Performance Budgeting: OMB's Performance Rating Tool Presents Opportunities and Challenges For Evaluating Program Performance
Published: 2004-03-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating federal programs during budget formulation. The subcommittee asked GAO to discuss its overall findings and recommendations concerning PART, based on a recent report, Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool for the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget (GAO-04-174).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: PART helped structure OMB's use of performance information for internal program and budget analysis and stimulated agency interest in budget and performance integration. Moreover, it illustrated the potential to build on GPRA's foundation to more actively promote the use of performance information in budget decisions. OMB deserves credit for inviting scrutiny of its federal program performance reviews and sharing them on its Web site. The goal of PART is to evaluate programs systematically, consistently, and transparently. OMB went to great lengths to encourage consistent application of PART in the evaluation of government programs, including pilot testing the instrument, issuing detailed guidance, and conducting consistency reviews. Although there is undoubtedly room for continued improvement, any tool is inherently limited in providing a single performance answer or judgment on complex federal programs with multiple goals. Performance measurement challenges in evaluating complex federal programs make it difficult to meaningfully interpret a single bottom-line rating. The individual section ratings for each PART review provided a better understanding of areas needing improvement than the overall rating alone. Moreover, any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity of the U.S. government will always require some interpretation and judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that OMB staff were not fully consistent in interpreting complex questions about agency goals and results. The lack of program performance information at the agency level also creates challenges in effectively measuring program performance. PART provides an opportunity to consider strategically targeting the assessments on groups of related programs contributing to common outcomes to more efficiently use scarce analytic resources and focus decision makers' attention on the most pressing performance issues cutting across individual programs and agencies. The relationship between PART and the broader GPRA strategic planning process is still evolving and highlights the critical importance of defining the unit of analysis for program evaluation. Although PART can stimulate discussion on program-specific performance measurement issues, it is not a substitute for GPRA's strategic, longer-term focus on thematic goals, and department- and governmentwide crosscutting comparisons. PART clearly serves OMB's needs, but questions remain about whether it serves the various needs of other key stakeholders. If PART results are to be considered in the congressional debate, it will be important for OMB to (1) involve congressional stakeholders early in providing input on the focus of the assessments; (2) clarify any significant limitations in the assessments and underlying performance information; and (3) initiate discussions with key congressional committees about how they can best leverage PART information in congressional authorization, appropriations, and oversight processes.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss performance budgeting and the  Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Program Assessment Rating  Tool (PART). Since the 1950s, the federal government has attempted  several governmentwide initiatives designed to better align spending  decisions with expected performance—what is commonly referred to as  “performance budgeting.” The consensus is that prior efforts—including  the Hoover Commission, the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System,  Management by Objectives, and Zero-Based Budgeting—did not succeed  in significantly shifting the focus of the federal budget process from its  long-standing concentration on the items of government spending to the  results of its programs. However, the persistent attempts reflect a long- standing interest in linking resources to results.
In the 1990s, Congress and the executive branch laid out a statutory and  management framework that provides the foundation for strengthening  government performance and accountability, with the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) as its centerpiece. GPRA is  designed to inform congressional and executive decision making by  providing objective information on the relative effectiveness and  efficiency of federal programs and spending. A key purpose of the act is to  create closer and clearer links between the process of allocating scarce  resources and the expected results to be achieved with those resources.  We have learned that this type of integration is critical from prior  initiatives that failed in part because they did not prove to be relevant to  budget decision makers in the executive branch or Congress. GPRA  requires both a connection to the structures used in congressional budget  presentations and consultation between the executive and legislative  branches on agency strategic plans; this gives Congress an oversight stake  in GPRA’s success.
This administration has made the integration of performance and budget  information one of five governmentwide management priorities under the  President’s Management Agenda (PMA). Central to this initiative is PART.  OMB developed PART as a diagnostic tool meant to provide a consistent  approach to evaluating federal programs and applied it in formulating the  President’s fiscal years 2004 and 2005 budget requests. PART covers four  broad topics for all “programs” selected for review: (1) program purpose  and design, (2) strategic planning, (3) program management, and   (4) program results (i.e., whether a program is meeting its long-term and  annual goals) as well as additional questions that are specific to one of  seven mechanisms or approaches used to deliver the program.
GPRA expanded the supply of performance information generated by  federal agencies, although as the PART assessments demonstrate, more  must be done to develop credible performance information. However,  improving the supply of performance information is in and of itself  insufficient to sustain performance management and achieve real  improvements in management and program results. Rather, it needs to be  accompanied by a demand for that information by decision makers and  managers alike. PART may mark a new chapter in performance-based  budgeting by more successfully stimulating demand for this information— that is, using the performance information generated through GPRA’s  planning and reporting processes to more directly feed into executive  branch budgetary decisions.
My statement today focuses on seven points:    PART helped structure OMB’s use of performance information for its  internal program and budget analysis, made the use of this information  more transparent, and stimulated agency interest in budget and  performance integration. Moreover, it illustrated the potential to build on  GPRA’s foundation to more actively promote the use of performance  information in budget decisions.
The goal of PART is to evaluate programs systematically, consistently, and  transparently. OMB went to great lengths to encourage consistent  application of PART in the evaluation of government programs, including  pilot testing the instrument, issuing detailed guidance, and conducting  consistency reviews. Although there is undoubtedly room for continued  improvement, any tool is inherently limited in providing a single  performance answer or judgment on complex federal programs with  multiple goals.
Performance measurement challenges in evaluating complex federal  programs make it difficult to meaningfully interpret a bottom-line rating.  The individual section ratings for each PART review provided a better  understanding of areas needing improvement than the overall rating alone.
As is to be expected with any new reform, PART is a work in progress and  we have noted in our work where OMB might make improvements. Any  tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity of  the U.S. government will require some exercise of judgment. Therefore it  is not surprising that we found some inconsistencies in OMB staff  interpreting and applying PART.
PART provides an opportunity to more efficiently use scarce analytic  resources, to focus decision makers’ attention on the most pressing policy  issues, and to consider comparisons and trade-offs among related  programs by more strategically targeting PART assessments based on such  factors as the relative priorities, costs, and risks associated with related  clusters of programs and activities. The first year PART assessments  underscored the long-standing gaps in performance and evaluation  information throughout the federal government. By reaching agreement on  areas in which evaluations are most essential, decision makers can help  ensure that limited resources are applied wisely.
The relationship between PART and its process and the broader GPRA  strategic planning process is still evolving. Although PART can stimulate  discussion on program-specific performance measurement issues, it is not  a substitute for GPRA’s strategic, longer-term focus on thematic goals and  department- and governmentwide crosscutting comparisons. PART and  GPRA serve different but complementary needs, so a strategy for  integrating the two could help strengthen both.
Federal programs are designed and implemented in dynamic environments  where competing program priorities and stakeholders’ needs must be  balanced continually and new needs must be addressed. While PART  clearly serves the needs of OMB in budget formulation, questions remain  about whether it serves the various needs of other key stakeholders. If the  President or OMB wants PART and its results to be considered in the  congressional debate, it will be important for OMB to (1) involve  congressional stakeholders early in providing input on the focus of the  assessments; (2) clarify any significant limitations in the assessments as  well as the underlying performance information; and (3) initiate  discussions with key congressional committees about how they can best  take advantage of and leverage PART information in congressional  authorization, appropriations, and oversight processes. Moreover,  Congress needs to consider ways it can articulate its oversight priorities  and performance agenda.
My statement is based on our recently published report on OMB’s PART  in which we reviewed the first year of the PART process—fiscal year  2004—and changes in the PART process initiated for fiscal year 2005. We  have not reviewed or analyzed the PART results for the fiscal year 2005  budget request. For this testimony, this subcommittee asked us to discuss  our overall findings and recommendations concerning PART to help frame  today’s hearing. We conducted our work in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Strengths and Weaknesses of PART in Its First Year of Implementation
paragraphs: Through its development and use of PART, OMB has more explicitly  infused performance information into the budget formulation process;  increased the attention paid to performance information and program  evaluations; and ultimately, we hope, increased the value of this  information to decision makers and other stakeholders. By linking  performance information to the budget process, OMB has provided  agencies with a powerful incentive for improving both the quality and  availability of performance information. The level of effort and  involvement by senior OMB officials and staff clearly signals the  importance of this strategy in meeting the priorities outlined in the PMA.  OMB should be credited with opening up for scrutiny—and potential  criticism—its review of key areas of federal program performance and  then making its assessments available to a potentially wider audience  through its Web site.
As OMB and others recognize, performance is not the only factor in  funding decisions. Determining priorities—including funding priorities—is  a function of competing values and interests. Accordingly, we found that  while PART scores were generally positively related to proposed funding  changes in discretionary programs, the scores did not automatically  determine funding changes. That is, for some programs rated “effective” or  “moderately effective” OMB recommended funding decreases, while for  several programs judged to be “ineffective” OMB recommended additional  funding in the President’s budget request with which to implement  changes. In fact, the more important role of PART was not its use in  making resource decisions, but in its support for recommendations to  improve program design, assessment, and management. Our analysis of  the fiscal year 2004 PART found that 82 percent of the recommendations  addressed program assessment, design, and management issues; only 18  percent of the recommendations had a direct link to funding matters.
OMB’s ability to use PART to identify and address future program  improvements and measure progress—a major purpose of PART— depends on its ability to oversee the implementation of PART  recommendations. As OMB has recognized, following through on these  recommendations is essential for improving program performance and  ensuring accountability. Currently, OMB plans to assess an additional 20  percent of all federal programs annually. As the number of  recommendations from previous years’ evaluations grows, a system for  monitoring their implementation will become more critical. However,  OMB does not have a centralized system to oversee the implementation of  such recommendations or evaluate their effectiveness.
The goal of PART is to evaluate programs systematically, consistently, and  transparently. OMB went to great lengths to encourage consistent  application of PART in the evaluation of government programs, including  pilot testing the instrument, issuing detailed guidance, and conducting  consistency reviews. Although there is undoubtedly room for continued  improvement, any tool is inherently limited in providing a single  performance answer or judgment on complex federal programs with  multiple goals.
OMB recognized the complexity inherent in evaluating federal programs  by differentiating its rating tool for seven mechanisms or approaches used  to deliver services, ranging from block grants to research and  development. However, judgment is involved in classifying programs by  these categories since many programs fit into more than one of these  groupings. OMB guidance, for instance, acknowledges that some research  and development programs can also be evaluated as competitive grants  and capital assets.
Performance measurement challenges in evaluating complex federal  programs make it difficult to meaningfully interpret a bottom-line rating.  OMB published both a single, bottom-line rating for PART results and  individual section scores. It is these latter scores that are potentially more  useful for identifying information gaps and program weaknesses. For  example, in the fiscal year 2004 PART, one program that was rated  “adequate” overall got high scores for purpose (80 percent) and planning  (100 percent), but poor scores in being able to show results (39 percent)  and in program management (46 percent). In a case like this, the individual  section ratings provided a better understanding of areas needing  improvement than the overall rating alone. In addition, bottom-line ratings  may force raters to choose among several important but disparate goals  and encourage a determination of program effectiveness even when  performance data are unavailable, the quality of those data is uneven, or  they convey a mixed message on performance.
Any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity  of the U.S. government will always require some interpretation and  judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that OMB staff were not fully  consistent in interpreting complex questions about agency goals and  results. Many PART questions contain subjective terms that are open to  interpretation. Examples include terminology such as “ambitious” in  describing sought-after performance measures. Because the  appropriateness of a performance measure depends on the program’s  purpose, and because program purposes can vary immensely, an  ambitious goal for one program might be unrealistic for a similar but more  narrowly defined program. Without further guidance, it is unclear how  OMB staff can be expected to be consistent.
We also found inconsistencies in how the definition of acceptable  performance measures was applied. Our review of the fiscal year 2004  PART surfaced several instances in which OMB staff inconsistently  defined appropriate measures—outcome versus output—for programs.  Agency officials also told us that OMB staff used different standards to  define measures as outcome-oriented. Outputs are the products and  services delivered by the program whereas outcomes refer to the results of  outputs. For example, in the employment and training area, OMB accepted  short-term outcomes, such as obtaining high school diplomas or  employment, as a proxy for long-term goals for the Department of Health  and Human Services’ Refugee Assistance program, which aims to help  refugees attain economic self-sufficiency as soon as possible. However,  OMB did not accept the same employment measure as a proxy for long- term goals for the Department of Education’s Vocational Rehabilitation  program because it had not set long-term targets beyond a couple of years.  In other words, although neither program contained long-term outcomes,  such as participants gaining economic self-sufficiency, OMB accepted  short-term outcomes in one instance but not the other.
The yes/no format employed throughout most of the PART questionnaire  resulted in oversimplified answers to some questions. Although OMB  believes it helped standardization, the yes/no format was particularly  troublesome for questions containing multiple criteria for a “yes” answer.  Agency officials have commented that the yes/no format can oversimplify  reality, in which progress in planning, management, or results is more  likely to resemble a continuum than an on/off switch. Our review of the  fiscal year 2004 PART found several instances in which some OMB staff  gave a “yes” answer for successfully achieving some but not all of the  multiple criteria, while others gave a “no” answer when presented with a  similar situation. For example, OMB judged the Department of the  Interior’s (DOI) Water Reuse and Recycling program “no” on whether a  program has a limited number of ambitious, long-term performance goals,  noting that although DOI set a long-term goal of 500,000 acre-feet per year  of reclaimed water, it failed to establish a time frame for when it would  reach the target. However, OMB judged the Department of Agriculture’s  and DOI’s Wildland Fire programs “yes” on this question even though the  programs’ long-term goals of improved conditions in high-priority forest  acres are not accompanied by specific time frames.
The lack of program performance information also creates challenges in  effectively assessing program performance. According to OMB, about half  of the programs assessed for fiscal year 2004 lacked “specific, ambitious  long-term performance goals that focus on outcomes” and nearly 40  percent lacked sufficient “independent, quality evaluations.” Nearly 50  percent of programs assessed for fiscal year 2004 received ratings of  “results not demonstrated” because OMB decided that program  performance information, performance goals, or both were insufficient or  inadequate. While the validity of these assessments may be subject to  interpretation and debate, our previous work has raised concerns about  the capacity of federal agencies to produce evaluations of program  effectiveness as well as credible data.
In our report on PART, we note that several factors have limited the  availability of performance data and evaluations of federal programs,  including the lack of statutory mandates and funding to support data  collection and analysis. Our work has recognized that research programs  pose particular and long-standing challenges for performance assessments  and evaluations. For instance, in both applied and basic research,  projects take several years to complete and require more time before their  meaning for the field can be adequately understood and captured in  performance reporting systems. These challenges can and have been  addressed by federal and private research organizations. One evaluation  approach we have identified in our review of leading practices is the use of  peer review to evaluate the quality of research outcomes. For example,  the National Science Foundation (NSF) convenes panels of independent  experts as external advisers—a Committee of Visitors (COV)—to peer  review the technical and managerial stewardship of a specific program or  cluster of programs periodically. The COV compares research plans with  progress made, and evaluates outcomes to determine whether the  research contributes to NSF mission and goals.
section_title: The Relationship between GPRA and PART
paragraphs: PART was designed for and is used in the executive branch budget  preparation and review process. As a result, the goals and measures used  in PART must meet OMB’s needs. By comparison, GPRA—the current  statutory framework for strategic planning and reporting—is a broader  process involving the development of strategic and performance goals and  objectives to be reported in strategic and annual plans and reports. OMB  said that GPRA plans were organized at too high a level to be meaningful  for program-level budget analysis and management review. OMB  acknowledges that GPRA was the starting point for PART, but as I will  explain, it appears that OMB’s emphasis is shifting such that over time the  performance measures developed for PART and used in the budget  process may also come to drive agencies’ strategic planning processes.
The fiscal year 2004 PART process came to be a parallel competing  structure to the GPRA framework as a result of OMB’s desire to collect  performance data that better align with budget decision units. OMB’s most  recent Circular A-11 guidance clearly requires both that each agency  submit a performance budget for fiscal year 2005 and that this should  replace the annual GPRA performance plan. These performance budgets  are to include information from the PART assessments, where available,  including all performance goals used in the assessment of program  performance done under the PART process. Until all programs have been  assessed using PART, the performance budget will also include  performance goals for agency programs that have not yet been assessed.  OMB’s movement from GPRA to PART is further evident in the fiscal year  2005 PART guidance stating that while existing GPRA performance goals  may be a starting point during the development of PART performance  goals, the GPRA goals in agency GPRA documents are to be revised, as  needed, to reflect OMB’s instructions for developing the PART  performance goals. Lastly, this same guidance states that GPRA plans  should be revised to include any new performance measures used in PART  and that unnecessary measures should be deleted from GPRA plans. In its  comments to another recently issued GAO report, OMB stated that it will  revise its guidance for both GPRA and PART to clarify the integrated and  complementary relationship between the two initiatives.
Although there is potential for complementary approaches to GPRA and  PART, the following examples clearly illustrate the importance of carefully  considering the implications of selecting a unit of analysis, including its  impact on the availability of performance data. They also reveal some of  the unresolved tensions between the President’s budget and performance  initiative—a detailed budget perspective—and GPRA—a more strategic  planning view. Experience with PART highlighted the fact that defining a  “unit of analysis” useful for both program-level budget analysis and agency  planning purposes can be difficult. For example, disaggregating programs  for PART purposes could ignore the interdependence of programs  recognized by GPRA by artificially isolating programs from the larger  contexts in which they operate. Agency officials described one program  assessed with the fiscal year 2004 PART—Projects for Assistance in  Transition from Homelessness—that was aimed at a specific aspect of  homelessness, that is, referring persons with emergency needs to other  agencies for housing and needed services. OMB staff wanted the agency to  produce long-term outcome measures for this program to support the  PART review process. Agency officials argued that chronically homeless  people require many services and that this federal program often supports  only some of the services needed at the initial stages of intervention.  GPRA—with its focus on assessing the relative contributions of related  programs to broader goals—is better designed to consider crosscutting  strategies to achieve common goals. Federal programs cannot be assessed  in isolation. Performance also needs to be examined from an integrated,  strategic perspective.
One way of improving the links between PART and GPRA would be to  develop a more strategic approach to selecting and prioritizing areas for  assessment under the PART process. Targeting PART assessments based  on such factors as the relative priorities, costs, and risks associated with  related clusters of programs and activities addressing common strategic  and performance goals not only could help ration scarce analytic  resources but also could focus decision makers’ attention on the most  pressing policy and program issues. Moreover, such an approach could  facilitate the use of PART assessments to review the relative contributions  of similar programs to common or crosscutting goals and outcomes  established through the GPRA process.
section_title: The Importance of Congressional and Other Stakeholder Involvement
paragraphs: We have previously reported that stakeholder involvement appears  critical for getting consensus on goals and measures. In fact, GPRA  requires agencies to consult with Congress and solicit the views of other  stakeholders as they develop their strategic plans. Stakeholder  involvement can be particularly important for federal agencies because  they operate in a complex political environment in which legislative  mandates are often broadly stated and some stakeholders may strongly  disagree about the agency’s mission and goals.
The relationship between PART and its process and the broader GPRA  strategic planning process is still evolving. As part of the executive branch  budget formulation process, PART must clearly serve the President’s  interests. Some tension about the amount of stakeholder involvement in  the internal deliberations surrounding the development of PART measures  and the broader consultations more common to the GPRA strategic  planning process is inevitable. Compared to the relatively open-ended  GPRA process, any budget formulation process is likely to seem closed.
Yet, we must ask whether the broad range of congressional officials with a  stake in how programs perform will use PART assessments unless they  believe the reviews reflect a consensus about performance goals among a  community of interests, target performance issues that are important to  them as well as the administration, and are based on an evaluation process  in which they have confidence. Similarly, the measures used to  demonstrate progress toward a goal, no matter how worthwhile, cannot  serve the interests of a single stakeholder or purpose without potentially  discouraging use of this information by others.
Congress has a number of opportunities to provide its perspective on  performance issues and performance goals, such as when it establishes or  reauthorizes a new program, during the annual appropriations process,  and in its oversight of federal operations. In fact, these processes already  reflect GPRA’s influence. Reviews of language in public laws and  committee reports show an increasing number of references to GPRA- related provisions. What is missing is a mechanism to systematically  coordinate a congressional perspective and promote a dialogue between  Congress and the President in the PART review process.
In our report, we have suggested steps for both OMB and the Congress to  take to strengthen the dialogue between executive officials and  congressional stakeholders. We have recommended that OMB reach out to  key congressional committees early in the PART selection process to gain  insight about which program areas and performance issues congressional  officials believe warrant PART review. Engaging Congress early in the  process may help target reviews with an eye toward those areas most  likely to be on the agenda of Congress, thereby better ensuring the use of  performance assessments in resource allocation processes throughout  government. We have also suggested that Congress consider the need to  develop a more systematic vehicle for communicating its top performance  concerns and priorities; develop a more structured oversight agenda to  prompt a more coordinated congressional perspective on crosscutting  performance issues; and use this agenda to inform its authorization,  appropriations, and oversight processes.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The PART process is the latest initiative in a long-standing series of  reforms undertaken to improve the link between performance information  and budget decisions. Although each of the initiatives of the past appears  to have met with an early demise, in fact, subsequent reforms were  strengthened by building on the legacy left by their predecessors. Prior  reforms often failed because they were not relevant to resource allocation  and other decision-making processes, thereby eroding the incentives for  federal agencies to improve their planning, data, and evaluations.
Unlike many of those past initiatives, GPRA has been sustained since its  passage 10 years ago, and evidence exists that it has become more  relevant than its predecessors. PART offers the potential to build on the  infrastructure of performance plans and information ushered in by GPRA  and the law’s intent to promote the use of these plans in resource  allocation decision making. GPRA improved the supply of plans and  information, while PART can prompt greater demand for this information  by decision makers. Enhancing interest and use may bring about greater  incentives for agencies to devote scarce resources to improving their  information and evaluations of federal programs as well.
Increasing the use and usefulness of performance data is not only  important to sustain performance management reforms, but to improve  the processes of decision making and governance. Many in the United  States believe there is a need to establish a comprehensive portfolio of key  national performance indicators. This will raise complex issues ranging  from agreement on performance areas and indicators to getting and  sharing reliable information for public planning, decision making, and  accountability. In this regard, the entire agenda of management reform at  the federal level has been focused on shifting the attention of decision  makers and agency management from process to results. Although PART  is based on changing the orientation of budgeting, other initiatives  championed by Congress and embodied in the PMA are also devoted to  improving the accountability for performance goals in agency human  capital management, financial management, competitive sourcing, and  other key management areas.
In particular, we have reported that human capital—or people—is at the  center of any serious change management initiative. Thus, strategic human  capital management is at the heart of government transformation. High- performing organizations strengthen the alignment of their GPRA strategic  and performance goals with their daily operations. In that regard,  performance management systems can be a vital tool for aligning an  organization’s operations with individual day-to-day activities, but they are  currently largely unused. As we move forward to strengthen government  performance and accountability, effective performance management  systems can be a strategic tool to drive internal change and achieve  desired results.
The question now is how to enhance the credibility and use of the PART  process as a tool to focus decisions on performance. In our report, we  make seven recommendations to OMB and a suggestion to Congress to  better support the kind of collaborative approach to performance  budgeting that very well may be essential in a separation of powers system  like ours. Our suggestions cover several key issues that need to be  addressed to strengthen and help sustain the PART process. We  recommend that the OMB Director take the following actions:    Centrally monitor agency implementation and progress on PART  recommendations and report such progress in OMB’s budget submission  to Congress. Governmentwide councils may be effective vehicles for  assisting OMB in these efforts.
Continue to improve the PART guidance by (1) expanding the discussion  of how the unit of analysis is to be determined to include trade-offs made  when defining a unit of analysis, implications of how the unit of analysis is  defined, or both; (2) clarifying when output versus outcome measures are  acceptable; and (3) better defining an “independent, quality evaluation.”
Clarify OMB’s expectations to agencies regarding the allocation of scarce  evaluation resources among programs, the timing of such evaluations, as  well as the evaluation strategies it wants for PART, and consider using  internal agency evaluations as evidence on a case-by-case basis—whether  conducted by agencies, contractors, or other parties.
Reconsider plans for 100 percent coverage of federal programs and,  instead, target for review a significant percentage of major and meaningful  government programs based on such factors as the relative priorities,  costs, and risks associated with related clusters of programs and activities.
Maximize the opportunity to review similar programs or activities in the  same year to facilitate comparisons and trade-offs.
Attempt to generate, early in the PART process, an ongoing, meaningful  dialogue with congressional appropriations, authorization, and oversight  committees about what they consider to be the most important  performance issues and program areas that warrant review.
Seek to achieve the greatest benefit from both GPRA and PART by  articulating and implementing an integrated, complementary relationship  between the two.
In its comments on our report, OMB outlined actions it is taking to address  several of these recommendations, including refining the process for  monitoring agencies’ progress in implementing the PART  recommendations, seeking opportunities for dialogue with Congress on  agencies’ performance, and continuing to improve executive branch  implementation of GPRA plans and reports.
Our recommendations to OMB are partly directed at fortifying and  enhancing the credibility of PART itself and the underlying data used to  make the judgments. Decision makers across government are more likely  to rely on PART data and assessments if the underlying information and  the rating process are perceived as being credible, systematic, and  consistent. Enhanced OMB guidance and improved strategies for obtaining  and evaluating program performance data are vital elements.
The PART process can be made more sustainable if the use of analytic  resources at OMB and the agencies is rationalized by reconsidering the  goal of 100 percent coverage of all federal programs. Instead, we suggest a  more strategic approach to target assessments on related clusters of  programs and activities. A more targeted approach stands a better chance  of capturing the interest of decision makers throughout the process by  focusing their attention on the most pressing policy and program issues  and on how related programs and tools affect broader crosscutting  outcomes and goals. Unfortunately, the governmentwide performance  plan required by GPRA has never been engaged to drive budgeting in this  way.
Improving the integration of inherently separate but interrelated strategic  planning and performance budgeting processes can help support a more  strategic focus for PART assessments. GPRA’s strategic planning goals  could be used to anchor the selection and review of programs by providing  a foundation to assess the relative contribution of related programs and  tools to broader performance goals and outcomes.
Finally, refining the PART questionnaire and review process and  improving the quality of data are important, but the question of whose  interests drive the process is perhaps paramount in our system. Ultimately,  the impact of PART on decision making will be a function not only of the  President’s decisions, but of congressional decisions as well.
Much is at stake in the development of a collaborative performance  budgeting process. Not only might the PART reviews ultimately come to  be disregarded absent congressional involvement, but more important,  Congress will lose an opportunity to use the PART process to improve its  own decision-making and oversight processes.
This is an opportune time for the executive branch and Congress to  carefully consider how agencies and committees can best take advantage  of and leverage the new information and perspectives coming from the  reform agenda under way in the executive branch. Ultimately, the specific  approach or process is not important. We face a long-term fiscal  imbalance, which will require us to reexamine our existing policies and  programs. It is all too easy to accept “the base” as given and to subject  only new proposals to scrutiny and analysis. The norm should be to  reconsider the relevance or “fit” of any federal program, policy, or activity  in today’s world and for the future.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to answer any questions you or the other Members of the Subcommittee  may have at this time.
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Paul L.  Posner, Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, at (202) 512-9573.  Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Denise M.  Fantone, Kristeen McLain and Tiffany Tanner.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.