Border Security: Additional Actions Could Strengthen DHS Efforts to Address Subterranean, Aerial, and Maritime Smuggling
Published: 2017-05-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As DHS has increased the security of overland smuggling routes, transnational criminal organizations have adapted their techniques to smuggle drugs and humans through alternative methods. These methods include cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational maritime vessels. While these methods account for a small proportion of known smuggling, they can be used to transport significant quantities of drugs or for terrorist activity. GAO was asked to review DHS's efforts to address subterranean, aerial, and maritime smuggling. This report addresses, among other things, (1) the known prevalence of the aforementioned smuggling methods, (2) efforts to address them, and (3) efforts to assess the results of activities to counter them. GAO analyzed relevant procedures, reports, and data for fiscal years 2011 through 2016. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and conducted site visits to locations in California, Arizona, and Florida, chosen based upon past detection of smuggling by the selected methods, among other things. The information from the site visits is not generalizable, but provided valuable insights.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data showed that there were 67 discovered cross-border tunnels, 534 detected ultralight aircraft incursions, and 309 detected drug smuggling incidents involving panga boats (a fishing vessel) and recreational vessels along U.S. mainland borders from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. The number of known smuggling events involving these methods generally declined over this period, but they remain threats.
DHS has established various coordination mechanisms and invested in technology to address select smuggling methods in the subterranean, aerial, and maritime domains. For example, DHS established interagency task forces to investigate cross-border tunnels. However, DHS has not established comprehensive standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, and we found that relevant officials were not aware of all DHS systems or offices with tunnel information. By establishing procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, DHS could provide strategic guidance and facilitate information sharing departmentwide, consistent with standards for internal control. DHS has also invested or plans to invest in at least five technology projects to help detect and track ultralight aircraft. However, DHS has not assessed and documented how all of the alternative ultralight aircraft technical solutions it is considering will fully address operational requirements or the costs and benefits associated with these different solutions. This type of analysis could help better position DHS to use its resources effectively and ensure that operational needs are met, consistent with risk management best practices.
DHS has established high-level smuggling performance measures and collects data on smuggling by tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels; however, DHS has not assessed its efforts specific to addressing these smuggling methods to, for example, compare the percent of detected panga boat and recreational smuggling events that are interdicted against targeted performance levels. By establishing measures and regularly monitoring performance against targets, managers could obtain valuable information on successful approaches and areas that could be improved to help ensure that technology investments and operational responses to address these smuggling methods are effective, consistent with standards for internal control. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in February 2017. Information DHS deemed For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive has been redacted.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making six recommendations, including that DHS establish procedures for addressing tunnels, assess ultralight aircraft technology, and establish performance measures and targets. DHS concurred with four recommendations and disagreed with those to establish tunnel procedures and maritime performance measures, citing other efforts. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. government has identified illicit drug and human smuggling,  particularly along the U.S-Mexico border (the southwest border), as a  threat to national security that poses risks to public safety and contributes  to illicit drug use that harms families and communities across the country.  To enhance security along the southwest border, the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS)—the agency responsible for securing the  nation’s borders—has made significant investments in personnel,  technology, and tactical infrastructure, such as fencing. In recent years,  DHS reports that it has interdicted millions of pounds of drugs and  hundreds of thousands of individuals attempting to illegally enter the  United States, mostly along the southwest border. In fiscal year 2015,  DHS reported that it seized or prevented the delivery of more than 3.3  million pounds of narcotics, of which about 2.1 million pounds were  seized at the southwest border. In addition, DHS reported that it  apprehended more than 337,000 illegal entrants between ports of entry,  of which about 331,000 were apprehended along the southwest border.
As DHS has increased the security of overland smuggling routes,  transnational criminal organizations have adapted their techniques to  smuggle drugs and humans through other methods to try to evade  detection and interdiction. These adapted smuggling methods include but  are not limited to illicit cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats  (a type of fishing vessel), recreational maritime vessels, and self- propelled semi-submersible and fully submersible vessels. While the  selected smuggling methods listed above generally account for a small  proportion of drug seizures between ports of entry—DHS data indicate  there were 49 seizures from tunnels, ultralight aircraft, and the selected  maritime conveyances in fiscal year 2015 compared to almost 12,900  total drug seizures—the actual number of smuggling events is unknown  and thus seizure data may not reflect the true prevalence. Further, these  selected smuggling methods can be used to transport significant  quantities of drugs. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s  (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) and U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)— the components within DHS responsible for securing the border between  land ports of entry and investigating cross-border and immigration-related  crimes, respectively—and other federal and local law enforcement  partners seized over 17,000 pounds of marijuana and 300 pounds of  cocaine from a cross-border tunnel discovered in 2013. In addition, the  U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) and CBP Air and Marine Operations  (AMO)—the DHS components that share maritime law enforcement  responsibilities—seized 5,700 pounds of marijuana from one panga boat  in March 2015. Human smugglers and migrants have also used panga  boats and recreational maritime vessels on occasion. In addition to  posing drug and human smuggling threats, transnational criminal  organizations’ utilization of these methods also raises concerns that they  could be used to smuggle terrorists and their weapons into the United  States.
You asked us to review DHS’s efforts to address threats posed by  smuggling in the subterranean, aerial, and maritime environments. This  report addresses the following questions:  1.  What do DHS data show about the prevalence of smuggling by cross- border tunnel, ultralight aircraft, and selected maritime methods from  fiscal years 2011 through 2016?  2.  To what extent has DHS assessed the risks from smuggling by these  methods?  3.  How has DHS addressed smuggling by these methods?  4.  To what extent has DHS assessed the results of its efforts to address  smuggling by these methods?
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we  provided to you in February 2017. DHS and the Department of Defense  deemed some of the information in the prior report as For Official Use  Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive, which must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information on  intelligence assessments, law enforcement operations, and capabilities of  technologies used to address subterranean, aerial, and maritime  smuggling. Although the information in this report is more limited in  scope, it addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the  overall methodology used for both reports is the same.
To address these questions, we focused our review on smuggling across  U.S. mainland borders, including coastal borders, and we selected the  following smuggling methods: cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft,  panga boats, recreational maritime vessels, and self-propelled semi- submersible and fully submersible vessels. We selected these smuggling  methods to include only those that would occur between ports of entry  through means other than overland (given our focus on subterranean,  aerial, and maritime smuggling); have been identified in strategy  documents or by senior DHS officials and DHS officials with whom we  met as a challenge or risk; and were of a magnitude that DHS had taken  steps to address them. We analyzed DHS policies, procedures, and  reports. We also conducted site visits to San Diego, El Centro, and  Riverside, California; Nogales and Yuma, Arizona; and Miami and Key  West, Florida. During these visits, we observed DHS approaches to  addressing the selected smuggling methods and interviewed cognizant  officials from Coast Guard; ICE HSI; and CBP’s Border Patrol and AMO  about their efforts. We selected these locations based upon a  combination of factors, including the past detected use of the selected smuggling methods and the presence of coordinated DHS efforts to  counter them in these areas. The information gathered from our site visits  is not generalizable to other locations but provides insights into DHS’s  responses to these incursions and efforts to use risk and performance  information to stop future smuggling incidents using these methods.  Additionally, we interviewed headquarters officials from the Coast Guard;  CBP’s Border Patrol, AMO, and Office of Acquisition, the office  responsible for CBP’s acquisition of products and services; ICE HSI; and  DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the office responsible  for leading research and development efforts across the department, to  obtain information and perspectives on their efforts to assess and  address threats posed by the selected smuggling methods.
To address the first question, we obtained and analyzed DHS data from  fiscal years 2011 through 2016. We assessed the reliability of these data  by performing electronic testing, among other things, and found the data  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting trends in the selected  smuggling methods from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. To address the  second question, we analyzed DHS risk, threat, intelligence, and  capability assessments against GAO’s risk management framework and  leading practices for interagency collaboration. To address the third  question, we analyzed DHS policies, procedures, and documentation on  developing and acquiring new technology. We also interviewed officials  from Border Patrol, AMO, ICE HSI, Coast Guard, and relevant  Department of Defense (DOD) offices and organizations to determine the  extent to which they have established mechanisms to coordinate assets,  operations, and share technology to address the selected smuggling  methods. We assessed these efforts against GAO’s leading practices for  interagency collaboration and risk management framework. To address  the fourth question, we analyzed DHS and component performance  reports, among other things, and interviewed DHS officials to determine  how they use performance information. We assessed DHS’s performance  monitoring efforts against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government and performance assessment best practices. Additional  details on our scope and methodology are contained in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2015 to May 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Selected Smuggling Methods
paragraphs: Transnational criminal organizations use subterranean, aerial, and  maritime smuggling methods to try to avoid the security measures  designed to address traditional overland smuggling routes. These  smuggling methods—which are further described below—include but are  not limited to, illicit cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats,  recreational maritime vessels, and self-propelled semi-submersible and  fully submersible vessels. While the use of some of these conveyances is  longstanding, DHS has identified changes in transnational criminal  organizations’ tactics, techniques, and procedures in using them that  present new or different challenges to border security.
Cross-border tunnels. Cross-border tunnels are man-made sub-surface  passageways that could be used to conceal the movement of humans or  contraband and circumvent U.S. border defenses. Cross-border tunnels  can be classified into one of four categories based on the predominant  features of the tunnel, as described below and shown in figure 1:
Sophisticated tunnels are elaborately constructed, may be of  significant length and depth, and may have shoring, lighting,  electricity, ventilation, and railways.
Rudimentary tunnels are crudely constructed and shallow.
Interconnecting tunnels exploit and connect to underground municipal  infrastructure, such as storm water and sewage systems.  Interconnecting tunnels typically connect to a rudimentary or  sophisticated tunnel to operate; however, in these cases the entire  tunnel would be classified into one category based on the  predominant features of the tunnel. The exclusive unaltered use of  underground municipal infrastructure to transport people or  contraband is not considered a cross-border tunnel, but is another  subterranean threat.
Mechanically bored tunnels are those that are constructed primarily  from mechanical means, instead of human diggers. Such mechanical  means can include horizontal directional drilling devices and tunnel  boring machines. These tunnels are generally lined by piping.
Ultralight aircraft. As shown in figure 2, ultralight aircraft are single-seat  aircraft that have an empty weight of about 250 pounds or less.  Smugglers modify ultralight aircraft to carry drug loads by, for example,  attaching large metal baskets.
Maritime vessels. Selected maritime smuggling methods include panga  boats, recreational vessels, and self-propelled semi-submersible and fully  submersible vessels, which are further described below and shown in  figure 3.
Panga boats are open-hulled, flat-bottomed fishing vessels designed  to arrive and depart directly from a beach. These vessels are between  20 and 60 feet long, and are fitted with one or more outboard motors.
Recreational vessels are motorized vessels and sailboats used for  leisure activities. Smugglers can exploit the ubiquity of legitimate  recreational activity to blend in and avoid detection using these  vessels.
Self-propelled semi-submersible and fully submersible vessels have  low profiles designed to have low radar reflectivity, making them  difficult to detect. Semi-submersible vessels generally cut through the  water at wave height, while fully submersible vessels can be entirely  submerged below the surface.
section_title: Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Multiple components within DHS have responsibilities for addressing  subterranean, aerial, and maritime smuggling, including ICE HSI, Coast  Guard, and CBP’s Border Patrol and AMO. Their specific roles and  responsibilities with regard to the selected smuggling methods are  discussed below.
Cross-border tunnels. CBP and ICE HSI share primary responsibility for  countering cross-border tunnel threats. ICE HSI is responsible for cross- border tunnel investigations, Border Patrol is the primary component for  interdiction, and CBP is responsible for the remediation of illicit tunnels.  Both Border Patrol and ICE HSI efforts can lead to the identification of  likely tunnel locations. In 2013, CBP established a Tunnel Program  Management Office (TPMO) within Border Patrol to lead and coordinate  CBP counter-tunnel efforts.
Ultralight aircraft. AMO, Border Patrol, and HSI have primary  responsibility for countering ultralight aircraft smuggling. AMO’s Air and  Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is to surveil the airspace above the  nation’s border and identify the criminal use of noncommercial air  conveyances, including ultralight aircraft. AMO and Border Patrol are  responsible for responding to and interdicting ultralight aircraft used for  smuggling, and ICE HSI is responsible for investigating ultralight aircraft  incursions.
Maritime vessels. Coast Guard, AMO, and Border Patrol share  responsibility for patrolling the U.S. maritime borders, and territorial sea  (i.e., maritime approaches 12 nautical miles seaward of the U.S. coast) to  interdict drugs and foreign nationals illegally entering the United States.  Coast Guard is the lead federal maritime law enforcement agency on the  high seas (waters beyond 12 nautical miles seaward of the U.S. coast).  ICE HSI and AMO may investigate cross-border maritime smuggling.
In addition, within DHS, DHS S&T and CBP’s Office of Acquisition  (formerly the Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition) are  responsible for assisting DHS components in obtaining technology that  can help them address the threats posed by the selected smuggling  methods. DHS S&T is responsible for leading research and development,  demonstration, testing, and evaluation to help bridge capability gaps.  CBP’s Office of Acquisition is responsible for providing policy and  acquisition oversight across CBP to help obtain products and services  that enhance border security.
Outside of DHS, DOD is the lead federal agency for the detection and  monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United  States and operates systems, such as radar systems, that can be used in  support of DHS and other federal, state, and local law enforcement  activities.
section_title: Known Smuggling Events Persisted but Generally Declined from Fiscal Years 2011 through 2016, According to DHS Data
subsections: section_title: Tunnel Discoveries Were Concentrated on the Southwest Border and Have Generally Declined since Fiscal Year 2011
paragraphs: Our analysis of Border Patrol tunnel data showed that there were 67  cross-border tunnels discovered along U.S. borders from fiscal years  2011 through 2016, all located on the southwest border, as shown in  figure 4. Nearly all cross-border tunnels—62 of 67—were discovered in  Border Patrol’s Tucson, Arizona or San Diego, California sectors and the  remaining 5 were discovered in the El Centro, California and Yuma,  Arizona Border Patrol sectors. Additionally, the number of discovered  cross-border tunnels generally declined during the period, with 18 tunnels  discovered in fiscal year 2011 and 9 tunnels discovered in fiscal year  2016. However, CBP’s 2015 tunnel report to Congress found that illicit  cross-border tunnels are a persistent threat to national security and that  increased border enforcement efforts would likely continue to push illicit  cross-border smuggling underground.
Our analysis of Border Patrol tunnel data also showed that sophisticated  and interconnecting were the most common tunnel types discovered from  fiscal years 2011 through 2016. In particular, 54 of the 67 discovered  cross-border tunnels from fiscal years 2011 through 2016 were  sophisticated and interconnecting types while 13 were rudimentary or  mechanically bored. Additionally, most drug seizures associated with  cross-border tunnels involved marijuana. For example, 21 of the 23  seizures involved marijuana, resulting in over 106,600 pounds of seized  marijuana.
section_title: Detected Ultralight Aircraft Incursions Occurred Mostly on the Southwest Border and Have Generally Declined since Fiscal Year 2011
paragraphs: Our analysis of AMO data showed that there were 534 suspected  ultralight aircraft incursions from fiscal years 2011 through 2016, all but  one located on the southwest border in Arizona, California, New Mexico,  and Texas. The number of suspected ultralight incursions declined each  year from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. For example, according to  AMO data, the overall number of suspected ultralight aircraft incursions  declined from 199 in fiscal year 2011 to 28 in fiscal year 2016, as shown  in figure 5. However, as discussed later in this report, AMO reports that  ultralight aircraft are a flexible threat and a surge in activity could occur in  any or all of the southwest border sectors. For example, while the overall  number of ultralight aircraft incursions declined, an increase of ultralight  activity occurred in Texas in fiscal year 2016. More specifically, 18  suspected ultralight aircraft incursions were detected in Texas in fiscal  year 2016, compared to 5 suspected ultralight aircraft incursions for all of  fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Additionally, most drug seizures  associated with ultralight aircraft incursions were of marijuana. For  example, more than 98 percent (100 of 102) of the seizures involved  marijuana, resulting in over 22,000 pounds of seized marijuana. Less  than two percent (2 of 102) of these seizures involved methamphetamine,  which resulted in nearly 8 kilograms of methamphetamine seized.
section_title: Known Maritime Drug Smuggling Events on Panga Boats and Recreational Vessels Mostly Occurred on the California Coast and Generally Declined since Fiscal Year 2011
paragraphs: Our analysis of Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB) data shows  that the majority of known maritime drug smuggling events involving  panga boats and recreational vessels along U.S. mainland borders— nearly 76 percent (234 of 309)—took place on the west coast, specifically  California, and over 24 percent (75 of 309) took place on the southeast  coast, northeast coast, and the southwest border. As depicted in figure  6, our analysis of CCDB data also showed that the number of known  panga boat and recreational vessel drug smuggling events varied from  fiscal years 2011 through 2016, with the highest number of events (82 of  309) occurring in fiscal year 2013 and lowest number of events occurring  in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, with 32 and 29 respectively. However, the  actual number of maritime smuggling events and the amount of drugs  smuggled by these methods is unknown. Additionally, a higher proportion  of events—nearly 65 percent (200 of 309)—involved motorized, open- hulled vessels, such as panga boats, and a lower proportion of events— over 35 percent (109 of 309)—involved recreational vessels. Our  analysis also showed that the majority of known panga boat and  recreational vessel drug smuggling events—nearly 86 percent (265 of  309)—involved marijuana, resulting in over 413,400 pounds of seized  marijuana from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. Nearly 14 percent (42 of  309) involved cocaine, resulting in over 3,200 kilograms of seized  cocaine, and nearly 1 percent (2 of 309) involved methamphetamine,  resulting in nearly 300 kilograms of seized methamphetamine from fiscal  years 2011 through 2016.
section_title: Known Maritime Migrant Smuggling on Panga Boats and Recreational Vessels Mostly Occurred off the Florida Coast and Has Generally Increased since Fiscal Year 2011
paragraphs: Our analysis of Coast Guard data from fiscal years 2011 through 2016  showed that the majority of the known migrants being smuggled along  U.S. mainland borders using panga boats and recreational vessels were  interdicted off the Florida Coast. Specifically, Coast Guard interdicted  nearly 92 percent (1,798 of 1,963) of these migrants off the Florida Coast  (e.g., North and South Florida Straits), and over 8 percent (165 of 1,963)  on the southwest border or southern California coastline. Our analysis of  Coast Guard data also showed that the number of migrants Coast Guard  interdicted in maritime smuggling-related events on panga boats and  recreational vessels varied over time but generally increased from fiscal  years 2011 through 2016. In particular, the lowest numbers were  interdicted in fiscal year 2011 (211) and 2013 (239) and the highest  number was interdicted in fiscal year 2016 (443), as shown in figure 7.  Additionally, of the migrants interdicted from fiscal years 2011 through  2016, about 72 percent (1,374 of 1,899) were on recreational vessels and  about 28 percent (525 of 1,899) were on panga boats. In fiscal year 2016,  this trend changed and Coast Guard interdicted over half (233 of 443) of  these maritime migrants on panga boats and under half (210 of 443) on  recreational vessels.
section_title: DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risks from the Selected Smuggling Methods but Could Enhance Assessment of Maritime Risk
subsections: section_title: DHS has Taken Steps to Assess the Smuggling Risk from Cross-Border Tunnels, Ultralight Aircraft, and Maritime Vessels
paragraphs: DHS has taken steps to assess the risks from smuggling by cross-border  tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels.  Specifically, DHS has assessed the threat of these selected smuggling  methods by identifying geographic areas that have experienced greater  incidence of smuggling and transnational criminal organization smuggling  tactics. DHS has also assessed vulnerabilities by identifying capability  gaps that affect the department’s ability to address the threats posed by  the selected smuggling methods.
Cross-border tunnels. To assess the risk from cross-border tunnels,  CBP commissioned a 2010 assessment that identified areas along the  southern borders of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and western Texas  as having a high risk from tunneling activity, based on factors such as soil  composition, water table, and known tunneling activity. However, this  assessment did not analyze the risk from rudimentary tunnels,  interconnecting tunnels, or mechanically bored tunnels. CBP is currently  in the process of obtaining a tunnel risk assessment tool that is to  compute an estimated statistical likelihood for each of the four types of  illicit tunnels along the southwest border. Further, unlike the 2010  assessment, this tool is to use a web-based platform that can be updated  to allow risk to be re-assessed on an ongoing basis. CBP officials expect  this tool to be completed in June 2017.
ICE HSI and Border Patrol have also conducted intelligence assessments  to identify areas that are at a higher risk from tunneling based on factors  such as transnational criminal organization smuggling tactics and past  tunneling activity. For example, a 2014 ICE HSI intelligence report states  that transnational criminal organizations primarily use tunnels to transport  narcotics, particularly marijuana, which is an important source of profit.  Marijuana is also relatively bulky, and tunnels have the advantage of  being able to accommodate large drug loads, according to the  assessment.
CBP has also identified capability gaps that affect its ability to address  cross-border tunnels. As part of the process to acquire tunnel detection  technology, CBP sought an independent examination of factors that affect  counter tunnel capabilities using a framework that assesses the state of  doctrine; organization; training; materiel; leadership; personnel; facilities;  and regulations, grants, and standards. The analysis was issued in June  2013 and identified some gaps in tunnel technology as well as non- technological capability gaps in doctrine, among other things. CBP’s  TPMO is responsible for addressing these capability gaps, and we  discuss the status of key efforts later in this report.
Ultralight aircraft. To assess the risk from ultralight aircraft, AMO has  analyzed ultralight aircraft data and, as previously discussed, found that  the majority of ultralight incursions have occurred in Arizona and  California, with a recent uptick in activity in Texas. AMO has reported in  its General Aviation Threat Assessments that ultralight aircraft are a  flexible smuggling method and that a surge in activity could occur in any  or all of the southwest border sectors, shifting when there is an increased  law enforcement presence. To keep relevant Border Patrol agents  informed of trends and recent ultralight aircraft activity, AMO and Border  Patrol officials stationed at AMO’s AMOC, which monitors the airspace on  the border, send each Border Patrol sector along the southwest border a  monthly briefing as well as provide real-time coordination at the time of  the incursions, as discussed later in this report.
AMO has also analyzed ultralight aircraft smuggling tactics and found that  ultralight aircraft smugglers generally will not land in the United States  and instead will airdrop the narcotics load in order to quickly return to  Mexico. AMO officials explained that pilots use this method hoping to  avoid arrest. According to AMO analysis, the narcotics are generally  dropped within a couple of miles of a main road so that the smugglers can  quickly collect the narcotics and blend in with other vehicle traffic on the  road. Additionally, AMO reports that ultralight aircraft smugglers operate  like sub-contractors for transnational criminal organizations, and are  financially responsible for the narcotics they transport. As a result,  ultralight aircraft primarily transport low- to mid-grade marijuana, with an  average load size around 200 pounds, because the cost of higher value  narcotics is prohibitive and the risk from destroying a load during the air  drop is too great.
CBP has identified gaps in its air domain awareness and made finding a  technical solution a priority in 2009. CBP has efforts underway to address  these capability gaps, which we discuss later in this report. According to  CBP analysis, CBP has sufficient capabilities to respond to and resolve  detected ultralight aircraft incursions and changes in non-technical  capabilities, such as increased manpower, will not significantly enhance  its ability to address the threat posed by ultralight aircraft.
Maritime vessels. To assess the risk from maritime smuggling through  noncommercial vessels such as panga boats and recreational vessels,  Coast Guard has produced annual cross-border drug smuggling  intelligence assessments since 2014. These assessments have  consistently identified Coast Guard Districts 11, 8, and 7, which cover the  coastal borders of California and the Southeast United States from Texas  through the east coasts of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, as well  as Puerto Rico, as the primary threat area for cross-border drug  smuggling by noncommercial vessels. Further, the Coast Guard  intelligence assessments identified marijuana smuggling from Mexico to  California by panga boats as a primary threat to the U.S. mainland. In the  fiscal year 2015 assessment, the most recent available, Coast Guard  found that as with previous years, panga boat smuggling routes tended to  be hundreds of miles off shore, with intended destinations north of Los  Angeles—most often between Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo,  California—to avoid U.S. maritime law enforcement.
Coast Guard has also assessed the risk from maritime migration through  its biennial National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment. Coast Guard’s  2014 risk assessment, the most recent available, found that illegal  maritime immigration was associated with societal costs and threats to  the safety of the migrants at sea, and was ranked 16 among the 27  incident types assessed in terms of the impact and severity of risks.  Specifically, Coast Guard found that the risk from maritime migration was  lower than the risks from drug smuggling, natural disasters, and over- fishing, among others, and greater than the risks from events such as an  accidental hazardous material release or a debris or sewage discharge,  among others.
The National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment is designed to analyze  risk at a national level to help inform resource allocation decisions and  does not provide assessments at the local level or by vessel type;  however, Coast Guard and its DHS partners have also conducted  regional assessments. DHS’s Southern Border and Approaches  Campaign Plan identified maritime migration from Cuba, Hispaniola, and  the Bahamas as the primary illegal maritime migration threat, and Florida- based Coast Guard, AMO, ICE HSI, and Border Patrol have analyzed  maritime migration from these areas. For example, intelligence  assessments issued from 2015 through spring 2016 found that there has  been an increase in Cuban maritime migration that will likely continue due  to perceptions that U.S. immigration policies for Cubans will change.  Coast Guard assessments show that most Cuban migrants use  homemade vessels known as rustics, rafts, or chugs to travel to the  Florida Keys; however, transnational criminal organizations commonly  use stolen or personally owned recreational vessels to transport migrants,  according to a fiscal year 2016 AMO assessment. Coast Guard, ICE HSI,  AMO, and Border Patrol reported that another key maritime migrant  smuggling route is from the Bahamas to Southeast Florida, a trip that can  be as short as 45 nautical miles.
Coast Guard data show that maritime migrant smuggling occurs less  frequently along the California coast, but California-based Coast Guard,  AMO, ICE HSI, and Border Patrol officials we met with have also  assessed this threat. Personal watercraft, such as jet skis, were the most  commonly used vessel to smuggle migrants in the region, according to a  joint fiscal year 2015 California Coastal Region assessment, though  recreational vessels and panga boats were also used. In addition, the  assessment reports that most migrant smuggling routes along the  California coastal region are destined for locations south of Los Angeles,  California.
Coast Guard and CBP have assessed maritime security capability gaps  through DHS S&T’s Integrated Product Team process, which brings  together component leaders to identify and prioritize technological  capability gaps. As discussed later, DHS S&T has projects underway to  enhance maritime domain awareness. Border Patrol and AMO have also  initiated their own capability gap assessments to identify gaps and  technical and nontechnical solutions to address gaps across the range of  each component’s responsibilities, to include maritime security. Border  Patrol is implementing its capability gap assessment and is expected to  complete the documentation of requirements to address capability gaps in  all Border Patrol sectors in 2019, according to officials. AMO expects to  complete its capability gap assessment by the end of fiscal year 2017.
section_title: DHS Could Enhance Assessment of Maritime Smuggling Risk by Standardizing Definitions for Maritime Vessels Departmentwide
paragraphs: Coast Guard, AMO, Border Patrol, and ICE HSI all capture information on  the types of maritime vessels used for smuggling drugs and migrants to  inform their counter smuggling efforts; however, the use of different  terminology for vessels in different regions and different data systems has  impeded DHS’s ability to develop a full picture of the risks from panga  boat and recreational vessel smuggling nationwide. For example, as  shown in table 1, the definition of a panga is different in the interagency  California coastal region intelligence assessment and data system than it  is in Coast Guard’s intelligence assessments, with the former specifying  that a panga would have “multiple” outboard motors while the latter states  that a panga would have “one or two” outboard motors. Furthermore, both  definitions of pangas overlap with other categories of vessels, including  “lanchas,” which Coast Guard has defined as open-hulled vessels with  one outboard motor used in the Gulf Coast region, and “go-fasts,” which  Coast Guard has defined as an open-hulled vessel with one or more  outboard motors that can operate at 25 knots in shallow water. The panga  boats that have been used to smuggle drugs in the California coastal  region are classified as “lanchas” and “go-fast” vessels in the  government-wide CCDB and “go-fasts” in a Coast Guard report and a  national counternarcotic strategy.
Additionally, the term “go-fast” is used by Coast Guard, AMO, Border  Patrol, and ICE HSI in various assessments to describe maritime  smuggling methods in Florida. However, the go-fast smuggling in Florida  includes vessels that can blend in with the recreational boating traffic in  the area—or what the California coastal region DHS partners would term  a “pleasure craft.”
AMO officials stated that differences in terminology do not impact  operations at the local level, as officials are familiar with smuggling  methods in their area and local vernacular; however, these differences  make it difficult to synthesize information across components and regions  to get a full picture of the threats posed by panga boat and recreational  vessel smuggling nationwide. Facilitating this type of comprehensive  assessment could help better inform management resource allocation  decisions. For example, Coast Guard and AMO officials we met with in  California and Florida stated that vessel types are associated with  different smuggling tactics that require different operational response;  recreational vessels used for smuggling narcotics that blend into  legitimate recreational maritime traffic may require additional tools, such  as human intelligence and training, canines, and non-intrusive inspection  equipment to identify suspect vessels and hidden compartments. In  comparison, the officials told us that more “overt” forms of smuggling,  such as panga boats with large unconcealed, or minimally concealed  drug loads, and recreational vessels overcrowded with migrants, are  relatively easier to address since they can be detected and identified as  suspect by maritime patrol aircraft.
Differences in regional parlance and varying options in different  databases have contributed to the lack of standardized definitions and  categories of vessels, according to Coast Guard, AMO, and ICE HSI  officials. Managers of the interagency CCDB recognized the issue of  overlapping vessel definitions and are planning to revise the vessel  options to eliminate overlapping categories such as “lancha” and “panga”  under the category of “go-fast.” However, these changes will not affect  the other databases or threat assessments used by DHS. Key  considerations for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms  state that developing a common terminology can help bridge  organizational cultures to enhance and sustain interagency efforts. DHS  has also recognized the importance of common definitions and produces  an annual DHS Lexicon to define terms and reduce the possibility of  misunderstanding when communicating across the department and help  DHS develop and manage knowledge, information, and data. Coast  Guard, AMO, Border Patrol, and ICE HSI officials agreed that it would be  beneficial to have standard vessel definitions DHS-wide to enhance the  quality of data and intelligence assessments and facilitate information  sharing across agencies.
However, Coast Guard and ICE HSI officials noted that it could be  challenging to identify all relevant data systems that use vessel types and  determine how to reconcile older data with new categories. While we  recognize that this could be challenging, there are upcoming opportunities  DHS could leverage to efficiently develop and promulgate common vessel  definitions and categories. For example, once changes to CCDB vessel  categories are finalized, relevant DHS components could consider  whether these vessel categories will meet their needs. Additionally, in the  next year DHS plans to draft a new Small Vessel Security Strategy to  address the risks that terrorists will use small vessels for transportation or  an attack, which could be used as a forum for developing standard  definitions for the various types of small vessels for inclusion in the DHS  Lexicon and use in future threat assessments. If updating all databases  proves to be difficult or costly, components could, for example, create  common terminology by documenting a crosswalk that demonstrates the  relationship between their vessel categories and established DHS-wide  vessel definitions. By standardizing definitions of panga boats and  recreational vessels in the DHS Lexicon for use in future threat  assessments, DHS would be better able to leverage its threat  assessments to develop a clearer and more comprehensive picture of the  threats posed by these maritime smuggling methods across the nation.  Having a complete picture of these maritime smuggling threats could, in  turn, help better inform management decisions, including resource  allocation decisions.
section_title: DHS Coordinates Among Partners and Uses Technology to Address the Selected Smuggling Methods, but Could Strengthen its Efforts
subsections: section_title: DHS Uses Various Coordination Mechanisms to Address Smuggling by Cross-Border Tunnels, Ultralight Aircraft, and the Selected Maritime Methods
paragraphs: DHS components have established various coordination mechanisms to  address smuggling by cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga  boats, and recreational maritime vessels, and to improve coordination  among federal, state, and local partners. As previously discussed, in 2015  DHS established a Border Security Integrated Product Team composed  of representatives from DHS S&T, CBP, ICE, and Coast Guard to identify  technology gaps and prioritize research and development efforts for  enhancing border security. We discuss research and development  projects that address the selected smuggling methods later in this report.  In addition, DHS has established coordination mechanisms that  specifically target the selected smuggling methods.
Cross-border tunnels. DHS has established two interagency Border  Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) Tunnel Task Forces to conduct  investigations into cross-border tunnel incursions. These Tunnel Task  Forces are located in San Ysidro, California, and Nogales, Arizona, within  the two Border Patrol sectors with the highest number of illicit cross- border tunnels found. Participants in the task forces include Border  Patrol, ICE HSI, and the Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement  Administration, among others. State and local law enforcement officials  sometimes provide additional support during a tunnel investigation. For  instance, state and local police will, at times, help provide personnel to  surveil or search a warehouse suspected of housing a tunnel exit. In  addition to participating in the interagency Tunnel Task Force, Border  Patrol established a Western Corridor Tunnel Interdiction Group in  California to patrol the subterranean drainage infrastructure to locate,  map, and monitor interconnected tunnels. Also, Border Patrol and ICE  officials in other sectors where tunnels pose threats have established  informal task forces and partnerships to facilitate information sharing and  leverage intelligence and resources on counter tunnel efforts. For  instance, Border Patrol and ICE HSI officials in El Centro, California,  stated they have monthly meetings to discuss trends and share  information.
DHS further coordinates with other federal partners, such as DOD, to  identify common tunnel requirements, test tunnel technologies, and  exchange tunnel-related information. For instance, DHS officials  participate in annual meetings led by the DOD Combating Terrorism  Technical Support Office to discuss subterranean trends, developments,  requirements, new and emerging technologies, and build relationships.  Additionally, Border Patrol officials in Nogales, Arizona, coordinate with  the DOD’s Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office and  Asymmetric Warfare Group to test tunnel technology and operational  scenarios in tunnels.
Ultralight aircraft. AMO’s AMOC surveils border airspace for ultralight  aircraft incursions and works with AMO and Border Patrol agents in the  field to interdict ultralight aircraft drug loads and crews. Currently,  AMOC’s Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System can help detect  ultralight aircraft. AMOC officials stated they can manually monitor  movement patterns on border airspace radar feeds and look for indicators  of ultralight activity. When AMOC officials detect a possible ultralight  incursion, they then call the relevant Border Patrol and ICE HSI stations.  Conversely, if Border Patrol agents or another federal law enforcement  partner suspects a possible ultralight aircraft incursion, they call AMOC in  order to confirm detection on radar. Border Patrol and ICE HSI  representatives stationed at AMOC stated that their co-location further  facilitates interagency coordination. AMO and Border Patrol officials noted  transnational criminal organizations have employed counter-measures to  thwart their efforts. For example, transnational criminal organizations use  drones and scouts to conduct counter-surveillance. In order to help  mitigate the challenges, select Border Patrol sectors and ICE HSI field  offices created ad hoc coordination mechanisms and operations to  partner and better focus resources when the threat posed by ultralight  aircraft is high in their areas of responsibility. These sectors and offices  also established tip lines for the general public to report suspicious air  activity and instruct their agents on ultralight detection methods.
DHS also coordinates with DOD to share information related to aerial  incursions, identify technical solutions, and coordinate assets to support  interdiction efforts. For example, DHS leverages DOD as well as Federal  Aviation Administration radars to feed into Air and Marine Operations  Surveillance System. Conversely, AMOC officials stated that AMOC has  also provided a number of DOD entities access to the Air and Marine  Operations Surveillance System, to help enhance their domain  awareness and identify suspicious targets.
Maritime vessels. In 2011, DHS established Regional Coordinating  Mechanisms (RECOM) to coordinate interagency operations and avoid  duplicative efforts to address U.S. mainland threats in the maritime  domain, including panga boats and recreational vessels. There are  RECOMs in California, Florida, and Texas, addressing the primary threat  areas of maritime smuggling. Participants include the Coast Guard, CBP  AMO and Border Patrol, ICE HSI, the U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and may  also include state and local law enforcement. To address maritime  smuggling, RECOM partners host joint teleconferences to create  interagency interdiction plans, coordinate asset deployment and  schedules to de-conflict missions, and discuss post-interdiction  prosecution of migrant cases. RECOMs also serve to share information  and intelligence on the threats posed by maritime smuggling and trends  among partners. While DHS component officials identified some  challenges in addressing maritime smuggling, component officials also  reported that the RECOMs help mitigate challenges. For example, DHS  component officials noted the vastness of the maritime environment  precludes DHS officials from having full awareness of the presence of  maritime vessels, including panga boats and recreational vessels.
However, the RECOMs coordinate and leverage each partner’s resources  in order to maximize assets and expand coverage. Additionally, Coast  Guard and AMO perform routine patrols on aerial and marine assets to  monitor potential smuggling routes, conduct public outreach at marinas  regarding smuggling, surveil for transnational criminal organization  scouts, and perform random searches of recreational vessels with  canines. Coast Guard officials indicated the Federal Emergency  Management Agency’s Operation Stonegarden grants have been  instrumental in involving state and local law enforcement agencies in  coastal border security operations. For example, Operation  Stonegarden local law enforcement partners helped the San Francisco  RECOM interdict 10 subjects involved in a panga boat landing in 2015.
RECOMs also conduct maritime smuggling investigations. For example,  the San Diego BEST Marine Task Force is the investigative entity for the  San Diego RECOM. Participants in the Marine Task Force include ICE  HSI, Border Patrol, AMO, Coast Guard’s Investigative Service, San Diego  Harbor Police, San Diego Sheriff’s Department, and the California Army  National Guard.
As with cross-border tunnels and ultralight aircraft, DHS components also  coordinate with DOD to share information and leverage technical  solutions for addressing maritime smuggling. For example, DHS  components and DOD share some cross-border drug removal data, in  order to increase domain awareness. Additionally, DHS coordinates with  DOD to address maritime smuggling in the transit zone through the Joint  Interagency Task Force South—a national task force that facilitates  international and interagency interdiction of illicit maritime trafficking. Joint  Interagency Task Force South officials told us the task force primarily  operates in the transit zone rather than along U.S. mainland borders due  to the large quantities of narcotics being moved from source countries  through the transit zone.
section_title: DHS Could Enhance its Collaboration Efforts to Address Cross-Border Tunnels with More Centralized Leadership and Guidance
paragraphs: DHS’s approach to countering cross-border tunnels centers on  collaboration to leverage the efforts of multiple agencies; however, no  comprehensive department-level standard operating procedures have  been established to provide strategic guidance and facilitate information  sharing departmentwide. As previously discussed, ICE is the primary  agency responsible for tunnel investigations, and CBP is responsible for  tunnel interdiction and remediation. Both ICE and CBP have designated  an authority within their agency for counter-tunnel responsibilities.  Specifically, ICE HSI has designated a Unit Chief in its Contraband  Smuggling Unit as responsible for oversight and coordination of ICE  tunnel investigations at the headquarters-level, among other things. CBP  designated Border Patrol as the primary point of contact for tunnels within  CBP in 2010, and tasked it with establishing standardized detection and  reporting procedures for CBP entities. CBP later formed the Tunnel  Program Management Office (TPMO) in 2013 to serve as CBP’s  centralized coordination point for addressing tunnels. However, as of  November 2016, neither of these ICE or CBP authorities had established  standard operating procedures guiding how agencies should individually  or collectively address tunnels used for smuggling. A tunnel capability gap  assessment commissioned by CBP in 2013 found that while standard  operating procedures existed in some sectors, CBP did not have an  accepted set of tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as best  practices and tunnel activity indicators. The ICE-led BEST Tunnel Task  Forces also do not have documented standard operating procedures for  addressing tunnels.
In studies, CBP and ICE have identified the absence of standard  operating procedures as a challenge. For example, the CBP capability  gap assessment found that DHS personnel located in different areas had  inconsistent knowledge of the primary methods for addressing tunnels  and that selected Border Patrol personnel conducting tunnel prediction  operations may not have access to all pertinent information.
During the course of our audit work, we further found that establishing  standard operating procedures could strengthen DHS’s counter-tunnel  efforts. Specifically, we found that not all officials addressing cross-border  tunnels were aware of—and thus not accessing—all relevant DHS  systems or offices with tunnel information. For example, ICE HSI officials  we met with at one location were unaware of the existing TPMO or any  national tunnel office. Further, TPMO, ICE HSI, and Border Patrol officials  told us that standard operating procedures for tunnels could be beneficial.  For example, ICE HSI and Border Patrol officials from three different  sectors indicated a national-level office could help support counter-tunnel  efforts by providing guidance, training, and strategic-level insight on  tunnels. For instance, ICE HSI officials from one sector said it would be  helpful to have guidance on detecting different types of tunnels and  different investigative techniques for detecting tunnels used across  sectors.
In recognition of these issues, both the CBP and ICE assessments  recommended that DHS establish standard operating procedures for  addressing tunnels in order to formalize methods and enhance  information sharing for operational coordination. CBP accepted the CBP  capability gap assessment’s recommendation and tasked the TPMO with  leading the effort to provide strategic-level guidance and direction for CBP  counter-tunnel efforts. However, according to the Assistant Chief who  leads the TPMO, it has not yet developed standard operating procedures  due to lack of personnel and resources. According to the ICE HSI Unit  Chief responsible for oversight and coordination of ICE tunnel  investigations, no standard operating procedures could be drafted that  would address the needs of specific locales due to the different  operational areas. Additionally, both the TPMO and ICE HSI officials at  the headquarters-level stated that establishing standard operating  procedures is unnecessary because current coordination is effective and  CBP and ICE have general memoranda of understanding from 2004 and  2006 that govern their coordination. While we recognize there are  different types of tunnel threats in varying geographic environments and  that CBP and ICE coordinate to address tunnels, counter-tunnel standard  operating procedures could include best practices and procedures  applicable to all sectors—such as procedures for reporting and accessing  information on tunnels—as well as key differentiated information to  account for the distinct operational areas. Further, CBP and ICE  assessments have recommended establishing standard operating  procedures for counter-tunnel efforts and the general CBP-ICE  memoranda of understanding do not speak specifically to counter-tunnel  coordination procedures.
Additionally, the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG)  recommended in a 2012 report that DHS designate an authority to  provide leadership, strategy and coordination of DHS counter-tunnel  efforts across DHS components. The OIG identified the lack of a  department-level focal point for tunnels as a concern and stated that it  increased the risk of DHS not achieving its goal of disrupting criminal  organizations that engage in cross-border smuggling. As an example, the  DHS OIG reported that there were not sufficient policies or procedures in  place to ensure that when acquiring tunnel detection technology, CBP  would take into account ICE HSI investigative requirements, such as the  need for covert use so as to not alert criminals to the presence of law  enforcement. At the time, CBP and ICE stated they would designate a co- chaired committee to satisfy the recommendation. DHS approved this  decision in February 2013. However, according to the TPMO, the co- chaired committee has never convened, nor has it had the need to take  action. The ICE HSI Unit Chief responsible for tunnel coordination and  oversight was unaware of the existence of the committee.
Convening this CBP-ICE committee to establish standard operating  procedures could help provide strategic guidance that addresses the  complexity of the threats posed by cross-border tunnels and ensure  information is shared among the range of agencies involved. Once  convened, this committee could also take the lead on other strategic  counter-tunnel efforts, such as developing training. Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement control  activities, such as policies, to help achieve objectives and ensure  accountability for stewardship of government resources. Additionally,  these standards state that control activities should be documented in, for  example, management directives, administrative policies, or operating  manuals. Leadership is a key feature for successful interagency  collaboration, and we have previously reported that it is often beneficial to  designate one lead in order to centralize accountability and expedite  decision making. We have also previously reported that establishing a  focal point with sufficient time, responsibility, authority, and resources can  help ensure successful implementation of complex interagency and  intergovernmental undertakings. While developing standard operating  procedures for detecting, identifying, and addressing cross-border tunnels  may require some investment of resources, having such standardized  procedures could reduce resource requirements over time by increasing  the efficiency of counter-tunnel efforts by formalizing and enhancing  information sharing and establishing protocols. Furthermore, according to  the tunnel capability gap assessment, having standard operating  procedures reduces the likelihood of gaps or conflict in roles and  responsibilities among staff, and minimizes the likelihood that information  and partnerships may be lost during personnel changes.
section_title: DHS Employs Various Technologies to Address Smuggling by Cross- Border Tunnels, Ultralight Aircraft, and the Selected Maritime Methods
paragraphs: DHS currently uses multiple existing technological solutions and is  researching additional technologies to address smuggling by cross-border  tunnels, ultralight aircraft, and the selected maritime methods.
Cross-border tunnels. DHS initiated a Cross-Border Tunnel Threat  program to acquire tunnel detection technology in 2012 and is currently  completing an analysis of alternatives to evaluate different technology  options. CBP’s preliminary concept of operations for tunnel detection  technology states that detection capability is required in border  environments that vary from urban, to coastal, to desert, to rugged,  mountainous terrain. According to CBP officials, completion of the  analysis of alternatives has been delayed as of November 2016 due to a  number of reasons, including delays in obtaining security clearances for  the contractor. CBP officials are currently determining new acquisition  timeframes. In the meantime, DHS is leveraging multiple existing tunnel  technologies.
DHS S&T is also in the process of developing additional technologies for  predicting, detecting, tracking, and interdicting cross-border tunnels, but  the projects are in the research and development phase. For example,  DHS S&T is developing technology to determine how long ago a  clandestine tunnel was built and infer the types of contraband and  number of people that may have gone through the tunnel over that period  of time. Appendix II provides more details on potential tunnel technology  projects being researched and developed.
Ultralight aircraft. AMO and Border Patrol are using existing radar and  surveillance camera technology, including DOD and Federal Aviation  Administration radars, the Tethered Aerostat Radar System, Remote  Video Surveillance Systems, Integrated Fixed Towers, and Mobile  Surveillance Capabilities, to detect and track ultralight aircraft. The  Tethered Aerostat Radar System has been helpful in detecting some  ultralight incursions, according to AMO and Border Patrol officials we  interviewed.
Maritime vessels. Coast Guard and AMO use both marine and aerial  assets equipped with sensors, such as cameras and forward looking  infrared radar, for surveillance and targeted interdictions of maritime  vessels used for smuggling, including panga boats and recreational  vessels. They also employ existing technologies, such as X-ray machines  to identify hidden compartments of maritime vessels. Additionally, DHS  leverages existing DOD maritime technology, such as a system called  Minotaur, which integrates and processes sensor data from multiple  sources for surveillance aircraft.
DHS S&T is in the process of developing additional technologies to be  used for predicting, detecting, tracking, and interdicting illicit maritime  vessels, but the technologies are not yet deployed. For example, DHS  S&T is developing the Integrated Maritime Domain Enterprise and  Coastal Surveillance System software to integrate multiple data systems  and create new maritime security common operating data to share across  DHS components. Appendix II provides more details on research and  development technology projects.
section_title: CBP Could Better Meet Operational Needs and Ensure Effective Use of Resources by Comprehensively Assessing Ultralight Technology Investments
paragraphs: CBP is considering various technological solutions to address ultralight  aircraft, but does not have a plan to assess how the solutions will meet its  operational needs. After Border Patrol identified ultralight aircraft  incursions as a high priority threat, it requested assistance from CBP in  September 2009 to identify a technology solution to aid in the detection  and interdiction of ultralights. In response, CBP initiated the Ultralight  Aircraft Detection acquisition program to acquire a technological solution.  In 2011, CBP formalized the operational need for an Ultralight Aircraft  Detection program in an Operational Needs Statement, in which it  justified its need for the technology by referring the reader to capability  gaps it had documented in a Mission Needs Statement for Small Dark  Aircraft-Low Flying Aircraft Detection, an ongoing research and  development project for technology to address the threats posed by  ultralight aircraft and other low-flying aircraft. CBP deployed a limited  number of Ultralight Aircraft Detection systems to detect ultralight aircraft  along both the southern and northern borders. In June 2015, CBP, in  accordance with recommendations from AMO and Border Patrol, ceased  operational use of the Ultralight Aircraft Detection systems. CBP officials  explained that a quick buy acquisition strategy and limited institutional  technical knowledge contributed to poorly defined requirements and the  acquisition of the Ultralight Aircraft Detection radar with limited capability.
In 2015, CBP began a technology demonstration to assess the ability of  DOD’s Lightweight Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar systems to aid  in the detection of low-flying aircraft along the southwest border. Once  again, CBP used the Small Dark Aircraft-Low Flying Aircraft Detection  Mission Needs Statement to describe the operational needs that  Lightweight Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar was intended to  address. The three ultralight aircraft technological solutions are further  described in Table 2.
Although CBP used the same mission needs statement for the three  projects, CBP officials stated that CBP is demonstrating separate  ultralight aircraft technological solutions to address different geographic  areas. For example, CBP officials told us the Small Dark Aircraft-Low  Flying Aircraft Detection technology demonstration is geared towards  identifying a technical solution for addressing aerial smuggling on the  northern border, which is more mountainous and remote, and the  Ultralight Aircraft Detection program was meant to detect and track  ultralight aircraft along the southern border, which has a relatively flatter  terrain. While we recognize that there may need to be multiple technical  solutions to address the threats posed by ultralight aircraft and account  for operational differences, such as terrain and manpower, CBP has not  assessed and documented how the technological solutions will fully  address Border Patrol and AMO’s operational needs to detect ultralight  aircraft in all operational environments or how these solutions fit into the  broader aerial domain awareness efforts. While the Ultralight Aircraft  Detection program is no longer being pursued, there are a number of  efforts that could be used to address ultralight aircraft smuggling. Both the  Small Dark Aircraft-Low Flying Aircraft Detection and Lightweight  Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar are still being demonstrated and  considered as potential solutions to acquire to address ultralight aircraft.  Furthermore, DHS S&T plans to extend the Small Dark Aircraft-Low  Flying Aircraft Detection project to the southern border to help detect and  track low-flying aircraft. Additionally, CBP intends to replace or modernize  the Tethered Aerostat Radar System and states in its acquisition  documentation that it is seeking alternative capabilities to improve target  detection of low flying aircraft, among other things. DHS has also  identified small unmanned aerial systems as an emerging smuggling  method and CBP is starting to look for technological solutions to address  this new threat that potentially could also detect ultralight aircraft.
We have previously identified the need for agencies to evaluate  alternatives by considering the costs and benefits of different measures  and to document management’s decisions and the rationale for the  investment of resources. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government states that significant events—including  decisions—need to be clearly documented, and the documentation  should be readily available for examination. There are multiple ongoing  analytical efforts that CBP could leverage to analyze how the alternative  technologies for detecting and tracking ultralight aircraft address  operational needs in various environments and the associated costs and  benefits. For example, AMO and John Hopkins University Applied  Physics Laboratory are leading the development of a formal Capability  Gap Assessment process to gather mission needs and elicit capability  gaps in both the air and maritime domains from the field; AMO and CBP’s  Office of Acquisition are jointly developing a comprehensive capabilities  analysis report for aerial domain awareness; and AMO and DHS S&T  have a Value Focused Modeling project to estimate return on investment  of AMOC’s existing radars and sensor technologies. CBP officials  acknowledged the benefit of analyzing alternatives and plan to analyze  the costs and benefits of some alternatives (e.g., existing Tethered  Aerostat Radar Systems) as part of the process to determine whether or  not to acquire the Small Dark Aircraft-Low Flying Aircraft Detection  system. However, they did not say that this analysis would include all  alternative approaches for addressing ultralight aircraft—such as  modernized Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems, the Lightweight  Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar, or any solutions DHS S&T is  developing.
CBP could be better positioned to use its resources more effectively and  ensure the technological solutions selected will fully meet operational  needs prior to making investment decisions by assessing and  documenting how the ongoing technology demonstrations and any other  potential technological solutions for detecting and tracking ultralight  aircraft will fully address operational needs. Documenting such  assessments, consistent with standards for internal control, prior to  making investment decisions would also enhance transparency by  providing stakeholders visibility into rationales for investment decisions  over time.
section_title: Establishing and Monitoring Performance Measures Could Allow DHS to Better Assess Effectiveness of Efforts to Address the Selected Smuggling Methods
paragraphs: DHS has established or is in the process of establishing high-level  smuggling-related performance measures and DHS components collect  data regarding the prevalence of cross-border tunnel, ultralight aircraft  and selected maritime smuggling, but DHS has not assessed the  effectiveness of its efforts specific to addressing these smuggling  methods. With respect to high-level smuggling-related performance  measures, DHS has, for example, established a performance measure  through which it monitors and reports on the percentage of ICE’s drug  investigations resulting in the disruption or dismantlement of high-threat  transnational drug trafficking organizations or individuals in its Annual  Performance Report. This performance measure includes data on any  investigations in which smugglers leveraged cross-border tunnels,  ultralight aircrafts, panga boats or recreational vessels, but does not  separately assess investigative performance by these conveyances.  Additionally, CBP AMO is in the process of developing high-level  measures related to interdiction, investigation, and domain awareness.  These high-level performance measures may include performance and  capabilities relevant to ultralight aircraft incursions such as the amount of  radar coverage for detecting a range of aerial threats within a given  volume of airspace along the southwest border but will not be specific to  ultralight aircraft, according to these officials. Furthermore, DHS  established performance measures through which Coast Guard reports  on maritime migrant interdiction effectiveness and cocaine removal rates  in the transit zone, but there is not a unified effort among all DHS  components responsible for maritime security to jointly assess their  performance to address panga boat and recreational vessel maritime  smuggling at U.S. mainland borders. Additionally, DHS components  collect various data regarding the prevalence of cross-border tunnel,  ultralight aircraft and selected maritime smuggling methods, but have not  established performance measures and associated targets to assess the  effectiveness of their efforts specific to addressing cross-border tunnels,  ultralight aircraft, or non-traditional maritime threats, as described below.
Cross-border tunnels. Border Patrol’s TPMO tracks and reports  DHS’s official tunnel data such as the number, location, type, and  dimensions of cross-border tunnels to Congress and plans to use this  information in its new threat assessments tool discussed earlier in this  report. Similarly, the ICE HSI Unit Chief responsible for tunnel  coordination and oversight stated that ICE also collects data on cross- border tunnels. However, Border Patrol and ICE HSI have not used  tunnel-related information to assess their collective performance to,  for example, help identify effective approaches to discover tunnels,  including technologies, investigative approaches, or patrols.
Ultralight aircraft. CBP AMO collects various data regarding  ultralight aircraft incursions, and has developed performance  measures specific to its efforts to address ultralight aircraft, but these  measures do not have targets that would allow it to gauge progress  toward goals. Specifically, CBP AMO collects ultralight data regarding  the number and location of suspected ultralight aircraft incursions,  how the ultralight aircraft was detected (i.e., by technology such as  ground or aerostat radars, or reported by an individual who heard or  saw the ultralight aircraft activity), if a law enforcement response was  coordinated, and if there was an arrest or seizure. AMOC uses these  data to track certain performance measures specific to its efforts to  address ultralight aircraft, such as the percent of detected ultralight  aircraft incursions where AMOC coordinated a law enforcement  response and the percent of ultralight incursions that resulted in a  violation (e.g., an arrest or seizure). For example, in fiscal year 2015,  AMOC reported that it coordinated a law enforcement response for 94  percent of the suspect ultralight aircraft incursions and that 32 percent  of the suspect ultralight aircraft incursions resulted in a violation.  However, AMO and Border Patrol have not assessed their  performance against targets in order to determine if these rates  represent a satisfactory level of performance, given the level of risk  and investment.
Maritime vessels. Coast Guard and the RECOMs collect data on  drug and migrant interdiction by fiscal year and vessel type as well as  the number of arrests and the outcome of the cases prosecuted.  However, data collection efforts are not consistent across RECOMs  and there are no established performance measures and targets, to  monitor, for example, how maritime smuggling events are identified  and detected, the number or percent of detected smuggling events  that resulted in interdictions, or the number of interdictions that  resulted in prosecutions.
DHS component officials provided a variety of reasons why they have not  established and monitored performance measures and targets to assess  effectiveness of DHS efforts to address cross-border tunnel, ultralight  aircraft and selected maritime smuggling, such as limited resources,  difficulty measuring unknown information, limitations of measures focused  on specific smuggling methods, and difficulty of jointly establishing and  monitoring performance among DHS components. For example,  according to the Border Patrol TPMO Assistant Chief, the office has not  established performance measures due to its previously discussed limited  resources and the difficulty of fully measuring the effectiveness of counter  tunnel efforts. In particular, Border Patrol officials told us that measuring  the performance of activities which detect and deter threats to the United  States where the universe of the total prevalence of smuggling is  unknown—as with the case of cross-border tunnels—is difficult.  Furthermore, ICE HSI and CBP AMO officials reported that performance  measures which focus on a particular smuggling method or conveyance  would not be the best measure of their efforts to combat smuggling. For  example, AMO officials reported that higher-level measures linked to  AMO’s goals and objectives can better address the full range of  smuggling methods. Additionally, CBP and ICE officials told us that jointly  establishing and monitoring performance measures and targets is difficult  due to the component’s different missions. For example, a performance  measure relevant to CBP, such as the number of miles of border under  surveillance for tunnels, would not be relevant to ICE.
We recognize the challenges associated with resource constraints and  establishing performance measures, as well as the value of higher level  performance measures; however, agency resources are being invested to  address cross-border tunnel, ultralight aircraft, and selected maritime  smuggling methods and without some type of performance measurement,  DHS does not have reasonable assurance that efforts to address these  selected smuggling methods are effective. DHS already collects data on  these selected smuggling threats that could be leveraged to mitigate the  resources needed to measure performance. Additionally, DHS could  leverage other DHS efforts as avenues to establish performance  measures. For example, DHS could utilize the planned Maritime Security  Coordination Working Group to establish performance measures and  targets related to assessing the effectiveness of efforts to address panga  boats and recreational vessels. Further, even if it is not possible to  collect certain data, such as the full universe of cross-border tunnels,  GAO, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Performance  Improvement Council’s Law Enforcement Measures Working Group—an  interagency effort to address issues related to law enforcement  performance measures chaired by the Office of Management and  Budget—have previously reported that agencies can use proxy measures  to determine how well a program is functioning. These proxy measures  should be closely tied to the desired outcome—preventing smuggling  through cross-border tunnels—and could include measures such as the  percent of tunnels discovered prior to completion or the percent of tunnels  discovered prior to being operational. In addition, by assessing the  performance for each selected smuggling method, DHS could obtain  valuable information on the relative risks posed by these smuggling  methods as compared to other methods to capture the overall smuggling  threat picture and better inform resource allocation decisions for  addressing smuggling. Moreover, assessing performance information  across components could help components determine cost-effective  means for improving performance. For example, if CBP established and  monitored performance measures related to subterranean domain  awareness, both ICE HSI and Border Patrol could use this information to  inform investigations and patrol operations.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  regular monitoring is needed to assess the quality of performance over  time, and information should be communicated to management to  achieve its objectives and ensure any issues are resolved. We have  previously reported that performance measures are important  management tools that can be used by individual programs or initiatives  and that performance measures should have quantifiable, numerical  targets or other measurable values to allow for easier comparison with  actual performance. Furthermore, interagency collaboration best  practices call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to  identify areas for improvement. By working together to establish  performance measures and regularly monitor performance against  targets, managers could obtain valuable information on successful  approaches and areas that could be improved to help ensure that both  technology investments and operational responses to address cross- border tunnel, ultralight aircraft, and selected maritime smuggling are  effective.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As transnational criminal organizations have adapted their techniques to  smuggle drugs and humans through cross-border tunnels, ultralight  aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels to evade detection, it is  vital that DHS respond accordingly in its border security enforcement  efforts. DHS has taken steps to assess and address the risk posed by  these smuggling methods, but opportunities exist to ensure these efforts  are effective and that managers and stakeholders have information  needed to make decisions. In particular, DHS would be better able to  develop a more comprehensive picture of the threats posed by panga  boats and recreational vessels across the nation and leverage its  maritime threat assessments to make decisions by standardizing vessel  definitions departmentwide in the DHS Lexicon for use in future threat  assessments. Additionally, convening the CBP-ICE committee to  establish standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border  tunnels could help provide strategic guidance that addresses the  complexity of the threats posed by cross-border tunnels and ensure  information is shared among the range of agencies involved.
DHS has also invested in technology to help detect and track  subterranean, aerial, and maritime smuggling, including various  technologies to help detect and track ultralight aircraft; however, CBP has  not assessed and documented how all of the alternative ultralight aircraft  technical solutions being considered will fully address operational  requirements or the costs and benefits associated with different  approaches. This type of analysis could help better position CBP to use  its resources more effectively and ensure that technology solutions  selected will fully meet operational needs prior to making investment  decisions. Furthermore, DHS has not assessed its performance in  addressing any of the selected smuggling methods. By establishing  performance measures and regularly monitoring performance against  targets, managers could obtain valuable information on successful  approaches and areas that could be improved to help ensure that both  technology investments and operational responses to address smuggling  through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and  recreational vessels are effective.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border  tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are  effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information  needed to make decisions, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland  Security take the following six actions:  1.  develop standardized, departmentwide definitions for maritime  vessels used for smuggling in the DHS Lexicon;  2.  direct the CBP-ICE tunnel committee to convene and establish  standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels,  including procedures for sharing information;  3.  direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess and document how the  alternative technological solutions being considered will fully meet  operational needs related to ultralight aircraft;  4.  direct the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE to jointly  establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to  cross-border tunnels;  5.  direct the Commissioner of CBP to establish and monitor performance  targets related to ultralight aircraft; and  6.  direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commissioner of CBP,  and the Director of ICE to establish and monitor RECOM performance  measures and targets related to panga boat and recreational vessel  smuggling.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOD for their review and  comment. DHS provided written comments, which are summarized below  and reproduced in full in appendix III, and DOD did not provide written  comments. DHS concurred with four of the six recommendations in the  report and described actions underway or planned to address them. DHS  did not concur with two recommendations in the report. DHS also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
With regard to the first recommendation, that DHS develop definitions for  maritime vessels used for smuggling in the DHS Lexicon, DHS concurred  and described planned actions to address the recommendation.  According to DHS, in March 2017, the DHS Lexicon Program created a  terminology working group composed of Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and  other DHS maritime subject matter experts to address terminology and  definition issues identified in our report. The terminology and definitions  would then be published for use across the department. If implemented  effectively, these actions should address the intent of the  recommendation.
With regard to the second recommendation, that the CBP-ICE tunnel  committee convene and establish standard operating procedures for  addressing cross-border tunnels, DHS did not concur. DHS noted that  there are memoranda of understanding between CBP and ICE outlining  how they work together and share information as well as component- specific procedures in place at the local sector level that DHS believes  constitute the procedures we recommended. In addition, DHS cited the  establishment of multi-agency BEST Tunnel Task Forces in the areas at  the highest risk for cross-border tunnel activity as helping to ensure  collaboration and information sharing. However, CBP and ICE agreed  that there may be benefits from strengthening existing operating  procedures and stated that they plan to review, revise, and potentially  consolidate procedures as they deem appropriate.
We continue to believe that establishing national-level, joint CBP-ICE  standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels could  help ensure that information is shared by CBP and ICE across all  locations and minimize the likelihood that information and partnerships  are lost during personnel changes. As discussed in this report, the  memoranda of understanding between CBP and ICE do not speak  specifically to counter-tunnel coordination procedures. Additionally, as we  reported, both CBP and ICE have completed studies that identified the  absence of standard operating procedures as a challenge and  recommended the establishment of departmental standard operating  procedures. During the course of our audit work, we further found that not  all officials addressing cross-border tunnels were aware of relevant  information systems or the TPMO, and ICE HSI and Border Patrol  officials from three different sectors indicated additional guidance,  training, and strategic-level insights would be helpful. While we agree that  strengthening existing operating procedures could be helpful, not all  sectors or relevant officials may benefit without the establishment of  standard operating procedures that apply nationwide. For example, as  noted in our report, the BEST Tunnel Task Forces do not currently have  documented standard operating procedures for addressing tunnels.
Establishing departmental standard operating procedures for tunnels  could help ensure that all relevant ICE and CBP officials have guidance  on how to address tunnels.
With regard to the third recommendation, that CBP assess and document  how alternative technological solutions being considered will fully meet  operational needs related to ultralight aircraft, DHS concurred. DHS  stated that AMO is developing a Capability Analysis Report, a Mission  Need Statement, and a Concept of Operations for air domain awareness  that will result in validated requirements for ultralight aircraft, among other  threats. In addition, DHS stated that subsequent to these efforts, it will  prepare operational requirements documents that will specify how  technological solutions will meet the requirements. If implemented  effectively, these actions should address the intent of the  recommendation.
With regard to the fourth recommendation, that CBP and ICE jointly  establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to  cross-border tunnels, DHS concurred and stated that CBP and ICE will  work together to harmonize performance data collection efforts and  develop performance measures and targets. However, DHS stated that it  would be premature to establish measures and targets prior to making  tunnel detection technology acquisition and deployment decisions, and  therefore will wait to develop them until it has addressed its technology  challenges. We believe that DHS could benefit from establishing some  performance measures and targets prior to making technology decisions.  As discussed in this report, DHS initiated a program to acquire tunnel  detection technology in 2012 and has an analysis of alternatives to  evaluate different technology options underway, but this analysis has  been delayed and CBP has not yet determined new time frames. Given  that CBP has been working to acquire additional tunnel detection  technology for several years and time frames for its acquisition have not  been determined, we believe that establishing some measures and  targets in the interim could help inform DHS’s current efforts to address  cross-border tunnels and provide insights relevant to its tunnel detection  technology acquisition decisions. Once fully implemented, DHS’s planned  actions should address the intent of the recommendation.
With regard to the fifth recommendation, that CBP establish and monitor  performance targets related to ultralight aircraft, DHS concurred and  stated that CBP’s AMO and Border Patrol are developing a joint  performance measure and targets for interdicting ultralight aircraft.  According to DHS, AMO and Border Patrol plan to document how the  measure will be defined and validate the data reporting process. If  implemented effectively, these actions should address the intent of the  recommendation.
With regard to the sixth recommendation, that Coast Guard, CBP, and  ICE establish and monitor RECOM performance measures and targets  related to panga boat and recreational vessel smuggling, DHS did not  concur. DHS stated that it believes that by establishing common  terminology to address our first recommendation, the RECOMs will have  more reliable, usable analyses to inform their maritime interdiction efforts.  However, it did not believe that performance measures and targets  related to smuggling by panga boats would provide the most useful  strategic assessment of operations to prevent all illicit trafficking,  regardless of area of operations or mode of transportation. DHS also  cited the recent creation of the DHS Office of Policy, Strategy, and Plans  that is to work with Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and other components and  offices to better evaluate the effectiveness of all operations that work to  prevent the illegal entry of goods and people into the country, as  appropriate. Additionally, DHS stated that it will continue to work with the  Office of National Drug Control Policy to create a set of enterprise-wide,  strategic-level measures of performance for drug supply reduction  activities. DHS requested that we consider this recommendation resolved  and closed.
We continue to believe that by jointly establishing performance measures  and targets related to panga boat and recreational vessel smuggling,  Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE could track valuable performance  information, such as how panga boat and recreational vessel smuggling  events are identified and detected, or the percent of these detected  smuggling events that result in interdictions, to help inform their  collaborative efforts to address maritime smuggling. We agree that  creating common terminology is a positive step; however, without  performance measures or targets, DHS does not have reasonable  assurance that its collaborative efforts and investments to counter cross- border smuggling by panga boats and recreational vessels are effective.  Similarly, we recognize the value of high level strategic performance  measures; however, these types of measures may not provide sufficiently  detailed performance information to allow DHS to identify successful  approaches to addressing smuggling by panga boats and recreational  vessels and areas for improvement. Further, performance measures and  targets related to panga boat and recreational vessel smuggling could, in  turn, better position DHS to understand the overall smuggling threat  picture and better inform resource allocation decisions for addressing  smuggling and drug supply reduction activities.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the  Defense, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available  at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the following questions:  1.  What do Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data show about  the prevalence of smuggling by cross-border tunnel, ultralight aircraft,  and selected maritime methods from fiscal years 2011 through 2016?  2.  To what extent has DHS assessed the risks from smuggling by these  methods?  3.  How has DHS addressed smuggling by these methods?  4.  To what extent has DHS assessed the results of its efforts to address  smuggling by these methods?
To address these questions, we focused our review on smuggling across  U.S. mainland borders, including coastal borders, and we selected the  following smuggling methods: cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft,  panga boats, recreational maritime vessels, and self-propelled semi- submersible and fully submersible vessels. We selected these smuggling  methods to include only those that would occur between ports of entry  through means other than overland (given our focus on subterranean,  aerial, and maritime smuggling); have been identified in strategy  documents or by senior DHS officials and DHS officials with whom we  met as a challenge or risk; and were of a magnitude that DHS had taken  steps to address them. We analyzed DHS policies, procedures, reports,  and data regarding the selected smuggling methods from fiscal years  2011 through 2016. We also conducted site visits to San Diego, El  Centro, and Riverside, California; Nogales and Yuma, Arizona; and Miami  and Key West, Florida. During these visits, we observed DHS approaches  to addressing the selected smuggling methods and interviewed cognizant  officials from U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard); U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI); and  U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol (Border  Patrol) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) about their efforts. We  selected these locations based upon a combination of factors, including  the past detected use of the selected smuggling methods and the  presence of coordinated DHS efforts to counter them in these areas. The  information gathered from our site visits is not generalizable to other  locations but provides insights into DHS’s responses to these incursions  and efforts to use risk and performance information to stop future  smuggling incidents using these methods. Additionally, we interviewed  headquarters officials from the Coast Guard; CBP’s Border Patrol, AMO,  and Office of Acquisition, the office responsible for CBP’s acquisition of  products and services; ICE HSI; and DHS’s Science and Technology  Directorate (S&T), the office responsible for leading research and  development efforts across the department, to obtain information and  perspectives on their efforts to assess and address threats posed by the  selected smuggling methods.
To determine what DHS data show about the prevalence of smuggling by  cross-border tunnel, ultralight aircraft, and the selected maritime methods,  we obtained and analyzed DHS data from fiscal years 2011 through  2016. Due to the illicit nature of smuggling, there are limitations to  identifying the total number of smuggling events. Therefore, in this report  we discuss the number of known smuggling events such as the numbers  of discovered cross-border tunnels and detected ultralight aircraft and  maritime drug and migrant smuggling events. We assessed the reliability  of these data by (1) performing electronic testing for obvious errors in  accuracy and completeness, (2) reviewing existing information about the  data and the systems that produced them, and (3) interviewing agency  officials knowledgeable about the data. Additionally, where possible, we  compared the data to similar data DHS previously reported in such  products as a Congressional report on cross-border tunnels and an AMO  management report that included data on aerial incursions. We found the  data sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting trends in the  selected smuggling methods from fiscal years 2011 through 2016.
To determine the extent to which DHS has assessed the risk from  smuggling by cross-border tunnel, ultralight aircraft, and the selected  maritime methods we analyzed Coast Guard, AMO, Border Patrol, and  ICE HSI risk, threat, and intelligence assessments. We also reviewed  CBP, DHS S&T, and Coast Guard documentation on capability gaps,  such as capability assessments and requirements documents. We  evaluated these efforts against GAO’s risk management framework and  leading practices for interagency collaboration.
To determine how DHS has addressed smuggling by the selected  methods, we analyzed DHS policies, procedures, training documents,  and documentation on developing and acquiring new technology, such as  project plans, mission needs statements, and concepts of operations. We  also interviewed officials from Border Patrol, AMO, ICE HSI and Coast  Guard to determine the extent to which they have established  mechanisms to coordinate assets and operations related to smuggling by  cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, and the selected maritime  conveyances, and associated challenges. Further, we met with  Department of Defense (DOD) officials from the offices and organizations  that have been involved in DHS efforts to address the selected smuggling  methods to determine the extent to which DHS has coordinated with DOD  to leverage any efforts or technologies. We assessed these efforts  against GAO’s leading practices for interagency collaboration and risk  management framework.
To examine the extent to which DHS has assessed the results of its  efforts to address the selected smuggling methods, we analyzed DHS  and component performance reports, threat assessments, and strategic  planning documents to determine what measures are in place to track the  effectiveness of DHS’s counter cross-border tunnel, ultralight aircraft, and  maritime smuggling efforts. We also interviewed DHS officials to  determine how they use performance information to inform decision  making. We assessed DHS’s performance monitoring efforts against  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and  performance assessment best practices.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2015 to May 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: DHS S&T Projects Related to Selected Subterranean, Aerial, and Maritime Smuggling Methods
paragraphs: A number of technology systems are being researched and developed by  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology  Directorate (S&T) to address selected subterranean, aerial, and maritime  smuggling threats. Below is an overview of these ongoing DHS S&T  projects.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Taylor Matheson (Assistant  Director), David Alexander, Chuck Bausell, Jr., Dominick Dale, Wendy  Dye, Megan Erwin, Eric Hauswirth, Kelsey Hawley, Susan Hsu, Richard  Hung, Heather May, and Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi made key contributions to  this report.