Hazardous Materials: EPA May Need to Reassess Sites Receiving Asbestos-Contaminated Ore from Libby, Montana, and Should Improve Its Public Notification Process
Published: 2007-10-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Between 1923 and the early 1990s, a mine near Libby, Montana, shipped millions of tons of asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore to sites throughout the United States. In 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began to clean up asbestos contamination at the Libby mine and evaluate those sites that received the ore to determine if they were contaminated. Under Superfund program regulations and guidance, EPA regional offices took steps to inform affected communities of contamination problems and agency efforts to address them. GAO was asked to (1) describe the status of EPA's and other federal agencies' efforts to assess and address potential risks at the facilities that received contaminated Libby ore and (2) determine the extent and effectiveness of EPA's public notification efforts about cleanups at sites that received Libby ore. GAO, among other steps, convened focus groups in three of the affected communities to address these issues.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2000, EPA has evaluated 271 sites thought to have received asbestos-contaminated ore from Libby, Montana, but did so without key information on safe exposure levels for asbestos. Based on these evaluations, 19 sites were found to be contaminated with asbestos from the Libby ore and needed to be cleaned up. EPA or the state of jurisdiction generally led or oversaw the cleanups. In general, a cleanup would be performed if sampling results indicated asbestos was present in amounts greater than 1 percent (based on the percentage area in a microscopic field) in soils or debris or greater than 0.1 asbestos fibers per cubic centimeter of air. However, these standards are not health-based and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry found that the sampling and analysis methods EPA used at most of the sites it examined were limited and have since been improved. The EPA Office of Inspector General reported in December 2006 that EPA had not completed an assessment of the toxicity of the asbestos in the Libby ore. Until it completes this assessment, EPA cannot be assured that the Libby site itself is cleaned to safe levels, nor will it know the extent to which the sites that received Libby ore may need to be reevaluated. EPA has agreed to complete a risk and toxicity assessment by the end of fiscal year 2010. EPA regional offices did not implement key provisions of the agency's public notification regulations at 8 of the 13 sites for which EPA had lead responsibility. At four sites, for example, EPA either did not provide and maintain documentation about the cleanups for public review and comment or provide for a public comment period. Also, although EPA guidance emphasizes that simply complying with the public notification rules is often insufficient to meet communities' needs, at five sites EPA did not go beyond these provisions. Reaction among community members to EPA's public notification measures was mixed. At two of the three sites in which GAO held focus groups with affected community members, participants were critical of EPA's efforts to inform them about the cleanup of the asbestos-contaminated sites in their neighborhood. These included participants in Hamilton Township, New Jersey and Minot, North Dakota who noted that newspaper notices did not identify asbestos as the contaminant in question and contained unclear and bureaucratic language. On the other hand, participants in Dearborn, Michigan praised EPA efforts to, among other things, hold public meetings and hand-deliver written notices.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Between 1923 and the early 1990s, a mine located near Libby, Montana,  shipped millions of tons of vermiculite ore to hundreds of locations  throughout the United States. The vermiculite ore mined in Libby  contained high concentrations of naturally occurring asbestos. Vermiculite  is used in the manufacture of products such as building insulation,  fireproofing material, and some gardening products. At some of the  facilities that received Libby ore, manufacturing processes released the  asbestos into the air. Some workers and others who inhaled the asbestos  fibers developed serious, in some cases fatal, asbestos-related respiratory  illnesses. In November 1978, a company in Marysville, Ohio, that  processed Libby ore to make fertilizer products reported to the  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that its employees were suffering  lung problems believed to be related to the asbestos in the ore. According  to EPA, a number of factors prevented the agency from addressing the  issue at the time, including competing priorities for funding and  fragmented authority and jurisdiction among federal agencies for  regulating substances contaminated with asbestos.
In 2000—more than 2 decades later and in the wake of a series of  newspaper articles highlighting health and environmental concerns  associated with the asbestos-contaminated ore—EPA began cleaning up  asbestos contamination in the Libby area under the authority of the  Superfund program, which was created by the Comprehensive  Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980  (CERCLA). In early 2000, EPA began identifying the sites that may have  received Libby ore and conducted site evaluations under CERCLA to  determine if any of the sites were contaminated with asbestos from the ore  and needed to be cleaned up. Either EPA or the state of jurisdiction has  had primary responsibility for planning and implementing or, in some  cases, overseeing cleanups at these sites. To help EPA assess the risks  posed by potential asbestos contamination at sites that received Libby ore,  the Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic  Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has performed evaluations of  human-health effects that may be associated with past or current exposure  to asbestos at selected sites.
Under the regulations implementing CERCLA, known as the National Oil  and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), EPA must  generally take a number of steps to notify communities when it cleans up  and removes hazardous materials from sites (removal action). These steps  include designating a spokesperson to notify communities about the  cleanup, creating a record documenting the basis for the cleanup, and  making the record available to the public for review and comment. EPA  has delegated responsibility for carrying out the public-notification  procedures to its 10 regional offices. EPA has also issued policies and  guidance establishing public-notification procedures that EPA regions  should follow to help ensure early and meaningful community  involvement. Even so, in some of the communities where EPA cleaned up  asbestos contamination from Libby ore, concerns have been raised as to  how well EPA regions followed NCP provisions and guidance for notifying  the public.
In this context, you asked us to (1) describe how EPA and other federal  agencies assessed and addressed potential risks at the facilities that  received asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore from a mine in Libby,  Montana, and the results of these efforts, and (2) determine the extent and  effectiveness of EPA regions’ efforts to notify the public about the cleanup  of facilities that received the contaminated ore.
Because of a pending federal criminal case against W.R. Grace—the  company that owned the Libby vermiculite mine and about half of the  exfoliation facilities that processed ore from the mine—and the need to  avoid undue influence on the case, we designed our methodology to  minimize direct contact with EPA staff. To determine the current status of  efforts to address potential risks at sites that received the Libby ore, we  obtained data from ATSDR, which was largely based on EPA data about  each of the sites identified as receiving ore from the Libby mine. For each  site, the data included the location, type of facility, amount of ore  received, and limited information on the results of EPA’s evaluation. We  then submitted a set of questions and a table containing data about each of  the sites to EPA’s headquarters and 10 regional offices to verify, update,  and complete that information. To determine the extent of the regional  offices’ public-notification efforts, we submitted sets of questions in  writing to EPA’s headquarters and 10 regional offices about their  compliance with NCP public-notification provisions and any additional  community-notification efforts at sites that were cleaned up. We limited  our review to the sites for which EPA had public-notification  responsibility. We also conducted structured interviews, in person and by  telephone, with state and local government officials to obtain their  perspectives on the public-notification efforts that took place in  communities where cleanups were located. Finally, we hosted discussions  with community members at three sites in different EPA regions to obtain  their perspectives on the public-notification efforts.
We performed our work from August 2005 to October 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The vermiculite ore mined at Libby, Montana, between 1923 and the early  1990s contained high concentrations of naturally occurring asbestos  minerals, including tremolite, winchite, richterite, and others (see fig. 1).  As the ore was mined and processed, dust containing asbestos fibers was  released into the air, which workers then inhaled. By the early 1900s,  asbestos was recognized as a cause of occupational disease. Initially, the  disease associated with asbestos was asbestosis, a nonmalignant  respiratory disease characterized by scarring of the lung tissue that may  progress to significant impairment and death. During the 1930s and 1940s,  the connection between asbestos exposure and lung cancer emerged. By  1960, the connection between asbestos and mesothelioma—a cancer of  the mesothelial lining of the lungs—was established. Diseases stemming  from exposure to asbestos may not be apparent for decades after the  initial exposure. Thus, even though the Libby mine closed around 1990,  many residents, former workers, and others who were exposed to the  asbestos-contaminated ore, recently have been diagnosed with asbestos- related diseases and many more may become ill in the future.
EPA’s involvement with Libby’s asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore  dates back to the late 1970s and continued intermittently until 1999, when  the agency initiated an investigation that led to ongoing cleanup activities  in the Libby area. In 1978, EPA learned that workers at a vermiculite  processing plant in Marysville, Ohio—one of hundreds of sites across the  United States where Libby vermiculite ore was sent—were exhibiting  symptoms of asbestos-related diseases. Between 1980 and 1982, EPA  issued a series of reports related to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite.  Most of these reports indicated that there was a lack of data on both  exposure to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite and its adverse health  effects. Further, the reports identified problems in sampling, analysis, and  reproducibility of data regarding low levels of asbestos in vermiculite,  which made it difficult to acquire data on exposure and health effects. One  of the studies also noted that EPA needed to develop more information  identifying, among other things, the vermiculite-mine sites, the processors  of vermiculite, and the potential number of employees exposed to  asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. In a February 1985 report, EPA  estimated the levels and ranges of exposure to asbestos-contaminated  vermiculite for workers and the general public and indicated that, with  further study, this information could be used for regulatory decision  making. This report contained a list of the locations of 52 exfoliation  plants in the United States that had received vermiculite ore from the  Libby mine. Even so, EPA did not initiate any action at the time and, until  1999, did little to address concerns about the health risks associated with  exposure to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore.
In 1999—after a series of newspaper articles reporting that miners and  their families in the area of Libby, Montana, had died or were ill from  exposure to the asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore—EPA began  investigating the contamination in the Libby area and began cleaning up  the contamination in 2000. Subsequently, concerns were raised about why  EPA had not taken action much earlier in Libby, which resulted in  investigations by both the EPA Office of Inspector General and GAO. The  subsequent reports concluded that, due to various challenges, EPA missed  past opportunities to take steps that might have protected the citizens of  Libby. These challenges included (1) fragmented regulatory authority and  jurisdiction with other federal agencies and within EPA, along with  ineffective communication, which made it difficult for EPA to take action;  (2) limitations of science, technology, and health-effects data that made it  difficult for EPA to determine the degree of health risk at Libby; and   (3) funding constraints and competing priorities, which led EPA to de- emphasize dealing with asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. Since these  reports were issued, as part of an ongoing criminal case against W.R.  Grace, the government has alleged that Grace engaged in a conspiracy to  defraud EPA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  by concealing and misrepresenting the nature of the asbestos-containing  vermiculite produced at the mine. Grace has denied the allegations.
When EPA began cleaning up contamination in the Libby area in 2000, it  also took steps to identify and evaluate sites that may have received  shipments of Libby ore for asbestos contamination according to CERCLA.  Under NCP regulations that implement CERCLA, a removal site evaluation  involves, among other things, identifying the source and nature of any  hazardous-substance release, analyzing the magnitude of the potential  threat to human health and the environment, and evaluating factors  necessary to make the determination of whether a removal is necessary.
According to NCP regulations, when EPA is the lead agency for a cleanup,  an EPA region must take certain actions, as appropriate, to notify the  public about a removal action. These actions include (1) designating a  spokesperson to notify immediately affected citizens and state and local  officials about the cleanup; (2) creating a record documenting the basis for  the cleanup action and making the record publicly available; (3) publishing  a notice that the record is available for review in a major local newspaper;  and (4) providing an opportunity for the public to comment on the record.  When EPA expects the cleanup action to last more than 120 days, the  regional office must also conduct interviews with interested or affected  parties, prepare a formal community response plan, and establish at least  one local information repository at or near the cleanup location, such as at  a public library.
EPA has also issued numerous policy directives and guidance documents  over the years establishing additional public notification procedures that  EPA regions should follow. For example, EPA guidance issued in July 1992  directed regions to interact closely with and reach out to communities.  This guidance specifies that one of the goals of public participation is to  inform the public about the risks associated with a site and any cleanup  actions. The guidance also states that it is imperative for EPA to give the  public prompt, accurate information about the nature of threats to public  health and the environment, and the removal action necessary to mitigate  the threats. In its April 2002 guidance, EPA stated that just complying with  NCP provisions is often insufficient for informing the media, the public,  and interested stakeholders. This guidance strongly suggested the regions  use other options for meeting community needs, such as scheduling press  briefings; establishing a local or toll-free telephone hotline; and canvassing  neighborhoods to identify residents’ needs, fears, and concerns.
ATSDR has provided information to EPA to help assess the risks posed by  potential asbestos contamination at selected sites that received Libby ore.  Specifically, in 2002, ATSDR launched the first phase of its National  Asbestos Exposure Review. Under this phase of the project, ATSDR  evaluated human health effects that may be associated with past or  current exposure to asbestos at 28 of the sites that had received and  processed the vermiculite ore mined in Libby, Montana. These sites were  selected because they received a high-volume of Libby ore (greater than  100,000 tons) or EPA identified them as needing further investigation.  These 28 sites together received about 80 percent of the vermiculite ore  shipped from the Libby mine between 1964 and 1980.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Assessed Sites Thought to Have Received Asbestos- Contaminated Ore but Did So without Critical Information about Safe Exposure Levels
paragraphs: EPA, with assistance from other federal and state agencies, has assessed  271 sites that were thought to have received asbestos-contaminated ore  from Libby, Montana, to determine if the sites are contaminated with  asbestos and if they need cleanup. As a result of these investigations, 19  sites were identified as requiring cleanup. As a part of ATSDR’s effort to  evaluate public-health risks posed by past and current exposures to  asbestos contamination in the Libby area and at some of the sites that  received the Libby ore, ATSDR has noted there is an absence of key  information on the toxicity of the asbestos found in the Libby ore. ATSDR  also noted that the methods EPA used to sample and analyze the air and  soil at most of the 28 sites it reviewed have since been improved and now  better quantify asbestos levels. After the EPA Office of Inspector General  recommended in December 2006 that EPA perform a toxicity assessment  to determine safe levels of exposure for humans, EPA agreed to do so.
subsections: section_title: EPA Has Evaluated Sites That May Have Received Libby Ore and Concluded Some Needed to be Cleaned Up
paragraphs: EPA has taken a number of actions to identify and evaluate sites that may  have received Libby ore and, when needed, has conducted removal  actions. In early 2000, EPA began compiling a list of facilities that might  have received asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore from the Libby mine.  To compile the list, it used shipping records and other information  obtained from W.R. Grace as well as historical information about  vermiculite processing facilities from the Bureau of Mines and the U.S.  Geological Survey. Initially, EPA identified over 500 sites, but after  coordinating with the U.S. Geological Survey to update and revise the list  of facilities and eliminate duplicate entries, EPA narrowed the list to less  than 300 potential sites.
The data that EPA collected on the sites believed to have received Libby  ore paint a picture of the distribution of Libby ore across the United  States. Figure 2 illustrates the nationwide distribution based on 195 sites  for which data on the amount of ore shipped were available. These 195  sites are believed to have received a combined total of at least 6 million  tons of ore from the Libby, Montana, mine and ore processing operations.  The 271 sites were located in 39 states, the District of Columbia, and  Puerto Rico. The most sites were in California (28) and Texas (26). EPA  has continued to identify sites and will investigate them as it deems  necessary. For example, in 2006, EPA identified additional sites (included  in the 271) that it needed to assess for asbestos contamination.
According to the data that EPA collected, most (95 percent) of the  vermiculite ore known to have been shipped from Libby between 1964 and  1990 went to facilities that converted it into commercial vermiculite  through a process called “exfoliation” (expansion). Exfoliation plants  heated the vermiculite ore to approximately 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit,  which caused the ore to expand, or pop. This expanded vermiculite was  then used in a variety of products, including loose-fill insulation in homes  (see figs. 3 and 4 for photos of expanded vermiculite ore and vermiculite  insulation). Because significant concentrations of asbestos fibers were  likely released during the exfoliation process, of the facilities that received  Libby ore, exfoliation plants were deemed the most likely to have caused  environmental contamination and exposure.
In performing their preliminary assessment of sites, EPA regions generally  tried to determine the facilities’ locations using a variety of methods,  including title searches; reviews of town records; and interviews with  people who might provide useful information, such as company  representatives or people who formerly worked at the sites. Once they  identified an accurate address for a site, a “windshield survey” was  performed to determine current site conditions and gather additional  information on past operations at the site. These surveys generally  included viewing the suspected location and its surrounding area and, in  some instances, interviewing business owners and residents in the  immediate vicinity.
If these initial surveys indicated the need for further examination, the  regions typically conducted a detailed investigation of the site. This  investigation typically consisted of a site visit, which included a more  thorough visual inspection of the property and surrounding area;  additional interviews with people who might be knowledgeable about past  operations, such as facility representatives; reviews of any relevant and  available documentation from state and federal agencies; and, if deemed  necessary, collection of soil and air samples.
As indicated in table 1, EPA conducted site visits to at least 241 of the  sites. At least 19 sites were not visited because either initial efforts to  determine site locations were unsuccessful or information gathered while  pre-screening the sites indicated that a site visit was not necessary. For  example, for a site located in Stanton, North Dakota, company officials  indicated in a letter that the company purchased a relatively small amount  of Libby ore in the early 1980s and had since obtained vermiculite ore from  a mine in Virginia. The company officials provided EPA Region 8 with a  lab analysis of the ore from the Virginia mine, which indicated no asbestos  was present in the ore. As a result, EPA Region 8 concluded a site visit was  not necessary.
For the sites where the regions decided sampling was warranted, samples  of “bulk” materials—such as raw vermiculite ore, suspected waste  vermiculite piles, and soils—were collected. Air samples were collected if  there was concern that disturbing contaminated materials (in the soil or  elsewhere) could result in asbestos fibers migrating into the air and being  inhaled. Based on information obtained during the site visits, bulk and, in  some cases, air samples were collected for at least 80 (30 percent) of the  sites (as shown in table 1).
One of the most important factors EPA regional offices considered in  determining whether a site needed to be cleaned up was the amount, if  any, of asbestos present at the site. In general, a cleanup would be  performed if sampling results indicated that asbestos was present in  amounts greater than 1 percent (based on the percentage of the area of a  microscopic field) in soils or debris or greater than 0.1 asbestos fibers per  cubic centimeter of air. According to EPA, the “1 percent threshold” for  asbestos in soils or debris is not a health-based standard, but is rather  related to the limit of detection for the analytical methods available during  the early years of EPA’s asbestos program (early 1970s), and to EPA’s  desire to concentrate resources on materials containing higher  percentages of asbestos. EPA has never determined that materials  containing less than 1 percent asbestos are safe, and scientists have not  been able to develop a safe level for exposure to airborne asbestos. Of the  sites sampled, 22 had levels of asbestos that that exceeded the thresholds,  29 had detectable levels of asbestos that were below the thresholds (trace  amounts), and 26 sites had no detectable levels of asbestos.
After reviewing the sampling results and other pertinent information  collected about the sites, EPA—and in some instances states—identified  19 sites where contamination from the asbestos in Libby ore needed to be  cleaned up. Figure 5 includes a map showing the location of the 19 sites  that were identified for cleanup. With the exception of one site, all of the  sites that needed to be cleaned up had levels of asbestos in soils that  exceeded the 1 percent threshold. For the one exception, a site located in  Salt Lake City, all of the soil samples contained trace amounts of asbestos  (less than 1 percent). However, after raking the ground and using a leaf  blower, EPA collected air samples which showed elevated levels of  asbestos fibers that exceeded the threshold of 0.1 asbestos fibers per cubic  centimeter of air. As a result, EPA determined this site needed to be  cleaned up as well.
section_title: ATSDR Concluded Former Workers at Facilities That Processed Libby Ore Were Most at Risk for Asbestos Exposure and That Health- Effects Data Are Limited
paragraphs: In conjunction with EPA’s efforts to evaluate sites that received Libby ore,  ATSDR is conducting a project—the National Asbestos Exposure  Review—to investigate selected sites that received and processed ore  from the Libby mine. These investigations—referred to as health  consultations—involve evaluating information about toxic material at a  site, determining whether people might be exposed to it, and reporting  what harm exposure might cause. Health consultations may be performed  by ATSDR staff or by state health department officials working under a  cooperative agreement with ATSDR. The consultations may consider    what levels (or concentrations) of hazardous substances are present;    whether people might be exposed to contamination and how (through  “exposure pathways” such as breathing air, drinking or coming into  contact with water, eating or coming into contact with soil, or eating  food);   what harm the substances might cause people (or the contaminants’  “toxicity”);   whether working or living nearby might affect people’s health; and    other dangers to people, such as unsafe buildings or other physical  hazards.
Every health consultation includes ATSDR’s conclusions about public- health hazards and recommendations for actions to protect public health.  These can include recommended follow-up activities for EPA, state  environmental and health agencies, and ATSDR. For example, the  recommendations could be related to (1) cleaning up sites; (2) keeping  people away from contamination and physical dangers—for example, by  placing a fence around a site; (3) giving residents safe drinking water;   (4) relocating exposed people; (5) providing health education for residents  and health-care providers to inform them about site contaminants and  harmful health effects; and (6) performing additional health studies.
ATSDR is conducting the National Asbestos Exposure Review in two  phases. In Phase 1, it is conducting health investigations of 28 sites. These  28 sites together received about 80 percent of the vermiculite ore believed  to have been shipped from the Libby mine between 1964 and 1980 (see fig.  6). As of June 2007, ATSDR had completed investigations at all 28 sites.  For each site, ATSDR has issued a health-consultation report and a fact  sheet summarizing the results of the site evaluation. Phase 1 will  conclude with the completion of a report summarizing all 28 site  investigations. This report will likely be released in late 2007 or early 2008.  In Phase 2 of the National Asbestos Exposure Review, ATSDR will build  on work from Phase 1 to determine the need for public-health activities at  additional sites that received Libby ore. ATSDR’s role during Phase 2 will  vary from providing technical support or advice to other agencies to  possibly conducting additional public-health activities.
In selecting the 28 Phase 1 sites, ATSDR selected sites that would be more  likely to pose public-health risks because the sites (1) had been designated  by EPA as requiring further action based on current contamination, or   (2) were exfoliation facilities that processed more than 100,000 tons of  vermiculite ore from the Libby mine. ATSDR’s general conclusions about  past and current exposures to asbestos from the contaminated Libby ore  at the 28 sites included the following:    Former employees at the facilities that processed the asbestos- contaminated vermiculite ore were most at risk for exposure.
Those who lived in the employees’ homes may have also been exposed  because asbestos fibers could have been carried home on the employees’  clothing, skin, and hair.
People could have been exposed to asbestos if they handled or played in  waste rock, a by-product of vermiculite exfoliation. At some of the  vermiculite plants, workers or people in the community may have brought  the waste rock from the plants to their homes to use in gardens and as fill  or driveway surfacing material. If this waste rock is uncovered and stirred  up, asbestos fibers may be released into the air. Determining the extent to  which former and current residents were or could currently be exposed to  waste rock on their properties was not possible at most sites given a lack  of knowledge about whether or to what extent past community members  may have taken waste material home.
People living around the plants could have been exposed to asbestos  fibers in the air when vermiculite was being processed at the sites.  Determining whether former residents were exposed to hazardous levels  of asbestos was not possible at most of the sites given a general lack of  data on past emissions from the facilities.
Since the plants no longer process Libby ore, current residents living  around the sites are no longer being exposed through air emissions from  processing activities at the plants.
As a part of its on-going work to assess public-health risks at the Phase 1  sites, ATSDR has also reported significant gaps in scientific data used to  evaluate health risks associated with exposure to the type of asbestos  fibers found in Libby ore. ATSDR has pointed out that evaluating health  effects requires extensive knowledge of both the ways in which people  were exposed and the level of asbestos that is harmful to humans (i.e., the  toxicity of the asbestos). According to ATSDR, the public health  implications of exposures to these fibers are difficult to determine in part  because the toxicological information currently available for the asbestos  fibers found in the Libby ore is very limited. Also, in a May 2003 Public  Health Assessment of the Libby site, ATSDR recommended that “more  research is needed, specifically: toxicological investigation of the risks  associated with low-level exposure to asbestos, especially Libby asbestos;  clinical research on treatment for mesothelioma and asbestosis; and  epidemiology studies to better characterize the link between exposure to  asbestos and disease.”
ATSDR has also noted that the 1 percent threshold used in determining  when sites need to be cleaned up is not health based. Furthermore, the  agency cited EPA studies showing that disturbing soils containing less  than 1 percent asbestos can suspend fibers in the air at levels that cause a  health concern. Therefore, ATSDR concluded it is unclear whether sites  that were not cleaned up and with asbestos levels of less than 1 percent  were safe.
In addition, ATSDR stated that the sampling and analysis methods used by  EPA at some of the sites were limited in their ability to detect and measure  asbestos fibers. In fact, recent health-consultation reports for two sites in  Portland, Oregon, issued by the Oregon Department of Human Services in  consultation with ATSDR, pointed out that sampling and analysis methods  have been improved since samples were taken at those sites in 2000 and  that new methods are better able to quantify levels of asbestos. As a result,  the health-consultation reports for those sites recommended, among other  things, that EPA conduct additional sampling at these sites to ensure  people are not being exposed to residual fibers. After conducting  additional sampling at one of these sites, EPA determined the site required  further cleanup.
section_title: EPA Has Attempted to Clarify Its Asbestos Cleanup Goals and Agreed to Complete a Toxicity Assessment for the Asbestos in Libby Ore
paragraphs: “to ban the use of materials which contain significant quantities of asbestos, but to allow  the use of materials which would: (1) contain trace amounts of asbestos which occur in  numerous natural substances, and (2) include very small quantities of asbestos (less than 1  percent) added to enhance the material’s effectiveness.”
This memo acknowledged that the widespread use of the 1 percent  threshold may have caused EPA managers at cleanup sites to assume that  levels below that threshold did not pose an unreasonable risk to human  health. The memo stated that it is important to note the 1 percent  threshold was related to (1) the limit of detection for the analytical  methods available in the early 1970s and (2) EPA’s decision to focus its  resources on materials containing higher percentages of asbestos.
The memo further noted the threshold may not be protective of human  health in all instances. It stressed that regions should not assume soil or  debris containing less than 1 percent asbestos does not pose an  unreasonable risk to human health and should instead develop risk-based,  site-specific action levels to determine if response actions should be  undertaken. However, the memo clearly stated that this information did  not constitute a regulation nor did it impose legally-binding requirements  on EPA.
In November 2005, EPA issued its Asbestos Project Plan. The plan  provided a framework for a coordinated agency-wide approach to identify,  evaluate, and reduce the risk to human health from asbestos exposure.
Among other things, the plan focused on improving the state of the science  for asbestos through a number of steps, including activities to improve  EPA’s (1) understanding of asbestos toxicology, (2) understanding of  asbestos-related exposures, and (3) ability to perform meaningful  environmental sample collection and analysis.
When asked about the status of these activities and funding provided to  accomplish the Asbestos Project Plan, EPA responded that the plan was  developed only to provide an overview of various ongoing and planned  agency-wide activities to address risks from asbestos, and that it was  never intended as an ongoing strategy with timelines for deliverables and  budget tracking features. Nevertheless, according to EPA, by pursuing  activities outlined in the plan the agency has made progress in improving  the state of the science for asbestos. Among other things, it has  undertaken work to (1) develop a methodology for estimating the risk of  lung cancer and mesothelioma from inhalation exposure to different forms  of asbestos; (2) update the asbestos health-effects information contained  in the EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS); (3) develop  methods for identifying the presence of asbestos in vermiculite attic  insulation; and (4) test an alternative method for removing asbestos from  buildings.
In December 2006, EPA’s Office of Inspector General reported that EPA  had not completed a toxicity assessment of the type of asbestos found in  the Libby ore and that this information was necessary to determine the  safe level of exposure for humans. Furthermore, the Office of Inspector  General reported without such information EPA cannot be sure that the  cleanup actions taking place in Libby sufficiently reduce the risk that  people may become ill from asbestos exposure or, if already ill, get worse.  When asked by the EPA’s Office of Inspector General’s staff why a toxicity  assessment had not been performed, officials from EPA’s Office of Solid  Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) replied that an assessment was  proposed but was not performed because it was not funded and because  OSWER believed the information could be obtained through completed  and ongoing epidemiological studies. According to the report, however,  OSWER program staff, as distinguished from OSWER senior officials, said  the epidemiological studies that were ongoing and planned would not be  sufficient to determine the toxicity of the asbestos in the Libby ore. As a  result, the EPA Office of Inspector General recommended that EPA fund  and execute a comprehensive asbestos toxicity assessment to determine  (1) the effectiveness of the Libby removal actions and (2) whether more  actions are necessary.
Shortly after the Office of Inspector General’s December 2006 report was  issued, EPA agreed to conduct additional toxicological and  epidemiological studies for the type of asbestos found in the Libby ore. In  January 2007, EPA convened a group of more than 30 scientists from EPA,  ATSDR, and the National Toxicology Program to identify data gaps and  recommend additional studies. According to EPA, a Libby Asbestos  Action Plan initiated at this meeting includes recommendations for 12  additional studies. Detailed work plans for five of these studies have been  completed with consultation from other agencies and external peer  reviewers. Two other studies are continuations of ongoing efforts.  Detailed work plans for the remaining five studies are currently being  finalized. All studies are scheduled to be completed by the end of calendar  year 2009. The milestone date for completing the baseline risk assessment,  including the comprehensive toxicity assessment, is the end of fiscal year  2010.
section_title: EPA Regions Did Not Consistently Implement Public- Notification Provisions and Adhere to Guidance
paragraphs: At most of the 13 sites for which EPA had public-notification  responsibilities, EPA regions did not implement key notification  provisions of NCP. At five sites, EPA regions did not perform notification  activities beyond those listed in NCP, even though EPA guidance strongly  recommends the regions do so. State and local government officials had  mixed views about how effective EPA was in notifying them about  cleanups in their jurisdictions—some state and local officials reported a  positive experience working hand-in-hand with EPA, while others said  EPA had not notified them at all. Similarly, while community members  participating in two of three focus groups were disappointed overall in  EPA’s efforts to inform them about cleanups in their neighborhoods, the  participants in the third group were very satisfied with EPA’s efforts.
subsections: section_title: EPA Regions Did Not Implement Key NCP Public-Notification Provisions at Most Sites
paragraphs: As the lead agency responsible for notifying the public of cleanup  activities taking place at 13 of the cleanup sites, EPA was required by NCP  regulations to take certain steps, as appropriate, to inform the public  about the cleanup activities. All 13 sites were classified as time-critical  removal actions, which means EPA must begin cleanup at the sites within  6 months of determining that a removal action is appropriate. Figure 7  shows the locations of the 13 sites.
For all 13 sites, EPA was required to take the following public-notification  steps:    Designate an agency spokesperson. This representative must inform the  community of actions taken, respond to inquiries, and provide information  concerning the release of hazardous substances.
Notify affected citizens. The spokesperson must, at a minimum, notify  citizens immediately affected by the release of hazardous materials, as  well as state and local officials, and when appropriate, civil defense or  emergency management agencies.
Create an administrative record. EPA must establish an administrative  record containing documents that form the basis for the cleanup action  selected and make this record available for public review.
Notify the public about the administrative record. Within 60 days of  initiating cleanup activities, EPA must publish an announcement in a  major local newspaper indicating that the administrative record is  available for review.
Hold a public-comment period, as appropriate, and respond to  comments. From the time the administrative record is made available for  review, EPA must provide the public no less than 30 days to provide  comments about the cleanup. EPA must prepare a written response to  significant comments.
When time-critical cleanup activities are expected to last more than 120  days, because there is more time for community involvement and  outreach, NCP requires the following additional notification activities be  performed, as appropriate:  Establish an information repository. To provide the public easier access  to site-related documents, EPA must establish at least one information  repository at or near the location of the cleanup site. At least one  repository must have the administrative record file available for public  inspection.
Notify the public about the repository. EPA shall inform the public that it  has established an information repository and provide notice that the  administrative record is available for review. If EPA knows that cleanup  activities will extend beyond 120 days, it can publish a single public notice  announcing the availability of the repository and the administrative  record.
Conduct community interviews. EPA must conduct interviews with local  officials, community residents, public-interest groups, or other interested  parties, as appropriate, to solicit their concerns, their information needs,  and their views on how and when they would like to be involved in the  cleanup.
Prepare a Community Relations Plan. Using information gathered from  the community interviews and other sources, EPA must prepare a formal  Community Relations Plan specifying the community-involvement  activities the agency expects to conduct during the cleanup.
According to EPA regional officials, key public notification provisions of  NCP were not implemented at 8 of the 13 cleanup sites. Specifically,  regional officials told us the following:    At the Great Falls, Montana site (Region 8), regional officials did not  establish an administrative record, did not place a notice announcing the  record was available for review, and did not hold a public-comment  period. According to Region 8 officials, they did not create a formal  administrative record because they made a mistake in processing the site’s  file and did not discover the mistake until after the cleanup was  completed. Before the cleanup, Region 8 did provide an information  packet equivalent to an administrative record to the owner of the site  where the cleanup occurred and to the state of Montana. Region 8  officials said they have since established a formal standard-operating  procedure for completing such tasks, which includes assigning tasks to  specific personnel and program offices within the region.
At the Denver, Colorado site (Region 8), although officials established an  administrative record, they did not notify the public that the record was  available for review and did not hold a public-comment period. The  omissions occurred because the employee responsible for placing the  notices had retired. During the time the position was vacant, the region did  not place public notices for some other removal actions. Region 8 has  since filled the position and, in December 2003, it established formal  procedures for setting up repositories and publishing notices; the  procedures include assigning these responsibilities to specific EPA  program offices and staff.
For both the Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Dearborn, Michigan, sites (both  in Region 5), the region established administrative records and placed  notices about their availability, but it did not hold public-comment  periods. EPA Region 5 officials explained that they do not believe that  NCP requires EPA to hold a comment period for removal actions, rather,  they said NCP allows EPA latitude to determine whether a comment  period is appropriate for removal actions. Their general view is that a  comment period is not appropriate for time-critical and emergency- removal actions because they need to proceed quickly and because there  is typically not a range of options to be considered. In such cases, regional  officials said it is more important to focus on other community-outreach  and community-relations activities.
At the Wilder, Kentucky (Region 4), Minot, North Dakota (Region 8), and  Phoenix, Arizona (Region 9) sites, regional officials posted notices of  availability in local newspapers, but they did not place the notices within  60 days of the start of the cleanup as provided in NCP. At two sites,  regional officials did not know why the notices were delayed. At the Minot  site, the notice was placed 22 days after the deadline and 2 days after the  cleanup was completed; and at the Wilder site, the notice was placed 6  days after the deadline. At the Phoenix site, regional officials said the staff  person who was responsible for placing the notice had resigned and that  position was still vacant at the time the notice should have been placed.  The notice was placed 42 days after the deadline and 90 days after the  cleanup was completed.
At one of the sites located in Salt Lake City (Region 8), regional officials  did not prepare a formal community-relations plan, even though regional  officials thought the cleanup could take more than 120 days to complete.  Region 8 officials explained that, at the time the memorandum justifying  the need for the cleanup was issued, it would have been reasonable to  expect that the initial scope of the cleanup would be completed within 120  days. Unfortunately, additional contamination was discovered during a  portion of the cleanup, which required the completion date to be  extended. However, the memo justifying the cleanup indicated the cleanup  might exceed 120 days. Specifically, the memo stated “total costs of the  removal action are anticipated to exceed $2 million due to the size of the  properties and the extensive amount of soil contamination; and the large  amount of excavation and monitoring of landscape restoration may cause  the removal to extend past 12 months.” Region 8 officials said that even  though a plan was not prepared for this site, the region conducted all  substantive community-relations activities that would have been  documented in a formal community-relations plan.
section_title: EPA Regions’ Adherence to Public-Notification Guidance Varied
paragraphs: Since the 1980s, EPA has issued policy and guidance documents providing  more direction to regional offices on how to ensure meaningful public  involvement in the agency’s decision making processes, including  decisions related to the cleanup of hazardous waste. The key guidance  issued by EPA includes:    January 1981. EPA issued its Public Participation Policy that provided  overall guidance and direction about reasonable and effective means of  involving the public in program decisions to public officials who manage  EPA programs. This policy defined public participation as that part of  EPA’s decision-making process that provides opportunity and  encouragement for the public to express their views to the agency, and  assures that the agency will give due consideration to public concerns,  values, and preferences when decisions are made.
July 1992. EPA published public participation guidance for on-scene  coordinators, who are responsible for directing cleanups. This guidance  stressed the need to (1) inform the public of the degrees and types of risks  associated with a site, planned or ongoing actions, and other issues; (2)  provide the public with an opportunity to comment on decisions about the  site; and (3) identify and respond to community concerns.
April 2000. The Director of EPA’s Office of Emergency and Remedial  Response instructed all EPA regional offices to contact related state or  tribal and agency officials to notify them of the potential evaluations of  sites that received ore from Libby, Montana, and to gather relevant  information from these officials and solicit their participation in site  activities.
April 2001. The EPA Administrator issued a policy memorandum that  endorsed “vigorous public outreach and involvement.”
October 2001. In an effort to encourage more substantive involvement of  communities from the very outset of a cleanup, the Acting Director of  EPA’s Office of Emergency and Remedial Response issued a policy  memorandum supporting “early and meaningful community involvement.”  This memo stressed that even if the cleanup is an emergency removal,  community involvement should not be neglected or postponed. The memo  stated that while initial calls should be to state and local authorities, soon  thereafter, efforts should be made to reach out to the entire community,  which may have a high level of anxiety and concern about health and  safety.
April 2002. EPA issued the Superfund Community Involvement Handbook  that contained detailed guidance on how to conduct public-notification  activities. This guidance states that while it is up to EPA officials in charge  of a site cleanup to decide what public-notification activities are needed  based on a site’s circumstances, EPA’s experience has shown that, at most  sites, just complying with NCP provisions is not sufficient to adequately  meet community needs. This guidance recommends that regions use many  other notification activities, such as distributing fact sheets to let residents  know about EPA’s activities; hosting public meetings to deliver  information to large groups of people; and, if community demographics  indicate a need, translating documents into appropriate languages.
September 2002. EPA issued the Superfund Community Involvement  Toolkit, which provided EPA community involvement staff with practical,  comprehensive, easy to use guidance for designing and enhancing  community involvement activities. The Toolkit includes guidance on how  to conduct both required and recommended notification activities, such as  how to place public notices and how to conduct public meetings. The  Toolkit indicated an expectation that EPA staff should not just distribute  information to the public; it should promote meaningful citizen  participation in the decisions affecting sites.
As indicated in table 2, EPA regions varied greatly in the extent to which  they followed the agency’s guidance for conducting public-notification  activities—with 9 of the 13 sites employing at least some of the  notification activities that went beyond NCP provisions. For the cleanup  sites located in Dearborn and Minneapolis (Region 5), EPA engaged in  many of the notification activities that are recommended by NCP  provisions. For example, at the Dearborn site, EPA coordinated with the  Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services to determine  the best approach for providing information about the cleanup to the Arab- American residents living near the site. EPA also distributed fact sheets,  printed newspaper notices in both English and Arabic, went door-to-door  to notify residents about the cleanup, and hosted two public meetings, and  conducted two direct mailings. At the Minneapolis site, EPA went door-to- door to discuss the cleanup with residents, held several public meetings,  and distributed fact sheets. However, for the sites located in Glendale,  Newark, Phoenix, and Honolulu (Region 9), and for the first phase of the  cleanup of the site in Hamilton Township (Region 2), EPA did not engage  in notification activities beyond those required by NCP provisions.  According to both Region 2 and Region 9 officials, even though residential  areas were located near each of these sites, additional community- outreach activities were not performed because the site settings, limited  scope of the removals, and the nature of the removal activities led them to  conclude that it would not be necessary.
section_title: State and Local Officials’ Views Varied on the Effectiveness of EPA’s Public-Notification Efforts
paragraphs: State officials we spoke with were mostly satisfied with EPA’s efforts to  inform them about site cleanups in their jurisdictions. That is, state  officials from 7 of 12 sites were generally satisfied with EPA’s public- notification efforts (North Dakota officials did not respond to our request  for their views about the Minot site).
At five of the seven sites (Glendale, Denver, Dearborn, and the two sites  located in Salt Lake City), state officials explained that when EPA is the  lead agency for a site, they typically expect EPA to inform them about  cleanups but do not expect to be involved in the final decision-making  process. For these sites, the state officials were pleased with EPA’s efforts  to keep them informed about the site evaluations, sampling results, and  cleanup activities.
At the other two sites (Minneapolis and Wilder), state officials reported  they worked hand-in-hand with EPA officials and were extremely pleased  with EPA’s efforts to keep them informed about site activities. For  example, officials from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)  collected samples with EPA Region 5 at the Minneapolis site and officials  from both agencies agreed the site needed to be cleaned up. EPA and  MPCA held joint public meetings to inform residents about the  contamination and went door-to-door in a wide area to determine if  residents had taken contaminated waste materials from the site to their  homes. Also, Minnesota Department of Health officials reported working  closely with EPA and MPCA to review site cleanup plans, ensure that  contractors were properly licensed, and obtain access to residential  properties so they could be tested for the presence of asbestos. Similarly,  for the Wilder site, officials from the Kentucky Department of  Environmental Protection (KYDEP) reported that EPA Region 4 officials  continually communicated through e-mails, telephone calls, written  correspondence, and meetings. KYDEP officials worked closely with EPA  at the site, providing general oversight on the cleanup, including removal  and disposal of the asbestos-contaminated materials. They coordinated  with EPA on all aspects of the planned removal and reported that EPA  staff were very professional, knowledgeable, helpful, courteous, and  visible.
For three sites (Honolulu, Great Falls, and Hamilton Township), state  officials said they were not satisfied with EPA’s efforts to inform them  about cleanup activities.
Honolulu. Officials from the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) said  that an EPA Region 9 official stopped by their offices and mentioned that  the Honolulu site had received vermiculite ore from Libby, Montana.
About a year later, HDOH officials said they were copied on a letter from  Region 9 stating that there had been a release of asbestos at the site.  Subsequent to receiving this letter, an EPA Region 9 official stopped by the  HDOH offices “as a courtesy” to let them know EPA would be conducting  a removal action at the site. However, HDOH officials said they did not  receive any more information from EPA about the site and that they would  have preferred having more advance notice about the cleanup and  information about the status of the cleanup as it was being conducted.
Great Falls. An official from the Montana Department of Environmental  Quality (MDEQ) was very dissatisfied with EPA Region 8’s lack of  notification about the cleanup. The site was a residence that was being  cleaned up because a former owner of the property who had worked at a  vermiculite processing facility in Great Falls had taken contaminated  waste product home to use on his driveway. The MDEQ official first  became aware of the site through an asbestos-abatement contractor who  had heard about the cleanup. The MDEQ official said he went to  investigate the site because EPA typically coordinates such matters with  him. The MDEQ official said he was not sure why EPA did not inform him  about the cleanup, but he considered this “slipshod” behavior.
Hamilton Township. Officials from the New Jersey Department of  Environmental Protection (NJDEP) said they first learned the site was  contaminated with asbestos when they were copied on an EPA Region 2  memorandum stating that the site needed to be cleaned up. They said they  received copies of two more EPA reports about the site before being  invited to a stakeholder meeting in March 2005 (approximately 1 year after  the completion of the first phase of the site cleanup) to discuss the site  cleanup. The NJDEP officials said that EPA had improved its public- notification efforts during the second phase of the site cleanup. For  example, since the beginning of the second phase, EPA has held several  public meetings and issued numerous community updates. The NJDEP  officials felt that EPA should have notified them and local government  officials about the first phase of the cleanup in the same manner as was  done for the second phase. In general, NJDEP officials said EPA could  improve public-notification efforts by, among other things, providing  additional public notices to state and local officials, keeping the site’s Web  site up-to-date, and by asking for and obtaining feedback from community  members about what their notification needs are, and then providing this  information to state and local agencies.
For the remaining sites in Phoenix and Newark, state officials said they  were neither entirely satisfied nor entirely dissatisfied about Region 9’s  efforts to inform them about the site cleanups. Specifically, officials from  the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality said they received a  report from Region 9 indicating that EPA was assessing sites that had  received Libby ore and that the Phoenix site was being assessed. A letter  accompanying the report indicated the Phoenix site would be cleaned up,  but did not indicate when the cleanup would occur. While Arizona officials  found it helpful that EPA kept them informed about the assessments of  sites that had received Libby ore, they said it would have been better if  EPA had informed them ahead of time about when the Phoenix site would  be cleaned up so they could have been better prepared to answer the  public’s questions about the cleanup. For the Newark site, an official from  the California Department of Health Services said EPA did not provide any  information to them directly about the site. Instead, they received most of  their information from ATSDR, who they understood was working closely  with EPA. Since the California Department of Health officials’ view their  role in such situations as providing support to ATSDR, the official said the  Department would not necessarily expect EPA to notify it about site  cleanups. However, as a part of its efforts to help ATSDR disseminate  information to communities, in September 2003, the California Department  of Health found that officials in the City of Newark and in the county  government were not aware of the cleanup or the site’s history (the site  cleanup began in April 2002).
Of the seven local governments that provided their views on EPA’s efforts  to inform them about cleanups within their jurisdictions, three  (Dearborn, Minneapolis, and Salt Lake City) said they were satisfied.
Dearborn. City officials said EPA Region 5 did everything that could have  been done to inform the public about the cleanup. According to these  officials, EPA informed the mayor’s office very early in the process and  asked the city to appoint a liaison to work with EPA on the site cleanup.  City officials also said EPA met with local government officials and the  emergency-management coordinator to determine any concerns they  might have. Overall, city officials thought EPA was professional, in control  of the situation, and cognizant that they needed to maintain frequent  contact with the residents.
Minneapolis. City officials said they already had a good working  relationship with EPA Region 5 and were impressed with EPA’s efforts to  be open and available to the community through, among other things,  public meetings and door-to-door contacts. They said that EPA was very  upfront with city officials, established good credibility with members of  the community, and was respected by local activist groups.
Salt Lake City (two sites). Officials from the Salt Lake City government  said EPA’s interaction with the local government was excellent and EPA  staff were always accessible to discuss their concerns. EPA Region 8 staff  first called them to explain that the sites had processed asbestos- contaminated ore from Libby and were likely contaminated. When the city  public utility offices raised concerns about whether contamination under  the streets near one of the sites was a threat to their employees, EPA met  with them to address their concerns. Once EPA began the removal action,  EPA kept the local government informed via weekly e-mails, three  meetings, and a site visit.
There were four sites (Newark, Wilder, Great Falls, and Hamilton  Township) where local government officials said they were somewhat to  largely dissatisfied with EPA’s notification efforts.
Newark. A city official said a Newark Fire Department official first found  out about the site cleanup from county health department officials and the  California Department of Health. After hearing about the contamination  and activities at the site, the fire department official informed the city  manager and the city’s executive team. The city officials said that EPA  Region 9 had very little contact with the local government as the cleanup  proceeded.
Wilder. A city official said he first learned about the site from a local  newspaper reporter and that EPA Region 4 notified the city after it  decided to clean up the site. According to this official, if the city had  known earlier, it could have cordoned off the area to prevent children  from riding their bikes through the site. The city official was also  concerned that EPA did not do enough to contact former workers and  identify people who took asbestos-contaminated waste rock from the site  to use in their yards.
Great Falls. A city official at the Great Falls site said EPA Region 8 did not  notify the city about the cleanup. After finding out about the cleanup from  an asbestos-abatement contractor, the city official decided to investigate  the site. The city official discovered the EPA contractor performing the  removal was not licensed to do work in the city. In the opinion of the city  official, EPA should have notified the state government about cleanup  activities and should have asked the local government to appoint a liaison  to work with EPA on matters concerning the cleanup.
Hamilton Township. During Phase I of the cleanup, township officials  said EPA Region 2 invited an official from the Hamilton Township  Department of Health to attend a visit to the site. During this visit,  township officials said the city health department official was told that  EPA was going to clean up the site. Township officials said that other than  EPA’s request for a permit to place a construction trailer on the site, they  did not receive any further communication until after the first phase of the  cleanup was completed. At that time, township officials said the New  Jersey Department of Health asked the Hamilton Township Department of  Health to help organize a public meeting about the second phase of the  cleanup; the Hamilton Township Department of Health then informed the  mayor’s office about the cleanup. According to township officials, while  EPA did place an administrative record for the site in the local library, the  agency did not notify local officials that it was available for review.  Township officials said that since the second phase of the cleanup began,  EPA has been doing a “great job” keeping local officials informed.  According to township officials, the catalyst for change was getting the  mayor’s office involved in the cleanup. In their opinions, because staffs in  mayors’ offices can help ensure communities are informed and that all  parties are working together, it is important for EPA to keep mayors’  offices informed about cleanup activities.
section_title: Many Community Members Believe EPA Should Have Done More to Notify Them about Cleanups
paragraphs: Ultimately, it is the affected community members who most need  information about the health risks posed by the presence of asbestos  contamination in their neighborhoods. Accordingly, to obtain detailed  insights into the effectiveness of EPA’s efforts to reach these individuals,  we conducted focus groups at three sites—Hamilton Township, New  Jersey; Minot, North Dakota; and Dearborn, Michigan. We discussed five  key issues at these locations: (1) how the community members first  became aware of the cleanup; (2) the content, visibility, and usefulness of  the public notices EPA placed to inform the community about the  cleanups; (3) overall views of EPA’s efforts to notify the community about  the cleanup; (4) information about site cleanups that community members  need; and (5) the best methods to reach out and inform affected members  of the community. Overall, participants in Dearborn were supportive of  EPA’s efforts, but their counterparts at the other two sites generally  characterized EPA’s notification efforts as ineffective.
subsections: section_title: How Community Members First Became Aware of Cleanups
paragraphs: According to the NCP provisions, EPA must at a minimum notify  immediately affected citizens and others of cleanup activities. EPA  notification guidance recommends that EPA perform outreach and other  community-involvement activities as early as possible. For example, the  guidance suggests EPA could meet with local officials, media, and  residents during the initial site assessment to explain EPA’s removal  program. At two of the three sites, however, most discussion group  participants said EPA did not notify them about the cleanups before they  began. At Minot, nearby residents said they did not know anything about  the cleanup until they saw contractors in “space suits” working at the site.  At Hamilton Township, most focus-group participants said they found out  about the site cleanup through articles in local newspapers. In contrast,  participants in the Dearborn focus group said they first heard about the  cleanup when EPA officials canvassed the neighborhood delivering letters  explaining what was happening at the site and through public meetings in  the neighborhood.
section_title: Content, Visibility, and Usefulness of Public Notices
paragraphs: The NCP public-notification provisions state that within 60 days of  initiation of cleanup activities, EPA must publish an announcement in a  major newspaper indicating the administrative record, which discusses  EPA’s planned cleanup action, is available for public review. Furthermore,  the provisions state that EPA must provide a public-comment period, as  appropriate, of not less than 30 days from the time the administrative- record file is made available for public inspections. EPA guidance  describes critical information that should appear in public notices and  states that they should contain (1) background information about the site,  which may include the location of the site and the contaminant involved;  (2) the location of the information repository and the hours during which  the repository is open; (3) the dates of the public comment period, if  applicable; (4) the time, date, and location of the public meeting, if  applicable; and (5) the name of the agency contact to whom written  comments on the administrative record file should be addressed. The  guidance also states that public notices should be placed in well-read  sections of newspapers and specifically indicates that if a well-written  notice is hidden in the classified section of a newspaper, it will not reach  many people. The guidance also recommends using a simply-stated  message in easily understood language. It even includes WordPerfect®  templates of public notices with graphics to help regional staff easily  modify the text to fit site-specific needs.
Based on this guidance, the notices EPA placed for all of the three focus- group sites were deficient in some respects. In particular, the notice for  the Hamilton Township site did not give the address of the site, did not  mention the contaminant of concern, and did not provide the dates of the  public-comment period. This notice also appeared in the classified section  of a local newspaper among many other classified advertisements. Figure  8 shows the content and placement of the Hamilton Township notice.  Although the notice for the Minot site appeared in a well-read section of a  local paper, it appeared in very small print, did not contain the  contaminant of concern, or the dates of the public-comment period. In  contrast, the notice for the Dearborn site appeared in well-read sections of  multiple newspapers and contained all the critical information except the  hours during which the repository would be open (see fig. 9).
We asked participants from the three focus groups to evaluate the  usefulness of the public notices that EPA had placed for the sites in their  neighborhoods. Focus group participants at two of the sites (Hamilton  Township and Minot) said they did not see the notices when they were  published. After examining the notices during the focus-group meetings,  all the participants said the notices did not indicate a threat to their health,  did not leave them with the impression that they were to seek out  additional information, or that there was a site in their neighborhood  contaminated with a hazardous material. For the Hamilton Township site,  one participant said the notice gave the impression that all the studies had  been completed and nothing more was to be done. For the Minot site, the  participants said the notice was in such small print that it would be hard to  find in a newspaper, especially if the notice ran for only one day. Another  participant from Minot said they would probably ignore the notice because  it does not convey useful information and is very bureaucratic and vague.  After examining the Minot notice, one participant who owns a business in  the city commented, “I run ads for a living, and if I ran ads like that, our  company would’ve been broke a long time ago.”
All but one of the participants in the Dearborn focus group said they had  seen the notice for the site when it was published, and all the participants  commented that it was placed in a well-read section of a newspaper and  conveyed useful information up front. This information included the  address of the site, the contaminant involved, essential information about  a public meeting, and contacts for further information. When the Dearborn  group compared the notice for that site with the Hamilton Township  notice, they commented that the Dearborn notice was much clearer and  the Hamilton Township notice lacked key information, such as the  location of the site and the contaminant of concern.
For two of the three focus groups (Hamilton Township and Minot),  participants reported that EPA’s efforts to inform them about the cleanups  were largely ineffective. For the Hamilton Township site, most of the  participants said they did not receive any fliers or any other information  from EPA about the cleanup. None of the participants in the Minot focus  group said they had heard anything about the cleanup before it began,  even though they all lived close to the site. None said they had received  any fliers or saw EPA officials walking around the neighborhood. One  participant, whose backyard borders the site, said he noticed workers in  hazmat suits working at the site and asked them what they were doing.  The participant said the engineer in charge of the cleanup provided him  with information and agreed to set up air monitors to ensure that he and  his neighbors were not exposed to elevated levels of asbestos during the  cleanup. None said they had heard about the administrative record for the  Minot site or about any opportunities for providing comments to EPA.
In contrast, participants in the Dearborn focus group said EPA effectively  informed the community about the cleanup. They reported that EPA held  several public meetings and even had a wrap-up meeting after the cleanup  was completed. The participants said all the notices, fliers, and letters had  contact information on them in case the residents had questions, and EPA  had an information trailer at the cleanup site where residents were  welcome to stop in with their questions. In addition, according to the  participants, EPA officials were always readily available to respond to  concerns. For example, when EPA became concerned that some residents  might have taken the contaminated waste product home to use in their  yards, the participants said EPA walked around the neighborhood and  hand delivered letters asking permission to access people’s properties for  inspection. Also, according to one participant, when some residents  expressed concern about the spread of contamination during windy  conditions, EPA set up monitors and stopped work at the site when the  wind speed went above a certain level. Finally, because of the number of  Arab-American residents in the community, participants said EPA  provided notices and letters in both English and Arabic.
section_title: Information That Community Members Need about Site Cleanups
paragraphs: For those focus-group participants who did not have an opportunity to ask  EPA questions about the site cleanups, we asked what information they  would have wanted EPA to provide. While Dearborn participants said they  had ample opportunities to ask EPA questions and received the  information they needed, participants in the other two focus groups  (Hamilton Township and Minot) said they would have asked questions  about the following:    Sampling, including what areas EPA sampled; whether there would be  any off-site sampling; the results of the sampling; and how they could be  sure their property was not contaminated.
Conduct of the cleanup, including what areas are being cleaned up; how  the soil will be removed and what precautions will be taken to keep  asbestos fibers from becoming airborne; how EPA will dispose of the  contaminated dirt; whether there will be a follow-up information session  after the cleanup is completed; and whether there will be continued  monitoring for a designated period of time after the cleanup.
Health risks, including what health risks are associated with the site  cleanup; what health risks are present before the site is cleaned up; who  the contact is for questions about the risks and health effects associated  with asbestos exposure.
section_title: Best Methods to Inform Affected Members of the Community
paragraphs: In the three focus groups, community members suggested several methods  of notification that would have helped them understand the situation. In  general, participants from all focus groups thought using multiple methods  of communication would help ensure that more people are informed about  cleanups. One participant pointed out, for example, if someone does not  read a notice about a cleanup in a newspaper, they might find out about it  instead by reading a flier that is placed on their door. Participants from all  three groups agreed that fliers, letters, public meetings, and door-to-door  contacts were effective. Some in the Hamilton Township focus group  commented that since they received automated phone calls to remind  them to vote, perhaps it would be possible for EPA to provide information  about cleanups in a similar fashion. The importance of including contact  numbers on all handouts, fliers, and letters was stressed by some  participants in the Dearborn focus group. In addition, some of the  Dearborn participants said that it was useful to have the trailer at the  cleanup site.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: To its credit, EPA has agreed to undertake a risk and toxicity assessment  for the type of asbestos found in Libby ore. It expects to complete the  assessment in 2010. Until then, EPA cannot be assured that of the 271 sites  that it assessed, only 19—those generally exceeding thresholds for  asbestos contamination—need to be cleaned up; nor can it be assured that  the sites still having detectable levels of asbestos do not pose a risk to  public health and the environment. As we noted, the thresholds EPA used  are not health based. Furthermore, the methods EPA used to determine  levels of asbestos contamination early in its assessment process are not as  accurate as currently available methods. Resampling the sites that EPA  initially sampled with these newly available and more reliable sampling  and analytical techniques would be a major commitment for EPA; this step  may nonetheless need to be taken for at least some of these sites to  provide a more accurate assessment of the threats they pose. Hence, in  addition to identifying a defensible health-based threshold, EPA will also  need to determine the implications of the new sampling and analytical  techniques to determine which sites may still need to be cleaned up.
Community members who live and work near sites where hazardous  materials are being removed need to understand how cleanups are being  conducted and have opportunities to voice any concerns they have. While  EPA has recognized the need to obtain early and meaningful community  involvement in cleanup decisions, and taken actions in recent years to  strengthen its efforts to inform the public, we found that at the 13 sites  where asbestos contamination from Libby ore was being cleaned up,  several of the EPA regions did not fully implement NCP notification  provisions and some did not adhere to the notification guidance. We  believe this provides sufficient indication that similar problems may be  occurring at other cleanup sites nationwide where EPA is responsible for  conducting public-notification activities. Also, the feedback that we  received during focus groups from community members living and  working near cleanup sites indicates, among other things, that the notices  EPA relies on to inform community members about cleanup activities  were deficient in some respects.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the EPA Administrator direct the Assistant  Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response to determine (1)  the manner and extent to which newly available sampling and analysis  techniques should be used to re-evaluate the threat that the sites receiving  Libby ore may pose to human health, and (2) whether any additional sites  that received the Libby ore need to be cleaned up when the results of the  risk and toxicity assessment—now scheduled to be completed in 2010— are available.
We also recommend that the Administrator direct the Office of Solid  Waste and Emergency Response to review regional offices’  implementation of the National Contingency Plan public-notification  provisions and associated guidance and ensure that, in the future, (1)  regional offices appropriately determine the extent of community  outreach needed and (2) newspaper notifications are prominent and  written in clear language that contains all critical information, such as the  name of the contaminant, the location of the site, and the associated  health risks.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to EPA and ATSDR for comment. EPA  responded in a letter dated September 21, 2007, which indicated that it  generally agreed with our recommendations and said that the agency is  taking steps to address many of the issues identified in the report. Both  EPA and ATSDR also provided technical comments which we  incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II includes EPA’s September 21,  2007 letter, along with our point-by-point response to their individual  comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the congressional requesters and  other interested parties.  In addition, we will send copies to the EPA  Administrator, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the  Secretary of Labor. We will also make copies available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We were asked to (1) describe how the U.S. Environmental Protection  Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies assessed and addressed  potential risks at the facilities that received asbestos-contaminated  vermiculite ore from a mine in Libby, Montana, and the results of these  efforts; and (2) determine the extent and effectiveness of the EPA regions’  efforts to notify the public about the cleanup of facilities that received the  contaminated ore.
Due to concerns of the Department of Justice and EPA that our work  could impact an ongoing federal criminal case against W.R. Grace—the  company that owned the vermiculite mine in Libby, Montana, and some of  the processing facilities that received ore from Libby—and the need to  avoid undue influence in the case, we designed our methodology to  minimize direct contact with EPA staff. Accordingly, we obtained most of  the information we needed about EPA’s assessments of the sites that  received Libby ore and the agency’s public-notification activities at the  sites that were cleaned up by submitting questions to EPA in writing; the  agency provided written responses. We did not further pursue access to  this information because we had sufficient data to respond to our  objectives.
subsections: section_title: EPA’s Assessment of Sites
paragraphs: To address the first objective, we obtained from the U.S. Department of  Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease  Registry (ATSDR) a table of sites that had potentially received  contaminated ore from Libby, Montana. This table was largely based on  data that ATSDR received from EPA about each of the sites identified as  receiving ore from the Libby mine. The table included, for each site, the  location, type of facility, and limited information on the status of EPA’s  assessments of the sites as of April 2003. The table also included  information on the amount of ore received by each site as of April 2001.  After revising the table to include only the information needed to address  our objectives, we sent the revised table to EPA and requested that EPA  verify, update, and complete the information in the table. We also  submitted in writing a set of questions to clarify the data in the table and a  set of questions to assess the reliability of the information in the table for  the purposes of our report, focusing mainly on the data about the amount  of ore received by each site.
From March 2006 to May 2007, through a series of correspondences, we  obtained EPA’s responses to our written questions and information about  the site data, which are reflected in this report. Based on EPA’s responses  regarding the accuracy and completeness of the information in the table of  sites, we determined the data are adequate to provide conservative  estimates of the amount of ore received by each site.
We also collected and analyzed relevant documentation about sites from  EPA’s Superfund record centers, which are public repositories. In  addition, we collected and analyzed ATSDR’s health consultations  prepared for selected sites that received ore from Libby, Montana.
We also obtained and analyzed several documents that relate to EPA’s  actions to clean up sites in Libby, Montana, and the sites that received  Libby ore. These documents included: the National Contingency Plan  (NCP) regulations that implement the Comprehensive Environmental  Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA); February  and April 2000 memoranda from EPA’s Director of the Office of  Emergency and Remedial Response to all EPA regions regarding  assessment of sites that received Libby ore; 2001 EPA Office of Inspector  General’s report entitled “EPA’s Actions Concerning Asbestos- Contaminated Vermiculite in Libby, Montana”; GAO’s 2003 report entitled  “Hazardous Materials: EPA’s Cleanup of Asbestos in Libby, Montana and  Related Actions to Address Asbestos-Contaminated Materials”; and an  August 2004 memorandum from the Director of EPA’s Office of Superfund  Remediation and Technology Innovation to EPA regions regarding  clarification of asbestos cleanup goals.
section_title: EPA’s Public-Notification Efforts
paragraphs: To address the second objective, we limited our review to the 13 sites that  were being cleaned up and for which EPA had public-notification  responsibility. These sites were located in Phoenix, Arizona; Glendale and  Newark, California; Denver, Colorado; Honolulu, Hawaii; Wilder,  Kentucky; Dearborn, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Great Falls,  Montana; Minot, North Dakota; Hamilton Township, New Jersey; and two  sites located in Salt Lake City, Utah. We interviewed officials from EPA’s  Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to obtain general  information about public-notification provisions to which EPA is subject  and any guidance that EPA has issued instructing regional offices about  their responsibilities for complying with these provisions. In April 2006,  we submitted structured questions in writing to EPA’s headquarters and 10  regional offices to determine compliance with public-notification  provisions and any additional community-notification efforts that took  place at the 13 sites. From April 2006 to May 2007, through a series of  correspondences, EPA provided responses to these questions and various  follow-up questions in writing.
We developed sets of structured questions to assist in obtaining state and  local government officials’ perspectives on the public notification that  took place in communities where cleanups occurred. To identify the state  and local government agencies involved in the cleanups and officials in  those agencies most knowledgeable about the notification that took place  at each site, we obtained some names from the administrative records for  the sites being cleaned up. In some cases, we asked EPA to provide the  names of state and local agencies or officials they worked with during the  cleanups. For sites where we only had the name of an agency, we called  the agency and asked for the person who would be most knowledgeable  about the site. We conducted these interviews in person and by telephone.  We interviewed officials in the following state offices: Arizona Department  of Environmental Quality, California Department of Toxic Substances  Control and California Department of Health Services, Colorado  Department of Public Health and Environment, Hawaii Department of  Health, Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection, Michigan  Department of Environmental Quality, Minnesota Department of Health  and Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Montana Department of  Environmental Quality, New Jersey Department of Environmental  Protection and New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, and  the Utah Department of Environmental Quality. We also interviewed  officials from the following local governments: Newark, California;  Alameda County, California; Wilder, Kentucky; Dearborn, Michigan;  Minneapolis, Minnesota; Great Falls, Montana; Hamilton Township, New  Jersey; Minot, North Dakota; and Salt Lake City, Utah.
To obtain community members’ perspectives on the extent and  effectiveness of EPA’s public-notification efforts, we conducted focus  groups to gather qualitative information about their attitudes, beliefs, and  perceptions. Four focus groups were conducted in Wilder, Kentucky;  Dearborn, Michigan; Minot, North Dakota; and Hamilton Township, New  Jersey to ensure geographic diversity. In order to help compare  notification practices across EPA regional offices, we selected sites that  were located in different EPA regions. Other criteria for selection included  the amount of ore received and whether the cleanup action had been  completed or was ongoing.
We contracted with a marketing research firm, Marketing Systems Group,  to obtain randomly selected names, addresses, and telephone numbers of  100 community members who lived or worked within a half-mile radius of  each of the sites. We mailed a letter and brief questionnaire to each  randomly selected community member to provide them some background  information about our study, obtain information about the number of  years they had lived in the communities, and determine whether they  would be willing to participate in a focus group. We contacted the  community members who returned questionnaires indicating they would  be willing to participate. To increase the number of focus-group  participants, we called the community members who did not return  questionnaires, to determine if they could participate. We also contacted  former workers and their family members who lived in each community to  determine if they would be willing to participate in focus groups. The  focus groups had between 4 and 14 participants.
In conducting the focus groups, the focus-group moderator encouraged  the participants to speak freely. Following a GAO-developed discussion  guide, the moderator asked the participants to give their perspectives on  (1) how they first became aware of the cleanups, (2) the content and  usefulness of public notices about the cleanups, (3) EPA’s overall efforts  to notify their communities about the cleanups, (4) information that the  community members need about site cleanups, and (5) best methods for  informing them about the cleanups.
While generating mailing lists for the focus-group sites, the contracting  firm inadvertently provided contact information for residences that lived  over one-half mile from the Wilder site. After the error was discovered, the  contractor provided corrected contact information for residences within a  half-mile of the site. However, because the people who attended the  Wilder focus group were either former workers or residents who lived  more than one-half mile from the site, we decided not to include the  results of that focus group in this report.
We also obtained and analyzed several documents that related to EPA’s  responsibilities for notifying the public about cleanups at sites that  received Libby ore. These documents included: the public-notification  provisions of the NCP regulations that implement CERCLA as amended;  EPA’s 1981 Public Participation Policy; EPA’s 1992 Public Participation  Guidance for On-Scene Coordinators; EPA’s 1997 guidance on Publishing  Effective Public Notices; EPA’s 2002 Superfund Community Involvement  Toolkit; EPA’s 2002 Superfund Community Involvement Handbook; and  EPA’s FY 2006/2007 Superfund Program Implementation Manual.
We performed our work from August 2005 to October 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Environmental Protection  Agency’s letter dated September 21, 2007.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  GAO does note in the report that the Great Falls site in Region 8  involved a single residence where a former worker at a facility that  processed Libby ore had taken contaminated waste product from the  plant to his residence to resurface his driveway. While GAO  acknowledges that the privacy of the homeowner should be  considered, providing the public with information about such  contamination could alert others who also used the waste ore for  similar purposes on their properties. Our review of information on  EPA’s evaluations of sites that received Libby ore revealed that one of  the primary concerns was whether former employees or the general  public took asbestos-contaminated waste ore from the sites to use in  their gardens or to landscape their properties. Indeed a review of EPA  documentation related to the plant in Great Falls where the  homeowner worked indicates that another former employee  interviewed by EPA stated that some people requested and were  allowed to take dust left over from the processing of the ore to use in  their gardens.
While GAO acknowledges that it is important to consider community  concerns in deciding the extent of public notification needed during  site cleanup, for the sites that received Libby ore, widely disseminating  information about these sites to the general public could help identify  former workers and others that could have been exposed in the past to  the asbestos in the ore. These people, in turn, could provide valuable  information that could help EPA in identifying contaminated areas that  need to be cleaned up, such as where waste rock was dumped.  2.  We did not make the suggested change. The statement is factually  accurate and we already note the discretionary nature of the relevant  NCP provisions in the report. Region 5’s reasoning for not holding  public comment periods for these sites is also reflected in the report.  3.  We changed the text to read, “Thus, even though the Libby mine closed  around 1990, many residents, former workers, and others who were  exposed to the asbestos-contaminated ore recently have been  diagnosed with asbestos-related diseases and many more may become  ill in the future.”  4.  We changed text to read, “Between 1980 and 1982, EPA issued a series  of reports related to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. Most of these  reports indicated that there was a lack of data on both exposure to  asbestos-contaminated vermiculite and its adverse health effects.  Further, the reports identified problems in sampling, analysis, and  reproducibility of data regarding low levels of asbestos in vermiculite,  which made it difficult to acquire data on exposure and health effects.”  5.  We added a footnote stating that EPA cited and fined W.R. Grace in the  early 1990s for failure to submit relevant information under the Toxic  Substances Control Act.  6.  We changed the text throughout the report as appropriate to clarify  that EPA is cleaning up properties in the Libby area.  7.  We revised the report to include the following statements: “As part of  an ongoing criminal case against W.R. Grace, the government has  alleged that Grace engaged in a conspiracy to defraud EPA and the  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health by concealing  and misrepresenting the nature of the asbestos-containing vermiculite  produced at the mine. Grace has denied the allegations.”  8.  Under the NCP, a removal site evaluation includes a removal  preliminary assessment and, if warranted, a removal site inspection. 40  C.F.R. § 300.410(a). A preliminary assessment includes, among other  things, an “evaluation of factors necessary to make the determination  of whether a removal is necessary.” 40 C.F.R. § 300.410(c)(1)(iv). We  now use this language in the report.  9.  We changed the language to read, “These 195 sites are believed to have  received a combined total of at least 6 million tons of ore from the  Libby, Montana mine and ore processing operations.”  10.  We changed the text throughout the report as appropriate to clarify  that the 1 percent asbestos standard is based on the percentage of the  area of a microscopic field.  11. We did not make any changes as a result of this comment because the  report already includes a discussion of this memorandum.  12. EPA had previously indicated to us that that the Removal Evaluation  Report was pending for this site. We interpreted this as meaning that  the final decision had not been made. The report has been updated to  indicate that a final assessment decision has been made for the site in  Brutus, New York, and the Region is drafting the report to document  this decision.  13.  We made the change suggested by EPA.  14. We clarified the language to read, “Since the plants no longer process  Libby ore, current residents living around the sites are no longer being  exposed through air emissions from processing activities at the  plants.”  15. We did not make any changes based on this comment because it was  for additional information and clarification and was not intended to  suggest a specific change to the report.  16. The sentence is now complete. It reads “After conducting additional  sampling at one of these sites, EPA determined the site required  further cleanup.”  17. We did not make any changes based on this comment because the text  is part of a footnote.  18. We changed the text to read, “Detailed work plans for five of these  studies have been completed with consultation from other agencies  and external peer reviewers. Two other studies are continuations of  ongoing efforts. Detailed work plans for the remaining five studies are  currently being finalized. All studies are scheduled to be completed by  the end of calendar year 2009. The milestone date for completing the  baseline risk assessment, including the comprehensive toxicity  assessment, is the end of fiscal year 2010.”  19. No change was made; the text in the bullet already contains the phrase  “as appropriate”.  20. We did not make the suggested change. The statement is factually  accurate and we already note the discretionary nature of the relevant  NCP provisions in the report.  21. We made the change suggested by EPA.  22. We did not make the suggested change. We already noted the  discretionary nature of the relevant NCP provisions in the report.  23. We revised the text to read, “and at the Wilder site, the notice was  placed 6 days after the deadline.”  24. We made the changes suggested by EPA.  25. We did not make the suggested change. In our correspondence with  EPA about the Honolulu site, EPA indicated that the Hawaii  Department of Health was involved in the cleanup. We contacted the  Hawaii Department of Health and were directed to officials identified  as being knowledgeable about the cleanup. The views expressed in the  report are those of the officials we were directed to. During our  interview with these officials, they stated the state OSC did do a drive  by of the site before the cleanup began, but said the state was not  involved around the time of the removal.  26. We did not make the suggested change. In the case of the Great Falls  site, we called the Montana Department of Environmental Quality and  asked to speak to the state staff EPA said were involved with this site.  We were directed to another person identified as being knowledgeable  about the cleanup. The views expressed in the report are those of the  official we were directed to. In response to EPA’s comment, we tried  to contact the two staff named by EPA again. One person was no  longer working for the Montana Department of Environmental Quality  and the other person said the official that we spoke to originally was  the main contact for that site and that he had nothing to add to the  information we already had about the site.  27. We sent a copy of EPA’s comments to the New Jersey Department of  Environmental Protection (NJDEP) for their review. These officials  responded that they agree with GAO’s summary of NJDEP’s comments  as presented in the report. They further stated that concerning the  Phase I removal action at the Hamilton Township site, NJDEP  continues to maintain that EPA’s notice to NJDEP of the Phase I  removal action at the site could have been better. The officials said the  March 24, 2000, meeting referred to in EPA’s comments was a regularly  scheduled, biannual meeting between NJDEP’s Emergency Response  Bureau and EPA’s response unit to discuss general removal activities  and to coordinate the activities of the Region 2 states (New York and  New Jersey) with those of the EPA. NJDEP officials said the attendees  at this meeting remember a short discussion about the probability that  the vermiculite ore from Libby, Montana, contained asbestos and that  this ore was shipped throughout the United States, but none of the  attendees construed this as official notification to NJDEP of asbestos  contamination at the Hamilton Township site. NJDEP added that the  “inventory of sites” and the “Agency Statement on Vermiculite Facility  List” sent by EPA to NJDEP following the March 2000 meeting  specifically stated that the “list  is evolving and is  subject to change as more information becomes available; therefore,  EPA cannot verify the accuracy of this list.” NJDEP did not view these  documents as any kind of official notification of a clean up action to be  undertaken at the Hamilton Township site.
NJDEP reiterated that it first learned of the proposed removal action at  the Hamilton Township site not in 2000, but rather only when it was  copied on a November 6, 2002 Action Memorandum. It subsequently  was copied on two Pollution Reports, dated January 30, 2004, and  February 27, 2004, but did not learn that the removal action was  completed until March 2005, when NJDEP attended a stakeholder  meeting.
During the time of the Phase I removal action, NJDEP said that it does  not dispute that EPA communicated with Janet Smolenski of NJDEP  by copying her on the two Pollution Reports referenced above and by  general telephone conversation(s) with Jim Daloia of EPA. The  officials said there are no other records in NJDEP’s files to indicate  that EPA sent any additional Pollution Reports to NJDEP, nor are  there records of the specific telephone conversations held.  28. We did not make the change suggested by EPA. In the case of the  Wilder site, we called the city of Wilder and asked to speak to the staff  with the most knowledge about the cleanup. This person was also  listed as a city contact in EPA’s community-relations plan for the  Wilder site. The views expressed in the report are those of that official.  29. We did not make the first change suggested by EPA. In the case of the  Great Falls site, we called the city of Great Falls and were directed to a  person identified as being knowledgeable about the cleanup. The  views expressed in the report are those of the official to whom we  were directed. Regarding the contractor licensing issue raised by a city  official, we noted the information that EPA provided in a footnote.  30. Table 2 of the draft report already indicates that, for the Minot site,  EPA distributed fact sheets, held a public meeting, and went door-to- door to discuss the removal action. The views presented in the report  are those of residents who lived within a half-mile of the Minot site. In  fact, as pointed out in the report, one focus group participant’s  backyard bordered the cleanup site. GAO cannot explain why EPA’s  public-notification efforts apparently failed to reach the participants in  the focus group.  31. Focus-group participants were asked if they had heard that EPA was  cleaning up the sites before the cleanup started, including receiving  any fliers from EPA, hearing about any public meetings sponsored by  EPA, or seeing any EPA officials walking around their neighborhoods.
For the Minot site, the views presented in this report are those of  residents who lived within a half-mile of the site. In fact, as pointed out  in the report, one focus group participant’s backyard bordered the  cleanup site. GAO cannot explain why EPA’s public notification efforts  apparently failed to reach the participants in the focus group.  32. We clarified the language to avoid any inference that sites that were  cleaned up to non-detectable levels still pose a risk.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Steve Elstein, Erin Lansburgh,  David Stikkers, and Lisa Turner made key contributions to this report.  Also contributing to the report were Richard Johnson, Jeremy Manion,  Stuart Ryba, Stephanie Sand, Carol Shulman, and Monica Wolford.