Terrorist Watch List Screening: Recommendations to Promote a Comprehensive and Coordinated Approach to Terrorist-Related Screening
Published: 2007-11-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. This testimony discusses (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities in screening processes and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. This statement is based on GAO's report (GAO-08-110). To accomplish the objectives, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated terrorist watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records. From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats. Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data. Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped--within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on U.S. efforts to  develop and use the terrorist watch list to screen for known or suspected  terrorists who pose a threat to homeland security. The list is an important  tool in the government’s overall efforts to combat terrorism.
The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is responsible for maintaining the  watch list and providing for its use during agency screening processes.  TSC receives the vast majority of its watch list records from the National  Counterterrorism Center, which compiles information on known or  suspected international terrorists from executive branch departments and  agencies. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides  TSC with information on known or suspected domestic terrorists who  operate primarily within the United States, such as Ted Kaczynski (the  “Unabomber”). TSC consolidates this information into its watch list  database and makes records available for a variety of screening purposes,  such as the screening of visa applicants and the screening of airline  passengers. When an individual on the watch list is encountered during  screening, several entities—TSC, the screening agency, investigative  agencies, and the intelligence community—can be involved in deciding  what action to take, if any.
My testimony today discusses (1) the standards agencies use for including  individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on  the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities in agencies’ watch list screening  processes and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote  effective terrorism-related screening.
This statement is based on the report we issued in October 2007. To  accomplish our report objectives, we reviewed procedural guidance,  statistics, and other relevant documentation obtained from and  interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism  Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that  perform terrorism-related screening. Specifically, at the Transportation  Security Administration, we examined the prescreening of airline  passengers prior to their boarding a flight; at U.S. Customs and Border  Protection, we examined the screening of travelers entering the United  States through ports of entry; and at the Department of State, we  examined the screening of visa applicants. We conducted our work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, the Attorney  General established TSC in September 2003 to consolidate the  government’s approach to terrorism screening and provide for the  appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in screening processes.  TSC’s consolidated watch list is the U.S. government’s master repository  for all records of known or appropriately suspected international and  domestic terrorists used for watch list-related screening.
When an individual makes an airline reservation, arrives at a U.S. port of  entry, or applies for a U.S. visa, or is stopped by state or local police within  the United States, the frontline screening agency or airline conducts a  name-based search of the individual against applicable terrorist watch list  records. In general, when the computerized name-matching system of an  airline or screening agency generates a “hit” (a potential name match)  against a watch list record, the airline or agency is to review each potential  match. Any obvious mismatches (negative matches) are to be resolved by  the airline or agency, if possible, as discussed in our September 2006  report on terrorist watch list screening. However, clearly positive or exact  matches and matches that are inconclusive (difficult to verify) generally  are to be referred to TSC to confirm whether the individual is a match to  the watch list record. TSC is to refer positive and inconclusive matches to  the FBI to provide an opportunity for a counterterrorism response.  Deciding what action to take, if any, can involve collaboration among the  frontline screening agency, the National Counterterrorism Center or other  intelligence community members, and the FBI or other investigative  agencies. If necessary, a member of an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force can  respond in person to interview and obtain additional information about  the person encountered. In other cases, the FBI will rely on the screening  agency and other law enforcement agencies—such as U.S. Immigration  and Customs Enforcement—to respond and collect information. Figure 1  presents a general overview of the process used to resolve encounters  with individuals on the terrorist watch list.
To build upon and provide additional guidance related to Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 6, in August 2004, the President signed  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11. Among other things, this  directive required the Secretary of Homeland Security—in coordination  with the heads of appropriate federal departments and agencies—to  submit two reports to the President (through the Assistant to the President  for Homeland Security) related to the government’s approach to terrorist- related screening. The first report was to outline a strategy to enhance the  effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities by developing  comprehensive and coordinated procedures and capabilities. The second  report was to provide a prioritized investment and implementation plan  for detecting and interdicting suspected terrorists and terrorist activities.  Specifically, the plan was to describe the “scope, governance, principles,  outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of  activities” to implement the U.S. government’s terrorism-related screening  policies.
section_title: Agencies Rely upon Standards of Reasonableness in Assessing Individuals for Inclusion on TSC’s Watch List
paragraphs: The National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI rely upon standards of  reasonableness in determining which individuals are appropriate for  inclusion on TSC’s consolidated watch list. In accordance with Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 6, TSC’s watch list is to contain information  about individuals “known or appropriately suspected to be or have been  engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to  terrorism.” In implementing this directive, the National Counterterrorism  Center and the FBI strive to ensure that individuals who are reasonably  suspected of having possible links to terrorism—in addition to individuals  with known links—are nominated for inclusion on the watch list. To  determine if the suspicions are reasonable, the National Counterterrorism  Center and the FBI are to assess all available information on the  individual. According to the National Counterterrorism Center,  determining whether to nominate an individual can involve some level of  subjectivity. Nonetheless, any individual reasonably suspected of having  links to terrorist activities is to be nominated to the list and remain on it  until the FBI or the agency that supplied the information supporting the  nomination, such as one of the intelligence agencies, determines the  person is not a threat and should be removed from the list.
Moreover, according to the FBI, individuals who are subjects of ongoing  FBI counterterrorism investigations are generally nominated to TSC for  inclusion on the watch list, including persons who are being preliminarily  investigated to determine if they have links to terrorism. In determining  whether to open an investigation, the FBI uses guidelines established by  the Attorney General. These guidelines contain specific standards for  opening investigations, including formal review and approval processes.  According to FBI officials, there must be a “reasonable indication” of  involvement in terrorism before opening an investigation. The FBI noted,  for example, that it is not sufficient to open an investigation based solely  on a neighbor’s complaint or an anonymous tip or phone call. If an  investigation does not establish a terrorism link, the FBI generally is to  close the investigation and request that TSC remove the person from the  watch list. Based on these standards, the number of records in TSC’s  consolidated watch list has increased from about 158,000 records in June  2004 to about 755,000 records as of May 2007 (see fig. 2). It is important to  note that the total number of records in TSC’s watch list does not  represent the total number of individuals on the watch list. Rather, if an  individual has one or more known aliases, the watch list will contain  multiple records for the same individual.
TSC’s watch list database is updated daily with new nominations,  modifications to existing records, and deletions. Because individuals can  be added to the list based on reasonable suspicion, inclusion on the list  does not automatically prohibit an individual from, for example, obtaining  a visa or entering the United States when the person is identified by a  screening agency. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered,  agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine  what action to take, if any.
section_title: Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) through May 2007,  screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who  were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times,  according TSC data. A breakdown of these encounters shows that the  number of matches has increased each year—from 4,876 during the first  10-month period of TSC’s operations to 14,938 during fiscal year 2005, to  19,887 during fiscal year 2006. This increase can be attributed partly to the  growth in the number of records in the consolidated terrorist watch list  and partly to the increase in the number of agencies that use the list for  screening purposes. Our analysis of TSC data also indicates that many  individuals were encountered multiple times. For example, a truck driver  who regularly crossed the U.S.-Canada border or an individual who  frequently took international flights could each account for multiple  encounters. Further, TSC data show that the highest percentage of  encounters involved screening within the United States by a state or local  law enforcement agency, U.S. government investigative agency, or other  governmental entity. The next highest percentage involved border-related  encounters, such as passengers on airline flights inbound from outside the  United States or individuals screened at land ports of entry. The lowest  percentage of encounters occurred outside of the United States.
The watch list has enhanced the U.S. government’s counterterrorism  efforts by allowing federal, state, and local screening and law enforcement  officials to obtain information to help them make better-informed  decisions during encounters regarding the level of threat a person poses  and the appropriate response to take, if any. The specific outcomes of  encounters with individuals on the watch list are based on the  government’s overall assessment of the intelligence and investigative  information that supports the watch list record and any additional  information that may be obtained during the encounter. Our analysis of  data on the outcomes of encounters revealed that agencies took a range of  actions, such as arresting individuals, denying others entry into the United  States, and most commonly, releasing the individuals following  questioning and information gathering.
TSC data show that agencies reported arresting many subjects of watch  list records for various reasons, such as the individual having an  outstanding arrest warrant or the individual’s behavior or actions  during the encounter. TSC data also indicated that some of the arrests  were based on terrorism grounds.
TSC data show that when visa applicants were positively matched to  terrorist watch list records, the outcomes included visas denied, visas  issued (because the consular officer did not find any statutory basis for  inadmissibility), and visa ineligibility waived.
Transportation Security Administration data show that when airline  passengers were positively matched to the No Fly or Selectee lists, the  vast majority of matches were to the Selectee list. Other outcomes  included individuals matched to the No Fly list and denied boarding  (did not fly) and individuals matched to the No Fly list after the aircraft  was in flight. Additional information on individuals on the watch list  passing undetected through agency screening is presented later in this  statement.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection data show that a number of  nonimmigrant aliens encountered at U.S. ports of entry were positively  matched to terrorist watch list records. For many of the encounters,  the agency determined there was sufficient information related to  watch list records to preclude admission under terrorism grounds.  However, for most of the encounters, the agency determined that there  was not sufficient information related to the records to preclude  admission.
TSC data show that state or local law enforcement officials have  encountered individuals who were positively matched to terrorist  watch list records thousands of times. Although data on the actual  outcomes of these encounters were not available, the vast majority  involved watch list records that indicated that the individuals were  released, unless there were reasons other than terrorism-related  grounds for arresting or detaining the individuals, such as the  individual having an outstanding arrest warrant.
Also, according to federal officials, encounters with individuals who were  positively matched to the watch list assisted government efforts in  tracking the respective person’s movements or activities and provided the  opportunity to collect additional information about the individual. The  information collected was shared with agents conducting  counterterrorism investigations and with the intelligence community for  use in analyzing threats. Such coordinated collection of information for  use in investigations and threat analyses is one of the stated policy  objectives for the watch list.
section_title: Potential Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes and Agency Efforts to Address Them
paragraphs: The principal screening agencies whose missions most frequently and  directly involve interactions with travelers do not check against all records  in TSC’s consolidated watch list because screening against certain records  (1) may not be needed to support the respective agency’s mission, (2) may  not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to  check individuals against watch list records, or (3) may not be  operationally feasible. Rather, each day, TSC exports applicable records  from the consolidated watch list to federal government databases that  agencies use to screen individuals for mission-related concerns. For  example, the database that U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses to  check incoming travelers for immigration violations, criminal histories,  and other matters contained the highest percentage of watch list records  as of May 2007. This is because its mission is to screen all travelers,  including U.S. citizens, entering the United States at ports of entry. The  database that the Department of State uses to screen applicants for visas  contained the second highest percentage of all watch list records. This  database does not include records on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent  residents because these individuals would not apply for U.S. visas.
The FBI database that state and local law enforcement agencies use for  screening contained the third highest percentage of watch list records.  According to the FBI, the remaining records were not included in this  database primarily because they did not contain sufficient identifying  information on the individual, which is required to minimize instances of  individuals being misidentified as being subjects of watch list records.  Further, the No Fly and Selectee lists disseminated by the Transportation  Security Administration to airlines for use in prescreening passengers  contained the lowest percentage of watch list records. The lists did not  contain the remaining records either because they (1) did not meet the  nomination criteria for the No Fly or Selectee list or (2) did not contain  sufficient identifying information on the individual. According to the  Department of Homeland Security, increasing the number of records used  to prescreen passengers would expand the number of misidentifications to  unjustifiable proportions without a measurable increase in security. While  we understand the FBI’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s  concerns about misidentifications, we still believe it is important that  federal officials assess the extent to which security risks exist by not  screening against certain watch list records and what actions, if any,  should be taken in response.
Also, Department of Homeland Security component agencies are taking  steps to address instances of individuals on the watch list passing  undetected through agency screening. For example, U.S. Customs and  Border Protection has encountered situations where it identified the  subject of a watch list record after the individual had been processed at a  port of entry and admitted into the United States. U.S. Customs and  Border Protection has created a working group within the agency to study  the causes of this vulnerability and has begun to implement corrective  actions. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services—the agency  responsible for screening persons who apply for U.S. citizenship or  immigration benefits—has also acknowledged areas that need  improvement in the processes used to detect subjects of watch list  records. According to agency representatives, each instance of an  individual on the watch list getting through agency screening is reviewed  to determine the cause, with appropriate follow-up and corrective action  taken, if needed. The agency is also working with TSC to enhance  screening effectiveness.
Further, Transportation Security Administration data show that in the  past, a number of individuals who were on the government’s No Fly list  passed undetected through airlines’ prescreening of passengers and flew  on international flights bound to or from the United States. The individuals  were subsequently identified in-flight by U.S. Customs and Border  Protection, which checks passenger names against watch list records to  help the agency prepare for the passengers’ arrival in the United States.  However, the potential onboard security threats posed by the undetected  individuals required an immediate counterterrorism response, which in  some instances resulted in diverting the aircraft to a new location.  According to the Transportation Security Administration, such incidents  were subsequently investigated and, if needed, corrective action was taken  with the respective air carrier. In addition, U.S. Customs and Border  Protection has issued a final rule that should better position the  government to identify individuals on the No Fly list before an  international flight is airborne. For domestic flights within the United  States, there is no second screening opportunity—like the one U.S.  Customs and Border Protection conducts for international flights. The  government plans to take over from air carriers the function of  prescreening passengers prior to departure against watch list records for  both international and domestic flights. Also, TSC has ongoing initiatives  to help reduce instances of individuals on the watch list passing  undetected through agency screening, including efforts to improve  computerized name-matching programs.
section_title: The U.S. Government Has Made Progress in Using the Watch List, but a Strategy and Plan Supported by a Governance Structure Would Enhance Use and Effectiveness
paragraphs: Although the federal government has made progress in using the  consolidated watch list for screening purposes, additional opportunities  exist for using the list. Internationally, the Department of State has made  progress in making bilateral arrangements to share terrorist screening  information with certain foreign governments. The department had two  such arrangements in place before September 11, 2001. More recently, the  department has made four new arrangements and is in negotiations with  several other countries.
Also, the Department of Homeland Security has made progress in using  watch list records to screen employees in some critical infrastructure  components of the private sector, including certain individuals who have  access to vital areas of nuclear power plants, work in airports, or transport  hazardous materials. However, many critical infrastructure components  are not using watch list records. The Department of Homeland Security  has not, consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6,  finalized guidelines to support private sector screening processes that  have a substantial bearing on homeland security. Finalizing such  guidelines would help both the private sector and the Department of  Homeland Security ensure that private sector entities are using watch list  records consistently, appropriately, and effectively to protect their  workers, visitors, and key critical assets. Further, federal departments and  agencies have not identified all appropriate opportunities for which  terrorist-related screening will be applied, in accordance with presidential  directives.
A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because  the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan— supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure—for  enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent with  presidential directives. Without an up-to-date strategy and plan, agencies  and organizations that conduct terrorist-related screening activities do not  have a foundation for a coordinated approach that is driven by an  articulated set of core principles. Furthermore, lacking clearly articulated  principles, milestones, and outcome measures, the federal government is  not easily able to provide accountability and a basis for monitoring to  ensure that (1) the intended goals for, and expected results of, terrorist  screening are being achieved and (2) use of the list is consistent with  privacy and civil liberties. These plan elements, which were prescribed by  presidential directives, are crucial for coordinated and comprehensive use  of terrorist-related screening data, as they provide a platform to establish  governmentwide priorities for screening, assess progress toward policy  goals and intended outcomes, ensure that any needed changes are  implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness.
Although all elements of a strategy and implementation plan cited in  presidential directives are important to guide realization of the most  effective use of watch list data, addressing governance is particularly vital,  as achievement of a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist- related screening involves numerous entities within and outside the  federal government. However, no clear lines of responsibility and  authority have been established to monitor governmentwide screening  activities for shared problems and solutions or best practices. Neither  does any existing entity clearly have the requisite authority for addressing  various governmentwide issues—such as assessing common gaps or  vulnerabilities in screening processes and identifying, prioritizing, and  implementing new screening opportunities. Thus, it is important that the  Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism  address these deficiencies by ensuring that an appropriate governance  structure has clear and adequate responsibility and authority to (a)  provide monitoring and analysis of watch list screening efforts  governmentwide, (b) respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c)  assess progress toward intended outcomes.
section_title: Conclusions and Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Managed by TSC, the consolidated terrorist watch list represents a major  step forward from the pre-September 11 environment of multiple,  disconnected, and incomplete watch lists throughout the government.  Today, the watch list is an integral component of the U.S. government’s  counterterrorism efforts. However, our work indicates that there are  additional opportunities for reducing potential screening vulnerabilities,  expanding use of the watch list, and enhancing management oversight.  Thus, we have made several recommendations to the heads of relevant  departments and agencies. Our recommendations are intended to help (1)  mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list screening processes  that arise when screening agencies do not use certain watch list records  and (2) optimize the use and effectiveness of the watch list as a  counterterrorism tool.  Such optimization should include development of  guidelines to support private sector screening processes that have a  substantial bearing on homeland security, as well as development of an  up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for using terrorist-related  information. Further, to help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related  screening efforts are effectively coordinated, we have also recommended  that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and  Counterterrorism ensure that an appropriate leadership or governance  structure has clear lines of responsibility and authority.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of our report, which provides the basis for my  statement at today’s hearing, the Department of Homeland Security noted  that it agreed with and supported our work and stated that it had already  begun to address issues identified in our report’s findings. The FBI noted  that the database state and local law enforcement agencies use for  screening does not contain certain watch list records primarily to  minimize instances of individuals being misidentified as subjects of watch  list records. Because of this operational concern, the FBI noted that our  recommendation to assess the extent of vulnerabilities in current  screening processes has been completed and the vulnerability has been  determined to be low or nonexistent. In our view, however, recognizing  operational concerns does not constitute assessing vulnerabilities. Thus,  while we understand the FBI’s operational concerns, we maintain it is still  important that the FBI assess to what extent security risks are raised by  not screening against certain watch list records and what actions, if any,  should be taken in response. Also, the FBI noted that TSC’s governance  board is the appropriate forum for obtaining a commitment from all of the  entities involved in the watch-listing process. However, as discussed in our  report, TSC’s governance board is responsible for providing guidance  concerning issues within TSC’s mission and authority and would need  additional authority to provide effective coordination of terrorist-related  screening activities and interagency issues governmentwide. The  Homeland Security Council was provided a draft of the report but did not  provide comments.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512- 8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this statement were  Danny R. Burton, Virginia A. Chanley, R. Eric Erdman, Michele C. Fejfar,   Jonathon C. Fremont, Kathryn E. Godfrey, Richard B. Hung, Thomas F.  Lombardi, Donna L. Miller, and Ronald J. Salo.
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