Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring the Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System
Published: 2007-03-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the world. It is, however, a system under strain. The skies are becoming more crowded every day, with an estimated 1 billion passengers per year expected by 2015. The current aviation system cannot be expanded to meet this growth. The reauthorization of FAA is an opportunity to examine how the agency is managing the operation and safety of the air transportation system as it leads the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)--a major redesign of the current system. GAO's testimony focuses on key issues related to FAA's reauthorization, including (1) FAA's progress in implementing initiatives that could provide a solid foundation for NextGen, (2) issues that need to be addressed to help ensure a successful transition to NextGen, and (3) safety areas that are important for the continued safe operation of the current and future system. This statement is based on recent GAO reports and ongoing work on some management and safety initiatives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FAA has made significant progress in moving to more businesslike and cost-effective operations and modernizing the air traffic control system. This progress should better position the agency for the complex implementation of NextGen. However, further work remains to fully address past problems in the modernization effort while at the same time finding new leadership--due to losses of key leaders at FAA and its Air Traffic Organization--that can continue an agencywide commitment to transformation. While FAA has improved its financial management capability, including implementing a new cost accounting system and developing a cost allocation methodology, it is not yet clear if that methodology provides a sound basis from which to derive the administration's proposed new cost-based funding structure for FAA. In addition, improved acquisition processes, such as establishing guidance on using Earned Value Management, are positive steps, but they need to be fully implemented across all critical acquisitions. As FAA works toward acquiring and deploying NextGen technology, it will also be important to phase out existing air traffic control equipment using a risk-based approach and continue to maintain existing systems. Key issues that FAA needs to address as it begins implementing NextGen include continued focus on coordination with the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO). FAA, in coordination with JPDO, is developing an implementation plan for NextGen that is expected to include details of the required technologies, procedures, and resources. This is a step in the right direction. While FAA estimates that its cost for NextGen programs may range between $15 billion and $22 billion, it will be important to determine which entities will fund and conduct the necessary developmental research. Also, GAO has recommended that FAA assess its capacity to handle the technical and contract management expertise to determine if it has the capabilities required to oversee the implementation of NextGen. FAA is considering action that would respond to this recommendation. To deal with current safety issues and the transition to NextGen, it will be important for FAA to address safety in the airport environment, where forecasted traffic growth could lead to increased ground congestion and safety hazards. FAA also needs to establish the appropriate regulatory approach for certain current airspace users, such as air ambulances, and new users, such as the emerging space tourism industry. In addition, to maintain and expand the margin of safety, especially if substantial growth in air traffic materializes, FAA will need to rely more on data than on labor-intensive inspections. GAO has recommended that FAA improve its safety data. FAA has taken some action to improve its data, but more work remains. FAA's ability to ensure a safe system will also be affected by its ability to hire, train, and deploy its workforce of air traffic controllers, inspectors, and technicians.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today as you consider  the reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). FAA  operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the world. It is,  however, a system under strain. The skies over America are becoming  more crowded every day. Demand for air travel has increased in recent  years, with over 740 million passengers flying in fiscal year 2006, climbing  toward an estimated 1 billion passengers per year in 2015, according to  FAA estimates. Already, with the increasing demand for air travel, flight  arrival delays have increased; such delays are nearing the record levels of  2000, a year in which one in four flights reached its destination behind  schedule. The system is also expected to absorb a variety of different  types of aircraft in the near future, ranging from the jumbo Airbus A380— which can hold more than 500 passengers—to very light jets—which may  greatly increase the number of aircraft in the sky while transporting six or  fewer passengers on any given flight. The consensus is that the current  aviation system cannot be expanded to meet this projected growth.
In 2003, recognizing the need for system transformation, Congress  authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office  (JPDO), housed within FAA but involving several federal partner  agencies, to conceptualize and plan for the Next Generation Air  Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen is envisioned as a major  redesign of the air transportation system that will move from largely  ground-based radars to precision satellite-based navigation and includes  digital, networked communications; an integrated weather system;  layered, adaptive security; and more. The reauthorization of FAA and the  Airport and Airway Trust Fund provides a unique opportunity to examine  how the agency is managing the operation and safety of the current air  traffic control system as it prepares to implement NextGen. My testimony  today focuses on these questions: (1) What progress is FAA making in  implementing initiatives that could provide a solid foundation for  NextGen? (2) What are the key issues that need to be addressed to help  ensure a successful transition to NextGen? and (3) What key safety areas  need to be addressed for the continued safe operation of the current and  future air transportation system? My statement is based on our recent  reports as well as ongoing work for this subcommittee assessing FAA’s  performance metrics for its acquisitions, runway safety, and safety issues  concerning the operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the national  airspace. We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
Over the past few years, FAA has made significant progress in moving to  more businesslike and cost effective operations and modernizing the air  traffic control system, which should better position the agency for the  complex implementation of NextGen. However, further work remains to  fully address past problems in the modernization program. FAA has  improved its financial management, including implementing a new cost  accounting system and developing a cost allocation methodology;  however, it is not yet clear if the cost allocation methodology is  sufficiently valid and reliable to derive the administration’s proposed new  cost-based funding for FAA. FAA has also sought to improve its financial  management with efforts to control and reduce costs. For example, FAA  plans to produce cost savings through outsourcing such as with its  planned contracting out of new surveillance technology, and through  facility consolidations. In addition to improvements in financial  management, FAA has improved its acquisition management, which will  be critical to a successful transition to NextGen. For example, FAA has  begun reviewing its major systems acquisitions and has established  guidance for using a project management technique known as Earned  Value Management in its acquisition management system, although  institutionalizing these improvements will continue to be a challenge for  FAA. FAA has also established performance measures and targets for its  critical acquisitions. While the acquisition and deployment of NextGen  technology are key issues facing the agency, it will be critical that FAA  continue to maintain existing systems and phase out existing systems  using a risk-based approach. And, although FAA has initiated numerous  financial, management, and acquisition process improvements, the agency  must work to institutionalize these changes while at the same time finding  new leadership—due to losses of key leaders at FAA and its Air Traffic  Organization (ATO)—that can continue to enforce an agencywide  commitment to change and continuous improvement.
As FAA begins implementing NextGen, key issues remain that will need to  be addressed, such as coordinating with JPDO, funding for NextGen- related programs, and ensuring that FAA has both the technical and  contract management expertise that will be required to oversee this  complex undertaking. FAA has become steadily more focused on NextGen  over the past few years and is expanding and revamping its Operational  Evolution Plan—renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership—to  integrate with JPDO activities and become its implementation plan for  NextGen, including details of required technologies, procedures, and  resources. This is a step in the right direction. JPDO recently reported that  the total cost for NextGen infrastructure may range between $15 billion  and $22 billion. The agency also noted that it expects a corresponding cost  to system users, who will have to equip themselves with the advanced  avionics necessary to realize the full benefits of some NextGen  technologies, in the range of $14 billion to $20 billion. Another transition  challenge for FAA and JPDO is to address questions about which entities  will fund and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and  demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen  capabilities and keeping the development of new systems on schedule. We  have also recommended that FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses  with regard to the technical and contract management expertise that will  be needed for NextGen implementation. In response to our  recommendation, FAA is considering convening a blue ribbon panel to  study the issue and make recommendations to the agency. We believe that  such a panel could help FAA begin to address this challenge.
To deal with current and future safety issues, it will be important for FAA  to also address several issues as it works to ensure that its safety  programs are aligned to meet future demand. First, ground safety is an  area of increasing concern because air traffic is forecast to grow  substantially during the coming decades, which will result in more aircraft  and increased congestion and safety hazards in the complex airport  environment. FAA needs to keep on schedule to deploy NextGen  technology that warns controllers of imminent ground collisions and  implement recommendations by the National Transportation Safety Board   (NTSB) (which continues to place runway incursions on its Most Wanted  Transportation Safety Improvements list). Second, FAA needs to establish  an appropriate regulatory approach for some current airspace users, such  as air ambulances, and new users such as the emerging space tourism  industry. For example, we suggested that Congress should consider  revisiting FAA’s dual role for ensuring safety and promoting the emerging  space tourism industry and decide whether the elimination of FAA’s  promotional role is necessary to alleviate a potential conflict of interest.  Third, to maintain and expand the margin of safety—especially if  substantial growth in air traffic materializes—FAA cannot rely on its  current oversight approach, which focuses on labor-intensive inspections.  Accurate, complete safety data would provide FAA with an early warning  of hazards that can lead to accidents. We have recommended that FAA  improve the accuracy and completeness of its safety data and its analysis  of that data. FAA is in the early planning stages of addressing our  recommendations, but more work remains. Fourth, FAA’s ability to ensure  safety in NextGen will be affected by its ability to manage its human  capital, including safety inspectors, engineers, technicians, and air traffic  controllers. FAA faces challenges in improving its staffing processes,  addressing human factors issues associated with significant increases in  the automation of air traffic management, replacing the large percentage  of staff expected to retire, and addressing the contentious relations with  its employee unions, which have the potential to hinder the agency’s  ability to retain and recruit skilled staff.
subsections: section_title: Improved, Businesslike Operations Should Better Position FAA to Implement and Manage NextGen, but Further Work Remains
paragraphs: Although the NextGen effort involves multiple government agencies and  the private sector, FAA will be the entity largely responsible for  implementing the policies and systems necessary for NextGen while safely  operating the current air traffic control system 24 hours a day, 7 days a  week. This means that FAA will be responsible for keeping a number of  large NextGen systems acquisitions on budget and on schedule as it  manages and sustains the current system. Historically, FAA has had  serious weaknesses in its financial management as well as chronic cost  and schedule difficulties with air traffic control system acquisitions.  During the past few years, FAA has made significant progress in  implementing businesslike processes and procedures for financial  management, acquisitions, and organization structures. The  implementation of these types of initiatives has improved FAA’s  management of the current system and should better position the agency  to manage the enormously complex transition to NextGen. However,  further work remains to fully address past problems and institutionalize  these changes throughout the agency, especially given the changing  leadership within both FAA and its ATO.
subsections: section_title: FAA Has Improved Its Financial Management, although the Soundness of Its Cost Allocation Methodology is Uncertain
paragraphs: Sound financial management, including sound cost accounting and cost  allocation systems, is important for the current operation of FAA and lays  the foundation for the transformation to NextGen and proposed changes  to the agency’s funding system laid out in the administration’s  reauthorization proposal. In 1999, we placed FAA on our high-risk list for  its financial management practices, noting weaknesses that rendered the  agency vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse by undermining its ability to  manage operations and limiting the reliability of financial information  provided to Congress. In 2005, we removed FAA’s financial management  from our high-risk list because the agency had made significant progress,  including implementing a new financial management system called Delphi  and receiving unqualified opinions from auditors on its annual financial  statements for fiscal years 2001 through 2005. Nonetheless, external  auditors issued a qualified opinion on FAA’s fiscal year 2006 financial  statement and repeated a material internal control weakness that was  reported in 2005. The concerns that led to the qualified opinion stemmed  from FAA’s inability to support the accuracy and completeness of its  construction-in-progress account, reported in the financial statement as  $4.7 billion. FAA is working to address the problem.
As part of its improved financial management, FAA has developed a cost  accounting system and a cost allocation methodology, which are critical to  the successful implementation of the new cost-based funding system  included in the administration’s reauthorization proposal. The proposal  would change FAA’s financing system from one based mainly on excise  taxes to one that provides a better link between revenues and the costs  that users of the national airspace system impose on the system, according  to the agency. FAA also says the proposal would improve revenue  adequacy, equity, and efficiency. While the reauthorization proposal may  address some of the equity and efficiency concerns that FAA has raised  with the current funding structure, we have reported that it is not yet clear  if FAA has developed a sound cost allocation methodology from which to  derive the new cost-based funding. We are reviewing FAA’s cost  allocation methodology and expect to issue a report later this year.
FAA has also improved its financial management through increased efforts  to achieve cost savings and cost avoidance throughout the agency. For  example, FAA is outsourcing flight service stations and estimates a $2.2  billion savings over 12 years. Similarly, FAA is seeking savings through  outsourcing its planned nationwide deployment of Automatic Dependent  Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), a critical element of NextGen. FAA is  planning to implement ADS-B through a performance-based contract in  which FAA will pay “subscription” charges for the ADS-B services and the  vendor will be responsible for building and maintaining the infrastructure.  (FAA also reports that the ADS-B rollout will allow the agency to remove  50 percent of its current secondary radars, saving money in the program’s  baseline. The remaining radars will serve as a back-up system to ADS-B.)  As for consolidating facilities, FAA is currently restructuring ATO’s  administrative service areas from nine offices to three offices, which FAA  estimates will save up to $460 million over 10 years.
We previously reported that FAA should pursue further cost control  options, such as exploring additional opportunities for contracting out  services and consolidating facilities. However, we recognize that FAA  faces challenges with consolidating facilities, an action that can be  politically sensitive. In recognition of this sensitivity, the administration’s  reauthorization proposal presents a “BRAC-like” initiative in which the  Secretary of Transportation would be authorized to establish an  independent, five-member commission, known as the Realignment and  Consolidation of Aviation Facilities and Services Commission, to  independently analyze FAA’s recommendations to realign facilities or  services. The commission would then send its own recommendations to  the President and Congress. In the past, we noted the importance of  potential cost savings through facility consolidations; however, it must  also be noted that any such consolidations must be handled through a  process that solicits and considers stakeholder input throughout and fully  considers the safety implications of both proposed facility closures and  consolidations.
section_title: Progress Has Been Made but Further Work Remains to Institutionalize Recent Improvements in Management and Acquisition Processes
paragraphs: A successful transition to NextGen will depend, to a great extent, on FAA’s  ability to manage the acquisition and integration of multiple NextGen  systems. Since 1995, we have designated FAA’s air traffic control  modernization program as high risk because of systemic management and  acquisition problems. However, in recent years, FAA has made significant  progress toward improving its acquisition management. Realization of  NextGen goals could be severely compromised if FAA’s improved  processes are not institutionalized and carried over into the  implementation of NextGen, which is an even more complex and  ambitious undertaking than past modernization efforts.
To its credit, FAA has taken a number of actions to improve its acquisition  management. By creating ATO in 2003 and appointing a chief operating  officer (COO) to head ATO, FAA established a new management structure  and adopted more leading practices of private sector businesses to  address the cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued  air traffic control acquisitions. ATO has worked to create a flatter  organization, with fewer management layers, and has reported reducing  executive staffing by 20 percent and total management by 16 percent. In  addition, FAA uses a performance management system to hold managers  responsible for the success of ATO. More specifically, to better manage its  acquisitions and address problems we have identified, FAA has    undertaken human capital initiatives to improve its acquisition workforce  culture and build towards a results-oriented, high-performing organization;   developed and applied a process improvement model to assess the  maturity of its software and systems acquisitions capabilities resulting in,  among other things, enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict  schedules and resources; and  reported that it has established a policy and guidance on using Earned  Value Management (EVM) in its acquisition management system and that  19 of its major programs are currently using EVM.
Institutionalizing these improvements throughout the agency will continue  to be a challenge for FAA. For example, the agency has yet to implement  its cost-estimating methodology, although, according to the agency, it has  provided training on the methodology to employees. Furthermore, FAA  has not established a policy to require use of its process improvement  model on all major acquisitions for the national airspace system. Until the  agency fully addresses these residual issues, it will continue to risk  program management problems affecting cost, schedule, and performance.  With a multibillion dollar acquisition budget, addressing these issues is as  important as ever.
section_title: FAA’s Methodology for Tracking and Reporting Performance on Critical Acquisitions is Subject of Ongoing Work for this Subcommittee
paragraphs: In another effort to improve agency processes, FAA expanded its use of  performance measures to track its performance. In its fiscal year 2007  portfolio of goals, FAA lists 30 performance measures. As part of our  ongoing work, we are currently reviewing how FAA selects and measures  two of these goals in particular: critical acquisitions on budget and critical  acquisitions on schedule. FAA has reported exceeding targets for both of  these measures for the past 3 fiscal years. FAA’s targets for fiscal year  2006 were to have 85 percent of critical acquisition programs within 10  percent of budget, as reflected in its capital investment plan, and to have  85 percent of critical acquisition programs on schedule. For fiscal year  2006, FAA reported that its critical acquisitions were 100 percent on  budget and over 97 percent on schedule. This represents a major  turnaround in a program that remains on our high-risk list.
It will be important, as FAA begins to implement NextGen systems, to  maintain critical acquisitions on schedule and on budget in order to meet  the goal of transitioning to NextGen by 2025 and to prevent escalation of  the costs of NextGen. Our ongoing work is examining FAA’s performance  and reporting on its critical acquisitions, including applicable performance  measures. We are also exploring FAA’s use of the most recently approved  cost and schedule baselines, which may have changed significantly since  the start of an acquisition, to measure program performance. Rebaselining  acquisitions is an accepted practice and there are valid reasons for doing  so, such as when changes in a program’s requirements fundamentally alter  the acquisition and make the originally approved schedule unrealistic.  Because rebaselining resets the cost and schedule variances to zero, we  want to verify that FAA’s practice is not masking acquisition performance  problems. We expect to issue a report on these issues later this year.
section_title: Although FAA Is Now Focusing on NextGen, It Must Continue to Manage and Sustain the Current System
paragraphs: While the acquisition and deployment of NextGen technology are key  issues facing the agency, it will be critical for FAA to continue to maintain  existing systems and phase out existing systems using a risk-based  approach. The adequacy of FAA’s maintenance of existing systems was  raised following a power outage and equipment failures in Southern  California that caused hundreds of flight delays during the summer of  2006. Investigations by FAA and the Department of Transportation  Inspector General into these incidents identified a number of underlying  issues, including the age and condition of equipment. Nationwide, the  number of scheduled and unscheduled outages of air traffic control  equipment and ancillary support systems has been increasing (see fig. 1).  Increases in the number of unscheduled outages indicate that systems are  failing more frequently.
In addition, the duration of unscheduled equipment outages has also been  increasing in recent years from an average of about 21 hours in 2001 to  about 40 hours in 2006 (see fig. 2), which may indicate, in part, that  maintenance and troubleshooting activities are requiring more effort and  longer periods of time. However, according to FAA, it considers user  impact and resource efficiency when planning and responding to  equipment outages. As a result, according to the agency, although some  outages will have longer restoration times, the agency believes they do not  adversely affect air traffic control operations. It will be critical for FAA to  monitor and address equipment outages to ensure the safety and efficiency  of the legacy systems, since they will be the core of the national airspace  system for a number of years and, in some cases, will become part of  NextGen.
section_title: Institutionalizing Change Within FAA Will Require Continued Strong Leadership
paragraphs: While FAA has implemented many positive changes to its management and  business processes in recent years, it currently faces the loss of key  leaders. We reported that the experiences of successful transformations  and change management initiatives in large public and private  organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years or more until such  initiatives are fully implemented and cultures are transformed in a  sustainable manner. Such changes require focused, full-time attention  from senior leadership and a dedicated team. However, the agency will  have lost two of its significant agents for change—the FAA administrator  and the COO, who heads ATO—by the end of September 2007. The  administrator’s term ends in September 2007; the COO left in February  2007, after serving 3 years. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that  the current director of JPDO is new, having assumed that position in  August 2006. For the financial, management, and acquisition  improvements to further permeate the agency, and thus provide a firm  foundation upon which to implement NextGen, FAA’s new leaders will  need to demonstrate the same commitment to improvement as the  outgoing leaders. This continued commitment to change is critical over the  next few years, as foundational NextGen systems begin to be  implemented. Because this is a critical time for FAA, the agency needs to  move expeditiously to find a new COO for ATO. It could be useful to have  a COO whose tenure lasted the length of the current statutory 5-year term.  This would allow for stable leadership at ATO during this critical  transition from planning to early implementation of NextGen.
section_title: Key Issues Remain in the Transition From Planning to Implementing NextGen
paragraphs: Several key issues will need to be addressed to help ensure a successful  transition to NextGen as FAA moves from the conceptualization and  planning of NextGen, handled largely through the interagency  collaborative efforts of FAA’s JPDO, to the implementation of NextGen  technologies and systems. Those issues include (1) continuing to focus on  the coordination between ATO and JPDO and stakeholder involvement;  (2) determining which entities will fund the necessary research,  development, and demonstration projects for NextGen; and (3)  determining whether FAA has the technical and contract management  expertise necessary to oversee the complex implementation of NextGen.
subsections: section_title: FAA Has Improved Coordination with JPDO, but Some Key Stakeholder Involvement is Absent
paragraphs: FAA has become steadily more focused on NextGen implementation, but  some key stakeholders, such as FAA technicians who will maintain  NextGen systems, are not currently involved. One of the most important  changes FAA has made with regard to NextGen is the expansion and  revamping of its Operational Evolution Plan (OEP)—renamed the  Operational Evolution Partnership—to become FAA’s implementation  plan for NextGen. This is a step in the right direction. The OEP is being  expanded to apply to all of FAA and is intended to become a  comprehensive description of how the agency will implement NextGen,  including the required technologies, procedures, and resources. (Figure 3  shows the OEP framework.) An ATO official told us that the new OEP is  expected to be consistent with JPDO’s key planning documents and  partner agency budget guidance. According to FAA, the OEP will allow it  to demonstrate appropriate budget control and linkage to NextGen plans  and will force FAA’s research and development to be relevant to  NextGen’s requirements. According to FAA documents, the agency plans  to publish the new OEP in June 2007.
In an effort to further align FAA’s efforts with JPDO’s plans for NextGen,  FAA has created a NextGen Review Board to oversee the OEP. This  review board will be co-chaired by JPDO’s director and ATO’s vice  president of operations planning services. Initiatives, such as concept  demonstrations or research proposed for inclusion in the OEP will now  need to go through the review board for approval. Initiatives are to be  assessed for their relation to NextGen requirements, concept maturity, and  risk. An ATO official told us that the new OEP process should also help  identify some smaller programs that might be inconsistent with NextGen  and could be discontinued and will assist in project integration.  Additionally, as a further step towards integrating ATO and JPDO, the  administration’s reauthorization proposal calls for the JPDO director to be  a voting member of FAA’s Joint Resources Council and ATO’s Executive  Council.
Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and technicians,  will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement in planning for  and deploying the new technology will be important to the success of  NextGen. In November 2006, we reported that air traffic controllers were  not involved in the NextGen planning effort. Controllers are beginning to  become involved as they are now represented on a key planning body.  However, the technicians do not participate in NextGen efforts. Input from  current air traffic controllers who have recent experience controlling  aircraft and current technicians who will maintain the new equipment is  important in considering human factors and safety issues. Our work on  past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack of  stakeholder involvement early and throughout a project can lead to cost  increases and delays.
section_title: FAA Has Begun Budgeting for NextGen Programs, although Questions Remain About the Funding of NextGen Research and Development
paragraphs: JPDO recently reported some estimated costs for NextGen, including  specifics on some early NextGen programs. JPDO believes the total  federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between  $15 billion and $22 billion. JPDO also reported a preliminary estimate of  the corresponding cost to system users to equip themselves with the  advanced avionics that are necessary to realize the full benefits of some  NextGen technologies may range from $14 billion to $20 billion. JPDO, in  its recently released 2006 Progress Report, noted that this range for  avionics costs reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual  aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-performance  airspace, and the amount of out-of-service time required for installation.
In its capital investment plan for fiscal years 2008-2012, FAA includes  estimated expenditures for 11 line items that are considered NextGen  capital programs. The total 5-year estimated expenditures for these  programs is $4.3 billion. In fiscal year 2008, only 6 of the line items are  funded for a total of roughly $174 million; funding for the remaining 5  programs would begin with the fiscal year 2009 budget. According to FAA,  in addition to capital spending for NextGen, the agency will spend an  estimated $300 million on NextGen-related research and development  from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. The administration’s budget for fiscal  year 2008 for FAA includes a total of $17.8 million to support the activities  of JPDO.
The administration’s reauthorization proposal would allow for $5 billion in  Treasury debt financing authority for NextGen-related capital needs for  fiscal years 2013-2017. Projects that might be appropriate for such  financing include safety-critical and mission-essential software and  systems that controllers and traffic flow managers will use to support  certain aircraft operations in the NextGen system, according to the  proposal. However, the proposed borrowing authority seems unlikely to  have a major impact on FAA’s ability to pay for capital investment  associated with moving to NextGen because the payback period is  relatively short. With a maximum payback period of 5 years, the advantage  of matching the time period for paying for a capital investment with the  time period in which the benefits of that investment are realized is unlikely  to be achieved. Therefore, the advantage of borrowing versus receiving  appropriations for a period of up to 5 years is unclear.
While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA’s NextGen  investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will fund and  conduct some of the necessary research, development, and demonstration  projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities and  keeping the development of new systems on schedule. In the past, a  significant portion of aeronautics research and development, including  intermediate technology development, has been performed by NASA.  However, NASA’s aeronautics research budget and proposed funding  shows a 30-percent decline, in constant 2005 dollars, from fiscal year 2005  to fiscal year 2011. To its credit, NASA plans to focus its research on the  needs of NextGen. However, NASA is also moving toward a focus on  fundamental research and away from developmental work and  demonstration projects. FAA and JPDO face the challenge of determining  the nature and scope of the research and technology development  necessary to begin the transition to NextGen. They also have to identify  the entities that can conduct that research and development and the  source of funding to support it.
section_title: FAA Needs to Explore whether It Has the Technical and Contract Management Expertise Necessary to Implement NextGen
paragraphs: In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA’s  management of air traffic control modernization efforts, and industry  experts with whom we spoke questioned whether FAA will have the  technical expertise needed to implement NextGen. In addition to technical  expertise, FAA will need contract management expertise to oversee the  systems acquisitions and integration involved in NextGen. In November  2006, we recommended that FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses  with regard to the technical expertise and contract management expertise  that will be required to define, implement, and integrate the numerous  complex programs inherent in the transition to NextGen. In response to  our recommendation, FAA is considering convening a blue ribbon panel to  study the issue and make recommendations to the agency about how best  to proceed with its management and oversight of the implementation of  NextGen. We believe that such a panel could help FAA begin to address  this challenge.
section_title: Aviation Safety Record Remains High, but Some Areas Need to be Addressed for Current and Future Safety as FAA Transitions to NextGen
paragraphs: As FAA works to develop the policies and systems to transition to  NextGen, it will be important for the agency to also ensure that its safety  programs are aligned with these changes. While recent safety trends are  generally positive, improving upon those trends will be necessary simply  to maintain the same level of safety if air traffic doubles or triples during  the coming decades. Moreover, certain recent trends—such as the  commercial air carrier fatal accident rate—may warrant immediate  attention. Although this accident rate has steadily declined in recent years,  FAA did not meet its performance target in this area for fiscal year 2006  due to four accidents, including two accidents on runway and ramp areas  and one runway overrun. FAA’s ability to deal with current safety issues  and the transition to NextGen would be enhanced by (1) acquiring and  deploying new safety enhancing technologies; (2) establishing appropriate  regulatory approaches for current airspace users and emerging sectors; (3)  improving the accuracy and completeness of its safety data; and (4)  addressing human capital issues associated with hiring, training, and  deploying its skilled workforce of air traffic controllers, safety inspectors,  engineers, and technicians.
subsections: section_title: FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Advanced Technology and Other Measures to Improve Safety in the Airport Environment
paragraphs: Safety in the airport environment is an area of increasing concern because  air traffic is forecast to grow substantially during the coming decades.    More aircraft and congestion at the airport will make maintaining safety  even more critical, as the airport environment involves enormously  complex interactions between air traffic controllers and the people who  operate on the airport surface, including pilots, mechanics, maintenance  technicians, and airport employees. FAA’s efforts to improve safety in the  airport environment include deploying NextGen technology, such as the  Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X), evaluating  runway status lights, and testing a low-cost surface surveillance system.  FAA pursues new technologies to improve runway safety because the  incursion rate at U.S. airports was higher in fiscal year 2006 than it was in  fiscal year 2002.  (Incursions are potential collisions on the ground.)   However, the deployment of new technology has faced schedule delays.  FAA originally planned to deploy ASDE-X at 35 major airports by 2007, but  the technology is operational at only 8 airports to date, and deployment at  the remaining 27 airports is not scheduled to be complete until 2011 (see  fig. 4). At the same time, FAA is evaluating the performance of runway  status lights, another technology aimed at preventing runway incursions  by warning pilots when a runway is unsafe for crossing or departure. FAA  expects to decide this year whether to deploy the system at 35 large  airports at an estimated cost of $300 million. Although the 35 airports that  are to receive ASDE-X—and may receive runway status lights—handle  about 70 percent of enplanements in the United States, they represent only  about 6 percent of the country’s 573 commercial service airports.  Therefore, FAA is also evaluating a low-cost surface surveillance system  that could meet the needs of small- to medium-sized airports. The system  is designed to alert controllers of potential conflicts and hazards and  provide direct warnings to pilots entering or approaching active runways.
The number of serious incursions—incidents where a collision was  narrowly avoided—rose from 28 in fiscal year 2004 to 31 in fiscal year  2006. As a result, NTSB continues to place runway incursions on its Most  Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements list. FAA has not yet  implemented any of the six runway incursion prevention  recommendations that NTSB made in 2000. The recommendations include  such things as implementing at commercial airports ground movement  safety systems that provide a direct warning to flight crews of possible  incursions and changing air traffic control procedures. According to  NTSB, FAA has not completed its evaluation and implementation of  technology to address the recommendation on safety systems, and the two  agencies have not reached agreement on the recommendations to change  air traffic control procedures.
FAA is also making efforts to prevent runway overruns, which occur when  aircraft pass the ends of runways during aborted takeoffs or while landing,  by the construction of runway safety areas or the installation of arresting  material at the end of runways. In 2000, FAA established its Runway Safety  Area program to accelerate the construction of runway safety areas— areas surrounding the runways designed to reduce the risk of damage to  aircraft from overruns. Since 2005, commercial service airports have been  required to bring their runway safety areas into compliance with FAA  standards by 2015. According to FAA, as of January 2007, 70 percent of the  1,020 runways at 573 commercial airports in the United States  substantially comply with runway safety area standards, up from 55  percent in 2000. In fiscal year 2006, the Airport Improvement Program  (AIP) awarded more than $240 million in grants for runway safety area  improvement projects. FAA indicates that about $1.1 billion in AIP funds  will be needed to complete the remainder. The administration’s budget  request for FAA calls for $2.75 billion in AIP funds in fiscal year 2008, a  substantial reduction from the $3.5 billion funding levels for fiscal years  2006 and 2007. It will be important for FAA to consider these runway  safety areas as it prioritizes AIP funds. FAA considers the installation of an  Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS), a bed of crushable  concrete designed to safely decelerate and stop overrunning aircraft, to be  an acceptable alternative for meeting runway safety area standards. As of  December 2006, EMAS was installed on 21 runways at 16 U.S. airports and  had successfully stopped three aircraft from overrunning runways. We are  conducting ongoing work for this subcommittee on runway and ramp  safety and expect to issue our final report later this year.
section_title: FAA and Congress Should Address Regulatory Approaches to Some Current Airspace Users and Emerging Sectors
paragraphs: Future air traffic is expected to include not only increases in the number  of traditional airspace users, but new users as well. It will be important for  FAA to establish the appropriate regulatory approach for current users  and new users such as the emerging space tourism industry and unmanned  aircraft systems. For example, we recently found that FAA’s current  oversight approach for air ambulances was not geared to the unique  operating characteristics and risks associated with that sector. Further,  in 2006, NTSB recommended, among other things, that FAA require that all  air ambulance operators comply with Part 135 of Title 14 of the Code of  Federal Regulations during all flights with medical personnel on board.  Under FAA regulation, most air ambulances operate under rules specified  in Part 135. However, pilots may operate under different standards,  depending on whether they are carrying patients. Without patients or  passengers on board, pilots may operate under rules specified in Part 91 of  Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. With patients on board, pilots  are required to operate under Part 135 rules. Parts 91 and 135 flight rules  differ significantly in two key areas—(1) weather and visibility minimums  and (2) rest requirements—with Part 135 requirements being more  stringent.
In many air ambulance trips, part of the trip may involve Part 135 rules,  while another part may involve Part 91 rules. For example, scene response  missions for air ambulance helicopters frequently have three legs—the  flight en route to the accident scene, the transport of the patient to the  hospital, and the reposition of the helicopter back to its base (see fig. 5).  Only the leg during which patients or other passengers (medical crew  members are not considered passengers) are on board must be flown  under Part 135 flight rules. Of the 89 air ambulance accidents that we  examined from 1998 through 2005, 64 took place during Part 91 flight and  the remaining 25 took place during Part 135 flight. However, because air  ambulance flights without patients or passengers could be flown under  Part 91 requirements, there may be more than twice as many flights taking  place under Part 91 compared with Part 135. A better understanding of the  trends in the air ambulance industry, including accident data, will be  important in deciding if the current regulatory approach is appropriate or  if more fundamental changes, such as revising FAA regulations, need to be  made.
As another example, the need for a different regulatory approach for all- cargo operations has been raised. According to FAA, from 1998 through  2005, the accident rate for scheduled air cargo operators declined  significantly but was still about 2.5 times higher than the accident rate for  scheduled passenger operators. The Congressional Research Service  pointed out that the size of aircraft, the range of operations flown by all- cargo operators, and the large growth in the all-cargo sector introduce  unique risks to operators, airports, and the public that may call for  revisiting the safety standards that apply to all-cargo operations.
In recent work, we also raised issues concerning FAA’s regulation of the  emerging space tourism industry. Specifically, we suggested that  Congress should consider revisiting the granting of FAA’s dual mandate  for ensuring safety and promoting space tourism and decide whether the  elimination of FAA’s promotional role is necessary to alleviate a potential  conflict. FAA licenses the operation of commercial space launches and  launch sites. Historically, these launches carried commercial payloads and  were unmanned. The prospect for commercial space tourism materialized  in 2004, after the successful launches of SpaceShipOne raised the  possibility of an emerging U.S. commercial space tourism industry that  would make human space travel available to the public. Several companies  are planning to start taking paying passengers on suborbital flights within  the next few years and a number of commercial spaceports are being  planned. For example, Virgin Galactic intends to provide suborbital space  flight from a planned spaceport in New Mexico starting in 2009. It plans to  carry 3,000 passengers over 5 years, with 100 individuals having already  paid the full fare of $200,000. Figure 6 shows current and planned  spaceports. In 1984, the Commercial Space Launch Act gave DOT the  authority to license and monitor the safety of commercial space launches  and to promote the industry. It is important that FAA’s statutory  responsibility to promote the commercial space launch industry does not  interfere with its safety oversight of the industry as the space tourism  sector develops. We have no evidence that FAA’s promotional activities,  such as sponsoring an annual industry conference and publishing  economic impact studies, have conflicted thus far with its safety  regulatory role, but conflicts could occur as the industry matures.
In addition, FAA faces the challenge of determining the circumstances  under which it would regulate the safety of crew and space flight  participants. In 2004, the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act  prohibited FAA from regulating crew and passenger safety before 2012,  except in response to high-risk incidents, serious injuries, or fatalities.  FAA has interpreted this limited authority as allowing it to regulate crew  safety in certain circumstances and has been proactive in proposing  regulations concerning emergency training for crews and passengers.  However, FAA has not developed safety indicators by which it would  monitor the developing space tourism sector and determine when to step  in and regulate human space flight. We have recommended that the agency  be proactive about safety rather than respond only after a fatality or  serious incident occurs by identifying and monitoring safety indicators  that might trigger the need for regulation before 2012. Actions have not  been taken on our recommendations.
Another emerging sector that poses regulatory issues is unmanned aircraft  systems (UAS) (see fig. 7), which are expected to be part of the mix of  aircraft that will operate in NextGen. A small number of UASs are  currently used by government agencies for a variety of purposes, such as  border security, search and rescue, firefighting, military training exercises,  and other law enforcement and homeland security initiatives. Recent  projections indicate that over 10,000 UASs could be in operation in the  United States by 2015, but FAA believes that the number may be less. We  have work ongoing for this subcommittee to assess issues such as the  technological and regulatory issues that remain in order for UASs to be  safely integrated in the national airspace system, the timeframes for  completing such work, and the identification of entities that should take  the lead in such work. We expect to issue a report later this year.
Our preliminary work, indicates that UASs pose unique safety challenges  and questions. For example, what standards should UASs meet to ensure  that they detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft? What standards should be  set for UAS safety and reliability? How should FAA classify UASs, which  can range in size from very small, hand launched systems to those similar  in size to a large passenger aircraft? What pilot qualifications are needed  for UAS operators? FAA has begun to answer such questions by reviewing  its existing safety regulations developed for manned aircraft to determine  how or whether they need to be modified to enable UASs to be safely  integrated into the national airspace system. FAA expects this to be a 5- to  10-year effort. In the meantime, FAA will continue its existing oversight  approach and review each request to operate on a case-by-case basis. If  FAA determines that a UAS can operate safely under specified conditions,  the agency issues a certificate of authorization and the airspace is  restricted during the period of operation. In fiscal year 2006, FAA  processed 96 applications for certificates of authorization and issued 62  certificates. FAA projects that it will receive over 400 applications in 2010.  The agency may have difficulty handling such an increase under its  existing case-by-case process, which could serve as a de facto limit on the  number of UASs operating in the next few years.
section_title: FAA Needs Improved Data and Analysis for Current Safety Oversight and for the Transition to NextGen
paragraphs: FAA cannot rely on its current oversight approach, which focuses on  labor-intensive inspections to maintain and expand the margin of safety,  especially if substantial growth in air traffic materializes. FAA  acknowledges this situation and sees the need to establish a safety  information system that can provide an early warning of hazards that may  lead to accidents and help the agency manage risk. However, our past  work has found problems with the accuracy and completeness of FAA’s  safety data. For example, FAA does not collect actual flight activity data  for general aviation operators, air taxis, or air ambulances. As a result,  FAA lacks information to monitor the rate of accidents and determine the  effectiveness of its oversight. We have recommended that FAA improve  the accuracy and completeness of its safety data and evaluate this  information to identify nationwide trends. FAA is in the early planning  stages of addressing our recommendations, but more work remains.
An important aspect of FAA’s safety oversight is the use of over 13,000  private individuals and organizations, known as designees, to leverage  inspector resources. Designees act as representatives of the agency to  conduct many safety certification activities, such as administering flight  tests to pilots, inspecting repair work by maintenance facilities, and  approving designs for aircraft parts. In reviewing FAA’s designee  programs, we found that the agency’s oversight of designees was  hampered, in part, by limited data on designees’ performance. FAA is in  the early stages of addressing our recommendation to improve the  consistency and completeness of designee information. FAA is also  changing and expanding the designee programs by replacing certain  designee programs with an organization designation authorization. By  expanding the number and types of organizational designees, FAA’s role is  being further transformed to monitoring the performance of organizations  rather than overseeing the individuals who perform the certification  activities. It will be important for FAA to have the data, evaluative  processes, and a well-trained inspector staff to effectively monitor the new  program to make sure that safety is not adversely affected.
FAA is in the early stages of addressing some of these data issues as it  begins planning a new system— Aviation Safety Information Analysis and  Sharing System—that would provide access to large volumes of industry  safety data. FAA began planning for the new system in 2006. Because this  activity is in the early planning stages, our concerns about FAA’s data  remain relevant. The successful completion of this planning effort will be  critical to FAA’s ability to improve safety. In fiscal year 2008, FAA  proposes budgeting $32 million for safety databases and computer  systems. As FAA prioritizes the activities that it undertakes with these  funds, it will be important to continue addressing these critical data  limitations.
In addition, FAA is shifting to a data-driven, risk-based approach to  maintaining the agency’s approximately 40,000 pieces of air traffic control  equipment, but it has not yet determined its new data needs. FAA is in the  very early planning stages of a 10-year or longer effort to switch to this  new approach, termed reliability centered maintenance (RCM), which  private industry and other federal agencies, such as the Department of  Defense (DOD) and NASA, use to maintain equipment. FAA expects the  new approach to improve equipment performance. However, we reported  in November 2006 that FAA had not developed a plan to implement RCM,  has not determined the data needs for RCM, and has not decided what  training will be provided to staff. As the agency moves forward with this  approach, it will be important for FAA to address the issues we identified  as well as work with stakeholders, including FAA maintenance  technicians, to ensure that decisions are not driven entirely by cost savings  and that the safety and efficiency of national airspace operations are not  adversely affected.
section_title: FAA Faces Human Capital Challenges
paragraphs: FAA’s ability to ensure safety in NextGen will also be affected by its ability  to manage its human capital, including air traffic controllers, safety  inspectors, engineers, and technicians. FAA faces a challenge in managing  human capital due to contentious relations with its labor unions. Fourteen  unions represent more than 34,000 of FAA’s 43,200 full time permanent  employees. With the exception of two unions—the National Air Traffic  Controllers Association (NATCA) and the Professional Airway System  Specialists (PASS), which represent about 23,000 FAA employees—12  unions have negotiated a contract or memorandum of agreement with  FAA, according to agency officials. In April 2006, after reaching an impasse  in negotiations with NATCA, FAA used its authority to settle the impasse  by imposing a contract on its air traffic controllers. After 4 years of  contract negotiations with PASS, FAA reached an agreement in April 2006.  The PASS membership, however, according to an FAA official, rejected  this proposed contract. Subsequently, FAA filed a complaint with the  Federal Labor Relations Authority claiming an unfair labor practice,  according to the same FAA official. Until this complaint is adjudicated, the  previous PASS contract remains in effect, according to the FAA official.  Improving the contentious relationship between FAA and these unions  could have positive effects on both the safety of FAA operations and the  implementation of new air traffic management systems under NextGen.  For example, delays in union approvals that may be needed to implement  new systems could lead to delays in their implementation if labor  management relations are acrimonious. In addition, the current contract  situations have the potential to hinder FAA’s ability to retain and recruit  skilled technical staff.
FAA estimates it will lose about 72 percent of its air traffic controller  workforce over the next 10 years. (See fig. 8.) To replace these controllers,  FAA plans to hire 15,004 new controllers from fiscal years 2006 through  2016, according to the agency’s March 2007 controller workforce plan.  This recent hiring target is higher than FAA’s June 2006 hiring target to  reflect recent data indicating that controllers are retiring at a faster rate  than FAA anticipated. To meet these higher targets, FAA has expanded its  hiring sources, which had focused on individuals with prior FAA or DOD  air traffic control experience and graduates from FAA’s collegiate training  initiative program to include the general public. This strategy is needed,  according to FAA officials, because DOD has recently become less of a  hiring source for controllers due to military incentives for retaining  controllers and DOD’s higher salaries than FAA’s entry-level salary.  However, those new hires that lack prior air traffic control experience will  require more training to become certified controllers. Additionally, since  it can take up to 3 to 5 years for a controller to become certified, within a  few years, a large portion of the controller workforce may be trainees and  not fully certified. Based on FAA’s hiring and retirement projections, by  2010, about 40 percent of the air traffic controller workforce will have 5 or  fewer years of experience. This high percentage of newly hired controllers  will continue for a number of years, making it important for FAA to  carefully balance the ratio of trainees to certified controllers at each air  traffic control facility.
In addition to the challenge of hiring and training new air traffic  controllers, it will be important to deploy them in an optimal manner to  reflect changing air traffic demands. FAA’s recent controller workforce  plan includes facility-by-facility staffing standards for fiscal year 2007  expressed as ranges. The staffing standards are intended to take into  consideration facility-specific information, such as air traffic operations,  productivity trends, expected retirements, and the number of controllers  in training. These new standards are an improvement over FAA’s historical  approach, which was to compute the number of controllers needed  systemwide and negotiate the distribution of these totals to the facility  level. However, FAA’s current staffing does not align with the new  standards at about one-third of FAA’s 314 facilities—93 of which are  currently overstaffed and 11 understaffed. This situation adds further  complexity to the controller hiring, training, and staffing issues that FAA  must carefully manage in the upcoming years. Furthermore, FAA has not  factored into its staffing standards or its projected hiring targets the effect  of new NextGen technologies on controller workload. The new  technologies will result in a more automated system that, over time, is  expected to change the role of controllers as well as productivity. In future  updates of the controller workforce plan, it will be important to begin to  factor in this impact.
Furthermore, having the right skill mix of safety inspectors and  technicians and deploying them to make best use of their skills is  especially important as new and developing sectors emerge. By 2010, 44  percent of FAA’s inspector workforce of about 3,865 will be eligible to  retire. To begin addressing this situation, FAA has requested funding to  hire an additional 87 inspectors in fiscal year 2008. In addition to  maintaining a sufficient number of safety inspectors, it will be important to  deploy them where they are most needed. However, FAA lacks a staffing  model to accomplish this. The National Academy of Sciences recently  completed a study that analyzed FAA’s staffing processes for safety  inspectors and identified a number of issues that the agency needed to  address. For instance, the study indicated that the current staffing process  does not focus resources in the areas of greatest need and the match  between individual inspectors’ technical knowledge and the facilities and  operations they oversee is not always optimal. In response to academy  recommendations, FAA expects to develop a staffing model, but the  agency does not have a specific time frame for initiating this effort. In  addition, FAA lacks staffing standards for its approximately 6,100  technicians, who are responsible for maintaining the agency’s air traffic  control equipment. The development of staffing models for safety  inspectors and technicians is important in the changing aviation  environment and is critical to FAA’s ability to ensure that its safety  programs and workload are aligned to meet the future demands for which  NextGen is preparing.
For further information about this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.  Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making  key contributions to this testimony include Faye Morrison, Teresa Spisak,  Nancy Boardman, Anne Dilger, Sharon Dyer, Kevin Egan, Colin Fallon, Jim  Geibel, Bob Homan, Rosa Leung, Ed Menoche, Taylor Reeves, Richard  Scott, Jeremy Sebest, Larry Thomas, Pam Vines, and Carrie Wilkes.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Federal Aviation Administration: Observations on Selected Changes to  FAA’s Funding and Budget Structure in the Administration’s  Reauthorization Proposal. GAO-07-625T. Washington, D.C.: March 21,  2007.
Aviation Safety: Improved Data Collection Needed for Effective  Oversight of Air Ambulance Industry. GAO-07-353. Washington, D.C.:  February 21, 2007.
Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges Facing the Agency in  Fiscal Year 2008 and Beyond. GAO-07-490T. February 14, 2007.
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges  Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System.  GAO-07-25. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006.
FAA’s Proposed Plan for Implementing a Reliability Centered  Maintenance Process for Air Traffic Control Equipment. GAO-07-81R.  Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2006.
Aviation Safety: FAA’s Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face  Challenges. GAO-06-1091T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2006.
Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and  Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism  Industry. GAO-07-16. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2006.
Aviation Safety: FAA’s Safety Oversight System Is Effective but Could  Benefit from Better Evaluation of Its Programs’ Performance. GAO-06- 266T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005.
National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural  Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available  Management Tools. GAO-06-154. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005.
Aviation Safety: System Safety Approach Needs Further Integration into  FAA’s Oversight of Airlines. GAO-05-726. Washington, D.C.: September 28,  2005.
Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program  Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts. GAO-05-266.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2005.
Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the Management of Its  Designees Programs. GAO-05-40. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004.
Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but  More can be Done to Institutionalize Improvements. GAO-04-901.  Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2004.
Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management  Capabilities in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems is  Needed. GAO-04-822. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2004.
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