Department of Energy: Observations on DOE's Management Challenges and Steps Taken to Address Them
Published: 2013-07-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOE missions encompass energy resources, scientific and technological development, environmental cleanup, and nuclear security. Management of major projects and contracts within EM and NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, remain on GAO's list of areas at high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, where they have been listed since 1990. Progress has been made, but GAO continues to identify management problems related to cost and schedule overruns on major environmental cleanup and nuclear projects and safety problems at DOE sites that have not been fully addressed.
This testimony discusses DOE's management challenges in (1) managing major projects and programs, (2) managing security and safety at DOE sites, and (3) producing reliable enterprise-wide information, including budget and cost data.
Over the past decade, GAO has made numerous recommendations in its reports to address challenges such as those identified in this testimony. DOE agreed with most of them and is taking steps toward implementing them. GAO's work has also recognized some of the steps that DOE has taken to address these challenges. For example, in the most recent update of GAO's high-risk series, GAO narrowed the focus of the high-risk designation of DOE's contract management to EM's and NNSA's major contracts and projects (i.e., those costing $750 million or more). GAO will continue to monitor DOE's implementation of actions to resolve long-standing management challenges, including actions taken in response to GAO's recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As GAO has reported over the last decade, the Department of Energys (DOE) management of major projects and programs, security and safety at DOE sites, and reliable enterprise-wide management information, including budget and cost data, are among the most persistent management challenges the department faces.
 Challenges managing major projects and programs . The Office of Environmental Management (EM) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) continue to face challenges managing major projects and programs, which have incurred significant cost increases and schedule delays. For example, GAO reported in July 2013 that the cost estimate range for a project to construct a modern Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at DOEs Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, had increased five- to seven-fold to up to $6.5 billion since the projects inception in 2004. Furthermore, the most recent cost estimate range may no longer be valid after the contractor reported in August 2012 that the UPFs roof would have to be raised 13 feet. GAO is currently assessing DOE cost estimating policies and practices and plans to issue a report based on this work later this year. DOE's actions to improve project management appear promising, but their impact on meeting cost and schedule targets may not be clear. Because all ongoing major projects have been in construction for several years, neither EM nor NNSA has a major project that can yet demonstrate the impact of DOE's recent reforms.
 Challenges managing security and safety . Reports about the July 2012 security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex identified numerous, long-standing and systemic security issues across the nuclear security enterprise and significant safety problems at DOE sites that have not been fully addressed. A NNSA Security Task Force and an independent panel convened at the request of the Secretary of Energy also found systemic security issues across the nuclear security enterprise, and found deficiencies in DOEs security culture and oversight, which closely matched issues GAO identified a decade earlier. GAO has ongoing work assessing DOE security reforms and plans to issue a report based on this work later this year. GAO has also found that DOE management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety problems at NNSA sites.
 Challenges in producing reliable enterprise-wide management information . GAO has reported that DOE does not have reliable enterprise-wide management data needed to, among other things, prepare its budget requests, identify the costs of its activities, and ensure the validity of its cost estimates. For example, in June 2013, GAO reported that while different approaches are allowed by Cost Accounting Standards, NNSAs management and operations contractors differ in how they classify and allocate indirect costs at NNSA laboratories, which limits NNSAs ability to assess cost data and meaningfully compare cost management performance across laboratories. In addition, GAO reported in June 2010 that NNSA could not accurately identify the total costs to operate and maintain weapons facilities and infrastructure because of differences among contractors accounting practices. GAO is currently monitoring DOEs ongoing efforts to improve its capability to produce reliable enterprise-wide information.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our recent work on some of the  pressing management challenges that the Department of Energy (DOE)  faces. DOE is responsible for executing some of the nation’s most  complex and technologically advanced missions, working to ensure the  energy future of the United States, providing scientific and technological  leadership, overseeing the nation’s nuclear security enterprise, and  resolving the environmental legacy of the Cold War. DOE carries out  these activities through mission-based program offices including the  Office of Environmental Management (EM) and the separately organized  National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Collectively, these and  other DOE offices operate dozens of government-owned, contractor- operated facilities throughout the United States.
Our prior testimonies before this Subcommittee in September 2012 and  March 2013, as well as reports we have issued over the past decade,  have highlighted various challenges that DOE components—principally  EM and NNSA—face in carrying out their responsibilities. These  testimonies and reports have highlighted management challenges  concerning (1) EM and NNSA projects and programs; (2) security and  safety at DOE sites; and (3) reliable enterprise-wide management  information, including budget and cost data. Regarding project and  program management, EM’s and NNSA’s management of major projects  and contracts remains on our list of areas at high risk of waste, fraud,  abuse, and mismanagement, where they have been listed since 1990.  Regarding security and safety management, we have frequently reported  on security issues and safety incidents at DOE facilities—as when we  testified before this Subcommittee in March 2013 on the temporary  shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 2004 and,  more recently, the security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex  in July 2012. Regarding reliable enterprise-wide management  information, we have reported on matters such as the steps that DOE has  taken to improve its budgeting and cost-estimating practices and the  weaknesses that persist in these areas.
In addition to these issues, NNSA’s relationship with DOE has come  under renewed scrutiny. Notably, the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense  Authorization Act created the Congressional Advisory Panel on the  Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to examine options and  make recommendations for revising the governance structure, mission,  and management of the nuclear security enterprise. As the new Secretary  of Energy has alluded to in recent testimony, addressing the management  challenges that we and other organizations have identified, as well as  clarifying departmental roles and responsibilities, will be among his top  priorities.
In this context, my testimony today discusses three of DOE’s most  persistent management challenges: (1) management of projects and  programs, (2) management of security and safety at DOE sites, and (3)  reliable enterprise-wide management information, including budget and  cost data. It focuses on our reports issued from January 2007 to June  2013. Detailed information about the scope and methodology used to  conduct this work can be found in each of our issued reports. We  conducted the performance audit work that supports this statement in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOE’s missions encompass energy resources, scientific and  technological development, environmental cleanup, and nuclear security.  DOE established EM in 1989 to carry out the mission to clean up  radioactive wastes, spent nuclear fuel, excess plutonium and uranium,  contaminated facilities, and contaminated soil and groundwater that  resulted from nuclear weapons production and government-sponsored  nuclear energy research. NNSA, a separately organized agency within  DOE, has primary responsibility for ensuring the safety, security, and  reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, including life  extension programs for multiple weapon types in the U.S. stockpile, for  promoting nuclear nonproliferation, and for naval reactor programs. In  fiscal year 2013, EM and NNSA received about $17 billion to support  these programs and related activities, which is approximately 60 percent  of DOE’s total budget. Figure 1 shows the fiscal year 2013 funding for  EM, NNSA, and other DOE programs and activities.
Contractors operate DOE sites and often conduct their work under  management and operating (M&O) contracts. These contracts provide  the contractor with discretion in carrying out the mission of the particular  contract. Currently, DOE spends 90 percent of its annual budget on  contracts, making it the largest non–Department of Defense contracting  agency in the government.
section_title: DOE Faces Challenges Managing Its Major Projects and Programs
paragraphs: As we have reported in the past decade, DOE continues to face  challenges managing its major projects and programs, which have  incurred significant cost increases and schedule delays in several  instances. Some recent examples include:
As we reported earlier this month, NNSA estimates that the project to  build the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National  Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will cost between five  and seven times more than previously thought and will be completed  over a decade behind schedule. NNSA estimated in 2004 that the  UPF would cost from $600 million to $1.1 billion to construct and  would start operating in 2012. As of June 2012, estimates were  revised to a cost range from $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion and a 2023  date for the start of operations. In June 2012, the Deputy Secretary of  Energy approved the latter cost range and schedule and deferred  significant portions of the original project scope. Two months later, the  UPF contractor concluded that UPF’s roof would have to be raised 13  feet and that the start of construction would be further delayed,  resulting in approximately $540 million in additional costs. As we  reported, these problems occurred because the contractor did not  adequately manage and integrate the design work subcontracted to  four other contractors. Given these additional costs and DOE’s stated  plan to pay for these additional costs from its contingency fund, it is  unclear if the cost range estimate approved in June 2012 remains  valid.
In March 2013, we reported preliminary observations from our  ongoing review of NNSA’s Plutonium Disposition Program that  highlight the need for continued efforts by DOE to improve contract  and project management. We reported DOE is currently forecasting  an increase in the total project cost for the MOX Fuel Fabrication  Facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina from $4.9 billion  to $7.7 billion and a delay in the start of operations from October 2016  to November 2019. According to NNSA officials and the contractor  for the MOX facility, inadequately designed critical system  components, such as the gloveboxes to be used for handling  plutonium and the infrastructure needed to support these gloveboxes,  are among the primary reasons for the proposed cost increase and  schedule delay. The performance baseline for the MOX facility was  set several years before NNSA issued guidance in 2012 to set cost  and schedule baselines only after design work is 90 percent  complete. As part of our ongoing review of NNSA’s Plutonium  Disposition Program, we are evaluating whether such guidance would  have been useful for NNSA to apply to the MOX facility, as well as the  potential impact this guidance might have had on mitigating cost  increases and schedule delays.
In December 2012, we reported that the estimated cost to construct  the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in Hanford,  Washington, had tripled to $12.3 billion since its inception in 2000 and  that the scheduled completion date had slipped by nearly a decade to  2019. We reported that DOE’s incentives and management controls  were inadequate for ensuring effective project management, and DOE  had in some instances prematurely rewarded the contractor for  resolving technical issues and completing work. DOE generally  agreed with the several recommendations we made to improve Waste  Treatment and Immobilization Plant projects and contract  management. In May 2013, we reported that significant technical  challenges at the Waste Treatment Plant remained unresolved,  contributing to uncertainty as to whether the project will operate safely  and effectively.
We also reported in December 2012 on progress by EM and NNSA in  managing nonmajor projects (i.e., those costing less than $750  million).  We found that of the 71 nonmajor projects that EM and  NNSA completed or had under way from fiscal years 2008 to 2012, 21  met or are expected to meet their performance targets for scope, cost,  and completion date. However, 23 projects did not meet or were not  expected to meet one or more of those three performance targets. We  also noted that, for 27 projects, many had insufficiently documented  performance targets for scope, cost, or completion date, which  prevented us from determining whether they met their performance  targets. As a result, we recommended, among other things, that EM  and NNSA clearly define, document, and track the scope, cost, and  completion date targets for each of their nonmajor projects. EM and  NNSA agreed with our recommendations. As we noted in our  February 2013 high-risk update, we have shifted our focus to major  contracts and projects, but we will continue to monitor the  performance of nonmajor projects.
In April 2010, we reported that weak management by DOE and NNSA  had allowed the cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities  at the National Ignition Facility to increase substantially. We reported  that, since 2005, ignition-related costs have increased by around 25  percent—from $1.6 billion in 2005 to over $2 billion in 2010—and that  the planned completion date for these activities had slipped from the  end of fiscal year 2011 to the end of fiscal year 2012 or beyond. We  made several recommendations to address program management  weaknesses—which NNSA agreed with—and we are currently  monitoring their implementation. Ten years earlier, in August 2000, we  had reported that poor management and oversight of the National  Ignition Facility construction project at Lawrence Livermore National  Laboratory had increased the facility’s cost by $1 billion and delayed  its scheduled completion date by 6 years.
In March 2009, we reported that NNSA and the Department of  Defense had not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical  risks for the B61 nuclear bomb and the W76 nuclear warhead  refurbishments. For the B61 life extension program, NNSA was only  able to stay on schedule by significantly reducing the number of  weapons undergoing refurbishment and abandoning some  refurbishment objectives. We made a number of recommendations to  improve the management of the nuclear weapons refurbishment  process. NNSA agreed with these recommendations, and we are  monitoring their implementation.
We are currently assessing DOE cost estimating policies and practices  and plan to issue a report based on this work later this year. DOE’s  actions to improve project management appear promising, but their  impact on meeting cost and schedule targets may not be clear. Because  all ongoing major projects have been in construction for several years,  neither EM nor NNSA has a major project that can yet demonstrate the  impact of DOE’s recent reforms.
section_title: DOE Faces Challenges Managing Security and Safety
paragraphs: As we testified before this Subcommittee in March 2013, reviews of the  July 2012 security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex  identified numerous, long-standing, and systemic security issues across  the nuclear security enterprise, and significant safety problems remain at  DOE sites that have not been fully addressed. Some examples from our  recent work include:
With regard to security, as we testified in March 2013, investigations  of the security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex  performed by NNSA, the DOE Office of Inspector General, and the  DOE Office of Independent Oversight found problems with NNSA’s  and its contractors’ performance, including problems with the  complex’s physical security systems, such as alarms, and the training  and response of the heavily armed guards supplied by NNSA’s  protective force contractor. In addition, both a NNSA Security Task  Force and an independent panel convened at the request of the  Secretary of Energy and composed of three former executives from  federal agencies and the private sector found systemic security issues  across the nuclear security enterprise. Both the Secretary’s panel and  the NNSA Security Task Force’s leader found deficiencies in DOE’s  security culture and oversight, with some of these being closely  matched to issues we identified a decade earlier. DOE took a number  of actions in response to the security breach and the findings of the  panel and task force. These actions included, among other things,  immediate actions to repair security equipment, as well as longer-term  actions that aim to improve NNSA and DOE oversight of security. As  we testified in March 2013, in assessing DOE’s actions regarding  security and NNSA’s new security oversight process, a central  question will be whether they lead to sustained improvements in  security at the Y-12 National Security Complex and across the nuclear  security enterprise. We have ongoing work assessing DOE security  reforms and plan to issue a report based on this work later this year.
With regard to safety, in September 2012 we testified before this  Subcommittee about NNSA management weaknesses that have  contributed to persistent safety problems at NNSA sites, including lax  attitudes toward safety procedures, inadequacies in identifying and  addressing safety programs with appropriate corrective actions, and  inadequate oversight by NNSA site offices. We stated in our  testimony that in March 2010, in an effort to address safety problems  across the nuclear security enterprise, the Secretary of Energy  announced a reform effort aimed at modifying DOE’s oversight  approach in order to “provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor  and implement safety and security programs without excessive  federal oversight or overly prescriptive departmental requirements.”  As we noted in the testimony, DOE’s safety reforms did not fully  address continuing safety concerns and, in fact, may have actually  weakened independent oversight. We noted, for example, that DOE’s  Office of Independent Oversight staff must coordinate its assessment  activities with NNSA site office management to maximize the use of  resources, raising concerns about whether Office of Independent  Oversight staff would be sufficiently independent from site office  management. In our April 2012 report, we recommended that DOE  analyze the costs and benefits of its safety reform effort and identify  how the effort will help address safety concerns. DOE agreed with our  recommendations.
Moreover, since our September 2012 testimony, DOE’s Office of  Independent Oversight has raised concerns about ongoing safety issues,  including reluctance by workers at NNSA’s Pantex Plant to raise safety  problems for fear of retaliation and a perception that cost took priority  over safety, as well as inadequate controls to protect workers or the  public in the case of earthquake, fires, or radiation exposures at the Y-12  National Security Complex. In addition, a March 2013 independent  evaluation of safety culture at DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and  Security (HSS)—which generally provides policy direction and  independent oversight of safety and security at DOE sites—found that  HSS staff raised concerns that the shift in recent years toward a more  collaborative oversight relationship with site management had weakened  HSS’s effectiveness in providing independent oversight and  enforcement.
section_title: DOE Has Not Produced Reliable Enterprise-Wide Management Data
paragraphs: For more than a decade, we have reported that DOE has not produced  reliable enterprise-wide management data needed to, among other  things, prepare its budget requests, identify the costs of its activities and  ensure the validity of its cost estimates. Some recent examples include:  In June 2013, we reported that NNSA’s M&O contractors differ in how  they classify and allocate indirect costs at NNSA laboratories.  Although different approaches are allowed by Cost Accounting  Standards, these differences limit NNSA’s ability to assess cost data  and meaningfully compare cost management performance across  laboratories, potentially impeding NNSA’s efforts to oversee M&O  contractors’ costs. This work built on the report we issued in June  2010, in which we found that NNSA could not accurately identify the  total costs to operate and maintain weapons facilities and  infrastructure because of differences among contractors’ accounting  practices. We concluded that, without the ability to consistently  identify program costs, NNSA did not have the ability to adequately  justify future presidential budget requests and risked being unable to  identify both the return on investment of planned budget increases  and opportunities for cost savings. As a result, we recommended that  NNSA require M&O contractors report to NNSA annually on the total  costs (i.e., both direct and indirect costs) to operate and maintain  weapons facilities and infrastructure.
In July 2012, we reported that NNSA did not comply with DOE’s order  that defines budget formulation because the agency believed the  order expired in 2003 and no longer applied to NNSA budget  activities. DOE’s order on budget formulation outlines the  requirements for the department’s annual budget formulation process,  including that budget requests shall be based on cost estimates that  have been thoroughly reviewed and deemed reasonable. However,  we found that NNSA is guided by its own policy for its planning,  programming, budgeting, and evaluation (PPBE) process and its  associated activities, and found significant deficiencies in NNSA’s  implementation of the process. For example, we found that NNSA did  not have a thorough, documented process for assessing the validity of  its budget estimates prior to their inclusion in the President’s budget  submission to Congress, thereby limiting the reliability and credibility  of the budget submission, but rather conducted informal,  undocumented reviews of contractor-submitted budget estimates. In  addition, we found that NNSA’s annual budget validation review  process occurred too late in the budget cycle to inform agency or  congressional budget development or appropriations decisions. As a  result, we made a number of recommendations to DOE and NNSA to  improve the budget review process. The agencies agreed with most of  these recommendations.
In January 2012, we reported that costs for contractor-provided  support functions at NNSA and DOE Office of Science sites—such as  procuring goods, managing human resources, and maintaining  facilities—were not fully known for fiscal years 2007 through 2011  because DOE changed its data collection approach beginning in 2010  to improve its data and, as a result, did not have complete and  comparable cost data for all years. We reported that the data for  fiscal year 2011 were more complete but that changes to DOE’s  definitions for support functions made it difficult to compare costs  across all years. We recommended several actions to streamline  contractor-provided support functions at NNSA and DOE sites. NNSA  and DOE agreed with these recommendations.
In conclusion, while DOE’s management challenges are significant, we  have noted in our recent work areas of progress. We have made  numerous recommendations in our reports to address challenges such as  those identified in this testimony, and DOE has agreed with and  implemented most of them. In addition, our work has recognized steps  that DOE has taken to address these challenges. For example, in the  most recent update of our high-risk series in February 2013, we narrowed  the focus of the high-risk designation of DOE’s contract management to  EM’s and NNSA’s major contracts and projects. We did so to  acknowledge progress made in managing EM’s and NNSA’s nonmajor  projects, noting that DOE continued to demonstrate strong commitment  and top leadership support for improving contract and project  management in EM and NNSA. We also noted that DOE had taken steps  to enhance oversight, such as requiring peer reviews and independent  cost estimates for projects with values of more than $100 million, as well  as to improve the accuracy and consistency of data in DOE’s central  repository for project data.
Over the past several years, management challenges such as those  discussed here have prompted some to call for removing NNSA from  DOE and either move it to another department or establish it as an  independent agency. However, as we have previously stated for the  record, it is our view that few, if any, of NNSA’s management challenges  stem from the organizational relationship between NNSA and DOE. As  the new Secretary of Energy considers needed reforms in these areas,  we note that DOE’s management of projects and programs, security and  safety, and enterprise-wide data must improve—regardless of the  department’s structure. We will continue to monitor DOE’s implementation  of actions to resolve its long-standing management challenges, including  actions that we have recommended to facilitate the resolution of these  challenges.
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this testimony are Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director, and Rob Grace,  Nancy Kintner-Meyer, Michelle Munn, Cheryl Peterson, Jeff Rueckhaus,  Rebecca Shea, and Kiki Theodoropoulos.
section_title: Selected Recent GAO Products Assessing the Department of Energy’s Management Efforts
paragraphs: The following is a selection of GAO’s recent work assessing the  Department of Energy’s management efforts.
National Nuclear Security Administration: Laboratories’ Indirect Cost  Management Has Improved, but Additional Opportunities Exist,  GAO-13-534 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2013).
Department of Energy: Observations on Project and Program Cost  Estimating in NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management,  GAO-13-510T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2013).
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on DOE’s and  NNSA’s Efforts to Enhance Oversight of Security, Safety, and Project and  Contract Management, GAO-13-482T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2013).
High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: February  2013).
Recovery Act: Most DOE Cleanup Projects Are Complete, but Project  Management Guidance Could Be Strengthened, GAO-13-23  (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2012).
Department of Energy: Better Information Needed to Determine If  Nonmajor Projects Meet Performance Targets, GAO-13-129  (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2012).
Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: DOE Needs to Take Action to Resolve  Technical and Management Challenges, GAO-13-38 (Washington, D.C.:  Dec. 19, 2012).
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the  National Nuclear Security Administration’s Oversight of Safety, Security,  and Project Management, GAO-12-912T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12,  2012).
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the  Organization and Management of the National Nuclear Security  Administration, GAO-12-867T (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2012).
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Reviews of Budget  Estimates and Decisions on Resource Trade-offs Need Strengthening,  GAO-12-806 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2012).
Spent Nuclear Fuel: Accumulating Quantities at Commercial Reactors  Present Storage and Other Challenges, GAO-12-797 (Washington, D.C.:  Aug. 15, 2012).
Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and Benefits of Its  Safety Reform Effort, GAO-12-347 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012).
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium Research  Facility at Los Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs, GAO-12-337  (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2012).
Department of Energy: Additional Opportunities Exist to Streamline  Support Functions at NNSA and Office of Science Sites, GAO-12-255  (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2012).
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options: DOE Needs to Enhance Planning for  Technology Assessment and Collaboration with Industry and Other  Countries, GAO-12-70 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2011).
High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February  2011).
Commercial Nuclear Waste: Effects of a Termination of the Yucca  Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned, GAO-11-229  (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2011).
Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its  Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and  Technology Readiness, GAO-11-103 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2010).
Recovery Act: Most DOE Cleanup Projects Appear to Be Meeting Cost  and Schedule Targets, but Assessing Impact of Spending Remains a  Challenge, GAO-10-784 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010).
Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to Identify Total Costs of Weapons  Complex Infrastructure and Research and Production Capabilities,  GAO-10-582 (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2010).
Department of Energy: Actions Needed to Develop High-Quality Cost  Estimates for Construction and Environmental Cleanup Projects,  GAO-10-199 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2010).
Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to Identify Total Costs of Weapons  Complex Infrastructure and Research and Production Capabilities,  GAO-10-582 (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2010).
Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for  the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives,  GAO-10-48 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2009).
Information Security: Actions Needed to Better Manage, Protect, and  Sustain Improvements to Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Classified  Computer Network, GAO-10-28 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2009).
Nuclear Security: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security  Improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully  Implemented and Sustained, GAO-09-321 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16,  2009).
Nuclear Weapons: NNSA and DOD Need to More Effectively Manage the  Stockpile Life Extension Program, GAO-09-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.  2, 2009).
Nuclear and Worker Safety: Actions Needed to Determine the  Effectiveness of Safety Improvement Efforts at NNSA’s Weapons  Laboratories, GAO-08-73 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007).
Nuclear Safety:  Department of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its  Independent Oversight of Nuclear Facilities and Operations, GAO-09-61  (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2008).
National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to  Improve Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs, GAO-07-36  (Washington, D.C.: Jan.19, 2007).
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