United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Measure Impact
Published: 2004-02-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.N. Secretary General launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s core management challenges--poor leadership of the Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and programs, and the lack of accountability for staff performance. In 2000, GAO reported that the Secretary General had reorganized the Secretariat's leadership and structure, but that the reforms were not yet complete. As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States has a strong interest in the completion of these reforms. GAO was asked to assess the (1) overall status of the 1997 and 2002 reforms, (2) implementation of reforms in four key areas, and (3) potential challenges to reform.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of December 2003, 60 percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda and 38 percent of the 66 initiatives in the 2002 agenda were in place. In general, reforms under the Secretary General's authority were progressing more quickly than those requiring member states' approval. Since 1997, the Secretariat has implemented reforms to provide more unified leadership and coordination across departments and offices. However, the Secretariat has implemented other reforms, such as developing a written plan or establishing a new office, that are only the first step in achieving the Secretary General's overall goals. Reforms in four key areas of U.N. operations are in various stages. First, the Secretariat has taken positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but reforms in this area are ongoing and additional challenges remain. Second, the U.N. has begun to adopt results-oriented budgeting, but its monitoring and evaluation system does not measure program impact. Third, although the Secretariat reorganized its public information department, reforms of library management and publications are not fully in place. Fourth, the Secretariat's human rights office implemented the majority of its management reforms but does not have the authority to implement reforms outside the Secretariat. U.N. reform faces several challenges. For example, the Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of U.N. reforms. In addition, the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities, interim goals, and target dates for overall completion. Other challenges include resistance to change from program managers and possible resource constraints.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United Nations’ regular budget for the 2004-2005 biennium exceeds   $3 billion for the first time. U.N. officials, including the Secretary General,  have stated that additional funding will be needed to upgrade U.N. security  worldwide and expand current programs in Iraq. In light of these  increasing demands, the Secretary General and member states have called  on the Secretariat to better define priorities and eliminate outdated  activities. These calls have also highlighted the need for more accountable  leadership and improvements in key management practices. In 1997, the  Secretary General launched a major reform initiative to restructure U.N.  leadership and operations, develop a results-oriented human capital  system, and introduce a performance-based programming and budgeting  process. In May 2000, we reported that, while the Secretary General had  substantially reorganized the Secretariat’s leadership and structure, he had  not yet completed reforms in human capital management and planning  and budgeting. To encourage the full implementation of the 1997 reforms  and highlight reforms in public information activities and the human rights  program, the Secretary General launched a second round of reforms in  September 2002.
As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United  States has a strong interest in the completion of these reforms. In response  to your request, we assessed (1) the overall status of the U.N. reforms  proposed in 1997 and 2002 by the Secretary General; (2) the Secretariat’s  efforts to implement specific reforms in four key areas: human capital  management, performance-oriented budgeting, public information  activities, and the human rights program; and (3) overall challenges facing  the implementation of U.N. reforms.
To address these issues, we reviewed the Secretary General’s 1997 and  2002 reform plans and interviewed senior officials from several Secretariat  departments in New York City and Geneva, Switzerland. We met with  officials from the Offices of the Deputy Secretary General, the Acting High  Commissioner for Human Rights, the Departments of Management and  Public Information, and the Office of Internal Oversight Services. In  addition, we reviewed reports and bulletins of the Secretariat, relevant  U.N. resolutions, and related budget documents. During the course of our  review, we discussed the status of U.N. reforms with officials from the  Department of State in Washington, D.C.; New York; and Geneva (see app.  I for more information on our scope and methodology).
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United Nations comprises (1) the Security Council, the General  Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and other governing bodies  of member states that set the work requirements, or mandates, for U.N.  programs and departments; (2) the Secretariat, headed by the Secretary  General, which carries out a large part of the mandated work; and (3) the  funds and programs, such as the U.N. Development Program, which are  authorized by the General Assembly to conduct specific lines of work.  Many funds and programs have their own governing bodies and budgets  (mainly paid for by voluntary contributions from participating nations).  The Secretary General’s reform initiatives do not apply to specialized  agencies—such as the World Health Organization and the Food and  Agricultural Organization—and programs that have their own governing  bodies.
Calls to reform the United Nations began soon after its creation in 1945.  Despite cycles of reform, U.N. member states have had concerns about  inefficient operations; problems of fragmentation, duplication, and poor  coordination; and the proliferation of mandates. As one of the 191 member  states, the United States played a significant role in promoting U.N.  reform, calling for financial, administrative, and programmatic changes.  The State Department and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations actively  promoted these reforms such as establishing inspector general’s offices,  many of which have been implemented. The State Department continues  to promote further reforms and reports on the status of major reform  initiatives to the U.S. Congress (see fig. 1).
In July 1997, the Secretary General proposed a broad reform program to  transform the United Nations into an efficient organization focused on  achieving results as it carried out its mandates. Although the Secretary  General does not have direct authority over specialized agencies and many  funds and programs, the reforms at the Secretariat were intended to serve  as a model for U.N.-wide reforms. In May 2000, we reported that the  Secretariat had substantially restructured its leadership and operations  and partly implemented a performance-oriented human capital  management system. However, performance-oriented programming and  budgeting proposals had not yet been adopted.
In September 2002, the Secretary General released a second set of reform  initiatives with 36 reform actions, some expanding on previous reform  initiatives introduced in 1997 and others reflecting new priorities for the  organization. The overall goal was to align U.N. activities with the  priorities defined by the Millennium Declaration and the new security  environment.
section_title: Implementation of U.N. Reforms Has Advanced in Recent Years, but Further Actions Are Needed to Complete Reforms
paragraphs: As of December 2003, 60 percent of the 1997 reforms and 38 percent of the  2002 reforms were fully or substantially in place—or 51 percent overall  (see app. II for the status of U.N. reforms). The Secretary General set a  target date of 1999 for the implementation of reforms in the 1997 agenda,  which consisted of initiatives that he could implement on his own  authority and those that required member states’ approval. Of these  reforms, the Secretary General implemented 70 percent of those reforms  under his authority, while 44 percent of reforms requiring member states’  approval were in place. However, the outputs of many reforms, such as  developing a written plan or establishing a new office, are only the first  step in achieving the Secretary General’s overall reform goals. Although  many of these reforms are in place, departments and offices in the  Secretariat are still institutionalizing these new plans to improve U.N.  operations in the long term.
subsections: section_title: Secretariat Is Implementing Reforms, but Those Requiring Member State Approval Take Longer to Implement
paragraphs: Since our May 2000 report, the United Nations continued to implement  reforms from the Secretary General’s 1997 reform agenda and began to  implement initiatives from the 2002 agenda (see fig. 2). We found that 60  percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda were in place,  compared with 38 percent of the 66 reform initiatives in the 2002 agenda.  Overall, 51 percent of reforms from the 1997 and 2002 agendas were in  place. We identified a total of 154 reform initiatives from the 1997 and 2002  reform agendas. This number differs from U.N. figures because many of  the Secretary General’s reform action items had several components that  we identified and counted as separate initiatives. To determine the  implementation status of these reforms, we interviewed senior U.N.  officials and reviewed relevant reports, bulletins, and resolutions. We then  rated the reforms as  in place or substantially so—that is, the reform had been approved and  most key and minor elements were in place;   partly in place—that is, the reform had been approved, and some key  elements, as well as some or most minor elements, were in place; or   not in place—that is, the reform had not been formally approved and  minor elements could be in place, but no key elements were in place (see  app. I for a more detailed description of our methodology).
The implementation of reforms under the Secretary General’s authority  advanced faster than those under the authority of the member states. We  found that 70 percent of the 56 reform initiatives in the 1997 reform  agenda under his authority are fully or substantially in place, compared  with 44 percent of the 32 initiatives requiring member state approval (see  fig. 3). The 2002 agenda did not differentiate between initiatives that the  Secretary General could implement on his own authority and those that  required member states’ approval.
In particular, the Secretariat made the most progress on the 1997 reforms  to  restructure U.N. operations to provide more unified leadership and  coordination across departments, programs, and offices; institute a new human capital management system that sets expectations  and rates staff performance; and   adopt results-based budgeting.
However, the General Assembly did not adopt many reforms, such as  those to  further shorten the length and reduce the cost of its annual meetings;  focus the assembly’s yearly debates on a few priority areas; and  institute time limits, or sunset provisions, for all new U.N. programs.
Delays in acquiring member state approval are due, in part, to the longer  time needed for the General Assembly to reach agreement. To pass  resolutions in favor of most specific reforms, the General Assembly  generally requires a majority vote from the 191 member states. Although  the Secretary General acknowledged that these reforms would take longer  to implement, he set the end of 1999 as the target date to complete the  1997 reforms. However, we found that approximately 40 percent of these  reforms are not fully in place.
section_title: Secretariat Will Need to Take Additional Steps to Achieve the Secretary General’s Overall Goals
paragraphs: More than one-quarter of the Secretary General’s completed reforms, such  as developing a written plan or establishing a new office, only represent  the first steps in achieving longer-term and more important goals. The  Secretariat’s departments and offices must then use these new plans and  offices to improve U.N. operations for the long term. For example, the  Secretary General directed the Secretariat to develop a plan to improve its  information technology systems. We found that the Secretariat  implemented a plan to upgrade software programs, enhance inter-office  communication between headquarters and the field, and train staff in the  use of these new systems. However, member states must continue to  invest the necessary resources for the plan’s implementation to ensure  that the technology does not become obsolete and to have an impact on  U.N. operations in the long term.
In addition, the Secretary General created several new offices as part of  his reform initiatives. These include a strategic planning office in the  Secretariat, an office to coordinate emergency humanitarian relief  programs, and an office in Vienna to manage the U.N.’s interrelated  programs to combat crime, drugs, and terrorism. Although the  establishment of any new office can be counted as a completed reform, it  is only the first step toward impacting the effectiveness of U.N. operations  and achieving the Secretary General’s overall reform goals. GAO has  previously reported that building an effective department that can meet  overall objectives requires several components, including a staff, financial  resources, and performance goals to measure progress toward objectives.
section_title: Reforms in Four Key Areas of U.N. Operations Are Progressing, but Overall Impact Is Still Not Clear
paragraphs: We found that the U.N. has implemented many reforms in four key areas:  (1) human capital management, (2) performance-oriented budgeting, (3)  public information activities, and (4) the human rights program. Although  numerous key initiatives are in place, other tasks are not yet complete,  such as strengthening the U.N.’s monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to  measure program impact and issuing additional guidelines on the new  worldwide staff rotation, or mobility, policy. Therefore, the impact of  these reforms on the effectiveness of U.N. operations is unclear.
subsections: section_title: Positive Steps Taken to Strengthen Human Capital Management, but Implementation of Reforms Is Ongoing and Additional Challenges Remain
paragraphs: In response to human capital concerns raised by U.N. officials and outside  observers, including the extensive time required to recruit and hire staff,  the Secretariat developed a reform strategy to address the key elements of  human capital management. The strategy included the implementation of a  new recruitment and placement system that decentralized hiring authority  and, according to U.N. officials, significantly reduced the average time to  hire staff. Additional steps are needed, however, to fully implement  reforms and address remaining challenges. For example, U.N. officials  cited the need to develop a system to efficiently screen the increased  number of applications received through the online hiring system.
subsections: section_title: Secretariat’s Reform Strategy Addresses Key Elements of Strategic Human Capital Management
paragraphs: The Secretary General’s reform strategy called for changes to the  Secretariat’s human capital management to create a results-oriented  organizational culture supporting high performance, increased training,  and more effective management. The United Nations’ human capital  management had long been criticized by U.N. officials and external  observers for the extensive time required for recruiting and hiring, the  need for increased accountability for performance, and limited  development and promotion opportunities. In his 1997 plan, the Secretary  General stated that human capital management has been characterized by  labor-intensive day-to-day staff administration and cumbersome rules and  processes. He further stated that these rules and processes were seen as  impeding program delivery and not maximizing staff contributions. The  reform initiatives also attempted to bring human capital policies up to date  with changes that had taken place within the organization, such as the  move from being primarily headquarters-based to having an increasingly  large field presence.
In 2000, the Secretariat expanded the reforms by developing a broader  human capital reform strategy. GAO has developed a human capital model  that highlights the steps that organizations can take in managing human  capital strategically. This model encompasses four human capital  cornerstones that, when taken together, embody an approach to human  capital management that is fact-based and focused on program results and  mission accomplishment. We found that the Secretariat’s reform strategy  includes actions in the areas of GAO’s four cornerstones of strategic  human capital management—leadership; strategic human capital planning;  acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; and results-oriented  organizational cultures (see fig. 4).
Leadership is defined as the demonstrated commitment of top leaders to  continuously improve human capital management and support efforts to  integrate human capital approaches with organizational goals. Soon after  taking office, the Secretary General developed the 1997 reform plan for the  Secretariat. He established a new leadership and management structure  and began overhauling human capital policies to align the organization’s  human capital capacity with its mission and structure. The Secretary  General also established core organizational values and competencies to  develop a results-oriented culture and has used this model to improve  recruitment, staff development, and performance management processes.  The Secretary General’s 2002 reform plan further emphasized the need for  human capital improvements, including increased opportunities for staff  mobility and expanded career prospects for support staff.
The leadership cornerstone also emphasizes that human capital  professionals have an expanded role, beyond paperwork processing, to  become more integrated in the work of the organization. The Secretariat’s  Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) has begun to take on  additional responsibilities, including developing human capital policies,  monitoring compliance with these policies, and providing guidance on  human capital issues. In addition, OHRM has begun to provide more  automated services to employees. For example, the office has streamlined  human capital rules and procedures and has made the Human Resources  Handbook and personnel forms available online. U.N. employees reported  in a survey that the streamlining of rules and procedures was the most  successful human capital reform implemented since 2000.
section_title: Strategic Human Capital Planning
paragraphs: To improve strategic human capital planning, the second cornerstone, the  Secretariat is developing its workforce planning activities through analysis  of the demographic characteristics of Secretariat staff, while departmental  staffing goals are being integrated with the organization’s broader human  capital objectives. The Secretariat’s departments and offices also are  preparing action plans, which incorporate human capital goals and  indicators. OHRM holds planning sessions with the head of each  department to develop measurable targets for achieving human capital  goals, including targets for hiring staff from unrepresented or  underrepresented countries. OHRM monitors the implementation of these  action plans through semiannual reviews of the departments’ progress in  meeting their goals.
The Secretariat also is making increased use of information technology in  implementing reforms. The electronic Human Resources Handbook, the  online hiring system, and the electronic performance appraisal system are  new technology tools that the Secretariat is using to manage human  capital. Historically, the Secretariat had unique job profiles for most  positions, but the new recruiting and placement system makes use of  generic job descriptions in advertising job openings. U.N. officials stated  that these generic job profiles have increased the accessibility and  transparency of the application and hiring process and have facilitated  staff’s ability to move to positions in other departments or offices.
section_title: Acquiring, Developing, and Retaining Talent
paragraphs: To acquire, develop, and retain talent, the third cornerstone, the  Secretariat introduced a new recruitment and placement system in 2002  that entrusts program managers with the responsibility and accountability  for hiring decisions. U.N. officials stated that the new hiring system has  streamlined the hiring process, contributing to a significant reduction in  the average time to hire an employee. In addition, an online tool allows  individuals to submit their applications through the Internet. U.N. officials  stated that this tool provides information on the status of applications and  on management indicators, such as the gender balance and geographic  distribution of applicants.
The Secretariat also increased the emphasis on training and developing  managers’ skills. Although U.N. officials acknowledged that more  resources are needed for training, the organization is providing mandatory  people management training for supervisory staff. The Secretariat also has  implemented a career development policy based on the newly developed  core competencies for managers and staff. Under this policy, managers  must demonstrate support for their staff’s development and career  progress. Finally, the Secretariat has implemented new initiatives to  improve the work environment for staff. For example, employees now  have more flexible work arrangements to address their personnel needs.
section_title: Results-Oriented Organizational Cultures
paragraphs: The key to developing results-oriented organizational cultures, the fourth  cornerstone, is to create a clear link between individual performance and  organizational success. To do this, the Secretary General is holding  senior managers accountable for accomplishing human capital goals  through the use of annual performance agreements. On an annual basis,  the Secretary General meets individually with department heads to discuss  human capital priorities and goals for the upcoming year and to review  indicators, such as the percentage of women in staff and management  positions and the percentage of vacant positions. For these indicators, the  managers’ departments are measured against the Secretariat’s overall  average and their targets for the year. Program managers have been able  to electronically track these and other indicators daily using a new tool  developed by the Department of Management.
The Secretary General also implemented a new electronic performance  appraisal system, introduced in 2002. Rather than having performance  management take place once a year, the new system emphasizes regular  conversations and feedback between staff and supervisors related to staff  performance. Under the system, staff also are assessed against newly  developed organizationwide competencies. Examples of the Secretariat’s  core staff competencies include communication, teamwork, commitment  to continuous learning, and technological awareness. Managers also are  assessed under additional competencies such as leadership, empowering  others, and building trust. In addition, the new performance appraisal  system links the individual’s performance to departmental or team goals  and provides mechanisms for dealing with poor performers. Staff that  have not met performance expectations under the appraisal system may  have their salary increases withheld or could face the termination of their  employment contracts.
section_title: Secretariat Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Achieve Its Human Capital Reform Goals
paragraphs: The Secretariat has made progress in implementing its reform agenda, but  it must address additional human capital challenges if it is to meet the  Secretary General’s overall reform goals. Key challenges include (1)  delegating increased authority and accountability for personnel actions to  managers, (2) implementing the organization’s staff mobility policy, (3)  developing a long-range workforce planning capacity, and (4) screening  the significant increase in applications received through the new recruiting  system. In addition, although the Secretariat has an overall reform strategy  in place, this strategy does not include specific time frames to complete  reform actions. Establishing time frames at the outset provides a baseline  for assessing the Secretariat’s progress in implementing reforms and  achieving its overall human capital reform goals.
First, U.N. officials we met with stated that OHRM has not gone far enough  in delegating authority for personnel decisions to program managers, a  component of the leadership cornerstone. For example, U.N. officials  stated that offices and programs working on humanitarian or development  assistance often needed to hire staff quickly during crisis situations around  the world. However, according to these officials, U.N. rules and  procedures have been a barrier to the hiring process. These officials  pointed out that the delegated hiring authority is only for employees under  regular budget positions on longer-term contracts. Field-based programs  and offices often hire staff under short-term contracts. U.N. officials stated  that the authority to hire these staff has not been decentralized. In his 2002  reform plan, the Secretary General also acknowledged the need to further  delegate responsibilities to managers.
Second, one of the Secretary General’s major reform initiatives was the  implementation of a staff mobility policy intended to facilitate the  movement of staff within and between offices and duty stations. The  policy establishes time limits of either 5 or 6 years for staff to occupy a  position, depending on the staff’s grade level. Although the human capital  office is developing incentives for staff to move to hardship duty stations,  U.N. officials have identified key challenges that may impede the  successful implementation of the mobility policy when the requirements  go into effect in 2007. U.N. staff, for example, are employed under  different types of contracts, some of which place restrictions on the  duration of employment and the type of work an employee can undertake.  U.N. officials stated that the differences in employment contracts would  make it difficult to move staff to certain positions or locations. Another  barrier to staff mobility is spousal employment. Some countries place visa  and work permit restrictions on hiring U.N. employees’ spouses. The  Secretary General has begun to negotiate with countries to ease the  restrictions on the employment of U.N. spouses.
A related challenge is the need for further improvements in strategic  workforce planning, linked to strategic goals and objectives. Long-range  workforce planning will enable the organization to remain aware of and be  prepared for its current and future needs as an organization. The Secretary  General has recognized the need for building this capacity, emphasizing  the need for more systematic succession planning to account for the  expected increase in retirement of U.N. staff. Ultimately, the success of an  organization’s workforce planning process can be judged by its results— how well it helps the agency attain its mission and strategic goals. We  have reported that other countries’ succession planning and management  initiatives have addressed specific human capital challenges, such as  retention and the identification of staff with critical skills.
Finally, U.N. officials stated that the Secretariat’s new recruiting and  placement system has made screening the increased number of incoming  applications a challenge. These officials stated that the organization now  receives an average of approximately 1,000 applications for each vacancy  announcement, compared with a previous average of about 100  applications per opening. U.N. officials have recognized that it will be a  challenge to develop an electronic mechanism to effectively and  accurately screen the growing numbers of applications received.
section_title: Performance-Oriented Budgeting Is Being Adopted, but Monitoring and Evaluation System Does Not Measure Program Impact and Results
paragraphs: The United Nations has begun to adopt performance-oriented budgeting,  but it lacks an adequate monitoring and evaluation system to measure  program performance and results. GAO has reported that a performance- oriented budgeting framework includes three key elements: (1) a budget  that reflects a results-based budgeting structure, linking budgeted  activities to performance expectations; (2) a monitoring and evaluation  system; and (3) procedures for shifting resources to meet program  objectives. In December 2000, the United Nations adopted a results-based  structure for its budgets. We found that this format at the United Nations  has resulted in clearer linkages between program activities and expected  results, but some performance indicators lack clear measures to assess  results. We also found that existing U.N. monitoring and evaluation  activities do not systematically measure program performance and impact.  Consequently, the Secretariat has developed and is implementing a  strategy to improve performance monitoring and evaluation. In December  2003, the General Assembly also adopted an initiative to strengthen the  role of one of its oversight committees responsible for monitoring and  evaluating programs, but the General Assembly does not evaluate the  Secretariat’s program results to reallocate resources to new priorities.
subsections: section_title: U.N. Budget Reflects New Results-Based Focus, but Some Performance Indicators Do Not Measure Results
paragraphs: The Secretariat has implemented the first key element of the U.N.’s  performance-oriented budgeting framework by adopting a budget that  reflects a results-based budgeting format, which involves specifying  program costs, objectives, expected results, and specific performance  indicators to measure the results. GAO previously reported that linking  funding to specific performance goals is a critical first step in supporting  the transition to a more results-oriented and accountable organization.  Expected results and performance indicators are intended to allow the  Secretariat to track the progress its programs make to meet objectives. By  approving the budget, the General Assembly can hold the Secretariat  accountable for meeting expected results.
The Office of Program Planning, Budget and Accounts, which prepares  and reviews the Secretariat’s budget, issued guidelines and provided  training sessions to assist program managers and other staff in preparing  budget proposals in a results-based format. This office also created a Web  site, which is updated regularly, to post information on best practices and  lessons learned. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and  Budgetary Questions noted an improvement in the clarity and detail of  expected results and performance indicators between the 2002-2003  biennium budget, which was the first submitted in a results-based format,  and the 2004-2005 budget. Figure 5 compares the 2002-2003 performance  indicators for the deployment of peacekeeping police units with those  developed for the 2004-2005 budget. For the first time, the 2004-2005  budget includes specific performance targets and baseline data for many  performance indicators that can help measure performance over time and  could allow program managers to compare actual achievements to  expected results. For example, the Department of Peacekeeping  Operations plans to use baseline data at the end of the budget period to  determine whether it will be able to deploy police units for peacekeeping  operations more quickly.
However, oversight committees also reported that some programs still  lack clear and concise expected outcomes and performance indicators.  For example, the Secretariat established an indicator to measure increased  coordination among U.N. agencies and programs, the Bretton Woods  institutions, and the World Trade Organization, and called for “closer  collaboration” to improve the delivery of economic assistance and  development projects. The associated performance target consists of the  estimated number of meetings among these institutions, but does not  describe what these meetings are to accomplish or how they will improve  coordination. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary  Questions reported that it cannot determine the impact of these activities,  which would cost close to $10 million in the 2004-2005 budget period. It  recommended that indicators, such as “closer collaboration” or “full  utilization of resources,” should be replaced with more specific and  concrete measurements. The vagueness of some of these indicators,  however, stems from the fact that baseline information has not been  collected or is missing due to inconsistent monitoring of program  activities, according to officials from the Office of Program Planning,  Budget and Accounts.
section_title: Secretariat’s Monitoring and Evaluation Inadequate to Measure Program Impact, but Strategy Developed to Strengthen System
paragraphs: The Secretariat does not systematically monitor and evaluate program  impact or resultsthe second key element of performance-oriented  budgeting. U.N. regulations require that programs should be regularly  monitored and evaluated to determine their relevance, effectiveness, and  impact in relation to their objectives. Program managers are responsible  for monitoring and evaluating programs to assess their impact and to  determine the extent to which changes are needed to meet expected  results. However, in 2002, the Office of Internal Oversight Services  (OIOS) found that program managers and department and office heads  were not complying with U.N. regulations. For example, both OIOS and  oversight committees reported in 2002 that nearly half of program  managers were not regularly monitoring and evaluating program  performance. In addition, program managers were not held directly  accountable for meeting program objectives because U.N. regulations  prevent linking program effectiveness and impact with program managers’  performance. U.N. officials told us that a more mature program monitoring  and evaluation system is needed before program managers can be held  responsible for program performance.
We found that there were a variety of problems related to the Secretariat’s  monitoring and evaluation of program results and impact. Most programs  do not have comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plans and, in many  cases, no systematic management review of evaluations. For example,  department heads and program managers did not directly review the  results of evaluation activities, consistent with U.N. guidance, in 13 out of  25 programs surveyed in 2001. OIOS reported that, overall, evaluation  findings were not used to improve program performance. In some cases,  such as with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,  monitoring and evaluation responsibilities were assigned to low-level staff  with minimal oversight from program managers. Further, adequate levels  of staff time and other resources needed to conduct evaluations have  never been assessed and programs were not regularly monitored and  evaluated, according to the U.N.’s oversight office. For example, all U.N.  programs supporting the economic and social development of Asia and the  Pacific, which cost approximately $25 million for the biennium, were not  evaluated in 2000 and 2001. Lastly, for the majority of programs, no  resources have been specifically allocated for activities related to  monitoring and evaluation.
To address these weaknesses, the Secretary General tasked the  Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting Division of OIOS to develop a  strategy to systematically monitor and evaluate program results and to  introduce information systems needed to implement results-based  budgeting. The division began to implement its strategy in 2002 and  expects to have a complete system by 2006. As part of its strategy, OIOS  introduced an Internet-based system that allows program managers to  prepare periodic assessments of program impact against stated objectives.  Program managers are required to submit performance assessments after  12 and 18 months, and at the end of the budget period. OIOS officials  stated that this would allow them to adjust the direction of their program  to meet objectives before the end of the budget cycle. In addition, OIOS is  updating its guidelines on monitoring and evaluation, which describe new  data collection methods, such as online surveys, to monitor results and  evaluation methods to report on results.
section_title: General Assembly Lacks System to Evaluate Program Results to Shift Resources to New Priorities
paragraphs: We found that the final component of performance-oriented budgeting— procedures to review evaluation results, eliminate obsolete programs, and  move resources to new priority programs—is not in place. The Advisory  Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions reported in 2003  that it did not receive systematic information from the Secretariat on  program impact and effectiveness to determine whether a program was  meeting its expected results. The Secretariat’s strategy to improve  program monitoring and evaluation is part of an effort to provide the  General Assembly with better program assessments. However, in 2003, the  Secretary General reported that the General Assembly’s oversight system  was ill-suited to review the Secretariat’s evaluation results and to  determine how best to distribute resources.
In his 2002 reform agenda, the Secretary General proposed redefining the  roles of U.N. oversight committees to focus on reviewing program results.  In December 2003, the General Assembly passed a resolution changing the  role of the Committee for Program and Coordination, the first step toward  shifting the focus of oversight responsibility to assessing program impact.  The committee now focuses exclusively on reviewing activities planned to  meet program objectives and no longer reviews budgeting information.  Although several committees review the U.N.’s planning and budgeting  documents for the next biennium period, these committees do not  systematically review programs to assess the impact of previous activities  and determine the appropriate level of funding (see fig. 6).
According to the Joint Inspection Unit, the planning and budgeting  review process was duplicative and redundant. In addition, the costs of  preparing and printing documents, servicing close to 300 meetings, and  staff time for this review have exceeded $20 million a biennium, with little  emphasis placed on evaluating program performance. To shift the focus to  evaluating results, the General Assembly in December 2003 required the  Committee for Program and Coordination to submit a proposal on ways to  improve its ability to monitor and evaluate program impact. The Secretary  General recommended that the committee assess the results achieved at  the end of the budget period and establish priorities to guide the allocation  of resources. This would support performance-oriented budgeting,  according to Joint Inspection Unit officials.
In August 2003, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary  Questions concluded that the General Assembly could not eliminate  programs and shift resources until it received evaluations that addressed  program impact. Performance information is necessary for decision- making bodies to determine whether programs are meeting their stated  objectives. Program performance reports provided to member states  focused on outputs (such as the number of staff recruited, reports issued,  meetings held, or computers purchased), instead of measuring program  impact. To address this concern, OIOS changed the format of the  performance report, which now requires program managers to link  resources to program activities and to use performance indicators to  measure program impact. The program performance report for the 2002- 2003 biennium, which will be submitted by March 2004, will be the first  prepared using the new format.
In December 2003, the General Assembly approved the elimination of 912  outputs in the 2004-2005 program budget based on the Secretariat’s review  of program activities and more than 50,000 outputs. In addition, as a result  of this review, the General Assembly has shifted resources from these  activities—deemed obsolete and inefficient by the Secretariat—to more  immediate U.N. priorities. In 2003, the Advisory Committee on  Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Committee for Program  and Coordination recommended that program managers in the Secretariat  continue to identify obsolete outputs in U.N. budgets in compliance with  U.N. regulations. The committees also reported that many sections in the  budget lacked justifications for continuing certain outputs.
section_title: Majority of Reforms of U.N. Public Information Activities Still in Early Phases
paragraphs: We found that the Secretariat had implemented some reforms related to  U.N. public information activities, but most were still in the early phases.  With a biennium budget of approximately $156 million, the Department of  Public Information undertakes news coverage of U.N. events through  radio, video, and the Internet in six official languages; manages the U.N.
Web site; manages its overseas branch offices; and oversees the Dag  Hammarskjold library and coordinates with depository libraries  worldwide. Following a series of management reviews of U.N. public  information activities, the Secretary General restructured the department  to improve its ability to develop coherent, cost-effective communications  strategies to promote the U.N.’s priorities. In addition, the Secretary  General consolidated department branch offices in Western Europe into a  regional branch office in Brussels, Belgium. However, we found that  reforms of other public information activities are not yet in place. For  example, reforms related to the Department of Public Information’s  program monitoring and evaluation and library management, as well as the  Secretariat’s publications oversight, are still in the early stages of  implementation and have had a limited effect on the effectiveness of  public information activities, according to U.N. officials.
subsections: section_title: Reorganization of Headquarters and Branch Offices Substantially in Place
paragraphs: Since 1948, internal oversight bodies and external groups have conducted  at least seven periodic management reviews of public information policies  and activities. However, these reviews resulted in few changes to the  Department of Public Information’s operations. Member states continued  to criticize the department, claiming that it did not adequately assess the  impact of its activities. In his 2002 reform agenda, the Secretary General  highlighted that fact that the department suffered from fragmented  programs because of too many mandates and missions.
To better align the Department of Public Information’s structure with its  mandated activities, highlight priorities, and reduce fragmentation, the  Secretary General reorganized the department into three divisions in  November 2002: (1) the Outreach Division, which focuses on relationships  with civil society, including outreach to educational institutions, and  manages the Dag Hammarskjold Library in New York; (2) the News and  Media Division, which aims to expand the United Nations’ access to media  organizations worldwide; and (3) the Strategic Communications Division,  which develops the U.N’s communications strategies in partnership with  the Secretariat’s departments and manages the network of overseas  branch offices. Within this third division, the department created focal  points that work across the Secretariat’s departments in priority areas— including development, peace and security, Africa, human rights,  Palestine, and decolonization—to identify communications strategies and  reduce duplicative programs. In its spring 2003 session, delegates to the  Committee on Information commented that the department’s new  structure should help focus the department’s activities and maximize the  use of its resources.
To improve the cost efficiency of the department’s field operations, the  Secretary General proposed changes to the structure of public information  branch offices. Branch offices in developed countries—including the  United States, Japan, Australia, and the European Union—accounted for  40 percent of all branch office expenditures, as of September 2002.  Therefore, the Department of Public Information was devoting a large  amount of funding to information activities in countries where available  technology permitted greater online access to its services in the field. In  2003, internal auditors concluded that the department should evaluate  these offices and consider options such as consolidation, regionalization,  or closure. Based in part on these findings, the Secretary General created a  regional branch office in Brussels in January 2004 and consolidated offices  in nine European Union countries as part of his 2002 reform agenda. At  its spring 2004 session, the Committee on Information will review a  progress report on the implementation of the regionalization proposal to  determine the feasibility of applying the initiative in other regions.
section_title: Additional Reforms of Public Information Activities Are Partly in Place
paragraphs: The Secretariat has begun implementing additional reforms of other public  information activities, but we found that these initiatives are only partly in  place. The Secretary General stated that the department had historically  devoted minimal attention to assessing the impact of its activities and that  a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of its activities had never been  conducted. Therefore, in 2003, the Department of Public Information and  internal auditors began a 3-year joint process to evaluate the effectiveness  and impact of the department’s activities through an annual review  process. As part of its efforts to promote monitoring and evaluation, the  department provides ongoing training for staff in results-based  management within existing resources—a challenge, according to public  information officials. Although these activities are still under way, an  official from the Deputy Secretary General’s office stated that the  department had taken positive steps to implement reforms to improve its  monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
Reforms of U.N. libraries are also in the early phases. The United Nations  has library collections in each of its headquarters offices and regional  commissions, as well as libraries in many of the 62 branch offices and  other depositories worldwide. The Secretary General reported in 2002 that  the public information department needed to centralize library policy  management and increase its use of technology in providing library  services. In response, it established a steering committee in March 2003 to  oversee the implementation of reforms, such as increasing the use of  online archival systems for library collections and expanding information  sharing among libraries to reduce duplication. The department plans to  report to the Committee on Information in 2004 on its progress in  implementing these reforms.
Lastly, the implementation of reforms of publications activities is still  under way. The Secretary General directed all departments to identify  outdated or duplicative publications from more than 1,200 produced  annually. We reported in 2000 that a review of U.N. publications in the  economic and social affairs area found considerable redundancy and  overlap. Publications activities are also extremely costly. For example,  the U.N. Chronicle—a publication for teachers and students of world  affairs—produced by the public information department—costs more than  $1 million annually to publish. In his 2002 reform agenda, the Secretary  General called for a review of the feasibility and cost of increasing online  publications delivery, as opposed to printing certain publications. This  review is not yet complete. To improve publications oversight, the relevant  executive committees must approve all new publications proposed by the  Secretariat pursuant to the 2002 reform plan. Overall, officials stated that  the implementation of publications reform will depend on the willingness  of Secretariat officials and the General Assembly to identify unneeded  publications and discontinue duplicative mandates. On a positive note, in  December 2003, the General Assembly approved the Secretary General’s  2004-2005 budget proposal calling for the discontinuation of 192  publications and reports.
section_title: Reforms of the U.N. Human Rights Program Outside the Secretariat’s Authority Are Incomplete
paragraphs: In recent years, management of the Secretariat’s human rights office has  been complicated by several factors, such as weak financial and program  management and a heavy reliance on voluntary funding to administer core  activities. In addition to technical assistance, training, publications, and  human rights advocacy, the office provides support to other parts of the  human rights program outside the Secretariat, such as the U.N.  Commission on Human Rights. We found that the office has implemented  reforms to address its management deficiencies. In addition, we found that  the human rights office has implemented reforms to improve its support to  the actors outside the Secretariat, including requesting funding for  additional staff. However, the Secretary General only has authority over  the management of the Secretariat’s human rights office and cannot  implement reforms across the entire U.N. human rights program,  according to human rights officials.
subsections: section_title: Management of the U.N. Human Rights Program Is Complicated by Several Factors
paragraphs: Several factors affect the management of the Office of the High  Commissioner for Human Rights—the Secretariat’s human rights office.  For example, in 2002, OIOS concluded that the human rights office had  poor financial controls and human capital management, as well as weak  internal oversight procedures. According to a senior human rights official,  for example, the office did not accurately track its unused voluntary  funding in the past. According to the human rights office, this problem  has been rectified and the office is tracking voluntary funding levels. In  addition, the office relies heavily on voluntary funding to administer its  core activities. Regular budget funding accounted for about 38 percent, or  $24.2 million, of the office’s activities in 2002, whereas voluntary  contributions accounted for about 62 percent, or $40 million (see fig. 6 for  funding trends for the human rights office). Human rights officials stated  that the heavy reliance on voluntary funding poses management  challenges, including the resulting uncertainty of funding for future  projects and low morale among staff unsure about job security.
As shown in figure 8, the human rights office also provides administrative,  technical, and substantive support to parts of the human rights program  outside the Secretariat, including  the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which is a functional commission  of the Economic and Social Council that meets annually to discuss human  rights issues and standards and governments’ adherence to them; independent reporters and working groups, appointed by the commission  to examine, monitor, and publicly report on human rights situations in  specific countries or territories or on major human rights themes—there  are reporters who focus on the right to education and on the situation of  human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and independent committees, established by international human rights  treaties, comprising independent experts that monitor governments’  compliance with treaty obligations.
The workload generated by these independent groups affects the human  rights office’s management. For example, the office provides  administrative support, such as report processing, to the monitoring  committees and national governments to ensure compliance with treaty  reporting requirements. As the number of signatories increases, the  Secretariat’s administrative burden increases. In addition, the Secretary  General reported in 2002 that the more than 40 human rights reporters and  working groups pose a management burden for the human rights office  because they have grown in recent years in an ad hoc fashion and without  clear rules for their responsibilities. The fragmentation and lack of clear  working guidelines complicated the office’s support to these individuals  and groups in the preparation of reports to the commission. As an  independent body, the Commission on Human Rights appoints new human  rights reporters. However, OIOS reported that the General Assembly has  not provided commensurate additional regular budget funding to the  human rights office for their support. As a result, the office has  increasingly resorted to using voluntary funding to recruit additional staff  to fulfill its responsibilities to the commission and monitoring committees.
section_title: Secretary General Does Not Have Authority to Implement Reforms of Human Rights Activities outside Secretariat
paragraphs: The Secretary General’s reform agendas called for the Secretariat’s human  rights office to develop a strategy to strengthen its financial and human  capital management and internal oversight procedures, among other  things. We found that the office has developed and is implementing this  strategy. For example, it established both the senior-level Management  Board and Project Review Committee, in 1997 and 1998, respectively, to  monitor the planning, budgeting, and implementation of the office’s  programs and to identify outdated or nonpriority activities. The human  rights office reported that it strengthened its program oversight and  planning throughout 2003. Officials stated that the 2004 annual appeal, for  example, presented a more strategic work plan than in prior years, which  resulted in a 12 percent decline in voluntary funding requirements for the  2004 annual appeal, from $62.5 million in 2003 to $54.8 million in 2004. In  addition, the office established the Advisory Panel on Personnel Issues in  March 1999 to evaluate the office’s use of temporary staff and staff funded  with voluntary resources and ensure the equitable geographic distribution  of staff from member states. It also restructured its three main branches to  reduce duplicative activities and leverage its personnel and financial  resources.
We found that the human rights office has also implemented reforms that  indirectly address areas of the U.N. human rights program outside the  Secretary General’s authority. For example, to help improve the quality of  human rights reports, the office developed an induction kit for human  rights reporters and working groups. The kit is updated regularly and used  to brief new reporters on their rules and procedures. In addition, the office  is working to keep them informed about the latest General Assembly  resolutions that may affect reporting procedures, such as page limits and  submission deadlines. In December 2003, the General Assembly also  approved the Secretary General’s request for funding in the 2004-2005  budget for additional staff to improve the office’s ability to respond to  increasing demands from the Commission on Human Rights and its human  rights reporters and working groups.
Nevertheless, the implementation of the Secretary General’s proposals is  incomplete because he does not have authority over human rights  activities outside the Secretariat’s human rights office. For example,  because the majority of human rights reporters are selected by the chair of  the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretariat’s human rights office  could only recommend that the commission consider developing criteria  for their selection. Moreover, only the commission can determine standard  entrance criteria for its reporters and working groups. Thus, any reform  related to the human rights reporters is dependent upon the support of  commission members. In addition, in his September 2002 reform agenda,  the Secretary General stated that governments should be allowed to  submit a single report to the monitoring committees summarizing their  adherence to human rights treaty obligations. Given his lack of authority  over the monitoring committees, the Secretary General requested that the  human rights office consult with the committees on methods of  streamlining the governments’ various treaty-reporting requirements. The  monitoring committees, however, resisted the concept of a single report,  according to the human rights office. The proposal resulting from these  consultations instead calls for an expanded core report containing  standard information pertinent to all of the monitoring committees, with  separate, more detailed reports going to individual committees.
section_title: Various Factors May Impede Full Implementation of U.N. Reforms
paragraphs: We identified several challenges that may impact the Secretariat’s ability  to meet the overall reform goals: (1) the Secretariat does not conduct  periodic, comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of reforms;  (2) the Secretary General did not differentiate between short- and long- term goals in the 2002 reform plan; (3) resistance from managers and staff  has slowed the implementation of reforms; and (4) potential financial and  personnel resource implications are associated with some reforms.
First, we found that the Secretariat does not conduct systematic,  comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of the Secretary  General’s reforms. Without such assessments, the Secretariat is not able to  determine where further improvements are needed. In 1998 and 2003, the  Secretary General issued reports on the status of the 1997 and 2002  reforms, respectively. These reports, however, did not include a  comprehensive impact assessment. We found that individual departments  and offices within the Secretariat oversee specific reforms within their  area of work; for example, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human  Rights oversees the implementation of reforms of the U.N. human rights  program. However, the Deputy Secretary General, who is responsible for  overseeing the overall reform process, has only one full-time professional  staff member dedicated to this effort. The Steering Committee on Reform  and Management—comprising department heads within the Secretariat  and chaired by the Deputy Secretary General—also tracks key reform  issues and policy implementation. However, the Deputy Secretary  General’s office neither systematically assesses departments’ performance  in implementing reforms nor holds managers directly accountable.  Furthermore, OIOS only monitors and evaluates the impact of select  reforms and is not responsible for overseeing the implementation of the  overall reform agendas.
Second, the Secretary General has not differentiated between short- and  long-term goals in his 2002 reform plan, and he has not consistently  established time frames or milestones for their completion. GAO has  identified the setting of implementation goals and a timeline to build  momentum and show progress as key practices for organizations  undertaking change management initiatives. We found that a few reforms  required departments and offices to conduct evaluations and report their  findings to the Secretary General by a certain date, but many reforms did  not specify time frames for completing these actions. For example, the  Secretary General called for the Department of Public Information and  OIOS to complete an evaluation of the impact and cost effectiveness of the  department’s activities within a three-year period (which started in 2003).  However, when the Secretary General called for a review of the feasibility  and cost of increasing the Secretariat’s delivery of online versus printed  publications, he did not specify a deadline. Without prioritizing efforts and  establishing deadlines, it is difficult to hold managers accountable for  completing the reforms.
Third, according to budget and human capital officials, some program  managers and staff have resisted implementing certain reform initiatives.  Human capital officials stated that program managers, for example, have  raised concerns about the staff mobility policy because they fear losing  expertise when staff rotate to new positions. In addition, OIOS reported  that about half of program managers across the Secretariat have not  complied with U.N. regulations to monitor and evaluate the performance  of program activities. The Secretariat lacks clear rules and procedures for  conducting regular monitoring and evaluation exercises, according to  OIOS officials. Some managers also stated that they lacked resources to  support this work and were concerned that these evaluation requirements  would detract time and money from their regular work responsibilities.  Consequently, the Secretariat is providing training to all departments to  assist managers and staff in conducting self-monitoring and evaluation  exercises to comply with performance-oriented budgeting and overcome  resistance. Managers’ support is critical for the institutionalization of  reforms in the long term.
Fourth, U.N. officials stated that they have encountered delays in  implementing reforms due to a lack of available regular budget resources.  For example, public information officials stated that their department did  not have a specific budget for new monitoring and evaluation activities—a  key aspect of public information reform. In addition, human capital  officials stated that they developed the online recruiting and hiring system  after receiving resources from another department in the Secretariat. The  Secretary General stated that departments would need to implement  reforms within existing resources because additional funding would not be  available in the regular budget. He also stated that program managers  should streamline operations and eliminate obsolete activities to make  resources available to implement reforms. According to U.N. officials, the  Secretariat did not complete a comprehensive assessment of the personnel  and budgetary implications during the development of his 2002 reform  agenda. Rather, departments have conducted resource assessments for  individual reforms on a case-by-case basis as a part of the budget process.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: In 1997 and 2002, the Secretary General proposed sweeping reforms of the  United Nations in response to recurring calls to improve its efficiency and  effectiveness in spending member states’ contributions. Many reforms  have been completed since our 2000 report, including key measures to  improve human capital management, focus the United Nations on results- based management, and strengthen the management of the human rights  program. However, the United Nations faces many challenges to  completing reforms, including potential resource constraints. Moreover,  the Office of the Deputy Secretary General does not periodically and  comprehensively assess the impact of reforms on the effectiveness of U.N.  operations. Given that the Secretary General does not provide regular,  comprehensive reports on the overall status and impact of reforms, it is  difficult to hold staff accountable for implementing these reforms and  their impact is unclear. In addition, the 2002 reform agenda did not specify  short- and long-term goals or establish expected time frames for their  completion—practices that increase the transparency and accountability  of the reform process. Adopting key practices in management, oversight,  and accountability for reforms, such as systematic monitoring and  evaluation, could facilitate the achievement of the Secretary General’s  overall reform goals. As the U.N.’s largest financial contributor and a  proponent of reform, the United States would also benefit from the  adoption of these practices.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To promote full implementation and accountability of the Secretary  General’s overall reform actions, we recommend that the Secretary of  State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United  Nations work with other member states to encourage the Secretary  General to  report regularly through an existing U.N. reporting mechanism on the  status and impact of the 1997 and 2002 reforms and other reforms that  may follow;   differentiate between short- and long-term reform goals and establish time  frames for completion for those reforms that are not in place; and   conduct assessments of the financial and personnel implications needed to  implement the reforms.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Department of State and the United Nations provided written  comments on a draft of this report (see apps. III and IV). State agreed with  our recommendations, stating that it will continue to encourage the full  implementation of all reform initiatives at the United Nations. In  particular, State noted several efforts it is pursuing through the General  Assembly, including further reforms related to human capital management  and the Department of Public Information, among others. Moreover, State  agreed with our conclusion that many reforms from the 1997 and 2002  agendas are first steps in achieving the Secretary General’s overall reform  goals. State also said that the report provides a comprehensive analysis of  the status of U.N. reforms and the challenges affecting their  implementation. State noted that our report did not contain an in-depth  analysis of reforms of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations—a  point that we acknowledge in our scope and methodology (see app. I). In  addition, State provided technical comments on our draft report, which  were incorporated into the text, where appropriate.
The United Nations also provided written comments on a draft of this  report. Although we did not make recommendations directly to the United  Nations, it generally agreed with the report’s findings. In particular, the  United Nations acknowledged that the implementation of certain reforms  is proceeding more slowly than others. The United Nations also provided  observations regarding its efforts to implement its ambitious reform  agenda. In addition, the United Nations provided technical comments,  which were incorporated into the text where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of  Congress. We are also providing copies of this report to the Secretary of  State, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United  Nations, and the United Nations. We will also make copies available to  others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov, or Phyllis Anderson at (202) 512- 7364 or andersonp@gao.gov. In addition to the persons named above,  Jeremy Latimer, Leland Cogliani, Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, Kathryn  Hartsburg, and Monica Wolford made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign  Relations and Committee member Michael Enzi, we examined the status  of U.N. reform activities to follow up on GAO’s 2000 report. Specifically,  we assessed (1) the overall status of U.N. reforms proposed in 1997 and  2002 by the Secretary General; (2) the Secretariat’s efforts to implement  reforms in four key areas: human capital management, performance- oriented budgeting, public information activities, and the human rights  program; and (3) the challenges facing the implementation of U.N.  reforms.
We focused our work on the Secretary General’s 1997 and 2002 reform  agendas. These reforms applied to the Secretariat and member state  governing bodies, including the General Assembly, the Economic and  Social Council, and the Security Council. We did not include U.N.  specialized agencies or funds and programs in our review. We did,  however, meet with officials and collect information from the  International Labour Organization, the United Nations High Commissioner  for Refugees, and the World Health Organization to discuss their progress  and challenges in implementing management reforms similar to those that  the Secretary General is undertaking.
Overall, we identified 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 reform agenda and  66 in the 2002 agenda, for a total of 154 reform initiatives. This number  differs from U.N. figures because many of the Secretary General’s reform  action items had several components that we identified and counted as  separate initiatives. For example, one of the Secretary General’s action  items called for improving the information technology systems of the  United Nations, which involved upgrading the U.N.’s Web site;  modernizing internal systems that produce, store and disseminate  documents; and adopting an information technology strategy for New  York headquarters and field offices. We counted each one of those actions  as separate initiatives, while the Secretariat grouped them into one action  item.
To determine the overall status of the reforms, we developed a  methodology to code them as (1) substantially or completely in place,   (2) partly in place, or (3) not in place (see table 1 for our definitions). We  discussed our methodology with U.N. officials, and they agreed to its  utility for assessing the status of U.N. reforms.
We defined a key element as one that is critical or central to the reform.  We considered that reforms could not be implemented or institutionalized  without these key elements (e.g., staff or budget). All other elements were  considered as minor. We considered a reform to be in place if it had  moved from the planning stage to implementation. Implementation should  have been well under way, though it may not have been completed and the  reform may not have been institutionalized. For reforms with more than  one key element, we considered the following factors to determine  whether some or most key elements were in place: (1) the number of  elements, (2) the relative importance of the elements, (3) the relative  difficulty of implementation, and (4) the degree of implementation of each  of the elements.
To assess the status of the reforms, we reviewed the Secretary General’s  1997 and 2002 reform plans and obtained and reviewed official reports of  the Secretariat and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),  budget documents, General Assembly resolutions, Secretary General  bulletins, Web sites, and statements from U.N. officials. We interviewed  senior officials from U.N. departments in New York City and Geneva.  Specifically, we met with the Deputy Secretary General and her staff, and  officials from the Department of Management, the Office of Human  Resources Management (OHRM), the Office of Program Planning, Budget,  and Accounts (OPPBA), the Department of Public Information (DPI), and  the Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights. We also met with  officials from OIOS and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU). During the course  of our review, we also discussed the status of U.N. reforms with U.S.  Department of State officials in Washington, D.C.; New York; and Geneva.
We selected reforms in the areas of human capital management, the  performance-oriented budgeting system, public information activities, and   the human rights program to assess in more detail. In our discussions with  U.N. and U.S. officials, and in our review of U.N. documents, we  determined that these were key areas of the Secretary General’s 1997 and  2002 reform plans. A detailed assessment of the reforms for peacekeeping  and improving the coordination among U.N. departments and offices and  between the U.N. and civil society was beyond the scope of this review.
To assess the status of human capital management reforms, we compared  the Secretariat’s human capital reform strategy with criteria from GAO’s  model of strategic human capital management. This model provides a  framework for examining an organization’s human capital practices and is  based upon the actions that are characteristic of high-performing  organizations. To collect information on the Secretariat’s progress in  implementing its reform strategy, we reviewed internal and public human  resources documents detailing the new recruitment and hiring system, the  performance appraisal system, human resources action plans, and a  survey of U.N. staff views on human capital reforms. We discussed human  capital management reforms with OHRM officials who are planning and  implementing the office’s reform initiatives. We also met with the chief  personnel officer for the U.N. Geneva Office, as well as personnel officers  at the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.N. High  Commissioner for Refugees, and the Internal Labour Organization, to  discuss the status and problems of human capital reforms in their  organizations. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of implemented  human capital reforms.
To assess the implementation of budgeting and monitoring and evaluation  reforms, we analyzed the last three U.N. biennium budget documents  (2000-2001, 2002-2003, and 2004-2005) to determine changes in the  budget’s format after the adoption of a results-based budgeting format. We  also examined budget-related documents prepared by the Committee for  Program and Coordination and the Advisory Committee on Administrative  and Budgetary Questions. In addition, we examined Secretariat documents  on program monitoring and evaluation activities to determine the U.N.’s  ability to report on and assess program results and impact, as well as  strategies the Secretariat developed to strengthen the monitoring and  evaluation system. We discussed performance-oriented budgeting reforms  with OPPBA, JIU, and OIOS officials from the Monitoring, Evaluation, and  Consulting Division. We also met with budget officers at the International  Labour Organization and the World Health Organization to discuss the  status and lessons learned from implementing performance-oriented  budgeting at their organizations.
To determine the status of reforms of U.N. public information activities,  including DPI’s reorganization, the restructuring of the department’s  branch offices, library management, and publications, we reviewed reports  from OIOS, the General Assembly’s Committee on Information, and the  Secretary General. We also spoke with DPI officials, including the Under  Secretary General, the department’s senior managers, and senior library  officials in New York. In addition, we interviewed officials from DPI’s  branch office and U.N. library in Geneva to determine the extent to which  operations in the field have been affected by these reforms.
To determine the status of efforts to reform the U.N. human rights  program, we reviewed official reports from the Office of the High  Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)— including annual appeals  and reports—detailing the steps the office is taking to implement these  reforms. We also reviewed internal audit reports and external reviews by  independent contractors highlighting the key management challenges  facing OHCHR and its efforts to improve in these areas. In addition, we  interviewed human rights officials in Secretariat offices in Geneva and  New York. To assess the Secretariat’s efforts to improve the management  of the human rights program, we spoke with the Acting High  Commissioner for Human Rights and senior management officials  responsible for implementing the Secretary General’s reforms. To  determine the status of reforms related to the monitoring committees and  human rights reporters and working groups, we analyzed relevant  Secretary General, General Assembly, and Commission on Human Rights  reports, resolutions, and other official documentation, and we spoke with  OHCHR officials. We did not review the work or membership of the  Commission on Human Rights or the performance of individual human  rights reporters.
To determine the challenges facing the implementation of U.N. reforms,  we reviewed reports and documentation of the Secretariat, General  Assembly, OIOS, and JIU. We also reviewed reports from outside  observers of the U.N. system, including nongovernmental organizations  and members of academia. In addition, we spoke with U.N. officials in  New York and Geneva. These included officials from the Office of the  Deputy Secretary General, the Department of Management, OHRM,  OPPBA, DPI, OHCHR, OIOS, and JIU. We also spoke with U.S. officials in  Washington, New York, and Geneva.
We conducted our work from June 2003 through January 2004, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Status of U.N. Reforms
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the United Nations