Emergency Management: Actions to Implement Select Provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
Published: 2009-03-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements--leadership, capabilities, and accountability--of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. In its 2006 work on the response to Hurricane Katrina, GAO noted that these elements needed to be strengthened. In October 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act to address issues identified in the response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO reported in November 2008 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had at least preliminary efforts under way to address most of the provisions, but also identified a number of areas that required further action. This statement discusses select issues within the basic elements related to (1) findings from the response to Hurricane Katrina, (2) provisions of the Post-Katrina Act, and (3) specific actions DHS and FEMA have taken to implement these provisions. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2006 through November 2008, and selected updates in March 2009. To obtain updated information, GAO consulted program officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO reported in September 2006 that the experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to respond to catastrophic disasters. For example, GAO reported that, in the response to Hurricane Katrina, there was confusion over roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan, including the roles of the DHS Secretary, the FEMA Administrator, the Principal Federal Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA's mission within DHS and set forth the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. The act also required that the FEMA Administrator provide a clear chain of command that accounts for these roles. In revising the National Response Plan--now called the National Response Framework--FEMA articulated specific roles for the PFO and FCO, which are described in GAO's November 2008 report. GAO reported in September 2006 that various congressional reports and GAO's own work on FEMA's performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggested that FEMA's capabilities were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the degree of damage and the number of hurricane victims. The capabilities issues GAO identified related to, among others, (1) emergency communications, (2) evacuations, (3) logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning and training, and (6) human capital. The Post-Katrina Act included a variety of provisions that related to these issues. For example, related to emergency communications, the act established an Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) within DHS. GAO reported in November 2008 that, in response to specific responsibilities outlined in its authorizing provision, OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and states to assess gaps in communications infrastructure and to determine technical requirements to enhance interoperable communications systems. GAO reported in February 2006 that accountability mechanisms--specifically, internal controls--were lacking or nonexistent in processing applications for individual and household assistance following Hurricane Katrina, which left the government vulnerable to fraud and abuse. For example, GAO estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent ($1 billion) in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply for disaster assistance. The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a system, including an electronic database, to counter improper payments. GAO reported in November 2008 that FEMA established a process to identify and collect duplicative payments by, among other things, enabling its disaster assistance database to check automatically for duplicate applications.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to strengthen emergency  management by implementing provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency  Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act), which Congress  enacted in October 2006 to address shortcomings in the preparation for  and response to Hurricane Katrina. My remarks today are grounded in our  prior work on FEMA’s and DHS’s response to Hurricane Katrina and the  actions they have taken to implement the Post-Katrina Act. In September  2006, we identified leadership, capabilities, and accountability as elements  that FEMA and DHS needed to strengthen to respond to catastrophic  disasters. This testimony discusses these three elements in terms of our  2006 findings about select issues within the elements; provisions of the  Post-Katrina Act that relate to those issues; the actions we reported in  November 2008 that FEMA and DHS have taken to implement those  provisions; and where possible, updates to these actions as of March 2009.
To conduct our 2006 work on Hurricane Katrina we visited the areas  affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi,  and Texas—and interviewed the governors of those states and the mayor  of New Orleans. We also interviewed senior federal officials. To conduct  our 2008 work about actions to implement provisions of the Post-Katrina  Act, we analyzed the text of the act and identified well over 300 discrete  provisions within the legislation that called for FEMA or DHS action to  implement requirements or exercise authorities. We reviewed agency  documents and discussed the act’s implementation with numerous senior- level program officials at FEMA and DHS to identify the actions that had  been taken. In March 2009, we consulted program officials about the  status of select actions to provide updates in this statement.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. More detailed information on our scope  and methodology appears in our published work.
This statement provides information about select actions related to our  2006 work on the response to Hurricane Katrina that FEMA and DHS have  taken to implement the Post-Katrina Act. The actions described are drawn  from our November 2008 report and, where possible, March 2009 updates  from program officials. As we reported in November 2008, for most of the  provisions we examined, FEMA and DHS had at least preliminary efforts  underway to address them. We also identified a number of areas that still  required action, and noted that it was clear that FEMA and DHS have work  remaining to implement the act.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: On August 29, 2005, and in the ensuing days, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and  Wilma devastated the Gulf Coast region of the United States. Hurricane  Katrina alone affected more than a half million people located within  approximately 90,000 square miles spanning Louisiana, Mississippi, and  Alabama, and ultimately resulted in over 1,600 deaths.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,  state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of  preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a catastrophic disaster.  Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select Bipartisan  Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane  Katrina, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  Committee, the White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS  Inspector General, DHS, and FEMA all identified a variety of failures and  some strengths in the preparation for, response to, and initial recovery  from Hurricane Katrina. Our findings about the response to Hurricane  Katrina in a March 2006 testimony and a September 2006 report focused  on the need for strengthened leadership, capabilities, and accountability to  improve emergency preparedness and response.
The Post-Katrina Act was enacted to address various shortcomings  identified in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. The  act enhances FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA  is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive  emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response,  recovery, and mitigation. Under the act, the FEMA Administrator reports  directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security; FEMA is now a distinct  entity within DHS; and the Secretary of Homeland Security can no longer  substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or  functions of FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by  subsequent legislation. The act further directs the transfer to FEMA of  many functions of DHS’s former Preparedness Directorate. The statute  also codified FEMA’s existing regional structure, which includes 10  regional offices, and specified their responsibilities. It also contains a  provision establishing in FEMA a National Integration Center, which is  responsible for the ongoing management and maintenance of the National  Incident Management System (NIMS)—which describes how emergency  incident response is to be managed and coordinated—and the National  Response Plan (NRP)—now revised and known as the National Response  Framework (NRF). In addition, the act includes several provisions to  strengthen the management and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For  example, the statute calls for a strategic human capital plan to shape and  improve FEMA’s workforce, authorizes recruitment and retention  bonuses, and establishes requirements for a Surge Capacity Force.
The Post-Katrina Act extends beyond changes to FEMA’s organizational  and management structure and includes legislative reforms in other  emergency management areas that were considered shortcomings during  Hurricane Katrina. For example, the Post-Katrina Act includes an  emergency communications title that requires, among other things, the  development of a National Emergency Communications Plan, as well as  the establishment of working groups within each FEMA region dedicated  to emergency communications coordination. The act also addresses  catastrophic planning and preparedness; for example, it charges FEMA’s  National Integration Center with revising the NRF’s catastrophic incident  annex, and it makes state catastrophic planning a component of one grant  program. In addition, the act addresses evacuation plans and exercises  and the needs of individuals with disabilities.
In November 2008, we reported the actions FEMA and DHS had taken in  response to more than 300 distinct provisions of the Post-Katrina Act that  we had identified. We also reported on areas where FEMA and DHS still  needed to take action and any challenges to implementation that FEMA  and DHS officials identified during our discussions with them. In general,  we found that FEMA and DHS had made some progress in their efforts to  implement the act since it was enacted in October 2006. For most of the  provisions we examined, FEMA and DHS had at least preliminary efforts  under way to address them. We also identified a number of areas that still  required action, and noted that it was clear that FEMA and DHS had work  remaining to implement the provisions of the act. Throughout this  statement, unless otherwise noted, the actions reported that DHS and  FEMA have taken to address provisions of the Post-Katrina Act are drawn  from our November 2008 report.
section_title: Leadership
paragraphs: Our 2006 report noted that in preparing for, responding to, and recovering  from any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles and  responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be  clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood in order to  facilitate rapid and effective decision making. We further noted that the  experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at  all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic disaster.  Specifically, we reported that in the response to Hurricane Katrina there  was confusion regarding roles and responsibilities under the NRP,  including the roles of the Secretary of Homeland Security and two key  federal officials with responsibility for disaster response—the Principal  Federal Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).
subsections: section_title: Updating the National Response Framework and Clarifying the Role of the FEMA Administrator
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA’s mission within DHS and set forth  the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. These provisions,  among other things, required that the FEMA Administrator provide advice  on request to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the  Secretary of Homeland Security, and that the FEMA Administrator report  directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security without having to report  through another official.
As a result of the limitations in the NRP revealed during the response to  Hurricane Katrina and as required by the Post-Katrina Act, DHS and FEMA  undertook a comprehensive review of the NRP. The result of this process  was the issuance, in January 2008, of the NRF (the name for the revised  NRP). The NRF states that it is to be a guide to how the nation conducts  an all-hazards response and manages incidents ranging from the serious  but purely local to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural  disasters. The NRF became effective in March 2008.
As reflected in the NRF and confirmed by FEMA’s Office of Policy and  Program Analysis and FEMA General Counsel, there is a direct reporting  relationship between the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of  Homeland Security. According to officials in FEMA’s Office of Policy and  Program Analysis, the FEMA Administrator gives emergency management  advice as a matter of course at meetings with the President, the Secretary  of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council.
The NRF also states that the Secretary of Homeland Security coordinates  with other appropriate departments and agencies to activate plans and  applicable coordination structures of the NRF, as required. The FEMA  Administrator assists the secretary in meeting these responsibilities.  FEMA is the lead agency for emergency management under NRF  Emergency Support Function #5, which is the coordination Emergency  Support Function for all federal departments and agencies across the  spectrum of domestic incident management from hazard mitigation and  preparedness to response and recovery.
section_title: Clarifying the Roles of the PFO and FCO
paragraphs: We reported in 2006 that in response to Hurricane Katrina, the Secretary of  Homeland Security initially designated the head of FEMA as the PFO, who  then appointed separate FCOs for Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. It  was not clear, however, who was responsible for coordinating the overall  federal effort at a strategic level. Our fieldwork indicated that the lack of  clarity in leadership roles and responsibilities resulted in disjointed efforts  of federal agencies involved in the response, a myriad of approaches and  processes for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about  who should be advised of requests and what resources would be provided  within specific time frames.
The Post-Katrina Act required that the Secretary of Homeland Security,  through the FEMA Administrator, provide a clear chain of command in the  NRF that accounts for the roles of the FEMA Administrator, the FCO, and  the PFO. According to the NRF, the Secretary of Homeland Security may  elect to designate a PFO to serve as his or her primary field representative  to ensure consistency of federal support as well as the overall  effectiveness of federal incident management. The NRF repeats the Post- Katrina Act’s prohibition that the PFO shall not direct or replace the  incident command structure or have directive authority over the FCO or  other federal and state officials. Under the NRF, the PFO’s duties include  providing situational awareness and a primary point of contact in the field  for the secretary, promoting federal interagency collaboration and conflict  resolution where possible, presenting to the secretary any policy issues  that require resolution, and acting as the primary federal spokesperson for  coordinated media and public communications.
According to DHS officials, at the time of our 2008 report, no PFO had  been operationally deployed for any Stafford Act event since the response  to Hurricane Katrina. DHS’s appropriations acts for fiscal years 2008 and  2009 have each included a prohibition that “none of the funds provided by  this or previous appropriations acts shall be used to fund any position  designated as a Principal Federal Official” for any Stafford Act declared  disasters or emergencies. Our Office of General Counsel plans to address  the implications of this funding prohibition in future work.
According to the NRF, the primary role and responsibilities of the FCO  include four major activities:  representing the FEMA Administrator in the field and discharging all  FEMA responsibilities for the response and recovery efforts under way;    administering Stafford Act authorities, including the commitment of FEMA  resources and the issuance of mission assignments to other federal  departments or agencies;    coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the federal response, within  the Unified Coordination Group at the Joint Field Office; and  interfacing with the State Coordinating Officer and other state, tribal, and  local response officials to determine the most urgent needs and set  objectives for an effective response in collaboration with the Unified  Coordination Group.
section_title: Updating the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement
paragraphs: The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the NRP (now NRF) was a source of  considerable criticism after Hurricane Katrina. The purpose of this annex  is to describe an accelerated, proactive national response to catastrophic  incidents and establish protocols to pre-identify and rapidly deploy  essential resources expected to be urgently needed. Lack of clarity about  the circumstance under which the annex should be activated contributed  to issues with clear roles and lines of responsibility and authority. Because  questions surrounded whether the annex should apply only to events that  occur with little or no notice rather than events with more notice that have  the potential to evolve into incidents of catastrophic magnitude, like a  strengthening hurricane, it did not provide a clear guidance about the  extent to which the federal government should have been involved in the  accelerated response role that it describes. We noted in 2006 that our  review of the NRP and its catastrophic incident annex—as well as lessons  from Hurricane Katrina—demonstrated the need for DHS and other  federal agencies to develop robust and detailed operational plans to  implement the catastrophic incident annex and its supplement in  preparation for and response to future catastrophic disasters.
Under the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA’s National Integration Center is  statutorily responsible for revising the Catastrophic Incident Annex and  for finalizing and releasing an operational supplement—the Catastrophic  Incident Supplement. The annex was revised and released in November  2008. Officials from FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate told us in  March 2009 that operational annexes of the Catastrophic Incident  Supplement are being updated to reflect the current response capabilities  of the federal government. FEMA officials told us that the annex and its  operational supplement were not activated during the 2008 hurricane  season because none of the storms resulted in a catastrophic incident that  would require their use.
section_title: Capabilities
paragraphs: In our 2006 report, we noted that developing the capabilities needed for  large-scale disasters is part of an overall national preparedness effort that  is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done, where, based on  what standards, how it should be done, and how well it should be done.  The response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the limitations in the  nation’s capabilities to respond to catastrophic disasters. Various reports  from Congress and others, along with our work on FEMA’s performance  before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggested that FEMA’s human,  financial, and technological resources and capabilities were insufficient to  meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and  the resulting number of hurricane victims. Among other things, in 2006 we  reported on problems during Hurricane Katrina with (1) emergency  communications, (2) evacuations, (3) logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning  and training, and (6) human capital.
subsections: section_title: Emergency Communications
paragraphs: Our 2006 report noted that emergency communications is a critical  capability common across all phases of an incident. Agencies’  communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be  operable, with sufficient communications to meet internal and emergency  communication requirements. Once operable, they then should have  communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g.,  police, fire, emergency medical services) and service agencies (e.g., public  works, transportation, hospitals) can communicate within and across  agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. Hurricane Katrina  caused significant damage to the communication infrastructure— including commercial landline and cellular telephone systems—in  Louisiana and Mississippi, which further contributed to a lack of  situational awareness for military and civilian officials.
Among other provisions aimed at strengthening emergency  communications capabilities, the Post-Katrina Act established an Office of  Emergency Communications (OEC) within DHS. The statutory  responsibilities of OEC include, but are not limited to, conducting  outreach, providing technical assistance, coordinating regional emergency  communications efforts, and coordinating the establishment of a national  response capability for a catastrophic loss of local and regional emergency  communications.
subsections: section_title: Stakeholder Outreach
paragraphs: OEC’s stakeholder outreach efforts have included coordinating with 150  individuals from the emergency response community to develop the  National Emergency Communications Plan. OEC officials stated that the  outreach was primarily carried out through several organizations that  represent officials from federal, state, and local governments and private- sector representatives from the communications, information technology,  and emergency services sectors.
section_title: Technical Assistance
paragraphs: Through the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance  Program, OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and  states to assess their communications infrastructure for gaps and  determine technical requirements that can be used to design or enhance  interoperable communications systems. According to the Deputy Director  of OEC, OEC provided technical assistance to 13 recipients of the 2007  Urban Area Security Initiative grants by providing guidance on technical  issues such as engineering solutions and drafting requests for proposals,  as well as providing best practices information. In addition, OEC offered  assistance to states and territories in developing their Statewide  Communication Interoperability Plans and, as of August 1, 2008, had  conducted plan development workshops for the 30 states and five  territories that requested such help.
section_title: Coordinating Regional Communications
paragraphs: Officials from OEC stated that they have been coordinating to minimize  any overlap between the roles and responsibilities of various DHS regional  staff offices related to emergency communications. According to the  officials, officials from these regional staff offices plan to attend and share  information through the Regional Emergency Communications  Coordination Working Groups—also established by the Post-Katrina Act.  OEC officials said that OEC had hired a federal employee to represent  OEC at working group meetings. In addition, OEC officials stated their  intention to hire regional interoperability coordinators for each of the 10  FEMA regions in fiscal year 2009 to work with FEMA on the activities of  the working groups.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that FEMA’s Disaster Emergency  Communications Division has filled one national and nine regional  positions to coordinate the working groups. FEMA’s Region II has not yet  filled the regional position. As of March 2009, all working groups, with the  exception of Regions II and IX, have been established. According to FEMA  officials, the eight established groups have had various levels of activity,  with the number of meetings ranging from one time (Regions VI and X) to  eight times (Regional IV). No updated information about specific efforts to  minimize overlap or to achieve the Post-Katrina Act objectives for the  working groups was provided.
section_title: Establishing a National Response Capability
paragraphs: To establish a national response capability for a catastrophic loss of local  and regional emergency communications, OEC officials told us they had  been working with FEMA and the National Communications System  (NCS) to coordinate policy and planning efforts relating to the existing  response capability managed through the NRF’s Communication Annex,  Emergency Support Function 2. According to OEC officials, an example  of this coordination was the inclusion of continuity of emergency  communications and response operations in the National Emergency  Communications Plan.
The officials also said that OEC would represent NCS in regions where the  system has no presence and would support the system’s private-sector  coordination role, as appropriate. In addition, the Director and Deputy  Director of OEC told us that OEC, FEMA, and the NCS were developing a  strategy that involved the OEC’s regional interoperability coordinators  providing technical support, playing a role as needed in Emergency  Support Function 2, and providing response capabilities within their  designated regions, among other things.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that FEMA and NCS have worked  closely to develop revised operating procedures that define their roles and  responsibilities under Emergency Support Function 2. In addition, they  said that NCS recently hired three Regional Emergency Communications  Coordinators with responsibility for coordinating with regional, private- sector communications providers. The NCS coordinators are working with  FEMA regional coordinators to ensure that infrastructure communications  restoration efforts are supported by and consistent with FEMA tactical  communications support to state and local response efforts.
To improve the national response capability, FEMA officials also reported  in March 2009 that they had defined an integrated response framework  and five critical disaster emergency communications incident support  functions—mission operations, facilities, tactical, restoration, and  planning and coordination. Additionally, the officials also reported  acquiring assets, assessing networks, and establishing prescripted mission  assignments to enhance response capabilities. Finally, the officials said  that FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications Division has coordinated  the development of 24 state and territory disaster emergency  communications annexes. They noted that some of these state and  territorial annexes were used in Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, as well as  during the Presidential Inauguration to support response activities,  understand state and local communications capabilities, and prepare for  any shortfalls that may arise.
In terms of tactical support, FEMA officials told us that FEMA’s Mobile  Emergency Response Support mission carried out a variety of support  activities during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. For example, among other  activities reported by the officials, FEMA provided mobile emergency  communications infrastructure to support continuity of local government  and supported maintenance and repair of communications equipment for  local first responders on Galveston Island.
section_title: Evacuations
paragraphs: We reported in 2006 that by definition, a catastrophic disaster like  Hurricane Katrina would impact a large geographic area necessitating the  evacuation of many people—including vulnerable populations, such as  hospital patients, nursing home residents, and transportation- disadvantaged populations who were not in such facilities.
subsections: section_title: Transportation Assistance
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act amended the Stafford Act to authorize transportation  assistance to relocate displaced individuals to and from alternate locations  for short- or long-term accommodations, or to return them to their  predisaster primary residences. FEMA officials in the Disaster Assistance  Directorate told us that they have developed a draft policy for  implementing the transportation assistance authority. They noted that it  would require implementation of proposed regulatory changes before  becoming effective, and as of March 2009, it was on hold due to these  required changes. In addition, they noted that according to FEMA’s July  2006 Mass Sheltering and Housing Assistance Strategy, if the scale of the  evacuation overwhelms affected states’ sheltering capabilities, FEMA will  coordinate and provide air or surface transportation in support of  interstate evacuation. If the evacuated area is without extensive damage to  residences, as stated in the strategy, FEMA will coordinate and fund return  mass transportation to the point of transportation origin. If the evacuated  area suffered extensive damage to residences, eligible evacuees are  authorized, with host state consent, to use FEMA funding known as Other  Needs Assistance to purchase return transportation when they are able to  do so.
section_title: Mass Evacuation Planning and Technical Assistance
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act authorized grants made to state, local, and tribal  governments through the State Homeland Security Program or the Urban  Area Security Initiative to be used to establish programs for mass- evacuation plan development and maintenance, preparation for execution  of mass evacuation plans, and exercises. According to the Director of  Grants Development and Administration, FEMA informed state, local, and  tribal governments that they may use the grant awards to assist mass  evacuation planning via the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security Grant  Program written guidance, which covers both grants.
The act also required the FEMA Administrator, in coordination with the  heads of other federal agencies, to provide evacuation preparedness  technical assistance to state, local, and tribal governments. FEMA  developed the Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the NRF, which  provides an overview of mass evacuation functions, agency roles and  responsibilities, and overall guidelines for the integration of federal, state,  tribal, and local support for the evacuation of large numbers of people  during incidents requiring a coordinated federal response. However,  according to officials in FEMA’s Disaster Operations Directorate, as of  March 10, 2009, FEMA had not finalized the Mass Evacuation Incident  Annex Operational Supplement to the NRF to provide additional guidance  for mass evacuations.
Officials in FEMA’s Disaster Operations Directorate also noted that the  states participating in FEMA’s Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative— an effort to strengthen response planning and capabilities for select  scenarios (e.g., a Category 5 hurricane making landfall in southern  Florida)—benefit from detailed federal, state, and local catastrophic  planning that includes examination of evacuation topics. These states  include Florida, Louisiana, California, and the eight Midwestern states in  the New Madrid Seismic Zone. National Preparedness Directorate officials  also told us that FEMA had conducted mass evacuation workshops in  Georgia and Florida and had provided technical assistance to the state of  Louisiana, helping to develop a mass evacuation plan. FEMA officials told  us that this plan—the Gulf Coast Evacuation Plan—was successfully  implemented during Hurricane Gustav to evacuate 2 million people from  New Orleans within 48 hours of the incident using a multimodal approach  (air, bus, and rail) and to enable their return within 4 days.
The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to provide mass evacuation planning  assistance to institutions that house individuals with special needs upon  request by a state, local, or tribal government. FEMA officials in the  Disaster Operations Directorate told us that they had not received any  requests for such assistance. These officials said that the draft Mass  Evacuation Incident Annex Operational Supplement will include a tab on  evacuation issues related to people with special needs and, once issued,  can provide guidance to hospitals, nursing homes, and other institutions  that house individuals with special needs. Officials from FEMA’s National  Preparedness Directorate also noted that the Homeland Security  Preparedness Technical Assistance Program provides technical assistance  upon request to jurisdictions interested in planning for mass evacuations.  Additionally, they said the directorate was developing evacuation and  reentry planning guidance for use by state and local governments, which is  scheduled for interim release in the summer of 2009.
section_title: Evacuation for Special Needs Populations
paragraphs: In establishing a Disability Coordinator within FEMA to ensure that the  needs of individuals with disabilities are addressed in emergency  preparedness and disaster relief, the Post-Katrina Act charged the  Disability Coordinator with specific evacuation-related responsibilities,  among other things. First, the act required the coordinator to ensure the  coordination and dissemination of model evacuation plans for individuals  with disabilities. Second, the act charged the coordinator with ensuring  the availability of accessible transportation options for individuals with  disabilities in the event of an evacuation. At the time of our 2008 report,  FEMA had efforts under way for each provision, but provided little  specific detail on the status of those efforts. The Disability Coordinator  told us that FEMA was in the process of developing model evacuation  plans for people with disabilities. She also told us that FEMA had begun to  work with state emergency managers to help develop evacuation plans  that include accessible transportation options, and that FEMA was  working with states to develop paratransit options as well as to coordinate  the use of accessible vans for hospitals and nursing homes.
section_title: Family and Child Locators
paragraphs: In 2006, we conducted work examining the nation’s efforts to protect  children after the Gulf Coast hurricanes and identified evacuation  challenges for this population. We noted that thousands of children were  reported missing to the National Center for Missing and Exploited  Children, which used its trained investigators to help locate missing  children after the evacuation. Officials from this Center stated that both  the American Red Cross and FEMA had some information on the location  of children in their databases; however, they said it was difficult to obtain  this information because of privacy concerns. These officials told us that  standing agreements for data sharing among organizations tracking  missing children, the Red Cross, and FEMA could help locate missing  persons more quickly.
The Post-Katrina Act established two mechanisms to help locate family  members and displaced children. First, the act established the National  Emergency Child Locator Center within the National Center for Missing  and Exploited Children and enumerated the responsibilities of the center,  among other things, to provide technical assistance in locating displaced  children and assist in the reunification of displaced children with their  families. Second, the act required the FEMA Administrator to establish  the National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System to help  reunify families separated after an emergency or major disaster.
The National Emergency Child Locator Center and the Family Registry  and Locator System have each established a hotline and a Web site. The  family locator system has a mechanism to redirect any request to search  for or register displaced children to the National Emergency Child Locator  Center.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that the family locator system was  activated and used during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike after it was  determined that the coastal evacuations of Louisiana and Texas would  involve millions of people. Once activated, FEMA’s Public Affairs Office  informed the media in the affected areas about the availability of the  service. Officials noted that use of the family locator system during  Hurricane Gustav resulted in 558 registrants and 862 searches, and use  during Hurricane Ike resulted in 1,162 registrants and 1,034 searches. The  National Emergency Child Locator Center was not activated, but three  referrals (one during Hurricane Gustav and two during Hurricane Ike)  were forwarded to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children  through the family locator system Web site.
At the time of our 2008 report, FEMA had established a memorandum of  understanding (MOU), effective March 6, 2007, with the following  organizations: the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and  Human Services, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,  and the American Red Cross that, among other things, requires signatory  agencies to participate in a cooperative agreement, and for FEMA, through  the National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System, to provide  relevant information to the National Emergency Child Locator Center. The  Disaster Assistance Directorate Unit Leader told us that the child locator  center was, at that time, in the process of finalizing cooperative  agreements with federal and state agencies and other organizations such  as the American Red Cross to help implement its mission. FEMA officials  told us that, as of March 2009, a cooperative agreement between FEMA  and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children was being  finalized. They said they expected the agreement to be tested during the  2009 hurricane season.
section_title: Logistics
paragraphs: We reported in 2006 that our work and that of others indicated that  logistics systems—the capability to identify, dispatch, mobilize, and  demobilize and to accurately track and record available critical resources  throughout all incident management phases—were often totally  overwhelmed by Hurricane Katrina. Critical resources apparently were not  available, properly distributed, or provided in a timely manner. The result  was duplication of deliveries, lost supplies, or supplies never being  ordered.
FEMA is responsible for coordinating logistics during disaster response  efforts, but during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA quickly became  overwhelmed, in part because it lacked the people, processes, and  technology to maintain visibility—from order through final delivery—of  the supplies and commodities it had ordered. Similarly, our 2006 work  examining the coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross to provide  relief to disaster victims found that FEMA did not have a comprehensive  system to track requests for assistance it received from the Red Cross on  behalf of voluntary organizations and state and local governments for  items such as water, food, and cots.The Post-Katrina Act required FEMA  to develop an efficient, transparent, and flexible logistics system for  procurement and delivery of goods and services necessary for an effective  and timely emergency response.
subsections: section_title: Logistics Management
paragraphs: In November 2008, we reported that FEMA had taken multiple actions to  improve its logistics management. First, seeking to develop an effective  and efficient logistics planning and operations capability, FEMA elevated  its logistics office from the branch to the directorate level, establishing the  Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) in April 2007.
Second, FEMA and the U.S. General Services Administration—FEMA’s co- lead for Emergency Support Function 7—sponsored the National  Logistics Coordination Forum in March 2008. The forum was intended to  open a dialogue between the sponsors and their logistics partners, and to  discuss how to better involve the private sector in planning for and  recovering from disasters. The forum was attended by representatives  from other federal agencies, public and private sector groups,  nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders.
Third, to improve its supply chain management, FEMA brought in a supply  chain expert from the United Parcel Service through its Loaned Executive  Program. FEMA also has a Private Sector Office to exchange information  on best practices and to facilitate engagement with the private sector. In  addition, FEMA established a Distribution Management Strategy Working  Group in January 2008 to analyze and develop a comprehensive  distribution and supply chain management strategy.
Finally, in 2007, FEMA conducted the Logistics Management  Transformation Initiative, a comprehensive assessment of FEMA’s  logistics planning, processes, and technology. LMD officials intend for this  initiative to help inform the development of a long-term strategy to  transform FEMA’s business processes and identify information technology  development opportunities. According to LMD officials, FEMA plans to  complete this transformation by 2009, and review and refine business  processes by 2014.
We noted in our November 2008 report, as an area to be addressed, that  the DHS Office of Inspector General reported in May 2008 that, while  FEMA had developed a logistics planning strategy that calls for developing  three levels of logistics plans (strategic, operational, and tactical), the  FEMA Incident Logistics Concept of Operations and a Logistics  Management Operations Manual were still in draft.
section_title: Total Asset Visibility
paragraphs: Our 2006 findings about logistics challenges included FEMA’s inability to  maintain visibility over supplies, commodities, and requests for assistance.  As of August 1, 2008, FEMA had fully implemented Total Asset Visibility  (TAV) programs in FEMA Regions IV and VI to manage and track,  electronically and in real time, the movement of its disaster commodities  and assets. At that time, according to FEMA LMD officials, TAV was  partially available in the other eight FEMA regions. FEMA officials told us  in March 2009 that the strategy to fully implement TAV by 2011 was  undergoing a comprehensive review. LMD had restricted spending to  critical mission functions, pending completion of the review. In the  meantime, they said LMD would focus on capabilities that could have the  most significant impact during the 2009 hurricane season, specifically, the  aspect of TAV used for warehouse management and the aspect that would  allow FEMA to use the system to order materials and from and track  shipments of its response partners. Initially LMD is working with four  partners—the Defense Logistics Agency, the General Services  Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the American Red  Cross. According to LMD officials, at the time of our November 2008  report, the aspect of TAV FEMA uses for warehouse management was only  available at distribution centers in Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort Worth,  Texas. The officials stated that FEMA expected to deploy the warehouse  management portion of TAV to the other six FEMA distribution centers— in Berryville, Virginia; Frederick, Maryland; San Jose, California; Guam;  Hawaii; and Puerto Rico—in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Further, the  officials said that shipments from FEMA’s logistics partners were not yet  tracked through TAV, but FEMA and the four initial partners were working  to provide full visibility of critical shipments to disaster areas.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that during Hurricanes Gustav and  Ike, they used TAV to create and track commodity requirements fulfilled  by FEMA or its partners and to track FEMA shipments in-transit. The  officials noted that they were not able to track shipments from partners  before they arrived at FEMA sites but that deficiency could be corrected  when the partner-tracking aspect of TAV was fully implemented. They also  said they used TAV’s warehouse management system, where available, to  track and manage shipments, receipts and inventory for eight critical  commodities daily. Other commodities that could not yet be tracked  through TAV’s warehouse management system had to be manually entered  into the system. Finally, they said they used TAV to track in-transit  visibility of ambulances, buses, and temporary housing units.
In March 2009, FEMA officials also shared four major lessons learned and  planned corrective actions resulting from the response to Hurricanes Ike  and Gustav. The four lessons learned related to: (1) inconsistent use of  TAV in the field during Hurricane Ike, (2) lack of TAV specialists to  support all distribution sites, (3) slow and unreliable connectivity to the  TAV system, and (4) use of standard operating procedures. To address  inconsistent use of TAV, FEMA officials say they have increased  standardized training and awareness at all levels within FEMA and have  developed a TAV communications plan intended increase awareness of  TAV capabilities. To address issues with the availability of TAV specialists,  FEMA officials told us they have identified and screened additional TAV  specialists, are planning to hire additional Disaster Assistance Employees,  and are planning to crosstrain additional employees. To address  connectivity issues, FEMA officials said they are testing use of portable  satellite equipment and scanners that are hardwired to a satellite. They  also said they are seeking to use extended wireless access to support  operations during the 2009 hurricane season. To address issues with  standard operating procedures, FEMA officials said they are reviewing and  updating the procedures and reemphasizing the appropriate use of TAV  through training.
section_title: Mass Care
paragraphs: Mass care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers,  basic first aid, and bulk distribution of needed items and related services  to affected persons. As we reported in 2006, during Hurricane Katrina,  charities and government agencies that provide human services, supported  by federal resources, helped meet the mass care needs of the hundreds of  thousands of evacuees. The Post-Katrina Act contained multiple  provisions aimed at strengthening capabilities to provide for immediate  mass care and sheltering needs, particularly for special needs populations.
subsections: section_title: Accelerated Federal Assistance
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act amended the Stafford Act to authorize the President  to provide accelerated federal assistance in the absence of a specific  request where necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or  mitigate severe damage in a major disaster or emergency. The act required  the President to promulgate and maintain guidelines to assist governors in  requesting the declaration of an emergency in advance of a disaster  event. FEMA issued an interim Disaster Assistance Policy in July 2007,  which provides guidelines to assist governors in requesting the declaration  of an emergency in advance of a disaster.
According to officials in FEMA’s Disaster Operations Directorate, FEMA  has established a program to preposition goods and services in advance of  a potential disaster. For example, the officials explained that FEMA was  able to respond quickly to a state that had been affected by ice storms  because the agency, acting without an initial request from the state, had  prepositioned goods in advance of the storms. FEMA officials told us  FEMA was reviewing a draft policy directive that would allow FEMA to  provide federal assistance without a declaration if a state would agree to  assume the normal cost share after a declaration has been made or to  assume total cost if no declaration is made.
section_title: Special Needs Populations
paragraphs: In establishing a Disability Coordinator within FEMA to ensure that the  needs of individuals with disabilities are addressed in emergency  preparedness and disaster relief, the Post-Katrina Act charged the  coordinator with coordinating and disseminating best practices for special  needs populations. The Disability Coordinator shared with us two such  practices that were in progress at the time of our November 2008 report.  First, FEMA was developing “go kits” for people with developmental  impairments, the hearing impaired, and the blind. The go kits are to  contain visual and hearing devices. For example, the go kit for the hearing  impaired will include a teletypewriter, a keyboard with headphones, and a  clipboard with sound capabilities. The go kits are to be stored in the  regions and include a list of their contents and directions for use. Second,  the Disability Coordinator said FEMA was developing a handbook for  federal, state, and local officials to use in the field to help them better  accommodate those with disabilities.
In addition, the Post-Katrina Act required that the FEMA Administrator, in  coordination with the National Advisory Council, the National Council on  Disabilities, the Interagency Coordinating Council on Preparedness and  Individuals with Disabilities, and the Disability Coordinator, develop  guidelines to accommodate individuals with disabilities.
FEMA has published a reference guide titled Accommodating Individuals  with Disabilities in the Provisions of Disaster Mass Care, Housing, and  Human Services. The reference guide describes existing legal  requirements and standards relating to access for people with disabilities,  with a focus on equal access requirements related to mass care, housing,  and human services. The reference guide states that it is not intended to  satisfy all of the guideline requirements contained in the Post-Katrina Act.
In addition to the reference guide, FEMA released for public comment  guidance titled Interim Emergency Management Planning Guide for  Special Needs Populations. This interim guidance—also known as the  Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 301—addressed some of the  requirements contained in the Post-Katrina Act, such as access to shelters  and portable toilets and access to emergency communications and public  information. However, it did not address other requirements, such as  access to first-aid stations and mass-feeding areas.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that they had received final  comments on CPG 301 and expected to release the final document in  spring 2009. In addition, FEMA officials stated that they have developed  guidance for the Functional Needs Support Unit, which they expect to  publish by the end of March 2009. According to the interim version of CPG  301, the Functional Needs Support guidance will serve as a template for  developing sheltering plans for special needs populations. Once the  Functional Needs Support program is in place, the Functional Needs  Support Unit can be used in shelters, so that trained and certified shelter  staff will be assigned to serve as caregivers and provide the assistance  normally supplied by a family member or attendant. FEMA officials told us  that the agency will contract to provide training to states and localities on  how to implement the Functional Needs Support guidance—such as how  to provide staff, caregivers, durable medical equipment, and facility  access.
FEMA officials stated that, in the absence of completed guidance for the  2008 hurricane season, shelters received the Justice Department’s  Americans with Disabilities Act Checklist for Emergency Shelters. They  also said that the 2008 hurricane season highlighted the need for a  standardized but scalable approach to sheltering special needs  populations, with attention given to durable medical equipment,  caregivers, trained staff, and special diets for evacuees.
section_title: Planning and Exercises
paragraphs: As we reported in 2006, ensuring that needed capabilities are available  requires effective planning and coordination, as well as training and  exercises, in which the capabilities are realistically tested, and problems  identified and lessons learned and subsequently addressed in partnership  with other federal, state, and local stakeholders. Clear roles and  coordinated planning are necessary, but not sufficient by themselves to  ensure effective disaster management. It is important to test the plans and  participants’ operational understanding of their roles and responsibilities  through robust training and exercise programs.
subsections: section_title: National Exercise and Training Programs
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act required the FEMA Administrator, in coordination  with the heads of appropriate federal agencies, the National Council on  Disabilities, and the National Advisory Council, to carry out a national  training program and a national exercise program. FEMA’s National  Preparedness Directorate has established a National Exercise Program.  According to officials from FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate,  the National Exercise Program conducts four Principal-Level Exercises  and one National-Level Exercise annually. These FEMA officials said that  the Principal-Level Exercises are discussion-based (i.e., tabletop or  seminar) to examine emerging issues and that one is conducted in  preparation for the annual National-Level Exercise. The National-Level  Exercises are operations-based exercises (drills, functional exercises, and  full-scale exercises) intended to evaluate existing national plans and  policies, in concert with other federal and nonfederal entities. We have  ongoing work examining the National Exercise Program, and we expect to  publish a report on the results of our work this spring.
FEMA’s Deputy for National Preparedness told us that DHS and FEMA  were developing the Homeland Security National Training Program to  oversee and coordinate homeland security training programs, increase  training capacity, and ensure standardization across programs.
section_title: National Exercise Simulation Center
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act also required the President to establish a National  Exercise Simulation Center (NESC) that uses a mix of live, virtual, and  constructive simulations to, among other things, provide a learning  environment for the homeland security personnel of all federal agencies,  and that uses modeling and simulation for training, exercises, and  command and control functions at the operational level.
According to FEMA officials, FEMA has been using FEMA Simulation  Centers, Department of Defense facilities, and other facilities to support  exercise simulation while it develops the NESC. For example, FEMA  officials said that FEMA has provided initial exercise simulation support  for exercises requiring the two highest levels of federal interagency  participation in the National Exercise Program. According to an official in  FEMA’s National Integration Center, the NESC is currently under  development and is estimated to take 3 to 4 years to fully establish.
section_title: Remedial Action Management Program
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act also required the FEMA Administrator, in  coordination with the National Council on Disabilities and the National  Advisory Council, to establish a remedial action management program to,  among other things, track lessons learned and best practices from training,  exercises, and actual events.
FEMA launched the Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) in  2003 and released it as a Web application for all FEMA intranet users in  January 2006. RAMP uses FEMA facilitators to conduct sessions  immediately after exercises or events, and these facilitators are  responsible for developing issue descriptions for remedial actions. In  addition, FEMA has a related program called the Corrective Action  Program (CAP) that is to be used for governmentwide corrective action  tracking by federal, state, and local agencies. While RAMP is FEMA’s  internal remedial action program, CAP is designed to serve as an  overarching program for linking federal, state, and local corrective  actions. FEMA developed RAMP prior to enactment of the Post-Katrina  Act. However, FEMA has not yet established any mechanisms to  coordinate ongoing implementation of RAMP or CAP with the National  Council on Disabilities or the National Advisory Council. We have ongoing  work related to FEMA’s efforts to track corrective actions from exercises  and actual events. We plan to publish a report this spring.
section_title: Human Capital Issues
paragraphs: In 2006, we reported that the various Congressional reports and our own  work on FEMA’s performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina  suggest that FEMA’s human resources were insufficient to meet the  challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the  resulting number of hurricane victims.
subsections: section_title: Surge Capacity
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act requires the FEMA Administrator to prepare and  submit to Congress a plan to establish and implement a Surge Capacity  Force for deployment to disasters, including catastrophic incidents. The  act requires the plan to include procedures for designation of staff from  other DHS components and executive agencies to serve on the Surge  Capacity Force. It also required that the plan ensure that the Surge  Capacity Force includes a sufficient number of appropriately credentialed  individuals capable of deploying to disasters after being activated, as well  as full-time, highly trained, credentialed individuals to lead and manage.
The Director of FEMA’s Disaster Reserve Workforce explained that unlike  in the military model, FEMA’s disaster reservists are the primary resource  for disaster response and recovery positions, filling 70-80 percent of all  Joint Field Office positions. FEMA has interpreted Surge Capacity Force  to include its Disaster Reserve Workforce of 5,000-6,000 reserve Disaster  Assistance Employees, who are full-time and contract staff. If additional  capacity is necessary, another approximately 2,000 Disaster Assistance  Employees are available to perform immediate, nontechnical functions  that require large numbers of staff. Other sources FEMA has identified  include local hires—additional staff hired from the affected area to  perform the same functions as disaster reservists; contract support for  activities that require specialized skill sets and for general disaster  assistance functions; other full-time FEMA staff detailed to perform  disaster assistance work; and other resources—particularly employees  from other DHS components—detailed to perform disaster assistance  work.
FEMA’s Disaster Reserve Workforce provided information on the  deployment of FEMA workforce in response to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike,  as outlined in table 1.
FEMA contracted to perform a baseline assessment and preliminary  design for professionalizing the Disaster Reserve Workforce and its  supporting program management function, including FEMA’s Surge  Capacity Force planning. The contractor developed a preliminary design  for the Disaster Reserve Workforce, which included an organizational  concept, workforce size and composition, concept of operations, and a  policy framework. An Interim Surge Capacity Force Plan was announced  in a meeting of the DHS Human Capital Council in March 2008 and  communicated to the heads of DHS components in a May 2008  memorandum from the FEMA Administrator.
Despite the initial actions FEMA has taken to assess its baseline  capabilities and draft an interim Surge Capacity Force Plan, according to  the Director of the Disaster Workforce Division, FEMA has not yet  provided Congress with a plan for establishing and implementing a Surge  Capacity Force. The director stated that her goal is to submit a plan to  implement a surge capacity force by summer 2009 with timelines and  information on select—but not all—positions in the disaster reserve  workforce.
In May 2008, FEMA sent a list of job titles and positions needed in the  Surge Capacity Force to all DHS Human Capital Officers and asked them  to identify approximately 900 employees throughout DHS for the Surge  Capacity Force. According to the director of the Disaster Reserve  Workforce Division, the initial DHS Agency Surge Capacity designation  lists were submitted in June 2008. However, she stated that upon review,  there were inconsistencies with the different agencies’ interpretation of  requirements for personnel, training, and skill sets. Therefore, a Surge  Capacity Force Working Group met to review surge staffing requirements  and to develop a timeline for the development of processes and a Concept  of Operations Plan. Agency participants in the working group included  FEMA, the Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Citizenship  and Immigration Services. The Disaster Reserve Workforce Division told  us that, as of March 2009, a draft of the Concept of Operations Plan was  being reviewed within these three component agencies and a final product  is expected to be delivered for DHS review by June 30, 2009. According to  the Disaster Reserve Workforce Division, because internal FEMA  resources were sufficient to respond effectively to Hurricanes Gustav and  Ike, FEMA did not require the assistance of other federal agency  employees for those events.
The Disaster Reserve Workforce Division, in partnership with FEMA’s  Emergency Management Institute, has been developing standardized  credentialing plans, which will incorporate existing position task books  for the Disaster Assistance Employee workforce (a total of 230 positions  organized in 23 cadres). FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that they had  either initiated development of or completed credentialing plans for 102  positions. They said they expected to complete the remaining  credentialing plans for all cadres and positions by spring 2010. Disaster  Reserve Workforce Division officials explained that development of the  credentialing plans in conjunction with the position task books will  highlight gaps in the training curriculum that will assist in prioritizing  curriculum development.
Apart from the Disaster Reserve Workforce Division’s credentialing  initiative, the FEMA workforce is to be credentialed by the National  Preparedness Directorate’s NIMS credentialing program, the  administrative process for validating the qualifications of personnel,  assessing their background, and authorizing their access to incidents  involving mutual aid between states. FEMA officials told us in March 2009  that the NIMS Credentialing Guideline was posted to the Federal Register  and issued for public comment on December 22, 2008, and the comment  period closed on January 21, 2009. They said comments have been  collected and were to be adjudicated March 11, 2009. According to the  officials, following adjudication, the guideline is to be revised and  submitted to the Executive Secretariat for formal FEMA adoption and  release. According to FEMA officials, experiences from the 2008 hurricane  season confirmed the basic need for the credentialing program.
section_title: Strike Teams and Emergency Response Teams
paragraphs: The Post-Katrina Act requires each FEMA Regional Office to staff and  oversee one or more strike teams within the region to serve as the focal  point of the federal government’s initial response efforts and to build  federal response capabilities within their regions. The act also requires  the President, acting through the FEMA Administrator to establish  emergency response teams (at least three at the national level and a  sufficient number at the regional level).
According to Disaster Operations Directorate officials, “strike teams” and  “emergency response teams,” the Post-Katrina Act’s terms for the support  teams deployed to assist in major disasters and emergencies under the  Stafford Act, are now called Incident Management Assistance Teams  (IMAT). IMATs are interagency national- or regional-based teams  composed of subject matter experts and incident-management  professionals, and are designed to manage and coordinate national  response emergencies and major disasters. According to the officials,  Regional Administrators oversee IMATs based within their regions. IMAT  personnel are intended to be permanent, full-time employees whose duties  and responsibilities are solely focused on their IMAT functions. The  officials said that the IMATs’ other functions include working with state  and local emergency managers to plan, prepare, and train for disasters;  running exercises; and building relationships with emergency managers  and other IMAT personnel. National IMATs are to consist of 26 positions,  including a designated team leader and senior managers for operations,  logistics, planning, and finance and administration sections. This sectional  organization mirrors the incident command structure presented in the  NIMS.
FEMA has established a national IMAT in the National Capital Region and  a second national IMAT in Sacramento, California, according to FEMA  officials in the Disaster Operations Directorate. At the regional level,  Disaster Operations Directorate officials said that IMATs had been  established in FEMA Regions II, IV, V, and VI. According to these officials,  they are in the process of establishing a fifth regional IMAT in Region VII,  to become operational later this year. They said that FEMA’s intention is  to establish IMATs in all 10 regions by the end of fiscal year 2010 and a  third national team in fiscal year 2011.
According to FEMA officials in the Disaster Operations Directorate,  although the National IMAT established in the National Capital Region was  fully staffed, when we reported in November 2008, some IMAT positions  were not yet filled with permanent full-time employees, but rather with  FEMA detailees who had been selected for their advanced training and  expertise. In general, the detailees were to provide guidance and support  to the permanent full-time employees until the teams were fully staffed  with personnel capable of managing their respective IMATs.
According to officials in FEMA’s Disaster Operations Directorate, at the  time of our November 2008 report, FEMA had procured personal  equipment for IMAT members and had ordered communications vehicles.  In addition, the National IMAT had participated in the National-Level  Exercise 2008. Also, Disaster Operations Directorate officials told us that  IMATs supported a number of disasters and special events in 2008  (including recent storms and hurricanes and the Democratic and  Republican National Conventions).
FEMA has established mandatory training courses for all IMAT personnel,  in addition to the standard training required for all FEMA employees.  According to officials in FEMA’s Disaster Operations Directorate, they  have been implementing a credentialing program for the IMATs. FEMA  planned to incorporate training and credentialing for all hazards by  identifying core competencies required for each IMAT position and  assessing the competencies against existing task descriptions to guide the  development of mandatory training and credentialing plans. According to  these officials, as of March 2009, a draft of the credentialing plan was  under review and they indicated that the credentialing process will be  consistent with FEMA’s Disaster Workforce Credentialing Plan.
At the time of our November 2008 report, Disaster Operations Directorate  officials told us that FEMA was finalizing an IMAT doctrine and a Concept  of Operations Plan. However, FEMA did not describe to us how it  established or intended to establish target capabilities for the IMATs,  which are required by the Post-Katrina Act as the basis for determining  whether the IMATs consist of an adequate number of properly planned,  organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel.
section_title: Accountability
paragraphs: Our 2006 report noted that when responding to the needs of the victims of  a catastrophic disaster, FEMA must balance controls and accountability  mechanisms with the immediate need to deliver resources and assistance  in an environment where the agency’s initial response efforts must focus  on life-saving and life-sustaining tasks. We reported in February 2006 that  weak or nonexistent internal controls in processing applications left the  government vulnerable to fraud and abuse, such as duplicative payments.  We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent  ($1 billion) in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants  who used invalid information to apply for disaster assistance.
The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a system, including an  electronic database, to counter improper payments in the provision of  assistance to individuals and households.
FEMA has established a process to identify and collect duplicative  Individual and Households Program (IHP) payments. This process  includes, among other things, FEMA’s disaster assistance database  automatically checking specific data fields in every applicant record for  potentially duplicate applications, having a FEMA caseworker and a  supervisor review potentially duplicate applications to determine if FEMA  is entitled to collect a payment already made, and notifying the applicant  of FEMA’s decision to collect a duplicate payment while providing an  appeal process for the applicant.
In addition, FEMA provides applicants with a copy of its application and a  program guide, Help after a Disaster: Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals  and Households Program. Updated and reissued in July 2008, this guide  provides applicants with information on the proper use of IHP payments.
Moreover, according to FEMA, the agency established identity verification  processes, which include verifying that the applicant’s social security  number is valid, matches the applicant’s name, and does not belong to a  deceased individual. Further, FEMA reported that it has implemented  procedures to validate that the address an applicant reports as damaged  was the applicant’s primary residence during the time of the disaster and  that the address is located within the disaster-affected area.
According to FEMA’s Information Technology Report submitted to  Congress in September 2007 under section 640 of the Post-Katrina Act,  FEMA uses the National Emergency Management Information System to  perform numerous disaster-related activities, including providing disaster  assistance to individuals and communities. Although this system interfaces  with FEMA’s financial accounting system through a special module, FEMA  has not yet taken action to ensure that applicant information collected in  the system is integrated with disbursement and payment records to  determine ineligible applicants.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my  statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other  Members of the Committee may have.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Leyla Kazaz, Assistant Director,  and Kathryn Godfrey, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Lara  Kaskie, Christine Davis and Janet Temko made significant contributions to  the work. Other contributors to the work include Jonathan Tumin, Sara  Margraf, and Michael Blinde.
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