Emergency Management: FEMA Has Made Progress since Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, but Challenges Remain
Published: 2015-10-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A little more than 10 years ago, Hurricane Katrina caused an estimated $108 billion in damage, making it the largest, most destructive natural disaster in our nation's history. Following the federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act). The act contained over 300 provisions that are intended to enhance national preparedness, emergency response and recovery, and the management of select disaster programs. In October 2012, another catastrophic hurricane—Hurricane Sandy—caused $65 billion in damage and once again tested the nation's preparedness and emergency response and recovery functions.
GAO has issued multiple reports that discuss a wide variety of emergency management issues reflecting the federal government and FEMA's efforts to implement provisions of the Post-Katrina Act and address various aspects of emergency management.
This statement discusses GAO's work on the progress FEMA has made and challenges that it still faces in three areas: (1) national preparedness, (2) disaster response and recovery, and (3) selected FEMA management areas. This statement is based on previously issued GAO reports from 2012 to 2015.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's recent work highlights both the progress and challenges in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) efforts to lead national preparedness efforts, particularly efforts to assess emergency support capabilities and enhance logistics capabilities. Assessing capabilities is critical to ensure that they will be available when needed in emergencies. For example, GAO found in December 2014 that federal departments have identified emergency response capability gaps through national-level exercises and real-world incidents, but the status of agency actions to address these gaps is not collected by or reported to Department of Homeland Security or FEMA. GAO recommended that FEMA—in collaboration with other federal agencies—regularly report on the status of corrective actions. FEMA agreed with GAO's recommendation and is taking action to address it but has not established a timeframe for completion.
GAO's recent work on disaster response and recovery programs also identified progress and challenges in a number of areas. From fiscal years 2004 through 2013, FEMA obligated over $95 billion in federal disaster assistance for 650 major disasters declared during this timeframe. With the growing cost of disasters it is vital for the federal government to address its fiscal exposure and ensure that response and recovery programs are as efficient and effective as possible. For example, in December 2014, GAO found that FEMA demonstrated progress controlling for potentially fraudulent payments to individuals during Hurricane Sandy as compared to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, GAO reported continued challenges, including weaknesses in validation of Social Security numbers and made recommendations to strengthen these processes. Further, in July 2015, GAO reported that states and localities affected by Hurricane Sandy were able to effectively leverage federal programs to enhance resilience during their recovery. However, states experienced continued challenges in implementing certain FEMA recovery programs, such as Public Assistance. GAO also found that there was no comprehensive, strategic approach to identifying, prioritizing, and implementing investments for disaster resilience. GAO made recommendations to address these continued challenges and FEMA is taking a range of actions to address them.
FEMA has also taken steps to strengthen a number of its management areas, but GAO reported that additional progress is needed in several areas. Specifically, In December 2014, GAO found that FEMA had taken steps to control its administrative costs—the costs of providing and managing disaster assistance—by issuing guidelines and reduction targets. However, GAO reported that FEMA does not require the targets to be met and continued to face challenges tracking the costs. Among other things, GAO recommended that FEMA develop an integrated plan to better control and reduce its administrative costs for major disasters. Further, in July 2015 GAO reported that FEMA had taken action to address various long-standing workforce management challenges, but faced multiple challenges, including implementing and managing its temporary workforces and completing strategic workforce planning efforts. FEMA agreed with GAO's recommendations and is taking action to address them.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made numerous recommendations in its prior reports to FEMA designed to address the challenges discussed in this statement. FEMA has taken actions to address many of these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the  subcommittee:  I appreciate the opportunity to testify today about efforts by the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component of the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to more efficiently lead the  nation’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters and  manage aspects of its operations to support these efforts. We have  reported on a broad range of issues and currently have ongoing work for  this committee related to FEMA’s disaster programs and operations. The  anniversaries of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy provide a valuable  opportunity to assess FEMA’s progress and challenges in national  disaster preparedness and response and recovery efforts, as well as its  management.
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was the largest, most destructive natural  disaster in our nation’s history. FEMA estimated that Hurricane Katrina  caused an estimated $108 billion in damages. Following the federal  response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Congress passed the Post-Katrina  Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act). The act  enhanced FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS and  contained over 300 provisions that call for DHS or FEMA action to  implement requirements or exercise authorities – or to be prepared to do  so under the appropriate condition. After the Post-Katrina Act was  enacted, we conducted reviews and issued multiple reports that  discussed a wide variety of these emergency management issues  reflecting the federal government and FEMA’s efforts to implement  provisions of the Post-Katrina act and improve national disaster  preparedness, and response and recovery. A selection of our related  reports is attached to my statement. Hurricane Sandy struck the United  States in October 2012, causing an estimated $65 billion in damages,  once again testing FEMA and the federal government’s ability to respond  to catastrophic disasters.
The initial response to a disaster is the job of local government’s  emergency services with help from nearby municipalities, the state and  volunteer agencies. In a catastrophic disaster, if the governor requests,  federal resources can be mobilized through FEMA for search and rescue,  electrical power, food, water, shelter and other basic human needs. The  long-term recovery phase of disaster places the most severe financial  strain on local or state government and damage to public facilities and  infrastructure, often not insured, can overwhelm even a large city. We  have recognized the rise in the number—and the increase in severity—of  disasters as a key source of federal fiscal exposure. Similarly, managing  fiscal exposure due to climate change has been on our high risk list since  2013, in part, because of concerns about the increasing costs of disaster  response and recovery efforts.
My testimony today discusses progress FEMA has made and challenges  that FEMA faces in three areas: 1) national preparedness, 2) disaster  response and recovery, and 3) selected FEMA management areas.
This statement is based on our prior work and focuses on reports issued  from September 2012 through September 2015. To conduct our prior  work, we reviewed relevant presidential directives, laws, regulations,  policies, and strategic plans; surveyed states; and interviewed federal,  state, and industry officials, among others. More information on our scope  and methodology can be found in each of the reports cited throughout this  statement.
The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: National Preparedness
subsections: section_title: Interagency Emergency Support Capability Assessments
paragraphs: In December 2014, we reported on the progress the departments that  coordinate federal emergency support functions (ESF) have made in  conducting a range of coordination, planning, and capability assessment  activities. For example, all 10 ESF coordinators identified at least one  nonemergency activity through which they coordinate with their ESFs’  primary and support agencies. Further, all 10 ESF coordinators identified  at least one planning document—in addition to the information contained  in the NRF’s ESF annexes—that they had developed for their ESFs to  further define the roles, responsibilities, policies, and procedures for their  ESFs’ coordination and execution.
We found, however, that the ESF Leadership Group and FEMA, as the  group’s chair, had not worked with other federal departments to issue  supplemental guidance detailing expectations for the minimum standards  for activities and product deliverables necessary to demonstrate ESF  preparedness. In the absence of such guidance, we found that ESF  coordinators are inconsistently carrying out their emergency response  preparedness activities. We also found that, while federal departments  have identified emergency response capability gaps through national- level exercises, real-world incidents, such as Hurricane Sandy and other  assessments, the status of federal interagency implementation of these  actions is not comprehensively collected by or reported to DHS or FEMA  and, as a result, DHS’s and FEMA’s ability to assess and report on the  nation’s overall preparedness is hampered. Further, we found that  FEMA’s plan to lead interagency actions to identify and address capability  gaps in the nation’s preparedness to respond to improvised nuclear  device (IND) attacks did not contain detailed program management  information—such as specific timeframes, milestones, and estimated  resources required to close any given capability gap—which is needed to  better enable ongoing management oversight of gap closure efforts.
In our December 2014 report, we recommended that FEMA—in  collaboration with other federal agencies—(1) issue supplemental  guidance to ESF coordinators detailing minimum standards for activities  and product deliverables necessary to demonstrate ESF preparedness,  develop and (2) issue detailed program management information to better  enable management oversight of the DHS IND Strategy’s recommended  actions, and (3) regularly report on the status of corrective actions  identified through prior national-level exercises and real-world disasters.  DHS concurred with our recommendations and FEMA has taken actions  in response. For example, in June 2015, FEMA issued guidance for ESF  coordinators that details minimum standards for activities and product  deliverables necessary to demonstrate ESF preparedness. The ESF  Leadership Group established a set of preparedness performance metrics  to guide ESF coordination, planning, and capabilities assessment efforts.  The ESF Leadership Group-generated metrics set standardized  performance targets and preparedness actions across the ESFs.  Collectively, the metrics and reporting of these metrics should provide an  opportunity to better measure preparedness efforts by assessing if ESF  coordination and planning is sufficient, and whether required ESF  capabilities are available for disaster response. In addition, FEMA  developed a detailed program plan to provide a quantitative analysis of  current work and addressing existing capability gaps linked to a project  management tracking system to identify specific dates for past, present  and upcoming milestones for its IND Program. We believe that FEMA’s  actions in these areas have fully met the intent of these two  recommendations. FEMA officials also collected information on the status  of National Level Exercise Corrective Actions from 2007-2014, an  important step to respond to our other recommendation and we are  continuing to monitor FEMA’s efforts in this area, however it has not  provided a timeframe for its completion.
section_title: Disaster Logistics
paragraphs: We recently reported in September 2015 on FEMA’s progress in working  with its federal partners to implement the National Response Framework  (NRF) Emergency Support Function #7 (ESF 7) Logistics Annex. We  found that FEMA’s efforts reflect leading practices for interagency  collaboration and enhance ESF 7 preparedness. For example, FEMA’s  Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) has facilitated meetings and  established interagency agreements with ESF 7 partners such as the  Department of Defense and the General Services Administration, and  identified needed quantities of disaster response commodities, such as  food, water, and blankets. Additionally, FEMA tracks the percentage of  disaster response commodities delivered by agreed-upon dates, and  available through FEMA and its ESF 7 partners. Regarding FEMA’s  support of its state and local stakeholders, we found that FEMA could  strengthen the implementation of its Logistics Capability Assessment Tool  (LCAT). For example, FEMA—through LMD and its regional offices—has  made progress in offering training and exercises for state and local  stakeholders, developing the LCAT, and establishing an implementation  program to help state and local stakeholders use the tool to determine  their readiness to respond to, disasters. However, we found that, while  feedback from states that have used the LCAT has generally been  positive, implementation of the program by FEMA’s regional offices has  been inconsistent; 3 of 10 regional offices no longer promote or support  LCAT assessments. Further, LMD did not identify staff resources needed  to implement the program, and did not develop program goals,  milestones, or measures to assess the effectiveness of implementation  efforts.
In our September 2015 report, we recommended that FEMA identify the  LMD and regional resources needed to implement the LCAT, and  establish and use goals, milestones and performance measures to report  on the LCAT program implementation. DHS concurred with the  recommendations and is taking actions to address them. For example,  FEMA officials said they intend to work closely with regional staff to  identify resources and develop a plan to monitor LCAT performance.
We also reported on the status of FEMA’s development of the Logistics  Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS) as part of a broader look at  22 acquisition programs at DHS, in April 2015. We reported that,  according to FEMA officials, LSCMS can identify when a shipment leaves  a warehouse and the location of a shipment after it reaches a FEMA  staging area near a disaster location. At the time of our review, LSCMS  could not track partner organizations’ shipments in route to a FEMA  staging area, and lacked automated interfaces with its partners’  information systems. We also reported that DHS leadership had not yet  approved a baseline establishing the program’s cost, schedule, and  performance parameters. According to FEMA officials, FEMA’s partners  and vendors can now receive orders directly from LSCMS and manually  input their shipment data directly into a vendor portal, providing FEMA  with the ability to track orders and shipments from time and date of  shipment to the estimated time of arrival, but not the in-transit real-time  location of shipments. They also said that the program baseline was still  under consideration by DHS leadership at the time of our review. In  addition, DHS’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a report on  LSCMS in September 2014. The DHS OIG made 11 recommendations  designed to address operational deficiencies that FEMA concurred with,  such as identifying resources to ensure effective program management  and developing a training program for staff. As of July 2015, FEMA  officials report that 5 of the OIG’s recommendations have been  implemented, and the agency is taking steps to address the remaining 6  recommendations.
In addition to these completed reviews of preparedness efforts, we  currently have work underway for this committee assessing how FEMA’s  regional coordination efforts support national preparedness. Specifically,  we plan to assess and report on FEMA’s management of preparedness  grants, implementation of the National Incident Management System, and  interactions with regional advisory councils later this year.
section_title: Disaster Response and Recovery
subsections: section_title: Disaster Declarations
paragraphs: In September 2012, we reported on FEMA’s processes for determining  whether to recommend major disaster declarations. We found that  FEMA primarily relied on a single criterion, the per capita damage  indicator, to determine whether to recommend to the President that a  jurisdiction receive Public Assistance (PA) funding. However, because  FEMA’s current per capita indicator at the time of our report, set at $1 in  1986, did not reflect the rise in (1) per capita personal income since it was  created in 1986 or (2) inflation from 1986 to 1999, the indicator was  artificially low. Further, the per capita indicator did not accurately reflect  a jurisdiction’s capability to respond to or recover from a disaster without  federal assistance. We identified other measures of fiscal capacity, such  as total taxable resources, that could be more useful in determining a  jurisdiction’s ability to pay for damages to public structures. We also  reported that FEMA can recommend increasing the usual proportion (75  percent) of costs the federal government pays (federal share) for PA (to  90 percent) when costs get to a certain level. However, FEMA had no  specific criteria for assessing requests to raise the federal share for  emergency work to 100 percent, but relied on its professional judgment.
In our September 2012 report, we recommended, among other things,  that FEMA develop a methodology to more accurately assess a  jurisdiction’s capability to respond to and recover from a disaster without  federal assistance, develop criteria for 100 percent cost adjustments, and  implement goals for and monitor administrative costs. FEMA concurred  with the first two recommendations, but partially concurred with the third,  saying it would conduct a review before taking additional action. Since  that time, FEMA has submitted a report to Congress outlining various  options that the agency could take to assess a jurisdiction’s capability to  respond to and recover from a disaster. We met with FEMA in April 2015  to discuss its report to Congress. FEMA officials told us that the agency  would need to undertake the rulemaking process to implement a new  methodology that provides a more comprehensive assessment of a  jurisdiction’s capability to respond and recover from a disaster without  federal assistance. They said that they identified three potential options,  which taken individually or in some combination would implement our  recommendation by (1) adjusting the PA per capita indicator to better  reflect current national and state specific economic conditions; (2)  developing an improved methodology for considering factors in addition to  the PA per capita indicator; or (3) implementing a state-specific deductible  for states to qualify for PA. Although FEMA initially concurred with our  recommendation to develop criteria for 100 percent cost adjustments, it  has concluded that it will not establish specific criteria or factors to use  when evaluating requests for cost share adjustments. FEMA conducted a  historical review of the circumstances that previously led to these cost  share adjustments, and determined that each circumstance was unique in  nature and could not be used to develop criteria or factors for future  decision making. Based on FEMA’s review and its clarification of the  intent to use cost share adjustments during only rare catastrophic events,  we agreed that their decision could lead to better stewardship of federal  dollars.
section_title: Disaster Assistance Payments To Individuals
paragraphs: In December 2014, we reported on FEMA’s progress in improving its  ability to detect improper and potentially fraudulent payments.  Specifically, while safeguards were generally not effective after  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the controls FEMA implemented since then,  designed to improve its capacity to verify applicants’ eligibility for  assistance, have improved the agency’s ability to prevent improper or  potentially fraudulent Individuals and Households Program (IHP)  payments. We reported that as of August 2014, FEMA stated that it had  provided over $1.4 billion in Hurricane Sandy assistance through its  IHP—which provides financial awards for home repairs, rental assistance,  and other needs—to almost 183,000 survivors. We identified $39 million  or 2.7 percent of that total that was at risk of being improper or fraudulent  compared to 10 to 22 percent of similar assistance provided for  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
However in December 2014, we identified continued challenges in the  agency’s response to Hurricane Sandy, including weaknesses in the  agency’s validation of Social Security numbers, among other things.  Although FEMA hired contractors to inspect damaged homes to verify the  identity and residency of applicants and that reported damage was a  result of Hurricane Sandy, we found 2,610 recipients with potentially  invalid identifying information who received $21 million of the $39 million  we calculated as potentially improper or fraudulent. Our analysis included  data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) that FEMA does not  use, such as SSA’s most-complete death records. We also found that  FEMA and state governments faced challenges in obtaining the data  necessary to help prevent duplicative payments from overlapping  sources. In addition, FEMA relied on self-reported data from applicants  regarding private home insurance—a factor the agency uses in  determining benefits, as federal law prohibits FEMA from providing  assistance for damage covered by private insurance; however that data  can be unreliable.
In our December 2014 report, we recommended, among other things, that  FEMA collaborate with SSA to obtain additional data, collect data to  detect duplicative assistance, and implement an approach to verify  whether recipients have private insurance. FEMA concurred with the  report’s five recommendations and has taken actions to address them.  For example, in response to our recommendations, FEMA started  working with SSA to determine the feasibility and cost effectiveness of  incorporating SSA’s identify verification tools and full death file data into  its registration process, and expects to make its determination by the end  of 2015. FEMA indicated that, depending on the determination, one  option would be to enter into a Computer Matching Agreement with SSA.
FEMA has also approved plans to improve the standardization, quality  and accessibility of data across its own disaster assistance programs,  which includes efforts to enhance data sharing with state and local  partners, that should allow it to more readily identify potentially duplicative  assistance. Also, after reviewing various options, FEMA has decided to  add an additional question to its application to help confirm self-reported  information on whether applicants have private insurance. We are  reviewing these actions to determine if they reflect sufficient steps to  consider our recommendations fully implemented.
section_title: Disaster Recovery and Resilience
paragraphs: In July 2015 we reported that during the Hurricane Sandy Recovery, five  federal programs—the FEMA’s Public Assistance (PA) and Hazard  Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), the Federal Transit Administration’s  Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program, the Department of  Housing and Urban Development’s Community Development Block  Grant-Disaster Recovery, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’  Hurricane Sandy program—helped enhance disaster resilience—the  ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more  successfully adapt to disasters. We found that, these programs funded  a number of disaster-resilience measures, for example, acquiring and  demolishing at-risk properties, elevating flood-prone structures, and  erecting physical flood barriers. State and local officials from all 12 states,  the District of Columbia, and New York City in the Sandy affected-region  reported that they were able to effectively leverage federal programs to  enhance disaster resilience, but also experienced challenges. The  challenges included implementation challenges within PA and HMGP,  limitations on comprehensive risk reduction approaches in a post disaster  environment, and local ability and willingness to participate in mitigation  activities. We found there was no comprehensive, strategic approach to  identifying, prioritizing and implementing investments for disaster  resilience, which increased the risk that the federal government and  nonfederal partners will experience lower returns on investments or lost  opportunities to strengthen key critical infrastructure and lifelines. Most  federal funding for hazard mitigation is available after a disaster and there  are benefits to investing in resilience post disaster. Individuals and  communities affected by a disaster may be more likely to invest their own  resources while recovering. However, we concluded that the emphasis on  the post-disaster environment can create a reactionary and fragmented  approach where disasters determine when and for what purpose the  federal government invests in disaster resilience.
In our July 2015 report, we recommended that (1) FEMA assess the  challenges state and local officials report and implement corrective  actions as needed and (2) the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group  (MitFLG) establish an investment strategy to identify, prioritize, and  implement federal investments in disaster resilience. DHS agreed with  both recommendations. With respect to the challenges reported by state  and local officials, FEMA officials said it would seek input from federal,  tribal, state, and local stakeholders as part of its efforts to reengineer the  PA program, which it believes will address many of the issues raised in  the report. In addition, DHS said that FEMA, though its leadership role in  the MitFLG would take action to complete an investment strategy by  August 2017.
We currently have work underway for this committee assessing several of  FEMA’s disaster response and recovery programs. For example, we are  reviewing FEMA’s urban search and rescue program, incident  management assistance teams, and evacuation planning, as well as  national disaster assistance programs for children and special needs  populations. In addition, we are reviewing DHS’s national emergency  communications programs and efforts to implement the National Disaster  Recovery Framework.
section_title: FEMA’s Management Efforts
subsections: section_title: Administrative Costs for Managing Disaster Assistance
paragraphs: In December 2014, we reported on FEMA’s progress in taking steps to  reduce and better control administrative costs—the costs of providing and  managing disaster assistance. For example, FEMA issued guidelines  intended to better control its administrative costs in November 2010. In  addition, FEMA recognized that administrative costs have increased and  it has taken steps such as setting a goal in its recent strategic plan to  lower these costs, and creating administrative cost targets. Specifically,  FEMA established a goal in its Strategic Plan for 2014-2018 to reduce its  average annual percentage of administrative costs, as compared with  total program costs, by 5 percentage points by the end of 2018. To  achieve this goal, FEMA officials developed administrative costs goals for  small, medium, and large disasters, and are monitoring performance  against the goals. However, FEMA does not require these targets be met,  and we found that had FEMA met its targets, administrative costs could  have been reduced by hundreds of millions of dollars. We found that  FEMA continued to face challenges in tracking and reducing these costs.  FEMA’s average administrative cost percentages for major disasters  during the 10 fiscal years 2004 to 2013 was double the average during  the 10 fiscal years 1989 to 1998. Further, we found that FEMA did not  track administrative costs by major disaster program, such as Individual  or Public Assistance, and had not assessed the costs versus the benefits  of tracking such information.
In our December 2014 report, we recommended that FEMA (1) develop  an integrated plan to better control and reduce its administrative costs for  major disasters, (2) assess the costs versus the benefits of tracking  FEMA administrative costs by the Disaster Relief Fund program, and (3)  clarify the agency’s guidance and minimum documentation requirements  for direct administrative costs. FEMA agreed with the report and its  recommendations. As of August 2015, FEMA told us it is developing an  integrated plan to control and reduce administrative costs for major  disaster declarations. According to FEMA officials, their Disaster  Administrative Cost Integrated Project Team has been working over the  past several months to analyze FEMA’s historic administrative costs,  identify cost drivers, document and evaluate the delivery of disaster  assistance, and set an improved framework to standardize the way FEMA  does business.
FEMA officials previously told us that the plan will describe the steps the  agency plans take to reduce administrative costs, milestones for  accomplishing the reduction, and clear roles and responsibilities,  including the assignment of senior officials/offices responsible for  monitoring and measuring performance. FEMA also continues to assess  the costs versus the benefits of tracking administrative costs by program.  According to FEMA officials, this project requires connecting multiple  disparate data sources. FEMA has identified some, but not all of the data  which needs to be integrated in order to be able to track administrative  costs by program area. FEMA is also evaluating its direct administrative  costs pilot program, which applies a standard fixed percentage towards  administrative costs. According to FEMA, if successful, results from this  program could inform the development of additional guidance or  regulatory modification and similar approaches could be applied in future  disasters. For current and other past disasters, FEMA told us it plans to  provide clarifying guidance. According to FEMA, this information will be  incorporated into the Public Assistance unified guidance document that is  scheduled to be issued in January 2016.
section_title: Workforce Management Efforts
paragraphs: In July 2015, we reported on FEMA’s progress in taking steps to address  various long-standing workforce management challenges in completing  and integrating its strategic workforce planning efforts we have identified  since 2007. We found that FEMA had not yet resolved these challenges  and fully addressed our prior workforce-related recommendations.   However, according to agency officials, they plan to do so through efforts  to develop (1) a new incident workforce planning model—pending final  approval—that will determine the optimal mix of workforce components to  include in FEMA’s disaster workforce, (2) a new Human Capital Strategic  Plan that was to have been finalized in September 2015—that will help  ensure it has the optimal workforce to carry out its mission, and (3) an  executive-level steering committee to help ensure that these workforce  planning efforts are completed and integrated. In addition, we discussed  FEMA’s continuing, long-standing challenges in implementing an  employee credentialing system and addressing employee morale issues.
We also reported that FEMA faces challenges in implementing and  managing its two new workforce components, the Surge Capacity Force  and the FEMA Corps. (The Surge Capacity Force consists of employees  of DHS components who volunteer to deploy to provide support to FEMA  in the event of a disaster. The FEMA Corps are temporary national  service participants of the National Civilian Community Corps who  complete FEMA service projects to complement its disaster-related  efforts.) For example, as of January 2015, the Surge Capacity Force was  at 26 percent of its staffing target of 15,400 personnel, and FEMA did not  have a plan for how it will increase the number of volunteers to meet its  goals. We also found that FEMA did not collect full cost information,  including the costs of FEMA Corps background investigations and the  costs of the salaries and benefits of Surge Capacity Force volunteers who  are paid by DHS components while they are deployed. Further, we  concluded that FEMA did not assess all aspects of program performance  because it does not have performance measures that correspond to all  program goals and that doing so would better enable FEMA to assess  whether it was meeting its program goals.
In our July 2015 report, we recommended, among other things, that  FEMA develop a plan to increase Surge Capacity Force volunteer  recruitment and collect additional cost and performance information for its  new workforce components. DHS concurred with the five  recommendations in the report and identified related actions the  department is taking to address them, primarily focusing on FEMA’s plans  to issue a new strategic workforce plan. However, FEMA has not met its  September milestone for issuing the plan, but told us it expects to issue  the plan on October 30, 2015.
section_title: Disaster Contracting Management
paragraphs: We reported in September 2015 on FEMA’s progress in building and  managing its contracting workforce and structure to support disasters  since enactment of the Post-Katrina Act. We found that the size of  FEMA’s contracting officer workforce at the end of fiscal year 2014 was  more than triple the size of its workforce at the time of Hurricane Katrina,  growing from a total of 45 contracting officers in 2005 to 163 contracting  officers at the end of fiscal year 2014. FEMA’s workforce increases are  due in part to the creation of a headquarters staff in 2010 charged with  supporting disasters, known as the Disaster Acquisition Response Team  (DART). DART has gradually assumed responsibility for administering the  majority of FEMA’s disaster contract spending, but FEMA does not have  a process for how the team will prioritize its work when they are deployed  during a busy disaster period. During this period of growth in the size of  its contracting officer workforce, FEMA has struggled with attrition at  times. We found this turnover in FEMA’s contracting officer workforce has  had particular impact on smaller regional offices which, with only one or  two contracting officers, face gaps in continuity. Further, we found that  FEMA’s 2011 agreement that establishes headquarters and regional  responsibilities in overseeing regional contracting staff poses challenges  for FEMA to cohesively manage its contracting workforce. For example,  regional contracting officers have a dual reporting chain to both regional  supervisors and headquarters supervisors, which heightens the potential  for competing interests for the regional contracting officers. Furthermore,  FEMA has not updated the agreement to incorporate lessons learned  since creating DART, even though the agreement states it will be  revisited each year. We also found that FEMA has not fully implemented  the four Post-Katrina Act contracting requirements we examined, due in  part to incomplete guidance and that inconsistent contract management  practices during disaster deployments—such as incomplete contract files  and reviews—create oversight challenges.
In our September 2015 report, we made eight recommendations to the  FEMA Administrator and one recommendation to DHS to help ensure  FEMA is prepared to manage the contract administration and oversight  requirements of several simultaneous large-scale disasters or a  catastrophic event, to improve coordination and communication between  headquarters and regional offices with respect to managing and  overseeing regional contracting officers, and to improve the  implementation of contracting provisions under the Post-Katrina Act. DHS  concurred with our recommendations and identified steps FEMA plans to  take to address them within the next year. Specifically, FEMA plans to  update relevant guidance and policies related to headquarters and  regional office roles and responsibilities for managing regional contracting  officers and disaster contracting requirements.
We currently have work underway for this committee assessing additional  FEMA management areas, including assessing FEMA’s management of  information technology systems that support disaster response and  recovery programs. We plan to report on that work early next year.
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne and members of the  subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony,  please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this statement. Christopher Keisling, Assistant  Director; Aditi Archer, Tracey King, and David Alexander made  contributions to this testimony.
section_title: GAO Related Products
paragraphs: Emergency Management: FEMA Collaborates Effectively with Logistics  Partners but Could Strengthen Implementation of Its Capabilities  Assessment Tool. GAO-15-781. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2015.
Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Interagency  Assessments and Accountability for Closing Capability Gaps. GAO-15-20.  Washington, D.C.: December 4, 2014.
National Preparedness: Actions Taken by FEMA to Implement Select  Provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of  2006. GAO-14-99R. Washington, D.C.: November 26, 2013.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress in Improving Grant  Management and Assessing Capabilities, but Challenges Remain.  GAO-13-456T. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2013.
Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and  Increasing the Nation’s Resilience. GAO-14-364T. Washington, D.C.:  February 12, 2014.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Additional Steps  Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities.  GAO-13-637T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2013.
Managing Preparedness Grants and Assessing National Capabilities:  Continuing Challenges Impede FEMA’s Progress. GAO-12-526T.  Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2012.
FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop and Implement a  System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities. GAO-11-51R.  Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2010.
Emergency Preparedness: FEMA Faces Challenges Integrating  Community Preparedness Programs into Its Strategic Approach.  GAO-10-193. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2010.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to  Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts.  GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.
Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal  Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters.  GAO-15-515. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2015.
Budgeting for Disasters: Approaches for Budgeting for Disasters in  Selected States. GAO-15-424. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2015.
Hurricane Sandy: FEMA Has Improved Disaster Aid Verification but  Could Act to Further Limit Improper Assistance. GAO-15-15. Washington,  D.C.: December 12, 2014.
Disaster Resilience: Actions Are Underway, but Federal Fiscal Exposure  Highlights the Need for Continued Attention to Longstanding Challenges.  GAO-14-603T. May 14, 2014.
Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a  Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own.  GAO-12-838. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.
Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Long-term Assistance Was Helpful to State  and Local Governments but Had Some Limitations. GAO-10-404.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Disaster Housing: FEMA Needs More Detailed Guidance and  Performance Measures to Help Ensure Effective Assistance after Major  Disasters, GAO-09-796. August 28, 2009.
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike Disaster Assistance: FEMA Strengthened Its  Fraud Prevention Controls, but Customer Service Needs Improvement.  Washington, D.C.: GAO-09-671. June 19, 2009.
Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Program  Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding. GAO-09-129.  Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2008.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Additional Planning and Data  Collection Could Help Improve Workforce Management Efforts.  GAO-15-437. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2015.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Opportunities Exist to  Strengthen Oversight of Administrative Costs for Major Disasters,  GAO-15-65. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2014.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Opportunities to Achieve  Efficiencies and Strengthen Operations. GAO-14-687T. Washington,  D.C.: July 24, 2014.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February  14, 2013.
FEMA Reservists: Training Could Benefit from Examination of Practices  at Other Agencies. GAO-13-250R. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2013.
Disaster Assistance Workforce: FEMA Could Enhance Human Capital  Management and Training. GAO-12-538. Washington, D.C.: May 25,  2012.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Workforce Planning and  Training Could Be Enhanced by Incorporating Strategic Management  Principles. GAO-12-487. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2012.
FEMA Has Made Progress in Managing Regionalization of Preparedness  Grants. GAO-11-732R. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011.
Government Operations: Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina  Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. GAO-09-59R. Washington,  D.C.: November 21, 2008.
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