Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: USDA Has Addressed Some Problems but Still Faces Enforcement Challenges
Published: 2004-01-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 1978, the Congress passed the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act to ensure that cattle, sheep, hogs, and other animals destined for human consumption are handled and slaughtered humanely. Within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for enforcing the act. Recently, the Congress took additional actions to improve FSIS enforcement. GAO reviewed (1) the frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter violations, (2) actions to enforce compliance, and (3) the adequacy of existing resources to enforce the act.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Incomplete and inconsistent inspection records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter violations. FSIS was unable to produce at least 44 of its inspection records that document violations of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) and implementing regulations. Also, inspectors did not always document violations of the HMSA because they may not have been aware of regulatory requirements. Further, the records that FSIS provided did not consistently document the scope and severity of each incident. USDA is taking steps to address these issues. Enforcement actions to address noncompliance with the act and regulations were also inconsistent. For example, we found that FSIS inspectors temporarily halted stunning operations in more than half of the cases involving ineffective stunning of a single animal, but in less than half of similar cases involving multiple animals. We also found that FSIS officials may not be using consistent criteria to suspend plant operations--the enforcement action used when serious or repeated violations of the HMSA occur. As a result, plants in different FSIS districts may not be subject to comparable enforcement actions. In November 2003, FSIS issued clearer guidance to its inspectors and field personnel that should help resolve some of these problems. FSIS lacks detailed information on how much time its inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter activities making it difficult to determine if the number of inspectors is adequate. In general, FSIS officials believe that, with the introduction of a District Veterinary Medical Specialist at each of the agency's field offices, the current number of personnel devoted to humane handling and slaughter compliance is adequate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: More than 125 million cattle, sheep, hogs, and other animals ultimately  destined to provide meat for human consumption were slaughtered in  fiscal year 2002, at some 900 federally inspected facilities throughout the  United States. In response to public concerns about cruelty to livestock in  meatpacking plants, the Congress passed the Humane Slaughter Act of  1958. The act established as the policy of the United States that the  slaughtering and handling of livestock be carried out only by humane  methods. The act’s provisions applied only to plants desiring to sell meat  to the federal government. Twenty years later, the Congress passed the  Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) of 1978 to ensure that at all  federally inspected slaughter establishments, not just those selling meat to  the federal government, adopt humane handling and slaughter practices.  In particular, the act specifies that animals must be quickly rendered  insensible to pain before they are slaughtered.
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), within the U. S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA), is responsible for enforcing the  Humane Methods of Slaughter Act. FSIS inspection personnel are  stationed at each federally inspected slaughter facility to examine every  carcass to ensure that it is safe for human consumption. Although their  responsibilities are primarily for food safety, these inspectors are also  responsible for monitoring compliance with the act and the applicable  regulations at slaughter facilities throughout the country. FSIS guidance  states that when inspectors observe noncompliance with the act’s  provisions, they should document the incident in a noncompliance record.  Inspectors are also authorized to take enforcement action by temporarily  shutting down parts of the plant’s operations until management provides  satisfactory assurances that the situation will be promptly remedied. In  more serious cases, the agency may temporarily suspend plant operations  by removing FSIS inspectors from a part of the facility or from the entire  facility until the problem is corrected. Finally, the FSIS administrator can  file a complaint to withdraw the grants of inspection from a facility, which  prevents its products from entering interstate or foreign commerce. By  law, slaughter facilities cannot slaughter and process animals for sale in  commerce without federal inspectors present.
In recent years, the Congress has taken various actions to strengthen  USDA’s resources and to better ensure that the agency enforces the  humane handling and slaughter provisions of the act. In fiscal year 2001,  the Congress earmarked funds for the agency to enhance humane  slaughter practices. In response, FSIS created the position of District  Veterinary Medical Specialist (DVMS) in each of its districts. The DVMSs  are the primary contacts for all humane handling and slaughter issues in  each FSIS district office, and they are the liaisons between the district  offices and headquarters on humane handling and slaughter issues. They  are responsible for on-site coordination of nationally prescribed humane  slaughter procedures and verification of humane handling activities, as  well as dissemination of directives, notices, and other information related  to the act. In fiscal year 2002, the Congress further directed that the  Secretary of Agriculture should fully enforce the Humane Methods of  Slaughter Act and report annually to the Congress on the number of  violations and trends recorded by FSIS inspectors. Fiscal year 2003  appropriations legislation included $5 million for additional inspection  activities. Also, in a recent congressional conference report for fiscal year  2003 appropriations, the conferees directed us to review and report to the  appropriations committees on the scope and frequency of humane  slaughter violations and to provide recommendations on the extent to  which additional resources for inspection personnel, training, and other  agency functions are needed to properly regulate slaughter facilities.
In response to this congressional directive, and through subsequent  discussions with your staff, we (1) analyzed the frequency and scope of  humane handling and slaughter noncompliance incidents documented by  FSIS inspectors, (2) analyzed FSIS actions to enforce compliance with  humane handling and slaughter provisions, and (3) assessed the extent to  which additional resources may be needed to ensure that humane  handling and slaughter provisions are enforced. To perform our work, we  obtained and analyzed all available FSIS records of noncompliance with  humane handling and slaughter requirements between January 2001 and  March 2003. We reviewed enforcement actions that the FSIS inspectors  took between January 2001 and March 2003 and that FSIS district  managers took between October 2001 and July 2003. To obtain  information on resources dedicated to humane handling and slaughter  oversight, we interviewed FSIS program officials and reviewed available  workforce data. We also reviewed all of the completed DVMS summary  reports that outline the officials’ overall observations after each plant visit.  To obtain their views on the adequacy of personnel and training resources,  we conducted structured interviews with district managers, deputy district  managers, and DVMSs in all 15 FSIS districts. Finally, we obtained the  views of humane slaughter experts, industry association representatives,  and animal welfare groups. We conducted our work between April 2003  and November 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Appendix I describes our methodology in more detail.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Congress passed the Humane Slaughter Act in 1958 in response to  intense and broad-based public concerns about cruelty and abuse of  livestock in meat-packing plants. At that time, the Congress determined  that using humane methods of slaughter prevented the needless suffering  of livestock, resulted in safer and better working conditions for  employees, and brought about improvements in products and economies  of slaughter operations, among other benefits. The act established as U. S.  policy that the handling and slaughtering of livestock should be carried out  using humane methods. However, the act applied only to plants wishing to  sell meat products to federal government agencies. In 1978, the Congress  passed the HMSA, which amended the Federal Meat Inspection Act and  extended the policy nationwide by requiring that all federally inspected  slaughter establishments adopt humane handling and slaughter methods.  The HMSA requires that animals be “rendered insensible to pain by a  single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is  rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut.”  The act also provides for a ritual slaughter exemption that allows the  slaughter of animals in accordance with the ritual requirements of any  faith “that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers  loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous  and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp  instrument and handling in connection with such slaughtering.”
FSIS has issued regulations and directives to enforce the act. Important  requirements of these regulations and guidance include the following:    All animals must be effectively stunned before they are slaughtered.
Stunning is effective when the animal feels no pain, is rendered instantly  unconscious, and remains unconscious until slaughtered;   Dragging of disabled and other animals unable to move, while conscious,    All holding pens and driveways and ramps must be designed, built, and  maintained to prevent injury to livestock;   Livestock should be provided with water in holding pens, and food if held  for more than 24 hours;   The use of electrical prods and other devices to move livestock must not  be excessive and should be used as little as possible.
Figure 1 illustrates two separate stunning efforts—-one of a cow being  stunned with a mechanical captive bolt and another of a sheep being  stunned with an electrical stunner.
As of October 2002, 918 plants were covered by the HMSA in the United  States. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these plants.
While the plants are concentrated heavily in the Northeast, they tend to be  smaller plants. The 49 large producers, who account for approximately 80  percent of total production of meat in the country during fiscal year 2002,  are mainly located in the Midwest, as figure 3 illustrates.
FSIS is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Humane Methods of  Slaughter Act. The FSIS is organized into 15 district offices that include:  Alameda, Albany, Atlanta, Beltsville, Boulder, Chicago, Dallas, Des  Moines, Jackson, Lawrence, Madison, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Raleigh,  and Springdale. Table 1 shows the states, number of plants, and type of  plant, by size, for each FSIS district.
In 2002, FSIS employed about 7,600 inspectors at red-meat plants and  poultry facilities to inspect each carcass after it is slaughtered to ensure  that it is safe for human consumption. Inspectors include at least one  veterinarian assigned to each plant, who is required to evaluate the general  health of animals before they are slaughtered, and Consumer Safety  Inspectors, who are not veterinarians and have varying inspection  responsibilities throughout the plant. FSIS officials maintain that as they  carry out their food safety and other activities, all inspectors are  responsible for monitoring compliance with humane handling and  slaughter requirements at plants that are covered by the HMSA from the  time livestock come into the custody of the plant to the time of slaughter.  According to the FSIS, while the HMSA requires inspectors to observe the  entire handling and slaughter process, inspectors do not have to observe  all animals all the time for HMSA compliance. In contrast, the Federal  Meat Inspection Act requires that each animal be examined prior to  slaughter and each carcass be individually inspected after slaughter to  ensure that the meat is safe for human consumption.
Typically, animals arrive on plant premises, are unloaded from trucks, and  then are held in the stockyard area where FSIS inspectors perform the  required antemortem inspection. During this inspection, disabled animals  are separated from the herd. Animals are then moved through curved  holding chutes and forcing pens onto the stunning platform, where they  are stunned before being slaughtered. Figure 4 illustrates the areas in a  typical, mid-size plant from which inspectors can observe for HMSA  compliance, although inspectors are not always present in all areas.
When inspectors observe a violation of the HMSA or its implementing  regulations, they are required to notify plant management and document,  with a noncompliance record, the violation and the actions taken by the   plant to correct it. Inspectors can document more than one violation, and  different types of violations, in a single noncompliance record. According  to FSIS guidance, each noncompliance record should include the  following information:    A unique record number,    The date of the violation,    The plant identification number,    Humane handling regulations applicable to the incident reported,    A written description of the violation,    The name of plant personnel notified of the violation, and    The plant management’s written response stating both the immediate  action to correct the violation and any subsequent action to prevent its  recurrence.
In response to HMSA noncompliance, FSIS can take a number of  enforcement actions—actions that impose restrictions on a facility’s  ability to operate. These actions include the following:    For less serious violations of the HMSA, inspectors at a facility can issue a  “reject tag” to quickly respond to violations that management can readily  address. Inspectors physically place these reject tags on a piece of  equipment or an area of the plant. This action temporarily prohibits the  use of a particular piece of equipment or area of the facility until the  violation is corrected.
For more serious violations, the district manager can suspend inspection  until the violation or violations are addressed. This action, which  removes FSIS inspectors from facility premises (or part of the facility),  suspends operations at the facility (or part of the facility) because  slaughter facilities may not operate without federal inspectors present.
In cases where a plant fails to respond to FSIS concerns about repeated  and/or serious violations, the administrator of FSIS can withdraw  inspection. This enforcement action removes the grant of inspection from  a facility, which prevents the facility’s products from entering interstate  and foreign commerce. The facility must reapply for and be awarded a  grant of inspection before it may resume operations. This action is rarely  used.
Agency supplemental appropriations in 2001 included $3 million, of which  no less than $1 million was to be used to enhance the agency’s humane  slaughter practices. USDA used $1.25 million of these funds to hire 17  DVMSs to serve as program coordinators for all humane handling issues.  By March 2002, a DVMS was at work in each of the FSIS district offices.  The DVMSs, who received extensive training on humane handling and  slaughter techniques and related inspection procedures, are the primary  contacts for inspectors in each FSIS district office and the liaisons  between the district offices and headquarters on humane handling and  slaughter compliance. As of May 2003, the 17 DVMSs had visited 576, or  about 63 percent, of 918 plants covered by the HMSA. Thirteen of the 16  DVMSs we interviewed said that they had visited all or almost all of their  assigned plants at least once. According to these 16 DVMSs, when they  came on board, all of them participated in a number of district activities  that went beyond the scope of humane handling and slaughter of animals,  such as biosecurity and food safety issues. For example, nine DVMSs  reported that these activities took 40 to 50 percent of their time. In March  2003, however, an FSIS memorandum directed all but five of the DVMSs to  only perform humane handling activities. As a result, the activities of 12  DVMSs changed, and their current focus is solely the implementation of  the HMSA.
Despite these actions, concerns about the treatment of animals at U.S.  slaughterhouses persist. For example, two animal welfare groups, the  Humane Society of the United States and the Humane Farming  Association, believe that enforcement of the act could be improved. These  groups maintain that more continuous monitoring of compliance with the  HMSA is necessary. Also, according to the Humane Society, USDA  oversight is especially critical at facilities that specialize in disabled  animals and old dairy cattle, as well as those with slaughter production  lines that operate at high speeds.
Conversely, meat industry associations we contacted maintain that the  way animals are handled and slaughtered has improved in response to  pressure from customers of fast food restaurants and industry audits of  slaughter establishments. When Dr. Temple Grandin, a renowned animal  science authority, conducted a survey of 24 slaughterhouses in 1996 at  USDA’s request, she found that only 36 percent were able to stun 95  percent of the cattle on the first try. When she repeated the survey in  2002, this time visiting 80 different plants, she found that 94 percent were  able to do so. While Dr. Grandin’s second survey shows a significant  improvement, it still indicates that hundreds of thousands of animals were  not stunned on the first try, as required by the act. Thus, there may be  undetected instances of inhumane treatment. Dr. Grandin believes that  effectively stunning animals on the first try 100 percent of the time is  unachievable—that is why she proposed an objective scoring method as  an alternative. Objective scoring uses definite thresholds for various types  of humane handling and slaughter incidents and provides a means to  promote consistency within and across slaughter establishments. When  we discussed the objective scoring approach with FSIS officials, they  pointed out that the approach may have merit, particularly as a monitoring  tool. However, the officials pointed out that the HMSA requires that  animals be effectively stunned on the first try with one single blow or  gunshot. Therefore, objective scoring would not be an appropriate  regulatory tool because it allows for less than 100 percent effectiveness in  stunning. That is, under the objective scoring method, a plant’s humane  slaughter procedures would be considered adequate if, for example, 95  percent of the animals were stunned with one single blow or gunshot on  the first try.
section_title: The Most Prevalent Violation Was Ineffective Stunning, but the Overall Frequency and Scope of Humane Slaughter Violations Is Difficult to Determine
paragraphs: Our ability to assess the frequency and scope of noncompliance with the  HMSA was limited because FSIS could not provide us with documentation  for all of the noncompliance incidents and because the documentation  provided was not always complete and consistent. The 553 noncompliance  records that the agency provided to us show that, between January 2001  and March 2003, there were 675 HMSA violations at 272 facilities— approximately 30 percent of the more than 900 slaughter facilities in the  United States. The most prevalent noncompliance documented was the  ineffective stunning of animals, in many cases resulting in a conscious  animal reaching slaughter. FSIS has made recent efforts to improve  documentation—including steps to improve inspector awareness of  documentation requirements, better tracking of noncompliance  documents, and issuing new HMSA guidance in November 2003.
subsections: section_title: Inspection Records Were Incomplete and Inconsistent, Making It Difficult to Determine the Frequency and Scope of Noncompliance
paragraphs: The universe of inspection records that FSIS provided to us was  incomplete, making it difficult to assess the frequency of noncompliance  with the HMSA. FSIS provided us with 553 documented records of  noncompliance with the act and the implementing regulations covering the  28-month period from January 2001 through March 2003. However, we  found internal control problems that call into question the reliability of the  information in the FSIS records regarding HMSA compliance. Our analysis  indicates that the extent of noncompliance with the HMSA and the  implementing regulations is likely to be greater than what is reflected in  the 553 records for several reasons. First, according to FSIS officials,  inspectors wrote at least 44 additional noncompliance records during this  period—January 2001 to March 2003. However, while their recordkeeping  system indicates that these noncompliance records exist, the agency could  not locate the actual noncompliance documents for our review. The  officials said that the records were not electronically stored and that they  would rather improve tracking of such documentation in the future than  attempt to locate the missing records. This internal control problem is  being addressed, according to FSIS officials, because the agency has  transitioned to a system that stores all noncompliance records  electronically. Second, according to several DVMSs’ observations during  their in-plant evaluations of humane slaughter activities, the frequency of  noncompliance with the act is likely to be underreported. At least 7 of the  16 DVMSs we spoke with believe that inspectors have not always  documented violations in noncompliance records when they should. The  DVMSs said that some inspectors were not always aware of regulatory  requirements and may have felt documentation was unnecessary because  they either determined the offense was not serious or that it could be  easily remedied. The principal guidance provided to inspectors—known as  the “Rules of Practice”—does not specifically instruct inspectors on  whether to document a violation if that violation does not result in an  enforcement action and leaves it to the discretion of the inspector when  an enforcement action is called for. However, recently, FSIS issued a  directive that requires inspectors to document all violations in  noncompliance records. Third, because inspectors do not engage in  continuous animal by animal observation for humane handling and  slaughter compliance purposes, violations may occur that are not  recorded by inspectors.
Our ability to determine the overall scope and severity of humane  slaughter violations was further limited by the inconsistent way inspectors  document violations in noncompliance records. Inspectors describe  noncompliances by narrative—for example, by specifying whether the  violation involved ineffective stunning or lack of access to water. Our  analysis of noncompliance records related to HMSA showed that  inspectors do not describe violations in a consistent manner and their  narratives can vary substantially. For example, while some noncompliance  records provide detailed information on the observed causes of ineffective  stunning and the exact number of animals impacted, other records only  mention that ineffective stunning occurred. Additionally, because  narrative is the only way an inspector can describe the HMSA  noncompliance, the agency cannot easily extract and analyze information.  Inspectors do include a code so that violations related to HMSA can be  distinguished from violations related to food safety, but it is a universal  code for all HMSA violations; and it does not provide any additional  information about the type or severity of the violation. As a result, it is  difficult for FSIS to quantify, interpret, and report the data related to the  scope and severity of documented instances of noncompliance.
Incomplete and inconsistent data can make it difficult for FSIS to  adequately assess how well HMSA standards are being enforced and to  report those results to the Congress and other interested parties. In 2002  legislation, the Congress stated that USDA should track violations of the  HMSA and report the results and relevant trends annually to the Congress.  In its March 2003 report to the Congress, USDA reported that during  fiscal year 2002 it documented 379 noncompliance incidents out of 70,403  times when inspectors made observations for compliance with the HMSA.  This averages to approximately six observations for HMSA compliance per  month, or less than two observations per week, for each the 918 plants  that are covered by the act. By analyzing approximately half of the  noncompliance records available for fiscal year 2002, FSIS concluded in  the report that the majority of these violations were related to facility  conditions (e.g., slippery flooring, large gap between pen bars, etc.) and  animals provisions (failure to provide water or food). It then concluded  that “very few infractions were for actual inhumane treatment of the  animals (e.g. dragging or ineffective stunning).”
However, our evaluation of USDA’s data showed otherwise. We analyzed  all the available noncompliance records for fiscal year 2002 and identified  366 noncompliance incidents, of which 92 (one-fourth) were for  ineffective stunning—a violation that USDA characterizes as “actual  inhumane treatment.” Likely reasons for the discrepancy between our  analysis and USDA’s report are that we analyzed all available records,  while FSIS officials told us that USDA’s analysis was based on a  subjectively selected sample of approximately half of the available  records. Additionally, FSIS’s violation documentation system—specifically  its sole reliance on narrative to document HMSA violations—required both  FSIS officials and us to interpret the inspectors’ narratives to identify the  number and types of violations identified in the documentation. The FSIS  official who conducted the analysis told us that upon close examination of  these narratives, some instances that appear to be cases of direct animal  injury in fact were not and would therefore not be considered by the  agency to be actual inhumane treatment of animals.
We found similar results when we analyzed noncompliance records over a  longer period—January 2001 to March 2003. During this period, FSIS  produced 553 noncompliance records indicating some type of  noncompliance with the HMSA. These noncompliance records were  written for 272 plants, or about 30 percent, of the 918 plants that were  covered by the act. Our analysis of these noncompliance records identified  675 violations. Of these violations, 167 were for ineffective stunning,  meaning animals were not quickly rendered insensible to pain as required  by the HMSA and the implementing regulations. We found that over 67  percent of the 167 ineffective stunning violations resulted in conscious  animals being slaughtered. Other less prevalent violations included facility  conditions that could lead to animal injury and lack of access to water.  Our interviews with the DVMSs support these data. Among the 16 DVMSs  we spoke with, the most prevalent violations they reported observing  when they visited plants to evaluate humane handling and slaughter  practices were ineffective stunning, poor facility conditions, and lack of  access to water. Figure 5 summarizes the types of violations we identified,  using FSIS documentation.
section_title: FSIS Is Taking Steps to Improve Inspector Awareness of Documentation Requirements and Introduced Changes in Its Documentation Process
paragraphs: FSIS has recently taken steps to improve inspector awareness of  documentation requirements and to correct the limitations in its  inspection documentation process. According to DVMSs and other FSIS  district officials with whom we spoke, as the DVMSs began playing an  active role in working with inspectors at plants covered by the HMSA, the  inspectors’ level of knowledge regarding interpreting and documenting  noncompliance has improved. In particular, DVMSs told us that inspectors  are becoming more aware of the need to document noncompliance  incidents that previously may have been considered to be too minor to  document or may not have been considered a violation at all. As a result,  the number of documented records for noncompliance incidents increased  from January 2001 through March 2003. For example, in the first quarter of  fiscal year 2002, FSIS inspectors issued 56 noncompliance records  documenting HMSA violations. This number increased to 134 in the first  quarter of fiscal year 2003. Similarly, the number of noncompliance  incidents documenting relatively minor violations increased as well. For  example, during the same time frames, documented incidents for facility  conditions that could cause injury to animals prior to slaughter increased  from 5 to 40, and documented incidents of lack of access to water  increased from 9 to 37. The DVMSs attributed the increase in part to the  enhanced awareness of humane handling and noncompliance  documentation requirements on the part of the inspectors.
Additionally, FSIS officials told us that the introduction of a humane  handling procedure code in its Performance Based Inspection System (the  computer-based system it uses to track compliance with all FSIS  regulations), which took effect in October 2001, should help FSIS better  track noncompliance records that document HMSA violations. While this  change may address the agency’s internal control problems regarding  record maintenance, it will not, as we discussed earlier, provide sufficient  data on the type of HMSA violations or make it easier for the agency to  quantify, interpret, and report the data related to the scope and severity of  the documented noncompliances.
FSIS also released a new directive, “Humane Handling and Slaughter of  Livestock,” in November 2003. This directive also provides additional  guidance and informs inspectors on many aspects of HMSA compliance.  Importantly, the directive specifically instructs inspectors to document all  violations of the HMSA and implementing regulations, regardless of the  severity of the violation or whether an enforcement action is called for.
section_title: FSIS Took Inconsistent Enforcement Actions to Address Noncompliance
paragraphs: Our review of noncompliance records indicates that FSIS has taken  inconsistent enforcement actions in response to violations of the Humane  Methods of Slaughter Act and applicable regulations. Inspectors stationed  in slaughter plants have not consistently issued “reject tags”—the  enforcement action used for less serious violations—to temporarily stop a  plant from using a piece of equipment or an area of the plant until the  violation is corrected or appropriate actions are taken to prevent  recurrence of the incident. Also, district managers were not using  consistent criteria to suspend plant operations when more serious  violations occurred.
subsections: section_title: Records Show Inspectors Took Inconsistent Enforcement Actions in Response to Noncompliance
paragraphs: FSIS inspectors took enforcement actions in almost 40 percent of the  documented noncompliance cases between January 2001 and March 2003.  FSIS officials and guidance indicate that it is not appropriate to take an  enforcement action for all violations. For example, while stunning an  animal more than once is clearly an instance of noncompliance with  humane handling and slaughter requirements, an inspector may not feel  that an enforcement action is necessary if a plant employee stuns an  animal more than once because of certain unavoidable conditions, such as  an animal moving its head just prior to being stunned.
Nevertheless, our analysis of the noncompliance records indicates that  inspectors are not consistently taking enforcement actions. Specifically,  they are not consistently using reject tags. The records show that serious  violations appear to have taken place—violations that involved multiple  instances of ineffective stunning or several animals being conscious during  slaughter—but that inspectors did not take any enforcement action. For  example, our analysis of enforcement actions taken in the 167 instances of  ineffective stunning shows that inspectors used reject tags to temporarily  suspend stunning operations in more than half of the 86 cases involving  ineffective stunning of a single animal but in less than half of the 79 cases  that involved multiple animals. In one particular incident, the inspector  who prepared the noncompliance record wrote that he observed six  conscious animals being slaughtered during a period of 5 minutes, and he  considered the incident unacceptable; however, he did not take  enforcement action. This inaction was in sharp contrast to many other  cases where inspectors took enforcement actions, for relatively less  serious violations, such as lack of access to water.
According to half of the 16 DVMSs we interviewed, inspectors often do not  take enforcement action when they should. DVMSs attribute this  inconsistent use of enforcement action to several factors. For example,  some inspectors are hesitant to issue reject tags for ineffectively stunned  animals because they are not veterinarians and are unsure about what  signs indicate that an animal is still conscious after it has been stunned.  They also noted that some inspectors lack the experience or knowledge  regarding their authority to issue reject tags or simply misinterpret routine  incidents—even though they are violations—as not warranting  enforcement actions. FSIS did not provide data for the level of experience  of inspectors. However, as part of the inspectors’ new hire program, FSIS  includes a module on humane handling issues; inspectors have no other  formal training on the HMSA and its enforcement. Most of the deputy  district managers and half of the DVMSs noted that an overall lack of  knowledge among inspectors about how they should respond to an  observed noncompliance has been a problem in enforcing the HMSA.
FSIS has begun to address the problem of unclear guidance by issuing a  new humane handling and slaughter directive on November 25, 2003. This  directive, for the first time, clearly states that inspectors are obligated to  take enforcement actions when they observe inhumane treatment whether  or not animal injury has resulted. Specifically, the directive states that  inspectors must take action if either (1) a violation of humane handling  and slaughter requirements has occurred that is not immediately causing  injury or inhumane treatment of animals and the establishment has not  taken appropriate preventative actions or (2) a violation of HMSA  requirements has occurred and animals are being injured or treated  inhumanely. Also, FSIS officials said that they have recently held meetings  with the DVMSs and district officials that focused on making enforcement  more consistent.
section_title: District Managers Have Also Taken Inconsistent Enforcement Actions
paragraphs: In addition to the enforcement actions available to inspectors stationed at  slaughter facilities, district managers may suspend the operations of an  entire facility, or part of the facility, by removing the inspectors from the  plant. Since FSIS inspectors must be present during slaughter operations,  this effectively shuts down a facility. This enforcement action is more  serious than the reject tags that inspectors can use and may be taken by  district managers in the event of serious or repetitive violations. Between  October 2001 and July 2003, district managers issued eight suspensions at  seven slaughter plants that directly involved HMSA violations. According  to FSIS, seven of the suspensions were issued in response to incidents  involving the physical treatment of animals—four in response to  inappropriate stunning or conscious animals observed at slaughter, two in  response to the mistreatment of disabled animals, and one in response to  excessive use of electric prods and force. One suspension was issued in  response to facility conditions (a protruding fence board that was pointing  toward the animals and could cause injury) and lack of access to water. In  addition, during the same period, FSIS districts issued four letters to  plants to inform them that if corrective actions were not taken to prevent  recurrence of noncompliance incidents, the districts would proceed with  suspension action.
Our analysis of the 553 noncompliance records indicated that the severity  and repetitiveness of the violations does not necessarily result in  consistent enforcement actions by district managers. For example, in one  case, inspectors had prepared 16 noncompliance records, all related to the  ineffective stunning of animals. However, the district manager did not take  enforcement action because, as he explained, the 16 incidents were not  triggered by the same factor; if they had been, he said he would have  suspended the plant. This contrasts with the opinion of another district  manager who, commenting on this same situation, said that a case of so  many related and relatively serious incidents is a definite candidate for a  suspension.
District managers said that they identify facilities for suspension by  reviewing the noncompliance records and looking for “red-flags”— specifically, cases of serious and/or repetitive incidents of inhumane  treatment of animals. While FSIS guidance stipulates that district level  enforcement actions, such as suspensions, are appropriate when facilities  have been unable to implement corrective and preventive actions in  response to previously identified violations, the guidance does not contain  suggested thresholds or criteria on when district actions are appropriate.  More specifically, the guidance does not address how many repetitive  instances of noncompliance should warrant district level enforcement  actions. In the absence of uniform criteria, these enforcement decisions  are likely to be inconsistent across FSIS districts, undermining FSIS’  efforts to effectively enforce the act.
While the November 2003 directive provides some additional guidance on  when suspensions are an appropriate response to multiple violations with  the same or related cause, it does not provide any information on the  number of related violations that would warrant a suspension. For  example, in deciding whether a suspension is warranted, the directive  states that district officials should consider the amount of time between  violations—not the number of repeat violations—taken by the plant. FSIS  officials noted that they have recently held meetings to emphasize  consistent enforcement and discussed the issue at the October 2003  National Supervisory Conference attended by over 200 agency field  supervisors.
section_title: FSIS Data on Inspection Resources Devoted to Overseeing Humane Handling and Slaughter Requirements Are Inadequate
paragraphs: Because FSIS does not have adequate data on the number of inspectors  responsible for enforcing the HMSA or the actual time they spend on  humane handling and slaughter requirements—nor other information,  such as criteria to determine the appropriate number of inspectors for  different sized plants—it is difficult to determine if the number of  inspectors is adequate to effectively enforce the HMSA. However, FSIS  headquarters and district officials believe that, for the most part, personnel  resources dedicated to monitoring and enforcing humane handling and  slaughter requirements are adequate. District officials believe that the  present number of DVMSs is adequate to cover each district’s HMSA  responsibilities. The DVMSs are the primary contacts for inspectors in  each FSIS district office and the liaisons between the district offices and  headquarters on humane handling and slaughter issues. They are  responsible for on-site coordination of nationally prescribed humane  slaughter procedures and verification of humane handling activities, as  well as dissemination of directives, notices, and other information related  to the act. Fifteen districts have one DVMS and two districts, Boulder and  Chicago, have two DVMSs each. According to FSIS district officials, the  17 DVMSs are sufficient to oversee humane handling and slaughter  activities in each district.
FSIS officials could not, however, provide us with quantitative data on the  actual time in-plant inspectors spend enforcing HMSA or other  quantitative data from which we could assess the adequacy of in-plant  inspection resources dedicated to humane handling and slaughter. Without  this basic information, it is difficult to determine with any degree of  certainty or precision if the number of inspectors is adequate to effectively  enforce the HMSA. Also, without this data, FSIS cannot determine the  appropriate number of inspectors for different sized plants or the adequate  number of inspectors overall to effectively enforce the act. FSIS recently  conducted an analysis showing that inspectors spent an estimated 132,405  hours, or 63 full-time equivalents, on humane handling and slaughter  activities in fiscal year 2003. To come up with this estimate, the agency  asked the DVMSs to estimate the number of hours that inspectors spent  observing humane handling, per shift per plant in their districts. The  DVMSs aggregated this information to determine how many total hours,  per plant per year, were spent on humane handing and slaughter.  Additionally, FSIS officials said they have a pilot program in place to track  hours spent enforcing the HMSA. However, without additional  information, such as criteria to determine the appropriate number of  inspectors for different sized plants, the agency has insufficient  information to make good decisions regarding how to allocate inspectors,  and we could not conclusively determine whether additional in-plant  inspectors are needed to ensure compliance with the HMSA.
Nevertheless, discussions with district officials suggest that additional  resources devoted solely to enforcing the HMSA are not needed, but that  additional inspectors who could conduct both food safety and humane  handling activities would be beneficial. District managers and their  deputies were in general agreement that there is no need for additional  inspectors whose sole responsibility would be to observe for compliance  with the HMSA. Five of the 29 district officials we spoke with who  disagreed with this position told us that dedicated HMSA inspectors would  be beneficial, primarily at larger plants only, or to supplement and follow  up on the DVMSs’ work when DVMSs are not present at a plant. However,  almost 40 percent of the district managers and their deputies reported a  general need for additional inspectors—inspectors responsible for both  humane handling and food safety. They noted that filling current vacancies  and/or hiring more relief inspectors to cover for vacations and other  expected and unexpected leave would benefit HMSA enforcement. Several  officials said this would be true particularly in larger plants where the size  and configuration of the facility make it difficult for inspectors to  effectively monitor humane handling and food safety compliance at the  same time.
While stating that personnel resources for overseeing handling and  slaughter requirements appear overall adequate, district officials  expressed some dissatisfaction with the inspectors’ overall level of  knowledge about humane handling and slaughter requirements. According  to 17 of the 29 district officials and at least 9 of the 16 DVMSs we  interviewed, despite improvements made by the hands-on training that  DVMSs provided inspectors, additional training of inspectors would  improve the agency’s ability to properly enforce the HMSA. Additionally,  14 DVMSs said that not all inspectors are fully knowledgeable about the  requirements of the HMSA or the implementing regulations—including not  being aware that certain actions are violations of the HMSA, or what their  authority and obligations are when a violation has been observed. FSIS  officials also believe that inspector knowledge needs to be improved, and  they said that they are committed to doing this through additional training  and other efforts. We agree that this is a reasonable first step—improving  existing personnel’s knowledge—before making decisions about the need  for additional resources. Accordingly, we are not making a  recommendation that FSIS provide additional training.
When we discussed this matter with senior FSIS officials, they said that  they are currently taking steps to improve inspectors’ knowledge. As a first  step, with the assistance of the DVMSs, FSIS is developing a survey of  veterinarians’ and other supervisory inspectors’ overall training needs,  including needs in the area of humane handling and slaughter.  Additionally, the agency’s November 2003 directive consolidates many  HMSA requirements into a single directive, making it easier for inspectors  to understand and interpret the requirements. DVMSs are also developing  scenarios that will illustrate to inspectors how to implement the HMSA  requirements and help them better understand their job function as it  relates to the act. These scenarios are distributed in the form of a monthly  report (Humane Interactive Knowledge Exchange—HIKE) that FSIS  employees will be able to access through the Internet. FSIS officials  believe that this will be a successful way of sharing knowledge throughout  the agency on key policy issues.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Congress first passed legislation in 1958 and subsequently in 1978 to  address humane treatment of livestock. Recently, the Congress also  provided USDA with additional resources and directed the Secretary of  Agriculture to fully enforce the HMSA and implementing regulations. In  response, FSIS created the DVMS position. According to many district  officials, this step has enhanced knowledge among slaughter plant  inspectors about their duties to ensure the humane handling and slaughter  of animals. Additionally, very recent efforts, such as the new directive for  inspectors, demonstrate a commitment to improving enforcement of the  act. However, FSIS still faces challenges. The agency needs to address  shortcomings related to adequately recording and analyzing documented  instances of noncompliance with the HMSA and ensure consistent  application of enforcement actions before it can assure the Congress and  the pubic that animals are treated humanely and the act is being fully  enforced. Finally, the lack of information on the level of effort FSIS  dedicates to humane handling and slaughter activities prevents it from  evaluating its own performance and making informed decisions on  whether additional inspectors are needed.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making six recommendations to the Secretary of Agriculture to  further strengthen the agency’s oversight of humane handling and  slaughter methods at federally inspected facilities.
To provide more quantifiable and informative data on violations of the  HMSA, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct FSIS to    supplement the narrative found in noncompliance records with more  specific codes that classify the types and causes of humane handling and  slaughter violations.
To ensure that district officials use uniform and consistent criteria when  taking enforcement actions, we recommend that the Secretary of  Agriculture direct FSIS to    establish additional clear, specific, and consistent criteria for district  offices to use when considering whether to take enforcement actions  because of repetitive violations; require that district offices and inspectors clearly document the basis for  their decisions regarding enforcement actions that are based on repetitive  violations.
To ensure that FSIS can make well-informed estimates about the  resources it needs to enforce the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, we  recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct FSIS to    develop a mechanism for identifying the level of effort that inspectors  currently devote to monitoring humane handling and slaughter activities;   develop criteria for determining the level of inspection resources that are  appropriate on the basis of plant size, configuration, or history of  compliance, once the mechanism is developed and in operation; and    periodically, assess whether that level is sufficient to effectively enforce  the act.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Responses
paragraphs: We provided FSIS with a draft of this report for their review and comment.  FSIS generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. In addition,  FSIS provided a number of specific comments and clarifications, which we  incorporated as appropriate. FSIS’s comments and our responses to them  appear in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Agriculture and  interested congressional committees. We will also provide copies to others  on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-3841.  Contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the scope and frequency of humane handling and slaughter  violations, we obtained and analyzed data from several sources. First, we  obtained the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s March 2003 Report to  Congress on Humane Handling and Slaughter Enforcement Activities, in  which USDA presents their findings on noncompliance with the Humane  Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) during fiscal year 2002. We reviewed  that information and followed up with the Food Safety and Inspection  Service (FSIS) officials who wrote the report to discuss the methodology  they used when they conducted their analysis. Second, in structured  interviews with 16 of the 17 District Veterinary Medical Specialists  (DVMS), we discussed what they thought were the most common types of  noncompliance with the HMSA, based on their visits to plants covered by  the act in their districts. In addition, we also reviewed the written  summaries that they prepared to document these observations. Third, we  obtained from FSIS all available documentation of observed violations to  the HMSA for the period January 2001 through March 2003, the period for  which FSIS could provide us with the most complete documentation. This  information was provided in the form of 553 records of noncompliance. To  analyze this information provided in these forms and determine the  frequency of violations, by type of violation, as well as their scope, we  classified them as follows:  Ineffective stunning (i.e., one or more animals had to be stunned more  than once);   One or more conscious animals showed signs of consciousness past the  stun box, i.e, when they were hoisted, cut, or bled;   Facility conditions that either caused injury to an animal or could cause  injury to an animal, such as broken fences, protruding nails, slippery  floors, and overcrowded pens;   Excessive use of electric prods or other devices;    Mishandling of ambulatory animals, such as hitting, kicking, or dragging a    Mishandling of disabled animals, such as keeping such animals among  ambulatory animals, increasing the risk of further injury;    Lack of access to water;    Lack of access to food; and    Other instances of noncompliance with the HMSA or applicable  regulations.
Using these categories, we aggregated the information to determine the  frequency of the various types of violations. In addition, to obtain a further  indication of the “scope” of the violation for cases where animals were  ineffectively stunned or where conscious animals were observed past the  stun box, we created a code indicating whether a single animal or multiple  animals were impacted. A GAO analyst knowledgeable of the subject  matter conducted all the classifications. A second GAO analyst reviewed  all forms and codes determined by the first analyst for accuracy. Any  discrepancies were resolved through discussion between the two analysts.  We also discussed our methodology with FSIS officials who did not have  any objections with our approach.
To further evaluate the information presented in the 553 reports, we  reviewed FSIS regulations and guidance to inspectors regarding when they  are required to write a noncompliance record and what they are supposed  to include in it. In addition, in our structured interviews with 16 of 17  DVMSs, we obtained their views on inspectors’ documentation of  noncompliance and factors, if any, which may impact it.
To determine FSIS actions to enforce compliance with the humane  handling and slaughter requirements, we obtained information on  enforcement actions taken at the plant and FSIS district level. To  determine how many times inspectors took enforcement actions, and  under what circumstances, we analyzed the 553 noncompliance records  we obtained from FSIS for the period between January 2001 and March  2003. We analyzed the narrative information in these records to determine  when inspectors temporarily stopped use of equipment or part of the plant  in response to a violation and for what type of violation. To determine how  many times district managers took enforcement actions, we obtained and  analyzed documentation for all plant suspensions and notices of intended  enforcement actions by a district, for the period between October 2001  and July 2003. In addition, we reviewed FSIS guidance on when inspectors  and districts should take enforcement action, and we talked with 16 of the  17 DVMSs about their views on inspectors’ enforcement of the act and  regulations; and we also talked with all district managers about how they  determine when to take enforcement action against a plant.
To assess the extent to which additional resources may be needed to  ensure that humane handling and slaughter provisions are enforced, we  contacted FSIS headquarters officials, district managers and deputy  district managers at the 15 FSIS district offices, and 16 of the 17 DVMSs.  First, from FSIS headquarters, we obtained information officials put  together on the estimated number of hours that inspectors devoted to  implementation of the HMSA during fiscal year 2003. We also obtained  documentation on the training available to inspectors regarding the HMSA  and information on the agency’s upcoming plans to further address  inspectors’ training needs and knowledge regarding the HMSA. Second, we  conducted structured interviews with district managers and deputy district  managers at all 15 FSIS districts to identify additional resource needs,  such as additional inspectors, training, and guidance that would be  necessary to ensure adequate implementation of the HMSA in their  district. Third, we conducted structured interviews with 16 of the 17  DVMSs to obtain their observations on how knowledgeable inspectors are  regarding the HMSA and their training needs. We supplemented our  analysis of the results of this work with interviews with Dr. Temple  Grandin, a renowned animal-handling expert; industry association  representatives from the American Meat Institute and the National Meat  Association; and animal welfare group representatives from the Humane  Society of the United States, Humane Farming Association, and Humane  Farm Animal Care, which provided us with their views on improving  HMSA enforcement.
To assess the reliability of the FSIS data cited in the background section  regarding plants covered by the HMSA, plant production, size of plants,  plants covered by each district, and DVMS visits to plants, we (1)  performed electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and  completeness and (2) had discussions with agency officials knowledgeable  about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this report.
We conducted our review from April 2003 through November 2003, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Food Safety and Inspection Service
paragraphs: The following are GAO comments on the Food Safety and Inspection  Service letter, dated January 14, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We clarified our report to reflect this comment.  2.  We clarified our report to reflect this comment.  3.  We already include the fact that FSIS provided us with 553  noncompliance records. Additionally, we acknowledge that the 44  records that FSIS did not provide to us represent less than 10 percent  of all the documented noncompliance records for the period.  4.  We acknowledge that the internal control problem we identified is  being addressed. However, we cite the internal control problem  because it affected the humane handling data for the period of our  analysis—January 2001 to March 2003.  5.  The report clarifies that FSIS sampled approximately half of the  available noncompliance records. We believe that we sufficiently  indicate the differences in the approaches used by FSIS and us in  analyzing those records. We acknowledge that the official who  conducted the FSIS analysis is a trained veterinarian. However, our  analysis relied directly on information provided by FSIS inspectors in  noncompliance records.  6.  We clarified our report to reflect this comment.  7.  The final report clarifies that the 16 DVMSs we interviewed (out of 17  DVMSs) told us that they originally participated in activities beyond  the scope of humane handling and slaughter of animals.  8.  We have made a slight modification in the report language, but overall,  we disagree with this comment. In our analysis, we did not attempt to  reinterpret the narratives contained in FSIS noncompliance records  that inspectors prepared after observing each violation. We  categorized each record according to the type of violation to the HMSA  and appropriate regulations. Regarding the first example in FSIS’s  comments, if a noncompliance record indicated that it was issued  because of ineffective stunning, that is the way we categorized the  incident. Further, we did not attempt to impose a standard of whether  or not documented noncompliance incidents resulted in animal injury  for two reasons. First, FSIS did not provide us with any additional  documentation, beyond the noncompliance records, indicating  whether direct animal injury resulted from the incident. Second,  whether or not an animal injury occurred is not a standard for writing  noncompliance records, according to FSIS’s own directives. Finally,  FSIS did not provide us with any additional examples or other  information that, in their view, indicate that ineffective stunning  violations reported in noncompliance records did not cause direct  injury to animals, and therefore, did not result in actual “inhumane  treatment.” The next three examples in FSIS’s comments do not  pertain to ineffective stunning, but we used the same approach to  categorizing these type of noncompliance records.  9.  We acknowledge that FSIS instituted a humane handling inspections  system procedure code, effective October 2001, which should help  FSIS better track noncompliance records that document HMSA  violations. However, we note that this is a universal code for all HMSA  violations and does not provide any additional information about the  type or severity of the violation.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individuals named above, Pauline Seretakis, Heather A.  Holsinger, Katheryn E. Summers, Charles T. Egan, John W. Delicath, and  Jennifer R. Popovic made key contributions. Other contributors include  Aldo A. Benejam, Michele C. Fejfar, Karen K. Keegan, Julian P. Klazkin,  and Katherine M. Raheb.