Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link between Its Defense Strategy and Military Personnel Requirements
Published: 2007-01-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The war in Iraq along with other overseas operations have led to significant stress on U.S. ground forces and raised questions about whether those forces are appropriately sized and structured. In 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with GAO's recommendation that it review military personnel requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) concluded in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the number of active personnel in the Army and Marine Corps should not change. However, the Secretary of Defense recently announced plans to increase these services' active end strength by 92,000 troops. Given the long-term costs associated with this increase, it is important that Congress understand how DOD determines military personnel requirements and the extent of its analysis. GAO has issued a number of reports on DOD's force structure and the impact of ongoing operations on military personnel, equipment, training, and related funding. This statement, which draws on that prior work, focuses on (1) the processes and analyses OSD and the services use to assess force structure and military personnel levels; (2) the extent to which the services' requirements analyses reflect new demands as a result of the changed security environment; and (3) the extent of information DOD has provided to Congress to support requests for military personnel.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of complex and interrelated analyses. Decisions reached by OSD during the QDR and the budget process about planning scenarios, required combat forces, and military personnel levels set the parameters within which the services can determine their own requirements for units and allocate military positions. Using OSD guidance and scenarios, the Army's most recent biennial analysis, completed in 2006, indicated that the Army's total requirements and available end strength were about equal. The Marine Corps' most recent assessment led to an adjustment in the composition and mix of its units. Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that may not have been fully reflected in OSD guidance, the QDR, or in recent service analyses. First, the Army's analysis did not fully consider the impact of converting from a division-based force to modular units, partly because modular units are a new concept and partly because the Army made some optimistic assumptions about its ability to achieve efficiencies and staff modular units within the QDR-directed active military personnel level of 482,400. Second, the Army's analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19 brigades at any one time to support worldwide operations. However, the Army's global operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future. The Marine Corps' analyses reflected some new missions resulting from the new security environment. However, the Commandant initiated a new study following the 2006 QDR partly to assess the impact of requirements for a Special Operation Command. Prior GAO work has shown that DOD has not provided a clear and transparent basis for military personnel requests that demonstrates how they are linked to the defense strategy. GAO believes it will become increasingly important to demonstrate a clear linkage as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges facing the nation and DOD attempts to balance competing priorities for resources. In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. To help illuminate the basis for its request, DOD will need to provide answers to the following questions: What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases are linked to the defense strategy? How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as training and acquisition? What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force and how does DOD plan to fund this increase? Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential challenges such as recruiting additional personnel, providing facilities, and procuring new equipment?

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) processes for determining force structure and military personnel  requirements for the Army and Marine Corps. The war in Iraq, along with  continuing operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world, have led  to significant stress on U.S. ground forces and have raised questions about  whether they are appropriately sized and structured to meet the demands  of the new security environment. Units are being tasked to stay in theater  longer than anticipated, and some personnel are now embarking on their  third overseas deployment since 2001. Although the department’s 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that the Army and Marine  Corps should plan to stabilize at a level of 482,400 and 175,000 active  military personnel respectively, the Secretary of Defense recently  announced plans to permanently increase the size of the active Army and  Marine Corps by a total of 92,000 troops over the next 5 years. Given the  significant long- term costs associated with such an increase, it is  important to understand how DOD determines military personnel  requirements and the extent to which requirements are based on rigorous  analysis. As our prior work has shown, valid and reliable data about the  number of personnel required to meet an agency’s needs are critical  because human capital shortfalls can threaten an organization’s ability to  perform missions efficiently and effectively. This is particularly true for  the DOD, where the lack of rigorous analysis of requirements could have  significant consequences for military personnel called upon to execute  military missions or, alternatively, could lead to inefficiencies in allocating  funds within the defense budget.
My testimony today will focus on three issues: (1) the processes and  analyses used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the  Army and Marine Corps to assess force structure and military personnel  levels; (2) the extent to which the services’ recently completed  requirements analyses reflect new demands resulting from the changed  security environment; and (3) the extent of information provided to  Congress to support the department’s requests for military personnel. In  light of the recent proposal to permanently increase the size of the Army  and Marine Corps, my comments will focus largely on requirements for  active personnel, although the service requirements process I will be  discussing apply to both the active and reserve components, and our prior  work has shown that ongoing operations have taken a toll on the reserve  components as well. A congressionally-mandated commission has been  tasked to conduct a comprehensive examination of how the National  Guard and Reserve are used in national defense. This commission’s work  is still ongoing.
My testimony today is based primarily on our past work on Army and  Marine Corps force structure and military personnel issues as well as our  work on human capital and military personnel issues defensewide. A list  of our past reports can be found in the Related GAO Products section at  the end of this statement. We updated some of our information during  recent discussions with Army and Marine Corps officials. To obtain these  updates we interviewed officials and obtained documents from  Headquarters, Department of the Army; the U.S. Army Center for Army  Analysis; Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and  the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. To assess the  processes and analyses used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and  the Army and Marine Corps to assess force structure and military  personnel levels, we relied on our past reports on these subjects, as well  as updated information from Total Army Analysis 08-13 and Marine Corps  force structure plans from the sources noted. To assess the extent to  which the services’ recently completed requirements analyses reflect new  demands resulting from the changed security environment, we relied on  our past work, DOD’s February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report,  the Secretary of Defense’s congressional testimony announcing his  proposal to increase Army and Marine Corps force levels, and Total Army  Analysis 08-13 and Marine Corps force structure plans. To assess the  extent of information provided to Congress to support the department’s  requests for military personnel, we relied on our past reporting on human  capital and end strength issues.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The 2005 National Defense Strategy provided the strategic foundation for  the 2006 QDR and identified an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic,  and disruptive challenges that threaten U.S. interests. To operationalize  the defense strategy, the 2006 QDR identified four priority areas for further  examination: defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland,  shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing  hostile state and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass  destruction. These areas illustrated the types of capabilities and forces  needed to address the challenges identified in the defense strategy and  helped DOD to assess that strategy and review its force planning  construct. Changes in the security environment and the force planning  construct may require DOD and the services to reassess force structure  requirements—how many units and of what type are needed to carry out  the national defense strategy. Likewise, changing force structure  requirements may create a need to reassess active end strength—-the  number of military personnel annually authorized by Congress which each  service can have at the end of a given fiscal year.
The services allocate their congressionally authorized end strength among  operational force requirements (e.g., combat and support force units),  institutional requirements, and requirements for personnel who are  temporarily unavailable for assignment. Operational forces are the forces  the services provide to combatant commanders to meet mission  requirements, such as ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Institutional forces include command headquarters, doctrine writers, and  a cadre of acquisition personnel, which are needed to prepare forces for  combat operations. Personnel who are temporarily unavailable for  assignment include transients, transfers, holdees, and students.
The Secretary of Defense’s recent proposal to permanently increase the  size of the Army and Marine Corps represents a significant shift in DOD’s  plans, as reflected in the 2006 QDR. In fiscal year 2004, the Army’s  authorized end strength was 482,400 active military personnel. Since that  time, the Army has been granted authority to increase its end strength by  30,000 in order to provide flexibility to implement its transformation to a  modular force while continuing to deploy forces to overseas operations.  Rather than return the Army to the 482,400 level by fiscal year 2011, as  decided in the 2006 QDR, DOD’s new proposal would increase the Army’s  permanent end strength level to 547,000 over a period of 5 years. DOD’s  plans for Marine Corps end strength have also changed. In fiscal year 2004,  the Marine Corps’ was authorized to have 175,000 active military  personnel. For the current fiscal year, Marine Corps end strength was  authorized at 180,000, although DOD’s 2006 QDR planned to stabilize the  Marine Corps at the 175,000 level by fiscal year 2011. The Secretary’s new  proposal would increase permanent Marine Corps end strength to a level  of 202,000 over the next 5 years. In terms of funding, DOD is currently  authorized to pay for end strength above 482,400 and 175,000 for the Army  and Marine Corps, respectively, with emergency contingency reserve  funds or from supplemental funds used to finance operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan. Until Congress receives the President’s budget request, it is  unclear how DOD plans to fund the proposed increases.
In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure  itself from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force—an  undertaking it considers the most extensive reorganization of its force  since World War II. This initiative, according to Army estimates, will  require an investment exceeding $52 billion through fiscal year 2011. The  foundation of the modular force is the creation of standardized modular  combat brigades in both the active component and National Guard. The  new modular brigades are designed to be self-sufficient units that are more  rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint and expeditionary  operations than their larger division-based predecessors. The Army  planned to achieve its modular restructuring without permanently  increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, in accordance  with a decision reached during the 2006 QDR. The February 2006 QDR  also specified that the Army would create 70 active modular combat  brigades in its active component and National Guard.
According to the Army, the modular force will enable it to generate both  active and reserve component forces in a rotational manner. To do this,  the Army is developing plans for a force rotation model in which units will  rotate through a structured progression of increased unit readiness over  time. For example, the Army’s plan is for active service members to be at  home for 2 years following each deployment of up to 1 year.
section_title: Determination of Force Structure and Military Personnel Requirements Is A Complex Process Involving Both OSD And The Services
paragraphs: Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force  structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of  complex and interrelated process and analyses-–rather than on one clearly  documented process. Decisions made by OSD can have a ripple effect on  the analyses that are conducted at the service level, as I will explain later.
OSD is responsible for the QDR–-the official strategic plan of DOD–-and  provides policy and budget guidance to the services on the number of  active personnel. The QDR determines the size of each services’  operational combat forces based on an analysis of the forces needed to  meet the requirements of the National Defense Strategy. For example, the  2006 QDR specified the Army’s operational force structure would include  42 active Brigade Combat Teams and that the Army should plan for an  active force totaling 482,400 personnel by fiscal year 2011. The QDR also  directed the Marine Corps to add a Special Operations Command and plan  for an active force totaling 175,000 military personnel by fiscal year 2011.
In order to provide a military perspective on the decisions reached in the  QDR, Congress required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to  conduct an assessment of the review including an assessment of risk. In  his assessment of the 2006 QDR, the Chairman concluded that the Armed  Forces of the United States stood “fully capable of accomplishing all the  objectives of the National Defense Strategy.” In his risk assessment, he  noted that the review had carefully balanced those areas where risk might  best be taken in order to provide the needed resources for areas requiring  new or additional investment.
Another area where the Office of the Secretary of Defense plays an  important role is in developing various planning scenarios that describe  the type of missions the services may face in the future. These scenarios  are included in planning guidance that the Office of the Secretary of  Defense provides the services to assist them in making more specific  decisions on how to allocate their resources to accomplish the national  defense strategy. For example, these scenarios would include major  combat operations, stability operations, domestic support operations, and  humanitarian assistance operations.
GAO examined whether DOD had established a solid foundation for  determining military personnel requirements. While we are currently  reviewing the plans and analyses of the 2006 QDR, our February 2005  assessment of DOD’s processes identified several concerns that, if left  uncorrected, could have hampered DOD’s QDR analysis. First, we found  that DOD had not conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis to  assess the number of active personnel needed to implement the defense  strategy. Second, OSD does not specifically review the services’  requirements processes to ensure that decisions about personnel levels  are linked to the defense strategy. Last, a key reason why OSD had not  conducted a comprehensive analysis was that it has sought to limit  personnel costs to fund competing priorities such as transformation.
subsections: section_title: The Army Has a Biennial Process to Assess Force Structure and Allocate Military Personnel Positions to Units
paragraphs: The Army uses a biennial, scenario-based requirements process to  estimate the number and types of operational and institutional forces  needed to execute Army missions. This process involves first determining  the number and type of forces needed to execute the National Military  Strategy based on OSD guidance, comparing this requirement with the  Army’s present force structure, and finally reallocating military positions  to minimize the risks associated with any identified shortfalls. Taken  together, this process is known as “Total Army Analysis.” The Army has  conducted this analysis for many years and has a good track record for  updating and improving its modeling, assumptions, and related processes  over time, as we noted in our last detailed analysis of the Army’s process.  Active and reserve forces are included in this analysis in order to provide a  total look at Army requirements and the total end strength available to  resource those requirements. Also, the number of combat brigades is  specified by OSD in the QDR and is essentially a “given” in the Army’s  requirements process. The Army’s process is primarily intended to assess  the support force structure needed to meet the requirements of the  planning scenarios, and to provide senior leadership a basis for better  balancing the force.
In the first phase of the Army’s requirements determination process, the  Army uses several models, such as a model to simulate warfights using the  scenarios provided by OSD and the number of brigades OSD plans to use  in each scenario. The outcomes of the warfighting analyses are used in  further modeling to generate the number and specific types of units the  Army would need to support its brigade combat teams. For example, for a  prolonged major war, the Army needs more truck companies to deliver  supplies and fuel to front line units. For other types of contingencies, the  Army may use historical experience for similar operations to determine  requirements since models are not available for all contingencies. The  Army also examines requirements for the Army’s institutional force, such  as the Army’s training base, in order to obtain a total bottom line  requirement for all the Army’s missions.
In the second phase of the Army’s process—known as the “resourcing  phase”— the Army makes decisions on how to best allocate the active and  reserve military personnel levels established by OSD against these  requirements. In order to provide the best match, the Army will develop a  detailed plan to eliminate lower priority units, and stand up new units it  believes are essential to address capability gaps and meet future mission  needs. For example, in recent years, the Army has made an effort to  increase units needed for military police, civil affairs, engineers, and  special operations forces. These decisions are implemented over the  multiple years contained in DOD’s Future Years Defense Program. For  example, the intent of the Army’s most recent analysis was used to help  develop the Army’s budget plans for fiscal years 2008–2013.
Historically, the Army has had some mismatches between the  requirements it estimated and its available military personnel levels. When  shortfalls exist, the Army has chosen to fully resource its active combat  brigades and accept risk among it support units, many of which are in the  reserve component.
section_title: The Marine Corps Conducts a Variety of Analyses to Assess Force Structure and Military Personnel Requirements
paragraphs: The Marine Corps uses a number of modeling, simulations, spreadsheet  analyses, and other analytical tools to periodically identify gaps in its  capabilities to perform its missions, and identify the personnel and skills  needed to provide the capabilities based largely on the professional  judgment of manpower experts and subject-matter experts. The results are  summarized in a manpower document, updated as needed, which is used  to allocate positions and personnel to meet mission priorities. This  document is an assessment of what core capabilities can and cannot be  supported within the authorized end strength, which may fall short of the  needed actual personnel requirements. For example, in 2005, we reported  that the Marine Corps analysis for fiscal year 2004 indicated that to  execute its assigned missions, the Corps would need about 9,600 more  personnel than it had on hand. At the time of this analysis, OSD fiscal  guidance directed the Marine Corps to plan for an end strength of 175,000  in the service’s budget submission.
section_title: New Demands on Services Have Not Been Fully Reflected In Recent Requirements Analyses
paragraphs: Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that  may not have been fully reflected in the QDR or their own service  requirements analyses, which have been based on OSD guidance. While  the Army’s most recent analysis, completed in 2006, concluded that Army  requirements were about equal to available forces for all three  components, this analysis did not fully reflect the effects of establishing  modular brigades-–the most significant restructuring of the Army’s  operational force structure since World War II. In addition, OSD-directed  planning scenarios used by the Army in its analysis to help assess  rotational demands on the force may not have reflected real-world  conditions such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the requirements  phase of the Army’s analysis, completed in the mid-2005 time frame, may  have been based on the best information available at the time, the Army’s  transformation concepts have continued to evolve and the mismatch  between the planning scenarios and actual operations are now more  apparent. The Marine Corps is also undergoing a high pace of operations,  as well as QDR-directed changes in force structure. This has caused the  Marine Corps to initiate a new post-QDR analysis of its force structure  requirements.
The service analyses I am about to discuss all preceded the Secretary of  Defense’s announcement of his intention to increase Army and Marine  Corps end strength by 92,000. However, some of GAO’s reporting on these  plans is only months old and should provide a baseline to help the  committee understand what has changed since the 2006 QDR and service  analyses were completed.
subsections: section_title: Army’s Most Recent Biennial Analysis Did Not Fully Consider Requirements for Modular Units and Force Rotation Demands
paragraphs: The Army’s most recent requirements analysis, which examined force  structure and military personnel needs for fiscal years 2008 through 2013,  considered some of the Army’s new transformation concepts, such as the  Army’s conversion to a modular force. However, the Army did not  consider the full impact of this transformation in its analysis, in part  because these initiatives were relatively new at the time the analysis was  conducted. The Army’s recent analysis recognized that modular units  would require greater numbers of combat forces than its prior division- based force and assumed this could be accomplished by reducing military  positions in the Army’s institutional forces, such as its command  headquarters and training base, rather than increasing the size of the  active force. However, in our September 2006 report discussing the Army’s  progress in converting to a modular force, we questioned whether the  Army could meet all of its modular force requirements with a QDR- directed, active component end strength of 482,400. Under its new  modular force, the Army will have 42 active brigades compared with 33  brigades in its division-based force. In total, these brigades will require  more military personnel than the Army’s prior division-based combat  units. Therefore, as figure 1 illustrates, the Army planned to increase its  active component operational force—that is, its combat forces—from  315,000 to 355,000 personnel to fully staff 42 active modular brigade  combat teams. To accomplish this with an active end strength level of  482,400, the Army had hoped to substantially reduce the size of its active  component institutional force—that is, its training base, acquisition  workforce, and major command headquarters—from 102,000 to 75,000  military personnel. The Army also planned to reduce the number of active  Army personnel in a temporary status at any given time, known as  transients, transfers, holdees, and students, or TTHS. In fiscal year 2000,  this portion of the force consisted of 63,000 active military personnel and  the Army planned to reduce its size to 52,400.
While the Army has several initiatives under way to reduce active military  personnel in its institutional force, our report questioned whether those  initiatives could be fully achieved as planned. The Army had made some  progress in converting some military positions to civilian positions, but  Army officials believed additional conversions to achieve planned  reductions in the noncombat force would be significantly more  challenging to achieve and could lead to difficult trade-offs. In addition,  cutting the institutional force at a time when the Army is fully engaged in  training forces for overseas operations may entail additional risk not fully   anticipated at the time the initiatives were proposed. Last, we noted that  the Army is still assessing its modular unit concepts based on lessons  learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other analyses led by  the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, and the impact on force  structure requirements may not yet be fully known.
We should note that, at the time of our report, the Army did not agree with  our assessment of its personnel initiatives. In written comments on a draft  of our report, the Army disagreed with our analysis of the challenges it  faced in implementing its initiatives to increase the size of the operational  force within existing end strength, noting that GAO focused inappropriate  attention on these challenges. The Army only partially concurred with our  recommendation that the Secretary of the Army develop and provide the  Secretary of Defense and Congress with a report on the status of its  personnel initiatives, including executable milestones for realigning and  reducing its noncombat forces. The Army stated that this action was  already occurring on a regular basis and another report on this issue  would be duplicative and irrelevant. However, the reports the Army cited  in its response were internal to the Army and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense. The comments did not address the oversight needs of Congress.  We stated in our report that we believe that it is important for the  Secretary of Defense and Congress to have a clear and transparent picture  of the personnel challenges the Army faces in order to fully achieve the  goals of modular restructuring and make informed decisions on resources  and authorized end strength.
Another factor to consider is that the Army’s most recent requirements  analysis was linked to planning scenarios directed by OSD and did not  fully reflect current operational demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. The  Army’s analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19  brigades at any one time (including 14 active and 4 to 5 National Guard  brigades) to support worldwide operations. However, the Army’s global  operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army officials  believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future.
section_title: The Marine Corps Is Also Facing New Demands That May Not Have Been Fully Reflected in Recent Requirements Analyses
paragraphs: The Marine Corps is also experiencing new missions and demands as a  result of the Global War on Terrorism. However, these new requirements  do not appear to have been fully addressed in its requirements analyses.  The following is a summary of the principal analyses that were undertaken  to address Marine Corps force structure personnel requirements in the  past few years.
In 2004, the Marine Corps established a Force Structure Review Group to  evaluate what changes in active and reserve capabilities needed to be  created, reduced, or deactivated in light of personnel tempo trends and the  types of units in high demand since the Global War on Terrorism. As a  result of this review, the Marine Corps approved a number of force  structure changes including increases in the active component’s infantry,  reconnaissance, and gunfire capabilities and decreases in the active  component’s small-craft company and low-altitude air defense positions.  However, this review was based on the assumption that the Marine Corps  would need to plan for an end strength of 175,000 active personnel. As a  result, the Marine Corps’ 2004 review focused mostly on rebalancing the  core capabilities of the active and reserve component rather than a  bottom-up review of total personnel requirements to meet all 21st century  challenges.  In March 2006, shortly after the QDR was issued, the Marine Corps  Commandant formed a Capabilities Assessment Group to assess  requirements for active Marine Corps military personnel. One of the  group’s key tasks was to determine how and whether the Marine Corps  could meet its ongoing requirements while supporting the QDR decision to  establish a 2,600 personnel Marine Corps Special Operations Command.  The group was also charged with identifying what core capabilities could  be provided at a higher end strength level of 180,000. We received some  initial briefings on the scope of the group’s work. Moreover, Marine Corps  officials told us that the group completed its analysis in June 2006.  However, as of September 2006 when we completed our work, the Marine  Corps had not released the results of its analysis. Therefore, it is not clear  whether and to what extent this review formed the basis for the  President’s recent announcement to permanently expand the size of the  active Marine Corps.
section_title: DOD Has Not Clearly Demonstrated the Basis For Military Personnel Requests
paragraphs: Our past work has also shown that DOD has not provided a clear and  transparent basis for its military personnel requests to Congress, requests  that demonstrate a clear link to military strategy. Ensuring that the  department provides a sound basis for military personnel requests and can  demonstrate how they are linked to the military strategy will become  increasingly important as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges  facing the nation. During the next decade, Congress will be faced with  making difficult trade-offs among defense and nondefense-related  spending. Within the defense budget, it will need to allocate resources  among the services and their respective personnel, operations, and  investment accounts while faced with multiple competing priorities for  funds. DOD will need to ensure that each service manages personnel levels  efficiently since personnel costs have been rising significantly over the  past decade. We have previously reported that the average cost of  compensation (including cash, non-cash, and deferred benefits) for  enlisted members and officers was about $112,000 in fiscal year 2004. The  growth in military personnel costs has been fueled in part by increases in  basic pay, housing allowances, recruitment and retention bonuses,  incentive pay and allowances, and other special pay. Furthermore, DOD’s  costs to provide benefits, such as health care, have continued to spiral  upward.
As noted earlier, we have found that valid and reliable data about the  number of personnel required to meet an agency’s needs are critical  because human capital shortfalls can threaten an agency’s ability to  perform its missions efficiently and effectively. Data-driven  decisionmaking is one of the critical factors in successful strategic  workforce management. High-performing organizations routinely use  current, valid, and reliable data to inform decisions about current and  future workforce needs. In addition, they stay alert to emerging mission  demands and remain open to reevaluating their human capital practices. In  addition, federal agencies have a responsibility to provide sufficient  transparency over significant decisions affecting requirements for federal  dollars so that Congress can effectively evaluate the benefits, costs, and  risks.
DOD’s record in providing a transparent basis for requested military  personnel levels can be improved. We previously reported that DOD’s  annual report to Congress on manpower requirements for fiscal year 2005  broadly stated a justification for DOD’s requested active military  personnel, but did not provide specific analyses to support the  justification. In addition, DOD’s 2006 QDR report did not provide  significant insight into the basis for its conclusion that the size of today’s  forces—both the active and reserve components across all four military  services—is appropriate to meet current and projected operational  demands. Moreover, the Marine Corps’ decision to initiate a new study to  assess active military personnel requirements shortly after the 2006 QDR  was completed is an indication that the QDR did not achieve consensus in  required end strength levels.
In evaluating DOD’s proposal to permanently increase active Army and  Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress  should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. It is clear that  Army and Marine Corps forces are experiencing a high pace of operations  due to both the war in Iraq and broader demands imposed by the Global  War on Terrorism that may provide a basis for DOD to consider permanent  increases in military personnel levels. However, it is also clear that  increasing personnel levels will entail significant costs that must be  weighed against other priorities. The Army has previously stated that it  costs about $1.2 billion per year to increase active military personnel  levels by 10,000. Moreover, equipping and training new units will require  billions of additional dollars for startup and recurring costs.
DOD has not yet provided a detailed analysis to support its proposal to  permanently increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps. Given the  significant implications for the nation’s ability to carry out its defense  strategy along with the significant costs involved, additional information  will be needed to fully evaluate the Secretary of Defense’s proposal.
To help illuminate the basis for its request, DOD will need to provide  answers to the following questions:    What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases  are linked to the defense strategy? To what extent are the proposed  military personnel increases based on supporting operations in Iraq versus  an assessment of longer-term requirements?
How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support  forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as training and  acquisition?
What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force  and how does the department plan to fund this increase?
Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential  challenges such as recruiting additional personnel, providing facilities, and  procuring new equipment?
Our prior work on recruiting and retention challenges, along with our  prior reports on challenges in equipping modular units, identify some  potential challenges that could arise in implementing an increase in the  size of the Army and Marine Corps at a time when the services are  supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, we  have reported that 19 percent of DOD’s occupational specialties for  enlisted personnel were consistently overfilled while other occupational  specialties were underfilled by 41 percent for fiscal years 2000 through  2005. In addition, we have reported that the Army is experiencing  numerous challenges in equipping modular brigades on schedule, in part  due to the demands associated with meeting the equipment needs of units  deploying overseas. Such challenges will need to be carefully managed if  Congress approves the Secretary of Defense’s proposal.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may  have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Janet St. Laurent at  (202) 512-4402. Other individuals making key contributions to this  statement include: Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant Director; Kelly  Baumgartner; J. Andrew Walker; Margaret Morgan; Deborah Colantonio;  Harold Reich; Aisha Cabrer; Susan Ditto; Julie Matta; and Terry  Richardson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy  With Some Risks. GAO/NSIAD-97-66. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 1997.
Force Structure: Army’s Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional  Forces Have Produced Few Results. GAO/NSIAD-98-65. Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 26, 1998.
Force Structure: Opportunities Exist for the Army to Reduce Risk in  Executing the Military Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-99-47. Washington, D.C.:  Mar. 15, 1999.
Force Structure: Army is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces,  but Challenges Remain. GAO/NSIAD-00-162. Washington, D.C.: July 18,  2000.
Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency  Operations. GAO-01-198. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2001.
Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well  Established. GAO-01-485. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of  Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense  Strategy. GAO-05-200. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005.
Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement  and Fund Modular Forces. GAO-05-443T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of  Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926.  Washington, D.C.: Sep. 29, 2005.
Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain  Uncertain. GAO-06-548T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006.
Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force  Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for  High-Demand Support Forces. GAO-06-962. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 5,  2006.
Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More  Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation  Plans. GAO-06-745. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 6, 2006.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.