Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results
Published: 2003-03-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Supporting democracy abroad is a major U.S. foreign policy objective. To better understand how this assistance has been implemented in Latin America, GAO was asked to review programs in six countries--Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru--that have been of particular importance to U.S. interests in Central and South America. Between fiscal years 1992 and 2002, U.S. agencies have funded more than $580 million in democracy-related programs in these countries. This report discusses the impact of and factors affecting this assistance and the overarching management issues that have affected program planning and implementation.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. programs to strengthen democratic institutions in six Latin American countries have had a modest impact to date. These programs have primarily focused on promoting (1) the rule of law, (2) governance, (3) human rights, and (4) elections. U.S. assistance has helped bring about important reforms in criminal justice in five of the six countries, improved transparency and accountability of some government functions, increased attention to human rights, and supported elections that observation groups have considered free and fair. However, host governments have not always sustained these reforms by providing the needed political, financial, and human capital. For example, host countries often did not support training programs, computer systems, or equipment after U.S. funding ended. In other cases, U.S.-supported programs were limited and targeted, and countries have not adopted these programs on a national scale. Since host country resources for sustaining democracy programs are difficult to mobilize, it is crucial that the U.S. government and other donors manage available international resources as efficiently as possible for maximum impact and sustainability. Several management issues have affected democracy assistance programs. Poor coordination among the key U.S. agencies has been a long-standing management problem, and cooperation with other foreign donors has been limited. U.S. agencies' strategic plans do not outline how these agencies will overcome coordination problems and cooperate with other foreign donors on program planning and implementation to maximize scarce resources. Also, U.S. agencies have not consistently evaluated program results or shared lessons learned from completed projects, thus missing opportunities to enhance the outcomes of their programs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In response to your request, this report discusses the nature, impact, and factors that affect U.S.  democracy assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru as well as  the overarching management issues that have affected program planning and implementation. We  include recommendations to the Departments of State and Justice and the U.S. Agency for  International Development. We recommend that these agencies develop more comprehensive  strategic plans at the regional and country level to address cooperation among agencies and other  major donors; develop a strategy to periodically evaluate democracy assistance projects; and develop  a mechanism to share information on development approaches, methods, materials, and results  among U.S. agencies and implementers.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents earlier, we plan no further  distribution of this report until 30 days after its date. At that time, we will provide copies to interested  congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the U.S.  Agency for International Development, and the President of the Inter-American Foundation. We will  also provide copies to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-4128. Other major  contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.
subsections: section_title: Introduction
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The countries of Latin America have a long history of political change,  including dictatorships, autocratic rule, military juntas, and various forms  of democracy.
According to Freedom House, a U.S. research organization that tracks  political developments around the world, these countries have, since the  1980s, gradually progressed toward stronger democracies, as measured by  the extent to which the citizens of these countries enjoy political rights and  civil liberties (see fig. 1). Of the six countries in our study (Bolivia,  Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru), all but Colombia  and Nicaragua experienced a strengthening of democracy by these  standards between 1992 and 2002 (see table 1 and app. VI for more  information). Appendix V provides further information on the quality of life  and selected indicators for the selected countries.
In September 2001, the 34 democratic members of the Organization of  American States (OAS) unanimously adopted the Inter-American  Democratic Charter, declaring that “the peoples of the Americas have a  right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote  and defend it.”  This commitment goes beyond preserving elections to  ensuring the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms, popular  participation in government, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and  transparent and accountable government institutions. Despite this  commitment, many Latin American nations have yet to fully achieve these  conditions. According to the OAS charter, the hallmarks of democracy  include  respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and sectors of   constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally   access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law;   transparency in government activities and probity, responsible public  administration on the part of governments;  participation of citizens in decisions relating to their own development;  separation of powers and independence of the branches of government;  a pluralistic system of political parties and organizations;  freedom of expression and of the press;  respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and  periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal  suffrage.
Although the national governments of all six countries we visited have been  democratically elected since the 1990s, they face serious social, economic,  and political challenges that have made strengthening key democratic  institutions a difficult and long-term endeavor.  In South America,  Colombia continues to struggle with the escalation of a nearly 40-year  campaign to overthrow the government, with attendant economic and  social disruptions that affect thousands of its citizens each year, while Peru  is emerging from the shadow of authoritarian rule and the violent actions of  insurgent guerillas. Bolivia, which has had a relatively more stable political  environment, must now deal with a host of economic challenges and an  increasingly disillusioned and vocal indigenous class. In Central America,  El Salvador’s and Guatemala’s Peace Accords were signed in 1992 and 1996,  respectively, providing a framework for rebuilding those societies after  decades of civil war. Nicaragua, one of the poorest nations in the  hemisphere, still confronts political polarization and corruption, according  to U.S. officials.
The United States has provided assistance to many of the countries of Latin  America and the Caribbean to aid in strengthening democracies. From  fiscal years 1992 to 2002, the six countries in our study, Bolivia, Colombia,  El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, received about $580 million  in assistance (see fig. 2 for distribution of funding among these six  countries). Almost all U.S. funding for democracy assistance, authorized  under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, is appropriated to the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of  State. A significant amount of assistance has been allocated to the  Department of Justice through interagency fund transfers from USAID and  State. From fiscal years 1992 through 2002, USAID has administered $479.3  million of program funding for democracy activities in this region, while  the Justice Department has administered $101.3 million. The State  Department also administered democracy-related programs  during this  time period. However, the department could not readily provide  disaggregated data on the bulk of its democracy-related programs, such as  funding provided by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs (INL). Figure 3 shows the distribution among the  major implementing agencies of democracy assistance funding to the six  countries we reviewed. Other organizations with democracy-related  assistance activities funded by the U.S. government include the National  Endowment for Democracy, the Inter-American Foundation, and the  Department of the Treasury.
These agencies provide assistance through a variety of means, primarily in  the form of goods and services to governmental and nongovernmental  organizations and individuals. For some projects, such as law enforcement  training, U.S. government agencies provide the assistance directly, or with  contract assistance, as needed. For other projects, such as institutional  development projects, the agencies distribute aid to beneficiaries primarily  through grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts with  nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and firms  located in the United States or overseas. Cash disbursements are generally  not provided directly to foreign governments.
Democracy assistance efforts, if successful, can influence political stability  and economic growth. Economists have long demonstrated that countries  with stronger democratic institutions are more likely to experience  sustained economic growth. For example, the positive relationship  between the respect for property and contractual rights and the rate of  economic growth has been found to be especially strong. Law-respecting,  accountable governments tend to provide conditions that encourage long- term investments and innovation. As the standard of living improves, the  probability of further democratization of political institutions over time  increases substantially.
Many other foreign donors have also provided democracy assistance to the  countries covered in our review. Multilateral donors, including the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, the United Nations,  and OAS have been active in funding democracy-related activities. In  addition, many Western European countries, the European Union, and  private international donors have also financed projects similar to those  funded by the United States. We did not attempt to determine the total  amounts of funding and the outcomes associated with this assistance,  given the difficulty in identifying many different efforts, their costs, and the  paucity of studies documenting program outcomes.
The United States has taken a broad approach to providing democracy  assistance. The assistance approach generally incorporates four elements:  (1) rule of law, (2) governance (3) human rights, and (4) elections. (See fig.  4 for an illustration of these elements.)
Rule of Law:  These projects support constitutional and criminal code  reforms to make criminal justice more swift, transparent, and  participatory; establish new institutions and enhance existing ones to  improve management of the justice sector and to help safeguard the legal  rights of citizens; provide technical assistance, training, and management  information systems for judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and law  enforcement agencies to improve their capabilities and increase their  efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness; increase access to justice through  mediation, alternative dispute resolution, and other mechanisms; and  reform law school curricula to reflect modern methods and necessary skills  for practicing law.
Governance:  These projects seek to improve the administrative, analytical,  and outreach capacity of legislatures; strengthen the administrative  capacity and accountability of municipalities and increase citizen  participation in local government; and foster a greater public awareness  about corruption and implement strategies to enable government  institutions to become more transparent and accountable.
Human Rights:  These projects are intended to prevent human rights  abuses through greater public awareness, protect citizens against abuses,  and respond to past violations through legal action and public  reconciliation processes.
Elections:  These projects are designed to improve election administration,  enhance voter access, and legitimize election results by supporting  domestic and international observers.
USAID and the State and Justice Departments have not traditionally  accounted for funding data according to the four elements previously  described but have provided this information for fiscal years 2000 through  2002, as shown in figure 5. While assistance to civil society appears to be  relatively small in figure 5, important civil society support is also included  through the four programmatic areas we focus on in this report.
While USAID funds and implements assistance projects in all areas covered  by this report, the State Department provides funding to the Justice  Department for law enforcement assistance. The State Department’s  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor also provided a relatively  small amount of democracy-related assistance to some of the six countries  covered in our review, as did the department’s Western Hemisphere public  diplomacy program.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the nature, impact, and sustainability of U.S. assistance programs  to strengthen democratic institutions in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador,  Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, we first interviewed headquarters  officials in Washington, D.C., at the departments and agencies providing  rule of law, governance, human rights, and election assistance, including  USAID, the State and Justice Departments, the National Endowment for  Democracy, and the Inter-American Foundation. We also interviewed  experts at nongovernmental organizations, including the National  Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the  Washington Office on Latin America, and Human Rights Watch. For all six  countries, we reviewed Mission Performance Plans, USAID country and  regional strategic plans and other planning documents, funding  agreements, contracts, and project evaluations. We obtained funding  information for fiscal years 1992 through 2002 from USAID headquarters  and country staff and the Justice Department (the Justice Department  administers funding provided by the State Department). The State  Department could not readily differentiate most of its democracy-related  assistance funding during this period from counternarcotics-related  funding, which we did not include in the scope of our review. We also  reviewed our prior reports on democracy assistance to Latin America.
We conducted fieldwork in each of the previously identified six countries  between March and September 2002. In each of these countries, we met  with the U.S. Ambassador; the USAID Chief of Mission; political and  economic officers; senior U.S. officials representing agencies with rule of  law, governance, human rights, or elections programs; and numerous  program staff, including contractors responsible for implementing the  projects. We interviewed host country officials at supreme courts; law  enforcement organizations; legislatures; national ombudsmen; and  ministries covering justice, police, local governments, government  oversight, and elections. We visited training schools for judges,  prosecutors, and police; local justice centers; local government pilot  projects; and legislative outreach offices, as appropriate. We also met with  numerous representatives from nongovernmental organizations and other  groups representing a broad spectrum of civil society, including local  citizen groups involved with rule of law, governance, human rights, and  elections programs.
To analyze the overarching management issues that have affected program  outcomes, we analyzed project documentation, interviewed knowledgeable  officials, and reviewed assistance activities on field visits to the six  countries. We then analyzed and synthesized information across the six  countries. To look for broader themes, we also interviewed experts in the  field, including those from nongovernmental organizations and academia,  and attended USAID’s annual democracy officers’ conference in 2001.
We performed our work from August 2001 through December 2002 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Rule of Law Assistance
paragraphs: Reforming the criminal justice sector has been a critical area of concern in  Latin America. Nontransparent legal processes, corruption, and  incarceration of prisoners for months or years before trials can undermine  confidence that justice is being dispensed fairly. Surveys done in the region  have shown that high levels of crime and citizens’ lack of trust in justice  institutions are positively correlated with reduced public support of  democracy. In the six countries we reviewed, USAID and the State and  Justice Departments have sought to (1) reform criminal justice systems by  helping establish new legal frameworks to make criminal procedures more  efficient and transparent and by strengthening the capabilities of justice  sector institutions, (2) increase the public’s access to the justice system by  establishing public defense services for poor defendants and by supporting  construction of justice centers in poor communities, and (3) help law  enforcement institutions conduct criminal investigations and manage their  operations more efficiently and effectively. We found that although the U.S.  assistance had contributed to noteworthy progress in these areas in most  of the countries we reviewed, concerns remain about whether gains will be  sustained. Due to resource constraints and other implementation  difficulties, judicial and law enforcement institutions in these countries  continue to rely to a large degree on U.S. and other international assistance  for implementing justice sector reforms. U.S. officials also stated that  legislative restrictions on law enforcement assistance restrict their ability  to plan and carry out comprehensive justice sector reform programs  because they prohibit many types of police assistance.
As seen in table 2, U.S. rule of law assistance has been provided to five of  the six countries we visited since the mid-1980s, beginning first with El  Salvador in 1984.
subsections: section_title: Criminal Justice Reforms Were Established but Not Fully Implemented; Sustainability Will Require Stronger Host Government Commitment
paragraphs: A key component of U.S. rule of law assistance in five of the six countries  we reviewed has been support for criminal justice sector reforms  establishing new roles and responsibilities for judicial and law enforcement  institutions and introducing oral procedures and public trials.  Support for  criminal justice reforms has been provided primarily by USAID and the  Justice Department and has focused on  facilitating constitutional and criminal code reforms,  helping to create and strengthen justice sector institutions, and   improving legal training for justice sector professionals and reforming  law school curricula.
subsections: section_title: Constitutional and Criminal Code Reforms Have Been Enacted but Not Fully Implemented
paragraphs: The United States has helped five of the countries we reviewed establish  new legal frameworks for their criminal justice systems, supporting the  drafting of new criminal codes and developing political consensus for  criminal justice reform, both within the government and among civil  society. Although the reforms each country has enacted have varied, U.S.  assistance has supported the necessary legal frameworks for oral,  adversarial criminal procedures and training for justice sector actors to  implement these procedures. The United States has assisted Latin  American countries’ transitions from inquisitorial to adversarial systems to  help increase the transparency and efficiency of the judicial process.  Benefits of the adversarial system include shortened pretrial detentions,  the presumption of innocence, and the right to a defense.
Host country officials commented that U.S. support has been critical to  building consensus for the development and enactment of these reforms.  USAID has supported constitutional and criminal procedures code reforms  that went into effect in Colombia (1991), Guatemala (1994), El Salvador  (1998), Bolivia (2001), and Nicaragua (2002).  In Bolivia, for example,  USAID’s rule of law assistance since 1997 has focused primarily on support  for the passage and implementation of a new criminal procedures code.  USAID’s assistance, provided in close coordination with the German  government, has supported reforms that provide the basis for oral,  accusatory procedures and public trials, which significantly changed the  roles and responsibilities of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the  police. In addition, U.S. and German assistance has supported  disseminating information on the code to the public, mainly through  nongovernmental organizations.
Despite achievements in passing criminal justice reforms, these countries  have had varying degrees of success in implementing the reforms in  practice, and each has work remaining to fully put into practice the new  roles and responsibilities contained in the reforms. For example, Nicaragua  and Bolivia have only recently begun implementing newly enacted criminal  procedures codes, while reforms for criminal sentencing codes have not  yet been enacted. The Nicaraguan legislature also passed an administrative  litigation code in 2000, which created a mechanism for citizens to bring  legal cases against the government.  This code has not been implemented  because, according to a USAID official, the Supreme Court has raised  constitutional objections to them.
Colombia and Guatemala enacted criminal justice reforms in the early  1990s but have made limited progress in implementing them. Colombia, for  example, has made little progress in establishing an adversarial criminal  justice system, including oral trials, despite enacting its constitutional  reform in 1991. Colombia’s reforms established a legal structure for oral  trials and modernized criminal investigation and prosecutorial functions,  and the reforms were developed through a coordinated approach that  involved key justice sector institutions.  Following this promising start,  however, political support for these reforms waned during the 1990s, and  oral, adversarial procedures are still rare in Colombia, according to USAID  officials.
Although Guatemala’s reforms provided the basis for transitioning to an  adversarial criminal justice system in 1994, and Guatemala reorganized and  created the necessary justice institutions for implementing the reforms, the  Guatemalan justice system is still plagued by problems, particularly the  courts, prosecutor’s office, and the police. During our visit to Guatemala,  the prosecutor’s office and the police were still trying to resolve profound  differences in the roles that their respective institutions would have in  carrying out criminal investigations. U.S. assistance provided by the State  and Justice Departments and USAID has helped justice institutions  introduce important enhancements to their organizations and operations.
Despite these improvements, the Guatemalan criminal justice system still  faces serious challenges in its efforts to fully implement these reforms.
El Salvador appears to have made the most progress in reforming its justice  sector; for example, the Attorney General has instituted sweeping  personnel changes in the prosecutor’s office to improve the quality and  integrity of its workforce. However, the judiciary in El Salvador has yet to  institute similar reforms, according to U.S. officials.
According to the State Department’s most recent human reports, the  judiciaries in each of the six countries we reviewed are continuing to face  problems, including inefficiency, corruption, and a climate of impunity. In  Bolivia, for example, State reported that judicial corruption and inadequate  case-tracking mechanisms are contributing to the incarcerations of persons  for months or years before their trials. In Colombia, State reported that  Colombia’s large backlog of over 3 million cases has overburdened the  judicial system, and that prosecutors and judges are struggling to transition  from traditional, written procedures, to an oral, adversarial system.
section_title: Justice Sector Institutions Were Established and Strengthened, but Pilot Programs Have Not Been Widely Replicated
paragraphs: U.S. assistance also has supported the creation and strengthening of new  institutions to implement the new codes and other reforms, such as judicial  councils that participate in selecting, training, and disciplining judges and  independent prosecutor’s offices to manage investigations and bring  criminal cases to trial. For example:  In Bolivia, USAID assistance supported creating a judicial council in  1998 that reviews the qualifications of judicial candidates, evaluates the  performance of sitting judges, and manages a training center for judges.
In Nicaragua, USAID has supported establishing a prosecutor’s office  that is independent of the executive branch that will implement the new  criminal procedures code.
The United States also has provided assistance to strengthen and  modernize justice sector institutions’ operational capabilities. For example,  USAID support helped establish a clerk of courts office in Guatemala City  that centralized case intake and management in one location for the city’s  11 criminal courts. A USAID study showed that after this office was  established in 1999, the annual number of cases that were unaccounted for  decreased from more than 1,000 to 2. USAID and the Justice Department  also have assisted in the publication of operations manuals for judges,  prosecutors, and other legal operators to help clarify roles and  responsibilities and ensure uniform implementation of legal codes.
Judicial and law enforcement institutions that the United States has  assisted face resource constraints that make it difficult to sustain or  expand U.S-supported pilot projects. For example, in Bolivia, the  government lacked the resources to maintain or replicate a U.S.-funded  model prosecutor’s office, and the project ended with little impact. Also in  Bolivia, USAID supported a pilot case intake and management system for  judges. This system was designed to provide information on case  assignments and their progress through the judicial system. Originally  implemented in 1996, use of this system continues to be uneven due to  resource constraints, and the system has not been implemented on a  national level.
In Colombia, USAID had funded 13 oral trial courtrooms, in addition to 13  such courtrooms opened by Colombia’s judicial council. However, these  are the only oral trial courtrooms currently operating in the country, and a  major challenge will be to build similar courtrooms for the country’s more  than 2,000 municipal, circuit, and special jurisdiction judges. In one  regional court we visited in Colombia, USAID had built an oral hearing  room and equipped it with new recording equipment to facilitate this  transition. Although judges were holding regular oral hearings in this room,  this equipment was not used because the court could not afford audiotapes  (see fig. 6).
section_title: New Legal Training Was Introduced but Has Not Been Institutionalized
paragraphs: In five of the six countries we visited, USAID and the Justice Department  have provided extensive legal training to judges, prosecutors, investigators,  and public defenders on new criminal procedures codes, either directly or  through support to training centers in host government institutions. For  example:  In Bolivia, these agencies  trained more than 5,000 justice operators on  the country’s new code through a variety of courses, seminars, and  “train-the-trainer” activities.
In Colombia, USAID has assisted a training academy for judges by  supporting restructuring the school and its curriculum. The school has  trained 600 judges to be trainers, allowing the training to be replicated  throughout the country. The Justice Department also has provided  extensive training to prosecutors and law enforcement personnel.
However, training centers for judges, prosecutors, and public defenders  have faced severe budgetary constraints, and in most cases do not operate  independent of U.S. assistance. For example, in Colombia, the director of  the judges training academy told us that its budget has been eliminated,  and the future operation of this center is uncertain. Similarly, a USAID- supported training center within Colombia’s Public Defender’s Office lacks  a training budget. In Bolivia, the Attorney General told us that, without  international assistance, he could not afford to staff and adequately equip  his academy to train prosecutors to implement the country’s new criminal  procedures code.
USAID also has worked with some law schools in Bolivia, Colombia, El  Salvador, and Guatemala to revise their curricula to reflect new reforms  and provide more practical training in oral, public trials. For example,  USAID helped Guatemala’s National University implement a revised  curriculum for new law students with greater emphasis on ethics and  including courses on constitutional law and human rights.
Nonetheless, U.S. and host country officials in the countries we visited also  stated that legal education remains a major concern. Although law schools  in these countries have proliferated, officials stated that many schools do  not provide adequate legal training. In El Salvador, the validity of the  degrees and academic credentials of judges and attorneys has come into  question, as the Supreme Court has initiated an extensive review of justice  officials’ academic backgrounds. Host country officials in El Salvador  commented that poor quality legal education requires that lawyers and  judges be retrained once they enter the justice sector.
section_title: USAID Has Helped Increase Citizen Access to Justice, but Sustainability and Expansion of Services Will Require Greater Host Country Support
paragraphs: USAID has supported efforts to increase citizens’ access to justice through  programs to provide legal services to poor citizens and communities (see  figs. 7 and 8). USAID’s access-to-justice assistance has focused on  establishing and strengthening public defender’s offices and  supporting decentralized justice centers and alternative dispute  resolution mechanisms.
subsections: section_title: Public Defenders Established for Poor, but Availability and Quality of Legal Defense Are Still Limited
paragraphs: USAID has assisted in establishing or strengthening professional Public  Defender’s Offices in five of the six countries we reviewed by helping build  political consensus for the creation of these offices and by providing  operational support. USAID also has provided training and operation  manuals and has supported computerized information systems for Public  Defender’s Offices. The number of public defenders and the services they  provided has also increased, due in part to USAID contributions. For  example:  In El Salvador, the number of public defenders increased from 25 in  1991 to over 300 in 2002, and USAID contributed to this increase by  initially paying public defender salaries. El Salvador’s Public Defender’s  Office now also has local and national coordinators, investigators, and  legal aids. This office handles an average of 35,000 cases per year, which  is approximately 95 percent of El Salvador’s criminal cases.
In Guatemala, USAID supported creating an independent public  defender’s institute, as called for in the 1996 Peace Accords. In 2001, the  institute provided services to approximately 20,000 Guatemalans.
These newly created Public Defender’s Offices have faced severe budgetary  constraints and in some cases are not able to provide adequate services to  poor defendants nationwide. For example:   In Nicaragua, the Public Defender’s Office, created in 1999, had only 13  attorneys when we visited, all of whom were located in the capital,  Managua. Since then, according to USAID 23 additional offices have  been established throughout Nicaragua, and the total number of public  defenders has increased to 47.
Colombia’s public defenders work on a part-time contractual basis.
According to USAID’s justice contractor, these defenders have large  caseloads and are paid a low, fixed salary. Furthermore, Colombia’s  approximately 1,200 public defenders handle less than 10 percent of the  cases involving poor defendants. Private attorneys appointed by the  court to work on a pro bono basis handle the rest of the cases.
In Bolivia, host country officials told us that the USAID-supported Office  of Public Defense, established in 1995, has not been adequately funded.  The office depends on external financing to fund the relatively low  public defender salaries. Bolivian officials stated that they have not been  able to adequately replace staff who left for higher salaries, and that in  criminal trials, public defenders are at a substantial disadvantage to  prosecutors because they lack resources and support services.
The State Department’s most recent reports on human rights cited the  Public Defender’s Offices in four of the six countries as being  overburdened by large caseloads and not always able to provide qualified  attorneys for indigent defendants. In Nicaragua, State also cited public  defenders’ complaints that judges were continuing to sentence poor  defendants without the presence of a public defender, despite these  defendants’ right to legal counsel.
section_title: Justice Houses and Centers Bring Legal Services to Poor Communities, but It Is Not Clear How the Centers Will Be Sustained or Expanded
paragraphs: In four of the six countries we reviewed, USAID has provided funds to  support the creation of decentralized, community-based houses and  centers to provide greater access to the justice system and mediation to  resolve domestic disputes.
In Colombia, “justice houses” (casas de justicia) have been built in  poor, marginalized areas to provide dispute resolution and other legal  services and help reinforce the presence of the Colombian government.  Since 1995, 18 justice houses have been built, and USAID plans to  expand this number to 40 by 2005. National institutions provide the  staff, including prosecutors, public defenders, police inspectors, social  workers, and mediators, while municipalities are expected to maintain  the facilities.
In Guatemala, 11 justice centers were built outside the capital along  with 16 complementary mediation centers to serve indigenous  communities near these centers. U.S. and Guatemalan officials stated  that the centers have facilitated coordination of services and have  improved local citizens’ experiences with the justice system.
In Peru, the Ministry of Justice has established 32 conciliation centers  and 31 legal aid clinics in poor communities.
In El Salvador, a pilot project plans to open 6 justice houses by the end  of 2003. These justice houses will focus on providing mediation services.
Despite the positive impact that the justice houses and centers appear to  have had, it is not clear how these projects will be supported by host governments or whether they will be able to operate without U.S.  assistance. Greater host country commitment of resources will be required  to make them more sustainable and to have a wider impact. For example:   While Colombia’s Ministry of Justice and Interior has supported the  justice houses, it has not made a commitment to build more or take over  existing ones from USAID. Further, many Colombian municipalities face  severe resource constraints and may not be able to maintain and  support existing justice houses.
Guatemala has had some success in expanding an aspect of the justice  center model from secondary cities to its capitol, Guatemala City,  improving officials’ ability to track criminal cases. However,  Guatemala’s justice centers are not currently sustainable without U.S. or  other donor support, according to USAID and contractor officials, and  the Guatemalan government has no plans to fully expand this justice  center model to the national level.
In Peru, USAID funded pilot conciliation and legal aid centers by  nongovernmental organizations and municipalities as well as  government-operated centers in several major cities. USAID also has  helped the Peruvian government build its capacity to train, license, and  regulate a growing number of private conciliators. However, most pilot  centers that USAID helped create are now closed for lack of funds,  according to project officials. The Minister of Justice also told us that  the government lacks the resources to expand the number of  government-operated conciliation centers or provide meaningful  oversight to privately run centers.
section_title: U.S. Police Assistance Supporting Criminal Investigations and Management of Police Operations Has Had Mixed Results
paragraphs: U.S. assistance to develop and strengthen the capacities of the police in the  six countries we reviewed was provided primarily by the Justice  Department’s International Criminal Investigations Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP).  ICITAP’s assistance in these countries has focused  primarily on  developing criminal investigations capabilities by providing training and   supporting police management, accountability, and operations (see figs.  9 and 10).
subsections: section_title: Criminal Investigations Capacities Are Supported through Training and Equipment, but Sustainability Is a Concern
paragraphs: Five of the countries we reviewed have ICITAP police assistance  programs. A key focus of this assistance has been to strengthen police  criminal investigations capabilities by providing direct training to  investigators in crime-scene management and coordinating with  prosecutors, among other areas, and helping investigator schools prepare  to take over these functions. ICITAP also has provided equipment for  analyzing forensic evidence and has assisted in developing computerized  case management systems. In Guatemala, for example, ICITAP has provided assistance to strengthen the criminal investigations unit within  the National Civilian Police, including training in investigative,  administrative, and case management skills, and supported an automated  case-tracking system.
In Colombia, ICITAP also has focused on providing training in criminal  investigations, developing internal training capabilities, and strengthening  forensics capabilities. Currently, ICITAP is providing assistance under Plan  Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative, which is a more than $2  billion effort to assist the Colombian government in fighting illicit crop  production and improve its judicial and law enforcement capabilities.  ICITAP, with the Justice Department’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial  Development, Assistance, and Training, has helped establish and  strengthen specialized investigative units that focus on money laundering,  human rights, anticorruption, and antinarcotics. In an effort to improve  interinstitutional coordination, these units include prosecutors, judicial  police, and other investigative personnel. In addition, ICITAP is  strengthening Colombia’s forensics capabilities in the country’s four  laboratory systems through standardized procedures, protocols, and new  equipment.
In El Salvador, USAID also is working in the criminal investigations area by  providing courses on joint crime-scene management as requested by El  Salvador’s Attorney General and Chief of Police. Prosecutors, police  investigators, and forensic specialists have attended this course to improve  police-prosecutor coordination in protecting and managing evidence.
U.S. assistance to strengthen criminal investigations capabilities has  provided extensive training and supported the development of internal  training centers. However, the impact of this assistance has been limited, in  some cases, due to the lack of political will for change and resource  constraints. In Guatemala, for example, U.S. officials stated that  corruption, funding problems, and the lack of political will for reform have  limited the impact of U.S. assistance to strengthen criminal investigations.  According to U.S. officials, key barriers to improving the police’s  investigative capabilities have been the lack of continuity of police  leadership and coordination problems between prosecutors and police,  including an inability of these institutions to agree on their roles. U.S.  officials in Guatemala further stated that the police-prosecutor dispute has  impeded effective crime-scene management and evidence handling, and  the two institutions developed criminal laboratories with overlapping  functions.
In Bolivia, ICITAP has supported training and provided equipment for the  criminal investigation unit, but the ICITAP program manager stated that  courses had to be repeated multiple times because of a high turnover of  officers within the unit. In addition, U.S. and Bolivian officials stated that  the Bolivian police are facing significant resource constraints that have  impeded their ability to operate and expand an ICITAP-supported case  management system that would link police units and records in different  cities. Originally designed as a nationwide system when it began in 1997,  ICITAP is now supporting implementation in five cities, and even in these  locations use of the system has varied. According to ICITAP officials, in  some cases, police have not paid telephone bills, causing service to be cut  off, which has been a major obstacle. Bolivian police officials told us that  resource constraints also have prevented them from purchasing fingerprint  powder and toner for printers, thus precluding full use of ICITAP-donated  equipment. ICITAP officials stated that Bolivia’s centralized administration  and management of the police have not been responsive to the resource  needs of departmental police units. In August 2002, the State Department’s  Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs defunded ICITAP’s police assistance  program in Bolivia. A State Department official said that the decision was  made on the basis of dissatisfaction with ICITAP headquarters’  management of the program. This official also stated that future U.S. police  assistance in Bolivia would be taken over by the State Department’s INL  and USAID. A Justice Department official said that State’s decision was a  reflection of a continuing disagreement between the State and Justice  Departments over the role of each agency in implementing and managing  criminal justice programs. The official noted that ICITAP headquarters had  provided the same management assistance throughout the region,  including to the successful program in El Salvador.
According to the State Department’s most recent human rights reports, the  police in each of the six countries continue to be involved in illegal  activities and were not always investigated for these activities. In  Guatemala, for example, State reported that there were credible allegations  of the involvement of police officers in kidnappings, and that impunity for  police who commit criminal offenses remained a problem. In Bolivia, State  cited credible allegations that police were involved in abuses, including  excessive force, extortion, and improper arrests. State also reported that  investigations of these abuses were slow.
section_title: Police Management, Accountability, and Operations Were Supported, with the Most Positive Results in El Salvador
paragraphs: In addition to supporting criminal investigations, ICITAP also has provided  assistance in police management, accountability, and operations. This  assistance has included training in police administration and management  and training to strengthen internal oversight. In Bolivia, ICTAP has  supported a new disciplinary code and Office of Professional  Responsibility. ICITAP also has supported curriculum improvements for  Bolivia’s 4-year, university-level police academy. In addition, ICITAP has  provided technical assistance to draft a new police organizational law that  would decentralize operational and administrative decision-making  authority and assign resources to operational units, rather than through a  centrally controlled budget. To date, this legislation has not been passed  into law.
Among the countries we visited, ICITAP’s assistance appears to have had  the greatest impact in El Salvador. ICITAP has helped El Salvador’s  National Civilian Police by developing a strategic plan, supporting  standardizing and centralizing record keeping and reporting, and providing  a management course to command-level officers. ICITAP also has  supported development of the Police Academy since its inception in 1993  and has been able to scale back its assistance to the academy because  Salvadorans are now managing its operations and teaching most of its  courses. In addition, in an effort to address the country’s serious crime  problem, ICITAP has helped develop a new policing model, characterized  by increased use of crime statistics and the deployment of police patrols  with greater community visibility. Modeled on U.S. programs, this project  seeks to establish a permanent and highly visible police presence in urban  areas facing crime and involves greater community outreach. The national  police have implemented such patrols in 174 of El Salvador’s 262  municipalities, covering approximately 80 percent of the country’s  population. Police statistics show that certain crimes have been  significantly reduced in areas where these patrols have been deployed. For  example, these statistics show a 30 percent drop in overall crime, a 32  percent decrease in homicides, and a 25 percent drop in armed robberies.  The program also is being coordinated with an ICITAP-supported “9-1-1”  system that covers approximately 65 percent of the country’s population.
section_title: Legislative Restrictions on Law Enforcement Assistance May Inhibit Rule of Law Programs
paragraphs: An additional factor related to implementation of police assistance is  section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which restricts the use of  foreign assistance funds for training and financial support for police or  other law enforcement forces of foreign governments. Specifically, the  provision states that that these funds may not be used “to provide training  or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law  enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal  intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government.”  This  prohibition was put in place in 1975 in response to human rights violations  committed by nondemocratic regimes receiving USAID public safety  assistance. USAID and the State Department have funded police assistance  programs in Latin America, implemented by the Justice Department, under  a series of exemptions that have subsequently been added to this provision.  For example, an exemption allows for U.S. assistance to support police in  the areas of investigative and forensic functions, the development of  academic instruction, and programs to improve the administrative and  management capabilities.  The Justice Department’s program supporting  community-oriented police patrols in El Salvador has been permitted under  an additional exemption allowing assistance to strengthen civilian police  authority and capability in postconflict countries.
U.S. officials from the State and Justice Departments and USAID have told  us that section 660 is a barrier to developing, or planning effectively, for a  comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated justice sector assistance  program that includes the police. Under the prohibition on law  enforcement assistance, U.S. agencies may not be able to fully incorporate  law enforcement organizations into their programs supporting justice  sector reform. For example, a USAID official in Nicaragua stated that due  to this restriction, the agency could not include the police in its human  rights promotion programs or invite police officials to seminars and other  forums where their participation was considered to be critical to a  productive dialog on implementing justice sector reforms. These officials  stated that U.S. assistance providers should be able to plan their rule of law  assistance strategies on the basis of local country situations and not on  whether an exemption from the law can be justified. For example, the  USAID-funded assistance for community-oriented police patrols,  implemented by the Justice Department, was scheduled to terminate in  2003 because USAID’s General Council determined that the postconflict  exemption permitting this program no longer applies in El Salvador.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. rule of law assistance to Latin America supports criminal justice  reforms, increased access to justice, and police investigative and  management capabilities, and U.S. assistance has had an impact in each  area. Due to budgetary constraints and other implementation difficulties,  judicial and law enforcement institutions in the six countries we visited  continue to rely to a large degree on U.S. and other international assistance  to implement judicial reforms and other projects. U.S. and Latin American  officials we interviewed stated that criminal justice reform in these  countries is likely to be a long-term process, and it will likely take a number  of years before these reforms are fully institutionalized. It is thus unclear at  this time whether the initial results of U.S. assistance will be sustained or  expanded to have greater impact. However, if U.S.-supported reforms are  to become sustainable and have a larger impact, it appears that a long-term  U.S. commitment and presence in providing rule of law assistance in these  countries will be necessary.
The State Department indicated that the Executive Branch should develop  and propose to the Congress new legislation on law enforcement  assistance that could be used to modify section 660 of the Foreign  Assistance Act, to provide a clear statement of authority for providing law  enforcement assistance abroad. The Justice Department stated that it  would work with the State Department and USAID to consider whether  changes to section 660 would be appropriate. This could be an important  step in providing the Congress with options when considering how to  better provide police assistance abroad.
section_title: Governance Assistance: Legislatures, Local Government, and Anticorruption
paragraphs: Latin American governments have historically been highly centralized, and  local governments have lacked authority and resources. In addition, the  legislative branch of government has usually been weaker than the  executive branch, and public sector corruption remains a serious problem.  To address these conditions, U.S. assistance activities, implemented  primarily by USAID, have focused on (1) strengthening legislatures by  improving their planning, analytical, and citizen outreach capabilities; (2)  improving democratic local governance by building the administrative  capabilities of municipalities and promoting effective decentralization of  government functions; and (3) combating corruption by raising citizen  awareness of this problem and establishing laws, regulations, and internal  control structures to enhance government accountability. Overall, we  found that U.S. governance assistance has enabled all six countries to  develop and adopt reforms to make government institutions more  effective, accountable, and responsive to the needs of the people. Despite  the initially positive results, the sustainability and scope of many of these  programs is uncertain because of inconsistent political support and lack of  resources.
subsections: section_title: Legislatures Initially Increased Their Planning, Infrastructure, Analytical, and Outreach Capacities, but Gains Have Eroded over Time
paragraphs: USAID’s legislative strengthening programs have aimed to   improve legislative planning and infrastructure,  enhance legislative analytical and technical capabilities, and  increase citizen knowledge of and input into congressional activities.
As shown in table 3, U.S. legislative strengthening assistance has been  provided to five of the six countries we visited, starting in the early 1990s  and continuing off and on to the present.
subsections: section_title: Legislative Planning and Infrastructure Strengthened, but Not All Improvements Have Lasted
paragraphs: USAID has provided support to help legislatures function more effectively  and professionally by improving their planning and infrastructure in all five  countries where there are or have been legislative strengthening programs.  USAID has generally done this by supporting the formation of  modernization committees, which have developed plans to improve  legislative infrastructure and processes, to encourage reform.
In Nicaragua, modernization committee projects included upgrading the  voting system, strengthening the legislature’s budget oversight  capabilities, and creating a Web site to publicize legislative information.  The Web site received 35,000 hits within the first 6 months that it was in  operation.
In El Salvador, the legislature developed a master plan for  modernization that has helped to facilitate a consensus across political  lines regarding public participation in the legislative process.
In addition, USAID’s efforts to upgrade legislative infrastructure helped  create more professional and transparent working conditions.
In El Salvador, semiprivate offices were constructed for all legislators,  thereby enabling some members to work more professionally and some  to increase the number of constituents they met with.
In Nicaragua, according to USAID officials, a conference room for the  National Assembly was equipped, and an electronic voting board was  also provided to display and record individual members’ votes.
However, not all of these modernization committees are functioning today,  and the infrastructure improvements have not always been well  maintained. According to USAID and host government officials, there have  been problems in three of the five countries where USAID has had  legislative strengthening programs.
In Nicaragua, former members of the modernization committee  reported a decrease in the committee’s influence since the 2000  elections and noted that the committee no longer has the administrative  or political support of the legislature. Also, the Nicaraguan legislature  invested its own funds to upgrade the electronic voting board, the  technician responsible for operating it told us that he no longer had  adequate funds to maintain or improve the voting board. Lastly, the  conference room that USAID had helped to equip in Nicaragua is now  being used solely by one party.
In Bolivia, the modernization committee no longer functions.
In Guatemala, after the 1999 elections the new majority party cut back  staffing of the modernization program, thereby causing the program’s  offices to decrease their operations.
section_title: Legislative Analytical Capabilities Bolstered Initially, but Most Gains Were Not Maintained
paragraphs: USAID has supported efforts to establish and strengthen analytical  capabilities in three of the five countries that have legislative strengthening  programs, thereby enabling them to develop laws and regulations in a more  informed fashion and to improve their oversight of the executive branch.
In Bolivia, USAID helped establish a congressional research center and  a budget office to analyze the executive branch’s proposed budget. This  office identified approximately $43 million in errors in 1995.
In Guatemala, assistance was provided to the Unit for Technical  Support, which produced about 150 studies. According to the former  manager of this unit, legislators now consider such reports necessary  before presenting a proposal to the legislature.
In El Salvador, a unit was created to provide analytical studies to  legislators, staff, and committees.
In two of these countries, USAID’s efforts to provide analytical support to  legislatures have faced challenges due to changes in political support.
In Bolivia, despite several years of positive impact, after the 1997  elections legislative branch institutions that USAID had supported,  including the congressional research center, lost credibility as neutral  entities and became ineffective, according to a 2001 USAID-sponsored  evaluation.
In Guatemala, after the 1999 elections, the new majority party cut 18 of  24 legislative technician positions, drastically curtailing the legislature’s  analytical capacity.
section_title: Citizen Input into Congress Increased, but Outreach Efforts Were Hindered by a Lack of Legislative Support
paragraphs: USAID also has assisted legislatures in increasing their constituent  outreach in all five countries with legislative strengthening programs and  has worked to provide more opportunities for citizens to have input into  congressional activities.
In Peru, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives provided assistance for  four congressional committees to hold public hearings. To inform  people about the congress, USAID supported seminars and a play that  was performed in 45 public high schools in Lima, Peru.
In El Salvador, three legislative outreach offices were built outside the  capital. At one center we visited, representatives from three different  political parties shared these offices. They stated that the presence of  these offices has helped decrease partisanship. According to a USAID  official, the legislature has been actively involved in setting program  priorities and has paid for the outreach offices’ recurring costs.
In Guatemala, three constituent outreach offices were established that  implemented civic education initiatives, organized public hearings, and  handled constituent casework.
In two countries, these outreach activities have not been sustained, owing  to a lack of consistent political support and in some cases politicization of  the project.
The head of the Nicaraguan Office of Citizen Participation, which  USAID helped to create, noted that her office has received little financial  or political support from the legislature. In visiting the office, we  observed that its location on the 10th floor of an office building in  central Managua makes it less accessible and visible to citizens outside  the capital (see fig. 11).
USAID ended its legislative strengthening program in Guatemala after  the 1999 elections when the constituent outreach office staff came  under undue political pressure. Today the majority party runs the  offices, and opposition legislators are not permitted to work there,  according to USAID officials.
section_title: Some USAID Legislative Programs Have Leveraged Funding from Other Donors
paragraphs: Some of USAID’s programs have helped leverage funding from other major  donors for legislative strengthening programs.
The Salvadoran congressional modernization plan helped the legislature  secure a loan from the IDB to support new information systems and  infrastructure.
The current USAID program in Bolivia encouraged investment from the  World Bank, the IDB, and two private German foundations.
In Peru, USAID expects that its project will complement a planned $10  million IDB technical assistance project.
section_title: Local Governance and Citizen Participation Were Enhanced in Target Municipalities, but Broader Impacts Are More Difficult to Achieve
paragraphs: U.S. programs to strengthen local governance, primarily implemented by  USAID and to a lesser extent by the Inter-American Foundation, aim to  increase the effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability of municipal  governments and to enhance citizen participation in local government.
USAID’s local governance assistance has focused on  strengthening municipal administrative, budgetary, and outreach  capabilities and increasing citizen participation in local government and  supporting national-level policy reform and institutions for  strengthening local governments.
As shown in table 4, local governance assistance has been provided in all of  the six countries we visited, with starting dates ranging from 1993 in El  Salvador to 2001 in Peru and Colombia.
In the late 1980s, Latin American governments began to make efforts to  decentralize their countries both fiscally and politically. Countries are  undertaking various decentralization activities, including developing a  nationwide decentralization program, addressing issues of financial  transfers and taxation, and focusing on municipal accountability and  citizen oversight.
With limited funding for local government, USAID has focused on a small  number of municipalities  in each country, with the general aim that the  host country government, other donors, and other municipalities would  replicate the programs’ concepts. For example, in El Salvador, USAID is  currently assisting 28 of 262 municipalities. In Colombia, USAID’s  democratic local governance program, run by several contractors, is  working intensively in 62 of 1,080 municipalities and is also providing  training to members of 226 city councils.
subsections: section_title: Administrative, Budgetary, and Outreach Capabilities of Target Municipalities Strengthened
paragraphs: USAID’s local governance programs have helped many target  municipalities operate more effectively and responsively (see fig. 12).
In El Salvador, target municipalities increased financial resources by 72  percent between 1996 and 1999 by improving tax records and tax  collection.
Colombia’s program aims to help increase local tax resources by  improving local land records and also partially funds small-scale social  infrastructure projects, such as the installation of water meters designed  to generate revenue to make local water systems sustainable. Mayors  we met with noted that these projects helped enhance local government  planning, budgeting, project design, implementation, and evaluation.
In Bolivia, according to yearly surveys done by a USAID contractor  between 1998 and 2000, citizens in USAID-assisted municipalities rated  their local governments more highly on responsiveness than citizens in  other municipalities.
In addition, USAID programs have helped to increase citizen participation  in, and oversight of, municipal activities in target municipalities. Some of  the municipal oversight activities are closely tied in with USAID’s  anticorruption programs.
In Guatemala, support was provided for municipalities’ efforts to  disseminate information  and organize public meetings to develop  municipal plans and budgets.
In Colombia, according to USAID data, more than 4,400 citizens have  participated in the development, implementation, and oversight of 67  municipal-level social infrastructure projects.
On a smaller scale, the work of the Inter-American Foundation also  supports local governance through small-scale, grassroots-driven projects  that often increase and strengthen participation by citizens and civil society  organizations (see fig. 13). For example, in Peru, one Inter-American  Foundation grantee organization described how they helped raise women’s  awareness of their rights, resulting in increased women’s participation in  municipal affairs. The Inter-American Foundation also funded a Bolivian  foundation that helped increase the involvement of small-scale rural  enterprises, cooperatives, and mayors in defining a national poverty- reduction strategy. From 1997 to 2001, the Inter-American Foundation  estimates it funded $34.3 million of projects that had some effect on local  governance in the six countries we visited.
section_title: Replication Outside Target Municipalities Was Mainly Limited to Bolivia and El Salvador
paragraphs: According to our observations and discussions with USAID and contractor  staff, the impact of USAID local governance programs projects has mainly  extended outside target municipalities in Bolivia and El Salvador.
In Bolivia, where the government has accepted USAID’s approach to  working with local governments to replicate programs, impact has been  broad. According to USAID, 175 of 314 municipalities in Bolivia now  employ some of these participatory methods. Subnational associations  of municipalities and departmental municipal associations have also  been trained to replicate aspects of USAID’s programs. An Internet  portal has also been funded that would enable municipalities to share  best practices, have more transparent procurement, expand their  financial base, and pursue advocacy and networking.
The Salvadoran government has made participatory municipal planning  a prerequisite for some government disbursements. The Salvadoran  National Municipal Association estimated that in 2001, 160 of 262  municipalities used some form of citizen participation.
In Bolivia and El Salvador, USAID has helped create materials that provide  guidelines for municipalities and implementers on strengthening local  governance and increasing citizen participation.
In El Salvador, a manual on the basic criteria for participatory municipal  planning was developed, in consultation with other donors. The  Salvadoran government has begun to use this manual to measure  progress in participation and transparency in all municipalities.
In Bolivia, the IDB has funded the publication of manuals, originally  developed with USAID support, that were made available to all 314  municipalities.
While these manuals have helped increase the scope and sustainability of  USAID’s programs in individual countries, they have not been widely or  systematically shared among USAID missions where there are local  governance programs. According to USAID officials in Washington, D.C.,  there is no central repository for these materials, which are usually  produced by contractors. USAID mission staff we spoke with agreed that  materials developed by USAID and its contractors are often not shared  across missions.
Other donors have also helped replicate USAID’s projects and expand their  impact beyond target municipalities.
A municipal-level integrated financial management system implemented  in 4 municipalities in El Salvador will be extended a $2 million IDB  project in at least 20 additional municipalities. In addition, the IDB and  the Salvadoran government are planning a joint $2 million project to  replicate USAID’s methodology of linking participatory development  plans to municipal budget support.
In Bolivia, USAID, a German foundation, and the Dutch Embassy have  adopted a common methodology for municipal strengthening.
section_title: USAID’s Municipal-Level Efforts Were Constrained by Limited Municipal Resources and Skills and by Staff Turnover
paragraphs: USAID’s efforts to assist target municipalities have been constrained by  limited municipal resources and skills and by staff turnover. Although these  conditions exist in other countries, they were most evident in our visits to  Nicaragua and Guatemala.
According to USAID officials, Nicaraguan municipalities do not have the  authority to set local taxes, which have been lowered in some cases by  the national government to attract foreign investment.
Representatives from a Nicaraguan institute that works with  municipalities expressed concern that local officials may not possess  the appropriate skills to handle increased governance responsibilities.  USAID officials in Nicaragua and contractor staff in Guatemala said  municipal staff turnover has exacerbated this problem, as newly elected  mayors have fired existing staff and brought in less experienced  personnel.
Municipal staff in Guatemala also stated that they were frustrated about  their lack of resources, noting that it was difficult to put into practice  USAID’s method of participatory planning since there were few funds to  implement projects.
section_title: Policy Reforms Adopted and Institutions Strengthened at the National Level, but Results Affected by Level of Political Support for Decentralization
paragraphs: At the national level in all six countries, USAID has helped develop policies  and institutions that support municipalities, often by working with national  municipal associations.
In Peru, policy advice has been given to the government for a  nationwide decentralization program scheduled to begin in 2003. As part  of this support, the Prime Minister’s office reviewed local experiences  with decentralization and a congressional committee held public  hearings to obtain input into its draft decentralization law.
In Guatemala, USAID supported national-level working groups on  municipal indebtedness and tax codes.
In Colombia, USAID is helping the Colombian Federation of  Municipalities organize meetings among mayors and local leaders at the  regional level to discuss areas for policy reform.
In Nicaragua, the National Association of Municipalities, which advises  and advocates for municipalities, was established and strengthened.
However, USAID’s work in this area has been affected by the level of  political support for decentralization, which varies by country.
In Nicaragua, municipal officials and representatives of the national  municipal association noted that  the past government had provided  little political or financial support to municipalities. Subsequent to our  visit, the current government passed three decentralization laws in May  2002, according to a USAID official. The lack of a municipal civil service  law, for example, has posed obstacles to efforts to train local officials.
Although the Bolivian government’s support for decentralization  decreased after the 1997 elections, USAID continued to work and have  an impact at the municipal level because the key decentralization law  was already in place.
In El Salvador, USAID’s program has been assisted by the government’s  commitment to implement a supportive policy agenda.
section_title: Anticorruption Policies and Procedures Have Been Implemented in Some Countries, but the Long-term Impact Is Not Yet Evident
paragraphs: USAID anticorruption assistance has focused on  supporting reforms in anticorruption legislation and regulations,  introducing programs to make national and municipal government  institutions more transparent and accountable, and  fostering citizen awareness and oversight.
As shown in table 5, U.S. anticorruption assistance has been provided in  five of the six countries we visited, beginning with Peru in 1995.
subsections: section_title: Anticorruption Legislation Was Developed; Some Institutions Are More Transparent and Accountable; and Citizen Awareness Has Increased
paragraphs: USAID’s anticorruption activities have helped countries develop  anticorruption legislation and regulations. In Nicaragua, for example,  USAID provided recommendations for the 2001 National Budget Law and  worked with the National Assembly’s Anticorruption Commission to  promote civil service reform. In both Colombia and El Salvador, USAID has  supported measures to increase the accountability of public servants,  including the development of a code of ethics.
USAID also has helped government institutions take steps to become more  transparent and accountable.
In Nicaragua, USAID collaborated with other donors to help develop an  integrated financial management system. This system, when fully  operational, will enable the Ministry of Finance to track the spending of  13 government ministries, the National Assembly, and the courts (see  fig. 14).
In Colombia, the government adopted regulations that will require 3,000  national and subnational entities to follow standardized internal control  processes that were recommended by USAID.
USAID-supported anticorruption programs have also helped citizens  become more aware and active regarding corruption issues.
In Colombia, an anticorruption campaign reached 23 million people  through radio and television spots.
According to a study by a USAID contractor, Nicaraguans have become  better informed about corruption issues as a result of a USAID- supported national anticorruption awareness campaign.
Municipal-level public oversight in El Salvador and Colombia has  increased as a result of local citizen watchdog groups that have been  supported by USAID.
section_title: USAID’s Programs Are Challenged by a Lack of Consistent Political Support and by the Broad Scope of Corruption
paragraphs: Despite some initial success, the broader impact and sustainability of  USAID’s anticorruption programs are still unclear. Transparency  International, which is an international nongovernmental organization that  focuses on combating corruption, concurs that although there have been  some positive developments in the region, the results of anticorruption  programs have been modest so far. According to our observations and  discussions with USAID and host country officials, USAID’s projects have  been hindered by politicization and a lack of consistent political support.
In Nicaragua, for example, the Comptroller General’s Office, which  USAID had been supporting with technical assistance and training, was  reorganized. Now, a committee of political appointees runs it, impairing  its objectivity. In addition, according to a high-ranking Nicaraguan  official, in 2001 the Ministry of Finance fired experienced staff that had  been trained as part of the USAID- and World Bank-supported integrated  financial management system, resulting in lost institutional memory and  expertise.
In Peru, the Comptroller General’s Office has been unable to fully  implement its oversight plans owing to a lack of political or financial  support from the government, according to USAID and Peruvian  officials.
Finally, the systemic nature of corruption in Latin America, combined with  public skepticism about anticorruption efforts, poses a major challenge for  USAID’s programs. Although the political leaders of countries such as  Colombia and Nicaragua have stated that combating corruption is a high  priority, both USAID and the host countries are in the relatively early stages  of addressing a broad and deeply rooted problem in the region.  Transparency International notes that despite some progress, corruption  remains widespread in the region, and the credibility of institutions is low.  According to a 2002 study focusing on four Latin American countries,  higher levels of corruption are significantly associated with lower levels of  support for the political system.  This is the case in El Salvador, according  to a 1999 study, where Salvadorans who were victims of corruption  demonstrated less support for the political system than those who were  not.  In Nicaragua, public sector corruption is endemic, according to  USAID, and the public has little confidence in many government  institutions, in part because of this corruption. According to a 2001 survey  by a USAID anticorruption contractor, more than 70 percent of the  Colombians surveyed considered corruption to be common in government  institutions. A work plan prepared by the same USAID contractor cited a  recent World Bank survey indicating that the same percentage of  respondents considered the Colombian Congress to be corrupt or very  corrupt. According to this USAID contractor, widespread public skepticism  exists regarding the national government’s effort to combat corruption.  USAID has noted that this lack of confidence poses challenges to its work  in Colombia.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. governance-related assistance programs have enabled the six  countries we visited to take limited steps toward more effective,  responsive, and accountable government institutions. In some cases, other  donors have taken steps to replicate or expand USAID’s programs. At the  same time, however, USAID’s governance programs have been challenged  by inconsistent political will and resource constraints. In light of this  modest progress and the continued obstacles to reform, it is unlikely that  U.S. governance-related assistance will be able to produce sustainable  results without ongoing, long-term involvement.
section_title: Human Rights
paragraphs: Many Latin American countries have suffered from decades of  authoritarian rule and internal conflict. Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia in  particular have endured terrorism, massacres, and forced disappearances.  While the human rights situation in Peru and Guatemala has slowly  improved over the last few years, the situation in Colombia has  deteriorated even further. U.S. human rights assistance to Latin America  has supported efforts to foster greater awareness of, and respect for,  human rights.
From 1992 to 2002, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia were among the largest  recipients of USAID human rights funding in Latin America. U.S. assistance  efforts to improve the human rights situation in these countries have  included technical assistance for the creation of government agencies that  address human rights problems, training programs, education programs,  and the provision of protection for threatened individuals. For the most  part, the impact of these projects has been positive, but they are limited in  scope and hindered by a lack of resources. Often, political and logistical  problems must be resolved for these programs to work better. Despite  some improvements in governments’ respect for human rights in these  countries, serious problems persist. In some cases, longer term project  results may be difficult for host governments to sustain owing to high  recurring costs.
As shown in table 6, the U.S. government has provided human rights  assistance over the past decade to Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Human Rights Assistance Has Increased Awareness and Government Accountability
paragraphs: U.S. human rights assistance has had a positive impact in the three  countries we reviewed that have a current human rights program. In  Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, human rights assistance has addressed  past abuses, protected threatened individuals, and prevented future  abuses. These efforts have fostered an increased awareness among the  citizenry as to what rights the efforts have, and they have increased  government accountability. Provided primarily by USAID, human rights  assistance in these countries has focused on  preventing future human rights abuses by promoting greater public  awareness and mechanisms to address potential incidents;  protecting human rights by providing physical, economic, and legal  assistance to threatened individuals and communities; and  responding to past abuses by supporting reconciliation commissions as  well as the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations.
subsections: section_title: Mechanisms Were Put in Place to Prevent Human Rights Abuses
paragraphs: USAID assistance programs have served to foster greater citizen awareness  of human rights and have provided mechanisms for government action in  support of human rights.  For example, in Colombia, USAID has supported  the creation of a national information network, called the “Early Warning  System,” for citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and local authorities  to report signs of impending massacres or other human rights violations in  their communities by any of the irregular armed groups involved in that  country’s ongoing conflict.  If a threat is deemed real, the military, police, a  national social service organization, or all three, will be alerted to take  appropriate action. As of August 2002, USAID had provided $600,000 of a  total planned investment of $3.1 million to support direct technical  assistance and training for the network as well as to establish its central  office. USAID also has helped establish 13 regional offices out of a planned  15, although the Early Warning System director said even more offices  would be needed. According to its Coordinator, the Early Warning System  has been publicized on the Internet and advertised on both television and  radio to inform citizens about its existence. This project appears to have  facilitated citizens’ ability to recognize and report potential human rights  threats as well as allowed them to hold the government directly responsible  for taking action. From June 2001 through August 2002, 150 alerts were  emitted, of which the military, the police, or both, responded to 107. The  Early Warning System director estimates that this response has saved  90,000 people from being victimized, although no actual results indicators  have been developed.
Although the Early Warning System is a unique tool for preventing large- scale human rights violations and has great potential for replication,  coordination problems could hinder its proper implementation and  ultimate impact. The director admitted that smooth communication  between the regional and central offices can be problematic on the  weekends, particularly Sundays, when the central office is not staffed. The  system does not appear to have adequate backup communications methods  and at times relies on one cell phone to ensure that alerts are transmitted to  the appropriate authorities. Furthermore, government authorities have not always responded consistently to alerts and have failed to avert major  human rights violations.
section_title: Increased Protection Provided for Some Threatened Citizens
paragraphs: The U.S. government also has supported the creation of protection  programs for threatened citizens in Colombia. The Justice Department  supports both a witness and a judicial protection program. Both of these  programs place special emphasis on operational security and seek to  ensure safe participation in judicial proceedings for witnesses, judges,  investigators, and prosecutors. USAID supports a separate protection  program for human rights defenders. As of August 2002, USAID has helped  protect 2,776 individuals from irregular armed groups.  In response to  lobbying from the human rights community, the Colombian government  has expanded the target protected population to include criminal  witnesses, union leaders, journalists, leftist party members, mayors (all  1,098 of Colombia’s mayors were threatened with kidnapping or death by  the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia if they did not resign in  2002), council members, and municipal human rights workers. In the 5-year  period between 1997 and 2002, the Colombian government spent  approximately $25 million on the project. Resources, however, are too  limited to help all vulnerable groups of people or even to keep pace with  the increasing demand for individual protection. Nevertheless, the program  demonstrates that the Colombian government is taking some action to  protect threatened citizens.
section_title: Official Response Provided for Some Past Abuses
paragraphs: USAID human rights programs also have fostered greater government  responsiveness to allegations of past or ongoing human rights abuses. For  example, the Human Rights Promoters Network operated by the  Colombian government educates citizen leaders about their rights  protected by law. These leaders are expected to promote greater human  rights awareness by replicating the training in their own communities,  particularly for those groups most vulnerable to human rights violations.
USAID also has been instrumental in supporting the creation of Human  Rights Ombudsman Offices in five of the six countries by providing  technical assistance, office equipment, and salaried professionals. These  offices address citizen complaints, investigate officials accused of human  rights violations, and propose human rights legislation. The State  Department has reported that despite providing a legal channel for citizen  complaints, funding problems have undermined sustainability and  credibility of the ombudsman offices in Colombia and Nicaragua.  Furthermore, the ombudsman has at times temporarily cast the entire  office in a negative light, as in the case of Guatemala, where an  ombudsmamn was accused of corruption. Various government officials,  however, stated that, according to public opinion polls in Peru and Bolivia,  the ombudsman’s office is one of the most highly respected public  organizations.
In Guatemala, USAID helped the Attorney General’s Office design the first  Victims Assistance Office in Latin America in 1997, staffed with full-time  doctors, nurses, social workers and lawyers to provide aid to victims of  crime and gather evidence for potential prosecution (see fig. 15). Since  then, each of Guatemala’s 23 departments has established at least one such  office.
USAID human rights programs have also fostered greater justice and  resolution for victims and their families. For example, the Foundation for  Anthropological Forensics of Guatemala, with funding from USAID, has  been carrying out exhumations of clandestine cemeteries created during  Guatemala’s 34-year civil war (see fig. 16). These efforts have helped to  prove that massacres occurred, put questions about loved ones to rest, and  aided in national reconciliation efforts. Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation  Commission is carrying out exhumation efforts with similar goals and also  is investigating culpability for atrocities. One of the commissioners with  whom we met stated that U.S. assistance has been critical for the  functioning of the commission, keeping it in operation when the Peruvian  government was delayed in providing promised funding. The commission’s  work is expected to culminate in a July 2003 report that will make  recommendations for government reparations.
Finally, the Justice Department has also worked to achieve justice and  resolution for victims of human rights violations in Colombia. The  department has trained special units of prosecutors and investigators to  pursue major human rights cases and high-impact crimes, such as  massacres, bombings, and kidnappings, in the criminal justice system.  From August 2001 to August 2002, special units operating out of eight cities  prosecuted 167 cases against irregular armed groups, including high-profile  cases such as the assassination attempt on then-presidential candidate  Alvaro Uribe in 2002 and various massacres across the country (see fig. 17).  According to the Justice Department, it has plans to help the Colombian  government expand the number and size of these units in fiscal years 2003  and 2004.
section_title: Despite Improvements, Serious Human Rights Problems Persist
paragraphs: According to the State Department’s most recent human rights reports,  although government respect for human rights has improved in some  cases, serious problems still remain. In Peru, State reports that in recent  years the government has demonstrated greater respect for human rights  advocates and had generally improved its relationship with civil society. In  Guatemala, State reports that the government generally respects the  human rights of its citizens, but its willingness and ability to prosecute and  convict human rights violators is seriously limited, and that the police and  military may be involved in illegal executions. In Colombia, the  government's human rights record remained poor, according to State; there  were continued efforts to improve the legal framework and institutional  mechanisms for protecting human rights, but implementation lagged, and  serious problems remained in many areas. For example, members of the  police and armed forces have committed serious human rights abuses and  have collaborated with paramilitary insurgents in doing so, but they have  rarely been brought to justice. Government security forces also often failed  to take action to prevent paramilitary attacks, according to the State  Department report.
section_title: Outlook for Human Rights Assistance
paragraphs: The long-term outlook for many U.S. human rights assistance projects  differs from most of the other programs we reviewed. Some human rights  efforts that the United States is supporting, such as Peru’s Truth  Commission, are short term and are projected to end on a specific date.  Other projects, such as assistance to Colombia’s internally displaced  persons, are fundamentally humanitarian in nature and may require outside  support for as long as there is internal conflict. Funding for some longer  term projects, however, is questionable owing to potentially high recurring  costs. For example, the Colombian human rights units trained by the  Justice Department still have a very limited national presence and depend  on U.S. support to update and expand their training and equipment. It is not  clear whether the Colombian government will expand these units on a  national basis.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The United States has provided Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru with some  important tools to help address the human rights problems. Nonetheless,  human rights remain a major concern in Colombia and Guatemala.  Given  the magnitude and political complexity of these problems and the limited  scope of U.S. assistance, the tools that the United States has provided are  likely to have only a marginal impact on these problems.
section_title: Elections
paragraphs: Over the last two decades, many Latin American countries have  transitioned to democracy and most countries in the region have held  elections regularly. Although U.S. election-related assistance has supported  efforts that have contributed to free and fair elections in the six countries  we reviewed, most of this assistance has gone to three of these countries— Nicaragua, Peru, and El Salvador—to help them improve electoral  institutions and enhance voter access. U.S. officials noted that of these  three countries, only Nicaragua is likely to require significant international  support before its next major election.
subsections: section_title: The United States Has Primarily Targeted Three Countries with Assistance in Election Administration, Voter Access, and Electoral Observation
paragraphs: The United States has been the largest donor of election-related assistance  in many of the six countries we visited, and USAID has provided the bulk of  this aid, almost $66 million, during fiscal years 1990 through 2002. Most of  this assistance went to Nicaragua ($27 million), Peru ($20 million), and El  Salvador ($13 million). The State Department, the National Endowment for  Democracy, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and  the International Republican Institute provided smaller amounts of  additional election assistance to some of these countries. The last two  organizations have also used USAID election funds in some of these  countries, according to representatives from these institutions.
As shown in table 7, USAID provided electoral assistance to all six of the  countries visited, starting in 1990 and continuing off and on to the present.
Overall, U.S. election assistance activities have focused on  improving election administration by building the institutional capacity   enhancing voter access by improving voter registration and education  and supporting electoral reform, and  legitimizing election results by supporting electoral observation by  domestic and international groups.
USAID also has recently helped improve election administration in Peru  and Nicaragua by strengthening the capabilities of electoral authorities. In  Peru, USAID supported staff training, technical assistance, election  planning, logistics, information systems, and transmission of results by  providing almost $3.3 million in assistance before the 2001 national  elections. The agency also provided support at a lower level to help run  Peru’s 2002 regional and local elections. In Nicaragua, USAID has provided  similar types of election administration support since 1990, including more  than $1.8 million to the electoral authority for administrative  enhancements in planning, logistics, information technology, and  transmission of results before the 2001 national elections.
U.S. assistance also has helped enhance voter access to the electoral  system by improving voter registration and education in El Salvador,  Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru. In El Salvador, according to USAID  officials, the agency supported the establishment of civil and voter  registries and helped issue 937,000 single identity documents, out of an  expected total of 3.2 million documents, which will be used as official voter  identification in future elections. On the basis of an electoral reform  enacted with USAID support, the Salvadorian electoral authority plans to  use the new voter registry to assign voters to polling stations closer to their  residence for the 2004 presidential  elections, thereby further improving  voter access. In Nicaragua, USAID also provided support for registration  efforts before the 2001 elections. This assistance helped about 150,000  citizens obtain voting credentials, according to USAID. To support  Guatemala’s 2003 elections, USAID, through OAS, is providing $750,000 in  assistance to fund voter registration activities to increase the access of the  population to the electoral system. In Peru, USAID funded voter-training  activities conducted by nongovernmental groups before the 2001 national  elections and the 2002 regional elections.
In Peru, El Salvador, and Guatemala, U.S. election-related assistance also  has supported electoral reform efforts to improve voter access, with  limited success. This assistance has focused on enhancing the rules and  procedures governing the electoral system in order to improve political  participation of the population. In Peru, USAID provided support for  electoral reforms that were proposed following the 2001 national elections,  but these reforms have not yet been enacted. In El Salvador and  Guatemala, following the signing of those countries’ Peace Accords in 1992  and 1996, respectively, the agency supported efforts to improve electoral  rules and procedures and increase political participation of the population,  including participation of women, indigenous groups, and rural  populations. In El Salvador, USAID supported the drafting of four  proposals to reform political parties, the electoral authority, electoral  procedures, and proportional representation. In Guatemala, the agency  supported efforts to develop an electoral and political parties law and to  facilitate public discussion of various other proposals under consideration.  These reforms are still being considered in the El Salvadoran and  Guatemalan legislatures.
U.S. assistance has recently helped legitimize election results by supporting  election observation in Peru, Nicaragua, and Colombia by domestic and  international groups. In Peru’s 2001 elections, for instance, USAID provided  more than $2.1 million to field election observers from the Peruvian  Ombudsman’s Office; the Organization of American States; the National  Democratic Institute; the Carter Center; and Transparencia, which is a  local nongovernmental group (see fig. 18). USAID also provided a similar  amount to fund international and domestic observers of Nicaragua’s 2001  elections and $325,000 to support OAS observers of Colombia’s 2002  elections.
section_title: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Ensure Free and Fair Elections, but Nicaragua May Still Need Additional Assistance
paragraphs: The State Department has noted in its human rights reports, on the basis of  reports by domestic and international observation groups, that elections in  the six countries have been generally free and fair, with the exception of  the seriously flawed and controversial 2000 Peruvian national elections.  This pattern of free and fair elections is consistent with the elections held  in other countries in the region since many of these countries started their  transition to democracy almost two decades ago.
Looking toward the future, USAID officials stated that Peru and El  Salvador might require significantly less international assistance to run  upcoming elections. USAID officials highlighted that these countries have  enhanced their institutional capabilities to run elections, as demonstrated  by the widely recognized legitimacy of their recent elections and the  decreasing international support required by their electoral authorities for  conducting elections. These officials noted that USAID does not plan to  fund any electoral activities in Peru and after the 2003 elections in El  Salvador (see fig. 19).
On the other hand, Nicaragua, which has received the largest amount of  U.S. election assistance, will likely require significant international aid to  run its next major election, according to USAID officials. These officials  noted that the Nicaraguan electoral authority, despite efforts to improve it,  still faces major financial, planning, and organizational problems. For  example, this electoral authority is still highly politicized and exhibits  serious institutional and managerial weaknesses that compromise its  ability to run elections. Also, Nicaragua’s civil and voter registries are  outdated, and many voter documents used in the 2001 national election  were temporary or will expire soon, leaving the challenge of registering a  large number of voters before the next election. In their final 2001 election  observation reports, the Carter Center and the International Republican  Institute noted that, despite having held a free and fair election, Nicaragua  still has important shortcomings in its electoral system, particularly in  election administration and voter access.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. elections assistance has helped all six countries we visited realize a  fundamental component of democracy—free and fair elections. While  continued improvements will be needed to achieve wider participation and  greater efficiency in elections administration, particularly in Nicaragua,  basic capabilities are in place in these countries to enable them to continue  to hold free and fair elections into the future.
section_title: Management Issues Hinder Impact and Sustainability of U.S. Democracy Assistance
paragraphs: Many organizations and entities are involved in providing democracy  assistance in the six countries we reviewed, including U.S. government  agencies, other multilateral and bilateral donors, and nongovernmental  organizations. Effective coordination and cooperation among these players  is critical for achieving meaningful, long-term results from assistance  efforts. U.S. agencies have not always managed their programs in a way  that would leverage the contributions from all of these organizations,  particularly other major donors, and maximize the impact and  sustainability of U.S. funded programs. Assistance efforts are not always  well-coordinated among the agencies, and strategic plans have not defined  overarching goals and the roles that key U.S. agencies will play in these  efforts or ways to link these efforts with those of other donors to help  ensure that results are sustainable. Furthermore, evaluation of program  results and sharing lessons learned has been limited among U.S. agencies  and implementers across countries where this assistance is provided.
subsections: section_title: Poorly Coordinated Program Management Limits Effectiveness of U.S. Democracy Assistance
paragraphs: Although a wide variety of U.S. government agencies and international  donors provide democracy assistance, coordination of this assistance was  inconsistent in the six countries we visited. We found that those  organizations supporting democratic institutions did not always cooperate  in a way that would maximize the impact and sustainability of their efforts.  As a result, the programs they implemented were often fragmented and not  mutually supportive and failed to overcome common financial and political  obstacles. U.S. government agencies have not outlined a long-term,  strategic approach to this assistance that considers all of the major parties  and available resources and information.
subsections: section_title: Poor Coordination and Strategic Planning among U.S. Government Agencies
paragraphs: The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act)  requires U.S. government agencies to identify their strategic goals and  develop annual plans for achieving them.  Further, as we have previously  reported in our work relating to this act, such plans should identify how  similar programs conducted by other agencies will be coordinated to  ensure that goals are consistent, and, as appropriate, program efforts are  mutually reinforcing.
The annual performance plans prepared by the State Department and  USAID in accordance with the Results Act both identify promoting  democracy and human rights abroad as agency strategic goals.  However,  neither USAID’s or State’s plans nor the subordinate regional or country- level planning documents we reviewed specifically address the role of  other U.S. agencies and donors in ensuring that U.S.-funded democracy  projects are well coordinated and leverage domestic and international  resources. With few exceptions, these planning documents did not take  into account the unique resources that each of the various U.S. agencies  has to offer and the role each could play over what will be a long-term  effort to help countries achieve and institutionalize democratic reforms.  Although some documents mentioned that other agencies would be  involved in the assistance effort, the nature or duration of that involvement  was not discussed in detail.
The relationship among USAID and the State and Justice Departments has  frequently been difficult when it comes to rule of law programs, which has  hindered long-term joint planning in that area. As we noted in a 1999 report,  interagency coordination on rule of law assistance has been a long-standing  problem. At that time, the Chairman of the House Committee on  International Relations had expressed the concern that, because funds  were provided through so many channels, rule of law programs had  become inefficient and uncoordinated. Little progress has been made to  resolve this problem. According to U.S. officials with whom we spoke, the  relationship among implementing agencies is often still characterized more  by competition than cooperation and has led to fragmented programs that  are not always mutually supportive in achieving common goals. For  example, in Bolivia, poor communication and disagreement among these  agencies on their respective roles has disrupted efforts to assist the  development of that country’s national police by casting the program’s  staffing and funding in uncertainty. Unresolved coordination issues among  these agencies have precluded efforts to establish a joint strategy on law  enforcement development on either the regional, or country-specific level.  As a result, in the countries we visited, the agencies are often operating on  parallel tracks and not developing programs that are closely coordinated  and mutually supportive.
Better coordination among these agencies could leverage the critical  resources and comparative advantage that each offers to overcome  obstacles. For example, while USAID has significant institutional  experience designing and implementing development programs, the Justice  Department has significant technical expertise in law enforcement and  criminal investigations, and the State Department has diplomatic  relationships and influence that can be helpful in resolving political  impediments to reform.
section_title: Limited Cooperation among International Donors
paragraphs: Other international donors have major efforts to promote democracy in the  countries we visited, and two of the largest, the World Bank and the IDB,  are funded in part by contributions from the U.S. government. However, the  strategic plans and other related planning documents prepared by the State  and Justice Departments and USAID included very little information on  plans to cooperate with other major international donors in the six  countries we reviewed. Some plans mentioned a few successful  cooperative efforts in the past, but donor cooperation was not consistently  discussed as an integral component of the U.S. government’s approach in  any of the areas of democracy assistance we reviewed.
We observed that donors working in closer coordination, with a common  strategy and work plan, can make significant progress. In Bolivia, the U.S.  and German governments embarked on a joint program to implement the  new criminal code, each providing mutually supporting activities and  financing. As a result of this effort, a large number of legal operators were  trained on the code’s provisions, and the Bolivian government began  implementing the code on schedule. Other examples of close coordination  include the following:  In Bolivia, USAID, a German foundation, and the government of the  Netherlands have adopted a common methodology for municipal  strengthening, expanding the impact of USAID’s initial contributions to  additional municipalities.
In El Salvador, the IDB is funding projects to extend a USAID-supported,  municipal-level financial management system to additional localities.
Donors and Latin American countries have been collaborating  regionally on anticorruption activities since the early 1990s. For  example, the Donors Consultative Group of the USAID-supported  Americas’ Accountability/Anticorruption Project has helped to increase  the number of anticorruption projects in the region, according to  USAID. Other multilateral initiatives, such as the Inter-American  Convention Against Corruption and ongoing United Nations  negotiations for a global anticorruption convention, are also mobilizing  states to focus on corruption.
Such donor cooperation was not always the norm in the countries we  visited, however, and donors often pursued parallel but not necessarily  mutually supporting activities. Donor coordination was generally  characterized by organizations keeping one another informed of the nature,  progress, and location of their activities. Across the six countries, the U.S.  government and other donors generally worked on different agendas in the  area of judicial reform. In Bolivia, for example, USAID and the World Bank  divided their justice sector reform efforts between host government  agencies using different approaches. The two organizations have helped  the government develop two information systems—one to track criminal  cases and one for civil cases. At the time of our visit in June 2002, neither  system was being fully implemented on a national scale, and USAID  officials were concerned about the future compatibility of these two  systems.
Pooling financial resources and political influence could enable donor  organizations to overcome some political and financial obstacles that limit  the impact and sustainability of assistance programs. The United States,  with its on-the-ground presence and long-standing diplomatic  relationships, can offer significant technical expertise and influence to help  achieve political support. At the same time, the multilateral development  banks, in particular, can offer significant, low-cost, long-term financing for  host governments. Better coordinated, these resources could be combined  to (1) leverage political support from host governments for mutually  agreed-upon reform programs, (2) devise appropriate program designs, and  (3) provide long-term financing that could help ensure that the programs  are sustainable.
Donor cooperation can be difficult for a number of political and cultural  reasons. Donors may have different development priorities or policies that  may not allow them to work on the same types of programs in some cases.  U.S. government officials have also cited bureaucratic incompatibilities  between the agencies that effectively limited the ability of the agencies to  work closely together on certain projects. In one country we visited, the  working relationship between USAID and a multilateral development bank  has been difficult, according to a USAID mission official with whom we  spoke. Overcoming some of these obstacles to closer cooperation may  require a high-level commitment and impetus from the senior management  of these organizations.
section_title: Limited Evaluation and Sharing of Lessons Learned among Program Implementers
paragraphs: U.S. agencies and their implementing contractors and grantees have not  extensively compiled and shared information on program results. Many  U.S. assistance programs have not been evaluated, and important  democracy project information, such as materials, final reports, and  evaluations, are not systematically made available to the large body of  project implementers.
subsections: section_title: Inconsistent Program Evaluation by U.S. Agencies
paragraphs: The U.S. agencies implementing democracy assistance programs have not  consistently evaluated the results of their activities. Our review of project  documentation and our discussions with senior U.S. government officials  at the State and Justice Departments and USAID indicate that limited  efforts have been made to review project results over time to ensure that  impact and sustainability have been achieved. In particular, officials from  the State and Justice Departments stated that those agencies have  conducted very little formal evaluation of law enforcement assistance.  Although USAID has a more extensive process for assessing its activities,  its efforts to evaluate democracy assistance have not been consistent.  Although governance programs in Latin America, in particular legislative  strengthening, have undergone considerable evaluation, we found  relatively little formal evaluation of rule of law, human rights, and elections  assistance. The level of evaluation has varied geographically as well: While  USAID sponsored a comprehensive democracy evaluation for Bolivia, it  has not conducted similar studies for the other countries we visited. In  2002, USAID commissioned a private contractor to complete a broad study  of the agency’s achievements in its rule of law programs around the world,  including in many of the countries we visited. This recently completed  study provides information on the nature and history of USAID rule of law  programs in individual countries but was not meant to be an evaluation of  these programs, according to a USAID official.
Furthermore, the agencies have not consistently used available survey data  to help evaluate the impact of their activities. In several of the countries we  visited, a USAID contractor had been conducting regular “democratic  values surveys” to gauge public opinion about recent and ongoing political  and government reforms, many of which the United States has assisted.  The mission in Bolivia has used the results of this survey as a source of data  for monitoring, among other things, the impact of Bolivia’s decentralization  activities; however, the other missions or embassies we visited did not  consistently use these data as a tool for evaluating or monitoring the  impact of U.S. assistance.
Without systematic evaluations identifying lessons learned and best  practices, agencies will have difficulty making informed decisions about a  strategy to maximize impact and sustainability and planning for future  efforts. For example, USAID and the State and Justice Departments are  currently debating the U.S. government’s strategy for police assistance.  Each agency has participated in police development programs, and  officials from each agency stated that they are uniquely qualified to manage  such programs in the future. Yet, none of these agencies has conducted a  comprehensive evaluation of police assistance program results to inform  the debate about how best to provide this assistance. Evaluations or other  efforts to systematically compile lessons learned across countries could  enable a more objective comparison of agency performance to identify the  advantages of one approach over another and to inform a long-term  interagency strategy for achieving various democracy assistance goals.
section_title: Project Materials and Information on Results Are Not Widely Available
paragraphs: USAID has not taken steps to pool the resources produced by U.S.-funded  democracy program implementers, including international development  firms, private voluntary organizations, and other nongovernmental  organizations to help them achieve common and related goals more  effectively and efficiently. USAID-funded contractors often used similar  approaches to achieve democratic strengthening and reform in many of the  countries we visited. For example, support for local governments often  aimed to influence the broad policy framework in a country while directly  assisting a relatively small number of target municipalities. However, we  found little evidence that the project implementers in these countries had  shared with each other the materials they had developed. For example, in  several countries, USAID financed the printing of operational guidance for  municipal officials, ranging from handbooks on countrywide criteria for  governance to detailed, step-by-step manuals on ways to improve local  public administration. The contractors and USAID officials stated that to  their knowledge, these handbooks had not been systematically shared  among USAID missions or contractors.
Although mission officials and implementers told us they frequently shared  information on an informal basis, the agency’s attempts to systematically  compile information about democracy program implementation and results  to establish an agency wide “institutional knowledge base” are incomplete.  USAID has a very decentralized organizational structure, and, according to  USAID officials, the agency has no central repository of implementation  reports and other program documents that can be accessed by the various  democracy program implementers to determine, among other things,  which activities have been more successful than others. Although USAID  maintains some documentation from its democracy programs, such as  scopes of work for projects, at its intranet site, the agency does not compile  contractors’ technical manuals and final reports with information on  implementation and results. Such information could be very instrumental  in identifying approaches that are most appropriate for replication, while  avoiding developing similar materials in different countries at additional  expense. As we have previously reported, use of lessons learned is a  principal component of an organizational culture committed to continuous  improvement. Lessons learned mechanisms serve to communicate  acquired knowledge more effectively and to ensure that beneficial  information is factored into planning, work processes, and activities.  Lessons learned provide a powerful method of sharing good ideas for  improving work processes, program design and implementation, and cost- effectiveness.  USAID mission directors and other agency officials stated  that future assistance efforts would be more effective if they were designed  on the basis of concrete information and lessons learned from similar  programs in other countries.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Local resources for sustaining democracy programs are difficult to  mobilize given the serious economic problems in the countries we visited,  and funding shortages were often cited by program implementers and  beneficiaries as major obstacles to long-term program success. Therefore,  it is crucial that the U.S. government and other international donors  manage available international resources as efficiently as possible.  Achieving greater impact and responsibility in democracy assistance  projects may be more likely with a more strategic approach, including  closer coordination, and greater information sharing among U.S. agencies,  international donors, and other program implementers.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that U.S. assistance activities designed to support and strengthen  democracies in Latin America have the maximum impact and sustainability,  we recommend that the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the  Administrator of USAID  develop more comprehensive interagency strategic plans at the regional  and country level for democracy assistance addressing how U.S.  agencies will cooperate with each other and other major donors to  achieve greater impact and sustainability in democracy programs;   establish a strategy for periodically evaluating democracy assistance  projects that is consistent across agencies, countries, and types of  programs; and  establish a systematic mechanism to share information on development  approaches, methods, materials, and results from all democracy  assistance projects among U.S. agencies and implementers.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Justice,  the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Inter- American Foundation for their comment. The Inter-American Foundation  did not comment on this report. The comments of the State and Justice  Departments and USAID, along with our responses to specific points, are  reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively.
In general, the State and Justice Departments and USAID acknowledged  that democracy assistance is a long-term challenge that requires host  country commitment and support for reforms, and that U.S.-supported  institutions and programs must ultimately be sustainable, as we discuss in  this report. Overall, the agencies basically agreed with the thrust of our  recommendations regarding how the management of program assistance  could be improved. They also noted that in some cases, activities are either  planned or under way that would address our recommendations.
The State Department concurred with our recommendation that it work  with other agencies to develop comprehensive strategic plans for  democracy assistance at the regional and country levels. State agreed with  our recommendation that democracy assistance programs should be  evaluated but said that our recommendation was a “broad brush” approach  that is not appropriate for the diversity of activities covered in the report.  State said that it is taking steps with USAID and the Justice Department to  improve evaluation, including recently agreeing to undertake joint  evaluations of justice programs. Such actions appear to meet the intent of  our recommendation. However, our recommendation is intended to  establish a basis for periodic overall assessments of democracy programs  as well as regular evaluations of specific components of democracy  assistance, such as rule of law, governance, and elections.
While the State Department agreed that it would be desirable to have better  access to project information across the board, they noted that the  recommendation goes too far in suggesting the need for a centralized  record system containing all project materials. State also said that much  useful information is currently shared among programs on an informal  basis. Our recommendation is designed to address an important problem  we identified in this report, namely that much information is currently not  being shared among agencies or programs with similar goals, approaches,  and methods. The thinking behind this recommendation is the State  Department and other agencies that fund and implement democracy  assistance programs should maintain key program documents and  evaluations along with examples of materials used for core activities (e.g.,  training manuals so that groups implementing similar programs can benefit  from lessons learned). Given the advances in Web-based technology as a  way of sharing information, we believe this recommendation is not  unreasonable. The State Department also provided technical comments,  which we have incorporated in this report, where appropriate.
The Justice Department endorsed our recommendation for better  coordination and planning among State, USAID, and Justice; agreed that  objective, regularized evaluation of assistance programs is needed to  consistently obtain useful information on program outcomes; and  supported the recommendation that agencies involved in democracy  assistance should establish effective information-sharing mechanisms. The  Justice Department also provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated in this report, where appropriate.
USAID also agreed with our recommendations. Regarding our  recommendation on strategic planning, USAID said that it participates in a  number of planning activities but that such planning systems can always be  upgraded. It also agreed that periodic evaluations of program outcomes  and results are important, noting that evaluating democracy programs is a  challenge made difficult by the complexities and subtleties of local political  situations that influence democracy program implementation and  outcomes. USAID also agreed with our recommendation that agencies  need to do a better job of sharing information on development methods,  approaches, and materials, noting that a new bureau within the agency  should respond to these concerns. USAID also provided technical  comments, which we have incorporated throughout this report, where  appropriate.
The State and Justice Departments both commented on our discussion of a  provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that restricts the use of  foreign assistance funds for training and financial support for police and  other law enforcement forces of foreign governments (section 660). In its  comments, State said that the Executive Branch should develop and  propose to the Congress new legislation on law enforcement assistance,  stating that the Executive Branch needs a clear statement of its authority to  provide law enforcement assistance abroad, coupled with whatever  specific prohibitions the Congress may wish to consider. The Justice  Department stated that it is concerned that section 660 may in some  instances adversely impact long-range planning and the development of  broad-based, practical police assistance programs. The Justice Department  also indicated that it will work with the State Department and USAID to  consider whether changes to section 660 would be appropriate. We believe  the approach suggested by the State and Justice Departments could be an  important and useful step in providing options for the Congress to consider  regarding potential amendments to section 660.