Critical Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary Observations on DHS Efforts to Assess Chemical Security Risk and Gather Feedback on Facility Outreach
Published: 2013-03-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations that establish standards for the security of high-risk chemical facilities. DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to assess the risk posed by these facilities and inspect them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. ISCD, which manages the program, places high-risk facilities in risk-based tiers and is to conduct inspections after it approves facility security plans. A November 2011 ISCD internal memorandum raised concerns about ISCD's ability to fulfill its mission.
This statement is based on GAO's ongoing work conducted for several congressional committees and subcommittees and provides preliminary observations regarding the extent to which DHS has (1) assigned chemical facilities to tiers and assessed its approach for doing so, (2) revised its process to review facility security plans, and (3) communicated and worked with owners and operators to improve security. To conduct this ongoing work, GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on risk assessments, security plan reviews, and facility outreach and interviewed DHS officials. GAO received input from 11 trade associations representing chemical facilities about ISCD outreach. The results of this input are not generalizable but provide insights about DHS outreach efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2007, the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) has assigned about 3,500 high-risk chemical facilities to risk-based tiers under its Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, but it has not fully assessed its approach for doing so. The approach ISCD used to assess risk and make decisions to place facilities in final tiers does not consider all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. For example, the risk assessment approach is based primarily on consequences arising from human casualties, but does not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation, nor does it include vulnerability, consistent with the NIPP. ISCD has begun to take some actions to examine how its risk assessment approach can be enhanced. Specifically, ISCD has, among other things, engaged Sandia National Laboratories to examine how economic consequences can be incorporated into ISCD's risk assessment approach and commissioned a panel of experts to assess the current approach, identify strengths and weaknesses, and recommend improvements. Given the critical nature of ISCD's risk assessment approach in laying the foundation for further regulatory steps in improving facility security, it is important that its approach for assigning facilities to tiers is complete within the NIPP risk management framework and the CFATS regulation.
DHS's ISCD has revised its process for reviewing facilities' site security plans-- which are to be approved by ISCD before it performs compliance inspections-- but it did not track data on the prior process so is unable to measure any improvements. The past process was considered by ISCD to be difficult to implement and caused bottlenecks in approving plans. ISCD views its revised process to be a significant improvement because, among other things, teams of experts review parts of the plans simultaneously rather than sequentially, as occurred in the past. Moving forward, ISCD intends to measure the time it takes to complete reviews, but will not be able to do so until the process matures. Using ISCD's expected plan approval rate of 30 to 40 plans a month, GAO estimated that it could take another 7 to 9 years before ISCD is able to complete reviews on the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue. ISCD officials said that they are exploring ways to expedite the process, such as reprioritizing resources.
DHS's ISCD has also taken various actions to work with facility owners and operators, including increasing the number of visits to facilities to discuss enhancing security plans, but trade associations that responded to GAO's query had mixed views on the effectiveness of ISCD's outreach. ISCD solicits informal feedback from facility owners and operators on its efforts to communicate and work with them, but it does not have an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach activities. Prior GAO work on customer service efforts in the government indicates that systematic feedback from those receiving services can provide helpful information as to the kind and quality of services they want and their level of satisfaction with existing services. GAO will continue to assess ISCD's efforts in these areas and consider any recommendations needed to address these issues. GAO expects to issue a report on its results in April 2013.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our preliminary observations on  the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to address the  various challenges in implementing and managing the Chemical Facility  Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The events of September  11, 2001, triggered a national reexamination of the security of facilities  that use or store hazardous chemicals in quantities that, in the event of a  terrorist attack, could put large numbers of Americans at risk of serious  injury or death. Chemicals held at these facilities can be used to cause  harm to surrounding populations during terrorist attacks, can be stolen  and used as chemical weapons or as precursors (the ingredients for  making chemical weapons), or stolen and used to build an improvised  explosive device. To mitigate this risk, the DHS appropriations act for  fiscal year 2007 required DHS to issue regulations to establish risk- based performance standards for securing high-risk chemical facilities,  among other things. In 2007, DHS established the CFATS program to  assess the risk, if any, posed by chemical facilities; place high-risk  facilities in one of four risk-based tiers; require high-risk facilities to  develop security plans; review these plans; and inspect the facilities to  ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements. DHS’s National  Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is responsible for the  CFATS program. Within NPPD, the Infrastructure Security Compliance  Division (ISCD), a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP),  manages the program.
In 2011, a leaked internal memorandum prompted some Members of  Congress and chemical facility owners and operators to become  concerned about ISCD’s ability to implement and manage a regulatory  regime under the CFATS program. In July 2012, we reported that ISCD  had efforts under way to address the problems highlighted in the internal  memorandum and had developed an action plan to track its progress on  various human capital, mission, and administrative issues. As requested,  this testimony discusses our preliminary observations on the extent to  which DHS has (1) assigned chemical facilities to risk-based tiers and  assessed its approach for doing so, (2) revised the process used to  review security plans, and (3) communicated and worked with facilities to  help improve security.
My statement today is based on preliminary analyses from our ongoing  review of the CFATS program for a number of congressional committees  and subcommittees. We expect to issue a final report on this work in  April 2013. To conduct this work, we are reviewing the CFATS statute  and regulation; the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP); as  well as applicable ISCD policies, processes, and procedures. We are  reviewing and analyzing ISCD documents including the web-based tools  used to collect security information from facilities, the ISCD risk  assessment approach used to determine a facility’s risk, and data ISCD  collects from facilities to assign them to risk-based tiers. We are also  reviewing documents such as the November 2011 internal memorandum  and ISCD security plan review policies and procedures. To confirm our  understanding of the security plan review process, we are also gathering  and analyzing statistics to determine how many security plans have been  reviewed, authorized, and approved from program inception through  December 2012. Regarding communicating and working with facilities to  improve security, we contacted officials representing 15 trade  associations with members regulated by CFATS to obtain their  perspectives on DHS efforts to work with facility owners and operators.  Out of these 15 associations, 11 responded, and the information we  obtained from them is not generalizable to the universe of chemical  facilities covered by CFATS; however, it provides insights into DHS  efforts to perform outreach and seek feedback on the implementation of  the CFATS rule. We assessed the reliability of the data we used for this  statement and found that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this statement. We also interviewed ISCD officials  responsible for overseeing the CFATS program to confirm our  understanding of the documents and data provided. We shared the  information in this statement with DHS officials and incorporated its  comments where appropriate. We are conducting our work in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Section 550 of the DHS appropriations act for fiscal year 2007 requires  DHS to issue regulations establishing risk-based performance standards  for the security of facilities that the Secretary determines to present high  levels of security risk, among other things. The CFATS rule was  published in April 2007, and appendix A to the rule, published in  November 2007, listed 322 chemicals of interest and the screening  threshold quantities for each. ISCD has direct responsibility for  implementing DHS’s CFATS rule, including assessing potential risks and  identifying high-risk chemical facilities, promoting effective security  planning, and ensuring that final high-risk facilities meet applicable  standards through site security plans approved by DHS. From fiscal years  2007 through 2012, DHS dedicated about $442 million to the CFATS  program. During fiscal year 2012, ISCD was authorized 242 full-time- equivalent positions.
ISCD uses a risk assessment approach to develop risk scores to assign  chemical facilities to one of four final tiers. Facilities placed in one of  these tiers (tier 1, 2, 3, or 4) are considered to be high risk, with tier 1  facilities considered to be the highest risk. According to an ISCD  document that describes how ISCD develops its CFATS risk score, the  risk score is intended to be derived from estimates of consequence (the  adverse effects of a successful attack), threat (the likelihood of an attack),  and vulnerability (the likelihood of a successful attack, given an attempt).  ISCD’s risk assessment approach is composed of three models, each  based on a particular security issue: (1) release, (2) theft or diversion, and  (3) sabotage, depending on the type of risk associated with the 322  chemicals. Once ISCD estimates a risk score based on these models, it  assigns the facility to a final tier.
section_title: ISCD Has Assigned Thousands of Facilities to Tiers, but ISCD’s Approach to Risk Assessment Does Not Reflect All Risk Elements
subsections: section_title: ISCD Has Tiered Thousands of High-Risk Chemical Facilities and Resolved Some Problems Using Its Risk Assessment Approach to Assign Tiers
paragraphs: In July 2007, ISCD began reviewing information submitted by the owners  and operators of approximately 40,000 facilities. By January 2013, ISCD  had designated about 4,400 of the 40,000 facilities as high risk and  thereby covered by the CFATS rule. ISCD had assigned about 3,500 of  those facilities to a final tier, of which about 90 percent were tiered  because of the risk of theft or diversion. The remaining 10 percent were  tiered because of the risk of release or the risk of sabotage.
Over the last 2 years, ISCD has identified problems with the way the  release chemicals model assigns chemical facilities to tiers and has taken  or begun to take action to address those problems. In February 2011,  ISCD found that some chemical facilities had been placed in an incorrect  final tier because this model included incorrect data about the release of  high-risk chemicals of interest. In June 2011, ISCD officials adjusted the  model, which resulted in lowering the tier for about 250 facilities, about  100 of which were subsequently removed from the CFATS program. In  October 2012, ISCD officials stated that they had uncovered another  defect that led the model to exclude population density calculations for  about 150 facilities in states or U.S. territories outside the continental  United States, including Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam. In  February 2013, ISCD officials said that they had made adjustments to the  model to resolve this issue and do not expect any facilities’ tier will  change due to this issue.
section_title: ISCD’s Risk Assessment Approach Does Not Consider All Elements of Risk
paragraphs: Our preliminary analyses indicates that the tiering approach ISCD uses to  assess risk and assign facilities to final tiers does not consider all of the  elements of risk associated with a terrorist attack involving certain  chemicals. According to the NIPP, which, among other things, establishes  the framework for managing risk among the nation’s critical infrastructure,  risk is a function of three components—consequence, threat, and  vulnerability—and a risk assessment approach must assess each  component for every defined risk scenario. Furthermore, the CFATS rule  calls for ISCD to review consequence, threat, and vulnerability  information in determining a facility’s final tier. However, ISCD’s risk  assessment approach does not fully consider all of the core criteria or  components of a risk assessment, as specified by the NIPP, nor does it  comport with parts of the CFATS rule.    Consequence. The NIPP states that at a minimum, consequences  should focus on the two most fundamental components—human  consequences and the most relevant direct economic consequences.  The CFATS rule states that chemical facilities covered by the rule are  those that present a high risk of significant adverse consequences for  human life or health, or critical economic assets, among other things,  if subjected to terrorist attack, compromise, infiltration, or  exploitation. Our review of ISCD’s risk assessment approach and  discussions with ISCD officials shows that the approach is currently  limited to focusing on one component of consequences—human  casualties associated with a terrorist attack involving a chemical of  interest—and does not consider consequences associated with  economic criticality. ISCD officials said that the economic  consequences part of their risk-tiering approach will require additional  work before it is ready to be introduced. In September 2012, ISCD  officials stated that they had engaged Sandia National Laboratories to  examine how ISCD could gather needed information and determine  the risk associated with economic impact, but this effort is in the initial  stages, with an expected completion date of June 2014. ISCD  officials added they are uncertain about how Sandia’s efforts will  affect their risk assessment approach.    Threat. ISCD’s risk assessment approach is also not consistent with  the NIPP because it does not consider threat for the majority of  regulated facilities. According to the NIPP, risk assessments should  estimate threat as the likelihood that the adversary would attempt a  given attack method against the target. The CFATS rule requires that,  as part of assessing site vulnerability, facilities conduct a threat  assessment, which is to include a description of the internal, external,  and internally assisted threats facing the facility and that ISCD review  site vulnerability as part of the final determination of a facility’s tier.  Our review of the models and discussions with ISCD officials shows  that (1) ISCD is inconsistent in how it assesses threat using the  different models because while it considers threat for the 10 percent  of facilities tiered because of the risk of release or sabotage, it does  not consider threat for the approximately 90 percent of facilities that  are tiered because of the risk of theft or diversion; and (2) ISCD does  not use current threat data for the 10 percent of facilities tiered  because of the risk of release or sabotage. ISCD did not have  documentation to show why threat had not been factored into the  formula for approximately 90 percent of facilities tiered because of the  risk of theft or diversion. However, ISCD officials pointed out that the  cost of adding a threat analysis for these facilities might outweigh the  benefits of doing so. ISCD officials said that given the complexity of  assessing threat for theft or diversion, they are considering  reexamining their approach. ISCD officials also said that they are  exploring how they can use more current threat data for the 10  percent of facilities tiered because of the risk of release or sabotage.    Vulnerability. ISCD’s risk assessment approach is also not consistent  with the NIPP because it does not consider vulnerability when  developing risk scores. According to the NIPP, risk assessments  should identify vulnerabilities, describe all protective measures, and  estimate the likelihood of an adversary’s success for each attack  scenario. Similar to the NIPP, the CFATS rule calls for ISCD to review  facilities’ security vulnerability assessments as part of its risk-based  tiering process. This assessment is to include the identification of  potential security vulnerabilities and the identification of existing  countermeasures and their level of effectiveness in both reducing  identified vulnerabilities and meeting the aforementioned risk-based  performance standards. Our review of the risk assessment approach  and discussions with ISCD officials shows that the security  vulnerability assessment contains numerous questions aimed at  assessing vulnerability and security measures in place but the  information is not used to assign facilities to risk-based tiers. ISCD  officials said they do not use the information because it is “self- reported” by facilities and they have observed that it tends to  overstate or understate vulnerability. As a result, ISCD’s risk  assessment approach treats every facility as equally vulnerable to a  terrorist attack regardless of location and on-site security. ISCD  officials told us that they consider facility vulnerability, but at the latter  stages of the CFATS regulatory process particularly with regard to the  development and approval of the facility site security plan.
section_title: ISCD Has Begun to Take Actions to Examine How Its Approach Could Be Enhanced
paragraphs: Our preliminary work indicates that ISCD has begun to take some actions  to examine how its risk assessment approach can be enhanced. For  example, in addition to engaging Sandia National Laboratories to develop  the framework for assessing economic consequences previously  discussed, ISCD has commissioned a panel of subject matter experts to  examine the strengths and weaknesses of its current risk assessment  approach. ISCD officials stated that the panel’s work is intended to focus  on whether ISCD is heading in the right direction, and they view it as a  preliminary assessment. According to ISCD’s task execution plan, the  panel is to provide actionable recommendations on potential  improvements to the CFATS models, but the panel is not to develop  alternative CFATS models or formally validate or verify the current  CFATS risk assessment approach—steps that would analyze the  structure of the models and determine whether they calculate values  correctly. In February 2013, after the panel was convened, ISCD officials  stated that they provided information to the panel about various issues  that they might want to consider, among them, (1) how to address  vulnerability in the models given ISCD concerns about data quality, and  (2) what the appropriate variables to use, if any, are for threats associated  with theft or diversion, as discussed earlier.
We believe that ISCD is moving in the right direction by commissioning  the panel to identify the strengths and weaknesses of its risk assessment  approach, and the results of the panel’s work could help ISCD identify  issues for further review and recommendations for improvement. Given  the critical nature of ISCD’s risk assessment approach in laying the  foundation for further regulatory steps in improving facility security—such  as the development and approval of facility site security plans—it is  important that its approach for assigning facilities to tiers is complete  within the NIPP risk management framework and the CFATS rule. Once  ISCD’s develops a more complete approach for assessing risk it would  then be better positioned to commission an independent peer review. In  our past work, we reported that peer reviews are a best practice in risk  management and that independent expert review panels can provide  objective reviews of complex issues. Furthermore, the National  Research Council of the National Academies has recommended that  DHS improve its risk analyses for infrastructure protection by validating  the models and submitting them to external peer review. As we have  previously reported, independent peer reviews cannot ensure the success  of a risk assessment approach, but they can increase the probability of  success by improving the technical quality of projects and the credibility of  the decision-making process. We will continue to monitor and assess  ISCD’s efforts to examine its risk assessment approach through our  ongoing work and consider any recommendations needed to address  these issues.
section_title: ISCD Revised Its Security Plan Review Process, but Plan Approvals Could Take Years
subsections: section_title: ISCD Revised Its Security Plan Review Process because of ISCD Managers’ Concerns, and Plans to Measure Related Improvements Moving Forward
paragraphs: Our preliminary work shows that ISCD has made various revisions to its  security plan review process to address concerns expressed by ISCD  managers about slow review times. Under the CFATS rule, once a facility  is assigned a final tier, it is to submit a site security plan to describe  security measures to be taken and how it plans to address applicable  risk-based performance standards. The November 2011 internal  memorandum that discussed various challenges facing the CFATS  program noted that ISCD had not approved any security plans and stated  that the process was overly complicated and created bottlenecks. The  memorandum stated that revising the process was a top program priority  because the initial security plan reviews were conducted using the risk- based standards as prescriptive criteria rather than as standards for  developing an overall facility security strategy.
According the ISCD officials, the first revision was called the interim  review process, whereby individual reviewers were to consider how layers  of security measures met the intent of each of the 18 standards. Under  the interim review process, ISCD assigned portions of each facility’s plan  to security specialists (e.g., cyber, chemical, and physical, among others)  who reviewed plans in a sequential, linear fashion. Using this approach,  plans were reviewed by different specialists at different times culminating  in a quality review. ISCD officials told us that the interim review process  was unsustainable, labor-intensive, and time-consuming, particularly  when individual reviewers were looking at pieces of thousands of plans  that funneled to one quality reviewer. In July 2012, ISCD stopped using  the interim review process and began using the current revised process,  which entails using contractors, teams of ISCD employees (physical,  cyber, chemical, and policy specialists), and ISCD field office inspectors,  who are to review plans simultaneously.
ISCD officials said that they believe the revised process for reviewing  security plans is a “quantum leap” forward, but they did not capture data  that would enable them to measure how, if at all, the revised process is  more efficient (i.e., less time-consuming) than the former processes. They  said that, under the revised process, among other things, field inspectors  are to work with facilities with the intent of resolving any deficiencies  ISCD identifies in their site security plans. They added that this contrasts  with past practices whereby ISCD would review the entire plan even  when problems were identified early and not return the plan to the facility  until the review was complete, resulting in longer reviews. Moving  forward, ISCD officials said they intend to measure the time it takes to  complete parts of the revised process and have recently implemented a  plan to measure various aspects of the process. Specifically, ISCD’s  Annual Operating Plan, published in December 2012, lists 63  performance measures designed to look at various aspects of the site  security plan review process—from the point the plans are received by  ISCD to the point where plans are reviewed and approved. Collecting  data to measure performance about various aspects of the security plan  review process is a step in the right direction, but it may take time before  the process has matured to the point where ISCD is able to establish  baselines and assess its progress.
section_title: Security Plan Reviews Could Take Years to Complete, but ISCD Is Examining How It Can Accelerate the Review Process
paragraphs: ISCD has taken action to improve its security plan review process, but  based on our preliminary analysis, it could take years to review the plans  of thousands of facilities that have already been assigned a final tier.  ISCD hopes to address this by examining how it can further accelerate  the review process. According to ISCD officials, between July 2012 and  December 2012, ISCD had approved 18 security plans, with conditions.  ISCD officials told us that, moving forward, they anticipate that the revised  security plan review process could enable ISCD to approve security plans  at a rate of about 30 to 40 a month.
Using ISCD’s estimated approval rate of 30 to 40 plans a month, our  preliminary analysis indicates that it could take anywhere from 7 to 9  years to complete reviews and approvals for the approximately 3,120  plans submitted by facilities that have been final-tiered that ISCD has  not yet begun to review. Figure 1 shows our estimate of the number of  years it could take to approve all of the security plans for the  approximately 3,120 facilities that, as of January 2013, had been final- tiered, assuming an approval rate of 30 to 40 plans a month.
It is important to note that our 7- to 9-year preliminary estimate does not  include other activities central to the CFATS mission, either related to or  aside from the security plan review process. In addition, our estimate  does not include developing and implementing the compliance inspection  process, which occurs after security plans are approved and is intended  to ensure that facilities that are covered by the CFATS rule are compliant  with the rule, within the context of the 18 performance standards.  According to ISCD officials, they are actively exploring ways to expedite  the speed with which the backlog of security plans could be cleared, such  as potentially leveraging alternative security programs, reprioritizing  resources, and streamlining the inspection and review requirements.  ISCD officials added that they plan to complete authorizations inspections  and approve security plans for tier 1 facilities by the first quarter of fiscal  year 2014 and for tier 2 facilities by the third quarter of fiscal year 2014.
section_title: ISCD Has Increased Its Efforts to Communicate and Work with Facilities, but Does Not Solicit Systematic Feedback on Effectiveness of Its Outreach
subsections: section_title: ISCD’s External Communication Efforts with Facilities Have Increased since 2007, but Selected Trade Associations Had Mixed Views about ISCD Efforts
paragraphs: Our preliminary work shows that ISCD’s efforts to communicate and work  with owners and operators to help them enhance security at their facilities  have increased since the CFATS program’s inception in 2007, particularly  in recent years. Since 2007, ISCD has taken various actions to  communicate with facility owners and operators and various  stakeholders—including officials representing state and local  governments, private industry, and trade associations—to increase  awareness about CFATS. From fiscal years 2007 through 2009, most of  ISCD’s communication efforts entailed outreach with owners and  operators and stakeholders through presentations to familiarize them with  CFATS; field visits with federal, state, and local government and private  industry officials; and compliance assistance visits at facilities that are  intended to assist facilities with compliance or technical issues. By 2010  and in subsequent years, ISCD had revised its outreach efforts to focus  on authorization inspections during which inspectors visited facilities to  verify that the information in their security plans was accurate and  complete, and other outreach activities including stakeholder outreach.
However, analysis of industry trade associations’ responses to questions  we sent them about the program shows mixed views about ISCD’s efforts  to communicate with owners and operators through ISCD outreach  efforts. For example, 3 of the 11 trade associations that responded to our  questions indicated that ISCD’s outreach program was effective in  general, 3 reported that the effectiveness of ISCD’s outreach was mixed,  4 reported that ISCD’s outreach was not effective, and 1 respondent  reported that he did not know.
section_title: ISCD Seeks Informal Feedback, but Does Not Solicit Systematic Feedback on the Effectiveness of Its Outreach Efforts
paragraphs: Our preliminary results indicate that ISCD seeks informal feedback on its  outreach efforts but does not systematically solicit feedback to assess the  effectiveness of outreach activities, and it does not have a mechanism  to measure the effectiveness of ISCD’s outreach activities. Trade  association officials reported that in general ISCD seeks informal  feedback on its outreach efforts and that members provide feedback to  ISCD. Association officials further reported that among other things ISCD  has encouraged association members to contact local ISCD inspectors  and has hosted roundtable discussions and meetings where members of  the regulated community provide feedback, suggest improvements, or  make proposals regarding aspects of the CFATS program such as site  security plans, alternative security programs, and gasoline storage site  risks. Furthermore, according to ISCD officials, while feedback is solicited  from the regulated community generally on an informal basis, inspectors  and other staff involved in ISCD’s outreach activities are not required to  solicit feedback during meetings, presentations, and assistance visits,  and inspectors are also not required to follow up with the facilities after  compliance assistance visits to obtain their views on the effectiveness of  the outreach.
ISCD, as part of its annual operating plan, has established a priority for  fiscal year 2013 to develop a strategic communications plan intended to  address external communication needs including industry outreach. We  have previously reported on the benefits of soliciting systematic feedback.  Specifically, our prior work on customer service efforts in the government  indicates that systematic feedback from those receiving services can  provide helpful information as to the kind and quality of services they want  and their level of satisfaction with existing services. We will continue to  monitor and assess ISCD’s efforts to develop a systematic way to solicit  feedback through our ongoing work and consider any recommendations  needed to address this issue.
Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, and members of the  subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For information about this statement please contact Stephen L. Caldwell,  at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this statement. Other individuals making key contributions  included John F. Mortin, Assistant Director; Chuck Bausell; Jose  Cardenas; Michele Fejfar; Jeff Jensen; Tracey King; Marvin McGill;  Jessica Orr; and Ellen Wolfe.
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