Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness
Published: 2002-03-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is intergovernmental, national policymakers need a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges when formulating antiterrorism strategies. Key aspects of this strategy should include a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities. GAO's has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. More than 40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of cohesive effort, and duplication of programs. This situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government. Goals and performance measures should be established to guide the nation's preparedness efforts. For the nation's preparedness programs, however, outcomes have yet to be defined in terms of domestic preparedness. Given the recent and proposed increases in preparedness funding, real and meaningful improvements in preparedness and establishing clear goals and performance measures are critical to ensuring a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. The strategy should include a careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best achieve national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and partnerships, can enhance the government's ability to (1) target areas of highest risk to better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing needs, (2) promote shared responsibility by all parties, and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national goals.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to be here in Nashville to discuss issues  critical to successful federal leadership of, assistance to, and partnerships  with state and local governments in the area of preparedness for terrorist  events. As you know, Mr. Chairman, federal, state, and local governments  have a shared responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks.  But the initial responsibility falls upon local governments and their  organizations—such as police, fire departments, emergency medical  personnel, and public health agencies—which will almost invariably be the  first responders to such an occurrence. For its part, the federal  government historically has principally provided leadership, training, and  funding assistance. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, for  instance, about one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency Response Fund  was dedicated to homeland security, including funds to enhance state and  local government preparedness.
Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly  intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a  firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those  governments in addressing these issues. My comments today are based on  a body of GAO’s work on terrorism and emergency preparedness and  policy options for the design of federal assistance, as well as on our  review of many other studies. In addition, we draw on ongoing work for  this subcommittee; pursuant to your request we have begun a review to  examine the preparedness issues confronting state and local governments  in a series of case studies over the next several months. We will examine  the state and local perspective on these issues and thereby help the  Congress and the executive branch to better design and target programs  and strategies.
In my testimony, I reiterate GAO’s call, expressed in numerous reports and  testimonies over the past years, for development of a national strategy that  will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between  federal, state and local governments to guard against terrorist attacks. The  creation of the Office of Homeland Security under the leadership of Tom  Ridge is an important and potentially significant first step. We recognize  that the President, in his proposed 2003 budget, has announced that the  Office of Homeland Security will propose such a plan later this year. As it  comes together, we believe that key aspects of this strategy should  include:
A definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities  of federal, state, and local entities. Our previous work has found  fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. Over 40  federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts  have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of a cohesive effort, and  duplication of programs. As state and local officials have noted, this  situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available  federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal  government.
The establishment of goals and performance measures to guide the  nation’s preparedness efforts. The Congress has long recognized the need  to objectively assess the results of federal programs. For the nation’s  preparedness programs, however, outcomes of where the nation should be  in terms of domestic preparedness have yet to be defined. Given the recent  and proposed increases in preparedness funding as well as the need for  real and meaningful improvements in preparedness, establishing clear  goals and performance measures is critical to ensuring both a successful  and a fiscally responsible effort.
A careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best  implement the national strategy and achieve national goals. The choice  and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and partnerships,  can enhance the government’s capacity to (1) target areas of highest risk  to better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing  needs, (2) promote shared responsibilities by all parties, and (3) track and  assess progress toward achieving national goals.
Since the attacks of September 11th, we have seen the nation unite and  better coordinate preparedness efforts among federal, state, and local  agencies, as well as among private businesses, community groups, and  individual citizens. Our challenge now is to build upon this initial response  to further improve our preparedness in a sustainable way that creates both  short- and long-term benefits. We applaud the subcommittee’s interest in  addressing this issue now and urge that it continue its efforts to oversee  the efficiency and effectiveness of these key intergovernmental  relationships to define and best achieve the necessary level of national  preparedness.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Because of such emergencies as natural disasters, hazardous material  spills, and riots, all levels of government have had some experience in  preparing for different types of disasters and emergencies. Preparing for  all potential hazards is commonly referred to as the “all-hazards”  approach. While terrorism is a component within an all-hazards approach,  terrorist attacks potentially impose a new level of fiscal, economic, and  social dislocation within this nation’s boundaries. Given the specialized  resources that are necessary to address a chemical or biological attack,  the range of governmental services that could be affected, and the vital  role played by private entities in preparing for and mitigating risks, state  and local resources alone will likely be insufficient to meet the terrorist  threat.
Some of these specific challenges can be seen in the area of bioterrorism.  For example, a biological agent released covertly might not be recognized  for a week or more because symptoms may only appear several days after  the initial exposure and may be misdiagnosed at first. In addition, some  biological agents, such as smallpox, are communicable and can spread to  others who were not initially exposed. These characteristics require  responses that are unique to bioterrorism, including health surveillance,  epidemiologic investigation, laboratory identification of biological agents,  and distribution of antibiotics or vaccines to large segments of the  population to prevent the spread of an infectious disease. The resources  necessary to undertake these responses are generally beyond state and  local capabilities and would require assistance from and close  coordination with the federal government.
National preparedness is a complex mission that involves a broad range of  functions performed throughout government, including national defense,  law enforcement, transportation, food safety and public health,  information technology, and emergency management, to mention only a  few. While only the federal government is empowered to wage war and  regulate interstate commerce, state and local governments have  historically assumed primary responsibility for managing emergencies  through police, fire-fighting, and emergency medical personnel.
The federal government’s role in responding to major disasters is generally  defined in the Stafford Act, which requires a finding that the disasters is  so severe as to be beyond the capacity of state and local governments to  respond effectively before major disaster or emergency assistance from  the federal government is warranted. Once a disaster is declared, the  federal government—through the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA)—may reimburse state and local governments for between 75 and  100 percent of eligible costs, including response and recovery activities.
There has been an increasing emphasis over the past decade on  preparedness for terrorist events. After the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo  subway system on March 20, 1995, and the Oklahoma City bombing on  April 19, 1995, the United States initiated a new effort to combat terrorism.  In June 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 39 was issued, enumerating  responsibilities for federal agencies in combating terrorism, including  domestic terrorism. Recognizing the vulnerability of the United States to  various forms of terrorism, the Congress passed the Defense Against  Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (also known as the Nunn-Lugar- Domenici program) to train and equip state and local emergency services  personnel who would likely be the first responders to a domestic terrorist  event. Other federal agencies, including those in the Department of  Justice, Department of Energy, FEMA and Environmental Protection  Agency, have also developed programs to assist state and local  governments in preparing for terrorist events.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the subsequent attempts to  contaminate Americans with anthrax, dramatically exposed the nation’s  vulnerabilities to domestic terrorism and prompted numerous legislative  proposals to further strengthen our preparedness and response. During  the first session of the 107th Congress, several bills were introduced with  provisions relating to state and local preparedness. For instance, the  Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, which you co­ sponsored, Mr. Chairman, proposes the establishment of a Council on  Domestic Preparedness to enhance the capabilities of state and local  emergency preparedness and response.
The funding for homeland security increased substantially after the  attacks. According to documents supporting the president’s fiscal year  2003 budget request, about $19.5 billion in federal funding for homeland  security was enacted in fiscal year 2002. The Congress added to this  amount by passing an emergency supplemental appropriation of $40  billion dollars. According to the budget request documents, about one- quarter of that amount, nearly $9.8 billion, was dedicated to strengthening  our defenses at home, resulting in an increase in total federal funding on  homeland security of about 50 percent, to $29.3 billion. Table 1 compares  fiscal year 2002 funding for homeland security by major categories with  the president’s proposal for fiscal year 2003.
section_title: A National Strategy Is Needed to Guide Our Preparedness Efforts
paragraphs: We have tracked and analyzed federal programs to combat terrorism for  many years and have repeatedly called for the development of a national  strategy for preparedness. We have not been alone in this message; for  instance, national commissions, such as the Gilmore Commission, and  other national associations, such as the National Emergency Management  Association and the National Governors Association, have advocated the  establishment of a national preparedness strategy. The attorney general’s  Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism Crime and Technology Plan,  issued in December 1998, represents one attempt to develop a national  strategy on combating terrorism. This plan entailed a substantial  interagency effort and could potentially serve as a basis for a national  preparedness strategy. However, we found it lacking in two critical  elements necessary for an effective strategy: (1) measurable outcomes and  (2) identification of state and local government roles in responding to a  terrorist attack.
In October 2001, the president established the Office of Homeland Security  as a focal point with a mission to develop and coordinate the  implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United  States from terrorist threats or attacks. While this action represents a  potentially significant step, the role and effectiveness of the Office of  Homeland Security in setting priorities, interacting with agencies on  program development and implementation, and developing and enforcing  overall federal policy in terrorism-related activities is in the formative  stages of being fully established.
The emphasis needs to be on a national rather than a purely federal  strategy. We have long advocated the involvement of state, local, and  private-sector stakeholders in a collaborative effort to arrive at national  goals. The success of a national preparedness strategy relies on the ability  of all levels of government and the private sector to communicate and  cooperate effectively with one another. To develop this essential national  strategy, the federal role needs to be considered in relation to other levels  of government, the goals and objectives for preparedness, and the most  appropriate tools to assist and enable other levels of government and the  private sector to achieve these goals.
subsections: section_title: Roles and Missions of Federal, State, and Local Entities Need to Be Clarified
paragraphs: Although the federal government appears monolithic to many, in the area  of terrorism prevention and response, it has been anything but. More than  40 federal entities have a role in combating and responding to terrorism,  and more than 20 federal entities in bioterrorism alone. The complex  relationships this creates in the area of bioterrorism, as they existed prior  to the recent creation of the Office of Homeland Security, are illustrated  by the chart contained in appendix II. One of the areas that the Office of  Homeland Security will be reviewing is the coordination among federal  agencies and programs.
Concerns about coordination and fragmentation in federal preparedness  efforts are well founded. Our past work, conducted prior to the creation of  the Office of Homeland Security, has shown coordination and  fragmentation problems stemming largely from a lack of accountability  within the federal government for terrorism-related programs and  activities. There had been no single leader in charge of the many terrorism- related functions conducted by different federal departments and  agencies. In fact, several agencies had been assigned leadership and  coordination functions, including the Department of Justice, the Federal  Bureau of Investigation, FEMA, and the Office of Management and Budget.  We previously reported that officials from a number of agencies that  combat terrorism believe that the coordination roles of these various  agencies are not always clear. The recent Gilmore Commission report  expressed similar concerns, concluding that the current coordination  structure does not provide the discipline necessary among the federal  agencies involved.
In the past, the absence of a central focal point resulted in two major  problems. The first of these is a lack of a cohesive effort from within the  federal government. For example, the Department of Agriculture, the Food  and Drug Administration, and the Department of Transportation have been  overlooked in bioterrorism-related policy and planning, even though these  organizations would play key roles in response to terrorist acts. In this  regard, the Department of Agriculture has been given key responsibilities  to carry out in the event that terrorists were to target the nation’s food  supply, but the agency was not consulted in the development of the federal  policy assigning it that role. Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration  was involved with issues associated with the National Pharmaceutical  Stockpile, but it was not involved in the selection of all items procured for  the stockpile. Further, the Department of Transportation has responsibility  for delivering supplies under the Federal Response Plan, but it was not  brought into the planning process and consequently did not learn the  extent of its responsibilities until its involvement in subsequent exercises.
Second, the lack of leadership has resulted in the federal government’s  development of programs to assist state and local governments that were  similar and potentially duplicative. After the terrorist attack on the federal  building in Oklahoma City, the federal government created additional  programs that were not well coordinated. For example, FEMA, the  Department of Justice, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,  and the Department of Health and Human Services all offer separate  assistance to state and local governments in planning for emergencies.  Additionally, a number of these agencies also condition receipt of funds on  completion of distinct but overlapping plans. Although the many federal  assistance programs vary somewhat in their target audiences, the potential  redundancy of these federal efforts warrants scrutiny. In this regard, we  recommended in September 2001 that the president work with the  Congress to consolidate some of the activities of the Department of  Justice’s Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support under  FEMA.
State and local response organizations believe that federal programs  designed to improve preparedness are not well synchronized or organized.  They have repeatedly asked for a one-stop “clearinghouse” for federal  assistance. As state and local officials have noted, the multiplicity of  programs can lead to confusion at the state and local levels and can  expend precious federal resources unnecessarily or make it difficult for  them to identify available federal preparedness resources. As the Gilmore  Commission report notes, state and local officials have voiced frustration  about their attempts to obtain federal funds and have argued that the  application process is burdensome and inconsistent among federal  agencies.
Although the federal government can assign roles to federal agencies  under a national preparedness strategy, it will also need to reach  consensus with other levels of government and with the private sector  about their respective roles. Clearly defining the appropriate roles of  government may be difficult because, depending upon the type of incident  and the phase of a given event, the specific roles of local, state and federal  governments and of the private sector may not be separate and distinct.
section_title: Performance and Accountability Measures Need to Be Included in National Strategy
paragraphs: Numerous discussions have been held about the need to enhance the  nation’s preparedness, but national preparedness goals and measurable  performance indicators have not yet been developed. These are critical  components for assessing program results. In addition, the capability of  state and local governments to respond to catastrophic terrorist attacks is  uncertain.
At the federal level, measuring results for federal programs has been a  longstanding objective of the Congress. The Congress enacted the  Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (commonly referred to  as the Results Act). The legislation was designed to have agencies focus on  the performance and results of their programs rather than on program  resources and activities, as they had done in the past. Thus, the Results  Act became the primary legislative framework through which agencies are  required to set strategic and annual goals, measure performance, and  report on the degree to which goals are met. The outcome-oriented  principles of the Results Act include (1) establishing general goals and  quantifiable, measurable, outcome-oriented performance goals and related  measures; (2) developing strategies for achieving the goals, including  strategies for overcoming or mitigating major impediments; (3) ensuring  that goals at lower organizational levels align with and support general  goals; and (4) identifying the resources that will be required to achieve the  goals.
A former assistant professor of public policy at the Kennedy School of  Government, now the senior director for policy and plans with the Office  of Homeland Security, noted in a December 2000 paper that a  preparedness program lacking broad but measurable objectives is  unsustainable. This is because it deprives policymakers of the information  they need to make rational resource allocations, and program managers  are prevented from measuring progress. He recommended that the  government develop a new statistical index of preparedness,incorporating a range of different variables, such as quantitative measures  for special equipment, training programs, and medicines, as well as  professional subjective assessments of the quality of local response  capabilities, infrastructure, plans, readiness, and performance in exercises.  Therefore, he advocated that the index should go well beyond the current  rudimentary milestones of program implementation, such as the amount of  training and equipment provided to individual cities. The index should  strive to capture indicators of how well a particular city or region could  actually respond to a serious terrorist event. This type of index, according  to this expert, would then allow the government to measure the  preparedness of different parts of the country in a consistent and  comparable way, providing a reasonable baseline against which to  measure progress.
In October 2001, FEMA’s director recognized that assessments of state and  local capabilities have to be viewed in terms of the level of preparedness  being sought and what measurement should be used for preparedness. The  director noted that the federal government should not provide funding  without assessing what the funds will accomplish. Moreover, the  president’s fiscal year 2003 budget request for $3.5 billion through FEMA  for first responders—local police, firefighters, and emergency medical  professionals—provides that these funds be accompanied by a process for  evaluating the effort to build response capabilities, in order to validate that  effort and direct future resources.
FEMA has developed an assessment tool that could be used in developing  performance and accountability measures for a national strategy. To  ensure that states are adequately prepared for a terrorist attack, FEMA  was directed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations to assess states’  response capabilities. In response, FEMA developed a self-assessment  tool—the Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR)—that focuses on 13  key emergency management functions, including hazard identification and  risk assessment, hazard mitigation, and resource management. However,  these key emergency management functions do not specifically address  public health issues. In its fiscal year 2001 CAR report, FEMA concluded  that states were only marginally capable of responding to a terrorist event  involving a weapon of mass destruction. Moreover, the president’s fiscal  year 2003 budget proposal acknowledges that our capabilities for  responding to a terrorist attack vary widely across the country. Many areas  have little or no capability to respond to a terrorist attack that uses  weapons of mass destruction. The budget proposal further adds that even  the best prepared states and localities do not possess adequate resources  to respond to the full range of terrorist threats we face.
Proposed standards have been developed for state and local emergency  management programs by a consortium of emergency managers from all  levels of government and are currently being pilot tested through the  Emergency Management Accreditation Program at the state and local  levels. Its purpose is to establish minimum acceptable performance  criteria by which emergency managers can assess and enhance current  programs to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters  and emergencies. For example, one such standard is the requirement that  (1) the program must develop the capability to direct, control, and  coordinate response and recovery operations, (2) that an incident  management system must be utilized, and (3) that organizational roles and  responsibilities shall be identified in the emergency operational plans.
Although FEMA has experience in working with others in the development  of assessment tools, it has had difficulty in measuring program  performance. As the president’s fiscal year 2003 budget request  acknowledges, FEMA generally performs well in delivering resources to  stricken communities and disaster victims quickly. The agency performs  less well in its oversight role of ensuring the effective use of such  assistance. Further, the agency has not been effective in linking resources  to performance information. FEMA’s Office of Inspector General has  found that FEMA did not have an ability to measure state disaster risks  and performance capability, and it concluded that the agency needed to  determine how to measure state and local preparedness programs.
section_title: Appropriate Tools Need to Be Selected for Designing Assistance
paragraphs: Our previous work on federal programs suggests that the choice and  design of policy tools have important consequences for performance and  accountability. Governments have at their disposal a variety of policy  instruments, such as grants, regulations, tax incentives, and regional  coordination and partnerships, that they can use to motivate or mandate  other levels of government and private-sector entities to take actions to  address security concerns.
The design of federal policy will play a vital role in determining success  and ensuring that scarce federal dollars are used to achieve critical  national goals. Key to the national effort will be determining the  appropriate level of funding so that policies and tools can be designed and  targeted to elicit a prompt, adequate, and sustainable response while also  protecting against federal funds being used to substitute for spending that  would have occurred anyway.
subsections: section_title: Grants
paragraphs: The federal government often uses grants to state and local governments  as a means of delivering federal programs. Categorical grants typically  permit funds to be used only for specific, narrowly defined purposes.  Block grants typically can be used by state and local governments to  support a range of activities aimed at achieving a broad national purpose  and to provide a great deal of discretion to state and local officials. Either  type of grant can be designed to (1) target the funds to states and localities  with the greatest need, (2) discourage the replacement of state and local  funds with federal funds, commonly referred to as “supplantation,” with a  maintenance-of-effort requirement that recipients maintain their level of  previous funding, and (3) strike a balance between accountability and  flexibility. More specifically:
Targeting: The formula for the distribution of any new grant could be  based on several considerations, including the state or local government’s  capacity to respond to a disaster. This capacity depends on several factors,  the most important of which perhaps is the underlying strength of the  state’s tax base and whether that base is expanding or is in decline. In an  August 2001 report on disaster assistance, we recommended that the  director of FEMA consider replacing the per-capita measure of state  capability with a more sensitive measure, such as the amount of a state’s  total taxable resources, to assess the capabilities of state and local  governments to respond to a disaster. Other key considerations include  the level of need and the costs of preparedness.
Maintenance of effort: In our earlier work, we found that substitution is to  be expected in any grant and, on average, every additional federal grant  dollar results in about 60 cents of supplantion. We found that  supplantation is particularly likely for block grants supporting areas with  prior state and local involvement. Our recent work on the Temporary  Assistance to Needy Families block grant found that a strong maintenance  of effort provision limits states’ ability to supplant. Recipients can be  penalized for not meeting a maintenance-of-effort requirement.
Balance accountability and flexibility: Experience with block grants shows  that such programs are sustainable if they are accompanied by sufficient  information and accountability for national outcomes to enable them to  compete for funding in the congressional appropriations process.  Accountability can be established for measured results and outcomes that  permitting greater flexibility in how funds are used while at the same time  ensuring some national oversight.
Grants previously have been used for enhancing preparedness and recent  proposals direct new funding to local governments. In recent discussions,  local officials expressed their view that federal grants would be more  effective if local officials were allowed more flexibility in the use of funds.  They have suggested that some funding should be allocated directly to  local governments. They have expressed a preference for block grants,  which would distribute funds directly to local governments for a variety of  security-related expenses.
Recent funding proposals, such as the $3.5 billion block grant for first  responders contained in the president’s fiscal year 2003 budget, have  included some of these provisions. This matching grant would be  administered by FEMA, with 25 percent being distributed to the states  based on population. The remainder would go to states for pass-through to  local jurisdictions, also on a population basis, but states would be given  the discretion to determine the boundaries of sub-state areas for such a  pass-through—that is, a state could pass through the funds to a  metropolitan area or to individual local governments within such an area.  Although the state and local jurisdictions would have discretion to tailor  the assistance to meet local needs, it is anticipated that more than one- third of the funds would be used to improve communications; an  additional one-third would be used to equip state and local first  responders, and the remainder would be used for training, planning,  technical assistance, and administration.
section_title: Regulations
paragraphs: Federal, state and local governments share authority for setting standards  through regulations in several areas, including infrastructure and  programs vital to preparedness (for example, highways, water systems,  public health). In designing regulations, key considerations include how to  provide federal protections, guarantees, or benefits while preserving an  appropriate balance between federal and state and local authorities and  between the public and private sectors (for example, for chemical and  nuclear facilities). In designing a regulatory approach, the challenges  include determining who will set the standards and who will implement or  enforce them. Five models of shared regulatory authority are:
Fixed federal standards that preempt all state regulatory action in the
Federal minimum standards that preempt less stringent state laws but  permit states to establish standards that are more stringent than the  federal;  Inclusion of federal regulatory provisions not established through  preemption in grants or other forms of assistance that states may choose  to accept;
Cooperative programs in which voluntary national standards are  formulated by federal and state officials working together;
Widespread state adoption of voluntary standards formulated by quasi- official entities.
Any one of these shared regulatory approaches could be used in designing  standards for preparedness. The first two of these mechanisms involve  federal preemption. The other three represent alternatives to preemption.  Each mechanism offers different advantages and limitations that reflect  some of the key considerations in the federal-state balance.
section_title: Tax Incentives
paragraphs: To the extent that private entities will be called upon to improve security  over dangerous materials or to protect vital assets, the federal government  can use tax incentives to encourage and enforce their activities. Tax  incentives are the result of special exclusions, exemptions, deductions,  credits, deferrals, or tax rates in the federal tax laws. Unlike grants, tax  incentives do not generally permit the same degree of federal oversight  and targeting, and they are generally available by formula to all potential  beneficiaries who satisfy congressionally established criteria.
Regional Coordination and  Intergovernmental Partnerships	 of government and the private sector) facilitates the maximizing of  Promoting partnerships between critical actors (including different levels  resources and also supports coordination on a regional level. Partnerships  could encompass federal, state, and local governments working together  to share information, develop communications technology, and provide  mutual aid. The federal government may be able to offer state and local  governments assistance in certain areas, such as risk management and  intelligence sharing. In turn, state and local governments have much to  offer in terms of knowledge of local vulnerabilities and resources, such as  local law enforcement personnel, available to respond to threats in their  communities.
Since the events of September 11th, local officials have emphasized the  importance of regional coordination. Regional resources, such as  equipment and expertise, are essential because of proximity, which allows  for quick deployment, and experience in working within the region. Large- scale or labor-intensive incidents quickly deplete a given locality’s supply  of trained responders. Some cities have spread training and equipment to  neighboring municipal areas so that their mutual aid partners can help.  These partnerships afford economies of scale across a region. In events  that require a quick response, such as a chemical attack, regional  agreements take on greater importance because many local officials do  not think that federal and state resources can arrive in sufficient time to  help.
Mutual aid agreements provide a structure for assistance and for sharing  resources among jurisdictions in response to an emergency. Because  individual jurisdictions may not have all the resources they need to  respond to all types of emergencies, these agreements allow for resources  to be deployed quickly within a region. The terms of mutual aid  agreements vary for different services and different localities. These  agreements may provide for the state to share services, personnel,  supplies, and equipment with counties, towns, and municipalities within  the state, with neighboring states, or, in the case of states bordering  Canada, with jurisdictions in another country. Some of the agreements  also provide for cooperative planning, training, and exercises in  preparation for emergencies. Some of these agreements involve private  companies and local military bases, as well as local government entities.  Such agreements were in place for the three sites that were involved on  September 11th— New York City, the Pentagon, and a rural area of  Pennsylvania—and provide examples of some of the benefits of mutual aid  agreements and of coordination within a region.
With regard to regional planning and coordination, there may be federal  programs that could provide models for funding proposals. In the 1962  Federal-Aid Highway Act, the federal government established a  comprehensive cooperative process for transportation planning. This  model of regional planning continues today under the Transportation  Equity Act for the 21st century (TEA-21, originally ISTEA) program. This  model emphasizes the role of state and local officials in developing a plan  to meet regional transportation needs. Metropolitan Planning  Organizations (MPOs) coordinate the regional planning process and adopt  a plan, which is then approved by the state.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, as increasing demands are placed on budgets  at all levels of government, it will be necessary to make sound choices to  maintain fiscal stability. All levels of government and the private sector  will have to communicate and cooperate effectively with each other across  a broad range of issues to develop a national strategy to better target  available resources to address the urgent national preparedness needs.  Involving all levels of government and the private sector in developing key  aspects of a national strategy that I have discussed today - a definition and  clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities, an establishment  of goals and performance measures, and a selection of appropriate tools—  is essential to the successful formulation of the national preparedness  strategy and ultimately to preparing and defending our nation from  terrorist attacks.
This completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to  any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)  512-2834, or Paul Posner at (202) 512-9573. Other key contributors to this  testimony include Jack Burriesci, Matthew Ebert, Colin J. Fallon, Thomas  James, Kristen Sullivan Massey, Yvonne Pufahl, Jack Schulze, and Amelia  Shachoy.
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Homeland Security
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and  Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November  7, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide  Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31,  2001.
Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal  Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.  GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues.  GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
section_title: Combating Terrorism
paragraphs: Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in  Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.:  October 17, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism  Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington,  D.C.: September 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s  Council on Domestic Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.:  May 9, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal  Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and  National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in  Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington,  D.C.: March 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied  Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01- 14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of  Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.:  March 21, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and  Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October  20, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk  Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.  GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response  Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO-NSIAD-99-151. Washington,  D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is  Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat  Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11,  1999.
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness  Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO-NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:  November 12, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici  Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington,  D.C.: October 2, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize  and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:  April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs  Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39.  Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.
section_title: Public Health
paragraphs: Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in  Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15,  2001.
Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO- 02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.  Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T.  Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01- 915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and  Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2001.
West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.  GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.
Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and  Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 7,  1999.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation  Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington,  D.C.: August 16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public  Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16,  1999.