Defense Management: DOD Should Enhance Oversight of Equipment-Related Corrosion Projects
Published: 2013-09-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: According to DOD, corrosion can significantly affect the cost of equipment maintenance and expected service life of equipment. Corrosion affects military readiness by taking critical systems out of action and creating safety hazards. GAO was asked to review DOD's military-equipment corrosion-prevention and mitigation projects. In this report, GAO addressed the extent to which DOD has (1) ensured the submission of required reports for equipment-related corrosion projects; (2) collected the information needed to determine whether benefits and other measures have been achieved from equipment-related corrosion projects; (3) tracked the status of equipment-related corrosion projects; and (4) identified, shared, and incorporated lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects into future planning to prevent or mitigate corrosion. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD policies and plans and met with DOD corrosion officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $63 million in 88 projects in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 to demonstrate new technology or methods addressing equipment-related corrosion. DOD's Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) has collected a majority of required final and follow-on reports on the results of equipment-related corrosion projects and is taking steps to obtain outstanding reports. As of May 2013, GAO found project managers had submitted final reports for 55 of the 88 projects (about 63 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 and submitted follow-on reports for 27 of the 41 projects (about 66 percent) funded from 2005 through 2007.
DOD requires the military departments to collect and report to the Corrosion Office key information from equipment-related corrosion projects about new technologies or methods; however, DOD does not have complete information about the benefits of all projects. GAO found that the military departments inconsistently reported measures of achievement other than the return on investment (ROI), such as when outcomes prompted changes to military equipment specifications. Further, the military departments did not always collect required information needed to recompute the estimated ROI and were unable to determine whether projects had achieved their estimated ROI. Corrosion Office officials plan to revise guidance on how project managers should be reassessing the ROI. Without specific guidance to require that follow-on reports include details of measures of achievement other than ROI, the Corrosion Office will be missing the opportunity to know whether equipment-related corrosion projects have achieved outcomes to prevent corrosion.
DOD has taken steps to improve oversight of its equipment-related corrosion projects, such as revising its DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan to provide additional guidance on reporting requirements. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive overview of the status of all equipment-related corrosion projects. While the reports provide the status for each project, GAO found that the Corrosion Office does not consolidate information to monitor the status of all these projects, such as if a project has not transitioned to service use or has been discontinued. Further, GAO found that project managers vary in how they reported the ROI for discontinued projects. Without a mechanism to consolidate projects' status to facilitate monitoring and guidance for reporting ROIs for discontinued projects, the Corrosion Office and the military departments may not have timely information of whether the corrosion projects produced proven methods and products to prevent the corrosion of military equipment.
DOD has identified and incorporated lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects and shared some lessons with the corrosion community; however, DOD has no centralized and secure database or other source to share lessons from all project reports, including those with sensitive information. While DOD has begun to develop a database that would contain lessons learned on all projects, development is in the early stages, and DOD is unsure when it will be completed. Until a comprehensive, centralized, and secure database is developed that includes lessons learned from all completed projects, officials from DOD's corrosion community will not have full and complete information on lessons learned, including proven methods or products to prevent or mitigate corrosion of military equipment.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends four actions to improve the oversight of DODs corrosion-prevention and control program. DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with one, and did not concur with one. DOD plans to develop a database to collect data and lessons learned on corrosion projects and to revise guidance on how to report the ROI for discontinued projects. DOD did not agree that guidance should be revised to ensure military departments consistently report projects benefits. GAO maintains that this recommendation is warranted for project oversight.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that the estimated  cost of corrosion was about $20.8 billion annually to prevent and mitigate  corrosion of all of its assets, including military equipment and weapons,  and facilities and other infrastructure. The vast majority of these costs,  approximately $19 billion, are related to corrosion issues on military  equipment and weapons. Corrosion is defined in Section 2228 of Title 10  of the United States Code as the deterioration of a material or its  properties due to a reaction of that material with its chemical  environment. Corrosion affects military readiness by taking critical  systems out of action and creating safety hazards. DOD funds military  demonstration projects for both military equipment and infrastructure to  identify new technologies or methods to prevent or mitigate corrosion.
Military equipment includes all weapon systems, weapon platforms,  vehicles, and munitions of DOD and the components of such items.
Congress has taken a series of legislative actions aimed at enhancing  DOD’s ability to effectively address corrosion prevention and mitigation  and provide Congress with greater transparency over the department’s  efforts. In 2002, Congress passed legislation that led to the creation of the  Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (hereafter referred to as the  Corrosion Office) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The Corrosion Office is  responsible for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion of military  equipment and infrastructure. Among other things, Section 2228 of Title  10 of the United States Code requires the Secretary of Defense to  develop and implement a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and the  effects of corrosion on the military equipment and infrastructure of the  department, including, among other things, (1) uniform application of  requirements and criteria for testing and certifying new technologies for  equipment and infrastructure with similar characteristics, missions, or  operating environments; (2) implementation of programs to ensure a  focused and coordinated approach to collect, review, validate, and  distribute information on proven corrosion-prevention methods and  products; and (3) establishment of a coordinated research and  development program for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion for  new and existing military equipment and infrastructure that includes a  plan to transition new corrosion-prevention technologies into operational  systems. Additionally, the statute requires the Secretary of Defense to  annually submit, along with the defense budget materials, a report to  Congress on corrosion funding, including funding requirements for the  long-term strategy, and including the returns on investment (ROI) for  corrosion-control demonstration projects.
In 2008, section 903 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required the Departments of the  Army, Navy, and Air Force to each designate a Corrosion Control and  Prevention Executive (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executive) to be  the senior official in each military department with responsibility for  coordinating department-level corrosion-prevention and control program  activities. Section 903, among other things, assigned responsibility to the  three Corrosion Executives for (1) coordinating department-level  corrosion prevention and control activities (including budget  programming) with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the program  executive officers of the military departments, and relevant major  subordinate commands of the military departments; (2) ensuring that  corrosion prevention and control is maintained in each department’s  policy and guidance, including military infrastructure design, construction,  and maintenance; (3) identifying the funding levels necessary for  accomplishing certain corrosion-related priorities in their departments;  and (4) submitting an annual report to the Secretary of Defense  containing recommendations pertaining to the corrosion-prevention and  control program of their departments. Section 903 also designated each  military department’s Corrosion Executive as that department’s principal  point of contact with the Director of the Corrosion Office.
To carry out its responsibilities, the Corrosion Office took a number of  actions, including developing an instruction to establish policy, assign  responsibilities, and provide guidance for corrosion-prevention and  control within DOD; and developing a strategic plan to describe policies,  strategies, objectives, and plans aimed toward an effective DOD-wide  approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion of military equipment and  infrastructure. Also, the Corrosion Office and military departments have  identified and funded corrosion projects in which the military departments  demonstrated new technology to address corrosion. Additionally, the  Corrosion Office has required military departments’ project managers to  submit periodic reports on the status and outcomes of these projects.
In response to your request, we reviewed DOD’s military-equipment  corrosion projects and DOD’s validation of the ROI of these projects. The  DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan uses the phrase  “return-on-investment (ROI) validation” to describe how project managers  recompute the ROI estimate included in a project’s status report. This  recomputation is based on revised cost data after the project has been  completed and the new technology has been transitioned to the services’  use and tracked for 2 years. We are using the terms “reassessment” or  “reassessed” rather than “validation” or “validated” because these terms  more closely describe the process that the project managers are to use to  review and update, if necessary, the assumptions used to recompute the  initial ROI estimate. Additionally, Corrosion Office officials told us that  they are planning to use the term “reassessment” in the revised DOD  strategic plan. The reassessment is not an update based on actual results  of the cost savings achieved by the project.
This report addresses to what extent DOD (1) has ensured the  submission of required reports for equipment-related corrosion projects;  (2) has collected the information needed to determine whether benefits  and other measures have been achieved from equipment-related  corrosion projects; (3) has tracked the status of equipment-related  corrosion projects; and (4) has identified, shared, and incorporated  lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects into future  planning to prevent or mitigate corrosion.
To determine the extent to which DOD has ensured the submission of  required reports for equipment-related corrosion projects, we reviewed  the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan and its  revised versions, and used the reporting milestones outlined in the plan to  identify the types of reports required for each project. We obtained project  information for 128 equipment-related corrosion demonstration projects  funded by the Corrosion Office for fiscal years 2005 through 2012. We  requested and reviewed the project documentation—project proposals,  final reports, and follow-on reports—to determine whether the data and  related reports met the Corrosion Office’s reporting requirements. We  interviewed officials from the Corrosion Office, as well as the Army, Navy,  and Air Force Corrosion Executives, to understand how projects are  tracked if required reports have not been submitted and to determine why  some required reports were not submitted at the prescribed deadlines.  We selected a nongeneralizable random systematic sample of 43  projects for further review and conducted an in-depth analysis of the  projects selected. We used a semistructured interview tool to obtain  information from project managers to understand reporting requirements  and time frames as well as challenges and limitations, if any, in  completing the reports.
To determine the extent to which DOD has collected the information  needed to determine whether benefits and other measures have been  achieved from equipment-related corrosion projects, we reviewed key  documents, including DOD Instruction 5000.67 and DOD’s strategic plan  to gain an understanding of the roles and responsibilities to develop  procedures for corrosion planning and implementation and the  department’s strategy to justify funding for corrosion projects by verifying  the initial investment of corrosion projects. We reviewed all follow-on  reports provided by the Corrosion Office and the military departments,  which included 30 follow-on reports on projects funded in fiscal years  2005 through 2008, to determine whether the military departments have  collected and reported measures of achievement of their completed  corrosion projects, including a reassessed ROI to verify the initial  investment. We interviewed officials from the Corrosion Office as well as  the military departments’ Corrosion Executives to understand whether  and how data are collected in order to determine whether the estimated  ROIs have been achieved. Additionally, from our nongeneralizable  random systematic sample of 43 projects, we interviewed project  managers and project personnel to understand how they verify the initial  investment of corrosion projects and how the assumptions were tracked  during the first few years of the projects.
To determine the extent to which DOD has tracked the status of  equipment-related corrosion projects, we reviewed relevant law to  understand legislative requirements, including the requirement that the  DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan include a plan to  transition new corrosion-prevention technologies into operational  systems. We also examined DOD policy, including DOD Instruction  5000.67, to gain an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the  Corrosion Office and Corrosion Executives to collect, review, reassess,  and distribute information on proven methods and products that are  relevant to prevent corrosion of military equipment. We conducted  analysis of each of the 43 projects in our sample, specifically reviewing  the project plans, final reports, and follow-on reports, to determine the  status of each project, including whether it was recommended to be  transitioned to service use. We interviewed Corrosion Office officials to  determine what status information is collected for each project, how such  information is consolidated, and what analysis is done to oversee the  status and outcomes of each project. We also interviewed Corrosion  Executives to determine their approach to collect, review, reassess, and  distribute information on proven methods and products that are relevant  to prevent corrosion of military equipment.
To determine the extent to which DOD has identified, shared, and  incorporated lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects  into future planning to prevent or mitigate corrosion, we reviewed DOD  policy, including DOD Instruction 5000.67, to understand the  department’s policy to ensure a focused and coordinated approach  throughout DOD to collect, review, reassess, and distribute information on  relevant proven methods and products. Also, we reviewed DOD’s  strategic plan to understand the department’s guidance for capturing,  documenting, and sharing lessons learned. We analyzed all final reports  to determine whether lessons learned were being included and the extent  to which they were being incorporated into future planning and guidance.  We interviewed Corrosion Office officials and Corrosion Executives to  gain an understanding of how they ensure lessons learned are collected,  shared throughout DOD, and incorporated into future projects. Likewise,  from our nongeneralizable random systematic sample of 43 projects, we  interviewed project managers and project personnel to gain an  understanding of how lessons learned are collected, documented,  shared, and incorporated into future corrosion planning.
We determined that the project documentation, including required reports,  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the extent to  which DOD ensured completion of required reports, collected the  information needed to determine whether benefits and other measures  have been achieved from military-equipment corrosion projects, tracked  the status of military-equipment corrosion projects, and identified, shared,  and incorporated lessons learned from military-equipment corrosion  projects into future planning to prevent or mitigate corrosion. We  determined that the data used to select the projects included in our  sample were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We  provide additional information about our project-selection methodology  and data-collection efforts in our detailed scope and methodology in  appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to September 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Strategic Planning and Guidance for Corrosion Prevention and Control
paragraphs: DOD submitted the first version of its long-term corrosion strategy to  Congress in December 2003. DOD developed this long-term strategy in  response to direction in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2003. In November 2004, DOD revised its long-term  corrosion strategy and issued its DOD Corrosion Prevention and  Mitigation Strategic Plan. DOD strives to update its strategic plan  periodically, most recently in February 2011, and officials stated the next  update is planned for 2013. The purpose of DOD’s strategic plan is to  articulate policies, strategies, objectives, and plans that will ensure an  effective, standardized, affordable DOD-wide approach to prevent, detect,  and treat corrosion and its effects on military equipment and  infrastructure.
In January 2008, the department first issued DOD Instruction 5000.67,  Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and  Infrastructure, which was revised and reissued with the same title in  February 2010. The stated purpose of the instruction is to establish  policy, assign responsibilities, and provide guidance for the establishment  and management of programs to prevent or mitigate corrosion of DOD’s  military equipment and infrastructure. This instruction assigns the military  departments’ Corrosion Executives responsibility for certain corrosion- prevention and control activities in their respective military departments. It  requires the Corrosion Executives to submit information on proposed  corrosion projects to the Corrosion Office with coordination through the  proper military department chain of command, as well as to develop  support, and provide the rationale for resources to initiate and sustain  effective corrosion-prevention and mitigation programs in each military  department.
section_title: Corrosion Office Operations
paragraphs: According to statute and DOD guidance, the Director of the Corrosion  Office is responsible for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion of DOD  equipment and infrastructure. The Director’s duties include developing  and recommending policy guidance on corrosion control, reviewing the  corrosion-control programs and funding levels proposed by the Secretary  of each military department during DOD’s annual internal budget review  process, and submitting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense  regarding those programs and proposed funding levels. To accomplish its  oversight and coordination responsibilities, the Corrosion Office has  ongoing efforts to improve the awareness, prevention, and mitigation of  corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure, including (1) hosting  triannual corrosion forums; (2) conducting cost-of-corrosion studies; (3)  operating two corrosion websites; (4) publishing an electronic newsletter;  (5) working with industry and academia to develop training courses and  new corrosion technologies; and (6) providing funding for corrosion- control demonstration projects proposed and implemented by the military  departments. According to the Corrosion Office, these corrosion activities  enhance and institutionalize the corrosion-prevention and mitigation  program within DOD. In addition, the Director of the Corrosion Office  periodically holds meetings with the DOD Corrosion Board of Directors  and serves as the lead on the Corrosion Prevention and Control  Integrated Product Team. The Corrosion Prevention and Control  Integrated Product Team includes representatives from the military  departments, the Joint Staff, and other stakeholders who help accomplish  the various corrosion-control goals and objectives. This team also  includes the seven Working Integrated Product Teams, which implement  corrosion prevention and control activities. These seven product teams  are organized to address the following areas: corrosion policy, processes,  procedures, and oversight; metrics, impact, and sustainment;  specifications, standards, and qualification process; training and  certification; communications and outreach; science and technology; and  facilities. Appendix A of DOD’s strategic plan contains action plans for  each product team, including policies, objectives, strategies, planned  actions, and results to date.
section_title: Development of Corrosion Projects
paragraphs: The Corrosion Office began funding military-equipment and infrastructure  corrosion-prevention projects in fiscal year 2005. Projects, including  equipment-related projects, are specific corrosion-prevention and  mitigation efforts, funded jointly by the Corrosion Office and the military  departments, with the objective of developing and testing new  technologies. To propose a project for Corrosion Office funding, the  military departments first refer to requirements in DOD’s strategic plan.  The requirements include initial submission of a project plan, and, if  approved, future submissions of final and follow-on reports. The military  departments’ proposals are evaluated by a panel of experts assembled  by the Director of the Corrosion Office. The Corrosion Office generally  funds up to $500,000 per project, and the military departments generally  pledge matching or complementary funding for each project that they  propose. The level of funding by each military department and the  estimated return on investment (ROI) are two of the criteria used to  evaluate the proposed projects. For the project-selection process, the  military departments submit preliminary project proposals in the fall and  submit final project proposals in the spring, and the Corrosion Office  considers the final proposals for funding. Projects that meet the Corrosion  Office’s criteria for funding are announced at the end of each fiscal year.  Figure 1 provides an overview of DOD’s process for corrosion projects  and notes which reports are required in each period.
Specifically, project plans include several elements to be considered for  funding by the Corrosion Office, according to DOD’s strategic plan. The  project plans include a statement of need, a proposed solution,  assumptions used to estimate the initial ROI, and a cost-benefit analysis  of the project’s initial estimate of ROI. DOD’s strategic plan describes  estimation steps for the cost-benefit analysis to include (1) calculating the  project costs—such as up-front investment costs and operating and  support costs, (2) calculating the benefits that are expected to result from  the project—such as reduction of costs like maintenance hours and  inventory costs, and (3) calculating the net present value of the annual  costs and benefits over the projected service life of the proposed  technology.
According to Corrosion Office officials, once a project is approved and  funded, project managers are typically responsible for overseeing the  project and completing the reporting requirements. First, the project  manager begins the research and development phase, also known as the  demonstration phase. During this phase, project managers and project  personnel test new technology, both in military laboratory and real-world  settings. Typically, the demonstration phase takes 1 to 2 years, and the  Corrosion Office requires submission of a final report upon completion of  the demonstration. In this final report, project managers document test  conditions, performance of the new technology, lessons learned, and their  recommendations for the new technology to be transitioned to a military  service’s use. Finally, project managers submit a follow-on report, which  is a checklist, to evaluate a project within 2 years after a project is  completed and the technology has transitioned to use within the military  department. The purpose of the follow-on report is to inform the  Corrosion Office of the overall outcome of the project and to reassess the  ROI. The Strategic Plan provides detailed instructions on how to reassess  the ROI. For example, the ROI reassessments consist of updating the costs and benefits associated with the new technology  reviewing assumptions used earlier in computing the estimated ROI;  resulting from the project;  recalculating the ROI based on reassessed data; and providing an assessment of the difference, if any, between the  estimated ROI and the reassessed ROI.
Figure 2 provides a breakout of the number of projects that have reached  various reporting milestones, as of May 2013. There were 128  equipment-related corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 2005  through 2012, in which
41 projects had reached the milestone for submitting final and follow- on reports, including ROI reassessments;
88 projects had only reached the milestone for submitting final
40 projects were not yet complete, thus they have not reached the  milestone for submitting final or follow-on reports.
In December 2010, we analyzed the extent to which the military  departments have reassessed the ROI for funded corrosion-prevention  projects. We found that the military departments did not complete  required validations of ROI estimates and were unable to fully  demonstrate the costs and benefits of their corrosion-prevention and  control projects. We recommended, in part, that DOD fund and complete  ROI validations. DOD concurred and noted that plans were already  underway to address this requirement within the Corrosion Office and  with the Corrosion Executives. Also, in September 2012, we reported that  the Corrosion Office performs an analysis to determine the average ROI  estimates for projects that it cites in its annual corrosion-control budget  report to Congress. Additionally, we reported that the Corrosion Office  did not use the most up-to-date data for the projects’ ROIs or provide  support for the projects’ average ROI that was cited in its fiscal year 2013  corrosion-control budget report to Congress. We recommended that DOD  provide an explanation of its ROI methodology and analysis, including the  initial and, to the extent available, the reassessed ROI estimates.  However, DOD did not agree with our recommendation. In its written  comments, DOD generally restated the methodology included in DOD’s  strategic plan, which the military departments use to estimate the  projected ROI of each project. DOD did not provide any additional  reasons why it did not use current return-on-investment estimates in its  report to Congress. We reported in April 2013 that DOD has made some  progress in completing the ROI validations but it needs to continue to  follow through on completing the validations to fully demonstrate the costs  and benefits of the corrosion projects.
In May 2013, we reported that the Corrosion Office had not ensured that  all reports on the results of its infrastructure-related corrosion projects  were submitted. We recommended four actions to improve DOD’s  project reporting and tracking, and the accuracy of its ROI data. However,  DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to take steps to enhance  the tracking and reporting of its infrastructure-related corrosion projects.  In written comments, DOD stated it is developing a web-based tracking  tool for the Corrosion Office, Corrosion Executives, and project managers  to input and extract project-related data. In regard to the recommendation  that DOD take action to ensure that its records reflect complete, timely,  and accurate data on the projects’ ROI, DOD partially agreed with the  recommendation and stated the web-based system would provide data  including ROI estimates. While DOD cited the web-based system to  address our recommendations, DOD did not state when the new system  would be available for use. Further, DOD did not agree with our  recommendation that the Corrosion Office use its existing authority to  identify and implement possible options or incentives for addressing  reasons cited by project-management offices for not meeting reporting  milestones. In written comments, DOD did not state what actions it would  take to improve submission of completed reports from the military  services that DOD’s strategic plan requires for infrastructure-related  corrosion projects. Also, DOD did not agree with our recommendation to  revise guidance to clearly define the role of Corrosion Executives to assist  the Corrosion Office in holding departments’ project-management offices  accountable for submitting reports in accordance with DOD’s strategic  plan. DOD stated that further guidance is not necessary as the  requirements are clearly stated in the strategic plan. All the related GAO  products are listed at the end of this report.
section_title: DOD Has Collected a Majority of Required Reports on the Results of Equipment- Related Corrosion Projects and Is Taking Steps to Obtain Those Outstanding
paragraphs: DOD’s Corrosion Office has collected a majority of required final and  follow-on reports from project managers on the results of equipment- related corrosion projects and is taking steps to obtain outstanding  reports. As of May 2013, our review found that the military services  submitted the majority of the required reports. Project managers had  submitted the required final reports for 55 of the 88 projects (about 63  percent) funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Also, for 27 of the  41 projects (about 66 percent) that were funded from 2005 through 2007,  we found that the project managers had submitted the required follow-on  reports on whether the corrosion-control technologies were effective and  the overall effect of the projects. Military departments’ Corrosion  Executives and project managers described various reasons for not  meeting milestones for all reports, such as personnel turnover, funding,  and demonstration phases lasting longer than anticipated. To improve the  collection of reports, DOD is taking steps to obtain outstanding reports.
subsections: section_title: Project Managers Submitted a Majority of the Required Final and Follow-on Reports
paragraphs: DOD has invested more than $63 million in 88 equipment-related  corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Project  managers submitted a majority, but not all, of the required reports on  whether the corrosion-control technologies were effective and the overall  effect of the projects. The DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation  Strategic Plan states that project plans should include a schedule  milestone for reporting, including final reports and follow-on reports. The  DOD strategic plan requires a final report at project completion, and  requires a follow-on report 2 years after project completion and transition  to use within the military departments. According to Corrosion Office  officials, these reports provide valuable information on the results of  corrosion projects and in planning future projects.
Corrosion Office officials stated that project managers must submit final  reports at project completion, which is typically within 2 years after the  receipt of the funding of each project. As stipulated in DOD’s strategic  plan, final reports should include certain content, such as an executive  summary, lessons learned, recommendations, and conclusions. We  found that 55 of the 88 required final reports (63 percent) for projects  funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 had been submitted. There was  variation, by military service, in the number of submitted final reports. For  example, the Marine Corps had not submitted three-quarters of its final  reports. The Air Force, in contrast, had submitted all but one final report.  Table 1 shows the status of final reports submitted by each service for  equipment-related projects.
We found that project managers submitted 27 of the 41 required follow-on  reports (66 percent). The military services varied in the number of  outstanding follow-on reports. For example, the Navy had not submitted  half of its follow-on reports. In contrast, the Army, Marine Corps, and Air  Force had only one outstanding follow-on report. DOD’s strategic plan  requires the submission of follow-on reports within 2 years after a project  is completed and transitioned to use in the military department. According  to Corrosion Office officials, this transition period includes up to 1 year to  implement the technology in a military department. Corrosion Office  officials also told us that they expected the follow-on reports to be  submitted within 5 years of initial funding. Therefore, follow-on reports for  41 completed projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 were due  on or before the end of fiscal year 2012. DOD’s strategic plan states that  the follow-on reports should include an assessment of the following  areas: project documentation, project assumptions, responses to mission  requirements, performance expectations, and a comparison between the  initial ROI estimate included in the project plan and the new estimate.  Table 2 shows the status of follow-on reports submitted by each service.
According to officials in the Corrosion Office, final and follow-on reports  are used to assess the effectiveness of the corrosion projects and  determine whether continued implementation of the technology is useful.  As Corrosion Office officials review project managers’ final reports, they  stated that they focus on any lessons learned, technical findings,  conclusions and recommendations, and whether the results from the  report should trigger follow-on investigations of specific technology and a  review for broader applications of the technology. Officials stated that  they review follow-on reports to assure necessary implementation actions  have been taken and to review changes in the ROI estimates.
section_title: Corrosion Officials Have Taken Steps to Obtain Outstanding Reports
paragraphs: Corrosion Office officials stated that they are taking steps to obtain the  completion and submission of all outstanding reports. For example,  according to the Corrosion Office, its officials regularly send the military  departments’ Corrosion Executives a report listing final and follow-on  reports that have not yet been completed and submitted and requesting  that the Corrosion Executives follow up with project managers to  complete the reports. According to Corrosion Executives, they coordinate  through their department and if the reports have not yet been completed,  they obtain an explanation and expected completion date and provide the  information to the Corrosion Office. Finally, according to Corrosion  Executives, they communicate any delays to the Corrosion Office verbally  and by e-mail to ensure the Corrosion Office is aware if a demonstration  period takes longer than originally anticipated or if a project has been  delayed due to unexpected laboratory or field testing issues  Corrosion officials in the military departments described various reasons  why project managers did not complete and submit mandatory final and  follow-on reports within expected time frames, including personnel  turnover, funding, and demonstration phases lasting longer than  anticipated, all delaying the completion and submission of the reports. For  example, Air Force and Marine Corps corrosion officials stated that most  teams retain key personnel throughout each project, but at times,  turnover results in teams delaying completion of their reports.  Additionally, Army corrosion officials stated that while their project was  approved by the Corrosion Office to start its demonstration at the  beginning of the fiscal year, the demonstration started much later than  expected because funding from the Corrosion Office for the project was  delayed due to the use of continuing resolutions to fund government  operations. Finally, the Navy’s Corrosion Executive stated that some  demonstrations last at least 3 years because the new technology or  method is tested on at least two carrier deployments, and each  deployment cycle can last 18 months.
section_title: DOD Collects Information on the Benefits of Corrosion Projects, but Is Not Always Reporting Details of the Benefits or Determining Whether Projects Achieve Their Estimated ROI
paragraphs: DOD requires the military departments to collect and report key  information from corrosion projects about new technologies and methods  to prevent and mitigate corrosion in military equipment to the Corrosion  Office; however, DOD does not have complete information about the  benefits of all of its projects and is sometimes unable to determine  whether projects achieve their estimated ROI. Specifically, the military  departments are collecting and reporting some measures of achievement  of the projects, including results, but do not always report details in follow- on reports about features and benefits of completed projects, such as  when outcomes prompted changes to specifications, standards, and  various reference and guidance documents. Further, the military  departments are not collecting required information on the assumptions  used to compute the estimated ROI in the project plan, and are unable to  determine whether the projects are achieving the estimated ROI.
subsections: section_title: Military Departments Use a Checklist to Note Some Projects’ Achievements, but Do Not Always Report Details of the Benefits of Projects
paragraphs: The military departments have collected and reported measures of  achievement of completed corrosion projects other than ROI, such as  when outcomes prompt changes in specifications, standards, technical  manuals, and other reference or guidance documents. However, the  departments’ follow-on reports do not always include details of the  achievements, including specific benefits. DOD Instruction 5000.67  requires the military departments’ Corrosion Executives to develop  procedures for corrosion planning, process implementation, management,  review, and documentation of results. Additionally, the DOD Corrosion  Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan requires the submission of a  checklist, which the department refers to as a follow-on report, to note  specific information about the corrosion project. The follow-on report,  which consists of a checklist, shows items to be reviewed on the status  and the results of corrosion projects that have completed research and  development, transitioned to service use, and been in use for 2 years.  Project managers have the option to include comments on details about  items on the checklist. Appendix II shows a copy of the checklist used for  project review. According to the strategic plan, the checklist is to focus not  only on reassessing the ROI, but also on examining and assessing other  benefits of the project. Project managers are required to review  documentation, such as specifications, technical manuals, and other  guidance; implementation, maintenance, and other sustainability costs;  and actual or intended application of the technology by others. Then,  project managers are to check “yes” or “no” for each item, but are not  required to write details about any benefits of the project. DOD’s strategic  plan allows the project managers the option to provide detailed comments  in the follow-on report, but does not provide specific guidance requiring  them to document benefits. Finally, according to Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government, control activities—including  appropriate documentation of transactions that should be clearly  documented and keeping documentation readily available for  examination—are an integral part of an entity’s planning, implementing,  reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of government resources  and for achieving effective results.
During our review of all available follow-on reports, we found that the  nearly three-quarters (22 of the 30 follow-on reports) contained  information on some measures of achievement, such as whether new  technology or methods were incorporated in maintenance manuals,  technical orders, or engineering change proposals. These project  managers for these reports modified the follow-on report to include  additional details that clearly acknowledge the benefits of the project,  such as incorporation into specifications, technical manuals, and other  guidance. For example, a joint Army and Navy project in our sample  examined aircraft corrosion prevention and control by testing gaskets to  prevent corrosion of antenna wiring. The project resulted in the Army  communicating the benefit of the antenna gasket by authorizing its use,  giving it a part number, and revising a technical manual. Also, the Navy  assigned the gasket a part number, authorized its use, and revised a  maintenance manual.
However, we also found that one quarter (8 of 30) of the follow-on reports  contained little to no narrative detail and did not document the benefits of  the project. For example, an Army project’s follow-on report contained no  information about achievements, and a Navy project’s follow-on report  provided little details about the project’s outcomes that could reduce cost  and reinforce mission readiness. Without specific guidance to require that  follow-on reports include details of measures of achievements other than  ROI, including benefits, the Corrosion Office will be missing the  opportunity to know whether equipment-related corrosion projects have  achieved outcomes to prevent or mitigate corrosion.
section_title: Military Departments Are Not Collecting Information to Determine Whether Projects Are Achieving Estimated ROI
paragraphs: The military departments’ project plans include an initial estimated ROI for  each equipment-related corrosion project that is based on specific  assumptions, but the departments’ project managers and project  personnel have not collected data to determine whether each project  achieved its estimated ROI. DOD’s strategic plan provides guidance on  estimating the ROI, collecting information to verify the ROI, and achieving  the ROI. First, the strategic plan states that project plans include  assumptions that are used to initially estimate the ROI, and provides a list  of assumptions that includes: replacement costs and intervals;  maintenance costs, including unscheduled maintenance and repair cost;  labor and other operating costs; and readiness savings. Second, the  strategic plan provides guidance on collecting information on the  estimated ROI for corrosion projects that have completed research and  development and transitioned to service use (i.e., whether a service  implemented the demonstrated technology or method). Specifically,  project managers are required to collect information to check on any  changes to the assumptions used in the initial estimated ROI in order to  compare, or recompute, the ROI and determine if the ROI is higher than,  lower than, or as originally estimated. Finally, the strategic plan identifies  a strategy to justify funding for corrosion projects by verifying the initial  investment of corrosion projects and cites a long-term objective to  achieve ROI for equipment-related corrosion projects, thus providing a  metric to assess progress.
During our review, we found that all project plans in our sample included  required assumptions as well as plans and methods to collect information  on those assumptions. Our sample included the following examples in  which the project managers and project personnel estimated the ROI in  the project plan based on certain assumptions and indicated they would  collect information when the technology or method was transitioned to  service use.
Army—Officials projected an ROI (i.e., benefit) of $46.75 for every  dollar invested in this project to prevent corrosion. The project, funded  in fiscal year 2008, tested a commercially available dehumidification  technology to protect the radar system on Patriot missile systems,  whose internal components generate extreme amounts of heat.  According to the project plan, the ROI was based on assumptions  including reduced labor and material maintenance costs. The project  plan stated that staff would collect ROI-related data by tracking the  rate of corrosion, including visual inspections of units with and without  the technology and by an examination of maintenance logs. However,  according to project personnel, they reassessed only some of the  original assumptions—such as the annual cost of corrosion  maintenance costs for the Patriot radar system—and did not track or  collect data to verify the assumptions used for the estimated ROI in  the project plan. Thus, they will be unable to compare or recompute  the ROI as required by the strategic plan.
Marine Corps—Officials projected an ROI of $189.74 for every dollar  invested in this project to prevent corrosion. The project, funded in  fiscal year 2010, tested supplemental coatings to protect tactical and  armored ground weapon systems against corrosion. According to the  project plan, the ROI was based on assumptions including testing on  the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle system, a 50  percent reduction in annual maintenance costs, and a 15-year service  life. The project plan stated that data would be collected by annually  monitoring weapon systems with and without these particular coatings  to verify the estimated ROI in the project plan. However, according to  project personnel, they plan only to provide an update of the original  assumptions. Thus, they will be unable to compare or recompute the  ROI as required by the strategic plan.
Air Force and Navy—Officials of the joint project predicted an ROI of  $61.32 for every dollar invested in this project to prevent corrosion.  The project, funded in fiscal year 2005, tested the use of aerosol paint  cans to address potential corrosion of aircraft coatings and meet the  requirements of rapid cure and rapid application in austere  environments when spray-application equipment is not available.  According to the project plan, the ROI was based on assumptions  including the estimated cost of paint and repair, the expectation to  save approximately 5 percent of the paint cost in reductions in  material preparation and clean-up, and decreased manpower  requirements associated with applying paints and repairing corrosion.  According to the project manager, he could collect certain data, such  as how many cans were ordered through the supply system, but could  not determine if personnel purchased aerosol paint cans from other  sources to estimate savings. Thus, they will be unable to compare or  recompute the ROI as required by the strategic plan.
Additionally, project managers and project personnel in our sample stated  that they have not collected information on the assumptions used in the  initial estimated ROI to compare or recompute the ROI, such as  information on the quantity of military equipment that has transitioned to  service use. Rather, the Corrosion Executives and the majority of project  managers and project personnel whom we interviewed stated that their  procedure has been to reassess only the accuracy of the assumptions of  the estimated ROIs.
Further, Corrosion Executives as well as project managers and project  personnel for 40 of the 43 projects in our sample (or 93 percent) stated  that they have not collected information to verify the initial investment and  determine if a project is achieving the estimated ROI stated in each  project plan because of the difficulties in doing so. For example, some  project managers and project personnel explained that they rely on repair  personnel to collect and record data on the performance of a new  technology or method, which would provide data to verify the initial  investment in corrosion projects. However, according to Corrosion  Executives, project managers, and project personnel, the repair  personnel do not have a consistent way to collect and record the data.  Also, some project managers and project personnel stated it is difficult to  monitor progress of a new corrosion-related technology or method  because the maintenance and repair community does not always note in  maintenance records the reason for repair or replacement. For example,  officials on an Air Force project noted that when electronic circuit cards  failed and were removed from aircraft, repair personnel removed them  and inserted new ones, but did not take the time to figure out why they  failed (such as whether sand and salt corroded the electronic circuit  cards). In some cases, the new technology or method goes beyond  affecting one military service, and effective recordkeeping would involve  the other services tracking, collecting, and reporting back information on  their use of the new technology or method, but we found that such  recordkeeping is not done consistently. Further, some equipment-related  projects are driven by environmental concerns, such as those aimed at  finding an alternative chemical to use to prevent corrosion. According to  officials, these concerns, such as measuring the environmental effect on  reducing pollution, are difficult to measure.
Consequently, the military departments and DOD management have  been unable to determine whether the projects are achieving their  estimated financial benefits. Officials from the Corrosion Office  acknowledged that project managers have not followed DOD’s strategic  plan regarding collecting information to verify whether projects are  achieving the benefits initially estimated in project plans because of  challenges in collecting and monitoring relevant data. Corrosion Office  officials stated that their original intent was for the project managers to  monitor the assumptions and collect updated information, but now the  Corrosion Office officials recognize that project managers did not always  collect all the needed data. On the basis of the identified challenges,  Corrosion Office officials stated that they plan to revise the strategic plan  to eliminate the guidance on validating the ROI and to provide revised  guidance on how the project managers should be reassessing the ROI.  They stated that the revision is planned for late 2013.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight, but Does Not Have a Comprehensive Overview of the Status of All Equipment-Related Corrosion Projects
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to improve oversight of its equipment-related  corrosion projects, such as revising its DOD Corrosion Prevention and  Mitigation Strategic Plan to provide additional guidance on reporting  requirements. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive overview  of the status of all equipment-related corrosion projects. While the reports  provide the status for each project, GAO found that the Corrosion Office  does not consolidate information to monitor the status of all these  projects, such as if a project has not transitioned to service use or has  been discontinued. Further, we found that project managers vary in how  they reported the ROI for discontinued projects.
subsections: section_title: Corrosion Office Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of Equipment- Related Corrosion Projects
paragraphs: DOD’s Corrosion Office has taken steps to develop and revise policies  and guidance to help improve the management and oversight of  equipment-related corrosion projects. For example, the Corrosion Office  developed, and has subsequently revised the DOD Corrosion Prevention  and Mitigation Strategic Plan. Also, officials from the Corrosion Office  stated that they have updated reporting requirements to include quarterly  status reports on the technical, programmatic, and financial status of the  projects. Further, Corrosion Office officials explained that the  establishment of the military department Corrosion Executives has helped  improve their management of corrosion programs. Starting in 2009, each  military department designated a Corrosion Executive to be the senior  official in the department with responsibility for coordinating corrosion- prevention and control program activities. For example, Corrosion  Executives and the Corrosion Office do an annual review of equipment- related corrosion projects to review project status and transition as well as  deadlines for final reports, follow-on reports, and ROI reassessments.  According to the Corrosion Office, each Corrosion Executive coordinates  through the respective military department’s chain of command to provide  information on corrosion projects to the Director of the Corrosion Office.  Further, quarterly status reports are required starting the first week of the  fiscal quarter after the contract award and every 3 months thereafter until  the final report is submitted, and officials from the Corrosion Office also  conduct an annual review of each project. Finally, the military  departments have developed and implemented service-specific strategic  plans for corrosion prevention.
section_title: The Corrosion Office Does Not Consolidate Information to Monitor the Status of Its Projects
paragraphs: The Corrosion Office collects reported details of individual corrosion  projects, including some status information, but does not consolidate the  information for an overview of the status of all its projects, which is a key  part of its oversight role. Project managers submit many project details in  their reports to the Corrosion Office, such as whether a project has been  recommended for transition to service use and the status of the transition;  whether a project has been recommended for transition to service use but  did not transition; and whether a project has not been recommended for  transition or discontinued. Corrosion Office officials stated that they  maintain some consolidated data in a spreadsheet, such as the project’s  identification number, fiscal year, funded amount, and ROI. However, the  office has not consolidated all key information about the projects so that  officials can regularly monitor their status and plan to implement new  corrosion-prevention technology or methods into the military departments’  operations. Instead, most key information on the status is listed in  individual final and follow-on reports.
DOD Instruction 5000.67 requires that the Corrosion Office develop an  overarching, long-term corrosion-prevention and mitigation strategy. The  instruction also requires that the Corrosion Office implement programs to  ensure that military departments throughout DOD take a focused and  coordinated approach to collect, review, reassess, and distribute  information on proven methods and products that are relevant to prevent  corrosion of military equipment. Also, the instruction requires Corrosion  Executives to develop procedures for corrosion planning and  implementation, and to review, manage, and document results.
During our review of the 43 projects in our sample, we found 14  (approximately 33 percent) of the projects performed well and each one’s  technology or method was implemented for use by a military department,  and 7 (approximately 16 percent) of the projects performed well and were  recommended for use by a military department but the military  department was not using it. We found varying reasons for military  departments not using a proven technology or method, such as the need  for additional field testing. Finally, we found 4 (approximately 9 percent) of  the projects did not perform as expected during the demonstration phase,  and were discontinued. The remaining projects in our sample, 18  (approximately 42 percent of the projects), were still in the demonstration  phase. However, Corrosion Office officials stated that they could not  readily provide information on the status of the projects’ implementation,  including whether projects were demonstrated successfully; were  recommended for a military department’s use but are not yet in use; or  had been discontinued. To provide an overview of the detailed status of  all projects, the officials stated that they would have to review each final  report and compile a list because the Corrosion Office does not use a tool  or method to consolidate such information when the office receives each  project’s report. Without a mechanism to consolidate projects’ status to  facilitate monitoring of whether the projects’ demonstrated technology or  methods are being used by military departments, the Corrosion Office  and the Corrosion Executives may not have timely information to know  whether the technology demonstrations produced proven methods and  products to prevent the corrosion of military equipment.
section_title: Project Managers Vary in How They Report Discontinued Projects, Including the ROI
paragraphs: During our review, we found that project managers varied in how they  reported discontinued projects and how they reported reassessed ROIs  for projects that had technology or methods recommended for a military  department’s use but were not being used. According to the DOD  strategic plan, a final report is required at project completion and is to  include certain content, such as recommendations on whether to  transition the technology or method to use in the military department. The  plan also requires the submission of follow-on reports within 2 years after  a project is completed and transitioned to use in the military department,  and is to include a reassessed ROI. In reviewing project reports, we found  seven instances of projects that had technology or methods  recommended for a military department’s use, but were not being used;  however, the Corrosion Office provided documentation that the ROIs  were reassessed for three of the projects. In one example, a follow-on  report showed one project’s results were awaiting validated data on  benefits so it had not yet been implemented by a military department. By  contrast, Corrosion Office records showed the project’s ROI was verified  as a cost benefit of $141.30 for every dollar invested in this project, which  suggested that the office considered the project to be implemented.  Additionally, we identified four projects that did not perform as expected  during the demonstration phase and were discontinued. According to  Corrosion Office officials, project managers still needed to submit follow- on reports, including verifying the estimated ROI. In interviews with  project personnel, we found differences in how the military departments  reported reassessed ROIs for discontinued projects in the follow-on  reports. For example, the Air Force reported the reassessed ROI for  discontinued projects as zero, while the Army reported the reassessed  ROI for discontinued projects to be the same as in the initial project plan.  Army officials stated that they believed they were following DOD guidance  in how they report ROI for discontinued projects. However, we found no  guidance in DOD’s strategic plan about how to report the ROI when a  project is discontinued, and Corrosion Office officials confirmed that they  have not provided such guidance. Corrosion Officials were unaware of  specific discontinued projects and were unable to readily provide us a list  of these projects. Without guidance to specify how project managers  should report the ROI for discontinued projects, the Corrosion Office may  receive varying reports about ROIs and have an incomplete picture of the  success of projects.
section_title: DOD Has Incorporated Lessons from Equipment- Related Corrosion Projects, but Does Not Have a Comprehensive Database to Share Lessons of All Projects
paragraphs: The military departments have identified lessons learned from their  equipment-related corrosion projects and shared some lessons with  corrosion-related personnel; however, DOD has no centralized and  secure database or other source to share lessons from all project final  and follow-on reports, including those with sensitive information. The  military departments have incorporated some lessons from proven  technologies or methods into maintenance guidance and repair  procedures for military equipment. DOD uses both formal and informal  methods to share lessons learned from corrosion projects, and is in the  early stages of developing a single database that can share the lessons  from final and follow-on reports, and do so in a secure system that can  archive sensitive information about projects.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Identified and Recorded Lessons in Maintenance Guidance and Procedures
paragraphs: The military departments have identified lessons learned from their  projects to prevent or mitigate corrosion of military equipment. These  lessons are described in the projects’ final reports. Further, military  departments have used the lessons learned to change maintenance  guidance and repair procedures in some cases.
The military departments have followed guidance in DOD’s strategic plan  to include lessons learned in the final report for each corrosion project.  We found that project managers and project personnel were identifying  lessons learned in the demonstration phase in lab books, journals and  final reports. Also, during our review of all submitted final reports, we  found that every final report included lessons learned. Additionally, project  managers and project personnel stated that they identify lessons learned  by an examination of testing conditions, observations and analysis of  successful and unsuccessful trials, and examining problems. For  example, one Navy project was successful in the lab, but the project  manager found that personnel in the field were not completing all the  steps necessary to make a particular protective paint coating effective to  prevent corrosion. The project was discontinued because the corrosion  method would not be successful in the field. Further, project managers  told us that they collect these lessons learned throughout project  demonstration, by recording analysis in lab books, which become part of  the laboratory record, as well as collecting data in the field. For example,  the project manager and project personnel who examined corrosion of  electronic circuit cards due to sand and salt stated that they collected  lessons learned while the weapon system was deployed. Also, they  collected lessons learned as the weapon systems were returned to their  home station, and found humidity at the home station greatly increased  corrosion, an unexpected result that was documented in the final report.
The military departments have incorporated lessons learned in guidance  or other information that will allow them to use the proven methods and  products. All project plans in our sample included plans or methods to  transition projects to military department use and incorporate what they  learned to change maintenance and repair procedures or allow the use of  new technology. During our review of final and follow-on reports, we  found that lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects  were incorporated primarily through the military performance  specifications; proposals for engineering changes; services’ technical  orders; or through DOD-wide military specifications. For example,
A Navy project developed cost-effective, corrosion-resistant boxes to  protect electrical equipment, indicator lights and connectors used on  Navy ships. The Navy issued a message, established stock numbers,  made drawings, and changed specifications to replace the boxes.
An Army project tested a protective covering for cable connectors on  the Patriot Missile System. As a result of the demonstration, the  Army’s Aviation and Missile Command’s corrosion officials  recommended the covers be part of repair kits and installed during  scheduled depot overhauls. Project personnel are working to develop  an Engineering Change Proposal to incorporate kits for these  protective coverings into repair procedures at an Army depot, and  plan to coordinate the assignment of National Stock Numbers for the  kits when the Engineering Change Proposal is approved.
An Air Force project tested and evaluated several rapid-cure  roller/brush and aerosol-applied coating systems for airplanes. The  final report recommended the aerosol system for implementation. As  a result of the project, the Air Force modified a technical order to  authorize the use of aerosol cans to apply protective coatings to an  aircraft.
Finally, changes to DOD-wide military specifications are another way for  lessons learned to be incorporated. For example, the Air Force created a  DOD standard to be used by industry and DOD for screening new  material technologies. Similarly, the Marine Corps created a DOD  standard to provide protective coatings for tactical and armored vehicles.
In addition, some lessons learned were incorporated into planning for  future projects. For example, a Marine Corps project was examining  improved methods to remove specialty coatings on vehicles in a corrosion  repair facility or depot. The process can take 32 hours to complete, during  which time the vehicle is unavailable for other repair activities. According  to the project manager, the project benefitted from lessons learned during  a prior Marine Corps project examining coating repairs. In another  example, the Air Force established a requirement for outdoor testing of  protective coatings for aircraft after several project managers found that  some protective coatings yielded contradictory results in the laboratory as  compared to outdoor exposure.
section_title: DOD Has Informal and Formal Methods to Share Some Lessons Learned
paragraphs: DOD has several methods for informally or formally sharing some lessons  learned from corrosion projects. Most lessons learned are shared  informally through conferences, working groups, and personal contacts,  according to Corrosion Executives, project managers, and project  personnel. While DOD has taken steps for a structured, formal process to  share information, such as by establishing a DOD corrosion website and  archiving final reports in the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)  database, neither the website nor the database has all lessons learned  from equipment-related corrosion projects.
Military departments’ Corrosion Executives, project managers, and  project personnel stated that lessons learned are shared in specific ways,  such as through past conferences, working groups, and personal  contacts. For example:
Conferences: The Corrosion Office has hosted the triannual DOD  Corrosion Forum—involving the military departments, private industry,  academia, and other government agencies—to share information on  the negative effects of corrosion on readiness and safety. Corrosion  officials whom we interviewed emphasized the importance of sharing  lessons learned at past conferences. Conferences have also included  briefings on project ideas and project submissions. For example, the  Air Force Corrosion Managers Conference included a briefing on the  results of a project on rapid-cure coating for aircraft. However,  according to a 2013 DOD budget memorandum, conferences have  been curtailed except those for mission-critical activities and must be  approved by component heads or senior officials designated by the  component head. Subsequently, DOD plans to hold for the first time  the DOD Corrosion Conference 2013 by means of a webinar.
Working Groups: The Corrosion Office has a number of Working  Integrated Product Teams to discuss and share corrosion information,  such as the Corrosion Policy, Processes, Procedures, and Oversight;  Communications and Outreach; and Science and Technology teams.  Further, officials supporting weapon systems have working groups  examining corrosion for their specific systems. For example, Air Force  officials examining the use of specific gaskets on C-17 aircraft  presented the project’s results, including lessons learned, to the C-17  Corrosion Prevention Advisory Board. Furthermore, these Air Force  officials explained that most major weapon systems have a Corrosion  Prevention Advisory Board, which consists of a team of engineers,  depot personnel, and industry officials, as a best practice to discuss  technology issues related to corrosion and corrosion management for  their weapon system.
Personal Contacts: During interviews with project managers and  project personnel, we found examples of sharing corrosion  information through emails, phone calls, and coordination on joint  projects. For example, Marine Corps corrosion officials stated that  because they share equipment with the Army through acquisition and  other processes, they are knowledgeable of Army lessons learned  from corrosion projects.
DOD has established formal methods to share many lessons learned with  officials working to prevent or mitigate corrosion of military equipment,  such as through websites or databases. In 2003, the department  established a DOD corrosion website that includes an online library,  information on submitting project plans, some nonsensitive final reports,  and a members-only section for sharing working-group findings.  Additionally, project managers and project personnel stated that they post  some information on lessons learned on service-specific corrosion  websites, including the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Control Office  website and the Army Aviation and Missile Command Corrosion Program  Office website. Further, according to corrosion officials and project  managers, the final reports are being archived, as required, at DTIC. We  also found lessons learned are shared in departmental databases, such  as the Naval Surface Warfighter Center database.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Database to Share Lessons from All Completed Projects, Including Sensitive Information
paragraphs: DOD officials have methods to share some lessons from projects, such  as information in final reports, but do not have a centralized and secure  database in which corrosion personnel across DOD can access lessons  from reports about all completed corrosion projects, including projects  involving sensitive information. DOD has archives of final reports in DTIC,  but the DTIC system does not include other information about corrosion  projects, such as follow-on reports that contain information on the  implementation of the projects. The DOD website has some final reports,  but it does not post other information that is considered sensitive. The  establishment of the website is cited as an accomplishment for one of the  goals in the DOD strategic plan. However, currently DOD has not  consolidated all project data and outcomes in a way that is available and  accessible to all relevant personnel.
DOD’s strategic plan states that DOD and the military departments should  use rapid and effective web-based strategies for communicating and  sharing best practices, including a centralized database to capture  corrosion-related technical information across the services to enhance  communication, leverage problems, and minimize duplication. Also, DOD  Instruction 5000.67 requires that the Corrosion Office’s long-term strategy  for corrosion prevention and mitigation of military equipment provide for  the implementation of programs, including supporting databases, to  ensure a focused and coordinated approach throughout DOD to collect,  review, reassess, and distribute information on relevant proven methods  and products. Finally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government states that federal program managers should have pertinent  information distributed in a form and time frame that permits them to  perform their duties efficiently.
According to Corrosion Executives, project managers, and project  personnel, DOD and the military departments could benefit from a  coordinated, centralized approach to archive all relevant information,  including sensitive information that should not be disclosed to the general  public, on methods and products proven to prevent or mitigate corrosion  of military equipment. Also, a Defense Science Board report on corrosion  control stated “when properly implemented, lessons learned from the  corrosion program will drive future design, acquisition, and performance  specifications.” To meet its goal to share lessons throughout the  department, DOD has begun work to develop a database that would  contain relevant information, including lessons learned, on all projects  and their outcomes—including sensitive or proprietary information.  However, officials at the Corrosion Office stated they are in the early  stages of developing the database and are unsure when it will be  completed. For example, they are still considering how the information  would be accessible in a secure way, such as through a nonpublic portal  of its corrosion website or through another DOD portal. Until a  comprehensive, centralized, and secure database is developed that  includes lessons learned from all completed corrosion projects, including  those with sensitive information, officials from DOD’s corrosion  community will not have full and complete information on lessons learned,  including proven methods or products to prevent or mitigate corrosion of  military equipment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD relies on the outcomes of its corrosion projects to reduce the life- cycle costs of its military equipment through the timely sharing of  information about successful projects with all relevant officials in DOD’s  corrosion community. Corrosion Office officials have provided assistance  to project managers for the submission of required reports on whether  specific corrosion-control technologies are effective; however, project  managers have not consistently followed DOD’s strategic plan regarding  collecting and reporting information to verify whether all projects are  achieving benefits other than the ROIs that were estimated in project  plans. Without specific guidance to require that follow-on reports include  details of measures of achievements other than ROI, including benefits,  the Corrosion Office will be missing the opportunity to know whether  equipment-related corrosion projects have achieved outcomes to prevent  or mitigate corrosion. Further, the Corrosion Office has not consolidated  information on projects’ status, such as whether a project was  recommended for transition to military departments’ use or has been  discontinued, and was unaware of which projects were discontinued.  Without a mechanism or tool to assist in monitoring and consolidating  status information about whether the technology or method demonstrated  by each equipment-related corrosion project has transitioned to the  military departments’ use, the Corrosion Office and the Corrosion  Executives may not have timely information about whether the corrosion  projects produced proven methods and products to prevent the corrosion  of military equipment. Also, the Corrosion Office may not have a complete  understanding of the success of projects if the military departments do not  have specific guidance for reporting the ROIs of discontinued projects,  and therefore report the ROIs in varying ways. Finally, DOD has not  consolidated all lessons learned in a way that is available and accessible  to all relevant personnel. Until a comprehensive, centralized, and secure  database is developed that includes lessons learned from all completed  corrosion projects, officials from DOD’s corrosion community will not have  full and complete information on lessons learned, including proven  methods or products to prevent or mitigate corrosion of military  equipment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making four recommendations to improve DOD’s corrosion- prevention and control program:  To enhance DOD in its oversight of the status and potential benefits of its  equipment-related corrosion projects, we recommend that the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics require  the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, to
Revise the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan or  other guidance to require that the military departments include in all  follow-on reports the details of measures of achievement other than  ROI, such as the features, results, and potential benefits of the  project.
To enhance tracking of DOD’s equipment-related corrosion projects, we  recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics require the Director, Corrosion Policy and  Oversight Office, to develop a tool or mechanism to assist in monitoring and consolidating  the status information for each equipment-related corrosion project  about whether the demonstrated technology or method has  transitioned to military departments’ use.
To ensure consistent reporting for all equipment-related corrosion  projects, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics require the Director, Corrosion  Policy and Oversight Office, to  revise guidance to specify how project managers should report the  ROI for discontinued projects.
To enhance planning for corrosion prevention and mitigation, we  recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics require the Director, Corrosion Policy and  Oversight Office, to establish a time frame for completing the comprehensive and secure  database so that all relevant officials of DOD’s corrosion community  have access to the proven technology methods, products, and other  lessons learned from all corrosion projects to prevent or mitigate  corrosion of military equipment.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, which are reprinted in appendix III, DOD concurred with two of  our four recommendations. DOD partially concurred with one  recommendation, and based on additional information provided in its  comments, we revised that recommendation. Finally, DOD did not concur  with one recommendation.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation that the Director,  Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, enhance tracking of DOD’s  equipment-related corrosion projects by developing a tool or mechanism  to assist in monitoring and consolidating the status information for each  equipment-related corrosion project about whether the demonstrated  technology or method has transitioned to military departments’ use. As  DOD notes in its comments, the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office  will monitor transition status using the corrosion Engineering Resource  Data Management (ERDM2) database program currently under  development.   According to DOD, ERDM2 is designed to collect, classify,  and file data on all aspects of corrosion projects and to provide the DOD  corrosion community access to information and tailored status reports.
DOD concurred with our fourth recommendation that the Director,  Corrosion Policy and Oversight, could enhance planning for corrosion  prevention and mitigation by establishing a time frame for completing the  comprehensive and secure database so that all relevant officials of  DOD’s corrosion community have access to the proven technology  methods, products, and other lessons learned from all corrosion projects  to prevent or mitigate corrosion of military equipment. DOD stated in its  comments that the development of the comprehensive and secure  ERDM2 data-management tool is underway and is a high priority.   According to DOD, development and deployment will occur incrementally  and simultaneously to ensure that needs of all stakeholders are met.  DOD anticipates that the initial phase of ERDM2 will contain data from  completed projects and will be in place by December 31, 2013.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation in the draft report  that the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, revise guidance  to specify how the military departments’ Corrosion Executives and project  managers should report the ROI for discontinued projects to ensure  consistent reporting for all equipment-related corrosion projects. In  partially concurring with this recommendation, DOD stated that the  military departments’ Corrosion Executives do not actively execute  projects or engage in the calculation of the ROI process, so the next  revision of DOD’s Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan will  address only how project managers will calculate and report ROI on  discontinued projects to the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight.   While we found that the military departments’ Corrosion Executives  review and coordinate through their respective chain of command to  provide information on corrosion projects to the Director of the Corrosion  Office, we agree that the military executives do not actively execute the  corrosion projects or engage in the calculation of the ROI. Thus, we have  revised the recommendation to include only the project managers.
DOD did not concur with our first recommendation that the Director,  Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, revise the DOD Corrosion  Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan or other guidance to require that  the military departments include in all follow-on reports the details of  measurements of achievement other than ROI, such as the features,  results, and potential benefits of the project. In its response, DOD stated  that the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan currently  provides sufficient guidance in this regard and believes it is not necessary  to revise this guidance. DOD cited instructions in section 3, appendix D of  the strategic plan about the 2 year follow-on reporting, which is to include  a focus on assessing the ROI computed at project completion, as well as  other features and benefits of the projects. Additionally, this appendix  accompanying the strategic plan includes instructions on completing and  submitting a checklist, also regarded as the follow-on report, to fulfill the  requirements. We noted in our report that the checklist for the follow-on  report that shows items to be reviewed on the status of the projects  allows project managers to check “yes” or “no” for each item, but project  managers are not required to write details about any benefits of the  project. During our review, we found that about three-fourths of the  completed checklists for the follow-on reports were modified by project  managers on their own accord to include some measures of achievement  of completed projects, such as when outcomes prompted changes to  military equipment specifications and standards. However, one-fourth of  the follow-on reports did not include information about features and  benefits of completed projects. Specifically, we found that 8 of 30 follow- on reports contained little to no narrative detail because there was no  requirement to do so. While DOD’s strategic plan provides instructions for  the 2 year follow-on reporting, the plan with its accompanying instructions  for completing the follow-on reports does not require that project  managers include details about any benefits of the project. We maintain  that DOD could enhance its oversight of corrosion projects by providing  additional, specific guidance to require that follow-on reports include  details of measures of achievements other than ROI, including project  benefits, to allow the Corrosion Office to have additional information  about whether equipment-related corrosion projects have achieved  outcomes to prevent or mitigate corrosion.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,  and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director of  the DOD Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight; and other interested  parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  ensured the submission of required reports for equipment-related  corrosion projects, we reviewed the DOD Corrosion Prevention and  Mitigation Strategic Plan and its revised versions, and used the reporting  milestones outlined in the plan to identify the types of reports required for  each project. We originally received project documentation for 129  projects, from which we selected our sample. However, one project was  eliminated because it was funded in fiscal year 2013. We obtained project  information for 128 equipment-related corrosion demonstration projects  funded by the DOD Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (hereafter  referred to as the Corrosion Office) for fiscal years 2005 through 2012.  We requested and reviewed the project documentation—project  proposals, final reports, and follow-on reports—to determine if the data  and related reports met the Corrosion Office’s reporting requirements. For  the purposes of our work in reviewing projects funded in fiscal years 2005  through 2010, we considered a final or follow-on report to be submitted as  required if the Corrosion Office had a copy of the report in its records  system, and confirmed the accuracy with the Corrosion Control and  Prevention Executives (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executives).  We did not consider the timeliness of the submitted reports. We received  project documentation through May 15, 2013. Additionally, for follow-on  reports, we could assess only the projects funded in fiscal years 2005  through 2007 because the DOD strategic plan’s milestone requires  submission of follow-on reports for completed projects within 2 years after  the projects have been completed and transitioned to use within the  military departments. We determined that the project-reporting data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the extent to which the  military departments met the Corrosion Office’s reporting requirements.  We did not assess elements of the actual report. We interviewed officials  from the Corrosion Office, as well as the Army, Navy, and Air Force  Corrosion Executives, to understand the process of what reports are  required and when; challenges and limitations, if any, in completing the  reports; and how projects are tracked if required reports have not been  submitted. Further, we interviewed these officials to determine why the  required reports were not submitted. Also, we determined what actions, if  any, they planned to take to complete the reports. Moreover, we selected  a nongeneralizable sample of 43 projects for further review and  conducted an in-depth analysis of the projects selected. We selected the  sample using a random systematic approach. We ordered the population  first by service, then by fiscal year, location, and project manager. Next  we selected a random starting point and then selected every third project.  Our nongeneralizable, sample-selection methodology ensured selection  of a variety of projects over all fiscal years, locations, and services. We  used a semistructured interview tool to obtain information from project  managers and project personnel to understand reporting requirements  and time frames as well as challenges and limitations, if any, that they  had in completing the reports. We also reviewed prior GAO work on  DOD’s corrosion-prevention and mitigation program.
To determine the extent to which DOD has collected the information  needed to determine whether benefits and other measures have been  achieved from equipment-related corrosion projects, we reviewed key  documents, including DOD Instruction 5000.67 and DOD’s strategic plan.  We examined DOD Instruction 5000.67 to gain an understanding of the  roles and responsibilities to develop procedures for corrosion planning  and implementation, and to review, manage, and document project  results. We examined DOD’s strategic plan to gain an understanding of  the department’s strategy to justify funding for corrosion projects by  verifying the initial investment of corrosion projects and guidance on  collecting information to check on any changes to the assumptions used  in the initial estimated return on investment (ROI) in order to compare, or  recompute, the ROI and determine whether the ROI is lower than  expected, as expected, or better than expected. Finally, we examined  guidance on internal controls to identify relevant responsibilities and  practices that could be used as criteria. We reviewed all follow-on reports  provided by the Corrosion Office and the military departments, which  included 30 follow-on reports on projects funded in fiscal years 2005  through 2008, to determine whether the military departments have  collected and reported measures of achievement of their completed  corrosion projects other than ROI, such as when outcomes prompt  changes in specifications, standards, technical manuals, and other  reference or guidance documents. We compared the amount of detail  provided in the follow-on reports. Additionally, we interviewed officials  from the Corrosion Office as well as the military departments’ Corrosion  Executives to understand whether and how they collect data in order to  determine whether the estimated ROIs have been achieved. Additionally,  from our nongeneralizable random systematic sample of 43 projects, we  interviewed project managers and project personnel to gain an  understanding of how they provide information on the status and the  results of corrosion projects that have completed research and  development, transitioned to a service’s use, and been in use for 2 years.  Specifically, we interviewed these officials to understand how they verify  the initial investment of corrosion projects, including what the project’s  assumptions were, how the assumptions were tracked during the first few  years of the project, and the extent to which the implementation affected  the ROI recomputation. For projects that were still in the demonstration  phase, or had just been transitioned to a service’s use, we interviewed  the officials to understand their plans to collect information to verify the  initial investment.
To determine the extent to which DOD has tracked the status of  equipment-related corrosion projects, we reviewed relevant law to  understand legislative requirements, including a long-term strategy and a  coordinated research and development program for the prevention and  mitigation of corrosion for new and existing military equipment, which  includes a plan to transition new corrosion prevention technologies into  operational systems. Further, we examined DOD Instruction 5000.67 to  gain an understanding of the department’s policy on the prevention and  mitigation of corrosion on DOD military equipment as well as roles and  responsibilities of the Corrosion Office and Corrosion Executives to  collect, review, reassess, and distribute information on proven methods  and products that are relevant to prevent corrosion of military equipment.  We analyzed documentation for each of the 43 projects in our sample,  specifically reviewing the project plans, final reports, and follow-on  reports, to analyze variables, including assumptions, initial estimated ROI  and the reassessed ROI, recommendations to transition to service use,  project status, and benefits and outcomes other than the ROI, among  others. We interviewed Corrosion Office officials to determine what status  information is collected for each project, how such information is  consolidated, and what analysis is done to oversee the status and  outcomes of each project. Likewise, we interviewed Corrosion Executives  to determine their approach to collect, review, reassess, and distribute  information on proven methods and products that are relevant to prevent  corrosion of military equipment. Specifically we interviewed these officials  to gain an understanding on how project results were reviewed,  managed, and documented.
To determine the extent to which DOD has identified, shared, and  incorporated lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects  into future planning to prevent or mitigate corrosion, we reviewed key  documents, including relevant law to understand legislative  requirements, and DOD policy and guidance. For example, we examined  DOD Instruction 5000.67 to understand the department’s policy to ensure  a focused and coordinated approach throughout DOD to collect, review,  reassess, and distribute information on relevant proven methods and  products. We also examined DOD’s strategic plan to understand the  department’s guidance on using rapid and effective web-based strategies  for communicating and sharing best practices, capturing corrosion-related  technical information across the services, and to determine the  requirements for lessons learned to be incorporated into project  documentation, specifically the final report. Finally, we examined  guidance on internal controls to identify relevant responsibilities and  practices that could be used as criteria. We analyzed all final reports to  determine whether lessons learned were being included and the extent to  which they were being incorporated into future planning and guidance.  We interviewed Corrosion Office officials to learn about their efforts to  develop a centralized database for project information that included  lessons learned. We interviewed Corrosion Executives and their staffs to  learn about how lessons learned are shared and incorporated.  Additionally, from our nongeneralizable random systematic sample of 43  projects, we interviewed project managers and project personnel to gain  an understanding of how lessons learned are collected, documented,  shared, and incorporated into future corrosion planning. Specifically, we  interviewed these officials to gain an understanding of what data are  collected and how they are analyzed, archived, and disseminated across  the department.
We visited or contacted the following offices during our review:
Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight
Air Force Corrosion Control and Prevention Executive
Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Control Office, Robins Air Force
Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright- Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
Army Corrosion Control and Prevention Executive
Army Research Lab, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
Aviation and Missile Command Corrosion Program Office, Redstone
Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics
Tobyhanna Army Depot, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering  Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Research, Development and Engineering
Navy Corrosion Control and Prevention Executive
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division
Navy Corrosion Control and Prevention Executive
Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River Naval Air Station,
Naval Sea Systems Command  We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 through September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Follow-on Report, also known as the Project Review Checklist
paragraphs: The Department of Defense Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation  Strategic Plan includes the template of the follow-on or project review  checklist for project managers to document the reassessed return on  investment and other features and benefits of the equipment-related  corrosion projects.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Carleen Bennett, Assistant  Director; Clarine Allen; James Ashley; Laura Czohara; Mark Dowling;  Linda Keefer; Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen; Richard Powelson; Amie  Steele; and John Van Schaik made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Infrastructure: DOD Should Improve Reporting and  Communication on Its Corrosion Prevention and Control Activities.  GAO-13-270. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2013.
Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve Military  Departments’ Corrosion Prevention Strategies. GAO-13-379.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2013.
Defense Management: The Department of Defense’s Annual Corrosion  Budget Report Does Not Include Some Required Information.  GAO-12-823R. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2012.
Defense Management: The Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2012  Corrosion Prevention and Control Budget Request. GAO-11-490R.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2011.
Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs,  Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP. Washington,  D.C.: March 1, 2011.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective  Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike  Fighter. GAO-11-171R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.
Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select Corrosion  Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance and  Validation of Returns on Investment. GAO-11-84. Washington, D.C.:  December 8, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on Department of Defense and  Military Service Fiscal Year 2011 Requirements for Corrosion Prevention  and Control. GAO-10-608R. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on the Department of Defense’s  Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control.  GAO-10-607R. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget  Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control. GAO-09-732R.  Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2009.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s Analysis of Options for  Improving Corrosion Prevention and Control through Earlier Planning in  the Requirements and Acquisition Processes. GAO-09-694R.  Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2009.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s FY 2009 Budget Request  for Corrosion Prevention and Control. GAO-08-663R. Washington, D.C.:  April 15, 2008.
Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions  Are Needed to Address Corrosion Issues. GAO-07-618. Washington,  D.C.: April. 30, 2007.
Defense Management: Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of  Prepositioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings. GAO-06-709.  Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of  DOD’s Long-Term Corrosion Strategy. GAO-04-640. Washington, D.C.:  June 23, 2004.
Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and  Increase Readiness. GAO-03-753. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic  Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities.  GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.