Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses
Published: 1996-07-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) for Alabama and Calhoun County, Alabama, focusing on: (1) the status and funding of CSEPP in these areas; (2) the impact of federal, state, and local management on Alabama's program; and (3) Calhoun County's opposition to the chemical stockpile disposal facility that the Army plans to build at the Anniston Army Depot.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that: (1) eight years after CSEPP's inception, Alabama communities near Anniston are not fully prepared to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency because they lack critical items; (2) Alabama and six counties have not spent $30.5 million, 66.4 percent of the $46 million allocated to enhance emergency preparedness; (3) the unexpended funds are associated primarily with four projects for which federal, state, and local officials have not agreed on specific requirements: (a) a CSEPP 800-megahertz emergency communications system; (b) equipment and supplies to protect people in public buildings; (c) indoor alert and notification devices for public buildings and homes; and (d) personal protective equipment for emergency workers; (4) citing these four projects and eight other areas as major emergency preparedness deficiencies, Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) opposes a state environmental permit for the construction of the disposal facility until it receives a written commitment from the Army to support the county's emergency preparedness requirements or provide acceptable alternatives; (5) the lack of progress in Alabama's CSEPP is the result of management weaknesses at the federal level and inadequate action by state and local agencies; (6) management weaknesses at the federal level are fragmented and unclear roles and responsibilities, incomplete and imprecise planning guidance, extensive involvement in the implementation of certain local projects, lack of team work in the budget process, and ineffective financial controls; (7) these weaknesses have resulted in time-consuming negotiations and delays in implementing projects critical to emergency preparedness; (8) Alabama EMA spent more than 2 years trying to contract for a demographics survey, which will serve as the basis for determining the requirements for the tone alert radios and developing critical planning documents; (9) the survey has not started as of May 28, 1996; (10) Calhoun County EMA has been reluctant to initiate CSEPP projects until federal officials agree to the county's requirements; (11) the situation in Alabama may not be unique; since 1994, GAO has reported that CSEPP is not working the way it was intended; (12) GAO's work has shown that although some progress has been made, communities near the eight chemical weapons storage sites in the United States are not fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency, financial management is weak, and costs are growing; (13) the problems experienced in Alabama's CSEPP are likely to continue until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements among federal, state, and local officials on specific requirements for projects; and (14) developing this approach should rest with the Army.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As requested, we reviewed the Army’s Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) for Alabama and Calhoun County. You were concerned that Alabama communities may not be prepared to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency, even though the Army allocated the state $46 million to enhance emergency preparedness. Our objectives were to assess (1) the funding and status of CSEPP in Alabama and Calhoun County; (2) the impact of federal, state, and local management on Alabama’s program; and (3) Calhoun County’s opposition to the chemical stockpile disposal facility that the Army plans to build at the Anniston Army Depot.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In November 1985, the Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy the U.S. stockpile of obsolete chemical agents and munitions and also directed that the disposal program provide for the maximum protection of the environment, the public, and the personnel involved in disposing of the munitions. Although the Army considers the likelihood of a chemical release at one of its eight storage sites to be extremely small, the health effects of an accident can be severe. Some munitions contain nerve agents, which can disrupt the nervous system and lead to loss of muscular control and death. Others contain a series of blister agents commonly, but incorrectly, referred to as mustard agents, which blister the skin and can be lethal in large amounts.
State and local officials, in accordance with state laws, have primary responsibility for developing and implementing emergency response programs for communities in the event of an emergency. In 1988, the Army established CSEPP to assist communities near the chemical stockpile storage sites to enhance existing emergency preparedness and response capabilities in the unlikely event of a chemical accident. Most communities near the sites had little capability to respond to a chemical emergency when CSEPP began. Threats to the stockpile include external events such as earthquakes, airplane crashes, and tornadoes and internal events such as spontaneous leakage of chemical agent, accidents during handling and maintenance activities, and self-ignition of propellant. The effect of a chemical stockpile accident would depend on such things as the amount and type of agent released, meteorological conditions, and the community’s proximity to the storage site and emergency response capabilities.
The Department of the Army is responsible for managing and funding CSEPP. Section 1521(c)(3) of 50 U.S.C. states that the Secretary of Defense may make grants to state and local governments, either directly or through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to assist those governments in carrying out functions related to emergency preparedness. Under a memorandum of understanding, the Army delegated partial management of the program to FEMA. As the primary source of technical expertise in chemical weapons, the Army determines overall program direction and provides funding. As the primary source of expertise in emergency preparedness, FEMA distributes Army funds to states through cooperative agreements and provides technical assistance. “Cooperative agreements” are legal instruments that provide federal funds when there will be substantial involvement by federal agencies in the management of state and local programs. In contrast to cooperative agreements, “federal grants” are legal instruments that provide funds when there will be no substantial federal involvement. Program funds flow from the Army to FEMA headquarters, through FEMA regional offices, and to the states. States provide funds to counties as their subgrantees. According to CSEPP guidance, FEMA is responsible for working with state and local governments in developing emergency preparedness plans, upgrading community response capabilities, and conducting training. A combined Army and FEMA office, called the CSEPP Core Team, coordinates and implements public affairs, exercises, training, communications, and other activities for the program. (See app. I for funds allocated to CSEPP entities for fiscal years 1988 through 1995.)
At the state level, the Alabama EMA is responsible for CSEPP and other emergency programs. Six Alabama counties participate in the program: Calhoun, Clay, Cleburne, Etowah, St. Clair, and Talladega. Of the six counties, Calhoun County has the largest population at risk and has received most of the funds. Calhoun EMA manages CSEPP and other emergency programs for the county. Anniston Army Depot in Alabama stores 661,000 chemical weapons containing more than 2,200 tons of nerve and mustard agents. Included in Anniston’s stockpile are approximately 78,000 nerve agent-filled M55 rockets, the stockpile’s most unstable weapon. Before constructing its chemical stockpile disposal facility at Anniston and other stockpile sites, the Army is required to obtain certain permits and approvals from federal, state, and local regulatory agencies. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq), the Environmental Protection Agency has delegated the administration of the environmental permitting process to the Alabama Department of Environmental Management (DEM).
section_title: Alabama and Six Counties Have Not Spent Most CSEPP Funds
paragraphs: Since 1989, the Army and FEMA have awarded Alabama $46 million, more than any other state, for CSEPP. Table 1 shows that as of March 1995 Alabama had spent only one-third of the $46 million and that Calhoun County, whose share of the $46 million is $30.2 million, had spent only one-fifth of its money.
Alabama and its counties have not been able to spend most of the CSEPP funds allocated to them because (1) FEMA, state, and local officials cannot agree on specific requirements for major capital projects and (2) FEMA has not provided Alabama or Calhoun County officials permission to spend some of the funds. According to FEMA, the unexpended funds are mostly the result of Calhoun County’s refusal to initiate the CSEPP projects until the Army and FEMA agree to all of the county’s demands related to specific requirements. According to Calhoun County EMA, the agency does not initiate actions that do not conform to CSEPP guidance and could be detrimental to providing maximum protection to the public. When disputes related to specific requirements occur, there is no established approach for negotiating an agreement among federal, state, and local officials. More than 83 percent of Alabama’s unexpended funds are associated with four projects: 800-MHz communications system, collective protection of special facilities, tone alert radios, and personal protective equipment.
subsections: section_title: Disagreements on Aspects of the 800-MHz Communications System Delayed the Project
paragraphs: On the basis of CSEPP-funded studies, Calhoun County EMA concluded in 1990 that the county’s conventional communications system did not meet CSEPP requirements. In 1992, the Army and FEMA determined that every CSEPP jurisdiction should have a functioning communications system connecting the Army installation, state EMA, and immediate response zone counties. The immediate response zone is the area generally extending approximately 6 to 9 miles around the storage site and the area considered at the greatest risk from a chemical release. The Army and FEMA approved a CSEPP 800-MHz communications system for Alabama in 1993 and authorized $8.8 million and $4.4 million in fiscal years 1994 and 1995, respectively. FEMA subsequently authorized an additional $3 million, bringing total funding for the system to $16.2 million.
The communications system is an integrated, simulcast network with  20 channels that operate at a frequency of 800-MHz. The system will enable Alabama emergency workers to communicate inter- and intra-agency without having to wait for a channel to clear if someone is using it. The system is also the platform to simultaneously activate sirens and tone alert radios. In the authorization, FEMA also said the precise number of radios, their distribution, and follow-on radios would be decided by negotiations among FEMA, state, and county officials.
Despite several years of studying, meeting, and negotiating, Alabama does not have an integrated 800 MHz communications system for CSEPP. Federal, state, and local officials did not agree on the number and distribution of the 800-MHz radios until April 23, 1996. In addition, FEMA officials decided to place a $1-million repeater tower and some radios in Talladega County’s precautionary zone. The “precautionary zone” is the area beyond 21 to  30 miles from the storage site and, under most conditions, beyond where CSEPP activities are required and where a repeater tower would be located. However, Calhoun and St. Clair county officials believe placing the tower and radios in the precautionary zone does not comply with program guidance. Some equipment will be nearly 50 miles from the Anniston Army Depot. As a result, Calhoun EMA, which is managing the contract for the 800-MHz system, was reluctant to award the contract.
According to FEMA, the 800-MHz communications system is not in place because Calhoun County EMA refused to initiate work on the contract until the county’s demand for additional radios was met. According to the Calhoun EMA Director, his agency only supports projects that provide goods, services, and equipment in compliance with CSEPP guidance. On April 23, 1996, federal, state, and county officials met to resolve the issues that were delaying the implementation of the CSEPP 800-MHz project in Alabama. At the meeting, federal officials agreed to provide additional 800-MHz radios to Alabama and Calhoun and Talladega counties. Calhoun County EMA awarded the 800-MHz contract on May 30, 1996. According to Calhoun EMA, the contractor has 16 months from the contract award date to manufacture and install the communications system.
section_title: Calhoun County EMA Disagrees With FEMA’s Selection of Facilities for Collective Protection
paragraphs: In 1989, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory concluded that, in the event of an accidental release of chemical agent, a chemical plume could cover sections of Calhoun County’s immediate response zone in 1 hour. (See app. II for a description of the potential distribution of the hazard from a chemical release.) Oak Ridge also concluded in the 1989 report that evacuation was not recommended for the general population in Anniston’s immediate response zone and recommended expedient sheltering. According to another Oak Ridge National Laboratory draft report in 1991, Calhoun County residents would take 5 hours and 45 minutes to evacuate the greater Anniston area. The Oak Ridge’s estimate is the clearance time required for 100 percent of the vehicles to evacuate the area during bad weather at nighttime. On the basis of the Oak Ridge studies, Calhoun County EMA officials believe that it would be impossible to safely evacuate everyone. However, according to a senior official from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Calhoun County officials should not rely on the results of the 1991 draft report for planning purposes because the (1) report was never finalized and (2) changes in road conditions and demographics since 1991 may have affected the results of the draft report.
To shelter the people they cannot evacuate, Calhoun County EMA officials believe collective protection is the best option. According to Calhoun EMA officials, “collective protection” is a combination of (1) a filtered overpressurized air system and (2) adequate food, water, and medical supplies to house a selected number of people up to 3 days in a closed facility. However, Army officials believe Calhoun EMA’s shelter time estimate of 3 days is excessive and that a chemical plume would pass over the area in 3 to 12 hours. The facilities to be provided with collective protection include schools, hospitals, jails, community centers, and public buildings that are within walking distance of homes and businesses. The Army Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center has completed a study to validate procedures for sheltering residents in a variety of housing types and identify a less burdensome and costly way to protect citizens in place. The draft report is dated December 8, 1995, and comments are being incorporated for publication of the final report.
Although FEMA allocated Alabama $4.2 million for positive pressurization, county officials are reluctant to accept the allocation because they disagree with FEMA’s selection of facilities and funding amount. In September 1995, Calhoun County EMA provided federal officials a suggested list of 55 facilities for collective protection. FEMA officials selected 21 facilities from the list on the basis of the location and type of facility but did not discuss their selection with Calhoun EMA officials. According to county officials, five of the facilities FEMA selected were not their highest priority. In addition, FEMA only provided enough funding for  8 to 10 hours of support rather than the 3 days requested by the county. As a result, as of April 19, 1996, county officials had not accepted the allocation. According to FEMA, the agency has not received a formal rebuttal or request from Calhoun County to change this authorization.
section_title: FEMA Has Not Released Funds for Tone Alert Radios Because Requirements Are Not Identified
paragraphs: In 1992, the Army and FEMA agreed that every CSEPP location should have a functioning alert and notification system for communities in the immediate response and protective action zones. Tone alert radios are indoor alert and notification devices that will be placed in homes, schools, hospitals, jails, nursing homes, and businesses in the zones. The radios are capable of providing alerting signals and instructional messages about appropriate protective actions.
In fiscal year 1993, FEMA allocated Alabama $900,000 to conduct a demographics survey to determine the requirements for tone alert radios and $4.3 million for the radios, with the stipulation that the funds not be released until the survey was completed. FEMA required the demographics survey to determine the number of residences and institutions requiring tone alert radios before they were purchased and installed. Because the Alabama EMA has not completed the demographics survey, FEMA has not released the funds. (See app. III for a discussion of Alabama EMA’s management of the demographics survey.) According to Alabama EMA officials, they are close to awarding a contract for the survey with the Argonne National Laboratory and plan to submit their contract proposal to the governor’s office in June 1996. After the contract is awarded, the demographics survey should take 6 to 9 months to complete.
section_title: FEMA Delayed Funding for Personal Protective Equipment
paragraphs: Personal protective equipment has been considered a critical response requirement for several years. In July 1994, the Argonne National Laboratory concluded there was a potential for the aerosol deposition of agents off post from a chemical stockpile accident at Anniston. The deposition creates the requirement for personal protective equipment. “Personal protective equipment” consists of portable respirators, protective suits, gloves, boots, and hoods. Because of their traffic, decontamination, health, and other critical response duties at the periphery of the chemical plume, local CSEPP emergency workers may find themselves in danger of contamination from an unexpected shift in the chemical plume.
In fiscal year 1994, Calhoun County EMA requested funding for personal protective equipment. FEMA deferred the request until CSEPP funds became available in fiscal year 1995. At this time, FEMA transferred $850,000 to Alabama EMA for personal protective equipment with the condition the agency was not authorized to purchase equipment until the Occupational Safety and Health Administration completed an evaluation of available civilian protective equipment. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration completed its evaluation in late 1995. However, Calhoun EMA officials believe they need additional funding for Army-provided equipment, protective components for decontamination teams, and medical examinations for local emergency workers. A draft document produced by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggests that emergency workers who wear personal protective equipment complete annual medical examinations. In late 1995, the Army initiated a needs assessment study to calculate new equipment requirements for Alabama and Kentucky. Alabama EMA officials assume that any additional personal protective equipment funding will be withheld pending the outcome of the assessment.
According to FEMA, there is nothing preventing Calhoun County EMA from purchasing the approved equipment, but the county has refused to initiate work on the project until its demand for additional funding is approved. According to Calhoun County EMA, the agency is ready to issue a contract for the civilian respirators and protective suits after the requirements for medical examinations are defined and related funds are provided by FEMA.
section_title: Management Weaknesses at the Federal Level Have Hampered Progress
paragraphs: The Army is slow to achieve the desired results in Alabama because CSEPP’s (1) management roles and responsibilities are fragmented and unclear, (2) planning guidance is imprecise and incomplete, (3) officials at the federal level are too involved in the management of certain local projects, (4) budget process lacks teamwork, and (5) financial controls are ineffective. These weaknesses have resulted in time-consuming negotiations and delays in implementing projects critical to emergency preparedness.
subsections: section_title: The Army’s and FEMA’s Roles and Responsibilities Are Not Well-Defined
paragraphs: The Army and FEMA formed the CSEPP Core Team to facilitate communication with state and county officials. However, the Core Team does not function as intended. The Army’s and FEMA’s management responsibilities are not well-defined; there is no clearly defined protocol for communicating with any of the management groups. As a result, state and county EMA officials are uncertain about federal roles and responsibilities, and often find themselves trying to interact with two or more officials from the CSEPP Core Team, FEMA headquarters, and the FEMA regional office. For example, a Calhoun EMA official recently contacted a FEMA Core Team member to discuss the unresolved issue about the distribution of 800 MHz radios. The Core Team member told the county official to use the state’s chain of command and direct his inquiries through Alabama EMA and the FEMA regional office. In some cases, county EMA officials have vented their frustrations to the Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization and to Members of Congress.
In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA said that CSEPP has a well-defined and long-established protocol for intergovernmental communications. Specifically, according to FEMA, information flows back and forth along the following protocol: However, FEMA’s protocol does not recognize the role and responsibilities of the CSEPP Core Team. According to the Core Team’s charter, dated January 6, 1995, the Core Team is the focal point for accountability of the program and coordinates and integrates on- and off-post activities. The Core Team was established, in part, to streamline procedures, improve responsiveness to state and local agencies, and enhance the overall budget process. We believe that FEMA’s illustration supports our observation that the role and responsibilities of the CSEPP Core Team are not clearly understood by state and county officials.
section_title: Planning Guidance Is Imprecise and Incomplete
paragraphs: The Army and FEMA’s planning guidance, by design, allows states and counties flexibility to enhance their local emergency preparedness programs to address the different risks at the stockpile sites. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA said that too much precision in the guidance would limit CSEPP’s ability to change with improvements in technology and emergency management techniques. However, as a result of its imprecise nature, the guidance is often interpreted differently by federal, state, and county officials. In other cases such as emergency medical services, reentry, and restoration, the guidance has not been completed.
CSEPP’s guidance on communication systems states that radios should go to public safety agencies. At one time, FEMA officials interpreted this to mean only agencies responding immediately to the chemical emergency. On the other hand, Calhoun EMA officials interpret the guidance to include law, fire, rescue, and other public safety agencies responding to a chemical emergency, as well as governmental, medical, educational, and other special agencies. County officials point out that CSEPP guidance goes far beyond public safety agencies. In February 1996, after extensive negotiations, FEMA tentatively agreed to fund radios for agencies defined as quasi-public safety agencies. These agencies include Calhoun County Road Department, Anniston Public Works, and Anniston Water Works. Federal, state, and local officials did not agree on the final number and distribution of the 800-MHz radios until April 23, 1996.
In another example, Calhoun County EMA officials provided five pages of references to CSEPP guidance to justify their request for 24-hour staffing of their emergency operations center. However, the guidance does not provide a firm position on the requirement for 24-hour staffing. County officials’ justification is based primarily on the 8-minute window to respond to a chemical emergency. The officials believe the county needs to have 24-hour staffing for its operations center to meet the 8-minute alert and notification requirement. If an incident occurred when the center was closed, it would take a minimum of 30 minutes for an employee to travel to the center and initiate the alert and notification process. The Army policy is to implement 24-hour staffing of the depot’s emergency operations center when disposal operations begin and not to fund 24-hour staffing of local centers. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Army said that Calhoun EMA should consider less costly options, such as using the county’s 911 emergency center, to initiate its alert and notification process. According to Calhoun County EMA, there are safety concerns about the location of the county’s existing 911 center in the immediate response zone. In addition, Calhoun EMA attempted to relocate and consolidate the county’s 911 emergency center with the EMA emergency operations center in the early 1990s, but did not receive any support from the Army or FEMA. The need for 24-hour staffing is still an ongoing issue with federal, state, and Calhoun County officials.
Local officials are also dissatisfied with FEMA’s inconsistent interpretation of CSEPP guidance. For example, the St. Clair County EMA Director commented to us about FEMA’s inconsistent budget decisions. FEMA denied her request for alert devices for the county’s volunteer fire department because the department was not in the protective action zone and does not comply with CSEPP guidance. In contrast, she points out that Talladega County is receiving a repeater tower and radios for its precautionary zone, outside of CSEPP guidance. According to FEMA officials, they are obtaining a waiver to CSEPP guidance for Talladega’s tower.
In other cases, CSEPP guidance is not complete. Program officials originally planned to complete all program guidance and standards by September 1989. However, they have not yet completed their guidance on emergency medical services or reentry and restoration procedures. As a result, local communities lack formal guidance to help them prepare their plans and determine their requirements for medical services, reentry, and restoration. According to FEMA officials, the guidance has been distributed in draft form pending resolution of outstanding issues. They believe that the outstanding issues should not preclude the states and counties from using the drafts for daily planning. However, Calhoun County EMA and other CSEPP participants do not consider FEMA’s drafts as final planning guidance.
section_title: FEMA Officials Are Too Involved in Certain Local Projects
paragraphs: FEMA has said that the states are in the best position to determine CSEPP priorities on a statewide basis and balance local requirements against the needs of all affected counties. However, our work shows that in certain cases, FEMA officials become involved in the management of local projects to the point of making specific decisions on requirements. This level of involvement has contributed to disagreements and time-consuming negotiation on projects.
For example, according to Calhoun EMA officials, FEMA never consulted with the county on their selection of the 21 facilities to be collectively protected and selected 5 facilities that county officials would prefer to be protected at a later date. In another example, FEMA officials had Talladega County EMA officials take them by helicopter to view the proposed sites for additional sirens. In Calhoun County, the same FEMA officials videotaped the locations where county officials said they needed sirens. With respect to the 800-MHz communications project, FEMA officials specified where the radios will be located by each agency in Calhoun County. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA said that the past and present scrutiny by the Congress and us has resulted in the agency’s instituting stricter controls to ensure that it does not authorize unnecessarily elaborate or unreasonable funding requests. We believe that once the Army and FEMA approve and allocate funds for a CSEPP project, state and local agencies are in the best position to implement and manage the project. Similarly, FEMA also concludes in its comments that the states are in the best position to determine program priorities on a statewide basis and balance local requirements against the needs of all CSEPP counties.
According to Calhoun County EMA, FEMA sometimes places unacceptable conditions on the county’s use of CSEPP funds. For example, in September 1995, FEMA allocated Calhoun County $11,400 to complete the purchase of three mobil emergency road signs, with the following conditions: no vehicles would be provided to move the signs, no additional funding would be provided for maintenance, and Calhoun County would be accountable for the signs. Calhoun EMA rejected the funding because of the conditions. The agency reported that FEMA’s conditions were unprecedented, undesirable, and unproductive. According to Calhoun EMA officials, the county does not have available vehicles to move the signs.
section_title: Budget Process Lacks Teamwork
paragraphs: According to state and county officials, the budget process lacks teamwork. County officials told us they have little or no influence on the budgetary process other than to make the initial request and that FEMA’s rationale for budget decisions is not fully explained to them.
Alabama EMA officials said that federal officials do not understand the state’s concept of operations. For example, FEMA allocated Alabama EMA funds in fiscal year 1996 to purchase laptop computers for local public information officers to use every day and take to the joint information center during a chemical emergency. However, the intent of this allocation differs from Alabama EMA’s concept of operations, which provides for local public information officers to remain in their counties’ operations centers. The state’s concept of operations provides for county liaisons in the joint information center to handle county affairs. As a result, Alabama EMA officials plan to request that FEMA reallocate these funds to the county EMAs.
Similarly, Calhoun EMA officials said that the funding process lacks teamwork and that federal officials do not understand the county’s concept of operations. FEMA deferred funding for several local projects that county officials believe should have been funded sooner. For example, the county did not receive funding for personal protective equipment until 1995—more than 6 years after the program’s inception. In another instance, Alabama and Calhoun EMA officials concluded in 1992 that Calhoun County lacked the infrastructure to treat and care for all evacuees but FEMA did not provide funding for host counties until fiscal year 1996. In addition, according to Calhoun EMA officials, FEMA may not have the personnel with the technical expertise to adequately assess local budget requests. For example, the FEMA regional official, who reviews Alabama budgets, said that he did not have the technical background to assess requirements for automation information systems and did not fully understand Calhoun County’s collective protection concept.
section_title: Our Previous Reports Describe Long-standing Weaknesses in CSEPP’s Financial Management and Controls
paragraphs: The Army’s financial management of CSEPP has not been effective in controlling the growth in costs. The Army’s current cost estimate for the program has increased by 800 percent over the initial cost estimate of $114 million in 1988. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Army said that the initial estimate was made prior to defining the program’s scope, requirements, and time frames. The Army and FEMA have already spent $350.5 million and estimate the program will cost $1.03 billion. In addition, almost $157.3 million (44.9 percent) of the expenditures have been for federal management, contracts, and Army installations. According to the Army, some of these expenditures were for computer hardware and software provided to state and local emergency management agencies and for emergency preparedness projects at Army installations at the local level.
In our previous work, we concluded that Army’s and FEMA’s management of CSEPP needed improvements to ensure that (1) local communities could effectively respond to a chemical emergency, (2) officials have accurate financial information to identify how funds are spent, and (3) program goals are achieved. In 1994, we reported that communities near the stockpile sites lacked critical items to respond to a chemical emergency, including operational communications systems, alert and notification devices, decontamination equipment, complete automated information systems, and personal protective equipment. For example, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Pueblo, Colorado, did not have sirens installed and most other stockpile sites did not have tone alert radios. According to the Army, Pine Bluff now has an operational siren system. In 1995, we reported that program officials lacked accurate financial information to identify how funds were spent and ensure that program goals were achieved. For example, Arkansas had reprogrammed $413,000 in unobligated funds to construct office space without FEMA’s approval, and Kentucky and Washington had unexpended CSEPP balances of $4.4 million and $2.4 million, respectively.
Army and FEMA officials subsequently stated that they are working to improve CSEPP’s financial management. For example, the Army restructured the overall management of CSEPP and established the centralized CSEPP Core Team. In addition, the Army and participating states developed life-cycle cost estimates for CSEPP in 1995 to facilitate DOD’s oversight of the program’s escalating costs. Notwithstanding these actions, the federal financial management of CSEPP is still weak. Specifically, records on expenditure data are limited; allocation data differ among FEMA, Alabama EMA, and county EMAs; and FEMA maintains large unexpended balances of funds for Alabama and Calhoun County. In response to our 1995 report on CSEPP, DOD reported that (1) it was not cost-effective for federal program managers to account for actual CSEPP expenditures after the initial allocations were made, (2) discrepancies in allocation data among management levels were not indications of weak financial management, and (3) existence of unexpended balances that are 2 years old was not poor management.
section_title: State and Local Actions Have Delayed Projects
paragraphs: Although the progress of CSEPP in Alabama has been hampered by management weaknesses at the federal level, some state and local actions have contributed to the delay in implementing projects critical to emergency preparedness. For example, Alabama EMA spent more than  2 years trying to contract for a demographics survey, which will serve as the basis for determining the requirements for the tone alert radios and developing critical planning documents. In addition, Calhoun County EMA has been reluctant to initiate CSEPP projects until federal officials agree to the county’s requirements.
subsections: section_title: Alabama EMA Is Slow to Contract for the Demographics Survey
paragraphs: In September 1993, FEMA allocated Alabama $900,000 to conduct a demographics survey of counties in the immediate response zone. The survey was intended to serve as the basis for determining the requirements for the tone alert radios, selecting host counties in Alabama, and developing critical planning documents.
Alabama EMA spent more than 2 years trying to contract for a demographics survey and the survey has still not begun. Because Alabama EMA lacked contracting and legal personnel, the agency wanted a former consultant to manage the contract for the demographics survey and other planning studies. Initially, Alabama EMA spent 2 years trying to hire and pursue a sole-source contract with the former consultant, but the Alabama Personnel Board denied the agency’s request for a merit position and, due to liability insurance issues, the contract was never awarded.
In October 1995, Alabama EMA requested FEMA’s assistance with managing the contract. In response, FEMA contacted the Argonne National Laboratory. In December 1995, Argonne submitted a draft contract proposal to the state EMA. The agency sent Argonne’s proposal to its six CSEPP counties for their review. Initially, Calhoun EMA was reluctant to participate because the contract did not provide for specific tasks, products, time frames, and a reasonable means of relief if the specifications were not met. In March 1996, Alabama EMA officials told us they had concurrence from all counties and planned to move forward with the contract. Agency officials submitted their contract proposal for approval to the Alabama Legislative Review Committee on May 28, 1996, and plan to submit the proposal to the governor’s office in June 1996. The purpose of the initial contract is for Argonne to develop statements of work for the first three planning projects: (1) the demographics survey, (2) evacuation time estimates, and (3) a traffic management plan. After the contract is awarded, the demographics survey should take 6 to 9 months to complete.
On May 9, 1996, the Director of Calhoun County EMA reported that his agency had not concurred with the state’s moving ahead with the total proposed contract with the Argonne National Laboratory because the proposal still lacks specific requirements. The Director hopes that the lack of specificity his agency is concerned about will be laid out in subsequent contractual efforts with Argonne.
section_title: Some of Calhoun County’s Actions Are Considered Controversial
paragraphs: Federal, state, and other county officials believe that Calhoun EMA is often uncooperative and that its actions have a negative effect on the progress of CSEPP in Alabama. Alabama EMA’s correspondence with Calhoun EMA often note that the county’s lack of teamwork consumes time and delays the progress of the program in Alabama. However, in commenting on a draft of this report, Calhoun County EMA Director disagreed with the federal, state, and other county officials’ assessment that some of his agency’s actions have slowed the progress of the program. The Director reported that Calhoun EMA has an obligation to the citizens of the county to ensure maximum protection and that he fully supports his agency’s prior decisions and actions regarding CSEPP issues.
In fiscal year 1992, FEMA allocated Alabama $1.2 million for a siren system in and around Anniston and, subsequently, asked Calhoun County EMA to manage the contract for the system. As part of the contract, Calhoun EMA officials purchased four sirens and one activation control panel, which are still county property, for Anniston Army Depot. During the project, Calhoun EMA officials installed four of the county’s sirens on the depot but kept the control panel. County EMA officials concluded there was no need for the depot to have a control panel to activate the off-base siren system and justified keeping the panel on the basis of a local statute prohibiting the transfer of county property to the federal government. As a result, Anniston Army Depot could not activate the four sirens it received or the off-base sirens. According to Army officials, the depot plans to return the four sirens to the county and install its own sirens. The Army estimates that the upgrade and addition of sirens for the depot will cost $88,000.
Calhoun County EMA also manages the contract for the CSEPP 800-MHz communications system in Alabama. In a memorandum dated October 18, 1995, after a meeting where Calhoun EMA officials declined to negotiate on the distribution of radios, an Alabama EMA official said it was a mistake to allow Calhoun County EMA to manage the contract. The official concluded that Calhoun EMA officials were unable or unwilling to look after the interests of other stakeholders in the program. However, in commenting on a draft of this report, the Calhoun County EMA Director disagreed with the state official’s assessment that Calhoun EMA was unable or unwilling to consider the interests of others in the program. The Director said that all Alabama CSEPP entities, as well as federal agencies, will directly benefit or have already benefitted from the county’s actions.
section_title: Calhoun County EMA Opposes the Environmental Permit for Anniston’s Disposal Facility
paragraphs: Because of 12 major deficiencies it has identified in the program, Calhoun County EMA opposes the Army’s environmental permit application to construct Anniston’s disposal facility until it receives a written commitment from the Army to support the county’s emergency preparedness requirements or provide acceptable alternatives. According to Calhoun EMA, correcting these long-standing deficiencies is critical for the county to adequately respond to a chemical stockpile emergency. (The 12 major deficiencies are described in app. III.) In addition, Calhoun EMA officials question the Army’s ability to maintain its current level of emergency support because of the decision during the base realignment and closure process to close Fort McClellan in Alabama. Previously, Fort McClellan was to provide medical, fire, decontamination, and transportation support to Anniston Army Depot.
According to Alabama DEM officials, the department does not plan to oppose the environmental permit on the basis of Calhoun EMA’s concerns. They believe that the Army has made adequate arrangements to replace Fort McClellan’s emergency response capabilities. If a conflict between DEM and Calhoun County should exist at the time a decision on the environmental permit is due, state laws allow the governor of Alabama to override local communities’ opposition in an emergency situation. According to DEM officials, the chemical stockpile weapons are considered to be a risk and, therefore, an emergency situation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We received written comments on a draft of this report from DOD, FEMA, and Calhoun County EMA. All of the agencies agreed that there has been a lack of progress in implementing CSEPP in Alabama; however, each expressed different views on the extent to which their actions contributed to the delay. The major concerns raised by each agency and our evaluations are presented here. The comments of DOD and FEMA are presented in their entirety in appendixes IV and V, respectively, along with our evaluation of specific points. They also provided technical clarifications and, where appropriate, we incorporated them in our report. The Director of Calhoun County EMA also provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated in our report. We did not reproduce the Director’s comments because they were technical in nature and their length and format made them difficult to reprint.
subsections: section_title: DOD Partially Concurred
paragraphs: DOD agreed with our assessment that the lack of progress in implementing CSEPP in Alabama relates to management weaknesses. However, DOD did not agree that federal agencies were primarily responsible. DOD suggested that a more balanced assessment would include the roles of federal, state, and local governments.
In our draft report, we concluded that the lack of progress of Alabama’s CSEPP was primarily the result of management weaknesses at the federal level and that state and local actions also slowed the program. It was not our intent to leave the impression that the delay in Alabama’s CSEPP was solely the result of management weaknesses at the federal level. We have revised the final report to eliminate the reference to primarily and to more clearly attribute the lack of progress to federal management weaknesses and actions by state and local agencies. However, it is important to note that the problems experienced in Alabama’s CSEPP are likely to continue until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements among federal, state, and local officials on specific requirements for projects. Even though other agencies are involved, CSEPP is an Army program and, as such, its progress and stewardship of CSEPP resources is ultimately the Army’s responsibility.
section_title: FEMA Raised a Number of Concerns
paragraphs: FEMA reported that it had serious concerns about our conclusions and the tone of the report. Specifically, the agency stated that the draft report did not (1) incorporate information supporting FEMA actions and (2) adequately assign blame to Calhoun County EMA for many of the delays in the program. FEMA was concerned that all of the problems were attributed to federal mismanagement; in FEMA’s view Alabama EMA and Calhoun County EMA clearly shared responsibility for many of the delays.
In response to FEMA’s comments, we incorporated additional information describing the agency’s actions in the report. Our draft report recognized that state and local actions, including Calhoun County, contributed to the lack of progress in Alabama’s CSEPP. However, it was not our intent to attribute the lack of progress solely to federal management weaknesses, and we revised the final report to eliminate the reference to federal weaknesses as the primary cause.
section_title: Calhoun County EMA Partially Concurred
paragraphs: The Director of Calhoun County EMA agreed with our assessment that Calhoun County is not fully prepared to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency and also reported that the county is not adequately prepared to recover from the effects of chemical contamination. In addition, the Director concurred with our assessment that the lack of progress in Alabama CSEPP is primarily the result of management weaknesses at the federal level, but said that our draft report should have focused less on management weaknesses at the state and local levels. The Director disagreed with our assessment that some of the county’s actions have slowed the progress of the program in Alabama. He reported that Calhoun County EMA has an obligation to the citizens of the county to ensure maximum protection and that he fully supports his agency’s prior decisions and actions regarding CSEPP issues. However, as discussed in the report, we believe that some of Calhoun EMA’s actions have contributed to the lack of progress in Alabama’s CSEPP.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We obtained information from the Army and FEMA on CSEPP policies, guidance, procedures, and projects. We also interviewed officials and analyzed data given to us by officials from the Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization; Anniston Army Depot; FEMA headquarters and region IV; Alabama EMA and DEM; and Calhoun, Clay, Cleburne, Etowah, St. Clair, and Talladega counties.
To assess the funding and progress of Alabama’s and Calhoun County’s emergency preparedness programs, we examined a variety of federal, state, and county planning and funding documents and reconciled data among the Army, FEMA, state, and counties. To assess the status of Alabama’s and Calhoun County’s programs, we compared selected projects with program guidance and requirements and determined whether the projects complied with program goals, benchmarks, and time frames. To assess the effectiveness of the federal, state, and county management, we reviewed the Army’s and FEMA’s management structure and guidance and compared them with state and local requirements and concerns. For those critical projects not yet completed, we identified and analyzed the reasons for their delay. We also documented and analyzed the impact of (1) state and county EMAs’ involvement in the funding process, (2) the Army’s and FEMA’s feedback on the budget process and partial funding of projects, and (3) slow disbursements of funds. To assess Calhoun County EMA’s opposition to the Army’s environmental permit application, we reviewed the permitting requirements and application process and determined the status of the county’s 12 major deficiencies.
Our review was conducted from November 1995 to April 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the House Committees on National Security and Appropriations, the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the Directors of FEMA and the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Funds Allocated to Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Entities in Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1995
paragraphs: Army major contracts (over $100,000)
section_title: Hazard Distribution From a Hypothetical Chemical Release
paragraphs: A variety of accidents associated with the chemical stockpile weapons can occur at the storage site or disposal facility or in transit. The distribution of the hazard from these accidents is based on a number of factors, including how much agent is released, how it is released, the duration of the release, the meteorological conditions, and the topography. In general, the risks from any release decreases as the distance away from the release point increases. As a result, the level of planning decreases and type of planning changes as the distance from the release site increases. CSEPP planning zones are partitioned into three territories: the innermost zone is the immediate response zone, the middle zone is the protective action zone, and the outermost zone is the precautionary zone. (See fig. II.1.)
section_title: Calhoun County Has Identified 12 Major Deficiencies in Its Program
subsections: section_title: No Demographics Survey
paragraphs: The demographics survey is 1 of 12 planning studies that the Army and FEMA provided the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (EMA) $1.5 million in fiscal years 1992, 1993, and 1994 to implement. A demographics survey would identify the size, density, and characteristics of the population in the state’s immediate response zone. Demographics data are critical to other CSEPP projects because their requirements will be based on these data. However, the survey had not started as of May 28, 1996. According to FEMA, Alabama EMA received adequate funding for the demographics survey in fiscal year 1992 and any delays encountered in contracting for the survey resulted from the difficulties Alabama EMA experienced rather than from any involvement on the part of the federal government.
Because Alabama EMA did not have the expertise to manage the contracts for the 12 studies, including the demographics survey, the agency pursued a person for 2 years in attempts to hire and contract with him to serve as the contract manager for the 12 studies. The Alabama Personnel Board denied the agency’s request for a merit position. The agency then pursued the person through a sole-source contract. Alabama EMA officials told us that a sole-source contract was justified because the individual previously worked as a consultant for the agency and had extensive knowledge of the program. State officials gave up the pursuit for a short time when the individual could not meet the liability insurance requirements imposed by Alabama Finance Department’s Risk Management Division. This person then went to work for Ketron Corporation, and Alabama EMA officials tried to hire him again believing he could get the necessary liability insurance through the corporation. However, by September 1995, negotiations with Ketron fell through.
In October 1995, Alabama EMA requested FEMA’s assistance with contracting for the demographics survey. FEMA contacted Argonne National Laboratory and requested its services. In December 1995, Argonne submitted a draft contract proposal to the state EMA. The Alabama EMA sent the proposal to its six CSEPP counties for review. Initially, Calhoun County EMA informed the agency that it was reluctant to participate in the contract because the proposal did not provide for specific tasks, products, time frames, and a reasonable means of relief if provisions are not met. In March 1996, Alabama EMA officials said that all county EMAs concurred with the proposed contract and they plan to move forward with negotiations. Agency officials submitted their contract proposal for approval to the Alabama Legislative Review Committee on May 28, 1996, and plan to submit the proposal to the governor’s office in June 1996. The purpose of the initial contract is for Argonne to develop statements of work for the first three planning projects: (1) the demographics survey, (2) evacuation time estimates, and (3) a traffic management plan. After the contract is awarded, the demographics survey should take 6 to 9 months to complete.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Director of Calhoun County EMA said that his agency had not concurred with the state’s moving ahead with the total proposed contract with the Argonne National Laboratory because the proposal still lacks specific requirements. The Director hopes that the lack of specificity his agency is concerned about will be laid out in subsequent contractual efforts with Argonne.
section_title: No Evacuation Time Estimate Study
paragraphs: This deficiency will be alleviated when the Argonne National Laboratory completes the 12 planning studies. The evacuation time estimate study is  1 of the 12.
section_title: No Indoor Tone Alert Radio System
paragraphs: Although funds were allocated in fiscal year 1993, Alabama communities still do not have tone alert radios. Tone alert radios are indoor alert and notification devices, that will be placed in homes, schools, hospitals, jails, nursing homes, and businesses in the immediate response and protective action zones. These warning devices are to be activated by the  800-megahertz (MHz) communications system to warn people of a chemical emergency and provide voice instructions on what to do. Until the radios are in place, according to Calhoun EMA officials, local citizens cannot be adequately warned of a chemical stockpile emergency.
In fiscal year 1993, FEMA allocated Alabama EMA $4.3 million for tone alert radios with the stipulation that funds would not be released until the agency had completed a demographics survey to determine the number of residences and institutions needing the radios before they are purchased and installed. Calhoun EMA cannot purchase tone alert radios because the demographics survey is not completed. According to FEMA, even if the tone alert radios had been purchased when initially funded, they would have remained unusable because Calhoun County EMA delayed implementation of the 800-MHz communications system needed to activate the radios. In addition, on April 12, 1996, an Alabama EMA official told us that FEMA was in the process of revising the standards for the tone alert radios.
Table III.1 shows the breakdown of funding for the radios in fiscal year 1993.
Calhoun EMA officials said FEMA has not allocated enough funding to meet the county’s requirement for tone alert radios. The initial funding estimate was based on obtaining 30,000 radios. However, county EMA officials now estimate the county will need approximately 50,000 radios.
section_title: No Personal Protective Equipment
paragraphs: Personal protective equipment is needed to provide protection for emergency workers responding to a chemical emergency. According to CSEPP guidance, personal protective equipment is required in any situation where there is a possibility that emergency personnel will encounter a chemical agent during the performance of their duties. Personal protective equipment consists of portable respirator, protective suit, gloves, boots, and hood. According to Calhoun County EMA officials, emergency workers cannot adequately respond to a chemical emergency until they are provided basic protection.
Because of their assigned traffic, decontamination, health, and other critical response duties at the periphery of the chemical plume, local emergency workers may find themselves in danger of contamination from an unexpected shift in the plume. In July 1994, the Argonne National Laboratory concluded there was a potential for aerosol deposition of a chemical agent off-post. The deposition creates the requirement for personal protective equipment. According to Calhoun EMA, local emergency workers who might normally help during a chemical emergency would have to evacuate if they did not have personal protective equipment. According to the Army, the typical public safety official should not be located in the predicted hazard area. However, the Army and FEMA allocated Alabama $850,000 for personal protective equipment in 1995.
FEMA allocated Alabama $850,000 with the condition the agency would not purchase the equipment until the Occupational Safety and Health Administration completed its ongoing evaluation. Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration had completed its evaluation at the end of 1995, personal protective equipment requirements in Alabama are still uncertain. According to Calhoun EMA officials, $780,000 is sufficient to purchase the required 1,148 sets of equipment. However, county EMA officials believe they need additional funding for Army-provided equipment, protective components for decontamination teams, and medical examinations for local emergency workers. A draft document produced by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggested that emergency workers who wear personal protective equipment complete annual medical examinations. Just recently, the Army initiated a needs assessment study to determine requirements for Alabama and Kentucky. Alabama EMA officials assume any additional personal protective equipment funding will be withheld pending the outcome of the new needs assessment.
Table III.2 breaks down FEMA’s funding for personal protective equipment in fiscal year 1995.
According to Army and FEMA officials, Alabama and Calhoun County EMAs have been authorized since December 1995 to purchase the baseline equipment with the funds already authorized. They do not understand why the agencies have not acted more aggressively in obtaining the equipment. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA said that there is nothing preventing Calhoun County EMA from purchasing the approved equipment but the county has refused to initiate work on the project until its demand for additional funding is approved. According to Calhoun County EMA, the agency is ready to issue a contract for the civilian respirators and protective suits when requirements for medical examinations and related funding are established and provided by FEMA.
section_title: Lack of Reception and Mass Care Locations
paragraphs: According to Calhoun County EMA officials, local citizens do not know where to evacuate in case of a chemical emergency. Parents are especially concerned about their children and demand to know where their children will be in the event county schools are evacuated. Regardless, Alabama EMA officials believe FEMA’s recent selection and funding of Lee, Jefferson, and Madison counties as reception and host counties essentially settled Calhoun EMA’s concern.
Host counties in Alabama are required to receive, decontaminate, medically screen, treat, and shelter an estimated 110,000 evacuees in case of a chemical emergency. The state EMA initially suggested some Calhoun County residents evacuate to Georgia. FEMA rejected this request and suggested the state study the option of sending evacuees to safe locations in the protective action zone. According to FEMA, the decision not to expand the program into Georgia was based on sound fiscal management. However, the counties in the protective action zones are rural, and do not have adequate infrastructure to process evacuees. Therefore, Alabama and Calhoun County EMA officials recommended that Lee, Jefferson, and Madison counties, which have the necessary infrastructure to provide mass care, serve as reception and host counties. In March 1996, FEMA approved the state’s selection of host counties. The annual costs, mostly for planning and preparation activities, are estimated to range from $50,000 to $60,000 for each county.
In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA said that reception and mass care facilities have been identified and CSEPP officials are in the process of working with the host counties. Because of FEMA’s recent approval of funds for host counties, according to Calhoun County EMA, Alabama participants can start working toward meeting the CSEPP requirement for reception and mass care facilities.
section_title: No Collective Protection System
paragraphs: Calhoun County EMA officials said that they first proposed the concept of collective protection about 4 years ago, but no one from the Army or FEMA ever discussed the idea with them. Collective protection provides pressurized shelter with an air-filtering system and enough food, water, and supplies to house a selected number of people up to 3 days. On March 25, 1996, Alabama EMA transferred $4.2 million to Calhoun County for collective protection projects.
In 1989, Oak Ridge National Laboratory concluded that, in the event of an accidental release of chemical agent, the chemical plume could cover segments of Calhoun County’s immediate response zone in 1 hour. Oak Ridge also concluded in the 1989 report that evacuation was not recommended for the general population in Anniston’s immediate response zone and recommended expedient sheltering. According to another Oak Ridge National Laboratory 1991 draft report, it would take  5 hours and 45 minutes to evacuate the residents in the greater Anniston area. The estimate is the clearance time required for 100 percent of the vehicles to evacuate the area during bad weather at nighttime. On the basis of the Oak Ridge studies, Calhoun County EMA officials believe it would be impossible to safely evacuate everyone from the chemical plume. To shelter the people they cannot evacuate, county officials believe collective protection is the best option. However, according to a senior official from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Calhoun County officials should not rely on the 1991 draft report for planning purposes because the (1) report was never finalized and (2) changes in road conditions and demographics since 1991 may have affected the results reported in the draft. According to the Army, Calhoun EMA must be planning to evacuate the entire immediate response zone and believe that a more prudent action would be to evacuate only those portions of the county that would be at risk.
Calhoun County EMA’s collective protection concept involves both building protection systems and community shelters. County EMA officials believe building protection systems will be needed in hospitals, schools, nursing homes, jails, and other facilities that cannot be quickly evacuated. This system consists of a small enclosed room that folds out within a larger room and contains an air filtration system and adequate food, water, sanitary, and medical supplies. Community shelters would include large facilities containing an air filtration system and provisions. The shelters would be located so that residents could walk to them during a chemical emergency.
Alabama EMA officials told us more research and data are needed to make any rational decision on Calhoun County’s proposal for collective protection. The Army Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center has completed a study to validate procedures for sheltering residents in a variety of housing types and identify a less burdensome and costly way to protect citizens in place. The draft report is dated December 8, 1995, and comments are being incorporated for publication in the final report.
On September 12, 1995, FEMA allocated Alabama $4.2 million for positive pressurization projects in Calhoun County. On March 25, 1996, Alabama EMA transferred the $4.2 million authorization to Calhoun County. However, positive pressurization is just one portion of Calhoun County’s concept of collective protection. The county’s concept combines filtered over pressurized air and the support of food, water, and medical supplies to house specific numbers of people up to 3 days. As a result, Calhoun EMA officials believe the $4.2 million allocation is too little. They estimate that the county will require about $67.6 million for collective protection—$16 million for building protection sites and $51.6 million for the community shelters. The Army believes that a chemical plume would pass over the area in 3 to 12 hours and that Calhoun EMA’s shelter time estimate of 3 days is excessive.
On the basis of the type of facilities, distance from the storage site, potential to support nearby communities and available funding, FEMA selected 21 facilities in Calhoun County for positive pressurization. However, according to Calhoun EMA officials, FEMA officials never coordinated their selection of the 21 facilities with them. Although county officials provided FEMA a suggested list of 55 facilities for collective protection, they disagree with 5 of the 21 facilities selected. They believe other facilities in the county have a greater need for collective protection. As a result, county officials would prefer protecting 5 facilities selected at a later date and replace them with 5 facilities considered higher priorities. According to FEMA, the agency has not received a formal rebuttal or request from Calhoun County to change this authorization. According to Army and FEMA officials, funds will be allocated in the future to pressurize additional facilities in the county.
section_title: No Integrated Communications System
paragraphs: After several years of studying and meeting, Alabama still does not have an integrated communications system. On the basis of CSEPP-funded research completed in 1990 and 1991, Calhoun EMA officials decided that the existing conventional communications system did not meet CSEPP integrated requirements. In 1992, Army and FEMA officials agreed that every CSEPP jurisdiction should have a functioning communications system connecting the Army installation, state EMA, and counties in the immediate response zone. In May 1993, FEMA approved the 800-MHz communications system for CSEPP in Alabama. The 800-MHz communications system is an integrated, simulcast network with 20 channels that operate at a frequency of 800-MHz. The CSEPP system will provide Alabama and Calhoun and Talladega counties with a critical capability of communicating inter- and intra-agency without having to wait for a channel to clear if someone is using it. The system can also be used as the platform to simultaneously activate sirens and tone alert radios.
Initially, federal officials anticipated local EMAs would jointly acquire and maintain the 800-MHz system. According to Alabama EMA officials, they wanted to handle the contract but FEMA officials allowed Calhoun County to manage the contract. However, according to Calhoun EMA officials, Alabama EMA could not put together the contract so FEMA officials asked the county to manage the contract.
Following are instances that show the history of the growth in costs for the CSEPP 800-MHz communications system in Alabama:
FEMA provided Alabama $8.8 million for the baseline system and $4.4 million to expand the system and purchase additional radios in fiscal years 1994 and 1995, respectively. According to the authorization letter, the funds were considered “not to exceed” limits for the project. The letter also declared that the precise number of radios, their distribution, and follow-on radios would be determined by negotiations between FEMA, state, and county officials. In June 1995, FEMA authorized an additional $1,034,426 for the placement of a second communications tower in Talladega County. The letter also said that any negotiated reductions in the system’s cost would be applied to additional field equipment at the discretion of FEMA, state, Calhoun, and Talladega officials. In August 1995, FEMA provided an additional $2 million for more equipment and radios bringing the total amount available for the 800-MHz system to $16.2 million.
Calhoun EMA officials announced during a meeting in October 1995 that with the additional $2 million they could obtain the required communication equipment plus 1,187 extra radios and Calhoun EMA intended to keep all the extra radios. According to other program officials, they attempted to negotiate with Calhoun EMA officials regarding the additional radios, but Calhoun officials would not negotiate. According to Calhoun EMA officials, they tried to discuss the distribution of the additional radios, but Talladega County officials left the meeting. In a memorandum describing the meeting, an Alabama EMA official said it was a mistake for Calhoun County to manage the contract. The official concluded Calhoun EMA officials were unable or unwilling to look after the interests of other stakeholders in Alabama. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Calhoun County EMA Director disagreed with the state EMA official’s assessment that his agency was unable or unwilling to consider the interests of others in the program. He said that all Alabama CSEPP entities either have or will directly benefit from the county’s actions related to CSEPP.
According to Alabama and Calhoun County officials, the number and distribution of radios were tentatively negotiated in December 1995. However, FEMA, state, and county officials continued to disagree about the number of radios needed by first responders until April 23, 1996. In addition, FEMA officials decided to place a $1-million communications tower and some radios for Talladega County in its precautionary zone. Some equipment would be nearly 50 miles from Anniston Army Depot. Calhoun and St. Clair county officials believe placing the equipment in the precautionary zone does not comply with program guidance. As a result, Calhoun EMA officials were reluctant to award the contract. On March 15, 1996, the Calhoun County Commission Chairman sent a letter to the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization expressing his concerns about the 800-MHz system and recommended that the Army reevaluate FEMA’s distribution of radios.
On April 23, 1996, federal, state, and county officials met to resolve the issues that were delaying the implementation of the 800-MHz project in Alabama. At the meeting, federal officials agreed to provide additional 800-MHz radios to Alabama and Calhoun and Talladega counties. In return, Calhoun County EMA awarded the 800-MHz contract on May 30, 1996. According to the Calhoun EMA, the contractor has 16 months from the contact award date to manufacture and install the communications system.
According to the Army, Calhoun EMA’s claim that the county does not have a sufficient communications system to adequately respond to a chemical stockpile emergency implies that the county is not prepared to respond to other hazards—earthquakes, tornadoes, hazardous material incidents, etc. The Army concluded that, until CSEPP provided funding for the county’s communications system, Calhoun EMA was unable to provide basic emergency protection to its citizens. According to the Army, Calhoun County has not provided any funding to upgrade its local communications system. According to FEMA, the CSEPP 800-MHz communications system is not in place because Calhoun EMA refused to initiate work on the contract until the county’s demand for additional radios was met. According to the Calhoun County EMA Director, his agency only supports projects that provide goods, services, and equipment complying with CSEPP guidance.
section_title: Lack of 24-Hour Staffing of Emergency Operations Center
paragraphs: Federal, state, and Calhoun County officials differ on the need for 24-hour staffing of the county emergency operations center. The center serves as the location where responsible officials gather during a chemical emergency to direct and coordinate operations, communicate with officials from other jurisdictions in the field, and formulate protective action decisions. The Army policy is to implement 24-hour staffing of the depot’s emergency operations center when disposal operations begin and not to fund 24-hour staffing of local centers. Alabama EMA officials believe the Army should staff the depot’s emergency operations center during both storage and disposal operations. State officials told us the current lack of 24-hour staffing at the depot’s center results in less than adequate immediate response capability during nonworking hours and places local citizens at unnecessary risk. CSEPP guidance requires Anniston Army Depot 5 minutes from the initial detection of an actual or likely chemical agent release to notify local points of contact of the release, its emergency notification level, and recommended protective actions.
Calhoun EMA officials believe they should staff their center 24 hours a day. Currently, Calhoun County emergency operations center is staffed only during normal working hours, 24 percent of the time. County EMA officials believe this would present a problem if there were a chemical emergency during the other 76 percent of the time when the center is empty. Calhoun EMA officials believe this is unacceptable when it takes a minimum of  30 minutes for agency employees to reach the center and begin activating the alert and notification process. According to CSEPP guidance, the time that elapses from the chemical accident to the decision to warn the public of the danger is of paramount importance to the success of the public alert and notification system. The guidance also requires the outdoor alert and notification system be capable of providing an alerting signal and instructional message within 8 minutes from the time a decision is made that the public is in danger. County EMA officials plan for a response time of 8 minutes—5 minutes to make a protective action decision and  3 minutes to alert and notify the public. According to county officials, if an emergency occurs while the center is empty, the lack of any capability to quickly activate the alert and notification system places local citizens at risk.
Calhoun EMA officials have proposed three ways to resolve the 24-hour staffing issue with CSEPP funds:
Provide Calhoun EMA additional people to staff its emergency operations center 24 hours a day. According to the Director of Calhoun County EMA, the current staff’s job descriptions do not provide for shift rotations to allow them to operate the center full time.
Consolidate the county’s 911 emergency center and CSEPP operations center. Currently, the 911 center is located in another facility in the immediate response zone, an area that would be evacuated during a chemical emergency.
Require the Army to administer the immediate response operations and initiate the alert and notification system.
Army and FEMA officials state that there is no need for Calhoun County to have a 24-hour emergency operations center on the basis of Anniston’s risk assessment. The risk assessment concludes that the greatest risk of a chemical accident is during normal handling and maintenance activities. The Army plans to staff Anniston’s emergency operations center 24 hours a day when disposal operations begin. Until then, Anniston has a duty officer in charge 24 hours a day. In the unlikely event a chemical emergency was to occur, Army officials would contact Calhoun County’s 24-hour 911 emergency center, which would notify the local emergency response agencies.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Army said that Calhoun County EMA should consider less costly and equally effective alternatives to 24-hour staffing of the county’s CSEPP operations center, such as using the county’s 911 emergency center to initiate the alert and notification process. In addition, FEMA believes that the cost of 24-hour staffing of the CSEPP emergency operations center out weighs the benefits in light of available alternatives, ranging from using the county’s current 911 emergency system to using the off-post warning system. FEMA officials also recommend that the 911 center stay in the immediate response zone and that its building be overpressurized to allow the center to operate during a chemical emergency and be responsible for the initial alert and notification actions. According to FEMA, Calhoun County refuses to consider reasonable alternatives adopted by other counties participating in CSEPP. However, Calhoun County EMA questions the feasibility of the Army’s and FEMA’s concept, without additional analysis, of using the county’s 911 emergency center to initiate a CSEPP response.
section_title: Lack of Funding for Local Public Information Awareness
paragraphs: Alabama and Calhoun County EMA officials believe FEMA does not provide adequate support and money for local public awareness programs. Calhoun officials cite the county’s $9,000 allocation in fiscal year 1995 for public awareness activities as one of the reasons for their concern. In addition, they note that the county has over 60 public schools, a university, 3 hospitals, 5 nursing homes, and approximately 120,000 people. Alabama EMA officials said that they agreed with the county on this issue.
Army and FEMA officials said that Calhoun EMA officials did not consider funds allocated to pay for salary of the county’s public information officer in their $9,000 figure. Federal officials also recognize that 1995 was a lean year for CSEPP. In contrast to the funding for fiscal year 1995, Calhoun County received over $150,000 for its public awareness program, but less than requested, in fiscal years 1994 and 1996. (See table III.3.)
In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA said that Calhoun County’s requests for funds do not professionally support the public affairs mission of informing the public of how to respond in the case of a chemical stockpile emergency. For example, FEMA reported that some of the county’s requests were intended to fund frisbees, key chains, baseball caps, T-shirts, and pencils. According to Calhoun County EMA, these public awareness items comply with CSEPP guidance, which provides that each CSEPP jurisdiction consider (1) using a variety of methods to communicate with the public and (2) developing promotional items for distribution at community fairs, shopping malls, and public meetings.
section_title: Lack of a Complete Siren System
paragraphs: According to Calhoun EMA officials, additional sirens are needed to adequately warn the public in case of a chemical emergency at Anniston Army Depot. Currently, the county has 43 sirens. According to Alabama EMA officials, they have supported the county’s position on this issue for several years, pending the on-site assessment of the current siren system.
Calhoun EMA officials believe they need at least 19 additional sirens to adequately warn the public of a chemical emergency. The immediate response zone has dead spots, where the population cannot hear the sirens, and the protective action zone has special population areas that are not covered by the current system. County officials said they saved $102,947 from their negotiations for the initial siren contract to pay for some of the additional sirens. However, FEMA is withholding the funds pending a site survey and a new site assessment and sound propagation study. Calhoun County EMA supports the requirement for the site assessment and sound propagation study, but questions why the assessment and study are required only for Calhoun EMA and not for other CSEPP entities.
FEMA reallocated Calhoun County $128,000 for a new sound propagation study and additional sirens in fiscal year 1995. In addition, FEMA reported that it would authorize the expenditure of existing funds to purchase additional sirens if the study validates the requirement. According to Alabama EMA, FEMA has been slow in taking action to resolve Calhoun County’s concern that the current siren system is inadequate to warn the public of a chemical stockpile emergency.
section_title: Lack of a Complete, Automated Information System
paragraphs: According to Calhoun EMA officials, the agency’s ability to respond and recover from a chemical emergency depends on its automated information system. County officials identified several items they believe are required to sustain or enhance their automated capabilities. They include remote automated workstations for county officials, additional projectors, a back-up server, and optical jukebox. In fiscal years 1995 and 1996, Calhoun EMA requested more than $1 million for automated data processing equipment. The Army and FEMA approved $79,700 for automation equipment in fiscal year 1995 and $201,000 in fiscal year 1996. According to Calhoun EMA officials, inadequate automation capabilities are still an unresolved issue for the county.
According to FEMA, the necessary equipment for the Federal Emergency Management Information System has been authorized for purchase for Alabama. FEMA said that Calhoun County EMA was insisting on equipment that exceeds the automation requirements for the county.
subsections: section_title: Requirement for Local Workstations
paragraphs: Calhoun EMA officials said they need 19 remote automated workstations for local officials from the County Commission, the County Health Department, the American Red Cross, mayors’ offices, hospitals, and several other groups. The workstations are estimated to cost about  $8,000 each. According to county EMA officials, these workstations would allow local officials to train and participate in daily CSEPP operations and operate from their offices during a chemical emergency if they could not travel to the county’s emergency operations center. According to state EMA officials, they believe procurement and maintenance costs are too high for the county’s workstation concept, especially when too many other higher priority projects are not fully funded.
In fiscal year 1995, Army and FEMA officials rejected the workstation concept stating it provides for unnecessary automation countywide. In fiscal year 1996, Calhoun EMA reported that remote stations are required to ensure that daily operations are carried out and to increase the county’s preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities. Army and FEMA officials again rejected the funding, stating that the other local agencies could provide data to Calhoun EMA’s data entry clerk for input to the county’s information system. According to Calhoun EMA officials, this would be difficult because the agency’s one data entry clerk is already overworked.
section_title: Requirement for Additional Projectors
paragraphs: FEMA funded six screens for Calhoun County’s operations center, but only three projectors. According to Calhoun EMA officials, three projectors are not enough during a chemical emergency. In addition, county officials said the current projectors need to be replaced because of the inadequate funding allocated for repair and maintenance. The projectors are operated daily and have more than 4,000 hours of use, compared with the recommended maximum of 1,700 hours.
In fiscal year 1995, FEMA and Alabama EMA officials said Calhoun County’s request for three additional projectors was not adequately justified. FEMA officials concluded that the county already has the required number of projectors. In fiscal year 1996, state officials changed their position and agreed with the county’s request for three new projectors if the county traded in the used ones. However, FEMA still rejected Calhoun’s request for funds. FEMA officials recommended that the existing projectors be used in moderation (not daily) and adequately maintained. In addition, FEMA officials said funding the county’s six screens was an oversight on their part and only three screens were necessary. In response, Calhoun EMA officials said their county has the greatest response requirement of any other county and therefore, requires a greater number of spatial displays.
section_title: Requirements for Backup Server and Optical Jukebox
paragraphs: According to Calhoun County EMA officials, a backup server is required in case the primary server crashes. Calhoun EMA documents indicate that the primary server has crashed or locked up several times and that on one occasion, the server was down for about a month. In fiscal years 1995 and 1996, the state EMA concurred with the county’s requests for a backup server on the basis of program guidance. FEMA officials rejected the requests stating that Alabama EMA, Anniston Army Depot, or Talladega County would have servers attached to their areawide network, which could serve as backups. However, according to Calhoun EMA officials, if the county server goes down, they cannot hook up to other servers at the state EMA, Anniston, or Talladega County. In addition, Calhoun County officials said the other servers cannot perform as Calhoun’s backup because the other automated systems do not have the county’s requirements or databases.
Calhoun EMA officials told us that other required automated data processing items are also unfunded or partially funded. For example, the county EMA requested $63,000 for an optical jukebox to provide on-line mass data backup and storage. However, FEMA and state EMA officials rejected the quoted price stating that the county could use less expensive storage equipment. As a result, FEMA allocated Calhoun County $24,000 for the optical jukebox on December 13, 1995. However, according to county officials, their initial request was based on a vendor’s quoted price for the item and federal officials did not seem to understand that the county could not purchase the item with less money.
section_title: Lack of Complete Planning Guidance
paragraphs: Although Army and FEMA officials originally planned to complete all CSEPP planning guidance and standards by September 1989, planning guidance for emergency medical services, reentry, and restoration procedures remains uncompleted. As a result, local communities lack formal guidance to help them prepare their plans and determine their requirements for these emergency response issues. According to FEMA officials, the guidance is scheduled to be issued mid-1996.
On June 27, 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published in the Federal Register its recommendations for medical preparedness guidelines for communities near the chemical stockpile storage sites. The Army reported that the recommendations were available to all locations for use. According to FEMA, the guidance has been distributed in draft form pending resolution of outstanding issues. The agency concluded that the outstanding issues should not preclude the states and counties from using the drafts for daily planning. However, Calhoun County EMA and other CSEPP participants do not consider FEMA’s drafts as final planning guidance.
section_title: Comments From the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. The letter was received on May 28, 1996.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. It was not our intent in our draft report to leave the impression that the delay in Alabama’s CSEPP was solely the result of management weaknesses at the federal level. We have revised the final report to eliminate the reference to primarily and to more clearly attribute the lack of progress to federal management weaknesses and actions by state and local agencies. It is important to note that the problems experienced in Alabama’s CSEPP are likely to continue until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements among federal, state, and local officials on specific requirements for projects. 2. In the draft of this report, we stated that the Army had taken some encouraging steps to improve the management and oversight of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. For example, the Army restructured the overall management of CSEPP and established a centralized office to streamline procedures, improve responsiveness to the states and counties, and improved the budget process. However, we found little evidence that these steps had any significant effect on the federal management of CSEPP in Alabama. For example, during this review, we found that records on expenditure data are limited; allocation data differ among FEMA, Alabama EMA, and county EMAs; and FEMA maintains large unexpended balances of funds for Alabama and Calhoun County.
section_title: Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Associate Director for Preparedness, Training and Exercises, FEMA. The letter is dated May 29, 1996.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. It was not our intent to leave the impression that the delay in Alabama’s CSEPP was solely the result of management weaknesses at the federal level. We have revised the final report to delete references to primarily and more clearly state that federal management weaknesses and state and local actions have contributed to the delay. However, until the Army and FEMA take steps to delineate their roles and responsibilities, complete and clarify CSEPP’s planning guidance, reduce their involvement in state and local management of projects, and implement effective financial controls, federal, state, and local officials will continue to disagree on specific CSEPP requirements and time-consuming negotiations on projects in Alabama are likely to continue. 2. See comment 1. 3. We revised the report to show that some of FEMA’s expenditures support the entire CSEPP community, including the development of program guidance, training courses, and computer software. However, almost  45 percent of all CSEPP funds have been for federal management, contracts, and military installations such as the Anniston Army Depot. Specifically, $190.4 million (54.3 percent) was allocated to the state and counties, $157.3 million (44.9 percent) was allocated to the Army and FEMA, $1.1 million (0.3 percent) was allocated to other entities, and $1.8 million (0.5 percent) is unallocated.
In our 1995 report on CSEPP’s financial management weaknesses, we said that allocated funds at four of the eight storage sites were generally used for priority items and other critical CSEPP projects. However, because of weaknesses in FEMA’s financial management and reporting, we were unable to provide a complete picture of how program funds were spent at the other four storage sites and that the program was susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition, we did not report that CSEPP funds were effectively allocated. On the contrary, we reported that critical items needed by local communities to adequately respond to a chemical stockpile emergency were not operational or had not been purchased. 4. We revised the final report to more clearly state that some of Alabama EMA’s and Calhoun County EMA’s actions have contributed to the lack of progress in Alabama’s CSEPP. However, we do not agree with FEMA’s position that the unexpended funds are mostly the result of Calhoun County EMA’s refusal to initiate CSEPP projects until the Army and FEMA agree to all of the county’s demands. The delays experienced in Alabama’s CSEPP are likely to continue until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements among federal, state, and local officials on specific requirements for projects. 5. We revised our report to reflect FEMA’s position that the 800-MHz communications system is not in place because Calhoun County EMA refused to initiate work on the contract until the county’s demand for additional radios was met. However, we disagree with FEMA’s statement that the overall scope of the 800-MHz communications project was resolved in 1993. Since 1993, the Army and FEMA allocated $1 million and $2 million for additional equipment and radios in June 1995 and August 1995, respectively. As recently as April 23, 1996, FEMA authorized additional radios for Alabama and Talladega and Calhoun counties. It appears that all the disagreements about the project may have been resolved on April 23, 1996, when Army and FEMA officials agreed to provide additional 800-MHz radios to Alabama and Talladega and Calhoun counties. Calhoun County EMA officials awarded the 800-MHz contract on May 30, 1996. According to Calhoun EMA officials, the contractor has 16 months from the contact award date to manufacture and install the communications system.
The 800-MHz project is an example in which Calhoun County EMA delayed implementation of the project until it received enough radios, in its opinion, to help ensure maximum protection for the citizens of the county. In addition, Alabama and Talladega County benefited from Calhoun EMA’s efforts in that they also received additional radios. In summary, we question FEMA’s conclusion that Calhoun County EMA wrongfully delayed the 800-MHz project because the county insisted on a system that exceeded CSEPP requirements; after 3 years of negotiations, FEMA itself agreed to fund the county’s request. Similar problems experienced with the 800-MHz project are likely to continue in Alabama until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements among federal, state, and local officials on specific requirements for projects. 6. We revised the final report to include that, according to FEMA, the agency has not received a formal rebuttal or request from Calhoun County to change the authorization for the collective protection project. We also added to the report that Army officials believe Calhoun EMA’s shelter time estimate of 3 days is excessive and that a chemical plume would pass over the area in 3 to 12 hours. However, our concern with this project was that FEMA officials did not discuss their selection of facilities to be protected with local officials and selected five that they would prefer to be protected at a later date. In addition, according to Calhoun EMA, FEMA did not (1) provide enough funding for the supplies requested by the county and (2) discuss FEMA methodology to estimate the average cost of $200,000 to protect each facility. Finally, as a result of CSEPP’s fragmented management structure, there was a 6-month lapse between FEMA headquarters’ authorization and Calhoun County’s receipt of it. 7. We revised our report to include FEMA’s position that there is nothing preventing Calhoun County EMA from purchasing the approved personal protective equipment but that the county has refused to initiate work on the project until its demand for additional funding is approved. As discussed previously, Calhoun County EMA is ready to issue a contract for the civilian respirators and protective suits when the requirements for medical examinations are defined and related funds are provided by FEMA. Although FEMA allocated funds for personal protective equipment in fiscal year 1995, federal and local officials are still negotiating specific requirements. The problems experienced in Alabama’s CSEPP are likely to continue until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements on specific requirements among federal, state, and local officials. 8. We revised our report to include the protocol for intergovernmental communications as described by FEMA. However, FEMA does not recognize the role and responsibilities of the CSEPP Core Team in its protocol. According to the Core Team’s charter, dated January 6, 1995, the team is the focal point for accountability of the program and coordinates and integrates on- and off-post activities. The Core Team was established, in part, to streamline procedures, improve responsiveness to state and local agencies, and enhance the overall budget process. Because of differences similar to these, we continue to believe that the role and responsibilities of the CSEPP Core Team are not clearly understood by state and county officials.
In addition, we disagree with FEMA’s statement that CSEPP has had a long-established protocol for communications. Army and FEMA officials routinely communicate with local officials without complying with the protocol described by FEMA. During this review, FEMA officials conducted on-site inspections of the CSEPP siren system in Alabama and routinely contacted county officials outside of FEMA’s stated protocol. 9. According to FEMA, to the extent that CSEPP guidance is unclear, such flexibility is necessary to meet the diverse functional, technical, and geographical needs of CSEPP and the ill-defined maximum protection mandate of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. We believe that without clear and complete program guidance, disagreements and time-consuming negotiations on projects in Alabama are likely to continue. In May 1996, we reported similar concerns about FEMA’s ambiguous criteria for its disaster assistance program.
We revised the report to show that CSEPP guidance has been distributed in draft to state and county agencies pending resolution of outstanding issues. FEMA officials believe that the outstanding issues should not preclude the states and counties from using the drafts for daily planning. However, Calhoun County EMA officials do not consider FEMA drafts as final planning guidance. In addition, Alabama EMA officials said the program still needs to resolve numerous problems with reentry and restoration issues and that the continuous changes and redirection of the program have diverted resources away from protecting the public and the environment. Clay County EMA officials in Alabama told us that there is a general lack of clear guidance for CSEPP. In addition, Etowah County EMA officials said that CSEPP standards and guidance were changed whenever Army and FEMA officials wanted to change them, without regard to the needs of local governments.
CSEPP has had a working definition of maximum protection since 1991. CSEPP Policy Paper Number 1, entitled Definition of Maximum Protection, states that the most important objective of the emergency preparedness and implementation process is the avoidance of fatalities to the maximum extent possible should an accidental release of chemical agent occur. The policy paper states that this objective can be achieved through (1) the establishment of comprehensive emergency planning and preparedness programs and (2) preventive measures designed to render the chemical stockpile less susceptible to both internally and externally generated accidents. The Assistant Associate Director in FEMA’s Office of Technological Hazards signed the policy paper on May 6, 1991. 10. We believe that the inability to reach agreement on specific projects is due, in part, to federal officials’ being too involved in the management of local projects. Once the Army and FEMA approve and allocate funds for a CSEPP project, state and local agencies are in the best position to implement and manage the project and federal involvement in the project should be minimal.
According to Alabama EMA officials, they have discussed the problem related to Army’s and FEMA’s micromanagement of CSEPP with FEMA officials. These officials said that the current CSEPP process does not allow state directors flexibility in managing their emergency preparedness programs. The issue of FEMA’s involvement in the management of local projects was also raised by the Director of Calhoun County EMA on July 13, 1995, before the Procurement Subcommittee, House Committee on National Security. The Director testified that CSEPP projects were hampered by micromanagement at the federal level. 11. We believe that the inability to reach timely agreements on project and funding requirements indicates that the CSEPP budget process is not working effectively. As discussed in the report, state and county officials told us that the CSEPP process lacks teamwork. For example, Etowah County EMA officials in Alabama told us that the agency did not have an influence on the CSEPP budget process and that the agency very seldom receives a response from the Army or FEMA on substantive issues. Similarly, according to St. Clair County EMA officials, the county has no influence in the CSEPP budget process. 12. We revised the final report to recognize that some progress in CSEPP has occurred in Alabama. However, communities near Anniston Army Depot are not fully prepared to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency, and Alabama and six counties have not been able to spend $30.5 million,  66.4 percent of the $46 million allocated to enhance their emergency preparedness. Alabama and its counties have not been able to spend most of the CSEPP funds allocated to them because (1) FEMA, state, and local officials cannot agree on specific requirements for major capital projects and (2) FEMA has not provided Alabama or Calhoun County officials permission to spend some of the funds. 13. As discussed above, we have revised the report to more clearly state that Calhoun County EMA’s actions have contributed to the delay of Alabama’s CSEPP. However, we do not agree with FEMA’s position that the unexpended funds are mostly the result of Calhoun County EMA’s refusal to initiate CSEPP projects until the Army and FEMA agree to all of the county’s demands. Disagreements and time-consuming negotiations on CSEPP projects in Alabama are likely to continue until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements on specific requirements.
section_title: Major Contributors to This Report
subsections: section_title: National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C.
section_title: Atlanta Field Office
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