Battlefield Automation: Army's Digital Battlefield Plan Lacks Specific Measurable Goals
Published: 1995-11-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Army's plans to digitize its battlefield operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that: (1) as part of its battlefield digitization plan, the Army plans to conduct a series of costly experiments from 1995 to 1997 to demonstrate the utility of a digitized force; (2) risks that the Army faces in implementing its digitization plan include integration, software development, hardware costs, unknown quantity requirements, communications, and interoperability with other command and control systems; (3) specific and measurable goals are needed to evaluate the achievements of each experiment, and these goals should be met before proceeding to the next experiment; (4) the Army is risking investments of almost $400 million for digital systems needed to conduct increasingly larger scale experiments through fiscal year 1999; (5) the investment required to digitize a 10-division Army could be as high as $4 billion; and (6) since Congress has directed the Army to include the Marine Corps in its digitization plan, the Department of Defense must identify funding for the Marine Corps to ensure its participation and success in the digitization program.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: One of the Army’s top priorities is a program to digitize the battlefield by creating a vast network of computers, sensors, and communications systems that would provide a common picture of the battlefield from soldier to commander simultaneously. Because of the importance and estimated $4 billion cost of this program, we reviewed the “Army Digitization Master Plan” to evaluate the Army’s efforts to digitize the battlefield, including the Marine Corps’ participation. We conducted this review under our basic legislative responsibilities and are addressing this report to you because we believe it will be of interest to your committees.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Automation of the battlefield has been a long-term goal of the Army because of its promise as a force multiplier: it produces greater fighting effectiveness through better use of battlefield resources. Digitization of the battlefield is the Army’s latest effort to bring it closer to its long-term goal. Prior Army efforts focused on automating command and control at the corps and division levels whereas digitization extends this automation to the brigade and lower echelons, including individual weapons platforms.
Digitization of the battlefield is part of a major effort to reshape the Army and, thus, it is one of the Army’s highest priorities. The Army hopes to identify how digitization will improve combat power and how to change its organizational structure, doctrine, and tactics to take advantage of digitization.
Army battlefield digitization started in the 1980s with the development of five corps- and division-level command and control systems collectively known as the Army Tactical Command and Control System. Their development and fielding have been a struggle. Two systems were fielded in 1993 and 1994, with limited capabilities. Two other systems are scheduled to undergo operational testing in 1995 and in 1996. The fifth system is scheduled to undergo its second operational test in 1996.
The Army’s strategy for digitizing the battlefield uses a bottom-up approach that experiments echelon by echelon with several digital systems simultaneously. It is a massive effort involving brigade-, division-, and corps-level experiments over the next 5 years. Advanced warfighting experiments were performed in 1993 at the company level, and in 1994 at the battalion level. Current plans call for a brigade experiment in February 1997, a division experiment in February 1998, and a corps experiment in April 1999.
There are many digital systems to evaluate. For example, 25 unique digital systems and more than 120 items of equipment were evaluated in the battalion experiment. More than 40 digital systems, including potentially 1,200 appliques, may be evaluated during the brigade experiment. The applique, which began its development when a contract was awarded on January 6, 1995, will provide digital capability to weapon systems that do not have any.
The major feature of the applique will be the situational awareness that it provides to its users. A digital map will display the locations of friendly and enemy forces and update their movement in near real time. This common picture will be provided simultaneously to all units in the brigade, from the command staff to the individual M1 tanks and other weapons platforms.
section_title: Digitization Plan Requires High Investment in Early Phases
paragraphs: The investment required for what the Army describes as the equivalent of the concept exploration and definition phase is $272 million through fiscal year 1997. For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, the equivalent of the demonstration and validation phase and the engineering and manufacturing development phase, the cost is expected to be $125 million, bringing the total development effort to $397 million. The cost primarily covers the development and acquisition of the applique and its integration onto many different vehicles, helicopters, and other platforms. It also covers the development of a digital radio and other related products. These research and development costs are relatively high because it is expensive to equip a battalion, a brigade, a division, and a corps with appliques for experiments. In the conventional concept exploration and definition phase, only a few prototypes of a system would be bought for experiments. The Army’s position is that, although these costs are relatively high, the resources are needed to demonstrate the utility of a digitized force.
Through 2005, the Army estimates that $2.1 billion is needed to field and sustain Force Package I. About 77 percent of this amount is to equip the force with appliques. The cost to equip the rest of the Army with appliques is not known, but according to Army officials, it could be $2 billion through 2011. This is in addition to funds already programmed for other digital battlefield efforts such as the five systems that comprise the Army Tactical Command and Control System and the embedded systems whose costs are born by the weapon systems themselves.
section_title: Digitization Plan Has Numerous Risks
paragraphs: The Army faces numerous technical, program, cost, and schedule risks in implementing its master plan for battlefield digitization. These risks are integration, software development, hardware costs, unknown quantity requirements, communications, and interoperability with other command and control systems.
subsections: section_title: Integration
paragraphs: The integration of the applique onto different platforms represents a technical risk. The underlying cause of this risk is that each platform is different and requires a separate solution in terms of installation kits. For example, the installation kit that works for a tank may not necessarily work for an infantry fighting vehicle or a helicopter.
section_title: Software Development
paragraphs: Software development is an additional technical, cost, and schedule risk in our view because no appliques have been delivered and tested. More will be known after a critical design review in August 1995, and evaluations of interim software currently scheduled for July, September, and December 1995 and January and May 1996 have occurred. During this period, soldiers from Fort Knox will evaluate each version of software.
Implementing all software functions and requirements will require additional engineering; in fact, 30 percent of applique software, which is needed for the brigade experiment, is estimated to be new code. The rest of the software is existing Brigade and Below Command and Control (B2C2) software and elements of the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control, the Combat Service Support Control System, and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System software, which have only been demonstrated separately and not as an integrated system.
section_title: Hardware Costs
paragraphs: Applique hardware costs may be understated, depending on (1) how frequently hardware will be replaced, (2) what mix of computers will be used in future experiments and fieldings, and (3) whether higher end machines with more memory and speed will be needed. The Army may be required to upgrade applique computers every 2 to 3 years or sooner to take advantage of industry’s technology advancements. The Army is still deciding on the proper mix of militarized, ruggedized, and commercial computers to be used for the brigade experiment. Currently, it is moving away from militarized toward ruggedized computers, which are less costly. However, the commercial computers, which are the least costly of the three variants, may not be rugged enough for the job. If the brigade experiment shows that more militarized and ruggedized computers are needed, that would drive up the costs of future experiments and deployment. The brigade experiment may also show that the appliques cannot do the job in terms of memory and speed. If so, higher end machines would be required, which will also increase costs.
section_title: Quantity Requirements
paragraphs: Cost risk is further aggravated by unknown quantity requirements for the applique. Because total quantity requirements are unknown, the total cost of the applique and the FBCB2 program is unknown. The 1997 brigade experiment may show that installing an applique in every tank, helicopter, and weapon system is useful but not affordable.
section_title: Communications
paragraphs: Army officials have told us that having adequate communications is key to the 1997 brigade experiment; otherwise, it may have to be postponed. The Army is developing a tactical internet that increases the digital capacity and connectivity of three existing radio based communications systems.However, the tactical internet is not expected to be delivered to the Army until May 1996, only 1 month before the start of training for the experiment. Consequently, it represents a significant schedule risk.
If successful, the tactical internet will provide a short-term solution to meeting the Army’s data distribution needs. However, long-term needs will increase as the Army becomes dependent on automation and adds new digital systems to its inventory. Because of this, Army officials told us that they will require two new data distribution systems, one in the interim to be potentially more capable but less costly than the current system, EPLRS, and another one in the future to meet long-term needs. Developing an interim digital communications system for a 10 division Army could cost at least as much as EPLRS, or more than $900 million, and could take years to field. In our view, the data distribution issue is the weak link in the Army’s plan because a new, interim system will be needed to meet the increasing communications demands imposed by the digital battlefield in the next century. Until it is resolved, we do not believe the full potential of battlefield digitization or automation will be realized.
section_title: Interoperability
paragraphs: A schedule risk is posed because a number of systems must interoperate with the applique and be available for integration and testing prior to the 1997 brigade experiment. An example would be the five division- and corps-level systems that comprise the Army Tactical Command and Control System. Interoperability has been demonstrated through a very limited number of messages being exchanged between these systems. However, database to database exchange, which is critical to providing commanders with an accurate, near real-time common picture of the battlefield, has not been achieved.
section_title: Army Risk Reduction Efforts
paragraphs: In commenting on our report, the Army recognizes the risks that we discuss and believes that it has taken steps to mitigate them. These include (1) the establishment of the Army Digitization Office, which provides high-level oversight by reporting to the Chief of Staff of the Army; (2) the establishment of the Digital Integrated Laboratory to assess interoperability issues; (3) the establishment of a “user jury” to provide early assessments of applique performance; and (4) the development of a Risk Management Master Plan. While these efforts are commendable, we still believe that the risks are substantial in number and formidable obstacles to the success of the digitization of the battlefield and we will continue to monitor the program to determine whether these risk reduction efforts really work.
section_title: Experimentation Approach Is Inadequate
paragraphs: The Army’s experimentation master plan states what experiments are to be performed through 1999, but it does not provide specific goals and clear criteria to support decisions to proceed with the experiments and buy additional appliques and other equipment. Thus, there is no criteria for measuring whether the experiments will be successful. As a result, the Army could continue to conduct large-scale, costly experiments at the brigade, division, and corps level, no matter what the results would be. For example, the 1994 battalion-level experiment lacked specific goals and exit criteria. Despite poor results in that experiment, the Army is moving on to a larger scale, brigade-level experiment in 1997, at a cost of $258 million. In addition, the Army’s experimentation approach lacks adequate instrumentation and data collection.
subsections: section_title: Experimentation Approach Lacks Specific Goals
paragraphs: Specific, measurable, and quantifiable goals are needed to evaluate program achievements and assure program success. The Army’s Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) stated this requirement in its report on the 1994 experiment. Its recommendation was to “establish entrance criteria for hardware and software to ensure equipment used by the units is reliable and interoperable, and insights and data generated on force effectiveness meet established goals and expectations.”
Although the experimentation plan identifies numerous goals, such as increased lethality, it does not say how much lethality is to be achieved from the battalion experiment to the brigade and division-level experiments. Increased lethality is measured by many factors, such as the number of enemy troops, artillery pieces, and helicopters lost in battle. However, neither numeric criteria nor a baseline is given for these factors. The Army intends to determine effectiveness based on increasing trends in a series of simulations, technical tests, and field and subfield experiments over the next 5 years.
The Army does not believe that either pass/fail criteria or a baseline are necessary at this stage since it is only experimenting. However, given that the experiment is expensive and important to its future, the Army should have measurable goals that it is expecting to achieve. Attainment or nonattainment of these goals, rather than subjective assessments alone, can best show the Army where it must direct its resources and whether it is appropriate to proceed to the next experiment.
section_title: 1994 Digitized Battalion Experiment Did Not Meet Expectations
paragraphs: From April 10 to April 23, 1994, a battalion-level experiment was conducted at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. It was the first experiment to use a digitized battalion task force. The experiment did not have (1) specific goals, (2) a specific way to measure success, or (3) a baseline to compare the digitized battalion’s performance to. However, some Army leaders expected that the digitized “blue” force would defeat its nondigitized opponent called the “red” force. This did not happen.
In the absence of specific goals, thresholds for performance, and a baseline, the Army compared the outcomes of seven nondigitized units that participated in four training rotations against the same well-trained red force at about the same time. Four units were at the National Training Center prior to April 1994, one at the same time as the digitized battalion, and two were there after the digitized unit’s exercise. The comparison showed that the blue force generally performed no better than the seven other nondigitized blue forces against the red force. For example, the loss exchange ratio (the ratio of enemy losses to friendly losses) of the digitized blue force was about the same as the seven nondigitized blue forces in offensive and defensive engagements. The main reasons for these poor results were the immaturity of the B2C2 software, its lack of interoperability with the M1A2 tank’s command and control software, and a lack of hands-on training with the digital systems. Despite these poor results, the Army decided to proceed to the brigade-level experiment instead of redoing the battalion experiment because it would have slowed the digitization effort by a year and cost several million dollars.
section_title: Adequate Instrumentation and Data Collection Are Lacking
paragraphs: “. . . additional instrumentation at critical nodes would allow increased confidence in experiment outcomes. It would permit a determination of when systems are operational, when they are used, how much they are used, who is communicating with whom . . . and if the systems are down, is the cause hardware, software, radio propagation, or human error. . . . The lack of instrumentation does not provide system developers the kind of information they need to troubleshoot problems identified during the exercise and make needed fixes.”
Objective data is vital in decisions to proceed to the next experiment and finally to full-rate production and deployment. The Army is planning to provide a more controlled environment for data collection of 100 instrumented vehicles during a 9-month training period prior to the February 1997 brigade experiment. However, it is unclear whether this will be enough in the context of numbers and critical nodes. The Army, in conjunction with an independent test agency, needs to decide specifically what instrumentation is needed to provide sufficient objective data to support moving the experiment forward.
section_title: Marine Corps Funding Issues
paragraphs: Last year, Congress directed the Army to include the Marine Corps in its plans for the digital battlefield. This has been done. Also, in fiscal year 1995, the Army provided the Marine Corps with $429,000 to help it launch its digitization program. The Army will also provide the Marines—at a cost of about $2.3 million to the Army—with enough appliques and installation kits to equip a light-armored reconnaissance company to participate in the 1997 brigade experiment.
Despite these efforts, the Marines will have a $4.8 million shortfall in fiscal year 1996 research and development funds for equipment, engineering support, and operational demonstrations, which will affect its preparation for the Army’s 1997 brigade experiment. The Army says it cannot provide additional assistance to the Marines because it has no more resources. Thus, the Marines’ participation in the Army’s 1997 experiment appears to be unknown.
This situation illustrates that the Marine Corps needs assured funding to solidify its participation and success in all of the Army’s digital battlefield experiments. These experiments may show that the Marines need additional appliques and communications systems to assure its interoperability with the Army in future joint combat operations. Thus, the Army; the Navy, which oversees Marine Corps funding; and DOD need to work together to produce a specific plan to create and assure Marine Corps funding.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To help ensure that resources are directed appropriately and the Army has the data it needs to determine whether it should (1) buy additional appliques and (2) proceed to the next level of experiments, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Secretary of the Army to develop specific, measurable goals and exit criteria for each phase of digital battlefield experimentation. Further, the Secretary of Defense should independently verify the goals’ attainments.
To carry out congressional direction, we also recommend the Secretary of Defense insure that the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps identify resources to support the Marine Corps’ participation and success in the Army’s battlefield digitization effort.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD partially concurred with the recommendations in our draft report. While the steps it plans to take on eventually establishing measurable goals substantially complies with our recommendation, we still have differences on the timing and specificity of the goals and the independent verification of the attainment of those goals.
DOD believes that while it is necessary to have some means to judge the outcome of these large-scale experiments, it is too early in the program to have specific goals and measurable standards that have a pass or fail criteria associated with them. We disagree and continue to maintain that specific, measurable goals are needed, even at this early stage because of the expenses involved, the scale and progressive nature of the experiments, and their importance to the Army. By not establishing specific goals now at this level of experimentation, DOD and the Army are escalating risk as each advanced warfighting experiment progresses from the brigade to the division and finally to the corps levels. The DOD-supported Army approach continues the risk associated with acquiring millions of dollars of appliques and other related developments without knowing whether previous experiments were successful. Without some limits and controls, the Army could spend hundreds of millions of dollars on these experiments without having an adequate basis to judge whether it should continue them.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the attainment of these yet to be established measurable goals needs to be independently verified by DOD and points to the involvement of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). We acknowledge that DOT&E involvement is a very positive step in the direction we recommend. However, it is still unclear whether DOT&E will actually (1) approve of specific, measurable goals early on as we recommend instead of the general ones that DOD and the Army advocate and (2) verify the attainment of those goals in each advanced warfighting experiment.
DOD’s recognition of the Marine Corps’ funding issue and its statement that it is working with the services to resolve it, essentially complies with the intent of our recommendation. We intend to monitor DOD’s implementation efforts.
DOD’s comments are addressed in the body of this report where appropriate and are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along with our evaluation.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We performed our review primarily at the Army Digitization Office in Washington, D.C., and the Program Executive Office for Command and Control Systems, and the Program Executive Office for Communications Systems at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. We also visited the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; OPTEC, Arlington, Virginia; and the Program Executive Office for Aviation, St. Louis, Missouri. In addition, we contacted DOD’s DOT&E, Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia.
We conducted our review between October 1994 and June 1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202)512-6548 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this report were William L. Wright, Donald F. Lopes, and Edwin B. Griffin.
section_title: Comments From the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated August 25, 1995.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We have identified these efforts in the body of our report. We believe that the Army’s intentions are encouraging. However, we will continue to monitor the program to determine whether these risk reduction efforts really work. We still believe that the risks are substantial in number and formidable obstacles to the success of the digitization of the battlefield. 2. The steps the Army plans to take on eventually establishing measurable goals substantially complies with our recommendation. We still have differences on the timing and specificity of the goals and the independent verification of the attainment of those goals. DOD believes that while it is necessary to have some means to judge the outcome of these large scale experiments, it is too early in the program to have specific goals and measurable standards that have a pass or fail criteria associated with them. We disagree and continue to maintain that specific, measurable goals are needed, even at this early stage because of the expenses involved, the scale and progressive nature of the experiments, and their importance to the Army. By not establishing specific goals now at this level of experimentation, DOD and the Army are escalating risk at higher levels as each advanced warfighting experiment progresses from the brigade to the division and finally to the corps levels. DOD supported Army approach continues the risk associated with acquiring millions of dollars of appliques and other related developments without knowing whether previous experiments were successful. Without some limits and controls, the Army could spend hundreds of millions of dollars on these experiments without having an adequate basis to judge whether it should continue with them. 3. We acknowledge that the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) involvement is a very positive step in the direction we recommend. However, it is still unclear whether DOT&E will actually (1) approve of specific, measurable goals early on as we recommend instead of the general ones as DOD and the Army advocate and (2) verify the attainment of those goals in each advanced warfighting experiment. 4. DOD’s recognition of the Marine Corps’ funding issue and its statement that it is working with the services to resolve it, essentially complies with the intent of our recommendation. We will continue to monitor DOD’s implementation efforts.
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