Defense Acquisitions: Changes in E-10A Acquisition Strategy Needed before Development Starts
Published: 2005-03-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Air Force is on the verge of making a major commitment to the multi-billion dollar E-10A Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft program. Due to the substantial investment needed and technological challenges in developing the aircraft, the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces asked GAO to examine the soundness of the E-10A business case as well as the risks associated with the current acquisition strategy.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As the E-10A Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft program nears its official starting point, questions remain regarding critical elements of its business case, including the need for the aircraft, the maturity level of its technology, and its funding. Plans call for the E-10A to couple a new radar system with a sophisticated and software intensive battle management command and control system aboard a Boeing 767. E-10A is planned to fill a current gap in U.S. capabilities and provide a defense against weapons such as cruise missiles. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is still working on a study to determine whether the E-10A program is the most cost-effective way to fill that gap. E-10A program funding plans changed dramatically in December 2004 when the DOD proposed reducing the total program budget by about 45 percent for the next 2 fiscal years. The business case for starting a development program requires demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the concept can be developed and produced within existing resources--including design knowledge, demonstrated technologies, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product. E-10A requirements and resources are still in flux. GAO found risks associated with the current E-10A acquisition strategy that could lead to costly changes later in the program. The program is set to move into production before critical knowledge is acquired. For example, the first fully assembled E-10A, outfitted with its radar and battle management command and control systems, would not be delivered in time to complete testing before the decision is made to begin production. Testing and production are scheduled to start at the same time in 2010. Furthermore, four of six E-10As are scheduled to begin production before the results of testing are available. By not demonstrating that the system can perform as expected before entering production, the program increases the risk of changes and delays later in the program. This strategy requires significant concurrency among the technology development, product development, and production phases.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In April 2005, the Air Force plans to make a major commitment to the   E-10A Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A) program and  officially begin its development and demonstration phase. The program,  estimated to cost over $7.3 billion through fiscal year 2013, is being  designed to fill a gap in U. S. capabilities and provide a defense against  weapons such as cruise missiles. It is also being designed to be an airborne  battle management platform capable of directing forces to respond to  moving targets in the air and on the ground. Given the technical challenges  and significant investment associated with this aircraft, you requested that  we review the E-10A program to determine whether its business case is  clearly defined and its acquisition process is well executed. This report  examines (1) the soundness of the Air Force’s business case including   E-10A requirements, technologies, and cost; and (2) the risks associated  with the planned acquisition strategy.
Because the E-10A is not officially a weapons system acquisition program  until the Milestone B decision has been approved, the Air Force  considered key elements of the business case as pre-decisional and subject  to change. Therefore, we did not have the opportunity to review all  elements related to the critical E-10A technology assessments, the cost  estimate, or the funding profile. The Air Force did provide, however, a  technology readiness assessment of the radar subsystem, the planned  overall acquisition strategy, and the analysis of alternatives supporting the  selection of the specific E-10A aircraft platform. Despite these limitations,  we were able to assess the relative state of the E-10A business case as  compared to the expectations of best practices. We did this by drawing on  other information available that indicated the current instability of  estimated cost and funding and that questioned the maturity of the  technology associated with a key subsystem. We conducted this review  from January 2004 to January 2005 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. More details about our methodology are in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The E-10A program comprises three primary elements: the aircraft, radar,  and battle management command and control subsystem. The aircraft is a  Boeing 767-400ER, the largest 767 variant Boeing makes. The Air Force  has only contracted for one aircraft to date, because a final decision on the  operational platform has not been made. This aircraft is a commercial  product that will be modified for military use and used as a testbed. At this  time there is only 1 unfilled order for the 400 model in the Boeing  assembly line and 25 other unfilled orders for other smaller 767 models. If  the Boeing production line were to close down before the Air Force is  positioned to make a production decision on the E-10A it would have to  find an alternative. Alternatives could include a different aircraft type or  model or the purchase of 767-400ER aircraft from commercial airline  companies.
The radar planned for the E-10A began development in 1997 as a response  to the growing concern about cruise missile proliferation. Initially, it was  intended to upgrade the radar on the Joint Surveillance Target Attack  Radar System (Joint STARS). The upgraded radar was to have advanced  sensor technology, providing air-to-air capability for cruise missile defense  and significant increases in ground surveillance capability. Shortly after  the program began development, the Air Force restructured the program  to develop a modular, scalable radar suitable for use on a variety of  airborne platforms. OSD approved the development of the multiple  platform radar in 2003. It is being designed for inclusion on the Global  Hawk and E-10A programs.
The Air Force began evaluating the need to improve its airborne battle  management command and control capabilities in 2002. The planned   E-10A battle management command and control subsystem is software  intensive and intended to enable the E-10A to process and display sensor  data from the radar and eventually from off board sensors so that the  onboard crew can take actions against time sensitive targets. The Air  Force issued a contract in September 2004 to begin preliminary design  efforts for this subsystem.
We have a body of work focused on best practices in product development  and weapon systems acquisition. This work has found that key to success  is formulation of a business case that matches product requirements to  available resources—proven technologies, sufficient engineering  capabilities, time, and funding. Several basic factors are critical to  establishing a sound business case for undertaking a new product  development. First, the needs of the party seeking the new product, the  user, must be accurately defined, alternative approaches to satisfying  these needs properly analyzed, and quantities needed for the chosen  system must be well understood. The developed product must be  producible at a cost that matches the users’ expectations and budgetary  resources. Finally, the developer must have the resources to design and  deliver the product with the features that the customer wants when it is  needed. If the financial, material and intellectual resources to develop the  product properly are not available, development does not go forward.  Additionally, an evolutionary and knowledge-based acquisition strategy  that captures critical knowledge before key decision points in the program  is needed to execute the business plan. This calls for a realistic assessment  of risks and costs; doing otherwise undermines the intent of the business  case and invites failure. Ultimately, preserving the business case and  attaining critical knowledge in time for decisions strengthens the ability of  managers to say “no” to pressures to accept high risks or unknowns.
If best practices are not followed, we have found a cascade of negative  effects becomes magnified in the product development and production  phases of an acquisition program. These have led to acquisition outcomes  that included significant cost increases and schedule delays, poor product  quality and reliability, and delays in getting the new capability to the  warfigher. These outcomes have been demonstrated in other programs  such as the F/A-22 fighter, C-17 airlifter, V-22 tiltrotor aircraft, PAC-3  missile, and others.
section_title: Uncertainties Exist in E-10A Business Case as It Approaches Its Decision Point
paragraphs: Questions remain as the Air Force develops the E-10A program’s business  case to support the decision to begin development in April 2005. The DOD  has identified a need for a cruise missile defense capability and the Air  Force has selected the E-10A to meet this need. There are, however,  unanswered questions in both the requirement and resource elements of  the E-10A business case. OSD is still studying whether the E-10A is the  most cost-effective alternative for the cruise missile requirement and the  extent of battle management command and control needed on board to  satisfy the intended need. Finally, assessments of the technology maturity,  estimated costs, and funding availability are still in process.
subsections: section_title: OSD Is Still Studying the Need for the E-10A
paragraphs: OSD officials from the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate are  not satisfied that the studies done by the Air Force to select the E-10A  sufficiently analyzed alternative systems. As a result, they are reviewing  alternative systems and attempting to determine the most cost-effective  solution to satisfy the warfighter’s needs. OSD officials agree that the E- 10A could provide an increased capability in identifying and tracking  ground moving and time-sensitive targets. However, they believe that if  there are less costly systems that can provide similar capabilities, it could  be more cost-effective to buy those systems. The Air Force began efforts  in 1997 to develop a radar sensor that would detect cruise missiles as part  of the Joint STARS program. The Air Force examined different size and  power combinations for the radar and which platforms had the capacity to  carry the radar and still perform multiple missions. These analyses  assumed that only manned airborne platforms could meet these  requirements. The Air Force completed a formal analysis of alternatives in  February 2002 of different possible host platforms for the radar. The study  indicated that other aircraft could meet many of the requirements but  were based on older commercial technology that was less efficient to  operate. The Air Force analysis concluded that the Boeing 767-400ER was  the optimal choice given the future multi-mission purpose of the system,  and the size, weight, and performance requirements of the radar.
OSD officials are also uncertain about the degree of battle management  command and control capability needed onboard the E-10A versus  transmitting the information gathered by the E-10A to other command and  control centers. According to the Air Force, the need for an onboard  capability is driven by the large amounts of data that would be collected  and analyzed, the limited bandwidth to transmit the data, and the need to  have line-of-sight communications for time-sensitive targeting, particularly  against cruise missiles. OSD officials said they are looking at whether the  battle management subsystem has to be part of the E-10A platform to meet  the timelines identified by the Air Force. They expect to present their  results by March 2005. Air Force officials told us that some of the battle  management functions are currently performed by ground units, but these  ground units cannot adequately respond to real-time events involving  moving targets like cruise missiles. The E-10A’s primary function will be  battle management command and control of cruise missile detection and  time-sensitive targeting activities. As a result, its battle management  capabilities will be tailored to support those functions. These capabilities  were validated in October 2004 by the Joint Requirements Oversight  Council in preparation for the program’s upcoming Milestone B decision.
To provide these capabilities, an onboard crew will be required. The  current E-10A crew size is estimated at 27 staff—2 flight crew, 21 mission  operators, and 4 technicians. According to the Air Force, the crew size  could change depending on the mission and the degree of automation on  the system. However, the Air Force has not performed any incremental  analysis to show crew size for individual specific missions, such as doing  cruise missile defense only.
section_title: Assessments of Needed Resources to Develop and Produce the E-10A Are Incomplete
paragraphs: To date, the Air Force has not identified sufficient or available resources  to meet the warfighter’s requirements and to start the development  program. The Air Force program office has completed its assessments of  E-10A critical technologies, cost estimates, and funding needs but these  assessments are being reviewed by OSD. While some resources will meet  the requirements, others are either unproven or in a state of flux. Radar  development started under a separate program, the Radar Technology  Insertion Program, and most radar technologies were reported as mature.  Because the Air Force did not provide GAO its technical assessment of the  battle management command and control system critical technologies, we  consider the maturity levels unproven, even though program officials told  us these technologies meet minimum maturity standards. In addition to  technologies, the financial resources for the program are in a state of flux.  The E-10A cost estimate for development and production is still a work in  process and funding was recently reduced by $600 million for fiscal years  2006 and 2007, which according to DOD officials will substantially impact  the program.
subsections: section_title: Status of Technologies
paragraphs: Most radar technologies are at a high level of maturity, but evidence was  not provided to support stated maturity levels of the battle management  command and control subsystem. The Air Force assessed radar  technologies prior to the October 2003 start of the Radar Technology  Insertion Program. The critical technologies identified in the radar  improvement program included the radar architecture, modes,  receiver/exciter, and signal processor among others. Of the nine  technologies identified, six were assessed as mature to our best practice  standard; the remaining three were one level below the best practice  requirement for mature technologies, a level DOD policy states is  sufficient to begin development. These three technologies are the pulse  compression unit, the structure, and the modes. Since the 2003 radar  technology assessment, the radar improvement program completed its  final design review in June 2004. Numerous tests have been conducted on  small-scale radar prototypes to mitigate program risks. These tests  electronically drove a signal through the radar, demonstrating the basic  functionality of the design. However, the radar subsystem being designed  for the E-10A has demonstrated neither form nor fit, nor has it been  integrated on the aircraft platform. Although the integration process is an  inherently high-risk endeavor, Air Force officials stated they have a  process in place to manage these risks. The actual size of the E-10A’s radar  will be significantly larger than the tested prototype and will require the   E-10A testbed aircraft in order to complete the demonstration currently  scheduled to occur in 2010. The process of scaling the radar to the  appropriate size and ensuring that all the individual modules work  together has yet to be accomplished. Recognizing this, program officials  have identified the integration of the radar as a critical technology for the  E-10A weapon system. The level of this technology’s maturity has not yet  been finalized. OSD officials accepted the Air Force’s assessment of the  radar technologies but expect more detailed information on the  technologies when the E-10A weapon system undergoes its Milestone B  review in April 2005.
An assessment of the battle management command and control subsystem  technologies was not provided for our review. This subsystem is complex  and software intensive. E-10A program officials told us these technologies  would meet the minimum DOD standard for starting a program. However,  the Air Force only recently directed the contractor to begin systems  engineering efforts to determine a preliminary design for this subsystem.  Development of critical software needed to demonstrate the technologies  has not started. The first increment of software is not scheduled to be  delivered until January 2008. On other major weapon system development  programs, we have found software development to be a substantial cause  for delays in technology development, system deliveries, and increased  costs. Therefore, even though program officials have stated technologies  are sufficiently mature, we think stronger evidence will be needed to  demonstrate their claim.
section_title: Status of Cost Estimate and Funding Needs
paragraphs: The Air Force has completed its cost estimate for the total E-10A program  and released it to OSD for review. The cost estimates for each of the three  major program elements contain risk. The biggest area of cost uncertainty  is the battle management command and control subsystem. It is a highly  complex software-intensive system. A contract was issued in September  2004 for about $71 million to begin early design and engineering efforts to  support a preliminary design review in late 2005. Until this initial design  and engineering effort is completed, the program will not be able to  establish high confidence in its estimated costs. In addition, the aircraft  contract only calls for the delivery of one commercial 767-400ER for  testing. To convert this aircraft to military use, there will be additional  costs for installing communication antennas, a refueling receptacle, hull  hardening, and FAA airworthiness certification. According to the Air  Force, these costs have been factored into its latest program estimate. The  initial cost estimate for the radar program, managed separately from the   E-10A program, has grown. Prior to entering system development, OSD  determined that projected costs were understated and directed the Air  Force to increase its funding by $154 million.
The Air Force acknowledges that funding for the E-10A program is also a  major concern. Funding cuts have delayed its start. It has undergone two  congressional budget reductions; the first cut in fiscal year 2003 ($343  million) required a significant program replanning effort. The second cut  in fiscal year 2005 ($115 million) resulted in schedule delays for the  planned test program, system integration lab, testbed aircraft delivery, and  the E-10A’s first flight. The Air Force states these cuts have caused the  planned initial operating capability date to slip 3 years to 2015. A third cut,  recently proposed by OSD in December 2004, reduces the program’s  budget request by $300 million in both fiscal year 2006 and 2007—a total  reduction of $600 million. The program office is in the process of  evaluating the impact of these reductions and officials indicated that  because these represent a reduction of about 45 percent in each year, they  will have a significant impact on the program if they are sustained. OSD  officials indicated that efforts related to aircraft development and the  delivery of the test aircraft will likely bear the bulk of the reductions. This  will have an impact on planned program milestones. They said it was  important to keep the radar program funded because it is developing the  radar planned for the new Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle in  addition to the E-10A.
section_title: E-10A Acquisition Strategy Does Not Capture Critical Knowledge before Program Decision Points
paragraphs: The E-10A acquisition strategy raises concern as key decisions are planned  before critical product knowledge is available. For example, the strategy  for developing the first E-10A increment does not allow for adequate  integration or prototype demonstration to ensure the design is stable at  the system critical design review. System integration allows program  officials to measure the stability of a product’s design and its ability to  meet established requirements. Both commercial companies and DOD  recognize the attainment of this knowledge as being demonstrated by the  completion of most engineering drawings and some demonstration of the  system level capabilities in a prototype. A stable design that meets  requirements should be achieved by critical design review, before system  demonstration and initial manufacturing of production representative  products begins. However, the Air Force does not expect to deliver the  battle management command and control and radar subsystems to the  integration laboratory until 2008 and 2009, after critical design review,  scheduled in 2007. The transition of the battle management command and  control and radar subsystems from the integration lab to the 767-400ER  test airframe is not scheduled to begin until late-2009, nearly 2 years after  the critical design review and only a few months prior to the program’s  production commitment decision. As a result, critical knowledge about the  basic performance of key subsystems integrated into an actual E-10A  prototype will not occur until 2010 (see fig. 1).
Additionally, the fully integrated E-10A prototype will not be available for  testing prior to the scheduled decision to begin production. This strategy  requires significant concurrency among the technology development,  product development, and production phases and places decision makers  at a disadvantage by not knowing if the E-10A can demonstrate it meets  system performance and reliability requirements before transitioning into  production. In fact, the results of operational testing are not scheduled to  be available until four of the six planned E-10As are already in production  in 2011, greatly increasing the risks of costly design changes and schedule  delays later in the program (see fig. 2). Our past reviews have found this to  be a high-risk acquisition approach.
The Air Force is planning to use an incremental approach to achieve the   E-10A’s full capability with each subsequent increment adding capability.  Although an incremental approach can reduce risks, the failure to capture  critical knowledge while developing the first increment will likely reduce  the benefits of such an approach. As currently planned there will be four  distinct E-10A increments. Program officials are planning to conduct  major program decision reviews prior to beginning development and  demonstration of each increment. This approach, if implemented as  planned, will provide decision makers with an opportunity to review the  program’s progress and risk before making further investment decisions  thus reducing risk in the program. The first increment is expected to  provide the users with many of the system’s basic required capabilities.  Those capabilities include cruise missile defense and on-board command  and control capability for processing, displaying, and communicating the  data needed to address time-sensitive targets. Subsequent increments will  enhance the system’s capabilities, moving them closer to objective levels  by increasing the amount of data processing and analysis done by  computers and decreasing the amount done by human analysts with  computer assistance, thus shortening the time it takes to make decisions.  However, if the first increment falters, the Air Force will likely spend  increasing amounts of time and money to achieve this initial capability,  thereby delaying subsequent increments.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The current conditions surrounding the development of the E-10A  business case portend the potential for poor outcomes if requirement,  resource, and acquisition strategy deficiencies are not resolved before  system development and demonstration begins. The decision to start a  major weapon systems acquisition program for the E-10A requires an  executable business case that demonstrates the E-10A is the best way to  satisfy the gap in warfighter’s capability and that the concept can be  developed and produced within existing resources. An evolutionary and  knowledge-based acquisition strategy is needed to ensure this business  case can be executed within planned goals. The Air Force and OSD are  still determining if a sound business case exists. Questions still  surrounding the business case include:  Is the E-10A the most cost-effective alternative?
How extensive of a battle management command and control capability is  needed?
Are technologies at a high level of maturity?
Is there sufficient funding to develop and deliver the capability in time?
The acquisition strategy also fails to capture critical design,  manufacturing, and reliability data in time to make investment decisions  for moving the program through the development program into  production. The gaps in knowledge increase the likelihood that the Air  Force will not be able to deliver on the cost, schedule, and performance  goals in its business case.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Because gaps exist in the information needed to make a sound business  case to start a major acquisition program, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense ensure that the open business case questions are  answered before a decision is made to start the E-10A program.  Additionally, to ensure a greater likelihood of success, if the E-10A  program is approved to begin, we recommend the Secretary direct the Air  Force to revise the acquisition strategy to ensure sufficient time is  included in the schedule to (1) integrate and demonstrate the design  before moving past the critical design review and (2) test a production  representative E-10A prototype before starting production.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The  comments appear in appendix II.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary ensure that  the open business case questions are answered before a decision is made  to start the E-10A program. DOD provided some information on the  current status of these questions and implies that some of the business  case questions had been answered. We believe that until the OSD/Program  Analysis and Evaluation study is completed and final results are provided  to OSD acquisition decision makers, the business case questions remain  open.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary  direct the Secretary of the Air Force to revise the E-10A acquisition  strategy to ensure sufficient time is available to (1) integrate and  demonstrate the design before moving past the critical design review and  (2) test a production representative E-10A before starting production.
Regarding (1), DOD stated that OSD policy does not require the integration  and demonstration of a design before critical design review. We disagree.  Section E1.1.14 of Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense  Acquisition System, states that “PMs…shall reduce integration risk and  demonstrate product design prior to the design readiness review.” DOD’s  design readiness review is required to end the system integration phase of  system development and demonstration. Additionally, DOD’s entrance  criterion for the demonstration phase requires a demonstration of the  integrated product in a prototype. Nonetheless, DOD stated that it is  restructuring the program with the goal of demonstrating the radar and  battle management technologies in a prototype before starting systems  development and demonstration. This approach incorporates the  knowledge-based approach inherent in commercial best practices and  endorsed by DOD policy. In its comments, DOD acknowledges that this  approach will increase confidence in the program’s cost estimate and  allow time to evaluate the aircraft platform.
Regarding (2), DOD stated that the Milestone C production decision for  low rate initial production decision will be based on the initial test results  from a representation E-10A aircraft system. While the program schedule  in effect at the time of our review did not indicate this, we believe this  approach is more consistent with a knowledge-based acquisition strategy.  By testing a production representative aircraft prior to committing to  production, DOD will be able to reduce program risks and make informed  decisions based on actual system capabilities and performance  information.
DOD also provided technical comments to our report. We made changes  where appropriate but many of these comments were based on a new  acquisition strategy that plans to delay the E-10A program Milestone B  decision until 2010. We did not make DOD’s recommended changes to the  report that reflected this new schedule because it has not been approved  and we have not had the opportunity to review it.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the  Secretaries of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy. We will also provide  copies to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on the GAO Website at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you have any questions concerning  this report. Other key contributors to this report were Martin Campbell,  Michael Hazard, Travis Masters, Rae Ann Sapp, David Schilling and John  Krump.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: During our review we discussed the E-10A program with officials from the  following organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics; the  Director, Defense Systems/Developmental Test and Evaluation; the  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; the Director, Defense Research  and Engineering; and the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation. We  also discussed the E-10A with the technical director of the Joint Theater  Air Missile Defense Organization. In addition, we discussed the program  with officials from several organizations in the Air Force. These officials  included representatives from the Information Dominance Directorate  with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition; the Directorate  of Operational Requirements; the Command Control Communications  Intelligence and Reconnaissance Center at Langley Air Force Base; the  Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom Air Force Base; and the  Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright Patterson Air Force Base.
To determine the progress the Air Force had made in developing the  business case for the E-10A, we obtained available information on the  system’s requirements and resources. However, the information we  received on resources such as technology maturity, cost, funding,  quantities, and schedule was limited. We discussed this information with  knowledgeable program office and oversight officials. We also contacted  officials studying force structure issues that could impact the  requirements for the E-10A program. To assess the validity of the proposed  business case, we compared the E-10A information with best commercial  practices and DOD policy guidance for new development programs.  Because the E-10A program has not yet been approved to enter system  development and demonstration, specific information on the system’s  technology readiness assessment and total program cost and funding were  not available. As a result, we could not conduct a detailed assessment of  these elements of the business case. However, because of other related  information, such as the status of the software intensive battle  management command and control subsystem, the significant reduction in  funding for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and the ongoing studies to answer  OSD concerns, we were able to conclude that at the time of our review key  business case elements were still not mature enough to begin product  development. For example, complex and software intensive subsystems in  other programs have caused major problems that have delayed achieving  technology maturity and the Air Force has only recently directed the  contractor to begin early systems engineering effort to determine a  preliminary design for the E-10A battle management subsystem.  Additionally, the $600 million reduction in funding planned for the first   2 years will almost certainly require the program to extend its planned  schedule resulting in additional costs and funding requirements not yet  estimated. These are business case elements that need to be firmly  established before entering the upcoming Milestone B decision point.
To determine the soundness of the E-10A’s acquisition strategy, we  obtained available information on the program’s original and revised  acquisition plans from the program office and discussed it with functional  oversight and program officials. In addition, we compared the E-10A’s  planned strategy to best commercial practices and DOD’s knowledge- based acquisition policy. However, since our analysis, the program’s  budget request was reduced by a total of $600 million in fiscal years 2006  and 2007.
We conducted our review from January 2004 to January 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense