Defense Civil Support: DOD Has Made Progress Incorporating the Homeland Response Force into the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise
Published: 2016-06-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD is expected to play a prominent role supporting civil authorities in a CBRN incident. By 2012, DOD had established the HRF, comprising 10 geographically dispersed National Guard forces. Each of the 10 HRFs consists of 583 authorized Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel who, as part of the HRF, are to respond within 6 to 12 hours of a request for assistance. The HRF, as part of DOD's CBRN Response Enterprise, is intended to bridge the gap between the National Guard's initial response to a CBRN incident and any need for additional capabilities that the DOD military services' active-duty personnel can provide, if requested. The HRF is to provide command and control, search and extraction, medical triage, decontamination, fatality search and recovery, and assistance and support capabilities.
House Report 114-102 included a provision that GAO review matters related to the HRF. This report (1) describes the current status of HRF capabilities and readiness and (2) assesses DOD's progress incorporating the HRF into the CBRN Response Enterprise. GAO examined National Guard fiscal year 2013-15 evaluation reports and fiscal year 2012 through March 2016 readiness information; reviewed combatant command plans and DOD guidance; and surveyed all 10 HRF Commanders about HRF readiness.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Guard has determined, through established capabilities and readiness measures, that the Homeland Response Force (HRF) is ready to conduct the HRF mission if called upon. The Department of Defense's (DOD) National Guard Bureau uses an evaluation of necessary tasks and actions as a primary measure of HRF capabilities and DOD's Defense Readiness Reporting System as a primary measure of readiness status. Six HRF Commanders told GAO that they have a goal to train between 10 percent and 30 percent additional National Guard personnel with prior HRF or similar mission experience. According to the HRF Commanders, these additional personnel, over the 583 authorized personnel, can mitigate the loss of personnel through turnover and other deployment disqualification factors, such as medical and personal factors. The capability and readiness measures indicate that the 10 HRFs are prepared for their mission. However, while the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region X (Washington) HRF partially deployed to support civil authorities after a mudslide occurred, until an entire HRF is deployed in response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident, the HRF capabilities and mission readiness will not be entirely known.
DOD has made progress in incorporating the HRF into the CBRN Response Enterprise by updating plans, guidance, and exercises. For example, GAO found that DOD is synchronizing major exercise schedules, thereby increasing the opportunity for the HRF to exercise with the other CBRN Response Enterprise National Guard and federal response forces. The figure below shows the plan for DOD's response to a CBRN incident.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any recommendations. DOD's technical comments on a draft of this report were incorporated in the final product.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Threats to the homeland, major disasters, and emergencies are  frequently unpredictable and may occur with little or no warning. The  Department of Defense (DOD) often is expected to play a prominent role  supporting civil authorities and must be prepared to provide a rapid  response when called upon to respond to an incident. In the 2010  Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Secretary of Defense directed  DOD to restructure its Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and  High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Response Force to  enhance its lifesaving capabilities, maximize its flexibility, and reduce  response times through regional forces. In response, DOD established  the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response  Enterprise and, according to DOD’s estimate, between fiscal year 2011  and 2012 the department spent about $43 million to establish the  Homeland Response Force (HRF) as part of that enterprise. The HRF  consists of 10 National Guard forces—one in each of the 10 Federal  Emergency Management Agency regions across the United States. Each  of the 10 HRFs consists of 583 authorized Army and Air National Guard  personnel who, as part of the HRF, are to bridge the gap between the  initial response by the National Guard in its State Active Duty or Title 32  status to a Governor’s request for assistance and the need for additional  capabilities provided by the active-duty military service members in their  Title 10 status. According to the DOD analysis conducted prior to and  during the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the addition of the  HRF to DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise would provide critical  advantages through faster response times; additional personnel for  lifesaving capabilities; increased regional distribution and integration; a  better balance between state and federal consequence management of  the incident response; and a comprehensive approach to training,  evaluation, and exercises.
In December 2011, we found that the Chemical, Biological, Radiological,  Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force  Package (CERFP) which comprise National Guard personnel, faced  personnel, training, and equipment challenges. We made a number of  recommendations to improve preparedness and ensure effective  command and control of CERFP operations, among other  improvements. As of June 2016, DOD had implemented 10 of our 11  recommendations. In addition, in June 2015, we testified on the progress  and remaining challenges DOD faces in addressing our  recommendations to strengthen its strategy, plans, and guidance in  support of civil authorities. See the Related GAO Reports section for  additional reports on support of civil authorities.
House Report 114-102, accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included a provision that we  review the preparedness of the HRF to accomplish its mission. In this  report, we (1) describe the current status of HRF capabilities and  readiness and (2) assess DOD’s progress incorporating the HRF into its  CBRN Response Enterprise.
To describe the status of HRF capabilities—the tasks and actions  necessary to conduct the mission—we examined the National Guard  Bureau’s Joint Interagency Training and Education Center’s fiscal year  2013-15 evaluation reports, the most recent reports issued for each HRF  on its performance. We analyzed each HRF evaluation report to identify  any systemic capability strengths or areas for improvement that the  National Guard Bureau had identified during the evaluations. We  reviewed the process used by the National Guard Bureau to ensure the  reliability and validity of its own evaluation process and determined that  the evaluation process was sufficient for our use in examining the status  of HRF capabilities. We relied on the results of those 10 evaluations  rather than conducting an independent assessment of HRF capabilities.  To describe the current status of HRF readiness—the personnel, related  training, and equipment necessary to conduct the mission—we analyzed  readiness information for each HRF input into DOD’s Defense Readiness  Reporting System for fiscal year 2012, the year by which all 10 HRFs  were established, through March 2016. We also conducted a data  reliability assessment of the information in the Defense Readiness  Reporting System. We provided a questionnaire on the readiness system  to officials in the National Guard Bureau’s CBRN Enterprise Training and  Readiness Office. We reviewed their responses to our questionnaire and  interviewed the official responsible for maintaining the readiness data  input by each HRF. We determined that the information was reliable for  our purposes. We received responses from all 10 HRF Commanders to a  survey on personnel, on the relevance of training on readiness, and on  equipment needed to conduct the mission. In addition, we conducted four  site visits to HRFs located in Federal Emergency Management Agency  Region III (Pennsylvania), Region IV (Georgia), Region VI (Texas), and  Region X (Washington), based on factors such as HRF readiness, forces  with upcoming exercises, regions with cities with an Urban Areas Security  Initiative designation, and input from various DOD CBRN Response and  Federal Emergency Management Agency officials, among other factors.  We chose these HRFs because they had at one time deployed part of  their force to support civil authorities, had upcoming exercises scheduled,  or were recommended by officials knowledgeable of the HRF. During our  site visits, we interviewed HRF Commanders and personnel about  maintaining capabilities and readiness and observed equipment and  temporary facilities used to support a response. While our discussions  and observations from these visits are not generalizable, the information  we collected from the HRF Commanders and their personnel provide  context for the evaluation results and the Commander’s comments from  the readiness system.
To assess DOD’s progress incorporating the HRF into the DOD CBRN  Response Enterprise, we reviewed plans and guidance from the   U.S. Northern Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, the National Guard  Bureau, the Army, and the Air Force. For example, we reviewed the U.S.  Northern Command’s and the U.S. Pacific Command’s Defense Support  of Civil Authorities (DSCA) plans and the National Guard Bureau’s HRF  guidance, including the HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation. We  compared these plans with the direction and guidance for DOD’s efforts  to, among other things, create faster response times and increase the  regional distribution and integration of DOD CBRN response assets,  outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the 2010  National Guard Bureau Implementation Base Plan for the introduction of  the concept and establishment of the HRF, and the 2013 DOD Strategy  for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. We  also reviewed information and planning documents on U.S. Northern  Command- and National Guard Bureau-sponsored exercises to  determine whether the HRF had opportunities to exercise with other DOD  CBRN response forces. In addition, we surveyed HRF Commanders  about their participation in exercises with other DOD CBRN response  forces. Finally, we interviewed DOD officials within the U.S. Northern  Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the National Guard Bureau  about the inclusion of the HRF into DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise. In  addition, during our four site visits, we interviewed HRF staff about the  types of exercises they conduct on CBRN response and their  opportunities to practice with other DOD CBRN response forces.  Appendix I discusses our scope and methodology in greater detail.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 to June 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: National Response Framework
paragraphs: The National Response Framework establishes the principles that guide  all response partners, including federal, state, local, private, and other  entities, in preparing for and providing a unified national response to  disasters—including those involving CBRNE materials. Under this  framework, disaster response is tiered, beginning with local governments  and agencies typically responding immediately following an incident.  When additional resources are requested, a state may provide assistance  with its capabilities, including its National Guard, or may request  assistance from other states through interstate mutual agreements or the  Emergency Management Assistance Compact. If an incident requires  capabilities beyond those available at the local and state levels, the  Governor can seek federal assistance. When coordination of federal  response activities is required, the Department of Homeland Security— through the Federal Emergency Management Agency—is generally  responsible for coordinating such federal assistance, including assistance  provided by DOD.
In February 2013, DOD released its updated Strategy for Homeland  Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, which highlights the  objective to “maintain defense preparedness for domestic CBRN” incident  in order to support the mission to provide defense support of civil  authorities. DOD often is expected to play a prominent role supporting  civil authorities and, in accordance with DOD guidance, must be prepared  to provide rapid response when called upon. To facilitate defense  support of civil authorities across the nation and at all organizational  levels, DOD has assigned responsibilities for this mission within the Office  of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Northern Command,  the U.S. Pacific Command, the National Guard Bureau, regional  interagency liaisons, and a number of other DOD components, including  roles and responsibilities with respect to military service units assigned  the CBRN response mission.
section_title: CBRN Response Enterprise
paragraphs: DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise, which provides capabilities to  support civil authorities under the National Response Framework, is  composed of both active federal and state-controlled National Guard  forces. The National Guard personnel comprise 56 percent of DOD’s  CBRN Response Enterprise, including 10 HRF, 17 CERFP, and   57 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams. The federal  military forces comprise about 44 percent of DOD’s CBRN Response  Enterprise, including the Defense CBRN Response Force and Command  and Control CBRN Response Element A/B, which bring additional  lifesaving and command and control capabilities to a CBRN response.  The National Guard forces generally operate in State Active Duty or   Title 32 status and remain under the command and control of respective  state Governors, unless they are federalized under Title 10 and placed  under the command and control of the President and the Secretary of  Defense. Federal military response forces, such as the Defense CBRN  Response Force, are always in Title 10 status. Table 1 identifies the  respective response in statuses between National Guard and federal  forces for a CBRN incident.
As figure 1 shows, DOD intends that the National Guard forces, under a  Governor’s control, will be the first DOD forces to respond to an incident.  A HRF is expected to be ready to deploy within 6 to 12 hours of  notification of an incident requiring its capabilities. A National Guard  response, including the HRF if such capabilities are needed, can be  followed by a federal response if requested by the Governor of the  affected state.
section_title: Homeland Response Force
paragraphs: The HRF mission is assigned by the states’ National Guard and the  mission may be rotated among units within the state. Figure 2 shows that  one HRF is located in each of the Federal Emergency Management  Agency’s 10 regions.
As seen in figure 3, each of the 10 HRFs consist of 583 personnel divided  among command and control (180 authorized personnel to the HRF and  16 authorized personnel to the CERFP), Joint Incident Site  Communications Capability (6 authorized personnel), casualty assistance  (200 authorized personnel), medical triage/stabilization (45 authorized  personnel), decontamination (75 authorized personnel), search and  extraction (50 authorized personnel), and fatality search and recovery   (11 authorized personnel) capabilities. Additionally, for Army personnel,  the HRF mission is a second mission to their Army National Guard  wartime mission. The HRF mission is the primary mission for the Air  National Guard. Finally, the HRF does not maintain Explosive Ordnance  Disposal capabilities, those capabilities related to the “E” in CBRNE, but  is able to provide capabilities to manage the consequence of a high-yield  explosion during a post-blast response.
section_title: National Guard Has Measured and Determined That the 10 HRFs Are Maintaining Capabilities and Readiness to Conduct Their Mission
paragraphs: The National Guard has determined, through established capabilities and  readiness measures, that the 10 HRFs are maintaining their capabilities  and are ready to conduct the HRF mission. The National Guard Bureau  uses an evaluation process conducted by its Joint Interagency Training  and Education Center as a primary means to measure HRF capabilities.  In addition, HRF Commanders report in DOD’s Defense Readiness  Reporting System—a primary means to measure readiness status—on  the HRF’s readiness to conduct its mission. HRF Commanders also  provide comments in the Defense Readiness Reporting System on any  issues impacting readiness.
subsections: section_title: The National Guard Has Conducted Evaluations to Measure HRF Capabilities and Has Validated Those Capabilities as Mission Ready
paragraphs: The National Guard Bureau uses its evaluation as a primary means to  measure and has validated the capabilities of the HRF to conduct the  necessary tasks and actions to meet its mission. The National Guard’s  Joint Collective Training Branch, Joint Interagency Training and  Education Center, develops scenarios for each evaluation. The National  Guard and the U.S. Northern Command conduct the evaluation of each  HRF every 36 months or more frequently if significant personnel rotation  or transfers occur.
The criteria used to measure the HRF’s CBRN response capabilities  during the evaluation includes the necessary tasks and actions—Joint  Mission Essential Task List and Training and Evaluation Outlines— as  identified in the National Guard CBRN Response Enterprise Joint Mission  Essential Task List to meet the mission, as it is defined in the  HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation.
Figure 4 shows the Region X (Washington) HRF and the Region IV  (Georgia) HRF, respectively, conducting decontamination tasks and  practicing search and extraction tasks.
The results of the evaluation are briefed to the HRF Commander and  reviewed by the Commander of Army North. The evaluation report is then  sent to the HRF’s state National Guard leadership, the Adjutant General,  to validate the results of their HRF’s evaluation. According to the National  Guard officials who manage the evaluation process, the evaluations  provide the entire HRF an opportunity to demonstrate its capabilities,  particularly since an entire HRF has not deployed in support of civil  authorities in response to a CBRN incident. See appendix II for examples  of HRFs that have deployed part of the HRF in support of civil authorities.
In analyzing the National Guard’s evaluation reports from fiscal years  2013-15 (the most recently issued evaluations for each of the 10 HRFs),  we found that the Joint Integrated Evaluation Team reported on individual  HRF strengths that were observed and made recommendations to  individual HRFs to improve operations. Based on our analysis, a  summary of the strengths and areas for improvement identified during the  evaluations are shown in table 2.
This summary of observations provides the kinds of individual  observations noted by the evaluation teams and does not indicate  systemic strengths or areas for improvement. The Joint Integrated  Evaluation Team observed and reported on individuals’ or teams’  performance. For example, four CBRN Task Forces, part of the HRF,  provided communication systems and situational awareness to keep their  colleagues informed of the operational environment during their  evaluation. Figure 5 is an example of the CBRN Task Force command  and control.
Five Search and Extraction HRF teams ensured readiness of equipment  prior to the start of their evaluation. Finally, five HRF medical personnel  were recognized for proper care, including the attention to treatment of  and the prioritization of transportation for actor-victims during their  evaluations.
In addition, the Joint Integrated Evaluation Team identified areas of  improvement for individual HRFs. In our analysis of the evaluation reports  to determine the status of HRF capabilities, we found individual HRF  areas for improvement but did not find systemic areas for improvement  that would indicate widespread problems. For example, the DOD  evaluators found that five HRFs needed to develop a plan on how to  manage information to support HRF Commanders’ decisions throughout  the exercise. The five HRFs have taken some action to address this  recommendation. For example, one HRF Commander stated that the  HRF has maintained a full-time, trained officer on knowledge  management to ensure that principles of knowledge management are  integrated into day-to-day operations and exercises. A second HRF  Commander told us that the HRF has assigned a knowledge  management officer and the HRF has increased the number of personnel  with a knowledge management role. A third HRF Commander told us that  the HRF has increased the number of personnel with knowledge  management roles and included information knowledge into its exercises.  A fourth HRF Commander reported that personnel were sent to a  knowledge management course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Upon  return, those personnel provided seminars to their colleagues on what  they learned during the course. In addition, according to the HRF  Commander, the HRF was updating its standard operating guidance and  procedures. Finally, the fifth HRF Commander reported that the HRF  updated the standard operating procedures, sent personnel to additional  training on incident command, and changed the setup of the HRF’s  operations center. The Commander stated that these actions were to  improve information flow across operations and administrative staff, to  utilize the software system to increase the visibility of the HRF’s activities  during a response, and to allow the HRF to provide the Commander with  information to make decisions.
Evaluators noted that three HRFs appeared to not check their Search and  Extraction team equipment adequately before, during, or after the  exercise operation. In two cases, rope equipment was not inspected,  potentially putting team members at risk or delaying operations. In  another case, medical equipment was not located where the medical staff  was treating actor-victims during the evaluation. Finally, in three cases,  HRF personnel did not use air monitoring equipment properly, resulting in  a potential contamination of the HRF response area. According to  National Guard Bureau officials who oversee collective HRF exercises,  the HRFs are expected to address evaluation recommendations through  their annual training, collective exercises, and the Standardization  Evaluation and Assistance Team Program inspections.
section_title: Commanders Measure and Report in the Defense Readiness Reporting System That the HRF Is Ready to Meet Its Mission
paragraphs: The HRF Commanders use the Defense Readiness Reporting System as  a primary tool for tracking and reporting the status of HRF readiness and  report through this system that their HRF is ready to conduct the  necessary tasks and actions to meet its mission. DOD’s Defense  Readiness Reporting System provides mission readiness assessments  based on metrics and supporting data from authoritative data sources  throughout DOD. The HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation identifies  maintaining readiness with respect to personnel, related training, and  equipment as a key task in preparing the HRF to perform its mission to  save lives and reduce human suffering. The Defense Readiness  Reporting System consists of two parts—a rating on whether the HRF is  meeting personnel and equipment standards and the Commander’s  comments on any issues impacting readiness. For example, at least   90 percent of the HRF personnel are expected to have received training  to support deployment and 90 percent of the equipment is expected to be  available for deployment. Each month, the HRF Commanders review the  status of individual training and availability of equipment in their tracking  systems. The status of the readiness of personnel and equipment to  conduct the necessary tasks and actions to meet the HRF mission is  input into the Defense Readiness Reporting System. From October 2012  through March 2016, each HRF Commander reported in the Defense  Readiness Reporting System that his or her HRF had maintained  readiness necessary to conduct its mission. In 2014, the Region X  (Washington) HRF demonstrated its capabilities and readiness by  deploying fatality search and recovery responders and logistics and  operations personnel in support of civil authorities after a mudslide  occurred. However, until an entire HRF is deployed in response to a  CBRN incident, the HRF capabilities and mission readiness of the HRF  will not be entirely known.
In addition to our examination of the information presented in the Defense  Readiness Reporting System, we surveyed individual HRFs on their  readiness to conduct the mission. The HRF Commanders reported in our  survey and in discussions during our site visits the steps they take to  manage personnel and equipment.
According to the National Guard Bureau’s 2015-16 planning guidance,  the primary objective for training, which includes individual and collective  training, is to attain and sustain maximum mission readiness for  immediate response in support of the Governors and the President. Such  training may enable the HRF to reduce response times. This guidance  requires, among other things, that at least 90 percent of assigned  personnel be trained to support an incident response. Six HRF  Commanders told us that they have a goal to maintain or are maintaining  between 10 percent and 30 percent additional, trained National Guard  personnel with prior HRF or similar mission experience. According to the  Commanders, these additional personnel, above the 583 authorized HRF  personnel, help ensure that enough personnel are ready to support the  HRF mission. According to some HRF Commanders, the additional  personnel can mitigate the loss of personnel through turnover and other  deployment disqualification factors, such as medical and personal factors.
To obtain information on capabilities and readiness of the HRF personnel  and equipment, we surveyed the 10 HRF Commanders. In response to  our survey question on equipment readiness, the HRF Commanders  reported, that in fiscal year 2015, at least one HRF experienced an  equipment shortfall in each capability area except in the fatality search  and recovery capability. The Joint Mission Essential Equipment List  includes the equipment the 10 individual HRFs are authorized to have in  their inventory to support the HRF mission. Of the nearly 300 different  pieces of equipment on the list, the 10 HRF Commanders reported a  combined 17 items of the nearly 2,800 total items of equipment held by  the 10 HRFs were unavailable at some point in fiscal year 2015. The  equipment fell into a variety of categories—primarily associated with  vehicles (5 items); vehicle-related items (4 items); communications   (3 items); a tent (1 item); equipment associated with protective masks   (2 items); air monitoring (1 item); and an air conditioner/heater (1 item).  To mitigate shortages, the HRF Commanders reported that they took  action generally by using substitute equipment that was authorized by the  National Guard Bureau. For example, 8 of the 10 HRF Commanders  reported part of the shortfall in equipment reported above was related to  the HRF command and control capabilities. However, the eight HRF  Commanders reported using authorized substitute equipment to mitigate  their shortfall in order to maintain readiness.
Finally, during two of our site visits, HRF officials told us that the  recommendations we made in 2011 to increase CERFP preparedness  and the effectiveness of operations have focused attention on the  National Guard’s CBRN Response Enterprise forces and positively  impacted the capabilities and readiness of the HRF. For example, HRF  officials told us that regular updates to the Joint Mission Essential  Equipment List, to include equipment needed to perform tasks, and the  addition of the Joint Incident Site Communications Capability to support  communications during a response help ensure that the HRF has the  capabilities and is ready to respond to an CBRN incident.
section_title: DOD Has Made Progress Incorporating the HRF into Its CBRN Response Enterprise by Updating Plans, Guidance, and Exercises
paragraphs: Since the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report established the  concept of the HRF, DOD has made progress in incorporating the HRF  into the CBRN Response Enterprise by taking steps to update and  develop plans, policies, guidance, and exercises. The U.S. Northern  Command and the U.S. Pacific Command have incorporated the HRF in  the CBRN Response Enterprise by updating their DSCA plans, which  describe the capabilities the HRF can provide during a response to a  CBRN incident in the United States or in U.S. territories. In addition, the  National Guard Bureau has updated and issued its HRF/CERFP Concept  of Operation, which covers the HRF, and drafted an instruction and  supporting manual to provide policy and guidance on the management of  the HRF. Further, the Army and the Air Force have taken actions to  incorporate the HRF operationally by issuing joint guidance on doctrine  and tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as information setting  the foundation for the tactical employment of the HRF. The   U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau continue to  make progress in incorporating the HRF into the CBRN Response  Enterprise by synchronizing the timing of CBRN exercises. According to  U.S. Northern Command and National Guard Bureau officials, the  synchronization of these exercises for Title 10 and National Guard forces,  beginning in fiscal year 2017, will increase the opportunity for CBRN  Response Enterprise forces to exercise together and will focus the  exercises on individual regional response.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Incorporated the HRF into Defense Civil Support Plans and Guidance
paragraphs: Aligned with the 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense  Support of Civil Authorities and their DSCA responsibilities in the Unified  Command Plan, the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Pacific  Command have developed plans to address their civil support roles,  responsibilities, and capabilities. The U.S. Northern Command and the  U.S. Pacific Command have incorporated the HRF into the CBRN  Response Enterprise by updating their DSCA plans with a description of  HRF capabilities to support a response to a CBRN incident within the  United States and in U.S. territories, in response to the introduction of the  HRF in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. In our discussions  with U.S Northern Command officials, they highlighted the importance of  the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report’s direction in establishing  the HRF as part of the CBRN Response Enterprise and viewed this as a  priority in achieving progress to increase regional distribution and  integration of capabilities, among other things, and to improve the  department’s mission of defense support of civil authorities.
The U.S. Northern Command’s CBRN Response Branch Plan, contained  within in its DSCA plan, points to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review  Report as part of the strategic guidance for establishment of the HRF.  The branch plan describes how the Command plans for the use of the  HRF as a key component of regional response to CBRN incidents within  the United States and in U.S. territories. In particular, the branch plan  identifies the HRF as part of the CBRN Response Enterprise and notes  that the HRF serves as a key organization in activities supporting unity of  effort among federal, state, and local responders. The branch plan also  discusses HRF assistance to the states in the development of their CBRN  response plans. In addition, the U.S. Northern Command’s DSCA plan  highlights the HRF search and extraction capability as part of DOD’s  support for ground search and rescue operations in response to a  complex catastrophe, which are part of a core capability identified in the  National Response Framework.
The U.S. Pacific Command’s DSCA plan annex on consequence  management support operations acknowledges the HRF’s important role  in regional and state planning efforts for the CBRN Response Enterprise.  The U.S. Pacific Command’s DSCA plan also notes the use of the HRF in  its area of responsibility, which includes Hawaii and U.S. island territories  such as Guam, in the event of a large-scale CBRN response. In  particular, the plan strongly recommends the use of a dual-status  commander for medium- and large-scale consequence management  support operations requiring the deployment of a HRF, the Defense  CBRN Response Force, or the Command and Control CBRN Response  Element follow-on forces. U.S. Pacific Command officials stated that the  command’s DSCA plan anticipates the use of Title 10 CBRN forces  already assigned to the area of responsibility to provide immediate  response if requested, and also noting a close working relationship with  state leadership in Hawaii. The plan contains multiple pre-planned force  packages, sets of capabilities, to support a response to various incident  scenarios, several of which reference the California HRF capabilities. For  example, the plan contains a scenario in which a pre-planned force  package for CBRN capability would support a response in two  geographically-separated areas or islands (e.g., Hawaii, Guam, or  American Samoa) in the U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility to  provide support to CBRN search and extraction, decontamination,  emergency medical, ground medical evacuation, aviation medical  evacuation and casualty evacuation, and security and logistics. This pre- planned force package identifies active duty, reserve component, and  National Guard forces that the U.S. Pacific Command can call upon,  including the California HRF.
The Joint Staff also has issued guidance that incorporates the HRF into  CBRN response efforts. Specifically, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff has issued an instruction on defense response to CBRN incidents in  the homeland. This guidance acknowledges the HRF as part of the DOD  CBRN Response Enterprise and that the HRF provides response support  during CBRN incidents, primarily under state control. In addition, Joint  Publication 3-41 on CBRN consequence management has been updated  to incorporate the HRF as part of the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise,  noting the HRF is part of DOD’s contribution to a layered CBRN response  approach, which requires integration and synchronization of capabilities  from the local, state, tribal, and federal levels of government. Further, in  2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an execute order  for CBRN response that includes the HRF as part of the CBRN Response  Enterprise.
section_title: National Guard Bureau and Services Have Issued Guidance to Support the Incorporation of the HRF into DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise
paragraphs: Since the issuance of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and  the National Guard Bureau’s Implementation Base Plan, the National  Guard Bureau has made progress in supporting the inclusion of the HRF  into DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise by issuing a HRF/CERFP  Concept of Operation and drafted an instruction and corresponding  manual. This concept of operation includes an outline of the structure of  the HRF elements through task organization charts, provides time frames  for a response to CBRN incidents, and provides guidance and  expectations for how the HRF will prepare for and respond to a request  for support. The HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation reinforces the HRF  mission as a support mechanism that responds to CBRN incidents when  directed by the Secretary of Defense, coordinated by the Chief of the  National Guard Bureau, and with the consent of the governors of the  affected states. For example, the HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation  describes the role of the National Guard Coordination Center to  coordinate and synchronize notification and deployment of National  Guard forces, such as the HRF and any additional follow-on National  Guard CBRN forces, in response to a request for support after a CBRN  incident. In addition, the National Guard Coordination Center coordinates  information exchange between the state requesting support, the National  Guard, the U.S. Northern Command, and the National Military Command  Center to include information on deployment of National Guard and Title  10 CBRN Response Enterprise forces.
In addition, the National Guard Bureau drafted an instruction and a  manual for the management of the HRF, among other CBRN response  forces, which National Guard Bureau officials stated will support the  incorporation of the HRF into DOD CBRN response operations by  informing DOD and state emergency managers about HRF capabilities  and response operations. These two guidance documents will also  include roles and responsibilities for HRF management and planning  expectations, which will support regional response and unity of effort with  combatant commands, states, and local first responders in a CBRN  incident response. The instruction was issued in June 2016, as this report  was in its final stages. National Guard Bureau officials said that the  manual is under review. The guidance is intended for use by DOD’s  CBRN Response Enterprise and all of the U.S. states’ and territories’  emergency management departments.
Further, the Army and the Air Force have taken actions to incorporate the  HRF by issuing joint guidance. The guidance provides doctrine and  tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as information setting the  foundation for the tactical employment of the HRF. In addition, the  guidance outlines the structure, element composition, capabilities, and  planning considerations of the HRF, among other things. For example,  the joint guidance describes the roles and responsibilities of the HRF  personnel and capabilities.
section_title: DOD Is Increasing the Opportunity for the HRF to Exercise with Other Enterprise Members
paragraphs: DOD is making progress in incorporating the HRF into the CBRN  Response Enterprise by synchronizing National Guard Bureau- and   U.S. Northern Command-sponsored exercise schedules, thereby  increasing the opportunity for the HRF to exercise with the other National  Guard and Title 10 CBRN Response Enterprise forces.
The National Guard Bureau’s yearly planning guidance outlines exercise  requirements for the HRF. At a minimum, the HRFs are expected to  participate in collective training exercises with two or more HRFs and  CERFPs. The guidance indicates that, during collective training, the HRF  should be assessed using the Joint Mission Essential Task List, which  includes the tasks likely to be used during a response to a CBRN  incident. Each organization is synchronizing its exercise schedule with the  primary collective exercises, Vibrant Response and Vigilant Guard.   U.S. Northern Command officials told us that its exercises will be  synchronized by fiscal year 2017. National Guard Bureau officials told us  that it will take 2 more years to synchronize its exercise schedule  because planning for exercises in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 is already  underway. In particular, National Guard Bureau officials are in the  process of synchronizing a 6-year exercise schedule from fiscal year  2018 through fiscal year 2023 that includes the consolidation and  alignment of the evaluations, inspections, Vigilant Guard, collective  training exercises, and special focus exercises for the HRF and other  regional CBRN forces.
According to U.S. Northern Command and National Guard Bureau  officials, synchronization will increase the opportunity for National Guard  and Title 10 forces to exercise together and will focus the exercises on  individual regional response. In support of increasing the opportunity for  Title 10 and National Guard forces to exercise together, U.S. Northern  Command issued guidance that authorizes the deployment of part of the  Title 10 Defense CBRN Response Force to participate in National Guard- sponsored Vigilant Guard exercises. This includes allowing personnel  from the Defense CBRN Response Force participating in the exercise to  be under the command and control structure established for the specific  Vigilant Guard exercise, which may include operating under a dual-status  commander construct. Figure 6 shows the Region X (Washington) HRF  participating in a CBRN exercise.
In response to our survey, about half of the HRF Commanders reported  that they had exercised with Title 10 CBRN response forces in fiscal  years 2013-15, as shown in figure 7.
With the synchronization of these exercises with other scheduled events  and exercises (i.e., special focus events, evaluations, inspections,  deployment readiness exercises, and other collective training events),  CBRN Response Enterprise forces will likely have more opportunities to  practice command and control and the dual-status commander concept  together. National Guard Bureau officials stated that the regional  synchronization and alignment will provide the HRF and other National  Guard units more opportunities to participate in exercises within their  region and in neighboring regions, where they would be most likely to  provide support in response to a CBRN incident.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We are not making any recommendations in this report. DOD reviewed a  draft of this report and provided written and technical comments, which  we incorporated where appropriate. In its written response, DOD  expressed appreciation that the report found DOD made improvements to  ensure fulfillment of its support of civil authority in response to a CBRN  incident. DOD’s written response is in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security; the  Attorney General of the United States; the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and  Global Security; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commanders,  U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command; the Secretaries of  the Army and the Air Force; Chief, National Guard Bureau; Commanders  of the Homeland Response Force; and the Directors, Federal Emergency  Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of  Management and Budget; and Administrators, Environmental Protection  Agency, National Nuclear Security Agency. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact Joseph W. Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or  kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in   appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To describe the current status of the Homeland Response Force (HRF)  capabilities, we examined evaluations of capabilities and surveyed all   10 HRF Commanders. We analyzed the most recent evaluation reports,  issued in fiscal years 2013-15, on each of the 10 HRFs performance of  necessary tasks within each capability to meet the HRF mission—to save  lives and reduce human suffering—as presented in the HRF/CERFP  Concept of Operation. We analyzed each HRF evaluation report to  identify any systemic capability strengths or areas for improvement that  the National Guard Bureau had identified during individual HRF  evaluations. In addition, we reviewed summary results of evaluations  conducted for fiscal years 2011-13 to understand the types of capabilities  issues that were identified in the first 2 years of the establishment of the  HRF. The National Guard Bureau’s Joint Interagency Training and  Education Center relies on the use of standard actions and tasks, from  the Joint Mission Essential Task List and Training and Exercise Outlines,  for each HRF capability to ensure the validity of the evaluation.   In addition, the Joint Interagency Training and Education Center uses a  standard grading process during the evaluation to ensure the reliability of  each HRF evaluation. We reviewed the process used by the Joint  Interagency Training and Education Center to ensure the reliability and  validity of its own evaluation process and determined that the evaluation  process was sufficient for our use in assessing the status of HRF  capabilities. We relied on the results of those 10 evaluations rather than  conducting an independent assessment of HRF capabilities.
To describe the status of HRF readiness, we examined readiness  information and conducted a survey of all 10 HRF Commanders. In  accordance with the HRF’s Concept of Operation and the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) Defense Readiness Reporting System, we focused our  review of readiness on the personnel, related training, and equipment  necessary to conduct the HRF mission in response to a chemical,  biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident. In the Defense  Readiness Reporting System, training is reported as part of the  assessment of HRF personnel. We reviewed readiness ratings for each  HRF as recorded in DOD’s Defense Readiness Reporting System for  fiscal year 2012, the first year all 10 HRFs were established, through  March 2016. In addition, we reviewed the HRF Commanders’ comments  input into the Defense Readiness Reporting System, to identify any  issues impacting readiness. We conducted a data reliability assessment  of the information in DOD’s Defense Readiness Reporting System. We  provided a questionnaire on the readiness system to officials in the  National Guard Bureau’s CBRN Enterprise Training and Readiness  Office. We reviewed their responses to our questionnaire and interviewed  the official responsible for maintaining the readiness data input by each  HRF. During two site visits, we observed how the HRF personnel input  information into their system. We determined that the readiness  information from the Defense Readiness Reporting System was reliable  for our purposes.
In addition, we sent a survey to all 10 HRF Commanders on the  personnel, the relevance of training on readiness, and on equipment  needed to conduct the mission. As part of the survey development, we  conducted an expert review and pre-tested the draft survey. We  submitted the questionnaire for review by our survey specialist, our  subject matter expert on CBRN, and HRF topic experts from the National  Guard Bureau. The expert review phase was intended to ensure that  content necessary to understand the questions was included and that  technical information included in the survey was correct. To minimize  errors that might occur from respondents interpreting our questions  differently than we intended, we pre-tested our questionnaire with  Commanders and senior staff from three HRFs. During the pre-tests  conducted by video teleconference and telephone, we asked the HRF  officials to read the instructions and each question aloud and to tell us  how they interpreted the question. We then discussed the instructions  and questions with officials to identify any problems and potential  solutions by determining whether (1) the instructions and questions were  clear and unambiguous, (2) the terms we used were accurate, (3) the  questionnaire was unbiased, (4) the questionnaire did not place an undue  burden on the officials completing it. We noted any potential problems  and modified the questionnaire based on feedback from the expert  reviewers and pre-tests, as appropriate. In addition, we provided the  survey to the National Guard Bureau for a classification review to  determine whether any of the survey questions would elicit classified  responses and/or whether the compilation of the survey responses  themselves would create a classified response. National Guard Bureau  officials determined that the survey responses would not be classified.
We sent an email to each HRF Commander beginning on   November 16, 2015, notifying them about the topics of our survey and  when we expected to send the survey. We then sent the   self-administered Microsoft Word form questionnaire and a cover email to  the HRF Commanders on November 18, 2015, and asked them to fill in  the questionnaire and email it back to us within 2 weeks. We closed the  survey on December 14, 2015. We received 10 completed questionnaires  for an overall response rate of 100 percent. Because we collected data  from every HRF rather than a sample of forces, there was no sampling  error. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may  introduce errors, commonly referred to as non-sampling errors. For  example, differences in how a particular question is interpreted, the  sources of information available to respondents, how the responses were  processed and analyzed, or the types of people who do not respond can  influence the accuracy of the survey results. We took steps in the  development of the survey, the data collection, and the data analysis to  minimize these non-sampling errors and help ensure the accuracy of the  answers that were obtained. For example, a social science survey  specialist designed the questionnaire, in collaboration with our staff with  subject matter expertise. Then, as noted earlier, the draft questionnaire  was pre-tested to ensure that questions were relevant, clearly stated, and  easy to comprehend. The questionnaire was also reviewed by external  experts at the National Guard Bureau and our survey specialist, as  mentioned above. Data were electronically extracted from the Microsoft  Word questionnaires into a comma-delimited file that was then imported  into a statistical program for analyses. Only one variable was manually  entered (the HRF’s state) and that data entry accuracy was verified. We  examined the survey results and performed computer analyses to identify  inconsistencies and other indications of error, and addressed such issues  as necessary. Quantitative data analyses were conducted by our survey  specialist using statistical software and a review of open-ended  responses was conducted by our staff with subject matter expertise. A  data analyst conducted an independent check of the statistical computer  programs for accuracy.
In figure 8, we show the verbatim wording of key survey questions whose  results are discussed in this report.
Finally, we selected four HRFs to visit to discuss and observe the actions  taken to maintain HRF capabilities and readiness that we examined in the  National Guard Bureau’s evaluations and readiness reports. While our  discussions and observations from these visits are not generalizable, the  information we collected from the HRF Commanders and their personnel  provide context for the evaluation results and the Commanders’  comments from the readiness reporting systems. The primary factor we  considered in selecting which HRFs to visit was the deployment of HRF  capabilities. We also considered information about:
CBRNE threats to the homeland and U.S. territories;
HRF unit readiness data;
Exercise schedules of the individual HRF during our travel period;
HRFs that had been deployed;
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s urban areas security
HRFs with geo-specific or regional plans; and
Input from officials with knowledge of the HRF or geographic region,  including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense and Global Security, the National Guard Bureau,  and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
We chose to conduct four site visits to the HRFs located the Federal  Emergency Management Agency Region III (Pennsylvania), Region IV  (Georgia), Region VI (Texas), and Region X (Washington). We chose  these HRFs because they deployed part of their force to support civil  authority, had upcoming exercises scheduled, or were recommended by  officials knowledgeable of the HRF. During our site visits, we interviewed  HRF Commanders and personnel about mission capabilities and  readiness and the actions they take to maintain capabilities and  readiness. In addition, we reviewed equipment inventories and observed  some of the temporary facilities used to support a CBRN response.
To assess the extent to which DOD has made progress incorporating the  HRF into its CBRN Response Enterprise, we collected plans, policies,  and guidance from the National Guard Bureau; the Joint Chiefs of Staff;  the U.S. Northern Command; the U.S. Pacific Command; the Army; and  the Air Force.
We reviewed DOD guidance and other documents including the Strategy  for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities as well  as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report to gain an  understanding of the department’s priorities and efforts to restructure the  enterprise and its support of civil authorities during CBRN incidents in the  United States. We also reviewed U.S. Northern Command’s and U.S.  Pacific Command’s Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) plans to  assess the extent to which the combatant commands incorporated the  HRF into their plans. In addition, we examined the National Guard  Bureau’s HRF policies and guidance, including the Implementation Base  Plan (IMPLAN)–Homeland Response Force (HRF/CERFP) and the  HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation, and a draft instruction and manual on  the management of the HRF, to determine the extent to which the  National Guard Bureau incorporated the HRF into its CBRN response.  Further, we examined the Army and Air Force’s joint guidance for HRF  operations, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield  Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)/Homeland  Response Force (HRF) Operations, to understand the military services’  inclusion of the HRF in their operations guidance. We compared these  actions with the direction and guidance for DOD’s efforts to, among other  things, create faster response times and increase regional distribution  and integration of DOD CBRN response assets, outlined in the   2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the 2010 National Guard  Bureau Implementation Base Plan for the introduction of the concept and  establishment of the HRF, and the 2013 DOD Strategy for Homeland  Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. We interviewed DOD  officials within the U.S. Northern Command, the U.S. Pacific Command,  and the National Guard Bureau about the inclusion of the HRF into DOD’s  CBRN Response Enterprise. Finally, we collected information and  planning documents on the U.S. Northern Command- and the National  Guard Bureau-sponsored exercises to determine whether the HRF was  incorporated into DOD’s CBRN Response Forces exercises. We  surveyed the 10 HRF Commanders about their participation in exercises  with other DOD CBRN response forces. In addition, we interviewed DOD  officials from the U.S. Northern Command, the National Guard Bureau,  and the four HRF staffs during our site visits to Georgia, Pennsylvania,  Texas, and Washington, about the types of exercises they conduct on  CBRN response and opportunities to practice with other DOD CBRN  forces.
We obtained relevant documentation and interviewed officials from the  following organizations:  List of Organizations Where We Obtained Documentation and  Interviewed Officials
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
National Guard Bureau
Joint Staff
U.S. Northern Command
U.S. Pacific Command
U.S. Marine Corps, Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
Defense CBRN Response Force
Command and Control CBRN Response Element A/B
Department of Homeland Security
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Nuclear Security Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Land and Emergency Management
Region IX National Guard Homeland Response Force
Georgia Emergency Management Agency
Region IV National Guard Homeland Response Force
Region I National Guard Homeland Response Force
Region VII National Guard Homeland Response Force
Region II National Guard Homeland Response Force
Region V National Guard Homeland Response Force
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
Region III National Guard Homeland Response Force
Texas State Operations Center
Region VI National Guard Homeland Response Force
Region VIII National Guard Homeland Response Force
Washington State Emergency Operations Center
Region X National Guard Homeland Response Force  We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 to June 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Examples of Homeland Response Force Support of Civil Authorities
paragraphs: Since their establishment by 2012, an entire Homeland Response Force  (HRF) has not deployed in support of civil authorities during a chemical,  biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident response. However,  one HRF partially deployed to support a natural disaster response and  other HRFs have participated in planning for, and were prepared to  respond during, national special security events (e.g., political  conventions, major sporting events, etc.) in case of an incident. The  following are examples of the HRFs’ response in support of civil  authorities:
Washington landslide. Members of the Region X (Washington) HRF  participated in the response to the March 22, 2014, Oso landslide in  Snohomish County, Washington. The landslide claimed 43 lives— making it the deadliest landslide in U.S. history, completely destroying  Steelhead Haven, a community of about 50 homes, and burying  portions of State Route 530 for 2 months. A state of emergency was  declared following the landslide and a request was made to deploy  some of the Region X (Washington) HRF capabilities. The HRF  provided personnel to assist civilian fatality search and recovery  responders, and personnel, logistics, operations, and finance to  support the National Guard headquarters staff during the operation.  HRF personnel were on State Active Duty orders under the direct  control of the Incident Commander. Figure 9 shows the Region X  (Washington) HRF responding to the landslide in Snohomish County,  Washington, in March 2014.
Region III (Pennsylvania) HRF planning. According to officials with  the Region III (Pennsylvania) Army National Guard, members of the  Pennsylvania HRF participated in planning from March 2015 through  September 2015 for the Papal visit to the United States in September  2015. The HRF worked with the other Pennsylvania Air National  Guard forces, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the  Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Secret Service,  and the Philadelphia Fire Urban Search and Rescue. The Region III  HRF used the Papal visit as a concurrent training exercise covering  three national special security events for the Papal visit in  Washington, D.C.; New York City, New York; and Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania. The deliberate participation in the planning phase and  in the on-site stand-by during the event provided members of the HRF  with an opportunity to interact with city, county, state and  commonwealth, and federal officials. This provided an opportunity to  integrate the Region III HRF capabilities into a tiered response plan in  the event of a CBRN incident during the Papal visit.
Region IV (Georgia) HRF planning. According to officials with the  Georgia National Guard, members of the Region IV (Georgia) HRF  participated in planning for a coordinated response to a CBRN or  other incident during the September 2012 Democratic National  Convention held in Charlotte, North Carolina. Along with state and  local responders, HRF personnel participated in the planning by  providing state and local officials information about the capabilities it  could provide in a response to a CBRN incident. In total, the Region  IV HRF and other National Guard personnel were prepositioned  during the event in Charlotte, North Carolina, as well as in Rock Hill  and Columbia, South Carolina, to support any flow of response forces  into the city to reduce response time, save lives, and reduce human  suffering after an incident.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, GAO staff who made  contributions to this report include Mark A. Pross, Assistant Director;  Jennifer Cheung; Ashley Grant; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Amber Lopez  Roberts; Elizabeth Morris; Richard Powelson; Bethann E. Ritter Snyder;  Michael Shaughnessy; Michael Silver; and Maria Storts.
section_title: Related GAO Reports
paragraphs: Disaster Response: FEMA Has Made Progress Implementing Key  Programs, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-16-87.  Washington, D.C.: February 5, 2016.
Civil Support: DOD Is Taking Action to Strengthen Support of Civil  Authorities. GAO-15-686T. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2015.
Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Planning for a  Complex Catastrophe. GAO-13-763. Washington, D.C.: September 30,  2013.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense  and Civil Support Guidance. GAO-13-128. Washington, D.C.: October 24,  2012.
Homeland Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Steps  Could Enhance the Effectiveness of the National Guard’s Life-Saving  Response Forces. GAO-12-114. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2011.
Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to  Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. GAO-10-386. Washington,  D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise  Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be  Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern  Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but  Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil  Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008  National Defense Authorization Act. GAO-08-311. Washington, D.C.: April  16, 2008.