Air Traffic Control Modernization: Status of the Current Program and Planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System
Published: 2006-06-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) effort to modernize the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system has been listed by GAO as a high risk program for more than a decade now, due to systemic management and acquisition problems. Two relatively new organizations housed within FAA--the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)--have been given the bulk of the responsibility for planning and implementing these modernization efforts. Congress created ATO to be a performance-based organization that would improve the culture, structure, and processes and improve accountability in the ATC modernization program. Congress created JPDO, made up of seven partner agencies, to coordinate the federal and nonfederal stakeholders necessary to plan a transition from the current air transportation system to the "next generation air transportation system" (NGATS). This testimony is based on GAO's recently completed and ongoing studies of the ATC modernization program. GAO provides information on (1) the status of ATO's efforts to implement processes and other initiatives aimed at efficiently managing and modernizing the current ATC system and (2) the status of JPDO's planning efforts and the key challenges that JPDO faces in planning for NGATS.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: ATO has made significant progress toward the efficient management of the nation's ATC system, but faces several challenges. ATO has implemented organizational and business process changes, and has taken steps to increase scrutiny of its acquisition decisions. ATO has met its acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive year--that is, 80 percent of its system acquisitions are on schedule and within 10 percent of budget. ATO has identified cost savings opportunities through consolidation of administrative activities and outsourcing. However, ATO faces several challenges, including sustaining and institutionalizing its progress toward operating effectively as a performance-based organization, hiring and training thousands of air traffic controllers, ensuring stakeholder involvement in major system acquisitions, and keeping acquisitions on schedule and within budget. JPDO is making progress in its planning for NGATS, but faces several challenges. JPDO is implementing a number of practices that our work has shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration that is central to its mission and legislative mandate. However, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and technological resources needed to continue developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. Thus, a challenge may arise in leveraging the resources of the partner agencies. As part of its planning, JPDO is working to develop a cost estimate for NGATS through a series of workshops with various stakeholders. JPDO has taken several important first steps and is following effective practices in developing an NGATS enterprise architecture--a blueprint for NGATS and one of the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort. JPDO faces several challenges, including maintaining stakeholder support over the long term, defining roles and responsibilities and deciding how to coordinate the implementation of NGATS, and addressing several critical policy issues, such as the extent to which NGATS will accommodate visual flights versus instrument-only flights.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss  the status of efforts by the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint  Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to modernize and transform the  nation’s air traffic control (ATC) system. Both organizations are within the  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and represent recent efforts by  Congress to, among others things, ensure a national airspace system that  is safe, efficient, and capable of meeting a growing demand for air  transportation—a demand that is expected to triple by 2025. ATO has  responsibility for operating, maintaining, and modernizing the current ATC  system. ATO was authorized as a performance-based organization (PBO)  in 2000 and includes 36,000 of FAA’s roughly 46,000 employees. JPDO,  authorized in 2003, is responsible for planning and coordinating the  broader and longer-term transformation (through 2025) to the “next  generation air transportation system” (NGATS). JPDO is conducting its  work with the assistance of seven partner agencies: the Departments of  Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White  House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
In 1981, FAA began a program to replace and upgrade ATC facilities and  equipment, but encountered chronic cost, schedule, and performance  problems, leading us to classify FAA’s ATC modernization program as high  risk in 1995. We have issued a series of reports on these problems and  made numerous recommendations over the years. Our reports focused on  many aspects of the national airspace system, including the management  of modernization projects; the management of the information technology  that is at the heart of many modern ATC systems; the challenges FAA  faces in increasing system capacity and reducing delays; and an  acquisition workforce culture that lacked the mission focus,  accountability, coordination, and adaptability needed for FAA to meet its  cost, schedule, and performance targets. FAA has implemented many of  our recommendations to varying degrees.
System modernization, as envisioned in NGATS and being planned by  JPDO, will be costly and will have to compete with other national  priorities and demands for resources. ATO will be especially challenged to  maintain the current ATC system while simultaneously developing and  transitioning to the future system. These tasks will require ATO to make  the best and most efficient use of increasingly scarce resources.  Additionally, the transition also involves the recognition that other nations  are upgrading their aviation systems, creating a need for global  harmonization to support international travel and commerce.
My statement today focuses on two key questions. (1) What is the status of  ATO’s efforts to implement processes and other initiatives aimed at  efficiently managing and modernizing the current ATC system? (2) What is  the status of JPDO’s planning efforts, and what are the key challenges that  JPDO faces in planning for NGATS? My statement is based on our recently  completed and ongoing studies of FAA’s ATC modernization program,  together with updated information from ATO and JPDO officials and  aviation stakeholders. Later this year, we expect to issue two detailed  reports related to the issues discussed in this statement. One report will  provide our assessment of the status of JPDO’s efforts to plan for the  development of NGATS. Another report will examine financial  management issues at FAA, including options for cost savings and  alternative funding mechanisms. We are performing our work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
The following is a summary of our findings to date:    ATO has made significant progress toward the efficient management of the  nation’s ATC system, but faces several challenges. ATO has implemented  organizational and business process changes to improve management of  the ATC modernization program. ATO has taken several steps to increase  its scrutiny of its acquisition decisions, in part by ensuring executive-level  oversight of key decisions and improving understanding of system  requirements to avoid delays and cost overruns. ATO has met its  acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive year—that is, 80  percent of its system acquisitions are on schedule and within 10 percent of  budget. ATO has identified cost savings opportunities through  consolidation of administrative activities and outsourcing. However, ATO  faces several challenges, including sustaining and institutionalizing ATO’s  progress toward operating effectively as a performance-based  organization, hiring and training thousands of air traffic controllers,  ensuring stakeholder involvement in major system acquisitions, and  keeping acquisitions on schedule and within budget.
JPDO is making progress in its planning for NGATS, but faces several  challenges. JPDO is implementing a number of practices that our work has  shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration that is central to its  mission and legislative mandate. However, JPDO is fundamentally a  planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human  and technological resources needed to continue developing plans and  system requirements for NGATS. Thus, a challenge may arise in leveraging  the resources of the partner agencies—agencies with a variety of missions  and priorities other than supporting NGATS. For example, NASA has  reduced its aeronautics budget, raising questions about how the research  and development efforts necessary for NGATS will be completed. As part  of its planning, JPDO is working to develop a cost estimate for NGATS  through a series of workshops with various stakeholders. JPDO has taken  several important first steps and is following effective practices in  developing an NGATS enterprise architecture—a blueprint for NGATS and  one of the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort. In  addition to the challenge of leveraging resources noted above, JPDO faces  several other challenges, including maintaining stakeholder support over  the long term, defining roles and responsibilities and deciding how to  coordinate the implementation of NGATS, and addressing several critical  policy issues, such as the extent to which NGATS will accommodate visual  flights versus instrument-only flights.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The ATC system is composed of an array of largely ground-based  subsystems, including radars; automated data-processing, navigation, and  communications equipment; and ATC facilities. These subsystems work  together to support all phases of flight for aircraft operating in U.S.  airspace. The ATC system also includes the FAA employees who manage,  operate, and maintain ATC equipment and facilities.
In 1995, based on the premise that FAA would be better able to manage  the ATC modernization if it were not constrained by federal personnel and  acquisition laws, Congress passed legislation that exempted FAA from  most federal personnel and acquisition laws and regulations. In December  2000, President Clinton signed an executive order and a few months later  Congress passed supporting legislation that, together, provided FAA with  the authority to create ATO as a PBO to control and improve FAA’s  management of the modernization effort. In February 2004, FAA  reorganized, transferring 36,000 employees (most of who worked in air  traffic services and research and acquisitions) to ATO. (See fig. 1.)
In late 2003, recognizing that the current approach to managing air  transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally  obsolete, Congress created JPDO to plan NGATS, a system intended to  accommodate what is expected to be three times more air traffic by 2025  than there is today. JPDO’s scope is broader than traditional ATC  modernization in that it is “airport curb to airport curb,” encompassing  such issues as security screening and environmental concerns.  Additionally, JPDO’s approach will require unprecedented collaboration  and consensus among many stakeholders—federal and nonfederal—about  necessary system capabilities, equipment, procedures, and regulations.  Each of JPDO’s partner agencies will play a role in creating NGATS. For  example, the Department of Defense has deployed “network centric”  systems, originally developed for the battlefield, that are being considered  as a framework to provide all users of the national airspace system—FAA  and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security—with a common  view of that system. To incorporate the expertise and views of nonfederal  stakeholders, the NGATS Institute was created by an agreement between  the National Center for Advanced Technologies and FAA.
JPDO began its initial operations in early 2004. A Senior Policy Committee,  chaired by the Secretary of Transportation and including senior  representatives from each of the participating departments and agencies,  provides oversight to JPDO. JPDO is located within FAA and reports to the  FAA Administrator and to the Chief Operating Officer within ATO. (See  figure 2.)
section_title: ATO Has Made Significant Progress Toward More Efficiently Managing ATC Modernization, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: ATO has implemented organizational and business process changes to  improve management of the ATC modernization program. ATO has taken  several steps to increase its scrutiny of its acquisition decisions and has  met its acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive year. ATO  has identified cost savings opportunities through consolidation of  administrative activities and outsourcing. However, ATO faces several  challenges, including sustaining and institutionalizing ATO’s progress  toward operating effectively as a performance-based organization, hiring  and training thousands of air traffic controllers, ensuring stakeholder  involvement in major system acquisitions, and keeping acquisitions on  schedule and within budget.
subsections: section_title: ATO Has Implemented Organizational and Business Process Changes to Improve Management of the ATC Modernization Program
paragraphs: In our past work, we noted that FAA’s acquisitions workforce operated in  an environment where accountability was not well defined or enforced  and vertical lines of authority impaired productivity, communication, and  decision-making across the organization. Our recent studies have shown  that ATO is taking steps to break down those vertical lines of authority  and organizational “stovepipes.” ATO has become a flatter organization,  with fewer management layers. Additionally, the Chief Operating Officer  (COO), who heads ATO, is holding ATO’s vice presidents collectively  accountable for the organization’s success, in addition to their areas of  specific responsibility. The COO conducts daily meetings with the  managers of ATO’s departments to review operations. According to the  COO, these meetings have provided a more holistic perspective on the  organization since, formally, some managers were only focused on and  responsible for their own departments.
ATO is also in the early stages of involving the line staff in the efforts  aimed at increasing organizational effectiveness and efficiency. For  example, ATO surveyed the workforce to determine the extent to which  employees and managers believe the organization exhibits managerial  accountability, customer focus, and transformational leadership. The first  survey established a baseline against which ATO plans to measure  progress through future annual surveys. By analyzing the results, ATO  expects to determine the underlying assumptions that drive employee  behavior and decide where to target efforts for change. According to an  ATO official, such a root-cause level of analysis has never been done  before in FAA. FAA is also undertaking an initiative that includes creating  a training framework and measures for the effectiveness of that training.  These initiatives mirror effective human capital practices that we have  identified in previous reports.
In addition to organizational efforts, ATO is moving forward with an   improvement to its business processes with the development of a cost  accounting system, which will eventually be implemented throughout FAA  to improve its financial management. Ultimately, ATO plans to routinely  incorporate the cost information generated by the cost accounting system  into its investment decision-making. When implemented, this cost  accounting system will address a long-standing GAO concern that FAA has  not had the needed cost accounting practices in place to effectively  manage software-intensive investments, which characterize many of the  agency’s major ATC system acquisitions. This type of information can be  used to improve future cost estimates for these acquisitions.
In another change to its business processes, FAA has stated that its  management will provide additional information to decision makers to  better illustrate the rationale behind its budget requests. This information  is helpful to decision makers when budget constraints do not allow all  system acquisitions to be fully funded at their planned and approved  levels, leaving FAA to decide which programs to fund and which to cut,  according to its priorities. Those that are cut may fall behind schedule,  requiring FAA to continue operating and maintaining the older equipment  and possibly delaying the realization of benefits from the new system. To  address this issue, we recommended that FAA identify and annually report  on programs that have had funding deferred, reduced, or eliminated, and  the impact of those decisions on ATC modernization. Such information  would make clear how constrained budgets will affect modernization of  the national airspace system and how FAA is working to live within its  means. In its formal written response to our recommendation, FAA stated  its intent to better inform Congress in the future by providing information  in its capital investment plan, submitted to Congress annually with the  President’s Budget, that will identify changes from the preceding year. We  have not yet verified whether FAA’s action fully responds to our  recommendation.
section_title: ATO Has Increased Scrutiny of Its Investment Decisions
paragraphs: ATO has taken several steps to increase its scrutiny of its acquisition  decisions, both with initial investment decisions and as part of acquisition  oversight. Since 2004, the ATO executive council has been reviewing the  mission need and readiness for decisions for all proposed investments.  Furthermore, to ensure executive-level oversight of all key decisions, FAA  plans to incorporate key decision points in a knowledge-based product  development process by June 2006, as we have recommended; however,  we have not yet independently assessed the sufficiency of this change.  FAA has also issued guidance on how to develop and use investment  pricing, including guidelines for disclosing the levels of uncertainty and  imprecision that are inherent in cost estimates for major ATC systems.
To improve its understanding of system requirements, FAA has developed  a software acquisition process improvement model. When a system’s  requirements are not fully understood at the start of an acquisition,  requirements must often be redefined or unplanned work performed,  which takes time and can be costly. In addition, unplanned work may  occur when the agency misjudges the extent to which a commercial-off- the-shelf or nondevelopmental item, such as one procured by another  agency, will meet the agency’s needs. To address these issues, FAA has  developed and applied a process improvement model that assesses the  maturity of FAA’s software and systems capabilities. As we reported, this  approach has resulted in enhanced productivity, higher quality, greater  ability to predict schedules and resources, better morale, and improved  communication and teamwork. However, FAA did not mandate the use of  the model throughout the organization. In response to our  recommendation that FAA institutionalize the model’s use throughout the  organization, FAA has begun developing a requirement that acquisition  projects have process improvement activities in place before seeking  approval from FAA’s investment review board.
With regard to acquisition investment oversight, ATO has increased the  use of an earned value approach to program oversight. In fiscal year 2000,  only 4 programs used an earned value approach, compared to 19 major  active programs in fiscal year 2006. Going forward, all new acquisitions  will use an earned value approach. ATO has also conducted business case  reviews for facilities and equipment- and operations-funded programs.  Based on these reviews, ATO terminated funding for three projects. One  was cancelled because the prototype lacked demonstrable benefits,  another due to a poor business case, and the third due to weaknesses in its  business case as well as schedule and performance issues.
Additionally, FAA has implemented, or is in the process of implementing, a  number of recommendations that we have made to improve acquisition  investment management. For example, FAA is now considering all  information technology investments as a complete portfolio. In 2004, we  pointed out that FAA was not evaluating projects beyond the first 2 years  of service to ensure alignment with organizational goals. Consequently,  the agency could not ensure that projects with a longer service history  (which at the time totaled about $1.3 billion per year) were still aligned  with FAA’s strategic plans and business goals and objectives. We  recommended that FAA include these projects in its investment portfolio  management for review. In response to this and other recommendations  we have made, FAA is making revisions to its Acquisition Management  System. FAA has modified its Acquisition Management Policy to require  periodic monitoring of in-service systems to collect and analyze  performance data to use as the basis for sustained deployment. In a similar  vein, ATO has committed to basing future funding decisions for system  acquisitions on their contribution to reducing the agency’s operating costs  while maintaining safety. ATO is also requiring that acquisition planning  documents be prepared in a format consistent with that prescribed by the  Office of Management and Budget for use in justifying all major capital  investments.
section_title: FAA Met Its Acquisition Performance Goal for the Second Consecutive Year, but Use of Revised Milestones Does Not Provide Consistent Benchmarks
paragraphs: FAA has met its acquisitions performance goal 2 years in a row. The goal  for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 was to have 80 percent of its system  acquisitions on schedule and within 10 percent of budget. The goal  gradually increases to 90 percent by fiscal year 2008. The increase will  make FAA’s acquisition performance goal consistent with targets set in the  Department of Transportation’s strategic plan and will comply with the  Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.
Having such a goal is also consistent with the President’s Management  Agenda, which calls for a commitment to achieve immediate, concrete,  and measurable results in the near term, and meeting this goal shows  progress toward better acquisition management. However, because the  milestones for certain acquisitions have changed over the years to reflect  changes in cost and schedule, using those revised milestones may not  provide a complete picture of the acquisition’s progress over time. For  example, the milestones for 3 of the 16 major system acquisitions that we  reviewed in detail during 2004 and 2005 were being revised to reflect cost  or schedule changes during 2005. These revised milestones, together with  revised targets for meeting them, will become the new milestones for  fiscal year 2006. While revising milestones and targets that are no longer  valid is an appropriate management action, using revised targets for  measuring performance does not provide a consistent benchmark over  time. The extent to which an acquisition meets its annual performance  targets is one measure of its performance and should be viewed together  with other measures, such as its progress against original and revised  baselines. The variance reports provided to the FAA Administrator and to  Congress may also be useful in evaluating an acquisition’s performance.
Since fiscal year 2003, the number of acquisition programs measured by  FAA has varied from 31 to 42. According to FAA, the number varies from  year to year, in part, because some programs reach completion and others  are initiated. The programs that are selected each fiscal year represent a  cross section of ATO programs, including investments in new capabilities  and others that are ready for use without modification. FAA’s Portfolio of  Goals, which provides supplementary information on the agency’s  performance goals, asserts that no bias exists in the selection of  milestones for performance review, but does not state the basis for this  conclusion. The portfolio also states that the milestones selected represent  the program office’s determination of the efforts that are “critical” or  important enough to warrant inclusion in the acquisition performance goal  for the year. However, we have not conducted a detailed examination of  the reliability and validity of FAA’s metrics for its acquisition program  performance.
section_title: ATO Is Reviewing Its Infrastructure and Operations for Cost Savings, but Lacks Consistent Processes for Determining Savings
paragraphs: ATO is seeking cost savings by reviewing its operations and infrastructure.  It has begun to decommission ground-based navigational aids, such as  compass locators, outer markers and nondirectional radio beacons, as it  begins to transition to a satellite-based navigation system. In fiscal year  2005, ATO decommissioned 177 navigational aids, claiming a savings of  $2.9 million. In addition to the savings generated from decommissioning,  one expert with whom we spoke noted that these sites could be converted  to revenue-generating uses, such as leasing the sites for warehouses or cell  phone towers. ATO also expects to reduce costs through streamlining its  operations. For example, it is consolidating its administrative activities,  currently decentralized across its nine regions, into three regions, and  anticipates an annual savings of up to $460 million over the next 10 years.  Our work analyzing international air navigation service providers has  shown that additional cost savings may be possible by further  consolidating ATC facilities such as terminal radar approach control  (TRACON) facilities and air traffic control centers. According to one  estimate, consolidating the existing 21 air route traffic control centers into  6 centers could save approximately $600 million per year.
ATO also expects to reduce costs through outsourcing. For example, it  reduced costs by outsourcing its automated flight service stations to a  private contractor and expects to achieve savings of $1.7 billion over ten  years. Additionally, $0.5 billion in savings are expected to be realized by  staffing reductions of 400 that occurred between the time the outsourcing  began and the new contract was actually implemented. The agency  expects to receive $66 million—the first installment of these cost  savings—in fiscal year 2007.
However, we have found that ATO lacks a consistent process for  identifying the costs and benefits associated with some of its cost control  efforts. For example, ATO did not offset its reported savings from  decommissioning navigational aids with the costs likely to accompany  such activities, such as real property disposition (including buildings or  real property leases, standby power systems, and fuel storage tanks), site  cleanup, and restoration. Without a transparent and verifiable process for  determining the savings, as well as the offsetting costs, the true savings  remain unclear. As ATO proceeds with these efforts, stakeholders also  caution that decommissioning navigational aids should entail  comprehensive risk mitigation to ensure that ATO retains adequate safety  levels.
However, while facility consolidations could offer additional savings, an  FAA official noted that there are practical limits to these efforts. For  example, consolidated facilities would need to handle higher volumes of  communication, but as the volume of communication increases, so does  “latency”—the delay in transmission that occurs between sending and  receiving messages. According to FAA, studies of telecommunications  centers in the private sector suggest that 15 facilities that combine the  approximately 180 existing en route and oceanic air traffic control centers  and terminal radar approach control facilities might be appropriate.  Security concerns, such as the need for redundancy, also come into play in  consolidation decisions. Consequently, if FAA decides to procede with  facility closures, it is important that it do so within the context of a logical,  well-documented, and risk-based process in consultation with  congressional oversight committees.
section_title: ATO Faces Human Capital Challenges in Institutionalizing Its Performance-based Organization and Hiring and Training Thousands of Air Traffic Controllers
paragraphs: ATO faces a challenge in sustaining and institutionalizing its efforts to  operate as a PBO. Our work has shown that successful transformations  and the institutionalization of change in large public and private  organizations can take 5 to 7 years or more to fully implement. Long- term, high-level management attention will be needed to assess ATO’s  transformation on a continuing basis.
FAA also faces the challenge of hiring and training thousands of air traffic  controllers during the coming decade. According to its controller staffing  plan, FAA expects to lose about 11,000 air traffic controllers due to  voluntary retirements or mandatory retirements at age 56, as well as other  reasons. These retirements stem from the 1981 controller strike, when  President Ronald Reagan fired over 10,000 air traffic controllers, and FAA  then had to quickly rebuild the controller workforce. From 1982 through  1991, FAA hired an average of 2,655 controllers per year. These controllers  will become eligible for retirement during the next decade.
To replace these controllers, as well as those who will leave for other  reasons, and to accommodate forecasted changes in air traffic, FAA plans  to issue annual air traffic controller staffing plans based on the agency’s  air traffic forecast. FAA’s December 2004 Air Traffic Controller Work  Force Plan called for hiring 12,500 new controllers over 10 years, based on  the agency’s 2004 air traffic forecast. FAA informed us that its 2006  staffing plan update, which it expects to issue shortly, will reflect the need  to hire fewer controllers over the next few years, compared to the 2004  plan, because FAA’s 2006 air traffic forecast predicts less air traffic during  this time frame. In fiscal year 2005, FAA hired 438 controllers—three more  than its target, which was constrained that year due to budget  considerations. According to an FAA official, FAA plans to hire 930  controllers in fiscal year 2006 (FAA had hired 637 controllers through May  2006).
section_title: FAA Faces Challenges in Ensuring Stakeholder Involvement in Major System Acquisitions
paragraphs: Adequately involving stakeholders in a system’s development is important  to ensure that the system meets users’ needs. In the past, air traffic  controllers were permanently assigned to FAA’s major system acquisition  program offices and provided input into air traffic control modernization  projects. In June 2005, FAA terminated this arrangement because of  budget constraints and other reasons. According to FAA, it now plans to  obtain the subject-matter expertise of air traffic controllers or other  stakeholders as needed in major system acquisitions. It remains to be seen  whether this approach will suffice for stakeholder involvement. Our past  work has indicated that a lack of stakeholder involvement both early on  and throughout a system’s development was a systemic factor contributing  to acquisitions missing their cost, schedule, and performance targets.
section_title: FAA Faces Challenges in Keeping Acquisitions on Schedule and within Budget
paragraphs: Three systems—all communications-related—missed their fiscal year 2005  acquisition performance goals for schedule. According to FAA, the $310  million FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) acquisition, which  is replacing costly existing networks of separately managed systems and  services by integrating advanced telecommunications services, was behind  schedule because the program was unable to ramp up its activities to the  level specified in its plan. To complete the installations in the first quarter  of fiscal year 2008 as originally scheduled, FAA initiated a plan to put the  program back on schedule and has met the plan’s milestones since August  2005.
To the extent that delays in FTI persist, FAA will not accrue the full extent  of the $672 million in cost savings that the program was expected to  produce. The Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector  General has reported that FAA did not realize $32.6 million in anticipated  operating cost savings in fiscal year 2005 because of the limited progress  made in disconnecting legacy circuits. The office also reported that  without a nearly tenfold increase in its rate of transferring service to FTI  and disconnecting legacy circuits, FAA stands to miss out on an additional  $102 million in cost savings in fiscal year 2006. FAA has informed us that  since the Inspector General made this assessment, the program has  achieved a significant increase in the rates of transferring over services  and disconnecting legacy circuits. As an alternative to continuing the  current FTI program, some experts have suggested that FAA consider  outsourcing this activity, as it did for its flight service stations.
Two other communications acquisition programs also missed their  acquisition performance goals for schedule in 2005—the $325 million Next  Generation Air-to-Ground Communication system, segment 1A, which  replaces analog communication systems with digital systems, and the $85  million Ultra High Frequency Radio Replacement, which replaces aging  equipment used to communicate with Department of Defense aircraft.  According to an FAA official, as the agency assessed its priorities for fiscal  year 2005, a decision was made that these programs would receive fewer  resources. The resources that were then available were not sufficient to  allow the programs to meet established milestones.
In summary, ATO has made a number of promising moves toward  operating effectively as a PBO, and we view ATO’s efforts to improve its  management and acquisitions processes as positive steps. However, ATO  has been established for only slightly more than 2 years. Work remains to  ensure that these processes become institutionalized and that continuing  challenges are addressed. Although it is still too early to evaluate the  effectiveness of many of these steps, we are monitoring ATO’s progress.
Moving forward, ATO will play a key role in implementing NGATS, as  planned by JPDO. I will now discuss the status of JPDO’s planning efforts.
section_title: JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS, but Faces Challenges in Several Areas
paragraphs: JPDO has implemented several effective practices to facilitate  collaboration among its partner agencies, but faces challenges in  continuing to leverage resources. JPDO is working to develop a cost  estimate for NGATS through a series of workshops with various  stakeholders. JPDO is taking a reasonable approach to technical planning,  but some key tasks are yet to be completed. However, JPDO faces several  challenges, including maintaining stakeholder support over the long term,  defining roles and responsibilities as well as deciding how to coordinate  the implementation of NGATS, and addressing several critical policy  issues.
subsections: section_title: JPDO Is Working to Facilitate Collaboration among Federal Agencies, but Faces Challenges in Continuing to Leverage Resources
paragraphs: Our work to date shows that JPDO is implementing a number of practices  that our work has shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration  that is central to its mission and legislative mandate. According to our  research, agencies must have a clear and compelling rationale for working  together to overcome significant differences in their missions, cultures,  and established ways of doing business. In developing JPDO’s integrated  plan, the partner agencies agreed to a vision statement and eight  strategies that broadly address the goals and objectives for NGATS. These  strategies formed the basis for JPDO’s eight integrated product teams  (IPT), and various partner agencies have taken the lead on specific  strategies. Our research has also shown that it is important for  collaborating agencies to leverage the human, technological, and physical  resources needed to initiate or sustain their collaborative effort. To  leverage human resources, JPDO has staffed the various levels of its  organization with partner-agency employees, many of whom work part  time for JPDO. To leverage technological resources, JPDO conducted an  interagency program review of its partner agencies’ research and  development programs to identify work that could support NGATS.  Through this process, JPDO identified early opportunities that could be  pursued during fiscal year 2007 to produce tangible results for NGATS,  such as the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)  program at FAA.
However, while JPDO’s legislation, integrated plan, and governance  structure provide the framework for collaboration among multiple  federal agencies, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body  that lacks authority over the key human and technological resources  needed to continue developing plans and system requirements for NGATS.  Consequently, the ability to continue leveraging resources of the partner  agencies will be critical to JPDO’s success. Beginning around 2008, JPDO  expects a significant increase in its IPTs’ workloads. JPDO officials told us  that although the partner agencies have not yet expressed concerns over  the time that their employees spend on JPDO work, it remains to be seen  whether agencies will be willing to allow their staff to devote more of their  time to JPDO. In addition, JPDO anticipates needing more agency  resources to plan and coordinate demonstrations of potential technologies  to illustrate some of the early benefits that could be achieved from the  transformation to NGATS.
This challenge of leveraging resources arises, in part, because the partner  agencies have a variety of missions and priorities other than supporting  NGATS. NASA, for example, while conducting key aeronautical and safety  research and development relevant to NGATS, nonetheless has other  competing missions. NASA has recently reduced its aeronautics budget  and plans to focus its efforts on foundational research. This decision  raises two important questions. First, what research needed for NGATS  will NASA perform or not perform? Second, for the foundational research  that will be performed, who will perform the development steps—the  validation and demonstration of new technology—that must take place  before a new technology can be transferred to industry and incorporated  into a product? JPDO and FAA officials told us that not enough is  understood about what NASA plans to do and not do and, therefore, the  impact of NASA’s action on NGATS remains unclear at present.
However, many experts with whom we spoke believe that NASA’s new  focus on foundational research creates a gap in the technology  development continuum. Some believe that FAA has neither the research  and development infrastructure nor the funding to do this work. FAA’s  Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC),  in a draft report, estimates that FAA would need at least $100 million  annually in increased funding to perform this research and development  work, and that reestablishing the infrastructure within FAA to accomplish  this work could delay NGATS implementation by 5 years. An official of the  working group that produced the draft report stated that a significant  amount of research and development is needed to create NGATS. For  example, the official stated that more research is needed to understand  wake vortex, which could be a limiting factor in airspace capacity and  would impact aircraft sequencing for landing or departure. The official  also stated that intermediate-level technology development is important in  establishing “product proof,” meaning that technology needs to be  validated, demonstrated, and certified before beginning the systems  acquisition process.
JPDO officials view leveraging partner agency resources as one of their  most significant near-term challenges. JPDO officials stated that they feel  the process has worked sufficiently well so far. For example, JPDO  successfully requested that FAA pursue funding in its fiscal year 2007  budget request to accelerate development of ADS-B and System Wide  Information Management (SWIM), which are two key systems identified  for NGATS. However, as noted, our past work on FAA’s national airspace  modernization program has shown that receiving fewer resources than  planned was one factor that contributed to delays in implementing  technologies and significant cost increases. Thus, continuing success in  leveraging partner agencies’ resources will help avoid program delays and  reduction in the benefits-to-cost ratio.
To further leverage resources for NGATS, JPDO has issued guidance to its  partner agencies identifying areas that JPDO would like to see emphasized  in the agencies’ fiscal year 2008 budget requests and expects to follow this  process annually in the years to come. JPDO officials have informed us  that they have held face-to-face discussions with partner agency managers  about the guidance and are currently in the process of reviewing partner  agency responses to the guidance and identifying whether gaps exist. Such  gaps will be presented to the Senior Policy Committee for discussion at its  July meeting, according to these officials.
JPDO is currently working with the Office of Management and Budget to  develop a systematic means of reviewing partner agency budget requests  so that the NGATS-related funding in each request is easily identified. This  includes a review of budgets submitted by the Department of Homeland  Security for efforts by the Transportation Security Administration and the  Department of Commerce for efforts by the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration. Such a process would help the Office of  Management and Budget consider NGATS as a unified federal investment,  rather than as disparate line items distributed across several agencies’  budget requests.
section_title: JPDO Is Working to Develop a Cost Estimate for NGATS
paragraphs: Important to the planning of NGATS is the development of realistic cost  estimates for the entire NGATS. To assist in developing such estimates,  JPDO is holding a series of investment analysis workshops with  stakeholders to obtain their input. The first workshop, held in April 2006,  was for commercial and business aviation, equipment manufacturers, and  systems developers. The second workshop is planned for early July for  operators of lower performance aircraft used in both commercial and non- commercial operations, including general aviation personal and business  flying, flight training, piston and turbine rotorcraft as well as public users  of the system including civil and military aircraft operated by local, state,  and federal governments. The third workshop, planned for late July or  early August, will focus on airports and other local, state, and regional  planning bodies. JPDO plans to use the combined information from these  three workshops to begin to develop a range of the potential costs of  NGATS.
Preliminary estimates of NGATS’ cost, developed by REDAC and ATO,  could also provide input into JPDO’s cost estimate. REDAC and ATO  officials emphasized that their estimates are preliminary and not yet  endorsed by any agency. A draft study by REDAC’s Financing the NGATS  Working Group estimated that to implement NGATS and continue  operating the national airspace system through 2025, the combined costs  of FAA’s four appropriation accounts—operations, facilities and  equipment, research, engineering and development—and grants-in-aid for  airports (commonly known as the Airport Improvement Program)—would  average about $15 billion per year, or about $900 million more than FAA’s  fiscal year 2006 appropriation. The estimate assumes that (1) the general  fund contribution will be 20 percent, using the current trust fund revenue  model and (2) between 2011 and 2025, productivity increases will offset  the increased operating costs of additional demand.
ATO has developed a preliminary estimate of the increased facilities and  equipment cost that NGATS would require. ATO estimates that the  cumulative additional facilities and equipment cost between fiscal years  2006 and 2025 would be about $15.3 billion, or about $800 million per year,  on average, from fiscal year 2007 through 2025. According to an ATO  official, the ATO facilities and equipment cost estimate is the same as the  facilities and equipment component of REDAC’s cost estimate. The only  difference is that ATO’s estimate accounts for inflation, while REDAC  expresses its estimate in constant 2005 dollars.
In addition to being preliminary, it is important to note the limitations of  these estimates. First, ATO’s estimate does not include any costs other  than those for facilities and equipment. However, an ATO official  acknowledged that there would likely be additional costs within FAA, such  as for safety certification or making operational changes to respond to  NGATS’ new technologies. Additionally, ATO’s facilities and equipment  cost estimate assumes that the intermediate technology development  work, which NASA has historically performed, has been completed. As I  previously stated, REDAC believes that the cost of intermediate  technology development could be substantial. Furthermore, neither  estimate includes other partner agencies’ costs to implement NGATS, such  as those that the Department of Homeland Security might incur to develop  and implement new security procedures. Also, these estimates treat  NGATS’ development and implementation period as an isolated event.  Consequently, the costs drop dramatically toward 2025. In reality, officials  who developed these estimates acknowledge that planning for the  subsequent “next generation” system will likely be underway as 2025  approaches and that actual operations and modernization costs could be  higher in this time frame than these estimates indicate.
In addition, several unknown factors will drive the cost of NGATS.  According to JPDO, one of these drivers is the technologies expected to be  included in NGATS. Some of these are more complex and thus more  expensive to implement than others. A second driver is the sequence in  which NGATS technologies will replace the technologies now in use. A  third driver is the length of time required to transition to NGATS, since a  longer transition period would impose higher costs. Later this year, JPDO  expects to issue a first draft of its enterprise architecture, or blueprint for  the NGATS, which could reduce these variables, thereby allowing  improved, albeit still preliminary, estimates of NGATS’ cost.
section_title: JPDO Is Taking a Reasonable Approach to Technical Planning, but Some Key Tasks are Yet to Be Completed
paragraphs: To conduct the technical planning for NGATS, JPDO has formed separate  divisions to perform system modeling and create the NGATS enterprise  architecture, but has not yet completed key activities. JPDO has formed an  Evaluation and Analysis Division (EAD), composed of FAA and NASA  employees and contractors, to assemble a suite of models that will help  JPDO refine its plans for NGATS and iteratively narrow the range of  potential solutions. For example, EAD has used modeling to begin  studying how possible changes in the duties of key individuals, such as air  traffic controllers, could affect the workload and performance of others,  such as airport ground personnel.
As I previously noted, NGATS could shift some tasks now done by air  traffic controllers to pilots. According to JPDO officials, the change in  roles of pilots and controllers is the most important human factors issue  involved in creating the NGATS. JPDO officials noted that the Agile  Airspace and Safety IPTs contain human factors specialists and that  JPDO’s chief architect has a background in human factors. However, EAD  has not yet begun to model the effect of the shift in roles on pilots’  performance because, according to an EAD official, a suitable model has  not yet been incorporated into the modeling tool suite. According to EAD,  addressing this issue is necessary, but will be difficult because data on  pilot behavior are not readily available to use in creating such models.  Furthermore, EAD has not yet studied the training implications of various  NGATS-proposed solutions because further definition of the concept of  operations for these solutions has not been completed. As the concept of  operations matures, it will be important for air traffic controllers and other  affected stakeholders to provide their perspectives on these modeling  efforts. In addition, as the concept of operations and plans for sequencing  equipment matures, EAD will be able to study the extent to which new air  traffic controllers will have to be trained to operate both the old and the  new equipment.
To develop an enterprise architecture—a blueprint for NGATS and one of  the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort—JPDO has  taken several important first steps and is following several effective  practices that we have identified for enterprise architecture development.  However, JPDO’s enterprise architecture is currently a work in progress  and many of JPDO’s future activities will depend on the robustness and  timeliness of its architecture development. The enterprise architecture will  describe FAA’s operation of the current national airspace system, JPDO’s  plans for the NGATS, and the sequence of steps needed to transition  between them. The enterprise architecture will provide the means for  coordinating among the partner agencies and private sector  manufacturers, aligning relevant research and development activities, and  integrating equipment. And as I noted earlier, the enterprise architecture  will also be a key tool in developing cost estimates for NGATS.
To date, JPDO has formed an Enterprise Architecture Division and has  established and filled a chief architect position. JPDO has also established  an NGATS Architecture Council composed of representatives from each  partner agency’s chief architect office to provide the organizational  structure and oversight needed to develop the enterprise architecture.  JPDO is using a phased “build a little, test a little” approach for developing  and refining its enterprise architecture that is similar to a process that we  have advocated for FAA’s major system acquisition programs. In addition,  this phased development process will allow JPDO to incorporate evolving  market forces and technologies in its architecture and thus better manage  change. JPDO plans to have an early version of the architecture by the end  of fiscal year 2006.
section_title: Maintaining Stakeholder Support Will Be a Long- Term Challenge for JPDO
paragraphs: JPDO has structured itself to involve federal and nonfederal stakeholders  throughout its organization, but maintaining their long-term support will  be a challenge. Our work has shown that involving stakeholders can,  among other things, increase their support for a collaborative effort.  Federal stakeholders from the partner agencies serve on JPDO’s Senior  Policy Committee, board, and IPTs. Nonfederal stakeholders may  participate through the NGATS Institute (the Institute). Through the  Institute, JPDO obtained the participation of over 180 stakeholders from  over 70 organizations for the IPTs. The NGATS Institute Management  Council, composed of top officials and representatives from the aviation  community, oversees the policy and recommendations of the Institute and  provides a means for advancing consensus positions on critical NGATS  issues.
Although JPDO has developed the mechanisms for involving stakeholders  and brought stakeholders into the process, it faces challenges in sustaining  nonfederal stakeholders’ participation over the long term. Much as with  the federal partner agencies, JPDO has no direct authority over the human,  technical, or financial resources of its nonfederal stakeholders. To date,  these stakeholders’ investment in NGATS has been through their part-time,  pro bono participation on the IPTs and the NGATS Institute Management  Council. The challenge for JPDO is to maintain the interest and  enthusiasm of these nonfederal stakeholders, which will have to juggle  their own multiple priorities and resource demands, even though some of  the tangible benefits of NGATS may not be realized for several years. For  example, stakeholders’ support will be important for programs such as  SWIM, which is a prerequisite to future benefits, but may not produce  tangible benefits in the near term.
In the wake of past national airspace modernization efforts, JPDO also  faces the challenge of convincing nonfederal stakeholders that the  government is financially committed to NGATS. While most of FAA’s  major ATC acquisition programs are currently on track, earlier attempts at  modernizing the national airspace system encountered many difficulties.  In one instance, for example, FAA developed a datalink communications  system that transmitted scripted e-mail-like messages between controllers  and pilots. One airline equipped some of its aircraft with this new  technology, but because of funding cuts, among other things, FAA ended  up canceling the program. In a similar vein, we have reported that some  aviation stakeholders expressed concern that FAA may not follow through  with its airspace redesign efforts and are hesitant to invest in equipment  unless they are sure that FAA’s efforts will continue. One expert suggested  to us that the government might mitigate this issue by making an initial  investment in a specific technology before requesting that airlines or other  industry stakeholders purchase equipment.
In addition to maintaining stakeholder involvement, JPDO faces  challenges in obtaining the participation of all stakeholders. In particular,  JPDO does not involve current air traffic controllers, who will play a key  role in NGATS. The current air traffic control system is based primarily on  the premise that air traffic controllers direct pilots to maintain safe  separation between aircraft. In NGATS, this premise could change and,  accordingly, JPDO has recognized the need to conduct human factors  research on such issues, including how tasks should be allocated between  humans and automated systems and how the existing allocation of  responsibilities between pilots and air traffic controllers might change.  The input of current air traffic controllers who have recent experience  controlling aircraft is important in considering human factors and safety  issues.
However, as mentioned, no current air traffic controllers are involved in  NGATS. In June 2005, FAA terminated its labor liaison program based on  its determination that program was not providing sufficient benefit  compared to the program’s cost. The liaison program assigned air traffic  controllers to major system acquisition program offices, as well as to  JPDO. Since that time, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association  (NATCA), the labor union that represents air traffic controllers, has not  been a participant in planning NGATS. Although the NGATS Institute  Management Council includes a seat for the union, a NATCA official told  us that the union’s head had been unable to attend the council’s meetings.  According to JPDO officials, the council has left a seat open in hopes that  the controllers will participate in NGATS as the new labor-management  agreement between NATCA and FAA is implemented.
Finally, some of the benefits of NGATS’ are contingent on users of the  system—airlines and general aviation—equipping their aircraft with  NGATS-compatible technologies. This is particularly important concerning  ADS-B, a new air traffic surveillance system that JPDO has determined will  be one of the early core technologies for NGATS. The first phase of ADS-B  implementation, known as “ADS-B out,” will allow FAA to replace many  ground radars that currently provide aircraft surveillance with less costly  ground-based transceivers. Aircraft would be equipped with ADS-B out,  which broadcasts a signal to these transceivers. FAA anticipates  significant cost savings from this phase and, according to trade association  officials, regional and large commercial airlines are largely supportive of  this initial phase. But implementing ADS-B out is just the first step to  achieving the larger benefits of ADS-B, which would be provided by “ADS- B in.” ADS-B in would allow aircraft to receive signals from ground-based  transceivers or directly from other ADS-B equipped aircraft—this could  allow pilots to “see” nearby traffic and, consequently, take on some  responsibility for maintaining safe separation from those aircraft.
However, before airlines can establish a business case that supports an  investment, several unknowns concerning ADS-B in must be resolved. For  example, the cost of installing ADS-B in must be determined. Also, human  factors considerations need further exploration to determine whether  pilots can safely use ADS-B in to maintain separation of aircraft. Finally, it  is unclear whether air carriers will be willing to equip with the second  frequency that ADS-B would require. How these issues are resolved will  be an important factor in airlines’ decisions on whether to equip with ADS- B in. Given the breadth and complexity of NGATS, issues involving  equipage decisions by nonfederal stakeholders are likely to arise again and  can impact the extent and speed to which the benefits envisioned by  NGATS will be realized.
section_title: As NGATS Moves Toward Implementation, Defining Roles and Responsibilities and Deciding How to Coordinate Implementation Are Challenges
paragraphs: JPDO also faces the challenge of clearly defining its partner agencies’ roles  and responsibilities. Our work has shown that collaborating agencies  should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and  responsibilities, including how the collaboration will be led. JPDO has  operated thus far with no formal, long-term agreement on partner  agencies’ roles and responsibilities in creating NGATS. JPDO officials  informed us that they are working to establish a memorandum of  understanding (MOU) signed by the heads of the partner agencies that will  broadly define partner agency roles and responsibilities at a high level.  JPDO officials said they hope to have the MOU signed and released next  month. JPDO is also developing more specific MOUs with partner agencies  that lay out expectations for support on NGATS components, such as  information sharing through network-enabled operations.
Defining roles and responsibilities is particularly important between JPDO  and ATO, because both organizations have responsibilities related to  planning the national airspace system’s modernization. ATO has primary  responsibility for the ATC system’s current and near-term modernization,  while JPDO has responsibility for planning and coordinating a  transformation to NGATS over the next 20 years. The roles and  responsibilities of each office are currently being worked out. ATO now  plans to expand its Operational Evolution Plan so that it applies FAA-wide  and represents FAA’s piece of JPDO’s overall NGATS plan. ATO is also  prioritizing its facilities and equipment investments to support the NGATS.  As the roles and responsibilities of the two offices become more clearly  defined, there is also a need to better communicate these decisions to  stakeholders.
As NGATS moves forward, JPDO and FAA must address how to define  roles and responsibilities for managing its implementation. JPDO, FAA,  and other aviation experts consider NGATS to be a task of unprecedented  complexity, with each partner agency having responsibility for developing  and implementing portions of NGATS, while JPDO maintains a  coordinating role. Recognizing the complexity involved in implementing  NGATS, FAA and JPDO officials are considering several different  approaches, one of which is to contract with a lead systems integrator  (LSI). Generally, an LSI is a prime contractor that would help to ensure  that the discrete systems used in NGATS will operate together and whose  responsibilities may include designing system solutions, developing  requirements, and selecting major system and subsystem contractors.
The government has used LSIs before for complex programs that require  system-of-systems integration. Our research indicates that, while LSIs  provide certain advantages, such as the ability to know, understand, and  integrate functions across various systems, they also entail certain risks.  For example, because the degree of responsibility held by the LSI may be  significantly greater than that usually held by a prime contractor, careful  oversight may be necessary to ensure that the government’s interests are  protected and that conflicts of interest are avoided. Consequently,  selecting, assigning responsibilities, and managing an LSI could pose  significant challenges for JPDO and FAA.
section_title: JPDO Must Address a Variety of Policy Issues
paragraphs: JPDO also faces critical policy issues as NGATS moves toward  implementation. Some stakeholders have noted that addressing the policy  issues needed to implement NGATS technologies will be even more of a  challenge for JPDO than determining the technologies for NGATS. JPDO’s  Concept of Operations—a document that provides a textual operational  description of the transformations needed to achieve NGATS’ overall  goals—has been used to identify key research and policy issues for  NGATS. For example, the Concept of Operations identifies several issues  surrounding the automation of the air traffic control system, including the  need for a backup plan in the event that automation fails, the  responsibilities and liabilities of different stakeholders in the event of  automation failure, and the level of monitoring needed by pilots when  automation is ensuring safe separation from surrounding aircraft.
JPDO officials said that most policy decisions, when they occur, will be  tied to the requirements of the enterprise architecture. However, some  decisions will involve input from several entities and stakeholders. For  example, it is likely that decisions on concepts and policies relating to  general aviation would be made in concert among FAA, JPDO, and the  Senior Policy Committee, with significant input from the general aviation  community, to address concerns such as visual flight rules versus  instrument flight rules. Flowing from broad policy decisions, FAA or other  partner agencies would have to start developing regulations to implement  the new technologies so that they would be ready at the appropriate time.
In addition, JPDO has limited control over some of the factors affecting  NGATS-related policy issues. For example, the consolidation of ATC  facilities could provide cost savings that could in turn be used for NGATS  technologies.  However, facility consolidations can often run into political  hurdles that are outside of JPDO’s control. Similarly, while JPDO’s Airport  IPT is considering how airport capacity can be expanded, a JPDO official  told us that the ability of JPDO to enhance airport capacity is still limited  because enhancement decisions are made at the state and local level. The  official also noted that JPDO cannot channel federal funds from the  Airport Improvement Program to airports where capacity expansion is  most needed to achieve the goals of NGATS.
Another key policy area is how JPDO will work toward global  harmonization. For example, concurrent with JPDO’s efforts, the  European Commission is conducting a project to harmonize and  modernize the European air traffic management systems. Known as the  Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme  (SESAR), the project is overseen by the European Organization for the  Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol). Eurocontrol has contracted out  the work of SESAR to a 30-member consortium of airlines, air navigation  service providers, airports, manufacturers, and others. The consortium is  receiving 60 million euros ($73 million) to conduct a 2-year definition  phase and produce a master plan for SESAR.
JPDO officials said they recognize the need for global harmonization of  systems and have met with officials from various parts of the world— including Europe, China, and East Asia—to assess the potential for  cooperative NGATS demonstrations. JPDO has a Global Harmonization  IPT, led by managers from ATO’s International Operations Planning  Services International and FAA’s Office of International Aviation. The  IPT’s mission is to harmonize equipment and operations globally and  advocate the adoption of U.S.-preferred transformation concepts,  technologies, procedures, and standards. The Harmonization IPT finalized  its charter in March 2006 and is working to develop an international  strategy and outreach plan. In addition to external efforts, the  Harmonization IPT plans to work as a crosscutting IPT that will raise  awareness of global interoperability and standards issues within the other  IPTs as they consider system performance requirements.
According to several European officials with whom we spoke, global  harmonization (and harmonization with the U.S. system specifically) is  considered to be a key ingredient for the success of SESAR. Several of  these officials said that although the European organization invited JPDO  to participate as a full member in SESAR and the organization has  indicated its willingness to have reciprocal participation with the United  States, personnel exchanges are just beginning to occur. JPDO officials  recognize the importance of cooperative efforts and noted that if Europe  and the United States were to implement different and incompatible  standards and technologies, there could be a major adverse impact on  airlines that serve international markets. Nonetheless, these officials point  out that JPDO, as a U.S. government entity, could not participate as a  member in a private industry effort like the SESAR consortium. FAA is,  however, a member of the European Commission’s Industry Consultation  Body, which provides advice to SESAR.
According to an FAA official, negotiations are currently underway to  complete an MOU between FAA and the European Commission that will  commit both parties to cooperation in information sharing and the  development of a seamless air traffic management system. JPDO officials  noted that personnel exchanges and other cooperative activities, such as  information exchanges and a joint working group on technical standards,  are already occurring under a memorandum of cooperation between FAA  and Eurocontrol.
While FAA and JPDO’s Harmonization IPT are planning cooperative  activities, our research has identified several other areas where  cooperation does not appear to be fully developed. For example, the  SESAR and NGATS initiatives, despite their similarities, do not have  coordination activities such as peer reviews of relevant research,  cooperation on safety analysis (such as through the pooling of accident  data), or validation of technologies. It is possible that greater cooperation  and exchange between NGATS and SESAR might develop once planning  has progressed to the development and validation stage.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Transforming the national airspace system to accommodate what is  expected to be three times the current amount of traffic by 2025, providing  adequate security and environmental safeguards—and doing these things  seamlessly while the current system continues to operate—will be an  enormously complex undertaking. Both ATO and JPDO have been given  difficult tasks in a difficult budgetary environment. Going forward, efforts  to control costs and leverage resources will become ever more critical.  Success also depends on the ability of ATO and JPDO to define their roles  and form a collaborative environment for planning and implementing the  next generation system.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any  questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this statement for the record, please contact  Gerald Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals  making key contributions to this statement include Nabajyoti Barkakati,  Christine Bonham, Colin Fallon, Carol Henn, David Hooper, Heather  Krause, Elizabeth Marchak, Edmond Menoche, Faye Morrison, Richard  Scott, Sarah Veale, and Matthew Zisman.
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