Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Progress Made on Block 2006 Missile Defense Capabilities and Oversight
Published: 2008-04-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion per year, the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) effort to develop and field a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is the largest research and development program in the Department of Defense (DOD). The program has been managed in 2-year increments, known as blocks. Block 2006, the second BMDS block, was completed in December 2007. By law, GAO annually assesses MDA's progress. This testimony is based on GAO's March 2008 report that addressed MDA's progress in (1) meeting Block 2006 goals for fielding assets, completing work within estimated cost, conducting tests, and demonstrating the performance of the overall system in the field, and (2) making managerial improvements to transparency, accountability, and oversight. GAO reviewed the assets fielded; contractor cost, schedule, and performance; and tests completed during 2007. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the charter of a new missile defense board.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In the past year, MDA has fielded additional and new assets, enhanced the capability of some existing assets, and achieved most test objectives. MDA did not meet the goals it originally set for the block. Ultimately, MDA fielded fewer assets, increased costs by about $1 billion and conducted fewer tests. Even with the cost increase, MDA deferred work to keep costs from increasing further, as some contractors overran their fiscal year 2007 budgets. Deferring work obscures the cost of the block because such work is no longer counted as part of Block 2006. The cost of the block may have been further obscured by a way of planning work used by several contractors that could underestimate the actual work completed. If more work has to be done, MDA could incur additional costs that are not yet recognized. MDA also sets goals for determining the overall performance of the BMDS. Similar to other DOD programs, MDA uses models and simulations to predict BMDS performance. GAO was unable to assess whether MDA met its overall performance goal because there have not been enough flight tests to provide a high confidence that the models and simulations accurately predict BMDS performance. Moreover, the tests that have been done do not provide enough information for DOD's independent test organization to fully assess the BMDS' suitability and effectiveness. GAO has previously reported that MDA has been given unprecedented funding and decision-making flexibility. While this flexibility has expedited BMDS fielding, it has also made MDA less accountable and transparent in its decisions than other major programs, making oversight more challenging. MDA, with some direction from Congress, has taken significant steps to address these concerns. MDA implemented a new way of defining blocks--its construct for developing and fielding BMDS increments--that should make costs more transparent. For example, under the newly-defined blocks, MDA will no longer defer work from one block to another. Accountability should also be improved as MDA will, for the first time, estimate unit costs for selected assets and report variances from those estimates. DOD also chartered a new executive board with more BMDS oversight responsibility than its predecessor. Finally, MDA will begin buying certain assets with procurement funds like other programs. This will benefit transparency and accountability, because to use procurement funding generally means that assets must be fully paid for in the year they are bought. Previously, Congress authorized MDA to pay for assets incrementally using research and development funds. Some oversight concerns remain, however. For example, MDA has not yet estimated the total cost of a block, and therefore, cannot have a block's costs independently verified--actions required of other programs to inform decisions about affordability and investment choices. However, MDA does plan to estimate block costs and have them verified at some future date. Also, the executive board faces a challenge in overseeing MDA's large technology development efforts and does not have approval authority for some key decisions made by MDA.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Missile Defense Agency’s  (MDA’s) strategy for acquiring a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)  and its progress in fielding Block 2006—its second increment of capability.
MDA has been charged with developing and fielding the BMDS, a system  expected to be capable of defending the United States, deployed troops,  friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of  flight. In fulfilling this charge, MDA placed an initial set of missile defense  components in the field in December 2005. These components are  collectively referred to as Block 2004. Recently, MDA delivered its second  increment of capability—Block 2006—which includes additional  components as well as performance enhancements.
The National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2002 and 2006  mandated that we prepare annual assessments of MDA’s ongoing cost,  schedule, testing, and performance progress. In March 2008, we issued our  report covering MDA’s progress toward achieving Block 2006 goals during  fiscal year 2007 as well as its efforts to improve transparency,  accountability, and oversight. My statement today will focus on the issues  covered in that report. We conducted this performance audit from May  2007 to March 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion annually, MDA’s BMDS is the  largest research development program in DOD’s budget. Since the 1980s,  DOD has spent more that $100 billion to develop and field the BMDS and it  estimates that continued development and fielding will require an  additional $50 billion between fiscal years 2008 and 2013.
Since 2002, MDA has worked to fulfill its mission through its development  and fielding of a diverse collection of land-, air-, sea-, and space-based  assets. These assets are developed and fielded through nine BMDS  elements and include the Airborne Laser (ABL); Aegis Ballistic Missile  Defense (Aegis BMD); BMDS Sensors; Command, Control, Battle  Management, and Communications (C2BMC); Ground-based Midcourse  Defense (GMD); Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI); Multiple Kill Vehicles  (MKV); Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); and Terminal  High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). software. In December 2007, MDA’s Director approved a new block  construct that will be the basis for all future development and fielding,  which I will discuss in more detail shortly.
To assess progress during Block 2006, we examined the accomplishments  of nine BMDS elements that MDA is developing and fielding. Our work  included examining documents such as Program Execution Reviews, test  plans and reports, production plans, and Contract Performance Reports.  We also interviewed officials within each element program office and  within MDA functional directorates. In addition, we discussed each  element’s test program and its results with DOD’s Office of the Director,  Operational Test and Evaluation. Regarding transparency, accountability,  and oversight, we held discussions with officials in MDA’s Directorate of  Business Operations to determine whether its new block structure  improved accountability and transparency of the BMDS. In addition, we  reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code to compare MDA’s current  level of accountability with federal acquisition laws. We also interviewed  officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics and DOD’s Joint Staff to discuss the oversight  role of the new Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). Additionally,  we reviewed the MDEB charter to identify the oversight responsibility of  the board.
section_title: Fielded Capability Increased, but Less than Planned at Higher Cost
paragraphs: MDA made progress in developing and fielding the BMDS during 2007.  Additional assets were fielded and/or upgraded, several tests met planned  objectives, and other development activities were conducted. On the other  hand, fewer assets were fielded than originally planned, some tests were  delayed, and the cost of the block increased by approximately $1 billion.  To stay within the revised budget despite increasing contractor costs,  MDA deferred some budgeted work to future blocks.  Such deferrals,  coupled with a planning methodology too often used by some contractors  that could obscure cost reporting, prevent us from determining the full  cost of Block 2006.  MDA was able to meet most test objectives despite  delays in several elements’ test schedules.  Neither we nor DOD could  evaluate the aggregate performance of fielded assets because flight testing  to date has not generated sufficient data. An evaluation of aggregate  performance would also have to consider that (1) some parts in fielded  interceptors identified as potentially problematic have not been replaced  yet, and (2) tests done to date do not provide enough information for  DOD’s independent test organization to fully determine if the BMDS is  suitable and effective for battle.
subsections: section_title: Fielding of Assets and Cost
paragraphs: During Block 2006, MDA increased its inventory of BMDS assets while  enhancing the system’s performance. It fielded 14 additional Ground-based  interceptors, 12 Aegis BMD missiles designed to engage more advanced  threats, 4 new Aegis BMD destroyers, 1 new Aegis BMD cruiser, and 8 Web  browsers and 1 software suite for C2BMC. In addition, MDA upgraded half  of its Aegis BMD ship fleet, successfully conducted four Aegis BMD and  two GMD intercept tests, and completed a number of ground tests to  demonstrate the capability of BMDS components.
MDA was unable to deliver all assets originally planned for Block 2006.The Sensors element was the only Block 2006 element to meet all of its  original goals set in March 2005 while the remaining elements––GMD,  Aegis BMD, C2BMC––did not meet all of their original quantity goals.  Sensors delivered a second FBX-T in January 2007 while the GMD element  fielded 14 of the 15 Ground-Based interceptors originally planned during  Block 2006. Last year, we reported that MDA delayed the partial upgrade  of the Thule early warning radar—one of GMD’s original goals-- until a full  upgrade could be accomplished.  Additionally, the Aegis BMD element  delivered 4 additional Destroyers and 1 new Cruiser as originally planned,  but delivered 12 of the 19 SM-3 missiles planned for the block. C2BMC did  not deliver two of the three software suites originally planned for Block  2006, but did provide the needed capability less expensively through Web  browsers and other techniques.
In March 2006, MDA made reductions to its block 2006 goals.  It was able in nearly all  instances to meet or exceed these revised goals. Two elements—GMD and C2BMC—were  able to exceed their revised fielding goals. In addition, the Aegis BMD element was able to  meet its revised block goals for one of its two components. The program upgraded all  planned ships, but fielded three fewer Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3s (SM-3) than planned  because the missiles were delayed into 2008 to accommodate an unanticipated requirement  to deliver three missiles to Japan.
2008 cost. Because MDA did not track the cost of the deferred work, the  agency could not make an adjustment that would have matched the cost  with the correct block.  Consequently, we were unable to determine the  full cost of Block 2006.
Another reason why it is difficult to determine the actual cost of Block  2006 is a planning methodology too often employed by some MDA prime  contractors that can obscure the full cost of work. Contractors typically  divide the total work of a contract into small efforts in order to define  them more clearly and to ensure proper oversight. Work may be planned  into categories including: (1) level of effort—work that contains tasks of a  general or supportive nature and does not produce a definite end product  and (2) discrete—work that has a definable end product or event.  When  work is discrete, delivery of the end product provides a sound basis for  determining actual contractor performance. When discrete work is instead  planned as level of effort, the contractor’s performance becomes less  transparent because work is considered complete when the time planned  for it has expired, whether or not the intended product has been  completed.  Earned value management does not recognize such variances  in completing scheduled work and to the extent more work has to be done  to complete the product, additional costs could be incurred that are not  yet recognized.of their work as level of effort.  MDA officials agree that its contractors  have improperly planned discrete work as level of effort, and are taking  steps to remedy the situation.
Many of MDA’s prime contractors plan a large percentage  We also observed that while several contractors had difficulty with  controlling costs, during fiscal year 2007, MDA awarded approximately 95  percent or $606 million of available award fee to its prime contractors.  In  particular, contractors developing the ABL and Aegis BMD Weapon  System were rated as performing very well in the cost and/or program  management elements and received commensurate fees, even though  earned value management data showed that their cost and schedule  performance was declining. Although DOD guidance discourages the use  of earned value performance metrics in award fee criteria, MDA includes  this––one of many factors for consideration in rating contractors’  performance––in several of its award fee plans. The agency recognizes  that there is not always a good link between its intentions for award fees  and the amount of fee being earned by its contractors. In an effort to  rectify this problem, the agency has begun to revise its award fee policy to  align agency practices more closely with DOD’s current policy that better  links performance with award fees.
section_title: Testing and Performance of Fielded Capability
paragraphs: Most test objectives were achieved during 2007, although several BMDS  programs experienced setbacks in their test schedules. The MKV, KEI, and  Sensors elements were able to execute all scheduled activities as planned.  The Aegis BMD, THAAD, ABL, STSS, and C2BMC elements experienced  test delays, but all were able to achieve their primary test objectives. GMD  successfully completed an intercept with an operationally representative  interceptor and a radar characterization test.  A second intercept test  employing the SBX radar has been delayed because a target malfunction  delayed the execution of the first intercept test. The SBX capability is  important as it is a primary sensor to be used to engage ballistic missiles in  the midcourse phase of flight. As of yet, this capability has not been  verified through flight testing.
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates Results but  Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, GAO-07-387 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.15, 2007). BMDS  performance goals included a numerical goal for the probability of a successful BMDS  engagement, a defined area from which the BMDS would prevent an enemy from launching  a ballistic missile, and a defined area that the BMDS would protect from ballistic missile  attacks.
GMD assets is also questionable because they contain parts identified by  auditors in MDA’s Office of Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance as less  reliable or inappropriate for use in space that have not yet been replaced.  MDA has begun to replace the questionable parts in the manufacturing  process and to purchase the parts for retrofit into fielded interceptors.  However, it will not complete the retrofit effort until 2012.
Finally, tests of the GMD element have been of a developmental nature,  and have not included target suite dynamic features and intercept  geometries representative of the operational environment in which GMD  will perform its mission. MDA has added operational test objectives to its  developmental test program, but many of the objectives are aimed at  proving that military personnel can operate the equipment. Up until 2007,  the lack of data limited the operational test and evaluation Director’s  annual BMDS assessment to commenting on aspects of tests that were  operationally realistic and recommending other tests to characterize  system effectiveness and suitability.  In 2007, tests allowed a partial  assessment of the BMDS’ effectiveness, suitability, and survivability.  According to the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation,  (1) further testing that incorporates realistic operational objectives and (2)  verification, validation, and accreditation of models and simulations will  be needed before the performance, suitability, and survivability of the  BMDS can be fully characterized.
section_title: Key Steps Taken to Enhance BMDS Oversight, but More Can Be Done
paragraphs: Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant amount of  flexibility. While this flexibility allows agile decision making, it lessens the  transparency of MDA’s acquisition processes, making it difficult to  conduct oversight and hold the agency accountable for its planned  outcomes and costs. As we reported in March 2007, MDA operates with  considerable autonomy to change goals and plans, which makes it difficult  to reconcile outcomes with original expectations and to determine the  actual cost of each block and of individual operational assets. In the past  year, MDA has begun implementing two initiatives—a new block construct  and a new executive board—to improve transparency, accountability, and  oversight. These initiatives represent improvements over current  practices, although we see additional improvements MDA can make. In  addition, Congress has directed that MDA begin buying certain assets with  procurement funds like other programs, which should promote  accountability for and transparency of the BMDS.
subsections: section_title: New Block Structure Offers Improvements, but Does Not Resolve All Issues
paragraphs: In 2007, MDA redefined its block construct to better communicate its  plans and goals to Congress. The agency’s new construct is based on  fielding capabilities that address particular threats as opposed to the  previous biennial time periods. MDA’s new block construct makes many  positive changes. These include establishing unit cost for selected block  assets, incorporating into a block only those elements or components that  will be fielded during the block, and abandoning the practice of deferring  work from block to block.
These changes should improve the transparency of the BMDS program  and make MDA more accountable for the investment being made in  missile defense. For example, the actual cost of each block can be tracked  because MDA will no longer defer work planned for one block, along with  its cost, to a future block. In addition, MDA plans to develop unit costs for  selected BMDS assets––such as THAAD interceptors—so that the cost of  those assets can be monitored. In addition, the agency plans to request an  independent verification of these unit costs and report significant cost  growth to Congress. However, MDA has not yet determined all of the  assets that will report a unit cost or how much a unit cost must increase  before it is reported to Congress. systems before system development and demonstration can begin. Until  the full cost of each block is known, it will be difficult for decision makers  to compare the value of investing in each block to the value of investing in  other DOD programs or to determine whether a block is affordable over  the long term.
Another issue yet to be addressed is whether the concurrent development  and fielding of BMDS assets will continue. Fully developing an asset and  demonstrating its capability prior to production increases the likelihood  that the product will perform as designed and can be produced at the cost  estimated. To field an initial capability quickly, MDA accepted the risk of  concurrent development and fielding during Block 2004. It continued to do  so during Block 2006 as it fielded assets before they were fully tested. For  example, by the end of Block 2004, the agency realized that the  performance of some ground-based interceptors could be degraded  because the interceptors included inappropriate or potentially unreliable  parts. As noted earlier, MDA has begun the process of retrofitting these interceptors, but work will not be completed until 2012. Meanwhile, there  is a risk that some interceptors might not perform as designed. MDA has  not addressed whether it will accept similar performance risks under its  new block construct or whether it will fully develop and demonstrate all  elements/components prior to fielding.
MDA has not addressed whether it will transfer assets produced during a  block to a military service for production and operation at the block’s  completion. Officials representing multiple DOD organizations recognize  that transfer criteria are neither complete nor clear given the BMDS’s  complexity. Without clear transfer criteria, MDA has transferred the  management of only one element—the Patriot Advanced Capability-3—to  the military for production and operation. For other elements, MDA and  the military services have been negotiating the transition of  responsibilities for the sustainment of fielded elements—a task that has  proven to be time consuming. Although MDA documents show that under  its new block construct the agency should be ready to deliver BMDS  components that are fully mission-capable, MDA officials could not tell us  whether at the end of a block MDA’s Director will recommend when  management of components, including production responsibilities, will be  transferred to the military.
section_title: New Executive Board Offers Improved, but Not Full, Oversight
paragraphs: Oversight improvement initiatives are also underway for MDA. In March  2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established a Missile Defense  Executive Board (MDEB) to recommend and oversee implementation of  strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options for  protecting the United States and its allies from missile attacks. The MDEB  is also to replace existing groups and structures, such as the Missile  Defense Support Group.
The MDEB appears to be vested with more authority than its predecessor,  the Missile Defense Support Group. When the Support Group was  chartered in 2002, it was to provide constructive advice to MDA’s Director.  However, the Director was not required to follow the advice of the group.  According to a DOD official, although the Support Group met many times  initially, it did not meet after June 2005. This led to the formation of the  MDEB.  Its mission is to review and make recommendations on MDA’s  comprehensive acquisition strategy to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It  is also to provide the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology  and Logistics) with a recommended strategic program plan and a feasible  funding strategy based on business case analysis that considers the best  approach to fielding integrated missile defense capabilities in support of  joint MDA and warfighter objectives. The MDEB will be assisted by four  standing committees. These committees, which are chaired by senior-level  officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff,  could play an important oversight role as they are expected to make  recommendations to the MDEB, which in turn, will recommend courses of  action to the Under Secretary of Defense and the Director, MDA as  appropriate. entered System Development and Demonstration, it has not triggered  certain statutes requiring the development of information that the Defense  Acquisition Board uses to inform its decisions. For example, most major  defense acquisition programs are required by statute to obtain an  independent verification of life-cycle cost estimates prior to beginning  system development and demonstration, and/or production and  deployment. Independent life-cycle cost estimates provide confidence that  a program is executable within estimated cost. Although MDA plans to  develop unit cost for selected block assets and to request that DOD’s Cost  Analysis Improvement Group verify the unit costs, the agency does not  initially plan to develop a block cost estimate and therefore, cannot seek  an independent verification of that cost. Although MDA will not be  required to obtain an independent verification of block costs when they  are estimated, MDA officials told us that they have initiated discussions  with the Cost Analysis Improvement Group on independent verifications  of block cost estimates.
Statute also requires an independent verification of a system’s suitability  for and effectiveness on the battlefield through operational testing before  a program can proceed beyond low-rate initial production. After testing is  completed, the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation assesses  whether the test was adequate to support an evaluation of the system’s  suitability and effectiveness for the battlefield, whether the test showed  the system to be acceptable, and whether any limitations in suitability and  effectiveness were noted. However, a comparable assessment of the  BMDS assets being fielded will not be available to the MDEB.  As noted  earlier, the limited amount of testing completed, which has been primarily  developmental in nature, and the lack of verified, validated, and accredited  models and simulations prevent the Director of Operational Test and  Evaluation from fully assessing the effectiveness,  suitability, and  survivability of the BMDS in annual assessments.
MDA will also make some decisions without needing approval from the  MDEB or any higher level DOD official. Although the charter of the MDEB  includes making recommendations to MDA and the Under Secretary of  Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) on investment options,  program priorities, and MDA’s strategy for developing and fielding an  operational missile defense capability, the MDEB will not necessarily have  the opportunity to review and recommend changes to BMDS blocks. MDA  documents show that the agency plans to continue to define each block of  development without requiring input from the MDEB. According to a  briefing on the business rules and processes for MDA’s new block  structure, the decision to initiate a new block of BMDS capability will be  made by MDA’s Director. Also cost, schedule, and performance  parameters will be established by MDA when technologies that the block  depends upon are mature, a credible cost estimate can be developed,  funding is available, and the threat is both imminent and severe. The  Director will inform the MDEB as well as Congress when a new block is  initiated, but he will not seek the approval of either.
Finally, there will be parts of the BMDS program that the MDEB will have  difficulty overseeing because of the nature of the work being performed.  MDA plans to place any program that is developing technology in a  category known as Capability Development. These programs, such as ABL,  KEI, and MKV, will not have a firm cost, schedule, or performance  baseline. This is generally true for technology development programs in  DOD because they are in a period of discovery, which makes schedule and  cost difficult to estimate. Yet, the scale of the technology development in  BMDS is unusually large, ranging from $2 billion to about $5 billion dollars  a year—eventually comprising nearly half of MDA’s budget by fiscal year  2012. The MDEB will have access to the budgets planned for these  programs over the next 5 or 6 years, each program’s focus, and whether  the technology is meeting short-term key events or knowledge points. But  without some kind of baseline for matching progress with cost, the MDEB  will not know how much more time or money will be needed to complete  technology maturation. MDA’s experience with the ABL program provides  a good example of the difficulty in estimating the cost and schedule of  technology development. In 1996, the ABL program believed that all ABL  technology could be demonstrated by 2001 at a cost of about $1 billion.  However, MDA now projects that this technology will not be demonstrated  until 2009 and its cost has grown to over $5 billion.
section_title: MDA Directed to Use Procurement Funding
paragraphs: In an effort to further improve the transparency of MDA’s acquisition  processes, Congress has directed that MDA’s budget materials delineate  between funds needed for research, development, test and evaluation;  procurement; operations and maintenance; and military construction.Congress gave MDA the flexibility to field certain assets using research,  development, test and evaluation funding which allowed MDA to fund the  purchase of assets over multiple years. Congress recently restricted MDA’s  authority and required MDA to purchase certain assets with procurement  funds. Using procurement funds will mean that MDA will be required to  ensure that assets are fully funded in the year of their purchase, rather  than incrementally funded over several years. Additionally, our analysis of  MDA data shows that incremental funding is usually more expensive than  full-funding, in part, because inflation decreases the buying power of the  dollar each year. For example, after reviewing MDA’s incremental funding  plan for THAAD fire units and Aegis BMD missiles, we analyzed the effect  of fully funding these assets and found that the agency could save about  $125 million by fully funding their purchase and purchasing them in an  economical manner. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2008, Congress directed that MDA request procurement funding and  advanced procurement funding for long lead items in its fiscal year 2009  budget including funding for THAAD fire units and Aegis BMD SM-3  missiles. MDA did not request such funding because it slipped the  schedule for procuring THAAD fire units 3 and 4 by one year and because  the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 was not  signed in time to allow MDA to adjust its budget request for SM-3 missiles.  However, in MDA’s fiscal year 2010 budget submittal, the agency intends  to incorporate a detailed plan of action and milestones to transition from  incremental funding to full funding beginning in fiscal year 2010 and for all  fiscal years thereafter.
section_title: Actions Recommended in Our Recent Report
paragraphs: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 223.
MDA to investigate ways of developing a baseline or some other  standard against which the progress of technology programs may be  assessed; and    MDA and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to agree on  criteria and incorporate corresponding scope into developmental tests  that will allow a determination of whether a block of BMDS capability  is suitable and effective for fielding.
DOD concurred with the first three recommendations DOD partially  concurred with the remaining two recommendations to investigate ways  of developing a baseline or some other standard against which the  progress of technology programs may be assessed and to agree on criteria  and incorporate corresponding scope into developmental tests. DOD  stated that MDA already uses key knowledge points, technology levels,  and engineering readiness levels to assess the progress of technology  programs and that it will continue to investigate other ways of making  such assessments. DOD also noted that MDA’s mission is to work with the  warfighter, rather than Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to  determine that the BMDS is ready for fielding.  However, DOD stated that  MDA will continue to work with operational testers to strengthen the  testing of BMDS suitability and effectiveness.  We believe that DOD and  Congress would benefit from understanding the remaining cost and time  needed to complete a technology program, important information that  MDA’s methods do not yet provide.  Since BMDS testing will continue to  serve both developmental and operational purposes, its scope should be  sufficient to enable the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to  evaluate the system’s operational effectiveness, suitability, and  survivability.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond  to any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or  Francisp@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include David Best, Assistant Director; LaTonya D. Miller; Steven B. Stern;  Meredith Allen Kimmett; Kenneth E. Patton; and Alyssa Weir.
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