National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors
Published: 2008-02-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Using lessons from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the federal government released the National Response Framework (NRF) in January 2008. This report examines (1) why the primary role for mass care in the NRF shifted from the Red Cross to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and potential issues with implementation, (2) whether National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (NVOAD)--an umbrella organization of 49 voluntary agencies--is equipped to fulfill its NRF role, (3) the extent to which FEMA has addressed issues with mass care for the disabled since the hurricanes, (4) the extent to which major voluntary agencies have prepared to better serve the disabled since the hurricanes, and (5) the extent to which FEMA has addressed issues voluntary agencies faced in receiving Public Assistance reimbursement. To analyze these issues, GAO reviewed the NRF and other documents, and interviewed officials from FEMA, voluntary agencies, and state and local governments.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FEMA and the Red Cross agreed that FEMA should be the primary agency for mass care in the NRF because the primary agency should be able to direct federal agencies' resources to meet mass care needs, which the Red Cross cannot do. The shifting roles present several implementation issues. For example, while FEMA has enhanced responsibilities for coordinating the activities of voluntary organizations, it does not currently have a sufficient number of specialized staff to meet this responsibility. NVOAD has characteristics that help it carry out its broad role of facilitating voluntary organization and government coordination, but limited staff resources constrain its ability to effectively fulfill its role in disaster response situations. NVOAD held daily conference calls with its members after Hurricane Katrina, but these calls were not an effective means of sharing information, reflecting the fact that NVOAD had only one employee at the time of Katrina. FEMA has begun taking steps in several areas to improve mass care for the disabled based on lessons learned from the Gulf Coast hurricanes. For example, FEMA hired a Disability Coordinator to integrate disability issues into federal emergency planning and preparedness efforts. However, FEMA has generally not coordinated with a key federal disability agency, the National Council on Disability, in the implementation of various initiatives, as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Red Cross has taken steps to improve mass care services for the disabled, but still faces challenges. For example, the Red Cross developed a shelter intake form to assist staff in determining whether a particular shelter can meet an individual's needs. However, Red Cross officials said that some local chapters are still not fully prepared to serve individuals with disabilities. Other voluntary organizations had not identified a need to improve services for individuals with disabilities, and we did not identify concerns with their services. FEMA has partially addressed the issues faced by local voluntary organizations, such as churches, in seeking Public Assistance reimbursement for mass care-related expenses after the hurricanes. At the time of the hurricanes, a key FEMA reimbursement program was not designed for a disaster of Katrina's magnitude, but FEMA has changed its regulations to address this issue. Local voluntary organizations also had difficulty getting accurate information about reimbursement opportunities. Key FEMA staff had not received training on reimbursement policies and sometimes did not provide accurate information, and some of the information on FEMA's Web site was not presented in a user-friendly format. FEMA has not addressed these communication issues.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes caused extensive human suffering and  damage along the Gulf Coast, and highlighted the need for improved  coordination of mass care services, such as shelter and feeding. Voluntary  organizations, including the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army,  play a critical role in providing these services after disasters. Using lessons  learned from the hurricanes, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  has developed the National Response Framework (NRF) that defines the  roles of federal, state, local, tribal governments; the private sector; and  voluntary organizations in response to disasters, including mass care. The  NRF—which was released in January 2008—designates 15 emergency  support functions (ESF) that address specific disaster response needs.   The NRF made a key change to the prior 2004 National Response Plan  (NRP) by shifting the primary agency responsibility for coordinating  federal support for mass care under the sixth emergency support function  (ESF-6) from the Red Cross to the Federal Emergency Management  Agency (FEMA), a federal agency that is a component of DHS.  As the  primary agency for mass care, FEMA is responsible for convening  organizations that are part of ESF-6 after disasters and responding to state  requests for assistance by directing resources from federal agencies to  meet state needs. Under the NRF, states continue to have principal  responsibility for meeting mass care needs.
When responding to a disaster, states utilize the mass care services of  voluntary organizations. The Red Cross—the nation’s largest mass care  provider—has two distinct roles in disaster response. As a support agency  under ESF-6 of the NRF, the Red Cross assists FEMA and states in  coordinating mass care activities. The Red Cross also maintains a separate  role outside of the federal framework as a private mass care service  provider using donated funds. National Voluntary Organizations Active in  Disasters (NVOAD), an umbrella organization of 49 nonprofits (see app. II  for a list of NVOAD members as of December 2007), is also a support  agency under ESF-6. NVOAD has responsibility for sharing information  and facilitating collaboration among its members while these  organizations plan for and respond to disasters. As support agencies, the  Red Cross and NVOAD work with FEMA at the nation’s disaster response  center after disasters. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, mass care  services to the disabled and elderly were identified as a key problem.  Partly in response, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency  Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act or the Act), which  included provisions directing FEMA to assist states, localities, and  voluntary organizations in preparing to serve these populations.
After Katrina, local voluntary organizations—such as churches—played a  critical role in providing mass care. At one point after Katrina, nearly as  many evacuees were staying in shelters operated by chuches and other  small nonprofits as were staying in Red Cross shelters. These  organizations often sought reimbursement for related expenses through  the Public Assistance program, which is administered by FEMA. The  federal government generally provides funds to state and local  governments through the Public Assistance program, which then  reimburse voluntary organizations.
Our previous work on the federal response to the 2005 Gulf Coast  hurricanes identified three main areas of concern: a lack of clearly defined  roles and responsibilities, the capabilities to perform those roles and  responsibilities, and accountability for resources. This report examines  the following questions: (1) What was the rationale of DHS for shifting the  primary role for coordinating mass care from the Red Cross to FEMA, and  what are potential implementation issues associated with this change? (2)  How well equipped is NVOAD to fulfill its role in ESF-6 of the NRF? (3) To  what extent has FEMA addressed issues that arose after Hurricanes  Katrina and Rita with the provision of mass care services to the disabled  and elderly? (4) To what extent have major national voluntary  organizations made preparations since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to  better meet the mass care needs of the disabled and elderly? and (5) What  difficulties did local voluntary organizations providing mass care after  Katrina and Rita face in being reimbursed under FEMA’s Public Assistance  Program, and to what extent has FEMA addressed these issues?
To obtain information on changes in the roles of FEMA and the Red Cross  under the NRF, we reviewed key FEMA and Red Cross documents, such  as the new NRF, and interviewed officials from FEMA, the Red Cross,  other major national voluntary organizations, including the Salvation Army  and Southern Baptists, and emergency management officials from a  selection of states that included Louisiana, Mississippi, and nine other  states throughout the country to help us identify potential implementation  issues with the shift in roles in the new ESF-6. We gathered information  about NVOAD’s capability to perform its NRF role by reviewing NVOAD  documents about its member services, internal governance, funding and  plans for the future. We also interviewed officials from NVOAD, eight of  NVOAD’s member organizations, and FEMA to obtain additional  information. To gather information about the efforts made by FEMA and  voluntary organizations to improve services for individuals with  disabilities and the elderly, we interviewed FEMA officials, officials from  five major national voluntary organizations–the Red Cross, Salvation  Army, Catholic Charities, Southern Baptists, and United Way–local- and  state-level emergency managers from Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas,  and officials from advocacy groups for elderly and disabled populations.  We also reviewed FEMA and Red Cross documents that pertained to the  elderly and disabled. To examine issues related to the Public Assistance  Program, we reviewed FEMA’s regulations, policies, and protocols for  reimbursements at the time of Katrina and subsequent changes to these  regulations, policies and procedures. We also reviewed FEMA’s website  and interviewed officials within FEMA’s Public Assistance Program,  FEMA’s Voluntary Agency Liaisons, local voluntary organizations  providing mass care that sought reimbursement, and state and local  governments in the Gulf Coast region. Finally, we reviewed reports on the  response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes. For a list of the reports that we  reviewed, see our bibliography.
We conducted this performance audit between January 2007 and February  2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused extensive human suffering and  damage in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Hurricane Katrina made  landfall in Mississippi and Louisiana on August 29, 2005, and alone caused  more damage than any other single natural disaster in the history of the  United States. Hurricane Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable an  estimated 300,000 homes—more than three times the total number of  homes destroyed by the four major hurricanes that hit the continental  United States in August and September 2004. Hurricane Rita followed on  September 24, 2005, making landfall in Texas and Louisiana and adding to  the devastation. Hurricane Katrina alone caused $96 billion property  damage.
subsections: section_title: Voluntary Organizations’ Roles in Disasters
paragraphs: Voluntary organizations have historically played a large role in the nation’s  response to disasters. These organizations raised more than $3.4 billion in  cash donations in response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes as of February  2006, according to the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University. The  American Red Cross raised more than $2.1 billion, about two-thirds of all  dollars raised. The Salvation Army raised the second-highest amount, $325  million, Catholic Charities raised about $150 million, and the Southern  Baptist National Convention raised about $20 million.
Voluntary organizations’ roles in responding to disasters can vary. Some,  including the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army, are equipped to  arrive at a disaster scene and provide immediate mass care, including  food, shelter, and clothing, and in some circumstances, emergency  financial assistance to affected persons. Other voluntary organizations  focus on providing longer-term assistance, such as job training,  scholarships, or mental health counseling. In addition, churches and other  community organizations that do not traditionally play a role in disaster  response may begin providing these services. For example, many small  churches and other organizations provided sheltering services after the  Gulf Coast hurricanes.
section_title: The Red Cross
paragraphs: Since its founding in 1881, the Red Cross has offered humanitarian care to  the victims of war and devastating natural disasters. The organization is a  private nonprofit entity but, since 1905, has had a congressional charter.  Under the congressional charter the purposes of the Red Cross are to  provide volunteer humanitarian assistance to the armed forces, serve as a  medium of communication between the people of the United States and  the armed forces, and provide disaster prevention and relief services.  Although it is congressionally chartered, the Red Cross provides these  services as a private organization.
Following a disaster, the Red Cross serves as a direct service provider to  disaster victims. In this capacity, the organization provides services that  include feeding, sheltering, financial assistance, and emergency first aid.
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross estimated that it provided  more than 3.7 million hurricane victims with financial assistance, 3.4 million  overnight stays in almost 1,100 shelters, and more than 27.4 million hot meals  and 25.2 million snacks. According to the Red Cross, its efforts after Hurricanes  Katrina and Rita were larger than for any previous disaster relief effort. For  example, the Red Cross provided more than six times the number of shelter  nights after Katrina and Rita than it did in the entire 2004 hurricane season,  when four major hurricanes—Charley, Francis, Ivan, and Jeanne—struck the  continental United States in August and September.
section_title: The NRF
paragraphs: The NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards disaster  response, including support for voluntary organizations providing shelter,  food, and other mass care services. The NRF revises the nation’s prior  disaster plan, the NRP, which was originally signed by major federal  government agencies, the Red Cross and NVOAD in 2004. Major federal  government agencies, the Red Cross, NVOAD, and other voluntary  organizations are included in the NRF. The NRF is designed on the  premise that disaster response is generally handled by local jurisdictions.  In the vast majority of disasters, local emergency personnel, such as  police, fire, public health, and emergency management personnel, act as  first responders and identify needed resources to aid the community.  Local jurisdictions can also call on state resources to provide additional  assistance. The federal government responds to state or local requests for  assistance when an incident occurs that exceeds state or local response  capability or when an incident falls within its own response authorities. In  such situations it may use the National Response Framework to involve all  appropriate response partners. The primary authority under which the  federal government provides assistance to states after a disaster is the  Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford  Act).  It authorizes the President to issue a major disaster or emergency  declaration when a state’s resources are overwhelmed and the governor  makes a request for federal assistance. Under the Stafford Act, the federal  government provides assistance for mass care, debris removal, restoration  of facilities, and financial aid to families and individuals, among other  activities. After disasters that result in extraordinary levels of mass  casualties or damage, called catastrophes, the federal government can  invoke the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the NRF. The Annex does not  assume that local governments—which may no longer be functioning— will ask for assistance, but rather that the federal government will provide  resources to the local level before being asked.
In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to respond to  disasters, the National Response Framework designates 15 emergency  support functions. ESF-6 creates a working group of key federal agencies  and voluntary organizations to coordinate federal assistance in support of  state and local efforts to provide:    mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid;    emergency assistance, such as coordination with voluntary  organizations; reunification of families; pet evacuation and sheltering;  support to specialized shelters; and support to medical shelters;    housing, both short- and long-term; and   human services, such as counseling and processing of benefits.
The NRF assigned FEMA to be the primary agency for a new component  of ESF-6, called emergency assistance, to ensure that immediate needs  that are beyond the scope of traditional mass care are addressed.  Emergency assistance adds new expectations for coordination with  voluntary organizations by the ESF-6 working group, stating that the group  works with non-governmental and faith-based organizations to facilitate  an inclusive, coordinated response effort. In addition, the emergency  assistance component includes the expectation that a National Shelter  System (NSS) will provide data from shelters. The NSS is a Web-based  system that provides information on shelter facilities, capacity, and  population counts.
In addition to its role as a service provider, the Red Cross has specific  responsibilities as a support agency under ESF-6. ESF-6 specifies that  these activities are separate from its role as a direct service provider. The  Red Cross announced in January 2008 that it planned to make significant  layoffs to its staff at the Red Cross national headquarters. These layoffs  could potentially have implications for the Red Cross’ capacity to meet its  NRF responsibilities. However, the Red Cross had not announced details  of these layoffs as of mid-February 2008. Figure 1 describes the Red Cross’  roles as a service provider, and in ESF-6.
Estimates place the population of individuals with disabilities in the  United States at nearly 20 percent of the entire population, and the  percentage of people over age 80 with disabilities at 72 percent. Although  there are few statistics on the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the disabled,  the White House report on the federal response to Katrina estimated that  over two-thirds of the 1,300 victims who died were over age 60. Individuals  with disabilities are a diverse group, including those with disabilities  affecting individuals’ functioning in a number of different ways. For  example, some disabilities, such as paraplegia, affect individuals’ mobility,  and other disabilities, such as deafness, affect communication. Many of  these disabilities can be prepared for and accommodated in general  population shelters. For example, with modifications to existing facilities,  many mobility impairments can be addressed. These modifications can  include ensuring accessible routes for people with wheelchairs, crutches,  or walkers from sleeping quarters to dining areas and toilet/bathing areas,  ramps, and handrails in toilet facilities. Modifications for communication- related disabilities can include braille signs for the blind. State and local  governments operate medical shelters for those individuals with serious  medical needs, including some disabled individuals.
section_title: Post-Katrina Act
paragraphs: On October 4, 2006, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency  Management Reform Act of 2006. That Act elevated FEMA’s status within  the Department of Homeland Security, enhanced its organizational  autonomy, and redefined its role. It provided that FEMA’s primary mission  is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the United States  from all hazards by leading efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover  from natural disasters, acts of terrorism, other man-made disasters, and  catastrophic incidents. In partnership with state, local, and tribal  governments, emergency response providers, the private sector, and  nongovernmental organizations as well as other federal agencies, FEMA is  tasked with building a national system of emergency management. The Act  included a number of provisions that should provide a new focus on  assistance to individuals with disabilities in connection with these efforts.  It directs the Administrator of FEMA to appoint a Disability Coordinator  who is required to report directly to the Administrator to ensure that the  needs of individuals with disabilities are being properly addressed in  emergency preparedness and disaster relief, and assigns a detailed set of  responsibilities to the Coordinator. The Post-Katrina Act provides  authority for FEMA to address the needs of individuals with disabilities by  adding the Americans with Disabilities Act’s definition of “individual with  a disability” to the Stafford Act and requires that the FEMA Administrator  develop guidelines concerning the provision of services to individuals with  disabilities in connection with emergency facilities and equipment. The  Post-Katrina Act adds individuals with disabilities and those with limited  English proficiency to the discrimination prohibition provisions of the  Stafford Act and directs FEMA to work with state and local governments  to identify critical gaps in regional capabilities to respond to populations  with special needs.
section_title: Public Assistance Program
paragraphs: The Public Assistance program provides assistance primarily to state and  local governments to repair and rebuild damaged public infrastructure and  includes activities such as removing debris, repairing roads, and  reconstructing government buildings and utilities. Specifically, applicants  submit requests for work that are considered for eligibility and subsequent  funding. FEMA obligates funds for approved projects, providing specific  amounts to complete discrete work segments on projects, while state and  local governments pay the remainder based on the state’s cost share  agreement with FEMA. As of March 16, 2007, FEMA has obligated about  $4.6 billion to Louisiana and about $2 billion to Mississippi through its  Public Assistance program.
Under the Public Assistance program, state and local governments can  reimburse voluntary organizations for several types of expenses. First,  they can be reimbursed for facility damage if they meet certain eligibility  criteria such as being an educational, medical or custodial care facility.  Second, voluntary organizations can be reimbursed for evacuation and  sheltering expenses (such as increased utility expenses, cots, and food).  The Post-Katrina Act expanded the universe of voluntary organizations  eligible for reimbursement for facilities damage after future disasters.  Private non-profit facilities that serve certain specified functions  (education, utility, irrigation, emergency, medical, rehabilitation, and  temporary custodial care) as defined by the President, no longer need to  provide essential services of a governmental nature to the general public  in order to be eligible for reimbursement. The Act also added another  group of private nonprofit facilities potentially eligible for assistance by  defining the term to include any facility providing essential services of a  governmental nature to the general public (including museums, zoos,  performing arts facilities, and community arts centers), as defined by the  President. The facilities in this group are similar to those identified in  FEMA regulations. Under the Public Assistance program, the federal  government typically pays 75 percent of costs, and state governments pay  25 percent, however, after Katrina the federal government paid 100  percent of the cost-share requirement in 45 states that sheltered evacuees.
section_title: FEMA Became the Primary Mass Care Agency Because the Red Cross Cannot Direct Federal Resources, and the Shifting Roles Present Several Implementation Issues
paragraphs: FEMA replaced the American Red Cross as the primary agency for mass  care in large part because the two organizations agreed that the primary  agency needs to be able to direct federal resources. Although the Red  Cross’ specific responsibilities under the NRF have largely remained the  same, one change is that the Red Cross will no longer be expected to  report data for all shelters, only Red Cross shelters. The changing roles of  the Red Cross and FEMA present several implementation issues. With  respect to sheltering, the NRF includes the expectation that a national  shelter system will be developed to collect and report shelter data. FEMA  and the Red Cross have developed an initial system for collecting and  reporting data on shelters, but FEMA is still working to develop a federal  shelter database.  Furthermore, some states have indicated that they are  concerned about their ability to collect and report data from non-Red  Cross shelters. In addition, the NRF places increased responsibility on  FEMA for coordinating with voluntary organizations, but FEMA does not  have sufficient staff resources to meet this responsibility. Last, although  FEMA has made progress, its efforts to identify and fill gaps in mass care  capabilities are not yet complete.
subsections: section_title: FEMA and Red Cross Agreed That FEMA Should Be the Primary Mass Care Agency Because It Can Direct Federal Resources
paragraphs: The Red Cross and FEMA agreed in February 2007 letters that because the  Red Cross cannot legally direct federal resources, FEMA is better  positioned to be the primary agency for ESF-6 mass care. The letters  indicated that the primary agency for mass care should be able to direct  federal resources in response to state requests for assistance, which the  Red Cross—as a nongovernmental entity—does not have the legal  authority to do. The Red Cross’ inability to direct federal resources after  the Gulf Coast hurricanes contributed to problems that we highlighted in  our June 2006 report. After Katrina, the Red Cross could not go directly to  federal agencies for resources to fulfill requests for assistance, but instead  had to request these items through FEMA, which then directed the  appropriate federal agencies to supply the needed materials or services.  This resulted in confusion about roles and led to duplicative requests.
In the February 2007 letters, the Red Cross and FEMA also agreed that the  expansion of ESF-6 to include a new function—emergency assistance— provided another reason why FEMA should be the primary agency for  mass care. The primary agency for mass care will need to coordinate mass  care activities with the primary agency for emergency assistance— FEMA—and having different primary agencies could make this more  difficult. For example, Red Cross and FEMA officials told us that Red  Cross is not knowledgeable about activities in the emergency assistance  function, which would make it difficult for them to coordinate these  activities with mass care. FEMA and the Red Cross agreed that having  FEMA serve as the primary agency for all four functions of ESF-6 would  help ensure a unified command structure during operational response.
Although the Red Cross role for mass care under the NRF will shift from  that of a primary agency to a support agency, its specific responsibilities  will largely remain the same as under the NRP. For example, the  organization still provides staff to work at DHS offices to support ESF-6  activities and supports DHS in working with state agencies for mass care  in planning and preparedness activities. However, the Red Cross will no  longer have two key responsibilities that it had under the NRP. First, the  Red Cross will no longer be responsible for filling out requests from states  and other local organizations for federal assistance after a disaster and  sending them to FEMA. This activity will now be performed primarily by  states. Under the NRF, the Red Cross will provide guidance to states as  they determine their needs for federal assistance. FEMA did tell us,  however, that in some rare circumstances the Red Cross may fill out  requests independently of states. States also filled out these requests  under the NRP—along with the Red Cross—and state officials that we  interviewed told us that they were familiar with this process. Second, the  Red Cross will no longer be responsible for reporting data on the number  and characteristics of people in shelters that are operated by organizations  other than the Red Cross. After Katrina, the Red Cross was responsible for  reporting data on all shelters to FEMA, including those operated by other  organizations, but both FEMA and the Red Cross reported problems with  this process. Now, states are responsible for reporting data on non-Red  Cross shelters to FEMA.
section_title: Several Implementation Issues Are Associated with the Shift in Primary Agency for Mass Care
paragraphs: The shifting ESF-6 roles of the Red Cross and FEMA present several  implementation issues for FEMA, including reporting shelter data,  coordinating with voluntary organizations and identifying and filling gaps  in mass care capabilities.
subsections: section_title: National Shelter System
paragraphs: In its role as primary agency, FEMA has made progress toward meeting  NRF expectations for an NSS, but still faces several challenges. An initial  NSS that is owned and was paid for by the Red Cross, with FEMA as a  partner agency, is currently operational. However, FEMA is still working  to develop a federal NSS that will be owned and housed at FEMA. When  the federal NSS is complete, the Red Cross will enter and verify data for  Red Cross shelters, and states will enter and verify data for all other  shelters. FEMA officials told us that the federal NSS will be finished in  spring 2008. Although the current version of the NSS can provide  information on shelter location, capacity, population, physical  accessibility for people with disabilities, and managing agency, the system  cannot track demographic data on the types of populations residing in  shelters. FEMA officials told us that FEMA is working to address this and  other issues that have been identified by states in the federal NSS. For  example, states identified the need for integrating Geographic Information  Systems (GIS) into the system to provide data that are more accurate.  FEMA told us that it would incorporate these elements into the updated  system.
In addition, many states still need to enter data into the system in  preparation for disasters. FEMA officials said that as of November 2007,  no more than four states had inserted shelter location data and, as a result,  most of the data in the system is on Red Cross shelters. The accuracy of  the shelter data is contingent upon states reporting information into the  system and updating it frequently, according to FEMA officials. Some state  officials told us that they had just recently received training on NSS and  were currently in the process of compiling the data needed. FEMA has  offered states the opportunity to have FEMA staff help include non-Red  Cross shelter data in the NSS after a disaster until NSS implementation is  complete. FEMA officials told us that it will take 2 to 3 years to fully  implement the federal NSS, because of training and time needed for states  to collect, input, and verify data.
During the 2007 California wildfires, FEMA deployed staff to help state  officials collect and report data from non-Red Cross shelters with the NSS  because California officials had not yet entered shelter data into the  system. California officials said that the NSS was useful because it gave a  single, accurate report on the shelter population.
section_title: Data from Unplanned Shelters
paragraphs: State officials we spoke with told us that they could collect shelter data from  pre-planned shelters, but officials in some states were concerned about their  capacity to collect and report data from unplanned shelters that are likely to  open after a major disaster. These shelters are likely to open if designated  shelter sites are overcrowded, evacuees are unable to reach designated sites, or  the designated sites are affected by the disaster. Officials from some states told  us that they do not have a mechanism in place to collect data from the small,  independent organizations that typically open these shelters. In contrast,  officials from another state told us that they do not anticipate the need for  unplanned shelters to open after a major disaster, and, as a result, are not  concerned about collecting these data.
Collecting data on unplanned shelters was a significant challenge after  Hurricane Katrina. There was no centralized system in place for collecting  and reporting these data after Hurricane Katrina and, as a result, these  data often went unreported, according to FEMA and Red Cross officials.  Because government and voluntary organizations did not know where  many of these people were staying, this led to problems planning for and  delivering needed resources.
section_title: Coordination with Voluntary Organizations
paragraphs: Changes in FEMA’s role under ESF-6 also present implementation issues with  respect to coordination with voluntary organizations. The NRF includes a new  component on voluntary organization coordination requiring that the ESF-6  working group—for which FEMA is the primary agency—coordinate federal  response efforts with state, local, private, non-governmental, and faith-based  organizations’ efforts. As the primary agency for ESF-6, FEMA will be primarily  responsible for addressing these issues. These requirements for coordination  with voluntary organizations are more extensive and specific than in the NRP,  and FEMA officials told us that FEMA voluntary agency liaisons (VAL) will fill  this role. VALs are FEMA staff members who coordinate the activities of  voluntary organizations with FEMA. Most FEMA VALs are based in FEMA  regions and work with state and local voluntary organizations, and the regional  offices of national voluntary organizations (see app. III for a job description for  VALs).
While the NRF calls for an enhanced FEMA role in helping coordinate  voluntary agency assistance, FEMA does not have the staff resources  necessary to meet this objective. As of July 2007, each FEMA region had  one full-time VAL who could work on the entire range of coordination  issues with voluntary organizations, as shown in figure 2. FEMA regions  can include up to eight states. FEMA VALs are tasked with coordinating  FEMA activities and policies with voluntary organizations across their  regions and building the capacity of these organizations according to  voluntary organization and FEMA officials. Effective VALs build  relationships and network, however, many officials from voluntary  organizations and multiple senior FEMA VALs told us that there are not  enough full-time VALs for them to develop strong relationships in all of the  areas covered. For example, one of the primary responsibilities of VALs is  to improve coordination with state- and local-level voluntary  organizations, but officials from FEMA and voluntary organizations said  that in many states coordination between these organizations and  government is weak. In addition, officials from some voluntary  organizations told us that VALs have so much work it is difficult to  communicate with them. Officials from voluntary organizations also said  that there were not enough VALs after disasters. During the response to  disasters, VALs can be pulled out of their own regions to assist in disaster- affected areas. For example, after Katrina, VALs from across the country  were brought to the Gulf Coast. As a result, during Katrina these VALs  were not available to respond to their own smaller scale regional disasters,  even though they had built relationships with voluntary organizations in  those states. At the time of Katrina, FEMA was providing states with  assistance for 38 other disasters across the nation. Disaster research  experts told us that there should be additional FEMA VALs in each  region. FEMA officials told us that there are no plans to change the  current staffing structure for VALs. A review of the response to Katrina by  the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) identified broader problems  with human capital management at FEMA. For example, the DHS OIG  found that FEMA does not have staff or plans adequate to meet its human  capital needs during catastrophic disasters.
FEMA has two other types of VALs, reserves and Katrina VALs. However,  the job responsibilities of these individuals constrain them from  performing many VAL job duties. FEMA had 85 reserve VALs that it can  call upon in response to major disasters, and 36 Katrina VALs as of  December 2007. The reserve VALs are only activated during disasters,  however, and are not available to network and build the capacity of  voluntary organizations during preparedness. Furthermore, the Katrina  VALs are designated specifically to address Katrina-related issues and  FEMA is not planning to retain these individuals after Katrina-related work  is finished.
In addition, VALs do not receive role-specific training and, as a result,  some VALs have not been fully prepared for their duties. The lack of  specialized training has resulted in VALs not always being prepared to  coordinate FEMA activities with the voluntary sector. For example, VALs  do not receive any training on how voluntary organizations can receive  reimbursement for their mass care activities during disasters. One  voluntary organization official that we spoke with said that, while some  VALs were very helpful in that they had access to information and  resources that they would not have had otherwise and understood FEMA  policies, other VALs were not familiar with key FEMA Public Assistance  policies for the reimbursement of voluntary organizations. A senior FEMA  official told us that FEMA has completed a VAL Handbook and is  preparing to develop a pilot training for VALs. The DHS OIG also found  that FEMA does not have an organized system of employee development.
section_title: Identifying and Filling Gaps in Mass Care Capabilities
paragraphs: FEMA’s broad new responsibilities under the Post-Katrina Act, and  FEMA’s new role as the primary agency for mass care, also present  implementation issues for FEMA with regard to identifying and filling gaps  in mass care capabilities. Although FEMA has taken several steps to  address these issues, FEMA’s efforts are not yet complete. For example,  the Post-Katrina Act specifically requires that FEMA identify gaps in mass  care capabilities at the state level. In response, FEMA has undertaken a  gap analysis initiative that examines, by state, the gaps in disaster  preparedness. This initiative, which began in 2007, has begun identifying  gaps in hurricane-prone states along the Eastern seaboard and Gulf Coast.  A FEMA official responsible for these efforts told us that the initial gap  analysis had been completed in 18 high-risk states as of December 2007.  Eventually, FEMA plans to roll this initiative out in every state, and to  make it all-hazards rather than hurricane-specific.
FEMA officials told us that they are also working to identify resources for  situations in which the mass care capabilities of government and voluntary  organizations are exceeded, but that FEMA is still working to develop a  standardized system for coordinating these resources. FEMA officials told  us that FEMA has developed contracts with private companies for mass  care and other disaster resources for situations in which federal  capabilities are exceeded. After Katrina, FEMA made four noncompetitive  awards to companies for housing services. These contracts have since  been broadened through a competitive process so that if a disaster struck  now they could also include facility assessment for shelters, facility  rehabilitation—including making facilities accessible—feeding, security,  and staffing shelters. The FEMA official in charge of these contracts said  that contractors had assessed facilities to determine whether they could  be used as shelters in the Gulf Coast during the summer of 2007. He said  that these contracts gave the federal government the option of purchasing  whatever resources it needs in response to disasters. FEMA officials told  us, however, that they prefer using federal resources when possible  because contract services are more expensive. Another round of contracts  will be awarded in May 2008 on a competitive basis.
However, FEMA is still working to standardize training, resources, and  terminology across the many different organizations—including the  private sector—involved in disaster response to improve coordination  among these organizations. FEMA is working to develop standardized  training that could be provided to staff from all of these organizations.  FEMA is currently working with the Red Cross to develop a standardized  training based on current Red Cross training, according to a FEMA official  responsible for these efforts. Having standardized training could, for  example, make it easier for employees of organizations providing services  contracted by the federal government to work in shelters operated by  other organizations. A key FEMA official said that this standardized  training should be complete by summer 2008. FEMA is also working to  standardize disaster relief resources and terminology across the providers  of mass care services. The FEMA official said that this allows disaster  service providers to communicate more readily, and to share resources  across organizations when necessary. NVOAD is assisting FEMA by  coordinating efforts among voluntary organizations to standardize the  types of resources used in disaster response. FEMA and NVOAD officials  told us that having organizations use the same language and resources  makes it easier to scale up disaster response operations.
section_title: NVOAD Has Several Characteristics That Help It Carry Out Its ESF-6 Role, but Is Constrained by Limited Staff Resources
paragraphs: NVOAD is in a unique position to coordinate voluntary organizations  active in disaster assistance under ESF-6. NVOAD brings together  voluntary organizations with diverse objectives and sizes under one  organization. Moreover, NVOAD does not compete with its members for  funds, since it is not a direct service provider. While NVOAD has facilitated  relationship building among its members prior to disasters, its  coordination efforts in responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were not  an effective way of providing key information. Due to staff limitations, the  organization was unable to fully meet its information-sharing  responsibilities under ESF-6 during the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Using  lessons learned from Katrina, NVOAD has identified ways to potentially  improve information sharing with its members, such as through enhanced  use of web technology.
subsections: section_title: NVOAD Is Positioned to Be a Coordinating Body and Has Facilitated Relationship Building among Members prior to Disasters
paragraphs: For several reasons, NVOAD is well positioned to coordinate voluntary  organizations active in disaster assistance under ESF-6. First, NVOAD is a  coordinating agency, not a direct service provider. This means NVOAD  does not compete with its members for funds. Instead, the organization is  primarily funded by member organizations.
Second, NVOAD brings together voluntary organizations with diverse  objectives, and sizes. NVOAD brings together organizations that provide  various types of disaster response and recovery services, such as  sheltering, feeding, home-building, and case management services, as well  as both secular and faith-based organizations. Officials from member  organizations told us that NVOAD helps them prepare for disasters by  developing relationships with other individuals active in disaster response  and recovery. These officials told us that developing these relationships is  a critical part of preparing for disasters, and that NVOAD provided an  opportunity to get to know officials from other organizations.
Although members we spoke with noted that NVOAD’s efforts were useful  in providing opportunities for networking and collaboration, some of the  larger and older members maintained that the organization does not  represent their needs well. For example, officials from one member  organization told us that NVOAD is increasingly serving the needs of new,  start-up disaster response organizations, rather than focusing on its larger  members. NVOAD’s executive director said that one strength of the  organization is that it gives smaller members representation in ESF-6.
section_title: NVOAD Is Considering Enhancing Web Technology to Address Coordination Problems after Katrina, but Has Limited Staff Resources
paragraphs: NVOAD has historically helped organizations prepare for disaster response  through relationship building, but as shown in table 1, the NRF also includes  responsibilities for NVOAD in disaster response, in addition to disaster  preparedness. NVOAD’s ESF-6 roles and responsibilities have remained the  same as those specified in the NRP, and include information-sharing and  convening voluntary organizations, but do not include directing the activities of  its members. NVOAD fulfills its ESF-6 information-sharing role in several  ways. First, NVOAD provides information about its members’ services to  FEMA, such as where its members are operating and what services they are  providing. One FEMA official said that having NVOAD report information for all  of its members made it easy to get updates from the voluntary sector. Second,  the NVOAD organization structure provides a system for coordination after  disasters. NVOAD includes a number of committees composed of NVOAD  member organizations that address key mass care issues after disasters, such  as managing donations and long-term recovery. For example, after the 2007  California wildfires the donations management committee immediately met  with state officials to identify warehouse space to store goods donated by the  private sector until they were needed. Third, NVOAD shares information with  voluntary organizations about the situation on the ground and services being  provided by different organizations after disasters. For example, after Katrina,  NVOAD hosted daily conference calls for several months after Katrina to  coordinate with its members. These conference calls provided situation  updates, brought new organizations up to speed on the basics of disaster  response, and gave organizations a forum to share information and collaborate  with each other.
We found that these conference calls were not an effective way of  communicating after the hurricanes. The conference calls included  NVOAD members, federal agencies, and voluntary organizations that were  not NVOAD members, some of which were new to the disaster response  field. FEMA officials provided information on the situation on the ground  and explained how FEMA was providing assistance. We participated in  one conference call and found that it was difficult to follow. It was  challenging to identify which region of the disaster zone speakers were  discussing, members were discussing different issues that were not  relevant to everyone on the call, and there were too many people on the  call. NVOAD members with whom we spoke identified similar concerns  about the effectiveness of the conference calls. NVOAD’s executive  director said that there were often 75 to 100 people on a single conference  call after Katrina. Some NVOAD members also told us that the conference  calls often ran long, which could get in the way of effectively meeting  hurricane victims’ needs. Figure 3 shows the flow of information during  NVOAD phone calls.
NVOAD’s executive director at the time of Katrina said that NVOAD was  limited by staff resources and, as a result, couldn’t do more than provide  conference calls. During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, NVOAD had one  staff person. NVOAD currently has two staff persons: an executive director  and an administrative position. NVOAD’s fiscal year 2006 operating budget  was about $270,000, and NVOAD relies primarily on funds from its  members, According to NVOAD’s current executive director. NVOAD dues  currently range from $3500 per member each year for its largest members  to $750 for its smaller members, according to the executive director. Since  the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, NVOAD has increased its membership  from 40 to 49, and the organization is currently considering increasing  membership further.
NVOAD’s current executive director told us that the organization of the  conference calls after Katrina was not an effective way to communicate  with its members. NVOAD has identified ways to potentially enhance  information sharing with its members. The current executive director told  us that better use of web technology would allow NVOAD to provide  members with more timely disaster updates and information about  member services on the ground. NVOAD members that we spoke with told  us that it would be helpful if NVOAD used web technology to provide  certain information so that they wouldn’t need to participate in lengthy  conference calls. One voluntary organization official suggested that key  information could be provided online, such as updates about the situation  on the ground, information about what organizations are operating in the  disaster zone, and what services are being provided by those  organizations. However, the executive director said that improving the  organization’s use of Web technology would require additional resources.
section_title: FEMA Has Made Progress Addressing Mass Care Issues for the Disabled, but Has Generally Not Coordinated as Required with NCD
paragraphs: FEMA has started addressing the problems with mass care services for the  disabled that occurred after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Various  assessments of FEMA’s performance after the hurricanes identified  needed improvements by FEMA in two areas: providing guidance to assist  states and others in planning to better meet the needs of the disabled, and  increasing the participation of people with disabilities and subject-matter  experts in the planning process. The Post-Katrina Act included  requirements in each area, and FEMA has taken actions in both of these  areas. For example, in response to the Act, FEMA hired a Disability  Coordinator to integrate disability issues into federal emergency planning  and preparedness efforts. However, FEMA has generally not coordinated  with NCD as required by the Act, which could result in disability-related  concerns not being fully addressed.
subsections: section_title: Key Gaps in Federal and State Mass Care Planning Efforts for Individuals with Disabilities Were Identified after the Hurricanes
paragraphs: After the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, reports from the Senate Committee  on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, DHS, and NCD identified  a lack of planning as one of the most significant problems related to the  provision of mass care to the disabled. For example, FEMA’s Nationwide  Plan Review, released in June 2006, reviewed the planning efforts of states  and major urban areas. The report found that “One of the most serious  deficiencies uncovered in the Review was inadequate planning for special  needs populations,” and that no state or urban area was found to have  sufficiently planned for these populations. The Nationwide Plan Review  also recommended several specific steps that FEMA should take to help  state and local governments with such planning:    develop a consistent definition of “special needs” to clarify state  planning efforts,    help local governments plan by providing guidance on disability-related  increase the participation of people with disabilities and subject-matter  experts in the planning and preparedness process.
In addition to recommending actions to be taken by FEMA, the  Nationwide Plan Review also found that states need stronger  accountability for the provision of mass care to people with disabilities.  The review concluded that states should develop standards for the care of  individuals with disabilities, with an emphasis on ensuring that  accessibility for persons with disabilities is a priority factor in selecting  emergency shelter sites.
section_title: FEMA Has Begun Addressing the Issues with Mass Care for the Disabled, but Has Generally Not Coordinated with NCD as Required
paragraphs: FEMA has taken several steps to help improve planning for the disabled  population. For example, FEMA developed a consistent definition of the  term “special needs” that is used in the NRF. The Nationwide Plan Review  said that at the time of Katrina the term lacked the specificity needed for  emergency managers to accurately determine the capabilities necessary to  respond to community needs. Through a working group of stakeholders,  FEMA developed a definition of special needs that refers to those who  may have additional needs before, during, or after an incident in one or  more of the following functional areas: maintaining independence,  communication, transportation, supervision, and medical care. For  example, hearing-impaired individuals would be categorized as those  needing assistance with communication. FEMA is also developing  guidance for states as they plan for serving disabled populations. One such  initiative has been developing guidance on collecting data on disabled  populations, which was expected to be released in December 2007  according to a FEMA official. This guidance will respond to the  Nationwide Plan Review’s recommendation that the federal government  help state and local governments incorporate disability-related  demographic analysis into emergency planning. In addition, in September  2007, FEMA released target capabilities that define the disaster response  capabilities that states should have, including capabilities for the disabled.  For example, the document includes a capability that states should  “Develop plans, policies, and procedures to ensure maximum retention of  people with disabilities in general population shelters.” A second phase of  the target capabilities project will include capabilities that states should  have for populations that require medical care.
The Post-Katrina Act required that FEMA take steps to include people with  disabilities, and subject-matter experts in the field, in planning and  preparedness efforts, as recommended by the Review. FEMA appointed a  Disability Coordinator, as required by the Act, who began work for FEMA  in the summer of 2007. FEMA officials told us that this individual has  begun working across FEMA to include disability-related concerns in  FEMA initiatives, and with disability organizations to ensure that their  concerns are addressed. For example, the Coordinator has been involved  in the drafting of the NRF according to a FEMA official. In addition, the  Coordinator was on the ground in California to assist with meeting the  needs of individuals with disabilities after the wildfires in the fall of 2007.  For example, the Coordinator worked to ensure that information and  materials disseminated to the public were in alternative formats.
However, FEMA has generally not coordinated with NCD, as required by the  Act. The Act requires FEMA to coordinate with NCD in the implementation of  several different initiatives as shown in figure 4. NCD and FEMA officials told  us that NCD had not been consulted for many of these initiatives. For example,  NCD was not consulted about the Comprehensive Assessment System, which  assesses the nation’s prevention capabilities and overall readiness. FEMA  officials who work on this initiative said that they had not consulted directly  with NCD, but were coordinating with the officials within FEMA who are  knowledgeable about disability issues. Other FEMA officials said that NCD has  provided public comment on the NRF and other key FEMA documents.  Officials from NCD said that there has been little coordination with FEMA and  that they had not been offered the chance to provide input on a number of  these initiatives. As a result, disability-related issues may not be fully addressed.  In the Nationwide Plan Review, FEMA reported that it is important to include  the disabled in planning because it provides responders with hands-on  experience about the needs of people with disabilities in disaster situations, and  provides planners with the ability to test their plans and modifications. The two  organizations have met several times to discuss how coordination would occur,  most recently in October 2007. However, as of January 2008, the agencies had  not agreed to specific action steps for how they would coordinate.
In response to requirements of the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA has also taken  steps to address the need for greater state accountability for the mass care  needs of individuals with disabilities. The Act requires that, as part of  FEMA’s gap analysis initiative, FEMA identify gaps in response capabilities  for special needs populations at the state level. The template used by state  and federal planners to identify gaps requires a substantial amount of  information about special needs sheltering. For example, one of the  indicators of readiness is whether states have formulas established for  estimating the number of special needs evacuees who will require public  shelter.
In response to Post-Katrina Act requirements, FEMA also released  guidance in August 2007 on accommodating disabled individuals. The  guidance identifies laws that apply to nonprofits involved in disaster  response and provides short summaries of each law. The guidance does  not provide tools that states and nonprofits can use to implement these  requirements. FEMA is planning to release additional guidance to provide  state and local officials with additional information to improve sheltering  for individuals with disabilities. In July 2007, the Department of Justice,  which enforces the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), released  detailed operational guidance for accommodating disabled populations in  emergency shelters. This guidance provides a checklist that can be used to  evaluate the accessibility of potential shelter sites. The checklist includes  detailed questions that could assist shelter managers in evaluating shelter  sites, such as whether there is an accessible route from shelter living  space to the shelter’s health and medical facilities. FEMA’s August 2007  guidance includes a Web site link to the Department of Justice guidance.
section_title: The Red Cross Has Taken Steps to Better Serve the Disabled, but Continues to Face Challenges
paragraphs: The Red Cross has taken several steps to address problems that occurred  after the Gulf Coast hurricanes in meeting the mass care needs of disabled  individuals. These problems included a lack of appropriate intake  procedures, resulting in some disabled individuals being turned away from  Red Cross shelters, and a lack of accessible shelter facilities. For example,  in some shelters medical units were located on upper floors or other  inaccessible areas, and individuals with mobility impairments were not  provided with accessible alternatives. In response to such problems, the  Red Cross has developed an intake form intended to assist volunteers in  determining whether a particular shelter can meet an individual’s needs  and also developed new training on serving the disabled. However, the  Red Cross continues to face challenges in this area: Red Cross officials  said that local chapters have considerable autonomy within the  organization and that it can be difficult to encourage chapters to  implement accessibility policies. Other major national voluntary  organizations that we examined had increased their attention to services  for the disabled, but did not identify a need to improve their services for  this population. We did not identify concerns with the services of these  organizations.
subsections: section_title: The Red Cross Has Taken Steps to Help Local Chapter Officials Serve the Disabled, including Developing a Shelter Intake Form and Training
paragraphs: After Hurricane Katrina, officials from the government and disability  organizations identified two main concerns with the mass care services  provided by the Red Cross to individuals with disabilities. The first was  that some Red Cross shelter managers did not use shelter intake  procedures that would have enabled them to identify individuals’ specific  disabilities and determine whether the shelter could serve those  individuals. As a result, many individuals with disabilities were sent to  medical shelters, which could result in families being split up or placing  greater demands on the more resource intensive services provided in  medical shelters.
The Red Cross, in partnership with the Department of Health and Human  Services, has developed a shelter intake form to address this problem after  future disasters. The form provides a series of questions for shelter  workers in general shelters to ask incoming evacuees (see app. IV for the  shelter intake form). The form will allow shelter managers to identify  disabilities and determine whether the shelter can meet the individual’s  needs, according to officials from the Red Cross and the Department of  Health and Human Services. NCD officials told us that they think the form  will help shelter managers make good decisions about whether individuals  with disabilities can enter a shelter. The Red Cross distributed the form to  its chapters along with guidance, but the form was often not used after the  California wildfires in Red Cross shelters. Red Cross officials said that  procedural changes like this often take time to be fully implemented in  chapters. Officials from California also said that the form was not used in  some cases because it took too long to fill out. “I have told Cajundome officials, medical staff, and Red Cross personnel about  this problem. But I have been unsuccessful in getting it resolved. I have seen many  frail people struggle to climb or descend the stairs in order to get medical  attention, and I have personally seen two very exhausted men in wheelchairs  almost decide to forego triage or other medical attention because of the difficulty  of accessing this unit.”
Other frequent concerns were that accessible shower and restroom  facilities were not provided, and that individuals with training to serve  disabled individuals were not permitted in Red Cross shelters. NCD and  other disability organizations have reported that these problems and  others existed prior to Katrina.
Officials from the Red Cross national headquarters told us that the Red  Cross is required to comply with the ADA and, therefore, its chapters must  make plans and take actions so that individuals with disabilities can stay  in Red Cross shelters. Red Cross officials said that the only individuals  who are not able to stay at Red Cross shelters are those with serious  medical needs, and that the organization does not have the ability to serve  these individuals. They said that this policy was in place at the time of  Katrina and Rita. Federal officials and disability advocates agreed that  there are some individuals who are not able to stay at Red Cross shelters  because their needs are too serious. Red Cross officials also said that the  Red Cross does not own the facilities that it uses for sheltering in a  disaster, and that not every building that is large enough to shelter a  community and withstand a disaster was constructed in accordance with  current accessibility standards. The Red Cross said that it surveys  potential shelter facilities prior to disasters and that accessibility to people  with disabilities is one of the factors considered when determining  whether to use a facility as a shelter.
The Red Cross has begun addressing concerns about accessibility of its  shelters by developing training for Red Cross employees and volunteers  about meeting the needs of individuals with disabilities. The training  presents information about Red Cross policies on accessibility and  modification requirements for emergency shelters and provides examples  of how Red Cross staff could address specific situations. It does not  provide specific operational guidance for chapters about how to  implement these requirements. The training, which was developed in  collaboration with disability advocates, is required for Red Cross workers  who have leadership roles in providing mass care after disasters. The  training is not required for Red Cross volunteers, although it is  recommended for key Red Cross volunteers who respond to disasters  anywhere in the nation.
In addition, the Red Cross told us that it has prepositioned items that will  improve shelter accessibility for individuals with mobility impairments in  key warehouses across the country. These items included 8,000 cots that  are designed for easy transitions from a wheelchair, commode chairs, and  shower stools.
Red Cross headquarters officials told us that some local chapters are still  not fully prepared to serve individuals with disabilities after disasters.  These officials said that, although the Red Cross has taken steps to  educate their employees and volunteers since Katrina, it has been difficult  to encourage chapters to prepare for and implement accessibility policies.  Red Cross headquarters officials said that Red Cross chapters have  considerable autonomy within the organization.
section_title: Katrina Made Other Major National Voluntary Organizations More Aware of Disability Issues, but They Did Not Identify a Need to Improve Services for the Disabled
paragraphs: Officials from the Salvation Army, Southern Baptists, and Catholic  Charities told us that these organizations have not made changes to their  disaster services for the disabled, although they said that Katrina made  them more aware of disability issues. We did not identify significant  concerns with their services, however, largely because sheltering—which  requires many modifications for individuals with disabilities—is not the  focus of these organizations’ services. Instead, these organizations  specialize in services such as feeding. One official from a disability  organization indicated that meeting specialized dietary needs could  sometimes be a disaster-response issue, but that it is a much lower priority  than problems with sheltering.
section_title: Local Voluntary Agencies Faced Several Problems in Obtaining Reimbursement and FEMA Has Partially Addressed These Issues
paragraphs: Voluntary organizations faced limitations in the scope of program  coverage and communication difficulties while trying to obtain  reimbursement under the Public Assistance program after Katrina. The  Public Assistance reimbursement program was not designed for a disaster  of Katrina’s magnitude because it only offered reimbursement to voluntary  organizations in the disaster zone, even though evacuees dispersed  throughout the country. FEMA has since changed its regulations so that  after future disasters voluntary organizations serving evacuees outside of  declared disaster zones can be reimbursed. Voluntary organizations also  faced significant communication problems as they sought reimbursement,  but FEMA has not taken steps to address these communication issues.  Some voluntary organizations said that VALs—FEMA’s liaisons to the  voluntary sector—could not provide them with information about the  Public Assistance program or provided them with the wrong information.  FEMA VALs do not receive training on Public Assistance program policies.  In addition, we found that some of the information on FEMA’s Web site  about the Public Assistance program was not presented in a user-friendly  format that would help voluntary organizations successfully navigate  reimbursement policies and procedures. As a result of these various  communication problems, some organizations said that they never found  out about reimbursement opportunities, or got so frustrated with the  process that they chose not to apply.
subsections: section_title: Limited Scope of Program Led to Reimbursement Difficulties, but FEMA Revised Regulations to Address This Issue
paragraphs: At the time of Hurricane Katrina, voluntary organizations were potentially  eligible to be reimbursed for mass care expenditures only in areas that  were within disaster zones, as declared by the President. Because of the  scale of the disaster, however, hundreds of thousands of Gulf Coast  residents evacuated to areas of the country outside of the declared  disaster zone. Many of these evacuees were sheltered by small local  voluntary organizations, such as churches, which were not eligible for  reimbursement under Public Assistance policies at the time.
On September 9, 2005—about 2 weeks after Katrina made landfall—FEMA  issued a memorandum stating that the President had declared an  emergency in states receiving Katrina victims. This permitted voluntary  organizations in states across the nation that were sheltering evacuees  from Katrina to receive reimbursement for mass care expenses. FEMA  changed its regulations in July 2006 to allow eligible public and private  non-profit entities outside of a declared disaster zone to receive  reimbursement for mass care expenses, without the requirement for  presidential declarations in each area where disaster victims are sheltered.
This change contributed to confusion among voluntary organizations  about the Public Assistance program after the hurricanes. Many officials  from voluntary organizations told us that changing reimbursement policies  caused confusion and made it difficult for them to get reimbursed, and  that in some cases they gave up on seeking reimbursement.
section_title: FEMA Strategies for Communicating about the Public Assistance Program Were Often Not Effective
paragraphs: Although FEMA and affected states took steps to publicize the Public  Assistance program, many voluntary organizations did not receive key  information. Voluntary organizations reported numerous problems, such  as not learning about Public Assistance reimbursement opportunities, not  being able to obtain information about how to apply, and not being able to  obtain assistance with the application process. Clear and accurate  communication was particularly important because many of the voluntary  organizations that were providing services had not sought reimbursement  for services before. Because organizations did not always receive needed  information, some organizations either never found out about  reimbursement opportunities, or got so frustrated with the process that  they withdrew their applications.
FEMA officials told us that they communicate Public Assistance policies  to voluntary organizations after disasters in three ways. First, states and  FEMA coordinate in convening meetings to make voluntary organizations  aware of Public Assistance program reimbursement opportunities.  Second, FEMA officials, including VALs, often respond to questions from  applicants. Third, FEMA provides information about the Public Assistance  program via its Web site. As described in FEMA’s December 2005 review  of the response to Katrina, FEMA’s role in publicizing reimbursement  opportunities is particularly important after large-scale disasters in which  local governments are severely compromised or no longer functioning.
There were several problems, however, with FEMA’s efforts to publicize  and communicate about the Public Assistance program with voluntary  organizations after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. First, because many of the  organizations responding to Katrina were small and had not received  Public Assistance funding in the past, they often did not find out about  briefings on the program. As a result, they missed an opportunity to  receive information about being reimbursed.
Second, VALs—a key FEMA link to the voluntary sector—were not  provided with information about the program. VALs are often in the field  working with voluntary organizations providing disaster response  services, and are potentially well-positioned to inform these organizations  about Public Assistance opportunities and tell them where they can go for  additional information. Yet many officials from local voluntary  organizations told us that VALs had either not informed them about the  program, could not tell them where to get the needed forms, or had  provided them with information that was incorrect. For example, one  representative of a voluntary organization told us that VALs had not told  the organization about reimbursement opportunities, and that when she  found out about the program, the VAL could not tell her where to obtain  more information.
FEMA officials told us that the Public Assistance program has traditionally  not worked closely with VALs—who are part of FEMA’s Individual  Assistance program, as opposed to the Public Assistance program—to  publicize the program. A Public Assistance official said that FEMA has  publicized the program through its Web site and state efforts, and that  there have been no efforts to work more closely with FEMA VALs since  Katrina. FEMA officials told us that there is currently no training for VALs  on Public Assistance policies. Several FEMA VALs told us that closer  coordination between the program and FEMA VALs would help publicize  the program.
Finally, our review of FEMA’s Web site, and comments from a number of  voluntary organizations, indicate that the Web site was not effective in  providing these organizations with the information about Public  Assistance opportunities after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. The two Public  Assistance reimbursement opportunities that voluntary organizations told  us they applied for—reimbursement for mass care and for facilities  damage—include different eligibility and procedural requirements for  voluntary organizations. Voluntary organization officials told us that they  are not accustomed to working with technical policies, and that they  needed a clear, step-by-step explanation of the Public Assistance  opportunities and requirements. FEMA provided an online fact sheet  regarding the opportunity for voluntary organizations to apply for Public  Assistance reimbursement for mass care costs several weeks after  Hurricane Katrina made landfall. However, the Web site does not include  user-friendly information for voluntary organizations about opportunities  for reimbursement for facilities damage. In addition, FEMA’s Public  Assistance Web site does not include contact information for specific  offices or officials who can help organizations develop reimbursement  applications for either program.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought widespread devastation and  challenged all levels of government and voluntary organizations. Using  lessons learned from Katrina, FEMA and voluntary organizations have  begun taking steps to improve mass care services for future disasters, such  as replacing the National Response Plan with the National Response  Framework.
The NRF includes an enhanced role for FEMA in coordinating with  voluntary organizations. FEMA VALs—employees who are FEMA’s  primary link to the voluntary sector—will have primary responsibility for  this role. However, the size of FEMA’s VAL workforce is not sufficient to  meet FEMA’s NRF responsibilities for voluntary agency coordination.  Having only one full-time VAL in each region who can work on the entire  range of coordination issues with voluntary organizations can limit VALs’  ability to build successful relationships in their states, a critical element of  fulfilling their responsibilities. In addition, VALs receive no role-specific  training, and no training on a key federal program that reimburses  voluntary organizations after disasters. If FEMA does not take steps to  address these issues, it will encounter difficulties in meeting its NRF role  of coordinating with voluntary organizations, and the nation is likely to see  some of the same coordination problems that occurred after the Gulf  Coast hurricanes.
Under the NRF, NVOAD plays a critical role in sharing disaster  information among national voluntary organizations, and FEMA plays an  important role in supporting coordination among these organizations.  After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, timely information was important for  organizations’ efforts to provide disaster services, but the daily conference  calls hosted by NVOAD were an ineffective communication strategy.  NVOAD’s executive director has indicated that improving the  organization’s communication systems is a priority, but NVOAD has only  two staff members and limited funding. Without FEMA’s assistance,  NVOAD may not have the technical capacity to adequately assess and  improve its communications systems. Unless NVOAD and FEMA work  together to systematically assess and expand NVOAD’s information  sharing efforts, NVOAD members are likely to face continued  communication problems after disasters.
FEMA has begun taking actions to improve the mass care services  provided to the disabled after disasters, including actions to implement  relevant provisions of the Post-Katrina Act. As FEMA noted in the  Nationwide Plan Review, it is critical that federal, state, and local  governments increase the participation of people with disabilities and  subject-matter experts in the development and execution of plans and  training. However, FEMA has generally not coordinated with NCD in its  efforts to implement relevant provisions of the Act, as required by the Act.  Unless FEMA begins working more closely with NCD, emergency planners  may not fully incorporate this population’s needs into planning efforts.
Small voluntary organizations played a key role in the mass care response  to Katrina, but were often unfamiliar with how to navigate these federal  reimbursement procedures. Although FEMA has posted the Public  Assistance program policies for voluntary organizations on its Web site,  the site does not provide key information about opportunities for  voluntary organizations to be reimbursed for facilities damage in a user- friendly format. In addition, the Web site does not include contact  information voluntary organizations could use to get more information.  Unless FEMA provides information in a more user-friendly format, some  voluntary organizations may be unable to take advantage of  reimbursement opportunities after future disasters, which could be an  incentive to stop providing mass care services.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To provide greater assurance that FEMA has adequate staff capabilities to  support the agency’s enhanced role under the NRF in helping coordinate  with voluntary organizations, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take action to  enhance the capabilities of its VAL workforce, such as:    converting some Katrina VALs into full-time VALs able to work on the  entire range of coordination issues with voluntary organizations;  increasing the number of full-time VALs; or    providing role-specific training to VALs, including providing them with  information about Public Assistance opportunities and policies for  voluntary organizations.
To improve NVOAD’s effectiveness in meeting its NRF information-sharing  responsibilities after disasters, we recommend that NVOAD assess  members’ information needs, and improve its communication strategies  after disasters. As part of this effort, NVOAD should examine how best to  fund improved communication strategies, which may include developing a  proposal for FEMA funding. To facilitate the implementation of improved  communication strategies, NVOAD may want to consider strategies for  increasing staff support for NVOAD after disasters, such as having staff  from NVOAD member organizations temporarily detailed to NVOAD. In  addition, in light of FEMA’s enhanced role under the NRF in helping  coordinate the activities of voluntary organizations in disasters, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the  Administrator of FEMA to provide technical assistance to NVOAD, as  needed, as NVOAD works to improve its communication strategies.
To ensure that the needs of individuals with disabilities are fully integrated  into FEMA’s efforts to implement provisions of the Act that require FEMA  to coordinate with NCD, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to develop a detailed set of  measurable action steps, in consultation with NCD, for how FEMA will  coordinate with NCD.
To help ensure that voluntary organizations can readily obtain clear and  accurate information about the reimbursement opportunities offered by  the Public Assistance program, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take action to  make the information on FEMA’s Web site about reimbursement  opportunities for voluntary organizations more user-friendly. This could  include:    developing a user-friendly guide or fact sheet that provides an overview  of opportunities for reimbursement for facilities damage; and    providing contact information for organizations to get more  information about Public Assistance program opportunities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department of  Homeland Security. DHS agreed with our recommendations. DHS  provided technical comments only, which we incorporated as appropriate.  We also provided a draft of relevant sections of this report to the Red  Cross. The Red Cross provided several technical comments that we  incorporated as appropriate.
After reviewing the section of this report pertaining to NVOAD, the  NVOAD Board President and Executive Director agreed with our findings  and recommendation regarding improving information sharing after  disasters. NVOAD added that it would be in favor of FEMA providing  support to implement this recommendation through its Disaster  Assistance Directorate. NVOAD’s comments are reprinted in appendix V.  In addition, we provided the Chairman of NCD with a draft copy of the  section of this report addressing issues with coordination between FEMA  and NCD under the Post-Katrina Act. NCD agreed with the report’s  findings and recommendation for this section. NCD’s comments are  reprinted in appendix VI.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of  Homeland Security, the Red Cross, appropriate congressional committees,  and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215  if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: As part of our body of work examining the response of the federal  government and others to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we conducted a  review of various issues pertaining to the role of voluntary organizations in  providing mass care services. To obtain information about the rationale  for, and implications of, the shift in the primary mass care role in the  National Response Framework (NRF) from the Red Cross to the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we reviewed letters between  FEMA and the Red Cross documenting reasons for the shift in the primary  agency role from the Red Cross to FEMA, the National Response  Framework, information about the National Shelter System, the Post  Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, and information about the  responsibilities of Voluntary Agency Liaisons. We also observed a  demonstration of the National Shelter System. We interviewed officials  from FEMA with responsibility for ESF-6, including FEMA Voluntary  Agency Liaisons (VALs) in headquarters and in the field, and from national  offices of voluntary organizations, including the Red Cross, National  Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, the Salvation Army, the United  Way, America’s Second Harvest, Catholic Charities, and the Southern  Baptist Convention. We also interviewed emergency management officials  from a selection of states that included Louisiana, Mississippi, and nine  other randomly selected states throughout the country.
To obtain information about NVOAD’s efforts to coordinate with the  voluntary sector, we reviewed documents about its member services,  internal governance, funding, and plans for the future. We also interviewed  NVOAD’s former and current executive directors, chairman of the board,  officials from eight of NVOAD’s member organizations, and FEMA officials  and disaster response experts who have worked with NVOAD. We also  interviewed an official who manages a Web site used to coordinate  disaster relief by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and  reviewed the Web site.
To obtain information about the efforts of FEMA and major national  voluntary organizations to improve services for the disabled since Katrina,  we reviewed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (the  Act), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and guidance released by  the Justice Department about ADA, and also and conducted document  reviews with FEMA, the American Red Cross, and the Southern Baptist  Convention. These included documents related to FEMA’s efforts to  improve services for the disabled and respond to the Act’s requirements,  such as the Target Capabilities and guidelines for accommodating  individuals with disabilities. In addition, we reviewed a number of Red  Cross documents related to services for individuals with disabilities,  including training materials and a shelter intake form. We also interviewed  officials from DHS, FEMA, the Red Cross, the Southern Baptists, Salvation  Army, the United Way, and Catholic Charities, and state-level emergency  managers from Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Our interviews with  FEMA included individuals from the various initiatives required by the Act  to consult with the National Council on Disability, and FEMA’s Disability  Coordinator. In addition, we interviewed officials from the National  Council on Disabilities, a number of disability advocacy organizations,  such as the National Spinal Cord Injury Association, and several advocacy  groups for the elderly, such as the American Association of Retired  Persons. We also reviewed a survey of 95 Red Cross chapters that was  conducted by the Disability Relations Group, an organization that  conducts survey research on disability issues. Due to several  methodological limitations—for example, we could not determine the  response rate to the survey—we did not cite the results of this survey in  the report.
To collect information about how FEMA coordinated with small voluntary  organizations through the Public Assistance program, we conducted  document reviews of FEMA’s Public Assistance program, including FEMA  Public Assistance policies, and documentation of changes to those  policies, and reviewed information about the program on FEMA’s Web  site. We also interviewed FEMA officials from the Public Assistance office,  and several FEMA VALs. We spoke with representatives of approximately  10 local voluntary organizations that provided services in the Gulf Coast  after the hurricanes, and the Director of Long-Term Recovery for the  Louisiana Association of Nonprofits—a group that works with nonprofits  that applied for reimbursement. In addition, we spoke with state  government officials from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, officials from  Baton Rouge and Houston, and several disaster response experts familiar  with Public Assistance.
We reviewed reports on the response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes issued  by the DHS Office of Inspector General, the House of Representatives, the  White House, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and  Governmental Affairs, the National Council on Disability, the Appleseed  Foundation, the American Association of Retired Persons, the  International Association of Assembly Managers, and the Aspen Institute.
In addition, this report drew from research conducted for GAO-06-712,  which was released in June 2006. For that report, we conducted site visits  to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. We toured damage caused by the  hurricanes in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Biloxi, Mississippi. Additionally  we toured the FEMA Joint Field Offices that were located in Baton Rouge,  Biloxi, and Austin; local emergency operations centers in Baton Rouge and  Austin; as well as distribution centers established by the Red Cross and  the Salvation Army. On these site visits, we met with local chapters of the  Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, and the United Way. We  held two additional discussion groups—one in Jackson, Mississippi, and  one in Houston, Texas—to obtain the perspectives of local voluntary  organizations that provided disaster relief on their efforts to be reimbursed  under the Public Assistance program, and other issues. We spoke with key  local emergency managers from East Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Austin,  and Houston, as well as the State of Texas. We also spoke with FEMA  Voluntary Agency Liaisons in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
In addition, for the June 2006 report we conducted a discussion group at a  Board of Directors meeting for the National Voluntary Organizations  Active in Disaster that included representatives from the United Methodist  Committee on Relief, America’s Second Harvest, and Lutheran Disaster  Response. We also observed a National Voluntary Organizations Active in  Disaster conference call in November 2005. These conference calls took  place daily after the Gulf Coast hurricanes and included representatives  from local and national voluntary organizations, as well as federal  agencies, such as FEMA.
We conducted this performance audit between January 2007 and February  2008, and work for the previous report, GAO-06-712, between October  2005 and June 2006, in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: NVOAD Members
section_title: Appendix III: Job Duties of FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons
paragraphs: Assist voluntary agencies in the development and promotion of state and local Voluntary  Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD) and other coalitions such as unmet  needs/resource coordination committees for long-term recovery.
Initiate and maintain a close working relationship between FEMA and voluntary agencies  including soliciting participation of the voluntary agencies in preparedness activities such  as training and exercises to improve response and recovery capacity.
Provide technical advice to FEMA Regional and Area Offices, other federal agencies,  and state emergency management officials regarding the roles and responsibilities of all  VOAD members, and other voluntary agencies active in disaster and emergency  situations.
Assist and collaborate with other FEMA Regional and Area Offices staff, in the  development and maintenance of emergency response and recovery plans to ensure  that voluntary agencies’ capabilities, specifically as they relate to emergency assistance,  mass shelter and feeding, donations management, and other voluntary agency disaster  relief activities are recognized in the plans.
Assist with the collection and dissemination of information concerning emergency  incidents, including initial damage assessment, emergency response activities, and  continued response and long-term recovery activities/plans of voluntary agencies.
Assist and support the FEMA Individual Assistance officer on disaster operations in  providing consultative support to voluntary agency leadership and encouraging  collaboration among voluntary agencies.
Provide or make available to the voluntary agencies information on the status of federal  and state response and recovery programs and activities.
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Andrew Sherrill, Acting Director, and Scott Spicer, Analyst in Charge,  managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects  of this report. Farahnaaz Khakoo and Danielle Pakdaman also made  significant contributions. Additionally, Cindy Bascetta, Mallory Barg  Bulman, Karen Doran, Tom James, Bill Jenkins, Gale Harris, Chuck  Wilson, and Walter Vance aided in this assignment. In addition, Jessica  Botsford assisted in the legal analysis, and Charlie Willson assisted in the  message and report development.
section_title: Bibliography
paragraphs: The American Association of Retired Persons. We Can Do Better: Lessons  Learned for Protecting Older Persons in Disasters. Washington, D.C.:  2006.
The Appleseed Foundation. A Continuing Storm: The Ongoing Struggles  of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees. Minneapolis, Minnesota: August 2006.
The Aspen Institute. Weathering the Storm: The Role of Local Nonprofits  in the Hurricane Katrina Relief Effort. Washington, D.C.: 2006.
Congressional Research Service. Federal Emergency Management Policy  Changes after Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions.  Washington, D.C.: December 2006.
Congressional Research Service. Reimbursement of Local Private  Nonprofit Organizations under the Stafford Act. Washington, D.C.:  January 2006.
Department of Homeland Security. Nationwide Plan Review: Phase II  Report. Washington, D.C.: June 2006.
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. A  Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in  Response to Hurricane Katrina. OIG-06-32. Washington, D.C.: March  2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response  Hotwash Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. New Orleans, Louisiana:  February 2006.
International Association of Assembly Managers. Mega-Shelter: Best  Practices for Planning, Activation, Operations. Coppell, Texas: July  2006.
National Council on Disability. The Impact of Hurricanes Katrina and  Rita on People with Disabilities: A Look Back and Remaining  Challenges. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 2006.
United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to  Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A  Failure of Initiative. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006.
United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental  Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared. Washington, D.C.:  2006.
The White House. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons  Learned. Washington, D.C.: February 2006.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of  Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. February 2007.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery  Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. July 31, 2006.
Child Welfare: Federal Action Needed to Ensure States Have Plans to  Safeguard Children in the Child Welfare System Displaced by Disasters.  GAO-06-944. July 28, 2006.
Small Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More Timely  Disaster Assistance. GAO-06-860. July 28, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance  for Health Facilities Should Be Addressed. GAO-06-826. July 20, 2006.
Purchase Cards: Control Weakness Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to  Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity. GAO-06-957T. July 19, 2006.
Individual Disaster Assistance Programs: Framework for Fraud  Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution. GAO-06-954T. July 12, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:  FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant  Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-655. June 16, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Improper and Potentially Fraudulent  Individual Assistance Payments Estimated to Be between $600 Million  and $1.4 Billion. GAO-06-844T. June 14, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red  Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.  June 8, 2006.
Lessons Learned for Protecting and Educating Children after the Gulf  Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-680R. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster  Recovery Contracts. GAO-06-622T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed  to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International  Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New Orleans  and Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6  Months after Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R. Washington, D.C.: March  28, 2006.
Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina  and Rita. GAO-06-461R. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of  Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06-443R.  Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:  FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant  Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Investigation: Military Meals, Ready-to-Eat Sold on eBay. GAO-06-410R.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s  Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February  1, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National  Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-335T. Washington, D.C.: January 25,  2006.
Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee  Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain  Project. GAO-06-322T. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. GAO- 06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.