Inspectors General: Limitations of IG Oversight at the Department of State
Published: 2007-10-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO was asked to provide testimony about the effectiveness and reliability of the State Department's Office of Inspector General (State IG). We focused on the independence of the State IG, the use of inspections instead of audits to provide oversight of the department, and the effectiveness of the IG's investigative function. The testimony is based primarily on our March 2007 report, Inspectors General: Activities of the Department of State Office of Inspector General (GAO-07-138).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The effectiveness of the oversight provided by the State IG is limited by (1) a lack of resources, (2) structural independence issues, (3) gaps in audit coverage, and (4) the lack of assurance that the department obtains independent IG investigations. These limitations serve to reduce the credibility and oversight provided by the State IG. From fiscal years 2001 through 2006, the State Department's budgets have increased from $13.7 billion to about $24 billion, an increase of almost 75 percent (or 55 percent in constant dollars adjusted for inflation) in order to manage an expanding role in the global war on terrorism. During this same period, the State IG's budget increased from $29 million to $31 million, which when adjusted for inflation is a decrease of about 6 percent in constant dollars. In addition, of the 318 authorized staff in the State IG's fiscal year 2006 budget, the actual onboard staff averaged 182, or about 57 percent of the authorized level and about 20 percent less than in fiscal year 2001. We continue to identify concerns regarding the independence of the State IG that are similar to concerns we reported almost three decades ago. Independence is critical to the quality and credibility of all the work of the State IG and is one of the most important elements of the overall effectiveness of the IG function. Our concerns include (1) the appointment of line management officials to head the State IG in an acting capacity for extended periods, and (2) the use of ambassador-level Foreign Service staff to lead inspections of the department's bureaus and posts even though they may have conflicts of interest resulting from their roles in the Foreign Service. In addition, because the State IG provides oversight coverage of high-risk areas and management challenges primarily through inspections rather than audits, the department has significant gaps in audit oversight. Compared to audits, oversight provided by inspections is fundamentally limited. To illustrate, the Inspector General Act requires the State IG to follow Government Auditing Standards, while use of inspection standards are voluntary. In addition, unlike auditing standards, inspection standards do not require an external peer review of quality. The State IG's ratio of inspections to audits in fiscal year 2005 was 2 to 1 while the ratio for the statutory federal IG community was about 1 to 10. We reviewed 10 of the State IG's inspections performed over fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and found that they relied heavily on questionnaires completed by management at each bureau or post being inspected without verification or testing for accuracy. We also found that investigations of the State Department lack a formal written agreement between the State IG and DS. Such an agreement is critical to help ensure that investigations of internal department operations are performed by the IG and not by bureau investigators who report to department management.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the activities of the Department of  State Office of Inspector General (State IG), which is responsible for  providing oversight of the department, the Broadcasting Board of  Governors, the foreign affairs community, and more than 260 embassies,  consulates, and other posts worldwide. The State IG has a critical  responsibility to provide effective and objective oversight to assist both  the department and the Congress.
In our March 2007 report on the activities of the State IG, we raised a  number of concerns about the lack of adequate resources, the  independence of the office, the lack of audit oversight in high-risk areas,  and the lack of assurance that the department is receiving independent  investigations.
My statement today is based primarily on our March report and recent  testimonies we have provided on the need for effective inspector general  (IG) offices. I will discuss in more detail (1) the importance of auditor and  IG independence, (2) independence concerns regarding the State IG that  are similar to those we reported almost three decades ago, (3) gaps in  State IG audit coverage in some high-risk areas due to the IG’s reliance on  inspections, and (4) a lack of assurance that investigations within the State  Department are independent of management. We performed this work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The current State IG was created by a 1986 amendment to the Inspector  General Act of 1978 (IG Act) to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse,  and mismanagement in the department’s programs and operations;  conduct and supervise independent audits and investigations; and  recommend policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.  Unique to the State IG is a requirement to provide inspections of the  department’s Foreign Service posts, bureaus, and operating units. The  State Department has had inspection functions in various forms since  1906. The function has changed and evolved over the years in response to  numerous statutory changes.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the State Department  has become involved in expanded reconstruction and stabilization roles  and manages a global presence that includes mobilizing some 180  countries and territories in the war on terrorism. To manage this expanded  role, the State Department’s budget has increased over fiscal years 2001  through 2006 from $13.7 billion to about $24 billion, an increase of about  75 percent (55 percent in constant dollars adjusted for inflation). At the  same time, the State IG’s budget has been inadequate and its workforce  has declined by approximately 20 percent. For example, from 2001 to  2006, the State IG’s budget for oversight has increased from $29 million to  $31 million, which when considered relative to inflation, is a budget  decrease of approximately 6 percent over 6 years in constant dollars.  During that same period, the State IG’s staffing level has declined from 227  to 182. Of the 318 authorized staff in the State IG’s fiscal year 2006 budget,  the actual onboard staff averaged 182, or about 57 percent of the  authorized level. (See fig. #1.)
In the State Department’s Performance and Accountability Report for  fiscal year 2006, the State IG reported the need for expanded oversight to  encompass new department initiatives in transformational diplomacy,  global repositioning, and public diplomacy, as well as substantial increases  in programs for Iraq and Afghanistan, counternarcotics, counterterrorism,  embassy construction, and information technology. In addition, the IG has  noted significant growth in the number of programs and grants with  mandated IG oversight, congressional and management requests for  special reviews and investigations, and opportunities for joint activities  with other departments.
The 1986 amendment that created the current IG office was a reaction to  concerns expressed in prior GAO reports in 1978 and 1982. In those  reports, we raised concerns about the independence of the previous IG  offices established administratively by the department and through  statutes prior to 1986. At the same time, our concerns about the State IG’s  independence were based in part on the IG’s use of temporarily assigned  Foreign Service officers to staff the IG office for performing inspections.
section_title: Importance of Auditor and IG Independence
paragraphs: We continue to be concerned about the independence of the State IG, an  issue that we first reported on almost three decades ago. Independence is  the cornerstone of professional auditing. Without independence, an audit  organization cannot conduct independent audits in compliance with  generally accepted government auditing standards (Government Auditing  Standards). Likewise, an IG who lacks independence cannot effectively  fulfill the full range of requirements for the office. Lacking this critical  attribute, an audit organization’s work might be classified as studies,  research reports, consulting reports, or reviews, rather than independent  audits.
Independence is one of the most important elements of an effective IG  function. In fact, much of the IG Act provides specific protections to IG  independence that are unprecedented for an audit and investigative  function located within the organization being reviewed. These  protections are necessary in large part because of the unusual reporting  requirements of the IGs, who are both subject to the general supervision  and budget processes of the agencies they audit, while at the same time  being expected to provide independent reports of their work externally to  the Congress.
Government Auditing Standards states, “in all matters relating to the  audit work, the audit organization and the individual auditor, whether  government or public, must be free from personal, external, and  organizational impairments to independence, and must avoid the  appearance of such impairments to independence. Auditors and audit  organizations must maintain independence so that their opinions, findings,  conclusions, judgments, and recommendations will be impartial and  viewed as impartial by objective third parties with knowledge of the  relevant information.”
Personal independence applies to individual auditors at all levels of the  audit organization, including the head of the organization. Personal  independence refers to the auditor’s ability to remain objective and  maintain an independent attitude in all matters relating to the audit, as  well as the auditor’s ability to be recognized by others as independent. The  auditor needs an independent and objective state of mind that does not  allow personal bias or the undue influence of others to override the  auditor’s professional judgments. This attitude is also referred to as  intellectual honesty. The auditor must also be free from direct financial or  managerial involvement with the audited entity or other potential conflicts  of interest that might create the perception that the auditor is not  independent.
External independence refers to both the auditor’s and the audit  organization’s freedom to make independent and objective judgments free  from external influences or pressures. Examples of impairments to  external independence include restrictions on access to records,  government officials, or other individuals needed to conduct the audit;  external interference over the assignment, appointment, compensation, or  promotion of audit personnel; restrictions on funds or other resources  provided to the audit organization that adversely affect the audit  organization’s ability to carry out its responsibilities; or external authority  to overrule or to inappropriately influence the auditors’ judgment as to  appropriate reporting content.
Organizational independence refers to the audit organization’s  placement in relation to the activities being audited. Professional auditing  standards have different criteria for organizational independence for  external and internal audit organizations. The IGs, in their statutory role of  providing oversight of their agencies’ operations, represent a unique  hybrid of external and internal reporting responsibilities.
The IG Act requires IGs to perform audits in compliance with Government  Auditing Standards. In addition, much of the act provides specific  protections to IG independence for all the work of the IGs. Protections to  IG independence include the requirement that IGs report only to their  agency heads and not to lower-level management, and a prohibition on  the ability of the agency head to prevent or prohibit the IG from initiating,  carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation. This prohibition is  meant to protect the IG office from external forces that could compromise  an IG’s independence. The IG’s personal independence and the need to  appear independent to knowledgeable third parties is also critical when  the IG makes decisions related to the nature and scope of audit and  investigative work performed by the IG office. The IG must determine how  to utilize the IG Act’s protection of independence in conducting and  pursuing the audit and investigative work. The IG’s personal independence  is necessary to make the proper decisions in such cases.
The IG Act also provides the IG with protections to external independence  by providing access to all agency documents and records, prompt access  to the agency head, the ability to select and appoint IG staff, the authority  to obtain services of experts, and the authority to enter into contracts. The  IG may choose whether to exercise the act’s specific authority to obtain  access to information that is denied by agency officials. Again, each IG  must make decisions regarding the use of the IG Act’s provisions for  access to information, and the IG’s personal independence becomes key in  making these decisions.
The IGs’ external reporting requirements in the IG Act include reporting  the results of their work in semiannual reports to the Congress. Under the  IG Act, the IGs are to report their findings without alteration by their  respective agencies, and these reports are to be made available to the  general public. The IG Act also directs the IGs to keep their agency heads  and the Congress fully and currently informed, which they do through  these semiannual reports and otherwise, of any problems, deficiencies,  abuses, fraud, or other serious problems relating to the administration of  programs and operations of their agencies. Also, the IGs are required to  report particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies  immediately to their agency heads, who are required to transmit the IG’s  report to the Congress within 7 calendar days.
With the growing complexity of the federal government, the severity of the  problems it faces, and the fiscal constraints under which it operates, it is  important that an independent, objective, and reliable IG structure be in  place at federal agencies to ensure adequate audit and investigative  coverage of federal programs and operations. The IG Act provides each IG  with the ability to exercise judgment in the use of protections to  independence specified in the act. While the IG Act provides for IG  independence, the ultimate success or failure of an IG office is largely  determined by the individual IG placed in that office and that person’s  ability to maintain personal, external, and organizational independence  both in fact and appearance while reporting the results of the office’s work  to both the agency head and to the Congress. An IG who lacks  independence cannot effectively fulfill the full range of requirements for  the office.
section_title: Continuing Concerns regarding the State IG’s Independence
paragraphs: Two continuing areas of concern that we have with the independence of  the office of the State IG involve (1) the appointment of management  officials to head the State IG in an acting capacity for extended periods of  time and (2) the use of Foreign Service staff to lead State IG inspections.  These concerns are similar to those independence issues we reported in  our 1978 and 1982 reports.
In 1978, GAO reviewed the operations of the office of the IG of Foreign  Service and questioned the independence of Foreign Service officers who  were temporarily detailed from program offices to the IG’s office. In 1982,  we reviewed the operations of the IG and again expressed our concerns  about the independence of inspection staff reassigned to and from  management offices within the department. In these reports we stated that  the desire of State IG staff to receive favorable assignments after their  State IG tours could influence their objectivity. Reacting to concerns  similar to those in our 1982 report, the Congress established an IG for the  Department of State through amendments to the IG Act in both 1985 and  1986. The 1986 amendment requires the State IG continue to perform  inspections of the department’s bureaus and posts, but also prohibits a  career member of the Foreign Service from being appointed as the State  IG.
After almost three decades, we continue to have similar concerns  regarding the independence of the State IG’s operations. In our March  2007 report we stated that during a period of approximately 27 months—  from January 24, 2003, until May 2, 2005—four management officials from  the State Department were acting in an IG capacity. All four of these  officials served in the Foreign Service in prior line management positions,  including political appointments as U.S. ambassadors to foreign countries.  In addition, three of these officials returned to significant management  positions within the State Department after heading the IG office.  Therefore, over more than a 2-year period, oversight of the State  Department was being provided by the department’s own management  officials. The 1986 amendment to the IG Act that created the current IG  office prohibits a career Foreign Service official from becoming an IG of  the State Department due to concerns about personal impairments to  independence that could result. That same concern exists when Foreign  Service officials head the State IG in an acting capacity, resulting in  limitations to the independence and effectiveness of the office.
The second continuing concern discussed in our March 2007 report  regarding State IG independence deals with the use of Foreign Service  officers to lead inspections of the department’s bureaus and posts. This  practice creates the mistaken impression that because these inspections  are products of an IG office, they are performed with the appropriate IG  independence. However, State IG policy is for inspections to be led by  Foreign Service officers at the ambassador level who are expected to help  formulate, implement, and defend government policy. The resulting  conflict of interest for career Foreign Service staff and others at the  ambassador level who lead inspections that may criticize the department’s  policies provides an appearance of impaired independence to the State  IG’s inspection results.
To address these concerns about the independence of the State IG Office,  we recommended in our March 2007 report that the IG work with the  Secretary of State to develop a succession planning policy that would  prohibit career Foreign Service officers and other department managers  from heading the State IG office in an acting capacity and to develop  options to ensure that State IG inspections are not led by career Foreign  Service officials or other staff who rotate to assignments within State  Department management.
In formal comments to a draft of our March 2007 report, the State IG  agreed with our concerns about having career Foreign Service officers  serving in an acting IG capacity and acknowledged that the temporary  nature of such arrangements can have a debilitating effect on the office  particularly over a lengthy period of time. However, the State IG disagreed  with our recommendation that personnel with State Department  management careers also not be considered for acting IG positions due to  the need to obtain prompt and capable personnel to fill these positions.  Also, the State IG agreed that use of Foreign Service personnel at the  ambassador level to lead inspections does create an appearance of  impaired independence; however, the IG plans to continue this practice in  order to utilize the diplomatic expertise of these Foreign Service officers,  which the IG believes is necessary for inspections.
We disagree with the State IG’s comments. Independence is a critical  element for IG effectiveness and success and is at the heart of auditing  standards and the IG Act. The State IG’s reluctance to take steps that  would preclude career management officials from leading the office in an  acting IG capacity and to stop the practice of having Foreign Service  officers at the ambassador level lead inspections weakens the credibility  of the entire office. For example, appointing career department managers  as acting State IGs could have the practical effect of subjecting the State  IG to supervision by management officials other than the Secretary or  Deputy Secretary. As noted above, the IG Act limits supervision of the IG  to the head of the department or the principal deputy rather than lower- level managers as an important protection to the IG’s independence.
In addition, the State IG’s decision to accept impairments to the  appearance of independence for all inspections performed at the  department limits the usefulness of these results for both the department  and the Congress in taking appropriate actions. We agree that Foreign  Service expertise could be a part of the inspection team, but we disagree  with placing independence second to experience and expertise. The State  IG can achieve both objectives with the proper staffing and structuring of  its inspections. To illustrate, our position remains that the State IG’s  inspection teams should not be led by career Foreign Service officers and  ambassadors, but could include experienced ambassadors and staff at the  ambassador level as team members, consultants, or advisors to help  mitigate concerns about the appearance of independence caused by the  State IG’s current practice.
section_title: State IG’s Reliance on Inspections Results in Gaps in Audit Oversight for High Risk Areas
paragraphs: In addition to the specific requirements for independent audits and  investigations, the State IG has a unique statutory requirement to inspect  each post at least every 5 years. However, since 1996, the Congress,  through the department’s appropriations acts, annually waives the 5-year  requirement. Nevertheless, the State IG completed inspections at 223 of  the department’s 260 bureaus and posts over the 5-year period of fiscal  years 2001 through 2005. Consequently, the State IG relies on inspections  rather than audits to provide the primary oversight of the State  Department. As a comparison, in fiscal year 2005, the statutory IGs issued  a total of 443 inspection reports compared to 4,354 audit reports, a ratio of  inspections to audits of about 1 to 10. During the same year, the State IG  issued 99 inspection reports and 44 audit reports during fiscal year 2005,  or a ratio of inspections to audits of over 2 to 1.
A troubling outcome of the State IG’s heavy emphasis on inspections is the  resulting gaps in audit coverage for high-risk areas we have identified and  the management challenges reported annually by the State IG in the  department’s performance and accountability reports. In our reports of the  government’s high-risk areas issued in January 2003 and January 2005, we  identified seven such areas at the State Department, which were also  included in management challenges identified by the State IG. These  critical areas are (1) the physical security and protection of people and  facilities, (2) information security, (3) financial management, (4) human  resources, (5) counterterrorism and border security, (6) public diplomacy,  and (7) postconflict stabilization and reconstruction.
To illustrate the State IG’s reliance on inspections for oversight of these  areas during fiscal years 2004 and 2005 combined, the State IG covered  human resource issues with 1 audit and 103 inspections, counterterrorism  and border security with 2 audits and 190 inspections, public diplomacy  with 2 audits and 103 inspections, and information security with 1 audit  and 13 inspections. (See table 1.) The high-risk areas of physical security  and protection of people and facilities had limited audit coverage that  addressed specific contracts and procurements, whereas financial  management was covered by the State IG’s financial audits. Postconflict  stabilization and reconstruction was covered by both audits and  inspections.
Because of State IG’s heavy reliance on inspections, it is important to note  that there are fundamental differences between inspections and audits.  Audits performed under Government Auditing Standards are subject to  more in-depth requirements in the areas of sufficient, appropriate,  relevant, and complete evidence and documentation supporting the  findings than are inspections performed under the Quality Standards for  Inspections. Also, auditing standards require independent external  quality reviews of audits, or peer reviews, on a 3-year cycle, while  inspection standards do not call for any such external quality reviews.
We reviewed the documentation for 10 State IG inspections to gain an  understanding of the extent of documented evidence to support each  report’s findings and recommendations. We found that the inspectors  relied heavily on questionnaires completed by management at each bureau  or post that was inspected, official department documents,  correspondence and electronic mail, internal department memorandums,  interviews, and the inspection review summaries. We did not find any  examples of additional testing of evidence or sampling of agency  responses to questionnaires and interviews to test for the accuracy,  relevance, validity, and reliability of the information as would be required  by auditing standards. In other words, for the inspections we reviewed, the  State IG’s results relied on the responses of department management  through questionnaires, interviews, and agency documents without further  verification.
We also found that for 43 of the 183 recommendations contained in the 10  inspections we reviewed, the inspection files did not contain documented  support of any kind beyond the written summaries of the findings and  recommendations contained in the final inspection reports. While the  State IG’s inspection policies require that supporting documentation be  attached to the written summaries, the summaries indicated that there was  no additional supporting documentation. Due to the significance of the  high-risk areas covered largely by inspections, the limited nature of  inspections, and the appearance of impaired independence, the State IG  would benefit by reassessing the mix of audit and inspection coverage for  those areas.
In our March 2007 report, we recommended that in order to provide the  appropriate breadth and depth of oversight coverage at the department,  especially in high-risk areas and management challenges, the State IG  reassess the proper mix of audit and inspection coverage. This assessment  should include an analysis of an appropriate level of resources needed to  address the increasing growth of the department’s risks and  responsibilities.
In formal comments on our report, the State IG disagreed with our  recommendation to reassess the mix of audit and inspection coverage  while agreeing that inspections are much more subjective than audits and  have a different level of requirements for evidence. The State IG explained  that the use of inspections is due to the congressional mandate for IG  inspections, which has been waived annually late in the IG’s planning  cycle, and the limited resources to hire more auditors. Therefore, things  that could be done in an audit have to be done through inspections.
We remain concerned that the State IG’s current mix of audits and  inspections does not provide adequate independent oversight. In addition,  the State IG’s use of inspections can create an “expectation gap” that  inspections will have the same credibility and independence as the IG’s  audits. By ultimately placing the results of inspections in the IG’s  semiannual reports without clarifying that they are a substitute for audit  coverage and are fundamentally limited in their results, the IG may be  creating a misleading image of oversight coverage of the department and  its high-risk areas.
section_title: Department Lacks Assurance of Obtaining Independent IG Investigations
paragraphs: The IG Act, as amended, established the State IG to conduct and supervise  independent investigations, in addition to audits, in order to prevent and  detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in the State Department.  In addition, the department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), as part  of its worldwide responsibilities for law enforcement and security  operations, also performs investigations that include passport and visa  fraud both externally and within the department.
While both the State IG and DS pursue allegations of passport and visa  fraud by State Department employees, DS reports organizationally to the  State Department Undersecretary for Management and is performing  investigations as a function of management. Therefore, DS investigations  of department employees, especially when management officials are the  subjects of allegations, can result in management investigating itself. In  contrast, the State IG is required by the IG Act to be independent of the  offices and functions it investigates. However, State IG officials stated that  they were aware of DS investigations in these areas that were not  coordinated with the State IG.
Our March 2007 report noted that DS and the State IG had no functional  written agreement or other formal mechanism in place to coordinate their  investigative activities. Without a formal agreement to outline the  responsibilities of both DS and the State IG regarding these investigations,  there is inadequate assurance that this work will be coordinated to avoid  duplication or that independent investigations of department personnel  will be performed. Moreover, we also reported that in fiscal year 2005, DS  entailed a global force of approximately 32,000 special agents, security  specialists, and other professionals who make up the security and law  enforcement arm of the State Department. In contrast, the State IG, which  also has global responsibilities for independent investigations of the State  Department, had a total of 21 positions in its investigative office with 10  investigators onboard at the time of our review.
In other federal agencies where significant law enforcement functions like  those of DS exist alongside their IGs, the division of investigative functions  between the agency and the IG is established through written agreement.  Our March report provides examples of formal written agreements  between (1) the U.S. Postal Service IG and the Chief Postal Inspector who  heads the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and (2) the Treasury Inspector  General for Tax Administration and the Internal Revenue Service’s  Criminal Investigation. These signed memorandums can serve as models  for a formal agreement between DS and the State IG for delineating  jurisdiction in investigative matters to help ensure that the independence  requirements of the IG Act are implemented.
In order to provide for independent investigations of State Department  management and to prevent duplicative investigations, we recommended  in our March 2007 report that the State IG work with DS and the Secretary  of State to develop a formal, written agreement that delineates the areas of  responsibility for State Department investigations. In comments on our  report, the State IG agreed with this recommendation.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The mission of the State IG is critical to providing independent and  objective oversight of the State Department and identifying any  mismanagement of scarce taxpayer dollars. However, the effectiveness of  the IG’s oversight is limited by the lack of resources, the lack of an  appearance of independence, gaps in audit coverage of high-risk areas,  and the lack of assurance that investigations of internal department  operations are performed by independent IG investigators. We made  recommendations to address each of these areas in our related report  (GAO-07-138). Overall, our recommendations are intended to assist in  strengthening the IG office and the independence and effectiveness of  oversight of the State Department.
We remain concerned about the weaknesses identified especially in light  of the State IG’s response to our March 2007 report. The State IG’s  comments to our report defend the status quo, and indicate an inadequate  concern and regard for the independence necessary to provide effective  and credible oversight of the department. Consequently, we reiterated the  importance of our recommendations because of our continuing concerns  about the adequacy of independent oversight provided by the State IG.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee  might have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any additional questions on matters discussed in this  testimony, please contact Jeanette Franzel at (202) 512-9471 or by e-mail at  franzelj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  testimony. Other key contributors to this testimony include Jackson  Hufnagle (Assistant Director) and Clarence Whitt.
section_title: Appendix I: A Comparison of Agency and IG Fiscal Year 2006 Budgetary Resources
paragraphs: Corporation for National and Community  Service  Treasury Inspector General for Tax  Administration  Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
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