DOE Nuclear Waste: Better Information Needed on Waste Storage at DOE Sites as a Result of Yucca Mountain Shutdown
Published: 2011-03-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for storing and managing a total of about 13,000 metric tons of nuclear waste--spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste--at five DOE sites in Colorado, Idaho, New York, South Carolina, and Washington. Also, a joint DOE-Navy program stores spent nuclear fuel from warships at DOE's Idaho site. DOE and the Navy intended to permanently dispose of this nuclear waste at a repository planned for Yucca Mountain in Nevada. However, that plan is now in question because of actions taken to terminate the site. This report assesses (1) agreements DOE and the Navy have with states at the five sites and the effects a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository would have on their ability to fulfill these agreements; (2) the effects a termination would have on DOE's and the Navy's operations and costs for storing the waste; and (3) DOE's and the Navy's plans to mitigate these potential effects. GAO reviewed state agreements and DOE plans, visited waste facilities, and interviewed federal and state officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Five states have agreements with DOE, and in one case with the Navy, regarding the storage, treatment, or disposal of nuclear waste stored at DOE sites. Only agreements with Colorado and Idaho include deadlines, or milestones, for removing waste from sites that may be threatened by a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program. Under the agreements, DOE and the Navy are expected to remove their spent nuclear fuel from Idaho, and DOE is to remove its fuel from Colorado, by January 1, 2035. If a repository is not available to accept the waste, however, DOE and the Navy could miss these milestones. As a result, the government could face significant penalties--$60,000 for each day the waste remains in Idaho and $15,000 for each day the waste remains in Colorado--after January 1, 2035. These penalties could total about $27.4 million annually. Navy officials told GAO, however, their greater concern is that Idaho might suspend Navy shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the state until the Navy meets its agreement to remove spent nuclear fuel, a suspension that would interfere with the Navy's ability to refuel its nuclear warships. Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository would not affect DOE's or the Navy's nuclear waste operations on DOE sites in the near term, according to DOE and Navy officials. But it would likely extend on-site storage and increase storage costs, which could be substantial. For example, an EM analysis estimates that EM could need an additional $918 million to extend storage, assuming a 20-year delay in a repository's opening. Since it is not known when an alternative to Yucca Mountain will be available, it is difficult to estimate the total additional storage costs stemming from terminating the repository. Although EM officials told GAO that DOE can extend storage of nuclear waste on DOE sites for some time, additional information is needed to plan for longer storage. For instance, DOE does not know how long the lives of existing storage facilities can be extended beyond estimates in current site plans. In addition, although research is being planned for long-term storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel beyond 120 years, DOE has no plan for comparable research focusing on its unique long-term waste storage needs. DOE and the Navy have not yet developed plans to mitigate the potential effects of longer storage resulting from a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository. EM and Navy officials said they are waiting for recommendations from a Blue Ribbon Commission that DOE created in 2010 to clarify future nuclear waste management alternatives. Even after the commission's recommendations are available, however, DOE could face difficulties in planning how to mitigate the impact of a termination of the repository. For example, because it is not clear how specific the commission's recommendations will be, it may take time to develop the recommendations into a new nuclear waste management policy. Further, some recommendations may not lead to a solution soon enough to meet existing waste removal milestones. DOE and the Navy said it was too early to change existing plans since no final disposition path for the waste has been determined.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOE (1) assess existing nuclear waste storage facilities and the resources and information needed to extend their useful lifetimes and (2) identify any additional research needed to address DOE's unique needs for long-term waste storage. DOE agreed with the recommendations, but objected to some of GAO's findings, which GAO continues to believe are sound.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: After decades of nuclear weapons production, the nation now faces the  complex task of storing and eventually disposing of two types of highly  radioactive waste. The first type, called “spent nuclear fuel,” is the fuel  that has been used and then removed from nuclear reactors operated for  weapons production. The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for  managing the spent nuclear fuel primarily from weapons-related activities  and other defense-related activities but also from certain nondefense  activities. The second type of nuclear waste is “high-level waste,” a by- product of weapons production and other defense-related activities— much of it currently stored in liquid or semiliquid form in large  underground tanks. DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) is  responsible for storing and managing a total of almost 13,000 metric tons  of nuclear waste at five sites: the Hanford Site in Washington state, the  Savannah River Site in South Carolina, Idaho National Laboratory in  DOE has agreements with these states governing how the nuclear waste is  managed. These agreements can include various dates by which DOE  agrees to complete certain activities, such as processing high-level waste,  transferring spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to safer storage, and  removing nuclear waste from the site. Some of these agreements include  penalties if these dates, known as milestones, are not met. The Navy is  also a party to agreements with Idaho, where it stores spent nuclear fuel  from submarines and aircraft carriers at DOE’s Idaho site.
For decades, DOE has planned to permanently dispose of these nuclear  wastes—some components of which remain dangerously radioactive for  thousands of years—in a deep geological repository at Yucca Mountain in  southwestern Nevada, but that plan is now in question. As amended in  1987, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 directs DOE to study Yucca  Mountain as the site for a repository to store both DOE’s nuclear waste  and spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear reactors. The act, as  amended, also identifies the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as  responsible for licensing the development, construction, and operation of  a repository at Yucca Mountain. In June 2008, after spending more than  $14 billion since 1983 to study potential repository sites and to develop the  technical documents for a license, DOE submitted an application to the  NRC seeking authorization to construct a repository at the Yucca  Mountain site. DOE planned to open the repository in 2020.
In a budget submission to Congress in 2009, however, the administration  stated its decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain program and proposed  eliminating funding for the development of the Yucca Mountain repository.  In March 2010, DOE filed a motion with NRC’s Atomic Safety and  Licensing Board—which is responsible for hearing legal and technical  challenges to DOE’s license application—to withdraw its application with  prejudice. DOE stated it was seeking “this form of dismissal because it  does not intend ever to refile an application to construct a permanent  geological repository for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste at  Yucca Mountain” and it “will provide finality in ending the Yucca Mountain  project.” In June 2010, NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied  DOE’s withdrawal motion, concluding that DOE lacks the authority under  the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, to withdraw the license  application. The ultimate outcome of DOE’s plan to terminate the Yucca  Mountain program remains unsettled. First, the commissioners who head  the NRC can choose whether to review the board’s decision to deny DOE’s  motion and can either uphold or reverse the board’s decision. In addition,  two states, a county, and private citizens sued DOE and NRC in federal  court, arguing that DOE had no authority to terminate the proposed Yucca  Mountain repository. As of mid-March 2011, the consolidated lawsuit for  these parties has not been settled or decided.
To develop waste disposal alternatives, the administration directed DOE to  establish the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. The  commission, which was formed in January 2010, is to conduct a  comprehensive review of policies and provide advice, evaluate alternatives,  and make recommendations for managing the storage, processing, and  disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, among other things. Its  final report is expected by January 29, 2012. For now, the decision to forgo  Yucca Mountain leaves DOE without a pathway to permanently dispose of  spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. In the absence of a repository at  Yucca Mountain, some affected states and communities are concerned that  DOE may store waste at its sites indefinitely.
In this context, you asked us to assess the effect of a possible termination  of the Yucca Mountain repository on nuclear waste stored at DOE sites.  For this report, our objectives were to assess (1) agreements DOE and the  Navy have with states concerning spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste  at five DOE sites and the effects, if any, a termination of the Yucca  Mountain repository would have on DOE’s and the Navy’s ability to fulfill  these agreements; (2) the effects, if any, a termination of the Yucca  Mountain repository would have on DOE’s and the Navy’s operations and  costs for storing spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste; and (3) DOE’s  and the Navy’s plans to mitigate these potential effects.
To address the first objective, we reviewed the statutory and regulatory  frameworks, including agreements between DOE and states, regarding  spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste at DOE sites. To address the second  objective, we reviewed documents, including waste treatment plans,  program missions, EM’s 5-year plan for fiscal years 2008 to 2012, DOE  annual budget justifications, public statements of DOE and EM officials,  recommendations of EM’s citizen advisory boards, and DOE, Congressional  Research Service, and GAO reports. We also analyzed EM’s contingency  planning for the costs that would arise from a hypothetical delayed opening  of the Yucca Mountain repository in 2040 rather than 2020 and EM’s cost  modeling for extending on-site storage for up to 500 years, the latter of  which was prepared at our request for a prior report. To view storage and  treatment facilities, we visited the three DOE sites—the Hanford Site, the  Savannah River Site, and Idaho National Laboratory—that store most of the  DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. To address the third  objective regarding EM’s and the Navy’s mitigation plans and other possible  options, we examined presentation slides, statements, and transcripts for  the Blue Ribbon Commission meetings and congressional hearings and  other pertinent documents. To get additional information on our research  objectives, we conducted interviews with DOE and contractor officials  representing the five DOE sites, EM headquarters, EM’s Office of  Environmental Compliance, and DOE’s Office of General Counsel. We  attended EM conferences on managing nuclear materials in March and  September 2010. We also interviewed officials from the Naval Nuclear  Propulsion Program and its counsel and officials with the Defense Nuclear  Facilities Safety Board, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,  Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and  state agencies in Colorado, Idaho, New York, South Carolina, and  Washington. We limited our review of the Department of Defense to only  the Navy because Defense and Navy officials told us that the Navy was the  only organization in the department with responsibilities for disposal of  nuclear materials destined for the Yucca Mountain repository.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to March 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: From 1944 until the 1980s, the United States used nuclear reactors to  produce plutonium and other materials for nuclear weapons. Plutonium  was extracted from the fuels used by these reactors by a chemical process  known as reprocessing. As a result of these activities, after the shutdown  of weapons production and of some reprocessing plants at the end of the  Cold War, DOE retained an inventory of spent nuclear fuel that had not  been reprocessed, as well as high-level waste—which is one of the  byproducts of reprocessing. Weapons production and related defense  activities—such as the reprocessing of the Navy’s spent nuclear fuel to  produce new fuel, which also created high-level waste—are the source of  about 87 percent of DOE’s inventory of spent nuclear fuel and almost its  entire inventory of high-level waste. Because weapons production and  reprocessing of the Navy’s spent nuclear fuel have ended, DOE’s  inventories of this waste are largely fixed.
DOE is also responsible for managing other nuclear waste from a variety  of sources, including some active programs that continue to add to DOE’s  inventory. For example, DOE is responsible for managing spent nuclear  fuel from the Navy through the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, which  is jointly operated by DOE and the Navy. The Navy uses nuclear-powered  ships and submarines in carrying out its missions. The spent nuclear fuel  removed from these vessels is the primary driver of increases in DOE’s  inventory, but it totals only 1 percent of DOE’s spent nuclear fuel  inventory. The remainder of DOE’s inventory of nuclear waste comes from  various nondefense sources, including spent nuclear fuel from its own test  and experimental reactors, reactors at U.S. universities, and other  government research reactors; commercial reactor fuel acquired by DOE  for research and development; and fuel from foreign research reactors.  For example, DOE stores fuel debris from the Three Mile Island accident  that occurred in 1979 at a commercial nuclear power plant. It also stores  spent nuclear fuel from three commercial power demonstration projects,  including from the first commercial-scale high-temperature gas-cooled  reactor plant in the United States, at the Fort St. Vrain site. In addition, the  United States operates a program to take custody of spent nuclear fuel  from foreign research reactors, which supports a U.S. policy to prevent the  proliferation of nuclear weapons; this program is scheduled for  completion in 2019.
DOE currently stores its inventories of nuclear waste at five DOE sites. In  1995, DOE decided to consolidate nearly all of its spent nuclear fuel from  other sites at three primary locations—the Hanford Site, Idaho National  Laboratory, and the Savannah River Site—for storage and preparation for  permanent disposal. The exception to this consolidation decision is DOE’s  Fort St. Vrain site, which stores less than 1 percent of DOE’s total  inventory. In 1999, DOE decided to store its high-level waste where it was  generated, at the same three primary sites. In addition, DOE manages a  small amount of high-level waste that resulted from the relatively brief  operation of the only commercial reprocessing plant ever run in the United  States. This waste was generated between 1966 and 1972 from  reprocessing spent nuclear fuel at a site near West Valley, New York,  where DOE is now responsible for storing it.
Some of the nuclear waste at these sites requires further processing and  packaging before it can be safely stored over the long term or removed for  final disposal. In the case of spent nuclear fuel, this generally means  removing it from storage pools of water and packaging it in stainless steel  canisters. The processing and packaging of high-level waste is vastly more  complicated—a massive enterprise in which DOE is removing waste from  storage tanks and transferring it to treatment facilities. For example, at the  Savannah River Site, DOE is vitrifying high-level waste by mixing it with a  glass-forming material, melting the mixture into glass, and pouring it into  stainless-steel canisters to harden. Across all sites, DOE expects to  eventually produce about 20,000 canisters of solidified high-level waste.  Once the wastes are stabilized, removing them from the sites would  require a destination where they could be stored or permanently disposed  of and a decades-long shipping campaign to get them there. Appendix I  describes how the sites are in different stages of preparing spent nuclear  fuel and high-level waste for final disposal.
In the meantime, DOE manages many types of storage facilities, as  illustrated in figure 1, of widely varying ages and conditions. For example,  DOE has generally been moving spent nuclear fuel from wet storage in  pools of water, designed to cool the fuel and provide radiation protection,  to dry storage. Dry storage has numerous configurations, including  underground storage vaults, only some of which are covered by a building,  and casks on an outdoor pad or a railroad car. Overall, these storage  facilities vary from aging to almost new; for instance, they range from a  1950s building at the Idaho National Laboratory to a high-level waste  canister building constructed in 2005 at the Savannah River Site.
DOE operates these five sites under a legal framework that includes self- regulation, as well as regulation by federal agencies and states. In contrast  to the commercial nuclear industry’s sites, which are regulated by NRC,  DOE generally operates under its own regulations for nuclear safety at its  sites. In addition, DOE’s treatment, storage, and disposal of radioactive  and hazardous wastes are governed by a number of federal and state laws,  including the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), as  amended, which regulates the management of hazardous waste from  generation to disposal. The Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992  amended RCRA to require federal agencies, including DOE, to develop  waste treatment plans for their sites that contain mixed wastes—certain  wastes with both radioactive and chemically hazardous materials. For  example, high-level waste is sometimes considered a mixed waste because  it contains highly corrosive, organic, or heavy metal components that may  be regulated under RCRA. These plans are approved by states that the  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authorized to administer  RCRA or by EPA in states that have not been so authorized.
Activities carried out under these plans are often governed by compliance  agreements between DOE, EPA, and the states (state agreements), which  regulate and oversee the activities. State agreements establish the scope of  work to be performed at given sites, as well as “milestones”—specific  dates by which these activities should be achieved. The agreements may  also impose monetary or other penalties for missing milestones.  Milestones may cover actions to treat, store, and dispose of hazardous  wastes located at the DOE sites. Agreements differ by state. Some cover  virtually all cleanup activities at a site, while others cover just a portion.  These activities may include soil and groundwater remediation, low-level  radioactive waste disposition, and special nuclear material consolidation;  in this report, we focus on state agreement cleanup activities involving  spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. States and DOE can negotiate to  amend or modify the agreements, including extending or eliminating  milestones.
State agreements may be created in at least four ways. First, states may  enter into Federal Facilities Agreements (also known as Tri-Party  Agreements) with DOE and EPA, which implement the Comprehensive  Environmental Responsibility, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980  (CERCLA) and RCRA, as well as state hazardous waste law requirements  to set the cleanup schedules at sites. CERCLA, among other things,  authorizes EPA to compel responsible parties to initiate cleanup activities  at hazardous waste sites. Second, states may take legal action against DOE  seeking review of its compliance with the National Environmental Policy  Act, which can result in settlement agreements between the parties and  may outline activities and milestones. Third, Congress may address the  management of wastes at a specific site. Finally, federal government  officials may enter into agreements with states concerning DOE-managed  radioactive waste, which may include specific cleanup milestones.
section_title: Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Could Threaten DOE’s and the Navy’s Ability to Fulfill Agreements with Colorado and Idaho
paragraphs: The five states with DOE sites storing nuclear waste have agreements with  DOE, and in one case with the Navy, regarding how nuclear waste will be  managed. However, only the agreements with Colorado and Idaho would  be affected by a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository because  only those agreements specify dates for removing the waste from the DOE  sites.
subsections: section_title: All Five States Have Agreements Regarding the Management of Nuclear Waste at DOE Sites
paragraphs: Each DOE site falls under at least one state agreement that specifies  certain treatment, storage, or disposal activities for high-level waste, spent  nuclear fuel, or both. The agreements with four sites deal with the safe  storage and treatment of high-level waste. (DOE’s site in Colorado, does  not store any high-level waste; it stores only spent nuclear fuel.) In  addition, state agreements for some DOE sites focus on the storage of  spent nuclear fuel or its removal from the states. Major state agreements  at each site are as follows:  Idaho National Laboratory. DOE and the Navy are party to a 1995  settlement agreement and consent decree (the Idaho Settlement  Agreement), entered into the United States District Court for the District  of Idaho, to settle a lawsuit brought by the state. The agreement commits  DOE to prepare its high-level waste for shipment out of Idaho for disposal.  The agreement also contains provisions for managing spent nuclear fuel.  Specifically, it requires DOE and the Navy to move their spent nuclear fuel  from storage in pools of water to dry storage—given state concerns that  the water pools might leak and radioactively contaminate the underlying  groundwater—and later to move the spent nuclear fuel out of Idaho.
Fort St. Vrain Site. In 1996 the Governor of Colorado signed an agreement  with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management at DOE,  referred to as the “Agreement Between the Department of Energy and the  State of Colorado Regarding Shipping Spent Fuel Out of Colorado.” The  agreement states that DOE is committed to shipping its spent nuclear fuel  stored at Fort St. Vrain out of Colorado.
Hanford Site. The Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order  (Tri-Party Agreement) of 1989, as amended, entered into by DOE, EPA,  and the state of Washington’s Department of Ecology, focuses on  completing DOE’s closure of tanks that store liquid waste and solidifying  its high-level waste for safer storage. The agreement also requires DOE to  develop a disposition plan for cesium and strontium capsules, which are  managed as high-level waste, if vitrification is not planned.
Savannah River Site. The 1993 Federal Facility Agreement for the  Savannah River Site and the Savannah River Site Treatment Plan of 1995  between DOE and the South Carolina Department of Health and  Environmental Control focus on completing DOE’s closure of tanks that  store liquid waste and solidifying its high-level waste for safer storage.
West Valley Site. The West Valley Demonstration Project Act, enacted in  1980, directs the Secretary of Energy to enter into a cooperative agreement  with New York and to carry out a radioactive waste management  demonstration project at the western New York Service Center in West  Valley, New York. The project includes solidifying high-level waste,  developing waste containers suitable for permanent disposal, and  transporting the solidified waste to an appropriate federal repository for  permanent disposal.
section_title: Agreements with Idaho and Colorado Have Milestones for Waste Removal That Could Be Affected by Terminating the Yucca Mountain Repository
paragraphs: A termination of the Yucca Mountain repository may prevent DOE and the  Navy from meeting agreements with Colorado and Idaho that establish  milestones for shipping the spent nuclear fuel out the states. As shown in  table 1, the other agreements do not set dates for removing spent nuclear  fuel from DOE sites. No state agreement sets a date for removing high- level waste.
DOE and the Navy, under the 1995 Idaho Settlement Agreement, are  required to remove from the state by January 1, 2035, spent nuclear fuel  stored at Idaho National Laboratory. In addition, DOE’s head of EM signed  an agreement to remove the spent nuclear fuel stored at the Fort St. Vrain  site from Colorado by the same date. When the agreements were signed,  DOE had intended to remove the spent nuclear fuel from these sites and  ship it to the Yucca Mountain repository for final disposition. Similarly,  the Navy had planned to transport its spent nuclear fuel from Idaho to the  Yucca Mountain repository starting after 2020. If the Yucca Mountain  repository is terminated, DOE and the Navy would lose their planned  shipping destination for their spent nuclear fuel, which could cause them  to miss the 2035 removal date they have committed to.
DOE and the Navy may be faced with significant penalties for missing  these removal milestones. For example, under the Idaho Settlement  Agreement, the federal government may be liable to pay the state $60,000  for each day past January 1, 2035, that DOE and the Navy have not  removed their spent nuclear fuel from the state. Under the Colorado state  agreement, DOE may be liable to pay the state $15,000 for each day after  January 1, 2035, that DOE fails to remove its spent nuclear fuel. These  penalties would total approximately $27.4 million per year, although both  state agreements stipulate that any possible future payments of these  penalties will be subject to the availability of appropriations specifically  for that purpose.
Under the Idaho Settlement Agreement, the state may also have the ability  to suspend any further DOE or Navy shipments of spent nuclear fuel to  DOE’s Idaho site until the agreement’s obligation for removal of spent  nuclear fuel is met. According to Navy officials, this would be of much  greater concern than the financial penalties. After removing spent nuclear  fuel from its warships as part of the refueling process, the Navy transports  it to the Idaho site for examination and storage. No other sites are  available for these critical activities. A Navy official told us that developing  the infrastructure for these activities at a new site outside of Idaho would  be time consuming and costly, and other states might oppose such a  facility within their boundaries if there were no disposal pathway for the  spent nuclear fuel. If Idaho were to suspend the Navy’s shipments of spent  nuclear fuel, the Navy would not be able to refuel its nuclear warships,  which Navy officials said would raise national security concerns. In  addition, suspension might effectively prevent the Navy from continuing to  examine its spent nuclear fuel at the Idaho site after 2035.
If DOE determines that it will not be able to meet the removal milestones  in the Idaho and Colorado agreements, it is unclear when the department  would approach these states or whether either state would be amenable to  renegotiating the agreement milestones. For example, Idaho officials said  they still expect DOE and the Navy to meet the milestones. They stated  that the 25 years remaining to remove spent nuclear fuel from Idaho may  not be enough time to establish an alternative repository, but they noted  that the Idaho Settlement Agreement does not require the spent nuclear  fuel to be sent to the Yucca Mountain repository, only that it be removed  from Idaho. These officials also said Idaho might seek remedies in court if  it becomes evident that DOE is not positioned to meet a future milestone.
section_title: Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Would Not Affect Near-Term Operations at DOE Sites but Would Likely Extend On-Site Storage of Nuclear Waste
paragraphs: According to DOE and Navy officials, a termination of the Yucca Mountain  repository would not generally affect their nuclear waste operations in the  near term. However, it would likely extend on-site storage of nuclear  waste, which would lead to increased storage costs for the federal  government. In addition, DOE officials said they will need additional  information on storage facilities to plan storage beyond the time set forth  in the current site plans.
subsections: section_title: Near-Term Operations at DOE Sites Generally Would Be Unaffected
paragraphs: According to EM officials, a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository  is not expected to affect site operations in the near term because current  DOE operations are primarily focused on treating high-level wastes and  moving spent nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage—activities that do not  depend on having a repository available. Operations at the primary DOE  sites we reviewed—Hanford, Idaho, and Savannah River—are currently  focused on treating high-level radioactive liquid tank waste or moving  spent nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage. These efforts are intended to  immobilize high-level waste and provide safer storage on site until  disposal at a repository. Savannah River is vitrifying the site’s high-level  waste by combining it with glass-forming chemicals to make a glass that is  poured into stainless steel canisters and sealed by welding; Hanford is  building a $12.3 billion complex to do the same. Savannah River and  Hanford officials said they intend to continue these operations through  completion, regardless of the status of the Yucca Mountain repository,  because of EM’s mission to mitigate environmental risk and because the  officials are trying to meet milestones in their state agreements for  removing high-level waste from tanks. Idaho National Laboratory has  treated much of its high-level waste with a different process, called  calcination, which turns the waste into a dry granular powder. In a 2009  record of decision, DOE decided to take additional steps to put the calcine  waste into a monolithic form within canisters for permanent disposal, but  according to EM officials, this work has not yet been started. Regarding  spent nuclear fuel, Idaho is in the process of moving all of it from wet to  dry storage, and Hanford has generally completed the process. According  to EM officials, there are no plans at this time for the Savannah River Site  to move spent nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage.
Furthermore, at a 2010 hearing, the head of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion  Program stated that termination of the Yucca Mountain repository would  have no near-term effect on its operations at Idaho. The Navy intends to  continue moving its spent nuclear fuel out of wet storage and placing it  into canisters that are ready for transport when an alternative to the Yucca  Mountain repository is available. In the meantime, the Navy will store the  canisters at the Idaho site, as it anticipated doing while waiting for the  Yucca Mountain repository to open.
Some officials, such as those from the Washington State Department of  Ecology, raised concerns that a termination of the Yucca Mountain  repository could affect current operations if a replacement repository is  selected with different requirements for accepting waste. Waste  acceptance criteria govern aspects such as the waste canister’s shape, size,  and radioactive content. According to EM officials, however, continuing  operations in accordance with the treatment and packaging requirements  established for the Yucca Mountain repository license application likely  does not raise any significant issues. They said that EM, in coordination  with NRC and EPA, strives to develop waste forms and package designs  that will likely be accepted at any geologic repository, and they expect that  any new repository would be designed to safely hold the high-level waste  and spent nuclear fuel that has already been packaged.
While the sites can generally continue with their operations and plans  without the opening of a repository, a termination of the Yucca Mountain  repository may change some plans related to disposal. For example, if a  repository is not available, sites can delay building shipping facilities,  which would need to be in place about 5 years before a repository is  available.
section_title: Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Will Likely Extend On-Site Storage and Increase Costs
paragraphs: Without a Yucca Mountain repository, DOE will likely have to extend  storage of nuclear wastes at DOE sites, which will increase its storage  costs—although it is difficult to predict by how much. According to a 2009  Congressional Research Service report, halting the development of the  Yucca Mountain repository would almost certainly require that nuclear  waste remain at on-site storage facilities longer than currently planned.  This is because a new repository to replace the Yucca Mountain repository  would be unlikely to open by 2020. Similarly, senior EM officials told us  they understand that high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel may remain  at DOE sites for a “considerable” period of time. On-site storage can be  safe and secure for long periods, according to a National Research Council  report, but it would require a continuing commitment of resources for the  storage to be continuously monitored, maintained, and periodically  rebuilt.
For our analysis, we used DOE’s own estimate that the Yucca Mountain  repository would be open in 2020. This 2008 estimate was made before  DOE took steps to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program.  While we recognize the 2020 date was not certain, we know of no better  assumption to meaningfully assess the impact of a termination of the  Yucca Mountain repository. In a written comment to us, DOE officials  stated that it is incorrect to conclude there will be a delay in moving the  nuclear materials or disposing of them using an alternative strategy  compared to pursuing the Yucca Mountain program. Specifically, they  stated it is speculation to say a new strategy will take longer to implement  than continuing with the Yucca Mountain program because there is no  guarantee of when, if ever, the many significant steps for opening the  Yucca Mountain repository would have occurred. Since the comment  provides only a hypothetical bounding possibility—the Yucca Mountain  repository might have never opened, even without DOE’s current steps to  terminate it—rather than a new estimate for when the repository might  have opened, we note the DOE officials’ position but do not analyze it  further.
Longer storage would increase costs at DOE sites because it would require  additional years of storage beyond current plans, which assumed  shipments to the Yucca Mountain repository starting in 2020. These  storage costs generally fall into three categories:    Annual and recurring storage costs: Annual costs include costs for  operations, maintenance, surveillance, and security for the storage  facilities. Recurrent costs are generally maintenance or repair costs that  are not annual, such as the anticipated cost of replacing a storage  building’s roof every 25 to 30 years.
Increased storage capacity: Beyond storage already available or planned,  the Hanford Site, the Savannah River Site, and the Naval Reactor Facility  at the Idaho site would have to build additional storage if their canister  inventory cannot be reduced by sending canisters to the Yucca Mountain  repository. This capacity can be expensive. For example, an EM analysis  estimated that Hanford would need three additional storage facilities to  accommodate all of the waste canisters. These facilities would be built as  needed, at an estimated cost of $100 million (2010 dollars) each.
Replacement of storage facilities and containers. Existing storage  systems must be replaced once they exceed their useful lives. DOE has not  yet determined the design of these replacement storage systems, and these  costs could be incurred well into the future. For example, in a 2002  analysis, DOE assumed that the storage facilities would undergo complete  replacement after the first 100 years and every 100 years thereafter.
EM estimates that it could need an additional $918 million (2010 dollars)  to extend storage if the opening of a permanent repository were delayed  from 2020 to 2040. About two-thirds of these costs would fall into the  category of annual and recurring storage costs. For example, costs for  storing spent nuclear fuel at the Hanford Site were estimated at $6 million  per year for an additional 20 years. The remaining one-third of the  projected additional costs fall into the category of increased storage  capacity beyond what would be needed if the Yucca Mountain repository  had opened in 2020. EM’s estimate did not include any costs in the  category of replacing storage facilities and containers because it assumed  a delay of 20 years would not necessitate the replacement of any existing  storage buildings or containers. If storage were extended well into the  future, however, some buildings would need to be replaced. For instance,  Savannah River Site officials said the high-level waste canister storage  buildings at the site have a design life of 50 years, but are expected to  have a usable life of 100 years if properly maintained. According to the  officials, if storage needs to be extended beyond the storage buildings’  usable life, these buildings would have to be replaced at an estimated cost  of about $75 million each, the cost when the last one was built in 2005.
DOE may also have to replace or reinforce waste containers. Specifically,  spent nuclear fuel canisters might need to be either repackaged or left in  the original canister but then placed into a larger one, called a canister  overpack. For the high-level waste canisters, which are not amenable to  repackaging (which would involve the removal of the high-level waste  glass from the original stainless steel canisters), Savannah River officials  stated that they could likely be stored safely on site for a long time,  perhaps 1,000 years, without the canisters breaching from corrosion.  Problems could arise earlier for transport to a repository, however. After  an estimated 200 years, DOE could face problems safely retrieving and  moving the canisters from the on-site storage vault to the permanent  repository because of potential corrosion at the neck of the canister.  Savannah River officials explained that a transporter lifts the canister by  its neck to move it in or out of storage in subsurface vaults, as illustrated  in figure 2. If a corroded neck breaks when lifted, DOE would have  difficulties retrieving the canister. Breaking the neck of the canister could  also contaminate the vault, which would require cleanup. Because of these  concerns, according to a site official and an EM expert, DOE might decide  to overpack the high-level waste canisters, perhaps as early as after 100 to  150 years of storage. Moreover, if DOE did overpack the canisters, it  would also need to design and construct new storage buildings because  the new larger overpack would not fit into the storage positions in the  existing buildings at Savannah River.
It is difficult to accurately estimate these increased on-site storage costs  because of three key factors. First, how long the wastes will remain on-site  cannot be projected with certainty because it is unclear when an  alternative to the Yucca Mountain repository will be available. Reflecting  the degree of uncertainty, presenters at a March 2010 EM conference on  managing spent nuclear fuel considered a wide variety of possible periods  of storage, from 40 to 300 years. Second, the actual configuration and cost  of any future storage systems are not yet known. This is because DOE has  not devised a plan for long-term storage and because DOE has yet to make  certain decisions that could change the type of future storage and costs,  according to EM officials. For example, because DOE has not decided  whether to process spent nuclear fuel through Savannah River Site’s H- Canyon facility, it does not know the final configuration of the waste  storage system or the cost of storing it. Third, because DOE does not  know how long current storage systems can be used safely, it does not  know the appropriate timing for replacing them, EM officials said. They  emphasized that the useful lives of existing storage systems are uncertain  and will only be discovered over time through continuous surveillance to  identify degradation.
section_title: Additional Information on Storage Facilities and Any Unique Storage Needs Would Be Required for DOE to Plan for Longer Storage
paragraphs: EM officials told us that DOE can extend storage of spent nuclear fuel and  high-level waste on DOE sites for some time but will need additional  information on storage facilities to plan storage beyond the time set forth  in the current site plans. These officials said the current plans generally  assume that the nuclear waste will be shipped to a repository by about  2050, and the sites’ facilities are designed to last approximately until then.  A major exception is that Idaho National Laboratory had planned to use its  spent nuclear fuel storage facilities only through 2035, a date chosen  because of the Idaho Settlement Agreement’s milestone.
One option for extending on-site storage would be to extend the lives of  existing storage facilities when they reach the end of their design lives. EM  officials said they do not know how long a storage facility may last  because long-term storage at sites is unprecedented. In addition, they said  they know of no studies that verify the estimates of facilities’ useful lives  beyond their design lives. It is also unclear how long the canisters or the  spent nuclear fuel can be stored without degradation, which would  interfere with safe retrieval and transport to another location. Such  degradation could necessitate repackaging or overpacking to meet NRC  transportation requirements before sending the canisters to a disposal site.
Although EM officials told us EM has not yet planned for extending the  lives of storage buildings, an official at Idaho National Laboratory told us  that studies could be designed to provide confidence that storage  buildings will last for an additional 20 or 30 years. Specifically, these  longevity studies could identify components of the storage facility that are  at risk for failure and repairs that could extend storage. For example, a  longevity study may conclude that Idaho National Laboratory needs to  shore up a particular wall in a storage area for spent nuclear fuel in order  to assure that the area will last for another 30 years. Such information  would be useful to EM in budgeting for the maintenance and repairs that  are needed to extend the lives of existing facilities or for their replacement  at the end of their useful lives. Similarly, to assess how to manage aging  facilities for the long term, EM officials told us about some internal  proposals for research and development on spent nuclear fuel storage,  including ways to monitor wet and dry storage for degradation. However,  it is uncertain how much information this intended effort will ultimately  provide, since EM officials said that EM has not budgeted any funds for  this work.
A second option would be to build new storage facilities for very long-term  storage—such as beyond 120 years—that may exceed the useful lives of  existing facilities. However, to plan for very long-term storage, DOE may  need to conduct research to get information about its sites’ unique storage  needs. EM officials said EM currently has no research plan for very long- term storage for the wastes at DOE sites. An NRC official stated that NRC  and other groups are planning to research the technical basis for the very  long-term storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel beyond 120 years.  However, it is unclear whether this research will address all of DOE’s  waste storage needs since EM officials said DOE storage systems generally  differ from those used for commercial waste. NRC is not evaluating DOE  spent nuclear fuel because it generally does not have authority over DOE,  according to an NRC official. According to NRC officials, NRC also is not  yet looking at long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel in the two NRC- licensed storage facilities at DOE’s Idaho and Colorado sites. Because this  spent nuclear fuel also differs from commercial spent nuclear fuel, it will  require a unique analysis that NRC is not likely to undertake soon, NRC  officials said.
More information would also be needed for DOE and the Navy to decide  between these two options. New facilities might increase the cost- effectiveness of storage over the long term and be better designed to  monitor deterioration and address security issues. However, DOE and the  Navy cannot determine the resulting benefit without knowing the costs  and time periods involved for each of the two options. For example, EM  officials said DOE would not want to invest in costly new storage facilities  that could last hundreds of years, only to discover that a shorter period of  storage was needed. Furthermore, DOE may need more information about  state and local support for the two options. Based on our discussions and  review of documents, some states and communities may oppose any signs  that DOE is planning long-term storage at the sites. As New York officials  told us, for instance, the local community may react negatively to a new  storage facility at the West Valley site because it would be a visible sign  that the nuclear waste is not moving. On the other hand, some states and  communities may favor building robust storage facilities to help ensure  safety.
section_title: DOE and the Navy Have Not Developed Plans to Mitigate the Impact of Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository on Nuclear Waste Storage
paragraphs: EM and Navy officials told us they will not make any mitigation plans until  those plans can be informed by the Blue Ribbon Commission’s  recommendations, which are expected by January 29, 2012. EM officials  told us that it is too early for EM to jettison its current plans because of  the uncertainties about the possible alternatives to the Yucca Mountain  repository. In addition, according to EM management, EM will not make  any plans for extended storage before the Blue Ribbon Commission has  made its recommendations because it does not want to preclude any  strategies or options the Blue Ribbon Commission might recommend.
For some years after the commission’s recommendations are available,  however, DOE and the Navy could experience difficulties planning how to  mitigate the impact of a termination because uncertainties about the  alternative to the Yucca Mountain repository may take time to resolve.  Establishing an alternative site for a repository, for example, would likely  require new legislation, according the officials at DOE’s Office of General  Counsel. This might reopen lengthy and contentious political debates over  repository siting. It took almost 4 years of congressional effort to pass the  Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, followed by about 5 years of additional  effort, before Congress narrowed the evaluation of possible repository  sites to Yucca Mountain. In addition, because it is not clear how specific  the Blue Ribbon Commission’s recommendations will be, it may take DOE  additional work and time to use these recommendations to develop a new  nuclear waste management policy. For example, it may take time to  reassess whether to use the same procedures in siting a repository for  DOE and Navy materials and commercial spent nuclear fuel. According to  a 1982 Office of Technology Assessment report, this issue was a major  obstacle to passing nuclear waste legislation in 1979 and 1980.
With a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository, both DOE and the  Navy recognize they will need to devise alternative strategies to meet state  commitments for removing spent nuclear fuel from both Colorado and  Idaho, and both are waiting for the Blue Ribbon Commission  recommendations before planning a strategy. Navy officials said they  expect that the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations will define a  potential alternate path for defense waste that will allow it to comply with  the Idaho Settlement Agreement and to continue operations at DOE’s  Idaho site. EM officials believe it is too early to talk with states about  renegotiating agreements and told us that they plan to wait until  alternative plans to the Yucca Mountain repository can be made. In any  event, they stated, DOE intends to remain in compliance with milestones  and requirements in agreements with the states of Colorado and Idaho.
A termination of Yucca Mountain, however, may threaten DOE’s and the  Navy’s ability to meet state commitments. Specifically, some alternatives  that the Blue Ribbon Commission might consider may not provide a  solution soon enough—in the less than 25 years remaining before the 2035  milestones—or may not be applicable to DOE’s and the Navy’s spent  nuclear fuel. Although the commission has not indicated what it plans to  recommend, it has heard testimony on alternatives that have previously  been discussed and that might allow for removal of nuclear waste from  DOE sites. One of these alternatives is to establish one or more new  permanent repositories to replace the Yucca Mountain repository.  However, establishing another repository may not allow enough time to  meet the 2035 milestones unless the process is more expeditious for a new  repository than it was for Yucca Mountain. For the Yucca Mountain  repository, in 2008 this process was projected to ultimately last at least 37  years—from the beginning of the siting process in 1983 to the earliest  possible start of operations, in 2020. The commission is also considering  changes to the way nuclear waste is stored prior to final disposal. One  alternative that DOE previously studied for commercial spent nuclear fuel  is storing it at a centralized site. For our November 2009 report on  alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository, an expert in centralized  storage estimated that opening a centralized facility could take between 17  and 33 years from site selection until the facility began accepting waste.  A third alternative, which DOE has also previously considered, is for the  United States to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to create new fuel for  reactors. However, current reprocessing technology may not be cost- effective and, if not managed properly, creates proliferation concerns  because the resulting materials could be used in a nuclear weapon.  Transitioning the nuclear industry to new technologies to address these  concerns could take 50 to 100 years, according to a 2010 report from the  Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Even then, this solution might  apply mainly to commercial spent nuclear fuel, rather than the fuel stored  at DOE sites, because it may be impractical or uneconomical to reprocess  the relatively small quantities and many different types of spent nuclear  fuels stored at DOE sites, according to DOE documents and Navy officials.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: For decades, the United States has been struggling with the issue of what  to do with the nuclear waste from weapons production and several other  sources. With the possible termination of the Yucca Mountain repository,  it may be about to restart this potentially time-consuming and contentious  process. In the short term, this is unlikely to affect nuclear waste  operations for DOE or the Navy. However, long-term storage costs at sites  are likely to increase since DOE would need to store waste for longer  periods prior to permanent disposal. Furthermore, as a result of the  potential termination, DOE and the Navy may fail to meet commitments  they have made with Colorado and Idaho to remove spent nuclear fuel by  2035.
The fate of the Yucca Mountain repository is still uncertain, and DOE’s  Blue Ribbon Commission may not provide recommendations on a new  direction for nuclear waste management until January 2012. Given this  situation, DOE and the Navy cannot yet easily plan or wisely invest in  long-term storage since they will not know how long they will have to  store waste at DOE sites. Nevertheless, it seems likely that some extension  of on-site storage will be needed, and additional information about storage  systems will be needed to even start planning for extended storage. For  example, it is not known how long the lives of existing facilities can be  extended or what will happen to the waste or the storage containers  during long-term on-site storage. EM officials told us that EM currently has  no plan for developing information on extending the lives of existing  facilities, but longevity studies could identify components of the storage  facilities that are at risk for failure and repairs that could extend storage.  Moreover, although NRC and other groups are planning to research the  long-term storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel, DOE does not have  comparable research planned for somewhat different storage systems at  its sites. Thus, without taking some preliminary steps to assess the  information necessary to plan for long-term storage, DOE and the Navy  will not have the understanding needed to proceed with such planning  when the future direction becomes clearer. The alternative is to wait until  there is further clarity about national and departmental policy, which may  take years after the Blue Ribbon Commission provides recommendations.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help prepare for longer storage of nuclear waste at DOE sites, we  recommend the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary for  Environmental Management, and other DOE officials as appropriate, to  take the following two actions:    Assess the condition of existing nuclear waste storage facilities and the  resources and information needed to extend the facilities’ useful lifetimes.
Identify any gap between past and ongoing research into long-term nuclear  waste storage and any additional actions needed to address DOE’s unique  waste storage needs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided DOE and the Navy with a draft of this report for their review  and comment. The Navy chose not to provide formal comments. DOE  provided written comments on March 11, 2011, which are summarized  below and reproduced in appendix II. DOE stated that it agreed with our  recommendations but disagreed with two aspects of our report—that (1)  there would likely be delay and increased costs due to DOE’s decision to  terminate a repository at Yucca Mountain and (2) DOE may not meet its  commitments to the states of Idaho and Colorado. After reviewing DOE’s  comments, we believe that our findings are adequately supported and that  any assumptions upon which those findings are based are appropriately  acknowledged.
We are encouraged that DOE agrees that it needs better information on the  condition of existing nuclear waste storage facilities as well as research on  very long-term storage to meet its unique needs. DOE recognizes that the  waste may remain on its sites for a considerable period of time. This will  likely require DOE to revise the target date in its current plans, which  assume that a repository will be available in 2020.
DOE disagreed with parts of the draft report that stated there would likely  be a delay in removing waste from DOE sites and increased costs as a  result of DOE's decision to terminate the proposed repository at Yucca  Mountain. DOE stated that there was no “certain” date for opening the  Yucca Mountain repository and that any opening was subject to  contingencies beyond DOE’s control. DOE characterized our finding of a  likely delay as speculation. DOE also stated that the Blue Ribbon  Commission could propose options that will lead to more rapid disposal of  waste than the Yucca Mountain approach.
We believe that using 2020 as an opening date for the Yucca Mountain  repository was a reasonable assumption for analyzing the effects of a  possible termination of the program. In 2008, DOE itself established this  target date for opening the planned Yucca Mountain repository, before it  took steps to terminate the program. DOE did not provide an alternative  target or any basis for one in its comments, which would be necessary for  conducting a meaningful analysis. We agree that the opening date for the  Yucca Mountain repository was uncertain, and therefore we have made  clear in the report that our analysis is based on DOE’s own assumption of  a 2020 opening. Regarding DOE’s assertion that the Blue Ribbon  Commission could propose options for more rapid disposal, this also  provides no new basis for analysis. It is unclear how specific the  commission’s recommendations will be, whether DOE will choose to  implement them, or how quickly they can be implemented. Key  alternatives to Yucca Mountain that we reviewed—centralized storage,  reprocessing, or a new repository—could take decades to implement.  Therefore, the Yucca Mountain repository could have opened many years  after 2020 and still possibly have been available sooner than these  alternatives. Such uncertainties for both the availability of the Yucca  Mountain repository and for any alternative led us to report a “likely”  lengthening of the duration of on-site storage. DOE’s comments provide no  basis for revising our finding.
Second, DOE objected to the suggestion that DOE may not meet its  commitments to the states of Idaho and Colorado. DOE stated in its  comments that it intends to meet its commitments to remove spent  nuclear fuel from those states by 2035, and that there is no factual basis to  support that the commitments will not be met. However, we disagree with  DOE’s representation of our findings and supporting facts. Although our  report does conclude that DOE may not meet it commitments, it does not  state that DOE “will not” meet them. Instead, we highlight some challenges  to meeting these commitments if the Yucca Mountain repository program  were terminated. Without the Yucca Mountain repository, DOE currently  has no planned shipping destination for its spent nuclear fuel, and it is not  clear when a new destination will be available. We also reported that some  alternatives that the Blue Ribbon Commission might consider may not  provide a solution soon enough—in the less than 25 years remaining  before the 2035 milestones—or may not be applicable to DOE’s spent  nuclear fuel. We are unable to say more because, as we reported, DOE has  yet to announce a new plan for meeting its commitments. Its likelihood of  meeting them will be clearer after DOE specifies how it plans to establish  a new destination and ship its spent nuclear fuel there by 2035.
DOE and the Navy also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretaries of Energy and Defense, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Status of DOE’s Preparation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste for Disposal
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy
paragraphs: The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Energy's letter  dated March 11, 2011.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comment
paragraphs: We acknowledged in our recommendations that they may need to be  directed to other DOE officials, as appropriate.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgmen
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following staff members made  key contributions to this report: Janet Frisch, Assistant Director; Arkelga  Braxton; Kevin Bray; Penney Harwell-Caramia; Scott Fletcher; Eugene  Gray; Terry Hanford; Jonathan Kelly; Anne Rhodes-Kline; Mehrzad Nadji;   Ben Shouse; and Vasiliki Theodoropoulos.