Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps
Published: 2010-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling abroad and domestically. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense, Energy, and State, an enhanced global nuclear detection system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. (DNDO refers to this system as an architecture.) DNDO is to implement the domestic portion of the architecture. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings, and DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other pathways. Over the past 7 years, GAO has issued numerous recommendations on nuclear or radiological detection to the Secretary of Homeland Security, most recently in January 2009. This testimony discusses the status of DHS efforts to (1) complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, (2) prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, and (3) develop a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture. GAO's testimony is based on prior work that was updated by obtaining DHS documents and interviewing DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS has made significant progress in both deploying radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials since GAO's 2006 report. While DHS reports it scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports, it has made less progress scanning for radiation (1) in railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) in international air cargo; and (3) for international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage. DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States through gaps DNDO identified in developing the nuclear detection architecture remain largely developmental since GAO's 2009 report. The gaps DHS identified include land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, international general aviation, and small maritime craft such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. These gaps are important because of their size, volume of traffic, and the difficulty of deploying available radiological and nuclear detection technologies. DHS's actions to address these gaps consist primarily of efforts to develop, test, and deploy radiation detection equipment; conduct studies or analyses to identify and address particular threats or gaps; develop new procedures to guide scanning for radiation; and develop and learn from pilot programs. DHS does not yet have a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture, but DHS officials said they began working on a plan earlier this year and expect to complete it by fall 2010--2 years after GAO last recommended this to DNDO--and more than 7 years after we first identified the need for a comprehensive plan in October 2002. The lack of a strategic plan has limited DHS's efforts to complete such an architecture, because although each agency with a role in combating nuclear smuggling has its own planning documents, without an overarching strategic plan, it is difficult to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. DNDO's 4-year effort to develop an advanced radiation detection monitor is an example of the consequences of not having a strategic plan and not reaching consensus on such a plan with other federal agencies. In GAO's view, the proposed deployment of this monitor distracted DNDO from its mission to fully deploy the architecture and close the gaps it identified. Also, in 2006 GAO recommended that the decision to deploy this monitor be based on an analysis of both benefits and costs--which GAO later estimated at over $2 billion--and a determination of whether any additional detection capability provided by the monitor was worth its additional cost. DNDO proceeded with advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) testing without fully completing such an analysis. Further, DNDO focused this monitor deployment effort on replacing components of the architecture where a radiation detection system was already in place--at established ports of entry--and shifting its focus away from closing the gaps it identified in the architecture.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Domestic Nuclear Detection  Office’s (DNDO) efforts to develop a global nuclear detection  architecture—an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and  interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at  the U.S. border, and inside the United States—and to provide an update on  the deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders.  Preventing terrorists from using radiological or nuclear material to carry  out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. DNDO, within  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is charged with enhancing  and coordinating federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological  and nuclear attacks. Among other things, DNDO is required to coordinate  with other federal agencies to develop an enhanced global nuclear  detection architecture. It is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and  deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and  other federal agencies. While federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling  have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and  land border crossings, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection  strategies along other potential pathways and has identified several gaps in  the architecture, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry  into the United States; (2) international general aviation; and (3) small  maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.
Even before DNDO’s inception in 2005, we were highlighting the need for a  more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002, we reported  on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing radiation detection  equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at all U.S. border crossings  and ports of entry that (1) addresses vulnerabilities and risks; (2) identifies  the complement of radiation detection equipment that should be used at  each type of border entry point—air, rail, land, and sea—and whether  equipment could be immediately deployed; (3) identifies longer-term  radiation detection needs; and (4) develops measures to ensure that the  equipment is adequately maintained. More recently, in July 2008, we  testified that DNDO had still not developed an overarching strategic plan,  and recommended that DHS coordinate with the Departments of Defense,  Energy, and State to develop one. In January 2009, we recommended that  the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic plan for the  domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to help ensure the  success of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities. We stated  that this plan should focus on, among other things, establishing time  frames and costs for the three gaps DNDO had identified—land border  areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels. DHS  agreed with the recommendation that we made in our 2008 testimony on  the need for an overarching strategic plan to guide future efforts to combat  nuclear smuggling and move toward a more comprehensive global nuclear  detection strategy.
In addition, since 2006, we have been reporting on longstanding problems  with DNDO’s efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP)  radiation detection monitors, a more advanced and significantly more  expensive type of radiation portal monitor to replace the polyvinyl toluene  (PVT) portal monitors in many locations that the Customs and Border  Protection (CBP), an agency within DHS, currently uses to screen cargo at  ports of entry. We have issued seven reports and testified before  Congress five times identifying problems with the cost and performance of  the ASPs and the lack of rigor in testing this equipment. For example, we  found that tests DNDO conducted in early 2007 used biased test met hods  that enhanced the apparent performance of ASPs and did not use critical  CBP operating procedures that are fundamental to the performance of  current radiation detectors. In addition, in 2008 we estimated the lifecycle  cost of each standard cargo version of the ASP (including deployment  costs) to be about $822,000, compared with about $308,000 for the PVT  standard cargo portal monitor, and the total program cost for DNDO’s  latest plan for deploying radiation portal monitors to be about $2 billion.  Based in part on our work, DHS informed this committee in February  2010, after spending over $224 million, that the department had scaled  back its plans for development and use of ASP technology. However, this  $224 million figure does not include the considerable cost of physical  testing of ASPs at national labs, the Nevada Test Site, and field validation  at working ports of entry at land borders and seaports. We have asked  DNDO for this information, and DNDO officials are in the process of  providing it to us.
As I will discuss today, while some progress has been made, DHS and  other federal agencies have yet to fully address critical gaps in the global s the  nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, my testimony discusse status of DHS efforts to (1) complete the deployment of radiation  detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, (2) prevent smuggling of nuclear or  radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, and (3)  develop a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture.
My testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts to  detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials  from October 2002 through January 2009, and details on the scope and  methodology for those reviews are available in our published reports. Wit information from DHS officials, we updated our prior work on (1) DHS’s  deployment of radiation detection equipment since we last reported on  this topic in 2006 and (2) DHS efforts to develop a strategic plan since we  last reported on this topic in 2009. We conducted the work for this  performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government  h  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform th audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. W believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DHS Scans Cargo and Conveyances Ente the United States through Land Border and Major Seaports but Is Still Develo Options to More Systematically Scan Rail, Air Cargo, and Commercial Aviation
paragraphs: DHS has made significant progress in deploying both radiation detectio equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances  entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for  nuclear and radiological materials. Specifically, DHS has deployed nearly  two-thirds of the more than 2,100 radiation portal monitors identified in its  re to  deployment plan—over 1,400—but needs to deploy more than 700 mo complete the plan. According to DHS officials, the department scans  nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United  States through land borders and major seaports. However, DHS has ma less progress scanning for radiation (1) in railcars entering the United  States from Canada and Mexico; (2) in international air cargo; and ( international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage.
subsections: section_title: Land Ports of Entry
paragraphs: According to DHS officials, since November 2009 almost all non-rail lan ports of entry have been equipped with one or more PVTs. Of the over  1,400 radiation portal monitors deployed, 885 PVTs have been deployed  along the northern and southern borders of the lower 48 states to all but a  few non-rail ports of entry. At present, 100 percent of all cargo,  conveyances, drivers, and passengers driving into the United States  through commercial lanes at land borders are scanned for radiation, as are  more than 99 percent of all personally operated vehicles (non-commercial  passenger cars and light trucks), drivers, and passengers.
section_title: Seaports
paragraphs: According to DHS officials, the department now scans nearly all  containerized cargo entering the U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiologica materials. Specifically, in addition to the PVTs deployed for land ports of  entry, DHS has deployed 444 PVTs to major American seaports––including the largest seaports accounting for the majority of cargo. However, some  DHS  smaller seaports that receive cargo may not be equipped with PVTs.  officials stated that current deployment plans have been in place to  l  address all the remaining gaps in the deployment of PVTs to seaports but  that current and future budget realities require a complete re-planning of  the deployment schedule.
section_title: International Rail
paragraphs: At present there is limited systematic radiation scanning of the roughly  4,800 loaded railcars in approximately 120 trains entering the United  States each day from Canada and Mexico through 31 rail ports of entry.  Much of what scanning for radioactive materials takes place at these ports  of entry is conducted with portable, hand-held radioactive isotope  identification devices (RIID). Such scans are triggered when, for example, anomalous readings are detected from imaging scans of rail car contents.  According to DHS officials, international rail traffic represents one of the  most difficult challenges for radiation detection systems due to the nature  of trains and the need to develop close cooperation with officials in  Mexico and Canada. In addition, there are unique operational challe this environment due to the length of the trains (up to 2 miles), the  distance required to stop moving trains, and the difficulties in separating  alarming cars for further examination. Furthermore, DHS officials told us  that rail companies resist doing things that might slow down rail traffic  and typically own the land where DHS would need to establish stations primary and secondary screening. Moreover, DHS officials said that it  takes time to develop the necessary close cooperation with officials in  Mexico and Canada and that an effective solution would require scanning  of at least some rail traffic on Mexican or Canadian soil, before a train  enters the United States. As a result, DHS is only in the early stages of  developing the procedures and technology to feasibly scan international  rail traffic. DHS is currently undertaking an International Rail Threat and  Gap Study to determine the most promising radiation detection approach.  DHS officials also told us that implementing the results of this study is  subject to the availability of adequate funding.
section_title: International Air Cargo and Commercial Aviation
paragraphs: DHS is in the early stages of addressing the challenges of scanning for  radioactive materials presented by air cargo and commercial aviatio present DHS is scanning for radioactive materials at certain major  international airports in the United States, and has deployed some o PVTs in its plans. It plans to deploy more PVTs by the end of 2011.
United States has helped them develop scanning procedures and info current and future deployment strategies for both fixed and mobile  radiation detection equipment. However, these officials told us that  scanning air cargo planes is a challenge because of the lack of natur choke points in airports where fixed detection equipment could be  deployed. They believe that further operational experience and research is necessary before they can develop practicable mobile scanning strategiesand procedures. Until solutions to these challenges can be found, DHS’s  goal of scanning 99 percent of air cargo at 33 international airports by 20 is currently on hold. According to DHS officials, whatever scanning for  radioactive materials occu rs at these 33 airports is currently conducted  with hand-held detectors.
International Commercial Aviation. As part of a pilot program, DH ation aircraft,  developing plans to effectively scan commercial avi passengers, and baggage for radioactive materials.
section_title: DHS’s Efforts to Prevent Smuggling of Nuclear and Radiological Materials into the United States via the Gaps DNDO Identified Are Still in the Early Stages of Development
paragraphs: DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materi into the United States through the critical gaps DNDO identified––land  border areas between ports of entry, international general aviation, and  small maritime craft––remain largely developmental. These pathway important because dangerous quantities of nuclear and radiological  material can be small and portable enough to be carried across land  borders by vehicles or pedestrians, on most private aircraft, or by small  maritime craft.
In addition, these pathways are challenging because of their size, volume  of traffic, and the difficulty of deploying available radiological and nucle detection capabilities and technologies. For example, the United States  has more than 6,000 miles of land border with many locations outside of  established ports of entry where people and vehicles can enter the Un States. In the maritime environment, a Coast Guard risk assessment  revealed that small boats pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling t shipping containers. There are at least 13 million registered domestic  pleasure craft in the United States and 110,000 commercial fishing ves These small boats have traditionally been used to smuggle drugs and  people but could be used to smuggle nuclear or radiological material. sels.
DHS’s actions to address these gaps consist primarily of efforts to develop,  test, and deploy current generation or newly developed radiation detectionequipment; conduct studies or analyses to identify and address particular  threats or gaps; develop new procedures to guide scanning for radiation in  pathways where no scanning had occurred before; and develop and learn  from pilot programs.
subsections: section_title: Land Border Areas between Ports of Entry
paragraphs: DHS is taking a number of steps it believes will improve its odds of  deterring or detecting attempts to smuggle nuclear or radiological  materials across the more than 6,000 miles of land border susceptible to  illegal crossings by people and vehicles into the United States. Specifically,  according to DHS officials, the department is procuring more current  generation mobile radiation detection technology, seeking new  technology, and further studying gaps in the detection architecture and the  threat they pose. These efforts are, however, not yet complete and in some  cases are behind schedule. For example, DHS is currently working to  equip Border Patrol officers responsible for patrolling the U.S. borders  with Canada and Mexico between ports of entry with current generation  portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment—specifically,  personal radiation detectors (PRD) and RIIDs. Portability is critical to  strengthening radiation detection efforts, according to DHS officials,  because it expands border patrol agents’ ability to detect a potential  radiological threat beyond fixed ports of entry. According to its  deployment plan, DHS planned to buy a certain number of PRDs and RIIDs  each fiscal year from 2008 through 2011 to complete acquisition by 2012.  However, the department has fallen short of these targets, citing a lack of  funds.
section_title: International General Aviation
paragraphs: According to officials, DHS has undertaken some initiatives to scan private  aircraft entering the United States as international general aviation. Since  December 2007, DHS has been scanning 100 percent of arriving  international general aviation aircraft (approximately 400 flights per day)  with a standard hand-held RIID for nuclear and radiological material. DHS  depends on the aircraft operators to obey the law by either arriving in the  United States only at an international airport—which are all equipped with  scanning capability—or departing for the United States from one of four  overseas airports where such aircraft can be scanned before departure.  Accordingly, DHS has already initiated studies to help it address this  challenge and plans, according to officials, to initiate further studies in  2011. Specifically, among other things, DHS plans to update its analysis of  pre-clearance scanning capabilities at airports overseas and evaluate the  feasibility of expanding the number of overseas airports with scanning  capabilities. It also plans to study the characteristics of aircraft that do not  comply with U.S. scanning requirements and develop interim surveillance  options to enhance DHS capabilities and mitigation strategies to detect  and interdict these aircraft.
section_title: Small Maritime Craft
paragraphs: A Coast Guard analysis revealed that small boats pose a greater threat  than shipping containers for nuclear smuggling. These small boats, which  include maritime craft less than 300 gross tons, number in the millions.  DHS has developed and tested equipment for detecting nuclear material  on small maritime vessels. However, efforts to use this equipment in a port  area have been limited to pilot programs. Whereas initiatives to combat  smuggling at land border areas between established ports of entry and  through aviation routes are being integrated into already existing CBP  screening operations, initiatives in the maritime environment require DHS  to acquire and test new equipment and procedures with the Coast Guard  and local law enforcement agencies. DHS is currently conducting 3-year  pilot programs in Puget Sound, Washington, and San Diego, California, to  design, field test, and evaluate equipment and is working with CBP, the  Coast Guard, state, local, tribal officials, and others as they develop  procedures for screening. These pilot programs are scheduled to end in  2010, when DHS will decide the future path of screening of small vessels  for nuclear and radiological materials. According to DHS officials, initial  feedback from federal, state, and local officials involved in the pilot  programs has been positive.
DHS hopes to sustain the capabilities created through the pilot programs  via federal grants to state and local authorities through the port security  grant program. By working with state and local authorities in Puget  Sound and San Diego since 2007, DHS hopes that equipment and  procedures can be developed that could be transferred to other ports and  other waterways and sustained with federal grants. DHS’s goal is to build  some capacity for radiation detection in all small and large ports so that  federal, state and local law enforcement has the capacity for, at the least,  random searches to keep would-be smugglers guessing, thereby offering  some measure of deterrence to nuclear and radiological smuggling in this  pathway.
section_title: DHS Has Not Yet Completed a Strateg Plan for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
paragraphs: DHS does not yet have a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection  architecture, but DHS officials told us they began working on a strategic  plan earlier this year and expect to complete it by the fall of 2010––2 years after we last recommended such a plan—and more than 7 years after we first identified the need for comprehensive plan in October 2002. In ou ogress towards completing the  view, DHS might have made greater pr architecture if it had a strategic plan.
subsections: section_title: DHS Officials Are W on a Strategic Plan
paragraphs: According to DHS officials, DNDO is in the process of establishing a  steering committee to guide and oversee the development of the strateg plan with interagency partners including the Departments of Defense,  Energy, Justice, and State, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the  Office of the Director of National Intelligence. DHS officials attributed delay in developing a strategic plan to a number of factors, including  DNDO’s initial focus on installing radiation detection equipment at po entry at land border crossings and major seaports in response to the  requirements of the SAFE Port Act, which set a number of benchmarks  and deadlines for scanning cargo entering the United States. DHS offici also cited the challenges and difficult deci sions involved in addressing  gaps in the areas between ports of entry. als  In addition, DHS officials said that they recognized that increasing  detection capabilities in one area of the architecture could simply lead a  potential smuggler of nuclear or radiological materials to use another  pathway into the United States. In developing the strategic plan, they are  considering ways to cover a greater range of potential pathways into the  United States. Drawing lessons from the tactics police use to catch  speeding motorists, DHS officials have concluded that the most effective  way to deter and make more difficult the smuggling of nuclear and  radiological materials into the United States is to develop more agile and  randomly deployed detection capabilities, similar to how local and state  police deploy officers and speed detection equipment randomly to deter  drivers from traveling over the lawful speed limit. DHS officials described  this approach as a shift from “detection to prevention.” This approach is  consistent with the basic design principles developed by DHS, as part of a  multinational collaborative process, to guide countries’ efforts to prevent  nuclear terrorism. DHS identified several attributes of an effective nuclear  detection architecture including, among other things, the capacity to  balance risk reduction and cost effectiveness, rely on multiple layers of  protection, adapt and evolve over time to changing threats, be  unpredictable to the adversary, augment the effectiveness of radiation  detection technologies with the use of intelligence and other information  sources that could help law enforcement select certain targets for  scrutiny, and be integrated within a larger national and international  security framework.
section_title: DHS Might Have Completed the Architecture Sooner If It Had a Strategic Plan
paragraphs: In our view, the lack of a strategic plan has limited DNDO’s efforts to  develop a global nuclear detection architecture. Strategic planning is a  way to respond to this governmentwide problem on a governmentwide  scale. Our past work on crosscutting issues suggests that governmentwide  strategic planning can integrate activities that span a wide array of federal,  state, and local entities. Although each agency with a role in combating  nuclear smuggling has its own planning documents, an overarching  strategic plan is needed to guide these efforts to address the gaps and  move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. In 2005,  we reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be  accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each  objective, ensure that the funding necessary to achieve the objectives is  available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and  identify needed improvements. For example, such a plan would define  how DNDO would monitor the goal of detecting the movement of  radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes,  such as small maritime craft or land border areas in between ports of  entry. Moreover, this plan would include agreed-upon processes and  procedures to guide the improvement of the efforts to combat nuclear  smuggling and coordinate the activities of the participating federal  agencies. DNDO’s 4-year effort to develop ASPs is an example of the  consequences of not having a strategic plan and not reaching consensus  on such a strategic plan with other federal agency partners. We believe the  proposed deployment of ASPs distracted DNDO from its mission to fully  deploy a nuclear architecture and close the gaps it identified in the  architecture. In addition, in 2006 we recommended that the decision to  deploy ASPs be based on an analysis of both the benefits and costs— which we later estimated at over $2 billion—and a determination of  whether any additional detection capability provided by the ASP is worth  its additional cost. DNDO has proceeded with ASP testing without fully  completing such an analysis. Furthermore, DNDO focused its ASP  deployment efforts on replacing components of the architecture with ASPs  where a detection system was already in place––established ports of entry  that were using PVTs and RIIDs––and shifting its focus away from  finishing the PVT deployments at ports of entry and closing the gaps it  identified in the architecture.
Similarly, in our view, had a strategic plan to complete the global nuclear  detection architecture been in place, DHS may have been less likely to  expend time and resources on ASPs when a radiation detection system  was already in place at ports of entry but not at other potential pathways  into the United States. A recent development that complicates the future  deployments of radiation detection equipment is that both PVTs and ASPs  require helium-3, which was recently found to be in short supply.  According to DHS officials, if an alternative to helium-3 is not found by  late 2011, further deployments of PVTs planned for the southern land  border and at seaports may be delayed. We are currently conducting work  on the helium-3 shortage—describing the federal government’s current  priority for how the limited supply of helium-3 will be allocated and  assessing, among other things, what alternative technologies are currently  available or in development that could replace helium-3. We plan to issue a  report later this year.
In addition to lacking a strategic plan, we also found that DHS did not use  the Joint Annual Interagency Review of the Global Nuclear Detection  Architecture to effectively coordinate U.S. government nuclear detection  priorities. In July 2007, Congress passed the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which required  DHS to collaborate with the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and  State as well as the Director of National Intelligence on an annual report  assessing federal agencies’ involvement, support, and participation in the  development, revision, and implementation of the global nuclear detection  architecture. In January 2009, we recommended that DHS use this review  to guide future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, including  analyzing overall budget allocations to determine whether  governmentwide resources clearly align with identified priorities to  maximize results and whether there is duplication of effort across  agencies. DHS did not directly comment on our recommendation and did  not use the most recent Joint Annual Interagency Review it issued in  January 2010 as a tool to analyze nuclear detection budgets across the  agencies with which it is required to collaborate on the report.  Specifically, the 2010 report does not describe a process through which  DHS used the review to guide or modify budget allocations or better align  resources with identified priorities. While the report has been reviewed  and approved by DHS and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice,  State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the report  does not make clear whether it is used as a part of these agencies’  programmatic or strategic planning processes.
In conclusion, DHS is at a crossroads. With such vast land borders, coast  lines, and air space to protect, addressing the gaps in the architecture is, in  many respects, a more difficult task than preventing the smuggling of  nuclear material through ports of entry. Now that land border crossings  and seaports appear to have become more secure through law  enforcement and technology, it makes the other gaps in the architecture  potentially more attractive to would-be smugglers and terrorists. At a time  of flat or declining federal agency budgets, it is especially important that  DHS develop a strategic plan for its global nuclear detection architecture  so that it can articulate its priorities in addressing these gaps and allocate  resources based on those priorities to maximize results. In addition, given  the national security implications and urgency attached to combating  nuclear smuggling globally, and that multiple federal agencies are  involved, we continue to believe that such a plan needs to be established  as soon as possible. Without an overarching plan that ties together the  various domestic and international efforts to combat nuclear smuggling  and clearly describes goals, responsibilities, priorities, resource needs, and  performance metrics, it is unclear how a strategy will evolve or whether it  is evolving in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions that you or the other Members of the committee  may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)  512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Dr. Timothy Persons (Chief Scientist), Ned  Woodward (Assistant Director), Joseph Cook, Carol Kolarik, Jonathan  Kucskar, Alison O’Neill, Kevin Tarmann, and Kiki Theodoropoulos made  key contributions to this testimony.
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