DOD Space Systems: Additional Knowledge Would Better Support Decisions about Disaggregating Large Satellites
Published: 2014-10-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Fiscal constraints and growing threats to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring space-based capabilities, including disaggregating large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads (see graphic). A Senate Armed Services Committee report mandated GAO to assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of disaggregation and examine if it offers decreased costs and increased survivability for selected DOD satellite systems.
This report (1) describes potential benefits and limitations of disaggregation, and (2) assesses the extent to which DOD is ready to make informed decisions regarding disaggregating these systems. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from over 35 offices within DOD, civilian agencies, contractors, and third parties to compile a list of factors relating to potential impacts of disaggregation. GAO used these factors, along with prior GAO work on best practices and space acquisitions, as criteria for evaluating DOD's work to date on assessing disaggregation.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: It is not yet known whether and to what degree disaggregation can help the Department of Defense (DOD) reduce acquisition costs and increase the resilience of its satellite systems. Experts GAO spoke with identified an array of benefits and limitations. For example, acquiring smaller, less complex satellites may require less time and effort to develop and produce. On the other hand, a larger number of satellites may be needed to provide the same level of capability, and the transition from existing system designs could increase costs. Experts agree that decisionmaking would benefit from assessments that look beyond a single satellite program and consider the broad range of potential effects of disaggregation. Benefits and limitations aside, there are longstanding barriers to implementation. For instance, disaggregation could exacerbate delays in the delivery of user equipment and ground systems. As GAO has reported, such delays, tied to management and oversight shortcomings, have resulted in expensive satellites being in orbit for years with limited use.
DOD is examining whether disaggregation should be used for some of its space systems, but significant uncertainty—including how to quantify a broad range of potential effects—remains. For example, DOD has initiated and completed studies and demonstrations, including Analyses of Alternatives that examine disaggregated concepts for certain systems. These studies can provide initial insights, such as rough order of magnitude costs of selected disaggregated scenarios, but they are not intended to comprehensively assess the effects of disaggregation. Moreover, DOD does not have common measures for resilience—a key space system consideration—which may limit the effectiveness of these assessments. Additionally, while technology demonstrations are providing an avenue for gaining knowledge about disaggregation, they have been limited, concentrating more on technical than operational feasibility. Focusing more on operational feasibility would help to empirically quantify the effects of disaggregation and address implementation barriers. Until more knowledge is gained, disaggregation will not only remain inconclusive, but poorly informed decisions could be made in the interim.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Before making decisions to disaggregate DOD space systems, DOD should (1) comprehensively examine the full range of potential effects of disaggregation, (2) develop common measures for resilience, and (3) expand demonstration efforts to examine the operational feasibility of disaggregation. DOD concurred with the first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third. GAO continues to believe DOD should demonstrate the operational feasibility of disaggregation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to  develop, produce, and launch space systems. These systems provide the  government with communication methods, critical intelligence information,  weather data, and other capabilities vital to military and civilian agencies  and commercial operations. DOD is rethinking its approach to building  large, complex, multi-mission satellites. As satellites have become more  complex, they have required larger investments of money and time to  develop, produce, and launch. In addition, these satellites face growing  threats from adversary attacks, such as anti-satellite weapons and  communications jamming, to environmental hazards, such as orbital  debris. A single launch failure, on-orbit problem, or adversary attack on  one of these large satellites could result in the loss of billions of dollars of  investment and a significant loss of capability. The time it takes to  develop and construct a complex satellite can also be very lengthy. Some  satellites, which have taken more than a decade to develop, contain  technologies that have become obsolete by the time they are launched.
To address these challenges, DOD has begun considering alternative  approaches for acquiring space-based capabilities and plans to decide on  an acquisition approach over the next two to three years. One such  approach involves disaggregating, or breaking up, large satellites into  multiple, smaller satellites or payloads. Given preliminary indications that  DOD intends to pursue disaggregation to potentially reduce costs and  make satellite constellations more survivable, the Senate Armed Services  Committee, in its report accompanying S. 1197, a bill for the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, mandated that we assess  the potential benefits and drawbacks of disaggregating key military space  systems and examine if disaggregation offers decreased acquisition and  lifecycle costs and increased survivability of a satellite constellation  compared to more traditional acquisition approaches.1, 2 Committee mandated that we examine disaggregation concepts for  capabilities provided by three military space systems:
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), which provides  protected (survivable, jam-resistant, and secure) satellite  communications;
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which provides missile  warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace  awareness capabilities; and
Weather System Follow-on (WSF), which is to provide space-based  environmental monitoring (WSF has not yet begun product  development).
Because DOD has only recently begun assessing the concept of  disaggregation and a variety of unknowns remain, we were not in a  position to definitively determine the benefits and drawbacks of  disaggregation, including impacts on acquisition and lifecycle costs and  survivability. Consequently, we focused our review on (1) describing the  potential benefits and limitations of disaggregating military space systems  and (2) assessing the extent to which DOD is ready to make informed  decisions regarding disaggregating AEHF, SBIRS, and WSF.
A satellite constellation is a group of satellites acting in concert to perform a specific mission.
S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 165 (2013). In its report accompanying S. 1197, a bill for the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the Committee mandated that we report on the  results of our engagement by March 31, 2014. As agreed with Committee staff, we satisfied this  reporting requirement by including preliminary results of this engagement in our written statement for  a March 12, 2014 hearing on military space issues before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,  Senate Committee on Armed Services (see GAO, Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management  Continues to Improve but Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs, GAO-14-382T  (Washington, D.C., Mar. 12, 2014)), to be followed by this report. factors for consideration regarding disaggregation and subsequently  verified the list with those experts.
To assess the extent to which DOD is ready to make informed decisions  regarding disaggregating AEHF, SBIRS, and WSF, we identified criteria  based on the factors identified by experts and prior GAO work regarding  early acquisition planning and development efforts to minimize cost and  schedule growth. We then evaluated DOD’s work to date on assessing  disaggregation against these criteria to determine the extent to which  DOD’s efforts may provide the information necessary for sound  decisionmaking. Additional details on our scope and methodology are  provided in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to October  2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD is considering alternative approaches—including disaggregation—to  providing space-based capabilities to address challenges related to high- cost satellite programs and increasing threats to its space system  capabilities. The size, capability, and complexity of DOD’s satellites have  tended to increase over the years, making them more costly to build. For  example, Milstar, the protected communications satellite that preceded  AEHF, weighed about 10,000 pounds, whereas the AEHF satellite weighs  about 13,600 pounds and provides ten times the communications  capacity. Additionally, SBIRS satellites are more capable than the  Defense Support Program satellites they are to replace, offering greater  sensor sensitivity and supporting a broader set of missions. According to  DOD officials, it has made economic sense to maximize satellite  capabilities as much as launch vehicle constraints would allow to fully  utilize the capacity of the selected launch vehicle—which can cost well  over $100 million for the vehicles DOD primarily uses. Additionally,  certain requirements were consolidated to more efficiently provide  capabilities, that is, fewer but more capable satellites could execute more  missions than in the past.
This approach of building large, multifunctional satellites also increased  acquisition risks since the design and manufacturing of satellites became  more complex. Total acquisition costs for the AEHF satellite  constellation, for example, have more than doubled, from $6.7 billion at  program inception in 2001 to $14.5 billion currently. This was partially  due to the acquisition of an additional satellite, but also due to technical  challenges and associated schedule delays of about 6 years for the  launch of the first satellite. Our reports over the years have found that the  significant cost and schedule growth for AEHF, SBIRS, and the  environmental satellites DOD was acquiring in a similar fashion were  partly due to design and manufacturing complexity. We also reported  that DOD’s tendency to build large, monolithic satellites limited its ability  to provide capabilities sooner and contributed to higher costs through  developing extensive new designs, custom-made spacecraft, and  payloads to meet the needs of multiple users. At the same time, other  issues drove up costs for these programs including immature  technologies, requirements instability, concurrent development and  production, poor management and oversight, and reduced testing. We  have reported that DOD has taken actions to address many of these  issues, and in recent years, DOD has largely overcome cost and  schedule problems for the programs currently in production, and  additional satellites of the same design are now being launched.
Reducing acquisition cost and risk are not the only reasons DOD is  considering new approaches. According to Air Force Space Command,  U.S. space systems face intentional and unintentional threats, which have  increased rapidly over the past 20 years. These include radio frequency  interference (including jamming), laser dazzling and blinding, kinetic  intercept vehicles, and ground system attacks. Additionally, the hazards  of the already-harsh space environment (e.g., extreme temperature  fluctuations and radiation) have increased, including numbers of active  and inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies, and other fragments and  debris. In response, recent governmentwide and DOD strategic and  policy guidance have stressed the need for U.S. space systems to be  survivable or resilient against such threats.
According to the Air Force, to maintain protected satellite communications, SBIRS, and space based  environmental monitoring capabilities, new satellites and/or payloads would be needed beginning in  2024, 2025, and 2015, respectively. impacts of decisions could reach far beyond the space segment, affecting  ground control systems, satellite user equipment, and communications  networks.
While this report is focused on the concept of disaggregation, it is  important to note that DOD officials we spoke with stressed that  disaggregation is only one of a number of approaches DOD is  considering for its future space system designs. For example, in addition  to disaggregation, DOD is considering the possibility of making satellites  more maneuverable and building in defense capabilities to protect  themselves as a means to increase survivability. Another approach under  consideration is to evolve, or enhance, the capabilities of the large  multifunctional satellites DOD is currently building. According to these  officials, the primary considerations for studying these approaches and  making decisions on which to use relate to finding the right balance  between:
Affordability—the determination that the life cycle cost of a program is  in line with long-range plans;
Resilience—the ability of a system to support the functions necessary  for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions;and
Capability—the ability to execute specified actions.
To build consensus, and to conduct a more rigorous analysis of options,  DOD is currently conducting studies that will consider future system  architectures. Among these are Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs) that  compare the effectiveness, suitability, risks, and estimated costs of  alternatives for future protected satellite communications, SBIRS, and  space-based environmental monitoring.design and components to pursue is critical because most of a program’s  total life-cycle cost is influenced by decisions made before it is approved  to start development.
section_title: Disaggregation Offers an Array of Benefits and Limitations, but Significant Barriers to Implementation Exist
paragraphs: It is not yet known whether and to what extent disaggregation, on a broad  scale, can enable DOD to reduce acquisition costs and increase the  resilience of its satellite systems. DOD has had limited experience with  disaggregating satellites and is still in the relatively early stages of  quantifying the costs and benefits of disaggregating its satellites. The  potential benefits of disaggregation, such as reduced costs associated  with shorter development cycles and simpler designs, have been  discussed in various Air Force publications. But less has been said about  potential limitations, such as changes that would need to be made to  interconnect systems—such as ground stations, user equipment, and  communications networks—and the investment those changes would  require. Moreover, many potential benefits can also be accompanied by  drawbacks. For instance, with capabilities distributed across multiple  platforms, rather than centralized onto just a few satellites, it may be more  difficult for an adversary to target all assets to attack full system  capabilities. However, with increased numbers of satellites, the space  environment becomes more congested, increasing risk of radio frequency  interference and the potential for on-orbit contact with and damage from  debris or other assets. Given the breadth of impacts disaggregation can  have, it may not be possible to have complete knowledge of its effects.  But experts agree that decisionmaking would benefit from assessments  that look well beyond a single satellite program.
Further, even if DOD concludes disaggregation would have net positive  effects, there are significant longstanding barriers to implementation. For  instance, our work continues to find that there are time gaps—sometimes  years—in aligning the delivery of satellites with associated user  equipment and ground systems, which means that satellites may be in  orbit for a long time with limited use. Without resolving the leadership,  management, and oversight issues that have led to these delays, time  gaps may well be exacerbated by disaggregation. Furthermore,  disaggregation may require a more complex infrastructure and additional  investments to support the satellites.
subsections: section_title: Disaggregation Offers a Range of Potential Benefits and Limitations
paragraphs: DOD, civilian agencies, industry officials, and researchers have identified  a broad range of potential benefits and limitations associated with  disaggregating military space systems that span numerous aspects of  space systems acquisitions and operations. Views on the potential  benefits and limitations are widely distributed among the various experts,  even within DOD. Because these potential effects are dependent on  various disaggregation approaches and have not yet been validated in  practice for large, complex space systems, some points may appear to  contradict one another. Further, some potential effects may not be unique  to disaggregation, but may also apply to other changes from the current  approach. Tables 1 through 5 describe the potential benefits and  limitations in terms of affordability and life cycle costs, resilience,  capability, the acquisition process, and the industrial base identified by  experts. The contents of the tables are not exhaustive, but each of the  potential benefits and limitations included were identified by more than  one expert as important considerations for deciding whether to pursue a  disaggregated approach.
subsections: section_title: Affordability and Life Cycle Costs
paragraphs: Affordability—the feasibility of producing and supporting a program  throughout its life cycle and within budget—is one of the key drivers  behind considering disaggregation as an option, according to experts.  Disaggregation may offer a more affordable approach to providing  capabilities because of the potential for reduced per-satellite costs over  the long term. Acquiring smaller, less complex satellites may require less  time and effort to develop and produce, for example. This may be in part  due to improved requirements discipline, as more frequent production  rates may allow program managers to delay new requirements to the next  production cycle instead of incorporating them into ongoing timelines mid- stream. However, a larger number of small satellites may be needed to  provide the same level of capability overall, and the transition from  existing system designs to disaggregation could increase costs in the  near term. Additionally, given the current budget environment facing  DOD, the transition to a new approach may be cost prohibitive, as  resources may not be available to maintain and operate a legacy system  and develop and field a new system at the same time. Table 1 describes  how affordability could be impacted by disaggregation.
Another main driver experts cited for examining disaggregation is the  potential for increased resilience—the ability of a system to support the  functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or  adverse conditions, according to one DOD definition—of space systems.  Distributing capabilities across more satellites will increase the number  and diversity of potential targets for an adversary and may make it more  difficult for an adversary to decide which assets to attack, though some  argue an adversary may be more likely to attack disaggregated satellites  because they may be considered lower risk in terms of escalating  hostilities. Potential effects of disaggregation in terms of resilience are  listed in table 2.
Experts also cite capability—the ability to execute specified actions—as a  key driver for considering disaggregation. Some experts assert  disaggregation will offer enhanced space-based capability, largely due to  increased opportunities to insert new technologies, while others argue  that disaggregation may reduce capability overall by losing the combined  capacity achieved by operating multiple payloads on a single satellite.  Table 3 details the range of potential benefits and limitations of  disaggregation with respect to capability.
The acquisition process—the way DOD buys, develops, and produces  defense systems to provide capabilities to the warfighter—is another area  that may be impacted by disaggregation. According to some experts,  disaggregation may allow DOD to implement new business practices,  though others are concerned about the ability of the existing process to  manage smaller, more frequent acquisitions. Table 4 expands on the  potential benefits and limitations of disaggregation related to DOD’s  acquisition process.
Experts identified various potential effects on the industrial base—the  capacity to produce and maintain U.S. military services and equipment— due to disaggregation. Some stated disaggregation may provide greater  stability for the industrial base, while others said it may be more  disruptive, especially for existing suppliers. Details on potential benefits  and limitations for the industrial base due to disaggregation are provided  in table 5.
section_title: DOD Faces Significant Longstanding Barriers to Implementation
paragraphs: Benefits and limitations aside, there are significant, persistent barriers to  implementing a disaggregation approach. Most of these relate to  leadership shortcomings over systems and assets that need to work  together to deliver space-based capabilities, such as satellite control and  data processing facilities, user terminals, and satellite launch vehicles and  facilities. Figure 2 depicts these interdependent segments. For each of  these segments, DOD is already facing considerable management and  oversight challenges that disaggregation could well exacerbate.
Disaggregation could require DOD to make significant cultural and  process changes in how it acquires space systems—for instance by  relying on new contractors, relinquishing control to providers who host  government payloads on commercial satellites, using different contracting  methods, and executing smaller but more numerous and faster-paced  acquisition programs. It will likely require DOD to be more flexible and  agile when it comes to satellite acquisitions, especially with regard to  coordinating satellite delivery with interdependent systems, such as user  equipment. Yet, we have reported that DOD’s culture has generally been  resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented  responsibilities have made it very difficult to coordinate and deliver  interdependent systems. At present, although some improvements in  leadership have been made, there is still no single person or organization  that is held accountable for balancing needs against wants, ensuring  coordination among the many organizations involved with space systems  acquisitions, and ensuring that resources are directed where they are  most needed. These challenges pose barriers for even the best-run  efforts and they likely will be exacerbated and pose significant  implementation barriers if DOD decides to disaggregate its space  systems.
subsections: section_title: Gaps in the Delivery of Satellites, Ground Systems, and User Terminals
paragraphs: One of the principal, persistent outgrowths tied to fragmented leadership  is that development of satellites often outpaces that of ground systems  and user terminals (such as those on airplanes, ground vehicles, and  ships), leading to underutilized on-orbit satellites and delays in getting  new capabilities to end users. In some cases, gaps in delivery can add up  to years, meaning that a satellite is launched but not effectively used for  years until ground systems become available. One reason DOD has been  unable to align the delivery of space system segments is because  budgeting authority for the segments is spread across the military  services and there is no single authority to ensure programs are funded in  a manner that would align their deliveries. There are other reasons that  have contributed to gaps in the delivery of space system segments,  including poor acquisition management (requirements instability,  underestimation of technical complexity, and poor contractor oversight),  program funding instability, and changing information security  requirements. These challenges could intensify with the potentially  larger numbers and novel configurations of satellites, payloads, and other  components of a disaggregated approach.
section_title: Stove-Piped Satellite Control Networks
paragraphs: Over the past decade, DOD has increasingly deployed standalone  satellite control operations networks, which are designed to operate a  single satellite system, as opposed to shared systems that can operate  multiple kinds of satellites. Dedicated networks can offer many benefits to  programs, including possible lower risks and customization for a particular  program’s needs. However, we have reported they can also be more  costly and have led to a fragmented, and potentially duplicative, approach  which requires more infrastructure and personnel than shared operations.  Moreover, DOD has not embraced practices and technologies that could  reduce satellite control costs and increase efficiency. more satellites developed by a potentially broader base of suppliers, DOD  risks increasing its reliance on standalone satellite networks, especially  since it has lacked a long-term plan for satellite control operations.
section_title: Satellite Launch Costs
paragraphs: GAO, Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices Could Improve  DOD’s Operations, GAO-13-315 (Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2013). competition is focused on the larger launch vehicles DOD primarily uses  for its satellites.
section_title: DOD Has Begun to Examine Disaggregation for Its Space Systems but Has Yet to Verify Effects
paragraphs: DOD has initiated and completed studies and demonstrations, including  AOAs that examine disaggregated concepts for certain systems. While  AOAs and other studies can provide initial insights, such as rough order  of magnitude costs of selected disaggregated scenarios, they are not  intended to comprehensively assess the effects of disaggregation.  Moreover, the lack of common measures for key factors such as  resilience may limit the effectiveness of these assessments. Technology  demonstrations are providing an additional avenue for gaining knowledge  about disaggregation, but demonstrations to date have been limited,  concentrating more on technical feasibility and less on operational  feasibility.
subsections: section_title: DOD is Beginning to Develop Knowledge on Disaggregation but Lacks Key Assessment Measures
paragraphs: DOD has multiple ongoing and completed efforts to examine aspects of  disaggregation (see table 6). These include AOAs—which are designed  to identify a range of solutions that could provide needed capability and  support a decision on the most cost effective solution—as well as other  studies and demonstrations that assess the potential for applying  disaggregation concepts. We have reported on the important role of  AOAs in establishing a sound basis for initiating programs, including  providing insight into the technical feasibility and costs of alternatives.AOAs carry significant weight in the decisionmaking process, in part  because they involve participation and oversight by all military services.  Many of the other studies and demonstration projects related to  disaggregation are Air Force efforts with a focused application to Air  Force missions or programs.
It is too early to determine the extent to which the AOAs will assess  disaggregation for AEHF, SBIRS, and WSF because the AOAs are  ongoing. While DOD plans to assess a disaggregated scenario in each of  the AOAs for the mission areas of these programs, it is not yet clear how  thorough the assessments will be in terms of the potential benefits and  limitations experts identified. However, the intent of the AOAs is not to  examine the merits of disaggregation on its own, but rather as one of the  many options that may or may not provide solutions. The additional  studies beyond the AOAs have been useful in providing results to inform  the ongoing AOAs, officials told us, though some have been regarded as  inconclusive because they were not conducted with sufficient analytical  rigor or did not consider the capabilities, risks, and trades in a holistic  manner. For example, according to the Office of the Secretary of  Defense’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, one study  of satellite communication architectures contained insufficient data to  support the conclusion that one architectural approach was more resilient  than others. In addition, the study’s cost estimates did not consider  important factors, such as ground control and user terminal costs, in  calculating the implications of changing architectures. Other studies on  specific applications and system components of disaggregation may  provide useful information in those narrow areas, though they are not set  up to cover a broader range of potential impacts of disaggregation.
Further, DOD lacks common measures for resilience that can be used  consistently in AOAs and other analysis. DOD leaders have emphasized  resilience as a priority when considering future systems. For example,  officials told us DOD is conducting an internal review on various aspects  of space resilience in the strategic portfolio, which includes  disaggregation as one potential method for affecting resilience in the  space segment. Officials acknowledge the need for measures and DOD  is taking steps to develop them. For example, in February 2014, DOD  hosted a forum convening DOD and industry experts to discuss resilience  and work toward developing an agreed-upon taxonomy. The Space and  Missile Systems Center, under Air Force Space Command, is also  working to develop a standard assessment methodology to quantify the  resilience of proposed enhancements to certain systems, including  overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) and satellite communications  systems. These efforts may not be completed in time to apply common  measures across alternatives in the AOAs in our review; instead,  resilience will be assessed on a relative basis by comparing alternatives  and determining which is more or less resilient than another, Air Force  officials told us. Without a consistent method to measure resilience that  can be used across DOD, though, it may be difficult to determine how  much resilience is needed and whether an alternative meets that need.
section_title: Demonstration Projects Are Helping to Build Knowledge but Have Not Concentrated on Operational Aspects
paragraphs: Demonstration projects related to disaggregation have provided  technological insight and valuable lessons that DOD may use in future  projects. For example, the CHIRP program demonstrated how new  infrared sensor technology can be applied in OPIR missions and whether  the capability of commercial spacecraft technologies could support  mission needs. For future hosted payloads, DOD learned that it is better  to finish payload upgrades before contracting for launch and integration  services to prevent schedule delays and take advantage of cost savings.  DOD also learned that conducting the necessary up-front systems  engineering to better configure the payload for the host vehicle could help  ensure the payload’s performance without harming the host. The Defense  Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) System F6 project also  provided a lesson learned with regard to the utility of efforts not in direct  support of a mission. DARPA officials said the lack of a driving mission  behind System F6—which was initiated with technology development as  a goal rather than support of a specific mission—limited its ability to  directly inform operational systems. The project did provide useful  outcomes that could be applied to future disaggregated architectures,  though, such as the development of data management protocols for  managing multiple satellites.
While technology demonstrations have been playing an important role in  assessing the technical feasibility of disaggregation, they have not  focused on operational feasibility, that is, how to introduce a  disaggregated approach into a program of record and make it work from a  holistic perspective. This would include assessing, for example, how a potential technical or design change would impact contracting how it would impact interconnected systems such as ground terminals  and control stations and the extent to which changes would be  needed to these systems; how data from disaggregated satellites would be integrated and how information assurance would be maintained with hosting  operational payloads on commercial or foreign satellites.
In addition to studies and technology demonstrations, officials we  interviewed emphasized the importance of testing the operational viability  of disaggregation—to provide real data to assess the effectiveness of the  concept—and gaining practical experience by disaggregating a mission  system. Along these lines, we have previously recommended that DOD  follow an incremental path toward introducing significant advancements  or changes into weapon programs and ensure critical technologies are  proven to work. Though disaggregation may not be introducing  revolutionary technology changes, it may be introducing design,  architectural, and operational changes that could have far-reaching  effects.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Disaggregation of satellites may offer a viable option for addressing  affordability and resilience challenges that DOD is facing. But it is not a  simple solution. The changes to satellite designs that are being  contemplated could have far-reaching effects on requirements, supporting  infrastructure, management and oversight of acquisitions, industry, and  other areas. They could also require upfront investments—which, under  DOD’s current fiscal constraints, may not be feasible—and more  leadership attention. DOD does not yet have the knowledge it needs to  make changes on a wide scale nor has it addressed underlying  challenges to space acquisition that could be exacerbated by  disaggregation. Without a determined and disciplined effort to develop  information about the full range of disaggregation issues—including  operations—decisions on future space capabilities could be under- informed and opportunities missed. For example, a premature decision to  pursue a large-scale disaggregated design could lead to a poor  investment. Alternatively, aspiring programs could overlook the benefits of  disaggregation in favor of status-quo approaches.
DOD is taking steps to gain knowledge, particularly in terms of technical  feasibility, costs, and technical alternatives. The ongoing studies,  including the AOAs for protected satellite communications, SBIRS, and  space-based environmental monitoring, if comprehensively conducted,  should help to determine some of the impacts of changing DOD’s current  space system designs and find the right balance among system  characteristics of affordability, capability, and resilience. However, until  resilience measures are developed and agreed upon, resilience  assessments—whether as part of the AOA studies or not—will be of  limited value. Further, even when these studies are completed, there may  still be significant uncertainties about how disaggregation could work and  there will still be significant risks in implementation if key challenges, such  as aligning satellite and ground systems, are not addressed. Because  most of DOD’s knowledge about disaggregation resides in paper studies  and a limited number of demonstration efforts, continued or expanded  demonstration efforts—including those to provide operational capabilities  or otherwise aimed at quantifying the benefits, limitations, and feasibility  of space system disaggregation—conducted before wide-scale change is  implemented could go a long way towards gaining empirical data to help  DOD develop quantifiable estimates and verify the wide range of potential  benefits and limitations disaggregation may yield.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Before making decisions on whether to disaggregate DOD’s protected  satellite communications, SBIRS, or environmental monitoring satellite  systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to take  the following three actions:  1.  Comprehensively examine—either through the AOA studies or  through other assessments—the full range of disaggregation issues,  including those that go beyond the satellite systems themselves;  2.  Develop common measures for resilience; and  3.  Expand demonstration efforts to examine the operational feasibility of  disaggregation by empirically quantifying its benefits and limitations as  well as addressing longstanding barriers that could hinder its  implementation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, DOD concurred with our first two recommendations and  partially concurred with our third recommendation. The comments are  reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments which we  incorporated as appropriate.
In concurring with our first recommendation, DOD agreed that the extent  to which disaggregation could help reduce costs and increase the  resilience of satellites is not yet known, and AOAs and other forms of  assessments should comprehensively examine the range of  disaggregation issues. DOD reiterated that alternatives for future satellite  constellations must balance required capability, affordability, and  resilience. Additionally, DOD stated that it continues to examine how  different architectural alternatives affect its acquisition process, its  relationship with industry partners, and the space industrial base as a  whole.
In concurring with our second recommendation, DOD agreed that  developing a common definition and measures for resilience is important.  During the course of our review, DOD officials we interviewed stated that  a consensus on a definition for resilience had not yet been achieved.  However, in commenting on this recommendation, DOD stated that its  Defense Space Council has approved a definition of resilience, contained  in its October 2012 Space Policy. In response, we revised our  recommendation to focus on the need for common measures for  resilience. DOD stated it is beginning to implement resilience measures  into space systems requirements and acquisition processes, and that it  agrees the development of metrics to measure space system resilience is  needed.
In partially concurring with our third recommendation, DOD agreed that  disaggregation requires continued analysis as one method of providing  increased space system resilience and emphasized that disaggregation is  just one approach. DOD stated the challenges of a disaggregated ground  system are well-known and demonstrated in existing architectures.  However, our work found that multiple stakeholders—including DOD  officials—are concerned about the unknown impacts of disaggregation on  ground systems, such as whether existing systems could support it.  Further assessment of the potential effects on the ground system— including how interconnected systems could be impacted and whether  changes would be needed—will be necessary to ensure DOD has a  complete understanding of the challenges it may face. DOD also stated it  is well-versed in managing constellations with many satellites and  networks with diverse users. However, disaggregation, depending on how  it is carried out, could represent a significant departure from DOD’s  current space system architectures, operational experience, as well as  acquisition strategy and oversight. Consequently, we continue to maintain  that gaining experience on the operational feasibility of disaggregation  through expanded demonstrations could provide DOD with valuable  knowledge for deciding a way forward for its space system acquisitions.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report, 113-44,  accompanying S. 1197, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2014, mandated that we assess the potential benefits and  drawbacks of disaggregating key military space systems—to include the  use of hosted payloads—with a focus on whether disaggregation offers  decreased acquisition and life cycle costs and increased survivability  compared to more traditional approaches to acquiring capabilities.1,  The  report mandated that we examine disaggregation for three military space  systems in particular: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF),  Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and Weather Satellite Follow-on  (WSF). This report (1) describes the potential benefits and limitations of  disaggregating military space systems, and (2) assesses the extent to  which DOD is ready to make informed decisions regarding disaggregating  AEHF, SBIRS, and WSF.
S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 165 (2013). In its report the Senate Armed Services Committee mandated  that we report on the results of our engagement by March 31, 2014. As agreed with Committee staff,  we satisfied this reporting requirement by including preliminary results of this engagement in our  written statement for a March 12, 2014 hearing on military space issues before the Subcommittee on  Strategic Forces, Senate Committee on Armed Services (see GAO, Space Acquisitions: Acquisition  Management Continues to Improve but Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs,  GAO-14-362T (Washington, D.C., Mar. 12, 2014)), to be followed by this report.
Information Officer; Joint Chiefs of Staff; U.S. Strategic Command;  military service headquarters, including the Offices of Executive Agent for  Space Staff, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions- Directorate of Space Programs), and the Office of the Chief of Naval  Operations; Air Force Space Command; applicable program offices at the  Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center; Naval Research  Laboratory; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; the Air  Force Scientific Advisory Board; and the National Geospatial-Intelligence  Agency. Outside of DOD, we met with government officials from the  Department of Commerce, including the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration. We also interviewed representatives from contractors  representing work in a range of mission areas (e.g., satellite  communications, weather monitoring, etc.), product and service types  (e.g., building satellites, integrating systems, etc.), and level of  involvement in military space systems within the scope of our review. In  addition, we spoke with third-party organizations such as non-profit  research and industry organizations. Based on these document reviews  and discussions, we compiled a list of potential benefits and limitations  that experts determined to be important factors for consideration  regarding disaggregation and subsequently verified the list with those  experts. Each of the potential benefits and limitations identified in our  report are supported by statements from at least two experts, generally  representing multiple types of organizations (i.e., DOD, civilian agency,  industry, and third-party). Further, we reviewed prior GAO work to  determine if longstanding space system acquisition challenges pose  potential barriers to implementing a disaggregated approach.
To assess the extent to which DOD is ready to make informed decisions  regarding disaggregating AEHF, SBIRS, and WSF, we reviewed prior  GAO work on DOD space systems acquisitions and identified criteria for  early acquisition planning and development efforts to minimize cost and  schedule growth. We interviewed officials from the DOD offices  responsible for conducting and reviewing the ongoing AOAs in the scope  of our review, as well as contributing offices, and reviewed available  guidance for conducting each of the AOAs. We also reviewed available  documentation about and interviewed the relevant DOD officials involved  in previous or ongoing studies and demonstrations related to  disaggregation. We assessed the completed and ongoing efforts—to  include the AOAs, other studies, and demonstrations—against the criteria  from prior GAO work and the potential benefits and limitations identified  by experts to determine the extent to which these efforts provide a  comprehensive assessment of disaggregation and prepare DOD to make  an informed decision.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to October  2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Jenny Chanley; Brenna Guarneros;  Kristine Hassinger; Rich Horiuchi; Carol Petersen; Jeff Sanders; Roxanna  Sun; Bob Swierczek; Jay Tallon; and Oziel Trevino.