Humanitarian Assistance: Status of North Korean Refugee Resettlement and Asylum in the United States
Published: 2010-06-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Famine killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in the 1990s and compelled a large number of others to leave in search of food, economic opportunities, and escape from a repressive regime. This migration continues. Some North Koreans seek resettlement in other countries, such as South Korea and the United States. To promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North Korean refugees, Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004. In reauthorizing the Act in 2008, Congress found that delays in processing North Korean refugees have led refugees to abandon their quest for U.S. resettlement. GAO was asked to (1) assess the U.S. government's efforts to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees who request resettlement in the United States from overseas, and (2) determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so. GAO is issuing a separate classified annex to this report. GAO analyzed data on North Korean refugees and asylees, interviewed agency officials, and conducted fieldwork in Asia. This report does not contain recommendations. The Departments of State (State), Homeland Security, and Justice provided technical comments and GAO incorporated these comments, as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The U.S. government has taken actions to facilitate the U.S. resettlement of North Korean refugees from overseas, but processing times did not improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008 due in part to some host countries' policies. The United States opened cases for 238 North Korean refugee applicants from October 2004 through March 2010, and 94 of these North Koreans arrived in the United States. As part of its recent actions to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees, State has placed a high priority on these cases and provided additional staff time and resources to process these cases. However, according to U.S. officials, some U.S. requirements, such as conducting and clearing security checks, can delay U.S. processing. According to officials from the U.S. government and international organizations, the policies of some host countries also can affect U.S. processing of North Korean refugees. For example, some host countries delay granting North Korean refugees permission to leave their countries. Average processing times for North Koreans did not improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, the most recent year for which complete data were available. State officials said that one host country limited U.S. government access to North Koreans in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, resulting in longer average processing times for cases created in those years. While processing times for North Koreans were lower in fiscal year 2006 than those of some other refugee populations, the processing times were generally comparable in fiscal year 2008. From October 1, 2004, through March 2, 2010, at least 33 North Koreans have sought asylum protection to remain in the United States, but the actual number is likely higher. Of the 33 North Koreans, 9 individuals have been granted asylum, 15 are still pending, and 9 are categorized as "other decisions," meaning their cases have been denied, dismissed, or withdrawn, according to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) data. The actual number of individuals is likely higher for several reasons including agencies' difficulties in compiling information. North Koreans can seek asylum protection through two processes--the affirmative or the defensive. In the affirmative process, individuals who are physically in the United States may present an asylum application to USCIS and undergo a non-adversarial interview to determine their eligibility for asylum. In the defensive process, applicants request that the Department of Justice grant them asylum as a defense against removal from the United States. USCIS data do not include information on North Koreans who first claimed asylum before an Immigration Judge in the defensive process.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Famine killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in the 1990s and  compelled a large number of others to leave in search of food, economic  opportunities, and escape from a repressive regime with a history of  human rights abuses. This migration continues up to this day. The  estimated number of North Koreans outside of the country has ranged  from the thousands to the hundreds of thousands at any given time,  according to nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and scholars. Some of  the North Koreans who have escaped from North Korea desire to seek  resettlement in other countries, such as the Republic of Korea (known as  South Korea) and the United States, where they may be eligible for  resettlement benefits. North Korean refugees often face difficult and  dangerous journeys transiting to countries where they can seek  resettlement. Along the way, they are vulnerable to forced repatriation,  human trafficking, and lack of protection from the countries they transit  through. North Koreans face various economic, linguistic, social, medical,  and other challenges when resettling in the United States and South Korea.  However, some North Koreans have overcome these challenges and  achieved accomplishments such as obtaining higher educational degrees.
To promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North  Korean refugees, Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act  (NKHRA) in 2004. This act    Authorized, in addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes, up  to $20 million for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2012 to provide  assistance to support organizations or persons that provide humanitarian  assistance to North Koreans who are outside of North Korea without the  permission of the North Korean government. These include refugees,  defectors, migrants, orphans, and victims of human trafficking. The act  defined humanitarian assistance as assistance to meet humanitarian  needs, including, needs for food, medicine, medicinal supplies, clothing,  and shelter. (See classified annex for details on the Department of State’s  (State) humanitarian assistance to North Koreans outside of North  Korea.)
Clarified that North Koreans are not barred from eligibility for refugee  status or asylum in the United States on account of any legal right to  citizenship that they may enjoy under the South Korean constitution.  According to State, historically the United Nations High Commissioner for   Refugees (UNHCR) and the international community, including the United  States, have viewed South Korea as the resettlement country of choice.
Instructed the Secretary of State to facilitate the submission of  applications for admission of North Koreans seeking protection as  refugees. Prior to 2004, the United States had not resettled any North  Korean refugees in the United States.
In reauthorizing the NKHRA in 2008, Congress found that few North  Korean refugees had resettled in the United States as opposed to South  Korea from 2004 to 2007, and extensive delays in assessing and  processing the applications of North Korean refugees for resettlement in  the United States had led refugees to abandon their quest for resettlement  in the United States. In addition, Congress found that the number of North  Koreans to whom the United States had granted asylum was fewer than  the number of North Koreans who had been granted asylum in other  countries. Based on your request, we (1) assessed the U.S. government’s  efforts to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees who request  resettlement in the United States from overseas, and (2) determined the  number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the United  States and the process by which they may do so. We are also issuing a  separate classified annex that provides additional information pertaining  to North Korean refugees.
To assess how the U.S. government processes North Korean refugees, we  reviewed documents from State and the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) related to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). We also  interviewed officials from State, DHS, and international organizations in  Washington, D.C. and Asia as well as the regional Overseas Processing  Entity (OPE) that processes refugee applications to understand the  various steps in overseas and domestic refugee processing. We also  analyzed data from State’s Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing  System (WRAPS) to determine the processing times for North Korean  refugees. We calculated the processing times for North Korean cases  created between fiscal years 2006 and 2008 to show the total number of  days between case creation and arrival in the United States. We do not  include cases created in fiscal year 2009 because all the refugees have not  arrived in the United States and thus the data are not complete. In  addition, we calculated the processing times for North Korean cases  created between fiscal years 2006 and 2009 to show the total number of  days between case creation and DHS approval, which occurs before a  refugee arrives in the United States, because the data are complete  through this step. To determine the number of North Koreans who have  sought asylum to remain in the United States and the process by which  they may do so, we reviewed documentation and data from U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS and from the Executive Office for  Immigration Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice (DOJ). We  also interviewed officials from these agencies and reviewed relevant  statutes. We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to June  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a  detailed description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Estimates of the North Korean Population Outside of North Korea Vary
paragraphs: Estimates of the numbers of North Koreans outside of North Korea have  varied widely over the past decade, according to NGOs and scholars.  Estimates have ranged from 6,000 to over 300,000, depending on the  source of the data and the time period in which the data were collected.  Scholars and NGOs said that a number of factors can contribute to the  variance in the estimates, including the following:    Some countries in the region limit access to the North Korean  population, thereby preventing NGOs, international organizations, and  scholars from collecting comprehensive data. The UNHCR, the UN agency  dedicated to the protection of refugees, has little access to North Korean  refugees, according to UNHCR officials.
Methodological variances among NGOs and scholars in accounting for  the numbers of North Korean refugees. In part because methodologies are  not readily shared among those who collect data, estimates on the higher  side could include North Koreans on the border who have been double- counted because of the two-way flow of migration across the border for  economic purposes of finding work, according to scholars. Conversely,  scholars also said that some estimates might not include those North  Koreans who transit through the region fairly quickly on their way to third  countries for resettlement (see fig. 1).
Difficulty obtaining comprehensive information on the estimates.
Scholars told us that because of the political sensitivities surrounding the  North Korean population outside of North Korea, those collecting data on  the population are hesitant to share their data for fear they will reveal their  sources or compromise their operations in country. One scholar stated  that it would be helpful if information on estimates of North Koreans in  the region could be shared among those collecting the data so that  methodological approaches could be critiqued.
NGOs and scholars told us that, within the last couple of years, the flow of  North Koreans out of North Korea has slowed due to the tightening of the  border and stricter scrutiny of North Korean migrants. One recent  estimate noted that the current number of North Koreans in the region  might be between 6,000 and 16,000 at any given time. Despite the  tightening of the borders, NGOs and scholars pointed out that North  Koreans are still transiting through Asia to seek resettlement in other  countries.
section_title: Composition of North Koreans Resettling in South Korea Has Changed over Time
paragraphs: According to NGOs and South Korean officials, the composition of North  Koreans who have resettled in South Korea has changed over the past  decade. While the ratio of male and female North Koreans arriving in  South Korea in the early 2000s was closer to equal, South Korean data  show that the number of female refugees has steadily increased, with 77  percent of the total number of refugees entering South Korea for  resettlement being female in 2009. In addition, some of the more recent  North Korean arrivals tend to be family members of those North Koreans  who are already in South Korea. South Korean data indicate that 75  percent of North Koreans who arrived in South Korea recently range in  age from 20 years to 40 years.
section_title: Various Entities Are Involved in the Processing and Resettlement of Refugees
paragraphs: The USRAP processes refugee applications for resettlement in the United  States through an interagency effort involving a number of governmental  and nongovernmental entities overseas and in the United States. Table 1  provides a description of these entities and their role in the USRAP  process.
USRAP’s steps for processing North Korean refugees who have arrived in  the United States for U.S. resettlement are shown in figure 2.
We provide further explanation of certain steps in the USRAP process  below.
Case creation. North Koreans generally request consideration as refugees  from a U.S. embassy or from UNHCR. Under the USRAP, a U.S. embassy  submits a P-1 referral to State/PRM in Washington, D.C., and the  DHS/USCIS Refugee Affairs Division in Washington, D.C., and they must  concur in the granting of the USRAP access to the refugee applicant. After  this concurrence, State requests or authorizes the OPE to create the case  in the State’s WRAPS database. At this point, the refugee applicant begins  the process for consideration for admission to the USRAP.
Security checks. Once the OPE prescreening interview is completed, the  OPE requests that U.S. government agencies conduct the required security  checks.
DHS approval. After the prescreening interview and usually after the  security checks have been cleared, DHS/USCIS officers interview the  refugee applicants and make a recommendation of either “approve,”  “hold,” or “deny” for the case. The USCIS District Director or Deputy  District Director must then review and agree with all recommendations  before the case decision can be finalized. DHS/USCIS will not finalize  approval for a case until all security checks have cleared. Once required  security checks and medical screening are complete, and DHS/USCIS has  determined that the refugee applicant is eligible for resettlement to the  United States, the OPE confirms the resettlement location.
Exit permission. After the United States has approved the refugee for  resettlement and after the individual is ready to travel, the U.S. embassy or  UNHCR requests exit permission from the government of the country  where the refugee is being processed. According to U.S. officials involved  in the processing of these cases, the exit permission process often entails  ongoing communications with that government and can take several  months.
Arrival in the United States. Upon arrival in the United States, U.S.  resettlement agencies and HHS provide eligible refugees with services and  assistance, as noted in table 1.
section_title: Although the U.S. Government Has Taken Actions to Facilitate U.S. Resettlement of North Korean Refugees, Processing Times Did Not Improve
paragraphs: The USRAP opened cases for 238 North Korean refugee applicants from  fiscal years 2005 to 2010, as of March 29, 2010. During this time period, the  U.S. government, particularly State, took actions to facilitate the  processing of North Korean refugees. However, the policies of some host  countries affect U.S. processing times for North Korean refugees. From  fiscal years 2006 to 2008, the most current year for which complete data  were available, U.S. processing times did not improve. In addition, while  processing times for North Koreans were lower in fiscal year 2006 than  those of some other refugee populations, processing times were generally  comparable in fiscal year 2008.
subsections: section_title: The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program Processed North Korean Refugee Cases from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2010
paragraphs: The USRAP processed a total of 238 North Korean refugee applicant  cases from fiscal years 2005 to 2010, as of March 29, 2010. During this  time period, 94 of these individuals arrived in the United States, 107  withdrew their applications, 18 were rejected or denied, and 5 individual  cases were closed. In addition, 14 individuals were pending, including 9  that were on hold awaiting medical or other clearances. Figure 3 shows  the status of North Korean refugee cases.
According to State, many North Koreans withdrew their applications when  they realized that (1) they would be found ineligible for consideration  because they had already been firmly resettled in South Korea or (2)  resettlement in South Korea was faster and entailed fewer requirements  than U.S. resettlement.
All of the pending cases were created in fiscal years 2009 or 2010. These  include active cases, some of which are awaiting exit permission, as well  as cases that were put on hold. Cases may be on hold because they are  awaiting medical clearance or clearance for other required security  checks. According to U.S. and IOM officials, some North Korean  applicants were required to complete medical treatment for tuberculosis,  for which the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention requires 6  to 9 months of treatment before the U.S. government grants medical  clearance and permission to travel to the United States.
section_title: The U.S. Government Has Taken Actions to Facilitate the U.S. Resettlement Process for North Korean Refugees
paragraphs: The U.S. government, particularly State, has taken actions to facilitate the  U.S. resettlement process for North Korean refugees by placing a high  priority on North Korean cases and providing additional resources to  process these cases.
subsections: section_title: The U.S. Government Places a High Priority on the Processing of North Korean Cases
paragraphs: In response to the NKHRA, the U.S. government places a high priority on  the overseas processing of North Korean refugee cases, specifically the  processing stages involving OPE prescreening, security checks,  DHS/USCIS interviews, and U.S. resettlement agencies.
OPE prescreening. State has directed the OPE to prioritize the  prescreening interviews of all North Korean cases at the start of the  process. To do so, the OPE schedules and conducts the prescreening  interview for North Korean cases before all other refugee cases on its list,  according to OPE officials.
Security checks. State has prioritized the security checks for some North  Korean cases. State/PRM told us they usually expedite the security checks  for some North Korean cases that have been pending for more than 2 or 3  months. Conducting and clearing security checks involve a number of  federal agencies, and this stage in USRAP can create delays in U.S.  processing times, according to U.S. officials.
DHS/USCIS interviews. State and DHS/USCIS prioritize North Korean  cases by scheduling USCIS adjudication interviews with them before other  refugee cases. According to DHS/USCIS officials, doing so can save a  month or more in overall processing time. In addition, to expedite some  North Korean cases that are urgent or of humanitarian concern,  DHS/USCIS may conduct interviews before the security checks are  cleared, whereas the standard protocol for most refugee populations is to  conduct the USCIS interview afterwards.
U.S. resettlement agencies’ assurance. A final part of the process that  State has prioritized is finding and confirming the resettlement location  and resettlement agency support for North Korean refugees who will  soon arrive in the United States. For North Korean cases, State/PRM  requests that U.S. resettlement agencies confirm the location and support  upon arrival within 1 week, whereas this confirmation can take up to 4  weeks for other refugee populations, according to State/PRM.
section_title: The U.S. Government Provides Additional Staff Time and Resources to Process North Korean Refugees
paragraphs: The U.S. government provides additional resources to process North  Korean refugee applicant cases. A State/PRM official told us that, overall,  each North Korean case usually requires more of State’s time and  resources than a comparable refugee case from another country.  According to another State/PRM official, North Korean cases at one point  comprised 1 percent of State/PRM’s caseload in the region but 20 percent  of PRM’s time. Since UNHCR is not permitted to access North Koreans in  some of the countries in the region, State and DHS take over the refugee  referral role. U.S. officials are also more involved in obtaining exit  permission for North Koreans in some countries than they are for other  refugee populations for which UNHCR or IOM typically assists with this  step of the process. Because North Korean refugee cases are more labor  intensive than other refugee cases, State/PRM and OPE officials said that  in 2006, State created and funded a Korean-speaking special caseworker at  the regional OPE to focus specifically on North Korean cases. According  to officials at the regional OPE, North Koreans are the only population to  which this OPE dedicates a special caseworker. The special caseworker  facilitates processing by often serving as an interpreter during the  prescreening and DHS/USCIS interviews or interactions with U.S. staff. In  addition, the special caseworker sends a biweekly status report to  State/PRM and DHS/USCIS and, as of early 2010, was in the process of  establishing monthly meetings with the North Koreans to update them on  the status of their case. As a result, processing of these cases is now more  efficient, according to U.S. and OPE officials. Additionally, officials from  U.S. and international organizations must spend time traveling to different  locations in the region to process some North Korean refugee applicants,  since North Koreans are often housed in shelters or immigration detention  centers located throughout the region rather than a few refugee camps  concentrated in one country. According to U.S. officials and international  organizations, these trips can also lengthen the processing times for these  cases.
section_title: Policies of Some Host Countries Affect U.S. Processing of North Korean Refugees
paragraphs: Some host countries’ policies affect the processing of North Korean  refugee cases, according to officials from the U.S. government and  international organizations. For example:    Some host countries delay granting exit permission for North Korean  refugees, which can add months to overall processing times, according to  U.S. officials. These officials also told us that some host countries often  delay granting exit permission because they do not want to become  “magnets” for more North Koreans and do not want to facilitate the  movement of North Korean refugees from the host country to the United  States. In addition, State officials told us that some host countries grant  exit permission to North Koreans seeking resettlement in South Korea  faster than those seeking U.S. resettlement, thus leading to faster  processing times for the South Korean-bound North Koreans.
Some host countries consider North Korean refugee issues to be sensitive  and prefer that these issues be handled discreetly, according to U.S.  officials. Due to these sensitivities, U.S. officials have told us that  processing North Korean cases often requires a high level of U.S.  involvement. For example, State officials described North Korean refugee  cases in which the U.S. government and host countries communicated  intensively over extended periods of time before the U.S. government  received permission to process these cases or received exit permission in  these countries. According to U.S. officials, one reason for these countries’  reluctance to assist in the U.S. processing of North Korean cases is  concern about creating tensions with the North Korean government.
Some host countries do not recognize any North Koreans as “refugees”  and limit access to them. Some host governments consider North Koreans  to be illegal or economic migrants, and thus do not offer them protection  as refugees. Some of these countries are also not parties to the UN  Protocol and Convention on Refugees and do not allow UNHCR access to  North Korean refugees, according to UNHCR officials. In some of these  countries, UNHCR does not assist the United States during the processing  of North Korean refugee applicant cases. U.S. and OPE officials told us  that some countries can also limit U.S. government and international  organizations’ access to North Korean refugee applicants by requiring  them to request permission for meetings with these refugees during  processing, which can cause delays.
section_title: U.S. Processing Times for North Korean Refugees Did Not Improve from Fiscal Year 2006 to 2008, and Were Generally Comparable to Those of Some Other Refugee Populations in Fiscal Year 2008
paragraphs: Overall, average processing times did not improve for the 85 cases created  in fiscal years 2006 to 2008 that arrived in the United States. Average  processing times increased from 133 days in fiscal year 2006 to 314 days in  fiscal year 2008 (see fig. 4). State officials said that one host country  limited U.S. government access to North Koreans in fiscal years 2007 and  2008, which resulted in longer average processing times for cases created  in those years.
Furthermore, for those stages in the overseas process that are primarily  handled by the U.S. government—the stages between case creation and  DHS approval—we found that average processing times did not improve  from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2009. Average processing times in fiscal  year 2009 (147 days) were faster than in fiscal years 2007 (284 days) and  2008 (192 days), but slower than in fiscal year 2006 (65 days) (see fig. 5).  The time period from case creation to DHS approval includes all of the  pending cases that were created in fiscal year 2009 that were excluded  from figure 4.
We have complete data through fiscal year 2009 for the processing times of North Korean  cases that pertain to the stages between case creation and DHS approval.
subsections: section_title: Processing Times for North Korean Refugees in Fiscal Year 2008 Generally Comparable to Those of Some Other Refugee Populations
paragraphs: According to State data from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, processing times  for North Koreans in fiscal year 2008 were generally comparable to those  of some other refugee populations that require similar security checks, as  well as to those of some other refugee populations in the region. (See figs.  6 and 7.) When compared to two other refugee populations that require  similar security checks—Iraqi and Sudanese refugees—there were greater  disparities in average processing times in fiscal year 2006 compared to  fiscal years 2007 and 2008; however disparities have lessened over time.  For example, in fiscal year 2006, average processing times for North  Koreans were 287 days faster than average processing times for Iraqis, but  were 74 days slower than these times for Iraqis in fiscal year 2008.
Processing times for North Koreans in fiscal year 2008 were also generally  comparable to those of three other refugee populations who are processed  in the region, namely Burmese, Chinese, and Vietnamese refugees. While  there were disparities in average processing times for North Korean  refugees compared to these populations in fiscal year 2006, these  disparities lessened over time. For example, in fiscal year 2006, average  processing times for North Koreans were 424 days faster than average  processing times for Burmese, but only 23 days faster in fiscal year 2008.  There are substantially fewer North Korean refugee cases than Iraqi,  Sudanese, Burmese, or Vietnamese refugee cases, as described in the  notes to figures 6 and 7.
A number of factors can affect processing times for all refugee  populations, including North Koreans as described earlier. While we  discussed factors that affect processing times of North Korean cases, the  factors affecting other populations were outside the scope of our review.
section_title: At Least 33 North Koreans Have Applied for Asylum Status in the United States, but the Number Is Likely Higher
paragraphs: In the United States, North Koreans have applied for asylum protection  through two processes—the affirmative and the defensive. DHS/USCIS  identified 33 North Koreans who have applied for asylum in the United  States from October 2004 through March 2010, but the actual number is  likely higher.
subsections: section_title: North Koreans Have Sought Asylum Protection in the United States through Both the Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Processes
paragraphs: North Koreans have sought asylum status in the United States through  either the affirmative or defensive process. The asylum process for North  Koreans is generally similar to that of individuals of other nationalities,  except that DHS/USCIS conducts an additional review of North Korean  cases.
subsections: section_title: Affirmative Asylum Process
paragraphs: In the affirmative asylum process, individuals, including North Koreans,  who are physically in the United States—regardless of how they arrived or  their current immigration status—may present an asylum application to  DHS/USCIS. Following the initiation of background checks, a DHS/USCIS  asylum officer conducts a non-adversarial interview with the applicant to  verify the applicant’s identity, determine whether the applicant is eligible  for asylum, and evaluate the credibility of the applicant’s asylum claim. If  the asylum officer finds the applicant is eligible for asylum, the officer  issues an approval and the applicant can remain in the United States. If the  asylum officer finds the applicant is ineligible for asylum but the applicant  is otherwise in lawful immigration status, the asylum officer denies the  claim and the applicant can remain in the United States under the terms of  his or her lawful status. However, if the applicant is determined to be  ineligible for asylum and does not otherwise have a lawful immigration  status, then the applicant is placed in removal proceedings and the case is  referred to an EOIR Immigration Judge for a hearing.
section_title: Defensive Asylum Process
paragraphs: Through the defensive asylum process, applicants, including North  Koreans, request asylum as a defense against removal from the United  States and can be held in detention while their case is processed.  According to DHS/USCIS officials, individuals generally enter the  defensive asylum process in one of three ways: (1) as a referral to an EOIR  Immigration Judge following a finding of ineligibility in an affirmative  asylum application; (2) by asserting a claim of asylum after they are  apprehended in the United States and placed into removal proceedings  because they are in violation of their immigration status or do not have  proper documentation; or (3) after being detained at a port of entry  without proper documentation or apprehended near a port of entry within  14 days of their illegal entry, being placed in expedited removal  proceedings, and asserting a fear of return or intention to apply for  asylum and after a DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds that they have a  credible fear of persecution or torture. Adjudication of asylum claims in  immigration court is “adversarial” in that the EOIR Immigration Judge  receives the applicant’s claim and then hears arguments about the  applicant’s eligibility for asylum from the applicant and the U.S.  government, which is represented by a DHS/Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) attorney. The EOIR Immigration Judge then makes an  eligibility determination, which can be appealed by either the applicant or  the U.S. government. Immigration Judges can grant asylum to applicants,  allowing them to stay in the United States, or deny asylum and order them  to be removed from the United States unless they qualify for another form  of relief. DHS/ICE enforces alien detention and removal. Appendix VI  provides more information about the affirmative and defensive asylum  processes.
section_title: Additional Level of Review for North Korean Asylum Cases
paragraphs: North Koreans and North Koreans with South Korean citizenship claiming  asylum through the affirmative process or who claim a credible fear of  persecution or torture during expedited removal proceedings receive an  additional level of review at USCIS Asylum Division headquarters.  DHS/USCIS officials stated that, because North Korean asylum seekers  may attract national media attention or a high-level U.S. government  interest, USCIS headquarters must review North Korean asylum cases  before rendering a final decision. DHS/USCIS asylum field offices send the  USCIS Asylum Division headquarters a packet containing the asylum  application or credible fear worksheet, a draft assessment of the case, and  other supporting documents. Asylum officers at USCIS headquarters  review the case to ensure that proper procedures were followed and the  decision on the case is legally sufficient. According to DHS/USCIS  officials, North Korean asylum cases follow the same process as  affirmative asylum cases of other nationalities apart from this case review.
Since some North Koreans seeking asylum have citizenship in both North  Korea and South Korea, according to USCIS and EOIR officials, U.S.  asylum decisions for North Koreans can be affected by the issues of dual  citizenship. Under U.S. law, North Koreans holding South Korean  citizenship must establish a fear of persecution or torture in South Korea,  as well as North Korea, to obtain asylum in the United States.  Historically, UNHCR and the international community, including the  United States, viewed South Korea as the third-country resettlement of  choice. The constitution of the Republic of Korea, known as South Korea,  states that the territory of South Korea shall consist of the Korean  Peninsula and its adjacent islands. According to South Korean officials,  since the South Korean constitution considers all Koreans on the Korean  Peninsula, including North Koreans, to be citizens of South Korea, North  Koreans generally are entitled to South Korean citizenship, with some  exceptions. However, the 2004 NKHRA sought to clarify that North  Koreans are not barred from eligibility for refugee or asylum consideration  in the United States on account of any legal right to citizenship that they  may enjoy under the South Korean constitution. Accordingly, USCIS and  EOIR officials told us that North Korean citizens applying for asylum who  have not availed themselves of South Korean citizenship only need to  establish a fear of persecution or torture in North Korea, while those  North Koreans who have availed themselves of South Korean citizenship  must establish a fear of persecution or torture in both countries. USCIS  and EOIR make a determination regarding the North Korean applicant’s  citizenship before determining eligibility for U.S. asylum. DHS/USCIS  officials stated that at least one North Korean with South Korean  citizenship was placed in the defensive asylum process after the individual  was found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture in both North  and South Korea. According to EOIR data, the North Korean was granted  asylum.
section_title: The Number of North Koreans Who Have Sought Asylum in the United States Is Likely Higher than 33
paragraphs: DHS/USCIS identified 33 North Koreans—including their dependents  (some of whom may not be North Korean)—who have sought asylum in  the United States since fiscal year 2005 through either the affirmative  asylum or credible fear process. Of the 33 North Korean asylum seekers,  9 have been granted asylum, 15 are pending, as of March 2, 2010, and 9  individual cases were closed or resolved for other reasons (“other  decisions”). A North Korean applicant receives a grant of asylum if  USCIS or the EOIR Immigration Judge determines that the applicant is  eligible for asylum. The asylee can remain in the United States indefinit unless asylum is terminated. The 33 North Korean asylum seekers  comprise a total of 25 asylum cases, of which 7 cases were grante asylum.  Furthermore, 24 North Koreans originally sought asylum thro he  the affirmative asylum process. Nine North Koreans were placed in t credible fear process, and when found eligible, applied for asylum with  EOIR in the defensive asylum process. Table 2 provides a summary of the  outcomes for North Korean asylum seekers since fiscal year 2005.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, Homeland  Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services. State, DHS, and DOJ  provided technical comments, which have been incorporated throughout  the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees and to the Secretaries of State, Homeland Security, Justice,  and Health and Human Services. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we (1) assess the U.S. government’s efforts to facilitate the  processing of North Korean refugees overseas for resettlement in the  United States, and (2) determine the number of North Koreans who have  sought asylum to remain in the United States and the process by which  they may do so. Because Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights  Act (NKHRA) in 2004, we focused our data collection efforts on fiscal  years 2005 through 2010.
To assess how the U.S. government processes North Korean refugees, we  reviewed documents from the Departments of State (State) and Homeland  Security (DHS) related to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).  We also interviewed officials from State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees,  and Migration (PRM); State’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs;  State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; State’s Office to  Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; State’s Office of the Special  Representative for North Korea Policy; DHS Security Advisory Opinion  Review Board; and DHS/U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Services  (USCIS). Additionally, in Asia we interviewed representatives from the  International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High  Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the regional Overseas  Processing Entity (OPE) to understand the various steps in overseas and  domestic refugee processing. We spoke with both U.S.- and South Korean- based nongovernmental organizations (NGO), academics, think tanks, and  resettled North Koreans living in the United States to learn about the  characteristics of the North Korean refugee population; the challenges that  North Korean refugees face in their journeys from North Korea to gain  access to refugee admissions processing in Asia; and factors that North  Koreans consider when deciding in which country to resettle. We also  analyzed aggregate and country-specific data from State’s Worldwide  Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) to determine the  processing times for North Korean refugees from fiscal years 2005 to 2010.  We asked State to provide us WRAPS data on an individual level because  some cases in WRAPS include more than one individual. To determine the  reliability of WRAPS data on North Korean refugees, we interviewed  State/PRM and OPE officials who input, monitor, and use these data about  procedures for collecting data and ensuring their accuracy. We also  reviewed the data at various stages of the refugee resettlement process  and analyzed the WRAPS Privacy Impact Assessment. We determined that  these data were sufficiently reliable to calculate the processing times for  North Korean cases created (1) between fiscal years 2006 and 2008 for the  total number of days between case creation and arrival in the United  States, and (2) between fiscal years 2006 and 2009 for the total number of  days between case creation and DHS approval of the case. We made this  determination because decisions on DHS approval had been made for all  pending cases created in fiscal year 2009 and prior years, but not all of the  pending cases that were created in fiscal year 2009 had arrived in the  United States, and therefore we did not have complete data on arrivals for  that year. However, although we worked to identify delays in U.S.  processing through interviews and an examination of the aggregate data,  we did not have access to individual-level data on the factors that might  influence processing times. Consequently, we were not able to probe these  factors using statistical modeling techniques, and cannot comment on the  extent to which changes in processing times might be attributable to  factors such as State Department or Asian countries’ actions.
To determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to  remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so, we  reviewed relevant statutes as well as documentation and data from USCIS  and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS and  from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the  Department of Justice (DOJ). We also interviewed officials from these  agencies. We analyzed data from USCIS’s Refugees, Asylum, and Parole  System (RAPS) to determine the number of North Korean affirmative  asylum applicants processed from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. To determine  the reliability of RAPS data on North Korean asylum applicants, we  interviewed DHS/USCIS officials about their procedures for collecting  affirmative asylum application data and ensuring their accuracy. In  addition, we asked about data limitations and analyzed the RAPS Privacy  Impact Assessment and System of Records. We also obtained data from  USCIS’s Asylum Prescreening System (APSS) to determine the number of  North Korean credible fear applicants processed between fiscal years 2005  and 2010. To determine the reliability of APSS data on North Korean  asylum applicants, we interviewed DHS/USCIS officials about their  procedures for collecting the credible fear data and ensuring their  accuracy. USCIS databases contain data on all citizens of North Korea in  both affirmative and credible fear cases, according to USCIS. We  requested data on North Korean asylum cases in the defensive process  from EOIR. However, EOIR was not able to provide comprehensive data  on its North Korean asylum cases without a manual review of individual  cases. According to EOIR officials, asylum applicants with North Korea as  their country of birth may have been categorized as South Koreans in  EOIR databases because, in accordance with eligibility requirements in the  INA, the database only tracks country of nationality and not birth, making  a manual review necessary to provide accurate data. EOIR officials also  stated that they did not have resources necessary to perform a manual  review. We determined that the RAPS and APSS data were sufficiently  reliable to report on the North Korean affirmative asylum cases and  credible fear cases from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. However, these data  may not represent all North Korean asylum cases filed during this time  period because EOIR was not able to provide data on North Koreans who  first claimed asylum defensively in front of an EOIR Immigration Judge.
To describe the resettlement benefits offered to North Korean refugees  both in the United States and in South Korea and to describe the  resettlement experiences of North Koreans, which are discussed in  appendixes II and III of this report, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations,  and policies regarding government-funded refugee resettlement programs  in both countries. We obtained documentation and spoke with officials at  State/PRM and the Department of Health and Human Service’s (HHS)  Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Through field work in South Korea,  we met with South Korean officials from the Ministry of Unification to  discuss the assistance and social services that the South Korean  government provides to North Koreans. Information on South Korea’s  resettlement program to North Koreans was provided by the South Korean  Ministry of National Unification and was not independently verified. We  also visited the Hanawon Social Adaptation Education facility, a South  Korean government-run facility, to observe the social adaptation training  provided to North Koreans and the Hangyeore Middle and High School to  see how North Korean students receive special educational courses to  prepare them for entrance into the South Korean school system. In  addition, we spoke with six resettlement agencies that have resettled  North Koreans in the United States: Episcopal Migration Ministries,  International Rescue Committee, Church World Service, Lutheran  Immigration and Refugee Service, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops,  and World Relief. We met with NGOs in both the United States and South  Korea who provide services to resettled North Koreans to discuss the  challenges that they have faced in serving this population. We also  interviewed several North Korean refugees who have resettled in the  United States about their experiences. Their views or experiences may not  be representative of all North Korean refugees. German, British, Japanese,  and Canadian foreign officials and embassies provided us with data on  North Koreans who have sought humanitarian protection in countries  other than the United States. We did not conduct a data reliability  assessment on this information because we are providing these data for  background purposes only.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to June 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Resettlement Benefits Available to North Koreans in the United States and South Korea
paragraphs: Both the United States and South Korea offer resettlement benefits to  North Koreans that cover immediate needs assistance, cash and medical  assistance, social and employment services, and other needs. By law, U.S.  resettlement assistance and services are provided to refugees without  regard to race, religion, nationality, sex, or political opinion. North  Koreans receive the same benefits and access to federal programs as all  other refugee populations. The United States, which resettles more  refugees than any other country, resettled refugees from 69 countries in  fiscal year 2008, according to State. The 99 North Koreans who have  resettled in the United States represent a very small portion of the  approximately 260,000 refugees resettled in the United States since fiscal  year 2006.
Almost all of the refugees in South Korea are North Korean, and South  Korea’s resettlement program was specifically created to provide benefits  and services for North Koreans. Approximately 18,000 North Koreans  have resettled in South Korea since the 1950s, while only 268 individuals  who were not from North Korea have been granted refugee or  humanitarian status in South Korea since 1994, according to South Korean  government officials. The South Korean Ministry of Unification manages  the resettlement program, and almost 50 percent of the Ministry’s budget  is allocated for the resettlement of North Koreans, according to Ministry  reports. According to South Korean officials, the government has tailored  its resettlement program to specifically reflect the changing needs of  resettled North Koreans over time.
Both governments’ resettlement benefits cover immediate needs (fig. 8),  cash and medical assistance (fig. 9), social and employment services  (fig.10), and other benefits (fig. 11).
subsections: section_title: Immediate needs - U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program
paragraphs: Reception irport. Trporttion to reettlement detintion. $1,100 to provide for initil food, housing, necessary clothing; referr to medicl, trining,  nd other ociervice progr. (from date of Hanawon  graduation, in years)
section_title: Immediate Needs - South Korean Resettlement Program for North Koreans
paragraphs: 12-week government-rn trining coe tht cover topic such as initiettlement  support; mentability nd helth edtion; creer gidnce nd basic voctionl  trining; nd introdction to Sth Koreociety nd overcoming ocio-cltl difference. -week coe focusing on locervice nd assnce nd pting to ociety.
Issuance of permnent reidence nd reident regitrtion crd.
Leased rtment nd $11,456 for ecrity depoit.
Two assnt offer intenive reettlement support fter fmily move into commnity.
section_title: Immediate Needs Assistance
paragraphs: Both the United States and South Korea provide benefits to address the  immediate needs of resettled North Koreans (see fig. 8). Refugees are  eligible for State/PRM-funded basic needs support and services when they  arrive in the United States. As of January 1, 2010, State/PRM provided the  resettlement agencies with $1,800 per refugee to cover the direct and  administrative costs of these services, of which at least $1,100 must be  designated for the direct support of the refugee’s short-term living  expenses. To facilitate North Koreans’ resettlement, the South Korean  government established the Hanawon Social Adaptation Education facility  in 1999 to provide North Koreans with a 12-week training course before  they resettle in local communities. The Hanawon curriculum is divided  into four categories: mental stability and health education, career guidance  and basic vocational training, introduction to South Korean society and  overcoming socio-cultural differences, and initial settlement support.  Following graduation from Hanawon and resettlement in a South Korean  community, North Koreans may continue their education through local  Hana Centers that provide an additional 3 weeks of job and employment  training. South Korea helps North Koreans find rental units and provides  the security deposit as well as the resettlement assistants who offer  additional support after a family moves into a South Korean community.
section_title: Cash and Medical Assistance - U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program
paragraphs: Time-limited casassnce nd other support ervice for qualifying low-income  individua with dependent children.  200 TANF level te rnged from $170 to $92  per month for  ingle-prent fmily of three.
Casassnce to low-income individua who re ged, lind, or disabled.
Progrimilr to TANF for refgee who do not qualify for TANF.
Helth cre coverge for qualifying low-income individua.
Progrimilr to Medicid for refgee who do not qualify for Medicid. (from date of Hanawon  graduation, in years)
section_title: Cash and Medical Assistance - South Korean Resettlement Program for North Koreans
paragraphs: One-time pyment of $2,644 t gruation from Hwon, with dditionl $2,644 in  quarterly inllment.
Pyment of $1,571 over  5-yer period for eligile North Kore with disabilitie.
Pyment of $6,45 over  5-yer period for individua over 60 ye of ge t gruation from  Hwon.
Casassnce of $  month for qualifying low-income fmilie.
Free medicervice Sth Koren hopit for qualifying low-income fmilie.
section_title: Cash and Medical Assistance
paragraphs: Both the United States and South Korea provide resettled North Koreans  with cash and medical assistance (see fig. 9). North Korean refugees may  be eligible for a number of longer-term U.S. federal public benefit  programs—including TANF, Medicaid and CHIP, and SSI for up to 7 years  generally, depending on the program and the state. Refugees who are not  eligible for TANF, SSI, Medicaid, or CHIP may be eligible for ORR funded  Refugee Cash Assistance and Refugee Medical Assistance for up to 8  months, according to HHS. In South Korea, resettled North Koreans  receive a one-time financial benefit, or endowment, valued at  approximately $5,000 upon their entry into South Korean society. Qualified  low-income families also receive free medical care indefinitely at South  Korean hospitals as well as minimum living support of $353 per month  indefinitely.
section_title: Social and Employment Services - U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program
paragraphs: Emphas on ecring erly employment for refgee, inclding employment preption  nd jo plcement nd retention ervice. (from date of Hanawon  graduation, in years)
section_title: Social and Employment Services - South Korean Resettlement Program for North Koreans
paragraphs: Finncil incentive for mintining able employment for t least 6 month; mximm of  $19,740 in comintion with jo trining incentive.
Finncil incentive for ndergoing t least 500 ho of jo trining, inclding quiring  technicl licen; p to $19,740 in comintion with employment incentive.
Service inclding pychologicl coeling, jo trining, nd employment assnce.
Compnie hiring  North Koren employee receive  subsidy equivlent to hlf of the  employee'ge.
Provide assnce with ecring government-issued docment nd ccessing finncind medicassnce.
Up to 8 month  Provide assnce on ccessing voctionl trining nd finding jobs.
ORR social service benefits are not subject to financial eligibility criteria.
ORR social services include citizenship and naturalization preparation services as well as referral  and interpretation services, which may be offered beyond 5 years.
The employment and job training incentives are provided per individual.
section_title: Social and Employment Services
paragraphs: Both the United States and South Korea provide social and employment  services for resettled North Koreans (see fig. 10). In the United States,  ORR social services emphasize the preparation of refugees for job  placement and retention. In addition, ORR’s program offers a wide range  of services that include employability services, such as English language  instruction, vocational training, and on-the-job training. North Koreans in  South Korea may also access social and employment services. For  example, North Koreans may receive financial payments as incentives for  maintaining stable employment or undergoing job training, including  acquiring technical licenses. The combined maximum value of these  incentives is about $20,000. The Hana Centers also provide psychological  counseling to North Koreans for up to 1 year following their resettlement.  The South Korean government also pays companies half of the wages of  their North Korean employees for up to 3 years.  ears.
section_title: Other Benefits - U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program
paragraphs: Food assnce for qualifying low-income individua. (from date of Hanawon  graduation, in years)
section_title: Other Benefits - South Korean Resettlement Program for North Koreans
paragraphs: Subsidy of p to $2,291 for reettling oide of the cpitl city, Seol.
Locl police officer provide protection.
Fll tition t public middle chool, high chool, nd niverity; hlf tition t privte  niverity.
Bording chool for North Koredent to prepre them for the trition to the Sth  Korechool tem.
section_title: Other Benefits
paragraphs: North Korean refugees in the United States and South Korea may receive  additional benefits (see fig. 11). For example, eligible refugees in the  United States can qualify for food assistance under SNAP. Aside from the  major federal benefit programs available to eligible refugees, there are  additional programs such as school lunch programs for children of eligible  refugees. The South Korean government provides North Koreans with a  personal safety counselor for protection indefinitely as well as a subsidy to  resettle outside of the capital city, Seoul. In addition, the South Korean  government may provide long-term tuition assistance for those North  Koreans attending higher education institutions. Notably, the South  Korean government has established a system to support the education and  integration of North Korean children. For example, the government- funded Hangyeore Middle and High School, established in 2006, was  specifically designed to address the needs of North Korean students and  serve as a transition school until the students are ready to enter regular  South Korean schools. Children at Hangyeore stay at the boarding school  for 6 months to 2 years depending on their individual performance.  According to the school’s principal, the school’s mission is to (1) match  the age group of the students with their abilities in school, (2) enhance  students’ learning capabilities, (3) help students to overcome cultural  differences, and (4) help students to heal psychologically.
section_title: Appendix III: Challenges Some Resettled North Koreans Face in Assimilating in the United States and in South Korea
paragraphs: North Koreans who have resettled in the United States and in South Korea  come from an isolated society with limited or no exposure to capitalism  and can therefore face economic difficulties. According to some of the  North Korean refugees we spoke with in the United States, they have  encountered difficulties finding jobs and affording basic living expenses.  South Korean and U.S. officials also noted that North Koreans in South  Korea have high rates of unemployment. In addition, North Koreans also  have difficulties learning basic day-to-day skills, such as using  supermarkets, credit cards, and public transportation.
According to NGOs and government officials, North Koreans face  linguistic, cultural, and social challenges in both the United States and  South Korea. For example, North Koreans who are now resettled in the  United States told us about their struggles adjusting to a new language and  culture. Even in South Korea, North Koreans face difficulties with the  Korean language due to the differences in dialects. In addition, North  Koreans in South Korea face social problems and have higher school drop- out, crime, and alcoholism rates, according to South Korean and U.S.  government officials.
Obtaining medical care has also been a challenge for some North Koreans.  Since some North Koreans arrive in the United States in poor health and  have suffered traumatic and stressful experiences, obtaining and affording  medical care has been important, according to resettled North Korean  refugees and NGOs. State/PRM, OPE, and IOM officials have told us that  some North Koreans face mental health issues and psycho-social  problems, in addition to physical problems.
Some North Koreans who have resettled in the United States and South  Korea have overcome some of the challenges of assimilating into a new  culture and society and have achieved accomplishments such as obtaining  higher educational degrees. According to an NGO, some North Koreans  who have resettled in the United States have passed their General  Educational Development Test or are attending community college.  Moreover, during our fieldwork in South Korea we heard of 10 North  Korean students who attended medical school in South Korea after  finishing high school. In addition, some resettled North Koreans have  become business owners, according to NGO and South Korean  government sources. Finally, some resettled North Koreans have  established or work for NGOs in South Korea that assist other resettled  North Koreans. For example, Dr. Lee Ae-Ran, the first female North  Korean defector to receive a doctoral degree in South Korea, has  established a number of organizations to assist other North Koreans in  South Korea. She was awarded the 2010 U.S. State Department  International Women of Courage award for her accomplishments.
section_title: Appendix IV: Data on North Koreans Who Have Resettled in South Korea from the End of the Korean War through 2009
paragraphs: As illustrated in figure 12, approximately 18,000 North Koreans have  resettled in South Korea since the end of the Korean War, according to  South Korean government data. The number of North Koreans resettling  in South Korea has increased since 2000 with some years, namely calendar  years 2004 and 2006, seeing an annual increase of 46 percent or more. The  number of North Korean refugees arriving in South Korea increased 5  percent from calendar years 2008 to 2009.
According to data from the South Korean government, 81 percent of the  resettled North Koreans in South Korea are from the Hamgyeong Province  in the northeast area of North Korea. In recent years, the percentage of  North Korean refugees who are women has increased from about   50 percent in 2001 to about 77 percent in 2009, according to South Korean  data.
section_title: Appendix V: Humanitarian Protection Status for North Koreans in the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Japan
paragraphs: This appendix provides data on North Korean applicants for humanitarian  protection status in the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Japan.  Humanitarian protection status includes refugee status, asylum status, and  other immigration statuses governments extend on humanitarian grounds.  Each country has different definitions of refugee or asylum seeker; thus,  countries’ data are not directly comparable.
The United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Japan have provided North  Koreans with a humanitarian protection status to allow them to remain in  their countries. As shown in table 3, from calendar year 2006 to September  30, 2009, the United Kingdom received a total of 665 applications filed by  North Koreans for a humanitarian protection status. According to the  British Embassy, the United Kingdom granted 350 North Korean cases  humanitarian protection status during this time period.
From calendar years 2000 through 2009, 329 North Korean individuals  applied for a humanitarian protection status in Germany, as shown in table  4. German Embassy officials informed us that Germany granted a  humanitarian protection status to 189 North Korean individuals from  calendar years 2000 through 2003. Since calendar year 2003, two North  Koreans have been granted a humanitarian protection status in Germany.
As shown in table 5, from calendar years 2000 through 2009, 217 North  Korean individuals applied for humanitarian protection status in Canada.  According to a Canadian official, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee  Board had granted 76 of these North Koreans humanitarian protection  status, with 66 granted in calendar year 2009.
Japanese officials informed us that over 100 North Koreans have entered  Japan on humanitarian grounds. They did not provide us with additional  information.
section_title: Appendix VI: The Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Processes in the United States
paragraphs: Individuals can acquire asylum status in the United States through either  the affirmative process or the defensive process. Figure 13 outlines the  steps involved in both the affirmative and defensive asylum processes.
subsections: section_title: Affirmative Asylum Process
paragraphs: In the affirmative asylum process, individuals who are physically in the  United States, regardless of how they arrived or their current immigration  status, may present an asylum application to DHS/USCIS. Following the  initiation of background checks, a DHS/USCIS asylum officer conducts a  non-adversarial interview with the applicant to verify the applicant’s  identity, determine whether the applicant is eligible for asylum, and  evaluate the credibility of the applicant’s asylum claim. DHS/USCIS asylum  officers can also request a comment letter from State’s Bureau of  Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) on a particular case. These  comment letters help inform the asylum officers’ decisions on cases by  providing information on general country conditions and information  specific to an individual applicant’s situation that may not be accessible  from other sources. In the case of dual citizenship, the DRL comment  letter could include information on both countries. If the DHS/USCIS  asylum officer finds the applicant is eligible for asylum,  the officer issues  an approval and the applicant can remain in the United States. If the  DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds the applicant is ineligible for asylum but  the applicant is otherwise in lawful immigration status, the asylum officer  issues a Notice of Intent to Deny to the applicant, who then has 16 days to  provide a rebuttal. The DHS/USCIS asylum officer considers the rebuttal, if  any, prior to issuing a final denial or grant of asylum. If the DHS/USCIS  asylum officer issues a final denial of asylum status, the applicant can  remain in the United States under the terms of his or her lawful status.  However, if the applicant is determined to be ineligible for asylum and  does not otherwise have a lawful immigration status, then the applicant is  placed in removal proceedings and the case is referred to an Executive  Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) Immigration Judge for a hearing.
section_title: Defensive Asylum Process
paragraphs: Through the defensive asylum process, applicants request asylum as a  defense against removal from the United States and can be held in  detention while their case is processed. According to DHS/USCIS officials,  individuals are generally placed in the defensive asylum process in one of  three ways.
DHS/USCIS can refer them to an EOIR Immigration Judge after a finding  of ineligibility in an affirmative asylum application.
They can assert a claim of asylum after they are apprehended in the United  States and placed into removal proceedings because they are in violation  of their immigration status or do not have proper documentation.
DHS can place them in the defensive asylum process if they are detained  at a port of entry without proper documentation or are apprehended near  a port of entry within 14 days of their illegal entry, they are being placed  in expedited removal proceedings they assert a fear of return or intention  to apply for asylum, and after a DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds that they  have a credible fear of persecution or torture (“the credible fear  process”).
Adjudication of asylum claims in immigration court is “adversarial” in that  the EOIR Immigration Judge receives the applicant’s claim and then hears  arguments about the applicant’s eligibility for asylum from the applicant  and the U.S. government, which is represented by a DHS/ICE attorney. The  Immigration Judge then makes an eligibility determination, which can be  appealed by either the applicant or the U.S. government. Immigration  Judges can grant asylum to applicants, allowing them to stay in the United  States, or deny asylum and order them to be removed from the United  States unless they qualify for another form of relief. DHS/ICE enforces  removal orders by coordinating alien deportation and repatriation.
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the persons named above, Cheryl Goodman, Assistant  Director; Andrea Miller; Teresa Abruzzo; Georgina Scarlata; Debbie Chung;  Martin de Alteriis; and Mary Moutsos made key contributions to this  report. Technical assistance was provided by Muriel Brown, Etana Finkler,  Mike Maslowski, Chhandasi Pandya, and Jena Sinkfield.