Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover from Food Crisis
Published: 2003-06-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The southern Africa food crisis threatened 15.3 million people in six countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) with famine. GAO was asked to look at (1) factors that contributed to the crisis, (2) how well the populations' needs were met, (3) obstacles to the food aid effort, and (4) challenges to emerging from crisis.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Multiple factors contributed to the food crisis. Erratic weather reduced maize (corn) production. A poorly functioning agricultural sector caused food supply shortages. Government actions--including the sale of Malawi's grain reserve and Zimbabwe's land reform--further cut available food. Widespread poverty contributed to food insecurity and the HIV/AIDS epidemic exacerbated food shortages by reducing the labor force. Food aid averted famine, but the overall response did not prevent widespread hunger. About 93 percent of the total cereal gap--the difference between domestic needs and production--was met by the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period. However, food aid deliveries fell short in several countries, and vulnerable households had limited ability to purchase commercial maize. Slow donations, poor infrastructure, and concerns about biotech food were major obstacles to an effective response. Excluding the United States, most donors did not make sufficient, timely donations to the World Food Program. Poor transportation systems and storage facilities hampered efficient food delivery. Zambia rejected food aid because of concerns regarding biotech food; other countries required milling maize for the same reason. This compromised the food aid pipeline given the United States was the region's key donor and its aid may contain biotech food. Declining investments in agriculture and the HIV/AIDS epidemic pose challenges to emerging from crisis into sustained recovery. U.N. and U.S. officials cite the need to reverse declining trends in agricultural investments by international financing organizations, national governments, and donors. Without a strategy that integrates, among other things, agricultural development, the impact of HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management, food crises will recur.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The southern Africa region has been facing its worst food crisis in more  than a decade. Approximately 15.3 million people (26 percent of the total  population) in 6 countries—Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland,  Zambia, and Zimbabwe—have experienced severe food shortages and the  threat of famine. Avoiding famine has required substantial supplies of food  from commercial imports and a large international food aid effort. The  United Nations began establishing emergency food aid operations in  individual countries as early as November 2001. In July 2002, the United  Nations appealed to international donors for $507 million to provide 1.2  million metric tons of emergency food aid as part of a consolidated regional  program for the April 2002-March 2003 crop year. However, food shortages  continue and emergency operations have been extended through June  2003.
Because of concerns over the nature and severity of this food crisis, you  asked us to determine: (1) what factors contributed to the current crisis in  southern Africa, (2) how well were the populations’ overall food needs met  during the crisis period, (3) what were the major obstacles to the food aid  effort, and (4) what are the challenges to emerging from the crisis into  sustained recovery.
To address these objectives, we met with and analyzed information from  U.S. government officials at the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID) and the Departments of State and Agriculture in Washington, D.C.,  and at U.S. missions in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia,  Zimbabwe, and South Africa. We also met with officials and reviewed  information from the World Food Program (WFP), the Food and  Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Fund for  Agricultural Development (IFAD) at their headquarters in Rome and in the  southern African countries we visited. In addition, we gathered information  from and met with representatives of the World Bank and the International  Monetary Fund (IMF), other U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations  (NGO), other donor governments, and host government ministries in  Washington and at the country level in southern Africa. As part of our  fieldwork, we observed WFP and NGO food aid distributions in Malawi,  Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (App. I provides detailed information  on our scope and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1991/92, drought caused massive crop failure, threatening 18 million  people in 10 southern African countries with famine. Because of a similar  reduced maize crop after the 2001/02 crop cycle, several early warning  systems predicted an impending food crisis that would run through the  beginning of the following harvest in April 2003. (App. II provides a timeline  of the crisis period, and app. III provides information on early warning  systems.)
Regional and national assessments of the crisis conducted by WFP, FAO,  and others estimated that 15.3 million people in the region were at risk of  starvation. (Fig. 1 shows the population at risk of famine in each of the six  affected countries.)
In July 2002, WFP initiated the Southern Africa Crisis Response Emergency  Operation (EMOP) for providing food aid to the six countries on a regional  basis. Prior to this consolidation, WFP had been delivering food to the  individual country emergency operating programs. WFP’s objectives in the  southern Africa food crisis were to prevent severe food shortages,  safeguard the nutritional well-being of vulnerable segments of the  population, preserve human assets, and prevent migration out of affected  areas.
As the major food aid donor in the southern Africa crisis, the U.S.  government has a significant role in the relief effort. Through USAID’s  Food for Peace Office and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and  USDA, the U.S. government has worked to support the EMOP and address  the crisis. In February 2002, in an effort to avert famine, the United States  began authorizing food aid shipments to the region. As of March 18, 2003,  the U.S. government had provided approximately $275 million in food aid  and $13 million for bilateral nonfood-related assistance such as agriculture,  health, shelter, and sanitation. (See app. IV for additional information on  the U.S. contributions.)
WFP, the United States, and other countries partner with nongovernmental  organizations to distribute food aid at the regional and village level. In  addition, many of these organizations also provide nonfood emergency  assistance and long-term development aid.
Much of the population in each of the affected countries works in the  agricultural sector. The percentage of labor force engaged in agriculture  ranges from 66 percent in Zimbabwe to 86 percent in Lesotho and Malawi.  Many of these farmers rely on maize (corn) as the primary staple crop.  Unlike root crops such as cassava and sweet potatoes—which are common  but less popular staples in the region—maize is relatively fragile, requiring  more fertilizer and differing amounts of water during the growing season.
section_title: Multiple Factors Contributed to the Food Crisis
paragraphs: The immediate factor contributing to the food crisis was the erratic  weather patterns that disrupted the normal growing cycle, causing maize  production in southern Africa to drop from a 5-year average of about 7.3  million MT to about 5.2 million MT in 2002. The dramatic reduction in  available maize can also be linked to a weak agricultural sector and  government actions, such as Malawi’s decision to sell off its strategic grain  reserve and Zimbabwe’s fast-tracked land reform. In addition, much of the  region’s population had limited access to food because of widespread  poverty. The HIV/AIDS epidemic further exacerbated the population’s  access to basic commodities by decreasing household food production and  income and increasing consumption requirements.
subsections: section_title: Erratic Weather Patterns Played a Key Role in Reducing Maize Production
paragraphs: Erratic weather patterns between December 2001 and May 2002 reduced  the harvests in five of the six affected countries, except Mozambique, when  compared with 5-year averages. Drought-like conditions gripped parts of  Malawi, southern Mozambique, Swaziland, southern Zambia, and  Zimbabwe in the middle of the growing season (see app. II for timeline).  This water deficit at a crucial point in the growing season severely stressed  crops and caused many hectares to wilt. In addition, parts of Zambia  suffered high rainfall mid-season, flooding the still-growing crops.  Similarly, in Malawi, after the mid-season dry spells wilted some crops, the  country received heavy rains that hampered the harvesting and drying of  what crops remained, and in some cases, caused them to rot. Lesotho also  experienced prolonged rains late in the season as well as an additional late- season frost that damaged crops across large parts of the country and  drastically reduced production.
subsections: section_title: Regional Cereal Production Dropped by 29 Percent
paragraphs: Regional food supplies have been limited due to poor cereal harvests in five  out of the six affected countries. (See table 1.) Mozambique was the one  exception: Its 2001/02 cereal harvest was actually above average. However,  due to transportation constraints, Mozambique’s production surpluses  could not be supplied to the southern part of the country where cereal  harvests were lower.
section_title: Poorly Functioning Agricultural Sector Negatively Affected Food Supply
paragraphs: In addition to poor weather conditions, weaknesses in the agricultural  sector contributed to a poor harvest. According to IFAD, these weaknesses  included the following:  Declining soil fertility reduced crop yields. In Lesotho, average  maize and sorghum yields have declined by more than 60 percent since  the mid-1970s. According to FAO, declining soil fertility is a primary  cause of this trend and is leading to a crop production catastrophe in  that country.
Restricted access to agricultural inputs such as seeds and  fertilizer limited harvests. In Zambia, important inputs such as seeds  and fertilizer were not available until December 2001 or January 2002,  resulting in late plantings. These crops were at a crucial stage of  development when the rains ceased in early 2002, causing crop failure.
Incomplete market development impaired farmers’ ability to sell  crops. In Malawi, market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s eliminated  price controls and removed government food grain monopolies. While  these liberalizing reforms increased the availability of seeds and  fertilizer, small farmers still lack access to credit.
section_title: Recent Government Actions Further Reduced the Food Supply
paragraphs: The food supply has been constrained further by certain government  actions, the most damaging of which were the sale of grain reserves in  Malawi and fast-tracked land reform in Zimbabwe.
subsections: section_title: Sale of Malawi’s Grain Reserve Hindered Stable Food Supplies
paragraphs: Between July 2000 and August 2001, the National Food Reserve Agency of  Malawi sold the 167,000 MT of maize it had purchased and stored as food  reserves for the country. Despite several audits, it is still uncertain where  the proceeds of the sale went. While the sold reserves did not cause the  Malawi food crisis, their absence jeopardized the population’s food  security. Had the government retained 60,000 MT of maize in accordance  with its own policy to ensure adequate food supplies or an equivalent  amount of currency to purchase new stocks, it could have been used to  help ease food shortages in the early stage of the crisis, when a  considerable number of people are reported to have died, and to fill  almost one-quarter of the country’s cereal gap while emergency response  operations were ramping up.
An investigation by Malawi’s National Audit Office in May 2002 concluded  that the National Food Reserve Agency lost money in every area of  handling maize because of poor financial management. Another  investigation, conducted by Malawi’s Anti-Corruption Bureau in mid-2002,  found that poor management of the grain reserve allowed companies and  individuals to take advantage of the maize shortage to increase prices  beyond the reach of a large sector of the community. The mismanagement  cost the Malawian government more than K 2.9 billion (about $40 million).
section_title: Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Decimated Production and Strained Region’s Supply
paragraphs: After years of trying to redistribute the country’s arable land, the  government of Zimbabwe fast-tracked its land reform and resettlement  policy in 2000 with the aim of acquiring all commercial farms no later than  August 8, 2002. The campaign was characterized by the forced expulsion of  landowners and farm laborers. To date, there remain more than a million  internally displaced farm laborers. While the government did acquire these  farms, it did not maintain them to ensure continued productivity. As a  result, the land seizure destabilized the country’s economy, leading to a 75  percent drop in commercial maize production over the past 2 years and  turning Zimbabwe from a net exporter of grain to a net importer. Because  Zimbabwe now cannot grow enough food to feed its own population, it has  strained the cereal supply for the entire region.
According to the State Department, the country’s gross domestic product  fell by more than 20 percent and inflation soared to more than 269 percent  between 1998 and 2002, coinciding with fast-tracked land reform. At the  same time, unemployment rose by more than 25 percent as dismantling of  commercial farms left many rural farm workers without a source of income  and, therefore, a way to purchase food when their subsistence crops failed.  In addition, government-imposed price controls on basic commodities have  caused shortages of everything from bread, milk, sugar, and wheat flour to  fuel and electricity.
section_title: Widespread Poverty Contributed to Food Insecurity
paragraphs: The six nations affected by the food crisis are generally low-income  countries. The percentage of population subsisting on less than $1 per day  range from 36 percent in Zimbabwe to 64 percent in Zambia. This  widespread poverty and lack of productive assets (e.g., livestock and farm  machinery) contribute to food insecurity in the region. In addition, the  region is currently facing serious economic problems that further increase  the population’s food insecurity. For example, in recent years, the dramatic  collapse in the economy of Zimbabwe and a decline in the mining industry  in South Africa and Zambia have removed sources of employment for many  individuals in the region. The region’s food insecurity is associated with  high rates of chronic malnutrition in the under-5 population—ranging from  30 percent in Swaziland to 59 percent in Zambia.
section_title: HIV/AIDS Epidemic Exacerbated Food Shortages
paragraphs: The HIV/AIDS epidemic has strained already-diminished food supplies by  decreasing affected households’ food production and increasing nutritional  requirements. In addition, the epidemic limits households’ access to food  by decreasing income and increasing household expenses. According to  the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), adult HIV/AIDS  infection rates in 2001 were approximately 31 percent for Lesotho, 15  percent for Malawi, 13 percent for Mozambique, 33 percent for Swaziland,  22 percent for Zambia, and 34 percent for Zimbabwe. Infection rates are  higher among women, who generally account for 70 percent of the  agricultural labor force and 80 percent of food production in Africa.
subsections: section_title: HIV/AIDS Reduces Food Supplies
paragraphs: HIV/AIDS has decreased household food production by attacking people in  their most productive working years, thus reducing the labor force. Around  three-fourths of HIV/AIDS cases in southern Africa are among adults  between the ages of 20 and 40. The percentage of agricultural labor force  lost due to HIV/AIDS deaths by 2000 was nearly 6 percent for Malawi and 10  percent for Zimbabwe. Recent studies on specific rural areas show, for  example, that each adult death in Zambia was associated with a 16 percent  reduction in the amount of land planted by the household, and 72 percent  of households affected by chronic illness in selected rural areas of Malawi  experienced an agricultural production decrease. In addition, a person  infected with HIV/AIDS requires up to 50 percent more protein and 15  percent more calories than a noninfected person. These extra needs put a  further strain on the already limited food supplies.
section_title: HIV/AIDS Decreases Access to Food
paragraphs: HIV/AIDS has lowered household incomes, making it more difficult to  access what food is available. Recent studies estimate that GDP growth in  southern Africa is currently around 1 percent to 2 percent lower due to  HIV/AIDS. For the six affected countries, 1 percent of GDP in 2001  amounted to around $200 million. Recent studies in the region also show  large monetary impacts at the household level. For example, in Zambia,  HIV/AIDS-affected households reported annual income levels of 30 percent  to 35 percent less due to the disease. In Zimbabwe, households with  orphans had 42 percent less income per capita than households without  orphans. In addition, medical care and funeral expenses are significant: In  Zambia, 42 percent of households with chronically ill members reported  unusually high health care expenses compared with 14 percent of  households without chronically ill members, while in Zimbabwe, funeral  costs can be as much as twice the annual per capita poverty line.
section_title: Food Needs Not Fully Met, but Famine Was Averted
paragraphs: By the end of the April 2002-March 2003 crisis period, approximately 93  percent of the regional cereal gap appeared to have been met.  Commercial cereal imports were reported as 1.72 million MT, while the  food aid effort achieved at least 0.73 million MT (60 percent of the planned  food aid amount). The commercial cereal imports and food aid prevented  large-scale famine and death but did not reach parts of the region early  enough throughout most of the crisis period to avert widespread hunger.  Many people resorted to coping mechanisms, such as rationing their food  intake, reducing their expenditures on nonfood items, and selling  household assets to obtain food. The limited data available on nutritional  status generally do not show a significant impact on acute malnutrition in  the countries of the region. In addition to problems with timely delivery of  food, U.N. agencies were only able to fund about 25 percent of urgent,  nonfood emergency humanitarian needs.
subsections: section_title: Approximately 93 Percent of the Cereal Gap Met during the Crisis Period
paragraphs: The May/June 2002 FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessments (CFSAM)  for each of the six countries estimated the cereal gap for the region at 4.1  million MT or 43 percent of domestic requirements for the April 1, 2002,  through March 31, 2003, period. However, by the end of March 2003, the  cereal gap had been revised downward substantially—-to 2.6 million MT or  31 percent of domestic requirements. Based on the plan that evolved from  the CFSAMs, the cereal deficit was to be offset by a combination of  commercial imports and emergency food aid. The assessments identified  an emergency cereals need of 1.2 million MT for the crop year, and this  amount was adopted as a goal in the United Nations’ July 2002 emergency  appeal for food aid for the region. Although later analyses projected more  people at risk of famine, the goal for emergency cereals needs was not  increased. As shown in figure 2, if the emergency goal of 1.2 million MT  were fully met, the estimated need for commercial cereal imports would be  1.4 million MT.
Figure 3 indicates the extent to which food aid and commercial imports  helped offset the cereal gap in each country and the region over the April 1,  2002, to March 31, 2003, period. As the figure shows, the region as a whole  met at least 93 percent of its need. In two countries—Malawi and Zambia— food aid and commercial imports combined considerably exceeded the  cereal gap, while the other four had unmet gaps ranging from between 9  percent to 50 percent. However, the numbers reported by the Vulnerability  Assessment Committees (VAC), WFP, and others do not allow us to  precisely define total food aid and commercial import levels. The figures  are estimates and should be interpreted with caution. Food aid figures  probably underestimate actual values because it was difficult for the VACs  and WFP to collect comprehensive food aid data from NGOs. Thus, total  NGO contributions could be considerably higher. Regarding commercial  imports, some countries had experienced a considerable amount of  informal trade in cereals, but the VACs and WFP did not always have  access to reliable figures on informal trade. In the case of Zimbabwe,  commercial imports may be exaggerated, since the VAC expressed  skepticism about the data that were reported. According to some  observers, Zimbabwe’s price controls may have encouraged a substantial  outflow of cereals to neighboring countries where controls did not exist.  Thus, the gap in Zimbabwe may have been much greater than shown in the  figure.
The data in figure 3 do not address the extent to which different parts of a  country were served. Although Zambia appears to have offset its cereal gap  by a large amount, the January VAC assessment reported serious cereal  supply problems at local markets in rural areas. In addition, Malawi,  which offset its cereal gap to an even greater extent, reported maize to be  available in most markets, but vulnerable households had limited ability to  pay for the food. (See app. V for additional information on commercial  imports.)
section_title: Food Aid Did Not Reach the Region Early Enough to Avert Widespread Hunger
paragraphs: The overall commercial cereal imports and food aid averted widespread  famine, according to WFP, USAID, and other observers in the region.  However, because food supplies to the region were less than planned  during the July through December period, far fewer people received food  aid than expected. Many people in vulnerable areas went without meals  and resorted to other coping mechanisms as well. Limited data available on  nutritional status generally do not show a significant impact on acute  malnutrition.
subsections: section_title: Food Supplies from World Food Program
paragraphs: Between July and December 2002, WFP distributed only 48 percent of the  cereal it planned to provide to beneficiaries during that period. While  Malawi and Swaziland received 87 percent and 76 percent, respectively, of  their planned deliveries, the other four countries fell below the 40 percent  mark.
In addition to cereal, WFP planned to provide several other foods  (principally pulses, vegetable oil, and corn/soya blend) for added nutrition  as well as to meet the special needs of some of its recipients. WFP realized  only 17 percent of its planned distribution of these foods for July through  December 2002. WFP deliveries in three countries—Mozambique, Zambia,  and Zimbabwe—each represented less than 10 percent of its plans (1  percent in the case of Zambia). In Malawi, which had the best performance,  WFP achieved 40 percent of its planned distribution.
Figure 4 shows WFP’s monthly performance in achieving its plans for  delivery of cereals and noncereal commodities in the region. In general,  WFP’s performance gradually improved between July and December. It  improved substantially in January, achieving 97 percent for cereals and 74  percent for noncereals. Deliveries declined during the next 2 months, to a  low in March of 81 percent for cereal and 53 percent for noncereals.
Independent of WFP’s program, NGOs were to provide about 402,000 MT of  cereals, or one-third of the emergency cereal need for the region. NGOs  obtained or financed food for their efforts from donor countries as well as  other voluntary contributions. The United States funded a World Vision  program that provided 19,710 MT of cereal food aid to Zimbabwe. In  addition, the United States contracted with an NGO consortium, called C- SAFE (Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security Emergency), to  deliver food into the region. According to U.S. officials, the program was  part of a longer-term strategy that targeted the most vulnerable populations  that the WFP program might miss. USAID, which began discussions withC- SAFE members (CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision) in July  2002, did not approve a program for the consortium until January 15,  2003. However, under a November pre-authorization agreement, C-SAFE  began delivering food into the region in late December 2002. As of the end  of March 2003, the consortium had delivered about 57,000 MT of cereal  food aid to Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (See app. IV for additional  information on C-SAFE.) Data provided to us by WFP indicate NGOs  provided at least another 16,200 MT of cereals food aid into the region.
section_title: Beneficiaries Fewer than Intended
paragraphs: Between July and December 2002, WFP averaged only 3.9 million  beneficiaries per month, compared with a planned average of 10.4 million  people per month (for both cereal and noncereal food aid). Figure 5  shows how the shortfall in food aid during the July through December 2002  period affected WFP beneficiary levels in each country. In four of the six  countries, fewer than 45 percent of planned beneficiaries were served.
In addition, many people who did receive food aid did not receive a full  ration. For example, WFP officials in Malawi told us that during  November they were only able to provide cereal to many of their  beneficiaries. Beans and vegetable oil were unavailable to provide a  balanced diet.
section_title: Reduced Food Intake, Other Coping Strategies
paragraphs: Studies show that people in vulnerable communities reduced food intake  as their major coping strategy, and this approach has increased since the  crisis began. For example, as of December 2002, more than 60 percent of  the population in all regions of Malawi reduced the amount of food and  number of meals they ate, according to the VAC.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) identified other  coping strategies including reducing expenditures on nonfood items,  selling or trading household assets to get food (e.g., sale of livestock),  increasing consumption of wild foods, migrating to find work or food,  stealing, and resorting to prostitution. Table 2 shows the extent to which  surveyed households in Zambia relied on reduced food consumption and  other coping strategies from between August and December 2002.
Between 1999 and 2001, acute malnutrition rates in countries of the region  for children under 5 years of age were between 1.2 percent and 6.4 percent.  Some assessments conducted between May and October 2002 found an  increase in acute malnutrition rates compared with earlier studies but did  not find rates consistent with a severe food crisis, which would be 10  percent to 15 percent. However, these studies did not exclude possible  pockets of severe malnutrition or hunger-related deaths in the region. Also,  adult malnutrition and malnutrition in urban areas were not surveyed.  More recent assessments (December 2002 through January 2003) of acute  malnutrition for children under age 5 in select districts of Malawi,  Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zambia found rates generally ranging  between 2 percent and 8 percent. However, the rate was 11.2 percent in one  province of Mozambique.
According to a recent internal U.S. government report, anecdotal evidence  from the field in late 2002 indicates that in certain districts in Zimbabwe,  children were being admitted to some health care facilities in increasing  numbers for malnutrition. At one facility, three to five children were  reported to have died of malnutrition during each month of 2002. More  formal nutrition surveys within the country have demonstrated acute  malnutrition rates of 6.4 percent and 7.3 percent in May and August 2002,  respectively. Results from a nutrition survey conducted in early 2003 are  still pending.
section_title: Nonfood Emergency Needs Severely Underfunded
paragraphs: In addition to requesting $507 million for emergency food aid for July 2002  through March 2003, U.N. agencies also requested $143.7 million to  address urgent and related humanitarian needs that increased people’s  vulnerability to famine for the July 2002 through June 2003 period. As of  April 9, 2003, less than 25 percent of the total identified requirements had  been funded, according to an April 22 U.N. southern Africa humanitarian  crisis update. Principal objectives of the request were to:   prevent, contain, and address the outbreak of disease through enhanced  health and nutritional surveillance;   address the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS and seek to prevent   ensure an adequate and timely provision of agricultural inputs for the  next planting season as well as emergency veterinary inputs;   maintain the capacity for planning recovery efforts in food self- sufficiency, education, and health services; and   prevent marginal populations from falling into a downward spiral that  could lead to prolonged dependency in the future.
A longer-term objective was to phase out emergency humanitarian  assistance and move toward a development agenda focused on poverty  reduction, HIV/AIDS prevention and control, and support for food security  by increasing food production and strengthening foreign exchange  earnings. (For additional information on nonfood emergency needs, see  app. VI.)
section_title: Slow Donations, Poor Infrastructure, Concerns Associated with Biotech Food Were Major Obstacles to an Effective Response
paragraphs: Major obstacles to the food aid effort’s success were the lack of sufficient,  timely food donations; poor infrastructure in recipient countries; and  concerns associated with biotech food. Although the United States made  substantial, early donations, aggregate commitments from donor countries  were 18 percent below what WFP needed for the July through December  period. The shortfall was actually higher given the lag in time between  when food is committed and when it arrives in-country. Poor infrastructure  in recipient countries and related logistical constraints impeded efficient  delivery of food aid and in some cases prevented food from reaching  beneficiaries. Concerns over biotech food led Zambia to reject U.S.- donated maize and other countries to impose costly processing  requirements. These actions reduced or delayed food aid, increased costs,  and complicated the logistics of the emergency operation.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Sufficient, Timely Donations Contributed to Food Aid Shortfalls
paragraphs: By the end of June 2002, the United States had delivered more than 41,000  MT of food aid to ocean ports in the southern African region. U.S. deliveries  to these ports between July and December 2002 represented approximately  50 percent of the food WFP needed to arrive in-country during that period.  (See app. IV for additional information on U.S. food aid donations.)  Nonetheless, in aggregate, donors did not make sufficient, timely donations  to WFP.
WFP needed about 855,000 tons of food (cereals and noncereals) to arrive  in the six countries from July through December 2002 to support its  planned food distributions. During that period, donors advised WFP that  they would contribute about 701,000 tons—a shortfall of 18 percent.  However, the shortfall was actually greater because of the considerable lag  time between when WFP was advised in writing that a contribution would  be made and when food arrived in a beneficiary country. WFP officials  estimate that in-kind contributions take 3 to 5 months from the time donors  confirm the contribution to the arrival of food aid at its final distribution  sites. However, according to WFP officials, when contributions are made  in cash and procurement is done within the region, the process can be  reduced to 1 to 3 months.
Table 3 shows the countries that gave the most to WFP’s regional  emergency food aid operation and when they advised WFP of their  intended donations. Some of the major donors, including the United States  and the United Kingdom, gave large amounts early to the crisis. Others,  including the European Union, South Africa, and Japan, waited several  months or longer before confirming what they would contribute.
WFP acknowledged that the early months of the regional EMOP would  indeed have benefited from more rapid mobilization of resources. At the  same time, WFP said, as of mid-May 2003, the operation had been 93  percent resourced, by 41 institutional donors--which represented an  unusually supportive response.
section_title: Poor Infrastructure Hampered Efficient Food Delivery
paragraphs: The flow chart shown in figure 6 illustrates WFP’s logistics process of  delivering food, from the time it is shipped by suppliers to the time food is  actually distributed to the recipients at the village level. Food aid  commodities are either purchased by WFP regionally or shipped to the  region through one of five ports of entry: Beira, Nacala, and Maputo in  Mozambique; Durban in South Africa; or Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. (See  fig. 7 for a map of the transportation network.) From these points of entry,  food is transported by truck or rail to intermediate storage facilities, or  transshipment points, which are strategically located in various districts  within the country to streamline the flow of deliveries. From these strategic  locations, food is then transported to extended delivery points—storage  facilities generally located at the district level—from which the food aid  allocations for each final distribution site are dispatched. WFP manages  this process, including transporting the food to the extended delivery  points. Wherever possible, nongovernmental organizations that are  designated as the implementing partners are responsible for the secondary  transport of food from the extended delivery points to the final distribution  points.
Long-standing weaknesses in transportation infrastructure across the  region hampered timely delivery of food aid where it was needed. Much of  the transportation infrastructure (including ports, railways, and roads) had  deteriorated since the 1991/92 drought. For example, the port of Maputo,  which is ideally situated for moving food commodities to landlocked  countries, such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe, cannot be used optimally  because of the lack of adequate port warehouse and storage facilities.  However, even when ports are full, there is a limit to the amount of food  that can be transported over land to landlocked countries, like Zambia, due  to rail and trucking capacity and other logistical considerations.
According to WFP officials, the port of Nacala was in better condition than  the port of Maputo. But its rail system—the sole transport link between  Malawi and the nearest port in Mozambique and the shortest, cheapest  route into Malawi and eastern Zambia—was in such poor condition it had  to be fixed during the crisis. In late 2002, the United Kingdom and Canada  gave WFP $6.4 million and $256,000, respectively, to rehabilitate a 48-mile- long track on the Nacala railway and to lease locomotives and wagons.  While these locomotives and ongoing repairs to the rail corridor  represented a major breakthrough, unexpected setbacks continued to mire  operations. For example, in Malawi, heavy rains in January 2003  completely destroyed one bridge on the Nacala rail line, thus impeding the  movement of commodities for at least 10 days. In late summer 2002, a  donation of 200 trucks from the government of Norway and the  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies helped  ease access to places that are particularly hard to reach. However, many  village roads in these countries routinely become impassable when the  rainy season (September to March) begins, thus isolating beneficiaries  from food deliveries.
section_title: Recipient Country Concerns about Biotech Food Compromised Food Pipeline
paragraphs: In the middle of 2002, Zambia and Zimbabwe debated whether to accept  U.S.-donated maize based on concerns that it might contain biotech  products that could adversely affect (1) the health of food aid recipients,  (2) the countries’ agricultural biodiversity, and (3) their ability to export  agricultural commodities. Despite some earlier concerns over U.S.  biotech food aid and Zimbabwe’s objections to biotech whole kernel maize  dating back to the middle of 2001, the United States and international  agencies did not have a ready alternative to biotech food aid in the  southern Africa crisis. The United States was only partly successful in its  efforts to persuade southern African country governments to allow  unrestricted import and distribution of food aid, including biotech  products, on an emergency basis for the duration of the crisis. Efforts  included providing information about agricultural biotechnology and the  safety of biotech food aid to Zambia and the other countries. Nevertheless,  Zambia rejected all food aid that could have included biotech  commodities. Zimbabwe implemented stringent grain handling  procedures, including milling of whole grain maize, that significantly  slowed distribution of food aid. Malawi, Mozambique, and Lesotho also  debated what to do and eventually imposed milling requirements on whole  grain maize that were enforced with varying degrees of rigor.
Toward the end of August 2002, FAO, WHO, and WFP issued a common  statement on biotech food aid, as did the European Union. Both statements  indicated that biotech food aid was unlikely to present a risk to human  health and suggested milling the maize as a way to overcome  environmental and trade concerns. However, U.S. officials from State,  USAID, and USDA believe that, given the severity of the crisis and existing  scientific evidence, U.N. agencies and the European Union did not speak  out early or forcefully enough on the issue.
The United States rejected the option of donating only milled maize, citing  increased costs and limited U.S. milling capacity that would cause delays in  getting food aid to needy people. U.S. officials estimate that U.S.-based  milling would double the costs of its food aid, thus reducing the amount of  aid it could provide. Additionally, according to U.S. officials, agreeing to  mill all of the maize could have promoted the idea that unprocessed maize  was unsafe. (App. VII provides further discussion of issues related to  biotech food.)
Despite the United States’ early and large donations, the impasse over  biotech food significantly compromised the food pipeline in several ways:   Food aid was reduced and delayed. On September 3, 2002, Zambia’s  Agriculture Minister, in a statement to the press, demanded that 19,000  MT of biotech maize that had been delivered to storage facilities inside  the country be sent to a country that was willing to accept it. (WFP was  officially notified on October 29, 2002.) According to U.S. officials, by  early November, Zambia had rejected an additional 57,000 MT of biotech  maize intended for its food aid beneficiaries. The combined 76,000 MT  of maize considerably exceeded WFP’s cereal shortfall for Zambia for  the July through December period and would have fed 1.5 million  Zambians for 3 months.In the case of Zimbabwe, there were delays  while the government debated whether to accept whole grain maize and  then negotiated, developed, and put in place restrictions it deemed  suitable. According to a U.S. official, at one point, more than 80,000 MT  of U.S. whole kernel maize imports destined for Zimbabwe were delayed  in South Africa and Mozambique port warehouses awaiting permits— while the food aid pipeline lacked cereal.
Costs of food aid operations increased. WFP, national governments,  and other donors have borne the additional costs associated with  requirements to mill some or all of the U.S.-donated maize. These costs  include the milling itself, added charges for transporting whole grain  maize to mills and for shipping milled product, added storage costs  because of limited milling capacity, and grain losses associated with the  milling process. WFP estimates that when it has to mill the product in  South Africa, regional distribution costs could total up to $80 per metric  ton more than for unmilled U.S. maize.
Logistics of the food aid effort were complicated. Logistics became  more complex because of (1) U.S. whole kernel maize piling up in ports  as governments debated whether to accept biotech maize and, if so,  under what conditions, (2) limited milling capacity, (3) added  transportation and storage requirements, and (4) the short shelf life of  maize milled regionally (3 months compared with 12 months for whole  maize). Because food is distributed to households on a monthly basis,  WFP had to ensure that milled maize would not take more than 2  months to arrive at final distribution sites.
U.S. officials said that recipient countries in southern Africa did not make  timely, informed decisions about whether to accept or reject biotech food  aid. These officials also said the U.S. government does not have  comprehensive data on which recipient countries are likely to accept or  reject biotech food aid, nor does the U.S. government have a strategy for  providing alternatives to biotech food to countries that may reject it.  According to officials from State, USAID, and USDA, these problems are  not confined to the southern Africa region but also have a global reach.
section_title: Declining Support for Agricultural Sector and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic Pose Challenges to Emerging from Crisis into Sustained Recovery
paragraphs: The major challenges to emerging from the current food crisis into  sustained recovery include (1) a decline in agriculture sector investments;  (2) limited scope of existing programs in agricultural development; and (3)  the negative impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Recognizing the need to  address numerous challenges to move out of this crisis into recovery, the  U.N. Secretary-General and several other key stakeholders have called for a  comprehensive and targeted approach to break the pattern of recurrent  food crises in Africa. The food outlook for the next crop year has improved,  but without continuing efforts to respond to the region’s problems,  recurring food crises may be difficult to avoid.
subsections: section_title: Agriculture Sector Investments by Donors and Governments Have Declined
paragraphs: Since agriculture accounts for 70 percent of the labor force in Africa,  investments that improve productivity in the agricultural sector have  significant implications for food security and overall rural development.  According to the International Food Policy Research Institute, a 1 percent  increase in agricultural productivity would help 6 million more Africans  raise their incomes above $1 per day. However, data show declining  investments in the agricultural sector as agricultural lending by the World  Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International Fund for  Agricultural Development has fallen. Similarly, agricultural spending by  national governments and U.S. bilateral assistance for agricultural  programs in the affected countries have declined.
subsections: section_title: Agricultural Lending by Selected International Financing Organizations
paragraphs: Total lending to the agriculture sector by selected international financing  organizations declined during the 1990s. For example, measured in 2003  dollars, the African Development Bank approved about $873 million in  loans for agriculture in 1990 compared with $236 million in 2000, as shown  in figure 8. Similarly, the World Bank approved $4.7 billion in loans for  agriculture in 1990 compared with $1.4 billion in 2000. Bank officials noted  that the World Bank now approaches the agricultural sector in the context  of the Bank’s overall rural development strategy that includes, among other  things, lending for rural infrastructure, rural health, and environment and  natural resource management. For this reason, starting in 2001, the World  Bank began to include agricultural investments as part of its rural  development lending. However, this does not negate the overall declining  trend in agricultural lending between 1990 and 2000.
Our review of World Bank agricultural loans to the six affected countries  since 1990 found that 15 had been made—with 9 of them approved between  1990 and 1993. There were no loans recorded for Swaziland. As shown in  figure 9, in 2002, the downward trend in World Bank agricultural lending to  the affected region reversed with two $50 million emergency drought  recovery loans for Zambia and Malawi. These loans included an  agricultural component but also comprised health, social services, and  other emergency programs.
In general, national governments have been spending a declining share of  their budgets on agriculture, as shown in figure 10. Real spending on  agriculture has declined for two countries—Lesotho and Zambia—whereas  total government spending has increased for all six affected countries. For  the remaining countries, national government spending on agriculture has  been stagnant or has grown at a slower rate than total government  spending.
Although the levels of U.S. bilateral assistance for agriculture by country  have been mixed, overall assistance to the region’s agricultural sector has  declined from $27 million in 1998 to $20.6 million in 2003. The largest  reductions were for Malawi, which went from $10.3 million in 1998 to $3.2  million in 2003, while assistance to Mozambique went from $14.5 million in  1998 to $12.8 million in 2003 (see fig. 11).
section_title: Existing Programs Are Helpful but Limited in Scope
paragraphs: To promote agricultural development and work toward achieving food  security, FAO, IFAD, and WFP advocate an approach that helps support  small farmers, enhances the ability of the poor to access food, and aids  recovery efforts (fig. 12 describes examples of some of the current  programs). Several U.N. and USAID officials told us that while many of the  programs they have funded have demonstrated promising results, the  programs are limited in scope due to resource constraints and would need  to be implemented on a much wider scale for greater impact and  effectiveness.
section_title: Negative Impact of HIV/AIDS on Food Security Will Grow
paragraphs: In addition to being a significant factor that contributed to the food crisis,  HIV/AIDS will continue to affect food security in the region by decreasing  food production, lowering household income, and increasing household  expenses, according to numerous experts. These effects will increase as  the HIV/AIDS epidemic worsens. For example, by lowering the productivity  of agricultural labor in its food supply model, USDA estimated that  HIV/AIDS will cause a 3.3 percent reduction in grain output in sub-Saharan  Africa over the next decade relative to the region's baseline projections. As  a result, the projected food deficit will grow by 13 percent.
According to an IMF study, HIV/AIDS will also lower gross domestic  product (GDP). Figure 13 shows the projected decrease in growth rates of  GDP per capita attributable to HIV/AIDS in 10 to 15 years: Estimates range  from minus 4 percent in Mozambique to about minus 7 percent in  Zimbabwe. Projected average per capita GDP growth rates without  HIV/AIDS range from 1.5 percent for Lesotho to 3.9 percent for  Mozambique, indicating that the HIV/AIDS effect will significantly reduce  national income. In fact, for a typical sub-Saharan African country with  HIV/AIDS prevalence of 20 percent, national income is estimated to be 67  percent lower at the end of a 20-year period than without the disease.
section_title: U.N. Secretary-General and Others Cite Need for Integrated Response
paragraphs: Although the international response was sufficient to avoid famine in past  food crises in the region—as well as the current one—food security  continues to be a significant development challenge. U.N. and U.S. officials  acknowledge that food aid and humanitarian assistance alone will not  prevent future crises without a comprehensive recovery strategy that  addresses the underlying causes of food insecurity. In our review, we found  no evidence of such a strategy.
In March 2003, the U.N. Secretary-General noted that the devastating  impact of HIV/AIDS requires an integrated response that may include long- term measures even when addressing short-term emergencies and called  for a more systematic, targeted approach to break the pattern of recurrent  food crises in Africa. Many other authoritative experts and key  stakeholders have echoed the U.N. Secretary-General’s call for an  integrated response. For example, in December 2002, SADC—the principal  organization for regional cooperation in food and agriculture and related  economic and social issues—acknowledged the need for political  commitment at all levels within the region and for coordinated support  from SADC, national governments, donors, nongovernmental  organizations, and civil society to ensure food security in the future. Among  those calling for a comprehensive response to address food security—one  that integrates agricultural development, HIV/AIDS, natural disaster  management, and other appropriate interventions—are the U.N. Office for  the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Food Policy  Research Institute, and the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in  Africa.
In recent years, international donors have announced major initiatives  related to food security. These include plans not only to enhance food  availability by increasing agricultural production but strategies to increase  food accessibility by reducing poverty. For example, the United Nations’  2001 Millennium Development Goals pledged to help cut hunger in Africa in  half by 2015. The World Bank and IMF have worked with countries  eligible for debt relief—Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia—to ensure that  food security and agriculture are central themes in these countries’ Poverty  Reduction Strategy Papers. Among other measures, these strategy papers  emphasize promoting small-scale irrigation, reducing land degradation, and  improving access to credit and agricultural inputs. In early 2002, USAID  introduced its Agricultural Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa, which is  designed to accelerate agricultural growth and reduce vulnerability to  hunger and poverty. However, as of April 2003, of the six affected countries,  only Mozambique was proposed for funding ($3.9 million in 2003) under the  initiative.
section_title: Regional Food Outlook Remains Tenuous; Sustained Efforts Seen as Necessary
paragraphs: Despite improved weather conditions and a better harvest beginning in  April 2003, food security conditions in the region are still tenuous. As of the  end of March 2003, early warning systems were forecasting that some parts  of the region may have better harvests than last year; however, they also  note that food insecurity and the need for emergency aid persist—and may  worsen—in some areas, particularly in Zimbabwe and parts of southern  Mozambique. In February 2003, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs stated that, because the response to improve  agricultural inputs has been inadequate, recovery by the next agricultural  season is unlikely and the need for food aid prolonged. In fact, the current  emergency operations, which were for the crop year that concluded March  2003, have been extended through June 2003. Beyond that, according to  WFP and USAID officials, the need for food aid will likely continue,  particularly for many of the poorest and most vulnerable households.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The current food crisis is complicated by disruptive agricultural and  governance policies in the affected countries and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  While the WFP, the United States, some donor governments, and NGOs  provided enough food to prevent a famine, overall donor response was  insufficient in terms of food quantities and timeliness to prevent  widespread hunger. In addition, other obstacles—including poor  infrastructure in the affected countries and concerns associated with  biotech food—hampered an effective response. The controversy about  biotech food aid, in particular, significantly complicated logistics,  increased costs, and delayed food aid reaching beneficiaries. Concerns  about agricultural biotechnology may be an obstacle to addressing future  emergency food aid needs around the world, partly because the United  States accounts for about half of global food aid and because several U.S.  food aid commodities are genetically modified. Action is needed to reduce  the likelihood of biotech food aid becoming a serious problem in future  crises. Furthermore, in a region where agricultural production is critical to  national economies and food security, there is a need for viable agricultural  policies and funding by national governments, as well as adequate  agricultural assistance and related strategies from multilateral  organizations and donors, including the United States. Without a concerted  strategy that integrates, among other things, agricultural development, the  impact of HIV/AIDS, and natural disaster management, destabilizing food  crises are likely to recur.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To maximize the effectiveness of the U.S. response to future food crises in  the southern Africa region as well as in other parts of the world, we  recommend that the Secretaries of State and Agriculture and the  Administrator of USAID initiate a comprehensive review of the issues  pertaining to biotech foods in emergency food aid. In anticipation of future  food crises, this review could consider measures such as (1) encouraging  recipient countries to enhance their capacity to make informed decisions  regarding agricultural biotechnology and offering technical assistance in  this endeavor; (2) identifying which countries are likely to accept, restrict,  or reject biotech food aid; and (3) determining ways that the United States  can contribute to emergency food aid needs in countries that decide to  restrict or reject biotech food aid.
To further food security in the region, we recommend that the Secretaries  of State and Agriculture and the Administrator of USAID work with  international organizations, donors, and national governments to develop a  comprehensive, targeted strategy to ensure sustained recovery that (1)  integrates agricultural development, HIV/AIDS awareness and action,  natural disaster management, and other appropriate interventions; (2)  estimates costs and resource requirements; and (3) establishes a plan for  mobilizing resources, a timetable for achieving results, and indicators for  measuring performance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Department of State, USDA, USAID, and WFP provided written  comments on a draft of our report. These comments are reprinted in  appendixes VIII, IX, X, and XI, along with our responses to specific points.
In general, the Departments of State and Agriculture, USAID, and WFP  agreed with our overall conclusions and recommendations. However, they  expressed technical concerns, primarily related to our discussion of  biotech food, which we have addressed in the text as appropriate.
USDA objected to our use of the term “biotech food,” saying it prefers  “foods which may contain the products of agricultural biotechnology.”  USDA also said that it opposes the use of the term “genetically modified  organisms” and the acronym “GMO” because these terms carry negative  connotations. According to the department, modern agricultural  biotechnology is simply the next step in plant breeding technology.  Notwithstanding USDA’s comments, FAO, WHO, and WFP use the terms  genetically modified food, GM food, and biotech food. In fact, after  receiving USDA’s comments, we found that USDA was still using the terms  “biotech plants” and “biotech crops” in some of its publicly available  informational materials. USAID objected to our use of the term “biotech  food aid,” noting that the United States provides food aid from the general  U.S. food supply, which may contain biotech crops. In certain places, we  now refer to U.S. food aid as aid that may contain biotech crops.
In commenting on our recommendation to initiate a comprehensive review  of the issues associated with biotech foods in emergency food aid, USDA  said that it agrees that all relevant parts of the U.S. government must  continue to review and engage other countries regarding their biotech  policies, including those related to food aid. USDA said it will continue to  support developing countries’ efforts to enhance their capacity for making  science-based and transparent decisions regarding products of modern  agricultural biotechnology. At the same time, USDA said it is difficult to  accurately identify countries that might accept or reject products of  modern agricultural biotechnology because many developing countries’  policies depend upon the specific political, economic, and social  circumstances at the time.
The Department of State said that an interagency review on how to manage  the presence of bioengineered foods in food aid might be useful for  developing a strategy. However, the department said that such a review  should be narrowly focused to ensure better coordination among food aid,  development, trade policy and regulatory agencies. USAID said it supports  further interagency discussion and coordination on the dimensions of  biotechnology in food aid. USAID noted that it is actively engaged in  supporting the development of capacity in a number of food aid recipient  countries to make informed decisions, but said in practical terms this is a  long-term strategy and unlikely to assist in emergency situations such as  we saw in southern Africa. USAID said it believes that the most practical  solution will be to work with recipient governments and partners involved  in the delivery of food aid to build confidence in the existing safety  evaluations of these products, including evaluations done in the United  States and by other countries, scientists, and international organizations  such as FAO and WHO.
Regarding our recommendation to develop an integrated recovery strategy,  the Department of State, USAID, and WFP fully support the need for a  comprehensive, coordinated approach to help address the underlying  causes of food insecurity. State cited U.S. efforts to work with major donor  countries to create a multilateral framework for improving long-term food  security throughout the world. USAID said that, along with an interagency  working group formed by the sub-policy planning committee to coordinate  the U.S. government response to the food crisis, it is in the process of  drafting a recovery strategy and action plan, which will guide the  development and review of new USAID country strategies in the region.  WFP emphasized the need for the international community to remain  engaged within the region and to help national governments address  medium- to longer-term issues related to food insecurity. We agree that  such efforts must be sustained if destabilizing food crises are to be avoided.
In addition, we provided FAO, IMF, and the World Bank an opportunity to  review parts of a draft of this report for technical accuracy, and we  incorporated their comments as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of State and Agriculture, and the USAID  Administrator. Copies will be made available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  on (202) 512-3149. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are  listed in appendix XII.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine what factors contributed to the current crisis in southern  Africa, we met with and analyzed information from government officials at  the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the  Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and State in Washington, D.C., and U.S.  missions in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South  Africa. We also met with officials and reviewed information from the World  Food Program (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and  the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) at their  headquarters in Rome and in the southern African countries we visited. In  addition, we gathered information from and met with representatives of the  World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), other U.N.  agencies, other donor governments, and host government ministries. We  also gathered information and met with representatives of early warning  systems and interagency food security assessment teams. In addition, we  gathered information and met with representatives of nongovernmental  organizations (NGO), including Africare, Bread for the World, the Coalition  for Food Aid, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the Coalition for Food Aid,  Save the Children, World Vision, and ACDI/VOCA. We also reviewed studies  from public and private research institutions on the causes of the current  and past food crises in southern Africa.
To determine how well the populations’ overall food needs were met during  the crisis period, we met with officials and reviewed information from  WFP, FAO, host governments, the private sector, donor governments,  NGOs, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). We  also met with and gathered information from representatives of  interagency famine early warning and vulnerability assessment teams. In  addition, we analyzed country-specific and regional WFP food aid data  tracking food aid flows from donors (through WFP and NGOs) to the  country level and, for WFP food aid, to the beneficiary level. Because of  southern Africa’s infrastructure and technology problems, our collection  and analysis of agricultural supply and demand information had inherent  limitations. We observed food aid distribution at various stages including at  the points of entry and storage facilities at the extended delivery points and  final distribution points. We met with WFP, NGO, donor, national  government, and local government officials responsible for managing and  monitoring the food aid distribution process. We reviewed WFP’s real time  logistics information system including its monitoring and loss reports. We  also reviewed U.S. and other donor financial contributions to determine  similar information on nonfood aid-related assistance. We verified the  accuracy of data and reports, to the extent possible, by tracing the flow of  information and obtaining comparable data from multiple government,  international organization, NGO, and private sector sources.
To determine the major obstacles to the food aid effort, we met with key  officials and gathered and examined data from governments and the  private sector in recipient countries, WFP, donor governments, NGOs, and  SADC on the rate and amount of donor contributions, infrastructure, and  biotech food aid and its impact on food aid distribution in the current  crisis. We examined U.S. and other donor funding of WFP’s EMOP,  reviewing actual country donations against pledges to determine the  sufficiency and timeliness of donations. We reviewed and examined data  on the transportation network for moving food in the region and identified  and confirmed transportation and infrastructure obstacles during our  fieldwork in country. We verified and confirmed the general accuracy of  these data through multiple private sector and governmental organizations.  With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, we had seven  U.S. scientists provide an independent perspective on the Zambian  Scientists’ biotech report.
To determine the challenges to emerging from the crisis into sustained  recovery, we met with numerous NGOs, the World Bank, the IMF, USAID,  and the Departments of Agriculture and State and analyzed information on  the decline in agricultural sector investment, the limited scope of existing  programs in agricultural development, and the negative impact of the  HIV/AIDS epidemic. In addition, we reviewed studies from private and  public research institutions, such as the International Food Policy  Research Institute, on the challenges to moving from crisis into recovery.  We also analyzed agricultural funding data of the six southern African  national governments. To analyze World Bank agricultural lending, we  reviewed World Bank annual reports and its Web site from 1990 to 2002 to  determine the amount and nature of loans made to the six affected  southern African countries. After identifying the loans, we calculated an  average deflator for each fiscal year (July to June) and calculated the 2003  value of each of these loans. To analyze the percentage of government  budgets expended for agriculture, we gathered fiscal data for each of the  six countries from the IMF country statistical appendices for 1997 through  2002. We then calculated the current and capital expenditures from  agriculture as a share of the total current and capital expenditures in the  government budget. We also calculated the real growth rate using least  square regression methodology for agricultural and total spending. Finally,  to determine the impact of HIV/AIDS on food security among the six  affected countries, we reviewed USDA and IMF studies that quantified the  food security situation and its economic implications.
The information on foreign laws in this report does not reflect our  independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary  sources.
We conducted our review from August 2002 through May 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Timeline of the Southern Africa Food Crisis
paragraphs: Figure 14 is a chronology of key events (political actions, alerts, and  emergencies) that occurred in the region and in some of the affected  countries during the 2-year period from July 2001 through April 2003.
U.N.   consolidated  appeal  launched  (regional  EMOP)
section_title: Early Warning Systems and Vulnerability Assessment Methods
paragraphs: Two types of data collection systems tracked the food crisis in southern  Africa: (1) early warning systems, which monitor factors that affect food  supply to provide decision makers with notice of potential crises; and (2)  assessment systems, which monitor the nutritional needs of vulnerable  populations in order to design or assess interventions.
subsections: section_title: Early Warning Systems
paragraphs: Famine early warning systems are designed to provide decision makers  with information of an impending food crisis or famine. These systems  compile various indicators of food security at a regional, national, or  subnational scale, including information on weather and household  purchasing power. While early warning systems are useful, preventing food  crises depends on timely responses to the information they disseminate.
For this report, we reviewed two early warning systems:  FEWS NET: The Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) is a specialized  Information Network (NET) based in 17 African countries contending  with chronic food insecurity.  FEWS NET is a partnership-based  program initiated and funded by USAID. The goal of FEWS NET is to  strengthen the ability of African countries and regional organizations to  manage risk of food insecurity by providing timely and analytical early  warning and vulnerability information. FEWS NET monitors  information from multiple technologies, such as satellites and field  observations, and seeks to facilitate timely access to that information;  identifies specific, acute food security threats; and provides regular  information assessments to decision makers that reflect the best  judgment of the food security community.
GIEWS: FAO’s Global Information Early Warning System on Food and  Agriculture (GIEWS) is an information system based in Rome that  includes 116 governments, 3 regional organizations, and 61  nongovernmental organizations. The goal of GIEWS is to provide the  international community with warning of imminent food crises to  ensure timely interventions in countries or regions affected by natural  or man-made disasters. The system seeks to monitor all aspects of food  supply and demand in all countries on a continuous basis at the global,  regional/subregional, national, and subnational levels. It reports to the  international community through its system of regular and ad hoc  reports.
FEWS NET and GIEWS often contribute to the WFP/FAO Crop and Food  Supply Assessment Missions. Additionally, FEWS NET supplies GIEWS  with the major proportion of its remote-sensing data for monitoring  agricultural production. However, according to USAID, these two early  warning systems differ in three main areas:  Geographic scope: FEWS NET has a 17-country scope in Africa,  whereas GIEWS has a global mandate.
Level of detail: FEWS NET reports on the subnational level based on  information gathered by field staff located throughout their scope,  whereas GIEWS reports on the national and global levels from their  headquarters in Rome with few field staff.
Technical focus on food security: FEWS NET focuses on food  availability, access, and utilization, while GIEWS focuses on food  production and availability.
subsections: section_title: Early Warning Systems in the Southern Africa Food Crisis
paragraphs: The famine early warning systems produced relevant information regarding  the southern Africa food crisis. FEWS NET and GIEWS reported on such  food security indicators as adverse weather events, current food shortages,  the status of cereal imports, the status of strategic grain reserves, the status  of grain prices, and forecasts for the 2001/02 harvest.
In particular, in late 2001 and early 2002 the early warning systems reported  questionable food security in parts of the six countries, accounting for the  poor 2000/01 harvest and anticipating future cereal gaps based on a poor  outlook for the 2001/02 harvest. In November 2001, FEWS NET reported  that the 2000/01 cereal harvest from earlier that year would likely be  insufficient to fill food needs in each country except Mozambique. After  FEWS NET highlighted these potential maize shortages, the U.S.  government began carefully monitoring the situation in southern Africa,  according to a Department of State cable. By mid-February 2002, GIEWS  warned that impending severe food shortages threatened some 4 million  people in the southern African countries, including parts of each of the six  countries. That same month, however, FEWS NET reported that although  there were localized areas of concern at the national and subnational  levels, there was no reason for serious concern over production prospects  from a regional perspective at that point in the growing season. In April  2002, closer to the harvest period, GIEWS warned of a looming food crisis  in southern Africa, with conditions in several countries set to worsen. By  May 2002, FEWS NET also warned of the potential for a food security crisis  of regional magnitude if appropriate and timely action were not taken.
Nevertheless, the early warning systems did not anticipate the severity of  the situation in Malawi. Although the systems did report serious maize  (corn) production shortfalls in Malawi during the 2000/01 harvest caused  by mid-season floods and late-season drought, flawed agricultural statistics  provided by the government of Malawi indicated that the production  shortfall would be covered by other food crops, especially cassava.  According to the IMF, the data error only became apparent in February  2002 when Malawi began experiencing severe food shortages.
section_title: Assessment Systems
paragraphs: For this report, we reviewed the following assessments:  VAM: The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit (VAM) analyzes,  maps, and reports on populations and geographic areas experiencing  food insecurity to inform WFP food aid operations in 43 countries. VAM  uses state-of-the-art mapping techniques to pinpoint the people most  vulnerable to hunger and target their needs. VAM and FEWS NET work  in close collaboration in the African countries where they are both  present. VAM relies on FEWS NET for early warning analyses in most  African countries. VAM also has a global mandate in supporting internal  WFP operations, whereas FEWS NET attempts to build assessment  capacity within the countries.
CFSAM: Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) is a rapid  assessment of information generated in an affected country used to fill  in information gaps and to provide an early forecast of production and  the emerging food supply situation of that country. This is done only at  the request of the host country government. A mission may also collect  information on household food security, vulnerability, coping  mechanisms, and social welfare programs. GIEWS/FAO coordinates  such missions in conjunction with WFP and other stakeholders such as  host country ministerial staff, FEWS NET staff, and the Southern  African Development Community’s (SADC) Regional Early Warning Unit  (REWU). CFSAM targets a wider audience than WFP’s internally  focused VAM unit. The international community uses the CFSAM  information to calculate how much food aid and other relief assistance  is needed to assist the most vulnerable people.
VAC:  SADC and some of its member states established vulnerability  assessment committees (VAC) to better assess and address food  security issues.  The purpose of VAC assessments is to (1) provide  additional information to help adjust response programs to better meet  the needs of vulnerable populations; (2) rapidly investigate and  characterize or verify suspected crises in local areas; and (3) better  understand the causes of the emergency and their implications for a  return to food security. The committees use a coordinated, collaborative  process that integrates the most influential assessment and crisis  response players into the effort to help gain privileged access to national  data sets and expert technicians and increase the likelihood of reaching  consensus among national governments, implementing partners, and  major donors. Key players include the SADC Regional Early Warning  Unit and national VACs, VAM, FEWS NET, GIEWS, and several NGOs.  The assessment methodology included sample surveys at the district,  community, and household levels and incorporated household food  economy and nutritional surveys.
subsections: section_title: Use of Assessments in the Southern Africa Food Crisis
paragraphs: Several of the above assessments have been used to prepare for and  monitor the southern Africa food crisis (see app. II for timeline). FAO  conducted a series of CFSAMs starting in May 2002. The missions  estimated cereal requirements and cereal production for each of the six  countries and the extent to which the gap could be offset by commercial  imports. (See app. V for more on commercial sector imports and their role  in the crisis.) The remaining deficit was identified as requiring emergency  food aid. The regional and national VACs built assessment capacity in the  region and increased the breadth and depth of food security monitoring  during the crisis. To this end, the committees conducted assessments and  prepared reports on their results in September 2002 and January 2003. A  third assessment occurred in May 2003.
section_title: U.S. Donations
paragraphs: By early 2002, the United States had recognized the seriousness of the  developing food crisis in southern Africa and initiated actions to donate  substantial quantities of food aid to the region. For example, in mid- February 2002, USAID arranged a loan of 8,470 metric tons (MT) of maize  to southern Africa from stocks held in Tanzania; the commodity began  arriving in the region in mid-March. On March 15, 2002, USAID authorized  World Vision to provide 14,310 MT of food aid to Zimbabwe (the amount  was later increased to 19,710 MT). On March 21, USAID authorized the  purchase of 35,330 MT of commodities—from existing stocks in New  Orleans—to be shipped to southern African ports; these stocks arrived by  the end of June 2002.
Overall, between late April 2002 and March 31, 2003, the United States  donated and delivered nearly 500,000 MT of food aid to the region valued at  about $275 million. The food represented approximately 68 percent of the  total food aid delivered into the region between April 1, 2002, and March 31,  2003. U.S. deliveries included:   81,950 MT for precursor WFP emergency programs in each of the six  countries—Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and  Zimbabwe, valued at $43 million;   19,710 MT for the World Vision program in Zimbabwe, valued at $12.8   326,553 MT for the WFP regional operation, valued at $165.4 million; and   71,600 MT for the C-SAFE operation, valued at $53.5 million.
Table 4 provides a breakout of the U.S. food aid by country and commodity.  As the table shows, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia received the largest  amounts of aid. Maize (corn) and maize meal accounted for more than 70  percent of the donated commodities. About 84 percent of all the donated  food represented biotech commodities (i.e., maize, maize meal, oil, and  corn soya blend (CSB)/corn soya milk(CSM)).
section_title: Commercial Imports
paragraphs: The extent and availability of commercial cereal food supplies during the  food crisis are difficult to assess for a number of reasons. Early concerns  about the progress of commercial imports stemmed from the large  amounts of cereal imports needed, the high regional prices for maize, and  the lack of sufficient foreign exchange resources for governments and  private sector entities to purchase the required imports.  Nonetheless, data  available in mid-May 2003 indicated that 1.72 million MT of commercial  cereal imports had been received in the six countries between April 1, 2002,  and March 31, 2003. However, the regional Vulnerability Assessment  Committee September 2002, December 2002, and January 2003 reports  indicated some serious problems with food availability during the year.  (See app. III for a detailed description of the VACs.)  Factors contributing  to the uncertainty over commercial cereal food supplies included the lack  of time frames indicating when imports needed to be purchased, data  reliability issues, problems between urban and rural distribution of food  supplies, and government policies that provided disincentives to the  private sector to import food or that, once imports were received in  country, discouraged the efficient supply of those goods to the local  market.
In contrast to WFP’s food aid effort, the CFSAMs did not identify the  monthly rate at which imports needed to occur, making it difficult to judge  the timeliness of commercial imports. The September VAC report for  Zambia indicated concern that it could be difficult for importers to find  maize in regional markets (as several countries in the region had large  deficits and would be competing to buy from the same suppliers), which in  turn could delay purchases. According to the December VAC report for  Lesotho, maize, wheat, and sorghum were generally not available for  purchase at the end of the year in communities across that country. In  Swaziland, maize was reported to be readily available in retail outlets  nationwide even though there had been no commercial imports between  July and November. However, there were fears that a shortfall in maize  imports would occur between December and March, causing another  round of price hikes.
Once data on commercial cereal imports began to be available, data  reliability became an issue in some cases. For example, according to the  December Zimbabwe VAC report, figures on the combination of  commercial imports, food aid imports, and available national production  should have resulted in a surplus of 200,000 MT at the national level.  However, the report indicated there was something seriously wrong with  the numbers, since 41 percent of communities surveyed reported that  cereal grains were not or were rarely available from the government’s grain  marketing board and the other 59 percent reported that the grains were  only occasionally available. U.S. government officials noted that there have  been numerous anecdotal reports of the government’s politicizing food aid,  which may partly explain some of the discrepancy.
While commercial cereal imports may have been provided to urban  markets, shortages were reported in many rural areas, indicating problems  with the distribution of commercial cereal supplies. The December VAC  report for Lesotho indicated that maize mealmaize that has undergone  the milling processwas said to be available, though very expensive, in the  various urban centers but generally not available in the rural areas, which  were characterized as experiencing a serious food crisis. The January VAC  report for Zambia said there was no commercial shortfall in urban areas  and millers did not expect one through February and beyond. However,  most of the maize that had been imported (officially or via cross-border  trade) was reportedly only servicing the urban markets, leaving the rural  areas with a severe commercial grain shortfall that drastically pushed up  prices. Of 48 villages surveyed, fewer than 10 percent said maize was  readily available and fewer than 30 percent said maize was occasionally  available.
Finally, some national governments implemented subsidies and price  controls that raised concern about private sector imports and whether  imports received would be supplied to local markets efficiently. For  example, in response to the crisis, Malawi implemented a countrywide  subsidy on the consumer price of maize to make it more affordable to the  public. However, this policy, combined with high interest rates that  inhibited the private sector from borrowing to cover its purchases, meant  that the private sector could not profit from importing maize and selling it  at the subsidized price. In Zambia, the government encouraged a program  whereby a private sector group, the Millers Association, would import  300,000 MT of maize without having to pay import duties and the  government would import 155,000 MT of maize to begin a strategic reserve.  However, the Zambian government reportedly provided conflicting  information about the amount of food it was to import for relief versus  strategic reserves, thus causing confusion about planned imports,  uncertainty over market prices, and conditions favorable for market  speculation. In Zimbabwe, the government banned all private sector  imports and implemented price controls on maize. This policy reportedly  encouraged traders with food supplies to stockpile them or sell them at a  much higher price on black markets in country or across borders.
section_title: Nonfood Emergency Needs
paragraphs: U.N. agencies requested $143.7 million to address urgent, nonfood  humanitarian needs that increased people’s vulnerability to famine for the  July 2002 through June 2003 period. As of April 9, 2003, less than 25 percent  of the total identified requirements had been funded. Figure 15 compares  the sectors and dollar amounts for which the U.N. agencies requested  funding to actual contributions. As the figure shows, the largest amounts  were requested for health, agriculture, and economic recovery. Only five of  the nine sectors received any funding and four of these were only partially  funded. The four sectors with the highest rates of funding were: multi- sector, 583 percent of the requested amount; coordination and support  services, 49 percent of the requested amount; agriculture, 35 percent; and  health, 21 percent.
Funding requests were tied to specific projects. For example, the World  Health Organization (WHO) asked for $2.9 million for projects in Malawi to  enable earlier detection of epidemics, improve response to disease  outbreaks in emergency situations, and strengthen emergency health  coordination. FAO requested funding for an $8.5 million project in  Zimbabwe to (1) increase agricultural production among 400,000  vulnerable households by providing inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, (2)  facilitate tillage, (3) rehabilitate local water sources, and (4) develop  opportunities to market agricultural products.
section_title: Biotech Food and the Southern Africa Food Crisis
paragraphs: This appendix provides additional information on crops and foods  produced with modern agricultural biotechnology, how concerns about  agricultural biotechnology developed in southern Africa, and how issues  surrounding agricultural biotechnology affected delivery of U.S. food aid  during the southern Africa food crisis.
subsections: section_title: Modern Agricultural Biotechnology
paragraphs: Modern agricultural biotechnology refers to various scientific techniques  used to modify plants, animals, or microorganisms by introducing in their  genetic makeup genes for specific desired traits, including genes from  unrelated species. Genetic engineering techniques allow development of  new crop or livestock varieties, since the genes for a given trait can be  introduced into a plant or animal species to produce a new variety  incorporating that specific trait. Additionally, genetic engineering increases  the range of traits that can be introduced in new varieties by allowing genes  from totally unrelated species to be incorporated into a particular plant or  animal variety.
Crops and foods containing or derived from genetically modified (GM)  plants have been characterized by various users as biotech, GM, genetically  modified organisms (GMO), and bioengineered crops and foods.
Biotech crops currently on the market are mainly aimed at increasing crop  protection by introducing resistance against plant diseases caused by  insects or viruses or by increasing tolerance to herbicides. Biotech crops  have lowered pest management costs and enhanced yields. By the end of  2000, such crops had been planted on nearly 100 million acres worldwide.  As of 2000, the United States had 76.7 million acres of biotech crop  varieties: 26 percent of all maize planted, 68 percent of cotton, and 69  percent of soybeans.
The United States and a number of other countries have established  regulatory processes for assessing whether foods derived from agricultural  biotechnology are as safe for humans, animals, other plants, and the  environment as their traditional counterparts. Safety assessments of GM  foods investigate direct health effects (toxicity), tendencies to provoke  allergic reaction, nutritional effects, and any unintended effects that could  result from gene insertion. Environmental assessments consider the ability  of the GMO to escape and potentially introduce the engineered genes into  wild populations; susceptibility of nontarget organisms (e.g., insects that  are not pests) to the gene product; loss of biodiversity; and increased use of  chemicals in agriculture. The environmental aspects vary considerably  according to local conditions.
GM food such as whole kernel maize seed contains living modified  organisms (LMO) that are capable of transferring or replicating genetic  material. If maize is milled, this is no longer the case. Whole kernel maize  seed can be eaten as a food or planted to grow a new crop.
subsections: section_title: Challenges to U.S. Agricultural Exports Containing Biotech Commodities
paragraphs: U.S. agricultural biotech exports have faced several significant challenges  in international markets. First, as the single, major producer of biotech  products, the United States has been relatively isolated in its efforts to  maintain access for these products. Second, in many parts of the world,  consumer concerns about the safety of biotech foods have increased,  leading key market countries to implement or consider regulations that  may restrict U.S. biotech exports. Third, in the United States, biotech and  conventional varieties are typically combined in the grain handling system  for more efficient use of crops from multiple sources. Thus, foreign  regulations on biotech could affect all U.S. exports of these commodities as  well as food products containing or derived from biotech crops.  Specifically, regulations limiting or banning the importation of foods  containing biotech products present serious challenges to U.S. exporters of  corn and soy products, according to Department of State and USDA  officials.
Several international organizations are involved in developing guidance on   biotech food and its regulation. The Codex Alimentarius Commission  (Codex)a joint FAO/WHO body responsible for an international food  code—has been developing principles for the human health risk analysis of  biotech foods. These principles are based on a premarket assessment,  performed on a case-by-case basis, that evaluates both direct effects (from  the inserted gene) and unintended effects that may arise from inserting the  new gene. The principles are in the final stage of an eight-step international  agreement process. Draft language under consideration includes an option  for mandatory labeling based on the method of production, even if there is  no detectable presence of DNA or protein in the end product resulting from  genetic modification. The United States and several other countries have  opposed mandatory processed-based labeling for foods, which may contain  the products of agricultural biotechnology. They favor mandatory labeling  only with regards to allergic reactions, changes in nutritional content, and  changes in handling requirements. Codex has been deadlocked on the  labeling issue for several years.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international environmental  treaty, regulates transboundary movements of LMOs. Biotech foods are  within the scope of the protocol only if they contain LMOs. The protocol  requires exporters to get consent from importing countries before the first  shipment of LMOs intended for release into the environment. This  requirement does not apply to LMOs intended for direct use as food, feed,  or for processing. The protocol will enter into force 90 days after the 50th  country has ratified it, which may be in late 2003, according to a USAID  official. The United States is not a signatory to the agreement. However,  according to U.S. officials, as a practical matter U.S. exporters will need to  observe and comply with local regulations implementing the protocol.
section_title: U.S. Versus EU Approval Process
paragraphs: The United States and the European Union (EU) have very different  regulatory frameworks for approving new agricultural biotech products.
The United States generally applies existing food safety and environmental  protection laws and regulations to biotech products and approves them  based on their characteristics rather than on whether they are derived from  biotechnology. To evaluate new products, U.S. regulators require sufficient  evidence to determine their safety or risk. Under this approach, the United  States has approved most new biotech varieties.
The EU follows the “precautionary principle,” under which the EU  maintains that approval of new biotechnology products should not proceed  if there is “insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain” scientific data regarding  potential risks. The EU has not approved any new biotech foods for  marketing since 1998. This stance has affected the viability of biotech  trade in other parts of the world. For example, given the importance of the  EU market, U.S. soybean producers have been reluctant to introduce new  biotech varieties not approved for marketing in the EU. Similarly, maize  growers in Argentina, who export to the EU, are deferring planting a  biotech variety known as “Round-up Ready” corn because the EU has not  approved it. They are only planting biotech varieties approved by the EU.
Biotech Issues in Zimbabwe  According to U S. officials, Zimbabwe raised concerns about the potential  adverse environmental and commercial/trade impacts of unmilled biotech  products as early as the summer of 2001, a year before the U.N.’s southern  Africa appeal. It did not want planting of whole kernel biotech seeds or  feeding of livestock on biotech products. In December 2001, the United  States offered to provide 14,300 MT of maize to Zimbabwe, but the  government refused, since it could not be certified as GMO-free. In January  2002, the United States agreed to provide 8,500 MT of fortified corn meal to  Zimbabwe as an initial contribution to a WFP program launched in  November 2001. Since this was a milled product that did not contain any  living GMOs, the government accepted it.
In May 2002, the United States offered an additional shipment of 10,000 MT  of whole kernel maize for the WFP program. The government again said it  would only accept contributions that included assurances that the food  was not derived from GMOs. As a result, the maize was reallocated to  Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique.
Near the end of July 2002, Zimbabwe proposed to accept a U.S. offer of  17,500 MT of maize that might contain biotech commodity. However, the  maize would be temporarily stored in silos to be milled and subsequently  distributed. In the meantime, the government would use its own maize for  distribution, which would be packed into USAID food bags and distributed.  This proposal became known as “the swap.”  Near the end of August, the  United States approved the swap arrangement. However, on September 1,  the Agriculture Minister of Zimbabwe was quoted as emphatically rejecting  biotech food assistance. Four days later, though, the President approved  accepting biotech maize, subject to special shipping, milling, and  distribution requirements.
section_title: Biotech Issues in Zambia
paragraphs: In February and March 2002, WFP and U.S. officials notified Zambia that  U.S. donations to that country would likely include maize containing  biotech varieties. In June 2002, Zambia’s Vice President said the country  would gladly accept the U.S. maize Zimbabwe refused. However, during  June and July a public debate on biotech food began and appeared to be  backed strongly by the opposition political party. In August, a 6-hour town  meeting on the issue was held, and on August 16, the government decided  to suspend all biotech imports and distributions.
After this announcement, the USAID Administrator invited seven Zambian  scientists to visit the United States on a fact-finding mission regarding the  biotech issue. The scientists came to the United States in September and  subsequently visited South Africa and several European countries as well.  Their report concluded that:   distributing biotech maize carries a high risk of eroding local maize  varieties;   the safety aspects of biotech foods are not conclusive; and  there is a potential risk of biotech maize, if planted, affecting the export  of baby corn and honey in particular and organic foods in general to the  EU.
They recommended that the government continue its policy of not  accepting biotech foods. On October 29, the Zambian government agreed.
Seven experts in the field of modern agricultural biotechnology reviewed  the Zambian scientists’ report for us. With regard to human health and  safety issues, two experts found the report to be fair, accurate, and fact- based; two experts disagreed with this assessment; and three did not  respond. Concerning environmental issues, three experts said the report  was fair, accurate, and fact-based; two experts disagreed; one expert was  not certain; and one did not respond. The experts generally agreed that  cross-pollination, or gene flow, would occur between biotech and  conventional maize plants, but disagreed about whether this warrants a  ban on biotech maize. Four experts suggested that milling of biotech maize  was a viable option for maintaining safety while simultaneously feeding the  hungry; the other three did not comment on this issue. Overall, the experts  supported the need for Zambia and other southern African countries to be  able to assess GMOs in their environments.
section_title: U.S. Views and Approach
paragraphs: During June 2002, the United States planned how it would respond to the  biotech issue. It recognized that (1) Zimbabwe’s rejection of whole kernel  maize was a problem that had to be addressed, (2) other affected countries’  positions on the import and transport of biotech food needed to be  determined, and (3) it was important to provide information about biotech  food. By early July, the United States was planning to use private and, if  necessary, public diplomacy to get the affected countries to accept the  biotech food aid. It would work with and through SADC and its members to  remove barriers to biotech food aid and would support WFP in asking for  humanitarian exceptions to current and proposed biotech regulations.  When feasible, the United States would attempt to provide alternative food  aid to countries that had bans on agricultural biotechnology in place.  However, if recipient countries placed special regulations on biotech  productsfor example, milling or labeling requirementsthey themselves  would have to pay to implement  these requirements. The U.S. government  opposed agreeing to provide only milled biotech food aid because the  process added costs and delayed shipments.
On July 25, 2002, the State Department directed its embassies in the six  affected states and Botswana to stress to host governments the importance  of addressing the region’s immediate needs rather than engaging in  protracted debate on the merits or supposed dangers of biotech food. State  warned that recent decisions by some recipient and transit countries not to  accept whole kernel biotech maize risked endangering the lives of millions  of people. State advised U.S. missions to urge SADC member states to  immediately adopt an agreement allowing unrestricted import and  distribution of food aid, including biotech produce, on an emergency basis  for the duration of the crisis. State’s background and guidance to its  overseas posts on biotech food aid included the following:   Food that is exported from the United States, whether commercially or  through food aid, is the same food eaten by Americans in terms of its  GMO content.
To date, there is no scientific evidence to suggest that commercially  available biotech commodities and processed foods are any less safe  than their conventional counterparts.
Commercially produced bioengineered plant varieties in the United  States have been reviewed under the U.S. regulatory process, which sets  rigorous standards for human, animal, and plant health and for  environmental safety. These varieties have received safety approval in a  number of countries.
Developing countries are concerned that genetically engineered genes  may contaminate other farmers’ fields or wild plants in the centers of  origin, but this occurrence would not necessarily be negative or  damaging. Genes naturally flow (through cross-pollination) between  traditionally developed varieties and modern hybrids.
Some African countries are concerned that if farmers plant whole grain  U.S. food aid, their trade with the EU may be affected. At this point in  time, the only whole grain in food aid that might contain biotech  varieties is maize. If whole maize is planted, it is possible biotech  varieties co-mingled in food aid could cross-pollinate with local  varieties. However, it is unlikely that the biotech grain will grow well as  it is made from hybrid seed and not well-adapted to conditions in  southern Africa.
section_title: U.N. Response
paragraphs: In May 2002, WFP’s Executive Director raised the issue of biotech food aid  with the U.N. Secretary General and in June briefed him on why biotech  food aid was an impediment for operations in southern Africa. By early July  2002, the U.N. Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs had  sought guidance from FAO, WHO, and WFP regarding food aid with biotech  components. The FAO Director-General responded with a letter incorrectly  citing the Cartagena Protocol as recommending that all food aid that might  contain biotech products be subject to an “advanced informed agreement”  and be milled before distribution to avoid the possibility of germination.  However, the Cartagena Protocol expressly states that advanced informed  agreement does not apply when the shipment is for direct use as food or  feed, or for processing, nor does it suggest that grain shipments containing  living biotech components be milled. After the United States raised  concerns about this misinformation, the Director-General issued a  correction letter. Nonetheless, the FAO representative in Malawi repeated  the same erroneous recommendations to Malawi’s Ministry of Agriculture.  The United States again cited the error, but in August, the FAO  representative in Zimbabwe gave similar inaccurate advice. This time,  when the United States alerted FAO, the problem was quickly corrected,  according to FAO.
On August 23, 2002, FAO, WHO, and WFP issued a joint U.N. statement on  the use of biotech foods as food aid in southern Africa.  Its key points  included the following:   Although there are no existing international agreements in force  regarding trade in biotech food or food aid, WFP policy is that all  donated food must meet the safety standards of both the donor and  recipient countries and all applicable international standards,  guidelines, and recommendations.
FAO and WHO are confident that the principal country of origin (i.e., the  United States) has applied its national food safety risk assessment  procedures to its food aid and has fully certified that these foods are  safe for human consumption. Based on national information from a  variety of sources and current scientific knowledge, FAO, WHO, and  WFP believe the consumption of biotech food now being provided as  food aid in southern Africa is unlikely to present human health risk.
Any potential risks to biological diversity and sustainable agriculture  from inadvertent introduction of GMOs have to be judged and managed  by countries on a case-by-case basis. In the case of maize, processing  techniques such as milling or heat treatment may be considered to avoid  inadvertent introduction of biotech seed. However, U.N. policy does not  require that biotech grain used for food, feed, or processing be treated  this way.
Governments must carefully consider the severe and immediate  consequences of limiting the food aid available for millions so  desperately in need.
section_title: European Union Statement
paragraphs: Several of the southern African countries were concerned that if whole  kernel biotech maize were planted and used as feed for their cattle, their  ability to export grain and cattle to the EU would be hampered. On August  28, 8 days after Zambia announced it would not accept biotech foods, the  delegation of the European Commission in Zambia issued a press release to  clarify its position, which stated the following:  The United States, the EU, and others have evaluated several biotech  maize varieties, and some have been authorized for use, including  planting. Given the serious food shortages in the region, governments  may want to use these evaluations rather than wait for them to be  repeated locally.
The fact that a country grows biotech maize has no impact on its ability  to export other agricultural products to the EU.
The importation and use of biotech maize in a form other than grain  should eliminate concerns about negative biodiversity effects and trade  consequences.
EU scientists have found no evidence that the biotech maize varieties  they have assessed are harmful to human health.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the State Department’s letter dated  June 3, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We recognize that the United States is taking steps to help improve  long-term food security in the region that include, among others, the  Agricultural Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa, which was introduced  early last year. However, as noted in figure 11, overall assistance to the  region's agricultural sector has declined between 1998 and 2003; and as  of April 2003, only one out of the six countries (Mozambique) was  proposed to receive funding under the new initiative. We also recognize  that U.S. bilateral assistance in several of the affected countries has  funded a number of programs related to food security over the years,  including ongoing programs on agricultural development, HIV/AIDS,  and disaster management. While all these programs do help to promote  food security, U.N. and U.S. officials told us that to have broad impact,  these programs need to be implemented on a much larger scale. Our  recommendation that U.S. agencies work with international  organizations, donors, and national governments to develop a  comprehensive, targeted strategy for sustained recovery would, if  implemented, help coordinate efforts, integrate approaches, and  leverage limited resources as necessary to achieve greater  effectiveness. 2. We modified the text on pages 3 and 23 to note that the United States  anticipated the crisis at the outset. Although the United States acted  early  so that food would arrive in a timely way, USAID officials advised  us that no food was prepositioned in any of the countries. We modified  the text on page 18 to reflect the point on the C-SAFE program. 3. We modified the text on pages 10-11 to reflect this information. 4. According to USAID officials, available quantities of sorghum and  bulgur were limited. 5. We noted this view on page 46. 6. We modified our discussion of Malawi’s policy on page 31. 7. We modified the text on pages 31 to reflect this point. 8. We replaced the definition, cited from a World Health Organization  publication, with an alternative. See pages 3 and 65. We modified the  discussion of safety issues on pages 64-65. 9. We modified the text on these several issues on page 67. 10. We clarified this footnote, on page 67, to indicate what information  would be required in the initial documentation and what information  would be required in subsequent exchanges of information. 11. On page 68, we changed our reference to the precautionary principle to  clarify that the statements represent the EU’s arguments under the  principle.
section_title: Comments from Department of Agriculture
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on USDA’s letter dated June 3, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We modified the text on page 30 to reflect this point. 2. We modified the text on page 66 to reflect the first point. Our draft  report noted that the biotech and conventional varieties are typically  combined in the U.S. grain handling system. Regarding the use of the  term biotech, see pages 45-46.
section_title: Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated June 9, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. Currently in draft form, the recovery strategy/action plan USAID  outlines in its comments represents a beginning. USAID notes that its  draft strategy has already been useful as a planning tool in developing  USAID’s country strategies for the region. As such, the recovery  strategy/action plan will help target U.S. efforts. However, our  recommendation goes beyond U.S. efforts. To ensure sustained  recovery in an environment of constrained resources, we believe there  is a need for a comprehensive strategy that pulls together the efforts of  international organizations, donors, and national governments;  integrates approaches; and leverages limited resources.
section_title: Comment from the World Food Program
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the WFP’s letter dated June 2, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We agree with WFP’s support for further collaboration with the U.S.  government and other partners in defining and implementing a  sustainable recovery strategy. 2. We further highlighted the problems of extreme poverty and regional  economic decline on page 11. 3. We further highlighted Zimbabwe’s economic problems on page 11. 4. We reflected these points on page 25.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the persons named above, Joy Labez, Miriam Carroll, Kendall  Schaefer, and Janey Cohen made key contributions to this report. Nathan  Anderson, Nima Edwards, Etana Finkler, Chase Huntley, Bruce Kutnick,  Jeremy Latimer, Barbara Shields, and Eve Weisberg provided technical  support.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of  Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities  and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government  for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal  programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other  assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding  decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of  accountability, integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs