more agile force. As part of its fiscal  year 2013 budget request, DOD asked Congress to authorize two more  rounds of BRAC in 2013 and 2015. Congress did not authorize additional  BRAC rounds in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2013, but if  Congress should decide to authorize a future round of BRAC, some  communities may face either significant increases or decreases in base  populations and the potential impacts of these changes.
House Report 112-479, accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (H.R. 4310) directed GAO to study  the practices and strategies that communities used to cope with base  closure or growth in previous BRAC rounds.the practices and strategies used by communities in dealing with the  installation closures from the 2005 BRAC round and how current  economic indicators for those communities compare to national averages;  (2) identifies the installations that have experienced significant population  increases since 2005 and describes the practices and strategies, if any,  that the surrounding communities have employed to accommodate this  growth; (3) presents information on communities’ needs in adjusting to  installation closure; and (4) presents information on communities’ needs  in adjusting to installation growth.
This report: (1) describes  To describe the practices and strategies that communities used to deal  with installation closures and compare their current economic indicators  to national averages, we identified communities that had major DOD  installation closures in the BRAC 2005 round using DOD’s information   We also collected  provided for our previously issued report on BRAC.2006 through 2011 economic indicator data—the most recent available— on these communities from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau  of Economic Analysis in order to compare them with national averages.  We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In  addition, we held discussion groups with and interviewed selected  community representatives, and surveyed representatives of closure  communities. We received responses to 16 out of 22 questionnaires we  sent, for a response rate of 73 percent. To identify the installations that  have experienced significant population increases since 2005 and  describe the practices and strategies, if any, that the surrounding  communities have employed to accommodate this growth, we started with  the list of 20 installations that DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment  (OEA) had identified and we discussed in our 2008 report. We reviewed  this list with OEA and the military services, and, based on information  provided by OEA, added 3 additional installations that OEA had identified  since 2008 as being significantly affected by growth. To identify the  strategies and practices that communities used to deal with installation  growth, we held discussion groups with and interviewed selected  community representatives. We also interviewed installation officials and  selected four installations to visit. These results cannot be generalized to  all closure or growth communities, but common responses across groups  and similar findings through the survey provide converging validation. Our  site selection included one installation per service, a joint base, and  installations in geographically diverse locations. Further, we surveyed  community representatives from all 23 growth installations and received  21 responses, for a response rate of 91 percent.
To determine the extent to which DOD has provided support to  communities to deal with base closure, we held discussion groups with  and interviewed community representatives from locations that had  installations close as a result of BRAC 2005 and we interviewed DOD and  service officials. We surveyed closure community representatives on their  experiences and any areas where they felt they needed additional  support or areas they considered adequate to support their needs. To  determine the extent to which DOD has provided support to communities  to deal with base growth, we held discussion groups with and interviewed  community representatives from growth communities. We also  interviewed DOD and service officials as well as installation officials at the  four visited installations. Further, we surveyed growth community  representatives on any areas where they felt that they needed additional  support and areas that they considered support to be adequate.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to May 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed description of  our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
Since 2005, we have issued over 30 reports and testimonies on BRAC  2005 planning, implementation, costs, and savings that provide  information to assist Congress as it considers BRAC authorizing  legislation and that DOD can use to improve the BRAC development and  implementation process. (For a list of related reports and testimonies, see  the Related GAO Products page at the end of this report.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since 1988, DOD has relied on the BRAC process as an important  means of reducing excess infrastructure and realigning bases to meet  changing force structure needs. The 2005 BRAC round was the fifth  round of base closures and realignments undertaken by DOD since 1988, and it was the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever.The 2005 BRAC process generally followed the legislative framework of  previous BRAC rounds, providing for an independent Defense Base  Closure and Realignment Commission to review the Secretary of  Defense’s closure and realignment recommendations, which were  produced through the BRAC processes coordinated by the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment.Commission assessed the Secretary’s recommendations, under its  authority to approve, modify, reject, or add closure or realignment  recommendations, before reporting its own recommendations to the  President. The President then approved the Commission’s  recommendations and forwarded them to Congress, and the  recommendations became final in November 2005. Implementation of the  recommendations was required to be complete by September 15, 2011.  Figure 1 below is a timeline of the 2005 BRAC round.
As specified in the BRAC statute, DOD has 6 years to complete all  installation closures and realignments, although certain actions, such as  the cleanup of environmentally contaminated property and the  subsequent transfer of unneeded property to other users, may extend  beyond the 6-year implementation period for each round. Once DOD  officially closes an installation, the property is typically considered excess  and offered to other federal agencies. As shown in figure 2, any property  that is not taken by other federal agencies is then considered surplus and  is disposed of through a variety of means to state and local governments,  local redevelopment authorities, or private parties.
The various methods used to convey unneeded property to nonfederal  parties noted in figure 2 are targeted, in many cases, to a particular end  use of the property. For example, under a public benefit conveyance,  state and local governments and local redevelopment authorities acquire  surplus DOD property for little or no cost for purposes such as schools,  parks, and airports. Under an economic development conveyance,  property is transferred for uses that promote economic recovery and job  creation. Conservation conveyances provide for the transfer of property to  a state, a political subdivision of a state, or a qualified not-for-profit group  for natural resource and conservation purposes. Property can also be  conveyed to nonfederal parties through other methods shown in figure 2  without regard, in many cases, to a particular end use. For example,  property can be sold or special congressional legislation can dictate  transfer to a particular entity.
In recent years, the growth of installations has occurred as a result of  both the 2005 BRAC round and other DOD initiatives. Under the 2005  BRAC round, DOD implemented 182 recommendations, many of which  resulted in significant personnel movement across installations and the  subsequent growth of some of those installations. In addition, DOD has  undertaken other actions outside of BRAC that have resulted in the  growth of installations. For example, the Army has undergone a major  force restructuring through its force modularity effort, which has been  referred to as the largest Army reorganization in 50 years. This effort  created Stryker brigades, primarily located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord,  Washington. Finally, DOD’s Grow the Force initiative increased the end  strength of the Army and the Marine Corps, affecting bases across the  country. Although DOD has recently announced plans to downsize the  Army and the Marine Corps, installations that experienced significant  growth under these initiatives, and their surrounding communities, are still  dealing with the impact of additional personnel and their dependents.
Within DOD, the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA)—a field activity  under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions,  Technology, and Logistics—assists communities by providing technical  and financial assistance in planning and carrying out adjustment  strategies in response to defense actions. OEA is the primary DOD office  responsible for providing assistance to communities, regions, and states  affected by significant defense actions including base closures and  realignments. Much of that assistance in the past was directed toward  communities that lost military and civilian personnel because of the  closure or major realignment of a base. However, because the 2005  BRAC round and other initiatives described above have created  significant growth at many bases, OEA has also assisted affected  communities with growth planning.
We have reported on the impact of BRAC actions numerous times over  the last several years. In particular in our 2005 report on BRAC, we  reported that DOD had closed 97 major installations since the first BRAC  round in 1988. Specifically DOD closed 16 bases in BRAC 1988, 26  bases in BRAC 1991, 28 bases in BRAC 1993, and 27 bases in BRAC  1995. (See appendix II for a list of the 97 bases and the year of closure  for each.) In that report, we studied 62 affected communities and found  that most of the surrounding communities were able to replace the jobs  lost due to the installation closure with new jobs created by the reuse of  the installation and that these communities generally had economic  indicators that compared favorably with the U.S. national averages.  Specifically, as of July 31, 2004, almost 70 percent of the 62 affected  communities studied in that report (43 out of 62) had unemployment rates  at or below the national average. Our analyses in that report of annual  real per capita growth rates for the BRAC–affected communities showed  mixed results. The latest available data at that time (1999-2001) showed  that only 48 percent of the BRAC-affected communities (30 of the 62) had  an estimated average real per capita income growth rate that was higher  than the national average. This was a decline from when we reported  these figures in our 2002 report, where we reported that 33 out of 62  communities (53 percent) matched or exceeded the national average for  real per capita income growth rate for 1996 to 1999.
section_title: Communities Have Used a Variety of Strategies to Deal with BRAC 2005 Closures and Select Local Economic Data Are Comparable to National Averages
paragraphs: Communities surrounding the 23 major DOD installations closed in  BRAC 2005 have used a variety of strategies to deal with the closures,  and economic data on unemployment and real per capita income growth  show the rates for these communities are comparable to national  averages.
subsections: section_title: Communities Surrounding DOD Installations Closed in BRAC 2005 Have Used a Variety of Strategies to Adjust to the Closures
paragraphs: During the BRAC 2005 round, DOD closed 23 major installations in the  United States, the majority of which were Army installations. Figures 3  and 4 show the number of major installations that were closed by military  service and the locations of these installations.
Communities affected by these installation closures faced a number of  different challenges and developed strategies to deal with them. In  particular, community representatives we spoke with or surveyed said  that some of their greatest challenges in dealing with the installation  closures were developing a plan for the reuse of the property, dealing  with facilities that were in poor shape or not suitable for reuse, and  obtaining funding for infrastructure improvements. Other challenges  identified by community representatives included navigating the legal  intricacies of property transfer, dealing with environmental cleanup, and  replacing lost jobs. Based on our analysis, we found that community  representatives have used a variety of strategies to deal with these  challenges. For example, several representatives that responded to our  survey cited forming a local redevelopment authority as an effective  strategy for dealing with installation closure. One community  representative said his local redevelopment authority was comprised of  local and regional stakeholders to help build alliances and partnerships  across the entire community spectrum. Another said his local  redevelopment authority operates in a public forum where all meetings  are open to the public and community input is solicited at every meeting.  This was also reiterated by another community representative who said it  was important to use an open process involving public meetings and  outreach to accept input and gain community support in developing a plan  for the reuse of the property.
Community representatives also cited working closely with DOD as an  effective strategy for dealing with installation closure. For example, one  community representative said the local redevelopment authority worked  with the Army to ensure there was an effective and acceptable plan for  dealing with environmental remediation prior to and after installation  closure. Another local representative worked with DOD to have many of  the facilities that were in poor condition demolished prior to finding new  tenants, thus saving the community maintenance and operation dollars. A  third representative said it would have been impossible without  assistance from DOD for the local redevelopment authority to make its  way through the maze of federal regulations and available information to  create redevelopment plans. In addition, another community  representative said that the Army was extremely helpful in transferring  knowledge from numerous years of operating the installation. He said this  historical knowledge allowed the local redevelopment authority to utilize  previously completed studies in lieu of committing taxpayer dollars to  repeat those investigations and reports. Further, he noted that data the  Army maintained on utility and infrastructure would be used to manage  repair and maintenance of the property in the future. Finally, another local  redevelopment authority worked with local and headquarters Air Force  staff to find follow-on jobs for DOD civilians that did not relocate or retire  when the installation closed.
Some community representatives cited leveraging funds from state and  federal agencies as a successful strategy. For example, one community  representative said the local redevelopment authority was able to secure  state-issued bonds to make the facilities more business-ready. Another  local redevelopment authority secured federal funds to modify existing  structures, and a third local redevelopment authority took advantage of a  state tax benefit that allowed it to use state money to pay down  improvement bonds. In addition, community representatives cited  receiving grants from OEA as being helpful to their local redevelopment  authority’s organizational, planning, and implementation efforts. For  example, one representative said the funding OEA provided was used to  hire personnel, maintain offices, and conduct planning. Another said OEA  provided funding through a grant that permitted the local redevelopment  authority to hire dedicated professional staff and contract with a  consultant to prepare the redevelopment plan and assist with the property  transfer application. Many other representatives told us that OEA  provided resources to develop reuse plans or supporting studies or to hire  specific consulting or legal services. Table 1 below displays the OEA  grants provided to closure communities during calendar years 2005  through 2012.
In addition, community representatives who responded to our survey or  that spoke with us said taking early possession of the property and  leasing some of its assets was an effective strategy for dealing with  installation closure. For example, one respondent said that since funding  is limited for BRAC reuse projects, the local redevelopment authority  entered into a protection and maintenance contract with the Army and  was therefore able to lease out some of the assets on the installation,  allowing the local redevelopment authority to increase revenue. Another  community representative said the local redevelopment authority was  able to move from complete financial dependence on federal funding to  utilizing alternative revenue sources such as leases, tax revenue, and  fees for service. He noted that the local redevelopment authority was  awarded the Army caretaker contract for the former installation, and by  providing services for fees, it was able to generate revenue. Furthermore,  another local redevelopment authority representative told us that it is  taking over the closure property in a piecemeal fashion. For example, it  has already taken over all the historic homes at the installation and has  leased out many of them. According to the community representative, this  has provided the local redevelopment authority with some revenue to  operate and maintain the facilities. The local redevelopment authority is  also preparing to take over the rest of the property when the primary  caretaker leaves.
Community representatives also said hiring experts was an effective  strategy for dealing with installation closure. For example, one community  representative said the local redevelopment authority had to hire  individuals who had experience with BRAC to get things done in a timely  and professional way. In particular, she said the local redevelopment  authority hired an attorney to draft documents associated with specific  lease amendments. Likewise, a community representative said the local  redevelopment authority hired an experienced BRAC attorney to advise  them on the process for land transfer.
section_title: Some Economic Data for Communities Surrounding DOD Installations Closed in BRAC 2005 Are Comparable to National Averages
paragraphs: Selected economic indicators for the 21 communities surrounding the 23  DOD installations closed in BRAC 2005 are comparable to national  averages. In our analysis, we used annual unemployment and real per  capita income growth rates compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor  Statistics (BLS) and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as  broad indicators of the economic health of those communities where  installation closures occurred. Our analyses of BLS annual  unemployment data for 2011, the most recent data available, showed that  11 (52 percent) of the 21 closure communities had unemployment rates  at or below the national average of 8.9 percent for the period from  January through December 2011. The other 10 communities had  unemployment rates that were higher than the national average (see  figure 5). Of the 21 closure communities, Portland, Maine (Naval Air  Station Brunswick) had the lowest unemployment rate at 6.1 percent and  Modesto, California (Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant) had the highest  rate at 16.8 percent.
We also analyzed BEA real per capita income growth rates between 2006  and 2011 and found that 13 (62 percent) of the 21 closure communities  had real per capita income growth rates that were higher than the national  average of 0.14 (see figure 6). The other 8 communities had rates that  were below the national average. Of the 21 communities affected, Yukon- Koyukuk, Alaska (Galena Forward Operating Location) had the highest  growth rate at 4.31 percent and Atlanta, Georgia (Fort Gillem, Fort  McPherson, and Naval Air Station Atlanta) had the lowest rate at -1.58  percent.
section_title: Growth Has Occurred at 23 Major Installations and Communities Have Used a Variety of Strategies to Accommodate this Growth
paragraphs: Since 2005, DOD has implemented several major initiatives, including  BRAC realignment actions and Army Modularity, that have resulted in  growth in military and civilian personnel at 23 installations, and the  communities surrounding these installations, which also experienced  growth, have used a variety of practices and strategies to accommodate  this growth. As shown in table 2, these 23 installations had a combined  net growth of about 191,000 military and civilian personnel from fiscal  years 2006 through 2012, with their total population growing from about  526,000 to over 717,000, a 36.3 percent increase.
While Fort Sill, Oklahoma actually incurred a net loss during this time  period, OEA treated it as a growth location because it was originally  projected to increase by more than 2,000 personnel which was  anticipated to impact the surrounding community in the areas of housing,  schools, and transportation. In addition, Fort Knox, Kentucky also  experienced a net loss in population, but changes to the mission and the  resulting changes to the demographics, including the increase of full-time  military personnel versus the temporary students that were previously  stationed at the installation, caused significant challenges to the  surrounding community. The growth of each of the 21 installations that  did grow during this time period ranged from about 12 percent to 117  percent. Of the 23 growth installations, 16 were Army, 3 were Navy and 4  were Air Force. The seven installations that grew the most all had growth  rates of more than 50 percent over fiscal years 2006 through 2012. These  were five Army installations (Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort  Carson, Colorado; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; and Fort Lee,  Virginia); one Navy installation (Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia);  and one Air Force installation (Joint Base San Antonio, Texas).
Between 2006 and 2011 all of the surrounding communities also  experienced growth. Table 3 shows the change in population of the  communities surrounding the major growth installations from calendar  years 2006 through 2011. The growth rates for the individual communities  associated with the installations ranged from about 1 to 14 percent over  this period. As with the installations, the majority of the communities  experiencing the most growth surround Army installations. Specifically,  communities surrounding Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Stewart, Georgia;  Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; and Fort Sill, Oklahoma experienced growth  rates of more than 12 percent from 2006 through 2011. Also, one Air  Force installation, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas experienced growth of  more than 13 percent. The community with the sixth largest population  gain was around the Marine Corps’ Camp Lejeune and New River Air  Station, North Carolina with a growth rate of about 12 percent.
Further, we found that population growth in the communities surrounding  the growth installations could differ based on factors other than  installation growth. While some of the community growth can be attributed  to additional servicemembers and their families living in the communities,  growth could also happen for other reasons. For example, at Joint Base  Lewis-McChord, Washington, the two counties surrounding the  installation experienced growth at the same time that the number of  servicemembers at the installation increased. Installation officials told us  that while the population of the installation increased primarily due to the  creation of the Army’s Stryker Brigades, the surrounding communities  also experienced an increase due to the growth in local industry, including  the aerospace industry. We also found that in some cases, an installation  experienced a large growth in personnel, but the surrounding community  did not experience the same level of growth. For example, Fort Belvoir  had the largest percentage of installation growth but ranked tenth in  percentage of community growth. This occurred for a number of reasons.  According to DOD officials most personnel that transferred to this  installation already lived in the region and thus were commuting from  other local areas to Fort Belvoir rather than moving to the region.  Therefore, while Fort Belvoir incurred significant growth, population  growth in the local communities was not impacted as directly as it might  have been if transferred personnel were coming from other communities.  Furthermore, the actual community growth for this area was almost  370,000 people—the largest overall increase of any community in our  review—but because the metropolitan area was so large to start with the  increase did not change the percentage of growth as significantly as did  smaller changes to smaller communities.
subsections: section_title: Installation Growth Raises Challenges for Communities, Which Have Used a Variety of Strategies to Accommodate This Growth
paragraphs: Growth of an installation can cause a variety of challenges for a  community, and we found that communities have used a variety of  strategies to cope with these challenges, which include increased  demand for transportation, education, and other public services. For  example, based on our site visits, interviews with DOD officials, data we  collected from surveys, and discussion groups, transportation was a key  challenge facing communities around growth installations. During all our  site visits, DOD officials cited transportation as a major challenge, as did  several other installations we contacted. For instance, several installation  officials expressed concerns about the impact of traffic in the community  and on the installation when vehicles are entering or leaving the base. In  September 2009, OEA conducted a project needs assessment for  defense growth communities. This assessment was initiated to assess  projects identified by communities as needed to support DOD growth  actions. As a result of this assessment, communities identified  transportation improvements to mitigate growth impacts as the greatest  need. In addition, based on data we collected from our surveys and  interviews of growth community representatives, transportation was the  most frequently cited challenge. Another challenge for communities  discussed during our site visits as well as in interviews with DOD officials  and discussion groups and cited by survey respondents involved  overcrowding in local schools. DOD officials at installations we contacted  expressed concerns about the capacity of local area schools to handle  the growth. In addition, the 2009 OEA project needs assessment  identified education as the second greatest funding need for defense  communities. Other challenges noted by DOD officials and community  representatives included the need for additional medical care and  housing, lack of federal funding to deal with the growth, and inadequate  utility systems.
Communities have used a variety of strategies and practices to deal with  these concerns. The most common successful strategy, cited by DOD  officials, community representatives we interviewed, survey respondents,  and discussion group participants, was to form a regional working group  composed of representatives from all of the jurisdictions affected by the  growth at the installation. Examples of some of the regional working  groups are cited below:  In response to growth at the North Carolina Eastern Region, which  includes Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps Air Station  Cherry Point and New River, the North Carolina’s Eastern Region  Military Growth Task Force was established. The task force included  representatives from surrounding counties, and its mission was to  analyze community impacts from the sudden and unanticipated  growth of these installations and develop potential recommendations  to address those impacts.
In response to mission growth at Fort Bragg, the Fort Bragg Regional  Alliance was formed to evaluate economic, employment,  infrastructure, and social impacts associated with this expansion and  to identify actions required to address future growth needs in the area.
The community around Walter Reed National Military Center  established a stakeholders’ advisory board that brought together local  business and community leaders and representatives from all levels  of government and the Navy, who worked together to identify growth  impacts and to propose solutions.
In addition, DOD officials, community representatives, survey  respondents, and discussion group participants cited seeking grants as a  successful strategy to cope with the challenges posed by installation  growth. In some cases, communities were successful in obtaining funding  to address the associated growth in their area. OEA provided growth  communities with grants to cover administrative expenses, including  hiring consultants to conduct growth management studies. As seen in  table 4 below, from 2005 through 2012, OEA provided over $73 million in  grants to growth communities. In addition to OEA funding, state and local  governments also provided funding to address various issues. For  example, at Redstone Arsenal, state and local governments provided  funding to address the overcrowding of the local schools.
Conducting studies to determine installation and community needs was  also cited as a key practice in working effectively through the challenges  that base growth creates. Studies provide the necessary data to guide the  individual bases and community representatives to take action to find  solutions to address challenges. Examples of studies are cited below:
At Joint Base Lewis-McChord, the South Sound Military and  Communities Partnership, a group comprised of communities  surrounding the installation, conducted a survey of servicemembers  and found that where servicemembers live in the community is  influenced by how much they can afford with their Basic Allowance for  Housing. Further, installation officials identified a lack of affordable  housing as an issue and worked with community representatives to  develop a rental property program where landlords from the  community voluntarily sign up to give discounts to servicemembers in  exchange for receiving their rent as an allotment directly from the  Army. This helped the community by decreasing vacancy rates, and  helped the base by finding servicemembers affordable housing.
At Fort Bragg, a study conducted for the Fort Bragg Regional Alliance,  a group formed to deal with the growth at Fort Bragg, revealed that  many people working in the Fort Bragg area were not prepared to  compete for high-wage and high-skill jobs both on base and in the  community. As a result the base and community worked together to  develop a career exploration platform and installed enhanced  technology classrooms into 33 schools and 8 community colleges  throughout the region, which provided training and resources to better  prepare the community for the workforce.
At Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base, a study conducted for the North  Carolina’s Eastern Region Military Growth Task Force identified traffic  issues between the base and the surrounding neighborhoods. The  study group proposed the implementation of an Intelligent Traffic  System in the surrounding City of Jacksonville to offer instant relief by  monitoring and controlling key choke points on area roadways that  connect the base to the neighborhoods where employees live.  Intelligent traffic lights were later installed and helped with the flow of  traffic on base and the surrounding communities.
section_title: DOD Provides Assistance to Communities Surrounding Closure Installations, but Additional Army Guidance Is Needed to Improve Maintenance of Facilities
paragraphs: Community representatives we surveyed and spoke with indicated that  DOD provides good support to communities facing base closure through  its OEA, but representatives from communities surrounding closed Army  installations that took ownership of the facilities stated that in many  instances the Army facilities were not maintained at a sufficient level to  retain their value or facilitate reuse. The Navy and the Air Force have  guidance that aligns with DOD guidance specifying levels of maintenance  to be provided during the BRAC process but the Army has not issued its  own guidance. If Army officials and community representatives do not  have a clear understanding as to the level of maintenance that should be  carried out, local redevelopment authorities and the Army will continue to  have differing expectations of the maintenance that should be provided to  closed facilities, hindering the transfer and reuse process.
section_title: DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment Provides Assistance to Communities Surrounding Closure Installations
paragraphs: DOD, primarily through OEA, provides assistance to communities  surrounding closure installations. OEA assigns a project manager to each  community who can provide assistance in a variety of ways. For example,  project managers can provide funds for hiring consultants to assist in  developing a reuse plan, information on federal grant money or other  available resources, and information on best practices used by other  closure communities. Installation and community representatives that we  spoke with and surveyed stated that they were pleased with the level of  assistance that OEA provided. For example, one representative stated  that the OEA project manager was a valuable resource in dealing with the  base closure. Another representative stated that OEA’s assistance was  helpful to address crucial issues with closing the installation. A third  representative described OEA’s support as invaluable and stated that his  community could not have planned for base reuse without OEA’s  assistance. Further, OEA provides grant money to closure communities  as described above.
All of the respondents to our survey that requested best practice  information from DOD, OEA or the services stated that they received  some or all of the information they requested. In addition, OEA project  managers regularly connect communities so that they can share best  practices and OEA’s website provides reports containing lessons learned  from other communities and information on other available resources.  OEA is currently developing a community forum function on its website  where community members can exchange ideas and learn from each  other’s experiences.
section_title: Two of the Three Military Departments Have Guidance on Maintenance Levels for Closed Facilities
paragraphs: The Navy and the Air Force have issued guidance on the appropriate  maintenance levels to be performed on closed facilities, but the Army has  not. In both interviews and discussion groups, representatives from  communities surrounding some closed Army installations stated that the  Army did not provide adequate facility maintenance to buildings it planned  to transfer ownership of during the BRAC process. An official from the  Army BRAC office stated, however, that the Army makes every effort to  provide maintenance in accordance with the planned usage of the  facilities and that communities have unrealistic expectations of the  condition of the buildings. DOD guidance states that surplus facilities and  equipment at installations that have been closed can be important to the  eventual reuse of the installation and that each military department is  responsible for protecting and maintaining such assets in order to  preserve the value of the property. The guidance further states that the  services should consult with the local redevelopment authority to  determine the maintenance levels for the facilities. Finally, while the DOD  guidance states that the services have developed specific maintenance  levels, only the Navy and the Air Force have published service-specific  guidance to clearly describe their maintenance levels consistent with  factors outlined in DOD’s guidance.
The Navy has developed the most comprehensive guidance on the  maintenance of closure facilities. The Department of the Navy’s Base  Realignment and Closure Implementation Guidance describes a process  for establishing initial maintenance levels in consultation with the local  redevelopment authority.intended reuse of the individual building. For example, a building that is  designated for immediate reuse, meaning that the local redevelopment  authority has already identified a tenant, will be given the highest level of  maintenance. A building that does not have a reuse identified is given the  lowest level of maintenance, where only conditions adversely affecting  public health, the environment and safety are to be corrected. This  guidance further states that the Navy’s BRAC Program Management  Office is responsible for overseeing this process and for serving as the  Navy’s liaison to the community. Navy officials stated that the local  redevelopment authorities often want all of the buildings maintained at a  high level or that they change their minds on the immediacy of reuse of  the buildings after the Navy has begun maintenance at a different  maintenance level, resulting in property that is not maintained to the level  that the community would like because degradation of the property may  have already occurred. Officials further stated that they are willing to work  with communities to determine the appropriate maintenance levels and  even to change the maintenance levels if possible, but the best way to  ensure maintenance levels are in place to meet the needs of the  community is for the local redevelopment authority to work closely with  the Navy early on in the closure process to determine the proper level of  maintenance for individual facilities.
Building maintenance levels are based on the  Air Force guidance from 1991 states that as facilities are vacated, they  shall be placed into one of six maintenance levels that are dependent on  the planned reuse of the facilities. This guidance has not been updated  to reflect the current command structure of the Air Force, including the Air  Force Real Property Agency, which was formed in 2002 and would have  responsibility for overseeing the implementation of these actions in a  future BRAC round. However, officials stated that the current policy is still  in effect and being followed, even though the Air Force has reorganized  the components overseeing this process. The Army has not issued any  guidance in this area. An Army official stated that the Army had draft  guidance, but it was never finalized and that the Army therefore relies  solely on the DOD guidance. However, the DOD guidance does not  describe specific levels of maintenance.
Community representatives surrounding some closed Army installations  who we spoke with in interviews and discussion groups stated that the  Army did not always maintain the facilities to their expectations, resulting  in facility deterioration. For example, at the former Kansas Army  Ammunition Plant, community representatives stated that a storm  damaged the roof of one building that was never repaired by the Army,  resulting in mold growing inside the building and requiring the building to  be demolished at the expense of the local redevelopment authority (see  figure 7).
In interviews, discussion groups and survey responses, other  representatives from communities surrounding closed Army installations  provided examples of poorly maintained property. One representative  stated that the service did not provide any maintenance to a housing  facility, resulting in significant mold growth inside the facility and rendering  it unusable. The community had to demolish this facility at its own  expense. Another representative told us that the service did not properly  maintain the grass on the property, causing it to become overgrown and  attract wildlife. Because of this increase in wildlife in the area, the service  had to spend approximately three times the originally budgeted amount  for environmental restoration of the property. Another community  representative stated that her local redevelopment authority took over the  maintenance of an Army installation prior to transfer through a  maintenance contract with the Army. She stated that her organization did  this to fix issues of deferred maintenance and to ensure that buildings  were properly maintained so that they could be reused.
An official with the Army BRAC office told us that the Army makes an  effort to maintain closed facilities in accordance with their planned usage.  For example, he stated that in fiscal year 2013 the Army provided $49  million in caretaker funds for installations closed during BRAC 2005. He  further stated that local redevelopment authorities would like the buildings  to be in new condition, but that is not a realistic expectation. As a result,  an expectations gap exists between the Army and communities regarding  the levels of maintenance to be provided to facilities during the transition  period. Without clear guidance on the expected levels of maintenance for  closed facilities, the communities will not have a clear understanding of  what maintenance the Army will provide, hindering the transfer and reuse  process.
section_title: DOD Provides Support to Communities Facing Installation Growth, but More Data and Long-Term Coordination Is Needed
paragraphs: Community representatives we surveyed or spoke with indicated that  DOD provides good support to communities facing base growth through  its OEA, but more data and long-term coordination could improve the  communities’ and DOD’s ability to respond to future force structure  changes. Without accurate and timely information, and a means to ensure  continued effective communication throughout the growth process,  communities will be hindered in their efforts to effectively plan for growth.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment Provides Support to Communities Facing Installation Growth
paragraphs: Similar to the types of support that DOD provides to communities facing  installation closures, DOD, primarily through OEA, also provides support  to communities facing base growth. OEA provides a project manager to  growth communities to help with technical and financial information  assistance and growth management planning assistance. The project  manager assists the communities in identifying available resources,  including potential OEA grants as described above. In addition, as in the  case of communities facing installation closures, the OEA project  manager can link growth communities with other growth communities to  facilitate collaboration and the sharing of best practices.
Growth community representatives that we spoke with or that responded  to our survey were pleased with the level of support that they received  from OEA. For example, one growth community representative  commented that his community’s OEA project manager was a great  source of information and had a lot of experience. Another community  representative commented that having OEA support was tremendously  beneficial to the community. She further stated that with OEA’s support,  her community was able to better plan for community needs. Several  community representatives that we spoke with stated that their project  manager visited their community regularly and participated in planning  meetings.
section_title: Communities Facing Installation Growth Expressed the Need for More Data and Long-Term Coordination
paragraphs: Community and installation representatives that we spoke with and  responded to our survey identified some areas where improvements  could be made to enable both DOD and the communities to be in a  position to better respond to potential installation growth, particularly with  regard to additional data for planning purposes and long-term  coordination between the community and the installation.
First, community representatives indicated that they need additional  information to adequately plan for the growth in their community. DOD  guidance states that maximum advance information and support should  be provided to state and local governments to plan for military growth  actions. The services implemented DOD’s guidance by issuing service- specific guidance specifying certain information that shall be provided to  communities including military and civilian personnel changes; school-age  children increases or decreases; and construction activity. However,  some community representatives noted that they would like more specific  information. For example, they told us that installations are unable to  provide communities with aggregate data on where servicemembers and  their families live while stationed at the local installation, because they do  not have a system that tracks this type of information. Service officials  confirmed that current personnel data systems contain the  servicemembers’ home station of record rather than their current  residence and payroll systems may only include direct deposit information  and not a home address, and that therefore this information is not  currently available. In addition, although the housing office at the  installation may have information on the number of servicemembers living  off the installation, there is no requirement to maintain information on  where those servicemembers live. Installation and service officials did  note, however, that existing data systems could potentially be modified to  provide this information. Installation officials noted that communities  continually asked for this information so that they can plan for the impact  of installation growth on transportation routes, local school districts, and  the need for various social services. Installation and service officials  expressed some concerns about privacy and force protection issues  stemming from the release of this information, but acknowledged that it  would be beneficial for communities to have some type of aggregate  information on where servicemembers reside in the communities to help  with community planning and traffic management, including where traffic  will feed into the access control points on base. One community  representative noted that as installation growth often happens  incrementally over time, having updated information that captures where  the additional servicemembers move to during the ongoing growth period  would enhance the communities’ ability to respond to this growth.
In addition to the need for more data on where personnel live, community  representatives and installation officials we interviewed stated that  establishing a long-term civilian point of contact at the base installation  level is necessary to effectively plan for the long-term effects of growth on  the base and local community. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps have  a provision for a Community Planning and Liaison Officer at installations  whose role is to be the central information point with the community. Navy  guidance states that to ensure continuity, the inclusion of a civilian  planner in the community planning liaison team is strongly encouraged.  The guidance further states that not every installation can support a full- time Community Planning and Liaison Officer position, and that this  position can be a collateral duty. In the Marine Corps, the Community  Planning and Liaison Officer is usually a senior civilian who has the  responsibility to develop and maintain a network with state and local  officials. Air Force officials told us that the Air Force has a draft instruction  with information on this type of position, but it has not yet been approved  and an Army official confirmed that the Army does not currently have this  type of position. We have previously reported that career civilians  possess institutional memory, which is particularly important in DOD  because of the frequent rotation of military personnel. An official from  the Army BRAC office agreed that a long-term point of contact at an  installation is important to maintaining community relationships. In the  past, the Army specifically stationed an additional officer to large growth  installations to be the primary contact point for the installation during the  growth period. This official further stated that he believes that the liaison  function can be performed by an active duty person; however, many Army  installations have a civilian deputy garrison commander acting in this  capacity.
According to leaders we spoke with, base commanders do an excellent  job with community outreach; however, because they are typically only in  their positions for 2 to 3 years and then transferred, community outreach  has to start all over again once a new commander is appointed. In the  Navy and the Marine Corps, the Community Planning and Liaison Officer  does not replace the installation commander in community outreach;  rather, the position provides an additional person to act as a day to day  point of contact to work directly with local governments, community  representatives, and non-governmental organizations. Officials at  installations that we visited felt that maintaining such a position at the  installation level would be beneficial in establishing long-term working  relationships with the community. Accurate and timely information on  such things as personnel residence areas and expected changes in  demand for public services could better facilitate communities’ efforts to  accommodate installation growth. Further, effective communication  throughout the growth process enables community and installation  leaders to collaborate on solutions to the problems raised by installation  growth.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD plays a significant role in communities across the country, and  actions taken by the department and the military services to change force  structure, composition, size, or distribution can have direct impacts on the  communities where such actions are implemented. A decision to change  the size or population of a base installation or to close it entirely affects  the economy of the surrounding community. DOD has taken effective  steps to aid both growth and closure communities during the BRAC  process, however further efforts could prove useful.
Base closure presents many challenges for a surrounding community.  The condition of the buildings that DOD no longer needs and plans to  either sell or transfer to the communities has a direct effect on the  development of a successful reuse plan or arrangement between the  parties; if properties deteriorate during the closure transition time, they will  have less value for the communities that acquire them. In the case of the  Army, both installation officials and communities would benefit if there  were clear Army guidance to govern the maintenance of facilities prior to  their transfer to the community.
Installation growth can affect surrounding communities, creating new  demands for transportation, education, and other social services. To meet  these needs, community representatives stated that additional information  could be helpful to facilitate planning efforts.
Finally, community leaders pointed out that having an established long- term point of contact with the military community on base to help see  growth projects through to completion would also be helpful. Community  representatives generally expressed satisfaction with the quality of DOD’s  support and regular interaction with community planners. However, the  support and regular interaction that is so important to maintaining  productive and efficient working relationships between communities and  installations can be enhanced by taking steps to lessen the impact of  changes in personnel such as those that occur with changes of station for  military personnel. With DOD hoping to pursue more BRAC rounds in the  future, actions that would further ease the transitions that communities  face would be worthwhile.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the ability of the Army and local communities to manage  future base closures, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Army to issue, consistent with DOD guidance,  guidance on specific levels of maintenance to be followed in the event of  a base closure based on the probable reuse of the facilities.
To improve the ability of DOD and the local communities to respond to  future growth actions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to consider  developing a procedure for collecting service members’ physical  addresses while stationed at an installation, annually updating this  information, and sharing aggregate information with community  representatives relevant for local planning decisions, such as additional  population per zip code, consistent with privacy and force protection  concerns.
Furthermore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force to consider creating or  designating a civilian position at the installation level to be the focal point  and provide continuity for community interaction for future growth  installations and to consider expanding this position to all installations.  This position may be a collateral duty.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one  recommendation and partially concurred with two recommendations.  DOD concurred with our first recommendation to direct the Secretary of  the Army to issue guidance on specific levels of maintenance to be  followed in the event of a base closure, based on the probable reuse of  the facilities. DOD stated that the Army agrees to publish property  maintenance guidance prior to closing installations in the event of future  base closures.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation to develop a  procedure for collecting service members’ physical addresses while  stationed at an installation, annually updating this information, and  sharing aggregate information with community representatives. DOD  stated that it agrees that information pertaining to the physical location of  installation personnel helps affected communities plan for housing,  schools, transportation and other off-post requirements and that existing  policy requires the military departments to share planning information,  including base personnel, with states and communities. DOD also stated  that in the event of future basing decisions affecting local communities, it  will work with the military departments to assess and determine the best  means to obtain, aggregate, and distribute this information to help ensure  that adequate planning information is made available. We are pleased  that DOD recognizes the importance of this information to community  planners and plans to address this in the future. However, we believe that  proactively determining the best means to provide such information,  rather than assessing the problem should it arise due to future basing  decisions, would reduce the challenges the department and affected  communities face.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation to direct the Army  and the Air Force to create or designate a civilian position at the  installation level to be the focal point for community interaction for future  growth installations, and consider expanding this position to all  installations. DOD stated that it agrees with the need for a designated  position at the installation level and will ensure that each military  department is meeting this need through current practices. DOD also  stated that many growth installation officials often already serve as “ex- officio members” of the community’s growth management organizations,  and as we noted in our report, community officials agree that this has  been quite valuable for both the department and affected growth  communities. However, it is not clear from DOD’s comments whether the  department specifically agrees that installations should maintain a civilian  rather than military position to fulfill the role of community liaison, and  thus we reiterate our belief that creating or designating a civilian position  would provide greater continuity over time than would assigning liaison  responsibilities to a military servicemember. DOD’s comments are printed  in their entirety in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air  Force; and the Director of the Office of Economic Adjustment. In addition,  the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify communities experiencing installation closures and to compare  their current economic indicators to national averages, we focused our  review on the 23 major DOD installations closed in the BRAC 2005 round  and their surrounding communities. For BRAC 2005, DOD defined major  installation closures as those that had a plant replacement value  exceeding $100 million. We identified the major closure installations using  DOD’s information provided for our previously issued report on BRAC.  We defined the “community” surrounding each installation as the  economic area identified in DOD’s Base Closure and Realignment  Report which linked a metropolitan statistical area, a metropolitan  division, or a micropolitan statistical area to each installation. Because  DOD’s BRAC report did not identify the census area for the Galena  Forward Operating Location in Alaska or the Naval Weapons Station Seal  Beach Detachment in Concord, California, we identified the town of  Galena as within the “Yukon-Koyukuk Census Area” and the city of  Concord in the Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA Metropolitan Division and  our analyses used the population and economic data for these areas. To  compare the economic indicator data of the communities surrounding the  23 major DOD installations closed in the BRAC 2005 round to U.S.  national averages, we collected and analyzed calendar year 2011  unemployment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and  calendar year 2006 through 2011 per capita income growth data, along  with data on inflation, from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),  which we used to calculate real per capita income growth. The most  current calendar year for which local area data was available from these  databases was 2011. We assessed the reliability of these data by  reviewing BLS and BEA documentation regarding the methods used by  each agency in producing their data and found the data to be sufficiently  reliable for our purposes. We used unemployment and real per capita  income as key performance indicators because (1) DOD used these  measures in its community economic impact analysis during the BRAC  location selection process and (2) economists commonly use these  measures in assessing the economic health of an area over time. While  our assessment provides an overall picture of how these communities  compare with the national averages, it does not necessarily isolate the  condition, or the changes in that condition, that may be attributed to a  specific BRAC action.
To identify the installations that have experienced significant population  increases since 2005 (“growth installations”) and their surrounding  communities, we collected and analyzed available military service data  regarding the personnel growth at 23 growth installations within the  United States. We identified the major growth installations by using  DOD’s information provided for our previously issued report on BRAC and  OEA grant data. We defined the “community” surrounding each  installation as the community identified in DOD’s Base Closure and  Realignment Report which linked a Metropolitan Statistical Area to each  installation, supplemented with U.S. Bureau Census data as needed. To  describe the populations of the 23 DOD growth installations and their  surrounding communities, we collected and analyzed population data  from the military services and the U.S. Census Bureau, respectively. In  order to present information regarding expected growth at each military  installation, we analyzed Army and Air Force headquarters-level data,  and Navy and Marine Corps installation-level population data. We  obtained and analyzed the installation population data for fiscal years  2006 and 2012, the most recent data available, for military and civilian  personnel excluding dependents and nonmission-related contractors. We  contacted cognizant Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force officials to  gather and explain these data. We found this data to be sufficiently  reliable for our purposes. We analyzed community population data for  calendar years 2006 through 2011, the most recent data available. For  the 2006 populations, we used the latest estimates available, which were  from 2009. We assessed the reliability of the Census Bureau data by  reviewing documentation regarding the methods used to produce the  data. We assessed the reliability of the military service data by asking  service officials to answer a set of standard questions about the accuracy  and completeness of the data including relevant data collection, storage,  maintenance, and error-checking procedures. In addition, we conducted  logic and computational checks on the data that the Army provided. We  found all these data sources to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes.  While our assessment provides an overall picture of how these  installations and communities grew during this timeframe, it does not  necessarily isolate the condition, or the changes in that condition, that  may be attributed to a specific BRAC action.
To gain initial insight into the practices and strategies communities used  to address installation closures and growth, we held two discussion group  meetings with closure community representatives and two discussion  group meetings with growth community representatives at the Association  of Defense Communities Conference in August 2012 in Monterey,  California. Officials from six closure communities and six growth  communities participated in these groups. A discussion group protocol  was developed to help the moderator gather information from these  officials about the experiences of these communities. The protocol  contained questions about challenges the communities had experienced,  strategies that the communities have found successful in preparing for or  dealing with installation closure or growth, and the type and quality of  assistance they had received from multiple sources. Notes were taken by  at least one, but usually multiple, GAO note-takers. Sessions were audio- recorded but recordings were used as a backup to written notes only. The  results of these discussion groups cannot be generalized to all closure or  growth communities, but common responses across groups and similar  findings through the survey provide converging validation. We also  conducted a survey of closure and growth communities, which is  described in detail below. We also called and talked to several  respondents by phone to clarify their answers to the survey and ask  additional follow-up questions. Further, we collected data from OEA about  the grants that they provided to closure and growth communities. We  assessed the reliability of the OEA data by asking OEA officials to answer  a set of standard questions about the accuracy and completeness of the  data including relevant data collection, storage, maintenance, and error- checking procedures. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for  our purposes.
To gain additional insight into the practices and strategies communities  used to address installation growth, we visited four locations representing  each of the military departments: Camp Lejeune Marine Corp Base, North  Carolina; Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and Joint  Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. At each location we interviewed  installation and local community officials regarding the communities’  growth challenges and strategies.
To determine the extent to which DOD has provided support to  communities to address base closure or growth, we discussed this issue  with closure and growth community representatives individually and in the  discussion groups described earlier and we interviewed DOD and service  officials. We also surveyed closure and growth community  representatives on their experiences and any areas where they felt they  needed additional support or areas they considered adequate to support  their needs. The survey is described in detail below. We also reviewed  DOD and service guidance on DOD and the services’ roles and  responsibilities in the event of a base closure or growth.
To inform multiple objectives, we sent a survey to representatives of all  23 growth communities and 22 of the 23 closure communities to gather  detailed information on the greatest challenges each community had  experienced, successful strategies they had used to deal with change,  and assistance and information they had received from federal sources.  We did not send a survey to the Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant  because the property was transferred from the U.S. Army to the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration, which did not require disposal  through a local redevelopment authority.
The survey was implemented as a self-administered Microsoft Word form  emailed to respondents. We sent e-mail notifications to community  representatives beginning on November 5, 2012. We then sent the  questionnaire and a cover e-mail to representatives on November 7, 2012  and asked them to fill in the questionnaire form and email it back to us  within two weeks. To encourage respondents to complete the  questionnaire, we sent e-mail message reminders and a replacement  questionnaire to each non-respondent approximately one week and three  weeks after the initial questionnaire was sent. We also made follow-up  phone calls to non-respondents from December 11, 2012 to February 4,  2013. We closed the survey on February 19, 2013. Overall, we received  37 completed questionnaires for an overall response rate of 82.2 percent.  Of those, 21 were from growth communities and 16 were from closure  communities, for response rates of 91.3 percent and 72.7 percent,  respectively.
To minimize errors that might occur from respondents interpreting our  questions differently than we intended, we pretested our questionnaire  with four community officials (two from growth communities, two from  closure communities) who were in positions similar to the respondents  who would complete our actual survey. During these pretests, we asked  the officials to complete the questionnaire as we observed the process  and noted potential problems (two sessions were conducted in-person,  two were conducted by phone). We then discussed the questions and  instructions with the officials to check whether (1) the questions and  instructions were clear and unambiguous, (2) the terms used were  accurate, (3) the questionnaire was unbiased, (4) the questionnaire did  not place an undue burden on the officials completing it, and (5) to  identify potential solutions to any problems identified. We also submitted  the questionnaire for review by an independent GAO survey specialist  and two external reviewers who were experts on the topic of the survey  (selected based on their experience with military installation closure  and/or growth issues). We modified the questionnaire based on feedback  from the pretests and reviews, as appropriate.
Because we attempted to collect data from every community rather than a  sample of communities, there was no sampling error. However, the  practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors,  commonly referred to as non-sampling errors. For example, differences in  how a particular question is interpreted, the sources of information  available to respondents, how the responses were processed and  analyzed, or the types of people who do not respond can influence the  accuracy of the survey results. We took steps in the development of the  survey, the data collection, and the data analysis to minimize these non- sampling errors and help ensure the accuracy of the answers that were  obtained. For example, a social science survey specialist designed the  questionnaire, in collaboration with GAO staff with subject matter  expertise. Then, as noted earlier, the draft questionnaire was pretested to  ensure that questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to  comprehend. The questionnaire was also reviewed by external experts  and an additional GAO survey specialist. Data were electronically  extracted from the Word questionnaires into a comma-delimited file which  was then imported into a statistical program for analyses. No manual data  entry was performed, thereby removing an additional potential source of  error. We examined the survey results and performed computer analyses  to identify inconsistencies and other indications of error, and addressed  such issues as necessary. Quantitative data analyses and the compilation  of open-ended responses were conducted by the first GAO survey  specialist using statistical software and working directly with GAO staff  with subject matter expertise. An independent GAO data analyst checked  the statistical computer programs for accuracy.
The verbatim wording of key survey questions whose results are  discussed in this report is below:  What have been your community’s three greatest challenges in  dealing with base closure or growth in your community? Please  list one challenge per box below. You can list up to three challenges  in any order. (Response options provided: Three text boxes.)
What successful strategies, if any, has your community used in  dealing with the first challenge? The box will expand as you type.  (Response option provided: One text box.)
Has your community received any financial, technical, or other  assistance (e.g., networking assistance) from the Office of  Economic Adjustment, the military services, or any other office  within the Department of Defense (DOD) to deal with the first  challenge you listed above? Please do not include any  assistance you received from the Association of Defense  Communities or any other agency or organization other than  DOD. (Response options provided: Checkboxes labeled “Yes”, “No”,  and ‘Don’t know.”)
If Yes, what assistance has your community received from the  Office of Economic Adjustment, the military services, or any  other office within DOD to deal with the first challenge you listed  above? (Response option provided: One text box.)
In your opinion, did the Office of Economic Adjustment provide  adequate assistance to address the first challenge you listed  above? (Response options provided: Checkboxes labeled “Yes”,  “No”, and ‘Don’t know.”)
Responses to closed-ended (e.g., Yes/No) questions were summarized  as standard descriptive statistics. Responses to open-ended questions  were analyzed through content analysis. In conducting the content  analysis, one GAO analyst reviewed each open-ended response from  each community representative to identify recurring themes. Using the  identified themes, the analyst then developed categories for coding the  responses. A second GAO analyst reviewed each response from each  community representative and reviewed the first analyst’s themes and  categories to reach concurrence on the themes and categories. Each of  the two GAO analysts then independently reviewed the answers to each  open-ended question and placed them into one or more of the categories.  The analysts then compared their coding to identify any disagreements  and reached agreement on all items through discussion.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to May 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Major Installations Closed During 1988, 1991, 1993 BRAC Rounds
section_title: Appendix III: Locations of Major Installations Closed in BRAC 2005 and Their Corresponding Economic Areas
subsections: section_title: Closure Installation Army Deseret Chemical Depot, UT
section_title: Closure Installation Air Force Brooks City-Base, TX
section_title: Appendix IV: Locations of Major DOD Growth Installations in BRAC 2005 and Their Corresponding Economic Areas
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: James R. McTigue, Jr., (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant  Director; Bonita Anderson; Leslie Bharadwaja; Timothy Carr; Mary Jo  LaCasse; Gregory Marchand; Michael Silver; and Erik Wilkins-McKee  made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Infrastructure: Improved Guidance Needed for Estimating  Alternatively Financed Project Liabilities. GAO-13-337. Washington, D.C.:  April 18, 2013.
Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment  and Closure Rounds. GAO-13-149. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2013.
DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve  Greater Efficiencies. GAO-13-134. Washington, D.C.: November 15,  2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency’s Technology Center Construction Project.  GAO-12-770R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings  Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to  BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012.
Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy  to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan  Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington, D.C.: April 1,  2011.
GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is  Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the  Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to  Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs.  GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning  Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth.  GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year  2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of  Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are  Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings  Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703.  Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support  Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of  Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.:  March 30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in  Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently  Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January  30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to  Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen  Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R.  Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.  GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower  Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC  Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations  Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R.  Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T.  Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have  Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159.  Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,  Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of  Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics  Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13,  2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve  Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need  for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2004.