Secure Flight: Additional Actions Needed to Determine Program Effectiveness and Strengthen Privacy Oversight Mechanisms
Published: 2014-09-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As requested, this testimony summarizes the findings from two reports GAO issued in September 2014, about the Secure Flight program: Secure Flight: TSA Should Take Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness ( GAO-14-531 ) and Secure Flight: TSA Could Take Additional Steps to Strengthen Privacy Oversight Mechanisms ( GAO-14-647 ). This testimony summarizes the findings of those reports. For those reports, GAO analyzed TSA documents and data related to performance measures, screener performance at airport checkpoints, the redress process, and privacy protections, and interviewed relevant officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2009, the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Secure Flight program has changed from a program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them against the No Fly List, composed of individuals who should be precluded from boarding an aircraft, and the Selectee List, composed of individuals who should receive enhanced screening at the airport security checkpoint, to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. Secure Flight has established program goals that reflect these new program functions; however, current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. Furthermore, TSA lacks timely and reliable information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors.
TSA has processes in place to implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance these processes. TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight determinations at the checkpoint. However, TSA does not have a process for systematically evaluating the root causes of these screening errors. Evaluating the root causes of screening errors, and then implementing corrective measures, in accordance with federal internal control standards, to address those causes could allow TSA to strengthen security screening at airports.
The Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) affords passengers who may have been incorrectly matched to or listed on high-risk lists based on the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the U.S. government’s consolidated list of known and suspected terrorists—an opportunity to seek redress. Passengers who, through the redress process, are determined to have been misidentified to a TSDB-based high-risk list are added to the TSA Cleared List, which allows them to be cleared (not identified as high risk) nearly 100 percent of time. In fiscal year 2013, DHS TRIP began working to reduce processing time for its redress and appeals cases. Specifically, DHS has reduced its target for average number of days for redress cases to be closed and has established a performance goal for the appeals process. DHS TRIP plans to periodically review its progress in achieving its appeals performance goal and determine by February 2015 whether further changes to the appeals process are warranted.
TSA has taken steps to implement several of the privacy oversight mechanisms it planned to establish when Secure Flight implementation began in 2009, but additional actions could allow TSA to sustain and strengthen its efforts. TSA has implemented privacy training for new Secure Flight staff, and all DHS employees receive annual privacy training. However, existing Secure Flight staff do not receive job-specific privacy refresher training consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements. Providing job-specific privacy refresher training could further strengthen Secure Flight’s protection of personally identifiable information. TSA also documents some aspects of its Secure Flight privacy oversight mechanisms, such as scheduled destructions of passenger data. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and decisions that arise through the development and use of Secure Flight.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In GAO’s September 2014 reports, GAO recommended that TSA develop measures to address all aspects of performance related to Secure Flight program goals, develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of Secure Flight system matching errors, develop a process to regularly evaluate the root causes of screening errors at security checkpoints and implement measures to address these causes, provide job-specific privacy refresher training for Secure Flight staff, and develop a mechanism to document and track key Secure Flight privacy issues and decisions. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the findings from our two  September 2014 reports, being released today, in which we assessed the  performance of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Secure Flight program and  related privacy issues. Secure Flight screens approximately 2 million  passengers each day, matching passenger information against federal  government watchlists and other information to assign each passenger a  risk category. By identifying those passengers who may pose security  risks, Secure Flight helps protect against potential acts of terrorism that  might target the nation’s civil aviation system.
In response to requirements of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism  Prevention Act of 2004, and a recommendation of the National  Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11  Commission), TSA developed and implemented Secure Flight in order to  assume from air carriers the function of matching passengers against  watchlists maintained by the federal government.matched passengers against two watchlists, which were intended to  identify high-risk individuals: (1) the No Fly List, composed of individuals  who should be precluded from boarding an aircraft, and (2) the Selectee  List, composed of individuals who should receive enhanced screening at  the airport security checkpoint. The No Fly and Selectee Lists are subsets  of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the U.S. government’s  consolidated watchlist of known or suspected terrorists maintained by the  Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multiagency organization  administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
At the time, TSA  After initiating development of Secure Flight in August 2004, TSA began  implementing it in 2009, and completed transitioning foreign and domestic  air carriers to the program in November 2010. Secure Flight now screens  passengers and certain nontraveling individuals on all domestic and  international commercial flights to, from, and within the United States;  certain flights overflying the continental United States; and international  point-to-point flights operated by U.S. aircraft operators.
Secure Flight can have inadvertent and potentially inappropriate impacts  on the traveling public, such as when passengers are identified as high  risk because they share a similar name and date of birth with an  individual listed on a watchlist, and thus experience delays and  inconveniences during their travels. DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry  Program (DHS TRIP) provides passengers who have been denied  boarding, or identified for additional screening, with an opportunity to be  cleared if they are determined not to be a match to TSDB-based watchlist  records (i.e., misidentified) or if they have been wrongly identified as the  subject of a TSDB watchlist record (i.e., mislisted).
My testimony today highlights the key findings of our two reports on  Secure Flight. My statement will address the extent to which (1) TSA’s performance measures appropriately assess progress toward achieving  the Secure Flight program goals, (2) TSA ensures that Secure Flight  screening determinations for passengers are fully implemented at airport  security checkpoints, (3) DHS’s redress process addresses the delays  and inconveniences that result from Secure Flight screening, and (4) TSA  has implemented privacy oversight mechanisms to address Secure Flight  privacy requirements.
For the September 2014 reports, we analyzed documentation of TSA’s  program goals and performance measures for fiscal years 2011 through  2013 and assessed these measures against provisions of the  Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). We also analyzed a  list that TSA compiled at our request of missed passengers on two high- risk lists (including the reasons for these matching errors) that occurred  from November 2010 through July 2013. We analyzed certain TSA data  on screener performance at airport security checkpoints from May 2012,  when TSA began tracking these data, through February 2014, when we  conducted the analysis. We also reviewed relevant DHS TRIP redress  and appeals data for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. In addition, to  evaluate TSA’s documentation of Secure Flight privacy issues and  decisions and TSA’s privacy training for Secure Flight staff, we reviewed  relevant documents prepared by TSA privacy officials and contract staff,  including privacy compliance validation reports for the period from April  2012 through April 2013, monthly status reports prepared by TSA’s  privacy contractor for the period from March 2013 through April 2014, and  privacy training documents. We interviewed TSA and other DHS officials  who are responsible for aspects of Secure Flight and DHS TRIP, as well  as TSA officials at nine airports, which we selected based on a variety of  factors, such as volume of passengers screened and geographic  dispersion. Our September 2014 reports provide further details on our  scope and methodology.was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since its implementation in 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a  program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them  against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a  risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. In 2010, following the  December 2009 attempted attack on a U.S.-bound flight, which exposed  gaps in how agencies used watchlists to screen individuals, TSA began  using risk-based criteria to identify additional high-risk passengers who  may not be in the TSDB, but who should be subject to enhanced  screening procedures. Further, in 2011, TSA began screening  passengers against additional identities in the TSDB that are not already  included on the No Fly or Selectee Lists. In addition, as part of TSA  Pre✓™, a 2011 program through which TSA designates passengers as  low risk for expedited screening, TSA began screening against several  new lists of preapproved low-risk travelers. TSA also began conducting  TSA Pre✓™ risk assessments, an activity distinct from matching against  lists that uses the Secure Flight system to assign passengers scores  based upon their travel-related data, for the purpose of identifying them  as low risk for a specific flight. See appendix I for a list of Secure Flight  screening activities.
To conduct Secure Flight screening, TSA uses passenger information,  known collectively as Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD), which is   Once this screening is conducted, Secure  collected by aircraft operators.Flight then sends the air carrier a determination of how the passenger will  be screened at the checkpoint if provided a boarding pass. These  determinations include a “TSA PreTM eligible” message for passengers  who may receive expedited screening; a “cleared” message for  passengers found not to match any high- or low-risk list and who,  therefore, will generally receive standard screening; and a “selectee”  message for passengers who should undergo enhanced screening.passengers matching the No Fly List, the air carrier is precluded from  issuing a boarding pass.
Passengers who believe they have been unfairly denied boarding or  identified for additional screening may apply to DHS TRIP using an online  application, by e-mail, or by mail. If DHS TRIP determines that an  individual is still a potential match to a TSDB watchlist record, it refers the  matter to TSC for further review. TSC then conducts its own review of  whether the individual has been misidentified to a watchlist and whether,  based on the most current available information and criteria for inclusion  on the list, the individual is either correctly assigned to the list or is  wrongly assigned and should be removed from the list. If DHS TRIP and  TSC determine that no change in the passenger’s status is warranted, the  passenger is notified of this decision, and depending on the  determination, some passengers are permitted the opportunity to appeal  the decision. When passengers appeal, DHS TRIP forwards all  completed appeals paperwork to TSC. TSC analysts are to review all  derogatory information maintained on the appellant to make a written  recommendation to TSA on the appeal. TSA then reviews TSC’s  recommendation through its own internal process, which can include  going back to TSC for additional information, before the TSA  Administrator makes the final determination to uphold the appellant’s  status, recommend that TSC downgrade the appellant to another TSDB-based list, or recommend that TSC remove the appellant from the list.
section_title: TSA Lacks Key Information to Determine whether the Secure Flight Program Is Achieving Its Goals
paragraphs: In September 2014, we reported that Secure Flight has established  program goals that reflect new program functions since 2009 to identify  additional types of high-risk and also low-risk passengers; however,  current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully  assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. For example, to  measure performance toward its goals that address the system’s ability to  accurately identify passengers on various watchlists, Secure Flight  collects various types of data, including the number of passengers TSA  identifies as matches to high- and low-risk lists. However, we found that  Secure Flight does not have measures to assess the extent of system  matching errors—for example, the extent to which Secure Flight is  missing passengers who are actual matches to these lists. In addition, we  found that Secure Flight’s measures do not provide information on  progress toward the program’s goal to incorporate additional risk-based  security capabilities to streamline processes and accommodate additional  aviation populations, in part because the goal itself did not specify how  performance toward the goal should be measured.
We concluded that additional measures that address key performance  aspects related to program goals, and that clearly identify the activities  necessary to achieve goals, in accordance with the Government  Performance and Results Act, would allow TSA to more fully assess  progress toward its goals. For example, a measure that reflects  misidentifications to all high-risk lists could help TSA appropriately gauge  its performance with respect to its goal of limiting such misidentifications.  Likewise, establishing measures that clearly represent the performance  necessary to achieve the program’s goal that addresses risk-based  security capabilities will allow Secure Flight to determine the extent to  which it is meeting its goal of adapting the Secure Flight system for  different risk-based screening activities. Without measures that provide a  more complete understanding of Secure Flight’s performance, TSA  cannot compare actual with desired results to understand how well the  system is achieving these goals. Therefore, we recommended in  September 2014 that TSA develop additional measures to address key  performance aspects related to each program goal, and ensure these  measures clearly identify the activities necessary to achieve progress  toward the goal. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that  TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) will evaluate its current  Secure Flight performance goals and measures and develop new  performance measures as necessary.
We also found in September 2014 that TSA lacks timely and reliable  information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors.
TSA officials told us at the time of our review that when TSA receives  information related to matching errors of the Secure Flight system, the  Secure Flight Match Review Board reviews this information to determine  if any actions could be taken to prevent similar errors from happening  again. We identified instances in which the Match Review Board  discussed system matching errors, investigated possible actions to  address these errors, and implemented changes to strengthen system  performance. However, we also found that TSA does not have readily  available or complete information on the extent and causes of system  matching errors. We recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to  systematically document the number and causes of the Secure Flight  system’s matching errors, in accordance with federal internal control  standards. Such a mechanism would provide Secure Flight more timely  and reliable information on the extent to which the system is performing  as intended. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that  TSA’s OIA will develop a more robust process to track all known cases in  which the Secure Flight system has made a matching error, and that the  Secure Flight Match Review Board will conduct reviews to identify  potential system improvement measures on a quarterly basis.
section_title: TSA Has Processes in Place to Implement Secure Flight Screening Determinations at Checkpoints, but Could Take Further Action to Address Screening Errors
paragraphs: In September 2014, we reported that TSA has processes in place to  implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints,  but could take steps to enhance these processes. Screening personnel at  airport checkpoints are primarily responsible for ensuring that passengers  receive a level of screening that corresponds to the level of risk  determined by Secure Flight by verifying passengers’ identities and  identifying passengers’ screening designations. TSA information from  May 2012 through February 2014 that we assessed indicates that  screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight  determinations at the checkpoint. TSA officials we spoke with at five of  the nine airports where we conducted interviews conduct after-action  reviews of screening errors at the checkpoint and have used these  reviews to take action to address the root causes of those errors.  However, we found that TSA does not have a systematic process for  evaluating the root causes of these screening errors at the checkpoint  across airports, which could allow TSA to identify trends across airports  and target nationwide efforts to address these issues.
Officials with TSA’s Office of Security Operations (OSO) told us in the  course of our September 2014 review that evaluating the root causes of  screening errors would be helpful and stated they were in the early stages  of forming a group to discuss these errors. However, TSA was not able to  provide documentation of the group’s membership, purpose, goals, time  frames, or methodology. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government states that managers should compare actual performance  with expected results and analyze significant differences. Therefore, we  recommended in September 2014 that TSA develop a process for  evaluating the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint and then  implement corrective measures to address those causes. DHS concurred  with our recommendation and stated that TSA’s OSO will collect and  evaluate data on screening errors to identify root causes and work to  implement corrective measures. Uncovering and addressing the root  causes of screening errors could allow TSA to strengthen security  screening at airports by reducing the number of these errors at the  checkpoint.
section_title: DHS TRIP Addresses Inconveniences and Delays Related to TSDB-Based Lists, and Is Taking Actions to Reduce Case- Processing Time
paragraphs: In September 2014, we reported that DHS TRIP affords passengers  adversely affected by TSA screening processes an opportunity to address  inconveniences and delays associated with being potentially misidentified  to a TSDB-based list. Passengers who are determined to have been  incorrectly matched to or listed on high-risk lists based on the TSDB are  added to a list of passengers known as the TSA Cleared List, which  allows them to be cleared (not identified as high risk) nearly 100 percent  of the time. The DHS TRIP process also allows passengers determined  to have been improperly included on a TSDB-based list (mislisted) to be  removed, minimizing the likelihood they will be identified as matches  during future travels. Although DHS TRIP is not able to provide redress  for passengers who may have been misidentified to high-risk, rules-based  lists (TSA’s lists of high-risk passengers who, based on risk-based  criteria, should be subject to enhanced screening procedures though they  may not be in the TSDB), according to TSA officials, TSA procedures for  using such lists mitigate impacts on these passengers. These procedures  may result in TSA removing passengers from the lists, which ensures that  passengers who are misidentified to those individuals will no longer be  identified as a match, and thus delayed or inconvenienced as a result.
We also found that DHS has reduced its average processing time for  redress cases and is taking actions to further reduce processing times.  Specifically, we found that DHS TRIP officials took several steps in fiscal  year 2013 to reduce the overall processing time and a backlog of redress  cases including, for example, automating its response to DHS TRIP  applicants and hiring additional staff. According to DHS TRIP officials, at  the beginning of fiscal year 2014, DHS TRIP’s average case-processing  time for redress cases was approximately 100 days, and as of June 2014,  the average case-processing time was about 42 days. In January 2014,  DHS TRIP also reduced its target for one of its key performance  indicators—average number of days for DHS TRIP redress cases to be  closed—from 93 to 78 days.
In addition, we reported in September 2014 that DHS TRIP is taking  actions to reduce processing times for appeals cases. Appeals applicants  receive a letter stating that DHS will provide a final agency decision on  the appeal within 60 days of receipt of the appeal. However, we found  that the average total processing time for the appeals process for fiscal  years 2011 through 2013 was 276 days. In fiscal year 2013, DHS TRIP  began taking several actions to make the appeals process more  structured and reduce the overall review time, including, among other  things, developing and distributing documents that provide information on  the status and outcome of each appeal case and implementing a more  formalized process for reviewing appeals. In January 2014, DHS TRIP  also established intermediate and long-term performance goals for the  appeals process for the first time. Specifically, the intermediate  performance goal calls for an average total processing time of 92 days,  while the long-term performance goal calls for an average processing  time of 60 days, consistent with the time frame DHS TRIP commits to  achieving in the letter informing applicants of their right to appeal.  According to DHS TRIP officials, the agency plans to periodically assess  its progress toward achieving its intermediate and long-term goals for  reducing appeals-processing times. Officials stated that if DHS TRIP finds  it is not making adequate progress by February 2015—about 1 year after  the program began taking specific actions to reduce the overall review  time—it would first evaluate whether further changes and improvements  could be made to shorten the appeals process before considering, in  collaboration with TSC and the DHS Screening Coordination Office, a  change to the 60-day time frame stated in the appeals letter.
section_title: TSA Has Implemented Oversight Mechanisms to Address Passenger Privacy Requirements, but Additional Actions Could Better Ensure Full Compliance
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps to implement privacy oversight mechanisms, but, as  we reported in September 2014, additional actions could allow TSA to  sustain and strengthen its efforts. Overall, TSA has implemented  mechanisms to identify privacy implications associated with program  operations and address them as necessary. For example, TSA has  regularly updated privacy documents to address changes in the Secure  Flight program and maintains and reviews audit logs of Secure Flight  system and user events, such as requests to access the system that  generates reports on Secure Flight activities. TSA has also implemented  privacy training for new Secure Flight staff, and all DHS employees  receive annual privacy training. However, we found that existing Secure  Flight staff do not receive job-specific privacy refresher training consistent  with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements. For  example, TSA updated its privacy training for new Secure Flight staff in  December 2013 to reflect new privacy risks unique to Secure Flight’s  expanded screening activities. However, because the DHS privacy  refresher training for existing staff is not job-specific, staff who joined  Secure Flight prior to December 2013 may not have received privacy  training specific to these new screening activities. We recommended that  TSA provide at least annual job-specific privacy refresher training in order  to further strengthen Secure Flight’s protection of personally identifiable  information. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that  TSA’s OIA will develop and deliver job-specific privacy refresher training  for all Secure Flight staff.
We also reported in September 2014 that TSA documents some aspects  of its Secure Flight privacy oversight mechanisms, such as scheduled  destructions of passenger data and reviews of planned changes to the  Secure Flight system. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to  comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and  decisions that arise through the development and use of Secure Flight—a  mechanism TSA planned to develop when Secure Flight implementation  began in 2009. In the course of our September 2014 review, TSA’s  Secure Flight privacy officer told us that, in the absence of such a system,  Secure Flight relies on its privacy contract staff to oversee and monitor  privacy protections, in consultation with the designated Secure Flight  program privacy officer and the TSA Privacy Officer. However, it is  unknown whether this ad hoc communication would be sustained after a  personnel change in Secure Flight’s privacy team or contractor personnel,  and whether privacy-related decisions previously made would continue to  be implemented without documentation to inform new staff. Therefore, to  help TSA ensure that these decisions are carried into the future in the  event of a change in personnel, we recommended that TSA  comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and  decisions, in accordance with federal internal control standards. DHS  concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will develop a  mechanism to document such issues and decisions.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and members of the  subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I look forward to  answering any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Jennifer Grover at  202-512-7141 or GroverJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include Maria Strudwick (Assistant Director), Ashley Vaughan (Analyst-in- Charge), Mona Nichols Blake, John De Ferrari, Michele Fejfar, Richard  Hung, Tom Lombardi, Erin McLaughlin, and David Plocher.
section_title: Appendix I: Secure Flight Screening Activities
paragraphs: Appendix I: Secure Flight Screening Activities Description  The No Fly List is a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), the U.S.  government’s consolidated watchlist of known or suspected terrorists maintained by the  Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization administered by the  Federal Bureau of Investigation. The No Fly List contains records of individuals who are  suspected of posing or known to pose a threat to aviation or national security and are  prohibited from boarding an aircraft or entering the sterile area of an airport. Secure  Flight has matched passengers against the No Fly List since 2009.
The Selectee List is a subset of the TSDB containing records of individuals who must  undergo enhanced security screening before being permitted to enter the sterile area or  board an aircraft. Secure Flight has matched against the Selectee List since 2009.
The Expanded Selectee List includes terrorist records in the TSDB with a complete name  and date of birth that meet the reasonable suspicion standard to be considered a known  or suspected terrorist, but that do not meet the criteria to be placed on the No Fly or  Selectee Lists. Secure Flight began matching against the Expanded Selectee List in  April 2011.
The high-risk rules-based lists include two lists of passengers who may not be known or  suspected terrorists, but who, according to intelligence-driven, scenario-based rules  developed by TSA in consultation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), may  pose an increased risk to transportation or national security.
The CDC Do Not Board List is managed by CDC. It includes individuals who pose a  significant health risk to other travelers and are not allowed to fly.
TSA Pre members of CBP’s Trusted Traveler programs, members of the U.S. armed forces,  Congressional Medal of Honor Society members, and Members of Congress—groups of  individuals TSA has determined pose a low risk to transportation or national security—as  well as a TSA PreTM list created by TSA and composed of individuals who apply and  are preapproved as low-risk travelers through the TSA PreTM Application Program.  Secure Flight began matching against its first set of low-risk lists, CBP Trusted Traveler  Lists, in October 2011 and instituted the TSA PreTM  Application Program in December  2013.
TM lists include lists of preapproved, low-risk travelers, such as certain  The TSA Pre involvement in violations of security regulations of sufficient severity or frequency (e.g.,  bringing a loaded firearm to the checkpoint), are disqualified from receiving expedited  screening for some period of time or permanently.
Disqualification List is a list of individuals who, based upon their   risk assessments (low risk)
Secure Flight assesses certain travel-related information submitted by passengers and  assigns them scores that correspond to a likelihood of being eligible for expedited  screening for a specific flight. Secure Flight began performing these assessments for  selected frequent flier members in October 2011 and, in October 2013, began using  them to evaluate all passengers not determined to be a match to a high-risk or low-risk  list.
All TSDB-based watchlists utilized by the Secure Flight program contain records determined to have  met TSC’s reasonable suspicion standard. In general, to meet the reasonable suspicion standard, the  agency nominating an individual for inclusion in the TSDB must consider the totality of information  available that, taken together with rational inferences from that information, reasonably warrants a  determination that an individual is known or suspected to be or have been knowingly engaged in  conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities. To be  included on the No Fly and Selectee Lists, individuals must meet criteria specific to these lists. The  TSDB, which is the U.S. government’s consolidated watchlist of known or suspected terrorists, also  contains records on additional populations of individuals that do not meet the reasonable suspicion  standard articulated above but that other federal agencies utilize to support their border and  immigration screening missions. In addition, according to TSA officials, Secure Flight does not utilize  all terrorist records in the TSDB because records with partial data (i.e., without first name, surname,  and date of birth) could result in a significant increase in the number of passengers misidentified.
Individuals on all low-risk lists receive a Known Traveler Number that they must submit when making  travel reservations to be identified as low risk. See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3 (defining “Known Traveler  Number”). TSA also refers to these lists as Known Traveler lists.
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