Iraq: U.S. Assistance to Iraq's Minority Groups in Response to Congressional Directives
Published: 2012-07-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2003, minority groups in Iraq have experienced religiously and ethnically motivated attacks, killings, and forced displacements. Concern for Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities led various congressional committees and Congress as a whole to issue a series of directives to provide assistance to these groups.
The 2008 directive directed that $10 million of unobligated ESF funds from prior years be provided to assist religious minorities in the Ninewa plain region of Iraq. The 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives directed that up to $10 million be provided to assist religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq for each directive. USAID and State reported to Congress that they met the provisions of these three directives by providing $40 million in assistance to Iraqi minority groups.
Congressional requesters asked GAO to examine the extent to which (1) USAID demonstrated that the assistance it reported to Congress met the 2008 directive and (2) USAID and State demonstrated that the assistance they reported to Congress met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State and USAID in Washington, D.C., and Iraq. This report is a public version of a Sensitive But Unclassified report issued in May 2012.
GAO is not making recommendations. Both agencies provided technical comments on the draft that were incorporated, as appropriate. State did not submit an agency comment letter in response to the draft. In its agency comment letter, USAID stated that it met minority groups needs to a greater extent than is presented in the report. GAO continues to believe that USAID could not demonstrate how its reported assistance met the provisions of the 2008 directive.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) could not demonstrate how the projects that it reported to Congress met the provisions of the 2008 directive because of three weaknesses. First, USAID documentsspecifically, the list of projects the agency submitted to Congress linked only $3.8 million of the $14.8 million in assistance (26 percent) directly to the Ninewa plain region. Second, USAID documents generally did not show whether the projects included minority groups among the beneficiaries of the assistance and specifically whether $8 million of assistance was provided for internally displaced families. Third, USAID officials and documents did not demonstrate that the agency used unobligated prior year Economic Support Fund (ESF) funds to initiate projects in response to the 2008 directive.
USAID and the Department of State (State) generally could demonstrate how they met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. According to USAID and State documents, the agencies approved $26.9 million in assistanceprimarily in essential services and humanitarian assistanceto meet the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives provisions to spend up to $10 million for each directive to assist religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq (see figure below). In addition, as directed by Congress, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad designated staff at the embassy to oversee and coordinate assistance to minority groups in 2008.
Using the Quick Response Fund (QRF) program, USAID and State took five steps that generally demonstrated how they met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. First, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad directed that support of minority groups be made one of the thematic goals of the QRF program in 2008. Second, USAID and State categorized projects in their respective QRF databases by thematic goal. Third, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) conducted outreach to inform potential beneficiaries of the availability of assistance through the QRF program. Fourth, PRTs or the QRF implementing partner conducted final site visits and prepared project close-out reports. Fifth, both USAID and State conducted third-party assessments at the close of their respective components of the QRF program. The QRF program closed and the PRTs ceased their operations by the end of 2011, as planned. According to USAID and State officials, the two agencies continue to assist minority groups through the obligation of an additional $28 million in reprogrammed ESF funds from previous years.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2003, religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq have experienced  attacks on holy sites, as well as religiously and ethnically motivated  killings, abductions, and forced displacements. According to international  aid groups, although religious minorities comprise only about 3 percent of  the Iraqi population, they are overrepresented in the refugee and  internally displaced populations. Concern for religious and ethnic  minorities (hereafter referred to as minority groups) in Iraq led various  congressional committees, as well as Congress as a whole, to issue a  series of directives beginning in June 2007 to provide assistance to these  groups. The directives accompanied the Department of State’s (State)  fiscal year 2008 appropriation (hereafter referred to as the 2008  directive) and fiscal year 2008 supplemental appropriation (hereafter  referred to as the 2008 supplemental directive), and appeared in State’s  fiscal year 2010 appropriation (hereafter referred to as the 2010  directive). More recently, in the Senate Appropriations Committee report  accompanying the fiscal year 2012 appropriations for State, the  committee recognized the importance of providing assistance to religious  and ethnic minorities in Iraq and directed State to report on assistance  provided to these groups (hereafter referred to as the 2012 directive).
As of November 2011, the United States Agency for International  Development (USAID) and State reported to Congress that they had  provided about $40 million in assistance for Iraq’s minority groups in  response to these directives. According to the agencies, USAID provided  $14.8 million for the 2008 directive; USAID and State provided $10.4  million for the 2008 supplemental directive; and State provided $16.5  million for the 2010 directive. However, some members of Congress  remained concerned about the transparency and distribution of the  assistance to minority groups in Iraq.
In response to your request, we examined the extent to which (1) USAID  demonstrated that the assistance it reported to Congress met the 2008  directive and (2) USAID and State demonstrated that the assistance they  reported to Congress met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives.  This report is a publicly releasable version of a prior GAO report, issued  in May 2012, that State and USAID had designated Sensitive But  Unclassified.
To address these objectives, we analyzed USAID’s and State’s reports to  Congress summarizing assistance provided in response to the directives  and reviewed supporting documents, such as project lists for the three  directives, as well as proposals and final close-out reports for projects  implemented in response to the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives.  We also interviewed USAID and State officials in Washington, D.C., and  Iraq; their implementing partner; and Iraqi recipients of assistance, such  as officials of religious and nongovernmental organizations. We  conducted fieldwork in Baghdad and Erbil, Iraq, in October 2011. Due to  security constraints, we were able to visit only one project site in Iraq,  which is located in Baghdad. This site received one of the largest  amounts of funds for the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to July 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more  detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Iraq is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. Ethnically, Arabs  comprise about 75 percent of the population of Iraq, with Kurds  comprising around 15 percent and other ethnic groups, such as  Turkoman and Assyrians, comprising the remaining 10 percent.  Religiously, Shi’a and Sunni Muslims make up 97 percent of the  population of Iraq, with non-Muslim groups—such as Baha’i, Christians,  Sabean Mandaeans, and Yazidis—comprising the remaining 3 percent of  the population. Some communities may be an ethnic majority but a  religious minority (such as Arab Christians), while other communities may  be an ethnic minority but a religious majority (such as Shi’a Shabaks). For  the purpose of this report, we refer to the following religious and ethnic  communities as minority groups: Anglican, Armenian, Assyrian, Baptist,  Chaldean, Coptic, Greek Orthodox, Latin Catholic, Presbyterians, Sabean  Mandaean, Shabak, Syriac, Turkoman, and Yazidi.
Since 2003, Iraq’s minority groups have experienced religiously and  ethnically motivated intimidation, arbitrary detention, killings, abductions,  and forced displacements, as well as attacks on holy sites and religious  leaders. In August 2007, coordinated truck bombings killed some 400  Yazidis and wounded more than 700. In August 2009, a series of attacks  in Ninewa province killed almost 100 and injured more than 400 from the  Yazidi, Shabak, and Turkoman communities. In February 2008, a  Chaldean archbishop was kidnapped and killed—the third senior  Christian religious figure to be killed in the city of Mosul since 2006. A  series of attacks against Christians occurred in 2010, including an attack  in October on a Catholic church in Baghdad that left more than 50 dead  and 60 wounded.
As a result of such violence, a significant portion of minority groups has  fled either to other parts of the country, becoming internally displaced  persons, or to neighboring countries, becoming refugees. According to  nongovernmental organizations, religious minorities make up a significant  portion of those migrating from locations in southern Iraq to locations in  northern Iraq, such as the Ninewa plain region. The International  Organization for Migration reports that, in 2010, in the provinces of  Dahuk, Erbil, and Ninewa, 49 percent, 24 percent, and 35 percent,  respectively, of the internally displaced population were Christian.  According to nongovernmental organizations, religious minority groups  face increased marginalization and are less able to access public  services or employment because of ethnic or religious prejudices. The  United Nations reports that, between 2003 and 2005, 36 percent of the  Iraqis seeking refugee status in Syria were Christian. In 2007, Iraq’s  Ministry of Displacement and Migration estimated that nearly half of the  minority communities had left the country. According to the U.S.  Commission on International Religious Freedom, at least half of the  Christians in Iraq have left the country since 2003. Further, the  commission reports that since 2003 nearly 90 percent of the roughly  50,000-60,000 Sabean Mandaeans have either fled Iraq or been killed.
Concern for Iraq’s minority groups led Congress to issue a series of  directives beginning in June 2007 to provide assistance to these groups.  These directives are as follows:
2008 directive: In December 2007, for fiscal year 2008, the House  Committee on Appropriations directed that not less than $10 million of  unobligated Economic Support Fund (ESF) account funds provided in  prior fiscal years for Iraq should be used to assist religious minorities  in the Ninewa plain region of Iraq. Further, the Committee directed  that $2 million of such assistance should be provided for microfinance   programs and $8 million for internally displaced families in the Ninewa  plain region.
2008 supplemental directive: In June 2008, the Explanatory  Statement submitted by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on  Appropriations explaining the fiscal year 2008 Supplemental  Appropriations Act directed that up to $10 million of funds made  available under various accounts, including the Migration and  Refugee Assistance account, should be made available for programs  to assist vulnerable Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities. Further, the  Explanatory Statement directed that the Secretary of State should  designate staff at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to oversee and  coordinate such assistance.
2010 directive: In December 2009, in the fiscal year 2010  Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress directed that up to $10  million of ESF account funds should be made available to continue  programs and activities to assist minority populations in Iraq, including  religious groups in the Ninewa plain region.
2012 directive: In September 2011, the Senate Appropriations  Committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2012 appropriations  for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related  Programs directed the Secretary of State to submit a report detailing  U.S. efforts to help ethno-religious minority communities in Iraq,  including assistance to build an indigenous community police force  and to support nongovernmental organizations in the Ninewa plain  region.
As of November 2011, USAID and State reported to Congress that they  had provided about $40 million in assistance for minority groups in Iraq in  response to these directives. According to the agencies, USAID provided  $14.8 million for the 2008 directive; USAID and State provided $10.4  million for the 2008 supplemental directive; and State provided $16.5  million for the 2010 directive.
section_title: USAID Could Not Demonstrate How It Met the 2008 Directive
paragraphs: In its report to Congress, in response to the 2008 directive, USAID  officials identified projects that they believed were in support of minority  groups from six existing programs that were designed broadly to assist all  Iraqis. However, our analysis of documents found that USAID could not  demonstrate how it met the provisions of the 2008 directive because of  three weaknesses. First, USAID documents—specifically, the list of  projects the agency submitted to Congress—linked only 26 percent of the  $14.8 million in assistance directly to the Ninewa plain region. Second,  USAID documents generally did not show whether the projects included  minority groups among the beneficiaries of the assistance and,  specifically, whether $8 million of assistance was provided for internally  displaced families. Third, USAID officials and documents did not  demonstrate that the agency used unobligated prior year ESF funds to  initiate projects in response to the 2008 directive.
subsections: section_title: USAID Identified Projects from Six Existing Programs
paragraphs: According to USAID officials, USAID identified projects from six existing  programs that were designed broadly to assist all Iraqis. These six  existing programs were implemented countrywide; funded many types of  activities; and had broad goals related to stabilizing communities and  developing agriculture, the economy, and essential services.  Accompanying its report to Congress on the 2008 directive, USAID  provided a list of 155 projects totaling $14.8 million of assistance to  minority groups. USAID could not provide information on how the agency  compiled the list of projects. Table 1 provides a description of the six  programs and the reported amount of assistance provided in support of  Iraq’s minority groups for the 2008 directive.
The $14.8 million in assistance that USAID reported in response to the  2008 directive represented about 1 percent of the $1.5 billion in  assistance provided through these six programs.
section_title: USAID Could Not Demonstrate How It Met the Provisions of the 2008 Directive
paragraphs: Our analysis of USAID documents found that USAID could not  demonstrate that it met the provisions of the 2008 directive because of  three weaknesses. First, although USAID reported that it provided $14.8  million in assistance to minority groups through existing programs to meet  the 2008 directive, its documents could link only $3.82 million (26  percent) of that amount to the Ninewa plain region. The documents linked  $1.67 million (11 percent) of the assistance to areas outside of the  Ninewa plain region. USAID documents did not provide sufficient detail to  determine the location of the remaining $9.35 million (63 percent).
Second, USAID documents generally did not show whether the projects  included minority groups among the beneficiaries of the assistance and  whether $8 million was provided specifically for internally displaced  families. According to USAID officials, the agency generally did not track  its beneficiaries by religious affiliation. For $14.7 million of the $14.8  million in assistance, USAID documents did not provide sufficient detail  for us to determine that Iraqi minority groups were among the  beneficiaries of all of the projects. Only 1 of the 155 projects ($66,707 out  of $14.8 million) provided sufficient detail in its documents for us to  determine that the assistance was directed to internally displaced  families; however, the location of that project was outside of the Ninewa  plain region. While USAID documents listed $2 million in funding for a  microfinance institution, USAID officials were unable to provide detail on  whether all of these loans were disbursed in the Ninewa plain region.
Third, USAID officials and documents did not demonstrate that the  agency used unobligated prior year ESF funds to initiate projects in  response to the 2008 directive. USAID could document that the agency  used unobligated prior year funds for two of the six programs after the  date of the 2008 directive. However, according to USAID officials, the  agency did not use unobligated prior year funds for the remaining four  programs.
section_title: USAID and State Generally Could Demonstrate How They Met the 2008 Supplemental and 2010 Directives
subsections: section_title: USAID and State Approved $26.9 Million in Assistance for Minority Groups
paragraphs: According to USAID and State documents, the agencies approved $26.9  million in assistance for minority groups, primarily through the QRF  program.million in response to the 2008 supplemental directive and State  approved $16.5 million of assistance in response to the 2010 directive.  For the 2008 supplemental directive, the agencies approved assistance in  support of minority groups in four provinces. For the 2010 directive, State  approved assistance in eight provinces. At least $4.8 million of this  assistance was linked to the locations mentioned in the directive.
Specifically, both agencies approved assistance totaling $10.3  USAID and State approved 36 projects in response to the 2008  supplemental directive and 90 projects in response to the 2010 directive.  QRF projects utilized four funding mechanisms: micro-grants, micro- purchases, grants, and direct procurements. Micro-purchases and micro- grants were used for projects costing up to $25,000; grants and direct  procurements were used for projects costing over $25,000. Projects  included procuring hospital equipment, paving roads, and constructing  water lines, among others and fell into four major categories (see table 2  below).
Reported projects varied in cost and scope, ranging from about $2,000 to  $1.6 million. For example, in response to the 2008 supplemental directive,  USAID reported that it initially approved $1.3 million to assist in the  reconstruction of a village that suffered significant damage from a  coordinated car-bomb attack. In response to the 2010 directive, State  reported that it initially approved $458,000 for a project in a municipality  that had an influx of internally displaced Christians.
According to State officials, the final disbursed amount of assistance likely  will be lower than the amount of assistance initially approved and  reported to Congress because many projects cost less than the initial  approved estimate. State officials told us that they completed reconciling  project disbursed amounts for the QRF program in early March 2012.  According to these officials, the final disbursed amount was about the  same as the approved amount for the 2008 supplemental directive and  $420,000 less than the approved amount for the 2010 directive.
section_title: State Designated Staff at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to Meet a Provision in the 2008 Supplemental Directive
paragraphs: State met the provision of the 2008 supplemental directive to designate  staff at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to oversee and coordinate  assistance to minority groups. In 2008, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad  announced the appointment of a special coordinator for minority issues  and has since appointed only senior staff to that position, which is  evidence—according to State officials—of State’s prioritization of  assistance in support of minority groups. The current special coordinator,  who is an ambassador as well as the Assistant Chief of Mission for  Assistance Transition in Iraq, told us that he conducts outreach to Iraq’s  minority communities, including religious leaders and members of the  Iraqi diaspora in the United States. In addition, he said that State  organizes dialogues and meetings for Iraqi religious minority group  leaders in an effort to improve connections and interactions among  Christian minority communities in Iraq.
Moreover, in January 2011, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad established a  working group for minority issues to further coordinate interagency efforts  and outreach to minority communities. This working group, led by the  special coordinator, meets on a monthly basis and includes  representatives from State, USAID, and the Departments of Justice and  Defense. According to U.S. embassy officials, the special coordinator  intends to continue to coordinate the U.S. embassy’s efforts in support of  minority groups during fiscal year 2012.
section_title: USAID and State Took Five Steps That Generally Demonstrated How They Met the 2008 Supplemental and 2010 Directives
paragraphs: USAID and State could generally demonstrate how they met the 2008  supplemental and 2010 directives through their use of the QRF program,  which served as the primary mechanism for the agencies to categorize,  track, monitor, and report on minority directive projects, among others.  Specifically, the agencies took the following five steps to provide  assistance that supported minority groups through the QRF program:
Made minority directive projects one of the goals of the QRF program.
As directed by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, the Office of Provincial  Affairs made support of minority groups one of the thematic goals of  the QRF program in 2008. Thus, USAID and State initiated new  projects through the PRTs in support of this goal at that time. State  established the QRF program in 2007 to enable PRTs in Iraq to  support local entities through short-term projects to fill gaps that were  not funded through existing programs. QRF projects under $25,000  were implemented by PRTs and projects over $25,000 mostly were  implemented by USAID or State’s implementing partner.
Categorized projects. USAID and State officials categorized projects  in the agencies’ respective QRF program databases by thematic goal.  The agency officials categorized projects in support of minority groups  as “Minority Directive” upon initiation, which allowed them to track  these projects for reporting purposes. For the 14 projects that we  spot-checked, the agencies were able to provide supporting  documents from their databases that included information about the  projects and showed that projects were categorized as “Minority  Directive.” Further, as a result of categorizing projects, the agencies  were able to produce lists that reported the amount of assistance  approved in support of minority groups for each directive. These lists  also showed that numerous minority groups were beneficiaries.
Conducted outreach to identify potential beneficiaries. To inform  potential beneficiaries of the availability of assistance through the  QRF program, PRTs and the special coordinator for minority issues in  Baghdad conducted informal outreach to community members,  religious leaders, elected officials, and civil society groups. For  example, the special coordinator met with minority group leaders to  discuss funding needs for projects, such as promoting private  investment opportunities. In addition, the agencies identified potential  beneficiaries through existing U.S. military and USAID relationships  with Iraqi officials and organizations.
Conducted final site visits and prepared close-out reports. According  to USAID and State officials, PRTs or the QRF program implementing  partner conducted final site visits and prepared project close-out  reports. We found that the implementing partner prepared close-out  reports for all 14 projects that we spot-checked. In the close-out  reports, the implementing partner reported on whether the grant  objectives were met and whether the grantee met all of their  responsibilities and reporting requirements, among others. In addition,  the implementing partner received a final report from the grant  recipient that included information on the project’s impact and on its  beneficiaries. Because the security situation hindered the agencies’  ability to independently verify the implementing partner’s reports, both  agencies relied on American and local PRT staff and, in some cases,  the U.S military to verify the implementing partner’s reports through  photographs and site visits. However, according to USAID and State  officials, PRTs did not always complete or document site visits for all  projects. State officials said that site visits by U.S. government  personnel could compromise the security of project sites and Iraqi  recipients.
Conducted third-party assessments. Both USAID and State  conducted third-party assessments at the close of their respective  components of the QRF program. Completed in 2010, the USAID  evaluation concluded that the information reported by the  implementing partner was valid and recipients received the equipment  that was agreed upon in the grant agreement. As of February 2012,  State had not finalized its third party’s QRF program evaluation.  During our fieldwork in Iraq, Iraqi recipients told us that assistance  reached their communities.
The QRF program—which served, among other things, as USAID’s and  State’s primary mechanism to provide, categorize, track, monitor, and  report on assistance to minority groups in Iraq from 2008 to 2011—ended  in December 2011. Further, PRTs—which helped identify and monitor  QRF projects—ceased operations during the drawdown of U.S. forces  from Iraq during 2011. U.S. forces completely withdrew from Iraq in  December 2011.
section_title: USAID and State Continue to Provide and Track Assistance to Iraq’s Minority Groups
paragraphs: According to USAID and State officials, the two agencies have continued  to assist Iraq’s minority groups through the obligation of an additional $28  million in reprogrammed ESF funds from prior fiscal years. USAID  officials told us they obligated $18 million through a program for  microfinance loans to members of minority groups in September 2011.  State officials told us that they obligated $10 million, in September 2011,  to support one project outside of Baghdad. According to officials from  both agencies, they have mechanisms in place to categorize, track,  monitor, and report on assistance to minority groups.
According to State officials, State intends to continue providing assistance  for minority groups in Iraq in fiscal year 2012. However, the officials could  not discuss State’s plans for providing assistance because, as of March  20, 2012, State had not yet determined its funding allocations for Iraq for  fiscal year 2012.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided drafts of this report to State and USAID. Both agencies  submitted technical comments on the draft that were incorporated, as  appropriate. State did not submit an agency comment letter in response  to the draft. In its agency comment letter, USAID remarked that despite  GAO’s findings, USAID met the needs of internally displaced persons and  religious minorities to a greater extent than is presented in this report (see  app. II). However, USAID did not provide additional documentation to  support its statement. We continue to believe that USAID could not  demonstrate how its reported assistance met the provisions of the 2008  directive.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of USAID. The  report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions, please contact me at  (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) the U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID) demonstrated that the assistance  it reported to Congress met the 2008 directive and (2) USAID and the  Department of State (State) demonstrated that the assistance they  reported to Congress met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives.  This report is a publicly releasable version of a prior GAO report, issued  in May 2012, that State and USAID had designated Sensitive But  Unclassified.
To address the first objective, we reviewed the provisions of the 2008  directive and analyzed USAID’s report to Congress and a list of projects  summarizing the reported amount of assistance provided in response to  the 2008 directive. To determine (1) the amount of assistance that USAID  provided in the Ninewa plain region and (2) if minority groups were  among the beneficiaries, we analyzed the list of projects and project  descriptions to identify locations where possible and beneficiaries where  identified. We also reviewed program documents, including program  evaluations and contracts. We interviewed USAID officials in Washington,  D.C., and Iraq, as well as former USAID-Iraq program managers in  Washington, D.C., and via teleconference in Cairo, Egypt.
To address the second objective, we analyzed (1) the provisions of the  2008 supplemental and 2010 directives; (2) State’s report to Congress  summarizing assistance in response to the 2008 supplemental and 2010  directives; and (3) USAID and State’s project lists. The project lists for the  2008 supplemental and the 2010 directives included information such as  the project name, grant identification number, project description, project  location, minority group served, and the initial approved estimate of each  project’s cost. We asked State to provide us with project lists that  included the recipient’s name. State officials told us that they could not  provide us with this information due to security concerns. However, we  determined that the project lists were sufficiently reliable for our purposes  by interviewing agency officials in Washington, D.C., and reviewing the  QRF database, in Iraq, that was used to create the lists. To address the  second objective, we also (1) interviewed USAID and State officials in  Washington, D.C., and Iraq; (2) conducted a spotcheck of project  documents, such as proposals and close-out reports; and (3) conducted  fieldwork in Baghdad and Erbil, Iraq, in October 2011. For the spotcheck,  we judgmentally selected 14 of the 126 projects to include a crosssection  of characteristics such as year (2008 or 2010), funding amount, and type  of project (i.e., procurement, training, etc.). We also interviewed USAID  and State officials in Washington, D.C., and Iraq (including former  Provincial Reconstruction Team staff); USAID and State’s implementing  partner; and Iraqi recipients of assistance, such as officials of religious  and nongovernmental organizations. During our fieldwork, we met with 14  Iraqi recipients of assistance who received funding for 28 of the 126  projects and collectively represented about 30 percent of the $26.9 million  in assistance provided in response to the 2008 supplemental and 2010  directives. However, their views are not generalizable to all recipients of  this assistance. Due to security constraints, we were able to visit only one  project site in Iraq, which is located in Baghdad. This site received one of  the largest amounts of funds for the 2008 supplemental and 2010  directives.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to July 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report include Judith McCloskey (Assistant  Director), Jenna Beveridge, Lisa McMillen, and Sushmita Srikanth. In  addition, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Mary Moutsos,  and Michael Rohrback provided technical assistance.