U.N. Peacekeeping: Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict Countries Lack Results-Oriented Measures of Progress
Published: 2003-09-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United Nations responded to the failure of some past peacekeeping operations by developing a strategy to help peacekeeping operations move a country from conflict to sustainable peace. It has attempted to apply this strategy to the large and costly peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. As a contributor of over 25 percent of the cost of U.N. operations, the United States has a stake in the successful application of this strategy. The strategy also has implications for the conduct of international peace operations in other post-conflict countries. GAO was asked to (1) identify the elements of the U.N. transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which the United Nations has applied the strategy to operations; and (3) assess the challenges to implementing the strategy in these three countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The United Nations has developed a transition strategy for its peacekeeping operations that takes a comprehensive and long-term view and focuses on the causes of the conflict. The U.N. strategy for making effective peacekeeping transitions has three elements: (1) establishing conditions for sustainable peace, (2) coordinating efforts among the United Nations and other international organizations to establish these conditions and sustain assistance after peacekeepers withdraw, and (3) developing objectives and results-oriented measures of progress to help manage and decide when a country's conditions warrant the withdrawal of peacekeepers. The United Nations is attempting to apply the elements of this strategy to help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo transition from conflict to sustainable peace, but it faces enormous challenges. Establishing security often takes longer and can be more expensive than originally planned in countries where rival factions may continue to fight. Developing participatory governance is also difficult in countries with little experience of accountable government. Coordinating with independent international organizations and donor nations with different priorities is also a challenge. The United Nations has not yet developed results-oriented measures of progress for the three peacekeeping operations. Although the United Nations uses some indicators to manage the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops, they did not have results-oriented measures to assess the security situations in Sierra Leone and East Timor and subsequent events in each country showed that the situation was not as secure as available measures indicated. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges that it needs better indicators by which to measure the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining sustainable peace. However, the department has not yet developed these indicators.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United Nations, in partnership with other international organizations,  has undertaken peace operations to establish security and the rule of law  in war-torn countries such as Somalia, Cambodia, and Bosnia. However,  years after these operations began, some of these countries do not have a  sustainable peace or fully abide by the rule of law. The U.N. Security  Council has since authorized other peace operations that have challenges  comparable to previous efforts. By June 2003, U.N. costs for operations in  East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo  exceeded $6 billion, with the United States contributing over 25 percent of  these funds. To ensure greater success in such peace operations, the U.N.  Secretary General developed a strategy for effective peacekeeping  transitions—the process peace operations use to move a country from  immediate conflict toward long-term sustainable peace. This strategy was  to apply to countries with complex emergencies—countries confronting  civil war, a humanitarian crisis, and a breakdown of civil order.
You asked us to assess the U.N. strategy for peacekeeping transitions in  countries with complex emergencies. In this report, we (1) identify the  elements of the U.N. transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which the  United Nations is attempting to apply the strategy in Sierra Leone, East  Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (3) assess the  challenges to implementing the strategy in these countries.
To identify the elements of the peacekeeping transition strategy, we  reviewed U.N., GAO, and other organizations’ reports about peacekeeping.  We met with officials at the United Nations, the World Bank, and other  international organizations to discuss their peacekeeping and assistance  strategies in countries with complex emergencies. We performed  fieldwork at U.N. operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone, which are in  the initial drawdown phase. We conducted limited work at the U.N.  operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is expanding  operations. We selected these peace operations because they are the only  U.N. operations begun in countries with complex emergencies since the  United Nations developed a new peacekeeping strategy. Appendix I details  our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The U.N. Security Council authorizes all peacekeeping operations as a  means to further international peace and security. The U.N. Department  of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for the planning,  management, and logistical support of U.N. peacekeeping operations  worldwide. From 1948 through August 2003, the Security Council  authorized 56 peacekeeping operations. Fourteen of these operations were  ongoing as of August 2003.
Most current U.N. peacekeeping operations have relatively narrow  mandates that authorize peacekeepers to monitor or supervise cease-fires  and peace agreements between formerly warring parties. Three ongoing  operations—those in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic  Republic of the Congo—have broader, multidimensional mandates that  address complex emergencies.
Earlier multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia,  and Bosnia tried to address governance, human rights, and humanitarian  affairs, but they initially lacked long-term transition strategies. For  example, the peace operation in Somalia did not clearly link security with  efforts to rebuild the country. In Bosnia, a coalition of nations led by the  North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed an international force to  provide security, which was initially planned to last 1 year. But 2 years  later, troop withdrawal was linked to the achievement of broad objectives  for the overall peace operation. In Cambodia, there was no clear plan for  effectively developing the rule of law after the peacekeeping operation  left. The Security Council recognized the shortcomings in these operations  and began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for  sustainable peace.
In 1999, the need to address such shortcomings gained greater urgency as  the Security Council mandated new U.N. operations to address complex  emergencies in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of  the Congo. (App. III describes in more detail the crisis each of these  countries faced and the United Nations’ response.) The council debated  the need for a new approach to planning, conducting, and concluding  multidimensional peacekeeping operations in countries with complex  emergencies. The council examined the lessons learned from these past  failures and the process for closing a peacekeeping operation. In 2000, the  council requested that the Secretary General make recommendations  about how to effectively launch, close, or significantly alter a U.N.  peacekeeping operation. Figure 1 provides more information on each  country and the U.N. operation there.
section_title: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Strategy Consists of Three Elements
paragraphs: Since the late 1990s, the United Nations has developed a general strategy  for peacekeeping transitions in complex emergency countries. The U.N.  strategy consists of three elements:    establishing the conditions for sustainable peace, including security, rule  of law, and economic and social reform;   coordinating and sustaining the efforts of international organizations and    developing objectives and results-oriented measures of progress to  manage the peace operation and make troop withdrawal decisions.
The Security Council has stated that it is supportive of this strategy but  also notes that it decides whether to authorize the troops and resources  needed to carry it out on a case-by-case basis. The U.N. Secretariat,  particularly DPKO, has strengthened its planning and management to help  implement this strategy.
subsections: section_title: Strategy Focuses on Achieving Security, Rule of Law, and Economic Reform
paragraphs: In 2001, the U.N. Secretary General stated that the ultimate purpose of  peacekeeping is to help countries achieve sustainable peace. To do this,  the U.N. transition strategy for complex emergency countries guides the  United Nations, other international organizations, and donor countries to  (1) establish and maintain security, (2) develop institutions that provide  rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) create conditions for  economic and social recovery and reform.
Establishing and maintaining security are priorities for U.N. peacekeeping  operations. However, when armed interventions have been necessary, the  United Nations generally has authorized alliances—such as the North  Atlantic Treaty Organization—or coalitions of nations to undertake  military operations to restore security. U.N. peacekeepers then have  responsibility for maintaining secure conditions so that other aspects of  the peace operation, including humanitarian efforts, can move forward. In  the longer term, maintaining security may include demobilizing and  reintegrating ex-combatants into society, training a fair and impartial  police force, and building a professional army that is accountable to the  national government.
The transition strategy emphasizes that sustainable peace is most likely if  the country establishes rule of law and participatory governance. To  support this, the peacekeeping operation and many other partners  undertake programs to reform a country’s justice system so that it is fair,  transparent, and equitable. Other activities include strengthening or  building government institutions to ensure transparency, equal access, and  accountability to all citizens. Other efforts, when authorized by the  Security Council, may include supporting broad-based political parties,  overseeing or administering free and fair elections, and supporting efforts  to combat corruption.
Creating the conditions for economic and social recovery and reform is  also important in the transition strategy. Efforts to create these conditions  include reconstruction of infrastructure and utilities and activities to  promote national reconciliation and human rights, such as supporting war  crimes tribunals or truth and reconciliation panels. Other efforts in this  area include support for resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.
Several studies have similarly found that the earlier operations did not  focus on obtaining comprehensive results needed for sustainable peace.  For example, a Department of Defense-sponsored study determined that  past failures in restoring peace were highly correlated with the failure to  restore public security, political rights, and honest government and with  the facilitation of economic reconstruction. A 2002 guide developed as a  tool for U.S. policy makers reached similar conclusions. The guide noted  that a peacekeeping operation must undertake a range of military and  political tasks to achieve a sustainable outcome in a complex emergency  situation. These tasks include demobilizing armed groups, reforming the  police, establishing rule of law, and rehabilitating the economy. The guide  concludes that assessment of progress toward restoring stability in the  country should identify measures to be relied upon (such as disarming ex- combatants or holding elections) and/or transforming conditions on the  ground (such as reducing the level of violence in the country and  increasing confidence in elected officials). Our observations on lessons  learned from our survey of 32 previous reports on peacekeeping  operations in 16 countries came to similar conclusions about the need for  comprehensive transition planning in complex emergency situations. The  Security Council recognized the shortcomings in the earlier missions and  began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for  sustainable peace.
In February 2001, the Security Council endorsed this broad approach for  effective transitions. The council stated that achieving a sustainable peace  requires a comprehensive approach that includes political, humanitarian,  and human rights programs to foster sustainable development, eradication  of poverty, and transparent and accountable government and rule of law.  However, the council qualified this endorsement by noting that it decides  on a case-by-case basis the extent to which to authorize the troops,  funding, and other resources needed to carry out these activities.
section_title: Strategy Emphasizes Coordination with Other Organizations and Donor States
paragraphs: The transition strategy recognizes that U.N. peacekeeping operations  cannot undertake all transition activities. Thus, transition efforts must be  closely coordinated among U.N. peacekeeping offices; U.N. development,  humanitarian, and human rights agencies; international financial  institutions; bilateral agencies; host nation governments; and  nongovernmental organizations. The Secretary General has observed that  peacekeepers should establish close working relationships with these  other stakeholders and begin transition planning during the operation’s  earliest stages. The Security Council has also strongly encouraged  cooperation among all stakeholders to monitor and develop an integrated  response to the specific conditions in each country.
As part of the transition strategy, other international organizations and  individual donor countries are expected to lead some efforts. For example,  the host government; international financial institutions, such as the World  Bank; and bilateral development agencies have responsibility for  economic recovery. These stakeholders continue efforts after the peace  operation ends.
section_title: Strategy Focuses on Developing Objectives and Results-Oriented Measures
paragraphs: The U.N. transition strategy also calls for developing objectives, linked to  the country conditions sought, and measures of progress toward achieving  those conditions. The objectives and results-oriented measures are  intended to help manage the peace operation and help make decisions  about drawing down the numbers of peacekeepers based on objective  data. The emphasis on using objectives and results-oriented measures is  part of the U.N. decision to implement results-based budgeting. Approved  by the General Assembly in 2000, results-based budgeting links program  objectives, outputs (the final product or service delivered to the client or  users), outcomes (the results of a program compared with its intended  purpose), and measures of impact (the result from achieving the program’s  objectives). According to the Secretary General, this approach is intended  to ensure that U.N. programs are designed to achieve results and to ensure  that the United Nations can measure performance.
section_title: U.N. Reforms Support Implementation of Strategy
paragraphs: The U.N. Secretariat has begun to reform its planning and management  capabilities to more effectively carry out peacekeeping operations and  transitions. These initiatives were adopted based on recommendations  made by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, a group of experts  convened by the Secretary General in 2000 to assess the shortcomings of  the existing system for managing peace operations. Some key initiatives  included the following:  In 2002, the United Nations consolidated all peacekeeping responsibilities  into DPKO. Previously, the Department of Political Affairs was responsible  for developing and proposing the mandates of potential peace operations,  and DPKO was responsible for planning and logistical support.
In 2001, the U.N. General Assembly approved a 50 percent increase in staff  for DPKO, allowing it to better plan and manage operations. By January  2003, DPKO had largely met its recruiting goals in key areas. For example,  it had increased the military planning group from 7 to 18 and increased the  civilian police division from 2 to 9 staff, which enabled it to provide useful  input in planning individual operations.
DPKO revised its overall process and guidance for planning peace  operations. This revised guidance requires planners to clarify long-term  aims in the country and develop plans that identify objectives, tasks to be  undertaken, resources required, expected timetables, and criteria for  measuring success.
As recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, DPKO  has begun using integrated mission task teams to plan operations. The task  force membership varies but should include core military and police  planners from DPKO and representatives of all involved U.N. humanitarian  and development agencies. Representatives of the World Bank and the  International Monetary Fund would also be invited to participate as  appropriate.
In 2001, DPKO merged two existing analysis units to create a best  practices unit and attached it directly to the Under Secretary General for  Peacekeeping Operations. The new unit’s mission is to analyze past  experiences and apply the results of that analysis to new operations. The  unit is also supposed to help develop guidelines and recommendations for  the conduct, management, and support of these operations. Unit officials  stated that they are beginning to make recommendations on the  implementation of the United Nations’ revised approach to transition  planning.
section_title: United Nations Is Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy
paragraphs: The United Nations is trying to apply all the elements of the transition  strategy to help move countries from conflict to sustainable peace. First,  the United Nations and other stakeholders have provided thousands of  peacekeeping troops and other international workers to establish and  maintain secure environments in East Timor and Sierra Leone and to help  develop rule of law. U.N. peacekeepers have also supported efforts by the  World Bank and others to begin development planning and to address  human rights issues. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. efforts  are more limited, but as of July 2003, the Security Council authorized more  peacekeepers and approved other efforts. Second, the United Nations and  international organizations have tried to coordinate transition efforts with  each other, host country governments, and donor countries. Third, each  U.N. peacekeeping operation has begun to identify objectives and results- oriented measures of progress and, to a limited extent, uses these to  manage drawdowns of operations. The Security Council, however, makes  the final decision on the drawdown and withdrawal of a peace operation.
subsections: section_title: U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Seek to Establish Conditions for Sustainable Peace
paragraphs: In countries with complex emergencies, U.N. peacekeeping operations and  other stakeholders seek to establish basic conditions for sustainable peace  by (1) providing and maintaining security, (2) developing institutions that  provide rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) creating  conditions for social and economic reforms. Table 1 illustrates the  transition objectives associated with U.N. and other stakeholder efforts to  achieve these conditions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic  Republic of the Congo.
The Security Council mandates for the U.N. peace operations in Sierra  Leone, East Timor, and the Congo made establishing and maintaining  security a priority to facilitate other mission objectives, such as  reestablishing government authority. For example, to assist in carrying out  provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the initial mandate for the U.N.  Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone authorized 6,000 military personnel to  provide security at key locations, government buildings, and disarmament  sites. The mission also facilitated the free flow of people, goods, and  humanitarian assistance. In May 2000, the Security Council expanded the  U.N. mission’s mandate in response to renewed violence and by March  2001 had increased the military force to 17,500 troops. According to the  force commander, the operation’s priorities since the election of a new  government in May 2002 have shifted from maintaining security to  improving the capacity of the local police and government officials. The  British government has also played a major role in achieving these  objectives. It deployed 4,500 troops to the region in 2000 to support the  government and U.N. peacekeepers and is helping to train Sierra Leone’s  armed forces and police.
The Security Council applied similar measures in East Timor. In  September 1999, the council sanctioned the deployment of an  international force led by 5,400 Australian troops to stop the widespread  violence perpetrated by pro-Indonesian militias. According to members of  the Australian parliament, the government led the coalition because it had  a strong national interest in ensuring a stable East Timor. The Security  Council subsequently authorized (1) the U.N. Transitional Administration  in East Timor in October 1999, with an authorized force level of 9,150  troops and 1,640 international police, and (2) the U.N. Mission of Support  in East Timor in May 2002, with a force level of 5,000 troops plus 1,250  police. According to the deputy force commander and other U.N. officials,  these missions have suppressed sporadic violence and have continued to  patrol along the boundary with Indonesian West Timor, begun training a  local police force, and supported donor nation efforts to train a small East  Timor military force (see fig. 2).
The Security Council has not yet applied similar security measures in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo. As of May 2003, the U.N. force had  about 4,600 troops; the mission was mandated to monitor the cease-fire  and oversee the disarmament and repatriation of foreign fighters. In May  2003, the council authorized the French government to lead a separate  1,500-strong force on a limited mission to protect U.N. peacekeeping  troops and suppress violence between rival militias fighting in and around  the city of Bunia in the northeastern district of Ituri. In July 2003, the  council increased the strength of the U.N. force to 10,800 and for the first  time authorized peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians in selected  locations.
subsections: section_title: U.N. Efforts to Develop Rule of Law and Participatory Governance
paragraphs: U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor have  undertaken tasks to begin establishing the rule of law and participatory  governance. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers, in coordination with the  U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, and others, have worked  with the Sierra Leone government to reestablish the court system, rebuild  courtrooms throughout the country, and develop projects to train judges  and prosecutors. In 2002, the U.N. operation provided transportation,  supplies, and security and monitored the conduct of national elections that  observers characterized as “free and fair.” Mission officials also plan to  provide security, logistics, and technical assistance for local government  elections in 2004. Furthermore, according to U.N. plans and reports, the  priority is to improve the work of government officials in structures  throughout the country.
In East Timor, U.N. efforts to develop the rule of law and participatory  governance have been extensive. For example, in 1999, the Security  Council empowered the peacekeeping operation to exercise all legislative  and executive authority for the country, including the administration of  justice. In this capacity, the operation established a national consultative  council to help make decisions about the future government and set up a  transitional judicial commission. According to U.N. officials, international  staff and advisors also provided on-the-job training to allow the East  Timorese to gradually assume more responsibility for running the  government. The U.N. mission also supervised East Timor’s first popular  election of members to the constituent assembly in 2001 and the  presidential elections in 2002. Since East Timor attained independence  and the end of the U.N. transitional administration in May 2002, the follow- on peace operation has focused on advising and training government  officials and on extending a national system of justice to outlying districts.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the U.N. peacekeeping  operation’s support for governance has been largely limited to supporting  the intermittent peace negotiations between the warring parties to  establish an interim government. A new government of National Unity and  Transition was formed in June, and, on July 28, 2003, the Security Council  expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to help the government  restore stability, including support for security sector reform, elections,  and rule of law, in coordination with other international actors.
section_title: U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Support Economic and Social Recovery Efforts
paragraphs: U.N. peacekeeping operations assist other stakeholders in working toward  conditions for economic and social recovery. For example, in 2002 in East  Timor, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the U.N.  peacekeeping operation, and the U.N. Development Program helped the  government develop a 20-year national development plan. The plan  described short- and medium-term strategies for the country’s economic  recovery and growth, and was used by the international community to  determine their economic support programs. Although the U.N.  peacekeeping operation provided funding for some projects, other donors  provided major funding for programs to reduce poverty, increase power  generation, and support private sector development.
U.N. peacekeeping operations also support efforts to provide social  reconciliation in both Sierra Leone and East Timor. In both countries, the  government, United Nations, and donor countries decided that leaders of  rival factions had to be held accountable for human rights violations. In  Sierra Leone, the United States and other donors helped establish and  fund an independent Sierra Leone international tribunal to prosecute those  bearing “greatest responsibility” for violations of international  humanitarian law during that country’s civil war. The U.N. operation  assists the tribunal by providing security, transportation, and supplies. In  East Timor, the U.N. operation established a unit to assist in the  investigation of the most serious atrocities committed in 1999. The United  Nations also provides technical support and other assistance to  commissions in both countries investigating human rights violations and  fostering reconciliation. Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for  Refugees coordinates refugee repatriation and return efforts in Sierra  Leone, East Timor, and the Congo. The peace operations assist these  efforts by providing security and logistical support.
section_title: U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Attempt to Coordinate and Sustain Assistance
paragraphs: The U.N. peacekeeping operations have undertaken several efforts to try  to coordinate with other international organizations and donor nations.  These include early planning efforts, donor meetings and conferences, and  the establishment of a high-level position in the mission to coordinate  security and economic recovery efforts.
In East Timor, attempts to coordinate efforts among donor countries and  international organizations occurred before the peacekeeping operation  deployed. A joint assessment mission began in the autumn of 1999, 8  months before the start of the peacekeeping operation. The assessment  mission included members from five donor countries, four U.N. agencies,  the European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World  Bank. The International Monetary Fund also conducted a concurrent  mission to assess East Timor’s budgeting capabilities. DPKO used the core  plans for reconstruction and budgeting from the joint assessments in its  planning. The joint assessment mission was a response to experiences in  other post-conflict countries, where lack of coordination had delayed  efforts and caused inefficiencies and duplication in the use of external  resources.
The U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor also  coordinated with other international organizations through regular donor  meetings and conferences. For example, during 2002, the government of  Sierra Leone, the World Bank, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs, and the peacekeeping mission completed revised  strategic plans for that country. U.N. organizations working in Sierra  Leone (including the peacekeeping mission and the World Bank)  subsequently collaborated in preparing an overall strategy for their  national recovery and peace-building efforts. At an international donors  conference in November 2002, U.N. organizations and other donors agreed  to work together to support the government’s comprehensive national  recovery strategy, restructure the government unit responsible for national  aid monitoring and coordination, and hold bimonthly coordination  meetings.
Several mechanisms are used in the field to increase coordination among  U.N. agencies and other international organizations in carrying out  peacekeeping transitions. The Secretary General created the position of  Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, the second  highest ranking position at each mission, to ensure coordination between  security and economic reform efforts. According to the deputy  representative in East Timor, his dual responsibilities for peacekeeping  operations and U.N. development programs allow him to better manage  the process of transitioning the mission’s emphasis from peacekeeping to  longer term peace building.
section_title: United Nations Is Beginning to Use Objectives and Results-Oriented Measures in Peacekeeping Operations
paragraphs: DPKO has specified objectives for its peacekeeping operations and  identified some results-oriented measures of progress. The operations in  Sierra Leone and East Timor are using the measures to a limited extent to  plan the drawdown of troops and other activities, but the Security Council  makes the final transition decisions.
subsections: section_title: Peace Operations Are Making Efforts to Specify Objectives and Measures
paragraphs: The U.N. operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic  Republic of the Congo have specified their objectives, based on mandates  from the Security Council, and have developed measures of progress,  some of which are results oriented. (App. II lists the objectives and  measures for the three missions.) For example, in Sierra Leone, one  objective is to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth. Measures  of progress include increasing (1) the percentage of households with  access to safe drinking water, (2) the percentage of women who are AIDS  aware, and (3) the growth in gross domestic product (to 6 percent  annually). Another objective is to ensure security and freedom of  movement. Measures of progress for this objective include minimizing and  containing cease-fire violations and opening roads and removing  roadblocks. Although some measures for the peacekeeping operations are  quantifiable, the United Nations faces challenges in developing results- oriented measures about conditions in the country that the peace  operations are supposed to improve. This issue will be discussed in the  last section of this report.
section_title: Peace Operations Use Measures of Progress to a Limited Extent in Planning Drawdown
paragraphs: The Security Council weighs political and budgetary considerations as  well as the conditions in each complex emergency country when making  the final decision to draw down and withdraw peacekeeping forces.  Nonetheless, the United Nations has to a limited extent used some  measures to plan the withdrawal of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and East  Timor. (The operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not at a  stage to begin withdrawing.) U.N. officials in Sierra Leone developed and  modified plans for withdrawing peacekeepers based on an evaluation of  progress in strengthening the police and armed forces, reintegrating ex- combatants, and restoring government control over diamond mining.  Mission staff used some of these measures when they reviewed the  security risks and capabilities of Sierra Leone security forces in each  region to ensure that peacekeeping troops were withdrawn from lower  security risk areas first and retained longer in higher risk areas along the  Liberian border. U.N. military staff acknowledged, however, that the force  was being drawn down more quickly under the current plan because of the  council’s budgetary and political pressure to end the peacekeeping  mission and not because the mission’s measures pointed to a reduced  threat to the country’s security and stability. In March 2003, the council  requested that the Secretary General provide faster and slower options for  the drawdown based on the security situation and the ability of Sierra  Leone security forces to take responsibility for external and internal  security functions. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed timetable for  withdrawal that the Secretary General presented to the council in  September 2002, as well as a revised drawdown option recommended by  the Secretary General based on his review of these factors and adopted by  the council in July 2003.
In East Timor, the Secretary General and Security Council have used  measures to plan the drawdown of its peacekeepers. However, although  the United Nations is retaining greater numbers of peacekeepers and  international police in response to unexpected security threats and lack of  sufficient progress in developing the capabilities of the East Timor police  service, the Security Council did not change the final withdrawal date of  June 2004. (Fig. 4 illustrates the alterations in the drawdown schedule for  the troops and police.) According to U.N., U.S., and Australian officials,  this end date is a political compromise developed in consultation with the  United States and key council members. Senior military officers in the  peacekeeping mission said that the failure to meet objectives, such as  having a judicial system in place by mid-2003, will not change the  withdrawal date.
Although objectives and measures of progress provide information to help  manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers, other factors influence council  decisions. According to U.N. officials, U.S. officials, and members of the  council, the following factors are involved in these decisions:    Peacekeeping missions are intended to provide a limited window for  countries to resolve internal differences and take advantage of the  opportunity to rebuild their country with broad international support.
The United Nations must set deadlines to maintain pressure on the  country’s leaders and political factions to take responsibility for their  country and fulfill their commitments.
Each peacekeeping mission must compete for the attention of the Security  Council, which often must respond to new crises and emergencies as it  devotes resources to ongoing operations.
The cost and resources needed for peacekeeping operations are high.
Security Council members face domestic pressures to limit their support,  particularly if an operation is not a priority national interest.
section_title: United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing Transition Strategy
paragraphs: The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each  element of the transition strategy. First, achieving the conditions for  sustainable peace establishing the conditions necessary for sustainable  peace is a challenge. Maintaining security is difficult because the rival  factions in a country may oppose the peacekeepers or continue their  internal disputes, regardless of the peacekeepers’ presence. Further,  establishing rule of law and democratic governance is problematic in  countries with little or no tradition of accountable government and  democratic principles. In this regard, peacekeeping transitions have taken  longer and have been more costly than initially expected. Second, the  United Nations has not been able to coordinate its efforts and priorities  with those of other independent international organizations and donor  states to the extent necessary to meet transition objectives. Third,  developing clear objectives and meaningful results-oriented measures of  progress is difficult. DPKO acknowledges that it needs better measures by  which to assess the progress that peacekeeping operations are making in  attaining sustainable peace. However, the department has not made  developing or using these measures a priority.
subsections: section_title: Achieving Security, Rule of Law, and Economic and Social Reform Is Difficult
paragraphs: Establishing security in war-torn countries is difficult because of uncertain  and volatile environments. For example, despite peace agreements among  opposing factions in Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were initially threatened  by one of the rival groups in the country, which restricted their  movements, took more than 400 peacekeepers hostage, and continued to  commit human rights atrocities. The armed intervention of 4,500 British  troops was needed to help establish security. Through June 2003, 49  peacekeepers had died through accidents or hostile acts. Similarly, in East  Timor, despite a free and fair referendum rejecting integration with  Indonesia in favor of independence, the pro-integration militia created  widespread violence to stop East Timor from becoming independent. A  military coalition of 8,000 troops led by Australia was necessary to restore  security. Through June 2003, 19 peacekeepers had died.
Establishing security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proven  extremely difficult. Despite numerous cease-fire agreements, the two large  rebel groups; five foreign governments with armed forces within the  country; and numerous foreign and domestic armed groups, many aligned  with neighboring states, did not cooperate with the U.N. peace operation.  The operation has not maintained a secure environment, and cease-fires  frequently have been violated. The government’s forces only have control  over half of the country’s territory. After violations of several cease-fire  agreements, France led a coalition force to help U.N. peacekeepers control  large-scale violence in the northeastern city of Bunia in the Ituri region  (see fig. 5).
Maintaining security in war-torn countries is also a problem. In East  Timor, pro-Indonesian militia groups conducted armed attacks from  Indonesian West Timor in January and February 2003, even after U.N.  military officials stated that the militia no longer posed a threat to East  Timor. The Secretary General concluded that U.N. peacekeeping troops  should be maintained along the border. In April 2003, Sierra Leone  peacekeepers expressed concern about ongoing violence in Liberia, a state  that recently supported Sierra Leone rebels. (Fig. 6 illustrates Sierra Leone  soldiers on duty near the border with Liberia.) U.N. officials also noted  that large concentrations of ex-combatants, unemployed youths,  corruption, and illegal mining in Sierra Leone’s diamond mining areas  continue to be ongoing threats to security.
Developing rule of law and participatory governance is difficult because  countries with complex emergencies may have little or no experience with  transparent accountable governments or democratic traditions and  institutions. For example, the U.N. strategy for restoring local government  to Sierra Leone included reestablishing both hereditary chieftaincies and  elected district councils. According to a British government analysis,  however, Sierra Leone’s reliance on hereditary chieftains has always  compromised transparency and accountability and provided a means for  the central government to control local affairs. Moreover, this reliance  limits democratic participation because only candidates meeting  hereditary lineage requirements were eligible to run in recent elections to  fill 61 tribal chieftaincies left vacant during the war. Additionally, local  civic leaders in one district stated that the Speaker of the National  Parliament arbitrarily replaced the locally selected candidate for chief. A  2002 U.K. study characterized the Sierra Leone justice system as  unresponsive, unaccountable, and corrupt. Furthermore, the Anti- Corruption Commission, a body specifically created in 2000 to investigate  corrupt practices among government officials, has been ineffective,  according to U.S. and U.K. officials. In light of these serious deficiencies,  the World Bank and the U.K. government are planning a 5-year effort to  improve the justice system beginning in late 2003.
In East Timor, U.N. and other international officials told us that years of  mistrust of the Indonesian-imposed court system and the rural  population’s isolation have created reliance on traditional laws and  informal courts. These courts show little regard for the rights of women,  according to U.N. and other international officials. These issues present a  significant obstacle to applying Western norms of judicial conduct and  respect for human rights. In addition, the East Timor government has not  passed laws identifying the number of locations or the villages that will  serve as political jurisdictions, nor has it extended authority and services  beyond the capital. We saw limited evidence of government services or  representation in villages beyond Dili, the national capital.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, government and rule of law have  almost completely collapsed after years of warfare, according to U.S.  government and U.N. officials. In 1999, the Secretary General noted that  the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the territory  was a key factor in making the Democratic Republic of the Congo a  difficult environment for peacekeeping. In June 2003, the parties to the  peace agreement formed a national unity government with the assistance  of the U.N. peacekeeping operation.
subsections: section_title: Economic Recovery Is a Long- Term Effort
paragraphs: U.N., international agency, and host and donor government officials have  noted that the time frames for peacekeeping operations are shorter than  those for economic recovery programs. Australian officials estimated that  developing the economy of East Timor and redressing its serious poverty  will take 20 to 50 years. As of December 2002, a study by the U.N.  Children’s Fund estimated that 25 percent of the East Timorese population  is below the poverty level. The most recent U.N. health survey indicated  that 30 percent of children below age 5 were malnourished.
Economic stabilization objectives can be difficult to achieve. In Sierra  Leone, for example, the government has made limited progress in  regaining legal and regulatory control over the diamond trade, a vital  sector in its economy. The value of legal exports of diamonds (as opposed  to smuggling) has increased from just over $1 million in 1999 to $41 million  in 2002. A January 2003 analysis commissioned by the British government  estimated that the annual value of diamond exports could rise to as much  as $180 million by 2006 if the industry was properly regulated and effective  anticorruption measures were implemented. However, Sierra Leone  government, U.N., and other international officials agree that government  systems for regulating the diamond industry remain weak and impractical.
section_title: Implementing Overall Transition Takes Longer and Is More Costly than Originally Planned
paragraphs: Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace,  overall peace efforts in countries with complex emergencies take more  time and are more costly than originally planned. In Sierra Leone,  international efforts to restore stability have been under way since the  early 1990s. Recent efforts have also taken longer than originally planned.  Although signatories of the Sierra Leone peace accord (July 1999)  anticipated holding an election in 2001, conditions for a free and fair  election were not achieved until May 2002, and peacekeepers will not exit  until the end of 2004. In East Timor, the United Nations approved a limited  operation in June 1999 to oversee a referendum to determine whether the  nation would become an autonomous but integrated part of Indonesia or  an independent country. The U.N. mission of 325 civilian police and  military observers was expected to last about 4 months, but following  violence over the results of the vote in favor of independence, the United  Nations sanctioned intervention by a multinational force and later  deployed thousands of U.N. peacekeeping troops to oversee the transition  to independence. The peace operation is now scheduled to end in 2004. In  the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a U.N. observer and peace mission  has been ongoing since 1999, but numerous cease-fire violations have  occurred. Congolese parties to the conflict did not form the interim  government called for in the 1999 peace agreement until June 2003. In July  2003, the Security Council expanded the mandate to support the new  government and increased the authorized force level to 10,800 troops.
Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace,  implementing the transition strategies in these countries has cost over   $6 billion:    The estimated total cost of the operations in Sierra Leone is over $2.6  billion through June 2004. Annual costs have risen from $263 million for  the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to $670 million for the U.N. fiscal  year ending June 2003. This increase reflects the Security Council’s  decision to almost triple the size of the peacekeeping force in response to  continued fighting and other problems. The estimated cost for the current  fiscal year is about $544 million.
The estimated total cost of the operations in East Timor is about   $1.8 billion through June 2004. The initial U.N. observer mission sent to  organize and conduct the referendum in East Timor in 1999 was expected  to cost about $53 million. The current operation’s annual cost is $292  million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2003, and the estimated cost  for the current fiscal year is $193 million.
The estimated annual cost for the operations in the Democratic Republic  of the Congo is about $1.9 billion through June 2004. Annual costs have  risen from $55 million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to an  estimated $608 million for the current fiscal year. However, the latter  estimate does not include costs associated with the Security Council’s  recent decision to expand the operation’s mandate and authorize a larger  U.N. force.
There are also costs above and beyond the peacekeeping operation that  are needed to fund overall transition efforts. These costs are often not  funded. For example, in 2002, the United Nations requested about   $69 million for humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, including the  reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people and improved  access to health, water, and education services. International donors  funded less than 50 percent of this request. Similarly, the peacekeeping  operation in East Timor faced a significant shortfall in additional donor  resources. In 2002, the East Timor government and the U.N. Development  Program identified the need for 228 donor-funded international advisers to  begin to help manage government and economic development programs  once the U.N. operation withdraws. As of April 2003, donors had provided  48 advisers and promised another 83, leaving a shortfall of nearly 100  positions.
section_title: Coordination among Multiple Organizations Is Sometimes Ineffective
paragraphs: Despite the numerous efforts at coordination—early planning, donor  conferences, and other field representation—the United Nations,  international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and donor  nations face difficulties in effectively working together on the ground. Part  of the problem results from the multiple independent agencies in the  country, each with its own mandates, funding, and priorities. This can  create a variety of problems on the ground.
In Sierra Leone, for example, officials of several agencies commented that  efforts to coordinate the work of numerous development and  humanitarian agencies were not effective. One donor agency official  described donor efforts to work together as chaotic. Donor officials and  Sierra Leone government representatives stated that neither the  government nor the United Nations has an adequate system to track the  amount and the impact of external aid, especially aid provided through  nongovernmental organizations. Nor did any organization have the overall  authority to direct the work of donors and thereby avoid duplication or  overlap in specific locations.
In East Timor, early efforts to coordinate U.N. peacekeeping operations  with donors did not address critical needs in the governance and security  areas. According to World Bank officials and assessments, U.N. officials  planned activities to rebuild East Timor’s governance and security sectors  largely outside of the coordinated needs assessments conducted by the  international community in 1999. This situation contributed to some  conflicts and hindered overall efforts. For example, one of the first World  Bank projects was to help villagers in outlying regions establish local  governing councils using traditional law. However, according to the  Deputy Special Representative, this effort complicated outreach efforts by  the peace operation, as it began establishing central government authority  and providing consistent regulations throughout East Timor.
section_title: Developing Meaningful Results-Oriented Measures Poses Difficulties
paragraphs: The United Nations has had difficulty in developing results-oriented  measures to help manage and make decisions about its peacekeeping  transitions. In addition, the United Nations has not fully staffed DPKO’s  Best Practices Unit, which is charged with developing tools for  peacekeeping transitions, such as meaningful and quantifiable results- oriented measures of progress.
subsections: section_title: Measures of Progress Often Focus on Tasks Rather than Conditions
paragraphs: Although U.N. missions are using measures of progress for their  operations, most measures are tasks and outputs rather than measures of  underlying conditions in the country that the peace operation is to  improve. For example, a U.K.-led coalition of donor nations in Sierra  Leone is working to strengthen the armed forces. Some measures of  progress in this area are the number of troops trained, reorganization of  the armed forces, and restructuring the Ministry of Defense. (Table 2  shows some objectives and measures for security in Sierra Leone.)
According to U.K. military trainers in Sierra Leone, other measures, such  as ensuring the sustainability of army deployments, are not clearly defined  or taken into account. These military trainers also said that measures for  this area do not provide meaningful indications of the capability of the  Sierra Leone armed forces. For example, military trainers noted that while  the U.N. operation focuses on such performance measures as the speed at  which units can deploy, it overlooks such measures as troop discipline,  loyalty to the government, and the effectiveness of unit leadership.  Subsequent events revealed problems in troop discipline, loyalty, and  effectiveness. The Secretary General reported in December 2002 that the  armed forces were “much improved” and were effectively patrolling the  country’s border. He also stated that U.N. troops were supporting army  units deployed along the Liberian border. However, the Secretary General  reported in March 2003 two incidents that took place in January 2003 that  lowered public confidence in the security forces and exposed  shortcomings in their capability and training. First, Sierra Leone army  troops retreated and left behind some of their equipment when about 70  Liberian raiders attacked a village near the border. Second, a police  investigation into an attack by former soldiers and civilians on an armory  implicated several active-duty soldiers in a plan to destabilize the  government and prevent the operation of the international tribunal.
A key objective of the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East  Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the increased  capacity of the national police force to provide internal security. However,  these missions use output-oriented measures. For example, in East Timor,  the peace operation originally intended to train 2,830 police by 2004.  However, the operation established this target using a standard European  police-to-population ratio and relied on outdated population estimates.  Moreover, the number of police does not measure the quality of their  training and whether they are improving security in the country. In  December 2002, riots occurred in the capital city, Dili, but the fully staffed  police force could not restore order. In the aftermath of the riots, the  United Nations resumed direct control over crowd control units,  lengthened and revised its training program to incorporate more human  rights and crowd control training, and increased the number of East Timor  police officers by 500.
The missions also use output measures to measure progress in creating  governance and restoring the economies. In Sierra Leone, the number of  district officials and magistrates placed in office is a measure of progress  toward consolidating state authority. In addition, U.N. analysts in Sierra  Leone reported that the reestablishment of courts in many areas was  having a positive impact on public attitudes toward the rule of law.  However, these analysts did not indicate that evaluations of the operations  of these institutions had applied any systematic measures or criteria, such  as the ability of those filing suit to obtain satisfactory resolution of their  cases within a reasonable period of time.
In 2002, DPKO tried to use the missions’ objectives and measures to  develop results-based budgets for peacekeeping but was unable to do so.  U.N. officials said that the missions’ measures were process-oriented and  did not measure changes in country conditions that the peacekeeping  operations were working to improve. A U.N. report in late 2002  acknowledged that it was difficult to shift from inputs and outputs to  objectives and measures. Our past reports have also noted the difficulties  in developing results-oriented measures.
An example drawn from a Department of Justice international assistance  program could be useful, however. Justice’s framework for overseas  prosecutorial training and development identifies an overall objective of  strengthening judicial independence, lists several subobjectives such as  decreasing corruption, lists tasks such as getting legislative approval for  an anticorruption task force, and then identifies several measurable  measures of progress. The measures include an output, funding for the  corruption task force. They also include measures of actual results,  including the percentage increases in convictions for corruption and  percentage increases in public confidence in judicial honesty. Such  measures help demonstrate that program objectives are being met (see  table 3).
Increased regard for  human rights  courses on corruption  and surveillance  in corruption  complaints filed,  investigated, and  leading to convictions  Output measure: A tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort that can be expressed in a  quantitative or qualitative manner.
Outcome measure: An assessment of the results of a program compared with its objective.
Impact measure: Measures of the net effect or consequences of achieving program objectives.
section_title: United Nations Has Not Yet Developed Results-Oriented Measures of Progress
paragraphs: U.N. officials stated that identifying measures of progress useful in past  missions would be helpful in developing results-oriented measures for  future missions. Moreover, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping  Operations stated that to develop and apply the transition strategy, his  department needed to develop better measures by which to assess the  progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining sustainable  peace. He also stated that developing systematic measures of results was  an important task.
Despite the importance of developing results-based measures, the  peacekeeping operations in East Timor; the Democratic Republic of the  Congo; and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone have not developed these  measures. Although DPKO’s revised planning process for peace operations  would require mission planners to clarify long-term aims in the country  and identify criteria for measuring success, the head of the DPKO military  planning group stated that it would be up to the individual missions to  develop results-oriented measures. Mission staff and DPKO desk officers  for each of the three operations noted that they have received only general  guidance on developing results-oriented measures. Moreover, they stated  they lacked the staff resources necessary to develop such measures and  collect the data. Status reports from the missions that we reviewed were  largely narrative accounts of daily or weekly events and did not use  results-oriented measures. Beginning in late 2002, DPKO and mission staff  attempted to implement results-based budgeting for peacekeeping  operations for fiscal year 2003-04. According to one DPKO official,  however, this effort to did not succeed because peacekeeping operations  staff had not made it a priority to develop results-oriented measures linked  to their peacekeeping mission strategies. U.N. officials noted that DPKO  and mission staff are working to develop results-oriented measures in  order to implement results-based budgets for most peacekeeping  operations by fiscal year 2004-05. They also indicated that the lessons  learned and best practices from this planning and budget preparation  process will be reflected in the 2005-06 budget. Nevertheless, DPKO has  only recently begun to provide the resources necessary to develop these  measures. In 2001, DPKO combined its units for policy and analysis and  peacekeeping lessons learned and to create a best practices unit to  systematically review the results of past U.N. peacekeeping operations and  develop guidelines and general measures of progress to better plan and  conduct future operations. DPKO did not provide a director for the unit  until April 2003, however, nor had it fully staffed the unit as of August  2003.
State Department officials in the Bureau of International Organization  Affairs and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations are responsible for  providing oversight of peacekeeping operations and budgets. For example,  they monitor the progress of the 14 U.N. peacekeeping missions and track  the budgetary costs, of which the United States contributes 27 percent.  They also brief Congress monthly on these peacekeeping missions.  According to these State officials, they have not focused on U.N. efforts to  develop results-based measures. However, they follow the progress of the  missions through U.N. reports and U.S. intelligence. Nonetheless, they said  more systematic measures of results would be useful to monitor the  progress of peacekeeping operations and would help in deciding whether  they were helping a country move toward sustainable peace. They  cautioned, however, that results were difficult to quantify and that the  United Nations was not responsible for all aspects of rebuilding a country  and helping it move toward sustainable peace.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The United Nations and other international stakeholders face an enormous  challenge in helping countries that have been recently involved in internal  conflicts and that have no rule of law or experience of accountable  government transition to sustainable peace. The development of a general  transition strategy for U.N. peacekeeping operations is a positive step in  overcoming this challenge. The strategy takes a comprehensive and long- term view and focuses on addressing the causes of the conflict. The  strategy further recognizes that the peacekeeping operation must specify  results-oriented measures of progress to effectively manage operations  and the withdrawal of peacekeepers.
However, the United Nations has not yet developed quantifiable results- oriented measures of progress to help the Security Council make  peacekeeping transition decisions. Although the United Nations uses  output measures to manage the drawdown of peacekeepers, these  measures did not provide useful information about results, such as  progress in improving security in Sierra Leone and East Timor. The U.N.  Department of Peacekeeping Operations has not yet developed results- oriented measures. It created a best practices unit to systematically review  the results of past U.N. peacekeeping operations and develop measures of  progress to plan and conduct future operations, but the unit did not have  the resources necessary to begin these tasks until recently.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Justice,  and State; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the United  Nations. We received verbal comments from the State Department and the  U.S. Agency for International Development, and written comments from  the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see app. IV). The  remaining agencies did not provide comments.
The State Department generally agreed with our findings and provided  technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated where  appropriate. The U.S. Agency for International Development provided  technical comments, which we also incorporated where appropriate.
The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key  issues facing peacekeeping operations.  The United Nations was  concerned, however, that the report (1) did not fully recognize its efforts  to apply results-oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did  not acknowledge numerical measures of progress included in routine  peacekeeping operations reports to headquarters, (3) did not fully explain  the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, and (4) did not  reflect progress made in the Congo over the past year and a half. We have  added information to the report about recent and proposed U.N. efforts to  develop results-oriented performance measures.  We describe in the report  a number of instances where the peacekeeping operations have used  numerical measures in their reporting, but these are largely measures of  tasks or outputs rather than the measures of outcomes called for by the  United Nations’ results-based budgeting system. The report provides an  accurate portrayal of the comparatively narrow focus of mandate of the  peacekeeping operation in the Congo as it pertains to U.N. efforts to  develop rule of law and participatory governance. Nonetheless, the report  fully explains the mandate for the operation in the Congo in table 1 and  appendix II. The report also notes that in July 2003 the Security Council  voted to expand the operation's mandate.  However, this operation's  limited focus is especially clear compared with the other two operations  we examined in detail for this report. Our report discusses the progress  attained in the Congo to date, but notes that it is very recent. The  Congolese parties to the conflict only formed a government in late June  2003, for example, and as of September 2003, the United Nations had yet to  fully execute its plans to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate Rwandan ex- combatants.
We are sending this report to interested congressional committees, the  Secretary of State, the Administrator for the Agency for International  Development, and the U.N. Secretary General. We will also make copies  available to other parties on request. In addition, this report will be made  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8979, or at christoffj@gao.gov. Other GAO  contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To identify the elements of the U.N. transition strategy, we obtained and  examined documentation on Security Council deliberations on  peacekeeping policies and reform initiatives, including relevant reports to  the council from the United Nations’ Secretary General. To obtain  additional detail, we interviewed and obtained documents on planning and  operational management from officials of the U.N. Department of  Peacekeeping Operations, as well as officials in the Department of  Political Affairs who are responsible for contributing to planning peace  operations. We also interviewed and obtained documents from officials  from other U.N. bodies, such as the Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs and the U.N. Development Program, that contribute  to overall U.N. efforts to restore stability in complex emergency countries.  To obtain other perspectives on U.N. policies and initiatives and  peacekeeping operations in general, we interviewed and/or obtained  critical evaluations and analyses from government and nongovernment  analysts, including officials from the U.S. mission to the United Nations;  the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the U.S. Agency for  International Development; the World Bank; the Organization for  Economic Cooperation and Development; the Henry L. Stimson Center;  and others.
To assess the extent to which the United Nations is attempting to apply  the strategy in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, we obtained information from the Department of Peacekeeping  Operations on the substance and status of initiatives to strengthen its  operations in these countries. We reviewed efforts by this department to  implement the United Nations’ commitment to applying results-based  budgeting principles as a management tool. We performed fieldwork in  Sierra Leone and East Timor to examine peacekeeping operations in those  countries. These trips included visits to U.N. and national government  military and police posts, ex-combatant reintegration centers, justice  institutions, and reconstruction projects. We interviewed and obtained  documentation from U.N. and host government officials, bilateral and  multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations supporting U.N.  peace efforts, and local citizens participating in or observing  internationally supported programs. In conjunction with these trips, we  visited and interviewed government officials in the United Kingdom and  Australia, the major bilateral supporters of the peace operations in Sierra  Leone and East Timor, respectively. Our work in these two countries  allowed us to assess overall transition planning and actual execution of  initial troop reductions, since the operations in these countries have  completed substantial portions of their work and are beginning to  withdraw. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we interviewed U.N.  peacekeeping officials about the demobilization and reintegration  programs and their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. However,  due to unsettled security conditions and the early stage of the United  Nations’ activities, our fieldwork in the Congo was not as extensive as it  was in Sierra Leone and East Timor.
To assess challenges faced in applying the U.N. strategy in these countries,  we reviewed our own substantial body of work on peacekeeping  operations over the last decade (including reviews of U.N. operations in  Cambodia and the Balkans) and included discussion about relevant issues  in our interviews with U.N. headquarters and field-level staff, U.S.  government officials, and other experts in the United States and abroad, as  previously described. Our findings regarding U.N. efforts to develop  meaningful measures and criteria for assessing progress were informed by  our prior work on U.S. government efforts to develop and apply similar  frameworks, including efforts to apply the principles advanced by the  Government Performance and Results Act. To examine whether consistent  and quantifiable measures were used to assess progress, we examined  progress reports sent from the U.N. missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor,  and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Department of  Peacekeeping Operations headquarters in New York between November  2002 and May 2003.
We conducted our work from October 2002 through August 2003, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission
paragraphs: Support the development of the East  Timor Police Service (ETPS)
section_title: Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
subsections: section_title: Sierra Leone
paragraphs: From 1991 through 2000, Sierra Leone experienced a devastating series of  armed conflicts between the government and rebel groups, brought on by  decades of poor governance, economic mismanagement, and corruption.  The conflict was exacerbated by external support for the rebels, primarily  from Liberia. The international community attempted unsuccessfully to  restore peace for nearly a decade. In 1999, the government and primary  rebel groups signed a peace agreement, and the United Nations deployed a  peacekeeping operation to support efforts to create a sustainable peace. In  2000, international efforts to restore the peace intensified after rebels took  about 500 peacekeepers hostage. The United Kingdom intervened and  ultimately deployed about 5,500 troops to protect and evacuate U.K. and  other nationals and to support the government and international  peacekeepers. The United Nations strengthened its mandate and by 2001  had nearly tripled the size of its military force to 17,500 troops. After the  rebel leader was captured in May 2000, the hostages were released or  rescued, and the rebel groups were largely disarmed and demobilized. In  May 2002, the former rebels participated in national elections conducted  with U.N. support and characterized by observers as free and fair. The  U.N. peacekeeping force currently assists the government of Sierra Leone  in its efforts to maintain security and restore law and order throughout the  country.
Sierra Leone, a small West African country with an estimated population  in 2001 of approximately 6 million was founded as a refuge for freed slaves  by the United Kingdom in the late 1800s. It has been an independent  country since 1961 (see fig. 7). Although endowed with substantial mineral  resources, most notably diamonds mined in the eastern portion of the  country, over 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s prewar population lived in  poverty.
The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 with a relatively small-scale  revolt against the government by a group known as the Revolutionary  United Front (RUF). With the help of Liberian faction leader (and later  president) Charles Taylor, the rebels gained control of Sierra Leone’s  diamond mining areas, enabling them to sustain prolonged and destructive  struggle against relatively weak and divided government opposition.  Independent militias and elements of the armed forces fought each other,  the RUF, and West African forces deployed as peacekeepers in a series of  conflicts. By the late 1990s, damage and disruption from the ongoing  conflict had reduced Sierra Leone to the extent that the United Nations’  global Human Development Index ranked it last place in the world. Much  of the nation’s infrastructure was destroyed, and about half of the  population was displaced from their homes. Approximately 500,000 people  fled the country, including an estimated 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s  professionals.
Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations and other elements of the  international community made a number of unsuccessful attempts to end  the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African  States, with the support of the United Nations and the Organization of  African Unity, attempted to achieve settlements through negotiated  agreements, sponsorship of democratic elections, and military  intervention. These attempts failed because of weaknesses in Sierra  Leone’s civilian and military institutions, continuing rebel resistance,  limitations of the international military forces operating in the country,  and competing international commitments to the region. The government  was overthrown by a military coup in 1992. The military relinquished  power to a new president and parliament elected in February 1996, but the  RUF did not participate in the elections and did not recognize the results.  In November 1996, the United Nations helped negotiate a peace agreement  (known as the Abidjan Accord) between the government and the RUF.  This agreement was derailed when the government was overthrown in  1997 by another military coup, and the army and the RUF formed a ruling  junta. The government was restored in 1998 after West African forces  drove the junta from power. In January 1999, an unsuccessful attempt to  overthrow the government by the RUF resulted in massive loss of life and  destruction in Freetown and the surrounding area.
In July 1999, the parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement (known  as the Lomé Agreement because it was signed in Lomé, Togo) negotiated  with the assistance of the United Nations. Under the agreement, the RUF  agreed to maintain a cease-fire, transform itself into a political party, and  join a government of national unity. In return, the agreement granted  pardon and amnesty to all combatants, including those from the RUF, for  actions before the agreement was signed. In October 1999, the Security  Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to, among  other things, assist in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, assist in  the disarmament demobilization and reintegration of former combatants,  and monitor the cease-fire. The council’s resolution authorized the  deployment of up to 6,000 military peacekeepers. Despite having signed  the Lomé Agreement, RUF forces attacked population centers and  engaged in a series of armed confrontations with African peacekeeping  forces and, subsequently, with U.N. troops. In May 2000, the RUF took  about 500 U.N. peacekeepers hostage. U.N. and other assessments  concluded that insufficient military strength and other shortcomings  contributed to the peacekeeping force’s inability to deter and repel RUF  attacks and stabilize the country.
The hostage-taking and other incidents prompted a significant change in  the United Nations’ and the international community’s approach to the  crisis in Sierra Leone. The international community applied greater  military and diplomatic pressure, which succeeded in overcoming RUF  resistance and restoring the peace. Beginning in May 2000, the United  Kingdom deployed troops to protect and evacuate U.K. and other nationals  and secure the area around Freetown and the airport. This deployment  boosted confidence in the government and allowed the United Nations to  redeploy peacekeepers to other areas. At the same time, the United  Nations began increasing the strength of its peacekeeping force in a series  of steps from 6,000 to 17,500 troops. The Security Council augmented the  mission’s mandate to clarify its right to self-defense and tasked it to help  extend government authority throughout the country, including areas  controlled by the RUF and other armed groups. In addition, Guinean  armed forces defeated RUF incursions into that country, and the United  Nations imposed sanctions on Liberia to reduce that country’s support for  the RUF. The arrest and imprisonment of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in  mid-2000 enhanced RUF cooperation.
The United Nations reported that, through May 2002, the U.N.  peacekeeping operation supported the extension of government authority  throughout the country, the disarmament and reintegration of ex- combatants, and the conduct of free and fair national elections. According  to U.N. reports, by December 2001, U.N. troops had been deployed to all  districts of Sierra Leone, and, by June 2002, government administrators  and police had also been deployed to all districts with the support of the  U.N. forces, the U.N. Development Program, and international groups. In  January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the United  Nations declared the disarmament process complete. Having disarmed, the  RUF participated as a political party in national presidential and  parliamentary elections in May 2002. The U.N. operation played an  important role in supporting these elections, which international and local  observers characterized as free, transparent, and generally free of  violence.
In the spring and summer of 2002, having achieved these basic milestones,  U.N. officials began to develop plans to gradually reduce the size of the  mission. In accordance with Security Council guidance, U.N. officials  identified and articulated strategic goals for key areas where progress  would affect the security threat facing Sierra Leone and its ability to  maintain security and stability without substantial assistance from U.N.  peacekeepers.
section_title: East Timor
paragraphs: A former Portuguese colony, East Timor experienced years of intermittent  conflict following its 1975 occupation by Indonesia. Low-level  international efforts to resolve this conflict were unsuccessful until 1998,  when Indonesian-Portuguese negotiations finally produced agreement on a  referendum to decide the territory’s political future. The ensuing vote for  independence in August 1999 provoked a violent response from militias  favoring integration with Indonesia. The international community  intervened to end the fighting and established a U.N. transitional  administration in 2000 to run the country and oversee international  assistance efforts until a new national authority was elected and  independence declared in May 2002. A U.N. peacekeeping operation  remains in East Timor in support of the government and ongoing  international efforts to create sustainable peace in the new country.
East Timor is a small country with a population ranging between 800,000  and about 1 million occupying the eastern portion of the island of Timor  (see fig. 8). First colonized by Portugal in the 1500s, Timor was divided  between the Netherlands and Portugal in 1859. While the Dutch side  became part of Indonesia after World War II, East Timor remained under  Portuguese rule. In 1975, Portugal finally withdrew and East Timor  declared independence. However, armed conflict among domestic factions  provided Indonesia with a pretext for occupation. For the ensuing quarter  century, Indonesia conducted an unsuccessful campaign to incorporate  East Timor, with intermittent warfare claiming 100,000 to 250,000 lives. By  1999, years of violence and disruption had reduced East Timor to last  place among Asian countries on the United Nations’ Human Development  Index.
Although the United Nations refused to recognize Indonesia’s annexation  and called for self-determination for East Timor, these calls did not  achieve results until the government of Indonesia changed hands in 1998  and the new administration decided to enter U.N.-mediated discussions  with Portugal about the territory’s political future.
In 1999, these talks resulted in agreement to hold a popular vote on  whether East Timor would accept or reject a proposal to remain affiliated  with Indonesia as an autonomous entity. To ensure a free and fair  referendum, the Security Council created a small observer mission, the  U.N. Mission in East Timor, to monitor campaigning and voting and to  oversee the result of the vote. However, Indonesia retained responsibility  for maintaining peace and security. On August 30, 1999, the population  voted overwhelmingly against the proposal, voting in effect for U.N.  administration and eventual transition to full independence. In response,  militias favoring integration with Indonesia went on a rampage with the  support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, killing hundreds of  people, displacing 500,000 more—many of whom fled or were forcibly  removed to West Timor—and destroying much of the country’s already  damaged infrastructure and housing. Those leaving included most of the  country’s professional class, who were predominantly Indonesian in  origin.
Despite diplomatic pressure from the Secretary General and others,  Indonesian authorities did little to end the violence; Indonesian security  forces in fact provided considerable support to pro-union militias. In 1999,  the Secretary General noted that the potential for post-vote discord was  widely acknowledged and Indonesian authorities had not done an effective  job of quelling prereferendum violence. The U.N. mission then in the  country, however, had not been provided with the means for taking  effective action to restore stability.
In the aftermath of the violence, the United Nations authorized a series of  interventions in East Timor that were intended to end the violence, create  a national government, and consolidate a stable environment that would  permit devolution of all responsibilities to the new national government  and withdrawal of U.N. forces. In September 1999, the Security Council  authorized an Australian-led international force of approximately 8,000  military personnel to intervene in East Timor, end the violence, and  facilitate humanitarian operations. With Indonesian consent, this force  quickly entered East Timor and restored order. About 500,000 East  Timorese were displaced from their homes. About half of the displaced  went to West Timor, in some cases forced to go by fleeing pro-Indonesia  militiamen. The following month, the council authorized creation of the  U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor that would assume  responsibility for maintaining security from the Australian-led force,  administer an interim government, and work to develop East Timor’s  capacity for self-government. In the ensuing months, the mission oversaw  development of a national consultative council, began training a police  force, assisted with the return of most of the refugees, helped other  international organizations create the conditions for economic  development, and patrolled the boundary with Indonesia. Between August  2001 and April 2002, the people of East Timor elected a constituent  assembly, adopted a constitution, and elected a president.
On May 20, 2002, East Timor became an independent country, and the U.N.  transitional administration turned over responsibility for governance to  Timorese authorities. Recognizing this change in circumstances, the  Security Council created a U.N. Mission in Support of East Timor to  pursue a mandate that supports the new government as it works to  establish stability and security in the country. The mission has developed  implementation plans for its activities, identified security and governance  “milestones” to be achieved, and developed a proposed timetable for  reducing its presence in East Timor over a 2-year period, with the final  withdrawal of the peacekeepers to be completed by mid-2004.
section_title: Democratic Republic of the Congo
paragraphs: Since suffering foreign invasion and overthrow of the government in 1996- 97 and again in 1998-99, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has  been divided by conflict among shifting alliances of foreign and domestic  armed groups, including troops from seven other countries sent to support  or oppose the government. International initiatives aimed at restoring  peace, including a U.N. peacekeeping operation, have made some progress  since 1999, but violence continues to occur. The Security Council  established a peacekeeping operation, the U.N. Organization Mission in  the Democratic Republic of Congo, in support of a 1999 peace agreement  signed in Lusaka, Zambia. The parties to the agreement largely failed to  meet their commitments until late 2002, making it difficult for the U.N.  mission to plan a comprehensive approach to restoring stability. Foreign  troops were withdrawn by May 2003, and the Congolese factions formed a  transitional government in June 2003. In July 2003, the council expanded  the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to assist the new government’s  efforts to provide security and rule of law. In addition, the council  authorized a substantial increase in the size of the peacekeeping force.
The DRC occupies the core of central Africa. Approximately equivalent in  size to the United States east of the Mississippi River, the country shares  borders with nine other nations and has a population of about 55 million.  The country is rich in natural resources, with substantial deposits of gold,  diamonds, coltan, and other minerals; ample timber; and enormous  potential for hydroelectric power generation. A colony of Belgium until  1960, the new country dissolved into a multisided war shortly after  declaring independence. The government of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, in  power from 1965 to 1997, eventually restored order but failed to channel  the country’s considerable wealth into economic and social development.  Corrupt government officials became wealthy while the population  remained poor, politically disenfranchised, and willing to support  opposition groups and coup attempts. The economy suffered a near-total  collapse during the early 1990s. By 1997, the central government could do  little to resist rebels and outside forces.
The political and economic tensions in the DRC were exacerbated by the  1994 conflict and associated genocide in neighboring Rwanda. More than 1  million ethnic Hutus fleeing Tutsi reprisals inside Rwanda became  refugees in eastern DRC. Ethnic tension and fighting involving Congolese  Tutsis, the army, and exiled Rwandan Hutu militias ensued, leading  eventually to a 1997 uprising by domestic rebel groups that succeeded in  deposing Mobutu with support from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. The  successor government under rebel leader Laurent Kabila was challenged  in 1998 by a new coalition of internal rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan  troops. With support from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, and Chad,  the Kabila government pushed its challengers back to eastern DRC before  losing the initiative. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their respective  rebel client groups remained in control of large portions of the country  (see fig. 9). According to International Rescue Committee estimates, the  continuing conflict has cost more than 3 million lives since 1998.
In July 1999, the main parties to the DRC conflict agreed to honor a cease- fire and begin a national dialogue to lead to the creation of a transitional  government and national elections. The Security Council authorized a U.N.  peacekeeping operation to support the cessation of hostilities, oversee the  withdrawal of foreign forces, and encourage talks sponsored by the United  Nations and the African Union to create a new national government that  included the current government and foreign-supported rebel groups in  eastern DRC. The peacekeeping operation would then support the new  government’s efforts to restore peace, including a timetable calling for  agreement on the formation of a unified transitional government within 3  months, withdrawal of all foreign forces within 6 months, and  reestablishment of state administration throughout the DRC within 9  months, that is, by April 2000.
The parties were slow to meet their commitments and were unable to  implement a comprehensive plan to restore peace. The formation of a  national government was also substantially delayed. The parties  committed numerous violations of the cease-fire, and it was not until  December 2002 that the Kinshasa government and major rebel groups  from eastern Congo signed a power-sharing agreement that would permit  the creation of the transitional government. Foreign troops have been slow  to withdraw in part because they want to retain control of mineral  resources. Rwanda withdrew its troops in late 2002, while Uganda  removed the last of its units in May 2003. As of August 2003, fighting has  continued among rebel militias seeking to control Ituri and other  northeastern regions. In Ituri, local, ethnic militias began fighting after  foreign troops vacated the area.
Since 1999, the Security Council has gradually increased the strength and  mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping operation that supported the peace  process. In 2001, the council authorized the mission to train police for the  eastern rebel-occupied city of Kisangani and help reopen the Congo River  to commercial traffic. In 2002, it inaugurated a program to disarm and  repatriate ethnic Hutu militiamen and their families from the DRC to  Rwanda. The council approved a number of increases in the size of the  peacekeeping force, raising its authorized strength from 90 military  liaisons in August 1999 to 8,700 troops by December 2002. The actual  forces provided by member states to the operation have been significantly  below the ceiling because the country’s unstable political environment,  great size, and poor transportation network make it costly to deploy  troops. Consequently, the number of U.N. troops actually deployed to the  DRC totaled about 6,200 soldiers and 76 police as of June 2003. In May  2003, the council also authorized the deployment of a separate French-led  force of about 1,500 international troops to the Ituri region to end fighting  and restore order in the city of Bunia.
The Congolese parties to the peace agreement formed the National Unity  and Transition government in June 2003. On July 28, 2003, the Security  Council expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to assist the  government in developing a more comprehensive approach to restoring  stability, including efforts to support security sector reform, elections, and  the establishment of the rule of law, in coordination with other  international actors. The council also authorized the mission to use force  to stabilize Ituri and other northeastern regions and expanded its force  level to 10,800 troops. The U.N. operation will also assume control over  international forces in the Ituri region in September 2003. The new  resolution extended the mission for 1 year but did not set a date for  elections. However, the Secretary General suggested in May 2003 that the  holding of free and fair national elections might serve as an appropriate  time to end the current peacekeeping operation.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Ann Baker, Lynn Cothern, Martin De  Alteriis, Michael McAtee, and Claire van der Lee made major contributions  to this report.