Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing
Published: 2009-09-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: While national security activities, which range from planning for an influenza pandemic to Iraq reconstruction, require collaboration among multiple agencies, the mechanisms used for such activities may not provide the means for interagency collaboration needed to meet modern national security challenges. To assist the 111th Congress and the new administration in developing their oversight and management agendas, this report, which was performed under the Comptroller General's authority, addresses actions needed to enhance interagency collaboration for national security activities: (1) the development and implementation of overarching, integrated strategies; (2) the creation of collaborative organizations; (3) the development of a well-trained workforce; and (4) the sharing and integration of national security information across agencies. This report is based largely on a body of GAO work issued since 2005.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Based on prior work, GAO has found that agencies need to take the following actions to enhance interagency collaboration for national security: Develop and implement overarching strategies. Although some U.S. government agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security issues, GAO has reported that in some cases, such as U.S. government efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq's ministries to govern, U.S. efforts have been hindered by multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts without an overarching strategy. In particular, a strategy defining organizational roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in activities, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. Create collaborative organizations. Organizational differences--including differences in agencies' structures, planning processes, and funding sources--can hinder interagency collaboration, potentially wasting scarce funds and limiting the effectiveness of federal efforts. For example, defense and national intelligence activities are funded through separate budgets. Disagreement about funding from each budget led to the initial operating capability date being pushed back 1 year for a new space radar system. Coordination mechanisms are not always formalized or not fully utilized, potentially limiting their effectiveness in enhancing interagency collaboration. Develop a well-trained workforce. Collaborative approaches to national security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and experience to integrate the government's diverse capabilities and resources, but some federal government agencies lack the personnel capacity to fully participate in interagency activities. Some federal agencies have taken steps to improve their capacity to participate in interagency activities, but personnel shortages have impeded agencies' ability to participate in these activities, such as efforts to integrate personnel from other federal government agencies into the Department of Defense's (DOD) new U.S. Africa Command. Increased training opportunities and strategic workforce planning efforts could facilitate federal agencies' ability to fully participate in interagency collaboration activities. Share and integrate national security information across agencies. Information is a crucial tool in national security and its timely dissemination is critical for maintaining national security. However, despite progress made in sharing terrorism-related information, agencies and private-sector partners do not always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. For example, GAO found that non-DOD personnel could not access some DOD planning documents or participate in planning sessions because they may not have had the proper security clearances. Additionally, incorporating information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to managing and integrating that information.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As evidenced by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and other  recent events, challenges to national security have expanded significantly  from the traditional state-based threats of the Cold War era to include  unconventional threats from nonstate actors. These new threats are  diffuse and ambiguous and include terrorist threats from extremist groups,  cyber attacks, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, and energy threats.  They arise from multiple sources and—because their interrelated nature  makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any single agency to effectively  address them alone—they have required the U.S. government to enhance  collaboration with interagency and international partners, among other  actions. In addition to changes in national security threats, the agencies  involved in addressing these threats also have evolved. Beyond the  traditional agencies of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, and  the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), other agencies  involved in national security include the Departments of Homeland  Security, Energy, Justice, the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce. While  national security activities require collaboration among multiple agencies  and often across federal, state, and local governments, the mechanisms  used for national security activities—such as developing strategies,  planning and executing missions, providing resources for those activities,  and sharing information—are based on a framework established to meet  threats posed by the Cold War and may not provide the means for  interagency collaboration needed to meet modern national security  challenges.
In our prior work, we have identified situations in which the lack of  interagency collaboration has hindered national security efforts. For  example, we have previously reported and testified that since 2005,  multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, USAID, and  DOD—led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to  govern, without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their  efforts. We found that the lack of an overarching strategy contributed to  U.S. efforts not meeting their goal of key Iraqi ministries having the  capacity to effectively govern and assume increasing responsibility for  operating, maintaining, and further investing in reconstruction projects.  Additionally, because of concerns about agencies’ ability to protect shared  information or use that information properly, other agencies and private- sector partners are sometimes hesitant to share information. For example,  we reported that Department of Homeland Security officials expressed  concerns about sharing terrorism-related information with state and local  partners because such information had occasionally been posted on public  Internet sites or otherwise compromised.
Congress has recently taken steps to strengthen interagency collaboration  for national security issues. For example, in the fiscal year 2008 National  Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed that the Secretary of  Defense develop and submit to Congress a plan to improve and reform the  department’s participation in and contribution to the interagency  coordination process on national security issues. Similarly, in the fiscal  year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress gave authority to  the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator of USAID to  jointly establish an advisory panel to advise, review, and make  recommendations on ways to improve coordination among the agencies  on national security issues, including reviewing their respective roles and  responsibilities. The panel would be comprised of 12 members with  national recognition and significant experience in the federal government,  the armed forces, public administration, foreign affairs, or development.
To better enable agencies to address today’s national security challenges,  a number of commissions, research institutions, and congressionally  mandated studies have put forth proposals to reform part or all of the  national security system. Proposals range from far-reaching restructuring  of the system to smaller-scale proposals such as increasing resources for  civilian agencies. A recurring theme of many of these proposals is the need  for changes to improve interagency collaboration on national security  matters.
Committed and effective leadership is a critical aspect of enhancing  interagency collaboration for national security–related activities. We have  previously reported that committed leadership by those involved in  collaborative efforts from all levels of the organization is needed to  overcome the many barriers to working across agency boundaries.  National security experts also note the importance of and need for  effective leadership for national security issues. For example, a recent  report by the Project on National Security Reform notes that the national  security system requires skilled leadership at all levels and, to enhance  interagency coordination, these leaders must be adept at forging links and  fostering partnerships all levels.
To assist the 111th Congress and the new administration in developing  their oversight and management agendas, we have provided a set of  enclosures on the challenges to enhancing interagency collaboration in  national security activities. These enclosures expand on issues related to  national security facing this Congress and the new administration  discussed on GAO’s transition Web site,  http://www.gao.gov/transition_2009/index.php. Based on our prior work,  to enhance interagency collaboration for national security, agencies need  to enhance their efforts to do the following:    Develop and implement overarching strategies. Although some U.S.  government agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on  national security–related issues, we have testified and reported that in  some cases U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on  roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination  mechanisms to integrate their efforts. For example, in May 2007 we  reported that the lack of an overarching strategy with clear roles and  responsibilities led two law enforcement agencies—which were  unknowingly working with different foreign law enforcement agencies in  their efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute  terrorists—to move in on the same subject. According to foreign and U.S.  law enforcement officials, this action may have compromised other  investigations. Our prior work has found that strategic direction is  required as the basis for collaboration toward national security goals.  Defining organizational roles and responsibilities and mechanisms for  coordination can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in  which activities, organize their joint activities and individual efforts,  facilitate decision making, and address how conflicts would be resolved,  thereby facilitating interagency collaboration.
Create collaborative organizations. Agencies have different  organizational structures, planning processes, and funding sources to plan  for and conduct their national security activities, which can hinder  interagency collaboration. This can result in a patchwork of activities that  waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal efforts.  For example, differences in organizational structures for interacting with  other nations require agencies to coordinate with a large number of  organizations in their regional planning efforts, potentially creating gaps  and overlaps in policy implementation and leading to challenges in  coordinating efforts among agencies. Moreover, funding for national  security activities is budgeted for and appropriated by agency, rather than  by functional area (such as national security), resulting in budget requests  and congressional appropriations that tend to reflect individual agency  concerns. Given these organizational differences, adequate coordination  mechanisms can facilitate the interagency collaboration needed to achieve  integrated approaches to national security. We found that some agencies  have established coordination mechanisms to facilitate interagency  collaboration. For example, DOD, State Department, and USAID officials  have established processes to coordinate projects in Iraq and Afghanistan  related to humanitarian relief and reconstruction funded through the  Commander’s Emergency Response Program. However, other  mechanisms are not formalized or are not fully utilized, potentially limiting  their effectiveness in enhancing interagency collaboration.
Develop a well-trained workforce. Collaborative approaches to national  security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and experience to  integrate the government’s diverse capabilities and resources, but some  federal government agencies lack the personnel capacity to fully  participate in interagency activities. For example, DOD’s U.S. Africa  Command was originally intended to have significant interagency  representation, with experts from the Departments of State, the Treasury,  and Agriculture, USAID, and other civilian agencies; however, due in part  to a shortage of available personnel at those agencies, the command has  received limited interagency participation. Moreover, some federal  government agencies do not have the necessary capabilities to support  their national security roles and responsibilities. For example, in  September 2009 we reported that 31 percent of the State Department’s  generalists and specialists in language-designated positions did not meet  the language requirements for their position, an increase from 29 percent  in 2005. In addition, agencies’ personnel systems do not always facilitate  interagency collaboration, with interagency assignments often not being  considered career-enhancing or recognized in performance management  systems, which could diminish employees’ interest in serving in  interagency efforts. Two tools could facilitate federal agencies’ ability to  fully participate in interagency collaboration activities: (1) increasing  training opportunities, which can help personnel develop the skills and  understanding of other agencies’ capabilities needed to facilitate  interagency collaboration, and (2) focusing on strategic workforce  planning efforts, which can support agencies’ efforts to secure the  personnel resources needed to collaborate in interagency missions.
Share and integrate national security information across agencies.
Information is a crucial tool in national security and its timely  dissemination is critical for maintaining national security; however,  agencies do not always share relevant information with their national  security partners. More than 8 years after 9/11, federal, state, and local  governments and private-sector partners are making progress in sharing  terrorism-related information. For example, we reported in October 2007  that most states and many local governments had established fusion  centers—collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond  to criminal and terrorist activity—to address gaps in information sharing.  However, agencies may not always share all relevant information with  their national security partners for a variety of reasons, including a lack of  clear guidelines for sharing information with other agencies and security  clearance issues. For example, we reported in May 2007 that non-DOD  personnel could not access some DOD planning documents or participate  in planning sessions because they may not have had the proper security  clearances, hindering interagency participation in the development of  military plans. Additionally, we have found that incorporating  information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to managing  and integrating that information. For example, we reported in December  2008 that in Louisiana, reconstruction project information had to be  repeatedly resubmitted separately to state and Federal Emergency  Management Agency officials during post–Hurricane Katrina  reconstruction efforts because the system used to track project  information did not facilitate the exchange of documents. Information was  sometimes lost during this exchange, requiring state officials to resubmit  the information, creating redundancies and duplication of effort. As a  result, reconstruction efforts in Louisiana were delayed.
As we discuss in the enclosures, we have made a number of  recommendations to executive branch agencies, including DOD, the  Departments of State and Homeland Security, USAID, and others, to  address these issues in recent years. In commenting on draft reports,  agencies generally agreed with our recommendations and, in some cases,  identified planned actions or actions that were underway to address the  recommendations. While agencies have taken some actions to enhance  interagency collaboration, much work remains in developing and  implementing overarching strategies, creating collaborative organizations,  developing a well-trained workforce, and sharing and integrating national  security information across agencies.
The issues discussed in the attached enclosures are largely based on  completed GAO work. We reviewed GAO’s body of work on interagency  collaboration related to national security, which includes reports and  testimonies on a variety of issues, including stabilization and  reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD’s establishment of  U.S. Africa Command, planning and coordination for an influenza  pandemic, information sharing, critical infrastructure protection, disaster  recovery, acquisitions and contracting, strategic planning, human capital,  and foreign aid reform. We did not update the findings from those reports,  but are reporting our findings as of the time the prior reports were issued.  To frame the issues and place them in strategic context, we also examined  studies from U.S. government agencies and research institutions. We  developed the scope of these external studies through a literature review,  followed by contacts with key researchers and organizations to ensure  that our review included an overview of the significant work on challenges  to collaboration on national security. We conducted this performance  audit from February 2009 through September 2009. This report is generally  based on completed GAO work that was performed in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
We are sending copies of this report to the congressional committees  listed below. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the  President and the Vice President of the United States and executive  branch agencies. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web  site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions, please contact   Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4300 or stlaurentj@gao.gov or   Jacquelyn L. Williams Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or  williamsbridgersj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page  of this report. For press inquiries, please contact Charles Young at (202)  512-3823. Key contributors to this report are included in appendix I.
section_title: Enclosure I: Developing and Implementing Overarching Strategies to Enhance Collaboration for U.S. National Security
subsections: section_title: Issue Statement
paragraphs: National security challenges covering a broad array of areas, ranging from  preparedness for an influenza pandemic to Iraqi governance and  reconstruction, have necessitated using all elements of national power— including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance,  economic, and law enforcement support. These elements fall under the  authority of numerous U.S. government agencies, requiring overarching  strategies and plans to enhance agencies’ abilities to collaborate with each  other, as well as with foreign, state, and local governments and  nongovernmental partners. Without overarching strategies, agencies often  operate independently to achieve their own objectives, increasing the risk  of duplication or gaps in national security efforts that may result in  wasting scarce resources and limiting program effectiveness. Strategies  can enhance interagency collaboration by helping agencies develop  mutually reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes,  and performance measures for implementing those strategies.
Strategies can be focused on broad national security objectives, like the  National Security Strategy issued by the President, or on a specific  program or activity, like the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Strategies have been  developed by the Homeland Security Council, such as the National  Strategy for Homeland Security; jointly with multiple agencies, such as  the National Strategy for Maritime Security, which was developed jointly  by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security; or by an agency that  is leading an interagency effort, such as the National Intelligence  Strategy, which was developed under the leadership of the Office of the  Director of National Intelligence. Congress recognized the importance of  overarching strategies to guide interagency efforts, as shown by the  requirement in the fiscal year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act for  the President to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a  report on a comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and  strategic communication of the federal government, including benchmarks  and a timetable for achieving such benchmarks, by December 31, 2009.  Congress and the administration will need to examine the ability of the  executive branch to develop and implement overarching strategies to  enhance collaboration for national security efforts.
section_title: Key Findings
subsections: section_title: Although Some Agencies Have Developed Overarching Strategies, the Lack of Information on Roles and Responsibilities and Lack of Coordination Mechanisms Can Hinder Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: Although some U.S. government agencies have developed or updated  overarching strategies since September 11, 2001, the lack of information  on roles and responsibilities and lack of coordination mechanisms in these  strategies can hinder interagency collaboration. Our prior work, as well as  that by national security experts, has found that strategic direction is  required as the basis for collaboration toward national security goals.  Overarching strategies can help agencies overcome differences in  missions, cultures, and ways of doing business by providing strategic  direction for activities and articulating a common outcome to  collaboratively work toward. As a result, agencies can better align their  activities, processes, and resources to collaborate effectively to  accomplish a commonly defined outcome. Without having the strategic  direction that overarching strategies can provide, agencies may develop  their own individual efforts that may not be well-coordinated with that of  interagency partners, thereby limiting progress in meeting national  security goals. Defining organizational roles and responsibilities and  mechanisms for coordination—one of the desirable characteristics for  strategies that we have identified in our prior work—can help agencies  clarify who will lead or participate in which activities, organize their joint  activities and individual efforts, facilitate decision making, and address  how conflicts would be resolved.
The lack of overarching strategies that address roles and responsibilities  and coordination mechanisms—among other desirable characteristics that  we have identified in our prior work—can hinder interagency  collaboration for national security programs at home and abroad. We have  testified and reported that in some cases U.S. efforts have been hindered  by multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching  strategies detailing roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or  coordination mechanisms to integrate their efforts. For example, we have  found the following:    Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of  Defense (DOD)—had led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s  ministries to govern without overarching direction from a lead entity to  integrate their efforts. As we have testified and reported, the lack of an  overarching strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting their goal of  key Iraqi ministries having the capacity to effectively govern and assume  increasing responsibility for operating, maintaining, and further investing  in reconstruction projects.
In July 2008 we reported that agencies involved in the Trans-Sahara  Counterterrorism Partnership had not developed a comprehensive,  integrated strategy for the program’s implementation. The State  Department, USAID, and DOD had developed separate plans related to  their respective program activities that reflect some interagency  collaboration, for example, in assessing country needs for development  assistance. However, these plans did not incorporate all of the desirable  characteristics for strategies that we have previously identified. For  example, we found that roles and responsibilities—particularly between  the State Department and DOD—were unclear with regard to authority  over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct certain program  activities in African countries, and DOD officials said that disagreements  affected implementation of DOD’s activities in Niger. DOD suspended  most of its program activities in Niger in 2007 after the ambassador limited  the number of DOD personnel allowed to enter the country. State  Department officials said these limits were set in part because of embassy  concerns about the country’s fragile political environment as well as  limited space and staff available to support DOD personnel deployed to  partner countries.
At the time of our May 2007 review, we found that the State Department  office responsible for coordinating law enforcement agencies’ role in  combating terrorism had not developed or implemented an overarching  plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. law enforcement agencies to  assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.  Additionally, the national strategies related to this effort lacked clearly  defined roles and responsibilities. In one country we visited for that  review, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities led two law  enforcement agencies, which were unknowingly working with different  foreign law enforcement agencies, to move in on the same subject.  According to foreign and U.S. law enforcement officials, such actions may  have compromised other investigations. We also reported that because the  national strategies related to this effort did not clarify specific roles,  among other issues, law enforcement agencies were not being fully used  abroad to protect U.S. citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks.
In our work on the federal government’s pandemic influenza preparedness  efforts, we noted that the Departments of Homeland Security and Health  and Human Services share most federal leadership roles in implementing  the pandemic influenza strategy and supporting plans; however, we  reported that it was not clear how this would work in practice because  their roles were unclear. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza  and its supporting implementation plan described the Secretary of Health  and Human Services as being responsible for leading the medical response  in a pandemic, while the Secretary of Homeland Security would be  responsible for overall domestic incident management and federal  coordination. However, since a pandemic extends well beyond health and  medical boundaries, to include sustaining critical infrastructure, private- sector activities, the movement of goods and services across the nation  and the globe, and economic and security considerations, it is not clear  when, in a pandemic, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would  be in the lead and when the Secretary of Homeland Security would lead.  This lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities could lead to confusion or  disagreements among implementing agencies that could hinder  interagency collaboration, and a federal response could be slowed as  agencies resolve their roles and responsibilities following the onset of a  significant outbreak.
In March 2008, we reported that DOD and the intelligence community had  not developed, agreed upon, or issued a national security space strategy.  The United States depends on space assets to support national security  activities, among other activities. Reports have long recognized the need  for a strategy to guide the national security space community’s efforts in  space and better integrate the activities of DOD and the intelligence  community. Moreover, Congress found in the past that DOD and the  intelligence community may not be well-positioned to coordinate certain  intelligence activities and programs to ensure unity of effort and avoid  duplication of efforts. We reported that a draft strategy had been  developed in 2004, but according to the National Security Space Office  Director, the National Security Council requested that the strategy not be  issued until the revised National Space Policy directive was released in  October 2006. However, once the policy was issued, changes in leadership  at the National Reconnaissance Office and Air Force, as well as  differences in opinion and organizational differences between the defense  and intelligence communities further delayed issuance of the strategy.  Until a national security space strategy is issued, the defense and  intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions  and use resources that are not necessarily based on national priorities,  which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations and  redundancies in others.
We testified in March 2009 that as the current administration clarifies its  new strategy for Iraq and develops a new comprehensive strategy for  Afghanistan, these strategies should incorporate the desirable  characteristics we have previously identified. This includes, among other  issues, the roles and responsibilities of U.S. government agencies, and  mechanisms and approaches for coordinating the efforts of the wide  variety of U.S. agencies and international organizations—such as DOD, the  Departments of State, the Treasury, and Justice, USAID, the United  Nations, and the World Bank—that have significant roles in Iraq and  Afghanistan. Clearly defining and coordinating the roles, responsibilities,  commitments, and activities of all organizations involved would allow the  U.S. government to prioritize the spending of limited resources and avoid  unnecessary duplication.
section_title: Past GAO Recommendations
paragraphs: In recent years we have issued reports recommending that U.S.  government agencies, including DOD, the State Department, and others,  develop or revise strategies to incorporate desirable characteristics for  strategies for a range of programs and activities including humanitarian  and development efforts in Somalia, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism  Partnership, foreign assistance strategy, law enforcement agencies’ role in  assisting foreign nations in combating terrorism, and meeting U.S. national  security goals in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In  commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with  our recommendations. Officials from one organization—the National  Counterterrorism Center—noted that at the time of our May 2007 report  on law enforcement agencies’ role in assisting foreign nations in  combating terrorism, it had already begun to implement our  recommendations.
section_title: Oversight Questions
paragraphs: What steps are agencies taking to develop joint or mutually supportive  strategies to guide interagency activities?
What obstacles or impediments exist to developing comprehensive  strategies or plans that integrate multiple agencies’ efforts?
What specific national security challenges would be best served by  overarching strategies?
Who should be responsible for determining and overseeing these  overarching strategies? Who should be responsible for developing the  shared outcomes?
How will agencies ensure effective implementation of overarching  strategies?
To what extent do strategies developed by federal agencies clearly identify  priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results?
What steps are federal agencies taking to ensure coordination of planning  and implementation of strategies with state and local governments when  appropriate?
section_title: Enclosure II: Creating Collaborative Organizations That Facilitate Integrated National Security Approaches
subsections: section_title: Issue Statement
paragraphs: U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State, the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of  Defense (DOD), among others, spend billions of dollars annually on  various diplomatic, development, and defense missions in support of  national security. At a time when our nation faces increased fiscal  constraints, it is increasingly important that agencies use their resources  efficiently and effectively. Achieving meaningful results in many national  security–related interagency efforts requires coordinated efforts among  various actors across federal agencies; foreign, state, and local  governments; nongovernment organizations; and the private sector. Given  the number of agencies involved in U.S. government national security  efforts, it is particularly important that there be mechanisms to coordinate  across agencies. However, differences in agencies’ structures, processes,  and resources can hinder successful collaboration in national security, and  adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate collaboration during  national security planning and execution are not always in place. Congress  and the administration will need to consider the extent to which agencies’  existing structures, processes, and funding sources facilitate interagency  collaboration and whether changes could enhance collaboration.
section_title: Key Findings
subsections: section_title: Organizational Differences Can Hinder Collaboration on National Security Activities
paragraphs: Based on our prior work, organizational differences—including  differences in organizational structures, planning processes, and funding  sources—can hinder interagency collaboration, resulting in a patchwork  of activities that can waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness  of federal efforts.
Differences in organizational structures can hinder collaboration for  national security efforts. Agencies involved in national security activities  define and organize their regions differently. For example, DOD’s regional  combatant commands and the State Department’s regional bureaus are  aligned differently, as shown in figure 1.
In addition to regional bureaus, the State Department is organized to  interact bilaterally through U.S. embassies located within other countries.  As a result of these differing structures, our prior work and that of  national security experts has found that agencies must coordinate with a  large number of organizations in their regional planning efforts, potentially  creating gaps and overlaps in policy implementation and leading to  challenges in coordinating efforts among agencies. For example, as the  recent report by the Project on National Security Reform noted, U.S.  government engagement with the African Union requires two of the State  Department’s regional bureaus, one combatant command (however,  before October 2008, such efforts would have required coordination with  three combatant commands), two USAID bureaus, and the U.S.  ambassador to Ethiopia. Similarly, in reporting on the State Department’s  efforts to develop a framework for planning and coordinating U.S.  reconstruction and stabilization operations, the State Department noted  that differences between the organizational structure of civilian agencies  and that of the military could make coordination more difficult, as we  reported in November 2007.
Agencies also have different planning processes that can hinder  interagency collaboration efforts. Specifically, in a May 2007 report on  interagency planning for stability operations, we noted that some civilian  agencies, like the State Department, focus their planning efforts on current  operations. In contrast, DOD is required to plan for a wide range of current  and potential future operations. Such differences are reflected in their  planning processes: we reported that the State Department does not  allocate its planning resources in the same way as DOD and, as such, does  not have a large pool of planners to engage in DOD’s planning process. We  found almost universal agreement among all organizations included in that  review—including DOD, the State Department, and USAID—that there  needed to be more interagency coordination in planning. However, we  have previously reported that civilian agencies generally did not receive  military plans for comment as they were developed, which restricted  agencies’ ability to harmonize plans. Interagency collaboration during plan  development is important to achieving a unified government approach in  plans; however, State Department officials told us during our May 2007  review that DOD’s hierarchical approach, which required Secretary of  Defense approval to present aspects of plans to the National Security  Council for interagency coordination, limited interagency participation in  the combatant commands’ plan development and had been a significant  obstacle to achieving a unified governmentwide approach in those plans.  DOD has taken some steps to involve other agencies in its strategic  planning process through U.S. Africa Command. As we reported in  February 2009, in developing its theater campaign plan, U.S. Africa  Command was one of the first combatant commands to employ DOD’s  new planning approach, which called for collaboration among federal  agencies to ensure activities are integrated and synchronized in pursuit of  common goals. U.S. Africa Command officials met with representatives  from 16 agencies at the beginning of the planning process to gain  interagency input on its plan. While a nascent process, involving other U.S.  government agencies at the beginning of the planning process may result  in a better informed plan for DOD’s activities in Africa.
Moreover, agencies have different funding sources for national security  activities. Funding is budgeted for and appropriated by agency, rather than  by functional area (such as national security or foreign aid). The  Congressional Research Service reported in December 2008 that because  of this agency focus in budgeting and appropriations, there is no forum to  debate which resources or combination of resources to apply to efforts,  like national security, that involve multiple agencies and, therefore, the  President’s budget request and congressional appropriations tend to  reflect individual agency concerns. As we have previously testified, the  agency-by-agency focus of the budget does not provide for the needed  integrated perspective of government performance envisioned by the  Government Performance and Results Act. Moreover, we reported in  March 2008 that different funding arrangements for defense and national  intelligence activities may complicate DOD’s efforts to incorporate  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. While DOD  develops the defense intelligence budget, some DOD organizations also  receive funding through the national intelligence budget, which is  developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to provide  support for national intelligence efforts. According to a DOD official,  disagreement about equitable funding from each budget led to the initial  operating capability date being pushed back 1 year for a new space radar  system. In an April 2008 Comptroller General forum on enhancing  partnerships for countering transnational terrorism, some participants  suggested that funding overall objectives—such as counterterrorism— rather than funding each agency would provide flexibility to allocate  funding where it was needed and would have the most effect. Similarly,  as part of the national security reform debate, some have recommended  instituting budgeting and appropriations processes—with corresponding  changes to oversight processes—based on functional areas to better  ensure that the U.S. national security strategy aligns with resources  available to implement it.
Agencies receive different levels of appropriations that are used to fund all  aspects of an agency’s operations, to include national security activities.  As shown in figure 2, DOD receives significantly more funding than other  key agencies involved in national security activities, such as the  Departments of State and Homeland Security.
As shown in figure 3, DOD also has a significantly larger workforce than  other key agencies involved in national security activities. As of the end of  fiscal year 2008, DOD reported having 1.4 million active duty military  personnel and about 755,000 government employees, while the State  Department and Department of Homeland Security reported having almost  31,000 government employees and almost 219,000 government employees  and military personnel, respectively.
Because of its relatively large size—in terms of appropriations and  personnel—DOD has begun to perform more national security–related  activities than in the past. For example, as the Congressional Research  Service reported in January 2009, the proportion of DOD foreign  assistance funded through the State Department has increased from 7  percent of bilateral official development assistance in calendar year 2001  to an estimated 20 percent in 2006, largely in response to stabilization and  reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Secretaries of Defense and State have testified and stated that  successful collaboration among civilian and military agencies requires  confronting the disparity in resources, including providing greater capacity  in the State Department and USAID to allow for effective civilian response  and civilian-military partnership. In testimonies in April 2008 and May  2009, the former and current Secretaries of State, respectively, explained  that the State Department was taking steps to become more capable and  ready to handle reconstruction and development tasks in coordination  with DOD. Specifically, former Secretary of State Rice explained that the  State Department had redeployed diplomats from European and  Washington posts to countries of greater need; sought to increase the size  of the diplomatic corps in the State Department and USAID; and was  training diplomats for nontraditional roles, especially stabilization and  reconstruction activities. Additionally, the current Secretary of State  noted in testimonies before two congressional committees that the State  Department is working with DOD and will be taking back the resources to  do the work that the agency should be leading, but did not elaborate on  which activities this included. Enclosure III of this report further  discusses the human capital issues related to interagency collaboration for  national security.
section_title: Some Agencies Have Established Mechanisms to Integrate Efforts, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Some agencies have established mechanisms to facilitate interagency  collaboration—a critical step in achieving integrated approaches to  national security—but challenges remain in collaboration efforts. We have  found in our prior work on enhancing interagency collaboration that  agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by  establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate  across agency boundaries, among other practices.
Some agencies have established and formalized coordination mechanisms  to facilitate interagency collaboration. For example:    At the time of our review, DOD’s U.S. Africa Command had undertaken  efforts to integrate personnel from other U.S. government agencies into its  command structure because the command is primarily focused on  strengthening security cooperation with African nations and creating  opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, which are  activities that traditionally require coordination with other agencies.  DOD’s other combatant commands have also established similar  coordination mechanisms. National security experts have noted that U.S.  Southern Command has been relatively more successful than some other  commands in its collaboration efforts and attributed this success, in part,  to the command’s long history of interagency operations related to  domestic disaster response and counterdrug missions.
As we reported in March 2009, an intelligence component of the Drug  Enforcement Administration rejoined the intelligence community in 2006  to provide a link to coordinate terrorism and narcotics intelligence with all  intelligence community partners. According to a Department of Justice  Office of the Inspector General report, intelligence community partners  found the Drug Enforcement Administration’s intelligence valuable in their  efforts to examine ongoing threats.
DOD, State Department, and USAID officials have established processes to  coordinate projects related to humanitarian relief and reconstruction  funded through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and  Section 1206 program. We reported in June 2008 that Multinational  Corps–Iraq guidance required DOD commanders to coordinate  Commander’s Emergency Response Program projects with various  elements, including local government agencies, civil affairs elements, and  Provincial Reconstruction Teams. DOD, State Department, and USAID  officials we interviewed for that review said that the presence of the  Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as well as embedded teams, had  improved coordination among programs funded by these agencies and the  officials were generally satisfied with the coordination that was taking  place. Similarly, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act  of 2006 gave DOD the authority to spend a portion of its own  appropriations to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake  counterterrorism and stability operations. The State Department and DOD  must jointly formulate all projects and coordinate their implementation  and, at the time of our review, the agencies had developed a coordinated  process for jointly reviewing and selecting project proposals. We found  that coordination in formulating proposals did not occur consistently  between DOD’s combatant commands and the State Department’s  embassy teams for those projects formulated in fiscal year 2006; however,  officials reported better coordination in the formulation of fiscal year 2007  proposals.
While some agencies have established mechanisms to enhance  collaboration, challenges remain in facilitating interagency collaboration.  We have found that some mechanisms are not formalized, may not be fully  utilized, or have difficulty gaining stakeholder support, thus limiting their  effectiveness in enhancing interagency collaboration.
Some mechanisms may be informal. In the absence of formal  coordination mechanisms, some agencies have established informal  coordination mechanisms; however, by using informal coordination  mechanisms, agencies could end up relying on the personalities of officials  involved to ensure effective collaboration. At DOD’s U.S. Northern  Command, for example, we found that successful collaboration on the  command’s homeland defense plan between the command and an  interagency planning team was largely based on the dedicated  personalities involved and the informal meetings and teleconferences they  instituted. In that report we concluded that without institutionalizing the  interagency planning structure, efforts to coordinate with agency partners  may not continue when personnel move to their next assignments.
Some mechanisms may not be fully utilized. While some agencies have  put in place mechanisms to facilitate coordination on national security  activities, some mechanisms are not always fully utilized. We reported in  October 2007 that the industry-specific coordinating councils that the  Department of Homeland Security established to be the primary  mechanism for coordinating government and private-sector efforts could  be better utilized for collaboration on pandemic influenza preparedness.  Specifically, we noted that these coordinating councils were primarily  used to coordinate in a single area, sharing information across sectors and  government, rather than to address a range of other challenges, such as  unclear roles and responsibilities between federal and state governments  in areas such as state border closures and vaccine distribution. In  February 2009, Department of Homeland Security officials informed us  that the department was working on initiatives to address potential  coordination challenges in response to our recommendation.
Some mechanisms have limited support from key stakeholders. While  some agencies have implemented mechanisms to facilitate coordination,  limited support from stakeholders can hinder collaboration efforts. Our  prior work has shown that agencies’ concerns about maintaining  jurisdiction over their missions and associated resources can be a  significant barrier to interagency collaboration. For example, DOD  initially faced resistance from key stakeholders in the creation of the U.S.  Africa Command, in part due to concerns expressed by State Department  officials that U.S. Africa Command would become the lead for all U.S.  government activities in Africa, even though embassies lead decision  making on U.S. government noncombat activities conducted in a country.
section_title: Past GAO Recommendations
paragraphs: In recent years we have issued reports recommending that the Secretaries  of Defense, State, and Homeland Security and the Attorney General take a  variety of actions to address creating collaborative organizations,  including taking actions to    provide implementation guidance to facilitate interagency participation  and develop clear guidance and procedures for interagency efforts,    develop an approach to overcome differences in planning processes,    create coordinating mechanisms, and    clarify roles and responsibilities.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred  with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned  actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2008  report on U.S. Northern Command’s plans, we recommended that clear  guidance be developed for interagency planning efforts and DOD stated  that it had begun to incorporate such direction in its major planning  documents and would continue to expand on this guidance in the future.
section_title: Oversight Questions
paragraphs: What processes, including internal agency processes, are hindering further  interagency collaboration and what changes are needed to address these  challenges?
What are the benefits of and barriers to instituting a function-based  budgeting and appropriations process?
What resources or authorities are needed to further support integrated or  mutually supportive activities across agencies?
What steps are being taken to create or utilize structures or mechanisms to  develop integrated or mutually supportive plans and activities?
What is the appropriate role for key agencies in various national security– related activities?
What strategies might Congress and agencies use to address challenges  presented by the various funding sources?
section_title: Enclosure III: Developing a Workforce to Enhance Collaboration in U.S. National Security
subsections: section_title: Issue Statement
paragraphs: As the threats to national security have evolved over the past decades, so  have the skills needed to prepare for and respond to those threats. To  effectively and efficiently address today’s national security challenges,  federal agencies need a qualified, well-trained workforce with the skills  and experience that can enable them to integrate the diverse capabilities  and resources of the U.S. government. However, federal agencies do not  always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the  right time to meet the challenges they face, to include having a workforce  that is able to deploy quickly to address crises. Moreover, personnel often  lack knowledge of the processes and cultures of the agencies with which  they must collaborate. To help federal agencies develop a workforce that  can enhance collaboration in national security, Congress and the  administration may need to consider legislative and administrative  changes needed to build personnel capacities, enhance personnel systems  to promote interagency efforts, expand training opportunities, and  improve strategic workforce planning, thereby enabling a greater ability to  address national security in a more integrated manner.
section_title: Key Findings
subsections: section_title: Some Agencies Lack Personnel Capacity to Fully Participate in Interagency Activities
paragraphs: Collaborative approaches to national security require a well-trained  workforce with the skills and experience to integrate the government’s  diverse capabilities and resources, but some federal government agencies  may lack the personnel capacity to fully participate in interagency  activities. When we added strategic human capital management to our  governmentwide high-risk list in 2001, we explained that “human capital  shortfalls are eroding the ability of many agencies—and threatening the  ability of others—to effectively, efficiently, and economically perform  their missions.” We also have reported that personnel shortages can  threaten an organization’s ability to perform missions efficiently and  effectively. Moreover, some agencies also lack the capacity to deploy  personnel rapidly when the nation’s leaders direct a U.S. response to  crises. As a result, the initial response to a crisis could rely heavily on the  deployment of military forces and require military forces to conduct  missions beyond their core areas of expertise.
Some federal government agencies have taken steps to improve their  capacity to participate in interagency activities. For example, in response  to a presidential directive and a State Department recommendation to  provide a centralized, permanent civilian capacity for planning and  coordinating the civilian response to stabilization and reconstruction  operations, the State Department has begun establishing three civilian  response entities to act as first responders to international crises. Despite  these efforts, we reported in November 2007 that the State Department has  experienced difficulties in establishing permanent positions and recruiting  for one of these entities, the Active Response Corps. Similarly, we also  reported that other agencies that have begun to develop a stabilization and  reconstruction response capacity, such as the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) and the Department of the Treasury,  have limited numbers of staff available for rapid responses to overseas  crises.
Moreover, some federal government agencies are experiencing personnel  shortages that have impeded their ability to participate in interagency  activities. For example, in February 2009 we reported that the Department  of Defense’s (DOD) U.S. Africa Command was originally intended to have  significant interagency representation, but that of the 52 interagency  positions DOD approved for the command, as of October 2008 only 13 of  these positions had been filled with experts from the State, Treasury, and  Agriculture Departments; USAID; and other federal government agencies.  Embedding personnel from other federal agencies was considered  essential by DOD because these personnel would bring knowledge of their  home agencies into the command, which was expected to improve the  planning and execution of the command’s programs and activities and  stimulate collaboration among U.S. government agencies. However, U.S.  Africa Command has had limited interagency participation due in part to  personnel shortages in agencies like the State Department, which initially  could only staff 2 of the 15 positions requested by DOD because the State  Department faced a 25 percent shortfall in mid-level personnel. In  addition, in November 2007 we reported that the limited number of  personnel that other federal government agencies could offer hindered  efforts to include civilian agencies into DOD planning and exercises.
Furthermore, some interagency coordination efforts have been impeded  because agencies have been reluctant to detail staff to other organizations  or deploy them overseas for interagency efforts due to concerns that the  agency may be unable to perform its work without these employees. For  example, we reported in October 2007 that in the face of resource  constraints, officials in 37 state and local government information fusion  centers—collaborative efforts intended to detect, prevent, investigate, and  respond to criminal and terrorist activity—said they encountered  challenges with federal, state, and local agencies not being able to detail  personnel to their fusion center. Fusion centers rely on such details to  staff the centers and enhance information sharing with other state and  local agencies. An official at one fusion center said that, because of  already limited resources in state and local agencies, it was challenging to  convince these agencies to contribute personnel to the center because  they viewed doing so as a loss of resources. Moreover, we reported in  November 2007 that the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for  Reconstruction and Stabilization had difficulty getting the State  Department’s other units to release Standby Response Corps volunteers to  deploy for interagency stabilization and reconstruction operations because  the home units of these volunteers did not want to become short-staffed or  lose high-performing staff to other operations. In the same report, we also  found that other agencies reported a reluctance to deploy staff overseas or  establish on-call units to support interagency stabilization and  reconstruction operations because doing so would leave fewer workers  available to complete the home offices’ normal work requirements.
In addition to the lack of personnel, many national security experts argue  that federal government agencies do not have the necessary capabilities to  support their national security roles and responsibilities. For example, in  September 2009, we reported that 31 percent of the State Department’s  Foreign Service generalists and specialists in language-designated  positions worldwide did not meet both the language speaking and reading  proficiency requirements for their positions as of October 2008, up from 29  percent in 2005. To meet these language requirements, we reported that  the State Department efforts include a combination of language training,  special recruitment incentives for personnel with foreign language skills,  and bonus pay to personnel with proficiency in certain languages, but the  department faces several challenges to these efforts, particularly staffing  shortages that limit the “personnel float” needed to allow staff to take  language training. Similarly, we reported in September 2008 that USAID  officials at some overseas missions told us that they did not receive  adequate and timely acquisition and assistance support at times, in part  because the numbers of USAID staff were insufficient or because the  USAID staff lacked necessary competencies. National security experts  have expressed concerns that unless the full range of civilian and military  expertise and capabilities are effective and available in sufficient capacity,  decision makers will be unable to manage and resolve national security  issues.
In the absence of sufficient personnel, some agencies have relied on  contractors to fill roles that traditionally had been performed by  government employees. As we explained in October 2008, DOD, the State  Department, and USAID have relied extensively on contractors to support  troops and civilian personnel and to oversee and carry out reconstruction  efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the use of contractors to support  U.S. military operations is not new, the number of contractors and the  work they were performing in Iraq and Afghanistan represent an increased  reliance on contractors to carry out agency missions. Moreover, as  agencies have relied more heavily on contractors to provide professional,  administrative, and management support services, we previously reported  that some agencies had hired contractors for sensitive positions in  reaction to a shortfall in the government workforce rather than as a  planned strategy to help achieve an agency mission. For example, our  prior work has shown that DOD relied heavily on contractor personnel to  augment its in-house workforce. In our March 2008 report on defense  contracting issues, we reported that in 15 of the 21 DOD offices we  reviewed, contractor personnel outnumbered DOD personnel and  constituted as much as 88 percent of the workforce. While use of  contractors provides the government certain benefits, such as increased  flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs, we and others have raised  concerns about the federal government’s services contracting. These  concerns include the risk of paying more than necessary for work, the risk  of loss of government control over and accountability for policy and  program decisions, the potential for improper use of personal services  contracts, and the increased potential for conflicts of interest.
Given the limited civilian capacity, DOD has tended to become the default  responder to international and domestic events, although DOD does not  always have all of the needed expertise and capabilities possessed by  other federal government agencies. For example, we reported in May 2007  that DOD was playing an increased role in stability operations activities,  an area that DOD directed be given priority on par with combat operations  in November 2005. These activities required the department to employ an  increasing number of personnel with specific skills and capabilities, such  as those in civil affairs and psychological operations units. However, we  found that DOD had encountered challenges in identifying stability  operations capabilities and had not yet systematically identified and  prioritized the full range of needed capabilities. While the services were  each pursuing efforts to improve current capabilities, such as those  associated with civil affairs and language skills, we stated that these  initiatives may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that would  be needed to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future.  Since then, DOD has taken steps to improve its capacity to develop and  maintain capabilities and skills to perform tasks such as stabilization and  reconstruction operations. For example, in June 2009, we noted the  increased emphasis that DOD has placed on improving the foreign  language and regional proficiency of U.S. forces.
In February 2009, the Secretary of Defense acknowledged that the military  and civilian elements of the United States’ national security apparatus  have grown increasingly out of balance, and he attributed this problem to  a lack of civilian capacity. The 2008 National Defense Strategy notes that  greater civilian participation is necessary both to make military operations  successful and to relieve stress on the military. However, national security  experts have noted that while rhetoric about the importance of  nonmilitary capabilities has grown, funding and capabilities have remained  small compared to the challenge. As a result, some national security  experts have expressed concern that if DOD continues in this default  responder role, it could lead to the militarization of foreign policy and may  exacerbate the lack of civilian capacity. Similarly, we reported in  February 2009 that State Department and USAID officials, as well as many  nongovernmental organizations, believed that the creation of the U.S.  Africa Command could blur the traditional boundaries among diplomacy,  development, and defense, regardless of DOD’s intention that this  command support rather than lead U.S. efforts in Africa, thereby giving the  perception of militarizing foreign policy and aid.
section_title: Agencies’ Personnel Systems Do Not Always Facilitate Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: Agencies’ personnel systems do not always facilitate interagency  collaboration, with interagency assignments often not being considered  career-enhancing or recognized in agency performance management  systems, which could diminish agency employees’ interest in serving in  interagency efforts. For example, in May 2007 we reported that the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had difficulty filling permanent overseas  positions because the FBI did not provide career rewards and incentives  to agents or develop a culture that promoted the importance and value of  overseas duty. As a result, permanent FBI positions were either unfilled  or staffed with nonpermanent staff on temporary, short-term rotations,  which limited the FBI’s ability to collaborate with foreign nations to  identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. At the time of that review, the  FBI had just begun to implement career incentives to encourage staff to  volunteer for overseas duty, but we were unable to assess the effect of  these incentives on staffing problems because the incentives had just been  implemented. Moreover, in June 2009 we reviewed compensation policies  for six agencies that deployed civilian personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan,  and reported that variations in policies for such areas as overtime rate,  premium pay eligibility, and deployment status could result in monetary  differences of tens of thousands of dollars per year. OPM acknowledged  that laws and agency policy could result in federal government agencies  paying different amounts of compensation to deployed civilians at  equivalent pay grades who are working under the same conditions and  facing the same risks.
In addition, we previously identified reinforcing individual accountability  for collaborative efforts through agency performance management  systems as a key practice that can help enhance and sustain collaboration  among federal agencies. However, our prior work has shown that  assignments that involve collaborating with other agencies may not be  rewarded. For example, in April 2009 we reported that officials from the  Departments of Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, and the  Treasury stated that providing support for State Department foreign  assistance program processes creates an additional workload that is  neither recognized by their agencies nor included as a factor in their  performance ratings. Furthermore, agency personnel systems may not  readily facilitate assigning personnel from one agency to another, which  could hinder interagency collaboration. For example, we testified in July  2008 that, according to DOD officials, personnel systems among federal  agencies were incompatible, which did not readily facilitate the  assignment of non-DOD personnel into the new U.S. Africa Command.
section_title: Training Opportunities and Strategic Workforce Planning Could Facilitate Collaboration
paragraphs: Increased training opportunities and focusing on strategic workforce  planning efforts are two tools that could facilitate federal agencies’ ability  to fully participate in interagency collaboration activities. We have  previously testified that agencies need to have effective training and  development programs to address gaps in the skills and competencies that  they identified in their workforces. Training and developing personnel to  fill new and different roles will play a crucial part in the federal  government’s endeavors to meet its transformation challenges. Some  agencies have ongoing efforts to educate senior leaders about the  importance of interagency collaboration. For example, we reported in  February 2009 that DOD’s 2008 update to its civilian human capital  strategic plan identifies the need for senior leaders to understand  interagency roles and responsibilities as a necessary leadership  capability. We explained that DOD’s new Defense Senior Leader  Development Program focuses on developing senior leaders to excel in the  21st century’s joint, interagency, and multinational environment and  supports the governmentwide effort to foster interagency cooperation and  information sharing.
Training can help personnel develop the skills and understanding of other  agencies’ capabilities needed to facilitate interagency collaboration. A lack  of understanding of other agencies’ cultures, processes, and core  capabilities can hamper U.S. national security partners’ ability to work  together effectively. However, civilian professionals have had limited  opportunities to participate in interagency training or education  opportunities. For example, we reported in November 2007 that the State  Department did not have the capacity at that time to ensure that its  Standby Response Corps volunteers were properly trained for  participating in stabilization and reconstruction operations because the  Foreign Service Institute did not have the capacity to train the 1,500 new  volunteers the State Department planned to recruit in 2009.
Efforts such as the National Security Professional Development Program,  an initiative launched in May 2007, are designed to provide the training  necessary to improve the ability of U.S. government personnel to address a  range of interagency issues. When it is fully established and implemented,  this program is intended to use intergovernmental training and  professional education to provide national security professionals with a  breadth and depth of knowledge and skills in areas common to  international and homeland security. It is intended to educate national  security professionals in capabilities such as collaborating with other  agencies, and planning and managing interagency operations. A July 2008  Congressional Research Service report stated that many officials and  observers have contended that legislation would be necessary to ensure  the success of any interagency career development program because,  without the assurance that a program would continue into the future,  individuals might be less likely to risk the investment of their time, and  agencies might be less likely to risk the investment of their resources.  Some national security experts say that implementation of the program  has lagged, but that the program could be reenergized with high-level  attention. The Executive Director of the National Security Professional  Development Integration Office testified in April 2009 that the current  administration is in strong agreement with the overall intent for the  program and was developing a way ahead to build on past successes while  charting new directions where necessary.
Agencies also can use strategic workforce planning as a tool to support  their efforts to secure the personnel resources needed to collaborate in  interagency missions. In our prior work, we have found that tools like  strategic workforce planning and human capital strategies are integral to  managing resources as they enable an agency to define staffing levels,  identify critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or  mitigate gaps between current and future skills and competencies. In  designating strategic human capital management as a governmentwide  high-risk area in 2001, we explained that it is critically important that  federal agencies put greater focus on workforce planning and take the  necessary steps to build, sustain, and effectively deploy the skilled,  knowledgeable, diverse, and performance-oriented workforce needed to  meet the current and emerging needs of government and its citizens.
Strategic human capital planning that is integrated with broader  organizational strategic planning is critical to ensuring agencies have the  talent they need for future challenges, which may include interagency  collaboration. Without integrating strategic human capital planning with  broader organizational strategic planning, agencies may lose experienced  staff and talent. For example, in July 2009 we reported that the State  Department could not determine whether it met its objective of retaining  experienced staff while restructuring its Arms Control and  Nonproliferation Bureaus because there were no measurable goals for  retention of experienced staff. As a result, some offices affected by the  restructuring experienced significant losses in staff expertise.
Additionally, in March 2007 we testified that one of the critical needs  addressed by strategic workforce planning is developing long-term  strategies for acquiring, developing, motivating, and retaining staff to  achieve programmatic goals. We also stated that agencies need to  strengthen their efforts and use of available flexibilities to acquire,  develop, motivate, and retain talent to address gaps in talent due to  changes in the knowledge, skills, and competencies in occupations needed  to meet their missions. For example, in September 2008 we reported that  USAID lacked the capacity to develop and implement a strategic  acquisition and assistance workforce plan that could enable the agency to  better match staff levels to changing workloads because it had not  collected comprehensive information on the competencies—including  knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience levels—of its overseas  acquisition and assistance specialists. We explained that USAID could  use this information to better identify its critical staffing needs and adjust  its staffing patterns to meet those needs and address workload  imbalances. Furthermore, in December 2005 we reported that the Office of  the U.S. Trade Representative, a small trade agency that receives support  from other larger agencies (e.g., the Departments of Commerce, State, and  Agriculture) in doing its work, did not formally discuss or plan human  capital resources at the interagency level, even though it must depend on  the availability of these critical resources to achieve its mission. Such  interagency planning also would facilitate human capital planning by the  other agencies that work with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,  which stated that potential budget cuts could result in fewer resources  being available to support the trade agency. As a result, since the Office of  the U.S. Trade Representative did not provide the other agencies with  specific resource requirements when the agencies were planning, it shifted  the risk to the other agencies of having to later ensure the availability of  staff in support of the trade agenda, potentially straining their ability to  achieve other agency missions.
section_title: Past Recommendations
paragraphs: In recent years we have recommended that the Secretaries of State and  Defense, the Administrator of USAID, and the U.S. Trade Representative  take a variety of actions to address the human capital issues discussed  above, such as staffing shortfalls, training, and strategic planning.  Specifically, we have made recommendations to    develop strategic human capital management systems and undertake  strategic human capital planning,  include measurable goals in strategic plans,  identify the appropriate mix of contractor and government employees  needed and develop plans to fill those needs,    seek formal commitments from contributing agencies to provide personnel  to meet interagency personnel requirements,    develop alternative ways to obtain interagency perspectives in the event  that interagency personnel cannot be provided due to resource limitations,    develop and implement long-term workforce management plans, and  implement a training program to ensure employees develop and maintain  needed skills.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred  with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned  actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2009  report on foreign aid reform, we recommended that the State Department  develop a long-term workforce management plan to periodically assess its  workforce capacity to manage foreign assistance. The State Department  noted in its comments that it concurs with the idea of further improving  employee skill sets and would work to encourage and implement further  training.
section_title: Oversight Questions
paragraphs: What incentives are needed to encourage agencies to share personnel with  other agencies?
How can agencies overcome cultural differences to enhance collaboration  to achieve greater unity of effort?
How can agencies expand training opportunities for integrating civilian  and military personnel?
What changes in agency personnel systems are needed to address human  capital challenges that impede agencies’ ability to properly staff  interagency collaboration efforts?
What incentives are needed to encourage employees in national security  agencies to seek interagency experience, training, and work  opportunities?
How can agencies effectively meet their primary missions and support  interagency activities in light of the resource constraints they face?
How can agencies increase staffing of interagency functions across the  national security community?
What are the benefits and drawbacks to enacting legislation to support the  National Security Professional Development Program?
What legislative changes might enable agencies to develop a workforce  that can enhance collaboration in national security activities?
section_title: Enclosure IV: Sharing and Integrating National Security Information across Agencies
subsections: section_title: Issue Statement
paragraphs: The government’s single greatest failure preceding the September 11, 2001,  attacks was the inability of federal agencies to effectively share  information about suspected terrorists and their activities, according to  the Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission. As such, sharing and integrating  national security information among federal, state, local, and private- sector partners is critical to assessing and responding to current threats to  our national security. At the same time, agencies must balance the need to  share information with the need to protect it from widespread access.  Since January 2005, we have designated information sharing for homeland  security as high risk because the government has faced serious challenges  in analyzing key information and disseminating it among federal, state,  local, and private-sector partners in a timely, accurate, and useful way.  Although federal, state, local, and private-sector partners have made  progress in sharing information, challenges still remain in sharing, as well  as accessing, managing, and integrating information. Congress and the  administration will need to ensure that agencies remain committed to  sharing relevant national security information, increasing access to  necessary information, and effectively managing and integrating  information across multiple agencies.
section_title: Key Findings
subsections: section_title: Agencies Do Not Always Share Relevant Information
paragraphs: Our prior work has shown that agencies do not always share relevant  information with their national security partners, including other federal  government agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector.  Information is a crucial tool in addressing national security issues and its  timely dissemination is absolutely critical for maintaining national  security. Information relevant to national security includes terrorism- related information, drug intelligence, and planning information for  interagency operations. As a result of the lack of information sharing,  federal, state, and local governments may not have all the information they  need to analyze threats and vulnerabilities.
More than 8 years after 9/11, federal, state, and local governments, and  private-sector partners are making progress in sharing terrorism-related  information. For example, we reported in October 2007 that most states  and many local governments had established fusion centers— collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to  criminal and terrorist activity—to address gaps in information sharing. In  addition, in October 2008 we reported that the Department of Homeland  Security was replacing its information-sharing system with a follow-on  system. In our analysis of the follow-on system, however, we found that  the Department of Homeland Security had not fully defined requirements  or ways to better manage risks for the next version of its information- sharing system. Additionally, in January 2009 we reported that the  Department of Homeland Security was implementing an information- sharing policy and governance structure to improve how it collects,  analyzes, and shares homeland security information across the department  and with state and local partners.
Based on our prior work, we identified four key reasons that agencies may  not always share all relevant information with their national security  partners.
Concerns about agencies’ ability to protect shared information or use  that information properly. Since national security information is sensitive  by its nature, agencies and private-sector partners are sometimes hesitant  to share information because they are uncertain if that information can be  protected by the recipient or will be used properly. For example, in March  2006, we reported that Department of Homeland Security officials  expressed concerns about sharing terrorism-related information with state  and local partners because such information had occasionally been posted  on public Internet sites or otherwise compromised. Similarly, in April  2006, we reported that private-sector partners were reluctant to share  critical-infrastructure information—such as information on banking and  financial institutions, energy production, and telecommunications  networks—due to concerns on how the information would be used and  the ability of other agencies to keep that information secure.
Cultural factors or political concerns. Agencies may not share  information because doing so may be outside their organizational cultures  or because of political concerns, such as exposing potential vulnerabilities  within the agency. As we noted in enclosure II of this report, we stated in a  May 2007 report on interagency planning for stability operations that State  Department officials told us that the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  hierarchical approach to sharing military plans, which required Secretary  of Defense approval to present aspects of plans to the National Security  Council for interagency coordination, limited interagency participation in  the combatant commands’ plan development and had been a significant  obstacle to achieving a unified governmentwide approach in those plans.  Moreover, in our September 2009 report on DOD’s U.S. Northern  Command’s (NORTHCOM) exercise program, we noted that  inconsistencies with how NORTHCOM involved states in planning,  conducting, and assessing exercises occurred in part because  NORTHCOM officials lacked experience in dealing with the differing  emergency management structures, capabilities, and needs of the states.  Additionally, in our April 2008 report on NORTHCOM’s coordination with  state governments, we noted that the legal and historical limits of the  nation’s constitutional federal-state structure posed a unique challenge for  NORTHCOM in mission preparation. That is, NORTHCOM may need to  assist states with civil support, which means that NORTHCOM must  consider the jurisdictions of 49 state governments and the District of  Columbia when planning its missions. NORTHCOM found that some state  and local governments were reluctant to share their emergency response  plans with NORTHCOM for fear that DOD would “grade” their plans or  publicize potential capability gaps, with an accompanying political cost.
Lack of clear guidelines, policies, or agreements for coordinating with  other agencies. Agencies have diverse requirements and practices for  protecting their information, and thus may not share information without  clearly defined guidelines, policies, or agreements for doing so. We  reported in April 2008 that NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with  state emergency response plans because there were no guidelines for  gaining access to those plans. As a result, NORTHCOM did not know  what state capabilities existed, increasing the risk that NORTHCOM may  not be prepared with the resources needed to respond to homeland  defense and civil support operations. We also reported in March 2009  about the lack of information sharing between the Drug Enforcement  Administration (DEA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  Since 9/11, DEA has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts by  prioritizing drug-trafficking cases linked to terrorism. DEA partners with  federal, state, and local agencies—including ICE—to leverage  counternarcotics resources. However, at the time of that review, ICE did  not fully participate in two multiagency intelligence centers and did not  share all of its drug-related intelligence with DEA. In one center, ICE did  not participate because they did not have an agreement on the types of  data ICE would provide and how sensitive confidential source information  would be safeguarded. Without ICE’s drug-related intelligence, DEA could  not effectively target major drug-trafficking organizations due to the  potential for overlapping investigations and officer safety concerns.
Security clearance issues. Agencies often have different ways of  classifying information and different security clearance requirements and  procedures that pose challenges to effective information sharing across  agencies. In some cases, some national security partners do not have the  clearances required to access national security information. Specifically,  we reported in May 2007 that non-DOD personnel could not access some  DOD planning documents or participate in planning sessions because they  may not have had the proper security clearances, hindering interagency  participation in the development of military plans. Additionally, in  October 2007 we reported that some state and local fusion center officials  cited that the length of time needed to obtain clearances and the lack of  reciprocity, whereby an agency did not accept a clearance granted by  another agency, prevented employees from accessing necessary  information to perform their duties. In other cases, access to classified  information can be limited by one partner, which can hinder integrated  national security efforts. For example, we reported that DOD established  the National Security Space Office to integrate efforts between DOD and  the National Reconnaissance Office, a defense intelligence agency jointly  managed by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National  Intelligence. However, in 2005, the National Reconnaissance Office  Director withdrew full access to a classified information-sharing network  from the National Security Space Office, which inhibited efforts to further  integrate defense and national space activities, including intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance activities.
section_title: Managing and Integrating Information from Multiple Agencies Continues to Present Challenges
paragraphs: When agencies do share information, managing and integrating  information from multiple sources presents challenges regarding  redundancies in information sharing, unclear roles and responsibilities,  and data comparability. As the Congressional Research Service reported in  January 2008, one argument for fusing a broader range of data, including  nontraditional data sources, is to help create a more comprehensive threat  picture. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that because no one agency  or organization holds all relevant information, information from all  relevant sources needs to be integrated in order to “connect the dots.”  Without integration, agencies may not receive all relevant information.
Some progress had been made in managing and integrating information  from multiple agencies by streamlining usage of the “sensitive but  unclassified” designation. In March 2006, we reported that the large  number of sensitive but unclassified designations used to protect mission- critical information and a lack of consistent policies for their use created  difficulties in sharing information by potentially restricting material  unnecessarily or disseminating information that should be restricted. We  subsequently testified in July 2008 that the President had adopted  “controlled unclassified information” to be the single categorical  designation for sensitive but unclassified information throughout the  executive branch and outlined a framework for identifying, marking,  safeguarding, and disseminating this information. As we testified, more  streamlined definition and consistent application of policies for  designating “controlled but unclassified information” may help reduce  difficulties in sharing information; however, monitoring agencies’  compliance will help ensure that the policy is employed consistently  across the federal government.
Based on our previous work, we identified three challenges posed by  managing and integrating information drawn from multiple sources.
Redundancies when integrating information. Identical or similar types  of information are collected by or submitted to multiple agencies, so  integrating or sharing this information can lead to redundancies. For  example, we reported in October 2007 that in intelligence fusion centers,  multiple information systems created redundancies of information that  made it difficult to discern what was relevant. As a result, end users were  overwhelmed with duplicative information from multiple sources.  Similarly, we reported in December 2008 that in Louisiana, reconstruction  project information had to be repeatedly resubmitted separately to state  and Federal Emergency Management Agency officials during post– Hurricane Katrina reconstruction efforts because the system used to track  project information did not facilitate the exchange of documents.  Information was sometimes lost during this exchange, requiring state  officials to resubmit the information, creating redundancies and  duplication of effort. As a result, reconstruction efforts in Louisiana were  delayed.
Unclear roles and responsibilities. Agency personnel may be unclear  about their roles and responsibilities in the information-sharing process,  which may impede information-sharing efforts. For example, we reported  in April 2005 that officials in Coast Guard field offices did not clearly  understand their role in helping nonfederal employees through the  security clearance process. Although Coast Guard headquarters officials  requested that Coast Guard field officials submit the names of nonfederal  officials needing a security clearance, some Coast Guard field officials did  not clearly understand that they were responsible for contacting  nonfederal officials about the clearance process and thought that Coast  Guard headquarters was processing security clearances for nonfederal  officials. As a result of this misunderstanding, nonfederal employees did  not receive their security clearances in a timely manner and could not  access important security-related information that could have aided them  in identifying or deterring illegal activities.
Data may not be comparable across agencies. Agencies’ respective  missions drive the types of data they collect, and so data may not be  comparable across agencies. For example, we reported in October 2008  that biometric data, such as fingerprints and iris images, collected in DOD  field activities such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, were not comparable  with data collected by other units or with large federal databases that  store biometric data, such as the Department of Homeland Security  biometric database or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  fingerprint database. For example, if a unit collects only iris images, this  data cannot be used to match fingerprints collected by another unit or  agency, such as in the FBI fingerprint database. A lack of comparable data,  especially for use in DOD field activities, prevents agencies from  determining whether the individuals they encounter are friend, foe, or  neutral, and may put forces at risk.
section_title: Past Recommendations
paragraphs: Since 2005, we have recommended that the Secretaries of Defense,  Homeland Security, and State establish or clarify guidelines, agreements,  or procedures for sharing a wide range of national security information,  such as planning information, terrorism-related information, and  reconstruction project information. We have recommended that such  guidelines, agreements, and procedures    define and communicate how shared information will be protected;  include provisions to involve and obtain information from nonfederal  partners in the planning process;    ensure that agencies fully participate in interagency information-sharing  efforts;  identify and disseminate practices to facilitate more effective  communication among federal, state, and local agencies;    clarify roles and responsibilities in the information-sharing process; and    establish baseline standards for data collecting to ensure comparability  across agencies.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred  with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned  actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our December  2008 report on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s public  assistance grant program, we recommended that the Federal Emergency  Management Agency improve information sharing within the public  assistance process by identifying and disseminating practices that  facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local  entities. In comments on a draft of the report, the Federal Emergency  Management Agency generally concurred with the recommendation and  noted that it was making a concerted effort to improve collaboration and  information sharing within the public assistance process. Moreover,  agencies have implemented some of our past recommendations. For  example, in our April 2006 report on protecting and sharing critical  infrastructure information, we recommended that the Department of  Homeland Security define and communicate to the private sector what  information is needed and how the information would be used. The  Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendation  and, in response, has made available, through its public Web site, answers  to frequently asked questions that define the type of information collected  and what it is used for, as well as how the information will be accessed,  handled, and used by federal, state, and local government employees and  their contractors.
Oversight Questions    What steps are needed to develop and implement interagency protocols    What steps are being taken to promote access to relevant databases?  for sharing information?
How do agencies balance the need to keep information secure and the  need to share information to maximize interagency efforts?    How can agencies encourage effective information sharing?    What are ways in which the security clearance process can be streamlined  and security clearance reciprocity among agencies can be ensured?
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition, the following staff contributed to the report: John H.  Pendleton, Director; Marie Mak, Assistant Director; Hilary Benedict;  Cathleen Berrick; Renee Brown; Leigh Caraher; Grace Cho; Joe Christoff;  Elizabeth Curda; Judy McCloskey; Lorelei St. James; and Bernice  Steinhardt.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory  and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and  Regional Proficiency. GAO-09-568. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009.
Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation’s Planning and  Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. GAO-09-760T. Washington, D.C.:  June 3, 2009.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.  GAO-09-679SP. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2009.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and  Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response  Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-61. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.
Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency  Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current  Efforts. GAO-09-192. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges  to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies.  GAO-09-476T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2009.
Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland  Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further  Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. GAO-09-63.  Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,  Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs  Associated with the U.S. Africa Command. GAO-09-181. Washington,  D.C.: February 20, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of  Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in  Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide  Implementation and Assess Progress. GAO-08-637T. Washington, D.C.:   July 23, 2008.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in  Countering Transnational Terrorism. GAO-08-887SP. Washington, D.C.:  July 2008.
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a  Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian  Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability  Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to  Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.  GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and  Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,  D.C.: October 21, 2005.