Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD's Planning for a Complex Catastrophe
Published: 2013-09-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States continues to face an uncertain and complicated security environment, as major disasters and emergencies, such as the Boston Marathon bombings and Hurricane Sandy illustrate. DOD supports civil authorities' response to domestic incidents through an array of activities collectively termed civil support. In July 2012, DOD began to plan for federal military support during a complex catastrophe--such as a large earthquake that causes extraordinary levels of casualties or damage, and cascading failures of critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to assess DOD's planning and capabilities for a complex catastrophe. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) planned for and identified capabilities to respond to complex catastrophes, and (2) established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents. To do so, GAO analyzed civil support plans, guidance, and other documents, and interviewed DOD and FEMA officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are updating their existing civil support plans to include a complex catastrophe scenario, as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. However, the commands are delaying the identification of capabilities that could be provided to execute the plans until the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead federal response agency, completes its regional planning efforts in 2018. NORTHCOM officials told us that the command's civil support plan would describe some general force requirements, such as types of military units, but that it will not identify specific capabilities that could be provided to civil authorities during a complex catastrophe. Similarly, according to PACOM officials, PACOM's plan also will not identify such capabilities. Still, defense coordinating officers--senior military officers who work closely with federal, state, and local officials in FEMA's regional offices--have taken some initial steps to coordinate with FEMA during its regional planning process to identify capabilities that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be required to provide in some regions. For example, a defense coordinating officer has helped one of the FEMA regions that has completed its regional plan to develop bundled mission assignments that pre-identify a group of capabilities that region will require during a complex catastrophe. DOD doctrine states that the department should interact with non-DOD agencies to gain a mutual understanding of their response capabilities and limitations. By working through the defense coordinating officers to identify an interim set of specific capabilities for a complex catastrophe-- instead of waiting for FEMA to complete its five-year regional planning process-- NORTHCOM and PACOM can enhance their preparedness and mitigate the risk of an unexpected capability gap during the five-year period until FEMA completes its regional plans in 2018.
DOD has established a command and control framework for a federal military civil support response; however, the command and control structure for federal military forces during complex catastrophes is unclear because DOD has not developed a construct prescribing the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents across multiple states. This gap in the civil support framework was illustrated by recent events such as National Level Exercise 2011--which examined DOD's response to a complex catastrophe--and the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy in 2012. For example, officials from NORTHCOM's Army component told us that the exercise revealed that the absence of an operationallevel command element created challenges for NORTHCOM in managing the operations of federal military forces during a large-scale, multistate incident. Similarly, DOD after action reports on Hurricane Sandy found that the command and control structure for federal military forces was not clearly defined, resulting in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. DOD doctrine states that operational plans should identify the command structure expected to exist during their implementation. By identifying roles, responsibilities, and command relationships during multistate incidents such as complex catastrophes, DOD will be better positioned to manage and allocate resources across a multistate area and ensure effective and organized response operations.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that combatant commands (1) work through the defense coordinating officers to develop an interim set of specific DOD capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes, as FEMA completes its five-year regional planning cycle; and (2) develop, clearly define, communicate, and implement a construct for the command and control of federal military forces during multistate civil support incidents such as complex catastrophes. DOD concurred with both recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States continues to face an uncertain and complicated  security environment with the potential for major disasters and  emergencies, as incidents such as the Boston Marathon bombings,  Hurricane Sandy, and recent wildfires illustrate. DOD supports civil  authorities’ response to domestic incidents through an array of activities  collectively termed civil support. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist  attacks, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern  Command (NORTHCOM) in October 2002 to, among other things,  provide for and manage DOD’s civil support mission. DOD generally does  not acquire capabilities specifically for civil support, but it possesses a  broad array of resources developed for its warfighting mission that could  be brought to bear when civilian response capabilities are overwhelmed  or exhausted—or in instances where DOD offers unique capabilities. For  example, DOD has been called upon to mitigate the effects of major  disasters and emergencies by providing fuel and medical care, and  certain military units within DOD may be tasked to provide specialized  life-saving and decontamination capabilities in response to a radiological  incident. The 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support  recognizes that, although DOD is always in a support role to civilian  authorities for disaster response, the capacity, capabilities, and training of  the military mean that DOD often is expected to play a prominent  supporting role in response efforts. The strategy also notes that public  expectations for a rapid federal response have grown in the wake of  major disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.
In July 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum directing  the department to plan for a complex catastrophe—that is, an incident  that results in cascading failures of critical infrastructure and causes  extraordinary levels of casualties or damage. DOD has defined a complex  catastrophe as a natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace  attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading  failures of multiple interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure  sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or  disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy,  public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or government  functions. A domestic incident of this scale is likely to affect multiple  states even though DOD’s definition of a complex catastrophe does not  specifically include multiple states. An example of a complex catastrophe  is the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor meltdown that struck  Japan in 2011 and caused extensive loss of life and suffering. DOD said  that the scope, scale and duration of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, which  affected several states on the East Coast of the United States, fell short  of the threshold for a complex catastrophe. According to Office of the  Secretary of Defense officials, the department’s increased focus on  complex catastrophes is largely the result of lessons learned from a 2011  national-level planning exercise. This exercise tested the government’s  response to a large earthquake scenario that involved numerous  casualties, and caused widespread property damage and critical  infrastructure degradation across eight states. A complex catastrophe has  not yet occurred in the United States; however, if it does occur it would  produce qualitative and quantitative effects that exceed those  experienced in major disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy,  creating unprecedented demand for response capabilities at all levels of  government.
In his July 2012 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense delineated nine  major tasks (and 28 related sub-tasks) requiring departmental entities to:  (1) define a complex catastrophe; (2) expedite access to reserve  components; (3) better leverage immediate response authority; (4)  enable effective access to and use of all defense capabilities; (5) update  DOD planning documents to include preparedness for complex  catastrophes; (6) integrate and synchronize DOD planning with federal,  regional, and state partners; (7) enable fastest identification of DOD  capabilities for complex catastrophe response; (8) strengthen shared  situational awareness, and (9) strengthen DOD preparedness through  improvements to doctrine, exercises, training, and education. Most of the  tasks and subtasks have a scheduled completion date, ranging from  August 2012 to September 2014.
To date, we have published several reports on the progress DOD has  made to address civil support issues. Among other things, these reports  have focused on coordination between NORTHCOM and the states, the  National Guard Bureau, and other federal agencies for civil support  planning and response; capabilities requirements for civil support;  National Guard requirements for responding to large-scale civil support  incidents; DOD’s planning, resourcing, and training for domestic  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; NORTHCOM’s  civil support exercise program; and NORTHCOM’s civil support guidance  development and planning efforts. We recommended that DOD update its  civil support strategy, doctrine, and DOD directives related to civil support  and clarify roles and responsibilities for civil support personnel. The  department generally concurred with these recommendations. These  reports are listed in the Related GAO Products section at the end of this  report. You asked us to assess DOD’s planning and capabilities for a  complex catastrophe. This report examines the extent to which DOD has  (1) planned for and identified capabilities to respond to complex  catastrophes, and (2) established a command and control construct for  complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for and identified  capabilities to respond to complex catastrophes, we assessed DOD civil  support planning documents, guidance, and after action reports from civil  support incidents and exercises that have occurred since 2011; and we  met with Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command,  military service, defense agency, and Reserve officials. We also met with  several defense coordinating officers and Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) officials to determine what planning was  being conducted at the regional level. We also met with officials at  NORTHCOM and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) to determine how the  commands are incorporating a complex catastrophe scenario into civil  support plans by the September 2013 and 2014 deadlines. We assessed  planning guidance issued by the Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense and  DOD joint doctrine against interviews with DOD and combatant command  officials to determine how DOD was incorporating a complex catastrophe  into civil support plans. To determine the extent to which DOD has  established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes  and other multistate incidents, we analyzed DOD doctrine and plans  related to operational planning and command and control. We also  reviewed laws and national-level policy pertaining to disaster response  coordination and planning, and met with officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, PACOM, the military  services, and the National Guard Bureau to determine DOD’s existing  command and control structure. In addition, we reviewed relevant  documentation—including briefings, analyses, and after action reports  related to Hurricane Sandy and National Level Exercise 2011—and met  with Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command,  military service, and National Guard officials to determine the extent to  which DOD had identified and analyzed multistate command and control  issues. We also assessed DOD and interagency guidance and other  documents including NORTHCOM’s civil support plan, DOD’s civil  support joint publication and Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of  Effort, and DOD after action reports from Hurricane Sandy to determine  how the existing command and control construct addressed complex  catastrophes and other multistate incidents.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More detailed information  on our objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in appendix I of  this report.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Framework for Disaster Response
paragraphs: The federal government’s response to major disasters and emergencies  in the United States is guided by the Department of Homeland Security’s  National Response Framework. The framework is based on a tiered,  graduated response; that is, incidents are managed at the lowest  jurisdictional level and supported by additional higher-tiered response  capabilities as needed. Overall coordination of federal incident- management activities is generally the responsibility of the Department of  Homeland Security. Within the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA  is responsible for coordinating and integrating the preparedness of  federal, state, local, and nongovernmental entities. In this capacity, FEMA  engages in a range of planning efforts to prepare for and mitigate the  effects of major disasters and emergencies. For example, FEMA is  currently developing regional all-hazards and incident-specific plans  intended to cover the full spectrum of hazards, including those that are  more likely to occur in each region. FEMA expects to complete its current  regional planning cycle by 2018.
Local and county governments respond to emergencies daily using their  own capabilities and rely on mutual aid and other types of assistance  agreements with neighboring governments when they need additional  resources. For example, county and local authorities are likely to have the  capabilities needed to adequately respond to a small-scale incident, such  as a local factory explosion, and therefore would not request additional  resources. For larger-scale incidents, when resources are overwhelmed,  local and county governments will request assistance from the state.  States have resources, such as the National Guard of each state,that  they can marshal to help communities respond and recover. If additional  capabilities are required, states may request assistance from one another  through interstate mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency  Management Assistance Compact, or the governors can seek federal  assistance.
Various federal agencies play lead or supporting roles in responding to  major disasters and emergencies, based on their authorities and  capabilities, and the nature of the incident when federal assistance is  required. For example, the Department of Energy is the lead federal  agency for the reestablishment of damaged energy systems and  components, and may provide technical expertise during an incident  involving radiological and nuclear materials. DOD supports the lead  federal agency in responding to major disasters and emergencies when  (1) state, local, and other federal capabilities are overwhelmed, or unique  defense capabilities are required; (2) it is directed to do so by the  President or the Secretary of Defense; or (3) assistance is requested by  the lead federal agency. When deciding whether to commit defense  resources to a request for assistance by the lead federal agency, DOD  evaluates the request against six criteria: legality, lethality, risk, cost,  readiness, and appropriateness of the circumstances.
section_title: DOD Organizations and Offices Involved in Major Disaster and Emergency Response
paragraphs: A number of DOD organizations have roles in planning for and  responding to major disasters and emergencies.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and  Americas’ Security Affairs: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs serves as the  principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on civil support  issues.
The Joint Staff: The Joint Staff coordinates with NORTHCOM and  PACOM to ensure that civil support planning efforts are compatible  with the department’s war planning and advises the military services  on the department’s policy, training, and joint exercise development.
Combatant commands: NORTHCOM and PACOM are responsible  for carrying out the department’s civil support mission, and have  command and control authority depending on the location. The  NORTHCOM area of responsibility for civil support is comprised of the  contiguous 48 states, Alaska, and the District of Columbia. Outside of  this area, NORTHCOM may also support civil authorities’ major  disaster and emergency response operations in the Commonwealth of  Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. PACOM has these  responsibilities for the Hawaiian Islands and U.S. territories in the  Pacific.
Other Defense Organizations: Other DOD organizations, such as  the Army Corps of Engineers, the National Geospatial Intelligence  Agency, and the Defense Logistics Agency, support FEMA during  major disasters and emergencies by providing power generation  capabilities, fuel, and logistics support as lead of several emergency  support functions cited in the National Response Framework. The  Army Corps of Engineers in particular serves as the lead for  Emergency Support Function 3, Public Works and Engineering.
National Guard Bureau: The National Guard Bureau serves as the  channel of communications on all matters relating to the National  Guard between DOD and the States.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM assigned a defense  coordinating officer with associated support staff (known as a defense  coordinating element) in each of FEMA’s 10 regional offices. Defense  coordinating officers are senior-level military officers with joint service  experience, and training on the National Response Framework and the  Department of Homeland Security’s National Incident Management  System. Defense coordinating officers work closely with federal, state,  and local officials to determine DOD’s understanding of what additional or  unique capabilities DOD can provide to mitigate the effects of a major  disaster or emergency. Figure 1 shows the 10 FEMA regions.
According to DOD officials, dual-status commanders—active duty military  or National Guard officers who coordinate state and federal responses to  civil support incidents and events—have been used for select planned  and special events since 2004, and more recently for civil support  incidents. The dual-status commander construct provides the  intermediate link between the federal and the state chains of command  and is intended to promote unity of effort between federal and state forces  to facilitate a rapid response to save lives, prevent human suffering, and  protect property during major disasters and emergencies. The Secretary  of Defense must authorize, and the Governor must consent to,  designation of an officer to serve as a dual-status commander. During  Hurricane Sandy, dual-status commanders served in New York, New  Jersey, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012  provided  that a dual-status commander should be the usual and customary  command and control arrangement in situations when the armed forces  and National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil  authorities, including major disasters and emergencies. When serving in a  title 32 or state active duty status, the National Guard of a state is under  the command and control of the state’s governor. DOD and National  Guard personnel serving on federal active duty, sometimes referred to as  being in Title 10 status, are under the command and control of the  President and the Secretary of Defense. Dual-status commanders  operate in both statuses simultaneously and report to both chains of  command. Command and control refers to the exercise of authority and  direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in  the accomplishment of the mission.
section_title: NORTHCOM and PACOM Are Including a Complex Catastrophe in Their Civil Support Plans but Are Delaying Identification of Capability Requirements
paragraphs: NORTHCOM and PACOM are updating their existing civil support plans  to include a complex catastrophe, as directed, but the plans will not  identify capabilities needed to execute their plans that could be provided  to execute the plans, as required, until FEMA completes its regional  planning efforts in 2018. In the interim, combatant command officials have  not determined how they will incorporate into their civil support plans  regional capability information from those FEMA regions that have  completed their plans.
subsections: section_title: NORTHCOM and PACOM Are Updating Civil Support Plans to Address a Complex Catastrophe; But Are Not Identifying Capability Requirements Until FEMA’s Regional Planning is Complete
paragraphs: NORTHCOM and PACOM are updating their civil support plans to include  a complex catastrophe. However, the commands are delaying the  identification of capabilities needed to execute the plans, as required by  the Joint Staff, until FEMA completes its regional planning efforts. The  Secretary of Defense’s July 2012 memorandum directed NORTHCOM  and PACOM to update their civil support plans—to include preparing for a  complex catastrophe—by September 2013 and September 2014,  respectively. In September 2012, the Joint Staff issued more specific  guidance to the commands; directing them to, among other things,  identify within the civil support plans required DOD forces and capabilities  for responding to a complex catastrophe by the September 2013 and  September 2014 deadlines. NORTHCOM officials told us that they  expect the command to update its civil support plan by September 2014,  and that the plan would describe some general strategic-level complex  catastrophe scenarios and identify general force requirements, such as  the types of military units that would be needed to respond to a complex  catastrophe. However, according to NORTHCOM officials, the command  will not identify DOD capabilities that could be provided to civil authorities  during a complex catastrophe until FEMA completes its plans.
According to PACOM officials, PACOM also expects to update its civil  support plan by September 2014. These officials told us that PACOM’s  plan will describe a complex catastrophe scenario that begins with an  infectious disease, followed by a typhoon that leads to an earthquake that  triggers a tsunami. PACOM also plans to identify critical infrastructure  likely to be impacted by this scenario. However, officials stated that  PACOM’s civil support plan will not identify capability needed to execute  the plan, despite the requirement specified in the Joint Staff’s planning  guidance. Rather, NORTHCOM and PACOM plan to continue to work  with FEMA to identify those DOD’s capabilities that could be provided to  respond to a complex catastrophe and include them in subsequent  versions of the civil support plans once FEMA has completed its plans for  each of the 10 FEMA regions during the next few years.
According to FEMA officials, DOD’s civil support concept plans are  intended to be coordinated with FEMA’s regional all-hazards and incident- specific plans but these plans are not scheduled to be completed until  2018. FEMA is currently working with each of its regions to update both  all-hazards and incident-specific plans, which are updated every 5 years.  FEMA’s all-hazards plans are intended to cover the spectrum of hazards,  including accidents; natural disasters; terrorist attacks; and chemical,  biological, nuclear, and radiological events. Incident-specific plans are  intended to address those specific hazards that are believed to have a  greater probability of occurring in a region when compared to other types  of hazards and have unique response requirements. Each FEMA region  has a collaborative team that is responsible for developing a regional all- hazards plan that details capabilities required at the regional level for  supporting emergency response.
While FEMA’s current efforts to develop regional plans are not scheduled  to be completed until 2018, FEMA officials told us that their process to  develop and update incident-specific plans is ongoing as needs arise in  the regions. As of August 2013, half of the 10 FEMA regions had  completed updating their all-hazards plan, and none of the 10 FEMA  regions had completed updating their incident-specific plans. According to  NORTHCOM officials, these FEMA regional plans are intended to, among  other things, inform DOD of the local and state-level capabilities available  for responding to a complex catastrophe in each FEMA region, as well as  any capability gaps that might ultimately have to be filled by DOD or  another federal agency.
section_title: DOD Officials Have Taken Some Initial Steps to Coordinate with FEMA to Develop Regional Capability Information; However, the Combatant Commands Have Not Determined How They Will Use This Information
paragraphs: DOD’s defense coordinating officers have taken some initial steps to  coordinate with FEMA; however, NORTHCOM, which is responsible for a  majority of the civil support mission for DOD, has not determined how it  will incorporate information produced by these efforts into its civil support  plan. DOD has defense coordinating officers in each of FEMA’s 10  regions who work closely with federal, state, and local officials to  determine what specific capabilities DOD can provide to mitigate the  effects of major disasters and emergencies when FEMA requests  assistance. Defense coordinating officers are senior-level military officers  with joint service experience, and training on the National Response  Framework and the Department of Homeland Security’s National Incident  Management System. Currently they are coordinating with FEMA and  other federal, state, and local agencies to determine regional and state  capability requirements for a complex catastrophe in each of the regions.  For example, the defense coordinating officer in FEMA Region IX, one of  the regions that has completed its all-hazards plan, has helped the region  develop bundled mission assignments for its regional plan that pre- identify a group of capabilities the region will require from DOD for a  complex catastrophe to fill an identified capability gap, such as aircraft,  communications, medical, and mortuary for responding to an earthquake  in southern California. The bundled mission assignments are specific to  the region’s plans and are intended to expedite the process of preparing a  request for assistance so that DOD can deliver the required capabilities  more quickly. Similarly, within FEMA Region IV, which has also  completed its all-hazards plan, the defense coordinating officer has  helped to develop a list of specific response capabilities that DOD can  plan to provide to civil authorities when needed. FEMA and the defense  coordinating officers are exploring the possibility of developing bundled  mission assignments for complex catastrophes for all of the FEMA  regions. However, NORTHCOM and PACOM have not determined how  this regional capability information will be incorporated into their civil  support plans.
According to DOD doctrine, an effective whole of government approach is  only possible when every agency understands the competencies and  capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals.  This doctrine further states that DOD should interact with non-DOD  agencies to gain a mutual understanding of their response capabilities  and limitations. By working through the defense coordinating officers to  identify an interim set of specific capabilities that DOD could provide in  response to a complex catastrophe—instead of waiting for FEMA to  complete its five-year regional planning processes and then updating civil  support plans—NORTHCOM and PACOM can enhance their  preparedness and more effectively mitigate the risk of an unexpected  capability gap during the five-year period until FEMA completes its  regional plans in 2018.
section_title: A Gap Exists in DOD’s Command and Control Framework for Complex Catastrophes and Other Multistate Incidents
paragraphs: DOD has established an overall command and control framework for a  federal military civil support response. However, the command and  control structure for federal military forces during incidents affecting  multiple states such as complex catastrophes is unclear because DOD  has not yet prescribed the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of  command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Established a Command and Control Framework for Responding to Federal Military Civil Support Incidents
paragraphs: DOD guidance and NORTHCOM civil support plans establish a  framework for the command and control of federal military civil support,  identifying a range of command elements and structures that may be  employed depending on the type, location, magnitude, and severity of an  incident, and the scope and complexity of DOD assistance. This  framework addresses command and control for federal military forces  operating independently or in parallel with state National Guard forces,  and it also provides a model for the integrated command and control of  federal military and state National Guard civil support.
Joint Doctrine and NORTHCOM’s civil support concept plans  collectively prescribe specific federal military command and control  procedures and relationships for certain types of civil support incidents— such as radiological emergencies—and also identify potential command  and control arrangements for incidents of varying scale. For example, for  small-scale civil support responses, NORTHCOM’s 2008 civil support  concept plan provides that a defense coordinating officer may be used  to command and control federal military forces so long as the response  force does not exceed the officer’s command and control capability.  Should an event exceed that threshold, a task force may be needed to  command and control medium-scale military activities. Such a task force  could be composed of personnel from a single military service; or, if the  scope, complexity, or other factors of an incident require capabilities of at  least two military departments, a joint task force may be established. The  size, composition, and capabilities of a joint task force can vary  considerably depending on the mission and factors related to the  operational environment, including geography of the area, nature of the  crisis, and the time available to accomplish the mission. For large-scale  civil support responses, per the civil support concept plan, NORTHCOM  can establish or expand an existing joint task force with multiple  subordinate joint task forces, or appoint one or more of its land, air, or  maritime functional component commanders to oversee federal forces.  U.S. Army North, located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is NORTHCOM’s  joint force land component commander. Air Force North, located at  Tyndall Air Force Base near Panama City, Florida, is NORTHCOM’s joint  force air component commander. U.S. Fleet Forces Command, located in  Norfolk, Virginia, is NORTHCOM’s joint force maritime component  commander.
According to NORTHCOM’s civil support concept plan, command and  control of federal military forces providing civil support is generally  accomplished using the functional component command structure. Within  this structure, NORTHCOM transfers operational control of federal  military forces to a designated functional component commander. This  commander may then deploy a subordinate task force or multiple task  forces to execute command and control. For example, for land-based  incidents, NORTHCOM would transfer operational control of federal  forces to U.S. Army North, which could then deploy one or more of its  subordinate command and control task forces. Figure 2 depicts a  functional component command and control structure for a land-based  federal military response to a major disaster or emergency in the  NORTHCOM area of responsibility.
In certain cases, such as large-scale civil support responses, federal  military and state National Guard forces may operate simultaneously in  support of civil authorities. In such instances, a dual-status commander— with authority over both federal military forces and state National Guard  forces—should be the usual and customary command arrangement.  Federal military forces allocated to the dual-status commander through  the request for assistance process are to be under that commander’s  control. For events or incidents that affect multiple states, a dual-status  commander may be established in individual states. Dual status  commanders do not have command and control over state National  Guard forces in states that have not designated that commander as a  dual status commander.
According to NORTHCOM’s civil support concept plan, dual-status  commanders provide the advantage of a single commander who is  authorized to make decisions regarding issues that affect both federal  and state forces under their command, thereby enhancing unity of effort.  For example, dual-status authority allows the commander to coordinate  and de-conflict federal and state military efforts while maintaining  separate and distinct chains of command. Unlike some federal military  task forces, dual-status commanders, when employed, are under the  direct operational control of NORTHCOM, operating outside of the  functional component command structure. Dual-status commanders also  fall under a state chain-of-command that extends up through the state  Adjutant General and Governor. Figure 3 depicts a command and control  structure for a land-based, single-state federal military response to a  major disaster or emergency in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility  when a dual status commander is employed.
The Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort emphasizes the  importance of properly configured command and control arrangements,  and DOD doctrine states that operational plans should identify the  command structure expected to exist during their implementation. The  Joint Action Plan also states that there is a likelihood that the United  States will face a catastrophic incident affecting multiple states, and that  past multistate emergencies demonstrated a coordinated and expeditious  state-federal response is crucial in order to save and sustain lives.  However, the command and control structure for federal military forces  during multistate incidents is unclear because DOD has not yet  prescribed the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among some of  the command elements that may be involved in responding to such  incidents. This gap in the civil support framework was illustrated by recent  events such as National Level Exercise 2011—which examined DOD’s  response to a complex catastrophe in the New Madrid Seismic Zone— and the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy led by NORTHCOM  in 2012. Citing this gap, officials we spoke with from across the  department—including NORTHCOM, U.S. Army North, the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, and two of the defense coordinating  elements—told us that the lack of a multistate command and control  structure has created uncertainty regarding the roles and responsibilities  of command elements that could be involved in response efforts.
National Level Exercise 2011  National Level Exercise 2011 simulated a  major earthquake in the central United States  region of the New Madrid Seismic Zone that  caused widespread casualties and damage to  critical infrastructure across eight states. The  exercise took place in May 2011 and focused  on integrated multi-jurisdictional catastrophic  response and recovery activities between  over 10,000 federal, regional, state, local, and  private sector participants at more than 135  sites across the country.
National Level Exercise 2011 helped to identify a gap in DOD’s federal  military command and control structure for multistate incidents. The  exercise highlighted uncertainty regarding the roles and relationships  among federal military command elements—and between such command  elements and responding forces. For example, officials from U.S. Army  North told us that the exercise revealed that not having a level of  command between the dual-status commanders and NORTHCOM did  not work well for such a large-scale, multistate incident, in part, because  NORTHCOM, in the absence of an operational-level command element,  faced challenges in managing the operations of federal military forces  across a widespread area. According to DOD doctrine, operational-level  commands, such as a functional component commander like the joint  force land component commander, can directly link operations to strategic  objectives. To address this gap, two task forces were employed to  operate between the dual-status commanders and NORTHCOM. While  the task forces improved the overall command structure, according to  Army officials, there was confusion regarding the role of the task forces in  relation to the dual-status commanders, as well as federal military forces  in states without a dual-status commander—which some of the state  governors involved in this exercise chose not to appoint.
National Level Exercise 2011 illustrated other potential challenges  associated with the lack of a multistate command and control structure.  For example, according to NORTHCOM’s publication on dual status  commander standard operating procedures, NORTHCOM is responsible  for coordinating the allocation of federal military forces among multiple  states or areas—that is, determining where and how to employ federal  military forces, particularly when there are similar requests for assistance.  NORTHCOM officials told us that the command, looking at the totality of  requests for assistance, would normally make such force employment  determinations based on FEMA’s prioritization of requests. However, in  the absence of a multistate command and control structure to provide the  necessary situational awareness over forces already engaged or  available, NORTHCOM may be impaired in its ability to make additional  informed decisions regarding the appropriate allocation of federal military  resources. For example, at the outset of a complex catastrophe, DOD  should expect to receive hundreds of requests with possibly redundant  requirements and no prioritization. Similarly, a preliminary NORTHCOM  analysis found that the current request for assistance process is unlikely  to handle the timely demands that a complex catastrophe would incur,  and that the prioritization of these requests would be unclear in the initial  hours and days of the incident. Army officials told us that without an  intermediate command entity to collate operational data and inform force  allocation decisions, it was unclear how DOD would prioritize requests for  federal military resources when there are multiple requests for the same  or similar capabilities. Officials from the Joint Staff, and defense  coordinating elements echoed these concerns, noting that it is unclear  how DOD would prioritize the allocation of federal military forces across  an affected multistate area when two or more dual-status commanders  are in place.
Civil Support Operations during Hurricane  Sandy  DOD’s activities during and after Hurricane  Sandy in October and November 2012  represented its largest civil support response  since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. DOD  received an unprecedented number of  requests for assistance, specifically in the  areas of power restoration and gasoline  distribution. According to DOD, the cascading  effects of the failures of critical infrastructure  in New York and New Jersey—including mass  power outages, major transportation  disturbances, and disruption of the fuel  distribution system—resembled those of a  complex catastrophe.
Challenges associated with the lack of a multistate command and control  construct were evident in the federal military response to Hurricane  Sandy, which marked the first occasion in which multiple dual-status  commanders were employed. For example, NORTHCOM officials told us  that the command recognized the need for a command and control  element between the dual-status commanders and NORTHCOM and, in  early November 2012, employed a joint coordinating element—a concept  without definition or doctrinal basis. According to DOD after action reports  for Hurricane Sandy, the purpose of the joint coordinating element,  employed as an extension of the joint force land component commander,  was to aid in the coordination, integration, and synchronization of federal  military forces. However, officials we spoke with from across the  department told us that the joint coordinating element’s role was neither  well-defined nor well-communicated, rendering it largely ineffective. For  example, officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs told us that  uncertainty regarding the role of the joint coordinating element contributed  to confusion during DOD’s response to Hurricane Sandy.
Additionally, officials from one of the defense coordinating elements  involved in the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy told us that  the roles and responsibilities of the dual-status commander, joint  coordinating element, and defense coordinating officer were unclear.  According to these officials, such uncertainty hampered unity of command  across state boundaries and created confusion regarding command and  control relationships and force allocation across the affected multistate  area. Officials from U.S. Army North and the Joint Staff similarly told us  that there were challenges in allocating federal military forces during the  response to Hurricane Sandy, in part, because of the command and  control structure that was employed. Joint Staff officials noted that DOD’s  joint coordinating element had limited visibility and control over federal  military forces.
DOD after action reports covering the federal military response to  Hurricane Sandy also found that the command and control structure for  federal military forces operating in the affected area was not clearly  defined, resulting in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of  effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. For  example, a U.S. Army North after action review concluded that while the  joint coordinating element initially had a positive effect on situational  awareness, inconsistencies in its purpose and task caused numerous  problems. Table 1 shows select Hurricane Sandy after action report  observations pertaining to command and control.
According to NORTHCOM officials, the command has recognized the  need for a multistate command and control construct, is analyzing this  issue, and plans to incorporate the results of its analysis into the  command’s updated civil support concept plan by October 2013.  NORTHCOM previously produced an analysis in March 2012 that  identified a command and control gap for multistate incidents along with  potential mitigation options, but this analysis was never approved. Also,  we recommended in 2012 that DOD develop implementation guidance for  the dual-status commanders that may partially address these challenges  by covering, among other things, criteria for determining when and how to  use dual-status commanders during civil support incidents affecting  multiple states. DOD agreed with this recommendation, and officials  from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland  Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs told us that they are in the  process of drafting such guidance. DOD has established a command and  control framework for single-state civil support responses; but, until it  develops, clearly defines, communicates, and implements a multistate  command and control construct, federal military forces responding to a  multistate event will likely face a range of operational ambiguities that  could heighten the prospects for poorly synchronized response to major  disasters and emergencies. For example, uncertainty regarding command  structure may negatively affect the flow of information and prevent  commanders from having adequate situational awareness over DOD’s  response, leading to reduced operational effectiveness and ineffective  use of DOD forces. By identifying roles, responsibilities, and command  relationships during multistate incidents such as complex catastrophes,  DOD will be better positioned to manage and allocate forces across a  multistate area, and ensure effective and organized response operations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD acknowledged in its 2013 strategy for homeland defense and civil  support that the department is expected to respond rapidly and effectively  to civil support incidents, including complex catastrophes—incidents that  would cause extraordinary levels of mass casualties and severely affect  life-sustaining infrastructure. The effects of such an incident would  exceed those caused by any previous domestic incident. NORTHCOM  and PACOM, the combatant commands responsible for carrying out the  department’s civil support mission, cannot effectively plan for complex  catastrophes in the absence of clearly defined capability requirements  and any associated capability gaps. Consequently, DOD’s decision to  delay identifying capabilities that could be requested by civil authorities  during a complex catastrophe until FEMA completes its five-year regional  planning efforts may lead to a delayed response from DOD and  ineffective intergovernmental coordination should a catastrophic event  occur before 2018. An interim set of specific capabilities that DOD could  refine as FEMA completes its regional planning process should help to  mitigate the risk of a potential capability gap during a complex  catastrophe. Further, developing, clearly defining, communicating, and  implementing a command and control construct for federal military  response to multistate civil support incidents would also likely enhance  the effectiveness of DOD’s response. National Level Exercise 11 and  Hurricane Sandy highlighted this critical gap in command and control.  Without a multistate command and control construct, DOD’s response to  a multistate incident, such as a complex catastrophe, may be delayed,  uncoordinated, and could result in diminished efficacy.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two  actions:  (1) To reduce the department’s risk in planning for a complex catastrophe  and enhance the department’s ability to respond to a complex  catastrophe through at least 2018, direct the Commanders of  NORTHCOM and PACOM to work through the defense coordinating  officers to identify an interim set of specific DOD capabilities that could be  provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes while FEMA  completes its five-year regional planning cycle.  (2) To facilitate effective and organized civil support response operations,  direct the Commander of NORTHCOM—in consultation with the Joint  Staff and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, acting through the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs—to develop, clearly define, communicate, and implement  a construct for the command and control of federal military forces during  multistate civil support incidents such as complex catastrophes—to  include the roles, responsibilities, and command relationships among  potential command elements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD  concurred with both recommendations and cited ongoing activities to  address our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their  entirety in appendix II. In addition, DOD provided technical comments,  which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to identify an interim set of  specific capabilities that could be provided to prepare and respond to  complex catastrophes. DOD stated that it recognizes the need for  detailed planning to ensure the department can provide the needed  capabilities, and is planning to work with defense coordinating officers  and emergency support function leads to develop a set of capabilities.  DOD also concurred with our recommendation to develop, clearly define,  communicate, and implement a construct for command and control of  federal military forces during multistate civil support incidents such as  complex catastrophes. DOD stated that it recognizes the need for this  and will ensure, as part of its contingency planning, that a range of  command and control options are available for NORTHCOM and PACOM  during multistate incidents. We believe that these actions will better  position DOD to effectively and efficiently provide support during a  complex catastrophe.
We also provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment.  DHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as  appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report  until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will distribute this  report to the Secretary of Defense, the Acting Secretary of Homeland  Security and other relevant officials. We are also sending copies of this  report to interested congressional committees. The report is also  available on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  Appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  planned for and identified capabilities to respond to a complex  catastrophe, we assessed current DOD civil support planning documents,  guidance, and after action reports from civil support incidents and  exercises since 2011, and met with Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint  Staff, combatant command, military service, defense agency, and  Reserve officials. We assessed planning guidance issued by the Joint  Staff and Secretary of Defense and DOD joint doctrine against interviews  with DOD and combatant command officials to determine how DOD was  incorporating a complex catastrophe into civil support plans. We also met  with several defense coordinating officers and Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) officials to determine what planning was  being conducted at the regional level. We met with defense coordinating  officers from regions that were impacted by Hurricane Sandy, participated  in National Level Exercise 11, and completed their regional plans to gain  an understanding of issues across a number of FEMA regions.  NORTHCOM’s deadline for completion of a complex catastrophe plan is  September 2013 and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM’s) deadline is  September 2014, which coincides with the commands’ planning cycles.  To determine NORTHCOM’s and PACOM’s planning requirements, we  reviewed the July 2012 Secretary of Defense memorandum on complex  catastrophes that requires NORTHCOM and PACOM to incorporate  complex catastrophe scenarios into the commands’ civil support plans  and the Joint Staff planning order related to complex catastrophes. We  compared planning requirements directed by the July 2012 Secretary of  Defense memorandum on complex catastrophes and other applicable  guidance to the federal and regional-level planning efforts to identify  capabilities for a complex catastrophe. We met with officials at  NORTHCOM and PACOM to determine how the commands are  incorporating a complex catastrophe scenario into civil support plans by  the September 2013 and September 2014 deadlines. Further, we  reviewed recent GAO reports describing long-standing problems in  planning and identifying civil support capabilities and gaps.
To determine the extent to which DOD has established a command and  control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents,  we analyzed DOD doctrine and plans related to operational planning and  command and control. Specifically, we assessed DOD and interagency  guidance including NORTHCOM’s civil support plan, DOD’s civil support  joint publication, and Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort and  DOD after action reports from Hurricane Sandy to determine how the  existing command and control construct addressed complex catastrophes  and other multistate incidents. We also reviewed laws relevant to disaster  response and domestic employment of federal military forces, including  the Stafford Act and certain provisions of Title 10 of the United States  Code, as well as national-level policy pertaining to response coordination  and planning, including the National Response Framework and National  Incident Management System. In addition, we reviewed relevant  documentation—including briefings, analyses, and after action reports  related to Hurricane Sandy—and met with Office of the Secretary of  Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command, military service, and National  Guard officials to determine the extent to which DOD had analyzed  multistate command and control issues.
In addressing both of our audit objectives, we met with officials from the  DOD and the Department of Homeland Security organizations identified  in table 2.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above Marc Schwartz, Assistant  Director; Tracy Burney; Ryan D’Amore; Susan Ditto; Gina Flacco; Michael  Silver; Amie Steele; and Michael Willems made key contributions to this  report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense  and Civil Support Guidance. GAO-13-128. Washington, D.C.: October 24,  2012.
Homeland Defense: Continued Actions Needed to Improve Management  of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations. GAO-12-311. Washington, D.C.:  January 31, 2012.
Homeland Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Steps  Could Enhance the Effectiveness of the National Guard’s Life Saving  Response Forces. GAO-12-114. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2011.
Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and  Coordination for Maritime Operations. GAO-11-661. Washington, D.C.:  June 22, 2011.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic,  Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness.   GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency  Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions.   GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to  Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. GAO-10-386. Washington,  D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge  DOD’s Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear  and High-Yield Explosive Incidents. GAO 10-123. Washington, D.C.:  October 7, 2009.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise  Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be  Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to  Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts.  GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.
Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’s Preparedness for  Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-08-868T. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.
National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to  Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process.   GAO-08-768. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern  Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau,  but Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but  Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other  Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities  during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. GAO-08-105. Washington, D.C.:  November 19, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Action to Address  Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare  for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address  Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts  Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk  Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters.   GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-903.  Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support  Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-498.  Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the  Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643.  Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington,  D.C.: March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
GAO’S Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response  to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.:  February 1, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington,  D.C.: July 11, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport  Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:  January 14, 2005.