Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List
Published: 2007-10-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. Because the list is an important tool for combating terrorism, GAO examined (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records. From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats. Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data. Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped--within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the events of September 11, 2001, agencies within the Departments  Since the events of September 11, 2001, agencies within the Departments  of Homeland Security, Justice, and State, as well as state and local law  of Homeland Security, Justice, and State, as well as state and local law  enforcement organizations and the intelligence community, have  enforcement organizations and the intelligence community, have  implemented enhanced procedures to collect and share information about  implemented enhanced procedures to collect and share information about  known or suspected terrorists who pose a threat to homeland security and  known or suspected terrorists who pose a threat to homeland security and  to track their movements. One important tool used by these agencies is the  to track their movements. One important tool used by these agencies is the  terrorist watch list, which contains records with identifying or  terrorist watch list, which contains records with identifying or  biographical information—such as name and date of birth—of foreign and  U.S. citizens with known or appropriately suspected links to terrorism.
Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, the Terrorist  Screening Center—an entity that has been operational since December  2003 under the administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation  (FBI)—was established to develop and maintain the U.S. government’s  consolidated terrorist screening database (the watch list) and to provide  for the use of watch list records during security-related screening  processes. To build upon and provide additional guidance related to this  directive, in August 2004, the President signed Homeland Security  Presidential Directive 11. Among other things, this directive required the  Secretary of Homeland Security—in coordination with the heads of  appropriate federal departments and agencies—to outline a strategy to  enhance the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities and  develop a prioritized investment and implementation plan for detecting  and interdicting suspected terrorists and terrorist activities.
The Terrorist Screening Center receives the vast majority of its  information about known or appropriately suspected terrorists from the  National Counterterrorism Center, which compiles information on  international terrorists from a wide range of executive branch  departments and agencies, such as the Department of State, the Central  Intelligence Agency, and the FBI. In general, international terrorists  engage in terrorist activities that occur primarily outside the territorial  jurisdiction of the United States or that transcend national boundaries and  include individuals in the United States with connections to terrorist  activities outside the United States. In addition to providing information  on international terrorists to the National Counterterrorism Center, the  FBI directly provides the Terrorist Screening Center with information  about known or suspected domestic terrorists, that is, individuals who  operate primarily within the United States, such as Ted Kaczynski (the  “Unabomber”). The center consolidates this information into a sensitive  but unclassified watch list and makes records available as appropriate for  a variety of screening purposes. For instance, the Transportation Security  Administration directs airlines to use portions of the Terrorist Screening  Center’s watch list—the No Fly and Selectee lists—to screen the names of  passengers to identify those who may pose threats to aviation. Also, to  help ensure that known or appropriately suspected terrorists are tracked,  and denied entry into the United States, as appropriate, applicable watch  list records are to be checked by Department of State consular officers  before issuing U.S. visas and passports, and by U.S. Customs and Border  Protection officers before admitting persons—including U.S. citizens—at  air, land, and sea ports of entry. Further, screening against applicable  watch list records can occur anywhere in the nation when, for example,  state or local law enforcement officers stop individuals for traffic  violations or other offenses.
When an individual on the terrorist watch list is identified or encountered  during screening, several entities—the Terrorist Screening Center, the  screening agency, investigative agencies, and the intelligence  community—can be involved in deciding what action to take. Regarding a  foreign citizen seeking to immigrate to the United States permanently or  temporarily for business or pleasure purposes, screening agencies rely on  immigration laws that specify criteria and rules for deciding whether or  not to admit the individual. In general, foreign citizens that have engaged  in or are likely to engage in terrorist-related activities are ineligible to  receive visas and ineligible to enter the United States. If a foreign citizen is  legally admitted into the United States—either permanently or  temporarily—and subsequently engages in or is likely to engage in a  terrorist activity, the individual may be removed to that person’s country  of citizenship. U.S. citizens returning to the United States from abroad are  not subject to the admissibility requirements applicable to foreign citizens,  regardless of whether or not they are subjects of watch list records. These  individuals only need to establish their U.S. citizenship to the satisfaction  of the examining officer—by, for example, presenting a U.S. passport—to  obtain entry into the United States. These individuals, however, can be  subjected to additional screening by U.S. Customs and Border Protection  before being admitted to determine the potential threat they pose, with  related actions taken, if needed.
This report is a public version of the restricted report that we also  provided to you on October 11, 2007. The various departments and  agencies we reviewed deemed some of the information in the restricted  report as Sensitive Security Information or Law Enforcement Sensitive  information, which must be protected from public disclosures. Therefore,  this report omits certain information associated with vulnerabilities we  identified in existing screening processes and measures that could be  taken to address those vulnerabilities. This report also omits key details  regarding (1) certain policies and procedures associated with the  development and use of the terrorist watch list and (2) specific outcomes  of encounters with individuals who were positively matched to the watch  list. In the context of agency efforts to screen for known or appropriately  suspected terrorists, the restricted report addressed the following  questions:  In general, what standards do the National Counterterrorism Center  and the FBI use in determining which individuals are appropriate for  inclusion on the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated watch list?
Since the Terrorist Screening Center became operational in December  2003, how many times have screening and law enforcement agencies  positively matched individuals to terrorist watch list records, and what  do the results or outcomes of these encounters indicate about the role  of the watch list as a counterterrorism tool?
To what extent do the principal screening agencies whose missions  most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers check  against all records in the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated  watch list? If the entire watch list is not being checked, why not, what  potential vulnerabilities exist, and what actions are being planned to  address these vulnerabilities?
To what extent are Department of Homeland Security component  agencies monitoring known incidents in which subjects of watch list  records pass undetected through screening processes, and what  corrective actions have been implemented or are being planned to  address these vulnerabilities?
What actions has the U.S. government taken to ensure that the terrorist  watch list is used as effectively as possible, governmentwide and in  other appropriate venues?
Although the information provided in this version of the report is more  limited in scope, it covers the same general questions as the restricted  report. Also, the overall methodology used for our restricted report is  relevant to this report because the information contained in this report  was derived from the restricted report. To address the questions in our  restricted report, we reviewed the Terrorist Screening Center’s standard  operating procedures, statistics on encounters with individuals on the  terrorist watch list, and other relevant documentation; and we interviewed  Terrorist Screening Center officials, including the director and the  principal deputy director. To identify standards used to nominate  individuals for inclusion on the watch list, we reviewed documentation  and interviewed senior officials from the National Counterterrorism  Center and the FBI.
Also, to assess the outcomes of encounters and the extent to which  screening agencies check against the entire watch list, we reviewed  documentation and interviewed senior officials from the FBI’s  Counterterrorism Division and the principal screening agencies whose  missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers.  Specifically, at the Transportation Security Administration, we examined  the prescreening of air passengers prior to their boarding a flight; at U.S.  Customs and Border Protection, we examined the screening of travelers  entering the United States through ports of entry; and, at the Department  of State, we examined the screening of nonimmigrant visa applicants. We  did not review the Department of State’s use of the watch list to screen  passport applicants. We also visited a nonprobability sample of screening  agencies and investigative agencies in geographic areas of four states  (California, Michigan, New York, and Texas). We chose these locations on  the basis of geographic variation and other factors. Further, to determine  the extent to which agencies monitor known incidents in which subjects  of watch list records pass undetected through screening processes and  efforts to address these vulnerabilities, we reviewed documentation and  interviewed senior officials from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Services—which screens individuals who  apply for immigration benefits or U.S. citizenship—and the Transportation  Security Administration. Finally, to assess the actions the U.S. government  has taken to ensure that the terrorist watch list is used as effectively as  possible, we compared the status of watch list-related strategies, planning,  and initiatives with the expectations set forth in Homeland Security  Presidential Directives 6 and 11. We considered federal plans to identify  screening opportunities, the private sector’s use of watch list records, and  the Department of State’s progress in sharing watch list information with  foreign governments.
Regarding statistical information we obtained from the Terrorist Screening  Center and screening agencies—such as the number of positive matches  and actions taken—we discussed the sources of the data with agency  officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of the  statistics. We determined that the statistics were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this review. We did not review or assess the derogatory  information available on individuals nominated to the terrorist watch list,  partly because such information involved ongoing counterterrorism  investigations. Also, a primary agency that collects information on known  or suspected terrorists—the Central Intelligence Agency—declined to  meet with us or provide us documentation on its watch list-related  activities. The Homeland Security Council—which is chaired by the  Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism— also denied our request for an interview. We performed our work on the  restricted version of this report from April 2005 through September 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Appendix I presents more details about our objectives, scope, and  methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In April 2003, we reported that watch lists were maintained by numerous  federal agencies and that the agencies did not have a consistent and  uniform approach to sharing information on individuals with possible links  to terrorism. Our report recommended that the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with the heads  of departments and agencies that have and use watch lists, lead an effort  to consolidate and standardize the federal government’s watch list  structures and policies. Subsequently, pursuant to Homeland Security  Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), dated September 16, 2003, the Attorney  General established the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to consolidate  the government’s approach to terrorism screening and provide for the  appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in screening  processes. TSC’s consolidated watch list is the U.S. government’s master  repository for all known or appropriately suspected international and  domestic terrorist records used for watch list-related screening. TSC  records contain sensitive but unclassified information on terrorist  identities—such as name and date of birth—that can be shared with  screening agencies, whereas the classified derogatory information that  supports the watch list records is maintained in other law enforcement  and intelligence agency databases. Records for inclusion on the  consolidated watch list are nominated to TSC from the following two  sources:  Identifying information on individuals with ties to international  terrorism is provided to TSC through the National Counterterrorism  Center (NCTC), which is managed by the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence.
Identifying information on individuals with ties to purely domestic  terrorism is provided to TSC by the FBI.
HSPD-6 required the Attorney General—in coordination with the Secretary  of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of Central  Intelligence—to implement appropriate procedures and safeguards with  respect to all terrorist information related to U.S. persons (i.e., U.S.  citizens and lawful permanent residents) that is provided to NCTC  (formerly the Terrorist Threat Integration Center). According to TSC,  agencies within the intelligence community that collect and maintain  terrorist information and nominate individuals for inclusion on TSC’s  consolidated watch list are to do so in accordance with Executive Order  12333. With respect to U.S. persons, this order addresses the nature or  type of information that may be collected and the allowable methods for  collecting such information. It provides that agencies within the  intelligence community are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate  information concerning U.S. persons only in accordance with procedures  established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the  Attorney General, consistent with the authorities set out earlier in the  order. The order further provides that agencies within the intelligence  community are to use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible  when such collection is conducted within the United States or when  directed against U.S. persons abroad. Also, according to TSC officials, the  center requires annual training for all personnel concerning the Privacy  Act of 1974 to ensure that information collected on U.S. persons is handled  in accordance with applicable law.
To facilitate operational or mission-related screening, TSC sends  applicable records from its terrorist watch list to screening agency  systems for use in efforts to deter or detect the movements of known or  suspected terrorists. For instance, applicable TSC records are provided to  the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for use by airlines in  prescreening passengers; to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  system for use in screening travelers entering the United States; to a  Department of State system for use in screening visa applicants; and to  an FBI system for use by state and local law enforcement agencies  pursuant to arrests, detentions, and other criminal justice purposes.
When an individual makes an airline reservation, arrives at a U.S. port of  entry, or applies for a U.S. visa, or is stopped by state or local police within  the United States, the frontline screening agency or airline conducts a  name-based search of the individual against applicable terrorist watch list  records. In general, when the computerized name-matching system of an  airline or screening agency generates a “hit” (a potential name match)  against a watch list record, the airline or agency is to review each potential  match. Any obvious mismatches (negative matches) are to be resolved by  the airline or agency, if possible, as discussed in our September 2006  report. However, clearly positive or exact matches and matches that are  inconclusive (uncertain or difficult-to-verify) generally are to be referred  to the applicable screening agency’s intelligence or operations center and  TSC for closer examination. Specifically, airlines are to contact TSA’s  Office of Intelligence; CBP officers at U.S. ports of entry are to contact  CBP’s National Targeting Center; and Department of State consular  officers who process visa applications are to submit a request for a  security advisory opinion to Department of State headquarters. The  intelligence or operations center is to refer exact matches and  inconclusive matches to TSC. State and local law enforcement officials  generally are to refer exact matches and inconclusive matches directly to  TSC. In turn, TSC is to check its databases and other sources—including  classified databases maintained by NCTC and the FBI—and confirm  whether the individual is a positive, negative, or inconclusive match to the  watch list record.
TSC is to refer positive and inconclusive matches to the FBI’s  Counterterrorism Division to provide an opportunity for a  counterterrorism response. Deciding what law enforcement or screening  agency action to take, if any, can involve collaboration among the frontline  screening agency, NCTC or other intelligence community members, and  the FBI or other investigative agencies. If the encounter arises in the  context of an application for a visa or admission into the United States, the  screening agency’s adjudicating official determines whether the  circumstances trigger a statutory basis for inadmissibility. Generally,  NCTC and the FBI are involved because they maintain the underlying  derogatory information that supports terrorist watch list records, which is  needed to help determine the appropriate counterterrorism response. If  necessary, a member of an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force can respond in  person to interview and obtain additional information about the person  encountered. In other cases, the FBI will rely on the screening agency  and other law enforcement agencies—such as U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement—to respond and collect information. Figure 1  presents a general overview of the process used to resolve encounters  with individuals on the terrorist watch list.
To build upon and provide additional guidance related to HSPD-6, in  August 2004, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential  Directive 11 (HSPD-11). Among other things, this directive required the  Secretary of Homeland Security—in coordination with the heads of  appropriate federal departments and agencies—to submit two reports to  the President (through the Assistant to the President for Homeland  Security) related to the government’s approach to terrorist-related  screening. The first report was to outline a strategy to enhance the  effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities by developing  comprehensive and coordinated procedures and capabilities. The second  report was to provide a prioritized investment and implementation plan  for detecting and interdicting suspected terrorists and terrorist activities.  Specifically, the plan was to describe the “scope, governance, principles,  outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of  activities” to implement the U.S. government’s terrorism-related screening  policies. According to DHS officials, the department submitted the  required strategy and the investment and implementation plan to the  President in November 2004. Additional information on the status of the  strategy and implementation plan is presented later in this report.
section_title: In Assessing Individuals for Inclusion on TSC’s Watch List, Officials Rely upon Standards of Reasonableness That Inherently Involve Some Subjectivity
paragraphs: NCTC and FBI officials rely upon standards of reasonableness in  determining which individuals are appropriate for inclusion on TSC’s  watch list, but determining whether individuals meet these minimum  standards can involve some level of subjectivity. In accordance with  HSPD-6, TSC’s watch list is to contain information about individuals  “known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct  constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.” In  implementing this directive, NCTC and the FBI strive to ensure that  individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to  terrorism—in addition to individuals with known links—are nominated for  inclusion on the watch list. Thus, as TSC adds nominated records to its  watch list, the list may include individuals with possible ties to terrorism,  establishing a broad spectrum of individuals that meet the “known or  appropriately suspected” standard specified in HSPD-6. As such, inclusion  on the list does not automatically cause an alien to be, for example, denied  a visa or deemed inadmissible to enter the United States when the person  is identified by a screening agency. Rather, in these cases, screening  agency and law enforcement personnel may use the encounter with the  individual as an opportunity to collect information for assessing the  potential threat the person poses, tracking the person’s movements or  activities, and determining what actions to take, if any.
subsections: section_title: The National Counterterrorism Center Uses a “Reasonable Suspicion” Standard in Determining Which Individuals Are Appropriate for Inclusion on the Watch List
paragraphs: NCTC receives international terrorist-related information from executive  branch departments and agencies—such as the Department of State, the  Central Intelligence Agency, and the FBI—and enters this information into  its terrorist database. On a formal basis, Department of State embassies  around the world—in collaboration with applicable federal agencies  involved in security, law enforcement, and intelligence activities—are  expected to participate in the “Visas Viper” terrorist reporting program.  This congressionally mandated program is primarily administered through  a Visas Viper Committee at each overseas post. The committee is to meet  at least monthly to share information on known or suspected terrorists  and determine whether such information should be sent to NCTC for  inclusion in its terrorist database. NCTC’s database, known as the  Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, contains highly classified  information and serves as the U.S. government’s central classified  database with information on known or suspected international terrorists.  According to NCTC’s fact sheet on the Terrorist Identities Datamart  Environment, examples of conduct that will warrant an entry into NCTC’s  database includes persons who    commit international terrorist activity;    prepare or plan international terrorist activity;    gather information on potential targets for international terrorist    solicit funds or other things of value for international terrorist activity  or a terrorist organization;     solicit membership in an international terrorist organization;    provide material support, such as a safe house, transportation,  communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial  benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons, explosives, or  training; or     are members of or represent a foreign terrorist organization.
If NCTC determines that an individual meets the “known or appropriately  suspected” standard of HSPD-6, NCTC is to extract sensitive but  unclassified information on the individual’s identity from its classified  database—such as name and date of birth—and send forward a record to  TSC for inclusion on the watch list. According to NCTC procedures, NCTC  analysts are to review all information involving international terrorists  using a “reasonable suspicion” standard to determine whether an  individual is appropriate for nomination to TSC for inclusion on the watch  list. NCTC defines reasonable suspicion as information—both facts, as  well as rational inferences from those facts and the experience of the  reviewer—that is sufficient to cause an ordinarily prudent person to  believe that the individual under review may be a known or appropriately  suspected terrorist. According to NCTC, this information can include past  conduct, current actions, and credible intelligence concerning future  conduct. In making this determination, NCTC generally relies upon the  originating agency’s designation that there is reasonable suspicion to  believe a person is engaged in terrorist or terrorist-related activities as  being presumptively valid. For example, NCTC will rely on the FBI’s  designation of an individual as a known or suspected international  terrorist unless NCTC has specific and credible information that such a  designation is not appropriate.
Also, NCTC officials noted that an individual is to remain on the watch list  until the respective department or agency that provided the terrorist- related information that supports a nomination determines the individual  should be removed from the list. According to TSC, if the FBI conducts a  threat assessment on an individual that reveals no nexus to international  terrorism, then NCTC will initiate the process for deleting the record from  its database and the watch list. If NCTC receives information that it  determines is insufficient to nominate an individual to TSC for inclusion  on the watch list, the available information may remain in the NCTC  database until additional information is obtained to warrant nomination to  TSC or be deleted from the NCTC database.
section_title: Individuals Who Are Subjects of FBI Counterterrorism Investigations Are Generally Nominated to the Watch List
paragraphs: In general, individuals who are subjects of ongoing FBI counterterrorism  investigations are nominated to TSC for inclusion on the watch list,  including persons who are being preliminarily investigated to determine if  they have links to terrorism. If an investigation does not establish a  terrorism link, the FBI generally is to close the investigation and request  that TSC remove the person from the watch list.
In determining whether to open an investigation, the FBI uses guidelines  established by the Attorney General. These guidelines contain specific  standards for opening investigations. According to FBI officials, there  must be a “reasonable indication” of involvement in terrorism before  opening an investigation. The FBI noted, for example, that it is not  sufficient to open an investigation based solely on a neighbor’s complaint  or an anonymous tip or phone call. In such cases, however, the FBI could  use techniques short of opening an investigation to assess the potential  threat the person poses, which would not result in adding the individual to  the watch list at that time.
The FBI has established formal review and approval processes for  nominating individuals for inclusion on the watch list. In general, FBI case  agents are to send nominations to a unit at FBI headquarters for review  and approval. If approved, information on domestic terrorists is sent to  TSC for inclusion on the watch list. For approved international terrorist  nominations, the FBI sends the information to NCTC, who then sends  forward the nomination to TSC.
section_title: TSC’s Watch List Is the Master Repository for Watch List Records
paragraphs: For each nomination, NCTC and the FBI provide TSC with biographic or  other identifying data, such as name and date of birth. This identifying  information on known or suspected terrorists is deemed sensitive but  unclassified by the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Then,  TSC is to review the identifying information and the underlying derogatory  information—by directly accessing databases maintained by NCTC, the  FBI, and other agencies—to validate the requirements for including the  nomination on the watch list. On the basis of the results of its review,  TSC is to either input the nomination into the watch list—which is the U.S.  government’s master repository for all known or appropriately suspected  international and domestic terrorist records that are used for watch list- related screening—or reject the nomination and send it back to NCTC or  the FBI for further investigation. TSC relies predominantly on the  nominating agency to determine whether or not an individual is a known  or appropriately suspected terrorist. According to TSC, on the basis of its  review of relevant identifying and derogatory information, the center  rejects approximately 1 percent of all nominations. Figure 2 presents a  general overview of the process used to nominate individuals for inclusion  on TSC’s watch list.
TSC’s watch list of individuals with known or appropriately suspected  links to terrorism has increased from 158,374 records in June 2004 to  754,960 records in May 2007 (see fig. 3). It is important to note that the  total number of records on TSC’s watch list does not represent the total  number of individuals on the watch list. Rather, if an individual has one or  more known aliases, the watch list will contain multiple records for the  same individual. For example, if an individual on the watch list has  50 known aliases, there could be 50 distinct records related to that  individual in the watch list.
TSC’s database is updated daily with new nominations, modifications to  existing records, and deletions. According to TSC data, as of May 2007, a  high percentage of watch list records were international terrorist records  nominated through NCTC, and a small percentage were domestic terrorist  records nominated through the FBI. TSC data also show that more than  100,000 records have been removed from the watch list since TSC’s  inception. As discussed later in this report, agencies that conduct  terrorism screening do not check against all records in the watch list.  Rather, TSC exports applicable records to federal government databases  used by agencies that conduct terrorism screening based on the screening  agency’s mission responsibilities and other factors.
section_title: Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: For the 42-month period of December 2003 (when TSC began operations)  through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered  individuals who were positively matched to watch list records  53,218 times, according to our analysis of TSC data. These encounters  include many individuals who were positively matched to watch list  records multiple times. Agencies took a range of actions, such as arresting  individuals, denying other individuals entry into the United States, and  most commonly, releasing the individuals following questioning and  information gathering. Our analysis of data on the outcomes of these  encounters and interviews with screening agency, law enforcement, and  intelligence community officials indicate that the watch list has enhanced  the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts by (1) helping frontline  screening agencies obtain information to determine the level of threat a  person poses and the appropriate action to take, if any, and (2) providing  the opportunity to collect and share information on known or  appropriately suspected terrorists with law enforcement agencies and the  intelligence community.
subsections: section_title: The Number of Positive Matches to the Watch List Has Increased Each Year, and Many Individuals Have Been Encountered Multiple Times
paragraphs: A breakdown of encounters with positive matches to the terrorist watch  list shows that the number of matches has increased each year—from  4,876 during the first 10-month period of TSC’s operations (December 2003  through September 2004) to 14,938 during fiscal year 2005, to  19,887 during fiscal year 2006. This increase can be attributed partly to the  growth in the number of records in the consolidated terrorist watch list  and partly to the increase in the number of agencies that use the list for  screening purposes. Since its inception, TSC has worked to educate  federal departments and agencies, state and local law enforcement, and  foreign governments about appropriate screening opportunities. Our  analysis of TSC data also indicates that many individuals who were  positively matched to the terrorist watch list were encountered multiple  times. For example, a truck driver who regularly crossed the U.S.-Canada  border or an individual who frequently took international flights could  each account for multiple encounters.
Further, TSC data show that the highest percentage of encounters with  individuals who were positively matched to the watch list involved  screening within the United States by a state or local law enforcement  agency, U.S. government investigative agency, or other governmental  entity. Examples of these encounters include screening by police  departments, correctional facilities, FBI agents, and courts. The next  highest percentage of encounters with positive matches to the watch list  involved border-related encounters, such as passengers on airline flights  inbound from outside the United States or individuals screened at land  ports of entry. Examples include (1) a passenger flying from London  (Heathrow), England, to New York (JFK), New York, and (2) a person  attempting to cross the border from Canada into the United States at the  Rainbow Bridge port of entry in Niagara Falls, New York. The smallest  percentage of encounters with positive matches occurred outside of the  United States.
State and local law enforcement agencies historically have had access to  an FBI system that contains watch list records produced by the FBI.  However, pursuant to HSPD-6 (Sept. 16, 2003), state and local law  enforcement agencies were, for the first time, given access to watch list  records produced by the intelligence community, which are also included  in the FBI system. This access has enabled state and local agencies to  better assist the U.S. government’s efforts to track and collect information  on known or appropriately suspected terrorists. These agencies accounted  for a significant percentage of the total encounters with positive matches  to the watch list that occurred within the United States.
section_title: The Watch List Has Helped Screening Agencies Assess the Potential Threat a Person Poses and Take a Wide Range of Counterterrorism Responses
paragraphs: The watch list has enhanced the U.S. government’s counterterrorism  efforts by allowing federal, state, and local screening and law enforcement  officials to obtain information to help them make better-informed  decisions during encounters regarding the level of threat a person poses  and the appropriate response to take, if any. The specific outcomes of  encounters with individuals on the watch list are based on the  government’s overall assessment of the intelligence and investigative  information that supports the watch list record and any additional  information that may be obtained during the encounter. Our analysis of  data of the outcomes of encounters revealed that agencies took a range of  actions, such as arresting individuals, denying others entry into the United  States, and most commonly, releasing the individuals following  questioning and information gathering. The following provides additional  information on arrests, as well as the outcomes of encounters involving  the Department of State, TSA, CBP, and state or local law enforcement,  respectively.
TSC data show that agencies reported arresting many subjects of watch  list records for various reasons, such as the individual having an  outstanding arrest warrant or the individual’s behavior or actions  during the encounter. TSC data also indicated that some of the arrests  were based on terrorism grounds.
TSC data show that when visa applicants were positively matched to  terrorist watch list records, the outcomes included visas denied, visas  issued (because the consular officer did not find any statutory basis for  inadmissibility), and visa ineligibility waived.
TSA data show that when airline passengers were positively matched to  the No Fly or Selectee lists, the vast majority of matches were to the  Selectee list. Other outcomes included individuals matched to the No  Fly list and denied boarding (did not fly) and individuals matched to the  No Fly list after the aircraft was in-flight, which required an immediate  counterterrorism response. Additional information on individuals on  the No Fly list passing undetected through airline prescreening and  being identified in-flight is presented later in this report.
CBP data show that a number of nonimmigrant aliens encountered at  U.S. ports of entry were positively matched to terrorist watch list  records. For many of the encounters, CBP determined there was  sufficient derogatory information related to watch list records to  preclude admission under terrorism grounds. However, for most of the  encounters, CBP determined that there was not sufficient derogatory  information related to the records to preclude admission.
TSC data show that state or local law enforcement officials have  encountered individuals who were positively matched to terrorist  watch list records thousands of times. Although data on the actual  outcomes of these encounters were not available, the vast majority  involved watch list records that indicated that the individuals were  released, unless there were reasons other than terrorism-related  grounds for arresting or detaining the individual.
Appendix IV presents more details on the outcomes of screening agency  encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list.
section_title: The Watch List Has Helped Support Law Enforcement Investigations and the Intelligence Community by Tracking the Movements of Known or Appropriately Suspected Terrorists and Collecting Information about Them
paragraphs: According to federal officials, encounters with individuals who were  positively matched to the watch list assisted government efforts in  tracking the respective person’s movements or activities and provided the  opportunity to collect additional information about the individual that was  shared with agents conducting counterterrorism investigations and with  the intelligence community for use in analyzing threats. Such coordinated  collection of information for use in investigations and threat analyses is  one of the stated policy objectives for the watch list. Most of the  individuals encountered were questioned and released because the  intelligence and investigative information on these persons that supported  the watch list records and the information obtained during the encounter  did not support taking further actions, such as denying an individual entry  into the United States.
Specifically, as discussed previously, for most Department of State, TSA  (via air carriers), CBP, and state and local encounters with individuals  who were positively matched to the terrorist watch list, the  counterterrorism response consisted of questioning the individuals and  gathering information. That is, the encounters provided screening agency  and law enforcement personnel the opportunity to conduct in-depth  questioning and inspect travel documents and belongings to collect  information for use in supporting investigations and assessing threats. TSC  plays a central role in the real-time sharing of this information, creating a  bridge among screening agencies, the law enforcement community, and  the intelligence community. For example, in addition to facilitating  interagency communication and coordination during encounters, TSC  creates a daily report of encounters involving positive matches to the  terrorist watch list. This report contains a summary of all positive  encounters for the prior day. TSC summarizes the type of encounter, what  occurred, and what action was taken. The report notes the person’s  affiliation with any groups and provides a summary of derogatory  information available on the individual. Overview maps depicting the  encounters and locations are also included in the report. The daily reports  are distributed to numerous federal entities, as shown in table 1.
According to federal law enforcement officials, the information collected  during encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list helps to  develop cases by, among other means, tracking the movement of known or  appropriately suspected terrorists and determining relationships among  people, activities, and events. According to NCTC officials, information  obtained from encounters is added to NCTC’s Terrorist Identities  Datamart Environment database, which serves as the U.S. government’s  central classified database on known or suspected international  terrorists. This information can be electronically accessed by  approximately 5,000 U.S. counterterrorism personnel around the world.
section_title: TSC Exports Applicable Watch List Records to Screening Agency Databases, Depending on Agency Mission and Technical Capacity; but Some Technical Requirements May Present Security Vulnerabilities
paragraphs: Each day, TSC exports applicable records from the watch list—containing  biographic or other identifying data, such as name and date of birth—to  federal government databases used by agencies that conduct terrorism  screening. Specifically, applicable watch list records are exported to the  following federal agency databases, which are described later in this  report:    DHS’s Interagency Border Inspection System.    The Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System.    The FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File.    TSA’s No Fly and Selectee lists.
The applicable records that TSC exports to each of these databases vary  based on the screening agency’s mission responsibilities, the technical  capabilities of the agency’s computer system, and operational  considerations. For example, records on U.S. citizens and lawful  permanent residents are not exported to the Department of State’s system  used to screen visa applicants for immigration violations, criminal  histories, and other matters, because these individuals would not apply for  a U.S. visa. Also, to facilitate the automated process of checking an  individual against watch list records, all of these databases require certain  minimum biographic or identifying data in order to accept records from  TSC’s consolidated watch list. The identifying information required  depends on the policies and needs of the screening agency and the  technical capacity of the respective agency’s computerized name-matching  program. Also, certain records may not be exported to screening agency  systems based on operational considerations, such as the amount of time  available to conduct related screening. In general, the agency governing a  particular screening database establishes the criteria for which records  from the consolidated watch list will be accepted into its own system.  Figure 4 presents a general overview of the process used to export records  from TSC’s consolidated watch list to screening agency databases.
According to TSC, in addition to agency mission, technical, and  operational considerations, an individual’s record may be excluded from  an agency’s database in rare cases when there is a reasonable and detailed  justification for doing so and the request for exclusion has been reviewed  and approved by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and TSC. The  following sections provide additional information on the databases of the  screening processes we reviewed, the percentage of records accepted as  of May 2007, and potential security vulnerabilities.
subsections: section_title: Interagency Border Inspection System (CBP)
paragraphs: The Interagency Border Inspection System is DHS’s primary lookout  system available at U.S. ports of entry and other locations. CBP officers  use the system to screen travelers entering the United States at ports of  entry, which include land border crossings along the Canadian and  Mexican borders, sea ports, and U.S. airports for international flight  arrivals. This system includes not only the applicable records exported by  TSC, but also additional information on people with prior criminal  histories, immigration violations, or other activities of concern that CBP  wants to identify and screen at ports of entry. The system is also used to  assist law enforcement and other personnel at approximately 20 other  federal agencies, including the following: U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; the FBI; the Drug  Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms  and Explosives; the Internal Revenue Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; the  Federal Aviation Administration; and the U.S. Secret Service.
Of all the screening agency databases discussed in this report, the  Interagency Border Inspection System has the least restrictive acceptance  criteria and therefore contained the highest percentage of records from  TSC’s consolidated watch list as of May 2007. This is because CBP’s  mission is to screen all travelers, including U.S. citizens, entering the  United States at ports of entry.
section_title: Consular Lookout and Support System (Department of State)
paragraphs: The Consular Lookout and Support System is the Department of State’s  name-check system for visa applicants. Consular officers abroad use the  system to screen the names of visa applicants to identify terrorists and  other aliens who are potentially ineligible for visas based on criminal  histories or other reasons specified by federal statute. According to the  Department of State, all visa-issuing posts have direct access to the system  and must use it to check each applicant’s name before issuing a visa.
Records on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents are not to be  included in the part of the Consular Lookout and Support System that is  used to screen visa applicants—because these individuals would not apply  for U.S. visas—but may be included in another part of the system that is  used to screen passport applicants. According to TSC officials, the part of  the system that is used to screen visa applicants generally contains the  same information as is contained in the Interagency Border Inspection  System, except for records on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent  residents. As of May 2007, the Consular Lookout and Support System  contained the second highest percentage of all watch list records.
section_title: Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (FBI)
paragraphs: The Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File is the FBI’s lookout  system for known or appropriately suspected terrorists, as well as gang  groups and members. The file is part of the FBI’s National Crime  Information Center database, which is accessible by federal, state, and  local law enforcement officers and other criminal justice agencies for  screening in conjunction with arrests, detentions, and other criminal  justice purposes. A subset of the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization  file consists of TSC’s records to be used to screen for possible terrorist  links. As of May 2007, the FBI database contained the third highest  percentage of watch list records.
According to TSC officials, if the remaining watch list records were  included in the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, the system  would identify an unmanageable number of records of individuals as  potentially being matches to the National Crime Information Center  database. The officials explained that name checks against the National  Crime Information Center database return not only potential matches to  terrorist watch list records in the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization  File, but also potential matches to the millions of other records in the  database. TSC officials noted, however, that not including these records  has resulted in a potential vulnerability in screening processes—or at least  a missed opportunity to track the movements of individuals who are the  subjects of watch list records and collect additional relevant information.  According to the FBI, the remaining records are not included to ensure the  protection of civil rights and prevent law enforcement officials from taking  invasive enforcement action on individuals misidentified as being on the  watch list. The FBI also noted that while law enforcement encounters of  individuals on the watch list provide significant information, unnecessary  detentions or queries of misidentified persons would be counterproductive  and potentially damaging to the efforts of the FBI to investigate and  combat terrorism. Because of these operational concerns, the FBI noted  that the extent of vulnerabilities in current screening processes that arise  when the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File cannot accept  certain watch list records has been determined to be low or nonexistent.  We note, however, that the FBI did not specifically address the extent to  which security risks are raised by not using these records.
section_title: No Fly and Selectee Lists (TSA)
paragraphs: The No Fly and Selectee lists are compiled by TSC and forwarded to TSA,  which distributes the lists to air carriers for use in identifying individuals  who either should be precluded from boarding an aircraft or should  receive additional physical screening prior to boarding a flight. TSA  requires that U.S. aircraft operators use these lists to screen passengers on  all of their flights and that foreign air carriers use these lists to screen  passengers on all flights to and from the United States. Of all of the  screening agency databases that accept watch list records, only the No Fly  and Selectee lists require certain nomination criteria or inclusion  standards that are narrower than the “known or appropriately suspected”  standard of HSPD-6. Specifically, the lists are to contain any individual,  regardless of citizenship, who meets certain nomination criteria  established by the Homeland Security Council.
Persons on the No Fly list are deemed to be a threat to civil aviation or  national security and therefore should be precluded from boarding an  aircraft. Passengers who are a match to the No Fly list are to be denied  boarding unless subsequently cleared by law enforcement personnel in  accordance with TSA procedures. The Homeland Security Council  criteria contain specific examples of the types of terrorism-related  conduct that may make an individual appropriate for inclusion on the  No Fly list.
Persons on the Selectee list are also deemed to be a threat to civil  aviation or national security but do not meet the criteria of the No Fly  list. Being on the Selectee list does not mean that the person will not be  allowed to board an aircraft or enter the United States. Instead, persons  on this list are to receive additional security screening prior to being  permitted to board an aircraft, which may involve a physical inspection  of the person and a hand-search of the passenger’s luggage. The  Homeland Security Council criteria contain specific examples of the  types of terrorism-related conduct that may make an individual  appropriate for inclusion on the Selectee list, as well as the types of  activities that generally would not be considered appropriate for  inclusion on the list.
According to the Homeland Security Council criteria, the No Fly and  Selectee lists are not intended as investigative or information-gathering  tools, or tracking mechanisms. Rather, the lists are intended to help ensure  the safe transport of passengers and their property and to facilitate the  flow of commerce. An individual must meet the specific nomination  criteria to be placed on one of the lists, and the watch list record must  contain a full name and date of birth to be added to either of the lists.
As of May 2007, the No Fly list and the Selectee list collectively contained  the lowest percentage of watch list records. The remaining records in  TSC’s watch list either did not meet the specific Homeland Security  Council nomination criteria or did not meet technical requirements that  the records contain a full name and date of birth. TSC could not readily  determine how many records fell into each of these two categories.  Nonetheless, these records are not provided to TSA for use in  prescreening passengers. According to TSA officials, without a full name  and date of birth, the current name-matching programs used by airlines  would falsely identify an unacceptable number of individuals as potentially  being on the watch list.
According to DHS, the amount or specific types of biographical  information available on the population to be screened should also be  considered when determining what portion of the watch list should be  used. For example, DHS noted that screening international airline  passengers who have provided passport information is very different from  screening domestic airline passengers for whom the government has little  biographical information. Further, DHS noted that for airline passengers,  there is not much time to resolve false positives or determine whether  someone on the watch list should be subjected to additional screening  prior to departure of a flight, whereas for individuals arriving at U.S. ports  of entry from international locations, CBP has more time to interview  individuals and resolve issues upon their arrival.
For international flights bound to or departing from the United States, two  separate screening processes occur. Specifically, in addition to TSA  requiring that air carriers prescreen passengers prior to boarding against  the No Fly and Selectee lists, CBP screens all passengers on international  flights—for border security purposes—against watch list records in the  Interagency Border Inspection System. CBP’s screening generally occurs  after the aircraft is in flight. This layered or secondary screening  opportunity does not exist for passengers traveling domestically within the  United States.
In 2006, the conference report accompanying the Department of Homeland  Security Appropriations Act, 2007, directed TSA to provide a detailed plan  describing key milestones and a schedule for checking names against the  full terrorist watch list in its planned Secure Flight passenger prescreening  program if the administration believes a security vulnerability exists under  the current process of checking names against only the No Fly and  Selectee lists. According to TSA, the administration has concluded that  non-use of the full watch list does not constitute a security vulnerability;  however, TSA did not explain the basis for this determination. Also, DHS’s  Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties emphasized that there is a strong  argument against increasing the number of watch list records TSA uses to  prescreen passengers. Specifically, the office noted that if more records  were used, the number of misidentifications would expand to unjustifiable  proportions, increasing administrative costs within DHS, without a  measurable increase in security. The office also noted that an expansion of  the No Fly and Selectee lists could even alert a greater number of  individuals to their watch list status, compromising security rather than  advancing it. Further, according to the office, as the number of U.S.  citizens denied and delayed boarding on domestic flights increases, so  does the interest in maintaining watch list records that are as accurate as  possible. Also, the office noted that an increase in denied and delayed  boarding of flights could generate volumes of complaints or queries that  exceed the current capabilities of the watch list redress process.
section_title: DHS Agencies Are Addressing Incidents of Persons on the Watch List Passing Undetected through Screening; TSC Has Ongoing Initiatives That Could Help Reduce This Vulnerability
paragraphs: Key frontline screening agencies within DHS—CBP, U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services, and TSA—are separately taking actions to address  potential vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list-related screening. A  particular concern is that individuals on the watch list not pass undetected  through agency screening. According to the screening agencies, some of  these incidents—commonly referred to as false negatives—have occurred.  Irrespective of whether such incidents are isolated aberrations or not, any  individual on the watch list who passes undetected through agency  screening constitutes a vulnerability. Regarding other ameliorative efforts,  TSC has ongoing initiatives that could help reduce false negatives, such as  improving the quality of watch list data.
subsections: section_title: Key Frontline Screening Agencies in DHS Are Separately Addressing Screening Vulnerabilities
paragraphs: CBP, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and TSA have begun to  take actions to address incidents of subjects of watch list records passing  undetected through agency screening. The efforts of each of these three  DHS component agencies are discussed in the following sections,  respectively. Generally, as indicated, positive steps have been initiated by  each agency. Given the potential consequences of any given incident, it is  particularly important that relevant component agencies have mechanisms  in place to systematically monitor such incidents, determine causes, and  implement appropriate corrective actions as expeditiously as possible.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Studying Cases Where Some Subjects of Watch List Records Were Not Detected by Screening at Ports of Entry
paragraphs: During our field visits in spring 2006 to selected ports of entry, CBP  officers informed us of several incidents involving individuals on the  watch list who were not detected until after they had been processed and  admitted into the United States. In response to our inquiry at CBP  headquarters in May 2006, agency officials acknowledged that there have  been such incidents. CBP did not maintain aggregated data on the number  of these incidents nationwide or the specific causes, but it did identify  possible reasons for failing to detect someone on the watch list.  Subsequently, in further response to our inquiries, CBP created a working  group to study the causes of incidents involving individuals on the watch  list who were not detected by port-of-entry screening. The working group,  coordinated by the National Targeting Center, is composed of subject  matter experts representing the policy, technical, and operations facets  within CBP. According to headquarters officials, the group is responsible  for (1) identifying and recommending policy solutions within CBP and  (2) coordinating any corrective technical changes within CBP and with  TSC and NCTC, as appropriate. The working group held its first meeting in  early 2007. According to CBP, some corrective actions and measures have  already been identified and are in the process of being implemented.
section_title: Agencies Are Working on Solutions to Prevent Unauthorized Applicants for Citizenship and Other Immigration Benefits from Getting through Agency Screening
paragraphs: Agencies are working to eliminate shortcomings in screening processes  that have resulted in unauthorized applicants for citizenship and other  immigration benefits getting through agency screening. The cognizant  agency, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, is to screen all  individuals who apply for U.S. citizenship or other immigration benefits— such as work authorization—for information relevant to their eligibility for  these benefits. According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  officials, the agency does not maintain aggregated data on the number of  times the initial screening has failed to identify individuals who are  subjects of watch list records or the specific causes. The officials noted,  however, that for certain applicants—including individuals seeking long- term benefits such as permanent citizenship, lawful permanent residence,  or asylum—additional screening against watch list records is conducted.  This additional screening has generated some positive matches to watch  list records, whereas these matches were not detected during the initial  checks.
According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, each instance of  individuals on the watch list getting through agency screening is reviewed  on a case-by-case basis to determine the cause, with appropriate follow-up  and corrective action taken, if needed. As a prospective enhancement, in  April 2007, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services entered into a  memorandum of understanding with TSC. If implemented, this  enhancement could allow U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to  conduct more thorough and efficient searches of watch list records during  the screening of benefit applicants.
section_title: A Final Rule and a Planned Prescreening Program Could Help Address the Issue of Individuals on the No Fly List Being Inadvertently Allowed to Fly
paragraphs: In the past, there have been a number of known cases in which individuals  who were on the No Fly list passed undetected through airlines’  prescreening of passengers and flew on international flights bound to or  from the United States, according to TSA data. These individuals were  subsequently identified in-flight by other means—specifically, screening of  passenger manifests conducted by CBP’s National Targeting Center.  However, the onboard security threats required an immediate  counterterrorism response, which in some instances resulted in diverting  the aircraft to a location other than its original destination. TSA provided  various reasons why an individual who is on the No Fly list may not be  detected by air carriers during their comparisons with the No Fly list.  However, TSA had not analyzed the extent to which each cause  contributed to such incidents. According to TSA, the agency’s regulatory  office is responsible for initiating investigative and corrective actions with  the respective air carrier, if needed.
For international flights bound to or from the United States, two separate  screening processes occur. In addition to the initial prescreening  conducted by the airlines in accordance with TSA requirements, CBP’s  National Targeting Center screens passengers against watch list records in  the Interagency Border Inspection System using information that is  collected from air carriers’ passenger manifests, which contain  information obtained directly from government-issued passports.  Specifically, for passengers flying internationally, airlines are required to  provide passenger manifest data obtained at check-in from all passengers  to CBP. Presently, CBP requires airlines to transmit the passenger data  no later than 15 minutes prior to departure for outbound flights and no  later than 15 minutes after departure for inbound flights. Because the  transmission of this information occurs so close to the aircraft’s departure,  the National Targeting Center’s screening of the information against watch  list records in the Interagency Border Inspection System—which includes  a check of records in the No Fly list—often is not completed until after the  aircraft is already in the air. If this screening produces a positive match to  the No Fly list, the National Targeting Center is to coordinate with other  federal agencies to determine what actions to take.
Procedures described in the final rule issued by CBP and published in the  Federal Register on August 23, 2007, could help mitigate instances of  individuals on the No Fly list boarding international flights bound to or  from the United States. Specifically, the rule will require air carriers to  either transmit complete passenger manifests to CBP no later than  30 minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft doors, or transmit manifest  information on an individual basis as each passenger checks in for the  flight up to but no later than the securing of the aircraft. When  implemented (the rule is to take effect on February 19, 2008), CBP should  be better positioned to identify individuals on the No Fly list before an  international flight is airborne.
Regarding domestic flights within the United States, there is no second  screening opportunity using watch list-related information. Rather, the  airlines are responsible for prescreening passengers prior to boarding in  accordance with TSA requirements and using the No Fly and Selectee lists  provided by TSA. Although TSA has been mandated to assume  responsibility for conducting the watch list screening function from the  airline industry, the agency’s proposed prescreening program, known as  Secure Flight, has not yet been implemented. Under the Secure Flight  program, TSA plans to take over from aircraft operators the responsibility  for comparing identifying information on airline passengers against watch  list records. We have reported and TSA has acknowledged significant  challenges in developing and implementing the Secure Flight program.  Last year, TSA suspended Secure Flight’s development to reassess, or  rebaseline, the program. The rebaselining effort included reassessing the  program goals, the expected benefits and capabilities, and the estimated  schedules and costs. According to TSC officials who have been working  with TSA to support implementation of Secure Flight, the program could  help to reduce potential vulnerabilities in the prescreening of airline  passengers on domestic flights.
section_title: The Terrorist Screening Center Has Various Ongoing or Planned Initiatives That Could Help Reduce Vulnerabilities in Watch List-Related Screening
paragraphs: To help reduce vulnerabilities in watch list-related screening, TSC has  ongoing initiatives to improve the effectiveness of screening and ensure  the accuracy of data. Also, prospectively, TSC anticipates developing a  capability to link biometric data to supplement name-based screening.
subsections: section_title: Improving the Effectiveness of Screening: Search Engine Technology and Direct-Query Capability
paragraphs: Generally, to handle the large volumes of travelers and others who must  be screened, federal agencies and most airlines use computer-driven  algorithms to rapidly compare the names of individuals against applicable  terrorist watch list records. In the name-matching process, the number of  likely matching records returned for manual review depends partly upon  the sensitivity thresholds of the algorithms to variations in name spelling  or representations of names from other languages. Screening agencies,  and airlines in accordance with TSA requirements, have discretion in  setting these thresholds, which can have operational implications. If a  threshold is set relatively high, for example, more names may be cleared  and fewer flagged as possible matches, increasing the risk of false  negatives—that is, failing to identify an individual whose name is on the  terrorist watch list. Conversely, if a threshold is set relatively low, more  individuals who do not warrant additional scrutiny may be flagged (false  positives), with fewer cleared through an automated process. A primary  factor in designing a computerized name-matching process is the need to  balance minimizing the possibility of generating false negatives, while not  generating an unacceptable number of false positives (misidentifications).
To help ensure awareness of best practices among agencies, TSC has  formed and chairs an interagency working group—the Federal Identity  Match Search Engine Performance Standards Working Group—that met  initially in December 2005. An objective of the working group is to  provide voluntary guidance for federal agencies that use identity matching  search engine technology. Essentially, the prospective guidance is  intended to improve the effectiveness of identity matching across agencies  by, among other means, assessing which algorithms or search engines are  the most effective for screening specific types or categories of names.  According to TSC, three agencies have volunteered to participate in pilot  programs in the summer of 2007, after which a target date for completing  the initiative to develop and provide voluntary guidance to screening  agencies will be set. If effectively implemented, this initiative could help  reduce potential vulnerabilities in screening processes that are based on  limitations in agencies’ computerized name-matching programs.
TSC is also developing a process whereby screening agencies can directly  “query” the center’s consolidated terrorist screening database. TSC noted  that a direct-query capability will ensure that all possible hits against the  database will be directed automatically into the center’s resolution  process to determine if they are positive matches, thereby ensuring  consistency in the government’s approach to screening. Currently, TSC  must rely upon the screening agencies to contact the center—generally by  telephone or fax—when they have possible hits. As of May 2007, TSC had  not developed specific time frames for implementing this initiative.
According to TSC, the technology for a direct-query capability is in place,  but related agreements with screening agencies were still being  negotiated.
section_title: Improving Data Quality
paragraphs: Preventing incidents of individuals on the watch list passing undetected  through agency screening is dependent partly on the quality and accuracy  of data in TSC’s consolidated terrorist watch list. In June 2005, the  Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General reported that its  review of TSC’s consolidated watch list found several problems—such as  inconsistent record counts and duplicate records, lack of data fields for  some records, and unclear sources for some records. Among other  things, the Inspector General recommended that TSC develop procedures  to regularly review and test the information contained in the consolidated  terrorist watch list to ensure that the data are complete, accurate, and  nonduplicative. In its September 2007 follow-up report, the Inspector  General noted that TSC has enhanced its efforts to ensure the quality of  watch list data and has increased the number of staff assigned to data  quality management. However, the Inspector General also determined that  TSC’s management of the watch list continues to have weaknesses.
TSC has ongoing quality-assurance initiatives to identify and correct  incomplete or inaccurate records that could contribute to either false  negatives or false positives. The center’s director and principal deputy  director stressed to us that quality of data is a high priority and also is a  continuing challenge, particularly given that the database is dynamic,  changing frequently with additions, deletions, and modifications. The  officials noted the equal importance of ensuring that (1) the names of  known and appropriately suspected terrorists are included on the watch  list and (2) the names of any individuals who are mistakenly listed or are  cleared of any nexus to terrorism are removed. In this regard, the officials  explained that the TSC’s standard operating practices include at least  three opportunities to review records. First, TSC staff—including subject  matter experts detailed to the center from other agencies—review each  incoming record submitted (nominated) to the center for inclusion on the  consolidated watch list. Second, every time there is a screening  encounter—for example, a port-of-entry screening of an individual that  generates an actual or a potential match with a watch list record—that  record is reviewed again. And third, records are reviewed when  individuals express their concerns or seek correction of any inaccurate  data—a process often referred to as redress.
section_title: Future Enhancement: Linking to Biometric Data
paragraphs: Conceptually, biometric technologies based on fingerprint recognition,  facial recognition, or other physiological characteristics can be used to  screen travelers against a consolidated database, such as the terrorist  watch list. However, TSC presently does not have this capability,  although use of biometric information to supplement name-based  screening is planned as a future enhancement. Specifically, TSC’s strategy  is not to replicate existing biometric data systems. Rather, the strategy,  according to TSC’s director and principal deputy director, is to develop a  “pointer” capability to facilitate the online linking of name-based searches  to relevant biometric systems, such as the FBI’s Integrated Automated  Fingerprint Identification System—a computerized system for storing,  comparing, and exchanging fingerprint data in a digital format that  contains the largest criminal biometric database in the world. TSC officials  recognize that even biometric systems have screening limitations, such as  relevant federal agencies may have no fingerprints or other biometrics to  correlate with many of the biographical records in the TSC’s watch list.  For instance, watch list records may be based on intelligence gathered by  electronic wire taps or other methods that involve no opportunity to  obtain biometric data. Nonetheless, TSC officials anticipate that biometric  information, when available, can be especially useful for confirming  matches to watch list records when individuals use false identities or  aliases.
section_title: The U.S. Government Has Made Progress in Using the Watch List but a Strategy and Plan Supported by a Governance Structure with Clear Lines of Authority Would Enhance Use and Effectiveness
paragraphs: Although the U.S. government has made progress in using watch list  records to support terrorism-related screening, there are additional  opportunities for using the list. Internationally, the Department of State  has made arrangements with six foreign governments to exchange  terrorist watch list information and is in negotiations with several other  countries. Within the private sector, some critical infrastructure  components are presently using watch list records to screen current or  prospective employees, but many components are not. DHS has not  established guidelines to govern the use of watch list records for  appropriate screening opportunities in the private sector that have a  substantial bearing on homeland security. Further, all federal departments  and agencies have not taken action in accordance with HSPD-6 and   HSPD-11 to identify and describe all appropriate screening opportunities  that should use watch list records. According to TSC, determining whether  new screening opportunities are appropriate requires evaluation of  multiple factors, including operational and legal issues—particularly  related to privacy and civil liberties. To date, appropriate opportunities  have not been systematically identified or evaluated, in part because the  federal government lacks an up-to-date strategy and a prioritized  investment and implementation plan for optimizing the use and  effectiveness of terrorist-related screening. Moreover, the lines of  authority and responsibility to provide governmentwide coordination and  oversight of such screening are not clear, and existing entities with watch  list responsibilities may not have the necessary authority, structure, or  resources to assume this role.
subsections: section_title: The Department of State Has Made Progress in Efforts to Exchange Terrorist Watch List Information with Foreign Governments
paragraphs: According to the 9/11 Commission, the U.S. government cannot meet its  obligations to the American people to prevent the entry of terrorists into  the United States without a major effort to collaborate with other  governments. The commission noted that the U.S. government should do  more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies and raise U.S.  and global border security standards for travel and border crossing over  the medium and longterm through extensive international cooperation.  HSPD-6 required the Secretary of State to develop a proposal for the  President’s approval for enhancing cooperation with certain foreign  governments—beginning with those countries for which the United States  has waived visa requirements—to establish appropriate access to  terrorism screening information of the participating governments. This  information would be used to enhance existing U.S. government screening  processes.
The Department of State determined that the most effective way to obtain  this information was to seek bilateral arrangements to share information  on a reciprocal basis. The Department of State’s Bureau of Consular  Affairs and the Homeland Security Council co-chair an interagency  working group to implement the international cooperation provisions of  HSPD-6. According to the Department of State, there is no single  document or proposal that sets forth the working group’s approach or  plan. Rather, a series of consensus decisions specify how to proceed, often  on a country-by-country basis in order to accommodate each country’s  laws and political sensitivities. The working group met six times from  September 2005 through December 2006 to discuss operational and  procedural issues related to sharing terrorism information and to update  working group members on the status of bilateral negotiations with  foreign governments.
According to the Department of State, the department’s Bureau of  Consular Affairs has approached all countries for which the United States  has waived visa requirements and two non-visa waiver program countries  with a proposal to exchange terrorist screening information. From  October through December 2006, interagency teams visited six countries  to brief government officials and also met in Washington, D.C., with  representatives of a number of other countries. According to the  Department of State, interagency working groups at U.S. embassies  around the world remain actively engaged with foreign counterparts and  coordinate discussions on international sharing of terrorist screening  information with a Department of State team in Washington, D.C.
Two countries have been sharing terrorist screening information with the  United States since before September 11, 2001, and that information has  been integrated into TSC’s consolidated watch list and, as applicable, into  screening agencies’ databases. According to the Department of State, since  2006, the United States has made arrangements to share terrorist  screening information with four new foreign government partners and is in  negotiations with several other countries. The department noted that it  had also received indications of interest from governments of non-visa  waiver countries.
section_title: DHS Has Not Finalized Guidelines for Using Watch List Records to Support Private Sector Screening
paragraphs: Although federal departments and agencies have made progress in using  terrorist watch list records to support private sector screening processes,  there are additional opportunities for using records in the private sector.  However, DHS has not yet finalized guidelines to govern such use.  Specifically, HSPD-6 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to  develop guidelines to govern the use of terrorist information, as defined by  the directive, to support various screening processes, including private  sector screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland  security. The interagency memorandum of understanding that implements  HSPD-6 also required the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish  necessary guidelines and criteria to (a) govern the mechanisms by which  private sector entities can access the watch list and (b) initiate appropriate  law enforcement or other governmental action, if any, when a person  submitted for query by a private sector entity is identified as a person on  the watch list.
According to the Associate Director of the Screening Coordination Office  within DHS, in developing guidelines to govern private sector screening  against watch list records, the department planned to partner with the  National Infrastructure Advisory Council. The council had previously  reported that the private sector wants to be informed about threats and  potential terrorists. Specifically, in its July 2006 report on public and  private sector intelligence coordination, the National Infrastructure  Advisory Council noted that chief executive officers of private sector  corporations expect to be informed when the government is aware of a  specific, credible threat to their employees, physical plants, or cyber  assets. The report also noted that chief executive officers expect to be  informed if the government knows that their respective company has  inadvertently employed a terrorist.
According to DHS’s Office of Infrastructure Protection and Infrastructure  Partnerships Division, employees in parts of some components of the  private sector are being screened against watch list records, including  certain individuals who have access to the protected or vital areas of  nuclear power plants, work in airports, and transport hazardous materials.  However, many critical infrastructure components are not using watch list  records. The office also indicated that several components of the private  sector are interested in screening employees against watch list records or  expanding current screening. In its June 2007 comments on a draft of this  report (see app. V), DHS noted that the Screening Coordination Office has  drafted initial guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to support  private sector screening processes and was in the process of working with  federal stakeholders to finalize this document. However, DHS did not  provide specific plans and time frames for finalizing the guidelines.  Establishing guidelines to govern the private sector’s use of watch list  records, in accordance with HSPD-6, would help in identifying and  implementing appropriate screening opportunities.
section_title: Federal Departments and Agencies Have Not Identified All Appropriate Opportunities for Using Watch List Records to Detect and Deter Terrorists
paragraphs: Although required to do so by presidential directives, federal departments  and agencies have not identified all appropriate screening opportunities  that should use terrorist watch list records. Specifically, HSPD-6 required  the heads of executive departments and agencies to conduct screening  using the terrorist watch list at all appropriate opportunities, and to report  the opportunities at which such screening shall and shall not be conducted  to the Attorney General. TSC provided an initial report on screening  opportunities to the Attorney General on December 15, 2003. According  to the report, TSC hosted a meeting with representatives of more than  30 agencies in October 2003 to discuss the HSPD-6 requirement. At the  meeting, TSC requested that the agencies identify appropriate screening  opportunities and report them to TSC. However, the report noted that  based on the agency responses TSC received, no meaningful or  comprehensive report on screening opportunities could be produced at  that time. TSC provided additional reports to the Attorney General in  April, July, and December 2004. These reports also did not contain  comprehensive information on all screening opportunities, consistent with  HSPD-6.
According to the Department of Justice, with the issuance of HSPD-11,  which “builds upon” HSPD-6, the Attorney General’s responsibilities for  identifying additional screening opportunities were largely overtaken by  DHS which, in coordination with the Department of Justice and other  agencies, was to create a comprehensive strategy to enhance the  effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities. Among other things,  the strategy was to include a description of the screening opportunities for  which terrorist-related screening would be applied. DHS has taken some  related actions but, as of June 2007, it had not systematically identified all  appropriate screening opportunities. Absent a systematic approach to  identifying appropriate screening opportunities, TSC has been working  with individual agencies to identify such opportunities. According to TSC,  as of May 2007, the center was working on approximately 40 agreements  with various federal departments or agencies to use applicable portions of  the terrorist watch list.
Also, a systematic approach to identifying screening opportunities would  help the government determine if other uses of watch list records are  appropriate and should be implemented, including uses primarily intended  to assist in collecting information to support investigative activities. Such  coordinated collection of information for use in investigations is one of the  stated policy objectives for the watch list. For example, during our review,  TSC noted that screening domestic airline passengers against watch list  records in addition to those in the No Fly and Selectee lists would have  benefits, such as collecting information on the movements of individuals  with potential ties to terrorism. According to TSC, other factors would  need to be considered in determining whether such screening is  appropriate and should be implemented, including privacy and civil  liberties implications. Moreover, it is not clear whether such screening is  operationally feasible, and if it were, whether TSC or some other agency  would perform the screening.
section_title: The U.S. Government Lacks an Updated Strategy and an Investment and Implementation Plan for Enhancing the Use and Effectiveness of Terrorist- Related Screening
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, we, as well as the Administration, have called  for a more strategic approach to managing terrorist-related information  and using it for screening purposes. In April 2003, we made  recommendations for improving the information technology architecture  environment needed to support watch list-related screening and called for  short- and long-term strategies that would provide for (1) more  consolidated and standardized watch list information and (2) more  standardized policies and procedures for better sharing watch list data and  for addressing any legal issues or cultural barriers that affect watch list  sharing. Subsequently, in August 2004, HSPD-11 outlined the  Administration’s vision to develop comprehensive terrorist-related  screening procedures. Specifically, HSPD-11 required the Secretary of  Homeland Security—in coordination with the heads of appropriate federal  departments and agencies—to submit two reports to the President  (through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security) related to  the government’s use of the watch list. Among other things, the first report  was to outline a strategy to enhance the effectiveness of terrorist-related  screening activities by developing comprehensive, coordinated, and  systematic procedures and capabilities. The second report was to provide  a prioritized investment and implementation plan for a systematic  approach to terrorist-related screening that optimizes detection and  interdiction of suspected terrorists and terrorist activities. The plan was to  describe the “scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones,  training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities” to enhance  and implement the U.S. government’s terrorism-related screening policies.
According to DHS officials, the department submitted the required  strategy and the investment and implementation plan to the President in  November 2004. However, neither DHS nor the Homeland Security  Council would provide us copies of either report. Instead, officials from  DHS’s Screening Coordination Office provided us a document that they  said contained department-specific information from the 2004 strategy and  implementation plan. According to DHS officials, because the strategy  and plan were products of an interagency process, the Screening  Coordination Office believed that it needed to redact information that  pertained to other departments’ processes, programs, or activities. The  DHS document contains information on the department’s efforts to  catalogue its terrorist-related screening activities and identifies significant  issues that inhibit effective terrorist-related screening. For example,  according to the document, “no one entity within the department is  responsible for defining roles and responsibilities for terrorist-related  screening, identifying gaps and overlaps in screening opportunities,  prioritizing investments, measuring performance, or setting technical and  non-technical standards.” Also, the document notes that DHS components  may have only limited knowledge of what screening is currently being  performed by others within the department, because there is no  coordination mechanism to share information on these activities.
DHS acknowledged that it has not updated either the strategy or the plan  since the 2004 reports, despite the fact that some aspects of the strategy  and plan had been overcome by other events, such as results of the  “Second Stage Review” initiated in March 2005 by the Secretary of  Homeland Security. Moreover, according to DHS screening managers, the  departmental office responsible for updating these documents—the  Screening Coordination Office—was not established until July 2006 and  has had other screening-related priorities. The officials noted that the  Screening Coordination Office is working on various aspects of terrorist- related screening, but that work remains in updating the strategy and the  investment and implementation plan.
Without an updated strategy and plan, the federal government lacks  mechanisms to support a comprehensive and coordinated approach to  terrorist-related screening envisioned by the Administration, including  mechanisms for building upon existing systems and best practices. Also,  the federal government has not taken necessary actions to promote the  effective use of watch list records at all appropriate screening  opportunities, including private sector screening processes that have a  substantial bearing on homeland security. An updated strategy and an  investment and implementation plan that address the elements prescribed  by HSPD-11—particularly clearly articulated principles, milestones, and  outcome measures—could also provide a basis for establishing  governmentwide priorities for screening, assessing progress toward policy  goals and intended outcomes, ensuring that any needed changes are  implemented, and responding to issues our work identified, such as  potential screening vulnerabilities and interagency coordination  challenges.
section_title: Existing Governance Structures May Not Provide Necessary Oversight and Coordination
paragraphs: Recognizing that achievement of a coordinated and comprehensive  approach to terrorist-related screening involves numerous entities within  and outside the federal government, HSPD-11 called for DHS to address  governance in the investment and implementation plan. To date, however,  no governance structure with clear lines of responsibility and authority  has been established to monitor governmentwide screening activities— such as assessing gaps or vulnerabilities in screening processes and  identifying, prioritizing, and implementing new screening opportunities.  Lacking clear lines of authority and responsibility for terrorist-related  screening activities that transcend the individual missions and more  parochial operations of each department and agency, it is difficult for the  federal government to monitor its efforts and to identify best practices or  common corrective actions that could help to ensure that watch list  records are used as effectively as possible. More clearly defined  responsibility and authority to implement and monitor crosscutting  initiatives could help ensure a more coordinated and comprehensive  approach to terrorist-related screening by providing applicable  departments and agencies important guidance, information, and  mechanisms for addressing screening issues.
Until the governance component of the investment and implementation  plan is clearly articulated and established, it will not be possible to assess  whether its structure is capable of providing the oversight necessary for  optimizing the use and effectiveness of terrorist-related screening. Our  interviews with responsible officials and our analysis of department and  agency missions suggest, however, that existing organizations with watch  list-related responsibilities may lack the authority, resources, or will to  assume this role. Specifically, DHS screening officials told us that the  department is the appropriate entity for coordinating the development of  the watch list strategy and the related investment and implementation  plan, but that it does not have the authority or resources for providing the  governmentwide oversight needed to implement the strategy and plan or  resolve interagency issues. The Office of the Director of National  Intelligence and its NCTC also have important roles in watch list-related  issues and information-sharing activities, but officials there told us that the  agency is not suited for a governmentwide leadership role either, primarily  because its mission focuses on intelligence and information sharing in  support of screening but not on actual screening operations. Likewise,  since its inception, TSC has played a central role in coordinating watch  list-related activities governmentwide and has established its own  governance board—composed of senior-level agency representatives from  numerous departments and agencies—to provide guidance concerning  issues within TSC’s mission and authority. While this governance board  could be suited to assume more of a leadership role, its current authority  is limited to TSC-specific issues, and it would need additional authority to  provide effective coordination of terrorist-related screening activities and  interagency issues governmentwide.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Managed by TSC, the terrorist watch list represents a major step forward  from the pre-September 11 environment of multiple, disconnected, and  incomplete watch lists throughout the government. Today, the watch list is  an integral component of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts.  However, our work indicates that there are additional opportunities for  reducing potential screening vulnerabilities. It is important that  responsible federal officials assess the extent to which security  vulnerabilities exist in screening processes when agencies are not able to  screen individuals on the watch list to determine the level of threat the  individuals pose because of technical or operational reasons and—in  consultation with TSC and other agencies—determine whether alternative  screening or other mitigation activities should be considered. Our work  also indicates the need for a more coordinated and comprehensive  approach to terrorist-related screening through expanded use of the list  and enhanced collaboration and coordination within and outside the  federal government.
To further strengthen the ability of the U.S. government to protect against  acts of terrorism, HSPD-6 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to  develop guidelines to govern the use of terrorist information to support  various screening processes, including private sector screening processes  that have a substantial bearing on homeland security. To date, however,  DHS has not developed guidelines for the private sector’s use of watch list  records in screening designed to protect the nation’s critical  infrastructures. Currently, some but not all relevant components of the  private sector use the watch list to screen for terrorist-related threats.  Establishing clear guidelines to comply with the presidential directive  would help both the private sector and DHS ensure that private sector  entities are using watch list records consistently, appropriately, and  effectively to protect their workers, visitors, and key critical assets.
HSPD-11 outlined the Administration’s vision to implement a coordinated  and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening and directed  the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate with other federal  departments to develop (1) a strategy for a coordinated and  comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening and (2) a  prioritized investment and implementation plan that describes the scope,  governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics,  costs, and schedule of activities necessary to achieve the policy objectives  of HSPD-11. DHS officials acknowledged that work remains to update the  strategy and the investment and implementation plan. Without an up-to- date strategy and plan, agencies and organizations that engage in terrorist- related screening activities do not have a foundation for a coordinated  approach that is driven by an articulated set of core principles.  Furthermore, lacking clearly articulated principles, milestones, and  outcome measures, the federal government is not easily able to provide  accountability and a basis for monitoring to ensure that (1) the intended  goals for, and expected results of, terrorist screening are being achieved  and (2) use of the list is consistent with privacy and civil liberties. These  plan elements, which were prescribed by HSPD-11, are crucial for  coordinated and comprehensive use of terrorist-related screening data, as  they provide a platform to establish governmentwide priorities for  screening, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes,  ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues  that hinder effectiveness, such as the potential vulnerabilities and  interagency coordination challenges discussed in this report.
Although all elements of a strategy and an investment and implementation  plan cited in HSPD-11 are important to guide realization of the most  effective use of watch list data, addressing governance is particularly vital,  as achievement of a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist- related screening involves numerous entities within and outside the  federal government. Establishing a governance structure with clearly  defined responsibility and authority would help ensure that agency efforts  are coordinated and the federal government has the means to monitor and  analyze the outcomes of interagency efforts and to address common  problems efficiently and effectively. To date, however, no clear lines of  responsibility and authority have been established to monitor  governmentwide screening activities for shared problems and solutions or  best practices. Neither does any existing entity clearly have the requisite  authority for addressing various governmentwide issues—such as  assessing common gaps or vulnerabilities in screening processes and  identifying, prioritizing, and implementing new screening opportunities.  Indeed, current unresolved interagency issues highlight the need for  clearly defined leadership and accountability for managing and overseeing  watch list-related issues across the individual departments and agencies,  each of which has its own mission and focus.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To promote more comprehensive and coordinated use of terrorist-related  screening data to detect, identify, track, and interdict suspected terrorists,  we recommended a total of five actions in the restricted version of this  report.
First, in order to mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list  screening processes, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland  Security and the Director of the FBI assess to what extent there are  vulnerabilities in the current screening processes that arise when  screening agencies do not accept relevant records due to the designs of  their computer systems, the extent to which these vulnerabilities pose a  security risk, and what actions, if any, should be taken in response.
Further, we recommended the following three actions to enhance the use  of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to  help ensure its effectiveness:  that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads  of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private  sector entities, develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list  records to support private sector screening processes that have a  substantial bearing on homeland security, as called for in HSPD-6;  that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads  of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the  President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security  and Counterterrorism an updated strategy for a coordinated and  comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening as called for in  HSPD-11, which among other things, (a) identifies all appropriate  screening opportunities to use watch list records to detect, identify,  track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to homeland security  and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy and civil liberties; and  that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads  of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the  President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security  and Counterterrorism an updated investment and implementation plan  that describes the scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones,  training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities necessary  for implementing a terrorist-related screening strategy, as called for in  HSPD-11.
Finally, to help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening  efforts have the oversight, accountability, and guidance necessary to  achieve the Administration’s vision of a comprehensive and coordinated  approach, we recommended that the Assistant to the President for  Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the governance  structure proposed by the plan affords clear and adequate responsibility  and authority to (a) provide monitoring and analysis of watch list  screening efforts governmentwide, (b) respond to issues that hinder  effectiveness, and (c) assess progress toward intended outcomes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the restricted version of this report for comments  to the Homeland Security Council, the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence, and the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and  State. We also provided relevant portions of a draft of the restricted  version of this report for comments to the Social Security Administration.  We received written responses from each entity, except for the Homeland  Security Council.
In its response, DHS noted that it agreed with and supported our work and  stated that it had already begun to address issues identified in our report’s  findings. The response noted that DHS, working closely with the FBI and  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, has ongoing efforts to  ensure that potential watch list vulnerabilities are identified and addressed  and that watch list records and screening programs are appropriate. Also,  DHS noted that at the time of our audit work, the department’s Screening  Coordination Office was relatively new—established in July 2006—but had  subsequently added key staff and begun the critical work of advancing  DHS screening programs and opportunities. According to DHS, the office  has drafted initial guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to  support private sector screening processes and is working with federal  stakeholders to finalize this document, but the department did not provide  specific plans and time frames for finalizing the guidelines. The  department also noted that it works closely with all DHS and federal  offices involved in screening initiatives and has begun appropriate  outreach to the private sector. Further, DHS noted that its Screening  Coordination Office is working within the department to advance a  comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening and that DHS  would review and appropriately update the department’s investment and  implementation plans for screening opportunities. However, DHS did not  specifically address our recommendations related to updating the  governmentwide terrorist-related screening strategy and the investment  and implementation plan, which is to include the scope, governance,  principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and  schedule of activities necessary for implementing the strategy. In our view,  an updated strategy and plan are important for helping to ensure a  coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening as  called for in HSPD-11. The full text of DHS’s written comments is  reprinted in appendix V. DHS also provided technical comments, which  we incorporated in this report where appropriate.
The FBI, responding on behalf of the Department of Justice, commented  that the report correctly characterized the FBI’s criteria for nominating  individuals for inclusion on the watch list. Also, the FBI response noted  that to ensure the protection of civil rights and prevent law enforcement  officials from taking invasive enforcement action on individuals  misidentified as being on the watch list, the Violent Gang and Terrorist  Organization File is designed to not accept certain watch list records. The  FBI explained that while law enforcement encounters of individuals on the  watch list provide significant information, unnecessary detentions or  queries of misidentified persons would be counterproductive and  potentially damaging to the efforts of the FBI to investigate and combat  terrorism. Because of these operational concerns, the FBI noted that our  recommendation to assess the extent of vulnerabilities in current  screening processes that arise when the Violent Gang and Terrorist  Organization File cannot accept certain watch list records has been  completed and the vulnerability has been determined to be low or  nonexistent. In our view, however, recognizing operational concerns does  not constitute assessing vulnerabilities. Thus, while we understand the  FBI’s operational concerns, we maintain it is still important that the FBI  assess to what extent vulnerabilities or security risks are raised by not  screening against certain watch list records and what actions, if any,  should be taken in response.
With respect to private sector screening, the FBI commented that it has  assigned staff to assist the DHS Screening Coordination Office with  drafting related screening guidelines. Finally, the FBI commented that the  language of our recommendation related to governance of the watch- listing process may be interpreted to have some overlap with existing  mandates carried out by TSC under HSPD-6. Specifically, the FBI noted  that governance of the watch-listing process is better suited to be a  component of TSC, rather than DHS. The FBI explained that DHS has no  authority or provisions for establishing any watch-listing procedures for  anyone other than DHS component agencies, whereas TSC has established  a governance board composed of senior members from the nominating  and screening agencies, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,  and the Homeland Security Council to monitor and update the watch  listing process. The FBI further explained that these members meet  regularly and address terrorist watch-listing issues ranging from  nominations and encounters to dissemination of information and  intelligence collected, and that all decisions approved by the governance  board are presented at the Deputies Meeting chaired by the White House.  The FBI believes this is the appropriate forum for obtaining a commitment  from all of the entities involved in the watch-listing process.
We recognize that TSC and its governance board have played and will  continue to play a central role in coordinating watch list-related activities  governmentwide. However, as discussed in this report, TSC’s governance  board is currently responsible for providing guidance concerning issues  within TSC’s mission and authority and would need additional authority to  provide effective coordination of terrorist-related screening activities and  interagency issues governmentwide. We are not recommending that a new  governance structure be created that overlaps with existing mandates or  activities currently carried out by TSC and other entities. Rather, we are  recommending that a governance structure be established that affords  clear and adequate responsibility and authority to (a) provide monitoring  and analysis of watch list screening efforts governmentwide, (b) respond  to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess progress toward  intended outcomes. The FBI also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated in this report where appropriate.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of  State, and the Social Security Administration provided technical  comments only, which we incorporated in this report where appropriate.
As arranged with your offices, we plan no further distribution of this  report until 30 days after the date of this report. At that time, we will send  copies of the report to interested congressional committees and  subcommittees.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to discuss  the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or  larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Other key contributors to this report were Danny R. Burton,   Virginia A. Chanley, R. Eric Erdman, Michele C. Fejfar,   Jonathon C. Fremont, Kathryn E. Godfrey, Richard B. Hung,   Thomas F. Lombardi, Donna L. Miller, Raul Quintero, and Ronald J. Salo.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
subsections: section_title: Objectives
paragraphs: In response to a request from the Chairman and the Ranking Member of  the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,  the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Permanent Subcommittee  on Investigations, and the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the  House Committee on Homeland Security, we addressed the following  questions:  In general, what standards do the National Counterterrorism Center  (NCTC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) use in  determining which individuals are appropriate for inclusion on the  Terrorist Screening Center’s (TSC) consolidated watch list?
Since TSC became operational in December 2003, how many times  have screening and law enforcement agencies positively matched  individuals to terrorist watch list records, and what do the results or  outcomes of these encounters indicate about the role of the watch list  as a counterterrorism tool?
To what extent do the principal screening agencies whose missions  most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers check  against all records in TSC’s consolidated watch list? If the entire watch  list is not being checked, why not, what potential vulnerabilities exist,  and what actions are being planned to address these vulnerabilities?
To what extent are Department of Homeland Security component  agencies monitoring known incidents in which subjects of watch list  records pass undetected through screening processes, and what  corrective actions have been implemented or are being planned to  address these vulnerabilities?
What actions has the U.S. government taken to ensure that the terrorist  watch list is used as effectively as possible, governmentwide and in  other appropriate venues?
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In addressing these questions, we reviewed TSC’s standard operating  procedures and other relevant documentation, including statistics on  screening encounters with individuals who were positively matched to  terrorist watch list records, and we interviewed TSC officials, including  the director and the principal deputy director. Further, we reviewed  documentation and interviewed senior officials from the FBI’s  Counterterrorism Division and the principal screening agencies whose  missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers.  Specifically, at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), we  examined the screening of air passengers prior to their boarding a flight; at  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), we examined the screening of  travelers entering the United States through ports of entry; and at the  Department of State, we examined the screening of nonimmigrant visa  applicants. We also visited a nonprobability sample of screening agencies  and investigative agencies in geographic areas of four states (California,  Michigan, New York, and Texas). We chose these locations on the basis of  geographic variation and other factors. More details about the scope and  methodology of our work regarding each of the objectives are presented in  the following sections, respectively.
subsections: section_title: Standards Used by NCTC and the FBI in Determining Which Individuals Are Appropriate for Inclusion on TSC’s Consolidated Watch List
paragraphs: To ascertain the general standards used in determining which individuals  are appropriate for inclusion on TSC’s consolidated watch list, we  reviewed available documentation. In particular, we reviewed    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, which specifies that TSC’s  consolidated watch list is to contain information about individuals  “known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in  conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to  terrorism;”    an NCTC document on building a single database of known and  suspected terrorists for the U.S. government, which provides NCTC’s  standards for including individuals on the watch list;  the Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security  Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection, which provide  standards for opening FBI international terrorism investigations; and   the Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering  Enterprise and Terrorist Enterprise Investigations, which provide  standards for opening FBI domestic terrorism investigations.
We discussed implementation of applicable guidance with responsible  NCTC and FBI Counterterrorism Division officials. However, we did not  audit or evaluate agencies’ compliance with the guidance. For instance, we  did not review or assess the derogatory information related to terrorist  watch list records, partly because such information involved ongoing  counterterrorism investigations. Also, a primary agency that collects  information on known or suspected terrorists—the Central Intelligence  Agency—declined to meet with us or provide us with documentation on its  watch list-related activities.
section_title: Number of Times That Screening and Law Enforcement Agencies Have Positively Matched Individuals to the Watch List: Results or Outcomes
paragraphs: From TSC, we obtained statistics on the number of positive encounters,  that is, the number of times that individuals have been positively matched  during screening against terrorist watch list records. Generally, the  statistics cover the period from December 2003 (when TSC began  operations) through May 2007. To the extent possible on the basis of  available information, we worked with the applicable agencies  (particularly the FBI, CBP, TSA, and the Department of State) to quantify  the results or outcomes of these positive encounters—which included  actions ranging from arrests and visa denials to questioning and releasing  individuals. Further, we inquired about the existence and resolution of any  issues regarding interagency collaboration in managing encounters with  individuals on the terrorist watch list. Moreover, in our interviews with  officials at TSC and the frontline screening agencies and in the law  enforcement and intelligence communities, we obtained perspectives on  whether (and how) watch list screening has enhanced the U.S.  government’s counterterrorism efforts.
section_title: Extent That Screening and Law Enforcement Agencies Check against All Records in the TSC’s Consolidated Watch List
paragraphs: We determined from TSC what subsets of records from the consolidated  watch list are exported for use by the respective frontline screening  agencies and law enforcement. Each day, TSC exports subsets of the  consolidated watch list to federal government databases used by agencies  that conduct terrorism-related screening. Specifically, we focused on  exports of records to the following agencies’ databases:    Department of Homeland Security’s Interagency Border  Inspection System. Among other users, CBP officers use the  Interagency Border Inspection System to screen travelers entering the  United States at international ports of entry, which include land border  crossings along the Canadian and Mexican borders, sea ports, and U.S.  airports for international flight arrivals.
Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System.
This system is the primary sensitive but unclassified database used by  consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants to  identify terrorists and other aliens who are potentially ineligible for  visas based on criminal histories or other reasons specified by federal  statute.
FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. This file,  which is a component of the FBI’s National Crime Information Center,  is accessible by federal, state, and local law enforcement officers for  screening in conjunction with arrests, detentions, or other criminal  justice purposes.
TSA’s No Fly and Selectee lists. TSA provides updated No Fly and  Selectee lists to airlines for use in prescreening passengers. Through  the issuance of security directives, the agency requires that airlines use  these lists to screen passengers prior to boarding.
The scope of our work included inquiries regarding why only certain  records are exported for screening rather than use of the entire  consolidated watch list by all agencies. At TSC and the frontline screening  agencies, we interviewed senior officials and we reviewed mission  responsibilities, standard operating procedures, and documentation  regarding the technical capabilities of the respective agency’s database.
section_title: Extent That Screening Agencies Monitor Incidents in Which Subjects of Watch List Records Pass Undetected through Screening Processes; Corrective Actions Implemented or Planned to Address Vulnerabilities
paragraphs: We inquired about incidents of subjects of watch list records who were  able to pass undetected through screening conducted by the various  frontline screening agencies or, at TSA direction, airlines. More  specifically, we reviewed available documentation and interviewed senior  officials at the FBI, CBP, TSA, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,  and the Department of State regarding the frequency of such incidents and  the causes, as well as what corrective actions have been implemented or  planned to address vulnerabilities.
section_title: Actions the U.S. Government Has Taken to Ensure That the Terrorist Watch List Is Used as Effectively as Possible
paragraphs: Regarding actions taken by the U.S. government to ensure the effective  use of the watch list, we reviewed Homeland Security Presidential  Directive 6 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11, which  address the integration and use of screening information and  comprehensive terrorist-related screening procedures. Generally, these  directives require federal departments and agencies to identify all  appropriate opportunities or processes that should use the terrorist watch  list. We did not do an independent evaluation of whether all screening  opportunities were identified. Rather, to determine the implementation  status of these directives, we reviewed available documentation and  interviewed senior officials at the Departments of Homeland Security,  Justice, and State, as well as TSC and the Social Security Administration.  Our inquiries covered domestic screening opportunities within the federal  community and critical infrastructure sectors of private industry. Further,  our inquiries covered international opportunities, that is, progress made in  efforts to exchange terrorist watch list information with trusted foreign  partners on a reciprocal basis. Finally, we compared the status of watch  list-related strategies, planning, and initiatives with the expectations set  forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 and Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 11. The Homeland Security Council—which  is chaired by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and  Counterterrorism—denied our request for an interview.
section_title: Data Reliability
paragraphs: Regarding statistical information we obtained from TSC and screening  agencies—such as the number of positive matches and actions taken—we  discussed the sources of the data with agency officials and reviewed  documentation regarding the compilation of the statistics. We determined  that the statistics were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review.
We did not review or assess the derogatory information related to terrorist  watch list records, primarily because such information involved ongoing  counterterrorism investigations or intelligence community activities.
We performed our work on the restricted version of this report from April  2005 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6 (Sept. 16, 2003)
paragraphs: Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential  Directive/HSPD-6 (Sept. 16, 2003)
Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential  Directive/HSPD-6 (Sept. 16, 2003)
section_title: Appendix III: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11 (Aug. 27, 2004)
paragraphs: Appendix III: Homeland Security Presidential  Directive/HSPD-11 (Aug. 27, 2004)
section_title: Appendix IV: Outcomes of Screening Agency Encounters with Individuals on the Terrorist Watch List
paragraphs: This appendix presents details on the outcomes of screening agency  encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list. Specifically, the  following sections provide information on arrests and other outcomes of  encounters involving the Department of State, TSA, CBP, and state or local  law enforcement.
subsections: section_title: Subjects of Watch List Records Have Been Arrested Hundreds of Times, with Some Arrests Based on Terrorism Grounds
paragraphs: According to TSC data, for the period December 2003 through May 2007,  agencies reported arresting subjects of watch list records for various  reasons hundreds of times, such as the individual having an outstanding  arrest warrant or the individual’s behavior or actions during the encounter.  For this period, TSC data also indicated that some of the arrests were  based on terrorism grounds. For example, according to TSC, in November  2004, the subject of a watch list record was encountered at the El Paso,  Texas, border crossing by CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement agents and subsequently arrested as a result of their  interview with the person. According to TSC, the arrest was done in  conjunction with the FBI on grounds of material support to terrorism. In  January 2007, TSC officials told us that—because of the difficulty in  collecting information on the basis of arrests—the center has changed its  policy on documentation of arrests and no longer categorizes arrests as  terrorism-related. As such, the number of times individuals on the watch  list have been arrested based on terrorism grounds is no longer being  tracked.
section_title: Subjects of Watch List Records Were Denied Visas and Also Granted Visas
paragraphs: U.S. consulates and embassies around the world are required to screen the  names of all visa applicants against the Department of State’s Consular  Lookout and Support System and to notify TSC when the applicant’s  identifying information matches or closely matches information in a  terrorist watch list record. For positive matches, officials at Department  of State headquarters are to review available derogatory information and  provide advice to the consular officer, who is responsible for deciding  whether to grant or refuse a visa to the applicant under the immigration  laws and regulations of the United States. According to TSC data, when  visa applicants were positively matched to terrorist watch list records, the  outcomes included visas denied, visas issued (because the consular officer  did not find any statutory basis for inadmissibility), and visa ineligibility  waived.
The Department of State described several scenarios under which an  individual on the terrorist watch list might still be granted a visa.  According to the department, visas can be issued following extensive  interagency consultations regarding the individuals who were matched to  watch list records. The department explained that the information that  supports a terrorist watch list record is often sparse or inconclusive. It  noted, however, that having these records exported to the Consular  Lookout and Support System provides an opportunity for a consular  officer to question the alien to obtain additional information regarding  potential inadmissibility. For instance, there might be a record with  supporting information showing that the person attended a political rally  addressed by radical elements. According to the Department of State,  while this activity may raise suspicion about the individual, it also requires  further development and exploration of the person’s potential ability to  receive a visa. Thus, using watch list records allows the department to  develop information and pursue a thorough interagency vetting process  before coming to a final conclusion about any given prospective traveler  who is the subject of a watch list record.
Further, individuals can receive a waiver of inadmissibility from the  Department of Homeland Security. According to the Department of State,  there may be U.S. government interest in issuing a visa to someone who  has a record in the terrorist watch list and who may have already been  found ineligible for a visa or inadmissible to the United States. For  instance, an individual might be a former insurgent who has become a  foreign government official. This person might be invited to the United  States to participate in peace talks under U.S. auspices. According to the  Department of State, in such a case, the visa application would go through  normal processing, which would include a review of the derogatory  information related to the terrorist watch list record. This information,  along with the request for a waiver, would be passed to the Department of  Homeland Security, which normally grants waivers recommended by the  Department of State.
Another scenario under which an individual on the terrorist watch list  might still be granted a visa involves instances where a watch list record is  not exported to the Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support  System. According to the department, originating agencies that nominate  terrorist watch list records occasionally ask TSC to not export a record to  the Department of State’s system for operational reasons, such as to not  alert the individuals about an ongoing investigation. In this case, if a  terrorist watch list record is not exported to the Consular Lookout and  Support System database, a consular officer will not be notified of the  record and may otherwise proceed in adjudicating the visa without  consulting Department of State officials in Washington, D.C.
section_title: Passengers Were Matched to the No Fly and Selectee Lists
paragraphs: TSA requires aircraft operators to screen the names of all passengers  against extracts from TSC’s consolidated watch list to help ensure that  individuals who pose a threat to civil aviation are denied boarding or  subjected to additional screening before boarding, as appropriate.  Specifically, TSA provides the No Fly and Selectee lists to airlines for use  in prescreening passengers. According to TSA policy, if a situation arises  in which a person on the No Fly list is erroneously permitted to board a  flight, upon discovery, that flight may be diverted to a location other than  its original destination.
According to TSA data, when airline passengers were positively matched  to the No Fly or Selectee lists, the vast majority of matches were to the  Selectee list. Other outcomes included individuals matched to the No Fly  list and denied boarding (did not fly) and individuals matched to the No  Fly list after the aircraft was in-flight. Regarding the latter, TSA officials  explained that there have been situations in which individuals on the No  Fly list have passed undetected through airlines’ prescreening of  passengers and flew on international flights bound to or from the United  States. These individuals were subsequently identified in-flight by other  means—specifically, screening of passengers conducted by CBP.
section_title: Many Nonimmigrant Aliens on the Watch List Were Refused Entry into the United States, but Most Were Allowed to Enter
paragraphs: CBP officers at U.S. ports of entry use the Interagency Border Inspection  System to screen the names of individuals entering the United States  against terrorist watch list records. Specifically, all individuals entering  the United States at seaports and U.S. airports for international flight  arrivals are to be checked against watch list records. At land border ports  of entry, screening against watch list records depends on the volume of  traffic and other operational factors.
While U.S. citizens who have left the United States and seek to reenter  may be subjected to additional questioning and physical screening to  determine any potential threat they pose, they may not be excluded and  must be admitted upon verification of citizenship (for example, by  presenting a U.S. passport). Alien applicants for admission are questioned  by CBP officers, and their documents are examined to determine  admissibility based on requirements of the Immigration and Nationality  Act. For nonimmigrant aliens who are positively matched to a terrorist  watch list record, officials at CBP are to review available derogatory  information related to the watch list record and advise port officers  regarding whether sufficient information exists to refuse admission under  terrorism or other grounds. CBP officers at ports of entry are ultimately  responsible for making determinations regarding whether an individual  should be admitted or denied entry into the United States.
According to CBP policies, CBP officers at the port of entry are required to  apprise the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the local U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement of all watch list encounters,  regardless of the individual’s citizenship and whether or not the person is  refused admission into the United States. If the individual is a U.S. citizen  or an admitted non-citizen, CBP officers at the port are to apprise the local  Joint Terrorism Task Force of any suspicions about the person after  questioning, in order to permit post-entry investigation or surveillance.
According to CBP data, a number of nonimmigrant aliens encountered at  U.S. ports of entry were positively matched to terrorist watch list records.  For many of the encounters, CBP determined there was sufficient  derogatory information related to the watch list records to preclude  admission under terrorism grounds in the Immigration and Nationality  Act, and the individuals were refused entry. However, for most of the  encounters, CBP determined there was not sufficient derogatory  information related to terrorist watch list records to refuse admission on  terrorism-related grounds in the Immigration and Nationality Act.  According to CBP, the center did not know how many times these  encounters ultimately resulted in individuals being admitted or denied  entry into the United States. The officials explained that after in-depth  questioning and inspection of travel documents and belongings, CBP  officers could still have refused individuals the right to enter the United  States based on terrorism-related or other grounds set forth in the  Immigration and Nationality Act, such as immigration violations.
section_title: Watch List Records Related to State and Local Encounters Indicate the Vast Majority of Subjects Were Released
paragraphs: To assist state and local officials during encounters, all watch list records  in the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File contain a specific  category or handling code and related instructions about actions that may  be taken in response to a positive watch list encounter. These actions may  include—in appropriate and lawfully authorized circumstances—arresting,  detaining, or questioning and then releasing the individual. State and local  officials are to contact TSC when the names of individuals queried match  or closely match a terrorist watch list record in the Violent Gang and  Terrorist Organization File. For positive or inconclusive matches, TSC is to  refer the matter to the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, which provides  specific instructions to state and local officials about appropriate actions  that may be taken or questions that should be asked.
According to TSC data, state or local law enforcement officials have  encountered individuals who were positively matched to terrorist watch  list records in the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File thousands  of times. Although data on the actual outcomes of these encounters were  not available, the vast majority involved watch list records that indicated  that the individuals were released, unless there were other reasons for  arresting or detaining the individual.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security