DOD Business Systems Modernization: Longstanding Management and Oversight Weaknesses Continue to Put Investments at Risk
Published: 2003-03-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its business systems modernization program has been an area of longstanding concern to Congress and one that GAO has designated as high risk since 1995. Because of this concern, GAO was requested to testify on (1) DOD's current inventory of existing and new business systems and the amount of funding devoted to this inventory; (2) DOD's modernization management capabilities, including weaknesses and DOD's efforts to address them; and (3) GAO's collective recommendations for correcting these weaknesses and minimizing DOD's exposure to risk until they are corrected. In developing this testimony, GAO drew from its previously issued reports on DOD's business systems modernization efforts, including one released today on four key Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) projects.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of October 2002, DOD reported that its business systems environment consisted of 1,731 systems and system acquisition projects spanning about 18 functional areas. This environment is the product of unrelated, stovepiped initiatives supporting nonstandard, duplicative business operations across DOD components. For fiscal year 2003, about $18 billion of DOD's IT funding relates to operating, maintaining, and modernizing these nonintegrated systems. To DOD's credit, it recognizes the need to modernize, eliminating as many of these systems as possible. The future of DOD's business systems modernization is fraught with risk because of longstanding and pervasive modernization weaknesses, three of which are discussed below. GAO's report on four DFAS systems highlights some of these weaknesses, and GAO's prior reports have identified the others. DOD has stated its commitment to addressing each and has efforts under way that are intended to do so. Lack of departmentwide enterprise architecture: DOD does not yet have an architecture, or blueprint, to guide and constrain its business system investments across the department. Nevertheless, DOD continues to spend billions of dollars on new and modified systems based the parochial needs and strategic direction of its component organizations. This will continue to result in systems that are duplicative, are not integrated, are unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface, and will not adequately address longstanding financial management problems. Lack of effective investment management: DOD does not yet have an effective approach to consistently selecting and controlling its investments as a portfolio of competing department options and within the context of an enterprise architecture. DOD is also not ensuring that it invests in each system incrementally and on the basis of reliable economic justification. For example, for the four DFAS projects, DOD spent millions of dollars without knowing whether the projects would produce value commensurate with costs and risks. Thus far, this has resulted in the termination of one of the projects after about $126 million and 7 years of effort was spent. Lack of effective oversight: DOD has not consistently overseen its system projects to ensure that they are delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. For example, for the four DFAS projects, oversight responsibility is shared by the DOD Comptroller, DFAS, and the DOD chief information officer. However, these oversight authorities have largely allowed the four to proceed unabated, even though each was experiencing significant cost increases, schedule delays, and/or capability and scope reductions and none were supported by adequate economic justification. As a result, DOD invested approximately $316 million in four projects that may not resolve the very financial management weaknesses that they were initiated to address.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense’s  (DOD) management of its business  systems modernization program  has been an area of longstanding  concern to Congress and one that  GAO has designated as high risk  since 1995.
As of October 2002, DOD reported that its business systems environment  consisted of 1,731 systems and system acquisition projects spanning about 18  functional areas. This environment is the product of unrelated, stovepiped  initiatives supporting nonstandard, duplicative business operations across  DOD components. For fiscal year 2003, about $18 billion of DOD’s IT funding  relates to operating, maintaining, and modernizing these nonintegrated  systems. To DOD’s credit, it recognizes the need to modernize, eliminating as many of these systems as possible.
Because of this concern, GAO was  requested to testify on (1) DOD’s  current inventory of existing and  new business systems and the  amount of funding devoted to this  inventory; (2) DOD’s modernization  management capabilities, including  weaknesses and DOD’s efforts to  address them; and (3) GAO’s  collective recommendations for  correcting these weaknesses and  minimizing DOD’s exposure to risk  until they are corrected.
The future of DOD’s business systems modernization is fraught with risk  because of longstanding and pervasive modernization weaknesses, three of  which are discussed below. GAO’s report on four DFAS systems highlights  some of these weaknesses, and GAO’s prior reports have identified the  others. DOD has stated its commitment to addressing each and has efforts  under way that are intended to do so.
In developing this testimony, GAO  drew from its previously issued  reports on DOD’s business systems  modernization efforts, including  one released today on four key  Defense Finance and Accounting  Service (DFAS) projects.
Lack of departmentwide enterprise architecture: DOD does not yet have an  architecture, or blueprint, to guide and constrain its business system  investments across the department. Nevertheless, DOD continues to spend  billions of dollars on new and modified systems based the parochial needs  and strategic direction of its component organizations. This will continue to  result in systems that are duplicative, are not integrated, are unnecessarily  costly to maintain and interface, and will not adequately address  longstanding financial management problems.
GAO has previously made a series of  recommendations related to putting  in place (1) an enterprise architecture  to guide and constrain system  investments; (2) an investment  management structure to ensure that  systems are aligned with the  architecture and economically  justified and approved on an  incremental basis; (3) effective  oversight to ensure that project  commitments are met; and (4) limited  investment spending until these  recommendations are implemented.
Lack of effective investment management: DOD does not yet have an  effective approach to consistently selecting and controlling its investments  as a portfolio of competing department options and within the context of an  enterprise architecture. DOD is also not ensuring that it invests in each  system incrementally and on the basis of reliable economic justification. For  example, for the four DFAS projects, DOD spent millions of dollars without  knowing whether the projects would produce value commensurate with  costs and risks. Thus far, this has resulted in the termination of one of the  projects after about $126 million and 7 years of effort was spent. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-553T.
To view the full report, including the scope  and methodology, click on the link above.  For more information, contact Randolph C. Hite  at (202) 512-5555 or hiter@gao.gov or Gregory  D. Kutz at (202) 9505 or kutzg@gao.gov.
Lack of effective oversight: DOD has not consistently overseen its system  projects to ensure that they are delivering promised system capabilities and  benefits on time and within budget. For example, for the four DFAS projects,  oversight responsibility is shared by the DOD Comptroller, DFAS, and the  DOD chief information officer. However, these oversight authorities have  largely allowed the four to proceed unabated, even though each was  experiencing significant cost increases, schedule delays, and/or capability  and scope reductions and none were supported by adequate economic  justification. As a result, DOD invested approximately $316 million in four  projects that may not resolve the very financial management weaknesses  that they were initiated to address.
Messrs. Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Subcommittees:  We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) management of its business systems modernization program, an  area of longstanding concern to the Congress, and one that we first  designated as a high risk program in 1995 and continue to do so today. As  we have said, DOD’s existing systems cannot provide reliable financial  data to support informed decisionmaking and promote accountability,  thus leaving DOD at a high risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition, we  have said that DOD’s business systems modernization will remain at risk  until the department has implemented proven modernization management  controls that are embodied in the Clinger-Cohen Act, federal guidance, and  commercial best practices. These controls include investing in new and  existing systems within the context of a departmentwide modernization  blueprint, commonly called an enterprise architecture; investing in these  systems in an incremental or modular fashion, and only when they can be  economically justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks; and  overseeing these system investments to ensure that they are delivering  promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget.
Last year, your hearing brought additional attention and focus to DOD’s  business systems modernization program. In our testimony at that hearing,  we highlighted the department’s modernization management weaknesses,  and the department testified that it was committed to addressing each.  Since then, DOD has begun a number of efforts to follow through on its  stated commitment. For example, it plans to issue the first version of its  enterprise architecture in May 2003, it is creating a new investment  governance and oversight approach, and it is revising its system  acquisition guidance. We view each of these as positive steps. However,  the fact remains that today, with but isolated exceptions, DOD’s  management and oversight of its hundreds of new and existing system  investments is largely unchanged from where it was last year. As a result,  the $18 billion that DOD has designated for business systems in fiscal year  2003 continues to be at risk. In particular, our report that you are releasing  today shows that for four key accounting system projects, DOD oversight  has been limited and has allowed hundreds of millions of dollars to be  spent without adequate economic justification. Thus far, this has resulted  in one of these systems being terminated after about $126 million and 7  years of effort has been spent.
As you requested, our testimony today discusses (1) DOD’s current  business systems environment, including a profile of (a) the number and  types of systems that have proliferated over the years and (b) the  enormous amounts of funding that are being spent to operate and maintain  existing systems and to introduce new systems; (2) DOD’s institutional  modernization management weaknesses, including specific system  investments that are at risk because of them, such as the above-mentioned  accounting systems, and (3) a framework for overcoming these  modernization management weaknesses and limiting DOD’s exposure to  investment risk until they are resolved, which is based on our open  recommendations to the department.
In developing this testimony, we drew from our previously issued reports  on DOD’s business systems modernization efforts, as well as the report  being released today.
subsections: section_title: DOD Is Investing Billions of Dollars Annually to Operate, Maintain, and Modernize Its Amalgamation of Business Systems
paragraphs: As part of its ongoing business systems modernization program, and  consistent with our past recommendation, DOD has created an inventory  of its existing and new business system investments. As of October 2002,  DOD reported that this inventory consisted of 1,731 systems and system  acquisition projects across DOD’s functional areas. In particular, DOD  reported that it had 374 separate systems to support its civilian and  military personnel function, 335 systems to perform finance and  accounting functions, and 221 systems that support inventory  management.  Table 1 presents the composition of DOD business systems  by functional area.
As we have previously reported, this systems environment is not the  result of a systematic and coordinated departmentwide strategy, but rather  is the product of unrelated, stovepiped initiatives to support a set of  business operations that are nonstandard and duplicative across DOD  components. Consequently, DOD’s amalgamation of systems is  characterized by (1) multiple systems performing the same tasks; (2) the  same data stored in multiple systems; (3) manual data entry and reentry  into multiple systems; and (4) extensive data translations and interfaces,  each of which increases costs and limits data integrity. Further, as we have  reported, these systems do not produce reliable financial data to support  managerial decisionmaking and ensure accountability. To the  department’s credit, it recognizes the need to eliminate as many systems  as possible and integrate and standardize those that remain. In fact, three  of the four Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) projects that  are the subject of the report being released today were collectively  intended to reduce or eliminate all or part of 17 different systems that  perform similar functions. For example,  the Defense Procurement Payment System (DPPS) was intended to  consolidate eight contract and vendor pay systems;  the Defense Departmental Reporting System (DDRS) is intended to reduce  the number of departmental financial reporting systems from seven to one;  and  the Defense Standard Disbursing System (DSDS) is intended to eliminate  four different disbursing systems.
The fourth system, the DFAS Corporate Database/Corporate Warehouse  (DCD/DCW), is intended to serve as the single DFAS data store, meaning  it would contain all DOD financial information required by DFAS and be  the central point for all shared data within DFAS.
For fiscal year 2003, DOD has requested approximately $26 billion in IT  funding to support a wide range of military operations and business  functions. This $26 billion is spread across the military services and  defense agencies—each receiving its own allocation of IT funding. The $26  billion supports three categories of IT—business systems, business  systems infrastructure, and national security systems—the first two of  which comprise the earlier cited 1,731 new and existing business systems  projects.
At last year’s hearing, DOD was asked about the makeup of its $26 billion  in IT funding, including what amounts relate to business systems and  related infrastructure, at which time answers were unavailable. As we are  providing in the report being released today and as shown in figure 1,  approximately $18 billion—about $5.2 billion for business systems and  $12.8 billion for business systems infrastructure—relates to the operation,  maintenance, and modernization of the 1,731 business systems that DOD  reported having in October 2002. Figure 2 provides the allocation of DOD’s  business systems modernization budget for fiscal year 2003 budget by  component.
However, recognizing the need to modernize and making funds available  are not sufficient for improving DOD’s current systems environment. Our  research of successful modernization programs in public and private- sector organizations, as well as our reviews of these programs in various  federal agencies, has identified a number of IT disciplines that are  necessary for successful modernization. These disciplines include having  and implementing (1) an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain  systems investments; (2) an investment management process to ensure  that systems are invested in incrementally, are aligned with the enterprise  architecture, and are justified on the basis of cost, benefits, and risks; and  (3) a project oversight process to ensure that project commitments are  being met and that needed corrective action is taken. These  institutionalized disciplines have been long missing at DOD, and their  absence is a primary reason for the system environment described above.
section_title: Key Modernization Management Weaknesses Continue, But DOD Plans to Correct Them
paragraphs: The future of DOD’s business systems modernization is fraught with risk,  in part because of longstanding and pervasive modernization management  weaknesses. As we have reported, these weaknesses include (1) lack of an  enterprise architecture; (2) inadequate institutional and project-level  investment management processes; and (3) limited oversight of projects’  delivery of promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within  budget. To DOD’s credit, it recognizes the need to address each of these  weaknesses and has committed to doing so.
subsections: section_title: DOD Is Developing, But Still Is Without, a Departmentwide Enterprise Architecture
paragraphs: Effectively managing a large and complex endeavor requires, among other  things, a well-defined and enforced blueprint for operational and  technological change, commonly referred to as an enterprise architecture.  Developing, maintaining, and using architectures is a leading practice in  engineering both individual systems and entire enterprises. Government- wide requirements for having and using architectures to guide and  constrain IT investment decisionmaking are also addressed in federal law  and guidance. Our experience has shown that attempting a major systems  modernization program without a complete and enforceable enterprise  architecture results in systems that are duplicative, are not well integrated,  are unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface, do not ensure basic  financial accountability, and do not effectively optimize mission  performance.
In May 2001, we reported that DOD had neither an enterprise architecture  for its financial and financial-related business operations nor the  management structure, processes, and controls in place to effectively  develop and implement one. Further, we stated that DOD’s plans to  continue spending billions of dollars on new and modified systems  independently from one another, and outside the context of a  departmental modernization blueprint, would result in more systems that  are duplicative, noninteroperable, and unnecessarily costly to maintain  and interface; moreover, they would not address longstanding financial  management problems. To assist the department, we provided a set of  recommendations on how DOD should approach developing its enterprise  architecture.
In September 2002, the Secretary of Defense designated improving  financial management operations (including such business areas as  logistics, acquisition, and personnel management) as one of the  department’s top 10 priorities. In addition, the Secretary established a  program to develop an enterprise architecture, and DOD plans to have the  architecture developed by May 2003. Subsequently, the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 directed DOD to develop, by May 1,  2003, an enterprise architecture, including a transition plan for its  implementation. The act also defined the scope and content of the  enterprise architecture and directed us to submit to congressional defense  committees an assessment of DOD’s actions to develop the architecture  and transition plan no later than 60 days after their approval. Finally, the  act prohibited DOD from obligating more than $1 million on any financial  systems improvement until the DOD comptroller makes a determination  regarding the necessity or suitability of such an investment.
In our February 2003 report on DOD enterprise architecture efforts, we  stated our support for the Secretary’s decision to develop the architecture  and recognized that DOD’s architecture plans were challenging and  ambitious. However, we also stated that despite taking a number of  positive steps toward its architecture goals, such as establishing a program  office responsible for managing the enterprise architecture, the  department had yet to implement several key recommendations and  certain leading practices for developing and implementing architectures.  For example, DOD had yet to (1) establish the requisite architecture  development governance structure needed to ensure that ownership of  and accountability for the architecture is vested with senior leaders across  the department; (2) develop and implement a strategy to effectively  communicate the purpose and scope, approach to, and roles and  responsibilities of stakeholders in developing the enterprise architecture;  and (3) fully define and implement an independent quality assurance  process. We concluded that not implementing these recommendations and  practices increased DOD’s risk of developing an architecture that would  be limited in scope, would be resisted by those responsible for  implementing it, and would not support effective systems modernization.  To assist the department, we made additional recommendations with  which DOD agreed. We plan to continue reviewing DOD’s efforts to  develop and implement this architecture pursuant to our mandate under  the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization act.
section_title: DOD Has Yet to Implement Effective Investment Management Processes
paragraphs: The Clinger-Cohen Act, federal guidance, and recognized best practices  provide a framework for organizations to follow to effectively manage  their IT investments. Collectively, this framework addresses IT investment  management at the institutional or corporate level, as well as the  individual project or system level. The former involves having a single,  corporate approach governing how the organization’s portfolio of IT  investments is selected, controlled, and evaluated across its various  components, including assuring that each investment is aligned with the  organization’s enterprise architecture. The latter involves having a  system/project-specific investment approach that provides for making  investment decisions incrementally and ensuring that these decisions are  economically justified on the basis of current and credible analyses.
Corporate investment management approach: DOD has yet to establish  and implement an effective departmentwide approach to managing its  business systems investment portfolio. In May 2001, we reported that  DOD did not have a departmentwide IT investment management process  through which to assure that its enterprise architecture, once developed,  could be effectively implemented. We therefore recommended that DOD  establish a system investment selection and control process that treats  compliance with the architecture as an explicit condition to meet at key  decision points in the system’s life cycle and that can be waived only if  justified by compelling written analysis.
Subsequently, in February 2003, we reported that DOD had not yet  established the necessary departmental investment management structure  and process controls needed to adequately align ongoing investments with  its architectural goals and direction. Instead, the department continued to  allow its component organizations to make their own parochial investment  decisions, following different approaches and criteria. In particular, DOD  had not established and applied common investment criteria to its ongoing  IT system projects using a hierarchy of investment review and funding  decisionmaking bodies, each composed of representatives from across the  department. DOD also had not yet conducted a comprehensive review of  its ongoing IT investments to ensure that they were consistent with its  architecture development efforts. We concluded that until it takes these  steps, DOD will likely continue to lack effective control over the billions of  dollars it is currently spending on IT projects. To address this, we  recommended that DOD create a departmentwide investment review  board with the responsibility and authority to (1) select and control all  DOD financial management investments and (2) ensure that its investment  decisions treat compliance with the financial management enterprise  architecture as an explicit condition for investment approval that can be  waived only if justified by a compelling written analysis. DOD concurred  with our recommendations and is taking steps to address them.
Project/system-specific investment management: DOD has yet to ensure  that its investments in all individual systems or projects are economically  justified and that it is investing in each incrementally. In particular, none  of the four DFAS projects addressed in the report being issued today had  current and reliable economic justifications to demonstrate that they  would produce value commensurate with the costs and risks being  incurred. For example, we found that although DCD was initiated to  contain all DOD financial data required by DFAS systems, planned DCD  capabilities had since been drastically reduced. Despite this, DFAS  planned to continue investing in DCD/DCW without having an economic  justification showing whether its revised plans were cost effective.  Moreover, DOD planned to continue investing in the three other projects  even though none had current economic analyses that reflected material  changes to costs, schedules, and/or expected benefits since the projects’  inception. For example, the economic analysis for DSDS had not been  updated to reflect material changes in the project, such as changing the  date for full operational capability from February 2003 to December  2005—a schedule change of almost 3 years that affected delivery of  promised benefits. Similarly, the DPPS economic analysis had not been  updated to recognize an estimated cost increase of $274 million and  schedule slip of almost 4 years. After recently reviewing this project’s  change in circumstances, the DOD Comptroller terminated DPPS after 7  years of effort and an investment of over $126 million, citing poor program  performance and increasing costs. Table 2 highlights the four projects’  estimated cost increases and schedule delays.
Our work on other DOD projects has shown a similar absence of current  and reliable economic justification for further system investment. For  example, we reported that DOD’s ongoing and planned investment in its  Standard Procurement System (SPS) was based on an outdated and  unreliable economic analysis, and even this flawed analysis did not show  that the system was cost beneficial, as defined. As a result, we  recommended that investment in future releases or major enhancements  to the system be made conditional on the department’s first demonstrating  that the system was producing benefits that exceeded costs and that  future investment decisions be made on the basis of complete and reliable  economic justifications. DOD is currently in the process of addressing this  recommendation.
Beyond not having current and reliable economic analyses for its projects,  DOD has yet to adopt an incremental approach to economically justifying  and investing in all system projects. For example, we have reported that  although DOD had divided its multiyear, billion-dollar SPS project into a  series of incremental releases, it had not treated each of these increments  as a separate investment decision. Such an incremental approach to  system investment helps to prevent discovering too late that a given  project is not cost beneficial. However, rather than adopt an incremental  approach to SPS investment management, the department chose to treat  investment in SPS as one, monolithic investment decision, justified by a  single, all-or-nothing economic analysis. This approach to investing in  large systems, like SPS, has proven ineffective in other federal agencies,  resulting in huge sums being invested in systems that do not provide  commensurate value, and thus has been abandoned by successful  organizations.
We also recently reported that while DOD’s Composite Health Care  System II had been structured into a series of seven increments (releases),  the department had not treated the releases to date as separate investment  decisions supported by incremental economic justification. In response  to our recommendations, DOD committed to changing its strategy for  future releases to include economically justifying each release before  investing in and verifying each release’s benefits and costs after  deployment.
section_title: Effective Oversight of IT Projects Remains an Unanswered Challenge
paragraphs: The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and federal guidance emphasize the need  to ensure that IT projects are being implemented at acceptable costs and  within reasonable and expected timeframes and that they are contributing  to tangible, observable improvements in mission performance (that is, that  projects are meeting the cost, schedule, and performance commitments  upon which their approval was justified). They also emphasize the need to  regularly determine each project’s progress toward expectations and  commitments and to take appropriate action to address deviations.
Our work on specific DOD projects has shown that such oversight does  not always occur, a multi-example case in point being the four DFAS  accounting system projects that are the subject of our report being  released today. For these four projects, oversight responsibility was  shared by the DOD comptroller, DFAS, and the DOD chief information  officer (CIO). However, these oversight authorities have not ensured, in  each case, that the requisite analytical basis for making informed  investment decisions was prepared. Moreover, they have not regularly  monitored system progress toward expectations so that timely action  could have been taken to correct deviations, even though each case had  experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays (see table 2).  Their respective oversight activities are summarized below:  DOD Comptroller—Oversight responsibility for DFAS activities, including  system investments, rests with the DOD Comptroller. However, DOD  Comptroller officials were not only unaware of cost increases and  schedule delays on these four projects, they also told us that they do not  review DFAS system investments to ensure that they are meeting cost,  schedule, and performance commitments because this is DFAS’s  responsibility.
DFAS—This DOD agency has established an investment committee to,  among other things, oversee its system investments. However, the  committee could not provide us with any evidence demonstrating  meaningful oversight of these four projects, nor could it provide us with  any guidance describing the committee’s role, responsibilities, and  authorities, and how it oversees projects.
DOD CIO—Oversight of the department’s “major” IT projects, of which  two of the four DFAS projects (DCD/DCW and DPPS) qualify, is the  responsibility of DOD’s CIO. However, this organization did not adequately  fulfill this responsibility on either project because, according to DOD CIO  officials, they have little practical authority in influencing component  agency-funded IT projects.
Thus, the bad news is that these three oversight authorities have jointly  permitted approximately $316 million to be spent on the four accounting  system projects without knowing if material changes to the projects’  scopes, costs, benefits, and risks warranted continued investment. The  good news is that the DOD Comptroller recently terminated one of the  four (DPPS), thereby avoiding throwing good money after bad, and DOD  has agreed to implement the recommendations contained in our report  released today, which calls for DOD to demonstrate that the remaining  three projects will produce benefits that exceed costs before further  investing in each.
Our work on other DOD projects has shown similar voids in oversight. For  example, we reported that SPS’s full implementation date slipped by 3 ½  years, with further delays expected, and the system’s life-cycle costs grew  by 23 percent, from $3 billion to $3.7 billion. However, none of the  oversight authorities responsible for this project, including the DOD CIO,  had required that the economic analysis be updated to reflect these  changes and thereby provide a basis for informed decisionmaking on the  project’s future. To address this issue, we recommended, among other  things, that the lines of oversight responsibility and accountability of the  project be clarified and that further investment in SPS be limited until  such investment could be justified. DOD has taken steps to address some  of our recommendations. For example, it has clarified organizational  accountability and responsibility for the program. However, much remains  to be done before the department will be able to make informed, data- driven decisions about whether further investment in the system is  justified.
section_title: Our Recommendations Provide a Roadmap for Improving Management of Business Systems Modernization
paragraphs: We have made numerous recommendations to DOD that collectively  provide a valuable roadmap for improvement as the department attempts  to create the management infrastructure needed to effectively undertake a  massive business systems modernization program. This collection of  recommendations is not without precedent, as we have provided similar  ones to other federal agencies, such as the Federal Aviation  Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and the former U.S.  Customs Service, to aid them in building their respective capacities for  managing modernization programs. In cases where these  recommendations have been implemented properly, we have observed  improved modernization management and accountability.
Our framework for DOD provides for developing a well-defined and  enforceable DOD-wide enterprise architecture to guide and constrain the  department’s business system investments, including specific  recommendations for successfully accomplishing this, such as creating an  enterprise architecture executive committee whose members are  singularly and collectively responsible and accountable for delivery and  approval of the architecture and a proactive enterprise architecture  marketing and communication program to facilitate stakeholder  understanding, buy-in, and commitment to the architecture.
Our recommendations also provide for establishing a DOD-wide  investment decisionmaking structure that consists of a hierarchy of  investment boards that are responsible for ensuring that projects meet  defined threshold criteria and for reviewing and deciding on projects’  futures on the basis of a standard set of investment criteria, two of which  are alignment with the enterprise architecture and return on investment.
In addition, our recommendations include ensuring that return on  investment is analytically supported by current and reliable economic  analyses showing that benefits are commensurate with costs and risks,  and that these analyses and associated investment decisions cover  incremental parts of each system investment, rather than treating the  system as one, all-or-nothing, monolithic pursuit. Further, our  recommendations provide clear and explicit lines of accountability for  project oversight and continuous monitoring and reporting of progress  against commitments to ensure that promised system capabilities and  benefits are being delivered on time and within budget.