Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to Verify Some Chemical Facility Information and Manage Compliance Process
Published: 2015-07-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. DHS established the CFATS program to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. Within DHS, ISCD oversees this program.
GAO was asked to assess the CFATS program. This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which DHS has (1) categorized facilities as subject to the CFATS regulation, and (2) approved site security plans and conducted compliance inspections. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and program documents; randomly selected data submitted to ISCD by facilities from 2007 to 2015, tested the data's reliability; and generated estimates for the entire population of facilities, and interviewed officials responsible for overseeing, identifying, categorizing, and inspecting chemical facilities from DHS headquarters and in California, Maryland, Oregon, and Texas (selected based on geographic location and other factors).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2007, the Office of Infrastructure Protection's Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has identified and collected data from approximately 37,000 chemical facilities under its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program and categorized approximately 2,900 as high-risk based on the collected data. However, ISCD used unverified and self-reported data to categorize the risk level for facilities evaluated for a toxic release threat. A toxic release threat exists where chemicals, if released, could harm surrounding populations. One key input for determining a facility's toxic release threat is the Distance of Concern (distance) that facilities report—an area in which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud could cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure. ISCD requires facilities to calculate the distance using a web-based tool and following DHS guidance. ISCD does not verify facility-reported data for facilities it does not categorize as high-risk for a toxic release threat. However, following DHS guidance and using a generalizable sample of facility-reported data in a DHS database, GAO estimated that more than 2,700 facilities (44 percent) of an estimated 6,400 facilities with a toxic release threat misreported the distance. By verifying that the data ISCD used in its risk assessment are accurate, ISCD could better ensure it has identified the nation's high-risk chemical facilities.
ISCD has made substantial progress approving site security plans but does not have documented processes and procedures for managing facilities that are noncompliant with their approved site security plans. Site security plans outline, among other things, the planned measures that facilities agree to implement to address security vulnerabilities. As of April 2015, GAO estimates that it could take between 9 and 12 months for ISCD to review and approve security plans for approximately 900 remaining facilities—a substantial improvement over the previous estimate of 7 to 9 years GAO reported in April 2013. ISCD officials attributed the increased approval rate to efficiencies in ISCD's security plan review process, updated guidance, and a new case management system. Further, ISCD began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013, but does not have documented processes and procedures for managing the compliance of facilities that have not implemented planned measures outlined in their site security plans. According to the nature of violations thus far, ISCD has addressed noncompliance on a case-by-case basis. Almost half (34 of 69) of facilities ISCD inspected as of February 2015 had not implemented one or more planned measures by deadlines specified in their approved site security plans and therefore were not fully compliant with their plans. GAO found variations in how ISCD addressed these 34 facilities, such as how much additional time the facilities had to come into compliance and whether or not a follow-on inspection was scheduled. Such variations may or may not be appropriate given ISCD's case-by-case approach, but having documented processes and procedures would ensure that ISCD has guidelines by which to manage noncompliant facilities and ensure they close security gaps in a timely manner. Additionally, given that ISCD will need to inspect about 2,900 facilities in the future, having documented processes and procedures could provide ISCD more reasonable assurance that facilities implement planned measures and address security gaps.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS (1) verify the Distance of Concern reported by facilities is accurate and (2) document processes and procedures for managing compliance with site security plans. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and outlined steps to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Facilities that produce, use, or store hazardous chemicals could be of  particular interest to terrorists who are intent on using toxic chemicals to  inflict mass casualties in the United States. These chemicals could be  released from a facility to cause harm to surrounding populations, stolen  and used as chemical weapons or the ingredients to make chemical  weapons, or stolen and used to build an improvised explosive device. For  example, on April 19, 1995, a domestic terrorist used ammonium nitrate  fertilizer mixed with fuel oil to blow up a federal building in Oklahoma City,  Oklahoma. The explosion killed 168 people and injured hundreds more.  The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program,  established pursuant to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  Appropriations Act, 2007, enables DHS to, among other things, identify  chemical facilities and assess the security risk posed by each, categorize  the facilities into risk-based tiers, and inspect the high-risk facilities to  ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. The Protecting and  Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014, enacted  in December 2014, in effect, reauthorized the CFATS program for an  additional 4 years while also imposing additional implementation  requirements on DHS for the program.Protection (IP), through its Infrastructure Security Compliance Division  (ISCD), within DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate  (NPPD), oversees the CFATS program.
In July 2012, we reported that ISCD had efforts under way to address  challenges in implementing the CFATS program—such as delays  approving site security plans—that were highlighted in a leaked internal  ISCD memorandum. We found that ISCD was in the early stages of implementing actions to address challenges and had not yet established  performance measures to assess results. We recommended that ISCD  explore opportunities to develop performance measures and assess  results, where practical. ISCD agreed with our recommendation and, in  response, developed an operating plan that included information on how  ISCD planned to measure performance. Subsequently, in April 2013, we  reported that ISCD had categorized about 3,500 chemical facilities as  high-risk, but that the approach ISCD used did not consider all elements  of risk (consequence, threat, and vulnerability), as called for by the  National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). We recommended,  among other things, that ISCD enhance its risk assessment approach to  incorporate all elements of risk, and conduct a peer review of the program  to validate and verify ISCD’s risk assessment approach. ISCD agreed  with our recommendations and, as of May 2015, was taking steps  intended to address the recommendations.
The Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks  Act includes a provision for GAO to assess implementation of the act and  amendments made by the act and submit an initial report to Congress not  later than 180 days after enactment. In addition, the explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing  Appropriations Act, 2013 (Public Law 113-6), provides that GAO is to  continue its ongoing effort to examine the extent to which DHS has made  progress and encountered challenges in developing a viable CFATS   We performed this review in response to both provisions, as  program.well as additional requests for reviews related to chemical security and  ammonium nitrate. This report assesses the extent to which DHS has  identified and categorized facilities as subject to the CFATS  regulation, and approved site security plans, conducted compliance inspections, and  measured results.
Appendix I of this report provides an update of ISCD actions under way to  address the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist  Attacks Act.
To address our first objective, we reviewed laws and regulations  applicable to facilities that possess or store chemicals, as well as  Executive Order 13650, to determine how ISCD is to identify and  categorize chemical facilities. To evaluate how ISCD has identified  facilities that could potentially be subject to CFATS, we reviewed and  analyzed ISCD documentation related to its efforts to identify facilities,  including documentation on coordinating with other federal agencies that  regulate chemical facilities, and the Executive Order 13650 Report for the  President: Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security—a  Shared Commitment. To evaluate how ISCD has categorized chemical  facilities, we reviewed and analyzed documentation ISCD provides to  facilities intended to guide them in submitting data that ISCD uses to  preliminarily categorize facilities as high-risk, which renders them subject  to additional requirements under the CFATS regulation during its  preliminary screening process. As part of this effort, we obtained data  submitted by facilities to ISCD in accordance with CFATS. We analyzed a  statistical sample of these data to determine the extent to which ISCD  used facility-submitted data to make categorization decisions that are  reproducible, defensible, and free from significant errors and omissions,  as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. We also  compared ISCD’s facility categorization efforts to project management  guidance.relevant documentation and interviewing knowledgeable officials. We  concluded that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report. We also interviewed ISCD officials to confirm our  understanding of the documents and data provided, and actions ISCD  has taken to identify and categorize chemical facilities.
In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, §  563, 121 Stat. 1844, 2083-90 (2007), DHS issued a proposed rule for the Ammonium  Nitrate Security Program in August 2011. See 76 Fed. Reg. 46,908 (Aug. 3, 2011). As of  July 2015, DHS had not implemented the program but, according to the DHS semiannual  regulatory agenda published in June 2015, a final rule for the program is anticipated in  October 2015. See 80 Fed. Reg. 35,030, 35,031 (June 18, 2015). standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for  documenting transactions and significant decisions. To determine how  DHS has measured results, we compared ISCD’s performance measure  with criteria in the NIPP for evaluating the effectiveness of risk  management efforts by, among other things, collecting performance data  to assess progress in achieving outputs and outcomes. We interviewed  ISCD headquarters officials responsible for overseeing the CFATS  program to confirm our understanding of their processes and systems for  authorizing, approving, and inspecting facilities for compliance. Finally,  we conducted four site visits to observe two authorization inspections and  two compliance inspections. We selected inspection locations in  California, Oregon, Maryland, and Texas based on geographic dispersion  and to cover different types of chemical facilities regulated by the CFATS  program. While the information obtained from these inspections cannot  be generalized to all inspections, it provides insight and context on how  ISCD conducts CFATS inspections. For further details on our scope and  methodology, see appendix II.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to July 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The CFATS program is intended to ensure the security of the nation’s  chemical infrastructure by identifying, assessing the risk posed by, and  requiring the implementation of measures to protect high-risk chemical  facilities. Section 550 of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, required DHS  to issue regulations establishing risk-based performance standards for  chemical facilities that, as determined by DHS, present high levels of risk,  and required vulnerability assessments and the development and  implementation of site security plans for such facilities.the CFATS interim final rule in April 2007 and appendix A to the rule,   DHS published  published in November 2007, lists 322 chemicals of interest (COI) and the  screening threshold quantities amount for each. According to DHS and  subject to certain statutory exclusions, all facilities that manufacture  chemicals of interest as well as facilities that store or use such chemicals  as part of their daily operations may be subject to CFATS. In general,  however, only chemical facilities determined to possess a requisite  quantity of COI (that is, the screening threshold quantity) and that are  subsequently determined to present high levels of security risk—that is,  covered facilities—are subject to the more substantive requirements of  the CFATS regulation. The Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities  from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014, enacted in December 2014, amended  the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding the Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards as Title XXI and, in effect, authorizing the program  for an additional 4 years. Among other things, the Act expressly repeals  DHS’s authority to implement the program under section 550 of the DHS  Appropriations Act, 2007, but also expressly provides that the CFATS  regulation promulgated under that authority shall remain in effect unless  otherwise amended, consolidated, or repealed. Consequently, while the  Act imposes new and additional responsibilities on DHS to implement the  CFATS program, the program continues to be implemented by ISCD  under the existing regulatory framework.
In addition to implementing the CFATS program, ISCD is also to manage  the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program—a program DHS is to establish  pursuant to section 563 of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008.  While the  CFATS program covers facilities with certain thresholds of ammonium  nitrate, the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program is to regulate the sale  and transfer of ammonium nitrate by an ammonium nitrate facility for the  purpose of preventing the misappropriation or use of ammonium nitrate in  an act of terrorism. Among other things, the statute authorizing the  ammonium nitrate program authorizes DHS to require individuals who  purchase, sell, or transfer ammonium nitrate to register with DHS and  submit to vetting against the Terrorist Screening Database, and requires  the owners of ammonium nitrate facilities to maintain records on each  sale or transfer of ammonium nitrate and to report any identified theft or  loss of ammonium nitrate to appropriate federal authorities. DHS issued  a proposed rule for the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program in August  2011 and, as of July 2015, has yet to establish the program.
subsections: section_title: The CFATS Regulation and Process
paragraphs: The CFATS regulation outlines how ISCD is to administer the CFATS  program. Specifically, any facility that possess any of the 322 chemicals  of interest (COI) in quantities that meet or exceed the screening threshold  quantities established by DHS for those COI are required to use ISCD’s  Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT)—a web-based application  through which owners and operators of facilities with COI are to provide  information about the facility—to complete a Top-Screen. The Top- Screen is the initial screening tool whereby a chemical facility in  possession of a COI at the requisite thresholds is to provide ISCD data,  including the name and location of the facility and the chemicals and their  quantities at the site.
ISCD’s risk assessment approach, which relies on data from the Top- Screen, among other sources, is based on three security issues: (1)  release (toxic, flammable, and explosive) chemicals with the potential for  impacts within and beyond a facility; (2) theft or diversion; and (3)  sabotage, depending on the type of risk associated with the COI.
Release: For the release threat, ISCD’s approach assumes that a  terrorist will release the COI at the facility and then estimates the risk  to the facility and surrounding population. Facilities with toxic release  chemicals are to calculate and report in their Top-Screen submission  the Distance of Concern—which represents the radius of an area in  which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud from a release event could  cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure. ISCD uses  the Distance of Concern to estimate the number of fatalities from an  intentional toxic release and to categorize the risk posed by this  facility. The Top-Screen directs respondents to use an online tool  called RMP*Comp to calculate the Distance of Concern.RMP*Comp takes inputs such as the quantity of chemical that could  be released and the surrounding terrain type to determine the  Distance of Concern.
Theft or diversion: For theft or diversion, the approach assumes that  a terrorist will steal or have the COI diverted to him or herself and then  estimates the risk of a terrorist attack using the COI to cause the most  harm at an unspecified off-site location.
Sabotage: For sabotage, the approach assumes that a terrorist will  cause water to be mixed with a COI that is shipped from the facility,  creating a toxic release at an unspecified location, and then estimates  the risk to a medium-sized U.S. city.
If, according to ISCD’s automated assessment of information provided via  the Top-Screen, the facility is preliminarily categorized to be high-risk it  becomes a “covered chemical facility,” and ISCD is to notify the facility of  its preliminary placement in one of four risk-based tiers—tier 1, 2, 3, or 4.  If ISCD does not categorize the chemical facility as high-risk, ISCD does  not assign the facility to one of these four risk-based tiers and the facility  is not subject to additional requirements under the CFATS regulation.Facilities that ISCD preliminarily categorizes to be high-risk—covered  chemical facilities—are required to then complete the CSAT security  vulnerability assessment, which includes the identification of potential  critical assets at the facility, and a related vulnerability analysis.to review the security vulnerability assessment to confirm and notify the  facility as to whether the facility remains categorized as high-risk and, if  so, about its final placement in one of the four tiers.
Once a covered chemical facility is assigned a final tier, the facility may  use CSAT to submit a site security plan (SSP) or submit an Alternative  Security Program in lieu of the CSAT SSP. The security plan is to  describe the existing and planned security measures to be implemented  to address the vulnerabilities identified in the security vulnerability  assessment, and identify and describe how existing and planned security  measures selected by the facility are to address the applicable risk-based  performance standards. To meet risk-based performance standards,  covered facilities may choose the security programs or processes they  deem appropriate to address the performance standards so long as ISCD  determines that the facilities achieve the requisite level of performance on  each of the applicable areas in their existing and agreed-upon planned  measures.
To determine whether facilities achieve the requisite level of performance  for each of the applicable areas, ISCD is to conduct a preliminary review  of the facility’s security plan to determine whether it meets the risk-based  regulatory requirements. If these requirements appear to be satisfied,  ISCD is to issue a letter of authorization for the plan, and conduct an  authorization inspection of the facility to determine whether to approve the  plan. Upon inspection of the facility, if ISCD determines that the plan  satisfies the CFATS requirements, it will issue a letter of approval to the  facility, which is to then implement the approved SSP. If ISCD determines  that the plan does not satisfy CFATS requirements, ISCD then notifies the  facility of any deficiencies and the facility must submit a revised plan for  correcting them.
See 6 C.F.R. § 27.250. in compliance with their approved SSP or whether to take enforcement  actions. Figure 1 illustrates the CFATS regulatory process.
section_title: ISCD Has Taken Steps to Identify Chemical Facilities but Used Unverified Data to Categorize Thousands of Facilities
subsections: section_title: ISCD Has Identified about 37,000 Chemical Facilities, but Plans Additional Identification Efforts
paragraphs: Since 2007, when ISCD began identifying chemical facilities to determine  which facilities present a high risk and therefore should be subject to  further regulation under CFATS, about 37,000 facilities have submitted a  Top-Screen but ISCD officials acknowledged some facilities may have  failed to do so. According to these officials, as of April 2015, ISCD had  received most Top-Screens within the first 3 years of the program;  specifically, ISCD received about 88 percent of Top-Screens from 2007  through 2009. ISCD officials told us they believe the 37,000 facilities  that have submitted Top-Screens represent most facilities subject to  CFATS. However, as we previously reported, ISCD officials have  acknowledged some facilities may not comply with the requirement to  submit a Top-Screen and therefore some facilities may not be included in  ISCD’s data, but the magnitude of potential Top-Screen noncompliance is  not known.
In response to Executive Order 13650, in May 2014, ISCD outlined a  number of efforts it had taken and planned to take to identify potentially  noncompliant chemical facilities. These efforts included comparing  facilities data from relevant federal partners and from state entities  against ISCD’s current database of chemical facilities to identify  potentially noncompliant chemical facilities, among others. ISCD officials told us ISCD consulted with the Occupational Safety and Health  Administration; the Department of Transportation; the Department of  Agriculture; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;  and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine the extent  to which ISCD could identify all chemical facilities using data held by  those agencies. According to ISCD officials, ISCD also reached out to all  50 states’ Homeland Security Advisors to request lists of chemical  facilities maintained by the states.
According to ISCD officials, as of April 2015, ISCD completed some of  these efforts, such as conducting cross-agency compliance analysis with  EPA and analyzing facility lists provided by New York, New Jersey, and  Texas. Although these efforts resulted in the identification of chemical  facilities subject to CFATS that had not submitted a Top-Screen, ISCD  officials told us the work resulted in few new covered facilities. For  example, in 2013, after conducting cross-agency compliance analysis  with EPA, ISCD identified and notified about 3,300 chemical facilities as  potentially noncompliant with the requirement to submit a Top-Screen. As  shown in figure 2, in response to notification by ISCD 1,571 facilities  reported they had previously submitted a Top-Screen and another 361  claimed they are not currently subject to the requirement to submit a Top- Screen. An additional 374 facilities have not submitted a Top-Screen for  other reasons such as the facility closed or the facility does not have  chemicals of interest above the screening threshold quantity. Of the 1,056  facilities required to submit a Top-Screen as a result of ISCD’s  notification, representing approximately 30 percent of all facilities notified,  ISCD categorized 2.3 percent, 24 facilities, as high-risk.
ISCD officials told us that although the effort to compare EPA and CFATS  facility data did result in more than 1,000 chemical facilities submitting  Top-Screens, they noted that efforts to identify chemical facilities have  resulted in few new covered facilities. Because of this, ISCD officials are  reevaluating how ISCD conducts federal-and state-level cross-agency  compliance analysis as a method for identifying chemical facilities. While  they plan to continue these efforts and the California Environmental  Protection Agency recently provided ISCD with information on over  46,000 facilities regulated by the state, ISCD is currently assessing which  approaches for identifying potentially noncompliant facilities will result in a  high return on investment. The officials cited two challenges to cross- agency matching. First, while other federal agencies collect some  information on chemical facilities, differing program goals and data  formats may limit the utility of these data in identifying chemical facilities  for the CFATS program. Second, according to ISCD officials, 14 of 50  states responded to ISCD’s request for facility lists. To continue  identifying chemical facilities for which the submission of a Top-Screen is  required, ISCD plans to designate a lead staff member to oversee efforts  to identify such facilities, measure effectiveness of efforts relative to the  costs and benefits, and recommend a long-term future strategy. ISCD  officials told us they also have hired a third-party vendor to pilot an effort  to analyze supply-chain data to identify noncompliant facilities.
section_title: ISCD Used Self-Reported Data That Is Not Verified to Categorize Thousands of Facilities
paragraphs: ISCD has used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk for  facilities with a toxic release threat. As described earlier, approximately  37,000 facilities have submitted Top-Screens to ISCD. Of these facilities,  we estimate that more than 6,400 facilities hold a chemical at or above  the screening threshold quantity that could pose a toxic chemical release  threat. As part of the Top-Screen, ISCD requires these facilities to self- report the Distance of Concern, which represents the radius of an area in  which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud from a release event could  cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure. As part of its  risk assessment of facilities with toxic release chemicals, ISCD uses the  Distance of Concern to determine the consequences from an intentional  toxic release. Using DHS guidance and Top-Screen information stored in  a DHS database—which contains facility-reported information such as  chemicals and quantities in their possession, and the Distance of  Concern—we recalculated the Distance of Concern for a generalizable  sample of facilities and compared these results to what facilities reported.  On the basis of these results, we estimate more than 2,700 facilities, or at  least 44 percent of facilities with a toxic release chemical, misreported the  Distance of Concern. We further estimate that at least 1,200 of the  2,700 misreporting facilities, or about 43 percent, underestimated the  Distance of Concern. Figure 3 depicts an example of 1 facility with more  than 200,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia that reported a Distance of  Concern of 0.9 miles compared to a minimum possibly correct Distance of  Concern of 2.4 miles.
ISCD officials acknowledged that some facilities may have erred when  reporting the Distance of Concern. However, ISCD officials told us that  they do not verify the Distance of Concern on the Top-Screen because  they believe that most facilities with toxic release chemicals above the  screening threshold quantities would be familiar with RMP*Comp.  According to ISCD officials, chemical facilities use the RMP*Comp for  purposes of meeting EPA regulatory requirements. However, guidance  published on the DHS web-site directs facilities to calculate the Distance  of Concern in a manner that is different from EPA reporting requirements.  For example, to satisfy EPA reporting requirements, facilities can include  in their Distance of Concern calculation information about passive  mitigation systems (such as dikes, enclosures, berms, and drains) that  may reduce the output RMP*Comp generates. Conversely, according to  DHS guidance, because the Top-Screen is evaluating an intentional  release rather than an accidental release, facilities are not to include  passive mitigation systems to calculate the Distance of Concern. ISCD  officials stated that because RMP*Comp is outside the domain of ISCD  oversight, they cannot say with full certainty that the information facilities  use to generate the Distance of Concern is accurate. Nevertheless, ISCD  has retained all Top-Screen data, including the necessary information that  can be used to verify the accuracy of Distances of Concern provided by  relevant facilities. ISCD officials also stated that they plan to develop a  new model that will incorporate a Distance of Concern calculation into the  next iteration of the Top-Screen, originally scheduled to be operational by  September 2015, which will not require facilities to calculate and provide  a Distance of Concern using RMP*Comp. Instead, the new Top-Screen  will calculate the Distance of Concern using chemical information, such  as the quantity of chemicals, reported by facilities. However, officials  stated ISCD has not yet decided whether to re-screen facilities that hold  toxic release chemicals that have already submitted a Top-Screen. As of  May 2015, ISCD officials stated that implementation of the new Top- Screen is delayed, and ISCD officials did not have a timeline for  implementation.
As described earlier, the Distance of Concern is one key input in the risk  assessment approach that ISCD uses to preliminarily categorize facilities  that could pose a toxic chemical release threat. Facilities ISCD  categorizes as high-risk are covered facilities subject to additional  requirements under the CFATS regulation, while facilities not categorized  as high-risk are, in general, not subject to additional requirements under  the CFATS program. According to ISCD officials, ISCD only verifies  information in the Top-Screens reported by high-risk facilities, including  the Distance of Concern. ISCD officials also told us that because ISCD  takes other factors into account, errors in the Distance of Concern may  not necessarily result in changes in ISCD’s risk-assessment of facilities  that misreport the Distance of Concern. According to ISCD, within our  sample 1 high-risk facility could be miscategorized based upon an  erroneous Distance of Concern.  On the basis of ISCD’s finding of 1  potentially miscategorized facility within our sample, we estimate that  ISCD could have miscategorized 85 high-risk facilities, but potentially up  to 543 high-risk facilities that have previously submitted Top-Screens.Additionally, because implementation of the new Top-Screen is delayed,  ISCD cannot provide reasonable assurance it will categorize facilities with  release toxic chemicals using reliable Distance of Concern data as these  facilities submit new Top-Screens.
Standard project management practices include activities such as  developing a schedule with milestone dates to identify points throughout  the project to reassess efforts under way to determine whether project  changes are necessary. Practices such as developing a new target  schedule with a forecasted finish date would provide ISCD a more  realistic plan to guide the implementation of the new Top-Screen.Additionally, the NIPP risk management framework calls for risk  assessment approaches—such as ISCD’s risk-based implementation of  CFATS—to be reproducible and defensible. Specifically, the NIPP states  the risk assessment methodology must produce comparable, repeatable  results free from significant errors or omissions. In the interim, before  ISCD implements the new Top-Screen and determines whether to re- screen facilities that have already submitted a Top-Screen, identifying  potentially miscategorized facilities that may pose a significant security  risk and verifying the Distance of Concern these facilities report is  accurate could help ensure that ISCD has accurately categorized facilities  with the potential to cause the greatest harm. Moreover, ISCD could  provide more reasonable assurance it has identified the nation’s high-risk  chemical facilities and, subsequently, that these facilities take actions to  address potential terrorist threats.
section_title: ISCD Has Made Substantial Progress Approving Site Security Plans and Conducting Compliance Inspections but Does Not Consistently Ensure Compliance and Effectively Measure Program Results
subsections: section_title: ISCD Has Substantially Reduced the Time Needed to Approve Remaining Site Security Plans
paragraphs: ISCD has taken actions to improve its processes for reviewing and  approving site security plans, which have reduced the amount of time  needed to resolve the backlog of unapproved plans. On the basis of  ISCD’s pace of site security plan approvals in calendar year 2014— between 80 and 100 plans per month—as of April 2015, we estimate  that it could take between 9 and 12 months for ISCD to review and  approve site security plans for the 929 facilities currently awaiting  approval. This represents a substantial improvement over our previous  estimates, in April 2013, when, we reported that, based upon ISCD’s  estimated approval rate of between 30 and 40 security plans per month, it  could take between 7 and 9 years for ISCD to complete reviews of the  approximately 3,120 plans in its queue at that time. Figure 4 shows our  revised estimate for the time needed to approve plans for unapproved  final-tiered facilities as of April 2015—assuming approval rates of 80, 90,  and 100 plans per month—as compared to our original April 2013  estimates.
ISCD officials attributed the increased rate of approvals and reduction in  the backlog of facilities awaiting approval to a number of improvements in  ISCD’s processes. These improvements included new steps ISCD has  taken since our last report and planned actions we previously reported in  April 2013 and May 2014, but could not assess at that time because they  had not yet been fully implemented. For example, ISCD has  continued the revised site security plan review process implemented  in July 2012 in which teams of ISCD headquarters officials review  plans by assessing how layers of security measures meet the intent of  each of the performance standards;  issued updates to the online Chemical Security Assessment Tool  (CSAT) beginning in March 2014 to make the system more user- friendly and improve facility data collection; distributed updated internal guidance and lessons learned on plan  approvals to inspectors and plan reviewers;  transitioned to a new internal case management system in December  2013 that provides improved program and facility management  capabilities; begun using inspectors alongside ISCD headquarters officials to  review site security plans in order to leverage inspectors’ knowledge  of facility security and role conducting CFATS inspections;  implemented changes to inspection processes, such as employing  smaller inspection teams, conducting preinspection phone calls with  facilities to help them prepare for inspections, and enabling inspectors  to help facility personnel edit their site security plans during  inspections; distributed updated guidance to facilities to help them improve their  site security plans and worked to expand the use of alternative  security programs; and worked with corporations that have multiple covered chemical facilities  to leverage inspection documents and security procedures that are  standard across corporations to expedite the inspection process.
While ISCD has taken actions to reduce the backlog of site security plans,  our estimate that ISCD could complete its approval of all current site  security plans within 9 to 12 months does not take into account the  potential impact of other tasks central to the CFATS program and  additional compliance activities for which ISCD is responsible.  Specifically, our estimate does not include the time required to:  identify, categorize, review, and approve site security plans for  facilities that have not yet submitted Top-Screens or those that ISCD  previously did not categorize as high risk but may now qualify as high- risk in light of the aforementioned errors in the Top-Screen  submissions we identified related to toxic release Distance of Concern  calculations, and  review approved site security plans to resolve issues relating to one  requirement of the personnel surety performance standard, under  which covered facilities are to perform background checks and ensure  appropriate credentials for personnel and visitors at their facilities. As  part of the personnel surety standard, DHS plans to check for terrorist  ties by comparing certain employee information against the Terrorist  Screening Database. ISCD currently has measures in place for other  screening requirements under the personnel surety standard, and as  of May 2015, ISCD was determining how the terrorist screening  requirement will be implemented.
In addition, our estimate assumes that the pace of site security plan  approvals will not be affected by ISCD’s implementation of the  Ammonium Nitrate Security Program. As described earlier, ISCD  released a proposed rule on August 3, 2011, for how it plans to  implement the program. According to ISCD officials, the final rule was  initially scheduled to be released in April 2015; as of May 2015, the rule  had not been released but, according to the DHS semiannual regulatory  agenda published in June 2015, a final rule for the program is anticipated  in October 2015. Although the rule has not yet been released, DHS has  stated that development and implementation of the ammonium nitrate  requirements would be resource-intensive and require trade-offs with  ISCD’s responsibilities under the CFATS program. For example, ISCD  officials estimated that approximately 1,000 or more ammonium nitrate  facilities would need to be inspected annually, which would likely increase  ISCD’s inspectors’ workload since they would be responsible for both the  CFATS program and the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program. According  to ISCD officials, it will take at least 1 year from issuance of the final rule  to establish the ammonium nitrate regulatory program. As a result, we  could not assess the impact of the pending ammonium nitrate regulations  on ISCD’s approval of site security plans or on the CFATS program as a  whole.
section_title: ISCD Is Conducting Compliance Inspections but Does Not Have Documented Processes and Procedures for Managing Facilities That Are Noncompliant with Security Plans
paragraphs: The CFATS regulation, consistent with the program’s underlying statutory  authority, authorizes ISCD to take enforcement action, such as issuing  orders to assess civil penalties or to cease operations, against a covered  chemical facility if, for example, a compliance inspection finds a facility to  be noncompliant with its approved site security plan. The regulation also  provides, however, that if a facility is found to be noncompliant, the facility  shall be provided written notification, an opportunity for consultation, and  time frames within which the facility is to ensure compliance. According to  ISCD officials, based on the nature of the violations found thus far, it has  been ISCD practice to exercise the discretion afforded to it under law and  regulation and not to take enforcement actions but to instead work with  noncompliant facilities on a case-by-case basis to ensure compliance.  However, ISCD does not have documented processes and procedures to  track facilities that are noncompliant with their approved site security  plans and ensure facilities implement planned measures to become  compliant.
ISCD standard operating procedures for inspections of covered facilities  provide that inspectors are to report to ISCD, among other things, any  recommended enforcement actions resulting from a compliance  inspection. The CFATS regulation also provides that if a facility is in  violation of any part of the regulation, appropriate action may be taken,  including the issuance of an order, compelling a facility to take actions  necessary to become compliant. For example, if a compliance  inspection determines that a facility does not fully implement security  measures as outlined in its site security plan, an order may be issued  specifying actions the facility must take to remedy the instances of  noncompliance, along with timeframes for coming into compliance. If a  noncompliant facility does not comply with such an order, an order  assessing a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per day for as long as the  violation continues or, if warranted, an order to cease operations may be  issued. ISCD officials stated that they consider an approved site security  plan to be a contract between a facility and ISCD and a facility is  therefore required to implement planned security measures by the  deadlines specified in its site security plan—commonly between 6 and 12  months after plan approval. According to ISCD officials, facilities that do  not implement planned measures by these deadlines are noncompliant  with their requirements under CFATS.
ISCD began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013 and  as of April 2015 had conducted 83 compliance inspections out of 1,727  facilities with approved site security plans. Our analysis of these  compliance inspections found that nearly half of facilities did not fully  implement security measures needed to satisfy the risk-based  performance standards—as required by the CFATS regulation—and  therefore were not fully compliant with their approved site security plans.  Specifically, 34 of 69 facilities that underwent compliance inspections and  had completed compliance inspection reports as of February 2015 had  not implemented one or more planned measures by deadlines specified  in their approved plans.
According to ISCD officials, ISCD has not exercised its authority to issue  orders and take enforcement actions based on the nature of violations  identified through compliance inspections it has conducted as of May  2015. Instead, ISCD officials told us they track noncompliant facilities  individually and work with the facilities on a case-by-case basis to help  ensure compliance. According to ISCD officials, as part of ISCD’s review  process following compliance inspections, officials track noncompliant  facilities on a case-by-case basis using individual compliance inspection  reports and do not close out a facility’s report until issues of  noncompliance are resolved. ISCD officials stated that, thus far, they  have provided additional time to noncompliant facilities and conducted  follow-on inspections to ensure implementation of planned measures.  ISCD officials also stated that, thus far, it has been more productive to  work with facilities on a case-by-case basis to ensure compliance than to  use enforcement actions. However, we found that ISCD does not have  documented processes and procedures for how officials and inspectors  are to track noncompliant facilities and ensure that they take actions  towards compliance when ISCD exercises its discretion not to take  enforcement actions. According to ISCD officials, ISCD provided written  guidance on this issue to inspectors in the March 2015 update to ISCD’s  inspections and approvals lessons-learned guidance. However, this  guidance outlines requirements for the proper submission of compliance  inspection reports by inspectors but does not provide documented  guidance for how officials and inspectors are to ensure noncompliant  facilities take actions to become compliant, such as how much additional  time to provide to facilities to implement planned measures.
Our analysis of compliance inspections conducted by ISCD as of  February 2015 indicated that inspectors made varying recommendations  relating to the 34 facilities that inspectors found had not implemented  planned measures as outlined in their site security plans by deadlines and  therefore were not fully compliant with their approved site security plans:  Inspectors recommended both a follow-on compliance inspection and  an enforcement action for 1 of the 34 noncompliant facilities.  However, ISCD officials later elected not to take an enforcement  action in that instance and determined that they would instead work  with the facility to ensure it implemented planned measures.
Inspectors recommended a follow-on compliance inspection to verify  the implementation of planned measures for 12 of the 34  noncompliant facilities.
Inspectors did not recommend an enforcement action or follow-on  compliance inspection for the remaining 21 of 34 noncompliant  facilities.
Inspectors reported that the 34 noncompliant facilities required  additional time, beyond their compliance inspection date, to  implement planned measures that were not implemented by deadlines  in their site security plans. Among the 34 noncompliant facilities,  additional time to implement these planned measures as intended  ranged from 3 weeks to another year.
Figure 5 summarizes our analysis of compliance inspections conducted  by ISCD.
Compliance inspections—after which ISCD makes compliance  determinations to either mitigate or accept risk at facilities—are a critical  stage in ISCD’s risk management approach to implementing the CFATS  program. The NIPP risk management framework states that risk  assessment approaches should be documented, reproducible, and  defensible—common principles that are broadly applicable to all parts of  a risk methodology. Specifically, the NIPP calls for risk assessment  approaches to clearly document what information is used, and that  subjective judgments need to be transparent to minimize their impact and  help ensure comparable results. In addition, Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government states that all organizational  transactions—which can include processes and procedures for dealing  with regulated entities—need to be clearly documented and that this  documentation should be readily available for examination in  administrative policies or operating manuals. According to ISCD  officials, ISCD’s processes and procedures—although not documented— track noncompliant facilities through the compliance process and ensure  they implement planned measures. According to ISCD officials, ISCD’s  current method of tracking noncompliant facilities on a case-by-case  basis using individual compliance inspection reports is sufficient. ISCD  officials also stated that inspectors and ISCD headquarters officials  evaluate the significance of security gaps and facilities’ ability to  implement planned measures when working to bring facilities into  compliance.
By documenting its processes and procedures for tracking noncompliant  facilities and ensuring planned measures are implemented, ISCD could  better ensure consistency in how officials and inspectors address  noncompliance in the CFATS program. Variations in the process for  addressing noncompliant facilities—such as facilities having widely  varying amounts of time to implement measures—may be warranted on a  case-by-case basis. However, according to ISCD officials, facilities that  do not implement planned security measures in accordance with their  approved site security plans remain vulnerable to security threats until  such measures are implemented. Such vulnerabilities could increase over  time as the CFATS program matures and ISCD conducts compliance  inspections for the approximately 2,900 additional facilities that, as of  April 2015, had an approved site security plan or were assigned a final  tier and awaiting approval of the site security plan. Documented  processes and procedures that prescribe how to address noncompliance  in lieu of taking enforcement actions, including the establishment of time  frames to implement planned measures, would better position ISCD to  achieve its broader mission of securing chemical facilities in a consistent  and timely manner.
section_title: DHS’s Performance Measure for CFATS Does Not Accurately Reflect Program Results
paragraphs: DHS’s performance measure for the CFATS program, which was  developed by ISCD and is intended to reflect security measures  implemented by facilities and the overall impact of the CFATS regulation  on facility security, does not solely capture security measures that are  implemented by facilities and verified by ISCD. Instead, DHS’s  performance measure reflects both existing security measures that were  in place when facilities completed their site security plans and planned  security measures approved by ISCD that facilities intend to implement  within the fiscal year. DHS reported this performance measure for the  CFATS program in its Annual Performance Report for Fiscal Years 2013- 2015 as the percent of performance standards implemented by the  highest risk chemical facilities and verified by ISCD. According to ISCD,  the performance measure reflects the value of the CFATS program and  its impact on reducing risk at facilities.
ISCD officials stated that they calculate the performance measure based  on existing and planned measures identified in each facility’s site security  plan rather than based on the results of compliance inspections, at which  ISCD verifies that facilities have implemented planned measures as  intended. According to ISCD officials, they count the planned measure as  having been implemented once the implementation date listed in a  facility’s site security plan has passed. However, according to ISCD  officials, ISCD does not adjust the performance measure if it later  determines that a facility did not implement a planned measure on time.  In our analysis of compliance inspections conducted as of February 2015,  we identified that 34 of 69 facilities did not implement one or more  planned measures by intended deadlines. As a result, ISCD may have  improperly counted some planned measures as implemented in the  performance measure and therefore overstated the CFATS program’s  progress in reducing risk.
According to ISCD officials, when ISCD developed the performance  measure, in fiscal year 2013, it had not yet begun conducting compliance  inspections, at which ISCD verifies that facilities have implemented  planned measures as intended. As a result, the performance measure  does not take into account information gathered during compliance  inspections, such as if facilities had implemented planned measures by  the intended date. Since developing the performance measure, ISCD  began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013, but ISCD  officials stated that they did not begin verifying that planned measures  had been implemented before including them in the performance  measure at that point because they had conducted too few compliance  inspections to produce meaningful performance data. ISCD officials also  told us that the performance measure includes existing measures that  were in place when facilities completed their site security plans because  the goal of the performance measure is to capture the overall extent of  security implemented by facilities. According to ISCD officials, it is difficult  to assess the source of existing security measures because facilities  could anticipate CFATS requirements and make enhancements prior to  becoming a covered facility under CFATS. As a result, ISCD officials  stated that it is a challenge to assess the baseline security measures  already in place at facilities and therefore the impact of the CFATS  program on improving those security measures. However, while it may be  illustrative to report the overall extent of security implemented, including  all existing measures does not reflect the value of the CFATS program  and its impact on reducing risk at facilities, as ISCD’s current  performance measure is intended to do.
The NIPP calls for evaluating the effectiveness of risk management  efforts by collecting performance data to assess progress in achieving  identified outputs and outcomes. In addition, the purpose of CFATS, as  stated in its regulation, is to enhance national security by furthering DHS’s  mission and lowering the risk posed by certain chemical facilities.  Measuring the effectiveness of the CFATS program requires that facilities  implement planned security measures identified as necessary to address  vulnerabilities and that DHS evaluate implementation of these measures  against CFATS performance standards. However, because ISCD’s  performance measure reflects both existing security measures that had  not necessarily been implemented in response to CFATS and planned  security measures that have not yet been verified as implemented,  ISCD’s performance measure does not reflect the value of the CFATS  program and its impact on reducing risk at facilities, as stated in  performance reports. As the CFATS program matures and ISCD  conducts compliance inspections in greater numbers, revising current  performance measures or adding new ones to accurately reflect only  security measures that have been implemented and verified would help  provide a more accurate picture of ISCD’s progress and help ISCD  ensure that the program is meeting its goals.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Individuals intent on using or gaining access to hazardous chemicals to  carry out a terrorist attack continue to pose a threat to the security of  chemical facilities and surrounding populations. DHS, through the CFATS  program overseen by ISCD, has made progress in identifying chemical  facilities that pose the greatest risks and in expediting the time it takes to  approve security plans. However, DHS has not taken steps to mitigate  errors in some facility-reported data and does not have reasonable  assurance that it has identified all of the nation’s highest-risk chemical  facilities. Additionally, DHS cannot ensure consistency in how it  addresses noncompliance in the CFATS program because it does not  have documented processes and procedures. Finally, DHS’s CFATS  performance measure does not reflect security measures that facilities  have implemented and that ISCD has verified, thus not accurately  reflecting the value of the CFATS program and its impact on reducing risk  at facilities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under  Secretary for NPPD, the Assistant Secretary for the Office of  Infrastructure Protection, and the Director of ISCD to take the following  two actions to ensure the accuracy of the data submitted by chemical  facilities: provide milestone dates and a timeline for implementation of the new  Top-Screen and ensure that changes to this Top-Screen mitigate  errors in the Distance of Concern submitted by facilities, and  in the interim, identify potentially miscategorized facilities with the  potential to cause the greatest harm and verify the Distance of  Concern these facilities report is accurate.
In addition, to better manage compliance among high-risk chemical  facilities and demonstrate program results, we recommend the following  two actions: develop documented processes and procedures to track  noncompliant facilities and ensure they implement planned measures  as outlined in their approved site security plans, and  improve the measurement and reporting of the CFATS program  performance by developing a performance measure that includes only  planned measures that have been implemented and verified.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix III,  and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS  concurred with all four recommendations and outlined steps that the  National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of  Infrastructure Protection (IP), Infrastructure Security Compliance Division  (ISCD) will take to address them.
With respect to the first recommendation that NPPD provide milestone  dates and a timeline for implementation of the new Top-Screen and  ensure that changes to this Top-Screen mitigate errors in the Distance of  Concern submitted by facilities, DHS noted that NPPD is developing a  revised Top-Screen to eliminate the need for facilities to calculate and  self-report Distances of Concern. In the interim, NPPD will verify the  accuracy of Distances of Concern submitted in new Top-Screens. These  actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the  recommendation.
Regarding the first recommendation, DHS indicated in its letter that the  impact from the erroneous Distance of Concern data is likely extremely  minimal because only 85 of approximately 37,000 facilities that submitted  Top-Screens were likely to have been assigned a lower risk status had  they correctly reported their Distances of Concern, with potentially as few  as two facilities actually having been impacted. However, as stated in our  report, we based our estimates on a simple random sample and followed  a probability procedure based on random selections. Our sample is only  one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn, each of  which could have provided different estimates. Therefore, the number of  facilities affected by this issue may be as low as two or as high as 543.
DHS also stated that the erroneous Distance of Concern data impacts  only preliminary tiering (categorization) results and additional information  submitted through a security vulnerability assessment will affect the final  tiering decision. As stated in our report, according to DHS data, 80  percent of facilities were determined not to be high-risk based upon  information provided in the Top-Screen, which made those facilities not  subject to additional requirements under the CFATS regulation. Thus,  only a minority of facilities that submitted a Top-Screen were ultimately  required to submit a security vulnerability assessment.
Regarding the second recommendation that NPPD identify potentially  miscategorized facilities with the potential to cause the greatest harm and  verify the Distance of Concern these facilities report is accurate, DHS  stated that NPPD will review facilities that submitted Top-Screens with  release-toxic chemicals of interest. NPPD will determine which facilities  are most likely to potentially cause the greatest harm and will verify the  Distances of Concern reported by the facilities. These actions, if fully  implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.
In response to the third recommendation that NPPD develop documented  processes and procedures to track noncompliant facilities and ensure  they implement planned measures, DHS stated that NPPD was in the  process of developing and documenting such procedures. DHS also  stated that NPPD has drafted requirements to update its case  management system to separately track noncompliant facilities, a function  not currently available in the system. According to DHS, in the interim,  NPPD will monitor noncompliant facilities through a function in the case  management system that keeps compliance inspection reports open until  a facility implements all aspects of its site security plan. These actions, if  fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.
Finally, for the fourth recommendation that NPPD improve the  measurement and reporting of the CFATS program performance by  developing a performance measure that includes only planned measures  that have been implemented and verified, DHS stated that NPPD will  develop a performance measure that will provide an additional means to  evaluate and illustrate the value of the CFATS program. According to  DHS, the new measure will be included in ISCD’s Fiscal Year 2016  Annual Operating Plan. These actions, if fully implemented, should  address the intent of the recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Under Secretary for the National Protection Programs  Directorate, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Summary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Plans to Implement the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014
paragraphs: Required elements  Section 2. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards  Program  The Secretary of Homeland Security’s (Secretary) efforts to  identify facilities, require the submission of Top-Screen and other  information, establish risk-based performance standards, and  require each covered facility to submit a security vulnerability  assessment and to develop, submit and implement a site security  plan. (6 U.S.C. § 622)
Content of site security plans and employee input. (§ 622(b))
In August 2014, DHS’s Infrastructure Security Compliance  Division (ISCD) initiated a rulemaking process through an  Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to identify ways to make  the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program  more effective in achieving its regulatory process. The rulemaking  process comment period closed in October 2014, and ISCD is  reviewing comments. According to ISCD officials, the rulemaking  was included in the latest unified agenda, but it was listed as a  long term item and thus did not have an expected timeframe  associated with it.   ISCD is considering requiring that facilities validate that employee  input has been obtained to the greatest extent practicable in the  development of their site security plans.
Approval and disapproval of site security plans, approval of  alternative security programs, risk assessment policies and  procedures for site security plan assessments. (§ 622(c)(1)-(3))
ISCD does not expect its review process to change.
Expedited approval program for site security plans, including  guidance issued by the Secretary within 180 days of enactment  (enacted December 18, 2014). (§ 622(c)(4))
The expedited approval process is the biggest change from the  original statute, according to ISCD. DHS issued guidance for the  expedited removal program in May 2015.
Audits and inspections by the Secretary, including (1)  requirements for individuals working for nondepartmental or  nongovernmental entities, who conduct audits or inspections, to  report to a regional supervisor and (2) standards for training and  retaining auditors and inspectors. (§ 622(d)(1))
ISCD is not planning to make any changes to its audits or  inspections. Third party inspectors could be considered at a later  date as appropriate, but ISCD did not have plans to use them as  of June 2015. In terms of training, ISCD officials stated that in  February 2015, they re-instituted a training task force to assess  the effectiveness of ISCD’s training efforts. As part of this effort,  ISCD developed a statement of work to hire a contractor to  analyze inspectors’ training competencies.
The Secretary’s establishment and carrying-out of a personnel  surety program. (§ 622(d)(2))
ISCDs personnel surety program is awaiting Office of  Management and Budget approval and ISCD did not have an  estimate on when it will be finalized.
DHS plans according to officials  political subdivisions, relevant business associations, and  public and private labor organizations to identify all chemical  facilities of interest; (§ 622(e)(1))  2.  Develop a security risk assessment approach and  corresponding tiering methodology for covered chemical  facilities; (§ 622(e)(2))  3.  Document each instance where tiering for a covered facility  changes or a covered facility is no longer subject to the  requirements; (§ 622(e)(3))  4.  Submit semiannual reports, beginning not later than 6 months  after enactment, that includes for the period covered the  number of covered facilities in the United States, changes in  tiering, metrics addressing reviews and inspections, among  other information. (§ 622(e)(4))
ISCD completed this requirement in response to Executive Order  13650 and is documented in the report of the Executive Order  13650 working group. ISCD intends to continue consulting with  stakeholders as appropriate to identify chemical facilities of  interest.  In response to GAO recommendations to incorporate additional  threat information into the risk tiering methodology, ISCD is  updating how it addresses consequence, vulnerability and threat  in its risk approach and corresponding tiering methodology. The  risk methodology will be subject to a peer review when completed.  ISCD currently documents each instance where a previously  assigned tier changes and is modifying its case management  system to facilitate required reporting on the number of such  instances and the rationale for each.  ISCD has drafted the first semi-annual report, which is currently in  the DHS review and clearance process. ISCD is on schedule to  submit the report to Congress in June 2015.
Protection and sharing of information. (§ 623)
ISCD does not plan to make changes to the protection and  sharing of information. ISCD is working to share permissible  information with certain partners through Infrastructure Protection  Gateway, a DHS portal containing tools and information to help  partners prepare vulnerability assessments and risk analysis.
Civil enforcement, including providing notices of noncompliance  and addressing circumstances of continued noncompliance; use  of civil penalties and emergency orders. (§ 624)
ISCD has assessed the new statutory language and believes that  some minor changes are necessary to make existing procedures  conform to the new statutory language. These modifications are  expected to be procedural in nature (i.e., do not require industry  notification and an opportunity to comment) and ISCD is in the  process of developing them.
Whistleblower protections, including: the establishment of  procedures within 180 days of enactment for reporting violations  to the Secretary. (§ 625)
Procedures for reporting violations already exist and are being  expanded with the ability to submit reports by e-mail. In addition,  ISCD is refining outreach materials to promote the availability of  these mechanisms, and is working closely with the Department of  Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration to  establish mechanisms to enforce the whistleblower retaliation  protections should they ever be invoked.
The Secretary’s efforts to promulgate regulations or amend the  existing CFATS regulations to implement provisions of the Act  and, within 30 days of enactment, whether the Secretary repealed  any existing CFATS regulation that the Secretary determines is  duplicative of, or conflicting with, the act. (§ 627)
This is a challenging deadline for DHS to meet, because repealing  any of this without including any pending program changes  resulting from the rulemaking process would not make sense.  Therefore, as a matter of policy, DHS is going to miss these  deadlines and continue to work through the rulemaking process.
Efforts undertaken by the Secretary, if any, to provide guidance  and other support to “small covered chemical facilities” (as that  term is defined in the Act) and whether the Secretary submitted  the requisite report on best practices that may assist small  covered chemical facilities in development of physical security  best practices. (§ 628)
ISCD is developing guidance as part of its 18-month reporting  requirement, but this may result in a separate deliverable to the  small covered chemical facilities. No additional activities are  anticipated.
Required elements  Establish an outreach implementation plan to identify chemical  facilities of interest and make available compliance assistance  materials and information on education and training, not later than  90 days after the date of enactment of the act. (§ 629)
DHS plans according to officials  ISCD completed this plan on March 18, 2015, and shared it with  federal, state, local, commerce, and other stakeholders for  comments in advance of completion.
This third party assessment is under development.
This report is under development. the CFATS program that includes certification by the  Secretary that significant progress in identifying all  chemical facilities of interest under 6 U.S.C §  622(e)(1) has been made; (§ 3(c)(1)(A))  b.  certification by the Secretary that a risk assessment  approach and corresponding tiered methodology  under 6 U.S.C § 622(e)(2) has been developed; (§  3(c)(1)(B))  the Secretary’s assessment of implementation by  DHS of recommendations by the Homeland Security  Studies and Analysis Institute; (§ 3(c)(1)(C)) and  d.  a description of best practices that may assist small  covered chemical facilities in the development of  physical security best practices. (§ 3(c)(1)(D))
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This appendix provides details of our scope and methodology to answer  each objective. For both objectives, we reviewed applicable laws,  regulations (including proposed rules), Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)  program policies and procedures, and our prior reports on the CFATS  program. We also identified various criteria relevant to this program and  compared the results of our analyses with these criteria, including the  CFATS statute and rule, internal control standards, project management  guidance, and policies and procedures outlined in the National  Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) risk management framework, which  calls for risk assessments to be documented, reproducible, and  defensible in order to generate results that can support investment,  planning, and resource prioritization decisions.
To address our first objective, on the extent to which the DHS’s  Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) has identified and  categorized facilities subject to the CFATS regulation, we reviewed laws  applicable to facilities that possess chemicals, including the statutes  authorizing and regulations governing the CFATS program and Executive  Order 13650. To address how ISCD has identified facilities that could  potentially be subject to CFATS but have not yet self-identified or been  identified by ISCD as being required to submit information to ISCD  pursuant to CFATS, we reviewed and analyzed ISCD documentation  related to its efforts to identify facilities, including documentation on  coordinating with other federal agencies that regulate chemical facilities,  and the Executive Order 13650 Report for the President: Actions to  Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security—a Shared Commitment.  To address how ISCD has categorized chemical facilities, we reviewed  and analyzed documentation ISCD provides to facilities intended to guide  them in submitting data that ISCD uses to preliminarily categorize  facilities as high-risk, which renders them subject to additional  requirements under the CFATS regulation during its preliminary screening   We reviewed ISCD applications and documents including web- process.based Chemical Security Assessment Tools (CSAT) applications—such  as the Top-Screen—used to collect security information from facilities, the  ISCD risk assessment approach used to determine a facility’s preliminary  risk tier, and policies and procedures on preliminary tiering. As part of this  effort, we obtained and analyzed data submitted by facilities to ISCD as  required by CFATS. First, to assess the reliability of data we obtained  from CSAT, we reviewed system documentation, compared similar data  sets for consistency, and interviewed knowledgeable ISCD officials about  system controls and determined that CSAT data were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this report. Second, we outlined the CFATS risk  assessment approach and the three security issues upon which it is  based—release-toxic/flammable/explosive, theft or diversion, and  sabotage.
Finally, we analyzed a sample of ISCD data and compared it to criteria in  the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), Supplemental Tool:  Executing a Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Approach, to  determine the extent to which ISCD used facility-reported data to make  categorization decisions that are documented and reproducible.  Specifically, we selected a simple random sample of 475 facilities from  the population of 36,811 facilities that submitted Top-Screens since the  inception of the CFATS program in 2007 through January 2, 2015. During  our review we identified 91 facilities from among the sample of 475  facilities that indicated that their facility had toxic release chemicals of  interest above the screening threshold quantity. For these 91 facilities we  tested the reliability of the Distance of Concern reported in Top-Screens.  To determine how DHS intended respondents to calculate the Distance of  Concern, we reviewed DHS guidance that directs facilities to use an  online tool, RMP*Comp. We also reviewed instructions for using this tool.  Using RMP*Comp, DHS guidance, and data from their most recently  submitted Top-Screen (the type and quantity of chemical that could be  released and terrain type surrounding facility), we calculated the Distance  of Concern for the 91 facilities and compared these results to what  facilities reported.
Because we followed a probability procedure based on random  selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we  might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different  estimates, we express our confidence in the lower of our particular  sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 7  percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual  population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. For  our determination of facilities potentially at risk of being missed by DHS  because of errors in their RMP*Comp calculations we provide the 95  percent confidence interval associated with each estimate.
To corroborate and confirm our understanding of ISCD’s approach to  identify and categorize chemical facilities, we also interviewed ISCD  officials knowledgeable about the processes to identify and categorize  chemical facilities to corroborate our understanding of the program.
To address our second objective, on the extent to which DHS has  approved site security plans, conducted compliance inspections, and  measured results, we reviewed laws and regulations on how DHS is to  approve site security plans and ensure compliance with the CFATS  program. We analyzed ISCD data to identify the number of site security  plans approved per month, and used the results of our analysis to  estimate the number of months it could take ISCD to approve remaining  site security plans. To assess the reliability of data we obtained from  ISCD’s case management system, we reviewed system documentation,  conducted data and logic testing, and interviewed knowledgeable ISCD  officials about system controls and determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We note limitations in  our analysis, including that our estimate does not take into consideration  resource constraints ISCD may face as it implements the pending   We analyzed 69 of 74 compliance  Ammonium Nitrate Security Program.inspection reports completed as of February 2015 to identify the extent to  which the reports identify noncompliance among facilities that have  reached the compliance inspection phase of the CFATS program. When  we conducted our analysis, in February 2015, ISCD inspectors had not  completed compliance inspection reports outlining the results of the  inspections for 5 of the 74 facilities, so we did not include these facilities  in our analysis. We compared ISCD’s processes and procedures for  tracking and monitoring noncompliant facilities to criteria in the NIPP for  documented, reproducible, and defensible risk assessment approaches  and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for  documenting transactions and significant decisions. To determine how  DHS has measured results, we compared ISCD’s performance measure  with criteria in the NIPP for evaluating the effectiveness of risk  management efforts by, among other things, collecting performance data  to assess progress in achieving outputs and outcomes. We also  interviewed ISCD headquarters officials regarding their processes and  systems for authorizing, approving, and inspecting facilities for  compliance. Finally, we conducted four site visits to observe (1) two  authorization inspections and (2) two compliance inspections. We  selected inspection locations in California, Oregon, Maryland, and Texas  based on geographic dispersion and to cover different types of chemical  facilities regulated by the CFATS program. While the information obtained  from these inspections cannot be generalized to all inspections, it  provides insight and context on how ISCD conducts CFATS inspections.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 to July 2015  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above Ben Atwater, Assistant Director,  and Joel Aldape, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Carl  Barden, Andrew Curry, Kathleen Donovan, Michele C. Fejfar, Eric D.  Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Thomas F. Lombardi, and Kelly Snow made  significant contributions to the work.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to Enhance  Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts.   GAO-14-507. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2014.
Chemical Safety: Actions Needed to Improve Federal Oversight of  Facilities with Ammonium Nitrate. GAO-14-274. Washington, D.C.: May  19, 2014.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on DHS Efforts to  Implement and Manage Its Chemical Security Program. GAO-14-608T.  Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2014.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on DHS Efforts to Identify,  Prioritize, Assess, and Inspect Chemical Facilities. GAO-14-365T.  Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2014.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess Chemical  Security Risk and Gather Feedback on Facility Outreach Can Be  Strengthened. GAO-13-353. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2013.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could  Advance DHS’s Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other  Infrastructure. GAO-13-11. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Summary of DHS Actions to Better  Manage Its Chemical Security Program. GAO-12-1044T. Washington,  D.C.: September 20, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage  Its Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results.  GAO-12-567T. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure: DHS Needs to Refocus Its Efforts to Lead the  Government Facilities Sector. GAO-12-852. Washington, D.C.: August  13, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage  Its Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results.  GAO-12-515T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Could Better Manage Security  Surveys and Vulnerability Assessments. GAO-12-378. Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2012.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Has Taken Action Designed to  Identify and Address Overlaps and Gaps in Critical Infrastructure Security  Activities. GAO-11-537R. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2011.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess and Promote  Resiliency Are Evolving but Program Management Could Be  Strengthened. GAO-10-772. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2010.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure  Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and  Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.