Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak's Management of Northeast Corridor Improvements Demonstrates Need for Applying Best Practices
Published: 2004-02-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In the 1990s, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) undertook the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project to make infrastructure improvements that would enable Amtrak to meet a statutory goal of providing 3-hour intercity passenger rail service between Boston and New York City. Amtrak shared responsibility for implementing the project with commuter rail authorities and state governments, and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) developed a master plan for the project and provided federal funds to Amtrak. GAO reviewed (1) the status of the project, (2) Amtrak's management of the project, (3) FRA's oversight of the project, and (4) best practices for managing future large-scale rail infrastructure projects.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Amtrak has not yet met the 3-hour trip-time goal established by the 1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act although electrified service between Boston and New York City was initiated in January 2000 and Amtrak began limited high-speed rail service in December 2000. Currently, this trip is scheduled to take 3 hours 24 minutes. Furthermore, 51 of 72 work elements that FRA identified in its 1994 master plan as necessary to reduce trip times (e.g., electrify tracks and acquire high-speed trains), enhance capacity (e.g., construct sidings), rebuild or extend the life of physical assets (e.g., replace bridges), or make other improvements are incomplete or their status is unknown. Fifteen of these work elements are on non-Amtrak owned sections of track and are important for achieving and maintaining 3- hour service as rail traffic increases over time. Through March 2003, Amtrak and others had spent about $3.2 billion on the project. Neither Amtrak nor FRA exercised effective management or oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Amtrak's management was not comprehensive, and it was focused primarily on the short term. Amtrak focused on managing the electrification and acquisition of new high-speed trains, and did not sufficiently address major infrastructure improvements needed to attain the trip-time goal. In addition, Amtrak did not fully integrate the interests of stakeholders (commuter rail authorities and state governments) into the project, even though work that involved them was critical to achieving 3-hour service. FRA served as a conduit for federal appropriations to the project but did not have the resources or the authority to oversee Amtrak's management of the project. Best practices--including comprehensive planning, risk assessment and mitigation, comprehensive financial management, accountability and oversight, and incorporation of diverse stakeholders' interests--provide a framework for effectively managing future large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects. These best practices have proved effective in managing large-scale infrastructure projects and could assist in managing future projects like the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Intercity passenger rail service is a critical component of the transportation  system in the densely populated Northeast Corridor, which is generally  defined as the area between Boston and Washington, D.C. The Northeast  Corridor is the busiest passenger rail line in the country—some 200 million  intercity and commuter rail passengers use this line, or some portion of it,  each year. Although the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)  is the primary owner of the Northeast Corridor between Washington, D.C.,  and New York City, track ownership between Boston and New York City is  divided among Amtrak, commuter rail agencies, and state governments.  Amtrak acquired its portion of the Northeast Corridor in 1976. Recognizing  the importance of the Northeast Corridor and the need to make critical  infrastructure improvements to the rail line, Congress established the  Northeast Corridor Improvement Project in 1976. This project, which  consisted of infrastructure improvements designed to enable high-speed  rail service between Boston and Washington, D.C., was one of the largest  rail infrastructure projects undertaken in recent times and represented the  single largest federal investment in intercity passenger rail service in the  last century.
In the 1990s, the focus of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project was  on infrastructure improvements between Boston and New York City. In  particular, in 1992 the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act directed  the Secretary of Transportation to develop a master plan for a program of  improvements that would permit regularly scheduled, safe, and dependable  rail passenger service between Boston and New York City in 3 hours or  less. In 1994, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) issued such a plan.  The plan contained three milestones—initiating electrified train service  between Boston and New York City, initiating 3-hour train service, and  completing infrastructure improvements designed to enhance track  capacity and extend the useful life of existing assets (called  “recapitalization”)—and identified 72 work elements that would be needed  to complete the project. FRA estimated that the first milestone could be  completed by mid-1997, the second by 1999, and the third by the end of  2009. FRA also estimated that about $3.1 billion (1993 dollars) would be  needed to enable 3-hour service between Boston and New York City and  complete capacity enhancement and recapitalization work to maintain this  schedule. Improvements to achieve the 3-hour service included electrifying  the route between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston; upgrading and  improving tracks, signals, and other infrastructure; and acquiring 26 high- speed passenger trains. Amtrak was responsible for managing these efforts,  which collectively became known as the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project, and shared responsibility for implementing the  project with several other entities, including commuter and freight  railroads and state governments, which we refer to in this report as  “stakeholders.”
This report responds to your request that we examine Amtrak’s  management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. In  particular, the report discusses (1) the status of the project, (2) Amtrak’s  management of the project, (3) FRA’s oversight of the project, and (4) the  use of best practices as a framework for managing future large-scale  intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects. Best practices in the  context of capital projects are defined as those “practices that have been  successfully implemented by organizations recognized for their  outstanding capital decision-making practices.”
To determine the status of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project, we reviewed applicable laws related to both it and the Northeast  Corridor Improvement Project and reviewed documents on its cost,  schedule, and status. To address Amtrak’s management of the project, we  reviewed documents related to the project’s organization and management  and interviewed Amtrak, FRA, and other officials about the project’s  management. To address FRA’s oversight of the project, we reviewed laws  related to FRA’s legislative authorities, discussed FRA’s oversight of the  project with FRA officials, and reviewed documents related to the Federal  Transit Administration’s (FTA) project management oversight program.  Finally, to address the use of best practices as a framework for managing  future large-scale intercity passenger rail projects, we conducted a  literature search to identify best practices related to infrastructure  management and discussed infrastructure management best practices with  Amtrak, FRA, and other officials. We then synthesized this information into  the framework presented. Appendix I discusses our overall scope and  methodology, appendix II discusses our methodology for identifying best  practices related to infrastructure project management, and appendix V  lists GAO and other products associated with project management best  practices.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created Amtrak to provide intercity  passenger rail service because existing railroads found such service to be  unprofitable. Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile network, primarily over freight  railroad tracks, providing service to 46 states and the District of Columbia.  Amtrak owns about 650 miles of track, primarily on the Northeast Corridor  between Boston and Washington, D.C. In fiscal year 2002, Amtrak served  23.4 million passengers, or about 64,000 passengers per day. According to  Amtrak, about two-thirds of its ridership is wholly or partially on the  Northeast Corridor.
Amtrak acquired the Northeast Corridor in 1976 from the Consolidated Rail  Corporation as part of the disposition of the Penn Central Transportation  Company’s assets. At the time, the Penn Central Transportation Company  and certain other Northeastern railroads were in bankruptcy. As required  by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, the purpose of this  acquisition was to facilitate improved high-speed passenger rail service.  However, Amtrak is neither the exclusive owner nor the exclusive user of  the Northeast Corridor. Although Amtrak is the owner and operator of the  Northeast Corridor between New York City and Washington, D.C. (called  the “south-end”), other organizations, including the Massachusetts Bay  Transportation Authority (MBTA), the Connecticut Department of  Transportation (CDOT), and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of  New York (MTA), own significant portions of the Northeast Corridor  between Boston and New York City (called the “north-end”). (See fig. 1.)  Both Amtrak and commuter rail trains operate on these segments of track:  MBTA provides commuter rail service between Boston and Providence,  Rhode Island; Shore Line East provides commuter rail service between  New London and New Haven, Connecticut; and Metro-North Railroad  provides commuter rail service between New Haven and New Rochelle,  New York. In fiscal year 2002, Amtrak accounted for 10 percent of the  number of intercity and commuter rail trains operated on the north-end of  the Northeast Corridor, and commuter railroads accounted for 90 percent.  Six freight railroads also operate on the Northeast Corridor and, in fiscal  year 2001, these freight railroads operated 38 trains per day on the  Northeast Corridor. In contrast, in the same year Amtrak and commuter  railroads operated approximately 470 trains per day on just the north-end  of the Northeast Corridor.
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act)  formally established the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project. Among  other things, the 4R Act authorized Amtrak to make improvements to the  right-of-way between Boston and Washington, D.C., needed to enable high- speed rail service, and it established certain goals for the project. In  particular, within 5 years of the 4R Act’s enactment, the project was to  achieve regularly scheduled and dependable intercity passenger rail service  between Boston and New York City in 3 hours 40 minutes, and between  New York City and Washington, D.C., in 2 hours 40 minutes. The ultimate  goal was to achieve service between Boston and New York City in 3 hours,  and between New York City and Washington, D.C., in 2 hours 30 minutes.  The act directed the Secretary of Transportation to determine the  practicability of meeting these latter goals and authorized $1.75 billion to  accomplish them as well as make certain other improvements on routes  related to the Northeast Corridor (such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and  Springfield, Massachusetts). The act did not specify a time by which these  latter goals were to be met, but did require a status report within two years  after the 4R Act was enacted. Under the act, FRA was the project manager.  Amtrak was a subcontractor primarily responsible for track and signal  work.
The Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-254) called for  transferring responsibility for the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project  from FRA to Amtrak by October 1985. FRA officials told us that at the time  of this transfer, they generally considered the project to be complete in that  additional funding for remaining major work elements was not envisioned.  Although the project had achieved significant improvements to the entire  Northeast Corridor, its principal focus had been on the south-end of the  corridor because of the significant deterioration of the infrastructure on  this segment of the line. An Amtrak official told us that the emphasis had  been largely on addressing infrastructure maintenance and repair issues,  not on enhancing the Northeast Corridor to accommodate high-speed rail  service. Consequently, although the project met the 2-hour-40-minute trip- time goal on the south-end of the Northeast Corridor between New York  City and Washington, D.C., it did not meet either the 3-hour-40-minute or  the 3-hour trip-time goals on the north-end of the Northeast Corridor  between Boston and New York City. FRA attributed the failure to meet the  trip-time goals for the north-end to a lack of funding, which prevented  electrifying the line north of New Haven and making other improvements  to track and structures. During the 1980s, funding for the project was  reduced several times, and these reductions limited the scope of the  project and led to the elimination of the north-end electrification work.
In 1992, the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act (P.L. 102-533)  required the Secretary of Transportation to develop a master plan for a new  project, the goal of which was to provide intercity passenger rail service  between Boston and New York City in 3 hours or less. The act authorized a  total of $470 million for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 to plan this effort and  make capital investments. Amtrak established the Northeast High-Speed  Rail Improvement Project in response to this act. In July 1994, FRA issued a  master plan for the project that called for a series of improvements  designed to meet the act’s 3-hour trip-time goal and permit initiation of 3- hour service by 1999. FRA estimated a cost of about $3.1 billion (in 1993  dollars) for the project, of which about $1.9 billion (1993 dollars) would be  required to achieve 3-hour rail service. The project was to be complete by  the end of 2009. (See app. III for more information on the history of the  Northeast Corridor Improvement Project and the Northeast High-Speed  Rail Improvement Project.)
Since its inception in 1970, Amtrak has struggled to earn revenues and  operate efficiently. These struggles have continued in recent years, leading  to proposals for restructuring the provision of intercity passenger rail  service. These proposals range from keeping Amtrak intact and providing  increased funding to improve its equipment and infrastructure, to breaking  Amtrak up and introducing competing rail service. The creation of a  separate infrastructure company has also been proposed as a means to  maintain and rehabilitate the Northeast Corridor and other infrastructure  for providing intercity passenger rail service. Finally, a proposal has been  made to delegate much of the responsibility for intercity passenger rail  service to states and have states (acting through interstate compacts)  provide a larger share of the funding and make decisions about intercity  passenger rail service. As of September 2003, these proposals were pending  before Congress. One or more of these proposals may influence how large- scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects are managed in the  future.
The federal government is also likely to be involved in future large-scale  intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects as high-speed rail corridors  are developed around the country. As of January 2002, there were 10  federally designated high-speed rail corridors nationwide. We reported in  March 2001 that 34 states were participating in the development of high- speed rail corridors and that those states had invested more than $1 billion  to improve local rail lines for that purpose. Federally designated corridors  may be eligible for federal funds. The total cost to develop high-speed rail  corridors is unknown. However, in April 2003, we reported that preliminary  estimates of the cost to develop these corridors could be between $50  billion and $70 billion over the next 20 years.
section_title: Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Has Not Achieved Trip-Time Goal
paragraphs: Amtrak has not met the goal of 3-hour rail service between Boston and New  York City, although it has reduced the scheduled trip time from about 4  hours in 1994 to 3 hours 24 minutes in 2003. To do this, it completed the  first milestone in FRA’s 1994 master plan—initiate electrified train service  between Boston and New York City—in January 2000, and it acquired  enough high-speed trains to begin limited high-speed rail service in  December 2000. However, it initiated these activities later than planned,  and, according to the latest available data (from March 2003), nearly three- quarters of the work elements (12 of 17 work elements) needed to  complete the second milestone—initiate 3-hour service—are incomplete or  their status is unknown. Progress toward completing the third and final  milestone—completing infrastructure improvements designed to enhance  track capacity and extend the life of existing track assets—has also been  slower than planned. In total, as of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter rail  authorities, and other stakeholders had completed 21 of the project’s 72  work elements—51 were either incomplete or their status was unknown.  Of these 51 work elements, according to FRA and commuter rail officials,  several (such as realignment of curves) are important to achieving the 3- hour goal. As of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and other  stakeholders had spent about $3.2 billion on the project. How much more  work will be done is uncertain. Several Amtrak officials said that they  consider the project complete, even though the 3-hour trip-time goal has  not been met and many work elements are incomplete. Work is continuing,  or is planned, for some of the master plan’s work elements, but there does  not appear to be an effort to complete the project or meet the trip-time  goal.
subsections: section_title: FRA’s Master Plan Identified Milestones and Work Elements and Estimated Costs for the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project
paragraphs: FRA’s 1994 master plan for the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project divided the project into three milestones and identified dates for  their completion. These milestones were as follows:  Initiate electrified service. This milestone consisted of 16 work  elements and required the completion of such things as the installation  of an electrification system between Boston and New Haven—the line  between New Haven and New York City was already electrified—and  the realignment of curves on the Boston to New Haven segment of track.  According to the master plan, the installation of the electrification  system was expected to take the most time, and its completion would  control the achievement of the first milestone. FRA estimated this  milestone could be completed by mid-1997.
Initiate 3-hour train service. This milestone consisted of 17 work  elements and required the completion of such things as the partial  delivery of high-speed trains (at least eight trains were expected to be  delivered to meet this milestone) and the realignment of curves between  New Haven and New Rochelle. FRA anticipated the initiation of limited  3-hour service between Boston and New York City in 1999, followed by  full 3-hour service using all 26 high-speed trains in 2001.
Complete capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements  necessary to maintain 3-hour service. This milestone consisted of 43  work elements and included the completion of several capacity  enhancement and recapitalization projects, such as construction of  passing sidings and the replacement of movable bridges—that is,  bridges that can be lifted or pivoted to accommodate maritime traffic.  This milestone was to be completed by the end of 2009 to accommodate  projected intercity, commuter, and freight traffic levels in 2010.
To accomplish the project’s three milestones, FRA’s 1994 master plan also  laid out the work elements in four categories. (See app. II for a list of all the  work elements.) The categories were   trip time reduction—20 work elements were designed to reduce trip  times through such efforts as electrifying the line from Boston to New  Haven and acquiring high-speed trains;   capacity enhancement—18 work elements were designed to enhance  capacity by, for example, reconfiguring interlockings to accommodate  traffic growth;   recapitalization—15 work elements were designed to rebuild or extend  the useful life of the infrastructure by, for example, replacing bridges;  and   other—19 work elements, labeled as “other,” including fiber optic  communications lines and pedestrian bridges, were designed to provide  more general benefits to rail passengers and others.
Under the master plan, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and state departments  of transportation shared responsibility for implementing the work  elements. According to FRA’s analysis, some of these elements exclusively  or primarily benefited Amtrak’s intercity passenger rail service, while other  elements primarily benefited commuter and freight rail service.
The 1994 master plan recognized that completing the work elements would  be expensive. FRA estimated that the work elements designed to reduce  trip times, enhance capacity, and perform recapitalization work would cost  about $3.1 billion (in 1993 dollars). This worked out to about $1.3 billion for  trip-time reductions, about $600 million for capacity enhancements, and  about $1.2 billion for recapitalization. FRA did not include a cost estimate  for the 19 other work elements. (See table 1.) Of the $3.1 billion cost  estimate, FRA estimated that about $1.9 billion (about 60 percent) would  be required to enable 3-hour service between Boston and New York City.  The 1994 master plan also did not assign funding responsibility to  particular organizations, but it did indicate that about 40 percent of the  project’s estimated costs would cover work that would provide significant  benefit to commuter railroads. The plan recognized that funding would  come from a variety of sources, including direct appropriations to FRA,  appropriations authorized under the Intermodal Surface Transportation  Efficiency Act of 1991, and state and local governments. The plan further  recognized that allocating funding responsibility and identifying funding  sources would involve negotiations between relevant parties.
Amtrak generally agreed with FRA’s 1994 master plan in their written  comments provided to FRA. However, in commenting on the plan, Amtrak  did not agree with certain cost estimates or with all of the plan’s work  elements that FRA identified as essential to achieve the 3-hour trip-time  goal. For example, Amtrak did not agree that FRA should have included  some capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements (such as  the installation of concrete ties in commuter rail territory) in its estimate of  the cost to complete the project. However, Amtrak recognized that both the  capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements were ultimately  essential to reliably and cost effectively support projected increases in rail  service over the following 20 years. Furthermore, Amtrak said that to  achieve a reliable 3-hour schedule it was not depending on improvements  to the non-Amtrak-owned sections of track (such as those owned by  commuter rail authorities) that FRA had identified as essential to achieve  the 3-hour trip-time goal. Finally, Amtrak stated its expectation that  improvements such as capacity enhancements would be funded by the  state or local agency or organization primarily benefiting from the  improvement, even if that agency or organization did not own the track.
In subsequent discussions with Amtrak officials, they said that, while  Amtrak had commented on FRA’s master plan during its development and  acknowledged its issuance, Amtrak did not adopt the plan or manage its  high-speed rail projects in accordance with it. According to Amtrak, the  master plan was never intended by Amtrak, Congress, or FRA to be used as  a “blueprint” or planning directive for the high-speed work and that the  document, once released, was virtually obsolete. This contradicts  information that was provided during our work. At that time, both Amtrak  and FRA officials agreed that the 1994 master plan was a blueprint for the  Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. A former Amtrak project  director had told us that FRA’s plan could be considered a baseline for the  overall project.
section_title: Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Has Not Achieved 3-Hour Goal and Is Far from Complete
paragraphs: Amtrak believed it could achieve a reliable 3-hour trip time by the summer  of 1999—about 2 years earlier than FRA had projected in the master plan.  Despite its belief that it could meet this goal by 1999, Amtrak has not yet  done so, and progress on the project has been slower than FRA initially  estimated. (See fig. 2.) As of March 2003, a total of 51 of the project’s 72  work elements were not complete or their status was unknown. Most of  these were in the third milestone. Although 49 of the project’s 72 work  elements were supposed to have been completed before 2003, as of March  2003, less than 40 percent (19 of the 49 work elements) had actually been  completed by that date. In addition, 2 other work elements that were  scheduled for completion after 2003 were actually completed by March  2003.
According to the master plan, Amtrak was scheduled to complete the first  milestone—initiate electrified service—by mid-1997, but it did not initiate  such service between Boston and New York City until January 2000, and  the electrification was not substantially completed until July 2000—about  3 years later than expected. The electrification was delayed, in part,  because Amtrak changed contractors in 1995 after the first electrification  contractor went out of business and the contract was terminated. Amtrak  then had to hire a new contractor to complete the work and lost about 2  years in work time. As of March 2003, 4 of the work elements for this  milestone were still incomplete, including the line electrification work  element, for which final acceptance is still pending.
Amtrak has yet to attain the second milestone—initiate 3-hour service.  Amtrak did begin limited Acela Express high-speed train service in  December 2000, but this service is scheduled to take 3 hours 24 minutes  from Boston to New York, not 3 hours. The 3-hour goal has not been met, in  part, because work elements on the 56-mile segment of track between New  Haven and New Rochelle that is operated by Metro-North Railroad have not  been completed. Amtrak did not believe work on this line segment was  necessary to achieve 3-hour service. However, both FRA and commuter rail  officials told us that work on this track segment is essential for achieving  the 3-hour goal. Among the work elements that have not been completed is  the reconfiguration of the New Rochelle (“Shell”) interlocking. Originally  this was to include the construction of a “flyover” (elevated track), called  the Shell Flyover. According to Amtrak officials, at-grade improvements are  now planned rather than a flyover because of high costs. Work at New  Rochelle is critical because of the severe train congestion in this area— Connecticut Department of Transportation officials said more than 200  commuter trains a day go through the Shell interlocking. As of March 2003,  about three-quarters of the work elements (12 of 17 work elements) needed  to reach this milestone were incomplete or their status was unknown.  According to Amtrak, work on some elements under this milestone is  actively under way. For example, the Stamford center island platforms  were completed in the summer of 2003, and final curve modifications were  under design. Amtrak said that this, in conjunction with completion of the  Connecticut Department of Transportation’s catenary program would,  among other things, allow it to travel 90 miles per hour between New  Haven and New Rochelle and generate about 7 minutes of trip-time savings.
Finally, progress toward the third milestone—complete capacity  enhancement and recapitalization work—has been slower than planned,  and nearly 90 percent of the work elements for this milestone (38 of 43  work elements) were incomplete or their status was unknown as of March  2003. Of the 38 work elements that were incomplete or their status was  unknown, 2 were related to trip-time reduction (a noise and vibration study  and construction of a transfer facility at Kingston, Rhode Island), 12 were  categorized as capacity enhancement (including construction of passing  sidings), 10 were recapitalization (including bridge replacements), and 14  were categorized as other (including construction of layover facilities and  commuter parking).
As of March 2003, 15 of the 51 work elements (about 30 percent) that had  not been completed or whose status was unknown were on track not  owned by Amtrak. (See fig. 3.) Of these 15 work elements, Amtrak was  expected to be the major beneficiary of 9. Some of these work elements,  including certain curve realignments and track clearances, are critical for  achieving the 3-hour trip time. For example, Amtrak is not currently able to  use a key feature of the new high-speed trains—a mechanism that allows  the trains to “tilt” and, therefore, take curves at a higher speed—in part,  because track centers are too close on the segment of track between New  Haven and New Rochelle. The Connecticut Department of Transportation  and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of New York own this track.  According to an Amtrak official, the tilt mechanism on the high-speed  trains is turned off between New Haven and New Rochelle. FRA’s 1994  master plan identified track curvature as the most severe constraint on trip  time, and both FRA and commuter rail officials told us that curves on the  north-end of the Northeast Corridor are a severe constraint on the  achievement of faster trip times.
Through March 2003, a total of about $3.2 billion (2003 dollars) had been  spent on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project—or just less  than 90 percent of the $3.6 billion (2002 dollars) project cost estimated in  FRA’s 1994 master plan. Amtrak has spent about $2.6 billion and three  commuter railroads, two freight railroads, and two state governments have  spent about $625 million. Most of Amtrak’s spending was for the  acquisition of high-speed trains and related maintenance facilities (about  $1.1 billion), electrification of the route (about $717 million), and track  and infrastructure projects ($652 million). (See table 2). Of the amounts  spent by commuter and freight railroads and the state governments, the  most—about $141 million—was spent by the Connecticut Department of  Transportation to replace a bridge. The Connecticut Department of  Transportation also plans to spend an additional $250 million to replace  catenary between the New York/Connecticut state line and New Haven.
While Amtrak did not track costs of improvements relative to the original  projections, it is clear that the cost of some work elements was higher than  expected. For example, the estimated cost of electrification increased from  about $300 million in 1992 to about $727 million in 2003. (See fig. 4.) As of  March 2003, Amtrak had spent about $717 million. According to Amtrak’s  data, much of the cost increase (more than $200 million) was attributable  to unexpected and unplanned items. Amtrak incurred approximately $120  million in unplanned costs because, according to an Amtrak official, the  contractor frequently revised the geographic location of the electrification  work, and each revision triggered the need for safety protection work,  called “flag protection,” that was provided by workers standing along the  track and at highway-railroad grade crossings holding flags. Under  collective bargaining agreements, Amtrak was required to advertise this  work for 7 to 10 days so that its unionized employees could express their  interest in doing the work. The extra time required for Amtrak to comply  with this requirement delayed the electrification work and increased  Amtrak’s costs.
Similarly, the cost of acquiring trains, locomotives, and maintenance  facilities also increased, from an original estimate of about $186 million for  26 trains in FRA’s 1994 master plan to about $800 million for 20 trains plus  three maintenance facilities in 1996. Through March 2003, Amtrak had  spent about $1.1 billion for these items. Amtrak attributed much of the cost  increase to, among other things, the addition of the three maintenance  facilities, various modifications to the trains, and a higher-than-expected  bid to manufacture the trains. Amtrak also said that an additional $100  million was incurred to add a second power car to each train (an extra 20  power cars) to comply with new FRA passenger car safety standards. An  Amtrak official said it was difficult to estimate the cost of trains, since the  acquisition went from a relatively simple procurement of train equipment  to a complex high-speed rail program that included the acquisition of  equipment capable of traveling at speeds of up to 150 miles per hour. The  acquisition cost of both the trains and maintenance facilities was financed,  and debt service on this financing began in fiscal year 2002 and will  continue through fiscal year 2023 for the high-speed trains and through  fiscal year 2042 for the maintenance facilities unless an early buyout offer  is exercised. Amtrak expects the interest on this financing to total about  $426 million.
Amtrak stated that FRA’s involvement with the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project also affected project cost and schedule. (See below  for a discussion of FRA’s role in this project.) For example, according to  Amtrak, the environmental impact statement that FRA developed for the  project was over a year late and imposed significant and costly mitigation  measures. Also, FRA’s new track standards required development of the  technologically challenging and expensive Advanced Civil Speed  Enforcement System—a system for automatic train control on the entire  Northeast Corridor. Because all trains that operate on the Northeast  Corridor would be required to use this system, Amtrak agreed to fund the  equipment upgrades for various railroads that use the Northeast Corridor,  including commuter railroads. Finally, FRA’s passenger car safety  standards required the 20 additional power cars discussed above as well as  an expensive crash-energy absorption system on the trains. FRA officials  told us that Amtrak was intimately involved with development of the track  and passenger car standards and that, in some instances, the standards  were specifically developed to accommodate the Northeast High-Speed  Rail Improvement Project. In general, FRA officials said there was no extra  cost for Amtrak to comply with FRA’s new safety regulations. However,  they acknowledged the additional cost to develop the Advanced Civil  Speed Enforcement System but said Amtrak could not operate high-speed  trains without this system.
section_title: Some Consider Project Complete Even Though Work Is Not Finished
paragraphs: Several Amtrak officials told us that they consider the Northeast High- Speed Rail Improvement Project complete, even though Amtrak has not  achieved the 3-hour goal and the work is not finished. As of March 2003, 41  of the work elements identified in FRA’s master plan were incomplete, and  on an additional 10 work elements there was no information or their status  was unknown. It is not clear how many work elements will be completed or  whether Amtrak is committed to achieving the 3-hour goal. A former  director of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project told us that  Amtrak hopes to reduce the trip time to 3 hours 10 minutes in the future if  funding is available. But the former director doubted there was much of a  market for 3-hour service between Boston and New York City. In the past,  however, Amtrak had stated that it was relying on meeting the 3-hour goal  to help it attract the ridership and revenue needed to attain operational  self-sufficiency, as called for in the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act  of 1997. As recently as 2000, the Chairman of Amtrak’s Board of Directors  testified before Congress that Amtrak would achieve the 3-hour trip-time  goal between Boston and New York City.
Although several Amtrak officials told us they consider the project  complete, work is continuing, or is planned, for some of the master plan’s  work elements. For example, Amtrak’s most recent 5-year capital plan  (covering fiscal years 2004 through 2008), issued in April 2003, includes 12  of the 51 work elements in FRA’s master plan that, as of March 2003, were  incomplete or whose status was unknown. These work elements consist  primarily of replacing bridges, reconfiguring interlockings, and completing  fire and life safety improvements in and around Pennsylvania Station in  New York. Amtrak’s 5-year capital plan also contains $52 million through  fiscal year 2008 for the at-grade improvements at the Shell interlocking. In  total, Amtrak’s capital plan budgets about $380 million for the work  elements associated with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project. However, there does not appear to be an effort to complete the  project or meet the trip-time goal, and Amtrak did not characterize its  recent capital plan as encompassing the completion of the Northeast High- Speed Rail Improvement Project. Rather, the plan was characterized as  aiming to stabilize the railroad by returning its plant and equipment to a  state of good repair, controlling operating deficits, and restoring liquidity.
Commuter rail agencies and state governments along the north-end of the  Northeast Corridor also plan to continue some of the work associated with  the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Commuter rail  agencies and state governments we contacted said they planned to  continue work on at least 20 of the work elements contained in the 1994  master plan. For example, one commuter rail authority (Metro-North  Railroad) plans to finish improving stations, rehabilitating movable bridges,  and upgrading power, communications and signal systems. Two state  governments (Connecticut and Rhode Island) said they plan to replace  bridges and catenary on the New Haven rail line, as well as construct  passing sidings and improve clearances for freight railroad operations.  Commuter rail and state officials estimated that these work elements could  cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Officials with the Connecticut  Department of Transportation, for example, said their state plans to spend  more than $800 million between 2003 and 2010 on at least 9 work elements  associated with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project,  including bridge and catenary replacements and station relocations.
Even though Amtrak has not reached the project’s 3-hour goal and many  important work elements remain to be completed, Amtrak officials  maintain that they achieved noteworthy successes, particularly in light of  the challenges they faced. Noting that Amtrak does not own major portions  of the Northeast Corridor, that freight and commuter rail operations  continued throughout the life of the project, and that funding was provided  annually in varying amounts, Amtrak officials consider the electrification  of the Northeast Corridor a significant success. According to one Amtrak  official, the entire project represents a success, because the Northeast  Corridor now enables freight trains to operate at 30 miles per hour while  intercity passenger trains travel up to 150 miles per hour. The official said  that some states outside the Northeast Corridor that are considering  upgrading their rail lines to accommodate both freight traffic and high- speed passenger trains have sought assistance from Amtrak.
section_title: Amtrak Did Not Exercise Effective Management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project
paragraphs: Amtrak could have exercised more effective management of the Northeast  High-Speed Rail Improvement Project had its management of the project  been more comprehensive and had it focused greater attention on critical  infrastructure issues needed to attain the 3-hour trip-time goal.  Although  FRA’s master plan laid out the blueprint for the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project, Amtrak did not adopt this plan and did not prepare a  comprehensive management plan of its own. Instead, Amtrak generally  focused on managing individual project components, particularly the  electrification and acquisition of high-speed trains. Although Amtrak senior  management obtained a substantial amount of information about these two  aspects of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, it did not  consistently use this information effectively to minimize the impact of  problems on the overall project. Amtrak also relied on annual  appropriations to plan work rather than on a more comprehensive financial  plan that considered long-term funding needs. Finally, although Amtrak  worked closely with stakeholders—commuter railroads and state  governments—to coordinate some project work, it did not fully integrate  their interests into project goals. The participation of stakeholders was,  and continues to be, essential for completing work critical for meeting the  3-hour trip-time goal.
subsections: section_title: Amtrak’s Project Management Was Focused on Selected Components, Not Attainment of Project Goals
paragraphs: Amtrak’s management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project contributed to its inability to achieve project goals. Project  management was not comprehensive but rather was focused on selected  components, not project goals. As discussed earlier, FRA’s 1994 master plan  laid out the work elements needed to complete the project, estimated their  costs, and identified those elements that would benefit Amtrak or others.  However, Amtrak did not adopt this plan or manage to it. Instead, Amtrak  focused on managing selected components of the project—primarily the  work associated with electrifying the line between Boston and New Haven  and acquisition of the high-speed trains. This occurred even though there  were critical infrastructure improvements that were required in order to  achieve the 3-hour trip time between Boston and New York City. Amtrak  did not ignore infrastructure improvements, but as the project evolved, and  costs increased and schedules slipped, the emphasis shifted to completing  those infrastructure improvements required to begin electrified service  between Boston and New York City, not those needed to achieve the 3-hour  trip-time goal. As of February 2004, some infrastructure improvements  (such as reconfiguring the Shell interlocking) that are critical to achieving  the 3-hour trip time had not been completed.
Amtrak received a substantial amount of information about selected  components of the project. Amtrak’s senior management and the Board of  Directors received periodic information about the project, including  monthly progress reports about the project. Amtrak also received monthly  progress reports from the consortium manufacturing the high-speed trains.  Amtrak used integrated program schedules that were updated monthly to  visually depict start and end dates for various project tasks. Such  information allowed Amtrak management to track work status and to  identify actual or potential problems. For example, an October 1996  monthly progress report on the high-speed trains noted that progress in this  component was “significantly less” than had been planned, and by  December 1996 the progress report noted that the high-speed train  acquisition program was no longer likely to finish on time, even with  planned late finish dates.
Amtrak did not use the information it received to effectively manage  problems that arose. While Amtrak attempted to take action to address  various problems that developed, those actions did not prevent significant  delays in completing either the electrification or high-speed train work. For  example, in 1997 Amtrak proposed hiring a second contractor to help  install electric pole foundations when installation rates decreased to an  unacceptable level, and, in 1998, Amtrak made acceleration payments to  help finish the electrification work. Despite these efforts, the line between  Boston and New Haven was not fully energized until July 2000—about a  year later than planned. Amtrak attempted to use recovery plans—plans  designed to identify specific actions to be taken to get a project “back on  track”—to address problems. But Amtrak did not assemble any program- level (projectwide) recovery plan for the project as a whole. A former  project director said a program-level recovery plan was not used because  the components of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project  were not mutually dependent on each other.
Not assembling comprehensive project management or program-level  recovery plans made it difficult for Amtrak’s senior management and Board  of Directors to effectively manage the project and assign accountability for  project results. A comprehensive project management plan similar to FRA’s  1994 master plan could have allowed senior management and the Board of  Directors to clearly understand the status of the project at any given point  and how problems in one project component could be affecting other  project components. Such a plan could also have facilitated understanding  how difficulties in one or more project components could affect the  ultimate success of the entire project and achievement of project goals. For  example, as noted earlier, FRA’s 1994 master plan identified the planned  improvements to Metro-North Railroad’s New Rochelle interlocking (the  “Shell interlocking”) as critical for achieving 3-hour service. Metro-North  officials said that Amtrak did not work collaboratively with them on  improving the Shell interlocking but instead imposed its own solution for  improving the interlocking. In the late 1990s, cost increases to the proposed  flyover led Amtrak to scale back its design to an at-grade improvement.  Based on the documents we reviewed, it was not clear that Amtrak’s Board  of Directors had an understanding of the effect of not completing either the  Shell interlocking or other critical infrastructure improvements. Moreover,  the lack of program-level recovery plans made it difficult to identify  specific actions being taken to correct problems, who was responsible for  these actions, when they would be completed, and expected outcomes.  Such information was critical for maintaining accountability for the project  and the conditions affecting the project’s outcomes. Again, project  documents we reviewed did not indicate that Amtrak’s Board of Directors  had a comprehensive understanding of project recovery efforts and  expected outcomes.
section_title: Financial Management of the Project Was Also Not Comprehensive and Was Largely Focused on the Short Term
paragraphs: Amtrak’s financial management of the project was also not comprehensive,  and it also focused primarily on the short term. Amtrak’s plans for financial  management were similar to its project management plans, in that they  addressed only individual work elements. In addition, these plans, which  Amtrak called “spend plans,” were based largely on annual appropriations  and focused on spending for a single fiscal year. Although the spend plans  contained many of the elements of a financial plan—such as the total cost  of each major work element in current-year dollars, a cumulative estimate  of expected spending on each of these elements through the end of the  current fiscal year, and the cumulative spending on each element to date— they were not comprehensive and only allowed Amtrak to identify short- term funding shortfalls for individual work components and not longer- term funding needs and potential shortfalls for the entire project. The  spend plans also did not track the three milestones and 72 work elements  laid out in the FRA master plan or incorporate funding needs and spending  by non-Amtrak stakeholders, both of which would have allowed a more  comprehensive financial management of the entire project and potentially  linked spending to a “useful segment.” OMB defines a “useful segment” as a  component that either (1) provides information allowing an organization to  plan the capital project, develop the design, and assess benefits, costs, and  risks before proceeding to full acquisition, or (2) results in a useful asset  for which the benefits exceed the costs even if no further funding is  appropriated.
Not having a stable, long-term source of funding for the project contributed  to the effects of Amtrak’s short-term approach to financial management. To  fund its portion of the project, Amtrak relied on annual appropriations, and  the amount of appropriations was not certain from year to year. Although  direct appropriations for the project from 1992 through 1998 (when direct  appropriations ended) averaged just under $200 million per year, they  ranged from $250 million in 1998 to $115 million in 1996. According to  FRA’s master plan, about $265 million per year (in 1993 dollars) would be  needed from all parties from 1995 through 2001 to achieve 3-hour service.  Both Amtrak and FRA officials told us that dependence on annual  appropriations hurt the project, and one Amtrak official said this type of  funding cycle constrained capital planning and financing for the project  and focused on the short rather than long term.
section_title: Amtrak Worked With Stakeholders on Numerous Project Work Elements, but Did Not Fully Integrate Stakeholders’ Interests into the Project
paragraphs: Amtrak worked with numerous stakeholders on certain work elements, but  did not fully integrate their interests into the project. Not fully integrating  stakeholders’ interests—particularly, non-Amtrak track owners and users,  such as commuter and freight railroads—into the Northeast High-Speed  Rail Improvement Project hindered Amtrak’s achievement of the project’s  goals, particularly along sections of the north-end of the Northeast  Corridor that Amtrak does not own. In its 1994 master plan, FRA  emphasized that it was critical for Amtrak to involve other stakeholders in  planning, designing, and financing the project to ensure its completion and  to achieve the 3-hour trip time between Boston and New York City. The  1994 master plan also emphasized the importance of completing  stakeholder-related work, including capacity enhancement, in order to  ensure the future reliability of high-speed service in light of expected  intercity and commuter rail traffic growth. According to Amtrak, one  premise of the project laid out in the FRA master plan was that  improvements made to benefit Amtrak were not to adversely affect other  track users—that is, other track users were to be “held harmless” for these  improvements. Amtrak officials said this premise significantly increased  the importance of involving stakeholders. To help ensure that federal, state,  and local concerns would be addressed, Amtrak established a project  office in Old Saybrook, Connecticut.
Amtrak communicated with other Northeast Corridor track owners and  users, holding regularly scheduled meetings and entering into work  agreements with them. Amtrak worked with commuter rail and state  officials to accommodate work that was required to begin electrified  service between Boston and New York City. For example, Amtrak worked  closely with MBTA on several work elements, including refurbishment of  Canton Viaduct and construction of new platforms at the Route 128  passenger rail station, to make sure electrified service could begin. Some  officials we spoke with complimented Amtrak’s handling of stakeholder  involvement.
Yet other commuter rail and state officials believed that Amtrak did not  fully integrate their interests into the project’s goals. For example, some  track users alleged that after Amtrak obtained their agreement to proceed  with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, it managed the  project with little regard for their interests. In their view, Amtrak did the  work required to accommodate high-speed trains and reduce trip times, but  it did little to focus on capacity enhancement or other work needed to  accommodate expected growth in commuter and freight rail traffic in  future years—a key aspect of FRA’s master plan for achieving and  maintaining faster trip times. An official with the state of Rhode Island, for  example, told us that Amtrak’s management of corridor improvements  “bogged down” its efforts to complete their Freight Rail Improvement  Project—a program to facilitate and grow freight railroad traffic in Rhode  Island. Regarding the latter, Amtrak observed that this project was  significantly behind in its development and that it paid to do preliminary  design work related to the project in order to facilitate placement of  catenary poles for the electrification work. Officials from Metro-North  Railroad also told us that Amtrak’s agenda has generally been to take care  of its own needs and spend money on its tracks, and commuter railroads  could take care of their own needs. In their opinion, better cooperation and  collaboration would have made the work go faster and more smoothly.
Completing the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project— particularly the goal of 3-hour service between Boston and New York  City—will continue to require collaboration between Amtrak and other  stakeholders. Most of the work elements critical for achieving the trip-time  goal that are not yet completed are on sections of track that Amtrak does  not own, particularly on the 56-mile section of track owned by the  Metropolitan Transportation Authority of New York and the Connecticut  Department of Transportation. According to Metro-North officials,  hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funds will be needed to  address infrastructure issues between New Haven and New Rochelle to  achieve 3-hour service between Boston and New York City. They estimated  that at least four bridges (costing $130 million to $150 million each) would  require replacement and most of the 60 curves between New Haven and  New York City would require modification. This might not only be  prohibitively expensive but also potentially require property acquisition,  which, because the track is in an urban setting, could be difficult due to  existing development and involve significant condemnation issues. A  Metro-North Railroad official estimated that gaining 1 minute or so in trip- time savings could cost $200 million or more.
section_title: FRA’s Oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Was Limited
paragraphs: Although providing millions of federal dollars to the Northeast High-Speed  Rail Improvement Project, FRA—the primary federal agency involved with  the project—provided little oversight of the project, generally because its  management adopted the position that it lacked legislative authority to do  so. Instead, FRA saw itself only as a conduit for funds from the federal  government to Amtrak—a role entailing far less oversight than the Federal  Transit Administration’s role as the manager of a project management  oversight program for the recipients of federal grants for major mass  transit projects. FRA was also legally responsible for preparing  environmental assessments for the project and developing track and  passenger railcar safety standards, and it carried out these responsibilities.  FRA officials said the agency provided little oversight because (1) it did not  have the resources or the authority to change Amtrak’s project  management, (2) Congress did not grant FRA specific legislative authority  to conduct such oversight, and (3) FRA did not have a formal mechanism  (such as a project management oversight process) for providing oversight.  We agree with FRA’s view that it had limited authority to oversee the  Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. For fiscal year 2003,  Congress increased FRA’s responsibility to provide oversight of and  accountability for federal funds used for intercity passenger rail service,  but this responsibility extends only to fiscal year 2003 funds.
subsections: section_title: FRA Adopted Position That It Had Limited Authority to Oversee the Project
paragraphs: In general, FRA adopted the position that it lacked specific authority to  oversee the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. According to  the agency, its primary responsibility is to enforce federal law as it relates  to railroad safety. To protect railroad employees and the public, FRA  carries out this responsibility by developing and administering safety  statutes, regulations, and programs; conducting research on railroad safety  and national transportation policy; and inspecting railroad track,  equipment, signals, and railroad operating practices. It also plays a role in  enforcing regulations applicable to the transportation of hazardous  materials by rail. According to FRA officials, the agency did not have  specific legislative authority to oversee the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project. Consequently, it did not have any particular  authority to direct Amtrak’s management of the project by, for example,  requiring Amtrak to prepare project management or finance plans.
FRA officials told us they saw themselves as responsible primarily for  making federal funding available for the project. While FRA, as grantor for  the government, is responsible for ensuring that grant funds are used for  their intended purposes, FRA officials said they did not believe they were  responsible for exercising any specific management oversight of  continuing work on the Northeast Corridor improvements or for ensuring  the success of high-speed rail after Amtrak assumed the responsibility for  managing the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project in 1985. In their  view, both of these responsibilities lay with Amtrak. Accordingly, FRA  officials provided little guidance for planning or for assessing and  mitigating risks to major capital rail projects after 1985—a position they  believed was consistent with congressional direction that limited FRA’s  oversight of grants to Amtrak before fiscal year 2003.
Under the 1985 grant agreement that transferred the Northeast Corridor  Improvement Project to Amtrak, FRA retained responsibility to formally  accept completed work and to audit the expenditure of funds to ensure that  monies provided by the federal government were spent for their intended  purposes. Amtrak was required to periodically provide reports concerning  work status, budget, and accounting matters. Between 1986 and 1998, the  grant agreement was amended 21 times. Some of these amendments added  work covered by the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, such  as the electrification work. In 1992, FRA and Amtrak amended the  agreement to allow FRA to provide support to and coordination of the  project. According to FRA, this included getting the environmental  assessment started, preparing the 1994 Master Plan, and helping coordinate  project activities among Amtrak, commuter railroads, and others. However,  under the agreement Amtrak retained full authority to decide issues  pertaining to property it owned and operated.
Given these circumstances, we agree with FRA’s view that it was not  authorized to exercise direct oversight of the project. Over time, Congress  removed responsibility for the management and execution of  improvements to the Northeast Corridor from FRA and gave it to Amtrak.  As part of the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980, Congress  directed the Secretary of Transportation to enter into an agreement with  Amtrak to reallocate authority and responsibility for track improvements  connected with the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project and to  transfer responsibility for the project to Amtrak by October 1, 1985. This  transfer made Amtrak responsible for implementing project goals Congress  had previously mandated, and thus relieved FRA of its responsibilities in  this regard. Congress later imposed additional duties on the Secretary of  Transportation in relation to Northeast Corridor improvements. For  example, the 1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act directed the  Secretary of Transportation to prepare a program master plan for  Northeast Corridor improvements in consultation with Amtrak and  commuter and freight railroads. Congress continued to reaffirm Amtrak’s  central role in managing these improvements and high-speed rail work.  Prior to 2003, there was no clear indication that Congress intended for FRA  to reassume responsibility for conduct of the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project. Rather, according to FRA, Congress intended for the  agency to principally act as a conduit of project funds appropriated for  Amtrak’s use. Therefore, we believe there is a basis in law for FRA acting  primarily as a conduit of project funds and not to conduct oversight.
FRA’s limited oversight role contrasts with the stronger oversight role that  Congress assigned to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) in 1987,  when it directed FTA to establish a project management oversight  program to better safeguard the federal investment in transit projects  funded through the agency’s fixed guideway grants program (called the  “New Starts” program). Under the project management oversight  program, contractors serve as an extension of FTA’s technical staff to  assess the project management and technical capacity of New Starts  grantees and their capability to successfully implement major capital  projects. In addition, contractors monitor projects to make sure they are on  time, within budget, and in accordance with their plans and specifications.  In 1998, FTA expanded its oversight efforts to include an assessment of  grantees’ financial capacity and the financial impact of major projects on  existing transit systems. These reviews, conducted by independent  accounting firms, assess a grantee’s financial health and are performed  before FTA commits funds for construction. The program is financed by a  set-aside of funds available under various FTA programs. FRA does not  have a project management oversight program similar to FTA’s.
section_title: FRA Focused on Environmental and Safety Activities, Not Oversight
paragraphs: While FRA had little clear oversight responsibility for the project, it was  involved with other activities, such as assessing the environmental impact  of electrifying the line between Boston and New Haven and developing  safety regulations for the high-speed rail service planned for the Northeast  High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Federal laws and requirements  dictated FRA’s involvement with these activities:   Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the  Council of Environmental Quality’s requirements, FRA’s Procedures for  Considering Environmental Impacts requires that either an  environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement be  prepared for all major FRA actions that could have a significant effect  on the quality of the human environment. According to an FRA official,  FRA prepared an environmental impact statement for the Northeast  High-Speed Rail Improvement Project’s electrification work because the  project was considered to be a “major action” that could have significant  impact on the environment.
FRA, as the federal agency responsible for railroad safety, was also  required to develop safety standards to facilitate the high-speed rail  service planned under the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project. The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992 required  FRA to review and revise its track safety standards. As part of this  review, in July 1997 FRA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to  amend its track safety standards to include new standards for track to  be used by high-speed trains. The revised standards, made final in 1998,  included three additional classes of track that would permit passenger  rail trains to travel up to 200 miles per hour. FRA officials said the  standards for high-speed rail service were developed at Amtrak’s  request to accommodate train speeds of up to 150 miles per hour  envisioned under the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project.
In addition, the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994  required FRA to develop safety standards for passenger equipment,  including passenger rail cars. Such standards did not previously exist.  FRA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking establishing  safety standards for passenger rail cars in 1996, a Notice of Proposed  Rulemaking in 1997, and a Final Rule in 1999. According to FRA, these  standards reflected the agency’s desire to ensure safety in the context of  an ever more complex passenger railroad operating environment  (including higher train speeds). These standards accommodate high- speed rail service.
Apart from these activities, FRA’s direct involvement with the Northeast  High-Speed Rail Improvement Project was limited, reflecting a decrease,  FRA officials said, in the resources that FRA devoted to the project after  the management of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project was  transferred from FRA to Amtrak in 1985. At that time, about 50 to 60  individuals who had been detailed to FRA to work on the Northeast  Corridor Improvement Project returned to the Federal Highway  Administration (FHWA), and FRA closed its project office and reduced  the number of FRA full-time employees working on the project from  between 8 and 10 to less than 1. FRA officials said the latter individual was  primarily responsible for monitoring the completion of outstanding work  on the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, ensuring compliance with  the final environmental record of decision, and serving as an ombudsman  between FRA and Amtrak. In addition, this individual helped coordinate  the project with local agencies as well as commuter and freight railroads.  Although FRA tracked federal spending on the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project and checked on project progress, agency officials  said FRA’s authority to change how Amtrak managed this project was  limited. FRA could raise matters of concern at meetings of Amtrak’s Board  of Directors, they said, but the agency was one of seven votes and had no  unilateral authority to change Amtrak’s decisions. Finally, FRA officials  said, Congress did not specify a desire for them to be proactive in  overseeing the project. Rather, in the officials’ view, FRA was to serve  largely as a conduit of federal funds to Amtrak and little else.
Amtrak’s management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project was also subject to limited oversight from the Inspector General for  Amtrak and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Inspector  Generals. Although Amtrak’s Inspector General devoted 8 to 10 staff and  created two groups to review the project’s activities, much of this work was  specific to contract matters rather than program management issues.  Amtrak’s Inspector General told us that ongoing claims disputes, criminal  investigations, and litigation over the Acela Express trains have precluded  his office from conducting broader audits of the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project’s program management. In addition, he said that  because the project is not yet considered complete, it would not currently  be appropriate to conduct a programmatic review of the project. Amtrak’s  Inspector General also told us there are certain lessons learned from the  Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project that he has recently  reinforced with Amtrak’s Chief Engineer. Similarly, DOT Inspector General  officials said they had not conducted much oversight of the project either.  The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 required the DOT  Inspector General to annually assess the financial requirements of Amtrak.  As a result, the office produced several reports on this issue. However, only  one report issued by the DOT Inspector General directly addressed the  Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. This report discussed the  progress of the electrification work.
In Amtrak’s fiscal year 2003 appropriations legislation, Congress adopted  measures to increase the Secretary of Transportation’s responsibility for  providing oversight of and accountability for the federal funds used for  intercity passenger rail service. Among other things, these measures  require that Amtrak transmit a business plan to the Secretary of  Transportation and Congress, supplemented by monthly reports describing  work completed, changes to the business plan, and reasons for the  changes. The business plan was to describe the work to be funded using  federal funds. Furthermore, on or after March 1, 2003, Amtrak was only  permitted to use fiscal year 2003 and 2004 federal capital expense and  improvement grant funds for purposes included in its business plans.  Finally, Amtrak was required to agree to certain terms and conditions that  would, among other things, improve its financial controls and accounting  transparency and seek operating cost reductions. Although these measures  acted to impact DOT’s role with respect to the expenditure of federal funds  provided to Amtrak, the measures apply only to expenditures financed with  fiscal year 2003 and 2004 funds and are not necessarily directed to the  oversight of any particular infrastructure project that might be financed  with funds provided prior to fiscal year 2003. FRA officials also said that  the appropriations act did not provide any additional resources analogous  to that given to FTA (such as a takedown from various program funds) to  conduct oversight.
section_title: Best Practices Framework Would Support Effective Management of Large- Scale Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects
paragraphs: Through our work on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project  and our analyses of reports and guidance published by our office, the  Office of Management and Budget (OMB), FTA, and FHWA, we have  identified key components of a best practices framework for effectively  managing large infrastructure projects, including future intercity passenger  rail projects. These best practices offer guidance for project managers and  decision makers and include the following:  Conduct comprehensive planning. Effective planning can include  developing a preconstruction planning process, using the resulting  preconstruction plans to implement a project, and evaluating the  project’s success by comparing the actual results with those planned.
Assess risks and identify mitigation measures. Early identification and  assessment of risks to a project allow for prompt intervention.
Comprehensively manage the project’s finances. Tools for financial  management can include project financial plans that provide for  accurately estimating and effectively controlling costs.
Establish accountability and oversight for prudent use of resources.
Assigning responsibility for a project and tying its performance to pay  and personnel decisions can help ensure accountability for the project’s  results. Independent assessments of the project’s plans and  implementation can provide oversight to help protect the federal  investment.
Incorporate the interests of diverse stakeholders. Coordination and  communication with stakeholders, including states, communities, and  others are important in identifying problems, reaching agreement on  solutions, and avoiding delays.
This framework applies to projects across their preconstruction,  construction, and postconstruction phases (see fig. 5).
subsections: section_title: Conduct Comprehensive Project Planning
paragraphs: Comprehensive planning serves as a foundation for effectively managing  large-scale infrastructure projects, both for agencies or organizations that  manage multiple capital projects and for individual projects. Such planning  helps manage and control one or more projects’ implementation, costs,  schedules, scope of work, and achievement of goals. As we reported in  1998, a long-term capital plan documents the specific projects an  organization intends to pursue and the resources it expects to use over the  long term and establishes priorities for implementation. Officials from  four Class I railroads we contacted prepare and develop multiyear capital  plans that establish organizational priorities and assist in developing  current and future budgets for the successful completion of capital  projects. Plans for individual projects can take years to complete. For  instance, preconstruction planning for the Alameda Corridor Project lasted  more than a decade. However, the time spent on planning can help  organizations and agencies avoid costs and delays later. Officials from the  Alameda Corridor Project credited that project’s comprehensive, long-term  planning process for helping them complete the 20-mile corridor within  budget and on schedule.
An important tool for comprehensive planning is the project management  plan, which typically uses performance baselines for goals, costs,  schedules, major milestones, and risks to manage and control a project’s  implementation. Developing a project management plan focuses  organizations, including those managing large-scale intercity passenger rail  projects, on implementation issues early in the life of a project. These plans  are not intended to be rigid, but rather, flexible and dynamic. During  implementation, the plans are updated and otherwise revised to reflect  changes in the project, such as changes in its cost, schedule, or scope of  work. After a project has been implemented, its success can be measured  by comparing its actual cost, schedule, and other outcomes with those that  were planned. The recently introduced Passenger Rail Investment Reform  Act (S. 1501) would similarly require organizations managing and receiving  funds for intercity passenger rail capital projects to submit a project  management plan for the Secretary of Transportation’s approval.
To help ensure effective uses of federal funds, FTA requires grantees  agreeing to federal fixed guideway project funds to develop project  management plans as a condition of receiving federal financial assistance.  These plans typically include budgets, implementation schedules,  procedures for controlling documents and keeping records, reporting  requirements, and cost and schedule controls. When project management  plans are not developed or used, projects can encounter problems, such as  cost overruns and schedule delays. As we reported in March 2000, the Bay  Area Rapid Transit (BART) expansion project to San Francisco  International Airport experienced costs that were $300 million more than  estimated. According to FTA, this was in part due to management not fully  committing to the project management plan. More specifically, managers  did not update the plan or submit monthly budget and schedule updates. As  a result, FTA said, cost and schedule trends were difficult to anticipate, and  overruns were hard to manage effectively.
section_title: Assess Risks and Identify Mitigation Measures
paragraphs: Risk assessments allow project managers to identify and manage risks  related to a project’s costs, schedules, and other aspects and to develop  mitigation measures that can increase the number of projects meeting  established goals. Best practices suggest that managing organizations  identify the risks to a project and their potential impact and then develop  mitigation strategies. As we reported in 1998, early recognition of problems  allows for prompt intervention, which increases the likelihood that  corrective action will get the project back on track before there is  significant deviation from its goals. Assessing and mitigating risks reduces  the probability of later encountering problems that can cause cost  increases and schedule delays. Potential risks to projects include cost  increases, funding reductions, schedule delays, and environmental,  political, and legal issues.
There are various techniques for performing risk assessments. Some of the  Class I freight railroads we contacted (1) include a risk management group  in planning a project to assess its risks, (2) conduct rigorous financial  analyses, or (3) monitor monthly status reports to identify risks. FHWA and  FTA suggest using what is called a critical path method to boost a project’s  efficiency and predictability, thereby potentially reducing its risks. This  method relies on computer technology to identify the most efficient  sequence of events to complete the project over the shortest time. The  computer technology identifies each task to be completed and calculates a  set schedule (see fig. 6). Managers can then visualize the impact of  potential delays on the project’s schedules and costs.
Strategies for mitigating risks include developing recovery plans that may  be integrated into the project management plan. Efforts to assess and  mitigate risks can take place from the beginning to the end of a project.  FHWA officials stated that no matter how much analysis is done before  construction begins, unknowns can always threaten a project’s estimated  costs, schedules, and goals. When risks start to affect a project’s progress,  developing a recovery plan can help the managing organization reevaluate  the project and outline changes to its scope, cost, schedule or other  elements that will mitigate the negative effects of the risks. In the context  of transit projects, FTA officials said recovery plans are not developed very  often because FTA’s project management oversight process acts as a first  line of defense to identify and address potential problems. However, when  recovery plans are developed, they are intended to demonstrate a  managing organization’s ability to complete a project, protect federal  funding, and still achieve the project’s goals in the form of transit benefits  to the community. Recovery plans help get a project “back on track” by  considering potential changes to its management, engineering, funding  sources, and other elements.
section_title: Comprehensively Manage Project Finances
paragraphs: Comprehensive financial management through accurately estimating and  controlling costs helps to ensure efficient uses of funds. Estimating and  controlling costs is important because the costs of large-scale  infrastructure projects can increase significantly. Best practices suggest  that managing organizations review and refine cost estimates as projects  move closer to implementation to improve accuracy. A project financial  plan, which shows a project’s estimated funding needs, funding sources,  and funding responsibilities, is one tool for estimating and controlling  costs. These plans enable project managers to compare actual costs with  planned expenditures, identify deviations, and take actions to address  potential problems.
Because of the large federal investment in major infrastructure projects  and the need to ensure sufficient funding to complete them, a financial plan  may be required for a project to receive federal financial assistance. For  example, since 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century has  required recipients of federal assistance under Title 23, United States Code,  to submit annual financial plans to DOT for projects estimated to cost $1  billion or more. FHWA has developed guidance that requests that state  financial plans include a total cost estimate for each project, annual  updates and adjustments for inflation, estimates of future cost increases, a  schedule for completing the project, a description of construction  financing sources and revenues, a cash flow analysis, and a discussion of  any other factors affecting the project’s cost. According to FHWA’s  guidance, annual updates to these financial plans can also integrate  changes in cost estimates that may arise as a project enters construction  and its plans and designs are more complete. In July 2003, the DOT  Inspector General testified before Congress that, in his opinion, financial  plans should be prepared for projects costing $100 million or more.
S. 1501 would require a detailed financial analysis to accompany grant  requests for federal funds, plus a business plan describing capital and  operating work to be funded, cost estimates, and a schedule for  completion. Monthly supplemental reports to the business plans would  also be required.
Accounting for the effects of inflation in a financial plan, as FHWA’s  guidance directs, can increase the accuracy of a multiyear project’s cost  estimate. Best practices suggest that cost estimates for multiyear projects  account for inflation to avoid deviations between actual and estimated  costs as years pass and the value of currency changes. The Boston Central  Artery/Tunnel project, for example, which started in 1985, was originally  expected to cost $2.6 billion, but as of May 2003, FHWA estimated that it  would cost $14.6 billion—about $12 billion more than originally estimated.  According to one FHWA official, about half of this cost increase can be  attributed to inflation. Although inflation has generally decreased since the  1980s, it can still have a significant impact on a project’s costs, as illustrated  by the Central Artery/Tunnel project.
A financial plan can also help control a project’s costs after construction  has begun by estimating the amount of funding needed to complete the  project and the availability of that funding. This information helps an  organization and its contractors to assess the impact of changes that can  cause a project’s schedules to slip and costs to rise. Particularly during the  first years of a project’s development and construction, the funding  received can be considerably less than the funding requested, especially  when the funding is incremental—that is, the practice of providing budget  authority for only a portion of a capital acquisition or part of a usable asset.  As we have reported, incremental funding without the certainty of future  funding can result in poor planning, higher costs, delays, and even a  project’s termination. We have advocated full funding of capital  projects—that is, providing budget authority for the full costs of a capital  acquisition or project at the time decisions are made to provide financial  resources—as a way to increase the recognition of implied commitments  embodied in budgetary decisions. Because a financial plan can  demonstrate the need for funding at particular times and the impact of  funding delays on the project’s costs and schedule, it can help an  organization and its contractors stay within cost estimates and keep their  project on schedule as well as determine full funding needs.
While incremental funding can create uncertainty and hamper planning,  funding a project in meaningful phases can help to control costs. As we  reported in 1998, best practices suggest breaking up a project’s capital  planning and budgeting cycle into phases before, during, and—in some  cases—after construction. Funding is provided for one of these phases at  a time, and future funding is generally tied to achieving milestones. Under  this approach, the initial design work can proceed far enough for higher- quality, more reliable cost estimates to be available for decision makers to  consider before deciding whether to complete the design and construct the  project—and before a substantial federal investment has been made. OMB  and a 2000 DOT task force have also recommended establishing separate  funding categories for preconstruction activities before making a  commitment to full construction. Some large-scale infrastructure projects  are already funded in phases. For example, projects funded by FTA’s fixed  guideway program (“New Starts”) are funded through federal grant  agreements after preconstruction work has given decision makers a sense  of a project’s costs, benefits, and financial viability.
section_title: Establish Accountability and Oversight for Prudent Use of Federal Resources
paragraphs: Best practices suggest that organizations be held accountable for adhering  to planned budgets and schedules, achieving goals, and other project  outcomes in order to ensure the prudent use of federal resources. By  monitoring a project’s performance against cost, schedule, and technical  performance goals, as well as establishing incentives to meet those goals,  organizations can increase the likelihood of the project’s successful  completion. Organizations can also hold project managers and other  personnel accountable for the project’s results. Some of the Class I freight  railroads we contacted use internal sign-offs to assign responsibility for  decisions about a project. They also often tie pay and personnel decisions  to results. Under these decisions, project managers are held directly  responsible for the project’s success or failure. Large-scale infrastructure  projects can also face external factors during implementation, such as  reductions in funding from federal, state, or local jurisdictions, that might  affect accountability decisions. In such circumstances, external factors can  be recognized and accountability can be maintained by developing a  system that only holds project managers responsible for their particular  actions.
Independent oversight of a project is a best practice designed to promote  the prudent use of federal resources. Independent assessments help  protect the federal investment in a project by reviewing the implementation  of its plans, monitoring its construction, and reporting problems. One  method of providing independent oversight is to use an approach similar to  FTA’s project management oversight (PMO) program. As we reported in  September 2000, this program has yielded benefits, including improved  project controls and cost savings. For example, for one project in the San  Francisco area, a PMO contractor’s recommendation led the grantee to  appoint a coordinator and prepare a comprehensive project management  plan that has improved the implementation of three interrelated projects.  We also reported that the PMO program has been instrumental in providing  FTA with a better understanding of issues surrounding complex  construction projects and a better awareness of potential problems that  could lead to cost increases and schedule delays. For example, PMO  contractors assigned to three projects identified significant cost increases  and schedule delays early in construction and helped FTA and the grantees  develop strategies to address these issues. In addition, financial  assessments, also a part of FTA’s PMO program, have helped ease FTA’s  concerns about grantees not having the capacity to complete new projects  without adversely affecting their existing transit systems.
section_title: Incorporate the Interests of Diverse Stakeholders
paragraphs: Incorporating the interests of diverse stakeholders (including commuter  and freight railroads and the public) into a project can increase its chances  of success. This is especially important during the planning stages, when  considering stakeholders’ interests can help project managers identify  needs and problems and develop action plans to address them. Best  practices suggest frequent communication and involvement through such  means as meetings and correspondence. These approaches allow  stakeholders like local governments and others to convey their concerns  and problems and work with project managers to address them.
Involving stakeholders in large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the  Alameda Corridor Project, has shown positive results. This project  developed community-based programs that provided business outreach,  job training and development, and a conservation corps for community  beautification. An official with this project said that managers frequently  involved local jurisdictions along the route, and, in her opinion, their  involvement helped achieve local buy-in and avoided delays through  agreements that set the parameters of state and local reviews. For some  highway and bridge projects, FHWA has included stakeholders by using  neighborhood liaisons, community advisory councils, and public  workshops.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although federal investments in the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project have yielded infrastructure improvements and faster  trip times, Amtrak did not act to comprehensively plan or manage the  project. The trip-time goal has not been achieved, and work related to  capacity enhancement and recapitalization is yet to be completed—much  of which is on track Amtrak does not own and is critical if Amtrak is still  planning to achieve a 3-hour trip time. Amtrak’s management approach and  poor integration of stakeholder interests into the project contributed to the  project not meeting its goals. For example, Amtrak did not develop project  management or finance plans that could have been used to better control  costs and schedule delays. Amtrak also could have done a better job of  integrating stakeholder interests into the project, which could have  facilitated completion of work elements on track not owned by Amtrak.
The lack of federal oversight also hindered the project’s successful  implementation. As experience has shown with other federally financed  infrastructure programs, including large transit projects, increased federal  oversight has the potential not only to facilitate a project’s management but  also to facilitate early intervention to correct problems once they develop.  Oversight is critical for protecting federal investments in capital projects.  The Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project’s performance has  demonstrated that future large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure  projects, including any future projects to recapitalize the Northeast  Corridor, will require better management and oversight. In our view, these  projects would benefit from a project management framework that is  rooted in best practices, including comprehensive planning and financial  management, risk assessment and mitigation, clear accountability and  oversight, and incorporation of diverse stakeholders’ interests.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that any future federally funded major intercity passenger rail  infrastructure projects that might be undertaken by Amtrak are  implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible, we recommend that  the President of Amtrak work with Amtrak’s Board of Directors to do the  following: 1. Adopt policies and procedures for managing infrastructure projects  that are based on best practices for managing large-scale infrastructure  projects, and require adherence to such policies and procedures before  approving or initiating significant changes to such projects. These  policies and procedures should address the following:  Preparation of comprehensive project management plans that are  updated as needed.
Preparation of comprehensive project financial plans that are updated  at least annually.
Requirements for assessing a project’s risks and the methodologies for  performing such assessments. The assessments should be  comprehensive and include those risks that can be reasonably foreseen  before construction begins. When warranted, a risk assessment should  be prepared before a project is approved and updated as conditions  indicate, and it should include measures to mitigate the potential  identified risks. The risk assessment should clearly indicate the  potential effects of the different types of risks that could be  encountered, and especially how those risks could affect a project’s  costs and schedules.
Preparation of program-level recovery plans. The policies and  procedures should establish the conditions under which these plans  would be prepared and the elements they would include.
Mechanisms to ensure accountability for a project’s success. Such  mechanisms should clearly indicate the individuals responsible for  implementing the project, the expectations for their performance and  the ways their performance will be measured, and the potential  consequences for failing to meet expectations. 2. Adopt policies and procedures to help ensure that appropriate  stakeholders, especially those external to Amtrak, are included in  project planning, decision making, implementation, and, where  appropriate, mechanisms to indicate stakeholders’ agreement with or  approval of project management and financial plans.
To better ensure the future oversight of federally financed, large-scale  intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects, we recommend that the  Secretary of Transportation seek legislation authorizing it to establish a  project management oversight-like program to oversee these types of  projects in the future. The legislation should do the following: 1. Specify the Federal Railroad Administration’s responsibilities for the  oversight of federal expenditures on major intercity passenger rail  infrastructure projects and permit as necessary, to oversee such  projects, the establishment and implementation of a project  management oversight-like program at the Federal Railroad  Administration similar to that authorized by the Surface Transportation  and Uniform Relocation Act of 1987. 2. Require the Federal Railroad Administrator to develop regulations for  administering the project management oversight-like program and to  specify the requirements for complying with such a program.  3. Establish a funding mechanism to finance the program established by  the Federal Railroad Administration. Among the mechanisms available  is direct appropriation or a statutorily limited set-aside of funds  appropriated for designated Federal Railroad Administration programs.
To ensure that federally funded major intercity passenger rail  infrastructure projects are implemented as effectively as possible and to  better ensure the protection of federal investments in such projects, we  recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, subsequent to a  clarification of the oversight authority of the Federal Railroad  Administration, direct the Federal Railroad Administrator to do the  following: 1. Require managers of major intercity passenger rail infrastructure  projects to adopt elements of the best practices framework, including  the development of project management plans and financial plans and  the assessment of risks to such things as the projects’ costs, schedules,  and implementation and completion. The risk assessment should  identify measures, as appropriate, to mitigate the risks. 2. Require managers of major intercity passenger rail infrastructure  projects to monitor the projects’ implementation and, where  appropriate, to develop project-level recovery plans once problems  arise that threaten the projects’ costs, schedules, or implementation or  completion. Each plan should identify, at a minimum, the actions to be  taken, the individuals or organizations responsible for the actions, the  expected outcomes, and an implementation time frame. 3. Develop guidance, based on best practices, and make it available to  states, railroads, and others to assist in managing large-scale intercity  passenger rail infrastructure projects. The guidance could cover the  preparation of such things as project management and finance plans,  risk assessments, and recovery plans that address issues that threaten  projects’ costs, schedules, or implementation or completion.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to Amtrak and the Department of  Transportation for their review and comment. Amtrak provided its  comments in a letter from its President and Chief Executive Officer (see  app. VI). In general, the President of Amtrak said that our report raised  many of the issues that he has had to address since he took office and that  on a regular basis he has had to deal with many of the consequences of  decisions made during the life of the project. He further said that after he  arrived he restructured Amtrak’s management and budget processes  because he believed that Amtrak had lost focus in a number of critical  areas, including management of capital projects. In addition, he observed  that as part of the management restructuring, project accountability, and  budget-based financial reporting changes he has made since arriving at  Amtrak in May 2002, Amtrak has incorporated many of the best practices  discussed in our report. Amtrak did not comment on our specific  recommendations directly but instead said they had incorporated many of  the best practices as part of their management restructuring. FRA  responded for the Department of Transportation and agreed with our  recommendations and said that the Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act  (S. 1501) incorporates many of our recommendations.
Amtrak stated that it was not in a position to provide specific comments on  our findings or conclusions because of allegations related to ongoing  litigation associated with the electrification and high-speed train  acquisition activities of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project. Although Amtrak said it was unable to comment on our report  because of matters under litigation, it believes our findings and conclusions  are incomplete because we did not consider how the actions of contractors  might have negatively affected Amtrak’s project management. For example,  Amtrak believes the outcome of the Justice Department investigation of the  electrification contractor would impact an assessment of its project  management. In addition, Amtrak believes our reliance on FRA’s master  plan to establish the criteria for costs and schedules in measuring their  management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project was  misplaced. We recognize that contractor actions can influence the  implementation and management of capital projects. However, our work  focused on Amtrak’s overall management of the project and the extent that  Amtrak prepared and used comprehensive project management and  financial plans in implementing the project, not the actions of contractors  or the planning and implementation of specific project components (e.g.,  high-speed train acquisition). As our report notes, Amtrak did not have  comprehensive project management or financial plans for the project— plans that could have been used to better control costs and schedule  delays. We also disagree that our use of FRA’s master plan to evaluate  Amtrak’s management of the project was misplaced. The Amtrak  Authorization and Development Act of 1992 required this plan. It  represented a comprehensive program of improvements that would permit  regularly scheduled, safe, and dependable rail passenger service between  Boston and New York City in 3 hours. Although Amtrak agreed that this  plan constituted a blueprint for the project, we found that Amtrak did not  use this plan to manage the project or create its own comprehensive  project management plan. We do not believe that Congress meant for FRA’s  plan to be ignored and not used in scoping and managing the project,  particularly in the absence of an Amtrak prepared plan.
Amtrak commented that it felt our conclusion about not fully integrating  stakeholder interests was undeserved criticism. Amtrak said that it held  countless meetings with stakeholders with often competing interests and  entered into numerous agreements with them that specified their  respective obligations and rights regarding work that was and was not  contained in FRA’s master plan. While we recognize the work that Amtrak  did with various stakeholders, including state departments of  transportation and commuter railroads, we continue to believe that Amtrak  did not fully integrate stakeholder interests into project goals. The FRA  master plan highlighted the criticality of stakeholder involvement in  achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal. Amtrak’s not achieving that goal is due,  in part, to its inability to fully incorporate stakeholder interests into the  project. Doing so could have identified stakeholder responsible work, the  priority of such work, and required stakeholder financial contributions.  Moreover, our report also states that some of the incomplete work  elements on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project as of  March 2003 that were critical to achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal were on  stakeholder owned property. This included infrastructure improvements  such as curve realignments and at-grade improvements at the Shell  interlocking. Preparation and use of a comprehensive project management  plan would have not only helped identify these projects but also ensured  they were prioritized so that project goals could be met.
Amtrak also commented that our report failed to adequately account for a  change in the trip-time goal for the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project and the effects this change might have had on  Amtrak’s management of the project. Amtrak said that as early as 1995 it  was assumed that the 3-hour trip time could only be achieved using a non- stop high-speed train from Boston to New York. Regularly scheduled  service with intermediate stops was planned for 3 hours and 10 minutes.  Amtrak also questioned whether the cost effectiveness of making the  infrastructure improvements necessary to achieve a 3-hour trip time would  currently be financially justified by the net ridership increase resulting  from such a trip-time reduction. This contradicts information we obtained  during our review. As the report notes, following enactment of the Amtrak  Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, which prohibited Amtrak from  using federal funds for operating expenses after 2002, Amtrak stated that it  was relying on meeting the 3-hour trip-time goal to help it attract the  ridership and revenue to attain this goal. As recently as 2000, the Chairman  of Amtrak’s Board of Directors testified before Congress that Amtrak  would achieve the 3-hour trip-time goal between Boston and New York  City. Such statements indicate that, rather than abandoning the 3-hour trip- time goal, Amtrak continued to publicly represent until at least 2000 that it  would attain this goal—a goal established by the 1992 Amtrak  Authorization and Development Act. Finally, our work focused on Amtrak’s  management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project in  achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal. It was beyond the scope of this work to  determine whether a 3-hour trip time should or should not have been the  project goal or if further improvements would be financially justified in  achieving this goal.
Finally, Amtrak commented that there was a need for dependable funding  of capital projects. Amtrak’s President observed that the Northeast High- Speed Rail Improvement Project suffered, especially in the early years,  from a lack of certain and dependable federal funding and that the amount  of financial support from year-to-year was inconsistent. In his opinion, the  success of any future projects will require stable federal financial support  and, without this, effective project planning and financial accountability  would be extremely difficult. We agree that dependable financial support is  important to the success of any capital project. However, as our report  notes, comprehensive financial management is an equally important  component in successfully planning and implementing capital projects. In  particular, preparation and use of financial plans are important tools for  estimating and controlling project costs. Financial plans are also important  in demonstrating the need for funding at particular times and the impact of  funding delays on project costs and schedules. We found that Amtrak had  no comprehensive financial plan for the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project, and that Amtrak focused on the short-term, not long- term, funding needs of the project. Preparation and use of a comprehensive  financial plan would not only have facilitated the effective use of the  financial resources provided but also have potentially demonstrated the  need for additional resources where warranted.
The Department of Transportation’s FRA said that it was in agreement with  our recommendations. FRA noted that the Passenger Rail Investment  Reform Act (S. 1501) would incorporate all of our recommendations by  creating a program based on the Federal Transit Administration model for  oversight. According to FRA, the structure of the capital program in S. 1501  was closely modeled after the Federal Transit Administration’s Transit New  Starts program. It will have the same sort of eligibility criteria, require the  same planning and analysis by applicants (including the development of  project management plans with regular updates), and will include the same  safety, procurement, management, and compliance reviews and audits as  the Department undertakes with recipients of Federal Transit  Administration funding. In addition, FRA said that S. 1501 proposes the  same mechanism to fund the oversight of capital projects as used by the  Federal Transit Administration, specifically authorizing the Secretary of  Transportation to retain a portion of the grant to fund the Department’s  oversight activities.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days from the date  of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of the report to  congressional committees with responsibilities for intercity passenger rail  issues; the President of Amtrak; the Secretary of Transportation; the  Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration; and the Director, Office of  Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report  included Matthew Cail, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Bert Japikse, Richard  Jorgenson, Nancy Lueke, Steve Martin, and E. Jerry Seigler.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address the status of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project, we reviewed documents related to the project’s costs and  schedules. These documents, obtained from Amtrak, the Federal Railroad  Administration (FRA), and others, included spending plans, progress  reports, and correspondence between Amtrak and FRA on the status of the  project and related issues. With the assistance of Amtrak, commuter rail  agencies, the Connecticut and Rhode Island Departments of  Transportation, CSX Transportation Inc., and the Providence and  Worchester Railroad, we also determined the status of the Northeast High- Speed Rail Improvement Project’s work elements as of March 2003. These  work elements appeared in FRA’s July 1994 master plan for the project. The  information we compiled included, for each work element, the completion  status, the actual or expected completion date, and the location of the work  to be completed. Additionally, with the assistance of Amtrak, commuter rail  agencies, the Connecticut and Rhode Island Departments of  Transportation, and the freight railroads using the Northeast Corridor  between Boston and New York City, we determined the amount of federal,  state, and local funds spent on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project through March 2003. To assess the reliability of the financial  information obtained from Amtrak, commuter railroads, and others, we  compared the financial data with original cost estimates and, to the extent  feasible and appropriate, with contract documents. We found no obvious  errors of completion or accuracy. In addition, we had extensive discussions  with Amtrak and commuter railroad officials about project finances and  our use of the financial data. Since the information was primarily used to  illustrate the magnitude of changes in project and project component costs,  we believe the data were sufficiently reliable for use in this report.
To address Amtrak’s management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project, we reviewed applicable law related to this project  and to the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, as well as the  legislative history of certain changes to the high-speed rail project. We also  reviewed documents showing how the project was organized and managed,  including project management schedules, information on the electrification  and train acquisition contracts, and quarterly status reports. We also  reviewed memorandums, letters, and other information about cost and  schedule issues, including an Amtrak-acquired assessment of cost and  schedule issues related to its acquisition of the high-speed trains. Finally,  we discussed the project’s management and implementation with Amtrak,  FRA, commuter rail agencies, and other officials. We did not evaluate how,  if at all, alternative structures for providing intercity passenger rail could  affect the potential management of future large-scale infrastructure  projects.
To address the federal government’s oversight of the Northeast High-Speed  Rail Improvement Project, we reviewed FRA’s legislative and regulatory  authority in relation to railroads, and to Amtrak in particular. We also  reviewed the October 1985 grant agreement between FRA and Amtrak (and  its subsequent amendments) to identify oversight and reporting  requirements related to the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project and  to the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Finally, we  reviewed information about FTA’s project management oversight program,  including the applicable law establishing the program and how it is funded.  We also reviewed previous GAO reports discussing the program, its  implementation, and the benefits attributable to it. We discussed with  Amtrak, FRA, and Inspector General officials from the U.S. Department of  Transportation the oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail  Improvement Project and how this oversight was conducted. Our  discussions with FRA officials covered their role in the Northeast High- Speed Rail Improvement Project, their legal authority to oversee the  project, how they exercised the oversight of the project, how oversight of  the project changed after Amtrak assumed responsibility for improvements  on the Northeast Corridor in October 1985, and FRA’s current authority and  ability to oversee major passenger rail infrastructure projects.
To address the use of best practices as a framework for the management of  large-scale passenger rail infrastructure projects, we conducted a literature  search to identify best practices related to infrastructure management. The  literature included previous GAO reports and guidelines on best practices  related to the acquisition and management of capital assets. It also  included publications from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),  the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and the Federal Transit  Administration (FTA) addressing best practices and infrastructure project  management issues. From this literature search, we compiled a list of best  practices related to the management of large-scale infrastructure projects.  We also discussed infrastructure management best practices with Amtrak,  FRA, FHWA, FTA, and commuter rail officials. The Amtrak officials  included managers and others associated with the Northeast High-Speed  Rail Improvement Project. Finally, we discussed infrastructure  management best practices with officials from four Class I freight railroads  and the Alameda Corridor project in Los Angeles. We then synthesized this  information into the best practices framework presented in this report.
We do not believe that our review of Amtrak’s overall project management  was materially or negatively affected by ongoing investigations and  litigation. In November 2001, one of the contractors manufacturing the  Acela Express trains (Bombardier) filed suit against Amtrak in the United  States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking damages for,  among other things, Amtrak’s alleged interference with the manufacture of  the equipment. In November 2002, Amtrak filed a countersuit against the  manufacturers alleging, among other things, breach of contract. As of  February 2004, these suits were still pending. In addition, Amtrak officials  indicated that the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office  were conducting investigations related to the contract for electrification  work done under the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. As  of February 2004, these investigations were also still pending. Nothing in  this report is intended to have any impact on the outcome of these suits or  investigations, and this work was not performed in relation to either the  suits or the investigations.
Subsequent to completion of our audit work, and in response to Amtrak’s  October 2003 comments made on a draft of our report that, because of its  concerns about the litigation, it had withheld critical documents during our  work, Amtrak made available to us additional material related to their  management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. This  included, among other things, monthly progress reports and quality  manuals that were used for the electrification work and high-speed train  acquisition, selected minutes from Amtrak Board of Directors meetings,  and project schedules that were used to track the progress of various  project components. We reviewed this material at both Amtrak’s High- Speed Trainset office in Philadelphia and at Amtrak’s headquarters in  Washington, D.C. We also interviewed a former manager of the Northeast  High-Speed Rail Improvement Project who had not previously been  available to us. We discussed with this individual Amtrak’s management of  the project. We used this additional information to further assess Amtrak’s  management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, the  effectiveness of this management, and the extent to which Amtrak involved  stakeholders in project management.
We conducted our work from November 2002 through February 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Work Elements, by Category and Status as of March 2003
paragraphs: Stamford, Conn. station center island platforms Reconfigure New Haven, Conn., terminal area Reconfigure Old Saybrook, Conn., station Track program (installation of concrete ties, track resurfacing/relining, ballast  cleaning)
section_title: Methodology Used to Develop a Framework of Best Practices for Managing Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects
paragraphs: This appendix discusses our development of a best practices framework  for the management of large-scale infrastructure projects, including how  we defined and classified best practices, what reports and organizations we  consulted, and what limitations apply to our framework.
subsections: section_title: Definition and Classification of Best Practices
paragraphs: We defined best practices as those “practices successfully implemented by  organizations recognized for their outstanding capital decision-making  practices.” Best, or leading, practices can provide a beneficial model for  other organizations to use to improve efficiency and performance. In this  case, best practices form a framework to boost efficiency and performance  when managing large-scale infrastructure projects.
We identified 28 best practices related to project management and grouped  these 28 best practices into five umbrella categories to create a framework.  (See table 2.) These umbrella categories include (1) conducting  comprehensive project planning, (2) assessing risks and identifying  mitigation measures, (3) comprehensively managing project financing, (4)  establishing accountability and oversight, and (5) incorporating the diverse  interests of stakeholders.
section_title: Literature Reviewed and Organizations Contacted to Identify Best Practices
paragraphs: To identify the 28 best practices, we reviewed literature on, and  interviewed organizations involved in, the management of large-scale  infrastructure projects. This literature included previous GAO reports on or  related to best practices; documents from OMB, FTA, and FHWA. We  primarily relied on our 1998 Executive Guide: Leading Practices in  Capital Decision-Making as a base for the framework. We supplemented  this literature with material from FTA’s Project and Construction  Management Guidelines, OMB’s Capital Programming Guide, and other  sources.
We also interviewed representatives of the following organizations to  substantiate our selection of the best practices identified in the literature:   Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority,   Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company,  Connecticut Department of Transportation,  Long Island Rail Road,  Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,  Norfolk Southern Corporation,  Providence and Worchester Railroad,  Rhode Island Department of Transportation, and  Union Pacific Railroad.
section_title: Limitations
paragraphs: Our report highlights the best practices we identified through our review of  federal agency reports and interviews. As such, it is not intended to suggest  that the identified best practices are the only methods for managing large- scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects or that other  management methods are flawed. In addition, our best practices  framework is not meant to be all-inclusive. There may be other best  practices that would also be applicable to the management of large-scale  infrastructure projects. Finally, difficulties in managing the Northeast High- Speed Rail Improvement Project may have arisen even when best practices  were used. Best practices serve as a useful framework for effectively  managing large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects, but  they are not meant to cover every aspect of project management and may  not address all problems or difficulties that organizations encounter during  project management.
section_title: Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Projects
paragraphs: Although interest in improving passenger rail service on the Northeast  Corridor dates to the 1960s, it was the Railroad Revitalization and  Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act) that formally established the  Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP)—a program of  infrastructure improvements designed to enable high-speed passenger rail  service between Boston and Washington, D.C. Among other things, the 4R  Act established certain goals for NECIP and authorized Amtrak to make  necessary improvements in its rights-of-way between Boston and  Washington, D.C., to enable high-speed rail service. In particular, by 1981,  Amtrak was to have achieved regularly scheduled and dependable intercity  passenger rail service between Boston and New York City (called the  “north-end” of the Northeast Corridor) in 3 hours 40 minutes, and between  New York City and Washington, D.C. (called the “south-end” of the  Northeast Corridor), in 2 hours 40 minutes. The act further directed the  Secretary of Transportation to determine the practicability of establishing  regularly scheduled and dependable passenger rail service between Boston  and New York City in 3 hours, and between New York City and Washington,  D.C., in 2 hours 30 minutes. The 4R Act authorized $1.75 billion to  accomplish these goals. Congress appropriated about $1.5 billion for fiscal  years 1976 to 1980.
FRA initially managed NECIP and developed a program of improvements  that included rehabilitating and upgrading the line between Boston and  Washington, D.C.; electrifying the line between Boston and New Haven,  Connecticut; and rehabilitating and upgrading the track electrification  system between New York City and Washington, D.C. It also included  repairing, rehabilitating, or replacing bridges; eliminating most railroad- highway grade crossings; and improving stations. Amtrak was a  subcontractor to FRA and was primarily responsible for track and signal  work. The project was to be substantially completed by 1981.
The project began to experience problems early. In a February 1978 report  to Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) concluded that  because of funding problems and a need to better coordinate elements of  the project with various users of the Northeast Corridor (such as commuter  and freight railroads), it was not likely that NECIP would be completed by  1981 and that additional investment in infrastructure improvements and  passenger rail equipment would be required to achieve a 3-hour trip  between Boston and New York City. In January 1979, DOT further stated  not only that the project had been inadequately planned, but also that  another $750 million would be needed to complete the project (for a total  of $2.5 billion). Completion would be delayed until at least 1983. In May  1980, the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 authorized an  additional $750 million for NECIP. It also required FRA to transfer  responsibility for the project to Amtrak by October 1, 1985. The project’s  legislative history suggests that Congress was concerned about the  project’s schedule delays and growing costs. Congress was also interested  in seeing the project completed by the transfer date.
Funding difficulties during the 1980s led to changes in the project. (See fig.  7 for NECIP appropriations.) By January 1982, because of federal budget  constraints, plans for the project had largely eliminated the construction of  many larger-cost items, such as electrifying the line between New Haven  and Boston. According to a former NECIP project director, these changes  also resulted from a desire by the federal government to hold the project’s  cost escalation to predetermined levels.
When FRA transferred NECIP to Amtrak in October 1985, FRA officials  generally considered the project complete in that additional funding for  remaining major work elements was not envisioned. A total of about $1.2  billion (out of the $2.5 billion authorized) had been spent on the project at  the time of transfer. Although NECIP achieved significant improvements to  the Northeast Corridor’s infrastructure and met some goals of the 4R Act,  such as reducing the travel time between New York City and Washington,  D.C., to 2 hours 40 minutes, it failed to achieve other goals, such as  reducing the travel time between Boston and New York City to 3 hours 40  minutes. FRA primarily attributed this shortcoming to a lack of funds for  electrifying the line from New Haven to Boston. Both FRA and Amtrak  officials told us that NECIP had largely focused work on the south-end of  the Northeast Corridor, not the north-end, because of significant  deterioration of the infrastructure on the south-end resulting from years of  deferred maintenance and neglect. In November 1986, DOT reported that  when Congress authorized and funded NECIP in 1976, the Northeast  Corridor had literally begun to disintegrate at both its northern and  southern ends.
Between 1985 and 1990, funding for NECIP decreased sharply. During this  time, appropriations for the project averaged about $21 million per year,  compared with about $250 million annually during fiscal years 1976  through 1984. As the result of efforts by various organizations in the mid-  and late 1980s, including the Coalition of Northeast Governors, interest  again rose in high-speed passenger rail service between New York City and  Boston, because of its potential to mitigate increasing highway and air  congestion, as well as air pollution levels. These efforts culminated in the  1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act. The act required the  Secretary of Transportation to develop a master plan for a coordinated  program of improvements that would result in regularly scheduled, safe,  and dependable passenger rail service between Boston and New York City  in 3 hours or less. A total of $470 million was authorized for fiscal years  1993 and 1994 to plan this effort and make capital investments. Congress  actually appropriated $429 million. Amtrak established the Northeast High- Speed Rail Improvement Project to implement this act.
In July 1994, FRA issued the master plan for the high-speed rail project  required by the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act. The plan  established three milestones for the project: (1) initiate electrified train  service between Boston and New York City, (2) initiate 3-hour train service  between these cities, and (3) complete the infrastructure improvements  designed to enhance track capacity and extend the useful life of existing  assets. FRA identified 72 work elements to achieve these milestones. These  work elements related to three main categories—trip-time improvement,  capacity enhancement, and recapitalization of the infrastructure. The trip- time improvements, which included electrifying the line between Boston  and New Haven and acquiring high-speed trains, were intended to either  directly lower trip times or increase trains’ operating speeds. The capacity  enhancements, such as reconfiguring “interlockings” (where trains can  switch from one track to another track), were intended to maintain the 3- hour trip time while accommodating the increased train traffic planned by  Amtrak and other users of the Northeast Corridor. The recapitalization  improvements, such as replacing various bridges, were intended to rebuild  or extend the useful life of the Northeast Corridor.
FRA’s plan estimated that the total cost of the trip time, capacity, and  recapitalization improvements would be about $3.1 billion (in constant  1993 dollars) and that the project would be completed by January 1, 2010.  Electrification was to be completed by the fall of 1997, and there was to be  full 3-hour service between Boston and New York City in 2001. The plan  assumed adequate funding from the federal government and users of the  Northeast Corridor (such as commuter railroads), as well as close  coordination of the project’s work elements between Amtrak and various  stakeholders, such as states, transportation agencies, and commuter  railroads. Coordination with stakeholders was particularly important, since  (1) Amtrak did not own various sections of the north-end of the Northeast  Corridor, including the sections between New Haven, Connecticut, and  New Rochelle, New York, and between Boston and the  Massachusetts/Rhode Island state line, and (2) there was significant  commuter railroad traffic on the north-end of the corridor.
Amtrak was the manager of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement  Project and began work using both contractors and its own workforce. It  relied on contractors primarily to electrify the line and manufacture the  high-speed trains. Amtrak used its own workforce to perform  infrastructure work, such as track improvements and signal work. Amtrak  initiated electrified service in January 2000, even though the electrification  work was not substantially completed until July 2000. High-speed rail  service was initiated in December 2000. Through March 2003, a total of  about $3.2 billion had been spent—about $2.6 billion by Amtrak and an  additional $625 million by commuter rail agencies and state governments.
section_title: Selected Sources of Best Practices for Managing Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects
subsections: section_title: GAO Products
paragraphs: Federal-Aid Highways: Cost and Oversight of Major Highway and Bridge  Projects—Issues and Options. GAO-03-764T. Washington, D.C.: May 8,  2003.
Mass Transit: Many Management Successes at WMATA, but Capital  Planning Could Be Enhanced. GAO-01-744. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2001.
Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making.  GAO/AIMD-99-32. Washington, D.C.: December 1998.
section_title: Non-GAO Products
paragraphs: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration.  FHWA Major Projects–Resource Manual for Oversight Managers.  Washington, D.C.: January 2002.  http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/mega/mega.htm (viewed 5/19/03).
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration.  FHWA Guidance–Financial Plans. Washington, D.C.: May 2000.  http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/contracts/fpgatt.htm (viewed  5/19/03).
Office of Management and Budget. Capital Programming Guide Version  1.0, Supplement to Circular A-11, Part 3: Planning, Budgeting, and  Acquisition of Capital Assets. Washington, D.C.: July 1997.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration. EG&G  Dynatrend Inc., Project and Construction Management Guidelines, 1996  Update. Wellesley, Mass.: June 1996.
section_title: Comments from the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Mission
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