Military Recruiting: DOD and Services Need Better Data to Enhance Visibility over Recruiter Irregularities
Published: 2006-08-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The viability of the All Volunteer Force depends, in large measure, on the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to recruit several hundred thousand individuals each year. Since the involvement of U.S. military forces in Iraq in March 2003, several DOD components have been challenged in meeting their recruiting goals. In fiscal year 2005 alone, three of the eight active and reserve components missed their goals. Some recruiters, reportedly, have resorted to overly aggressive tactics, which can adversely affect DOD's ability to recruit and erode public confidence in the recruiting process. GAO was asked to address the extent to which DOD and the services have visibility over recruiter irregularities; what factors may contribute to recruiter irregularities; and what procedures are in place to address them. GAO performed its work primarily at the service recruiting commands and DOD's Military Entrance Processing Command; examined recruiting policies, regulations, and directives; and analyzed service data on recruiter irregularities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. DOD, for example, has not established an oversight framework that includes guidance requiring the services to maintain and report data on recruiter irregularities and criteria for characterizing irregularities and establishing common terminology. The absence of guidance and criteria makes it difficult to compare and analyze data across services and limits DOD's ability to determine when corrective action is needed. Effective federal managers continually assess and evaluate their programs to provide accountability and assurance that program objectives are being achieved. Additionally, the services do not track all allegations of recruiter wrongdoing. Accordingly, service data likely underestimate the true number of recruiter irregularities. Nevertheless, available service data show that between fiscal years 2004 and 2005, allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing increased, collectively, from 4,400 cases to 6,500 cases; substantiated cases increased from just over 400 to almost 630 cases; and criminal violations more than doubled from just over 30 to almost 70 cases. The department, however, is not in a sound position to assure Congress and the general public that it knows the full extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. A number of factors within the recruiting environment may contribute to irregularities. Service recruiting officials stated that the economy has been the most important factor affecting recruiting success. Almost three-quarters of active duty recruiters responding to DOD's internal survey also believed that ongoing hostilities in Iraq made it hard to achieve their goals. These factors, in addition to the typical challenges of the job, such as demanding work hours and pressure to meet monthly goals, may lead to recruiter irregularities. The recruiters' performance evaluation and reward systems are generally based on the number of contracts they write for applicants to enter the military. The Marine Corps is the only service that uses basic training attrition rates as a key component of the recruiter's evaluation. GAO previously recommended that the services link recruiter awards and incentives more closely to applicants' successful completion of basic training. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation, but has not made this a requirement across the services. The services have standard procedures in place, provided in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and service regulations, to investigate allegations of recruiter irregularities and to prosecute and discipline recruiters found guilty of violating recruiting policies and procedures. In addition, to help recruiters better understand the nature and consequences of committing irregularities in the recruitment process, all services use available information on recruiter wrongdoing to update their training.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The viability of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) depends, in large measure, on  the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ability to successfully recruit several  hundred thousand qualified individuals each year to fill over 1,400  occupational specialties. Since the March 2003 involvement of U.S. military  forces in Iraq, attracting sufficient numbers of high-quality recruits to  military service has proven to be one of the greatest personnel challenges  faced by DOD since the inception of the AVF. The active Army, the Army  Reserve, and the Navy Reserve, for example, failed to meet their fiscal year  2005 recruiting goals.
Recruitment of high-quality personnel is a tough proposition, made even  more challenging in the current environment when the nation is engaged in  combat operations. To exacerbate the recruitment challenges further, DOD  estimates that over half of the youth in the U.S. population between the  ages of 16 and 21 do not meet the minimum requirements to enter military  service. Moreover, additional factors such as the shrinking numbers of new  recruits in delayed entry programs and the Army’s use of stop loss, which  delays servicemembers from leaving active duty, indicate that the  components may experience continued recruiting challenges as they  attempt to meet their personnel requirements.
To help overcome recruiting challenges, the military services during the  past several years have assigned roughly 20,000 recruiters to manage their  recruiting programs and achieve their accession goals. In addition, the  services have taken other steps to enhance their recruiting efforts, such as  offering increased enlistment bonuses and other benefits. Despite these  actions, many of the recruiting challenges remain.
Determined to find ways to succeed in a challenging recruiting  environment, some recruiters, reportedly, have resorted to overly  aggressive tactics, such as coercion and harassment. Such tactics are  violations of recruiting policies and diminish the public’s perception of, and  confidence in, the recruiting process. Furthermore, recruiter irregularities  can negatively impact the services’ recruiting ability by damaging  relationships with potential applicants, and causing those who have  influence over potential applicants to question military service. These  influencers include parents, coaches, teachers, and other family members.  Consequently, a recruiter’s actions can be far reaching and have significant  impact. Given the large numbers of servicemembers DOD must recruit  every year, there is ample opportunity for recruiter irregularities to occur. A  2005 internal DOD survey reports about 20 percent of active duty recruiters  believe that irregularities occur frequently. Even one incident of recruiter  wrongdoing can erode public confidence in the recruiting process.
We looked at military recruiting processes in two prior reports dated  January 1997 and January 1998, both of which recommended that DOD  needed to improve its recruiter performance criteria across the services.  Both of these reports point to the increased stress on recruiters as a result  of restrictive recruiting goals and long working hours to succeed in a tough  recruiting environment.
This report addresses the following questions: (1) To what extent do DOD  and the services have visibility over recruiter irregularities? (2) What  factors within the current recruiting environment may contribute to  recruiting irregularities? (3) What procedures are in place to address  individuals involved in recruiting irregularities?
Our work covers recruiting irregularities that affect all services’ active and  reserve component enlisted personnel. For the purposes of this report, we  define recruiter irregularities as those willful and unwillful acts of omission  and improprieties that are perpetrated by a recruiter or alleged to be  perpetrated by a recruiter to facilitate the recruiting process for an  applicant. These recruiter irregularities range from administrative  paperwork errors, to actions such as failing to disclose disqualifying  eligibility criteria or instructing applicants not to reveal medical conditions  or prior civil litigation, to criminal violations committed by a recruiter who  is subsequently prosecuted under articles of the Uniform Code of Military  Justice. Criminal violations may include such actions as sexual harassment  and falsifying documents. We performed our work primarily at the service  recruiting commands and DOD’s Military Entrance Processing Command.  To answer our objectives, we examined DOD and service policies,  regulations, and directives related to recruiting. We also reviewed data  DOD compiled on recruiters and survey results on their opinions about  their jobs. Additionally, we analyzed data the services compiled and  maintained on recruiter irregularities. We also interviewed DOD and  service recruiting officials, and recruiters in each service. However, we did  not review irregularities within DOD’s National Guard components because  the National Guard Bureau does not maintain centralized data. Although  we identified weaknesses in the available data, we determined that, for the  purposes of this report, the data were reliable for providing limited  information on recruiter irregularities. We conducted our work from  September 2005 through August 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Further details on the scope and  methodology are described in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense,  each military service (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) has the  responsibility to recruit and train a force to conduct military operations. In  fiscal year 2006, DOD committed over $1.5 billion to its recruiting effort.  Each service, in turn, has established a recruiting command responsible for that service’s recruiting mission and functions. The services’ recruiting  commands are similarly organized, in general, to accomplish the recruiting  mission. Figure 1 illustrates the organization of the recruiting commands  from the senior headquarters level through the recruiting station where  frontline recruiters work to contact prospective applicants and sell them  on military service.
Region (Western) Region (Eastern)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 (few sites) (several sites) (numerous sites)
Each service has at least two levels of command between the senior  headquarters and the recruiting station where frontline recruiters work to  contact prospective applicants for military service. The Army Brigades,  Navy and Marine Corps Regions, and Air Force Groups are subordinate  commands of their service recruiting command and have responsibility for  recruiting operations in large portions of the country. The Navy and Marine  Corps organize their servicewide recruiting commands into Eastern and  Western Regions that more or less divide responsibilities east and west of  the Mississippi River. The Army, in comparison, has five Brigades and the  Air Force has four Groups based regionally across the country that are  responsible for their recruiting operations. These commands are further  divided into local levels responsible for coordinating the frontline  recruiting efforts. These 41 Army Battalions, 26 Navy and 6 Marine Corps  Districts, and 28 Air Force Squadrons are generally organized around  market demographics, including population density and geographic  location. Finally, the 1,200 to 2,000 recruiting stations per service or in the  case of the Marine Corps—the substations—represent that part of the  recruiting organization with which the general public is most familiar.
Of the approximately 22,000 total military recruiters in fiscal year 2006,  almost 14,000 are frontline recruiters who are assigned a monthly  recruiting goal. The recruiter’s monthly goal varies by service, but is  generally 2 recruits per month. The remaining recruiters—roughly 8,000—  hold supervisory and staff positions throughout the services’ recruiting  commands. Table 1 provides a summary of the average number of  recruiters by service for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 broken out by total  number of recruiters and frontline recruiters who have a monthly  recruiting goal.
A typical frontline military recruiter is generally a midlevel enlisted  noncommissioned officer in the rank of Army and Marine Corps Sergeant  (E-5) or Staff Sergeant (E-6), Navy Petty Officer Second Class (E-5) or First  Class (E-6), and Air Force Staff Sergeant (E-5) or Technical Sergeant (E-6),  who is between the ages of 25 and 30 years old and has between 5 and 10  years of military service. While some frontline recruiters volunteer for  recruiting as a career enhancement, others are selected from among those  the services have identified as their best performers in their primary  military specialties. All services have comprehensive selection processes in  place and specific eligibility criteria for recruiting duty. For example,  recruiters must meet service appearance standards, have a stable family  situation, be able to speak without any impairment, and be financially  responsible. The services screen all prospective recruiters by interviewing  and conducting personality assessments and ensuring the prospective  recruiters meet all criteria.
To augment its uniformed recruiters, the Army also uses contract civilian  recruiters, and has been doing so under legislative authority since fiscal  year 2001. This pilot program, which authorizes the Army to use civilian  contractors, will run through fiscal year 2007. The goal of the program is to  test the effectiveness of civilian recruiters. If civilian recruiters prove  effective, this would allow the Army to retain more noncommissioned  officers in their primary military specialties within the warfighting force.  Currently, the Army is using almost 370 contract civilian recruiters,  representing approximately 3 percent of the Army’s total recruiting force.
In general, training for frontline recruiters is similar in all services and has  focused on ethics and salesmanship, with a growing emphasis placed on  leadership and mentoring skills to attract today’s applicant. Each service  conducts specialized training for approximately 6 weeks for  noncommissioned officers assigned as recruiters. The number of hours of  training time specifically devoted to ethics training as a component of the  recruiter training curriculum ranges from 5 hours in the Navy to 34 hours of  instruction in the Army.
After recruiters successfully convince applicants on the benefits of joining  the military, they complete a prescreening of the applicant, which includes  an initial background review and a physical and moral assessment of the  applicant’s eligibility for military service. After the recruiter’s prescreening,  the military pays for the applicant to travel to 1 of 65 military entrance  processing stations (MEPS) located throughout the country. At the  processing stations, which are under the direction of DOD’s Military  Entrance Processing Command, processing station staff administer the  Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, a test to determine whether  the applicant is qualified for enlistment and a military job specialty, and  conduct a medical examination to determine whether the applicant meets  physical entrance standards. After the processing station staff determine  that an applicant is qualified, the applicant signs an enlistment contract and  is sworn into the service and enters the delayed entry program. When an  applicant enters the delayed entry program, he or she becomes a member  of the Individual Ready Reserve, in an unpaid status, until reporting for  basic training. An individual may remain in the delayed entry program for 1  day up to 1 year. Just before reporting for basic training, the applicant  returns to the processing station, undergoes a brief physical examination,  and is sworn into the military.
Figure 2, in general, illustrates the recruiting process from a recruiter’s  initial contact with a prospective applicant to the applicant’s successful  graduation from the service’s initial training school, commonly referred to  as basic training.
section_title: DOD and the Services Have Limited Visibility over Recruiter Irregularities
paragraphs: DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to  which recruiter irregularities are occurring. The Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Personnel and Readiness has the  responsibility for overseeing the recruiting program. However, OUSD has  not established a framework to conduct oversight of recruiter irregularities  and provide guidance requiring the services to maintain data on recruiter  wrongdoing. Although not required by OUSD to do so, the services require  their recruiting commands to maintain data for 2 years; the Army  Recruiting Command maintains data for 3 years and can retrieve case files  back to fiscal year 1998. Furthermore, OUSD has not established criteria  for the services to characterize recruiter irregularities or developed  common terminology for irregularities. Accordingly, the services use  different terminology, which makes it difficult to compare and analyze data  across the services. Moreover, each of the services uses multiple systems  for maintaining data that are not integrated and decentralized processes for  identifying and tracking allegations and service-identified incidents of  recruiter irregularities. Perhaps most significantly, none of the services  accounts for all allegations or incidents of recruiter irregularities.  Therefore, service data likely underestimate the true number of recruiter  irregularities. Nevertheless, our analysis of service data suggests that most  allegations are not substantiated.
subsections: section_title: DOD Lacks an Oversight Framework to Provide Guidance on Recruiter Irregularities, and Has Not Established Criteria to Characterize Irregularities
paragraphs: Effective federal managers continually assess and evaluate their programs  to provide accountability and to assure that they are well designed and  operated, appropriately updated to meet changing conditions, and  achieving program objectives. Specifically, managers need to examine  internal control to determine how well it is performing, how it may be  improved, and the degree to which it helps identify and address major risks  for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. According to the mission  statement for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness, its responsibilities include reviewing and evaluating plans  and programs to ensure adherence to approved policies and standards,  including DOD’s recruitment program. OUSD officials stated that they  review service recruiter irregularity issues infrequently usually in response  to a congressional inquiry, and they do not perform oversight of recruiter  irregularities. OUSD has not issued guidance requiring the services to  maintain data on recruiter irregularities. Nevertheless, the services require  their recruiting commands to maintain data on recruiter irregularities for 2  years; the Army Recruiting Command maintains data for 3 years and can  retrieve case files dating back to fiscal year 1998.
Moreover, OUSD has not established or provided criteria to the services for  how they should characterize various recruiter irregularities and has not  developed common terminology because it responds to individual inquiries  and, in general, uses the terminology of the service in question.  Accordingly, the services use different terminology to refer to recruiter  irregularities. How the services categorize the irregularity affects how they  maintain data on recruiter irregularities. For example, the Army uses the  term impropriety while the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force use the term  malpractice to characterize the intentional enlistment of an unqualified  applicant. Only the Army uses the term recruiter error to describe those  irregularities not resulting from malicious intent or gross negligence.  Consequently, if DOD were to require services to report on recruiter  wrongdoing, the Army might not include its recruiter error category  because these cases are not willful violations of recruiting policies and  procedures and the Army does not identify such cases as substantiated or  unsubstantiated in their data system. The Air Force uses the term  procedural error to refer to an irregularity occurring as a result of an  administrative error by the recruiter due to lack of knowledge or  inattention to detail. If DOD were to require services to report on recruiter  wrongdoing, the Air Force might not include its procedural error category  because these cases are not intentional acts to facilitate the recruiting  process for an ineligible applicant. In both cases, however, wasted taxpayer  dollars result; unintentional recruiter errors can have the same effect as  intentional recruiter irregularities because both result in inefficiencies in  the recruiting process.
DOD’s need for oversight may become more critical if the department  decides to rely more heavily on civilian contract recruiters in the future. As  we previously stated, the civilian recruiter pilot program currently  authorizes the Army to use civilian recruiters, through fiscal year 2007, to  test their effectiveness. Future reliance on civilian recruiters, in any  service, would allow a service to retain more noncommissioned officers in  their primary military specialties. However, OUSD would also need to be in  a position to assure that this type of change is well designed and operated,  and that its recruiting programs are appropriately updated to reflect a  change in recruiting operations.
section_title: Each Service Uses Systems That Are Not Integrated and Do Not Allow the Services to Readily Report All Recruiter Irregularities
paragraphs: None of the services can readily provide a comprehensive and consolidated  report on recruiter irregularities within their own service because they use  multiple systems that are not integrated. Currently, the services use  systems that range from electronic databases to hard-copy paper files to  track recruiter irregularities and do not have a central database dedicated  to compiling, monitoring, and archiving information about recruiter  irregularities. When we asked officials in each of the services for a  comprehensive report of recruiter irregularities that occurred within their  own service, they were unable to readily provide these data. Officials had  to query and compile data from separate systems. For example, the Navy  Recruiting Command had to access paper files for allegations of recruiter  irregularities, while the Air Force Judge Advocate provided information  from an electronic database from which we were able to extract cases  specifically related to recruiter irregularities.
Furthermore, the services cannot assure the reliability of their data  because the services lack standardized procedures for recording data, their  multiple systems use different formats for maintaining data, and in some  instances the services do not conduct quality reviews or edit checks of the  data. The services used the following systems to maintain data on recruiter  irregularities at the time of our review:  Army: The Army maintains three separate data systems that contain  information about recruiter irregularities. The Army Recruiting  Command’s Enlistment Standards Division has a database that houses  recruiting irregularities that pertain to applicant eligibility. The Army  Recruiting Command Inspector General maintains a separate database  that houses other irregularities, including recruiter misconduct that may  result in nonjudicial punishment. The Judge Advocate maintains hard- copy case files for recruiter irregularities that are criminal violations of  the recruiting process that may result in judicial punishment.
Navy: The Navy maintains four separate data systems that contain  information about recruiter irregularities. The Naval Inspector General,  the Navy Bureau of Personnel Inspector General, and the Navy  Recruiting Command Inspector General all maintain some data on  allegations of recruiter irregularities. The Naval Criminal Investigative  Service investigates and maintains data on Navy criminal recruiting  violations.
Marine Corps: The Marine Corps Recruiting Command maintains two  systems that track information on recruiting irregularities, one that  captures reported allegations and another that only tracks the  disposition of allegations and service-identified incidents that a  commander or recruiting official at some level in the recruiting  command structure determined to merit an inquiry or investigation. The  Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigates and maintains data on  Marine Corps criminal recruiting violations.
Air Force: The Air Force maintains three separate databases with  information about recruiter irregularities. The Air Force Recruiting  Service Inspector General maintains a database that houses data on  allegations of recruiter irregularities. The liaison from the Air Force  Recruiting Service, located at the Air Force basic training site, maintains  data within a separate electronic system on allegations of recruiter  irregularities that applicants raise about their recruiters when they  report to basic training. The Air Force Judge Advocate maintains a  database containing criminal violations of recruiting practices and  procedures.
At the time of our review, Navy officials told us they believe there is value  in having servicewide visibility over the recruiting process and they plan to  improve their systems for maintaining data on recruiter irregularities. Navy  officials stated that the Navy Bureau of Personnel Inspector General is  working with the Navy Recruiting Command Inspector General and the  Naval Education and Training Command to develop a system that  maintains recruiting and training data that will include allegations and  service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities. Marine Corps  officials told us they are in the process of improving their systems for  maintaining data on recruiter irregularities by merging all data on  allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities into  one database that can be accessed at all command levels of the Marine  Corps Recruiting Command. An Air Force official told us that as a result of  our review, the Air Force modified its system for capturing allegations and  service-identified incidents surfacing at basic training by improving its  ability to query the system for information on the type of allegation or  incident and whether or not it was a substantiated case of recruiter  wrongdoing.
section_title: Services’ Decentralized Processes Do Not Allow Them to Account for All Recruiter Irregularities
paragraphs: Where and how an irregularity is identified will often determine where and  how it will be resolved. The services identify an allegation or incident of  recruiter wrongdoing in a number of ways. These include input from  service hotlines, internal inspections, congressional inquiries, and data  collected by DOD’s Military Entrance Processing Command. The services’  recruiting command headquarters typically handle allegations and service- identified incidents of recruiter irregularities that surface through any of  these means during the recruiting process. At other times, allegations  surface in the recruiting process at command levels below the service  recruiting command headquarters, and commanders at the Army Battalion,  Navy and Marine Corps District, and Air Force Squadron level handle  allegations that typically surface during supervisory reviews at the  recruiting stations and substations. We were unable to determine the  extent of these allegations, however, because the service recruiting  commands do not maintain complete data. For example, Military Entrance  Processing Command officials, responsible for assessing an applicant’s  moral, mental, and physical eligibility for military service, stated that they  forward all allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter  irregularities that surface during the screening process at the military  entrance processing station to the services’ recruiting commanders.  However, officials also stated that the services’ recruiting commanders do  not provide feedback to them regarding the disposition of these cases. In  fact, the services’ recruiting command headquarters data did not show  records of allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter  irregularities received from the Military Entrance Processing Command.
Additionally, each service provides applicants an opportunity to disclose  any special circumstances relating to their enlistment process, including  allegations of recruiter wrongdoing, when they enter basic training. Army  and Air Force officials told us that they record all allegations of recruiter  irregularities made by applicants at basic training. Army Recruiting  Command officials stated that liaison officers at each of the basic training  installations forward all allegations received from applicants to the Army  Recruiting Command Enlisted Standards Division to record in its database.  The Air Force implemented a new database in fiscal year 2005 specifically  to record and resolve all allegations and service-identified incidents of  recruiter wrongdoing that surface at basic training. The Navy and Marine  Corps, on the other hand, do not record all allegations of recruiter  irregularities made by applicants at basic training.
Navy: The Navy gives applicants a final opportunity to disclose any  irregularity that they believe occurred in their recruiting process when  they arrive at basic training. The Recruiting Command Inspector  General has the authority to investigate allegations or service-identified  incidents of recruiter wrongdoing and uses its Navy Recruit Quality  Assurance Team to conduct the final Navy recruiting quality assurance  check before applicants begin basic training. In turn, the Assurance  Team generates reports on allegations raised by applicants who claim  they were misled during the recruiting process and submits its reports  to the Navy Recruiting Command Inspector General. Navy recruiting  command officials explained that the Inspector General investigates  those allegations that the Assurance Team, based on the professional  judgment and experience of its team members, recommends for further  investigation. The Navy Recruiting Command Inspector General,  however, does not maintain data on allegations that it does not  investigate. The Assurance Team also sends its reports to the Navy  Recruiting District Commanders who are responsible for overseeing the  recruiters who appear on the reports. The District Commanders use the  Assurance Team’s reports to monitor recruiter wrongdoing. Again,  however, the District Commanders do not provide feedback to the  Assurance Team as to how they resolve these allegations, nor do they  report this information to the Navy Recruiting Command Inspector  General unless they deem the case to merit further investigation or  judicial processing. Moreover, the Assurance Team members do not  record allegations of wrongdoing as a recruiter irregularity in those  cases where they can easily resolve the discrepancy by granting an  applicant an enlistment waiver to begin basic training. Assurance Team  officials told us that they believe that some recruiters encourage  applicants to conceal potentially disqualifying information until they  arrive at basic training because the recruiters perceive that it is  relatively easy to process a waiver at basic training. In addition, these  same officials told us that this behavior saves recruiters the burden of  collecting supporting documentation and expedites the time it takes a  recruiter to sign a contract with an applicant and complete the  recruiting process.
Marine Corps: The Marine Corps also gives applicants a final  opportunity to disclose any irregularity that they believe occurred in  their recruiting process prior to beginning basic training. However, the  Marine Corps’ Eastern and Western Recruiting Region staff use different  criteria to handle allegations of recruiter irregularities that they cannot  corroborate. Recruiting staff at the Eastern Region basic training site in  Parris Island, South Carolina, enter all allegations applicants make  against recruiters, while recruiting staff at the Western Region basic  training site in San Diego, California, only enter those allegations that a  third party can verify. A Marine Corps Recruiting Command official told  us that, as a result of our review, Marine Corps officials discussed  accounting procedures for allegations of recruiter irregularities at the  command’s national operations conference held in May 2006. The  official further stated that the Marine Corps Recruiting Command’s goal  is to standardize procedures to account for all allegations of recruiter  irregularities.
section_title: Although Likely Underestimated, Service Data Suggest Most Allegations Are Not Substantiated
paragraphs: Existing data suggest that substantiated cases of recruiter wrongdoing  make up a small percent of all allegations and service-identified incidents,  although, for reasons previously cited, we believe the service data likely  underestimate the true number of recruiter irregularities. Substantiated  cases of recruiter irregularities are those cases in which the services  determined a recruiter violated recruiting policies or procedures based on  a review of the facts of the case. (A more detailed discussion of the  procedures that are in place to address substantiated cases of recruiter  irregularity are discussed later in this report.) While the services cannot  assure that they have a complete accounting of recruiter irregularities, the  data that they reported to us are instructive in that they show the number  of allegations, substantiated cases, and criminal violations increased  overall from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005. At the same time, the  number of accessions into the military decreased from just under 250,000  in fiscal year 2004 to about 215,000 in fiscal year 2005.
Table 2 shows that, DOD-wide, the services substantiated about 10 percent  of all allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities.  The services categorized cases as substantiated when the preponderance  of the evidence supported the allegation of wrongdoing against a recruiter.  Similarly, the services categorized cases as unsubstantiated when the  preponderance of the evidence did not support the allegation against a  recruiter.
Table 3 shows the number of recruiter irregularities that were criminal  violations of the recruiting process and addressed by the services’ Judge  Advocate or criminal investigative service. The number of criminal  violations in the recruiting process increased in fiscal year 2005; however,  in both fiscal years, this number represented approximately 1 percent of all  allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities. The  large increase in the number of Navy cases in fiscal year 2005 is likely a  result of a special investigation where four cases led to nine additional  cases of criminal wrongdoing.
Table 4 shows that on average, the percentage of substantiated cases of  recruiter wrongdoing compared to the number of actual accessions was  under 1 percent in each service during the past 2 fiscal years.
Table 5 shows that when we compared the number of substantiated cases  of recruiter wrongdoing to the number of frontline recruiters, 4.7 percent of  recruiters would have had a substantiated case against them in fiscal year  2005 if each recruiter who committed an irregularity had committed only  one. (However, this is not to say that 4.7 percent of frontline recruiters  committed an irregularity, given that some recruiters may have committed  more than one irregularity).
Without an oversight framework to provide complete and reliable data,  DOD and the services are not in a position to gauge the extent of recruiter  irregularities or when corrective action is needed, nor is the department in  a sound position to give Congress and the general public assurance that  recruiter irregularities are being addressed.
section_title: Many Factors May Affect the Recruiting Environment
paragraphs: A number of factors within the current recruiting environment may  contribute to recruiting irregularities. Such factors include the economy,  ongoing hostilities in Iraq, and fewer applicants who can meet military  entrance standards. These factors, coupled with the typical difficulties of  the job and pressure to meet monthly recruiting goals, challenge the  recruiter and can lead to recruiter irregularities in the recruiting process.  Data show that as the end of the monthly recruiting cycle draws near, the  number of recruiter irregularities may increase.
subsections: section_title: Many Factors Contribute to a Challenging Recruiting Environment
paragraphs: Among a number of factors that contribute to a challenging recruiting  environment are the current economic situation and the ongoing hostilities  in Iraq. Service recruiting officials told us that the state of the economy,  specifically the low unemployment rate, has had the single largest effect  recently on meeting recruiting goals. These officials stated DOD must  compete harder for qualified talent to join the military when the economy is  strong. According to U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics  data, the national unemployment rate fell each year between 2003 (when it  was at 6 percent) and 2005 (when it was 5.1 percent). In fiscal year 2005,  three of the eight active and reserve components we reviewed—the Army,  Army Reserve, and Navy Reserve—failed to meet their recruiting goals.
Recruiters also believe that the ongoing hostilities in Iraq have made their  job harder. Results of a DOD internal survey show that almost three- quarters of active duty recruiters agreed with the statement that current  military operations made it hard for them to achieve recruiting goals and  missions. Recruiters we interviewed expressed the same opinion. DOD  has found that the public’s perceptions about military enlistment have  changed because youth and their parents believe that deployment to a  hostile environment is very likely for servicemembers with some types of  military specialties. Officials further stated that adults who influence a  prospective applicant’s decision about whether to join the military are  increasingly fearful of the possibility of death or serious injury to the  applicant.
Recruiters also must overcome specific factors that routinely make their  job hard. Recruiters told us that their work hours were dictated by the  schedules of prospective high school applicants, which meant working  most evenings and weekends. Almost three-quarters of active duty  recruiters who responded to DOD’s survey stated that they worked more  than 60 hours a week on recruiting or recruiting-related duties. Other  factors that affect the recruiting environment include a recruiter’s location  and access to eligible applicants. For example, service officials stated that  it was easier to recruit in or near locations with a military presence.  Recruiters also have difficulty finding eligible applicants. DOD researchers  have estimated that over half of U.S. youth aged 16 to 21 are ineligible to  join the military because they cannot meet DOD or service entry  standards. DOD officials stated that the inability to meet medical and  physical requirements accounts for much of the reason youth are ineligible  for military service. Additionally, many youth are ineligible because they  cannot meet service standards for education, as indicated by DOD’s  preference for recruits with a high school diploma; mental aptitude, as  indicated by receipt of an acceptable score on the armed forces vocational  aptitude test; and moral character, as indicated by few or no criminal  convictions or antisocial behavior. All of these factors contribute to a  difficult recruiting environment that is challenging for recruiters to  succeed.
Pressure to meet monthly goals contributes to recruiter dissatisfaction.  Over 50 percent of active duty military recruiters responding to the 2005  internal DOD survey stated that they were dissatisfied with their jobs.  Approximately two-thirds of Army recruiters reported that they were  dissatisfied with recruiting, while over a third of Air Force recruiters stated  they were dissatisfied. The Navy and Marine Corps rates of recruiter  dissatisfaction fell within these extremes, with just under half of Navy and  Marine Corps recruiters reporting that they were dissatisfied with their  jobs. When asked in this same survey if they would select another  assignment if they had the freedom to do so, over three-quarters of active  duty DOD recruiters said they would not remain in recruiting.
On the one hand, the services expect recruiters to recruit fully qualified  personnel; while on the other hand, the services primarily evaluate  recruiters’ performance on the number of contracts they write, which  corresponds to the number of applicants who enter the delayed entry  program each month. In 2005, over two-thirds of those active duty  recruiters responding to the internal DOD survey believed that their  success in making their monthly quota for enlistment contracts had a  make-or-break effect on their military career. Over 80 percent of Marine  Corps recruiters held that opinion, as did almost two-thirds of Army and  over half of Air Force recruiters. Navy officials stated that individual  recruiters are not tasked with a monthly goal; rather, the goal belongs to  the recruiting station as a whole. Still, approximately two-thirds of Navy  recruiters responding to DOD’s survey indicated they felt their careers  were affected by their success in making their individual recruiting goal.  The recruiters who we interviewed also believed their careers were  affected by how successful they were in achieving monthly recruiting  goals.
section_title: Recruiter Evaluations Are Linked to Monthly Recruiting Results
paragraphs: Recruiters, like all servicemembers, receive performance evaluations at  least once a year. Our review of service performance evaluations and  conversations with the services’ recruiting command officials show that  Army, Navy, and Air Force recruiter evaluations are not directly linked to  an applicant successfully completing his or her service’s basic training  course. Instead, we found that the Army, Navy, and Air Force generally  evaluate recruiters on their ability to achieve their monthly goal to write  contracts to bring applicants into the delayed entry program. The Army’s  civilian contractor recruiters, for example, receive approximately 75  percent of their monetary compensation for recruiting an applicant when  that applicant enters the delayed entry program and the remaining 25  percent of their compensation when the applicant begins basic training.  The Army’s contract, therefore, does not tie compensation to the  applicant’s successful completion of basic training and joining the Army.  Even though Navy officials told us that recruiters do not have individual  goals because the monthly mission is assigned to the recruiting station,  Navy performance metrics include data on the number of contracts  written. However, the Navy does not hold recruiters directly accountable  for attrition rates from either the delayed entry program or basic training.
Marine Corps recruiters, unlike recruiters in the other services, are held  accountable when an applicant does not complete basic training and  remain responsible for recruiting an additional applicant to replace the  former basic trainee. Marine Corps recruiter evaluation performance  standards measure both the number of contracts written each month as  well as attrition rates of applicants from the delayed entry program and  basic training. Marine Corps Recruiting Command officials stated that they  believe their practice of holding recruiters accountable for attrition rates  helps to limit irregularities because recruiters are likely to perform more  rigorous prescreening of applicants to ensure that a recruit is likely to  complete Marine Corps basic training. In fact, Military Entrance Processing  Command data show that Marine Corps recruiters have been the most  consistently successful of all service recruiters at prescreening and  processing applicants through their initial physical assessments,  subsequently maintaining applicants’ physical eligibility while in the  delayed entry program, and finally ensuring that applicants pass the final  physical assessment and enter basic training. Table 6 shows the low  medical disqualification rate of the Marine Corps in comparison with the  other services.
In addition to performance evaluations, the services provide awards to  recruiters that are generally based on the number of contracts that a  recruiter writes, rather than on the number of applicants that graduate  from basic training and join the military. We reported in 1998 that only the  Marine Corps and the Navy used recruits’ basic training graduation rates as  key criteria when evaluating recruiters for awards. Recruiters in some  services and other service recruiting command officials stated their belief  that recruiters who write large numbers of contracts over and above their  monthly quota are almost always rewarded. Such rewards can include  medals and trophies for recruiter of the month, quarter, or year;  preferential duty stations for their next assignment; incentives such as paid  vacations; and meritorious promotion to the next rank.
When unqualified applicants are recruited or when applicants who lack  eligibility documentation are processed through the military entrance  processing station in the effort to satisfy end-of-month recruiting cycle  goals, wasted taxpayer dollars result. For example, the Army spends  approximately $17,000 to recruit and process one applicant, and as much as  $57,500 to recruit and train that applicant through basic training.
We continue to believe our 1997 and 1998 recommendations to the  Secretary of Defense have merit. Specifically, we recommended that the  Secretary of Defense require all the services to review and revise their  recruiter performance evaluation and award systems to strengthen  incentives for recruiters to thoroughly prescreen applicants and to more  closely link recruiting quotas to applicants’ successful completion of basic  training. The department concurred with our recommendations in order to  enhance recruiter success and help recruiters focus on DOD’s strategic  retention goal, and it indicated that the Secretary of Defense would instruct  the services to link recruiter awards more closely to recruits’ successful  completion of basic training. Our review shows that the Army, Navy, and  Air Force have not implemented this recommendation.
section_title: Recruiter Irregularities May Increase as the Deadline to Meet Monthly Goals Nears
paragraphs: DOD Military Entrance Processing Command officials told us that they  believe data from the Chicago military entrance processing station for the  first 6 months of fiscal year 2006 indicate that it may be possible to  anticipate when irregularities may occur. While service data show that the  numbers of irregularities that occur in the recruiting process are relatively  small when compared with the total number of applicants that access into  the military, the Chicago station data suggest that recruiter irregularities  increase as the end of the monthly recruiting cycle nears and recruiting  goals are tallied. The end-of-month recruiting cycle for the Army occurs  midmonth and data from DOD’s Chicago processing station show that  irregularities peaked at the midmonth point. Figure 3 illustrates the  increase in recruiter irregularities that occurred at the Chicago station at  the end of the Army’s monthly recruiting cycle. We present Army data  because the Chicago station processes more applicants for the Army than it  does for the other services. However, Chicago station data show similar  results for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force.
When we asked U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command officials for  data from the other stations, they said that the other stations did not  maintain these data and that this data collection effort was the initiative of  the Chicago station commander. We believe these data can be instructive  and inform recruiting command officials whether monthly goals have an  adverse affect on recruiter behaviors, and if so, whether actions to address  increases in irregularities near the end of the monthly recruiting cycle may  be necessary.
section_title: Services Have Standard Procedures in Place for Administering Military Justice to Address Recruiter Irregularities
paragraphs: The services have standard procedures in place, provided in the Uniform  Code of Military Justice and service regulations, to investigate allegations  and service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities and to prosecute  and discipline recruiters found guilty of violating recruiting policies and  procedures. Each service recruiting command has a designated  investigative authority to handle allegations of irregularities, and the  services’ respective Judge Advocates have primary responsibility for  adjudicating criminal violations of the recruitment process. Moreover, each  service has mechanisms by which to update its recruiter training as a result  of information on recruiter irregularities.
As previously discussed, the services identify allegations and service- identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing in a number of ways.  Allegations made or discovered at the Army Battalion, Navy and Marine  Corps District, and Air Force Squadron command level are generally  resolved by that commander using administrative actions and nonjudicial  punishment under authority granted by the Uniformed Code of Military  Justice. The commander forwards allegations and service-identified  incidents of recruiter irregularities arising at that level that he or she deems  sufficiently egregious to require further investigation, or as service  regulations require, to the service recruiting command or to the Judge  Advocate for judicial processing of possible criminal violations in the  recruitment process.
Commanders in the service recruiting commands, like all commanders  throughout the military, exercise discretion in deciding whether a  servicemember should be charged with an offense, just as prosecutors do  in the civilian justice system. Army Battalion, Navy and Marine Corps  District, and Air Force Squadron commanders initiate a preliminary inquiry  into allegations of wrongdoing against recruiters after receiving a report of  a possible recruiter irregularity. When the preliminary inquiry is complete,  the commander must make a decision on how to resolve the case. The  commander can decide that no action is warranted or take administrative  action, such as a reprimand or counseling. The commander can also decide  to pursue nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of  Military Justice, or refer the case to trial and decide what charges will be  brought against the recruiter.
Limitations in data we previously discussed prevent a thorough review of  how services discipline recruiters found guilty of violating recruiting  policies and procedures. In addition, we found that in some cases, the  services did not document the disciplinary action a commander took  against a recruiter. Even though service data are not complete, data the  Army provided allow us to illustrate the range of disciplinary actions  commanders may take to resolve cases of recruiter irregularities. These  actions range from counseling a recruiter for an irregularity up to discharge  from the Army. For example, in fiscal year 2005, Army data show that  commanders imposed disciplinary actions ranging from a verbal reprimand  to court martial for recruiters who concealed an applicant’s medical  information. Service recruiting officials stated that the range of possible  disciplinary actions a commander may impose is mitigated by the  circumstances of each case, including the recruiter’s overall service record,  duty performance, and number of irregularities the recruiter may have  previously committed. Table 7 summarizes disciplinary actions taken  against Army recruiters in the past 2 fiscal years for specific kinds of  irregularities.
section_title: Services Use Information on Recruiter Irregularities to Update Their Training
paragraphs: All of the services have mechanisms for updating their recruiter training as  a result of information on recruiter irregularities. These mechanisms  include internal inspection programs and routine recruiter discipline  reports. The services also react to reassure public confidence in the  recruiting process when specific incidents or reports of recruiter  irregularities become widely known. Each service recruiting command  assesses and evaluates how recruiting policies and procedures are being  followed, the results of which are focused on training at the Army  Battalion, Navy and Marine Corps District, and Air Force Squadron  command level. For example, the Navy Recruiting Command’s National  Inspection Team conducts unannounced inspections at the Navy recruiting  districts and forwards the results of the inspection to the Navy Recruiting  Command headquarters. The Navy Recruiting Command’s National  Training Team follows up by conducting refresher training at the recruiting  station locations or in the subject areas where the National Training Team  identified discrepancies. The Marine Corps’ National Training Team also  conducts periodic inspections and training based on the results of their  inspections. Additionally, the Marine Corps National Training Team  provides input and guidance to the Marine Corps recruiter school course  curriculum. The Air Force Recruiting Command Judge Advocate  distributes quarterly recruiter discipline reports to heighten awareness of  wrongdoing and encourage proper recruiter behavior. In addition, these  reports are used to show examples of wrongdoing during new recruiter  training. The Army Recruiting Command conducted commandwide  refresher training on May 20, 2005, in response to a series of press reports  of recruiters using inappropriate tactics in their attempts to enlist new  servicemembers. The Army stated that the training goal was to reinforce  that recruiting operations must be conducted within the rules and  regulations and in accordance with Army values.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Military recruiters represent the first point of contact between potential  servicemembers and those who influence them—their parents, coaches,  teachers, and other family members. Consequently, a recruiter’s actions can  be far reaching. Although existing data suggest that the overwhelming  number of recruiters are not committing irregularities and irregularities are  not widespread, even one incident of recruiter wrongdoing can erode  public confidence in DOD’s recruiting process. Existing data show, in fact,  that allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing  increased between fiscal years 2004 and 2005. DOD, however, is not in a  position to answer questions about these allegations and service-identified  incidents because it does not know the true extent to which the services  are tracking recruiter irregularities or addressing them. Moreover, DOD is  unable to compile a comprehensive and consolidated report because the  services do not use consistent terminology regarding recruiter  irregularities. Individual service systems are not integrated, processes are  decentralized, and many allegations are undocumented. Although DOD  officials can point to external factors, such as a strong economy and  current military operations in Iraq as recruiting challenges, data suggest  that internal requirements to meet monthly recruiting goals may also  contribute to recruiter irregularities. Having readily available, complete,  and consistent data from the services would place DOD in a better position  to know the nature and extent of recruiter irregularities and identify  opportunities when corrective action is needed.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s visibility over recruiter irregularities, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense take the following action:  Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  establish an oversight framework to assess recruiter irregularities and  provide overall guidance to the services.
To assist in developing its oversight framework, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness to take the following three actions:  Establish criteria and common definitions across the services for  maintaining data on allegations of recruiter irregularities.
Establish a reporting requirement across the services to help ensure a  full accounting of all allegations and service-identified incidents of  recruiter irregularities.
Direct the services to develop internal systems and processes that better  capture and integrate data on allegations and service-identified  incidents of recruiter irregularities.
To assist DOD in developing a complete accounting of recruiter  irregularities, we further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the  following action:  Direct the commander of DOD’s Military Entrance Processing  Command to track and report allegations and service-identified  incidents of recruiter irregularities to the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Such analysis would include  irregularities by service and the time during the monthly recruiting cycle  when the irregularities occur.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three of  our recommendations that address the need for an effective oversight  management framework to improve DOD's visibility over recruiter  irregularities. While DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to  establish a reporting requirement across the services and did not concur  with our recommendation for the Military Entrance Processing Command  to provide OSD with data on recruiter irregularities, the department did not  disagree with the substance of these recommendations.  Rather, DOD  indicated that it would implement these recommendations if it determined  such requirements were necessary.  DOD's comments are included in this  report as appendix II.
DOD concurred with our recommendations to establish an oversight  framework to assess recruiter irregularities and provide overall guidance to  the services; to establish criteria and common definitions across the  services for maintaining data on recruiter irregularities; and for the  services to develop internal systems and processes that better capture and  integrate data on recruiter irregularities.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to establish a reporting  requirement across the services to help ensure a full accounting of  recruiter irregularities, but agreed that some type of reporting requirement  be established.  The department believes that implementing this  recommendation may be premature until it has established an over-arching  management framework to provide oversight that uses like terms for  recruiter irregularities, and that the requirement and frequency should be  left to the judgment of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness.  DOD stated its intent to establish an initial  reporting requirement to ensure the processes it develops are functioning  as planned and to use this time period to assess the severity of recruiter  irregularities issues.  DOD further stated that regardless of whether or not  it establishes a fixed reporting requirement, the services will be required to  maintain data on recruiter irregularities in a format that would facilitate  timely and accurate reports upon request.  We do not believe it would be  premature to establish a reporting requirement at this time.  As we stated in  our report, data that the services reported to us show that the number of  allegations, substantiated cases, and criminal violations all increased from  fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005.  Without a reporting requirement, we  believe it would be difficult for OUSD to identify trends in recruiter  irregularities and determine if corrective action is needed.  Accordingly, we  continue to believe that a reporting requirement for the services would help  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness  to carry out its responsibilities to review DOD's recruitment program to  ensure adherence to approved policies and standards.
The department did not concur with our recommendation for DOD's  Military Entrance Processing Command to track and report allegations and  incidents of recruiter irregularities to OUSD because it believed this  reporting would duplicate service reporting, and added that we had stated  that recruiter irregularities are not widespread.  However, DOD  acknowledged, as our report points out, that even one incident of recruiter  wrongdoing can erode public confidence in the recruiting process and  agreed to consider this recommendation at a later date if it determines that  recruiter irregularities are a significant problem and further analyses are  required.  While we did conclude from the data services provided to us that  recruiter wrongdoing did not appear to be widespread, we also stated our  belief that service data likely underestimate the true number of recruiter  irregularities, and further concluded that DOD is not in a position to  answer questions about these allegations and service-identified incidents  because it does not know the full extent to which the services are tracking  recruiter irregularities or addressing them.  We believe, therefore, that the  significance of recruiter irregularities is not fully understood, and that  addressing this recommendation should not be delayed.  As we reported,  Military Entrance Processing Command officials told us that they forward  all allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities  that surface during the screening process at the military entrance  processing stations to the services' recruiting commands.  We found,  however, that the services’ recruiting command headquarters data do not  show records of allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter  irregularities received from the Military Entrance Processing Command.   Data currently captured by the Military Entrance Processing Command  would be instructive, particularly because these data show an increase in  irregularities as Army recruiters approach the end of their monthly  recruiting cycle, and we believe that these data would further inform DOD  about the effectiveness of the oversight management framework it has  agreed to establish.
As arranged with your office, unless you publically announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to  interested congressional members; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army,  the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We  will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To conduct our work, we examined Department of Defense (DOD) and  military services’ policies, regulations, orders, and instructions that govern  the recruitment of military servicemembers and the investigation and  resolution of allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter  wrongdoing. We also reviewed recruiting-related reports issued by GAO,  DOD, and the services. We analyzed data on allegations and service- identified incidents of recruiter irregularities from the active and reserve  components of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force databases,  reports, and individual paper files. Additionally, we interviewed individuals  at several DOD and service offices and recruiters in each service, and  visited a number of recruiting and recruiting-related commands. In the  course of our work, we contacted and visited the organizations and offices  listed in table 8.
To assess the extent to which DOD and the services have visibility over  recruiter irregularities, we examined DOD and service policies,  procedures, regulations, and instructions related to recruiting. In addition,  we interviewed officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness and the services’ recruiting officials and  Inspectors General to obtain an understanding of various aspects of the  data DOD and the services collect on allegations and service-identified  incidents of recruiting irregularities. We obtained data on recruiter  irregularities from service recruiting commands’ Inspectors General or  other designated recruiting command offices, the Headquarters Air Force  Recruiting Service Basic Training Inspector General Liaison, the Naval  Criminal Investigative Service, and the recruiting commands’ Staff Judge  Advocates. Specifically, within each service, we analyzed fiscal years 2004  and 2005 data.
For the Army, we obtained data on allegations and service-identified  incidents of recruiter irregularities from its Recruiting Improprieties All  Years database. We also obtained data on recruiting irregularities that  were processed as criminal violations from the Army Recruiting  Command Judge Advocate’s paper files.
For the Navy, we obtained data on allegations and service-identified  incidents of recruiter irregularities from the Naval Inspector General’s  Case Management Information System, the Navy Bureau of Personnel  Inspector General, the Navy Recruiting Command Inspector General’s  paper files, and the Navy Recruiting Quality Assurance Team. We also  obtained data on Navy recruiter criminal violations from the Navy’s  Criminal Investigative Service.
For the Marine Corps, we obtained data on allegations and service- identified incidents of recruiter irregularities from its Marine Corps  Recruiting Information Support System. We also obtained data on  recruiter criminal violations from the Navy’s Criminal Investigative  Service data system.
For the Air Force, we obtained data on allegations and service-identified  incidents of recruiter irregularities from its Automated Case Tracking  System and Trainee Tracking System, and data on criminal violations  from its Automated Military Justice Administrative Management  System. We also obtained data from the Air Force Reserve Command  Recruiting Service’s Headquarters Queries database.
To identify the factors within the current recruiting environment that may  contribute to recruiting irregularities, we reviewed prior GAO work,  Congressional Research Service reports addressing the recruiting  environment, and the 2005 DOD Recruiter Quality of Life Survey Topline  Report. We reviewed the sampling and estimation documentation for this  survey and determined that it conforms to commonly accepted statistical  methods for probability samples; the response rate for the DOD internal  survey was 46 percent. Because DOD did not conduct a nonresponse bias  analysis, we cannot determine whether estimates from this survey may be  affected by nonresponse bias. Such bias might arise if nonrespondents’  answers to survey items would have been systematically different from  those of respondents. We reviewed service policies and processes  governing recruiter selection, training, and performance evaluation, and  interviewed key service officials about the types of challenges that exist in  the recruiting environment and the methods used to evaluate recruiter  performance. Additionally, we gathered and analyzed statistical  information from the Department of Labor and reviewed Military Entrance  Processing Command data on the frequency and occurrence of applicant  disqualifications by service and reports on recruiter irregularities. Finally,  we interviewed officials at the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command  and two military entrance processing stations regarding recruiter  irregularities.
To identify what procedures DOD and the services have in place to address  individuals involved in recruiting irregularities, we examined service case  data and spoke with service recruiting command officials to determine how  services imposed disciplinary action and what, if any, other actions they  took to mitigate wrongdoing in the recruiting process. For each service, we  obtained data on disciplinary actions imposed for cases of recruiter  irregularities but specifically examined and analyzed Army data as they  appeared to be the most comprehensive. We present these data for fiscal  years 2004 and 2005. We also reviewed service regulations and the Uniform  Code of Military Justice to understand departmentwide standards and the  authorities that are granted to commanders to administer military justice.  Finally, we reviewed service training materials and spoke with service  recruiting command officials to identify other ways services use  information on recruiter wrongdoing to try to mitigate errors and  irregularities in the recruiting process.
To assess the reliability of the services’ data on allegations and service- identified incidents of recruiter irregularities, we interviewed officials  about the processes used to capture data on recruiter irregularities, the  controls over those processes, and the data systems used; and we reviewed  documentation related to those systems. Based on responses to our  questions, follow-up discussions, and the documentation we reviewed, we  found limitations in many service data systems, including reliance on paper  files; databases that cannot be fully queried, if at all; and in some cases,  lack of edit checks and data quality reviews. Although we identified  weaknesses in the available data, we determined, for the purposes of this  report, that the data were reliable for providing limited information on  recruiter irregularities.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, David E. Moser, Assistant Director,  Grace A. Coleman, Tanya Cruz, Nicole Gore, Gregg J. Justice III, Mitchell B.  Karpman, Warren Lowman, Julia C. Matta, Charles W. Purdue, and Shana  Wallace made key contributions to this report.