The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Major Challenges Impede Efforts to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives; Systematic Assessment of Progress Is Needed
Published: 2008-03-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: During the last decade, conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)--one of the world's poorest countries--led directly or indirectly to the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million Congolese. A U.S.-supported peace process began in 2001, and the country's first democratically elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in 2006. However, conflict in the country has continued. In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15 U.S. policy objectives that address humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource management, governance, and security concerns in the DRC. The Act mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in the DRC that support these policy objectives. In this testimony, based on its December 2007 report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges hindering the accomplishment of the objectives. For its report, GAO obtained and analyzed program documents for seven U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor (DOL), State, and the Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also met with officials of these agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, seven agencies allocated a total of about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of these funds supported the Act's humanitarian and social development objectives and about 30 percent supported its economic and natural resource management, governance, and security objectives. Agencies' programs and activities included, for example, USAID's provision of emergency supplies, food, and water and sanitation improvements to vulnerable populations; Treasury's provision of interim debt relief; and State's provision of training and other assistance for professionalizing members of the DRC's military. Several major, interrelated challenges--an unstable security environment, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources, and lack of basic infrastructure--have impeded efforts to achieve the Act's policy objectives. For instance, weak and abusive DRC security forces have worsened humanitarian and social problems, forcing U.S. and NGO staff to curtail some efforts. At the same time, corruption and other governance problems have impeded efforts to reform the security sector and hold human rights violators accountable. Meanwhile, mismanagement of natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption, and a lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs. The U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall progress toward the Act's policy objectives. As a result, it cannot be assured that it has allocated U.S. resources in the most effective manner. In its December 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of State work with the heads of the other agencies implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the U.S. government's overall progress in achieving the Act's policy objectives. State agreed with GAO's recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on U.S. assistance in  the Democratic of the Congo (DRC). Because of its large size, central  location in sub-Saharan Africa, and abundant natural resources, the DRC  is important to the stability of central Africa and the interests of the United  States. However, since achieving independence in 1960, the DRC—one of  the world’s poorest countries—has suffered from despotic rule,  underdevelopment, and economic problems. Further, during the last  decade, conflict in the DRC resulted directly or indirectly in the deaths of  an estimated 5.4 million Congolese.
According to the Department of State, Western aid to the DRC fell in the  early 1990s because of concerns about human rights abuses and the need  for internal reforms, but the United States began to increase its support in  2001 after the initiation of U.S.-supported peace talks. A transitional DRC  government was installed in 2003, and the country’s first democratically  elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in December 2006. However,  conflict in the country has continued. In December 2006, Congress  enacted the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006  (the Act), establishing 15 policy objectives related to humanitarian, social  development, economic and natural resource, governance, and security  concerns in the DRC. The Act mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in  the DRC that support these policy objectives.
My statement today is based on our December 2007 report that identified  (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act’s objectives,  (2)  major impediments hindering accomplishment of these objectives, and (3)  U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the objectives. (See  app. I for a description of our methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The DRC’s size, location, and wealth of natural resources contribute to its  importance to U.S. interests in the region. With an area of more than  900,000 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the United States east  of the Mississippi River. Located in the center of Africa, the DRC borders  nine nations. Its abundant natural resources, which constitute its primary  export products, include 34 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves, 10  percent of the world’s copper reserves, and 64 percent of the world’s  coltan reserves, as well as diamonds, gold, cassiterite, and other minerals.  Moreover, the DRC’s rain forests provide 8 percent of the world’s carbon.
The DRC has had a turbulent history. In 1965, fewer than 5 years after the  nation achieved independence from Belgium, a military regime seized  control of the DRC and ruled, often brutally, for more than 3 decades. It  was toppled in 1997 by a coalition of internal groups and neighboring  countries to the east, including Rwanda and Uganda, after dissident  Rwandan groups began operating in the DRC. Subsequent efforts by a new  DRC government to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan  troops prompted a second war in 1998 that eventually drew the armies of  three more African nations into the DRC. Beginning in 1999, a United  Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was deployed to the DRC. After a series  of U.S.-supported peace talks that began in 2001, the other nations  withdrew all or most of their troops and an interim government was  established. Elections held in 2006 with logistical support provided by UN  peacekeepers culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the  DRC’s first democratically elected president in more than 40 years.  However, conflict in the DRC has continued. According to the  International Rescue Committee, from 1998 through 2007, 5.4 million  Congolese died as the direct or indirect consequence of conflict in the  country, with an estimated 2.1 million of those deaths since 2002.
The DRC suffers from a wide range of problems, including acute poverty  and limited economic prospects. It is one of the poorest and least  developed countries in the world: the current life expectancy is 43 years,  in part because the DRC suffers from high rates of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS,  and malaria. USAID reports that 2 of every 10 children born in the DRC die  before their fifth birthday and that the maternal death rate is the world’s  highest. An international group of donor nations recently concluded that  the DRC’s educational system is failing and that most rural children do not  attend school. In addition, wars and turmoil have reduced its economy to  dependence on subsistence agriculture and informal activities. The DRC’s  prospects are also encumbered by an external debt load of around $8  billion, which is three times greater than the level of debt that the World  Bank and the IMF consider sustainable. Moreover, the DRC has not fully  qualified for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor  Country (HIPC) initiative.
The DRC receives assistance from a number of donor nations and  organizations. During 2004 and 2005, the 10 largest donors to the DRC  were the World Bank’s International Development Association, the  European Commission, Japan, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United  States, France, Germany, the IMF, and the Netherlands. The United States’  goal for its assistance to the DRC, as characterized by State, is to  strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and democratization to  promote a stable, developing, and democratic DRC. As described by the  Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. policy is to support,  but not lead, the efforts of the DRC to address its problems.
Table 1 shows the Act’s 15 U.S. policy objectives for the DRC, linked to the  five categories of assistance—humanitarian, social development,  economic and natural resource management, governance, and security.
section_title: U.S. Programs and Activities That Support the Act’s Policy Objectives
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities that  support the Act’s policy objectives. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, about 70  percent of U.S. funding for the DRC was allocated for programs that would  support the Act’s emergency humanitarian and social development  objectives and about 30 percent was allocated for programs and activities  that would support the Act’s economic, governance, and security  objectives (see fig. 1).
Seven U.S. agencies—USDA, DOD, HHS, DOL, State, Treasury, and  USAID—allocated about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the  DRC in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, with State and USAID  providing the majority of these funds (see fig. 2).
Examples of U.S. agencies’ programs and activities in each category  include the following (see app. II for more information).
Humanitarian. USAID and State have provided humanitarian assistance  to help the DRC meet its citizens’ and vulnerable populations’ basic needs.
USAID has provided emergency assistance to vulnerable populations in  the DRC. Working primarily through the UN World Food Program and an  NGO, USAID has supported distribution of food to internally displaced  persons; people infected with, and orphans affected by, HIV/AIDS; and  victims of sexual abuse by soldiers. Working primarily through NGOs,  USAID has provided emergency supplies, health care, nutrition programs,  water and sanitation improvements, food, and agricultural assistance to  other vulnerable populations, such as malnourished children and war- affected populations.
USAID has provided emergency assistance to support road rehabilitation  and bridge reconstruction projects; schools; and the socioeconomic  reintegration of ex–child soldiers, adult combatants, and their families.
State has provided humanitarian assistance to help repatriate, integrate,  and resettle refugees in the DRC. In fiscal year 2007, this assistance was  implemented primarily by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, other  international organizations, and NGOs.
Social development. USAID, HHS, and DOL have provided assistance to  support the Act’s social development and rehabilitation objectives.
USAID has worked through NGOs to improve education, health care, and  family planning. For instance, USAID has funded efforts to reduce  abandonment of children; provide psychosocial support, medical  assistance, and reintegration support to survivors of sexual and gender- based violence in the eastern DRC; train teachers; and increase access to  education for vulnerable children.
USAID has funded efforts to train medical staff and nurses in the  management of primary health care, distribute bed nets to prevent the  spread of malaria and polio, provide family planning services, and support  voluntary counseling and testing centers for HIV/AIDS.
HHS has allocated funds for immunization against, and the surveillance  and control of, infectious diseases such as polio, measles, and HIV/AIDS.
DOL has allocated funds to address children’s involvement in mining and  related services, small-scale commerce, child soldiering, and other forms  of child labor in the DRC.
Economic and natural resource management. Treasury, USAID, State,  and USDA have provided support for the Act’s economic objectives.
Treasury has worked with the World Bank and the IMF to relieve the DRC  of some of its foreign debt. The United States provided the DRC interim  debt relief (primarily through reduced interest payments) in fiscal years  2005 through 2007, following the DRC’s admittance into the HIPC debt  relief program. Once the DRC qualifies for the completion of its HIPC debt  relief, Treasury plans to pay the budgetary costs of fully relieving the  DRC’s $1.3 billion debt to the United States.
USAID has allocated funds to support sustainable natural resource  management, forest protection, and biodiversity in the DRC through the  Central African Regional Program for the Environment.
State has supported efforts to promote transparency in the DRC’s natural  resource sector by serving as the U.S. representative to the Kimberley  Process Certification Scheme, which deals with rough diamond trade,  and to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
USDA has allocated funds to improve agricultural productivity, increase  rural market development, provide credit for agribusiness and rural  infrastructure, and increase access to potable water and water for  irrigation in the DRC.
Governance. USAID and State have allocated funds for programs that  support the Act’s governance objectives.
USAID has allocated funds to organize itinerant court sessions intended to  bring justice institutions closer to citizens, facilitate greater access to  justice for vulnerable people, and provide quality legal assistance to the  population in relatively inaccessible parts of the DRC.
USAID has supported an NGO’s establishment of democracy resource  centers to assist political party leaders, civic activists, elected local and  national officials, and government institutions in promoting good  governance and democracy.
USAID, to promote judicial independence, supported an NGO’s efforts by  fostering improvements to the DRC’s legal framework, such as laws on  sexual violence and the rights of women, and providing legal assistance  activities for victims of sexual and gender-based violence.
State allocated funds in 2006 for more than 30 programs by the National  Endowment for Democracy, including programs aimed at informing  women of their rights, addressing issues of abuse and corruption, and  promoting political participation.
Security. State, USAID, and DOD have provided security-related  assistance in the DRC.
State has facilitated a multinational forum, the Tripartite Plus  Commission, for the DRC and nations on its troubled eastern border— Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi—to discuss regional security issues,  including militias operating illegally in the eastern DRC.
USAID has launched programs to promote the reintegration of some  former fighters into Congolese society.
State is refurbishing the DRC’s military officer training school and training  multiple levels of the military, including brigade- and battalion-staff level  officers, on military justice reform, civil-military relations, and other issues  of concern.
section_title: Major Challenges Hindering Achievement of the Act’s Policy Objectives in the DRC
paragraphs: U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several major  challenges that are impeding U.S. efforts to achieve the Act’s policy  objectives. These challenges include (1) an unstable security environment,  (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3) mismanagement of  natural resources, and (4) lack of basic infrastructure. Because these  challenges are interrelated, they negatively impact progress in multiple  areas.
Unstable security environment. The DRC’s weak and abusive  security forces have been unable to quell continuing militia activities in  the DRC’s eastern regions, where security worsened during 2007. For  example, the UN reported that the DRC army is responsible for 40  percent of recently reported human rights violations—including rapes,  mass killings of civilians, and summary executions—and DRC police  and other security forces have killed and tortured civilians with total  impunity. State reported that government and other armed forces in  the DRC have committed a wide range of human rights abuses,  including forcing children into the security forces. Further, the DRC’s  unstable security situation has worsened the DRC’s humanitarian and  social problems and impeded efforts to address these problems. For  instance, U.S. agency officials reported that the conflict has forced  them to curtail some emergency assistance programs, and NGOs  implementing development and humanitarian assistance activities in  the DRC reported that the lack of security has resulted in attacks on  their staff or led them to suspend site visits and cancel and reschedule  work. In addition, the DRC’s unstable security situation has negatively  affected the country’s economic potential by discouraging investment,  which in turn could worsen security through renewed conflict.
Weak governance and corruption. By many accounts, corruption in  the DRC is widespread. For example, Transparency International’s  2007 Corruption Perceptions Index identifies the DRC as one of the  10th most corrupt countries in the world. Further, weak governance  and corruption in the DRC have hindered efforts to reform the security  sector and hold human rights violators accountable. For instance,  according to U.S. officials, the DRC lacks a government office with  clear authority on security issues, and efforts to reform the DRC’s  police may be impeded by lack of support from corrupt DRC  institutions. According to NGO representatives, the lack of an effective  judiciary impedes efforts to hold human rights violators accountable  for their actions, which in turn promotes a “culture of impunity.”  Moreover, governance problems have hindered efforts to implement  economic reforms required for debt relief and promote economic  growth. For example, according to Treasury officials and IMF  documents, the government’s lack of commitment to meet certain  requirements has jeopardized the DRC’s ability to receive some interim  debt relief, qualify for full debt relief, and improve the country’s overall  economic prospects. Finally, the judiciary’s ineffective enforcement of  commercial contracts in the DRC has likely discouraged private sector  investment and hence economic growth. The World Bank rated the  DRC’s enforcement of contracts as among the weakest in the world,  such that a company might need to expend roughly 150 percent of a  typical contract’s value to ensure enforcement through court  proceedings.
Mismanagement of natural resources. Governance and capacity  challenges in the DRC have limited the ability of international donors,  NGOs, and the DRC government to improve natural resource  management. For example, the Kimberley Process Certification  Scheme has criticized the DRC for weak internal controls, customs  capacity, and ability to track diamonds extracted by large number of  self-employed miners. According to U.S. and NGO officials, the DRC  also conducted a national mining contract review without publishing  its terms of reference or all of the contracts or clearly defining the role  of civil society representatives. Further, mismanagement of the DRC’s  natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption.
According to U.S. officials, international donors, and NGOs, the DRC’s  abundant natural resources fuel conflict between neighboring  countries’ militias and armed domestic factions and foster corruption  among government officials.
Lack of basic infrastructure. The DRC lacks many key elements of  basic infrastructure, such as buildings, equipment, and transportation.  For example, according to a recent study by 17 donor nations, no roads  link 9 of the DRC’s 10 provincial capitals to the national capital and no  roads link the DRC’s northern and southern regions or its eastern and  western regions. International observers have reported that the DRC’s  educational and penal infrastructures are dilapidated, and an  international group of donor nations stated that the DRC’s  electrification, communications, and supplies of clean water have  major deficiencies. Moreover, the DRC’s lack of basic infrastructure  has hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance  programs. According to U.S. officials, the lack of an adequate in- country transportation system increases the time required to get  supplies to those in need and, according to U.S. and NGO officials,  increases the expense or difficulty associated with their programs.  International donors and organizations said that the lack of  infrastructure has made economic development impossible in many  areas and may stifle the potential for economic growth and private  sector activity in most DRC provinces.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Assess Overall Progress toward Achieving the Act’s Policy Objectives
paragraphs: Although U.S. agencies monitor their efforts in the DRC, the U.S.  government has not established a process to assess overall progress  toward achieving the Act’s policy objectives in the DRC. Further, although  State and NSC have developed mechanisms to coordinate some of the  agencies’ activities in the DRC, neither mechanism systematically assesses  overall progress.
Some of the key agencies involved in the DRC monitor their respective  programs. For example, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance  (OFDA) has two program officers in the DRC who regularly visit project  sites and publish quarterly reports on OFDA activities. Their partner  organizations, or implementers, also provide reports and updates on their  projects.
However, the executive branch has not established a governmentwide  process to use such information for an assessment of overall U.S. progress  in the DRC. Although State and NSC have developed mechanisms aimed at  providing some degree of coordination among executive branch agencies  active in the DRC, neither mechanism currently provides for the  systematic assessment of overall U.S. progress toward its goals.
In 2006, to ensure that foreign assistance, including assistance provided to  the DRC, is used as effectively as possible to meet broad foreign policy  objectives, the Secretary of State appointed a Director of Foreign  Assistance (DFA), who also serves as the Administrator of USAID. Under  DFA’s guidance, State and USAID have begun to develop a joint planning  and budgeting process that, according to State officials, may eventually  assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However, as of February 2008, the Office  of the DFA had not completed its DRC operations plan for fiscal year 2007,  which ended on September 30, 2007.
To focus attention on issues affecting the Great Lakes region of central  Africa, which encompasses the DRC, the National Security Council  established an interagency working group, comprising officials from DOD,  State, and USAID. The group’s mission is to establish a coordinated  approach, policies, and actions to address issues, such as security, in the  DRC and other countries in the region. However, according to NSC and  State officials, the group has not developed systematic tools for assessing  the impact of all U.S. agencies’ efforts to achieve the Act’s objectives. Also,  the group does not include several agencies providing assistance to the  DRC, such as DOL, HHS, and USDA.
The lack of a governmentwide process for assessing its overall progress in  the DRC limits the U.S. government’s ability to ensure that it has allocated  its resources in the most effective manner. At the same time, given the  DRC’s significance to Africa’s stability, the scope, complexity, and urgency  of the challenges to achieving U.S. policy objectives in the DRC warrant a  governmentwide response. To ensure a basis for informed decisions  regarding U.S. allocations for assistance in the DRC as well as any needed  bilateral or multilateral actions, we recommended in December 2007 that  the Secretary of State, through the Director of Foreign Assistance, work  with the heads of the other U.S. agencies implementing programs and  activities in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the  extent to which the U.S. government as a whole is making progress in  achieving the Act’s policy objectives. Commenting on a draft of our 2007  report, State endorsed our recommendation, noting that it would likely be  met as DFA’s joint planning and budgeting processes are extended to  include all U.S. agencies engaged in the DRC.
This completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to  any questions that Members of the Caucus may have at this time.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: For our December 2007 report, we identified (1) U.S. programs and  activities that support the objectives of the DRC Relief, Security, and  Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), (2) major challenges  hindering accomplishment of these objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to  assess progress toward accomplishing these objectives.
To identify U.S. programs and activities that support the Act’s objectives,  we analyzed policy, planning, budget, and programming documents  describing U.S. policies and programs in the DRC provided by key U.S.  agencies—the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor  (DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury; the  Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID). We identified the amount of funding  each agency allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal years 2006 and 2007;  we did not determine the extent to which each agency obligated or  expended its allocated funds. We also met with representatives from each  of these agencies, the National Security Council (NSC), nongovernmental  organizations (NGO), and other organizations with expertise on DRC- related issues.
To identify key impediments hindering accomplishment of the Act’s policy  objectives, we analyzed relevant policy and program documents;  interviewed U.S. agency officials; conducted a round-table session with a  nonprobability sample of 11 NGOs with a broad range of experience and  expertise implementing programs and projects in the DRC; and  interviewed representatives from other organizations with experience in  the DRC.
To identify U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the Act’s  policy objectives, we reviewed U.S. agency assessments and  implementation documents. Although we did not travel to the DRC, we  conducted several telephone interviews with U.S. embassy and USAID  mission staff in the DRC.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to December 2007, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Zina Merritt (Assistant Director),  Pierre Toureille, Kristy Kennedy, Kendall Schaefer, Martin De Alteriis,  Michael Hoffman, Reid Lowe, and Farhanaz Kermalli made key  contributions to this report. Grace Lui provided technical assistance.
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