Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa
Published: 2010-09-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Somali pirates operating off the Horn of Africa have attacked more than 450 ships and taken nearly 2,400 hostages since 2007. A small number of U.S.-flagged vessels and ships have been among those affected. As Somalia lacks a functioning government and is unable to repress piracy in its waters, the National Security Council (NSC) developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration with international and industry partners. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and any challenges they face in doing so, and (2) have collaborated with partners in counterpiracy efforts. GAO examined counterpiracy plans, activities, collaborative practices, and data, and interviewed industry and international partners and officials at U.S. agencies and the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The U.S. government has made progress in implementing its Action Plan, in collaboration with international and industry partners, but pirates have adapted their tactics and expanded their area of operations, almost doubling the number of reported attacks from 2008 to 2009, and the U.S. government has yet to evaluate the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of its efforts or update its plan accordingly. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded prosecution arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles. Officials credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels in 2009. However, from 2007 to 2009, the most recent year for which complete data were available, the total number of hijackings reported to the International Maritime Bureau increased, ransoms paid by the shipping industry increased sharply, and attacks spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast Indian Ocean. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy as effectively as possible, but the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S. activities--such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting suspected pirates--nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks. GAO's prior work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to evaluate their activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been revised. Without a plan that reflects new developments and assesses the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. efforts, decision makers will lack information that could be used to target limited resources to provide the greatest benefit, commensurate with U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. government has collaborated with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but it has not implemented some key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among U.S. agencies. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has shared information with partners for military coordination. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable--in part because the Action Plan does not designate which agencies should lead or carry out 13 of the 14 tasks. For instance, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. The NSC, the President's principal arm for coordinating national security policy among government agencies, could bolster interagency collaboration and the U.S. contribution to counterpiracy efforts by clarifying agency roles and responsibilities and encouraging the agencies to develop joint guidance to implement their efforts.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the NSC reassess and update its Action Plan; identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and responsibilities. The NSC did not comment. The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury provided comments to clarify facts in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Piracy off the Horn of Africa has been growing in frequency and severity  over the past several years and threatens one of the world’s busiest  shipping lanes near key energy corridors and the route through the Suez  Canal. Since 2007, more than 450 ships have reported pirate attacks in this  area, and Somali pirates have taken nearly 2,400 hostages and received  over $100 million in ransom payments. Although only a few U.S.-flagged  vessels—notably the MV Maersk Alabama in April 2009—have been  attacked, pirates have attacked or attempted attacks on chemical and oil  tankers, freighters, cruise ships, fishing vessels, and even warships. In  addition to jeopardizing the lives and welfare of the citizens of many  nations, piracy contributes to regional instability and creates challenges  for shipping and freedom of navigation. With Somalia’s lack of a  functioning government, this illicit but profitable activity has raised  concerns that piracy ransom proceeds may undermine regional security  and contribute to other threats, including terrorism.
The international community has taken several steps to respond to the  growing piracy problem. The United Nations Security Council has adopted  several resolutions addressing an international response to piracy off the  Horn of Africa. In 2008, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty  Organization, the European Union, regional naval forces, and others began  patrolling waters near Somalia. In January 2009, a multinational naval task  force—Combined Task Force 151—was established under the U.S.-led  Combined Maritime Forces with a specific mission to conduct  counterpiracy operations. Additionally, in January 2009, a multilateral  Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group) was  formed pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 to  coordinate international counterpiracy efforts.
Recognizing that vibrant maritime commerce underpins global economic  security and is a vital national security issue, the United States has  developed policies and plans to collaborate with its international and  interagency partners to address piracy off the Horn of Africa and to  mobilize an interagency U.S. response. In December 2008, the National  Security Council (NSC) published the Countering Piracy off the Horn of  Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan). This plan  implements the National Strategy for Maritime Security (September  2005) and the Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal  Acts of Violence at Sea (June 2007) as applied to piracy off the Horn of  Africa. Consistent with the U.S. policy to continue to lead and support  international efforts to repress piracy and to urge other states to take  decisive action both individually and through international efforts, the  Action Plan seeks to involve all nations, international organizations,  industry, and other entities with an interest in maritime security to take  steps to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa. The interagency initiatives  of the Action Plan are to be coordinated and undertaken by the U.S.  Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State,  Transportation, and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence, subject to the availability of resources.
Over the last few years, we have completed a number of reviews that  examine issues related to piracy off the Horn of Africa. In December 2007,  we reported that the vast areas at risk for piracy off the Horn of Africa  combined with the small number of ships available for patrolling them  make protecting energy tankers and other commercial vessels difficult. In  February 2008, we reported that several challenges limit U.S. and  international stabilization, humanitarian, and development efforts in  Somalia and recommended that the United States develop a more detailed  strategy to address these challenges. In June 2008, we evaluated the  National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans and  determined that the implementation status of the eight supporting plans  varied. In September 2009, we reported on the Department of the  Treasury’s collaboration with interagency partners to safeguard the  financial system against illicit use and combat national security threats,  and recommended mechanisms to improve interagency collaboration.  Also in September 2009, we reported on the key actions agencies need to  take to enhance interagency collaboration on national security issues. A  list of our related GAO products is included at the end of this report.
Interested in U.S. efforts to respond to piracy, your offices asked us to  review the extent to which the U.S. government agencies: (1) have made  progress in implementing the Action Plan to counter piracy off the Horn  of Africa and any challenges they face; and (2) are collaborating with each  other, and with international and industry partners to counter piracy off  the Horn of Africa.
To assess U.S. government progress and challenges in implementing the  Action Plan for countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, we reviewed the  Action Plan, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other  Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, relevant U.S. laws, and United Nations  Security Council resolutions. We also reviewed program documents,  analyzed data on the incidents of piracy off the Horn of Africa for the years  2007 through June 2010, and interviewed officials from the Departments of  Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the  Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as well as  component agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),  Coast Guard, and National Maritime Intelligence Center to discuss  implementation of the Action Plan and collaboration with partners in  counterpiracy efforts. We selected these departments and agencies  because the Action Plan states they shall contribute to, coordinate, and  undertake initiatives in accordance with the plan. We also reviewed prior  GAO work related to results-oriented government and evaluated the extent  to which the interagency Counter-Piracy Steering Group followed select  key practices for achieving results. In addition, we met with international  and industry partners involved in developing best practices for protecting  ships from pirate attack, working with the international Contact Group,  and participating in naval patrols off the Horn of Africa. We discussed  data-collection methods, processes for data entry, and the steps taken to  ensure reasonable accuracy of the data with both the International  Maritime Bureau and the Combined Maritime Forces. We determined the  data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To identify the extent to which U.S. government agencies are collaborating  with each other, and with international and industry partners, we  evaluated the extent to which department and agency actions incorporate  key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration on complex  national security issues. In addition, we observed information sharing  forums; reviewed program documents; and interviewed agency,  international, and industry officials about collaboration efforts. We  conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology used in our  review are described in further detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the United Nations  Convention on the Law of the Sea share the same definition of piracy, and,  under that definition, piracy consists of any of several acts, including any  illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed  for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship and  directed against another ship, aircraft, persons, or property onboard  another ship on the high seas; or against a ship, persons or property in a  place outside the jurisdiction of any state. Additionally, according to both  conventions, all states have the duty to cooperate to the fullest extent  possible in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place  outside the jurisdiction of any state. Furthermore, both conventions  authorize states to seize pirate ships or a ship under the control of pirates  and arrest the persons and seize the property onboard, on the high seas or  in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. In addition, a single  piratical attack often affects the interests of numerous countries, including  the flag state of the vessel, various states of nationality of the seafarers  taken hostage, regional coastal states, owner states, and cargo owner,  transshipment, and destination states.
Somali pirates attack and harass vessels transiting the Indian Ocean and in  the Gulf of Aden, a natural chokepoint that provides access to the Red Sea  and the Suez Canal and through which over 33,000 ships transit each  year. Pirates operate from land-based enclaves along the 1,880-mile  coastline of Somalia, which is roughly equivalent to the distance from  Portland, Maine, to Miami, Florida. Figure 1 illustrates the vast area in  which incidents of piracy are occurring, 1,000 nautical miles from  Somalia's coast. Figure 1 also shows the location of the Internationally  Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden, where coalition  forces have established naval patrols to help ensure safe passage for  transiting vessels.
To conduct their attacks, Somali pirates generally use small skiffs,  carrying between four and eight persons armed with AK-47 rifles or similar  light arms and, at times, with rocket-propelled grenades. Once they target  a vessel, pirates typically coordinate a simultaneous two- or three-pronged  attack from multiple directions. Depending on the characteristics and  acquiescence of the victim vessel, pirates can board and commandeer a  vessel in less than 20 minutes. Pirate vessels usually are equipped with  grappling hooks, ladders, and other equipment to assist the boarding of a  larger craft. Pirate vessels vary in sea-worthiness and speed with some  able to travel at speeds between 25 and 30 knots and operate in high sea  conditions, while others have more restricted capabilities. According to  the Office of Naval Intelligence, Somali pirates do not typically target  specific vessels for any reason other than how easily the vessel can be  boarded. Pirates patrol an area and wait for a target of opportunity.  Vessels that travel through the high-risk area at a speed of less than 15  knots and have access points close to the waterline are at higher risk of  being boarded and hijacked.  According to a June 2010 self-protection  guide published by maritime industry organizations, there have been no  reports of pirates boarding ships proceeding at speeds over 18 knots.   Figure 2 shows U.S. authorities boarding a suspected pirate skiff.
Unlike pirates in other parts of the world, Somali pirates kidnap hostages  for ransom and, up to this point, have not tended to harm captives, steal  cargo, or reuse pirated ships for purposes other than temporarily as  mother ships. Mother ships are typically larger fishing vessels often  acquired or commandeered by acts of piracy that pirates use to store fuel  and supplies, and tow skiffs, which allow them to operate and launch  attacks further off shore. This “hostage-for-ransom” business model is  possible in part because the pirates have bases on land in ungoverned  Somalia where they can bring seized vessels, cargoes, and crews and have  access to food, water, weapons, ammunition, and other resources during  ransom negotiations. In an ungoverned state with widespread poverty, the  potential for high profits with low costs and relatively little risk of  consequences has ensured that Somali pirate groups do not lack for  recruits and support. Moreover, some U.S. and international officials  suspect that Somali businessmen and international support networks may  provide financing, supplies, and intelligence to pirate organizations in  exchange for shares of ransom payments.
In addition to posing a threat to the lives and welfare of seafarers, piracy  imposes a number of economic costs on shippers and on governments.  Costs to shippers include ransom payments, damage to ships and cargoes,  delays in delivering cargoes, increased maritime insurance rates, rerouting  vessels, and hardening merchant ships against attack. According to  officials at the Departments of State and Defense, governments incur costs  by conducting naval patrols, as well as the costs of transporting,  prosecuting, and incarcerating suspected and convicted pirates.
The United States’ National Strategy for Maritime Security, issued in  2005, declares that the United States has a vital national interest in  maritime security. The strategy recognizes that nations have a common  interest in facilitating the vibrant maritime commerce that underpins  economic security, and in protecting against ocean-related terrorist,  hostile, criminal, and dangerous acts, including piracy. The National  Strategy for Maritime Security also requires full and complete national  and international coordination, cooperation, and intelligence and  information sharing among public and private entities to protect and  secure the maritime domain. The 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy  and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea states that it is the policy of  the United States to “continue to lead and support international efforts to  repress piracy and urge other states to take decisive action both  individually and through international efforts.”
In December 2008, the NSC developed the Countering Piracy off the Horn  of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) to implement the  2005 strategy and the 2007 policy as applied to piracy off the Horn of  Africa. The Action Plan establishes three main lines of action for  interagency stakeholders to take to repress piracy in collaboration with  industry and international partners: (1) prevent pirate attacks by reducing  the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; (2) disrupt acts of  piracy consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities  of coastal and flag states; and (3) ensure that those who commit acts of  piracy are held accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution  of suspected pirates by flag, victim, and coastal states, and, in appropriate  cases, the United States. The NSC—including the Maritime Security  Interagency Policy Committee—develops policy for the U.S. response to  piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Action Plan directed the Secretary of  State and Secretary of Defense to establish a high-level interagency,  operational task force—the Counter-Piracy Steering Group—to  coordinate, implement, and monitor the actions centered in the Action  Plan. In addition, the NSC directed that the Departments of Defense,  Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury and  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence contribute to,  coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance with the Action Plan,  subject to available resources. Figure 3 shows the U.S. departments and  agencies involved in implementing the three lines of action contained in  the Action Plan.
The Department of State (State) is involved in efforts to prevent acts of  piracy and hold pirates accountable, primarily by leading U.S. interaction  with international partners working through the Contact Group, building  regional judicial capacity to prosecute suspected pirates, and encouraging  states to prosecute when their interests are involved. Additionally, State is  involved in efforts to disrupt acts of piracy by tracking ransom payments  and following financing issues related to piracy. Within Defense, U.S.  Naval Forces Central Command is involved in prevention, interdiction, and  prosecution efforts by contributing forces to the Combined Maritime  Forces, an international maritime coalition. Within the Combined Maritime  Forces, Combined Task Force 151 conducts counterpiracy operations in  international waters, including the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of  Oman, the Arabian Gulf and the waters off the Somali coast in the Indian  Ocean. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service supports and assists  interdiction and prosecution efforts by conducting incident investigations,  supervising detention of suspected pirates, assisting U.S. and international  prosecutions, debriefing released crews, and providing criminal  intelligence information. U.S. Africa Command assists in preventing piracy  through strategic communication efforts and building partner capacity in  regional states and would plan and, if authorized, conduct any land-based  military activities in Somalia to interrupt pirate operations. U.S. Africa  Command also conducts counterpiracy naval patrols and interdiction  efforts in its area of responsibility. Treasury is involved in disrupting  pirates’ revenue sources by examining pirate financial activity and  implementing an executive order to block the assets of certain persons.  Justice is involved in holding pirates accountable through prosecution as  well as judicial capacity-building in African states. The Coast Guard, under  Homeland Security, helps prevent piracy through its work with and  regulation of the U.S. shipping industry and assists in interrupting piracy  by providing law enforcement units and boarding teams on Navy vessels.  Transportation’s Maritime Administration assists with preventing piracy  by working with the shipping industry to develop best practices for the  industry to protect itself from piracy. In addition, within the intelligence  community, the Office of Naval Intelligence–as part of the National  Maritime Intelligence Center—provides maritime intelligence assistance.
The international community, shipping industry, and international military  forces also have been involved in taking steps to prevent and disrupt acts  of piracy off the Horn of Africa, and facilitate prosecutions of suspected  pirates. Over the past few years, the United Nations adopted a number of  United Nations Security Council resolutions related to countering piracy in  the Horn of Africa region, including resolutions 1816 which authorizes  states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia in coordination with the  Somali Transitional Federal Government, for the purpose of repressing  acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to use all necessary and  appropriate means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery within  Somali territorial waters. In January 2009, the Contact Group on Piracy  off the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group) formed under the auspices of  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851, and facilitates  discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to  suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. In addition, in February 2009  organizations representing the interests of ship owners, seafarers, and  marine insurance companies worked to publish the first version of  voluntary commercial vessel self-protection measures to avoid and  respond to pirate attacks, referred to as “best management practices.” In  May and September 2009, 10 countries signed the New York Declaration,  and committed to (1) promulgate the internationally recognized best  management practices for self-protection to vessels on their registry and  (2) ensure that vessels on their registry have adopted and documented  appropriate self-protection measures in their ship security plans when  carrying out their obligations under an existing international agreement.
The United States also has provided forces and leadership to the  Combined Maritime Forces, which is a coalition of 25 contributing nations  that are working to conduct maritime security operations in the region. In  January 2009, the Combined Maritime Forces established Combined Task  Force 151, a multinational naval task force with the sole mission of  conducting counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters  off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean. That role previously had been  filled by Combined Task Force 150, which continues to perform  counterterrorism and other maritime security operations as it has since  2001. There are 11 nations that have participated and several others that  have agreed to send ships or aircraft or both to participate in Combined  Task Force 151. In addition, the United States has contributed assets to the  North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s counterpiracy effort since its  inception. Its current effort, Operation Ocean Shield, focuses on at-sea  counterpiracy operations and offers assistance to regional countries in  developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities. Moreover, as  part of the Combined Maritime Forces, the United States also works with  the European Union, which conducts counterpiracy operations and  escorts World Food Programme vessels delivering humanitarian aid to  countries in the region, as well as independent deployers not part of the  coalition that escort vessels and patrol area waters.
Figure 4 shows many of the key international and industry partners  involved in the response to piracy off the Horn of Africa with whom the  United States collaborates and coordinates. More information on  international and shipping-industry partners is included in appendix III.
According to officials at State and Justice, the United States will consider  prosecuting suspected pirates in appropriate cases when U.S. interests are  directly affected, such as what occurred when suspected pirates attacked  the U.S.-flagged ships MV Maersk Alabama, USS Nicholas, and USS  Ashland. When suspected pirates are captured by U.S. forces and Justice  determines not to prosecute the case in the United States, the United  States works with the affected states and regional partners to find a  suitable venue for prosecution. In January 2006, 10 suspected pirates were  captured by U.S. forces after they hijacked the Indian-flagged dhow Safina  al Bisarat and used it to attack the Greek-owned and Bahamian-flagged  Delta Ranger. This was the first incident where U.S. forces captured  suspected pirates in the region and transferred them into the custody of  Kenya. As of July 2010, the United States had formalized two arrangements  with regional states—Kenya and the Seychelles—to facilitate the transfer  and prosecution of suspected pirates. The United Nations Office on  Drugs and Crime, the International Maritime Organization, and individual  governments have assisted in developing the judicial capacity of regional  states.
section_title: The United States Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Counterpiracy Plan, but Has Not Evaluated Its Efforts or Updated Its Plan
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have made progress implementing the NSC’s Countering  Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan)  to lead and support international efforts to counter piracy, but the effort  faces several implementation challenges. The United States has made the  most progress on working with partners to implement efforts to prevent  attacks, such as by encouraging the shipping industry to transit in areas  patrolled by international navies. However, the U.S. government has had  less success in other areas. For example, the United States has not  disrupted pirate bases on shore, and the international community has  made only limited progress to disrupt pirates’ revenue and prosecute  suspected pirates. While many stakeholders credit international, industry,  and U.S. government efforts with contributing to a decline in the  percentage of successful attacks that resulted in a vessel boarding or  hijacking, since 2007 pirates have increased their total number of attacks,  become more organized, and greatly expanded their area of operations.  Meanwhile, the Action Plan has not been updated to address these  changes since it was published in December 2008, and the U.S.  government has not evaluated the costs or effectiveness of its  counterpiracy efforts or reported on the results of the interagency effort.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Government Has Taken Steps to Implement Planned Efforts to Prevent, Disrupt, and Prosecute Pirate Attacks but Faces Challenges
paragraphs: In collaboration with their international and industry partners, U.S.  agencies have taken steps across the three lines of action established in  the Action Plan to: (1) prevent attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the  maritime domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in ways consistent with  international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag  states, and (3) ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held  accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected  pirates. The Action Plan establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as a  collaborative one, seeking to involve all countries and shipping-industry  partners with an interest in maritime security. For U.S. agencies, the  Action Plan states that, subject to available resources, the Departments of  Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the  Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will  contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance with the  Action Plan. The NSC also establishes some limits to the scope of the plan  by focusing on immediate measures to reduce the incidents of piracy,  rather than longer-term stabilization of Somalia that the Action Plan  asserts is needed to fully repress piracy.
Our review focused on the steps U.S. agencies have made to repress piracy  off the Horn of Africa, but given the international nature of the issue, our  analysis frequently refers to the related efforts of international and  industry partners. We found that, of the 14 total tasks established within  the three lines of action in the Action Plan, substantial progress has been  made in implementing 4 tasks, the majority of which are related to  preventing piracy. The United States has made some progress toward  implementing 8 other tasks, including all of the tasks involved in  facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates. Little or no progress has  been made with regard to 1 task that relates to disrupting acts of piracy,  and we did not assess 1 task because agencies decided it would duplicate  the efforts of international partners and should not be implemented.  Figure 5 summarizes the results of our assessment. For more detailed  information about U.S. agencies’ efforts to implement the Action Plan and  our analysis of their progress, see appendix II.
In collaboration with its international and industry partners, the U.S.  government has made substantial progress overall toward implementing  Action Plan tasks aimed at preventing acts of piracy. First, the United  States has been a key contributor among the 49 countries participating in  the Contact Group, including leading a working group on industry self- protection. Second, State, Defense, Coast Guard, and the Maritime  Administration, in collaboration with international and industry partners,  also have made substantial progress on the second task to encourage  commercial vessels to transit high-risk waters through the Maritime  Security Patrol Area, which includes the Internationally Recommended  Transit Corridor patrolled by international naval forces. Third, the U.S.  government has made substantial progress to ensure shippers update U.S.- flagged vessels’ ship security plans to address the pirate threat, and in  encouraging the crews of commercial vessels to use industry-developed  self-protection measures to prevent piracy, often referred to as “best  management practices.” These practices include adding physical barriers  to obstruct pirates from boarding a vessel and taking evasive maneuvers to  fend off attack.
Despite these and other actions to prevent attacks, U.S. government and  shipping industry officials stated that ensuring all vessels transiting the  area implement best management practices remains a challenge. The  Coast Guard has developed regulations mandating self-protection  measures, but these regulations only apply to U.S.-flagged vessels, which  comprise a small portion of the total shipping traffic transiting the region.  The shipping industry has developed a document outlining self-protection  measures, but implementation is voluntary. While government and  shipping industry officials lack data on the extent to which best  management practices are used, they estimate that about a quarter of the  vessels are not using one of the easiest and least costly of the best  practices, registering their passage with a naval coordination center in the  region, which raises questions about the extent of their implementation of  the other practices. Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and  shipping industry officials stated it may be challenging to find additional  ways to encourage the remaining vessels to self-protect from attack.
Regarding the Action Plan’s fourth task aimed at preventing piracy, we  determined that U.S. agencies have made some progress on strategic  communication, described in the Action Plan as a global information  campaign to highlight the destructive elements of piracy and the  international efforts to coordinate a response to the problem. While U.S.  agencies have taken steps in this area, State has yet to finalize a strategic  communication plan to coordinate interagency communications efforts to  counter piracy. Defense officials stated that the lack of a U.S. presence in  Somalia presents additional challenges to efforts to communicate with the  Somali population to discourage piracy and for measuring the  effectiveness of U.S. communication efforts.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Agency Efforts to Disrupt Acts of Piracy
paragraphs: While the United States and its international partners have made  substantial progress overall on the task of providing forces and assets  capable of interdicting pirates off the Horn of Africa and have made some  progress on the tasks related to seizing and destroying pirate vessels,  supporting regional arrangements to counter piracy, and disrupting pirate  revenue, U.S. agencies have made little or no progress toward  implementing the task related to disrupting and dismantling pirate bases.  We found that the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have made substantial  progress contributing assets and leadership to coalition forces patrolling  the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. According to Defense officials,  typically, more than 30 ships from coalition, European Union, North  Atlantic Treaty Organization, and independent forces patrol the region at  any given time, with the United States contributing between 4 and 5 ships  per day on average. In addition, consistent with the Action Plan, U.S.  forces have responded to and successfully interdicted pirate attacks. For  example, in April 2009, U.S. forces successfully terminated the hostage  situation that occurred when pirates attacked the U.S.-flagged MV Maersk  Alabama and kidnapped the vessel’s captain. U.S. forces intervened and  freed the captain after killing all but one of the pirates conducting the  attack.
However, as pirate activity has expanded to the larger Indian Ocean, U.S.  and international military officials stated that providing an interdiction  capable force similar to that provided in the Gulf of Aden is not feasible.  Though coalition forces developed guidance for improving coordination of  forces in the Indian Ocean, Defense officials emphasized that there are not  enough naval vessels among all of the combined navies in the world to  adequately patrol this expansive area for pirates. Moreover, Defense  officials acknowledged that there are other competing U.S. national  interests in the region, such as the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as  well as counterterrorism missions that require the use of the limited naval  and air assets that are used to monitor and gather intelligence for  counterpiracy operations.
In addition, the U.S. government has made some progress to seize and  destroy pirate vessels and equipment, and deliver suspected pirates for  prosecution. For example, U.S. forces have contributed to coalition forces  that confiscated or destroyed almost 100 pirate vessels. However, U.S.  forces have encountered more difficulty in delivering captured suspected  pirates to states willing and able to ensure they are considered for  prosecution. From August 2008 to June 2010, international forces  subsequently released 638 of 1,129 suspected pirates, almost 57 percent of  those captured, in part because of the difficulty finding countries that  were willing or able to prosecute them. Further, the United States has  made some progress on the task to disrupt pirate revenue. In April 2010,  President Obama signed an executive order that blocks assets of certain  persons, including two suspected pirates, who have engaged in acts that  threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia. However,  according to officials at Treasury, the department charged with  implementation, the executive order applies only to assets subject to U.S.  jurisdiction, and U.S. efforts to track and block pirates’ finances in  Somalia are hampered by the lack of government and formal banking  institutions there and resulting gaps in intelligence.
The U.S. government has made some progress on the task to support  “shiprider” programs and other agreements. The United States has  supported some bilateral and regional counterpiracy arrangements, most  notably the International Maritime Organization’s effort to conclude a  regional arrangement, generally referred to as the Djibouti Code of  Conduct. This arrangement contains provisions related to information  sharing regarding pirate activity among the signatories, reviews of national  legislation related to piracy, and provision of assistance between  signatories. However, U.S. agencies have made little progress on the  second part of this task to develop shiprider programs, in which regional  law enforcement officials accompany naval patrols to collect evidence to  support successful prosecutions. Justice officials explained that the  potential benefits do not warrant the resource investment the programs  would require. Specifically, the presence of shipriders would not  significantly enhance the ability of regional countries to prosecute  suspected pirates.
State and Defense officials report that no steps have been made to disrupt  and dismantle pirate bases ashore in part because the President has not  authorized this action, the United States has other interests in the region  that compete for resources, and long-standing concerns about security  hinder the presence of U.S. military and government officials in Somalia.  While the United States has not supported the creation of a Counter-Piracy  Coordination Center, as called for in the Action Plan, we did not provide a  progress assessment for this task since government and industry officials  have stated that existing organizations and coordination centers  currently fulfill the incident reporting and monitoring functions, and that  establishing a new center would duplicate those efforts.
section_title: U.S. Agency Efforts to Facilitate Prosecution of Suspected Pirates
paragraphs: While the United States has made some progress on implementing the  tasks established in the Action Plan to hold pirates accountable, the  United States and its international partners have only prosecuted a small  number of pirates overall for a variety of reasons. As of July 2010, Kenya  and the Seychelles were the only regional partners that accepted transfers  of suspected pirates from U.S. forces for purposes of prosecution.  According to officials from State, the reluctance of affected states to  prosecute and limited judicial capacity in the region are barriers to the  ability of the U.S. government to make substantial progress on the task of  concluding prosecution arrangements. Officials also noted that the facts  and circumstances of each encounter differ, with not all cases eliciting  evidence that could be brought to court. As already described, these  factors contributed to the release of almost 57 percent of the suspected  Somali pirates that international forces encountered from August 2008 to  June 2010. The United States has made some progress on the task to  support and encourage the exercise of jurisdiction under the Convention  for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime  Navigation as a framework to prosecute suspected pirates. For example,  the United States has used the convention while prosecuting one pirate in  the United States. The U.S. government has also supported and  encouraged the use of other applicable conventions and laws by  exercising jurisdiction over 11 suspected pirates who attempted an attack  on U.S. warships. However, Defense, State, and Justice officials reported  that the United States and its international partners have faced significant  challenges in encouraging countries to prosecute pirates, due to a lack of  political will or judicial capacity, such as an inadequate number of  attorneys to prosecute the cases. Lastly, on the task to enhance the  capabilities of regional states to accept suspected pirates for prosecution,  the U.S. government has provided assistance to several regional states,  and the United States has contributed to international efforts to build  regional judicial capacity. For example, according to State officials, the  United States has worked with the government of Tanzania to allow  pirates to be prosecuted there even when cases lack a domestic  connection. However, regional states continue to have a limited capacity  to prosecute suspected pirates and incarcerate convicted pirates.
section_title: Pirates Have Increased the Number of Attacks, Expanded Their Area of Operations, and Become More Organized
paragraphs: While many stakeholders anecdotally credit international, industry, and  U.S. government efforts with preventing and disrupting piracy off the Horn  of Africa, from 2007 through the first half of 2010 piracy has evolved in  many ways—pirates increased their attacks, claimed more hostages and  revenue from shipping industry’s ransom payments, expanded their area  of operations, and became more organized. As figure 6 illustrates, the total  number of reported pirate attacks increased from 30 in 2007 to 218 in 2009.  These reported attacks include four attempts on U.S.-flagged vessels in  2009, one of which was successful—the attack on the MV Maersk  Alabama.
However, the rate of successful attacks, or the proportion of total reported  attacks that resulted in vessel boardings or hijackings, decreased from  around 40 percent in 2008 to 22 percent in 2009. U.S. and international  officials interpret this as a sign that the efforts of the shipping industry,  governments, and the international naval patrols to prevent or disrupt  attacks are having a positive effect on the situation. In addition, in the first  6 months of 2010, reports of total attacks declined to about 100 attacks, as  compared with 149 attacks during the first half of 2009. However, other  data show that piracy remains a persistent problem. For example, as figure  7 shows, the number of hostages of various nationalities captured by  Somali pirates from 2007 to 2009 more than quintupled. The total number  of hostages includes 21 hostages from the U.S.-flagged MV Maersk  Alabama in 2009. Furthermore, in the first half of 2010, pirates took 529  hostages compared to 510 in the first half of 2009.
In addition, pirates have expanded their area of operations with an  increasing number of attacks occurring in the Indian Ocean, an area much  larger to patrol than the Gulf of Aden. By the end of 2008, when the NSC  issued its Action Plan, approximately 83 percent of the 111 reported pirate  attacks off the Horn of Africa that year took place in the Gulf of Aden, an  area just over 100,000 square miles, with the remainder off the coast of  Somalia. However, just a year later in 2009, only 53 percent of the 218 total  attacks occurred in the Gulf of Aden as Somali pirates expanded their area  of operations to the broader Indian Ocean. Pirates now threaten an area of  nearly 2 million square nautical miles in the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden,  and Northern Arabian Sea. Figure 8 shows the number and location of  pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa reported to the International Maritime  Bureau in 2007, 2008, 2009, and the first half of 2010.
While the Action Plan cites attacks as far as 450 miles from Somalia’s  coast, in April 2010 the International Maritime Bureau reported that  pirates had increased their capability to attack and hijack vessels to more  than 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia using mother ships, from which  they launch smaller boats to conduct the attacks. International officials  stated that piracy in the Indian Ocean is more challenging due to the great  expanse of water, and requires a different approach than that used in the  Gulf of Aden. One U.S. Navy analysis estimated that 1,000 ships equipped  with helicopters would be required to provide the same level of coverage  in the Indian Ocean that is currently provided in the Gulf of Aden—an  approach that is clearly infeasible.
Although U.S. and international officials have expressed concern that  international support networks may be providing pirate groups with  financing, supplies, and intelligence in return for shares of ransom  payments, as of March 2010 the intelligence community assessed that  Somali pirates are not receiving funding or coordination from non-U.S.  foreign sources outside Somalia, aside from ransom payments. Defense  supports FBI and Treasury efforts to monitor whether there is U.S.-based  support for piracy. Figure 9 shows that from 2007 to 2009 the estimated  amount of total ransom payments paid to pirates by the shipping industry  increased from about $3 million to $74 million, with the average amount of  ransoms paid per vessel increasing from $300,000 to more than $2  million.
A December 2008 United Nations report revealed characteristics of  structural organization in piracy operations, including evidence of pirate  leaders and financiers who supply the equipment and provisions for other  pirates to carry out the attacks, and that ransom payments are distributed  according to organizational roles. In addition, State, Defense, and FBI  officials observed that piracy off the Horn of Africa has become more  organized, and Defense officials said that gathering more information  about pirate organizations that could be used to identify pirate leaders  would be beneficial. FBI officials noted that pirate organizations lack the  sophistication associated with other types of organized crime, such as the  American mafia. These officials stated that the FBI continues to  investigate potential ties Somali pirates may have to individuals outside of  Somalia. Moreover, U.S. officials have expressed repeated concerns that  funds generated by piracy have the potential to attract extremists or  terrorists located in the region to become involved in piracy. Treasury,  Justice, State, and Defense are monitoring piracy on an ongoing basis to  determine if there is a link between pirates and extremist organizations,  but as of July 2010 had found no credible link.
section_title: The U.S. Government Has Not Evaluated the Costs, Benefits, or Effectiveness of Its Counterpiracy Efforts, Reported Results, or Updated Its Action Plan Accordingly
paragraphs: The Action Plan’s objective is to repress piracy in the interest of the global  economy, among other things, but the effectiveness of U.S. resources  applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency group  responsible for monitoring the Action Plan’s implementation was not  specifically charged with tracking the cost of U.S. activities or  systematically evaluating the relative benefits or effectiveness of the  Action Plan’s tasks and neither the interagency steering group nor the  federal agencies involved have performed these tasks. Our prior work has  shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to  evaluate activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, as pirates  have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been revised.
The U.S. government is not systematically tracking the costs or the  benefits and effectiveness of its counterpiracy activities to determine  whether its investment has achieved the desired results or should be  revised. According to officials at State and Defense, the interagency  Counter-Piracy Steering Group, which is jointly led by these two agencies  and charged with monitoring implementation of the Action Plan, has not  been systematically monitoring the cost or evaluating the benefits or  effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy efforts. In commenting on a draft of  this report, Defense stated that the interagency group was not performing  these functions because it was not specifically charged to do so in the  Action Plan. Instead, State officials told us the group primarily provides a  forum for U.S. agencies to coordinate efforts before multilateral Contact  Group meetings or discuss ongoing initiatives such as the development of  the April 2010 executive order on Somalia. Officials from Justice,  Treasury, Coast Guard, and State reported that the NSC’s Maritime  Security Interagency Policy Committee, a high-level interagency group that  is focused on maritime issues, generally tracks U.S. progress toward  implementing the Action Plan and discusses status updates on piracy  provided from the various agencies. However, the officials were not aware  of systematic efforts to track the costs, or evaluate the benefits or  effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities. Table 1 describes selected  costs we identified that may be incurred by U.S. agencies for  counterpiracy efforts.
While most of the agencies involved had not systematically tracked the  cost of their counterpiracy efforts, Defense developed a partial estimate.  Defense officials estimated that U.S. Central Command’s counterpiracy  operations for fiscal year 2009 totaled approximately $64 million for costs  associated with 773 U.S. Navy ship steaming days, flight hours to support  ships operating in the area, port costs, and those related to detaining and  delivering suspected pirates to proper authorities. However, officials said  this estimate does not include estimates for costs incurred for  counterpiracy operations by other combatant commands such as U.S.  Africa Command. In addition, Defense officials noted the deployment of  naval forces in support of the counterpiracy operations takes the ships,  crew, aircraft, intelligence assets, and other forces away from other global  missions such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts.
In addition to not tracking the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts, U.S.  agencies also are not evaluating the benefits of U.S. counterpiracy efforts  to U.S. interests. While the Action Plan discusses the United States’  national security interest in maintaining freedom of navigation of the seas  in order to facilitate vibrant maritime commerce, the extent to which  counterpiracy benefits U.S. interests and maritime commerce has not been  evaluated. The Maritime Administration reports that piracy may pose costs  to the maritime industry for protecting vessels from being attacked or  hijacked. For example, industry may incur costs for rerouting ships to  avoid pirate-infested waters, higher insurance premiums, or enhancing  vessel security by hiring private security guards or installing nonlethal  deterrent equipment. Ultimately, according to the Maritime  Administration, any costs incurred would be passed along to the taxpayer  and the consumer. However, agencies are not systematically evaluating  the extent to which the U.S. investment in counterpiracy operations is  benefiting maritime commerce or weighing these benefits against the costs  incurred to conduct counterpiracy operations. In addition, data show that  the number of U.S. ships operating in the region is low. The Coast Guard  reports that, at any given time, there are about six to eight U.S.-flagged  vessels operating in the region and the chance of a commercial vessel  being attacked by pirates in the Gulf of Aden is estimated to be less than 1  percent. Furthermore, according to the Maritime Administration, vessels  carrying commerce to the United States are less susceptible to piracy  given their high speed. Moreover, in 2009, the Congressional Research  Service reported that despite the increased threats and estimates of rising  costs associated with piracy off the Horn of Africa, the effect on the  insurance industry appeared negligible and U.S. insurance rates had not  changed.
The Action Plan also establishes objectives related to repressing piracy  and reducing incidents of piracy, but it does not define measures of  effectiveness that can be used to evaluate progress toward reaching those  objectives, or assess the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action  Plan’s tasks to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute acts of piracy. Further, the  Action Plan does not specify what information the NSC or other  designated interagency groups should use to monitor or evaluate to  determine progress, or assess benefits or effectiveness. Agency officials  have cited several challenges associated with measuring the effectiveness  of U.S. efforts, including the complexity of the piracy problem, difficulty in  establishing a desired end-state for counterpiracy efforts, and difficulty in  distinguishing the effect of U.S. efforts from those of its international and  industry partners. Nevertheless, U.S., international, and industry officials  we spoke with attributed the decrease in the pirates’ rate of successful  attacks in 2009 and shift to the Indian Ocean to U.S. and international  prevention and interdiction efforts. We previously have reported that  performance information is essential to the ability of decision makers to  make informed decisions, and that specifying performance metrics can be  one tool in evaluating the effectiveness of government efforts in a  changing environment. Identifying measures of effectiveness and  systematically evaluating the effectiveness of agency efforts could assist  the U.S. government in determining the costs and benefits of their  activities to ensure that resources devoted to counterpiracy efforts are  being targeted most effectively, and whether adjustments to plans are  required.
Without information on the magnitude of U.S. resources devoted to  counterpiracy operations, or the benefits or effectiveness of its actions,  the U.S. government is limited in its ability to weigh its investment of  resources to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa against its other  interests in the region. The lack of systematic evaluation of costs, benefits,  and effectiveness also makes it difficult for agencies to target and  prioritize their activities to achieve the greatest benefits. We have  previously reported that agencies should identify the human, information  technology, physical, and financial resources needed to initiate or sustain  a joint effort among multiple agencies, as one means of enhancing  interagency collaboration. In addition, a discussion of resources,  investments, and risk management is an important characteristic of  national strategies that can enhance their usefulness to resource and  policy decision makers and resource managers.
Moreover, despite the expansion of pirate attacks over a vastly larger  geographic area, increased ransom demands and payments, and better  organized pirate activities since the Action Plan was written, according to  U.S. government officials, there are no plans to reassess the Action Plan in  order to determine whether it should be revised. Currently, the Action  Plan does not specifically address how to counter pirates in the broader  Indian Ocean or what methods to use to meet its objective of  apprehending leaders of pirate organizations and their financiers. U.S.  agencies have reported taking some steps to respond to the changing  methods and location of pirate attacks. For example, the Navy issues  weekly updates on piracy incidents to inform mariners and naval forces,  which in 2010 have cautioned that pirates are operating at considerable  distances off the coast of Somalia. Defense officials also have worked with  coalition partners to develop a coordination guide for operations in the  Somali Basin and have described measures they have taken to interdict  and destroy pirate mother ships. However, according to Coast Guard,  Treasury, and Justice officials, as of April 2010, the Maritime Security  Interagency Policy Committee affirmed the overall course of U.S.  counterpiracy efforts and did not identify a need to modify the current  approach to countering piracy. Furthermore, the Action Plan contains  tasks such as those to create a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center and  support shiprider programs that are no longer being pursued by U.S.  agencies because they have determined that these tasks are not needed or  would not be beneficial. We have established in prior work that federal  efforts are implemented in dynamic environments in which needs must be  constantly reassessed, and that agencies can enhance and sustain  collaborative efforts by, among other things, developing mechanisms to  report on results. By continually evaluating its approach to countering  piracy off the Horn of Africa and reporting on results of its counterpiracy  efforts to key stakeholders, the United States may be in a better position to  hold agencies accountable for results and achieve its ultimate goal of  repressing piracy.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Worked Collaboratively with Partners but Could Take Key Steps to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration in Counterpiracy Efforts
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and  industry partners to counter piracy, but they could implement other key  collaborative practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among  U.S. interagency partners. According to U.S., international, and industry  stakeholders, U.S. agencies have collaborated effectively with  international and industry partners through mechanisms and organizations  to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa. The United States also has  collaborated well with international military partners and industry groups.  Within the U.S. government, while agencies have implemented some  collaborative practices, other practices could be implemented to further  enhance collaboration. The U.S. government has not made substantial  progress on those Action Plan tasks that involve multiple agencies and  those in which the NSC has not clearly identified roles and responsibilities  or coordinated with U.S. agencies to develop joint guidance.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Collaborated Effectively with International and Industry Partners
paragraphs: U.S. agencies, primarily State and Defense, have collaborated with  international partners through two new organizations established to  counter piracy off the Horn of Africa: the Contact Group on Piracy off the  Coast of Somalia (Contact Group) and the Shared Awareness and  Deconfliction meetings. As previously discussed, the Action Plan directed  U.S. agencies to establish and maintain a Contact Group, which serves as  an international forum for countries contributing to the counterpiracy  effort to share information. State orchestrates U.S. participation in the  Contact Group, coordinating with officials from Defense, Justice,  Homeland Security, Transportation, and Treasury. As part of the Contact  Group, the United States has participated in six plenary meetings with  international partners in counter piracy efforts since January 2009. These  meetings have facilitated international military coordination, provided  guidance to international efforts, and established a trust fund to support  counterpiracy efforts. As part of the Contact Group’s efforts, the Coast  Guard and the Maritime Administration cochair a working group focusing  on coordinating with the shipping industry, which has reviewed and  updated best management practices for industry self-protection,  encouraged continued communication between industry and government  organizations such as the Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa, and is  developing guidance for seafarer training regarding pirate attacks. In  addition, officials told us that State has participated in the working group  on strategic communication and assisted in developing draft strategic  communication documents considered by the group.
The United States also has worked to establish collaborative  organizations, share information, and develop joint guidance for  international military partners working to counter piracy. As the leader of  the Combined Maritime Forces, in 2008 the U.S. Navy, along with other  international partners, established the Shared Awareness and  Deconfliction meetings that are intended to provide a mechanism for  militaries active in the region to share information on their movements  and make efficient use of the limited naval assets patrolling pirate-infested  waters. We observed one of these meetings that occur every 4 to 6 weeks  with representatives from the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty  Organization, and the shipping industry, as well as with nontraditional  partners from countries such as Russia and China. According to U.S. and  international officials, these meetings have improved coordination and led  to the creation of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor  within the Maritime Security Patrol Area as well as coordination guides for  military operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. The  coordination guides provide joint guidance to participating international  forces intended to ensure the most effective use of the military assets in  the region by outlining shared practices and procedures.
The United States has also worked to support information sharing efforts  on investigative and prosecutorial techniques. In July, 2010, the Naval  Criminal Investigative Service hosted a workshop on counterpiracy  investigations that was attended by over 50 representatives from the  United States, international military, law enforcement, and industry  organizations. According to Defense officials, this workshop facilitated  development of a draft investigators manual designed to help standardize  counterpiracy operations.
U.S. agencies, primarily the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration,  have worked with industry partners to facilitate collaborative forums,  share information, and develop joint guidance for implementing  counterpiracy efforts. Industry partners play an important role in  preventing and deterring pirate attacks since they are responsible for  implementing self -protection measures on commercial vessels. According  to officials, in late 2008 the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration  encouraged industry groups to develop best practices for industry to  counter piracy and hosted several meetings with U.S. and international  industry groups. According to U.S. and shipping industry officials, these  meetings resulted in the industry-published best management practices  guide. This document has provided critical guidance to ship owners and  operators on how to protect themselves from pirate attacks. In addition,  for those ship owners who choose or are required to carry armed security  teams, the Coast Guard and State have worked to identify viable methods  for doing so in accordance with applicable U.S., international, and port- state laws. The Coast Guard has communicated methods for taking arms  on ships and the responses from international partners to the shipping  industry through two port security advisories. As the U.S. agency  responsible for implementing national and international maritime security  regulations on U.S.-flagged vessels, the Coast Guard also has hosted four  collaborative forums with industry partners to address piracy issues since  April 2009. These meetings have provided a forum to discuss changes  required to ship security plans to address the piracy threat, the evolving  piracy situation, and U.S. efforts to assist in protecting U.S.-flagged  vessels. For example, the Coast Guard facilitated a meeting with industry  representatives and officials from State and Treasury in April 2010 to  discuss the executive order on Somalia, which has implications for the  shipping industry’s ability to pay ransoms to secure the release of captive  crews. Further, the Maritime Administration developed training courses to  inform vessel crews about how to help prevent piracy and steps to take if  taken hostage.
In addition, the Maritime Administration and the Military Sealift Command  have created a new collaborative mechanism for working with industry in  the form of Anti-Piracy Assistance Teams. When requested by the owner of  a U.S.-flagged vessel, a team consisting of the Maritime Administration and  the Naval Criminal Investigative Service personnel will assess a ship’s  security and offer advice on ways to improve. When the teams visit a  vessel, Maritime Administration officials meet with company officials to  discuss their security efforts and document these efforts so they can be  shared with other ship operators. Lastly, U.S. Central Command has used  the Maritime Liaison Office based in Bahrain as an additional mechanism  to exchange information between naval forces and industry. This office  serves as a conduit for information focused on safety of shipping and  conducts outreach with the shipping industry, such as through newsletters  to encourage the use of self-protection measures.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Implemented Some Collaborative Practices but Could Enhance Efforts by Incorporating Others
paragraphs: U.S. government agencies have implemented some collaborative practices  in working with interagency partners to counter piracy but could enhance  efforts where less progress has been made by incorporating other key  practices. Several key practices than can enhance interagency  collaboration include developing an overarching strategy, establishing  collaborative mechanisms to share information with partners, assigning  roles and responsibilities, and developing joint guidance to implement  interagency efforts. Consistent with key practices, the NSC established its  Action Plan, which serves an overarching strategy to guide U.S.  interagency efforts and provides a framework for interagency  collaboration. The Action Plan creates an interagency task force that is  intended to coordinate, implement, and monitor the actions contained in  the plan.
In addition, the U.S. departments and multiple component agencies  involved in counterpiracy efforts have also implemented another key  practice—using collaborative organizations to share information.  Collaborative organizations that provide adequate coordination  mechanisms to facilitate interagency collaboration and achieve an  integrated approach are particularly important when differences exist  between agencies that can impede collaboration and progress toward  shared goals by potentially wasting scarce resources and limiting  effectiveness. Within the NSC, which includes committees with agency  secretaries, deputy secretaries, and assistant secretaries, are existing  forums for discussing and coordinating interagency efforts that officials  have reported discuss counterpiracy efforts. Additionally, as called for in  the Action Plan, State and Defense established the Counter-Piracy  Steering Group, which includes representatives from the U.S. departments  and component agencies involved in counterpiracy efforts.
Furthermore, in certain circumstances, such as a pirate attack on a U.S.- flagged vessel, the U.S. government uses the existing Maritime Operational  Threat Response process to facilitate a discussion among U.S. agencies  and decide on courses of action, which is outlined in an October 2006 plan  that is part of the National Strategy for Maritime Security. For example,  when the MV Maersk Alabama was attacked in April 2009, facilitators  utilized established protocols to activate the process and bring together  the appropriate government officials. Figure 10 shows U.S. authorities  responding to the MV Maersk Alabama incident in 2009. According to U.S.  and Maersk officials involved, over the course of several meetings—some  of which included Maersk representatives—U.S. officials decided on  actions to take in response to the attack, resulting in the release of a U.S.  merchant marine captain that had been taken hostage by pirates. U.S. and  Maersk officials considered the outcome of the Alabama incident to be a  success. Officials from Defense, State, Coast Guard, the Maritime  Administration, and Justice have reported that this process has been an  effective tool in responding to this and other piracy incidents. In addition,  the Coast Guard established a new collaboration mechanism—a weekly  interagency conference call—to coordinate operational efforts among the  agency partners working to counter piracy, which we observed during this  review.
Although the NSC and U.S. agencies have taken these collaborative steps,  the NSC could incorporate two other key practices—assigning roles and  responsibilities and developing joint implementation guidance—to further  enhance interagency collaboration in counterpiracy efforts. As of July  2010, the NSC had only assigned roles and responsibilities for  implementing 1 of the 14 Action Plan tasks. The Action Plan recognizes  that, consistent with other U.S. mission requirements, the U.S. Navy and  the Coast Guard provide persistent interdiction through their presence and  can conduct maritime counterpiracy operations. In addition, the Action  Plan states that those forces shall coordinate counterpiracy activities with  other forces operating in the region to the extent practicable and sets out a  number of specific actions to be taken in various piracy situations.  Although the Action Plan states that the Departments of Defense,  Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury, and  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall contribute to,  coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance with the Action Plan,  the NSC did not clearly identify roles and responsibilities for specific  agencies that will ensure the implementation of the other 13 tasks in the  Action Plan. Establishing roles and responsibilities can help agencies  clarify which agencies will lead or participate in activities, help organize  their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making.
Agencies could enhance collaboration by developing joint guidance to  implement and coordinate actions on several Action Plan tasks. Joint  guidance helps ensure that agencies involved in collaborative efforts work  together efficiently and effectively by establishing policies, procedures,  information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate across  agency boundaries. Effective joint guidance also addresses how agency  activities and resources will be aligned to achieve goals.
section_title: Implementing Key Practices Could Enhance Efforts Involving Multiple Agencies Where Less Progress Has Been Made
paragraphs: In the absence of clearly identified roles and responsibilities and joint  implementation strategies, agencies involved in countering piracy have  made comparatively more progress in implementing those Action Plan  tasks that fall firmly within one agency’s area of expertise, such as those to  establish a Contact Group, update ship security plans, and provide an  interdiction-capable presence, than they have on those tasks for which  multiple agencies may be involved. For example, State, which has the  authority and capability to work with international partners in establishing  the Contact Group, has made substantial progress toward implementing  that task. Furthermore, the Action Plan calls for commercial vessels to  review and update their ship security plans in order to prevent and deter  pirate attacks. Officials explained that because the Coast Guard has  responsibility for enforcing U.S.-regulated commercial-vessel compliance  with maritime security requirements, the agency took the lead on  implementing this task and has made substantial progress. Similarly,  Defense has primary responsibility for providing a persistent interdiction- capable presence in the region and has made substantial progress as lead  on that task.
In contrast, there are several tasks in the Action Plan for which multiple  agencies have relevant authorities, capabilities, or interests, and on which  less progress has been made. The NSC did not identify roles and  responsibilities for implementing these tasks and officials have  acknowledged that the agencies have not developed joint guidance to  ensure their efforts work together efficiently and effectively. For example,  the NSC included efforts related to developing a strategic communications  strategy, disrupting pirate revenue, and holding pirates accountable as  essential to implementing the Action Plan.
Strategic communication: The Action Plan calls for the United States  to lead and support a global public information and diplomatic  campaign to highlight, among other things, the international  cooperation undertaken to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa, as  well as piracy’s destructive effects on trade, human and maritime  security, and the rule of law. In addition, according to the Action Plan,  any strategic communication strategy must also convey concerns  about the risks associated with paying ransoms demands. Multiple  agencies are involved in communicating with various audiences about  piracy. State communicates with international partners about  international cooperation; Defense communicates with military  partners about international military cooperation and with African  audiences to discourage piracy; the Naval Criminal Investigative  Service communicates with U.S. and international law enforcement  partners about law enforcement, investigative, and analytical  cooperation; and the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration  communicate with the shipping industry about self-protection  measures and ransom concerns. However, there is no governmentwide  strategic communication plan in place to guide agency efforts,  optimize effects, and enhance the achievement of goals. According to  State officials, State has drafted a governmentwide counterpiracy  strategic communication plan for interagency review but as of July  2010, the department was still awaiting comments from interagency  partners and did not have an estimated date for when the plan would  be finalized, though Treasury officials had provided comments.  Meanwhile agencies have taken varying approaches to strategic  communication. Defense has developed a classified plan for its  activities, and according to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard  suspended its effort to develop a plan upon learning that State was  drafting a governmentwide plan. As a result, U.S. agencies have not  implemented all the strategic communication efforts called for by the  Action Plan, and it is not clear that the agencies’ efforts are  coordinated or as effective as possible in communicating the intended  messages about piracy.
Disrupting pirate revenue: According to the Action Plan, the goal for  disrupting pirate revenue is to trace ransom payments and apprehend  leaders of pirate organizations and their enablers. Multiple agencies  are involved in collecting information on pirate finances. Justice  collects information on financial assets entering the United States  related to piracy. According to officials, Treasury examines financial  activities and reviews intelligence, law enforcement, and publicly  available information, to map illicit financial networks and to  determine appropriate action, including potential designation of an  individual or entity pursuant to the April 2010 executive order on  Somalia. State officials described their work with international  partners to gather information on illicit financial networks, while  Defense officials told us they collect intelligence on pirate financial  activities by questioning captured pirate suspects. However, the NSC  did not clearly identify any agency with specific responsibility for  disrupting pirate revenue. As a result, officials at Justice, State, and  Defense agree that information their agencies gather on pirate finances  is not being systematically analyzed, and it is unclear if any agency is  using it to identify and apprehend pirate leaders or financiers. In  addition, though Justice, State, and Defense officials reported that  Somali piracy exhibits characteristics of international organized crime,  currently pirate attacks prosecuted by the United States are not  investigated by the FBI’s Organized Crime Section but instead by the  Violent Crimes Section. In the absence of clearly identified roles and  responsibilities, and with competing priorities, officials indicated  agencies have not taken initiative to develop joint guidance to ensure  these disparate efforts work together efficiently and effectively.  Similarly, officials acknowledged there is no supporting plan or joint  guidance to direct U.S. interagency efforts to collect and analyze  criminal intelligence on pirates. However, State is in the process of  creating a Counter-piracy Finance Working Group intended to  facilitate closer interagency coordination of efforts to combat the  financial flows and support networks of piracy off Somalia. According  to Justice officials, as of July 2010, the United States has not  apprehended or prosecuted the leaders of any pirate organizations or  their enablers as called for in the Action Plan.
Facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates: The Action Plan  contains several tasks related to facilitating the prosecution of  suspected pirates by parties with an interest in prosecution, but it does  not identify clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies needed to  ensure implementation of these tasks. In some cases, U.S. officials said  roles are apparent where an agency’s mission aligns with the Action  Plan’s tasks, such as State’s diplomatic work with regional partners to  conclude prosecution arrangements. However, a lack of defined roles  and joint guidance to implement U.S. efforts to facilitate prosecutions  poses challenges for prosecuting suspected pirates when each  agency’s role is less clear. For example, absent defined roles and  responsibilities and interagency guidance, U.S. officials explained that  they had to dedicate time during a high-level interagency meeting of  the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee to arrange details,  including cost sharing, for the transportation of suspects after the  spring 2010 pirate attacks on the USS Ashland and USS Nicholas. State  officials told us that prior to these attacks the U.S. government had  limited experience being involved with the prosecution of Somali  pirates and had not established the necessary interagency procedures  for transferring suspects and sharing costs among the agencies  involved.
By enhancing interagency collaboration, the NSC can reduce the risk of  leaving gaps in its counterpiracy efforts or the risk that agency efforts may  overlap, which could waste resources that could be applied to combat  other threats to national security, such as terrorism. Clarifying roles and  responsibilities and developing joint implementing guidance could also  help agency officials—who must balance their time and resources among  many competing priorities—more fully and effectively carry out their roles  in helping to repress piracy and avoid duplication of effort.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given that the President identified piracy as a threat to U.S. national  security interests and that it is a complex problem that affects a variety of  stakeholders, the U.S. government has taken a collaborative approach in  its counterpiracy plans. The U.S. government has taken many steps to  implement the Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership  and Action Plan (Action Plan), but still faces a number of challenges to  meeting the Action Plan’s objective of repressing piracy, including  inherent limits on its ability to influence industry and international  partners and persuade other states to consider prosecuting suspected  pirates. In addition, the United States must address the problem of piracy  in an environment in which counterpiracy efforts compete with other high- priority U.S. interests in the region, and the NSC acknowledges that  longer-term efforts to stabilize Somalia are needed to fully address the  root causes of piracy. In the face of such challenges, the NSC’s Action  Plan provides a roadmap for federal departments and agencies to follow in  implementing efforts to counter piracy. However, the U.S. government is  not tracking the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of its counterpiracy  activities and thus lacks information needed to weigh resource  investments. In addition, without a systematic evaluation of interagency  efforts to compare the relative effectiveness of various Action Plan tasks,  key stakeholders lack a clear picture of what effect, if any, its efforts have  had. Establishing performance measures or other mechanisms to judge  progress and evaluating performance information could provide U.S.  government stakeholders with more specific information to update the  Action Plan and better direct the course of U.S. government plans and  activities to repress piracy. Without updating U.S. government plans and  efforts to reflect performance information and the dynamic nature of  piracy, the U.S. government is limited in its ability to ensure that efforts  and resources are being targeted toward the areas of greatest national  interest.
Federal agencies have made great strides to collaborate with each other  and with international and shipping-industry partners, but could benefit  from greater specificity in the Action Plan about their roles and  responsibilities and development of joint implementing guidance,  especially with regard to those Action Plan tasks that require a variety of  stakeholders to implement. Without specific roles and responsibilities for  essential aspects of its Action Plan—including developing a U.S.  government strategic communication plan, disrupting pirate revenue, or  facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates—U.S. agencies have either  developed their own approaches to these tasks or developed no approach  at all. In addition, developing joint implementing guidance could help  agencies work together more effectively and potentially improve progress  toward U.S. goals.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve U.S. government efforts to implement the Countering Piracy  off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan),  enhance interagency collaboration, provide information to decision  makers on results, and better target resources, we recommend that the  Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in  collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice,  State, Transportation, and the Treasury take the following four actions:  reassess and revise the Action Plan to better address evolving  conditions off the Horn of Africa and their effect on priorities and  plans;  identify measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S.  counterpiracy efforts;    direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to (1) identify the costs of  U.S. counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and  personnel costs; and (2) assess the benefits, and effectiveness of U.S.  counterpiracy activities; and  clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop joint guidance,  information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate across  agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as strategic  communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating prosecution.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of  Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the  Treasury; and the National Security Council (NSC).  The NSC did not  provide comments on the report or our recommendations.  Defense  provided written comments to clarify facts in the report which are  reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.  Defense, Homeland Security,  Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury provided technical comments  which we incorporated as appropriate.
In written comments, Defense stated that the department does not agree  that using percent of seized suspected pirates who were delivered for  prosecution is an appropriate measure of program success. Defense also  commented that the metric does not take into account that it is up to  individual countries within the coalition to determine the validity of  evidence and decide whether to prosecute. We did not state that the  percent of suspects delivered for prosecution was an appropriate measure  of program success. In the draft report, we stated that the Action Plan  establishes objectives related to repressing piracy and reducing incidents  of piracy, but does not define measures of effectiveness that can be used  to evaluate progress toward reaching those objectives. In the absence of  defined measures of effectiveness, we made qualitative assessments of  U.S. government progress in implementing the Action Plan tasks by  reviewing program documents, analyzing data, and interviewing agency  officials. We determined that the U.S. government had made some  progress on the Action Plan task to seize and destroy pirate vessels and  related equipment and deliver captured suspected pirates for prosecution.  In response to Defense’s comments, we have modified the report to  explicitly recommend that the NSC identify measures of effectiveness to  use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts. We also revised the summary  text contained in figure 5 for this line of action to better incorporate some  of the prosecution challenges discussed in appendix II and more fully  address the rationale for our assessment.
Defense also provided comments to better depict the contributions of the  Naval Criminal Investigative Service to counterpiracy operations which we  incorporated throughout the report. And finally, Defense stated that U.S.  Special Operations Command does not conduct counterpiracy operations  and stated in its technical comments that it is a force provider to other  combatant commands who are responsible for conducting counterpiracy  operations. As a result, we modified the draft to eliminate reference to the  U.S. Special Operations Command as incurring costs for counterpiracy  operations.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 7 days from its  date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Special  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Attorney  General; the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, State,  Transportation, and the Treasury; and interested congressional  committees. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  either John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov or  Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we analyzed data, reviewed documentation,  and interviewed officials from the U.S. government agencies that the  National Security Council (NSC) specifically tasked to contribute to,  coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance with NSC’s 2008  Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan  (Action Plan). We met with and gathered information from officials  representing the various agencies tasked with implementing the Action  Plan and who participate on the committees within the NSC. We also  conducted work with international and industry partners involved in the  response to piracy off the Horn of Africa.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has made progress in  countering piracy off the Horn of Africa and the challenges it faces, we  reviewed the Action Plan, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy  and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, the 2005 National Strategy  for Maritime Security, relevant U.S. laws, United Nations Security  Council resolutions on piracy off the Horn of Africa, as well as our prior  work related to Somalia, maritime security, interagency collaboration, and  combating illicit financing. To assess the implementation status of the  actions called for in the Action Plan, we reviewed program documents,  analyzed data, and interviewed agency officials. Our assessments are  based on data from multiple sources, are qualitative in nature, and are  derived from consensus judgments. We assessed “substantial progress” for  those tasks where all components specified by the Action Plan were  implemented; “some progress” for tasks where components were partially  implemented or agencies had taken steps toward implementation; and  “little or no progress” where agencies had made minimal or no effort  toward implementing the components of the task. We provided a “not  applicable” assessment for one task in the Action Plan that agency  officials and our analysis revealed to have been overtaken by events and  no longer relevant for U.S. counterpiracy efforts. We provided a summary  of our progress assessments to the agencies and incorporated their  comments as appropriate. We also reviewed our prior work related to  results-oriented government and evaluated the extent to which the  interagency Counter-Piracy Steering Group charged with coordinating,  implementing, and monitoring the actions in the NSC plan followed select  key practices for achieving results including monitoring and evaluating  efforts, using performance information to improve efforts and revise plans  as needed, and reporting on results. In addition, we met with international  and industry partners involved in developing best practices for protecting  ships from pirate attack, working with the international Contact Group,  and participating in naval patrols off the Horn of Africa to gain their  perspective on the challenges and progress in countering piracy, the  effectiveness of counterpiracy actions, implementation of best  management practices for protecting ships, and how conditions off the  Horn of Africa are evolving. To gain insight on trends in pirate activity  since the United States and coalition partners began counterpiracy  operations, we obtained and analyzed data on the incidents of piracy off  the Horn of Africa for the years 2007 through June 2010 from the  International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau. The  International Maritime Bureau operates a Piracy Reporting Center that  collects data on pirate attacks worldwide. According to its officials, there  are some limitations with International Maritime Bureau data because they  rely on ship officials to provide the information, which can vary, and some  information is not provided due to sovereignty issues regarding  investigations. However, we reviewed internal controls and measures used  by the bureau to protect the reliability and accuracy of their data on pirate  attacks and attempted attacks and discussed the reliability of the bureau’s  data with international, industry, and government subject-matter experts  involved in counterpiracy operations and determined that the bureau’s  data were the best data available on pirate attacks and attempted attacks.  Therefore, we determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purpose of describing the context of piracy as a threat to seafarers and the  geographical scope of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. To identify the  results of interdiction efforts led and supported by the United States we  obtained and reviewed data from the Combined Maritime Forces for the  years 2008 to June 2010. There are some limitations with Combined  Maritime Forces’ data because these data are compiled from military and  nonmilitary sources and reporting. Although efforts are made to correlate  and confirm the accuracy of these data, Combined Maritime Forces cannot  fully guarantee their accuracy. We discussed data-collection methods,  processes for data entry, and the steps taken to ensure reasonable  accuracy of the data with both the International Maritime Bureau and the  Combined Maritime Forces. We determined the data to be sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. To identify the amount of ransoms  being paid to Somali pirates we reviewed monthly ransom data from the  Office of Naval Intelligence for 2007 through 2009. Due to the classified  nature of the sources and methods used to develop this data, we did not  independently verify the reliability of this information.
To identify the extent to which U.S. government agencies are collaborating  with each other and with international and industry partners, we  synthesized key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration on  complex national security issues from our prior work. We then evaluated  the extent to which department and agency actions incorporate select key  practices including (1) developing overarching strategies and mutually  reinforcing plans, (2) assigning roles and responsibilities, and (3) creating  collaborative organizations that share and integrate information. To obtain  information on the nature and extent of collaboration on counterpiracy  efforts among agencies, international and industry partners, we reviewed  the NSC’s Action Plan, and department and agency program documents;  and interviewed agency, international, and industry officials. To gain  insight into new and existing coordination mechanisms applicable to  piracy, we observed the weekly interagency conference calls on  counterpiracy efforts, attended a Shared Awareness and Deconfliction  meeting in Manama, Bahrain, and reviewed program documents.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Government Agencies
paragraphs: For both of our objectives, we interviewed and, where appropriate,  obtained documentation from officials with the following U.S. government  agencies:    Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy): the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity  Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (Counter-Narcotics and  Global Threats), the Oceans Policy Advisor in the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (Countering  Weapons of Mass Destruction), and the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (African Affairs)
Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy  Directorate) for Oceans Policy / Counterpiracy, J3 (Operations  Directorate), and J2 (Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate), Piracy Lead    Office of General Counsel    Under United States Africa Command: the Strategy, Plans and  Programs Directorate; the Intelligence and Knowledge Development  Directorate; the Operations and Logistics Directorate, Information  Operations Division; the Command, Control, Communications, and  Computer Systems and Chief Info Officer Directorate; and the  Outreach Directorate, Strategic Communications Division    Under United States Central Command: the Maritime Liaison Office  (Bahrain); and the Naval Forces Central Command’s Maritime  Operational Center (Bahrain), Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General’s  Corps U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (Bahrain), and Naval  Criminal Investigative Service (Bahrain)
United States Special Operations Command    Under the Department of the Navy: the Naval Criminal Investigative  Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence    United States Coast Guard’s offices of Assessment, Integration, and  Risk Management; Counterterrorism and Defense Operations;  International Affairs and Foreign Policy Advisor; Public Affairs; Vessel  Activities; Prevention Policy; Maritime and International Law; Policy  Integration; Law Enforcement; Operations Law; and the Patrol Forces  Southwest Asia (Bahrain)
National Security Division    Criminal Division’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development  Assistance Training and Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section    Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal Investigative Division,  Violent Crimes Section and Organized Crime Section    United States Attorneys’ Office    Office of the Secretary of State    Bureau of African Affairs’ Office of East African Affairs and Office of    Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis  and Office of International Security Operations    Office of the Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence;  Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; Attorney- Adviser (specializing in law of the seas); and Attorney-Adviser  (specializing in United Nations issues)
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ Office  of Anti-Crime Programs, Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing Unit    Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Office of Country  Reports and Asylum Affairs and Office of Africa and Eurasia    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific  Affairs’ Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs    Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs’ Office of  Transportation Policy and Office of Terrorism Finance and Economics  Sanctions Policy    Foreign Policy Advisor from the Department of State to the U.S. Naval  Forces Central Command (Manama, Bahrain), and the Permanent  Representative to the International Maritime Organization from the  Department of State / U.S. Embassy–London U.S.
section_title: International, Industry, and Nongovernmental Organizations
paragraphs: We also interviewed and, where appropriate, obtained documentation  from the following:  International Maritime Organization (London, U.K.)
European Union Naval Forces (Northwood, U.K.), Maritime Security  Centre–Horn Of Africa Industry Liaison, Chief of Staff, J4 Movements  and Transport, and Industry Liaison    Combined Maritime Forces (Manama, Bahrain), Coalition Forces’  Chief Air Coordination Element and Shared Awareness and  Deconfliction Meeting    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Northwood, U.K.), Maritime Air  Operations, N2 Intelligence Division, N3 Operations Division, and  North Atlantic Treaty Organization Shipping Centre    United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of  Defense, and Department for Transport    APL Maritime; Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO);  Chamber of Shipping of America; International Association of Dry  Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO); International Association of  Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO); International Chamber  of Shipping; International Group of P&I Clubs; International Maritime  Bureau; International Transportation Workers Federation (ITF);  Lloyd’s Market Association; Maersk Line Limited; National Academy of  Sciences, Transportation Research Board, Marine Board; Society of  International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Limited (SIGTTO);  and the World Shipping Council.
Former Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces (Combined  Task Force 151), former United States Navy Judge Advocate General,  Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies,  International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Royal Institute of  International Affairs (Chatham House).
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Government Agency Progress in Implementing the National Security Council’s Action Plan
paragraphs: In December 2008, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) published its  Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan  (Action Plan), which laid out 14 tasks to implement three lines of action to  prevent, disrupt, and prosecute acts of Somali piracy. We assessed the  extent to which U.S. government agencies involved in countering piracy  have made progress implementing the Action Plan. In addition to the  information provided earlier in this report, this appendix contains further  details on the steps that those agencies have taken—or have yet to take— to implement various tasks called for under each of the plan’s three lines  of action: (1) prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the  maritime domain to piracy; (2) disrupt acts of piracy consistent with  international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag  states; and (3) facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag,  victim, and coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the United States to  ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their  actions.
We based our assessment on reviews of agency plans, status reports, and  interviews with U.S. government, international, and industry officials  involved in counterpiracy efforts. The scope and methodology used in our  review are described in further detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Progress in Implementing Actions to Prevent Pirate Attacks by Reducing the Vulnerability of the Maritime Domain to Piracy
subsections: section_title: Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Establish and Maintain a Contact Group
paragraphs: In concert with the United Nations and international partners, the U.S.  government has made substantial progress in helping to establish and  maintain a Contact Group of countries willing and able to help combat  piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Action Plan calls for the immediate  establishment of a Contact Group to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa,  which would meet as necessary to develop and coordinate international  policy initiatives, share information, provide resources for building  regional capacity to counter piracy, and advocate for other mechanisms to  repress piracy. In January 2009, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast  of Somalia (Contact Group) was formed in response to United Nations  Security Council Resolution 1851, and, as of June 2010, it had 49 member  nations as well as international organization partners. The Contact Group  established a multidonor trust fund to help offset the cost of prosecuting  suspected pirates, and in April 2010, members approved $2.1 million for  programs in the Seychelles and Somalia.
The Department of State (State) orchestrates U.S. participation in the  Contact Group, coordinating with officials from the Departments of  Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury. In  addition, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration cochair the  working group on industry self-protection, which facilitated development  and adoption of best management practices for self-protection, in  coordination with industry and the International Maritime Organization.  Military, industry, and international officials credit these self-protection  measures, in part, for the reduction in successful pirate attacks in the Gulf  of Aden from 2008 to 2009. According to agency officials, the Department  of Defense (Defense) and State have participated in various other working  groups, including military coordination and judicial efforts.
section_title: Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Strengthen and Encourage the Use of the Maritime Security Patrol Area
paragraphs: The U.S. government has made substantial progress on strengthening the  use of the Maritime Security Patrol Area in collaboration with its  international partners, though there are limits to the reach of government  influence on commercial vessels. The Action Plan calls for the United  States to strengthen the use of the Maritime Security Patrol Area—the area  patrolled by coalition Combined Maritime Forces and other navies—by  encouraging other countries to assign naval forces and assets to the area,  coordinating and sharing information with the other navies, and urging  members of the shipping industry to use the Maritime Security Patrol  Area. State has encouraged multinational military coordination through  bilateral channels and the Contact Group. The U.S. Navy has contributed  to both to the Combined Maritime Forces and North Atlantic Treaty  Organization patrols. In addition, the United States contributes to Shared  Awareness and Deconfliction meetings, established to share information  with and coordinate the counterpiracy patrols of coalition forces and  independent countries. International officials also told us that Combined  Maritime Forces, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and European Union  forces are coordinating surveillance and patrol of the Internationally  Recommended Transit Corridor, the recommended route within the  Maritime Security Patrol Area for commercial vessels transiting the Gulf of  Aden.
Defense, Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the Maritime  Liaison Office have used a variety of methods to encourage commercial  vessels to use the Maritime Security Patrol Area and coordinate with naval  patrols, such as publishing advisories, maintaining informational Web  sites, and sponsoring information-sharing meetings. The Coast Guard  requires that U.S.-flagged vessels register their transit plans through the  Horn of Africa region with the Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa  and notify the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations office in Dubai,  which both monitor the transit of vessels in the region. However, U.S.- flagged vessels comprise a small proportion of the ships that transit the  high-risk waters off the Horn of Africa, and , and the Coast Guard  regulations mandating self-protection measures only apply to U.S.-flagged  vessels. While the U.S. government encourages commercial vessels from  other flag states to take advantage of the monitoring provided by navies  patrolling the Maritime Security Patrol Area, Defense, Maritime  Administration, shipping industry, and international officials estimate that  approximately 20 to 25 percent of the shipping traffic in the region does  not register its transit with patrolling forces. These officials also told us  that, as pirates have expanded their area of operations into the Indian  Ocean, coalition forces faced increased challenges in disrupting attacks  given the unfeasibility of establishing secured transit corridors in this area  similar to that used in the Gulf of Aden.
section_title: Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Update Ships’ Security Assessments and Plans
paragraphs: The Coast Guard has achieved substantial progress in ensuring that ship  security plans for U.S.-flagged vessels have been updated with piracy  annexes, and the United States is encouraging other countries to  implement similar measures. The Action Plan calls for the United States to  urge other nations to update their ship security plans and to encourage  vessels in the Gulf of Aden to take specific protective measures. In May  2009, the Coast Guard promulgated the second revision of Maritime  Security Directive 104-6, which requires that all U.S.-flagged vessels  transiting high-risk areas have an approved security plan to prevent and  defend against pirate attacks. Furthermore, the Coast Guard and the  Maritime Administration have taken steps to implement this task by  issuing guidance to support industry efforts to prevent attacks. For  example, the Coast Guard’s Port Security Advisories provide information  on using armed security teams to protect vessels transiting high-risk  waters. As of July 2010, the Coast Guard had approved the additional  security measures submitted by each of the 211 U.S.-flagged vessels  identified as traveling through high-risk waters, 108 of which travel  through the Horn of Africa region. The Coast Guard ensures those U.S.- flagged vessels transiting high-risk waters have an updated plan by  monitoring the movement of U.S.-flagged vessels, checking for approved  plans, and investigating compliance when vessels are at certain ports.
However, U.S.-flagged vessels comprise only a small proportion of the  ships that transit the area, and according to officials the influence of the  U.S. government on international ships is limited.
To encourage international implementation of self-protection measures by  commercial vessels, the United States has signed and promoted the  nonbinding New York Declaration. According to the declaration, the  signatory countries will ensure, when carrying out their obligations under  the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, that vessels  on their registry have adopted and documented appropriate self-protection  measures in their ship security plans. These plans specify how each vessel  will employ the applicable self-protection measures. While officials  acknowledge that best management practices do not provide guaranteed  protection against a hijacking, officials at the International Maritime  Organization and the Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa, established  by the European Union Naval Force, estimate that the majority of ships  hijacked in the Gulf of Aden were not following one of the easiest and  least costly of self-protection measures, registering their voyage through  high-risk waters with the centre. Although U.S., international, and industry  officials told us that no data are available on the extent to which ships  transiting high-risk waters are following best practices, U.S., international  military, and industry officials estimate that approximately 70 to 80  percent of ships are using best management practices to deter piracy.  However, the United States and its international partners still face  challenges urging compliance with these practices among the remaining 20  to 30 percent of vessels.
section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made in Strategic Communication to Counter Piracy
paragraphs: In collaboration with the Contact Group, U.S. departments and agencies  involved in strategic communication efforts have made some progress in  implementing actions called for in the Action Plan. The Action Plan calls  for the U.S. government to lead and support a global public information  and diplomatic campaign to highlight the international cooperation,  coordination, and integration undertaken to repress piracy off the Horn of  Africa while emphasizing the destructive effects of piracy on trade, human  and maritime security, and the rule of law. Agency officials have stated  that the lack of a U.S. presence in Somalia presents challenges to efforts to  communicate directly with the Somali population to discourage piracy and  makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness of strategic communication  efforts.
High-level U.S. government officials have warned of the threat of piracy in  public statements, and the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration  have actively shared information with members of the shipping industry to  encourage self-protection from attack. For example, in April 2009 the  Secretary of State outlined four steps State was taking in the aftermath of  the hijacking of the MV Maersk Alabama, primarily diplomatic  engagement with international partners and Somali government officials,  and work with the shipping and insurance industries. Further, the Coast  Guard held a series of roundtable discussions with the shipping industry to  address concerns about ransom payments following the issuance of an  April 2010 executive order that prohibits persons under U.S. jurisdiction  from making payments to persons designated under the Order, and State  and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials also told us they  established guidance for and communicated with the shipping industry  after the executive order was issued.
In addition, according to officials, Defense and State lead interagency  meetings held, in part, to gain U.S. consensus on piracy-related strategic  communication issues prior to meetings with international partners. State  officials also reported contributing to interagency strategic  communication efforts of the Contact Group and have created a publicly  available maritime security Web page, which includes information on  piracy.
The Department of Defense has developed a strategic communication  plan, but it is a classified document for internal use. State officials told us  they have drafted a plan to coordinate interagency strategic  communication on counterpiracy efforts, including outreach to domestic  and foreign audiences to inform them about U.S. and international efforts  to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, but at the time of this report, the  draft was still undergoing review by interagency partners and had not been  finalized.
section_title: Progress in Disrupting Acts of Piracy Consistent with International Law and the Rights and Responsibilities of Coastal and Flag States
subsections: section_title: Progress Assessment Is Not Applicable for Efforts to Support and Contribute to a Regionally Based Counter-Piracy Coordination Center
paragraphs: The United States has not worked to create a Counter-Piracy Coordination  Center as called for in the Action Plan, but a progress assessment toward  this task was considered not applicable given changing circumstances and  the status of other ongoing counterpiracy efforts since the time of the  plan’s publication. The Action Plan calls for the creation of a Counter- Piracy Coordination Center to establish a single, centralized service to  receive reports of piracy and suspicious vessels, alert maritime interests,  gather and analyze information regarding piracy off the Horn of Africa,  provide a secure common operating picture for stakeholder governments  and the shipping industry, and as appropriate, coordinate the dispatch of  available response assets. However, according to Defense officials,  creating such a center would duplicate existing capabilities provided by  international partners. Subsequent to the publication of the Action Plan,  Defense officials determined that existing efforts were in place to meet the  goals outlined for a coordination center. Three organizations are currently  involved in carrying out the tasks outlined for a single coordination center,  each of which covers the functions of a Counter-Piracy Coordination  Center. The Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa is a coordination  center for transiting ships to voluntarily record their ships’ movements and  to receive updated threat information. It also coordinates available  response assets to provide support and protection to mariners. The United  Kingdom’s Maritime Trade Operations office in Dubai serves as the first  point of contact for reporting an attack. The Maritime Liaison Office in  Bahrain serves as the link between the commercial maritime community  and U.S. and coalition military forces. Other mechanisms exist to  coordinate stakeholder governments, such as the Contact Group and its  associated working groups, and to coordinate military patrols, such as the  Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings.
section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made in Seizing and Destroying Pirate Vessels and Equipment, and Delivering Suspects for Prosecution
paragraphs: The United States has made progress toward seizing and destroying pirate  vessels and equipment but has had limited progress delivering suspected  pirates for prosecution. The Action Plan calls for the seizing and  destroying of vessels outfitted for piracy and related equipment, and states  the U.S. government may conduct and urge others to conduct  counterpiracy operations in international waters around Somalia.  According to data from the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces, coalition  and other international partners destroyed or confiscated nearly 100 pirate  vessels and confiscated more than 380 weapons, including small arms and  rocket propelled grenades between August 2008 and June 2010. Coalition  forces also report that international partners confiscated approximately  140 items of pirate paraphernalia, including automatic weapons, grappling  hooks, ladders, and global positioning system devices in that same time  period.
According to military officials, interdicting forces determine a vessel to be  potentially used for piracy upon sight, given the presence of certain gear  and weaponry and the absence of typical fishing gear. Military officials  also told us that, once piracy equipment is seized and destroyed, U.S.  forces follow international protocols and, in the event suspects are not  detained, release the vessel and those onboard with sufficient fuel and  provisions to reach shore. According to international military officials,  European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces also are  monitoring pirate bases on shore from warships, and then seizing and  destroying pirate skiffs and equipment as they leave bases. However,  military and international officials told us that the seizing of pirate  paraphernalia provides only a temporary obstacle to pirate operations.  U.S. efforts to deliver suspected pirates to states for prosecution are  hampered by a lack of states that are willing and able to prosecute. The  Action Plan states the U.S. government will deliver suspected pirates to  states that are willing and able to prosecute in those cases where pirate  vessels are seized or destroyed. As of June 2010, international forces had  encountered more than 1,100 suspected Somali pirates since August 2008  but had delivered only approximately 40 percent to states for prosecution.  According to a report issued by the Department of Defense in May 2010,  U.S. military forces have transferred 24 suspected pirates for prosecution  to Kenya, the only country with which the United States had an  arrangement to accept pirate transfers at the time. According to State and  Department of Justice (Justice) officials, Kenya is only willing to accept  cases with strong evidence, such as cases in which suspects are caught in  the act of committing piracy. According to Combined Maritime Forces  officials, when suspected pirates are interdicted at sea and are not  engaged in an act of piracy, but are in possession of pirate equipment,  interdicting forces typically will detain the suspected pirates, confiscate  their equipment, and then release the suspects. Additionally, officials  stated that because of evidence standards and the limited options for  prosecution, interdicting forces are left with little choice but to catch and  release the suspected pirates.
As of June 2010, approximately 57 percent of the suspects that  international forces encountered were caught and released. Furthermore,  military officials told us there have been cases of suspects being  encountered multiple times at sea, so the practice of catching and  releasing suspects could allow multiple attempts at piracy. Although  Defense officials we spoke with had varied opinions on whether repeat  offenders were a credible issue, since biometric data—such as  fingerprints—are not systematically gathered to track such cases, U.S. and  international forces cannot determine whether they are finding repeat  offenders.
Although, as noted in the Action Plan, piracy is a universal crime that any  state could potentially prosecute, most states, including the United States,  in practice will consider prosecuting suspected pirates in appropriate  cases when it is in their national interest to do so. However, according to  State officials, some countries lack sufficient domestic law to support  prosecution of suspected pirates. Others may have the domestic legal  frameworks, but lack the resources or political will to take action. State  officials also told us that logistical difficulties exist in prosecuting piracy  cases such as evidence collection and preservation at sea, bringing in  merchant mariners or naval personnel to provide testimony and difficulty  proving intent in cases where suspects were not caught in the act. Finally,  some countries that might otherwise provide a venue for prosecution may  also have concerns that acquitted suspects or convicted pirates who are  released after serving a prison sentence may seek asylum. Officials from  State told us the U.S. government has prosecuted cases against every  suspected pirate captured who attempted an attack on a U.S. vessel.  Currently, a total of 12 suspects from attacks on the MV Maersk Alabama  (April 2009), USS Nicholas (March 2010) and USS Ashland (April 2010) are  being tried in the United States. The U.S. government will approach other  affected states for prosecution in cases interdicted by U.S. forces where  there is no interest for the U.S. government to prosecute. According to  officials at State, preference for prosecution is given to the flag state of a  vessel. State officials also said they are encouraging regional countries to  prosecute.
section_title: Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Provide Persistent Interdiction- Capable Presence
paragraphs: Since the Action Plan was issued, the U.S. military and Coast Guard have  made substantial progress in providing an interdiction-capable presence  by providing resources to a counterpiracy task force under the U.S.-led  Combined Maritime Forces, and the U.S. Navy has contributed to North  Atlantic Treaty Organization counterpiracy operations. According to the  Action Plan, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard forces operating in the region  provide persistent interdiction through presence, can conduct maritime  counterpiracy operations, and shall coordinate counterpiracy activities  with other forces to prevent, respond to, and disrupt pirate attacks. Since  the Combined Maritime Forces’ counterpiracy task force was established  in January 2009, the U.S. Navy has provided patrol ships, aircraft,  surveillance assets, medical response units, as well as leadership for the  international naval coalition conducting counter piracy operations in the  Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. According to Defense officials, from June  2009 to June 2010, the U.S. Navy had an average of four to five ships  present daily in the Horn of Africa, with two or three of those ships having  embarked air assets. Defense officials told us as many as eight U.S. Navy  ships could be present on any given day, with Navy ships supporting  Combined Maritime Forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization  counterpiracy operations, and other maritime coalition and U.S. national  efforts. For example, U.S. Marine Corps aviation units have provided  support to counterpiracy operations during transits of the area and,  according to agency officials, the Coast Guard has assigned deployable  specialized forces and a cutter to the combatant commander to support  counterpiracy operations. In addition, the Naval Criminal Investigative  Service also supports maritime counterpiracy operations by providing  special agents afloat to assist boarding teams and lead immediate  investigations into piracy incidents on the high seas.
U.S., international, and industry officials credit the reduction in the rate of  successful pirate attacks from approximately 40 percent in 2008 to 22  percent in 2009, in part, to international patrols in the Gulf of Aden. The  U.S. military also initiated and contributes to tactical military coordination  and information sharing with international partners through Shared  Awareness and Deconfliction meetings that optimize patrol coverage of  the transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden and aid with coordination of  coalition and independently deployed counterpiracy forces. However,  coalition officials acknowledge U.S. and international forces face  challenges in interdicting pirate incidents as pirates have adapted their  tactics and expanded their area of activity to the much larger and harder- to-patrol Indian Ocean. Pirates have attacked several vessels more than  1,000 nautical miles from Somalia and now threaten an area of nearly 2  million square nautical miles. Analytic estimates from Defense officials  show that full coverage of the area affected by piracy would require more  than 1,000 ships equipped with helicopters—a level of support Defense  officials say is beyond the means of the world’s navies to provide. With  current resources, Combined Maritime Forces officials estimate 25 to 30  international ships conduct counterpiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa at  any given time. In addition, military officials noted it is hard to predict how  long countries will sustain counterpiracy investments, since countries  participate in Combined Maritime Forces patrols at will. The Action Plan  also states that effective and prompt consequence-delivery mechanisms  are critical to the success of interdiction efforts. However, challenges  related to judicial capacity and securing prosecution venues may  complicate interdiction efforts.
section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made in Supporting Shiprider Programs and Other Bilateral and Regional Counterpiracy Agreements and Arrangements
paragraphs: The U.S. government has discussed shiprider programs with several  countries but no counterpiracy shiprider programs have been finalized for  this region. The Action Plan calls for supporting and participating in the  development of shiprider programs and other bilateral and regional  counterpiracy agreements and arrangements. Shiprider arrangements  would allow foreign law enforcement officials to operate from U.S. naval  vessels and facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates. For example,  shipriders from the country that would prosecute suspected pirates would  be able to arrest the suspects and collect evidence directly, thereby  facilitating the prosecution of the suspected pirates.
According to officials at State, they determined, in discussion with Kenyan  officals, that a shiprider program would not facilitate prosecution of  suspected pirates in Kenya because Kenyan law requires suspects to be  presented before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody  by a Kenyan official, including a shiprider. This requirement would be  challenging to meet when suspected pirates are interdicted far out in the  Indian Ocean. A shiprider provision was therefore not included in the  prosecution arrangement facilitating transfer of suspects between the  United States and Kenya for prosecution. According to officials at State,  the Seychelles has a similar law and therefore a shiprider provision was  not included in its arrangement with the United States. While State and  Justice officials told us there are ongoing discussions regarding  arrangements with other countries, such as Mauritius and the Philippines,  the U.S. government faces challenges in finding willing partners for such  programs. Officials acknowledged that shiprider programs may not be as  beneficial for counterpiracy efforts as the authors of the Action Plan  intended.
The U.S. government also has been involved in the International Maritime  Organization’s effort to conclude a regional arrangement, called the  Djibouti Code of Conduct. This arrangement includes sections that  address topics similar to those addressed in the Action Plan. For example,  the code contains provisions related to information sharing regarding  pirate activity, reviews of national legislation related to piracy, and the  provision of assistance between the signatories. The code also includes a  section addressing the possibility of using shipriders. Coast Guard and  State officials were involved in the development of the code and have also  expressed support for implementing elements of the code.
section_title: Little or No Progress Has Been Made to Disrupt and Dismantle Pirate Bases Ashore
paragraphs: The U.S. government has not taken any action toward disrupting and  dismantling pirate bases ashore, for a number of reasons including that the  President has not authorized this action, the United States has other  interests in the region that compete for resources, and long-standing  concerns about security hinder the presence of U.S. military and  government officials in Somalia. The Action Plan states that piracy at sea  can be abated only if pirate bases ashore are disrupted or dismantled.  Additionally, the plan states that the appropriate authority to disrupt and  dismantle pirate bases ashore has been obtained from the United Nations  Security Council and Somali authorities, and states that the United States  will work with concerned governments and international organizations to  disrupt and dismantle pirate bases to the fullest extent permitted by  national law. However, as of April 2010, such action had not been  authorized by the President. In addition, Somalia has lacked a functioning  central government since 1991. Further, the United States closed its  embassy in Mogadishu in 1991, and there is currently no official U.S.  military or civilian presence in that country. While the international  community, including the United States, continues to provide  humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia, challenges have  limited efforts to establishing peace, security, stability, and an effective  and functioning government. According to officials at State and Defense,  U.S. agencies allow travel to Somalia; however, general practice has  severely limited the U.S. presence in Somalia since 1994. Furthermore,  State officials told us that there has been no recent travel to Somalia other  than a short trip by a senior official made in February 2008. Defense and  State officials said that the United States has a number of other higher  priority interests in Somalia and in the region, which compete for military  and civilian resources and that may ultimately affect counterpiracy  decisions.
section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made toward Disrupting Pirate Revenue
paragraphs: While Treasury, State, and Justice have each taken steps to achieve some  progress toward disrupting pirate revenue, challenges inhibit further  implementation of this task. The Action Plan states that the U.S.  government will coordinate with all stakeholders to deprive pirates and  their supporters of any illicit revenue and the fruits of their crime,  advocating the development of national capabilities to gather, assess and  share financial intelligence on pirate financial operations, with the goal of  tracing payments to and apprehending the leaders of pirate organizations  and their enablers. Treasury served as the lead agency for implementing an  executive order signed by the President in April 2010 that blocks all  property or interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction of any persons  that are listed in the order and allows for designation of other persons that  threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including those who  support or engage in acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. However,  Treasury officials told us the order applies only to assets that pass through  U.S. financial institutions or come into the possession or control of  persons in the United States or U.S. citizens or permanent residents, which  limits the potential effect of the executive order on piracy revenue. As a  result, it is not clear the extent to which designating pirates in the  executive order will achieve the goal of disrupting pirate revenue.
While officials told us the U.S. government has reserved the right to take  enforcement action against private companies for paying ransoms to  individuals designated in the executive order, only two pirates have been  designated thus far. Representatives of the shipping industry have stated  that ship owners have no viable option for rescuing crews being held  hostage other than to pay ransoms, and they fear that a failure to pay  ransoms could escalate pirates’ violence against crew members. State and  Treasury officials told us they have communicated to shipping industry  representatives that Treasury and Justice have discretion to decide  whether or not to take enforcement action for any violation of the order,  and that a decision to take enforcement actions will depend on the facts of  each case.
Treasury officials told us their efforts to disrupt pirate revenue also have  been limited by the lack of sufficient information on pirate networks in  Somalia and on the flows of pirate finances, including ransom payments.  According to officials at State, the U.S. intelligence community has the  strongest understanding of pirate financing, but no U.S. agencies have  dedicated resources toward the issue. Federal Bureau of Investigation  (FBI) and State officials told us that information related to pirate  organizations may be collected in the course of pursuing other U.S.  interests in the area, but piracy is not among their top priorities and is  unlikely to be assigned resources. As a result, according to FBI officials,  the FBI Organized Crime Section is not working to build a case against  pirate leaders and enablers. State officials described the need to better use  intelligence to target efforts by the U.S. government and other  stakeholders, but also acknowledged that the poor security situation in  Somalia poses challenges for gathering the intelligence needed to disrupt  pirate financing. Ultimately, officials from multiple agencies told us U.S.  agencies face resource constraints in disrupting pirate financing given  higher-priority concerns such as counterterrorism.
In addition, the absence of a formal financial sector in Somalia is a major  challenge to filling intelligence gaps. Treasury officials stated that the lack  of a formal financial sector in Somalia and the pirates’ reliance on informal  financial systems presents a challenge because many of the tools they  normally would use to track financial activity are implemented through  formalized financial systems.
State has taken several actions to raise the issue of pirate financing among  international partners and to address misconceptions within the shipping  industry about the U.S. position on ransoms. The U.S. government has  helped elevate the issue of pirate financing within the Contact Group,  including releasing a paper to participants. State and Justice also have  worked with partner governments and international organizations, such as  Interpol and the United Nations, to develop collaborative events linking  experts on pirate financing, and sponsored a workshop in Kenya with the  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime that covered money laundering  and organized crime.
section_title: Progress to Ensure That Those Who Commit Acts of Piracy Are Held Accountable for Their Actions by Facilitating the Prosecution of Suspected Pirates by Flag, Victim, and Coastal States, and, in Appropriate Cases, the United States
subsections: section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made toward Concluding Arrangements to Formalize Custody and Prosecution
paragraphs: The U.S. government has made some progress in concluding prosecution  arrangements for Somali piracy cases, by securing prosecution  arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles, and is working toward  similar arrangements with other countries. The Action Plan calls for the  U.S. government to conclude agreements and arrangements to formalize  custody and prosecution arrangements both in and outside the region. In  January 2009, the U.S. government formalized an arrangement with Kenya  to facilitate transfers of piracy cases from U.S. forces. The United States  has transferred 24 suspected pirates to Kenya for prosecution, and  Defense officials told us one conviction has been secured thus far. In July  2010, the U.S. government also concluded an arrangement with the  Seychelles for transfers of piracy cases from U.S. forces. In addition, State  officials said that discussions are ongoing with countries that have a  regional or commercial interest in countering piracy, such as Mauritius,  the Philippines, and Tanzania, and it is taking steps to conclude further  arrangements. As of May 2010, according to agency officials, State had  encouraged 17 countries to consider prosecution of suspected pirates.  However, State officials told us that the lack of prosecution venues is a  primary challenge to prosecuting pirates, which may undermine  interdiction efforts. According to State and Justice officials, challenges to  establishing prosecution arrangements include limited regional capacity  and interest of states outside the region to prosecute suspected pirates.
In addition the relatively low rate of prosecutions contributes to the  perception that pirates operate with relative impunity. As of June 2010,  international forces had encountered more than 1,100 suspected Somali  pirates since August 2008 but had delivered only approximately 40 percent  to states for prosecution. Although Kenya announced its intent to  withdraw from its arrangement with the United States in April 2010, that  decision was later reversed, and more than 100 piracy cases were being  processed through the Kenyan criminal justice system as of June 2010.
section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made to Support and Encourage the Exercise of Jurisdiction under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
paragraphs: The United States has made some progress in using the United Nations  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of  Maritime Navigation to exercise jurisdiction to prosecute suspected  pirates, but this effort involves several challenges. The Action Plan calls  for the United States to use—and encourage other countries to use— appropriate jurisdiction of flag, port, and coastal states, as well as states of  the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy, through the  prosecution of any persons having committed an act of piracy, and states  that the United States will urge other states party to the convention to use  it as a vehicle for the prosecution of acts violating the convention. For  example, the United States has exercised jurisdiction under the  convention to prosecute one pirate in the United States. U.S. officials told  us that State, Justice, Defense, and the Coast Guard have been involved in  efforts, through the Contact Group and the International Maritime  Organization, to encourage use of the Convention to prosecute suspects.  However, U.S. agency officials cited hurdles to prosecuting pirates, such  as limits to affected countries’ willingness and capacity to prosecute  pirates, and difficulties associated with collecting evidence in the maritime  environment.
section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made to Support and Encourage the Use of Other Applicable International Conventions and Customary International Law
paragraphs: The United States has taken some steps to support and encourage the use  of other applicable international conventions and customary international  law as they relate to prosecuting piracy. The Action Plan calls for the U.S.  government to support and encourage the use of relevant and appropriate  jurisdiction through the framework of applicable international  conventions, in addition to the Convention for the Suppression of  Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, such as the 1979  Hostage Taking Convention, the 2000 Transnational Organized Crime  Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention, and customary  international law. For example, the U.S. government has exercised  jurisdiction over 11 suspected pirates who attempted attacks on the USS  Nicholas in March 2010 and the USS Ashland in April 2010.
The Action Plan also anticipates ongoing discussion with other states on  the possibility of an international court to prosecute suspected pirates, if  necessary. However, the U.S. government does not support creation of a  dedicated piracy court because of the amount of time, resources, and  infrastructure that would be required. State officials said that the U.S.  government is interested in solutions for challenges to prosecution,  including the possibility of a hybrid court combining a piracy chamber  within a national system. However, they said despite interest expressed by  members of the Contact Group and other nations, no countries have  offered their prosecutors or territories for use in establishing a dedicated  international court.
section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made toward Enhancing Regional States’ Capabilities to Accept Suspected Pirates for Prosecution, Extradition, and Incarceration
paragraphs: The Departments of Justice and State have achieved some progress in  providing assistance to several regional countries, and the United States is  contributing to international efforts to develop regional judicial capacity.  The Action Plan calls for the United States to work with interested parties  to identify the nature and scope of international assistance needed to  enhance the capacities of regional states in connection with the arrest,  detention, prosecution, and fair trial of persons accused of involvement in  piracy, and to pursue bilateral programs to provide judicial capacity- building efforts. State has created an assessment tool to identify gaps in  regional states’ maritime capabilities including judicial capacity. The U.S.  government provides support to regional partners for building judicial  capacity. For example, the resident legal advisor at the U.S. Embassy in  Nairobi has provided assistance to Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles.  This advisor, a position within Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial  Development, Assistance and Training but supported by State, told us he  provided assistance in developing piracy cases, and helped develop  guidance for U.S. forces on evidence collection and transferring piracy  cases to Kenya. Naval Criminal Investigative Service special agents have  testified in Kenyan courts, and provided counter-piracy training and  operational support to officials in the Seychelles. In addition, the U.S.  government, in conjunction with the United Nations Office on Drugs and  Crime, has sponsored conferences focused on piracy for law enforcement  and judges from countries in the Horn of Africa region.
Further, the United States has contributed $250,000 to the United Nations  counterpiracy effort for regional capacity-building. In April 2010, the  Contact Group board that administers a trust fund for prosecution issues,  which includes the United States, approved $2.1 million for five projects  primarily to support the prosecution of suspected pirates in Somalia and  the Seychelles. However, Justice and State officials told us that regional  states continue to have a limited capacity to prosecute suspected pirates  and incarcerate convicted pirates. Although State officials said that they  were attempting to include a funding request for future operations, in the  current budget cycle, counterpiracy operations at State have no dedicated  budget.
section_title: Appendix III: International and Shipping- Industry Partners Involved in Counterpiracy Efforts
subsections: section_title: Declaration signatories
paragraphs: Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia  In January 2009, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia  (Contact Group) was formed in response to United Nations Security  Council Resolution 1851 to facilitate discussion and coordination of  actions among countries and organizations working to suppress piracy off  the coast of Somalia. The participating countries established four working  groups in which all Contact Group parties may participate. Working Group  1 addresses activities related to military and operational coordination and  information sharing and the establishment of the regional coordination  center, and is chaired by the United Kingdom with the support of the  International Maritime Organization. Denmark chairs Working Group 2,  which addresses judicial aspects of piracy with the support of United  Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The United States chairs Working  Group 3 to strengthen shipping self-awareness and other capabilities, with  the support of the International Maritime Organization. Egypt chairs  Working Group 4 which focuses on improving diplomatic and public- information efforts on all aspects of piracy. As of June 2010, 49 countries,  7 international organizations, and 3 industry observers participate in the  Contact Group.
First open for signature in May 2009, the New York Declaration is a  commitment by countries to promulgate the internationally recognized  best management practices for self-protection to vessels on their registry  and ensure that vessels on their registry have adopted and documented  appropriate self-protection measures. As of July 2010, 10 countries had  signed the declaration.
The Djibouti Code of Conduct recognizes the problem of piracy and armed  robbery against ships in the Horn of Africa region. Signatories declare  their intention to cooperate to the fullest extent possible, consistent with  their available resources and related priorities, their respective national  laws and regulations, and international law in the repression of piracy and  armed robbery against ships. Among other things, under the code,  participants should set up national focal points to facilitate coordinated,  timely, and effective flow of information about piracy and armed robbery  against ships. Additionally, according to the code, each participant intends  to review its national legislation to ensure it has laws in place to  criminalize piracy and armed robbery against ships and adequate  provisions for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations, and  prosecution of alleged offenders. The code is open for signature by the 21  countries in the region and, as of March 2010, 13 of the 21 countries had  signed.
Combined Maritime Forces and Combined Task Force 151  Under the leadership of the commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central  Command and U.S. 5th Fleet, the Combined Maritime Forces is a 25-nation  coalition that is focused on countering terrorism, preventing piracy,  reducing illegal trafficking of people and drugs, and promoting safety of  the maritime environment. Established in 2002, the Combined Maritime  Forces patrol more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters to  conduct both integrated and coordinated operations. Additionally, the  Combined Maritime Forces conducts maritime security operations in the  Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean. This  expanse includes three critical points in high-risk waters at the Strait of  Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Bab al Mandeb at the southern  tip of Yemen.
In January 2009, the Combined Maritime Forces established Combined  Task Force 151 with the sole mission of conducting counterpiracy  operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in the  Indian Ocean. This is a multinational naval task force made up of countries  willing and able to participate in counterpiracy operations. So far, 11  countries have contributed forces to Combined Task Force 151 and  several others that have agreed to send ships or aircraft or both to  participate in counterpiracy operations.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Operation Ocean Shield  Operation Ocean Shield is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s  contribution to international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of  Africa. This operation builds on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s  previous counterpiracy operations which began in late 2008 when the  North Atlantic Treaty Organization began providing escorts to United  Nations World Food Programme vessels transiting the high-risk waters off  the Horn of Africa. The North Atlantic Council approved Operation Ocean  Shield in August 2009. This operation focuses on at-sea counterpiracy  operations, support to the maritime community to take actions to reduce  incidents of piracy, as well as regional-state counterpiracy capacity  building. This operation is designed to complement the efforts of existing  international organizations and forces operating in the area. This  operation is being implemented by the Standing North Atlantic Treaty  Organization Maritime Group 2, made up of vessels from eight different  member countries that routinely contribute to the group and other  countries that occasionally contribute.
European Union Naval Force Somalia—Operation Atalanta  The European Union is conducting Operation Atalanta to help deter,  prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of  Somalia. This operation began in late 2008 following the adoption of  Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, and 1846 by the United Nations Security  Council. The operation’s objectives are to protect World Food Programme  vessels, humanitarian aid, and African Union Military Mission in Somalia  shipping; help deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed  robbery; protect vulnerable shipping; and monitor fishing activities off the  coast of Somalia. This operation is being implemented by 14 countries  with operational support provided by a team at the Northwood Operation  Headquarters. Operation Atalanta has been extended by the European  Council until December 2012.
Independent deployers are countries that are not part of the coalition  forces. These countries deploy naval forces to the region under national  auspices to escort their ships through high-risk waters and to monitor  counterpiracy operations, and may coordinate with coalition patrols.
Although the Action Plan considers piracy to be a universal crime that any  country can prosecute, in practice, most countries, including the United  States, will consider prosecuting suspected pirates in appropriate cases  when it is in their national interest to do so. A single piratical attack often  affects the interests of numerous countries, including the country in which  the vessel is flagged, the various countries of nationality of the seafarers  taken hostage, regional coastal countries, the country of the vessel or  cargo owner, and transshipment and destination countries.
Various organizations representing interests of the shipping industry have  been involved in efforts to prevent or respond to piracy off the Horn of  Africa. For example, the 12 shipping industry organizations actively  involved in the development of the “Best Management Practices to Deter  Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia” represent the  interests of ship owners, seafarers, marine insurance companies, and  others, and included: the International Association of Independent Tanker  Owners, International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies International  Marine Forum, Baltic and International Maritime Council, Society of  International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators, International  Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners, International Group of Protection  and Indemnity Clubs, Cruise Lines International Association, International  Union of Marine Insurers, Joint War Committee & Joint Hull Committee,  International Maritime Bureau, and International Transport Workers  Federation.
section_title: Appendix IV: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010
paragraphs: Pirates have expanded their area of operations with an increasing number  of attacks occurring in the Indian Ocean, an area much larger than the  Gulf of Aden. Defense officials report that pirates now threaten an area of  nearly 2 million square nautical miles in the Somali Basin and Gulf of  Aden. Figure 11 shows the number and location of pirate attacks off the  Horn of Africa reported to the International Maritime Bureau in 2007, 2008,  2009, and the first half of 2010.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; Patricia  Lentini, Assistant Director; Elizabeth Curda; Susan Ditto; Nicole Harms;  Barbara Hills; Brandon L. Hunt; Farhanaz Kermalli; Eileen Larence; Tom  Melito; Tobin McMurdie; John Mingus; Susan Offutt; Terry Richardson;  Mike Rohrback; Leslie Sarapu; Amie Steele; Gabriele Tonsil; Suzanne  Wren; and Loren Yager made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Anti-Money Laundering: Better Communication Could Enhance the  Support FinCEN Provides to Law Enforcement. GAO-10-622T.  Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2010.
Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational  Benefits, but Challenges Remain. GAO-10-433R. Washington, D.C.: April 7,  2010.
Anti-Money Laundering: Improved Communication Could Enhance the  Support FinCEN Provides to Law Enforcement. GAO-10-141. Washington,  D.C.: December 14, 2009.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of  National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and  Information Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25,  2009.
Combating Illicit Financing: Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and  Financial Intelligence Could Manage More Effectively to Achieve Its  Mission. GAO-09-794. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information,  but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337.  Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were  Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.
Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization,  Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. GAO-08-351. Washington, D.C.:  February 19, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in  Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity  Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on  a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification.  GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving.  GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Terrorist Financing: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Deliver Counter- Terrorism-Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad.  GAO-06-632T. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and  Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,  D.C.: October 21, 2005.
Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration: Maritime  Security Program. GAO-06-123R. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2005.
Maritime Security Fleet: Many Factors Determine Impact of Potential  Limits on Food Aid Shipments. GAO-04-1065. Washington, D.C.:  September 13, 2004.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies Face Continuing Challenges in  Addressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering. GAO-04-501T.  Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2004.
Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess  Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms. GAO-04-163.  Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime  Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.