Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Continued Coordination, Operational Data, and Performance Standards Needed to Guide Research and Development
Published: 2013-02-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Unmanned aircraft systems are aircraft and associated equipment that do not carry a pilot aboard, but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or are manually controlled by pilot-operated ground stations. Although current domestic uses of UAS are limited to activities such as law enforcement, forensic photography, border security, and scientific data collection, UAS also have a wide range of other potential commercial uses. According to an industry forecast, the market for UAS is expected to grow and could be potentially worth $89 billion over the next decade. Concerned with the pace of UAS integration into the national airspace, Congress established specific requirements and set deadlines for FAA in the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act (the 2012 Act).
This testimony discusses 1) the roles and responsibilities of and coordination among federal agencies and other UAS stakeholders involved in integrating UAS, 2) FAAs progress in complying with the 2012 Acts UAS requirements, and 3) research and development efforts by FAA and other entities to address challenges for safely integrating UAS.
This testimony is based on a 2012 GAO report. In past work, GAO analyzed FAAs efforts to integrate UAS into the national airspace, the role of other federal agencies in achieving safe and routine integration, and research and development issues. GAO also conducted selected interviews with officials from FAA and other federal agencies, industry, and academic stakeholders.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While Congress has tasked FAA to lead the effort of safely integrating unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the national airspace, several federal and other entities also have a role. FAA has established various mechanisms to facilitate collaboration with these entities. For example, FAA has entered into formal agreements with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on obtaining appropriate safety data and coordinating research and development, respectively. FAA has also involved industry stakeholders and academia in the development of standards and research for UAS operations. FAA recently created the UAS Integration Office, within FAA, to coordinate all intra-agency UAS efforts and provide organizational leadership. Continued collaboration among UAS stakeholders will be critical to minimizing duplication of research and addressing implementation obstacles.
While FAA has made progress toward meeting the 2012 Act's requirements, as of January 2013, it has missed several of its deadlines. FAA continues to face challenges, with many of its efforts still in process. For example, the establishment of six test ranges for UAS operations, as required by the 2012 Act, is being delayed due to privacy concerns. Meeting the 2012 Act's requirements moving forward will require continued collaboration and significant work for FAA. In September 2012, GAO recommended that FAA incorporate mechanisms in its planning that allow for regular monitoring to assess its progress. Such mechanisms can help FAA identify what has been achieved and what remains to be done.
Research and development efforts are under way to mitigate obstacles to safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace. However, these research and development efforts cannot be completed and validated without safety, reliability, and performance standards, which have not yet been developed because of data limitations. GAO previously reported that FAA has not utilized the operational data it already possesses, such as data provided by the DOD.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to testify on several efforts to allow  unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to safely and routinely fly in the  national airspace. UAS are aircraft and associated equipment that do not  carry a pilot aboard, but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or  are manually controlled by following commands from pilot-operated  ground control stations. Figure 1 shows the components of a UAS,  including the airframe, power plant, communications links, and ground  control station. UAS are typically described in terms of weight, endurance,  purpose of use, and altitude of operation. For the purposes of this  testimony, we consider UAS in two broad categories: a small UAS is less  than 55 pounds, while a large UAS is 55 pounds or more.
Current domestic use of UAS is limited to activities such as law  enforcement, search and rescue, forensic photography, border security,  weather research, and scientific data collection. UAS also have potential  commercial uses that include pipeline, utility, and farm-fence inspections;  vehicular traffic monitoring; real-estate and construction-site photography;  relaying telecommunication signals; film industry production; and fishery  protection and monitoring. Concerned with the pace of progress toward  integrating UAS into the national airspace, in February 2012, Congress  established specific requirements and set deadlines for FAA to expedite  UAS integration in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (the 2012  Act). In September 2012, we reported that FAA had taken steps to meet  these requirements and deadlines, and raised concerns about when UAS  integration in the national airspace will be achieved. We recommended  that FAA incorporate regular monitoring of its efforts to measure progress  toward fulfilling its statutory requirements. We also reported on a variety  of obstacles that still must be overcome before UAS might be safely  integrated in the national airspace.
My statement today is based on our September 2012 report, updated as  appropriate, and discusses 1) the roles and responsibilities of and  coordination among federal agencies and other UAS stakeholders  involved in integrating UAS into the national airspace; 2) FAA’s progress  in complying with the 2012 Act’s UAS requirements; and 3) research and  development efforts by FAA and other entities to address challenges for  safely integrating UAS. We reviewed and analyzed documents and  interviewed relevant government, academic, and private-sector entities,  as well as federal UAS users. More detailed explanations of the methods  used to conduct our work can be found in the full report referenced  above. We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Currently, FAA authorizes all domestic military; public (academic  institutions, federal, state, and local governments including law  enforcement organizations); and civil (private sector entities) UAS  operations on a limited basis after conducting a case-by-case safety  review. Federal, state, and local government agencies must apply for  Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), while civil operators must  apply for special airworthiness certificates in the experimental category.  Because special airworthiness certificates do not allow commercial  operations, there is currently no means for FAA to authorize commercial  UAS operations.
Since FAA started issuing COAs in January 2007, 1,428 COAs have  been issued. At present, under COA or special airworthiness certification,  UAS operations are permitted for specific time frames (generally 12 to 24  months); locations; and operations. So, one agency can be issued  multiple COAs to operate one UAS for the same purpose. In 2012, FAA  issued 391 COAs to 121 federal, state, and local government entities  across the United States, including law enforcement entities as well as  academic institutions (see fig. 2).
According to an industry forecast, the market for government and  commercial use of UAS is expected to grow, with small UAS having the  greatest growth potential. This forecast estimates that the worldwide  UAS market could be potentially worth $89 billion over the next decade.  The majority of this estimate is for military-type products (primarily the  U.S. military) with the associated research and development for  production estimated to be $28.5 billion over the next 10 years. As  smaller UAS are expected to continue to improve in technology and  decrease in price, their prevalence in the national airspace is expected to  increase. The forecast also indicates that the United States could account  for 62 percent of the world’s research and development investment for  UAS technology over the coming decade.
section_title: FAA Is Responsible for Leading Coordination Efforts across Agencies and Industry to Achieve UAS Integration
paragraphs: Congress has tasked FAA to lead the effort of safely integrating UAS into  the national airspace, but several other federal agencies—such as the  Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS),  and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—also  have a role. While DOD uses UAS for training and operational missions,  DHS for border patrol, and NASA for scientific research, each agency  provides FAA with safety, reliability, and performance data through the  COA process. These agencies also participate in UAS integration forums  as discussed later in this section. Table 1 provides an overview of key  federal UAS stakeholders and their roles in integrating UAS.
FAA has established various mechanisms to facilitate collaboration with  its partner agencies, and private sector entities to safely integrate UAS  (see table 2). For example, given its unique role in managing partnerships  among federal agencies for the Next Generation Air Transportation  System (NextGen), FAA’s Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)  was tasked by the Office of Management and Budget to, in conjunction  with partner agencies, develop a strategic interagency UAS Research,  Development, and Demonstration Roadmap. This roadmap provides a  framework for interagency and private sector coordination on UAS  research and development efforts. Several working groups have also  been formed, such as the UAS Executive Committee, to facilitate  collaboration between agencies. FAA has also entered into  memorandums of understanding (MOU) with some of these federal  agencies. FAA signed MOUs with NASA and DOD regarding research  and development and the availability of safety data, respectively. FAA has  also involved industry stakeholders and academia through the UAS  Aviation Rulemaking Committee and RTCA SC-203. For example, the  RTCA SC-203 (a standards-making body) is developing safety, reliability,  and performance standards for UAS operations.
FAA also has agreements with a range of industry, federal research  entities, universities, and international organizations to conduct research.  These research and development agreements, known as Cooperative  Research and Development Agreements and International Agreements,  typically require the agency, organization, or company to perform types of  research and provide FAA with the data in exchange for funding. For  example, in 2009 FAA established an agreement with the European  Union to initiate, coordinate, and prioritize the activities necessary for  supporting the development of provisions required for the evolution of  UAS to full recognition as a legitimate category-of-airspace user. In  addition, FAA partners with federally funded research and development  centers on UAS integration efforts.
Within FAA, steps have also been taken to increase collaboration and  provide the organizational leadership needed to safely accelerate UAS  integration. FAA recently created the UAS Integration Office under one  executive to provide stable leadership and focus on the FAA UAS  integration efforts. The office will coordinate all intra-agency collaboration  efforts. At this time, some UAS responsibilities are being handled in other  offices throughout FAA. For example, some of the research and  development efforts and analysis of operation and safety data are being  performed by the Air Traffic Office and the Accident, Investigation, and  Prevention Office, respectively. The UAS Integration Office reports  directly to the Director of the Flights Standards Service, which provides  visibility for the office. At this time, several planning efforts are under way  in the office. However, because the reorganization has only recently been  implemented, it remains unclear whether the office will provide the  support needed to guide a collaborative effort given the complexities of  safely integrating UAS into the national airspace.
While collaboration mechanisms have been developed to help facilitate  UAS integration into the national airspace, continued collaboration among  UAS stakeholders will be critical to minimizing duplication of research and  addressing implementation obstacles. For example, as we previously  reported in our September 2012 report, federal agencies have not yet  stepped forward to proactively address the growing concerns regarding  the potential security and privacy implications of UAS. We  recommended that DOT, DHS, and the Attorney General initiate  discussions, prior to the integration of UAS into the national airspace, to  explore whether any actions should be taken to guide the collection and  use of UAS-acquired data. As we discuss later in this statement, FAA and  DOD will need to continue to work together to determine how to leverage  DOD’s operational and safety data to help develop UAS operations  standards, which is a critical step in the integration process. While we did  not evaluate the collaboration mechanisms already in place, stakeholders  told us that collaboration was occurring, but efforts could be improved.  Specifically, stakeholders told us they would like to see additional  leadership from FAA.
section_title: Meeting the 2012 Act’s Requirements Will Continue to Challenge FAA
paragraphs: FAA has several efforts under way to satisfy the 2012 Act’s requirements,  most of which must be achieved between May 2012 and December 2015.  See table 3 for a list of selected requirements and the status of FAA’s  efforts to meet them. FAA has made progress toward these selected  requirements. Of the seven deadlines that had passed, however, FAA  had completed two as of January 2013.
These requirements can be considered under four categories: (1)  developing plans for integrating UAS into the national airspace; (2)  changing the COA process; (3) integrating UAS at six test ranges; and (4)  developing, revising, or finalizing regulations and policies related to UAS.  The following provides additional information on the status of FAA’s  efforts to meet the requirements under these four categories:
Comprehensive plan and roadmap for UAS integration. FAA, with the  assistance of JPDO, is developing several planning documents  required by the 2012 Act, including a 5-year roadmap and  comprehensive plan to outline steps toward safe integration. As of  January 2013, FAA officials told us they were in the final stages of  reviewing and approving these documents and expected to make  them publically available by the February 14, 2013 deadline. In light of  the timeframes and complicated tasks involved in achieving the  requirements, in September 2012, we recommended that FAA  incorporate mechanisms in its 5-year roadmap and comprehensive  plan that allow for regular monitoring to assess progress toward safe  and routine access of UAS into the national airspace. Incorporating  regular monitoring can help FAA understand what has been achieved  and what remains to be done and help keep Congress informed about  this significant change to the domestic aviation landscape. While FAA  concurred with our recommendation, because these documents were  not publically available as of January 2013, it remains unclear whether  they include mechanisms for monitoring progress.
Changes to the COA process. FAA has changed the existing COA  process in response to the 2012 Act, including taking steps to  expedite COAs for public safety entities and developing agreements  with government agencies to expedite the COA or waiver process. To  help expedite COAs for public safety entities, FAA extended the  length of UAS authorization from a 12-month period to a 24-month  period so that those entities receiving COAs do not have to reapply as  frequently. In addition, FAA made additional changes to simplify the  COA application process, including automating the application  process through an online form. FAA also worked with DOJ’s National  Institute of Justice to develop an MOU to meet the operational  requirements of law enforcement entities, which are expected to be  early adopters of small UAS. Officials from both FAA and DOJ have  reached agreement on a draft version of the MOU establishing this  process. However, this MOU is still under legal review at FAA and  DOJ.
Test ranges. FAA has taken steps to develop, but has not yet  established, a program to integrate UAS at six test ranges, as  required by the 2012 Act. As part of these ranges, FAA must safely  designate airspace for integrated manned and unmanned flight  operations, develop certification standards and air traffic requirements  for UAS, ensure the program is coordinated with NextGen, and verify  the safety of UAS and related navigation procedures before  integrating them into the national airspace. FAA expects data  obtained from these test ranges will contribute to the continued  development of standards for the safe and routine integration of  UAS. In March 2012, FAA issued a Request for Comments in the  Federal Register and received a number of comments. FAA officials  told us they are still working to meet all of the specified requirements  for the test ranges and had expected to issue a Screening Information  Request to initiate the competitive bid process for selecting the six  test ranges in July 2012. However, because of privacy concerns  regarding the collection and use of UAS-acquired data expressed by  commenters, the internal review process of the Screening Information  Request was delayed. FAA officials said they hired a privacy expert to  help develop a strategy to address these concerns and are working to  incorporate this strategy in its Screening Information Request. As of  January 2013, officials noted that FAA expects to release the  Screening Information Request in the next 4 to 6 weeks.
Rulemaking. While FAA has efforts under way supporting a  rulemaking for small UAS, as required by the 2012 Act, it is uncertain  whether FAA will meet the August 2014 deadline. In fact, the agency’s  rulemaking efforts for UAS date back more than 5 years, when it  established the small UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee in 2008.  In August 2011, FAA initially provided the Secretary of Transportation  with its draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). FAA officials  told us in January 2013 that the FAA is still internally reviewing the  draft and working to agree on the NPRM’s language. According to the  officials, FAA has not determined when it might issue the NPRM.
section_title: Standards and Data Needed to Guide UAS Research and Development Efforts for Agencies
paragraphs: As we reported in 2012, many entities have research and development  efforts under way to mitigate obstacles before UAS are allowed to operate  safely and routinely in the national airspace. Some of these obstacles and  related research include vulnerabilities in UAS operations, such as sense  and avoid; command, control, and communications, including lost link,  dedicated radio-frequency spectrum, and Global Positioning System  (GPS) jamming and spoofing; and human factors. However, these  research and development efforts cannot be completed and validated  without safety, reliability, and performance standards, which have not yet  been developed because of data limitations.
subsections: section_title: Elements of UAS Research and Development
subsections: section_title: Sense and Avoid
paragraphs: To date, no suitable technology has been deployed that would provide  UAS with the capability to sense and avoid other aircraft and airborne  objects and to comply completely with FAA regulatory requirements of the  national airspace. However, research and development efforts by FAA,  DOD, NASA, and MITRE, among others, suggests that potential solutions  to the sense and avoid obstacle may be available in the near term.  Since 2008, FAA and other federal agencies have managed several  research activities to support meeting the sense and avoid requirements.  DOD officials told us that the Department of the Army is working on a  ground-based sense and avoid system that will detect other airborne  objects and allow the pilot to direct the UAS to maneuver to a safe  location. The Army has successfully tested one such system, but it may  not be useable on all types of UAS. Another potential system to address  this obstacle is an airborne sense and avoid system, which could equip  UAS with the same GPS-based transponder system that will be used in  FAA’s NextGen air-traffic-management system and with which some  manned aircraft are starting to be equipped. In 2012, NASA researchers  at Dryden Flight Research Center successfully tested an automatic  dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) transponder system on its  Ikhana UAS.  An airborne sense and avoid system could include ADS- B, along with other sensors such as optical/infrared cameras and radar.
Ensuring uninterrupted command and control for both small and large  UAS remains a key obstacle for safe and routine integration into the  national airspace. Since UAS fly based on pre-programmed flight paths  and by commands from a pilot-operated ground control station, the ability  to maintain the integrity of command and control signals are critically  important to ensure that the UAS operates as expected and as intended.
In a “lost link” scenario, the command and control link between the UAS  and the ground control station is broken because of either environmental  or technological issues, which could lead to loss of control of the UAS. To  address this type of situation, UAS generally have pre-programmed  maneuvers that may direct the UAS to hover or circle in the airspace for a  certain period of time to reestablish its radio link. If the link is not  reestablished, then the UAS will return to “home” or the location from  which it was launched, or execute an intentional flight termination at its  current location. It is important that air traffic controllers know where and  how all aircraft are operating so they can ensure the safe separation of  aircraft in their airspace. FAA and MITRE have been measuring the  impacts of lost link on national airspace safety and efficiency, but the  standardization of lost link procedures, for both small and large UAS, has  not been finalized. Currently, according to FAA, each COA has a specific  lost link procedure unique to that particular operation and air traffic  controllers should have a copy for reference at all times. Until procedures  for a lost link scenario have been standardized across all types of UAS,  air traffic controllers must rely on the lost link procedures established in  each COA to know what a particular UAS will do in such a scenario.
Progress has been made in obtaining additional dedicated radio- frequency spectrum for UAS operations, but additional dedicated  spectrum, including satellite spectrum, is still needed to ensure secure  and continuous communications for both small and large UAS operations.  The lack of protected radio-frequency spectrum for UAS operations  heightens the possibility that a pilot could lose command and control of a  UAS. Unlike manned aircraft—which use dedicated, protected radio  frequencies—UAS currently use unprotected radio spectrum and, like any  other wireless technology, remain vulnerable to unintentional or  intentional interference. This remains a key security and safety  vulnerability because, in contrast to a manned aircraft in which the pilot  has direct physical control of the aircraft, interruption of radio  transmissions can sever the UAS’s only means of control.
UAS stakeholders are working to develop and validate hardware and  standards for communications operating in allocated spectrum. For  example, FAA’s UAS Research Management Plan identified 13 activities  designed to mitigate command, control, and communication obstacles.  One effort focused on characterizing the capacity and performance  impact of UAS operations on air-traffic-control communications systems.  In addition, according to NASA, it is developing, in conjunction with  Rockwell Collins, a prototype radio for control and a non-payload  communications data link that would provide secure communications.
The jamming of the GPS signal being transmitted to the UAS could also  interrupt the command and control of UAS operations. In a GPS jamming  scenario, the UAS could potentially lose its ability to determine its  location, altitude, and the direction in which it is traveling. Low cost  devices that jam GPS signals are prevalent. According to one industry  expert, GPS jamming would become a larger problem if GPS is the only  method for navigating a UAS. This problem can be mitigated by having a  second or redundant navigation system onboard the UAS that is not  reliant on GPS, which is the case with larger UAS typically operated by  DOD and DHS.
Encrypting civil GPS signals could make it more difficult to “spoof” or  counterfeit a GPS signal that could interfere with the navigation of a UAS.  Non-military GPS signals, unlike military GPS signals, are not encrypted  and transparency and predictability make them vulnerable to being  counterfeited, or spoofed. In a GPS-spoofing scenario, the GPS signal  going from the ground control station to the UAS is first counterfeited and  then overpowered. Once the authentic (original) GPS signal is  overpowered, the UAS is partially under the control of the “spoofer.” This  type of scenario was recently demonstrated by researchers at the  University of Texas at Austin at the behest of DHS. During the  demonstration at the White Sands Missile Range, researchers spoofed  one element of the unencrypted GPS signal of a fairly sophisticated small  UAS (mini-helicopter) and induced it to plummet toward the desert floor.  The research team found that it was straightforward to mount an  intermediate-level spoofing attack, such as controlling the altitude of the  UAS, but difficult and expensive to mount a more sophisticated attack.
The research team recommended that spoof-resistant navigation systems  be required on UAS exceeding 18 pounds.
UAS stakeholders have been working to develop solutions to human  factor issues for both small and large UAS. According to FAA, human  factors research examines the interaction between people, machines, and  the environment to improve performance and reduce errors. Human  factors are important for UAS operations as the pilot and aircraft are not  collocated. The separation of pilot and aircraft creates a number of  issues, including loss of sensory cues valuable for flight control, delays in  control and communications loops, and difficulty in scanning the visual  environment surrounding the unmanned aircraft. As part of its UAS  Integration in the National Airspace System Project, NASA is working to  develop human factor guidelines for ground control stations and plans to  share the results with RTCA SC-203 to inform recommended guidelines.  In addition, the Department of the Army is working to develop universal  ground control stations, which would allow UAS pilots to fly different types  of UAS without having to be trained on multiple configurations of a ground  control station.
section_title: Development of UAS Safety, Reliability, and Performance Standards
paragraphs: The development of standards for UAS operations is a key step in the  process of safe integration and supporting research and development  efforts. Setting standards, certification criteria, and procedures for sense  and avoid systems as well as protocols to be used for the certification of  command, control, and communication systems will guide research and  development efforts toward a specifically defined goal. Once the  standards are developed, FAA will use the standards in UAS regulations.  Currently, UAS continue to operate as exceptions to the regulatory  framework rather than being governed by it. Without specific and  permanent regulations for safe operation of UAS, federal stakeholders,  including DOD and NASA, continue to face challenges and limitations on  their UAS operations. The lack of final regulations could hinder the  acceleration of safe and routine integration of UAS into the national  airspace.
Standards-making bodies are currently developing safety, reliability, and  operational standards. While progress has been made, the standards  development process has been hindered, in part, because of FAA’s  inability to use safety, reliability, and performance data from DOD, the  need for additional data from other sources, as well as the complexities of  UAS issues in general. As we previously reported, while DOD provided  FAA with 7 years of data in September 2011, FAA officials told us they  have been unable to use this data to develop standards because of  differences in definitions and uncertainty about how to analyze these  data. To mitigate these challenges FAA has been working with DOD to  develop an MOU and better identify what data are needed. Finally, FAA is  also working with MITRE to develop a data collection tool that will allow  officials to better analyze the data they receive from DOD.
The establishment of six test ranges, as previously discussed, and the  designation of permanent areas of operation in the Arctic could provide  FAA with two potential new sources of safety, reliability, and performance  data for UAS. However, it is unclear when the test ranges and Arctic area  will be operational. Use of these data will be important in developing  safety, reliability, and performance standards, which are needed to guide  and validate the supporting research and development efforts. According  to an RTCA official, both DOD and NASA are sharing the results of their  UAS flight experience and research and development efforts to assist  RTCA in the standards development process. The RTCA official  suggested that the standards-making process might be accelerated if it  could start by producing an initial set of standards for a specific UAS with  a clearly defined mission. The committee could then utilize those initial  standards, along with the subsequent safety and performance data from  those operations, to develop additional standards for increasingly  complex UAS functions and missions.
FAA and NASA are taking steps to ensure the reliability of both small and  large UAS by developing a certification process specific to UAS.  Currently, FAA has a process and regulations in place for certifying any  new manned aircraft type and allowing it access to the national airspace.  FAA’s Research and Development office is working to identify the  substantive differences in how to meet the certification standards for  manned and unmanned aircraft. According to its 2012 Research  Management Plan, the office has six activities under way that support the  development of UAS-specific certification and airworthiness standards.
In closing, UAS integration is an undertaking of significant breadth and  complexity that touches several federal agencies. Congress has  highlighted the importance of UAS integration by establishing statutory  requirements and setting deadlines for FAA. FAA, as the lead agency,  faces the daunting task of ensuring that all of the various efforts within its  own agency, as well as across agencies and other entities, will align and  converge in a timely fashion to achieve UAS integration within these  deadlines. Because of concerns about the agency’s ability to meet  deadline requirements, we recommended that FAA incorporate regular  monitoring of its efforts to assess progress toward fulfilling its  requirements outlined in the 2012 Act. Incorporating regular monitoring  will help to inform stakeholders and Congress about what has been  achieved and what remains to be done and help FAA build stakeholder  confidence in its ability to achieve UAS integration in a safe and timely  manner. In addition, the various entities’ research and development  efforts require continued collaboration to address the critical issues that  need to be resolved before UAS are allowed to operate safely and  routinely in the national airspace. This collaboration will be important to  help align research and development goals across federal agencies and  minimize duplication of research or inefficient use of resources.
Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Maffei, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to answer any questions at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald L.  Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. In  addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and  Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals  making key contributions to this testimony include H. Brandon Haller,  Assistant Director; Heather Krause, Assistant Director; Cheryl Andrew;  Colin Fallon; Rebecca Gambler; Geoffrey Hamilton; Daniel Hoy; Brian  Lepore; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Faye Morrison; Jeffrey Phillips; Nalylee  Padilla; and Melissa Swearingen.
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