Electronic Monitoring: Draft National Standard for Offender Tracking Systems Addresses Common Stakeholder Needs
Published: 2015-10-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: OTS is an electronic monitoring technology consisting of hardware, such as an ankle bracelet, used for collecting Global Positioning System (GPS) signals to determine an individual's location, and software for analyzing data collected from the hardware device. While demand for GPS-based electronic monitoring devices has increased, there are currently no standards that OTS devices are required to meet. In 2009, NIJ initiated development of a voluntary OTS standard and companion guide, which is expected to be published no later than March 2016. GAO was asked to review NIJ's approach for developing the OTS standard.
This report examines the extent to which (1) NIJ collaborated with stakeholders in developing the standard, and (2) the standard and guide address stakeholder needs and challenges. GAO analyzed NIJ's draft OTS standard, companion guide, and standard development process. To obtain perspectives on the standard development process and OTS needs and challenges, GAO interviewed stakeholders including NIJ officials, practitioners and experts who developed the standard, criminal justice and victims' associations, manufacturers, and officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 10 criminal justice agencies that employ OTS. GAO selected the 10 criminal justice agencies based upon a combination of factors, including ensuring a range of federal, state, and local jurisdictions, among other things.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) collaborated with a variety of criminal justice and technical experts to develop a draft standard for offender tracking systems (OTS), but earlier involvement of manufacturers could have expedited its development. For example, the committee that developed the draft standard included practitioners spanning all levels of government and program areas such as pretrial, probation, and parole services and technical experts with backgrounds in developing test methods for performance standards. NIJ invited manufacturers to provide input through a workshop held in May 2011 and two subsequent public comment periods. GAO found that earlier and ongoing involvement of OTS manufacturers could have better informed and facilitated development of the OTS standard by, for example, providing insights on OTS capabilities and limitations at the outset. Coordination has improved since 2012, and manufacturers' major concerns have been addressed.
Global Positioning System (GPS) Offender Tracking System
NIJ's draft OTS standard and guide address many common stakeholder needs and challenges. The draft standard includes requirements for common operational and circumvention detection needs. For example, requirements for location accuracy and the ability to provide alerts when an offender tries to remove the device or is at a prohibited location are included in the standard. In addition, the draft guide provides information and guidance related to challenges identified by the criminal justice agencies GAO met with as well as other considerations for implementing an OTS program. These challenges include
misconceptions among the public and victims that OTS allows agencies to prevent bad behavior before it happens;
developing appropriate protocols to respond to OTS alerts, such as those for tampering with the tracking device; and
workload issues, such as whether there is sufficient staff or resources to respond to OTS alerts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
In recognition of the range of agencies, resources, and objectives of offender tracking, the guide provides information and guidance, and does not offer “one size fits all” solutions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 1996, criminal justice agencies have been monitoring the location  of individuals with mobile devices. Prior to the advent of electronic  monitoring with Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, criminal  justice agencies’ methods for supervising individuals were limited to  selected site location tracking (e.g., house arrest) and manual methods  such as in-person visitation. Demand for and use of GPS-based  electronic monitoring devices for tracking criminal offenders, also known  as offender tracking systems (OTS), has increased in large part because  of numerous legislative mandates, according to the Department of  Justice’s (DOJ) National Institute of Justice (NIJ). For instance, NIJ  reports that by 2010, 33 states had enacted legislation requiring OTS to  track the location of sex offenders. According to 2012 Bureau of Justice  Statistics (BJS) surveys of probation and parole agencies in the 50 states,  the federal system, and the District of Columbia, over 31,600 adults on  probation or parole were supervised with GPS technology.
While demand for GPS-based electronic monitoring devices has  increased, there are currently no standards that OTS devices are required  to meet. For example, while users expect OTS devices to report location  information, there is currently no minimum performance requirement for  how accurate the location information must be. Absent a standard with  minimum performance requirements, criminal justice agencies across the  nation have relied on vendor assertions on performance and, at times,  their own field testing of equipment to inform purchases.
In fiscal year 2006, a technology working group sponsored by DOJ’s NIJ  identified the development of a standard for OTS technology as a high  priority. The purpose of the OTS standard is to ensure OTS devices meet  certain minimum performance requirements. In fiscal year 2009, NIJ  directed funding to develop an OTS standard and a companion guide.  Development of the standard and guide remains an ongoing effort. NIJ  estimates that it will publish the standard by the end of calendar year  2015, and no later than March of 2016. Use of the OTS standard is to be  on a voluntary basis. OTS device manufacturers are to independently  decide whether to comply with the voluntary standard by submitting their  devices for testing and certification. Likewise, stakeholders, such as  criminal justice agencies across the United States, are to individually  decide whether to require compliance with the standard when acquiring  new OTS technologies.
You asked us to review NIJ’s approach for developing the OTS standard  and expressed questions about public safety. This report addresses the  following questions:  1. To what extent has NIJ collaborated with stakeholders in developing the OTS standard? 2. To what extent have the OTS standard and companion guide incorporated stakeholder needs and addressed potential challenges?
To assess the extent to which NIJ collaborated with stakeholders in  developing the OTS standard, we reviewed federal laws such as the  National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995. The act  generally states, with certain exceptions, that all federal agencies and  departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted  by voluntary consensus standard bodies, using such technical standards  as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the  agencies and departments. In addition, we reviewed Office of  Management and Budget Circular A-119, which establishes policies  consistent with the act to improve the internal management of executive  branch agencies. In addition, we reviewed NIJ procedures on the  development and use of standards. We examined the OTS standard  development process NIJ has implemented by obtaining its records of  activity and meeting with program officials involved in the development  process. We compared NIJ’s development process for the OTS standard  as applicable against the American National Standard Institute’s (ANSI)  Essential Requirements, to understand whether NIJ’s process was  consistent with accepted practices. ANSI is a well-established  organization that accredits leading standard development organizations,  such as Underwriters Laboratories Incorporated, and determines approval  of individual standards. We further looked at A Guide to the Project  Management Body of Knowledge’s stakeholder and collaboration  practices to assess whether NIJ had followed practices for effectively  involving stakeholders.
We reviewed the timing, duration, and level and nature of stakeholder  involvement. We also interviewed individuals appointed by DOJ to serve  on the Advisory Working Group (AWG), which is charged with reviewing  the standard. More specifically, we interviewed AWG members from the  following organizations: the American Probation and Parole Association,  American Correctional Association, National Sheriffs’ Association, and the  U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, we interviewed  members of the Special Technical Committee (STC), which is charged  with writing the standard and includes criminal justice practitioners from  federal, state, and local levels of government as well as technical experts  with experience in developing laboratory testing methods.
Given its role in federal standard development and level of technical  expertise, we met with officials from the National Institute for Standards  and Technology to assess their interaction with NIJ, involvement in the  development process, and their perspective on NIJ’s process. In addition,  we met with victims’ groups and OTS manufacturers to understand their  perspectives on the likely effects of the standard and their involvement in  the standard’s development process. Specifically, we met with  representatives from the National Center for Victims of Crime, the  National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, the National Organization  for Victim Assistance, and the National Sexual Violence Resource Center.  We selected the victims’ groups based upon recommendations from the  American Probation and Parole Association, in response to our request to  identify groups that represent communities’ concerns over the safety and  protection of individuals affected by sexual and violent criminal offenses.  We also met with representatives from the following OTS manufacturers:  BI Incorporated, Satellite Tracking of People LLC, and Sentinel Offender  Services LLC. We selected these manufacturers based upon their having  submitted comments on the draft OTS standard. Further, these  manufacturers provide equipment and services to the agencies that we  interviewed, which included a range of jurisdiction types and sizes as  discussed further below. The information we obtained from these  organizations cannot be generalized, but provides perspectives and  insights on NIJ’s process for developing the OTS standard.
To address the second objective, we selected a nonprobability sample of  10 criminal justice agencies and analyzed the extent to which their OTS  needs and challenges were addressed in NIJ’s draft OTS standard and  the draft companion document, the Criminal Justice Offender Tracking  System Selection and Application Guide (the guide). In recognition that  the standard is meant to address a range of criminal justice OTS uses,  we selected the 10 agencies based upon a combination of factors,  including ensuring a range of federal, state, and local jurisdictions;  geographic location; size; and types of offenders monitored. The 10  agencies are the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation;  Colorado Department of Corrections; DeKalb County, Georgia, Sheriff’s  Office; Denver Community Corrections; Florida Department of  Corrections; Leon County  Office of Intervention and Detention  Alternatives; Georgia Department of Corrections; Los Angeles County  California Probation Department; the Department of Homeland Security’s  Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency; and the U.S. Courts’  Probation and Pretrial Services System. To identify the selected  agencies’ OTS needs, we reviewed their OTS contractual documents,  such as statements of work, and OTS program procedures. At the time of  our review, 1 of the 10 selected agencies was in the process of  documenting its OTS needs. We therefore omitted this agency from the  analysis of OTS performance requirements. We identified the range of  performance requirements across the remaining 9 agencies and  compared them against selected requirements in the draft OTS standard  to determine the extent to which the draft standard addressed their  needs. We also interviewed program officials and criminal justice officers  responsible for supervising offenders from all 10 selected agencies to  discuss their needs and identify any challenges they experience. The  information we obtained from these agencies cannot be generalized to all  criminal justice agencies, but offers insight into the range of OTS needs  and challenges agencies may have.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2014 to October 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Purposes and Methods for Offender Monitoring
paragraphs: Numerous agencies at the federal, state, and local levels with varying  missions monitor or supervise individuals. Criminal justice agency  missions that require monitoring include pretrial and post-trial services,  probation and parole services, and immigration enforcement. For pretrial  services, judicial agencies monitor defendants at the discretion of the  court for a period of time preceding a scheduled court date. Other criminal  justice agencies monitor offenders as an alternative to detention. For  instance, probation agencies typically monitor offenders whom courts  place on supervision in the community, in lieu of incarceration. The  Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement agency monitors certain aliens prior to adjudication hearings  or deportation. With regard to post-trial monitoring, parole agencies  monitor offenders who are conditionally released from prison to serve the  remaining portion of their sentences in the community.
There are many supervisory and monitoring methods, manual and  electronic, used by criminal justice agencies. See figure 1 for several of  these methods.
Manual methods are routinely used to supervise offenders, including  employment verification, compliance searches, narcotic testing, clinical  treatment, home or field contact visits, and stakeholder collaboration.  There are various programs that require close supervision of individuals,  most predominantly state and local probation or parole agencies’  monitoring of selected offender populations (e.g., gang-related and sex  offenders). Therefore, as a supplement to the traditional manual methods,  many criminal justice agencies use electronic monitoring technologies.  Electronic monitoring includes technologies that track individuals’ physical  location to help supervise compliance with program requirements  designed to ensure public safety. These technologies are not designed to  replace manual methods. Rather, they are one tool used in concert with  other methods for monitoring offenders.
Electronic monitoring technologies include voice verification, radio  frequency monitoring, and GPS. Voice verification refers to voice  recognition technology that can verify the identity of an individual.  Applications include low-risk offenders self-reporting their status by  telephone. Radio frequency monitoring involves a device that detects a  signal connected to a home telephone (landline), so that authorities can  ensure that an offender is at home. However, authorities will not know the  location of the offender if he/she leaves. GPS is a U.S.-owned utility that  provides users with positioning, navigation, and timing services. The  frequency with which GPS data are collected and reported can vary.  Passive tracking technology collects and stores location and status data,  which are reported retrospectively. Active tracking technology can  accomplish near-real-time collection and reporting of location and status  data.
section_title: National Institute of Justice Standard Development
paragraphs: DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP) works in partnership with the  justice community to provide information, training, coordination, and  strategies for addressing crime-related challenges. NIJ is an office of OJP  that acts as the research, development, and evaluation agency of DOJ.  NIJ’s mission is to provide objective and independent knowledge and  tools to reduce crime and promote justice, particularly at the state and  local levels. The NIJ Policy, Standards and Grant Management Division  develops and publishes voluntary consensus equipment standards that  specifically address the needs of law enforcement, corrections, and other  criminal justice agencies.
OTS is an electronic monitoring technology consisting of hardware, such  as an ankle bracelet (see fig. 2), used for collecting and transmitting data  on an individual’s location, and software for analyzing data collected from  the hardware device. As written in the current draft, the OTS standard  pertains to devices using passive tracking or active tracking technology,  such as GPS. See figure 3 for a graphical depiction of how the  components of GPS-based OTS interact to collect and transmit location  data.
To develop the OTS standard, NIJ established the Advisory Working  Group and the Special Technical Committee (STC). The AWG reviews  the work of the STC and provides high-level guidance on issues that  affect users, service providers, and manufacturers. It is composed of  senior-level representatives from selected stakeholder groups and  individuals experienced in standards development. The STC’s role is to  identify requirements for OTS technology, consult with leading  manufacturers, and develop minimum performance requirements and  associated testing methods for equipment certification. The STC is  composed of criminal justice practitioners and subject matter and  technical experts. See figure 4 for NIJ’s organization that supports the  development of the OTS standard.
In addition to the OTS minimum performance requirements documented  in the draft standard, the STC has drafted companion documents to  provide guidance on implementing offender tracking programs and OTS  equipment certification programs. Specifically, the Criminal Justice  Offender Tracking System Selection Application Guide provides guidance  about the functionality, selection, use, and maintenance of OTS. The  Criminal Justice Offender Tracking System Certification Program  Requirements and the Criminal Justice Offender Tracking System  Refurbishment Service Program Requirements addresses accreditation  requirements for certification bodies.
section_title: Standard Development Process
paragraphs: There are numerous accredited national and international standard  development organizations that have published thousands of equipment  standards in use today. ANSI, which has accredited over 200 standard  development organizations, requires adherence to a general approach  displayed in figure 5 when developing American standards.
section_title: NIJ Collaborated with a Variety of Stakeholders, but Earlier Manufacturer Involvement Could Have Expedited Development of the OTS Standard
paragraphs: NIJ collaborated with stakeholders by leveraging expertise from a broad  variety of criminal justice and technical experts. However, earlier and  continued collaboration with OTS manufacturers could have better  informed and facilitated development of the OTS standard. Coordination  between NIJ and manufacturers has since improved, and manufacturers’  major concerns have been addressed.
NIJ’s process for developing the OTS standard is consistent with ANSI  criteria for accrediting organizations. For instance, NIJ sought and  involved participants from diverse backgrounds with the objective of  achieving a balance of interests. Participants in the OTS development  process include criminal justice practitioners from all levels of government  representing parole, probation, and pretrial services agencies. NIJ also  made efforts to leverage any national or international standards that  apply, and solicited and incorporated feedback on the draft standard and  companion documents through two public comment periods. In particular,  NIJ formed working groups by appointing members who represent the  OTS user community, relevant fields of technology, and affected  professional associations. For example, NIJ created the STC and the  AWG to inform the development of the OTS standard.
In addition, NIJ efforts extended to collaborating with subject matter  experts such as ones in the U.S. Air Force and the National Institute of  Standards and Technology (NIST)—leveraging both organizations’  technological backgrounds. For example, the Air Force contributed  information on GPS for the STC’s consideration so that the STC could  more fully understand the technology. Similarly, NIST also contributed its  technical expertise related to its ongoing work with location and tracking  systems.
While the standards development process NIJ employed for developing  the OTS standard is consistent with the process outlined by ANSI, earlier  and ongoing inclusion of OTS manufacturers could have expedited  development of the OTS standard. See figure 6 outlining selected events  throughout the OTS standard development process. The Guide to the  Project Management Body of Knowledge emphasizes the importance of  considering stakeholder equities and ensuring their ongoing involvement  throughout the entire project life cycle. It recognizes that stakeholders’  views and interests can be varied, and states that overlooking the views  of a stakeholder that will be negatively affected can result in an increased  likelihood of failure, delays, or other negative consequences to a project.
NIJ’s approach for developing the OTS standard is described by agency  program officials and STC members as practitioner-driven. Practitioners  are those who use OTS equipment when tracking the location of  individuals. Initially, STC practitioners created a list of criminal justice  needs that they sought to be addressed through OTS technology.  Subsequent to this assessment of needs and the development of  corresponding equipment performance requirements, the technical  experts on the STC were tasked with developing corresponding test  methods.
In May 2011, approximately 1-1/2 years after the development process  began, manufacturers, who are to voluntarily ensure their equipment  conforms to the standard, had a means to formally provide their input.  Specifically, on May 12, 2011, NIJ held a manufacturer’s workshop to  seek manufacturer input on the standard. According to manufacturer  representatives with whom we met, manufacturers expressed significant  concerns related to the feasibility of many requirements and associated  testing methods in the OTS standard. For example, two manufacturers  we met with reported that it was unlikely that existing OTS equipment in  the market could pass performance requirements in the draft standard as  written, since current technology did not meet the expressed need. This is  particularly important to the manufacturer community, as the  manufacturers are the ones that ensure their equipment meets  requirements in the standard and bear any related costs and market  consequences if their equipment does not meet the standard. Similarly,  NIJ had not identified the need for refurbished equipment certification  program requirements. This is significant, as refurbished equipment is  routinely provided by OTS manufacturers as part of their service  agreements with government agencies.
Approximately 1 year after the manufacturers’ workshop, NIJ had not  provided feedback to manufacturers regarding their concerns. Therefore,  OTS manufacturers were not aware that NIJ had taken action to  incorporate their concerns into the draft OTS standard based on their  review of the draft standard circulated during the first public comment  period. On July 18, 2012, in a joint letter to NIJ nearing the conclusion of  the first public comment period, a group of manufacturers wrote the  following, “The Manufacturers are very concerned that we have received  absolutely no feedback regarding the information we provided to the  , and that nothing has been incorporated  into the standard.”
NIJ officials we met with reported that they considered manufacturer  input. Specifically, they reviewed manufacturer comments received at the  2011 workshop as well as those received on the first OTS standard draft  during the public comment period from June 6 through July 23, 2012.  However, at the time, NIJ officials told us that they were focused on  working to address comments from all stakeholders and, therefore, did  not immediately communicate to manufacturers if or how their comments  were being addressed.
We reviewed revisions made to the OTS standard since the first draft and  formal comments submitted in response to both the first and second  comment periods along with NIJ’s responses, and met with STC  members and selected manufacturers. According to our review, earlier  and ongoing involvement of OTS manufacturers in the standard  development process could have better informed and expedited the OTS  standard development process. OTS manufacturers could have  contributed to NIJ’s overall understanding of the technology at the  forefront of the process since they act as both developers and service  agreement providers to numerous government agencies. For example,  OTS manufacturers could have better informed and facilitated  development of the OTS standard by providing insights on OTS  capabilities and limitations at the outset. Manufacturers could have further  clarified whether existing OTS technology could meet each performance  requirement and testing method shortly after being conceived by the STC  members rather than after the first draft of the OTS standard had been  developed. For instance, the detection of certain methods used by  offenders to avoid location monitoring are either not fully developed or  available to all manufacturers.
While the OTS standard and associated testing methods remain under  development, coordination between NIJ and manufacturers has improved  since 2012. For example, through the second public comment period for  the draft standard, NIJ has communicated to the manufacturers that their  major concerns related to minimum performance requirements and  testing methods have been addressed. In addition, according to NIJ  officials, at the end of the public comment periods, NIJ reached out to  each manufacturer that provided comments. On the basis of our analysis,  the current draft OTS standard and changes proposed in response to the  second public comment period generally reflect input manufacturers have  provided NIJ. For instance, as a result of stakeholder input, the STC has  developed refurbishment service program requirements, and it has also  revised certain performance areas in the draft standard as optional based  on available technology. NIJ is currently in the final stages of OTS  standard development and plans to issue the standard by March 2016. As  NIJ works to finalize the standard, it has invited manufacturers to  participate in assessing the viability of test methods to be used when  validating whether an OTS meets requirements set forth in the standard.  Specifically, it has asked manufacturers to provide samples of their  equipment. At least one manufacturer we met with is participating in this  process by providing its OTS equipment for testing, and NIJ reports that  an additional two manufacturers have as well.
section_title: Draft OTS Standard and Companion Guide Address Many Common Needs and Challenges Identified by Stakeholders
subsections: section_title: Draft OTS Standard Addresses Common Needs; Performance Requirements Vary by Agency
paragraphs: NIJ’s draft OTS standard sets minimum performance standards that  address common operational and circumvention detection needs  identified by the 9 criminal justice agencies from which we collected  procurement and policy documents. Agencies’ specific performance  requirements varied and were sometimes more or less rigorous than the  draft standard, based on factors such as the type of offender supervised  and environmental conditions in their jurisdictions. Furthermore, these  agencies did not always define performance requirements corresponding  to their needs, such as specific location accuracy requirements. By  setting minimum requirements for a range of commonly identified offender  tracking system needs, the standard could help agencies more thoroughly  consider and develop contractual requirements and help ensure their  needs will be met. Officials from all of the ten agencies we selected stated  that implementing a standard would be beneficial because, among other  things, it could provide objective information on performance that could  inform their procurement processes. Agencies we reviewed, at times, also  defined additional requirements specific to their circumstances that are  not in the draft standard, such as a two-way communication feature that  allows the offender and officer to speak to each other. NIJ officials stated  the standard is meant to address performance needs that are common to  a broad range of agencies.
subsections: section_title: Common Operational and Circumvention Detection Needs
paragraphs: The draft standard addresses common operational and circumvention  detection needs, such as location accuracy, the ability to obtain an  offender’s location on demand, programming “zones”—geographical  areas an offender is or is not to enter— and alerts to report device  tampering, among others. Some of these operational and circumvention  detection needs are discussed below. See appendix I for additional  information on specific requirements in the draft standard and summary  data on the extent to which the requirements met stakeholder needs.
Testing Conditions  Environmental factors, such as cloud cover,  could affect the performance of offender  tracking systems. To help ensure replicable  and fair testing, the draft standard defines  specific conditions for testing each  performance requirement. For example, the  outdoor location accuracy test is to be  performed when a minimum cellular speed is  achieved, there is a clear view of the sky, and  there is limited cloud cover, among other  conditions.
Location accuracy. One of the primary objectives of OTSs is to  continuously track the location of offenders. NIJ’s draft standard includes  performance requirements for both indoor and outdoor location accuracy.  Specifically, it calls for OTS to provide a location that is accurate within 10  meters 90 percent of the time in an open air environment with no  obstructions. It also calls for OTS to provide a location that is accurate  within 30 meters 90 percent of the time when placed in an 8-foot by 8-foot  single-story structure. The nine agencies we reviewed identified location  accuracy as important, but none of the agencies had developed a specific  accuracy requirement. The officials from the agencies we interviewed  also noted that they must track offenders in a variety of settings, such as  urban areas with high-rise buildings, which are not accounted for in the  draft standard. However, the NIJ and STC members responsible for  developing the standard stated that adding additional types of indoor  environments would increase the cost of testing. NIJ and manufacturers  agreed that it is important that the tests not be too costly so that  manufacturers would voluntarily participate in the standard and consumer  prices would not be significantly affected, since the cost of testing could  be passed down to users. Furthermore, as discussed later in this report,  there are inherent limitations to the GPS technology that prevent it from  always providing accurate location data in certain conditions, and NIJ’s  guide provides additional information on addressing these challenges.
On-demand location. On-demand location allows agencies to determine  the most recent location of an offender. The draft standard calls for OTSs  to be able to provide an on-demand location within 3 minutes of a  request. Five of the nine agencies we reviewed defined an on-demand  location requirement, with two of the five agencies specifying that they  require the ability to instantly receive an offender’s location and status.  Representatives from all three manufacturers with whom we met stated  that their OTSs cannot provide “instant” location updates because of  limitations including GPS and cellular technology, and that while quicker  response times are possible, the 3-minute time frame is a reasonable  requirement for the minimum performance standard. More specifically,  these representatives emphasized that the 3-minute time frame is  appropriate because of the number of steps that must occur to obtain an  offender’s location. Such steps include, for example, the software calling  out to the tracking device through a cellular network to acquire data, the  device collecting the GPS satellite signals to acquire location data,  calculating location data, and transmitting the location data back to the  agency.
Zones. An important feature of OTSs is the ability to develop zones. As  shown in figure 7, inclusion zones are geographic areas where an  offender is scheduled to be, such as home or work; exclusion zones are  geographic areas where the offender is not permitted to visit, such as a  victim’s home, schools, or outside the state or county border. The draft  standard calls for OTSs to configure zones in the shapes of circles,  rectangles, and arbitrarily shaped polygons, as well as be able to have  zones within zones. Officials from one agency explained, for example,  that it was important that they be able to draw precise exclusion zones  around areas such as schools to prevent the system from alerting when  the offender is driving by the location. The draft standard also calls for  OTSs to generate zone templates that store a minimum of 50 predefined  inclusion or exclusion zones, which agencies can apply to any offender.  Officials from one agency explained that zone templates are useful when  common exclusion zones such as county and state borders or schools  need to be applied to many offenders. The zone shape and zone  template requirements in the draft standard are more comprehensive than  any of the requirements established by the nine agencies we reviewed.  For example, eight of the nine agencies we reviewed did not define  specific zone shape requirements.
Alert notifications. Another important feature of OTSs is to provide  alerts to notify an agency of a number of different events. These events  include, among others, occasions when an offender tampers with the  tracking device by cutting it off or trying to remove it by stretching it over  his or her foot, an offender violates zone rules by crossing the border of  an exclusion or inclusion zone, the GPS location is lost; cellular  communication is lost; and when the tracking device battery is low. Alerts  for tampering with the device and low battery are particularly important  because cutting the device off and letting the battery die were the most  common circumvention methods reported by officials at eight of the nine  agencies we reviewed.
Tamper and zone violation alerts: The draft standard calls for the OTSs to provide alerts within 3 minutes of an ankle strap being cut and within 4 minutes of ankle strap stretching and zone violations. The tamper alert requirements in the draft standard are consistent with the requirements established by five of the nine agencies we reviewed. Similarly, the zone violation alert requirements are consistent with the requirements established by four of the nine agencies we reviewed. The remaining agencies established requirements for immediate notification of tamper events and zone violations, though they did not define a time parameter for “immediate.” Representatives from the three manufacturers we met with stated that as with the on-demand location feature, instantaneously sending alert status information is not currently feasible with their OTSs. Rather, the 3- to 4-minute maximum time frame in the draft standard for producing an alert was feasible and would sufficiently test for the OTSs’ ability to provide a near real-time alert. NIJ officials explained that this time frame was determined by the practitioners on the STC and balances their performance needs with the state of the technology.
Loss of GPS and cellular alerts: The draft standard requires an alert within 4 minutes of loss of GPS or cellular communication. This time period was consistent with the requirements established by all of the agencies we reviewed that had defined such requirements. Officials from one agency we met with explained that GPS and cellular communications are lost frequently in their jurisdiction, in areas such as subways, large office buildings, and basements. Therefore, this agency required an alert notification after a number of hours without GPS or cellular communications to avoid overwhelming officers with alerts. Another agency we met with did not require any alerts for loss of GPS or communications because it supervised offenders who were not on probation or parole. In recognition that agencies may wish to delay alert notifications in areas where offenders often lose cellular  communications, the draft standard also calls for OTSs to have the  ability to alert after communications have been lost for 1 hour. NIJ  officials explained that STC members included the 1-hour alert  requirement in the draft standard to reflect a more typical time frame  used by practitioners. They further stated that agencies could  continue to request shorter or longer notification requirements from  their OTS vendors based on their individual needs.
Low battery alert: The draft standard calls for OTSs to provide a low battery alert prior to the battery completely discharging, but it does not specify exactly when this alert is to occur. Eight of the nine agencies we reviewed required a low battery alert, but the time period for when they wanted to receive the alert varied. The draft standard also addresses other battery performance needs, such as battery life. For more information see appendix I.
Optional circumvention requirements. Metallic shielding is the use of  metallic material to block GPS signals. Jamming is the use of an  electronic device to block GPS or cellular signals. Both of these  circumvention methods can prevent agencies from tracking an offender’s  location. The draft standard includes optional performance requirements  for the detection of metallic shielding and jamming. According to  members of the STC, these requirements are optional because only one  manufacturer offered jamming detection capabilities and had developed  and patented shielding detection capabilities at the time the standard was  being drafted. Further, they believe it is important to have a standard with  performance requirements in which several manufacturers would  voluntarily participate. According to our review, one of the nine agencies  required metallic shielding and GPS jamming capabilities as part of its  procurement process. Officials from eight of the nine agencies reported  that shielding and jamming were not considered common circumvention  methods. However, officials from one agency explained that jamming  may be occurring, but they did not have evidence, such as recovered  jammers or alert data, to support that it is a common occurrence. Officials  from the nine agencies generally agreed that making shielding and  jamming detection optional performance requirements is reasonable.  While one of the nine agencies established a shielding or jamming  requirement, officials from five of the eight agencies that had not  established such a requirement stated that these circumvention detection  capabilities are or could be useful.
Historical data. OTSs generate a considerable amount of data on each  offender. The draft standard calls for historical location data, status of all  alerts, and offender identifiers to be exported into a defined comma- delimited text file, a widely used format. All nine agencies we reviewed  had established a requirement to have access to historical data. Officials  from these agencies stated that accessing historical data is important  because the data could be needed as evidence in an investigation, for  example. In addition to the requirement to make historical data available,  some agencies also specified particular business practices, such as  record retention time frames. For example, one agency required that the  OTS data be retained for 7 years. NIJ’s guide also provides further  guidance on retaining offender tracking data, including taking into account  federal, state, and local laws or policies that require certain data be  maintained for a specific number of years.
Robustness. OTS devices are worn on the body and may be subject to  wear and tear and a number of different environmental conditions,  depending on factors such as where the offender lives and works. The  draft standard calls for OTSs to function properly after being exposed to  extreme temperatures ranging from —4 degrees Fahrenheit to 122  degrees Fahrenheit, immersed in 2 meters of water, undergoing different  shock tests, and exposure to vibration, among other things. One agency  we reviewed had not defined any robustness requirements and none of  the remaining eight agencies had established as many or as specific  robustness requirements as those in the draft standard. For example,  seven agencies required the OTS device to be shock resistant, but did  not define what this meant. In addition, none of the agencies had  established vibration exposure requirements. However, four agencies  established robustness requirements that were more rigorous in certain  areas. For example, one agency required the device to be waterproof up  to 50 feet, while another agency called for the device to function in  conditions up to 135 degrees Fahrenheit.
section_title: Individualized Needs Not Considered Minimum Performance Requirements in the Draft Standard
paragraphs: In addition to the performance areas identified as part of the draft OTS  standard, the 9 agencies we reviewed also had a variety of individualized  needs. These needs were not, however, consistent across agencies. For  example, 3 agencies required the OTS to have motion detection. Officials  from 1 agency explained that a no-motion alert could indicate that the  offender is experiencing a medical emergency or has removed the ankle  bracelet. In addition, 1 agency required an OTS with two-way  communication that would allow the offender and officer to speak to each  other. Officials from this agency said that this has been a useful tool that  has enhanced offenders’ compliance. One agency also required victim  support tools such as beepers or cell phones to notify victims of pertinent  alerts from their offenders’ tracking systems.
Further, agencies had different analytical requirements. For example, 1  agency required the ability to automate crime scene correlation analysis.  Crime scene correlation analysis involves comparing offenders’ location  data against the locations of crimes to identify potential suspects or  witnesses. Another agency required analysis tools to identify common  places at which each offender spends time. Officials from this agency  explained that they use the analysis to help find offenders in the event  that they abscond.
NIJ and STC members stated that the standard is meant to establish  minimum performance requirements that would be common to a broad  range of criminal justice uses. Further, they stated that agencies could  continue to specify additional requirements beyond those in the standard  as part of their individual procurement processes. In addition, the  technical experts on the STC with whom we met stated that as OTS  technology advances, the common needs of agencies may also change.  It would, therefore, be important to periodically reassess the minimum  performance requirements in the standard to determine if they are still  valid or if they should be changed to address changes in practitioners’  needs or advances in technology. This is consistent with NIJ’s standard  development process, which calls for standards to be reevaluated every 3  to 5 years.
section_title: The OTS Standard’s Draft Companion Guide Addresses Potential Challenges and Other Considerations
paragraphs: Officials from the 10 criminal justice agencies we met with also identified  programmatic challenges with implementing offender tracking programs,  such as managing public expectations of what the technology can  achieve, as well as technical limitations that could affect the success of  their offender tracking programs. NIJ’s draft guide provides information  and guidance on these challenges and other considerations. In  recognition of the range of agencies, environments, resources, and  objectives of offender tracking, the draft guide does not offer “one size fits  all” solutions.
subsections: section_title: Programmatic Challenges
paragraphs: Challenges commonly cited by officials from the 10 agencies we met with  included public expectations, establishing response protocols, and  managing workloads. The draft guide discusses these and other  programmatic considerations that can affect the success of an electronic  monitoring program.
Public expectations. One of the challenges officials cited was  misconceptions among the public about how offender tracking programs  operate. According to officials, common misconceptions include the  beliefs that (1) officers are stationed at computers and watch the live  movement of offenders 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and (2) offender  tracking technology allows officers to prevent bad behavior before it  happens.
Investigating Crimes  Global Positioning System (GPS) data from  offender tracking systems (OTS) can be used  to help investigate and solve crimes. For  example,
Officials from 1 agency we met with reported that two sex offenders were identified as suspects in the killing of four women in California based upon the GPS data collected from the OTS, which placed them at the crime scenes.
OTS data can also help eliminate offenders as suspects. In Florida, the mother of an abducted boy pointed to a sex offender who lived in the vicinity as a suspect. The GPS data collected by the OTS showed that the offender had not been at the boy’s location and helped law enforcement exclude the offender as a suspect.
Agency officials reported that officers are rarely stationed at computers  watching the live movement of offenders. Instead, as one of many  supervisory and monitoring methods, practitioners commonly rely on OTS  devices collecting location information and developing alerts that notify  them when offenders may be violating restrictions imposed upon them.  While OTS devices do collect data on offenders’ location, the information  is not sufficient for officers to make definitive conclusions regarding  offenders’ behavior. As officials from 1 agency noted, offenders can  commit crimes without setting off any alerts. In addition, some offenders  may purposely keep the device on to prevent alerting authorities prior to  or while they commit a crime. Furthermore, even if an offender sets off an  alert, an agency may not respond immediately. Response time depends  on the alert protocols established by the agency and factors such as  staffing and resources, as discussed later in this report. Although OTSs  may not deter or prevent all offenders from recidivating, officials from 1  agency emphasized the important role GPS location data can play in  providing evidence to solve crimes.
Understanding key aspects of how offender tracking programs operate is  particularly important for victims. Representatives from the victims’ rights  organizations we met with explained that victims should understand the  limitations of the technology so they do not develop a false sense of  security. The draft guide contains a section on managing media relations  to inform the public of the agency’s mission, policies, and practices. It  advises agencies to provide proactive updates on the program and have  a plan to communicate to the media in the event that a critical incident  occurs.
Response protocols. Officials from the agencies we met with told us that  it was challenging to develop appropriate response protocols that balance  the likelihood of risk to public safety with available resources. Officials  reported that alerts for loss of GPS, cellular communications, and low  battery can occur frequently, even when the offender has no intention of  circumventing tracking. Responding to all such alerts can overwhelm  officers, according to officials with whom we met. To help reduce officers’  alert workload, 1 agency we met with set up its OTS to generate an  exclusion zone alert only after multiple consecutive location points were  collected within an exclusion zone. The officials explained that this  reduced the number of alerts caused by inaccurate location data and  situations where the offender was driving by an exclusion zone. On the  other hand, reducing the number of alerts officers receive may increase  the risk that an offender will be able to circumvent tracking or commit a  new crime. One victims’ rights group representative noted that an agency  can have the best OTS technology available, but it will not help protect  the public if the agency does not use or respond to the data it generates.
Critical incidents in which offenders with a GPS tracking device have  committed serious crimes, including rape and murder, have caused some  agencies to reassess how they respond to alerts and oversee their  programs. For example, officials from 1 agency’s regional office decided  to receive tamper alert notifications only after the device had been in a  tamper status for 5 minutes. The 5-minute time period was chosen to help  prevent alerts not indicative of a violation, such as frequent impact to the  device as a result of the offender’s work environment. However, this  delayed notification was inconsistent with the agency’s national policy and  resulted in one offender being able to generate a series of tamper alerts  over several weeks that lasted less than 5 minutes. In this case, an officer  did not receive alert notifications and did not investigate the matter. This  offender subsequently pleaded guilty to raping a child and killing the  child’s mother after removing his tracking device. Following this incident,  the agency’s national office investigated the supervision of the offender  and reaffirmed the importance of receiving immediate notifications for and  responding to all tamper alerts.
In recognition of the importance of establishing appropriate response  protocols, the draft guide includes examples for an inclusion zone  violation and a low battery alert. The draft guide also highlights a number  of factors that agencies should take into consideration when determining  how to respond to alerts. For example, the draft guide advises agencies  to consider the offender’s conviction type, level of risk, and whether there  are victims who should be notified. The draft guide also advises agencies  to consider their available resources when determining who will be  notified of alerts and when. Specifically, agencies should determine if they  are able to respond to alerts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and whether  they can use a vendor to monitor or respond to alerts prior to agency staff  being notified. Figure 8 shows examples of two alert response  approaches—one in which all alerts are received by an officer and one in  which a monitoring center reviews alerts to determine whether an officer  should be notified.
Workload. Implementing an OTS program can create workload  challenges. For example, officials we met with said that they have  experienced high or unpredictable officer caseloads and the need for  overtime to respond to alerts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The draft  guide asserts that OTS programs need to have sufficient staffing to meet  the increased workload demands. It also states that failing to adequately  staff an OTS program can lead to officer burnout, unanticipated overtime  expenses, high turnover rates, and protests from collective bargaining  groups. The draft guide provides information on the multiple new duties  that OTS programs may require and that agencies should consider when  making decisions about the size and objectives of their program. These  duties may include, for example, offender orientation to instruct the  offender of program rules and conditions, installation of offender tracking  equipment, routine inspection of offender tracking equipment to ensure  the offender has not tampered with it, responding to alerts, and reviewing  location tracking data.
The draft guide also provides information on different approaches and  considerations for addressing workload issues. For example, if there is a  large enough offender population, the draft guide states that a specialized  workforce for offender tracking could result in efficiencies. Hours of  operation are another consideration. According to the draft guide,  agencies should determine whether OTS alerts should be responded to  24 hours a day, 7 days a week, or if passive tracking is a viable  alternative part or all of the time. Data review requirements can also affect  officers’ workloads. Reviewing all offender tracking data takes a  significant amount of time, but can help officers identify patterns and  deviations that warrant further investigation. Thus, the draft guide states  that agencies should determine whether a review of all offender tracking  data is needed or if responding to alerts is sufficient to achieve program  goals. Further, agencies can contract with vendors to provide various  levels of services including training, installing and inspecting equipment,  responding to certain alerts, dispatching alerts to criminal justice officers,  and data analysis. The draft guide advises agencies to take into account  both program objectives as well as stakeholder expectations when  determining what approach to take.
Other considerations. In addition to addressing the challenges raised  by officials from the agencies with whom we met, the draft guide also  discusses a number of other issues agencies should consider when  implementing an offender tracking program. For example, the draft guide  provides information on common procurement processes and what to  look for in a vendor. It also addresses training issues and provides  information on establishing contractual requirements for the vendor to  provide training, as well as considerations for training content, format, and  frequency. Furthermore, the draft guide discusses several OTS data  considerations, including managing data that are evidence related to a  crime and data retention issues, such as the data format, how long the  data will be kept, and who will have access to the data. Another  consideration is measuring offender tracking program outcomes. The  draft guide advises that the appropriate approach to measuring success  will be determined by the objectives of the program, which can range from  reducing overcrowding in correctional institutions to enhancing public  safety.
section_title: Technical Limitations
paragraphs: Cellular and GPS reception can affect the OTSs’ location accuracy or  ability to report location and alerts. Officials from the 10 agencies with  whom we met all experienced challenges with cellular and GPS signal  reception in certain areas of their jurisdictions. The draft guide provides  information and guidance for how to mitigate these challenges.
Cellular coverage. OTSs rely on cellular communications to transmit  location data; thus an agency will not be able to determine an offender’s  location in near real time while he or she is in an area with insufficient  cellular coverage. Officials from all 10 criminal justice agencies stated that  there are areas in their jurisdictions that lack sufficient cellular coverage  to allow devices to perform as designed. The draft guide suggests that  agencies inquire about the cellular providers that vendors use for their  equipment and test the devices prior to making a final procurement  decision. If cellular coverage is limited, the draft guide states that one  option is to use passive tracking, where the location and alert status data  are transmitted to the agency through a landline at a predetermined  interval, usually once a day.
GPS signal reception. Signals from a minimum of three GPS satellites  are required to calculate location, and the greater number of satellite  signals received, the more accurate the location will be. As with cellular  coverage, officials from all 10 criminal justice agencies we met with stated  that there are areas in their jurisdictions where their OTSs lose or have  compromised GPS signal reception. The draft guide provides information  on factors that can affect GPS signal reception and cause inaccurate  location data—often referred to as GPS drift—to help agencies  understand the limitations of OTSs. Specifically, the draft guide notes that  structures, foliage, cloud cover, and natural land formations such as  canyons can block GPS signals. In addition, buildings or bodies of water  can create a phenomenon known as multi-path, where the GPS signal is  reflected off one or more surfaces prior to reaching the tracking device.  Because GPS calculations usually assume that a signal follows a straight  line to the tracking device, multipath reflections can significantly affect the  accuracy of the location data.
The draft guide also provides information on OTS features that can help  mitigate GPS signal reception issues that agencies can consider and test  when making equipment selection decisions. For example, OTS with  antennas that can track more satellite signals will be less subject to drift  and will have greater location accuracy. Table 1 provides further  information on different OTS features discussed in the draft guide that  can help mitigate GPS signal reception issues.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOJ, DHS, and AOUSC for their  review and comment. None of the agencies provided written comments.  DHS and AOUSC provided technical comments, which we incorporated  as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Attorney General, the Director of the  Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Secretary of the Department  of Commerce, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,  and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Operational and Circumvention Detection Needs Addressed in NIJ’s Draft Offender Tracking Standard
paragraphs: The National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) draft standard addresses common  operational and circumvention detection needs. Table 2 summarizes  some of the operational and circumvention requirements in the draft  standard. The agencies’ requirements were sometimes more or less  rigorous than those in the standard. Furthermore, in some instances,  agencies did not define a performance requirement for a specific  operational or circumvention detection need.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: David C. Maurer, (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Joseph P. Cruz (Assistant  Director), Pamela Aker, David Alexander, Willie Commons III, Susan  Czachor, Dominick Dale, Eric Hauswirth, Heather May, Linda Miller, and  Michael Tropauer made key contributions to this report.