Foreign Assistance: USAID Completed Many Caribbean Disaster Recovery Activities, but Several Challenges Hampered Efforts
Published: 2006-05-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Jeanne passed through the Caribbean, taking lives and causing widespread damage in several countries. After initial U.S. emergency relief, in October 2004 Congress appropriated $100 million in supplemental funding, primarily for Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, which were significantly affected. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), leader of the U.S. recovery programs, agreed, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, to complete the programs by December 31, 2005, giving the agency a 1-year time frame. GAO was asked to (1) review the nature and status of the programs in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that affected the programs' progress; and (3) assess USAID's use of guidance and lessons learned from previous similar programs and efforts to draw lessons from the current programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of December 31, 2005, USAID had spent about 77 percent of funds allocated for assistance in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti and completed many disaster recovery activities, such as providing business and agriculture grants. However, the agency significantly reduced its targets for building and repairing houses, in part because of cost increases, and granted contractors extensions to complete some of these projects. Severe weather delayed the progress of recovery activities in Jamaica and Haiti--for example, two hurricanes in the summer of 2005 disrupted Jamaican housing repairs. In addition, difficulty coordinating activities with the Grenadian and Jamaican governments hampered housing construction. Further, other construction-related challenges--for example, shortages of cement--delayed projects in Grenada and Jamaica. Finally, frequent security problems in Haiti hindered contractors' progress. USAID has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons learned from previous recovery and reconstruction programs, such as ways to mitigate challenges commonly faced in rebuilding after disasters. USAID staff inexperienced with disaster recovery efforts said that this made it difficult to design and implement the programs. Further, in agreeing to complete the programs within 1 year, USAID faced challenges in designing a broad spectrum of activities that would help rebuild residents' lives and that could be sustained after the programs ended. In addition, the agency did not adopt recommendations from GAO and USAID reviews of past recovery programs that could have helped it more rapidly hire and transfer staff for the Caribbean programs. Although the agency contracted with a management firm to quickly staff its program in Grenada and Jamaica, this led to additional challenges, such as confusion about the management firm's roles and responsibilities in relation to USAID staff and other contractors. USAID staff and contractors are recording lessons learned from the programs in each country.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan struck several Caribbean islands,  including Grenada and Jamaica, where it killed 59 people and inflicted  damage of about $1.4 billion. In the same month, Tropical Storm Jeanne  struck parts of Haiti with heavy rains, causing flash floods that killed more  than 2,000 people, affected an estimated 300,000 others through loss of  homes, schools, and livelihoods, and caused an estimated $300 million in  damage. The United States and other donors responded initially to these  disasters by providing emergency relief, such as food, water, medical  supplies, and temporary shelter. In October 2004, recognizing the need for  longer-term recovery and reconstruction assistance, Congress passed a  supplemental appropriation allocating $100 million for additional  hurricane recovery efforts in the Caribbean. The U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID), designated to lead the U.S.-funded  assistance, initiated the Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Rehabilitation  Program (Hurricane Ivan Program) in Grenada and Jamaica and the  Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program (Tropical Storm Program) in  Haiti in January 2005. Following discussions with the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB), USAID agreed to complete the programs  by December 31, 2005—that is, within 1 year of initiating the programs;  this time frame is shorter than for previous USAID disaster recovery and  reconstruction programs, such as USAID’s program in Central America  following Hurricane Mitch. In addition, instead of transferring or directly  hiring staff, as it has done in the past, USAID hired a management firm,  Wingerts Consulting, to quickly staff and establish the programs in  Grenada and Jamaica.
Having previously examined U.S. efforts to provide disaster recovery  assistance, we were asked to monitor USAID’s delivery of the assistance  in the Caribbean. In this report, we (1) review the recovery and  reconstruction activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, including the  status of the activities as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that  affected USAID’s ability to implement and complete the programs within  the 1-year time frame; and (3) assess USAID’s use of guidance and  application of lessons learned from similar previous programs and its  efforts to draw lessons from the current programs.
To address these matters, we reviewed USAID’s objectives and oversight  strategy for the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Programs. We made  several trips to Grenada and Jamaica and one trip to Haiti. In all three  countries, we reviewed program documents and interviewed USAID staff,  private contractors, and host government officials. We visited 80 project  sites, most of them randomly selected, in Jamaica and Grenada as well as  nine project sites in Haiti that were not randomly selected. We also  analyzed program expenditure and activity data, having assessed the data’s  reliability and finding it sufficient for our purposes. We conducted our  work from March 2005 through May 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. (See app. I for a more detailed  discussion of our scope and methodology).
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In September 2004, four major hurricanes and storms, including Ivan and  Jeanne, caused extensive damage in the Caribbean, particularly in  Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti. Figure 1 shows the paths of Hurricane Ivan  and Tropical Storm Jeanne and describes the extent of damage in the  three countries.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Emergency Relief and Immediate Recovery Assistance
paragraphs: USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provided  emergency relief, such as food, water and sanitation, and shelter, to  address the urgent needs of those affected by the storms. Following  OFDA’s relief efforts in response to Hurricane Ivan, USAID directed  existing agency funding to Grenada and Jamaica—$3.2 million and $7.3  million, respectively—for immediate recovery activities, including clearing  farmland, cleaning up communities, and repairing houses and schools, that  were carried out through June 30, 2005. Soon after Tropical Storm Jeanne  struck Haiti, the U.S. government provided $11.8 million for immediate  emergency relief and recovery assistance, including emergency food and  water, as well as for cleaning up communities.
section_title: U.S. Recovery and Reconstruction Assistance
paragraphs: Of the $100 million supplemental assistance that Congress approved for  hurricane recovery and reconstruction activities in the Caribbean, USAID  allocated $92.4 million to Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti. Figure 2 shows the  amount and percentage allocated to each country.
Lacking a mission in Grenada, the agency administered the Hurricane Ivan  Program from its Jamaica mission and Barbados satellite office, and it  administered the Tropical Storm Program from its Haiti mission. Using a  new approach to its program staffing, rather than reassign USAID staff or  hire personal services contractors, the agency hired Wingerts Consulting  to manage and oversee project activities in Grenada and Jamaica.  Wingerts’s responsibilities included monitoring program activities,  reporting progress to the USAID mission in Jamaica, and coordinating  USAID’s efforts with the Grenadian and Jamaican governments and with  other donors.
USAID created special objectives for each country that defined the target  areas for the recovery and reconstruction funding. For Grenada and  Jamaica, the supplemental funding expanded the initial emergency, or a  short-term response and aimed to help people quickly rebuild their  communities, enhance and improve their skills, provide limited income  support, and resume their path of sustainable development through  activities that provide immediate income, skills training and employment  opportunities. In Haiti, supplemental funds aimed to meet the immediate  needs of Haitians affected by the tropical storm, help them regain sources  of economic activity, and help them prepare for future natural disaster  threats. According to USAID, recovery and reconstruction programs are  essentially development programs with short time frames but share the  same objectives of sustainable growth and prosperity.
section_title: USAID Completed Numerous Recovery Efforts within 1 Year but Granted Extensions for Many Construction Projects
paragraphs: USAID completed many activities it implemented in Grenada, Jamaica,  and Haiti by December 31, 2005. Of the $92.4 million allocated for recovery  and reconstruction across the three countries, the agency expended $71.3  million. The agency implemented a variety of non-construction-related  activities—for example, providing business rehabilitation grants in  Grenada and Jamaica and implementing community cleanup activities in  Haiti—and met or exceeded its targets for these projects within the 1-year  time frame. In addition, it implemented a number of construction-related  projects, such as repair and building housing and infrastructure. However,  although USAID reduced targets, in part because of cost increases for  these projects in all three countries, USAID contractors did not complete  many of them by December 31, 2005—in particular, new housing  construction—and required extensions to finish these projects.
subsections: section_title: USAID Expended Majority of Recovery Funds within 1 Year
paragraphs: As of December 31, 2005, USAID had expended approximately 77 percent  of the $92.4 million that it allocated for recovery efforts in the three  countries. Figure 3 shows program allocation and expenditure by country.
section_title: USAID Implemented Various Nonconstruction Recovery Activities
paragraphs: USAID implemented a variety of non-construction-related activities to help  hurricane and storm survivors in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti recover from  the disasters, completing most of them within the 1-year time frame.  USAID generally reached or exceeded its targets for nonconstruction  recovery activities, despite having raised many of these targets after  initiating the activities. We visited a total of 37 non-construction-related  sites to observe USAID’s progress and interview beneficiaries. Table 1  shows a selection of USAID’s initial and revised nonconstruction targets  and its completed activities, in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti as of  December 31, 2005.
In all three countries, USAID provided assistance to revitalize businesses  and agriculture. In addition, in Haiti, USAID also helped communities clear   away flood debris and take steps to prevent similar disasters in the future.  Following are descriptions of several USAID nonconstruction activities in  the three countries:  In Grenada, USAID provided grants averaging about $6,300 to small  businesses (those with 5 to 24 employees) and grants averaging about  $15,000 to medium-sized businesses (those with 25 to 75 employees) to  reimburse them for hurricane-related repairs. We visited five grant  recipients, each of whom reported using the grants to pay for repairs or  purchase equipment. According to a survey conducted by the contractors  that implemented these grants, about half of the businesses receiving  assistance estimated that they reopened at least 6 months sooner than if  they had had to finance the repairs themselves. Fisherfolk received grants  averaging about $1,900 to replace fishing gear and equipment and repair  boats. Many of the farmers and fisherfolk also received technical  assistance—for example, farmers were taught techniques for turning  backyard yam production into commercial production.
In Jamaica, USAID grants to poultry farmers allowed them to buy egg  grading and cold storage equipment, which in turn will enable them to  increase production and incomes. We visited six horticultural farmers who  received grants from USAID consisting of a technology package, such as  seedling nurseries, drip irrigation systems, or integrated pest management  systems. According to USAID staff, they were able to provide an  unexpectedly large number of grants (11,478 versus the revised target of  2,451) to small and medium-size enterprises because the implementing  team decided to make several grants to individual beneficiaries as an  incentive for beneficiaries to continue to adopt various new technologies  and practices. According to a November 2005 USAID report, agricultural  production for farmers who received grant and technical assistance  through the program was estimated to have increased by 41 percent  compared with pre-Hurricane Ivan production levels. USAID also  conducted workshops that taught artisans how to improve and develop  products, procure goods and services, and package and label their  merchandise. In addition, fisherfolk in Jamaica received grants and  disaster preparedness training. For example, training courses in “Safe  Seamanship and Environmental Management” were delivered to 295  fisherfolk.
In Haiti, USAID cleared streets of mud and improved urban drainage that  had been damaged from flooding. In addition, USAID implemented a cash- for-work program that paid local workers about $2 per day for assisting  with various activities throughout the program, including road and schools  repair, mud removal, and clearing of urban drains (see fig. 4). Further,  USAID funded training in disaster preparedness and response that,  according to a report by a USAID contractor, aimed to “raise disaster  awareness, reduce risks, and prepare for contingencies in vulnerable local  communities and municipalities.” Among the topics covered were forming  community emergency response teams, designating first responders to  coordinate emergency activities, and developing risk management and  mitigation plans.
section_title: USAID Began Many Construction-Related Projects but Did Not Complete All
paragraphs: USAID initiated construction-related projects to repair or replace  hurricane and storm-damaged structures in each of the three countries.  However, USAID contractors did not complete a number of these projects,  although USAID reduced its targets for many of the projects. According to  USAID staff and contractors, rising costs in all three countries were a  factor in USAID’s decision to reduce construction targets. According to an  April 2006 Regional Inspector General (RIG) audit of the Hurricane Ivan  Program, the high cost of housing construction was due, in part, to the  contractor’s unfamiliarity with the local market, which led to the  negotiation of unfavorable subcontracts. The report also indicated that the  cost of houses financed by USAID in Grenada was 37 percent to 49 percent  higher than comparable houses built by the Grenadian Housing Authority;  and, in Jamaica, USAID-funded houses were more than double the cost of  houses built by the Jamaican government. In addition, in Haiti, USAID staff  indicated that a detailed needs survey found that the costs of material and  labor needed to make repairs had more than doubled since the initial  estimates. Table 2 shows a selection of USAID’s initial and revised  construction targets and its completed activities, in Grenada, Jamaica, and  Haiti as of December 31, 2005.
In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID negotiated 6-month extensions of the  bilateral agreements with the respective host governments in December  2005 and, subsequently, granted contractors extensions of varying lengths  based on the expectation that they could complete activities by June 30,  2006. In Haiti, USAID granted the contractor an 18-month extension in  September 2005 to complete major infrastructure repair on a road and  bridge; however, USAID officials managing the program said they  expected to complete these activities by June 2006.
In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID’s construction efforts have focused  primarily on repairing and rebuilding houses and building new homes, and  in Haiti, on repairing infrastructure, public facilities, and houses.  Following are descriptions of several of USAID’s construction-related  projects.
In Grenada, USAID is building 55 new houses on the sites of homes that  had been destroyed by the hurricane. The new houses consist of lumber  over a concrete slab and include septic systems and electrical  connections. Of the 55 homes, 36 have an area of 400 square feet and 19  have an area of 650 square feet, with the size of the house depending on  the size of the household. We visited 11 housing construction sites in  August 2005 and revisited five of them in December, at which time, for the  most part, construction was just beginning. In addition, USAID has  initiated repairs of houses, tourist sites, and schools, among other  buildings (see fig. 5).
In Jamaica, USAID is constructing 220-square-foot concrete-block houses  in two sites provided by the Jamaican government. The Jamaican Office of  National Reconstruction agreed to provide septic systems and electrical  connections for the houses. Most of the beneficiaries are families whose  houses were destroyed by the hurricane because they were close to the  shore; the new housing sites are near the old sites but a safe distance from  the shoreline. We visited the two sites in the early stages of construction  and several months later, after construction had begun. As of January  2006, construction was well under way in the two communities, but none  of the houses were complete.
In Haiti, USAID funded the construction of a bridge and the repair of a  national road that runs from Gonaives to Cap-Haitien. According to  USAID’s contractor implementing infrastructure activities, repairs to the  road will have a significant impact on the local economy by restoring farm- to-market transportation and supporting USAID’s other rehabilitation  projects in the area. According to USAID staff, as of December 2005, 60  percent to 70 percent of the road was completed.
section_title: Various Factors Slowed USAID’s Implementation and Completion of Program Activities
paragraphs: USAID’s implementation and completion of recovery activities in Grenada,  Jamaica, and Haiti within the 1-year time frame were hampered by several  factors. Severe weather in 2005 delayed the progress of some activities, in  particular the reconstruction of houses in Jamaica and infrastructure in  Haiti. Coordination challenges in Grenada and Jamaica contributed to  delays in the implementation and completion of program activities. In  addition, USAID contractors encountered various construction-related  challenges, such as shortages of materials and labor, and difficulty in  fulfilling USAID requirements. Haiti faced continued security challenges  that limited access to recovery sites, consequently delaying progress.
subsections: section_title: Severe Weather Delayed Program Activities in Jamaica and Haiti
paragraphs: Hurricanes and heavy rains in 2005 affected the progress of USAID  reconstruction and recovery activities in Jamaica and Haiti. In Jamaica,  two hurricanes during the summer of 2005, as well as heavy rain in  October and November, contributed to delays in housing reconstruction  and some agriculture activities, including the training of farmers. In Haiti,  a heavier than usual rainy season delayed some USAID construction  activities. Some structures that protected ongoing work on riverbank  repair and irrigation pumps were washed away, and protective dikes had  to be rebuilt. The heavy rain also damaged roads in many of the project  areas, making it difficult to transport construction materials and field staff.
section_title: Coordination Challenges Hindered USAID’s Implementation and Completion of Activities in Grenada and Jamaica
paragraphs: USAID faced several coordination challenges in Grenada, owing in part to  the agency’s lack of a permanent presence in the country, which affected  its ability to implement recovery activities. In Jamaica, USAID  encountered challenges in coordinating with the government, which  negatively affected its ability to complete new housing.
Coordination challenges in Grenada. Grenada lacked a central  coordinating agency immediately following the hurricane to facilitate  disaster recovery within the country. Because USAID has no mission in  Grenada, staff and contractors had to work with various government  ministries to initiate the recovery process. To address the lack of a central  agency, USAID and other donors provided funds to help Grenada establish  the Agency for Reconstruction and Development to coordinate donor  hurricane recovery efforts; however, establishing the agency took several  months, contributing to delays in certain activities, such as developing  criteria for, and identifying, beneficiaries to receive housing repairs and  reconstruction.
Coordination challenges in Jamaica. The government of Jamaica did  not complete certain construction activities as agreed with USAID,  delaying USAID’s completion of new houses. Jamaica’s Office of National  Reconstruction (ONR), established by the government to coordinate  Hurricane Ivan recovery activities, verbally agreed to provide, by  December 31, 2005, concrete bases and install water, roads, and drainage  infrastructure at the two sites selected for new USAID housing  construction. However, USAID did not sign a memorandum of agreement  with the Jamaican government that clearly designated the construction  responsibilities of each party and deadlines for completion. According to  USAID officials and our observations during site visits, ONR made slow  progress in fulfilling its part of construction activities and as of January  2006 had not installed electricity and septic systems, although USAID’s  construction of many houses was close to completion. As of March 2006,  ONR had not completed the construction activities that it had agreed with  USAID to complete by December 31, 2005.
section_title: Construction-Related Challenges Led to Delays in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti
paragraphs: USAID contractors encountered several challenges that slowed the  agency’s implementation and completion of construction projects in all  three countries. These challenges included shortages of materials, USAID’s  policies regarding land titles and bank guarantees, and difficulties working  with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and subcontractors.
Materials shortages. In Grenada, disruptions following the hurricane, as  well as the island’s relatively remote location, led to shortages of  construction materials that periodically delayed housing repairs and new  housing construction. According to USAID, obtaining building materials in  Grenada became more challenging following Hurricane Emily in 2005. In  Jamaica, according to USAID, increased duties on imported cement, heavy  rains that soaked the cement quarries, and a labor strike that occurred in  the country’s only cement factory led to shortages that delayed housing  repairs and construction. As of March 2006, USAID reported that  construction in Jamaica continued to be slowed by a shortage of cement  because the production site that supplies the region shut down after  producing low-quality cement.
Difficulty in establishing land titles. In Grenada, difficulties in  establishing land title or ownership caused construction delays. A USAID  housing contractor in Grenada told us that although it originally identified  400 to 500 prospective beneficiaries who met selection criteria established  by the Grenadian government, many of these people lacked the land titles  or proof of ownership, which USAID required of new-housing  beneficiaries. Because the process of verifying ownership was so time  consuming, the contractor eventually ran advertisements soliciting  respondents who met the selection criteria and had proof of land  ownership.
Delays in obtaining bank guarantees. In Haiti, delays encountered by  contractors seeking bank guarantees contributed to implementation  delays of some construction projects. USAID staff in Haiti explained that  the agency requires construction contractors to provide a bank guarantee  in order to receive advance disbursements to buy materials and pay for  labor, which USAID officials said is common commercial practice.  However, Haiti’s economic situation made it difficult for local contractors  to obtain bank guarantees, even when the contractors were reputable and  had a valid contract with an international organization. Because  contractors could not begin work without the guarantees, some  construction activities were delayed. For example, according to USAID  officials, one highway construction contractor lost a month and a half of  work time and another contractor lost 2 months while obtaining bank  guarantees.
NGO-related and subcontractor challenges. In Grenada, contractors  encountered challenges in working with local NGOs and subcontractors.  The implementing contractor in Grenada relied on NGOs to help identify  people who met government criteria to receive housing support. However,  according to the contractor, the NGOs had difficulty quickly selecting  beneficiaries and, as a result, housing construction was delayed. In  Jamaica, USAID worked with NGOs to perform housing repairs. According  to USAID staff, it was difficult to attract NGOs that could fulfill the  agency’s documentation and reporting requirements in order to receive  grants for the housing repairs. In addition, according to an April 2006 RIG  report, the sole subcontractor hired to build houses performed poorly,  which also contributed to construction delays.
section_title: Security Problems Disrupted Program Activities in Haiti
paragraphs: In Haiti, kidnappings and continued violence in areas affected by the  tropical storm presented security challenges that disrupted USAID’s  recovery work. According to USAID officials, most security issues that  delayed program activities occurred in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince,  where frequent kidnappings and violence made the port zone extremely  dangerous. In addition, attacks on port officials prompted them to strike  for better security, and sometimes delayed distribution of materials.  USAID officials told us that the lack of security required USAID’s  contractors to take precautionary measures, such as daily monitoring of  the security situation, and invest additional resources to protect staff and  activity sites before undertaking activities. In addition, security concerns  led to the temporary evacuation of most direct-hire USAID staff from Haiti  during the summer of 2005. Security concerns also limited USAID staff’s  and contractors’ access to project sites and ability to provide assistance in  certain areas. For example, U.S. embassy security policies required special  approval for travel to Gonaives—one of the areas most affected by the  tropical storm and a target for USAID assistance—because of continued  violence there.
section_title: Lack of Formal Program Guidance, Time Frame, and Staffing Issues Contributed to Implementation Problems
paragraphs: USAID has not issued recovery and reconstruction program guidance that  incorporates lessons learned from previous programs; as a result, USAID  staff were challenged to find information to guide the design and  implementation of the Hurricane Ivan Program, leading to an ad hoc  design process and implementation delays. In addition, although it applied  some lessons learned from its Hurricane Mitch and other past programs,  USAID did not apply lessons and recommendations regarding time frames  and staffing, and as a result, USAID staff tasked with managing the  Caribbean disaster recovery programs faced challenges similar to those  encountered in prior programs. USAID staff and contractors stated that  they are currently recording lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan and  Tropical Storm Programs.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Guidance That Includes Lessons Learned Contributed to Program Design and Implementation Challenges
paragraphs: Although USAID has managed several large disaster recovery and  reconstruction programs since 1999, USAID has not provided guidance  specific to these programs that includes lessons learned from previous  programs. USAID has issued guidance for OFDA emergency assistance  that serves as a reference both for OFDA staff and for the private and  public organizations that work with OFDA in providing emergency  assistance. However, this guidance does not address the design and  implementation of the recovery and reconstruction activities that USAID  provides following OFDA’s emergency response. In addition, the agency  has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons learned from designing  and implementing its prior recovery and reconstruction programs. For  example, for our 2002 report on USAID’s assistance after Hurricanes Mitch  and Georges, USAID staff and other federal agencies involved in the  recovery efforts in Latin America provided us with some lessons learned  and ideas for improving the delivery of future disaster recovery assistance,  such as the need to establish accountability mechanisms as part of  program design, hire firms to provide technical oversight, and develop  fixed-amount reimbursable contracts. Although USAID recorded some  lessons learned from its Hurricanes Mitch and Georges recovery program,  this document, unlike its OFDA guidance, has remained in draft form since  2002, has not been formally issued or approved by the agency, and may not  be readily available to all staff.
USAID staff assigned to manage the Hurricane Ivan Program, who did not  have prior experience in managing recovery and reconstruction activities,  reported that the lack of guidance and access to lessons learned created  challenges in planning and managing a wide range of activities. According  to USAID staff designing the Hurricane Ivan Program, the lack of ready  access to lessons learned from previous recovery and reconstruction  programs resulted in an ad hoc approach to planning recovery activities.  USAID headquarters officials told us that no formal agency guidance was  available to assist them in planning the recovery effort; consequently, they  had to search for documents and contact staff involved in previous USAID  disaster recovery efforts to understand how previous programs were  implemented.
Officials at USAID headquarters told us that some program planning  during disaster recovery situations is by necessity country specific and  based on the political, economic, and disaster situation in the affected  country. However, a USAID official stated that operational guidance would  have facilitated the design process and that ready access to lessons  learned could have prevented some mistakes. For example, if USAID  officials had had access to lessons learned regarding likely increases in  postdisaster demand for construction materials and labor, it might have  helped them to establish more realistic targets for activities to be achieved  within a 1-year time frame. With regard to construction and repair,  important lessons from prior USAID disaster recovery programs include  the need to account for the difficulties involved with hiring and  supervising contractors unfamiliar with USAID requirements, selecting  beneficiaries and verifying land titles.
section_title: USAID Applied Some Lessons from Previous Disaster Programs but Did Not Follow Prior Recommendations on Time Frame and Staffing
paragraphs: In designing and implementing recovery efforts in Grenada, Jamaica, and  Haiti, USAID applied some lessons from previous disaster recovery  programs. However, the agency did not apply lessons and  recommendations regarding time frames and staffing for recovery  programs. As a result, USAID staff tasked with managing the Caribbean  disaster recovery programs faced challenges that could have been avoided  if they had had access to lessons learned from prior programs; in addition,  staffing issues remain unaddressed.
subsections: section_title: USAID Applied Some Lessons Learned from Previous Programs
paragraphs: Despite lacking ready access to lessons learned, USAID headquarters  officials that designed the recovery programs gained access to draft  documents that they said allowed them to apply some lessons learned  from USAID’s Hurricane Mitch recovery program. For instance, referring  to lessons regarding accountability and sustainability, officials involved  the Regional Inspector General to ensure that appropriate accountability  mechanisms were in place and incorporated the concept of “build back  better,” such as rebuilding hurricane-affected infrastructure to better  withstand future natural disasters. According to USAID, the team  implementing business, agriculture, and training activities in Jamaica  followed lessons learned from Hurricane Mitch regarding hiring  contractors with proven track records. USAID staff in Haiti also reported  that some lessons learned from the Hurricane Georges recovery program,  which included projects in Haiti, had been incorporated into their  program’s design, including    simplifying the task order approval process for hiring contractors,    working with community-based organizations to implement recovery    hiring monitoring firms to assist with technical and financial oversight of  program activities.
section_title: One-Year Time Frame May Have Limited Impact and Sustainability of Some Activities and Conflicted with Prior Lessons Learned
paragraphs: In agreeing to a 1-year time frame for the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical  Storm Programs, USAID may have limited the impact and sustainability of  some activities and did not take into account lessons learned from the  Hurricanes Mitch and Georges effort. According to OMB officials  responsible for foreign affairs programs, the 1-year time frame was  developed to speed its completion of recovery activities relative to  previous USAID disaster recovery efforts and, in response to concerns  expressed by members of Congress that these emergency supplemental  resources be expended in a timely manner, to assist with recovery efforts  and not divert funds to regular long term development programs.  However, our recent interviews with USAID staff and contractors, as well  as previous GAO work, suggests that in agreeing to the December 31, 2005,  deadline, USAID faced a trade-off in trying to complete a broad spectrum  of activities within the 1-year time frame and ensure that activities  supported through these programs have the intended impact in helping  beneficiaries recover, rebuild, and find jobs in the postdisaster  environment and can be sustained by host government staff after the  programs end.
In Grenada, USAID provided training in various trades and also paid  participants a stipend while they attended 6-week courses. However, in a  later evaluation of this program component, the contractors conducting  the training reported that participants had commented that 6 weeks was  too short to fully develop some skills, such as those needed for  construction; however, because the contractor did not assess the training  until the end of the 1-year time frame, they were unable to modify the  training design. The contractor reported that a longer program time frame,  such as 18 months, would have allowed them to assess the training’s  results—for instance, by tracking the number of people that found jobs  after being trained—and adjust the design to increase its impact. The  contractors also found that the time frame limited their ability to assess  the results of training in hotel services, because many of the islands’ hotels  were still closed for repair during the year that training was provided. We  interviewed 19 persons who participated in USAID’s skills training in  Grenada and found that fewer than half were employed 3 to 6 months after  completing it.
In Haiti, USAID officials said that although they tried to select projects  that fit the needs of affected areas, the 1-year time frame had implications  for the sustainability of some program activities. For example, the officials  explained that their activities included hillside stabilization and the  development of an early warning system to be transferred to the  government of Haiti at the program’s conclusion. However, the USAID  officials said that 1 year was not enough time to implement and test some  activities, and train government staff to take them over. USAID officials  said that 2 years would have been a more reasonable time frame.
Our prior assessments of the agency’s Hurricane Mitch recovery program  highlighted some of the trade-offs in trying to design activities that are  sustainable and can be completed within a short time frame. In our 2002  assessment of USAID’s administration of disaster recovery assistance after  Hurricanes Mitch and Georges, we reported, based on responses from  USAID staff and other agencies involved in providing the assistance, that  “the December 31, 2001, deadline was a major factor in how they planned,  designed, and implemented their disaster recovery activities, and it also  affected the extent to which sustainability could be built into the  program.” For example, one agency involved in the Mitch recovery  reported that the deadline limited project sustainability because it did not  allow enough time to complete training for local entities. Another agency  said future projects should have follow-on activities to assess the  implementation of technical guidance and training provided. USAID  officials in the Dominican Republic acknowledged that they selected some  activities because they knew they could complete them by the program  deadline, despite recognizing that other activities might have achieved  greater sustainability.
section_title: USAID Did Not Implement Some Prior Staffing Recommendations and Encountered Challenges Related to Use of Management Firm
paragraphs: USAID did not adopt several prior recommendations that could have  helped it to more rapidly hire and transfer staff in response to recovery  and reconstruction needs, and as a result of hiring Wingerts Consulting to  quickly staff the Hurricane Ivan Program in Grenada and Jamaica, the  agency encountered additional challenges. In our 2002 report, we  observed that USAID did not have the “surge capacity” to quickly design  and initiate a large-scale infrastructure and development program with  relatively short-range deadlines (2.5 years) while providing emergency  relief and initial reconstruction assistance and managing its regular  development program. Based on these findings, we recommended that  USAID develop and implement procedures that would (1) allow it to  quickly reassign key personnel in postemergency and postcrisis situations  and (2) allow missions to hire personal services contractors to augment  staff on an expedited basis. In addition, USAID’s draft document  outlining lessons learned from its Hurricane Mitch program indicates that  a shortage of qualified engineering and technical staff constrained the  implementation of the program; the document recommends designating an  official to identify staffing needs quickly and take action to address them.  USAID agreed with the recommendations in our 2002 report but as of April  2006 had not taken steps to respond to them; it also had not implemented  the recommendations in its 2002 draft lessons-learned report. In addition,  we recently reported that USAID had not staffed several positions that it  considered critical to essential technical oversight of its tsunami  reconstruction programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, indicating that  staffing these types of programs remains a challenge.
USAID decided to hire Wingerts Consulting to manage and oversee the  program in Grenada, where USAID has no permanent presence, and assist  with oversight in Jamaica. According to USAID’s Mission Director in  Jamaica and other staff, factors influencing the decision included the  following:    The mission needed assistance in initiating recovery activities and  personnel with technical skills to oversee disaster recovery activities,  particularly construction.
The agency’s process for hiring personal services contractors can take up  to 6 months, and given the 1-year time frame, staff were needed quickly.
Hiring a consulting firm provided the agency the flexibility to acquire  short-term staff with skills needed for specific program activities as well  as to replace staff when their skills were no longer needed.
According to USAID’s Regional Inspector General, USAID staff, and  contractors, the agency’s decision to hire Wingerts Consulting to oversee  the program in Grenada and Jamaica led to additional challenges.
In its April 2005 report, USAID’s RIG found that Wingerts’s roles and  responsibilities in monitoring the program’s implementation had not been  clearly defined, making it difficult for contractors to implement the  program, and for USAID staff to manage program activities. USAID  subsequently refocused Wingerts’s responsibilities primarily on providing  technical oversight and supporting the USAID permanent staff responsible  for various program components in Grenada and Jamaica. It took two  months after the Wingerts contract was signed to more clearly define each  party’s roles and responsibilities.
USAID staff and contractors told us that they were uncertain about  Wingerts’s role in managing the program. In addition, according to USAID  contractors, the added layer of oversight that Wingerts provided  sometimes created tension and confusion because contractors were still  required to report to USAID staff overseeing their program activities in  Jamaica and Barbados. In its April 2006 follow-up audit, the RIG noted that  the Wingerts oversight model was problematic in that USAID’s other  contractors were not accustomed to having Wingerts perform functions  that USAID staff would normally perform, and as a result, working  relationships were uncomfortable.
Although USAID staff and contractors reported some challenges in  working with Wingerts, USAID officials in Jamaica noted that the mission  has benefited by engaging a contracting firm to fulfill specific functions,  rather than hiring staff. According to USAID, by using a contractor to  provide a range of management and oversight support, the mission created  a structure that was highly flexible and allowed for quick responses to  changing needs throughout the program. USAID also noted that in  Grenada, where USAID has no presence, the contracting firm served an  essential function of handling day-to-day interaction with the government  in addition to managing the $8 million allocated for direct government  support. While the use of Wingerts provided USAID with flexibility, USAID  staff and the U.S. embassy in Grenada said that temporarily relocating  USAID permanent staff or personal services contractors to manage  recovery efforts in the country would have been more efficient than using  the management firm.
section_title: USAID Staff and Contractors Are Recording Lessons Learned
paragraphs: As part of its internal evaluation of the Hurricane Ivan reconstruction,  USAID staff and contractors are recording lessons learned, including an  assessment of the program’s economic impact and whether the program  helped the countries to “build back better” and prepare for future  disasters. The staff and contractors told us in December 2005 that they  would incorporate this information into their final program summary,  which they expected to complete in May 2006. Staff at the Haiti mission  told us that they were recording lessons learned from the Tropical Storm  Program disaster mitigation activities and that overall lessons learned will  be included in the final program report. However, we have not yet learned  whether USAID headquarters intends to incorporate lessons learned from  the Caribbean programs into guidance that would be available to staff  implementing future recovery and reconstruction programs. (See app. II  for our summary of lessons learned reported by U.S. officials and  contractors involved in the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Programs  as well as for lessons culled from our and USAID’s reviews of its previous  disaster recovery programs.)
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Disaster recovery and reconstruction assistance is an important  component of USAID’s development assistance portfolio, providing a  bridge between its emergency relief efforts and its long-term development  assistance. In responding to the Caribbean disasters, USAID provided a  wide range of recovery and reconstruction support. However, despite  having administered several large-scale disaster recovery programs in  Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia since 1999, USAID has not issued  guidance for recovery and reconstruction programs that incorporates  lessons learned from its prior efforts, leading to challenges in designing  and implementing the recovery and reconstruction activities discussed in  this report. In addition, although USAID and GAO have previously  documented USAID’s difficulties in quickly staffing its recovery and  reconstruction programs and have made recommendations to assist  USAID in correcting these problems, these issues remain unaddressed. As  a result, the agency is likely to be unprepared to rapidly recruit and  mobilize technically skilled staff for its next disaster recovery program.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better facilitate USAID’s ability to design and implement future disaster  recovery programs and address its previously documented recurring  staffing challenges, we recommend that the USAID Administrator take the  following two actions:    Develop disaster recovery and reconstruction program guidance that  incorporates lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan Recovery and  Reconstruction Program and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program as  well as previous disaster recovery programs.
Revise staffing procedures to allow the agency to more quickly reassign or  hire key personnel, either to augment staff responsible for disaster  recovery efforts in countries with a USAID mission or to manage efforts in  countries where USAID does not maintain a permanent presence.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to USAID, the Department of State and  OMB. We received a formal comment letter from USAID (see app. III), in  which they agreed with our recommendations. USAID and OMB provided  technical comments that we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.  The Department of State had no comments.
USAID agreed with our first recommendation and indicated it has  established an agency task force for complex emergency and stabilization  responses to allow it and other U.S. government agencies to undertake a  structural approach based on past experience to provide an integrated and  effective response to future disasters. Further, as part of its technical  comments, USAID indicated that the Jamaica Mission has taken steps to  document a draft list of lessons learned that will be included in the final  report at the conclusion of the Hurricane Ivan program. USAID said these  reports will be shared with USAID officials in Washington for developing  guidelines for future disaster recovery programs and for inclusion in  USAID’s Center for Development and Evaluation databases.
USAID also agreed with our second recommendation. The agency  acknowledged that recent large-scale natural disaster and complex  emergencies, including the Asian tsunami and conflicts in Afghanistan and  Iraq, have revealed glaring gaps in the U.S. capacity to respond effectively,  particularly for stabilization and reconstruction programs. In technical  comments, USAID’s Jamaica mission noted that its use of a management  and oversight firm provided a highly flexible structure to respond quickly  to changes in staffing needs throughout the program; however, USAID  further recommended that any adjustment to the agency’s policy address  ongoing urgent needs to change staffing under projects with a short time  horizon. To respond to staffing challenges, USAID has proposed the  development of a “civilian surge capacity,” which, if approved and funded,  would give USAID over a 3-year time period to develop short- to long-term  staff on an as-needed basis, focusing on skill sets that USAID has  identified as lacking sufficient capacity.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees as well as the Administrator, USAID; Acting Director, OMB;  and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We were asked to periodically monitor the delivery of assistance under  USAID’s Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Reconstruction Program (Hurricane  Ivan Program) and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program (Tropical  Storm Program). In this report, we (1) review the recovery and  reconstruction activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, including the  status of activities as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that  affected USAID’s ability to implement and complete the programs within  the 1-year time frame; and (3) assess USAID’s use of guidance and  application of lessons learned from similar previous programs as well as  its efforts to draw lessons from the current programs.
To determine the status of the programs, we initially reviewed the  supplemental appropriation language passed in 2004 and USAID  documents that outline special objectives for each country and  interviewed program officials regarding program goals. We also made  three monitoring trips to Grenada, two trips to Jamaica, and one trip to  Haiti. The information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our  independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary  sources. After our initial monitoring trip to Haiti, our ability to travel there  was curtailed when, because of security concerns, the U.S. Department of  State restricted country access to emergency personnel only. Therefore,  after the initial trip, we reviewed monthly reports and held periodic  conference calls with USAID staff and contractors to discuss the status of  the recovery program in that country. During our monitoring trips to  Grenada and Jamaica, we conducted document reviews and held  interviews with USAID staff as well as contractors to discuss program  progress, determine compliance with established requirements set by  audit entities, and learn how funding allocation decisions were made and  tracked. We also met with private contractors and subcontractors, and  host government officials involved in the recovery efforts to discuss  program implementation and progress. In Grenada, we interviewed 19  attendees of the skills training program to get a sense for the skills that  were taught and the extent to which the training provided employment  opportunities for the attendees. In addition, we conducted field visits to  various project sites to observe the progress of activities and verify the  extent to which objectives and timelines were being met. We visited a  random selection of 80 project sites in Jamaica and Grenada, and 9 project  sites in Haiti that were not randomly selected due to security restrictions  and our inability to visit following our initial information gathering trip.  (See table 3.)
We assessed factors affecting the implementation and completion of  program activities by reviewing USAID monthly reports and interviewing  USAID staff, contractors, and host government officials overseeing the  various program activities during our monitoring trips to Grenada and  Jamaica. For Haiti, during our periodic conference calls, we discussed  implementation and completion challenges with USAID staff and  contractors with oversight responsibility for the various program  components.
To assess USAID’s application of lessons learned from previous disaster  recovery programs, we reviewed reports from prior USAID recovery  efforts and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., Grenada,  Jamaica, and Haiti as well as contractors. We reviewed documentation on  lessons learned that USAID officials had compiled following the Hurricane  Mitch recovery program in Central America. We further reviewed reports  on disaster relief from various international organizations, such as the  World Bank, that detailed lessons learned from other disaster recovery  efforts. Two members of our audit team also attended a Caribbean Basin  conference that highlighted disaster preparedness and mitigation  strategies, including strategies for funding reconstruction, whether  building codes should be regionally or nationally applied, and how the  private sector can contribute to effective disaster preparedness and  mitigation strategies. Finally, we collated lessons learned in a separate  appendix (see app. II) based on interviews with staff and contractors  administering the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Jeanne Programs  and lessons documented in previous GAO and USAID assessments of  disaster recovery programs in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia.
To ensure that appropriate internal controls were established to account  for program funds, we interviewed USAID financial management staff in  Jamaica and reviewed program documents that described USAID’s  mechanisms for ensuring accountability. We also coordinated with  USAID’s Regional Inspector General to determine the Inspector General’s  involvement with establishing internal controls and monitoring how well  USAID maintained controls throughout the program.
For this report, we relied primarily on USAID’s data reported to date in the  agency’s monthly reports on expenditures and progress in each country.  We assessed the reliability of this data by (1) interviewing USAID program  staff and its contractors to determine how data were collected and  reported and what quality assurance mechanisms were in place, (2)  reviewing a sample of USAID’s program files as well as its contractors’  files in Grenada and Jamaica, and (3) collaborating with USAID’s Regional  Inspector General on the reliability of expenditure data. During our trip to  Grenada in August 2005, we found errors and a misrepresentation of data  in USAID’s monthly reports, which we reported to USAID staff and  contractors responsible for the collating the data. USAID corrected the  data errors and made changes to certain indicators that we had found to  be misleading. Overall, we found that USAID’s data as corrected were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of addressing our reporting  objectives. We conducted our work from March 2005 through May 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned from USAID Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction Efforts
paragraphs: We reviewed USAID’s recovery efforts following the 1998 hurricanes in  Latin America and 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador, as well as its ongoing  efforts in response to the 2004 tsunami in Asia. Following is a compilation  of lessons reported by U.S. officials and contractors involved in USAID’s  Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Rehabilitation Program and Tropical Storm  Jeanne Recovery Program as well as lessons from GAO and USAID  reviews of previous disaster recovery programs. Although this list is by no  means exhaustive, it summarizes some common lessons and examples of  USAID’s efforts to address disaster recovery challenges and is intended as  a tool for future disaster recovery programs.
subsections: section_title: Lessons Learned for Program Planning and Implementation
paragraphs: Set appropriate time frames. Disaster recovery program time frames  should be based on a needs assessment of the activities that best aid  recovery and should be undertaken in phases, if necessary. In our 2002  report on USAID’s Hurricane Mitch and Georges recovery program,  various agency officials said the program’s time frame influenced how  planning, design, and implementation of recovery activities affected  program sustainability. For example, the Dominican Republic mission  reported that it selected some activities it knew could be completed by the  expenditure deadline despite recognizing that other activities may have  achieved greater sustainability, especially those with more cost sharing  with the host government and other implementing organizations. Other  agency officials involved in the recovery suggested that future efforts  include time for follow-on activities, such as training, to ensure better  sustainability. USAID staff and contractors implementing the Caribbean  programs’ activities discussed in this report stated that the 1-year time  frame influenced the types of activities they selected and may have limited  the sustainability of some projects. One contractor explained that in a  previous program, activities were divided into different phases (e.g.,  immediate recovery activities were implemented in less than 1 year, while  road construction was given a 1.5-year time frame and railroad  reconstruction was planned for 2 years but completed in 3). In the  Hurricane Ivan Program, USAID was able to identify beneficiaries for  business and agriculture recovery grants and expend the majority of  program funds allocated to these activities within a 1-year time frame,  while reconstruction of houses in Jamaica and Grenada required an  extension several months beyond December 31, 2005. Based on their  experience in the Hurricane Mitch and Georges recovery program, USAID  officials designing and implementing the Tropical Storm Program in Haiti  said that program staff should not attempt to complete activities in an  arbitrarily short time frame. USAID staff and contractors we interviewed  stated that 15 to 18 months is a more reasonable time frame for  reconstruction activities.
Conduct thorough cost assessments. USAID should ensure that initial cost  estimates are based on specific information about site conditions. Due to  inadequate estimates in the Caribbean programs regarding the cost of  labor and materials for reconstruction activities, USAID originally targeted  an unrealistically high number of activities that later had to be reduced.  Part of this lesson includes anticipating increases in construction  materials and labor due to increases in demand for construction after a  disaster. For example, in Indonesia, USAID’s initial cost estimates for a  road to be rebuilt after the tsunami were based on limited information  about site conditions. Because of the uncertainty about the site conditions,  the Army Corps of Engineers included a 20 percent contingency in its cost  estimate. However, actual costs may still exceed this estimate because  plans for the road have changed.
Look beyond restoration of the status quo and aim to improve  infrastructure and livelihood opportunities. In the planning of  Hurricanes Mitch and Georges recovery efforts, the U.S. and its  international partners agreed on an approach that would not simply  replace what was destroyed, but would “build back better” with a lasting  impact. This approach was adopted in the Caribbean programs. For  example, in the rehabilitation of schools, USAID repaired schools to their  pre-Ivan condition or better in compliance with the building codes and  hurricane resistance standards. In Haiti, USAID also provided household  restoration grants as well as created a cash-for-work program to help  those affected by the storm to rebuild their livelihoods and decrease their  vulnerability to future floods.
Establish a host government agency to coordinate the international  response to the disaster. USAID worked with the governments of Grenada  and Jamaica to establish independent coordination entities separate from  those countries’ ministries to facilitate the recovery process and  streamline working with the government. A central agency to coordinate  disaster recovery between donors is important for ensuring that activities  are not duplicated; however, USAID and other donors should take into  account the time needed to establish these agencies when developing  implementation schedules and setting program completion time frames.  For example, USAID reported that the Agency for Reconstruction in  Development in Grenada, funded by USAID and other donors, did not take  over coordination responsibilities until March 2005, about 3 months into  USAID’s program. In Jamaica, USAID coordinated with the Office for  National Reconstruction to identify recipients for recovery assistance as  well as to build new housing communities. The Indonesian government  established the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency to coordinate  the international response to the tsunami. The entity has produced a  master plan for reconstruction that it has used to attempt to control and  track organizations involved in reconstruction.
Channel assistance through organizations and contractors with proven  track records and a history of working in the affected country. USAID  officials administering Haiti’s Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program  reported that they selected contractors that had a history of working there  as a means of strengthening coordination and ensuring implementation of  program activities. This was particularly critical given Haiti’s security  challenges and USAID’s inability to travel to many of the project sites  regularly. In El Salvador, USAID contracted with at least five private  voluntary organizations that it had previously worked with to implement  earthquake recovery projects. According to USAID officials, using  organizations that have proven to be capable and reliable reduces the  likelihood of misuse of funds and corruption.
Involve community-based organizations in program implementation.  Noting that this was a successful approach in Hurricane Georges, USAID  officials in Haiti worked with community-based organizations in  implementing the Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program. For example,  one contractor worked with local management committees it had worked  with during a previous program in Gonaives several years before. These  groups were one of the few functioning civil society organizations in  Gonaives immediately after the flooding and served as program partners  and liaisons on community issues, security, and sustainable maintenance  efforts. Another contractor worked with already existing water user  groups organized around irrigated parcels in the Plaine des Gonaives and  Trois Rivieres areas. The use of community-based organizations also  allowed the contractor to mobilize the local population rapidly to execute  short-term employment generation activities, such as tertiary roads and  ravine protection structures. In addition, school rehabilitation frequently  was organized around parent and teacher groups that supported the  school in preflood periods.
Avoid overlap between host governments and community-based  organizations to avoid inefficiencies. To avert potential future overlap  with nongovernmental organizations in Sri Lanka during tsunami  reconstruction, USAID participated in weekly meetings with the  government coordinating entity and NGOs, among others, to designate  responsibility for different geographic areas.
section_title: Lessons Learned for Staffing
paragraphs: Identify staffing needs quickly and designate someone to manage the  staffing process. USAID officials involved in Hurricane Mitch recovery  activities drafted lessons learned recommending that, when responding to  disaster recovery, USAID mission and Washington officials need to quickly  identify staffing needs and that an appropriate official should be charged  with tracking staff issues to facilitate the response. For example, in our  2002 report of Hurricane Mitch and Georges, we reported that the number  of USAID direct-hire staff in general, and contracts officers in particular,  has declined and USAID had difficulty finding qualified personnel to  manage the large-scale emergency program on an expedited basis. In the  same report, USAID’s Honduran mission reported serious constraints due  to the absence of a contracts and grants officer needed to negotiate and  sign agreements and ensure that implementation and acquisition  mechanisms are in place. The mission in the Dominican Republic reported  that the majority of staff hired for its reconstruction effort had no prior  USAID experience and that implementation slowed as new staff learned  the agency’s management system. As stated earlier in this report, the lack  of experienced staff was also a challenge in the Hurricane Ivan program.
Create a mechanism to quickly hire staff for recovery and reconstruction  programs. In addition, a draft document in which contractors assessed  USAID’s Hurricane Mitch program reported that lengthy personal service  contract hiring practices added to staffing bottlenecks, and some USAID  staff recommended that waiver authorities should be made available to  hire staff quickly on a noncompetitive basis. In addition, the Honduras  Mission stated that USAID needs to do a better job of immediately  identifying staff with the skills needed for reconstruction activities rather  than relying on staff within the mission or region. In the tsunami program,  to establish technical oversight, USAID reassigned and hired experienced  staff, such as engineers, and acquired additional technical expertise  through interagency agreements but had difficulty filling some positions it  considered critical to technical oversight.
section_title: L essons Learned for Recovery Activities
subsections: section_title: Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation
paragraphs: Provide disaster preparedness and mitigation training to communities.
In Haiti, 222 participants in seven communities were trained in disaster  preparedness and mitigation, including the designation of emergency  responders and the development of local action plans focused on risk  assessment, disaster mitigation, and preparedness. In Jamaica, fisherfolk  received training in “Safe Seamanship and Environmental Management.”  USAID also developed training to ensure sustainability and provide local  capacity building through a course on “General Safety and Survival at  Sea,” which was taught to 60 participants from three local NGOs, in  coordination with the Caribbean Maritime Institute. Participants received  safety equipment and an emergency response guide developed for the  fisheries sector, including specific measures to reduce vulnerability with  regard to small boat safety, search and rescue, sinking vessels, fires, bad  weather, and survival at sea under different distress situations.
section_title: Construction
paragraphs: Ensure quality control of construction and follow building codes  appropriate to type of disaster sustained. USAID has difficulty ensuring  that contractors build houses correctly and completely. For example, in  our review of the El Salvador earthquake program, we reported problems  such as roof supports that were improperly connected to walls, and metal  windows and doors that were not functioning properly. Following the  GAO visit, USAID issued detailed procedures that Army Corps of  Engineers Officials and contractors were required to complete following  their work. USAID also conducted additional quality control training that  contractors, NGOs, and other entities involved in implementing the  program were required to attend. USAID officials stated that the training  was useful in reinforcing the principle of “building back better” and that,  following the training, the quality of construction improved. Contractors in  the Hurricane Ivan program followed local building and hurricane  resistance codes, including the use of hurricane straps and Caribbean  Disaster Mitigation Standards for wood and concrete houses.
Understand the local land tenure system. In El Salvador, many  Salvadorans whose houses were destroyed had no legal proof that they  owned the property on which their house had stood. Housing starts were  delayed because contractors had to wait weeks for approvals to begin  construction. The USAID contractor responsible for housing in Grenada  also encountered challenges due to land title issues. The contractor told us  that although it originally identified 400 to 500 prospective beneficiaries  who met selection criteria established by the Grenadian government, many  of these people lacked the land titles or proof of ownership that USAID  required of new-housing beneficiaries. Because the process of verifying  ownership was so time consuming, the contractor eventually ran  advertisements soliciting respondents who met the selection criteria and  had proof of land ownership.
Establish memorandums of understanding or formal agreements if  reconstruction efforts are shared with the host government. In Haiti,  USAID officials established a memorandum of understanding with the  government for road and bridge construction activities. Conversely, in  Jamaica, USAID did not establish a memorandum of understanding with  the government in its coordination for new-housing construction.
According to USAID, when the Jamaican government did not fulfill its  obligation to install electricity and septic systems and to provide other  infrastructure for the housing communities, USAID had to grant  extensions to complete activities that were impacted by the delays and, as  a result, delayed the delivery of new housing to beneficiaries.
Address warranties and liabilities for construction projects before  building. Warranty and liability responsibilities should be detailed in the  contract agreements and determined prior to construction. In the  Hurricane Ivan Program, USAID did not determine who would fulfill  warranty and defects liability responsibility early on in the program, and  such issues were still being resolved, in some cases, after construction of  schools and other buildings were already completed and the contractor  considered the project closed.
section_title: Nonconstruction
paragraphs: Coordinate with local industry boards and organizations to identify  recipients and community leaders. USAID contractors in Grenada  worked to improve tourism services after Hurricane Ivan left 50 percent of  the persons previously working in this sector unemployed and another 40  percent underemployed. The contractor formed partnerships with several  local tourism associations, including hotel, airport, taxi, and small- business organizations. The contractors developed skills training courses  to improve hospitality and tourist services. For example, after some  participants were trained in craft making, the contractors organized a “Buy  Grenada” fair to showcase the participants’ work. In addition, the  contractors partnered with several community-based organizations to  deliver training in small business management, food vending, ecotourism,  and professional tour guiding.
Coordinate with government for education or skills training. USAID’s  skills training program in Grenada provided needed income support and  skills development, but was not designed in consultation with the  government’s Ministry of Education. Moreover, the government does not  recognize the training certificates issued to participants. Also, contractors  and participants recognized that the 6-week training period was not long  enough to develop certain skills, such as construction, and that it would  have made more sense to develop fewer, but longer, courses to adequately  train participants.
section_title: Lessons Learned for Ensuring Accountability
paragraphs: Establish accountability mechanisms. Concerns over public and private  corruption due to the wide dispersion of activities following Hurricane  Mitch influenced USAID to take extra precautions to safeguard program  funds. USAID’s Regional Inspector General (RIG) and GAO monitored the  Hurricane Mitch and El Salvador earthquake reconstruction programs and  briefed USAID staff as well as Congress on a regular basis on key issues  that USAID needed to correct. In the Caribbean program, USAID involved  RIG officials early in the design to ensure proper accountability  mechanisms were established and audits were performed early in the  program.
Hire third-party monitoring firms. USAID officials in Haiti contracted  with an engineering firm to monitor construction activities and with a  financial management firm to validate performance reports, report on the  quality of activities executed by the contractor, and identify problem  areas, and ensure flexibility in implementation. USAID officials reported  that the oversight and recommendations from the two firms have proven  to be invaluable. Specifically, the engineering firm was instrumental in  providing several good recommendations on urgent needs that had not  been identified in the damage survey; additionally, the firm provided early  warning on a number of occasions where work needed immediate  correction and collaborated closely with the implementing firms and  quickly gained their confidence for sound recommendations. It served as a  capable arbiter on several disputes between implementers and their  subcontractors. Both the engineering and financial firms served a critical  function at a time when USAID direct hires were unable to travel freely in  Haiti to monitor progress due to poor security. In its El Salvador  earthquake recovery program, USAID required that a private accounting  firm conduct a concurrent audit of a USAID-funded health clinic being  implemented by AmeriCares, a U.S.-based private voluntary organization  that provides medical supplies overseas. This was done because  AmeriCares had no experience implementing a USAID-funded program  and was working through a Salvadoran nongovernmental organization to  carry out the construction.
In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID also contracted engineering expertise to  monitor the completion and quality of implementing contractors’  construction activities. The USAID Mission in Jamaica obtained these  services by augmenting the engineering staff of Wingerts Consulting. The  work of the engineers engaged through Wingerts was similar to that  typically performed by a USAID staff engineer, including monitoring and  reviewing the processes utilized by the implementing contractor to assure  reasonable costs, quality control, and delivery of a final product that is  consistent with the expected results specified in the contract. According  to USAID, the Wingerts staff served as an extension of the mission, given  that the mission needed to move swiftly to implement construction and  renovation activities and the mission did not have internal staff with  sufficient expertise to effectively implement the activities under a short  time frame. The engineers engaged by the Jamaica Mission through  Wingerts worked collaboratively with USAID’s technical staff and the  implementing contractors to provide technical approval of contract award  processes and certifications and to perform site visits and environmental  monitoring during execution of construction contracts and grants.
section_title: Lessons Learned for Monitoring and Evaluation
paragraphs: Conduct monthly progress reviews and provide interim reports. In its  April 2005 report, the Regional Inspector General recommended that  USAID staff responsible for the Hurricane Ivan Program monitor the  program by maintaining a spreadsheet of target due dates for each activity  and verify that all activities are completed on time. USAID provided  monthly reports of its Caribbean recovery efforts that summarized the  progress of program activities, challenges in implementing and completing  activities, and the programs’ expenditures to date. According to USAID  officials responsible for the Hurricane Ivan Program, the contractor hired  to assist with oversight, Wingerts Consulting, played a role in ensuring  regular and timely progress reporting and program analysis, including  capturing cross-country and cross-program implementation issues, and  providing program-level financial analyses. USAID also reported that  Wingerts conducted various site visits and served as a liaison between  USAID’s technical staff and implementing contractors to better assess the  status of activities “on the ground” and report back to the mission, the  bureau, and other stakeholders. USAID officials acknowledged that these  reports might have been prepared by mission staff rather than Wingerts if  USAID had a mission in Grenada or had sufficient staff in Jamaica to  compile and produce the reports.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Phillip Herr (Assistant Director),  Francisco Enriquez, Adrienne Spahr, Reid Lowe, Shana Wallace, and Mark  Dowling made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Foreign Assistance: USAID Has Begun Tsunami Reconstruction in  Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but Key Projects May Exceed Initial Cost and  Schedule Estimates. GAO-06-488. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2006.
Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID  Address Current and Future Challenges. GAO-03-946. Washington, D.C.,  August 22, 2003.
Foreign Assistance: USAID’s Earthquake Recovery Program in El  Salvador Has Made Progress, but Key Activities Are behind Schedule.  GAO-03-656. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended  Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response  Capability. GAO-02-787. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.
Foreign Assistance: AID Strategic Direction and Continued  Management Improvements Needed. GAO/NSIAD-93-106. Washington:  D.C.: June 11, 1993.