Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Better Protect National Icons and Federal Office Buildings from Terrorism
Published: 2005-06-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The threat of terrorism has made physical security for federal real property assets a major concern. Protecting these assets can be particularly complex and contentious for agencies whose missions include ensuring public access such as the Department of the Interior (Interior) and the General Services Administration (GSA). GAO's objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that Interior faces in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as related actions intended to address these challenges; and similarly, (2) determine any challenges GSA faces related to the protection of federal office buildings it owns or leases and actions that have been taken.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Interior faces a range of major challenges in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism--these include balancing security and public access; addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues; and securing assets in rugged, remote areas. In addition, there was concern among Interior officials about the department's ability to leverage limited resources for security. Since September 11, 2001, Interior has improved security at high-profile sites, created a central security office to oversee its security efforts, developed physical security plans required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and developed a uniform risk management and ranking methodology. As Interior moves forward, linking the results of its risk rankings to security funding priorities at national icons and monuments is an important next step. Also, given Interior's complex and often contentious environment, setting forth the guiding principles by which the department balances its core mission with security could have benefits. Other organizations have used guiding principles to foster greater transparency in complex environments. GSA also faces a range of major challenges, some similar to Interior's, that include balancing security and public access, addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues, securing federally leased space, and adjusting to the transfer of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) from GSA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Actions GSA has taken to address the challenges include working to develop security standards for securing leased space and establishing a memorandum of agreement with DHS on security at GSA's facilities. However, despite these actions, GSA lacks a mechanism--such as a chief security officer position or formal point of contact--that could serve in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the challenges GSA faces related to security at its buildings, and enable GSA to better define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS to DHS.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in  Oklahoma City and the September 11, 2001, attacks, federal agencies have  devoted significant resources and attention to the physical security of their  real property assets. Protecting federal real property assets can be  particularly complex and contentious for agencies whose missions include  ensuring public access to their assets, including the Department of the  Interior (Interior) and the General Services Administration (GSA). Interior  and its eight bureaus are charged with protecting the nation’s natural,  historic, and cultural treasures, including thousands of facilities. GSA  houses agencies in over 8,000 owned and leased facilities that contain  roughly 338 million square feet. These facilities are used by over a million  federal employees and contractors and are visited by citizens receiving  services from, and conducting business with, the federal government.
In November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was  created to bring a central focus to the government’s efforts to prevent and  respond to terrorist threats, including threats to its physical infrastructure.  DHS, through its Federal Protective Service (FPS), is directly responsible  for law enforcement and related security functions at GSA facilities and  also provides policy leadership on facility protection issues to other  agencies, including Interior. Although law enforcement and related security  functions were transferred from GSA to DHS when FPS transferred to  DHS, GSA officials said that it still assists FPS and tenant agencies with  facility security, implements various security measures that FPS  recommends, and incorporates enhanced security measures into new  space it constructs or leases.
Our objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that Interior faces in  protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as related  actions intended to address these challenges; and similarly, (2) determine  any challenges GSA faces related to the protection of office buildings it  owns or leases and the actions that have been taken. To do this work, we  interviewed officials from Interior, including officials at the department  level, the National Park Service (Park Service), U.S. Park Police (Park  Police), and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR); GSA; and DHS, including  FPS. We also interviewed other agencies and organizations that have an  interest in security issues, including the National Capital Planning  Commission and the National Parks Conservation Association. We also  reviewed pertinent documents and policies that we obtained from these  agencies and related laws and directives. Our work included visiting sites  that Interior and GSA identified as particularly illustrative of the challenges  they face and how they are trying to address them. Additional information  about our methodology and the sites we visited, along with a complete  description of the organizations we interviewed, appears at the end of this  report. We conducted our work between January 2004 and March 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Separately, we issued a “For Official Use Only” report detailing the results  of our review. This version of the report, for public release, provides a  general summary of the challenges identified and our recommendations to  help Interior and GSA enhance their protection of national icons and  federal office buildings from terrorism. (The “For Official Use Only” report  provided technical details to assist Interior and GSA in their efforts.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Interior is responsible for the safety of 70,000 employees and 200,000  volunteers, 1.3 million daily visitors, and over 507 million acres of public  lands that include a number of sites of historical or national significance  (national monuments and icons), and the security of dams and reservoirs.  The Park Service’s mission is the unimpaired preservation of the natural  and cultural resources and values of the national park system for the  enjoyment, education, and inspiration of current and future generations.  According to Interior officials, the Park Service cooperates with various  partners to extend the benefits of natural and cultural resource  conservation and outdoor recreation throughout this country and the  world. Within Interior, the Park Service is responsible for managing and  protecting some of the nation’s most treasured icons, including the  Washington Monument, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, the Statue of  Liberty, Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia, and Mt.  Rushmore in South Dakota. The Park Service welcomes 428 million visitors  to its 388 national park units each year throughout the United States,  American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
The Park Police provides security and law enforcement services to Park  Service monuments and memorials in the District of Columbia, New York  City, and in conjunction with Park Service rangers in San Francisco. Park  superintendents and rangers manage and provide security and law  enforcement services at the other parks throughout the United States in  conjunction with their other duties. These other duties include  management of public use, dissemination of scientific and historical  information, and protection and management of natural and cultural  resources.
Among Interior’s other bureaus, BOR has an important role in protecting  critical infrastructure because of its responsibilities related to dams. BOR’s  core mission is to manage, develop, and protect water and related  resources in an environmentally and economically sound manner. It is the  largest wholesale water supplier in the nation, delivering 10 trillion gallons  of water to over 30 million people each year. According to information from  BOR, it manages 471 dams, making it the nation’s second largest producer  of hydropower; the dams generate approximately 42 billion kilowatt hours  each year. BOR, among other things, is responsible for managing and  protecting well-known assets, such as Hoover Dam in Arizona and Nevada.
While Interior is responsible for protecting icons, monuments, and dams,  GSA serves as the federal government’s landlord and designs, builds, and  manages facilities to support the needs of other federal agencies  throughout all three branches of government. GSA is responsible for  managing over 8,000 owned and leased buildings that comprise roughly 3  billion square feet of building floor area. FPS was created in 1971 to  provide security services and law enforcement to GSA-owned facilities  across the United States. FPS has the authority to, among other things;  enforce laws and regulations that protect federal property, and persons on  such property, and conduct investigations. As a result of the Homeland  Security Act, 22 agencies—including FPS—were centralized under DHS,  and FPS retained its role related to law enforcement and security at GSA  buildings. In accordance with the act, the transfer of FPS from GSA to DHS  became effective on March 1, 2003. GSA officials said that GSA still assists  FPS and tenant agencies with facility security, implements various security  measures that FPS recommends, and incorporates enhanced security  measures into new space it constructs or leases. Within DHS, FPS fell  under the authority of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),  which, according to DHS, is its largest investigative arm. DHS also chairs  ISC, which has representation from all the major property-holding agencies  and was established after the Oklahoma City bombing. ISC has a range of  governmentwide responsibilities related to protecting nonmilitary  facilities. In July 2004, we reported on issues related to the transfer of FPS  from GSA to DHS; and in November 2004, we reported on progress ISC has  made and key practices in facility protection.
section_title: Terrorist Threat Poses a Range of Challenges for Interior in Protecting National Icons and Monuments
paragraphs: The September 11 attacks demonstrated the nation’s vulnerability to the  threat posed by formidable, well-organized terrorists. As evidenced by the  attacks, the terrorists are sophisticated, relentless, and patient in their  planning and execution. This new type of threat represents a shift from  historical assumptions about national security, where the military, foreign  policy establishment, and intelligence community are responsible for  protecting the nation, to a new paradigm where others—such as Interior,  state and local governments, and the private sector—also have a role in  homeland security. National icons and monuments represent the nation’s  heritage, tradition, values, and political power. Among Interior assets that  could logically be categorized as potential symbolic targets are national  icons and monuments such as Mt. Rushmore and the Washington  Monument. Destroying these icons would likely have a profound effect on  the nation’s morale. In addition, Interior’s portfolio includes assets that are  part of the nation’s critical infrastructure, such as the 471 dams it operates  that provide hydropower to Western states. Information from Interior  shows that these assets are vulnerable to attack in a variety of ways and  that Interior faces a range of challenges to improving protection. These  challenges include the inherent conflict between security and public  access, jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder issues regarding  such matters as access and oversight of enhancements, the effect that the  rugged and remote location of some assets has on perimeter security, and  the ability to leverage available resources to address vulnerabilities by  implementing security enhancements.
subsections: section_title: Balancing Security with Public Access at Icons and Monuments Is a Major Challenge
paragraphs: Interior officials and staff at the icons and monuments we visited  acknowledged, and the Interior Inspector General (IG) has reported, that  balancing security with access is a major challenge facing the department.  Implementing appropriate physical protection measures can be a challenge  because such measures often run counter to societal values that associate  access to icons and monuments with living in a free society. And, the core  missions of some of the Interior’s agencies—including the Park Service— reflect a high level of public accessibility and interaction. As reported by  the Interior IG and discussed by Interior officials we interviewed, the  organizational challenge of shifting to a homeland security focus in a  culture rooted in preservation and education is also significant. Overall,  the challenge of balancing protection against terrorism with public access  is formidable and transcends other challenges Interior faces, including  jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests.
subsections: section_title: Security versus Access: The Statue of Liberty
paragraphs: The Park Service’s efforts to balance security with access at the Statue of  Liberty demonstrate this challenge. The Statue of Liberty is one of the  nation’s most treasured sites and is an international symbol of American  values. Located on 12-acre Liberty Island in New York Harbor, the Statue of  Liberty was a gift of international friendship from the people of France to  the people of the United States and is one of the most universal symbols of  political freedom and democracy. It is a popular tourist attraction for  visitors from around the world. In fiscal year 2003, over 3.2 million people  visited the Statue. Park Service management of the Statue of Liberty and  Liberty Island also includes Ellis Island and its facilities. The Statue  consists of three sections: the Statue, the pedestal, and a base known as  Fort Wood. The Park Service and Park Police oversee the monument’s  security program, including operation of screening facilities housed at  Battery Park in Lower Manhattan in New York and Liberty State Park in  New Jersey. Park Service and Park Police officials consider these locations,  plus Governor’s Island, part of a 5-point security perimeter that they  monitor within New York Harbor. Figure 1 shows the Statue of Liberty,  which is surrounded by New York Harbor.
Due to concerns about additional terrorist attacks, the Park Service closed  Liberty Island and the Statue of Liberty immediately following September  11. The Park Service reopened Liberty Island in December 2001 but  refrained from allowing access to the Statue until additional security and  fire safety assessments could be done. These assessments identified a  number of steps that needed to be taken before visitors could be allowed  back into the Statue. In addition, the primary threats included aerial attacks  and explosives detonated inside the structure.
In August 2004, the Park Service reopened the Statue to visitors with  access restricted to the top of the pedestal and the exterior observation  deck. The security improvements were primarily aimed at preventing  would-be terrorists from gaining access to the interior of the Statue and its  grounds. Under this revised plan, visitors are able to tour the Statue of  Liberty Museum, see close-up views of the statue from the promenade,  view the inside structural elements of the statue, and experience a 360- degree panoramic view of New York Harbor from the observation deck. In  addition, the Park Service and Park Police implemented other  improvements, including more rigorous visitor screening, better explosive  detection capabilities, improved fire safety, and enhanced communications.  Park Service officials also noted that new barriers were installed at the  Ellis Island service bridge and that Park Service and Park Police staffing  has been increased since September 11 to implement the improved security  plan. The Park Service reported in mid-2004 that, to make these  improvements, it had invested $19.6 million and was anticipating an  additional $9 million in future spending. In addition, the Park Service  reported that the Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation, which is a  consortium of private donors, had partnered with the Park Service to assist  with funding a number of the safety improvements. Figure 2 shows the  security checkpoint for Liberty Island.
According to Park Service officials, the issue of public access to the Statue  received high visibility and publicity while a new security plan was being  developed. Some of the editorial press from this time expressed a concern  that by closing the Statue, it had “ceded to al Qaeda.” The Mayor of New  York was quoted in a newspaper saying that as long as the Statue is closed,  “in some sense, the terrorists have won.” Interior and Park Service officials  said that it was difficult to communicate the rationale for initially  prohibiting, then later limiting, public access to the Statue without  revealing the specific vulnerabilities that led to their decisions. A major  reason for limiting access to the Statue was the need to adhere to building  codes related to fire safety. For example, the Statue did not meet standards  for exits and fire suppression capability. However, Interior and Park  Service officials were also concerned with the security vulnerabilities of  the Statue and the fact that knowledge of these vulnerabilities could make  the Statue an even more attractive target. Although many security  improvements have been implemented at the Statue of Liberty National  Monument and Ellis Island, Park Service officials noted that several key  security challenges remain.
section_title: Security versus Access: Hoover Dam
paragraphs: Hoover Dam in Nevada and Arizona is another icon that presents Interior  with challenges related to public access. Located approximately 38 miles  southeast of Las Vegas, Hoover Dam is a national, historical, hydrological,  and structural icon that is part of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  Managed by BOR, it receives approximately 1 million paid visitors every  year and provides water and electricity for millions of people throughout  the Southwest. Its 4.4 million cubic yards of concrete is recognized as a  marvel of civil engineering. In addition, nearly 9 million people visit  adjacent Lake Mead every year, which is the nation’s largest man-made lake  and is a national recreational area managed by the Park Service. Hoover  generates electricity for southwestern states through its 17 turbines using  water from Lake Mead. Also, Interstate 93 sits on top of the dam, serving as  the region’s main vehicular route across the Colorado River.
According to BOR officials, following the terrorist attacks of September 11,  BOR implemented a range of security enhancements, such as hiring  additional security officers and guards and revising and canceling some  public tours. In addition, BOR is taking steps to provide a long-term  solution for its biggest security concern to visitors—the proximity of  Interstate 93 to large crowds of visitors who also have access to the top of  the dam. Related to security staffing, BOR nearly doubled the number of  federal police officers and added new contract security guards. To help  control the flow of tourists and provide additional security, BOR added  access doors, and contract guards to certain areas of the visitor center.  BOR also improved security at the visitor center by adding blast-resistant  films to the windows. In addition, BOR improved gates and fencing in some  areas surrounding the dam to improve perimeter security. BOR also  installed a series of buoys and linked “boom lines” to serve as a security  perimeter at water access points. Figure 3 shows the dam and a linked  boom line in the water.
To further secure the dam’s perimeter, BOR created two traffic security  checkpoints, one in Arizona and one in Nevada, to screen and inspect  passenger vehicles crossing the dam. Figure 4 shows a security checkpoint  on the Arizona side of the dam.
Since September 11, BOR also made other changes to its security  operations, including performing additional background checks on  contractor personnel, obtaining security clearances for office directors and  key personnel, conducting various site security inspections, initiating boat  patrols on Lake Mead, contracting for the design of a new integrated  security system, and installing additional surveillance cameras to monitor  traffic checkpoints and other parts of the dam and visitor areas. To address  one security concern as far as visitors are concerned—public access to the  top of the dam due to the proximity to Interstate 93—BOR is currently  working with Arizona, Nevada, the Federal Highway Administration, and  others to construct a new four-lane bridge across the Colorado River  approximately 1,500 feet from the dam. This bridge and additional  roadways would re-route Interstate 93 off of the dam and improve traffic  flow for the thousands of trucks and vehicles that use this road daily and  reduce security vulnerabilities for the dam and its visitors. The cost of the  project is currently estimated at $234 million, with funding coming through  a combination of federal and state sources. Construction has already begun  on new highways that approach the bridge, and the project is currently  scheduled to be completed in 2008. Nonetheless, although it appears that  BOR has taken the necessary steps to address the security concern with the  highway, ensuring adequate security while allowing vehicle access will  remain a unique and significant challenge for the next few years.
section_title: Addressing Jurisdictional Issues and Competing Stakeholder Interests Is Another Challenge for Interior
paragraphs: Complicating its efforts to balance security and access, balancing  jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests represents  another challenge facing Interior. Pursuing security improvements that  Interior believes are needed often puts the department at odds with other  entities—such as planning commissions, private foundations, and local  governments—that have jurisdiction over, or input regarding, physical  security enhancements. For example, efforts to secure the perimeter of a  national monument or icon in an urban setting by closing streets and/or  alleyways can be prevented by local governments. Similarly, local planning  commissions and other oversight groups can prevent the placement of  various protective measures because of aesthetic concerns and other  considerations, such as perceived loss of revenue. According to  information from Interior, limiting the types of measures it can employ can  lead to delays in enhancing security and the use of potentially more costly  and/or less effective alternatives.
subsections: section_title: Jurisdictional and Competing Stakeholder Issues: Independence National Historical Park in Philadelphia
paragraphs: One location that illustrates the major challenges Interior faces related to  jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests is Independence  National Historical Park (INHP) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. INHP is an  open, national park space in the center of a densely populated urban area.  Spanning approximately 45 acres, the park has about 20 buildings open to  the public, including Independence Hall (site of the signing of the  Declaration of Independence) and the Liberty Bell Center. Additionally,  INHP houses multiple historically irreplaceable buildings and documents,  including Carpenter’s Hall (site of the first Continental Congress), Congress  Hall, and an original copy of the Declaration of Independence. Figure 5  shows a security sign near Independence Hall, where the Declaration of  Independence and U.S. Constitution were created.
Due to its urban location, oversight responsibility at INHP involves several  stakeholders. The Park Service and the city of Philadelphia have a  memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding emergency response  responsibilities and other jurisdictional issues. Public city streets that carry  both pedestrian and vehicular traffic surround the park and its buildings.
According to Interior officials, the park is surrounded by local businesses  that, along with city officials, are consulted regarding any change in park  operations. Complicating oversight, the Park Service owns the land that  covers the three blocks known as Independence Mall, and the city of  Philadelphia owns the Independence Hall building and the Liberty Bell. The  city and the Park Service operate under a cooperative agreement for the  management and operation of Independence Mall. Also, the focus on  security in this area of Philadelphia is further heightened because of the  presence of other federal assets. Within a few block radius of INHP are  multiple federal buildings, including the U.S. Mint, the Federal Reserve  Bank of Philadelphia, and a federal courthouse that houses the U.S. District  Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Park Service officials reported that prior to September 11, INHP managed  its law enforcement and security operation consistently with the majority  of urban parks across the nation. After the Oklahoma City bombing, a blast  assessment focused primarily on Independence Hall was conducted and  influenced the design of the new Liberty Bell Center. Aside from this  assessment, no comprehensive risk assessment had been completed that  addressed overall threat potential. Following September 11, the Park  Service decided to keep the park open but added staff patrols from parks  around the country to support INHP staff for approximately 6 to 9 months.  A perimeter consisting of temporary fencing and concrete jersey barriers  was also placed around the two city blocks containing the Liberty Bell and  Independence Hall and, with the approval of city officials, Chestnut Street  was closed on December 12, 2001. With these security improvements, staff  coverage was roughly doubled, but the Park Service had to have rangers  work overtime to allow for 24-hour coverage. The Park Service also  implemented security measures that included the use of magnetometers  and individual hand searches conducted at Liberty Bell Center and  Independence Hall.
After September 11, the Park Service also contracted with a private firm to  conduct a threat assessment, which used a pre-existing blast assessment.  Park Service officials added that the blast assessment, however, was too  narrowly focused, and the lack of a comprehensive assessment of threats  and vulnerabilities limited their ability to identify the full range of security  measures that were needed to fully protect the park. In early 2005, an  Interior security official told us that a comprehensive assessment  conducted in compliance with HSPD-7 had been completed, and Interior  officials are evaluating this assessment to determine additional security  enhancements.
Interior officials told us that jurisdictional issues at INHP and the political  sensitivity of related disagreements have been the greatest challenges in  terms of implementing security enhancements since September 11. These  officials said that although there is a standing operational agreement  between the Park Service and the city of Philadelphia, there is no current  MOU regarding law enforcement and security. INHP security officials  stated that their ability to effectively secure the park is limited by a lack of  authority over Chestnut Street and consensus among stakeholders as to  how to provide the best protection. This challenge is evidenced most  clearly by the ongoing disagreement between INHP and the city of  Philadelphia over the closure of Chestnut Street, the street that carries  both pedestrian and vehicular traffic between Independence Hall and the  Liberty Bell Center. INHP officials said that the city reopened Chestnut  Street on April 1, 2003, after local residents and business owners made the  case to the city that the closure would have an adverse impact on business.  Chestnut Street currently remains open to pedestrians and traffic with the  use of a controlled pedestrian intersection at Sixth and Chestnut Streets  managed by Park Service security staff and contract guards to monitor  park visitors transiting from the Liberty Bell Center to Independence Hall.  Figure 6 shows traffic in front of Independence Hall and park rangers  allowing screened visitors to cross Chestnut Street.
In addition to addressing jurisdictional issues related to differences with  the city, Park Service officials at INHP said that their views on what  security measures are needed often put them directly at odds with local  stakeholder groups and business owners, specifically the Independence  Mall Business and Residents Coalition (IMBARC). IMBARC was created for  the purpose of challenging the closure of Chestnut Street. IMBARC’s  chairman told us that IMBARC members are united in their belief that the  security measures implemented at INHP since September 11 are excessive  and aesthetically unappealing. In addition, potential street closures  surrounding Independence Mall also affect the Southeastern Pennsylvania  Transportation Authority (SEPTA), the regional transit provider. Chestnut  and Sixth Street are considered thoroughfares through the city’s  downtown, and Park Service officials said that major changes to the traffic  patterns would likely meet additional resistance. We did not evaluate the  competing views of the Park Service, the city of Philadelphia, or IMBARC  regarding the Park Service’s security efforts at INHP. Nonetheless, the  situation the Park Service faces at this park illustrates the complex and  often differing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder views that Interior  faces related to security in the post-September 11 era.
section_title: Jurisdictional and Competing Stakeholder Issues: Monuments on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.
paragraphs: Other national icons where Interior faces jurisdictional and competing  stakeholder challenges are the monuments on the National Mall (the Mall)  in Washington, D.C. In particular, Interior has responsibility for several  major monuments on or near the Mall—including the Washington  Monument; the Lincoln, Jefferson, and Roosevelt Memorials; and the World  War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War Memorials. The Park Police provides  protection for these monuments and icons.
Prior to September 11, there was a concern that monuments and icons on  or near the Mall could be the focus of a terrorist attack. According to  Interior officials, after September 11, Interior worked with a private  security firm to assess the risk of terrorist attacks at Mall monuments. This  assessment examined potential threats and alternate methods of both  prevention and protection. Additionally, the Park Service identified specific  protection criteria and designated key areas with the highest vulnerability  as priority status for increased security. According to Interior and Park  Service officials, they have used the report’s findings to determine where to  allocate appropriated funds and implement security upgrades for high-risk  structures.
The Park Service has pursued a number of security enhancements to the  Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, which were  the focus of our review. Construction is currently under way on a  landscape security solution for the grounds of the Washington Monument.  When construction is complete, a 30-inch-high granite retaining wall along  newly constructed pedestrian pathways will surround the monument. The  wall will serve as a vehicle barrier while also providing visitor seating. In  addition, the monument grounds will receive nearly 800 new shade and  flowering trees, upgraded lighting, and granite paving on the plaza. The  Park Service closed the monument to the public in September 2004 to  complete the final phase of the security enhancement project and reopened  it on April 1, 2005. At the Lincoln Memorial, the Park Service plans to  construct a 35-inch-high granite retaining wall at the edge of the roadway  around the north, west, and south sides of Lincoln Memorial Circle, and  install retractable bollards for a portion of the circle that does not handle  everyday traffic. The Park Service is also developing an alternative to a 715- foot line of jersey barriers on the memorial’s east side, facing the Mall.  Figure 7 shows the temporary jersey barriers and fencing on the east side  of the memorial.
For the Jefferson Memorial, the Park Service has proposed the  construction of a security barrier, closure of a U-shaped driveway next to  the monument to create a pedestrian plaza, and creation of additional  parking away from the monument to improve security by limiting vehicular  access. The Park Service’s proposal includes the elimination of parking  adjacent to the monument. According to the Park Service’s environmental  assessment of various options, the options under consideration would have  adverse impacts on historic structures and the cultural landscape because  the proposed security barrier would introduce a new element within the  historic scene. However, the Park Service also said that the historic  structures, cultural landscape, and aesthetic and visual quality would  benefit due to the removal of the existing security measures that currently  compromise the views, vistas, and historic scene. According to the Park  Service, safety and security would be improved because the barrier would  provide a first line of defense from the potential threat of a vehicle bomb  and would serve as a deterrent to terrorists. Figure 8 shows a jersey barrier  and temporary snow fencing at the memorial. According to Park Service  officials, the snow fencing is used to control pedestrian flow to and from  the memorial.
In addition to these improvements at the monuments, the Park Service has  upgraded its security camera capabilities in and around the Mall. The  camera system began its initial test run in July 2002 and was fully  operational by the fall of 2002. Park Service officials reported that the  system consists of cameras mounted in and around the Mall that digitally  record footage. It is designed for redundancy; if one camera fails, another  camera could quickly cover the same area. Park Service officials stated that  in the near future, they would like to expand coverage and progressively  upgrade the camera system. Since September 11, Interior has also  established internal security protocols directly tied to the Homeland  Security Advisory System.
In implementing security enhancements, several entities have an oversight,  advisory, or advocacy role for the monuments on the National Mall and  have an interest in security enhancements at the monuments. These  entities include the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC),  Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (Advisory Council), the U.S.  Commission on Fine Arts (CFA), and the District of Columbia’s State  Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). In addition, advocacy groups,  including the National Coalition to Save Our Mall and the National Parks  Conservation Association (NPCA), are involved in, and offer their views on,  security enhancements to the monuments. The roles of the major entities  and organizations are as follows:  NCPC (www.ncpc.gov) is the central planning agency for the federal  and District of Columbia governments in the national capital.  Established in 1924 as the National Capital Park Commission and later  renamed, NCPC’s responsibilities include conducting comprehensive  planning to direct federal activities and protect federal interests,  reviewing and approving all federal development projects in the city and  outlying region, leading specific initiatives to enhance the region, and  preparing an annual Federal Capital Improvements Program. NCPC is  composed of three presidential appointees, two D.C. mayoral  appointees, the Secretaries of Defense and the Interior, the Chairmen of  the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  and House Committee on Government Reform, the Administrator of  GSA, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and the Chairman of the  D.C. City Council.
The Advisory Council (www.achp.gov) is an independent federal agency  that promotes the preservation, enhancement, and productive use of the  nation’s historic resources and advises the president and Congress on  national historic preservation policy. The National Historic Preservation  Act (NHPA) established the Advisory Council in 1966. According to the  Advisory Council, it seeks to have federal agencies act as responsible  stewards of our nation's resources when their actions affect historic  properties. The Advisory Council recommends administrative and  legislative improvements for protecting the nation’s heritage; advocates  full consideration of historic values in federal decision making; and  reviews federal programs and policies to promote effectiveness,  coordination, and consistency with national preservation policies.
CFA (www.cfa.gov) was established by Congress in 1910 as an  independent agency to advise the federal and District of Columbia  governments on matters of art and architecture that affect the  appearance of the nation's capital. CFA’s primary role is to advise on  proposed public building projects, but it also reviews private buildings  adjacent to important public buildings and grounds.
NHPA provides for the designation of a SHPO in each state. SHPOs have  duties that include locating and recording historic resources;  nominating significant historic resources to the National Register of  Historic Places; fostering historic preservation programs at the local  government level; reviewing all federal projects for their impact on  historic properties in accordance with Section 106 of NHPA; and  providing technical assistance on rehabilitation projects and other  preservation activities to federal agencies, state and local governments,  and the private sector. “defend our national gathering place and symbol of Constitutional principles against threats  posed by recent and ongoing proposals—for new memorials, security barriers, service  buildings and roads—that would encroach on the Mall's historical and cultural integrity, its  open spaces and sweeping vistas, and its significance in American public life.”
NCPA (www.ncpa.org) is an advocacy organization whose mission is to  protect and enhance the National Park System for present and future  generations. According to its Web site, NCPA has been in existence for  85 years and has 300,000 members. NCPA’s objectives are to advocate  for the national parks and the Park Service, educate decision makers  and the public about the importance of preserving the parks, help to  convince Members of Congress to uphold the laws that protect the  parks and support of new legislation to address threats to the parks,  fight attempts to weaken these laws in the courts, and assess the health  of the parks and park management to better inform its advocacy work.
Interior and Park Service officials said that implementing security  measures can be particularly challenging at monuments on the Mall in  Washington, D.C., because of the number of entities and organizations that  have jurisdictional, advisory, or advocacy roles regarding changes. These  officials said that in gaining the approval for projects from NCPC and  incorporating the views of the other organizations, the Park Service tries to  strike a balance among the various stakeholders and build consensus. For  example, in an effort to streamline the process for gaining approval and  input for enhancements at the Washington Monument, the Park Service,  NCPC, ACHP, and the D.C. SHPO established a streamlined review process  in 2002 that allows for public participation. However, Interior and Park  Service officials acknowledged that there is often disagreement over how  to balance security with public access and aesthetic beauty. For example,  as part of its plans for security enhancements at the Washington  Monument, the Park Service gained approval from the NCPC in April 2003  to build an underground visitor screening area and tunnel that would lead  to the basement of the monument. However, after meeting significant  resistance from NCPA, the Save Our Mall Coalition, and other interested  stakeholders, a senior Park Service official told us that the Park Service  abandoned this concept in the interest of maintaining support for security  enhancements. Due to the high visibility that security enhancements at  Mall monuments receive, Interior officials said that addressing  jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests on the Mall will  remain their biggest challenge.
section_title: Remote Location of Some Interior Assets Poses a Security Challenge
paragraphs: Due to the remote and rugged location of some assets, Interior officials  reported that some icons and monuments pose additional issues related to  securing perimeters and ensuring an adequate response in the event of an  attack. According to information from Interior, although the remoteness of  the locations may reduce the threat exposure associated with more “target  rich” environments, it can present a significant disadvantage when Interior  attempts to implement security measures.
subsections: section_title: Remote Locations: Mt. Rushmore
paragraphs: Mt. Rushmore, which is located in the Black Hills of southwestern South  Dakota, typifies how difficult it can be for Interior to protect icons and  monuments that are located in remote and often rugged environments. Mt.
Rushmore is the world’s largest sculpture and is one of the most widely  recognized symbols of the United States. In addition to its cultural and  symbolic significance, size, and location, Mt. Rushmore hosts a large  number of visitors each year, including numerous dignitaries. The  monument has a visitor center, restaurant, gift shop, and amphitheatre that  are used for various events. Each Fourth of July, the park hosts a holiday  celebration with fireworks and other activities that attracts tens of  thousands of visitors. The monument is also about 50 miles south of  Sturgis, the site of an annual motorcycle rally that can bring over 500,000  tourists to the area—many of whom visit Mt. Rushmore. Approximately 2.9  million tourists visit the monument annually, with up to 40,000 visiting on  some days during the summer months.
Mt. Rushmore has a history prior to September 11 of security incidents  involving domestic terrorists, political demonstrators, and bomb threats,  according to Park Service officials. The threats and related incidents have  included the following:  Between 1970 and 1973 there were multiple efforts by the American  Indian Movement to occupy the mountain and deface the monument.
In 1975, a bomb was detonated in front of the visitor center—there were  no injuries because the detonation occurred early in the morning.
In 1987, the environmental group Greenpeace illegally climbed the  mountain and attempted to unfurl a protest banner.
In 1991, the Park Service received multiple, credible threats to  assassinate then-President George H.W. Bush during the 50th  anniversary celebration of the monument.
In 1999, a Colorado man was arrested for making a threat to blow up Mt.
Rushmore.
According to Park Service officials, because of these incidents, the Park  Service took actions, including a security assessment in 1997 that  recommended a range of countermeasures costing approximately $2.9  million, most of which were subsequently implemented. However, Park  Service officials told us that prior to September 11, the focus of their  security efforts was directed at protecting the monument. In light of the  September 11 attacks, Park Service officials are now including visitors and  employees in their protection at Mt. Rushmore. With increases in funding  for security after September 11, Park Service officials told us in mid-2004  that they were in the process of adding protection park rangers and other  employees. In addition, the Park Service made other security  enhancements, including the installation of security fencing, lighting, and  gates at multiple locations; improvements to existing mechanical systems  for dispatch and incident management; and the purchase of all-terrain  vehicles for use in patrols and at special events. Figure 9 shows a security  camera mounted near the amphitheatre at the base of the monument.
Despite these improvements, security at Mt. Rushmore is a major Park  Service concern, due to the large area to patrol and large number of  visitors. The park has 1,278 acres, 40 acres of which are part of the visitor  service area that offers hiking and educational opportunities at the  sculptor’s studio and visitor center’s amphitheater, museum, and  bookstores. In addition, the area immediately surrounding the sculpture  has steep rock faces and a series of canyons. While terrain serves as a  natural barrier for most visitors and casual hikers, preventing individuals  seeking to climb to the top of the monument for nefarious purposes is  difficult. Park rangers at the monument told us that in order to fully secure  the monument’s perimeter, rangers must regularly hike and patrol the  mountain—a time-consuming and physically challenging task. Figure 10  shows the rugged terrain at the front of the sculpture and a canyon in the  area behind the sculpture.
In addition, the park relies on backup from state and county law  enforcement agencies, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  According to Park Service officials, these agencies also provide support  during major events at the park.
section_title: Leveraging Limited Resources for Security Improvements Is Viewed by Interior Officials as a Challenge
paragraphs: In addition to the range of challenges with protecting icons and  monuments, Interior officials were also concerned about the department’s  ability to leverage limited resources for its protection initiatives in terms of  security staffing and funding. These officials said that the increased  emphasis on visitor protection and homeland security demands that  Interior maintain a well coordinated and highly professional law  enforcement capability. However, the department’s law enforcement staff  is already spread thin, according to these officials, averaging one law  enforcement officer for about every 110,000 visitors and 118,000 acres of  land. Funding challenges for Interior homeland security programs have  been well documented. According to the August 2003 Interior IG report  mentioned earlier, September 11 and the resulting increase in icon park  security have had an impact on other parks and law enforcement officers  across the Park Service. According to the report, rangers have been  detailed from their permanent parks to supplement the icon park forces,  leaving many other parks with a diminished protection staff. The Interior  IG also reported that law enforcement staff were strained right after  September 11 because officers were working 12-hour shifts 7 days a week  for several months and with no days off. The Interior IG reported that there  is a concern about the long-term effectiveness of the protection staff and  the officers who operate under these conditions.
At the icons and monuments we visited, concerns about having adequate  resources for security were evident. In Philadelphia at INHP, Park Service  officials said that law enforcement represents the largest portion of the  INHP budget at approximately $8 million per year and accounts for more  than one-third of the park’s budget. By comparison, prior to September 11,  law enforcement accounted for about $2.4 million per year. At the Jefferson  Memorial, Park Service officials told us that they sometimes leave the snow  fencing (shown in fig. 8) in place because they lack the staff resources to  remove and reinstall the fencing before and after each major event on the  Mall. At Mt. Rushmore, the need for additional staff was, as mentioned  before, an ongoing concern.
Although we did not do a detailed assessment of security funding issues,  officials at the sites we visited told us that they were concerned about their  ability to implement further security enhancements that they believe are  needed. They viewed lack of additional funding as a major challenge.  Interior officials with OLES, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary for  Law Enforcement and Security, expressed concern about the department’s  inability to obtain homeland security funding through DHS. These officials  said that state and local governments receive significant funding through  DHS. These officials said that there have been discussions within the  administration about allowing other federal agencies to receive funding  through DHS but such actions have not been taken. Nonetheless, with the  establishment of a central office to manage security matters and Interior’s  efforts to respond to various governmentwide initiatives, the department  has taken some important steps to better position itself to compete for  homeland security-related funds. At the individual icons and monuments  we visited, steps clearly had been taken to improve security since  September 11, such as the Washington Monument perimeter landscaping  project, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorial security projects, the visitor  screening system at the Statue of Liberty, increased staffing at Mt.  Rushmore, and the rerouting of Interstate 93 at Hoover Dam.
section_title: Initiatives to Protect National Icons and Monuments Are Part of the National Homeland Security Strategy
paragraphs: Initiatives by Congress and the administration since September 11 to  improve homeland security have been intended to, among many objectives,  address the range of challenges associated with protecting national icons,  monuments, and other key assets held by Interior. The September 11  terrorist attacks prompted Congress to pass the Homeland Security Act,  which created DHS. DHS’s mission includes preventing terrorist attacks  within the United States, reducing the vulnerability of the United States to  terrorism, and minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from  attacks that do occur. The creation of DHS centralized the government’s  homeland security efforts, including policy setting with regard to  protecting national icons and monuments. As discussed earlier, several of  Interior’s assets are highly visible and symbolic icons, monuments, and  critical infrastructure such as dams. Due to the prominence of Interior’s  assets, protecting them has figured heavily into the broad strategic goals  set forth by the administration after September 11.
More specifically, the President’s July 2002 National Strategy for  Homeland Security recognized the potential for attacks on national icons  and monuments, which could be targets for symbolic reasons and whose  destruction could profoundly damage national morale. The President’s  February 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical  Infrastructures and Key Assets provides a statement of national policy to  remain committed to protecting critical infrastructures and key assets— including national monuments, icons, and dams that Interior is responsible  for—from terrorist attacks and is based on eight guiding principles. These  principles include establishing responsibility and accountability and  encouraging and facilitating partnering among all levels of government and  between government and industry. The strategy also establishes three  strategic objectives, which are to (1) identify and ensure the protection of  the most critical assets, in terms of national level public health and safety,  governance, and economic and national security and public confidence; (2)  ensure protection of infrastructures and assets facing specific, imminent  threats; and (3) pursue collaborative measures and initiatives to ensure the  protection of other potential targets that may become attractive over time.
The critical infrastructure strategy identifies Interior as the lead federal  entity for taking actions in a number of areas, in conjunction with DHS,  related to protecting icons, monuments, and other key assets. These  actions include developing guidance and standards for determining  criticalities and protection priorities, conducting threat and vulnerability  assessments, exploring opportunities for using technology to protect  visitors at monuments, and collaborating with state and local governments  and private foundations to ensure the protection of symbols and icons  outside the federal domain. In our prior work, we assessed these plans and  in February 2004 testified that the national strategy related to critical  infrastructure contained the most desirable characteristics among the  strategic plans for homeland security that the administration has produced  since September 11. These characteristics included addressing such areas  as purpose, scope, and methodology; problem definition and risk  assessment; and organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination.
While the 2002 and 2003 national strategies identified a broad framework  for homeland security as it relates to critical infrastructure, HSPD-7, which  the administration issued in December 2003, establishes a national policy  for federal agencies to identify and prioritize critical U.S. infrastructure and  key resources and to protect them from terrorism. The directive identified  several critical infrastructure sectors, such as agriculture, water systems,  public health, and national monuments and icons. For several of the  sectors, the directive identifies lead agencies that have sector-specific  knowledge, including Interior for national icons and monuments. SSA  responsibilities include collaborating with all relevant federal entities, state  and local governments, and the private sector; conducting or facilitating  vulnerability assessments of the specific sector; and encouraging risk  management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of  attacks. Section 35 of the directive also requires, on an annual basis, that  sector-specific agencies report on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and  coordinate the protection initiatives in their respective sectors. In addition,  section 34 of the directive requires that all federal departments and  agencies develop physical and cyber security plans for the assets they own  or operate.
subsections: section_title: Interior’s Actions Have Been Positive, and Further Steps Could Strengthen Its Efforts in the Security Area
paragraphs: After September 11, the Secretary of the Interior took steps to address  serious organizational and management problems in the law enforcement  and security components of the department. Of particular concern,  according to Interior’s IG, was the lack of coordination among these  components and the absence of a meaningful single point of contact that  the Secretary and senior managers could depend upon for reliable  information and advice. The Secretary approved a Deputy Assistant  Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security in July 2002, established the  security office named OLES, and approved the implementation of the  additional 24 recommendations from a January 2002 Inspector General  report. OLES oversees the department’s security efforts and seeks to  ensure consistent application across bureaus and offices. OLES has  responsibilities related to (1) coordinating the development of policies and  standards, (2) coordinating and overseeing implementation of policies and  standards, (3) representing the department externally, (4) conducting  compliance reviews, and (5) providing leadership during incidents.  Because Interior was designated as an SSA, OLES prepared a sector- specific security plan for icons and monuments, as required by section 35  of HSPD-7. Interior also developed a physical security plan for the assets it  owns and operates in response to section 34 of HSPD-7. These plans  recognize many of the major challenges facing Interior, including security  versus access, jurisdictional considerations, security in remote locations,  and security staffing issues.
In response to HSPD-7’s requirement that Interior formulate a plan for  identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and developing protective programs for  critical assets within the national icons and monuments sector, Interior  developed a uniform risk assessment and ranking methodology called the  National Monuments and Icons Assessment Methodology (NM&I  methodology). According to information from Interior, the NM&I  methodology is specifically designed to quantify risk, identify needed  security enhancements, and measure risk-reduction benefits at icon and  monument assets. The NM&I methodology has a consequence assessment  phase and a risk assessment phase. During the consequence assessment  phase, there is an asset tier ranking process, in which each asset’s iconic  significance is subjectively determined. Specific attack scenarios—such as  chemical/biological, aircraft, or improvised explosive device—are used to  evaluate security at each asset and score attack consequences.  Consequence categories include casualties, economic impact, and length of  disruption. During the risk assessment phase, Interior uses the  methodology to determine the effectiveness of existing security systems  for preventing or mitigating the specified attack scenarios. Using risk  values calculated from this comparison, Interior assigns asset risk ratings  of high, medium, or low, and specific mitigation recommendations are  formulated. To date, Interior has applied this methodology to assets that  fall under the purview of the Park Service. Interior officials said that BOR  has used a risk assessment methodology for dams for several years. These  officials said that BOR’s methodology is similar, but also takes into account  several factors that are unique to dams, such as downstream population at  risk, structural vulnerability, and the economic impact if the asset were to  be destroyed.
Interior has made significant progress in the risk assessment area,  particularly regarding the new methodology for national icons and  monuments. Before the development of this approach, Interior did not have  a uniform, comprehensive risk management approach for icons and  monuments. It relied instead on the judgment of senior officials in  determining where resources should be directed, and the risk assessments  completed at individual sites were done by a number of external experts  using different methodologies. Given the range of challenges Interior faces,  particularly with regard to limited resources, it is especially important that  Interior’s funding priorities are linked with its risk rankings so that decision  makers—including Interior, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and  Congress—can direct resources where they will have an optimal return on  investment in terms of better protection. Setting funding priorities for  protecting assets using a uniform approach is the foundation of the  National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for  the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. For  example, the section of the National Strategy related to critical  infrastructure calls for DHS and stakeholders like Interior to develop a  uniform methodology for identifying facilities, systems, and functions with  national level criticality to help establish priorities.
Government agencies often face a variety of interests whose competing  demands force policymakers and managers to balance stakeholders’  concerns and other factors such as quality, cost, and customer satisfaction.  For Interior, the trade-offs that have to be made between security and its  cultural mission are often difficult, which was apparent at the sites we  visited. Full transparency regarding the basis for its decisions on security  matters could, in our view, improve Interior’s ability to achieve mutually  acceptable and consistent outcomes with stakeholders. As Interior  continues with the implementation of security measures, a clearly defined  set of guiding principles for balancing security with its core cultural  mission could also be beneficial due to the complex and often contentious  environment in which Interior operates. Such principles could be used in  conjunction with the broader guiding principles the administration set  forth in the national strategy for critical infrastructure and efforts by the  department to define its guiding principles in other areas that are already in  place. For example, the Park Service’s strategic plan for fiscal years 2001 to  2005 identifies a set of guiding principles for achieving its mission that  include excellent service, productive partnerships, and citizen  involvement.
Guiding principles have been used by other organizations to improve  transparency and thus allow stakeholders to better understand the basis  for decisions. For example, the administration has outlined guiding  principles for postal reform given the U.S. Postal Service’s financial  difficulties and a complex operating environment that involves multiple  competing interests and stakeholders.   These principles relate to best  practices, transparency, flexibility, accountability, and financial self- sufficiency. In another example that relates directly to security, the  government of Canada has identified guiding principles that are part of its  long-term plan for the Parliament Precinct area in Ottawa. These  principles address the issue of balancing openness, accessibility, and  security; which, like in the United States, is a concern in Canada.
section_title: The Threat Against Federal Office Buildings is Significant, and GSA Faces Various Challenges as the Owner and Landlord of These Assets
paragraphs: Terrorism is a major threat to federally owned and leased buildings, the  civil servants and military personnel who work in them, and the public who  visits them. This threat was evidenced by the Oklahoma City bombing in  1995; the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa; the September 11, 2001, attacks  on the World Trade Center and Pentagon; and the anthrax attacks in the fall  of 2001. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the  focus on security in federal buildings has been heightened considerably.  More recently, DHS raised the national threat level to Code Orange in some  areas in August 2004 because of specific threat information for office  buildings with critical missions. According to information from DHS,  intelligence reports indicated that al Qaeda was targeting several specific  buildings, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in  the District of Columbia, Prudential Financial in northern New Jersey, and  Citigroup buildings and the New York Stock Exchange in New York. GSA  owns several federal office buildings on which an attack could seriously  disrupt the business of government and harm federal employees and the  public. Overall, GSA controls more than 8,000 buildings that it owns and  leases nationwide, encompassing about 338 million square feet of space.  These properties include office buildings, courthouses, border stations,  and other types of facilities, representing about 6 percent of all federally  owned space worldwide and 39 percent of all federally leased space  worldwide. In addition to most of the major departmental headquarters in  Washington, D.C., including the Departments of State, Justice, and Interior,  GSA owns most of the key multiagency federal office buildings in major  cities, including New York, and Chicago, as well as every federal  courthouse in the country.
Various potential threats—including large-scale attacks using truck bombs  to other breaches and attempts to bring weapons, explosives, or  chemical/biological agents into the buildings—pose several challenges for  GSA as the owner and landlord of these buildings. These include  maintaining a proper level of security without limiting the public’s access to  federal offices for services that the government provides and for other  business; working with stakeholders and other jurisdictions that have an  interest in the type of security that is employed; securing access to  privately owned buildings and space where GSA leases space for federal  agencies, but where GSA and FPS do not have control over security for the  building; and the challenge GSA faces as a result of the transfer of FPS,  which has responsibility for providing law enforcement and security  related functions, to DHS.
subsections: section_title: Balancing Security with Public Access at Federal Facilities Is a Major Challenge
paragraphs: A major challenge in protecting federal buildings is balancing increased  security with the public’s access to government offices for services and to  transact other business. According to GSA, its intent is to create an  environment that reflects an open, welcome atmosphere, but one that  challenges those with intent to do harm. In addition, GSA also considers  federal workers’ convenience and privacy an important part of these  considerations. Nonetheless, striking a balance among these competing  factors is an ongoing challenge. It is particularly challenging for federal  agencies in GSA-owned buildings that require regular public access such as  courthouses, and federal office buildings that have agencies that interact  often with the public, such as the Social Security Administration. A GSA- owned and managed federal courthouse in Nevada demonstrates the  challenge of balancing public access with security needs and how GSA has  fostered this balance. This large courthouse houses multiple tenants  requiring heightened security, including the federal courts, the U.S.  Attorney’s Office, and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).
According to GSA officials, the courthouse is unique because it hosts  cultural events such as concerts and contains many displays of sculpture,  painting, and photographic art that are open to the public.  Located in what  GSA officials said is a neglected downtown area, the courthouse is also a  key part of a business and community revitalization effort that offers free  public events and encourages public participation. Balancing the need for  securing the facility and public accessibility is especially important given  the dual roles of the courthouse.
The courthouse has many security features incorporated into its design. It  is the first courthouse to be designed with federal architectural blast-  resistance guidelines adopted after the Oklahoma City bombing. According  to GSA officials, the design of the courthouse incorporated many of the  lessons learned from Oklahoma City.  Some of these many security features  incorporated into the building design include the following:  setback from the streets;  window glazing and hardened exterior building;  bollards around building perimeter;  controlled parking for building staff;  security barriers entrance to mitigate the danger of high-speed vehicle  attempting to enter the parking garage;  separate sally port for prisoner transfer and elevators for transfers of   unique, unobtrusive design for magnetometer checkpoints at main   access card operated doors and nonpublic elevators; and  surveillance cameras both within and outside the structure.
USMS and FPS provide law enforcement and security functions for federal  buildings that house court functions. Given the events of September 11,  FPS and USMS made a number of enhancements to their operations and  physical security features at the courthouse. For example, FPS and USMS  officials told us that they now hold weekly meetings with the buildings’  principal stakeholders to review security issues. In addition, USMS officials  told us that they have instituted new gun and hazardous materials training  for their officers and have stepped up evacuation drills and training for  building employees. FPS and USMS officials said that since September 11  there has been a great deal of cooperation amongst local law enforcement  agencies. For example, one local law enforcement agency allowed FPS to  link to its radio systems to enhance communication between the entities.  The local law enforcement agency also involved USMS in their regionwide  security efforts on New Year’s eve 2003, when the national threat alert level  was raised to orange. Finally, USMS and FPS have made physical security  enhancements, including, among other things, hardening the exterior wall  of the courthouse that did not have a setback with a reinforced retaining  wall and a rock garden with large boulders, replacing the gates to the  vehicle sally port—which is a secure entryway for the loading and  unloading of prisoners and protected witnesses—with stronger iron gates,  adding surveillance cameras, adding alarms, and constructing a secure gun  locker for use by armed officers.
The fact that office buildings traditionally have been constructed with an  emphasis on ease of access makes security measures difficult to  implement. However, as mentioned above, the design of the courthouse  incorporated many of the lessons learned from the Oklahoma City bombing  with respect to building security and safety, as well as a design that  emphasizes openness and accessibility. Nonetheless, according to GSA  officials, balancing security design and enhancement with access is an  ongoing challenge.
section_title: Addressing Jurisdictional Issues and Competing Stakeholder Interests Is Another Challenge for GSA
paragraphs: In addition to the challenges related to balancing security with public  accessibility at GSA buildings, addressing the competing needs of federal  agencies, local governments, and private sector entities in securing its  buildings is a challenge. For example, local governments get involved when  GSA requests permits to implement additional security enhancements that  require such actions as closing streets, removing public parking spaces,  and installing bollards around the perimeter of the facility. One location  that typifies the jurisdictional and stakeholder issues GSA faces is a federal  building in New York City. It is a GSA-owned and managed building that  houses multiple federal agencies and is visited by thousands of individuals  each year conducting business with the government.
GSA was focused on security at the federal building before the September  11 terrorist attacks. In coordination with the FBI and the city, GSA had  developed a preliminary security upgrade plan, which included  improvements such as maintaining street control around the building,  increasing the use of building access controls, and hardening the building  to protect it from blasts. After September 11, GSA and FPS implemented  several additional security enhancements, including further strengthening  perimeter security, access control, surveillance, and blast resistance. GSA  and FPS took steps to improve the perimeter security of the federal  building by accelerating plans to install bollards and barriers around the  perimeter and working with city and fire department officials to close some  nearby streets to vehicular traffic. In addition, GSA instituted a new  building access system employing smart card technology. Smart cards  contain the name, title, and picture of the employee; electronic data that  can prove the authenticity of the card; and biometric data about the  employee. Figure 11 shows the bollards that were installed in front of the  federal building.
GSA officials said that to implement these and other security  enhancements, their greatest challenge has been dealing with competing  stakeholder interests and jurisdictional issues. GSA officials indicated that  the decision-making process involves multiple stakeholders, steps, and  requirements, most of which involve the city of New York. GSA officials  noted that in addition to new steps and requirements that arose during the  permit process, some requirements changed after permit issuance. In these  cases, city officials have retracted some permits for security  enhancements, and GSA has had to restart the permitting process.  Specifically, GSA officials noted that they encountered delays when trying  to install bollards along the building perimeter. Initially, the city  Department of Transportation was supportive of the idea; but as the  process continued, GSA officials said that issues related to historic  preservation arose that needed to be addressed. Moreover, GSA officials  also noted that the city has prevented GSA from making some security  enhancements that they believed were needed.
GSA has also experienced opposition from various groups in trying to close  a nearby street due to security concerns. According to GSA officials, the  city has asked GSA to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS),  hold public hearings, and consider traffic and economic impacts on the  street closure. In contrast with the challenges they have encountered with  the city, GSA officials said that the New York Police Department (NYPD)  has been supportive of their security efforts. At a recent demonstration  near the federal building, GSA officials said that NYPD provided police  officers to assist with crowd control. Although GSA has been faced with  various jurisdictional issues and the process has been challenging, the city  ultimately has also allowed GSA to close streets and make several of the  previously mentioned security upgrades. Nonetheless, GSA’s experience at  the federal building demonstrates the complexities it faces when  attempting to implement security enhancements for large, multitenant  buildings in urban settings.
section_title: The Challenge of Security for Leased Space
paragraphs: Securing access to privately owned buildings and space that houses federal  tenants is a unique challenge that may put the government at odds with  private lessors and other nonfederal building occupants. GSA has reported  that its goal and biggest challenge in this area is to provide the same level of  security for occupants of leased facilities as it provides for those that GSA  owns. However, this is often difficult because GSA has to work with lessors  to implement changes and in some instances coordinate with other  nonfederal tenants. As a result, GSA may have difficulty getting the lessor  to allow security countermeasures in buildings that are not fully occupied  by federal employees. This challenge arises because many private owners  resisted heightened levels of security because of the adverse impact or  inconvenience potentially caused to private tenants. GSA officials also  identified negotiating the need and costs of increased security standards in  leased properties as a significant challenge in the post-September 11  environment. GSA officials said that negotiating with private owners  presents a challenge of determining how to effectively secure mixed-tenant  buildings without security being overly burdensome. A GSA official,  knowledgeable of leasing issues told us, however, that September 11  changed the perspective of private owners as they realized vulnerabilities  and recognized that federal tenants would begin requiring increased levels  of security in order to continue to lease space.
The D.C. metro area, managed by GSA’s National Capital Region, has a high  concentration of federal leases. One such leased building is a 10-story,  privately owned facility located in Washington, D.C. The property is a  mixed-tenant space with both private sector and federal tenants. The  building posts guards and operates screening checkpoints at each entrance  and restricts access to elevator banks and stairwells to only those  authorized or with escort. In addition, a GSA official said that at the request  of the building’s largest federal tenant, every individual entering the  building must be screened. Additionally, the building also operates a mail  facility to screen all mail, packages, and deliveries.
Due to security concerns following the September 11 attacks, FPS, along  with GSA and the building’s largest federal tenant, assessed the building’s  risk and began to develop and implement a comprehensive security  program. FPS conducted a threat assessment of the building and  determined the building to be classified as a Level IV property. Once the  building had been assessed and classified, agency officials from the  building’s largest federal tenant, GSA, and FPS began developing a plan for  security program development and implementation. The program plan  included armed contract guards manning magnetometers and X-ray  machines, random spot checks of vehicles entering the parking garage, and  close monitoring of visitor badges.
Additionally, a GSA official said that technology advancement has changed  since September 11. The leased building’s security program incorporates its  newest technology, the E-Pop system. The E-Pop system can be controlled  by security officials; in the event of an emergency, it is able to connect to  computers in the building and deliver emergency messages communicating  evacuation instructions. Furthermore, E-Pop allows tenants to be  immediately informed of an incident, thereby increasing their chances of  exiting the building safely. The leased building is also considering  implementing smart card technology, a building access system that uses  plastic identification cards containing an individual’s personal and  biometric data. This is the same system used at the federal building in New  York City.
A GSA leasing official stated that ISC’s development of leased space  security standards, which will be discussed later, has been useful in  effectively communicating increased physical security needs to private  owners and involving them directly in the process of security program  development for their buildings. This official said that the standards have  established the credibility and validity of increased security measures,  where no or few guidelines existed before. A GSA official said that even  though the commercial real estate community in the capital area has  become attuned to the needs of the federal government in the post- September 11 security environment, challenges still exist. According to  GSA and security officials, one challenge in leasing space in property  mixed with federal agency and private sector tenants is incorporating  increased security standards while balancing occupants’ varying interests  and needs. Some private owners and their private sector tenants may not  want random car checks conducted or magnetometers placed at the  entrances to their buildings because this may, in some way, adversely affect  their business. GSA officials also noted that negotiating the need and costs  of increased security standards in leased properties is still a significant  challenge, as security demands for privately owned buildings are still  relatively new.
section_title: FPS Transfer to DHS Poses a Challenge for GSA
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act transferred FPS to DHS, effective March 1,  2003. FPS’s transfer to DHS was intended to improve law enforcement  and related security functions by centralizing building security activities  with other homeland security functions. Under the act, DHS became  responsible for protecting buildings, grounds, and property owned,  occupied, or secured by the federal government that are under GSA’s  jurisdiction, as well as other DHS facilities. A March 2003 operational  memorandum of agreement between GSA and DHS made FPS responsible  for the same types of security services that FPS provided for GSA  properties prior to the transfer to DHS. These include, among other things,  performing risk assessments, managing the installation of some security  equipment, conducting criminal investigations, and managing the contract  guard program. Although law enforcement and security related functions  were transferred to DHS from GSA, GSA officials said that it still assists  FPS and tenant agencies in implementing various security measures that  FPS recommends, and incorporating enhanced security measures into new  space it constructs or leases. In October 2003, GSA and DHS agreed on a  number of interim support services GSA would provide to FPS during the  transition in a separate memorandum of agreement. In July 2004, we  reported on the challenges FPS was facing related to the transfer, including  its expanding homeland security mission and related increase in  responsibility; unresolved issues related to how it would be funded,  because its funds at that time were tied to the rent GSA charges tenant  agencies; and, difficulties with transferring mission-support functions for  FPS from GSA to DHS. DHS concurred with our findings and related  recommendations and agreed to take action.
In addition to the challenges facing FPS, our work for this review showed  that GSA is facing its own management challenges because it no longer has  control over the law enforcement and related security functions of its  properties. GSA officials expressed concern about their ability to track  security expenditures and stay informed about FPS protection activities in  GSA buildings. These officials also expressed concern about not having a  formal mechanism for communicating with FPS and for ensuring that FPS  is meeting its responsibilities with regard to security enhancements and  services. The Deputy Commissioner of GSA’s Public Buildings Service said  that since the departure of FPS, GSA has had difficulty adjusting to not  having responsibility for protecting its own buildings and is still trying to  define its overall role in security. This official said that GSA’s new role  should be that of a coordinator between FPS and the tenant agencies and  that GSA was examining the MOU between GSA and DHS to determine if  GSA’s role and visibility in facility protection could be enhanced. Concerns  about the departure of FPS were identified by GSA’s Office of the Inspector  General (IG) in its August 2004 updated assessment of GSA’s major  management challenges. The GSA IG identified protection of federal  facilities and personnel as one of seven major management challenges  facing the agency. The GSA IG said that although FPS was transferred to  DHS, GSA will have a continual need to closely interact with security  personnel due to GSA’s mission of housing federal agencies. The GSA IG  concluded that ensuring federal employees have a secure working  environment and that building assets are adequately safeguarded must  remain a primary concern of GSA. “Traditionally, what has previously been lacking is a single position at the senior governance  level having the responsibility for crafting, influencing, and directing an organization-wide  protection strategy. In many organizations, accountability is dispersed, possibly among  several managers in different departments; with potentially conflicting objectives….the  diversity of today’s risks comes in a complex matrix of interrelated threats, vulnerabilities,  and impacts, the safeguards for which must, therefore, be interdependent. The ability to  influence business strategy and address matters of internal risk exposure requires a chief  security officer at the appropriate level in the organization.”
section_title: Protecting Government Facilities Is Part of the National Homeland Security Strategy
paragraphs: The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical  Infrastructures and Key Assets mentioned earlier has clear implications  for GSA and its role as the owner and landlord of federal facilities. The  strategy identifies a number of actions intended to improve federal facility  protection. These included developing a process to screen nonfederal  tenants and visitors entering private sector facilities that house federal  organizations, determining the criticality and vulnerability of government  facilities, developing long-term construction standards for facilities  requiring specialized security measures, and implementing new security  technology at federally occupied facilities.
subsections: section_title: GSA Actions in Response to the National Homeland Security Strategy and Other Related Initiatives
paragraphs: GSA has taken a number of positive actions, as follows:  A senior GSA official chaired ISC’s working group on security in leasing;  after receiving input from ISC member agencies, ISC issued its policy on  security standards for leased space in July 2003.
GSA is working with DHS to utilize a risk management process called  Federal Security Risk Management (FSRM) for assessing federally  owned and leased facilities.
GSA worked with ISC to develop security design criteria and is involved  with ISC’s ongoing efforts to update the criteria annually.
GSA is working with ISC on several technology-related initiatives,  including smart card and biometrics access control technology,  nonjersey barrier perimeter protection, and indoor air monitoring  systems to prevent uncontrolled movement of toxic air substances.
In the area of risk assessment, FPS uses a computer-based methodology  that allows FPS to evaluate risk and identify countermeasures on an  ongoing basis. FPS is able to use a series of input screens and queries to  maintain pertinent data that can be adjusted as threats and vulnerabilities  change. The tool allows the user to enter information on each asset,  identify existing countermeasures, assign an impact of loss and a  vulnerability rating to each threat, and input countermeasure upgrade  alternatives and their associated costs.
As mentioned earlier, HSPD-7 requires, on an annual basis, that sector- specific agencies report on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and  coordinate the protection initiatives in various critical infrastructure  sectors. Although GSA was not given responsibility for any of the sectors  identified in the directive, all federal departments and agencies are  required, under the directive, to develop physical and cyber security plans  for the assets they own or operate. However, in a July 2004 letter to the  Director of OMB, GSA stated that “no GSA owned or leased space meets  the definitions for critical infrastructure and/or key resources.” The letter  went on to say that “GSA owns and leases many buildings where important  activities take place, but GSA is unable to make a determination as to  whether these tenant activities are critical infrastructure.”
GSA officials said that OMB has not commented on GSA’s response to  HSPD-7 regarding a physical security plan. The Executive Director of ISC— which has responsibility for reviewing agencies’ HSPD-7 plans for the  administration—said that ISC has not completed its review of agencies’  plans, including GSA’s response to HSPD-7. We are deferring to ISC on  whether GSA’s decision not to prepare a physical security plan is  reasonable. In the future, a chief security officer position or formal point of  contact could aid in determining GSA’s involvement in governmentwide  critical infrastructure efforts such as HSPD-7.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: There is a heightened concern that terrorists may again try to exploit the  nation’s vulnerabilities. In this environment, Interior has a critical role in  protecting our national icons and monuments and ensuring the safety of  the millions of people who visit them. National icons such as the Statue of  Liberty and Mt. Rushmore could be attacked for symbolic reasons. Since  September 11, Interior has made significant progress in improving security  by doing vulnerability assessments of high-profile sites that are likely  targets and implementing various security measures. For example, at the  individual icons and monuments we visited, steps clearly had been taken to  improve security since September 11, such as the Washington Monument  perimeter landscaping project, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorial security  projects, the visitor screening system at the Statue of Liberty, increased  staffing at Mt. Rushmore, and the rerouting of Interstate 93 at Hoover Dam.
In addition, Interior has made management changes, including creating a  central security office, intended to enhance its homeland security  initiatives, and has recently developed a uniform risk management  methodology for national icons and monuments. These actions should help  Interior address the major challenges it faces—which include balancing  security and Interior’s mission related to access and education; addressing  jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues; securing icons and  monuments in rugged, remote areas; and leveraging limited staff and  funding resources.
As Interior moves forward, it could link the results of its risk assessments  and related risk rankings to its security funding priorities. This could allow  for well-informed decisions by stakeholders—such as Interior, OMB, and  Congress—about where to direct resources so that they have an optimal  return on investment in terms of better protection. Also, a set of guiding  principles for balancing security with its core cultural and educational  mission—which Interior lacks but other organizations with complex  environments have developed—could help in addressing the challenges. A  set of guiding principles could provide decision makers and Interior’s other  stakeholders with greater transparency regarding the rationale for security  decisions. An approach with these components should yield results that  would allow decision makers both within and external to the department to  better gauge and consider competing priorities.
Since September 11, security at office buildings has remained a concern, as  evidenced by threats revealed by DHS in August 2004 that al Qaeda was  targeting several office buildings in New York, northern New Jersey, and  Washington, D.C. GSA has taken action to address the challenges it faces as  the owner and landlord of federal office buildings. These challenges  include balancing security and public access, addressing jurisdictional and  competing stakeholder issues, securing federally leased space, and  adjusting to the transfer of FPS to DHS. These actions have included  working with ISC to develop security standards, continuing with upgrades  that GSA began implementing after the Oklahoma City bombing, and  establishing a memorandum of agreement with DHS related to FPS.  Despite these actions, GSA lacks a mechanism such as a chief security  officer position or formal point of contact to coordinate security efforts for  its federal office building portfolio. As a result, GSA is less equipped to  effectively share information with FPS and tenant agencies, ensure that  FPS is fulfilling its responsibilities, track security expenditures, and define  its overall role in security—capabilities that GSA officials were concerned  the agency was lacking.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior and  one recommendation to the Administrator of GSA. First, to ensure that  useful information is available for decisions on resources for the protection  of national icons and monuments, we recommend that the Secretary of the  Interior link the results of the agency’s risk assessments and related risk  rankings to its funding priorities. Second, given the complex nature of the  challenges Interior faces in protecting national icons and monuments, the  Secretary should also develop guiding principles for balancing security  initiatives with Interior’s core mission so that decision makers and  stakeholders will have a clearer, more transparent understanding of  Interior’s rationale for security enhancements at individual assets.  Regarding GSA, we recommend that the Administrator establish a  mechanism—such as a chief security officer position or formal point of  contact—that could serve in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies,  work to address the challenges GSA faces related to security in buildings it  owns and leases, and enable GSA to define its overall role in security given  the transfer of FPS to DHS.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to Interior, GSA, and DHS for their review  and comment. Interior did not comment on our conclusions and  recommendations. However, Interior provided technical comments, which  we incorporated, where appropriate. GSA concurred with the report’s  overall findings and stated that it concurs with the recommendation and  will address it. GSA comments are contained in appendix II. DHS provided  technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Interior,  Homeland Security, and the Administrator of GSA. Additional copies will  be sent to other interested Congressional Committees. We will also make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on (202)  512-2834 or at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that the Department of  the Interior (Interior) faces in protecting national icons and monuments  from terrorism, as well as related actions intended to address these  challenges, and similarly, (2) determine any challenges the General  Services Administration (GSA) faces related to the protection of federal  office buildings it owns or leases and the actions that have been taken. To  determine what challenges Interior and GSA have faced in their efforts, we  interviewed Interior and GSA officials to identify the major challenges, and  reviewed available reports and other documents. In addition, in  consultation with these officials, we identified sites that are illustrative of  these challenges.
From the sites identified, we selected five Interior sites and three GSA  buildings for further analysis of the challenges. These eight sites were  geographically dispersed and represented a range of asset types, including  office buildings and national icons in both densely populated and remote  areas. The sites included, the Statue of Liberty, New York, NY;  Independence National Historical Park, Philadelphia, PA; Mt. Rushmore  National Memorial, Keystone, SD; Hoover Dam, Boulder City, NV; the  Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials on the  National Mall in Washington, D.C.; and three major facilities in the GSA  inventory. Collectively, the sites we selected provided examples of the  range of challenges Interior and GSA reported facing. We included the  Hoover Dam because, in addition to being a source of hydropower, the dam  has iconic status and attracts large numbers of tourists. At each site, we  interviewed agency officials with primary responsibility for security  implementation, operation, and management. We toured each site and  observed the physical environment, the facilities, and the principal security  elements to gain firsthand insights on the challenges. Furthermore, we  interviewed stakeholders with significant interest in the security program,  including the National Parks Conservation Association, the Commission on  Fine Arts, the National Capital Planning Commission, Independence Mall  Business and Residents Coalition, the National Coalition to Save our Mall,  the U.S. Marshals Service, a charitable organization, and local government  and law enforcement officials. We collected documents, when available,  that contained site-specific information on security plans, policies,  procedures, budgets and staffing. Finally, we considered prior GAO work  on challenges in facility protection and security.
To determine what actions have been taken by Interior and GSA to address  its challenges, we collected and analyzed documents from, and conducted  interviews with Interior and GSA officials. The documents collected  provided information on these agencies’ past and present security plans,  policies and procedures, organizational structures, funding and staffing.  The interviews included officials from GSA’s Public Building Services and  Interior’s Office of Law Enforcement and Security, National Park Service,  and Bureau of Reclamation. We also interviewed officials from the Federal  Protective Service, which is part of DHS and protects leased and owned  GSA facilities. We reviewed relevant laws and guidance including the  Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Federal Property and Administrative  Services Act of 1949, and the Interagency Security Committee Security  Standards for Leased Space. Additionally, we reviewed other pertinent  reports, including the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the  National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures  and Key Assets. We also considered past GAO work related to facility  protection and security issues at Interior and GSA, as well as broader GAO  work on homeland security issues.
Agency officials and the representatives of stakeholder organizations  provided much of the data and other information used in this report. In  cases where officials provided their views and opinions within the context  that they were speaking for their organization, we corroborated the  information with other officials. We requested official comments on this  report from Interior, GSA, and DHS.
section_title: Comments from the General Services Administration
section_title: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those individuals named above, David Sausville, Casey  Brown, Matt Cail, Erika Carter, Roshni Davé, Daniel Hoy, Anne Izod, Donna  Leiss, and Susan Michal-Smith were key contributors to this report.