Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and Assessment Efforts
Published: 2013-06-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: At the end of fiscal year 2004, DHS had about 28,100 personnel assigned to patrol U.S. land borders and inspect travelers at air, land, and sea POEs, with a total security cost of about $5.9 billion. At the end of fiscal year 2011, DHS had about 41,400 personnel assigned to air, land, and sea POEs and along the borders, with a total security cost of about $11.8 billion. DHS has reported that these resources have contributed to stronger enforcement efforts on the border. However, challenges remain to secure the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS border security programs and operations.
As requested, this statement addresses some of the key issues and recommendations GAO has made in the following areas: (1) DHSs efforts to secure the border at and between POEs; (2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security information sharing and enforcement efforts; and (3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets used to secure the border. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from January 2008 through March 2013, along with selected updates conducted in April 2013. For selected updates, GAO reviewed DHS information on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has reported progress in stemming illegal cross-border activity, but it could strengthen the assessment of its efforts. For example, since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry (POE) as an interim measure for border security. GAO reported in December 2012 that apprehensions decreased across the southwest border from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, generally mirroring a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. CBP attributed this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and increased resources for border security. Data reported by CBP's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) show that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012. It is too early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend. GAO testified in February 2013 that the number of apprehensions provides information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource allocation decisions. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs, but it has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them, as GAO recommended. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and said that it plans to set a date for establishing such milestones and time frames by November 2013.
According to DHS law enforcement partners, interagency coordination and information sharing improved, but challenges remain. GAO reported in November 2010 that information sharing and communication among federal law enforcement officials responsible for federal borderlands had increased; however, gaps remained in ensuring law enforcement officials had access to daily threat information. GAO recommended that relevant federal agencies ensure interagency agreements for coordinating information and integrating border security operations are further implemented. These agencies agreed, and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum affirming the importance of federal partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of GAO's recommendation, DHS needs to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements.
Opportunities exist to improve DHS's management of border security assets. For example, DHS conceived the Secure Border Initiative Network as a surveillance technology and deployed such systems along 53 miles of Arizona's border. In January 2011, in response to performance, cost, and schedule concerns, DHS canceled future procurements, and developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. GAO reported in November 2011 that in developing the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives, but it had not documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of technologies proposed in the Plan, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS concurred with this recommendation. GAO has ongoing work in this area, and among other things, is examining DHS's efforts to address prior recommendations, and expects to issue a report in fall 2013.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to DHS to strengthen its border security programs and efforts. DHS generally concurred and has taken actions, or has actions planned or underway to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to address the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) efforts to secure U.S. borders against threats of  terrorism; the smuggling of drugs, humans, and other contraband; and  illegal migration. At the end of fiscal year 2004, the first full year DHS  existed as an agency, it had about 10,500 agents assigned to patrol the  U.S. land borders and about 17,600 officers inspecting travelers at air,  land, and sea ports of entry (POE), and a total of about $5.9 billion  allocated to secure the entire U.S. border. At the end of fiscal year 2011,  both the number of personnel and amount of resources dedicated to  border security had substantially increased, with approximately 21,400  agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and more than 20,000  officers assigned to air, land, and sea POEs, amounting to about $11.8  billion allocated to secure the entire U.S. border.
DHS has reported that these increased resources have contributed to  stronger enforcement efforts on the border. However, challenges remain  in securing the border both at and between land POEs. For example,  DHS data also show that several hundred thousand persons have  entered the country illegally through and between the nation’s POEs.  Further, our analysis of DHS data indicated that across southwest border  sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83 percent  from fiscal years 2006 through 2011—from 10,321 to 18,898. In fiscal year 2012, DHS data indicated that seizures decreased to 17,891 across  the southwest border.
DHS’s efforts to secure the border at and between the POEs are the  primary responsibility of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP)  Office of Field Operations (OFO) and Office of Border Patrol,  respectively. Other DHS components also play a role in border security.  CBP’s Office of Air and Marine operates a fleet of air and marine assets  in support of federal border security efforts. DHS’s U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for investigating cross-border  illegal activity and criminal organizations that transport persons and  goods across the border. In addition, other federal, state, local, and tribal  law enforcement agencies also expend resources for border security. For  example, the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA)  have jurisdiction for law enforcement on federal borderlands administered  by their component agencies, including DOI’s National Park Service, Fish  and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land Management, and USDA’s  Forest Service.
Over the years, we have reported on a variety of DHS border security  programs and operations. As requested, my statement discusses  progress and challenges in the following areas:  (1) DHS’s efforts to secure the border at and between POEs;  (2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security  information sharing and enforcement efforts; and  (3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets  used to secure the border.
This statement is based on related reports and testimonies we issued  from January 2008 through March 2013 that examined DHS efforts to  secure the U.S. border (see Related GAO Products at the end of this  statement). It also includes selected updates we conducted in April 2013.  Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we obtained and  analyzed from officials from various DHS components, the Department of  Justice (DOJ), DOI, USDA; and state and local law enforcement  agencies. More detailed information about our scope and methodology  can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the updates, we  collected information from DHS on actions it has taken to address  recommendations made in prior reports on which this statement is based.  We conducted all of this work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Reported Progress in Addressing Illegal Cross-Border Activity, but Could Improve Assessment of Its Efforts
subsections: section_title: Border Patrol Has Reported Some Success in Addressing Illegal Migration, but Challenges Remain in Assessing Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of  apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim  measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance  reports. As we reported in December 2012, our data analysis showed that  apprehensions across the southwest border decreased 69 percent from  fiscal years 2006 through 2011. These data generally mirrored a  decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border  sector. As we testified in February 2013, data reported by Border Patrol  following the issuance of our December 2012 report showed that total  apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000  in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend for Border  Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year  2011, Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors  in part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic  objectives, and increased resources for border security.
It is too early to  In addition to collecting data on apprehensions, Border Patrol collects  other types of data that are used by sector management to help inform  assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal  migration and smuggling of drugs and other contraband. These data  show changes, for example, in the (1) percentage of estimated known  illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known  illegal entrants who are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders),  (3) number of seizures of drugs and other contraband, and (4) number of  apprehensions of persons from countries at an increased risk of  sponsoring terrorism. Our analysis of these data show that the  percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended from fiscal  years 2006 through 2011 varied across southwest border sectors. The  percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the  border illegally declined by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 through  2011. Further, the number of seizures of drugs and other contraband  across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in  fiscal year 2011. Our analysis of the data also show that apprehensions  of persons from countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism— referred to as Aliens from Special Interest Countries—increased each  fiscal year from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but  dropped to 253 in fiscal year 2011.
As we reported in December 2012, Border Patrol sectors and stations  track changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the  appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets are being  deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from  Border Patrol headquarters. Border Patrol data showed that the  effectiveness rate for eight of the nine sectors on the southwest border  improved from fiscal year 2006 through 2011. Border Patrol  headquarters officials said that differences in how sectors define, collect,  and report turn back data (entrants who illegally crossed the border but  were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico) and got  away data (entrants who illegally crossed the border and continued  traveling into the U.S. interior) used to calculate the overall effectiveness  rate preclude comparing performance results across sectors. Border  Patrol headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border Patrol  sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and got away  data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting the data varied  across sectors and stations based on differences in agent experience and  judgment, resources, and terrain. Border Patrol headquarters officials  issued guidance in September 2012 to provide a more consistent,  standardized approach for the collection and reporting of turn back and  got away data by Border Patrol sectors. Each sector is to be individually  responsible for monitoring adherence to the guidance. According to  Border Patrol officials, it is expected that this guidance will help improve  data reliability. Implementation of this new guidance may allow for  comparison of sector performance and inform decisions regarding  resource deployment for securing the southwest border.
Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and  measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border  between POEs and for informing the identification and allocation of  resources needed to secure the border, but has not yet identified  milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Since  fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the  southwest border between POEs as an interim performance goal and  measure for border security as reported in its annual performance report.
Prior to this, DHS used operational control as its goal and outcome  measure for border security and to assess resource needs to accomplish  this goal. Operational control—also referred to as effective control—was  defined as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the  capability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity.  DHS last reported its progress and status in achieving operational control  of the borders in fiscal year 2010. At that time, DHS reported achieving  operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S.  northern, southwest, and coastal borders. Along the southwest border,  DHS reported achieving operational control for 873 (44 percent) of the  about 2,000 border miles. At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, DHS  transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome  measure for border security. We testified in February 2013 that the  interim goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the southwest  border between POEs provides information on activity levels but does not  inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions,  and therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and  Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability.  Further, studies commissioned by CBP have found that the number of  apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency  officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border  illegal activity.
Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of  developing performance goals and measures, but has not identified  milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them.  According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time  frames for the development of performance goals and measures is  contingent on the development of key elements of its new strategic plan,  such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency’s time frames for  implementing these key elements—targeted for fiscal years 2013 and  2014—are subject to change. We recommended that CBP establish  milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals,  for border security between POEs that defines how border security is to  be measured, and a performance measure, or measures, for assessing  progress made in securing the border between POEs and informing  resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS concurred with our  recommendations and stated that it plans to set a date for when it will  establish such milestones and time frames by November 2013.
section_title: CBP Has Strengthened POE Inspection Programs and Officer Training, and Has Additional Actions Planned or Under Way
paragraphs: As part of its homeland security and legacy customs missions, CBP  inspects travelers arriving at POEs to counter threats posed by terrorists  and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or altered travel  documents and to prevent inadmissible aliens, criminals, and goods from  entering the country. In fiscal year 2012, CBP inspected about 352 million  travelers, and over 107 million cars, trucks, buses, trains, vessels, and  aircraft at over 329 air, sea, and land POEs. We have previously  identified vulnerabilities in the traveler inspection program and made  recommendations to DHS for addressing these vulnerabilities, and DHS  implemented these recommendations. For example, we reported in  January 2008 on weaknesses in CBP’s inbound traveler inspection  program, including challenges in attaining budgeted staffing levels  because of attrition and lack of officer compliance with screening  procedures, such as those used to determine citizenship and admissibility  of travelers entering the country as required by law and CBP policy.Factors that contributed to these challenges included lack of focus,  complacency, lack of supervisory presence, and lack of training. We  recommended that CBP enhance internal controls in the inspection  process, implement performance measures for apprehending  inadmissible aliens and other violators, and establish measures for  training provided to CBP officers and new officer proficiency. DHS  concurred with these recommendations and has implemented them.
Specifically, in January 2008, CBP reported, among other things, that all  land port directors are required to monitor and assess compliance with  eight different inspection activities using a self-inspection worksheet that  is provided to senior CBP management. At that time, CBP also  established performance measures related to the effectiveness of CBP  interdiction efforts. Additionally, in June 2011, CBP began conducting  additional classroom and on-the-job training, which incorporated ongoing  testing and evaluation of officer proficiency.
In December 2011, we reported that CBP had revised its training program  for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own training  development standards. Consistent with these standards, CBP  convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify and rank the tasks  that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new  curriculum was designed to produce professional law enforcement  officers capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal,  biological, and agricultural threats.
We also reported that CBP took some steps to identify and address the  training needs of its incumbent CBP officers but could do more to ensure  that these officers were fully trained. For example, we examined CBP’s  results of covert tests of document fraud detection at POEs conducted  over more than 2 years and found weaknesses in the CBP inspection  process at the POEs that were tested. In response to these tests, CBP  developed a “Back to Basics” course in March 2010 for incumbent  officers, but had no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the training. We  also reported that CBP had not conducted an analysis of all the possible  causes or systemic issues that may have contributed to the covert test  results. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP analyze covert  tests and evaluate the “Back to Basics” training course, and DHS  concurred with these recommendations. In April 2012, CBP officials  reported that they had completed an evaluation of the “Back to Basics”  training course and implemented an updated, subsequent training course.  Further, in November 2012, CBP officials stated that they had analyzed  the results of covert tests prior to and since the implementation of the  subsequent course. According to these officials, they obtained the results  of covert tests conducted before and after the course was implemented to  determine to what extent significant performance gains were achieved  and to identify any additional requirements for training. In April 2013, CBP  provided a copy of its analysis of the covert test results. GAO is reviewing  CBP’s analysis of the covert test results and other documentation as part  of a congressional mandate to review actions the agency has taken to  address GAO recommendations regarding CBP officer training. We  expect to report on the status of CBP’s efforts in the late summer of 2013.  Further, in July 2012, CBP completed a comprehensive analysis of the  results of its document fraud covert tests from fiscal years 2009 through  2011. In addition, we reported that CBP had not conducted a needs  assessment that would identify any gaps between identified critical skills  and incumbent officers’ current skills and competencies. We  recommended in December 2011 that CBP conduct a training needs  assessment. DHS concurred with this recommendation. In April 2013,  CBP reported to us that it is working to complete a training needs  assessment, but has faced challenges in completing such an assessment  because of personnel and budget issues, including retirements, attrition,  loss of contract support, sequestration, and continuing resolutions. CBP  plans to develop a final report on a training needs assessment by August  2013 outlining findings, conclusions, and recommendations from its  analysis.
section_title: DHS Law Enforcement Partners Reported Improved Results for Interagency Coordination, but Challenges Remain
subsections: section_title: DOI and USDA Reported Improved DHS Coordination to Secure Federal Borderlands, but Gaps Remained in Sharing Information for Daily Operations
paragraphs: Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands  protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the southwest  and northern borders and can cause damage to natural, historic, and  cultural resources, as well as put agency personnel and the visiting public  at risk. We reported in November 2010 that information sharing and  communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement officials  had increased in recent years. For example, interagency forums were  used to exchange information about border issues, and interagency  liaisons facilitated exchange of operational statistics. Federal agencies  also established interagency agreements to strengthen coordination of  border security efforts. However, we reported in November 2010 that  gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements to ensure law  enforcement officials had access to daily threat information to better  ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal  activity. For example, Border Patrol officials in the Tucson sector did not  consult with federal land management agencies before discontinuing  dissemination of daily situation reports that federal land law enforcement  officials relied on for a common awareness of the types and locations of  illegal activities observed on federal borderlands. Further, in Border  Patrol’s Spokane sector, on the northern border, coordination of  intelligence information was particularly important because of sparse law  enforcement presence and technical challenges that reduced Border  Patrol’s ability to fully assess cross-border threats, such as air smuggling  of high-potency marijuana.
We recommended that DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and  accountability as needed to further implement interagency agreements for  coordinating information and integrating operations. These agencies  agreed with our recommendations, and in January 2011, CBP issued a  memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol agents  emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address  border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to  fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, DHS would need to take  further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing  interagency agreements to enhance border security on federal lands.
section_title: Northern Border Partners Reported Interagency Forums Improved Coordination, but DHS Did Not Provide Oversight to Resolve Interagency Conflict in Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: DHS has stated that partnerships with other federal, state, local, tribal,  and Canadian law enforcement agencies are critical to the success of  northern border security efforts. We reported in December 2010 that DHS  efforts to coordinate with these partners through interagency forums and  joint operations were considered successful, according to a majority of  these partners we interviewed. In addition, DHS component officials  reported that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border  had improved. However, DHS did not provide oversight for the number  and location of forums established by its components, and numerous  federal, state, local, and Canadian partners cited challenges related to the  inability to provide resources for the increasing number of forums, raising  concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. In addition, federal law  enforcement partners in all four locations we visited as part of our work  cited ongoing challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, Border Patrol  and Forest Service, and ICE and DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration  in sharing information and resources that compromised daily border  security related to operations and investigations. DHS had established  and updated interagency agreements to address ongoing coordination  challenges; however, oversight by management at the component and  local levels has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of  these agreements.
We also reported in December 2010 that while Border Patrol’s border  security measures reflected that there was a high reliance on law  enforcement support from outside the border zones, the extent of partner  law enforcement resources that could be leveraged to fill Border Patrol  resource gaps, target coordination efforts, and make more efficient  resource decisions was not reflected in Border Patrol’s processes for  assessing border security and resource requirements. We  recommended that DHS provide guidance and oversight for interagency  forums and for component compliance with interagency agreements, and  develop policy and guidance necessary to integrate partner resources in  border security assessments and resource planning documents. DHS  agreed with our recommendations and has reported taking action to  address one of them. For example, in June 2012, DHS released a  northern border strategy, and in August 2012, DHS notified us of other  cross-border law enforcement and security efforts taking place with  Canada. However, to fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, CBP  would need to develop policy and guidance specifying how partner  resources will be identified, assessed, and integrated in DHS plans for  implementing the northern border strategy. To address the remaining  recommendations, DHS would need to establish an oversight process for  interagency forums to ensure that missions and locations of interagency  forums are not duplicative and consider the downstream burden on  northern border partners, as well as an oversight process that evaluates  the challenges and corrective actions needed to ensure Border Patrol and  ICE compliance with interagency memorandums.
section_title: Opportunities Exist to Improve DHS’s Management of Border Security Assets
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Deployed Assets to Secure the Borders, but Has Not Provided Complete Information on Plans, Metrics, and Costs
paragraphs: In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a  multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and  reducing illegal immigration. Through this initiative, DHS planned to  develop a comprehensive border protection system using technology,  known as the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), and tactical  infrastructure—fencing, roads, and lighting. Under this program, CBP  increased the number of southwest border miles with pedestrian and  vehicle fencing from 120 miles in fiscal year 2005 to about 650 miles as of  March 2013. We reported in May 2010 that CBP had not accounted for  the impact of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border  security. Specifically, CBP had reported an increase in control of  southwest border miles, but could not account separately for the impact of  the border fencing and other infrastructure. In September 2009, we  recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border fencing and  other infrastructure to border security. DHS concurred with our  recommendation and, in response, CBP contracted with the Homeland  Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of the  impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. CBP reported in  February 2012 that preliminary results from this analysis indicate that an  additional 3 to 5 years are needed to ensure a credible assessment.
Since the launch of SBI in 2005, we have identified a range of challenges  related to schedule delays and performance problems with SBInet.  SBInet was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a “virtual  fence” along the border, and after spending nearly $1 billion, DHS  deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona’s border that  represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January 2011, in response to  concerns regarding SBInet’s performance, cost, and schedule, DHS  canceled future procurements. CBP developed the Arizona Border  Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona  border.
In November 2011, we reported that CBP does not have the information  needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS  and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. In developing  the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives and outreach to  potential vendors. However, CBP did not document the analysis justifying  the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border  surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan. Specifically, according to  CBP officials, CBP used a two-step process to develop the Plan. First,  CBP engaged the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to  conduct an analysis of alternatives beginning with ones for Arizona.  Second, following the completion of the analysis of alternatives, the  Border Patrol conducted its operational assessment, which included a  comparison of alternative border surveillance technologies and an  analysis of operational judgments to consider both effectiveness and cost.  While the first step in CBP’s process to develop the Plan—the analysis of  alternatives—was well documented, the second step—Border Patrol’s  operational assessment—was not transparent because of the lack of  documentation. As we reported in November 2011, without  documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and  deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the  Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify  how the analysis of alternatives was used, assess the validity of the  decisions made, or justify the funding requested. We also reported that  CBP officials have not yet defined the mission benefits expected from  implementing the new Plan, which could help improve CBP’s ability to  assess the effectiveness of the Plan as it is implemented.
In addition, we reported that CBP’s 10-year life cycle cost estimate for the  Plan of $1.5 billion was based on an approximate order-of-magnitude  analysis, and agency officials were unable to determine a level of  confidence in their estimate, as best practices suggest. Specifically, we  found that the estimate reflected substantial features of best practices,  being both comprehensive and accurate, but it did not sufficiently meet  other characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, such as credibility,  because it did not identify a level of confidence or quantify the impact of  risks. GAO and OMB guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are  important for program approval and continued receipt of annual funding.  In addition, because CBP was unable to determine a level of confidence  in its estimate, we reported that it would be difficult for CBP to determine  what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks  associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining  Arizona border.
We recommended in November 2011 that, among other things, CBP  document the analysis justifying the technologies proposed in the Plan,  determine its mission benefits, and determine a more robust life cycle  cost estimate for the Plan. DHS concurred with these recommendations,  and has reported taking action to address some of the recommendations.  For example, in October 2012, CBP officials reported that, through the  operation of two surveillance systems under SBInet’s initial deployment in  high-priority regions of the Arizona border, CBP has identified examples  of mission benefits that could result from implementing technologies  under the Plan. Additionally, CBP initiated action to update its cost  estimate for the Plan by, among other things, providing revised cost  estimates in February and March 2012 for the Integrated Fixed Towers  and Remote Video Surveillance System, the Plan’s two largest projects.  We currently have ongoing work in this area for congressional requesters  and, among other things, are examining DHS’s efforts to address prior  recommendations, and expect to issue a report with our final results in the  fall of 2013.
In March 2012, we reported that the CBP Office of Air and Marine  (OAM)—which provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of its  customers, primarily Border Patrol—had not documented significant  events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement  across locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate  that its decisions to allocate resources were the most effective ones in  fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats. OAM issued various  plans that included strategic goals, mission responsibilities, and threat  information. However, we could not identify the underlying analyses used  to link these factors to the mix and placement of resources across  locations. OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the  deployment decisions in the plan to mission needs or threats. For  example, while the southwest border was Border Patrol’s highest priority  for resources in fiscal year 2010, it did not receive a higher rate of air  support than the northern border. Similarly, OAM did not document  analyses supporting the current mix and placement of marine assets  across locations. OAM officials said at the time that while they generally  documented final decisions affecting the mix and placement of resources,  they did not have the resources to document assessments and analyses  to support these decisions. However, we reported that such  documentation of significant events could help the office improve the  transparency of its resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the  effectiveness of these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs  and addressing threats. We recommended in March 2012 that CBP  document analyses, including mission requirements and threats, that  support decisions on the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine  resources. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it  plans to provide additional documentation of its analyses supporting  decisions on the mix and placement of air and marine resources by 2014.
Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and members of the  subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key  contributions to this statement included Lacinda Ayers, Kathryn Bernet,  and Jeanette Espinola (Assistant Directors), as well as Jennifer Bryant,  Frances Cook, Joseph Dewechter, Alana Finley, Barbara Guffy, and  Ashley D. Vaughan.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S.  Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.
Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border  Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-330T. Washington, D.C.:  February 26, 2013.
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to  Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-25.  Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2012.
Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and  Assessment Efforts. GAO-12-688T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2012.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of  DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30,  2012.
Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers Are Fully  Trained. GAO-12-269. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2011.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.:  November 4, 2011.
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures  for the Southwest Border. GAO-11-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 15,  2011.
Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of  Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97.  Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a  Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands.  GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying  Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. GAO-10-651T.  Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the  Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections  Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.:  January 3, 2008.
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