Chemical And Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers
Published: 2005-01-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons against U.S. forces. Consequently, DOD doctrine calls for U.S. forces to be sufficiently trained to continue their missions in an NBC-contaminated environment. Given longstanding concerns about the preparedness of DOD's servicemembers in this critical area, GAO has undertaken a body of work covering NBC protective equipment and training. For this review, GAO was asked to determine the following: (1) To what extent do Army and Marine Corps units and personnel attending combat training centers participate in NBC training, and to what extent do these units and personnel perform NBC tasks at the centers to service standards? (2) Do the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training at the centers in a standardized format that allows the services to identify lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-center comparisons?
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Army and Marine Corps combat training centers provide a unique opportunity for units to perform advanced training under conditions that approximate actual combat, thereby enabling units to assess and build upon skills learned at home stations. Although DOD and both services have stressed the importance of including NBC defense in all types of training, they have not established minimum NBC-related tasks for units attending the centers. Commanders sometimes reduce NBC training to focus on other priority areas. As a result, the extent of NBC training actually conducted at these centers varies widely, and some units receive little or none at all. For example, officials at two Army training centers estimated that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, a typical unit training rotation for a brigade-sized unit--which may include up to 4,000 soldiers--experienced NBC events that required only about 5 percent of these troops to train in full NBC protective clothing for a total of 18 hours or more. For the Marine Corps, no NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at its training center for at least 5 years prior to January 2004. The Marine Corps began to introduce NBC training into its combined arms exercises in two rotations that occurred in January and February 2004 but suspended it because of other priorities related to preparing units for ongoing operations. Without minimum NBC tasks, the services often miss the opportunity to use the centers' unique environment to improve units' proficiency in NBC defense. When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers noted that many units did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army standards. For example, during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most brigades attending one center did not meet standards for basic NBC tasks such as donning protective gear, seeking overhead shelter, and conducting unmasking procedures. Observers at the Army centers often cited inadequate home-station training as the reason units were not performing basic NBC tasks to standards. Skills in these basic tasks are normally acquired during training at home stations and lay the foundation for acquiring more complex skills associated with large-unit NBC training. When units arrive at the centers with inadequate basic NBC skills, they may not be able to take full advantage of the unique and more complex large-unit NBC training opportunities offered at these centers. The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on NBC training at the centers in a way that can be used to identify trends over time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. Army and Marine Corps doctrine stresses the importance of identifying lessons learned during training to enable tailored training at home stations and elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that similar problems will occur during operations. Because service guidance does not require standardized reporting formats, the training centers submit different types of after-action reports that might or might not mention NBC training. This lack of standardized reporting represents opportunities lost to the services to collect comparable data to identify NBC training trends and lessons learned.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely  that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC)  against U.S. forces as a means of offsetting superior conventional warfare  capabilities, for gaining an asymmetrical advantage, or as an act of  terrorism. Consequently, DOD policies require U.S. forces to be provided  with NBC protective equipment and to be sufficiently trained not only to  survive an NBC attack but also to continue to perform their missions in a  contaminated environment. Given long-standing concerns about the  preparedness of DOD’s servicemembers in this critical area, you requested  that we undertake a body of work covering DOD’s management of its NBC  protective equipment and training. This report is one of a series on this  subject that we have issued at your request.
For this review, you asked that we examine the contribution of the Army’s  and Marine Corps’ combat training centers (CTCs) in preparing  servicemembers for surviving and accomplishing their missions under  NBC conditions. For the Army, these centers include the National Training  Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the  Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). The Marine Corps’ combat  training center is located at Twentynine Palms, California. These two  military services introduce NBC training to their servicemembers in basic  training and continue with formal and on-the-job training at NBC schools  and home stations and during collective training field exercises, such as  those offered at the CTCs. The CTCs are large ground-combat training  sites where units can train collectively in a realistic battlefield  environment, including live fire. The centers represent an opportunity for  units to train on their mission-essential tasks and to discover—through  training lessons learned provided by expert observers/controllers—areas  requiring additional training at their home stations or elsewhere that could  improve their ability to perform on an actual battlefield. Specifically, you  asked that we answer the following questions: (1) To what extent do Army  and Marine Corps units and their personnel attending CTCs participate in  NBC training, and to what extent do these units and personnel perform  NBC tasks to service standards while at the CTCs? (2) Do the Army and  the Marine Corps report NBC training at the CTCs in a standardized format  that allows the services to identify trends and lessons learned and to do  cross-unit and cross-center comparisons?
To obtain information on NBC training that occurred at the Army’s and  Marine Corps’ CTCs during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we interviewed  officials and analyzed relevant documents at each of the centers and other  Army and Marine Corps organizations related to NBC and CTC training.  We determined that the data and documents we reviewed were sufficiently  reliable for answering the above questions. We performed our review from  March 2003 through October 2004 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. A more thorough description of our scope  and methodology is included in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army has three large combat training centers that train brigade-sized  units during exercises, referred to as “rotations,” that last for 13 to 25 days:  the National Training Center, located at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint  Readiness Training Center, located at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the  Combat Maneuver Training Center, located at Hohenfels, Germany. Figure  1 illustrates NBC training being conducted at the Army’s Combat  Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The Marine Corps has  an Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, where it  trains brigade-sized units in a combined arms exercise that similarly  allows Marine Corps units to train to perform their missions in large  maneuver areas and to fire their ground and air weapons. “A CTC experience is the closest thing to combat the Army’s soldiers, leaders, staffs and  units ever experience. It is a battlefield where soldiers can die, come back to life, correct  their mistakes, and fight again. . . . the Army must look at harnessing the role of the CTCs in  developing doctrine and collecting data so it can maximize their potential and draw the  right conclusions from lessons learned in a training environment.”
During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 57 active and reserve component  rotations took place at the three Army CTCs. Rotation costs are  significant: In 1999 we reported that the Army spent about $1 billion a year  to provide training at the NTC, the JRTC, and the CMTC. These centers  are equipped with instrumentation and simulators that allow the units to  have their battle effectiveness measured, recorded, and commented on by  observers/controllers, who are Army subject-matter experts for NBC  defense and other mission areas. During fiscal years 2002 and 2003,  approximately 12 active and reserve battalion-sized Marine units  underwent combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms.
DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have all stressed the importance of  fully integrating NBC scenarios into their training exercises, whether  conducted at a unit’s home station, at a CTC, or elsewhere. The U.S.  National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction acknowledges  that NBC weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists  represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.  At the DOD level, Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in  Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, states that “US  forces must be prepared to conduct and sustain operations in NBC  environments with minimal degradation” and urges that individuals and  organizations train often and realistically while wearing NBC protective  clothing so that they are better prepared for the constraints it imposes on  communication, vision, and movement.
Army and Marine Corps regulations, orders, and doctrine similarly stress  the importance of fully integrating NBC scenarios into training exercises.  For example, Army Regulation 350-1, “Army Training and Education,”  which establishes Army-wide baseline NBC defense training policy,  requires that NBC defense tasks, such as contamination avoidance,  protection, and decontamination, be fully integrated into units’ mission  training, including field training exercises. Specifically, Army Regulation  350-1 states that “The NBC defense training must be fully integrated into  unit exercises . . . for both offensive and defensive operations.” This  integration is intended to develop and test the capability of commanders,  staffs, and units to perform their missions under extended NBC  conditions. In other words, NBC skills are not seen as isolated tasks, but  NBC defense is viewed as a condition under which units should be able to  do their mission-essential tasks. Similarly, Marine Corps Order 3400.3F,  paragraph 6, establishes Marine Corps-wide baseline NBC defense training  requirements and states that “Every unit and commander will fully  integrate NBCD  training into every combat, combat  support, combat service support, and command and control exercise  during offensive and defensive operations, to include live fire evolutions.”   Like the Army, the Marine Corps intends to integrate NBC training into its  exercises in order to develop and test the ability of Marines at all levels not  only to survive an NBC attack but to perform their missions under NBC  conditions.
Army and Marine Corps regulations and orders also require after-action  reporting for unit training exercises, including those that occur at the  CTCs. The Army believes that it is important to capture lessons learned  during training in order to identify combat-relevant lessons learned that  will enhance the Army’s ability to perform its missions and that will  support tailored training for anticipated conditions of combat. Army  regulations for the JRTC and the CMTC state that NBC defense training  should be addressed in every training unit commander’s after-action  report, but guidance for the NTC and the overall Army lessons learned  program does not. Like Army regulations, Marine Corps orders state that  after-action reports should be prepared for all training exercises and  maintained in a central lessons learned facility. The Marine Corps uses  training lessons learned to identify unit strengths and weaknesses that  must be addressed for the overall benefit of the Marine Corps.
section_title: NBC Training at Army and Marine Corps CTCs Varies, and Units Often Do Not Perform to Acceptable Proficiency Standards
paragraphs: Although the Army and the Marine Corps stress in their doctrine,  regulations, or orders the need to fully integrate NBC training into training  exercises and both have defined what they consider to be essential NBC  skills, neither has established minimum NBC tasks for units to perform  while they are training at the CTCs. They believe that it is important to  leave decisions on the amount and type of training that occur at the CTCs  to commanders. Consequently, during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, Army  and Marine Corps units and personnel attending the CTCs received widely  varying amounts of NBC training, with some receiving little or none.  Furthermore, Army units that do undergo NBC training at the CTCs often  do not perform to the proficiency levels defined by the Army as  acceptable. Based on commanders’ discretion, both services’ CTC  exercises currently are oriented toward preparing units for operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan and do not emphasize NBC defense training. Because  of this variation in NBC training at the CTCs, the Army and the Marine  Corps often miss the unique opportunity offered by the CTCs to be  assured through objective observer/controller assessments that every  servicemember who trains at a CTC has training in a minimum number of  NBC tasks essential to survive and perform in an NBC-contaminated  environment.
subsections: section_title: Army and Marine Corps Have Defined Essential NBC Skills but Do Not Specify That Minimum Tasks Must Be Trained at the CTCs
paragraphs: Both the Army and the Marine Corps have defined in various publications  what they believe are the essential NBC skills that all soldiers and Marines  should have. Also, as described in the background section of this report,  both services stress in their doctrine, regulations, or orders the need to  fully integrate NBC defense training into their exercises.
The Army has defined what it considers are the NBC skills essential for  soldiers to know in its Army Universal Task List. Army commanders  select training tasks, including NBC training tasks, from this and other  task lists. For each task, the Army provides an extended definition, along  with suggested ways to measure a soldier’s proficiency in doing the task.  For example, for the task of using individual and collective NBC protective  equipment, one measure a commander may select to evaluate a soldier’s  competence includes the time it takes a soldier to don chemical protective  gear in response to enemy use of NBC weapons. In addition, the Army  requires that units conduct weapons qualifications on individual and crew- served weapons with personnel wearing chemical protective equipment.  Neither the task list nor the regulation specifies where such training is to  be conducted.
U.S. Forces Command, which oversees the training and readiness of U.S.- based Army operational forces, has issued a list of predeployment NBC  tasks, but it also does not specify where training for these tasks must take  place. Forces Command directs that soldiers spend approximately 8 hours  per quarter under NBC defense conditions. These tasks are all in the  Army’s most basic NBC skill level category and include wearing and  maintaining chemical protective equipment and identifying chemical  agents.
Like the Army, the Marine Corps has defined what it considers to be NBC  tasks essential for Marines to know, both to survive an NBC attack and to  continue performing the unit’s mission. In Marine Corps Order 3400.3F,  “Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense (NBCD) Training,” the Marine  Corps lists essential individual survival standards, such as maintaining and  wearing protective chemical equipment, detecting chemical agents, and  decontaminating one’s skin and equipment. It also lists essential “basic  operating standards,” such as using crew and personal weapons while  wearing NBC protective gear, maintaining NBC equipment, avoiding  contamination while continuing the mission, and decontaminating units if  necessary. The order does not state that any of these tasks must be  included in exercises such as the combined arms exercise at Twentynine  Palms.
Appendix II provides a listing of Army and Marine Corps definitions of  essential NBC skills.
section_title: NBC Training at Army CTCs Varies Widely
paragraphs: NBC training at the Army’s CTCs varies widely, and many Army subunits  receive little NBC training at the CTCs. For example, in fiscal years 2002  and 2003, observers/controllers from the NTC and the JRTC estimated that  only about 5 percent of soldiers underwent NBC training during a brigade  rotation that required them to wear their full protective gear for at least 18  hours. This is because Army regulations do not mandate that NBC  training must occur at the CTCs, leaving commanders to decide what skills  training to include in the unit’s CTC rotation. For the NBC training that did  occur at the CTCs, observers/controllers frequently reported that the units  did not perform even basic NBC tasks to the level of proficiency defined as  acceptable by the Army.
subsections: section_title: Many Army Subunits Receive Little NBC Training at the CTCs
paragraphs: During our review of Army CTC training that occurred during fiscal years  2002 and 2003, we found that, while most units were exposed to some  NBC training at the CTCs, the overall percentage of Army battalion- or  brigade-sized units that received extensive NBC training during a rotation  was small. One measure of intensive unit training under NBC defense  conditions is the extent to which soldiers are required to dress and  operate for extended periods of time in their individual protective  clothing, including their masks and gloves. NTC training officials  estimated that, on average since fiscal year 2002, a typical 20- to 25-day  brigade rotation—which may include up to 4,000 soldiers—includes NBC  events that cause the entire unit to don the full chemical protective suit for  a total of 2 to 3 hours and about 150 to 200 soldiers to train in full  protective gear for a total of 18 to 24 hours. In other words, only about 5  percent of the brigade is affected by NBC training that requires wearing  full protective gear for more than 2 to 3 hours. Similarly, an Army JRTC  training official reported that during a typical brigade rotation, an average  of only 200 soldiers operate in full protective gear for a total of 16 to 20  hours. The number of personnel who receive this training at the JRTC  ranges from as few as 50 soldiers up to 400 or more, depending on the type  of contamination and the location of the attack, and the time that a soldier  spends in protective gear can range from as little as 1 hour to as much as  48 hours.
section_title: Army Unit Commanders Determine Units’ Training at the CTCs
paragraphs: Because Army regulations do not state what NBC training must occur at  the CTCs, the commander of the unit to be trained may choose not to  emphasize it during the unit’s CTC rotation. Typically, up to 180 days  before the rotation is to start, the brigade commander, in coordination  with the division or other senior commander, begins to coordinate with  the CTC to specify what training objectives will be included in the unit’s  training rotation. A unit rotation traditionally emphasizes the warfighting  skills a unit requires to perform its mission and combat operations.  Because training to survive and operate under potential NBC conditions is  generally treated as a condition of training for all mission-essential tasks  for units, rather than as a separate mission task, the CTCs, which develop  the training scenarios, generally propose some types of NBC conditions in  all rotations. However, unit commanders may specify that a CTC include  more or fewer NBC conditions in training scenarios.
During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the Army’s CTCs generally included  three to seven chemical events in each standard rotation’s training  scenarios. A particular chemical attack by an “enemy” is generally targeted  at a specific area of the simulated battlefield and thus involves those units  that may be affected by a chemical attack in that area. Chemical events  during fiscal years 2002 and 2003 included the simulated use of chemicals  that were categorized as “persistent” (defined as lasting for 24 hours or  more) and “nonpersistent” (defined as lasting for 24 hours or less) and that  were delivered by “enemy” artillery, rockets, aircraft bombs, truck bombs,  rucksack bombs, and spray. At the NTC and the CMTC,  observers/controllers use CS (tear) gas to simulate chemical agents.  Flares, ground-burst simulators, air-burst simulators, or spray tanks  mounted on helicopters may also be used to simulate enemy chemical  weapons. At the JRTC and the NTC, observers/controllers also frequently  simulate a biological event by such means as simulating that the “enemy”  has sabotaged the water supply by poisoning it with a biological  contaminant.
The CTCs have increasingly emphasized training rotations specifically  tailored to preparing units for expected deployments. These rotations  might or might not include chemical or biological events. Many of the units  completing the tailored rotations at the Army’s CTCs in fiscal years 2002  and 2003 later deployed for combat operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. NBC  defense training at CTCs has been emphasized less for units training for  Bosnia and Kosovo or for Afghanistan and Iraq after NBC weapons were  not found there. Because the NBC defensive training for each soldier  varies so widely at the CTCs, the Army continues to have no assurance  that all servicemembers attending a CTC have trained on a minimum  number of essential NBC tasks.
section_title: Units Often Did Not Perform NBC Tasks to Army Standards
paragraphs: Our review of after-action reports from the three Army CTCs for fiscal  years 2002 and 2003 indicated that units frequently arrived at the CTCs at  the beginning of their training periods without having mastered basic NBC  skills. Observers/controllers frequently comment on units’ NBC skills  when they first arrive at training at the NTC to assess the units’ needed  level of NBC training and note that, often, units do not perform even basic  NBC tasks to the level of proficiency that the Army defines as acceptable.  Observers/controllers at all three CTCs noted that because units had not  adequately prepared for basic NBC training at their home stations, they  were not able to fully train on the more sophisticated collective and  mission tasks under NBC conditions that could be practiced at the CTCs.  Of the three CTCs, the NTC had the most complete information on the  NBC skills of the units being trained during fiscal years 2002 and 2003.  Unlike the other CTCs, the NTC often uses a standard format to assess  incoming units on six basic NBC tasks while they are receiving their  equipment and assembling to begin training. For example, one of these  early NTC training scenarios subjects a brigade arriving at a deployment  destination to an attack by a chemical weapon. Table 1 summarizes the  assessments made by NTC observers/controllers of the NBC skills of  brigades that arrived for training during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The  table lists the six NBC tasks assessed at the NTC and shows whether the  brigades did or did not perform the tasks to the level of proficiency  defined as acceptable by the Army. Most brigades failed to perform to  standard NBC tasks 3, 4, and 6, which are ranked at the most basic skill  level, called skill level 1.
We were unable to compile summaries, such as the NTC summary in   table 1, of how well brigades did in basic NBC tasks at the JRTC and the  CMTC because these centers did not routinely assess and collect this  information. However, JRTC and CMTC after-action reports frequently  noted deficiencies in units’ NBC training attributable to their incomplete  preparation at home stations. For example, for several rotations for fiscal  years 2002 and 2003, JRTC observers/controllers reported that soldiers and  leaders lacked training and knowledge of critical NBC tasks.  Observers/controllers recommended that units “Develop an NBC training  plan at home station that addresses the individual, leader, and collective  soldier skills necessary to sustain operations in an NBC environment.” A  similar CMTC recommendation called for “more emphasis on NBC training  and integration at home station.”
The observation that units do not get adequate NBC training at their home  stations is not new and has been repeatedly reported by DOD and the  Army. In 1998, for example, the DOD Office of the Inspector General  reported that unit commanders generally were not fully integrating  chemical and biological defense into their units’ collective mission training  exercises. The report noted that “units rarely trained for their mission- essential tasks under  conditions.” In 2002, the Army  Audit Agency reported that it had evaluated training for chemical and  biological defense provided to soldiers at the unit level and found that this  training needed to be more effectively integrated and supplemented. In  DOD’s 2002 report to Congress on its Chemical and Biological Defense  Program, the department stated that the Army’s CTCs continued to see  units at the company, battalion, and brigade levels that were unable to  perform all NBC tasks to standard. The report concluded that this   less-than-satisfactory performance at the CTCs was directly attributable to  a lack of home-station NBC training. The report stated the need for  increased emphasis in educating senior leaders on the necessity for NBC  training and expressed concern that NBC training consist not only of NBC  survival but also of continuous operations in an NBC environment.
We have also reported for more than a decade on problems with Army  units’ inadequate home-station training. In 1991, we reported that Army  home-station training lacked realism and often did not include NBC  training. In 1996, we reported that officials from Army major commands,  corps, divisions, and individual units said that chemical and biological  defense skills not only tended to be difficult to attain and were highly  perishable but were also often given a lower priority because of, among  other things, too many other higher priority taskings. In 1999, we noted  that training units lacked proficiency when they arrived at the training  centers, and as a result, the content of the CTC training was frequently  modified to provide less challenging scenarios than would normally be  expected. We also reported that, although units should have been  proficient at battalion-level tasks when they arrived at the CTCs, many had  trained only up to company level, and the units’ leaders struggled with the  more complicated planning and synchronization tasks required for the  battalion- and brigade-level exercises conducted at the centers.
section_title: NBC Training Was Not Conducted at the Marine Corps’ Combined Arms Exercises at Twentynine Palms
paragraphs: No NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at the  Marine Corps’ training center at Twentynine Palms for at least 5 years  prior to our review. While Marine Corps orders and doctrine emphasize  the need to include NBC defense training in combined arms exercises,  they do not provide any clearly articulated NBC defense training tasks or  requirements that must be accomplished in conjunction with these  exercises. In the absence of specific training requirements, NBC defense  training has historically been left up to the discretionary control of the unit  commander, and Marine Corps commanders decided to remove it to make  room for other training. According to a Marine Corps training official, unit  commanders gave several reasons that NBC defense training at the  combined arms exercise was given a lower priority, including that it was  difficult to perform tasks in cumbersome and uncomfortable protective  gear, chemical training was time-consuming, and the likelihood of NBC  warfare was perceived as low.
In November 2001, the Naval Audit Service issued a report on infantry and  armor readiness in the Marine Corps. One of its findings was that the  Marine Corps was not fully integrating chemical and biological training  into its collective unit exercises in a consistent manner. The Naval Audit  Service attributed this condition to the fact that Marine Corps officers did  not consider chemical and biological training a high priority, even though  they considered it important. One of the Naval Audit Service’s  recommendations was for the Marine Corps to “integrate [chemical and  biological defense] training into unit field exercises under realistic  conditions, and insure that  training is  appropriately integrated into such major events as Combined Armed  Exercises . . . .” In a February 2004 memorandum to the Commandant of  the Marine Corps, the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Training  and Education Command stated that in response to the Naval Audit  Service’s recommendation, NBC training and assessment had been added  to the formal schedule at the combined arms exercise program in January  2004. The memorandum stated that “Due to world events, it continues to  be a challenge concerning the ‘full integration’ of Nuclear, Biological,  Chemical Defense  training into unit exercise programs.”
In 2003, in response to the Naval Audit Service’s recommendation, the  Marine Corps began its planning for introducing NBC training into the  combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. In that year, the Marine  Corps assigned two NBC staff specialists to Twentynine Palms to begin  devising a training plan for the combined arms exercise program. Also,  chemical protective equipment was obtained for use at Twentynine Palms  by rotating Marine Corps units. In January 2004, the Marine Corps  introduced NBC defense classroom courses and one field exercise into the  combined arms exercise program. Appendix III provides a listing of the  classroom NBC courses that were introduced in the first week of rotations  in fiscal year 2004 and were conducted at the platoon to company levels.
According to a Marine Corps official, eight combined arms exercise  rotations were conducted in fiscal year 2004. NBC training was introduced  into the third and fourth rotations in January and February, respectively.  Rotations five and six concentrated on stability and support operations  but did include NBC classroom training. Rotations seven and eight, for  reserve units, also received the NBC classroom training but no NBC field  exercises. Planned rotations 9 and 10 were canceled. The Marine Corps is  introducing a shortened, revised combined arms exercise scenario that is  more oriented to current operational requirements. Exercise revisions  include an emphasis on small-unit leadership and stability and support  operations, which encompass asymmetric and counterinsurgency  operations. A Marine Corps official told us that the current design of the  revised combined arms exercise scenario does not include NBC training.  However, an extensive home-station training period for units precedes  attendance at the revised combined arms exercise, and Marine Corps units  are required to accomplish NBC training required for their units’ mission- essential tasks. According to the Marine Corps, when it resumes its  standard combined arms exercise rotations, units will participate in  whatever NBC task training the combined arms exercise scenarios include  at that time.
section_title: NBC Lessons Learned from Iraq and Afghanistan Reflect Problems Identified at Training Centers
paragraphs: For both the Army and the Marine Corps, lessons learned during  Operation Iraqi Freedom identified many NBC skill deficiencies that were  highlighted earlier by observers/controllers during individual brigade  rotations through the Army’s CTCs during fiscal years 2002 and 2003.  These continuing deficiencies illustrate the importance of requiring Army  and Marine Corps units to establish minimal NBC defense training tasks  for units training at their respective CTCs. Problems identified by both the  Marine Corps and the Army during this operation included    units arriving without appropriate NBC equipment and suits,    units arriving without necessary individual and collective NBC skills,    units unable to properly set up and operate their NBC detection    chemical personnel not included in battlefield decisions, and    units unable to properly decontaminate their equipment.
Many of these problems were also noted in the Army’s lessons learned  reporting from earlier conflicts, including those in the Balkans, Somalia,  and Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Establishing minimal NBC tasks for  units attending CTCs could provide an opportunity for units’ NBC defense  capabilities to be objectively assessed and for CTC observers/controllers  to identify units’ NBC equipment shortfalls. This information may aid  commanders in decisions on units’ training needs.
section_title: Army and Marine Corps After-Action Reporting at the CTCs Does Not Fully Facilitate the Identification of NBC Training Trends
paragraphs: The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on  NBC training at the CTCs in a way that can be used to identify trends over  time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. Army and  Marine Corps regulations and orders strongly encourage after-action  reporting for all training exercises, including those that occur at the CTCs.  However, Army and Marine Corps after-action reviews of CTC training do  not always discuss NBC training and, when they do, the reporting is not  standardized to allow for uniform reporting to fully support the  identification of NBC trends.
subsections: section_title: Army and Marine Corps Regulations and Orders State That Lessons Learned Should Be Reported for CTC Training
paragraphs: Army and Marine Corps regulations and orders state that after-action  reports and lessons learned should be prepared to capture the results of  training that occurs at the CTCs, but they do not always state that NBC  training must be covered in these documents or encourage NBC training  results to be presented in a standardized format. As a result, different  types of after-action reports and lessons learned are prepared for CTC  training, and these documents might or might not mention NBC training.
The Army’s regulation that establishes the purpose and objectives of its  CTC program states that as part of their mission to provide realistic joint  combined arms training, the CTCs will provide the Army and joint  participants with feedback to improve warfighting, to increase units’  readiness for deployment and warfighting, and to provide a data source for  lessons learned. This regulation also requires that each CTC conduct  doctrinally based after-action reviews for each unit that undergoes a  rotation at a CTC. The Army regulation on the Army’s lessons learned  system requires that these after-action reports be submitted to the Center  for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) no later than 120 days from the end of  an exercise. Each of the Army’s CTC regulations describes a general  format to be used in the after-action reports and lists specific topics to be  included. Though the CTC and lessons learned regulations agree on some  general points, they differ on what should be covered specifically in after- action reports. For example, the JRTC and CMTC regulations indicate that  NBC defense training should be addressed in the training unit  commander’s after-action report, but the CTC, NTC, and overall Army  lessons learned program regulations do not. Appendix IV includes specific  details of how the various Army regulations differ in recommended  formats for after-action reports.
Like the Army regulations, the Marine Corps order on its lessons learned  system states that after-action reports should be prepared for all training  exercises. However, the Marine Corps order for the combined arms  exercise program at Twentynine Palms does not specify that written after- action reports must be prepared, only that a structured debrief be  conducted upon the conclusion of each event or exercise. Though not  required by Marine Corps order, Twentynine Palms does prepare a  Microsoft PowerPoint (computer software) presentation describing events  that took place during the final 3 days of the exercise. For the two  rotations in 2004 in which NBC field training was included in the  combined arms exercise, NBC training was not included in after-action  reporting because it did not occur during the 3 training days covered by  the reporting.
section_title: Army’s CTC Reports Might or Might Not Contain Information on NBC Training
paragraphs: All Army regulations do not require that NBC training completed at a CTC  be discussed in the written after-action reports that are prepared for each  training rotation at the three Army CTCs, and thus the reports do not  always include information on NBC training. These reports are primarily  intended to be feedback for the units being trained to help them assess  their own training levels and craft home-station training plans to address  identified deficiencies. The after-action reporting and supplementary  materials provided to the units that are trained, such as videos of training,  are called “take-home packages” and may include as many as five or six  compact discs containing Microsoft PowerPoint presentations and  summaries of observers/controllers. The structure, format, and content of  the after-action reporting vary by center.
The NTC typically includes Microsoft PowerPoint briefings and written  after-action reports for the units training during each rotation. When  subunits of a brigade experience NBC “events,” or NBC training scenarios,  during their rotations, observers/controllers generally include a  description of the units’ performance in an “NBC executive summary,”  which cites areas in which subunits need to improve proficiency, along  with specific recommendations for home-station training and citations of  applicable NBC-related field manuals. When subunits do not experience  NBC events, this section is absent from after-action reporting for the  overall unit. Nowhere in the report does the NTC include an overall  brigade summary for the entire rotation period of 20 to 25 days that  indicates the number of NBC events that occurred during a single rotation,  the percentage of subunits that conducted NBC tasks, the type of tasks  performed, or how well all individual subunits did. The NTC does include,  in many cases, an assessment of a brigade’s NBC skills in its first week of  training. Out of the 21 rotations conducted by the NTC during fiscal years  2002 and 2003, take-home packages for 12 brigades contained such  scorecards, which assessed units’ ability to perform six essential NBC  tasks when they first arrived for training.
Like a take-home package for the NTC, a take-home package prepared by  the JRTC contains multiple types of documents and after-action reporting.  One document lists the types of NBC events planned for the rotation and  their timing. When NBC events are not planned for the rotation, this  document is absent, and when planned NBC events are canceled, there is  no documentation stating that these scenario events did not occur or why.
Neither is there a document that contains an overall summary of how  many NBC events occurred during a single rotation, the percentage of  subunits performing NBC tasks and the type of tasks performed, or how  well all individual subunits did. Unlike the NTC, the JRTC includes no  “scorecard” for assessing units’ ability to perform basic NBC tasks. When  subunits do experience NBC events, JRTC observers/controllers cite areas  in which subunits need to “sustain” or “improve” proficiency, along with  specific recommendations for home-station training and citations of  applicable NBC field manuals.
A CMTC take-home package also contains multiple Microsoft PowerPoint  briefings, written after-action reporting, and videotapes. However, a  package might or might not mention NBC training that occurred during a  rotation, as this is not a mandatory reporting section. When a subunit  experiences an NBC event, an observer/controller may mention how the  unit performed if the subunit’s performance was considered to be notable.  When NBC events are discussed in an after-action report, CMTC, like NTC  and JRTC, includes general observations of a unit’s performance,  comments on what it did well, and recommendations for improvement.  Because there is no overall NBC summary document, however, CMTC’s  take-home packages seldom provide information on how many NBC  events occurred during a rotation, what these events were, what  percentage of the overall rotating unit participated, and how well they did  on particular NBC tasks. Because no NBC section is required, it is not  possible to calculate what percentage of CMTC rotations experience NBC  events.
Twice a year, CALL publishes “trends” documents for each Army CTC.  These publications cover all rotations that occurred during a 6-month  period and expunge any information from the reporting that would  identify a particular unit. The trends documents are compiled from after- action reports prepared for CTC training. They are prepared by  observers/controllers and given to CALL representatives at each CTC, who  then forward these reports to CALL analysts at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  When NBC training is determined to reveal a “trend” to report, it is  included in the trends publications. Individual take-home packages and  after-action reports that identify particular units are not generally made  available. Rather, they are protected to prevent them from becoming  public “report cards.” CALL is now limited in its ability to identify NBC  trends in its trends reports because NBC training completed at CTCs is not  now uniformly reported in a standardized format that can reliably provide  comparable data to support the identification of NBC trends.
The Army has a large portion of CTC after-action reports located in a  database at CALL. However, because each CTC sends different or no  information on NBC training, CALL does not have information available  that would make it possible to do cross-unit or cross-center comparisons.  CALL also stores compact discs and videotapes, some of which are  entered into the electronic database. The CALL representative at each CTC  maintains some portions of the take-home packages on site. However, at  least in part because the take-home packages are considered the property  of the units being trained, they are not made widely available. Also, many  of the Army’s after-action reports for NBC training at the CTCs for fiscal  years 2002 to 2003 were not received, not locatable, or never loaded into  the database located at CALL for archiving and subsequent research. We  found during our visit to CALL that its researchers were very skilled in  performing database analysis, but they were limited by incomplete and  nonstandard reporting for NBC training data.
section_title: Marine Corps’ Written After-Action Reports Do Not Include NBC Training Information
paragraphs: The Marine Corps’ written after-action reporting system does not address  NBC training conducted in the combined arms exercise primarily because  NBC training has not been included in that training. At Twentynine Palms,  a final written exercise report containing lessons learned is prepared by  the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command for the last 3 days  of the combined arms exercise. However, the command does not prepare  written after-action reports for the other major segments of the exercise.  After-action feedback is primarily given orally throughout the exercise  period. This oral feedback is based on observations by  observers/controllers assigned to each unit being trained. In the combined  arms exercises that included NBC training in 2004, the written final  exercise reports did not include any lessons learned on NBC operations  because this training did not occur during the final 3 days. At that time,  NBC exercise scenarios had not been fully integrated into the combined  arms exercises.
The Marine Corps has no formal evaluation requirements for the combined  arms exercise. The applicable Marine Corps order states that “A structured  debrief will be conducted upon conclusion of each event or exercise.” A  Microsoft PowerPoint briefing on the final 3 days of the exercise does  identify training objectives that the participant forces used to guide them  through their training exercises, and in a sample briefing we reviewed, we  found an assessment of the unit’s performance for each training objective.  However, NBC operations were not identified as a training objective, and  the briefing included no lessons learned or recommendations for NBC  defense training. NBC content is being added to the standard combined  arms exercise scenario. However, the standard combined arms exercises  have recently been replaced by revised combined arms exercises oriented  toward current operations, and the revised combined arms exercise  scenarios for Twentynine Palms contain no NBC defense training.
In addition, the Marine Corps has not been archiving at any central  location its reporting on any unit training—NBC or otherwise—completed  at Twentynine Palms or submitting related training issues to its lessons  learned system. Therefore, no after-action reports on the combined arms  exercises that occur at Twentynine Palms are being placed into the Marine  Corps Lessons Learned System’s database. The Marine Corps recently  determined that its overall lessons learned system was not functioning  well. In December 2003, a working group that studied the Marine Corps  Lessons Learned System found that problems with reporting and  maintaining lessons learned were Marine Corps-wide. A Marine Corps  information paper reported that throughout the Marine Corps, only eight  reports had been submitted to the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System  in 2002. The information paper also stated that the Marine Corps plans to  implement an improved Web-based lessons learned system in the future. It  also plans to establish a permanent organization to collect, review, and  maintain this improved lessons learned system. Separately, an Enduring  Freedom Combat Assessment Team was formed in 2001 to collect lessons  learned in Afghanistan. In 2003, the team was restructured to support  Operation Iraqi Freedom.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The CTCs represent a rare opportunity for Army and Marine Corps units to  perform advanced training under conditions that are designed to  approximate actual combat as closely as possible, thereby enabling units  to assess and build upon skills learned at home stations. The services  stress the importance of including NBC defense training in their exercises.  Yet only a small percentage of the servicemembers passing through the  CTCs encounter NBC defense training tasks because an Army or Marine  Corps regulation or order requiring it is lacking. We recognize that  commanders’ discretion in determining unit training plans for CTC  rotations is, and should continue to be, a central part of Army and Marine  Corps training doctrine. However, until units are required to perform at  least minimum NBC tasks while attending the CTCs, the services will  continue to risk missing a unique opportunity to (1) uniformly assess these  units’ proficiency while they are operating in a field environment and (2)  leverage the benefits of an objective assessment by an expert staff of units’  NBC skills.
NBC lessons learned during training rotations at the combat training  centers would be very useful for the services in their attempts to anticipate  and train for NBC problems that may occur later during operations.  Service regulations or orders specify that (1) all units at CTCs should  conduct doctrinally based after-action reviews of events supported by  observers/controllers, (2) lessons learned should be entered into an  archived database, and (3) training unit commanders’ after-action reports  should be analyzed for trends and lessons learned. However, service  regulations or orders do not now state that NBC training at the CTCs must  be captured in a standardized format. In the absence of such a  requirement, the Army’s archived NBC data on training at the CTCs will  remain incomplete or noncomparable and thus will not fully support  research and reporting on NBC trends and lessons learned. The Marine  Corps also does not employ a standard method of reporting NBC training  at Twentynine Palms or providing the Marine Corps’ trend and lessons  learned reporting systems with NBC training information. Until the Marine  Corps standardizes the reporting formats to capture service-defined NBC  training at Twentynine Palms, it will be unable to analyze, over time, the  units’ NBC skills at these exercises, the effectiveness of NBC training at  Twentynine Palms, or NBC trends and lessons learned. Overall,  improvements to collecting, archiving, and using NBC training data could  help the services capitalize on their substantial investment in maintaining  CTCs and in sending units to train there, as well as to monitor the quality  of NBC training and units’ NBC skill levels.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the NBC training opportunities offered to Army and Marine  Corps units from training at their combat training centers are maximized  and that NBC lessons learned at these centers are uniformly recorded and  archived, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Army to take the following two actions:    Establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending training exercises  at CTCs.
Standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs at  the CTCs.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of  the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the  following two actions:    Establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending the combined  arms exercise at Twentynine Palms.
Standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs  during a combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments, DOD stated that it agreed with the findings and  recommendations of the report and that the Army and Marine Corps have  established programs to implement the recommendations.  Army and  Marine Corps officials indicated that they are currently taking those  actions necessary to develop the NBC content to be included in future  CTC rotations and modify their after-action reporting systems and  regulations to ensure that NBC training completed at CTCs is  appropriately reported.  However, because of current operational  requirements, full implementation of NBC training at CTCs will be  delayed.  DOD’s comments are printed in their entirety in appendix V.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its  issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the  Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of  Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-9619 or e-mail me at pickups@gao.gov. Additional contact and  staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which Army and Marine Corps units participate  in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training at the combat training  centers (CTC) and the extent to which these units and personnel perform  NBC tasks at the centers to service standards, we interviewed appropriate  officials and reviewed pertinent documents and after-action reports at the  following locations:    Office of the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3,    Center for Army Lessons Learned, Battle Command Training Program,  Combined Arms Center-Training, Combined Arms Research Library,  Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;    U.S. Army Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, and the Army  Maneuver Support Center Academic Library, Fort Leonard Wood,  Missouri;    Training Division, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Command, Fort    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training,  Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia;    Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;    Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana;    Army Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany;    Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; and    Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.
To compile a collection of planning documents and after-action reports for  the Army CTC rotations that occurred during fiscal years 2002 and 2003,  we visited and obtained documents from various locations. The largest  collection of planning documents and after-action reports was located at  the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), though we also obtained  some documents from other locations, including the CTCs. We were able  to obtain at least some parts of after-action reporting for 41 of the 57  rotations that occurred at the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint  Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat Maneuver Training  Center (CMTC) in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The following organizations  provided us with the planning documents and after-action reports for units  attending the CTCs:    Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;    National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;    Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and    Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany.
To determine the extent of NBC training completed at the Army CTCs  during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we analyzed all available planning and  after-action reports. As mentioned in our report, we found that NBC  training that occurred was not always discussed in after-action reports;  that subunits of an entire brigade experienced chemical or biological  events that did not affect the overall brigade; and that  observers/controllers frequently noted deficiencies in units’ basic NBC  skills, often attributing them to inadequate home-station training. Because  the CTCs’ formatting of NBC reporting differed and none contained an  overall summary document of all the NBC training that occurred during a  single rotation, we were not able to definitively determine whether we had  been able to collect all pertinent documents, though we did examine all of  the reporting that the CTCs and CALL said was available.
The Marine Corps provided us with only two after-action reports for  combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. It told us that there was  no central repository for these after-action reports and that only two  reports were located. However, because NBC training had not been  introduced to the combined arms exercise until January 2004 and was  suspended thereafter, we were able to determine that no after-action  reports on NBC training would have been submitted. The one after-action  report that the Marine Corps provided us with, for the January 2004  combined arms rotation, did not mention NBC training because this  training did not occur during the last 3 days of the exercise—the only time  period captured in the after-action report.
To determine whether the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training  at the CTCs in a standardized format that allows the services to identify  trends and lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-center  comparisons, we collected all available after-action reports from the  above-listed locations. These reports were all part of the after-action  reporting contained in “take-home packages”—that is, the materials  prepared for the units to take with them to document training completed  and to aid in units’ development of home-station training plans. Because  these reports contained particular names of units and comments on unit  performance, they are not made generally available, which required us to  obtain these reports from lessons learned repositories and the CTCs. We  also compared these reports with general trends documents prepared by  the Army and the Marine Corps, which expunge units’ identification and  summarize the results of groups of rotations, and learned that not all NBC  training at CTCs was reported because of the lack of standardized  reporting formats.
We conducted our review from March 2003 through October 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine Corps
paragraphs: Both the Army and the Marine Corps have defined in various publications  what they believe are the essential nuclear, biological, and chemical  (NBC) skills that all soldiers and Marines should have. In no case,  however, do service regulations or orders prescribe where the training  must take place. Specifically, applicable documents do not state that any  particular NBC tasks must be included in training that units receive while  they are at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), but they do state that  NBC training should be incorporated into all types of exercises. The  services’ guidance and policy have left it to the discretion of commanders  to determine where their units should train in the required NBC skills. The  following is a listing of Army and Marine Corps definitions of essential  NBC skills.
subsections: section_title: Army Universal Task List
paragraphs: In Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, the Army provides a  common, doctrinal foundation and catalog of the Army’s tactical missions,  operations, and collective tasks. A commander can use this list as a menu  in developing the unit’s mission-essential task list. The NBC tasks cited in  the Army’s Universal Task List are  take measures to avoid or minimize the effects of NBC attacks and  reduce the effects of NBC hazards,  identify NBC hazards,    warn personnel/units of contaminated areas,   report NBC hazards throughout the area of operations,    use individual/collective NBC protective equipment,    perform immediate decontamination,    perform operational decontamination,    perform thorough decontamination,    perform area decontamination, and    perform patient decontamination.
section_title: NBC Tasks Required by Army Forces Command
paragraphs: The tasks listed by U.S. Army Forces Command, which are all skill level-1  NBC survival-oriented tasks, are    protect yourself from chemical and biological injury/contamination  using your M40-series protective mask with hood,  replace the canister on your M40-series protective mask,    maintain your M40-series protective mask with hood,   react to chemical or biological hazard/attack,    protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination with chemical  protective equipment,  identify chemical agents using M8 detector paper,    protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination when drinking from  your canteen while wearing your protective mask,    administer first aid to a nerve agent casualty,    administer nerve agent antidote to self (self-aid),    decontaminate your skin using the M291 skin decontaminating kit,    decontaminate your skin and personal equipment using an M258A1    decontaminate your individual equipment using the M295 individual  equipment decontamination kit.
In addition, the Army requires that “Units will conduct weapons  qualification on individual and crew-served weapons with personnel  wearing protective equipment.”
section_title: Marine Corps’ NBC Survival Standards
paragraphs: The Marine Corps lists NBC “survival standards” for each individual in  Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, “Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense  Training.” They are as follows:  1.  Identify North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC markers.  2.  Properly maintain Individual Protective Equipment.  3.  Properly don, clear, and check their field protective mask within 9  seconds of an NBC alarm or attack.  4.  Properly don the appropriate individual protective clothing and  assigned field protective mask to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture  Level 4.  5.  Perform basic functions (e.g., drinking, waste removal, sleep) while in  Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Level 4.  6.  Perform NBC detection measures with issued detection equipment,  i.e., M256A1 Chemical Detection Kit, M8 detection paper, M9 detection  tape, and DT 236 radiac detector.  7.  Decontaminate skin and personal equipment using M291 skin  decontamination kit or other appropriate decontaminants.  8.  Perform individual (emergency) Mission-Oriented Protective Posture  equipment exchange.  9.  React to a nuclear attack.  10.  React to a chemical attack.  11.  React to a biological attack.  12.  Take the specific actions required to operate efficiently before, during,  and after NBC attacks to reduce the effects of NBC contamination.  13.  Recognize or detect chemical agent contamination and perform  immediate decontamination techniques: e.g., person, weapon, clothing,  equipment, position, vehicle, and crew-served weapons.  14.  Treat a chemical agent casualty.  15.  Be able to drink water from a canteen or other water container while  masked.  16.  Be able to properly format and send an NBC 1 report.
section_title: Marine Corps’ NBC Basic Operating Standards
paragraphs: The Marine Corps lists NBC “basic operating standards” for units in  Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, “Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense  Training.” They are as follows:    The unit will maintain its collective nuclear, biological, and chemical  defense equipment in a high state of serviceability at all times.
The unit must be proficient in taking the specific actions required to  operate efficiently before, during, and after NBC attacks to reduce the  effects of NBC contamination.
The unit must be able to recognize or detect chemical agent  decontamination and perform immediate individual and operational  decontamination techniques: e.g., person, weapon, clothing, equipment,  position, vehicle, and crew-served weapons.
The unit must demonstrate proficiency in contamination avoidance  procedures when crossing NBC-contaminated areas.
The unit must demonstrate proficiency in performing primary military  duties, to include the use of crew/personal weapons and  minimum/basic combat skills, while wearing Individual Protective  Equipment for extended periods.
The unit must demonstrate proficiency in operational and thorough  decontamination procedures.
The unit must demonstrate proficiency in the principles of collective  protection, including passage through contamination control areas,  where applicable.
The unit must demonstrate proficiency in the use of dosimetric  devices; chemical and biological detection; and monitoring equipment,  where applicable.
The unit must be able to send and receive NBC-1 reports and plot NBC- 3 reports.
The unit must be able to properly conduct monitor/survey missions as  directed by higher headquarters personnel.
The unit must be able to conduct unmasking procedures.
section_title: Appendix III: NBC Classroom Courses Introduced into the Marine Corps Combined Arms Exercise Program in January 2004
subsections: section_title: Perform unit actions before, during, and after a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack.
paragraphs: Command Brief (1 hour): All NBC personnel will receive this instruction as a one-time  prerequisite to nuclear, biological, and chemical defense instruction.
Vulnerability Analysis (2 hours): Students learn to source, develop, and contribute to  unit intelligence preparation of the battlefield; conduct hazard assessments; and finally  develop and recommend courses of action from NBC.
Control Center (Nuclear) (3 hours): Students rehearse the use of the NBC warning and  reporting procedures for nuclear detonations. Includes manual plotting methods,  communication protocols, and operational aspects. Time of stay/exit, shielding, and  decay problems are illustrated.
Control Center (Chem-Bio) (2 hours): This course instructs and rehearses the student  in the use of the NBC warning and reporting procedures for chemical and biological  attack. Includes manual plotting methods, communication protocols, and operational  aspects. Incident response through consequence management.
Joint Warning and Reporting Network (3 hours): This is the prescribed automated  platform for integration of NBC warning and reporting to command and control systems  and networks.
Radiation Safety/Depleted Uranium (1 hour): Designed to be refresher instruction for  the unit. Addresses types and characteristics of ionizing radiation, medical effects, and  protection standards/tasks. Reviews the current inventory of radioactive sources in the  Department of Defense’s use and the handling of accidents.
Unit Sustainment (3 hours): Formerly referred to as “decontamination,” sustainment is  the units’ effort to recover personnel and equipment for continued use on the  battlefield. This period of instruction develops the principles of decontamination and  updates the NBC specialist/officer on the latest equipment and decontaminants.
Special Sustainment (1 hour): The special requirements for decontamination of  casualties and aircraft are instructed per current doctrine. Instruction covers site  reconnaissance and the development of best practices in areas that every unit may not  encounter.
Biodefense and Medical Management (2 hours): Designed for both NBC and medical  personnel, the lecture covers casualty identification, triage, and decontamination  requirements. Part 2 of this instruction highlights the biological sampling and modeling  of the battlefield; how to collect, escort, and ship etiologic agents; laboratory protocols;  reporting requirements; and fundamentals of epidemiology.
Joint Mission Essential Task List (1 hour): Class begins with a review of mission- essential task development and NBC tasks at the strategic national, strategic theater,  and operational levels. Lecture then details the Marine Corps’ Task List and the seven  mission-essential task areas for the Marine Air Ground Task Force, focusing on sense,  shape, shield, and sustain. Puts Marine Air Ground Task Force requirements into  perspective and sets the stage for joint and combined operations.
section_title: Appendix IV: Different Regulations Suggesting Different Formats for After-Action Reporting for the Army’s CTCs
subsections: section_title: U.S. Army, Europe, Regulation 350-50 (CMTC Training)
paragraphs: Forces Command Regulation 350- 50-1 (NTC Training)
Forces Command Regulation  350-50-2 (JRTC Training)
After Action Report, Part I:  Executive overview. (No corresponding required report  section.) (No corresponding required report  section.)
Mission objectives.
General description.
Participating units (including  specific information) such as  troop list, number of  personnel who participated,  and number and type of  vehicles used.  (must coincide with the  current modification table of  organization and equipment,  broken down by vehicle type,  unit requirement, and unit  shipped).  (broken down by vehicle type,  unit requirement, and unit  shipped).
Significant issues.
Limitations.
Funding (including personnel,  transportation type and cost,  total vehicle transportation  cost, and total cost  reimbursed to the Combat  Maneuver Training Center  ).
After Action Report, Part II:  Lessons Learned. (No corresponding required report  section.) (No corresponding required report  section.)
Observation.
Discussion.
Lessons learned.
Recommended action.
Comments.
U.S. Army, Europe, Regulation  350-50 (CMTC Training)
Forces Command Regulation 350- 50-1 (NTC Training)
Forces Command Regulation  350-50-2 (JRTC Training) (No corresponding required  report section.) (No corresponding required report  section.) (No corresponding required report  section.)
Tactical lessons learned, to  include command and control;  maneuver (offense/defense);  fire support; intelligence; air  defense;  mobility/countermobility;  electronic warfare; nuclear,  biological, chemical defense;  and combat service support.
Tactical lessons learned. Address  the Battle Functions.
Administrative lessons learned,  including deployment, redeployment,  equipment draw, and regeneration.
Tactical lessons learned. Address  the battlefield operating system;  nuclear, biological, and chemical  defense; electronic warfare;  deployment; and any other  pertinent topics.
Benefits of training at the National  Training Center (NTC).
Administrative lessons learned,  including deployment,  redeployment, and any other  pertinent topics.
Administrative and logistics  lessons learned (including  deploying to, training at, and  redeploying from the CMTC). improvement.
Benefits of training at the Joint  Readiness Training Center  (JRTC).
General narrative comments, to  include the following:  improving existing doctrine.
Benefits of training at the  learned on preparatory training,  including comments on usability  of the Army Training and  Evaluation Program or any other  training and training support  product developed by the Training  and Doctrine Command  (TRADOC). doctrinal improvement. improving preparatory training,  including comments on the  usability of TRADOC  publications or other training  support products. lessons learned on  preparatory training. improvement of the NTC  experience.
Recommendations for  improving the training  exercise.
Management lessons learned. improving the JRTC  experience.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Beverly Schladt, Mike Avenick,  Matthew Sakrekoff, James Lawson, Leslie Bharadwaja, Gerald Winterlin,  Jim Melton, R.K. Wild, Dave Mayfield, and Jay Smale made key  contributions to this report.