Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts
Published: 2009-09-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of State (State) has designated about two-thirds of its 268 overseas posts as hardship posts. Staff working at such posts often encounter harsh conditions, including inadequate medical facilities and high crime. Many of these posts are vital to U.S. foreign policy objectives and need a full complement of staff with the right skills to carry out the department's priorities. As such, State offers staff at these posts a hardship differential--an additional adjustment to basic pay--to compensate officers for the conditions they encounter and as a recruitment and retention incentive. GAO was asked to assess (1) State's progress in addressing staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any remaining gaps, and (2) the extent to which State has used incentives to address staffing gaps at hardship posts. GAO analyzed State data; reviewed relevant documents; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork in five hardship posts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Despite some progress in addressing staffing shortfalls since 2006, State's diplomatic readiness remains at risk due to persistent staffing and experience gaps at key hardship posts. Several factors contribute to these gaps. First, State continues to have fewer officers than positions, a shortage compounded by the personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, while State has reduced its mid-level experience gap, the department does not anticipate eliminating this gap until 2012 and continues to face difficulties attracting experienced applicants to hardship posts--especially posts of greatest hardship. Third, although State's assignment system has prioritized the staffing of hardship posts, it does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at such posts, many of which are strategically important, yet are often staffed with less experienced officers. Staffing and experience gaps can diminish diplomatic readiness in several ways, according to State officials. For example, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage, loss of institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements for senior staff, detracting from other critical diplomatic responsibilities. State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives to serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in service and bidding requirements, such as reduced tour lengths at posts where dangerous conditions prevent some family members from accompanying officers. In a 2006 report on staffing gaps, GAO recommended that State evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post assignments. In response, State added a question about hardship incentives to a recent employee survey. However, the survey does not fully meet GAO's recommendation for several reasons, including that State did not include several incentives in the survey. State also did not comply with a legal requirement to assess the effectiveness of increasing danger and hardship pay in filling certain posts. Recent legislation increasing Foreign Service Officers' basic pay will increase the cost of existing incentives, thereby heightening the importance that State evaluate its incentives for hardship post assignments to ensure resources are effectively targeted and not wasted.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of State (State) has designated roughly two-thirds of its  268 overseas posts as hardship posts. Staff working in such locations  often encounter harsh environmental and living conditions that can  include inadequate medical facilities, limited opportunities for spousal  employment, poor schools, high levels of crime, and severe climate. In  addition to the high number of hardship posts State must staff, the number  of positions in locations too dangerous for some family members to  accompany an officer has grown considerably in recent years, from more  than 700 in 2006 to over 900 at the end of fiscal year 2008. Many hardship  posts are of critical importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives and  necessitate a full complement of staff with the right skills to carry out the  department’s priorities.
In recent years we have reported on a number of human capital issues  facing State, including staffing deficits at hardship posts that negatively  impact diplomatic readiness. We reported in 2002 that State’s staffing  shortfalls and ineffective assignment system compromised diplomatic  readiness at hardship posts. Subsequently, we reported in 2006 that State  had made progress in addressing overall staffing shortfalls since  implementing its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), which enabled the  department to hire and train more than 1,000 employees above attrition  from 2002 to 2004; however, the initiative did not fully meet its goals and  mid-level vacancies remained a problem at critical posts. Furthermore,  the department faces the continuing challenge of staffing embassy  compounds in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. To help meet  these challenges, the Congress authorized additional positions for State in  2008—the first new positions outside the department’s consular and  worldwide security upgrade programs since 2004, according to State.  Moreover, State has requested over 700 additional Foreign Service Officer  (FSO) staff in its fiscal year 2010 budget request.
In response to your request, this report discusses (1) State’s progress in  addressing staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any  remaining gaps, and (2) the extent to which State has used incentives to  address staffing gaps at hardship posts.
To address these objectives, we reviewed GAO and State Office of  Inspector General (OIG) reports and analyzed staffing, bidding, and  position data. We also examined surveys conducted by State, analyzed  State documents that outline incentives for hardship service, and collected  data on participation in and funds expended on hardship incentive  programs. Additionally, we met with officials in State’s Bureau of Human  Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bureau of Administration, six  regional bureaus, and the American Foreign Service Association. To assess  the impact of staffing gaps and State’s use of hardship incentives firsthand,  we conducted fieldwork in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Shenyang, China;  and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. We selected these posts for their  level of hardship, their strategic importance to the United States, and the  low number of staff applying for each position. Specifically, the locations  in Nigeria and Shenyang are posts of greatest hardship and the locations in  Saudi Arabia are hardship posts which, at the time of our visit, had 1-year  tours. In addition to our fieldwork, we conducted telephone interviews  with senior officials in several additional hardship locations, including  Bangladesh, Cambodia, Liberia, and Tajikistan. We also convened an  expert roundtable of several retired senior State officials, all of whom  previously served as ambassadors to hardship posts.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through September  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: State is the lead agency responsible for implementing American foreign  policy and representing the United States abroad. It staffs approximately  268 embassies, consulates, and other posts with over 8,000 Foreign Service  positions overseas. Roughly two-thirds of these posts are in locations that  qualify for a special salary differential to compensate officers for the  harsh living conditions experienced there. The differential ranges from 5  to 35 percent of basic pay and is determined by a number of factors  including extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive physical  hardship, or notably unhealthy conditions affecting at least a majority of  employees stationed at such a post. Figure 1 shows the distribution of  overseas posts and positions by hardship differential. In general, tours of  duty are two years in the United States and at 20 percent and 25 percent  hardship posts. Tours at other posts are generally three years, although a  number of posts in locations too dangerous for some family members to  accompany an officer carry 1-year tours.
FSOs serving abroad fall into two broad categories: generalists and  specialists. FSO generalists help formulate and implement the foreign  policy of the United States and are grouped into five career tracks:  management, consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. FSO  specialists provide support services at overseas posts worldwide or in  Washington, D.C., and are grouped into seven major categories:  administration, construction engineering, information technology,  international information and English language programs, medical and  health, office management, and security. State requires its FSOs to be  available for service anywhere in the world, and reserves the ability to  direct officers to any of its posts overseas or to its Washington  headquarters. However, directed assignments are rare. The process of  assigning FSOs to their positions typically begins when the staff receive a  list of upcoming vacancies for which they may compete. Staff then submit  a list of positions for which they want to be considered, or “bids,” to the  Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) and consult  with their career development officer. The process varies depending on an  officer’s grade and functional specialty:    Entry-level officers’ assignments are directed by the En of HR/CDA with little input from the posts or bureaus.
Mid-level officers consult with bureaus and overseas posts to market  themselves for their desired position panels to finalize the assignments. s. Subsequently, HR/CDA convenes    Senior-level officers are selected for their positions by the Director General, following approval of policy-level positions by a special  committee. As with mid-level officers, HR/CDA convenes a panel to  finalize the assignments.
In recent years, State has taken a series of measures to address gaps and  reallocate staff to emerging priority nations. In 2002, State implemented  the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to address staffing and training  gaps that, according to the department, endangered U.S. diplomatic  readiness. Through the DRI—a 3-year, $197 million program—State hired  1,069 new foreign and civil service employees above attrition. However, as  we previously reported, most of this increase was absorbed by the demand  for personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2006, State introduced the Global  Repositioning Program, which reallocated existing positions to emerging  high-priority countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The primary  focus of this program was to move political, economic, and public  diplomacy officers from places like Washington and Europe to countries  of increasing strategic importance such as China and India.
section_title: Persistent Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can Compromise Diplomatic Readiness
paragraphs: Despite some progress since we last reported in 2006, State has continued to  face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts that may compromise its  diplomatic readiness. Several factors contribute to gaps at hardship posts,  including State’s overall staff shortage, which is compounded by the  significant personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a mid-level  staffing deficit that has been reduced, but not eliminated. Moreover, State  continues to experience difficulty in attracting officers to hardship posts and  its assignment system does not explicitly address the experience gap at these  posts. Staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts can diminish diplomatic  readiness in a variety of ways, according to current and former State officials,  including by reducing reporting coverage, weakening institutional knowledge,  and increasing the supervisory burden on senior staff.
subsections: section_title: Staffing and Experience Gaps Remain at Key Hardship Posts
paragraphs: State continues to face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts,  including many of significant strategic importance to the United States.  First, State has faced difficulty in filling critical positions at hardship  posts. In its FY 2007 Annual Performance Report, State identified staffing  of critical positions—designated positions at the posts of greatest hardship  (those with hardship differentials of at least 25 percent)—as a key priority,  noting that such positions are often on the forefront of U.S. policy  interests. As such, State established a target for fiscal year 2007 of filling  90 percent of such critical positions with qualified bidders by the end of  the assignments cycle. However, State reported filling 75 percent of its  critical positions, thereby missing its target. State further noted that it  would be unable to fill more than 75 percent of critical positions until its  resource needs were met. Subsequently, the department lowered its target  to 75 percent for fiscal year 2008, which it reported it met.
In addition to staffing gaps specific to critical positions, State faces its  highest rate of vacancies at the posts of greatest hardship. As of  September 2008, State had a 17 percent average vacancy rate at the posts  of greatest hardship—nearly double the average rate of 9 percent at posts  with no hardship differentials. Vacancies at posts we visited during our  review included a mid-level public affairs position in Jeddah, Saudi  Arabia, that was vacant as of September 2008 and, at the time of our  March 2009 visit, was not expected to be filled until June 2009. Similarly, a  section chief in Lagos, Nigeria, stated that prior to his arrival at post in  August 2008, his position had been vacant for nearly a year. Although there  were few vacancies in Shenyang, China, at the time of our visit, nearly  one-quarter of the staffed positions had been vacant for 4 months or more  before their current incumbents arrived.
Beyond higher position vacancy rates, posts of greatest hardship face  experience gaps due to a higher rate of staff filling positions above their  own grades (see table 1). As of September 2008, about 34 percent of mid- level generalist positions at posts of greatest hardship were filled by  officers in upstretch assignments—15 percentage points higher than the  upstretch rate for comparable positions at posts with no or low  differentials. Furthermore, as of the same date, 25 of 34 (over 70 percent)  of all overseas generalists working two grades above their rank were  located at hardship posts.
At posts we visited during our review, we observed numerous officers  working in positions above their rank. For example, in Abuja, Nigeria,  more than 4 in every 10 positions were staffed by officers in upstretch  assignments, including several employees working in positions two grades  above their own. We also found multiple officers in upstretch assignments  in Shenyang, including one mid-level consular position that officials stated  has never been filled at grade.
section_title: Several Factors Contribute to Gaps at Hardship Posts
paragraphs: A number of factors lead to gaps at hardship posts, including:    State’s overall staff shortage, which is compounded by the significant  personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan;    a persistent mid-level staffing deficit exacerbated by continued low  bidding on hardship posts; and    an assignment system that does not explicitly address the continuing  experience gap at hardship posts.
subsections: section_title: Overall Foreign Service Staffing Shortage Compounded by Personnel Needs of Iraq and Afghanistan
paragraphs: As of April 2009, State had about 1,650 vacant Foreign Service positions in  total. Approximately 270 of these vacancies were due to State not having  enough employees to fill all of its positions—a shortfall that has grown  since our last report. Officers attending training or rotating from post to  post without replacements to fill their positions accounted for most of the  remaining 1,380 vacancies. As we reported in 2006, State implemented  DRI with the intention of hiring enough new employees above attrition to  allow staff time for critical job training—also referred to as a “training  float”—and to respond to emerging crises. However, as we previously  reported, this goal became quickly outdated largely due to staffing  demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, due to the overall  shortage of FSOs and the high priority of meeting Iraq and Afghanistan’s  staffing needs, bureaus have had to identify nearly 670 positions to leave  unfilled, or “frozen,” since 2005. As a result, State has generally been able  to find candidates to fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan—its top  priority posts—but doing so has created gaps elsewhere, including at other  hardship posts. For instance, positions that bureaus decided not to fill in  the 2009 assignments cycle included several positions at hardship posts,  such as an economic officer in Lagos, a management officer in Shenyang,  and three or more positions each in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Mexico City,  Mexico; and Moscow, Russia.
State officials also noted that the pressing need to staff Iraq and  Afghanistan has led officers serving elsewhere to interrupt or cancel their  current tours and volunteer for service in those two countries, thereby  leaving other posts with unexpected gaps. For example, a senior official  stated that a key political/military officer position in Russia was vacant  due to the incumbent volunteering for a year of service in Afghanistan. The  senior official further stated that he anticipated it would be difficult to find  a temporary replacement for the unexpected vacancy. Similarly, officials  in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs told us an officer who  received nearly a year of language training in Vietnamese cancelled her  tour in Vietnam to serve in Iraq.
Although State recently received a significant increase in resources and  has requested more, the extent to which this influx will allow the  department to eliminate vacancies is unclear. State received funding for  about 140 additional Foreign Service positions in fiscal year 2008.  Subsequently, in fiscal year 2009, State received about 720 additional  Foreign Service positions that, according to the department, largely  allowed it to fill vacancies created by personnel serving in Iraq and  Afghanistan and increases in language training. The department has  requested nearly 740 additional Foreign Service positions for fiscal year  2010 that, according to State’s 2010 Congressional Budget Justification,  will allow it to begin expanding its presence according to strategic  priorities. However, given that about 1,650 positions were vacant as of  April 2009, it is unclear if the approximately 1,600 positions received or  requested will enable State to both eliminate vacancies and expand its  operations as stated.
section_title: Despite Some Progress, Mid- Level Experience Gap Remains
paragraphs: While new resources may enable State to partially address vacancies and  the department has reduced its mid-level deficit since 2006, the remaining  shortage of mid-level officers represents a continuing experience gap. As  of December 2008, State had 85 fewer mid-level generalist officers than  positions (see table 2)—an improvement on the deficit of 316 that we  previously reported. However, as of the same date, State faced a 28  percent greater deficit at the FS-02 level than it did in 2006, with mid-level  positions in the public diplomacy and consular cones continuing to  experience the largest shortages of staff overall.
According to a senior State official, the department will continue to face a  deficit at the FS-02 level until 2012. The official told us that the department  plans to manage this experience gap by assigning officers in the FS-03  grade to stretch positions. However, as we discuss later in this report,  positions filled by officers in upstretch assignments can compromise  diplomatic readiness. State has also accelerated promotions of FS-03  officers to address the experience gap. For instance, State’s Five-Year  Workforce Plan for Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012 projects that it will  take about 8 years for officers hired in 2008 to be promoted to the FS-02  level. By contrast, officers promoted to the FS-02 level in 2003 had an  average time-in-service of 10.7 years. However, according to State,  additional acceleration of promotions is unlikely given the potential risks  associated with promoting officers with insufficient experience.
section_title: Despite Improvements, Low Bidding on Hardship Posts Continues to Exacerbate Mid- Level and Other Staffing Deficits
paragraphs: Although hardship posts have experienced an increase in bidding since we  last reported, they continue to have difficulty attracting bids from  experienced officers. Figure 2 shows the average number of bids on FS-02,  FS-03, and FS-04 positions at overseas posts by differential rate for the  2008 summer assignments cycle.
Since our 2006 report, the median average of all bids on hardship posts  has increased by about 20 percent (from 5 to 6). The increase has been  more pronounced for posts of greatest hardship, which received a median  average of 4.5 bids per post in 2008—about 40 percent higher than the  median average of 3.2 bids we previously reported. However, hardship  posts continue to have difficulty attracting bids from experienced officers.  Specifically, positions at hardship posts received a median average of 4  bids from at-grade officers, including a median average of 2.7 at-grade bids  for positions at the posts of greatest hardship. By contrast, posts with no  or low hardship differentials received a median average of over 9 at-grade  bids. Furthermore, as of September 2008, hardship posts comprised over  90 percent (62 of 67) of posts that State classified as historically difficult to  staff for 2009.
Low bidding on hardship posts exacerbates State’s staffing deficits— particularly its shortage of mid-level consular and public diplomacy  officers. Figure 3 shows the average number of bids per generalist career  track for each hardship differential in the summer 2008 assignments cycle.  While all generalist career tracks received about 3 to 4 times fewer bids at  the posts of greatest hardship than at posts with no differentials in 2008,  consular and public diplomacy positions received among the fewest bids  on average—3.6 and 4.3, respectively. Given that State faces its largest  staff shortages in mid-level consular and public diplomacy positions, low  bidding for such positions at hardship posts increases the difficulty of  filling them.
State has taken steps in recent years to prioritize staffing of hardship  posts. For example, in the 2007 assignments cycle, State assigned staff to  hardship positions it considered critical—including in Iraq and  Afghanistan—prior to assigning staff to positions elsewhere. Similarly, in  the 2008 assignments cycle, State assigned staff to the posts of greatest  hardship before assigning staff elsewhere. However, as we noted earlier in  this report, hardship posts face a higher rate of upstretch assignments than  posts with no or low differentials—an experience gap that State’s  assignment system does not explicitly address. For example, while State’s  instructions to bidders for the 2007 and 2008 assignments cycles did  emphasize the staffing of hardship positions, the instructions did not  differentiate between filling the positions with at-grade officers and filling  them with officers below the positions’ grades. Although State’s  instructions to bidders clearly state that employees bidding on stretch  assignments compete against at-grade bidders, the low number of at-grade  bids on hardship positions limits the likelihood that such positions will be  filled by at-grade officers. Furthermore, in the assignments cycles for 2007  through 2009, State consistently permitted upstretch assignments to  hardship posts 1 to 3 months prior to permitting upstretch assignments to  posts with low or no hardship differentials, which may have encouraged  officers with less experience to bid on hardship posts. According to State,  upstretch assignments can be career-enhancing in some cases; however,  the experience gap they represent—particularly at the mid-levels—can  compromise diplomatic readiness.
section_title: Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can Compromise Diplomatic Readiness
paragraphs: Current and former State officials, including recently retired ambassadors  and former directors general who participated in a GAO expert  roundtable, staff currently posted overseas, and officials in Washington  told us that staffing gaps at hardship posts diminish diplomatic readiness  in a variety of ways. According to these officials, gaps can lead to  decreased reporting coverage, loss of institutional knowledge, and  increased supervisory requirements for senior staff, which take time away  from other critical diplomatic responsibilities.
Senior management at selected posts had concerns that vacant positions  caused an increased workload on officers at posts, which may detract  from important functions. For example, the economic officer position in  Lagos, whose responsibility is solely focused on energy, oil, and natural  gas, was not filled in the 2009 cycle. The incumbent explained that,  following his departure, his reporting responsibilities will be split up  between officers in Abuja and Lagos. He said this division of  responsibilities would diminish the position’s focus on the oil industry and  potentially lead to the loss of important contacts within both the  government ministries and the oil industry. A 2008 Office of Inspector  General (OIG) inspection of Freetown, Sierra Leone, noted concern over  the effect of a sudden vacancy when the embassy’s sole political/economic  officer cut his tour short to serve in Iraq. This vacancy deprived the  embassy of its only reporting officer and the resulting transition period  caused officials in Washington to be dissatisfied with economic reporting  on issues such as the diamond industry and its impact on political  instability, money laundering, drug smuggling, and, perhaps, terrorism.  Similarly, an official told us that a political/military officer position in  Russia was vacant because of the departure of the incumbent for a tour in  Afghanistan, and the position’s portfolio of responsibilities was divided  among other officers in the embassy. According to the official, this  vacancy slowed negotiation of an agreement with Russia regarding  military transit to Afghanistan.
Another potentially adverse effect of staffing gaps is that important post- level duties, such as reporting and staff development, may suffer from  inexperience when entry-level officers are staffed to mid-level positions.  While officials at post said that some officers in stretch positions perform  well, others told us that the inexperience of entry-level officers serving in  mid-level capacities can have a negative impact. For example, the  economic section chief at one post we visited stated that reporting  produced by an entry-level officer in a mid-level position lacked the  necessary analytical rigor. The political section chief at the same post  noted that a mid-level position responsible for reporting on terrorism was  staffed by an officer serving two grades above his current grade level with  no previous reporting experience. A 2008 OIG inspection of N’Djamena,  Chad, found that difficulties attracting staff with the requisite skills and  experience contributed to deviations from standard operating  procedures.
Another consequence of staffing gaps is that senior-level staff at posts with  no experienced mid-level officers are diverted from key responsibilities by  the need to supervise inexperienced entry-level staff. In 2006, we found  that senior staff at several posts spent more time on operational matters  and less time on overall planning, policy, and coordination than should be  the case. On our recent visits, we found that there are still inexperienced  officers taking on mid-level responsibilities and that these officers require  more supervision and guidance from senior post leadership than more  experienced mid-level officers would require; as a result, the senior  officers have less time to perform high-level planning and policy  implementation. According to officials we met with, inexperienced  officers sometimes perform essential tasks such as adjudicating visas,  identifying political trends, and assisting American citizens abroad;  therefore, they often require guidance on how to carry out such activities.  When senior-level officials must serve as the only source of guidance, post  officials explained, they have less ability to plan and coordinate policy. For  example, the ambassador to Nigeria told us spending time helping officers  in stretch positions is a burden and interferes with policy planning and  implementation. The consular chief in Shenyang told us he spends too  much time helping entry-level officers adjudicate visas and, therefore, less  time managing the section. A 2008 OIG inspection of N’Djamena, Chad,  reported that the entire front office was involved in mentoring entry-level  officers and that this was an unfair burden on the ambassador and deputy  chief of mission, given the challenging nature of the post.
In addition to gaps in established positions, some State officials at  overseas posts told us that there are not enough authorized positions to  manage the heavy workload at some posts. These officials stated that even  if the department had an adequate number of people to fill all current  positions, there would still be a need for additional positions and officers  to fill them because the current workload outweighs the workforce. For  example, a senior official at one post told us that her embassy did not have  enough authorized management positions to support the rapid increase in  staff for all government agencies located there. As a result, the  ambassador placed a moratorium on the addition of any new staff from  any agency until the embassy received more management officer  positions. The official explained that the moratorium has prevented some  agencies from adding staff to implement important programs related to  health, education, and counternarcotics efforts. During the GAO expert  roundtable of former ambassadors to hardship posts, a former director  general said that one of his former posts had so many visitors that four  officers had to deal primarily with visits and not their other  responsibilities. In addition, according to the ambassador to Liberia, the  embassy in Monrovia lacks adequate staff positions to meet its goals. She  said it is not uncommon for one section to work twenty hours of overtime  in one week. The ambassador listed four new positions that she believes  should be authorized but, according to her, will not likely be added in the  next few years. The State OIG also commented on the need for reasonable  growth in Monrovia in a 2008 mission inspection. A 2009 OIG inspection  of Nouakchott, Mauritania, noted concern that without another political  officer in the embassy, the post would not have the depth needed to  adequately cover the rapidly evolving political situation and achieve  department goals in the country. Similarly, officials in Jeddah, Saudi  Arabia, noted that the creation and filling of a political/economic section  chief position, as they have requested in their Mission Strategic Plan,  would alleviate the current need for entry-level officers to report directly  to the consul general.
section_title: State Has Wide Range of Measures and Incentives to Staff Hardship Posts but Their Effectiveness is Unclear Due to Lack of Evaluation
paragraphs: State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their  effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives to  serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in service  and bidding requirements. In 2006, we recommended that State evaluate  the effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post assignments,  but the department has not yet done so systematically. Further, recent  legislation will increase the cost of existing incentives, thereby increasing  the need for State to fully evaluate its incentives to ensure resources are  effectively targeted and not wasted.
subsections: section_title: State Has a Wide Range of Measures and Other Incentives to Staff Hardship Posts
paragraphs: State has created a wide range of measures and financial and nonfinancial  incentives to encourage mid-level officers to seek assignments to—and  remain at—hardship posts around the world. These have included some  measures designed for all hardship posts, as well as others tailored  specifically to fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, posts State has  declared to be the highest priority.
In addition to hardship and danger pay, incentives to bid on—and remain  in—hardship posts, particularly those considered historically difficult to  staff, include:    The opportunity to include upstretch jobs on core bid list. Mid-level  officers may include bids for upstretch positions in their “core bid” list,  provided that the position is at a hardship post or the officer is serving at a  hardship post when the bid list is due. State generally requires employees  to maintain a list of six “core bids” on positions at their grade level. State  often offers upstretch assignments as a reward for strong performance and  as a career-enhancing opportunity.
Eligibility to receive student loan repayments. Officers who accept  assignments to posts with at least a 20 percent hardship differential or any  danger pay allowance may be offered student loan repayments as a  recruitment or retention incentive.
Extra pay to extend tour in certain posts. Employees who accept a 3-year  assignment at certain historically difficult to staff posts qualifying for the  Service Need Differential (SND) program are eligible to receive an  additional hardship differential over and above existing hardship  differentials, equal to 15 percent of the employee’s basic compensation.
One year of service at unaccompanied or certain difficult to staff posts.
State has established a 1-year tour of duty at posts considered too  dangerous for some family members to accompany an officer, in  recognition of the difficulty of serving at such posts. Additionally,  employees may negotiate shorter tours to historically difficult to staff  posts, provided it is in the interest of the service.
Consideration for promotion. State instructs the selection boards who  recommend employees for promotion to “...weigh positively creditable and  exemplary performance at hardship and danger posts…” However, the  instructions only identify Iraq and Afghanistan by name.
State has taken special measures to fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan,  including assigning officers to these two posts before assigning them to  other posts. Incentives for officers to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan  include:    Priority consideration for onward assignments. State has instituted a  program whereby a Foreign Service employee may be selected for his/her  assignment for 2010 at the same time as he/she is selected for a 2009 Iraq  assignment.
The option to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan on detail and extend current  assignment. State allows officers to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan on detail  from Washington or their current post of assignment, which provides  financial and other benefits. For example, officers serving on detail from  Washington, D.C., retain locality pay. Moreover, according to State  officials, officers who leave their families at their current post of  assignment to serve on detail avoid the disruption of moving their families  and may extend their tour at their current post of assignment from 3 years  to 4 years, which may be particularly attractive for officers with school age  children as it enables more educational continuity.
Favorable consideration for promotion. State’s selection boards that  recommend employees for promotion are expected to look favorably on  service in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, State instructs the boards to  “particularly credit performance in Provincial Reconstruction Teams and  other regional operations in Iraq, which the President and Secretary of  State have determined to be of the highest priority.”
In addition to incentives, State has rules requiring certain employees to bid  on positions at hardship posts. These Fair Share rules require designated  FSOs to bid on a minimum of three posts with a 15 percent or higher  differential pay incentive in two geographic areas.
Table 3 lists the various incentives and requirements across posts, based  on hardship differential.
Although State offers a range of incentives, it does not routinely track or  report on their total cost. In response to our request for cost information,  State queried its payroll system and estimated that it spent about $83  million on hardship pay, $30 million on danger pay, and about $3 million  on SND in fiscal year 2008. The cost information indicates that the amount  spent on financial incentives has increased in recent years. According to  the State OIG, in fiscal year 2005, the department spent about $65 million  on hardship pay, $16 million on danger pay, and $3 million on SND.  Separately, State reports the amount spent on student loan repayments to  the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as part of that office’s  statutory requirement to report annually to the Congress on agencies’ use  of student loan repayments. According to our analysis of data from  OPM’s report for 2007, State repaid about $2.5 million of student loans to  FSOs in that year.
Although not all incentives cost money, they may present other tradeoffs.  First, State officials report that the 1-year tour of duty to Iraq has been a  useful recruitment tool. However, these and other officials told us that  the 1-year tour length makes it difficult for FSOs to form the relationships  with their counterparts in other governments necessary for the conduct of  U.S. diplomacy. For example, a State official told us of a recent instance  where the U.S. government needed information on a Middle Eastern  country’s relationship with another nation in the region. However, none of  the four political officers at the U.S. embassy in the country had sufficient  contacts with the host government to obtain the information required.  Consequently, the U.S. embassy needed to ask State headquarters to  obtain the information from the host government by way of that country’s  embassy in the United States, resulting in delayed reporting of the  information. A former Director General told us that 1-year tours result in a  loss of institutional knowledge and program continuity. Second, the  opportunity to bid on stretch assignments is an incentive because such  assignments may be career-enhancing. However, as noted earlier in this  report, senior officials may need to supervise and guide officers in stretch  positions more than officers in positions at their current grade levels.
section_title: State Has Not Systematically Evaluated Effectiveness of Incentive Programs for Hardship Post Assignments
paragraphs: State has not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of its incentive  programs, despite recommendations to do so. Agency officials cited the  difficulty of evaluating the impact of any single incentive because of the  numerous factors involved, but State has not taken advantage of available  tools to evaluate incentive programs. State has not generated sufficient  data to evaluate the impact of the favorable consideration for promotion  and the SND program in attracting employees to bid on, or remain in,  hardship post assignments. State also did not comply with a congressional  mandate to evaluate recent increases in hardship and danger pay.
subsections: section_title: State’s Effort to Evaluate Effectiveness of Incentive Programs for Hardship Posts is Insufficient
paragraphs: State’s efforts to evaluate hardship incentives remain insufficient. We  previously reported that State created a number of incentives to address  the growing number of vacancies at hardship posts to achieve its goal of  having the right people in the right place with the right skills. However, in  2006, we reported State had not measured the effectiveness of hardship  incentives, and recommended State systematically evaluate the  effectiveness of such measures, establishing specific indicators of  progress and adjusting the use of the incentives based on this analysis.  State responded to this recommendation by including a question on the  impact of incentives to its biennial employee quality of life survey, but this  step does not fully respond to our recommendation for three reasons.
First, the survey’s incentive question is not specific enough. State included  the question “How important was each of the following in your decision to  bid on overseas positions during the last assignment cycle in which you  submitted bids?” in its most recent Quality of Life at Work survey. The  question then listed 11 items, some of which are incentives (e.g., hardship  pay) and others are generic aspects of overseas assignments (e.g.,  security). While the survey provides some limited information, the survey  question does not ask about the influence of the incentives on officers’  willingness to bid on—and remain in—hardship post assignments.  Further, by mixing incentives and other aspects of hardship post  assignments, the question dilutes the focus on the incentives. Moreover,  the list of incentives included is incomplete. For example, it does not ask  employees about the extent to which the opportunity to include upstretch  jobs on their core bid list or the favorable promotion consideration by  selection boards impact their decisions to bid on hardship post  assignments. Excluding some incentives from the survey hampers State’s  ability to evaluate the effectiveness of programs for hardship post  assignments individually and collectively.
Second, the overall survey design has limitations preventing State officials  from segregating responses by post and also does not collect key  demographic information. For example, the survey data do not allow State  officials to determine which responses came from posts with no hardship  differential, such as London, United Kingdom, and which came from posts  of greatest hardship, such as Lagos, Nigeria. The survey also does not ask  respondents for key demographic information, such as age and family  status. The absence of this information makes it difficult to assess the  effectiveness of the incentives as they apply to posts differently. Further,  the appeal of one incentive relative to another incentive may differ based  upon an officer’s personal circumstances.
Third, State did not establish specific indicators of progress against which  to measure the survey responses over time. As previously noted, State  tracks the percentage of critical positions filled with qualified bidders by  the end of the assignments cycle. However, State has not attempted to link  this information to the survey results, as suggested by government  management standards. Since the survey incentive question is so vague,  tracking it over time would not provide a useful indicator of progress to  assess the outcomes of its programs for hardship post assignments.
section_title: While State Cites External Constraints for Evaluating Incentives, Proper Evaluation Design and Execution May Help Meet This Challenge
paragraphs: State has not taken advantage of available tools to evaluate incentive  programs for hardship post assignments. State officials maintain that  external constraints make it challenging to evaluate the department’s  incentive programs. They reported that, in their view, it is not possible to  isolate the effectiveness of a single incentive because of the large number  of factors staff consider when bidding on assignments. Specifically, the  department cited the difficulties of capturing the personal and family  preferences and values that influence bid decisions in a database. While  acknowledging the challenges of this type of analysis, there are statistical  methods and procedures to help determine the extent of association  between the key variables of interest, while controlling for the effect of  other measurable factors that could influence outcomes. Further, cost- effectiveness analysis—which attempts to systematically quantify the  costs of alternatives and assumes that each alternative results in achieving  the same benefits—can be an appropriate evaluation tool when dollar  values cannot be ascribed to the benefits of a particular program.
section_title: State Has Not Generated Data to Measure Key Incentives
paragraphs: While State has taken steps to improve its data collection effort, it does  not collect sufficient information to determine whether the SND program  or the instructions to selection boards to weigh service at hardship posts  positively are having an impact on bidding on hardship posts. State has  increased the amount of data it collects on the SND program since we last  reported in 2006, but more information is needed to evaluate the  program’s effectiveness. In 2006, we reported State was able to provide  information on the number of officers who actually enrolled in the  program, but was not able to provide information on the number of  eligible officers who did not. Since we last reported on this issue, State has  begun collecting data on which officers decline SND. However, State has  not gathered the additional information necessary to measure the  effectiveness of the program. According to a department official, State has  considered the calculation of the worldwide rate at which officers extend  their tours of duty to be a lower priority than other human resources  initiatives. The State official said that it is not possible to evaluate the  program’s effectiveness without this information.
The manner in which State tracks employees serving in Iraq and  Afghanistan makes it difficult to analyze the impact of the promotion  consideration outlined in the instructions to selection boards. As  previously noted, officers may serve in Iraq and Afghanistan on detail from  Washington or another post of assignment; however, while they are on  detail, State’s personnel database continues to reflect the officer’s current  post of assignment. Furthermore, we reported in June 2009 that State  does not have a mechanism for identifying and tracking its employees  deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and recommended the department  establish policies and procedures to do so. The lack of readily available  data on FSOs deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan may make it difficult to  comply with a June 2009 congressional direction to State that it report on  the promotion process at the department as it relates to any preferential  consideration given for service in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as  compared to other hardship posts. According to officials, State has not  yet attempted to analyze the impact of the instructions to the selection  boards on promotions.
section_title: State Did Not Undertake Congressionally Mandated Report to Assess Impact of Increased Hardship and Danger Pay on Staffing Shortfalls
paragraphs: State has not complied with a congressional mandate to assess the  effectiveness of increasing hardship and danger pay ceilings to recruit  experienced officers to certain posts, hampering oversight of State’s use of  the authority to increase such differentials. In December 2005, Congress  passed legislation authorizing State to raise the hardship differentials and  danger pay allowances from 25 percent to 35 percent as a recruitment and  retention incentive. The law required the department to (1) notify several  congressional committees of the criteria to be used in adjusting the  hardship and danger differentials and (2) study and report by 2007 on the  effect of the increases in hardship differential and danger pay allowance  ceilings in filling “hard to fill” positions. In response, State notified  Congress in March 2006 that it would increase the threshold for posts to  qualify for the 30 and 35 percent differentials and allowances under the  present criteria it uses to calculate its hardship and danger pay differential  calculations, rather than add new criteria. However, State officials  confirmed that the department did not study the effect of these increased  differentials and allowances on filling “hard to fill” positions and did not  provide the required report to Congress. A State official said that, as of  July 2009, the department had begun an effort to comply with the  congressional mandate. According to State’s comments on this report, the  department expects to fulfill the mandate by October 2009.
Despite the hardship and danger pay increases, these high-priority posts  continue to have difficulties attracting bidders. Specifically, 17 of the 26  posts with either danger or hardship pay differentials above 25 percent  were designated historically difficult to staff as of May 2008. The lack of an  assessment of the effectiveness of the danger and hardship pay increases  in filling positions at these posts, coupled with the continuing staffing  challenges in these locations, makes it difficult to determine whether these  resources are properly targeted.
section_title: Legislative Changes May Result in Increased Expenditures on Incentives for Hardship Post Assignments
paragraphs: Several measures passed by Congress this year may raise the cost of  hardship post incentives already in place and provide additional  incentives. Legislation enacted in 2009 authorized locality pay adjustments  for fiscal year 2009 for members of the Foreign Service stationed overseas  comparable to that if such member’s official duty station were in the  District of Columbia, and appropriated $41 million for this purpose.  According to a State official, the legislative change will result in an  approximately 8 percent increase in basic pay for FSOs, beginning in  August 2009. Locality pay is not itself an incentive for hardship post  assignments. However, the resulting increase in basic pay will lead to an  increase in hardship pay, danger pay, and SND, all of which are calculated  as percentages of basic pay. Officials we interviewed, both at hardship  posts and in Washington, D.C., cited the lack of locality pay as a deterrent  to bid on overseas positions. We have reported in the past that differences  in the statutes governing domestic locality pay and differential pay for  overseas service created a gap in compensation, which State officials, the  American Foreign Service Association, and many officers have reported  effectively penalizes overseas employees compared to employees based in  Washington, D.C.
Congress also recently enacted legislation authorizing State to pay  recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to all FSOs other than  ambassadors and chiefs of mission who are on official duty in Iraq,  Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Previously, Foreign Service generalists were  not entitled to receive recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses. As  of the end of fiscal year 2008, there were about 340 Foreign Service  generalist positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Further, State also  plans to increase the number of FSOs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The  large—and growing—number of FSOs serving at these posts represents a  potentially significant increase in recruitment, relocation, and retention  bonus payments.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The conduct of U.S. diplomacy compels State to assign staff to hardship  posts where conditions are difficult and sometimes dangerous, but that  nonetheless are at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy priorities. State has  made progress since 2006 in reducing its deficit of mid-level officers and  increasing the average number of bids at hardship posts. Despite these  advances, State continues to face persistent staffing and experience gaps  at such posts—especially at the mid-level—which can compromise its  diplomatic readiness. The department has generally been able to fill its top  priority posts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but key positions at other hardship  posts remain vacant or are filled by officers who may lack the necessary  experience to effectively perform their duties, potentially compromising  State’s ability to advance U.S. international interests. Although State plans  to address staffing gaps by hiring more officers, the department  acknowledges it will take years for these new employees to gain the  experience they need to be effective mid-level officers. The department  plans to manage this experience gap in the near term by continuing to  assign officers to positions above their current grade level. However, the  frequent assignment of officers to stretch positions in hardship posts  brings some risks, which will likely persist since State’s assignment system  does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at hardship  posts as a priority consideration in making assignments. Furthermore,  despite State’s continued difficulty attracting qualified staff to hardship  posts, the department has not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of  its incentives for hardship service. These incentives cost the department  millions of dollars annually—an investment that will grow given recent  legislative initiatives that raise FSO basic pay and expand the use of  bonuses for recruitment, relocation, and retention. Without a full  evaluation of State’s hardship incentives, the department cannot obtain  valuable insights that could help guide resource decisions to ensure it is  most efficiently and effectively addressing gaps at these important posts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that hardship posts are staffed commensurate with their stated  level of strategic importance and resources are properly targeted, we  recommend the Secretary of State take the following two actions:    Take steps to minimize the experience gap at hardship posts by making  the assignment of at-grade, mid-level officers to such posts an explicit  priority consideration.
Develop and implement a plan to evaluate incentives for hardship post  assignments. Such a plan could include an analysis of how the hardship  assignment incentive programs work individually and collectively to  address the department’s difficulty in recruiting staff to accept—and  remain in—positions at hardship posts.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State provided written comments on a draft of this report.  The comments  are reprinted in Appendix IV.  State generally agreed with the report’s  findings, conclusions, and recommendations. For example, the department  acknowledged that many hardship posts may face experience gaps. State  also provided us with a draft analysis of the impact of increased hardship  and danger pay on staffing shortfalls and indicated that it plans to  continue tracking employee attitudes toward hardship incentives through  future surveys. While these are positive steps, they do not fully respond to  our recommendation to implement a plan to evaluate hardship incentives.  In addition, State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary  of State and interested congressional committees. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Department of State’s (State) progress in addressing staffing  gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any remaining gaps, we  reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports (OIG), as well  as applicable legislation and budget documents;    analyzed staffing, bidding, and position data; and  interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of  Consular Affairs, and six regional bureaus regarding staffing issues.
To determine State staff surplus/deficit figures, we analyzed State staffing  data and compared the number of positions in each career track with the  number of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) in each track. For example, if  the total number of employees in the consular career track is 1,055 and the  total number of consular positions is 1,866, the deficit in officers would be  811.
We analyzed bid data from the 2008 summer assignments cycle to  determine the average number of bids per post, the median number of bids  for each differential rate, and the average number of bids per generalist  career track for each differential rate. In order to compare 2008 data with  the 2005 data from our previous report and remain consistent, we used FS- 04, FS-03, and FS-02 bid data. The bid data include the number of positions  to be filled at each post and the number of bids received for each position.  We used the bid data for the summer assignments cycle because,  according to State officials, most employees are transferred during this  cycle, compared to the winter cycle. Because State staffed Iraq through a  separate assignments cycle in 2008 that involved a different bidding  process than the regular summer assignments cycle, we did not include  Iraq positions in our analysis.
We used the following methodology to obtain our results:    To obtain the average number of bids per post, we took the total number  of bids received on all positions at each post and divided it by the total  number of positions to be filled at the post. For example, in the 2008  summer assignments cycle, Lagos had 9 positions to be filled and received  a total of 23 bids, resulting in an average of 2.6 bids for this post.
To obtain the median number of bids at each differential rate, we arranged  in ascending order the average number of bids for each post at the  corresponding differential rate and used the middle average. For example,  assuming there are 5 posts at the 25 percent differential rate and their  average bids are 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16, the median of the average bids is 7.
To obtain the average number of bids per generalist career track at each  differential rate, we took the total number of bids received on all positions  in each career track per differential and divided it by the total number of  positions to be filled in the career track per differential. For example,  assuming there are 3 management positions at the 15 percent differential  rate receiving a total of 12 bids, the average number of bids for  management positions at 15 percent differential posts is 4.
We also analyzed data on all State Foreign Service positions as of the end  of fiscal year 2008 to determine the vacancy rate for each post, the average  vacancy rate for each differential rate, and the proportion of mid-level  generalist positions filled by officers working above their grades for each  differential rate. The position data include the number of positions at each  post, the career track and grade of each position and, for positions that are  staffed, the career track and grade of the incumbent. We used position  data as of the end of the fiscal year because, according to State officials,  most employees moving on to their next assignments have arrived at their  new posts by that time. Due to limitations in the position data for Iraq, we  did not include Iraq positions in our analysis.
We used the following methodology to obtain our results:    To obtain the vacancy rate for each post, we took the total number of  vacant positions at each post and divided it by the total number of  positions to be filled at the post. For example, assuming there are 10 total  positions at a given post and 2 vacancies, the vacancy rate is 20 percent.
To obtain the average vacancy rate for each differential rate, we took the  sum of all vacancy rates for posts with a given differential and divided it by  the total number of posts with that differential. For example, assuming  there are 5 posts at the 25 percent differential rate and their vacancy rates  are 10 percent, 12 percent, 15 percent, 17 percent, and 20 percent, the  average vacancy rate is 14.8 percent.
To obtain the proportion of mid-level generalist positions filled by officers  working above their grades for each differential rate, we took the total  number of generalist positions at the FS-03, FS-02, and FS-01 levels filled  with officers in upstretch assignments for each differential and divided it  by the total number of generalist positions at those levels with that  differential. For example, assuming there are only 7 mid-level generalist  positions at posts with a 20 percent differential and 2 are filled by officers  in upstretches, the upstretch rate is 29 percent.
To assess the extent to which State has used incentives to address staffing  gaps at hardship posts, we  reviewed GAO and State OIG reports, as well as applicable legislative  documents and guidance from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)  and the Office of Management and Budget;    examined surveys conducted by State;    analyzed State documents that outline incentives for hardship service,  including those available to officers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan;    collected data on participation in and funds expended on hardship  interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of  Administration, and six regional bureaus regarding State’s use of  incentives.
We obtained bidding data from State’s FSBID database and staffing and  position data from State’s Global Employee Management System (GEMS)  database. Since we have previously checked the reliability of both these  databases, we inquired if State had made any major changes to the  databases since our 2006 report. State indicated that it had not made major  changes to either. We also tested the data for completeness and  interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of Resource  Management and Organizational Analysis and the Office of Career  Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) concerning the reliability of the  data. Based on our analysis of the data and discussions with the officials,  we determined the bidding and staffing data to be sufficiently reliable for  our purposes. We also determined that the position data for all posts but  Iraq were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. Given  the limitations associated with Iraq positions in the position data, we  obtained a separate set of Iraq-specific position data from the Bureau of  Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) to use to analyze staffing in Iraq. To assess the  reliability of the Iraq position data provided by NEA, we asked State how  the data are collected, entered, and checked. State indicated that the data  are collected and maintained manually by authorized assignment  personnel and constantly updated through coordination between NEA and  human resources officials in Iraq, among others. Based on this assessment  and our analysis of the data, we determined NEA’s Iraq position data to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
We conducted fieldwork in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Shenyang, China;  and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to study the impact of staffing gaps  at selected hardship posts and State’s use of incentives for hardship  service. In deciding where to conduct our fieldwork, we considered  factors such as the historic difficulty of staffing a given post; the mix of  incentives available; strategic importance; and recommendations from  cognizant State officials. We selected the posts in Nigeria because of their  historically low bidding, their 25 percent hardship differentials, and  because each offers Service Need Differential (SND). We selected  Shenyang because of the post’s 30 percent hardship differential,  historically low bidding, and SND. We selected the posts in Saudi Arabia  because, in addition to their historically low bidding and 20 percent  hardship differentials, both were unaccompanied 1-year posts at the time  of our review. In addition to our fieldwork, we conducted telephone  interviews with senior officials in several additional hardship posts,  including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Liberia, and Tajikistan. We also  convened an expert roundtable of several retired senior State officials. The  participants in the roundtable had all served as ambassadors to hardship  posts in the last 10 years. Two participants were also former directors  general.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through September  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Department of State Generalist Staffing Surplus/Deficit by Career Track
paragraphs: Table 4 shows staffing surpluses and deficits by career track for foreign  service generalists as of December 31, 2008.
section_title: Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to Staff and Service Need Differential Posts
paragraphs: Table 5 lists posts that State designated as historically difficult to staff or  eligible for Service Need Differential (SND) for the 2009 summer  assignments cycle.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following is GAO’s comment to the Department of State’s letter dated  September 2, 2009.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comment
paragraphs: While State’s analysis of hardship differential and danger pay increases and  its request to OPM to include customized questions about hardship  incentives in future surveys are positive steps, they do not fully respond to  our recommendation to implement a plan to evaluate hardship incentives.  State expects to fulfill the mandate to study and report on the effect of the  increases in hardship differential and danger pay ceilings in filling “hard to  fill” positions in October 2009. However, as noted earlier, State offers other  incentives which it has not evaluated. Furthermore, we also note that  State's last survey had several limitations. For example, the survey lacked  the requisite specificity, included an incomplete list of incentives, and did  not collect key demographic information. Unless State addresses these  issues, the survey’s utility as an evaluation tool will remain limited.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report include Anthony Moran, Assistant Director;  Richard Gifford Howland; Aniruddha Dasgupta; Brian Hackney; Joseph  Carney; Martin de Alteriis; Grace Lui; Michael Courts; Zina Merritt; Gloria  Hernandez-Saunders; and John Brummet. Technical assistance was  provided by Robert Alarapon, Gena Evans, and Thomas Zingale.