Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities
Published: 2008-11-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water from Washington to Maine, the U.S.-Canadian border is the longest undefended border in the world. Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies share responsibility for northern border security, primarily U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in collaboration with other federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian entities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act of 2007 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress that addresses the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provides recommendations and required resources to address them. The act also required GAO to review and comment on this report. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1) the extent to which the DHS report to Congress is responsive to the legislative requirements and (2) actions that may be necessary to address northern border vulnerabilities in addition to the actions addressed in the report. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DHS plans, reports, and other documents, and interviewed DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to legislative requirements in providing information for improving northern border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border. DHS officials provided several reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact that the component agencies' priorities for action and resources are reflected in the existing budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or request through this report. However, budget documents do not reflect the resources needed over time to achieve control of the northern border. The lack of this information makes it difficult for Congress to consider future actions and resources needed. DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS is currently developing strategic plans that are intended to provide overall direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security. DHS officials have said that the success of various pilot projects, such as DHS's testing of new technology, will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to protect the northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to reduce vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and marine assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and deploying nuclear detection equipment--which DHS and other agencies generally agreed to take action to implement--have remained open for at least 1 year and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S.-Canadian border stands as the longest undefended border in the  world, covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water, most of which is  sparsely populated with limited law enforcement presence. Historically,  U.S. attention and resources have been focused primarily on the U.S.  border with Mexico, which continues to experience significantly higher  levels of drug trafficking and illegal immigration than the U.S-Canadian  border. However, the extensive volume of trade and travel between the  two countries, and large expanse of areas with limited law enforcement  presence, provide potential for terrorists and other criminal elements to  enter the United States undetected at or between the northern ports of  entry.
Securing the northern border is the primary responsibility of various  components within DHS, in collaboration with other federal, state, local,  tribal, and Canadian entities. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) is the frontline agency responsible for interdiction of  persons and contraband crossing the border illegally; U.S. Immigration  and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for investigating the  source of cross-border crimes and dismantling their operations; and the  U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) executes its maritime security mission on all  navigable waterways on the northern border, including the Great Lakes.
DHS submitted a report to Congress in February 2008, discussing ongoing  initiatives of these agencies to improve security along the northern border,  as required by law. Specifically, the Implementing Recommendations of  the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required the Secretary of  Homeland Security to submit a report within 180 days of enactment that  was to (1) address the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and   (2) provide recommendations to address such vulnerabilities, including  required resources needed to protect the border.
The 9/11 Act also directed us to submit to Congress, within 270 days of  DHS’s report, a report that reviews and comments on the DHS report, and  to provide recommendations regarding any additional actions necessary to  protect the northern border. In response to this mandate, we prepared  this report to answer the following key questions:    To what extent is the DHS report to Congress responsive to the  legislative requirements to report on ongoing initiatives to improve U.S.  northern border security, address the vulnerabilities along the northern  border, and provide recommendations to address these vulnerabilities  and required resources to protect the northern border?  In addition to the actions addressed in the report, what actions may be  necessary to address northern border security vulnerabilities?
In conducting our work, we reviewed the DHS report structure and  content against requirements in the 9/11 Act. We also reviewed whether  the DHS report content was complete and consistent with information  provided in its key management documents including strategic plans,  performance and accountability reports, budget requests, and other  documentation produced by relevant DHS agencies. We interviewed DHS  officials from CBP, ICE, and USCG located at headquarters and Detroit,  Michigan, who had roles and responsibilities for northern border security  to obtain their perspectives on documented information. For this reason,  we also interviewed Department of Justice (DOJ) officials with the Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has national responsibility for  drug enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which  has national responsibility for terrorism. We selected Detroit, Michigan,  among CBP’s Office of Border Patrol’s (OBP) eight northern border  sectors based on factors including relative threat and vulnerabilities,  priority for resources, and demonstration site for new technology. Our  observations from the Detroit sector cannot be generalized across the  other seven sectors; however, we believe that they were sufficient for the  purposes of this report in comparing the headquarters and field  perspective. While in Detroit, we also spoke with state and Canadian  officials involved in northern border security to obtain their perspectives  on northern border security threats and vulnerabilities, DHS actions to  address them, and the effectiveness of binational and national  partnerships. To determine actions that could help address northern  border security vulnerabilities, we reviewed whether the information  reported by DHS reflected a strategic risk–informed approach as required  in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential  Directive 7 (HSPD-7). We also identified report recommendations for  strengthening national border security from past GAO evaluations from  fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that when fully implemented have potential  to help address northern border vulnerabilities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through November  2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United States shares nearly 4,000 miles of border with Canada  stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts, and the U.S.-Canadian  border is considered to be the world’s longest open border between two  nations. There is a great deal of trade and travel across this border, and  approximately 90 percent of Canada’s population lives within 100 miles of  the U.S. border. While legal trade is predominant, DHS reports networks of  illicit criminal activity and smuggling of drugs, currency, people, and  weapons between the two countries. Annually, CBP reports making  approximately 4,000 arrests and interdicts approximately 40,000 pounds of  illegal drugs at and between the northern border ports of entry.  Historically, these numbers have been significantly lower than those of the  southwest border; however, DHS reports that the terrorist threat on the  northern border is higher, given the large expanse of area with limited law  enforcement coverage.
DHS agencies are charged with protecting the nation and its citizens from  threats of terrorism, as shown in table 1. CBP is the lead federal agency in  charge of securing our nation’s borders, and has three components with a  mission to interdict illegal contraband and persons seeking to enter  illegally at and between the land ports of entry. Two other DHS agencies,  ICE and USCG, also have key roles. The ICE mission includes investigating  and dismantling criminal organizations that transport persons and goods  across the border illegally, while USCG executes its maritime security  mission by providing patrol presence and operational response for all  navigable waterways on the northern border, including the Great Lakes.
DHS agencies leverage their border security efforts through partnerships  with state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement agencies to share  intelligence, information, and conduct joint operations for interdiction and  investigation of cross-border crime. DHS considers these collaborative  efforts particularly important for the northern border in remote, sparsely  populated areas.
There has been growing concern within Congress over the number of  personnel assigned to the northern border, the increasing amount of illegal  activity, and the potential for terrorists to gain unlawful entry into the  United States. There has also been concern with respect to the adequacy  of facilities and physical infrastructure to accommodate the increasing  volume of traffic. Congress has shown increasing interest in issues  surrounding security of the northern border—first authorizing, and later  directing—resource allocations to the northern border for personnel and  improved technology. Congress has also established various reporting  requirements in laws that are to provide updates on the status of northern  border security. In addition to the 9/11 Act, for example, the Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 2008, directs DHS to prepare and submit a biennial  National Land Border Security Plan. This plan is to include a vulnerability,  risk, and threat assessment of each port of entry located on the northern  border or the southern border, beginning in January 2009.
The DHS report—issued to Congress on February 29, 2008—was overseen  and facilitated by CBP’s Office of the Executive Secretariat (OES). OES  was formed in August 2007 to assign responsibilities for and coordinate  the development of all CBP congressional reports, correspondence, and  external requests for information. OES tasked the CBP Office for Secure  Border Initiative with taking the lead in coordinating information  gathering from the relevant CBP components. OES also received input  from ICE and USCG in formulating the report. The information from these  sources was compiled and reviewed within CBP, DHS, and the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) before submission to Congress.
section_title: DHS Report Is Not Fully Responsive to Congress in Providing Information for Improving Northern Border Security
paragraphs: While the DHS report to Congress discusses northern border  vulnerabilities and ongoing initiatives in place as required in law,  information is missing that identifies the extent that various vulnerabilities  remain unaddressed, and recommendations and resources to address  these security gaps. Without this information, it is difficult for Congress to  consider future actions and resources needed on the northern border in  the broader context of national security.
subsections: section_title: The DHS Report Discusses Vulnerabilities and Initiatives Reflected in Key Management Documents, but Does Not Link This Information to Identify Security Gaps
paragraphs: The DHS report to Congress discusses northern border vulnerabilities and  ongoing initiatives to improve northern border security consistent with the  content of its planning, performance, and budget documents, but DHS  does not link this information to show the extent that security gaps remain  on the northern border. The DHS report states that the northern border is  vulnerable to the primary threats of terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal  immigration. These facts were consistently supported by threat  information obtained from Canadian officials, and officials from DHS and  CBP. According to these sources, northern border vulnerabilities are  most actively exploited to smuggle illegal drugs and contraband; illegal  immigration is a lesser problem. While DHS reports significant concern  that terrorists can enter the United States undetected at or between the  northern ports of entry, U.S. and Canadian officials agree that there is  currently no credible intelligence or evidence indicating that there are  terrorists in Canada planning an attack on U.S. soil.
The DHS report lists initiatives its component agencies have underway to  address vulnerabilities and achieve operational control of the border but  does not mention progress made in this regard, or how many border miles  are under operational control. CBP reports on these indicators—border  miles under effective (or operational) control, and border miles with  increased situational awareness—as two of its key performance measures  and reports that it plans to increase and achieve control of the northern  border by deploying a proper mix of personnel, technology, facilities, and  partnerships at and between the ports of entry. While the DHS report lists  initiatives in each of these areas, they are not linked to the reported  vulnerabilities, and the extent that these initiatives mitigate or eliminate  vulnerabilities at and between the ports of entry is not mentioned. Also not  mentioned in the report is the timeline DHS is using to request and deploy  resources necessary to increase the levels of control of the northern  border. The absence of such information makes it difficult for Congress to  consider future action and resources needed on the northern border in the  context of other areas of national security.
subsections: section_title: Personnel
paragraphs: In terms of personnel, DHS lists ongoing initiatives for adequately staffing  the northern ports of entry, and hiring initiatives to increase staffing  between the ports of entry by 2010. For the ports of entry, DHS describes  its implementation of a workload staffing model that considers workload  and processing times to help identify the number of personnel that should  be deployed at each location, which has resulted in the deployment of 190  CBP officers. Between the ports of entry, DHS does not provide its  methodology for identifying adequate staffing, but does describe initiatives  to more than double the number of border patrol agents from fiscal years  2007 to 2010, in response to direction from Congress. It is unclear,  however, to what extent these staffing initiatives will result in obtaining  effective control of the border. For example, the report states that 190  CBP officers have been deployed to ports of entry as indicated in part by  the workload staffing model; however, DHS reports in its strategic plan for  fiscal years 2008-2013 that additional CBP officers are needed at many  ports of entry. Similarly, while DHS reports a commitment to meet  statutory staffing goals between the ports of entry by the year 2010, OBP  officials indicated that a greater number of agents would be needed to gain  operational control of the northern border.
section_title: Technology
paragraphs: In discussing technology initiatives, CBP reports that technology has been  employed at the northern ports of entry to address a number of  vulnerabilities, but between the ports of entry, discussion is focused on  pilot projects intended to test capabilities for potential use on the northern  border. At the ports of entry, CBP reports that much technology is in place  to address vulnerabilities related to the transport of illegal radiological and  nuclear materials, illegal contraband, and misrepresentation of identity  through the use of fraudulent documents. Between the ports of entry, pilot  projects address vulnerabilities related to the inability to detect low-flying  aircraft; the inability to detect unauthorized border crossings in areas  without law enforcement patrol; and to share communications. The report  does not discuss when the results of the projects will be available or the  extent that DHS would use these technologies, if successful, to address  existing vulnerabilities. DHS also does not discuss initiatives to address  the vulnerabilities cited in the report related to maritime security, such as  the lack of video capabilities in marinas, unregulated access that small  private vessels have on the Great Lakes and other border waterways, and  insufficient resources to access boats on the open water. Subsequent to  the report issued to Congress, DHS provided a thorough discussion of the  vulnerabilities and challenges in addressing these aspects of maritime  security in the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, issued April 2008.  USCG stated that an implementation plan would be finalized at the end of  December 2008, to guide agency actions in implementing the strategy, but  this plan would not be released to the public due to its security  classification.
section_title: Facilities
paragraphs: In discussing facilities, the DHS report describes ongoing initiatives to  systematically review the port of entry inspection facilities to identify the  need for upgrade or replacement, and to develop a new standard station  concept to accommodate the growth in number of border agents between  the ports of entry. The report describes the age and condition of some  facilities and volume of traffic and use. However, while the DHS strategic  plan states that the department’s secure border program depends  significantly on modernizing the ports of entry, there is no discussion in  the report to Congress on the status of these efforts, when they will be  completed, and how they currently affect northern border security.
section_title: Partnerships
paragraphs: The DHS report lists various initiatives underway that establish binational  partnerships or partnerships among U.S. federal, state, and local agencies  to share information and improve communication and cooperation among  agencies working along the border. Five binational partnerships were  discussed, four with a broad focus on cross-border law enforcement  efforts, and one with a specific focus on preventing illegal air incursions.  Six U.S. partnerships were also mentioned, one specific to smuggling on  Indian reservations, two related to drug trafficking, two related to  intelligence gathering, and one related to augmenting enforcement  capacity by cross-designating federal authority to other agencies. DHS  and CBP management documents support the report’s discussion of these  partnerships as a key strategy for northern border security; however, there  is no discussion of the extent that these partnerships were responsible for  increasing the level of control across the border or how they will do so in  the future.
section_title: DHS Report Does Not Provide Recommendations or Resource Requirements to Improve Northern Border Security
paragraphs: The DHS report contains a section for recommendations to address  northern border vulnerabilities, but the information provided is a  restatement of initiatives in place without mention of recommendations  for further action or additional resources as required by law. Officials from  DHS component agencies provided several reasons this information was  missing from the report. One reason was that the Secure Border Initiative  (SBI) office—which was tasked with coordinating component agency  contributions to the report—directed them to discuss their resource needs  in terms of the existing budget; therefore, they did not discuss actions or  resource requirements for future years. A second reason was that some  components were satisfied with their current budget allocation. CBP  officials stated that they supported the President’s budget and had nothing  further to recommend or request in the report to Congress. A third reason  is that some components did not have the information necessary to  identify recommendations or additional resources. USCG officials  indicated that the lack of departmentwide strategic direction for the  northern border has made it difficult to identify specific resource needs.  Similarly, ICE officials said that information was lacking to compare and  assess overall resources devoted across various northern border agencies,  initiatives, and border locations.
section_title: DHS Is Taking Action to Improve Northern Border Security, and Implementing Past GAO Recommendations Would Also Provide Benefit
paragraphs: DHS is developing strategic plans, a risk-management process, and new  initiatives that could change the level and mix of resources needed to  protect the northern border; however, most efforts were incomplete and  unavailable for our review. Over the years, we have conducted evaluations  of various border security activities and our reports included a number of  recommendations for improvement. DHS action to fully implement these  recommendations would provide benefit in addressing northern border  vulnerabilities.
subsections: section_title: DHS Is Developing Strategic Plans and a Risk- Management Process
paragraphs: DHS and CBP have reported the need to provide a coherent framework to  coordinate federal, state, local, and tribal northern border security efforts,  and are developing northern border strategic plans, as well as a risk- management process to further these goals. Completion of these efforts  should provide DHS with useful information in developing future reports  to Congress on northern border security.
DHS has completed, or begun efforts to develop, three strategic plans that  will help address vulnerabilities on the northern border. Strategic plans  help ensure that missions requiring a multiagency response are firmly  aligned with articulated goals and objectives, and help keep agencies  focused on the desired “end state.” While DHS has developed a broad  strategic plan to outline the department’s overall mission and objectives, it  has begun to focus on the need to develop coordinated and unified  strategies to address more specific concerns, such as northern border  security. A key effort under development is an overall northern border  strategic plan that will, for the first time, take all DHS component agencies  into account in efforts to address vulnerabilities necessary for control of  the northern border. CBP did not indicate when this plan may be  completed. A second strategic plan under development will address  security vulnerabilities in the air environment, such as the inability to  detect low-flying aircraft. CBP officials stated that they were working on  performance measures for this plan, and estimate that it will be released in  April 2009. DHS issued its third strategic plan, the Small Vessel Security  Strategy, in April 2008 to help close existing maritime security gaps on  waterways such as the Great Lakes, related to the small vessel  environment.
To help component agencies achieve the major goals outlined in each of  these strategic plans, DHS plans to develop implementation plans that are  to describe specific actions component agencies will take in support of  each objective, identify lead component agencies for these actions, and  provide target completion dates. USCG has stated that the implementation  plan for the small vessel strategic plan is scheduled to be issued for use by  component agencies at the end of December 2009, but will be considered  security sensitive. Dates are not yet available for implementation plans to  follow the remaining two strategic plans.
Some DHS component agencies have acted to incorporate risk- management principles that provide information to prioritize and allocate  resources for their individual programs and activities as required by law  and presidential directive, but DHS has not yet completed efforts to  implement this approach departmentwide. Risk management is important  for strengthening homeland security resource allocations, as the nation  cannot afford to fully protect against every type of threat. Therefore, an  approach is needed that considers how best to allocate resources based on  factors such as probability and adverse consequence. The DHS goal is to  develop a risk-management process that will assess risk and inform  strategic planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes  across all of its component agencies and that will evaluate the risk- reduction effects among relevant DHS programs. However, achieving this  goal has been difficult. While risk management has been used in the  private and public sectors for decades, its application for homeland  security and combating terrorism is relatively new and without a  precedent framework. As such, the effort to assess risk across DHS  component agencies and programs is still in its very early stages of  development.
section_title: Future DHS Action to Improve Northern Border Security Is Influenced by Success of Pilot Projects, Partnerships, and External Factors
paragraphs: DHS component agencies have identified resources to increase and  achieve northern border security, but the need for these resources  constantly evolves in response to various factors. For example, the DHS  report described many pilot projects for new technology. If successful,  OBP officials report that these projects could reduce security  vulnerabilities and current needs for other resources, such as existing  technology, personnel, or infrastructure. However, these officials also  indicate that new technology must be fully tested for operational  effectiveness, and delays coupled with uncertainties of success have made  it difficult to balance future resource investments in new technology with  current investments in existing technology. Such balance is necessary to  ensure security as well as effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
Similarly, DHS officials discussed partnerships among federal, state, and  local agencies to coordinate information and operations—either newly  created or still in development—that could result in greater efficiencies in  border security. However, time will tell if these partnerships are  sustainable and warrant a decrease or change in current estimated needs  for personnel.
External factors—such as the interplay among private parties,  governments, and agencies—also influence actions in addressing security  vulnerabilities. In Detroit, for example, CBP officials said that action to  improve facilities at northern ports of entry was stymied by private  ownership of property and landlocked facilities. In addition, the Small  Vessel Security Strategy indicates that efforts to address maritime  vulnerabilities were challenged by different practices or views among  federal, state, and Canadian governments in balancing security needs with  the freedom of the waterways expected by the small-vessel community.  Further, ICE officials said that the scope of their authority in pursuing  narcotics investigations influenced their actions in addressing some cross- border crimes.
section_title: DHS Action to Implement Past GAO Recommendations Would Strengthen Northern Border Security
paragraphs: DHS has an opportunity to address some northern border vulnerabilities  by fully implementing recommendations made in past evaluations of its  security efforts. Over the past few years, we have conducted evaluations  and issued a number of reports related to the security of the U.S. border  both at and between ports of entry (see Related GAO Products section at  end of this report). In some instances, our reports included  recommendations addressing vulnerabilities in border security—including  the northern border—while in other cases, our reports and  recommendations were more general, but when implemented, would  provide benefit to the northern border.
We reviewed recommendations resulting from GAO evaluations conducted  from fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and identified 11 reports containing 50  recommendations that had potential to address vulnerabilities in border  security, or to address weaknesses in key initiatives. At the time of our  review, DHS had implemented 11 of these 50 recommendations. For  example, DHS implemented a recommendation to formalize a  performance measure for the traveler inspection program that would help  agency management and Congress monitor effectiveness in apprehending  inadmissible aliens and other violators.
However, 39 recommendations from the 11 GAO reports are still open. In  some cases, recommendations were open because DHS and other federal  agencies had not yet had time to implement them. For example, 18 of the  39 open recommendations were from GAO reports issued within the last  fiscal year. In regard to the remaining 21 recommendations, DHS and other  agencies agreed to take action, but at least 1 and, in some cases, over 3  years have passed without full implementation. Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government state that agencies are to ensure that  findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. The time  necessary to resolve recommendations varies depending on the type of  action required. However, DHS does not have a transparent process to  show how long it will take to implement each recommendation  considering the resources, risk level, and complexity of effort required.  Timely implementation of recommendations would help address  vulnerabilities related to a variety of border security initiatives. Some of  the older recommendations that have not been fully implemented include  those to improve screening of travelers at ports of entry to ensure legal  entry, preclude cross-border transport of illicit nuclear materials, reduce  risks in delivering key technology for border surveillance and for  information sharing, and increase information sharing and coordination  among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as shown in  table 2 and appendix I. We believe that these outstanding  recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Federal agency reporting requirements, such as those contained in the 9/11  Act, can provide Congress with important information for debating policy  and allocating scarce resources, and the level of agency responsiveness  can either support or hinder these efforts. While the DHS report to  Congress provided information on the status of its efforts, there is little  sense of the relative effect these efforts have had in protecting the  northern border, and what additional action or resources may be needed  in the future. Requirements in law to periodically assess the status of  northern border security provide DHS with additional opportunity to  highlight information that can best meet congressional needs.
Completion of DHS efforts to develop a northern border strategic plan and  risk management process to prioritize action and funding could lead to  better understanding among DHS, its component agencies, and Congress  in determining whether resources are most effectively allocated across  initiatives, border locations, and responsible agencies. However, balancing  current and future funding for border security will remain challenging as  the resource needs for the northern border will continue to evolve in  response to the relative success of new initiatives. In the meantime,  implementing recommendations for improving border security in a more  timely fashion would help reduce the nation’s risk due to unaddressed  vulnerabilities.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide Congress with information that will facilitate policy  discussions and resource decisions for northern border security, we  recommend that for future reporting requirements the Secretary of  Homeland Security include more specific information on the actions,  resources, and time frame needed to improve security of the northern  border along with any attendant uncertainties, and the basis used to  prioritize action and resources for northern border security relative to  other areas of national security.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of  Homeland Security and Attorney General.  In its response, DHS and CBP  agreed with our recommendation and stated that CBP will work with the  department to implement it through the approved budget process.  DOJ  did not provide formal comments.
In its comments, DHS stated that our report said DHS and other agencies  should proceed to adopt and address all of the recommendations from  previous reports without any assessment of priority based on risk. Our  intent in discussing these recommendations was to point out potential  security vulnerabilities that exist, not to imply that all of these  recommendations were of equal importance, or that risk-based  prioritization should not be applied when addressing them.  GAO has  advocated the use of risk management principles, and using them to  sequence actions on open recommendations would seem to be  appropriate. We have added language to clarify that while the definition of  timely implementation will vary across recommendations, DHS lacks a  transparent process to show how long it will take to implement each  recommendation considering the resources, risk level, and complexity of  effort required.
DHS’s comments are reprinted in appendix II.  DHS and DOJ also offered  technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where  appropriate.
We are providing copies of this report to the Senate and House committees  that have authorization and oversight responsibilities for homeland  security.  We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition,  this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8777, or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations from GAO on Various Border Security Issues
paragraphs: In the past, GAO has offered numerous recommendations to the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) related to border security.  Although previous recommendations are not specific to the northern  border, many touch on different aspects that do affect various elements of  northern border security. Many recommendations made by GAO  concerning general border security, nuclear security, technology, and  interagency cooperation and information sharing, have yet to be  implemented by DHS. Fully implementing these recommendations could  provide great benefits to DHS and the nation in terms of strengthening  general border security, and by extension, security of the northern border.  Tables 3 through 6 detail 39 selected open recommendations related to  border security vulnerabilities.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant Director,  and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. David  Holt made significant contributions to the work. Amanda Miller and  Michele Fejfar assisted with design, methodology, and data analysis. Linda  Miller provided assistance in report preparation; and Frances Cook  provided legal support.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in  Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1086. Washington, D.C.:  September 22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. GAO- 08-1141T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.
Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management  Principles in Homeland Security. GAO-08-904T. Washington, D.C.: June  25, 2008.
Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better  Track and Detect Radioactive Materials. GAO-08-598. Washington, D.C.:  June 19, 2008.
Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for  the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007. GAO-08-757. Washington,  D.C.: May 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border  Security Program and Operations, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-542T.  Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections  Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.:  January 3, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections  Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-219. Washington, D.C.:  November 5, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet  Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: October 24,  2007.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance  Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening  Processes, and Expand Use of the List. GAO-08-110. Washington, D.C.:  October 11, 2007.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections  Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-123SU. Washington, D.C.:  October 5, 2007, SBU.
Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and  Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations. GAO-07-884T. Washington, D.C.:  September 27, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure  Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.  GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but  More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use. GAO-07-1006.  Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007.
Border Security: Long-term Strategy Needed to Keep Pace with  Increasing Demand for Visas. GAO-07-847. Washington, D.C.: July 13,  2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-378T.  Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248.  Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-56SU.  Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006 SBU.
Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at  24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies. GAO-07-89.  Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-1090T. Washington, D.C.: September  7, 2006.
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the  United States. GAO-06-976T. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. March 22, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. December 15, 2005.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and  Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. August 12, 2005.