Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities
Published: 2007-07-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as high on their priority lists. The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing in many ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), to meet the growing demand for ISR assets to support the warfighter. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing operations while optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets. Specifically, this report addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations, and (2) DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. GAO also reviewed the extent that DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting warfighters' needs. To perform this work, GAO analyzed data and guidance on the use of ISR assets, and interviewed DOD officials, including those supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not address coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them to ongoing operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD addresses the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations and may exacerbate integration challenges such as limited bandwidth. DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does not consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command charged with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support operational requirements does not have awareness of all available ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for obtaining this information. Similarly, the commander responsible for coordinating ongoing joint air operations does not have information on how assets controlled by tactical units are being used or what missions they've been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked, which results in problems such as duplicative taskings. This lack of visibility occurs because DOD does not have a mechanism for tracking the missions both theater- and tactical-level ISR assets are supporting or how they are being used. Without an approach to allocation and tasking that includes a mechanism for considering all ISR capabilities, DOD may be unable to fully leverage all available ISR assets and optimize their use. DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive feedback to ensure the warfighter's needs were met. Although the Joint Functional Component Command for ISR has been tasked with developing ISR metrics, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus captured. While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not capture all of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions. There is an ongoing effort within DOD to develop additional quantitative as well as qualitative ISR metrics, but no DOD-wide milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of the results of joint operations; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring due to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without metrics and feedback, DOD may not be able to validate how well the warfighters' needs are being met, whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or which new systems would best support warfighting needs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being transformed  Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being transformed  by new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and strike  by new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and strike  capabilities, some of which have been achieved through the use of  capabilities, some of which have been achieved through the use of  unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Effective ISR can provide early warning  unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Effective ISR can provide early warning  of enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military  of enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military  forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality. ISR data can  forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality. ISR data can  come from a variety of sources, including surveillance and reconnaissance  come from a variety of sources, including surveillance and reconnaissance  systems such as satellites; manned aircraft like the U-2; unmanned aircraft  systems such as satellites; manned aircraft like the U-2; unmanned aircraft  systems like the Air Force’s Global Hawk and Predator and the Army’s  systems like the Air Force’s Global Hawk and Predator and the Army’s  Hunter; other ground, air, sea, or space-based equipment; and human  Hunter; other ground, air, sea, or space-based equipment; and human  intelligence teams.  intelligence teams.
Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations are supported by  Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations are supported by  the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ISR assets, including theater-level ISR  the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ISR assets, including theater-level ISR  assets that are generally used to support combatant commander ISR  assets that are generally used to support combatant commander ISR  priorities, tactical ISR assets that are generally used to support operational  priorities, tactical ISR assets that are generally used to support operational  units including conventional and special operations forces, and assets  units including conventional and special operations forces, and assets  acquired by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to  acquired by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to  aid in the identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices.  aid in the identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices.  Additionally, combatant commanders receive support from ISR assets  Additionally, combatant commanders receive support from ISR assets  controlled by U.S. intelligence agencies such as the National Security  controlled by U.S. intelligence agencies such as the National Security  Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial- Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency. U.S. allies also provide ISR assets to support ongoing  Intelligence Agency. U.S. allies also provide ISR assets to support ongoing  combat operations.  combat operations.
Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the information  Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the information  they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that is reflected in DOD’s  they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that is reflected in DOD’s  planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR assets at every level of  planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR assets at every level of  command is growing, and DOD is making investments in a number of ISR  command is growing, and DOD is making investments in a number of ISR  systems, including unmanned aircraft systems, manned platforms, and  systems, including unmanned aircraft systems, manned platforms, and  space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems. Specifically, for UAS,  space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems. Specifically, for UAS,  funding has increased from $363 million in fiscal year 2001 to $2.23 billion  in fiscal year 2007, and DOD has requested $2.54 billion for fiscal year  2008. As of February 2007, DOD had more than 3,900 unmanned aircraft in  its inventory compared to fewer than 50 in 2000. The majority of these  aircraft are currently being used in support of ongoing operations in Iraq  and Afghanistan.
In December 2005, we reported that while commanders are experiencing  mission success with UAS in ongoing operations, they face challenges in  fully optimizing the use of these assets, due in part to the growing number  of UAS. Specifically, we reported that DOD had achieved operational  successes with UAS, but challenges such as interoperability and limited  communications bandwidth were hampering joint operations or  preventing timely UAS deployment. Additionally, in April 2006, we testified  that while DOD continues to request funds to support service plans for  acquiring UAS, it lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS development  and investment decisions.
You asked us to review DOD’s efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing  combat operations while optimizing the capabilities offered by all DOD  ISR assets. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) DOD has  taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; and  (2) DOD’s approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all  available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. We are also  providing information on the extent to which DOD evaluates the  performance of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting the warfighters’  needs.
To address our objectives, we reviewed DOD and military service  publications and documentation pertaining to ISR, including those specific  to UAS such as joint publications, concepts of operations, manuals on   tactics and procedures, and the 2005–2030 UAS Roadmap.  We also  interviewed officials from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task  Force within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of the military services;  U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and associated Army and Air Force  component commands; and the Joint Functional Component Command  for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). Further,  we reviewed documentation, such as joint publications and briefings that  explain the process for tasking ISR assets, and interviewed officials at  CENTCOM to better understand how ISR assets are assigned to specific  missions. Additionally, we discussed the use of UAS in military operations  with Combined Air Operations Center officials in Qatar and units that  recently returned from or are currently supporting ongoing operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan. To understand how requests for ISR support are  generated and satisfied at the tactical level, we spoke with units that  recently returned from, or are currently supporting, ongoing operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan as well as units within the services such as the  Marine Corps’ Tactical Fusion Center that are involved in determining if  tactical assets are available to satisfy those requests or if the requests need  to be forwarded for theater-level support. We performed our work from  June 2006 to June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.  More details on our scope and methodology are  presented at appendix I.
In addition to this report, we recently issued a report that discussed  whether DOD is acquiring its ISR assets in the most efficient manner. We  are also conducting work for the committee examining how DOD  determines its requirements for ISR systems and expect to report on this  work early next year.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: UAS represent one of many DOD airborne ISR assets available to support  ongoing combat operations. Unmanned aircraft are deployed and  controlled at different levels of command and can be categorized into  three main classes: man-portable, tactical, and theater. Table 1 illustrates  examples of UAS in each category. Man-portable UAS are small, self- contained, and portable and are generally used to support the small  ground combat teams in the field. Tactical UAS are larger systems that are  generally used to support operational units at tactical levels of command  such as the battalion or brigade. Tactical UAS are locally operated and  controlled by the units. Theater UAS are operated and controlled by the  Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) and are generally used  to support combatant commander ISR priorities, although in certain  circumstances they can be assigned to support tactical operations, such as  when troops are being fired on. Theater UAS traditionally have been more  capable than tactical or man-portable systems. For example, theater UAS  typically contain characteristics that make them more capable than other  categories of UAS, such as their more robust communications architecture  and more capable payloads that allow for production of more diverse  intelligence data products. However, some tactical systems, such as the  Army’s Warrior UAS, are being developed that are capable of performing  theater-level requirements and, as currently envisioned, will be embedded  in and controlled at the tactical level by units.
DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available DOD  theater-level airborne ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant  commanders. The allocation process is managed by U.S. Strategic  Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,  Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). In 2003, DOD altered its  unified command plan to give U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for  planning, integrating, and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and  global operations. To execute this responsibility, U.S. Strategic Command  established the JFCC-ISR in March 2005. The JFCC-ISR is charged with  recommending to the Secretary of Defense how DOD’s theater-level ISR  assets should be allocated, or distributed, among combatant commanders  and for the integration and synchronization of DOD, national, and allied  ISR capabilities and collection efforts.
Once DOD’s ISR assets are allocated to the combatant commanders, they  are available to be assigned or tasked based on combatant commander  priorities against specific missions in support of ongoing operations.  Authority for tasking ISR assets, including UAS, is generally determined by  the level of the objective the asset is deployed to support and the  command level of the unit that controls the asset. Therefore, most theater- level UAS assets that are controlled and tasked by the JFACC are generally  used to support theater-level objectives and priorities, as established by  the combatant commander. Most tactical UAS assets controlled by the  services or the U.S. Special Operations Command are used to support  tactical objectives and priorities, which may differ from theater-level  priorities. For example, authority to task the Army’s Hunter resides with  the commander of the unit in which it is embedded, whereas authority for  tasking the Air Force’s Predator resides with the JFACC.
In August 2005 DOD issued its current UAS Roadmap which was  developed to assist DOD in developing a long-range strategy for UAS  development, acquisition, and other planning efforts as well as to guide  industry in developing UAS related technology. According to DOD  officials, DOD is in the process of developing an update to this Roadmap  and expects to issue the updated version in late summer 2007. The UAS  Roadmap is intended to guide UAS planning; however, it does address  limited operational aspects such as operational issues or challenges that  have emerged as a result of operating UAS in support of ongoing  operations. For example, the Roadmap acknowledges that the limited  number of bandwidth frequencies constrains DOD’s ability to operate  multiple unmanned aircraft simultaneously.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges
paragraphs: DOD components have developed guidance—such as a Multi-Service  Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of  Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for UAS— to facilitate UAS integration. However, DOD continues to face UAS  integration challenges, such as the lack of interoperability and limited  communications bandwidth. These challenges may be exacerbated  because DOD has not established DOD-wide advance coordination  procedures for integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD takes  steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may  continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS into combat  operations and may exacerbate existing integration challenges.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Developed Guidance to Facilitate the Integration of UAS
paragraphs: DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of  UAS into combat operations. For example, in August 2006 DOD issued its  Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical  Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This document was designed  to serve as a planning, coordination, and reference guide for the services  and provides a framework for warfighters employing UAS. Furthermore, in  March 2007 DOD issued its Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned  Aircraft Systems, which provides overarching principles, a discussion of  UAS capabilities, operational views, and a discussion of UAS use in  various operational scenarios. Each of the above documents represent an  important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations, and DOD  officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD  learns more about the capabilities of UAS and their application in combat  operations.
section_title: DOD Continues to Face UAS Integration Challenges
paragraphs: DOD continues to face challenges, such as interoperability and  communications bandwidth, in integrating UAS into combat operations. In  December 2005 we reported that challenges such as the lack of  interoperability and limited communications bandwidth have emerged to  hamper recent joint operations or prevent timely UAS employment.  Specifically, some UAS cannot easily exchange data, sometimes even  within a single service, because they were not designed with interoperable  communications standards. Additionally, as we previously reported, U.S.  forces are unable to interchangeably use some payloads from one type of  UAS on another, a capability known as “payload commonality.”
Furthermore, electromagnetic spectrum frequencies, often referred to as  bandwidth, are congested by a large number of UAS and other weapons or  communications systems using the same frequency simultaneously. While  some UAS can change to different, less congested, frequency bands, most  UAS were built without the ability to change frequency bands.  Thus,  commanders have had to delay certain missions until frequency  congestion cleared. DOD is taking steps to address these challenges such  as equipping UAS with the Tactical Common Data Link and, according to  DOD officials, it is developing common ground control stations to improve  interoperability of its UAS.
section_title: Lack of DOD-wide Advance Coordination May Exacerbate Integration Challenges of UAS and Other ISR Assets
paragraphs: Existing UAS integration challenges may be exacerbated because DOD has  not established DOD-wide advance coordination procedures for  integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations. Specifically,  DOD officials indicate that assets arriving in theater without advance  coordination may exacerbate UAS integration challenges, such as further  taxing the limited available bandwidth. As additional ISR assets are rapidly  acquired and fielded to meet the increasing demand for ISR support in  ongoing operations, CENTCOM has recognized that advance coordination  is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling  efficient deployment of assets and effective utilization of them once they  are in theater. Furthermore, advance knowledge of system requirements is  crucial to allow the combatant commander sufficient time to adequately  plan to support incoming assets. DOD officials acknowledge that having to  incorporate assets quickly into the theater infrastructure creates  additional challenges and further emphasizes the need for advance  coordination.
In response to this issue, CENTCOM has developed procedures to ensure  the services coordinate their plans prior to deploying UAS to CENTCOM’s  theater of operations. In May 2005 CENTCOM established the Concept of  Operations for Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, which states that  when a full-motion video-capable asset or weapons system is scheduled  for deployment to CENTCOM’s theater of operations, the controlling unit  will notify CENTCOM of the deployment no later than 30 days prior to  arrival of the asset in theater. It also states that the controlling unit will  provide a system and platform concept of operations to CENTCOM no  later than 15 days prior to the asset’s arrival. According to CENTCOM  officials, they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM’s service  components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces  Central Command. However, they were unaware if the procedures were  distributed further to the services, and service officials we interviewed,  including those at the service Headquarters as well as those stationed  within units returning from ongoing operations, indicated they were not  aware of the requirement. CENTCOM officials indicate that the procedures  have not always been followed.
The Warrior Alpha, which was fielded by the Joint Improvised Explosive  Device Defeat Organization and operated by the Army to aid in the  identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices, illustrates  why this advance coordination is so critical. As a result of coordinating  with CENTCOM, the Army was made aware of limitations such as  bandwidth and limited ramp space and decided to deploy the Warrior  Alpha to an alternate location. While CENTCOM and Army officials  disagree on whether the coordination was completed in a timely manner,  all agree it was ultimately completed. While this example is limited to  CENTCOM’s area of operations, the potential exists for DOD to have to  quickly establish operations in other areas of the world, which makes the  need for advance coordination even more critical.
CENTCOM officials acknowledge the need for advance coordination for  all ISR assets entering CENTCOM’s theater of operations, not just those  assets that are capable of full-motion video. To address this need,  CENTCOM developed in November 2006 an ISR Systems Concept of  Operations Standardization Memo. CENTCOM officials stated that the ISR  memo is intended to provide CENTCOM with awareness of what assets  are coming into theater and to allow CENTCOM to ensure the asset is able  to be incorporated into the existing infrastructure, given operational  challenges such as limited communications bandwidth. This memo  requires the inclusion of certain elements in all ISR system concepts of  operations, including how the asset will be tasked; how intelligence will be  processed, exploited, and disseminated; and system bandwidth  requirements that must be coordinated with CENTCOM prior to  deployment of ISR assets.
This ISR memo applies only to CENTCOM’s theater of operations and does  not constitute DOD-wide guidance. While the Warrior Alpha example is  limited to CENTCOM, the potential exists for DOD to need to establish  operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide  procedure for advance coordination would be critical for quickly  supporting UAS and other ISR assets once deployed. Until DOD takes  steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be  unable to successfully integrate UAS and other ISR assets into combat  operations and existing integration challenges may be exacerbated.
section_title: DOD’s Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does Not Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets
paragraphs: DOD’s current approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including  UAS, does not consider the capabilities of all ISR assets because it lacks  an awareness or visibility over all ISR capabilities available to support the  combatant commanders and how DOD ISR assets are being used, which  hinders DOD’s ability to optimize the use of its assets. Although DOD has  established a process for allocating available DOD ISR assets, including  UAS, to the combatant commanders to meet their needs, it does not have  an awareness of all ISR assets, which impairs its ability to distribute or  allocate DOD assets while considering the capabilities of all ISR assets.  Additionally, DOD’s process for tasking its ISR assets does not currently  allow for information at all levels into how DOD’s ISR assets are being  used on a daily basis, which hinders its ability to leverage other assets  operating in an area and to avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings.  Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that considers  all ISR capabilities, DOD is not in a sound position to fully leverage all the  capabilities of available ISR assets and to optimize the use of those assets,  and therefore cannot be assured that it is addressing warfighter needs in  the most efficient and effective manner. DOD recognizes the opportunity  to better plan for and control its ISR assets and has initiated a study to  examine the issue.
subsections: section_title: DOD Does Not Have Visibility over All ISR Assets Available to Meet the Warfighters’ Needs
paragraphs: Although DOD has established a process for allocating available DOD ISR  assets to the combatant commanders to meet the warfighters’ needs, it  does not have an awareness or visibility over the total number and types of  ISR assets available to support combatant commanders or the capabilities  represented by those assets. DOD uses an annual process for allocating or  distributing its available ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant  commanders to meet theater-level needs. That process is managed by U.S.  Strategic Command’s JFCC-ISR, which is tasked with making  recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate  DOD ISR resources for theater use across the combatant commands and  ensuring the integration and synchronization of DOD, national, and allied  ISR capabilities and collection efforts. DOD officials indicate that annual  allocation levels are constrained by the number of ISR assets in DOD’s  inventory and believe that JFCC-ISR is, therefore, not able to allocate to  the combatant commanders ISR assets in sufficient numbers to meet all  requests for ISR support. However, our work suggests that additional  information is needed to assess the true demand for ISR assets and the  best way to meet this demand. Specifically, JFCC-ISR’s ability to fulfill its  mission of integrating DOD, national, and allied partner ISR capabilities  and making recommendations on how best to allocate ISR assets to  support the warfighter depends, in part, on the extent to which it has  awareness and visibility over all ISR assets, including DOD, national, and  allied ISR assets. JFCC-ISR does not have complete visibility into all assets  that could be used to support combatant commanders’ needs, which  hinders its ability to optimally distribute or allocate DOD ISR assets. JFCC- ISR officials estimate it has 80–90 percent visibility into DOD ISR assets  but does not have the same level of visibility into other national and allied  ISR assets available to support theater-level requirements, such as assets  that are owned and controlled by U.S. national intelligence agencies such  as the National Security Agency or by our allies supporting ongoing  operations. According to JFCC-ISR officials, although they are working to  gain better visibility over all ISR assets, they currently do not have this  level of visibility because DOD does not currently have a mechanism for  obtaining information on all ISR assets—including all DOD, national, and  allied assets—operating in each of the combatant commanders’ area of  operations. Absent such a mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been trying to learn  more about the capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by building  relationships with other national and allied intelligence agencies and  addressing limitations related to intelligence agency system access.  Without an approach to its allocation process that considers all available  ISR capabilities, JFCC-ISR does not have all the information it needs to  leverage the capabilities of all available ISR assets and to optimize the  allocation of DOD’s ISR assets.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have Visibility over the Tasking of All DOD Airborne ISR Assets, Including UAS
paragraphs: DOD’s process for tasking its airborne ISR assets, including UAS, does not  provide for visibility at all levels into how DOD airborne ISR assets are  being used on a daily basis. Once DOD ISR assets have been allocated,  those assets are available to the combatant commanders to be assigned, or  tasked, against specific requests for ISR support in ongoing operations.  The JFACC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint  air operations to focus the effect of air capabilities and for assuring their  effective and efficient use in achieving the combatant commanders’  objectives. However, while the JFACC has visibility into how all theater- level ISR assets, like the Air Force’s Predator, are being used, he or she  does not have visibility into how tactical ISR assets, such as the Army’s  Hunter, are being used on a daily basis or what missions they are  supporting. The JFACC generally tasks assets that support theater-level  objectives, while assets that support tactical-level objectives are tasked  and controlled by the services or by the U.S. Special Operations  Command. Tactical units utilize their embedded, or tactical, assets first to  satisfy unit intelligence needs. However, when tactical assets are not  available or capable of satisfying a unit’s need for ISR support, the unit  requests theater-level ISR support. Requests for most theater-level assets  are entered into a central DOD database, but there is no similar database  that captures requests for tactical-level assets. While there are procedures,  such as the Air Tasking Order and Airspace Control Order, for tracking  where theater- and tactical-level assets are operating for airspace control  and deconfliction purposes, a comparable mechanism for tracking the  missions these assets are supporting or how they are being used on a daily  basis does not exist. For example, the Air Tasking Order would track the  time, date, and location where a UAS was operating, but there is no  mechanism that would track what intelligence the UAS was supposed to  gather on a mission or why the UAS was being used on a mission. Without  a database or similar mechanism providing visibility into how tactical-level  assets are being tasked, the JFACC is limited in his or her awareness of  how those assets are being used on a daily basis, which hinders the  JFACC’s ability to optimize the use of those assets.
This lack of visibility limits the JFACC’s ability to leverage those assets  using techniques such as cross-cueing, which is the collaborative effort of  using capabilities offered by multiple ISR platforms to fulfill a mission. By  using techniques such as cross-cueing, the JFACC has been able to use the  different types of capabilities brought by different theater-level manned  and unmanned ISR assets to maximize the intelligence collected. For  example, a manned Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System was  tasked to monitor an area. When this system sensed movement in the area,  a Predator was then tasked to collect imagery to confirm suspected  activity. Without visibility into how tactical assets are being utilized, the  JFACC is limited in his or her ability to optimize the use of all available  DOD ISR assets and to focus the effect of these assets to ensure their  efficient and effective use. Such visibility will become even more  important given that services such as the Army are acquiring, and planning  to embed in units, ISR assets capable of satisfying theater-level  requirements, such as the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose or Warrior UAS,  which could otherwise be leveraged to support JFACC requirements.
Duplicative taskings that occur are often driven by a lack of visibility into  where ISR assets at all levels are operating and what they are tasked to do.  For example, a DOD official shared with us an example of unnecessary  duplication where an Army unit requested a full-motion video-capable  asset to support a high-priority requirement. When the asset, a Predator  UAS, arrived to support the requirement, its operator realized the Army  unit had also tasked one of its tactical assets, a Hunter UAS, against the  requirement. As a result of the lack of visibility over all assets, the  potential exists for multiple ISR aircraft to be tasked to operate in the  same area and against the same requirement. However, some level of  duplication may be necessary when driven by mission requirements and  system capabilities. Certain missions, such as special operations, often  need a certain amount of duplication in order to achieve the desired result.  For example, a mission intended to track activity of suspected terrorists  may require multiple systems to follow identified individuals who flee the  scene in different directions. Furthermore, assets such as the Predator  UAS experience system limitations when equipped with a full-motion- video sensor in that they are only able to provide surveillance of a narrow  or “soda straw” view. A certain level of duplication of UAS may be  necessary to support a mission to obtain a complete view of the area  under surveillance.
Greater visibility at the tactical level could provide units with a greater  awareness of where other ISR assets, including both theater-level and  those assets embedded in other units, are operating and what they are  being used to do. A mechanism that provides this visibility would allow  tactical units, when appropriate, to leverage other assets operating in  their area to optimize the information captured and avoid unnecessary  duplicative taskings.
DOD recognizes the opportunity to better plan for and control its ISR  assets and has initiated a Persistent ISR Capabilities Based Assessment  Study. The study, sponsored by the Battlespace Awareness Functional  Capabilities Board, focuses on what other actions such as better planning,  direction, command and control, and better fusion and exploitation of  information can provide the warfighter with more persistent surveillance  capability. The study is expected to be completed in the August– September 2007 time frame.
section_title: DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter’s Needs Are Met
paragraphs: DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because  it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive  feedback from operators and intelligence personnel to ensure the  warfighter’s needs are met. Specifically, although JFCC-ISR is tasked with  developing metrics and standards of performance to measure the success  of DOD ISR missions, existing metrics are limited and no DOD-wide  milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD officials  acknowledged that they do not consistently receive feedback from  operators and intelligence analysts to ensure the warfighter’s needs are  met. Without feedback and a complete set of metrics for evaluating its ISR  assets, DOD may not be in the best position to validate how well the  warfighter needs are being met, the true demand for ISR assets, and  whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or to acquire new  systems that best support warfighting needs.
subsections: section_title: DOD Is Developing Metrics to Measure Success of Its ISR Assets, but Progress Has Been Limited and DOD Has Not Established Milestones
paragraphs: DOD is working to develop additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as  qualitative metrics to measure the success of its ISR assets, but existing  quantitative metrics are limited and no milestones have been established.   The JFCC-ISR is tasked with developing metrics and standards of  performance to assess DOD ISR mission accomplishment. Moreover, we  recommended in a December 2005 report that DOD ensure its  performance measurement systems measure how effectively UAS perform  their missions, identify performance indicator information that needs to be  collected, and systematically collect identified performance information.  We continue to believe this recommendation has merit, and DOD officials  agree that metrics are needed not only for UAS, but for all ISR missions.  However, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited  quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus the  number collected against. While these metrics are a good start, DOD  officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not take into account all  of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset  effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous  ISR missions, whether the ISR asset did what it was intended to do,  whether it had the intended effect, and whether the intelligence captured  contributed towards accomplishment of the mission.
The JFCC-ISR is working with the combatant commands to develop  additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to assess  the effectiveness of ISR assets, although DOD officials acknowledge the  progress in developing metrics has been limited. In developing these  metrics, the JFCC-ISR is leveraging national intelligence attributes, which  include characteristics such as whether the intelligence is comprehensive  to perform all missions anywhere and at anytime in any weather; credible  to allow users to make sound decisions and take appropriate action;  persistent to collect often and long enough to get the job done; and timely  to meet user needs. Furthermore, the JFCC-ISR has not made any progress  in establishing DOD-wide milestones for the development of these metrics.  Milestones are the required steps and planned dates for completion of  those steps leading up to metrics development.
DOD officials indicate that determining the success of ISR missions is  difficult given the nature of intelligence collection. Specifically, hundreds  of hours of ISR missions and target tracking could culminate in the  capture of a high value target; however, it may be difficult to measure the  effectiveness of each individual ISR mission that led to the ultimate  capture and mission success. This cumulative knowledge provided by ISR  assets is difficult to quantify. An official from the Office of the  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics also  acknowledged that it may be more difficult to evaluate the success of  ongoing operations due to the dynamic and subjective nature of  requirements. The official noted, however, that DOD is better equipped to  measure the success of its more mature and traditional ISR missions, such  as sensitive reconnaissance operations, because the objectives are better  defined allowing more direct determination of success.
section_title: DOD Lacks Consistent Feedback on Whether ISR Assets Meet Warfighters’ Needs
paragraphs: In addition to metrics, DOD also relies on feedback for evaluating how  successful its ISR assets are in meeting the warfighter’s needs. However,  DOD lacks consistent feedback on whether ISR assets meet the needs of  the warfighters. Joint Publication 2-01 calls for intelligence personnel and  consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on how well  intelligence operations perform to meet commander’s intelligence  requirements. This information could be used to inform DOD’s acquisition,  allocation, and tasking of ISR assets. While DOD officials indicate they  occasionally receive feedback on ISR asset performance, they  acknowledge that feedback specific to how ISR assets performed in  individual ISR missions is not consistently occurring. While there is real- time communication among unmanned aircraft system operators,  requesters, and intelligence personnel during an operation, and agency  officials indicate this communication is beneficial to providing real-time  feedback, there is little to no feedback after the operation to determine  whether the warfighters’ needs were met. Officials indicate that the fast  pace of operations in theater affects the ability of end users to provide  feedback on every ISR mission. For example, according to Marine Corps  officials, there is a mechanism for Marine Corps units to provide feedback,  but the feedback is not consistently provided because there is no  systematic process in place to ensure that this feedback is captured.  Without developing metrics and systematically gathering feedback that  enables it to assess the extent to which ISR assets are successful in  supporting warfighter needs, DOD is not in a position to validate the true  demand for ISR assets, determine whether it is allocating and tasking its  ISR assets in the most effective manner, or acquire new systems that best  support warfighting needs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD has achieved operational success with UAS in ongoing operations,  but it continues to face operational challenges that limit its ability to fully  optimize the use of these assets. These operational challenges have been  exacerbated by the lack of advance coordination when new assets are  being deployed in theater. While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have  been ongoing for some time, the potential exists for DOD to need to  establish operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide  procedure for advance coordination is critical to enable DOD to quickly  support ISR assets once deployed to ongoing operations. Until DOD takes  steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be  limited in its ability to efficiently deploy and utilize UAS assets and may  not allow the combatant commander time to plan to support incoming  assets.
With the operational successes that have been realized with UAS,  commanders are requesting them in greater numbers. In spite of a  dramatic increase in UAS funding, DOD officials indicate that annual  allocation levels are constrained by the number of ISR assets in the  inventory and JFCC-ISR is, therefore, not able to allocate to the combatant  commanders DOD ISR assets in sufficient numbers to meet all requests for  ISR support. However, our work indicates that DOD’s approach to UAS  may not leverage all of the DOD ISR assets currently available and DOD  may not be in the best position to determine if perceived demand is well- founded. Given the substantial investment DOD is making in UAS and the  increasing demand for them, it is critical that DOD’s approach to managing  its ISR assets, including UAS, allow it to optimize the use of these assets.  Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that considers  all ISR capabilities, DOD may not be in a position to leverage all available  ISR assets and to optimize the use of those assets. Moreover, DOD lacks  visibility over the true demand for and use of ISR assets, which could  hinder its ability to make informed decisions about the need to purchase  additional UAS assets and what quantities should be purchased.  Furthermore, without developing metrics and systematically gathering  feedback that enables DOD to assess the extent to which ISR missions are  successful in supporting warfighter needs, decision makers may not be in  a position to determine which UAS systems would best support the  warfighters’ needs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To mitigate challenges in integrating UAS, and other ISR assets, into  combat operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in  conjunction with the service secretaries and combatant commanders, take  the following three actions:    establish DOD-wide requirements for coordinating with the combatant  commanders in advance of bringing UAS into the theater of operations;    develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout DOD;    establish a mechanism to ensure the services comply with these  requirements.
To ensure DOD has the information needed to consider all ISR assets   when allocating and tasking these assets, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for    obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD, national, and  allied assets, operating in each of the combatant commanders’ area of  operations; and   allowing users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational  awareness on where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not  prohibited by the mission, what they are being used to do.
To improve DOD’s ability to evaluate the performance of its ISR missions,  we recommend the Secretary of Defense    establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and    develop a process for systematically capturing feedback from intelligence  and operations communities to assess how effective ISR assets are in  meeting warfighters’ requirements; and   create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DOD’s  acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred  with all of our recommendations.  DOD generally agreed with our  recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the  service secretaries and combatant commanders, establish DOD-wide  requirements for coordinating with the combatant commanders in  advance of bringing UAS into the theater of operations; develop a plan for  communicating those requirements throughout DOD; and establish a  mechanism to ensure the services comply with these requirements. DOD  noted that it currently has a well-defined process to coordinate with the  combatant commanders on the introduction of UAS into theater and cited  several examples including the annual process for allocating theater-level  UAS, and actions between stateside units and units in theater to plan for  deployment of ISR capabilities. DOD, however, acknowledged that a more  standardized method could improve efficiency of the coordination process  and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be tasked to look at  standardizing the coordination process and evaluate and provide direction  for an improved coordination process. Further, DOD noted that, based on  this evaluation, if direction is required, it will be issued via a Chairman’s  directive which is mandatory and therefore establishes the mechanism  that ensures compliance. We recognize that DOD has various processes  related to UAS but note that none, including the examples cited by DOD,  represent a standardized, DOD-wide approach that the services and  combatant commanders can follow in coordinating the specific details of  deploying UAS assets, regardless of geographic area.  Furthermore, we  believe that a directive requiring coordination, by itself, does not ensure  compliance, and would encourage DOD to include provisions detailing  how implementation of the directive will be monitored.
DOD also generally concurred with our recommendation that the  Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for obtaining information on  all ISR assets—including all DOD, national, and allied assets—operating in  each of the combatant commanders’ area of operations; and allowing  users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational awareness on  where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not prohibited by the  mission, what they are being used to do.  Specifically, DOD agrees that a  mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR assets is needed and  commented that work is underway within the JFCC-ISR to develop such a  mechanism.  DOD commented that it is not currently practical to provide  situational awareness on some UAS such as the small, hand-launched UAS  at the lowest operational level because these systems do not have the  capacity or capability to communicate their position to a common point.  DOD noted that it will determine the UAS operational levels that will  provide widespread situational awareness, including operational details  and timelines of data reporting. We recognize that situational awareness  may not currently be practical for some UAS but would encourage the  department to seek to maximize coverage in exploring options for  improved situational awareness.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and  quantitative metrics and stated that JFCC-ISR is standing up an  Assessments Division that will be responsible for the development of  metrics.  We recognize the Assessment Division has been tasked with  development of ISR metrics and reemphasize the need to develop  milestones for metrics development. DOD partially concurred with our  recommendations that it develop a process for systematically capturing  feedback from intelligence and operations communities to assess how  effective ISR assets are in meeting warfighters’ requirements and create a  mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DOD’s acquisition,  allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets.  DOD agreed that an improved and  standardized process for collection and reporting of feedback would  enhance visibility and provide more effective warfighter support, but  pointed out that organizations within the department collect feedback or  conduct lessons learned studies.  We acknowledge that DOD has  organizations such as the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned that are  responsible for capturing feedback and developing lessons learned based  on that feedback. However, these organizations are charged with  capturing lessons learned on a number of issues and are not focused on  ISR effectiveness.  Furthermore, our recommendation pertains to DOD’s  guidance which states it is imperative that intelligence personnel and  consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on how well  individual intelligence operations perform to meet commanders’  intelligence requirements. While the feedback that may be captured by  those lessons learned organizations is noteworthy, it is often not  immediate and specific to individual missions. As we noted in our report,  DOD officials acknowledged that feedback specific to how ISR assets  performed in individual ISR missions is not consistently occurring. DOD  further commented that it has mechanisms in place to inform its decision  making processes on the acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR  assets such as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System  which assesses, among other things, capability gaps and solutions. We  agree that the mechanisms mentioned in DOD’s response exist; however,  DOD currently does not have sufficient qualitative and quantitative metrics  needed to collect data on UAS performance nor does it have a means for  incorporating such data into the processes currently used to make  decisions on ISR assets.
The full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II. DOD  also provided technical comments separately and we have made  adjustments where appropriate.  In particular, the Army provided  additional information on the coordination of the Warrior Alpha UAS in its  technical comments, including a timeline for introduction of the asset into  theater.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. We will  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you  or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Staff members who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken  steps to facilitate the integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into  combat operations, we examined DOD and military service publications  and documentation on UAS such as the 2005–2030 UAS Roadmap, the  Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical  Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the Joint Concept of  Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the Concept of Operations for  Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, and the ISR Systems Concept of  Operations Standardization Memo. Additionally, we met with key DOD  and service officials, including those from the Joint UAS Center of  Excellence and the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task Force  within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics, and the Air Land Sea Application Center. We  also met with officials from U.S. Central Command and the services,  including units that had returned from deployment to the theater, or that  were currently supporting ongoing operations, to discuss the integration  of UAS into U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility and to better  understand integration challenges.
To determine the extent to which DOD’s approach to allocating and  tasking its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets,  including UAS, considers all available ISR assets to optimize their  capabilities, we met with key DOD and service officials, including those  from U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air Force  component commands, the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid  Air Base in Qatar, the Joint Functional Component Command for  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and other organizations.  We interviewed and obtained documentation including the fiscal year 2007  ISR allocation briefing from officials of the Joint Functional Component  Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance to better  understand the allocation process. We also reviewed documentation such  as joint publications and briefings that explain the process for tasking ISR  assets and interviewed officials at U.S. Central Command, Central  Command Air Forces, and the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar to  better understand how ISR assets are assigned to specific missions. To  understand how requests for ISR support are generated and satisfied at the  tactical level, we spoke with units that recently returned from, or are  currently supporting, ongoing operations in Iraq as well as units within the  services such as the Marine Corps’ Tactical Fusion Center that are  involved in determining if tactical assets are available to satisfy those  requests or if the requests need to be forwarded for theater-level support.  To understand how manned and unmanned assets are being leveraged to  optimize the intelligence captured, we met with manned and unmanned  units stationed at the Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. To  understand DOD’s ongoing efforts to study its process for tasking ISR  assets, we reviewed documentation and interviewed an official from the  Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board.
To assess whether DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets,  including UAS, to ensure that warfighters’ needs are met, we interviewed  DOD and service officials to discuss the metrics for evaluating the  performance of its ISR assets. We discussed with the Joint Functional  Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  its efforts to establish metrics for evaluating ISR assets performance. We  reviewed metrics routinely captured to assess the success of DOD’s ISR  missions. We also met with service officials and service units recently  returned from Iraq to determine the extent to which feedback is received  on how effective ISR support is in meeting the warfighters’ needs. We  performed our work from June 2006 to June 2007 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Patty Lentini, Assistant  Director; Renee Brown; Jamie Khanna; Kate Lenane; LaShawnda Lindsey;  Elisha Matvay; and Susan Tindall made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD’s Intelligence,  Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems.  GAO-07-578.  Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary  Observations on DOD’s Approach to Managing Requirements for New  Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. GAO-07-596T.  Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition  Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T.  Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote  Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49.  Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition  Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T.  Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2005.