Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns Remain
Published: 2005-01-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For years, the Coast Guard has conducted search and rescue operations from its network of stations along the nation's coasts and waterways. In 2001, reviews of station operations found that station readiness--the ability to execute mission requirements in keeping with standards--was in decline. The Coast Guard began addressing these issues, only to see its efforts complicated by expanded post-September 11, 2001, homeland security responsibilities at many stations. GAO reviewed the impact of changing missions on station needs, the progress made in addressing station readiness needs, and the extent to which plans are in place for addressing any remaining needs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Coast Guard does not yet know the extent to which station readiness needs have been affected by post-September 11 changes in mission priorities, although increases in homeland security operations have clearly affected activities and presumably affected readiness needs as well. Following the attacks, stations in and near ports received the bulk of port security duties, creating substantial increases in workloads. The Coast Guard is still in the process of defining long-term activity levels for homeland security and has yet to convert the homeland security mission into specific station readiness requirements. Until it does so, the impact of these new duties on readiness needs cannot be determined. The Coast Guard says it will revise readiness requirements after security activity levels have been finalized. Increased staffing, more training, new boats, more personal protection equipment (such as life vests), and other changes have helped mitigate many long-standing station readiness concerns. However, stations have been unable to meet current Coast Guard standards and goals in the areas of staffing and boats, an indication that stations are still significantly short of desired readiness levels in these areas. Also, because Coast Guard funding practices for personal protection equipment have not changed, stations may have insufficient funding for such equipment in the future. The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for addressing remaining readiness needs. The Coast Guard's strategic plan for these stations has not been updated to reflect increased security responsibilities, and the agency lacks specific planned actions and milestones. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual goals that would allow the agency and others to track stations' progress.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The 188 Coast Guard multimission stations located along the nation’s  coastlines and interior waterways have been a mainstay of one of the  Coast Guard’s oldest missions—finding and rescuing mariners in danger.  In 2001, after a series of search and rescue mishaps, the Coast Guard and  others conducted reviews of station operations. These reviews showed  that station readiness had been declining for more than 20 years and was  continuing to decline. In response to these findings, the Coast Guard  began a long-term effort to address station needs. The response focused in  large part on reconfiguring operations and bolstering resources in four  areas—staffing, training, boats, and the personal protection equipment  used by personnel during operations, such as life vests and survival suits.
This effort, which began prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, was complicated by the new and increased homeland security  responsibilities stations assumed in the wake of the attacks. With the  intensification of maritime security operations, the Coast Guard faces  additional challenges in reorganizing resources to meet potential maritime  threats and at the same time reach new and sustainable levels of  readiness.
The term “readiness,” as used by the Coast Guard, involves more than the  ability to carry out required operations, such as a rescue or a security  patrol; it involves the ability to do so at a sustainable level while adhering  to agency standards. For example, a station may have enough personnel to  carry out rescues and other required missions, but not enough to meet  agency standards that specify the number of hours personnel should work.  In this scenario, the station is not considered fully ready because it is not  complying with agency standards and, therefore, may have difficulty  maintaining its performance over an extended period. However, as the  example illustrates, a lack of full readiness should not be interpreted as an  inability to meet basic mission responsibilities. Moreover, readiness  requirements can change depending on the needs of the mission. While  some assets at a station may not fully meet readiness requirements for  certain missions, they can be used to perform other missions. For  example, a rescue boat with a mechanical problem that precluded  operating it at top speed would not meet full readiness requirements for  rescues or high-speed chases, but it could meet requirements for missions  that did not typically require high speeds, such as patrols or vessel escorts.  Thus, a lack of full readiness does not affect all missions equally.
This report, the second of two reviews directed by Congress on  multimission station operations, focuses on the Coast Guard’s progress in  addressing long-standing station readiness needs while balancing  changing mission demands. Specifically, this report addresses the extent  to which the Coast Guard:    has experienced a change in multimission station readiness needs as a  result of post-September 11 changes in mission priorities;   has been able to address readiness concerns through the addition of  resources in the areas of personnel, training, boats, and personal  protection equipment; and   has plans in place for addressing any readiness needs that may still exist.
To address these objectives, we analyzed Coast Guard data, reviewed  relevant documents, and interviewed headquarters and field officials. The  key data we reviewed included (1) station resource (boat) hour data, used  to track the number of hours spent on individual missions; (2) port  activities data, used to monitor security operations at key ports;  (3) various operations data (in the areas of staffing, training, boats, and  personal protection equipment), used to monitor station needs; and  (4) fiscal year 2003 results from the Coast Guard’s annual station workload  survey, used to assess changes in personnel workloads. On the basis of  interviews with knowledgeable agency officials, data assessments from  previous reports, and reviews of existing documentation, we determined  that these data were sufficiently reliable for this report. To better  understand stations’ readiness needs and how those needs have changed  over time, we also visited 8 multimission stations on the Pacific and  Atlantic coasts and interviewed relevant field officials. The stations were  selected based on geographic location, proximity to a strategic port, and  the number of station resource hours expended on various missions  during fiscal year 2003. To further explore how changes in mission  priorities after September 11 affected stations, we interviewed by  telephone officials responsible for operations at 8 additional stations,  located at various strategic ports, which we selected based on the number  of station resource hours expended on port security operations. For  security purposes, the 16 stations we visited or reviewed through  telephone interviews are not identified in this report. On the basis of input  from station personnel, we also interviewed officials from 13 local and  state organizations that have partnerships with 8 of the stations we  reviewed. Appendix I explains in more detail the scope of our work and  the methodology we used. We conducted our work for this second report  from September 2003 through December 2004 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: What Are Multimission Stations?
paragraphs: As shore-based units located along the nation’s coasts and interior  waterways, the Coast Guard’s 188 multimission stations conduct a wide  range of operations, from rescuing mariners in distress to patrolling ports  against acts of terrorism. The stations are involved in all Coast Guard  programs, including search and rescue, port security, recreational and  commercial fishing vessel safety, marine environmental response, and law  enforcement (drug and migrant interdiction). Their involvement varies  geographically from one Coast Guard district to the next, depending on  differing conditions among regions. Some program operations also vary  depending on the season—for example, search and rescue operations are  greater in the summer when recreational boating is more active and lower  in the winter. Because stations are traditionally associated with search and  rescue operations, they can be compared to fire stations, in the sense that  crew members remain at the station for extended periods, on duty, ready  to respond to an emergency.
Stations range in size from as few as 4 personnel at seasonal stations to as  many as 60 personnel at larger stations. Individual stations are usually  commanded by a command cadre consisting of an officer-in-charge—such  as a senior chief petty officer—an executive petty officer, and an  engineering petty officer. The command cadre is responsible for  overseeing personnel, equipment, and mission-related issues. In support of  operations, the stations also provide unit-level (on-the-job) training as well  as equipment and minor boat maintenance. As shown in table 1, stations  employ personnel in numerous occupations, but the principal staff usually  consists of boatswain’s mates—those who operate the boats and carry out  many station duties. In addition to performing essential station  responsibilities, boatswains’ mates can undergo additional training for  more advanced occupations, such as a coxswain (a boat driver) or a  surfman (a coxswain who is qualified to operate boats in heavy weather  and high surf conditions).
Like the number of personnel, the number of boats at stations varies.  Small, seasonal stations may have only one boat, while larger stations can  have as many as nine. Table 2 describes the type of boats stations typically  operate. (see app. II for pictures of selected boats). All station personnel  are required to wear personal protection equipment (PPE), while  operating or riding in a boat. Coast Guard personnel use PPE to protect  against various dangers, such as inclement weather and cold water  exposure. PPE includes items such as life vests, helmets, goggles, gloves,  cold weather protection suits, thermal underwear, and electronic location  devices. (See app. II for more information on the nature and use of PPE.)
section_title: What Are the Roles of Multimission Stations in Port and Nonport Areas?
paragraphs: Following the events of September 11, the Coast Guard created a new  program area for homeland security operations—the Ports, Waterways,  and Coastal Security (PWCS) program. The type and frequency of PWCS  activities performed by stations varies depending on whether a station is  located in a port area or in a nonport area. Stations located in or near a  port tend to perform more PWCS tasks, such as patrolling, escorting  vessels, and other duties. The responsibilities can vary by port, however,  depending on several factors, including the availability of other Coast  Guard units to share in operations, the strategic importance of the port,  and the support of non-Coast Guard entities—such as state and local  agencies—in both homeland and nonhomeland security activities.  Although stations located in nonport areas also conduct PWCS operations,  such as patrolling waterways, they tend to have fewer PWCS  responsibilities. In general, stations located in nonport areas do not have  the responsibility of maintaining the security of critical infrastructure,  high-profile vessels, or shore operations as do stations located in port  areas. As tactical units, stations do not determine the nature or frequency  of their tasks; rather, they carry out the tasks assigned to them by  operational units, which provide oversight as well as operational and  administrative support to the stations.
section_title: Why Is Readiness a Concern?
paragraphs: In 2001, studies by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and a Coast  Guard internal review team found that readiness conditions at  multimission stations had been deteriorating for over 20 years. The  studies, which had largely consistent findings, identified readiness  concerns in the areas of staffing, training, and boats and presented  recommendations for addressing these concerns. Table 3 presents  selected findings from these studies, as well as congressional concerns  regarding station readiness. In December 2002, in response to a  recommendation from the OIG and at the direction of the Senate  Appropriations Committee, the Coast Guard developed a draft strategic  plan to maintain and improve essential capability of all its boat force units,  including stations. The plan recognized that stations did not have  sufficient resources to be fully capable of meeting all their workload  requirements and that it would take both increases in resources as well as  “more judicious tasking by operational commanders” to address the  imbalance. In its 2003 report on station operations, the OIG criticized the  plan for being too general in nature, specifically regarding how and when  the Cost Guard will increase staffing, training, equipment, and experience  levels at stations.
section_title: Added Security Responsibilities Had Impact on Readiness Needs but Extent of Impact Unknown
paragraphs: Added security responsibilities after the September 11 attacks had a  definite—but as yet unmeasured—impact on stations’ readiness needs.  Stations have seen a substantial increase in their security workload, along  with a shifting of activity levels in other missions. The effect of these  changes on readiness needs is still largely undetermined, mainly because  the Coast Guard has not yet translated the security-related mission  responsibilities into specific staffing standards and other requirements.  Until it does so, the impact of increased responsibilities on readiness  cannot be determined nor can the Coast Guard or others measure progress  made in meeting station needs. With the support of state and local entities,  stations and other units appear to be meeting the majority of port security  responsibilities identified in the Coast Guard’s interim guidelines.
subsections: section_title: Stations Have Increased Operations to Address Homeland Security Responsibilities
paragraphs: After September 11, the Coast Guard’s multimission stations experienced a  substantial rise in overall activity levels. Following the attacks, the Coast  Guard elevated the priority of the homeland security program to a level  commensurate with search and rescue, and according to field and  headquarters officials, stations were assigned the brunt of the Coast  Guard’s port security responsibilities. These responsibilities led to  considerable increases in the stations’ security workloads. One way to see  this change is in the number of hours that station boats were operated  before and after September 11. Station boat hours increased by 44 percent  from a level of about 217,000 hours prior to the terrorist attacks to more  than 300,000 hours by the end of fiscal year 2004 (see fig. 1).  Coast Guard  officials explained that increases in boat hours were due to increased  homeland security responsibilities and the 160 additional boats and  personnel stations received from fiscal years 2002 to 2004.
While total boat hours for stations increased following September 11, the  trend among specific programs varied greatly, with some programs  experiencing substantial increases and others experiencing declines  (see fig. 2). Most notably, boat hours for the PWCS program increased by  almost 1,900 percent between pre-September 11 levels and fiscal year  2004. Coast Guard officials attributed the increases in PWCS hours to  (1) stations’ expanded homeland security responsibilities, (2) several  elevations in the Maritime Security Condition (MARSEC) after 2001, and  (3) acquisition of new boats and additional personnel stations received in  fiscal years 2002 through 2004. Conversely, during the same period, hours  dedicated to nonhomeland security programs decreased. For example,  boat hours expended for search and rescue decreased by 15 percent, while  hours for living marine resources decreased by 61 percent.
Similar trends emerge in the limited data available about how Coast Guard  personnel spend their time at stations. While the Coast Guard does not  formally track the number of work hours station personnel spend on each  program (either when operating a boat or while at the station), it does  administer a survey each year to personnel at selected stations, asking  them to estimate how they spent their time over an average week or week  period in August. Survey results indicated that the number of hours spent  on PWCS activities increased for those responding by about 29 percent  between calendar years 2002 and 2003, while the number of hours spent  on search and rescue activities decreased by about 12 percent.
Coast Guard officials told us that although the stations’ workload has  increased since September 11, mission performance has not suffered. This  does not mean that they believe stations’ readiness needs were not  affected by the increase in operations, only that stations have been able to  sustain expected performance despite increased workloads. Officials  responsible for overseeing operations at the stations we contacted  explained that stations have been able to sustain performance levels by  achieving greater efficiencies in operations, specifically by (1) conducting  multiple missions during port security operations and (2) coordinating  their efforts with state and local organizations. They also noted that  stations have received additional boats and personnel since September 11.  It is likely that other factors also play a role in this issue. Our prior work  on the Coast Guard’s overall use of resources suggests an additional  possible factor, such as decreases in search and rescue responsibilities  over time. This work also showed that even in those program areas in  which the number of boat hours declined following September 11, the  Coast Guard was generally able to meet performance goals.
section_title: Effect of Homeland Security Responsibilities on Readiness Needs Not Yet Known
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has not yet determined the extent to which changes in  post-September 11 mission priorities—specifically, increases in homeland  security responsibilities—have affected station readiness needs. Coast  Guard officials told us there are two reasons for this. First, the Coast  Guard’s maritime homeland security requirements are being revised to  better align with current resource levels. The Coast Guard is currently  working under Operation Neptune Shield, an interim set of guidelines that  establishes Coast Guard’s homeland security activity levels—taskings— under each MARSEC level. However, because the guidelines call for a level  of operations that exceeds the Coast Guard’s current resource levels, the  Coast Guard is in the process of revising the guidelines. Officials told us  they expect the new, long-term, risk-based requirements to establish more  realistic activity levels that better align with existing resources and take  into account support from state and local organizations at strategic ports.  Officials told us they expect to have new activity level standards finalized  by February 2005. Under these new standards—requirements—it is  possible that station workload levels may change. Officials also told us  that although the new requirements, known as the Strategic Deployment  Plan, will better align security operations with existing resources, the  Coast Guard will need to monitor this balance in the future given the  dynamic nature of homeland security issues.
Second, because homeland security requirements have yet to be finalized,  the Coast Guard has begun, but not yet completed, efforts to update  station staffing standards and other requirements to reflect post- September 11 changes in mission priorities and station readiness needs.  Officials told us that once homeland security requirements have been  finalized under the Strategic Deployment Plan, they will revise station  staffing standards and other requirements to better reflect readiness  needs. Although station staffing levels have been increased in response to  the new homeland security priorities and past reports of staffing readiness  concerns, the staffing standards are still based upon pre-September 11  mission priorities (i.e., search and rescue operational levels). Until the  Coast Guard can translate the impact of security-related activities into  specific station requirements, the impact of the new homeland security  responsibilities on station readiness needs cannot be determined.  Furthermore, without specific requirements, neither the Coast Guard nor  others can measure the progress made in meeting station readiness needs.
section_title: With Assistance from Other Entities, Most Stations Can Perform Expected Port Security Operations
paragraphs: While the impact of new responsibilities on overall readiness needs  remains unknown, there is evidence that most stations have been able to  meet the port security responsibilities—i.e., activity levels—expected of  them given their available resources and, in some cases, all security  responsibilities with the help of other entities. Since the level of security  activities established under the interim guidelines exceeds available  resources, the Coast Guard has communicated to stations and other units  that they are expected to carry out security operations within the  constraints of existing resources. The Coast Guard does not track station- specific performance regarding port security responsibilities, but in 2003 it  developed an unofficial evaluation system that indicates that current  security responsibilities for major ports—for which stations bear  significant responsibility—are largely being met. This evaluation system— referred to as the Scorecard system—captures activity levels for selected  PWCS standards at ports of high military and economic significance.  However, it is important to note that the Scorecard results are not station- specific in that (1) they do not separate tasks handled by stations from  those of other entities (either Coast Guard or other) that address port  security needs and (2) stations that do not contribute to port security are  not included. Nonetheless, the Scorecard results do provide some  indication that at least some stations are for the most part able to meet  their current port security responsibilities. Furthermore, of the 16 stations  we reviewed, officials from all but 1 told us that PWCS responsibilities—as  identified by the interim guidelines—were being met. In most instances,  stations reported meeting PWCS responsibilities with the assistance of  state and local entities, which were either directly performing PWCS tasks  or performing other mission responsibilities—such as fisheries  enforcement or search and rescue—that allowed station personnel to  focus on PWCS responsibilities.
There are also clear signs that partnerships with other agencies and other  Coast Guard units play an essential role in the stations’ ability to meet  assigned homeland security tasks. Most of the officials responsible for  overseeing operations at the 16 stations we reviewed told us that their  stations have been able to meet increased operational responsibilities only  by sharing overall tasks—nonhomeland security-related as well as  homeland security-related—with state and local partners as well as other  Coast Guard entities. Officials explained that they have developed two  main types of partnerships. First, they have established partnerships with  local organizations such as police, fire, and marine patrol units to conduct  port security operations as well as nonhomeland security activities.  Officials at the majority of stations we contacted told us that they rely on  assistance from marine patrol units to conduct patrols of key  infrastructure, such as harbor docks; officials from several stations also  indicated that these units assist with vessel escorts. Officials also told us  that stations rely on partner organizations to conduct nonhomeland  security activities, such as search and rescue, and that expanded  partnership efforts have resulted in operational efficiencies. For example,  officials representing one station located at a major port told us that a  local partner increased its search and rescue operations following  September 11, allowing the Coast Guard station to focus more of its efforts  on homeland security operations.
Second, stations have relied on varying levels of support from other Coast  Guard components, namely, Marine Safety Offices (MSO) and Maritime  Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), to conduct port security operations.  Station officials we interviewed told us that the level of support provided  by both components varied. For example, MSST support varied by  geographic location. One official told us that certain MSSTs located on the  Pacific Coast each set aside 5,000 hours a year to perform port security  operations, while those on the East Coast do not. Headquarters officials  told us that because the Coast Guard is still considering the role MSSTs  will play in port security operations, the amount of support they provide to  stations will vary. One senior headquarters official told us that newly  established MSSTs can generally provide only a limited amount of support  because of initial training requirements. As the MSSTs mature, they are  usually able to assume greater responsibilities for port security operations.
While stations’ efforts to leverage external support are commendable, the  extent to which they can continue to rely on that support is unclear. To  better understand the potential for support levels to change, we contacted  a number of state and local organizations that partner with the stations we  interviewed. We asked them if they expected their level of support would  change in the future. Of the 13 organizations we contacted, officials from  12 organizations told us that since the September 11 attacks, they have  either directly increased port security operations or increased other  operations—such as search and rescue—that enable Coast Guard stations  to focus on port security and other missions. One of the organizations we  contacted explained that they had plans to decrease resource levels  allocated to port security in future years. In addition, another 6  organizations we contacted emphasized that while they did not have plans  in place to reduce funding levels for port security, they were not confident  that future funding would continue at current levels.
section_title: Progress Made in Addressing Readiness Concerns but Stations Are Still Unable to Meet Standards and Goals
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has made progress in addressing multimission station  readiness concerns identified prior to September 11. The Coast Guard has  increased station staffing levels by 25 percent, expanded formal training  programs and increased training capacity, begun modernizing its small  boat fleet, and as of fiscal year 2003 appeared to have provided station  personnel with appropriate amounts of PPE. However, despite this  progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet existing readiness standards  and goals in the areas of staffing and boats and does not have adequate  processes in place to help ensure the future funding of station PPE, a  shortcoming that could result in an insufficient supply of PPE at stations  in future years.
subsections: section_title: Station Staffing Levels Have Increased but Key Staffing Standards and Goals Have Not Yet Been Met
paragraphs: Since 2001, the Coast Guard has developed a variety of initiatives aimed at  resolving long-standing staffing concerns at multimission stations. Table 4  presents a selection of the initiatives, either planned or under way, that we  identified as noteworthy in addressing station staffing needs. (App. II  contains a more detailed description of the initiatives.)
In addition to increasing the number of personnel and positions allotted to  stations by 25 and 12 percent, respectively, the Coast Guard has begun to  reconfigure aspects of the station staffing program to provide more  effective operations. For example, in an effort to provide a more  appropriate mix of positions and skills at stations and to address concerns  about insufficient numbers of senior personnel, the Coast Guard added 99  support officer positions in fiscal years 2002 through 2004, and 486 senior  petty officer positions in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. According to one  official, the additional support positions will allow station command cadre  to spend less time on administrative work and more time on operations.  Recognizing that in the past a significant number of positions had been  initially filled with unqualified personnel, the Coast Guard plans to take  steps to base assignments on position requirements and experience.  Furthermore, once long-term homeland security responsibilities have been  determined, the Coast Guard plans to complete steps it has already begun  to reconfigure its station staffing standards, which define the number and  type of positions at stations based on mission requirements. The  reconfiguration is expected to better align staffing resources with mission  activities. Despite this progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet five key  standards and goals related to staffing at the stations. Each is discussed  below.
subsections: section_title: Adherence to Workweek Standards
paragraphs: Most notably, despite increases in station staffing levels over the past 2  years and other actions, average station workweek hours continue to  exceed, by significant levels, the 68-hour standard established by the Coast  Guard in 1988 to limit fatigue and stress among station personnel.  According to the Coast Guard’s Boat Forces Strategic Plan, excessive  workweek hours is symptomatic of “the adverse operational trends,  identified lack of resources, and general reduction in …readiness”  experienced by stations in recent years. Moreover, the plan also notes  that the high number of stations working in excess of 68 hours shows that  “staffing continues to be a significant problem at stations.” According to  estimates from Coast Guard surveys of station personnel, although the  average work week at stations decreased somewhat between 1998 and  2003, since 1994 it has not dropped below 81 hours per week. It should be  noted that these survey data, although the best source of information  available on station workweek hours, may have limitations. That is, the  survey is administered every August—during both the peak search and  rescue season and the Coast Guard’s period for rotating personnel—and it  may be that a year-round average, which would include off-peak, winter  hours, would be lower. In addition, although response rates for every year  were not readily available, the 2003 response rate was relatively low, with  only a little over half of the personnel surveyed responding.
An explanation of how workweek hours are measured may be helpful in  interpreting this workweek information. The way in which the workweek  is measured at stations is similar to the way it is measured in professions  such as firefighting, in that personnel are on duty for an extended amount  of time—such as 24 hours—to respond to emergencies but may spend part  of it in recreation, sleep, exercise, training, or other activities. Personnel  can thus be on duty or off duty for consecutive periods of time during a  week. Workweek hours are calculated by totaling the amount of hours  spent on duty or at a station, over a 1-week period, or averaging the  amount of time spent on duty over a 2-week period. The Coast Guard’s  2003 survey of stations indicated that slightly less than half of all  respondents reported working either an average 77- or 84-hour workweek.  Approximately 6 percent of respondents reported working a 68-hour  workweek. (See app. II for more information regarding these results.)
According to the Coast Guard, working excessively long hours leads to  injury and illness. Officials told us that station personnel can exceed the  68-hour work week standard in one of two ways. First, they can be  assigned to a work schedule that averages to more than 68 hours a week,  such as an 84-hour schedule. The work schedule, which is determined by  the officer-in-charge, defines the number of days personnel spend on duty  and is therefore the primary driver of whether personnel will consistently  work an average of 68 hours per week or some number above that  amount. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each of  the many possible schedules stations can adopt—table 5 shows a  comparison of the 68- and 84-hour work schedules. For example, a  potential disadvantage to having personnel work the 68-hour schedule is  that it requires stations to retain more qualified personnel for duty work  than the 84-hour schedule, which could be one reason why officers-in- charge who are short of qualified personnel would use the higher hour  schedule. The 84-hour schedule, in contrast, requires smaller numbers of  qualified personnel, which could be of benefit to stations with high  workloads and too few qualified personnel. It could also be preferred by  some personnel because it provides for 3-day weekends. However, a  significant disadvantage to the 84-hour schedule, as noted in the station  operations and training manual, is that it puts personnel “at significant  risk of exceeding fatigue standards,” which is why it is normally restricted  to stations with low numbers of response-driven cases. In other words,  personnel at stations that have a greater number of response operations— such as rescue cases—are at a higher risk of exceeding fatigue standards  because they are underway (that is, operating a boat) more often. The  Coast Guard’s 1991 staffing study found that long hours on duty resulted in  lost time among personnel because of illness and injury, as well as  increased attrition levels. According to officials, in the late 1990s the  Coast Guard switched from an 84-hour standard—which it had adopted to  better meet significant staffing shortages—to the present 68-hour standard  because of concerns about crew fatigue and an increasing number of boat  accidents.
A second way personnel can exceed the 68-hour schedule is by working  overtime, which, if significant, can also lead to lost time due to illness and  injury. Overtime generally occurs when required operations exceed the  number of qualified, available personnel. As with the 84-hour work  schedule, significant amounts of overtime can increase the likelihood that  personnel will exceed Coast Guard fatigue standards and can lead to lower  retention levels for trained personnel.
Field and headquarters officials told us that at most stations, the high  number of hours worked is being driven by the following factors:    an increase in homeland security responsibilities;    an increase in the number of inexperienced personnel;  the formation of MSSTs, which siphoned experienced and qualified  crewmembers from stations; and   a lack of sufficient support for training, building and equipment  maintenance, and administrative duties.
Of these factors, the primary one is the increased homeland security role.  One senior official told us that although increased staffing levels may have  been sufficient to meet pre-September 11 mission needs, the homeland  security mission has greatly expanded the stations’ workload, and it is  unknown whether current staffing levels will be sufficient to meet  operational requirements as well as the 68-hour work week standard.  According to senior Coast Guard officials, it may take 5 to 10 years before  the 68-hour standard is attained at all stations because of the high levels of  inexperienced personnel and other issues previously discussed. In fact,  one senior official questioned whether stations will ever reach the goal  given competing Coast Guard priorities. Officials told us that the Coast  Guard will not be able to determine optimum station staffing levels until  (1) long-term homeland security requirements have been identified,  (2) inexperienced staff have grown into senior positions, and (3) all new  staffing initiatives (such as increased administrative support) have taken  effect. Until these issues have been addressed, officials said it is likely that  stations with high workloads and resource constraints will continue to  work longer work weeks.
section_title: Appropriate Mix of Junior and Senior Personnel
paragraphs: The Office of Boat Forces’ targeted goal for senior personnel, as a  percentage of total station personnel, is 50 percent; as of March 2004,  senior staff comprised about 37 percent of total staff. Officials told us that  in recent years stations have received a significant number of relatively  inexperienced personnel, which has skewed staffing proportions, and that  it will take at least 3 years to increase the number of senior personnel to  desired levels.
section_title: Adherence to Full Assignment Length
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has yet to meet its goal of an average 48-month station  assignment (tour of duty) for experienced personnel. According to Coast  Guard data, the average tour of duty length for boatswain’s mates  increased from 33 months in 1999 to 35 months in 2000, but has remained  fairly constant between 35 and 36 months through 2003. Although  assignment practices have been modified for some personnel to allow for  longer tour lengths at stations, officials told us that meeting the 48-month  goal will be a challenge given that stations draw upon a pool of personnel  they share with other units—such as ships—that generally require shorter  tours of duty. Thus, significant changes to station assignment policies will  affect these other units. One senior official told us that although the  stations may not meet the 48-month goal in the foreseeable future, given  competing personnel needs from other units, even extending the average  tour length to 36 months would be a significant improvement. Increasing  the tour length lessens the training burden on senior station personnel  (i.e., they end up training fewer new personnel) and allows a station to  reap the benefits of the training it has already invested in junior  personnel.
section_title: Sufficient Levels of Qualified Surfmen
paragraphs: Stations continue to experience a shortage of qualified surfmen. As of  June 2004, approximately 42 percent of surfman positions were not filled  with qualified personnel. According to training and program officials, in  the past this shortage stemmed from difficulties in recruiting sufficient  numbers of applicants, because of several factors: (1) a long training  process of 3 to 6 years (deters potential applicants);  (2) higher  workloads (because of the shortage of qualified personnel); (3) remote  assignment locations (surfman stations are largely located in remote areas  of the Northwest); (4) obstacles to promotion (promotion to senior  enlisted ranks requires a year of sea duty, which surfmen, who are needed  at stations, have difficulty obtaining); and (5) program challenges (make it  difficult to retain bonus pay benefits).
To address these challenges, the Coast Guard has revised relevant  personnel policies to facilitate career advancement and to clarify the  process for becoming a surfman. The Coast Guard has also revamped the  surfman training program by developing courses that that address training  needs. Regarding the former, the Coast Guard has (1) eased requirements  for advancement (waived the requirement for 1 year of sea duty for  promotion to senior positions) and (2) allowed surfmen to retain special  pay status after they transfer to a new station and are in the process of  certifying for their new area of operation. Beginning in May 2005,  surfmen will also receive additional points on their service-wide exams,  the scores of which are used to determine promotions. Regarding training,  the Coast Guard has concentrated on a two-pronged approach. First, to  increase the number of trainees who actually qualify as surfmen, in 2004  the Coast Guard implemented a new 2-year intensive training program that  will require trainees to reside at the surfman training center; this will allow  trainees to concentrate more fully on the training process. Officials told us  they would not know the impact of this new training initiative until 2006,  when the first class of resident trainees graduates. Second, to improve  formal training for personnel who are qualifying through on-the-job  training at their stations, in November 2004, the Coast Guard implemented  a new 2-week surfman course. Because the course was designed in part to  relieve the training burden on stations (which are short of qualified  surfmen who can serve as instructors), trainees will complete most of  their qualification requirements during training. Officials expected 18  students to take the course during the winter of 2004.
section_title: Matching Number of Personnel with Number of Positions
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has not met its goal of aligning the number of individuals  assigned to stations with the number of designated positions, making it  unclear whether station staffing levels (individuals assigned to stations),  which are currently greater than designated positions, will remain at  current levels or decrease, potentially affecting station workweek hours  and other issues. At the end of fiscal year 2004, the estimated number of  personnel assigned to stations exceeded the number of Coast Guard- designated positions by an estimated 1,019 (or about 17 percent of total  estimated personnel assigned to stations). Because the 1,019 personnel  are not assigned to permanent positions, and thus their assignment is  potentially more temporary than that of other personnel, the Coast Guard  could not assure us that the estimated fiscal year 2004 station staffing level  of 5,925 personnel will be maintained in the future. In contrast, the  number of designated positions—4,906 at the end of fiscal year 2004—is  considered permanent. Officials told us that although the Coast Guard’s  goal is to align personnel and position levels, it has been necessary to  assign a greater number of less experienced staff to the stations, above  designated staffing levels, to develop required numbers of senior staff  (officials estimate it takes three junior personnel to produce one senior  crew member). Attrition patterns, limited space on ships, and the need to  expose junior personnel to on-the-job-training are driving factors in this  decision. The Coast Guard does not plan to add either additional  personnel or positions to stations in fiscal year 2005; rather, it will use this  time to evaluate current station resource levels and give junior personnel  time to gain experience and become fully trained. It is unclear how this  decision may affect staffing levels—if staffing levels drop, the number of  hours station personnel work might increase. On the other hand, if lower  staffing levels are accompanied by higher levels of experienced personnel,  then workweek hours might be unaffected or even decline. The impact  will also depend in part on other factors, such as the implementation of  remaining staffing initiatives—such as the station staffing standards—and  the nature of future homeland security responsibilities.
section_title: Coast Guard Has Formalized the Majority of Its Training and Taken Steps to Increase Training Capacity at National Training Centers
paragraphs: Since 2001, the Coast Guard has made progress in developing a more  formalized training program and in expanding the number of training slots  available for the majority of station occupations. As late as August 2003,  when we began our work, the Coast Guard had yet to determine whether  formal training delivered in a classroom environment was preferable to  on-the-job training—administered by senior personnel at stations—or  whether it should utilize a combination of both on a long-term basis.  Subsequently, the Coast Guard identified formal training as its preferred  training method because, according to officials, it provides greater  accountability for consistent and uniform training across all occupations  and stations. To date, the Coast Guard has taken steps to formalize or  augment several aspects of station training, including boatswain’s mate  and boat driver training. With respect to boatswain’s mate training, in  fiscal year 2002 the Coast Guard instituted a formal training center with  the capacity to train 120 trainees per year; during fiscal year 2003 it more  than tripled the center’s capacity to 450 training slots. Training officials  told us they plan to further expand the capacity of the center each year  through 2006, when its annual capacity is expected to reach 1,000 slots,  the estimated number of new boatswain’s mates needed each year.  Furthermore, in conjunction with efforts to modernize its boat fleet, in  fiscal year 2003 the Coast Guard increased the amount of formal training  available to boat drivers who were learning to operate new response boats  and nonstandard boats. Training officials told us that they employed a  two-pronged approach to train operators on the new boats using on-site  training teams, which conduct training at the stations, and a new 2-week  national training center course. Table 6 provides additional information  regarding the Coast Guard’s initiatives to address training needs. (See app.  II for a more detailed discussion of the Coast Guard’s planned and ongoing  initiatives regarding station training needs.)
According to officials, the Coast Guard’s efforts to train boat drivers were  developed to address missions with greatest priority as well as for training  needs for new boats going into service. For example, in 2003 and 2004,  training teams were deployed to all strategic ports to provide training in  tactical operations, an emerging requirement following the attacks of  September 11. In addition, to address safety concerns associated with the  operation of nonstandard boats, officials told us that training efforts were  targeted at stations that would retain nonstandard boats, while the Coast  Guard completes its program to replace stations’ nonstandard boats.
section_title: Progress Made in Modernizing Boat Fleet, but Inspection Results Indicate Weaknesses in Boat Readiness
paragraphs: Since 2001, the Coast Guard has made progress in restructuring the  stations’ boat fleet to address safety and operational concerns resulting  from aging and nonstandard boats. The Coast Guard has focused a major  part of its efforts on replacing an assorted variety of nonstandard small  boats with new, standardized boats. Officials told us that although the  Coast Guard had just started planning the acquisition of the new boats in  2001, following the attacks of September 11, it expedited the purchase of  100 of the new boats to meet stations’ increased homeland security  responsibilities. Approximately 50 of these boats were distributed to  stations located at strategic ports, to provide quick response capabilities  for port security operations, and to stations in critical need of new boat  replacement. The remaining 50 boats were distributed to MSSTs. In 2003,  the Coast Guard developed a multiyear contract to replace the remainder  of stations’ aging and nonstandard boats with an estimated 350 new boats.  The Coast Guard has also initiated efforts to replace the aging 41-foot  utility boat fleet, which will reach the end of its 25-year service life  beginning in 2005, with a medium-size utility boat. Officials told us that as  of August 2003 the Coast Guard was in the process of reviewing three  medium boat prototypes and that they expect to select a manufacturer in  2005. In addition, in 2003, the Coast Guard completed the replacement of  the 30-year old 44-foot motor lifeboat with a fleet of new 47-foot motor life  boats. Table 7 describes the Coast Guard’s actions to address concerns  regarding the stations’ boat fleet. (See app. II for a more detailed  discussion of ongoing and planned efforts for addressing station boat  needs.)
Despite this progress, the Coast Guard has yet to meet mission readiness  goals for medium-sized boats (utility and motor life boats), as indicated by  internal inspection results. The Office of Boat Forces’ goal is for  80 percent of boats inspected to meet readiness standards at the initial  inspection. Results from the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2003 inspections  indicate that only 16 percent of the motor lifeboats and utility boats  inspected met mission readiness goals when initially inspected. After a 1- day opportunity to correct identified problems, approximately 81 percent  had met readiness goals. It is important to note that the majority of the  discrepancies cited were not of such severity that they would prevent the  boats from being used in most mission operations. For example, the  failure of navigation lights on a 41-foot utility boat could preclude the boat  from being operated (i.e., disable it) until the lights were fixed or the  operational commander issued a waiver outlining the conditions under  which the boat could be operated. Boats that receive waivers are  considered able to “perform some missions, but not all missions safely.”  In this scenario, the boat’s failure to meet full readiness standards would  not necessarily affect the station’s operational readiness. Officials also told  us that in order to ensure that operational readiness is maintained at  stations when a boat is disabled, all multimission stations have more than  one boat.
Officials attributed the inability of stations to meet full readiness standards  for boats to the following:    Junior engineers did not have the necessary experience to perform  maintenance in compliance with operating manuals and configuration  updates from the manufacturer.
Engineers lacked sufficient time to perform maintenance because of  increased operational hours (that is, the boats are being used more often,  and the engineers assigned to perform maintenance are spending more  time conducting boat operations).
Station utility boats were reaching the end of their service life and had  deteriorated to the point that they required more maintenance to meet  mission readiness standards.
New boats are more technologically advanced (e.g., satellite navigation  systems) requiring specialized technical training in order to perform  maintenance.
Officials told us that they are taking various steps to respond to these  issues. First, to compensate for the lack of experience among junior  engineers, the Coast Guard intends to intensify the training that is  provided to engineers for the motor lifeboat. In November 2004, the Coast  Guard implemented a 2-week course focused specifically on motor  lifeboat operations and maintenance. The Coast Guard does not have  plans, however, to provide specialized training for utility boat  maintenance, given that these boats are at the end of their life span and  will be replaced within a few years with new medium response boats.  Likewise, the replacement of the utility boats will address low scores  related to their deteriorating condition. Regarding the lack of time  engineers have to perform maintenance, officials told us that this issue will  be examined after the Coast Guard has reassessed changes in station  workloads following September 11.
section_title: Processes and Practices for Estimating PPE Funding Needs Result in Allocation Shortfalls
paragraphs: As of the end of fiscal year 2003, station personnel appeared to have  sufficient PPE, but the Coast Guard does not have adequate processes and  practices in place to help prevent funding shortfalls from recurring. The  Coast Guard’s continued use of these processes and practices in fiscal  year 2004 resulted in a $1.9 million shortfall in estimated PPE funding  needs for that year. As we discussed in our previous report, following the  expenditure of an additional $5.6 million on PPE in fiscal year 2003 to  address perceived shortfalls, active and reserve station personnel  appeared to possess sufficient PPE. However, the Coast Guard’s processes  and practices for estimating station PPE needs and allocating funds have  historically resulted in an underfunding of station PPE, despite  congressional direction to provide adequate supplies of PPE. If these  funding practices are not modified, funding shortfalls could continue to  occur in the future. Moreover, such funding shortages would affect the  Coast Guard’s ability to meet one of its strategic objectives for stations— namely, to ensure that station personnel are properly outfitted with  mission-specific equipment, such as PPE. A shortfall in estimated PPE  funding needs of $1.9 million occurred in fiscal year 2004, although the  actual impact of the shortfall—in terms of PPE that was needed but not  purchased—is not known, since the purchase of PPE is not tracked at the  headquarters level. A shortfall of $1.9 million is projected for fiscal year  2005.
Following a mishap in 2001 in which the improper use of PPE was found  to have contributed to the death of two station personnel, the adequacy of  PPE took on added importance. The Coast Guard has emphasized the  importance of PPE, both through a Commandant directive and in its policy  manual, stating that the proper supplies and use of PPE is one of the top  priorities of Coast Guard management.
Although these measures are important, several aspects of the Coast  Guard’s processes for estimating and allocating station PPE funds raise  concerns. Appendix II discusses these concerns in detail, but they are  summarized as follows:    The Coast Guard’s forecasting models do not recognize PPE funding needs  for personnel assigned to stations over and above the number of  designated positions. This is because the forecasting models are  predicated on the number of positions designated for stations, rather than  the number of personnel assigned (in fiscal year 2004 the estimated  number of personnel assigned to stations exceeded positions by an  estimated 1,019). According to program officials, historically the amount  of funds allotted by the Coast Guard each fiscal year for station PPE has  not been sufficient to fund the estimated needs of all assigned station  personnel. For example, in 2003, the OIG reported that the Coast Guard  had not provided PPE funding for 541 (69 percent) of the 789 personnel it  had added to stations during fiscal year 2002.
Even when funding is narrowed to just designated positions, the Coast  Guard’s traditional practice has been to fund only about half of PPE  station needs, according to program officials. For example, in fiscal year  2003, the Coast Guard initially allocated $1.8 million, or 56 percent, of the  estimated $3.2 million needed to provide PPE for personnel in designated  station positions. Stations also receive general operating funds that may  be used to purchase PPE, although these funds are also used for other  purposes, such as boat maintenance.
Assumptions used in PPE forecasting models have not been validated,  according to officials. Without validated assumptions, the Coast Guard  could be either underestimating or overestimating the life span and  replacement cycle of the PPE. According to one official, the assumptions  were based on input from station personnel.
The Coast Guard does not require that PPE funds allocated to stations and  oversight units actually be spent on PPE, according to program officials.  Officials told us that in the interests of command flexibility units are  allowed to spend allocated PPE funds on various operational expenses.  Although such flexibility may be needed, the former PPE program  manager told us that it was possible that oversight units have not been  passing PPE funds on to stations as intended (i.e., the amount expended  for PPE may be less than the amount allocated). To help address this  possibility, the official said that in recent years he has disclosed to stations  the total amount of PPE funding available to them, including funds held by  oversight units.
Officials told us the Coast Guard has no immediate plans to revise the  traditional PPE funding allocation process because they believe it has  been sufficiently reliable for the agency’s purposes. However, the process  may change once long-term homeland security requirements have been  identified. Given the historic shortages in PPE funding that have resulted  from the Coast Guard’s allocation processes, as witnessed by the onetime  increase in funding during fiscal year 2003, it seems likely that stations will  experience shortfalls in the future if PPE allocation processes and  practices are not adjusted.
section_title: Strategic Plan for Improving Station Readiness Lacks Key Components for Measuring Progress
paragraphs: The Coast Guard Guard’s Boat Forces Strategic Plan, its 10-year plan for  maintaining and improving readiness at stations and other boat units,  lacks key components for achieving and assessing station readiness in the  post-September 11 operating environment. The plan, although extensive,  has not been updated to include the impact of post-September 11  homeland security requirements on station operations. The plan also does  not identify the specific actions, milestones, and funding amounts needed  to assure Congress and others that the Coast Guard is committed to  achieving identified readiness levels. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to  develop measurable annual goals for stations that would (1) allow it to  track its progress in achieving long-term goals and objectives, (2) allow  others to effectively monitor and measure progress, and (3) provide  accountability. Without these key planning elements, the strategic plan’s  effectiveness as a management tool, as well as the Coast Guard’s ability to  ensure desired progress in meeting station readiness needs, is limited.
subsections: section_title: Current Strategic Plan Outlines Numerous Goals, Objectives, and Initiatives
paragraphs: The Boat Forces Strategic Plan identifies strategic goals in four areas:  (1) leadership and management; (2) personnel and staffing; (3) training  and expertise; and (4) equipment, support, and technology. These goals  are supported by objectives and initiatives, the latter of which are  prioritized, by fiscal year, in a summary implementation plan. Table 8  presents examples of goals, objectives, and initiatives, as well as the  targeted time frames, pertaining to each of the four readiness categories  (staffing, training, boats, and PPE). The initiatives contained in the plan  are designed to address station readiness concerns identified in 2001. For  example, to address the concern that stations’ have not received the  appropriate number of positions or qualified personnel, the plan contains  an initiative to revise station staffing standards as well as an initiative  regarding the need to staff stations according to these revised standards.
section_title: Lack of Key Planning Elements
paragraphs: Although the strategic plan provides an indication of what overall  measures may be needed to restore station readiness, the Coast Guard has  not developed key planning elements in four areas—either pertaining to  the strategic plan or related to it—that are essential to setting clear  expectations about what will be achieved, and translating the expectations  into specific funding needs. In four key areas, as discussed later, the Coast  Guard does not follow practices that we and others have identified as  necessary to effectively measure performance and hold agencies  accountable for results.
Plan not updated to reflect homeland security responsibilities: The  plan has not been updated to reflect the impact of post-September 11  homeland security requirements on stations. Although it incorporates  performance goals for other Coast Guard programs, the plan does not  incorporate—because they have yet to be finalized—goals and  requirements for the PWCS program, a major driver of station operations.  Until those requirements have been developed, the capability and  resources stations will need to address one of their most significant  operational responsibilities, and hence overall readiness needs, cannot be  fully determined. For example, the plan cites two important initiatives in  the category of staffing—(1) revise station staffing standards (i.e.,  determine the optimal number and type of personnel needed at each  station) and (2) staff stations according to those standards. According to  the plan’s implementation summary, these standards were to be revised in  fiscal year 2003 and station staffing completed by fiscal year 2007. As of  January 2005, officials had yet to revise the standards because long-term  homeland security responsibilities had not been finalized. Until the  staffing standards have been revised, the bigger picture—when stations  staffing needs will be met—cannot be determined.
Plan contains insufficient details on specific planned actions and  milestones: The plan does not identify, in sufficient detail, planned  actions and milestones. Effective strategic plans should show an obvious  link between objectives and the specific actions that will be needed to  meet those objectives. These actions, in turn, should be clearly linked to  milestones. Although the plan includes a summary implementation  schedule, it does not clearly identify what steps will be taken to implement  the initiatives and when they will be completed. For example, the plan  does not identify what actions will be needed to ensure that station  personnel are placed in positions that are appropriate for their experience,  or to increase the actual length of time personnel are assigned to stations.
Plan’s objectives not linked with budget: The plan lacks a clear link  between objectives and required funding levels. Without a clear  understanding of the funding needed each year, there is little assurance  that initiatives will be implemented and long-term objectives realized.  Clearly identifying funding needs would also help to ensure that projected  goals and objectives are commensurate with available resource levels.  Because the plan does not identify the funding needed to carry out key  objectives and initiatives, even in the short term, it is unclear whether the  Coast Guard will be able to fund initiatives according to proposed time  frames.
Lack of measurable annual goals: The Coast Guard has not established  measurable annual goals linked to the long-term goals identified in the  strategic plan. Without annual goals, Congress, the Coast Guard, and  others cannot effectively and readily measure an agency’s progress in  meeting its long-term goals.
The above planning elements would help the Coast Guard and Congress  use the strategic plan as a more effective tool for monitoring station  readiness needs and identifying areas of continuing concern. As with any  strategic plan, Coast Guard officials agree that it will also need to be  revisited and revised to keep pace with changing events and, thus, the plan  will be reviewed on an annual basis. The Coast Guard’s plan may be  particularly susceptible to changing circumstances, given that it must deal  with so many unpredictable events, ranging from natural disasters and  accidents to the uncertainties of terrorist threats. A senior headquarters  official told us that while the Coast Guard should more clearly identify  expectations regarding annual goals, continually changing priorities often  make it difficult for the agency to adhere to—and fund—long-term  strategic plans and in some cases to even maintain program consistency.  We acknowledge that these difficulties exist and must be considered in  developing and using the plan, but even with these difficulties,  incorporating the key elements discussed above would improve the plan’s  effectiveness as a management tool.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: It has been 3 years since the September 11 terrorist attacks changed the  mission priorities for multimission stations, and there is no doubt that  station readiness requirements need to be updated to reflect this new  reality. The Coast Guard’s decision to hold off updating these  requirements until they can be aligned with homeland security  responsibilities Coast Guard-wide is sensible. The readiness of  multimission stations is but one of the many competing demands the  Coast Guard must balance as it attempts to meet increased homeland  security responsibilities while continuing to support other missions.  Nonetheless, the Coast Guard still needs to have the necessary plans,  processes, and safeguards in place to help ensure that it can continue the  impressive progress made thus far in addressing 20 years of operational  deterioration at stations. In particular, indications of high workweek hours  for many personnel and inadequate processes and practices used to  estimate and fund needs for personal protection equipment may limit the  stations’ readiness. Historic shortages in station PPE funding allocations,  which continued in fiscal years 2004 and are estimated for 2005, indicate  that stations will continue to experience funding shortfalls in the future  unless PPE allocation processes and practices are adjusted. Perhaps more  significantly, it remains unclear where station readiness falls in the Coast  Guard’s list of priorities, as evidenced by a lack of measurable annual  goals related to stations and the lack of detail—in terms of both specific  actions as well as necessary funding—in the Boat Forces Strategic Plan,  the Coast Guard’s strategy for addressing station readiness issues. The  lack of specificity on the Coast Guard’s part thus far is perhaps  understandable given the challenges it has faced in the wake of September  11. However, continuing in this way will make it difficult to know what the  Coast Guard intends as a readiness baseline, how close or far away it is  from achieving this level, and what it thinks will be needed to get there.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To help ensure that the Coast Guard and Congress have the information  necessary to effectively assess station readiness needs and track progress  in meeting those needs, and that multimission station personnel receive  sufficient personal protection equipment to perform essential and  hazardous missions as specified by Congress, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security, in consideration of any revised homeland  security requirements, direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to take  the following three actions:    Revise the Boat Forces Strategic Plan to (1) reflect the impact of  homeland security requirements on station needs and (2) identify specific  actions, milestones, and funding needs for meeting those needs.
Develop measurable annual goals for stations.
Revise the processes and practices for estimating and allocating station  PPE funds to reliably identify annual funding needs and use this  information in making future funding decisions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security  and the Coast Guard for their review and comment. The Department of  Homeland Security and the Coast Guard generally concurred with our  findings and recommendations and did not provide formal comments for  inclusion in the final report. The Coast Guard, however, provided technical  clarifications as well as suggested contextual adjustments, which we  incorporated to ensure the accuracy of the report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees and subcommittees. We will also make copies available to  others on request.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (415) 904-2200 or Steven N. Calvo at (206) 287-4839. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. This report will also  be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the extent to which multimission station readiness needs  changed as a result of post-September 11 changes in mission priorities, we  reviewed relevant Coast Guard documents, including Operation Neptune  Shield, the agency’s interim guidelines for implementing homeland  security operations; the Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security; and  mission planning guidance used to establish fiscal year 2004 mission  priorities. We also reviewed our previous work on the Coast Guard’s  efforts to balance its homeland security and nonhomeland security  missions. In addition, we interviewed headquarters officials regarding  trends in station operations and the agency’s plans for addressing the  homeland security mission. To better understand how station performance  was affected by changes in mission priorities, we reviewed data from the  Coast Guard’s Scorecard System, its unofficial process for monitoring  security operations at strategic ports. We interviewed officials responsible  for analyzing and compiling these data at the field and headquarters levels  and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report, given the parameters of the system. We also reviewed boat  hour data from the Coast Guard’s Abstract of Operations database to  determine trends in the number of hours station boats were operated, by  program, both before and after September 11. Boat hour data, reported by  station crews, represent the number of hours that boats were operated by  station personnel. To develop a more representative estimate of pre- September 11 boat hours and to normalize for fluctuations in hours that  might occur in a single year, we averaged the number of boat hours  expended during fiscal years 1999 and 2000 to create a pre-September 11  baseline. The Coast Guard agreed with our use of this 2-year average as  an appropriate baseline of pre-September 11 boat hours. To determine the  reliability of the data, we used assessments from our previous report,  which consisted of (1) a review of existing documentation regarding the  data and the systems that produced them and (2) interviews with  knowledgeable agency officials. On the basis of these assessments, we  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
We visited 8 multimission stations on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, as  well as the four groups and activities responsible for overseeing their  operations, to better understand how stations’ readiness needs changed  following September 11. These stations were selected on the basis of  geographic location, proximity to a strategic port, and the number of boat  hours expended in fiscal year 2003 on homeland security, search and  rescue, and law enforcement operations. To further explore how increased  homeland security operations had affected stations, we conducted  telephone interviews with field officials responsible for overseeing  operations at 8 additional stations located at strategic ports. We selected  these additional 8 stations based on the number of station resource hours  expended on port security operations. To assess the levels of support  provided to stations by state and local organizations, we contacted 13  organizations identified as key partners for 8 of the stations we reviewed.
To address multimission station readiness concerns identified prior to  September 11, we reviewed the Department of Transportation’s Office of  Inspector General (OIG) reports on station readiness, the Coast Guard’s  internal review of station operations, and various congressional reports.  We also spoke with Coast Guard headquarters officials from the Offices of  Boat Forces; Budget and Programs; and Workforce Performance, Training,  and Development. To identify actions the Coast Guard has taken or is  planning to take regarding station readiness concerns, we reviewed  available Coast Guard data regarding station staffing, training, boats, and  personal protection equipment (PPE). In the areas of staffing and PPE, we  used data from our May 2004 report—such as the number of staff and  positions added to stations in fiscal year 2003 and the estimated amount of  funds expended on station PPE in fiscal year 2003—which we had  determined were sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. To assess the  reliability of training and boat data, we (1) reviewed existing  documentation regarding the data and how they were developed and  (2) interviewed knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Furthermore,  we interviewed officials responsible for overseeing operations at the 16  stations we reviewed, as well as at relevant oversight units. To review the  Coast Guard’s training programs and identify progress made in expanding  formal training opportunities for station personnel, we visited the  following Coast Guard training centers: the Motor Life Boat School; the  Boatswain’s Mate School, the Boat Forces Center, the Boat Engineering  School; and the Maritime Law Enforcement Center. In addition, we  interviewed officials from the Coast Guard’s internal inspection teams to  discuss biennial inspections of station operations and reviewed station  inspection results for fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
To obtain a better understanding of personnel workloads and how those  workloads may be changing, we also reviewed fiscal years 2002 and 2003  survey results from the Coast Guard’s annual survey of station personnel  activities. With some exceptions, the Coast Guard has conducted an  annual survey of station workweek hours since 1991. The Coast Guard  uses the survey results to gauge changes in the average number of hours  personnel work each week, and thus have not validated the survey.  Personnel are asked to report the number of hours spent among 49  predefined activities during an average workweek in August. In 2003,  personnel at 77 of the 188 stations were surveyed, with personnel from 64  stations responding, for a total response rate of 54 percent of all personnel  surveyed. (Response rate data were not readily available for other survey  years.) One possible reason for this low response rate may be that  nonrespondents did not have time to complete the survey, which could  mean that workweek hours were under-reported. However, it is also  possible that personnel who were working longer hours per week were  more inclined to report that condition, leading to an over-reporting of  workweek hours. To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed the  headquarters officials who oversee the survey as well as available  documentation. Recognizing the limitations of the data—such as the low  response rate—we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this report. That is, as an indicator of average station  workweek hours, and general trends in those hours over time, the survey  results are sufficiently reliable.
To assess the extent to which Coast Guard’s plans address station  readiness needs, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s Boat Forces Strategic  Plan, the agency’s strategy for maintaining and improving essential  operations capabilities for all boat units, including multimission stations.
We also reviewed the Department of Transportation OIG’s assessment of  the draft plan. To identify practices for effectively measuring program  performance, we reviewed the Government Performance and Results Act  (GPRA) of 1993, our prior work on results-oriented management, and  Office of Management and Budget circulars.
We conducted our work between September 2003 and December 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Actions Taken by Category to Meet Station Readiness Needs
paragraphs: This appendix presents additional information regarding the four  categories of multimission station operations we reviewed—staffing,  training, boats, and PPE. The appendix also contains additional  information regarding the initiatives the Coast Guard has either started or  plans to develop to address concerns in each of these categories.
subsections: section_title: Staffing
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has initiated multiple efforts to address staffing concerns  at multimission stations. This section provides additional information  regarding Coast Guard (1) station survey results regarding workweek  hours and (2) initiatives to address staffing concerns.
subsections: section_title: Survey of Station Workweek Hours
paragraphs: Approximately 44 percent of the individuals who responded to the Coast  Guard’s 2003 station staffing survey indicated that they worked an average  workweek that was in excess of the 68-hour standard (see table 9).  Approximately 6 percent of those questioned indicated they worked a  standard 68-hour work week.
Table 10 presents additional information on initiatives the Coast Guard  has under way or plans to develop with regard to station staffing needs.
section_title: Training
subsections: section_title: Initiatives to Increase Formal Training Opportunities for Station Personnel
paragraphs: Since 2001, the Coast Guard has taken steps to increase training capacity  at national training centers. Two efforts to expand formal training slots  have been the reinstituting of the boatswain’s mate training center and the  implementation of response boat training courses. Additional information  regarding training efforts are summarized in table 11.
The Coast Guard has also taken steps to improve the way it evaluates job  performance for station personnel. To monitor knowledge levels and  provide insight on areas of training that may need improvement, every 2  years station personnel are tested on requisite areas of job performance.  In an effort to improve how the examinations measure station personnel  knowledge levels, the Coast Guard employed professional test writers in  2004 to revise the examinations. Over the past few years test scores for  station personnel have shown mixed trends. For example, between fiscal  years 2002 and 2003 assessment results for boat drivers and motor lifeboat  engineers improved somewhat, while results for crew members (boat  personnel other than the boat driver or engineer) and for utility boat  engineers decreased slightly. Coast Guard officials told us that they are  exploring the reasons for these results, but in general, increases in test  results can be attributed to improvements made in on-the-job training.  Conversely, decreases can be attributed to a continued lack of experience  on the part of junior personnel, the number of which have increased in the  past few years, and to high levels of personnel turnover at stations.
section_title: Boats
paragraphs: Multimission station personnel use a variety of boats to support  operations. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate three of the primary boats used by  station personnel.
The Coast Guard has made progress in replacing nonstandard and aging  boats to support station operations. Table 12 presents additional  information regarding the Coast Guard’s initiatives to modernize stations’  boat fleet.
As we previously reported, anecdotal and quantitative data indicate that  as of fiscal year 2003 active and reserve station personnel possessed  sufficient levels of PPE. During fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard spent  $7.5 million to address PPE shortfalls for station personnel, of which $5.6  million came from specially designated funds. In fiscal year 2003, the cost  of a total basic PPE outfit was $1,296. The cost of a cold weather PPE  outfit, which is used by personnel working at stations where the outdoor  temperature falls below 50 degrees Fahrenheit, was $1,431. (Fig. 5 shows a  station crew member in cold weather PPE.) According to the Coast Guard,  personnel at 135 (72 percent) of the 188 multimission stations require cold  weather PPE in addition to basic PPE.
Despite indications that the Coast Guard had met its goal in fiscal year  2003 of providing sufficient amounts of PPE to all active duty and reserve  station personnel, concerns remain as to whether the Coast Guard will  provide sufficient funding for station PPE in the future. The Coast Guard’s  processes for estimating station PPE needs and allocating funds have  historically resulted in an under funding of station PPE. See table 13 for  concerns regarding the Coast Guard’s processes and practices for  allocating funds for station PPE.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Randy B. Williamson, Barbara A. Guffy,  Joel Aldape, Marisela Perez, Stan G. Stenersen, Dorian R. Dunbar,  Ben Atwater, Michele C. Fejfar, Elizabeth H. Curda, and Ann H. Finley  made key contributions to this report.