Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations
Published: 2007-09-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious security risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other contraband with them. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and southern U.S. borders, Congress is concerned that unmanned and unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to meet its obligation to protect the border. Today's testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a limited security assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the U.S.-Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators from attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point in Mexico.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: On the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In some of these locations, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross without being challenged by law enforcement, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. In one location on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate GAO investigators. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence on a state road, including unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal lands adjacent to the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation of potential  security vulnerabilities on northern and southern U.S. borders. The United  States shares over 5,000 miles of border with Canada to the north, and  1,900 miles of border with Mexico to the south. Individuals attempting to  legally enter the United States by land present themselves to a Customs  and Border Protection (CBP) officer at one of the 170 ports of entry  located along these borders. Any other method of land entry is illegal.Because CBP checks the identification of entrants into the United States  and searches vehicles for contraband at ports of entry, individuals entering  the United States illegally may attempt to avoid screening procedures by  crossing the border in areas between ports of entry. The U.S. Border  Patrol, which is part of CBP, is responsible for patrolling and monitoring  these areas to stop cross-border violators. However, given limited  resources and the wide expanse of the border, the U.S. Border Patrol is  limited in its ability to monitor the border either through use of technology  or with a consistent manned presence. Commensurate with the perceived  threat, there is a sharp contrast between how CBP distributes human  resources on the northern border as opposed to the southern border.  According to CBP, as of May 2007, it had 972 U.S. Border Patrol agents on  the northern border and 11,986 agents on the southern border.
Given the potential security vulnerabilities on our borders, you expressed  concern that cross-border violators may attempt to enter the United  States, possibly bringing with them radioactive materials or other  contraband, such as explosives, drugs, counterfeit money, and bogus  credit cards. We were therefore asked to perform a limited security  assessment to identify vulnerable border areas where CBP does not  maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there is no  apparent monitoring equipment in place. You also requested that, where  possible, our investigators attempt to simulate the cross-border movement  of radioactive materials or other contraband to demonstrate the existence  of serious security vulnerabilities. To perform this work, our investigators  visited seven border areas that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both—  four at the U.S.–Canada border and three at the U.S.–Mexico border. We  identified these areas by reviewing information that is publicly available  and by reviewing our previous work on border security. These areas were  located in four states on the northern border and two states on the  southern border. We did not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border  security vulnerabilities. Investigators used a global positioning system  (GPS) in some cases and geographic landmarks in others to determine the  location of the border. In three out of four locations on the U.S.–Canada  border, investigators crossed into the United States from Canada carrying  a duffel bag to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive  materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented our  investigators from attempting to cross north into the United States from a  starting point in Mexico.
We conducted our investigation from October 2006 through June 2007 in  accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by the  President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
subsections: section_title: Northern Border
paragraphs: According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator  can travel to the border, cross the border, and leave the location of the  crossing, are critical factors in determining whether an area of the border  is vulnerable. We identified state roads close to the border that appeared  to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from  Canada into the United States. We also located several ports of entry that  had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were  unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment  was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to stop a  cross-border violator from entering the United States was a barrier across  the road that could be driven around. CBP provided us with records that  confirmed our observations, indicating that on one occasion a cross- border violator drove around this type of barrier to illegally enter the  United States. The violator was later caught by state law enforcement  officers and arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol.
subsections: section_title: State Roads Close to the Northern Border
paragraphs: We found state roads close to the U.S.–Canada border in several states.  Many of the roads we found appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored,  allowing us to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive  materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States.
subsections: section_title: Northern Border Location One
paragraphs: On October 31, 2006, our investigators positioned themselves on opposite  sides of the U.S.–Canada border in an unmanned location. Our  investigators selected this location because roads on either side of the  border would allow them to quickly and easily exchange simulated  contraband. After receiving a signal via cell phone, the investigator in  Canada left his vehicle and walked approximately 25 feet to the border  carrying a red duffel bag. While investigators on the U.S. side took  photographs and made a digital video recording, the individual with the  duffel bag proceeded the remaining 50 feet, transferred the duffel bag to  the investigators on the U.S. side, and returned to his vehicle on the  Canadian side (see fig. 1).
The set up and exchange lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which  time the investigators were in view of residents both on the Canadian and  U.S. sides of the border.
According to CBP records of this incident, an alert citizen notified the U.S.  Border Patrol about the suspicious activities of our investigators. The U.S.  Border Patrol subsequently attempted to search for a vehicle matching the  description of the rental vehicle our investigators used. However, the U.S.  Border Patrol was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag,  even though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the  port of entry.
section_title: Northern Border Location Two
paragraphs: Investigators identified over a half dozen locations in this area where state  roads ended at the U.S.–Canada border. Although investigators took  pictures of the border area, they did not attempt to cross the border  because of private property concerns. There was no visible U.S. Border  Patrol response to our activities and no visible electronic monitoring  equipment. CBP told us that the activities of our investigators would not  be grounds for a formal investigation. Still, according to CBP records,  criminals are aware of vulnerabilities in this area and have taken  advantage of the access provided by roads close to the border. For  example, appendix I details an incident on January 25, 2007, in which an  alert citizen notified CBP about suspicious activities on the citizen’s  property, leading to the arrest of several cross-border violators.
section_title: Northern Border Location Three
paragraphs: On November 15, 2006, our investigators visited an area in this state where  state roads ended at the U.S.–Canada border. One of our investigators  simulated the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other  contraband by crossing the border north into Canada and then returning to  the United States (see fig. 2). There did not appear to be any monitoring or  intrusion alarm system in place at this location, and there was no U.S.  Border Patrol response to our border crossing.
On December 5, 2006, our investigators traveled along a road parallel to  the U.S.–Canada border. This road is so close to the border that jumping  over a ditch on the southern side of the road allows an individual to stand  in the United States. While driving the length of this road on the Canadian  side, our investigators noticed cameras placed at strategic locations on the  U.S. side of the border. They also observed U.S. Border Patrol vehicles  parked at different locations along the border. At a location that appeared  to be unmanned and unmonitored, one investigator left the vehicle  carrying a red duffel bag. He crossed the ditch and walked into the United  States for several hundred feet before returning to the vehicle. Our  investigators stayed in this location for about 15 minutes, but there was no  observed response from law enforcement. At two other locations,  investigators crossed into the United States to find out whether their  presence would be detected. In all cases, there was no observed response  from law enforcement.
section_title: Ports of Entry with Posted Hours on the Northern Border
paragraphs: We identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in a state  on the northern border. During the daytime these ports of entry are staffed  by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that it relies on surveillance  systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt to interdict illegal border  crossing activity. On November 14, 2006, at about 11:00 p.m., our  investigators arrived on the U.S. side of one port of entry that had closed  for the night. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in  operation but that the only visible preventive measure to stop an  individual from entering the United States was a barrier across the road  that could be driven around. Investigators stayed at the port of entry for  approximately 12 minutes to see whether the U.S. Border Patrol would  respond. During this time, the investigators walked around the port of  entry area and took photographs. When the U.S. Border Patrol did not  arrive at the port of entry, our investigators returned south, only to have a  U.S. Border Patrol agent pull them over 3 miles south of the port of entry.  When questioned by the U.S. Border Patrol agent, our investigators  indicated that they were federal investigators testing security procedures  at the U.S. border. The agent did not ask for identification from our  investigators and glanced only briefly at the badge and commission book  the driver offered for inspection. In addition, he did not attempt to search  the vehicle, ask what agency our investigators worked for, or record their  names. According to DHS, the agent acted in a manner consistent with  operational protocol because he was satisfied with the credentials  presented to him and did not have probable cause to search the vehicle.
CBP provided us with records concerning this incident. According to the  records, the agent was dispatched because of the suspicious activities of  our investigators in front of the port of entry camera. The records  indicated that after this incident, CBP staff researched the incident fully to  determine whether our investigators posed a threat. By performing an  Internet search on the name of the investigator who rented the vehicle,  CBP linked the investigators to GAO. CBP also provided us with records  that confirmed our observations about the barrier at this port of entry,  indicating that on one occasion a cross-border violator drove around this  type of barrier to illegally enter the United States. The violator was later  caught by state law enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S. Border  Patrol.
section_title: Southern Border
paragraphs: Safety considerations prevented our investigators from performing the  same assessment work on the U.S.–Mexico border as performed on the  northern border. In contrast to our observations on the northern border,  our investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National  Guard presence near a state road on the southern border, including  unmanned aerial vehicles. However, our limited security assessment also  identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands  adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be  monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement presence during the time  our investigators visited the sites. Although CBP is ultimately responsible  for protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal,  environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement.
subsections: section_title: State Road Close to the Southern Border
paragraphs: On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a main U.S. route about a  quarter mile from a U.S.–Mexico port of entry. Traveling on a dirt road that  parallels the border, our investigators used a GPS system to get as close to  the border as possible. Our investigators passed U.S. Border Patrol agents  and U.S. Army National Guard units. In addition, our investigators spotted  unmanned aerial vehicles and a helicopter flying parallel to the border. At  the point where the dirt road ran closest to the U.S.–Mexico border, our  investigators spotted additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in a  covered position. About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles, our  investigators pulled off the road. One investigator exited the vehicle and  proceeded on foot through several gulches and gullies toward the Mexican  border. His intent was to find out whether he would be questioned by law  enforcement agents about his activities. He returned to the vehicle after 15  minutes, at which time our investigators returned to the main road. Our  investigators did not observe any public traffic on this road for the 1 hour  that they were in the area, but none of the law enforcement units  attempted to stop our investigators and find out what they were doing.  According to CBP, because our investigators did not approach from the  direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement  units to question these activities. (See fig. 3.)
section_title: Federal Lands Adjacent to the Southern Border
paragraphs: Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally  managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. These areas did not  appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the time  our investigators visited the sites. Investigators learned that a  memorandum of understanding exists between DHS (of which CBP is a  component), Interior, and USDA regarding the protection of federal lands  adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for  protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal, environmental,  and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement—for example,  environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights.
subsections: section_title: Southern Border Location One
paragraphs: On January 9, 2007, our investigators entered federally managed land  adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. The investigators had identified a  road running parallel to the border in this area. Our investigators were  informed by an employee of a visitor center that because the U.S.  government was building a fence, the road was closed to the public.
However, our investigators proceeded to the road and found that it was  not physically closed. While driving west along this road, our investigators  did not observe any surveillance cameras or law enforcement vehicles. A  4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent the movement of a vehicle rather  than a person) stood at the location of the border. Our investigators pulled  over to the side of the road at one location. To determine whether he  would activate any intrusion alarm systems, one investigator stepped over  the fence, entered Mexico, and returned to the United States. The  investigators remained in the location for approximately 15 minutes but  there was no observed law enforcement response to their activities.
section_title: Southern Border Location Two
paragraphs: On January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on federally managed lands  adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. In this area, the Rio Grande River  forms the southern border between the United States and Mexico. After  driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks of the Rio Grande, our  investigators observed, in two locations, evidence that frequent border  crossings took place. In one location, the investigators observed well-worn  footpaths and tire tracks on the Mexican side of the river. At another  location, a boat ramp on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande was mirrored by a  boat ramp on the Mexican side. Access to the boat ramp on the Mexican  side of the border had well-worn footpaths and vehicle tracks (see fig. 4).
An individual who worked in this area told our investigators that at several  times during the year, the water is so low that the river can easily be  crossed on foot. Our investigators were in this area for 1 hour and 30  minutes and observed no surveillance equipment, intrusion alarm systems,  or law enforcement presence. Our investigators were not challenged  regarding their activities. According to CBP officials, in some locations on  federally managed lands, social and cultural issues lead the U.S. Border  Patrol to defer to local police in providing protection. This sensitivity to  social and cultural issues appears to be confirmed by the provisions of the  memorandum of understanding between DHS, Interior, and USDA.
section_title: Corrective Action Briefing
paragraphs: On February 23, 2007, we met with CBP officials to discuss the results of  our investigation. CBP officials clarified their approach to law  enforcement in unmanned and unmonitored areas at the northern and  southern U.S. borders, including an explanation of jurisdictional issues on  federally managed lands. CBP indicated that resource restrictions prevent  U.S. Border Patrol agents from investigating all instances of suspicious  activity. They added that the northern border presents more of a challenge  than the southern border and that many antiquated ports of entry exist.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Our visits to the northern border show that CBP faces significant  challenges in effectively monitoring the border and preventing undetected  entry into the United States. Our work shows that a determined cross- border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other  contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.–Canada  border at any of the locations we investigated. CBP records indicate that it  does successfully stop many individuals from crossing the border illegally,  but our own observations and experiences (along with CBP’s  acknowledgment of existing challenges) lead us to conclude that more  human capital and technological capabilities are needed to effectively  protect the northern border. Our observations on the southern border  showed a significant disparity between the large law enforcement  presence on state lands in one state and what seemed to be a lack of law  enforcement presence on federally managed lands.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my  statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have  at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.  Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contacts points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this testimony.
section_title: Appendix I: Case Studies of Successful Customs and Border Protection Responses to Suspicious Activities on Northern and Southern U.S. Borders
paragraphs: This appendix details four cases where Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) apprehended individuals who were engaged in suspicious activities  on the northern and southern borders. According to CBP, U.S. Border  Patrol agents followed proper protocols in responding to these incidents.  We are summarizing these case studies—which CBP provided to us—to  further illustrate challenges the U.S. Border Patrol faces.
subsections: section_title: Northern Border Incident One
paragraphs: At about 3:20 a.m. on June 24, 2006, electronic surveillance equipment  observed a vehicle arrive at the port of entry gate from the direction of  Canada. The suspect got out of the vehicle and, after inspecting the area  around the gate, returned to the vehicle and drove around the gate into the  United States. U.S. Border Patrol agents were notified, along with state  law enforcement. The state officer identified and stopped the vehicle while  the U.S. Border Patrol agents were en route. U.S. Border Patrol agents  arrived and arrested the suspect. The suspect was identified as a citizen of  Albania and admitted to driving around the port of entry gate. The suspect  had applied for asylum in the United States and been denied in 2001, at  which point he had moved to Canada. Attempts to return the suspect to  Canada failed, as he had no legal status in Canada. Suspect was held in jail  pending removal proceedings.
section_title: Northern Border Incident Two
paragraphs: At about 6:00 p.m. on January 25, 2007, the U.S. Border Patrol was notified  of suspicious activity on the U.S.–Canada border. U.S. residents on the  border had observed a vehicle dropping off several individuals near their  home. A U.S. Border Patrol agent proceeded to the area where residents  had observed the suspicious activity. Once there, the agent followed  footprints in the snow and discovered two suspects hiding among a stand  of pine trees. The suspects were Columbian nationals, one male and one  female. They indicated that a man was going to pick them up on the  Canadian side of the border, and that a friend had driven them to the  agreed-upon location on the U.S. side. Cell phone numbers retrieved from  the suspect’s phone linked him to phone numbers belonging to a known  alien smuggler in the area. The suspects said they intended to seek  political asylum in Canada. They were sent to a detention facility after  their arrest.
section_title: Northern Border Incident Three
paragraphs: On February 10, 2007, at about 2:00 a.m., U.S. Border Patrol surveillance  equipment detected six suspects entering the United States from Canada.  The suspects were walking south along railroad tracks. After a short foot  chase, U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended all six suspects—two  individuals who were believed to be smugglers and a family of four. All the  suspects were citizens of South Korea. According to interviews with the  suspects, after the family arrived in Canada they were approached by an  individual who said he could take them to the United States. He brought  the family to a desolate area and introduced them to a male and a female,  who they were to follow across the border. The individual then instructed  the family to leave their luggage in the car and said that he would pick all  six of them up in the United States. The wife and two children in the  family were released for humanitarian reasons after apprehension, and the  male was placed in detention.
section_title: Southern Border Incident One
paragraphs: On May 3, 2007, at about 1:20 a.m., an alert citizen reported a possible  illegal alien near the U.S.–Mexico border. The responding U.S. Border  Patrol agent located the individual, who claimed to be a citizen of  Uruguay. He said that he had used a variety of transportation means,  including airplanes and buses, to travel from Uruguay to a Mexican city  just south of the U.S. border. The individual claimed to have crossed the  border by foot along with four other individuals. He then walked for 4 days  through the desert. When he became dehydrated, he sought help at a  nearby U.S. town. As a result, he was spotted by the alert citizen who  notified the U.S. Border Patrol. The individual was scheduled to be  removed from the country but requested a hearing before an immigration  judge.
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