Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable
Published: 2004-07-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2000, the U.S. government has provided a total of $3.3 billion to Colombia, making it the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance. Part of this funding has gone toward nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, including programs to (1) promote legitimate economic alternatives to coca and opium poppy; (2) assist Colombia's vulnerable groups, particularly internally displaced persons; and (3) strengthen the country's democratic, legal, and security institutional capabilities. GAO examined these programs' objectives, reported accomplishments, and identified the factors, if any, that limit project implementation and sustainability. We also examined the challenges faced by Colombia and the United States in continuing to support these programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs have begun to produce some results, individual projects reach a relatively small number of beneficiaries, face implementation challenges, and may not be sustainable. For example, projects designed to promote legitimate economic alternatives to illicit crop cultivation have helped about 33,400 families. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated in 2000 and 2001 that as many as 136,600 families needed assistance, and these projects face implementation obstacles, such as difficulty marketing licit products and operating in conflictive areas. U.S. assistance to Colombia's vulnerable groups has provided support to many internally displaced persons, but these program beneficiaries do not receive all of the assistance they need, and there is no systematic way for beneficiaries to transition from emergency aid to longer-term development assistance. The U.S. government has made some progress toward facilitating democratic reform in Colombia, but projects face certain obstacles, such as limited funding and security constraints. Despite the progress made by the three nonmilitary assistance programs, Colombia and the United States continue to face long-standing management and financial challenges. The Colombian government's ability to contribute funds for nonmilitary assistance programs is limited by a number of domestic and foreign factors, and Colombia's longstanding conflict poses additional challenges to implementing and sustaining nonmilitary assistance efforts. The U.S. government has not maximized the mutual benefits of its nonmilitary assistance programs and has not established a mechanism for vulnerable groups to transition from emergency aid to longer-term assistance. Furthermore, the Departments of State and Justice and USAID have not established timelines for achieving their stated objectives, nor have State and USAID developed a strategy to turn programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the early 1970s, the United States has supported Colombia’s efforts to  reduce drug trafficking activities and stem the flow of illegal drugs,  principally cocaine and heroin, entering the United States. Recognizing the  severity of illicit drug activities and the links between drug trafficking,  illicit crop cultivation, and the violence affecting Colombia, the Colombian  government announced a $7.5 billion plan in October 1999, known as Plan  Colombia. This plan, among other things, proposed to reduce the  cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent  over 6 years. To assist Colombia’s efforts, the United States substantially  increased funding and material support to Colombia in 2000. During fiscal  years 2000 through 2004, the United States provided a total of $3.3 billion,  making Colombia the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance since fiscal  year 2002. For fiscal year 2005, the administration has requested a total of  $571 million for Colombia.
A key component of U.S. strategy has involved providing nonmilitary  assistance for programs to (1) promote legitimate economic alternatives to  the cultivation of coca and opium poppy; (2) assist Colombia’s vulnerable  groups, particularly internally displaced persons; and (3) strengthen the  country’s democratic, legal, and security institutional capabilities. This  assistance is provided through the Department of State (State), the  Department of Justice (Justice), and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID). As of December 31, 2003, State, Justice, and USAID  had programmed approximately $566 million for fiscal years 2000 through  2004 for nonmilitary assistance programs to Colombia. For fiscal year 2005,  the administration has requested an additional $150 million for these  programs.
In response to your request, we examined (1) the three U.S. nonmilitary  assistance programs’ objectives, reported accomplishments, and the  factors, if any, limiting project implementation and sustainability and (2)  the challenges faced by Colombia and the United States in continuing to  support these programs.
To address these objectives, we analyzed program and project information  from State, Justice, and USAID and their implementing partners both in  Washington, D.C., and in Colombia. We also met with representatives of  several independent organizations with specialized knowledge about the  nonmilitary programs in Colombia. We traveled to Colombia in January  2004. While there, we met with cognizant officials of the U.S. Embassy and  the government of Colombia. We reviewed how the data provided to us  were compiled and determined that they are sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. Finally, we met with local nongovernmental  organizations and project beneficiaries and observed projects in Bogotá  and Soacha (near Bogotá), Medellín, and Puerto Asís and Villa Garzón in  Putumayo. We performed our work from August 2003 through June 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See  app. I for a more complete discussion of our scope and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine and 40 percent of the  heroin entering the United States. To assist the Colombian government in  its efforts to implement Plan Colombia and reduce the cultivation and  trafficking of illegal drugs, the United States has pursued a strategy  emphasizing interdiction, aerial eradication and alternative development.  The strategy has resulted in a 33 percent reduction in the amount of coca  cultivated in Colombia over the last 2 years—from 169,800 hectares in  2001 to 113,850 hectares in 2003—and a 10 percent reduction in the amount  of opium poppy cultivated over the last year. However, according to Drug  Enforcement Administration officials and documents, cocaine prices  nationwide have remained relatively stable—indicating that cocaine is still  readily available—and Colombia dominates the market for heroin in the  northeastern United States.
Despite improvements in Colombia’s security situation in 2003—for  example, the murder rate declined 20 percent that year—insurgent and  paramilitary groups still control large parts of the countryside. According  to State Department officials, the insurgents exercise some degree of  control in up to 40 percent of Colombia’s territory east and south of the  Andes—which, as illustrated in figure 1, includes the primary coca-growing  regions of Colombia. These groups, which include the Revolutionary  Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation Army, and paramilitary  forces such as the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, are involved in  every facet of narcotics trafficking and are on the State Department’s list of  terrorist organizations. Recognizing that the insurgents and illicit drug  activities are inextricably linked, the Congress provided “expanded  authority” in 2002 for the use of U.S. assistance to Colombia. This authority  enables the government of Colombia to use U.S.-provided equipment to  fight groups designated as terrorist organizations as well as to fight drug  trafficking.
Beginning in fiscal year 2000, the United States substantially increased  counternarcotics assistance to Colombia. For fiscal years 2000 through  2004, the United States provided a total of approximately $3.3 billion,  making Colombia the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance since fiscal  year 2002. (See table 1.) Most of this funding was provided through the  Andean Counterdrug Initiative, an appropriation provided annually that  supports counternarcotics programs throughout the Andean region. Much  of this assistance was provided to the Colombian Army to conduct  interdiction missions and to the Colombian National Police to conduct the  aerial eradication of coca and poppy. For fiscal year 2005, the  administration has proposed an additional $571 million for assistance to  Colombia.
U.S.-provided nonmilitary assistance to Colombia indirectly assists in  reducing narcotics cultivation and trafficking by providing alternatives to  cultivating illicit crops, assisting vulnerable groups, and supporting  democracy and rule of law reforms. As shown in table 2, for fiscal years  2000 through 2004, the United States has programmed about $566 million  for nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, which represents about 17 percent  of the total U.S. assistance to Colombia during the period. State, Justice,  and USAID have obligated about $575 million and expended about  $310 million of these funds. Most of the funding—about $210 million—has  been programmed for democracy, rule of law, and enhancement of state  presence programs. The administration has requested an additional  $150 million for nonmilitary programs in fiscal year 2005.
Our past reports have addressed each of these nonmilitary programs. In  February 2002, we reported that USAID faced serious obstacles to  developing alternatives to cultivating illicit crops in Colombia, among them  the Colombian government’s lack of control over many coca-growing  areas. In August 2001, we reported that international organizations  generally met the emergency food and shelter needs of internally displaced  persons in Colombia, but were less effective in meeting their longer-term  needs, and that the U.S. government lacked an overall policy to coordinate  its efforts for dealing with the displaced. In March 2003, we reported that  U.S. democracy programs in six countries, including Colombia, had a  limited effect as a result of various factors, and questions remained  regarding the sustainability of the gains made with U.S. assistance.
section_title: Nonmilitary Assistance Programs Have Begun to Show Intended Results, but Progress May Not Be Sustainable
paragraphs: A key component of U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia has  involved providing nonmilitary assistance for programs to promote  legitimate economic alternatives to the cultivation of coca and opium  poppy; assist Colombia’s vulnerable groups, particularly internally  displaced persons; and strengthen the country’s democratic, legal, and  security institutional capabilities. Each of the three U.S. nonmilitary  assistance programs has begun to produce results envisioned in 2000 when  U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was approved. However, each program has  limitations.
Alternative development projects often benefit only a few people or  families; have difficulty marketing products; and, without additional  sources of funding, likely cannot be sustained.
The assistance for vulnerable groups program cannot address all the  needs identified because of limited resources, and the number of  individuals displaced and needing assistance is increasing.
U.S. assistance for democracy and rule of law is a long-standing  program, but progress has been limited because the government does  not control large parts of the country, and many projects are small scale  and have insufficient numbers of trained personnel and equipment.
subsections: section_title: Alternative Development Has Made Progress, but Projects Are Limited in Scope
paragraphs: USAID oversees and implements the alternative development program.  According to the agency’s strategy, the objective of the alternative  development program is to provide economic and social alternatives to  illicit crop production through short- and long-term projects involving crop  substitution, infrastructure development, and income generation projects  in rural parts of the country, as well as in secondary cities affected by illicit  crop cultivation. The alternative development program has had some  success promoting economic and social alternatives to illicit crop  production, but individual projects are relatively localized and small in  scale.
USAID’s original alternative development strategy from 2000 focused  primarily on encouraging farmers to manually eradicate illicit crops, and  those who did received assistance in licit, short-term, income-producing  opportunities. This assistance was intended to complement the eradication  and interdiction components of Colombia’s effort to eliminate coca  cultivation in southern Colombia. USAID primarily supported initiatives in  the departments of Caquetá and Putumayo, where, at the time, much of  Colombia’s coca was cultivated. USAID (and its implementing partners)  found it difficult to implement projects in the largely undeveloped south,  where the Colombian government exercised minimal control. In addition,  poor soil made growing licit crops a challenge, and farmers found it more  lucrative to continue growing coca. Furthermore, the USAID/Colombia  mission estimated that implementing such a comprehensive alternative  development program could involve assisting as many as 136,600 families  and cost up to $4 billion over 3 years.
As a result, USAID revised its approach in February 2002 to support long- term income-generating activities, focus more attention and resources  outside southern Colombia, and encourage private sector participation.  The agency’s revised strategy is to promote and leverage significant private  sector investment in longer-term, economically viable agro-business and  forestry initiatives, as well as linkages to small- and medium-sized  enterprises. Unlike the initial alternative development efforts, the program  is no longer based on an explicit mandate to assist illicit crop growers  whose crops had been eradicated or who agreed to manually eradicate  their illegal crops. Some current program participants were not directly  involved in cultivating coca or poppy.
USAID has alternative development projects in 25 of Colombia’s 32  departments. To assess its progress, USAID uses four measures: the  number of hectares of illicit crops eradicated, the number of hectares of  licit crops cultivated, the number of families benefited, and the number of  small infrastructure projects established. Table 3 illustrates USAID’s  reported accomplishments.
Based on these four measures, the alternative development program has  started to produce results. However, USAID officials acknowledge that  these indicators do not measure the agency’s progress in reaching its  primary objective of promoting economic and social alternatives to illicit  crop production. Individual alternative development projects may employ  only a small number of people for a short period of time or benefit a  relatively small number of families. Without broader participation and  financial support, such projects may not be sustainable if U.S. support is  reduced. Furthermore, as we reported in 2002, the lack of security in the  project areas continues to seriously hamper the Colombian government’s  ability to develop infrastructure where illicit crop cultivation takes place,  establish viable and reliable markets for licit products, and attract the  private investment needed for long-term, income-generating  development. For example:  In 2002, a contractor received about $1.4 million from USAID to build a  water treatment plant in Villa Garzón in the department of Putumayo.  The plant is designed to provide clean water for the town and to create  employment opportunities for local residents. Construction began in  December 2002, and when we visited the site in January 2004, it was  nearing completion. Although the project provided jobs for some local  residents, these jobs will end shortly.
Another contractor received funding for a hearts of palm canning plant  in Puerto Asís, Putumayo, which is intended to provide long-term  employment opportunities for the workers and income to farmers who  grow palm fronds. The United Nations Drug Control Program built the  plant with the government of Colombia in the late 1990s, but it was  dormant for several years. USAID took over the plant in 2002. When we  visited the site in January 2004, it was operating at 30 percent capacity.  Although the plant had secured a buyer for its product, USAID support  will end in September 2004, and the plant manager told us he did not  know if the plant could maintain or increase its operating capacity when  U.S. funding stops.
The same contractor overseeing the hearts of palm plant also receives  USAID funding to operate a woodworking center in Puerto Asís, where  program participants make furniture parts. According to the project’s  annual work plan, the woodworking center will directly employ 25  people. The contractor plans to sell the furniture parts for assembly  elsewhere, targeting the North American market. However, when we  toured the center, we learned that the contractor has not been able to  market the wood products outside Putumayo because when the  products are shipped to less humid regions, the wood cracks.
An alternative development project outside Putumayo is designed to  encourage families to cultivate specialty coffee rather than coca or  opium poppy. To participate, farmers must commit to eradicate or not  enter into illicit crop cultivation. However, the contractor has been able  to market only a very limited amount of the product because before a  specialty coffee can be marketed, measures must be taken to ensure  that the coffee meets industry standards—a process that can take 1 to 5  years due, in part, to the need to renovate coffee farms and implement  more stringent quality control procedures. Moreover, according to the  contractor, before February 2004, security concerns prevented U.S.  buyers from traveling to Colombia’s coffee-growing regions to evaluate  the product.
As we reported in February 2002, alternative development progress in  Bolivia and Peru took 20 years of sustained U.S. assistance, and the host  government agencies involved in the efforts continued to be heavily  dependent on U.S. support. The situation in Colombia is similar. As noted  earlier, the USAID/Colombia mission once estimated that a comprehensive  alternative development program could involve assisting as many as  136,600 families and cost up to $4 billion over 3 years. The agency has  requested about $56 million for the program in fiscal year 2005, and for  fiscal years 2006 through 2008, USAID planning documents call for a total  of $234 million. In addition, according to USAID officials, recent funding  and personnel cuts have hurt the Colombian alternative development  agency’s ability to support the USAID program.
section_title: Vulnerable Groups Program Has Aided Numerous Disadvantaged Persons, but Assistance Is Limited
paragraphs: State and USAID implement programs to assist Colombia’s vulnerable  groups—particularly its displaced population. Internally displaced  persons—those forced to flee their homes because of armed conflict and  persecution but who remain within their own country—are among the  most at-risk, vulnerable populations in the world. They are unlikely to  have adequate shelter, health care, and the ability to earn a livelihood. By  many estimates, Colombia has one of the world’s largest internally  displaced populations. The U.S. vulnerable groups program has provided  assistance to many internally displaced persons and others, but program  beneficiaries may not receive all of the services they need, and State and  USAID do not track individuals after they receive assistance.
subsections: section_title: State’s Emergency Assistance
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2003, State provided about $19 million to seven  organizations for assisting Colombia’s internally displaced persons— generally for a 3-month period immediately following initial displacement.  This emergency assistance included protection, shelter, medical assistance,  and food and assistance targeted specifically to help displaced children.  State also provided some emergency humanitarian assistance to  Colombian refugees living in neighboring countries, primarily Ecuador.  However, State does not have any written strategy outlining the objectives  and performance goals of its vulnerable groups program. Furthermore,  State does not routinely track the number of people its program supports.  After several requests by us, State officials said the program assisted  763,000 internally displaced persons in 2003. State officials did not provide  comparable figures for fiscal years 2000 through 2002.
State does not have a mechanism to “hand off” its program beneficiaries to  USAID’s longer-term assistance program after they have received the  emergency aid. Although USAID’s annual report for fiscal year 2003 states  that USAID helped internally displaced persons gain access to basic  services after short-term emergency relief provided by State had expired,  this has not happened in any systematic way.
USAID’s Longer-Term Assistance During fiscal year 2003, USAID provided about $38.2 million to seven  nongovernmental and international organizations for mid- to long-term  development assistance to Colombia’s vulnerable groups. The agency  reported that as of December 2003, its program had helped more than   1.4 million individuals. Following are examples of USAID’s projects that  assist vulnerable persons.
One grantee received $5.1 million from USAID to alleviate child hunger  and improve the health and well-being of displaced families. The  project’s two primary activities are a school feeding program and a  health education project for mothers. While these services address a  significant need, a relatively small number of beneficiaries will receive  them. Children and adolescents account for half (at least 1 million  persons) of Colombia’s displaced population. According to agency  documents, 113,000 displaced school children will benefit from this  program.
Another USAID project in Soacha (just outside Bogotá) is designed to  address the health and education needs of displaced Afro-Colombian  children and their families. An assistance center provides day care to  children in the community, trains youth in life- and job-related skills, and  provides information to mothers about childcare and nutrition.  Colombia has at least 279,000 Afro-Colombian internally displaced  persons; this project will provide services to 120 Afro-Colombian  children and their families, 100 adolescents and their families, 210  fathers, and 50 lactating mothers and their families.
Another USAID grantee received $16.7 million to, among other things,  provide microenterprise loans (averaging $1,000) and home  improvement loans (averaging $2,000) to internally displaced persons.  However, grantee officials stated that they have had minimal success  with both types of loans. Internally displaced persons often move to new  locations with little notice or lack the financial knowledge to manage a  loan. For these reasons, the grantee has decided to limit the number of  loans it awards.
USAID’s program to rehabilitate and reintegrate excombatant children into  Colombian society provides specialized, individualized care, including  medical attention and psychosocial counseling. Some receive formal  education; others receive vocational or agricultural training. When they  reach age 18 or are reunited with their families, the children are supported  through regional reference centers that provide continued assistance  through a network of social service providers. Types of assistance provided  include employment assistance, legal aid, and general services available  through Colombia’s social service system. USAID reports that it has  assisted 1,375 former child combatants, or roughly 13 to 23 percent of  Colombia’s total child soldier population. About 450 to 500 children  currently receive assistance through USAID’s rehabilitation and  reintegration program. The rehabilitation center we visited had 30 former  child soldiers enrolled. Program participants were taking traditional  classes and learning useful skills through more unconventional projects.  Some students were learning how to make household cleaning products  and were communicating with a local company about marketing the  products to the local community. However, the program may face difficulty  reintegrating its beneficiaries into society. Several students we met with  expressed concern about what will happen when they leave the center. One  student stated that he wanted to stay and become a teacher, rather than  leave.
Although USAID reports that it has provided at least some assistance to  more than half of Colombia’s estimated 2.5 million internally displaced  persons, this does not mean that the individuals received all or even most  of the services they needed. This is because most USAID grantees  specialize in one or two areas of assistance and operate in different  locations. Of the 27 departments in Colombia with vulnerable groups  projects, more than half had just one or two grantees providing assistance.  In addition, although USAID’s most recent annual report (January 2004)  identifies “durable solutions” for program beneficiaries as one of its  performance goals, USAID officials acknowledged that they have no way to  track program beneficiaries once they have received assistance through  one of the agency’s projects to determine whether they have been  assimilated back into society or still need additional assistance.
State and USAID programs to assist Colombia’s vulnerable groups are  achieving some of the intended results, but U.S. assistance cannot address  all the identified needs. One organization estimates that providing a basic  package of services to all of Colombia’s internally displaced persons would  cost approximately $1 billion. However, U.S. government expenditures for  assistance to vulnerable groups have declined each year since fiscal year  2001—from $36 million in fiscal year 2001 to $21 million in fiscal year 2004.
Nevertheless, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for  Refugees estimates that in Colombia, 900 to 1,000 individuals are newly  displaced everyday. In addition, USAID anticipates the demobilization of  30,000 insurgents and paramilitaries over a 5-year period. USAID estimates  that the complete demobilization of all illegal armed groups in Colombia  could cost between $254 million and $298 million.
section_title: Democracy and Rule of Law Programs Are Long- standing, but Progress Is Limited
paragraphs: USAID, State, and Justice provide support and oversight for the democracy  and rule of law programs. In the 1980s, the United States began to help  Colombia and other Latin American countries improve their judicial  systems as a way to counter political instability and support democratic  principles and institutions. According to planning documents from the  three agencies, the objectives are to promote a more responsive,  participatory, and accountable democracy; enhance state presence; and  strengthen Colombia’s justice sector. Democracy and rule of law programs  are intended to increase the Colombian government’s control over its  territory and thereby help prevent the cultivation of illicit crops in those  areas. In addition, a strengthened justice sector would help enforcement of  Colombian laws that make cultivation of coca and opium poppy illegal and  afford greater protections to vulnerable populations.
The United States has achieved some results in reaching its three main  objectives in the area of democracy and rule of law reform in Colombia, but  individual projects often produce limited results. USAID reports progress  in promoting a more responsive, participatory, and accountable democracy  in Colombia, but many of the projects are implemented on the scale of  demonstration projects. State indicates that it has made progress toward  enhancing state presence and public security through specially trained  police units, but these units have limited equipment and show mixed  results. Finally, Justice reports that it has made some progress in  strengthening Colombia’s justice sector, but budget cuts have impeded the  Colombian government’s ability to take over full program responsibility,  and Justice has lowered its initial targets in some cases.
subsections: section_title: USAID’s Program to Further Democracy
paragraphs: USAID’s primary objective is to promote a more responsive, participatory,  and accountable democracy in Colombia. Its Casa de Justicia (Justice  House) program is designed to increase Colombians’ access to legal  services, as well as to enhance the presence of the state throughout the  country. Justice houses are multi-agency centers of information,  orientation, reference, and conflict resolution. People in poor, marginalized  areas visit these centers to receive both formal and informal legal services.
To date, 37 justice houses have been built, and USAID plans to expand this  number to 40 by 2005. Since the start of the program, more than 2 million  cases have been handled in the justice houses. However, the USAID  contractor told us some justice houses cannot provide services to residents  on a daily basis because government of Colombia personnel do not always  show up for work.
Another project supported by USAID is a public defense pilot center. Until  recently, public defenders in Colombia worked on a part-time basis, were  paid a low fixed salary, and handled less than 10 percent of cases involving  poor defendants. In September 2003, USAID opened a public defense pilot  center in Bogotá specifically designated to handle cases requiring a public  defender. The center houses offices and a law library and makes it possible  to have a permanent public defense service. USAID pays half the salaries of  public defense lawyers, while Colombia has responsibility for the other  half. As a pilot project, the center’s benefits have been limited—the 15 full- time public defenders that the center employs are the only ones in the  country.
USAID’s Peace Initiatives Program consists primarily of support for the  peace negotiations and implementation of coexistence and resolution  activities. These activities include establishing self-determination projects  and coexistence centers. Both are designed to provide basic government  services at the municipal level.
The self-determination projects promote cooperation, coordination, and  confidence building between citizens and the state in municipalities.  These projects have two principal components: (1) training in peaceful  coexistence, local governability, and civic education; and (2) financial  and technical support for infrastructure. In Cauca, for example, the  citizens of one municipality formed a committee to determine the  community’s needs. They decided that they needed a road connecting  the various small towns in the area. Using USAID funds, the citizens are  planning to build the road themselves. USAID has implemented self- determination projects in three municipalities; its goal is to have 40  projects by 2005.
Coexistence centers, like justice houses, provide government services  to marginalized populations. They are located in municipalities  considered too small for justice houses. Coexistence centers provide  on-site administrative and legal assistance, educational opportunities  for children, youth, and adults, and a neutral space for community  meetings, dialogue, and events. Some of the services offered include  libraries, ludotecas (which are similar to preschools), and municipal  family services. Although USAID’s goal was to establish 6 coexistence  centers by September 30, 2003, 4 coexistence centers had been  established through the end of 2003. USAID intends to establish 14  centers by the end of 2005.
section_title: State’s Program to Enhance State Presence
paragraphs: State’s primary objective is to enhance state presence and public security.  Reestablishing a government of Colombia presence in all municipalities is  also one of President Uribe’s primary strategic objectives. When President  Uribe assumed office in August 2002, 158 municipalities in Colombia  lacked a police presence. As of February 2004, State reported that all  municipalities in Colombia had a police presence for the first time in  history. According to State’s 2003 Human Rights Report, as a result of the  Colombian government’s emphasis on improving security, murders were  reduced by 20 percent over the year, kidnappings by 39 percent, and forced  displacements of persons by 49 percent.
State has assisted the Colombian National Police in organizing, training,  and equipping more than 16,500 police officers. Once trained, special police  units were sent to targeted municipalities to establish a secure base and  begin the process of restoring public security. According to State,  afterwards, permanent police units of a minimum of 46 police were sent in;  the more conflictive municipalities received units of up to 180 police.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that these units may have improved  conditions in some areas. State officials say that judges and prosecutors  will now be able to visit some municipalities that were previously deemed  too dangerous and provide local justice services to citizens whose only  prior recourse was appealing to the local insurgency leader.
However, some of the police units cannot safely leave their posts, and they  face difficulty patrolling their areas of responsibility. For example,  Colombian National Police mobile police squadrons, which are tasked with  reinforcing security in rural conflict zones, have a limited ability to do so.
The United States is providing basic equipment to the squadrons, while  the government of Colombia is responsible for maintaining them. To date,  none of the mobile squadrons has been fully equipped.
section_title: Justice’s Program to Strengthen the Justice Sector
paragraphs: Justice’s primary objective is to strengthen Colombia’s justice sector. Its  Justice Sector Reform Program is intended to help Colombia develop and  sustain a modern, effective, and efficient criminal justice system. The  program consists of 12 interrelated project areas, including developing  human rights investigative units; combating organized financial crime;  supporting joint case investigations and prosecutions; and providing  witness and judicial officer protection. For example, Justice has supported  satellite human rights units to investigate and prosecute human rights  cases in Colombia. Investigations increased significantly in fiscal years  2002 and 2003; arrest warrants increased by 35 percent, accusations by 73  percent, and guilty pleas by more than 200 percent. However, Justice has  reduced its original target to establish 32 satellite units to as few as 15  units; as of January 2004, 11 had been created. Justice officials expect  funding for this program to decrease. Although Justice has budgeted  $4 million for fiscal year 2004 and requested $3 million for fiscal year 2005,  the department plans to reduce the funding level to less than $2 million in  later years.
Justice has also assisted the Colombian government in developing a new  criminal procedure code. As we noted in a prior report, Colombia enacted  constitutional reform in 1991 that called for criminal justice reform, but  little progress had been made. According to Justice, the new code  provides the framework for an accusatory criminal justice system and oral  trials. In order to prepare for and support the code’s implementation,  Justice trained 122 prosecutors in criminal trial techniques in fiscal year  2003 and plans to train 10,000 judicial police investigators by 2005 for their  new roles as witnesses in oral trials. The department also plans to train an  additional 3,000 prosecutors in the new procedural code and their changed  roles in an accusatory system. Justice uses a “train-the-trainer” approach to  encourage and facilitate the transition of program responsibility to  Colombian personnel.
section_title: Management and Financial Challenges Continue to Complicate Project Implementation
paragraphs: Although the U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs are beginning to  achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia and the United  States must address management and financial challenges. USAID has not  yet maximized the mutual benefits of its programs, and State and USAID  have not coordinated their assistance programs to internally displaced  persons. State, Justice, and USAID have not established timelines, nor have  State or USAID developed an overall strategy for turning programs over to  the Colombian government or to the private sector. In addition, funding  constraints and Colombia’s long-standing conflict will complicate  sustainability efforts.
subsections: section_title: Program Benefits May Not be Maximized Due to Lack of Coordination
paragraphs: As we reported in 1998, U.S. counternarcotics activities were hampered by  a lack of planning and management coordination. While U.S. agencies  recognize the need for greater coordination to maximize program benefits,  we found this was not always happening. USAID was not maximizing the  interrelationships among its programs for alternative development,  vulnerable groups, or democracy, and its implementing partners expressed  concern that they were often not aware of one another’s projects even  when they were nearby. Moreover, State and USAID were not coordinating  their programs for internally displaced persons.
The three nonmilitary assistance programs are interrelated. Alternative  development can provide legitimate income generation for coca and opium  poppy farmers. An increased state presence and strengthened judicial  system can provide greater protection and a safer environment for those  who want to grow licit crops and participate in other licit income- generating alternatives. A more secure situation can lead to fewer people  leaving their homes and depending on assistance for internally displaced  persons.
The USAID/Colombia mission recognizes this interrelationship among its  programs. Its recently amended strategy for fiscal years 2006 through 2008  recognizes the need to explore opportunities for program synergies and  efficiencies.
However, coordination among USAID’s implementing partners is not  always occurring. A February 2004 evaluation of USAID’s alternative  development projects in Putumayo concluded that the successful  continuation of these projects depended, in part, on greater coordination  among USAID’s contractors and grantees. Many of the grantees and  contractors implementing USAID’s three nonmilitary assistance programs  told us they had never met as a group to discuss and coordinate their  efforts. In our meetings with grantees working with vulnerable groups, the  representatives also suggested that specific barriers limit coordination. For  instance, if grantees from two different programs implement a joint project,  only one of them can claim an achievement for having served the project  beneficiaries. According to one grantee, this is a disincentive to cooperate  with other grantees. Another barrier cited was general confusion among  grantees about how to account for money taken from different programs— according to some grantees, USAID’s rules and regulations about using  funding from different strategic objectives are prohibitively complex.
USAID officials and representatives of many of its implementing partners  told us that while USAID holds monthly meetings to ensure that alternative  development grantees and contractors coordinate with one another, no  mechanisms exist for ensuring that similar coordination occurs among  grantees and contractors working in USAID’s other assistance programs,  even in areas of the country where several projects are taking place near  one another. For example, in January 2004 we met with local USAID  democracy grantees in Antioquia. All told us they had never met each other  and did not know about one another’s projects, even when they dealt with  similar issues. They reported that as a result of their meeting with us, they  would make a better effort to coordinate with one another.
In addition to coordination problems among the nonmilitary assistance  programs, coordination is weak within the vulnerable groups program.
Although State and USAID have agreed to split responsibilities for  providing emergency aid and longer-term development assistance to  internally displaced persons, respectively, they do not have any procedures  for coordinating or transitioning from one to the other. USAID’s and State’s  Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 does not include any  specifics for joint program implementation. We found that   during a site visit to a USAID-funded project outside of Bogotá, an  agency official was surprised to learn that State also funded a project in  the same location; and   half of the grantees involved in USAID’s program were unaware of  State’s program to assist the displaced and did not know whether their  project beneficiaries had first received emergency humanitarian  assistance from State.
While State and USAID are not explicitly required to assist the same  beneficiaries, agency officials and program documents indicate that their  goal is to ensure that internally displaced persons who receive emergency  aid are then provided longer-term assistance, if needed. In 2001, we  reported that the U.S. government had difficulty coordinating and  managing its programs to aid the internally displaced. These challenges  continue in Colombia.
section_title: Limited Financial Resources Continue to Affect Program Implementation and Sustainability
paragraphs: Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the government of Colombia  pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to provide  $3.5 billion. We reported in June 2003 that this international assistance— apart from that provided by the United States—did not materialize as  expected. International donations not directly related to Plan Colombia  have also been limited. For example:   The United Nation’s Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for $62 million in  humanitarian assistance to Colombia is underfunded. Donations as of  November 2003 amounted to approximately $14 million, of which the  United States contributed about 42 percent.
As we reported in August 2001, scarce or declining budgetary resources  provided by the international donor community inhibit agencies from  expanding their internally displaced person protection and assistance  activities.
The Colombian government has dedicated some of its own resources for  nonmilitary assistance programs, although they are not sufficient to sustain  ongoing programs. For example, according to a United Nations agency,  Colombia is providing resources to support internally displaced persons,  and Colombian law exempts internally displaced persons from paying fees  for education, health, and other basic services. However, the report (dated  May 2003) goes on to note that only 43 percent of the total number of  internally displaced persons registered with the Colombian government  received relief items. Furthermore, the government’s response to  displacement does not reach remote areas and is inadequate in urban  areas. Similarly for democracy programs, the Colombia Human Rights  Ombudsman’s office agreed to produce a sustainability plan outlining its  financial and technical responsibilities on a long-term basis by January  2004. As of May 2004, the plan had not been completed. Specifically within  the rule of law program, Colombian nondefense budget reductions have  prevented the government from taking control of the human rights  investigative units as originally planned and funds for maintaining the  justice houses may be in jeopardy.
A number of domestic and foreign factors have limited the Colombian  government’s ability to contribute more resources. In August 2003,  President Uribe promoted a referendum designed to produce fiscal reform.  However, voter turnout was short of the threshold required, and the  referendum failed. To mitigate the effects of these failed cost-cutting  measures, State said that the Uribe administration introduced new  economic austerity legislation in the Colombian Congress. According to  State officials, these measures included taxes on wealth, personal income,  and financial transactions; creation of anti-evasion policies; and an  expansion of the tax base. However, these measures will not entirely  eliminate the fiscal shortfall. According to State, the tax bill that passed the  Colombian Congress in December 2003 provided $817 million in added  revenues, leaving a $286 million gap to be bridged by spending cuts.
Fiscal constraints due to revenue shortfalls and an International Monetary  Fund requirement to reduce the combined sector deficit to 2.5 percent of  gross domestic product will preclude the government from increasing both  defense and nondefense spending in 2004. Because the success of  President Uribe’s democratic security policy depends in part on increasing  the size of Colombia’s security forces, President Uribe has announced that  nondefense spending will be cut to enable the Colombian government to  meet its fiscal targets. This strategy should enable the government to meet  its short-term fiscal targets. However, without significant cuts in  expenditures for pensions and other earmarks, U.S. embassy officials  stated that the Colombian government may also need to reduce defense  spending to meet its long-term goal of significantly reducing public debt. At  a time when nonmilitary assistance programs are beginning to produce  intended results, such budget cuts could impede project implementation  and sustainability.
section_title: Colombia’s Long-Standing Conflict Complicates Assistance Efforts
paragraphs: The government of Colombia has stated that ending the country’s civil  conflict is central to solving Colombia’s problems, from improving  economic conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. The continuing  violence limits both the U.S. and Colombian government’s ability to  institute economic, social, and political improvements. A peaceful  resolution to the decades-old insurgency would help stabilize the nation,  speed economic recovery, help ensure the protection of human rights, and  restore the authority and control of the Colombian government in the coca- growing regions.
Although the Colombian National Police, with U.S. assistance, have  reestablished a presence in every municipality, rebel groups continue to  exercise control in large geographic areas. State estimates that Colombia  still does not control up to 40 percent of the country. Lack of government  control intensifies the difficulty of implementing assistance programs.  According to USAID officials, the agency is still prohibited from operating  in certain parts of the country because of security concerns. Within the  alternative development program, for example, it makes the process of  verifying that communities are adhering to voluntary eradication  agreements highly risky. Moreover, while many human rights indicators  improved last year due to the Colombian government’s efforts to improve  security, both armed forces and insurgents continue to commit serious  human rights abuses, according to human rights organizations, as well as  State’s 2003 Human Rights Report. The ongoing violence often prevents  USAID and contractor officials from visiting project sites to implement and  monitor efforts. Furthermore, it discourages private business groups from  traveling to and investing in remote parts of Colombia.
The long-standing insurgency also limits the government’s ability to  address the socio-economic conditions—including poverty, inadequate  social services, and high unemployment—that encourage illicit activities.  Several USAID officials emphasized the importance of job creation in the  fight against violence and illicit activities, yet unemployment was over  14 percent in September 2003. In 2002, the World Bank estimated that  60 percent of Colombia’s population lives below the poverty line, and rural  poverty in Colombia is estimated at 79 percent. The World Bank also  calculated that even if a positive growth path is reestablished and  sustained, Colombia will require more than a decade to reduce poverty to  the levels recorded in 1995—an economic performance that Colombia has  not been able to achieve in recent years.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Colombia is a long-time ally and significant trading partner of the United  States and, therefore, its economic and political stability is important to the  United States as well as to the Andean region. Colombia’s long-standing  insurgency and the insurgents’ links to the illicit drug trade complicate the  country’s efforts to tap its natural resources and make systemic economic  reforms. Solving these problems is important to Colombia’s future stability.
Colombia and the United States continue to face financial and management  challenges in implementing and sustaining counternarcotics and  counterinsurgency programs in Colombia. Namely, the government of  Colombia does not have the capacity to sustain alternative development  projects, provide the level of assistance needed for vulnerable groups, or  implement democracy and judicial reform. Colombia’s financial resources  are limited and its economy is weak, and thus it will need U.S. assistance  for the foreseeable future. In 2000 and 2001, USAID determined that an  alternative development program for the estimated 136,600 families  involved in illicit drugs could cost up to $4 billion. At least one organization  has predicted that providing basic services to Colombia’s displaced population could cost $1 billion. If demobilization occurs on a large scale,  it could cost well over $250 million. In addition, we note that these  estimates do not include future funding needed for other U.S. programs in  Colombia, including support for the Colombian Army and Colombian  National Police.
In recent years, world events—from the global war on terrorism to the  massive reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq—have diverted  scarce U.S. resources and made it paramount that the United States fully  consider the resources committed to its overseas assistance programs.  Because of competing demands, the United States very likely cannot  continue current levels of assistance to Colombia; in some instances, State,  Justice, and USAID have already begun to limit or curtail their programs.  Yet, State and USAID have not systematically coordinated their programs  to maximize the interrelated benefits or developed a plan for turning  program responsibilities over to the Colombian government and the private  sector.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: Because of Colombia’s prolonged conflict and the limited financial  resources available for nonmilitary assistance programs, we recommend  that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and  the Administrator, USAID, develop a detailed plan for improving systematic  coordination among the three nonmilitary assistance programs in  Colombia. The plan should include clearly defined objectives and future  funding requirements for the programs; a timeline for achieving the stated  objectives; and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including  transitioning program responsibility to the government of Colombia and  the private sector. Particular attention should be placed on establishing a  coordination mechanism between State and USAID to facilitate internally  displaced persons’ transition from emergency aid to longer-term  assistance. The Secretary of State should provide this information to the  Congress for consideration in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations cycle.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: State, Justice, and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this  report. See appendixes I, II, and III, respectively. Overall, the agencies  found the report helpful, but none specifically commented on our  recommendation. Justice did not address coordination. State and USAID  noted instances of where coordination was occurring and said that they are  looking for ways to improve. For instance:  State reported that it is exploring ways in Washington, D.C., and the field  to improve coordination between State and USAID on the hand-off of  beneficiaries from State’s emergency assistance to USAID’s longer-term  assistance.
USAID acknowledged that more can be done to improve coordination  and detailed new initiatives designed to do so, including the creation of  a Joint Policy Council between State and USAID. USAID also noted that,  with the start-up phase of its programs completed, it was developing  approaches and programs that are more sustainable and relying on  private sector support to leverage additional resources where possible.
Our recommendation was intended to help ensure that State, Justice, and  USAID worked together to build on the progress that each of the  nonmilitary programs is making by taking advantage of the synergies  among the programs. Without a more formal plan for improving systematic  coordination, we do not believe that the U.S. nonmilitary assistance to  Colombia will be leveraged to the extent possible.
Each agency also provided additional information and elaborated on the  status of their programs. In addition, the agencies provided us technical  comments and updates that we have incorporated throughout the report,  as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to  interested congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney  General, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International  Development. We will also make copies available to others on request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov, or Al Huntington, Assistant Director, at  (202) 512-4140 or HuntingtonA@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this  report were José M. Peña, Elizabeth Singer, and Judith Williams.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the objectives of each program; determine the programs’  reported accomplishments; as well as the factors, if any, limiting their  implementation, we   analyzed project design documents, including funding documents and  contracts and grant agreements, describing the projects from State,  Justice, and USAID;  reviewed project documentation, including progress reports and other  documents prepared by the grantees and contractors implementing the  projects;    interviewed cognizant contractor and grantee officials both in  Washington, D.C., and Colombia; and   interviewed State, Justice, and USAID officials responsible for program  oversight and implementation both in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S.  Embassy in Bogotá.
We traveled to Colombia in January 2004. In Colombia, we held two  roundtable discussions with representatives of most of the grantees and  contractors responsible for alternative development and vulnerable groups  projects. We observed U.S.-funded projects in Bogotá and Soacha (near  Bogotá), Medellín, and Puerto Asís and Villa Garzón in Putumayo. During  these site visits, we met with project beneficiaries and interviewed  representatives of the nongovernmental organizations implementing the  projects.
To determine the challenges faced by Colombia and the United States in  sustaining these programs, we obtained program information and  economic data prepared by a variety of sources and interviewed U.S. and  Colombian government officials. In Washington, D.C., we interviewed  agency officials from State, Justice, and USAID. We also examined political  and economic reports prepared by the Congressional Research Service, the  World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. We reviewed several  studies evaluating issues of concern and U.S. assistance to Colombia,  particularly alternative development, vulnerable groups, and democracy  and rule of law programs. In Colombia, we reviewed program documents,  including USAID’s draft 5-year strategic plan, a February 2004 evaluation of  USAID’s programs in the Putumayo, the U.S. Embassy’s Mission  Performance Plan, and contractor and grantee organization reports. In  addition, we interviewed U.S. embassy officials knowledgeable about  Colombia’s economic and political situation and met with Colombian  government officials knowledgeable about the state of the Colombian  economy and the Colombian government’s budgetary constraints,  including the director of the Office of National Planning, which is similar to  the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.
To determine the reliability of the funding data used in this report, we  examined State, Justice, and USAID quarterly progress reports and other  financial management activity reports. Agency officials also verified the  data. Moreover, we obtained copies of State, Justice, and USAID Inspector  General audits of their respective agencies’ consolidated financial  statements, which reported, among other things, on their internal control  structures. All three agencies received unqualified opinions. However,  State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs did  not provide complete funding data for the programs it supports. As a result,  the funding figures may not reflect what was actually programmed,  obligated, and expended for assisting vulnerable groups, promoting  democracy and rule of law programs, and enhancing state presence and  public security. Moreover, we did not audit the funding data and are not  expressing an opinion on them. However, based on our examination of the  documents received and our discussions with cognizant agency officials,  we concluded that the funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this engagement.
To determine the reliability of the performance measurement data we  obtained, we asked State, Justice, and USAID program officials how the  data were collected and verified. We found that because of the difficult  security situation in Colombia, U.S. agencies (USAID in particular) must  often rely on third parties, including the United Nations, to document  performance data, such as the number of hectares voluntarily eradicated.  We also found that while U.S. embassy officials conduct oversight to assess  the accuracy of program data submitted by grantees and contractors, not  all do. For example, according to State, it does not independently verify  estimates of the number of beneficiaries assisted by the international  organizations it funds. In addition, any data collected by the agencies is  subject to some limitations. For example, the November 2003 Inspector  General report stated that the alternative development program might be  overstating the number of families benefited due to the way program data  are collected. In addition, the vulnerable groups program may double count  project beneficiaries, and the statistics collected through the justice houses  are generally not reliable because they are not equipped to collect data  regularly on their own.
However, USAID has taken measures to address these limitations. For  example, in response to its Inspector General’s concerns, USAID agreed to  separate the alternative development program data between crop  substitution and infrastructure projects to avoid double counting. Similarly,  to avoid the double counting in the vulnerable groups program, the agency  asks grantees to jointly report on individuals assisted in areas where more  than one grantee was present. Finally, to correct data collection difficulties  associated with the justice houses, the USAID contractor plans to have a  national automated information system by 2005.
Nevertheless, based on our discussions with State, Justice, and USAID  officials, we concluded that the performance data we obtained were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State letter, dated  June 28, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. Throughout this report, we acknowledge the many obstacles that the  U.S. government faces in reaching its nonmilitary assistance objectives,  including Colombia’s long-standing conflict and limited financial  resources. As such, we recognize that establishing a formal mechanism  for transitioning beneficiaries of the vulnerable groups program from  emergency to longer-term assistance is not an easy task. Nevertheless,  State and USAID will benefit from a more formal mechanism to address  this transition gap, as we recommended. Any informal coordination  that already occurs is an important step toward implementing this  recommendation. 2. While some of State’s implementing partners may track some  individuals after they receive assistance, not all do. Further, it should be  noted that while the Colombian Government’s Social Solidarity  Network works to avoid duplication of assistance and to attend to  registered internally displaced persons, both State’s and USAID’s  implementing partners provide services to persons who are not  registered with the Colombian government. 3. State is incorrect. GAO did not praise the Policy and Program Review  Committee (PPRC) regional policy paper process in past reports. After  we inquired about this point, a PRM official acknowledged that State’s  Inspector General and the Office of Management and Budget have  complimented the process, but GAO has not. In addition, State declined  to provide GAO a copy of PPRC #2004-38, and the same official said  that State had not provided a copy to USAID, either.  4. We recognize that tracking beneficiaries assisted by international  organizations may be difficult. However, we found that USAID tracks  the number of individuals assisted each quarter by its grantees,  including international organizations. 5. The report does not state that there is no coordination. Rather, we  concluded that State and USAID can do a better job of “handing off”  State’s short-term beneficiaries to USAID’s longer-term assistance  program.  6. We modified the text to better describe State’s funding.  7. The $1 billion figure was not intended to be a definitive estimate. The  point is that U.S. assistance cannot address all identified needs.  8. We do not agree that better coordination between State and USAID  would compromise the security of the staff. 9. We modified the text to acknowledge the government of Colombia’s  efforts to enhance public security and the improvement in human rights  indicators over the past year. However, as State quotes from its own  2003 Human Rights report, “The Government’s human rights record  remained poor.”
section_title: Comments from the Department of Justice
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice letter,  dated June 23, 2004.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. As we indicate in note “c” on p. 8, State transfers funding to Justice for  its rule of law programs. We have added Justice’s total originally  appropriated figure of $88 million, which is approximately 16 percent of  total U.S. nonmilitary assistance funding. 2. Rather than budget increments, President Uribe has announced cuts in  nondefense spending. 3. GAO recognizes that the new asset forfeiture law referred to by Justice  has strengthened the government of Colombia’s ability to employ  seized assets, but it remains to be seen to what extent that will benefit  the justice sector’s capacity. 4. We recognize that Justice has a variety of projects within its Justice  Sector Reform Program and that these projects are instrumental in  strengthening Colombia’s justice sector. We did not focus on all of the  projects in detail, however, because of their small size (in terms of  funding) relative to State’s and USAID’s projects. We do highlight the  human rights units, code reform assistance, prosecutor training, and  judicial police training projects. 5. We modified the text to give Justice more credit for its efforts to turn  programs over to the Colombian government.
section_title: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Mission
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