Deepwater Horizon: Coast Guard and Interior Could Improve Their Offshore Energy Inspection Programs
Published: 2011-11-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The April 2010 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU), showed that the consequences of an incident on an offshore energy facility can be significant. A key way to ensure that offshore energy facilities are meeting applicable security, safety, and production standards is through conducting periodic inspections of the facilities. The Coast Guard and the Department of the Interior (Interior) share oversight responsibility for offshore energy facilities. The Coast Guard is to conduct security inspections of such facilities, whereas based on an agreement between the two agencies, Interior is to conduct safety compliance inspections on some offshore facilities on behalf of the Coast Guard as well as its own inspections to verify production. This testimony addresses: (1) the extent to which the Coast Guard has conducted security inspections of offshore energy facilities, and what additional actions are needed; (2) the extent to which Interior has conducted inspections of offshore energy facilities, including those on behalf of the Coast Guard, and challenges it faces in conducting such inspections; and (3) the Coast Guard's oversight authority of MODUs. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from September 2008 through October 2011.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Coast Guard conducted about one-third of its required annual security inspections of offshore energy facilities from 2008 through 2010 and does not have procedures in place to help ensure that its field units conduct such inspections in accordance with its guidance. The Coast Guard's guidance does not describe specific procedures for the way in which Coast Guard staff should track whether annual inspections have been conducted. For example, Coast Guard field unit supervisors and marine inspectors GAO interviewed from five of the six Coast Guard field units that are to conduct annual security inspections said that they do not maintain any tool to track whether such inspections had been conducted. GAO recommended in October 2011 that, among other things, the Coast Guard develop policies and procedures to monitor and track annual security inspections. The Coast Guard concurred and stated that it is planning to update its guidance for field units to address these issues. Interior's inspection program has not consistently met its internal targets for production inspections, and faces human capital and reorganization challenges, but has met its limited target for compliance inspections conducted for the Coast Guard. In March 2010, GAO found that for four district offices it reviewed, Interior only met its production inspection goals once during fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Further, GAO reported that difficulties in hiring, training, and retaining key staff had contributed to challenges in meeting its inspections goals. However, in recent years, Interior reported that it met its 10 percent target to conduct compliance inspections of staffed, fixed offshore energy facilities on behalf of the Coast Guard. In fiscal year 2010, Interior reported that it exceeded its target and conducts such inspections on 169 of the 1,021 staffed, fixed offshore energy facilities and has met this target for such inspections for the previous 5 years. In May 2010, Interior reorganized its bureau responsible for overseeing offshore energy activities. In June 2011, GAO reported that while this reorganization may eventually lead to more effective operations, GAO is concerned with Interior's ability to undertake this reorganization while meeting its oversight responsibilities. Among other things, Interior plans to hire additional staff with expertise in inspections and engineering. Amidst these changes, Interior reported that it was difficult to determine how many inspections it would conduct in fiscal year 2012. The Coast Guard has limited authority regarding the security of MODUs registered to foreign countries, such as the Deepwater Horizon. MODUs are subject to Coast Guard security regulations if (1) they are self-propelled or (2) they meet specific production or personnel levels. Whereas the Coast Guard may physically inspect a U.S.-flagged MODU to ensure compliance with applicable security requirements, the Coast Guard's oversight of foreign-flagged, self-propelled MODUs, such as the Deepwater Horizon, is more limited. The Coast Guard is conducting a study designed to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy facilities, including MODUs. Further, the Coast Guard has implemented a risk-based oversight policy for all MODUs to address safety and environmental protection issues. Although this policy does not directly address security, increased oversight resulting from this policy could help mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack to a MODU. GAO has previously recommended that the Coast Guard develop policies and procedures to monitor and track annual security inspections for offshore energy facilities and that Interior address its human capital challenges. The Coast Guard and Interior agreed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here today to discuss oversight and inspections of  offshore energy facilities. The April 2010 explosion of the Deepwater  Horizon mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) showed that the  consequences of an incident at offshore energy facilities can be significant.  The explosion resulted in 11 deaths, serious injuries, and the largest oil  spill in the history of the United States. Recent reports on the Deepwater  Horizon incident, including the Incident Specific Preparedness Review, On  Scene Coordinator Report, and Joint Investigation Team Report, have  raised questions about the oversight of such offshore energy facilities. Our  recent work raises similar concerns about federal inspections and related  oversight of offshore energy facilities and MODUs.
Offshore energy facilities include facilities that operate on the outer  continental shelf (OCS) and are generally described as facilities temporarily  or permanently attached to the subsoil or seabed of the OCS and which  engage in exploration, development, or production of oil, natural gas, or  mineral resources. There are currently about 3,900 such facilities in the  Gulf of Mexico, which include fixed and floating offshore energy facilities as  well as MODUs. The nation’s economy and security are dependent, in  part, on the domestic offshore exploration and production of oil and natural  gas that occur at offshore energy facilities. However, if an incident occurs  at one of these offshore facilities, it could be difficult for the Coast Guard  and other federal or local agencies to respond quickly because such  facilities are generally located many miles from shore.
A key way to ensure that offshore energy facilities are meeting applicable  security, safety, and environmental standards is through conducting  periodic inspections of the facilities. The Coast Guard and the  Department of the Interior (Interior) share oversight responsibility for  offshore energy facilities. The Coast Guard—a component of the  Department of Homeland Security—is the lead federal agency  responsible for maritime security, including the security of offshore energy  facilities. Interior, through its component agencies, is the lead federal  agency responsible for enforcing safety, environmental oversight, and  conservation compliance regarding offshore resources on the OCS.
Our testimony today will address three main objectives:  the extent to which the Coast Guard has conducted security  inspections of offshore energy facilities, and what additional actions  are needed;  the extent to which Interior has conducted inspections of offshore  energy facilities, including those on behalf of the Coast Guard, and  what challenges it faces in conducting such inspections; and  the Coast Guard’s oversight authority of MODUs.
This testimony is based on an October 2011 report on the Coast Guard’s  efforts to ensure the security of offshore energy facilities as well as our  body of work on Interior’s oil and natural gas leasing and royalty collection  programs issued from September 2008 through June 2011. We  conducted the performance audit work that supports this statement in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Detailed information on the scope and methodology for our prior work can  be found in those reports. Further, we reviewed memorandums of  understanding or agreement between the Coast Guard and Interior  regarding how the two agencies regulate offshore energy facilities as well  as agency documents, such as budget justifications.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Jurisdictions on the OCS
paragraphs: In 2004, the Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service—a  component of Interior that was subsequently reorganized into the Bureau  of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE),  and, most recently, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)  and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)— signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to delineate inspection  responsibilities between the agencies. Per the MOU, the Coast Guard is  responsible for ensuring (1) the safety of life and property on offshore  energy facilities and vessels engaged in OCS activities; (2) workplace  safety and health, including enforcement of requirements related to  personnel, workplace activities, and conditions and equipment on the  OCS; and (3) security of offshore energy facilities. The MOU assigns  Interior responsibility for, among other things, managing the nation’s oil,  natural gas, and other mineral resources on the OCS in a safe and  environmentally sound manner.
In addition to delineating inspection responsibilities between the Coast  Guard and Interior, the MOU is further divided into five memorandums of  agreement, one of which addresses the agencies’ responsibilities where  jurisdiction overlaps. In accordance with this memorandum of agreement,  the Coast Guard is the lead agency with responsibility for the inspection  and testing of all marine and lifesaving equipment onboard fixed and  floating offshore energy facilities and MODUs, and Interior is the lead  agency with responsibility for the inspection and testing of all production  and drilling equipment on these facilities. The Coast Guard, however, had  authorized Interior (specifically, what was then the Minerals Management  Service) to perform inspections of fixed offshore energy facilities and to  enforce Coast Guard regulations applicable to such facilities. For  example, the Coast Guard is to conduct an initial inspection of each new  fixed offshore energy facility to determine whether it is compliant with  Coast Guard safety regulations. However, after the initial inspection, the  Coast Guard has authorized Interior’s inspectors to conduct such safety  inspections on behalf of the Coast Guard and enforce Coast Guard  regulations applicable to those facilities as a means to avoid duplicating  functions, reduce federal costs, and increase oversight for Coast Guard  compliance without increasing the frequency of inspections. Therefore,  with respect to fixed offshore energy facilities, the only inspections for  which the Coast Guard is exclusively responsible beyond the initial safety  inspection are the annual security inspections, to the extent that these  facilities meet the applicable criteria, as described below. The Coast  Guard continues to have responsibility for conducting inspections and  enforcing its regulations on floating offshore energy facilities and MODUs.
section_title: Coast Guard’s Security Inspection Responsibilities
paragraphs: In accordance with federal laws, agreements between the Coast Guard  and Interior described above, and Coast Guard guidance, Coast Guard is  responsible for conducting annual security inspections of offshore energy  facilities that meet or exceed any one of three thresholds for production or  personnel—(1) producing greater than 100,000 barrels of oil a day, (2)  producing more than 200 million cubic feet of natural gas per day, or (3)  hosting more than 150 persons for 12 hours or more in each 24-hour  period continuously for 30 days or more. We refer to the 57 offshore  energy facilities that met or exceeded these thresholds at some point  from 2008 through 2010—and were therefore subject to security  inspections during those years—as “OCS facilities.” Of these 57 OCS  facilities, all of which are located in the Gulf of Mexico, 41 are fixed OCS  facilities and 16 are floating OCS facilities.
Staff at Coast Guard headquarters oversee and develop policies and  procedures for field staff to follow when conducting security inspections of  OCS facilities and to assist affected owners and operators so that they  can comply with maritime security regulations. Among other things, Coast  Guard marine inspectors in the field units conduct security inspections of  OCS facilities by taking helicopter rides to facilities that can range up to  200 miles offshore. Once arriving, inspectors are to conduct on-site  interviews with facility security officers and observe operations to verify  whether required security measures are in place. As of August 2011, the  Coast Guard had about 12 active marine inspectors who were qualified to  conduct security inspections of OCS facilities. These inspectors work out  of six field units near the Gulf of Mexico—Mobile, Alabama; Morgan City,  Louisiana; New Orleans, Louisiana; Corpus Christi, Texas; Galveston,  Texas; and Port Arthur, Texas.
section_title: Interior’s Inspection Responsibilities
paragraphs: In line with the responsibilities set forth in the MOU discussed above and  to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations, Interior has an  offshore oil and natural gas inspection program intended to verify that the  operator complies with Interior regulations and requirements at a well site.  Interior’s offshore oil and natural gas oversight includes inspections of  production activities including drilling, regular production activities,  meters, abandoned platforms, and pipelines, among other things. Also  in accordance with the MOU between the two agencies, Interior conducts  both “full” and “limited” inspections of fixed offshore energy facility on  behalf of the Coast Guard. During the full inspections of staffed, fixed  offshore energy facilities, Interior’s inspectors are to review all applicable  Coast Guard requirements, which include 27 safety items. During limited  inspections, which are to be conducted on all fixed offshore energy  facilities in the course of conducting inspections at those facilities for  Interior’s purposes, Interior’s inspectors are to review less than half of the  safety items. During these inspections, Interior’s inspectors are to, among  other things, check for safety items such as the presence of equipment  designed to prevent tripping, slipping, or drowning.
section_title: Coast Guard’s Security Inspection Program Has Faced Challenges and Could Be Improved
paragraphs: Coast Guard OCS facility guidance provides that Coast Guard personnel  are to conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually, but our  analysis of inspections data show that the Coast Guard has not  conducted such inspections for most of these OCS facilities. For  example, the Coast Guard conducted about one-third of the required  annual inspections of OCS facilities from 2008 through 2010 (see table  1). Specifically, our analysis of Coast Guard inspections data shows that in 2008 the Coast Guard inspected 7 of 56 OCS facilities, which was e  13 percent of the required annual inspections. More recently, in 2010, th Coast Guard inspected 23 of 51 (45 percent) OCS facilities that the Coast  Guard should have inspected.
Our analysis of Coast Guard inspections data shows that the Coast  Guard generally inspected a greater percentage of floating OCS facilities  than fixed OCS facilities (see table 2). For example, from 2008 through  2010, the Coast Guard conducted annual security inspections of 54  percent of floating OCS facilities compared to 24 percent of fixed OCS  facilities. During our interviews with Coast Guard marine inspectors and  their supervisors, we learned that some field units did not know that they  were responsible for conducting security inspections of these fixed  facilities, approximately one-third of which are not staffed because  operations are automated. For example, marine inspectors in the Coast  Guard field unit that oversees more than half of the OCS facilities stated  that they had only recently learned that they were responsible for  conducting security inspections of fixed OCS facilities. These marine  inspectors stated that they thought that security inspections of the fixed  OCS facilities within their area of responsibility were carried out by  another field unit and that they had only been conducting annual security  inspections of the floating OCS facilities. Further, other Coast Guard  officials stated that it is easier to arrange for security inspections of  floating OCS facilities because marine inspectors visit those facilities  more frequently for other types of inspections, such as hull or safety  inspections, whereas for fixed OCS facilities, the Coast Guard is required  to conduct an initial safety inspection of each new facility and then is  solely responsible for conducting annual security inspections of fixed  OCS facilities once a year for annual security inspections.
The Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to help ensure that  its field units conduct annual security inspections of OCS facilities  annually in accordance with its guidance. Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government state that internal controls should include control  activities, such as policies, procedures, and mechanisms that help ensure  management directives are carried out. However, the Coast Guard does  not have such control activities in place. For example, the Coast Guard’s  OCS facility guidance does not describe specific procedures for the way  in which Coast Guard staff should track whether annual security  inspections have been conducted. Further, Coast Guard district officials  and most local field unit supervisors and marine inspectors we spoke with  do not maintain any kind of tool, such as a spreadsheet or calendar, to  remind them when annual security inspections of OCS facilities are due.  Coast Guard officials from five of the six Coast Guard field units that  conduct annual security inspections of OCS facilities told us that they do  not maintain a spreadsheet or other management tool to track whether  annual security inspections had been conducted. For example, at three of  these locations, Coast Guard officials told us they rely on owners and  operators to inform them when inspections were due rather than  independently tracking when annual inspections were due. As a result of  no procedures or control activities to manage the offshore security  inspection program, the Coast Guard is not complying with its established  maritime security requirements for most of the OCS facilities. Without  conducting annual inspections of OCS facilities, the Coast Guard may not  be meeting one of its stated goals of reducing the risk and mitigating the  potential results of an act that could threaten the security of personnel,  the OCS facility, the environment, and the public.
In our October 2011 report, we made a recommendation, among others,  that the Coast Guard develop policies and procedures to monitor and  track annual security inspections for OCS facilities to better ensure that  such inspections are consistently conducted. The Coast Guard concurred  with this recommendation and stated that it is planning to update its OCS  facility policy guidance for field units to monitor and track annual security  inspections for OCS facilities to better ensure that such inspections are  consistently conducted.
section_title: Interior’s Inspection Program Has Faced Challenges in Meeting Some Inspection Targets
paragraphs: Interior’s inspection program has not consistently met its internal targets  for production inspections, as we have reported in recent years. In 2008,  we reported that Interior had not met its targets for conducting production  inspections—examining metering equipment used to measure oil and  natural gas production. Interior officials responsible for conducting  production inspections in the Gulf of Mexico told us they completed about  half of the required inspections in 2007, raising uncertainty about the  accuracy of oil and natural gas measurement. In March 2010, we found  that Interior had not routinely met its oil and natural gas production  inspection goals. Specifically, we reported that Interior met its inspection  goals only once—in 2008—during fiscal years 2004 through 2008, for four  district offices we reviewed in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific. Interior  inspection staff told us that, during these years, there was a shortage of  inspectors and that inspections were delayed because of cleanup related  to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. We are unable to present data for  these years because, according to Interior officials, district offices often  did not correctly record production inspections on their inspection forms;  since then, Interior instituted a policy to record inspections correctly. Also  in March 2010, we reported that Interior had encountered persistent  human capital challenges in its inspection programs designed to ensure  accurate measurement of oil and natural gas from federal lands and  waters. In particular, we reported that Interior was hindered by  difficulties in hiring, training, and retaining key inspections staff. We  reported that this difficulty in attracting and retaining key staff contributed  to challenges in meeting its responsibilities to conduct inspections,  thereby, reducing its oversight of oil and gas development on federal  leases, potentially placing the environment at risk. In our report, we made  a number of recommendations to Interior to address these issues, some  of which Interior is already in the process of implementing.
Although Interior has not consistently met its internal targets for  production inspections, it has exceeded its target for Coast Guard  compliance inspections. For fiscal year 2010, the most recent year  reported, Interior’s goal was to conduct full inspections covering all  applicable Coast Guard regulations on 10 percent of the estimated 1,000  staffed, fixed offshore energy facilities. For fiscal year 2010, Interior  reported that it more than met this goal by conducting such inspections on  169 of the 1,021 staffed, fixed offshore energy facilities—about 17  percent. Further, Interior reported that it has met internal targets for  these inspections for the previous 5 years. In addition, Interior reported  that in fiscal year 2010 its inspectors also conducted limited inspections  for compliance with Coast Guard regulations on all other fixed offshore  energy facilities in the course of inspecting these facilities for their own  purposes.
Interior has recently been reorganizing its offshore inspection program,  which has resulted in some uncertainty regarding its inspection  capabilities. After the Deepwater Horizon incident in April 2010, Interior  initiated a reorganization of its bureau responsible for overseeing offshore  oil and natural gas activities. Specifically, in May 2010, Interior  reorganized its Minerals Management Service—the bureau previously  tasked with overseeing offshore oil and natural gas activities—and  created the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and  Enforcement (BOEMRE). On October 1, 2011, Interior was further  reorganized by dividing BOEMRE into two separate bureaus, the Bureau  of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)—which oversees leasing and  resource management, and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental  Enforcement (BSEE)—which is responsible for issuing oil and natural gas  drilling permits and conducting inspections. We have reported that Interior  could face challenges during its reorganization. In June 2011, we testified  that Interior’s reorganization of activities previously overseen by MMS will  require time and resources and may pose new challenges. We stated  that while this reorganization may eventually lead to more effective  operations, organizational transformations are not simple endeavors. We  also expressed concern with Interior’s ability to undertake this  reorganization while meeting its oil and natural gas oversight  responsibilities. We believe that these concerns are still valid today.
While Interior was reorganizing its oversight responsibilities, it was also  reforming its inspection program and, according to Interior, these reforms  have created uncertainty regarding future oversight inspections. As part  of the inspections program reform, Interior plans to hire additional staff  with expertise in oil and natural gas inspections and engineering and  develop new training programs for inspectors and engineers involved in  its safety compliance and enforcement programs. Specifically, Interior  reported in February 2011 that it was seeking to hire additional inspectors  for its offshore inspection program to meet its needs during fiscal years  2011 and 2012. Interior reported that it had 62 inspectors—which, it  reported, was not sufficient to provide the level of oversight needed for  offshore oil and natural gas production. Interior has also requested  additional funding to implement these changes. Further, Interior has  stated that its new inspection program may involve inspectors witnessing  more high-risk activities, and in-depth examination of some aspects of  Gulf oil and natural gas production, and so inspections may take more  time in the future and be more difficult to fold into the existing inspection  schedules. As a result, Interior reported that it was difficult to determine  how many inspections would be conducted in fiscal year 2012.
section_title: The Coast Guard Has Limited Authority over the Security of MODUs Registered to Foreign Countries
paragraphs: While the Deepwater Horizon incident was not the result of a breakdown  in security procedures or the result of a terrorist attack, the loss of the  Deepwater Horizon, a foreign-flagged MODU, and the resulting oil spill  have raised concerns about U.S. oversight over MODUs that are  registered to foreign countries. In this regard, various circumstances  govern the extent to which the Coast Guard oversees the security of  MODUs. In general, MODUs operating on the OCS implement security  measures consistent with applicable security requirements—specifically,  they implement requirements in accordance with U.S. security regulations  and the International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port  Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Depending on the particular  characteristics and operations of the MODU—for example, its method of  propulsion or its personnel levels—it may be subject to Coast Guard  security regulations governing vessels (33 C.F.R. part 104) or OCS  facilities (33 C.F.R. part 106). MODUs will fall under applicable Coast  Guard regulations if (1) they are self-propelled—that is, they are capable  of relocating themselves, as opposed to other types that require another  vessel to tow them—in which case they are subject to the ISPS Code and  33 C.F.R. part 104, or (2) they meet production or personnel levels  specified in 33 C.F.R. part 106. Whereas the Coast Guard may physically  inspect a U.S.-flagged MODU to ensure compliance with applicable  security requirements, the Coast Guard’s oversight of foreign-flagged,  self-propelled MODUs, such as the Deepwater Horizon, is more limited.  In the case of self-propelled, foreign-flagged MODUs, the Coast Guard  will assess compliance with part 104 by reviewing a MODU’s International  Ship Security Certificate, which certifies compliance with the ISPS Code.  While Coast Guard inspectors may also observe security measures and  ask security related questions of personnel, absent consent from the flag  state, the inspectors generally do not have authority to review a self- propelled, foreign-flagged MODU’s vessel security plan. In all other cases  where MODUs are subject to Coast Guard security requirements, the  Coast Guard assesses compliance with part 104 or part 106 through  annual security inspections. Figure 1 illustrates the types of MODUs,  the applicable security requirements, and the means by which the Coast  Guard assesses compliance.
The Coast Guard may not be fully aware of the security measures  implemented by self-propelled, foreign-flagged MODUs because of its  limited oversight of such MODUs. The Coast Guard and BOEMRE, BSEE’s  predecessor, conducted a joint investigation into the Deepwater Horizon  incident, and the Coast Guard’s report from the investigation emphasized  the need to strengthen the system of Coast Guard oversight of foreign- flagged MODUs. The Coast Guard’s report from the joint investigation  stated that the Coast Guard’s regulatory scheme for overseeing the safety  of foreign-flagged MODUs is insufficient because it defers heavily to the  flag state to ensure safety. While the investigation focused on issues that  were not related to security, such as safety, these findings may have  implications for security oversight because the Coast Guard also relies on  the flag state to carry out responsibilities for assessing compliance with  security requirements. The joint investigation team recommended, among  other things, that the Commandant of the Coast Guard develop more  comprehensive inspection standards for foreign-flagged MODUs operating  on the OCS. The Commandant concurred with this recommendation and  has chartered an Outer Continental Shelf Activities Matrix Team, which has  been tasked with providing recommendations on the establishment and  implementation of an enhanced oversight regime for foreign-flagged  MODUs on the U.S. OCS.
According to Coast Guard officials, it is likely that MODUs operating in  deepwater would be subject to security requirements because the  industry is increasingly using dynamically positioned MODUs that are  able to maintain position without being anchored to the seabed, and as  such MODUs are self-propelled, they would be subject to the ISPS Code  and 33 C.F.R. part 104. Additionally, the Coast Guard is conducting a  study designed to help determine whether additional actions could better  ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico,  including MODUs. This study is expected to be completed in the fall of  2011. Gaining a fuller understanding of the security risks associated with  MODUs could better inform Coast Guard decisions and potentially  improve the security of these facilities. Further, the Coast Guard has  implemented a new risk-based oversight policy for MODUs, including  foreign-flagged MODUs, to address safety and environmental protection  issues. This policy includes a targeting matrix to assist inspectors in  determining whether a foreign-flagged MODU may require increased  oversight, based on inspection history or other related factors, through  more frequent examinations by the Coast Guard. Additionally, the policy  calls on Coast Guard field units to conduct random, unannounced  examinations of a portion of all MODUs in their areas of responsibility.  Although this policy does not directly address security, increased  oversight resulting from this new policy could help mitigate some of the  ways in which a MODU might be at risk of a terrorist attack.
Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be  happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at  (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov, or Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841  or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  statement. In addition to the contacts named above, key contributors to  this testimony were Christopher Conrad, Assistant Director; Jon  Ludwigson, Assistant Director; Lee Carroll and Erin O’Brien, analysts-in- charge; and Alana Finley. Thomas Lombardi provided legal support and  Lara Miklozek provided assistance in testimony preparation.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Maritime Security: Coast Guard Should Conduct Required Inspections of  Offshore Energy Infrastructure. GAO-12-37. Washington, D.C.:   October 28, 2011.
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Actions Needed to Reduce Evolving but  Uncertain Federal Financial Risks. GAO-12-86. Washington, D.C.:  October 24, 2011.
Maritime Security: Progress Made, but Further Actions Needed to Secure  the Maritime Energy Supply. GAO-11-883T. Washington, D.C.:   August 24, 2011.
Oil and Gas: Interior’s Restructuring Challenges in the Aftermath of the  Gulf Oil Spill. GAO-11-734T. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2011.
Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port  Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Oil and Gas Management: Interior’s Oil and Gas Production Verification  Efforts Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance of Accurate Measurement  of Production Volumes. GAO-10-313. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2010.
Mineral Revenues: Data Management Problems and Reliance on Self- Reported Data for Compliance Efforts Put MMS Royalty Collections at  Risk. GAO-08-893R. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2008.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility  Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices,  and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in  Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity  Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
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