Maritime Security: Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit From Agency Assessments
Published: 2014-06-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Piracy and maritime crime continues to threaten ships off the Horn of Africa's east coast and in the Gulf of Guinea off Africa's west coast, putting seafarers in harm's way and costing governments and industry billions of dollars in ransom, insurance, and protective measures. The types and causes of piracy and maritime crime, as well as the African states' ability to address the problem in the two regions, differ. To help U.S. agencies coordinate efforts, the NSCS developed an interagency plan in 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration with industry and international partners. GAO was asked to evaluate U.S. counterpiracy activities.
This report: (1) assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since our 2010 review, and describes U.S. efforts to assess its counterpiracy actions, given any changing conditions; and (2) identifies trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea and U.S. efforts to address them, and evaluates the extent to which the United States has assessed its counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. GAO reviewed plans, activities, and data from 2007 through 2013 and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, international partners, and industry, selected as a nongeneralizable sample for their involvement in counterpiracy activities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa's east coast near Somalia have declined sharply since 2010, but U.S. agencies have not assessed their counterpiracy efforts as GAO recommended in 2010. Since 2010, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports piracy incidents declined from 219 to 15 in 2013. Similarly, from 2010 to 2013 hostages taken by pirates declined from 1,016 to 34. Also, a World Bank report stated that total ransoms declined by 2012. Officials participating in counterpiracy activities from the Departments of Defense and State, among others, as well as shipping industry officials and international partners, attribute the decline to a combination of prevention, disruption, and prosecution activities. However, officials cautioned that this progress is tenuous, and discontinuing these efforts could allow piracy to resurge. Despite changing conditions, U.S. agencies have not systematically assessed the costs and benefits of their counterpiracy efforts. Agency officials stated that their decisions and actions are guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. GAO has previously noted that assessments of risk and effectiveness in an interagency environment can strengthen strategies and resource usage. As such, GAO's prior recommendations remain valid and could help U.S. agencies identify the most cost effective mix of efforts and prioritize activities as they respond to changing conditions and fiscal pressures while avoiding a resurgence in piracy.
Off the west coast of Africa, piracy and maritime crime has been a persistent problem in the Gulf of Guinea, as shown in the figure below. Although the United States has interagency and international efforts underway with African states to strengthen maritime security, it has not assessed its efforts or the need for a collective plan to address the evolving problem in the region. The U.S. role in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has focused on prevention, disruption, and prosecution, through training and assistance to African coastal states. However, according to U.S. agencies working in the region, the National Security Council Staff (NSCS) has not directed them to collectively assess their efforts to address piracy and maritime crime. An assessment of agencies' Gulf of Guinea efforts could strengthen their approach by informing the appropriate mix of activities to achieve the most effective use of limited resources, as well as help determine if additional actions are needed.
Reported Incidents of Piracy and Maritime Crime, 2008 through 2013
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the NSCS, with the Secretaries of Defense and State, collaborate with the involved agencies to assess their efforts and to determine whether additional actions are needed to guide efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. The NSCS did not concur or non-concur with GAO's recommendations but provided an update on its planning activities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Piracy and maritime crime, including armed robbery, kidnapping, and  hijackings, continues to threaten ships in the waters off the Horn of Africa  and in the Gulf of Guinea, putting seafarers in harm’s way and costing  businesses and governments billions of dollars in ransoms, insurance,  and protective measures. U.S. efforts to combat piracy and maritime  crime involve multiple agencies from the Departments of Defense (DOD),  Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State), Transportation  (DOT), and the Treasury (Treasury) and are coordinated with  international and industry partners. While maritime piracy is not a new  threat, pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa started reaching  unprecedented levels in 2008. At the same time, the persistence of  attacks in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea—including the kidnapping of two  Americans from a vessel in October 2013—have evolved with pirates  venturing farther from shore and using more violent tactics.DOD and State officials, piracy off the Horn of Africa stems from an   According to  ungoverned Somalia and has generally focused on hijacking ships  transiting through open waters, while piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has  generally focused on armed robbery of ships in territorial waters of  sovereign states and has displayed less regard for the health and safety  of its victims.
In September 2010, we issued a report examining U.S. efforts to address  piracy off the Horn of Africa and found that the U.S. government had  taken steps to implement the National Security Council’s (NSC)  Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan  (Action Plan) by, for example, working with partners to conduct naval  patrols, update ship security plans, and provide judicial capacity building  to African states. However, we found that many agencies could benefit  from greater specificity in assigning roles and responsibilities, and from  identifying the costs, benefits, and measures of effectiveness of their  counterpiracy efforts, among other things. We recommended that the  NSC collaborate with the agencies to reassess and update its Action  Plan; identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of  U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and responsibilities.  In March 2011, we testified that piracy off the Horn of Africa continued to  be a problem as pirates shifted tactics, and we reiterated our  recommendations on actions the government could undertake to improve  U.S. efforts.implemented and are discussed later in this report.
As of June 2014, these recommendations have not been  As piracy and maritime crime continues to evolve off both African coasts  and the U.S. government faces fiscal pressures, you asked that we  examine whether opportunities exist to leverage the cooperative efforts  and strategies used to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa in addressing  the problem of piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea.  Specifically, this report: assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa in the East has changed  since our 2010 report and describes U.S. efforts to assess  counterpiracy actions, given any changing conditions; and identifies trends in piracy and maritime crime in West Africa’s Gulf of  Guinea and U.S. efforts to address them, and evaluates the extent to  which the United States has assessed its counterpiracy efforts in the  Gulf of Guinea.
To assess how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 2010, we  analyzed data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the U.S.  Office of Naval intelligence (ONI) on reported piracy incidents, hostages  taken, and ransom paid off the Horn of Africa from 2008 through 2013.  We discussed data collection methods, processes for data entry, and the  steps taken to ensure reasonable accuracy of the data with both IMB and  ONI. We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report. In addition, we met with DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, and  Treasury officials; international partners; and representatives from  insurance, shipping, and private security industry associations to discuss  their involvement in counterpiracy activities such as developing best  practices for protecting ships from pirate attack, working with the  international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and   We met with officials  participating in naval patrols off the Horn of Africa.from shipping industry associations that represent owners and operators  from over 80 percent of the world’s merchant fleet and describe  themselves as providing a unified industry voice in the creation of industry  policy and strategy; insurance industry associations whose members  cover approximately 90 percent of the world’s ocean-going tonnage; and  a private security industry association that has over 180 members across  35 countries. While the statements of these industry officials cannot be  generalized to the entire industries they represent, their perspectives  provide valuable insight since each is actively involved in international  collaborative efforts to combat piracy. To determine the extent to which  the United States has assessed its counterpiracy actions as outlined in  the 2008 Action Plan for countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, we  reviewed the 2008 Action Plan, the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime  Security, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal  Acts of Violence at Sea, relevant U.S. policies and laws, and United  Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions. We also reviewed program  documents such as briefings and meeting summaries and interviewed  officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, and the Treasury, as well as  components including U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, the U.S.  Coast Guard, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to discuss  implementation of the Action Plan and the status of implementing  recommendations from our September 2010 report to improve the plan.  We selected these departments and agencies because the Action Plan  states they shall contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in  accordance with the plan and they are members of the Counter-Piracy  Steering Group established to oversee the implementation of the plan.
To identify trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, we  analyzed IMB and ONI data on piracy incidents—hijackings, boardings,  attempts, ships fired upon, and kidnappings—reported from 2007 through  2013. As with the Horn of Africa data, we discussed the accuracy and  reliability of the data with IMB and ONI officials and determined the data  to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. efforts to address piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, we  reviewed program briefings and meeting summaries and interviewed  officials from the previously described U.S. agencies, international military  partners, and partners from the insurance, shipping, and private security   To evaluate U.S.
IMB data is based on self-reporting directly to IMB by vessels and companies operating  in the area. According to ONI data—which is aggregated from multiple data sources, (e.g.,  open source data such as media reports, IMB information, and all-source intelligence) and  corroborated with other U.S. agencies and information—the actual number of incidents in  the Gulf of Guinea is greater than what is reported to IMB. According to ONI and IMB  officials, reasons for the variation between the two sets of data, include differences in  categorization of incidents, validation of sources, under reporting, and differences in  geographic scope. industries. The agencies, international partners, and industry associations  we interviewed were those that we identified as contributors to ongoing  counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea or those representing or  insuring vessel owners and operators in the region. While the statements  of the industry officials cannot be generalized to the entire industries they  represent, their perspectives provide valuable insight since each is  actively involved in international collaborative efforts to combat piracy. We  compared agency efforts and their coordination against recommended  practices in the National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan and the  Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime which are used to  guide the efforts and, in general, call for risk-based assessments. A full  description of our objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in  appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Piracy Is a Recognized Global Issue
paragraphs: Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the United  Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy consists of  any of several acts, including any illegal act of violence or detention, or  any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the  passengers of a private ship and directed against another ship, aircraft,  persons, or property onboard another ship on the high seas, or against a  ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any  state. According to both conventions, all states have the duty to  cooperate to the fullest extent possible in the repression of piracy on the  high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state and  are authorized to seize pirate ships or a ship under the control of pirates  and arrest the persons and seize the property onboard on the high seas  or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. When crimes  that would constitute piracy are committed in the territorial waters of a  coastal state, they are generally referred to as maritime crime. For the  purposes of this report, we describe the criminal conduct in the Gulf of  Guinea as piracy and maritime crime in order to include piracy on the high  seas (i.e., outside the jurisdiction of any one sovereign state), as well as  hijacking, armed robbery, kidnapping, and attempts at these crimes within  the territorial waters of a state.
Piracy and maritime crime off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea  affect countries around the globe. In 2013, over 42,000 vessels transited  the waters off the Horn of Africa, which include some of the world’s  busiest shipping lanes. Within these waters, pirates target merchant  vessels, fishing ships, and dhows. Since 2008, the UN has adopted a  number of United Nations Security Council resolutions related to  countering piracy off the Horn of Africa. Similarly, in 2011 and 2012,  recognizing the Gulf of Guinea’s critical shipping and global energy  resources, the UN adopted resolutions that expressed deep concern  about the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of  Guinea pose to international navigation, security, and the economic  development of states in the region.
section_title: Piracy off the Horn of Africa Generally Differs from That in the Gulf of Guinea
paragraphs: The types of crime, vessel traffic, and coastal states’ jurisdictional  responses to address the piracy problem off the Horn of Africa and in the  Gulf of Guinea generally differ, as does the U.S. response. DOD and  State officials described the following as key differences:
Types of crime: Piracy off the Horn of Africa is generally characterized  by ransom-seeking, in which pirates attack ships for their crew, cargo,  or the ship itself, which are often held hostage for months or years to  obtain millions of dollars in ransom. In the Gulf of Guinea, piracy is  generally characterized either as armed robbery—such as petroleum  tanker hijackings to steal a ship’s oil—or targeted kidnappings for  ransom near or within the Niger Delta, according to DOD officials.
Additionally, unlike the hostage-taking and high-dollar ransoms off the  Horn of Africa that can result in months or years that a vessel and its  crew are held, the kidnappings off the Niger Delta are for days or  weeks, for thousands of dollars in ransom, and do not necessarily  involve the hijacking of a vessel. In general, pirates hijack tankers and  their crew only for the time it takes to offload the oil.
Vessel traffic: The nature of how vessels travel through the regions  also differs. Sea traffic off the Horn of Africa is characterized by large,  high-speed cargo vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden and  Indian Ocean. Piracy in this region generally involves pirates pursuing  and boarding moving vessels. In contrast, in the Gulf of Guinea,  commercial vessels generally are smaller and operate closer to shore,  slowing down to make port calls and stopping at off-shore facilities in  territorial waters or in the exclusive economic zones of coastal states.  The slow speeds and stationary positions make these vessels  vulnerable to piracy and maritime crime.
Jurisdiction and response: U.S. efforts to combat piracy off the Horn  of Africa and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea evolved in response  to the particular characteristics of piracy and maritime crime in each  region and the extent to which the United States has jurisdiction and  coastal states have the capability to respond. For example, the UN  authorized international militaries and organizations to enter Somali  territorial waters and economic zones to conduct counterpiracy  operations and patrols as though they were international waters. The  transitional and new Somali governments have relied on the  assistance of international militaries since they are building maritime  security capacities. Conversely, in the Gulf of Guinea, maritime  security in territorial waters is under the authority of the respective  recognized national governments in the region.
Figures 1 and 2 show the number of attempted and successful pirate  attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea respectively from  2010 through 2013.
Click on the       to show that year’s attacks, click on the       to hide that year. For a noninteractive version see appendix II.
In addition to the types of crimes, vessel traffic, and jurisdiction, other  characteristics such as the reporting of incidents by vessel owners and  operators and the ability of pirates to use land based safe havens for  operations, among others, create differences between piracy off the Horn  of Africa and piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. These  differences are summarized in table 1.
section_title: The Response to Piracy off the Horn of Africa Involves Combined Efforts from U.S. and International Partners
paragraphs: Since 2008, the international community has taken steps to respond to  piracy off the Horn of Africa, including patrols by the United States,  NATO, the European Union (EU), and others in waters near Somalia; the  establishment of international naval task forces with specific mandates to  conduct counterpiracy operations; and the formation of a voluntary  multilateral Contact Group to coordinate international counterpiracy  efforts such as the development of industry practices and coordination of  international law enforcement efforts. Recognizing that vibrant maritime  commerce underpins global economic security and is a vital national  security issue, the United States has also developed policies and plans to  collaborate with its international partners and to mobilize a U.S.  interagency response. In December 2008, the NSC published the Action  Plan, which discusses countering piracy emanating from Somalia. The  Action Plan directed the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to  establish a high-level interagency task force—the Counter-Piracy  Steering Group—to coordinate, implement, and monitor the actions  contained in the plan. In addition, the NSC directed that DOD, DHS, DOJ,  State, DOT, the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence undertake coordinated initiatives in accordance with the plan,  subject to available resources.
section_title: Various Efforts Have Reduced Piracy off the Horn of Africa Since 2010, but the United States Has Not Updated its Action Plan
subsections: section_title: Piracy Incidents Off of the Horn of Africa Have Declined Since 2010
paragraphs: Piracy activity off of the Horn of Africa has declined as indicated by the  number of incidents reported, the number of hostages taken, and the  amount of money paid in ransoms in 2013 as compared with recent  years. In September 2010, we reported that successful and attempted  piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa had risen from 30 in 2007 to 218 in  2009.incidents from ship owners and operators, shows that the number of   Our analysis of data provided by the IMB, which collects reported  piracy incidents continued to rise to 235 in 2011, but declined thereafter  to 15 total incidents in 2013, as shown in figure 3.
At the same time, the number of hostages taken during pirate attacks  rose from 815 in 2008 to 1,016 in 2010, but declined to 34 in 2013, as  shown in figure 4.
As the number of hostages taken during piracy incidents rose, the amount  of ransom money collected by pirates also increased. According to the  UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank, low estimates of the  total dollar amount of ransoms paid to free hostages rose from $2.4  million in 2007 to $151.1 million in 2011 but declined to $36.4 million in  2012. While ransoms paid were an estimated average of $1.2 million in  2007, the estimated average amount rose to $4 million in 2012, as shown  in figure 5. According to State Department officials, at of the end of 2013,  there were at least 49 hostages from 11 countries held by Somali pirates.
section_title: Officials Attribute the Decline in Horn of Africa Piracy to a Combination of Efforts to Prevent, Disrupt, and Prosecute
paragraphs: The Action Plan establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as a  collaborative one, seeking to involve all countries and shipping-industry  partners with an interest in maritime security. DOD, DHS, DOJ, State,  DOT, and the Treasury, in collaboration with their international and  industry partners, have implemented steps in the Horn of Africa across  the three lines of action established in the Action Plan, which are to: (1)  prevent piracy attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime  domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in ways consistent with international law  and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states, and (3)  ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for  their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Efforts to Prevent Acts of Piracy
paragraphs: U.S. agencies, in collaboration with their international and industry  partners have taken several steps to deter pirates and reduce the  vulnerability of ships transiting off the Horn of Africa. DOD and State  officials and representatives from each of eight shipping industry  associations we met with emphasized that these prevention efforts work  together and described the following as examples of key prevention  efforts.
Working with Industry: U.S. agencies have worked with industry  partners to develop guidance and requirements for implementing  counterpiracy efforts. For example, the Coast Guard issued Maritime  Security (MARSEC) Directives that provide guidance to owners and  operators of U.S. vessels on how to respond to emerging security  threats. These directives include practices that help to prevent pirate  attacks and require that vessels operating in high risk waters update  their vessel security plans to include security protocols for terrorism,  piracy, and armed robbery against ships in high risk waters. Among  other things, these plans cover the need for enhanced deterrence,  surveillance and detection equipment; crew responses if a potential  attack is detected or is underway; and coordination with counterpiracy  organizations that could be of assistance. The practices are mandated  for U.S. flag vessels operating in high risk waters and are also  recommended for foreign flag vessels in the Coast Guard’s Port  Security Advisories and in the International Maritime Organization’s  (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee circulars.
Additionally, the Coast Guard and DOT’s Maritime Administration  (MARAD) co-chaired Working Group 3 of the Contact Group on Piracy off  the Coast of Somalia which focused on industry awareness. Through this  working group, practices were developed and enhanced through the Best  Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy  (BMP), developed by the working group’s maritime industry  representatives to deter, prevent, and deny incidents of piracy off the  Horn of Africa. The BMP was introduced in 2008 as a joint industry  strategy and has been updated based on lessons learned from  investigated piracy incidents throughout the region. Version 4 of the BMP  was issued in August 2011 and recommends 14 specific actions shipping  companies can take to mitigate pirate activity while transiting high risk  waters off the Horn of Africa. Examples of these ship protection measures  include providing additional lookouts during watch periods, enhancing the  ship’s physical barrier, and establishing a safe point or secure citadel on  the ship to ensure the safety of the crew and vessel during a pirate  boarding. Use of the BMP is not mandatory; rather, officials from each of  the eight shipping industry associations we interviewed describe the BMP  as a tool kit of practices the ship’s master can tailor to the situation and  risks that the ship faces. Officials from an insurance industry association  we met with stated that its members encourage and consider the  implementation of the practices when pricing products based on steps  that vessel owners have taken to mitigate risks.
Of the various implemented practices, officials from the six U.S. agencies  engaged in counterpiracy activities and the eight shipping industry  associations we interviewed describe the use of privately contracted  armed security personnel on ships as a key factor in reducing the number  of piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa. However, each of the eight  shipping industry associations we interviewed stated that they do not  want armed security teams to become a standard long term practice,  primarily because of the hazards involved with the use of force and  weapons aboard ships as well as the expense, with an average cost of  about $5,000 per day for a four person security team. These officials  added that, in comparison, requiring crew to continuously lookout for  suspicious activity is a relatively low-cost measure when compared to  deploying armed security personnel with a vessel – the burden of which  could be too costly for smaller shipping companies. As security costs  become a concern and the threat of piracy declines, DOD, EU, and NATO  officials expressed concern that some in the shipping industry may seek  to reduce the size and qualifications of the security teams as well as the  hours they are deployed to protect the ship.
Strategic communication: According to officials from DOD’s  AFRICOM, strategic communication from Somali radio stations is also  an effective method of preventing piracy. These officials stated that  the United States and its international partners have supported a  partnership with Somali radio stations to bring awareness to the  Somali public about the dangers of piracy and acts of abuse that  hostages may endure.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Acts of Piracy
paragraphs: U.S. efforts to disrupt acts of piracy involve working with international  partners to position resources to interdict pirates at sea and prevent the  financing of pirates on land. The following were described by DOD, State,  Treasury, EU, and NATO as examples of U.S. efforts that are intended to  prevent acts of piracy.
Maritime coalition operations: DOD, State, industry, EU, and NATO  officials cited the presence of international navies in the region as a  key factor in interdicting and disrupting pirate activity. Three  multinational maritime coalition operations— the Combined Task  Force (CTF) 151, EU Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) Operation  Atalanta, and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield—along with  independent deployments from countries outside of NATO and the EU  such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea have worked to protect  the waters off the Horn of Africa and the Internationally  Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). U.S. involvement in these  activities is primarily through participation in CTF 151 and NATO’s  Operation Ocean Shield. DOD and State officials stated that these  operations are effective in establishing a protective force in a region  that is growing its own capabilities and has allowed the United States  to build new partnerships with navies from around the world.
U.S. presence: According to Navy officials, while as of 2013 the  United States no longer regularly dedicates naval vessels to CTF 151,  the U.S. presence plays an important role in fostering the participation  of other countries in the task force. Additionally, the Navy may task  ships from other missions, such as counternarcotics or  counterterrorism, into the task force on a given day or for short  periods to respond in an emergency if they are the closest or most  appropriate—consistent with the overarching goal of preserving safety  of life at sea. The Unites States has regularly provided, from 2010  through 2014, at least one ship in support of NATO’s Operation  Ocean Shield counterpiracy mission. As incidents of piracy have  declined off the Horn of Africa, the number of steaming days has also  declined, as shown in figure 6.
Disrupting pirate financing: To help disrupt pirate revenue, the U.S.
Treasury is authorized to block financial transactions of known pirate  actors through the application of Executive Order 13536 when there is  a nexus to U.S. interests.sanctions on individuals providing funds to known pirate actors and  can block the transaction if it involves a U.S. financial institution.  Officials from an insurance industry association we met with stated  that ship owners can carry insurance policies that reimburse  companies for ransom paid as a result of pirate attacks. According to  Treasury officials, members of the U.S. and international shipping  industry initially expressed concerns that the ransom paid and  reimbursed by their policies could be prohibited by the executive  order. Treasury officials also stated that the order has specific  application, is applied on a case-by-case basis, and, as of March  2014, had not been formally applied in response to a potential ransom  payment.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Facilitate Prosecutions of Suspected Pirates
paragraphs: The Action Plan aims to ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are  held accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of  suspected pirates, and in appropriate cases prosecuting pirates in the  United States. Officials from DOD, State, and DOJ described several  examples of how the United States plays a role in making sure pirates are  brought to justice.
Building law enforcement capabilities: The United States helps  expand law enforcement capabilities within the region through two key  efforts. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducts  investigations and has developed a manual that provides  recommendations to law enforcement agencies investigating acts of  piracy at sea. Last, the United States has contributed to a piracy  database administered by INTERPOL that allows law enforcement  agencies to access evidence connected to piracy incidents, although  U.S. investigations are primarily focused on piracy incidents with a  nexus to U.S. interests.
Judicial capacity building: U.S. agencies have also provided piracy- related judicial capacity-building assistance to countries in the region,  such as Kenya and the Seychelles, for law enforcement and  prosecutions. These activities have included establishing regional  courts and building prisons in Somalia. Additionally, DOD, DOJ, and  State have worked with international partners to ensure that pirates  are tried and held accountable for their crimes by facilitating  prosecution agreements. As of November 2013, among 22 nations,  1,130 Somali pirates had been detained for trial, were on trial, or had  been convicted.
U.S. prosecutions: The United States has jurisdiction to prosecute  anyone who commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of  nations on the high seas and is later brought to or found in the United  States. U.S. government prosecutions have resulted in the  conviction of at least 28 Somali pirates since 2010. In 2010, five men  from Somalia were convicted of piracy and related offenses by a  federal jury in what, according to DOJ officials, is believed to be the  first piracy trial conviction in the United States since 1820 and is seen  as the first in a series of government prosecutions aimed at slowing  the spread of piracy off of Africa. In February 2013, a federal jury  found five Somalis guilty of engaging in piracy and other offenses in  connection with the attack on the Navy ship the USS Ashland.  Additionally, in November 2013, a Somali pirate involved in the  shooting of four Americans aboard a yacht off the coast of Somalia  during a failed kidnapping attempt was sentenced to 21 life sentences  for his role in their deaths. Also, DOD, State, and DOJ officials  stated that these prosecutions send a message that piracy carries  serious consequences and may serve as a deterrent to others  involved in piracy. However, DOJ and State officials told us that,  especially in cases where the hijacked vessel or crew has little or no  connection to the United States, a more appropriate role for the  United States would be to provide technical assistance to other  countries in prosecuting pirates.
Appendix III provides a summary of the three lines of action and specific  activities in the Action Plan. DOD, State, U.S. Coast Guard, DOJ, DOT,  and the Treasury attribute the decline in piracy attacks to the collective  implementation of these actions. Officials from these agencies noted that  the efforts of governments and the industry practices work together to  reduce vulnerabilities and prevent attacks. DOD, State, EU, and NATO  naval officials as well as officials from the eight shipping industry  associations we interviewed cautioned that discontinuing counterpiracy  efforts could provide opportunities for piracy to resurge off the Horn of  Africa. They stated that piracy off the Horn of Africa is a crime of  opportunity driven by economic conditions in Somalia that have not been  addressed. They noted that the practices in place have reduced the  likelihood of a successful pirate attack by increasing the risk but the  capability and motivation of pirates have not changed.
section_title: The U.S. Action Plan Has Not Been Updated as We Recommended in 2010
paragraphs: The Action Plan was published in December 2008 when piracy off the  Horn of Africa was on the rise but has not been updated, as we  recommended in 2010, to reflect changing dynamics in piracy, such as  industry’s use of armed security teams or the sharp decline in piracy  incidents, or to implement recommendations we previously made to  include elements of a strategic approach. The Action Plan was developed  to identify and implement measures to suppress pirate activity off the  Horn of Africa. Its intent was to respond to the growing threat and be  mutually supportive of longer-term initiatives aimed at establishing  governance, rule of law, security, and economic development in Somalia.  In September 2010, we reviewed the Action Plan, which implements the  National Strategy for Maritime Security and the Policy for the  Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea as  applied to piracy off the Horn of Africa. At that time, we found that the  Action Plan had not been revised to reflect adapted piracy tactics and did  not designate which agencies should lead or carry out most activities.  Additionally, we found that the National Security Council Staff (NSCS) did  not fully include characteristics of a strategic approach in the Action Plan,  such as measures to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied  to counterpiracy, the identification of roles and responsibilities, or the cost  of U.S. activities relative to the benefits they achieved.
As a result, in September 2010 we recommended that the NSCS, in  collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, State, Homeland Security,  Transportation, and the Treasury, as well as the Attorney General: (1)  reassess and revise the Action Plan to better address evolving conditions  off the Horn of Africa and their effect on priorities and plans; (2) identify  measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts;  (3) direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to identify the costs of U.S.  counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and personnel costs;  and assess the benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy  activities; and (4) clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop  joint guidance, information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to  operate across agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as  strategic communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating   Since we issued our report in 2010, conditions have  prosecution. continued to change off the Horn of Africa in many ways since the Action  Plan was developed in 2008. However, as of June 2014 the NSCS had  not fully implemented the four recommendations from our September  2010 report as summarized in table 2.
Our recommendations were made to the National Security Staff which changed its name  to the National Security Council Staff pursuant to Executive Order 13657, dated February  10, 2014.
Update since 2010   Action Plan not updated. In September 2010, we recommended that the NSCS  update the Action Plan because piracy was increasing and pirate tactics were  changing. Since that time, conditions have continued to evolve off the Horn of  Africa. Industry has made frequent use of embarked armed security teams. An  internationally-recognized Somali federal government was established in August  2012 and responsibility for strategic communication was transferred to it. Piracy  declined sharply in 2012 and 2013. EU NAVFOR and NATO counterpiracy  operations off the Horn of Africa are set to expire by the end of 2016. State officials  recognize that an updated Action Plan is needed and have provided input to the  NSCS, but as of March 2014 they had not received guidance from the NSCS  regarding any changes to counterpiracy plans or efforts. In commenting on a draft of  this report, an NSCS official stated that a global action plan is being developed, with  a separate annex focusing on the Horn of Africa and was expected to be issued in  the summer of 2014.
Measures not established to assess counter piracy efforts. In September 2010, we  recommended that the NSCS include measures of effectiveness in the Action Plan  to provide direction for counterpiracy activities and information that could be used in  strategic and resource-based decisions. During the course of this review, State  officials told us the key measures are the number of hostages and ships hijacked,  but they have not established formal measures and their decisions are generally  guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. However, this information  does not provide insight into which efforts are having the greatest effect in  suppressing piracy.
U.S. counterpiracy costs and benefits not fully tracked. In September 2010, we  reported that the United States is not collecting information to determine the most  cost-effective mix of counterpiracy activities. During the course of this review, we  obtained information from agencies identifying some costs related to their  counterpiracy efforts. For example, the costs of counterpiracy efforts incurred by  DOD peaked in 2011 at approximately $275 million but have declined to  approximately $70 million in 2013. State tracks funds used to operate its  counterpiracy and maritime security functions, as well as foreign assistance  provided to African countries. However, most agencies do not systematically track  the costs of counterpiracy efforts or activities because these efforts and activities  typically fall under a broader maritime security category. Further, the Counter-Piracy  Steering Group has not identified the benefits of the various counterpiracy activities  relative to their costs and resources.
Agency roles and responsibilities defined for some tasks. In September 2010, we  reported that agencies had made less progress in implementing action items in the  Action Plan that involved multiple agencies than those that were the responsibility of  one specific agency. Since that time, U.S. agencies have defined roles and  responsibilities for applying the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)  process to piracy incidents involving U.S. interests. DOJ officials stated that the  NSCS has also identified roles and responsibilities for transporting pirate suspects  for prosecution. However, the NSCS has not established roles and responsibilities  across all activities outlined in the Action Plan.
Plan contains operational coordination requirements to ensure quick and decisive action to counter  maritime threats.
In commenting on a draft of this report, an NSCS official stated that  the Action Plan is being updated through a global action plan, with a  separate annex focusing on the Horn of Africa, but did not indicate  whether the plan would include all of the elements in our  recommendations. We continue to believe our recommendations have  merit and should be implemented. While conditions affecting piracy  have continued to evolve in the Horn of Africa since 2010, the 2008  Action Plan continues to guide U.S. efforts. Officials from each of the  six agencies engaged in counterpiracy activities noted that current  efforts are suppressing piracy off the Horn of Africa, but the results  are tenuous and piracy could resurge without addressing its root  causes. The Action Plan was developed at a time when U.S. policy  focused on addressing problems in the absence of a functioning  government in Somalia and without involving a U.S. presence in the  country. With U.S. agencies and industry both having limited  resources available for counterpiracy activities, we continue to believe  that implementing our recommendations would be of value in  understanding the costs and benefits and measuring the effectiveness  of U.S. counterpiracy efforts. DOD, Coast Guard, DOJ, and State  officials, as well as shipping industry officials, noted that the  suppression of piracy has been based on a combination of  government and industry counterpiracy activities, particularly the use  of armed security teams on private vessels and the presence of naval  patrols. However, U.S. agencies do not assess how industry practices  and government resources could potentially offset each other’s roles  and associated costs. As we concluded in September 2010, in an  environment where government resource decisions directly affect  costs incurred by the shipping industry and international partners,  balancing risk reduction and benefits with costs should be  emphasized.
section_title: U.S. Efforts Aim to Address Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, But an Assessment Would Help Inform Efforts and Determine the Need for Additional Actions
subsections: section_title: Piracy and Maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea Is an Ongoing Problem, although Recent Incidents May Indicate Evolving Tactics and Capabilities
paragraphs: Piracy and maritime crime, primarily armed robbery at sea, oil theft, and  kidnapping, is a persistent problem that continues to contribute to  instability in the Gulf of Guinea. According to ONI data, incidents of piracy  and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea rose from nearly 60 in 2010 to  over 100 in 2011, and totaled more than 110 in 2013, as shown in figure  7. According to this data, incidents in 2013 included 11 vessel hijackings  and 32 kidnappings. According to officials from AFRICOM, ONI, State,  and the IMO, this recent rise in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of  Guinea is part of a long-standing, persistent problem in the region. For  example, according to DOD officials, the Gulf of Guinea was the most  active region in the world for piracy in 2007, prior to the rise in pirate  activity off the Horn of Africa. According to the IMB, the number of vessel- reported incidents in the Gulf of Guinea from 2007 through 2009 is similar  to that of 2011 through 2013. IMO officials added that, while the  reported incidents indicate an ongoing, persistent problem, the number  and frequency of incidents do not yet rise to the epidemic proportions that  were seen off the Horn of Africa.
According to the U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime  and information from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as well  as the UN Security Council, piracy and maritime crime pose a threat to  regional commerce and stability in the Gulf of Guinea. For example,  according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, while Nigeria  has the second largest amount of proven crude oil reserves in Africa, as  of December 2013, exploration activity there was at its lowest levels in a  decade as a result of rising security problems related to oil theft, onshore  pipeline sabotage, and piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea,  as well as other investment and government uncertainties.
Moreover, incident data since 2010 shows that piracy is moving farther off  shore, prompting concerns that these trends may continue. According to  officials from AFRICOM, ONI, and State, and according to IMB data as  shown in figure 2 of this report, Gulf of Guinea piracy and maritime crime  prior to 2011 have generally occurred in the coastal areas near Lagos or  off the Niger Delta. However, recent attacks have taken place farther  away from the waters off Nigeria, demonstrating a broader reach of  pirates, as well as increasing the number of coastal states involved. For  example, since 2011, several tanker hijackings were reported farther west  than previously observed, off Togo and Cote d’Ivoire, according to ONI  officials. Further, a July 2013 tanker hijacking off the coast of Gabon, and  a similar incident off Angola in January 2014 represent, as of March 2014,  the southernmost occurrences in which vessels were hijacked and sailed  to Nigeria to offload the stolen oil cargo. According to AFRICOM officials,  the ability to conduct such hijackings, which involve difficult maneuvering  of large vessels across swaths of open water while conducting oil  bunkering operations, illustrates that these maritime criminals may be  increasingly capable of complex and long-range operations.
In the context of this report and data reported by ONI and IMB, kidnappings refer to  those that have occurred, or were reported to have occurred. According to ONI and  AFRICOM officials, such incidents would include scenarios in which oil industry personnel  or others were kidnapped from offshore supply vessels or platforms and held for ransom,  such as the case of the two U.S. oil industry personnel taken from the C-Retriever in  October 2013 off the coast of Nigeria. However, according to AFRICOM and Naval  Forces–Africa officials, kidnappings conducted against the oil industry, including those  perpetrated by Nigerian militants over the last decade, also include onshore kidnappings,  or kidnappings within the inland waters and river ways of the Niger Delta. Onshore or  inland kidnappings are generally not included in this data, and ONI officials said they take  steps to validate the data they report However, ONI officials told us that some self- reported or other data may unintentionally include such incidents. the Horn of Africa, MARAD, State, and all eight of the shipping industry  association officials we interviewed expressed that the increasing  prevalence of kidnappings is a cause for concern.
section_title: The United States Has Ongoing Efforts to Strengthen Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
paragraphs: According to AFRICOM officials, the objective of building partner capacity  in the Gulf of Guinea, including strengthening maritime security, has long  been part of U.S. military and diplomatic efforts in the region, even though  the United States and international partners do not generally conduct  naval patrols such as those conducted off the Horn of Africa. For  example, AFRICOM has conducted training and other efforts to  strengthen regional security, including combating piracy and maritime  crime, since its creation in 2008. According to AFRICOM, State, and U.S.  Coast Guard Officials, while U.S. efforts in the Gulf of Guinea are  informed by the region’s specific geopolitical context, they also include  efforts aimed to improve the prevention, disruption, and prosecution of  piracy and maritime crime.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Efforts to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Maritime Crime
paragraphs: According to State and DOD officials, providing a permanent U.S. or  international interdiction presence in the region is impractical because  foreign nations do not have the authority to conduct military operations in  another sovereign nation’s territory and the need for limited naval  resources to address other strategic priorities. However, as in the Horn of  Africa, a variety of U.S. efforts are underway to help prevent acts of piracy  and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, including in the following areas:
Coordination of international activities and assistance: According to  DOD and State officials, facilitating collaboration and avoiding  duplication is important to U.S. and international partners. To help  achieve this, and in recognition of increasing concern in the region, an  ad hoc Group of Eight (G8) group called the G8++ Friends of the Gulf  of Guinea was established to conduct high-level coordination and  discussion of international assistance efforts. Further, State and  AFRICOM officials said that as part of their planning process,  AFRICOM holds planning conferences to solicit input from  international partners, coordinate activities, and leverage resources.  All U.S. officials we spoke with agreed that while the establishment of  the Contact Group for the Horn of Africa was helpful in the absence of  a functioning Somali government, in the case of the Gulf of Guinea,  solutions must emerge from the region itself, and the role of the  international community is to support and promote African-led  initiatives. For example, the U.S., through DOD and State, has  supported and facilitated the efforts of the two relevant African  economic communities—the Economic Community of West African  States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African  States (ECCAS)—to develop and lead efforts to prevent and suppress  piracy. For example, according to AFRICOM and State officials,  AFRICOM and respective U.S. embassies supported the recent  development of a code of conduct concerning the prevention of  piracy, armed robbery, and other maritime crime, which was signed in  June 2013 by leaders of the Gulf of Guinea coastal states.
Security advisories for U.S. vessels and ship protection measures:  MARAD provides security advisories to alert U.S. vessel operators  transiting all over the world, and in August 2008, MARAD issued a  maritime advisory warning of piracy and criminal activity against oil  industry and other vessels by Niger Delta militants in Nigerian  territorial waters. Additionally, in August 2010, MARAD warned that  vessels operating near oil platforms in Nigerian waters were at high  risk of armed attacks and hostage taking, and advised vessels to act  in accordance with Coast Guard directives on security plans and risk  assessments. Further, in March 2012, shipping industry organizations  in coordination with NATO issued interim guidelines for protection  against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as a companion to their August  2011 BMP version 4 for the Horn of Africa region. Most recently, in  July 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard directed U.S. vessels to revise their  ship security plans and protective measures in response to continued  attacks and lessons learned from investigations of recent incidents,  including hijacking tankers for oil theft, acts of robbery, and  kidnapping for ransom of vessel masters and officers from offshore oil  exploration support vessels.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Acts of Piracy and Maritime Crime
paragraphs: Unlike off the coast of Somalia, where agreements authorize international  forces, including the United States, to disrupt pirate attacks in territorial  waters and dismantle pirate bases ashore, every Gulf of Guinea country  possesses the sovereign rights to control its maritime and land borders.  Accordingly, the U.S. role and the majority of its efforts pertain to training,  security assistance, and coordination, including the following activities:
Bilateral equipment and training assistance to navies and coast  guards: According to IMO, DOD, and State officials, the development  of regional countries’ naval capabilities is critical to successfully  fighting piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. Further, DOD  officials told us that regional navies have either nascent or insufficient  national maritime forces to independently combat the crime that  occurs off their coasts, let alone that which may occur farther out to  sea. To increase capabilities for regional maritime forces, State, in  coordination with DOD, provides bilateral assistance and training to  countries in the region. This includes approximately $8.5 million since  2010 in equipment and related training (e.g., vessels, engines, and  maintenance training and parts) provided to countries in the greater  Gulf of Guinea region to help build their maritime forces, according to  State officials. Additionally, according to State budget documents,  since 2010, State has used its Africa Maritime Security Initiative to  provide regional maritime security training and support through the  DOD’s Africa Partnership Station and requested $2 million for this  effort in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
Training exercises to strengthen regional response capabilities: In  addition to equipment and training to build countries’ maritime forces,  AFRICOM and its naval component, U.S. Naval Forces – Africa  provide multilateral training to improve regional maritime security  operations capability, such as navy-to-navy exercises focused on  maritime interdiction operations and response. For example, the  annual Obangame Express exercise is a multi-country, multi-fleet  exercise that implements various scenarios over several days. Begun  as a proof of concept in 2010 with limited countries and vessels  involved, the objectives of Obangame Express conducted in February  2013, according to AFRICOM, were focused on information sharing  and interoperability among 10 Gulf of Guinea countries, the ECCAS  Combined Maritime Center, ECOWAS, as well as the United States  and 4 international partners. The exercises involve combating and  responding to various scenarios including oil bunkering, trafficking  illegal cargo, illegal fishing, and piracy, and AFRICOM officials stated  that future exercises already have commitments of expanded  international and regional participation.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Support Prosecution of Suspected Pirates and Maritime Criminals
paragraphs: According to the Action Plan, facilitating the prosecution and detention of  pirates off the Horn of Africa is a central element of U.S. efforts to combat  piracy in the region. However, as previously noted, the majority of Gulf of  Guinea maritime crimes occur within the territorial waters of one or more  country and as a result are under their legal jurisdiction. As such, the U.S.  role in prosecuting suspected criminals, like its role in prevention and  disruption of attacks, is one of support and capacity building, such as the  following efforts:
Maritime law enforcement training and prosecution: According to  DOD, State, and U.S. Coast Guard officials, much of the training the  United States provides to maritime law enforcement in the Gulf of  Guinea is similar to that provided in the Horn of Africa, and is used to  combat a variety of crimes, such as narcotics trafficking, arms  smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing, as well as piracy. For  instance, in West Africa, AFRICOM and the Coast Guard provide  training including visit, board, search, and seizure skills and  mentorship through the African Maritime Law Enforcement  Partnership (AMLEP) program, which aims to strengthen countries’  abilities to enforce their maritime laws. AMLEP targets illicit trafficking  in drugs, arms, and humans, as well as counterpiracy issues and  illegal fishing, and the program has resulted in the successful seizure  and prosecution of illegal fisherman by African law enforcement  officers in African waters, according to AFRICOM officials.
Judicial capacity building: State’s Bureau of International Narcotics  and Law Enforcement (INL) has conducted a series of regional  maritime criminal justice seminars. Specifically, INL and the Africa  Center for Strategic Studies have hosted a series of Trans-Atlantic  Maritime Criminal Justice Workshops, which provide an opportunity  for regional law enforcement agencies to learn about maritime crime  and related gaps in their judicial systems. This series of conferences  included a June 2013 session for ECOWAS countries in Ghana, with  the other conferences held in February 2013 in Cape Verde and  February 2014 in Benin. Additionally, according to State officials, in  2013 the agency began discussions with the G8++ Friends of Gulf of  Guinea to develop possible future U.S. programs to strengthen  regional countries’ capacity to investigate and prosecute cases of  armed robbery at sea and piracy.
section_title: The United States Has Not Assessed Piracy and Maritime Crime in the Gulf of Guinea
paragraphs: According to DOD and State officials, U.S. efforts to combat piracy and  maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea are guided by the same over-arching  U.S. policies and security goals as the efforts to combat piracy off of the  Horn of Africa. These policies include the 2007 Policy for the Repression  of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, the 2011 Strategy to  Combat Transnational Organized Crime, the 2012 Strategy toward Sub- Saharan Africa, the 2012 National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the  2013 National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan. For example, the  Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime outlines East and  West African maritime security as regional priorities, specifically noting  incidents of Somali piracy and oil theft and kidnapping of oil workers in  the Gulf of Guinea. DOD and State officials emphasized that U.S. efforts  are then developed in consideration of the particular contexts of each  region. In the case of Somalia, the surge and intensity of the rising piracy  problem, the specific nature of the crime, and the absence of a  functioning government presented a crisis that warranted collective  international action, as well as a U.S. plan to guide its contribution to this  response. Alternatively, State, DOD, and Coast Guard officials we spoke  with explained that because the context of maritime crime in the Gulf of  Guinea, and thereby the U.S. efforts there, encompass a broader set of  geopolitical issues and maritime crimes, creating a piracy-focused plan  similar to the Action Plan in the Horn of Africa may not be appropriate.
While there is not a whole-of-government plan to guide maritime security  efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, DOD, State, Coast Guard, and others  continue to expand and coordinate their maritime security activities there,  which range from individual boarding team trainings to broad judicial  sector reform. DOD and State officials told us that as the United States  and international partners look to expand efforts in the Gulf of Guinea,  coordinating activities to achieve the most effective mix and efficient use  of resources is increasingly important. For example, officials from U.S.  Naval Forces – Africa stated that occasional duplication of training  activities can happen, particularly as international partners increase their  attention to the region. However, according to officials from the U.S.  government agencies working in the region, the NSCS has not directed  them to conduct a collective assessment of efforts to combat piracy and  maritime crime that weighs the U.S. security interests, goals, and  resources in the region against the various types of agency and  international activities underway. Moreover, while individual agencies  have conducted analysis regarding the incidents of piracy and maritime  crime such as armed robbery and kidnapping in the region, there has not  been a coordinated interagency appraisal of how the variety of existing  and planned activities address U.S. policy objectives in the context of  such a broad set of maritime crimes, from illegal fishing and oil theft, to  arms trafficking and kidnapping of U.S. citizens from offshore supply  vessels.
The National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan cites the importance of  understanding new and emerging maritime challenges in the maritime  domain, the development of solutions to address those challenges, and  continuous reassessment using risk management principles. Further, the  Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime outlines a specific set  of U.S. priority actions to combat transnational criminal threats such as  piracy and maritime crime, one of which is to increase research, data  collection, and analysis to assess the scope and impact of such crime  and the most effective means to combat it.
Individual agencies may include some assessment information into their  planning and evaluation processes but this information is specific to  agencies and programs rather than the overall U.S. effort. For example,  according to AFRICOM officials, it uses available information to assess  the operating environment, such as demographic surveys, to develop  indicators to help measure program effectiveness, or it may conduct an  assessment of a partner country’s naval capabilities to inform program  design. However, the chief of the AFRICOM assessments directorate said  this assessment process is relatively new for the command, and there are  no known interagency efforts to leverage this information into a broader  assessment of U.S. maritime security or counterpiracy efforts.  Additionally, according to State officials from the Political-Military Affairs  Bureau, while individual programs such as State’s foreign military  financing or other security assistance activities may conduct evaluations  of their programs, it is not part of a broader assessment of State’s  regional maritime security activities.
Program guidance for other multi-agency international collaborative  efforts—such as providing counternarcotics assistance to countries to  disrupt drug production and trafficking—has also shown that assessing  agencies’ progress in meeting established goals can provide better  information for decision making. Guidance for these efforts demonstrates  how incorporating elements of a strategic approach such as evaluating  performance measures and setting performance targets can provide  oversight and guide management decisions about the allotment of  program resources. If a multi-agency collaborative plan, such as the  Action Plan, was developed for the efforts that address piracy and  maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, including elements of a strategic  approach could help determine the best use of resources to meet its  objectives.
An assessment that identifies the various U.S. and international efforts  underway to strengthen maritime security, examines the relationship of  these efforts with the nature and scope of the problem in the region, and  considers the geopolitical environment and other regional factors could  help strengthen ongoing efforts to combat maritime crime, as well as  inform the appropriate mix of activities in order to use resources most  effectively. Further, such an assessment could help determine whether  additional actions, such as developing an action plan or other guidance, is  needed to align U.S. interagency efforts to better achieve national  security goals. In commenting on a draft of this report, an NSCS official  stated that a global action plan is being developed, with a separate annex  focusing on the Gulf of Guinea, but did not indicate the extent to which  the plan was based on an assessment of ongoing activities or would  include elements of a strategic approach.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since our September 2010 report on piracy off the Horn of Africa, the  U.S. Government—as part of an international partnership—has continued  to take steps outlined in the Action Plan to counter piracy. In 2013, piracy  steeply declined off the Horn of Africa, but the gains are tenuous and  piracy could easily resurge if the international coalition becomes  complacent. Whether piracy incidents are rising or declining, it is  important for the Action Plan to be updated to account for current  circumstances. In addition, our current work indicates that the U.S.  Government has not implemented additional steps we recommended to  identify measures of effectiveness, identify costs and benefits, and clarify  agency roles and responsibilities. We are not making any new  recommendations regarding the Action Plan for the Horn of Africa, but we  continue to believe that our 2010 recommendations remain relevant to the  changing conditions, and acting on these recommendations would assist  the NSCS—and DOD and State as the co-chairs of the Counter-Piracy  Steering Group—in better assessing, planning, and implementing actions  to counter piracy as it continues to evolve, and would help ensure that  recent progress is sustained.
Meanwhile, piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea has escalated  and in 2013 surpassed the Horn of Africa in terms of incidents. The  variety of U.S. efforts by multiple government agencies to combat piracy  in the region highlights the importance of having coordinated activities  that combine the most effective mix of resources. Without a collective  assessment of the scope and nature of the problem of piracy and  maritime crime, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea where no such collective  assessment has occurred, the U.S. may not be coordinating its efforts in  the most effective or cost efficient manner. An assessment of the various  U.S. and international efforts, as well as of the geopolitical environment  and other regional factors could help determine what additional actions  are needed to align all of the efforts underway. Furthermore, an  assessment of whether and to what extent such actions, such as  developing an action plan that would include elements of a strategic  approach, is needed can guide decision making to address the evolving  threat, coordinate resources and efforts, and prioritize maritime security  activities in the Gulf of Guinea.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that efforts to counter piracy and maritime crime are  coordinated and prioritized to effectively address the evolving threat, we  recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security  Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense and State, work  through the Counter-Piracy Steering Group or otherwise collaborate with  the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury,  and the Attorney General to  conduct an assessment of U.S. efforts to address piracy and maritime  crime in the Gulf of Guinea to inform these efforts and determine whether additional actions to address counterpiracy and  maritime security, such as developing an action plan that includes  elements of a strategic approach, are needed to guide and coordinate  activities.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT,  Treasury, and the NSCS for review and comment. DHS, DOJ, DOT, and  Treasury, did not provide official comments on our draft report and DOD  and State deferred to the NSCS for comments on the recommendations.   In an email from the NSCS dated June 12, 2014, the NSCS did not  concur or non-concur with our recommendations, but provided  information related to its current counterpiracy efforts.
Specifically, the NSCS stated that it is coordinating with departments and  agencies through the interagency process to develop a global action plan  for countering piracy, with separate annexes focusing on the Horn of  Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The updated plan will provide guidance to  the federal government focusing on three core areas including: prevention  of attacks, response to acts of maritime crime, and enhancing maritime  security and governance. The plan will be forthcoming in the summer of  2014 and the Executive Branch will continue to evaluate maritime crime  around the world and develop or refine guidance to account for evolving  conditions in specific regions.
We are encouraged by the steps being taken by the NSCS in providing  the federal agencies responsible for counterpiracy activities with an  updated plan, but it is not clear to what extent the plan will include  previously recommended elements of a strategic approach. The  description of the plan appears to provide a needed update to the Action  Plan given the changes in conditions off of the Horn of Africa. The  updated plan also appears to be responsive to part of our  recommendation to consider additional actions such as developing a  similar plan for the Gulf of Guinea. However, the description of the plan  does not address the extent to which it will include elements such as an  assessment of costs and benefits, measures of effectiveness to evaluate  counterpiracy efforts, and defined roles and responsibilities for the  agencies involved in carrying out counterpiracy activities. Further, the  description does not address the extent to which the updated plan is  based on an assessment of ongoing counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of  Guinea. We will monitor the situation and review the updated plan once it  is released and will continue to monitor the NSCS’s progress in planning  and providing guidance for counterpiracy activities as well as DOD and  State’s progress in implementing the plan as co-chairs of the Counter  Piracy Steering Group.
DOD, DHS, and DOJ provided technical comments on a draft of this  report which have been incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its  issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Assistant  to the President for National Security Affairs; the Attorney General; the  Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, State, Transportation, and  the Treasury; and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  either Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov or  Chris P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are found in  Appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since  2010 and describes U.S. efforts to assess its counterpiracy actions, given  any changing conditions; and identifies trends in piracy and maritime  crime in the Gulf of Guinea and U.S. efforts to address them and  evaluates the extent to which the United States has assessed its  counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.
To assess how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 2010, we  analyzed data from the International Chamber of Commerce’s  International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the U.S. Office of Naval  intelligence (ONI) on reported piracy incidents, hostages taken, and  ransoms paid off the Horn of Africa from 2008 through 2013. We  discussed data-collection methods, processes for data entry, and the  steps taken to ensure the reliability of the data with both IMB and ONI  officials. We collected information from both IMB and ONI on their  processes for quality control, data verification, and how potential errors  are identified and corrected. We also discussed variation between IMB  and ONI data with officials from ONI and other Department of Defense  (DOD) organizations, the Department of State (State), and IMB, who  attributed differences in categorization of incidents, validation of sources,  and geographic scope to the variation. Officials stated that while values  between ONI and IMB data may differ, IMB is a generally accepted data  source for tracking global piracy incidents and suitably reflects general   We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the  historical trends.purposes of describing the context, trends, and scope of pirate attacks off  the Horn of Africa in this report. In addition, we met with U.S. agency  officials, international partners, and representatives from insurance,  shipping, and private security industry associations to discuss their  involvement in counterpiracy activities such as developing best practices  for protecting ships from pirate attack, working with the international  Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and participating in  naval patrols off the Horn of Africa. We met with officials from shipping  industry associations that represent owners and operators from over 80  percent of the world’s merchant fleet and provide a unified industry voice  in the creation of industry policy and strategy; insurance industry  associations whose members cover approximately 90 percent of the  world’s ocean-going tonnage; and a private security industry association  that has over 180 members across 35 countries. While the statements of  these industry officials cannot be generalized to the entire industries they  represent, their perspectives provide valuable insight since each is  actively involved in international collaborative efforts to combat piracy. To  determine the extent to which the U.S. has assessed its counterpiracy  actions as outlined in the 2008 Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:  Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan), we reviewed the Action Plan,  the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, the 2007 Policy for the  Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, relevant  U.S. policies and laws, and United Nations Security Council resolutions.  We also reviewed program documents including briefings and meeting  summaries and interviewed officials from DOD, State, and the  Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), Transportation  (DOT), and the Treasury, including components such as U.S. Naval  Forces – Central Command, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to discuss implementation of the Action Plan and the status of our 2010 recommendations to improve the plan.We selected these departments and agencies because the Action Plan  states they shall contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in  accordance with the plan.
To identify trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea we  analyzed IMB data on actual and attempted piracy incidents from 2007  through 2013, and ONI data from 2010 through 2013. As with the IMB  and ONI data pertaining to the Horn of Africa, we collected information on  the quality control, verification, and safeguards from error and discussed  the reliability of the data with officials from IMB, ONI, and State officials  involved in maritime security initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea and  determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. Because ONI data on the Gulf of Guinea is unavailable prior to  2010 we chose to present the IMB data from 2007 through 2013  alongside the ONI data to show trends over a broader period. In addition  to data, we reviewed publicly available reports and documents regarding  maritime security and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea from the United Nations  Office on Drugs and Crime, the EU, and other multilateral and  nongovernmental organizations. To evaluate U.S. efforts to address  piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the extent to  which the U.S. has assessed the need for a strategic approach for the  region, we reviewed relevant U.S. and international policies and laws,  such as the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, 2007 Policy for  the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, the  2008 Action Plan, the 2012 Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, and  United Nations Security Council resolutions pertaining to the Gulf of  Guinea. We also compared agency efforts with U.S. policy priorities and  requirements for conducting assessments outlined in the 2011 Strategy to  Combat Transnational Organized Crime and the 2013 National Maritime  Domain Awareness Plan, documents that guide U.S. maritime security  efforts, including in the Gulf of Guinea.
subsections: section_title: Department of Defense
paragraphs: Office of the General Counsel; Office of the Undersecretary of  Defense for Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Counter-Narcotics and Global Threats; and the Joint Staff  J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate
Department of the Navy, as well as the Naval Criminal Investigative  Service, and the Office of Naval Intelligence
U.S. Africa Command (Germany) and its components U.S. Naval  Forces – Africa and Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
U.S. Central Command and its component U.S. Naval Forces –  Central Command (Bahrain)
section_title: Department of State
section_title: Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: U.S. Coast Guard offices, including the National Defense Strategy  Division, Maritime Security (Counterterrorism) Division, Office of  International Affairs and Foreign Policy; Office of Commercial Vessel  Compliance; Office of Budget and Programs; and the Intelligence  Coordination Center
U.S. Coast Guard representatives at other agencies, including U.S.
Africa Command (Germany) and Patrol Forces Southwest Asia  (Bahrain)
section_title: Department of Justice
section_title: Department of Transportation
section_title: Department of the Treasury
section_title: International Government and Multilateral Organizations include:
paragraphs: European Union Naval Forces (United Kingdom)
Combined Maritime Forces (Bahrain)
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (observed in Bahrain)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the NATO Shipping  International Maritime Organization (United Kingdom)
Centre (United Kingdom)
United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)
section_title: Industry Partners and Nongovernmental Organizations include:
paragraphs: Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Chamber of Shipping of America
Lloyd’s Market Association
Maersk Line, Limited
Oceans Beyond Piracy
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI)
Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Limited  International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO)  International Association of Independent Tanker Owners  (INTERTANKO)  International Chamber of Shipping  International Group of P&I Clubs  International Maritime Bureau  International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)  Japanese Shipowners’ Association  (SIGTTO)
We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through 2013
section_title: Appendix III: Interagency Progress in Implementing the Lines of Action in the National Security Council’s 2008 Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan
paragraphs: In September 2010, we assessed the counterpiracy efforts of the United  States government against the lines of action identified in the Countering  Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan).  These lines of action continue to guide the United States’ efforts off the  Horn of Africa. Table 3 summarizes our assessments from our September  2010 report and also provides updated information for each action since  that time.
section_title: Appendix IV: Department of Defense Counterpiracy Costs, 2010 through 2013
paragraphs: During the course of our review, the Department of Defense provided  information on the costs of its counterpiracy efforts as shown in table  4.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; Suzanne  Wren, Assistant Director; Jason Bair; Charles Bausell; Jennifer Cheung;  Toni Gillich; Eric Hauswirth; Kevin Heinz; Stan Kostyla; Landis Lindsey;  Tom Lombardi; John Mingus; Jessica Orr; Matt Spiers; and Sally  Williamson made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve  Visibility of Combatant Commands’ Resources. GAO-13-293.  Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2013.
Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage  Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation.  GAO-13-335T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.
Maritime Security: Progress Made, but Further Actions Needed to Secure  the Maritime Energy Supply. GAO-11-883T. Washington, D.C.: August  24, 2011.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic,  Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.  GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June, 20, 2011.
Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains  Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa. GAO-11-449T.  Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2011.
Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and  Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off  the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency  Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. GAO-10-794.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of  Africa Task Force. GAO-10-504. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were  Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in  Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity  Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.