Border Security: State Could Enhance Visa Fraud Prevention by Strategically Using Resources and Training
Published: 2012-09-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Foreign nationals may apply for entry into the United States under dozens of different visa categories, depending on circumstances. States Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security share responsibility for the prevention of visa fraud, which is a serious problem that threatens the integrity of the process. Some documents through illegal means, such as using counterfeit identity documents or making false claims to an adjudicating officer. Visa fraud may facilitate illegal activities in the United States, including crimes of violence, human trafficking, and terrorism. This report examines (1) countries and visa categories that are subject to the most fraud; (2) State's use of technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention. GAO examined State's reports and data on fraud trends and statistics, examined resources and technologies to counter fraud, and observed visa operations and fraud prevention efforts overseas and domestically.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Certain countries and visa categories are subject to higher levels of fraud. In fiscal year 2010, almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) involved applicants from Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico. Department of State (State) officials told GAO that fraud most commonly involves applicants for temporary visits to the United States who submit false documentation to overcome the presumption that they intend to illegally immigrate. Fraud is also perpetrated for immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary worker visas and student visas. In response to State efforts to combat visa fraud, unscrupulous visa applicants adapt their strategies, and as a result, fraud trends evolve over time.
State has a variety of technological tools and resources to assist consular officers in combating fraud, but does not have a policy for their systematic use. For example, State recently implemented fraud prevention technologies such as a fraud case management system that establishes connections among multiple visa applications, calling attention to potentially fraudulent activity. Overseas posts have Fraud Prevention Units that consist of a Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and locally employed staff who analyze individual fraud cases. In 2011, the ratio of Fraud Prevention Unit staff to fraud cases varied widely across overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads. The Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) is a domestic resource available to posts that verifies information on certain visa applications. However, KCC services are only provided on an ad-hoc basis, and State does not have a policy for posts to systematically utilize its resources. For example, an FPM at a high fraud post told GAO that the post would like to utilize KCC anti-fraud services for screening certain visa categories, but did not know how to request KCC assistance.
Although State offers anti-fraud training courses at the Foreign Service Institute and online, it does not require FPMs to take them and does not track FPMs enrollment. Consular officers receive limited fraud training as part of the initial consular course, and FPMs are not required to take advanced fraud training in new technologies. In addition, GAO found that 81 percent of FPM positions were filled by entry-level officers and 84 percent of FPM positions were designated as either part-time or rotational. Between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers made up about 21 percent of the total students who registered for a course on detecting fraudulent documents, and State could not guarantee that FPMs were among them. Four out of the five FPMs with whom GAO spoke had not been trained in State's new fraud case management system.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that State (1) formulate a policy to systematically utilize anti-fraud resources available at KCC, based on post workload and fraud trends, as determined by the Department and (2) establish requirements for FPM training in advanced anti-fraud technologies, taking advantage of distance learning technologies, and establishing methods to track the extent to which requirements are met. State concurred with these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of State’s (State) visa issuance process is the first line of  defense against fraudulent or unlawful entry into the United States. State  issues visas for both temporary visitors (referred to as nonimmigrant  visas) and those seeking to enter the United States as permanent  immigrants (referred to as immigrant visas). There are dozens of visa  categories for entry, such as tourist visas, student visas, and temporary  worker visas (see app. II for a list of all temporary visitor visa categories).  State seeks to identify and prevent attempts by applicants to obtain travel  documents through unauthorized means, such as knowingly altering or  using counterfeit identity documents or intentionally making false claims  or statements. Some applicants use fraudulently obtained visas to  facilitate illegal activities in the United States, including crimes of violence,  narcotics, human trafficking, and terrorism.
In 2005, we reported that State and other agencies had taken many steps  to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool since the  September 11, 2001 attacks. For example, State increased hiring of  consular officers, revamped consular training with a focus on  counterterrorism, and increased resources to combat visa fraud. In 2007,  we reported that the security of visas had been enhanced but more  needed to be done to prevent their fraudulent use. That same year, we  reported that the Diversity Visa Program is particularly vulnerable to  manipulation from an unscrupulous visa industry in some countries.
This report examines (1) countries and visa categories subject to the  most visa fraud; (2) State’s technologies and resources to combat fraud;  and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud  prevention.
To determine the countries and visa categories subject to the most visa  fraud, we analyzed State Fraud Digest reports from 1996 through 2012,  reviewed fraud summaries for posts with high rates of fraud, reviewed  compilations of Diplomatic Security Monthly Status reports, analyzed data  on the number of visa applications referred to Fraud Prevention Units,  and interviewed State officials at headquarters and abroad to discuss  fraud trends. To assess State’s use of technologies and resources to  combat fraud, we met with State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of  Consular Systems and Technology to review State’s major data systems  as well as the latest technological tools available to consular officers and  Fraud Prevention Managers, and we visited the Kentucky Consular  Center (KCC) to observe prescreening and anti-fraud activities. To  understand the training required of State officials responsible for  combating fraud, we gathered information about the training requirements  of Fraud Prevention Managers and staff working in Fraud Prevention  Units. We also analyzed data on the experience level of Fraud Prevention  Managers at all 222 visa-issuing posts. Lastly, we conducted interviews  with consular officials and Diplomatic Security Special Agents working in  five overseas posts on issues related to visa fraud prevention.
We conducted our work from August 2011 through September 2012, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. (see appendix I for more  information about our scope and methodology).
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The mission of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (Consular Affairs) is to  protect the lives and interests of U.S. citizens overseas and to strengthen  U.S. border security through the vigilant adjudication of U.S. passports  and visas. Consular officers abroad have sole legal authority to adjudicate  visa applications, and they receive overseas and domestic support to help  identify visa fraud. Consular officers at overseas posts issue  nonimmigrant visas to temporary visitors and immigrant visas to people  who intend to immigrate to the United States. The adjudication  processes for both nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications contain  steps to check for fraud.
subsections: section_title: Consular Officers Rely on Overseas Support to Identify Fraud
paragraphs: Consular Affairs has more than 11,000 officers, local staff, and  contractors working in over 300 locations around the world, including  domestic visa centers and passport facilities. Within each consular  section at overseas posts, consular officers adjudicate visa applications,  serving as fraud detection officers on the first line of defense for border  security. Consular officers are charged with facilitating legitimate travel  while preventing ineligible aliens, including potential terrorists, from  gaining admission to the United States. To help detect and prevent fraud,  consular officers work with members of a Fraud Prevention Unit located in  the consular section. In large posts, the Fraud Prevention Unit may be led  by a Fraud Prevention Manager, and may be augmented at certain high- fraud posts by a Diplomatic Security Assistant Regional Security Officer   In smaller posts, the Fraud Prevention Manager may be a  Investigator.consular officer who has other responsibilities depending on the workload  volume and prevalence of fraud at the post. Consular officers may also  coordinate with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Visa Security  Officer and an external anti-fraud working group.
Fraud Prevention Manager. Under the Bureau of Consular Affairs,  fraud prevention efforts at the 222 visa-issuing posts are led by a  Fraud Prevention Manager—a Foreign Service Officer assigned by  consular management to investigate fraud cases, conduct fraud  training, and provide information on fraud trends to the entire consular  section. As of April 30, 2012, 81 percent of all visa issuing posts (180  of 222) had Fraud Prevention Manager positions filled by an entry- level officer or an officer of unspecified grade, and 84 percent of visa  issuing posts (186 of 222) had Fraud Prevention Manager positions  designated as part- time or rotational. As of April 30, 2012, 36 posts  had full-time mid-level Fraud Prevention Managers serving for 2  years. An additional 40 posts had full-time entry-level Fraud  Prevention Managers serving for 2 years in positions originally  designated for mid-level officers. Officers assigned to part-time Fraud  Prevention Manager positions have other consular-related duties in  addition to preventing fraud. An officer filling the position on a  rotational basis serves as the Fraud Prevention Manager for a  designated period of time, typically 6 months, before moving on to  other duties. State officials told us that the reason most Fraud  Prevention Manager positions are part-time or rotational is in order to  provide consular managers more flexibility in how they use consular  staff, and also to provide officers with more opportunities to work on  different activities.
Fraud Prevention Unit. At 94 percent of visa-issuing posts (208 of  222), Fraud Prevention Managers have locally employed staff to  assist them in fraud investigations, forming a Fraud Prevention Unit.  Out of the 3,700 locally employed staff working at consular posts, 417  are assigned to Fraud Prevention Units. These staff generally have  special expertise in host country culture and language, as well as a  network of local contacts to help develop leads on possible fraud. The  Fraud Prevention Unit collects and verifies data for use in identifying  fraud trends, analyzes individual fraud cases, and drafts and  disseminates fraud reports. Tools utilized in individual fraud  investigations vary from post to post, but may include physical  document examination, visa record searches, facial-recognition  review, phone calls to verify data, Internet searches, and site visits.  Once all of the data have been collected, verified, and assessed, the  Fraud Prevention Manager reviews the results and provides a final  fraud finding to consular officers, who use the information to make a  determination on whether to issue a visa to the applicant. If the Fraud  Prevention Manager determines that the visa fraud may involve  criminal activity, the case may be referred to Diplomatic Security  agents at post for further investigation.
Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator. Under the Bureau of  Diplomatic Security, 84 Assistant Regional Security Officer  Investigators (ARSO-I) are assigned to 75 high-fraud posts to protect  the integrity of the visa system and disrupt criminal networks and  terrorist mobility. ARSO-Is are Diplomatic Security Special Agents  who specialize in criminal investigations of visa fraud. Diplomatic  Security recommends that ARSO-Is spend 80 percent of their time  working on visa fraud, and 20 percent of their time supporting other  Diplomatic Security responsibilities, such as providing security to high- level visitors at post. ARSO-Is often work with local law enforcement  and judicial officials to arrest and prosecute violators of local laws  related to visa fraud, such as the fraudulent production of local  identification documents used in applications for visas. Some  investigations are connected to large-scale alien smuggling or human  trafficking cases.
DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Visa  Security Program. ICE deploys Visa Security Officers to assist the  consular section at designated high-risk posts by providing advice and  training to consular officers regarding specific security threats,  reviewing visa applications, and conducting investigations with  respect to consular matters under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of  Homeland Security.
External Anti-Fraud Working Group. At some posts, members of the  Fraud Prevention Unit may coordinate with officials from other  countries’ embassies and consulates to share fraud trends in an anti- fraud working group.
section_title: Consular Officers Also Rely on Domestic Fraud Prevention Efforts
paragraphs: Domestically, both State and DHS play a role in fraud prevention and  detection. While the Secretary of State has the lead role with respect to  foreign policy-related visa issues, DHS is responsible for reviewing  implementation of the policy and providing additional direction.
State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Office has direct responsibility  for visa policy and oversight for the operations of KCC and the  National Visa Center in New Hampshire. These two centers  prescreen visa applications for fraud and provide other support for  visa adjudication worldwide.
State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of Fraud Prevention  Programs advises posts on visa and passport fraud questions,  develops training material to manage fraud prevention programs,  produces publications on fraud issues and trends, and coordinates  with other U.S. agencies involved in preventing visa fraud.
State’s Diplomatic Security Office of Overseas Criminal Investigations  Branch provides managerial oversight, guidance, and support to  ARSO-Is at overseas posts.
Diplomatic Security domestic field offices support overseas  investigations by investigating visa fraud that is connected to criminal  networks within the United States.
DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Fraud  Detection National Security Directorate is responsible for detecting,  pursuing, and deterring immigration benefit fraud, and identifying  persons seeking benefits who pose a threat to national security and  public safety. In addition, Fraud Detection National Security  Directorate staff conduct site visits and administrative inquiries within  the United States on persons or entities suspected of immigration  fraud and follow up with ICE investigators, law enforcement, and  intelligence agencies on potential national security risks identified  during background checks on immigration benefit applications.
DHS’s ICE Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces work with  federal, state, and local partners to detect, deter, investigate, and  present instances of benefit fraud for criminal prosecution.
DHS’s Customs and Border Protection agents serve as the last line of  defense in protecting American borders. Customs and Border  Protection agents verify that visitors have proper travel documents  and valid visas, and have the discretion to not admit travelers with  valid visas into the United States if the agent suspects the traveler  intends to violate the terms of his or her visa.
section_title: Issuance of Visas Has Generally Increased since 2003
paragraphs: After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the number of visas issued  initially declined, but has generally increased steadily since 2003, and  State anticipates demand for visas to continue to rise. As seen in figure 1,  in 2001, the United States issued almost 8 million nonimmigrant and  immigrant visas, based on data from the Consular Consolidated  Database. From 2001 to 2003, visa issuances declined by 34 percent.  However, since then, the number of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas  issued has generally trended upward. In 2011, consular officers issued  more than 7.5 million nonimmigrant visas, up 54 percent from 2003  levels. Approximately 75 percent of the 7.5 million nonimmigrant visas  issued in 2011 were processed for temporary visits to the United States   More than half (52  for business or personal reasons, such as tourism.percent) of the visas for temporary visits were issued to visitors from  Brazil, China, India, and Mexico. According to the Deputy Assistant  Secretary for Visa Services, State continues to see increases in visa  demand for individuals residing in some of the world’s fastest-growing  economies.
While visa issuances have generally increased since 2003, visa refusals  have fluctuated since 2006. In fiscal year 2011, more than 2.1 million  nonimmigrant visa applicants worldwide were denied visas for entry into  the United States. As seen in table 1, adjusted refusal rates for tourist  visas in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico fluctuated between fiscal years  2006 and 2011. While refusals of visitors from Brazil, China, and Mexico  have generally decreased in the last 6 years, refusals of visitors from  India have increased. Visas may be refused for a number of reasons  other than a suspicion of fraud, such as insufficient documentation or  suspected immigration intent. When a consular officer suspects that the  applicant’s travel or financial documents are counterfeit, the consular  officer may deny the applicant’s request for a visa or may refer the case  to the Fraud Prevention Unit for an additional fraud assessment.
The U.S. travel and tourism industry benefits from foreign visitors, and the  U.S. government is working to accommodate an increase in demand for  tourist travel. For example, State reported in 2010 that international  tourists contributed $134 billion to the U.S. economy and supported over  1.1 million jobs. The Administration has encouraged State to increase  visa processing capacity and reduce wait times for receiving a visa. In  January 2012, President Obama issued an Executive Order requesting  that the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, in consultation with  the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and  Counterterrorism and the Director of the Office of Management and  Budget, develop an implementation plan to (1) increase nonimmigrant  visa processing capacity in China and Brazil by 40 percent over the  coming year and (2) ensure that 80 percent of nonimmigrant visa  applicants are interviewed within 3 weeks of receipt of visa applications.
section_title: Nonimmigrant and Immigrant Visa Adjudication Processes Include Fraud Checks
subsections: section_title: Nonimmigrant Visa Adjudication Process
paragraphs: Almost all nonimmigrant visa applicants submit an online visa application  called the DS-160 through State’s web-based portal called the Consular  Electronic Application Center, and then schedule a visa interview at a  local U.S. embassy or consulate. Consular officers interview visa  applicants, review the application and supporting documents, such as  birth certificates, and make an initial decision to issue or deny the visa  application. A consular officer may temporarily deny the visa in order to  scrutinize the application for suspected fraud or to process it further  administratively (see fig. 2).
Obtaining an immigrant visa is one part of a four part process for aliens  outside of the United States to become a permanent resident of the  United States. First, an eligible U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident,  called a petitioner, must file a petition (a paper form) with USCIS on  behalf of the alien applying for lawful permanent resident status, who is  called the beneficiary. Generally, the petitioner can be either a relative  or employer, although there are visa categories in which the applicant can  self petition, such as the diversity visa. USCIS has the sole authority to  approve or deny the petition. Second, once a petition is approved and a  visa number is available in the appropriate category, the beneficiary  prepares for a visa interview by gathering required documentation and  undergoing a medical exam. Third, the beneficiary, now called the  applicant, submits an online visa application, either the DS-260 or the DS- 230, along with evidence supporting the applicant’s eligibility, such as a  birth certificate or diploma. All aliens outside the United States apply for  an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate in their current country of  residence. As in the nonimmigrant visa process, the alien schedules a  visa interview, submits fingerprints, and pays a visa application  processing fee. During the interview, a consular officer reviews submitted  documentation as well as biometric and other security and fraud checks,  determines if the alien is subject to any ineligibilities, and confirms that  the applicant has the required legal relationship with the petitioner. The  consular officer then either approves or denies the visa application. If the  visa application is approved, a visa is printed and placed in the applicant’s  passport. Fourth, the applicant travels to the United States with his or her  immigrant visa and packet of supporting documentation. Upon admission  by a Customs and Border Patrol officer at the port of entry, the alien  becomes a lawful permanent resident.
section_title: Certain Countries and Visa Categories Experience High Levels of Fraud, but Trends Evolve over Time
paragraphs: Certain countries, such as Brazil, China, the Dominican Republic, India,  and Mexico, had high numbers of suspected fraud cases in fiscal year  2010, and certain visa categories, such as work visas, student visas, and  diversity visas, had high levels of fraud. Visa fraud has become more  sophisticated over time with increased globalization, advanced  technology, and ease of travel.
subsections: section_title: Although Fraud Conditions Are Post-Specific, Certain Countries Have High Numbers of Suspected Fraud Cases
paragraphs: State requires Fraud Prevention Managers to classify fraud levels at each  post. Fraud Prevention Managers are required to submit a fraud  assessment twice a year as part of the post’s bi-annual fraud summary.  Fraud assessments rank a post’s fraud conditions as high, medium, or  low, based on the ratio of visa applications referred to the Fraud  Prevention Unit out of the total number of visa applications. The fraud  assessment also includes the prevalence of corruption in the local  environment, including the reliability of country documents and  cooperation with local law enforcement. Additionally, ARSO-Is provide  input into fraud assessments regarding the nature of criminal activity  involving visas. According to State, a country with high numbers of  suspected fraud cases may not necessarily be designated as a high-fraud  country if its proportion of suspected fraud to visa applications is low.
Recently, State has taken steps to improve its ability to compare fraud  levels across posts. In the past, according to State officials, self-reported  fraud levels had not been used to assess posts’ fraud conditions relative  to other posts because posts had different methods for referring cases to  Fraud Prevention Units. Referrals to Fraud Prevention Units are  considered an accurate portrayal of the volume of fraud cases handled at  individual posts because Fraud Prevention Managers must make a fraud  assessment for all cases that are referred. In July 2012, State distributed  new guidance that clarifies when consular officers should refer visa  applications to Fraud Prevention Units. For example, new guidance  instructs consular officers to refer applications to Fraud Prevention Units  whenever the unit is expected to expend resources to verify some aspect  of an applicant’s case or when consular officers cannot perform a needed  task, such as verifying the employment of an applicant.
The volume of visas processed and the number of fraudulent applications  vary from country to country. In general, fraudulent activity is found in a  very small percentage of overall visas granted. Based on State’s  Consular Consolidated Database, 6.9 million nonimmigrant and immigrant  visas were issued worldwide in 2010. That same year, approximately  74,000 visa applications were referred to Fraud Prevention Units for  additional scrutiny. Of these, about 16,000, or 22 percent, were confirmed  as fraudulent in fiscal year 2010. Some countries may experience high  visa demand but low numbers of suspected fraud cases, while other  countries may experience high visa demand and high numbers of  suspected fraud cases. For example, in 2010, consular officers  throughout Brazil issued approximately 556,000 visas and referred about  3,000 visa applications to their Fraud Prevention Units, of which 750 (or  24 percent of visa applications suspected of fraud) were confirmed as  fraudulent. Meanwhile, consular officers throughout India issued about  528,000 visas in 2010, referred about 5,200 visa applications to their  Fraud Prevention Units, and confirmed about 2,600 (or 50 percent of visa  applications suspected of fraud) as fraudulent. See figure 3 for the top 10  posts for referrals to Fraud Prevention Units among total nonimmigrant  and immigrant visa applications in 2010. Almost 60 percent of confirmed  fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) were referred to Fraud Prevention Units  in Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico in fiscal year  2010.
State’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs reports that a majority of  visa fraud involves nonimmigrant visa applicants who submit false  documents or make false statements to obtain a tourist or business visitor  visa. According to State officials, some visitor visa applicants provide  fraudulent statements or documents, such as a false bank statement, to  demonstrate strong ties with their home country and therefore overcome  the presumption that they intend to use their temporary visitor visa to  illegally immigrate to the United States. Denied visitor visa applications  are not usually referred to the Fraud Prevention Unit unless the officer  suspects the case could be linked to organized crime.
Other kinds of fraud can be found in temporary worker visas, student  visas, exchange visitor visas, immigrant visas, and diversity visas.
Temporary Worker Visas: While State officials said that most work  visas facilitate legitimate travel, fraud has been found among  petitioners and applicants for both skilled worker and temporary  agricultural worker visas. Some petitioners in the United States  create phony companies and petition for workers to join them in the  United States, usually with the applicants’ knowledge and participation  in the fraudulent activity, according to State officials. Other examples  of fraud include cases in which educational degrees were found to be  fraudulent, signatures were forged on supporting documents, and  workers performed duties or received payments significantly different  from those described in the applications. A recent DHS study reported  that 21 percent of skilled worker petitions they examined involved  fraud or technical violations. In 2005, DHS began collecting an  additional $500 fee on certain work visas to be used for fraud  prevention and detection purposes.
Student Visas: Foreign students interested in studying in the United  States must first be admitted to a school or university before applying  for a visa at a U.S. embassy or consulate overseas. The process for  determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several  steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews,  collection of applicants’ fingerprints, and cross-references against  multiple databases of information. In 2011, State issued over  486,000 student visas, of which 71 percent were issued to students  from Asia. According to the Fraud Prevention Coordinator for India,  fraud among student visa applications is common throughout India.  For example, some exam centers that offer the Test of English as a  Foreign Language (TOEFL) are suspected of being complacent when  students cheat on the exam in order to achieve high scores. If a  student applicant cannot answer a consular officer’s questions in  English, yet received 105 out of 120 on their TOEFL score, fraud may  be present, according to a consular officer in New Delhi.
Exchange Visitor Visas: Summer Work and Travel (SWT) visas are a  subset of the Exchange Visitor Program, and are susceptible to  fraud. The Exchange Visitor Program fosters global understanding  through educational and cultural exchanges. All exchange visitors are  expected to return to their home country upon completion of their  program in order to share their experiences. In 2011, 35 percent  (108,717) of the total exchange visitors (306,429) were granted entry  into the United States for the purpose of “Summer Work and Travel.”  According to State officials, many SWT visa applicants misrepresent  their status as students or their intentions for using the SWT visa.  Additionally, many U.S. sponsors falsely represent their businesses  and how they intend to employ SWT applicants. U.S. sponsors have  been found to exploit SWT visa holders for financial gain. On May 10,  2012, State’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Exchange issued  rules that are expected to protect the health, safety, and welfare of  SWT program participants. The rules provide a cap on the number of  annual SWT program participants that may be granted visas.
Immigrant Visas: In 2010, State issued 482,052 immigrant visas. That  same year, 21,013 immigrant visa applications were referred to Fraud  Prevention Units and 4,984 (or about 24 percent) were confirmed as  fraudulent. Immigrant visa fraud can take many forms. At several  posts we visited, State officials said a common problem involved  applicants who pay American citizens to marry them or who falsely  represent their intentions to citizens and deceive them into marriage in  order to obtain lawful permanent residence in the United States. In a  typical immigrant visa fraud case, an individual divorces his or her  spouse in a foreign country, marries an American citizen, and, after  living in the United States for a certain period of time, obtains U.S.  citizenship or legal permanent resident status, divorces the U.S.  spouse, and remarries the original spouse so that they can reunite in  the United States.
Diversity Visas: The Diversity Visa Program was established through  the Immigration Act of 1990 and provides up to 55,000 immigrant  visas annually to aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to  the United States. Aliens register for the diversity visa lottery for free  online and applicants are randomly selected for interviews through a  lottery process. Upon being selected, a winner must apply for a visa,  be interviewed, and be found eligible for the diversity visa. All  countries are eligible for the Diversity Visa Program except those from  which more than 50,000 immigrants have come to the United States  over the preceding 5 years. In 2011, approximately 16.5 million  people applied for the program and about 107,000 (7 percent) were  selected for further processing. Of those selected, 75,000 were  interviewed at posts for a diversity visa, and approximately 50,000  received visas. Because the program does not require a U.S.-based  petitioner, it is particularly susceptible to fraud. Diversity visa fraud is  rampant in parts of South Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, and is  particularly acute in areas where few individuals have independent  access to the Internet.travel agents, or Internet café operators who help would-be applicants  submit an entry for a fee. Many of these facilitators withhold the  confirmation information that the entrant must use to retrieve his or   A typical scenario includes visa facilitators,  her selection status. To access the lottery notification, the facilitators  may require winning applicants to either pay an additional exorbitant  fee or agree to enter into a marriage with another of the facilitator’s  paying clients solely for the purpose of extending immigration  benefits.
section_title: Fraud Risks Evolve Over Time
paragraphs: Visa fraud has evolved and become more sophisticated over time due to  unscrupulous visa applicants who adapt to State’s efforts to combat fraud,  increased globalization, advanced technology, and ease of travel. Fraud  schemes are no longer centralized in individual countries. Criminal fraud  rings, human smuggling networks, and trafficking rings work across  multiple countries to circumvent State’s visa process. For example, in  2009, a typical route for traffickers from India who sought religious asylum  in the United States originated in New Delhi and transited through  Moscow, Dubai, Sao Paulo, and Mexico before reaching Texas,  according to the Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator in New  Delhi. In addition, new technologies have helped individuals and  organizations adapt to State’s visa security features and develop  increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. For example, high-quality  micro-printing and new assembly methods have allowed imposters to  duplicate State’s visa security threads and serial numbers. With global  access to the Internet, fraud scams used in one country or continent have  quickly made their way to others, and therefore high-fraud countries and  posts have shifted from year to year. For example, only 4 countries were  among the top 10 countries for visa fraud in both 2005 and 2010: the  Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, and Peru.
section_title: State Has a Variety of Tools and Resources to Combat Fraud, but Does Not Have a Policy for Systematically Utilizing Domestic Anti-Fraud Resources
paragraphs: Consular officers rely on State’s advanced information technology, fraud  reports, and domestic and overseas fraud prevention resources to  improve their ability to detect and deter fraud. However, State does not  have a policy to systematically utilize its domestic anti-fraud resources to  offset fraud workload overseas.
subsections: section_title: State Has Implemented New Technological Tools Intended to Enhance Its Visa Fraud Prevention Efforts
paragraphs: The Consular Affairs Office of Consular Systems and Technology has  deployed several new tools to counter fraud in the visa process, including  the following:
Online Nonimmigrant Visa Application Form, DS-160: In the spring of  2010, State implemented the DS-160 online nonimmigrant visa  application system, which requires applicants to submit all information  electronically. With the collection of electronic information prior to the  scheduled visa interview, State is able to research and analyze  applicants’ data for indicators of fraud prior to an interview with a  consular officer. Overseas, State encourages Fraud Prevention Units  to conduct pre-screening checks of applicants’ visa history to identify  aliases or discrepancies between current and previous applications.
Enterprise Case Assessment Service (eCAS): In April 2011, State  released eCAS, the first centralized system for Fraud Prevention Units  to track and manage their nonimmigrant and immigrant visa fraud  cases. eCAS is based in the Consular Consolidated Database, and  Fraud Prevention Units use it to create, develop, and resolve fraud  assessments. Previously, fraud cases were either designated as  “fraud confirmed” or “fraud not confirmed.” With eCAS, fraud cases  are now designated as “fraud confirmed,” “no fraud,” or “inconclusive,”  which allows Fraud Prevention units more flexibility to designate that  some cases have a suspicion of fraud but not enough evidence to  confirm fraud. In the first 5 months of the system’s use, May 2011  through September 2011, 188 posts worldwide used eCAS to process  over 43,000 fraud cases. According to State, in 2012 State released  an eCAS module domestically that can also be used to process  passport fraud cases, and State plans to extend this module overseas  in 2013.
MATRIX: In 2011, State released a new fraud prevention tool known  as MATRIX that is accessible to Fraud Prevention Units and  Diplomatic Security agents through State’s Consular Consolidated  Database. MATRIX is a search tool that makes associations  between information on a visa application and other records and data  sources. MATRIX links information in the Consular Consolidated  Database to other State records, USCIS records, and INTERPOL  data. Fraud Prevention Managers and ARSO-Is can use MATRIX to  link information contained on previous visa applications and to reveal  similarities across multiple applications as an indicator of fraud. For  example, according to Consular Affairs officials, MATRIX found that  one applicant’s contact phone number in the United States matched  the phone numbers used by 17 other applicants, a possible indication  of fraud.
Diversity Visa Entry Status Check: In 2010, State began an online  verification system called the Entry Status Check that allowed all  entrants of the 2010 Diversity Visa Program to electronically,  individually, and privately check the status of their online submissions  through a State website. This system eliminated the need for direct  mailing of Diversity Visa correspondence and enhanced State’s ability  to combat fraud. Prior to the electronic system, notification letters  were physically mailed to the address listed on the application.  Unscrupulous visa agents listed their own addresses so that the  notification letters were delivered to them instead of the people  selected in the lottery. The agent could demand thousands of dollars  from an applicant in exchange for the letter.
Consular Consolidated Database Search Rules to Identify Fraud  Indicators: State is currently developing a new anti-fraud tool that will  automatically search visa applications for fraud indicators and alert  consular officials when fraud indicators are found. For example, State  may find higher rates of fraud among visa applicants who rely on  services provided by a particular local visa company. Consular  officials in that country can request that State flag future visa  applications listing that visa company’s name.
section_title: State Compiles Various Internal Reports to Share Information about Fraud Trends and Available Resources
paragraphs: State shares information between consular posts and headquarters  regarding the latest fraud trends through reporting mechanisms such as  validation studies, semi-annual fraud summaries, fraud digests, fraud  notices, or reporting cables, Diplomatic Security monthly status reports,  and Diplomatic Security program reviews.
Validation Studies: State considers validation studies to be one of the  best fraud-prevention tools available to consular officers. Posts  conduct validation studies on visas that have been issued to  determine the extent to which the visas have been misused, and  posts send summaries of fraud risks to headquarters twice a year.  Posts are required to conduct at least two validation studies per year,  one on a visa category of the post’s choosing and one on visa  referrals. Generally, consular officers select a sample of visa  issuances and determine how many of the visa recipients departed  the United States within the terms of their visas, how many remained  in the United States longer than their visas allowed, and how many  never traveled to the United States.the accuracy of adjudication decisions, and allow Consular Affairs  officials to share emerging fraud trends across posts.
Semi-Annual Fraud Summaries: State guidance calls for validation  studies to be incorporated into posts’ Semi-Annual Fraud  Summaries—reports submitted twice annually that provide input for  improvements in fraud prevention guidance, training, and resources.  State guidance notes that the summaries should discuss current  country conditions that may contribute to fraud risks, such as the  presence of organized crime networks. According to the guidance, the  summaries should discuss fraud trends for nonimmigrant visas,  immigrant visas, diversity visas, passports, and coordination with  Diplomatic Security personnel, among other topics. These studies  should discuss new information that may be used to establish new  fraud indicators.
Fraud Digests: Since September 1996, State has published a monthly  newsletter called the Fraud Digest that profiles worldwide fraud  trends, fraud prevention techniques, and advances in areas such as  fraud prevention technology and immigration document design. The  digests are accessible on the web and are shared government-wide  with approximately 3,600 subscribers, as of April 2012. The main  audience for the digest is domestic and overseas consular personnel  and Diplomatic Security agents.
Reporting Cables: State headquarters gathers and analyzes  information from posts, and distributes guidance to posts through  monthly reporting cables in order to update consular officers on  evolving fraud trends.
Diplomatic Security Monthly Status Reports: According to Diplomatic  Security officials, ARSO-Is worldwide submit monthly status reports  that delineate the number of hours spent on criminal investigations  and training of foreign personnel. The status report also describes  progress on the post’s visa cases, including preliminary queries for  information and arrests. The information supplements data entered  into the Diplomatic Security primary case management system known  as the Investigative Management System, according to Diplomatic  Security officials.
Diplomatic Security Program Reviews: Diplomatic Security officials  told us that Diplomatic Security program reviews are internal reports  that highlight best practices at posts and make recommendations for  improvements. To complete the program reviews, officials from  Diplomatic Security’s Office of Criminal Investigations told us that they  spend 2 days at each post answering standardized questions about  training, pending cases, arrests, budget, and information systems,  among other topics. Diplomatic Security aims to visit all posts with an  ARSO-I presence once every 2 years, according to Diplomatic  Security officials.
section_title: State Has Expanded Anti- Fraud Activities Conducted by KCC
paragraphs: KCC, located in Williamsburg, Kentucky, has become an important anti- fraud resource for State. State opened KCC in October 2000, to process  worldwide diversity visa applications and reduce the workload on  adjudicating officers at overseas posts. According to KCC officials, the  number of local employees at KCC has increased from 40 to 273,  including 54 staff working within a Fraud Prevention Unit. In August  2001, KCC began a pilot project to screen all nonimmigrant visa  applications with facial recognition software. According to KCC officials,  after the September 11, 2001 attack, State was required to store visa  applications for 7 years. As a result, KCC officials began scanning old  visa applications and uploading all biographic information and evidence of  visa ineligibilities. All visa applicants’ biographic information, including  both fingerprints and digitized photographs, is checked through State’s  Consular Lookout and Support System database and facial recognition  software.
State describes KCC as an incubator for new consular projects, and KCC  is in the process of expanding anti-fraud services to posts overseas,  according to KCC officials. Currently, KCC provides prescreening  services for selected posts overseas. Any post may request KCC  assistance in conducting research and analysis on visa applications,  either on an ad-hoc basis for individual cases, or on a pilot basis for  larger-scale projects. For example, since over 50 percent of all skilled  worker (H-1B) and intracompany transfers (L) visas are processed in  India, KCC initiated a process to verify all petitioner information contained  on these types of visa applications from posts in India, according to State  officials. Globally, KCC screened 81,862 H-1B and L-1 applications for  fraud in calendar year 2011. In addition to H and L visas, KCC conducts  prescreening on several other visa classifications that are susceptible to  fraud. According to State officials, KCC screeners and fraud analysts  conduct basic checks, such as verifying the legal name of the business as  well as more complex research including data mining, evaluation of the  petitioning organization’s business viability, and phone calls to petitioning  employers. Additionally, KCC fraud analysts may also refer the case to  onsite Fraud Detection and National Security officers to request a visit to  the proposed employment site. If derogatory information, such as a  revocation of a prior petition, exists on a petitioning company, screeners  enter all comments into the applicant’s online DS-160 form, for access by  the consular officer, who makes the ultimate decision to issue or deny the  visa.
In fiscal year 2012, State intends to prescreen 15 percent of all worldwide  nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications prior to the visa interview,  increasing to 50 percent by fiscal year 2013. To prescreen visa  applications, KCC reviews and processes all sets of documents and data  received from petitioners and beneficiaries. KCC employees conduct  research on visa applicants and petitioners, and provide this information  to consular officers overseas so that they have access to the information  prior to interviewing a visa applicant in person. For example, we  observed a KCC analyst conducting research on a summer work and  travel visa application that listed the sponsor business as a restaurant.  However, the KCC analyst determined that the physical address listed on  the visa application was an adult entertainment venue, a business  prohibited by the program. The KCC analyst notified the interviewing post  of this finding so that the adjudicating officer would have knowledge of it  before the interview. KCC now prescreens the vast majority of certain  visa categories that have been associated with high rates of fraud, such  as summer work and travel visas. From March 2011 to April 2012, KCC  analysts researched over 9,000 companies participating in the Summer  Work and Travel Program and found that 13 percent of them had fraud  indicators. For example, some companies did not exist, the company’s  phone number was invalid, or the company reported that it never  expected a summer work and travel participant.
section_title: Overseas Anti-Fraud Staffing Levels and Workload Vary by Post
paragraphs: Anti-fraud staffing levels in Fraud Prevention Units vary widely across  overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads. State assigns  personnel to Fraud Prevention Units based on input from post  management and consular affairs management at headquarters.  Personnel from State’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs said  resource decisions for Fraud Prevention Units are driven by visa workload  and other factors at posts, not by the number of fraud cases.statistics on the number of fraud cases confirmed, unconfirmed, or  inconclusive are used by posts to direct anti-fraud strategies, Consular  Affairs does not use these statistics to determine the appropriate  distribution of personnel to Fraud Prevention Units.
The posts with the highest numbers of suspected fraud cases in 2011  were not assigned a number of Fraud Prevention Unit staff proportionate  to the number of fraud cases, as seen in table 2. For example, one entry  level officer and one mid-level officer in Santo Domingo, who were  assigned to Fraud Prevention Manager positions, joined five locally  employed staff in the Embassy’s Fraud Prevention Unit to combat the  entire country’s visa fraud. With approximately 7,879 cases suspected of  fraud in 2011, each member of Santo Domingo’s Fraud Prevention Unit  investigated an average of 1,126 cases and each member of  Guangzhou’s Fraud Prevention Unit investigated an average of 239  cases that year.
According to State officials, while State plans to expand the use of KCC  anti-fraud resources, there is no systematic process for overseas posts to  formally request KCC prescreening assistance. State’s Program  Evaluation Policy notes that program evaluation is essential for planning  decisions, and evaluation findings should be integrated into program  strategies and policies. However, State officials told us that anti-fraud pilot  programs conducted at KCC are not formally evaluated and there is no  established policy for posts to access domestic anti-fraud resources.  Rather, KCC provides anti-fraud assistance to overseas posts on an ad- hoc basis based on informal communication.
According to KCC’s Director, most posts have not requested KCC’s  assistance because they are not familiar with all of the anti-fraud services  that KCC can provide or how to request services. For example, a Fraud  Prevention Manager in a high-fraud post that we visited told us that the  post would like additional KCC prescreening of certain visa categories,  but was unaware of how to request KCC assistance. Multiple State  officials told us that most KCC prescreening initiatives have been due to  institutional knowledge at the management level in the field. For example,  all India-specific services provided by KCC were a direct result of a  Consular Manager in India who was aware of the prescreening services  KCC could provide.
According to the KCC Director, there are clear benefits to utilizing KCC  for fraud investigations. KCC staff are fully vetted U.S. citizens with secret  clearances and access to all restricted databases used in visa  adjudications. In addition, both Diplomatic Security and the U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Service are represented at KCC, and are  available to assist in fraud investigations. The majority of KCC staff are  provided through a contractor, and the contract provides for the ability to  adjust to changes in demand for services.
section_title: Although State Offers a Variety of Anti- Fraud Training Courses, Fraud Prevention Managers Are Not Required to Take Them
paragraphs: Although State offers anti-fraud courses in a classroom setting and  online, State does not require Fraud Prevention Managers to take them.  In addition, State does not track Fraud Prevention Manager enrollment in  anti-fraud courses, and therefore State does not know whether the large  number of entry-level officers filling fraud prevention manager positions  have taken the anti-fraud courses.
subsections: section_title: State Offers a Variety of Anti-Fraud Training Courses
paragraphs: The Foreign Service Institute has expanded the number of courses it  offers Foreign Service Officers in fraud prevention and detection, covering  topics such as advanced name checking, analytic interviewing, and  emotional content analysis. The institute’s anti-fraud training courses  include the following:
Basic Consular Course (PC530): Commonly known as ConGen,  PC530 is a 6-week course that all Foreign Service officers are  required to take prior to their first consular tour. PC530 is also  required for any officer heading to a consular tour who has neither  done consular work nor taken ConGen in the preceding 5 years. The  course contains a module covering security, accountability, fraud, and  ethics, which includes training in detecting and preventing fraud.
Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers (PC541): This course is  designed for Fraud Prevention Managers who are currently serving in  the field, emphasizing anti-fraud and counterterrorism tools for  consular officers.
State also offers consular officers distance learning or online courses in  detecting and preventing fraud. These courses are either prescheduled  live courses, prerecorded or accessible 24 hours a day, or offered on- demand. Online consular training in fraud includes the following:
Detecting Imposters (PC128): This course teaches students  procedures for identifying imposters either at the interview window or  in photographs.
Detecting Fraudulent Documents (PC544): This course teaches  consular officers how to determine whether a document has been  altered or is counterfeit.
New Consular Technologies (eCAS and MATRIX): This course trains  consular officers in how to use eCAS and MATRIX to combat visa  fraud.
State officials from the Office of Consular Systems and Technology said  that its training programs are updated as soon as new features are rolled  out, and the training typically focuses on new technology features.  Consular officers are provided with manuals that explain the new software  tools about a month in advance and can attend live and prerecorded  training courses. While some consular courses can take about 2 hours,  training in MATRIX is a prerecorded session that takes approximately 30  minutes. Although training on new technological tools is available and  encouraged by State, a survey of Fraud Prevention Managers revealed  that respondents’ lack of knowledge of some key anti-fraud tools  indicated that updates were not uniformly reaching officers.
section_title: State Does Not Require Fraud Prevention Managers to Take Anti- Fraud Courses
paragraphs: While State encourages Fraud Prevention Managers to take updated  fraud prevention training, the training is not required. Entry-level officers  are required to complete 6 weeks of basic consular training prior to their  arrival at post but are not required to take other advanced anti-fraud  courses offered at the Foreign Service Institute or online, such as eCAS  or MATRIX. For example, four of the five Fraud Prevention Managers we  met with had not been trained in MATRIX. Advanced fraud training  courses are targeted to mid-level officers, but the majority of Fraud  Prevention Manager positions (180 of 222) were filled by an entry-level  officer or an officer of unspecified grade. In 2011, a little more than half of  the students enrolled in PC541 were entry-level officers, and State could  not determine whether Fraud Prevention Managers were among them.  Additionally, between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers  made up approximately 22 percent (489 of 2,252) of the total number of  students who registered for Detecting Imposters (PC128) and 21 percent  (486 of 2,246) of the total number of students who registered for  Detecting Fraudulent Documents (PC544). Without advanced fraud  training courses, Fraud Prevention Managers may not know about the  roles and responsibilities of KCC, or how to use the Consular Lookout  and Support System name-check database and biometric systems. For  example, two of the five Fraud Prevention Managers with whom we met  were unfamiliar with the anti-fraud services available at KCC. According  to the Office of Fraud Prevention Program’s country desk officers, the  level of anti-fraud training offered to Foreign Service Officers largely  depends on the officer’s experience level, years in the Foreign Service,  and available time. Desk officers offer a 1-hour briefing of country-specific  fraud issues and resources to all Foreign Service Officers prior to their  deployment, but not all of the officers take advantage of the briefing,  according to officials from the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs.
In addition, a significant period of time may pass between an entry-level  officer’s completion of the basic consular course and the time when he or  she assumes the role of Fraud Prevention Manager. Entry-level officers  are required to take only limited fraud prevention training that does not  include new anti-fraud technologies. For example, officers may not arrive  at a post until they complete required language training, which can take 6  months to a year. Additionally, entry-level officers who are not on the  consular affairs career track may serve a rotation in a different specialty  area before serving a rotation in consular affairs. Finally, many entry-level  officers are not assigned to the Fraud Prevention Manager position until  after they arrive at post.
section_title: State Does Not Track Enrollment of Fraud Prevention Managers in Anti-Fraud Courses
paragraphs: While State offers these anti-fraud training courses, both in Washington  D.C., and online, it does not track whether Fraud Prevention Managers  are taking them. In 2012, four of the five Fraud Prevention Managers with  whom we met had not been formally trained in MATRIX. Since its  rollout, State has not tracked the number of Fraud Prevention Managers  that have been trained in eCAS and MATRIX. In addition, State was  unable to differentiate enrollment data by position and therefore could not  confirm that Fraud Prevention Managers had enrolled in any fraud  prevention course.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: State’s fraud prevention efforts protect the integrity of the visa process  and help prevent people from exploiting the visa process to commit  crimes or threaten the security of the United States. Fraud trends evolve  over time as criminal networks and unscrupulous visa applicants seek to  circumvent State’s visa application process. Meanwhile, the number of  visas issued has risen steadily since 2003 and consular officers face  increased pressure to expedite visa processing. The evolving nature of  fraud and increases in the volume of visas adjudicated require State to  continuously update its anti-fraud efforts. In recent years, State has taken  steps to enhance the tools and services available to combat visa fraud,  including the deployment of new anti-fraud technologies and resources  improving State’s ability to prescreen applications for indicators of fraud  and to readily access information from prior visa applications. However,  these technologies and resources are only useful if consular officers know  that they exist and know how to use them. Currently, the majority of Fraud  Prevention Manager positions are filled by entry-level officers, who are  not the targeted audience for advanced anti-fraud training, and State  does not require them to be trained in all anti-fraud technologies. As a  result, Fraud Prevention Managers may not be fully equipped to detect  and combat fraud. Furthermore, posts increasingly rely on KCC to  prescreen certain visa applications for fraud, and State intends to  prescreen 50 percent of all visa applications worldwide prior to consular  interviews. However, State does not have a policy that specifies how to  systematically utilize the center’s resources, based on post workload and  fraud trends. Therefore, State cannot be assured that a valuable tool to  combat fraud is being strategically utilized. Absent effective support and  training, Fraud Prevention Units may make uninformed decisions, thus  enabling ineligible aliens, including potential terrorists, to gain admission  to the United States.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To further improve the visa fraud prevention process, we recommend that  the Secretary of State take the following two actions:  (1) Formulate a policy to systematically utilize anti-fraud resources  available at the Kentucky Consular Center, based on post workload and  fraud trends, as determined by the department; and  (2) Establish standardized training requirements for Fraud Prevention  Managers, to include training in advanced anti-fraud technologies, taking  advantage of distance learning technologies, and establishing methods to  track the extent to which requirements are met.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our report to State and DHS. State and DHS  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.  State also provided written comments, which are reproduced in   appendix IV. State concurred with our recommendations.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 14 days from the  report date.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  members of Congress and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and  State, as well as other interested members of Congress. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8980 or CourtsM@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines (1) countries and visa categories subject to the  most visa fraud; (2) technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3)  training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention.  This report focuses on visa fraud, and not passport fraud.
To determine the countries and visa categories subject to the most visa  fraud, and the evolution of fraud over time, we reviewed nonimmigrant  and immigrant visa issuance data from the Consular Consolidated  Database from 1992 to 2011. While we did not analyze State data on the  number of visa applications during this time period, we reviewed visa  refusal percentages by country. We did not review the reliability of these  data because they were for background purposes only. We also reviewed  State Fraud Digest reports from September 1996 through May 2012,  semi-annual fraud summaries for some of the posts with the highest  numbers of suspected fraud cases, and Diplomatic Security Monthly  Status reports from fiscal year 2011. We also analyzed fiscal year 2010  and 2011 data on the number of visa applications referred to Fraud  Prevention Units. We found 2010 data more reliable because State  transitioned to a new fraud management system in the middle of fiscal  year 2011, and formal guidance on how and when to refer cases to Fraud  Prevention Units was not released until July 2012. We compared the  2005 Country Fraud Ranking of Posts to fiscal year 2010 data on the  countries with the highest numbers of suspected fraud cases. We found  these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of indicating the  countries that reported the highest volumes of reported fraud cases and  made the most referrals. However, we found that these data may not  accurately reflect the relative levels of actual fraud in each country due to  possible differences in reporting by posts. We used fiscal year 2010 data  for our analysis because State introduced a new data system in 2011,  and we noted some potential problems with the 2011 data that arose due  to the transition. State officials in the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs  provided qualitative information on the types of visa categories that are  subject to fraud. Lastly, we interviewed State officials at headquarters and  abroad to discuss recent fraud trends.
To assess State’s use of technologies and resources to combat fraud, we  met with State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of Consular Systems  and Technology to review State’s major data systems as well as the latest  technological tools available to consular officers and Fraud Prevention  Managers. Specifically, we received demonstrations on State’s newly  deployed Enterprise Case Assessment Service (eCAS) used for tracking  fraud cases, and MATRIX, a search tool used in fraud prevention. We  visited the Kentucky Consular Center, an anti-fraud resource available to  posts, and observed its activities. We interviewed State officials at posts  regarding their usage of these tools and resources. To determine the  reliability of data captured by eCAS on the number of cases referred to  Fraud Prevention Units and the number of confirmed cases, we met with  consular officers and Fraud Prevention Managers in five posts to  determine how information was entered into eCAS. We determined that  the eCAS system was widely used across posts and was sufficiently  reliable to determine the general volume of fraud referrals.
To understand the training required of State officials responsible for  combating fraud, we gathered information about training requirements  and course enrollment from the Foreign Service Institute’s Student  Training Management System. We interviewed Foreign Service Institute  personnel regarding controls, strengths and limitations of the course  enrollment data and determined it was sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. We also analyzed data on the number of direct hire and local  staff working in all 222 visa-issuing consular posts as of December 2011  and reviewed data gathered by State liaisons from the Consular Workload  Statistics System on the number and grade of officers assigned to Fraud  Prevention Units at consular posts as of April 2012. We obtained staffing  data from State’s GEMS database. We tested the data on direct hires and  local staff working at visa-issuing posts for completeness, confirmed the  general accuracy of the data with select overseas posts, and interviewed  knowledgeable officials from the Office of Resource Management and  Organizational Analysis concerning the reliability of the data. We  assessed data on the number and grade of officers assigned to Fraud  Prevention Units for reliability, and interviewed Consular Affairs officials  regarding how the data was collected and entered into the database, the  controls and reviews of the data collection, and the major strengths and  limitations of the data. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. Lastly, we conducted interviews with visa chiefs, Fraud  Prevention Managers, and DS Assistant Regional Security Officers  working in five overseas posts on issues related to consular staffing and  resources, among other topics.
We visited U.S. consular posts in five countries—Brazil, the Dominican  Republic, India, Jordan, and Ukraine. During these visits, we observed  visa operations and interviewed consular staff and embassy management  about visa adjudication policies, procedures, and resources. In addition,  we spoke with officials from other U.S. agencies that assist consular  officers in the visa adjudication process. We chose Brazil, the Dominican  Republic, India, and Ukraine because each of the fraud prevention teams  in these countries investigated 500 or more fraud cases in fiscal year  2010. We chose Jordan because of the nature of the fraud cases  investigated in that country, which included security concerns.
We conducted our work from August 2011 through September 2012, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Classes of Admission
subsections: section_title: Temporary visitors for business B-1
section_title: Temporary visitors for pleasure B-2
section_title: Temporary workers and trainees H-1B
paragraphs: Temporary workers with “specialty occupation”
Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreement Aliens   Nurses under the Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act of 1999   Spouses and children of H-1, H-2, or H-3 visa holders   Temporary workers with extraordinary ability or achievement in the  sciences, arts, education, business, athletics, TV or film.
section_title: Visa Class R-2
section_title: TD Treaty traders and investors E-1
section_title: Intracompany transferees L-1
section_title: Representatives of foreign information media I-1
section_title: Students F-1
section_title: Exchange visitors J-1
section_title: Other categories A-1
section_title: Visa Class G-4
section_title: Appendix III: Case Studies
paragraphs: The following five case studies provide examples of the types of activities  carried out by Fraud Prevention Units and Assistant Regional Security  Officer Investigators (ARSO-Is) overseas.
subsections: section_title: Fraud Prevention Unit Case Study
paragraphs: In Ukraine, we observed consular officers adjudicating visas for the  Summer Work and Travel program. A consular officer suspected an  applicant’s student identification was fraudulent, and he told the applicant  to wait while he asked the Fraud Prevention Unit for assistance. The  senior Locally Employed Staff (LES) person inspected the student ID and  said it was most likely a fake. The consular officer asked the LES to assist  in questioning the applicant. The LES reviewed the applicant’s school  transcripts that were submitted with the visa application, and asked the  applicant to provide the name of the school’s chancellor. The applicant  could not provide the name. The Fraud Prevention Unit called the school  to attempt to verify whether the applicant was currently enrolled, but the  school would not verify the applicant’s status. The Fraud Prevention Unit  told the consular officer that they believed the applicant was committing  fraud on her application, and the consular officer denied the visa.
section_title: ARSO-I Case Studies
subsections: section_title: U.S. Embassy Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic
paragraphs: U.S. Major League Baseball (MLB) teams award large signing bonuses to  younger prospective players in the Dominican Republic, creating a  significant economic incentive to make prospective players seem  younger. As a result, MLB prospects often falsify their ages and  sometimes their identities on visa applications to make them appear  younger than they truly are. To date, ARSO-I Santo Domingo has  facilitated the arrests of two MLB Dominican talent scouts, an MLB  Investigator, and an MLB pitcher, among others, for participating in  identity fraud. The pitcher, a Dominican citizen, assumed the identity of a  younger person and obtained a contract to play professional baseball as  a pitcher in the United States in 1999. The pitcher has since illegally  obtained at least 10 nonimmigrant visas in his assumed identity. ARSO-I  Santo Domingo confirmed the pitcher’s true identity and coordinated with  the Dominican prosecutors’ office to obtain a Dominican arrest warrant.  The pitcher later returned to the Dominican Republic and obtained travel  documents and a new nonimmigrant visa petition from the MLB in his true  identity, and applied for a nonimmigrant visa. The interviewing consular  officer found the pitcher ineligible for the nonimmigrant visa due to identity  fraud, and the ARSOI-I Santo Domingo subsequently facilitated his arrest  by the Dominican National Police, based on his outstanding Dominican  arrest warrant.
In December 2010, Sao Paulo Civil Police arrested a Brazilian who  presented false documents in support of his U.S. visa application. This  was the ninth arrest of applicants whom had named the same individual  known to be a smuggler and fraudulent document vender on their visa  application. Further investigation identified approximately 70 persons who  had used false documents provided by the document vendor since 2009.  ARSO-I Sao Paulo received information that the document vendor and  his accomplices were also producing false documents in support of  Canadian visa applications, and Italian and Brazilian passports. In March  2011, the Brazilian Federal Police, the State of Santa Catarina Civil  Police, and the State of Santa Catarina Prosecutor’s office arrested the  document vendor and three of his accomplices.
Immigrations Customs Enforcement (ICE) contacted the Deputy Assistant  Regional Officer Investigator in New Delhi after receiving information that  a private translator was extorting money from U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services (USCIS) refugee/asylum applicants. The translator  had access to protected information from USCIS files. ICE spoke with an  informant who was being threatened by the translator to pay significant  sums or have her application denied. Preliminary investigations  determined that the translator would “cold-call” asylum applicants. ARSO- I New Delhi and ICE interviewed the translator, three USCIS local  employees, and three local guards. The translator denied obtaining  personal identifiable information from embassy staff. As a result of this  investigation, the translator was arrested upon departure of the Embassy,  one local guard was terminated for accepting money from the translator,  and one USCIS LES employee was put on administrative leave for  divulging personally identifiable information.
Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attaché contacted ARSO-I Kyiv  for assistance with an individual present in Kyiv with an active INTERPOL  Red Warrant for human trafficking. The fugitive was wanted in the  Eastern District of Michigan for forced labor, money laundering,  immigration and visa fraud, and witness tampering. ARSO-I Kyiv  coordinated assistance with the Ministry of Internal Affairs Organized  Crime Department. The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs Organized  Crime Department agents arrested the fugitive at his residence for  immigration overstay charges. ARSO-I Kyiv and ICE Attaché Frankfurt  escorted the fugitive from Kyiv to New York, where the fugitive was  arrested by ICE agents.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of State
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Anthony Moran (Assistant  Director), Jon Fremont, Julia Ann Roberts, Katie Bernet, Karen Deans,  Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Mary Moutsos, Mark Speight, and Maria  Stattel made key contributions to this report. Others providing technical  assistance include Claude Adrien and Emily Biskup.