U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges
Published: 2006-05-03T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities--led by the State Department (State)--are designed to counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual understanding between nations. Since 2003, we have issued three reports on U.S. public diplomacy efforts that examined (1) changes in public diplomacy resources since September 11, 2001; (2) strategic planning and coordination of public diplomacy efforts; and (3) the challenges facing these efforts. We have made several recommendations in the last 3 years to the Secretary of State to address strategic planning issues, private sector engagement, and staffing challenges related to public diplomacy. For example, today's report recommends that the Secretary develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim world. State has consistently concurred with our findings and recommendations for improving public diplomacy, and the department, in several cases, is taking appropriate actions. However, the department has not established a timetable for many of these actions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. Since 2001, State has increased its public diplomacy resources, particularly in regions with significant Muslim populations. That funding trend has continued more recently, with increases of 25 percent for the Near East and 39 percent for South Asia from 2004 to 2006, though public diplomacy staffing levels have remained largely the same during that period. The Secretary of State recently announced plans to reposition some staff to better reflect the department's strategic priorities, including plans to shift 28 public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to China, India, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. In 2003 and again in 2005, we reported that the government lacked an interagency communication strategy to guide governmentwide public diplomacy activities, and it continues to lack this strategy. We also noted that State did not have a strategy to integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities and that efforts to effectively engage the private sector had met with mixed success. Today, although State has developed a strategic framework to focus its public diplomacy efforts and related tactics to achieve these goals, the department has not issued guidance on how to implement these strategies and tactics. In addition, posts' public diplomacy efforts generally lack important strategic communication elements found in the private sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan to bring all these elements together. State officials indicate that the department has begun to develop communication plans for 15 pilot posts, but it remains to be seen whether these communication plans will contain all of these strategic elements. Posts throughout the world, and particularly in the Muslim world, face several challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs, including concerns related to staff numbers and language capabilities and the need to balance security with public outreach. For example, we found that 24 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions worldwide were filled by officers without the requisite language skills. Furthermore, security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public access. State has begun to address many of these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of many of these efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work on U.S. public  diplomacy efforts, particularly in the Muslim world. Since the terrorist  attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign public opinion polls have shown  that negative attitudes toward the United States have generally grown  worse in many countries around the world. One particular concern has  been a marked worsening of such attitudes in the Muslim world—an  audience of key strategic interest in the United States’ war on terrorism.  U.S. public diplomacy activities—led by the State Department (State)—are  designed to counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy  actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual understanding  among nations. Today, we are issuing a report on the State’s public  diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world. This follows our April 2005 report  examining interagency coordination of public diplomacy activities and  our September 2003 report on State’s overall public diplomacy efforts.  These efforts include daily news operations, information programs, and  various types of exchange programs.
Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss our findings from these reports  and, where possible, to highlight ways of strengthening public diplomacy  going forward. Today, I will talk about (1) changes in U.S. public  diplomacy resources since September 11, 2001; (2) strategic planning and  coordination of public diplomacy efforts; and (3) the challenges facing  these efforts. My comments will focus on State’s activities, as State was  the subject of our work. While our most recent report focuses on activities  in the Muslim world, many of our findings apply to public diplomacy  efforts worldwide.
As part of our reviews of public diplomacy, we met with officials from the  Departments of State and Defense (DOD), U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), and Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). We  traveled to Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom  and met with a broad cross-section of U.S. embassy officials, British  Council and embassy staff, and local focus groups. We also convened  roundtables of experts on public relations, international opinion research,  and the Muslim world. The reports used for this testimony were conducted  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The overall goal of U.S. public diplomacy is to understand, inform, engage,  and influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign audiences in ways that  support U.S. strategic interests. The State Department leads these efforts,  which are guided by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public  Affairs and include academic and professional exchanges, English  language teaching, information programs, and news management. The  department’s regional and functional bureaus also contain public  diplomacy offices, which report to the relevant assistant secretary. The  Under Secretary has direct authority over the three public diplomacy  bureaus but does not have line authority over public diplomacy operations  in other regional or functional bureaus. In overseas missions, Foreign  Service public diplomacy officers (including Public Affairs, Cultural  Affairs, Information, Information Resources, and Regional English  Language officers) operate under the authority of the chief of mission and  report to their regional bureau managers in Washington, D.C.
In fiscal year 2005, State dedicated $597 million to public diplomacy and  public affairs. According to the department’s performance plan, its  investment in public diplomacy continues to increase, particularly for  efforts targeting audiences in the Middle East. Exchange programs  received $356 million, the majority of fiscal year 2005 funding and a 12.4  percent increase over fiscal year 2004. State’s information programs  received roughly $68 million in fiscal year 2005 to fund programs such as  the U.S. speakers program, mission Web sites, and American Corners,  which are centers that provide information about the United States, hosted  in local institutions and staffed by local employees. The remaining public  diplomacy funds went to State’s regional bureaus to pay the salaries of  locally engaged staff overseas, among other purposes.
section_title: Public Diplomacy Resources Have Shifted to the Muslim World, but Staffing Numbers Have Leveled Off
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its  public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the  Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on  terrorism. Between 2004 and 2006, total spending on overseas public  diplomacy will increase 21 percent, from $519 million to an estimated $629  million. Much of this increase has gone to regions with significant Muslim  populations, including South Asia (39 percent), East Asia and the Pacific  (28 percent), and the Near East (25 percent). These increases continue the  trend we reported in 2003, when we found that the largest relative  increases in overseas public diplomacy resources went to regions with  large Muslim populations. However, the Bureau of European and Eurasian  Affairs continues to receive the largest overall share of overseas public  diplomacy resources—roughly 36 percent of the total for all six regional  bureaus.
In 2003, we noted that authorized officer positions overseas had  significantly expanded, with the most notable increases occurring in  State’s Near East (27-percent increase) and South Asia (15-percent  increase) bureaus. However, current data show that staff numbers have  stayed largely the same over the past 3 years, with increases of 3 percent  or less. In January 2006, Secretary Rice announced plans to reposition  officers as part of her transformational diplomacy initiative. State officials  said that the department will initially reposition approximately 75 Foreign  Service officers this year from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to  India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. According  to these officials, 28 of the positions to be relocated are public diplomacy  positions.
section_title: Strategy, Planning, and Coordination Efforts Are Inadequate
paragraphs: Since 2003, we have reported on the lack of strategic elements to guide  U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Despite several attempts, the United States  still lacks an interagency public diplomacy strategy. While State has  recently developed a strategic framework for its public diplomacy efforts,  it has not issued guidance on how this framework is to be implemented in  the field. In addition, posts generally lack a strategic approach to public  diplomacy.
subsections: section_title: Government Lacks an Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy
paragraphs: In 2003, we reported that the United States lacked a governmentwide,  interagency public diplomacy strategy, defining the messages and means  for communication efforts abroad. We reported that the administration  had made a number of aborted attempts to develop a strategy, but to date  no public diplomacy strategy has been developed. The lack of such a  strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages, which  increases the risk of making damaging communication mistakes. State  officials said that the lack of such a strategy diminishes the efficiency and  effectiveness of governmentwide public diplomacy efforts, while several  reports concluded that a strategy is needed to synchronize agencies’ target  audience assessments, messages, and capabilities.
On April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordination  Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. This  committee, to be led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and  Public Affairs, is intended to coordinate interagency activities to ensure  that:    all agencies work together to disseminate the President’s themes and    all public diplomacy and strategic communications resources, programs,  and activities are effectively coordinated to support those messages; and   every agency gives public diplomacy and strategic communications the  same level of priority that the President does.
According to department officials, one of the committee’s tasks will be to  issue a formal interagency public diplomacy strategy. It is not clear when  this strategy will be developed.
section_title: State Has Established Public Diplomacy Strategic Framework but Lacks Implementing Guidance
paragraphs: In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.  public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1) support  the President’s Freedom Agenda with a positive image of hope; (2) isolate  and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote understanding regarding  shared values and common interests between Americans and peoples of  different countries, cultures, and faiths. The Under Secretary noted that  she intends to achieve these goals using five tactics—engagement,  exchanges, education, empowerment, and evaluation—and by using  various public diplomacy programs and other means. This framework  partially responds to our 2003 recommendation that the department  develop and disseminate a strategy to integrate all State’s public  diplomacy efforts and direct them toward achieving common objectives.  However, the department has not yet developed written guidance that  provides details on how the Under Secretary’s new strategic framework  should be implemented in the field.
In 2005, we noted that State’s efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit  of common public diplomacy objectives had met with mixed success and  recommended that the Secretary develop a strategy to guide these efforts.  State is currently establishing an office of private sector outreach and is  partnering with individuals and the private sector on various projects. The  Under Secretary plans to institutionalize this function within the  department surrounding key public diplomacy objectives, but it is unclear  when this office will be established and whether it will develop a  comprehensive strategy to engage the private sector.
section_title: Posts Lack a Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy
paragraphs: GAO and others have suggested that State adopt a strategic approach to  public diplomacy by modeling and adapting private sector communication  practices to suit its purposes (see fig. 1). However, based on our review of  mission performance plans and on fieldwork in Nigeria, Pakistan, and  Egypt, we found that the posts’ public diplomacy programming generally  lacked these important elements of strategic communications planning. In  particular, posts lacked a clear theme or message and did not identify  specific target audiences. According to a senior embassy official in  Pakistan, the United States has too many competing messages, and the  post needs to do a better job of defining and clarifying its message. Posts  also failed to develop detailed strategies and tactics to direct available  public diplomacy programs and tools toward clear, measurable objectives  in the most efficient manner possible. Finally, posts lack detailed, country- level communication plans to coordinate their various activities.
Recently, State has begun to help posts improve their strategic  communications planning. For example, the department has issued  guidance on preparing fiscal year 2008 mission performance plans that  calls for more strategic thinking and planning than was required in the  past, including identification of specific target audiences, key themes and  messages, detailed strategies and tactics, and measurable performance  outcomes that can clearly demonstrate the ultimate impact of U.S. public  diplomacy efforts. If fully implemented, this guidance should begin to  address the shortcomings we found in mission performance plans;  however, it will not be implemented for another 2 years, raising significant  concerns about what the department intends to do now to address  strategic planning shortfalls. Moreover, it is unclear whether this guidance  will include all the strategic elements from private sector communication  practices.
In addition to this guidance, the department is currently developing a  sample country-level communication plan and has asked 15 pilot posts to  develop specific plans for their host countries. These plans are intended to  better focus U.S. efforts to counter ideological support for terrorism,  according to State. Part of this process will include the development of a  key influencers analysis to help identify target audiences in each country.  State officials said that they expect to have plans for these countries by  fall or winter 2006.
section_title: Staffing Challenges and Security Concerns Limit U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities
paragraphs: Public diplomacy efforts in the field face several other challenges, many of  which are heightened in the Muslim world. Officials at posts we visited  said they lacked sufficient staff and time to conduct public diplomacy  tasks, and we found that many public diplomacy positions are filled by  officers without the requisite language skills. Furthermore, public  diplomacy officers struggle to balance security with public access and  outreach to local populations.
subsections: section_title: Insufficient Staff and Lack of Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Activities
paragraphs: While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an  increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy  officials stated that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the  capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State data, the  department had established 834 public diplomacy positions overseas in  2005, but 124, or roughly 15 percent, were vacant. Compounding this  challenge is the loss of public diplomacy officers to temporary duty in Iraq,  which, according to one State official, has drawn down field officers even  further. Staffing shortages may also limit the amount of training public  diplomacy officers receive. According to the U.S. Advisory Commission on  Public Diplomacy, “the need to fill a post quickly often prevents public  diplomacy officers from receiving their full training.”
In addition, public diplomacy officers at post are burdened with  administrative tasks and thus have less time to conduct public diplomacy  outreach activities than previously. One senior State official said that  administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and internal reporting,  compete with officers’ public diplomacy responsibilities. Another official  in Egypt told us that there was rarely enough time to strategize, plan, or  evaluate her programs. These statements echo comments we heard during  overseas fieldwork and in a survey for our 2003 report. Surveyed officers  told us that, while they manage to attend functions within their host  country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time to travel outside  the capitals to interact with other communities. This challenge is  compounded at posts with short tours of duty, which include many in the  Muslim world. According to data provided by State, the average tour  length at posts in the Muslim world is about 22 percent shorter than tour  lengths elsewhere. Noting the prevalence of one-year tours in the Muslim  world, a senior official at State told us that Public Affairs officers who  have shorter tours tend to produce less effective work than officers with  longer tours.
To address these challenges, we recommended in 2003 that the Secretary  of State designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs  sections to reduce the administrative burden. Officials at State said that  the Management bureau is currently considering options for reducing the  administrative burden on posts, including the development of centralized  administrative capabilities offshore. State is also repositioning several  public diplomacy officers as part of its transformational diplomacy  initiative; however, this represents a shift of existing public diplomacy  officers and does not increase the overall number of officers in the  department.
section_title: Language Deficiencies Pronounced, Especially in the Muslim World
paragraphs: In 2005, 24 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions  were filled by officers without the requisite language proficiency, similar  to our findings in 2003. At posts in the Muslim world, this shortfall is even  greater, with 30 percent of public diplomacy positions filled by officers  without sufficient language skills. This figure is primarily composed of  languages that are considered difficult to master, such as Arabic and  Persian, but also includes languages considered easier to learn, such as  French.
section_title: Embassies Must Balance Security and Public Outreach
paragraphs: Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public  access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between  safety and mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “Safety is one of our top  priorities… but it can’t be at the expense of the mission.” While posts  around the world have faced increased threats, security concerns are  particularly acute in countries with significant Muslim populations, where  the threat level for terrorism is rated as “critical” or “high” in 80 percent of  posts (see fig. 2).
Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly  accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and  Libraries. In Pakistan, for example, all of the American Centers have  closed for security reasons; the last facility, in Islamabad, closed in  February 2005. These same concerns have prevented the establishment of  a U.S. presence elsewhere. As a result, embassies have had to find other  venues for public diplomacy programs, and some activities have been  moved onto embassy compounds, where precautions designed to improve  security have had the ancillary effect of sending the message that the  United States is unapproachable and distrustful, according to State  officials. Concrete barriers and armed escorts contribute to this  perception, as do requirements restricting visitors’ use of cell phones and  pagers within the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan, visitors  to the embassy’s reference library have fallen to as few as one per day  because many visitors feel humiliated by the embassy’s rigorous security  procedures.
Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to  reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report  concluded that “security concerns often require a ‘low profile’ approach  during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier times,  would have been able to generate considerable good will for the United  States.” This constraint is particularly acute in Pakistan, where the  embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and exchange programs.
State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly  accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including American  Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United  States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees.  According to State data, there are currently approximately 300 American  Corners throughout the world, including more than 90 in the Muslim  world, with another 75 planned (more than 40 of which will be in the  Muslim world). However, two of the posts we visited in October 2005 were  having difficulty finding hosts for American Corners, as local institutions  fear becoming terrorist targets.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may  have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at  (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to  this statement include Diana Glod, Assistant Director; Michael ten Kate;  Robert Ball; and Joe Carney.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.