U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain
Published: 2004-08-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many or most people had a favorable view of the United States and its fight against terrorism. By 2003, opinion research indicated that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, viewed the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11, 2001, within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); (2) the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and measures of effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to address planning and performance issues. Both agencies agreed with these recommendations and have made some progress in implementing them. On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its report and recommendations. Two of the Commission's recommendations relate to the management of U.S. public diplomacy. For this testimony, GAO was asked to discuss its prior work as it relates to these recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. These initiatives are consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that the United States rebuild its scholarship, library, and exchange programs overseas. Since 9/11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. The 9/11 Commission report highlights these broadcast efforts and recommends that funding for such efforts be expanded. While State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism, we found that there is no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and other federal agencies' communication efforts. The absence of such a strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages to overseas audiences. Likewise, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States do a better job defining its public diplomacy message. In addition, we found that State does not have a strategy that integrates and aligns all its diverse public diplomacy activities. State, noting the need to fix the problem, recently established a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. The BBG did have a strategic plan, but the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan. We also found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. The BBG subsequently made audience size a key performance goal and added broadcaster credibility and plans to add other performance measures that GAO recommended. In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. State officials are trying to address staffing gaps through increased recruitment. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. It has developed a number of solutions to address these challenges.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s issued work on U.S. public  diplomacy efforts and to focus specifically on the Middle East and related  recommendations by the 9/11 Commission report. The terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of  cultivating a favorable public opinion of the United States abroad. Recent  opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries  with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. Last  September, we reported to the House International Relations Committee  on the State Department’s public diplomacy efforts. In July 2003, we  issued a report for that committee on the progress that the Broadcasting  Board of Governors (BBG)—the agency responsible for nonmilitary U.S.  international broadcasting—has made in developing a new strategic  approach to reverse declining audience trends and support U.S. strategic  objectives such as the war on terrorism. The Department of State and the  BBG share an annual budget of more than $1 billion for public diplomacy  activities. While neither of our reports focused exclusively on the Middle  East, each identified systemic problems that would apply to public  diplomacy activities there.
Mr. Chairman, on February 10, 2004, I testified before you and this  Subcommittee on public diplomacy. Today, I will present a similar  statement updated in light of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on  public diplomacy. I will address (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy  resources and programs since September 11, 2001; (2) the government’s  strategies for its public diplomacy programs and measures of  effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public  diplomacy efforts. My testimony will highlight our findings that are  relevant to specific 9/11 Commission recommendations to (1) rebuild our  scholarship, exchange, and library programs overseas, and increase  support for broadcasting to Arabs and Muslims; and (2) better define the  U.S.’s public diplomacy message.
As part of our past work underpinning our issued reports, we surveyed top  officials of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide on such  issues as guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency of  budgetary, staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately measure  performance. We met with relevant State officials, members of the BBG,  and senior members of each broadcast entity to discuss management  issues. We also met with academics specializing in public diplomacy and  international affairs issues, and private sector officials from U.S. public  relations and opinion research firms with international operations. While  several government entities conduct public diplomacy activities, my  comments will focus on State’s and BBG’s efforts since they were the  subject of our work. We conducted our work from May 2002 to May 2003  and in August 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and  influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a  wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print,  broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S.  public diplomacy focused on foreign elites—current and future overseas  opinion leaders, agenda setters, and decision makers. However, the  dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have  forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider  techniques for communicating with broader foreign audiences. The BBG,  as the overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, supports U.S.  public diplomacy’s key objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate  information about the United States, while maintaining its journalistic  independence as a news organization. The BBG manages and oversees the  Voice of America (VOA), WorldNet Television, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free  Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Farda, the Middle East Television Network  (which consists of Radio Sawa and Alhurra, the Board’s new Arabic  language television station), the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio  Free Asia. Radio Sawa, Alhurra, and Radio Farda (Iran), provide regional  and local news to countries in the Middle East.
Together, State and the BBG spend in excess of $1 billion on public  diplomacy programs each year. State’s public diplomacy budget totaled an  estimated $628 million in fiscal year 2004. About 51 percent, or $320  million, is slated for the Fulbright and other educational and cultural  exchange programs. The remainder covers mostly salaries and expenses  incurred by State and embassy officers engaged in information  dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, speaker programs,  publications, and other activities. BBG’s budget for fiscal year 2004 is $546  million. This includes more than $42 million for radio and television  broadcasting to the Middle East. Since initiating the language service  review process in 1999, the Board has reduced the scope of operations of  more than 25 language services and reallocated about $19.7 million in  funds, with the majority redirected toward Central Asia and the Middle  East, including $8 million for Radio Farda service to Iran.
section_title: More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim- Majority Countries
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim- majority countries that are considered strategically important in the war  on terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and  number of Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near  Eastern Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives  targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly  Muslim countries—that include expanding exchange programs targeting  citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies  in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims  share certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to  support the war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the  Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. In  addition, the Board expanded its presence in the Middle East through the  launch of the Alhurra satellite television network in mid-February 2004.  The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States rely on such  programs and activities to vigorously defend our ideals abroad, just as the  United States did during the Cold War.
subsections: section_title: State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its  resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim  countries. For example, while State’s bureau of Europe and Eurasia still  receives the largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources,  the largest percentage increases in such resources since September 11  occurred in State’s bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs,  where many countries have significant Muslim populations. Public  diplomacy funding increased in South Asia from $24 million to $39 million  and in the Near East from $39 million to $62 million, or by 63 and 58  percent, respectively, from fiscal year 2001 through 2003. During the same  period, authorized American Foreign Service officers in South Asia  increased from 27 to 31 and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15  percent and 27 percent, respectively.
Furthermore, in 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources  to better support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement  with Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize  exchanges with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning  Program—designed to target young and diverse audiences through  academic and professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International  Visitor, and Citizen Exchange programs. According to State, under this  program, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries  have already arrived and are living with American families and studying at  local high schools. State has also carried out increased exchanges through  its Middle East Partnership Initiative, which includes computer and  English language training for women newly employed by the Afghan  government and a program to assist women from Arab countries and  elsewhere in observing and discussing the U.S. electoral process. In  addition, State is expanding its American Corners program, as  recommended by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in October  2003. This program uses space in public libraries and other public  buildings abroad to provide information about the United States. In fiscal  year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American Corners in the East  and South Asia. In fiscal year 2005, State plans to open 10 in Afghanistan  and 15 in Iraq.
State’s Office of International Information Programs has also developed  new initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including a print and  electronic pamphlet titled The Network of Terrorism, distributed in 36  languages via hard copy, the Web, and media throughout the world, which  documented the direct link between the September 11 perpetrators and al  Qaeda; and a publication titled Iraq: From Fear to Freedom to inform  foreign audiences of the administration’s policies toward Iraq.
section_title: New BBG Initiatives Target Large Audiences in Priority Markets
paragraphs: Several of the BBG’s new initiatives focus on reaching large audiences in  priority markets and supporting the war on terrorism. The first of these  programs, Radio Sawa in the Middle East, was launched in March 2002  using modern, market-tested broadcasting techniques and practices, such  as the extensive use of music formats. Radio Sawa replaced the poorly  performing VOA Arabic service, which had listening rates at around 2  percent of the population. According to BBG survey research, Radio Sawa  is reaching 51 percent of its target audience and is ranked highest for news  and news trustworthiness in Amman, Jordan. Despite such results, it  remains unclear how many people Radio Sawa reaches throughout the  entire Middle East because audience research has been performed only in  selected markets. Further, the State Inspector General and the Advisory  Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have raised  questions about whether Radio Sawa has focused more on audience size  and composition than on potential impact on attitudes in the region. The  BBG has also launched the Afghanistan Radio Network and a language  service to Iran called Radio Farda. Estimated costs for these three  initiatives through fiscal year 2003 are about $116 million. In addition, the  Board started Alhurra, an Arabic language television network in the  Middle East, in mid-February 2004.
section_title: Planning Deficiencies, Inability to Gauge Progress Toward Goals Hinder U.S. Public Diplomacy Efforts
paragraphs: While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks the recognition  of the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population, there still is  no interagency strategy to guide State’s and all federal agencies’  communication efforts and ensure consistent messages to overseas  audiences. In addition, as of June 2004, State still lacked a comprehensive  and commonly understood public diplomacy strategy to guide its  programs. We agree with the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the  U.S. government must define its message. State also is not systematically  or comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals.  In addition, we found that , although BBG has a strategic plan, the plan  lacks a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the  Board’s success in increasing audience size. Further, the BBG’s plan  contains no measurable program objectives to support the plan’s strategic  goals or to provide a basis for assessing the Board’s performance. Since  our report, however, the Board revised its strategic plan and has improved  its ability to gauge its program effectiveness measures by adding broadcast  credibility and audience awareness measures. The Board also plans to add  additional performance measures, such as whether broadcast entities are  achieving their mandated missions.
subsections: section_title: Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy Has Not Been Established
paragraphs: No interagency public diplomacy strategy has been implemented that lays  out the messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts  to overseas audiences. The absence of an interagency strategy complicates  the task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually  reinforcing benefits. State officials told us that, without such a strategy,  the risk of making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S.  public diplomacy efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a strategy  diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public  diplomacy efforts.
Our fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance of  interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a very  small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of U.S.  assistance provided to their countries. Egypt is the second largest  recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance totaling more  than an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to Morocco totaled more  than $13 million in 2003.
Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in  recent years. Immediately after September 11, 2001, the White House,  State Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated  various public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White  House established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One  such mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information  Centers in Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early  stages of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were  designed to provide a rapid response capability for correcting inaccurate  news stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to generate  negative responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news favorable  to U.S. efforts.
In January 2003, the President established a more permanent coordination  mechanism, the White House Office of Global Communications, which is  intended to coordinate strategic communications from the U.S.  government to overseas audiences. The President also established the  Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by  the State Department and the National Security Council and to work  closely with the Office of Global Communications, to ensure interagency  coordination in disseminating the U.S. message across the globe. Although  it is the committee’s long-term objective to develop a National  Communications Strategy, according to recent conversations with U.S.  officials, the committee has not met since March 2003.
section_title: State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide Public Diplomacy Operations
paragraphs: After September 11, State acknowledged the need for a strategy that  integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them  toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in the  development stage. State officials told us that such a strategy is  particularly important because State’s public diplomacy operation is  fragmented among the various organizational entities within the agency.  Public affairs officers who responded to our survey indicated that the lack  of a strategy has hindered their ability to effectively execute public  diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66 percent of public affairs officers  in one region reported that the quality of strategic guidance from the  Office of the Undersecretary at the time of our review (10/01-3/03) was  generally insufficient or very insufficient. More than 40 percent in another  region reported the same. We encountered similar complaints during our  overseas fieldwork. For example, in Morocco, the former public affairs  officer stated that so little information had been provided from  Washington on State’s post-September 11 public diplomacy strategy that  he had to rely on newspaper articles and guesswork to formulate his in- country public diplomacy plans.
During our audit work, we learned that private sector public relations  efforts and political campaigns use sophisticated strategies to integrate  complex communication efforts involving multiple players. Although  State’s public diplomacy efforts extend beyond the activities of public  relations firms, many of the strategic tools that such firms employ are  relevant to State’s situation. While it is difficult to establish direct links  between public diplomacy programs and results, other U.S. government  agencies and the private sector have best practices for assessing  information disseminating campaigns, including the need to define success  and how it should be measured. Executives from some of the largest  public relations firms in the United States told us that initial strategic  decisions involve establishing the scope and nature of the problem,  identifying the target audience, determining the core messages, and  defining both success and failure. Subsequent steps include conducting  research to validate the initial decisions, testing the core messages,  carrying out pre-launch activities, and developing information materials.  Each of these elements contains numerous other steps that must be  completed before implementing a tactical program. Further, progress must  be measured continuously and tactics adjusted accordingly.
section_title: State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals
paragraphs: We also found that State is not systematically and comprehensively  measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas  performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and  program outputs, rather than gauging progress toward changing foreign  publics’ understanding and attitudes about the United States. Some posts  judge the effectiveness of their public diplomacy efforts by simply  counting the number of public diplomacy activities that occur in their host  country—for example, the number of speeches given by the ambassador  or the number of news articles placed in the host-country media. While  such measures shed light on the level of public diplomacy activity, they  reveal little in the way of overall program effectiveness.
State currently has no reporting requirements in place to determine  whether posts’ performance targets are actually met. At one overseas post  we visited, the post had identified polling data showing that only 22  percent of the host country’s citizens had a favorable view of the United  States—a figure the post used as a baseline with yearly percentage  increases set as targets. However, a former public affairs officer at the  post told us that he did not attempt to determine or report on whether the  post had actually achieved these targets because there was no requirement  to do so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited also cited the  lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up on whether they  met their annual performance targets. An official in State’s Office of  Strategic and Performance Planning said that they have now begun to  require posts to report on whether they have met performance targets.
Furthermore, public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not  conduct systematic program evaluations. About 79 percent of the  respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their missions was  insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations. Many officers also  reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to carry out the long-range  monitoring required to adequately measure program effectiveness. Even if  sufficient staffing were available, State would still have difficulty  conducting long-range tracking of exchange participants because it lacks a  database with comprehensive information on its various exchange  program alumni. State had planned to begin building a new worldwide  alumni database with comprehensive data linking all of its various  exchange programs. However, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs  officials told us they had received insufficient funds to do so, and thus are  seeking to improve existing information systems for individual exchange  programs.
section_title: BBG Has Strategy for International Broadcasting and Has Made Progress in Measuring Performance
paragraphs: In contrast to State’s lack of strategy, BBG has introduced a market-based  approach to international broadcasting that aims to generate large  listening audiences in priority markets that the Board believes it must  reach to effectively meet its mission. Early implementation of this strategy  has focused on markets relevant to the war on terrorism, in particular the  Middle East. The Board’s vision is to create a flexible, multimedia,  research-driven U.S. international broadcasting system that addresses the  many challenges we noted in our report, including an organizational  structure that consists of several broadcast entities with differing  missions, broadcast approaches, and constituencies.
In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the plan  did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to  gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy  focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. We also  found that the plan lacked measurable program objectives to support its  strategic goals, including a broadcaster credibility measure. The Board has  taken several steps to address the recommendations we made in our  report. First, the Board created a single strategic goal to focus on the key  objective of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the United  States and made audience size a key performance measure. Second, the  Board has added broadcast credibility and plans to add the additional  performance measures we recommended, including audience awareness  and whether broadcast entities are achieving their mandated missions.
section_title: A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities
paragraphs: Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy  resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and the  need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy with  measurable indicators of progress. There are other challenges our  government faces in executing successful public diplomacy activities.  According to public affairs officers, these challenges include insufficient  time and staffing resources to conduct public diplomacy tasks. In addition,  many public affairs officers reported that the time available to attend  public diplomacy training is inadequate. Furthermore, a significant  number of Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy efforts  overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. The Board’s key challenge  in executing its strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing  with a number of media market, organizational, and resources issues.
subsections: section_title: Insufficient Time and Staff
paragraphs: More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed reported  that the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to executing public  diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas fieldwork, officers  told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and other foreign embassy  receptions and functions within their host country capitals, it was  particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to interact  with ordinary citizens. More than 50 percent of those responding to our  survey reported that the number of Foreign Service officers available to  perform public diplomacy duties was inadequate. Although State increased  the actual number of Americans in public diplomacy positions overseas  from 414 in fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal year 2002, State still had a  shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based on the projected needs  identified in State’s 2002 overseas staffing model. In 2002, State’s overseas  staffing model projected the need for 512 staff in these positions; however,  64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were not filled. In addition, about 58  percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections reported that  Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for training in the skills  required to effectively conduct public diplomacy.
We reported in 2002 that as part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,  State has launched an aggressive recruiting program to rebuild the  department’s total workforce. Under this initiative, State requested 1,158  new employees above attrition over the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002  through 2004, and according to State officials, the department has met its  hiring goals under this initiative for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. However, it  does not have numerical targets for specific skill requirements such as  language proficiency or regional expertise. Although State officials are  optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to address the  overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the recruiting efforts  will result in the right people with the right skills needed to meet specific  critical shortfalls.
section_title: Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills
paragraphs: Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many  officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign Service  officers filling “language-designated” public diplomacy positions overseas  did not meet the foreign language speaking requirements of their  positions. The highest percentages not meeting the requirements were in  the Near East, where 30 percent of the officers did not meet the  requirement. Although State had no language-designated positions for  South Asia, it had eight language-preferred positions, none of which was  filled by officers who had reading or speaking capability in those  languages. It is important to note that most of the foreign languages  required in these two regions, such as Arabic and Urdu, are considered  difficult to master. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling French  language-designated positions and 97 percent of those filling Spanish  language-designated ones met the requirements. Officers’ opinions on the  quality of the foreign language training they received also varied greatly by  region. The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy noted this challenge and  recommended an increase in public diplomacy staff dedicated to issues of  the Arab and Muslim world, with specific emphasis on enhancing fluency  in local languages.
Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited and  other State officials told us that having fluency in a host country’s  language is important for effectively conducting public diplomacy. The  foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt, Morocco, and  the United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in countries where  English is widely understood, speaking the host country’s language  demonstrates respect for its people and its culture. In Morocco, officers in  the public affairs and other sections of the embassy told us that, because  their ability to speak Arabic was poor, they conducted most embassy  business in French. French is widely used in that country, especially in  business and government. However, embassy officers told us that  speaking Arabic would provide superior entrée to the Moroccan public.  The ability to speak country-specific forms of Arabic and other more  obscure dialects would generate even more goodwill, especially outside  the major cities.
According to the department, the largest and most significant factor  limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-standing  staffing shortfall, which State’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is designed  to fill. Other planned actions include bolstering efforts to recruit job  candidates with target language skills, sending language training  supervisors to posts to determine ways to improve training offerings, and  developing a new “language continuum” plan to guide efforts to meet the  need for higher levels of competency in all languages, especially those  critical to national security concerns.
section_title: Outdated Broadcast Services and Structure Pose Challenges to Expanding in Priority Markets
paragraphs: The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy  challenges, key among them is how to gain large audiences in priority  markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and  noncompetitive language services, (2) a disparate organizational structure  consisting of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency  and grantee organizations that are managed by a part-time Board of  Governors, and (3) the resource challenge of broadcasting in 97 language  services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. Although its  strategic plan identifies a number of solutions to the competitive  challenges the Board faces and provides a new organizational model for  U.S. international broadcasting, we found that the Board’s plan did not  include specifics on implementation strategies, resource requirements,  project time frames, or a clear vision of the Board’s intended scope of  operations. The Board recently completed a review of the overlap issue  and identified six approaches to addressing the problem while still  meeting the discrete missions of the Voice of America and other broadcast  entities. All of the Board’s overlapping services were assessed against this  analytical framework, and more than $9.7 million in potential savings for  priority initiatives were identified. However, the Board has yet to revise its  strategic plan to include details on implementation strategies, resource  requirements, and project timeframes for the various initiatives supporting  its overarching strategic goal of increasing program impact.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may  have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or  Diana Glod at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this  testimony included Robert Ball, Lynn Cothern, and Michael ten Kate.
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