Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains
Published: 2007-02-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in November 2001, has developed and implemented a variety of programs to secure the commercial aviation system. To implement these efforts, TSA funding related to aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. Other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in securing commercial aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts TSA has taken or planned to strengthen aviation security, and the challenges that remain, in three key areas: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and air cargo screening. GAO's comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies and our preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, and staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers (TSO).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for these efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the TSO workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. Some of the actions taken by TSA in these areas were in response to GAO recommendations. For example, consistent with GAO's recommendation to strengthen checked baggage screening, TSA has developed a strategic planning framework and identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems. While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation security, GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based decision-making efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For example, as TSA moves forward with Secure Flight--TSA's prospective domestic passenger prescreening program--it will need to employ a range of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA has put in place a new management team, but it is too early to know how this change will affect the program's development. In addition, while TSA has tested some proposed modifications to passenger screening procedures at airports to help determine whether to implement the changes, GAO identified that TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved. GAO also found that limited progress has been made in developing and deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For example, limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, and while TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and to identify funding and financing strategies for installing these systems, the agency has identified that under current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be completed until approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery time frames of air carriers. GAO also found that more work is needed to fully implement a risk-based approach to securing air cargo, including finalizing a methodology and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. TSA stated that the agency intends to perform a vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and activities, as recommended by GAO, and plans to complete this assessment in 2007.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  security of our nation’s aviation system. The Transportation Security  Administration (TSA) was established in 2001 with the mission to protect  the transportation network while also ensuring the free movement of  people and commerce. Since its inception, TSA has focused much of its  efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety  of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. To implement  these efforts, TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about   $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) also plays a role in securing commercial aviation. In particular, CBP  has responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening—or the  matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists—for  international flights operating to or from the United States, as well as  inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States. In  addition, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and  Technology Directorate (S&T) is responsible for the research and  development of aviation security technologies. In carrying out its broader  homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the daunting challenge of  determining how to allocate its finite resources within the aviation system  and across all sectors to address threats and strengthen security.
My testimony today focuses on three key areas of the aviation security  system: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked  baggage screening, and air cargo security. In particular, I will address the  numerous efforts TSA has taken or has planned to strengthen aviation  security in these three key areas, and the challenges that remain.
My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies  addressing the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system; and our  preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA’s passenger  checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, air carriers’ domestic  passenger prescreening systems, and staffing standards for Transportation  Security Officers (TSO). We plan to report on the results of this work later  this year. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. A list of our related reports on aviation  security is included at the end of this testimony.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: With the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)  in November 2001, TSA assumed responsibility for civil aviation security  from the Federal Aviation Administration and for passenger and checked  baggage screening from air carriers. As part of this responsibility, TSA  oversees security operations at the nation’s more than 400 commercial  airports, including establishing requirements for passenger and checked  baggage screening, and ensuring the security of air cargo transported to,  from, and within the United States. While TSA has operational  responsibility for conducting passenger and checked baggage screening,  TSA has regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for air carriers who  conduct air cargo screening. While TSA took over responsibility for  passenger checkpoint and baggage screening, as directed by ATSA, air  carriers have continued to conduct passenger prescreening, which  includes the process of checking passenger information against federal  watch list data before flights depart. In accordance with the Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, TSA is developing a  program to take over this responsibility from air carriers for passengers on  domestic flights, and CBP has issued a proposed rule that would enable it  to perform its identity-matching function for passengers on international  flights traveling to or from the United States prior to flight departure.
subsections: section_title: Airline Passenger Prescreening
paragraphs: The prescreening of airline passengers—the process of identifying  passengers who may pose a security risk before they board an aircraft—is  one of many important layers of security that is intended to help officials  focus security efforts on those passengers representing the greatest  potential threat to civil aviation. Within DHS, TSA is responsible for  ensuring that passenger prescreening is conducted before domestic  flights—flights operating entirely within the United States—take off, while  CBP has responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening for  international flights operating to or from the United States.
TSA is developing a program, in accordance with ATSA and the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, through which  TSA would assume the watch list matching function currently conducted  by air carriers prior to domestic flight departures. TSA has named this  prospective prescreening program Secure Flight. In accordance with  security directives issued by TSA, air carriers—and not the U.S.  government—currently match passenger-supplied reservation information  (referred to as passenger name record (PNR) data), against the No Fly and  Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers before domestic flights depart.  According to TSA, the No Fly List includes the names of individuals  considered to be known or suspected threats to civil aviation and are  therefore precluded from boarding an aircraft traveling to, from, or within  the United States, while the Selectee List includes the names of individuals  who require additional security screening—which includes physical  inspection of the person and a hand search of their luggage—prior to  being permitted to board an aircraft. These lists are extracted from the  Terrorist Screening Center’s (TSC) consolidated terrorist screening  database (TSDB) and are exported to the air carriers through TSA. The  current domestic prescreening process also requires that air carriers  operate the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS),  which identifies passengers for additional screening based on certain  behavioral characteristics.
The existing identity-matching component of DHS’s international aviation  passenger prescreening process involves separate matching activities  conducted by air carriers (prior to a flight’s departure and pursuant to TSA  requirements) and by CBP (generally after a flight’s departure). As with  domestic passenger prescreening, air carriers conduct an initial match of  self-reported PNR data against the No Fly and Selectee Lists before  international flight departures. CBP’s process, in effect, supplements the  air carrier identity matching for international flights by comparing  additional passenger information collected from passports (this  information becomes part of Advanced Passenger Information System  (APIS) data), against the No Fly and Selectee Lists and other government  databases. Under current federal regulations for CBP’s prescreening of  passengers on international flights, air carriers are required to provide the  U.S. government with PNR data as well as APIS data to allow the  government to conduct, among other things, identity matching procedures  against the No Fly and Selectee Lists—which typically occur just after or  at times just before the departure of international flights traveling to or  from the United States, respectively. To address a concern that the  federal government’s identity matching may not be conducted in a timely  manner, in 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue a proposed rule  requiring that the U.S. government’s identity-matching process occur  before the departure of international flights. CBP published this proposed  rule in July 2006, and, if implemented, it will allow the U.S. government to  conduct passenger prescreening in advance of flight departure, and will  eliminate the need for air carriers to continue performing an identity- matching function for international flights.
section_title: Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening
paragraphs: One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from  the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening operations  to the use of federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs). Prior to ATSA,  passenger and checked baggage screening had been performed by private  screening companies under contract to airlines. ATSA required TSA to  create a federal workforce to assume the job of conducting passenger and  checked baggage screening at commercial airports. The federal screener  workforce was put into place, as required, by November 2002.
Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA  inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any  unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item  onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area. Passenger screening personnel  must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated screening  locations. As shown in figure 1, the four passenger screening functions  are:    X-ray screening of property,    walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,    hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and    physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.
Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their carry- on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector. Passengers  whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm the walk- through metal detector, or who are designated as selectees—that is,  passengers selected by the CAPPS or other TSA-approved processes to  designate passengers for additional screening—are screened by hand- wand or pat-down and have their carry-on items screened for explosives  traces or physically searched.
Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security  screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent  the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon  onboard an aircraft. As shown in figure 2, checked baggage screening is  accomplished through the use of explosive detection systems or  explosive trace detection systems, and through the use of alternative  means, such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag  match, when the explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems  are unavailable.
The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of  three elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the  screening of airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked  baggage, the technology used during the screening process, and the  procedures TSOs are to follow to conduct screening. Collectively, these  elements help to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of passenger  and checked baggage screening.
section_title: Air Cargo Security
paragraphs: TSA’s responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other things,  establishing security rules and regulations covering domestic and foreign  passenger air carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign all-cargo  carriers that transport cargo, and domestic indirect air carriers. TSA is  also responsible for overseeing the implementation of air cargo security  requirements by air carriers and indirect air carriers through compliance  inspections, while air carriers are required to inspect air cargo for  weapons, explosives, or stowaways.
Air carriers (passenger and all-cargo) are responsible for implementing  TSA security requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved  security program that describes the security policies, procedures, and  systems air carriers are required to implement. These requirements  include measures related to the acceptance, handling, and inspection of  cargo; training of employees in security and cargo inspection procedures;  testing employee proficiency in cargo inspection; and access to cargo  areas and aircraft. If threat information or events indicate that additional  security measures are needed to secure the aviation sector, TSA may issue  revised or new security requirements in the form of security directives or  emergency amendments applicable to domestic or foreign air carriers. The  air carriers must implement the requirements set forth in the security  directives or emergency amendments in addition to those requirements  already imposed and enforced by TSA.
Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type from  perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic  equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry goods,  fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish, and human  remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including large containers  known as unit loading devices that allow many packages to be  consolidated into one container that can be loaded on an aircraft, wooden  crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as  break bulk cargo.
Participants in the international air cargo shipping process include  shippers, such as individuals and manufacturers; freight forwarders or  regulated agents, who consolidate shipments and deliver them to air  carriers; air cargo handling agents, who process and load cargo onto  aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and passenger and all-cargo carriers that  store, load, and transport air cargo. International air cargo may have been  transported via ship, train, or truck prior to its loading onboard an aircraft.  Figure 3 identifies cargo being loaded onto an aircraft for transport.
section_title: Fiscal Years 2004 Through 2007 Aviation Security Funding and Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request for Aviation Security
paragraphs: According to DHS’s budget execution reports, TSA’s appropriations for  aviation security have totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. In  fiscal year 2004—the first year for which data was available—TSA  received about $3.9 billion for aviation security programs. In fiscal year  2007, TSA received about $5.7 billion. The President’s budget request for  fiscal year 2008 includes about $5.7 billion to continue TSA’s aviation  security efforts. This total includes about $5.0 billion specifically  designated for aviation security and about $0.79 billion for aviation- security related programs.  Figure 4 identifies reported aviation security  funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2007.
Of the approximately $5.7 billion requested for aviation security in the  President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, almost $4.4 billion, or about   77 percent, is for passenger and checked baggage screening. This includes  approximately $4 billion to support passenger and checked baggage  screening operations, such as TSO salaries and training, and $176 million  for the procurement and $259 million for the installation of checked  baggage explosive detection systems. Additional information on the  President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008 as it relates to airline  passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening,  and air cargo security is provided later in this statement.
section_title: TSA and CBP Are Working to Strengthen Domestic and International Passenger Prescreening, but Management and Technical Challenges Remain
paragraphs: TSA and CBP have separate efforts under way to strengthen domestic and  international passenger prescreening, respectively. However, these  programs are in development and face management and technical  challenges. Further, while TSA and CBP have been developing their  respective identity-matching programs separately, the two agencies are  now taking steps to align their prescreening programs to minimize  duplication and provide a single set of requirements for air carrier  participation. However, key policy and technical decisions have not yet  been made to clarify how these two programs will be aligned.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Reported Addressing Challenges That Have Hindered Secure Flight’s Implementation, but It Is Not Yet Known Whether These Efforts Will Address Past Problems
paragraphs: For over 4 years, TSA has faced significant challenges in developing and  implementing its advanced passenger prescreening program, now known  as Secure Flight, and has not yet taken the identity-matching function over  from air carriers as mandated by Congress. According to TSA, the Secure  Flight program—which is to perform the functions associated with  determining whether passengers on domestic flights are on the No Fly and  Selectee Lists—is intended to (1) decrease the chance of compromising  watch list data by centralizing its use within the federal government;   (2) provide earlier identification of potential threats, allowing for the  expedited notification of law enforcement and other organizations  responsible for threat management; (3) provide a fair, equitable, and  consistent matching process across all air carriers; and (4) offer consistent  application of an expedited and integrated redress process for passengers  misidentified as a threat. However, during the past 3 years, we reported on  multiple occasions that the Secure Flight program (and its predecessor,  CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or finalized its goals, objectives, and  requirements. Further, in February 2006, we reported that, taken as a  whole, the development of Secure Flight had not been effectively managed  and the program was at risk of failure. We found that TSA had not  conducted critical activities in accordance with best practices for large- scale information technology programs, and had not followed its own  systems development life cycle guidance in managing the program’s  development. Former program officials stated that TSA had instead used a  rapid development method that was intended to enable it to develop the  program more quickly. However, as a result of this approach, the  development process had been ad hoc, with project activities conducted  out of sequence. For example, program officials declared the design phase  complete before requirements needed to guide the design of Secure Flight  had been detailed. In addition, TSA had not maintained up-to-date program  schedules or developed cost estimates for the program. In March 2005, we  recommended that TSA take numerous steps to strengthen the program’s  development, such as finalizing system requirements and developing  detailed test plans to help ensure that all Secure Flight system  functionality is properly tested and evaluated. We also recommended that  TSA develop a plan for establishing connectivity among the air carriers  and other stakeholders to help ensure the secure, effective, and timely  transmission of data for use in Secure Flight operations.
In early 2006, acknowledging the challenges it faced with the program,  TSA suspended the development of Secure Flight and initiated a  reassessment, or rebaselining, of the program, to be completed before  moving forward. In January 2007, TSA announced that it had completed its  rebaselining efforts, which included reassessing program goals and  capabilities, and developing a new schedule and cost estimates—actions  that we recommended in March 2005. The Assistant Secretary of  Homeland Security for TSA stated that TSA had made significant progress  in upgrading the design and development of the Secure Flight program,  and that program documentation had been revised to reflect TSA’s plans  for reliably delivering Secure Flight capabilities. In December 2006, the  DHS Investment Review Board—a group of DHS senior executives  charged with reviewing certain programs at key phases of development to  help ensure they meet mission needs at expected levels of costs and  risks—completed its review of Secure Flight and approved the program to  proceed into capability development and demonstration phases.  According to the Investment Review Board, this approval was based on  rescoping Secure Flight using a new business model better focused on  mission; putting a new team in place with appropriate technical and  management skills; and improving its management approach to privacy,  security, and quality assurance. However, the board also noted that this  important screening capability was needed sooner than its planned mid- 2009 implementation time frame, and requested that TSA determine the  feasibility of accelerating the program schedule to deliver initial capability  by mid-2008. As we have reported, earlier attempts to accelerate the  Secure Flight program have led to developmental problems and program  delays. Accordingly, as TSA moves forward, it will need to employ a range  of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing,  to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. As part  of our ongoing work assessing the Secure Flight program, we will be  reviewing DHS’s and TSA’s efforts to develop and implement the program,  including progress made during its rebaselining efforts.
Regarding TSA’s communications with air carriers about Secure Flight  system requirements, we reported in March 2005 that air carriers had  expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty of Secure Flight system and  data requirements, and the impact that these requirements may have on  the airline industry and traveling public. Further, based on preliminary  results for our ongoing work, officials from 9 of the 15 air carriers we  interviewed from February 2006 to January 2007, reported that they were  enhancing their respective identity-matching systems or planned to do so.  While these efforts may improve the accuracy of each air carrier’s  individual identity-matching system, the improvements will only apply to  their respective systems and could further exacerbate differences that  currently exist among the air carriers’ various identity-matching systems.  These differences may result in varying levels of effectiveness in the  matching of passenger information against the No Fly and Selectee Lists,  which was a key factor that led to the government’s effort to take over the  identity-matching function through Secure Flight. Also, officials from 7 of  15 air carriers stated that TSA had not communicated with them about  Secure Flight requirements within the past 6 months while the program  was being rebaselined. TSA officials stated that in October 2006 they had  resumed discussions with air carriers regarding Secure Flight  requirements, and as of January 2007, had discussed plans for Secure  Flight with officials from 8 air carriers and the Air Transport Association.  TSA officials stated that they also plan to take into account current air  carrier capabilities and programs as they proceed with Secure Flight  development, and to update guidance previously provided to air carriers to  reflect the current concept of operations for the rebaselined Secure Flight  program.
In February 2006, we also reported that TSA was in the early stages of  coordinating with TSC and CBP on broader issues of integration and  interoperability related to other people-screening programs used by the  government to combat terrorism. However, TSA needed to provide these  stakeholders with detailed information about its concept of operations for  Secure Flight to enable them to plan for and provide the support necessary  for the program. For example, a TSC official stated that without specific  information on Secure Flight requirements, TSC could not make decisions  about needed resources, such as personnel needed to operate its call  center that would be used to help resolve potential matches against the No  Fly and Selectee Lists. In January 2007, TSC officials stated that while they  had been participating in meetings with Secure Flight officials, they had  not yet received the specific operational and technical information needed  to plan for supporting Secure Flight operations. During Secure Flight  rebaselining efforts, TSA officials also stated that they were coordinating  with CBP to more closely align their respective identity-matching  programs. However, this collaboration is ongoing and key policy and  technical decisions regarding how the programs will be coordinated have  not been announced. We discuss TSA and CBP’s coordination of their  domestic and international prescreening programs later in this statement.
We have also previously reported that TSA, as part of its requirements  development process, had not clearly identified the privacy impacts of the  envisioned system or the full actions it planned to take to mitigate them.  Specifically, because TSA had not made final determinations about its  requirements for passenger data, and Secure Flight’s system development  documentation did not fully address how passenger privacy protections  were to be met, it was not possible to assess potential system impacts on  individual privacy protections at that time. We have also previously  reported that TSA violated provisions of the Privacy Act by not fully  disclosing its use of personal information during systems testing. In  March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify how Secure Flight will  protect personal privacy. TSA officials stated that they are aware of, and  plan to address, the potential for Secure Flight to adversely affect  passenger privacy protections, and the need to provide a redress process  whereby aviation passengers adversely affected by the identity matching  process may express their concerns, seek correction of any inaccurate  data, and request other actions to reduce or eliminate future  inconveniences. Concurrent with its rebaselining efforts, TSA reported  that it has developed a Secure Flight privacy program that is rooted in the  Fair Information Practices—a set of internationally recognized privacy  principles that underlie the Privacy Act. TSA officials further stated that  the rebaselined Secure Flight program will result in a more transparent  and privacy-enhanced program by addressing concerns identified by us  and others in the following areas: program oversight, program scope, data  collection activities, redress requirements, relationships with other TSA  credentialing programs, and technical requirements. TSA officials also  stated that they have embedded privacy contractor experts in the program  teams to address privacy issues as they arise. In addition, in January 2007,  officials from Secure Flight and TSA’s Office of Transportation Security  Redress stated that Secure Flight will use the TSA redress process that is  currently available for individuals affected by the air carrier identity- matching processes, but the details of how this process will be integrated  with other Secure Flight requirements have not yet been completed. We  will continue to assess TSA’s efforts to manage system privacy protections  and establish a redress process for resolving misidentified passengers as  part of our ongoing review of the program.
We believe that TSA’s efforts to reassess Secure Flight’s development and  progress was an appropriate step given the problems that faced the  program in early 2006. However, since TSA only recently announced that it  has completed its rebaselining efforts, and just recently provided more  details of its rebaselined program, it is too early to determine the extent to  which TSA has addressed the long-standing issues that have affected the  program. According to DHS’s budget execution reports, TSA received  about $126 million for fiscal years 2004 through 2006—including funds  spent on the CAPPS II predecessor program—and $15 million for fiscal  year 2007 for Secure Flight. For fiscal year 2008, the President’s budget  request includes $53 million for TSA to continue this program. According  to the TSA’s budget justification, the increase of $38 million is requested to  provide for the development and the authority to operate the Secure Flight  system. Additionally, the funding request would provide for procuring  hardware, starting operations and training, and developing a network  interface between Secure Flight and CBP. We will continue to monitor  Secure Flight’s development as part of our ongoing review of the program.
section_title: DHS Intends to Align Domestic and International Prescreening Programs, but Key Policy and Technical Decisions Have Not Yet Been Made
paragraphs: As originally envisioned, once Secure Flight became operational, TSA  would be operating a domestic passenger prescreening system, while CBP  would be operating an international passenger prescreening system.  However, air carriers raised concerns regarding having to support  different data requirements for two separate government prescreening  programs. Further, we reported that both programs could result in  potentially different results for passengers flying on domestic and  international flights, results that could cause additional costs to air  carriers, and confusion and inconvenience to passengers. For example, if  the programs are not aligned, air carriers might have to implement  different information connections, communications, and programming for  each prescreening program, resulting in added costs and inefficiencies.  Also, if the two separate programs use different passenger data elements  or identity-matching technologies, air carriers may receive conflicting  notifications to handle a passenger differently for an international than for  a domestic flight. Passengers may also be inconvenienced since a  passenger may be delayed on one leg of a multileg trip, which includes  both a domestic and an international flight segment, and possibly miss a  flight.
The air carrier community has asked CBP and TSA to coordinate their  efforts to ensure that the programs are compatible and are developed as a  single approach to avoid the need for air carriers to implement two  separate screening systems to meet CBP and TSA requirements. In a joint  letter to the Secretary of DHS dated October 27, 2005, the Air Transport  Association of America and the Association of European Airlines urged  DHS to coordinate international and domestic airline passenger  prescreening programs so that air carriers are not unduly burdened by the  costs and inefficiencies posed by working with two different prescreening  programs. The letter also stated that the Air Transport Association of  America and the Association of European Airlines believed that there had  been a lack of coordination between CBP and TSA in aligning their  respective passenger prescreening programs. Air carrier industry groups  reiterated this concern in comments they provided in response to CBP’s  proposed rule for conducting passenger prescreening on international  flights. We have also previously reported that since both agencies are  developing and implementing passenger prescreening programs, CBP and  TSA could mutually benefit from the sharing of technical testing results  and the coordination of other developmental efforts. Coordination and  planning in the development of these two programs would also enhance  program integration and interoperability, potentially limit redundancies,  and increase program effectiveness. We have recently recommended that  DHS take additional steps and make key policy and technical decisions  that are necessary to more fully coordinate these programs.
Recognizing these concerns, DHS has directed TSA and CBP to coordinate  their prescreening activities so that they provide “One DHS Solution” to  the commercial aviation industry consistent with applicable authorities  and statutes. CBP and TSA officials stated that they are taking steps to  coordinate their prescreening efforts, including meeting routinely with  DHS’s Office of Screening Coordination and with aviation and travel  industry stakeholders to develop joint data requirements, processes, and  methods for disseminating information to other government and law  enforcement organizations in the event of a positive identity match against  the No Fly and Selectee Lists. DHS officials told us that they envision a  joint approach that will allow for standardization between the two  programs to the extent possible, reduce unnecessary programming by  aircraft operators, and provide consistent treatment for passengers across  all aircraft operators. However, despite this coordination, key policy and  technical decisions have not yet been made regarding how these programs  will be aligned, including determining how differences in the data used to  conduct identity matching and the identity matching techniques used will  be resolved. Further, it is unclear how the different implementation  schedules for the two programs—CBP has already issued a proposed rule  to implement a new passenger prescreening program for passengers on  international flights, while TSA’s schedule shows that Secure Flight will  not begin operations until 2009—will affect coordination efforts. Given  DHS’s commitment to align the two prescreening programs, and the  security and efficiency benefits of doing so, it will be important for CBP  and TSA to take the steps necessary to successfully coordinate these  programs. Until international and domestic prescreening efforts are more  fully aligned, the extent to which potential problems of duplication and  conflicting results in international and domestic passenger prescreening  will be addressed remains unclear.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screening Checkpoints and Checked Baggage Screening Stations, but Continues to Face Challenges
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps to strengthen the three key elements of the passenger  and checked baggage screening systems—people (TSOs), screening  procedures, and technology—but continues to face management,  planning, and funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing  Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect  current operating conditions, and provided TSOs with additional training  intended to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly  improvised explosives. TSA also proposed modifications to passenger  checkpoint screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability  information), among other factors, but could do more evaluation of  proposed procedures before they are implemented to ensure they achieve  their intended results. Additionally, TSA is exploring new technologies to  enhance the detection of explosives and other threats, but continues to  face management and funding challenges. For example, in May 2006, TSA  reported that under current investment levels, the installation of optimal  checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until  approximately 2024. TSA, in collaboration with key stakeholders, has  identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal  checked baggage screening systems, such as continued appropriations for  the procurement and installation of EDS machines.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Management and Performance of Its TSO Workforce
paragraphs: TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the  management and performance of its TSO workforce, which TSA has  identified as its most important asset in accomplishing its mission. We  reported in February 2004 that staffing shortages and TSA’s hiring process  had hindered the ability of some Federal Security Directors (FSD)—the  ranking authority responsible for leading and coordinating security  activities at airports—to provide sufficient resources to staff screening  checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their checkpoints  without using additional measures such as overtime. Since that time, TSA  has developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels  at airports. In determining staffing allocations, the model takes into  account the workload demands unique to each airport based on an  estimate of each airport’s peak passenger volume. This input is then  processed against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers  and checked baggage—including expected processing rates, required  staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard  operating procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates. In August  2005, TSA determined that the staffing model contained complete and  accurate information on each airport from which to estimate staffing  needs, and the agency used the model to identify TSO allocations for each  airport. At that time, the staffing model identified a total TSO full-time  equivalent allocation need of 42,303—a level within the congressionally  mandated limit of 45,000 full-time equivalent TSOs. According to TSA,  when TSA runs the model, it does so without imposing a limitation on the  maximum number of full-time equivalent TSOs, either the   45,000 congressional limit or any budgetary limits that affect the number  of TSOs that can be hired.
In addition to the levels identified by the staffing model, TSA sets aside  TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those considered by the  staffing model in the annual allocation run for airports. For example, in  order to handle short-term extraordinary needs at airports, TSA  established a National Screening Force of 615 TSOs who can be sent to  airports to augment local TSO staff during periods of unusually high  passenger volume, such as the Super Bowl. Additionally, certain airports  may, during the course of the year, experience significant changes to their  screening operations, such as the arrival of a new airline or opening of a  new terminal. TSA established a reserve of 329 TSO full-time equivalents  during fiscal year 2006 that can be used to augment the existing force. The  President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request includes $35 million for  operational expenses for a National Deployment Office—an office that  would be responsible for deploying the National Screening Force and  other TSOs to those airports experiencing significant staffing shortfalls.
According to TSA, TSA’s approach to allocating TSOs has allowed the  agency to stay within the 43,000 full-time equivalent TSO budgetary limit  for fiscal year 2006—a staffing level that TSA’s Assistant Secretary stated  is sufficient to provide passenger and checked baggage screening  services. According to the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, the  $2.6 billion requested for the federal TSO workforce represents an  increase of about $131 million over fiscal year 2007 for cost of living  adjustments and a travel document checker initiative. Under this initiative,  about 1,330 full-time equivalent TSOs would be placed at the 40 highest  risk category X and I airports to conduct document checking for  passengers approaching the passenger screening checkpoint. According  to the budget request, the $2.6 billion is to fund the personnel,  compensation, and benefits of approximately 43,688 full-time equivalent  TSOs and about 1,045 full-time equivalent Screening Managers. Table 1  shows the total TSO and Screening Manager full-time equivalents and the  funding levels for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, as reported by TSA.
FSDs we interviewed in 2006 as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s  staffing model generally reported that the model is a more accurate  predictor of staffing needs than TSA’s prior staffing model, which took  into account fewer factors that affect screening operations. However,  FSDs identified that some assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006 staffing  model did not reflect actual operating conditions. For example, FSDs  noted that the staffing model’s assumption of a 20 percent part-time  workforce—measured in terms of full-time equivalents—had been difficult  to achieve, particularly at larger (category X and I) airports, because of,  among other things, economic conditions leading to competition for part- time workers, remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass transit,  TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year 2002, and part-time  workers’ desire to convert to full-time status. TSA data show that for fiscal  years 2005 and 2006, the nation’s category X airports had a TSO workforce  composed of about 8 percent part-time equivalents, and the part-time TSO  attrition rate nationwide remains considerably higher than the rate for full- time personnel (approximately 46 percent versus 16 percent for full-time  TSOs for fiscal year 2006). FSDs also expressed concern that the model  did not specifically account for the recurrent training requirement for  TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged over a fiscal year quarter. Further,  FSDs identified that the model for fiscal year 2006 did not account for time  away from screening to perform operational support duties. FSDs we  interviewed stated that because they are not authorized to hire a sufficient  number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely used to perform  certain operational support functions, such as payroll processing,  scheduling, distribution and maintenance of uniforms, data entry, and  workman’s compensation processing. Similarly, in September 2006, the  Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General reported  that TSA had not determined the precise number of FSD administrative  positions it needed and was using TSOs to perform administrative work.
In response to FSDs’ input and the various mechanisms TSA has  implemented to monitor the sufficiency of the model’s allocation outputs,  TSA made changes to some assumptions in the model for fiscal year 2007.  Our preliminary observations indicate that these revisions should help  address the concerns identified by FSDs. For example, TSA recognized  that some airports cannot likely achieve a 20 percent part-time full-time  equivalent level and others (most likely smaller airports) may operate  more effectively with other levels of part-time TSO staff. As a result, for  fiscal year 2007, TSA modified this assumption to include a variable part- time goal based on each airport’s historic part-time to full-time TSO ratio.  TSA also included an allowance in the fiscal 2007 Staffing Allocation  Model for training to provide additional assurance that TSOs complete the  required training on detecting improvised explosive devices—which TSA  has identified as the most significant threat to commercial aviation.  Additionally, TSA included an allowance for operational support duties in  the 2007 Staffing Allocation Model to account for the current need for  TSOs to perform these duties.
Factors outside of the staffing model’s determination of overall TSO  staffing levels also affect FSDs’ ability to effectively deploy their TSO  workforce. Specifically, FSDs we interviewed as part of our ongoing  review of TSA’s staffing model cited difficulties in recruiting and retaining  sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full allocations  as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints appropriately given that  some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism and injuries; and managing  around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports, such as lack of  room for additional lanes or baggage check areas despite demand levels  that would justify such added capacity. TSA has made progress in  addressing these challenges through a variety of human capital initiatives.
For example, to allow FSDs to more efficiently address staffing needs,  TSA has shifted responsibility for hiring TSOs from TSA headquarters to  FSDs at individual airports and, according to TSA officials, provided  contractor support to assist in this effort. TSA data show that since local  hiring began in March 2006, TSA has increased the number of new hire  TSOs from approximately 180 per pay period in February 2006 to nearly  450 each pay period under the local hiring initiative.
In addition to having an adequate number of TSOs, effective screening  involves TSOs being properly trained to do their job. Since we first  reported on TSO training in September 2003, TSA has taken a number of  actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO workforce  beyond the basic training requirement. For example, TSA has expanded  training available to the TSO workforce, such as introducing an Online  Learning Center that makes self-guided courses available over TSA’s  intranet and the Internet, and enhanced training on explosives detection.  This training included both classroom and hands-on experience, and  focused particularly on identifying X-ray images of improvised explosives  device component parts, not just a completely assembled bomb.  According to TSA, as of February 6, 2007, about 98 percent of the   48,236 TSOs on board had received classroom, checkpoint, or computer- based improvised explosive device recognition training. TSA has also  developed new training curriculums to support new screening approaches.  For example, TSA recently developed a training curriculum for TSOs in  behavior observation and analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers  exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception. The  President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request includes $89.7 million to fully  implement TSO training programs and related TSO workforce  development programs.
TSA has also made progress in addressing challenges that made it difficult  for TSOs to access training. We reported in May 2005 that insufficient TSO  staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access  the Online Learning Center made it difficult for all TSOs at many airports  to receive required training, and had limited TSO access to TSA training  tools. We stated that without addressing the challenges to delivering  ongoing training, including installing high-speed connectivity at airport  training facilities, TSA may have difficulty maintaining a screening  workforce that possesses the critical skills needed to perform at a desired  level. As previously discussed, our preliminary observations from our  ongoing review of TSA’s staffing model indicate that TSA has taken steps  to address the TSO staffing challenges, including providing an allowance  for TSO training in the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2007.  However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA’s efforts will address  TSA’s ability to provide required training while maintaining adequate  coverage for screening operations. TSA established its Online Learning  Center to provide passenger and baggage TSOs with online, high-speed  access to training courses. However, effective use of the Online Learning  Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access, which TSA has not  been able to provide to all airports. We reported that as of October 2004,  about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have high-speed  Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center. Given the  importance of the Online Learning Center in both delivering training and  serving as the means by which the completion of TSO training is  documented, we recommended that TSA develop a plan that prioritizes  and schedules the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity  to all TSA’s airport training facilities to help facilitate the delivery of TSO  training and the documentation of training completion. Since that time,  TSA has made progress in deploying high-speed connectivity to airports.  According to the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, 95 percent of  the nation’s airports now have high-speed connectivity. According to the  budget request, TSA expects to meet the goal of all airports having high- speed connectivity during fiscal year 2007.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Monitoring of the Procedures
paragraphs: In addition to TSA’s efforts to train and deploy a federal TSO workforce,  steps have also been taken to strengthen passenger and checked baggage  screening procedures to enhance detection capabilities. However, TSA  could improve its evaluation and oversight of these procedures. With  regard to passenger checkpoint screening procedures, between April and  December 2005, proposed modifications were made in various ways and  for a variety of reasons, and a majority of the proposed modifications—  48 of 92—were ultimately implemented at airports. As part of our ongoing  review of TSA’s process for determining whether and how screening  procedures should be modified, we found that TSA officials proposed  standard operating procedure (SOP) modifications based on risk  information (threat and vulnerability information), daily experiences of  staff working at airports, and complaints and concerns raised by the  traveling public. In addition to these factors, our preliminary  observations indicate that consistent with its mission, TSA senior  leadership made efforts to balance the impact that proposed SOP  modifications would have on security, efficiency, and customer service  when deciding whether proposed SOP modifications should be  implemented. For example, in August 2006, TSA sought to increase  security by banning liquids and gels from being carried onboard aircraft in  response to the alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard  multiple aircraft en route from the United Kingdom to the United States. In  September 2006, after obtaining more information about the alleged  terrorist plot—to include information from the United Kingdom and U.S.  intelligence communities, discussions with explosives experts, and testing  of explosives—TSA officials decided to lift the total ban on liquids and  gels to allow passengers to carry small amounts of liquids and gels  onboard aircraft. TSA officials also lifted the total ban because banning  liquids and gels as carry-on items was shown to affect both efficiency and  customer service. Specifically, following the implementation of the total  ban in August 2006, the number of bags checked per passenger increased  by approximately 27 percent—thus placing a strain on the efficiency of the  checked-baggage screening system. In addition, TSA recognized that  passengers have legitimate needs that may require them to carry some  liquids and gels onboard aircraft. Moreover, in an effort to harmonize its  liquid screening procedures with other countries, in November 2006, TSA  revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and  aerosols onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100 milliliters—the  amount permitted by the 27 countries in the European Union, as well as  Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. According to TSA, this means  that approximately half of the world’s travelers will be governed by similar  measures with regard to this area of security.
In some cases, TSA first tested proposed modifications to screening  procedures at selected airports to help determine whether the changes  would achieve their intended purpose, such as to enhance detection of  prohibited items or free up TSO resources to perform screening activities  focused on threats considered to pose a high risk, such as explosives.  TSA’s efforts to collect quantitative data through testing proposed  procedures prior to deciding whether to implement or reject them is  consistent with our past work that has shown the importance of data  collection and analyses to support agency decision making. However, as  part of our ongoing work, we identified that TSA’s data collection and  analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed  procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended  purpose. Specifically, we found that for the tests of proposed screening  procedures TSA conducted during the period April 2005 through  December 2005, including the removal of small scissors and small tools  from the prohibited items list, although TSA collected some data on the  efficiency of and customer response to the procedures at selected airports,  the agency generally did not collect the type of data or conduct the  necessary analysis that would yield information on whether proposed  procedures would achieve their intended purpose. We will report on the  results of our analysis of TSA’s efforts to test proposed modifications to  screening procedures later this year.
Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that  TSA have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with  established procedures. As part of our ongoing review of TSA’s process for  revising passenger screening procedures, we identified that TSA monitors  TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs through its  performance accountability and standards system and through local and  national covert testing. According to TSA officials, the performance  accountability and standards system was developed in response to a 2003  report by us that recommended that TSA establish a performance  management system that makes meaningful distinctions in employee  performance, and in response to input from TSA airport staff on how to  improve passenger and checked baggage screening measures. This system  will be used by TSA to assess agency personnel at all levels on various  competencies, including, among other things, technical proficiency. The  technical proficiency component of the performance accountability and  standards system will be used to measure TSO compliance with passenger  checkpoint screening procedures. In addition to implementing the  performance accountability and standards system, TSA conducts local and  national covert tests to evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs’  noncompliance with the SOPs affects their ability to detect simulated  threat items hidden in accessible property or concealed on a person. Our  preliminary observations indicate that TSA airport officials have  experienced resource challenges in implementing these compliance  monitoring methods. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are taking  steps to address these challenges. For example, officials said that they  have automated many of the data entry functions of the performance  accountability and standards system to relieve the field of the burden of  manually entering this information into the online system.
TSA has also taken steps to strengthen checked baggage screening  through reducing the need to use alternative screening procedures. In  addition to screening with standard procedures using EDS and ETD,  which TSA had determined to provide the most effective detection of  explosives, TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used  when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose security vulnerabilities  or when TSA officials determine that there is a security risk associated  with large concentrations of passengers in an area. These alternative  screening procedures include the use of EDS and ETD machines in  nonstandard ways, and also include three procedures that do not use  EDS or ETD—screening with explosives detection canines, physical bag  searches, and matching baggage to passenger manifests to confirm that  the passenger and his or her baggage are on the same plane. TSA’s use of  alternative screening procedures has involved trade-offs in security  effectiveness. However, the extent of the security trade-offs is not fully  known because TSA has not tested the effectiveness of alternative  screening procedures in an operational environment. In our July 2006  report on TSA’s use of alternative screening procedures, we recommended  that TSA conduct local testing of alternative screening procedures to  determine whether checked baggage TSOs can detect simulated  improvised explosives when using these procedures. Since then, TSA has  conducted covert testing of alternative screening procedures at some  airports.
TSA is pursuing several mitigating actions to reduce the need to use  alternative screening procedures. These actions include deploying more  efficient checked baggage screening systems, strengthening its  coordination with groups such as tour operators to better plan for  increases in baggage screening needs, deploying “optimization teams” to  airports that were frequently using alternative screening procedures to  determine why the procedures were being used so often and to suggest  remedies, and deploying additional EDS machines. However, although  TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening  procedures at airports, TSA’s oversight of FSDs’ use of alternative  screening procedures could be strengthened. For example, in July 2006,  we reported that FSDs and their staff did not always accurately report the  occurrences when a particular alternative baggage screening procedure  was used, impeding TSA’s ability to reliably determine how often and for  how long the alternative screening procedures were used. In addition,  FSDs and their staff did not always report the use of alternative screening  procedures as required. TSA officials stated that they were working with  FSDs to correct these reporting problems and had issued guidance  clarifying requirements for reporting alternative screening procedures.
Additionally, while TSA is working to minimize the need to use alternative  screening procedures at airports, TSA has not created performance  measures or targets related to the use of these procedures. By creating a  performance measure for the use of alternative screening procedures as  part of the checked baggage screening index or as a stand-alone measure,  TSA could gauge whether it is making progress towards minimizing the  need to use these procedures at airports and have more complete  information on how well the overall checked baggage screening system is  performing. Furthermore, performance targets for the use of alternative  screening procedures would provide an indicator of how much risk TSA is  willing to accept in using these procedures, and TSA’s monitoring of this  indicator would identify when it has exceeded the level of risk that it has  determined acceptable. We recommended that TSA develop performance  measures and performance targets for the use of alternative screening  procedures. Additionally, in September 2006, Congress directed TSA to  take a variety of actions—most of which we recommended in our July  2006 report—to monitor and assess the use of alternative screening  procedures, including (1) develop performance measures and  performance targets for the use of alternative screening procedures;   (2) track the use of alternative screening procedures at airports; (3) assess  the effectiveness of these measures; (4) conduct covert testing at airports  that use alternative screening procedures; (5) develop a plan to stop  alternative screening procedures at airports as soon as practicable; and   (6) report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the  Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the  House Committee on Homeland Security by January 23, 2007, on  implementation of these requirements. According to TSA officials, the  agency is continuing to monitor and track the use of alternative screening  procedures, which has allowed it to identify areas for improvement  nationwide and address local issues to minimize the need for alternative  screening procedures.
section_title: TSA is Exploring New Technologies to Enhance Detection of Explosives and Other Threats, but Faces Management and Funding Challenges in Fielding Technologies to Airports
paragraphs: TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to  strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and  funding challenges. For example, TSA and DHS’s S&T are exploring new  passenger checkpoint screening technologies to enhance the detection of  explosives and other threats. However, limited progress has been made in  fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening  checkpoints, in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in  coordinating research and development efforts. In addition, TSA has  begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked  baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available to  fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-scale basis.
subsections: section_title: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies
paragraphs: To enhance passenger checkpoint screening, TSA is currently working  with DHS S&T’s Transportation Security Laboratory to develop new  passenger checkpoint screening technologies. TSA designated about  $80.5 million in fiscal year 2007 to acquire and deploy emerging screening  technologies, and has requested $81.6 million for similar purposes in fiscal  year 2008. Our preliminary work has found that of the various research  and development projects funded by TSA and DHS S&T, six checkpoint  screening projects are currently in the applied research or advanced  development phases. Projects in the applied research phase include  liquid bottle screening devices, explosives trace portals that will reduce  the size of the current explosives trace portals at checkpoints, and shoe  scanners. Three other projects in the advanced development phase include  whole body imagers, cast and prosthesis scanners, and checkpoint  explosives detection systems. TSA plans to place whole body imagers and  checkpoint explosives detection systems at certain airport locations to  collect initial operational data, and plans to continue to conduct similar  tests of the cast and prosthesis scanners during fiscal year 2007. Table 2  provides a description and status of the passenger checkpoint screening  technologies TSA and DHS S&T are currently researching and developing.
Despite TSA’s efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening  technologies, preliminary results from our ongoing work suggests that  limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection  technology at checkpoints. For example, TSA’s fiscal year 2007 budget  justification requested $80.5 million in budget authority to acquire and  deploy screening technologies emerging from research and development  programs, including the acquisition of 92 additional explosives trace portal  machines and funds to operate and service approximately 434 portals. TSA  had anticipated that the portals would be in operation throughout the  country during fiscal year 2007. However, due to performance and  maintenance issues, TSA halted the acquisition and deployment of the  portals in June 2006, and the acquisition of additional portals is contingent  on resolution of these issues. As a result, TSA has fielded less than   25 percent of the 434 portals it projected it would deploy by fiscal year  2007. In addition to the portals, TSA has fallen behind in its projected  acquisition of other emerging screening technologies. For example, the  acquisition of 91 Whole Body Imagers has been delayed in part because  TSA needed to develop a means to protect the privacy of passengers  screened by this technology.  For fiscal year 2008, TSA has requested an  additional $81.6 million to evaluate, acquire, and install emerging  technologies.  We will continue to assess DHS S&T and TSA’s deployment  of checkpoint screening technologies during our on-going review.
While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research,  development, and deployment of checkpoint technologies, our ongoing  work has identified that challenges remain. For example, TSA and DHS  S&T officials stated that they encountered difficulties in coordinating  research and development efforts due to reorganizations of TSA and S&T.  A senior TSA official also stated that while TSA and the DHS S&T have  executed a memorandum of understanding to establish the services that  the Transportation Security Laboratory is to provide to TSA, coordination  with S&T remains a challenge because the organizations have not fully  implemented the terms of the memorandum of understanding. In addition  to challenges in coordinating with each other, our preliminary  observations suggest that TSA and DHS S&T also face challenges in  coordinating with external stakeholders. Specifically, while TSA and DHS  S&T have taken steps to coordinate efforts with external stakeholders,  some airport managers we interviewed in October 2006 stated that TSA  did not adequately communicate with them about when new technologies  were to be deployed in their airports. TSA officials stated that they do not  have a master schedule that establishes milestones for conducting  operational tests and evaluations of emerging technologies or for  deploying these technologies. Lack of such a schedule could limit TSA’s  ability to coordinate operational tests and deployments with stakeholders.
Additionally, TSA does not yet have a strategic plan to guide its efforts to  acquire and deploy screening technologies. As part of our ongoing work,  we will assess further TSA’s efforts to develop an overall strategic  approach to guide the deployment of checkpoint technologies. A lack of a  strategic plan or approach could limit TSA’s ability to deploy emerging  technologies at those airport locations deemed at highest risk. TSA  officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing a strategic  plan for the checkpoint that is scheduled to be completed in early 2007.  TSA officials stated that the completion of the plan was delayed due to  competing priorities, including ensuring the screening of checked baggage  using explosives detection systems and responding to new and emerging  threats, such as homemade explosives. TSA officials also said that  reorganizations at TSA and DHS S&T have contributed to the delay.
It is important that TSA continue to invest in and develop technologies for  detecting explosives, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006 terrorist  plot to detonate liquid explosives on board multiple commercial aircraft  bound for the United States from the United Kingdom. The President’s  fiscal year 2007 budget request notes that emerging checkpoint technology  will enhance the detection of prohibited items, especially firearms and  explosives, on passengers. We are currently evaluating DHS’s and TSA’s  progress in planning for, managing, and deploying research and  development programs in support of airport checkpoint screening  operations and will report on the results of our work later this year.
section_title: Checked Baggage Screening Technologies
paragraphs: At checked baggage screening stations, TSA has been effective in  deploying EDS machines and ETD machines. However, initial deployment  of EDS machines in a stand-alone mode—usually in airport lobbies—and  ETD machines resulted in operational inefficiencies and security risks as  compared with using EDS machines integrated in-line with airport baggage  conveyor systems. As we reported in March 2005, to initially deploy EDS  and ETD equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for  explosives, TSA implemented interim airport lobby solutions rather than  in-line EDS baggage screening systems. TSA officials stated that they  used EDS machines in stand-alone mode and ETD machines as an interim  solution in order to meet the congressional deadline for screening all  checked baggage for explosives. Officials stated that they employed these  interim solutions because of the significant costs required to install in-line  systems and the need to reconfigure many airports’ baggage conveyor  systems to accommodate the equipment. TSA’s use of stand-alone EDS  and ETD machines has required a greater number of TSOs and resulted in  screening fewer bags for explosives each hour. Additionally, because in- line EDS checked baggage screening systems can significantly reduce the  need for TSOs to handle baggage, installing them may also reduce the  number of TSO on-the-job injuries. Moreover, screening with in-line EDS  systems could also result in security benefits by reducing congestion in  airport lobbies and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening  procedures.
In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA had agreed to  help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that  screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government  about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that a  savings of approximately $4.7 billion could be realized over a period of   20 years by installing optimal checked baggage screening systems,  including in-line EDS machines, at the airports with the highest checked  baggage volumes. However, TSA also reported in February 2006 that many  of the initial in-line EDS systems had not achieved the degree of  anticipated savings initially estimated. TSA has since determined that  recent improvements to the design of the in-line EDS systems and EDS  screening technology now offer the opportunity for higher-performance  and lower-cost screening systems. In June 2006, TSA issued guidance to  airports to provide options, ideas, and suggestions for airports to choose  from when considering security requirements in the planning and design  of new or renovated airport facilities. This guidance also provides  recommendations for airports in constructing in-line systems.
TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of  checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made  available to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-scale  basis. In March 2005, we reported that while TSA had made progress in  deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic,  prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to  achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. We  recommended that TSA systematically evaluate baggage screening needs  at airports. In February 2006, TSA released its strategic planning  framework for checked baggage screening aimed at increasing security  through deploying more EDS machines, lowering program life-cycle costs,  minimizing impacts to TSA and airport and airline operations, and  providing a flexible security infrastructure. According to TSA, the  framework will be used to establish a comprehensive strategic plan for  TSA’s checked baggage screening program. As part of this planning effort,  TSA identified, among other things, the top 25 airports that should first  receive federal funding for projects related to the installation of in-line  EDS systems, and the optimal checked baggage screening solutions for the  250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes. DHS’s budget  execution reports for TSA for fiscal year 2007 show that TSA received  $524.4 million for the purchase, installation, maintenance, and operations  integration of EDS and ETD machines. The President’s fiscal year 2008  budget request includes $692 million for these activities—an increase of  $167.6 million over the previous year's appropriations. Most (about   72 percent) of this increase is for installation of EDS and ETD machines.
In February 2006, TSA officials reported that if some of the top 25 airports  do not receive in-line checked baggage screening systems, they will  require additional screening equipment to be placed in airport lobbies and  additional TSO staffing in order to remain in compliance with the mandate  for screening all checked baggage using explosive detection systems.  Additionally, in May 2006, TSA reported that under current investment  levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems  would not be completed until approximately 2024. According to TSA, as of  September 30, 2006, 36 airports had operational in-line systems—  18 airports had airport-wide systems, while the remaining 18 airports had  systems at a particular terminal or terminals. Over the next 2 years, TSA  expects full and partial in-line systems to become operational at   25 additional airports. This level of effort, according to TSA, balances  resources with other risks to transportation security.
In March 2005, we reported that TSA and airport operators were relying on  several sources of funding to construct in-line checked baggage screening  systems. One source of funding airport operators initially used was the  Federal Aviation Administration’s Airport Improvement Program, which  traditionally funds grants to maintain safe and efficient airports. With  Airport Improvement Program funds no longer available after fiscal year  2003 for this purpose, airports turned to other sources of federal funding  to construct in-line systems. The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated  Appropriations Resolution approved the use of letter of intent agreements  as a vehicle to leverage federal government and industry funding to  support facility modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage  screening systems. TSA also uses other transaction agreements as an  administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments,  airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification projects. Under  these agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator provides a  portion of the funding required for the modification. To fund the  procurement and installation of explosive detection systems in-line, TSA  uses annual appropriations and the $250 million mandatory appropriation  of the Aviation Security Capital Fund. For example, in fiscal years 2005,  2006, and 2007, TSA received appropriations of $175 million, $180 million,  and $141.4 million, respectively, for the procurement of explosive  detection systems. It received appropriations of $45 million in fiscal years  2005 and 2006, and $138 million in fiscal year 2007 for the installation of  explosive detection systems, in addition to the $250 million made available  through the capital fund. Congress also authorized an additional  appropriation of $400 million per year through fiscal year 2007 for airport  security improvement projects, including the installation of in-line EDS  systems. However, appropriations have not been made under this  authorization. Figure 5 shows TSA obligated funding levels for EDS  installation and integration.
TSA is collaborating with key stakeholders to identify funding and  financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening  systems. In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee  baggage screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a  member, released a study outlining an investment strategy for funding  TSA’s checked baggage screening program. According to TSA, this study,  which has been provided to the Office of Management and Budget for  review, is the final component of TSA’s strategic plan for checked baggage  screening. The investment study recommended four investment options,  including (1) tax credit bonds, (2) continued appropriations for the  procurement and installation of EDS machines, (3) combined line items  for the purchase and installation of EDS machines in order to provide TSA  increased flexibility in directing the funding where it is most needed, and  (4) enhanced eligibility for the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC). The  working group estimated that under its recommended approach, the  present value cost of the checked baggage screening program is   $23.3 billion over the next 20 years. Of these costs, the aviation industry is  projected to bear $3.6 billion and the federal government is projected to  bear $19.7 billion. According to the working group, the net effect of  investing in optimal systems would be to reduce overall life-cycle costs by  $1.2 billion relative to the current rate of investment, primarily through  TSO staff cost savings and avoidance of increased TSO staff costs in the  future. In addition, in its August 2006 study, the working group identified  that in order to achieve these cost savings, a formal cost management  process is needed given evolving technology and design practices, the  various parties involved in design and operation, and the amount of capital  investment to be made over the next several years. The working group  identified a variety of actions that should be taken by Congress, TSA, and  the aviation industry, including implementing a structured process for  ongoing government and industry collaboration and increasing program  management resources to provide for more substantial TSA involvement  throughout the planning, design, and construction process. (App. I  includes a complete list of the specific actions the working group  identified for Congress, TSA, and the aviation industry.)
section_title: Federal Action Is Needed to Strengthen Air Cargo Security
paragraphs: In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions  intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but, as we reported,  factors existed that may have limited their effectiveness. Since our report  was released, TSA has issued an air cargo security rule that revised some  of the requirements air carriers are required to follow to ensure air cargo  security, and has drafted new and revised security programs for domestic  and foreign passenger and all-cargo carriers that contain more specific  security requirements. However, more work remains to ensure that TSA  has a comprehensive strategy to secure air cargo that fully incorporates  risk management principles.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Risk Management Principles into Its Decision Making to Secure Domestic Air Cargo, but Most Efforts Are in the Early Stages
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps towards applying a risk-based management approach  to addressing domestic air cargo security, including conducting threat  assessments. However, opportunities exist to strengthen these efforts.  Applying a risk management framework to decision making is one tool to  help provide assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are  properly prioritized and focused. TSA has underscored the importance of  implementing a risk-based approach that protects against known threats,  but that is also sufficiently flexible to direct resources to mitigate new and  emerging threats. According to TSA, the ideal risk model would be one  that could be used throughout the transportation sector and applicable to  different threat scenarios. As part of TSA’s risk-based approach, TSA  issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that focused on  securing the domestic air cargo supply chain. TSA coordinated with air  cargo industry stakeholders representing passenger and all-cargo carriers  to develop this plan. TSA officials stated that they are revising their  existing domestic air cargo strategic plan, but as of February 5, 2007,  agency officials had not set a timeframe for when TSA will complete this  revision. TSA’s Air Cargo Strategic Plan describes, among other things, an  approach for screening or reviewing information on all domestic air cargo  shipments to determine their level of relative risk, ensuring that   100 percent of cargo identified as posing an elevated risk is physically  inspected, and pursuing technological solutions to physically inspect air  cargo.  TSA officials anticipate that the agency's system for targeting  domestic air cargo, referred to as Freight Assessment, will minimize the  reliance on the random physical inspections currently conducted by air  carriers.  According to agency plans, air carriers would receive targeting  information from TSA on specific cargo items identified as posing an  elevated risk. Upon notification by TSA's Freight Assessment System, air  carrier personnel would be responsible for conducting the inspection of  cargo identified as elevated risk. In October 2005, we reported that  although TSA had identified data elements that could be used in its Freight  Assessment System, the agency had not yet ensured that these data are  complete, accurate, and current. We recommended that TSA take steps to  do so; however, as of February 2007, TSA has not yet addressed this  recommendation. Further, while TSA planned to phase in implementation  and deployment of the targeting system for cargo transported on  passenger carriers during calendar years 2006 and 2007, as of February  2007, TSA’s system for targeting domestic cargo is still under development.
In addition to developing a strategic plan, a risk management framework  in the homeland security context should include risk assessments, which  typically involve three key elements—threats, vulnerabilities, and  criticality or consequence. Information from these three assessments  provides input for setting priorities, evaluating alternatives, allocating  resources, and monitoring security initiatives. In September 2005, TSA’s  Office of Intelligence (formerly known as the Transportation Security  Intelligence Service) completed an overall threat assessment for air cargo,  which identified general and specific threats to domestic air cargo.  However, we reported that TSA had not conducted a vulnerability  assessment to identify the range of security weaknesses that could be  exploited by terrorists. TSA plans to conduct this assessment of domestic  air cargo vulnerabilities—as we recommended—and expects it to be  completed in late 2007.
section_title: TSA Has Implemented Measures Intended to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, but More Work Remains
paragraphs: In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions  intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but that factors existed  that may limit the effectiveness of these actions. For example, we reported  that TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper database to  streamline the process by which shippers (individuals and businesses) are  made known to carriers with whom they conduct business. However, at  that time, the information in this database on the universe of shippers was  incomplete, because participation in this database was voluntary.
Moreover, we identified problems with the reliability of the information in  the database. TSA estimated that the agency’s centralized database  contained information on about 400,000 known shippers, or less than one- third of the total population of known shippers, which is estimated to be  about 1.5 million. In May 2006, TSA issued an air cargo security rule that  included a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of air  cargo. For example, TSA made participation in the Known Shipper  database mandatory, requiring air carriers and indirect air carriers to  submit information on their known shippers to TSA’s Known Shipper  database. However, the May 2006 security rule did not modify TSA’s  current process for validating known shippers, which remains the  responsibility of indirect air carriers and air carriers. Accordingly,  passenger, all cargo, and indirect air carriers will continue to be  responsible for determining the integrity of the shipper, which may allow  for potential conflicts of interest because air carriers who conduct  business with shippers will also continue to have the authority to validate  these same shipping customers.
In October 2005, we also reported that TSA had established requirements  for air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo, but had exempted some  cargo from inspection, potentially creating security weaknesses. We  recommended that TSA examine the rationale for existing air cargo  inspection exemptions, determine whether such exemptions leave the air  cargo system unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack, and make any  needed adjustments to the exemptions. TSA established a working group  to examine the rationale for existing air cargo inspection exemptions, and  in October 2006, issued a security directive and emergency amendment to  domestic and foreign passenger air carriers operating within and from the  United States that limited the inspection exemptions. According to TSA  officials, the agency is still considering revisions to the inspection  exemptions for cargo being transported into the United States.
In October 2005, we also reported that TSA conducted compliance  inspections of air carriers to ensure that they were complying with  existing air cargo security requirements. These compliance inspections  ranged from a comprehensive review of the implementation of all air cargo  security requirements by an air carrier or indirect air carrier to a review of  just one or several security requirements. However, TSA had not  developed measures to assess the adequacy of air carrier compliance with  air cargo security requirements, or assessed the results of its compliance  inspections to target higher-risk air carriers or indirect air carriers for  future reviews. More recently, TSA reported that the agency has increased  the number of inspectors dedicated to conducting air cargo inspections,  and has begun analyzing the results of the compliance inspections to help  focus their inspections on those entities that have the highest rates of  noncompliance. For fiscal year 2008, the President’s budget includes a  request of about $56 million for TSA’s air cargo security program, which  includes funding for, among other things, 300 air cargo security inspectors,  TSA-certified canines for air cargo related activities, and the development  and deployment of a Freight Assessment System to target elevated-risk  cargo.
In addition to taking steps to strengthen inspections of air cargo, TSA is  working to enhance air cargo screening technologies. Specifically, TSA,  together with DHS’s S&T, is currently developing and pilot testing a  number of technologies to assess their applicability to inspecting and  securing air cargo. These efforts include:     an air cargo explosives detection pilot program implemented at  three airports, testing the use of explosive detection systems,  explosive trace detectors, standard X-ray machines, canine teams,  technologies that can locate a stowaway through detection of a  heartbeat or increased carbon dioxide levels in cargo, and manual  inspections of air cargo;    an EDS pilot program, which is testing the use of computer-aided  tomography to measure the densities of objects in order to identify  potential explosives in air cargo;    an air cargo security seals pilot, which is exploring the viability of  potential security countermeasures, such as tamper-evident security  seals, for use with certain classifications of exempt cargo;  the use of hardened unit-loading devices, which are containers  made of blast-resistant materials that could withstand an explosion  onboard the aircraft; and  the use of pulsed fast neutron analysis, which allows for the  identification of the material signatures of contraband, explosives,  and other threat objects.
According to TSA officials, the agency will determine whether it will  require the use of any of these technologies once it has completed its  assessments and analyzed the results. However, TSA has not established a  timeframe for completing these assessments. According to TSA officials,  the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges  that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies  to inspect or secure air cargo. These challenges include factors such as the  nature, type, and size of the cargo; environmental and climatic conditions;  inspection throughput rates; staffing and training issues for individuals  who inspect air cargo; the location of air cargo facilities (centralized  versus decentralized); cost and availability; and employee health and  safety concerns. To effectively inspect domestic air cargo that TSA deems  to pose an elevated risk, the agency will need to make decisions regarding  which technologies will be used to inspect such cargo. According to TSA  officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently and effectively  inspecting all types of air cargo for the full range of potential terrorist  threats, including explosives and weapons of mass destruction.
We will soon report on the second phase of our review of air cargo  security, which focuses on DHS’s efforts to secure air cargo that is  transported into the United States from abroad, referred to as inbound air  cargo. This report will address (1) the actions TSA and CBP have taken to  secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all these efforts could be  strengthened; and (2) the practices the air cargo industry and select  foreign governments have adopted that could be used to enhance TSA’s  efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and the extent to which  TSA and CBP have worked with foreign governments to enhance their air  cargo security efforts.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the  security of the nation’s aviation system, and should be commended for  these efforts. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline  passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since  that time, TSA has turned its attention to strengthening passenger  prescreening, more efficiently allocating and deploying TSOs,  strengthening screening procedures, developing and deploying more  effective and efficient screening technologies, and improving domestic air  cargo security, among other efforts. TSA has made progress in all of these  areas, but opportunities exist to further strengthen their efforts, in  particular in the areas of risk-based decision making, program planning  and monitoring, and stakeholder collaboration. Our work has shown—in  homeland security and in other areas—that a comprehensive risk  management approach can help inform decision makers in the allocation  of finite resources to the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that  risk management has been a cornerstone of DHS and TSA policy, and that  TSA has implemented risk-based decision making into a number of its  efforts. Despite this commitment, however, TSA will continue to face  difficult decisions and trade-offs—particularly as threats to commercial  aviation evolve—regarding acceptable levels of risk and the need to  balance security with efficiency and customer service. We recognize that  doing so will not be easy. In implementing a risk-based approach, DHS and  TSA must also address the challenges we identified in our work related to  program planning, risk assessments, and implementation and monitoring  of aviation security programs. Without rigorous planning and  prioritization, and knowledge of the effectiveness of aviation security  programs, DHS and TSA cannot be sure that they are focusing their finite  resources on the areas of greatest need. Risk-based decision making will  be particularly important as TSA begins to place more focus on the  security of non-aviation modes of transportation, including passenger rail,  and resource decisions and related trade-offs will have to be made not  only within aviation, but across all transportation modes.
TSA must also continue its work to strengthen partnerships with other  federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and  international partners to improve the security of the commercial aviation  system. Securing all aspects of commercial aviation is shared a  responsibility among these parties. Accordingly, it is important that all  stakeholders be involved, as appropriate, in coordinating security-related  priorities and activities, and reviewing and sharing best practices and  developing common security frameworks. Such efforts are particularly  important with international partners due to our interdependence with  foreign nations in securing the aviation system—as evidenced by the  recent alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple  aircraft departing the United Kingdom for the United States. TSA has  strengthened its coordination efforts with domestic and international  partners, which has aided its security efforts and helped to avoid  duplication of effort. Existing risk-based decision making, program  planning and monitoring, and coordination efforts will need to continue  and be strengthened as TSA works to address continuing challenges and  threats facing commercial aviation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact Information
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.  Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, Mike Bollinger, Kristy Brown,  Carissa Bryant, Tony Cheesebrough, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett,  Samantha Goodman, John Hansen, Mike Harmond, Dawn Hoff,   Suzanne Heimbach, Adam Hoffman, Anne Laffoon, Thomas Lombardi,  Steve Morris, Katrina Moss, Mona Nichols-Blake, Leslie Sarapu, Brian  Sklar, Edith Sohna, Maria Strudwick, Meg Ullengren, and Candice Wright  made contributions to this testimony.
section_title: Appendix I: Key Actions for Congress, TSA, and the Aviation Industry, as Recommended by the Baggage Screening Investment Study Working Group
paragraphs: In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee baggage  screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a member,  released a study outlining an investment strategy for the funding of TSA’s  checked baggage screening program. The working group’s investment  study identified five key actions that should be taken by Congress, TSA,  and the aviation industry, respectively, with regard to funding these  systems. Table 3 provides a summary of the key actions identified by the  working group.
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Airline Passenger Prescreening
paragraphs: Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Intelligence:  Responses to Post Hearing Questions on Secure Flight. GAO-06-1051R.  Washington D.C.: August 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program.   GAO-06-864T. Washington D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not  Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight  Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps  to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22,  2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed.   GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial  Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: Feb.  23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:  March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,  D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004.
section_title: Airline Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening
paragraphs: Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening  Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: July  28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding  Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked  Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,  D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made  Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring  Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of  Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.:  July 13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement  Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.:  May 2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing  Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T.  Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: Sept.  24, 2003.
section_title: Air Cargo
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and  DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10,  2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002.
section_title: In-Flight Security
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better  Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in  Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May  26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28,  2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed.   GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges  of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.  GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial  Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
section_title: Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and General Aviation
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted  Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T.  Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but  Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of  Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.  Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.   GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to  Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.  Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the  Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial  Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a  Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development  Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004.
section_title: Other Aviation Security
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the  Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed  to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.: Jan.  24, 2007.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects  on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority  of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation  Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen  Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the  Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover  Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 25, 2003.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has  Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: Oct.  15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses  Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: Sept.  25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: Sept.  20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.
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