Defense Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and Analysis of Alternatives Needed to Assess Military Posture in Asia
Published: 2011-05-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently conducting the largest transformation of military posture in the Pacific region since the end of World War II. Transforming posture in Korea, Japan, and Guam will affect tens of thousands of military personnel and their families and require the construction of hundreds of new facilities and more than 3,500 housing units. GAO was asked to examine: (1) initiatives in Korea, their cost implications, and the basis for "tour normalization;" (2) initiatives in Japan and Guam and their cost implications; and (3) the extent to which DOD estimates the total cost of posture and addresses affordability issues. GAO assessed DOD policies and procedures, interviewed relevant DOD and State Department officials, and analyzed cost data from the military services
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD is transforming the facilities and infrastructure that support its posture in Asia without the benefit of comprehensive cost information or an analysis of alternatives that are essential to conducting affordability analysis. In South Korea, DOD is transforming its military posture through a series of four interrelated posture initiatives. GAO obtained DOD cost estimates that total $17.6 billion through 2020 for initiatives in South Korea, but DOD cost estimates are incomplete. One initiative, to extend the tour length of military service members and move thousands of dependents to South Korea--called "tour normalization"--could cost DOD $5 billion by 2020 and $22 billion or more through 2050, but this initiative was not supported by a business case analysis that would have considered alternative courses of action and their associated costs and benefits. As a result, DOD is unable to demonstrate that tour normalization is the most cost-effective approach to meeting its strategic objectives. This omission raises concerns about the investments being made in a $13 billion construction program at Camp Humphreys, where tour normalization is largely being implemented. DOD is also transforming its military posture in Japan, Okinawa, and Guam but has not estimated the total costs associated with these initiatives. Based on an October 2006 Government of Japan budget estimate study for realignment costs and limited cost information developed by DOD, GAO identified approximately $29.1 billion--primarily just construction costs--that is anticipated to be shared by the United States and Japan to implement these initiatives. DOD officials stated total cost estimates for its initiatives were not available because of the significant uncertainty surrounding initiativeimplementation schedules. The Senate Appropriations Committee recently directed DOD to provide annual status updates on posture initiatives in Korea, Japan, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. If DOD is fully responsive to the Committee's reporting direction, these updates should provide needed visibility into initiative cost and funding requirements. DOD's posture planning guidance does not require the U.S. Pacific Command to include comprehensive cost data in its theater posture plan, and as a result, DOD lacks critical information that could be used by decision makers as they deliberate on posture requirements and affordability. GAO analysis shows that of the approximately $24.6 billion obligated by the military services to support installations in Asia from 2006 through 2010, approximately $18.7 billion (76 percent) was for operation and maintenance of these facilities. The services estimate that operation and maintenance costs would be about $2.9 billion per year through 2015. However, this estimate appears to be understated, and DOD's initiatives may significantly increase those costs. For example, DOD has yet to estimate costs associated with furnishing and equipping approximately 321 new buildings and 578 housing units in Okinawa. Without comprehensive and routine reporting of posture costs, DOD decision makers will not have the full fiscal context in which to develop posture plans and requirements, and congressional committees will lack a full understanding of the potential funding requirements associated with DOD budget requests.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD develop a business case analysis for its strategic objectives related to tour normalization in Korea, limit investments at Camp Humphreys until the business case is completed, and develop comprehensive cost estimates of posture in the Pacific. DOD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations, but it did not specify what corrective actions it would take or time frames for completion.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review approximately  400,000 U.S. military personnel are forward-stationed or rotationally  deployed around the world on any given day—including those involved in  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In recent years, the Department of  Defense (DOD) has embarked on the largest transformation of U.S.  military posture in the Pacific region since the end of World War II. As of  March 2011, DOD posture initiatives planned for South Korea, Japan, and  Guam will affect tens of thousands of forward-deployed military personnel  and their dependents, and require the construction of hundreds of new  facilities and more than 3,500 housing units. According to DOD estimates,  the DOD population in South Korea may increase from approximately  56,000 to as much as 84,000, and the DOD population in Guam may  increase from 15,000 to 39,000 by as early as 2020. The cost of these  initiatives has yet to be fully estimated, but billions of dollars in combined  investments by host nations and the U.S. government have already been  identified as necessary to implement these initiatives.
These posture transformation initiatives are being conducted in an era of  increasing budgetary pressures and competition for scarce resources. In  August 2010, the Secretary of Defense called on military leaders to  consider the affordability of programs in developing future plans, with  particular emphasis on reducing overhead costs. The Secretary of Defense  sought a $100-billion reduction in overhead costs over the next 5 years,  froze the size of combatant commands, and required ”zero-based” reviews  of their staffing and organizations. In January 2011, the Secretary of  Defense announced he had approved the elimination of more than   100 general officer and flag officer positions and the elimination or  downgrading of nearly 200 civilian Senior Executive Service or equivalent  positions.
In addition, we have recently reported on the need to address the long- term sustainability of the federal government’s fiscal policies. Since the  end of the recent recession, the gross domestic product has grown slowly  and unemployment has remained at a high level. While the economy is still  recovering and in need of careful attention, there is widespread agreement  on the need to look not only at the near term but also at steps that begin to  change the long-term fiscal path as soon as possible without slowing the  recovery. In our report on opportunities to reduce potential duplication in  government programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue, we  observed that having U.S. troops stationed overseas provides benefits,  such as deterring aggression against U.S. allies, but permanent stationing  comes with significant costs. We emphasized the need for DOD to assess  costs and benefits of overseas military presence options before  committing to costly personnel realignments and construction plans.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights the importance of  periodically assessing and tailoring global defense posture in light of  continued globalization and enduring transnational threats. In the  Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD indicates that defense posture will  continuously adapt to the dynamic world environment and that ongoing  assessments of national interests, military requirements, and the strategic  environment should guide U.S. global defense-posture planning. In  addition, DOD identifies global posture as consisting of: (1) forces  (forward-stationed and rotationally deployed), capabilities, and  equipment; (2) overseas infrastructure and facilities; and (3) international  agreements with allies and key partners that may address issues such as  access, transit, and the framework under which U.S. military personnel  operate in a foreign country. This report focuses on one of these three  elements—DOD’s network of overseas infrastructure and facilities—which  can vary widely in size and complexity from location to location.
Given the cost of DOD’s efforts to realign its global posture and the  criticality to national security of the U.S. force structure and infrastructure  abroad, you asked us to examine major global posture realignment  initiatives in Europe, Africa, and Asia. This report, prepared prior to the  earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011, addresses  the cost and affordability of the the department’s efforts to transform its  defense posture in Asia. We examine: (1) the magnitude of cost associated  with the major global defense posture initiatives ongoing and planned on  the Korean peninsula and the process by which the decision was made to  move forward with the largest of these initiatives—”tour normalization;”  (2) the magnitude of cost associated with the major global defense-posture  initiatives ongoing and planned in Japan and Guam; and (3) the extent to  which DOD develops comprehensive estimates of the cost of defense  posture in Asia to inform the decision-making process.
This report is one of a series of GAO reports on DOD’s global defense- posture initiatives. Since 2006, we have reported on issues related to  DOD’s overall global-posture strategy and management practices, the  military buildup on Guam, the transformation of United States Army  posture in Europe, and the establishment of the United States Africa  Command. Those reports make a number of recommendations to improve  DOD’s management of these efforts and the information about them that  DOD makes available to the executive branch and congressional  committees. Most recently, in February 2011, we reported on DOD military  posture in Europe, highlighting the need for additional cost information  and methods for evaluating posture alternatives in that region. In many  cases, DOD has agreed with our recommendations and has taken actions  to implement them.
For each of our objectives, we reviewed relevant policies and procedures  governing the management and supervision of global defense posture, and  collected information by interviewing and communicating with officials in  the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force, the Army, the Navy,  the Marine Corps, the Joint Staff, United States Pacific Command  (PACOM), and the State Department. We conducted site visits at PACOM  and its service components in Hawaii; United States Forces Japan (USFJ),  its service components, and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, and the  U.S. Consulate on Okinawa; United States Forces Korea (USFK), its  service components, and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, South Korea. To  identify the major global defense-posture initiatives ongoing and planned  and their associated costs, we reviewed appropriate DOD strategies, plans  and guidance including, but not limited to, the Quadrennial Defense  Review, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Guidance for the  Deployment of the Force; we also reviewed PACOM’s Theater Campaign  Plan, Theater Posture Plan, and relevant plans and strategies developed  by PACOM’s service components. To identify the cost of posture initiatives  in Korea and Japan, we requested posture-initiative cost estimates from  officials in each military service headquarters, PACOM, USFK, and USFJ.  For initiatives in Japan, DOD officials provided information based on  budget estimates prepared by the Government of Japan, but provided only  limited estimates of costs to the United States. For initiatives in Korea,  DOD officials provided high-level cost estimates, which included  assumptions related to the use of host-nation support funding and host- nation costs, which in some cases were constantly changing or not yet  approved. We discussed this cost information with officials in USFK,  USFJ, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and  determined that although the information was incomplete, it was  sufficiently reliable to provide an order of magnitude estimate of the  potential cost of each initiative, and therefore was adequate for the  purposes of our review, subject to the limitations discussed in this report.  To determine whether DOD captures and reports the total cost of posture  across the PACOM area of responsibility, we assessed the information  included in the 2009 and 2010 DOD Global Defense Posture Reports to  Congress, including the sections addressing posture costs, the 2010  PACOM Theater Posture Plan, and President’s Budget requests for fiscal  years 2010 and 2011. We then used a systematic data collection approach  to obtain cost data from the departments of the Army, Air Force, and  Navy, including the Marine Corps, and their PACOM service component  commands, on posture funding requirements and obligations for fiscal  years 2006 through 2015. To assess the reliability of the cost data obtained  through our systematic data collection effort, we reviewed data system  documentation and obtained information on internal controls for those  systems. We determined that the cost data we received were reliable for  the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 to April 2011,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more  detailed description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD operates six geographic combatant commands, each with an  assigned area of responsibility (see fig. 1). Each geographic combatant  commander carries out a variety of missions and activities, including  humanitarian assistance and combat operations, and assigns functions to  subordinate commanders. Each command is supported by a service-  component command from each of the services. All of these component  commands play significant roles in preparing detailed posture plans and  providing the resources that the combatant commands need to execute  operations in support of their missions and goals.
DOD’s facilities are located in a variety of sites that vary widely in size and  complexity. Some sites are large complexes containing many facilities to  support military operations, housing, and other support facilities, while  others can be as small as a single radar site. To develop common  terminology for posture planning, DOD has identified three types of  installations that reflect the large-to-small scale of DOD’s enduring  overseas posture—main-operating bases, forward-operating sites, and  cooperative security locations.
Main-operating bases are overseas installations with relatively large  numbers of permanently stationed operating forces and robust  infrastructure, including family support facilities.
Forward-operating sites are scaleable installations intended for  rotational use by operating forces in lieu of permanently stationed  forces that DOD would have to support. Because they are scaleable,  they may have a large capacity that can be adapted to provide support  for combat operations, and therefore DOD populations at these  locations can vary greatly, depending on how they are used at any  given time.
Cooperative security locations are overseas installations with little or  no permanent U.S. military presence, which are maintained with  periodic U.S. military, contractor, or host-nation support. DOD  populations at these locations can vary greatly, as they do at forward- operating sites, depending on how they are being used at any given  time.
A hierarchy of national and defense guidance informs the development of  DOD’s global posture. The National Security Strategy, issued by the  President at the beginning of each new Administration and annually  thereafter, describes and discusses the worldwide interests, goals, and  objectives of the United States that are vital to its national security, among  other topics. The Secretary of Defense provides corresponding strategic  direction in the National Defense Strategy. Furthermore, the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance to the military through the  National Military Strategy. The department has developed new guidance  for global defense posture in numerous documents, principally the 2008  Guidance for Employment of the Force and the 2008 Joint Strategic  Capabilities Plan. The Guidance for Employment of the Force  consolidates and integrates planning guidance related to operations and  other military activities, while the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan  implements the strategic policy direction provided in the Guidance for  Employment of the Force and tasks combatant commanders to develop  theater campaign, contingency, and posture plans that are consistent with  the Guidance for Employment of the Force. The Theater Campaign Plan  translates strategic objectives to facilitate the development of operational  and contingency plans, while the Theater Posture Plan provides an  overview of posture requirements to support those plans and identifies  major ongoing and new posture initiatives, including current and planned  military construction requirements. Figure 2 illustrates the relationships  among these national and DOD strategic guidance documents.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Estimated the Cost of Posture Initiatives in South Korea or Provided an Analysis of Alternatives to Tour Normalization
paragraphs: DOD is currently transforming its military posture in South Korea through  a series of four interrelated posture initiatives, but has not estimated the  total costs involved, or provided an analysis of alternatives for one  initiative—tour normalization—that was initiated by the Commander,  USFK that potentially could affect tens of thousands of DOD personnel  and dependents and increase costs by billions of dollars. Although DOD  has not fully estimated the total cost of its posture initiatives, we obtained  USFK and Army estimates for each initiative, which were primarily  focused on construction costs, which indicate the magnitude of costs will  be significant—almost $18 billion in costs have been identified either to  the Government of South Korea or to DOD through fiscal year 2020 (see  table 1). The largest of these four initiatives and the primary long-term  cost driver is tour normalization—extending the tour length of military  service members and moving thousands of their dependents from the  United States to South Korea. According to USFK officials, the decision to  move forward with tour normalization was made to achieve certain USFK  strategic objectives, such as to provide military commanders greater  flexibility in how U.S. military forces assigned to South Korea are used and  to improve the quality of life for military service members and their  families. However, prior to making the decision to move forward with the  tour normalization initiative, DOD did not complete a business case  analysis that would evaluate the quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits,  advantages, or disadvantages of competing alternatives in order to identify  the most cost-effective means to satisfy its strategic objectives. As a result,  DOD is embarking on an initiative that involves moving thousands of U.S.  civilians to South Korea and constructing schools, medical facilities, and  other infrastructure to support them without fully understanding the costs  involved or considering potential alternatives that might more efficiently  achieve U.S. strategic objectives.
subsections: section_title: Transforming United States Military Posture in South Korea
paragraphs: Four major, interrelated initiatives that will affect posture are under way  in South Korea. Two of these initiatives—the Yongsan Relocation Plan and  the Land Partnership Plan—will consolidate U.S. military and civilian  personnel from Seoul and sites north of Seoul, to a site south of Seoul. The  third will establish and maintain United States military troop strength at  28,500 soldiers, and the fourth—tour normalization—will provide for   36-month accompanied tours (personnel who bring their families with  them) for military personnel stationed in South Korea. In total, USFK  officials have estimated the total DOD population in South Korea could  increase from approximately 54,000 to 84,000 under these initiatives (see  fig. 3). DOD has not estimated the full cost to implement these initiatives,  but as of January 2011, DOD had identified approximately $18 billion in  costs from the start of the initiative through fiscal year 2020 either to the  Government of South Korea or to DOD, as described below. According to  USFK and State Department officials, the United States and South Korea  are currently consulting on the extent to which Special Measures  Agreement funding will be applied to these initiatives.
Yongsan Relocation Plan ($8.3 billion through fiscal year 2016).  According to USFK officials, this is an initiative agreed to between the  governments of the United States and South Korea in October 2004. The  agreement involves the relocation of U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, which  contains the headquarters for U.S. 8th Army, USFK, Combined Forces  Command, and the United Nations Command. This initiative will move  most DOD personnel and their families—currently more than 17,000  people—from U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, an installation located in the  heart of Seoul, to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys (Camp Humphreys), so  that the land at Yongsan can be returned to South Korea. It is anticipated  that South Korea will fund much of the construction costs for this  initiative; USFK officials estimate that it will cost South Korea about   $6.3 billion and the United States about $2 billion in construction costs  through fiscal year 2016.
Land Partnership Plan ($4 billion through fiscal year 2016). This  realignment, agreed to between the governments of the United States and  South Korea in March 2002, will move U.S. troops who are currently  stationed north of Seoul farther south to Camp Humphreys, and the land  they vacate is intended to be returned to South Korea. This move will  involve about 7,000 to 8,000 servicemembers, primarily from the 2nd  Infantry Division. The total estimated construction costs for the Land  Partnership Plan are nearly $4 billion, about $3.4 billion of that to be  funded by the United States.  28,500 U.S. troops ($0.245 billion through fiscal year 2016).  According to the State Department, in 2008, the Presidents of the United  States and South Korea agreed that U.S. troop strength would reach and  be maintained at 28,500. USFK officials estimate that this initiative will  cost the United States about $245 million during the 5-year period of fiscal  years 2012 through 2016 ($140 million in military construction and   $105 million in operation and support costs).
DOD defines dwell time as the period of time between the release from involuntary active  duty and the reporting date for a subsequent tour of active duty pursuant to 10 U.S.C.  § 12302. Such time includes any voluntary active duty performed between two periods of  involuntary active duty pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12302. consideration for back-to-back non-accompanied deployments. Tour  normalization would reduce uncertainty for service members and their  families, and affirm the United States commitment to the U.S.-Korean  alliance and the region. It enables a more adaptive and flexible U.S. and  combined-force posture on the Korean peninsula to strengthen the  alliance’s deterrent and defense capabilities and long-term capacity for  regional and global defense and security cooperation, according to the  Commander’s Narrative Assessment.
DOD has not finalized an implementation schedule for tour normalization  as DOD continues to evaluate alternative implementation schedules and  associated costs. As of September 2010, USFK officials estimated that the  total DOD population in South Korea was approximately 52,800, including  11,600 dependents. One approach developed by USFK officials for  implementing tour normalization called for completing the construction of  facilities and movement of dependents to South Korea by 2020 except for  the facilities and dependents associated with service members at Kunsan  Air Base (the Air Force has yet to decide if tour normalization will be  implemented at Kunsan Air Base). Under that schedule, initial steps to  implement tour normalization, such as increasing the number of  accompanied tours in South Korea, were expected to be completed in  fiscal year 2011, when USFK officials estimated the total DOD population  in South Korea would be about 54,000. Follow-on implementation steps  would increase the DOD population to about 60,000 by 2016, and 76,000 by  2020, according to USFK estimates (see fig. 4). If DOD implements tour  normalization at Kunsan Air Base, USFK estimated that this would occur  after 2020, and the total DOD population on the South Korean peninsula  could increase to about 84,000.
Because DOD is still analyzing alternative tour normalization  implementation schedules, the estimated costs have yet to be fully defined  and have been changing. USFK officials have estimated that based on the  2020 implementation schedule, the cost to implement tour normalization  for all services (including military construction, family housing,  personnel, and operation and maintenance costs) would be about   $5.1 billion from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2020, although these  estimates are very preliminary and likely to change. Additional costs  estimated by USFK and the Army include:    USFK estimated $1.5 billion would be needed to implement tour  normalization at Kunsan AFB after fiscal year 2020. However,  according to Air Force officials, this estimate only covers construction  costs; the total implementation costs could be much higher.
The Army calculated an extended cost estimate for tour normalization  from 2021 through 2050. That estimate shows that tour normalization  could increase Army operations and support costs by $15.7 billion or  more from 2021 through 2050 in areas such as increased personnel and  medical expenses.
On October 18, 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced in a memo to  the Secretaries of the Military Departments and similar officials from other  DOD organizations that he had directed USFK and the military services to  “proceed with full Tour Normalization for Korea, as affordable, but not  according to any specific timeline.” He also directed the Army to execute  the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program for the construction of  1,400 units and to pursue Military Construction funding for additional  family housing. However, the Secretary directed that no later than   March 31, 2011, USFK—along with PACOM, the military services, and  other relevant DOD organizations—was to provide the Secretary with a  feasible and affordable plan to continue the momentum toward full tour  normalization on the Korean peninsula. He directed the Cost Analysis and  Program Evaluation organization to evaluate the plan and cost estimates  to establish a “no less than” funding level to be identified on an annual  basis. The Secretary stated he would continue to closely monitor changes  in timelines, requirements, and cost as he considered how to most  effectively implement the overall tour normalization plan.
section_title: Tour Normalization Is Not Supported by a Business Case Analysis
paragraphs: Although detailed cost estimates are being prepared at the direction of the  Secretary of Defense as alternative implementation schedules are  considered, DOD has not developed a business case analysis that would  include an analysis of alternatives to support the decision to move forward  with tour normalization, and did not have one planned at the time of our  report. According to the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, a  business case analysis is a comparative analysis that presents facts and  supporting details among competing alternatives. A business case  analysis considers not only all the life cycle costs of competing  alternatives, but also quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits. This  analysis should be unbiased by considering all possible alternatives and  should not be developed solely for supporting a predetermined solution.  Moreover, a business case analysis should be rigorous enough that  independent auditors can review it and clearly understand why a  particular alternative was chosen. A business case analysis seeks to find  the best value solution by linking each alternative to how it satisfies a  strategic objective. Each alternative should identify the  relative life-cycle costs and benefits;    methods and rationale for quantifying the life-cycle costs and benefits;   effect and value of cost, schedule and performance tradeoffs;    Sensitivity to changes in assumptions; and  risk factors.
On the basis of this information, the business case analysis then  recommends the best alternative. Our Cost Assessment Guide also states  that in addition to supporting an investment decision, the business case  analysis should be considered a living document and should be updated  often to reflect changes in scope, schedule, or budget. In this way, a  business case analysis is a valuable tool for validating decisions to sustain  or enhance the program.
DOD has focused on and produced tour normalization cost estimates and  continues to refine them, but has not addressed the other aspects of a  business case analysis—which, according to the GAO Cost Estimating  and Assessment Guide would include analyzing alternatives to tour  normalization and determining the associated costs, benefits, advantages,  and disadvantages of any viable alternative. For example, USFK officials  stated that tour normalization was driven by the USFK Commander’s  strategic objectives to (1) obtain greater flexibility in deploying U.S. forces  assigned to South Korea and (2) improve military families’ quality of life by  reducing the amount of time they were separated by deployments.  However, DOD has not clearly demonstrated the extent to which tour  normalization will actually achieve these objectives or the total costs  involved relative to other alternatives. Specifically, a January 2006 joint  statement of the United States and South Korea affirms that South Korea,  as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S.  global military strategy and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility  of the U.S. forces in South Korea. U.S. Embassy officials in Seoul  confirmed that there are currently no legal impediments to prevent the  United States from deploying its forces, and under existing agreements,  DOD has flexibility in deploying its forces to other countries or regions as  necessary. However, USFK officials told us that in their view, the  Government of South Korea and the general public remained reluctant to  support such deployments after the United States deployed an Army  brigade to Iraq in 2004 that did not return to South Korea.
According to the State Department, in April 2008 the Presidents of the United States and  South Korea agreed to maintain the United States force level on the peninsula at 28,500. regions. In those cases, servicemembers would be separated from their  immediate family members in South Korea when they are deployed, and  family members residing in South Korea would be separated from their  extended family network in the United States.
The financial risks of implementing tour normalization without a business  case analysis to support the decision are high, given the magnitude of the  resources that will be required and the impact on military construction  plans. For example, most of the military dependents who would move to  South Korea under this initiative would move to Camp Humphreys. At the  time of our visit to that location in March 2010 the construction plan for  Camp Humphreys included adding 2,328 acres to the camp, increasing the  total size to 3,538 acres. The plan also included constructing more than a  thousand new structures, including five new schools and an assortment of  housing and other support facilities at an estimated cost of approximately  $13.1 billion. This construction plan and the estimated cost combines  construction of new facilities and infrastructure to accommodate military  service members and dependents associated with the Yongsan Relocation  Plan, Land Partnership Plan, and initial construction associated with tour  normalization initiatives. At the time of our visit, significant land  reclamation was already under way to support the overall transformation  efforts, and new construction had started on facilities such as family  housing, recreational facilities and a family style water park. (see fig. 5).
Existing Camp  Humphreys 1,210 acres However, the plan for Camp Humphreys at the time of our visit did not  include building the necessary infrastructure to accommodate the  population expected to be added if tour normalization is fully  implemented. DOD officials stated that if tour normalization were to be  fully implemented, Camp Humphreys would require seven additional  schools—as well as an increase in other infrastructure such as housing,  commissaries, and postal facilities. We were also told that the land area  currently dedicated to new construction would not accommodate these  additional buildings, and therefore existing building plans would have to  be modified and additional land might have to be acquired. The Army  Corps of Engineers official responsible for executing the building plan at  Camp Humphreys stated that accommodating the total tour normalization  population would call for a modified or new plan for the camp and that,  with construction already under way, it would be critical to modify the  plans as soon as possible, because costly modifications to building plans  could result from changing facility requirements after major construction  has begun. However, in our discussions with Office of the Secretary of  Defense officials from the Policy and Comptroller’s office, we were told  that because the construction plan for Camp Humphreys combines facility  and infrastructure requirements for the Yongsan Relocation, Land  Partnership, and tour normalization initiatives, they were unable to  determine the extent to which tour normalization has affected  construction plans at Camp Humphreys.
Tour normalization will also have a major impact on posture costs and  pilot training capabilities at Osan Air Base, located a few miles away from  Camp Humphreys. For example, during our visit to Osan Air Base, officials  told us that one of the challenges they face in implementing tour  normalization is the limited amount of space available to construct the  required housing, parking, child development center, commissary, six  schools, and other quality-of-life facilities. At the time of our visit to Osan  Air Base, base officials provided an overview of their plans to implement  tour normalization, which required the demolition of approximately 20 or  more existing facilities and included 51 construction projects. (All but one  of these projects were planned to start in fiscal year 2012 or later.) Also,  according to Air Force officials, the Air Force’s training capabilities in  South Korea for its F-16 pilots are inadequate; lengthening tours to 2 or   3 years would exacerbate this training deficiency. Specifically, Air Force  officials stated that their pilots do not get enough training time on South  Korean training ranges because the pilots must share the ranges with  South Korean pilots. In addition, South Korean ranges do not offer all of  the training these pilots need. Currently, this reduced training capacity is  deemed acceptable by the Air Force because pilots are reassigned after a  1-year tour and can update their training at their next duty station.  However, according to Air Force officials, if 3-year tours are established  for their pilots in South Korea, they may have to send the pilots on training  missions to Alaska—the closest site with the required capabilities—for the  training they need to maintain the necessary qualification levels. The  additional costs in terms of fuel and other operating expenses for these  training missions to Alaska would be an added expense.
Without a business case analysis that identifies alternative courses of  action and their associated life cycle costs, potential benefits, advantages,  and disadvantages, DOD is embarking on an initiative that involves moving  thousands of U.S. civilians to South Korea and constructing schools,  medical facilities, and other infrastructure to support them without fully  understanding the costs involved or considering potential alternatives that  might more efficiently achieve its strategic objectives. Furthermore,  blending the construction requirements for the Yongsan Relocation Plan,  Land Partnership Plan, and tour normalization has obscured the extent to  which construction at Camp Humphreys has been or could be affected by  tour normalization decisions. As previously discussed, the Secretary of  Defense requested a feasible and affordable plan to continue the  momentum toward full tour normalization on the Korean peninsula; this  plan could help determine the future of the initiative. However, according  to USFK and OSD officials, a business case analysis has not been included  as part of this decision process.
section_title: DOD Has Not Estimated the Cost of Posture Initiatives in Japan and Guam
paragraphs: DOD has embarked on a major realignment of U.S. military posture in  mainland Japan, Okinawa, and Guam, but has not developed  comprehensive cost estimates for these initiatives; as a result, DOD is  unable to ensure that all costs are fully accounted for or determine if  resources are adequate to support the program. In February 2005, the  United States Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense hosted Japan’s  Minister for Foreign Affairs, and its Minister of State for Defense and  Director-General of the Defense Agency in a meeting of the United States- Japan Security Consultative Committee. During that meeting, the officials  reached an understanding on common strategic objectives, and  underscored the need to continue examinations of the roles, missions, and  capabilities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces in  pursuing those objectives. They also decided to intensify their  consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. On October  29, 2005, the Security Consultative Committee released a document titled  U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future  that, among other points, approved recommendations for realignment of  U.S. military forces in Japan and related Japan Self Defense Forces, in  light of their shared commitment to maintain deterrence and capabilities  while reducing burdens on local communities, including those in  Okinawa. Both sides recognized the importance of enhancing Japanese  and U.S. public support for the security alliance. In May 2006, a United  States—Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation was released  that provided details on the approved recommendations for realignment  and stated the construction and other costs for facility development in the  implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of  Japan unless otherwise specified. The Roadmap also stated the U.S.  Government will bear the operational costs that arise from  implementation of these initiatives, and the two Governments will finance  their realignment-associated costs consistent with their commitments to  maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local  communities. The U.S. and Japanese governments signed an agreement in  February 2009 that implemented certain aspects of the Roadmap related  to the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to  Guam.
As of December 2009, DOD had approximately 45,000 servicemembers  stationed in Japan, with approximately 24,600 stationed in Okinawa. In  addition, DOD had almost 39,800 dependents who accompanied these  servicemembers—-20,250 in mainland Japan and 19,521 in Okinawa. The  planned end state of the announced realignment initiatives will affect DOD  posture in several areas of Japan, including servicemembers, dependents,  and/or military forces located in Misawa, Yokota, Camp Zama, Yokusuka,  Atsugi, Iwakuni, Kadena, and Futenma (see fig. 6). For example, DOD’s  realignment initiatives, as presented in the Roadmap, would include  relocating a joint U.S./Japan Air Defense Command headquarters to  Yokota Air Base, relocating a carrier air wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni,  consolidating several Marine Corps bases in Okinawa, and relocating  Marine Corps units to Guam. These and other initiatives are discussed in  greater detail below. Figure 6 also illustrates the approximate location of  the epicenter of the earthquake that struck off the east coast of Japan on  March 11, 2011. The effect of this and the ensuing tsunami and nuclear  reactor incidents on DOD posture realignment initiatives is not yet known.
Although DOD and the Government of Japan have embarked on these  initiatives, DOD has not estimated the total costs associated with them.  However, USFJ officials were able to provide us with details from an  October 2006 Government of Japan budget estimate study for realignment  costs covering Japan’s fiscal years 2007 through 2014. According to USFJ  officials, the Government of Japan has not provided any updates to these  costs, so they are the best estimates of Government of Japan costs  available at this time. We also obtained limited cost information  associated with initiatives in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands that  was developed by the Marine Forces, Pacific Command. Taken together,  the available cost information we gathered indicates that posture initiative  costs will be significant—we identified approximately $29.1 billion— primarily construction costs for these initiatives (see table 2). According  to USFJ and OSD officials, DOD is now in the process of developing cost  estimates for these initiatives. These costs may include, among other  items, the cost to outfit, furnish, and maintain buildings constructed by  Japan and to move personnel and equipment into consolidated locations.
Carrier air wing move from Atsugi to Iwakuni ($1.4 billion— Japan budget estimate only). As outlined in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap  for Realignment Implementation (the Roadmap), Carrier Air Wing 5, a  Navy air wing paired with the aircraft carrier USS George Washington  (currently stationed at Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan), would move its  headquarters and fixed wing flight operations from Naval Air Facility  Atsugi to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. In 2006, Japan estimated that  it would spend approximately $1.4 billion to construct new facilities under  this initiative, but DOD has not estimated its own costs. Under this  initiative, the fixed-wing aircraft attached to Carrier Air Wing 5 would  move to Iwakuni, but according to Navy officials, the rotary wing  squadrons would stay at Atsugi. In addition, Marine Corps rotary wing  aircraft currently located at Iwakuni would eventually relocate to Guam as  part of the Marine Corps relocation from Okinawa to Guam described  below.
Camp Zama/ Sagama Depot ($0.3 billion—Japan budget estimate  only). The intent of this initiative is to improve command and control  capabilities between the U.S. Army and the Japanese Ground Self Defense  Force by transforming the Army’s headquarters at Camp Zama,  establishing the headquarters of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force  Central Readiness Force there, and giving Japanese helicopters access to  the Army’s Kastner Army Airfield at Camp Zama. In addition, a battle  command training center and other support facilities are to be constructed  at Sagami General Depot. The United States would also return portions of  both Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot to Japan for local  redevelopment. According to USFJ officials, in 2006, Japan estimated it  would spend approximately $300 million to construct new facilities under  this initiative, but DOD has not estimated its own costs.
Aviation Training Relocation ($0.3 billion—Japan budget  estimate only). In order to reduce the impact of noise on communities  surrounding U.S. air facilities at Kadena Air Base, Naval Air Facility  Misawa, and Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and to enhance bilateral  training with the Japanese, aviation training would be relocated to six  Japanese Air Self Defense Force facilities. Both the United States and  Japan would work toward expanding the use of Japanese Air Self Defense  Force facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future. In 2006,  Japan estimated it would spend approximately $300 million to construct  new facilities for this initiative, but DOD has not estimated its own costs.
Yokota Air Base and Air Space (No cost estimate provided). The  Japan Air Self Defense Force Air Defense Command and relevant units  would relocate to Yokota Air Base and a bilateral master plan would be  developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements. A  bilateral, joint operations coordination center, established at Yokota Air  Base, would include a collocated air and missile defense coordination  function. Measures would be pursued to facilitate the movement of civilian  aircraft through the Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational  requirements.
Okinawa consolidation ($4.2 billion—Japan budget estimate  only). Following the relocation of Marines to the Futenma Replacement  Facility, the return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the Japanese,  and the transfer of III Marine Expeditionary Forces personnel to Guam,  four additional U.S. facilities and part of a fifth facility in southern  Okinawa would be vacated (see fig. 7). The Marines in these locations  plan to move to four primary locations in the northern, less crowded part  of Okinawa. In 2006, Japan estimated it would spend approximately   $4.2 billion to construct projects under this initiative, but DOD has not  estimated its own costs.
Futenma Replacement Facility ($3.6 billion—Japan budget  estimate only). A new runway and surrounding infrastructure for the  Marine Corps are to be built at Camp Schwab to replace Marine Corps Air  Station Futenma; this new facility is known as the Futenma Replacement  Facility. DOD plans to relocate a Marine Aviation Group, Logistics  Squadron, and several helicopter squadrons to the Futenma Replacement  Facility once it is complete. Although plans for the new air base have not  been finalized, one option includes the construction of two runways  aligned in a V shape that would extend into the Oura and Henoko Bays,  while another option would require a single runway. Both options would  require significant reclamation of the sea to complete. Figure 8 below  shows some of the current facilities at Camp Schwab and the estimated  level of landfill that would be required to construct the runway(s). The  Marine Corps relocation to the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp  Schwab is planned to occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.  In 2006, Japan estimated it would spend approximately $3.6 billion for this  initiative, but DOD has not estimated what its costs will be.
Marine Corps Relocation from Okinawa to Guam ($17.4 billion— Japan budget estimate and DOD estimated costs). As part of the  military posture realignment on Okinawa, about 8,600 Marines and their  9,000 dependents are to transfer from several locations in Okinawa to  Guam. It is expected that the 8,600 marines who relocate to Guam will  include the III Marine Expeditionary Force Command Element, the 3rd  Marine Division Headquarters and 3rd Marine Logistics Group  Headquarters, the 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and the 12th Marine  Regiment Headquarters. The governments of Japan and the United States  have agreed to share the costs of transferring the Marines from Okinawa  to Guam, with the Government of Japan anticipated to provide about   $6.1 billion and the United States anticipated to provide an additional   $4.2 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) for construction of new  facilities and infrastructure development on Guam. In addition, the  Marine Corps estimates that an additional $7.1 billion may be required to  complete the move to Guam-—$4.7 billion for additional construction  costs and $2.4 for costs associated with utilities, labor, and procurement of  military equipment. However, these Marine Corps estimates have not  been validated by DOD.
This transfer of Marine Corps personnel and families is part of a larger  DOD effort to increase the military posture on Guam, including Air Force  initiatives to add intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  capabilities; Navy initiatives related to new pier construction and a new  hospital; and an Army initiative related to installation of an air and missile  defense system. Figure 9 illustrates the locations where these initiatives  will be implemented on the island. If implemented as planned, these  initiatives will increase the U.S. military presence on Guam from about  15,000 in 2009 to more than 39,000 by 2020, which will increase the current  population of the island by about 14 percent over those years. We have  issued a series of reports discussing various aspects of the military buildup  on Guam and the costs and challenges DOD will face in accomplishing  those initiatives, including obtaining adequate funding and meeting  operational needs, such as mobility support and training capabilities. For  example, we have reported DOD cost estimates for the military buildup in  Guam do not include the estimated costs of all other defense organizations  that will be needed to support the additional military personnel and  dependents who will relocate to Guam.
Expanding training capabilities in the Northern Mariana Islands  ($1.9 billion). According to Marine Corps officials, independent of the  progress made on the initiatives in Japan and Guam, the Marine Corps will  proceed with constructing new training areas in the Pacific. Some training  areas are expected to be constructed on Guam for the Marines. However,  the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Marine Corps’ move to  Guam found that Guam cannot accommodate all training for the realigned  Marine Corps forces. DOD has identified the nearby island of Tinian   (100 miles away) and other islands in the Northern Mariana Islands as  locations that could provide additional land for training. Marine Corps  officials estimate that building the training range in the Northern Mariana  Islands could cost approximately $1.9 billion or more. Of that amount,  Marine Corps Pacific officials identified $1 billion in funding requirements  from fiscal years 2012 through 2015 to cover costs such as military  construction, planning and development, environmental compliance, and  combat arms training ranges. The remaining cost for full development of  the training capabilities and capacity in the Northern Mariana Islands was  at least $900 million over an unspecified period of time, according to the  Marine Corps officials.
According to DOD officials, comprehensive cost estimates for posture  initiatives in Japan, including all costs that will be incurred by the United  States, have not been completed because there are many uncertainties  surrounding initiative implementation schedules. According to Marine  Corps officials and confirmed by USFJ officials, when the Government of  Japan is constructing any facility for the United States, it does not outline  specific timetables; therefore, knowing when a Government of Japan-led  construction project will begin or end is difficult to determine and can  affect DOD’s ability to estimate future costs. This is important because the  United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, dated  May 1, 2006, indicates that the Government of Japan will generally bear the  construction and other costs for facility development under these  initiatives, and the United States will bear the operational costs. In  January 2011, USFJ officials indicated that the service component  commands were in the process of developing some initiative cost  estimates, but their efforts were not complete and no additional  information was provided on the status of these efforts or expected  results.
In the United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2011 Budget  Request Overview, prepared by the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller), DOD outlined the need to change how the  department buys its weapons and other important systems and  investments. According to DOD, one way to reform how the department  invests is to strengthen front-end scrutiny of costs and not rely on overly  optimistic or underestimated costs from the beginning of the investment.  In addition, according to the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment  Guide, one method for capturing all cost elements that pertain to a  program from the initial concept through its operations, support, and  eventual end, is through a life-cycle cost estimate. A life cycle cost  estimate encompasses all past, present, and future costs for every aspect  of the program, regardless of funding source. A life-cycle cost estimate  usually becomes the program’s budget baseline because the estimate  ensures that all costs are fully accounted for, determines when a program  is supposed to move from one phase to another, and establishes if  resources are adequate to support the program.
Seeking more visibility into DOD posture initiative costs and funding  requirements, the Senate Appropriations Committee recently directed  DOD to provide comprehensive and routine updates on the status of  posture-restructuring initiatives in South Korea, Japan, Guam, and the  Northern Mariana Islands (see app. II). The updates should be provided  annually, beginning with the submission of the fiscal year 2012 budget  request, until the restructuring initiatives are complete or funding  requirements to support them are satisfied. The updates should address  such things as schedule status, facilities requirements, and total costs— including operations and maintenance. If fully responsive to the  committee’s reporting direction, DOD status updates should provide  needed transparency and visibility into the near- and long-term costs and  funding requirements associated with the transformation initiatives.
section_title: DOD Lacks Comprehensive Cost Information Needed for Affordability Analysis
paragraphs: As discussed in our recent report on military posture in Europe, DOD  guidance does not require combatant commanders to include  comprehensive information on posture costs in their theater posture plan,  and as a result, DOD lacks critical information that could be used by  decision makers and congressional committees as they deliberate new  posture requirements and the associated allocation of resources. The  2008 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requires that each combatant  command provide, in its theater posture plan, information on the  inventory of installations in the combatant commander’s area of  responsibility, to include estimates of the funding required for proposed  military construction projects. However, this guidance does not  specifically require—and therefore PACOM does not report—the total cost  to operate and maintain DOD’s posture in Asia whether those costs are  associated with a posture initiative or not. Our analysis shows that  operation and maintenance costs are significant. Of the approximately  $24.6 billion obligated by the services to support DOD’s posture in Asia  from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, approximately $18.7 billion   (76 percent) was for operation and maintenance costs. The military  services project that operation and maintenance funding requirements will  continue at about $2.9 billion annually for fiscal years 2011-2015. However,  as previously discussed, DOD has major posture transformation initiatives  underway in South Korea, Japan, and Guam that could significantly impact  estimates of these future costs. For example, according to USFJ and  Marine Corps officials, although the Government of Japan has agreed to  construct new facilities as part of the realignment of U.S. military forces in  Japan, DOD is responsible for the costs to furnish, equip, and maintain  those facilities to make them usable, and for operation and support costs,  but DOD has not yet estimated those costs. According to USFJ officials, in  Okinawa alone, Japan would build approximately 321 new buildings and  573 housing units, all of which will need to be furnished and equipped by  DOD. Our prior work has demonstrated that comprehensive cost  information—including accurate cost estimates—is key to enabling  decision makers to make funding decisions, develop annual budget  requests, and evaluate resource requirements at key decision points.
subsections: section_title: DOD Does Not Routinely Capture and Report Total Posture Costs
paragraphs: As we previously reported, the 2008 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan  requires that theater posture plans prepared by each combatant command  provide information on each installation in a combatant commander’s area  of responsibility, to include identifying the service responsible for each  installation, the number of military personnel at the installation, and  estimates of the funding required for military construction projects. In  accordance with these reporting requirements, PACOM’s 2010 theater  posture plan provides personnel numbers, service responsibilities,  specified posture initiatives, and associated military construction costs for  installations within PACOM’s area of responsibility. However, the Joint  Strategic Capabilities Plan does not specifically require the combatant  commands to report estimates for other types of costs, such as costs  associated with the operation and maintenance of DOD installations, in  their theater posture plans. DOD’s operation and maintenance funding  provides for a large number of expenses. For example, with respect to  DOD installations, operations and maintenance funding provides for base  operation support and sustainment, restoration, and modernization of  DOD’s buildings and infrastructure, funding that—among other  purposes—is to keep facilities and grounds in good working order.  Because the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan does not require operations  and maintenance costs to be reported, they were not included in PACOM’s  2010 theater posture plan.
To obtain a more comprehensive estimate of the cost of defense posture in  the Pacific, we gathered, from each military service, obligations data  related to military construction, family housing, and operation and  maintenance appropriations for installations in the PACOM area of  responsibility. We found that military construction and family housing  obligations accounted for almost one-quarter of the services’ total  obligations against those appropriations from fiscal years 2006 through  2010. In total, from 2006 through 2010, the military services obligated  about $24.6 billion to build, operate, and maintain installations in Asia, of  which about $5.9 billion (24 percent) was for military construction and  family housing, and $18.7 billion (76 percent) was for operation and  maintenance of these installations (for a more detailed breakdown of costs  at installations in Asia see app. III). On average, the services reported  they obligated almost $5 billion annually for installations in PACOM’s area  of responsibility, with $3.7 billion obligated for operations and  maintenance (see fig. 10).
section_title: Ongoing Transformation Initiatives May Significantly Increase the Cost of DOD’s Posture in Asia
paragraphs: Data provided by the military services projects that they will require  approximately $5.2 billion per year through 2015, of which $2.3 billion   (45 percent) will be for military construction and family housing and   $2.9 billion per year (55 percent) will be for installation operations and  maintenance costs. However, the operations and maintenance costs may  be significantly understated since the military services historically  obligated approximately $3.7 billion annually from 2006 through 2010 for  installation operation and maintenance costs, as discussed above, and the  major transformation initiatives under way in South Korea, Japan, and  Guam may significantly increase costs over the long term, potentially  through 2015 and beyond, as illustrated by the following examples.
Potential for Cost Growth in South Korea:    To provide housing for thousands of dependents that DOD wants to  move to South Korea under tour normalization, DOD has established  the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program, whereby, according to  USFK officials, private developers would build housing for DOD  families and then recover their investments through the rents that  military families pay using DOD overseas housing allowance funds.  (Current estimates indicate this monthly allowance would be about  $4,200/month for service members at Camp Humphreys.) Although  using the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program has the potential  to lower or even eliminate construction-funding requirements, it would  increase the Army housing-allowance costs.
One Army estimate indicates fully implementing tour normalization  could increase education and medical costs by almost $10 billion from  2012 through 2050.
According to USFK and State Department officials, the United States  and Korea are currently consulting on the extent to which Special  Measures Agreement contributions (funds provided and expenditures  borne by the Government of South Korea to help defray the costs of  the U.S. military presence in South Korea) will be used to pay for some  military construction costs. Based on historical information and the  current Special Measures Agreement through 2013, South Korea has  provided or agreed to provide the United States on average ₩786 billion  per year from fiscal years 2007 through 2013, which is equivalent to  approximately $698 million U.S. dollars. While using these  contributions to pay for construction costs can lower DOD’s  construction funding requirements, it also eliminates the opportunity  DOD has to apply those funds to reduce operation and maintenance  costs and related appropriations, thus increasing the required funding  in these appropriations.
Potential for Cost Growth in Japan:    The Government of Japan has historically been a major financial  contributor, in the form of host-nation support funding, to help defray  DOD posture costs. However, after peaking in 1999 (¥276 billion),  funding from Japan has steadily declined. In 2010, the Government of  Japan provided ¥187 billion in host-nation support—the lowest total  since 1992. One element of host-nation support, the Japanese  Facilities Improvement Program—which, as of April 2010, has  provided over $22 billion worth of construction for U.S. military  facilities—has declined nearly 80 percent since 1993, as illustrated in  figure 11. According to an official in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, in January 2011, the governments of Japan and the United  States agreed to maintain the 2010 levels of host-nation support for the  next 5 years. Any increases in DOD’s operation and support costs  would therefore be borne by DOD.
As previously discussed, DOD has not estimated the total costs to the  United States associated with the posture initiatives in Japan, which  could be significant. According to USFJ and Marine Corps officials,  although the Government of Japan has agreed to construct new  facilities as part of the realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan,  DOD is responsible for the costs to furnish and equip those facilities to  make them usable, and DOD has not yet estimated those costs. Due to  the number of buildings involved, these costs could be significant— USFJ officials have estimated that Japan would build approximately  321 new buildings and 573 housing units in Okinawa, all of which will  need to be furnished and equipped by the U.S. government.
While it is difficult to determine at this time what, if any, impact the  March 11, 2011, earthquake, tsunami, and associated nuclear reactor  incident will have on current agreements and initiative construction  plans, DOD officials have said that there is potential for increases in  the cost of materials and labor in Asia. They said that it could be  similar to the impact that was experienced in the United States after  Hurricane Katrina. As we reported, at that time, service officials at  various installations expressed concern about the potential for  increases in construction costs because of ongoing reconstruction due  to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, coupled with the large volume  of anticipated Base Realignment and Closure construction.
Potential for Cost Growth in Guam:  In the introduction to the 2009 Agreement, the United States and Japan  have reaffirmed their intention to spend just over $10 billion together  to provide facilities and infrastructure on Guam to accommodate the  Marine Corps relocation by 2014. However, as previously discussed,  Marine Corps officials estimate it will cost an additional $4.7 billion for  military construction and $2.4 billion for operation and maintenance,  procurement, and collateral equipment to complete the relocation.  These Marine Corps cost estimates have not been reviewed or  validated within DOD and are therefore subject to change.
If implemented as planned, military posture initiatives will increase the  U.S. military presence on Guam from about 15,000 in 2009 to more  than 39,000 by 2020, a presence that will increase the current island  population by about 14 percent over those years. Operation and  maintenance costs will increase as the DOD population grows.
section_title: Comprehensive Cost Information Is Needed for Affordability Analysis
paragraphs: According to the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide,  affordability is the degree to which a program’s funding requirements fit  within the agency’s overall portfolio plan. Making a determination about  whether a program is affordable depends a great deal on the quality of its  cost estimate. Our prior work has demonstrated that comprehensive cost  information is a key component in enabling decision makers to set funding  priorities, develop annual budget requests, and evaluate resource  requirements at key decision points. We have developed a cost estimation  process that, when followed, should result in reliable and valid cost  estimates that management can use to make informed decisions about  whether a program is affordable within the portfolio plan. Furthermore,  guidance from the Office of Management and Budget has highlighted the  importance of developing accurate cost estimates for all agencies,  including DOD.
In addition, our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide highlights the  importance of considering the collective resources needed by all programs  designed to support an agency’s goals. The benefit of considering the  collective program requirements gives decision makers a high level  analysis of their portfolio and the resources they will need in the future.  Whether these funds will be available will determine what programs  remain in the agency’s portfolio. Because programs must compete against  one another for limited funds, it is considered a best practice to perform  this affordability assessment at the agency level, not program by program.  In the case of PACOM-posture costs, affordability analysis therefore  requires an accurate cost estimate of the total cost to sustain existing  posture—such as the cost to sustain existing DOD infrastructure and  facilities in Hawaii and other locations currently in place in the Pacific—to  serve as a foundation for deliberating the cost and affordability of new  posture initiatives. While approaches may vary, an affordability  assessment should address requirements at least through the programming  period and, preferably, several years beyond.
To improve DOD’s reporting on global posture costs, we recommended, in  February 2011, that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman, Joint  Chiefs of Staff, revise the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to require that  theater posture plans include the cost of operating and maintaining  existing installations and estimate the costs associated with initiatives that  would alter future posture. DOD agreed with this recommendation and  recognized that the costs associated with operating and maintaining  overseas facilities are an important consideration in the posture decision- making process, but DOD’s proposed corrective actions did not fully  address the intent of our recommendation. Specifically, the department  did not state that it would further modify the Joint Strategic Capabilities  Plan to require that the theater posture plans include the cost of operating  and maintaining existing installations outside of costs associated with  posture initiatives. DOD stated that there are limits to combatant  commands’ abilities to include operation and maintenance information in  theater posture plans, as those costs are inherently a service function.  DOD stated that, when operation and maintenance costs are known,  combatant commanders should include them in their theater posture  plans. When these costs are unknown—but required for oversight and  decision making—the department would require the services to provide  appropriate cost detail.
DOD’s proposed corrective actions would therefore not require the  combatant commanders to routinely collect and consider operations and  maintenance costs at existing installations (costs that recently have been  about $3.7 billion annually in the Pacific) unrelated to posture initiatives  as theater posture plans are developed. Furthermore, the department’s  proposed action to include operations and maintenance costs in the  theater posture plans only when they are known and to require the  services to provide additional data only when it is needed for decision  making could result in DOD decision makers receiving fragmented posture  cost information on an ad-hoc basis. Without a comprehensive estimate of  the total cost of posture—including existing facilities and infrastructure  that will not be affected by any new posture initiatives—and routine  reporting of those costs, DOD decision makers and congressional  committees will not have the full fiscal context they need to develop and  consider DOD’s funding requests for future posture initiatives. Absent  further modification to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to require  the theater posture plans to include the cost of operating and maintaining  existing installations, DOD decision makers are left with the option to  require the Services to provide this data.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD posture in Asia provides important operational capabilities and  demonstrates a strong commitment to our allies—critical aspects of our  national defense. However, in an era of significant budgetary pressures  and competition for resources, comprehensive cost information and  alternative courses of action must be routinely considered as posture  requirements are developed. To ensure the most cost effective approach is  pursued, major initiatives, such as tour normalization in South Korea,  require not only comprehensive cost estimates but a thorough  examination of the potential benefits, advantages, disadvantages, and  affordability of viable alternatives before a course of action is selected.  However, despite not having an approved business case that supports the  decision to move forward with tour normalization and the presence of  outstanding questions about the cost and schedule to implement the  initiative, DOD is constructing facilities and infrastructure at Camp  Humphreys in a manner that combines requirements for multiple  initiatives, an approach that makes it difficult to identify what funds or  construction activities are at risk if a more cost-effective alternative to  tour normalization is identified. Furthermore, across the Pacific region,  DOD has embarked on complex initiatives to transform U.S. military  posture, and these initiatives involve major construction programs and the  movement of tens of thousands of DOD civilian and military personnel,  and dependents—at an undetermined total cost to the United States and  host nations. Although we have identified potential costs that range as  high as $46.7 billion through 2020, and $63.9 billion through 2050, these  estimates are volatile and not comprehensive. Furthermore, congressional  committees have been presented with individual posture decisions and  funding requests that are associated with specific construction programs  or initiatives, but those requests lack comprehensive cost estimates and  the financial context that such estimates would provide—including long- term costs to complete and annual operation and maintenance costs.  Without that context, DOD is presenting Congress with near-term funding  requests that will result in significant long-term financial requirements  whose extent is unknown.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide DOD and Congress with comprehensive posture cost  information that can be used to fully evaluate investment requirements  and the affordability of posture initiatives, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense take the following seven actions:  Identify and direct appropriate organizations within the Department of  Defense to complete a business case analysis for the strategic  objectives that have to this point driven the decision to implement tour  normalization in South Korea. This business case analysis should  clearly articulate the strategic objectives, identify and evaluate  alternative courses of action to achieve those objectives, and  recommend the best alternative. For each alternative course of action  considered, the business case analysis should address, at a minimum:      methods and rationale for quantifying the life-cycle costs and  relative life-cycle costs and benefits;        potential advantages and disadvantages associated with the  benefits;  effect and value of cost and schedule trade-offs;  sensitivity to changes in assumptions;  alternative; and  risk factors.
Set specific time frames for the completion of the business case  analysis, the Secretary of Defense’s review, and the approval of the  selected alternative.
Through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the  Commander, United States Forces Korea, to provide a detailed  accounting of the funds currently being applied and requested to  construct new facilities at Camp Humphreys, identify construction  projects that will be affected-—directly or indirectly—by a decision to  fully implement tour normalization, and provide that information to  the Office of the Secretary of Defense with sufficient time to limit  investments associated with tour normalization as recommended  below.
Identify and limit investments and other financial risks associated with  construction programs at Camp Humphreys—funded either by direct  appropriations or through alternative financing methods such as the  Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program—that are affected by  decisions related to tour normalization until a business case analysis  for the strategic objectives that have to this point driven the decision  to implement tour normalization in South Korea, is reviewed and the  most cost-effective approach is approved by the Secretary of Defense.
Direct the Secretaries of the military departments to take the following  three actions with respect to annual cost estimates:    Develop annual cost estimates for DOD posture in the U.S. Pacific  Command area of responsibility that provide a comprehensive  assessment of posture costs, including costs associated with  operating and maintaining existing posture as well as costs  associated with posture initiatives, in accordance with guidance  developed by the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).    Provide these cost estimates to the Combatant Commander in a  time frame to support development of the annual theater posture  plan.    Provide these cost estimates to the Offices of the Under Secretary  of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense  (Policy) to support DOD-wide posture deliberations, affordability  analyses, and reporting to Congress.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with six of  our recommendations, partially agreed with one recommendation, and  stated it would work with DOD components to implement the  recommendations. However, DOD did not indicate the specific steps or  time frames in which corrective actions would be taken. Specifics  regarding DOD’s corrective actions and time frames for completion are  important to facilitate Congressional oversight, and can provide  reasonable assurance that DOD will take all appropriate measures to  mitigate financial risks and better define future requirements.
DOD agreed with our three recommendations to complete a business case  analysis for the strategic objectives that have, to this point, driven the  decision to implement tour normalization in South Korea; set specific time  frames for the completion of the business case analysis; and account for  the funds currently being applied and requested to construct new facilities  at Camp Humphreys. In its response, DOD acknowledged that while USFK  has completed numerous analyses concerning tour normalization, DOD  agrees that there is value in conducting a business case analysis that  assesses alternatives to strategic objectives. However, DOD provided no  specifics on the steps or time frames it would follow to implement these  corrective actions.
DOD also agreed with our recommendations to develop annual cost  estimates for DOD posture in the U.S. Pacific Command area of  responsibility; provide these cost estimates to the Combatant Commander  in a time frame to support development of the annual theater posture plan;  and to provide these cost estimates to the Offices of the Under Secretary  of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to  support DOD-wide posture deliberations, affordability analyses and  reporting to Congress. However, DOD provided no specifics on the steps  or time frames it would follow to implement these corrective actions.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to identify and limit  investments and other financial risks associated with construction  programs at Camp Humphreys—funded either by direct appropriations or  through alternative financing methods such as the Humphreys Housing  Opportunity Program—that are affected by decisions related to tour  normalization until a business case analysis for the strategic objectives is  reviewed, and the most cost-effective approach is approved by the  Secretary of Defense. DOD stated it will identify and consider limiting the  investments and other financial risks, while examining the implications  (diplomatic, fiscal) of such decisions. While we agree it is prudent to  examine the implications of decisions to limit investments and financial  risks, DOD provided no specifics on the steps or time frames it would  follow to implement this corrective action. Without specific  implementation time frames for a business case analysis that are  synchronized with planned investment decisions, DOD may not be in a  position to effectively limit actions and investments to expand housing at  Camp Humphreys planned for this fiscal year if the business case analysis  proves those investments to be inappropriate.
We also provided the Department of State with a draft of this report for  official comment, but it declined to comment since the report contains no  recommendations for the State Department. DOD and State provided  technical comments separately that were incorporated into the report as  appropriate. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and appropriate DOD organizations.  In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Affairs and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of  this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the magnitude of cost associated with the major global  defense posture initiatives ongoing and planned on the Korean peninsula  and the process by which the decision was made to move forward with the  largest of these initiatives-—tour normalization—we interviewed and  collected data from officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Policy), the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), and  the Joint Staff; the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Air  Force; PACOM and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force  component commands; and United States Forces Korea and its Army and  Air Force service components. We conducted interviews and collected  data from officials at the U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, U.S. Army Garrison  Humphreys, and Osan Air Base. We also met with U.S. officials at the U.S.  Embassy in Seoul, South Korea. We collected planning and cost  information at military service headquarters, PACOM, United States  Forces Korea, and United States Forces Korea’s Army and Air Force  service components. For initiatives in Korea, USFK officials provided high- level cost estimates, which included assumptions related to the use of  host-nation support funding and host-nation costs, which in some cases  were constantly changing or not yet approved. Army headquarters officials  provided us with detailed estimates of tour normalization costs extended  to 2050, and stated those estimates were the official position of the  Department of the Army on tour normalization costs. We compiled this  initiative information, including available cost information and  assumptions related to host-nation funding, in order to identify the  magnitude of DOD’s initiatives and their potential costs. We converted  host-nation funding to U.S. dollars using exchange rates published in the  2011 Economic Report of the President. We discussed the cost information  we received with officials in USFK and Office of the Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller) and determined that although the information was  incomplete, it was sufficiently reliable to provide an order-of-magnitude  estimate of the potential cost of each initiative and therefore was adequate  for the purposes of our review, subject to the limitations discussed in this  report. Once we consolidated initiative description and cost information,  we provided our summaries back to the cognizant DOD offices to ensure  we had appropriately interpreted the data they provided. To determine  whether tour normalization was supported by a business case analysis, we  interviewed and collected data from the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Policy), the Department of the Army, and United States Forces  Korea officials. Additionally, we collected and analyzed documentation,  including the current and previous versions of the Quadrennial Defense  Review, OSD policy documents related to tour normalization, and strategic  documentation referencing the decision to move forward with tour  normalization. We then compared DOD’s approach to criteria established  in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.
To determine the magnitude of cost associated with the major global  defense posture initiatives ongoing and planned in Japan, Guam, and the  Northern Mariana Islands, we interviewed and collected data from officials  in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Office of the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), and the Joint Staff;  the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the  Department of the Air Force; PACOM and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,  and Air Force component commands; United States Forces Japan and its  military service components, including Marine Corps Bases Japan; and the  Joint Guam Program Office. We conducted interviews and collected data  from officials at Yokota Air Base, Camp Zama, and Fleet Activities  Yokosuka, and on Okinawa at Camps Schwab, Butler, and Courtney, and  Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. We also met with U.S. officials at the  U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, and the U.S. Consulate in Naha, Okinawa.  At all appropriate offices included in our review, including Office of the  Secretary of Defense, PACOM and its service component commands, USFJ  and its component commands and at specific military facilities visited, we  requested comprehensive DOD cost estimates for each posture initiative  and were told that comprehensive cost estimates for each initiative did not  exist. As a result, we collected planning, any cost information that was  available, and initiative status information. For initiatives in Japan, DOD  officials provided information based on budget estimates prepared by the  Government of Japan, but provided only limited estimates of costs to the  United States. We discussed this cost information with officials at USFJ  and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and determined  that although the information was incomplete, it was sufficiently reliable  to provide an order-of-magnitude estimate of the potential cost of each  initiative, and therefore was adequate for the purposes of our review,  subject to the limitations discussed in this report. We compiled the data,  including cost information, from all locations in order to assemble a full  description of the initiatives and any identified cost. We analyzed and  compared the cost information received with criteria established in the  GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Additionally, to provide us  with more comprehensive information on the military buildup on Guam,  we interviewed and collected data from the Joint Guam Program Office  and used information developed through other related GAO work.
To determine the extent to which DOD develops comprehensive estimates  of the total cost of defense posture in Asia to inform the decision-making  process, we interviewed and collected data from officials in the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and  Environment), and the Joint Staff; the Department of the Army, the  Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force; PACOM and  its Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force component commands;  United States Forces Japan and its military service components; United  States Forces Korea and its Army and Air Force service components; and  the Joint Guam Program Office. We also reviewed the 2009 and 2010 DOD  Global Defense Posture Reports to Congress, including the sections  addressing posture costs, and sections of the 2010 PACOM Theater  Posture Plans. We also reviewed budget documentation, including the  military construction appropriations component of the President’s Budget  request for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, we issued data  requests asking for actual obligations and projected requirements data on  military construction, family housing, and operations and maintenance  appropriations related to installations as part of DOD’s defense posture in  Asia for fiscal years 2006 through 2015. We obtained data from the  Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and their PACOM service  component commands, including the Marine Corps. After we received the  data and consolidated them by military service, we sent this information  back to the services that had provided them to ensure we had  appropriately interpreted the data they had provided. After receiving  validated data from all of the services, we aggregated and analyzed it. To  assess the reliability of the cost data received during this data call, we  reviewed data system documentation and obtained written responses to  questions regarding the internal controls on the systems. To ensure the  accuracy of our analysis, we used Statistical Analysis Software (SAS)  when analyzing the data and had the programming code used to complete  those analyses verified for logic and accuracy by an independent reviewer.  Furthermore, we reviewed previous GAO reporting on overseas basing,  military construction, the uses of cost information when making decisions  about programs, and guidance on cost estimating and the basic  characteristics of credible cost estimates.
Given the various steps discussed above to assess the quality of the cost  data, cost estimates, and other data used, we determined the data were  sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 through April  2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Committee Reporting Direction Contained in Senate Report 111-226 (S. Rep. No. 111-226, at 13-15 (2010))
paragraphs: Appendix II: Committee Reporting Direction  Contained in Senate Report 111-226 (S. Rep.  No. 111-226, at 13-15 (2010))
In order to provide Congress with comprehensive and routine information  on the status of these major DOD posture initiatives in a manner that can  be used to provide the appropriate context for budget deliberations and  oversight, the Committee directs the Department to provide detailed  annual updates on the status of posture restructuring initiatives in Korea,  Japan, Guam, and the initiative that will address training capabilities and  capacity in the Pacific region as an appendix to the annual DOD Global  Posture Report.
These initiative status updates should be provided annually, beginning  with the submission of the fiscal year 2012 budget request, until the  restructuring initiatives are complete and/or funding requirements to  support them are satisfied. The initiative status updates should address the  following areas:  Initiative Description—an overall description of each initiative, the  major components of the initiative, the relationships between each  component and the overall successful completion of the initiative, a  program baseline that provides an estimated total cost of the initiative,  expected completion date, and the basis for pursuing the initiative that  is clearly linked to specific DOD strategic goals and objectives defined  by the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, Combatant  Commander, or Service Component Commands.
DOD organization responsible for managing and executing the  initiative.
Schedule Status—a comparison of the current estimated timeframe to  complete the overall initiative and major components of the initiative  with original baseline estimates and the currently approved schedule.  An explanation of changes in the estimated completion date or  changes in the approved schedule should be provided.
Facilities Requirements—a comparison of the baseline and current  projected number of facilities required to provide appropriate work  space, housing, and support services to the population DOD  anticipates it will be supporting, including facilities, family housing,  commissaries/post exchanges, schools, child care, clinics and  hospitals, and any other facility that will be needed to support the  military, civilian employee, local national employees, contractor, and  retiree population.    Cost Summary—a comparison of the baseline, approved program,  and current estimated costs by appropriation; expressed in base  year and then-year dollars, addressing all costs associated with  establishing, modifying, and sustaining DOD’s posture under this  initiative, including costs such as the housing allowance provided  to military service members and families that are then paid to  external organizations for housing.    Funding Summary—a listing of the funding profile, by  appropriation, for the initiative, based on the current year  President’s Budget detailing prior years, current year, future years  defense program, and costs to complete; expressed in then-year  dollars. All funding requirements associated with the initiative  should be addressed, including, but not limited to military  construction, operations and support, and personnel  appropriations  Initiative Estimate Assumptions—the key assumptions that drive  initiative cost and schedule estimates, including:    Population, including the number of military, civilian, non- DOD  personnel, command sponsored families and dependants, non- command sponsored families and dependants, and military retirees  affected by the initiative.    Housing, including the use of public/private partnerships to  provide necessary facilities, percentage of personnel and  dependents expected to reside in base housing and off the base or  installation, availability of host-nation land for construction of  facilities, and the anticipated host-nation funded and/or provided  housing construction.    Cost Estimating, including modeling used to predict costs, inflation  estimates used for then-year dollar projections, and contracting  strategy.    Financial, including the funding that will be available and provided  by military services and other DOD agencies affected by the  initiative to cover their respective costs, including the expected  overseas base housing allowance that will be provided to military  families.    Medical, including extent to which each military base or  installation will have stand-alone medical treatment facilities, will  share medical treatment facilities or capacity, the services  provided (medical, dental, vision), dates new facilities will be  available for use, ratio of primary care providers to population, and  any other element that drives the number of medical treatment  facilities and associated infrastructure or personnel required to  support the population.    Education, including the estimated number of children per family,  student distribution by grade level, tuition assistance that will be  required/provided, assumptions used to develop related  Department of Defense Education Activity  cost factors,  and any other element that drives the number of schools and  associated infrastructure or personnel required to support the  population.    Support Services, including capacities of commissaries, exchanges,  USO, Red Cross or other support services or organizations,  necessary modifications to their existing facilities, and sources of  funding necessary to pay for any needed improvements or new  construction.    Local Community Support, including the extent to which local  business, housing, medical treatment, education, and other support  services will be available and necessary to support the expected  DOD population.    Host-Nation Agreements, including any specific agreements with  host nations or legal issues that establish or drive specific  timeframes for completion of the initiative or major components of  the initiatives.
S. Rep. No. 111-226, at 13-15 (2010).
section_title: Appendix III: Additional PACOM Cost and Funding Data
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Robert L. Repasky, Assistant  Director; Jeff Hubbard; Joanne Landesman; Ying Long; Greg Marchand;  Richard Meeks; Charles Perdue; Lisa Reijula; Terry Richardson; Michael  Shaughnessey; and Amie Steele made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Infrastructure: The Navy Needs Better Documentation to  Support Its Proposed Military Treatment Facilities on Guam.   GAO-11-206. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2011.
Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder  Input Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe. GAO-11-131.  Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2011.
Defense Planning: DOD Needs to Review the Costs and Benefits of  Basing Alternatives for Army Forces in Europe. GAO-10-745R.  Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2010.
Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency  Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. GAO-10-794.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
Defense Management: U.S Southern Command Demonstrates  Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed  Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. GAO-10-801.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
National Security: Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges  at DOD’s Southern and Africa Commands. GAO-10-962T. Washington,  D.C.: July 28, 2010.
Defense Infrastructure: Guam Needs Timely Information from DOD to  Meet Challenges in Planning and Financing Off-Base Projects and  Programs to Support a Larger Military Presence. GAO-10-90R.  Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Provide Updated Labor  Requirements to Help Guam Adequately Develop Its Labor Force for the  Military Buildup. GAO-10-72. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and  Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European  Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Ability to Manage,  Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives GAO-09-706R.  July 2, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Planning Challenges Could Increase Risks for  DOD in Providing Utility Services When Needed to Support the Military  Buildup on Guam. GAO-09-653. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,  Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs  Associated with the U.S. Africa Command. GAO-09-181. Washington,  D.C.: February 20, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future  Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning  Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam. GAO-08-1005. Washington, D.C.:  September 17, 2008.
Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and  Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command.  GAO-08-947T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military  Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet  to Be Addressed.GAO-08-722T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD  Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military  Buildup on Guam. GAO-07-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability  Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting  Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture  Restructuring. GAO-06-852. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.