Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers
Published: 2007-12-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U. S. energy needs rest heavily on ship-based imports. Tankers bring 55 percent of the nation's crude oil supply, as well as liquefied gases and refined products like jet fuel. This supply chain is potentially vulnerable in many places here and abroad, as borne out by several successful overseas attacks on ships and facilities. GAO's review addressed (1) the types of threats to tankers and the potential consequences of a successful attack, (2) measures taken to protect tankers and challenges federal agencies face in making these actions effective, and (3) plans in place for responding to a successful attack and potential challenges stakeholders face in responding. GAO's review spanned several foreign and domestic ports, and multiple steps to analyze data and gather opinions from agencies and stakeholders.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The supply chain faces three main types of threats--suicide attacks such as explosive-laden boats, "standoff" attacks with weapons launched from a distance, and armed assaults. Highly combustible commodities such as liquefied gases have the potential to catch fire or, in a more unlikely scenario, explode, posing a threat to public safety. Attacks could also have environmental consequences, and attacks that disrupt the supply chain could have a severe economic impact. Much is occurring, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and facilities, but significant challenges remain. Overseas, despite international agreements calling for certain protective steps, substantial disparities exist in implementation. The United States faces limitations in helping to increase compliance, as well as limitations in ensuring safe passage on vulnerable transport routes. Domestically, units of the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, report insufficient resources to meet its own self imposed security standards, such as escorting ships carrying liquefied natural gas. Some units' workloads are likely to grow as new liquefied natural gas facilities are added. Coast Guard headquarters has not developed plans for shifting resources among units. Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work. First, plans for responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans simultaneously to see if they work effectively together. Second, ports generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as prioritizing the movement of vessels after a port reopens. The President's maritime security strategy calls for such plans. Third, some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to carry out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed. Decisions about the need for more response capabilities are hindered, however, by a lack of performance measures tying resource needs to effectiveness in response.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: This is a public version of a report we issued in March 2007 that contained  Sensitive Security Information related to the transportation of energy  commodities by tanker. Specific details regarding the nature of security  conditions and operations at specific ports, and specific findings related to  response plans and results of exercises that are sensitive were removed.  We worked with the cognizant agencies to ensure that this version would  not contain Sensitive Security Information. No additional audit work was  performed for the completion of this version. The conclusions and  recommendations of our March 2007 report remain generally unchanged.
The United States economy is dependent on oil, gas, and other energy  commodities that are transported from overseas by ship. For example, in  2005, approximately 55 percent of the nation’s crude oil supply—one of  the main sources of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, heating oil, and many  other petroleum products—and approximately 3 percent of the natural gas  supply, was imported by tanker. Daily ship-based imports of crude oil  averaged about 8.5 million barrels, or the equivalent of about four  supertankers arriving at U.S. terminals each day. In addition to crude oil,  the United States also imports highly combustible liquid energy products,  such as gasoline, jet fuel, and liquefied gases, such as liquefied petroleum  gas (LPG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Natural gas is converted to  LNG by cooling it to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, at which point it  becomes a liquid. In its liquid form, natural gas reduces to more than  1/600th of its volume as a gas, making it feasible to transport over long  distances. Daily ship-based imports of LNG now average about 1.7 billion  cubic feet, or the equivalent of two LNG tankers arriving at a U.S. port  every 3 days. This already extensive reliance on imported energy  commodities is expected to increase—and for LNG, to grow substantially.  The Energy Information Administration forecasts that by 2015, the amount  of crude oil imported into the United States will increase by nearly 4  percent, while the amount of imported LNG will grow more than 400  percent.
Transporting these often hazardous commodities by sea involves a global  supply chain with many players. For energy commodities imported by the  United States, this supply chain has three main activities: loading it aboard  a ship at a foreign facility, shipping it across oceans and waterways, and  unloading it at a facility in this country. Waterborne shipments originate at  facilities in a variety of countries—for crude oil, primarily in Mexico, Saudi  Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria, and for LNG, primarily in Algeria and  Trinidad and Tobago. Overseas facilities where tankers are loaded are  owned by the private sector, governments, or combinations of the two.  Foreign governments play a substantial role in overseeing the security of  energy export operations. Shipment of these commodities likewise  involves vessels owned by many different companies, as well as  transportation routes across international waters that no government  controls. In 2006, there were approximately 3,550 registered crude oil  tankers of 300 gross tons or more, along with 200 registered LNG tankers.  Most of these vessels are registered in countries other than the United  States, which means the United States has limited oversight authority over  these vessels’ crews or condition until they enter U.S. waters. Once the  crude oil or LNG tanker arrives in the United States, it is unloaded at  terminals that may be on the Atlantic, Gulf, or Pacific coasts. LNG is  currently unloaded at one of five locations. As demand for natural gas  grows, the number of domestic LNG unloading locations is expected to  increase. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which must  approve each onshore LNG terminal siting and construction application,  has already approved 11 additional terminals, and dozens more have been  proposed.
This supply chain, while critical, is also vulnerable to disruption by  terrorists. Port facilities are inherently vulnerable, because they must  provide access by land and sea and because they are sprawling  installations, often close to population centers. Likewise, the ships that  transport these products are vulnerable because they travel on direct  routes that are known in advance and, for part of their journey, they may  have to travel through waters that do not allow them to maneuver away  from possible attacks. Since so many different players are involved,  terrorists have room to probe the supply chain for the weakest link.  Despite an often heavy security presence, terrorists have attempted—and  in some cases carried out—several attacks on this supply chain since  September 11, 2001. To date, these attacks have included attempts to  damage tankers or disrupt loading operations in or near overseas ports.  For example, in 2004 terrorists coordinated an attack against two offshore  oil terminals in Iraq where tankers were loading, and in 2002 terrorists  conducted a suicide boat attack against the French supertanker Limburg  off the coast of Yemen.
Much of the international framework for protecting this supply chain and  preventing pollution from vessels is laid out in international conventions.  The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was adopted  under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) by  the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International  Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). In accordance with the  SOLAS Convention as amended in 2002, the code establishes requirements  for contracting governments of countries where ports are located,  contracting governments of countries where ships are registered,  operators of port facilities, and operators of vessels traveling on the high  seas. Individual nations can set higher standards for facilities on their soil  and for vessels registered in that country. The United States has chosen to  set higher standards, largely through the Maritime Transportation Security  Act of 2002 (MTSA). Enacted after the September 11, 2001, attacks, MTSA  places much of the responsibility for coordinating and overseeing security  efforts with the federal government—and more specifically with the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its agencies, such as the U.S.  Coast Guard. Another international agreement developed under IMO  auspices is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution  from Ships, which entered into force in 1983 and was intended to prevent  pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or  accidental causes. Included in its provisions was pollution by oil,  chemicals, and harmful substances. In the United States, Congress passed  the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil  spill. OPA 90 addressed prevention, response, and compensation for oil  pollution from vessels and facilities in U.S. waters and the shoreline. OPA  90 greatly increased federal oversight of maritime oil transportation by  setting new requirements for vessel construction and crew licensing and  manning, mandating contingency planning, enhancing federal response  capability, broadening enforcement authority, and increasing penalties.
In setting U.S. policy with regard to homeland security, both Congress and  the Administration have endorsed making decisions on the basis of risk— that is, on identifying critical infrastructure, determining what is most at  risk, and applying sound measures designed to make cost-effective use of  resources and funding. As groups such as the 9/11 Commission have  pointed out, no amount of money can totally insulate seaports from attack  by a well-funded and determined enemy. Managing on the basis of risk  acknowledges the trade-offs inherent in deciding how finite resources  should be spent.
Federal actions to prevent attacks against the energy supply chain involve  coordination with the many players involved, including foreign  governments; foreign and domestic corporations that own and operate the  ships that carry energy commodities; companies that import, refine, and  market petroleum and liquefied gases; and a host of state and local  governmental agencies. At the state and local levels, fire and police  departments would be the first responders, with support from emergency  management, environmental, and transportation departments. Private  sector agencies, such as oil or gas facility terminal operators, vessel  management companies, and oil spill response organizations, would also  be involved. Finally, multiple federal agencies would also respond. In  particular, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) would have primary responsibility for leading the  response effort.
To help evaluate how secure the maritime energy supply chain is and how  the United States would respond in the event of a terrorist attack, you  asked us to review security and safety efforts taken to date. This report  addresses three questions:    What are the types of terrorist threats to tankers carrying energy  commodities and the potential consequences of a successful attack?
What measures are being taken to protect these tankers, and what  challenges do federal agencies face in making these actions effective?
If a terrorist attack succeeds despite these protective measures, what  plans are in place to respond and what are the potential challenges in  responding to an attack?
To address these objectives, we conducted a wide range of activities  overseas and in the United States. Overseas, we met with officials from the  IMO, foreign government security agencies, vessel and facility operators,  international industry associations, vessel and cargo insurers, and risk  management companies. We conducted our overseas work primarily in  five countries, which we selected for specific reasons related to their role  in the supply chain, the sophistication of their security procedures, or the  presence of key stakeholders. In the United States, we met with officials in  many federal departments and agencies, including the Departments of  Homeland Security, Defense, State, Energy, Transportation, and Justice;  the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; and the Environmental  Protection Agency. We met with a variety of state and local government  officials dealing with homeland security, emergency response, and law  enforcement, as well as with operators of oil cleanup organizations,  petroleum tankers, liquefied gas carriers, and their attendant unloading  facilities. We also visited field units of the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and  Border Protection, the FBI, and a nonprobability sample of petroleum and  liquefied gas import and export facilities. In these visits we observed  security practices firsthand, and conducted interviews with officials. We  obtained and reviewed studies on the consequences of an attack, obtained  additional views from experts, and specifically convened a panel of  academic and industry experts to determine the potential consequences of  an incident involving LNG. We analyzed databases, progress reports,  regulations, and guidance documents we obtained from the Coast Guard  and Federal Energy Regulatory Administration. We obtained necessary  information from the Coast Guard to review the reliability of the  information contained in the databases used in this report. Appendix I  contains a more detailed discussion of our methodology. We conducted  our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards from April 2005 through February 2007.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Many Stakeholders Are Involved in Securing the Maritime Energy Supply Chain
paragraphs: Numerous international and domestic organizations play a role in the  security of maritime energy commodities. The list of stakeholders outside  the United States is quite diverse. They include international organizations,  governments of nations where tankers load or where tankers are  registered, and owners and operators of tankers or facilities (see table 1).
On the domestic side, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency and  is responsible for a wide array of maritime safety and security activities.  Other U.S. government agencies support the Coast Guard’s maritime  security mission by addressing a wide range of issues that affect the flow  of cargo and people into the United States. State and local governments  and the private sector also have responsibilities to secure domestic ports.  Table 2 lists key federal agencies and other stakeholders on the domestic  side, together with examples of the kinds of maritime security activities  performed.
All of these international and domestic stakeholders help to ensure the  safety and security of a global supply chain that brings energy  commodities to the United States. This supply chain spans the globe and  reaches many regions of the world. Each day, the United States imports  many different energy commodities from overseas suppliers in Africa,  Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America. Excluding  Canada, which supplies petroleum and natural gas to the United States via  pipeline, the vast majority of these varied imports arrive by tanker.
section_title: Tankers Transport Energy Commodities around the World
paragraphs: The various types of energy commodities require different handling  methods, and as a result, various kinds of tankers have been built to  accommodate them. An LNG carrier is designed for transporting LNG at  minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, when gas liquefies and shrinks drastically  in volume. The cargo is transported in special tanks insulated to minimize  evaporation. LNG carriers are up to 1,000 feet long and have a draft (depth  below the water line) of 40 feet when fully loaded. The global LNG fleet is  expected to double from 200 in 2006 to over 400 by 2010. According to  industry reports, the existing fleet has completed more than 33,000  voyages without a substantial spill. Oil tankers are more numerous and  vary greatly in size. Tankers transporting crude oil from the Middle East  generally consist of Very Large Crude Carriers, which typically carry more  than 2 million barrels of oil per voyage. These ships are over 1,000 feet  long, nearly 200 feet wide, and have a draft of over 65 feet. Figure 1  shows a typical Very Large Crude Carrier. These ships are too big for most  U.S. ports and must transfer their loads to smaller tankers (a process  called lightering) or unload at an offshore terminal. At present, the United  States has only one such offshore terminal—the Louisiana Offshore Oil  Port (LOOP). Most tankers transporting cargos from the Caribbean and  South America, by contrast, are smaller than Very Large Crude Carriers  and can enter U.S. ports directly.
There are generally two enforcement systems aimed at ensuring that these  vessels are in compliance with applicable regulations, laws, and  conventions: flag state control and port state control. The flag state is the  country in which the vessel is registered. Flag state control can extend  anywhere in the world where the vessel operates. For example, a flag  state’s requirements set the standards for the operation and maintenance  of all vessels flying that flag. If the flag state is a contracting government to  the SOLAS Convention, these standards are required to be at least as  stringent as those included in the ISPS Code. The port state is the country  where the port is located. Port state control is the process by which a  nation exercises its authority over foreign-flagged vessels operating in  waters subject to its jurisdiction. It is intended to ensure that vessels  comply with all domestic requirements for ensuring safety of the port,  environment, and personnel. Thus, when a foreign-flagged oil tanker  enters a U.S. port, the U.S. port state control program, administered by the  U.S. Coast Guard, becomes the primary means of marine safety  enforcement. For example, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires that all  tankers built after 1994 coming to the United States must have double  hulls—that is, a two-layered hull to help prevent spills resulting from a  collision or grounding (see fig. 2).
section_title: Energy Commodities Originate in a Variety of Locations
paragraphs: According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States  consumes more than 20 million barrels of petroleum every day. Of that  amount, over 65 percent comes from foreign sources. The top suppliers of  crude oil and petroleum products to the United States in 2005 were  Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria—each supplying  over 1 million barrels of petroleum per day (see fig. 3). Iraq, Algeria,  Angola, Russia, and the United Kingdom are also major energy suppliers  with daily imports to the United States of up to 500,000 barrels per day.  These top 10 energy suppliers accounted for approximately 75 percent of  all U.S. petroleum imports in 2005. All petroleum imports to the United  States from those countries arrive on tankers, except those from Canada.
Imports are a growing portion of the natural gas supply in the United  States. With consumption of natural gas growing faster than domestic  production, imports of natural gas will almost certainly continue to rise,  according to the Energy Information Administration. Today, Canada is the  primary supplier of natural gas to the United States and all of natural gas  imports from Canada are carried by pipeline. Approximately 3 percent of  all natural gas imports to the United States is LNG. Trinidad and Tobago is  the single largest supplier of LNG to the United States, supplying 70  percent of all LNG imported into this country (see fig. 4). Other LNG  suppliers in 2005 included Algeria, Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, and  Oman.
section_title: Key Domestic Ports Handle Vast Majority of Energy Imports
paragraphs: The United States imports about 65 percent of its crude oil and petroleum  products as well as about 3 percent of its natural gas needs. As shown in  figure 5, certain energy commodities are imported into particular regions  of the country. Appendix II provides detailed descriptions of U.S. energy  commodity imports transported by tanker. For example, in 2004:    Ports along the Gulf Coast imported 62 percent of the crude oil  imported to the United States.
Ports along the East Coast imported 95 percent of the gasoline and 75  percent of the LNG.
Ports along the West Coast imported 60 percent of all jet fuel.
section_title: Characteristics of Maritime Supply Chain Make It Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack
paragraphs: The global maritime environment through which the energy supply chain  operates is constrained by physical geography and influenced by regional  political dynamics. The physical geography of the continents, for example,  forces shipping lanes to pass through certain narrow channels, or  chokepoints. There are approximately 200 such locations, but only a  handful are of strategic importance for the global energy supply (see fig.  6). A chokepoint by definition tends to be shallow and narrow, resulting in  impaired navigation and congestion from other tankers, cargo ships, and  other smaller vessels, which can impede the free and efficient flow of  goods. Moreover, several key chokepoints are surrounded by more than  one sovereign nation, resulting in a complex security environment within a  constrained physical space. Managing security in this environment  requires significant coordination among these countries to successfully  manage the security in these locations. According to the Energy  Information Administration, chokepoints are susceptible to pirate attacks  and shipping accidents in their narrow channels. In addition, chokepoints  can be blocked, mined, or rendered inaccessible by foreign naval forces,  with potentially devastating consequences for the flow of oil and goods  around the world and into the United States.
The Straits of Hormuz and Malacca are two critical maritime shipping  chokepoints that tankers pass through regularly. The Strait of Hormuz,  which connects the oil fields of the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman  and the Indian Ocean, is the most important chokepoint in the world in  terms of the global energy supply, with about 20 percent of the world oil  supply, including 17 percent of U.S. petroleum imports passing through it.  Tankers with oil from the Persian Gulf must navigate through this  chokepoint in order to access the principal international shipping lanes  toward the United States. Another chokepoint, the Strait of Malacca, links  the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean (and oil coming from the Middle  East) with the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean (and major  consuming markets in Asia). The Strait of Malacca is located among  Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore and about 600 vessels pass through it  each day. Piracy and political instability in the region, especially in  Indonesia, are issues of concern for shipping operations in the strait. The  Energy Information Administration identified other important maritime  chokepoints, including the Bab el-Mandab passage from the Arabian Sea,  the Panama Canal connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, the Suez  Canal connecting the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, and the Bosporus  Straits linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.
Besides facing vulnerabilities while in transit, vessels can be vulnerable  while moored at facilities where they are receiving or unloading their  cargoes, and the energy-related infrastructure located in ports can also be  vulnerable to attack. Vessels transiting into and out of ports and their  attendant infrastructure can be vulnerable in a number of ways. During  transit into and out of port, these vessels travel slowly, which increases  their exposure. Tankers follow timetables that are easy to track in advance  and they follow a fixed set of maritime routes. Once tankers arrive in this  country, they must wait offshore for pilots to navigate the ship channels  into many of the nation’s ports.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, increased national attention  has been focused on the potential vulnerability of the nation’s 361 major  seaports to terrorist attack. According to the National Strategy for  Maritime Security, the infrastructure and systems that span the maritime  domain have increasingly become both targets of and potential  conveyances for dangerous and illicit activities. GAO has previously  reported that ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven  with complex transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan  areas, and easily accessible. Ports and their maritime approaches,  including waterways and coastal areas, facilitate freedom of movement  and the flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and vessels to transit  with relative anonymity. Some energy terminals are located in open seas  where they are accessible by water or air, while others are located in  metropolitan areas, along key shipping channels, or near pristine  environmental sanctuaries where they may be accessible by water, air, or  land.
section_title: Addressing Tanker Security Vulnerabilities Involves Setting Risks in the Context of Other Security and Nonsecurity Priorities
paragraphs: In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was  widespread acknowledgement that numerous and substantial gaps existed  in homeland security. There is also widespread acknowledgment,  however, that resources for closing these gaps are limited and must  compete with other national priorities. It is improbable that any security  framework can successfully anticipate and thwart every type of potential  terrorist threat that highly motivated, well-skilled, and adequately funded  terrorist groups could perpetrate. While security efforts clearly matter,  various groups like the 9/11 Commission have emphasized that total  security cannot be bought no matter how much is spent on it. In short, the  nation cannot afford to protect everything against all threats, even within  the relatively narrow context of tanker security. Choices are clearly  involved—including decisions about the relative vulnerability posed by  attacks on energy commodity tankers as compared with attacks in other  forms, such as air safety or security in crowded urban centers.
In this context, risk management has become a widely endorsed strategy  for helping policymakers make decisions about allocating finite resources  in such circumstances. It emphasizes the importance of assigning  available resources to address the greatest risks, along with selecting  those strategies that make the most efficient and effective use of  resources. Risk management has received widespread support from  Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Homeland Security as a tool  that can help set priorities and inform decisions about mitigating risks.
section_title: Energy Commodity Shipments Face Varied Threats, and a Successful Attack Could Have Substantial Consequences
paragraphs: Even though intelligence sources have reported that there are currently no  specific credible threats to energy tankers in U.S. waters or their attendant  facilities on U.S. soil, attacks overseas show that tankers face several  major types of threats, and if a threat were to be successfully carried out  domestically, it could have serious consequences. Overseas, terrorists  have demonstrated the ability to carry out at least three types of threats.  First, and of greatest concern, according to officials we spoke with, is a  suicide attack against a tanker or attendant facility. Second is a standoff  missile attack using a rocket or some other weapon launched from a  distance. Third is an armed assault by terrorists or armed bands while a  tanker is moored or in transit. There are additional types of threats,  including internal crew conspiracies and collisions with a vessel piloted by  terrorists. While attacks have so far occurred only overseas, two Coast  Guard admirals testified before Congress that malicious maritime  incursions into U.S. waters, such as immigrant or drug smuggling, occur  regularly. If an attack on a commodity tanker were successful in U.S.  waters or while docked at a U.S. unloading facility, substantial public  safety, environmental, and economic consequences could result. Public  safety and environmental consequences of an attack vary by commodity.  For instance, LNG and LPG are highly combustible and pose a risk to  public safety of fire or—in a more unlikely scenario in which they are in a  confined space—explosion. The environmental impact, however, of LNG  and LPG spills would be minimal since they dissipate in a short period of  time. Crude oil and heavy petroleum products remain in the environment  after they are spilled and must be removed, potentially causing significant  environmental damage. Potential economic consequences of an attack  include psychological market responses as well as significant delays and  possible shortages if major transit routes, key facilities, or ports are  closed.
subsections: section_title: No Credible Specific Threat of Attack at U.S. Ports to Date, but Events Overseas Indicate Reasons for Concern
paragraphs: According to U.S. government intelligence sources, there have been no  specific credible terrorist threats to tankers in U.S. waters or their  unloading facilities on U.S. soil in the wake of the September 11 attacks.  Nonetheless, several events overseas and intelligence reports indicate  ongoing concern about the potential for an attack against tankers or  energy facilities.
Heightened security threat levels in response to potential  threats. The Coast Guard has raised the Maritime Security (MARSEC)  level from Level 1 to Level 2 on several occasions in response to  nonspecific threats based on intelligence or other warnings to the  maritime sector. In the past, the Coast Guard has raised the MARSEC  level due to general threats.
Other intelligence indicating ports are targets under  consideration. Security officials in the U.S. government are concerned  about the possibility of a terrorist attack in a U.S. port in the future. For  example, captured terrorist training manuals cite seaports as targets  and instruct trainees to use covert means to obtain surveillance  information for use in attack planning. Terrorist leaders have also  stated their intent to attack infrastructure targets within the United  States, including seaports, in an effort to cause physical and economic  damage, and inflict mass casualties.
Continued policy priority for port security. Four years after  passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Congress  remained sufficiently concerned about maritime security to again  increase security efforts under the Security and Accountability Act for  Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006. This law (1) required the Department  of Homeland Security to conduct terrorist watch list checks of newly  hired port employees, (2) provided authority for risk-based funding  through security grants to harden U.S. ports against terrorist attacks  and enhance capabilities to respond to attacks and resume operations,  and (3) required the Department of Homeland Security to develop  protocols for resuming trade after a transportation security incident.
subsections: section_title: Officials Are Concerned about Three Primary Types of Threats
paragraphs: Our discussions with officials of various agencies and our review of  reports and other published documentation indicate that the following  three types of attacks on tankers or attendant facilities are considered to  be the most likely.
section_title: Suicide Attacks
paragraphs: In the maritime domain, suicide attacks have been carried out using a  small, explosive-laden boat or vehicle that the attacker rams into a tanker  or energy facility. The intent of such an attack is maximum damage to  human or physical targets without concern for the life of the attacker.  Previous attack history underscores terrorist intentions and capability to  use small boat attacks. Moreover, intelligence experts say that the suicide  boat attack uses a proven, simple strategy that has caused significant loss  of life and significant damage to commercial and military vessels.
Several suicide attacks have been carried out against tankers and energy  infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region. They have taken place in  restricted waterways where a ship’s ability to maneuver or engage the  attackers is hampered or when a ship has stopped or moored. For  example:  In April 2004 terrorists attacked the Al-Basrah and Khawr Al’Amaya  offshore oil terminals in Iraq using vessels packed with explosives.  Several oil tankers were either docked at or in the vicinity of the  offshore terminals during the attack. Even though the speedboats  detonated prematurely and missed striking the oil tankers and the  offshore terminals, another small craft near the Khawr Al’Amaya  terminal exploded when coalition forces attempted to intercept it,  killing two U.S. Navy sailors and a U.S. Coast Guardsman. According to  a recent study on maritime terrorism, the coordinated attack appears  to have been part of an overall terrorist strategy to destabilize Iraq, and  both terminals were shut down for 2 days, resulting in lost revenue of  nearly $40 million.
Another suicide attack occurred in October 2002 when terrorists  rammed the French supertanker Limburg as it slowed for a pilot to  approach the Ash Shihr Terminal off the coast of Yemen. (See fig. 7.)  The resulting explosion breached the Limburg’s double hull and  ignited stored oil on board the vessel. An estimated 90,000 barrels of oil  were spilled, 1 crewman was killed, and 17 were injured.
In addition to maritime suicide attacks, terrorists have also targeted  energy facilities on land. In February 2006, for example, terrorists  attempted to drive vehicles packed with explosives through the gates  of a major oil-processing facility in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province. Al  Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed two Saudi  guards and represented the first direct assault on a Saudi oil  production facility.
A second type of threat against tankers and attendant maritime  infrastructure is a standoff missile attack using a rocket, mortar, or rocket- propelled grenade launched from a sufficient distance to evade defensive  fire. Standoff missile attacks have been aimed at military ships in ports in  the Persian Gulf, but these kinds of attacks also represent a serious type of  threat against tankers. Terrorists launched such an attack using Katyusha  rockets in 2005, narrowly missing two U.S. naval ships moored at a  Jordanian port. Compared to suicide attacks, standoff attacks are easier to  execute, but are less likely to be as effective, according to intelligence  experts. The range, size, and accuracy of explosive projectiles used in  such an attack could vary considerably.
section_title: Armed Assaults
paragraphs: Armed assaults, particularly at critical shipping chokepoints, represent a  third major type of threat to tankers along the energy supply chain,  according to the International Maritime Bureau. These attacks on tankers  and energy infrastructure have taken place where maritime security is  lacking and they have been carried out in most cases by pirates seeking to  gain control of the ship for financial gain, including petty theft and  kidnapping of crew for ransom. Pirate attacks against tankers and cargo  ships have taken place in numerous locations, including off the coast of  Somalia, in the Gulf of Guinea and Persian Gulf, and along the Strait of  Malacca. According to officials at the International Maritime Bureau, oil  tankers account for about one-quarter of all pirate attacks. Pirate groups  armed with automatic weapons have seized tankers in the Strait of  Malacca and off the coast of Somalia. For example, in March 2006 pirates  armed with automatic weapons hijacked a tanker off the coast of Somalia  and demanded ransom payments for the release of the ship and its crew.  Also, attacks on offshore oil facilities have become commonplace in  Nigeria, where local rebel groups claim to be fighting the Nigerian  government over control of oil revenue. While no attacks on international  oil tankers off the coast of Nigeria have occurred to date, militant groups  in the area have threatened to escalate the conflict by attacking ships.
section_title: Other Types of Threats Are Considered Less Likely
paragraphs: There are other types of threats besides the three above, but assessments  we reviewed and officials we met with indicated these other scenarios  were less likely to occur. Two examples cited were the following:    Crew conspiracies. Coast Guard intelligence reports suggest a  hypothetical possibility that crew members (or persons posing as crew  members) could conspire to commandeer a tanker with the intent of  using the vessel as a weapon or disrupting maritime commerce. Vessel  operators and industry groups do not consider this to be a serious  threat, especially given the technical complexity of modern gas carriers  and large oil tankers and the extensive vetting process for crew on  these kinds of vessels. Crew conspiracy could also result in situations  where oil tankers or gas carriers could be used to transport terrorists.  Intelligence officials estimate that the number of overall stowaways on  all vessels entering U.S. ports was expected to average 30 per month in  2005. There have been cases of stowaways with suspected terrorist  connections on board U.S.-bound vessels since 2000.
Collisions. One scenario related to armed assaults involves pirates or  terrorists hijacking a large ship and ramming it into a tanker, an energy  facility, or critical infrastructure such as a bridge. Although such  scenarios require gaining control of a ship, terrorists’ successful  takeover of aircraft in the September 11 attacks demonstrate that such  plans could be feasible. To date, there have been no known cases of  terrorists intentionally using a vessel as a weapon, but there have been  some close calls in pirate-prone areas. Security experts point to an  example in 2003 in which a group of pirates gained control of the  chemical tanker Dewi Madrim in the Strait of Malacca. Once at the  tanker’s helm, the pirates altered the ship’s speed, disabled  communications, and steered the ship for over 1 hour before escaping  with equipment and technical documents.
section_title: Intelligence Reviews Indicate Threats Are Likely to Persist
paragraphs: Reports we reviewed and assessments we received indicate that the threat  of seaborne terrorist attack on maritime energy tankers and infrastructure  is likely to persist. The information we reviewed and discussions we had  with agency officials indicate the greatest degree of concern remains  overseas. For example, in October 2006 it was reported that there were  threats against Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura oil terminal, which is the world’s  biggest offshore oil facility, as well as a refinery in Bahrain. As part of its  mission in the area, the U.S. Navy, together with coalition forces,  continues to patrol areas containing critical maritime energy infrastructure  to ensure their security, and works with regional navies in the Persian Gulf  to improve their ability to enforce maritime security. In addition, Coast  Guard maritime threat assessments we reviewed consider the threat of  terrorists attacking vessels outside U.S. territorial waters to be significant.  According to these reports, future maritime terrorist attacks are most  likely to occur in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and  Southeast Asia.
Domestically, intelligence reports and other assessments continue to  disclose incidents that demonstrate the need for continued concern about  potential terrorist threats. For example, two Coast Guard admirals  testified that the nation is subject to an estimated four malicious maritime  incursions around the country each week. These incursions represent  opportunities to infiltrate homeland security and could cause widespread  human, economic, and environmental damage in our nation’s maritime  points of entry. Most of these incursions to date have involved vessels  bringing illegal immigrants, drugs, or other contraband into the country.
section_title: Possible Consequences of an Attack Include Public Safety, Environmental, and Economic Impacts
paragraphs: A successful attack on an energy commodity tanker could have substantial  public safety, environmental, and economic consequences. Public safety  and environmental consequences vary by commodity. LNG and LPG are  highly combustible and pose a risk to public safety of fire and explosions,  but their environmental impact would be minimal since they dissipate in a  short period of time. Crude oil and heavy petroleum products do not  dissipate quickly and must be removed from the water, posing a greater  environmental than public safety risk. Economic consequences of an  attack could be substantial, not so much because of the loss of a tanker or  its cargo, but because of the greater shock to the economy, particularly if  major transit routes, key facilities, or ports are closed. Price spikes that  reflect fears or expectations about the price and supply of energy  commodities could also be significant.
subsections: section_title: Public Safety and Environmental Consequences Vary by Commodity
paragraphs: LNG and LPG spills pose primarily a public safety hazard to structures and  people because of the potential for fires and explosions. These gaseous  energy commodities are transported as liquids either by cooling or by  pressurizing the gas. If spilled, they will return to their gaseous state,  causing vapor to form above the spill. It is these vapors that will burn.  Further, the vapors will drift away from the site of the spill if not  immediately ignited by a source such as an open flame or strong static  charge. Once ignited, the fire will travel back through the vapors toward  the initial spill site and, if fuel remains, continue to burn near the tanker.
One of the key elements of how a fire will affect the public is the amount  of heat that is radiated away from the fire. The amount of heat radiated  away from a fire is related to how smoky the fire burns—fires with a great  deal of smoke radiate much less heat because the dark smoke absorbs the  radiation. LNG and LPG vapor fires burn very cleanly, with little smoke,  and thus emit more heat than light petroleum product or crude oil fires.
Besides the danger of fire, there is also a danger of explosions if LNG or  LPG vapors are ignited in a confined area, such as under a dock. If the  attack on a tanker occurred in a congested port area, an explosion could  damage infrastructure or harm people located nearby. In addition to  potential explosions of confined vapors, a particular type of explosion— called a boiling-liquid-expanding-vapor explosion—can occur on tankers  that carry pressurized cargoes, such as some LPG tankers. In these  tankers, the individual tanks carrying the LPG may rupture violently if they  are compromised by heat or explosion. Since LNG is not transported in  pressurized tanks, this type of explosion is not likely to occur.
Finally, people who come in contact with spilled refrigerated liquefied  gases could be burned due to the cryogenic (freeze) nature of the liquid.  LNG and LPG are both transported internationally in refrigerated tankers  that keep the gas so cold that it retains a liquid form. A spill of either LNG  or LPG could expose people close to the spill to the cold liquid and cause  cryogenic burns or frostbite. This is not likely to affect the public, but  could affect the crew on the tanker or other people located close to the  tanker.
LNG and LPG spills pose little threat to the environment because they  almost entirely vaporize in a matter of minutes or hours and disperse into  the atmosphere. If an LNG or LPG spill were ignited, there could be  localized impacts on wildlife near the fire, but few other environmental  effects.
Spills of light petroleum products, such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel,  can have both public safety and environmental consequences. Light  petroleum products produce flammable vapors when they are spilled.  These vapors can be ignited and could result in large, damaging fires.  Further, the vapors could drift away from the site of the spill if not  immediately ignited by a source such as an open flame or strong static  charge. Once ignited, the fire will travel back through the vapors toward  the initial spill site and, if fuel remains, continue to burn near the tanker.  Besides the danger of fire, there is also a danger of explosions if light  petroleum product vapors are ignited in a confined area, such as under a  dock. If the attack on a tanker occurred in a congested port area, an  explosion could damage infrastructure or harm people located nearby.
Spills of light petroleum products have varying environmental impacts,  depending on conditions. Light petroleum products evaporate—almost all  of the spill can evaporate in a few hours or up to a day. Consequently, light  petroleum products generally do not persist in the environment for long  unless the spill is churned by significant wave action. In that case, such  products can mix with water and will linger in the environment for much  longer periods of time. A 1996 spill highlighted the damage that can occur  when a light distillate oil is spilled in heavy wave conditions, resulting in  much of the oil mixing with water rather than evaporating. In this case, a  tank barge carrying home heating oil was grounded in the middle of a  storm near Point Judith, Rhode Island, spilling approximately 20,000  barrels of heating oil. An estimated 80 percent of the release was mixed  into the water, with only about 12 percent evaporating and about 10  percent staying on the surface of the water. The spill affected animals  and plants living on the sea bed, with an estimated mortality of 9 million  lobsters, 19.4 million clams, 7.6 million rock and hermit crabs, and 4.2  million fish. The oil spill resulted in a fishing closure for about 250 square  miles in Block Island Sound for a period of 5 months.
Spills of crude oil and heavy petroleum products could result in significant  environmental consequences. Since these types of spills do not readily  evaporate, they can linger in the environment. Environmental cleanup of  crude oil and heavy petroleum product spills can take several years and in  some cases cost billions of dollars. According to ExxonMobil, the  company spent $2.2 billion on the Exxon Valdez cleanup. Crude oil and  heavy petroleum products can mix with water, particularly in the presence  of waves, causing small drops of water to be trapped inside the spilled oil.  This is called an emulsion and can hamper cleanup by making the spilled  oil difficult to skim off the water. This will greatly increase the volume of  the spill, since the water trapped within the oil also has to be removed. In  addition, residual oils are sometimes more dense than water, allowing  them to sink and contaminate bottom sediments. Finally, crude oil and  heavy petroleum products can coat birds and marine mammals, both  smothering the organisms and exposing them to them to hypothermia as  their feathers and fur lose the ability to insulate.
While crude oil and heavy petroleum products evaporate, they produce  few flammable vapors. For instance, less than half of a crude oil spill and  10 percent of heavy petroleum product spills will evaporate into vapors  that could burn or explode. While fire always raises concerns about public  safety, the smaller volume of vapors available to burn would result in  small fires that are less likely to endanger the public.
section_title: Blockage of Key Transit Routes, Key Facilities, or Ports Could Cost Billions
paragraphs: Although the Exxon Valdez accident demonstrates that even one spill can  create substantial environmental cost, an attack that affects only a single  tanker is unlikely to have significant consequences on the overall  economy, other than a relative short-term market price increase. One  tanker carries a small percentage of the total daily demand for a  commodity. As mentioned above, Very Large Crude Carriers typically  carry more than 2 million barrels of oil per voyage, which is about 10  percent of U.S. daily oil consumption. In most cases, the relatively small  volume in an individual tanker could be replaced with other imports or  from domestic storage. Two examples show the relatively small effect on  supply if the broader supply network is not substantially affected:    The approximately 240,000 barrels of oil released into Prince William  Sound by the Exxon Valdez represented about 20 minutes of total U.S.  oil consumption in 1989. The spill’s actual disruption was somewhat  greater: According to the Department of Energy, the incident actually  resulted in an oil supply disruption of 13 million barrels of oil over 13  days, because the spill restricted tanker transport in Prince William  Sound and the volume of oil piped from the Alaskan North Slope also  had to be reduced. Still, even this 13 million barrel disruption  represented only about 18 hours of total national consumption.
More recently, an approximately 6,300-barrel oil spill in November 2004  significantly reduced tanker traffic on a stretch of the Delaware River  for more than a week. As a result, a nearby refinery had to reduce  production of refined products because of reduced crude oil  availability. The oil spill also threatened to contaminate the water  intake system of a nuclear power plant along the river, which was  temporarily shut down. Despite these reductions in energy supply,  gasoline prices actually dropped in the days after the oil spill.
The loss of a tanker carrying crude oil or heavy petroleum commodities  will pose additional economic costs for ship replacement and  environmental cleanup. Tankers can cost about $150 million, and the lost  cargo could cost over $100 million dollars more. The Delaware River oil  spill cleanup cost about $175 million over the course of 1 year. As the $2.2  billion Exxon Valdez spill cleanup illustrates, a larger spill or a spill in a  more sensitive ecological zone could cost much more.
A much more significant impact could occur if an attack on a tanker  resulted in the closure of a port, damage to a key facility, or long  interruption of a key transit route. A successful attack while a tanker was  docked, for example, could result in damage to a key facility. Even if a  port were not closed altogether, the Coast Guard could increase the  MARSEC level at one or more ports or industries to MARSEC 3—the  highest level. The Coast Guard noted in the Federal Register that MARSEC  Level 3 will involve significant restriction of maritime operations that  could result in the temporary closure of individual facilities, ports, and  waterways, in either a region or the entire nation. Depending on the nature  of the specific threat, this highest level of maritime security may have a  considerable impact on the stakeholders in the affected ports or maritime  areas. The ability to estimate the costs to business and government for  even a short period at MARSEC Level 3 is difficult to do with any level of  accuracy or analytical confidence due to the infinite range of threats and  scenarios that could trigger MARSEC Level 3. The Coast Guard also noted  that the length and the duration of the increased security level to MARSEC  Level 3 will be entirely dependent on the scope of transportation security  incidents or disasters that have already occurred. The Coast Guard  expects MARSEC Level 3 to increase the direct costs to businesses  attributable to increased personnel or modified operations, and it also  expects indirect costs to society of the ‘‘ripple effects’’ associated with  sustained port closures would greatly outweigh the direct costs to  individual businesses.
The scale of these effects can perhaps be seen in several hypothetical  examples, both international and domestic.
Strait of Hormuz. Each day, tankers transport 20 percent of global  daily oil consumption—about 17 million barrels of oil—through the  Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that connects the Persian Gulf  with the Arabian Sea. While there are some limited alternatives for  exporting oil from the Persian Gulf without going through the strait,  these alternatives could not make entirely for the amount of oil lost by  closure of the strait. While the United States and other oil-importing  countries have reserves of crude oil that they could use to mitigate the  loss of supply from the Persian Gulf, oil could not be withdrawn fast  enough to entirely make up the lost volumes. For example, while the  U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve has 688 million barrels of oil, the  send-out capacity of the reserves is only 4.4 million barrels per day.  Other countries face similar constraints. Additionally, if closure of  Hormuz lasted for an extended period of time, strategic reserves could  run out or become so low as to be unable to mitigate any additional  petroleum supply disruptions.
Northeast United States. An attack on a key port in the northeastern  United States, such as Boston, could result in energy commodity  shortages or price spikes. For instance, the LNG facility near Boston  (in Everett, Massachusetts), is the only facility importing liquefied  natural gas in the Northeast. LNG is very important to the Northeast  during heating season because natural gas movement into the  Northeast is constrained during the winter because existing pipelines  to New England are fully utilized. A report prepared by the Power  Planning Committee of the New England Governor’s Conference, Inc.,  concluded that if LNG from the Everett facility and satellite operations  elsewhere in the region is not available on a peak winter day, the region  could have insufficient gas supply to meet the needs of all customers  for space heating and some key electric generators. An attack that  damages the Everett LNG facility during a cold winter could result in  natural gas shortages or price spikes.
LOOP. A loss of import capacity at the LOOP could increase the price  of crude oil and refined products. LOOP is a key energy facility—a  terminal in the Gulf of Mexico that, according to DOE, accounts for  more than 10 percent of total U.S. crude oil imports. LOOP and its  storage terminals are connected to more than 50 percent of the refining  capacity in the United States. LOOP is also the only facility in the  United States that can receive tankers of the ultra-large and very large  types. Counteracting the impact of losing LOOP could involve release  of oil from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and lightering in other  U.S. ports.
While we did not find any studies on the economic consequences of  closures to energy facilities at ports, other broader reviews of port  closures identified possible loses in the billions of dollars. One study of the  2002 West Coast port shutdown, a 11-day closure of all West Coast ports  due to a labor dispute, developed estimates (based on models) for the  costs of the shutdown based on the losses in income by U.S. workers,  consumers, and producers based on trade flow, ability to ship goods, and  the inclination of consumers and industries to substitute for other,  available goods. The study found that for a shutdown lasting 4 weeks  (which was longer than the actual 11-day shutdown) total loses to the U.S.  economy would be about $4.7 billion, with industrial consumers bearing  the majority of that burden.
Other studies have attempted to model the economic impact of terrorist  attacks on ports. For example, one study examined the potential effects of  a 15-day port closure at Los Angeles-Long Beach due to a radiological  bomb. It concluded that such a closure would result in regional impacts of  $138 million in lost economic output and 1,258 person-years of lost  employment. The study also analyzed the potential effects of a  simultaneous attack on key bridges in the port area. The study assumed  such an attack would cause a longer port closure and limited truck access  to the port for 120 days, and under that scenario, it estimated the national  economic impact at $34 billion and 212,000 person-years of employment  lost. This analysis did not consider the potential mitigating effects of other  modes of transportation for moving goods out of the port (i.e., using rail  instead of trucks), or potential trade diversion to other ports during the  crisis.
section_title: Economic Consequences from the Psychological Market Reaction to an Attack Could Be Severe
paragraphs: Finally, psychological ramifications of an attack could affect prices and  supply. Researchers have noted that psychological market reactions to the  consequences of an event may cause individuals and firms to change their  decision-making processes, potentially causing consequences to ripple  outward from the incident itself. If the incident affects key facilities,  indirect effects could be magnified and also include businesses that are  unable to operate both in the port and elsewhere if they are dependent on  goods that move through the port. There is also the potential for  unemployment of indirectly affected businesses.
The movement of gasoline prices after the Exxon Valdez spill is an  illustration. Although the actual disruption in supply was relatively small,  the oil spill sent shock waves through oil markets, particularly those most  dependent on oil from the Alaskan North Slope along the West Coast. In  the first week after the oil spill, spot market prices of unleaded regular  gasoline increased $0.50 from $0.68 per gallon to $1.18 per gallon, a 74  percent increase due to fears of an extended closure of oil from the  Alaskan North Slope. In the following weeks, however, prices began to  decrease, hitting $0.99 on April 7 (2 weeks after the spill) and $0.82 on  April 14 (3 weeks after the spill). Thus as markets realized that the supply  shortage would be short lived, prices dropped sharply. The Department of  Energy concluded in its analysis of the incident that the temporary loss of  Alaskan North Slope supplies resulted in a perception of tight oil markets  rather than a significant change in fundamental supply and demand  factors.
section_title: Although Stakeholders Are Taking Protective Measures, Implementation Challenges Pose Difficulty Both Abroad and at Home
paragraphs: Many efforts are under way, both internationally and domestically, to  protect energy commodity tankers and their attendant facilities, but  significant challenges to the success of these efforts may limit the  effectiveness of these actions. These challenges are evident in protecting  the loading and transit of tanker shipments. In these settings, a broad  range of international stakeholders is involved, including IMO, foreign  governments, vessel and facility operators, and U.S. government agencies.  To help protect the international maritime supply chain, signatory  governments are responsible for implementing the requirements of IMO’s  ISPS Code into law, many facility and vessel operators have taken steps to  implement ISPS Code requirements, various industry organizations have  reported security conditions in ports around the world to better inform  their members, and the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy have also established  their presence overseas. Challenges are evident, however, when examining  how this framework has been implemented to date. Our limited reviews at  foreign facilities showed wide disparity in the quality and extent of  security. The Coast Guard is limited in the degree to which it can bring  about improvements abroad when security is substandard, in part because  its activities are limited by conditions set by host nations. The Navy takes  actions that help to prevent attacks on tankers in transit, but is limited in  the areas where it can patrol. In U.S. ports and waterways, a wide array of  stakeholders is taking steps to protect arriving vessels, but challenges  persist here as well. Key participants include the Coast Guard, CBP, and  local law enforcement agencies. In some locations, however, the Coast  Guard has had difficulty meeting its own self-imposed requirements for  security activity. The completion of new LNG facilities planned for a  number of ports could further exacerbate the Coast Guard’s ability to meet  current requirements with its current resources.
subsections: section_title: In Spite of the Widespread Adoption of the ISPS Code, the Primary Challenge Overseas Involves Overcoming Disparities in Security at Different Locations
paragraphs: The ISPS Code lays out the international regime for securing port facilities  and commercial vessels. Signatory governments of port and flag states are  responsible for ensuring compliance with the ISPS Code at port facilities  and vessels under their jurisdiction. Port states enter the compliance  status of their facilities directly into an IMO database. While the ISPS Code  was adopted under the auspices of IMO, IMO officials told us they have no  way of knowing if a country’s port facilities are truly in compliance. IMO  merely reports information submitted by member governments and does  not verify its accuracy. Additionally, there is no other internationally  recognized mechanism for third party review to verify actual compliance  at port facilities. Without third party compliance review, it is extremely  difficult to determine if ports are secure against terrorism.
Within some countries, the actual security measures can vary greatly from  port facility to port facility, as indicated both by our own visits to foreign  facilities and our discussions with agency and shipping officials. For  example,  In one country we visited, we observed varying degrees of  implementation of measures to control access at different port  facilities. One facility we visited had security cameras, fences, guards  checking perimeter security, and identification checks for access  control. Here, we were challenged by guards regularly as we passed  through gates, even though facility officials were escorting us. At  another facility, however, someone came to the guard station only  when our escort signaled for him to come over, and fences were  collapsed in some places and had holes in others.
Vessel operators we met with also described differences in security at  different ports where they load. These operators said they use many  sources of intelligence to determine their security stance when  entering a port. Some operators said they can call on the knowledge of  their own intelligence sources in port states, including contacts with  intelligence agencies. Members of Intertanko, an international industry  organization, can access its database of port security conditions, a  database made up of reports from vessel operators that experience  these conditions when they stop at various ports. In this database,  operators reported that some ports security conditions are  substantially worse than would be expected for an ISPS Code- compliant facility. In such cases, they reported taking steps that went  beyond ISPS requirements, such as keeping ships at security postures  beyond those called for by the port state’s declared security level.
The United States is attempting to deal with facility security lapses and  inconsistent security conditions in some overseas ports with overseas  efforts of its own. Because of congressional concern over the effectiveness  of antiterrorism measures in place at foreign ports, the Coast Guard has  implemented the International Port Security Program, which was designed  in part to assess and help improve the security at foreign ports. This  program reviews port states’ implementation of port facility security  measures using established security standards, particularly the ISPS Code.  According to the Coast Guard, the ISPS Code is the benchmark against  which the effectiveness of a country’s anti-terrorism measures will be  assessed. The program also reviews the country’s implementation of ship  security provisions of the ISPS Code to help decide what actions to take in  reviewing that country’s vessels when they call in U.S. ports. Visits are  conducted by Coast Guard personnel operating out of the Netherlands,  Japan, Singapore, and the United States. According to program guidance,  the Coast Guard officers making these visits are to exchange information  with officials of the host country, visit port facilities, and share best  practices.
The Coast Guard faces a number of challenges, however, in operating this  program. The locations to be visited are negotiated with the host country;  thus the Coast Guard team making the visit could be precluded from  seeing locations that were not in compliance. Coast Guard officials said  International Port Security Program officers typically make up to three  visits to a country, each lasting about a week. Their assessments are thus  based on conditions observed when their visits occur. We are currently  conducting a separate review of the Coast Guard’s international programs,  and the report we issue will include a more complete review of the  effectiveness of its International Port Security Program.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Military Presence Overseas Aimed at Helping Deter Maritime Terrorist Attacks
paragraphs: In certain locations, the Navy and Coast Guard have also taken more  direct action to protect oil terminals—most notably in Iraq. The Navy has  set security zones (zones where unauthorized vessels will be fired upon)  around Iraqi oil terminals and stationed warships and patrol boats around  the terminals (see fig. 8). The Navy has also stationed security personnel  on the terminal platforms.
An additional protective measure taken overseas is the effort of State  Department (State) officials to help ensure that terrorists cannot gain  entry to the United States by working as seafarers on tankers or other  vessels. State Department regulations eliminated crew list visas and  required all crew members seeking to enter the United States to apply for  individual crew visas. These visas are usually presented at U.S. ports of  entry, but they can only be obtained abroad. Applicants must make  appointments with State Department officials located at embassies and  consulates and be interviewed. They must submit background  information, fingerprints, and sufficient documentation to show they are  employed by a shipping company. This information is then checked  against a State Department database that contains records provided by  numerous agencies and includes information on persons with visa  refusals, immigration violations, criminal histories, and terrorism  concerns. We reported in September 2005 steps State has taken since  September 11, 2001, to improve the visa process as an antiterrorism tool as  well as some of the additional actions that we believed State could take to  further strengthen the process. According to the State Department, it has  corrective actions under way that it believes will address the  recommendations.
section_title: While Vessels Are in Transit, the Primary Challenge Involves Patrolling the Vast Distances Involved
paragraphs: Many countries help to protect energy commodity tankers by patrolling  the sea transit routes. For example, Combined Task Force 150, which as of  December 2006 included navies of the United States, Canada, France,  Germany, Italy, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, conducted operations  in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea  to secure the waterways and prevent piracy and terrorism (see fig. 9).  Naval and coast guard forces of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore patrol  the Strait of Malacca, a major choke point in the shipment of energy  commodities. Improvements in security in the strait led to its removal  from a list of areas in which Lloyds vessel insurers could raise premiums  due to severe security risks. To protect their ships in areas of known  danger, tanker operators said they are also modifying their normal  practices. For example, tanker operators told us that they have directed  their vessels to travel much further off the shore of Somalia than they  would ordinarily. Near Somalia, the International Maritime Bureau  recommended in 2005 that commercial vessels stay 200 miles away from  the coast, and the U.S. Maritime Administration and Coast Guard issued  similar guidance for U.S.-flagged vessels. In piracy-prone waters, such as  the Strait of Malacca, actions include sailing with all lights on, using extra  lookouts, and equipping crews with fire hoses to prevent or repel  boarders.
While these actions have had some success in securing transit routes, the  vast areas to be patrolled and the small number of ships available present  the military forces of the world with great challenges in protecting the sea  lanes. For example, a multinational task force of military vessels that  patrols the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, and northwestern  Indian Ocean is made up of about 15 ships. The navies of regional  countries also patrol near their shores, but in areas such as the Horn of  Africa this multinational task force is the only major presence. Because  tankers travel so frequently and so few naval ships are available to be on  station, naval protection cannot be offered for all those who travel in these  waters.
Besides patrolling the waters, tracking the movement of tankers is another  way to monitor them. A recently passed IMO requirement calls for most  commercial vessels, including tankers, to begin transmitting identification  and location information on or before December 31, 2008, to SOLAS  contracting governments under certain specified circumstances. This will  allow the vessels to be tracked over the course of their voyages. Under this  requirement, information on the ship’s identity, location, date, and time of  the position will be made available to the ship’s flag state, the ship’s  destination port state, and any coastal state within 1,000 miles of the ship’s  route. For ships approaching the United States, an extensive tracking  program is already in place. The Coast Guard currently tracks ships as  they approach the U.S. coastline and is developing programs for longer- range tracking.
section_title: In U.S. Waterways and Ports, the Primary Challenge Involves Coping with Limited Resources and a Growing Security Workload
paragraphs: Domestically, many agencies and other stakeholders have taken steps to  develop and implement plans for helping ensure the security of maritime  energy commodity shipments. The Coast Guard’s primary challenge is  utilizing its limited resources to meet its security workload. Since the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Coast Guard field units have seen  a substantial increase in their security workload. Coast Guard field units  at some ports have not always been able to meet their maritime security  activity requirements. Moreover, the Coast Guard’s resource demands are  expected to grow as more facilities for importing LNG come on line,  increasing the number of shipments requiring Coast Guard protection.
The efforts to provide security over energy commodity shipments arriving  at U.S. waterways and port facilities involve a wide range of federal and  local agencies as well as owners and operators of the facilities that receive  the shipments. Much of the framework for port security is contained in  MTSA. DHS, which is the main agency responsible for homeland security  responsibilities contained in MTSA, has assigned most of the  responsibilities to the Coast Guard. To carry out this responsibility, as  well as the nation’s port state oversight of foreign-flagged vessels, the  Coast Guard’s efforts range from boarding ships and escorting those  shipments of greatest concern to patrolling port waters and overseeing the  security actions undertaken by vessel and facility operators. CBP has the  lead role in ensuring that only authorized persons onboard tankers come  ashore when calling on U.S. ports and that no contraband is smuggled into  the United States using the tankers. MTSA requires regular vulnerability  assessments of port facilities, and facility owners and operators are  required to develop and update regularly a plan for meeting basic security  requirements. Facility security plans and updates to them are to be  reviewed and approved by DHS.
subsections: section_title: Security Requirements Vary by Commodity
paragraphs: Particularly for the Coast Guard, the security activities vary greatly  depending on the type of energy commodity being carried by tankers. Two  energy commodities, LNG and LPG, are on the list of what the Coast  Guard has traditionally called Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC). Coast  Guard guidance requires its field units to take certain actions to protect  LNG and LPG tankers in key port areas, which include high-population  areas or areas with critical infrastructure, such as bridges or refineries.  Beyond protecting LNG and LPG shipments in these key port areas, Coast  Guard field units are required to implement security activities  commensurate with the extent of critical infrastructure, extent of high- profile vessel traffic transiting through key port areas, and availability of  support of non-Coast Guard entities, such as state and local law  enforcement agencies. According to senior Coast Guard field officials with  LNG security responsibilities, LNG tanker transits have received the  greatest attention of the two, due in large part to the much greater size of  LNG tankers, the amount of hazardous cargo they are carrying, and the  public perception of the danger of LNG shipments. Many of these security  measures are now being implemented at existing LNG ports around the  country. The security measures address two phases of LNG operations,  including (1) the transit of an underway tanker through a port and (2) the  period when a tanker is moored at a receiving terminal.
Coast Guard security activity requirements are less stringent for oil  tankers or tankers carrying many other petroleum-based products, such as  gasoline or crude oil, because they are not identified in the CDC list of  hazardous marine cargo as posing the greatest human safety risks.  However, field units do have discretion to take additional actions to  protect oil tankers and associated waterside loading facilities that are  determined to pose security concerns.
section_title: State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Play a Major Role in the Protection of Tankers and Facilities
paragraphs: At many ports we visited or contacted, Coast Guard field units are  receiving assistance from state and local law enforcement agencies for  help in conducting port security operations. These partnerships with  state and local law enforcement agencies have been encouraged by Coast  Guard headquarters. Coast Guard officials said the support has been  particularly valuable in protecting LNG carriers. For example, field units at  two of the four ports with onshore LNG importing facilities reported using  regular escort support from state or local law enforcement agencies.
In addition to state and local law enforcement agencies, facility operators  play a significant role in protecting against terrorist threats. For those key  energy ports we visited, the Coast Guard reported that the waterfront  energy facilities in those ports were taking actions to comply with the  requirements the Coast Guard established pursuant to MTSA. Of the 19  domestic waterside petroleum facilities we visited, all were reported by  the Coast Guard to be in compliance with MTSA regulations. Examples of  steps taken include key-card access systems, closed-circuit television  cameras and sensors along fencing, hardened perimeter fencing, and  reinforced gates at most access control points. Facility operators told us  they conduct regular security drills involving emergency and terrorism  scenarios and they regularly share pertinent security information with  other participants of the Area Maritime Security Committees. In some  cases we observed steps that go beyond MTSA requirements, such as using  radio frequency identification cards that can track the location of all  persons on facility property.
section_title: The Coast Guard Faces Challenges Meeting Internal Security Guidance
paragraphs: Coast Guard records show that its field units in several of the energy- related ports we reviewed have been unable to accomplish many of the  port security responsibilities called for in Coast Guard guidance.  According to the data we obtained and our discussions with field unit  officials, resource shortfalls were the primary reasons for not meeting  these responsibilities.
section_title: The Coast Guard’s Near-Term Efforts to Align Requirements with Field Unit Capacity Have Limitations
paragraphs: We have noted in earlier work that the Coast Guard is ahead of many  agencies in the degree to which it has developed a sound framework for  managing its workload on the basis of risk. When carried out effectively,  risk management offers a way to make informed decisions about how best  to use limited resources. In the Coast Guard’s case, its actions involve a  balancing act both in deciding how best to meet its various security and  nonsecurity missions agencywide, but also in weighing the pros and cons  of investing additional resources in energy commodity tanker protection  versus the wider range of other port activities that require protection. The  Coast Guard uses the requirements laid out in its guidance to establish a  port-specific security approach in which the workload varies based on  such factors as the proximity of population centers to the port area, the  extent of critical infrastructure at the port, the extent of high-profile vessel  traffic transiting through key port areas, and the availability of support  from other entities.
Given that the resource levels of some field units have limited their ability  to achieve Coast Guard security standards, the Coast Guard has attempted  to realign its security requirements to more closely match available  resource levels. Coast Guard headquarters officials meet on an annual  basis to review new risk assessments and current Coast Guard capacity to  mitigate risk. The Coast Guard also receives recommendations from field  unit commanders for introducing tactical efficiencies into security  requirements. Over the past several years, the Coast Guard has revised its  operational security guidance in two main ways:    Revising the standards for the amount of activity required for  conducting some security activities. In August 2006 the Coast  Guard substantially reduced the types of CDC-carrying vessels that  must be escorted. The Coast Guard developed a subset list of the CDC  commodities—called Especially Hazardous Cargo—it determined as  posing the greatest safety and security risks. This list included both  LNG and LPG, meaning that the activities required to protect them  remain unchanged. However, for CDC commodities not included on the  Especially Hazardous Cargo list, such as vinyl chloride, escort  requirements were eliminated during normal threat conditions— MARSEC I. In all, requirements were reduced for about 20 different  CDC commodities carried in bulk. The August 2006 list of Especially  Hazardous Cargo consisted of seven hazardous liquid gas or liquid  commodities: acrylonitrile, ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate/fuel  oil, anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, LNG, and LPG.
Providing greater operational flexibility for Area Commanders  when resource constraints may limit the ability to meet  requirements. The Coast Guard has introduced new tactical options  that Area Commanders may utilize, in some cases, to accomplish  resource intensive security activities.
The Coast Guard’s methodology used to develop the Especially Hazardous  Cargo has two substantial shortcomings, however. Our specific concerns  are as follows:    Lack of thoroughness. To identify the highest risk CDC commodities,  senior Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they reviewed  available consequence analysis assessments that had been conducted  by the Coast Guard’s Special Technical Assessment Program and also  reviewed a 2004 consequence analysis of LNG by Sandia National  Laboratories. They said they also incorporated the views of persons  with expertise in CDC commodities, including Coast Guard field  officials. However, the Coast Guard did not perform consequence  assessments on many CDC commodities by the time it created the  Especially Hazardous Cargo list, and as of January 1, 2007, it still had  not done so.
No systematic comparative analysis was conducted to identify  and prioritize the highest-consequence commodities. Coast Guard  headquarters officials acknowledged they did not conduct a relative  risk assessment of the CDC commodities. Rather, officials told us they  relied on the collective best judgment of Coast Guard experts from  field units and headquarters that had significant experience dealing  with various transportable energy and chemical commodities. By  conducting a relative risk analysis of all CDC commodities, the Coast  Guard would have had available more definitive input for determining  which CDC vessels posed the greatest risks necessitating additional  mitigation measures, which in this case would be an escort.
The Coast Guard is taking action to address the methodological limitations  we note. Shortly after the Coast Guard released the Especially Hazardous  Cargo list, we shared our concerns with Coast Guard officials. The Coast  Guard has since begun efforts to broaden its studies of potential  consequences to include a wide range of hazardous commodities. It  contracted with the American Bureau of Shipping to perform a  comparative analysis of the consequences of an attack on vessels carrying  all commodities on the CDC list, including LNG and LPG. The product of  this analysis is to be a ranking of the relative consequences of each of the  CDC commodities. This study is scheduled to be completed in spring 2007.  Coast Guard headquarters officials told us that following this analysis, and  subject to available funding and other considerations, they may consider  adding other commodities to the comparative analysis, such as gasoline  and jet fuel.
Going beyond the consequence analyses of hazardous commodities, the  Coast Guard has also developed a tool to compare the overall relative risk  scores of different terrorist attacks at the nation’s ports. Field units are  developing risk scenarios for potential targets at their ports and possible  attack types that could be used against those targets. Using the Maritime  Security Risk Assessment Model, the units are to analyze the different risk  scenarios in relation to three key elements of risk: reported threat of  different types of attack, vulnerability of the targets (incorporating  different protective actions taken by security stakeholders), and  consequences of a successful attack (including human health, economic,  and environmental). Each risk scenario is to receive a score. These risk  scores are to be comparable within and between ports so that they can be  used in risk management decisions both locally and nationally.
section_title: Additional LNG Facilities Set to Come On Line Will Likely Pose Additional Challenges for Meeting Mission Requirements
paragraphs: In the longer term, plans for adding additional LNG facilities may require  the Coast Guard to reassess its workload yet again. Currently the Coast  Guard is faced with providing security for vessels arriving at four domestic  onshore LNG import facilities, but the number of LNG tankers bringing  shipments to these facilities will increase considerably because of  expansions that are planned or under way. In addition, industry analysts  expect approximately 12 more LNG facilities will be built over the next  decade (see fig. 12). Consequently, Coast Guard field units will likely be  required to significantly expand their security workloads to conduct new  LNG security missions.
Recognizing this coming increase in demand on security resources at LNG  ports, Coast Guard field units have been planning strategies to help meet  this demand. We found evidence that, in their planning efforts, Coast  Guard field units and affected locations are seeking assistance from a wide  range of stakeholders and sources. In particular, stakeholders mentioned  the following:    Manpower from state and local law enforcement. Several field  units plan to rely on state and local agencies to conduct a considerable  share of the new LNG workloads. While state and local law  enforcement agencies have generally agreed to participate in LNG  security operations, such support was largely contingent upon their  receiving funding to cover their own resource gaps. According to the  Coast Guard, at some ports, law enforcement agencies required  funding to cover new capital investments, such as additional patrol  boats, as well as operational costs such as funding for additional  manpower or fuel for the new boats.
Financial help from facility operators. At some of the proposed  LNG ports we reviewed, facility operators were also planning to  contribute considerable financial resources to help fund new LNG  security operations. In doing so, these companies planned to fund both  operational and capital enhancement costs for state and local law  enforcement agencies that had agreed in concept to support Coast  Guard LNG security missions. At two ports where the Coast Guard had  approved security arrangements for new LNG facilities, state and local  law enforcement agencies had already developed, or were planning to  develop, a cost-sharing agreement with the facilities. For example, at  one port, a potential LNG facility operator made a commitment to fund  most of the capital enhancements and operational costs of the state  and local law enforcement agencies involved, including two patrol  boats for state agencies, two tugboats, and communications equipment.  Facility operators told us they were motivated to provide resources  because they understood that doing so was essential to ensuring final  approval of the LNG facilities. Some facility operators also told us that  the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required them to develop resource cost- sharing agreements to offset state and local government resources  used specifically for the new LNG facilities.
Financial help through federal grants. State and local law  enforcement agencies also reported that they were relying, in part, on  federal grants to obtain additional resources. Of the 15 state and local  law enforcement agencies we contacted, 9 agencies reported applying  for Port Security Grants or Urban Area Security Initiative grants. Law  enforcement agency officials told us they planned to fund capital  enhancements with this grant funding. Among those items officials  planned to fund with their grants were new patrol boats, construction  of a new boathouse and piers, helicopters, and security cameras to be  placed along an LNG transit route.
While port security grants and resource sharing agreements are expected  to address at least part of the resource needs of the Coast Guard’s law  enforcement partners, the Coast Guard is likely to require additional  resources to fulfill its own new security responsibilities. To date, however,  field units have made little progress in obtaining additional resources.  Additionally, because federal law prohibits the Coast Guard from receiving  resources for its own use from private sector companies, the Coast Guard  cannot use resource-sharing partnerships to help fill its own resource  needs. Consequently, Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they  recognize that despite the efforts of Captains of the Port to develop local  solutions to new security demands, some field units will continue to lack  the resources necessary to meet their increasing LNG security workloads.
Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they were considering two  general options to provide field units with the necessary resources to carry  out their new LNG security workloads. These two options are as follows:    Redistribute resources to units with new LNG activity. Coast  Guard officials told us they are considering shifting resources from  ports with surplus resources to ports with new or expanded LNG  facilities. Coast Guard headquarters officials told us, however, that they  have not yet determined which ports would, or even could, provide  these excess resources. Coast Guard’s Atlantic area—where most of  the new LNG activity is expected—has ordered districts and field units  to report any excess resource capacity. Guided by risk management,  Coast Guard headquarters may redistribute any available excess  capacity to ports with new LNG security workloads. The earliest that  the Coast Guard could reprogram assets from within the Atlantic Area  is fiscal year 2009.
Request new resources via budget proposals. Coast Guard officials  also reported that they may request additional funding through the  annual budget process to support the acquisition of additional boats  and personnel to conduct vessel escorts and infrastructure patrols and  the training of additional personnel.
As of January 1, 2007, Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they had  not yet developed a plan—or blueprint—for how to proceed with these  two options for addressing new LNG security resource demands. The  decisions about how to proceed may involve difficult choices, because  shifting resources to this growing need could involve trimming resources  now tasked to other homeland security duties or traditional non-homeland  security missions, and because seeking more resources involves asking  Coast Guard decision makers to weigh important, but competing,  priorities. A national plan that identifies the Coast Guard’s nationwide  LNG resource needs and identifies milestones and funding needs for  meeting those needs can help the Coast Guard manage its limited  resources and communicate resource needs to Congress. It is important to  complete this plan and address in it key elements and issues so that it is  both comprehensive and useful to decision makers who must make  difficult policy and budget choices.
section_title: Stakeholders Have Developed Spill and Terrorism Response Plans but Face Several Challenges in Integrating Them
paragraphs: To mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack on a tanker carrying  energy commodities, the United States has multiple plans that address  actions to be taken at the national, port, facility, and vessel levels. To  translate these plans into effective response actions, stakeholders could  face at least three main challenges. First, if an attack were to occur, the  stakeholders would need to integrate current, separate plans for the two  types of responses necessary for mitigating the consequences of an  attack—spill and terrorism responses. Second, port-level plans to mitigate  the potentially substantial economic consequences of an attack, such as  plans that set priorities for the movement of vessels after a port reopens,  could be useful. Third, stakeholders may need to obtain resources to  ensure that they can carry out the plans. At the port level, this challenge  may extend to response equipment, training, and communications  equipment. To date, federal grants for port security have been directed  mostly to prevention rather than response, but now DHS is moving toward  a more comprehensive risk-based decision-making process for allocating  grant funds. At the time of our review, DHS did not have performance  measures for determining how to allocate resources to ensure ports can  effectively respond to an energy commodities spill caused by terrorism.
subsections: section_title: Planning for Spill Response Is Largely Separate from Planning for Terrorism Response
paragraphs: The planning framework for responding to spills and terrorism incidents is  extensive, involving multiple federal plans and memorandums of  understanding, port-specific plans, as well as plans for individual facilities  and vessels. As figure 13 shows, at the national level these plans are  carried out under the general framework of the National Response Plan  (NRP) but are developed into two separate lines of effort—one for spill  response, the other for terrorism response.
The NRP designates the Coast Guard as the primary agency for spill  response on water and the FBI as the primary agency for terrorism  response, and it calls on the two agencies to coordinate their responses if  the terrorist attack involves energy commodities. For this type of incident,  FBI officials stated, crime scene investigation and preservation would take  place at the same time as the environmental response activities that would  be initiated to contain the likely spill. In this situation, the NRP notes that  spill responders will provide assistance, investigative support, and  intelligence analysis for oil and hazardous materials response in  coordination with the law enforcement and criminal investigation  activities of the FBI.
As the figure shows, beneath the NRP, spill responses are coordinated by  the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan  (NCP), while terrorism responses are coordinated by the Terrorism  Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex. Also at the federal  level, various other federal plans and agreements, such as the National  Incident Management System (NIMS), the Marine Operational Threat  Response Plan (MOTR), and interagency memorandums of agreement also  help guide the response. The spill and terrorism responses continue into  port-level planning, where the key guidance for spill responses is found in  a port’s Area Contingency Plan (ACP) and the key guidance for terrorism  responses is found in the port’s Area Maritime Security Plan (AMSP).  Table 3 provides a brief description of the various plans and agreements  found in figure 13.
At the federal level, in addition to the plans and agreements governing spill  and terrorism responses in table 3, other guidance and requirements  related to economic recovery include the following:    The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP)—a supporting plan  for the National Strategy for Maritime Security—contains procedures  for managing the economic consequences and recovery of maritime  infrastructure after a transportation security incident, such as a  terrorist attack. The MIRP provides strategic-level guidance for  national, regional, and local decisionmakers to set priorities for  restoring the flow of domestic cargo. The plan recommends that the  Captain of the Port consider key shipping channels and waterways for  homeland security; military traffic; and commercial operations; key  landside transportation infrastructure, such as tunnels and bridges; and  other infrastructure key to maintaining continuity of operations in the  port.
The SAFE Port Act of 2006 requires the Secretary of Homeland  Security to develop protocols for the resumption of trade after a  transportation security incident, such as a terrorist attack. The  protocols must include a plan to redeploy resources and personnel as  necessary to reestablish the flow of trade, and appropriate factors for  establishing prioritization of vessels and cargo that are critical for  response and recovery, including factors related to public health,  national security, and economic need.
At the port level, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Maritime  Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Captain of the Port is to establish  both spill and terrorism response plans. In doing so, the Captain of the  Port must identify local public and private port stakeholders who will  develop and revise separate plans for marine spills of oil and hazardous  materials (ACP) and for terrorism response (AMSP). Both plans call for  coordinated implementation with other plans, such as the response and  security plans developed by specific facilities or vessels. Local  stakeholders are organized into two separate groups: an area committee  for spill response (Area Committee), which develops the ACP, and an area  committee for terrorism response (Area Maritime Security Committee),  which develops the AMSP—both committees are chaired by the Captain of  the Port. Some stakeholders, such as port authorities, fire departments,  and facilities in the port, may be part of both committees, while others  may be part of only one committee. For example, oil spill response  organizations are likely to be involved only with spill response planning.
If an energy commodity tanker was attacked while moving through a U.S.  port or while docked, a range of response activities would need to occur  to address the consequences. Figure 14 illustrates how incident response  would potentially take place following an attack and a subsequent spill.
As figure 14 shows, incident response includes three separate but  overlapping activities, as reported by port stakeholders:    Initial incident response for public safety and establishment of  the incident command site. Because energy commodity tankers  carry flammable and/or hazardous materials, the first responders are  likely to be area fire and police departments; receiving facility  personnel may also respond. The first concern is always public safety,  and therefore the fire department would begin rescuing victims and  addressing the probable fire. Law enforcement agencies would secure  the perimeter of the scene to prevent potential follow-on attacks as  well as to prevent the public from moving too close to the attack  location—both to protect the public and to maintain the crime scene  for subsequent investigation. Initial responders would also establish a  multi-agency incident command site near the location of the vessel,  where all responding agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities for  spill and terrorism response would congregate to manage the  operations.
Crime scene preservation and investigation, and initial spill  response activities. As public safety operations continue, law  enforcement agencies would determine whether terrorism had caused  the spill, and if so, would conduct an investigation at the same time  that life safety operations are continuing and spill response operations  are beginning. Investigations would involve crime scene and perimeter  control, determining if additional devices may be present and disposing  of them, and apprehending suspects. Spill operations would initially  involve the laying of a containment boom to protect the surrounding  environment from contamination caused by the spill. Law enforcement  and spill response organizations will need to coordinate their activities  because actions to mitigate environmental consequences can  potentially damage crime scene evidence.
Spill and port recovery activities. Once the resulting spill is  contained, incident commanders would determine their next steps,  depending on conditions. Spill recovery may include intentionally  burning contained oil, allowing the commodity to evaporate, using  chemicals to disperse the spill, or using mechanical recovery to skim  the oil out of the water. If a terrorist attack had occurred, the crime  scene investigation would have to be conducted before the port could  be fully restored for cargo and passenger ships.
According to FBI officials, the FBI would work with the Coast Guard to  get access to the incident site as soon as possible to obtain all crime scene  evidence possible, without interfering with the response.
These complex activities would be carried out by many different federal,  state, and local agencies. Figure 15 illustrates one possible scenario for  spill and terrorism response actions and shows some of the agencies that  might carry out these actions.
section_title: Federal Agencies and Local Ports Could Face Challenges in Integrating Spill and Terrorism Response Plans, Planning for Economic Response, and Obtaining Needed Resources
paragraphs: In the event of a terrorist attack on an energy commodity tanker, federal  agencies and port communities could face challenges in integrating their  spill and terrorism response plans. Ports could face two additional  challenges: planning for economic response activities and obtaining the  necessary resources to respond to a terrorist attack on an energy  commodity tanker.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies and Ports Could Face Challenges in Integrating Spill and Terrorism Response Plans
paragraphs: As we have noted in prior reports, a fundamental goal of emergency  preparation and response is the ability to respond to emergency incidents  of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective  efforts that reduce the loss of life and property and set the stage for  recovery. In our September 2006 report on the preparation for and  response to Hurricane Katrina, we stated that fundamental to effective  preparation and response are (1) clearly defined, clearly communicated,  and clearly understood legal authorities, responsibilities, and roles at the  federal, state, and local level, and (2) identification and development of  the capabilities needed to mount a well-coordinated, effective response to  reduce the loss of life and property and set the stage for recovery.  Providing these fundamentals requires effective planning and  coordination, including detailed operational plans, and robust training and  exercises in which needed capabilities are realistically tested, assessed,  and problems identified and addressed. With regard to potential attacks  on energy commodity tankers in U.S. ports, the ports could face  challenges if roles and responsibilities have not been clearly defined,  communicated, and understood and if needed capabilities have not been  fully identified and appropriately tested. The National Preparedness Goal  uses 15 scenarios to identify 37 capabilities and the associated critical  tasks needed to respond to incidents of national significance—those that  go beyond the state and local levels and require a coordinated federal  response. However, the scenarios used to identify these capabilities do not  specifically encompass the capabilities needed for responding to attacks  on oil, gas, or other tankers in American ports.
The NRP calls upon the Coast Guard and the FBI to coordinate their  response in the event of a terrorist attack on an oil or hazardous materials  tanker. However, the agencies cannot be assured that their joint response,  concurrently implementing the numerous existing plans, will be effective  unless they have developed a detailed operational plan that integrates  their spill and terrorism responses and have tested these responses in joint  exercises. According to headquarters and field office Coast Guard and FBI  officials, coordination would be managed through the use of the unified  command structure in the National Incident Management System and the  other general coordination mechanisms in the NRP and the MOTR.  However, the unified command structure and the NRP are generally not  specific in explaining how they will be made operational following an  attack. As we have recently reported, the implementation of the NRP  following Hurricane Katrina identified concerns with coordination within  and between federal government entities using the plan. We  recommended the development of detailed operational plans for the NRP  and its annexes.
In addition to having operational plans, agencies should conduct joint  exercises that simulate an attack and the agencies’ responses. Without  such exercises, it would be questionable whether joint Coast Guard and  FBI activities would proceed as planned. Simulation exercises help  determine the strengths and weaknesses of various plans and the ability of  multiple agencies or communities to respond to an emergency incident.  According to DHS’s Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program,  well-designed and executed exercises are the most effective means of (1)  testing and validating policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, and  interagency agreements; (2) clarifying and training personnel in roles and  responsibilities; (3) improving interagency coordination and  communications; (4) identifying gaps in resources; (5) improving  individual performance; and (6) identifying opportunities for  improvement.
The value of joint simulation exercises in uncovering problems has been  demonstrated in the results of the largest national, state, and local  interagency terrorism response exercise ever conducted. This exercise— called TOPOFF 3—was conducted in April 2005 and included explosions  and hazardous materials releases in multiple locations around the nation  (none of which were on the water). According to the Coast Guard after- action report for one of the sites, the FBI (1) never fully integrated into  and accepted the unified command called for under NIMS, (2) did not  appropriately staff the incident command post with its representatives, (3)  maintained distinctions between hazardous materials release response and  terrorism investigation actions, and (4) kept management of the  investigation separate from the incident management overseen by the  unified command. According to the after-action report, “concurrent  management of both the investigation and all other response functions  would have increased the effectiveness and efficiency of the response  effort.” The report also recommended the continuation of multiagency  training and exercises to test interagency coordination efforts.
The need for joint spill and terrorism response exercises has been  discussed, but exercises have not been conducted, at the national level.  Specifically, planning discussions for the 2004 Spill of National  Significance (SONS) exercise identified the need to clarify how the FBI fits  into spill response activities when the possibility of terrorism is present,  but the exercise did not test integrating the FBI’s and other agencies’  response. However, both Coast Guard guidance and the Department of  Justice’s Inspector General have supported the need to combine spill and  terrorism response exercises. Specifically:    Coast Guard guidance recommends combining terrorism response  exercises with other exercises, such as spill response. OPA 90 and  MTSA implementing regulations require similar schedules for exercises  of spill and terrorism response plans, and the integration of these  exercises could improve response performance and complete required  multiple response exercise mandates at one time, according to Coast  Guard officials.
The Department of Justice’s Inspector General in 2006 called for more  joint exercises between the Coast Guard and the FBI in high-risk ports  to, among other things, resolve potential role and incident command  conflicts in the event of a maritime terrorism incident. The Inspector  General’s report emphasized the interaction of Coast Guard and FBI  security units, but these recommendations are equally applicable for  integrated exercises to respond to a spill caused by a terrorist attack.  Once public safety is addressed, the Coast Guard and FBI have  different priorities for their jurisdictional responsibilities—spill  containment and cleanup and crime scene preservation and  investigation, respectively. At the time of our review, FBI officials told  us they knew of no upcoming joint planned exercises. FBI  headquarters officials have not issued guidance to field office agents on  integrating spill and terrorism responses activities within a single  exercise.
Coast Guard officials told us that the MOTR is intended to delineate Coast  Guard and FBI roles in responding to an attack. FBI headquarters officials  told us that their participation in several MOTR conference calls  demonstrated that coordination among MOTR agencies is effective. These  telephone discussions may improve overall coordination, but exercises for  joint spill and terrorism responses should be conducted as often as  appropriate.
At the port level, effectively integrating spill and terrorism emergency  responses requires all plans to operate in unison—the port spill response  plan (ACP) and the port terrorism response plan (AMSP), as well as  facility and vessel response plans. As figure 13 shows, there is no direct  operational link between the ACP and the AMSP.
Without a direct link, spill responders may not have the information they  need to respond to a spill caused by a terrorist attack. While the AMSP has  served as the terrorism response plan for ports since July 2004, it contains  sensitive security information and is therefore only available to those  individuals who are considered to have a “need to know.” As a result,  nonsecurity personnel, such oil spill cleanup responders, may not have  access to these plans during an emergency. For example, only 3 of the 13  ports we visited had ACPs that addressed terrorism response within the  spill plan by incorporating terrorism incident annexes or other plans.  Consequently, the ACPs may need to have explicit sections for responding  to terrorism.
The general lack of integration in the plans carries over to the separate  spill and terrorism response communities at the port level. As previously  discussed, individual members on these committees may not know all the  members of the other committee, but a terrorist attack on a tanker would  require them to respond simultaneously. We identified only a few  examples of joint committee meetings that enabled members to interact.  For example, Coast Guard officials told us that, since September 11, 2001,  the Captain of the Port at one location has facilitated meetings between  spill response providers and local offices of emergency management and  federal and local law enforcement agencies in order to improve response  coordination among all entities. They stated that if the spill and terrorism  response communities were formally joined, response integration and  efficiency would improve. In addition, at another location, Coast Guard  officials noted, the local area training and exercise workgroup contains  members of both the spill and terrorism response committees in order to  consolidate training and exercises. Finally, in an attempt to improve  communication, the FBI established Maritime Liaison Agents (MLA) at the  ports so that all stakeholders would know the local agent in the event of  an incident. At some ports we visited the spill responders knew who the  FBI agent was and at other ports they said they did not.
USCG guidance states that local port operators, municipalities, and public  safety agencies are expected to provide and maintain adequate disaster  response capabilities in their ports, with capability requirements likely to  vary from port to port depending on size, commodities received,  environmental considerations, relation to population, etc. Recognizing the  variability of capability requirements, the USCG has developed Critical  Success Factors (CSF) for spill response that drive a “Best Possible  Response”—that is, a set of general goals to achieve when conducting a  comprehensive and effective response. Six particular CSF are to be  considered when developing ACPs, including (1) no public or responder  injuries, illness or deaths; (2) sensitive areas protected; (3) resource  damage minimized; (4) infrastructure damage minimized; (5) economic  impact minimized; and (6) highly coordinated law enforcement and  emergency management operations. Joint exercises can maximize the  ability of a given port to carry out a “best response” in the event of an  attack on a tanker. However, we recognize that numerous scenarios could  be exercised in any given port; consequently, joint spill and terrorism  response exercises may not be the most urgent for a port that receives  limited quantities of energy commodities. Figure 16 shows firefighters  preparing for a potential marine response during a training exercise.
Two developments—one a project at an individual port, the other a new  requirement added by Congress—may help bring about more integrated  responses. Specifically:    At one port, we found a potential leading practice for integrating a  marine terrorism response. The port’s Marine Terrorism Response  (MTR) project was launched to develop and validate a multiagency  response system and national model plan to help mobilize local, state,  and federal resources for marine terrorism incidents. The MTR’s goals  include increasing preparedness, identifying gaps in emergency  response capabilities, and planning for timely restoration of trade. The  project generated a response plan and a field guide for how to integrate  responses for a range of issues, such as public safety, response  coordination, recovery, and crime scene management. Stakeholders  plan to incorporate existing response plans, such as the ACP, as  annexes to the MTR. According to the FBI official involved with the  MTR planning process, the MTR serves as an effective linkage between  the spill and terrorism response sections of the National Response  Plan.
Under the SAFE Port Act of 2006, DHS must develop interagency  operational centers by fall 2009 for port security at all high-priority  ports. The Coast Guard and the FBI are among the agencies that will be  represented at these operational centers, as will other public and  private sector stakeholders who would be adversely affected by a  terrorist attack. These centers may also include stakeholders who  would be involved in a joint spill and terrorism response. Integration  may be improved through the daily interaction of all these  stakeholders. In April 2006 testimony before the House Homeland  Security Committee, DHS’s Deputy Secretary stated that physically  connecting the various agencies involved is important, and the Port of  New York and New Jersey’s Manager of Port Security voiced support  for the development of joint operation centers in key U.S. ports.
section_title: Port Plans to Mitigate Economic Consequences Could Be Useful
paragraphs: The economic consequences of a terrorist attack on a tanker could be  significant, particularly if one or more ports are closed. Currently,  guidance in the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan suggests that ports  develop priorities for bringing vessels into port after a closure.  Additionally, AMSPs must include a section on crisis management and  recovery to ensure the continuity of port operations. At the time of our  review, there was no national-level guidance for use by local ports. We  identified some ports that, on their own initiative, were incorporating  economic recovery considerations into their port-level plans, which could  benefit other ports seeking to develop their own plans for mitigating the  economic consequences of an attack.
The SAFE Port Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to  develop protocols for how maritime trade will be reestablished after a  terrorist attack. These protocols must include appropriate factors—related  to public health, national security, and economic need—that can be used  to set priorities for vessels and cargo entering the port after a closure.  While the act does not expressly require the development of port-level  plans for facilitating the resumption of trade after an incident, DHS could  consider developing guidance for ports to use to develop plans for  mitigating economic consequences.
section_title: Ports Could Face Challenges in Securing Resources to Carry Out Their Response Plans
paragraphs: Ports could face challenges in marshaling resources to improve port  response capabilities, including obtaining or sharing needed marine  firefighting equipment and training, other training, and interoperable  communication systems that allow emergency responders to talk to each  other to effectively coordinate their efforts.
section_title: Marine Firefighting Equipment and Training
paragraphs: The ports we visited varied considerably in their ability to combat marine  fires. Some ports had large fireboats that are designed to deal with fires on  tankers, as well as firefighters trained to conduct shipboard firefighting  operations. In contrast, other energy commodity ports relied on land- based firefighting companies; these companies told us that they did not  have the training and/or the equipment to fight marine fires. See figure 17  for two examples of marine firefighting response.
While some local ports may not be well equipped to handle marine fires,  companies operating tankers are required to provide for marine  firefighting and salvage capabilities under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.  However, we identified several limitations associated with these  requirements:    Timeliness of response not spelled out. OPA 90 does not specify  how soon after an event either marine firefighting or salvage must  occur. Under a Coast Guard rule proposed in 2002, and not yet issued  as final, contracted marine firefighting resources generally would have  to be provided within 8 hours after notification of an event, while  salvage operations generally would have to begin within 16 hours. Even  if this rule were in force, it might not be timely enough to prevent the  vessel from sinking.
Extent of planning for salvage varies widely. Salvage is important  for marine firefighting because a ship may sink from an attack, may be  deliberately sunk to control the resulting fire, or may be accidentally  sunk by the firefighters because they are not familiar with ship stability  issues inherent in the marine firefighting environment. In addition to  the OPA 90 requirement, the SAFE Port Act of 2006 requires the  development of salvage response plans to supplement Area Maritime  Security Plans. While all ACPs for the ports we visited contain sections  on salvage, we found that the plans varied widely in detailing salvage  responses. A 2003 National Transportation Safety Board workshop  identified potential shortfalls in local salvage planning and/or  capabilities as an issue that needed to be addressed. One reason for  capability shortfalls identified was that locally available salvage  resources may sometimes be lacking.
If ports lack marine firefighting or salvage capabilities, we identified the  following other avenues for obtaining resources to enhance these  capabilities. However, these avenues carry limitations, mainly related to  the speed with which they could be deployed on site.
Mutual aid agreements. Some port community members have mutual  aid agreements in place to provide assistance in emergencies. These  agreements can be industry-to-industry, municipal-to-municipal,  industry-to-municipal, or municipal-to-industry. However, these  agreements can have inherent delays in response time if needed  resources are located some distance away or require considerable time  for redeployment. For example, one refinery noted, in its site  emergency manual section for ship fire procedures, that there is a need  to evaluate whether refinery responders need to call the local fire  department and request fireboat assistance because of a 45-minute  delay in subsequent arrival of this resource. If the refinery needs to call  for additional assistance from a nearby fire department’s fireboats, the  delay could be several hours, according to state fire officials.
National Oil Spill Response Resource Inventory. Each Coast  Guard Captain of the Port has emergency contracting authority to  obtain needed resources. The National Strike Force’s Response  Resource Inventory lists public and private organizations that can  provide these needed spill response resources. The Coast Guard is to  review these organizations’ resources at least every 3 years to keep an  up-to-date resource list. Again, in some cases delay in getting these  needed resources to the incident location would occur.
In addition to the differences in the availability of marine firefighting  equipment, we found that access to marine firefighting training, which is  highly specialized and different from land-based firefighting, can be  limited because of distance from a training center or lack of resources.  While a range of locations provide firefighter response training for energy  commodity fires in the marine environment, these facilities are limited and  are sometimes not located near a firefighting response organization that is  seeking this training. Some local emergency responders told us they have  not received shipboard firefighting training, which is even more  specialized than general marine firefighting, and many of the responders  we contacted identified the need for additional training. At one port we  visited, fire department officials stated that the firefighters had not  received this training but would board a burning vessel. See figure 18 for  an example of firefighters training to combat an aviation fuel fire.
We also found differences in training for federally established procedures  outlining coordination—known as the incident command system (ICS)— for responding to any incident, including terrorism. Some emergency  responders identified a lack of experience and training on this system as a  potential concern for effectively coordinating and leading a response to an  attack. The Coast Guard and fire departments are familiar with ICS  because they were using it before September 11, 2001, but law  enforcement does not have equivalent experience with it. At the ports we  visited, the local Coast Guard and firefighting responders identified  themselves as generally compliant with ICS training requirements.  Although the FBI would have jurisdictional responsibility for leading the  multiagency response to a terrorist attack on a tanker, FBI personnel did  not have to comply with ICS training requirements until December 31,  2006.
section_title: Interoperable Communications
paragraphs: At the ports we visited, officials identified the lack of fully interoperable  communications as an ongoing issue, as did many of the after-action  reports we reviewed. Spill and terrorism responders may have difficulty  coordinating their emergency response if their communications systems  are not interoperable—that is, one agency’s equipment may not be able to  communicate with another’s. For example, according to local emergency  planners, during one port exercise in 2006 the responders used their cell  phones because of interoperability problems. This workaround may be  adequate during an exercise, an FBI official noted, but responders may not  be able to rely on the cell phone communications network during an  actual event. While interoperability is a problem for emergency responders  throughout the nation, responders in the marine environment face  additional challenges. These include the need for additional equipment  on or near ships so that radio signals can get through to the ship’s hold, as  well as marine band radios for operating on water.
Response organizations have some options to work around the problem of  interoperability. For example, the FBI can use a range of equipment to  coordinate the signals of all the various responding agencies’  communications equipment, but it takes some time to make this  equipment operational because the equipment has to be brought to the  site, and each responding organization has to provide a radio to the same  location for the workaround system to function. The Coast Guard also has  communications equipment for interoperability stored in locations around  the nation, but again, there would be a delay in getting this equipment to  the site of an incident.
section_title: DHS Grants May Become More Accessible for Response and Recovery Projects, but Funding Decisions Require Better Application of Performance Measures
paragraphs: For ports that may be facing resource shortfalls, finding ways to pay for  improvements and enhancements is an issue. One potential funding source  is DHS’s Port Security Grant Program. In the past, most DHS grants  awarded to ports were for terrorism prevention and detection projects  (such as fences, cameras, and security systems), rather than for response  and recovery projects, according to DHS officials. For some states that  contain ports we visited, officials who oversee grant resource distribution  also told us that only a limited number of post-incident response project  applications, such as marine firefighting assets or shipboard firefighter  training, have received grant funding.
This emphasis on prevention and detection is changing. Recent changes in  the grant program are more likely to result in consideration of response  and recovery projects, according to DHS officials. They told us that the  DHS Port Security Grant Program is undergoing a fundamental shift from  a facility security focus to a more comprehensive approach to managing  risk within ports. The Office of Grants and Training, within the  Preparedness Directorate, is working with the Coast Guard to develop an  integrated, risk-based decision-making process for allocating grant funds  for each port area. This shift in strategy recognizes that port security  entails not only prevention and detection activities but also response and  recovery capabilities. Plans for fiscal year 2007 grant guidance will place  more emphasis on post-incident response projects, according to DHS  officials. The SAFE Port Act of 2006 likewise emphasizes a risk-based  approach for port security grants.
To make effective judgments about such projects, performance measures  are needed to quantitatively determine the spill and terrorism resources  that should be available. Such measures help decide the extent to which a  given resource is needed to effectively conduct a response within a given  time period. At the time of our review, DHS was surveying available  emergency response capabilities within a given port, according to officials  from DHS’s Office of Infrastructure Protection.
In September 2006, the New York City Fire Department Chief of  Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness questioned whether the  nation is prepared for an emergency and called for performance measures  that emphasized (1) capability (What can we do?), (2) capacity (How much  can we do?), (3) proficiency (How well can we perform?), and (4)  deployment (How quickly can we deploy capabilities?). As we have  previously reported, in the absence of comparable standards for  emergency responder performance, it is difficult to assess whether grant  resources will be directed effectively to reduce risk. Without such  performance measures, the federal government would not be able to  conduct an analysis, based on reducing overall risk, that could be used to  set priorities for acquiring needed response resources. Performance  measures are critical for setting priorities to effectively allocate federal  funds.
The Captain of the Port may assist local authorities in reviewing the  adequacy of the port’s overall marine firefighting and salvage capability.  Such qualitative reviews assess a range of factors related to the nature of  operations within the port. However, these assessments cannot set  priorities for addressing these shortfalls because they do not have  quantitative performance measures that would provide a way to compare  one shortfall against another to determine such priorities. Other related  assessments face the same priority-setting issues. A recent qualitative  advisory report for siting a potential future LNG facility illustrates this  problem. The assessment identified the need to send firefighters to  specialized fire schools on an annual basis to become trained in fighting  LNG fires, as well as to provide local firefighters with additional training  on hazardous materials and confined space rescue. The assessment also  identified a range of equipment procurement needs, including additional  fireboats capable of mitigating a large LNG spill on water as well as dry  chemicals and foam caches for extinguishing any resulting fire. While all  these shortfalls may need to be addressed, the assessments do not provide  a road map for setting federal funding priorities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The ship-based supply chain for energy commodities remains threatened  and vulnerable, and appropriate security throughout the chain is essential  to ensure safe and efficient delivery. The threats are especially strong  internationally, where the United States faces limitations in ensuring that  facilities in foreign ports are meeting security standards and in protecting  shipments in international waters. Domestically, the nexus for  strengthening security efforts rests with the U.S. Coast Guard, which has  primary responsibility for security actions in U.S. ports and waterways.  Despite considerable efforts to protect ports and the energy traffic in  them, the level of protection is not where the Coast Guard believes it  should be. At some ports Coast Guard units are not meeting their own  levels of required security activities. Growing demand for Coast Guard  resources requires that the Coast Guard take action on several fronts. In  adjusting security standards to take into account its limited resources, the  Coast Guard needs to assure itself and other stakeholders that its  adjustments are based on a careful assessment of risk. This process has  begun with the Coast Guard’s ongoing assessment of risks associated with  all CDC commodities, and since this assessment is already under way, we  do not see a need to make a recommendation in this case. The results of  that study, and of any comparative analysis that includes hazardous  materials not on the CDC list, will be important in a careful and  dispassionate analysis for ensuring that available resources are deployed  in such a way that commodities receive protection commensurate with the  relative risks involved. This is especially important with the expected  growth in LNG imports. Similarly, we believe that the results of the risk  analyses stemming from use of the Maritime Security Risk Assessment  Model will be important in determining how field units can best make use  of security resources at their ports. With the ability to compare different  targets and different levels of protection offered by security stakeholders,  the model should allow the Coast Guard to take a more complete  accounting for the various risks at U.S. ports. These two efforts are vital  inputs that are needed to ensure an accurate reflection of security risks to  tankers and the ports that receive them.
Local Coast Guard units have been active in preparing for the coming  growth in LNG shipments, engaging with local law enforcement agencies  as a means to augment Coast Guard resources. The assistance the Coast  Guard already receives from state and local law enforcement is vital for  many units as they try to meet security activity requirements with limited  resources. Coast Guard headquarters, however, needs to do more to help  these local efforts. More specifically, it needs to begin centralized planning  for how to address resource shortfalls across many locations. As LNG  facilities continue to multiply, the resulting increase in workload will  affect some Coast Guard units but not others, necessitating a centralized  response as well as a port-specific one. It is important for the Coast Guard  to begin this centralized planning soon, when attention can also be paid to  assessing the options for partnering with state or local law enforcement  agencies to ensure appropriate security. This broader planning is  important for ensuring a proper distribution of resources to best meet the  Coast Guard’s diverse responsibilities.
In the event of a successful attack on an energy commodity tanker, ports  would need to provide an effective, integrated response to protect public  safety and the environment, conduct a terrorism investigation, and restore  operations in a timely manner. Consequently, clearly defined and  understood roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders who would need  to respond are needed to ensure an effective response. Operational plans  for the response, among the various levels of government involved, should  be explicitly linked. As we have reported previously, it is essential that  these roles and responsibilities be clearly communicated and understood.  Furthermore, while we recognize that ports may have exercise priorities  other than responding to a terrorist attack on a tanker, we believe that  combined spill and terrorism response exercises should be considered and  pursued in ports that are considered to be at risk. In addition, national- level guidance has generally suggested that ports plan for mitigating the  economic consequences of an attack. In implementing the post-incident  recovery portions of the SAFE Port Act, DHS has an opportunity to  provide specific guidance for how ports could plan for lessening  potentially significant economic consequences, particularly if an attack  results in a port closure. Finally, DHS has just begun to focus more on  providing funding for response resources through the Port Security Grant  program. However, DHS cannot be assured that it will appropriately target  funding to the projects that most reduce overall risk because it has not  developed quantitative performance measures. These measures would  allow DHS to set priorities for funding on the basis of reducing overall  risk. To make effective judgments about such projects, performance  measures are needed to quantitatively determine the spill and terrorism  resources that should be available.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the  Commandant of the Coast Guard to take the following actions:    Develop a national resource allocation plan that will balance the need  to meet new LNG security responsibilities with other existing security  responsibilities and other Coast Guard missions. This plan needs to  encompass goals and objectives, timelines, impacts on other missions,  roles of private sector operators, and use of existing state and local  agency capacity.
Develop national-level guidance that ports can use to plan for helping  to mitigate economic consequences, particularly in the case of port  closures.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the  Commandant of the Coast Guard and that the Attorney General direct the  Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to work together to take  the following two actions:    At the national level, help ensure that a detailed operational plan has  been developed that integrates the different spill and terrorism  response sections of the National Response Plan.
At the local level, help ensure that spill and terrorism response  activities are integrated for the best possible response by maximizing  the integration of spill and terrorism response planning and exercises  at ports that receive energy commodities where attacks on tankers  pose a significant threat.
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with  federal, state, and local stakeholders to develop explicit performance  measures for emergency response capabilities and use them in risk-based  analyses to set priorities for acquiring needed response resources.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, State,  Justice, and Homeland Security, including the Coast Guard, for their  review and comment. These departments provided formal written  comments, except for the Department of State, which provided oral  comments. The Department of Defense, in its written comments,  concurred with our recommendations. The Departments of Justice,  through the FBI, and Homeland Security generally concurred with our  recommendations and provided specific comments on the  recommendations that are detailed below.
Regarding our recommendation that the Coast Guard develop a national  resource allocation plan that takes into account new LNG security  responsibilities along with its other mission demands, DHS generally  concurred. It stated, however, that while it agrees with the need to address  resource demands based on forecasted increases in LNG imports, it also  stated that LNG was one of many Certain Dangerous Cargoes that add risk  to the maritime environment, and the Coast Guard would address the risk  from CDCs as a whole. We agree that there are other dangerous cargoes  and it is logical for the Coast Guard to review them holistically in targeting  its resources to where the risks are greatest. On the basis of its comments,  the Coast Guard plans to examine the risk caused by dangerous  commodities, and to take a number of steps to allocate resources. We will  monitor the Coast Guard’s actions to see if these actions, collectively or in  combination with a plan, allow it to optimally allocate its limited resource  to meet growing security requirements along with its various other mission  needs. Such a plan is important to ensure the best distribution of  resources to meet the Coast Guard’s diverse responsibilities.
Regarding our recommendation to develop national-level guidance to help  ports plan how to mitigate economic consequences, particularly in the  case of port closures, DHS generally concurred. It stated that its  experience from Hurricane Katrina showed that disruptions to the  maritime transportation system can have significant economic impacts  and that these impacts need to be considered during recovery actions. It  also stated that the Coast Guard, in partnership with CBP, is currently  engaged in a broad effort to improve maritime recovery planning. While  information on this effort was not provided to us during our review,  according to its comment, the Coast Guard seems to recognize the  problem and is taking action to address the basis of our concern.
Regarding our recommendation to develop a detailed national operational  plan that integrates spill and terrorism sections of the National Response  Plan, both DHS and FBI generally concurred. They both stated, however,  that the NRP itself already serves as the basis for integrating such  response planning, and the FBI did not concur with the need to develop a  separate operational plan. As we have noted in prior reports, effective  planning and coordination require the development of detailed operational  plans for response. While the NRP serves as a strategy-level doctrinal  document, it is not an operational plan. We remain concerned that an  intentional attack on an energy commodity tanker in a U.S. port may not  be met by the best possible response without such a plan to direct the  specific circumstance when both the spill and terrorism response sections  of the NRP must be integrated and implemented simultaneously. Without a  detailed operational plan for this situation, effective and efficient law  enforcement investigation and environmental consequence mitigation may  be hindered. As we have recently reported, the implementation of the NRP  following Hurricane Katrina identified concerns with coordination within  and between federal government entities using the NRP. Further, the  October 2005 draft version of the MOTR called for DHS and DOJ to  develop specific, detailed supporting operational plans for their  responsibilities, in close consultation with other departments and  agencies. However, this requirement was dropped from the October 2006  final version of the MOTR. As a result, no detailed operational plans exist  for the situation described in the response section of this report. We  believe our recommendation will help fill the guidance gap between  doctrine and port-level operations.
Regarding our recommendation to maximize terrorism and spill response  planning and exercises at the local level for the best possible response,  DHS generally concurred and FBI concurred. DHS said that while these  efforts must be coordinated they need not be an amalgamation. It stated  that there are opportunities for this coordination at the local committees  that are responsible for planning terrorism and spill response and because  the Coast Guard serves as chair for both committees, coordination already  occurs. In its comments FBI listed exercises that combined terrorism and  spill response. It also stated that local Maritime Liaison Agents were  specifically directed to engage agency partners to ensure integration of  FBI response. While these actions are beneficial for increased integration,  there is no direct link between the actual local terrorism plan and spill  response plan. Also, because terrorism response plans have distribution  limited to those who need to know, many nonsecurity stakeholders— particularly in the spill response community—would not have access to  these plans in an emergency, allowing for the possibility for these  stakeholders to take actions that may hinder terrorism response.
Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security  work with federal, state, and local stakeholders to develop explicit  performance measures for emergency response capabilities, DHS  responded that it was taking the recommendation under advisement and  was exploring approaches to address our recommendation. We will follow  up with DHS later to get its formal position on this recommendation.
All of the respondents provided technical comments that we incorporated  into the report as appropriate. Written comments from DHS are  reproduced in appendix V, written comments from FBI are reproduced in  appendix VI, and written comments from the Department of Defense are  reproduced in appendix VII.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan on no further distribution of this report until 30 days after  its issue date. At that time we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard,  and the Attorney General. We will also make copies available to others at  no charge at GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
This report was prepared by two teams within GAO, each of which  concentrated on particular aspects of the assignment. If you or your staffs  have any questions regarding (1) the types of threats to tankers carrying  energy commodities and (2) the measures being taken to protect tankers  and the challenges federal agencies face in making these actions effective,  please call Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610, or caldwells@gao.gov.  For questions regarding (1) the potential consequences of a successful  attack on tankers or energy infrastructure or (2) the plans in place and the  potential challenges in responding to an attack, please call Mark Gaffigan  at (202) 512-3841, or gaffiganm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX.
section_title: Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this report were to (1) determine the types of terrorist  threats to tankers carrying energy commodities and the potential  consequences of a successful attack; (2) describe what measures are being  taken both internationally and domestically to protect these tankers, and  what challenges, if any, federal agencies face in making these actions  effective; and (3) if a terrorist attack succeeds despite these protective  measures, describe what plans are in place to respond and discuss the  potential challenges federal agencies may face in responding to a future  attack.
To determine the types of terrorist threats to tankers carrying energy  commodities, we conducted interviews with maritime intelligence officials  from the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy at the National Maritime Intelligence  Center. We also met with Coast Guard and Customs and Border  Protection officials at headquarters and in the field responsible for port  and vessel security to determine their views about maritime terrorism  related to energy tankers and infrastructure. During site visits to domestic  ports, we also interviewed operators of petroleum waterside facilities and  tankers to determine their understanding of the threat environment. We  also met with shipping and vessel management companies to discuss their  views of the threats they face at foreign loading ports and while in transit  to the United States. To gain an international perspective on threats to  tankers and loading facilities, we conducted interviews with officials from  international maritime organizations, international shipping and petroleum  trade associations, vessel operators, vessel insurers, and private security  and risk management organizations. We also reviewed classified  intelligence documents, including port threat assessments, and  government directives related to maritime security.
Continuing with our first objective to describe the potential public safety,  environmental, and economic consequences of a successful terrorist  attack on a waterside energy facility or tanker, we met with officials from  the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S.  Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, and the Federal Energy  Regulatory Commission. In addition, we conducted a panel study with  academic and industry experts to specifically determine the consequences  of an attack on a liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker. We also visited major  petroleum, LNG, and liquefied petroleum gas terminals to discuss possible  consequences of attacks at these locations. We also analyzed import data  from U.S. government sources for petroleum and other energy  commodities into the United States and the ports receiving the imports.  Finally, we reviewed published information, such as studies and scholarly  articles, to determine the environmental and public health and safety  consequences of a terrorist attack to a petroleum waterside facility or  tanker.
To describe measures that are being taken to protect these tankers, and  what challenges, if any, federal agencies face in making these actions  effective, we interviewed a variety of foreign and domestic government  officials and private industry representatives. To determine the actions  taken in foreign nations, we visited four countries. The selection criteria  for our overseas site visits were the amount of energy commodities  exported to the United States and the opportunity to learn about maritime  anti-terrorism best practices. At the countries we visited we conducted  interviews with government officials responsible for maritime security  activities and petroleum waterside facility and tanker operators. We also  obtained information from the Coast Guard, international maritime  organizations, tanker operators, vessel management companies, and  insurers to understand port and vessel security practices and procedures  overseas and while tankers are in transit to the United States.
To determine the actions taken domestically, we met with officials in the  Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, State, Energy,  Transportation, and Justice; private sector facility and vessel operators;  and state and local officials dealing with homeland security, emergency  response, and law enforcement.
We also conducted site visits to a nonprobability sample of petroleum and  liquefied gas import and export facilities in the United States. During our  site visits we observed security practices and conducted interviews with  representatives of federal agencies that oversee the security of the energy  facilities, as well as facility security officers and relevant local and state  law enforcement officials. The information obtained from these site visits  cannot be generalized to all petroleum and liquefied gas import and export  facilities nationwide.
We also reviewed government and industry documents and data sources  relevant to domestic actions taken by agencies and companies to prevent  terrorist attacks. To establish criteria for evaluating the Coast Guard’s  ability to mitigate the risk of maritime terrorism, we obtained 9 months of  Operation Neptune Shield (ONS) Scorecard security performance data— the Coast Guard’s performance measurement tool for tracking  performance in meeting security activities at the nations most strategically  important ports—from select Coast Guard field units covering the months  of November 2005 through July 2006. We chose to review scorecard data  for ports that the U.S. Maritime Administration identified as being top  ports for receiving energy commodity tankers. We calculated the ONS 9- month average of both the monthly activity requirement attainment  percentages and share of workload conducted by other government  agencies. In conducting this work, we met with Coast Guard headquarters  personnel on several occasions to further our understanding. We also  asked Coast Guard officials responsible for the scorecard data what steps  they took to ensure the reliability of the data and determined that they  were sufficiently accurate for our purposes.
To describe what plans are in place for responding to a terrorist attack,  should one occur despite protective measures, and discuss the challenges  federal agencies may face in responding, we conducted interviews with  officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice; the  Environmental Protection Agency; as well as officials representing port  authorities, state and local offices of public safety and emergency  management, oil and gas facilities, and first responders, including police  and fire departments. These interviews were conducted to identify spill,  terrorism, and economic response plans and priorities; mechanisms for  response coordination; access to resources; training availability; types of  exercises conducted; potential communications challenges; performance  metrics; and information-sharing systems. During our site visits, we  observed port operations and the working relationships between some  government and private stakeholders. To assess the integration of national  and local spill and terrorism response plans, we gathered and reviewed  identified plans. Finally, we interviewed emergency response officials and  reviewed after-action reports to identify best practices and lessons learned  as a result of emergency response exercises and incidents.
We conducted our work from April 2005 to February 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Selected Energy Commodities Transported by Tanker into United States
subsections: section_title: Crude Oil
paragraphs: Crude oil is used to produce a wide array of petroleum products,  including gasoline, diesel and jet fuels, heating oil, lubricants, asphalt,  plastics, and many other products used for their energy or chemical  content.
Crude oils range from very light (high in gasoline) to very heavy (high  in residual oils). Sour crude is high in sulfur content. Sweet crude is  low in sulfur and therefore often more valuable than other kinds.
section_title: Gasoline
paragraphs: A complex mixture of relatively volatile hydrocarbons with or without  small quantities of additives, blended to form a fuel suitable for use in  spark-ignition engines.
Motor gasoline includes conventional gasoline; all types of oxygenated  gasoline, including gasohol; and reformulated gasoline, but excludes  aviation gasoline.
section_title: Jet Fuel
paragraphs: A refined petroleum product used in jet aircraft engines.
Kerosene-type jet fuel is used for commercial and military turbojet and  turboprop aircraft engines.
Naphtha-type jet fuel is used primarily for military turbojet and  turboprop aircraft engines because it has a lower freeze point than  other aviation fuels and meets engine requirements at high altitudes  and speeds.
A natural gas that has been cooled to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit to  a liquid state so that it can be transported.
Consists almost entirely of methane (85-95 percent) along with small  concentrations of ethane, propane, butane, and trace amounts of  nitrogen.
Mainly used as fuel for electricity generation, home heating, industrial  manufacturing, and, to a lesser extent, motor vehicles.
Group of hydrocarbons, such as propane and butane, derived mainly as  a byproduct of oilfield production and crude oil refining processes.
The vast majority of LPG traded internationally consists of propane and  butane cargo.
LPG has a variety of agricultural, household, petrochemical, and, to a  lesser extent, vehicle fuel applications.
section_title: Appendix III: Recent High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers and Energy Infrastructure
subsections: section_title: Shell Gas Facility, Nigeria
paragraphs: Nigerian militants attacked an energy facility and abducted  foreign oil workers in the oil-rich Niger delta. The Movement for  the Emancipation of the Niger Delta is responsible for a wave  of militant attacks in Nigeria.
Two cars packed with explosives tried to attack a major oil  processing facility in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province. Al  Qaeda suicide attackers were killed along with two Saudi  guards.
Closely timed suicide boat attacks on northern Persian Gulf oil  terminals in Iraq left two Navy sailors and one Coast  Guardsman dead and five others injured.
The Free Aceh Movement claimed responsibility for hijacking  the M/V Penrider, a fully laden tanker shipping fuel oil in  Southeast Asia. Three hostages were eventually released  following a ransom payment.
Ten pirates boarded tanker from a speedboat. Pirates took the  helm, altered the speed, disabled ship’s radio, and steered the  vessel for an hour. Pirates left with cash and abducted captain  and first officer.
Small boat filled with explosives rammed the side of the  French-flagged oil tanker Limburg as it was approaching the  Ash Shihr Terminal several miles off the coast of Yemen. The  suicide attack killed one crew member and 90,000 barrels of  oil spilled.
section_title: Appendix IV: Assessing and Managing Risks Using a Risk Management Approach
paragraphs: Risk management is a systematic approach for analyzing risk and deciding  how best to address it. Because resources are limited and cannot eliminate  all risks, careful choices need to be made in deciding which actions yield  the greatest benefit. Figure 19 depicts a risk management framework that  is our synthesis of government requirements and prevailing best practices  previously reported. To be effective, this process must be repeated when  threats or conditions change to incorporate any new information to adjust  and revise the assessments and actions.
Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first step in  implementing a risk management approach and helps to ensure that  management decisions are focused on achieving a strategic purpose.  These decisions should take place in the context of an agency’s strategic  plan that includes goals and objectives that are clear, concise, and  measurable.
Risk assessment, a critical step in the approach, helps decision makers  identify and evaluate potential risks so that countermeasures can be  designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate the effects of risk. Risk  assessment is a qualitative and/or quantitative determination of the  likelihood of an adverse event occurring and the severity, or impact, of its  consequences. Risk assessment in a homeland security application often  involves assessing three key elements—threat, criticality, and  vulnerability:    A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the  basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
A criticality or consequence assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets  and functions in terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to  public safety and the economy, as a basis for identifying which  structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from  attack.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited  by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.
Information from these three assessments contributes to an overall risk  assessment that characterizes risks on a scale such as high, medium, or  low and provides input for evaluating alternatives and management  prioritization of security initiatives.
The next two steps involve deciding what mitigation measures to adopt.  Alternatives evaluation considers what actions may be needed to address  identified risks, the associated costs of taking these actions, and any  resulting benefits. This information is provided to agency management to  aid in completing the next step—selecting alternative actions best suited  to the unique needs of the organization.
The final step in the approach involves implementing the selected actions  and evaluating the extent to which they mitigate risk. This involves  developing criteria for monitoring the performance of these actions and  follow-up to ensure that these actions are effective and reflect evolving  risk.
Risk management has received widespread support from Congress, the  President, and the Secretary of Homeland Security as a tool that can help  set priorities and inform decisions about mitigating risks.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Jonathan Bachman, Jason  Berman, Steven Calvo, Jonathan Carver, Frances Cook, Frank Chase  Cook, Amy Higgins, David Lysy, Jean McSween, Erica Miles, Jobenia  Odum, Josh Ormond, Janice Poling, Franklin Rusco, Peter Singer, Carol  Shulman, Stan Stenerson, Barbara Timmerman, James Turkett, JimWells,  and Margaret Wrightson made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T.  Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Maritime Security: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the SAFE Port  Act.  GAO-08-171T.  Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our  Nation’s Seaports.  GAO-08-86T.  Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington,  D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1081T. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation  of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.:  August 17, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2007.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.  Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington,  D.C.: May 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port  Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March  28, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Ter a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07- 316. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2007.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washingt D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are  Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06- Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2006.
816.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery  Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:  July 31, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO- 06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Energy Security: Is Oil Production. GAO-06-668. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2006.  sues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan  Coast Guard: Observations on Ag Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.   ency Performance, Operations, and  Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenge Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at  Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-150.  Washington, D.C.: January 27, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 2005.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from  Additional Management Actions by State and DHS. GAO-05-859.  Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C. May 17, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information  Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. .
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006  Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Im Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January  31, 2005.   proving, but Resource Challenges and  Homeland Sec Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:  January 14, 2005.   urity: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport  Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime  Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:  December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effectiv Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:  September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and  Facilitate Implementation of Automa GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.   tic Vessel Identification System.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New  Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Yea 2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting  Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Wash D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target  Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,  D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime  Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to B Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require  Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,  D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation  Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.