Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain Unclear
Published: 2007-06-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent and continues to invest hundreds of millions of dollars each year in its U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry (POEs). The program uses biometric identifiers (digital finger scans and photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. GAO's testimony addresses the status of US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities and DHS's management of past and future exit efforts. In developing its testimony, GAO drew from eight prior reports on US-VISIT as well as ongoing work for the committee.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: After investing about $1.3 billion over 4 years, DHS has delivered essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and land POEs but comparable exit capabilities are not. To the department's credit, operational entry capabilities have reportedly produced results, including more than 1,500 people having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. However, DHS still does not have the other half of US-VISIT (an operational exit capability) despite the fact that its funding plans have allocated about one-quarter of a billion dollars since 2003 to exit-related efforts. During this time, GAO has continued to cite weaknesses in how DHS is managing US-VISIT in general, and the exit side of US-VISIT in particular, and has made numerous recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the program delivers clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. The prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit solution are as uncertain today as they were 4 years ago. The department's latest available documentation indicates that little has changed in how DHS is approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit efforts. Specifically, DHS has indicated that it intends to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit capabilities. However, it has not produced either plans or analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest these funds. Rather, it has only described in general terms near-term deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is not possible. Beyond this high-level schedule, no other exit program plans are available that define what will be done by what entities and at what cost. In the absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its exit intentions, it is unlikely that the department's latest efforts to deliver near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different from the past. Therefore, the prospects for having operational exit capabilities continue to be unclear. Moreover, the longer the department goes without exit capabilities, the more its ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement missions will suffer. Among other things, this means that DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by identifying and removing those people who have overstayed their original period of admission, which is a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, DHS immigration and customs enforcement entities will continue to spend limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who have already left the country.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the subcommittee’s  hearing focusing on the exit side of the United States Visitor and  Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). As you know,  US-VISIT is a multibillion dollar program of the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) that is to, among other things, enhance  the security of our citizens and visitors and ensure the integrity of  the U.S. immigration system. To achieve these goals, US-VISIT is to  record certain travelers’ entry and exit to and from the United  States at over 300 ports of entry (POEs), verify their identity, and  determine their compliance with the terms of their admission and  stay.
Since fiscal year 2002, we have produced eight reports that have  identified fundamental challenges that DHS continues to face in  defining and justifying the program’s future direction and delivering  program capabilities and benefits on time and within cost.  Our  testimony today draws on the above cited reports as well as our  ongoing work for the House Committee on Homeland Security on  the definition and completion of US-VISIT’s strategic solution. All  the work on which this testimony is based was performed in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, DHS has invested about $1.3 billion over 4 years and  delivered basically one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically  enabled entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and  land POEs, but comparable exit capabilities are not. Moreover, the  prospects for this changing are essentially as uncertain today as  they were 4 years ago, despite the fact that the department’s funding  plans have provided about one-quarter of a billion dollars to exit- related efforts. During this time, we have continued to cite  weaknesses in how DHS was managing US-VISIT in general, and the  program’s exit capability in particular, and have made numerous  recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the program  delivered clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities and  benefits on time and within budget. Today, as DHS embarks on yet  another attempt to deliver long-overdue exit capabilities, these  recommendations still apply. Unless the department implements  them, it runs the serious risk of repeating the mistakes it made on  prior exit efforts and producing similar results. Accordingly, we urge  the department to approach its latest attempt at deploying mission  critical exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous and disciplined  fashion that we have recommended. If it does not, the prospects for  having an operational exit capability will be diminished, which in  turn will limit the department’s ability to effectively and efficiently  perform its border security and immigration enforcement missions.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: US-VISIT is a governmentwide program intended to enhance the  security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and  trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and  protect the privacy of our visitors. To achieve its goals, US-VISIT is  to collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign  nationals who enter and exit the United States; detect fraudulent  travel documents, verify traveler identity, and determine traveler  admissibility through the use of biometrics; facilitate information  sharing and coordination within the immigration and border  management community; and identify foreign nationals who (1)  have overstayed or violated the terms of their admission; (2) may be  eligible to receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3)  should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials.  The scope of the program includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and  exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter  and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs.
The US-VISIT program office is responsible for managing the  acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT  systems in support of such DHS agencies as Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).   As of March 31, 2007, the program director reports to the Under  Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate.
In 2003, DHS planned to deliver US-VISIT capability in 4 increments:  Increment 1 (air and sea entry and exit), Increment 2 (land entry and  exit), Increment 3 (land entry and exit), and Increment 4, which was  to define, design, build, and implement a more strategic program  capability. Since then the scope of the first three increments has  changed. The current scope is Increment 1 (air and sea entry),  Increment 2 (air, sea, and land entry), and Increment 3 (land entry).  Increment 4 is still intended to define, design, build, and implement  a more strategic program capability, which program officials stated  will consist of a series of incremental releases or mission capability  enhancements that will support business outcomes. In Increments 1  through 3, the program has built interfaces among existing  (“legacy”) systems, enhanced the capabilities of these systems, and  deployed these capabilities to air, sea, and land POEs. These first  three increments have been largely pursued through existing system  contracts and task orders. Increment 4 strategic system  enhancements are being pursued through a systems integration  contract awarded to Accenture and its partners in May 2004.
Through fiscal year 2007, about $1.7 billion has been appropriated  for US-VISIT. According to the Department of Homeland Security  Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS may not obligate $200 million of the  $362.494 million appropriated for US-VISIT in fiscal year 2007 until  DHS provides the Senate and House Committees with a plan for  expenditure that meets several criteria. The department has  requested $462 million in fiscal year 2008 for the program. As of  January 31, 2007, program officials stated that about $1.3 billion has  been obligated for US-VISIT activities.
section_title: US-VISIT Entry Is Operating at Most POEs
paragraphs: A biometrically enabled US-VISIT entry capability is operating at  most POEs. On January 5, 2004, the program office deployed and  began operating most aspects of its planned biometric entry  capability at 115 airports and 14 seaports for certain foreign  nationals, including those from visa waiver countries. As of  December 2006, the program office also deployed and began  operating this entry capability in the secondary inspection areas of  154 of 170 land POEs. According to program officials, 14 of the  remaining 16 POEs have no operational need to deploy US-VISIT  because visitors subject to US-VISIT are, by regulation, not  authorized to enter into the United States at these locations. The  other two POEs do not have the necessary transmission lines to  operate US-VISIT, and thus they process visitors manually.
According to DHS, these entry capabilities have produced results.  For example, as of June 15, 2007, it had more than 7,600 biometric  hits in primary entry resulting in more than 1,500 people having  adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them.  Further, about 14,000 leads were referred to ICE’s immigration  enforcement unit, resulting in 315 arrests. Another potential  consequence is the deterrent effect of having an operational entry  capability. Although deterrence is difficult to demonstrate, officials  have cited it as a byproduct of having a publicized capability at the  border to screen entry on the basis of identity verification and  matching against watch lists of known and suspected terrorists.
section_title: Despite Expending Considerable Time and Resources, US-VISIT Exit Is Not Operational
paragraphs: Over the last few years, DHS has devoted considerable time and  resources towards establishing an operational exit capability at air,  sea, and land POEs. For example, between 2003 and 2006, DHS  reports allocating about $250 million for exit-related efforts.  Notwithstanding this considerable investment of time and  resources, DHS still does not have an operational exit capability.  Our prior reports have raised a number of concerns about DHS’s  management of US-VISIT’s exit efforts.
As we and others have reported, the absence of a biometric exit  capability raises questions about what meaningful US-VISIT data are  available to DHS components, such as ICE. Without this exit  capability, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration  system by identifying and removing those people who have  overstayed their original period of admission—a stated goal of  US-VISIT. Further, ICE’s efforts to ensure the integrity of the  immigration system could be degraded if it continues to spend its  limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who have  already left the country.
subsections: section_title: Air and Sea Exit Efforts Have Not Been Managed Well
paragraphs: Between January 2004 and May 2007, the program office conducted  various exit pilots at one air and one sea POE without fully  deploying a biometric exit capability. Throughout this period, we  have reported on the limitations in how these pilot activities were  planned, defined, and justified. For example, we reported in  September 2003, prior to the pilots being deployed, that DHS had  not economically justified the initial US-VISIT increment (which was  to include an exit capability at air and sea POEs) on the basis of  benefits, costs, and risks. As a result, we recommended that DHS  determine whether proposed incremental capabilities would  produce value commensurate with program costs and risks. We  later reported in May 2004 that DHS had not deployed a biometric  exit capability to the 80 air and 14 sea POEs as part of Increment 1  deployment in December 2003, as it had originally intended. Instead,  as we mention above, the pilot exit capability was deployed to only  one air and one sea POE on January 5, 2004.
In February 2005, we reported that the program office had not  adequately planned for evaluating its exit pilot at air and sea POEs  because the pilot’s evaluation scope and time line were compressed,  and thus would not provide the program office with sufficient  information to adequately assess the pilots and permit the selection  of the best exit solution for deployment. Accordingly, we  recommended that the program office reassess its plans for  deploying an exit capability to ensure that the scope of the pilot  provided an adequate evaluation of alternatives.
A year later in February 2006, we reported that the program office  had extended the pilot from 5 to 11 POEs (nine airports and two  seaports) and the time frame by an additional 7 months.  Notwithstanding the expanded scope and time frame, the exit pilots  were not sufficiently evaluated. In particular, on average only about  24 percent of those travelers subject to US-VISIT actually complied  with the exit processing steps. The evaluation report attributed this,  in part, to the fact that compliance during the pilot was voluntary,  and that to achieve the desired compliance rate, the exit solution  would need an enforcement mechanism, such as not allowing  persons to reenter the United States if they do not comply with the  exit process. Despite this limitation, as of February 2006, program  officials had not conducted any formal evaluation of enforcement  mechanisms or their possible effect on compliance or cost, and  according to the then Acting Program Director, no such evaluation  would be done. Nonetheless, DHS continued to operate the exit  pilots.
In February 2006, we also reported that while DHS had analyzed the  cost, benefits, and risks for its air and sea exit capability, the  analyses did not demonstrate that the program was producing or  would produce mission value commensurate with expected costs  and benefits, and the costs upon which the analyses were based  were not reliable. A year later, we reported that DHS had not  adequately defined and justified its past investment in its air and sea  exit pilots and its land exit demonstration projects, and still did not  have either an operational exit capability or a viable exit solution to  deploy. We further noted that exit-related program documentation  did not adequately define what work was to be done or what these  efforts would accomplish, did not describe measurable outcomes  from the pilot or demonstration efforts, and did not indicate the  related cost, schedule, and capability commitments that would be  met. We recommended that planned expenditures be limited for exit  pilots and demonstration projects until such investments were  economically justified and until each investment had a well-defined  evaluation plan. In its comments on our report, DHS agreed with our  recommendation.
section_title: Land Exit Efforts Have Not Produced a Viable Solution
paragraphs: In January 2004, DHS committed to delivering a biometric exit  capability by December 2005; however, we reported that program  officials concluded in January 2005 that a biometric land exit  capability could not be implemented without having a major impact  on land POE facilities. According to these officials, the only proven  technology available to biometrically verify individuals upon exit at  land POEs would necessitate mirroring the entry processes, which  the program reported was “an infeasible alternative for numerous  reasons, including but not limited to, the additional staffing  demands, new infrastructure requirements, and potential trade and  commerce impacts.”
In light of these constraints, the program office tested radio  frequency identification (RFID) technology as a means of recording  visitors as they exit at land POEs. However, this technology was not  biometrics-based. Moreover, testing and analysis at five land POEs  at the northern and southern borders identified numerous  performance and reliability problems, such as the failure of RFID  readers to detect a majority of travelers’ tags during testing.
According to program officials, no technology or device currently  exists to biometrically verify persons exiting the country that would  not have a major impact on land POE facilities. They added that  technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it  possible to biometrically verify persons exiting the country without  major changes to facility infrastructure and without requiring those  exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles.
In November 2006, during the course of our work on, among other  things, the justification for ongoing land exit demonstration  projects, DHS terminated these projects. In our view, the decision  was warranted because DHS had not adequately defined and  justified its investment in its pilots and demonstration projects. As  noted earlier, we recommended in February 2007, that planned  expenditures be limited for exit pilots and demonstration projects  until such investments are economically justified and until each  investment has a well-defined evaluation plan. DHS agreed with our  recommendation.
section_title: Lack of Definition and Justification of Future US-VISIT Exit Capabilities Risks Repeating Past Mistakes
paragraphs: According to relevant federal guidance, the decision to invest in a  system or system component should be based on a clear definition  of what capabilities, involving what stakeholders, will be delivered  according to what schedule and at what cost. Moreover, such  investment decisions should be based on reasonable assurance that  a proposed program will produce mission value commensurate with  expected costs and risks. As noted earlier, DHS funding plans have  collectively allocated about $250 million to a number of exit efforts  through 2006, but without having adequately defined or  economically justified them. Now, in 2007, it risks repeating these  same mistakes as it embarks on yet another attempt to implement a  means by which to biometrically track certain foreign nationals  exiting the United States, first at airports, and then at seaports, with  land exit capabilities being deferred to an unspecified future time.
Based on the department’s latest available documentation, it intends  to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and  $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit  capabilities. However, it has not produced either the plans or the  analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest  these funds. Rather, it has only generally described near-term  deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs,  and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land  POEs is not possible.
More specifically, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan  states that DHS will begin the process of planning and designing an  air and sea exit solution during fiscal year 2007, focusing initially on  air exit and then emulating these technology and operational  experiences in completing the sea exit solution. According to this  plan, air exit efforts will begin during the third quarter of fiscal year  2007, which ends in 2 days. However, US-VISIT program officials  told us as recently as three weeks ago that this deadline will not be  met.
Moreover, no exit program plans are available that define what will  be done, by what entities, and at what cost to define, acquire,  deliver, deploy, and operate this capability, including plans  describing expected system capabilities, defining measurable  outcomes (benefits and results), identifying key stakeholder (e.g.,  airlines) roles/responsibilities and buy-in, and coordinating and  aligning with related programs. Further, there is no analysis  available comparing the life cycle costs of the air exit solution to its  expected benefits and risks. The only additional information  available to date is what the department characterized as a  high-level schedule for air exit that we obtained on June 11, 2007.  This schedule shows that business requirements and a concept of  operations are to be completed by September 3, 2007; a cost-benefit  analysis is to be completed by October 1, 2007; testing is to be  completed by October 1, 2008; and the exit solution is to be fully  deployed in 2 years (June 2009). However, the schedule does not  include the underlying details supporting the timelines for such  areas of activity as system design, system development, and system  testing. According to program officials, more detailed schedules  exist but were not provided to us because the schedules had not yet  been approved by DHS.
Further, while the expenditure plan states that DHS plans to  integrate the air exit solution with the commercial airlines’ existing  check-in processes and to integrate US-VISIT’s efforts with CBP’s  pre-departure Advance Passenger Information System and the  Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) Secure Flight, the  program office did not provide any documentation that describes  what has been done with regard to these plans or what is planned  relative to engaging with and obtaining buy-in from the airlines.
Nevertheless, DHS plans to issue a proposed regulation requiring  airlines to participate in this effort by December 17, 2007.
With regard to land exit, the future is even more unclear. According  to the fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan, the department has  concluded that a biometric land exit capability is not practical in the  short term because of the costly expansion of existing exit capacity,  including physical infrastructure, land acquisition, and staffing. As a  result, DHS states an intention to begin matching entry and exit  records using biographic information in instances where no current  collection exists today, such as in the case of individuals who do not  submit their Form I-94 upon departure. According to DHS, it has  also initiated discussions with its Canadian counterparts about the  potential for them to collect biographical exit data at entry into  Canada. Such a solution could include data sharing between the two  countries and would require significant discussions on specific data  elements and the means of collection and sharing, including  technical, policy, and legal issues associated with this approach.  However, DHS has yet to provide us with any documentation that  specifies what data elements would be collected or what technical,  policy, and legal issues would need to be addressed. Further,  according to DHS, it has not yet determined a time frame or any cost  estimates for the initiation of such a non-biometric land exit  solution.                          ---------------------------------------------------------------  In closing, we would like to emphasize the mission importance of a  cost effective, biometrically enabled exit capability, and that  delivering such a capability requires effective planning and  justification, and rigorous and disciplined system acquisition  management. To date, these activities have not occurred for DHS’s  exit efforts. If this does not change, there is no reason to expect that  DHS’s newly launched efforts to deliver an air and sea exit solution  will produce results different from its past efforts—namely, no  operational exit solution despite many years and hundreds of  millions of dollars of investment. More importantly, the continued  absence of an exit capability will hinder DHS’s ability to effectively  and efficiently perform its border security and immigration  enforcement mission. Hence, it is important that DHS approach its  latest attempt to deploy its exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous  and disciplined fashion that we have previously recommended.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes our statement. We would be  happy to answer any questions that you or members of the  subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: If you should have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov, or  Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Other major  contributors include Deborah Davis, Kory Godfrey, Daniel Gordon,  David Hinchman, Kaelin Kuhn, John Mortin, and Amos Tevelow.
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