West Coast Ports: Better Supply Chain Information Could Improve DOT's Freight Efforts
Published: 2016-10-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. West Coast ports are critical to the national transportation freight network and global supply chains. Changes in global shipping and disruptions at ports can create congestion and economic hardship for shippers with resulting effects throughout supply chains. The 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act provides freight policy goals, including increasing U.S. economic competitiveness; reducing freight congestion; and improving the safety, reliability, and efficiency of the freight network. The act also established new DOT freight funding programs.
This report addresses: (1) how major U.S. West Coast ports have responded to recent changes in global shipping; (2) how selected shippers have been impacted by and responded to a recent port disruption, and (3) how DOT's efforts support port cargo movement and whether they can be improved. GAO conducted case studies of the three major port regions on the West Coast; interviewed key stakeholders—such as port authorities and state and local transportation agencies—for each region and 21 industry representatives, and evaluated DOT's freight efforts relative to criteria on using quality information to support decision-making.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Some infrastructure and operations at major West Coast ports are strained in the face of recent changes in global shipping, but port stakeholders are attempting to address these constraints. For example, as the shipping industry deploys larger vessels capable of delivering more cargo, some port terminals lack big enough cranes, or other infrastructure, needed to handle these vessels. All major West Coast ports have planned or completed port-related infrastructure projects and implemented operational changes. For example, in Long Beach, California, the Gerald Desmond Bridge is being heightened to enable larger vessels to pass underneath. Port stakeholders also noted that efforts to address constraints at ports can be hampered by competing priorities and limited data. For example, most state and local government officials said that having information on ports' performance and industry supply chains—the end-to-end process of producing and distributing a product or commodity from raw materials to the final customer—would be helpful to target efforts to address constraints at ports.
Selected shippers were impacted by and responded to one recent port disruption in various ways. In July 2014, the labor agreement that covers most West Coast port workers expired and was not renewed until February 2015. During this period, as widely reported, ports remained open, but vessels backed up in harbors, and loading and unloading of cargo were delayed. In response to this disruption, 13 of 21 selected industry groups representing shippers of some of the top commodities moving through West Coast ports said at least some of their members modified their supply chains by, for example, diverting shipments to ports outside the West Coast or to alternate modes of transportation. All 13 said shippers' costs increased or revenues declined. Six industry groups said some members had difficulty altering shipping plans because of commodity attributes, such as perishability or prohibitive costs.
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) freight-related activities are increasingly multi-modal and inclusive of ports, but gaps exist in the information available to DOT and state and local governments about important aspects of supply chains. For example, a 2015 DOT report notes that movements of international trade between ports and domestic origin for exports and domestic destinations for imports are not measured. This report further states that this information could help DOT to assess international trade flows within the United States and strengthen the role of freight transportation in U.S. economic competitiveness. Federal guidance and leading practices in capital planning emphasize that good information is essential to sound decision making and achieving agency objectives. A few current DOT initiatives may help address some information gaps, but they are in the early stages. DOT has also articulated the need for supply chain information in its draft National Freight Strategic Plan , but does not outline how DOT will obtain this information or how it will be used. Based on a 2014 GAO recommendation, DOT is in the early stages of developing a written freight data strategy to improve the availability of national data on freight trends, among other things. Broadening its freight data strategy to include supply chain information could help DOT to think more strategically about the specific supply chain information needed to support its freight efforts and advance national freight policy goals.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In developing a freight data strategy, DOT should identify: what supply chain information is needed, potential sources of that information, data gaps, and how it intends to use this information to inform freight efforts. DOT concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Ports on the U.S. West Coast are a critical component of the freight  transportation network that supports billions of dollars in annual trade  activity, especially with Asia. This trade is an integral part of supply chains  for retail and manufacturing as well as for agricultural goods. In 2015,  West Coast ports handled almost 35 percent of the more than $1.56  dollars of the total international waterborne trade that moved through  domestic ports. The majority of ocean-borne cargo moves through a  relatively small number of ports. On the West Coast, the three major port  regions—the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in Southern  California; of Oakland in the San Francisco Bay Area; and of Seattle and  Tacoma in the Northwest—handled 88 percent of total West Coast port  volumes in 2015. The global shipping industry has been evolving rapidly,  necessitating changes in both operations and infrastructure at ports. For  example, ocean carriers built larger vessels in an effort to reduce costs  and to lower the unit cost of moving a container. Accordingly, some ports  now need, for example, deeper harbors, taller cranes, improved  operational efficiency, and additional truck and rail capacity to  accommodate larger vessels and the increased amount of cargo  offloaded from a single ship. Amid these changes, shippers and port  stakeholders have raised questions about the impact of increasing  congestion at ports. Addressing these issues is of paramount importance  to the continued vitality of local, regional, and national economic activity  that relies on the efficient movement of cargo through ports.
The efficient movement of cargo through ports requires the coordination  of public and private entities and is vulnerable to a variety of sources of  congestion and disruption. Any event that impedes this flow of cargo can  disrupt global supply chains, trade, and commerce. On the West Coast,  port authorities are generally landlords, with terminal operators leasing  land and dock infrastructure from the port and owning equipment, such as  terminal cranes, that are needed to load and unload vessels. Private firms  are typically responsible for the movement of containers to and from  vessels and in and out of West Coast port terminals. Operations can  become congested due to equipment shortages, deteriorating  infrastructure, and labor shortages, among other causes. Unexpected  events, such as severe weather or labor disputes, can also disrupt the  flow of cargo through ports. In particular, due to the complexity of modern  supply chains—which require close coordination to move goods across  varied infrastructure—even a small delay (e.g., changes in vessel  schedules or dock operations) can have rippling effects throughout supply  chains, potentially resulting in economic losses for businesses and  ultimately the broader economy.
At ports on the West Coast, much of the labor is provided by longshore  workers, organized by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union  (ILWU), working under contract with the Pacific Maritime Association  (PMA), which represents the owners and operators of port terminals. In  July 2014, the contract between ILWU and PMA expired and port work  continued without a contract until a new contract was signed in February  2015. At the same time, as widely reported, West Coast port congestion  worsened from already congested levels, with vessels backed up in  harbors and delays in cargo loading and unloading. Observers disputed  whether the congestion was caused more by labor and management  actions or operational and infrastructure challenges stemming from  changes in global shipping, or a combination of factors. Whatever the  cause, some U.S. shippers experienced adverse economic  consequences as their supply chains were disrupted.
With the passage of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century  Act (MAP-21) in 2012, the federal government articulated its first national  freight policy, giving new focus to intermodal freight, such as cargo  moving through ports. The policy goals include improving the efficiency  and resiliency of freight transportation and enhancing the global economic  competitiveness of the United States. Much of the responsibility for  meeting these goals falls on the Department of Transportation (DOT) as  the agency works to finalize a National Freight Strategic Plan and  establish new freight programs authorized by the Fixing America’s  Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act), enacted in December 2015.
You asked us to review a range of issues related to West Coast ports.  This report addresses: (1) how recent changes in global shipping have  impacted the movement of cargo at major U.S. West Coast ports, and  how these ports and their stakeholders have responded to these  changes; (2) how selected shippers have been impacted by and  responded to disruptions at West Coast ports during 2014 and 2015 as  well as to other recent or potential disruptions; and (3) how DOT’s current  freight-related efforts support cargo movement through ports and whether  these efforts can be improved.
To understand how changes in global shipping have affected major West  Coast ports and how these ports and their stakeholders (e.g., marine  terminal operators, truck and rail firms, and other entities involved in  moving cargo through ports) have responded, we conducted three in- depth case studies in the West Coast regions with the largest port  complexes—Los Angeles-Long Beach, Oakland, and Seattle-Tacoma.  These case studies included site visits and interviews with stakeholders  for each port complex that represented port authorities, marine terminal  operators, longshoreman, truckers, and state and local transportation  agencies. As part of each case study, we reviewed relevant documents,  such as state and regional freight plans and project-specific funding  applications. To supplement our case studies, we interviewed one  national trade association, one state port trade association, and the port  authorities of two smaller West Coast ports (San Diego, California, and  Portland, Oregon), and two major East and Gulf coast ports (Port  Authority of New York and New Jersey, and Port of Houston) to learn  about how changes in global shipping have impacted other ports and  actions these ports attempted to address these impacts. We selected  these other ports based on their relatively large sizes, in terms of the  dollar value and twenty-foot equivalent unit volume (TEU). Finally, we  reviewed literature on global shipping changes and our prior work related  to freight mobility, intermodalism, and marine transportation finance.
To assess how selected shippers have been impacted by and responded  to recent port disruptions and associated port congestion and delays, we  conducted semi-structured interviews with 21 industry trade groups that  represent shippers. We selected these groups because the shippers  these groups represent handle some of the top commodities imported  and exported through major West Coast ports, as shown by U.S.  international trade data. We selected specific associations such that we  had representation of manufacturers, retailers, and agricultural firms and  representation from all parts of the country. Additionally, to understand  the logistical impacts of disruptions, we interviewed a selection of  Customs Broker and Freight Forwarder regional associations, that  represent logistics handlers. We selected these interviewees after  interviewing the national-level association and selecting 9 regional  associations representing a variety of West Coast, East Coast, and Gulf  Coast port regions from the 28 total regional associations nationwide.  These interviewees represent a non-generalizable sample of different  industries along different parts of the supply chain. To complement our  qualitative analysis, we conducted statistical analysis of U.S. international  trade data maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau (Census), covering all  imports and exports from January 2005 to March 2016.
To identify and evaluate any ways that DOT could better support cargo  movement through ports, we gathered information on an array of topics  related to cargo moving though ports and relevant federal efforts, with a  focus on DOT. We reviewed DOT’s draft National Freight Strategic Plan  and programmatic activities of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) as  well as other DOT administrations. We also reviewed literature on  shipping, logistics, and freight topics to identify areas others have noted  need attention. We conducted interviews with DOT, Department of  Commerce, and Federal Maritime Commission officials. We also  interviewed selected transportation experts, and, during the interviews  conducted for the other objectives, also asked about areas in which DOT  could improve. To identify possible ways to improve DOT’s current efforts,  we evaluated DOT’s progress against criteria on leading practices in  capital decision making that were used in a prior GAO freight report and  related Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We  focused our attention on whether DOT had good information on supply  chains available for decision making as the department establishes and  expands policies and programs related to ports. See appendix I for more  detailed information on our scope and methodology, including listings of  the stakeholders and organizations we interviewed.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to October 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Ports and Port Stakeholders
paragraphs: Ports are critical components of the freight transportation network and  serve as gateways for the movement of international (imports and  exports) and domestic goods between navigable waterways and landside  transportation systems, such as the Interstate highway system or the  national rail network. For the purposes of this report, we define a port as  the area “inside the gate” and under the control of the local port authority  or marine terminal operator, where cargo is loaded and unloaded to and  from ships. We refer to a “port complex” as encompassing one to two  ports and the nearby roadways, rail, bridges, and intermodal facilities (i.e.,  connectors) on which cargo arrives or departs the port.
Major West Coast ports—Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland, Tacoma,  and Seattle—have historically handled about half of the nation’s  containerized cargo (see figure 1) and all of these ports have projected  increasing volumes. For example, the regional government for Southern  California, where the nation’s largest port complex is based, has  forecasted that the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports will handle  approximately 40 million TEUs by 2035, more than two times the cargo  handled today. Though cargo volumes at West Coast ports are expected  to increase, the share of total cargo handled by West Coast ports has  declined slightly in recent years as Gulf and East Coast ports gained  market share.
Cargo moving through ports is inherently intermodal. Efficient freight  movement depends upon the condition of intermodal connections. Port  connectors include transportation infrastructure such as roads, railways,  and marine highways that connect the port to major trade corridors and  allow freight to transfer from one transportation mode to another (e.g.,  from a ship to a truck). The movement of cargo through ports involves  multiple entities, public and private, which compete with one another  (ports against other ports, terminals against other terminals, etc.) and  coordinate with one another (terminals with truckers and rail carriers, etc.)  for shipping business and to make key infrastructure investment and  operations decisions. See appendix II for a description of the key entities’  roles and how they fit in the end-to-end sequence of processes and  network of companies involved in the production and distribution of goods  that make up supply chains.
At 29 West Coast ports—including the ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach,  Oakland, Seattle, and Tacoma—the employment requirements and  responsibilities between terminal operators and labor are outlined in one  contract negotiated between the PMA—which represents marine terminal  operators and ocean carriers—and the ILWU—which represents  approximately 14,000 registered workers and another 7,000 non- registered workers eligible for employment at marine terminals. The most  recent contract was finalized in February 2015 after protracted  negotiations that began in May 2014 on a contract that was set to expire  on July 1st of that same year. Historically, U.S. terminal-labor contract  negotiations can be contentious and lengthy. In some cases, contract  negotiating difficulties can effectively shut down port operations.
section_title: Global Shipping Changes
paragraphs: Global shipping has changed over the past decade in several  fundamental ways as ocean carriers have attempted to reduce their  costs. These global shipping changes can impact how cargo is moved  through a port.
Increased ship size: Over the past decades, many ocean carriers  decided to order larger container vessels to meet demand spurred by  growing Asian economies, to capture economies of scale made  possible by advances in fuel efficient engine technology, and to  maintain market share and presence. The largest vessel to call on  West Coast ports in 2016 could carry nearly 18,000 TEUs whereas in  2005, the largest vessel was roughly half as large. These larger  vessels are longer, wider, and taller. Port terminal infrastructure— crane heights and reach, berth depth, and other considerations, such  as the availability of truck chassis—the truck trailers that are used to  carry shipping containers—must be adequate to receive these larger  vessels. See figure 2 for an illustration of the growth in vessel size  since circa 1985 with a Boeing 747 included for scale.
Formation of shipping alliances: Ocean carriers have formed alliances  as a strategy to contain costs and offer more competitive services.  These alliances allow for cargo booked with one carrier to be  transported by another alliance carrier’s ship. Shifts in these alliances  can result in vessels calling on different ports and terminals,  depending on obligations under alliance agreements. There are  currently four broad alliances which transport about 80 percent of the  U.S. containerized cargo.
Changing ownership structures: Historically, ocean carriers owned not  only the vessels, but also the cargo containers and the truck chassis  that transport containers to and from the vessels. Previously, chassis  would be stored, maintained, and repaired (by labor) within the  terminal gates. Before leaving the terminal, labor would also conduct  a chassis safety, or “roadability” inspection. In an effort to keep their  costs low in response to the global recession in 2007-2009 and to  follow models of chassis provision in other countries, carriers have  divested themselves from chassis ownership and shifted these  responsibilities to third-party leasing companies.
section_title: Supply Chains
paragraphs: Supply chains are the end-to-end process of producing and distributing a  product or commodity from raw materials to the final customer. Supply  chains can be fairly localized, global, or anywhere in between.  Management of the supply chain involves shippers adapting supply chain  decisions to changing market conditions and to gain efficiencies. For  example, a furniture importer’s supply chain could include materials and  finished goods from Southeast Asia that are then transported to a West  Coast port and distributed across the United States. The freight  transportation network, including ports, is a critical component of how  end-to-end supply chains function. Lowering production or transportation  costs can be key to achieving efficiencies in the supply chain. Industry  supply chains have evolved in recent years with advances in  communications and computing technology, reductions in trade barriers  and production costs, and the opening of new markets globally.
Over the past several decades, firms have become increasingly reliant on  timely shipping. “Just-in-time” business models enable firms to save  inventory costs by planning their supply chains carefully to have inputs  and goods delivered within very specific time frames. While these  strategies are highly efficient, any disruption in the supply chain can have  a greater impact than would be the case if larger inventories were held,  buffering any breakdown in planned deliveries. Further, many shippers  face seasonal demand, where goods must be delivered to the customer  during a narrow window of time, such as goods for the holiday season or  agricultural goods.
section_title: Federal Freight Policy and Role with Ports
paragraphs: In addition to private entities and state, regional, and local governments,  multiple federal agencies have roles in various aspects of port and near- port freight infrastructure and in facilitating international trade. Although  historically DOT’s freight policy and funding have been targeted towards  highways and transit, some DOT programs have funded port-related  projects such as the Transportation Investment Generating Economic  Recovery Discretionary Grant (TIGER) program; the Transportation  Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program; and Railroad  Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF). These programs’  broad eligibility has allowed states and local governments to fund multi- modal, multi-jurisdictional projects. In 2012, MAP-21 expanded DOT’s  authorities to address multimodal freight, and DOT has subsequently  assumed more of a leadership role in federal freight activity. MAP-21  established a national freight policy focused on highways and directed  DOT to develop a national freight strategic plan. The goals of this policy  include increasing the economic competitiveness of the United States,  reducing freight congestion, and improving the safety, reliability, and  efficiency of the freight network, among other goals. In October 2015,  DOT issued a draft National Freight Strategic Plan for public comment  and plans to finalize the plan by December 4, 2017, in accordance with  the statutory deadline mandated by the FAST Act. In December 2015, the  FAST Act expanded DOT’s freight role again. The FAST Act created a  new freight formula program, authorized at $6.2 billion over 5 years, to  fund improvements on the National Highway Freight Network. Up to 10  percent of the funds may be used for freight rail and intermodal projects,  including projects at ports. The FAST Act also created a new  discretionary grant program, commonly referred to as the FASTLANE  program, to fund major transportation projects, such as highway bridge  projects, as well as freight projects. Up to $500 million of the $4.5 billion  authorized for the program over 5 years may be used for freight rail,  intermodal, or port projects. The Act also directed DOT to designate a  multimodal freight network and undertake a port performance data  effort.
Other federal agencies with specific roles related to ports include the  Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, and Agriculture as well  as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Federal Maritime  Commission (FMC) (see table 1). For example, the Corps is tasked with  maintaining navigable waterways and, consequently, is the lead federal  agency for harbor dredging projects at ports. Other agencies have a  specific role related to a step in the flow of goods and share information  with other agencies to support their purposes. For example, Customs and  Border Protection, within Homeland Security, inspects and clears cargo  as part of its overall mission of protecting the homeland. After gathering  required customs information, it provides data on import trade to the U.S.
Census, within Commerce, which it maintains and makes available for  analysis. Environmental regulation and protection of port complexes,  channels, and waterways, may involve multiple federal agencies including  the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency, and DOT.
section_title: West Coast Ports and Their Stakeholders Have Taken Actions to Address Constraints on Cargo Movement Created by Global Shipping Changes; However, Challenges Remain
subsections: section_title: Outdated Infrastructure Can Cause Constraints on Cargo Movement, but a Variety of Terminal and Inland Projects Are Under Way
paragraphs: Some port infrastructure is outdated and not well suited to address the  recent changes of global shipping. Literature we reviewed and  stakeholders we interviewed as part of our case studies described how  existing capacity at each of our case study ports could not adequately  accommodate larger ships, specifically, and increased volumes,  generally. For example, acreage for storing containers within some  terminals (i.e. a terminal container yard) was identified as inadequate for  handling increased container volumes, though a port may have sufficient  acreage across its multiple terminals. Marine terminal operators  increase terminal capacity by stacking containers higher, which are then  more time-consuming and costly to sort through when a trucker arrives for  pick up.
Other infrastructure may be coming to the end of its useful life and need  to be replaced or retrofitted to more capably handle larger ships and  increased volumes. For example, according to the port authority of  Seattle, installing new cranes that can reach across larger vessels would  also require sections of one pier to be reinforced to handle the cranes’  heavier weight. Outside ports, aging roadways can also impede cargo  movement to and from the port particularly where freight rail, trucks, and  other road users converge at congested crossings and intersections. At  each of our three case-study port complexes, stakeholders have identified  numerous grade crossings, nearby and in the broader metropolitan  region, that are problematic for the transport of growing cargo volumes. A  number of terminal and inland infrastructure constraints created or  exacerbated by global shipping changes are illustrated in figure 3.
In response to global shipping changes, infrastructure projects have been  completed or are planned at all major West Coast ports, though some  projects have been deferred indefinitely. See appendix II for examples of  these landside (terminal and inland) infrastructure projects. According to  port authorities and other stakeholders we interviewed, infrastructure  projects are of vital importance for maintaining the capability of serving  current cargo volumes, as well as enhancing the long-term  competitiveness of their ports and shippers’ products. For example,  according to the Port of Oakland, the redevelopment of the former  Oakland Army Base adjacent to the port into facilities serving port cargo  will accommodate anticipated growth and provide shippers with  transportation cost savings. The first phase of the project consists of  several types of infrastructure development, including roads, an  expanded railyard, and other facilities for the movement of goods. By  increasing rail access, the port anticipates reducing truck traffic to and  from the port and reducing the typical cost of transporting a container by  an estimated $300. At full capacity, according to the Port and City of  Oakland, the equivalent of 375,000 truckloads of cargo can be  transported directly into the port by rail rather than by trucks, yielding over  $112 million in annual savings for the nation’s exporters.
Infrastructure is funded through a combination of public investments and  private sector partnerships, typically requiring significant resources and  potentially decades to plan and complete. State and local governments,  as well as port authorities of the three major West Coast port complexes  look to both the federal government and the private sector to secure  funding for infrastructure projects. For example, according to Port of Long  Beach officials, about 78 percent of the Gerald Desmond Bridge’s  replacement project’s $1.3 billion in secured funding comes from federal  sources, which includes about $325 million of financing through TIFIA.  According to the port, replacement of the bridge was initially considered in  the early 1990s due to mounting maintenance costs; in 2002, the port  began developing an initial cost estimate and finalized the estimate in  2008. The height of the replacement bridge will allow passage of larger  vessels and additional lanes will increase capacity to handle the  estimated 15 percent of the nation’s waterborne cargo that navigates  under this stretch of roadway. The bridge, in conjunction with other port  projects, represents a $4 billion capital improvement program being  implemented by the port, according to Port of Long Beach officials. See  figure 4 for an illustration of the existing 50-year bridge compared to the  replacement bridge scheduled to be substantially completed in 2018 and  the clearance of different sized vessels.
Private partnership is also key for successful project implementation. For  example, private entities were responsible for operating and maintaining  some buildings and rail facilities, and the marine terminal, among other  portions of the first phase of the Port of Oakland’s Army base  redevelopment project. Though the first phase, specifically the rail yard,  had received $15 million in TIGER funding, construction of the second  phase of the redevelopment project, involving a new intermodal rail  terminal, additional warehouse and logistics space, and a new grade  separation have not yet commenced with various aspects of the project’s  development still under negotiation. According to a Port of Oakland  official, aspects of the project that mostly benefit the public, such as a  new grade separation project, will likely require public investment, unless  there is strong growth in rail activity through Oakland to motivate private  investment. Similarly, the Port of Los Angeles’ modernization of a 185- acre terminal, which included automation and more than $500 million to  develop, relied on a public-private partnership for funding and subsequent  operations. According to Port authority officials, the port contributed  $460 million, the state of California another $60 million in grants, and the  marine terminal operator invested more than $200 million in specialized  automated equipment. The marine terminal operator has a 30-year lease  to operate the terminal. According to the Port of Los Angeles’ 2014  master port plan, this and other expansion projects are needed to ensure  that projected future cargo volumes can be handled.
Although infrastructure projects were generally considered important by  port stakeholders to address constraints in cargo movement, some  questioned the effectiveness or the efficiency of some infrastructure  investments. For example, one terminal operator we spoke with said that  investments (which included federal funds) made at a competing terminal  at the Port of Seattle were unnecessary because expected volumes could  be accommodated at lower costs by consolidating two terminals.  Similarly, labor representatives also questioned the impact of pursuing  infrastructure projects that automate terminal operations rather than other  options that may as effectively improve a terminal’s efficiency, such as  investing in longshoremen’s training and extending gate hours.  Representatives from a trucking association also questioned  infrastructure investments, such as some projects involving terminal  automation, to enhance the efficiency of trucks picking up cargo without  commensurate investments to improve inland roadways that are used to  access the port.
section_title: Global Shipping Changes Have Strained Operations, but Ports and Their Stakeholders have Attempted to Mitigate These Effects on Cargo Movement
paragraphs: Global shipping changes have affected how key equipment, specifically  chassis, are made available, as well as strained traditional port and  terminal gate hours, according to some literature and stakeholders  included in our review.
Difficulties with truck chassis availability and condition: In recent  years, it has become increasingly difficult and time-consuming for  truckers to obtain and pass road safety inspections, complete repairs,  and reposition chassis, according to some literature and port  stakeholders we interviewed. For example, according to a 2015  Federal Maritime Commission report, performing inspections just prior  to exiting the terminal (instead of inspecting chassis beforehand and  then loading only those that are roadworthy) can cause delays. If  needed repairs are identified, the driver must wait for maintenance  and repair crews at the port, who can be in short supply. Additionally,  if an inspection finds damage on a chassis that is owned by a driver or  a trucking company (rather than a third-party leasing company), the  driver may elect to have repairs conducted off-site. However, the  loaded containers would be required to be returned to the terminal,  further delaying the movement of cargo. Other reported chassis  issues stem from provisions in some contracts between a third-party  leasing company and an ocean carrier, which specify the brand of  chassis to be used or where the chassis must be repositioned after  use. According to representatives from one trucking association we  interviewed, such provisions limit chassis options for truckers and  require them to make extra trips retrieving and repositioning approved  chassis rather than hauling containers.
Changes in cargo loads and schedule delays due to alliances:  Broader shipping alliances have complicated vessel unloading and  loading, as cargo booked with multiple ocean carriers may be onboard  the same vessel but bound for different terminals within a port or  different destination ports. According to some stakeholders,  containers typically are not loaded at origin ports in Asia by “block  stowage,” where containers bound for a particular terminal are  grouped together onboard to facilitate more efficient unloading. The  mixture of containers from multiple alliance partners on a vessel  increases the time it takes to unload and sort containers. This in turn  can lead to a cascading effect, potentially delaying the arrival of other  vessels at an occupied terminal.
Adequacy of terminal gate hours: The standard daytime gate hours of  marine terminals (7 or 8 am to 4 or 5 pm) may be inadequate,  particularly given the complexity and time required to load and unload  containers. Some port stakeholders, specifically, trucking and labor  representatives, indicated that additional gate hours could improve  congestion. Most stakeholders we interviewed agreed that marine  terminal operators do not hire labor for extra shifts unless there is a  specific demand (i.e., request or requirement) for it by cargo owners,  because the additional costs associated with these shifts would not be  offset by the amount carriers or cargo owners generally pay. Some  stakeholders acknowledged that there may not be sufficient demand  from shippers to pick up cargo in the off-peak hours if, for example,  distribution warehouses are not open to receive these containers.  Where night gate hours have been instituted, such as the ports of Los  Angeles and Long Beach, several stakeholders said it contributed to  congestion at certain times because drivers and shippers, wanting to  avoid the traffic mitigation fees charged for daytime pickup, line up  prior to off-peak hours. A senior official from PierPass, the  organization that manages the collection of daytime fees and marine  terminal operators’ participation, suggested that port authorities  provide a staging area for those truckers waiting to pick up cargo  during the off-peak shift that could provide a place for them to rest,  eat, and access restroom facilities.
Stakeholders at all major West Coast ports have taken a number of  actions to address impacts from larger ships, alliances, and the provision  and condition of chassis, according to the stakeholders we interviewed.  Some efforts have been undertaken in a collaborative manner, while  others have been pursued individually by stakeholders. These efforts  seek to maximize competitive advantages for a port complex or a private  entity to maintain or secure shipping business. Illustrative examples  include the following:  In May 2015, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach created the  Supply Chain Optimization Steering Committee to organize supply- chain stakeholder working groups. One working group facilitated a  chassis pool that allows any chassis in the combined fleet to be  utilized by any authorized user and expands the number of pick-up  and drop-off locations. Other working groups are addressing container  terminal optimization, key performance indicators, information flow  and data solutions, off-dock solutions, drayage (the movement of  containers in and out of ports by truck), and intermodal rail.
In February 2016, the Port of Oakland allocated $1.5 million to  reimburse marine terminal operators up to 50 percent of their costs for  operating night gates over a 12-week period. In June 2016, the port  allocated another $1.7 million for these extended night gate  operations. According to an Oakland port official, the subsidy was  instituted in response to increased cargo flows at several of its marine  terminals following the cessation of operations of its second-largest  terminal operator due to bankruptcy in early 2016. According to this  official, the largest terminal operator reported about 600 container  transactions every night and 1,200 on Saturdays, easing daytime,  peak gate hours. This terminal operator has begun assessing a flat  fee of $30 on all loaded import and export containers to continue night  gate operations.
In August 2015, the Ports of Seattle and Tacoma formed the  Northwest Seaport Alliance as a way of staying regionally competitive  against other North American ports. Each port maintains its own  board of commissioners. By combining resources and jointly  managing terminal assets, the alliance hopes to undertake specific  facility improvement projects that might have been infeasible as  separate port entities. For example, in April 2016, the two boards  voted to approve $141 million for infrastructure improvements at one  terminal at the Port of Tacoma, as well as to extend the marine  terminal operator’s lease at this terminal for an additional 20 years.  The alliance plans a similar terminal modernization project in Seattle.  Through the alliance, the two ports jointly advocate for regional  projects to the Washington state legislature, according to port officials.  The alliance has also developed a unified marketing program to  communicate its combined competitiveness to shippers, ocean  carriers, and the public.
Terminal operators have also sought to address container yard  acreage and gate hour constraints. For example, some terminal  operators, such as those at the Ports of Oakland, Los Angles, and  Long Beach, have instituted trucker appointment systems that allot a  window of time for truckers to arrive at the terminal. This allows  operators to approximate when a container is expected to leave the  terminal and enhances their ability to effectively stage a container for  efficient pick-up. However, appointment systems can be costly to set  up and traffic outside the port and other factors can force appointment  windows to be missed, according to some stakeholders. One terminal  operator we interviewed is using a 100-acre off-dock depot for  container storage in Southern California, which is located some  distance away from the port, where shippers can pick up and send  containers. According to this terminal operator, such facilities allow  truckers to move containers more efficiently because they can avoid  congested roads near the ports.
section_title: Port Stakeholders’ Efforts to Address Infrastructure and Operational Constraints Are Hampered by Competing Priorities and Limited Data
paragraphs: Port stakeholders interviewed as part of our case studies highlighted  some key challenges to mitigating infrastructure and operational  constraints stemming from global shipping changes. Port stakeholders, in  particular state and local governmental agencies, said that aligning public  and private competing priorities or interests to fund or construct port  infrastructure projects was difficult. We have previously found that freight  projects may not compete well with other types of transportation projects  for limited available public funds because their benefits are not always  obvious to the public. State and local government officials we  interviewed noted that this tension may be particularly acute for ports  located in large metropolitan areas, such as the major West Coast ports.  These areas are experiencing significant population growth with demand  for housing, transit, and environmental protections. For example, plans  for a near-dock railyard at the Los Angeles-Long Beach port complex  could falter because of local lawsuits over its potential environmental  impact. Funding port or freight infrastructure for large volumes of  “discretionary” cargo (that is, cargo not destined for the local or regional  markets, but bound for the national market) can also be perceived as  heightening overall congestion or producing negative effects in local  communities. Moreover, as we have previously found, federal programs  that can be used to address certain freight-related issues do not always  align with local priorities, and state and local transportation funds are  often limited and prioritized for operating and maintaining existing  highway infrastructure. According to port authorities we spoke with, local  and state DOTs are beginning to recognize the importance of freight  mobility, but the voting public may be less supportive of freight projects  and as a consequence, transportation funding is often focused on  commuters.
Private sector interests, such as shifts in shipping alliances, may also  conflict with planning efforts to facilitate cargo movement. It can be  difficult for port authorities to target their investments in infrastructure  projects that will yield sustained improvements in cargo movement  because of evolving industry alliances. For example, new shipping  alliance agreements may require all vessels within the alliance to call on  specified port terminals, quickly changing the flow of cargo through a port.  These changes may conflict with what importers, exporters, or port  authorities may believe to be the best-suited terminal for their respective  needs (i.e., does the appropriate terminal or inland have capacity such as  on-dock rail to handle additional volumes?). For example, at the Port of  Seattle in 2013, after a shift in an alliance, a major ocean carrier directed  its vessels to call on a different terminal, moving from a larger terminal to  a smaller one, and increasing congestion within that terminal.  Additionally, marine terminal operators may abruptly end operations at a  port, even when they have a long-term contract, if the operators are not  able to attract sufficient cargo volumes to sustain profitability. This  situation happened in Oakland in 2016, when a terminal operator filed for  bankruptcy 6 years into a 50-year lease—publicly citing that it was  choosing to concentrate its resources at its other terminals, including  those at the port complexes of Los Angeles-Long Beach and Seattle- Tacoma.
Some state and local government officials from our case studies of port  complexes said that information on port performance and supply chains  would be helpful to help target operational and infrastructure efforts. For  example, local officials in Seattle indicated they have some information on  truck counts, but lacked information about cargo loads (e.g., number of  empty trucks versus trucks carrying heavy hauls) and their interim and  final destinations. Officials explained that having that information would  help them design and prioritize street improvements, such as signal  timing, turning radius, and pavement conditions on certain streets.  Similarly, officials from the Southern California Association of  Governments said that while they were able to conduct roadside truck  counts to tally the number of trucks coming and leaving the port, they did  not have information into the origins and destinations of these trucks.  Moreover, these limited counts can become quickly outdated for planning  purposes and agency officials stated they lack the resources to  continually gather new data. Without these data, local and regional  planners may be less likely to use a performance-based approach and  less able to justify transportation projects, such as port-related projects  relative to other modes or priorities. Similarly, limited information on  supply chain practices can lead to public investments underperforming.  For example, use of the Alameda Corridor—a 20-mile freight rail  expressway linking the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles to the  nation’s transcontinental rail network—was lower than expected because  it was anticipated that 50 percent of port cargo that left southern  California by rail would do so using the corridor. However, after  operations began in April of 2002, only about 30 percent of the ports’  containerized cargo was using the rail corridor. A 2004 study revealed  that a new cargo handling practice called transloading was occurring in  the transportation logistics industry. This practice entails moving  containerized imports by truck from ports to local and regional distribution  centers. The cargo then is transferred from 40-foot ocean containers to  longer domestic containers before being shipped by rail from loading  points that bypass the corridor. Transloading practices are used by  shippers to more efficiently control inventory by postponing domestic  destination and volume decisions until after cargo arrives in the United  States. According to officials from the Alameda Corridor Transportation   Authority, transloading partly explains the lower than expected use of the  Alameda Corridor.
section_title: Selected Shippers Were Impacted to Varying Degrees by Port Disruptions, Especially in 2014 and 2015, and Responded by Modifying Their Supply Chains
paragraphs: Ports that are already strained and experiencing congestion may be  particularly vulnerable to events such as natural disasters or disruptions  that can further impede the movement of cargo through ports and, in turn,  impact shippers’ supply chains. When we asked representatives from  selected industry groups about recent disruptive events to shippers’  supply chains, almost all of them told us that at least some shippers  experienced impacts to their supply chains from recent port disruptions.  Most industry groups brought up the 2014 and 2015 West Coast labor  negotiation as the most disruptive event in the last 5 years; some also  mentioned other disruptive events. Of our 21 selected industry groups,  over half, or 13 industry groups, told us some shippers took actions in  response to the 2014 and 2015 disruption, such as modifying their supply  chains. However, about one-third, or 6 industry groups, said some  shippers had difficulty making such modifications due to specific firm or  commodity attributes or prohibitively high costs. Other industry groups  said shippers made no supply chain modifications because they were  able to weather the disruption. Our analysis, using U.S. Census  international trade data from the first quarter of 2005 through the first  quarter of 2016, found some significant changes in trade flows, especially  decreased exports, during the disruption period, suggesting the disruption  may have had an impact on exports from West Coast ports.
subsections: section_title: Impacts on Selected Shippers from Port Disruptions and Shippers’ Responses Varied
paragraphs: Almost all of our 21 selected industry groups said that shippers in their  respective industries using major West Coast ports were affected by  recent port disruptions. Specifically, representatives from 18 such groups  told us that at least some shippers experienced some impacts to their  supply chains from recent disruptive events such as the 2014 and 2015  port disruption, while about half (11 out of 21) said that all or a majority of  shippers who ship out of West Coast ports were affected by that  disruption. Interviewees said the disruption in 2014 and 2015 mainly  affected containerized shipments.
Some industry groups also told us that other events such as severe  weather events have also caused port disruptions in the last 5 years. For  example, winter weather conditions have closed the Snoqualmie Pass on  Interstate 90 in Washington State—a critical transportation corridor linking  the port of Seattle to the agricultural industries of Eastern Washington— with little advanced warning, making it difficult at times to arrange reliable  transportation to and from the port, an industry group said. In addition, a  severe winter in 2013-2014 in the Plains resulted in rail backups to West  Coast ports for Midwest corn growers and exporters, industry  representatives told us. Representatives from one industry group said it is  difficult to make contingency plans for unpredictable events like these,  particularly since shippers make shipment decisions months in advance.
Most industry group representatives we spoke with said the main types of  short- and long-term financial and business impacts they experienced as  a result of the 2014 and 2015 port disruption included increased costs,  decreased revenue, and shipment delays (see table 2). For example,  almost all of the industry groups (17 out of 21) told us they experienced  some form of increased costs, and several industry groups experienced  multiple types of increased costs. Specifically, 13 of those 17 industry  groups noted shippers experienced increased transportation or storage  costs, and 6 noted shippers also experienced late fees imposed for late  shipments. Some of the impacts were short-term—such as increased  costs or shipment delays—while other impacts were of longer-term  duration, such as the loss of sales, customers, or market share.
In order to mitigate some of the impacts of the disruption, over half of the  selected industry groups (13 out of 21) told us at least some shippers  responded to the 2014 and 2015 port disruption by temporarily modifying  their supply chains. Modifications included diverting shipments to other  ports or alternate modes of transportation—mostly air freight—or diverting  shipments intended for the export market to the domestic market.  According to these industry groups, all of these supply chain  modifications increased costs or decreased revenues. About one-third, or  6 industry groups, said some shippers had difficulty modifying their supply  chains or making alternative shipping arrangements due to specific firm or  commodity attributes or simply due to the prohibitive increased costs of  doing so. Other industry groups said shippers in their industry did not  deem it necessary to make such arrangements because, for example,  their shipments were not perishable or time sensitive (see table 3).  Following the end of the recent port disruption, industry groups said  shippers in their industry maintained and permanently implemented some  of the supply chain modifications they made, such as shipping some  commodities through East or Gulf Coast ports instead of West Coast  ports, in order to diversify their shipping routes and minimize their risk  exposure to West Coast ports in the case of future disruptions there.
Following earlier disruptions at ports, such as the 2002 labor dispute and  work stoppage at the major West Coast ports, or other events such as  hurricanes, some companies made significant modifications to their  supply chains, shipping practices, and business models that diversified  the number and location of ports they used. Some shippers also made  contingency plans as much as a year prior to the ILWU-PMA labor  contract expiration in July 2014 to reroute cargo or to ship commodities  earlier than usual. Those industries or shippers that made such  contingency plans told us they were well-positioned to do so because of  commodity, firm or industry characteristics. Specifically, well-positioned  shippers included bigger firms that could manage higher transportation  costs as well as those that already had diversified geographic supply  chains.
Based on our interviews with 21 selected industry groups, we found that  certain firm or commodity attributes can affect the extent to which a port  disruption impacts a firm or industry’s supply chain as well as shippers’  ability to respond to such events. During a port disruption, a shipping  route that is typically the most economical or efficient might become less  cost-effective or even infeasible, according to the Transportation  Research Board. As a result, shippers may strive to make alternative  plans to minimize any additional costs and time. After speaking with the  21 selected industry groups, we found several commodity attributes, as  discussed below, that were frequently important in influencing the ability  of shippers to respond to a disruption. Some industries or commodities  might possess several of these attributes simultaneously, which may  complicate their shipping options further.
Geography of a shipper’s supply chain: Fourteen industry groups said  the location of many shippers and their individual supply chains— namely, where the product is produced (or in the case of agricultural  commodities, grown) and sold—affects the magnitude of impacts on  and responses by shippers in an industry to a port disruption.  Geographic factors influence supply chain decisions, as shippers  search for routing and shipping options with low costs. For example,  the entire U.S. commercial supply of almonds is grown in California,  near the Port of Oakland. As a result, shipping almonds from other  ports can be too costly, according to an industry group. A disruption at  the Port of Oakland might impact these exporters to a greater degree  than those exporters whose products are grown or manufactured in  multiple locations and, therefore, near multiple ports that can be  reached at low transportation costs.
Time-sensitivity: Six industry groups told us their products or  shipments are time-sensitive because they are seasonal, perishable,  or rely on a “just-in-time” business model. For example, apple industry  representatives told us shipments of apples follow regular and  predictable growing and harvesting seasons. Some shipments are  also time-sensitive if they are meant to reach the market in time for a  particular shopping seasons driven by consumer demand—such as  the back-to-school or winter holiday seasons. For example, about 60  percent of total toy sales occur in advance of the winter holiday  season, according to an industry group we spoke with. Consequently,  the peak shipping season for toys is from late August to November.  Perishable agricultural products are time-sensitive because they have  a limited shelf-life. For example, exports of chilled meat to East Asia  are time-sensitive because transit across the Pacific Ocean takes  several weeks from the West Coast and the chilled meat has a limited  shelf-life, according to an industry group we spoke with. In addition,  several industry groups told us they rely on a “just-in-time” business  model, making their shipments time-sensitive as well.
Profit margins: Six industry groups told us that shippers with low profit  margins may be more affected by disruptions at ports they use  because alternative routes may not be cost-effective. For example,  soybean shippers told us profit margins in their industry can be as low  as 1 to 2 percent, and any additional costs, such as late fees  assessed by a trade arbitration organization when shipments are  delayed, potentially result in firms losing money. In addition, apparel  products have low gross profit margins, which preclude them from  switching from ocean freight to more expensive air freight, according  to an industry representative.
Dependence on imports/exports: Ten industry groups told us their  industries were highly reliant on imports or exports. For example,  some retail industry groups said nearly all of what they sell in the  United States is imported, while other manufacturers said they are  highly reliant on imported components. Specifically, 98 percent of  apparel sold in the United States is imported, mostly from Asia,  according to an industry representative we spoke with. In addition,  about 90 percent of wood furniture sold in the United States is  imported, according to industry representatives we interviewed. Other  industries may have highly trade-dependent niche products. For  example, the vast majority of the nation’s hay crop is used  domestically, but some types of hay are almost exclusively exported,  industry representatives told us. If importers or exporters in an  industry are almost entirely reliant on ports for market access, then  any disruption at those ports would likely have large impacts on those  firms.
Storage or inspection requirements: Six industry groups told us that  their industry has specific storage or inspection requirements relevant  to importing or exporting their cargo and that these requirements  affect their ability to modify their supply chain in response to port  disruptions. The requirements cannot be met by all ports because  some ports, or port regions, lack the necessary facilities. For example,  according to an industry expert, petroleum coke, a byproduct of the oil  refining process used for energy in some other countries, has specific  storage requirements due to environmental concerns. Likewise, as  part of the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) port-of- entry inspections, some agricultural imports must be treated (e.g., with  chemicals, heat, or irradiation) prior to their release in the U.S. market  because of concerns with plant pests not known to occur in the United  States but prevalent in the country of origin. For example, imports of  Chilean grapes must be fumigated with methyl bromide prior to  release in the United States. As a result, disruptions at a port with the  specialized facilities might have more of an impact on those industries  since fewer ports can handle rerouted cargo, industry groups told us.
section_title: 2014 and 2015 Port Disruption May Have Contributed to Changes in Trade Flows
paragraphs: Our analysis of U.S. Census international trade data from January 2005  to March 2016 finds some significant changes in the dollar value of trade  flows at certain ports coinciding with the 2014 and 2015 West Coast port  disruption. Specifically, our statistical analysis showed total exports at  major West Coast ports were significantly lower in this time frame than  during other quarters included in the analysis, given other established  trends in the economy and other factors we were able to control for.  Trade flows can be affected by many factors, so it is difficult to know the  extent to which the 2014 and 2015 port disruption contributed to  variations in trade flows without considering the impact of other factors  that can affect trade. Therefore, we developed a statistical method to  examine trade flows at large U.S. ports during the West Coast port  disruption. The model helped identify whether the level of trade at West  Coast ports was significantly different compared to other quarters  included in our analysis, after controlling for factors that might influence  trade over time. Specifically, the model controlled for some variables that  might influence the level of trade over time, such as trends in trade  volumes over time, seasonality, and the influence of the recession of late  2007 to 2009. It also controlled for a set of variables to capture the  influence of specific characteristics of each port, each commodity  category, and each trading partner country. Our analysis examined: (1)  whether the dollar value of all imports and exports at West Coast ports  (and ports at other coasts) on average, across ports, commodities and  trading partners during the port disruption period was significantly  different compared to other quarters included in our analysis, and (2)  whether the dollar value for our 13 selected import commodities in  aggregate and our 14 selected export commodities in aggregate  appeared to be different during the relevant timeframe than during other  quarters, and (3) whether trade flows to and from U.S. airports along the  three coasts were different during the disruption timeframe compared to  other quarters. Appendix IV provides more detailed information on our  statistical model.
For all vessel exports as well as for some of our selected export  commodities, we found significant changes in export levels at West Coast  ports during the first quarter of 2015. By contrast, import levels for all  imports as well as for all of our selected import commodities at West  Coast ports during the relevant time frame were not statistically different  than during other quarters, given established trends and our other control  variables.
Exports: For vessel exports, it appears that the port disruption of 2014  and 2015 coincided with reduced exports from large West Coast  ports. First, we found that the extent to which total exports were  lower during this time frame than in past quarters was not constant  over the three quarters examined. Specifically, during the third quarter  of 2014, exports from West Coast ports were not statistically lower  than other quarters, while in the fourth quarter of 2014, our findings  suggest, with only weak statistical significance, that exports were  likely somewhat lower than past quarters. By the first quarter of 2015,  we find that, on average across our port, commodity, and trading  partner observations, exports appear to have been about 50 percent  lower than past levels based on what we could control for in the  model. These findings suggest that the reduction in the value of  exports may have been in the billions of dollars. However, it is  important to note that there could be other elements at play that also  had an influence on trade flows. Second, we ran a separate  regression to examine trade flows for 14 specific West Coast export  commodities. We found that those exports on average were not  different than past levels in either of the last two quarters in 2014, but  were lower than past levels in the first quarter of 2015. In addition,  those exports remained lower than past levels after the port disruption  was resolved, possibly indicating lingering effects from the disruption  (e.g., resulting from lost customers or market share, or permanent  diversions of cargo to other ports), some other factor not accounted  for in the model, or, a combination of both. These results could be  consistent with information we gathered during our interviews.  Namely, some exporters experienced revenue losses, including lost  customers or market share, and exports in their industry are not back  to pre-disruption levels.
Imports: We did not find that West Coast port vessel imports were  statistically different during any of the three quarters that correspond  with the 2014 and 2015 port disruption when compared to imports  during other quarters included in our analysis. We also found that  there were no differences in total imports at East Coast ports during  this time frame compared to other quarters included in the analysis.  However, our model did find that the dollar value of imports at Gulf  Coast ports was substantially higher during the three quarters of the  port disruption than other quarters included in the model, and those  imports continued to be higher than past levels in every subsequent  quarter at Gulf Coast ports, up to and including the first quarter of  2016. These findings may suggest that some factor or factors other  than those considered in our analysis are related to rising imports in  the Gulf region in recent years. It is also possible that diversion from  West Coast ports may have played some role in these increases  during the port disruption but because we found no statistical  evidence that imports were lower at West Coast ports, it would appear  that diversion likely played a small role, if at all. Second, we ran a  separate regression to examine whether trade flows for 13 specific  West Coast imported commodities were statistically different during  the disruption period compared to other periods after controlling for  the various factors mentioned above. For these 13 imported  commodities, consistent with our findings for all commodities imported  from West Coast ports, we found that trade was not different from  past levels in any of the time frames examined.
Our analysis also indicates that, for imports, there may have been some  shifts to air freight during the disruption period. We used our model to  examine whether trade flows at large U.S. airports exhibited any unusual  changes during the same quarters of the 2014 and 2015 disruption. We  found that imports were statistically higher during the last two quarters of  2014 but not during the first quarter of 2015, compared to past levels at  the West Coast airports. However, we found no changes in air imports at  East or Gulf Coast airports during any of the time frame examined in our  analysis. While our findings may suggest that some imports that might  have typically been shipped by sea to West Coast ports were diverted to  West Coast airports—which we also heard during some of our interviews  with trade groups—it is possible that other factors influenced the trends  we found at West Coast airports.
section_title: DOT Has Made Progress Including Ports in Freight Efforts, but DOT’s Data Strategy Could Be Improved by Including Supply- Chain Information
paragraphs: DOT’s freight-related activities have grown increasingly multi-modal and  inclusive of ports since 2012. In the draft National Freight Strategic Plan,  issued in October 2015, DOT signaled the importance of ports to the  freight system and, through the inclusion of ports in two new funding  programs, DOT is better positioned to support ports than in previous  years. However, there are substantive gaps in the supply chain  information DOT (and state and local governments) have available to  them to support freight efforts. Disruptions at ports can have ramifications  throughout industry supply chains. Based on leading practices in capital  decision making, we previously recommended that DOT develop a  freight-data improvement strategy to address gaps related to, among  other things, local impacts of freight congestion. These practices  emphasize that quality information gives organizations the ability to  support strategic as well as operational decisions.
subsections: section_title: DOT’s Recent Freight Strategy and Programs Have Become More Inclusive of Ports
paragraphs: Since the passage of MAP-21 in 2012 and the FAST Act in 2015, DOT’s  freight-related activities have increased, with more focus on multimodal  freight infrastructure, including ports. For example, DOT’s draft National  Freight Strategic Plan, issued in October 2015, acknowledges the  importance of ports and includes several port strategies to advance  freight goals. The draft plan discusses the need to upgrade water and  landside port facilities and acknowledges that ports face many challenges  as they adapt to larger vessels and other global shipping changes. The  draft plan also includes some strategies that could help cargo move  through ports more smoothly, including facilitating intermodal connectivity  and supporting efforts, such as chassis pooling, to address port  congestion. The draft strategic plan was released for public comment and  DOT officials anticipate finalizing the strategic plan by the end of 2017, in  accordance with the statutory requirement of the FAST Act. Officials  noted that many of the strategies identified in the draft will be updated in  light of new programs and authorities, such as new funding programs,  provided by the FAST Act. DOT officials stated that the department was  working to address multimodal infrastructure and pushing for a more  comprehensive approach to freight prior to these acts, but the new  authorities enable DOT to take a less highway-focused approach. As a  result, at this time, the precise nature and scope of the strategies of the  department related to ports are a work in progress.
DOT is also pursuing an increasingly multimodal perspective in its efforts  to identify and define the national multimodal freight network, or map,  which includes ports and intermodal connectors that meet certain  criteria. Previously, MAP-21 directed DOT to identify a national freight  network of highways, of which the Primary Freight Network was the  core. The FAST Act required DOT to develop, and release for public  comment, an Interim National Multimodal Freight Network by June 2016  and a final National Multimodal Freight Network by December 2016. The  act required that freight facilities with certain characteristics—for example,  public ports with total foreign and domestic trades of at least 2 million  tons—be included in the Interim National Multimodal Freight Network.  DOT released the interim network on time and the public comment period  closed on September 6, 2016. DOT plans to issue a final National  Multimodal Freight Network by December 4, 2016, according to officials.  DOT officials indicated that the final network is likely to include port and  port-related facilities due to their importance to freight. Some state and  regional government officials we interviewed acknowledged that DOT is  making progress toward developing a more complete multimodal network  that accurately identifies freight facilities. However, most raised concerns  that the interim network has errors, omissions, and disconnected  segments of roads. For example, freight staff in Washington State’s  Department of Transportation indicated that some important road  connections to the Port of Tacoma were missing in the interim network.  DOT officials emphasized to us that anyone may submit comments  addressing any aspect of the network, including any errors, omissions, or  disconnected network segments that they feel should be addressed in the  final network.
DOT is also positioned, through two new freight funding programs  established by the FAST Act to potentially fund more port, freight rail, and  intermodal projects than in previous years. In the National Highway  Freight Program (NHFP), formula funds are allocated to states based on  similar formula factors used in federal highway programs. Up to 10  percent of the funds may be used for freight rail and intermodal projects,  including projects at ports. Thus, funding is spread across the country,  and states will decide whether to prioritize port projects or to focus on  other freight transportation projects. DOT officials noted that many states  have established freight advisory committees that have a role in  prioritizing freight projects. Given states’ historical focus on highway  infrastructure, states may prioritize those project types over port  projects. Out of about $1.1 billion total of formula funds, DOT estimated  that California and Washington State—where the largest West Coast  ports are located—will be allocated approximately $126 million in fiscal  year 2016. State officials we interviewed from these two states indicated  that port or near-port projects (e.g., road or rail projects in close proximity  to a port and likely to benefit port cargo) are among the projects they  expect to consider for these funds.
For the new FASTLANE program, DOT solicited project proposals from  a broad group of constituencies (highway, rail, ports, etc.) in which nearly  $800 million was available for competitively awarded grants in fiscal year  2016. Over the 5-year term of the FAST Act, up to $500 million of the  $4.5 billion authorized, may be used for freight rail, intermodal and port  projects. DOT officials stated they received 212 applications that  requested $9.8 billion total, 35 of which were for projects at or near ports.  In September 2016, DOT awarded 18 grants, including 5 port project  grants. Though none of these 5 awards went to major West Coast Ports,  2 of the other 13 projects are in the Seattle area—one road and one rail— and are expected to facilitate port cargo movement. According to program  officials, in the first round of FASTLANE grants, the department did not  target specific types of projects or synergies between projects but rather,  selected applications based on their individual merits and the program’s  statutory requirements. According to DOT freight officials, the agency is  trying to maximize public benefits and balance national priorities with local  project selection.
In part to facilitate ports’ access to funding sources such as these,  MARAD has established the StrongPortsSM program, which provides a  range of technical support to ports upon request, according to program  officials. For example, the StrongPortsSM program team educated the  ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach about available federal assistance  for intermodal projects. Some port stakeholders told us these new funding  programs could be important in addressing challenges facing ports, but it  remains to be seen how well port projects will compete for funds against  highway or other freight projects.
DOT is also taking steps to develop port performance measures. As  required by the FAST Act, DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics  (BTS) recently convened a group of port stakeholders to form a Port  Performance Freight Statistics Working Group and instituted a port  performance freight statistics program. This effort is focused on  developing standard freight measures that DOT could publicly report.  According to industry groups we interviewed, port performance  measures—such as truck waiting times to pick up cargo and terminal  throughput activity—could be used by shippers to assess ports or port  operations and adapt supply chains accordingly. According to DOT  officials, the group will focus on port operations, with specific priorities to  be determined by members, and the department does not have specific  goals for the group, beyond those outlined in statute. The working group  met for the first time in July 2016, with the goal of recommending port  performance measures by December 4, 2016, as required by the FAST  Act. Most port stakeholders we interviewed, including participants in the  working group, such as a port authority, noted that developing uniform  metrics of port performance will be challenging because of differences  among ports, the proprietary nature of some data, and other hurdles.  However, some generally support efforts to better understand port  performance. The FAST Act requires DOT to issue its first annual report  on nationally consistent measures of port performance in January 2017.  BTS officials explained that this time frame is short given the complexity  of the topic and limited staff available in BTS for the program. As a result,  they told us that they have begun to draft the report based on the limited  data that are readily available and that it will be difficult to incorporate any  of the working group’s recommendations in the first report, although they  will be considered for future annual reports.
section_title: Inclusion of Supply Chain Information in DOT’s Development of a Freight Data Strategy Could Benefit Freight Efforts
paragraphs: Better information and analytical tools to assess supply chains may  improve DOT’s freight efforts. Although DOT has information on freight  movements, less is known about supply chains and how they affect the  freight transportation network. DOT’s Transportation Statistics Annual  Report 2015 states, for example, that while data on tonnage and the  value of region-to-region commodity flows exist, data on the relationships  between industry supply chains and region-to-region commodity flows  have major gaps. Filling those data gaps could help, for example, guide  investments in transportation facilities, assess international trade flows  within the United States, and identify and address freight bottlenecks that  are barriers to economic development and competitiveness, according to  the report. For example, public sector decision makers do not typically  have the data and analytic models to understand and incorporate into  infrastructure decisions how freight moves to and from shippers’  warehouses, a critical component of a supply chain. The report also notes  that while the movement of goods between ports and foreign countries is  tracked continuously, the movement of international trade between ports  and domestic origin for exports and domestic destinations for imports is  not measured. Understanding how shippers are adapting their supply  chains in light of global shipping changes could give DOT a more  informed basis to assess current and future demands on the freight  network and make sound infrastructure investment decisions. DOT’s  Freight Analysis Framework (FAF)—which DOT officials said is the  agency’s most comprehensive source of freight data—is not able to  support supply chain analyses because it lacks key information on  industries, cargo destinations, and other facets of supply chains. DOT  officials, regional and state freight planners, and transportation  economists we interviewed at the Brookings Institution agreed that FAF  data are too aggregated for analyzing commodity flows at metropolitan  levels, making it difficult to use FAF data to accurately analyze supply  chains. Most public freight planners in all the major West Coast port  regions that we spoke with similarly noted they have access to some data  related to port cargo movement—such as the number of trucks on roads  near ports, the overall value and weight of cargo, and the major  commodities shipped in their area—but have much less data about that  tracks end-to-end cargo movements from origin to destination and across  modes.
Recent work by the Transportation Research Board (TRB), has called for  developing and using better information on supply chains for public sector  infrastructure decision making. For example, a 2013 TRB report noted the  differences between public and private sector decision making related to  good movement and infrastructure. The report recommended freight data  and modeling improvements to integrate real-world supply chain  management practices with public sector decision making and the  development of analytic tools to predict freight activity from the  perspective of shippers, carriers, and others in the supply chain.  Another TRB report called for more comprehensive and realistic  information on freight movement and logistics, following freight through  intermodal interchanges and identifying the locations of resources such  as manufacturing and distribution facilities.  In 2014, the National  Freight Advisory Committee also, highlighted the importance of  addressing ports and supply chains in DOT’s freight efforts, and  specifically, in developing the National Freight Strategic Plan. For  example, it recommended that DOT address the inadequacy of  multimodal freight flow (origin-destination) data and support research on  better metropolitan and regional freight models, including supply chain  based modeling approaches.
Federal guidance and practices highlight the need for quality information  for planning and effective decision making and achieving agency  objectives. For example, leading practices in capital planning emphasize  the importance of good information for sound capital planning and  effective decision making. According to these practices, information  provided by well-planned information systems gives organizations the  ability to perform analyses that can be used to support strategic as well  as operational budgeting decisions. We previously found that making  available good information on highway freight trends to states and the  federal government could help establish relevant goals and prioritize  mitigation efforts for freight-related traffic congestion. Furthermore,  Federal Internal Control Standards states that quality information is vital  to achieving agency objectives. These standards further define quality  information as being appropriate, current, complete, accurate, and  accessible. Management should use quality information to make  informed decisions and evaluate performance in achieving key objectives.
DOT officials we spoke with acknowledged that better information on  supply chains would help DOT’s freight efforts, and part of DOT’s  approach is to encourage state partners to gather and use this  information. For example, in 2012, DOT issued interim guidance for the  development of state freight plans. DOT advised states that they include  a discussion of the role that freight transportation plays in the state’s  overall economy; identify those industries that are most important to the  state; and identify what supply chains (including the transportation modes  that support them) are critical to the state’s industries and exports from  the state. Some of the state transportation agencies we talked to have  taken some steps to better understand supply chains within their state as  part of developing state freight plans. For example, the Washington State  Department of Transportation has identified corridors with freight  intensive land uses, intermodal facilities, and agricultural processing  facilities (e.g., apple packers, dairy plants) that are part of important  supply chains within the state. The FAST Act requires that states have a  freight plan by December 4, 2017, to obligate National Highway Freight  Program funds. DOT officials indicated however, that it was too soon to  know how, if at all, the plans states develop can help inform DOT’s freight  efforts or what information on supply chains the plans will provide.
However, some supply chain information can be difficult for local, state,  and federal entities to obtain because it may be proprietary, expensive,  become dated quickly, or be difficult to aggregate. For example, shippers  may be reluctant to share information with local and state DOTs due to  proprietary and competitive interests. According to most port authorities  we spoke with, terminal operators are not contractually obligated to  disclose, for example, information about terminal productivity or capacity  as part of their lease agreements with the ports. Public agencies using  private third-party data also may be subject to non-disclosure agreements  governing the access to or sharing of data with other agencies, strictures  that, in turn, limits the ability of state and local planning agencies to use  these data. In addition, some state and regional government officials we  interviewed explained that buying data can be too costly for cash- strapped agencies. For example, officials from a regional government  noted that purchasing private real estate data on warehouse inventories  could cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Without this data, the  officials told us they have difficulties modeling and targeting local  infrastructure investments or making land use decisions to support freight  movement.
Some of DOT’s freight-related ongoing efforts could help provide  information on supply chains; however, because these efforts are still in  the early stages, it is not clear how, if at all, DOT plans to use that  information. For example, the I-95 Corridor Coalition, which includes DOT  as a member, convened a broader range of supply chain stakeholders to  identify and study freight needs and selected supply chains, across all  modes of transportation, along the I-95 corridor between Florida and  Maine. A related effort lead by FHWA focuses on “freight fluidity.” The  effort focuses primarily on truck probe data (i.e., GPS data on trucks  location and movement) and will be supplemented by multimodal data— which might include ports—as the project progresses, according to DOT  program officials. According to officials that effort plans to hold workshops  in 2017 with the goal of developing white papers on applications that  could support metropolitan, regional, and state transportation multi-modal  freight planning. Likewise, MARAD program officials explained to us that  understanding supply-chain issues—such as how the opening of the  expanded Panama Canal may impact trade—is one of the expectations of  Gateway directors in each port region, but efforts to capture and  disseminate this expertise across DOT are a work in progress and early,  according to MARAD officials.
DOT has also taken steps to gather supply chain information from other  federal agencies, but it is unclear how the department will use this  information to inform its freight efforts. For example, DOT officials said  that they have been working with the Department of Commerce, which  coordinates with industry representatives about supply chain issues, to  better understand supply chains. Specifically, officials said they have  attended the Department of Commerce’s roundtable discussions with  supply chain industry members on port efficiency and competitiveness  issues, at which industry members have offered and shared best  practices for port-user coordination, collaboration, and information  sharing. Commerce officials indicated they plan to publish a report on  this initiative’s results in December 2016. Additionally, DOT officials  stated that FHWA’s Freight Fluidity initiative involves close interaction  with Commerce, and DOT is represented on the Department of  Commerce’s Advisory Committee on Supply Chain Competitiveness  (ACSCC) as an ex-officio member. DOT has not explained in the draft  strategic freight plan, or elsewhere, how other agencies and sources of  information fit into the department’s freight goals and objectives. DOT  officials acknowledged that although they have made strides, they have  yet to determine how supply chain information gathered from federal  partners should be used in DOT’s freight efforts.
DOT has articulated broad strategies to improve freight data and analytic  tools in the draft National Freight Strategic Plan. For example, DOT  officials told us they incorporated the National Freight Advisory  Committee’s recommendations in drafting the plan: (1) to address the  inadequacy of multimodal freight data; (2) to support research on better  metropolitan and regional freight models, including supply-chain-based  modeling; and (3) to evaluate freight movement from an end-to-end  supply chain perspective. DOT officials emphasized to us that the draft  strategy includes an extensive discussion of data issues, including the  need for supply chain information, as one of the key issues facing the  department that the strategies are meant to address. However, the draft  National Freight Strategic Plan does not specifically outline how DOT  plans to leverage the various ongoing initiatives, or begin new ones, to  identify information sources, improve supply chain data, and advance  analytic tools related to ports and supply chains. For example, the draft  National Freight Strategic Plan does not explain how the department will  use the supply chain information that could come from existing efforts to  inform freight planning and programming or lay out a specific path for how  the limitations of existing sources, such as the FAF, will be overcome.
DOT may be able to address supply chain information needs through its  effort to develop a freight data strategy. In our 2014 report on freight- related traffic congestion, we found a number of data limitations that, if  resolved, could assist DOT in prioritizing projects to mitigate freight- related community impacts. Furthermore, we also found and discuss in  that report, based on leading practices in capital planning, without a  written strategy defining clear missions and desired outcomes related to  improving data on freight-related traffic congestion, DOT may miss the  opportunity to advance its data-improvement efforts and clarify its national  role in supporting the freight infrastructure critical to supply chains. DOT  officials told us that they plan to develop the recommended freight data  strategy in conjunction with the finalization of the National Freight  Strategic Plan at the end of 2017, either as part of the strategic plan or as  a standalone document. Including supply chain information in the  development of this data strategy, may provide an opportunity for DOT to  think more comprehensively and strategically about current and planned  freight data efforts. Doing so could help ensure the agency obtains the  supply chain information needed to support its port-related efforts and  advance national freight policy goals such as enhancing resiliency to  freight disruptions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The United States is part of a global economy, and industry supply chains  are the backbone of international trade and commerce. Ports, an  important segment of the U.S. freight network, are critical to the efficient  movement of freight that countless supply chains depend upon. Ports  face an array of challenges, including increasing congestion, and are  adapting operations and infrastructure to remain competitive amid  significant global shipping changes, such as the increasing size of  vessels and changing shipping alliances between ocean carriers that are  exacerbating existing conditions. These changes affect ports and the  cargo moving through them in sometimes unexpected ways, further  challenging efforts to effectively anticipate and plan for the changes. A  disruption at a port can ripple throughout a supply chain and have  business and economic impacts. Shippers, and their supply chains, have  varying degrees of dependence on specific ports based on their industry,  traded commodities, and other attributes. When the ports that shippers  use are not functioning as expected, because of disruptions or simply  endemic congestion, shippers face higher costs, decreased revenues,  and delays.
Including information on supply chains as part of DOT’s existing effort to  develop a written freight data strategy provides an opportunity for the  agency to think more comprehensively about the information needed to  support its freight efforts including further refining the objectives and goals  in its National Freight Strategic Plan. Our review of the disruption in  2014—2015 at West Coast Ports and the resulting impacts on the supply  chain highlights DOT’s need for additional supply chain information.  Federal guidance and leading practices in capital planning emphasize the  importance of the use of good information to achieve agency objectives.  Including information on supply chains in DOT’s freight data efforts could  be beneficial. As we previously recommended and DOT agreed, a freight  data strategy that addressed freight trends and freight-related congestion  impacts would help to better define the agency’s role in this area. If DOT  develops the freight data strategy in a way that includes information about  supply chains, then it may be even more effective in providing direction to  the various efforts under way, helping to close existing gaps or identifying  new efforts that could be undertaken to further DOT’s freight goals. As  shipping and supply chains change, if DOT and other public officials who  make decisions about port and near-port infrastructure do not anticipate  how demand for that infrastructure will change, then new investments  might not provide the full benefits expected or operate as well as hoped.  Likewise, as DOT continues to develop its freight efforts, better supply  chain information could help the department’s decision making such as by  prioritizing freight infrastructure needs and achieving its freight policy  goals.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: To inform DOT’s development of its national freight strategy and  associated freight efforts, such as states’ development of freight plans,  newly established freight funding programs, and advancing DOT’s efforts  to implement national freight policies, we recommend that in the  development of the freight data strategy the Secretary of Transportation  include a specific plan to identify: appropriate freight data sources, information, and analytic tools for  transportation modes involved in the freight network and supply  chains; data gaps that could help both the agency and states and local  governments in the development of their freight plans, and an  approach for addressing obstacles to developing high-quality, reliable  supply chain information;  current and planned efforts that can provide insights into supply  chains and their impacts on freight networks; and how DOT plans to use the supply chain information and analytical  tools to inform freight planning and programming.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOT, DOC, FMC, and USDA for  review and comment. DOT provided a letter stating it concurred with our  recommendation (see app. V). DOT as well as DOC and FMC provided  technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where  appropriate. USDA did not have any comments on the draft report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department  of Transportation, Department of Commerce, Federal Maritime  Commission, Department of Agriculture, and interested congressional  requesters. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the following objectives: (1) how recent changes in  global shipping have impacted the movement of cargo at major U.S. West  Coast ports and how these ports and their stakeholders have responded;  (2) how selected shippers have been impacted by and responded to  disruptions at West Coast ports during 2014-2015 as well as other recent  or potential disruptions; and (3) how the Department of Transportation’s  (DOT) current freight-related efforts support cargo movement through  ports and whether these effort can be improved.
To understand how global shipping changes have affected ports, we  conducted three in-depth case studies of the largest port complexes on  the West Coast ports—Los Angeles-Long Beach, Oakland, and Seattle- Tacoma, which were selected based on their total trade value (imports  and exports). In 2015, the Ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland,  Seattle, and Tacoma handled 88 percent of total West Coast port volume.  For the purposes of this report, we define a port as the area “inside the  gate” and under the control of the local port authority or marine terminal  operator, where cargo is loaded and unloaded to and from ships. We  refer to a “port complex” as encompassing one to two ports and the  nearby roadways, rail, bridges, and intermodal facilities (i.e., connectors)  on which cargo arrives or departs the port. The results of these case  studies are not generalizable, but do provide insights regarding port,  state, local, and private-sector roles and experiences in cargo movement  constraints from global shipping changes and efforts to address these  constraints.
These case studies included site visits of facilities inside the gate (such  as container yards and on-dock rail) and outside the gate (such as  adjacent local streets and neighborhoods). We interviewed stakeholders  and reviewed relevant documents on planning and projects, including the  California and Washington freight mobility plans and similar plans issued  by the metropolitan planning organizations for each of the port  complexes. Based on these interviews and documents, we identified the  infrastructure projects and operational actions undertaken by  stakeholders to address impacts from global shipping. We then confirmed  with the port authorities that these projects were significant and the  information presented about each project or action. Table 4 describes  each of the stakeholders we interviewed as part of each case study’s site  visit.
Additionally, we interviewed representatives from American Association of  Port Authorities, Pacific Maritime Association, International Longshore  and Warehouse Union, the California Association of Port Authorities, and  the port authorities of two smaller West Coast ports (San Diego and  Portland), one East Coast port (New York / New Jersey) and one Gulf  Coast port (Houston). These sets of interviews provided additional  context for the constraints on cargo movement at West Coast ports  created by global shipping changes, as well as, impacts on the national  freight network and supply chains. We selected the smaller West Coast  ports because of their relatively larger size (in terms of twenty-foot  equivalent units, a measure of volume) and for geographic diversity,  among other reasons. Similarly we selected the ports of New York/New  Jersey and Houston, because these ports are the largest on their  respective coasts, handling the most trade (in terms of TEUs) in 2013.
We also reviewed a selection of governmental reports, non-governmental  research, and academic literature on global shipping changes and their  impact on cargo movement published since 2005, including reports  recently issued by the Federal Maritime Commission and the  Transportation Research Board. We identified these articles and reports  through our interviews and by conducting a literature search. Search  terms included ones pertaining to our West Coast port complexes, and  related subjects, such as “ocean carriers and alliances,” “intermodal  supply chain and logistics shifts, growth, trends,” and “chassis supply,  shortages.” Various databases were used, including ProQuest and  Transport Research International Documentation. We determined the  literature cited in our report were sufficiently reliable for our research  objective describing the impacts on cargo movement from global shipping  changes and actions taken by major West Coast ports. Our work is also  informed by prior GAO reports on freight mobility, intermodalism, and  marine transportation finance.
To assess how shippers have been impacted by and responded to port  disruptions, we conducted semi-structured interviews with one or more  representatives of 21 industry trade groups representing shippers. In  order to select the industry trade groups we interviewed, we first identified  the top 30 commodities imported and exported through major West Coast  ports by analyzing U.S. international trade data. We identified the top  imported and exported commodities by dollar value and by weight (in  kilograms) from each of the three major West Coast port regions: Los  Angeles/Long Beach, Oakland, and Seattle/Tacoma, as well as at all  three port regions combined. As a result of the many different top  commodities at the three port regions and due to limited resources for  interviewing relevant industry association groups, we chose a  nongeneralizable sample of about 27 commodities that represented  diversity, in terms of geography at the three port regions, perishability,  mode of transportation, high or low dollar value commodities, high or low  weight commodities, as well as commodities that represented different  agricultural, retail, or manufacturing sectors. The 27 commodities  consisted of 13 imported commodities and 14 exported commodities. We  identified via Internet searches and then interviewed appropriate and  relevant industry groups that represented those 27 commodities with  either an emphasis on trade or a regional West Coast emphasis. We  shared our list of potential industry groups with the U.S. Department of  Agriculture, as well as the Department of Commerce, to see whether  agency officials believed our list of industry groups adequately  represented the relevant commodities and then incorporated their  suggestions in order to pare down the initial list to 21 industry groups (see  table 5). Additionally, to understand the logistical impacts of disruptions,  we interviewed a selection of customs broker and freight forwarder  regional associations, which represent logistics handlers. We chose a  nongeneralizable sample of 9 regional associations from the 28 affiliated  associations of the National Customs Brokers and Forwarders  Association of America. Of the 9 affiliated associations, we chose  associations that represented four West Coast port regions, three East  Coast port regions, and two Gulf Coast port regions in order to provide  insight into the potentially different impacts that port disruptions have on  logistics handlers around the country.
To complement our qualitative analysis, we conducted statistical analyses  of U.S. international trade data maintained by the Census Bureau. The  data we collected covered all imports and exports from January 2005  through March 2016. We used Census trade data for the port, month,  country of origin, or destination, and six-digit product code level. We  aggregated that data to port, quarter, country, and two-digit product code.  We estimated a statistical model designed to examine whether exports  and/or imports at West Coast ports during the three quarters of the  disruption were different than other quarters included in the analysis,  controlling for linear trends, seasonality, and time invariant port, country,  and product characteristics. We also controlled for exchange rates in  some specifications. For more information and results, see appendix II.
To identify and evaluate ways DOT’s current freight-related efforts  support cargo movement through ports and whether these efforts could  be improved, we gathered information on an array of topics related to  cargo moving through ports and relevant federal efforts to support this  movement. We focused on DOT initiatives and programs, but also efforts  of the Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture (USDA), and  Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), and reviewed surface  transportation legislation. DOT programs and initiatives we reviewed  included the activities of the Maritime Administration within the DOT, the  Office of Freight in the Federal Highway Administration, and the Bureau  of Transportation Statistics and freight policy activities within DOT’s Office  of the Secretary. We also looked into activities within Commerce’s  International Trade Administration, especially the Advisory Committee on  Supply Chain Competitiveness; the USDA’s role in agricultural  inspections at ports and promoting agricultural exports; and the FMC’s  efforts to address port efficiency, especially the Supply Chain Innovation  Initiative. We did not evaluate activities outside of DOT. After compiling a  list of relevant efforts, we interviewed program officials and reviewed  program documentation to understand the nature and scope of these  efforts. We reviewed selected literature to identify areas others have  noted as needing attention. We reviewed literature and reports from the  National Freight Advisory Committee, the American Association of State  and Highway Transportation Officials, the I-95 Corridor Coalition, the  Transportation Research Board, and others. We also interviewed federal  officials responsible for relevant aspects of federal transportation and  trade policies and programs and industry associations to gain an  understanding of areas that could be improved. We interviewed selected  transportation and logistics experts, such as economists with the  Brookings Institute and Global Insight, who had conducted relevant work  or were known experts in the issues raised in our work. Additionally,  during the interviews we conducted for the other engagement objectives,  we asked about areas in need of federal attention and how well current  efforts were working. Through these activities, we identified the need for  supply chain information (e.g., freight data for quantitative analysis of  trends as well as qualitative information on market trends or dynamics)  that is broadly recognized as an area in need of improvement and that  DOT is in a position to change. To find ways for these efforts to be  improved, we reviewed various criteria that had been used in prior GAO  reports on freight or related issues. We focused our attention on whether  DOT had good information available for decision making, an important  factor in leading practices in capital planning as articulated in GAO’s  Executive Guide on Capital Decision-Making and its Federal Internal  Control Standards. These practices emphasize the importance of good  information and information systems, among other practices, to support  sound decision-making. We reviewed the draft National Freight Strategic  Plan and other DOT’s efforts to determine if DOT had a defined, written  strategy for supply chain information because stakeholders we  interviewed during our work identified this as an area in need of  improvement.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to October 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Key Entities Involved in Cargo Movement to and from Ports and Their Role in the Supply Chain
paragraphs: Appendix II: Key Entities Involved in Cargo  Movement to and from Ports and Their Role in  the Supply Chain The ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle, and Tacoma are “landlord” ports, in that  they lease their property and infrastructure to marine terminal operators. Port authorities may also  operate port facilities, whereby they act as the marine terminal operator. For example, the port  authorities of San Diego and Houston own and operate marine terminals.
section_title: Appendix III: Examples of Key Landside and Terminal Infrastructure Projects at Major West Coast Ports Addressing Challenges Related to Changes in Global Shipping
section_title: Appendix IV: Empirical Analysis of Trade Flows during Late 2014 and Early 2015
paragraphs: This appendix describes the analyses we conducted to assess whether  trade flows through West Coast ports during the port disruption that  occurred in late 2014 and early 2015 appeared to be discernably different  than other quarters included in our analysis. West Coast ports account for  a large share of U.S. trade. For example in 2015 West Coast ports  handled almost 23.2 percent of U.S. vessel exports ($118.7 out of a total  of $512.6 billion in vessel exports) and 40.5 percent of vessel imports  ($425.76 out of a total of $1.1 trillion in vessel imports); that is, in 2015,  the West Coast ports handled almost 35 percent of more than $1.6 trillion  dollars in total trade. Moreover, large West Coast ports—Los Angeles,  Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle, and Tacoma—handled 81.4 percent of  vessel exports ($96.7 out of $118.7 billion) and 89.8 percent of vessel  imports ($382.2 out of $425.7 billion); that is, large West Coast ports  handled 88.0 percent of total West Coast port volume in 2015. As we  have noted in this report, our audit work indicated that although this  disruption occurred during a timeframe when labor contracts with port  workers at West Coast ports had lapsed, other factors also likely  contributed to difficulties for importers and exporters at this time. Our  work was designed to assess whether there were discernable trade flow  anomalies during this time frame, but not to identify the specific cause of  any such anomalies. This appendix discusses: (1) the conceptual  framework of the analysis, (2) data sources for international trade data  and independent factors controlled included in the model, and (3) model  results for all trade, and for the 23 unique selected products.
subsections: section_title: Conceptual Framework of Analysis
paragraphs: During the later months of 2014 and into early 2015 many ports in the  United States, but particularly on the West Coast, became highly  congested according to trade associations we spoke with. Our analysis  was designed to assess the extent that trade flows during this period  were substantially different than other quarters included in our analysis  after controlling for various factors. Specifically, our model examined  quarterly data over an 11-year period and is designed to examine  whether there was any discontinuity in trade patterns during the third and  fourth quarters of 2014 or the first quarter of 2015, holding other  independent factors constant including economic trends, seasonal  factors, and well as fixed effects for ports, country of origin/destination,  and product classification. The time frame for our analysis was motivated  by our discussion with stakeholders; for instance, a trade association  indicated that the port difficulties became significant in Fall 2014 and did  not diminish until after the second quarter of 2015. We examined whether  aggregate exports and imports had any discontinuous pattern in that  timeframe not only at the large West Coast ports as a group, but also at  the large Gulf and large East Coast Ports. Also, for 23 unique selected  products that accounted for substantial shares of either exports or imports  at West Coast Ports, we also examine whether the aggregate trade in  each direction for those products indicated any discontinuity in the  relevant time period.
section_title: Data Sources and Basic Model Structure
subsections: section_title: Data Development
paragraphs: The primary data source for trade information was the U.S. Census  Bureau international trade statistics. The U.S. Census Bureau collects  import and export data primarily through electronic transmission and  some forms that exporters and importers file with the U.S. Customs and  Border Protection and, in some instances, directly with the Census  Bureau. The trade data provides both the dollar value and weight of  trade flows. We used dollar value as the primary focus of our analysis, but  alternatively used weight as a robustness check on our findings. The data  available are fairly disaggregated and can be pulled from Census in  variety of ways. We used data that centered on activity at ports, and  made various other decisions about how to assemble that data for the  analysis:  1.  Port: We accessed data that are available at the port level, meaning  that information on trade flows are recorded based on the port of entry  or exit. We made certain decisions as to what ports to use in the  analysis and the extent of aggregation across ports. First, we  determined that, in addition to analyzing trade flows at West Coast  ports, we would also run the same analysis for ports on other U.S.  coasts as a frame of comparison. As such, we used data on ports that  were located on the West, East, or Gulf coasts, and then used  aggregated port traffic according to these three coastal groupings. In  addition, since larger ports account for the vast majority of traffic, we  only include ports in our analysis that accounted for at least 5 percent  of 2012 directional trade on the relevant coast. That is, a port on the  East Coast had to account for at least 5 percent of, for example,  exports from East Coast ports in 2012, to be included in the export  analysis of East Coast ports. This reduced the number of ports in the  analysis considerably. For example, for the West Coast there were 40  ports in total for imports and 41 for exports, but after applying the 5  percent screen we found that only 5 West Coast Ports exceeded the  screen for both directions of trade. In the West Coast these selected  ports accounted for 86.4 percent of exports and 92.6 of imports in the  region. Additionally, we focused solely on the ports with containerized  vessel trade during our study period along each of the three coasts.  We also separately conducted an analysis of trade through airports  located on each of these coasts, for which a similar screening criterion  was applied.  2.  Direction of trade: We conducted separate analyses for imports and  exports. Therefore, each record in the data set we developed was  classified according to the directional trade flow it represented and  included in the model accordingly.  3.  Trading partners: The data available from the Census Bureau  includes information for trade between the United States and all  countries for which there is any reported trade. However, we found  that the majority of countries have little trade with the United States.  For example, in 2015, Census officials explained that 50 countries  made up 79 percent of imported volume into the United States.  Because each country’s observation would weigh equally in the  model, we determined that it would be appropriate to focus the  analysis on the larger trading partners—that is, those countries that  account for the majority of trade with each coastal region of the United  States. Therefore, after reducing the number of ports based on the  port screen described above, we imposed an additional screen for  countries. Specifically we only included a country in our analysis if its  trade with the United States constituted at least 0.1 percent of either  imports or exports of U.S. trade for the large ports on each coast. For  example, for a country to be included in the export analysis from West  Coast ports, at least 0.1 percent of exports through large West Coast  ports needed to be destined to that country. Applying this screen  reduced the number of countries included in the analysis  considerably. In total, there were 239 countries in the full export  dataset that had some trade with the United States and 237 in the full  import dataset. After applying the screen in the export analysis we  reduced the number of countries to 44 for the West Coast region, 79  for the East Coast region and 85 for the Gulf Coast. In 2012, at the  West Coast these selected countries accounted for 97.4 percent of  exports through the large ports, for the East Coast they accounted for  97.5 percent and for the Gulf Coast they accounted for 97.6 percent.  In the import analysis we reduced the number of countries to 32 for  the West Coast, 64 for the East Coast, and 71 for the Gulf Coast. In  2012, at the West Coast these selected countries accounted for 98.2  percent of imports through the large ports, in the East Coast they  accounted for 98.3 percent and for the Gulf Coast they accounted for  98.9 percent.  4.  Level of Commodity Classification: Commodity information can be  classified at various levels of aggregation. The six-digit commodity  classification was the most disaggregated classification of  commodities available in the Census Bureau’s files we accessed. For  example, a six-digit classification for “apples, fresh”, is a component of  the more aggregated 2-digit “edible fruit and nuts; citrus fruit or melon  peel” commodity group. Our primary analysis uses the 2-digit  commodity classification—of which there are 98 groups.  5.  Time Frame: Census data was available by month. However, we  aggregated data to the quarterly level for the analysis. We collected  data beginning with the first quarter of 2005 and ending with first  quarter of 2016, which were the most recent data available when we  conducted the analysis.
Based on the data collected and the elements of aggregation described  above, our data set was organized as follows:  Import data: A file in which each record contains information for the dollar  value of imports of a particular commodity at the 2-digit level, coming into  a particular U.S. port, during a particular quarter, which originated in a  particular country: for example: the vessel dollar value of apparel and  accessories, knit and crochet, imported through the port of San  Francisco, during the third quarter of 2010 that originated in Korea.
Export data: A file in which each record contains information for the dollar  value of exports of a particular commodity at the 2-digit level, embarking  from a particular U.S. port, during a particular quarter, destined for a  particular country. Example: the vessel dollar value of edible fruits and  nuts exported through the Port of Seattle, during the 2nd quarter of 2013  and destined for Japan.
section_title: Model Structure
paragraphs: Our model attempts to examine whether there were any significant shifts  in trade patterns during the 2014q3-2015q1 period, after controlling the  various factors that may also influence trade volume. That is, our model  will estimate any break in the levels of trade during the 2014q3-2015q1  period given (1) existing historic trends in trade growth over time— expressed in the model as a linear time trend, (2) seasonal impacts, (3)  time invariant port, country, and product characteristics, and, in some  specifications, (4) exchange rates. i denotes port,  p denotes product category at the two-digit Harmonized System (HS)  code level,  t denotes quarter  c denotes country of origin or destination  ln (y+1)iptc, the dependent variable, is the natural log of the dollar  value of either exports or imports plus one, in order to account for  zeroes in the data, passing through port i (which will be identified as  being on one of the three coasts), for product category p, during  quarter t, and coming from or destined for country c port disruption is a dummy variable designed to capture whether there  was any shift in the volume of trade during the entire time frame of the  port disruption—2014q3-2015q1—or, alternatively, for each of those  three quarters separately as well as the quarters following the port  disruption, up to and including 2016q1   trendt is a linear time trend that controls for trends in trade overtime,   Recessiont is an indicator equal to one during the quarters that the pattern of which is likely related to trends in overall economic ∝q, are quarter of the year indicators to control for seasonality correspond to the great recession, 2007q4-2009q2, to account for any activity and other factors that may influence the underlying pattern of   ERct is the exchange rate for country c in time t (included in only changes in trade during that period related to the economic downturn trade growth. ∝i are port fixed effects, which control for time invariant port characteristics. Such characteristics might include factors such as the ∝p are product category fixed effects, which control for time invariant products that are produced near the port that would drive elements of ∝c are country fixed effects, which control for time invariant country the trade it handles, management characteristics of the particular port,  The parameter of interest, 𝛽𝛽1, measures any break in the level of trade or other similar port-specific related factors. some specifications of the model)  product characteristics, such as the underlying demand  characteristics of the product in the U.S. or in other countries.  characteristics, such as location of the country and its bilateral trade  agreements with the United States.  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is the error term.  compared to other quarters during our study period after controlling for  the independent factors included in the model. We estimated the equation  above separately for exports and imports across ports with containerized  cargo trade on each of the three coasts. For example, one estimation  analyzed vessel exports from the West Coast ports, while another was  vessel imports into East Coast ports. As such, there are 6 different  estimations to examine trade at ports with containerized cargo and an  additional 6 estimations to examine trade at ports with air cargo in the  three coast regions. The standard errors are clustered at the port level in  order to account for serial correlation in trade for a given port over time.
section_title: Model Results
subsections: section_title: Exports for All Goods
paragraphs: Table 7 displays the model’s results for exports from ports with  containerized cargo along each of the 3 coasts. We provide results for  two model specifications. In the first, we test whether exports for the  entire port disruption period—including the last two quarters of 2014 as  well as the first quarter of 2015—appear to be significantly different along  each of the coasts. The second examines the same issue, but rather than  collapsing the time frame all together, we model each of the three  quarters separately as well as the subsequent quarters post-disruption to  assess whether there were any abnormal trade patterns even after the  port situation had abated. In table 7, we provide the coefficients directly  from the regressions for the port disruption time frames in the odd- numbered columns of results for each coast, but in the even columns we  provide the percentage change in exports our model would suggest if  each of the variables in the model were increased by one.
These results indicate that for the 3 quarters of the port disruption in  aggregate, there appears to be a decline in the value of exports from  West Coast ports relative to the level of exports in other non-disruption  quarters after controlling for the various factors in the model. In particular,  from the regression results for the entire port disruption period we find  that exports appear to have been 23.5 percent lower during this period.  This finding is significant at the 5 percent level. We find no statistically  significant changes in exports from the other coasts for the entire 3- quarter period.
When looking at the three quarters separately our model suggests that  the extent by which exports in each quarter of the disruption period were  different than past quarters varied across the disruption period. Notably,  we find no statistical changes in exports from the West Coast ports during  the third quarter of 2014, and a weakly significant finding of reduced  exports during the last quarter of 2014 from those ports. However, during  the first quarter of 2015 we find that exports from West Coast ports  appear, on average across the port, commodity, and trading partner  observations, to have been substantially lower than past quarters by  roughly 50 percent. This finding is statistically significant at the 1 percent  level.
In addition, while we do not find any unusual changes in exports from  East Coast ports during this time frame, it does appear that exports were  lower than during late 2014 at Gulf Coast ports, and again at these ports  in the later part of 2015 and early 2016, compared to other quarters  included in the analysis. Finally, results for the control variables are  generally as expected—exports have tended to rise over time, and each  group of fixed effects for port, country, and product, are jointly statistically  significant.
section_title: Imports for All Goods
paragraphs: Table 8 displays the model results for imports from ports with  containerized cargo along each of the 3 coasts. As above, we provide  results for two model specifications—the first examines imports for the  entire port disruption period and the second assesses imports for each of  the three quarters separately as well as the quarters post-disruption.
As shown on table 8, we did not find any indication that imports into West  Coast ports during the port disruption were statistically different than  import levels in the other quarters, after controlling for the various factors  in the model. In addition, we found no evidence of unusual changes in  trade flows at East Coast ports during this time frame. However, we did  find that imports at Gulf Coast ports were higher during the West Coast  port disruption time frame, as well as for every quarter we examined  thereafter, compared to other quarters included in the analysis. This may  suggest that some factor not accounted for in the model was leading to  increased imports in the Gulf region during and after the disruption period.
section_title: Exports and Imports for Selected Interview Commodities at West Coast Ports
paragraphs: Table 9 provides results for our regression analysis for the 2 distinct sets  of selected interview commodities—13 commodities that are major  imported goods at West Coast ports, and 14 commodities that are major  exported goods from West Coast ports. For each direction of trade, in  turn, we aggregated the dollar value of trade flows at the four-digit  commodity level for the specific products that fell under these categories  and ran the model on this subset of the trade data. Our findings for these  commodities align with our findings for total trade flows discussed above.  Notably, we found that during the entire time frame of the port disruption,  there appears to have been a statistically significant reduction in exports,  but that reduction was not experienced equally across the 3 quarters. In  the case of the 14 export commodities combined, we found no statistical  reduction in trade in the last two quarters of 2014, but by the first quarter  of 2015 the dollar value of these exports, on average across the port,  commodity, and trading partner observations, appears to be about half of  the levels in other quarters in the analysis after controlling for the various  factors in the model. Additionally, for these commodities we found that  exports remain below past levels in the second quarter of 2015, which  would align with stakeholders views expressed to us that the port  difficulties took some time to ameliorate in the winter of 2015 and trade  was affected into the second quarter. We find no evidence that imports at  West Coast ports showed any unusual change during any of the time  period of the port disruption.
section_title: Exports and Imports by Air
paragraphs: Table 10 displays the model results for air exports and imports for each of  the three coasts. Panel A shows the percentage change in exports and  panel B shows the percentage change in imports for each region for the  three quarters combined, column (1), as well as for each of the quarters  separately, columns (2)-(8).
As shown on table 10, we did not find any indication that exports during  the disruption were statistically different than past export levels at airports  on any of the three coasts. However, we did find that imports were  significantly higher during each of the quarters of the disruption period for  the West coast but not for the other regions. As the results show, air  imports to the West coast remained higher than past levels even after the  disruption time frame, suggesting that the increase might have been part  of a more general change in trend.
section_title: Robustness Analysis
paragraphs: We conducted a variety of analyses to assess the robustness of our  model results. In particular:
Timing: In alternative specifications we conducted falsification tests  under which we ran a separate regression with an indicator for each  of the quarters between 2010q1 and 2014q3, along with our baseline  controls, to test whether there was a change in trade patterns in any  of those quarters. We did not find any significant changes in any of  the quarters after 2010q1 and before the disruption.
Cargo weight: The base case analysis used the dollar value of  shipments as the measurement of the extent of trade. We alternatively  used cargo weight to gauge extent of trade. Results were stable in  this alternative analysis.
Non-agricultural products: We ran the analysis on the West Coast  ports using only non-agricultural products and the results were similar  to the model when both agricultural and non-agricultural products  were included. Thus it does not seem that the results were driven by  shocks to the agricultural sector, such as weather shocks.
Alternative trend analysis: Two of the independent variables included  in the models are designed to capture elements of how  macroeconomic conditions may influence trade flows over time. The  first of these variables is the linear time trend, and the second is the  dummy variable for the quarters associated with the recession that  began in late 2007 and ended in mid-2009. In an alternative  specification of the model, we excluded these two variables and  instead included a measure of U.S. quarterly GDP to reflect the health  of the economy over time. This specification resulted in the same  general outcomes for our variable of interest. That is, we found  exports from West Coast ports to be significantly lower than other  quarters during the port disruption but found no such results for  imports into those ports.
Alternative specification for port level trends: In the original analysis  the time trend was assumed to be the same for all ports. In an  alternative specification we allowed this linear time trend in trade to  vary by port—that is, the time trend could be different across ports  through the time frame of our data. This alteration did not have any  effect on the core findings of the model.
Inclusion of exchange rates: The base-case analysis did not control  for exchange rates between the U.S. and each of the trading  countries. In an alternative specification we included these data.  Model results were not affected by the inclusion of exchange rates.
Exclusion of observations with zero value: In our main analysis the  dependent variable was log(y+1), where y was either exports or  imports, in order to include observations with zero value in the  analysis. In an alternative sample any port/commodity/country  observation that had zero vessel value at any point during our study  period was excluded, and thus we ended up with a balanced panel  with only non-zero values. The dependent variable in this analysis  was log(y) since all observations were non-zero. This modification did  not affect the main findings.
section_title: Limitations
paragraphs: As we have noted above, the results are not meant to disentangle the  cause of any changes in trade patterns during the 2014q3-2015q1 period.  It is meant to establish whether there were any changes in trade patterns  during this time period after accounting for linear time trends, seasonality  patterns as well as port, product and country fixed effects. There could be  other factors that we are not accounting for, such as economic shocks to  trading partners, industry level shocks, among others, that could have  impacted trade through the various regions during the disruption period.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Transportation
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Sharon Silas (Assistant  Director), John Stambaugh (Analyst in Charge), Amy Abramowitz, Lilia  Chaidez, Ming Chen, Leia Dickerson, Delwen Jones, Jessica Lewis,  Maureen Luna-Long, SaraAnn Moessbauer, Josh Ormond, Cheryl  Peterson, and Friendly Vang-Johnson made key contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: The following are GAO products pertinent to the issues discussed in this  report. Other products may be found at GAO’s Web site at www.gao.gov.
U.S. Border Communities: Ongoing DOT Efforts Could Help Address  Impacts of International Freight Rail. GAO-16-274. Washington, D.C.:  January 28, 2016.
Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal  Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters.  GAO-15-515. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2015.
Surface Transportation: DOT Is Progressing toward a Performance- Based Approach, but State and Grantees Report Potential  Implementation Challenges. GAO-15-217. Washington, D.C.: January 16,  2015.
Freight Transportation: Developing National Strategy Would Benefit from  Added Focus on Community Congestion Impacts. GAO-14-740.  Washington, D.C.; September 19, 2014.
Maritime Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Effectiveness  of Federal Efforts to Support the Marine Transportation System.  GAO-13-80. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2012.
Intercity Passenger and Freight Rail: Better Data and Communication of  Uncertainties Can Help Decision Makers Understand Benefits and Trade- offs of Program and Policies. GAO-11-290. Washington, D.C.: February  24, 2011.
Surface Freight Transportation: A Comparison of the Costs of Road, Rail,  and Waterways Freight Shipments That Are Not Passed on to  Consumers. GAO-11-134. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2011.
Statewide Transportation Planning: Opportunities Existing to Transition to  Performance-Based Planning and Federal Oversight. GAO-11-77.  Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2010.
Freight Transportation: National Policy and Strategies Can Help Improve  Freight Mobility. GAO-08-287. Washington, D.C.: January 7, 2008.
Surface Transportation: Restructured Federal Approach Needed for More  Focused, Performance-Based, and Sustainable Programs. GAO-08-400.  Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008.
Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning and  Financing Limitations. GAO-04-165. Washington, D.C.: December 19,  2003  Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and a Framework for  Infrastructure Investments. GAO-02-1033. Washington, D.C.: September  9, 2002.