Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts
Published: 2017-04-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Violent extremism—generally defined as ideologically, religious, or politically- motivated acts of violence—has been perpetrated in the United States by white supremacists, anti-government groups, and radical Islamist entities, among others. In 2011, the U.S. government developed a national strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. In 2016, an interagency CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ was created to coordinate CVE efforts.
GAO was asked to review domestic federal CVE efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States have implemented the 2011 SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has assessed progress. GAO assessed the status of activities in the 2011 SIP; interviewed officials from agencies leading CVE efforts and a non-generalizable group of community-based entities selected from cities with CVE frameworks; and compared Task Force activities to selected best practices for multi- agency efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of December 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National Counterterrorism Center had implemented 19 of the 44 domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for countering violent extremism (CVE) in the United States. Twenty-three tasks were in progress and no action had yet been taken on 2 tasks. The 44 tasks aim to address three core CVE objectives: community outreach, research and training, and capacity building. Implemented tasks include, for example, DOJ conducting CVE outreach meetings to communities targeted by violent extremism and DHS integrating CVE content into law enforcement counterterrorism training. Tasks in progress include, for example, DHS building relationships with the social media industry and increasing training available to communities to counter violent extremists online. Tasks that had not yet been addressed include, implementing CVE activities in prisons and learning from former violent extremists. Federal CVE efforts aim to educate and prevent radicalization before a crime or terrorist act transpires, and differ from counterterrorism efforts such as collecting evidence and making arrests before an event has occurred.
The federal government does not have a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the overall CVE effort. Although GAO was able to determine the status of the 44 CVE tasks, it was not able to determine if the United States is better off today than it was in 2011 as a result of these tasks. This is because no cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes has been established to guide the multi-agency CVE effort. Such a strategy could help ensure that the individual actions of stakeholder agencies are measureable and contributing to the overall goals of the federal government's CVE effort. The federal government also has not established a process by which to evaluate the effectiveness of the collective CVE effort. The CVE Task Force was established in part to evaluate and assess CVE efforts across the federal government, but has not established a process for doing so. Evaluating the progress and effectiveness of the overall federal CVE effort could better help identify successes, gaps, and resource needs across stakeholder agencies.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ concurred with both recommendations and DHS described the CVE Task Force's planned actions for implementation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Violent extremism—generally defined as supporting or committing violent  acts to achieve political, ideological, religious, or social goals—has been  perpetrated and promoted by a broad range of groups in the United  States for decades. Such groups include white supremacists, anti- government groups, and groups with extreme views on abortion, animal  rights, the environment, and federal ownership of public lands; and radical  Islamist entities, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), among  others. The September 11, 2001, attacks account for the largest number  of fatalities in the United States resulting from violent extremism.  According to the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), since the  September 11 attacks, 85 attacks in the United States by violent  extremists—associated with both radical Islamist and far right  ideologies—have resulted in 225 fatalities.
In response to this threat, in 2011, the U.S. government developed a  national strategy and a Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for countering  violent extremism (CVE). Primarily led by the Departments of Homeland  Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) through an interagency task force, the federal government’s leadership in CVE is aimed at educating and  providing resources to communities for preventing violent extremist acts.  Specifically, CVE activities outlined in the 2011 SIP and updated in the  2016 SIP are aimed at enhancing the ability of local police and  community organizations—including religious, educational, and non-profit  entities—to provide information and resources to communities targeted by  violent extremists and individuals who may have started down a road to  violent extremism. These activities generally aim to provide alternative  messages and options to terrorist or violent extremist recruitment and  radicalization efforts through civic engagement.
Given the broad scope of activities associated with CVE and the  importance of effective programs to address domestic threats, you asked  us to review the implementation and organization of CVE efforts. This  report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key  stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States implemented the 2011  SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to  implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has developed a  process for assessing overall progress.
To assess the extent to which DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders  tasked with CVE in the United States implemented the 2011 SIP, we  collected information from each agency responsible for leading 44  domestically related tasks in the 2011 SIP. Specifically, we asked for  information—including, for example, program descriptions, internal  progress reports, and materials distributed to the public—from each  agency on the status of actions taken to address their assigned activities  between December 2011 and December 2016. We assessed the  information to determine whether each task had been implemented, was  still in progress, or had not yet been addressed.
To determine the extent to which the federal government has developed a  strategy to implement CVE activities and the CVE Task Force has  developed a process for assessing overall progress, we reviewed the  2011 National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent  Extremism in the United States (National Strategy), the 2011 and 2016  Strategic Implementation Plans for the strategy, and other documents  related to the creation and activities of the CVE Task Force. Specifically,  we reviewed these documents to identify whether measurable outcomes  and associated metrics had been defined, and compared this information  against practices for creating effective interagency collaborative efforts  and managing cross-cutting issues. We interviewed officials from the  stakeholder agencies including DHS, DOJ, the Department of Education,  the Department of Health and Human Services, the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to  discuss their approaches to CVE and their roles and responsibilities as  part of the federal CVE effort. A detailed description of our scope and  methodology can be found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2015 to April 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Violent Extremists in the United States
paragraphs: White supremacists, anti-government extremists, radical Islamist  extremists, and other ideologically inspired domestic violent extremists  have been active in the United States for decades. Examples of attacks  include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by radical Islamists, in  which 6 persons were killed; and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the  Alfred P. Murrah federal building by anti-government far right individuals,  in which 168 lives were lost. The September 11, 2001, attacks account for  the largest number of fatalities in the United States in a single or closely- related attack resulting from violent extremism in recent decades. While  the September 11, 2001, attacks were perpetrated by foreign violent  extremists, from September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016,  attacks by domestic or “homegrown” violent extremists in the United  States resulted in 225 fatalities, according to the ECDB. Of these, 106  were killed by far right violent extremists in 62 separate incidents, and  119 were victims of radical Islamist violent extremists in 23 separate  incidents. Figure 1 shows the locations and number of fatalities involved  in these incidents. A detailed list of the incidents can be found in appendix  II. According to the ECDB, activities of far left wing violent extremist  groups did not result in any fatalities during this period.
Since September 12, 2001, the number of fatalities caused by domestic  violent extremists has ranged from 1 to 49 in a given year. As shown in  figure 2, fatalities resulting from attacks by far right wing violet extremists  have exceeded those caused by radical Islamist violent extremists in 10  of the 15 years, and were the same in 3 of the years since September 12,  2001. Of the 85 violent extremist incidents that resulted in death since  September 12, 2001, far right wing violent extremist groups were  responsible for 62 (73 percent) while radical Islamist violent extremists  were responsible for 23 (27 percent). The total number of fatalities is  about the same for far right wing violent extremists and radical Islamist  violent extremists over the approximately 15-year period (106 and 119,  respectively). However, 41 percent of the deaths attributable to radical  Islamist violent extremists occurred in a single event—an attack at an  Orlando, Florida night club in 2016 (see fig. 2). Details on the locations  and dates of the attacks can be found in appendix II.
section_title: The U.S. Approach to Countering Domestic Violent Extremism
paragraphs: In October 2016, the federal government defined the U.S. approach to  countering violent extremism as proactive actions to counter efforts by  extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence. The  three parts of the U.S. approach to CVE efforts are: (1) empowering  communities and civil society; (2) messaging and counter–messaging;  and (3) addressing causes and driving factors. CVE activities are different  from traditional counterterrorism efforts, such as collecting intelligence,  gathering evidence, making arrests, and responding to incidents, in that  they generally focus on preventing an individual from finding or acting out  on a motive for committing a crime, as shown in figure 3. In February  2015, the White House released a fact sheet stating that CVE  encompasses the preventative aspects of counterterrorism as well as  interventions to undermine the attraction of violent extremist movements  and ideologies that seek to promote violence.
According to the national strategy, CVE actions intend to address the  conditions and reduce the factors that most likely contribute to recruitment  and radicalization by violent extremists. CVE efforts, as defined by the  White House, are not to include gathering intelligence or performing  investigations for the purpose of criminal prosecution. CVE efforts aim to  address the root causes of violent extremism through community  engagement, including:
Building awareness—through briefings on the drivers and indicators of  radicalization and recruitment to violence. For example, U.S.  Attorney’s and DHS offices host community outreach meetings in  which they provide information on identifying suspicious activity.
Countering violent extremist narratives—directly addressing and  countering violent extremist recruitment messages, such as  encouraging alternative messages from community groups online. For  example, DOJ partnered with the International Association of Chiefs  of Police to produce awareness briefs on countering online  radicalization.
Emphasizing community led intervention—supporting community  efforts to disrupt the radicalization process before an individual  engages in criminal activity. For example, the FBI aims to provide  tools and resources to communities to help them identify social  workers and mental health professionals who can help support at-risk  individuals and prevent them from becoming radicalized.
Recognizing that most CVE activities occur at the community level, DHS  and DOJ officials leading the CVE Task Force describe the federal role in  CVE as a combination of providing research funding and training  materials, and educating the public through activities such as DHS or  DOJ hosted community briefings in which specific threats and warning  signs of violent extremism are shared. According to FBI officials, these  outreach efforts also provide an opportunity to build relationships in the  community and help clarify the FBI’s role in engaging community  organizations. According to DHS officials, DHS also conducts regular  community engagement roundtables in multiple cities that provide a forum  for communities to comment on and hear information about Department  activities, including CVE. In addition to community meetings, education of  the public is to occur through a multiplicity of outreach channels, including  websites, social media, conferences, and communications to state and  local governments, including law enforcement entities.
section_title: Organization of CVE Programs and Initiatives Have Undergone Recent Changes
paragraphs: Since 2010, federal agencies have initiated several steps towards  countering violent extremism. In November 2010, a National Engagement  Task Force, led by DHS and DOJ, was established to help coordinate  community engagement efforts to counter violent extremism. The task  force was to include all departments and agencies involved in relevant  community engagement efforts and focus on compiling local, national,  and international best practices and disseminating these out to the field,  especially to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The task force was also responsible  for connecting field-based federal components involved in community  engagement to maximize partnerships, coordination, and resource- sharing. According to DHS officials, the National Engagement Task Force  disbanded in 2013.
In September 2015, DHS recognized that its CVE efforts were scattered  across a number of components and lacked specific goals and tangible  measures of success. DHS created the Office of Community Partnerships  (OCP) to consolidate its programs, foster greater involvement of the  technology sector and philanthropic efforts to support private CVE efforts,  and to enhance DHS grant-making in the area. At the same time, federal  agencies involved in CVE recognized that the CVE landscape had  changed since the issuance of the national strategy and SIP in late 2011.  According to DHS and DOJ officials, ISIS had emerged as a threat, and  an increase in internet recruiting by violent extremist groups since 2011  required an update to the SIP. In 2015, NCTC led a review to ensure that  the federal government was optimally organized to carry out the CVE  mission. According to DOJ and DHS officials leading CVE activities, the  review validated the objectives of the 2011 strategy, but identified gaps in  its implementation. Specifically, representatives from 10 departments and  agencies contributing to CVE efforts identified four needs: infrastructure  to coordinate and prioritize CVE activities across the federal government  and with stakeholders; clear responsibility, accountability, and  communication internally and with the public; broad participation of  departments and agencies outside national security lanes; and a process  to assess, prioritize, and allocate resources to maximize impact.
In response, in January 2016, a new CVE task force was created to  coordinate government efforts and partnerships to prevent violent  extremism in the United States. The CVE Task Force is a permanent  interagency task force hosted by DHS with overall leadership provided by  DHS and DOJ. Staffing is to be provided by representatives from DHS,  DOJ, FBI, NCTC, and other supporting departments and agencies. The  Task Force is administratively housed at DHS and is to rotate leadership  between DHS and DOJ bi-annually. The interagency CVE Task Force  was established to: (1) synchronize and integrate whole-of-government  CVE programs and activities; (2) conduct ongoing strategic planning; and  (3) assess and evaluate CVE efforts.
In October 2016, the Task Force, through the White House, issued an  updated SIP for the 2011 national strategy. The 2016 SIP outlines the  general lines of effort that partnering agencies will aim to undertake to  guide their coordination of federal efforts and implement the national  strategy. These lines of effort include:
Research and Analysis: The Task Force is to coordinate federal  support for ongoing and future CVE research. Since 2011, DHS has  funded 98 CVE related research projects and DOJ has funded 25.  Coordination through this line of effort aims to prevent overlap and  duplication while identifying guidelines for future evaluations. This line  of effort also aims to identify and share guidelines for designing,  implementing, and evaluating CVE programs.
Engagements and Technical Assistance: The Task Force is to  coordinate federal outreach to and engagement with communities.  DHS, FBI, U.S. Attorneys, and other departments regularly provide  information to local community and law enforcement leaders. To date,  much of the information provided has been from the individual  perspective of each agency and its mission rather than a coordinated  CVE mission. This line of effort aims to coordinate these outreach  efforts to synchronize the messages that are reaching the  communities.
Interventions: This line of effort aims to develop intervention options to  include alternative pathways or “off-ramps” for individuals who appear  to be moving toward violent action but who have not yet engaged in  criminal activity. Law enforcement officials are looking for ways to  support community led programs, particularly when they focus on  juveniles and others who have the potential to be redirected away  from violence. The CVE Task Force, in coordination with DOJ and the  FBI, aim to support local multidisciplinary intervention approaches.
Communications and Digital Strategy: Recognizing that general CVE  information and resources are not easily accessible by stakeholders,  the CVE Task Force aims to create a new online platform, including a  public website, to ensure stakeholders around the country are able to  quickly and easily understand national CVE efforts. This platform aims  to serve as the national digital CVE clearinghouse by centralizing and  streamlining access to training; research, analysis, and lessons  learned; financial resources and grant information; networks and  communities of interest; and intervention resources.
According to the 2016 SIP, the lines of effort were developed to align with  the three priority action areas outlined in the 2011 national strategy and  SIP: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities;  (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing  violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while  promoting our ideals. Also in October 2016, DHS issued its own strategy  outlining the specific actions it aims to take to meet its CVE mission.  Figure 4 shows a timeline of federal CVE milestones and activities.
section_title: CVE Funding
paragraphs: Consistent with direction in the 2011 National Strategy, federal CVE  efforts have generally been initiated by leveraging existing programs and  without a specific CVE budget. For example, activities that address  violence in schools or hate crimes in communities may be relevant to  constraining or averting violent extremism, but receive funding as part of  a different program. In fiscal year 2016, the DHS Office of Community  Partnerships operated with a $3.1 million budget and focused on raising  awareness of violent extremists’ threats in communities, building  relationships with community organizations that are conducting CVE  efforts, and coordinating CVE efforts within DHS. Additionally, DHS’s  fiscal year 2016 appropriation included $50 million to address emergent  threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist  attacks. Of the $50 million,
DHS awarded $10 million through a competitive grant program
DHS designated $1 million for a Joint Counterterrorism Workshop;
DHS designated the remaining $39 million to be competitively  awarded under the existing Homeland Security Grant Program.
section_title: Almost Half of Planned 2011 CVE Tasks Were Implemented, but Work Remains
paragraphs: Developed to help execute the 2011 National Strategy for Empowering  Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, the  2011 SIP detailed federal agency roles and responsibilities for current  and future CVE efforts. The SIP outlined 44 tasks to address CVE  domestically and called for the creation of an Assessment Working Group  to measure CVE’s progress and effectiveness. From our analysis of  agency documentation and other evidence as to whether tasks had been  implemented, we determined that agencies implemented almost half of  the 44 domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 SIP. Specifically,  from December 2011 through December 2016, federal agencies  implemented 19 tasks, had 23 tasks in progress, and had not yet taken  action on 2 tasks (see fig. 5 below and app. III for additional details).
While progress was made in implementing the tasks, the Assessment  Working Group was never formed according to DHS and DOJ officials  responsible for implementing the SIP. Moreover, as of December 2016,  there had been no comprehensive assessment of the federal  government’s CVE efforts’ effectiveness.
The 44 domestically-oriented tasks identified in the 2011 SIP were  focused on addressing three core CVE objectives: community outreach,  research and training, and capacity building. Below is a description of  progress made and challenges remaining by core CVE objective.
subsections: section_title: Community Outreach
paragraphs: Community outreach aims to enhance federal engagement and support to  local communities that may be targeted by violent extremism. For  example, community outreach might include expanding relationships with  local business and communities to identify or prevent violent extremism or  integrating CVE activities into community-oriented policing efforts.
Of the 17 community outreach tasks in the SIP, we determined that  agencies implemented 8 tasks and 9 remain in progress. In general,  agencies implemented tasks focused on expanding CVE efforts in local  communities and identifying ways to increase funding for CVE activities,  among other things. For example, DOJ expanded CVE activities to  communities targeted by violent extremism through a series of outreach  meetings led by the U.S. Attorney’s offices. Further, both DHS and DOJ  identified funding within existing appropriations to incorporate CVE into  eligible public safety and community resilience grants.
However, community outreach tasks that remained in progress include  tasks related to reaching communities in the digital environment. For  example, DHS aims to build relationships with the high-tech and social  media industry and continues to meet with officials to discuss how to  address violent extremism online. In providing a status update on such  activities, DHS recognized this as an area that continues to need  attention.
section_title: Research and Training
paragraphs: Research and training relates to understanding the threat of violent  extremism, sharing information, and leveraging it to train government and  law enforcement officials. For example, activities under research and  training might include funding or conducting analysis on CVE-related  topics or developing training curriculums for CVE stakeholders.
Of the 19 research and training tasks we assessed in the SIP, we  determined that agencies implemented 9 tasks, had 9 tasks in progress,  and had not yet taken action on 1 task. Agencies implemented activities  related to continuing research on CVE and integrating CVE training into  federal law enforcement training, among other things. For example, DHS,  through its Science and Technology Directorate, continued its research  and reporting on violent extremist root causes and funded an open source  database on terrorism as stated in the SIP. DHS also implemented a task  related to integrating CVE content into counter-terrorism training  conducted at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Additionally,  NCTC implemented tasks related to expanding awareness briefings to  state and local law enforcement, and developing and reviewing guidance  on CVE training, while the FBI implemented a task regarding the  completion of a CVE coordination office.
Further, tasks related to training non-security federal partners to  incorporate CVE training remain in progress. For example, DHS was  given responsibility for collaborating with non-security federal partners to  build CVE training modules that can be incorporated into existing  programs related to public safety, violence prevention, and resilience.  DHS acknowledged this task needs attention and noted that, while initial  steps were taken, the interagency effort needs to better define roles and  opportunities for future collaborations. However, agencies have not yet  taken action on implementing CVE in federal prisons.
section_title: Capacity Building
paragraphs: Capacity building tasks relate to investments of resources into  communities to enhance the effectiveness and future sustainability of  their CVE efforts. Capacity building might, for example, include expanding  the use of informational briefings to a wider audience or outreach to  former violent extremists to counter violent narratives.
Of the 8 capacity building tasks we assessed in the SIP, we determined  that agencies implemented 2 tasks, 5 tasks were in progress, and action  had not yet been taken on 1 task. For example, one of the implemented  capacity building tasks included providing regular briefings on CVE to  Congress and others. In implementing this task, DHS participated in over  two dozen briefings and hearings for Congress.
Capacity building tasks that were in progress included brokering  connections with the private sector and building a public website on  community resilience and CVE, among others. DHS had, for example,  taken steps to broker connections with the private sector. DHS officials  also noted making initial progress with YouTube and the Los Angeles  Police Department in developing campaigns against violent extremism,  but recognized this as an area that continues to need attention. Despite  progress in 7 of 8 capacity building tasks, action had not yet been taken  on a task related to learning from former violent extremists to directly  challenge violent extremist narratives. According to DHS officials, legal  issues regarding access to former violent extremists are being explored  and DOJ will lead this task moving forward.
section_title: The Federal CVE Effort Lacks a Cohesive Strategy with Measureable Outcomes and a Process for Assessing Progress
subsections: section_title: A Cohesive CVE Strategy with Measurable Outcomes Has Not Been Established
paragraphs: Although we were able to determine the status of the 44 domestically  focused CVE tasks from the 2011 SIP, we could not determine the extent  to which the United States is better off today as a result of its CVE effort  than it was in 2011. That is because no cohesive strategy with  measurable outcomes has been established to guide the multi-agency  CVE effort towards its goals.
Neither the 2011 SIP nor its 2016 update provides a cohesive strategy— one that sets forth a coordinated and collaborative effort among partner  agencies—that includes measurable outcomes. For example, the 2016  SIP includes a task on strengthening collaboration with the private sector  and academia to pursue CVE-relevant communications tools and  capabilities. The task describes the benefits of such collaboration, but  does not include any information on how the task will be implemented,  timeframes for implementation, desired outcomes, or indicators for  measuring progress towards those outcomes. Similarly, the 2016 SIP  includes a task on identifying and supporting the development of  disengagement and rehabilitation programs. While the SIP describes  research conducted in partnership with one such program that provides  pathways out of violent extremism, it does not include any information on  how the federal government will identify other groups and what kind of support they might provide. Absent defined measureable outcomes, it is  unclear how these tasks will be implemented and how they will  measurably contribute to achieving the federal CVE goals.
Consistent with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, establishing a  cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes can provide  agencies with a clear direction for successful implementation of activities  in multi-agency cross-cutting efforts. Participants in multi-agency efforts  each bring different views, organizational cultures, missions, and ways of  operating. They may even disagree on the nature of the problem or issue  being addressed. As such, developing a mutually agreed-upon cohesive  strategy with measureable outcomes can strengthen agencies’  commitment to working collaboratively and enhance the effectiveness of  the CVE effort while keeping stakeholders engaged and invested.
Absent a cohesive strategy with defined measureable outcomes, CVE  partner agencies have been left to develop and take their own individual  actions without a clear understanding of whether and to what extent their  actions will reduce violent extremism in the United States. For example,  agencies such as the Department of Education and the Department of  Health and Human Services are listed in the SIP as two of the agencies  with responsibility for implementing the 2016 SIP. However, the tasks  for which they are listed as partners do not include measurable outcomes  to guide implementation. As another example, in 2016 DHS issued its  own CVE strategy for the department intended to align with the 2016  SIP. It is specific to DHS components and programs, establishes goals,  outcomes, and milestones, and states that DHS will assess progress.  However, DHS’s CVE strategy does not demonstrate how these activities  will integrate with the overall federal CVE effort. Further, it establishes  goals and outcomes for only one of the many departments responsible for  CVE. DHS and DOJ officials speaking on behalf of the CVE Task Force  stated that, as of November 2016, they had not determined if other  stakeholder agencies, such as DOJ, the Department of Education, or the  Department of Health and Human Services, would be developing similar  strategies.
In January 2016, the CVE Task Force was established as the multi- agency body charged with coordinating government efforts and  partnerships to prevent violent extremism in the United States. As such,  it is best positioned to work with federal stakeholders in developing a  cohesive strategy with measureable outcomes. More details on the CVE  Task Force are provided in the following section. Our previous work has  shown that agencies across the federal government have benefited from  applying such strategies to cross cutting programs. By developing a  cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes, CVE stakeholders will be  better able to guide their efforts to ensure measurable progress is made  in CVE.
section_title: No Process for Assessing Overall CVE Progress Is In Place
paragraphs: The CVE Task Force has not established a process for assessing  whether the federal government’s CVE efforts are working. Establishing a  process for assessing progress is a consistent practice of successful  multi-agency collaborative efforts we have previously reviewed.
Moreover, such assessments can help identify successful implementation  and gaps across agencies.
Recognizing the need for assessing the effects of CVE activities, the  2011 SIP described a process in which departments and agencies were  to be responsible for assessing their specific activities in coordination with  an Assessment Working Group. Agencies were to develop a process for  identifying gaps, areas of limited progress, resource needs, and any  additional factors resulting from new information on the dynamics of  radicalization to violence. Further, the progress of the participating  agencies was to be evaluated and reported annually to the President.  However, according to DHS and DOJ officials, the Assessment Working  Group was never created and the process described in the SIP was not  developed. As a result, no process or method for assessing the federal  CVE effort’s progress and holding stakeholders accountable was  established.
Absent a mechanism for assessing the federal CVE effort, in 2015 NCTC,  along with 10 federal agencies, including DHS and DOJ, undertook an  effort to review progress agencies had made in implementing their CVE  responsibilities. According to DHS and DOJ officials, the review, along  with those of the supporting agencies, helped identify areas for continued  focus and improvement in fulfilling the CVE effort. Specifically, the review  team identified the need for clear responsibility and accountability across  the government and with the public. It also identified the need for a  process to assess, prioritize, and allocate resources to maximize impact,  among other needs.
Informed by these efforts, in January 2016 the CVE Task Force was  established as a permanent interagency task force with overall leadership  provided by DHS and DOJ. As previously described, the task force was  charged with coordinating government efforts and partnerships to prevent  violent extremism in the United States. Moreover, the CVE Task Force  was assigned responsibility for synchronizing and integrating CVE  programs and activities and assessing and evaluating them. The CVE  Task Force worked with its partner agencies to develop the 2016 SIP but  did not identify a process or method for assessing whether the overall  CVE effort is working. Instead, the SIP states that it will use prior  evaluations of individual programs to develop guidelines for departments  and agencies to evaluate their own programs. Moreover, according to  CVE Task Force officials, they do not believe that assessing the overall  effectiveness of the federal CVE effort is their responsibility.
Moving forward with the approach identified in the 2016 SIP is likely to  continue to limit the federal government’s understanding of progress  made in CVE efforts to that of individual activities rather than the entirety  of the federal CVE effort. Agencies have conducted assessments of the  effectiveness of some individual CVE programs. However, those  assessments do not address the overarching effectiveness of the CVE  effort. In addition, efforts to evaluate individual CVE initiatives alone will  not provide an overall assessment of progress made in the federal CVE  effort. For example, DOJ funded an evaluation of a community-based  CVE programming effort led by the World Organization for Resource  Development and Education (WORDE). The evaluation assessed  WORDE’s effectiveness in promoting positive social integration and  encouraging public safety in Montgomery County, Maryland. The  evaluation looked at community-based participation in CVE programs,  community awareness of risk factors of radicalization to violent  extremism, and the community’s natural inclinations in response to these  factors. The evaluation provides some insights into how WORDE’s  program worked in Montgomery County, Maryland, but not the overall  federal CVE effort.
Absent a consistent process for assessing the federal CVE effort as a  whole, the federal government lacks the information needed to truly  assess the extent to which the WORDE effort and others have countered  violent extremism. Further, stakeholders will be limited in their efforts to  identify successes and gaps and allocate or leverage resources  effectively. Given that the CVE Task Force, as a permanent interagency  body, is charged with synchronizing and integrating CVE programs and  activities and assessing and evaluating them, the CVE Task Force should  establish a process for assessing overall progress in CVE, including its  effectiveness.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Combatting violent extremism is of critical importance for the United  States. Extremist attacks of all kinds can have perilous effects on the  perceived safety of our nation. It is therefore imperative that the United  States employ effective means for preventing and deterring violent  extremism and related attacks. To help confront this critical need, in 2011  the President issued a CVE strategy and corresponding implementation  plan. However, over 5 years have passed and the federal government  has not developed a cohesive strategy among stakeholder agencies that  provides measurable outcomes to guide the collaborative implementation  of CVE activities. While the CVE Task Force provided a forum for  coordination and led the effort to develop a new SIP, the plan does not  provide stakeholder agencies with specific direction and measures to  identify successes and gaps in the implementation of their activities. In  the absence of a cohesive strategy, DHS has developed its own strategy,  while no such roadmap is in place for the collaborative implementation of  activities by all stakeholder agencies. As the entity responsible for the  synchronization and integration of CVE programs across the government,  the CVE Task Force is well positioned to develop a cohesive strategy that  provides all stakeholder agencies with a clear path forward in achieving  the federal CVE effort’s desired outcomes.
The CVE Task Force, established in part to assess and evaluate CVE  programs, has also not established an approach for assessing overall  progress. Without consistent measures and methodologies for evaluating  CVE as a whole, the federal government lacks the necessary information  needed to assess the extent to which stakeholder agencies are achieving  their goals. Without this information, stakeholders will not be able to  identify successes and gaps and allocate or leverage resources  effectively. When dealing with programs and activities that are designed  to keep Americans safe from the threat of violent extremism, agency  leaders and policy makers need to be able to know how well the federal  government is doing in implementing these activities. Establishing an  approach for assessing progress of the overall CVE effort can help the  CVE Task Force enhance understanding of progress made as a result of  CVE.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent  to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the  Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General—as heads of  the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts—should  direct the CVE Task Force to:  1.  Develop a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes for  2.  Establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE,  including its effectiveness.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education, Health  and Human Services, Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ) and  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). In its written  comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DHS concurred with both of our  recommendations. In comments provided in an email from the DOJ Audit  Liaison, DOJ also concurred with both recommendations. In addition,  DHS, DOJ, and ODNI provided technical comments which we  incorporated as appropriate. The Departments of Education and Health  and Human Services did not comment on the report.
DHS, in its letter, concurred with our recommendation to develop a  cohesive strategy that includes outcomes for CVE activities. DHS also  recognized that additional strategic-level performance documentation will  improve coordination and collaboration tasks among partner agencies, as  well as define how cross-cutting tasks will be implemented and how they  will measurably contribute to achieving federal CVE goals. DHS noted  that the CVE Task Force is developing measurable outcomes to support  and guide the development of performance, effectiveness, and  benchmarks for federally sponsored CVE efforts. DHS stated that the  CVE Task Force plans to report on the progress of implementing the  2016 Strategic Implementation Plan in January 2018. DOJ also concurred  with the recommendation in comments received by email.
DHS also concurred with our recommendation to establish and implement  a process to assess overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness.  DHS, in its comment letter, recognized that such a process will drive an  understanding of the contributions of individual activities in the federal  CVE effort. In DHS’s response, the department maintained that the CVE  Task Force will not be engaged in specific evaluations of its members or  partners, but instead will develop resource guides on methodologies and  measures that federal and non-government partners can use in  evaluating their own CVE efforts. As noted in our report, the CVE Task  Force’s approach of providing guidance on evaluations might enhance  the evaluation efforts of individual programs, but establishing a process  that assesses progress and effectiveness across the federal CVE effort  can provide better insight into the successes and gaps within this multi- agency collaborative effort. DOJ also concurred with the recommendation  in comments received by email.
We are sending copies of this report to Secretary of Education, the  Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of National  Intelligence and appropriate congressional committees and members,  and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no  charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Diana Maurer at  (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made significant contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the extent to which (1) the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other  key stakeholders tasked with Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in the  United States have implemented the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan  (SIP) and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to  implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has developed a  process for assessing overall progress.
To assess the extent to which DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders  tasked with CVE in the United States implemented the 2011 SIP, we  collected and analyzed information from each agency responsible for  leading a task in the 2011 SIP, which included DHS, DOJ, the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center  (NCTC). The FBI was treated as a lead agency for reporting purposes  because it was listed as a lead agency in the SIP. These four agencies  were responsible for domestic CVE activities and were collectively  responsible for implementing 44 out of the 47 tasks in the SIP. We did not  analyze the implementation of 3 of the 47 tasks because they were  international in scope and led by an agency outside of the four agencies  responsible for domestic CVE. Specifically, we did not analyze the  Department of Treasury’s efforts to address terrorism financing, the  Department of Defense’s effort to provide training to military personnel,  and the State Department’s international exchange program. GAO asked  for information from each lead agency on actions taken from December  2011 through December 2016 to address their assigned activities in the  2011 SIP. Based on information provided, one analyst analyzed each  agency’s action(s) to determine whether each task in the SIP had been  implemented, was still in progress, or had not been addressed. A  separate analyst independently reviewed each assessment and narrative.  If there was disagreement on a rating, a third analyst reviewed that  information and made a determination on the final rating. Upon  preliminary completion of the appendix table, GAO sent the table to DHS,  DOJ, FBI, and NCTC and incorporated technical comments as  appropriate. The results of this assessment are shown in appendix III.
To determine the extent to which the federal government has developed a  strategy to implement CVE activities and the CVE Task Force has  developed a process for assessing overall progress, we reviewed the  National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent  Extremism in the United States, the 2011 and 2016 Strategic  Implementation Plans for the strategy, and other documents related to the  creation and activities of the CVE Task Force. Specifically, we reviewed  these documents to identify whether measurable outcomes and  associated metrics had been defined. We interviewed officials from the  stakeholder agencies including DHS, DOJ, the Department of Education,  the Department of Health and Human Services, FBI, and NCTC to  discuss their approaches to CVE and their roles and responsibilities as  part of the federal CVE effort. We compared the practices of the Task  Force to selected leading practices of multi-agency collaborative efforts  identified in prior GAO work as well as selected practices in the GPRA  Modernization Act of 2010. Practices were selected for comparison  based on their applicability to the CVE Task Force. For context and  perspectives on how CVE activities were implemented in local areas we  interviewed a non-generalizable group of community organizations  selected based on their location in the three pilot cities that have adopted  CVE frameworks: Los Angeles, California; Boston, Massachusetts; and  Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2015 to April 2017 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the United States that Resulted in Fatalities, September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016
paragraphs: This appendix provides details on the violent extremist attacks in the  United States based on the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) data  and as described in the background section of this report. Specifically,  tables 1 and 2 show a description, date, location and number of victim  fatalities for each far right and radical Islamist attack between September  12, 2001 and December 31, 2016. During this period, no persons in the  United States were killed in attacks carried out by persons believed to be  motivated by extremist environmental beliefs, extremist “animal liberation”  beliefs, or extremist far left beliefs. The information on these attacks,  including the motivations of the attackers, is from the ECDB, maintained  by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to  Terrorism (START), at the University of Maryland. START is a  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of Excellence. The  ECDB tracks violent extremist incidents in the United States since 1990.  For our analysis, we included the time period from September 12, 2001  through December 31, 2016, to show violent extremist attacks that have  occurred since the September 11, 2001 attacks. We assessed the  reliability of this data source through review of database documentation  and interviews with the ECDB principle investigators. We discussed  cases with the ECDB investigators to clarify details as needed. We  determined that this data source was sufficiently reliable for providing  background information on the problem of violent extremism in the United  States, including the number of attacks and fatalities by ideological  motivation (far right or radical Islamist), year and location.
Far right violent extremist attackers are characterized by ECDB as having  beliefs that include some or all of the following:
Fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in
Suspicious of centralized federal authority;
Reverent of individual liberty (especially right to own guns; be free of
Belief in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national  sovereignty and/or personal liberty;
Belief that one’s personal and/or national “way of life” is under attack  and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent; and
Belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating  in or supporting the need for paramilitary preparations and training or  survivalism.
In addition, according to the ECDB, many persons having violent extreme  far right views express support for some version of white supremacy, the  Ku Klux Klan, and neo-Nazism.
According to the ECDB, attackers with violent radical Islamist beliefs were  generally those who professed some form of belief in or allegiance to the  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qa’ida, or other (radical) Islamist- associated terrorist entities. ECDB’s determination of these beliefs are  based on statements made by attackers prior to, during, or after their  attacks that showed a belief in violent extremist interpretations of Islam,  or evidence gathered by police and other sources about the attackers.
According to the ECDB, all information in the database is collected from  publicly available sources, including mass media reports. ECDB analyzes  this information using a standardized and consistent methodology to  characterize each attack in terms of the ideological motivation. In  addition, ECDB rates the confidence in this assessment of ideological  motivations using standard definitions of the factors that lead a  confidence level on a scale from 0 to 4, where 0 is the lowest level of  confidence and 4 is the highest level of confidence. During our reliability  assessment, it was determined that the far right-motivated attacks  included 12 incidents where there was unclear evidence about the  motivation of the attacker; these 12 were excluded from our analysis.
section_title: Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan
paragraphs: In August 2011, the White House issued the National Strategy for  Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United  States followed by The National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners  to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, Strategic  Implementation Plan (SIP) in December 2011. The SIP designated the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice  (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National  Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as leads or partners for the 44  domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 SIP. From December  2011 through December 2016, federal agencies implemented 19 tasks,  had 23 tasks in progress, and had not yet taken action on 2 tasks. The  tasks fall under three categories: community outreach, research and  training, and capacity building.
The SIP identified 18 community outreach tasks to be implemented by  federal agencies. Community outreach aims to enhance federal  engagement and support to local communities that may be targeted by  violent extremism. For example, community outreach might include  expanding relationships with local business and communities to identify or  prevent violent extremism or integrating CVE activities into community- oriented policing efforts.
The SIP identified 20 research and training tasks to be implemented by  federal agencies. Research and training relates to understanding the  threat of violent extremism, sharing information, and leveraging it to train  government and law enforcement officials. We analyzed implementation  of 19 research and training tasks in the SIP to determine the extent they  had been implemented by the responsible agency(s).
The SIP identified 9 capacity building tasks to be implemented by federal  agencies. Capacity building might include outreach to former violent  extremists to counter violent narratives. We analyzed the implementation  of 8 capacity building tasks in the SIP to determine the extent to which  they had been implemented by the responsible agency(s).
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Joseph Cruz (Assistant  Director), Eric Hauswirth, Kevin Heinz, Tyler Kent, Thomas Lombardi,  Jonathan Tumin, Amber Sinclair, and Adam Vogt made significant  contributions to the report.