World Trade Organization: Early Decisions Are Vital to Progress in Ongoing Negotiations
Published: 2002-09-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In November 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a new set of multilateral negotiations at its ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar. The ministerial conference was important because it laid out an ambitious agenda for a broad set of new multilateral trade negotiations, set forth in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. The declaration calls for a continuation of discussions on liberalizing trade in agriculture and services which began in 2000. In addition, it provides for new talks on market access for nonagricultural products, trade and the environment, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, and other issues. Four main factors led to the World Trade Organization's successful launch of new multilateral trade negotiations in Doha. First, the United States' and the European Union's clear support of the launch, bolstered by the strong personal relationship between the U.S. Trade Representative and the European Union Commissioner for Trade, facilitated agreement on the agenda for new negotiations. Second, World Trade Organization members applied an effective preparation strategy before the Doha ministerial conference. Third, some key developments at the Doha conference helped gain support from the developing countries for launching negotiations. Last, World Trade Organization officials and member country representatives said that the tragic events of September 11th galvanized Organization members to show their support for a strong and healthy worldwide trading system. The Doha Declaration requires negotiators to make early, crucial decisions because it mandates several important interim deadlines. One of these deadlines involves decisions on agricultural trade, where World Trade Organization members must agree on modalities, or methodologies, timetables, and desired targets, for reducing agricultural export subsidies, domestic support, and agricultural tariffs by March 31, 2003. The second interim deadline concerns the "Singapore issues," which Organization members must decide whether to include in the negotiations by the next ministerial conference in September 2003. The overriding challenge for the World Trade Organization in the negotiations will be to forge consensus within its large and diverse membership and to deal with several difficult organizational issues. In addition, the Organization will need to overcome the negative effects of outside events, such as disputes among its key members.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In November 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a new set of  multilateral negotiations at its ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar. The  ministerial conference was important, because it laid out an ambitious  agenda for a broad set of new multilateral trade negotiations set forth in the  Doha Ministerial Declaration.  The declaration calls for a continuation of  discussions on liberalizing trade in agriculture and services, which began in  2000. In addition, it provides for new talks on market access for  nonagricultural products, trade and the environment, trade-related aspects  of intellectual property rights, and other issues. The negotiations on these  issues are scheduled to conclude by January 1, 2005.
Because the Doha ministerial conference successfully launched new  multilateral trade negotiations, you asked us to analyze the nature of those  negotiations and their future prospects. In this report, we (1) analyze the  factors that contributed to the Doha ministerial conference’s successful  launch of new World Trade Organization negotiations, (2) analyze the key  interim deadlines for the most sensitive issues from the present time  through the next ministerial conference in 2003, and (3) evaluate the most  significant challenges facing the World Trade Organization in the overall  negotiations. Appendix I contains a brief synopsis of remaining issues on  the Doha negotiating agenda. Appendix II identifies the working groups  that the Doha Declaration established on issues that are not formally part  of the negotiations.
To address these objectives, we met with and obtained documents from a  wide variety of World Trade Organization, U.S., and foreign government  officials. In addition, we met with private sector, nongovernmental, and  intergovernmental organization representatives in Washington, D.C.,  Geneva, and Brussels. This report, however, is not meant to be a  comprehensive review of all the issues in the negotiations. For a detailed  account of the issues and their progress in the negotiations, refer to the  World Trade Organization Web site http://www.wto.org. A full description  of our scope and methodology can be found in appendix III.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Uruguay Round, the seventh in a series of multilateral negotiations  known as “rounds,” established the World Trade Organization (WTO) on  January 1, 1995, as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and  Trade (GATT). This round resulted in over a dozen separate agreements  that, among others, covered intellectual property rights and trade in  services and strengthened existing disciplines on agriculture. It also  established a stronger dispute settlement process than had been available  under the GATT. Moreover, unlike previous trade rounds, the Uruguay  Round agreements were part of a “single undertaking,” meaning that all  GATT members had to agree to all their provisions, with no discretion as to  which accords they wished to accept.
The WTO administers rules for international trade, provides a mechanism  for settling disputes, and provides a forum for conducting trade  negotiations. WTO membership has increased since its creation to 144  members, up from 90 GATT members when the Uruguay Round was  launched in 1986. WTO membership is also diverse in terms of economic  development, consisting of all developed countries and a large percentage  of developing countries, from the more advanced to the very poor.  Specifically, while the WTO has no formal definition of a “developing  country,” the World Bank classifies 105 current WTO members, or  approximately 73 percent, as developing countries. In addition, 30 members, or 21 percent of the total, are designated as “least developed  countries.”
The ministerial conference is the highest decisionmaking authority in the  WTO, convenes at least once every 2 years, and consists of trade ministers  from all WTO member countries. The WTO General Council, made up of  representatives from all WTO member governments, implements decisions  adopted by the members in between ministerial conferences.  Decisionmaking in the WTO is largely based on consensus among its  members rather than on a majority of member votes as it is in many other  international organizations.
Four ministerial conferences have taken place since the WTO’s creation.  Prior to the third ministerial conference, held in Seattle in December 1999,  WTO members announced their intention to launch a new round of  multilateral trade negotiations. However, the Seattle conference ended  without launching negotiations. Following four days of intensive talks, the  conference was suspended without issuing a ministerial declaration. The  failure to launch a new round in Seattle resulted from a combination of  circumstances, including a lack of agreement among members on the  issues to be discussed in a new round, the sensitivity and complexity of  trade issues under consideration, and inherent difficulties in the  negotiation process.
Ultimately, at the fourth ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, in  November 2001, WTO members were able to reach consensus on a new  negotiating effort, officially called the Doha Development Agenda. The  Doha Declaration sets forth a work program for the negotiations to be  concluded by January 1, 2005. Figure 1 illustrates the organizational  structure that the WTO has established to conduct the negotiations  mandated by the Doha Declaration.
The new negotiating effort will encompass agriculture and trade in  services, two critical areas where negotiations have been ongoing since  2000, under an existing Uruguay Round mandate. Special sessions of  standing WTO bodies will also address the relationship between trade and  the environment; attempt to clarify and improve provisions of the WTO  Dispute Settlement Understanding; and negotiate the establishment of a  multilateral notification and registration system for geographical indications for wines and spirits.  The WTO also called for a special  session of the Trade and Development Committee to identify and attempt  to strengthen special and differential treatment provisions for developing  countries. The status of this body has been the subject of debate and is  unclear. While some countries consider it to be a legitimate negotiating  group, the United States and several other countries contend that it belongs  under the general Doha work program. In addition to the special sessions,  two new negotiating groups have been created to review and propose  revisions to WTO disciplines dealing with trade rules and to recommend  cuts in tariffs and other steps to facilitate market access for nonagricultural  products. Chairpersons of special sessions and new negotiating groups  have been appointed by the WTO membership to serve up to the fifth  ministerial conference in 2003, at which time all appointments will be  reviewed. The Doha Declaration also mandated negotiations on numerous  issues related to difficulties that developing countries face in implementing  their Uruguay Round commitments. However, the declaration did not  create a separate negotiating group for these implementation issues.
section_title: Several Factors Led to Successful Doha Launch
paragraphs: Several factors contributed to the WTO’s successful launch of new trade  negotiations, which was a difficult feat, considering the lingering  uncertainty about launching such a round among WTO members since their  failure to do so 2 years earlier in Seattle. First, a strong relationship  between the United States and the European Union, particularly the U.S.  Trade Representative (USTR) and the European Union (EU) Commissioner  for Trade, helped forge consensus among other WTO members. Second,  WTO members used an effective strategy to prepare for the Doha  ministerial conference. Third, two key developments occurring during the  Doha ministerial greatly contributed to the developing countries’,  particularly African countries’, willingness to launch negotiations. Finally,  the tragic events of September 11th helped galvanize WTO members to show  their support for a strong and healthy worldwide trading system.
subsections: section_title: U.S.-EU Relationship Was Critical
paragraphs: The strong support on the part of the United States and the European  Union for the negotiations, bolstered by the positive relationship between  the U.S. Trade Representative and the EU Commissioner for Trade, helped  bring together other WTO members on specific issues and on the overall  goal of launching a new set of global trade negotiations. WTO members did  not agree to launch a new set of trade negotiations at the 1999 ministerial  conference in Seattle due, in part, to a lack of consensus among major  trading countries, especially the United States and the European Union. In  Doha, by contrast, the United States and the European Union, while not  agreeing on all of the key issues, were united behind a common goal of  launching a new round. According to some member country  representatives, the long-standing friendship between the U.S. Trade  Representative and the EU Trade Commissioner, dating back to the 1980s,  was a positive force in launching the negotiations. They noted that the two  officials used their personal rapport to garner support for an agenda for  these negotiations. Examples cited included their efforts to build bridges  with developing countries and to work together to devise compromise  language on trade and the environment, which allowed the European  Union to make crucial concessions in agriculture. Several WTO member  country representatives told us that agreement between the United States  and the European Union was essential to forging a consensus to launch  negotiations.
section_title: Preparation Strategy Was Effective
paragraphs: According to U.S. officials and foreign government representatives, a key  strategy for achieving consensus to launch negotiations was holding two  informal “mini-ministerials,” or informal meetings, among a cross section  of developed and developing country members, in the months before the  Doha ministerial conference. According to U.S. and foreign officials, these  meetings helped to rebuild personal relationships among ministers that  were crucial to overcoming the negative atmosphere evidenced by the  WTO’s failure to launch negotiations in Seattle in 1999. Further, throughout  2001, trade ministers from major trading countries met individually with  other ministers, especially from developing countries. In addition,  developing countries, including many in Africa, participated in a network of  informal meetings to prepare for the ministerial. Some developing country  representatives said that in contrast to preparations before the Seattle  ministerial, these efforts showed willingness on the part of developed  countries to better understand and address their concerns. For example,  several foreign representatives cited the fact that the U.S. Trade  Representative spent a great deal of time before the Doha ministerial  listening to developing countries’ views, particularly those of African  nations. They added that this was a positive step in relations between  developed and developing WTO member countries. According to U.S. and  WTO officials and foreign representatives, this effort was significant, as  negotiations could not have been launched without the developing  countries’ support.
Another preparatory strategy that helped WTO members reach consensus  on an agenda for new negotiations was the nature of the text used as the  basis for discussion at the ministerial meeting. Before the Doha ministerial,  the General Council chair produced his own text based on input he  received during exhaustive meetings with small groups of WTO members.  This text reflected the consensus views of members on the issues, based on  the chair’s own best judgment. In contrast, before the Seattle ministerial  conference, specific proposals from various member countries on each  issue drove the discussions on what should be included in the draft  declaration. This led to a lengthy (32 page) draft declaration text that was a  compendium of member country positions, including nearly 400 bracketed  items, indicating disagreement among members.
section_title: Key Developments in Doha Won Developing Country Support
paragraphs: WTO officials and foreign representatives said that two developments at  the Doha ministerial conference were crucial to gaining developing  countries’ support to launch a new set of negotiations. First, the WTO  granted the European Union a waiver from WTO’s most-favored-nation  clause (MFN) to continue providing preferential market access to African,  Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries through its Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in 2000.   The Cotonou Agreement will be valid for 20  years, during which time the European Union and ACP countries can enter  into additional economic integration agreements, progressively removing  barriers to trade. In addition, the agreement includes a pledge of 13.5  billion euros in development assistance to ACP countries for the initial 5- year period. The Secretary General of the ACP group has concluded that  the Cotonou Agreement will help integrate ACP countries into the world  economy by reinforcing regional integration, thus helping them to benefit  from globalization.
Second, WTO officials and U.S. and foreign country representatives said  the adoption at Doha of a declaration clarifying the relationship between  the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property  Rights (TRIPS) and public health was critical to gaining the support of  many African nations. The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and  Public Health states that the TRIPS agreement “does not and should not  prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.”  Prior to  the ministerial, African nations, nongovernmental organizations, and  others had argued that TRIPS could prevent developing countries from  gaining access to medicines needed to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,  malaria, and other epidemics (see app. I for a further discussion of this  declaration).
section_title: September 11th Tragedy Galvanized Support for Negotiations
paragraphs: The final major factor that U.S. and WTO officials and member country  representatives cited as contributing to the ministerial’s success was the  tragic events of September 11th. They said that after September 11th, many  WTO members felt that it was essential for there to be a successful major  international meeting to demonstrate the strength of the international  community. Further, given the potential impact of the attacks on the world  economy, which was already in recession, the ministerial would be an  important barometer of the strength of the multilateral trading system. The  combination of these factors led one official to remark that after  September 11th, the ministerial had to succeed because “the price of failure  was too high.”
section_title: Early Decisions on Key Sensitive Issues Vital to Progress in Round
paragraphs: The most important interim deadlines in the negotiations involve early key  decisions on agricultural trade and the Singapore issues, including  competition and investment in particular. Meeting the interim deadlines on  these issues will be crucial to achieving overall progress in the negotiations  and will provide a good indication of the ultimate prospects for the  negotiations’ successful conclusion. The following section discusses the  nature of these key decisions and analyzes the importance of these  particular issues and what makes them sensitive and difficult to negotiate.  Figure 2 shows the main interim deadlines and key events in the  negotiations through the fifth ministerial conference in 2003.
subsections: section_title: Meeting Interim Deadline on Agricultural Trade Crucial but Difficult
paragraphs: According to several WTO member country representatives and senior  WTO officials, whether WTO members meet the March 31, 2003, interim  deadline for establishing the agricultural modalities (that is, numerical  targets, timetables, and formulas for countries’ commitments) specified in  the Doha Declaration will be a crucial indicator of the likelihood of success  in the overall negotiations. This is attributable to the extreme importance  of agricultural trade reform for a large number of WTO member countries,  many of which want to see progress in the agriculture talks before coming  to agreement on other issues. However, meeting this deadline will be  difficult, because it necessitates reaching agreement on areas of long- standing dispute, particularly with regard to agricultural export subsidies  and domestic support payments, which have generated strong domestic  constituency concerns. Specifically, it is the negotiators’ intention to agree  on a target and timetable for phasing out agricultural export subsidies.  They will also need to agree on a definition of the types of domestic  agricultural support payments that should be considered trade-distorting.  Agricultural modalities also include devising a formula for WTO members  to reduce tariffs, which, while important, is less controversial.
Achieving agricultural trade reform in the negotiations is critical because  improving access to countries’ agricultural markets is a major priority for a  wide range of WTO member countries, including major agricultural  exporters such as Canada, Australia, and Brazil, who want to expand their  overseas markets. Proponents also include many developing countries,  among them Colombia, the Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand, who  wish to take advantage of their natural competitive advantage in the  agricultural sector. Agricultural reform is also critical to the United States,  whose farmers have faced a finite domestic market over the past several  years, falling international commodity prices, and a strong dollar that had  effectively inflated the cost of their exports to foreign markets. Because  agricultural trade is such a top priority to so many WTO members, the chair  of the special session of the Committee on Agriculture has called it a key to  completion of the negotiations, stating that without progress in agriculture,  there will be no progress in the overall round.
Meeting the March 2003 interim deadline on modalities for export  subsidies and domestic support payments will be difficult, as these areas  have been particularly contentious, generating intense domestic  constituency concerns in the European Union, Japan, and the United  States. For the European Union, the goals set out in the Doha Declaration  for phasing out export subsidies present a serious challenge. Over the  years, European farmers have come to rely on the generous support and  subsidies provided under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In fact,  the CAP has become the single biggest expenditure in the EU budget,  representing approximately 42 percent of its budget. In recent years, the  European Union has begun to reform the CAP and lower costs.  Nevertheless, EU farmers in certain countries, such as France, wield  considerable political power and could challenge the positions taken by  governments that would agree to eliminate export subsidies. Similarly, in  Japan, accepting substantial cuts in domestic support for agriculture and  reduced tariffs on agricultural imports could jeopardize farmers’ support  for the current government. Meanwhile, in May 2002, the United States  enacted the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171),  which will raise U.S. spending on domestic support for agriculture by about  $73.5 billion over the next 10 years.
Many WTO member countries are aggressively pursuing the goal of  reducing and eventually eliminating export subsidies, including the 18- country coalition known as the Cairns Group, which accounts for one- third of the world’s agricultural exports, as well as India, Mexico, Nigeria,  and the United States. The European Union is the main target of the Doha  mandate regarding export subsidies, as its subsidies far exceed those of  other countries. As shown in figure 3, in 1998 the European Union was  responsible for about 90 percent ($6.6 billion) of all agricultural export  subsidies used worldwide. In 2000, EU expenditures on export subsidies  were about 170 times the amount paid by the United States.  The  European Union has stated that it cannot agree to eliminate export  subsidies completely. The European Union and other WTO member  countries maintain that disciplining export subsidies without addressing  other programs affecting export competition, such as U.S. export credit  guarantees, would be discriminatory.
Like export subsidies, the Doha mandate of reducing domestic support  payments to farmers is highly controversial. The Cairns Group maintains  that only non-trade-distorting support payments, such as for pest and  disease control measures, should be allowed. Non-trade-distorting  domestic support programs are government funded and typically are not  directed at particular products or related to production levels or prices.  Although Japan and the European Union are willing to reduce support  payments to their farmers, they want to maintain some types of payments  linked to production. EU officials, for example, argue that certain  payments to farmers, based on measurement such as acreage or number of  animals, should continue to be allowed, provided they are tied to limits on  production and serve worthwhile goals. These goals include stewardship of  the rural environment and more humane treatment of farm animals. The  United States has called for simplifying the rules for domestic support and  establishing a ceiling on trade-distorting support that applies  proportionately to all countries. As shown in figure 4, the European Union  has provided much higher levels of support to its farmers than have other  WTO members, and it also enjoys a much higher allowable ceiling for such  support under its Uruguay Round commitments.
A third aspect of the decision on modalities is to devise a formula for  reducing tariffs on agricultural products. While less contentious than  attempts to reach agreement on modalities for export subsidies and  domestic support payments, agreeing on how to reduce agricultural tariffs  is important, particularly to the United States. According to the U.S.  Undersecretary of Agriculture, the average tariff for U.S. agricultural  products is 12 percent, while the average global tariffs for food and  agricultural products worldwide are 62 percent. Japan’s tariffs average 59  percent, while the Cairns Group’s and the EU’s are 30 percent. Tariff  reductions are a sensitive issue for many developing countries. Some  developing countries are reluctant to bring tariffs down to a level that  might compromise the livelihood of significant segments of their  populations who depend on agricultural production. Once WTO members  agree on agricultural tariff modalities, they must submit tariff schedules  detailing their proposed new tariff levels by the fifth ministerial conference  in September 2003. Accomplishing this task 6 months after the March  modalities deadline could be difficult for some WTO members. For  example, some developing countries have limited staff, experience, and  resources. In addition, the European Union must create tariff schedules not  only for its current members but also for the 10 countries that are  candidates to become EU members.
section_title: Meeting Interim Deadline on Singapore Issues Is Highly Contentious
paragraphs: A second critical decision point in the Doha Development Agenda involves  whether negotiations should proceed on what are generally referred to as  the Singapore issues, which include issues related to investment,  competition, trade facilitation, and transparency in government  procurement. Because of the extreme sensitivity of these issues,  particularly regarding competition and investment, WTO members decided  in Doha to delay the start of formal negotiations on these topics until they  could make certain decisions at the fifth ministerial conference in 2003.  These decisions are of key importance, because they, along with progress  in agriculture, are likely to drive the rest of the negotiations. EU officials  insist that moving forward with negotiations on competition and  investment is essential to the successful conclusion of the overall  negotiations, while developing countries have consistently opposed  including them in the talks.
Basic disagreement among WTO members on the meaning of the language  in the Doha Declaration is likely to make the upcoming decision on the  Singapore issues difficult, particularly in the areas of trade and investment  and trade and competition. The language in the declaration is ambiguous  on this issue. It states that for each of the four areas, negotiations should  take place after the fifth ministerial conference “on the basis of a decision  to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of  negotiations.”  In the view of developed countries, including the United  States and the European Union, the declaration calls for negotiations on  these issues to be launched after the fifth ministerial in September 2003.  However, India, with the support of some other developing countries,  maintains that no such consensus was reached at Doha. In Doha, India held  up consensus until it obtained a statement from the ministerial conference  chair that each WTO member would have “the right to take a position on  modalities that would prevent negotiations from proceeding …until that  member is prepared to join in an explicit consensus.” The general view  among WTO member representatives in Geneva is that the Doha  Declaration does not mandate that negotiations on the Singapore issues be  launched after the fifth ministerial conference. Instead, a decision on  whether to proceed with these negotiations will have to be made at that  2003 ministerial meeting.
The main controversy surrounding the Singapore issues deals with the EU’s  strong advocacy for negotiations on trade and investment and trade and  competition. Japan and South Korea also support negotiating these issues.  The European Union argues that investment rules based on the principles  of national treatment, MFN treatment, transparency, and the right to  establish businesses overseas are necessary to contribute to a stable and  predictable global business climate for foreign direct investment.  Regarding trade and competition policy, the European Union advocates  incorporating basic principles into domestic law, including  nondiscrimination, transparency, due process, judicial review, a ban on  certain cartels, and sufficient enforcement powers.
Many developing countries, on the other hand, led by a group of countries  known as the Like-Minded Group, have consistently expressed their  strong opposition to the inclusion of the Singapore issues in the negotiating  agenda. For example, India has acted to prevent any discussions in the  applicable WTO working groups on these issues. India is concerned that  any discussion might be construed as a negotiation, rather than as an effort  to clarify the issues. India argued that undertaking new obligations in these  areas would present too great a burden on developing countries. In fact,  many developing countries maintain that they are still having difficulty  implementing their Uruguay Round obligations (see app. I for a discussion  of implementation issues). Some developing countries want to see progress  on other issues, particularly improving the adequacy of the WTO’s technical  assistance and capacity building efforts, before agreeing to launch  negotiations on the Singapore issues.
section_title: WTO Negotiations Face Several Overarching Challenges
paragraphs: The overarching challenges facing the WTO in the negotiations launched in  Doha will be (1) building consensus within its large and diverse  membership, (2) overcoming various organizational difficulties, and (3)  avoiding tensions generated by controversial events occurring outside the  negotiations.
subsections: section_title: Diverse Membership Makes Consensus More Difficult
paragraphs: The WTO’s large and diverse membership makes reaching agreement by  consensus more difficult, particularly between developed and developing  country members. Developing countries are taking on a more active role in  these negotiations as compared with those under the Uruguay Round, and  in some cases they express different views about trade liberalization. For  instance, some developing country members are concerned that  commitments they make in the current negotiations could put them at a  disadvantage as compared with their developed country counterparts.  They argue that they should not be held to the same standard of trade  liberalization as the developed country members. Balancing these different  views will be a challenge in the negotiations. Further, China’s recent  membership in the WTO could affect the dynamics of the organization,  partly because of the size of its economy.
WTO members include high-income countries like the United States, which  alone accounts for about 13 percent of world trade; large, low-income  countries like China and India, each having populations of over 1 billion;  and members like Dominica, with fewer than 71,000 inhabitants, and  Mongolia, which accounts for less than 0.01 percent of world trade. As  mentioned earlier, the World Bank classifies 105 current WTO members, or  approximately 73 percent, as developing countries, and about 21 percent of  these as least developed countries. One WTO official pointed out that 80  percent of the WTO membership represents only 1.7 percent of world  trade.
Developing countries are taking a more active role in the current  negotiations as compared with the Uruguay Round, and they will scrutinize  more closely the commitments they agree to make. Notably, WTO members  are calling the current negotiations the Doha Development Agenda,  symbolizing the special emphasis on meeting the needs of developing  countries. According to a WTO official and a developing country  representative in Geneva, many developing country members have  maintained that they had not fully realized that, under the Uruguay Round,  all WTO members were obligated to implement the complete package of  agreements and were to be held accountable by the WTO’s dispute  settlement system. (Prior to the completion of the Uruguay Round, parties  to GATT could opt out of agreements if they so chose.) One WTO official  believed that, because WTO developing country members now better  understand the WTO dispute settlement process, they are less likely to  accept vague language in order to reach a consensus, as compared with the  previous round. He said that this could make it harder to reach consensus,  as negotiators demand more clarity. Finally, some developing country  members have had difficulty implementing their Uruguay Round  obligations.
Some developing country members have views on trade liberalization that  are different from those of their developed country counterparts. Although  many developing countries are willing to liberalize their markets to gain  concessions in areas in which they are most competitive, particularly in  agricultural trade, others maintain that they need special exceptions to  trade liberalization to help them develop. For example, some of these  developing country members want to opt out of lowering tariffs for certain  products, reevaluate existing tariff bindings for food security reasons, or  continue to use export subsidies to promote development.
The WTO’s challenge lies in the fact that the Doha Declaration calls for  strengthening the ability of developing countries to argue for exceptions to  trade liberalization through the WTO’s “special and differential treatment”  provisions. By the end of July 2002, the Committee on Trade and  Development was to identify those special and differential treatment  provisions that are mandatory and those that are nonbinding in character,  and to examine ways in which these provisions could be made more  precise and effective. On July 24, 2002, the committee recommended that  the General Council agree to set up a monitoring mechanism, whose details  would be worked out later. It further asked the General Council to approve  extending until December 31, 2002, the committee’s deadline for making  clear recommendations for decisions on special and differential treatment.  According to a WTO official, this exercise will be difficult, given the  potential for such exceptions to undermine the overall negotiations’ goal to  increase trade liberalization.
China’s entry as a new member of the WTO in 2001 is another sign of the  diversity of the WTO’s membership. Because China is a large economy and  a significant trader, as well as a developing country under World Bank  standards, the role it chooses to take in the WTO could affect the  dynamics of the organization and therefore the negotiations. In fact, one  high-level WTO official noted that China’s new mission to the WTO in  Geneva is the fourth largest among the membership. WTO officials and  member country representatives with whom we spoke generally believed  that China would act in its own national interest and not necessarily side in  all cases with any one bloc of WTO member countries. One WTO  representative from a developing country predicted that China would form  alliances where it made sense for China. Many WTO country  representatives predicted that China would be active in the negotiations  and would be likely to support further trade liberalization by other WTO  members. However, it has been reported that Chinese officials have  recently taken the position that China should not be expected to make  significant concessions in the negotiations given the substantial  commitments it has already made in joining the WTO, particularly in the  area of market access for nonagricultural products. In addition, one WTO  country representative predicted that China’s membership might have an  impact on the outcome of the WTO negotiations on trade remedies.  Specifically, WTO member countries may be less inclined to weaken WTO  antidumping provisions because of the possibility of China’s dumping  products on their markets.
section_title: WTO Faces Organizational Challenges
paragraphs: The WTO will face several organizational challenges during the  negotiations. First, the WTO will face pressure to meet many developing  country members’ high expectations for receiving technical assistance to  help them fully participate and benefit from the negotiations. Second, some  aspects of the WTO’s guiding principles for conducting the negotiations  have the potential for slowing progress in the negotiations. Finally,  uncertainties associated with the change in WTO leadership could  potentially affect negotiations as a new WTO Director General took office  in September 2002.
subsections: section_title: High Expectations for Technical Assistance Must Be Met
paragraphs: The WTO’s most difficult organizational task will be to meet some  developing country members’ high expectations for receiving technical  assistance mandated in the Doha Declaration. While the WTO has recently  been allocated additional funds to meet these needs, a WTO official  suggested that the WTO might lack the staff and resources to effectively  utilize the funds. In addition, according to foreign country and WTO  officials, some developing countries are expecting the WTO to expand its  activities not only to play its traditional role of explaining WTO agreements  but also to provide broader assistance, such as helping countries to  increase their capacity to export. The latter involves providing  development assistance, a role for which the WTO lacks the resources and  expertise. Many developing countries have indicated that the adequacy of  these efforts will affect their willingness to accept many of the developed  countries’ priorities in the negotiations, according to WTO and foreign  government officials.
The WTO’s delivery of technical assistance to developing countries has  become critical to the successful outcome of the Doha Development  Agenda. The Doha Declaration calls for firm commitments to provide  technical assistance and capacity building, which it identifies as “core  elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system.”   The WTO Director General has repeatedly highlighted the importance of  these commitments, stating that further progress in trade liberalization is  conditional on capacity building.
The WTO is also highlighting the importance of coordination among other  international organizations in providing trade-related development  assistance to developing countries, particularly least developed countries.  The focus of these efforts is through an enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to the Least Developed Countries.  The six core international agencies of the integrated framework, which  include the WTO, issued a joint communiqué in February 2002 committing  them to helping least developed countries and low-income economies to  “stimulate supply-side responses to improve market access opportunities,  diversify their production and export base, and enhance their trade- supporting institutions.”  The Doha Declaration directs the WTO Director  General to provide an interim report to the General Council in December  2002 and a full report to the fifth ministerial conference in 2003 on the  implementation and adequacy of commitments made to provide technical  assistance and capacity building to developing countries, including WTO  efforts to enhance the integrated framework on behalf of least developed  countries.
However, despite a significant increase in funding from the WTO and  commitments for a coordinated effort from other international  organizations to expand technical assistance, several WTO and foreign  government officials were concerned that developing countries’  expectations for these efforts may be unrealistic. These officials worried  that developing countries may view such assistance as a condition to their  agreeing to move forward in the negotiations. According to both a WTO  official and a foreign government representative in Geneva, some  developing countries expect to obtain assistance from the WTO with  infrastructure projects to facilitate their capacity to export. However, the  Deputy U.S. Trade Representative stated in April 2002 that the WTO’s  mandate for providing technical assistance and capacity building relates  “strictly to assisting these countries in negotiations and does not require  broader development aid.” He further stated that the extent of these  activities and what they should accomplish must soon be clarified. Some  WTO member country representatives whom we interviewed agreed with  the U.S. view that this clarification was essential so that developing  countries cannot claim later that technical assistance was inadequate to  obtain their willingness to participate further in the negotiations. This will  be one of the critical issues to be addressed at the fifth ministerial  conference in Mexico in September 2003.
section_title: Principles Guiding the Negotiations Could Slow Progress
paragraphs: In January 2002 the General Council established “principles and practices,”  or guidelines, for conducting the negotiations. Certain aspects of these  guidelines were written specifically to accommodate many of the concerns  of developing countries. However, some of these guidelines could create  delays in the negotiations. For example, a WTO official highlighted a  requirement that chairs of negotiating bodies include the different views of  members in draft texts if no consensus exists. This is partly because  several developing countries claimed that the General Council chair’s draft  Doha Declaration did not reflect their consistent opposition to negotiations  on the Singapore issues. Consequently, these countries insisted on this  requirement in the principles and practices to prevent drafts from being  produced that do not reflect their positions. However, this limitation could  make it harder for chairpersons to broker a final negotiating agreement, if  it produces the type of unwieldy text that prevented consensus at the  Seattle ministerial.
Another element of the principles and practices that could delay the  progress of the negotiations is guidance that only one negotiating body  should meet at a given time, according to a WTO official. The objective of  this guideline is to structure the talks so that small delegations would be  better able to participate. Developing countries have stressed the  importance of enabling greater inclusion of all members in the negotiating  process. Although this is an important goal, it limits the total number of  meetings that could possibly take place over the course of the negotiations.  A chair of one of the negotiating groups believes chairs still have the  flexibility to schedule overlapping meetings if absolutely necessary to  move the talks along. However, he suggested that some WTO members,  who do not support further trade liberalization, could use the principles  and procedures as a means of restricting the flexibility of the negotiating  bodies.
section_title: Transition to New WTO Director General Presents Some Uncertainties
paragraphs: A new WTO Director General from Thailand, Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi,  began a 3 year term in September 2002, replacing the former Director  General, Mike Moore, from New Zealand. Before the Seattle ministerial in  1999, after failing to reach consensus on one candidate, WTO members  selected both men to serve consecutive 3 year terms. While this latest  transition in leadership could very well be a smooth one, any change in  leadership could potentially affect the negotiations. The new Director  General has come on board in the middle of difficult negotiations. In  addition, the terms of the four current Deputy Directors General expire at  the end of September, and four new deputies have been named to replace  them as of October 1st. While the WTO is largely a member-driven  organization, the Director General and his or her deputies can play an  important role in facilitating consensus and organizing work so as to  ensure maximum progress in the negotiations. Significantly, as the first  Director General from a developing country, the new leader may face  additional pressure to address the concerns of developing country  members. For example, the new Director General will have to try to deliver  on promises made regarding technical assistance.
section_title: Outside Events Could Affect the Negotiations
paragraphs: Events not directly part of the negotiations could also affect their progress.  First, any ongoing contentious WTO dispute settlement cases concerning  issues being negotiated could negatively affect negotiators’ willingness to  reach agreement. For example, several WTO members have filed dispute  settlement cases against the United States in reaction to its decision to  impose higher tariffs on imported steel. Another event that may undermine  the negotiations is concern on the part of many WTO members about the  increase in the U.S. agricultural domestic support payments called for in  the U.S. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, mentioned  earlier. This concern could affect U.S. credibility in persuading other  countries to reduce such payments in the negotiations. Finally, more  optimistically, the enactment of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) this  August, granting the U.S. President trade promotion authority, is likely to  provide positive momentum in the negotiations.
subsections: section_title: Dispute over U.S. Imposition of Tariffs on Steel Imports
paragraphs: Some experts believe that tensions caused by a recent WTO dispute  settlement case regarding increased U.S. tariffs on steel imports could  diminish the level of trust and cooperation among negotiators that had  existed at the time of the Doha ministerial conference. On March 5, 2002,  President Bush agreed to impose tariffs of up to 30 percent on certain steel  imports. This was in response to a U.S. International Trade Commission  finding that the U.S. steel industry had been harmed by substantially  increased imports of steel products. As a result of the tariff increases, the  European Union, China, Japan, Korea, Brazil, and other WTO members  have entered into consultations with U.S. officials under WTO dispute  settlement procedures. On June 3, 2002, the WTO established a dispute  settlement panel to hear concerns that these countries have about U.S.  tariffs on steel imports.
Some countries have indicated that they may also introduce tariffs to guard  against what they perceive as a surplus of steel imports flooding their  markets, as a result of the U.S. action. China has already enacted a tariff- rate quota on 9 categories of steel products to prevent a possible surge of  steel imports resulting from U.S. actions. Similarly, the European Union has  imposed a provisional tariff-rate quota on 15 categories of steel to prevent  what the European Union describes as a potential flood of diverted steel  coming into the EU market. Moreover, the European Union is considering  imposing tariffs on imports from the United States amounting to about $335  million to offset potential losses as a result of increased U.S. steel tariffs.
The U.S. Trade Representative has responded to WTO members’ criticism  of U.S. tariffs on steel imports by emphasizing that “the WTO expressly  permits safeguard measures to allow an industry injured by imports  temporary relief and time to restructure.” He also pointed out that Japan,  Korea, Brazil, and others have used similar safeguards in the past or are  using them today. Further, he noted that in the 1980s the European Union  and its member states provided more than $50 billion in government  subsidies to restructure the European steel industry.
section_title: WTO Member Concerns about U.S. Farm Legislation
paragraphs: Several WTO members have expressed concern that the U.S. farm  legislation passed earlier this year calls for raising domestic support  payments to U.S. farmers over the next 10 years. They maintain that it  undermines one of the main objectives set out in the Doha Declaration, that  of reducing trade-distorting domestic support. The EU Commissioner for  Agriculture has severely criticized the farm legislation, claiming that it will  undermine ongoing multilateral efforts to reform global farm trade.  Specifically, the Commissioner criticized not only the increase in domestic  payments but also their potential to distort trade. For example, he  maintained that one type of support payment in the legislation, termed  “counter-cyclical payments,” would shield U.S. farmers from low  agricultural prices and would result in overproduction. Similarly,  Australian government officials have declared that because the act raises  domestic support payments and would increase payments to U.S. farmers  should commodity prices fall, the United States has effectively relinquished  its leadership in the WTO agricultural talks, even though this leadership has  historically been crucial to obtaining agricultural concessions from the  European Union. Further, the Canadian Minister of Agriculture and Agri- Food called the farm legislation, particularly its price-based support  payments, a serious blow to U.S. credibility in the WTO negotiations.
The United States has countered that it is fully committed to the  negotiations and will be a strong advocate for liberalizing trade in food and  agricultural products. USTR officials stated that the new farm legislation  supports U.S. farmers while maintaining U.S. obligations under WTO. The  U.S. Secretary of Agriculture said that the legislation does nothing to  change the resolve of the United States to negotiate a very aggressive result  in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. Moreover, the U.S.  Undersecretary of Agriculture emphasized that the U.S. domestic support  ceiling allowable under the WTO is low relative to those of other WTO  members, and pledged that the United States would not exceed its  allowable ceiling. For example (as shown earlier in fig. 4), in 1998, the EU  ceiling was $80.4 billion, versus the U.S. ceiling of $20.7 billion. Stressing  this point, the Undersecretary cited a fail-safe mechanism in the legislation  directing the Secretary of Agriculture to use, to the maximum extent  practicable, a so-called circuit breaker to ensure that the United States  does not exceed its WTO limit on domestic support payments to  agricultural producers.
section_title: Outcome of U.S. Trade Promotion Authority Legislation
paragraphs: On a positive note, for the first time since 1994, in August of this year,  Congress granted the President trade promotion authority. Under this  authority, Congress agrees to consider legislation to implement trade  agreements negotiated by the President under a streamlined procedure  with mandatory deadlines, no amendments, and limited debate. Prior to the  act’s passage, WTO officials and member country representatives cited the  lack of trade promotion authority for the U.S. President as a significant  obstacle to progress in the WTO negotiations. Following congressional  approval of this authority, the WTO Director General and trade ministers  from the European Union, Japan, Australia, and other countries cited it as  providing a boost to the WTO negotiations. Specifically, the WTO Director  General noted that it has “renewed confidence to wrap up these talks” by  the 2005 deadline.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: On the whole, two main factors made it possible for WTO members to  reach consensus on the Doha Development Agenda: (1) the strong U.S. and  EU support for the negotiations, bolstered by the positive relationship  between the U.S. Trade Representative and the EU Commissioner for  Trade; and (2) the strategy of deferring some important decisions to the  actual negotiations. Nevertheless, the first factor may not continue to be  present throughout the negotiations, and the second may actually impair  WTO members’ ability to reach a viable agreement.
First, if the negotiations go beyond the WTO’s target date of January 2005,  there will be a new set of players who may not have the same kind of  positive relationship that existed when the negotiations were launched.  Specifically, in January 2005, a new EU Commission is likely to take office  and thus a new EU Commissioner for Trade may be appointed. In addition,  a new U.S. Trade Representative could be named depending upon the  outcome of the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Further, the current WTO  Director General’s term of office expires on August 31, 2005, and the terms  of his deputies are up a month later.
Second, the Doha strategy of deferring several contentious decisions to the  negotiations means that these decisions now need to be made, and the  timetable is ambitious. For example, the outcome of the ministerial  conference in September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico, will be a critical  indication of whether key decisions on agricultural trade and the Singapore  issues can be made. This is especially true because trade ministers have  only 15 months thereafter to conclude the negotiations by January 1, 2005.  During the Uruguay Round, the negotiations took 7 years to conclude,  which was significantly longer than the original 4 year deadline.
Further, these negotiations will take place in the context of significant  organizational challenges. In particular, the larger and more diverse set of  WTO developing country members are taking a more active role in the  negotiations and placing greater demands on the organization than during  the Uruguay Round. The WTO’s ability to successfully address these  development dynamics could have a direct bearing on the progress of the  negotiations. Therefore, the Doha Development Agenda is a serious test of  WTO members’ ability to preserve positive relations while balancing their  considerable organizational challenges and their strongly held disparate  views on several politically sensitive trade issues.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from the U.S. Trade  Representative and from the Secretary of Agriculture, or their designees.  The Assistant U. S. Trade Representative for WTO Multilateral Affairs and  the Director of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Foreign Agricultural  Service, provided us on July 24th and August 8th, respectively, with technical  oral comments on the draft, which we incorporated into the report. In  addition, on July 26th we obtained and incorporated into the report oral  comments from the Director of the Office of Policy, Import Administration,  the Department of Commerce, on sections in the draft covering trade rules  regarding countries’ unfair trade practices.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 12 days after its  date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the U.S. Trade  Representative, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce,  and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies  available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Additional Issues on the Doha Negotiating Agenda
paragraphs: This appendix provides a brief synopsis of the issues to be negotiated in the  Doha Development Agenda (other than agriculture, the Singapore issues,  and special and differential treatment). As seen in figure 5, these issues  include World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, nonagricultural market  access, services, environment, dispute settlement, and a registry for  geographical indications for wines and spirits. Also included in this  appendix is a discussion of intellectual property and public health as well  as the implementation of existing Uruguay Round agreements, for which  the WTO did not create new negotiating groups or special sessions of  existing WTO bodies. For a more detailed account of all the issues in the  Doha Declaration and updates on their progress, refer to the WTO Web site  at http://www.wto.org.
subsections: section_title: WTO Rules
paragraphs: The Doha Declaration launched negotiations in several areas pertaining to  WTO rules. Specifically, WTO members agreed to negotiate on WTO rules  dealing with antidumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, fisheries  subsidies, and regional trade agreements.
subsections: section_title: Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
paragraphs: The negotiations on the trade remedies of antidumping and countervailing  duties are among the most important and contentious on the Doha agenda.  An increasing number of WTO members are applying antidumping and  countervailing duty measures. At the same time, several members are  voicing serious concerns about how their fellow members, particularly the  United States, are implementing those measures, and questioning whether  in some cases the measures are being applied fairly. While the United States  accounted for about 20 percent of antidumping measures reported to the  WTO in 2001, Canada and the European Union (EU) also made extensive  use of these measures. In addition, some developing countries have  become major users of antidumping measures. In 2001, for example, India  actually reported more antidumping measures to the WTO than did the  United States. Accordingly, before the 2001 Doha ministerial conference,  countries including Brazil, Korea, and Japan called for clarifying rules on  antidumping measures to prevent unjustified investigations and to remove  ambiguity and excessive discretion in their implementation. Urging  caution, the United States has strongly supported preserving current trade  remedy laws while allowing for clarification of existing provisions. In  addition, U.S. officials emphasize the need for enhanced disciplines on the  way that WTO members apply trade remedy measures.
According to U.S. officials, the major difficulty in these negotiations will be  to find common ground, on the one hand, between WTO members who  believe that clarifying and improving trade remedies require a major  overhaul of the Uruguay Round agreements on antidumping and  countervailing duties, and on the other hand, U.S. insistence that these  agreements remain intact and that no changes in U.S. trade remedy laws  are necessary.  In the first phase of negotiations, member countries will  identify and agree on the specific issues to be clarified and improved. A  group of 14 countries has submitted a list of several topics that they want to  raise in these discussions on trade remedies to clarify and improve,  including a number on antidumping measures. Examples include the  practice of excluding certain transactions from the calculation of a  “dumping margin,” or establishing a clearer link between dumped imports  and the resultant injury. The WTO Appellate Body has issued rulings  regarding the use of these practices over the past few years, in some cases  citing problems with EU and U.S. methodologies.
While the United States is advocating caution and discretion in this initial  phase of identifying WTO trade remedy disciplines to be clarified and  improved, it is not discounting the need for improvement in some areas. In  particular, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has noted that any  consideration of WTO rules must focus on improving the transparency of  the processes of the rapidly increasing number of countries using trade  remedies. Moreover, the United States is concerned about the way that  other countries determine damages and trade-distorting practices. For  example, one USTR official explained that he would like to see improved  disciplines on what constitutes valid trade remedy investigations.
The Doha Declaration does not specify any interim deadlines regarding the  trade remedy negotiations. A U.S. negotiator told us that the really difficult  decisions on trade remedies will likely be left to the end of the 3 year  negotiating period, because so many trade-offs will be necessary to achieve  any progress in this controversial area.
Some labor and industry groups and some members of the Congress have  expressed strong opposition to weakening U.S. trade remedy laws.  For  example, the American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial  Organizations (AFL-CIO) has warned that including antidumping and  countervailing duties in the WTO negotiations will weaken U.S. trade  remedy laws and leave American workers vulnerable to other countries’  unfair trade practices. Some U.S. businesses, such as those in the steel  industry, argue that effective rules against dumping and trade-distorting  subsidies are an essential element of the multilateral trading system.
The importance of antidumping and countervailing duty measures was  emphasized in the trade promotion authority sections of the recently  passed Trade Act of 2002. Thus, the law states that one of the principal U.S.  trade negotiating objectives is to preserve the ability of the United States to  rigorously enforce its trade laws, including antidumping and countervailing  duty law, and avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of domestic  and international rules on unfair trade, especially dumping or subsidies.   Another provision in this legislation requires that the President report to  Congress, at least 180 days before entering into a trade agreement, on the  range of proposals advanced in the negotiations and how those proposals  relate to the negotiating objectives on trade remedy laws.
section_title: Fisheries Subsidies
paragraphs: As part of the mandate to negotiate WTO rules, including subsidies in  general, the Doha Declaration specifically calls for negotiations to “clarify  and improve” WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies. The United States  was one of the major proponents for these negotiations, which it views as a  win-win opportunity to reduce trade-distorting subsidies while supporting  environmental and developmental goals. Fisheries subsidies will be  covered under the general heading of “subsidies,” which are part of the  agenda of the Negotiating Group on Rules.
The United States is one of a group of countries known as Friends of Fish.  The group believes that current trade disciplines under the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures are inadequate to  address the negative effects of fisheries subsidies. They cite a range of  studies that conclude that annual subsidies in the fisheries sector are  between $14 and $20.5 billion. In an April 2002 paper submitted to the  Negotiating Group on Rules, these countries argued that fisheries  subsidies distort trade and contribute to “excessive fishing capacity,”  leading to the depletion of fish stocks. They also argued that trade  distortions and overcapacity in the fisheries sector “impede the sustainable  development of many countries with significant fisheries resources.”  The  Friends of Fish paper also claims that developing countries cannot  compete with subsidized, distant-water fishing fleets from wealthier  countries. Additionally, nonsubsidizing countries seeking to safeguard a  shared fish stock lose the extra catch gained by fishers from subsidizing  countries, according to this paper.
Japan and Korea, both major providers of subsidies in the fisheries sector,  opposed specific reference to fisheries subsidies in the Doha Declaration.  They argued that subsidies are not to blame for the depletion of fish stocks.  Instead, they claimed that inadequate management regimes and  uncontrolled illegal fishing were the main causes of the depletion of fish  stock, and that subsidies designed to reduce capacity would actually be  beneficial. The European Union, which includes a group of countries with  subsidized fishing sectors, mostly in Southern Europe, is also unlikely to  support efforts during the negotiations to reduce or eliminate fisheries  subsidies, according to a USTR official. Efforts within the European Union  to reform its fisheries policies have faced resistance from France, Spain,  Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland.
section_title: Regional Trade Agreements
paragraphs: Regional trade agreements are arrangements through which countries may  grant more favorable terms of trade to countries within a regional group  than to countries outside that arrangement. These arrangements may vary  in form but generally include customs unions and free trade areas.They  also differ in the extent to which their preferential treatment provisions  cover trade in various economic sectors and products. Regional trade  agreements have proliferated during the past decade. In addition, there has  been interest in clarifying WTO rules on such arrangements. Nearly all  WTO members have notified the WTO of their participation in one or more  such agreements.
WTO members are permitted to enter into preferential trade arrangements.  Nevertheless, a fundamental debate has taken place concerning the  compatibility of regional trade agreements with the multilateral trading  system. At Doha, WTO members agreed to negotiations to clarify and  improve the current WTO provisions that apply to regional trade  agreements. However, countries are divided over whether such a mandate  would require revising existing WTO rules or developing additional rules.  Countries are also split over whether to apply new disciplines to existing  regional trade agreements.
Toward the end of the Uruguay Round, regional trade agreements emerged  as an issue for certain countries as they became aware of how these  agreements might work to their disadvantage. Several countries began  calling for a review of the impact of these arrangements on multilateral  commitments under WTO agreements. The concerns these countries  express vary. For example, Australia and New Zealand are concerned that  regional trade agreements may lead to an uneven process of trade  liberalization, because existing rules allow countries negotiating these  agreements to select those sectors that they wish to liberalize. In contrast,  a U.S. official stated that Japan and Korea have opposed regional trade  agreements in the past because such arrangements permit different terms  of trade for certain products that originate in specified countries. India has  sought reforms to WTO rules on regional trade agreements because it has  felt excluded from those arrangements. And Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong  have also argued that newly clarified and improved WTO rules should apply  to existing agreements; otherwise, new disciplines may be irrelevant,  because so many countries have already entered into regional agreements.
Those WTO members that have entered into regional trade agreements  generally have less of an interest in seeking further disciplines covering  such agreements, which could then be applied retroactively. The United  States, already a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement and  currently considering other bilateral and regional free trade arrangements,  including a free trade agreement encompassing the entire Western  Hemisphere, has not taken a strong position in favor of reforming existing  WTO provisions governing regional trade agreements. The United States  has advocated more transparency in the implementation of existing  obligations. Similarly, the European Union (which has notified the WTO of  more than 30 regional trade agreements) has been hesitant to clarify  disciplines, because it seeks flexible procedures for interpreting its existing  regional agreements and future agreements with countries seeking to join  the European Union. Other WTO members, such as Argentina, Brazil,  Hungary, and Mexico, oppose the application of new disciplines to existing  agreements. These countries argue that the application of new rules to  already negotiated agreements may allow members to undertake dispute  settlement cases on trade agreements that have been in existence for years.
section_title: Nonagricultural Market Access
paragraphs: The reduction of nonagricultural tariffs is one of the key goals of the new  multilateral negotiations and has been the traditional focus of past  multilateral negotiations. For example, previous multinational negotiations  have reduced trade-weighted most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates on  industrial goods from an average high of 40 percent at the end of World War II to about 4 percent at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in  1994. Still, there is considerable potential for further cuts, as tariff  reductions have not been evenly distributed across countries or applied  equally among all products and sectors. According to the World Bank, even  though developing countries agreed to cut their tariffs in the Uruguay  Round, these tariffs are still on average considerably higher than those of  the developed countries. For example, the post–Uruguay Round average ad  valorem “bound” rate for developed economies was 3.5 percent, as  compared with 25.2 percent for developing economies, according to the  World Bank.
The Doha Declaration mandates negotiations aimed at reducing or, as  appropriate, eliminating tariffs for nonagricultural products, including  reducing or eliminating tariff peaksand tariff escalation, as well as  nontariff barriers. Negotiations are to be comprehensive in that no  products are to be excluded, and they must take fully into account the  principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries  embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This includes  allowing for “less than full reciprocity” in meeting tariff reduction  commitments.
The negotiations on market access for nonagricultural goods face several  difficulties. U.S. tariffs, as well as those of its industrialized trading  partners, are already very low. For example, the average U.S. trade- weighted industrial tariff rate is about 3 percent, and more than 5,000 of the  10,000 U.S. tariff lines are now duty free. This leaves the United States with  limited leverage to convince other countries to reduce their higher tariffs,  according to USTR officials. In addition, the countries with the highest  tariffs, primarily developing countries, are resistant to reducing their tariffs  for several reasons. First, many already enjoy dutyfree access through U.S.  and EU trade preference programs, so further reductions in MFN rates will  only dilute the competitive advantage they receive from these programs.  Second, many developing countries are resistant to making significant  reductions in their nonagricultural tariffs, or are opposed to their  elimination, because they rely on tariffs as a significant source of revenue.
The key points of controversy will likely surround the issues of tariff  reciprocity among countries, tariff peaks, and tariff escalation. The United  States views “less than full reciprocity” as, among other things, allowing  longer transition periods for implementing tariff concessions, and it will  consider it on a case-by-case basis depending upon the situation and the  country involved. Some developing countries may argue that less than full  reciprocity entitles them, under some circumstances, to avoid eliminating  or reducing their tariffs. A priority of many developing countries is to  reduce the tariff peaks and tariff escalation practices that industrialized  countries often employ, especially in sectors in which they have the  greatest competitive advantage, such as textiles and apparel. For example,  the relatively high U.S. textile and apparel tariffs (out-of-quota rates for  various apparel items range from 20 to 33 percent) will be a certain target  for developing countries because of the size of the U.S. market, according  to a USTR official. However, it will be difficult for the United States to offer  concessions in this area. Indeed, the U.S. textiles industry has proposed  that the level of U.S. textile and apparel tariffs be frozen, while Asian and  other countries’ tariffs are brought down to U.S. levels.
On July 19, 2002, the Negotiating Group on Market Access established a  program of meetings for the negotiations on market access for  nonagricultural products. As a part of this program, the participants in the  negotiations will aim at achieving “a common understanding on a possible  outline of modalities by the end of March 2003 with a view to reaching an  agreement on those modalities by May 31, 2003.”
section_title: Trade in Services
paragraphs: The large and growing volume of international trade in services makes  services liberalization an important part of the Doha negotiating agenda.  Over the past 10 years, international trade in services has grown  dramatically, increasing from $783 billion in 1990 to $1.4 trillion (or about  19 percent of total world trade) in 2000. At the national level, trade in  services accounts for nearly 80 percent of U.S. employment and private- sector gross domestic product. U.S. exports of commercial services were  $279 billion in 2000, supporting more than 4 million services and  manufacturing jobs. Other major services exporters in 2000 included the  United Kingdom ($100 billion), France ($81 billion), Germany ($80 billion),  and Japan ($68 billion). A U.S. Trade Representative official indicated that  the U.S. objectives in the services negotiations include broad participation  by many countries, reduction of restrictions, building upon previous  services agreements, and expansion of regulatory transparency. A U.S.  services industry representative noted that issues of importance for the  negotiations also include providing regulatory transparency and personnel  mobility and preventing a safeguard provision for trade in services.
The Doha Declaration intends that WTO members complete the work they  initiated in January 2000 under the General Agreement on Trade in Services  (GATS). The declaration calls for pursuing the GATS’ intention of  increasing developing country participation in world trade and achieving a  progressively higher level of liberalization in the services trade. Guidelines  and procedures for the negotiations include two key principles: no sectors  should be excluded from the negotiations; and negotiations can occur in  bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral (including all members) groups,  mainly using a request-offer method. However, according to a WTO  official, the negotiations will be conducted predominantly on a bilateral  basis using the request-offer approach, with results applied to all WTO  members on an MFN basis.
Although it is probably one of the least controversial issues on the Doha  agenda, the services negotiations face several difficulties. One challenge  is to convince developing countries to open up their services sectors.  According to a U.S. services industry representative, this difficulty is  attributable, in part, to the fact that developed countries can offer few  concessions in the services area because their barriers are already so low  in many sectors. Another difficulty is that some areas of trade in services  that developing countries are interested in pursuing may be difficult to  negotiate. For example, the tourism sector is one of the developing  countries’ best economic growth opportunities. But liberalization in this  sector will be difficult to negotiate because of its linkage to other sectors  such as air and road transport and financial services. Finally, services  negotiations are by nature especially complex, time consuming, and  resource intensive. For example, they can involve a separate set of bilateral  negotiations among all 144 WTO member countries, for each and every  sector; and they would involve agreeing to change domestic laws and  regulations and developing and implementing new administrative  procedures.
section_title: Trade and the Environment
paragraphs: For the first time, the WTO will begin negotiations on trade and  environment issues. These negotiations are intended to clarify the  relationship between WTO rules and explicit trade measures included in  multilateral environmental agreements (MEA). An MEA is any agreement  between three or more signatory countries concerning some aspect of  environmental protection. There are approximately 200 multilateral  environmental agreements in place today. In addition, the negotiations are  to address procedures for exchanging information between WTO  committees and MEA secretariats, and the criteria for granting observer  status. They are also to liberalize trade in environmental goods and  services. These negotiations will be conducted in special sessions of the  existing WTO Committee on Trade and Environment.
During the preparation period before the Doha ministerial, the European  Union demanded that the negotiations include environmental issues.  Developing countries have generally resisted any efforts to negotiate these  issues in the WTO, arguing that industrialized countries might use  environmental standards as a form of “green” protectionism. The United  States also opposed the EU’s objectives for addressing environment in the  WTO. Of the three environment-related issues that the European Union  specifically sought at the Doha ministerial, only the relationship between  MEAs and WTO rules became part of the negotiating agenda. The European  Union also sought negotiations to clarify countries’ use of the  “precautionary principle” in taking trade measures to protect  environmental and human health, and of “eco-labeling.” However, the  issue of precaution was left out of the Doha Declaration entirely, while eco- labeling could be added to the negotiations if members decide at the next  ministerial that there is consensus to do so. According to a USTR official,  additional environmental issues are unlikely to be included in the  negotiations.
Clarifying the relationship between the WTO and the MEAs is the most  prominent item on the negotiating agenda related to the issue of trade and  the environment. To be acceptable to WTO members, including the United  States, the Doha Declaration limited the scope of these negotiations. In  particular, the results of the negotiations are limited to the applicability of  WTO rules to parties to an MEA. Further, negotiations shall not affect WTO  rights of any WTO member that is not a party to an MEA in question.  However, there has never been a challenge under the WTO dispute  settlement system to trade measures taken between parties to an MEA,  and, according to both a USTR official and a WTO Secretariat official, such  a challenge is unlikely. Consequently, the negotiations on this issue may  have a limited impact.
The Doha Declaration also limits the negotiations to clarifying the  relationship between WTO rules and “specific trade obligations set out in  MEAs.”  Members are debating whether this language excludes trade  measures that are not specifically mentioned by an MEA but that are taken  to pursue an MEA objective. The European Union is likely to support a  broader scope than are most other members, including the United States.  Only about 20 MEAs contain trade provisions. For example, the Montreal  Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer controls the  production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances such as  chlorofluorocarbons. The Basel Convention, which controls trade or  transportation of hazardous waste across international borders, and the  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species are other  multilateral environmental agreements containing trade provisions.
The Committee on Trade and Environment has been charged with  reviewing the effect of environmental measures on market access and  reporting to the fifth ministerial conference on the desirability of future  action. In addition, although the mandate in the Doha Declaration for  negotiations on environmental goods and services appears in the section  on trade and the environment, the negotiating body handling trade in  services will cover environmental services. Further, the negotiating group  addressing nonagricultural market access will cover environmental goods.  However, the special session of the Committee on Trade and Environment  will also play a role in these negotiations, including monitoring  developments in the aforementioned negotiating groups and clarifying the  concept of environmental goods. The United States believes that these  negotiations allow “win-win” opportunities to provide trade liberalization  and promote sustainable development.
section_title: Dispute Settlement
paragraphs: The Uruguay Round agreements, which created the WTO, also established  a new dispute settlement system, replacing the procedures that had  gradually emerged under the GATT. Unlike the GATT, the WTO Dispute  Settlement Understanding (DSU) discourages stalemate by not allowing  parties to block decisions. It also establishes a standing Appellate Body,  making the dispute settlement process more stable and predictable.  Nevertheless, many WTO member governments have argued there is still  room for improvement in the existing WTO dispute settlement system.  Beginning in 1997, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, which administers  the dispute settlement process, held a series of informal discussions on the  basis of proposals and issues that members had identified to improve the  DSU. However, this effort did not result in a consensus for change.  Subsequently, at the Doha ministerial conference, WTO members agreed to  initiate formal negotiations to improve and clarify DSU provisions.
Many countries want these negotiations to address the issue of conflicting  time lines in WTO rules regarding when a member can retaliate against  another for failing to implement a dispute settlement ruling. Other  priorities for the United States specifically include (1) streamlining the  dispute settlement process to achieve faster results by preventing countries  from delaying compliance with dispute settlement rulings and (2)  increasing the transparency of the proceedings of dispute settlement and  appellate panels. A potential area of disagreement in the DSU negotiations  involves the way in which members can impose sanctions on other  countries when they fail to implement adverse WTO decisions. The  European Union wants to limit the ability of members to shift sanctions among various imports from the offending country. To the contrary, the  United States supports shifting sanctions among imports.
The Doha Declaration calls for concluding DSU negotiations by May 2003,  and for taking steps to ensure that the results enter into force as soon as  possible. Unlike other aspects of the negotiating agenda that the Doha  Declaration mandated, the DSU negotiations will not be part of the single  undertaking. In other words, the DSU negotiations will not be tied to the  overall success or failure of the other negotiations, which are scheduled to  conclude by January 2005.
section_title: Registry for Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits
paragraphs: The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  (TRIPS) must resolve the issue of developing a registry and notification  system for geographical indications. While TRIPS mandated that the  Council negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system for  notification and registration of geographical indications for wines, it did  not establish a deadline for the negotiations. At the Doha ministerial, WTO  members decided that these negotiations, which began in 1997, should be  concluded by the fifth ministerial conference in 2003. The negotiations  are being undertaken in special sessions of the Council for TRIPS.
Proposals previously submitted in meetings of the Council for TRIPS  adopted two different approaches. One proposal made by the European  Union and supported by a number of other countries maintains that  geographical indications on the registry for wines and spirits would be  considered as protected by all WTO members. The proposal allows WTO  members to challenge any geographical indication on the registry that they  consider to be generic. The other proposal, made by United States, Canada,  Chile, and Japan and supported by a number of other countries, treats the  registry as a database to assist WTO members, but it contains no  requirement that all members protect all items on the registry.
The debate among WTO members over the meaning and purpose of this  registry has been contentious. According to the U.S. Department of  Agriculture, under the EU’s proposal, many WTO members would incur  significant costs for the examination and enforcement of geographical  indications, which would not be paid for through fees or trade concessions  and would be offset by few benefits. In contrast, the European Union  believes that its proposal would not impose any new substantive  obligations on WTO members. In addition, the European Union contends  that the joint U.S., Canadian, Chilean, and Japanese proposal to publish a  list of geographical indications exclusively for informational purposes  would not necessarily facilitate the protection of those indications, as  called for in the TRIPS agreement.
section_title: Issues Negotiated Outside New Negotiating Groups or Special Sessions of WTO Bodies
paragraphs: WTO members have also agreed to negotiate two sets of issues outside of  any new negotiating group or special session of existing WTO bodies. They  include intellectual property rights and public health, and issues  surrounding the implementation of existing Uruguay Round agreements.
subsections: section_title: Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health
paragraphs: Prior to the Doha ministerial, African nations, nongovernmental  organizations, and others argued that the patent protection provisions of  TRIPS were preventing developing countries from gaining access to  medicines needed to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other  epidemic diseases. For example, they argued that such provisions made  some medicines unaffordable in some developing countries. In response,  some developed countries, including the United States, maintained that  TRIPS should not prevent access to such medicines, because the  agreement is flexible. For example, it contains provisions allowing WTO  members to grant licenses to domestically produce pharmaceuticals  without the consent of the patent holder in situations of “national  emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”  In response to this  ongoing debate, ministers from WTO members adopted the Declaration on  the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in Doha that explicitly stated  members’ opinions that TRIPS does not and should not prevent any WTO  member from taking measures to protect public health. According to U.S.  government officials, the declaration demonstrates the flexibility of TRIPS  while keeping the provisions of the agreement intact. In addition, the  declaration mandates that the WTO Council for TRIPS develop alternatives  for members to take advantage of the flexibilities in TRIPS to allow them  access to medicines even if they lack the ability to manufacture  pharmaceuticals domestically. The Council for TRIPS is mandated to  complete this work by the end of 2002.
section_title: Implementation Issues
paragraphs: Issues surrounding the implementation of agreements deal with long- standing concerns on the part of developing country members about the  Uruguay Round agreements. These issues played a primary role in  preparations for the Doha ministerial. Their discussion was facilitated  when a group of seven countries, chaired by Uruguay, proposed that they  be dealt with in three stages—before, during, and after the ministerial  conference. Implementation issues involve two major concerns. First,  many developing countries maintained that they lacked the capacity in  terms of expertise, financial resources, and institutions to fully meet their  Uruguay Round obligations such as complying with subsidies obligations  and initiating trade-related investment measures. Given these difficulties,  many developing countries demanded that deadlines for these obligations  be extended. Second, many developing country members claimed that they  had not reaped the economic benefits promised by the Uruguay Round  agreements. They argued for changing the agreements to make them more  balanced in favor of developing country interests. Examples include  accelerating the schedule for increasing textile and apparel quota growth  rates in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. While  developed countries have been agreeable in some cases to extending  developing countries’ deadlines for implementing their Uruguay Round  obligations and making other changes, they have maintained that any  issues involving changes to the Uruguay Round agreements would have to  be pursued in new trade negotiations.
Ultimately, the Doha Declaration commits WTO members to addressing the  implementation issues under two categories. First, issues with a specific  negotiating mandate will be addressed in the relevant negotiating group.  For example, since trade remedies are mandated for the negotiation group  on WTO rules, concerns about antidumping practices will be folded into  the negotiations on trade remedies. Second, other outstanding  implementation issues not mandated for negotiations, such as initiatives  surrounding textile and apparel trade, are to be addressed as a matter of  priority by the existing WTO bodies. The WTO bodies are to report on those  issues to the Trade Negotiations Committee for “appropriate action” by the  end of 2002. Many implementation issues are contained in the Decision on  Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns adopted at the Doha  ministerial.
Several WTO developing country representatives emphasized that it was  very important that existing WTO bodies address outstanding  implementation issues by the end of 2002, as mentioned in the Doha  Declaration. One WTO official said that he expected developing countries  to push hard for progress on those implementation issues not mandated for  negotiation at the fifth ministerial conference in September 2003. Another  WTO official was concerned that some developing countries might try to  keep some implementation issues that were mandated for negotiations,  particularly trade remedies, on a separate track.
subsections: section_title: Geographical Indications Other than Wines and Spirits
paragraphs: Whether or not to extend a higher level of protection for geographical  indications for products other than wines and spirits is one of the more  controversial implementation issues listed in the Doha Declaration but not  mandated for negotiations. The issue has been assigned to the WTO’s  Council for TRIPS, which is to report on appropriate action by the end of  2002. WTO officials have indicated that this is an important issue to watch,  because it involves many WTO members with diametrically opposed  positions and thus could affect the progress in the overall negotiations.
Using the geographical indication when the product was made elsewhere,  or when the product does not meet the standards originally associated with  the geographical indication, can mislead consumers, and TRIPS requires  countries to prevent the misuse of geographical indications. For wines and  spirits, TRIPS provides an even higher level of protection, protecting  geographical indications even when there is little risk of misleading the  consumer.
The European Union and some other WTO members believe that the  Council for TRIPS should agree on rules for negotiating the extension of a  higher-level protection for products beyond wines and spirits. These  countries believe that extending heightened protection would benefit  countries’ development, because geographical indications can be a means  for countries—particularly developing countries—to market their products  and secure higher prices, since product quality is associated with those  geographical indications. Further, one WTO member has warned that  failure to reach consensus on this issue would have implications for other  subjects under negotiation: in particular, agriculture. The United States and  some other WTO members believe that the Council for TRIPS should  simply report to the Trade Negotiations Committee on its discussions,  without proposing any rules for further negotiations. These members  believe that existing protection for geographical indications for all  products is sufficient, and that extending the higher level of protection to  products other than wines and spirits would restrict trade and necessitate  serious costs to governments, manufacturers, and consumers. According to  the U.S. Department of Agriculture, examples of such costs include  administrative mechanisms to implement the broadened standards,  relabeling, and repackaging.
section_title: Work Mandated by the Doha Declaration, but Not Part of Negotiations
paragraphs: In addition to the issues under negotiation discussed in the report and in  appendix I, the Doha Declaration mandates other areas of work that are  not part of the negotiations. Figure 6 shows the organization of the WTO  negotiations from appendix I and also identifies these additional areas in  the general Doha work program.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance, the  Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, and the Chairman  of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade asked us to (1)  analyze the factors that contributed to the Doha ministerial conference’s  successful launch of new WTO negotiations, (2) analyze the key interim  deadlines for the most sensitive issues, from the present time through the  next ministerial conference in 2003, and (3) evaluate the most significant  challenges facing the WTO in the overall negotiations.
We followed the same overall methodology to complete all three of our  objectives. We obtained, reviewed, and analyzed documents from a variety  of sources. From the WTO, we analyzed the Doha Ministerial Declaration,  the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, and the  Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, as well as  numerous negotiating proposals from WTO member countries and other  documents. From U.S. government agencies, we obtained background  information and documentation regarding negotiating proposals and  positions.
We met with and obtained documents from a wide variety of U.S.  government and private-sector officials, foreign government and private- sector officials, WTO officials, and officials from international  nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. Prior to the Doha  ministerial conference, we met with officials from the Department of  Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Environmental Protection  Agency, the Department of Commerce, the Office of the U.S. Trade  Representative, the Department of Justice, and the State Department. We  also met with representatives from developed and developing countries in  Washington, D.C., including Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union,  France, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, Thailand, and Zambia.  Further, we met with private-sector representatives from the AgTrade  Coalition, the American Forest and Paper Association, the National  Association of Manufacturers, the National Farmers Union, and the  National Foreign Trade Council.
After the Doha ministerial conference, we met with additional U.S., WTO,  and foreign government officials, private-sector representatives, and  nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations to obtain their  views about the negotiations launched in Doha. We also traveled to the  WTO’s headquarters in Geneva, where we met with WTO member country  representatives from developed and developing countries, including Brazil,  Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,  and Uganda. We also met with WTO officials, including all the Deputy  Directors-General and eight division directors. In addition, while in  Geneva, we met with representatives from the South Centre and the  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. In Brussels,  we met with officials from the European Commission, including the  Directorates-General for trade and agriculture. Also in Brussels, we met  with representatives of business and environmental groups from the  European Union. In Washington, D.C., we met with private-sector  representatives including those from the American Forest and Paper  Association, the Coalition for Service Industries, the Center for  International Environmental Law, and Kodak.
We performed our work from August 2001 through July 2002 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those listed above, Juan Gobel, Howard Cott, Jason Bair,  Bradley Hunt, Lori Kmetz, Rona Mendelsohn, and Richard Seldin made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to  support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve  the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American  people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and  policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help  Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s  commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,  integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
paragraphs: The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is  through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and full- text files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older  products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents  using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety,  including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and  correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site  daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail this  list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly released products” under the GAO Reports heading.
subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs