Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide
Published: 2010-12-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NSC officials have approved a governmentwide strategy for the President's 4-year global nuclear material security initiative that describes the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and identifies the main efforts by U.S. agencies and programs to support the initiative. However, this interagency strategy lacks specific details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the identity of vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. As a result, key details associated with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost, time frame, and scope of planned work. Three NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs GAO reviewed--the MPC&A program, the Materials Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)--have made varying degrees of progress in securing Russian nuclear warheads and materials. While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress securing Russia's nuclear warhead and material facilities, the MCC and GTRI programs have had more limited success achieving their objectives in Russia. Moreover, the future of these efforts in Russia is unclear because of questionable high-level Russian political commitment to nuclear security cooperation with the United States. Each of these three programs also faces implementation challenges. The MPC&A program, in particular, faces challenges in successfully completing upgrades against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities and in transitioning responsibility to Russia for sustaining MPC&A systems. Because of the time required to address these challenges, NNSA is unlikely to meet a deadline under current U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will need to continue in Russia beyond the statutory deadline. In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other countries on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. In two countries believed to have large nuclear material stockpiles--China and India--political sensitivities have limited NNSA's efforts in both nations to the relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices, training, and demonstration projects instead of implementing MPC&A activities directly at nuclear sites. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon-usable nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI program, including key countries that made new commitments at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable nuclear material stockpiles. In particular, NNSA officials reported progress in negotiations with several nations--including Ukraine and South Africa--following the summit for the removal of some highly enriched uranium located in those countries. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program activities in Russia.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC&A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: One of the most serious threats facing the United States and other  countries is the possibility that other nations or terrorist organizations  could steal a nuclear warhead or nuclear weapon-usable materials from  poorly secured stockpiles in various locations around the world.  Terrorists or countries seeking nuclear weapons could use as little as 25  kilograms (Kg) of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 8 Kg of  plutonium to construct a nuclear weapon. To address this threat and  related nuclear proliferation concerns, the Department of Energy’s (DOE)  National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) implements more than  20 nonproliferation programs worldwide. Among other things, these  programs include efforts to secure nuclear warheads; protect, consolidate,  and dispose of weapon-usable nuclear materials and radiological sources;  reduce the risks of nuclear smuggling; research and develop  nonproliferation technologies; redirect weapons of mass destruction  (WMD) expertise to peaceful research; and enhance international export  controls and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear  safeguards.
Many of these programs were initiated in the early 1990s, following the  dissolution of the Soviet Union, and have focused principally on improving  nuclear security in Russia because of the large size of its nuclear complex  and its vast nuclear material and weapons stockpiles. In 2005, the U.S. and  Russian Presidents issued a joint statement in Bratislava, Slovakia, on  nuclear security cooperation between both countries, including  accelerating security improvements to Russian nuclear material and  warhead storage sites. Some NNSA programs are winding down as work is  completed in Russia—such as the program to end Russian production of  weapon-grade plutonium—while others are planning to continue  indefinitely. A major area of continuing focus is ensuring the long-term  sustainability of U.S.-funded security improvements at nuclear facilities in  Russia and other countries as U.S. assistance phases out. Congress has  required that the NNSA program to improve Russian nuclear material and  warhead security—known as the Material Protection, Control, and  Accounting (MPC&A) program—conclude efforts in that country by the  beginning of 2013, with Russia assuming responsibility for sustaining the  program at that time.
In recent years, NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs have focused  increasing attention on the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials in  countries beyond Russia and the former Soviet states. For example, the  Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was created in 2004 to  consolidate and accelerate NNSA efforts to secure and recover nuclear  and radiological materials overseas and convert HEU-fueled research  reactors in dozens of countries around the world. The NNSA programs  have engaged more than 100 countries, and are seeking to increase nuclear  security work with several countries where there has been limited prior  cooperation. In fiscal year 2009, NNSA spent over $2 billion on its nuclear  nonproliferation programs.
The Obama administration has proposed to further strengthen and expand  U.S. efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation risks and improve nuclear  security worldwide. As Congress directed, President Obama created a  position within the National Security Council (NSC)—Special Assistant to  the President and Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction—to serve  as the central organizer for U.S. efforts to improve nuclear security and  prevent nuclear terrorism worldwide. In April 2009, in a speech in Prague,  Czech Republic, President Obama announced a new international effort to  secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4 years.  NSC staff have taken the lead in coordinating efforts among different  federal agencies that will contribute to this 4-year nuclear material  security initiative. In addition, leaders of 47 nations—including Russia,  China, India, and Pakistan—endorsed this 4-year nuclear material security  goal in a communiqué from a Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the  President in April 2010. The summit work plan accompanying the  communiqué committed countries to voluntarily take steps to improve  nuclear security by bringing international nuclear agreements into force,  improving nuclear security standards, and exchanging information on  nuclear security best practices. Senior representatives from each  government will meet in December 2010 to evaluate progress toward the  summit’s goals, and a follow-on summit is planned for 2012 in South  Korea.
We have performed several reviews of NNSA nuclear nonproliferation  programs, as well as those implemented by the Department of State  (State) and Department of Defense (DOD), and found a number of  limitations, management weaknesses, and other challenges facing these  efforts. For instance, in 2005, we assessed the DOD and DOE strategies  guiding their nuclear nonproliferation programs and efforts to coordinate  DOE, DOD, and State nonproliferation activities. We found that there was  no overall strategy integrating the threat reduction and nuclear  nonproliferation programs of these agencies. We also found that  coordination of DOD, DOE, and State border security programs could be  improved. To that end, we recommended that NSC issue clear guidance  for the coordination of border security programs, as it has done with  programs to employ biological weapons scientists. We also recommended  that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy develop an integrated plan for  improved coordination of all U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation  programs. DOE concurred with the report and our recommendations.  DOD concurred with the need for better integration of nonproliferation  and threat reduction programs but did not specify whether it agreed about  the need for an integrated plan, while neither State nor NSC commented  on the report.
This report responds to your request that we conduct a review of U.S.  nuclear nonproliferation strategies. Specifically, our objectives were to  assess (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President’s  initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4  years; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA’s nuclear security  programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in  countries other than Russia. In September 2010, we reported to you on the  results of our work in a classified report. This report summarizes certain  aspects of our classified report.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed official  documentation, including an interagency document describing the strategy  for improving security of nuclear materials worldwide, an international  nuclear security status report, NNSA’s plan for advancing the President’s  initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within 4  years, materials on MPC&A program efforts in Russia, and other  information on NNSA’s efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries  other than Russia. We also interviewed senior U.S. officials at NSC, NNSA,  DOD, State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)  and representatives of the intelligence community. We also interviewed  senior Russian officials who have worked with the NNSA nuclear  nonproliferation programs, including officials from the Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs; the Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy  (Rosatom); the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD); Russian Federal  Customs Service; and Russian Federal Service of Environmental,  Technological, and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor), which provides  oversight of Russia’s civilian nuclear facilities. Additional details on our  scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to December 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1991, Congress authorized DOD to establish the Cooperative Threat  Reduction (CTR) program—the initial program of nuclear security  assistance to Russia and the former Soviet states and the origin of some of  the NNSA programs—to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan  secure and protect former Soviet nuclear weapons. In 1992, the United  States and Russia signed a CTR “umbrella agreement” that established an  overall legal framework for U.S. nuclear security assistance to Russia.  The United States and Russia completed 7-year extension protocols for the  umbrella agreement in 1999 and 2006, and similar CTR umbrella  agreements have been concluded with other former Soviet states.
In 1993, DOE began implementing some CTR program activities funded by  DOD, principally the MPC&A effort to help secure weapon-usable nuclear  materials in the former Soviet Union. In 1995, DOE established its own  MPC&A program with its own funding, and in 1996, funding for the  MPC&A program shifted directly from DOD to DOE. The scope of DOE  nonproliferation programs further expanded with DOE assuming  responsibility for the CTR effort to shut down Russia’s three remaining  plutonium production reactors, initiating efforts to detect nuclear  smuggling in Russia and other countries, and undertaking programs to  redirect WMD scientific expertise through cooperative peaceful research  projects. In October 1999, DOE’s nonproliferation programs were  realigned in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation with the  creation of NNSA. This office consists of six line offices under which  various nuclear nonproliferation programs are implemented (see fig. 1).
The principal NNSA nuclear nonproliferation offices involved in securing  and eliminating nuclear warheads and materials in foreign locations  include the following:    The Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation. This  office administers the MPC&A program through four suboffices: (1) the  Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection, which, in cooperation with DOD,  works with the Russian MOD, including the 12th Main Directorate, the  Russian organization responsible for nuclear munitions; Navy; and  Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) to improve security of Russian warheads;  (2) the Office of Weapons Material Protection, which enhances MPC&A  systems at nuclear weapons material facilities controlled by Rosatom; (3)  the Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites, which conducts  MPC&A upgrades at civilian nuclear facilities in Russia, supports  conversion of Russian HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU), consolidates  nonweapons Russian HEU and plutonium to fewer locations, and  cooperates with other key countries on nuclear security; and (4) the Office  of National Infrastructure and Sustainability, which is working with Russia  and other countries where MPC&A security improvements have been  made to develop and strengthen national-level infrastructures that can  sustain MPC&A systems over the long term.
The Office of Global Threat Reduction. This office implements the GTRI  program, which protects, removes, and eliminates the use of nuclear and  radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI  subprograms work in the United States and internationally to convert  research reactors from use of HEU to LEU, remove and dispose of excess  nuclear and radiological materials, and protect high-priority nuclear and  radiological sources from theft. The GTRI program has removed all  significant amounts of HEU from 17 countries and Taiwan, including  removals from Chile, Libya, Romania, Taiwan, and Turkey, since the  President’s April 2009 Prague speech; removed or assisted in the disposal  of more than 2,800 Kg of HEU and plutonium from 39 countries; and  assisted in the conversion from the use of HEU to LEU or verified the  shutdown of 72 HEU research reactors around the world, including  reactors in the Czech Republic, Ukraine, South Africa, Uzbekistan, and  Vietnam.
The Office of Nuclear Risk Reduction. This office has led work with Russia  under the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program  to facilitate the permanent shutdown of the three remaining Russian  weapon-grade plutonium production reactors—which collectively  produced approximately 1.2 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium each  year—by refurbishing existing and constructing new replacement fossil- fuel-based sources of power. The last reactor was shut down in April 2010,  and the program is to come to an end in fiscal year 2011.
The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition. This office has two major  missions: the disposition of surplus U.S. weapon-grade HEU, and the  elimination of U.S. and Russian plutonium no longer needed for defense  programs. Under this latter mission, the fissile material disposition  program will assist Russia in modifying reactors that will dispose of 34  metric tons of Russian weapon-grade plutonium. In April 2010, the United  States and Russia concluded a revised agreement laying the groundwork  for both countries to begin this process by 2018.
The two other U.S. agencies that conduct major nuclear nonproliferation  programs and activities overseas are DOD and State. DOD administers the  CTR program, which has facilitated the removal of nuclear weapons from  Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and has helped Russia and Ukraine  meet their arms control commitments by assisting in the elimination of  strategic delivery systems. CTR has also provided assistance to secure  Russian nuclear warheads, destroy the Russian chemical weapons  stockpile, reduce biological proliferation risks across the former Soviet  Union, and combat WMD smuggling in the region. The CTR program has  expanded its geographic scope in recent years, notably helping Albania  eliminate its chemical weapons.
State manages its own nonproliferation programs, provides support to  NNSA and other U.S. agency nuclear nonproliferation programs working  overseas, and conducts bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to address  proliferation threats around the world under the Bureau of International  Security and Nonproliferation. Among other things, State’s nuclear  nonproliferation programs include efforts to enhance international export  controls and border security; counter nuclear smuggling; redirect WMD  expertise in Iraq, Libya, and other countries to peaceful research; and  sustain a Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund that provides  supplemental funding to address nonproliferation contingencies and other  urgent threat reduction efforts.
NSC staff have the principal role in coordinating the implementation of  NNSA, DOD, State, and other agency nonproliferation programs. While  NSC oversees development of general policy and establishes guidelines for  U.S. nonproliferation programs, it does not implement programs or control  their budgets.
section_title: A Governmentwide Strategy for the President’s 4-Year Global Nuclear Material Security Initiative Has Been Developed, but Details Concerning the Initiative’s Overall Cost, Time Frame, and Scope of Work Are Unclear
paragraphs: NSC officials approved a governmentwide strategy for the President’s 4- year initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. In  addition, U.S. agencies—including NNSA, DOD, and State—have identified  individual plans in varying levels of development and specificity describing  how they intend to contribute to the 4-year initiative. However, this  interagency strategy lacks specific details concerning how the initiative  will be implemented, including the identity of and details regarding  vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed,  agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned  activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for  overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. As  a result, key details and objectives for the 4-year initiative remain unclear,  including the overall estimated costs, time frames, and scope of work  associated with the initiative.
subsections: section_title: NSC Has Approved an Interagency Strategy for the President’s 4-Year Global Nuclear Material Security Initiative, and Individual Agencies Have Identified Plans for Contributing to This Goal
paragraphs: NSC has approved an interagency document describing NNSA, DOD, and  State contributions to the President’s initiative to secure all vulnerable  nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. According to NSC officials,  this document serves as a governmentwide strategy for the 4-year  initiative. We reviewed a copy of this seven-page document, “Interagency  Efforts to Improve the Security of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials,”  which, among other things, describes the scope and objectives of the  interagency effort and identifies the main activities by agencies and  programs in support of the President’s 4-year initiative.
Individual agencies have plans in varying levels of development and  specificity regarding their contributions to the 4-year nuclear security goal.  Specifically,    NNSA was the only agency to have developed a formal written plan with  specific details regarding how it intends to contribute to the 4-year nuclear  material security goal. NNSA officials told us that they had anticipated a  presidential initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide  prior to the President’s April 2009 announcement and began developing a  plan in 2008 based on statements made during the 2008 presidential  campaign. The classified NNSA plan details a prioritized five-part effort,  including (1) continuing nuclear security cooperation, especially MPC&A  upgrades and efforts to transition responsibility for sustaining MPC&A  systems; (2) expanding nuclear security cooperation with other countries;  (3) accelerating nuclear material removal efforts with other countries; (4)  strengthening nuclear security standards, practices, and next-generation  international nuclear safeguards; and (5) building international capabilities  to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and smuggling. Among other things,  the NNSA plan identifies specific sites and facilities in various countries  for engagement and includes additional technical information that will  support the development of next steps for cooperation.
DOD is planning to contribute to the President’s 4-year initiative through  the CTR program. In February 2010, the CTR program announced a Global  Nuclear Lockdown initiative as its contribution, with funding of $74.5  million for fiscal year 2011. While DOD has not developed a detailed  written plan similar to NNSA’s, according to DOD officials, the CTR  program is planning to undertake several activities, including the  following:   Working with NNSA to establish Centers of Excellence for Nuclear  Security in China and India to foster nuclear material security training,  facilitate exchange of nuclear material security best practices, and  explore possible cooperative activities to improve nuclear material  security infrastructure.
Continuing to provide assistance to the Russian MOD for secure  transportation of nuclear warheads and working in collaboration with  NNSA to evaluate and provide possible future nuclear warhead  security assistance to the Russian MOD, including various forms of  assistance to sustain security improvements at Russian nuclear  warhead storage sites.
Cooperating with NNSA and other countries to identify HEU in spent  nuclear fuel in locations where NNSA’s GTRI program and other  international efforts are not active.
State has also not developed a written plan similar to NNSA’s for  contributing to the President’s 4-year initiative, but according to State  officials, State intends to provide general diplomatic support for the other  agency programs in implementing their nuclear material security activities  abroad. State also intends to support several international mechanisms  and regimes relevant to the initiative, including the G-8 Global Partnership  Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the  Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the United Nations  Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, and the Amendment to the  Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
section_title: Interagency Strategy for the 4-Year Global Nuclear Material Security Initiative Lacks Key Implementation Details, and the Initiative’s Overall Costs, Time Frames, and Scope Are Uncertain
paragraphs: We found that the interagency strategy for the 4-year global nuclear  material security initiative lacks specific details concerning how the  initiative will be implemented, including the identity of and details  regarding vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be  addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site,  planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for  overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates.  NSC officials told us that they believed developing such a single,  integrated cross-agency plan could take years. However, we found that  absent such an implementation plan, essential details associated with the  4-year initiative remain unclear, including the initiative’s overall estimated  costs, time frames, and scope of work.
subsections: section_title: Costs to Implement Initiative Are Unknown
paragraphs: The overall costs associated with fulfilling the President’s 4-year initiative  have not been estimated and are unknown. For its part, NNSA estimated  that approximately $700 million would need to be shifted to its fiscal year  2010 and 2011 nuclear nonproliferation program budgets from projected  out-year budgets in NNSA’s Future Years Nuclear Security Plan in order to  accelerate MPC&A and GTRI activities under the 4-year work scope. NSC  officials told us, however, that they did not believe this was a valid  estimate of costs associated directly with the 4-year nuclear material  security goal, in part because the NNSA work scope encompasses  activities that NSC believes fall outside of the initiative’s scope. In  addition, these officials told us that estimating the costs associated with  the President’s goal is impossible because the initiative is predicated on  other countries providing assistance and cost sharing, and it is impossible  to forecast cooperation that may be possible with other countries in the  future, including resuming denuclearization efforts in North Korea.
section_title: Time Frames Are Uncertain
paragraphs: NSC does not consider the 4-year time frame for securing nuclear  materials worldwide a hard and fast deadline. NSC officials told us that the  President did not state that nuclear material security would or should be  completed within 4 years when he announced the proposal in 2009, and  they did not believe the purpose of the initiative is to achieve a specific  level of nuclear material security around the world within a specific period  of time. Instead, these officials described the value of the President’s  proposal in broader terms, specifically as a “forcing function” to (1)  accelerate ongoing U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs, (2) drive  closer integration of nuclear nonproliferation programs across the federal  government, and (3) mobilize greater international responsibility for and  commitment to nuclear material security. NSC officials stressed that the 4- year initiative is international, and that responsibility rests with all  nations—not just the United States—to achieve this goal.
section_title: Scope of Foreign Sites to Be Covered by Initiative, Levels of Access to Some Foreign Sites, and When Materials Will Be Considered Secure Are Unclear
paragraphs: Details relating to the overall scope of the 4-year initiative—including the  identity of and details regarding vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites  and facilities to be addressed, how limitations on access to nuclear  facilities that some countries may impose will be overcome, and the  criteria used to judge when foreign nuclear sites can ultimately be  considered secure—remain vague.
Regarding the initiative’s scope of foreign nuclear material sites, NSC has  led an interagency process to identify, classify, and prioritize sites  internationally based on information about the amounts and types of  material at those locations and security vulnerabilities. This effort draws  heavily on information from the Nuclear Materials Information Program  (NMIP), an interagency program whose details are classified that  organizes, consolidates, and assesses information from a range of U.S.  government agencies and sources on worldwide nuclear material  inventories, locations, and security status in an integrated and  continuously updated information management system. On the basis of  information from NMIP, nuclear material sites around the world were  placed in one of seven different categories:    sites in high-income countries with a relatively high degree of security;    sites now considered relatively secure based on prior assistance from the  MPC&A program and other U.S. nonproliferation assistance programs;   sites where MPC&A security upgrades have been made, but where residual  security concerns still remain;   sites to be addressed by the GTRI program for protection and/or removal  of nuclear materials, or conversion of facilities so they no longer require  HEU;   sites in countries that have been reluctant to relinquish their HEU for  shipment to more secure facilities in the United States or Russia;   a separate category for several specific countries where there are political  sensitivities and access limitations to working with the United States on  nuclear material security issues; and   sites in high-income countries with large nuclear industries where there  may be security vulnerabilities.
According to the interagency strategy document for the 4-year nuclear  material security initiative, several hundred sites around the world were  determined to have significant amounts of nuclear material. While the  majority of these sites were determined to meet IAEA baseline security  guidelines, a large number of sites were determined to be most vulnerable.  NSC officials told us that a list of the most vulnerable sites, derived from  NMIP, is being used in planning for the 4-year nuclear material security  initiative. We received and reviewed information describing the NMIP  methodologies and criteria used to assess the security of nuclear material  storage sites. However, the interagency strategy document did not identify  the total universe of sites evaluated or the subset of sites determined to be  most vulnerable, and we did not obtain additional information specifying  or providing further details about these sites within the time frame of this  engagement.
In a 2008 U.S. government report inventorying known facilities and sites  worldwide with nuclear weapons or formula quantities of strategic special  nuclear materials, which draws on information from NMIP, we found a  list of foreign nuclear material sites that could be within the scope of the 4- year effort. An NSC official told us that this list would be comparable to  the overall scope of sites evaluated for inclusion under the 4-year nuclear  material security initiative. However, the inventory of facilities in this  document does not include detailed information for these sites—such as  warhead or material inventories, vulnerability assessments, or risk  ratings—that would allow us to understand and assess the potential scope  of the 4-year nuclear material security initiative.
NSC officials told us that even with the information available through  NMIP, there is a large universe of nuclear material sites around the world  and there are many unknowns and uncertainties concerning some foreign  nuclear material sites. For this reason, the scope of international facilities  with nuclear materials that are considered vulnerable is constantly  evolving. Furthermore, NSC officials also told us that they are taking a  broad view of what constitutes vulnerable nuclear material. Specifically,  they told us that any material that could be used in a nuclear explosive  device is inherently dangerous and that some weapon-usable materials  located in high-income countries could still be considered vulnerable and  within the scope of the President’s initiative.
In addition, it is unclear how the initiative intends to address foreign sites  with potentially vulnerable nuclear materials in cases where the host  countries have imposed access limitations that could complicate or  preclude security assessments and assistance. Some countries with  weapon-usable nuclear materials may resist nuclear security cooperation  with the United States, and U.S. programs may never be given access to  some foreign nuclear sites and facilities. For example, the Russian  government has refused to include in the scope of cooperation with NNSA  three major facilities in the closed nuclear cities of Lesnoy, Trekhgorny,  and Zarechny that are responsible for serial production of nuclear  weapons material. NNSA has not been provided access to and is not  anticipating conducting future MPC&A work at those locations.
Finally, the criteria for determining when foreign nuclear material sites  can be considered secure remain vague. The interagency strategy  document for the initiative states that the goal of the effort is to ensure  that all nuclear material sites are secured at least to IAEA guidelines on  the “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities”  (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4) and to integrate when and where possible the most  recent versions of these guidelines. However, NSC and NNSA officials  told us that nuclear material security is a long-term and evolving endeavor  that extends beyond making near-term improvements to nuclear material  sites, such as installing modern MPC&A systems. While near-term security  upgrades to nuclear material are important, NSC and NNSA officials both  told us—and as we have previously reported—that effective and lasting  nuclear material security requires working with other countries to adopt  effective security practices so they can sustain MPC&A systems on their  own; removing and consolidating nuclear materials to fewer, more secure  locations; converting facilities such as research reactors so they no longer  require weapon-usable materials; and ultimately eliminating nuclear  materials wherever possible.
section_title: NNSA’s Nuclear Security Programs Have Made Varying Levels of Progress in Russia and Face Challenges That Are Delaying Program Implementation and Could Increase Future Program Costs
paragraphs: Three NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs we reviewed—the  MPC&A program, the nuclear Material Consolidation and Conversion  (MCC) program, and the GTRI program—have made varying degrees of  progress in securing Russian nuclear warheads and materials. The future  of these efforts in Russia could be jeopardized by an uncertain high-level  Russian political commitment to further nuclear security cooperation with  the United States. In addition, each of these programs faces  implementation challenges that could delay or prevent achievement of its  objectives in Russia. In particular, because of the challenges facing the  MPC&A program, NNSA is unlikely to meet the deadline under current  U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining  MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will likely need  to continue in Russia beyond 2012.
subsections: section_title: NNSA Program Securing Russian Nuclear Warhead and Material Facilities Has Made Progress, while NNSA Programs to Consolidate Russian HEU and Convert Russian Research Reactors Have Produced More Limited Results
paragraphs: While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress in improving  the security of Russia’s nuclear warheads and material facilities, the other  two programs—MCC and GTRI—have had more limited success in  achieving their objectives in Russia.
subsections: section_title: MPC&A Program Has Implemented Security Upgrades at 110 Russian Nuclear Warhead and Material Sites
paragraphs: Through the MPC&A program, NNSA has improved security at 110 Russian  nuclear warhead and material sites. NNSA has completed a combination of  rapid and comprehensive MPC&A upgrades to 73 Russian MOD nuclear  warhead sites. However, there is currently no agreement to conduct  security upgrades at additional Russian warhead facilities. NNSA has also  implemented MPC&A upgrades at 37 Russian nuclear material sites. A  total of 214 Russian nuclear material buildings at these 37 sites are  included in NNSA’s current scope of work, of which 195 have been  upgraded.
However, the MPC&A program’s scope of upgrade work for Russian  nuclear warhead and material sites continues to evolve. For instance, the  MPC&A program is conducting additional work at some of the 73 Russian  MOD sites where MPC&A upgrades have already been made, such as  installing checkpoints to improve screening of vehicles and personnel on  the perimeter of four Russian Navy closed cities where nuclear warhead  sites are located. NNSA is also retrofitting and improving previous  upgrades to 15 Russian Navy warhead sites to address vulnerabilities that  were unknown at the time initial upgrades were made. A similar  replacement of outdated and obsolete MPC&A equipment installed at 11  SRF sites has also been proposed by MOD. In addition, at Russian nuclear  material sites, NNSA is planning to replace obsolete or nonfunctioning  equipment and retrofit previously upgraded systems that have reached the  end of their expected lifetimes. NNSA has also identified additional  buildings at several Russian nuclear material sites that it would like to add  to the U.S.-Russian action plan for future MPC&A upgrade work.
NNSA has also been working to transition to Russian ownership and  responsibility for sustaining the upgraded MPC&A systems that it has  provided to Russia. NNSA officials told us that this transition is critical to  effective long-term nuclear security in the country and to ensuring that the  significant U.S. investment in Russian MPC&A is not wasted. As MPC&A  upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead and material sites have been  completed, NNSA has typically funded a period of sustainability assistance  to the sites, including support for maintenance, repair, and logistical  services and spare equipment for the improved security systems. In  addition, NNSA has worked with Russian government agencies and  organizations to establish an effective national MPC&A infrastructure  through regulatory development, training, inspections, and other forms of  assistance, such as equipping guard and protective forces for the sites.  Joint concepts and plans to transition responsibility for sustaining MPC&A  have been developed by NNSA with Rosatom and the Russian MOD under  which U.S. funding for sustainability is to gradually decrease while  Russian support gradually increases. In fiscal year 2009, NNSA spent  approximately $100 million on MPC&A sustainability efforts in Russia for  nuclear warheads and materials.
section_title: MCC Program Has Made Limited Progress in Facilitating Consolidation of Russian HEU
paragraphs: The MCC program supports (1) converting non-weapons-origin Russian  HEU to LEU and (2) reducing the number of buildings and sites in Russia  that contain HEU by consolidating materials in fewer, more secure  locations. While NNSA has made progress in the HEU-LEU conversion  component of the program, having facilitated the conversion of over 12  metric tons of Russian HEU, less progress has been made in the  consolidation component of the program. When it was created, in 1999,  the MCC program estimated that it would assist Russia in removing  material from 50 buildings and 5 sites completely by 2010. However, to  date, it has achieved removal of all HEU from only 1 site and 25 buildings.
section_title: GTRI Program Has Made Little Progress in Converting Research Reactors in Russia from Use of HEU
paragraphs: While NNSA officials told us that there is uncertainty about the total  number of Russian reactors using HEU, the GTRI program plans to  complete the conversion or verified shutdown of 71 HEU-fueled research  reactors and related facilities in Russia by 2020. Although Russia has not  yet agreed to convert any of these facilities, Russia verified to the GTRI  program in February 2010 that it had shut down 3 of its research reactors,  and GTRI officials told us that the program has a commitment from Russia  to close 5 additional HEU research reactors. NNSA officials also told us  that GTRI has achieved an agreement in principle with Russia to conduct  conversion feasibility studies on 6 Russian research reactors, which could  facilitate completion of feasibility studies for other Russian facilities once  Russia agrees to them.
section_title: Future NNSA Nuclear Security Efforts in Russia Jeopardized by Uncertain Political Commitment from the Russian Government
paragraphs: “Russia maintains its nuclear security at an appropriate level. The Russian Federation  confirms that all nuclear materials in its territory and respective facilities are safely  protected, so there are no vulnerable nuclear materials or facilities in its territory, which  would raise concerns due to their security level.”
As a consequence, some Russian officials have raised questions about the  need for continuing U.S. assistance to improve Russian nuclear warhead  and material security. For example, a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  official told us that it was the ministry’s position that the CTR umbrella  agreement should not be extended for a third time when the current  extension protocol expires in 2013. However, without the privileges and  immunities provided by the umbrella agreement, NNSA officials told us  that with the exception of the MPC&A program’s work with  Rostekhnadzor, which occurs under a separate government-to-government  agreement, it would be impossible to continue MPC&A program work in  Russia.
Russian officials told us that it was important for Russia to be considered  an “equal partner” with the United States on nuclear material security  instead of being viewed as a recipient of U.S. nuclear security assistance.  Moreover, these officials said that the emphasis of U.S.-Russian  cooperation should be on nuclear proliferation risks in countries other  than Russia. However, these officials did not provide us with specific  examples of new initiatives or proposals where the United States and  Russia could work together in the future to address nuclear security risks  in other nations.
We also found that the Russian government’s financial commitment to  provide and sustain effective nuclear security systems independent of U.S.  support is uncertain. Russian officials told us that the Russian government  considers its nuclear security budgets secret and refuses to provide such  information to the United States. This lack of transparency makes it  difficult to assess Russia’s willingness and ability to support an effective  nuclear security program independent of U.S. assistance.
section_title: Some NNSA Nuclear Security Programs Working in Russia Face Implementation Challenges
paragraphs: The MPC&A, MCC, and GTRI programs also face challenges to the  effective and timely implementation and completion of their efforts in  Russia. The MPC&A program in particular faces two principal challenges  to completing its efforts in Russia by the end of 2012, as required under  U.S. law, including (1) successfully completing upgrades against insider  and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities and (2)  developing both Russian national-level infrastructure and practices and  procedures at Russian sites to ensure effective long-term sustainability of  MPC&A systems for nuclear materials. To overcome these challenges,  MPC&A program activities in Russia will need to continue beyond 2012.  NNSA also faces continuing obstacles to completing a government-to- government agreement needed to advance the consolidation component of  the MCC program in Russia, while Russian technical concerns over the  conversion of its research reactors from HEU and the absence of a formal  conversion agreement also pose obstacles to the achievement of GTRI  program objectives.
subsections: section_title: Challenges to Mitigating Insider and Outsider Threats at Russian Nuclear Material Facilities
paragraphs: We found that NNSA faces challenges in implementing MPC&A upgrades  against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material  facilities to reduce the risk of material theft. NNSA has sought to work  more actively with some Russian nuclear facilities to jointly identify where  additional or augmented MPC&A upgrades would be desirable. While  NNSA has proposed MPC&A upgrades at certain Russian sites to address  these concerns, we found that progress in implementing upgrades at some  locations and in some MPC&A technical areas has been limited.  Implementing certain types of upgrades—especially those that Russian  facilities believe could slow site operations—can take considerable time,  and require several rounds of discussions and project demonstrations for  NNSA and Russian counterparts to reach agreement.
section_title: Challenges to Developing Russian National Infrastructure and Site-Level Practices and Procedures for Long-Term MPC&A Sustainability
paragraphs: NNSA is working to enhance Russia’s national-level infrastructure to  sustain MPC&A systems for nuclear materials in 10 ongoing project areas,  including enhancement of Russian nuclear security culture, developing  Russian regulations for MPC&A operations, and strengthening Russian  inspection and oversight capabilities. Appendix II identifies and  y  describes the goals of the MPC&A program’s national-level sustainabilit project areas in Russia. In our interviews with U.S. and Russian officials,  we found that more work needs to be done in several of these areas,  including development of Russian MPC&A regulations, nuclear securit culture enhancement, MPC&A oversight and inspection, and MPC&A  operations m onitoring.
The United States and Russia have also fostered development of MPC&A  sustainability practices and procedures at the Russian nuclear material  site level based on seven sustainability elements, such as the presence of  an effective MPC&A management structure at the site that plans,  implements, tests, and evaluates the site’s MPC&A systems. For each of  the seven sustainability elements, a series of indicators has been  established to monitor and rate progress at each site toward these  objectives. Appendix III identifies each of the seven sustainability  elements and selected indicators for each.
At certain Russian sites and in certain MPC&A sustainability areas, we  found that the MPC&A program has made limited progress and faces  challenges in developing effective practices and procedures consistent  with the seven elements of MPC&A sustainability. For instance, we found  that sustainability-related activities had not started or were only in the  early stages of implementation at some of the Russian nuclear material  sites where MPC&A activities are ongoing.
section_title: A Potentially Large Scope of MPC&A Work in Russia May Be Needed beyond 2012
paragraphs: Because of the ongoing challenges confronting MPC&A program work in  Russia, an effective MPC&A system sustained solely by Russia is unlikely  to be achieved by the congressionally mandated January 1, 2013, deadline,  and a potentially significant program of continued U.S. assistance to  Russia may be necessary beyond this date. Specifically, a combination of  continued MPC&A upgrades and sustainability activities at some Russian  nuclear material sites and support for further development of Russian  national-level MPC&A sustainability infrastructure could continue through  2018.
Regarding Russian nuclear warhead sites, both NNSA and the Russian  MOD have exchanged proposals for upgrade work at certain warhead  facilities that could continue beyond 2012, including NNSA support for  replacing obsolete MPC&A equipment at 11 SRF sites as proposed by  MOD. NNSA officials also indicated that MPC&A sustainability activities  for Russian warhead MPC&A could continue past 2012, including assisting  MOD and the services with the implementation of MPC&A regulations.
NNSA has not developed firm out-year budget estimates for continuing  MPC&A efforts overall in Russia. However, NNSA officials told us that  they had roughly estimated that approximately $150 million per year  would be needed to support MPC&A efforts in Russia beyond fiscal year  2012, including approximately $40 million per year for national-level  sustainability activities and approximately $110 million per year to support  future site-level upgrades and sustainability programs.
section_title: MCC Program Faces Continuing Challenges in Consolidating Russian Nuclear Materials to Fewer, More Secure Locations
paragraphs: NNSA has made little progress in and faces continuing challenges to  advancing the consolidation component of the MCC program in Russia.  NNSA believes consolidating Russian HEU is important because it would  (1) reduce the burden on the MPC&A program by allowing it to focus on  securing a smaller number of Russian material sites, (2) allow Russia to  focus its MPC&A resources on fewer potential theft targets, and (3)  enhance nuclear security at a lower, more sustainable cost. NNSA officials  acknowledged that there has been limited nuclear material consolidation  progress in Russia and described two reasons for the slow pace. First,  NNSA is not aware of any Rosatom plan for reducing the size of its nuclear  complex, and therefore cannot make specific proposals regarding  potential MCC program support for such an effort. Second, the MCC  program has been implemented only on a pilot basis in Russia. Efforts  have been under way since 2007 to conclude a formal government-to- government MCC agreement that, according to NNSA, would give the  program an agreed-upon legal framework for the continuation and  expansion of program activities. NNSA officials said that they expected  this agreement to be concluded during the July 2009 summit meeting  between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev in Moscow.  However, the agreement was reportedly rejected during Russian  government interagency review. As a consequence, NNSA officials told us  that plans to work with Russia on nuclear material consolidation remain  on “cold standby.”
section_title: GTRI Program Faces Challenges in Converting Russian Research Reactors from HEU to LEU
paragraphs: NNSA also faces challenges in working with Russia to convert its research  reactors and related facilities currently utilizing HEU. NNSA officials told  us that Russian research reactor operators have traditionally been wary of  such conversion because of concerns about the performance of  replacement LEU-based fuels. In the 2005 joint U.S.-Russian presidential  statement in Bratislava, Slovakia, the United States and Russia agreed to  focus the reactor conversion program on “third countries,” thus excluding  Russian reactors from U.S.-Russian cooperation.
The GTRI program has achieved an agreement in principle with Russia to  conduct conversion feasibility studies on 6 Russian research reactors.  However, NNSA officials told us that completion of this agreement, which  was expected in early fiscal year 2010, has been delayed. Moreover, NNSA  officials told us that any agreement to conduct these studies would not  constitute an official Russian decision to convert or undertake activities  toward conversion. According to NNSA officials, a formal government-to- government agreement would need to be completed to facilitate the  conversion of any Russian HEU research reactors or related facilities,  while Russian officials have indicated that pursuing conversion activities  beyond the feasibility study phase may require implementation of a U.S.- Russian agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
section_title: NNSA’s Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Security in Other Countries Are Under Way, but Progress Is Mixed
paragraphs: In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other countries  on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. In  two countries that are believed to have large nuclear material stockpiles— China and India—NNSA’s efforts have been primarily limited to the  relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices,  training, and demonstration projects, rather than working to develop a  program of security improvements at nuclear material facilities in those  countries. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon- usable nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI  program, including key countries that made new commitments at the April  2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable  nuclear material stockpiles.
subsections: section_title: Limited Scope of NNSA Nuclear Security Cooperation with China and India
paragraphs: Beyond Russia, NNSA is also engaging China and India in discussions on  issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. The  MPC&A program is the lead NNSA program involved in this effort.  However, because this cooperation is considered politically sensitive,  NNSA’s approach in both nations has been limited to the relatively  noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices, training, and  demonstration projects.
subsections: section_title: Nuclear Security Efforts in China
paragraphs: Since 2003, NNSA has held technical discussions primarily with Chinese  civilian nuclear officials—including officials of the China Atomic Energy  Authority (CAEA) and China National Nuclear Corporation—and other  Chinese nuclear experts principally through workshops and training  sessions on nuclear material security best practices, export controls, and  safeguards. NNSA also sponsored a 2005 joint technology demonstration  with CAEA in Beijing to promote modern MPC&A and safeguards  technologies. In total, NNSA officials estimated that approximately $8.2  million has been spent on MPC&A cooperation with China through March  2010.
To further the nuclear security dialogue with the Chinese civilian nuclear  sector, NNSA is working with China, in cooperation with DOD, to  establish a center of nuclear security excellence in the country, where  nuclear material security best practices could be exchanged and related  technologies demonstrated. At the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit,  China announced its intent to cooperate on the development of such a  center. There is no official agreement among NNSA, DOD, and the Chinese  government to establish such a center, though a memorandum of  understanding is under discussion and may be signed in early 2011.  However, notwithstanding these plans, NNSA officials told us that they do  not anticipate conducting a program of site-specific upgrade work in  China in either the civilian or the defense sector.
Moreover, NNSA officials said that while CAEA supports continued  MPC&A cooperation with NNSA, a Chinese government reorganization has  replaced CAEA as the lead implementing agency under the existing  agreement that serves as the vehicle for the implementation of NNSA  nuclear nonproliferation activities in China. NNSA officials told us that  they believe CAEA is interested in pursuing a new bilateral agreement with  NNSA under which this cooperation could continue and expand. The  MPC&A program’s interactions in China, however, are likely to be limited  to CAEA and China’s civilian nuclear organizations. While there has been  some participation by Chinese defense personnel in workshops, according  to NNSA, Chinese military organizations—which control the bulk of  China’s nuclear weapon-usable material inventory—have shown little  interest in discussing nuclear security collaboration with the United  States.
Separately, the GTRI program has worked with China through an IAEA  Coordinated Research Project to address conversion of Chinese-supplied  Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) located in China, and which  China exported to Ghana, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria. Existing  replacement LEU fuels GTRI is developing for conversion of other foreign  research reactors may not be feasible for the Chinese MNSRs. However,  China has shut down one MNSR and converted another, and according to  State officials, replacement LEU fuel being developed by China will likely  be feasible for conversion of other Chinese MNSRs. In addition, China has  committed to the disposition of HEU from Ghana, Nigeria, and Syria  through an agreement with IAEA.
section_title: Nuclear Security Efforts in India
paragraphs: NNSA is also seeking to work with India on a range of nuclear material  security subjects, including implementing a Design Basis Threat,  vulnerability assessments, physical protection systems, material control  and accounting, transportation security, and nuclear security culture  development. However, according to NNSA officials, there is no active,  bilateral cooperation with India on these issues. In total, NNSA has spent  less than $500,000 on activities designed to stimulate a nuclear security  dialogue with India through workshops sponsored under the auspices of  IAEA and other organizations.
NNSA officials told us that discussions of Indian nuclear facility security  with Indian officials has been very sensitive, though NNSA officials  anticipate that a planned center of nuclear excellence in India, to be  established in cooperation with DOD, could promote a broader nuclear  security dialogue. However, NNSA officials told us that there is no official  agreement with India to develop such a center.
At the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the Indian government  announced that it would work with IAEA and other international partners  to establish a regional Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership in  India that would have a nuclear security component, along with other  components related to nuclear power, radiation safety, and civilian  applications of nuclear energy. NNSA officials told us that this  announcement did not constitute a direct endorsement of the center  planned by NNSA and DOD, but that further negotiations with the Indian  government were expected to determine what role NNSA and DOD could  play in the center proposed by India.
section_title: Prospects for NNSA Removal of HEU from Other Countries Are Improving after Nuclear Security Summit
paragraphs: NNSA has also focused on efforts to remove weapon-usable material from  nearly two dozen countries through the GTRI program. NNSA officials told  us that some progress has been made in negotiations with several  countries for the removal of their HEU to either the United States or  Russia following the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.
For example, NNSA officials told us that negotiations had been under way  with the Ukrainian government for many years concerning the repatriation  of its HEU inventory to Russia. During the Nuclear Security Summit, the  Ukrainian President pledged to “get rid of” all Russian-origin HEU from  the country by 2012, from all three sites where the material is currently  located. In May 2010, GTRI facilitated the removal of a significant portion  of Ukraine’s HEU inventory—specifically, the return of 56 Kg of HEU in  spent fuel from the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research to Russia. This  effort represented the removal of more than a third of Ukraine’s HEU  inventory. Consistent with the joint statement made by the U.S. and  Ukrainian Presidents during the Nuclear Security Summit, under which  the United States agreed to provide technical and financial assistance to  help Ukraine eliminate its HEU stocks, negotiations have been under way  with the Ukrainian government and nuclear institutes to complete an  agreement on an assistance package that would help facilitate the removal  of Ukraine’s remaining HEU stocks.
In addition, NNSA officials told us that discussions occurred with the  South African Nuclear Energy Corporation on nuclear material security  issues following the Nuclear Security Summit. For instance, NNSA  completed a contract for the future return of U.S.-origin spent HEU fuel  located in South Africa to the United States. NNSA and the South African  Nuclear Energy Corporation also agreed to establish a joint U.S.-South  African technical working group to develop cost estimates and address  technical issues for the possible future disposition of South African HEU  in spent fuel form. The first meeting of the joint working group occurred in  August 2010, during which both sides agreed to produce a joint feasibility  study by the fall of 2010. Finally, South Africa has decided to pursue  production of the molybdenum-99 medical isotope using a research  reactor—converted previously from use of HEU to LEU fuel, with the help  of the GTRI program—that will now use LEU targets instead of HEU  targets. According to GTRI officials, South Africa would become the  world’s first major molybdenum-99 producer to convert to an all-LEU  process.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The President’s 4-year nuclear material security initiative has a worthwhile  objective and can provide an impetus to accelerate NNSA and other U.S.  government nuclear material security efforts with foreign countries. The  initiative’s goal, however, seems unrealistic in light of the formidable  challenges to improving the security of nuclear stockpiles worldwide,  especially the reluctance of key countries such as Russia to acknowledge  weaknesses in their nuclear security systems. The uncertainty surrounding  the likelihood of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide  within 4 years is compounded by the absence of a robust U.S. interagency  implementation plan for the initiative that clearly identifies vulnerable  foreign nuclear material facilities to be addressed, assigns clear agency  and program responsibilities for those locations, identifies activities to be  conducted at each location, reviews potential challenges and how those  obstacles could be overcome, estimates time frames for completing  activities at each site, and presents estimated funding needed to achieve  this goal. In addition to clarifying key objectives and details concerning  how the 4-year initiative would be implemented, such a plan would  provide Congress with a useful baseline on the status of global nuclear  material security and provide a framework to systematically track  progress.
Important challenges continue to confront NNSA efforts to work  cooperatively with Russia on nuclear material security. It is clear that U.S.- Russian collaboration on MPC&A will take more time—certainly beyond  the January 1, 2013, deadline under current U.S. law—to have confidence  that Russia will be in a position to assume full responsibility for sustaining  U.S.-provided nuclear security systems over the long term. Even if this  deadline were amended, we believe it is important for the program to  provide Congress with realistic estimated time frames, strategy, work  scope, and costs for future work in that country. In our view, the  continuation of MPC&A assistance to Russia beyond the current deadline  should not be open-ended but for a specified period of additional time, at  the end of which Congress can reassess the progress that has been made  and evaluate the need to authorize any additional extension.
The efforts of the MPC&A and other NNSA programs working in Russia  require cooperation from the Russian government, and we believe greater  Russian commitment and openness are essential for the NNSA programs  to succeed. As U.S. and Russian officials told us, it is important that  cooperation between the two countries on joint nuclear security efforts be  viewed as one of partnership and not U.S. assistance. We believe an  important measure of partnership is the financial contributions from the  foreign governments to the NNSA programs being implemented in their  countries. In that regard, if the Russian government were to provide the  United States with a clearer and more thorough sense of its current and  future spending plans on nuclear security programs and activities, NNSA  and other U.S. agency officials could have more informed discussions with  Russian counterparts on where resources and cooperation are most  urgently needed.
While NNSA has made considerable progress securing Russian nuclear  warheads and materials at numerous sites where they are located, we  believe more progress is needed in consolidating and reducing the number  of locations in Russia with nuclear materials, and phasing out the use of  HEU at Russian research reactors and related facilities. In our view, these  steps would provide a higher level of security at lower potential cost.  Unfortunately, Russia has been reluctant to work more actively with  NNSA to consolidate its nuclear weapon-usable materials and convert its  HEU-fueled research reactors.
Beyond Russia, it is apparent that some countries and facilities that are  high priorities for the NNSA programs may be addressed by NNSA or  other U.S. nuclear security programs only in very limited or restricted  ways. While the President’s April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit helped  draw high-level international political attention to the threat of nuclear  terrorism and proliferation risks, the process of building relationships with  certain countries will likely take many years. Recognizing that progress on  nuclear material security with foreign countries requires mutual  cooperation, we believe the centers of nuclear security excellence that  NNSA and DOD are planning to jointly develop in China and India are  good first steps toward cultivating international nuclear security best  practices and a shared perception of nuclear security risks. These centers  may represent a model for engaging other countries in nuclear security  dialogues and possibly more extensive future cooperation.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Because of the likely need for the MPC&A program to work with Russia  past December 31, 2012, Congress may wish to consider amending the  current law—as initially laid out in the Bob Stump National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003—to give the MPC&A program  additional time to work toward achievement of an MPC&A system that  Russia is prepared for and capable of sustaining on its own. Considering  input from the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA as  recommended below, Congress may wish to consider such an extension  for a fixed period of time.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of  NNSA take the following three actions:  to assist Congress in its decision whether and for how long to extend the  current deadline, clarify in a written plan the scope of remaining MPC&A  work in Russia beyond the current program deadline, including  information on remaining MPC&A activities by site or facility, timelines,  and estimated costs of completing MPC&A program work in that country;  to enhance NNSA nuclear nonproliferation program planning, and provide  a clearer picture of Russia’s willingness and ability to support and sustain  MPC&A and other nuclear security investments the United States has  made in Russia, strengthen cooperation with the Russian government  regarding the transparency of its current and future spending plans on  nuclear security programs and activities; and reevaluate NNSA strategies—with an eye toward new incentives,  inducements, or other sources of leverage—to persuade Russia to expand  its cooperation with the MCC and GTRI programs with the goal of  expediting the consolidation of Russian HEU to fewer locations and the  conversion of Russian HEU-fueled research reactors and related facilities.
We are making the following recommendation to the Assistant to the  President for National Security Affairs:  To provide a clear sense of the overall scope of work anticipated under the  President’s initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide  within 4 years, we recommend that NSC lead and coordinate through  NNSA, DOD, State, and other relevant agencies, including members of the  intelligence community, the development of a comprehensive plan for  implementing the initiative. Such a plan should clearly identify the specific  foreign countries, sites, and facilities where materials have been  determined to be poorly secured, and include information specifying the  agencies and programs responsible for addressing each location; planned  activities, potential implementation challenges, and steps needed to  overcome those challenges at each location; and estimated time frames  and costs associated with achievement of the 4-year goal.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our classified report to NNSA, DOE, NSC, State,  DOD, and ODNI for formal comment. DOE and NNSA provided written  comments on the classified draft report, the unclassified portions of which  are presented in appendix IV. NSC, State, DOD, and ODNI had no written  comments on our classified report. NNSA, DOE, NSC, State, and DOD  provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
DOE and NNSA agreed with our three recommendations that they (1)  clarify in a written plan for Congress the scope of remaining MPC&A work  in Russia beyond the 2013 program deadline, (2) strengthen cooperation  with the Russian government regarding the transparency of its current and  future spending plans on nuclear security programs and activities, and (3)  reevaluate strategies to persuade Russia to expand its cooperation with  the MCC and GTRI programs with the goal of expediting the consolidation  of Russian HEU to fewer locations and the conversion of Russian HEU- fueled research reactors and related facilities. DOE and NNSA responded  that progress has already been made in implementing the third  recommendation.
DOE and NNSA took issue with our characterization that the GTRI  program has made little progress in converting Russian research reactors  using HEU to LEU. We noted in the report that Russia verified to the GTRI  program in February 2010 that it had shut down 3 HEU research reactors  and that the GTRI program has an agreement in principle with Russia to  conduct conversion feasibility studies on 6 Russian research reactors. We  have modified the report to include language noting that the GTRI  program has obtained a commitment from Russia to close 5 additional  research reactors. However, we believe the statement and the findings  supporting it are factually correct, for the following reasons. First, as we  reported, the GTRI program plans to complete the conversion or verified  shutdown of 71 Russian HEU-fueled research reactors and related  facilities. To date, the program acknowledges having verified the  shutdown of only 3 of these reactors. In our view, this constitutes little  progress toward the specific GTRI program objective relating to Russian  research reactor shutdown or conversion. DOE’s and NNSA’s comment  that the GTRI program’s primary focus is on threat reduction efforts  outside of Russia is not relevant to our finding that limited progress has  been made toward this specific GTRI program goal in Russia. Moreover,  the prospects and timelines for future shutdowns or actual conversions of  Russian HEU research reactors are unclear and contingent on Russian  government support, which we also believe is uncertain. As we noted in  our report, NNSA officials told us that completion of the implementing  agreement with Russia to allow for conversion feasibility studies on 6  Russian research reactors that was expected in early 2010 has been  delayed, the agreement would not constitute a Russian agreement to  actually convert any of its facilities, and any future conversion activities  beyond feasibility studies may require implementation of a U.S.-Russian  agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
In addition, DOE and NNSA commented that some recent GTRI program  accomplishments were not addressed in our report. We have modified  language in our report to reflect those accomplishments.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretaries of Energy, State, and Defense; the  Administrator of NNSA; the Assistant to the President for National  Security Affairs; the Director of National Intelligence; and other interested  parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to assess (1) U.S. governmentwide  efforts to implement the President’s initiative to secure all vulnerable  nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years; (2) the status and challenges,  if any, of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) nuclear  security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear  materials in countries other than Russia.
To assess overall U.S. strategies and plans for implementing the 4-year  global nuclear material security initiative proposed by the President, we  obtained and reviewed relevant documentation on the strategies for  achieving this goal, including the interagency strategy document for this  effort; an overview of the Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP)  used to identify vulnerable nuclear material sites overseas; the most recent  annual report to Congress on the security of nuclear weapons, strategic  special nuclear materials, and related equipment located outside the  United States as of 2008; and NNSA’s “work scope” plan for securing  nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. The Department of Defense  (DOD) and Department of State (State) did not develop comparable  written plans detailing how their programs would contribute to the 4-year  initiative. We interviewed National Security Council (NSC) officials on the  initiative, the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, and issues related to  broader national-level nuclear nonproliferation strategies and planning.  We also interviewed officials at NNSA, DOD, and State concerning their  contributions to the 4-year nuclear material security initiative. We also  interviewed officials from the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence (ODNI) and representatives of the intelligence community,  and reviewed documentation provided to us by ODNI, on issues and  threats related to worldwide nuclear material security.
We focused our evaluation of the status of and challenges facing NNSA  nuclear security programs in Russia on three NNSA nuclear  nonproliferation programs working in that country—the nuclear Material  Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program; the nuclear  Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program; and the Global  Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). We selected these three programs  because they work directly on securing Russian nuclear warheads and  materials in place (MPC&A program), converting Russian highly enriched  uranium (HEU) to non-weapon-usable low-enriched uranium and  consolidating the number of Russian sites with HEU to fewer, more secure  locations (MCC program), or eliminating Russian use of HEU (GTRI  program). We did not address other NNSA nuclear nonproliferation  programs in Russia that are nearing completion (such as the Elimination  of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program), have not yet initiated  significant programs of assistance to Russia (such as the program that will  assist Russia in the disposition of its excess weapon-grade plutonium), or  are indirectly related to nuclear warhead or material security (such as  nuclear smuggling detection or weapons of mass destruction scientist  reemployment programs).
To evaluate the status of and challenges facing the efforts of these NNSA  nuclear security programs in Russia, we examined these issues in  interviews with the NNSA Administrator, senior officials in the NNSA  Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and the principal  nonproliferation program offices involved in nuclear material security  activities in Russia, including the Office of International Material  Protection and Cooperation, which implements the MPC&A and MCC  programs in Russia; the Office of Global Threat Reduction, which  administers the GTRI program to, among other things, facilitate  conversion of Russian research reactors and related facilities from use of  HEU to use of low-enriched uranium; the Office of Nuclear Risk  Reduction, which has facilitated the shutdown of Russia’s last remaining  weapon-grade plutonium production reactors; and the Office of Fissile  Materials Disposition, which is working with Russia to eliminate  plutonium it has declared excess to defense needs.
We reviewed documentation and analyzed information provided to us by  NNSA describing nuclear warhead and material security program efforts  and the challenges they face in Russia, including documentation on the  status of MPC&A upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead and material sites  and efforts to transition responsibility to Russia for sustaining MPC&A  over the long term.
In addition, we obtained documentation from and interviewed senior  Russian officials who have worked with the NNSA nuclear  nonproliferation programs, including those from the Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs; Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy (Rosatom);  Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD); Russian Federal Customs Service;  and Russian Federal Service of Environmental, Technological, and  Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor), which provides oversight of  Russia’s civilian nuclear facilities.
We obtained and reviewed documentation from and interviewed U.S.  officials to assess NNSA’s efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries  other than Russia. Specifically, we reviewed documentation provided by  NNSA and interviewed MPC&A program officials concerning nuclear  security program activities in China and India. We also interviewed DOD  officials on DOD’s plans to work jointly with NNSA in developing nuclear  security centers of excellence in China and India. We analyzed relevant  information from and interviewed GTRI program officials concerning  program plans for foreign HEU removal and reactor conversion.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to December 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: NNSA National-Level Project Areas for MPC&A Sustainability of Russian Nuclear Materials
paragraphs: Appendix II: NNSA National-Level Project  Areas for MPC&A Sustainability of Russian  Nuclear Materials Provide a civilian regulatory structure in Russia for an integrated MPC&A program  Enhance Russian MPC&A inspections by establishing an infrastructure with sufficient  resources to enforce MPC&A regulations though federal and industry oversight  Assist Russia in improving the security of weapon-usable material at high risk of theft or  diversion, through development and support of a sustainable and effective measurement- based MC&A program  Develop cost-effective, self-sustaining, and accessible training and technical support for  upgraded MPC&A systems in Russia  Educate the next generation of Russian safeguards and security specialists to secure  special nuclear material  Install MOM systems at non-Rosatom nuclear sites in Russia with completed MPC&A  upgrades to provide increased confidence that the upgrades continue to operate effectively Work with Rosatom to improve the security of Russian nuclear materials in transit  Ensure that a sufficient number of organized, equipped, and trained protective force  personnel are present to provide balanced protection against all design basis threats to  Russian special nuclear material  Operate and upgrade a Russian system designed to systematically collect, process, and  analyze site reports on quantities of nuclear materials and inventory changes (project  completed)
section_title: Appendix III: Seven Elements of MPC&A Sustainability and Selected Indicators
subsections: section_title: Description
paragraphs: Site MPC&A organization  MPC&A organizations at the site level plan,  coordinate, implement, test, and evaluate  MPC&A operations and have sufficient authority  to carry out all aspects of their duties.
Site has an established and documented MPC&A  organization with clear roles and responsibilities.
Site has developed MPC&A plans of its own.
Site has developed a budget for MPC&A  organization, activities, and personnel.
Site operating procedures  MPC&A personnel follow existing regulatory  requirements for using systems, equipment, and  technologies to ensure security of nuclear  materials at the sites and during transportation.  The development of regulatory requirements  takes into account data from vulnerability  assessments and is customized to technical  processes for handling nuclear materials.
Site has written procedures for all key MPC&A  operations.
Site procedures conform to Russian regulations.
Site has a process for field evaluation of  procedures.
The human resource management and  personnel training programs at the site ensure  that employees have the requisite knowledge,  skills, and abilities to perform necessary MPC&A  operations.
Performance by site personnel complies with  operating procedures.
Site has established and resourced an on-site  training organization.
MPC&A training is required for each staff member  every year.
Operational cost analysis  Operation of MPC&A systems requires adequate  funding to ensure reduction of risk of theft and  unauthorized use of nuclear materials. An  operational cost analysis should examine all  categories of costs associated with the upgrade  and subsequent operation of MPC&A programs.
Site has identified life cycle costs, capital  replacement costs, and other costs for MPC&A  equipment.
Site’s operating budget covers the site’s MPC&A  requirements.
Site demonstrates ability to technically and  financially sustain MPC&A.
Timely preventive maintenance, repair, and  calibration of equipment provide for the efficient  operation of all system components.
Site has evaluated MPC&A system maintenance  requirements.
Site has developed a master list of MPC&A  equipment installed and maintenance and/or  replacement priorities.
Site has spare parts supply and extended  equipment warranties or replacement service  contracts.
To evaluate MPC&A program effectiveness, it is  necessary to have a performance testing and  operational monitoring program.
Site has internal review program to evaluate  MPC&A performance.
Site is identifying and correcting MPC&A  deficiencies.
Site tracks number and type of MPC&A incidents.
To sustain the efficient operation of MPC&A  systems, it is necessary to track, log, and  evaluate any changes that are introduced into  these systems’ configuration.
Changes to MPC&A system configuration are  reviewed by appropriate staff to verify system  effectiveness is not degraded.
Changes in configuration are communicated to  and understood by site staff.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Glen Levis (Assistant Director),  William Hoehn, William King, and Kevin Remondini made key  contributions to this report. Other technical assistance was provided by  Antoinette Capaccio and Alison O’Neill.