Afghanistan: Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Assistance
Published: 2014-06-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. government has engaged in multiple efforts in Afghanistan since declaring a global war on terrorism that targeted al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other violent extremists, including certain elements of the Taliban. These efforts have focused on a whole-of-government approach that calls for the use of all elements of U.S. national power to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates and prevent their return to Afghanistan. This approach, in addition to security assistance, provided billions toward governance and development, diplomatic operations, and humanitarian assistance.
To assist Congress in its oversight, GAO has issued over 70 products since 2003 including key oversight issues related to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. This testimony summarizes the key findings from those products and discusses: (1) the challenges associated with operating in Afghanistan, (2) key oversight and accountability issues regarding U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, and (3) the need for contingency planning as the U.S. transitions to a civilian-led presence in Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2003, GAO has identified numerous challenges related to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Among the various challenges that GAO and others have identified, are the following: the dangerous security environment, the prevalence of corruption, and the limited capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services and sustain donor-funded projects. As illustrated in the figure below, between fiscal years 2002 and 2013, U.S. agencies allocated nearly $100 billion toward U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
The United States, along with the international community, has focused its efforts in areas such as building the capacity of Afghan ministries to govern and deliver services, developing Afghanistan's infrastructure and economy, and developing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces. In multiple reviews of these efforts, GAO has identified numerous shortcomings and has made recommendations to the agencies to take corrective actions related to (1) mitigating the risk of providing direct assistance to the Afghan government, (2) oversight and accountability of U.S. development projects, and (3) estimating the future costs of sustaining Afghanistan's security forces which the United States and international community have pledged to support.
In February 2013, GAO reported that while the circumstances, combat operations, and diplomatic efforts in Iraq differ from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons could be learned from the transition from a military- to a civilian-led presence to avoid possible missteps and better utilize resources. As GAO has reported, contingency planning is critical to a successful transition and to ensuring that there is sufficient oversight of the U.S. investment in Afghanistan. This is particularly vital given the uncertainties of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and the ultimate size of the post-2014 U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: While GAO is not making new recommendations it has made numerous recommendations in prior reports aimed at improving U.S. agencies' oversight and accountability of U.S. funds in Afghanistan. U.S. agencies have generally concurred with these recommendations and have taken or plan to take steps to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss key issues relating to the oversight  and accountability of U.S. government efforts in Afghanistan. Since  declaring a global war on terrorism, the U.S. government has engaged in  multiple efforts in Afghanistan. These efforts have focused on a whole-of- government approach that calls for the use of all elements of U.S.  national power to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its  affiliates, and other extremists, including certain elements of the Taliban,  and prevent their return to Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2002 through 2013,  U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State (State) and Defense  (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have  allocated close to $100 billion for efforts in Afghanistan. As shown in  figure 1, U.S. agencies allocated: $62.8 billion to support Afghanistan’s security in areas such as the  development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and  counternarcotics efforts. $23.1 billion to support governance and development efforts, such as  the construction of roads, schools, and other infrastructure projects. $8.0 billion for diplomatic operations, such as diplomatic, consular and  building operations. $2.1 billion for humanitarian assistance, including refugee, food, and  disaster assistance.
Since 2003, GAO has issued over 70 products and participated in  numerous congressional hearings and briefings on U.S. efforts in  Afghanistan. In the course of our work, we have made over 150  recommendations to U.S. agencies on a range of actions that should be  taken to improve program planning, implementation, management, and  oversight. U.S. agencies have generally concurred and have taken steps  to address many of our recommendations. In addition, we have identified  several matters and key oversight issues for Congress. Our most recent  key issues report prepared for the 113th Congress identified several  oversight issues and is the basis for my testimony today.
Among the key issues we have highlighted related to U.S. efforts in  Afghanistan:  challenges faced by U.S. agencies operating in Afghanistan; the need to ensure oversight and accountability of U.S. efforts  invested in Afghanistan; and  the need to plan for contingencies as the U.S. transitions to a civilian- led presence in Afghanistan.
This testimony and our 2013 key issues report summarizes some of the  work we have reported on in over 70 issued products since 2003 related  to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Detailed information on the scope and  methodology for our prior work summarized in this testimony can be  found in the reports cited. We conducted the work that this statement is  based on in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits  to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis  for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Challenges Associated with Operating in Afghanistan
paragraphs: Our work has identified several challenges related to U.S. efforts in  Afghanistan. Among those we highlighted in our 2013 key issues report  are a dangerous security environment, the prevalence of corruption, and  the limited capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services and  sustain donor funded projects.
Dangerous security environment. Afghanistan’s security environment  continues to challenge the efforts of the Afghan government and  international community. This is a key issue that we noted in 2007  when we reported that deteriorating security was an obstacle to the  U.S. government’s major areas of focus in Afghanistan.2009, the U.S. and coalition partners deployed additional troops to  disrupt and defeat extremists in Afghanistan. While the security  situation in Afghanistan has improved, as measured by enemy-  In December  initiated attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, Afghan security forces,  and non-combatants, including Afghan civilians, the number of daily  enemy-initiated attacks remains relatively high compared to the  number of such attacks before 2009. In 2012, attacks on ANSF  surpassed attacks on U.S. and coalition forces (see fig. 2).
Prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan. Corruption in Afghanistan  continues to undermine security and Afghan citizens’ belief in their  government and has raised concerns about the effective and efficient  use of U.S. funds. We noted in 2009 that according to the Afghan  National Development Strategy pervasive corruption exacerbated the  Afghan government’s capacity problems and that the sudden influx of  donor money into a system already suffering from poor procurement  practices had increased the risk of corruption and waste of  resources. According to Transparency International’s 2013  Corruption Perception Index, Afghanistan is ranked at the bottom of  countries worldwide. In February 2014, the Afghan President  dissolved the Afghan Public Protection Force which was responsible  for providing security intended to protect people, infrastructure,  facilities, and construction projects. DOD had reported major  corruption concerns within the Afghan Public Protection Force.
Limited Afghan capacity. While we have reported that the Afghan  government has increased its generation of revenue, it remains  heavily reliant on the United States and other international donors to  fund its public expenditures and continued reconstruction efforts. In  2011, we reported that Afghanistan’s domestic revenues funded only  about 10 percent of its estimated total public expenditures. We have  repeatedly raised concerns about Afghanistan’s inability to sustain  and maintain donor funded projects and programs, putting U.S.  investments over the last decade at risk. DOD reported in November  2013 that Afghanistan remains donor dependent.
These persistent challenges are likely to play an even larger role in U.S.  efforts within Afghanistan as combat forces continue to withdraw through  the end of 2014.
section_title: Key Oversight and Accountability Issues Regarding U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan
paragraphs: The United States, along with the international community, has focused  its efforts in areas such as building the capacity of Afghan ministries to  govern and deliver services, developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure and  economy, and developing and sustaining ANSF. In multiple reviews of  these efforts, we have identified numerous shortcomings and have made  recommendations to the agencies to take corrective actions related to (1)  mitigating against the risk of providing direct assistance to the Afghan  government, (2) oversight and accountability of U.S. development  projects, and (3) estimating the future costs of ANSF.
subsections: section_title: Mitigating the Risk of Providing Direct Assistance to the Afghan Government
paragraphs: In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its  development aid directly through the Afghan government budget within 2  years. This direct assistance was intended to help develop the capacity  of Afghan government ministries to manage programs and funds. In the  first year of the pledge, through bilateral agreements and multilateral trust  funds, the United States more than tripled its direct assistance awards to  Afghanistan, growing from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to over  $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. For fiscal year 2013 USAID provided about  $900 million of its Afghanistan mission funds in direct assistance. In 2011  and 2013, we reported that while USAID had established and generally  complied with various financial and other controls in its direct assistance  agreements, it had not always assessed the risks in providing direct  assistance before awarding funds. Although USAID has taken some  steps in response to our recommendations to help ensure the  accountability of direct assistance funds provided to the Afghan  government, we have subsequently learned from a Special Inspector  General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report that USAID may  have approved direct assistance to some Afghan ministries without  mitigating all identified risks.
section_title: Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Development Projects
paragraphs: Since 2002, U.S. agencies have allocated over $23 billion dollars towards  governance and development projects in Afghanistan through USAID,  DOD, and State. The agencies have undertaken thousands of  development activities in Afghanistan through multiple programs and  funding accounts. We have previously reported on systemic weaknesses  in the monitoring and evaluation of U.S. development projects as well as  the need for a comprehensive shared database that would account for all  U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan (see table 1).
With respect to monitoring and evaluation, although USAID collected  progress reports from implementing partners for agriculture and water  projects, our past work found that it did not always analyze and interpret  project performance data to inform future decisions. USAID has  undertaken some efforts in response to our recommendations to improve  its monitoring and evaluation of the billions of dollars invested toward  development projects in Afghanistan. We and other oversight agencies,  however, have learned that USAID continued to apply performance  management procedures inconsistently, fell short in maintaining  institutional knowledge, and still needed to strengthen its oversight of  contractors. For example, in February 2014, we reported that USAID  identified improvements needed in its oversight and management of  contractors in Afghanistan, including increasing the submission of  contractor performance evaluations. We also found that USAID may  have missed opportunities to leverage its institutional knowledge, and  have recently recommended that USAID further assess its procedures  and practices related to contingency contracting.
GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but  Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are  Needed, GAO-08-689 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2008). comprehensive database of U.S. development projects in Afghanistan in  2012, we suggested that Congress consider requiring U.S. agencies to  report information in a shared comprehensive database.
section_title: Estimating Future Costs of Sustaining ANSF
paragraphs: Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from coalition nations, has  worked to build, train, and equip ANSF so that the Afghan government  could lead the security effort in Afghanistan. U.S. agencies have allocated  over $62 billion to support Afghanistan’s security, including efforts to build  and sustain ANSF, from fiscal years 2002 through 2013. This has been  the largest portion of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan. The United States  and the international community have pledged to continue to assist in  financing the sustainment of ANSF beyond 2014. In April 2012, we  reported concerns regarding the need to be transparent in disclosing the  long-term cost of sustaining ANSF beyond 2014. DOD initially objected  to such disclosure noting that ANSF cost estimates depend on a  constantly changing operational environment and that it provided annual  cost information to Congress through briefings and testimonies. Our  analysis of DOD data estimates that the cost of continuing to support  ANSF from 2014 through 2017 will be over $18 billion, raising concerns  about ANSF’s sustainability. Furthermore, we reported that on the basis  of projections of U.S. and other donor support for ANSF, that there will be  an estimated gap each year of $600 million from 2015 through 2017  between ANSF costs and donor pledges if additional contributions are not  made. We previously noted in 2005 and 2008 that DOD should report to  Congress about the estimated long-term cost to sustain ANSF.Congress mandated that DOD take such steps. In 2012, we once again   In 2008,  reported that DOD had not provided estimates of the long-term ANSF  costs to Congress. Subsequently, in a November 2013 report to  Congress on its efforts in Afghanistan, DOD included a section on the  budget for ANSF and reported the expected size of ANSF to be 230,000  with an estimated annual budget of $4.1 billion.
section_title: Need for Contingency Planning as the U.S. Transitions to a Civilian-Led Presence in Afghanistan
paragraphs: In February 2013, we reported that while the circumstances in Iraq differ  from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons could be learned from the  transition from a military to civilian-led presence to avoid possible  missteps and better utilize resources. As we have reported, contingency  planning is critical to a successful transition and to ensuring that there is  sufficient oversight of the U.S. investment in Afghanistan.particularly vital given the uncertainties of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral  Security Agreement and post-2014 presence.
subsections: section_title: Lessons Learned from Iraq
paragraphs: While the circumstances, combat operations, and diplomatic efforts in  Iraq differ from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons can be learned  from the transition from a military to civilian-led presence in Iraq and  applied to Afghanistan to avoid possible missteps and better utilize  resources. In Iraq, State and DOD had to revise their plans for the U.S.  presence from more than 16,000 personnel at 14 sites down to 11,500  personnel at 11 sites after the transition had begun—in part because the  United States did not obtain the Government of Iraq’s commitment to the  planned U.S. presence. Given these reductions, we found that State was  projected to have an unobligated balance of between about $1.7 billion  and about $2.3 billion in its Iraq operations budget at the end of fiscal  year 2013, which we brought to the attention of Congressional  appropriators. As a result, $1.1 billion was rescinded from State’s  Diplomatic and Consular Programs account. According to DOD officials,  U.S. Forces-Iraq planning assumed that a follow-on U.S. military force  would be approved by both governments. The decision not to have a  follow-on force led to a reassessment of State and DOD’s plans and  presence.
section_title: Status of Transition to a Civilian-Led Presence in Afghanistan
paragraphs: In April 2014, we reported that State planned for the U.S. footprint in  Afghanistan to consist of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, with additional  representation at other locations as security and resources allow. In a  review still under way, we are examining the status of U.S. civilian  agencies’ plans for their presence in Afghanistan after the scheduled end  of the U.S. combat mission on December 31, 2014, and how changes to  the military presence will affect the post-2014 U.S. civilian presence. We  have found that State plans to provide some critical support services to  U.S. civilian personnel after the transition, but is planning to rely on DOD  for certain other services. We plan to report in July 2014 on the  anticipated size, locations, and cost of the post-2014 U.S. civilian  presence, the planned division of critical support responsibilities between  State and DOD, and how pending decisions regarding the post-2014 U.S.  and coalition military presence will affect the U.S. civilian presence.
In closing, the President announced in May 2014 that the United States  intends to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan through the end of  2016, stationing about 10,000 military personnel in Afghanistan with two  narrow missions: to continue supporting ANSF training efforts and to  continue supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of  al Qaeda. Simultaneously, the President announced that the embassy  would be reduced to a “normal” presence. At the same time, the United  States has made commitments to continue providing billions of dollars to  Afghanistan over the next 2 years. These recently announced plans  underscore the bottom line of my message today: continued oversight of  U.S. agencies is required to ensure the challenges they face are properly  mitigated in Afghanistan and that there is oversight and accountability of  U.S. taxpayer funds.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this statement, please contact me at (202) 512- 7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony  include Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director), David Dayton, Anne DeCecco,  Mark Dowling, Brandon Hunt, Christopher J. Mulkins, Kendal Robinson,  and Amie Steele.
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