Aviation Safety: FAA Has Increased Efforts to Address Runway Incursions
Published: 2008-09-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Despite a recent reduction in air traffic due to economic factors, congestion on airport runways remains a safety concern. The nation's aviation system is still expected to grow and become more crowded in the coming years, exacerbating concerns about ground safety issues, including runway incursions, which occur when aircraft enter runways without authorization. This statement addresses (1) recent trends in runway incursions, (2) steps taken to improve runway safety, and (3) what more could be done. This statement is based on GAO's November 2007 report issued to this Subcommittee on runway safety. GAO's work on that report included surveying experts on the causes of runway incidents and accidents and the effectiveness of measures to address them, reviewing safety data, and interviewing agency and industry officials. This statement also contains information from FAA on recent incursions and actions taken since November 2007.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While the number of serious incursions this fiscal year is slightly lower than last year, the rate (measured by the number of incidents per 1 million takeoffs and landings) has increased. The number of serious runway incursions--incidents in which collisions were narrowly or barely avoided--decreased from 24 in fiscal year 2007 to 23 in fiscal year 2008 through September 16, 2008. The rate of serious incursions increased by 5 percent during fiscal year 2008 through September 16, 2008, compared with fiscal year 2007. For all categories of severity, the total number and rate of incursions increased at a slightly slower pace during fiscal year 2008, compared with the prior year. The total number of incursions during the first three quarters of fiscal year 2008 increased by 7 percent and the rate increased by 10 percent, compared with the same period during fiscal year 2007. During fiscal year 2008, FAA has given higher priority to improving runway safety than it did during the previous 2 years when it did not have a permanent director for its Office of Runway Safety, which it created to lead and coordinate the agency's runway safety efforts. FAA's recent actions to improve runway safety include continuing to deploy and test new technology designed to prevent runway collisions; promoting changes in airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting; and issuing new air traffic procedures. FAA could further improve runway safety by ensuring the timely deployment of technology, encouraging the development of new technology, and increasing its focus on human factors issues, which aviation safety experts identified as the primary cause of incursions. For example, experts said that technology such as the FAA's planned installation of runway status lights at 22 major airports and the development of an incursion warning system in the cockpit are promising technologies and that increased training for pilots and air traffic controllers could help address human factors issues.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on runway safety. Although  air traffic has declined as economic factors, among others, have led  airlines to reduce service, congestion on the movement areas—runways  and taxiways—remains a matter of concern. Since we last testified on  runway safety before this Subcommittee, in February 2008, 11 more  serious runway incursions—incidents in which collisions were narrowly  or barely avoided—have occurred at U.S. airports, including 4 incursions  involving commercial aircraft. On August 28, 2008, for example, a SkyWest  commuter jet that was landing at the Fresno Yosemite International  Airport in California came within 15 feet of colliding with a general  aviation aircraft that was still on the runway.
My testimony today focuses on (1) recent trends in runway incursions, (2)  steps FAA has taken to improve runway safety, and (3) what more could  be done. This statement is based on our November 2007 report and  February 2008 testimony on runway safety and is updated with  information we gathered in August and September 2008 on recent  incursions and actions taken by FAA. Our work on the November 2007  report included surveying experts on the causes of runway incidents and  accidents, the effectiveness of measures that are being taken to address  them, and additional measures that could be taken. We conducted this  work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: The Overall Number and Rate of Incursions Increased This Fiscal Year
paragraphs: Runway safety is a long-standing major aviation safety concern. The  prevention of runway incursions, which are precursors to aviation  accidents, has been on the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB)  list of most wanted transportation improvements since 1990 because  runway collisions can be catastrophic. The number and rate of incursions  reached a peak in fiscal year 2001 and remained relatively constant for the  next 5 years. However, from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2007, the  overall number and rate of incursions increased by 12 percent and nearly  regained the 2001 peak (see fig. 1).
Data for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2008 show that the number of  incursions counted increased substantially after FAA adopted a definition  of incursions developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization  (ICAO), a United Nations specialized agency. Using the ICAO definition,  FAA is now counting some incidents as incursions that the agency  formerly classified as surface incidents. Using its new definition, FAA had  counted 957 incursions during fiscal year 2008 as of September 16, 2008,  712 of which occurred during the first three quarters.
If FAA had continued using its previous definition, that data would have  shown an increase in the number and rate of incursions, with the rate  exceeding the earlier peak in 2001. Using the previous definition, FAA  would have counted 293 incursions during the first three quarters of fiscal  year 2008, compared with 275 for the first three quarters of fiscal year  2007, an increase of 7 percent. Under FAA’s previous incursion definition,  the overall rate of incursions for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2008  was 6.72 per 1 million air traffic control tower operations, compared with  6.11 for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2007 and 6.1 for fiscal year  2001. Thus, the first three quarters of fiscal year 2008 represent a 10  percent increase in the rate over both the first three quarters of fiscal year  2007 and fiscal year 2001, an earlier peak year for the number and rate of  incursions. Figure 2 shows the number and rate of incursions, by quarter,  during fiscal year 2007 and during the first three quarters of fiscal year  2008.
From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007, the number of serious  incursions—incidents in which collisions are narrowly or barely avoided— decreased from 53 to 24, or by about 55 percent. The number of serious  incursions, which is not affected by FAA’s adoption of a new incursion  definition, has decreased from 24 in fiscal year 2007 to 23 in fiscal year  2008 as of September 16, 2008, but the rate has increased. The rate of  serious incursions for fiscal year 2008 through September 16, 2008 was  0.41 per 1 million tower operations, compared with 0.39 for fiscal year  2007, an increase of 5 percent.  The number and rate of serious incursions,  by quarter, during fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 are shown in   figure 3.
Most runway incursions involve general aviation aircraft. According to  FAA, about 67 percent of incursions from fiscal year 2005 through August  2008 involved at least one general aviation aircraft. However, about one- third of the most serious incursions during fiscal year 2002 through August  2008—about 9 per year—involved at least one commercial aircraft. The  involvement of commercial aircraft in incursions is of particular concern  because they can carry many passengers. For example, on April 6, 2008, a  Boeing 777, which was being towed from a maintenance facility at the  Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, entered a runway where an  American Airlines MD-80 had just landed, and the two aircraft missed each  other by about 25 feet. As of September 16, 2008, there have been 7  serious incursions involving commercial aircraft in fiscal year 2008,  compared with 8 in fiscal year 2007. (See table 3 in app. I for additional  information about serious incursions involving commercial aircraft during  fiscal years 2007 and 2008.) Figure 4 shows the number of serious  incursions involving commercial aircraft from fiscal year 2001 through  fiscal year 2008.
In the United States, most incursions have occurred at major commercial  airports, where the volume of air traffic is greater. Chicago O’Hare  International and Los Angeles International Airports had the most runway  incursions from fiscal year 2001 through August 18, 2008, as shown in   figure 5.
The primary causes of incursions, according to experts we surveyed and  some airport officials, are human factors issues, which can include  miscommunication between air traffic controllers and pilots, a lack of  situational awareness on the airfield by pilots, and performance and  judgment errors by air traffic controllers and pilots. According to FAA, in  fiscal year 2007, 57 percent of incursions were caused by pilot errors, 28  percent by air traffic controller errors, and 15 percent by vehicle operator  or pedestrian errors (see fig.6). Air traffic controller errors are a particular  concern because, as we noted in our June 2008 testimony before this  Subcommittee, FAA is hiring large numbers of new air traffic controllers  to replace those who are retiring and the proportion of new hires is  increasing over time. Our analysis of FAA’s hiring and retirement  projections indicates that by 2011, up to 59 percent of the controller  workforce will have less than 5 years of experience. Newly certified  controllers may be less efficient than experienced controllers in handling  the high volumes of traffic that occur at large and congested airports, and  any loss in efficiency could affect runway safety.
section_title: FAA Has Increased Efforts to Oversee Runway Safety, but Collision Risk Remains
paragraphs: During fiscal year 2008, FAA has given higher priority to improving runway  safety than it did during the previous 2 years, when the agency did not  have a permanent director for its Office of Runway Safety. FAA’s recent  actions to improve runway safety include continuing to deploy and test  new technology designed to prevent runway collisions; promoting changes  in airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting; and issuing new air  traffic procedures. However, NTSB officials and some aviation safety  experts said that the risk of a runway collision is still high.
Efforts to develop and deploy technology have been among FAA’s major  actions to improve runway safety. To provide ground surveillance on the  airfield, FAA has deployed the Airport Movement Area Safety System  (AMASS), which uses the Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE-3)  radar, at 34 of the nation’s busiest airports and is deploying an updated  system, the Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), at  35 major airports. According to its current plans, FAA will complete the  deployment of ASDE-X by 2010, and a total of 44 airports will then have  AMASS, ASDE-X, or both (see table 6 in app. I). FAA is also testing low- cost surface surveillance systems in Spokane, Washington, and has  solicited industry proposals to acquire and install low-cost ground  surveillance systems at 6 additional airports that are not scheduled to  receive ASDE-3 or ASDE-X. Both ASDE-3 and ASDE-X are designed to  alert controllers when they detect a potential collision on the ground. As  of August 29, 2008, FAA had commissioned ASDE-X at 13 airports, up from  11 in August 2007. According to FAA, all ASDE-X-commissioned airports  now have safety logic, which generates visible and audible signals to air  traffic controllers of potential runway collisions. In our February 2008  testimony, we indicated that 2 ASDE-X-commissioned airports did not yet  have safety logic. According to FAA, for all future systems, safety logic will  be implemented when ASDE-X system is installed.
Despite ongoing efforts, FAA risks not meeting its current plans to  complete the deployment of ASDE-X by 2010. FAA plans to finish  installing ASDE-X at New York LaGuardia, Memphis International, and Las  Vegas McCarran International Airports, where the agency is coordinating  the implementation of ASDE-X with the completion of new air traffic  control towers, after the fall of 2010. In addition, although it took about 4  years for ASDE-X to be installed at the first 11 airports and ASDE-X was  commissioned at 2 airports during the first 11 months of fiscal year 2008,  FAA plans to install the system at 19 additional airports by the end of fiscal  year 2010. In commenting on whether the 19 remaining installations can be  completed on schedule, FAA’s ASDE-X program manager said that the  installations at all 19 airports have already begun, that the system  installations are not done one airport at a time, and that the agency is  working hard to push local governments and airports to obtain the needed  approvals and leases.
In November 2007, we reported operational difficulties with ASDE-X’s  alerting functions. For example, some ASDE-X-commissioned airports  were experiencing false alerts, which occur when the system incorrectly  predicts an impending collision, and false targets, which occur when the  system incorrectly identifies something on the airfield, such as an aircraft  or vehicle, that could generate a false alert. We reported that the control  tower at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport reported the  most problems with false alerts and that the control tower at Seattle- Tacoma International Airport reported the most problems with false  targets. However, FAA recently provided documentation indicating that  the number of false alerts at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International  Airport had declined by 84 percent during 2008 and that the number of  false alerts at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport had declined by 90  percent after the airport received a software upgrade in March 2008.
Another technology for improving runway safety that FAA recently  decided to install at 22 airports is a runway status lights system. This  technology, which gives pilots a visible warning when runways are not  safe to enter, cross, or depart on, has already been tested and has received  positive evaluations at Dallas-Fort Worth International and San Diego  International Airports (see table 7 in app. I for a list of airports to receive  runway status lights). Proposed legislation to reauthorize FAA would  authorize $74 million to acquire and install runway status lights. In  November 2007, we reported that 10 of 17 experts we surveyed indicated  that FAA’s testing of runway status lights was very or extremely effective  in addressing runway incursions. In addition, the Department of  Transportation’s Inspector General reported in January 2008 that runway  incursions on the test runway at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport  decreased by 70 percent during the 29 months of testing, compared with  the 29 months before testing. In addition, FAA and NTSB officials said  that runway status lights prevented a serious incursion from occurring at  Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport on May 15, 2008, involving an MD- 80 aircraft and a regional jet. According to FAA, the MD-80 aborted its  takeoff after seeing the status lights turn red when the regional jet was  crossing that runway farther ahead. However, runway status lights need a  surface surveillance system such as ASDE-3/AMASS or ASDE-X to operate,  making the timely deployment of ASDE-X at the remaining 19 airports  even more important.
Still another runway safety technology that FAA is testing is the Final  Approach Occupancy Signal (FAROS) at Long Beach-Daugherty Field  airport in California.  FAROS activates a flashing light visible to aircraft on  approach as a warning to pilots when a runway is occupied and hazardous  for landing. FAA is also planning to install and evaluate an enhanced  version of FAROS at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. According to  FAA, the additional information on runway traffic provided by FAROS can  improve the pilot’s situational awareness and help reduce the severity of  an incursion. However, nationwide deployment of FAROS is years away.  Furthermore, FAA is still testing a low-cost surface surveillance system  that already is being used at 44 airports outside the United States. FAA has  also offered to provide up to $5 million to test in-cockpit displays that  inform pilots where they are located on runways or electronic flight bags,  which are electronic display systems that provide pilots with a variety of  aviation data.  In addition, in the longer term, deployment of the Automatic  Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system, a satellite-based  technology that broadcasts aircraft identification, position, and speed with  once-per-second updates, will provide pilots with greater situational  awareness and help to keep aircraft at safe distances from each other on  the runways.
Besides deploying and testing technology, FAA has taken other actions to  improve runway safety, including  issuing new air traffic procedures requiring controllers to give explicit  instructions to pilots on precise routes to take from the gate to the  runway;    conducting safety reviews at 42 airports based on incursion and wrong- runway-departure data, the findings from which were used to improve  signage and markings, as well as implement training programs for airport  personnel (see table 8 in app. I for a list of the airports reviewed);   establishing the Runway Safety Council, consisting of FAA and aviation  industry representatives, to analyze the root causes of serious incursions  and recommend runway safety improvements; and testing a voluntary safety reporting program for air traffic controllers at  facilities in the Chicago area—a program we had recommended in our  November 2007 report that FAA implement.
In June 2008, FAA also completed an internal review of runway incursions  at Boston Logan International Airport with a team of experts from FAA,  the airport, and a major airline to identify best practices to prevent  incursions. FAA is currently reviewing runway incursions at Hartsfield- Jackson Atlanta International Airport and is planning reviews at 8  additional airports based on the frequency of runway incursions. In  addition, FAA plans to work with a contractor to validate the alerting  perimeters of AMASS and ASDE-X to ensure that controllers receive  warnings in time to act on them and relay the warnings to pilots.  Furthermore, according to an FAA official, the agency is drafting a new  national runway safety plan, which we recommended in our November  2007 report. In addition, in July 2008, FAA submitted, as requested by this  Subcommittee, its first quarterly progress report on how it was handling  serious incursions.
Several aviation safety stakeholders, including officials from associations  representing airlines and pilots, said that FAA has increased its attention  to runway safety during the past year. For example, an official from the Air  Transport Association (ATA), which represents the airline industry, said  that FAA’s level of attention to runway safety is noticeably better than last  year, there is more communication, and FAA leadership at the highest  levels is focused on the issue. In addition, an official from the Air Line  Pilots Association (ALPA) said that the new air traffic procedures  requiring controllers to give explicit instructions to pilots on precise  routes to take from the gate to the runway were a substantial  improvement, resulting in less confusion. However, an official from the  National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) said that FAA had  not made progress in addressing air traffic controller overtime and fatigue  issues over the last year. In November 2007, we reported that, as of May  2007, at least 20 percent of the controllers at 25 air traffic control facilities,  including towers at several major airports, were regularly working 6-day  weeks, which could cause fatigue. We also recommended that FAA  develop a mitigation plan for addressing controller overtime. FAA officials  said that this year, the agency had offered relocation and retention  incentives for controllers, targeting major facilities experiencing high rates  of overtime. The officials said that 80 controllers had been selected to  receive the relocation bonuses and that 100 controllers had accepted  retention bonuses in exchange for 2 more years of service. An FAA official  said that it was too early to tell what impact those actions would have on  the frequency of overtime.  To address controller fatigue issues, FAA  officials said that the agency held a summit on the subject in June 2008  and is considering shift scheduling changes for controllers.
In commenting on the voluntary safety reporting program for air traffic  controllers being tested in the Chicago area, FAA officials said that since  the test program began last month, controllers have submitted about 40  reports, 4 of which involved runway incidents. Senior NATCA officials said  that although controllers are participating, some are concerned that FAA  will take disciplinary actions against them for reporting safety incidents.  However, FAA officials said that it is not agency policy to discipline  controllers for reporting incidents through the program except under the  circumstances specified in the memorandum of understanding with  NATCA involving criminal activity, substance abuse, controlled  substances, alcohol, or intentional falsification.
According to FAA, airlines have also taken actions to improve runway  safety.  For example, FAA indicated that all 112 active air carriers have  reported that they (1) provide pilots with simulator or other training that  incorporates scenarios from aircraft pushback through taxi and (2) have  reviewed cockpit procedures to identify and develop a plan to address  elements that contribute to pilot distraction while taxiing. Verification of  these actions during FAA’s inspections will ensure that these activities are  fully implemented.
With the help of FAA funding, several airports have made recent changes  to their runways and taxiways to reduce the risk of collisions. In June  2008, Los Angeles International Airport opened a new center taxiway that  requires aircraft to reduce speed before exiting. Previously, aircraft used  high-speed taxiways in that area of the airfield, resulting in runway  incursions when aircraft did not stop in time before approaching active  runways. In our February 2008 testimony, we reported that Los Angeles  International Airport had experienced the most runway incursions in fiscal  years 2001 through 2007. However, the new taxiway may have been a  contributing factor in reducing the number of incursions at Los Angeles  International Airport this fiscal year, compared with last year. Using FAA’s  previous definition of incursions to compare both years, the Los Angeles  International Airport had 3 incursions during fiscal year 2008 through  September 16, 2008, and none were serious, compared with 8 during fiscal  year 2007, including 2 serious ones. When data through August 2008 are  included, Chicago O’Hare International Airport has experienced the most  runway incursions since fiscal year 2001. In October 2008, Dallas-Fort  Worth International Airport plans to open a perimeter taxiway (also called  an end-around taxiway) that gives aircraft access to gates without crossing  active runways. Crossing active runways is one of the many causes of  incursions. In April 2007, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport  also opened a perimeter taxiway. According to an airport official, the  perimeter taxiway eliminates about 560 runway crossings per day, or  about one-third of the airport’s total daily runway crossings.
In November 2007, we reported that FAA’s Office of Runway Safety had  not carried out its leadership role to coordinate and monitor the agency’s  runway safety efforts. Until FAA hired a permanent director at the senior  executive service (SES) level for the Office of Runway Safety in August  2007, that office had been without a permanent director for the previous    2 years. Since a permanent director was hired, the number of full-time staff  in the Office of Runway Safety has increased, up to 41 as of August 2008  from about 37, including contractors, led by a non-SES-level acting  director in May 2007. Although we did not determine what the appropriate  level of staffing for the Office of Runway Safety would be, we note that  before 2004, when FAA provided a high level of attention to runway safety,  the office had 66 full-time staff, including contractors.
NTSB officials and some aviation safety experts said that, despite the  numerous actions taken by FAA to improve runway safety, the risk of a  runway collision is still high. NTSB officials, for example, cited two  nonfatal runway collisions that occurred this year—one at an untowered  airport in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, where two general aviation aircraft  collided on a runway, substantially damaging both aircraft, and another  accident at the airport in Reading, Pennsylvania, where a landing general  aviation aircraft collided with a tractor that was at the intersection of a  runway and a taxiway, breaking off part of the aircraft’s left wing. In  addition, an official from the Flight Safety Foundation said that although  the probability of a runway collision is very low, the severity of such an  accident means that the risk is high. The low probability of a runway  collision is supported by the fact that FAA controls the takeoff, landing,  and flights of about 50,000 aircraft every day, but the most recent fatal  runway collision at a towered airport involving commercial aircraft  occurred 14 years ago, in 1994, when a Trans World Airlines MD-82  collided with a general aviation aircraft on a runway at Lambert-St. Louis  International Airport, killing 2 people. However, the worst accident in  aviation history involved a runway collision, in 1977, when two Boeing  747s collided on a runway in Tenerife, the Canary Islands, killing 583  passengers and crew. Moreover, despite recent reductions in air traffic, by  2025, air traffic is projected to increase two- to threefold, equating to about  100,000 to 150,000 flights a day, making airports even more congested than  they are today.
To address runway overruns, FAA and airports have increased the  percentage of runways that are in compliance with FAA standards for  runway safety areas—unobstructed areas that surround runways to  enhance safety in the event that an aircraft overruns, overshoots, or veers  off a runway. As of August 2008, 76 percent of 1,015 runways at 561  commercial service airports were in substantial compliance with runway  safety area standards, up from 70 percent in May 2007. FAA considers  runway safety areas that meet 90 percent of the standards to be in  substantial compliance. Increased compliance with runway safety area  standards reduces the chances of aviation accidents resulting from  overruns. In addition, as of August 2008, the Engineered Materials  Arresting System (EMAS), a bed of crushable concrete designed to stop  overrunning aircraft, was installed at 35 runway ends at 24 U.S. airports,  up from 24 runway ends at 19 U.S. airports during June 2007. Furthermore,  as of August 2008, there were plans to install 15 additional EMAS systems  at 11 additional airports. (Table 9 in app. I lists the airports with EMAS  installations.) In our November 2007 report, we recommended that FAA  develop and implement a plan to collect data on runway overruns that do  not result in damage or injury for analyses of trends and causes of  overruns. In response, FAA indicated that a working group will be  established to assess what additional runway overrun data could be  collected and to make recommendations by the end of this year.
section_title: Addressing Human Factors Issues Could Help Improve Runway Safety
paragraphs: FAA could further improve runway safety by addressing human factors  issues, which aviation safety experts identified as the primary cause of  incursions. To address these issues, FAA could encourage the  development of new technology, revise additional procedures, and adopt  best practices. Proposed legislation to reauthorize FAA would support  additional efforts to improve runway safety by authorizing $114 million to  develop runway incursion reduction programs and to deploy technology.
In November 2007, we reported that, according to experts we surveyed,  encouraging the development of a runway incursion warning system in the  cockpit would be among the most effective actions that FAA could take to  improve runway safety. In addition, in 2000, NTSB recommended, among  other things, that FAA require airports to deploy a ground movement  safety system to prevent runway incursions and develop a direct incursion  warning capability for flight crews. A system that provides a direct  warning to the cockpit being developed by Honeywell and the Sensis  Corporation, called the Runway Incursion Cockpit Alerting System, is  designed to work at airports equipped with ASDE-X and functioning safety  logic. A demonstration of the system was conducted with FAA and NTSB  officials at Syracuse Hancock International Airport in August 2007. NTSB  officials said that FAA could move faster to approve technology that  provides runway incursion warnings directly to the cockpit.  However,  FAA officials said the cockpit warning system would need to be  thoroughly reviewed before being approved for use, a process they said  could take at least 2 years.
Also to improve runway safety, ATA and ALPA officials suggested FAA  could standardize air traffic control phraseology. Future FAA air traffic  procedures will cover clearances for runway crossings, takeoffs, and  multiple landings and will include the adoption of international  phraseology such as “line up and wait” instead of “position and hold.” A  senior ALPA official said that adopting international standards for air  traffic control phraseology could be particularly useful at airports that  handle a large volume of foreign airline traffic, such as Los Angeles  International Airport. However, senior NATCA officials said they are  concerned about FAA’s adoption of international taxiing phraseology  because of the complexity of handling the high volume of air traffic in the  United States. These officials also said that FAA could do more to reduce  air traffic controller overtime and take additional actions to address  controller fatigue. In the meantime, NATCA plans to start its own fatigue  management initiative, according to senior NATCA officials. In addition, a  NATCA official said that FAA’s focus on reporting the number of serious  incursions should not distract attention from less serious incursions,  which the official said are also important. A human factors expert we  contacted agreed, saying that serious incursions are only the “tip of the  iceberg,” that less serious incursions can lead to more serious ones, and  that the entire scope of incidents should be examined.
Adopting best practices for runway safety, such as ones that FAA has  compiled, also could help address human factors issues. These include  practices such as conducting runway safety training for controllers, pilots,  and airport personnel; checking the accuracy of airport diagrams and  updating them as needed; encouraging pilots to turn aircraft lights on  during landing and departure; and eliminating distractions in the control  tower.
In closing, although FAA has increased its efforts to improve runway  safety through a multilayered approach, the current high level of attention  must be sustained to reduce the risk of potentially catastrophic runway  accidents. Although the number of serious incursions has declined since  2001, the continuing incidence of near collisions involving commercial  aircraft and the continuing increase in the overall number and rate of  incursions suggest that a significant risk of catastrophic runway collisions  still exists. A significant reduction in the number and rate of incursions  may not be realized until the development and installation of runway  safety technology is complete. Therefore, FAA must continue to provide a  high level of attention to further reduce the number of serious incursions  and reverse the upward trend in the overall number of runway incursions  through the timely deployment of technology, sustained leadership, and  other means.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions from you or other Members of the  Subcommittee.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.  Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making  key contributions to this testimony include Teresa Spisak, Bob Homan,  and Pamela Vines.
section_title: Appendix I: Data on Runway Incursions and Deployment of Related Safety Technology
paragraphs: Not yet available.
Information not contained in the NTSB incident reports.
Serious incursions involving  at least one commercial  2008   (through Sept. 16, 2008)
John Wayne-Orange County,  Santa Ana, CA  Long Beach-Daugherty Field, CA  General Mitchell International,  Milwaukee, WI  des 30 incrsions that FAA had not yet classified as of Ast 18, 2008. The above nmbers  combine data sing FAA’s previos definition of incrsions from fiscal year 2001 throgh fiscal year  2007 and the ICAO definition of incrsions dring fiscal year 2008. The nmber of serios incrsions  is not affected by FAA’s adoption of the ICAO definition.
William P. Hobby,  Houston, TX  led deployment dates are as of Ag. 25, 2008, and represent when the facility first declares  the system ready for conditional se. Once the system is formally accepted by the facility, the system  is commissioned. FAA’s draft accelerated schedle, shown in this table, targets completing ASDE-X  deployment by the fall of 2010, except at New York LaGardia, Memphis International, and Las  Vegas McCarran International Airports, where the agency is coordinating ASDE-X implementation  with the completion of new air traffic control towers.
Chicago O’Hare International  Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International, FL  George Bush Intercontinental, Houston, TX  rrently being tested at these locations.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.