Driver's License Security: Federal Leadership Needed to Address Remaining Vulnerabilities
Published: 2012-09-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Obtaining a driver's license under another's identity can enable criminals to commit various crimes. The 9/11 terrorists, for example, possessed fraudulent licenses. The REAL ID Act sets minimum standards for states when verifying license applicants' identity, which go into effect in January 2013. If states do not meet these requirements, their licenses will not be accepted for official purposes such as boarding commercial aircraft. DHS is responsible for establishing how states may certify compliance and for determining compliance. SSA helps states verify SSNs. GAO was asked to examine (1) states' identity verification procedures for license applicants, (2) the procedures' effectiveness in addressing fraud, and (3) how federal agencies have helped states enhance procedures. GAO analyzed DHS and SSA data on states' use of verification systems; interviewed officials from DHS, SSA, and other organizations; and conducted on-site or phone interviews with licensing agency officials in 11 states. GAO tested state procedures in three states that have known vulnerabilities; results from these states are not generalizable.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To verify license applicants' identity, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have procedures that may detect counterfeit documents. For example, all states are now verifying key personal information, such as Social Security numbers (SSN) through online queries to a Social Security Administration (SSA) database, a significant increase from about a decade ago. This effort helps ensure that the identity information presented belongs to a valid identity and also is not associated with a deceased person. Additionally, most states verify non-citizen applicants' immigration documents with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure these individuals have lawful status in the United States. Many states are also using facial recognition techniques to better detect attempts to obtain a license under another's identity. While most states have taken steps required by the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Act), officials in some states indicated that they may not comply with certain provisions--such as re-verifying SSNs for license renewals--because of state laws or concerns that these requirements are unnecessary and burdensome.
State officials interviewed by GAO report that identity verification procedures have been effective at combating certain kinds of fraud, but vulnerabilities remain. Officials in most of the 11 states GAO contacted reported a decline in the use of counterfeit identity documents, and officials in states using facial recognition said they detected a number of identity theft attempts. However, criminals can still steal the identity of someone in one state and use it to get a license in another because states lack the capacity to consistently detect such cross-state fraud. A system for addressing such fraud would enable states to comply with the Act's prohibition against issuing licenses to individuals who already have a license from another state, but may not be fully operational until 2023. Furthermore, officials in many states said they have difficulties detecting forged birth certificates. Verifying date of birth is also required by the Act, and a system exists for doing so, but no licensing agencies are using it because of concerns about incomplete data, among other reasons. Partly because these two systems are not fully operational, GAO investigators were able to use counterfeit out-of-state drivers' licenses and birth certificates to fraudulently obtain licenses in three states.
By improving their respective verification systems, SSA and DHS have helped states enhance their identity verification procedures. For example, SSA has established timeliness goals for responding to state SSN queries and DHS has addressed data accuracy issues. DHS has also provided funding for states to develop new systems. However, DHS has not always provided timely, comprehensive, or proactive guidance to help states implement provisions of the Act related to identity verification. For example, DHS did not issue formal, written guidance in this area for more than 4 years after issuing final regulations, even though officials from most states GAO interviewed said they needed such guidance. Additionally, even though relevant national systems are not yet fully operational, DHS has no plans to promote certain alternatives states can use to comply with the Act's identity verification requirements and combat cross-state and birth certificate fraud. Officials in some states indicated they needed direction from DHS in this area.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS work with partners to take interim actions to help states address cross-state and birth certificate fraud. DHS did not concur with these recommendations, saying its ongoing efforts are sufficient. GAO has demonstrated that vulnerabilities remain as long as national systems are not yet fully operational. Therefore, GAO continues to believe additional DHS actions are needed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Driver’s license fraud is a crime that can have significant financial and  domestic security consequences. Because drivers’ licenses have become  a widely accepted form of identification, identity thieves may try to obtain  a license under someone else’s name—with forged or stolen Social  Security cards or other documents—and use it to commit financial fraud.  By one estimate, in 2010 over 8 million Americans were victims of identity  theft and such crimes cost victims a total of $37 billion. Individuals may  also try to obtain licenses for other criminal purposes; for example, some  of the 9/11 terrorists obtained licenses fraudulently. In 2005, after the  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States  recommended enhanced security for licenses, Congress passed the  REAL ID Act of 2005 (REAL ID Act or Act), which, among other  provisions, sets minimum national standards for driver’s license security  including procedures for states to follow when verifying the identity of  license applicants.Act’s requirements. While states are not required to comply, if they  choose not to, the licenses they issue will no longer be accepted for  official purposes as defined in the Act, such as boarding commercial  aircraft.
States have until January 2013 to comply with the  We were asked to review the current status of states’ identity verification  procedures when issuing drivers’ licenses, such as those related to Social  Security number (SSN) verification. Specifically, we address: (1) what  procedures states have in place to verify the identity of driver’s license  applicants, (2) how effective these procedures have been in addressing  license application fraud and what vulnerabilities remain, and (3) what  actions federal agencies have taken to help states enhance their identity  verification procedures. In addressing these objectives, we focused solely  on procedures for verifying license applicants’ identity and did not review  other aspects of driver’s license security that are addressed by Title II of  the REAL ID Act. We reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations,  selected state laws, and previous studies. We interviewed officials from  two federal agencies that have a role in helping states implement the Act:  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Social Security  Administration (SSA). We collected and analyzed national data from SSA  and DHS on states’ use of verification systems, and performed a data  reliability assessment—including a review of related documentation and  interviews with agency officials—that determined the data were  sufficiently reliable for reporting the number of states using these systems  and the verification rates they obtained. We also interviewed officials from  a number of other organizations, including the American Association of  Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), which represents and provides  guidance to state licensing agencies; the National Association for Public  Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS), which represents  the vital records agencies that issue birth certificates; the Coalition for a  Secure Driver’s License; the Center for Immigration Studies; and the  National Governors Association. To gain a more in-depth perspective on  identity verification procedures and their impact at the state level, we  conducted site visits to three states (Iowa, New York, and Texas). During  the site visits, we interviewed officials at the state licensing agency  headquarters and local license issuance branches, including investigative  staff. We also conducted phone interviews with driver licensing agencies  in eight additional states (California, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, New  Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington). In three of our states  we also interviewed officials with vital records agencies, which issue birth  certificates. We judgmentally selected states based on factors including  geographical dispersion, population, and use of particular identity  verification procedures. While our review of procedures in these 11 states  cannot be generalized to all states, in 2010 these states represented  almost half of the U.S. population. Finally, our investigative staff tested  identity verification procedures by attempting to obtain licenses under  fictitious identities in three states. We chose states with certain identified  vulnerabilities in their procedures. The results from these three states  cannot be generalized to others.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 through  September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We performed  our related investigative work in accordance with standards prescribed by  the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Drivers’ licenses have become widely accepted as an identity document  because they generally contain identifying information such as the  licensee’s name, photograph, physical description, and signature and  may include features that make them more difficult to counterfeit or alter.
As of 2010, about 210 million drivers were licensed in the United States.Due to the crucial role of the driver’s license as an identity document,  individuals may try to fraudulently obtain them for a wide range of  purposes. For example, some may try to get a license in someone else’s  name to commit financial fraud, such as stealing government benefits,  opening bank or credit card accounts, and writing counterfeit checks.  Criminals may also obtain multiple licenses under different identities so  they can commit criminal acts and, if apprehended, avoid having charges  associated with their true identity. Illegal aliens may use a counterfeit  license to live in the United States.
The prevalence of driver’s license fraud in the United States is difficult to  fully determine or quantify. The Federal Bureau of Investigation collects  data from all states on a number of different categories of crimes through  its Uniform Crime Reporting program, but this program does not have a  category specifically for driver’s license fraud. Estimates are, however,  available from a few sources. For example, in 2010 the Federal Trade  Commission (FTC) reported that complaints involving the issuance or  forging of drivers’ licenses accounted for 0.9 percent of the approximately  251,000 identity theft complaints it received overall (about 2,300  complaints). Some evidence suggests, though, that many identity theft  cases go unreported and thus the total number of identity theft cases may  be substantially higher than the FTC figure. In addition, the Center for  Identity Management and Information Protection analyzed 517 identity  theft cases investigated by the U.S. Secret Service between 2000 and  2006, and found that counterfeit drivers’ licenses were used in 35 percent  of these cases.
Verifying license applicants’ identity and preventing fraud has traditionally  been a state responsibility, but after the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, there was an increased federal interest in driver’s license issuance  and security, as evidenced by the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005.  States are not mandated to comply with the Act; however, the Act  establishes specific procedures states must follow when issuing drivers’  licenses in order for those licenses to be accepted by federal agencies for  “official purposes,” including, but not limited to, boarding commercial  aircraft, entering federal buildings, and entering nuclear power plants.  As of July 2012, 17 states had enacted laws expressly opposing  implementation or prohibiting the relevant state agencies from complying  with the REAL ID Act. Under the REAL ID Act, DHS has primary  responsibility for establishing how and when states can certify their  compliance and determining whether states are compliant. DHS issued  regulations in 2008 that provided details on how it would determine  whether states were REAL ID-compliant. Although the Act set a May 11,  2008, deadline for compliance, DHS’ regulations allowed states to  request an extension of the full compliance deadline to May 11, 2011, and   the agency later pushed the date back to January 15, 2013. If states are  interested in complying with the Act, they must submit documentation no  later than 90 days before this deadline (around October 15, 2012).  Initially, after the January deadline, individuals with licenses from states  determined to be compliant may continue to use their licenses for official  purposes, regardless of when these licenses were issued, according to  DHS. However, by December 1, 2014, certain individuals—those born  after December 1, 1964—must be issued new, REAL ID-compliant  licenses by states that have been determined to be compliant in order to  use their licenses for official purposes. By December 1, 2017, all license  holders must be issued new, REAL ID-compliant licenses in order to use  them for official purposes.
The REAL ID Act sets minimum standards for several aspects of the  license and identification card issuance process. In the area of identity verification, the Act establishes the following requirements, among others,  for states seeking compliance:
Documentation: States must require license applicants to provide  documentation of their name, date of birth, SSN, address of principal  residence, and lawful status in the United States;
Verification: Requires states to verify with the issuing agency the  issuance, validity, and completeness of the documents presented as  proof of name, date of birth, SSN (or verify the applicant’s ineligibility  for an SSN), address, and lawful status, with specific requirements to  confirm SSNs with SSA and verify lawful status of non-citizens  through an electronic DHS system;  Image capture: Requires states to capture and store digital images of  all documents presented by license applicants to establish identity,  such as passports and birth certificates, and capture the facial images  of all applicants;
Renewals: Requires states to establish an effective procedure for  confirming or verifying the information provided by individuals seeking  to renew their licenses;
One driver, one license: Requires states to refuse to issue a license  to an applicant who already holds a license from another state,  without confirming that this other license has been or is in the process  of being terminated; and
Staff training: States must establish training programs on  recognizing fraudulent documents for appropriate employees involved  in issuing licenses.
section_title: States Have Taken Steps to Detect Counterfeit Documents and Identity Theft, Including Many Required by the REAL ID Act
paragraphs: State driver licensing agencies use a combination of different techniques  to verify the identity of license applicants and prevent fraud. These  various procedures are used together to detect license fraud and no  single technique is sufficient, according to officials at several licensing  agencies. All states have in place some procedures to detect counterfeit  documents, which may include electronic systems to verify data  contained on documents—such as the Social Security card—or visual  inspection of documents. Many states also use other techniques to detect  fraud, including facial recognition, cross-state checks, or internal controls  for licensing transactions. (See table 1.)
All states plus the District of Columbia are now using Social Security  Online Verification (SSOLV) to verify license applicants’ SSNs and other  personal data, consistent with the REAL ID Act’s requirement to confirm  SSNs with SSA. The number of states verifying SSNs with SSA has  increased substantially since 2003, when we reported that 25 states were   Even states with laws opposing implementation of the REAL  doing so.ID Act are checking SSNs through SSOLV. Use of SSOLV allows states  to verify that the SSN provided by a license applicant is valid. In other  words, SSOLV allows states to check whether (1) someone has been  issued this SSN, (2) the SSN matches the name and date of birth  provided by the applicant, and (3) the SSN is associated with a deceased  individual. Officials in most of the states we interviewed said they never or  rarely issue a permanent driver’s license before obtaining a verification of  the applicant’s personal data. In fiscal year 2011, the SSOLV  verification rate—that is, the percentage of SSOLV verification requests  that confirmed the validity of the personal data submitted—was 93  percent on average nationwide, and almost all the states had rates above  85 percent. The national average is an increase from the 89 percent  average rate in fiscal year 2008, the earliest year for which data were  available. Officials in almost all of the states we interviewed said they had  no concerns about the percentage of SSOLV queries that failed to verify.  The most common reason for non-verifications nationwide in 2011 was  that the name presented by the applicant did not match the name  associated with the SSN on file with SSA. Officials in most of the states  we interviewed cited name changes as the most common reason for this.  A license applicant may have changed their name after marriage, but not  reported this change to SSA. In such cases, states may ask applicants to  resolve the issue with SSA and then return to the licensing agency so the  SSOLV query may be run again.
Most states are also using Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements  (SAVE), another REAL ID Act requirement, but officials in some of the  states we interviewed reported challenges with the system. SAVE,  operated by DHS, verifies the information in documents that non-citizen  applicants provide to prove they have lawful status in the United States.  As of 2012, licensing agencies in 42 states plus the District of Columbia  had agreements with DHS to use it.agreements do not use the system consistently for each non-citizen  applicant. For example, officials in one state we interviewed said they  used SAVE only when the documents submitted by a non-citizen raised  questions, such as if they appeared tampered with or indicated a non- citizen no longer has lawful status in the country. Officials in the five   However, a few states with such  states we interviewed that were not using SAVE most often cited  technological challenges, such as difficulties providing front-counter staff  in local issuance branches with routine access to the system. Officials in  all but one of these states said they plan to start using the system if these  issues are resolved.
Officials in half of the states we interviewed that were using SAVE said  they were concerned about the verification rate they obtained. When  states submit data from non-citizens’ lawful status documents, the system  searches a variety of DHS databases in an effort to verify these data. If  data are not verified on the first attempt, the state may initiate a second  and then a third attempt, which entail manual checks by DHS staff and  additional costs for the state. Officials in one state, for example, told us  when SAVE does not verify lawful status on the first attempt, moving on  to additional attempts requires additional efforts by staff. Officials in a few  states said they believe data entry errors and delays in updating the data  in DHS databases are common reasons that data are not verified; DHS  officials also listed these as possible factors. Among all licensing  agencies using SAVE, the verification rate for initial SAVE queries during  fiscal year 2011 varied from 45 percent to 91 percent, according to DHS  data (see fig. 1). DHS officials said it is possible that states that only  submit SAVE queries when there is a potential problem with a document  have a higher percentage of queries that do not verify on the initial  attempt.
Another fraud prevention technique is inspection of identity documents by  front-counter staff. In all the states we contacted, front-counter staff in  local licensing offices inspects identity documents in an effort to detect  counterfeits. This step is often done even for documents that are also  verified electronically, such as SSN documents. Inspection generally  involves the visual or physical examination of documents. Staff told us  they look for security features embedded in authentic documents, such as  watermarks and proper coloring in Social Security cards or raised seals  on birth certificates. They may check if documents are printed on security  paper that is used for authentic documents, and also to see if a document  appears to have been tampered with. Staff may use a variety of tools to  assist with their inspection. For example, they may use black lights and  magnifying glasses. For certain types of documents, such as out-of-state  drivers’ licenses, they may consult books showing the most current  versions of these documents. Staff in about half of the states we  interviewed also used document authentication machines designed to  detect counterfeit documents such as out-of-state licenses and passports.  Officials in one of these states explained that front-counter staff scans  certain types of documents into the machines, and the machines indicate  if the document is authentic. Finally, training also plays a role in helping  staff inspect documents. Officials in all the licensing agencies we  contacted said they have provided fraudulent document recognition  training to their staff, which is also required by the REAL ID Act; most said  that 100 percent of their staff have received such training. Even officials in  states we contacted that have laws prohibiting implementation of the  REAL ID Act said they have taken this step.
Many states are using facial recognition techniques or fingerprinting  which, while not required by the REAL ID Act, may detect applicants who  attempt to obtain a license under an identity other than their own.  According to AAMVA, licensing agencies in 41 states plus the District of  Columbia were using facial recognition, fingerprinting, or both techniques  as of June 2012. Among the 11 states in our review, 5 routinely used  biometric techniques as part of their verification procedures (4 used facial  recognition and 1 used fingerprinting) and an additional 4 had plans to  implement facial recognition procedures. Licensing agency officials in the  remaining 2 states said they are barred by state law from using facial  recognition to screen license applicants.
State licensing agencies generally perform facial recognition checks only against their  own photo databases, according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST) which conducts studies on facial recognition. an applicant. These checks are not necessarily a purely automated  function, and staff may need time to review images that are potential  matches to determine if they really are of the same individual.
While states’ facial recognition programs are focused on detecting in- state license fraud, states also have some procedures in place that may  detect cross-state fraud. As of March 2012, 23 states and the District of  Columbia were participating in a photo-sharing program facilitated by  AAMVA that is designed to help detect fraud across state lines. This  program allows a participating state to obtain the facial image associated  with a surrendered license from the issuing state if that state also  participates in the program. Through this process, a fraudulent license  could be detected if a state query yields either no photo or a photo that  does not match the applicant. In addition, state licensing agencies may  detect cross-state fraud through other systems. For example, all states  plus the District of Columbia participate in the Problem Driver Pointer  System (PDPS), to check if license applicants have adverse driving  records. actions in other states, PDPS may also help states identify applicants  who already have licenses in other states that they have not divulged.  Also, a few state licensing agencies said they may use the National Law  Enforcement Telecommunications System to check if a license applicant  already has a license in another state. This system is generally only  available to law enforcement personnel, not to all front-line staff in license  issuance offices. Officials in one state told us they use it only in limited  circumstances, such as when there is reason to suspect license fraud.
The PDPS searches the National Driver Register, a database of state-provided driver  information maintained by the Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic  Safety Administration, and if an individual is identified as having an adverse record, the  PDPS “points” to the state where the individual’s record may be obtained. A PDPS check  is typically used to detect certain serious traffic violations or license suspensions or  revocations associated with an applicant in other states, which might make the applicant  ineligible to receive a license in a new state. example, officials in almost all the states we interviewed said front-line  staff may not override a non-match in an electronic verification system  such as SSOLV in order to issue a license. Additionally, officials in most  states told us managers examine licensing transactions to ensure proper  procedures were followed. For example, officials in one state told us an  audit team checks to make sure all required identity documents were  collected as part of the transaction. Other procedures that states employ  include monitoring licensing transactions to identify anomalies that may  indicate internal fraud, such as the issuance of multiple duplicate licenses  to the same individual; rotating staff among different stations so they do  not know where they will be working on any particular day; and randomly  assigning license applicants to the employee who will serve them, to  avoid collusion.
Figure 2 illustrates how the various systems and efforts work together to  detect and prevent driver’s license fraud in one of the states we reviewed.  This state’s process includes a number of the different types of checks we  have described. An individual applying for a driver’s license proceeds  through two different stations, where several checks and other steps are  performed by different employees. Certain steps are performed at one  station only, such as taking the applicant’s photo, checking documents  with the authentication machine and performing the electronic  verifications such as SSOLV. But other steps are performed at both  stations, including entering data from identity documents into the licensing  agency’s computer system. State officials told us that having two  employees enter applicants’ data helps guard against internal corruption,  because if one employee tries to collude with an applicant to enter false  information, this will be caught by the other employee. If no potential fraud  is found through all the checks at the local branch, the applicant is issued  a paper license valid for 45 days. The licensing agency performs some  additional checks after the issuance of the temporary license, including a  facial recognition check against all photos in its database and verification  that the applicant’s mailing address is valid. If no concerns are found, the  state mails a permanent license to the applicant.
Although states are already implementing a number of the identity  verification procedures required by the REAL ID Act, some states may not  comply with certain provisions for various reasons. For example, officials  in one state we interviewed said they are not verifying applicants’ lawful  status through SAVE because the state does not require people to have  lawful status in the United States to obtain a license. Officials said the  state has no plans to enact such a requirement. In other cases, state  officials told us they find certain statutory or regulatory requirements to be  burdensome or unnecessary. For example, several of the states we  interviewed do not verify SSNs through SSOLV when individuals renew  their licenses, a step required by DHS’ regulations. State officials told us  it is not necessary to take this step because these SSNs were already  verified at the time of initial license application; officials in one state also  mentioned the cost of a SSOLV query as a reason not to re-verify an  SSN. DHS said one reason it is necessary to re-verify personal data  such as SSNs for renewals is that such checks can detect cases where  the data are actually associated with a deceased individual. Re-verifying  SSNs may therefore detect attempts to renew a license fraudulently  under the identity of a deceased individual. In addition, several of the  states we interviewed do not require applicants to provide a document  showing their SSN. Officials in one of these states said the Social  Security card is easy to tamper with so it is more valuable to verify the  actual SSN than to assess the validity of the paper document. Officials in  two states said they do not plan to comply with the deadlines in DHS’  regulations, which will require states, after DHS has determined they are  REAL ID-compliant, to process new applications and issue new licenses  to certain license holders by 2014 and all license holders by 2017. These  officials cited the expected resource burden of processing so many  applications in a short period of time.
section_title: States Report Success in Preventing License Fraud but Cross-State Fraud and Counterfeit Birth Certificates Remain Challenges
subsections: section_title: States Report Success in Detecting Counterfeit Documents and Identity Theft
paragraphs: Officials in most of the states we interviewed said their anti-fraud efforts  have had success in preventing the use of counterfeit documents to  obtain licenses, especially documents associated with completely  fictitious identities. Indeed, officials in the majority of our 11 selected  states said they have seen a decline in attempts to obtain licenses using  counterfeit documents. SSOLV makes it harder for criminals to obtain a  license under a fictitious identity. Officials in most of the states we  interviewed said SSOLV checks have helped make the use of fraudulent  documents more difficult. For example, officials in one state told us that  before it started using SSOLV, about 75 percent of license fraud cases  involved counterfeit Social Security cards, but the use of counterfeit  documents such as these has declined significantly and is no longer the  main type of fraud they see. Officials in several states also cited SAVE as  having made the use of counterfeit documents more difficult. For  example, officials in one state commented that when they started using  SAVE in 2002 they identified many forged documents intended to prove  lawful status in the United States, but over time they have seen fewer  forgeries of these documents. Officials in several states said their efforts  to train staff on fraudulent document recognition or to prevent corruption  among their staff have also had an impact. Officials in one state said the  use of counterfeit Social Security cards has declined partly because front- line staff is better trained on how to check documents for security  features. Officials in another state told us internal control procedures,  including having two staff separately inspect each document, has made  license fraud more difficult to accomplish. Several states provided data  indicating a decline in recent years in the number of license fraud  investigations involving fraudulent documents. For example, one provided  data showing a steady decline in the annual number of investigations  based on referrals from front-counter staff, from 156 in 2002 to 36 in  2011. Officials said this trend reflects a decline in the use of counterfeit  documents, because such cases are the ones typically detected by front- counter staff.
State officials also reported successes in using facial recognition  technology to detect license fraud, particularly fraud involving identity  theft. SSOLV has made it harder to get a license under a fictitious  identity, but it cannot determine whether a valid SSN and other personal  information (name and date of birth) submitted by a license applicant are  truly associated with that applicant. Some evidence suggests that  criminals seeking a license are now more likely to try to obtain one under  another real identity—using genuine and sometimes forged identity  documents to do so. For example, law enforcement officials in one state  said that as the number of fraud cases involving counterfeit documents  has declined, they have seen an increasing number of what they called  imposter fraud: attempts to steal another person’s complete identity— including name, SSN, and date of birth—and obtain a license under that  identity. Officials in several states told us facial recognition plays an  important role in preventing such fraud. Officials in one state, for example,  said it is their most effective tool for detecting identity theft, and has  detected over 100 license fraud cases annually since 2008. Officials in  another state told us facial recognition has resulted in about 6,200  investigations and 1,700 arrests since its implementation in 2010.  Officials in a few states told us after they introduced facial recognition  they detected individuals with a number of licenses under different  identities—as many as 10 different identities associated with one  individual in one case. However, state officials also said there are some  limitations in the ability of facial recognition to detect matches between  photos when a person’s appearance has been altered in one photo. For  that reason, among others, an official with NIST said facial recognition  may be less effective than other biometric techniques such as  fingerprinting and iris recognition in detecting matches.
Examples of How Facial Recognition Detected License Fraud  In one state we visited, licensing agency employees were issuing licenses to individuals  using real identities of other people for payments of $7,500 to $12,500 a piece. As part of  the scheme, these employees provided their customers with legitimate identity documents  belonging to other people, such as Social Security cards and birth certificates. Facial  recognition successfully identified that the individuals who had paid for the fraudulent  licenses had already received other identification documents from the state and therefore  had photos in the state’s database. In another example from the same state, according to  state officials, a foreign national who these officials identified as being on the “no-fly” list  had obtained licenses under four different identities. This individual had been deported  from the United States multiple times, and each time was able to re-enter the country  under a different identity. Using facial recognition software, the state was able to detect  him by comparing the photos associated with the different licenses.
section_title: License Fraud across State Lines and the Use of Counterfeit Birth Certificates Remain Challenges
subsections: section_title: States Remain Vulnerable to Cross-State License Fraud
paragraphs: States’ vulnerability to license fraud perpetrated by individuals who cross  state lines has been a longstanding issue, and it remains a challenge for  states despite the success officials report in detecting other kinds of   Officials in the majority of states we interviewed told us their  fraud.states bar their license holders from also holding licenses in other states,  and the REAL ID Act also prohibits states from issuing a license to an  applicant who already has one in another state. However, individuals may  try to obtain licenses in multiple states. For example, criminals may try to  get licenses under different identities by using the identity of someone  who resides—and may have a license—in one state to obtain a license  under that identity in a different state, perhaps to commit financial fraud  under their stolen identity. Officials in all the states we interviewed  acknowledged they lack the ability to consistently determine if the identity  presented by a license applicant is already associated with a license- holder in another state. Some existing verification systems may  accomplish this goal in limited circumstances but do not fully address the  gap. For example, officials in a number of states told us a check against  the problem driver database (Problem Driver Pointer System) will not  detect a license in another state if it is not associated with any driving  violation. Moreover, the national law enforcement data exchange system  (National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System) is cumbersome  to use if a state does not know which state an applicant may already have  a license in, and in any case is generally only available to law  enforcement personnel. Similarly, the AAMVA photo sharing program  cannot be used to detect fraud if an applicant does not present an out-of- state license to be verified, and not all states participate. Finally, facial  recognition programs generally only check a state’s own internal photo  database. They cannot detect cases when a criminal tries to obtain a  license under the identity of someone else if neither of them have a  license in the state.
Example of Cross-State Fraud  In one state an individual obtained an identification card under the identity of a person  residing in another state by successfully using identity documents belonging to that  person. The identity thief used this identification card as authorization to work. The crime  was only discovered when the victim filed an identity theft complaint with the state in which  the criminal obtained the fraudulent identification card and had been working.
States are trying to develop additional mechanisms for addressing cross- state license fraud, but none are fully operational yet. For example, a  consortium of five states is developing a state-to-state verification system  that would enable states to check if a license applicant’s identity— including name, date of birth, and a portion of the SSN—is already  associated with a license in other states. Officials in almost all the states  we interviewed said such a system would be useful. Officials in several  states said it could detect criminals who try to use the identity of someone  in one state to obtain a license in another state—provided the identity  theft victim is a license holder in the first state. However, officials in a  number of states said there would be challenges to implementing such a  system, primarily related to cost and ensuring the security of personal  data. The state consortium expects to complete its design work by 2013  and implement a pilot by 2015, but said it may not be until 2023 that the  states have entered data on all their license holders into the system.  Beyond the planned state-to-state system, some states have considered  other approaches to addressing cross-state license fraud. Officials in  several states told us cross-state facial recognition, in which states run  checks against neighboring states’ photo databases, could be a helpful  tool. However, they cited obstacles, including the much larger number of  potential matches that staff would have to examine, the technological  incompatibility of different states’ facial recognition programs, and privacy  concerns. In addition, officials in one state suggested that it would be  helpful if SSA informed states when an SSN submitted to SSOLV for  verification had already been submitted previously, because this would  alert states that someone might be fraudulently applying for licenses in  multiple states. SSA officials said developing this capacity could slow  down SSOLV response times and raise privacy concerns because SSA  would need to store SSNs submitted by states. While AAMVA’s photo  sharing program can play a role in detecting certain kinds of cross-state  fraud, the program’s usefulness is limited because fewer than half the  states currently participate, and AAMVA told us it lacks the resources to  promote use of this program among additional states.
Even with the progress reported in preventing the use of certain types of  counterfeit documents, the use of forged or improperly obtained birth  certificates remains a challenge that leaves states vulnerable to license  fraud. Officials in about half the states we interviewed said it can be  challenging to detect counterfeit birth certificates. Officials in several  states told us the wide variety of formats in which birth certificates are  issued across the country makes detecting counterfeits difficult.  According to NAPHSIS, there are thousands of different versions of birth  certificates because formats vary over time and among issuing  agencies.often sees birth certificates from another state, where security features on  birth certificates vary from county to county, and it can be difficult to keep  track of all the variations. Besides forging birth certificates, criminals may  improperly obtain someone else’s genuine birth certificate. For example,  criminals may steal or purchase the documents and use them as part of  packages of identity documents to obtain licenses fraudulently. In other  cases criminals may be able to obtain another person’s birth certificate  directly from a vital records agency. According to NAPHSIS, 15 states  have virtually no restrictions on who may obtain a birth certificate from a  vital records agency. Even in states that restrict access, there may be  limited safeguards to ensure birth certificates are only provided to those  who have a legitimate right to them. For example, officials at one vital  record agency acknowledged that local staff who issue birth certificates  do not receive fraudulent document recognition training, and a criminal  with a sophisticated fake identification document such as a driver’s  license could use it to obtain someone else’s birth certificate.
Example of Using A Forged Birth Certificate to Obtain a License Fraudulently  In one state an individual obtained a victim’s personal data and applied for a license using  a counterfeit birth certificate and counterfeit SSN documentation. This fraud was only  discovered when the alleged criminal fled an accident involving a plane carrying narcotics,  and checked into a nearby motel under the false identity.
A system exists that could help address the issue of counterfeit birth  certificates and meet the REAL ID requirement to verify birth certificates  with the issuing agency when they are submitted by license applicants,  but state officials said there are challenges with using it and no states are  currently doing so for this purpose. The Electronic Verification of Vital  Events (EVVE) system is designed to verify the accuracy of data on birth  certificates including name, date of birth, and either the date the  certificate was filed or the file number. It is operated by NAPHSIS, the  organization that represents the nation’s vital records agencies. As of  February 2012, 43 of 57 vital records agencies were participating in the  system, meaning at least some of their birth records could be  electronically verified. Licensing agencies in three states participated in  a multi-year pilot ending in 2011, in which they used the system to verify  birth certificates for license applicants. Officials in one of the pilot states  told us that, based on their experience, EVVE has the potential to help  detect counterfeit birth certificates, because while criminals may be able  to obtain another person’s name and date of birth and create a counterfeit  birth certificate, it is more difficult to obtain the correct file date on the  victim’s birth certificate—which must match to pass an EVVE check.  However, officials in this state cited challenges they experienced during  the pilot, including confusion about which date on the birth certificate is  the file date that should be entered for verification and gaps in the state’s  vital records data which make verification difficult for birth certificates filed  during certain periods of time. Similarly, officials in most of the states we  interviewed that had not participated in the pilot said it could be helpful to  use EVVE, but also expressed concerns about the cost of using the  system, the fact that not all vital records agencies are participating, and  the completeness or accuracy of the vital records data that are already  available for verification through it. As an interim solution, some licensing  agencies are working towards verifying at least their own states’ birth  records electronically. Officials in several of the licensing agencies we  interviewed have considered or are planning to start working with the vital  records agencies in their states to electronically verify birth records for  license applicants born in-state. Officials in one licensing agency told us  they have discussed this approach with the vital records agency in their  state, and see it as an interim step before EVVE is more viable. Licensing  agencies face obstacles in these efforts, though, such as birth records not  being fully in electronic format or the reluctance on the part of vital  records agencies to participate in electronic birth record verification  arrangements.
Our investigative staff exploited the vulnerabilities discussed above to  fraudulently obtain drivers’ licenses in the three states where we made  such attempts. In each state, investigative staff obtained genuine licenses  under fictitious identities—combinations of name, date of birth, and SSN  that do not correspond to any real individuals. In two states, a staff  member obtained two licenses under two different identities. In each  attempt, staff visited local license issuance branches and submitted  various counterfeit documents to establish their identities, depending on  state requirements. In all cases they submitted a counterfeit driver’s  license and a counterfeit birth certificate, both purportedly from other  states. (See figure 3 below for examples of the counterfeit birth  certificates used.) In some cases, staff also submitted other documents  including fake Social Security cards and fake pay stubs. In most of these  five attempts across the three states, we were issued permanent or  temporary licenses in about 1 hour or less. In only one case did a front- counter clerk appear to question the validity of one of the counterfeit  documents, but this clerk did not stop the issuance process. All three  states check the validity of applicants’ personal data—including SSN— through SSOLV, but assuming SSOLV checks were performed, they were  not sufficient to detect these fraud attempts because the SSNs were  valid.
These successful fraud attempts demonstrate several vulnerabilities in  states’ defenses against license fraud. First, the fact that we were able to  use counterfeit out-of-state licenses in each attempt further confirms  states’ inability to consistently check if applicants’ identities are already  associated with licenses in other states. If the envisioned state-to-state  verification system were in place, then the states where we applied might  have discovered that the out-of-state licenses we submitted were fakes  and did not actually exist. Under current plans, this system would verify  the validity of licenses submitted from other states as well as check if  applicants have licenses from other states that they have not divulged.  Even in the absence of the state-to-state system, if all states participated  in AAMVA’s photo sharing program, then the counterfeit out-of-state  licenses might have been detected through a request to the purported  state of origin of the license to validate it. We specifically selected states  for our undercover work that are not among the 23 participating in this  program. But as long as any states are not participating, criminals could  present counterfeit licenses from these states, and even participating  states would be vulnerable. The second vulnerability relates to birth  certificates. We were likely able to use counterfeit birth certificates  containing fictitious information because no state licensing agencies are  verifying birth certificate data through EVVE. None of the front-line clerks  in the offices where we applied for licenses questioned the validity of the  counterfeit birth certificates presented. Finally, the third vulnerability is  that some states are still not using facial recognition or other biometric  techniques to detect identity theft. The fact that the two states where our  staff applied for multiple licenses are among the nine states that do not  use facial recognition technology or other biometric techniques most likely  made it easier in these states for our staff to obtain two licenses under  two different identities. Facial recognition checks may be able to detect  multiple licenses associated with the same individual. While it might still  be possible for a criminal to obtain a license fraudulently even if all states  utilized a state-to-state verification system, EVVE, and facial recognition,  use of these systems would likely have increased the chances of  detecting our fraudulent license applications.
section_title: SSA and DHS Have Enhanced Verification Systems but DHS Has Not Provided Adequate Guidance on REAL ID Implementation
subsections: section_title: Agencies Have Improved Existing Systems and Helped States Develop New Verification Systems
paragraphs: SSA has taken actions that enhance licensing agencies’ ability to verify  SSNs and other personal data. Specifically, the agency has addressed  two areas of concern that we raised in 2003. First, to enhance the level  of service provided to states, SSA established performance goals,  including hours when SSOLV is to be available and response times.  Second, to address a vulnerability that might leave states open to license  fraud by criminals stealing the identity of a deceased individual, SSA now  automatically checks all inquiries against its death records.
DHS has similarly taken several actions to improve the usefulness of  SAVE. To improve data accuracy and verification rates, the agency  monitors verification rates in order to identify problems with data accuracy  in the databases SAVE accesses, which contribute to unsuccessful initial  verification attempts. Officials in several of the states we interviewed  acknowledged that DHS has been taking steps to improve verification  rates, the timeliness of query responses, and the accuracy of underlying  data, and these officials reported improvements in these areas. In  addition, DHS has recently developed a new portal for accessing and  using SAVE. Known as the Verification of Lawful Status (VLS) system, it  will be accessible through AAMVA’s electronic hub for accessing other  verification systems such as SSOLV. DHS is pilot testing VLS, with roll  out to all states planned by the end of fiscal year 2012. Officials in several  states told us they believe this new approach will make it easier for them  to use SAVE more consistently or extensively. Officials in two states, in  fact, said the deployment of VLS would enable them to start using the  system in the future. DHS has conducted webinars for licensing agency  staff on using SAVE, and it is developing online training modules that  DHS officials say will also include instruction on interpreting verification  results.
Beyond these efforts to improve existing verification systems, DHS has  provided financial assistance to support states’ efforts to develop new  verification systems that could be used to comply with the REAL ID Act.  Section 204 of the REAL ID Act authorizes grants to assist states in  conforming to the minimum standards in the Act. DHS has awarded about  $63 million through various grants since 2008 for upgrading the  communications and verification systems infrastructure including  development of the state-to-state system and pilot testing other systems.  All of these funds were awarded to a group of five states that were part of  a consortium that was formed for this purpose. At least half of the $63  million is being used by the consortium for the development and  implementation of the state-to-state system, and these funds are  available through fiscal year 2016. DHS officials said these funds are  designed in part to induce states to start using the system, but in the  longer term, the agency expects states to pay for the operation of the  system. Besides funding support, DHS has also provided technical advice  to help the states understand the federal requirements the system must  meet. In addition to the funds set aside for the state-to-state system,  some of the grants were also used to support a pilot project in which  licensing agencies verified birth certificates through EVVE. However,  based on a recommendation from the consortium, DHS does not plan to  provide any additional financial support to state licensing agencies for  further pilot testing of EVVE because of high transaction costs charged by  state vital records agencies. DHS officials are also concerned about  inaccuracies in electronic birth records that may lead to non-verifications,  and the fact that EVVE checks may still be evaded by people who obtain  someone else’s birth certificate in one of the states where birth records  are accessible to the general public.
DHS has also provided grants to individual states to help them improve  their driver’s license security procedures, including identity verification.  The Driver’s License Security Grant Program (DLSGP) provided over  $200 million in grants to states and territories from fiscal years 2008 to  2011. All but 2 states applied for and received grant funds during this  time period (see fig. 4). Initially established as the REAL ID  Demonstration Grant program, the DLSGP provides assistance to states  for improving the security and integrity of their drivers’ licenses in ways  that are consistent with the requirements of the REAL ID Act. Both states  with and without laws opposing implementation of the REAL ID Act were  eligible to apply for and received these grants. Funds could be used for  planning activities, equipment purchases, equipment maintenance and  repair, and related costs. Officials in states we interviewed said they used  their funds for efforts such as installing or updating facial recognition  systems, providing staff anti-fraud training and information sharing, and in  one case supporting efforts by the state’s vital records agency to digitize  its birth records.
DHS has conducted other activities that may help combat license fraud  generally, and officials in several of the states we interviewed told us they  were participating in these efforts. However, these efforts are broad in  nature and are not specifically designed to support compliance with the  REAL ID Act. For example, DHS operates a forensic laboratory that  investigates the use of counterfeit identity documents and is a resource  available to driver licensing agencies. DHS also leads task forces  involving federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that are  designed to combat identity document fraud, including driver’s license  fraud. These task forces seek to pursue criminal prosecutions and  financial seizures.
section_title: DHS Has Not Provided Comprehensive Guidance to Help States Implement the REAL ID Act
paragraphs: Despite the approaching January 2013 deadline for compliance, DHS has  not provided timely, comprehensive, or proactive guidance on how states  seeking REAL ID compliance could meet the identity verification  requirements. For example, DHS did not issue written guidance on how to  meet specific REAL ID Act identity verification requirements for over 4  years after it issued its final regulations in 2008. Officials in most of the  states we interviewed expressed a need for additional guidance on how  they could meet the identity verification requirements of the REAL ID Act  and DHS regulations. Because of this lack of guidance, officials in these  states said they are uncertain as to whether they will be in compliance  with various provisions when the law goes into effect, and some are  concerned about investing resources in particular steps only to find out  afterwards that they are not in compliance. For example, officials in one  state said there was a lack of clarity about whether military identification  cards may be used to prove identity under the REAL ID Act. In the  absence of formal written guidance, they have often had to make  assumptions based in part on DHS officials’ informal remarks.
The guidance DHS has provided regarding verification of license  applicants’ identities has generally been ad hoc or in response to state  requests. For example, DHS provided additional information to states in  June 2012 in the form of answers to frequently asked questions posted to   Moreover, agency officials previously indicated that DHS  its website. was planning to issue a comprehensive guidance document specifying  See http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/secure-drivers-licenses.shtm.    actions states could take to meet REAL ID Act requirements and what  states should cover in the certification plans they submit to DHS for  approval. However, DHS officials said they are now reevaluating that  decision. Agency officials said DHS will continue to provide additional  guidance as needed through the frequently asked questions web page,  presentations at conferences of state licensing agency officials, or  responses to specific questions from individual states. However, state  officials reported mixed experiences with how DHS has responded to  their specific questions. On the one hand, officials in several states said  DHS has been responsive to questions they had on meeting particular  REAL ID Act requirements. For example, officials in one state said DHS  has for the most part responded relatively quickly to e-mail inquiries. On  the other hand, however, officials in some states cited instances in which  DHS has not responded promptly, or at all, to their questions. For  example, officials in one state told us they had not received a response to  a question they first asked DHS in 2009 about whether enhanced drivers’  licenses would meet REAL ID Act requirements. Officials in another  state told us it took longer than they expected for DHS to respond to a  question about whether refugees and asylum seekers should be treated  as permanent U.S. residents when they apply for a license.
DHS guidance is especially critical for two key REAL ID Act  requirements—not issuing licenses to persons who already have them  from other states and verifying birth certificates—given that the electronic  verification systems designed for those purposes will not be fully  operational for years, and the approaching deadline for states to submit  their compliance plans. DHS regulations require states to use electronic  verification systems as they become available, but also authorize states  to use alternative methods approved by DHS.not providing comprehensive guidance specifying what alternative  procedures would be acceptable for compliance with these requirements,  DHS officials also indicated they have no plans to promote certain  strategies they consider potentially useful that might partially help states  meet these requirements, such as: (1) expansion of the AAMVA photo   However, in addition to  sharing program to additional states, and (2) expansion of licensing  agencies’ efforts to verify birth certificates through their own states’ birth  records for applicants born in-state. Instead, DHS plans to consider  alternatives states propose in their compliance plans. DHS officials said  they believe this approach gives states opportunities to develop  innovative solutions and flexibility to consider their own circumstances.  However, officials in some states we interviewed expressed a need for  direction from DHS to help identify possible alternatives. Officials in one  state we interviewed, for example, wanted assistance in identifying what  procedures could be followed to meet these requirements until the state- to-state verification system and EVVE are fully operational. Officials in  another state told us that in their view, DHS would need to provide  additional options for meeting these requirements in order for DHS to  determine states are compliant by January 2013.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, states have largely  closed off certain approaches that identity thieves and terrorists have  used to fraudulently obtain drivers’ licenses, and federal actions have  contributed to this progress by enhancing verification systems or by  providing financial support to help states develop new systems. But, as  our investigative work demonstrates, it is still possible to exploit several  remaining vulnerabilities in states’ identity verification procedures to  fraudulently obtain genuine drivers’ licenses, contrary to the purpose of  the REAL ID Act. DHS has provided some guidance about certain  aspects of REAL ID implementation primarily in response to state  questions. However, the lack of proactive guidance by DHS on interim  solutions for certain REAL ID Act requirements has hampered states’  ability to fully address these gaps. For example, even though the state-to- state system is still years from fruition, there are opportunities before the  system’s expected completion date of 2023 for states to at least partially  address the REAL ID requirement to prevent people from getting multiple  licenses from different states—and thereby close off certain paths to  cross-state fraud. But without guidance and encouragement from DHS,  states and other agencies may be less likely to coordinate in pursuit of  these opportunities. Similarly, even though EVVE is not yet fully  operational, states can still make it harder for criminals to use forged birth  certificates by, for example, checking their own birth records for license  applicants born in-state. However, without leadership from DHS, states  and other agencies may be less likely to coordinate in pursuit of these  opportunities or see the value in taking action. Additionally, in the  absence of an effective DHS strategy to help states address these REAL  ID Act requirements and high-risk vulnerabilities while the national  systems are being developed, states may elect not to comply with the  Act, may invest in ad hoc or stopgap measures that are not sufficient for  compliance, or most importantly, may be ill-equipped to adequately  combat this type of fraud.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance state driver licensing agencies’ ability to combat driver’s  license fraud, consistent with the requirements of the REAL ID Act, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following  interim actions while national systems to detect cross-state and birth  certificate fraud are being developed:  1.  Work with state, federal and other partners to develop and implement  an interim strategy for addressing cross-state license fraud. Such a  strategy could include, for example, expansion of AAMVA’s photo  sharing program or enhanced utilization of SSOLV to identify SSNs  that are queried multiple times by different states. This strategy should  include plans for sharing best practices and ideas for alternative  solutions among the states.  2.  Work with states and other partners to develop and implement an  interim strategy for addressing birth certificate fraud. Such a strategy  could include, for example, coordination between driver licensing  agencies and state vital records agencies to verify birth certificates for  license applicants born in-state.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and SSA for review and  comment. In its written comments (see app. I), DHS did not concur with  either of our recommendations, saying that interim strategies for  addressing cross-state and birth certificate fraud are not needed. The  agency said it has informed states that existing systems and procedures  may address these issues and meet regulatory requirements, and has  provided grant funds to help states develop their own new solutions. DHS  emphasized that states need the flexibility to adopt solutions that best fit  their individual circumstances. We acknowledge in our report that DHS  has supported states’ efforts to address cross-state and birth certificate  fraud in the ways it outlines in its comments. However, we continue to  believe that DHS needs to assume a more proactive role in these areas— and that it is possible to do so without being overly prescriptive. State  driver licensing agencies remain vulnerable to cross-state and birth  certificate fraud. Existing systems and methods are not sufficient to  address the vulnerabilities, as our undercover work demonstrates. Given  the anticipated date (2023) for full implementation of the state-to-state  system, and the continuing issues with driver licensing agencies’ use of  the EVVE system, states need new interim solutions and alternatives  now. And, officials in many of the states we contacted still said they are  confused about how to comply with certain REAL ID provisions, such as  those related to cross-state and birth certificate fraud, despite DHS’  efforts to provide information through conferences and responses to  individual state questions. A formal strategy for addressing these  vulnerabilities in the short term that is made available to all states in a  consistent manner would better enable states to learn about and  implement new options. Furthermore while DHS notes in its comments  that HHS has a statutory responsibility for setting minimum standards for  birth certificates, DHS involvement in this area is also critical because  establishing date of birth is a central part of the driver’s license application  process. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated  as appropriate.
In its written comments (see app. II), SSA asked that we remove from our  first recommendation the reference to enhanced utilization of SSOLV as  one option for detecting cross-state fraud. As SSA notes, we do  acknowledge in our report that there may be challenges with such use of  SSOLV. Accordingly, our recommendation does not direct DHS and SSA  to proceed with modifying SSOLV. It directs DHS to consider, in  consultation with relevant partners, the enhanced use of SSOLV as one  of a range of options for addressing cross-state fraud. We expect that  DHS and SSA would more thoroughly evaluate the potential benefits and  challenges of using SSOLV for this purpose and jointly determine whether  to include this option in an overall strategy for combating cross-state  fraud. Consequently, we made no change in response to this comment.  SSA also provided technical comments which we incorporated as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the relevant congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of  Social Security, and other interested parties. This report is also available  at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7215 or bertonid@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Staff members who made key contributions  to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Social Security Administration
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lori Rectanus, Assistant Director;  Lorin Obler; Joel Marus; Susannah Compton; John Cooney, Jr.; Sarah  Cornetto; Keira Dembowski; Holly Dye; Robert Graves; Dana Hopings;  Kristy Kennedy; Otis Martin; Mimi Nguyen; George Ogilvie; Almeta  Spencer; and Walter Vance made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: State Department: Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance Process  Remains Vulnerable to Fraud. GAO-10-922T. Washington, D.C.: July 29,  2010.
Identity Theft: Governments Have Acted to Protect Personally Identifiable  Information, but Vulnerabilities Remain. GAO-09-759T. Washington, D.C.:  June 17, 2009.
Social Security Numbers Are Widely Available in Bulk and Online  Records, but Changes to Enhance Security Are Occurring.  GAO-08-1009R. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2008.
Social Security Numbers: Use Is Widespread and Protection Could Be  Improved. GAO-07-1023T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2007.
Social Security Numbers: Federal Actions Could Further Decrease  Availability in Public Records, though Other Vulnerabilities Remain.  GAO-07-752. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2007.
Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of  Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown.  GAO-07-737. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2007.
Personal Information: Key Federal Privacy Laws Do Not Require  Information Resellers to Safeguard All Sensitive Data. GAO-06-674.  Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2006.
Social Security Numbers: Internet Resellers Provide Few Full SSNs, but  Congress Should Consider Enacting Standards for Truncating SSNs.  GAO-06-495. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
Social Security Numbers: More Could Be Done to Protect SSNs.  GAO-06-586T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Identity Theft: Some Outreach Efforts to Promote Awareness of New  Consumer Rights Are Under Way. GAO-05-710. Washington, D.C.: June  30, 2005.
Social Security Numbers: Governments Could Do More to Reduce  Display in Public Records and on Identity Cards. GAO-05-59.  Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2004.
Social Security Numbers: Improved SSN Verification and Exchange of  States’ Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification. GAO-03-920.  Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003.