DOD Schools: Limitations in DOD-Sponsored Study on Transfer Alternatives Underscore Need for Additional Assessment
Published: 2005-04-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) operates 59 elementary and secondary schools serving over a dozen military bases in the continental United States Periodically, questions have been raised concerning the continuing need for such schools. In 2002, DOD commissioned the Donahue Institute of the University of Massachusetts to examine the potential for transferring these schools to local education agencies (LEAs). GAO's assessment focused on (1) the extent to which DOD has established a school closure policy and the effect such policies have on quality-of-life issues for servicemembers and their dependents; and (2) the transfer study, including the clarity of the basis for conclusions reached, the overall financial impact, and issues identified but not resolved by the study. GAO's report also identifies issues not addressed in the transfer study that could impact the future of DOD's domestic schools.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Officials in the DOD Education Activity, which administers the DOD school program, said that neither DOD nor Department of Defense Education Activity has specific policy guidance related to closing domestic dependent elementary and secondary schools. While some expansion and contraction of the number of domestic schools operated by DOD occurred between the 1950s and early 1970s, relatively few have been closed or transferred since then, and most of those have been related to base closure activities. For affected military families, the retention of these schools is seen as an important quality-of-life issue. The basis for the expert panel recommendations to transfer selected DOD schools to LEAs is difficult to ascertain. Specifically, it is often unclear how various analytical factors examined led to recommendations being made. For example, in one instance the panel recommended transfer of educational responsibilities to the neighboring LEA even though the LEA's per pupil costs were higher than DOD's and the LEA schools were cited as mostly "underperforming." Moreover, the study data indicate that DOD could incur an estimated $125 million to repair and upgrade existing schools. Under the panel's recommendations, DOD would also have a continuing obligation to maintain the schools even after program transfers to the LEAs. Some long-term savings in operating costs could accrue to DOD, but many of these costs would need to be absorbed by LEAs or other federal programs. The transfer study also indicates that various legal restrictions in some states would need to be resolved. Finally, ownership of the schools DOD operates needs to be clarified in order to ensure that it is properly reflected in property records. There are other factors, most not present when the transfer study began, that could further complicate school transfer decisions, including ongoing DOD plans to relocate about 70,000 military personnel and approximately 100,000 family members currently stationed overseas to bases in the United States within the next few years; Army efforts to reorganize its force structure, with the potential for increased numbers of personnel assigned to selected military bases in the United States; and the impact of the 2005 base realignment and closure round. Likewise, current DOD efforts to privatize housing on its military bases could also impact future requirements for schools serving military dependents. DOD has appropriately said that it is postponing decision making on the results of the transfer study until after base closure decisions are finalized later this year. However, the impact of troop redeployments and other force structure changes on schools has not yet been fully assessed. Given the expected increase of school age military dependents on various stateside military bases over the next few years, a clear decision on school transfer issues should be made after the results of the base closure process and overseas rebasing plans are known to ensure adequate planning for facilities by DOD and LEAs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Historically, public elementary and secondary education has been a state  and local responsibility.  However, for many years, the Department of  Defense (DOD) has also operated a number of such schools (currently 59)  serving over a dozen military bases in the continental United States.   Periodically, questions have been raised within the Congress concerning  the continuing need for such schools, and various studies were  commissioned in the 1980s and early 1990s to study the potential for  transferring responsibility for educating students served by these schools  to local public school districts—otherwise referred to in this report as local  education agencies (LEAs).  Prior studies identified multiple issues that  would have to be addressed if a transfer of responsibilities were to be  attempted, and such transfers were not considered feasible. Furthermore,  military members served by these schools and related support groups have  voiced strong support for retention of these DOD schools based on quality- of-life considerations.
In 2002, the department’s attention once again turned to studying the  potential for transferring DOD’s domestic elementary and secondary  education program over to LEAs.  Officials in the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA), which administers this program, have  indicated that the new effort was the result of questions raised by the then  chairman of the House Appropriations Military Construction  Subcommittee regarding whether there was a need for continued operation  of these schools by DOD arising from a request for funding for a school- related project on a military base.  Additionally, in 2002, as part of its focus  on improving management of the department, DOD’s senior leadership  endorsed examining departmental functions to determine whether they  were core to the department’s warfighting mission, with expectations that  needed products or services associated with non-core functions should be  obtained from other government agencies or the private sector. In  announcing that it would begin a new study of elementary and secondary  schools operated by DOD on 14 installation areas in seven states including  Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, New York,  and Virginia, Department of Defense Domestic Dependent Elementary and  Secondary Schools’ (DDESS) press release indicated that the study would  “focus largely on the ability and willingness of LEAs to assume educational  responsibility for the students currently enrolled in DOD’s domestic  schools.” The transfer study effort, apart from a facilities analysis phase by  Parkhill, Smith, and Cooper Inc., was completed under contract by the  Donahue Institute of the University of Massachusetts.
The Donahue Institute retained an independent panel of education experts  which developed recommendations based on the Institute’s data and the  facility data obtained under the Corps of Engineers contract.  The panel of  experts recommended transferring educational responsibilities at 10 of 14  installation areas studied from DDESS schools to LEAs.  DOD does not  plan to make a decision regarding the recommendations until after  decisions on the upcoming base realignment and closure round are  completed later this year.
Section 597 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2005, which was signed into law on October 28, 2004,  required the Comptroller General to prepare a report containing: (1) an assessment of the policy of the Department of Defense, and the  criteria utilized by the department, regarding the closure of Department of  Defense dependent elementary and secondary schools, including whether  or not such policy and criteria are consistent with department policies and  procedures on the preservation of the quality-of-life of members of the  Armed Forces and their dependents; and  (2) an assessment of any current or on-going studies or assessments of the  department with respect to any of the schools.
The legislation required that the report be submitted to the Senate and  House Armed Services committees not later than 180 days after the date of  the enactment of the legislation.
Our assessment focused on (1) the extent to which DOD has established a  school closure policy and the effect such a policy has on quality-of-life  issues for servicemembers and their dependents; and (2) the transfer study  conducted by the Donahue Institute, including the clarity of the basis for  conclusions reached, the overall financial impact, and issues identified but  not resolved by the study.  While conducting this work, we also noted other  issues not addressed in the transfer study that could impact decision  making regarding the future of DOD’s domestic elementary and secondary  schools.
In completing this engagement, we interviewed DODEA officials regarding  their policy guidance related to closing schools and reviewed the results of  the recent study dealing with the potential transfer of DDESS schools to  LEAs.  We discussed the study design and methodology with officials of  DODEA, DDESS, the Donahue Institute and two of the three members of  the panel of experts employed by the institute to review its data and to  develop study recommendations. We examined the various study summary  documents to try to gauge the basis for the study’s recommendations and  determine how clearly the recommendations were linked to the summary  information provided.  We also reviewed summaries of interviews  completed by the institute with leaders in affected DDESS schools and  local education agencies to confirm and better understand the range of  issues associated with the issue of potential transfer of the schools to  LEAs.  Likewise, we also discussed relevant issues concerning federal  impact aid and experience in transferring federally owned schools to LEAs  with officials at the U.S. Department of Education.  Given time constraints,  we did not attempt to validate data included in DOD’s transfer study, but  we did review the steps taken by the Donahue Institute to verify its data  and analysis and to compare key data against other available data sets to  corroborate its relative accuracy.  We obtained other relevant statistical  data concerning data about DDESS schools from DODEA and made limited  checks to assure ourselves that the data was sufficiently accurate for the  purposes of our review.
We conducted this review from January to April 2005 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.  Further details about  our scope and methodology appear at the end of this report.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Notwithstanding that public elementary and secondary education  historically has been a state and local responsibility, DOD has also operated  such schools at selected U.S. and overseas locations to educate military  dependents residing on military bases. Collectively, the domestic and  overseas programs operate over 200 dependent schools in the United  States, U.S. territories, and overseas, with 59 schools operated in the  continental United States. (See appendix II for a listing of these DDESS  school locations.) Approximately 105,000 students are enrolled in these  combined programs, with approximately 24,000 students attending the 59  schools in the continental United States.  DDESS schools mostly serve  elementary school-aged students in the United States, with older students  attending public schools off the installations.   The overseas DODDS  system has approximately 12,000 employees while the DDESS system has  approximately 5,700 employees.  The combined operating budget for both  systems and headquarters in fiscal year 2005 is about $1.49 billion of which  approximately $367 million is for operating DDESS schools.
As we have previously reported, the federal government’s operation of  elementary schools in the continental United States to educate military  dependents residing on military bases traces its history back many years  and to locations where a suitable free public education was not available.
There were a variety of reasons for establishing schools on military bases,  including military installations that were located in sparsely populated  areas and efforts to avoid racial segregation at the neighboring school  districts.
From 1951 to 1981, funding responsibility for the domestic schools resided  with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and subsequently  with the Department of Education. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-35) transferred funding responsibility to DOD.   Today, DODEA, the umbrella agency created in 1994 to administer the  overseas (DODDS) and domestic (DDESS) systems, operates under the  direction of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Military Community  and Family Policy, and the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and  Readiness.
The DDESS model is but one of several approaches to providing  elementary and secondary education to dependents of military personnel  residing on military bases in the United States.  There are 33 Department of  Education-owned schools located on military bases but operated by LEAs,  providing education for military dependents residing on those bases.  The  Department of Education has been gradually transferring these schools to  LEAs as funds are available to upgrade the condition of the schools to  encourage acceptance of the schools by LEAs.   In other instances, LEAs  own and operate schools located on military bases.  Finally, in a limited  number of instances, DOD directly funds LEAs to educate military  dependents at schools operated on military bases.
Periodically, questions have arisen within the Congress concerning the  continuing need for such schools within the continental United States, and  various studies were commissioned in the 1980s and early 1990s to evaluate  the potential for transferring the schools to LEAs. In December 1986 we  examined three methods to educate military dependents, then in selected  use, which were viewed as alternatives to the DOD-funded and operated  schools.  They included: (1) operation by local school districts, with  funding from federal, state, and local governments; (2) DOD contracting  with local school districts for educational services; and (3) coterminous  operation, whereby dependents’ schools operated as local school districts  whose boundaries were the same as the military installations’ boundaries,  and where funding for those districts was shared by the Department of  Education (through the federal impact aid program) and the responsible  state government.  We reported in December 1986 that creation of school  districts coterminous with military installations appeared to be the best of  the three alternatives, in part because such an approach would likely  minimize the transfer of students from existing schools and eliminate costs  to DOD.  However, according to a DODEA official, most states have since  passed laws that prohibit the creation of new school districts, which  eliminates the coterminous option from  consideration.  We also reported  that jurisdictional, legal, and other issues could impede consideration of all  three alternatives.  Subsequent studies by others offered varying degrees of  insights regarding these alternatives and difficulties likely to be  encountered in trying to implement them, and often identified multiple  issues that would have to be addressed—including legal and financial  issues, and strong opposition from affected military families—if a transfer  of responsibilities were to be attempted.  As a result, school transfers were  not considered feasible.  (See app. III for a synopsis of each of the prior  studies.)
In 2002, DOD’s attention again turned to studying the potential for  transferring DOD’s domestic elementary and secondary education program  over to LEAs.  DODEA officials have indicated that the new effort was the  result of questions raised by the then chairman of the House  Appropriations Military Construction Subcommittee regarding whether  there was a continuing need for DOD to operate these schools triggered by  a request for funding for a school-related project on a military base.  We  also note that in 2002, as part of its focus on improving management of the  department, DOD’s Senior Executive Council endorsed a core  competency-based approach for DOD sourcing decisions—that is, the  decision to use a public or private sector source to perform a necessary  agency function or activity was based on whether the function or activity  was core to the agency’s mission. The Senior Executive Council believed  that the department should focus its energies and talents on those  functions that were core or directly linked to its warfighting mission. These  core functions must be performed by the agency, with the expectation that  necessary products or services associated with non-core functions should  be obtained from other government agencies or the private sector.
A DDESS press release, announcing the planned transfer study in 2002,  indicated that the study would “focus largely on the ability and willingness  of LEAs to assume educational responsibility for the students currently  enrolled in DOD’s domestic schools.”  This transfer study was performed in  multiple phases that included:  A facility condition assessment performed by Parkhill, Smith, and  Cooper, Inc., and contracted through the Army Corps of Engineers.   Field observer site visits were made to document the current physical  condition of each school, estimate probable costs for remediation, and  assess whether renovation or replacement was needed. This assessment  identified about $125 million in remediation costs for all 58 DDESS  schools surveyed and about $33 million to replace 4 of the schools.
A data collection and analysis phase conducted by the Donahue  Institute of the University of Massachusetts to examine the feasibility of  transferring 58 DDESS schools operating in the continental United  States to local school districts.  A set of transfer alternatives was  developed and analyzed for each of the DDESS schools.
Use of a three-person expert panel, approved by DOD and contracted by  the Donahue Institute to independently assess the Institute’s data and  analysis and make recommendations regarding transfer alternatives.
A quality-of-life assessment, based on an October 2003 meeting in  Peachtree City, Georgia, with representatives of the domestic DDESS  schools and installations where their views were solicited and  documented.  Participants included installation commanders, students,  parents, union leaders, and special interest groups.
The recommendations of the panel of experts were submitted to DODEA in  December 2003, but remained closely held without widespread  dissemination inside the department and without public dissemination  until February 2005.  At the time we completed our work, DOD had not  made a decision regarding adoption of the panel’s recommendations,  postponing such a decision until later this year after decisions related to  the 2005 base realignment and closure round are completed.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have Specific Criteria for Closing Schools
paragraphs: While DOD has previously urged its components to examine for potential  divestiture or outsourcing of functions not core to warfighting efforts to the  private sector, neither DODEA nor DOD has policy guidance related to  closing the dependent elementary and secondary schools operated by the  department.  While expansion and contraction of the number of domestic  schools operated by DOD occurred between the 1950s and early 1970s,  relatively few have been closed or transferred since then, and most of these  have been related to base closure activities. For affected military families,  the retention of these schools is seen as a quality-of-life issue, but there are  varying perspectives on this issue within DOD.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Eliminated Few Domestic Schools in Recent Years
paragraphs: DODEA officials told us they had eliminated only three domestic schools in  the past few years; one in 2001 in Georgia as the result of military housing  privatization initiative, and two others in 2004 as the result of a base  closure in Puerto Rico.  This contrasts with an earlier period between the  1950s and 1970s when there was a more robust expansion and contraction  in such schools.
Per the 2004 defense appropriations act, the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station  in Puerto Rico was closed in 2004 and, as part of that closure, the DDESS  schools on that base also closed.  The only other instance of a DDESS  school being eliminated in recent years occurred in 2001 as a result of the  department’s housing privatization efforts.  In that instance, land  associated with on-base housing at Warner Robins Air Force Base, Georgia,  was transferred to a contractor and the land transferred included one of the  base’s two schools.  As a result, the school was subsequently transferred to  the LEA, which became responsible for educating students at that school.   DOD housing privatization officials indicated they do not currently  anticipate similar transfers of schools in the future.
Earlier transfer studies point to expansion and contraction of DOD  operated schools on military bases between 1950 and 1970. Schools were  added to the DDESS system as a result of the racial integration of the  military during the time when the schools in the neighboring LEAs  remained segregated.  At one point, about 100 military installations  reportedly had schools that belonged to what is now the DDESS system.  Various studies report a subsequent contraction in the number of these  schools due to a variety of factors including successful implementation of  integration policies in many instances that allowed base schools to rejoin  their former LEAs, pressure from the U.S. Department of Education on  states and  localities to acknowledge responsibility for the education of  military dependents, and  commercial and residential development  adjacent to some bases that enabled the LEA to provide a viable  educational program.
section_title: Retention of Domestic Dependent Schools Is Seen as a Quality-of-Life Issue
paragraphs: Survey and other data from the current and earlier studies on transfer  issues clearly indicate that affected military families, whose dependents  attend DDESS schools, view their retention as a quality-of-life issue. While  their children represent a very small percentage of the dependent school- aged population, affected servicemembers’ views of the quality of  education and related services provided by the dependent schools makes  clear that the retention of these schools is very important to them.  An  October 1997 Defense Manpower Data Center study noted that “the loss of  the DDESS schools would undoubtedly be viewed as another loss of a  military quality-of-life benefit. But unlike many other benefit cuts… that  affect all or most military servicemembers, the loss of this benefit would  affect a small proportion of military servicemembers.”
The Defense Manpower Data Center report also indicated that DDESS  students comprised only three percent of all school-aged children of active- duty servicemembers.  DODEA provided us with data that indicate that  figure remains current today.  Moreover, only 23 percent of all school-aged  dependents of military members assigned to the installations served by  DOD’s domestic dependent schools in the continental United States attend  the schools. This can be attributed to the fact that many military families  reside in local communities—that is, not on the base—and thus are not  eligible to attend DDESS schools, and the fact that relatively few DDESS  schools provide education for high school students.
DOD’s guidance for deciding what functions the department performs that  could be considered commercial in nature and readily available in the  private sector, has exempted DOD schools from outsourcing consideration.  DOD’s guidance stipulates that principals and faculty at DOD dependent  schools perform functions that could be performed by the private sector  “but without the same effect—i.e., military performance of these activities  carries special meaning for military personnel, and their families.”  The  guidance also notes that principals and faculty at DOD Dependent Schools  demonstrate family support, promote quality-of- life and foster  camaraderie for recruitment and retention purposes.  Accordingly, DOD  dependent schools were exempt from private sector performance  comparisons.  In addition, in recent years, DOD has sought a more  aggressive look at whether various functions are core to the department’s  warfighting mission, and to increase the number of functions that might be  performed by the private sector. Dependent schools are one such function  that has sometimes been questioned regarding its connection to DOD’s  core mission.
Conversely, in July 2002, DOD published A New Social Compact: A  Reciprocal Partnership Between The Department of Defense,  Servicemembers and Families.  The document was issued under the  auspices of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community  and Family Policy).  It noted that in 2001, the President had issued a  National Security Presidential Directive requiring the Secretary of Defense  to undertake a review of measures for improving the quality of life for  military personnel and provide recommendations for their implementation.   While the new compact did not specifically address the issue of whether  DOD dependent schools should be retained or transferred to LEAs, it did  include a section devoted to enhancing educational opportunities provided  through DODEA worldwide.
section_title: Expert Panel Recommends Program Transfers to LEAs in Most Instances, but Basis for Decisions Are Not Always Clear, and Many Issues Remain to be Addressed
paragraphs: The panel of experts recommended transferring most educational  responsibilities from DDESS schools to LEAs at 10 of 14 installation areas  studied.  The institute sought to contrast DDESS and LEA schools to guide  the panel’s analysis and process for making recommendations.  Nonetheless, the basis for these recommendations is difficult to ascertain  based on study report documents. The study indicates that DOD could  incur significant costs, as well as face legal and other issues related to the  transfer of schools to LEAs.  Finally, the panel recognizes that such  transfers would have to be done on an individual, negotiated basis.
subsections: section_title: Transfer Study Contrasts DDESS and LEA Schools to Guide Expert Panel’s Recommendations
paragraphs: The Donahue Institute study built on the work of prior studies, examining  many transfer alternatives previously considered in earlier studies ranging  from the status quo to the transfer of educational programs to LEAs. While  various issues addressed in the study were similar to those previously  studied—such as facility conditions and remediation costs and identifying  transfer options and impediments to their use—it sought to make a  comparative assessment of DDESS and surrounding LEA schools to  provide the basis for informed decision making.  The report noted that the  expert panel established the following guiding principles to guide its  recommendations:  All students transferred from DDESS to local public schools must be  provided comparable educational programs, services and facilities.
School communities gain from diversity.
Cost effectiveness of government. Any transfer alternative must be cost- effective not only to DODEA, but to the state and local entities involved.
Deference to the needs of younger students.  It is rarely advisable to  transfer or otherwise disrupt the educational process of very young  students.
Any transfer of DDESS will include just and reasonable compensation to  the LEA for operational and facilities costs.
Each installation/LEA will be considered separately.
The report noted that the experts stressed that while each one was  important, no single principle or criterion would necessarily rule in or out a  transfer alternative.  Rather, the totality of all financial and non-financial  factors was carefully considered, evaluated, and factored into each  recommendation.  The panel also developed feasibility rules associated  with any transfer decisions to help assure basic equity and fairness for the  students, families, and communities that might be affected by the study.   Appendix IV includes summary information on the rules and alternatives  considered.
The expert panel recommended that the educational responsibility for  most schools in 10 of the 14 installation areas be transferred to the LEAs,  and with use of DDESS operated facilities in most instances, as noted in  table 1.
The expert panel recommended transferring most school programs to  LEAs with use of existing school facilities on the military installations, but  with DOD continuing to be responsible for funding maintenance,  operations, and improvements for most facilities.   The panel of expert’s  recommendation for continued DOD responsibility for the facilities was  attributed to legal difficulties the expert panel believed existed in some  states that could prohibit LEAs from expending funds for schools located  on federal lands, as well as the recognized need to provide reasonable  assistance to the LEAs.   In total, LEAs were projected to use 45 DDESS  operated schools, but take title to only 1 of them.
The recommendations included just a few exceptions to the recommended  transfer approach wherein DOD would continue to maintain the school  facilities.  For two South Carolina (Laurel Bay area) school programs  recommended for transfer, one school would be retained by DDESS to  continue educating Pre-K through grade 3 students, and one school would  be transferred to the LEA through a title transfer—the only title transfer  recommended.  In another instance—involving Quantico, Virginia schools  and the Prince William County Schools—responsibility for educating about  fifty percent of the school children would be transferred, but without any  of the school facilities.  The Prince William County LEA reportedly had  indicated an unwillingness to use the DDESS school facilities.  At West  Point, New York, responsibility for educating all children would be  transferred to the LEA and it would use only one DDESS facility.
Notwithstanding the panel of expert recommendation that DOD continue  to fund maintenance and operation for most of the school facilities, we  found that clarification of ownership of DDESS-operated school facilities  between DOD and the U.S. Department of Education needs to be  addressed.  In completing this review we found that despite DOD having  assumed responsibility for operating the current DDESS facilities from the  U.S. Department of Education many years ago, a majority of the 58 school  facilities had not been formally transferred to DOD.  U.S. Department of  Education officials told us they were working to transfer the schools to  DOD.  Resolution of this issue is important to ensure proper accounting for  property in the appropriate agency’s property records.  At the same time,  we also learned that any efforts by DOD to transfer schools to LEAs where  it has clear ownership of the property could be more difficult and time  consuming than for the Department of Education since the latter has  specific legislative authority authorizing such direct transfers.
section_title: Lack Of Clarity for Selecting LEAs Over Some DDESS Schools And Proposing Transfers of Most Schools
paragraphs: While the methodology used by the Donahue Institute and its expert panel  reportedly guided data gathering, analysis, and development of  recommendations, the expert panel’s summary comments and various  binders of data comprising the study report do not always make clear the  basis for the panel’s recommendations.  The report stated that the panel  agreed that no single factor would be the basis of a decision to accept or  reject a specific alternative.  How the panel of experts evaluated the  various factors in order to come up with recommendations is not always  clear based on information provided in the various study documents.  Two  of the expert panel members we contacted acknowledged that the  recommendations were subjective but based on all the members’ collective  expertise and experiences.
Moreover, we found instances where data for selected quality measures  such as teacher to student ratios and teacher qualifications included in  various study report documents provide mixed pictures of comparative  quality factors between DDESS and LEA schools.  For example, in a few  instances, the panel recommended transfers to LEA districts even though  the district schools were considered to be “underperforming” while  another adjacent LEA’s schools were considered “overperforming” and  with lower per pupil costs; or a LEA was recommended over DDESS even  though the LEA’s per pupil costs were higher and its schools were cited as  mostly “underperforming.” Appendix V highlights examples of the  divergent information contained in various transfer study documents for  four installations.
section_title: DOD Would Achieve Savings, but Some Costs Would Be Shifted to Department of Education and LEAs
paragraphs: In transferring the education responsibility to LEAs, DOD would achieve  savings in costs it currently incurs by operating schools, but many of these  costs would be shifted to others.  However, study data indicate that DOD  could incur costs of about $125 million to repair and upgrade existing  DDESS school facilities,.  Moreover, DOD would also continue to have  ongoing costs to maintain the school facilities as the education programs  are operated by the LEAs under the alternative recommended by the panel  of experts.  At the same time, given various pending changes in basing  arrangements that will likely increase the number of dependent students at  bases in the United States, we believe that the facility costs contained in  the study would be subject to change before any potential decision to  approve the study recommendations was implemented.
The study, based on data provided by the Department of Education,   assumes that many costs would be passed on to the state and local  governments, and that LEAs would be eligible for impact aid from the  federal Department of Education.   While the study makes various  assumptions about likely impact aid to LEAs, we are not able to affirm the  reliability of those estimates based on the data provided.  Impact aid is a  program that is subject to annual appropriations and not an entitlement;  and, based on our discussions with Department of Education officials, the  amount of impact aid to which an LEA would be entitled is formula based,  and not easily calculated in advance.  Also, as we note elsewhere in this  report, various communities surrounding military bases in the United  States are expected to experience a significant influx of military  dependents over the next few years as DOD restations many military  personnel from bases overseas to ones in the continental United States.   This could place an increased burden on the Department of Education’s  impact aid program as it distributes resources across more LEAs.  In  addition, states and LEAs would bear an additional burden if impact aid  funds were not increased.
The recent study, as did prior studies, found unique circumstances that  could impact costs and would require resolution on a site-by-site basis,  should an effort be made to transfer educational responsibilities from  DDESS to LEAs.  For example, Fort Campbell has a large DDESS student  population, with eight schools in two states, and agreements would have to  be worked out to permit the students to cross jurisdictional boundaries to  attend the LEA administered school.  In a couple of other instances, DDESS  schools for an installation may fall within the jurisdiction of two counties  and special arrangements would be needed to enable students whose on- base residency falls in one county to attend schools in the other county.  In  other instances, the study report noted limitations or caps on numbers of  students eligible for special education in certain LEAs compared with those  in DDESS schools that would need to be addressed.  Thus, individual  negotiations at each DDESS location and LEA would be required to address  these and other issues.
section_title: Other Issues Could Impact Decision Making
paragraphs: Apart from issues identified in the transfer study, there are other  factors/issues that were not present when the transfer study began that  could impact DDESS and LEA schools and further complicate school  transfer decisions. These factors relate to planned overseas basing  changes, major force structure changes planned by the Army, the domestic  base closure process, and DOD efforts to privatize housing.
The study did not consider ongoing DOD plans to realign U.S. bases  overseas and announced plans to restation about 70,000 military personnel  and approximately 100,000 family members currently stationed overseas to  bases in the United States.  However, the details on where many of these  personnel and associated units are likely to be restationed will not be  known until the 2005 base realignment and closure decisions are made  later this year. Nevertheless, this rebasing effort could result in significant  increases in populations of various bases with many new students requiring  education by LEAs.  To the extent DDESS programs are affected, this could  complicate any negotiations with LEAs regarding assumption of on-base  DDESS programs.  Likewise, the extent to which DDESS installations will  be impacted by the base closure process will not be known until later this  year.
The study also does not reflect efforts under way by the Army to reorganize  its force structure, creating new units of action with the potential for  increased numbers of personnel assigned to selected military bases in the  United States. A recent Congressional Research Service report summarized  the magnitude of this effort. It noted that, “…in what the Army describes  as the ‘most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years,’ the Army  intends to redesign its current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48  brigade-level unit of action or UA force by FY 2007.”  This conversion is  expected to add over 2,000 personnel to many of these former brigades at  various installations.  A few of these new units of action tentatively have  been identified for installations in the United States where some DDESS  schools operate.
DOD has appropriately said that it is postponing decision making on the  results of the transfer study until after base closure decisions are finalized  later this year. Importantly, the transfer study, in examining educational  expenditures, largely considered the cost impact on LEAs from a potential  transfer decision on an incremental cost basis.  A large influx of students  into LEA or DDESS schools as a result of the above factors could require a  fuller assessment of funding and facility needs than provided for in the  existing study.
The transfer study partly touched on current DOD efforts to privatize  housing on its military bases, but study officials recognize that the full  impact of that initiative was not available for consideration in their report.   Additionally, DOD housing officials told us that previous plans for housing  privatization may need to be adjusted as efforts are made to ensure  adequate housing for the thousands of military personnel scheduled to be  redeployed to the United States.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The transfer study has a number of limitations that present less than a  clear-cut answer to the feasibility and desirability of transferring  educational responsibilities from DDESS to LEAs.  Moreover, there are  important issues not addressed in the study such as the anticipated  restationing of thousands of military personnel and their dependents from  overseas to U.S. bases, the Army’s planned force restructuring, and the  domestic base closure process that could stress existing educational  capacities and require expanded capabilities at affected bases. DOD has  appropriately said that it is postponing decision making on the results of  the transfer study until after base closure decisions are finalized later this  year. Until DOD obtains a fuller understanding of all these plans and time  frames the likely financial impact on DDESS and LEAs remains unknown.  Without that assessment, the financial assessment completed by the  current transfer study is incomplete.  Fundamentally, a decision on  whether to transfer educational responsibilities from DDESS to LEAs is a  policy decision that requires balancing fiscal, educational, and other quality  of life considerations.  Once the results of the domestic base closure  process and overseas rebasing plans are known, a decision on the school  transfer issue should be made sooner rather than later to ensure adequate  planning, funding and siting of new school facilities in the United States  that may be needed to support increasing populations of military  dependent students.  Regardless, there needs to be proper accounting for  the school facilities in federal property records.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Should a decision be made to transfer some or all of DDESS domestic  schools to LEAs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in  conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness require that such efforts be accompanied by a more complete  assessment of the impact of troop redeployments and other force structure  changes on educational facility requirements on affected installations and  surrounding communities to facilitate needed facility and operational  planning by DOD, the Department of Education and LEAs to meet changing  needs.  Regardless of transfer decisions, we recommend that the Secretary  ensure DDESS school facilities are properly reflected in DOD’s property  records and removed from the Department of Education records.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Principal Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) concurred with our  recommendations. The department’s response indicated that any decision  to transfer educational responsibility to local educational authorities would  occur after the base closure process is complete and would involve  consultations with the military services and Congress, and that it is  working with the Department of Education to ensure school facilities are  properly recorded in real property records.  However, the department took  exception with the title of our report because it believed we raised issues  that were related to events occurring after the study began such as the  formulation of the rebasing plan, which were outside the scope of the  transfer study.  We believe, however, that the title correctly captures the  limitations of the DOD-sponsored study as both having to do with external  issues affecting the study that became known after the study began as well  as limitations with the study that made unclear the basis for the transfer  recommendations.  Therefore, we did not change our title. The department  separately provided various technical comments which are incorporated  where appropriate.  DOD’s comments are included in appendix VI of this  report.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which DOD has established a school closure  policy and the effect such policies have on quality-of-life issues for  servicemembers and their dependents, we discussed the issue with  cognizant officials within DODEA and other departmental officials.  We  obtained and reviewed data on DDESS school closures in prior years and  the basis for those closures, as well as similar information from the U.S.  Department of Education concerning schools owned by that department  serving military dependents.  We also met with education officials to  discuss administration of federal impact aid and learn about their  experience in transferring federally owned schools to LEAs.  To obtain  DOD perspectives concerning the issues of dependent schools as a quality  of life issue, we obtained and reviewed the Department’s July 2002,  publication entitled A New Social Compact: A Reciprocal Partnership  Between The Department of Defense, Servicemembers and Families.  The  document was issued under the auspices of the Deputy Assistant Secretary  of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy) providing  departmental perspective on a range of quality of life issues, including  schools.  We contrasted that with information obtained from the  Department’s Housing and Privatization Office on criteria for considering  commercial activities performed by the department for potential  public/private competitions under OMB Circular A-76.  Likewise, we  contrasted that information with other information regarding departmental  efforts to more rigorously assess what functions are considered core to  warfighting efforts with policy direction to consider those not designated  for potential outsourcing.
To assess the transfer study completed for DODEA by the Donahue  Institute, including the clarity of the basis for conclusions reached, the  overall financial impact, and issues identified but not resolved by the study,  we first reviewed the various summary reports prepared by the Donahue  Institute, the results of the facility condition assessment performed by  Parkhill, Smith, and Cooper, Inc., and a summary of the phase 3 quality-of- life assessment. We discussed the transfer study design and methodology  with officials of DODEA, the Donahue Institute and two of the three  members of the panel of experts employed by the institute to review its  data and to develop study recommendations. Likewise, we also reviewed  the results of previous transfer studies to understand similarities and  differences between previous studies and the recent study effort.  To assess  the basis for recommendations made by the expert panel, we examined the  data developed for the panel’s use that was contained in the Donahue  Institute’s various study summary documents to try to gauge the basis for  the recommendations and determine how clearly the recommendations  were linked to the summary information provided. Given time constraints,  we did not attempt to validate financial and other quantitative data  included in the study, but we did review the steps taken by the Donahue  Institute to verify its data and analysis and to compare some key data  against other available data sets to corroborate its relative accuracy. We  also reviewed summaries of interviews completed by the institute with  leaders in affected DDESS schools and local education agencies to confirm  and better understand the range of issues associated with the issue of  potential transfer of the schools to LEAs—as well as similar information  contained in prior studies. We obtained other relevant statistical data about  DDESS schools from DODEA and made limited checks to assure ourselves  that the data was sufficiently accurate for the purposes of our review.
To frame other issues not addressed in the transfer study that could impact  decision making regarding the future of DOD’s domestic elementary and  secondary schools, we relied on insights gained from other ongoing GAO  assessments in the Defense area that had the potential to impact dependent  educational requirements on military bases and confirmed our assumptions  through discussions with cognizant Defense officials.
We conducted this review from January to April 2005 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority  Members, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittees on  Defense and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs; Chairmen and  Ranking Minority Members, House Committee on Appropriations,  Subcommittee on Quality of Life; Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the  Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the  Secretary of Education; and the Director, Office of Management and  Budget.   Copies will be made available to others upon request.  In addition,  this report will be available at no charge on our Web site at  htt://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-5581, or my Assistant Director, Michael  Kennedy, at (202) 512-8333 if you or your staff have any further questions  regarding this report.  Major contributors to this report were Maewanda  MichaelJackson, Hilary Murrish, and R.K. Wild of GAO’s Defense  Capabilities and Management team, Dr. Nagla’a D. El-Hodiri of GAO’s  Education and Workforce team, and Julia Matta, Office of General Counsel.
section_title: Expert Panel Members
paragraphs: The DDESS Transfer study completed by the Donahue Institute of the  University of Massachusetts indicated that the results of its data and study  component analysis were presented to a panel of three leading national  experts on educational administration and finance.  The study report  provides the following information regarding the three experts:  Kern Alexander, Ed.D.  Dr. Alexander is a national expert in the field of  school finance.  He is Chair of the Board of Editors for the Journal of  Education Finance.  He served as director of the Institute for  Educational Finance at the University of Florida, and as Director of the  National Educational Finance Project while it conducted a nationwide  study of educational fiscal policy involving all 50 state education  agencies.  He has published numerous books, book chapters and articles  on school finance.  He is currently a professor at the University of  Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;  Richard Salmon, Ed.D.  Dr. Salmon is a nationally recognized expert in  the fields of school finance and Federal Impact Aid issues.  He is a  professor at Virginia Tech and has authored numerous textbooks, book  chapters, and articles on public school finance.  Dr. Salmon is a member  of the Board of Editors for The Journal of Education Finance.  He also  consults for the U.S. Department of Education Bureau of Impact Aid and  has testified for the department in several federal trials.  He served in  the United States Navy for more than 20 years, retiring as Commander  from the Naval Reserve; and  Deborah A. Verstegen, Ph.D.  Dr. Verstegen is a national expert in the  field of school finance.  She is a professor of education at the University  of Virginia, where she teaches a number of courses including  Educational Finance Policy and Practice, School Finance, and  Educational Policy Analysis.  She has authored many books, book  chapters, and refereed journal articles and monographs on education  finance.  She is past editor and currently serves on the editorial staff of  The Journal of Education Finance.  She has completed a study of all 50- state school finance systems for the Education Commission of the  States, entitled “School Finance at a Glance.”
section_title: Department of Defense Elementary and Secondary (DDESS) Schools in the Continental United States
paragraphs: Adjacent Local Education  Agency(ies)
section_title: Prior Studies on Transferring DDESS Schools to LEAs
paragraphs: A December 1986 study entitled DOD Schools:  Funding and Operating  Alternatives for Education of Dependents, by GAO.  Congress, in  enacting the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1985 (Public Law  98-407), expressed the view that the exclusive federal responsibility for  funding and operating the military dependents’ schools might no longer  be necessary, and directed us to determine the most suitable alternative  for funding and operating these schools.
A July 1988 study entitled The Transfer Of Section 6 Schools: A Case by  Case Analysis. The study was completed by Rand under the  sponsorship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Force Management  and Personnel as the result of Congress incorporating into the Military  Construction Authorization Act, 1986, a request to the Secretary of  Defense to submit a plan “which provides for the orderly transfer, not  later than July 1990, of all Section 6 schools to the appropriate local  school districts of the states in which such schools are located.” DOD  later reported to the Congress, in December 1988, that based on the  results of a detailed study of the schools, it had decided to suspend  efforts to transfer educational responsibilities for the schools to LEAs.
A 1991 study entitled Section 6 Schools in Six States:  Eleven Case  Studies of Transfer Issues.  This study was also completed by Rand  under sponsorship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force  Management and Personnel), as a supplement to the earlier Rand study.
A March 1995 study entitled Construction, Repair, and Rehabilitation  Needs of Dependent School Facilities Located on Military Installations  in the United States.  This study was jointly prepared by the DOD and  the Department of Education. According to the study, it was the result of  language contained in the House Committee on Appropriations Report  on the Fiscal Year 1993 DOD Appropriations Bill, Committee Report  Number 102-627, dated June 29, 1992, which requested DOD and the  Department of Education to conduct a study to assess:  the condition of  school facilities on military installations in the United States; the  requirements for remedial maintenance to bring school facilities up to  an acceptable condition, including meeting applicable building codes;  the feasibility and desirability of transferring ownership of facilities to  local school districts that provide educational services at military  installations; and a funding plan for correcting the maintenance backlog  over the next 5 years and the new construction backlog over the next 10  years.  The study included existing on-base dependent school facilities  owned by DOD or the Department of Education and operated by DOD  or LEAs.
An October 1997 study entitled A Study of Schools Serving Military  Families in the U.S.: Education Quality, Federal Administration, and  Funding.  The study was completed by the Survey & Program  Evaluation Division of the Defense Manpower Data Center.  It was  conducted in response to a request contained in the Conference Report  on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public  Law 103-337), asking the Secretary of Defense to collect information  concerning the possibility of transferring DOD dependent schools to  local education agencies.  The study included results of a survey of  military parents on the quality of education provided by DOD dependent  schools and local education agencies and their perspective on the  transfer issue.
section_title: Transfer Study Rules and Alternatives
paragraphs: The transfer study notes that “the deeper the study team got into the data  collection and site visit process, the more evident it became that a limited  set of universal principles or rules was needed to help all parties achieve  two important and complementary purposes.  The first purpose was to  assure basic equity and fairness for the students, families and communities  that might be affected by the outcomes of particular transfer alternatives;  the second was to assure that the panel of national experts ends up with a  package of findings and analysis that was sufficiently manageable so it  could produce its recommendations.  It noted that while exceptions might  be appropriate on a case-by-case basis, applying the following rules to all  installations helped achieve these dual ends of equity and practicality:  It would be unfair for some students at the same grade level to transfer  to the LEA district while other students in the same grade remain on  base.  Therefore, at any installation, any decision affecting one DDESS  school shall apply to all DDESS schools with the same or overlapping  grade levels;  To maintain continuity and effective education, it is not feasible to  transfer students at a particular grade and then return them to the  DDESS curriculum at a higher grade.  Therefore, if a transfer is made at  one grade, all succeeding higher grades must transfer as well;  If a DDESS elementary school with a pre-kindergarten (pre-K) program  is transferred to an LEA that does not offer a pre-K program, DDESS will  continue to offer pre-K services, using either on-site or off-site  resources; and  It would be both inefficient and detrimental to educational consistency  to have some DDESS schools run under contract with the LEA while  others on the same installation do not.  Therefore, if a contract or  coterminous alternative is chosen for any DDESS school, that  alternative should apply to all schools on the installation.
The study team developed a set of transfer alternatives for consideration  including:  Maintaining the status quo, i.e. DDESS schools would continue to  operate as they have in the past.
Transfer responsibilities for the educational program to the LEA along  with facilities being used by DDESS.  The LEA would accept full  responsibility for educating military children and for the future upkeep  of the facilities. It assumed the installation school facilities would be  brought up to LEA maintenance and building standards prior to LEA  occupancy.
Transfer without facilities.  DDESS students would transfer to the  neighboring LEA and integrated into the existing school facilities.
Contract with the LEA to provide educational services on the  installation.
Create a public school district within the installation, coterminous with  its existing boundaries (coterminous alternative).  Under that  assumption, all DDESS schools on base would be included in the newly  created LEA. DOD would provide the LEA with title of DDESS facilities  (except where noted otherwise), and buildings and facilities would be  brought up to LEA standards before being transferred to the LEA.
These were similar to alternatives considered in some prior studies.
section_title: Differing Perspectives on Selected DDESS and LEA Schools Contained in Various Transfer Study Report Documents
paragraphs: The DDESS Transfer Study Report prepared by the Donahue Institute with  its supporting data is contained in multiple binders.  The recommendations  report, prepared by the panel of experts, are contained in a binder  sometimes referred to as the “green book”.  Underpinning that were  additional binders prepared by the Donahue Institute staff.  They included  a so-called book of narratives—referred to as the “white book”--providing  an overview of each domestic DDESS school and adjacent LEAs.   Additional information on individual DDESS schools and adjacent LEAS is  contained in multiple “blue binders” summarizing financial, performance,  and data on the educational quality of individual schools.  Additional  financial information is then contained in multiple “yellow binders” labeled  appendixes.
Our examination of individual recommendations and supporting  information provided in individual study binders sometimes provided what  appeared to be divergent pictures of school performance, quality, and cost  factors that did not always fully comport with information contained in the  recommendations report.  Below are key examples.
Fort Benning  The Recommendations Report suggests transferring  responsibility for schools to Chattahoochee County vice Muscogee County  (five of seven DDESS schools are within Chattahoochee County).  It noted  that installation officials had expressed concerns about quality of  Chattahoochee County Schools, but noted DDESS students would  represent the vast majority of student enrollment within the LEA.  It  expected that most students would still be educated on base and most  teachers still have opportunity to teach. It said the pupil-teacher ratios and  the per pupil expenditures of the DDESS and Chattahoochee County are  already comparable (GAO note: data suggest less comparability in costs  than stated here).
The White Book points out that salaries and benefits make up 90 percent,  86 percent, and 84 percent of the Fort Benning DDESS, Chattahoochee  County, and Muscogee County school budgets.  The White Book indicates  per pupil expenditures of approximately $8,244, $7,345, and $5,956 for Fort  Benning DDESS, Chattahoochee County, and Muscogee County  respectively.
The White Book points out that Fort Benning DDESS students test results  ranged from the 52nd to 65th percentile for grades 3, 5, and 8. Chattahoochee  County and Muscogee County test scores were mostly above predicted  scores for grades 3, 5, and 8.
The Blue Book shows that four of the Benning DDESS schools were  deemed underperforming and three overperformed.  It confirms Muscogee  test scores were mostly deemed over performing for 5th grade but some  underperforming for 8th grade, while Chattahoochee’s were deemed  underperforming for 8th grade.
Fort Campbell  The Recommendations Report suggests transferring  responsibility for schools to LEA, Christian County versus Clarksville- Montgomery County.  The report notes that considering all factors,  Christian County, Kentucky has higher quality measures than Clarksville- Montgomery County, Tennessee.
The White Book notes salaries and benefits make up 88 percent, 64 percent  and 64 percent respectively of the Fort Campbell DDESS, and Clarksville- Montgomery County and Christian County school budgets.  Fort  Campbell’s per pupil expenditure, which is projected to be about $7,962 in  fiscal year 04, has been rising in recent years due to increasing costs and  decreasing enrollment (reason for decreasing enrollment not indicated).   Clarksville-Montgomery’s per pupil expenditure in fiscal year 2004 is $5,166  but will decline because of recent budget cuts.  Christian County’s per pupil  cost is about $ 6,589 in fiscal year 2004 but notes escalating salary costs  coupled with relatively stable enrollment will likely lead to increased per  pupil expenditure.
The White Book indicates that Fort Campbell DDESS students performed  at or above the 60th percentile for most subjects and grades. Performance of  LEA schools of both districts was mixed.  Clarksville-Montgomery matched  or exceeded predicted scores in seven of nine instances cited.  The  Christian County matched or exceeded in five of nine instances cited.  However, the White Book also notes that Fort Campbell schools have a  lower student-to-teacher ratio than either LEA and have a higher  percentage of DDESS teachers (82 percent) with advanced degrees than  Christian County (68 percent), or Clarksville (52 percent).
The Blue Book rates Fort Campbell schools as mixed in terms of over or  under performing.  Same was true for Christian County schools.  The Blue  Book rates Clarksville-Montgomery County schools as primarily  underperforming.
Fort Jackson  The Recommendations Report suggests status quo  notes  reductions in state funding of education over recent two years.  It notes  that Richland County’s schools are already over capacity, and the LEA has  little physical room to expand its facilities. (GAO note:  Why this is a  discriminating factor is unclear since most transfer recommendations are  based on use of DDESS schools.)  The Green Book also notes that “a  transfer to the LEA could jeopardize the quality of education now received  by students at Fort Jackson, who, as mostly younger students, would face  substantial disruption of educational services in the event of a transfer.”  (GAO note:  report is not  clear why younger students at Jackson would  face substantial disruption yet the same issue is not raised in most other  transfer recommendations.)
The White Book notes that because Fort Jackson does not track salaries  and benefits for each type of school employee, salaries and benefits were  allocated based on the teaching roster and an average salary and benefit  expenditure.  School costs were not laid out comparably to those at other  installations.  However, it projects approximately 90 percent, 73 percent of  Fort Jackson DDESS and LEA budgets respectively to be spent on salaries  and benefits. It indicated there was per pupil expenditures of $10,700 for  DDESS versus $6,165 for LEA.
The White Book shows Fort Jackson scores on Tera Nova tests scores  reported were lower than recorded for many other DDESS systems for  grades 3 and 5. LEA schools were shown in the White Book as exceeding  predicted test scores for grades 3 and 5.
The Blue Book does not contain school level testing for Fort Jackson  schools so doesn’t indicate whether they were viewed as over or under  performing.  It shows LEA mixed in terms of over or under performing for  grade 6 but over performing for grade 8 (at one school).
Fort Knox  The Recommendations Report recommends transferring  responsibility to adjacent LEA, Hardin County, versus LEA Meade County.   However, the report notes that while the level of education quality  indicators for the two LEAs is generally comparable, Hardin County’s per  pupil expenditure exceeds that of Meade County in the instructional area.   This indicates Hardin County is larger and more capable than Meade  County to absorb DDESS students, and the executive leadership of Hardin  County appeared more receptive to a transfer of DDESS students.  The  White Book indicates Hardin is geographically closer to installation  housing and because of this proximity, Hardin has a closer relationship  with Fort Knox.
The White Book projects that 88 percent, 78 percent, and 75 percent of Fort  Knox DDESS, Meade County and Hardin County LEAs school budgets  respectively were spent on salaries and benefits.  This indicated per pupil  expenditures of $8, 454 for DDESS versus $5,108 in Meade County, and  $5,493 in Hardin County.
The White Book shows Fort Knox students scored above the 50th   percentile for all subjects and grades in Terra Nova testing.  At the same  time, the performance information provided indicated that many Hardin  County grades scored lower than predicted on testing, while Meade County  grades nearly always scored higher than predicted.
The Blue Book indicates that Fort Knox DDESS schools presented a mixed  picture in terms of over or under performing on performance tests. At the  same time, all Hardin County schools were cited as underperforming in  testing for grades 3 and 6 and over for one school with grade 9 scores; at  the same time, while Meade County schools were identified as over  performing for grades 6 and 9.
West Point  The Recommendations Report suggests transferring  responsibility to LEA, Highland Falls Central School District, but grades  PK-4 remain in the current school.  The report notes that in this case, the  LEA had a higher per pupil expenditure and a lower pupil-teacher-ratio  than DDESS, both of which are quality indicators.  The report said the  recommendation for transfer was due, in part, to the fact that the middle  school facility needs to be replaced immediately.
The White Book projects that 84 percent and 76 percent of West Point  DDESS and Highland Falls school budgets respectively were spent on  salaries and benefits.  However, it notes that the LEA’s budget has seen 10  percent growth, with costs for health and liability insurance and special  education and retirement system costs rising.  It also indicated per pupil  expenditures of $10, 957 for West Point DDESS (among the highest of all  DDESS districts mainly due to salaries) and $11,196 for Highland Falls.  It  notes that this is the only district where the per pupil expenditure is greater  than the corresponding DDESS per pupil expenditure.
The White Book shows West Point DDESS schools scored in the 70-80th  percentiles in Tera Nova testing.  Conversely, Highland Falls Schools  indicated almost all (three of four) test scores were lower than predicted.
The Blue Book indicates that West Point DDESS schools over performed  on performance tests while Highland Falls schools were mostly cited as  underperforming.