Military Housing: Opportunities That Should Be Explored to Improve Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Servicemembers
Published: 2003-06-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to house unmarried junior enlisted servicemembers, primarily in military barracks. Over the next several years, the Army, Navy, and Air Force plan to spend about $6 billion to eliminate barracks with multi-person bathroom facilities and provide private sleeping rooms for all permanent party members. Given the cost of the program, GAO looked at (1) the status of efforts to examine the potential for private sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks; (2) the opportunity to reduce the construction costs of barracks through widespread use of residential construction practices; and (3) whether opportunities exist to make better use of existing barracks.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found three areas where DOD could potentially reduce costs in its unmarried servicemember housing program. DOD and the services have not determined whether "privatization," or private sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks is feasible and cost-effective. Barracks privatization involves a number of unique challenges ranging from the funding of privatization contracts to the location of privatized barracks. Recently, each service has independently given increased attention to developing privatization proposals. A collaborative, rather than independent, approach could minimize duplication and optimize lessons learned. DOD could reduce the construction costs of government-owned barracks through the widespread use of residential construction practices rather than traditional steel frame, concrete, and cement block. The Army estimated that residential type construction could reduce barracks construction costs by 23 percent or more. However, concerns about barracks durability and unanswered engineering questions have prevented widespread use of these practices. DOD's full use of required existing barracks space could reduce the cost of housing allowances paid to unmarried junior members to live off base in local communities. GAO found that the services have authorized housing allowances for unmarried members to live off base even when existing barracks space was available. This occurred because of lenient barracks utilization guidance, which in some cases does not require full use of existing barracks, and possible noncompliance with guidance. The Air Force could have potentially reduced annual housing allowances by about $20 million in fiscal year 2002 by fully using available barracks space.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each year the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to  house unmarried servicemembers at their permanent duty locations in the  United States. Unmarried junior enlisted members are normally required  to live on base in furnished living quarters commonly referred to as  barracks. If barracks space is unavailable, these members can be  authorized a housing allowance and live off base in local civilian  communities. Because DOD views housing as a key factor affecting quality  of life, the services have initiated plans to improve barracks living  conditions. Over the next several years, the services plan to spend about   $6 billion to eliminate barracks with multi-person bathroom facilities, or  “gang latrines,” and provide private sleeping rooms for all permanently  assigned members. The Navy has an additional goal to provide barracks  for approximately 20,000 sailors who currently live aboard ships even  when in homeport. To improve military housing faster than could be  achieved if only traditional military construction funds were used,  legislation was enacted in 1996 at DOD’s request to authorize private  sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military  housing, including barracks. Because of the cost of the program and the  importance of housing on servicemembers’ quality of life, we examined,  on the basis of the Comptroller General’s authority, DOD’s housing  program for unmarried members and explored whether opportunities  exist to reduce costs.
Since 1998, we have issued six reports on DOD’s military housing  program—three about the military housing privatization initiative, one  about the services’ barracks design standard, one about DOD’s process for  determining military housing requirements, and one about the opportunity  for the services to reduce future barracks construction costs and improve  quality of life by allowing more unmarried members to live off base. This  report examines additional opportunities for reducing unmarried enlisted  servicemember housing costs and discusses (1) the status of DOD and  military service efforts to examine the potential for private sector  financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks;   (2) the opportunity to reduce the construction costs of government-owned  barracks through widespread use of residential construction practices;  and (3) whether opportunities exist to make better use of existing  barracks.
Our review included interviews with DOD and service housing officials;  analysis of DOD and service data; and site visits to Fort Eustis, Virginia;  Fort Meade, Maryland; Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; Langley Air Force  Base, Virginia; and Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Under the overall direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the military services provide on- base furnished living quarters for over 200,000 unmarried enlisted  servicemembers at their permanent duty locations in the United States.  Commonly referred to as barracks, housing for unmarried members is  often cited by DOD officials as a problem area because many military  barracks are old, rundown, and otherwise do not meet contemporary DOD  standards for size, privacy, and other amenities designed to enhance the  quality of life of unmarried members. Junior unmarried members often  share dilapidated barracks rooms with one or two other members and a  gang latrine with occupants from several other rooms. Also, about 20,000  junior enlisted members assigned to Navy ships continue to live in  cramped onboard quarters even when their ships are in homeport. The  living conditions in barracks are far different from an apartment or  townhouse with two bedrooms, living area, bath, and full kitchen that is  the normal housing standard for junior enlisted married members.
The services have established specific goals and milestones for improving  the housing provided to unmarried junior enlisted members. First, the  services plan to eliminate permanent party barracks—i.e., barracks for  servicemembers at their permanent duty locations—with common bath  and shower facilities, or “gang latrines,” through barracks replacement or  renovation. The Air Force already has achieved this goal and the Army,  Navy, and Marine Corps plan to eliminate gang latrines by fiscal years  2008, 2007, and 2005, respectively. Second, the Army and the Navy plan to  provide each junior enlisted member in the United States a private  sleeping room with a kitchenette and bath shared by one other member— referred to as the 1+1 barracks design standard—by fiscal years 2010 and  2013, respectively. The Air Force, which already provides private sleeping  rooms, plans to eliminate its barracks deficit and replace its worst  barracks by fiscal year 2009. The Marine Corps, given a permanent waiver  from the Secretary of the Navy to use a different barracks design standard,  plans to provide barracks with sleeping rooms and baths shared by two  junior members by fiscal year 2012. Third, the Navy plans to complete its  homeport ashore initiative by fiscal year 2008, which will provide barracks  spaces for about 20,000 junior members who are currently required to live  aboard their ships while in homeport. To improve barracks conditions and  achieve these goals, the services plan to spend about $6 billion over the  next 6 years. Appendix II shows photographs of old and new style  barracks as well as typical living conditions aboard Navy ships.
Service officials state that unmarried junior enlisted servicemembers  should live in barracks to help instill service core values, provide for team  building and mentoring, and meet operational requirements. However,  significant differences exist among the services regarding personnel who  are required to live in barracks. More specifically:  the Army requires unmarried personnel in pay grades E1 through E6 to  live in barracks,  the Navy requires unmarried personnel in pay grades E1 through E4  with fewer than 4 years of service to live in barracks,  the Air Force requires unmarried personnel in pay grades E1 through  E4 to live in barracks, and  the Marine Corps requires unmarried personnel in pay grades E1  through E5 to live in barracks.
The Military Housing Privatization Initiative, authorized by law on  February 10, 1996, provided new authorities that, among other things,  allows DOD to provide direct loans, loan guarantees, and other incentives  to encourage private developers to construct and operate military family  and unaccompanied housing (barracks) either on or off military  installations. According to DOD, the initiative was aimed at solving its  inadequate housing problem faster and more economically by taking  advantage of the private sector’s investment capital and housing  construction expertise. With private-sector investment, DOD planned to  obtain at least 3 dollars in military housing improvements for each dollar  that the government invested, thereby reducing the amount of government  funds initially required to revitalize housing and accelerating the  elimination of inadequate housing. Although there can be exceptions,  DOD’s position is that the government’s estimated total costs for a  privatization project also should be equal to or less than the total costs for  the same project financed by military construction funding.  Servicemembers who live in privatized housing receive a housing  allowance to pay for rent and utilities. In fiscal year 1997, the Congress  appropriated $5 million for the services to use to initiate privatized  barracks projects. However, the Congress rescinded these funds in fiscal  year 1999 because the services had developed no plans for privatized  barracks.
In June 1997, DOD and the Office of Management and Budget agreed to a  set of guidelines that would be used as a frame of reference for scoring  privatization projects. The guidelines state that if a project provides an  occupancy guarantee, then funds for the project must be available and  obligated “up front” at the time the government makes the commitment of  resources. In other words, if a project provides an occupancy guarantee,  then the value of the guarantee—the cumulative value of the rents to be  paid for the housing over the entire contract term—must be obligated at  the beginning of the project. As a result, DOD officials stated that such a  project might not be financially attractive because the amount of  appropriated funds required would be approximately equivalent to the  military construction funding that would be required to build the barracks.  According to DOD officials, this issue has not been a problem for family  housing privatization projects because DOD does not provide occupancy  guarantees and does not mandatorily assign members to family housing.  Military families can choose where to live and the project contracts  include provisions for civilians to rent privatized housing if military  families choose not to live there.
subsections: section_title: Prior GAO Reports on the Military Housing Program
paragraphs: Since 1998, we have issued six reports on DOD’s military housing  program—three about the military housing privatization initiative, one  about the services’ barracks design standard, one about DOD’s process for  determining military housing requirements, and one about the differences  among the services concerning who is required to live in barracks.
In July 1998, we reported on several concerns related to the new  military housing privatization program. These included (1) whether  privatization would result in significant cost savings and whether the  long contract terms of many projects might result in building housing  that will not be needed in the future; (2) whether controls were  adequate to protect the government’s interests in the event developers  might not operate and maintain the housing as expected; and (3)  whether DOD would face certain problems if privatized housing units  were not fully used by military members and were subsequently rented  to civilians, as the contracts permit.  In March 1999, we reported on the status of the services’  implementation of the 1+1 barracks design standard. The report also  discussed DOD’s rationale for adopting the standard, the costs of  alternatives to the standard, and service views of the impact of the  standard from a team-building, individual isolation, or similar  perspective.  In March 2000, we reported that initial implementation progress for the  privatization program was slow, the services’ life-cycle cost analyses  provided inaccurate cost comparisons because DOD had not issued  standardized guidance for preparing the analyses, and DOD lacked a  plan for evaluating the effectiveness of the program. DOD  subsequently quickened the pace of family housing privatization, issued  standard guidance for privatization life-cycle cost analyses, and  developed a program evaluation plan.  In August 2001, we reported that despite earlier recommendations,  DOD had not implemented a standard process for determining military  housing requirements. In that report, we pointed out that the initiative  to increase housing allowances heightened the urgency for a consistent  process, because the initiative could lessen the demand for military  housing by making housing in local communities more affordable. In  January 2003, DOD approved a new standard family housing  requirements determination process.  In June 2002, we noted that by investing about $185 million of military  construction funds in the first 10 family housing privatization projects,  DOD should obtain housing improvements that would have required  about $1.19 billion in military construction funds had only government  funds been used. We also reported that privatization projects were not  supported by reliable or consistent needs assessments, and the overall  requirement for military housing was not well defined. Further,  although DOD had included provisions in project contracts designed to  protect the government’s interests, our report identified several areas  where DOD could further enhance protections to the government. DOD  responded by outlining ongoing and planned management actions to  address the concerns noted in the report.
In January 2003, we reported on the widely varying standards among  the services regarding who should live in barracks and the effect this  can have on program costs and quality of life. We noted that requiring  more personnel (more pay grades) to live in barracks than is justified  results in increased barracks program and construction costs and has  negative quality-of-life implications because most junior  servicemembers would prefer to live off base. We noted that by  allowing junior enlisted personnel already living off base with a  housing allowance to continue to live off base, the Air Force could  reduce planned barracks construction spending by $420 million.  Accordingly, we recommended that the rationale behind the services’  barracks occupancy requirements be based, at least in part, on the  results of objective, systematic analyses that consider the  contemporary needs of junior servicemembers, quality-of-life issues,  the services’ mission requirements, and other relevant data that would  help provide a basis for the services’ barracks occupancy requirements.  While DOD agreed in principle with our recommendation, it reiterated  the importance of military judgment in such decisions and left unclear  the extent to which it is likely to make changes.
section_title: DOD and the Military Services Have Not Determined the Feasibility of Barracks Privatization
paragraphs: While the services have considered barracks privatization over the past  several years, they have not yet initiated pilot project proposals to  determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of private sector financing,  ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks. According to  DOD officials, barracks privatization involves unique challenges compared  to family housing privatization. These challenges range from the  potentially higher amount of appropriated funds needed to secure a  privatization contract (as a result of the services’ requirement that  unmarried junior members live in barracks) to the differences in where  private developers and the military prefer barracks to be located.  Deferring to the individual services, DOD has provided limited centralized  direction and focus to help overcome the challenges associated with  barracks privatization. Recently, each service has independently given  increased attention to developing project proposals, with the Navy hoping  to do so by the end of 2003. Still, there are unresolved issues associated  with barracks privatization and, without more coordination of activities to  address these issues, efforts might be duplicated and the benefits from  collaboration might be lost.
subsections: section_title: Barracks Privatization Involves Unique Challenges Compared to Family Housing Privatization
paragraphs: Compared to family housing privatization, barracks privatization includes  unique challenges that, thus far, have prevented the development of pilot  project proposals. DOD has actively pursued privatization of military  family housing and has awarded contracts to construct or improve about  26,000 family housing units by the end of fiscal year 2002 and has plans to  privatize an additional 96,000 units by the beginning of fiscal year 2006.  The primary problem with privatizing barracks lies in the services’  mandatory assignment policy for unmarried junior enlisted  servicemembers and whether this policy implies that DOD would provide  private-sector housing developers with an occupancy guarantee.  Mandatory assignment, if viewed as an occupancy guarantee, might make  a proposed barracks privatization project financially unattractive because  a higher amount of appropriated funds would be needed to secure the  contract than would be needed for a similar military construction project.  Other challenges are related to barracks locations, unit deployments, and  funding for housing allowances.
The current policy in each service requires mandatory assignment of  unmarried junior members to barracks located on base, provided that  space is available. According to DOD officials, most military leaders  support this policy because they believe that mandatory assignments  provide for military discipline and unit integrity. Mandatory assignments,  however, might result in the need for more appropriations—in comparison  to military construction financing—to cover the obligations that the Office  of Management and Budget determines should be recorded at contract  award. This could make a proposed barracks privatization project  financially unattractive. The amount of appropriations needed hinges on  whether the mandatory assignment policy would provide private-sector  housing developers with a DOD guarantee of occupancy.
Because there have been no barracks privatization project proposals to  date, it is unclear whether the services’ mandatory barracks assignment  policies for junior members might be viewed as an occupancy guarantee.  Office of Management and Budget officials stated that having a mandatory  assignment policy alone would not necessarily guarantee that the rent paid  to the developer over the life of the project would have to be scored up  front. However, if the privatization contract specifically stated that  mandatory assignment would occur, the officials stated that the office  probably would view this as an occupancy guarantee and the project’s  projected rent would be scored up front.
As with family housing projects, Office of Management and Budget  officials stated that the scoring of a barracks project depends on the  details and circumstances involved in a proposed project and the  associated risk to the government. Key issues that might be considered  include whether the project allows the private developer enough  autonomy to manage the project without significant military control and  whether the contract includes provisions for civilians to rent vacant  barracks spaces in the event of reduced government demand. Obviously,  such issues present problems for the services—specifically, the  willingness of the services to relinquish their control of barracks and allow  civilians to occupy vacant barracks spaces. With a specific barracks  privatization proposal, the Office of Management and Budget officials  stated they would work with DOD to address the associated scoring  questions.
Although the potentially high amount of appropriated funds needed to  secure a contract appears to be the most significant challenge to barracks  privatization, there are other challenges as noted below.
Barracks location. According to DOD officials, private developers have  indicated that they would prefer that privatized barracks be located off  base or along an installation’s boundary and be severable from the  installation. Developers would then have greater flexibility in renting  the units to civilians in the event of reduced government demand.  However, the services do not want barracks located off-base or near  installations’ perimeter fences largely for force protection reasons and,  currently, most existing barracks are not located along installation  boundaries.
Deployments. In the event of unit deployments, many servicemembers  would not be in the barracks and possibly entire buildings could be  empty for months. As a result, the developer’s normal rental income  could be reduced or eliminated even though the developer would still  need to pay for expenses such as mortgage payments and operations  and maintenance costs. This is less of a problem in privatized family  housing because family members normally continue to occupy the  housing and pay rent if the servicemember deploys.
Funding for housing allowances. Service officials stated that identifying  and shifting funds to pay housing allowances to servicemembers living  in privatized barracks could be an administrative problem. This is less  of a problem with privatized family housing because military family  housing has a separate operations and maintenance budget account.  When a private developer takes over existing military family housing,  funds from the family housing operations and maintenance account  can be shifted to help pay for housing allowances used to pay rent for  the families living in the housing. However, barracks operations and  maintenance is not funded by a similar separate account. Instead,  barracks operations and maintenance funds are included in each  installation’s overall base operating budget. According to service  officials, it is more difficult to identify, break out, and shift barracks  funding to the personnel accounts to pay housing allowances for a  privatized barracks project.
section_title: DOD Has Provided Limited Centralized Direction and Focus for Barracks Privatization
paragraphs: With its attention largely concentrated on initiating and managing  privatization of military family housing, DOD has provided limited  centralized direction and focus to help the services overcome the  challenges associated with barracks privatization and proceed with pilot  project proposals. Also, in August 1998, 2 years after the military housing  privatization legislation was enacted, DOD shifted primary responsibility  for implementing the privatization program to the individual services.  Since that time, the services have independently studied the barracks  privatization concept but have not developed actual project proposals.  More recently, the services have given increased attention to exploring  barracks privatization, but their efforts continue to be independent and  non-coordinated. The status of barracks privatization in each service  follows.
subsections: section_title: Navy and Marine Corps Efforts to Privatize Barracks
paragraphs: While no service has yet initiated a barracks privatization project, the Navy  and the Marine Corps currently appear to be the most active among the  services in examining its potential use. Navy officials stated that they  believe barracks privatization offers an opportunity for the Navy to more  quickly meet its barracks improvement goals, including the goal of  providing barracks space for all junior sailors currently required to live on  their ships even while in homeport.
In order for barracks privatization to be feasible, Navy officials believed  that the Navy needed additional authorities not contained in the Military  Housing Privatization Initiative legislation. Specifically, Navy officials  believed that existing housing allowance rates provided more money than  would be needed to develop a privatized barracks project. The housing  allowance rate for unmarried junior members is targeted to cover the  costs of a one-bedroom apartment in the civilian community. Yet, the  barracks occupancy standard is based on a lesser standard—the modern  1+1 barracks design standard where two members share a module  consisting of two small bedrooms with a kitchenette and bath. As a result,  Navy officials believe the current housing allowance could provide more  money than would be needed to pay rent for a similar design standard in a  privatized barracks, and the rental income received by the private-sector  developer would be more than is needed to finance the construction and  management of the project. To address this situation, the Bob Stump  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 provided the Navy  with specific legislative authority to undertake three pilot projects to  privatize barracks. According to Navy officials, the legislation will allow  the Navy to pay occupants’ allowances in the amounts needed to provide  the rental income to support the privatized barracks projects and will  allow junior sailors on ships to be assigned to privatized barracks.
With this authority, Navy and Marine Corps officials stated that they plan  to develop specific proposals for privatization. Candidate installations for  barracks privatization include the Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; the  Naval Station San Diego, California; and the Marine Corps Base Camp  Pendleton, California. Although remaining challenges, such as those noted  above, must be addressed, Navy officials hope that specific proposals will  be developed by the end of calendar year 2003.
section_title: Air Force Efforts to Privatize Barracks
paragraphs: In May 1997, the Air Force issued the results of a barracks privatization  feasibility study. The study concluded that privatization was feasible and  recommended that the Air Force pursue development of a barracks  privatization project at one base to further define the concept. However,  the study, which was performed prior to issuance of the budgetary scoring  guidelines for privatization projects, stated that occupancy guarantees  would be provided in order to facilitate private financing. According to Air  Force officials, the study recommendation was not implemented because  of the costs associated with occupancy guarantees and the other  challenges associated with barracks privatization.
More recently, however, the Air Force has again begun to explore the  issue. In August 2002, an Air Force team was formed to establish a  baseline for an Air Force barracks privatization program including the  development of policy and guidance. Air Force officials also stated that Air  Force major commands have been asked to identify potential privatization  candidates. One potential candidate identified was Elmendorf Air Force  Base, Alaska, where a family housing privatization project is already  underway. However, officials stated that they do not expect any privatized  barracks proposals in the near future and that they planned to monitor the  Navy’s progress under its pilot program.
section_title: Army Efforts to Privatize Barracks
paragraphs: Army officials stated that they have explored the concept of barracks  privatization but that they have made relatively little progress toward  reaching a consensus that the concept should be pursued. They also stated  that they were not optimistic that the many challenges facing barracks  privatization could be overcome and did not expect any project proposals  in the near future. Nevertheless, the Army is continuing to review the  issue. For example, in an April 2002 memorandum, the Army Assistant  Secretary for Installations and Environment stated that the time was right  to pursue the issue and requested the support of the Army’s Training and  Doctrine Command and the Army’s Forces Command in formal studies of  barracks privatization. At the time of our review, no studies had been  completed. In addition, Fort Lewis, Washington, has a barracks  privatization study underway that is expected to be completed in 2003.
section_title: Residential Construction Practices Offer Opportunities to Reduce Costs of Government-Owned Barracks
paragraphs: To the extent the services continue to rely on government built and  operated barracks on military installations, opportunities exist to reduce  costs of constructing those barracks through adoption of residential  construction practices. In the past, DOD policies generally required that  traditional barracks construction practices use commercial-type  construction including use of steel frame, concrete, and cement block.  Similar multi-unit residential housing in the private sector, such as  apartments, college dormitories, and extended stay hotels, normally use  residential construction practices that include the use of wood frame  construction. Compared to steel frame, concrete, and cement block  construction, Army analyses show that residential construction practices  could reduce typical barracks construction costs by 23 percent or more.  DOD policies now generally allow use of residential construction  practices. However, some barriers still exist to DOD’s adoption of these  cost-reducing practices as a normal way of doing business, including  concern about durability and unanswered questions about the ability of  wood-frame barracks to meet all antiterrorism force protection  requirements.
subsections: section_title: Army Analyses Show That Residential Construction Practices Cost Less
paragraphs: Concerned with the high construction costs of barracks built to the 1+1  design standard, the Army began to search for savings opportunities and  concluded that using residential construction practices to build barracks  would cost less than using traditional construction practices. In June 2000,  the Army revised its barracks construction guidance to permit Army  construction projects to be of any construction type. Subsequently, the  Army began a pilot barracks project using residential construction  practices at Fort Meade, Maryland.
subsections: section_title: Army Concern Over Barracks Costs Resulted in Search for Savings Opportunities
paragraphs: As the Army began building new barracks in accordance with the 1+1  barracks design standard adopted in 1995, Army officials became  concerned with the high construction costs of these barracks. To explore  reasons for the high costs and opportunities for savings, the Army Corps  of Engineers performed a study in 1996 that compared the construction  costs of three typical Army 1+1 barracks with the construction costs of a  similar private sector multi-unit project—specifically a national brand, all  suites, extended stay hotel. After making adjustments to account for  differences in geographic location and dates of construction, the Army  Corps of Engineers found significant cost differences between the projects  as shown in table 1.
The extended stay hotel provided each occupant with more amenities and  space than the Army barracks at a construction cost per occupant of  $14,100, or 29 percent, less than the barracks’ average construction cost  per occupant. The Army Corps of Engineers determined that although  many factors accounted for the cost difference between the projects, the  primary reason was the type of construction used to build the projects.  The barracks were constructed in accordance with Uniform Building Code  type I/II (commercial) standards that call for non-combustible  construction built from concrete, masonry, and/or steel. The private  extended stay hotel was constructed in accordance with Uniform Building  Code type V (residential) standards that permit use of any building  material allowed by the code, including wood. The Army Corps of  Engineers’ data showed that if the barracks had been built using  residential construction practices instead of traditional barracks  construction practices, the Army’s average construction cost per occupant  would have been about $37,500, a reduction of about $11,200, or 23  percent, per occupant. This study did not address differences in the  barracks’ total costs—i.e., construction costs and operations and  maintenance costs—over their lifetimes. However, subsequent Army  analyses indicate that a barrack’s total costs over its lifetime would be less  if constructed with residential practices because of its lower initial  construction costs and comparable operations and maintenance costs for  many building components. (See app. III for additional details on the  Army’s analyses.)
A subsequent Army study also concluded that the materials and methods  traditionally used to construct government-owned barracks were more  costly than the materials and methods normally used to construct similar  multi-unit residential buildings in the private sector. In a joint February  2001 report, the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation  Management and the Army Corps of Engineers concluded that using  residential construction practices, similar to the practices used to build  apartment buildings, could achieve considerable cost reductions without  adversely impacting barracks’ durability or maintainability. The report  included an additional example comparing barracks built using traditional  construction practices with a residential condominium built using  residential construction practices. Specifically, the report cited an Army  1+1 barracks built in fiscal year 2000 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Each  two-bedroom, bath, and kitchenette module had 506 square feet and cost  $193,000. During this time frame, the construction cost of a 1,500 square  foot residential unit with two bedrooms, two baths, full kitchen, living  room, laundry room, and balcony in a new private condominium complex  in Maryland was $180,000. Although the condominium unit was almost  three times larger than the barracks module, it cost $13,000 less.
section_title: Army Revised Barracks Construction Guidance
paragraphs: The Army revised its barracks construction guidance in recent years to  permit construction projects to be of any construction type, largely in  response to its analyses. When building barracks, the Army had been  following guidance in Military Handbook 1008C, which provides direction  on the design and construction of DOD facilities. The handbook stated  that construction of new buildings should be limited to use of traditional  barracks construction practices. However, in June 2000, the Army Corps  of Engineers issued guidance that authorized Army construction projects  to be of any construction type as long as they complied with the Uniform  Building Code requirements for the construction type used. Further, in a  July 2002 memorandum, the Army Vice Chief of Staff stated that use of  less restrictive residential practices in barracks construction would  improve soldier quality of life and provide better value to the Army. An  enclosure to this memorandum stated that, although Army barracks  traditionally have been designed in many cases to exceed industry codes  and standards, such an approach is not in the Army’s best economic  interests.
section_title: Fort Meade Barracks Project Is Army’s First to Use Residential Construction Practices
paragraphs: A 1+1 barracks design project currently under construction at Fort Meade,  Maryland, is the Army’s first barracks to be built using residential  construction practices. According to Army officials, the project calls for  eight new three-story barracks buildings with a total of 576 private  sleeping rooms. The project’s initial design assumed use of traditional  construction practices. However, on the basis of this design, the Army  Corps of Engineers estimated that the project would cost $48 million— about $11 million more than had been approved for the project. In an  effort to reduce construction costs, the Army decided to redesign the  project using multi-unit residential 1-hour fire resistive construction  practices. After the redesign and solicitation process, the project was  awarded for about $31 million. With the project 83 percent complete in  January 2003, the Army Corps of Engineers estimated that the final project  cost—including supervision and overhead costs and costs of changes and  enhancements to the contracted design—would be about $39 million. In  addition, the project’s estimated completion date was about 8 months  ahead of the contracted completion date of January 2004.
In January 2003, we visited the Fort Meade barracks construction site.  Visually, we noted few differences in the appearance of these barracks  compared to traditional barracks. Figure 1 shows photographs of the Fort  Meade barracks project contrasted with a traditionally constructed  barracks at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
For a comparison with the Fort Meade project, we asked the Army for cost  data on two 1+1 barracks projects under construction at Fort Bragg, North  Carolina. One project is building 960 rooms using traditional non- combustible construction practices and the other project is building 608  rooms using traditional 1-hour fire resistive construction practices.  Compared to the Fort Bragg projects, it appears that use of the residential  construction practices in the Fort Meade project will result in  considerable cost reductions—from $12,600 to $31,800 per occupant (see  table 2).
section_title: Barriers Exist to Greater Use of Residential Construction Practices
paragraphs: There are barriers to DOD’s widespread adoption of residential  construction practices as a normal way of doing business. Because Army  studies and the pilot project at Fort Meade indicate the potential to reduce  some costs by using residential construction practices, it would seem that  the services would be eager to adopt these practices for all future barracks  construction projects. However, this has not been the case due to  concerns about barracks durability and concerns related to antiterrorism  force protection issues.
According to Army officials, the services have been reluctant to change  construction practices because of the concern that switching to residential  construction practices would result in barracks that are less attractive and  less durable. However, the officials noted that the exterior appearance of  barracks constructed with residential and traditional practices normally  would be the same. Also, Army analyses indicate that there is little  difference in durability with each type of construction and a barrack’s  total costs over its lifetime would be less if constructed with residential  practices because of its lower initial construction costs and comparable  operations and maintenance costs for many building components. (See  app. III for additional details.) Still, the officials stated that the idea of  switching construction practices continues to face resistance. Because of  this, even the Army had no definite plans, as of February 2003, for  additional barracks construction using residential construction practices.
The Air Force also had no plans to use residential construction practices  for its barracks projects. The Navy, which has completed two barracks  projects using residential construction practices, has no additional  barracks projects underway or planned using these practices.
Another barrier to widespread adoption of residential construction  practices for barracks relates to unresolved questions on whether use of  these practices would result in barracks that fully complied with new  antiterrorism guidance for force protection. In July 2002, DOD finalized  guidance requiring military components to adhere to common criteria and  minimum construction standards to mitigate antiterrorism vulnerabilities  and terrorist threats. The standards seek to minimize the likelihood of  mass casualties from terrorist attacks against DOD personnel in the  buildings where they work and live.
As applied to barracks construction, two standards in the antiterrorism  force protection guidance are particularly important—standoff distance  and prevention of building collapse. Standoff distance refers to the  minimum distance that buildings should be situated from roads, parking  lots, trash containers, and an installation’s perimeter. According to the  guidance, the easiest and least costly way to achieve appropriate levels of  protection against terrorist threats is to incorporate sufficient standoff  distance into project designs. In situations where the standoff distance  standards cannot be achieved because land is unavailable, the guidance  calls for building hardening or other techniques to mitigate possible blast  effects. According to Army officials, because most barracks projects in the  United States could be situated to meet required standoff distances, use of  residential construction practices and compliance with this standard  would not be a problem in most instances. Navy officials, however, stated  that enough land to meet required standoff distances was not available at  many of its installations.
The DOD standard for preventing building collapse applies to buildings of  three or more stories and requires that they be designed with provisions  that permit the structure to sustain local damage without the entire  building collapsing. According to Army officials, questions remain as to  whether barracks built using residential practices would comply with the  collapse standard. They stated that the primary issue is lack of engineering  data. Most available building collapse information addresses structural  systems typical of taller buildings that were not built using residential  construction practices. Army officials also stated that complying with the  collapse standard using residential barracks construction practices might  not be a problem or might be solved with inexpensive adjustments to  construction techniques. Designers do not have sufficient data on exactly  what, if anything, needs to be done to ensure compliance with the  standard when using residential construction practices.
At the same time, some Army officials also questioned whether the  collapse standard should apply to low-rise three-story barracks buildings.  They noted that industry design standards usually make a distinction in  structural requirements at four stories and above—not at three stories and  above as required by the collapse standard. They further noted that today’s  1+1 barracks design standard provides relatively low occupancy densities  that are more similar to family housing which is exempt from the force  protection requirements as long as a family housing building contains no  more than 12 family units.
section_title: Opportunities Exist to Make Better Use of Existing Barracks
paragraphs: The services could minimize housing costs by ensuring full use of existing  barracks space. Having unused government-owned barracks spaces and  paying housing allowances at the same time wastes available resources.  Air Force and Army barracks instructions, however, do not require  installations to use all vacant space before authorizing housing allowances  for junior members to live off base. Our review, as well as previous  reviews by military service audit groups, found that the lenient barracks  utilization guidance, and in some cases noncompliance with the guidance,  resulted in installations paying housing allowances when barracks  vacancies existed. The services could also reduce costs by identifying and  eliminating excess barracks infrastructure if they were to change their  barracks occupancy requirements and permit more junior members to live  off base.
subsections: section_title: Army and Air Force Instructions Do Not Require Full Utilization of Barracks Space
paragraphs: Army instructions allow its installations to authorize junior members to  live off base with a housing allowance when barracks occupancy reaches  95 percent. Air Force instructions only require that 90 percent of an  installation’s available barracks spaces be used before authorizing junior  members to live off base with a housing allowance. Prior to June 1998, the  Air Force required 95-percent occupancy. Air Force officials stated that  the change was made to facilitate flexibility and to help maintain unit  integrity in barracks assignments. To put these instructions in perspective,  such policies, if practiced in the private sector, would be the equivalent of  the owner of a private apartment complex turning away prospective  tenants even though 5 to 10 percent of the apartments were vacant—an  action not likely to happen if the owner is concerned about costs and  revenues. Further, allowing 5 to 10 percent of barracks spaces to go  unused appears contrary to the services’ policies requiring that all  unmarried junior members live in the barracks as long as space is  available.
In contrast to Army and Air Force instructions, Navy and Marine Corps  instructions state that maximum practical occupancy should be achieved  before junior members are authorized to live off base with a housing  allowance. The Navy instruction specifically states that barracks  utilization should routinely approach 100 percent.
section_title: Actual Barracks Utilization Varied
paragraphs: In view of the differences in the services’ barracks utilization guidance, we  attempted to review barracks utilization and payment of housing  allowances for unmarried junior members in each of the services.  However, our analysis was limited to the Air Force and the Marine Corps  because only those services require their installations to collect and  centrally report barracks utilization data and the number of members  authorized to live off base. The Navy requires barracks utilization reports,  but the reports do not include the number of members authorized to live  off base. Army officials stated that although utilization data is maintained  by each installation, they had eliminated central reporting requirements  years ago in order to reduce paperwork costs. With centralized data only  available from the Air Force and the Marine Corps, we focused our review  on an analysis of that information.
subsections: section_title: Many Air Force Barracks Rooms Were Vacant
paragraphs: The Air Force reported an inventory of about 43,400 adequate permanent  party barracks rooms in the United States as of September 30, 2002. Table  3 shows that on September 30, 2002, about 4,700 of these rooms were  diverted from normal use for maintenance and other reasons. Of the  remaining rooms, about 35,300, or 91 percent, were occupied and about  3,400 rooms, or 9 percent, were vacant. Among major Air Force  installations, the occupancy rates for the available barracks rooms ranged  from 100 percent at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, to 82 percent at  Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
The Air Force also reported that as of September 30, 2002, it had  authorized about 24,100 unmarried junior servicemembers in pay grades  E1 through E4 to live off base with a housing allowance. We analyzed this  data to estimate the housing allowance funds that the Air Force could  potentially have prevented if members living off base had been assigned to  the vacant barracks rooms. To do this, we compared—on an installation- by-installation basis—the number of junior servicemembers living off base  with a housing allowance to the number of barracks vacancies on  September 30, 2002. Our analysis showed that the vacant barracks spaces  could have accommodated about 2,900 of the junior members who were  living off base—suggesting a practice at variance with the Air Force’s  stated policy of requiring E1 through E4 to live on base in barracks. Had  these members been assigned to the barracks, the Air Force potentially  could have reduced its annual housing allowance costs by about   $20 million. Because the data used in this analysis reflected barracks use  on a single date, September 30, 2002, our analysis reflects results as of this  single date. Also, because barracks occupancy can change daily, results  would have differed if utilization data on another date had been used or if  data had been available to show daily utilization over a period of time.
Although Air Force instructions require that 90 percent of an installation’s  available barracks spaces be used before authorizing junior members to  live off base, some Air Force installations apparently were not in  compliance with this guidance. For example, data for Kirtland Air Force  Base, New Mexico, indicated an 85-percent occupancy rate with 105  vacancies and 392 junior members living off base with a housing  allowance. Similarly, data for McChord Air Force Base, Washington,  indicated an 86-percent occupancy rate with 101 vacancies, and 118 junior  members living off base with a housing allowance. Air Force officials  noted that installation occupancy rates are reported only twice a year and  represent a snapshot in time. Thus, to determine whether installations  reporting less than 90-percent occupancy were not complying with policy  would require a detailed installation level review of occupancy rates over a  period of time and the reasons why members living off base were allowed  to do so. Air Force officials also noted that Air Force commands are  reminded on a regular basis of the importance of complying with  utilization policy and making full use of their barracks.
section_title: Nearly All Marine Corps Barracks Were Occupied
paragraphs: The Marine Corps data as of September 30, 2002, showed that barracks at  most Marine Corps installations were fully used. Of the few major  installations that reported less than 100-percent utilization, only one also  reported unmarried junior enlisted members living off base with a housing  allowance. In this instance, however, the installation reported only three  junior members with a housing allowance.
section_title: Audit Groups Have Reported Noncompliance with Utilization Guidance
paragraphs: Previous reports from service audit groups also have noted that  noncompliance with existing guidance has resulted in installations paying  housing allowances when barracks vacancies existed. For example, in a  February 1999 report on barracks management at Langley Air Force Base,  Virginia, the Air Force Audit Agency stated that housing managers did not  require individual barracks to meet the occupancy goal before authorizing  members to live off base. The report also stated that maintaining  barracks occupancy rates above the Air Force goal would provide direct  savings to the Air Force budget. The Army Audit Agency reported in  January 1997 that Fort Benning, Georgia, had authorized members to live  off base even though barracks utilization was below the Army goal of   95 percent. The report stated that the unnecessary authorizations were  issued because Fort Benning decentralized barracks management to the  unit level and did not make sure that each unit fully used its barracks  before authorizing members to live off base with a housing allowance.
section_title: Changing Occupancy Requirements Could Reduce the Need for Barracks Spaces
paragraphs: While it is important to make full use of existing barracks space, it is also  important that the services maintain an inventory of barracks spaces only  in the numbers actually required. In our January 2003 report, we discussed  the widely varying standards among the services regarding who should  live in barracks and the effect this can have on program costs and quality  of life and recommended that the services review the rationale behind  their barracks occupancy requirements. DOD has left unclear the extent  to which it is likely to make changes in its barracks occupancy  requirements. However, if the services were to change their barracks  occupancy requirements and permit more junior members to live off base  with a housing allowance, then the services could reduce housing costs by  identifying and eliminating excess barracks infrastructure. To use the Air  Force case as an illustration, instead of bringing junior members back on  base to fill up barracks vacancies, the Air Force could officially decide that  many of these members should be allowed to continue to live off base.  This decision would reduce barracks needs and the Air Force could then  consider vacant barracks spaces as excess infrastructure that could be  eliminated to reduce costs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD and the services have not fully explored barracks privatization to  determine whether the concept could provide a better economic value to  the government than the use of military construction financing. Although  the services have separately studied the issues and unique challenges  associated with barracks privatization, DOD has largely concentrated on  family housing privatization and not on promoting a coordinated, focused  effort to address the challenges and develop pilot project proposals to  determine the overall feasibility and merits of barracks privatization.  Without more coordination of activities to address the challenges  associated with barracks privatization, efforts might be duplicated and  potential opportunities to optimize lessons learned might be lost.
For several reasons, DOD and the military services have not taken  advantage of opportunities to potentially reduce their housing costs for  unmarried servicemembers through use of residential construction  practices in government-owned barracks construction and better  utilization of existing government-owned barracks. First, widespread  adoption of residential construction practices in building government- owned barracks has been hampered because of concerns about barracks  durability and unanswered questions about the ability of wood-frame  barracks to meet all antiterrorism force protection requirements. Without  engineering studies to resolve these questions and, if appropriate,  adoption of residential construction practices, the services could be  spending more than is needed on barracks construction. Second, lenient  barracks utilization guidance—which in some cases does not require full  use of existing government-owned barracks before authorizing housing  allowances for junior members to live off base—and limited enforcement  of existing guidance have led in some cases to the routine acceptance of  less than maximum use of barracks and the payment of housing  allowances when vacancies exist. The establishment of and compliance  with guidance that requires maximum use of required existing barracks— specifically, utilization that routinely approaches 100 percent before  unmarried junior members are authorized housing allowances—could  result in reducing the services’ housing costs for junior members. It is also  important that the services maintain an inventory of barracks spaces only  in the numbers actually required. If the services were to change their  barracks occupancy requirements based on their review of the  requirements’ rationale and permit more junior members to live off base,  then they could also reduce costs by identifying and eliminating barracks  space that is no longer needed.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To capitalize on opportunities for reducing housing costs for unmarried  servicemembers, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to:    Promote a coordinated, focused effort among the military services to  determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of barracks  privatization by addressing the associated challenges and facilitating  the development of pilot project proposals. This effort should support  the Navy’s use of the pilot housing privatization authority provided to  the Navy in the Fiscal Year 2003 Bob Stump National Defense  Authorization Act, with lessons learned applied to the other services’  efforts.
Direct the Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities  Engineering Command to jointly undertake an engineering study to  resolve questions about use of residential construction practices for  barracks and compliance with antiterrorism force protection  requirements.
Direct the military services to adopt residential construction practices  for future barracks construction projects to the maximum extent  practical, providing that the engineering studies show that barracks  built with residential construction practices can economically meet all  force protection requirements.  Issue guidance directing that the services maximize use of required  existing barracks space—defined as utilization that routinely  approaches 100 percent—before authorizing unmarried junior  members to live off base with a housing allowance.
Direct the military services to identify and eliminate excess barracks  infrastructure if, by reviewing the rationale behind their barracks  occupancy requirements, they determine that more unmarried junior  members should be permitted to live off base with a housing  allowance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Director, Competitive  Sourcing and Privatization, fully agreed with four and partially agreed with  one of our recommendations and indicated that actions were underway or  planned to deal with most of them. DOD stated that it was supportive of  initiatives to energize barracks privatization and planned to build on  lessons learned from the Navy’s pilot project to encourage barracks  privatization. DOD also stated that it supports the study and use of  commercial and residential construction standards and use of the  privatization authorities to improve the living conditions for  unaccompanied members as quickly as possible. In addition, it stated that  the Army Corps of Engineers has already begun a study of residential  construction methods and compliance with antiterrorism force protection  requirements using the Fort Meade barracks project as a basis for the  study. Further, as the first step to maximizing use of existing barracks,  programming for new barracks, and divesting of excess infrastructure,  DOD stated that the actual need for barracks space must be determined by  establishing a common requirements process consistent with individual  service missions.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to issue guidance  directing the services to maximize use of required existing barracks space.  DOD stated that barracks requirements must first be determined before  issuing such guidance. We agree that the services should maintain an  inventory of barracks spaces only in the numbers actually required and  that if the services were to reduce their barracks occupancy requirements  and permit more junior members to live off base, then they could reduce  costs by identifying and eliminating barracks space that is no longer  needed, as DOD suggests in its comments. However, on the basis of their  current barracks occupancy requirements and construction plans, the  services have individually determined that most of their existing barracks  spaces are needed. Unless stated barracks occupancy requirements are  reduced, we believe that these spaces should be fully used before  authorizing housing allowances for junior members to live off base and  that additional DOD guidance is needed now to help achieve this. To do  otherwise, results in having unused government-owned barracks spaces  and paying housing allowances at the same time, which wastes available  resources.
DOD’s comments are included in appendix IV of this report.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit  a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the  Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on  Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A  written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees  on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made  more than 60 days after the date of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, and it will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions on the matters  discussed in this letter, please contact me at (202) 512-8412, or my  Assistant Director, Mark Little, at (202) 512-4673. Gary Phillips, Jim Ellis,  Sharon Reid, Harry Knobler, and R.K. Wild were major contributors to this  report.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our review of DOD’s housing program for unmarried servicemembers  focused on enlisted members at their permanent assignment locations in  the United States—after the members completed recruit and advanced  individual training. We interviewed DOD and service headquarters housing  officials; reviewed applicable DOD and military service policies and  procedures; reviewed barracks improvement plans and milestones; and  visited selected installations to view barracks conditions and discuss local  management practices. Specifically, we visited the Naval Station Norfolk,  Virginia; Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Fort Eustis, Virginia; and Marine  Corps Base Quantico, Virginia.
To examine opportunities for reducing costs through barracks  privatization and the barriers to developing barracks privatization project  proposals, we examined the laws authorizing and funding the program,  reviewed DOD’s experiences with family housing privatization,  interviewed DOD and service officials, and reviewed available  documentation to identify past efforts and current plans related to  barracks privatization. We also discussed privatization plans and  challenges with local officials at the installations visited and discussed  budget scoring issues for barracks privatization with officials at the Office  of Management and Budget.
To examine opportunities for reducing costs through adoption of  residential construction practices for barracks construction, we reviewed  Army studies and analyses in this area. We also obtained and compared  selected cost information for barracks constructed using traditional  practices and for barracks constructed using residential practices. We did  not attempt to validate this cost information. Further, we interviewed  service officials to discuss the services’ use of residential construction  practices for barracks and to determine the reasons why the concept has  not been widely adopted. We also visited Fort Meade, Maryland, to  observe construction progress on the Army’s first barracks project that  has incorporated residential construction practices.
To examine opportunities for reducing costs through better utilization of  barracks, we reviewed the services’ policies and instructions related to  barracks use, occupancy goals, and justification for authorizing unmarried  junior members to live off base with a housing allowance. To determine  whether greater use of barracks could reduce housing allowance costs, we  obtained and analyzed readily available data showing the number of  barracks vacancies and the number of junior servicemembers living off  base with a housing allowance on September 30, 2002. To estimate the  potential cost reductions, we multiplied the number of members who  could have been assigned to the barracks vacancies by the national  average basic allowance for housing rate. We also reviewed prior audit  reports related to barracks utilization from military service audit  organizations.
We conducted our review between May 2002 and April 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Photographs of Old and New Style Barracks and Quarters Aboard Navy Ships
paragraphs: The military services are replacing old barracks, where junior members  often share a sleeping room with one or two others and share a gang  latrine with occupants from several other rooms, with new barracks,  where in most cases junior members have a private sleeping room and  share a bath and kitchenette with one other member. The Navy’s  “homeport ashore” initiative intends to provide barracks spaces on base  for junior members who are currently required to live in cramped quarters  aboard their ships even when their ships are in homeport. During our visits  to installations, we observed a variety of barracks in conditions ranging  from outdated to newly constructed. Figure 2 shows photographs of  typical old and new style barracks.
At the older barracks, we saw cramped living quarters, peeling paint,  damaged walls and ceilings, and poor heating, ventilation, and air  conditioning systems. On board ship, the space was cramped. Some  examples of the living quarters and gang latrines in old style barracks and  aboard ship are shown in figure 3.
In contrast, we observed several newly constructed barracks that provided  living quarters using the 1+1 barracks design standard. Some examples of  the bedrooms, shared baths, and shared kitchenettes are shown in   figure 4.
section_title: Appendix III: Details on Cost Differences in Barracks Built with Residential and Traditional Construction Practices
paragraphs: Compared to traditional steel frame, concrete, and cement block  construction, Army analyses show that use of residential construction can  reduce typical barracks construction costs by 23 percent or more. Army  analyses also indicate that a barrack’s total costs over its lifetime—i.e.,  initial construction costs and annual operations and maintenance costs— would be less if constructed with residential practices. The lower “life- cycle costs” from use of residential construction practices results not only  from the lower initial construction costs, but also from comparable  operations and maintenance costs for many building components  regardless of the type of construction practices used—traditional or  residential. Use of residential construction practices to build barracks  could also reduce renovation costs and result in additional cost reductions  in labor construction costs.
Army officials noted that actual differences in barracks operations and  maintenance costs are dependent on the particular building designs. In  general, however, the officials stated that there should be no significant  operations and maintenance cost differences with use of either traditional  or residential construction practices in many architectural features, such  as exterior and interior finishes, electrical and plumbing systems, doors  and hardware, and windows. For other building components, such as roofs  and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems, operations and  maintenance costs could be lower with traditional construction. But,  because of the lower initial construction costs, use of residential  construction practices for such components could still result in lower  costs over the life of the barracks. For example, the roof system for many  traditionally constructed barracks consists of metal and concrete that  would normally last for the entire life of the barracks. When using  residential construction practices, the barracks roof system would  normally consist of heavy-duty shingles that would require replacement  during the life of the barracks. Yet, Army analyses show that a shingle roof  system would have lower life-cycle costs than a metal and concrete roof  system because of its lower initial construction costs.
Army officials also noted that use of residential construction practices for  barracks would result in buildings that could be renovated at lower costs  than traditionally constructed barracks. They stated that many military  buildings, including barracks, become functionally obsolete in 25 years or  less because of changed missions or design standards, such as the change  in the barracks design standard in 1995 from multi-person to private  sleeping rooms. The costs to renovate and reconfigure a traditionally  constructed barracks with masonry interior walls would normally be  greater than the costs to renovate and reconfigure a barracks built with  residential construction practices using wood frame and sheetrock walls.
According to Army officials, use of residential construction practices to  build barracks could result in additional reductions in construction labor  costs. Federal statutes, commonly referred to as the Davis-Bacon Act and  related legislation, require that workers on most government construction  projects be paid according to the prevailing local wage rates as determined  by the Department of Labor. However, there are different prevailing local  wage rate scales depending on the type of construction being performed.  Traditionally, barracks construction has been considered commercial  construction and the commercial wage rate scale has been used for these  projects. In contrast, military family housing construction has been  considered residential construction and the residential wage rate scale has  been used for these projects. According to Army officials, the residential  wage rate scale is normally 5 to 30 percent less than the commercial wage  rate scale. Thus, using residential construction practices in a low-rise  (three stories or less) barracks construction project and application of the  residential, instead of commercial, wage rate scale, could result in  additional reductions in barracks construction costs.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense