Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation
Published: 2013-02-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD has increasingly focused on security cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign partners and allies, furthering the U.S. objective of securing international peace and cooperation. Both the 2011 National Military Strategy of the United States of America and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism identify building partner capacity as a worldwide priority. As DOD continues to emphasize building partner capacity, the need for efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners and within the U.S. government has become more important, in part due to fiscal challenges, which can be exacerbated by overlapping or ineffective efforts. This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen DOD's management of its building partner capacity efforts by focusing on three key practices: (1) setting clear goals and defining terminology, (2) coordinating activities and sharing information, and (3) sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. It is based on GAO's body of work on building partner capacity from April 2010 through November 2012.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's recent work has identified key practices that would enhance the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of building partner capacity efforts. Such efforts include a range of security cooperation activities such as military exercises with partner nations and counternarcotics activities. In GAO's reviews of these activities, GAO found that DOD has demonstrated some of these key practices, but opportunities for improvement remain.
Setting clear goals and defining terminology. Setting clear goals and defining terminology can help stakeholders understand what partnership capacity programs seek to accomplish and how they fit in with broad national security interests. GAO has reported that DOD activities to build the capacity of foreign military forces though the Global Train and Equip program have generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism priorities while also addressing partner countries' security interests. However, in a 2012 review of security force assistance, GAO found that the lack of a common understanding of this term within DOD resulted in different interpretations of what types of activities are included and presented challenges in planning activities and forecasting needs for force capabilities. GAO recommended DOD take steps to clarify its intent and then determine what additional actions are required to plan for and conduct security force assistance.
Coordinating activities and sharing information. Coordination mechanisms that facilitate communication within DOD and across agencies are needed to achieve integrated approaches to building partner capacity efforts. In 2012, GAO found that stakeholders had difficulties in obtaining status information on security assistance acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are difficult to access and contain limited information. The department is developing a new information system to address this gap but it will not be fully implemented until 2020. Further, GAO's review of the National Guard State Partnership Program in 2012 found that data systems used by the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau were not interoperable and users applied varying methods and definitions to track the program's activities and funding. As a result, the data on types and frequency of activities were incomplete and inconsistent. GAO recommended that DOD develop guidance including agreed-upon definitions for data fields.
Sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. Developing plans to sustain projects and establishing mechanisms to evaluate them can help ensure that programs have long-term impact. In 2010, GAO reported that the long-term impact of some projects to train and equip foreign militaries could be limited because U.S. agencies have not fully addressed their sustainment. Specifically, only 26 percent of the 135 proposals for fiscal years 2007-2009 projects explicitly addressed the recipient country's ability or willingness to bear sustainment costs. In a review on counternarcotics efforts in 2012, GAO found that DOD is working to improve its counternarcotics performance measurement system, but the department has been unable to attest to the reliability of the performance data for several countries from 2007 through 2011. GAO recommended that DOD submit its performance summary report with the reliability attestation to the National Drug Control Policy office.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made numerous recommendations to align goals with broader strategies and to clarify terminology; develop mechanisms to better coordinate activities and share information; and develop and implement plans and metrics to sustain and evaluate progress. DOD has generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and has taken some actions, but work remains to fully implement GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) efforts at building partner capacity and share with you a few key  practices that can lead to effective management of these efforts. DOD  has become increasingly focused on a broad range of security  cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign  partners and allies and further the U.S. objective of securing international  peace and cooperation. These activities include training, equipping,  advising, and assisting host countries’ security forces in becoming more  proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their  resources and territories. The 2011 National Military Strategy of the  United States of America and the 2011 National Strategy for  Counterterrorism identify building partner capacity as a worldwide  priority. These documents stress that the global security environment  presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to  which all elements of the United States’ national power must be applied.  They also emphasize the need to strengthen and expand the United  States’ network of international partnerships to enhance security and,  according to the National Military Strategy, the joint force, combatant  commands, and service chiefs shall partner with other U.S. government  agencies to pursue theater security cooperation. Further, the 2010  Quadrennial Defense Review report cites building the security capacity of  partner nations as a key mission area and emphasizes security force  assistance as an increasingly critical element of this mission. It also  identifies several initiatives to enhance its ability to build partner nation  security capacity, such as strengthening and institutionalizing the  capabilities of general purpose forces to conduct security force  assistance, enhancing linguistic, regional and cultural abilities, and  strengthening the department’s capacities for ministerial–level training.
As DOD continues to emphasize building partner capacity, the need for  efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners and within the U.S.  government has become more important, in part due to fiscal challenges,  which can be exacerbated by overlapping or ineffective efforts. Strategic  guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in January 2012 emphasized  that building partner capacity elsewhere in the world is important for  sharing the costs and the responsibilities of global leadership and that the  department would develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint  approaches to achieving the United States’ security objectives.
Since 2010, we have issued numerous reports and testimonies and made  recommendations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s  management of its building partner capacity efforts. My testimony today is  based on our prior work and will discuss three key practices that we  believe could provide opportunities for DOD to more effectively manage  its building partner capacity efforts. The key practices are: (1) setting  clear goals and defining terminology, (2) coordinating activities and  sharing information, and (3) sustaining efforts and evaluating progress.  The examples I will draw on today are based on our past work and  include partner capacity building efforts that are primarily funded by DOD.  Detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found in the  reports and testimonies we cite throughout this statement. For the  purposes of this testimony, we also updated information on the status of  our recommendations. We conducted the work supporting our prior  reports, which were issued from April 2010 through November 2012, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD’s efforts to build partner capacity include a broad range of security  cooperation activities designed to build the defense capacity of foreign  partners and allies. These security cooperation activities include military- to-military training, military exercises in cooperation with partner nations,  knowledge sharing from subject matter experts, visits between senior  military leaders, providing military equipment and supplies, and  counternarcotics activities. Table 1 below describes selected partner  capacity activities that DOD implements. The table illustrates the broad  range of activities DOD engages in to build partner capacity and is not a  comprehensive list.
To perform its military missions around the world, DOD operates six  unified military geographic combatant commands, which are responsible  for a variety of functions including planning for and conducting missions  that range from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.their planning responsibilities, geographic combatant commands develop  theater campaign plans, which are multiyear plans that reflect the  command’s strategy to achieve certain end states within their areas of  responsibility. These plans are the primary vehicle for designing,  organizing, integrating, and executing security cooperation activities. A  hierarchy of national and strategic guidance—including the National  Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military  Strategy, and the Guidance for Employment of the Force—informs the  development of the combatant commands’ theater campaign plans.
The U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible for preparing special operations  forces to carry out assigned missions and to plan and conduct special operations. Its  mission is (1) to provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the United  States and its interests and (2) to synchronize global operations against terrorist networks,  including receiving, reviewing, coordinating, and prioritizing all DOD plans that support the  global campaign against terror. notifies the combatant command and solicits proposals from the adjutants  general of the state Guards. These proposals go through three levels of  review within DOD, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau forwards  a recommended nominee to the combatant command and the partner  country’s U.S. embassy for final approval.
I would like to now discuss the key practices we have identified that can  aid DOD in more effectively managing its building partner capacity  activities.
section_title: Setting Clear Goals and Defining Terminology
paragraphs: Setting clear goals and defining terminology can help stakeholders  understand what partnership capacity programs seek to accomplish and  how they fit in with broad national security interests. In our reviews, we  found that DOD’s efforts to align goals with broader strategies and clarify  terminology have varied. More specifically, in some reviews, we found  that programs have aligned with broader strategies but DOD officials  have experienced challenges in agreeing upon key terms.
A positive example of strategic alignment involves our work on the  Section 1206 program. In 2010, we reported that the Section 1206  activities have generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism  priorities while also addressing the partner countries’ security interests.  For example, in 2010, we found that DOD and the State Department  (State) have used Section 1206 funds in Kazakhstan to address its  priority of enhancing the country’s counterterrorism capacity in the  Caspian Sea, according to a U.S. embassy official. Additionally, in  Pakistan, U.S. officials used Section 1206 funds to increase special  operations capacity to support counterterrorism operations on its western  border. Overall, from fiscal year 2006 to 2009, DOD and State allotted  $932 million, or 95 percent, of all Section 1206 funding for  counterterrorism-related equipment and training for partner countries and  the remaining $47 million, or 5 percent, to build the capacity of five  partner nations to participate in stability operations with the United States,  such as providing spare parts for a country’s ground vehicles. We also  found that most Section 1206 counterterrorism resources had been  directed to countries that the U.S. intelligence community has identified  as priority countries for the counterterrorism effort.
In another case we found that DOD is taking steps to address challenges  faced by department officials in identifying and defining partner country  assistance requirements. In a November 2012 report on the Defense  Security Cooperation Agency’s oversight of security cooperation and  assistance programs, we found that since 2009, DOD has initiated  reforms to improve the process of developing assistance requests that  are intended to reduce implementation delays and improve the  effectiveness of assistance to partner countries. new training courses and provided in-country advisors to help country  officials identify short- and long-term requirements and strategies to meet  those requirements. Second, DOD is reforming its own processes for  defining requirements to improve long-term effectiveness of security  cooperation programs and provide short-term solutions for meeting  requirements using assistance requests. Third, DOD created a strategic  planning support group to assist combatant commands with early  identification and resolution of issues related to capability requirements  and certain types of assistance requests. Fourth, the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency established expeditionary teams whose purpose is  to help the combatant commands, partner countries, and security  cooperation officers identify and refine a partner country’s requirements.
GAO, Security Assistance: DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but  Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management, GAO-13-84  (Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2012). the Task Force’s original mission of countering violent extremism and its  location at Camp Lemonnier remain important, particularly given terrorist  threats in the region, we found some activities that may not be aligned  with the command’s mission. For example, at a training exercise for  incoming Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa officials, discussion  was raised concerning Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s  discovery of a dilapidated school in Kenya with a placard stating “donated  by Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa”; current staff had been  unaware of the school’s existence. While the activity may have promoted  temporary benefits for the participants at the time it was built, its  dilapidated state could have potentially promoted unfavorable views of  the U.S. military within the partner nation and heightened concerns about  how such activities fit into a framework of sustained security engagement.  In another example, other embassy officials stated that the experiences of  African navy and coast guard participants of Task Force maritime training  sessions were dampened because participants had anticipated a  permanent training program; instead, they received sporadic and short- term training, which may not promote U.S. Africa Command’s mission of  sustained or long-term security engagement. As a result, we  recommended that U.S. Africa Command complete its evaluation of  Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa to determine whether the Task  Force should be retained, and if so, whether changes are needed to its  mission, structure, and resources to best support the command’s mission.  In a 2012 follow up on our recommendation, U.S. Africa Command stated  that it had issued a plan to alter the Task Force’s mission in accordance  with the command’s assessment of the current security environment.  However, DOD has not identified how the Task Force is changing its  structure and resources to support the new mission.
Another review in 2012 found that DOD’s lack of clarity surrounding the  term “security force assistance” has created challenges for the combatant  commands and military services in their efforts to plan for security force  assistance as a distinct activity and enhance force capabilities. DOD  intends to focus more on security force assistance activities and has  directed the combatant commands to incorporate them into their long  range plans and forecast requirements. In its instruction, DOD defined  security force assistance as “DOD activities that contribute to unified  action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity  and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting  institutions.” Seeking to clarify this definition, DOD has further stated  that security force assistance encompasses all DOD activities conducted  under various programs to “organize, train, equip, rebuild/build and advise  foreign security forces and their supporting institutions from the tactical to  ministerial levels.” Notwithstanding DOD’s efforts to clarify its  terminology, we found that the commands continue to lack a common  understanding of the term and therefore some were unclear as to what  additional actions were needed to meet DOD’s intent. Officials we  interviewed generally viewed security force assistance as a  recharacterization of some of their existing security cooperation activities  but had different interpretations of what types of activities should be  considered as security force assistance. For example, within one  command, officials considered nearly every activity with partner nations to  be security force assistance. Another command considered only  individual efforts to train partner nations as security force assistance and  excluded other activities. Also, some command officials were not clear as  to the intent of DOD’s increased focus on security force assistance and  whether any related adjustments should be made in their plans and scope  or level of activities. As a result, they do not currently distinguish security  force assistance from other security cooperation activities in their plans.  The services are taking steps and investing resources to organize and  train general purpose forces capable of conducting security force  assistance based on current requirements. Without greater clarity in  regard to future needs, the services are uncertain whether their current  efforts are sufficient or whether additional capabilities will be required.  Therefore, we recommended that DOD take steps to clarify its intent,  including the level of effort that combatant commands should devote to  security force assistance, and what additional actions are required by the  commands to plan for and conduct security force assistance beyond their  existing security cooperation efforts. These steps would also help inform  the services’ efforts to ensure that the capabilities that they are  developing and thus the resources that they are investing are appropriate  and adequate to meet future requirements. DOD generally agreed with  our recommendations.
In another instance, we found that DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for  International Development used different terminology to describe similar  efforts during our review of DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts. For  example, according to DOD officials, DOD uses the term “humanitarian  assistance” to describe its strategically planned assistance. In contrast,  the U.S. Agency for International Development and State refer to  immediate, life-saving relief as “humanitarian assistance” but other  capacity-building efforts as “development assistance.” DOD officials  explained that the terminology they use is derived from their legislative  authority to perform humanitarian assistance, and DOD and U.S. Agency  for International Development officials said that DOD uses “humanitarian  assistance” rather than “development assistance” to ensure that the  department is not perceived as performing development efforts that are  outside of its legislatively-prescribed areas of responsibility. Further, DOD  officials who are engaged in implementing some of DOD’s humanitarian  assistance efforts told us that differences in terminology can create  challenges among agencies in understanding the scope and nature of  each others’ efforts. State officials said that differing terminology creates  challenges to setting goals or objectives when planning with other  agencies. As a result, we recommended and they agreed that DOD,  State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development collaborate to  develop guidance that provides a common understanding of the  terminology used for their humanitarian and development assistance  efforts. In a 2013 follow-up on our recommendation, DOD officials stated  that they have continued to regularly engage officials at State and the  U.S. Agency for International Development through working groups and  briefings to minimize confusion over terminology, but did not identify any  actions taken to develop guidance on the differences in the agencies’  terminology.
section_title: Coordinating Activities and Sharing Information
paragraphs: National strategies have emphasized the importance of building partner  capacity using an interagency and whole of government approach, but  mechanisms for coordinating activities and sharing information within  DOD and across agencies have not been consistently implemented. Our  work shows that DOD has taken steps to work with other agencies on  activities, such as embedding representatives from their agencies at its  combatant commands, but challenges remain. Agencies have different  organizational structures, planning processes, and funding sources to  plan for and conduct their building partner capacity efforts, which can  hinder interagency collaboration. Given these organizational differences,  coordination mechanisms that can facilitate interagency collaboration are  needed to achieve integrated approaches to building partner capacity  efforts.
Our work has found that DOD has led or participated in coordinating  activities and taken steps to share and integrate information for building  partner capacity activities through some of the programs at its geographic  combatant commands. For instance, U.S. Southern Command is a  geographic combatant command that operates in the Americas and the  Caribbean, areas primarily affected by challenges such as corruption,  crime, transnational terrorism, natural disasters, and poverty that impact  the security and stability of the region. In recent years, in an effort to  better support security and stability in the region, U.S. Southern  Command has sought to become a more interagency-oriented command,  recognizing that many of the challenges it faces cross role and mission  lines of various U.S. government agencies. In 2010, our review of U.S.  Southern Command found that the command coordinated with  interagency partners to develop mutually reinforcing strategies, including  its 2009 Theater Campaign Plan and its 2020 Command Strategy. U.S.  Southern Command coordinated the development of its 2009 Theater  Campaign Plan, which lays out the command’s theater priorities and  guides its resource allocations, with over 10 U.S. government  departments, agencies, and offices. In addition, for U.S. Southern  Command’s 2020 Command Strategy, which was in development in  2010, the command conducted a 3-day conference to gather perspectives  from interagency partners on the command’s assessment of challenges in  the region and the command’s strategic objectives.
However, challenges with coordinating and information sharing with other  agencies remain. In 2012, we reported that DOD, State, and the U.S.  Agency for International Development recognize the need to improve  information sharing for humanitarian assistance efforts and they have  begun to take steps to address the challenge.assistance efforts include constructing schools, digging water wells,  preparing communities for natural disasters, and helping local populations  obtain medical care. Despite DOD’s various collaborative efforts,  challenges remain, particularly in project coordination and data  management for information sharing. For example, officials said that the  frequent rotation of personnel can lead to continuity challenges. Many  officials also stated that coordination tends to be personality driven; when  staff is replaced, relationships have to be rebuilt and progress can be lost.  Further, while officials from DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for  International Development said that interagency personnel at the  commands have helped improve coordination with DOD, the roles of  these personnel may be limited. Some State and U.S. Agency for  International Development officials explained that the role of their  advisors assigned to DOD’s combatant commands is limited. Specifically,  they are able to report on what is happening in their respective areas of  responsibility but cannot make decisions or speak on behalf of their home  agencies. Moreover, DOD, State, and U.S. Agency for International  Development do not have full visibility over each others’ assistance  efforts, which could result in a fragmented approach to U.S. assistance.  There are several initiatives under way to improve information sharing;  however, no framework, such as a common database, currently exists for  the agencies to readily access information on each others’ efforts.  Therefore, we recommended that the State Department, U.S. Agency for  International Development, and DOD develop a framework for sharing  information to be used by all agencies in their assistance efforts, and  indicated that this framework could involve selecting an existing initiative,  such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard. They agreed with our  recommendation, and in 2012 DOD officials stated they submitted foreign  assistance data on their peacetime humanitarian assistance programs  and 12 other security programs to State for inclusion into the Foreign  Assistance Dashboard. Further, State officials said they expect to have  DOD’s foreign assistance data available on the Dashboard by the end of  fiscal year 2013.
We have found that when agencies share information, managing and  integrating information from multiple sources present challenges  regarding data comparability. For instance, we found that the multiple  data systems used to track National Guard State Partnership Program  activities and funding are not interoperable and users apply varying  methods and definitions to guide data inputs. In 2012, we reported that  we could not provide complete information on the types and frequency of  State Partnership Program activities because activity data are incomplete  as well as inconsistent. According to National Guard Bureau officials,  DOD’s Guidance for Employment of the Force mandates that all security  cooperation activities be tracked, including State Partnership Program  activities, in management information system databases. However, the  National Guard Bureau and the combatant commands maintain separate  databases for tracking events and each entity independently tracks its  activities in databases that are not interoperable. Further, the terminology  used to identify activity types varied both across the combatant  commands and between the combatant commands and the National  Guard Bureau. As a result, we found it difficult to identify whether the data  in different databases were describing the same activity or two separate  activities. Therefore, we recommended and the department agreed that  DOD, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, the combatant  commands, and the embassy country teams, develop guidance for all  stakeholders that includes agreed-upon definitions for data fields and  rules for maintaining data until the program’s global data system is fully  implemented. In December 2012, DOD issued an instruction requiring  combatant commanders to submit annual records of State Partnership  Program activities and defining specific data that must be included in  these reports. While this instruction does not directly identify data field  definitions, it could provide a basis for improving the department’s efforts  to track State Partnership Program activities and funding.
In 2012, we found that DOD efforts to provide timely security assistance  were affected by communication and coordination issues within DOD that  in some cases delayed assistance and increased costs. DOD’s Security  Cooperation Organizations in foreign countries reported persistent  difficulties obtaining information from the Defense Security Cooperation  Agency and the implementing agencies of the military departments—the  Army, Navy, and Air Force—on the status of security assistance  equipment acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are  difficult for them to access and contain limited information. DOD’s existing  delivery tracking system provides only limited data on the status of  equipment deliveries because partner country agents and DOD agencies  are not entering the needed data into the system. Without advance notice  of deliveries, Security Cooperation Organization staff have been unable to  ensure that addresses were correct and that partner countries were ready  to receive and process deliveries, resulting in delays or increased costs.  For example, security cooperation officers we met with reported instances  where: equipment was held by the partner country’s customs agency  because the delivery lacked proper documentation or proper address  labels, and additional customs fees were incurred while the security  cooperation officers found the missing information;  shipments were warehoused in a customs office for 2 years because  they had no addresses or were improperly addressed;  the Security Cooperation Organization discovered equipment at ports  and airports that had arrived without advance notice.
To improve the ability of combatant commands and Security Cooperation  Organization officials to obtain information on the acquisition and delivery  status of assistance agreements, we recommended that DOD establish  procedures to help ensure that DOD agencies populate security  assistance information systems with complete data. In response, the  Defense Security Cooperation Agency stated that it would work with the  military departments to ensure that information systems are populated  with acquisition and delivery status data. The Defense Security  Cooperation Agency is also developing a new electronic system, the  Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution, to improve visibility and  aggregate data from the separate computer management systems used  by DOD’s implementing agencies, but it is not expected to be fully  implemented until 2020.
section_title: Sustaining Efforts and Evaluating Progress
paragraphs: Developing plans to sustain DOD’s building partner capacity activities and  establishing mechanisms to monitor programs and evaluate results can  help ensure that these programs have long-term impact. Our work has  shown that some building partner capacity activities may not endure  because planning for sustainment has been a systemic challenge. In a  2009 memo to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,  the Secretary of Defense stated that sustaining the results of capacity- building has proven difficult because the lack of multi-year planning and  funding authorities at the outset of security assistance efforts makes it  difficult for the U.S. government and its partners to build or maintain  effective collaborative relationships. Further, our work has also shown  that DOD had not consistently defined performance measures, and  reporting on progress and effectiveness of some building partner capacity  activities has been limited to anecdotal information.
One example of sustainment planning challenges came from our review  of the Section 1206 program. In 2010, we reported that the long-term  impact of some Section 1206 projects could be limited because U.S.  agencies have not fully addressed how to sustain these projects. For  example, we found that most participating countries have relatively low  incomes and may be unwilling or unable to provide the necessary  resources to sustain projects. According to project proposal instructions  applicable at the time of our report, proposals must explain how projects  will be sustained in future years. However, we found that only 26 percent  of the 135 proposals we reviewed for fiscal years 2007-2009 projects  explicitly addressed the recipient country’s ability or willingness to bear  sustainment costs. Moreover, only 1 of the 15 Security Assistance  Officers we interviewed indicated that he believed his partner nation had  the ability to sustain its Section 1206 projects independently. For  example, the Security Assistance Officer in Mali noted that sustainment of  the Section 1206 project to train and equip that country’s light infantry  units would be problematic if the country had to find its own funding. Our  2010 report also showed that DOD and State had conducted little  monitoring and evaluation of the Section 1206 security assistance  program. Specifically, DOD and State’s reporting has generally consisted  of anecdotal information and DOD officials told us that they had not  consistently monitored these security assistance projects. Our review of  149 approved proposals for Section 1206 projects for fiscal years 2006  through 2009 showed that only 32 percent (48 proposals) defined  measures of effectiveness or anticipated outcomes. In addition, only 25  percent (34) of 135 approved fiscal year 2007 through 2009 proposals we  reviewed documented an intention to monitor results. We recommended  that DOD and State develop and implement specific plans to monitor,  evaluate, and report routinely on the results of such monitoring and  evaluation for Section 1206 projects. DOD agreed with our  recommendation and, in response, completed its first systematic  assessments of Section 1206 projects implemented in 5 countries in  2012. As part of that effort, DOD also created the Section 1206  Assessment Handbook to be used for the future, annual assessment  efforts. Officials we spoke to stated that these pilot assessments validated  the assessment methodology, which will be used to evaluate all future  potential recipients’ capabilities prior to receipt of Section 1206  equipment, as well as to conduct evaluations of selected Section 1206  efforts following the implementation.
In a separate review of U.S. Africa Command in 2010, we found that it is  unclear whether all of the activities that U.S. Africa Command inherited or  is planning fully align with its mission of sustained security engagement in  Africa because the command was generally not measuring the long-term  effects of its activities. met with while observing a command activity in Uganda told us that the  command planned to produce an “after action” report after the activity, but  they acknowledged that U.S. Africa Command needs to develop a  method to perform longer-term assessments of activities. Command  officials also stated they did not know whether projects such as  reconstructing a school would have a sustainable effect on the community  and State officials added that the command’s efforts to support U.S.
GAO, Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency  Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa, GAO-10-794 (Washington, D.C.:  July 28, 2010). embassies by augmenting or broadening existing public-diplomacy efforts  were not being assessed. While long-term evaluation can be difficult to  achieve, particularly the ability to link an action to a desired effect, we  noted it nonetheless remains important for the command to have some  performance measures. Therefore, we recommended that U.S. Africa  Command conduct long-term assessments of the full range of its activities  to determine whether the activities are having their intended effects and  supporting the Command’s mission. In a 2012 follow up to our  recommendation, the command stated that it has conducted nationwide  polling and stakeholder interviews across several African countries to  develop a baseline against which progress can be measured. For  example, the command asked how participants viewed their nation’s  military and how they felt toward international cooperation in military  training and peacekeeping in Africa. However, U.S. Africa Command still  needs to take steps to develop metrics and indicators in order to conduct  more thorough assessments. Until the long-term assessments of its  activities are completed, U.S. Africa Command may have difficulty making  successful future planning decisions and allocating resources to  maximize its effect in Africa.
More recently, in 2012, we found that because the National Guard’s State  Partnership Program did not have agreed-upon goals or metrics, it could  not assess progress. National Guard Bureau officials acknowledged that  once they update program goals and objectives, they will need to develop  metrics to measure results of the program. The officials are working with  experts from other organizations and have begun to develop metrics for  the program. However, they indicated that due to the relationship-building  nature of the program, it is difficult to establish appropriate metrics that  capture the effects of the program. We recommended that the department  complete and implement the program’s comprehensive oversight  framework by using the goals, objectives, and metrics currently being  developed. In the December 2012 DOD instruction, the department  directed the alignment of State Partnership Program activities with  combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation program objectives,  as well as with the objectives of the U.S. embassies and national security  objectives of the partner nations. This is a positive step; however, goals,  objectives, or metrics specific to the State Partnership Program still need  to be completed. Such goals, objectives, and metrics would form the  foundation for a comprehensive oversight framework and, until they are  put into place, DOD cannot fully assess whether the program is an  effective and efficient use of resources.
In addition, our work on counternarcotics efforts has found challenges  with the reliability of performance data. For example, our 2012 review of  the Andean countries found that although DOD is working to improve its  counternarcotics performance measurement system, the department’s  Inspector General has been unable to attest to the reliability of the  performance data from 2007 through 2011, as required by the Office of  National Drug Control Policy. We previously reported that DOD had  established performance measures for its counternarcotics activities,  such as percentage of tasked counternarcotics missions flown, the  number of partner nation law enforcement agencies engaged, and the  number of military working dog teams trained. However, during our  2012 review, we found that the DOD Inspector General cited a number of  reasons for not attesting to the reliability of DOD’s performance data. One  example was that DOD’s 2008 performance report did not include 4  consecutive years of data required for tracking improvements. Lacking  these attestations from DOD, the Office of National Drug Control Policy  has minimal assurance of the reliability of DOD’s reporting on its  estimated $956 million in counternarcotics assistance for those years.  Without reliable information, the Office of National Drug Control Policy  may be limited in its ability to carry out its responsibility for coordinating  and overseeing implementation of the policies, goals, objectives, and  priorities established by the national drug control program and to report to  Congress on counternarcotics assistance provided by agencies under its  purview. As a result, we recommended that the department submit its  performance summary report along with the Inspector General’s  attestations of the reliability of the information reported to the National  Drug Control Policy office. DOD agreed with our recommendation but did  not detail how it would address this recommendation.
In conclusion, DOD’s building partner capacity efforts encompass a broad  range of security cooperation activities that focus on emphasizing existing  alliances and expanding cooperation with emerging partners to ensure  collective capability and capacity for securing common interests, as well  as sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Given the  recent emphasis on these efforts, it is vital to manage them effectively  and efficiently. By setting clear goals and defining terminology,  coordinating activities and sharing information, and sustaining efforts and  evaluating progress, DOD can avoid confusion about the activities and  help to assess their long-term impact. Effective management of current  and future building partner capacity efforts will help DOD steward its  resources to achieve its strategic priorities and provide Congress with the  information it needs as it evaluates current programs and considers future  funding levels. Moreover, effective management of these efforts will likely  better position the U.S. government to respond to changing conditions  and future uncertainties around the world.
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, this concludes my prepared  remarks. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.
For future information regarding this statement, please contact Janet A.  St. Laurent at (202) 512-4300 or at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on  the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this statement are  listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Security Assistance: DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some  Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance  Program Management. GAO-13-84. Washington, D.C.:  November 16, 2012.
Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in  Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results.  GAO-12-824. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2012.
State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training  Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners. GAO-12-548.  Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.
Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide  Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.
Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and  Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts.  GAO-12-359. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2012.
Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates  Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed  Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. GAO-10-801.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency  Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. GAO-10-794.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement  System to Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotics Activities.  GAO-10-835. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of  Africa Task Force. GAO-10-504. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment  Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207  Assistance Programs. GAO-10-431. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of  National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information  Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4300 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact name above, Charles Michael Johnson Jr.,  Director; John Pendleton, Director; Sharon Pickup, Director; Marie Mak,  Assistant Director; James Michels, Assistant Director; Jennifer Andreone,  Kathryn Bolduc, Katherine Forsyth, Simon Hirschfeld, Meghan Perez,  Erika Prochaska, Steven Putansu, Jodie Sandel, Michael Simon, John  Van Schaik, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Nicole Willems made key  contributions to this testimony.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.