Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts
Published: 2010-02-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Navy plans to spend about $28 billion to buy 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and at least 64 interchangeable mission packages to perform one of three missions--mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare--in waters close to shore. The Navy has been developing two different LCS seaframes and plans to select one for production in 2010. Due to the small 78-person crew size--40 core crew, 23 for aviation detachment, and typically 15 for mission packages--the Navy is developing new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) estimated LCS long-term operating and support costs and (2) developed plans to operate and support LCS. To do so, GAO compared Navy cost estimates to DOD guidance and GAO best practices; and analyzed Navy plans to implement its concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance and the extent these plans included assessments of program risk.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Navy estimated operating and support costs for LCS seaframes and mission packages in 2009, but the estimates do not fully reflect DOD and GAO best practices for cost estimating and may change due to program uncertainties. GAO's analysis of the Navy's 2009 estimates showed that the operating and support costs for seaframes and mission packages could total $84 billion (in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars) through about 2050. However, the Navy did not follow some best practices for developing an estimate such as (1) analyzing the likelihood that the costs could be greater than estimated, (2) fully assessing how the estimate may change as key assumptions change, and (3) requesting an independent estimate and comparing it with the program estimate. The estimates may also be affected by program uncertainties, such as potential changes to force structure that could alter the number of ships and mission packages required. The costs to operate and support a weapon system can total 70 percent of a system's costs, and the lack of an estimate that fully reflects best practices could limit decision makers' ability to identify the resources that will be needed over the long term to support the planned investment in LCS force structure. With a decision pending in 2010 on which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the program, decision makers could lack critical information to assess the full costs of the alternatives. The Navy has made progress in developing operational concepts for LCS, but faces risks in implementing its new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that are necessitated by the small crew size. Specifically, the Navy faces risks in its ability to identify and assign personnel given the time needed to achieve the extensive training required. GAO's analysis of a sample of LCS positions showed an average of 484 days of training is required before reporting to a crew, significantly more than for comparable positions on other surface ships. Moreover, the Navy's maintenance concept relies heavily on distance support, with little maintenance performed on ship. The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new concepts and has established groups to address how to implement them. However, these groups have not performed a risk assessment as described in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. The Strategy describes the need to assess and mitigate risks to executing future missions and managing personnel, training, and maintenance. If the Navy cannot implement its concepts as envisioned, it may face operational limitations, have to reengineer its operational concepts, or have to alter the ship design. Many of the concepts will remain unproven until 2013 or later, when the Navy will have committed to building almost half the class. Having a thorough risk assessment of the new operational concepts would provide decision makers with information to link the effectiveness of these new concepts with decisions on program investment, including the pace of procurement.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: With the ability to maneuver in shallow waters inaccessible to other  surface combatants, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a new class of  warship meant to facilitate U.S. Navy access to and operations in the  littorals, which are waters close to shore. The Navy plans a major  investment in the LCS program, which could cost $28 billion to buy 55  ships and related, interchangeable combat capability. The planned 55 ships  would comprise about 38 percent of the Navy’s surface combatants  in a  313-ship Navy. The Navy is using two contractors to build differently  designed ships, called seaframes. As of October 2009, the Navy had  procured two ships (one of each design) and contracted for two more (one  of each design). The Navy plans to select one design in fiscal year 2010. To  increase flexibility, the LCS’s combat capability will be contained in  removable, interchangeable mission packages to perform one of three  primary missions—mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, and  surface warfare concentrating on countering small surface boat attacks.  Each LCS ship will carry only one package at any given time. Further,  since the cost to operate and support a weapon system traditionally  accounts for over 70 percent of the total cost over a system’s lifetime, the  resources needed to operate and support the LCS seaframes and mission  packages could be significant over time.
In 2005, the Navy began developing an LCS concept of operations which  broadly describes these unique approaches to personnel, training, and  maintenance and outlines the responsibilities of shore organizations to  support LCS operations. LCS differs from other Navy ships in three key  areas—personnel, training, and maintenance. First, a deployed LCS will  have a total of 78 personnel on board comprised of 40 core crewmembers  to operate the ship, 15 to operate the mission packages, and 23 for the  aviation detachment. A crew of this size is significantly less than on other  surface combatants—about 172 for a frigate and about 254 for a destroyer.  In order to increase operational availability, the Navy intends to rotate  crews about every 4 months to enable each LCS to deploy continuously for  up to 18 months. Second, due to the decision to operate the ship with 40  sailors, training will be tailored to each position and include training in  skills outside the crewmember’s specialty. For example, a fire fighter  specialist is also required to be trained in an engineering skill area. Third,  the crew will perform minimal maintenance on board the ship and will rely  extensively on support from organizations ashore to perform maintenance  and administrative functions such as maintaining supply and pay records.
Considering the Navy’s unique LCS concept of operations, you asked us to  review the Navy’s efforts to estimate the program’s operating and support  costs and to plan for how the ship will be operated and supported  considering the small crew size. For this review, we assessed the extent to  which the Navy has (1) estimated the long-term operating and support  costs for LCS seaframes and mission packages; and (2) developed and  implemented plans to operate and support the LCS particularly in the  areas of personnel, training, and maintenance.
To assess the extent to which the Navy estimated the long-term operating  and support costs for LCS seaframes and mission packages, we reviewed  documentation of seaframe and mission package cost estimates prepared  by the Naval Sea Systems Command. We compared the estimates to cost  estimating best practices identified by the Office of the Secretary of  Defense’s Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation (CAPE) as well as in our GAO Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide. To assess the extent to which the Navy analyzed the  force structure requirements underlying the planned purchase quantities  of LCS seaframes and mission packages, we reviewed force structure  analysis documents and met with officials of the Assessments and Surface  Warfare divisions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Although,  as discussed later in this report, the Navy’s estimates did not fully reflect  best practices, they were based on a cost estimating process we deemed  sufficient for reporting the results of our analysis of the Navy’s operating  and support cost estimates.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has developed and implemented  plans to operate and support LCS, particularly in the areas of personnel,  training, and maintenance, we reviewed and analyzed the Department of  Defense (DOD) and Navy guidance and reviewed key studies and planning  documents including the LCS Wholeness Concept of Operations.  We also  reviewed prior GAO products and DOD guidance on risk management to  assess the extent that Navy plans included assessments of program risk.  To estimate long term LCS personnel requirements, we analyzed Navy  documentation and validated the results with appropriate Navy officials.  To compare LCS training days to training days for other surface ships, we  first identified a non-probability sample of LCS positions from both  seaframes based on criteria for which positions required a wide variety of  training or, based on Navy information, might be hard to fill. Then we  compared the required training days for these LCS positions with  comparable positions on two other surface ships. We validated the data  and results with appropriate Navy officials. On the basis of the work  described above, we concluded that the data had no limitations and were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to February 2010  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Program Description
paragraphs: The LCS is being developed to assure access to the littorals that are  threatened from mines, submarines, and surface forces. The LCS program  consists of two distinct parts, the ship itself—called a seaframe—and the  mission package it carries and deploys to provide combat capability. In  addition to the capabilities associated with the mission packages, the LCS  may be expected to perform inherent capabilities such as homeland  defense, search and rescue, or humanitarian assistance. The Navy is using  two contractors to build differently designed seaframes. As of December  2009, the Navy had bought two ships of each design, of which the first ship  of each design has been delivered. The Navy plans to select one design in  fiscal year 2010 for the remainder of the class. Figure 1 shows each of the  seaframes.
By the end of fiscal year 2015, the Navy plans to have bought up to 23 of  the planned 55 ships. These ships represent a significant investment in the  LCS program not only for procurement but also for long-term operating  and support costs. A weapon system’s life-cycle costs include research and  development, procurement, military construction, operations and  support, and disposal. Since operating and support costs are historically  the largest portion (over 70 percent) of a weapon system’s lifetime costs,  these costs were the focus of our analysis of the Navy’s LCS cost  estimates.
The LCS seaframe’s combat capability will be provided by one of three  interchangeable mission packages. Each mission package will also include  an aviation detachment of manned helicopters and unmanned aerial  vehicles. Currently the Navy plans to buy 64 mission packages for three  mission areas—24 for mine countermeasures, 16 for antisubmarine  warfare, and 24 for surface warfare. The surface warfare mission package  also includes a module for maritime security, primarily to provide  capability for boarding other ships. The Navy has not yet decided how  many maritime security modules it will buy. Table 1 below describes the  basic mission of each mission package.
The Navy plans to incrementally add capability to these packages over  time, and, according to Navy officials, may develop additional mission  packages as needed.
section_title: Rotational Crewing for LCS
paragraphs: The Navy intends to rotationally crew LCS to enable each seaframe to  remain deployed for up to 18 months. The Navy plans to have four crews  for every three ships with one of the three ships being deployed at any one  time. Since the LCS crew is smaller than the crews on many other surface  ships, the Navy plans to rotate the core crews after about 4 months (117  days) to help reduce crew fatigue. During the 2-week turnover period, the  crews and contractors will perform preventive and corrective  maintenance and resupply the ship. Navy officials stated that one benefit  to having more crews than ships is that the Navy is able to quickly replace  a deployed crew member who becomes sick or injured with a comparably  trained sailor. The primary benefit of rotational crewing will be the ability  to maintain a deployed seaframe for up to 18 months continuously while  allowing the crews to relieve one another and return to their homeport  without undue hardship.  The seaframes would be rotated every 18  months with a 30-day overlap period.
section_title: Navy Organizations Are Intended to Monitor Development of and Resolve Implementation Issues with the LCS Concept of Operations
paragraphs: Given the challenges in implementing new concepts for personnel,  training, and maintenance, the Navy established several groups to identify  and resolve challenges it faces. These groups include an Oversight Board,  a Council of Captains, and two cross-functional teams. These groups are  comprised of members from across the Navy and, collectively, these  groups identify and review issues and barriers to implementing the LCS  concepts articulated in the Wholeness Concept of Operations and work  together to jointly develop solutions.
Oversight Board: The board is chaired by the Commander Naval Surface  Forces and the membership includes executive-level representatives from  program executive offices, program sponsors, and other major  stakeholders from across the Navy. The board is supported by a senior  executive-level working group called the Council of Captains. The board  meets quarterly to consider key issues that require high-level decisions.  For example, issues discussed this past year included the need to support  development of distance support capabilities, and the need to fund  aviation crews for the detachments that will support LCS operations.
Cross functional teams: Two cross functional teams support the Oversight  Board—one focused on manning and training issues and the other focused  on maintenance and logistics issues. For example, the manning and  training team is working on issues such as upgrading the shore-based  trainers and the need to determine the appropriate level of shore support  personnel. Also, the maintenance and logistics team has raised issues,  such as remotely monitoring the condition of ship systems and funding for  distance support development.
In addition, the LCS Program Office, an office within the Naval Sea  Systems Command, chairs the Risk Management Board. The board’s work  is predominately contained within the LCS Program Office and focuses on  identifying, measuring, and mitigating technical, schedule, and cost risks.  Navy officials stated that the board differs from the other groups in that  the risks it manages are almost exclusively focused on development and  production—issues within the program office’s control. The few  operationally related risks that the board has identified to date include:  personnel operating the launch and recovery equipment, personnel  transporting supplies on board, potential for increased crew fatigue  caused by the ship’s motion, and crew training. According to Navy  officials, the mitigation for the training issues is the ongoing study to  develop a long-term LCS training plan and the mitigation for the personnel  issues is to observe and learn from the ongoing test and trials period and  initial deployments and then make adjustments, if needed.
section_title: The Navy’s Operating and Support Cost Estimates Do Not Fully Reflect Best Practices and May Change Due to Program Uncertainties
subsections: section_title: The Navy Estimated Operating and Support Costs for the LCS Program
paragraphs: The Navy has estimated operating and support costs that include most  elements of the LCS program. Our analysis of the Navy’s 2009 estimates  showed that the operating and support costs for the planned seaframes  and mission packages could total $84.8 billion which amounts to about  $61.7 million per seaframe annually to operate and support both the  seaframes and mission packages.
For the seaframes, the Navy’s 2009 estimate of operating and support costs  projected a total of $64.1 billion based on a 25-year service life.  According to Navy officials, this estimate assumed a nearly even split of  the two seaframe types as the seaframes have different operating and  support cost profiles. However, the Navy has announced that it will  choose one of the two seaframe designs in 2010 so the associated  operating and support costs will likely change depending on the design  selected.
For the mission packages, operating and support costs could total $20 billion. The Navy provided us with its estimate of the average annual  operating and support costs of each mission package. Therefore, to  calculate the total operating and support costs, we multiplied the average  annual estimates by the number of packages of each type with an expect 30-year service life. The Navy’s most recent estimates were prepared to  support the fiscal year 2010 budget but did not include the antisubmarine  package since its contents are under development; therefore, we used thete to calculate the operating and support costs for this  prior year’s estima mission package.
section_title: Operating and Support Cost Estimates Do Not Fully Reflect Best Practices
paragraphs: Although the Navy has estimated operating and support costs, we found  that the Navy had not fully implemented cost estimating best practices.  According to DOD and GAO best practices for cost estimating, a credible  cost estimate should include the following three steps:  analyze the likelihood that the costs could be greater than estimate assess how the cost estimate may change in response to changes in  program assumptions, and  compare the estimate to an independently developed estimate.
The Navy’s estimates showed some aspects of a high-quality cost  estimating process. For example, the estimates included most cost  categories recommended by DOD’s cost estimating best practices— as personnel, maintenance, and sustaining support—and documented  ground rules and assumptions, methodologies, and data sources. However,  d  our assessment of the Navy’s operating and support cost estimates showe e  that the Navy did not take two of the three steps listed above to ensure th estimates’ credibility, and only partially completed the other step.
First, the Navy did not perform an analysis to assess the likelihood that t operating and support costs for either the seaframe or mission packages  ysis,  could be greater than estimated. This analysis, known as a risk anal estimates the likelihood that operating and support costs could ris beyond what was projected and the degree of the possible increase. We reported in 2009 that out of 10 of DOD’s largest acquisition programs, 5 had increased overall acquisition costs from their first full cost estimate.  Of those that didn’t, three programs sharply reduced procurement  quantities, and unit costs increased for all but one According to best practices, a credible cost estimate should include a risk  analysis that shows the range of possible costs and the likelihood that  costs could increase to particular levels. The results of a risk analysis are  usually shown in a cumulative probability distribution or “S-curve.” Figure  2 below shows a notional example of an S-curve.   of the systems.
section_title: Operating and Support Cost Estimates Are Likely to Change Due to Program Uncertainties
paragraphs: The Navy has not yet decided which one of the two LCS seaframes it will  buy for the remainder of the program, leading to uncertainty about the  effects of this program decision on the operating and support cost  estimates developed to date. Also, the Navy has not yet decided what it  will do over the long term with the two ships of the design that is not  chosen. The Navy currently plans to deploy these two ships as they  become available, according to Navy officials. Since the two designs will  require separate training facilities and core crew, and since each design  has unique equipment and therefore different maintenance requirements,  continuing to support both designs may carry a cost premium. Likewise,  deciding which one of the two LCS seaframes to buy is likely to, in turn,  affect decisions on issues such as infrastructure and training requirements,  with accompanying cost implications.
The Navy’s force structure analyses supporting the planned purchase  quantities of mission packages are incomplete, adding to uncertainty  about costs in future budget years. Our prior work has shown that a  knowledge-based decision-making process can help provide a  comprehensive analytic basis for an acquisition program, including  determining the optimum quantities of LCS seaframes and mission  packages. This information in turn can help decision makers evaluate the  affordability of the LCS program and establish funding priorities. Navy  officials from two divisions within the Office of the Chief of Naval  Operations—the Surface Warfare Division and the Assessments Division— said they were unaware of any analysis supporting the total planned  quantities for either the surface warfare package or its maritime security  module. Also, Navy officials said that the Navy has not performed a force  structure analysis on the antisubmarine package because the contents are  under development. The Navy has not performed a complete analysis of  LCS seaframe and mission package quantities because certain information  needed for the analyses was not yet available, including decisions on  potential changes to program operating assumptions and requirements.   Further, an analysis of LCS seaframe and mission package quantities is not  included in the Assessments Division’s fiscal year 2010 agenda.
The planned force structure of 55 LCS seaframes is based on a 2005  analysis of requirements for responding to possible overseas conflicts and  meeting overseas presence requirements, which officials said they  revalidated in 2007 and 2008. However, this analysis is based, in part, on  certain assumptions that are not yet verified. For example, one assumption  is that rotational crewing plans will work as expected, allowing a greater  presence per ship than the traditional one crew per ship. However,  rotational crewing has never been routinely conducted by the Navy for an  entire class of surface combatants. If the Navy switches to a different  crewing model, a different number of ships could be required to sustain  the same presence, or alternatively, a different number of crews could be  required. The expected purchase of 55 seaframes is also based on an  assumption that some ships would be homeported overseas, according to  Navy officials. If the assumed number homeported overseas changes, then  the number of LCS needed to maintain the same presence requirements  could also change. If these assumptions change due to program decisions  or operating experience, the total number of LCS seaframes needed to  meet requirements may change. It may be important for Navy and DOD  decision makers to have updated and complete force structure analyses  for the LCS program since any changes to the planned purchase quantities  as a result of updated force structure analyses would affect the program’s  total operating and support costs. Without such analyses, decision-makers  may not be able to effectively evaluate the affordability of the program.
Finally, the LCS cost estimates could change as actual operating data  become available and operational concepts are refined. Since little actual  LCS operating and support data are available to date, the estimates are  currently based on data from other systems, and the estimates could  change as actual cost data become available. The cost estimates are also  based on new operational concepts for personnel, training, and  maintenance. These new concepts are not fully developed, tested, and  implemented, and, if these concepts change, the estimates could change.  For example, the Navy has not yet fully developed or implemented a  comprehensive training plan, and it is possible that the plan could cost  more or less than the training costs accounted for in the current estimates.
section_title: Upcoming Program Decisions Would Benefit from Further Analysis of Long-Term Operating and Support Costs
paragraphs: Decision makers could benefit from further analysis of the program’s long- term operating and support costs before making key program and  investment decisions. Since operating and support costs constitute a major  portion of system life-cycle costs—over 70 percent—they are critical to  the evaluation of acquisition alternatives. Navy officials told us that they  are developing criteria for selecting one seaframe for the remainder of the  program; however, at this time it is not clear that the criteria will include a  comparison of the operating and support costs of each seaframe or  whether the estimates will be developed according to all three steps for  ensuring credibility and the results presented to decision makers in the  Navy and DOD.
According to DOD and GAO best practices for cost estimating, decision  makers should consider affordability at major decision points, and a  comparative analysis should be done to identify costs and benefits of  competing alternatives, including an operating and support estimate of  each alternative. The lack of cost estimates that fully meet best practices,  such as including an analysis to assess the likelihood that costs will be  greater than estimated, raises questions about the credibility of the  estimates that have been produced to date and limits the ability of decision  makers to make fully informed program and investment decisions, such as:    accurately assessing the affordability of LCS within the broader portfolio  of Navy and DOD programs,  identifying the resources needed over the long term to support the planned  investment in the LCS force structure,    assessing the long-term cost implications of alternative acquisition  strategies such as which seaframe the Navy will buy for the remainder of  the 55-ship class, and    analyzing the costs of options for what to do with the two seaframes of the  design that is not selected.
According to DOD acquisition guidance, at the Milestone B decision point  lead and initial follow-on ships are normally approved and an independent  life-cycle cost estimate for the program, including operating and support  costs, is required. The Milestone B decision point for the LCS program  has been delayed several times. Originally scheduled for January 2007,  Navy officials now say they plan to hold the milestone in May or June  2010.
According to Naval Sea Systems Command officials, the Navy plans to  develop a life-cycle cost estimate including operating and support costs  and have an independent cost estimate prepared by CAPE to support the  program’s Milestone B decision in May or June 2010. Navy officials told us  they plan to complete the other two steps for a credible estimate— analyzing the likelihood that costs will increase over time, and fully  assessing the effects of changing key program assumptions—at Milestone  B. However, Navy officials said that this information may not be presented  to top decision makers in the Navy and DOD, and therefore may not  inform key program decisions such as the decision of which seaframe to  buy for the remainder of the program. Further, congressional decision  makers may not be fully aware of the LCS program’s operating and  support costs since, to date, the LCS Selected Acquisition Reports  submitted to Congress have not included operating and support cost  estimates. Operating and support costs are required to be included in  such reports for programs that have passed Milestone B and, as  previously noted, the LCS program has not yet passed that point. Without  the benefit of current, credible estimates of the long-term operating and  support costs, congressional decision makers may not be fully aware of  the resources that will be needed over time to support the ships for which  DOD requests funds to buy each year.
section_title: The Navy Has Made Progress but Faces Risks in Implementing Its Plans to Operate and Support LCS
subsections: section_title: The Navy Faces Risks in Implementing Its Personnel Plans over the Long Term
paragraphs: Although the Navy is conducting studies to determine personnel  requirements for LCS, it has not fully identified the number of ship and  shore support personnel required to support LCS over the long term and  faces risks in its ability to identify and assign personnel over the long term.  Additionally, the Navy has not routinely rotationally crewed an entire class  of surface combatants; therefore, the concept being planned for the LCS  class is unproven. Although the Navy rotationally crews some small ships,  such as the mine countermeasure ships, the Navy has only experimented  with rotationally crewing surface combatants such as destroyers and only  did so for a short time.
The current Navy plan for a 40-person core crew has not yet been  validated by an analysis of the crew’s expected workload. Early Navy  estimates indicated that the core crew might need to be more than 40 to  mitigate a concern that a crew this small could experience fatigue. For  example, one study raised the issue that crew fatigue could affect missions  which could be mitigated by temporarily augmenting the crew or  modifying how missions are conducted. The 40-person core crew size was  based upon the results of a 2005 conference to explore options for  reducing the size of the core crew, which was not the typical workload  analysis. The Navy’s Manpower Analysis Center typically conducts  analyses of a ship’s workload to determine the number and type of  personnel required to complete all operational and maintenance tasks.  However, this analysis for the LCS core crew and the three mission  packages is not scheduled to be complete until after the first full  deployment, around fiscal year 2014.
The Navy’s initial analysis to identify shore personnel requirements is due  by the end of 2009; however, the full requirements for shore personnel  may not be known for several years. Due to the limited crew size, many  administrative and maintenance duties will have to be performed ashore  rather than on board as on other surface ships and will be managed by  LCS squadrons.  Navy officials estimated that the number of people  needed in a squadron organization to manage and support 12 to 15 LCSs  might be about 170. The LCS squadrons are likely to be larger than  squadrons for other surface ships since their responsibilities for the level  of shore-based support required for the small core crew will be greater.  However, Navy officials said that they will not know how large the LCS  squadrons should be until they have experience with supporting deployed  ships. In addition, the shore support personnel required will be affected by  outstanding decisions, such as where to homeport the ships and the long- term maintenance strategy. Since the Navy has not yet completed its  studies to identify the LCS personnel requirement, we compiled Navy  estimates of the personnel that may be required to support LCS over the  long term. Specifically, we added Navy estimates of the personnel that  may be required for the ship crews, mission package crews, and the LCS  squadrons to derive a total number of personnel that may be required for  the program. Table 2 below shows that the total personnel required for the  LCS program over the long term might be approximately 4,600 people.
The above estimate of the total personnel required does not include  aviation crews, which could total an additional 1,656 people. We did not  include aviation crew personnel in the table because these crews are not  totally dedicated to LCS and may be tasked to support other ship types,  according to Navy officials. The Navy has the core and mission package  crews in its personnel plans, but to date has not funded all the aviation  crews. According to Navy officials, if the aviation crews are not funded in  the Navy’s fiscal year 2012 budget, then the Navy may begin to experience  shortfalls in aviation crews beginning in fiscal year 2014.
The Navy also faces risks in its ability to identify and assign personnel to  LCS over the long term due to the requirement for relatively senior, highly  trained personnel. Specifically:    LCS sailors must be experienced sailors and positions must be filled by a  person of the exact pay grade required, which could limit the pool of  personnel available. Sailors must also commit to serving on an LCS crew  for 36 months after completing their LCS training. Considering the concept  for rotational crewing, a sailor might serve two or three 4-month  deployments during their 36-month LCS tour for a total of 8 to 12 months  of LCS deployment time.
The number of requirements that potential sailors must meet in order to  qualify for an LCS assignment is rigorous. For example, potential LCS  sailors must meet current physical fitness standards as well as have  passed the previous 18 months of physical fitness assessments. In  contrast, sailors are considered qualified for assignment on other surface  ships if they passed the most recent physical fitness test. Also, sailors will  not be considered for assignment to LCS if they are color blind or have a  pending application for the officer commissioning program.
Due to the longer training time required to prepare LCS sailors, the Navy’s  Personnel Command must identify personnel 18 to 24 months prior to  when they need them to report to the LCS crew. For other surface ships,  the Personnel Command needs to identify personnel only 5 to 9 months  ahead of time. Personnel Command officials stated that they must  manually identify the personnel for LCS since the computer system  normally used to identify personnel can only identify personnel up to12  months in advance. Due to the increased workload resulting from the  manual process, the Navy Personnel Command has set up a separate office  specifically to handle LCS personnel assignments and added eight  positions. Officials stated that they will likely need more personnel as  more ships and mission packages enter service. Since the average annual  turnover rate is about one-third, according to Navy officials, the Personnel  Command will have to manually identify a significant number of  replacement sailors each year to support the LCS program.
section_title: The Navy Faces Risks in Achieving the Extensive LCS Training Requirements
paragraphs: The Navy has made progress in identifying LCS-unique training  requirements, but faces risks in implementing its training concept.  According to the Navy’s concept for LCS, sailors must be ready to  perform their duties when they arrive on board without additional  supervised, on-the-job training that is typical of other surface ships. The  Navy calls this the “train to qualify” standard. In contrast, it is typical on  other ships for a sailor to complete his or her training on board via  supervised, on-the-job training. According to Navy officials, it may take  about 6 months of onboard on-the-job training for a sailor on other surface  ships to reach the same level of proficiency as that described in the  concept for LCS sailors. The Navy’s approach to LCS training is different  than for other surface ships since the small LCS crew size means that  there is little capacity on board for supervised training and no training  group on board the ship as is typical of other surface ships. LCS sailors  will also be required to be trained in several skill areas outside their  primary specialty. For example, an LCS Damage Control Assistant will also  have to train in an engineering skill area and an Electronics Technician  will also have to train in a Fire Controlman skill area. In addition, LCS  sailors will be expected to perform various collateral duties, such as  serving as the crew’s barber and running the ship’s store.
The Navy expects to complete a study of LCS training by the end of 2009  but may not fully implement the results for several years. The Navy began  this study to fully identify LCS training requirements and to recommend  alternatives for providing training over the life of the LCS program. This is  a complex process since training requirements for the core crew are  unique for each position on the two seaframes. Although the Navy has  identified LCS-specific training requirements for both seaframes and the  three mission packages, the Navy has not yet completed plans for how to  provide this training over the long term. Further, the training plan resulting  from the Navy’s LCS training study may not be fully implemented until  about 2013 or after, largely due to the need to develop and buy simulators  and virtual training facilities. Depending on homeporting decisions, the  Navy may need to build comparable simulators on the east coast as well as  the west coast. Although the Navy has built one shore-based trainer for  each seaframe, the trainers will need to be upgraded in accordance with  the training study results and to meet the train-to-qualify standard. Until  the results of the training analysis are implemented, the Navy has  developed an interim solution, called the LCS Academy, to provide LCS- specific training and fill training gaps.
Another reason the training required prior to the sailor coming on board  the LCS is longer and more extensive than for other surface ships is that  the training requirements include courses outside of the sailor’s primary  specialty. To assess the training requirements for LCS versus other surface  ships, we compared the training days required before a sailor reports to an  LCS crew to the training days required before a sailor reports to other  types of surface ships. Our analysis of a sample of LCS positions showed  that the number of training days required before an LCS sailor reports to  the crew is significantly longer than for sailors in comparable positions on  other ships—an average of 484 days versus 126 days for an amphibious  transport docking ship and 103 days for a destroyer. The lowest number  of training days required for an LCS position in our sample was 264 and  the highest was 832. Figure 3 below shows the average number of training  days for the positions in our sample on a typical destroyer, amphibious  transport docking ship, and the LCS.
As noted above, a sailor on ships other than LCS may spend an additional  6 months completing training on board via supervised, on-the-job training.  Therefore, even accounting for this time, the LCS training time required is  significantly higher. Implementing the LCS concept of train-to-qualify has  two important effects. First, the costs to train sailors before they report to  an LCS crew are likely to be significantly higher than for other surface  ships due to the longer training time required before the sailors report to a  crew and due to the costs to build and sustain the shore-based training  facilities. Second, the longer training time before reporting to a crew is the  major reason that the Personnel Command has to identify people 18 to 24  months before they report to an LCS crew, which Navy documents have  indicated may be unsustainable using the current personnel distribution  system.
section_title: The Navy Faces Risks in Implementing Its Maintenance Concept
paragraphs: The Navy also faces risks in implementing the maintenance concept being  developed to allow for a small assigned crew. Performing preventive  maintenance is an important factor in maintaining the material condition  of the ship. According to the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey,  deferred maintenance was a key factor in some surface ships having  significant material problems identified during recent inspections. The  risks for LCS are in preventive maintenance—periodic tasks to keep  equipment in good condition—and distance support—moving work from  the ship to the shore. Regarding preventive maintenance, the Navy is still  assessing how much preventive maintenance the core crew can  accomplish. Due to the small core crew size, a significant amount of  maintenance has to be moved off ship. The initial analysis was that 20 to  30 man-years of preventive maintenance would have to be moved off of  the ship. According to the Navy’s LCS concept, the core crew is expected  to do little or no corrective maintenance and minimal preventive and  facilities maintenance. The rest would be done during in-port periods— by the crew or contractors—or by teams that fly out to the ship to perform  maintenance during crew turnover periods. As of October 2009, Navy  officials stated that well over 50 percent of the preventive maintenance  had been transferred from the ship to the shore and is being accomplished  by contractors under the interim support plan agreement. In contrast, on  other surface ships, the crew performs all preventive maintenance and  much corrective maintenance that involves diagnosing problems and  completing somewhat complex repairs. During fiscal year 2009, the Navy  spent $6.0 million on the interim support plan for seaframe preventive and  facilities maintenance. The Navy is also still working to resolve issues in  the system developed for LCS to schedule and track accomplishment of  preventive maintenance.
The Navy also faces risks in implementing its plans for distance support.  Distance support is a key enabler for supporting LCS and requires the  capability to move information to and from the ship. Although other ships  in the Navy rely to some extent on distance support, Navy officials stated  that distance support is critical to enabling LCS to operate as envisioned in  the operational concept due to the small crew size. According to the  concept, many administrative functions are also planned to be moved  ashore such as postal, administrative records, logistic support, and  maintenance and fuel records. Commander, Naval Surface Forces  established LCS distance support requirements in April 2009, which  included developing the capability to move the workload for 120 processes  from the ship to the shore. Navy officials stated that they are still  evaluating what work to move ashore and how to do so. The processes  identified to date include identifying corrective maintenance, monitoring  crew qualifications, fuel reporting, and remote monitoring of the condition  of some ship systems. However, the Navy has not yet provided funding for  the development, implementation, and long-term sustainment of these  distance support capabilities. If these capabilities are not fully developed  and maintained, then the crew’s workload could increase or the crew size  might need to be increased.
In addition, the Navy does not yet have a long-term maintenance strategy  for the LCS seaframes and mission packages. Currently, the Navy has  interim support plans for both the seaframes and mission packages that  include contractor-provided maintenance. The Navy intends to develop  and implement a long-term maintenance strategy by about 2015 for the  mission packages and by the end of 2011 for the seaframes. The long-term  strategy may continue to employ mostly contractor-provided maintenance  or could consist of a combination of contractor- and service-provided  maintenance in a Navy shipyard. According to Navy officials, the Navy has  not yet analyzed core logistics capabilities for the LCS program but plans  to do so as part of its analysis to identify a long-term maintenance strategy.  Under section 2464 of Title 10 U.S. Code, DOD is required to maintain a  “core logistics capability” that is government owned, government  operated, and that uses government personnel, equipment, and facilities.  However, we reported in May 2009 that DOD has neither identified nor  established core capabilities in a timely manner for certain new systems  that were included in the May 2009 report. Consequently, among other  things, we recommended that DOD require an initial core assessment early  in the acquisition process, preferably before Milestone B, and that  acquisition strategies for new or modified systems include either a plan for  establishing core capability within 4 years of initial operational capability,  or a statement that no core capability requirements were identified.
section_title: A Risk Assessment Could Inform Key Procurement Decisions
paragraphs: Despite risks in implementing its new LCS operational concepts, the Navy  has not specified the potential operational effects or identified alternative  approaches if its concepts cannot be implemented as envisioned. The 2008  National Defense Strategy describes the need to assess and mitigate risk  in the execution of defense programs critical to national security,  including risks relating to the department’s capacity to execute future  missions and manage personnel, training, and maintenance. Our prior  work also showed that a risk assessment is a best practice that informs an  organization’s decision making and includes identifying potential risks and  identifying countermeasures to reduce the risks.
The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new LCS  operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance, and has  established some groups to manage the details of how to implement the  concepts, such as the cross-functional teams and the Oversight Board.  These groups identify and review issues and barriers to implementing the  LCS concepts and work together to jointly develop solutions. In addition,  the LCS program office has established a Risk Management Board, which  monitors issues primarily related to development and production of the  seaframe and mission packages and focuses on technical, schedule, and  cost risks. In general, this board does not focus on personnel, training, and  maintenance risks. Although the work these groups perform is important,  their scope does not include a thorough risk assessment as described in  DOD’s Strategy and GAO best practices. These groups are focused on how  to make the operational concepts work and, as yet, have not fully  identified operational risks and assessed alternatives to mitigate the risks  if these new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance cannot be  implemented as intended. In the case of LCS, a thorough risk assessment  could be used, for example, to: identify the operational limitations if a 40- person core crew experiences undue fatigue and assess alternatives to the  40-person core crew or to identify the operational limitations if the  distance support does not work as intended and assess alternatives for  supporting a small crew. Without such a risk assessment to inform  decision makers, the Navy faces unspecified operational and program  risks at the same time that it plans to buy a total of 23 ships by the end of  fiscal year 2015. Although the LCS operational testing is expected to  provide some insights into the effectiveness of the new operational  concepts, according to Navy officials, the tests are not scheduled to be  completed until about fiscal year 2014. As shown in figure 4 below, the  Navy plans to make a significant investment in LCS force structure before  it has information indicating whether the operational concepts are likely  to be successful.
LCS“Fleet Redy” (Jne)
Complete implementtion of trining dy result Complete ly of peronnel requirement Opertionl tet event chedled throgh  Although Navy officials expect to gather useful information about how to operate and support LCS  during this limited deployment, the deployment will not fully reflect how the Navy intends to deploy  LCS as described in the Wholeness Concept of Operations, according to Navy officials.  For example,  the ship will not be deployed for 1 months, may not rotate crews, and will have more than 7 people  on board such as contractors to provide additional support and assistance.  “Fleet Ready” means that a specific LCS and mission package combination has completed some  testing and certification and is ready for a deployment tasking, according to a Navy official.
If the operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance  cannot be implemented as desired, then, according to Navy officials, the  Navy may face operational limitations, may have to reengineer its  operational concept, or may have to make significant design changes to  the ship after committing to building 23 ships which represents a  significant portion (42 percent) of the class. Further, without an  assessment identifying the operational effects and without exploring  alternatives, if the Navy’s approach to personnel, training, and maintaining  LCS ships does not work as planned the Navy risks continuing to buy ships  without the assurance that its plans for personnel, training, and  maintenance can be implemented as envisioned. In contrast, having a  thorough risk assessment of the new operational approaches to personnel,  training, and maintenance would provide decision makers with  information to link the effectiveness of these new operational concepts  with decisions on program investment, specifically the pace of  procurement.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the Navy’s major investment in the LCS program, it is critical that  DOD and congressional decision makers have a complete cost estimate  that fully reflects best practices—including analyses of how costs may  increase with time and vary with changing program assumptions, as well  as comparison with an independently developed estimate. Such estimates  are needed to enable decision makers to assess the program’s  affordability, including the long-term, recurring operating and support  costs, and assess the long-term operating and support costs of all the  acquisition alternatives before a decision is made. Specifically, having  complete estimates of the long-term operating and support costs that are  periodically updated and based on results of complete and current force  structure analyses could be an important factor for decision makers to  consider when weighing program investment alternatives such as which  seaframe to buy or options for what to do with the two seaframes of the  design that is not selected. Although the Navy’s operating and support cost  estimates showed some qualities of a sound estimating process, the Navy  did not follow best practices, such as requesting an independent estimate  and comparing it to the program estimate, analyzing the likelihood that  costs will increase, and analyzing the effects on the estimate of key cost  drivers. Further, the Navy’s force structure analyses of the quantities of  required seaframes and mission packages are incomplete and based on  assumptions, such as how many ships may be homeported overseas,  which, if changed, could change the quantities required. Changes in the  quantities of required seaframes and mission packages could affect  estimates of the program’s total operating and support costs. Cost  estimates that fully reflect best practices and are based on complete and  current force structure analyses of required quantities could enhance the  ability of decision makers to identify the resources needed over the long  term to support the seaframes and mission packages and assess the  affordability of the LCS program. Further, decision makers in both DOD  and Congress lack a complete picture of the likely long-term operating and  support costs that will be incurred when buying an increasing number of  LCS ships, hampering their ability to make sound program and investment  decisions.
At the beginning of the LCS program, the Navy stated that reducing the  number of ship personnel would be a major factor in lowering operating  and support costs. As a result, the Navy’s decision to operate the LCS with  a core crew of only 40 sailors drove the need to develop new operational  concepts. Currently, these concepts are broadly stated and the Navy has  not fully developed the details to implement its vision for identifying  personnel, providing LCS-unique training over the long term, or shifting  maintenance from the ship to shore. Although the Navy acknowledges its  approach entails risk, the Navy has not specified what the potential  operational effects might be if its concept cannot be fully implemented as  envisioned. For example, the Navy has not specified potential negative  consequences to LCS missions or identified mitigating strategies if there  are not enough or insufficiently trained personnel on board or if the  distance support concepts cannot be fully implemented. The Navy’s LCS  plans represent a significant investment to achieve its force structure goals  at a time when there are competing demands for limited resources.  However, without a thorough risk analysis including an assessment of  alternatives, the Navy faces undefined and, potentially significant  operational and program risks. If the operational concepts for personnel,  training, and maintenance cannot be implemented as desired, the Navy  may face operational limitations, may have to reengineer its operational  concept, or may have to make significant design changes to the ship after  committing to building almost half of the class. For example, a thorough  risk assessment could help the Navy identify the operational risks of a 40- person core crew, such as whether the crew can operate continuously for  a 30-day mission without undue fatigue. A risk assessment could assess  the alternatives such as the pros and cons of conducting shorter missions  or increasing the size of the crew. Having such a risk assessment would  enable decision makers to identify and assess: the operational effects if  these concepts cannot be implemented as envisioned; alternatives to  mitigate these risks; and information to link the effectiveness of these new  operational concepts with decisions on program investment, specifically  how many ships the Navy should buy each year. Moreover, doing so could  help the Navy avoid costly retrofits if ship design changes are needed in  order to implement its new concepts.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following six  actions:  In order to assess the long-term affordability of the LCS program and  enhance decision making ability for the LCS program, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the  following actions:    before deciding which seaframe to buy, produce a complete estimate of  the long-term operating and support costs which fully reflects cost  estimating best practices for each seaframe and use these updated  estimates in deciding which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the  program;    use an updated estimate as a basis for analyzing the costs and benefits of  options regarding the two seaframes built but not selected for long-term  production, and use the results of this analysis in making the decision of  how to use, or whether to retire, these seaframes;    annually update the cost estimate for the long-term operating and support  costs of the seaframe and each mission package using cost estimating best  practices and submit the results to DOD as well as to Congress as part of  the LCS Selected Acquisition Report;    perform complete and updated force structure analyses on the LCS  mission packages to help determine the appropriate purchase quantities  over the life of the program, and use these updated quantities for the  mission package cost estimate; and    perform an updated seaframe force structure analysis when key  underlying assumptions affecting seaframe quantities change, such as  crewing policy, overseas homeports, or presence requirements, and use  this updated analysis to adjust quantities and to update the seaframe cost  estimate.
To improve the Navy’s ability to make better informed LCS program and  investment decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy to perform a risk assessment and consider the  results before committing to buy LCS ships each year in order to link  procurement with evidence that the Navy is progressing in its ability to  implement its new personnel, training, and maintenance concepts and has  taken actions to mitigate the operational effects if these concepts cannot  be implemented as intended. Specifically, this analysis should identify and  assess the:    operational limitations the Navy may face if the Navy’s approach to  personnel, training, and maintenance cannot be implemented as  envisioned;    possible alternatives, such as changes to the concepts or the ship design,  and the related costs of those alternatives if the Navy’s approach to LCS  personnel, training, and maintenance cannot be implemented as  envisioned in its concept of operations; and    personnel policies and processes to reduce the risks to the LCS program.
Such a holistic review could include the processes for identifying and  assigning personnel, requirements LCS personnel must meet to qualify for  assignment to an LCS crew, and identifying the total ship and shore LCS  personnel required steady state to support the program over the long term.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with four  recommendations and partially agreed with two of our six recommended  actions.  The department’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in  appendix II.  DOD also provided technical comments, which we have  incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially agreed with our first recommendation that the Navy  produce an estimate of the long-term operating and support costs and use  these estimates in deciding which seaframe to buy.  DOD stated that the  Navy will prepare two cost estimates, one for each seaframe design, that  will include estimates of the total operating and support costs for the  entire class of LCS ships.  However, DOD stated that, since the Navy has  not released the solicitation for the fiscal year 2010-2014 buy, it is  premature to discuss the down-select criteria included in the solicitation.    While we appreciate the sensitivity of discussing criteria for the down- select prior to the release of the solicitation, we noted in the report that  operating and support costs are critical to any evaluation of acquisition  alternatives since these costs constitute over 70 percent of system life- cycle costs.  We continue to believe that decision makers should consider  long-term operating and support costs when deciding which of the two  seaframes to buy for the remainder of the program.  DOD also stated that  the LCS seaframe estimate we reviewed for the report was developed  solely to support trade study analysis and was not intended as a budget  quality estimate.  We understand this was the case, but the seaframe  estimate we analyzed was the only estimate available even though the  Navy has bought four LCS ships.  The intent of our recommendation is to  encourage DOD to develop a comprehensive cost estimate to assist  decision makers as the program moves forward.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to use updated operating and  support cost estimates to analyze the costs and benefits of options  regarding the two seaframes built but not selected for long-term  production.  However, DOD stated that the Navy intends to operate and  maintain the two non-selected LCS ships as part of the total LCS force  structure but will continue to explore options to keep, sell, or retire the  two non-selected ships during annual budget reviews.  DOD’s response  implies that, for the present, the department has decided to keep the two  non-selected LCS ships without considering the results of a complete  analysis of the costs and benefits of keeping the ships compared to other  alternatives.  As we point out in the report, it is important that estimates of  long-term operating and support costs are available to decision makers to  assess alternatives before a decision is made.  However, if the  department’s intent is to do such a cost analysis of alternatives and  consider the results as part of the annual budget process, then their  actions would meet the intent of our recommendation.  DOD also agreed  with our recommendations to include an annual update to the operating  and support costs for the LCS program in the Selected Acquisition Report,  and our recommendations to update both the seaframe and mission  package force structure analyses and use these results in updating  operating and support cost estimates.
DOD partially agreed with our sixth recommended action that DOD  perform a risk assessment and consider the results before committing to  buy LCS ships each year in order to link procurement with evidence that  the Navy is progressing in its ability to implement its new personnel,  training, and maintenance concepts.  DOD stated that it agrees such risk  assessments are appropriate and should be conducted.  However, DOD  disagreed that the risk assessment results should be linked to annual  procurement decisions since the acquisition strategy is now to buy LCS in  blocks—that is multiple ships—in fiscal years 2010, 2012, and 2015.  DOD  stated that, as an alternative, it will consider reviewing the risk  assessments for personnel policies, training, and maintenance planning at  the start of each new block buy.  At the time of our review, the acquisition  strategy involving the block buys was not yet approved by DOD.  We  believe that DOD’s proposed alternative approach would meet the intent  of our recommendation.  However, we also believe that, given the new  acquisition approach, it is even more important that DOD conduct the risk  assessment and consider the results before making a procurement  decision for each block buy since the department will be committing to  several ships with each block and there will be a gap of several years  between each block buy.  As we point out in our report, without such a  risk assessment to inform each procurement decision, the Navy risks  buying ships without the assurance that its plans for personnel, training,  and maintenance can be implemented as envisioned.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the  Secretary of the Navy; Naval Sea Systems Command; and Fleet Forces  Command. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (404) 679-1816.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who  made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Navy estimated the long-term operating  and support costs for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) seaframes and  mission packages, we reviewed documentation of seaframes and mission  package cost estimates prepared by the cost-estimating division of the  Naval Sea Systems Command. We met with officials from Naval Sea  System Command’s cost-estimating division, as well as the program offices  responsible for developing both seaframes and mission packages, to  discuss and document the methodologies employed in the estimates. We  also met with the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s office of the Director  of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to determine the  extent to which CAPE had reviewed Navy cost estimates for LCS and  produced an independent estimate. We compared the estimates to cost  estimating best practices identified by the CAPE and in the GAO Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide, and reviewed Department of Defense  (DOD) and Navy acquisition regulations. To assess the extent to which the  Navy analyzed the force structure requirements underlying the planned  purchase quantities of LCS seaframes and mission packages, we met with  officials of the Assessments and Surface Warfare divisions of the Office of  the Chief of Naval Operations. We also reviewed documents reflecting the  force structure analyses the Navy performed on LCS seaframes and  mission packages.
Although the Navy’s estimates did not fully reflect best practices, they  were based on a cost-estimating process that we deemed sufficient for  reporting, with appropriate limitations. To calculate an average annual  seaframe operating and support cost estimate, we divided the Navy’s  estimate of total operating and support costs of LCS seaframes by the  planned purchase quantity of seaframes and by their expected service life.  We multiplied the average annual estimated mission package operating  and support cost for each mission package by the planned purchase  quantity of that mission package and the assumed service life. We then  added together the seaframe and mission package totals. To obtain an  average annual seaframe cost that included the cost of mission packages,  we divided this total program operating and support estimate by the  number of seaframe service years (seaframe quantity times assumed  service life). We validated the methodology and results of our analysis  with relevant officials from the Naval Sea Systems Command. However,  our analysis of the Navy estimates is approximate and does not fully  reflect cost estimating best practices as described in the report.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has developed and implemented  plans to operate and support LCS, particularly in the areas of personnel,  training, and maintenance, we reviewed and analyzed DOD and Navy  guidance, the LCS Wholeness Concept of Operations, and instructions on  personnel, training, and maintenance as well as key studies and planning  documents. We also reviewed prior GAO products and DOD guidance on  risk management to assess the extent that Navy plans included  assessments of program risk. In addition, we interviewed officials at  Headquarters, Department of the Navy and Navy Sea Systems Command  for personnel, training, and maintenance as well as Fleet Forces  Command, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Navy Personnel Command,  Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Navy Manpower Analysis Center.
To estimate long-term LCS personnel requirements, we analyzed Navy  documentation, including personnel estimate documentation and the  concept of operations, and validated the results with Navy officials at the  offices listed above. To compare LCS training days to training days for  other surface ships, we first identified a non-probability sample of LCS  positions from both seaframes which were for critical positions such as  the most senior enlisted personnel (E-8 or above), or those that generally  met three of the following four criteria:    a position that required training in several areas outside the sailor’s    a position for a specialty that was on a list of 14 specialties which the  Commander, Naval Surface Forces determined to have “unique cross rate  training”;    a position for a specialty which, at the time, was filled at less than 100  percent or a position for a specialty which, at the time, was filled at less  than 100 percent at the lower levels, which might lead to less availability in  the future; and    a position in the unplanned loss pool.
To identify the training days required prior to reporting to an LCS crew,  we obtained the training days required for the positions in our sample  based on the Navy’s study of training requirements for LCS. We reviewed  the process of how the Navy study team developed the course time  requirements by speaking with knowledgeable officials and found the  process was reasonable. To identify the training days required before  reporting to a destroyer and amphibious transport docking ship, we  obtained the training days required for comparable positions in our  sample. We validated these data in meetings with Naval Sea Systems  Command and Bureau of Naval Personnel officials. Finally, we compared  the training days for LCS with the training days for the destroyer and  amphibious transport docking ship. We reviewed the results of this  comparison with Bureau of Naval Personnel, Fleet Forces Command,  Naval Sea Systems Command, and several offices within the Office of the  Chief of Naval Operations who generally agreed with the data,  methodology, and results. Based on the work described above we  concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through  February 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Patricia W. Lentini, Assistant  Director; Brenda M. Waterfield; James R. Bancroft; Simon J. Hirschfeld;  Linda S. Keefer; and Grace Coleman made key contributions to this report.