Earthquakes: Additional Actions Needed to Identify and Mitigate Risks to Federal Buildings and Implement an Early Warning System
Published: 2016-08-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Earthquakes pose a significant threat to people and infrastructure because of their capacity to cause catastrophic casualties, property damage, and economic disruption. According to the USGS, 16 states have a relatively high likelihood of experiencing damaging ground shaking in the next 50 years, and nearly half of all Americans are exposed to potentially damaging earthquakes.
GAO was asked to review efforts to mitigate against earthquakes impacts in the United States. Specifically, this report address (1) actions select cities have taken to mitigate seismic risks, (2) the distribution of federal buildings relative to earthquake prone areas and actions to identify and mitigate seismic risks to these buildings, and (3) what is known about the benefits of USGS's earthquake early warning system, ShakeAlert, and the extent to which implementation challenges are being addressed. GAO reviewed key documents and federal authorities; collected federal building inventory information; conducted site visits to selected cities—Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Memphis; and interviewed, among others, federal, state, and local officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The four cities GAO visited (see figure) have taken various actions to assess and mitigate seismic risks, including identifying and assessing their high risk buildings, structurally retrofitting buildings, and requiring that furnishings and nonstructural components be secured, among other things.
Note: A 2 percent in 50 years probability equates to an earthquake recurring and exceeding a given MMI level about every 2,475 years.
About 40 percent of federally-owned and -leased buildings in the United States are located in areas where very strong to extreme shaking from earthquakes could occur. The Department of Defense (DOD) and General Services Administration (GSA), which are responsible for the majority of these buildings, have not fully identified their exceptionally high risk (EHR) buildings or prioritized and implemented comprehensive seismic safety measures. Federal agencies identified their EHR buildings as part of a government-wide effort in the 1990's, and GSA has begun taking initial steps to identify its current EHR buildings. In addition, while DOD and GSA have taken some steps to reduce the seismic risk of their buildings through seismic retrofits, disposals, and low-cost mitigation alternatives, GAO observed gaps in the extent to which these agencies have comprehensively implemented these mitigation measures, such as securing furniture. Until they fully identify their EHR buildings and prioritize and implement comprehensive safety measures, DOD and GSA will be unable to fully understand and address the vulnerabilities of their buildings.
U.S. Geological Survey's (USGS) early warning system—ShakeAlert—is capable of broadcasting early warnings, and stakeholders, including state agencies and universities, have identified multiple benefits, such as enhanced public safety. However, implementation challenges exist that could inhibit efforts to expand the system throughout the western United States. For example, decisions on funding, public education, and user certification are needed to enable implementation of an integrated system across jurisdictions. Developing a program management plan, which helps establish management controls, could help address ShakeAlert implementation challenges.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD and GSA (1) fully identify their exceptionally high risk buildings; (2) prioritize and implement comprehensive seismic safety measures to mitigate earthquake risks; and (3) that USGS develop a program management plan to address, among other things, ShakeAlert implementation challenges. DOD, GSA, and USGS agreed with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the United States each year, natural disasters cause hundreds of  deaths and cost billions of dollars in disaster aid, disruption of commerce,  and destruction of homes and critical infrastructure. According to the  Department of the Interior United States Geological Survey (USGS),  within the United States, hurricanes account for about two-thirds of the  insured property losses, and over 75 percent of declared federal disasters  are related to floods; however, earthquakes, while less frequent, have the  highest potential for causing catastrophic casualties, property damage,  and economic disruption. Earthquakes pose a significant threat to people  and infrastructure by producing damaging ground shaking, tsunamis, and  fires, among other hazards. According to the USGS, 16 states have a  relatively high likelihood of experiencing damaging ground shaking in the  next 50 years, and nearly half of all Americans are exposed to potentially  dangerous damaging earthquakes. For example, according to USGS,  there is a 99 percent chance that California will experience a magnitude  6.7 or greater earthquake in the next 30 years.
Preparing for and reducing risk of damage from earthquakes is largely the  responsibility of state and local government agencies; however, the  federal government provides support through coordinated activities of key  agencies in response to legal requirements and policy directives. For  example, the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act (EHRA) of 1977, as  amended, seeks to reduce the risks of life and property from future  earthquakes through the establishment and maintenance of an effective  earthquake hazards reduction program. EHRA established the National  Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), which, among other  things, promotes the adoption of earthquake hazards reduction measures  by the federal government and others with a role in planning and  constructing buildings, structures, and lifelines through the development  of standards, guidelines, and voluntary consensus codes aimed at  reducing the damaging effects of earthquakes. NEHRP promotes  improved design and construction methods, coordinated emergency  preparedness plans, and public education and involvement programs.
The four agencies that work together in coordination through the NEHRP  partnership are the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Institute of  Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Science Foundation  (NSF), and USGS. FEMA is the federal agency responsible for improving  the nation’s capacity to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and  recover from and mitigate all hazards. As part of these responsibilities,  FEMA is charged by NEHRP with, among other things, promoting better  building practices and providing assistance to enable states to improve  earthquake preparedness. NIST is the lead NEHRP agency and has the  primary responsibility for NEHRP planning and coordination. NIST  conducts earthquake engineering research to provide the technical basis  for building codes, standards, and practices, and is responsible for  working with FEMA and others to implement improved earthquake- resistant design guidance for building codes and standards for new and  existing buildings. NSF supports research in seismology, fault physics,  and rock and mineral physics; structural and geotechnical earthquake  engineering; and social, behavioral, and economic sciences pertinent to  the preparation for, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from  earthquakes and tsunamis. USGS provides the nation with earthquake  monitoring and notification, delivers regional and national seismic hazard  assessments, and coordinates post-earthquake investigations, among  other responsibilities. In addition, USGS is the lead federal agency  responsible for developing and implementing an Earthquake Early  Warning (EEW) system—known as ShakeAlert—which is intended to  warn people prior to earthquake shaking.
In addition to the four agencies responsible for managing earthquake  preparedness, all federal agencies manage their own building inventories,  the majority of which are owned or leased by the Department of Defense  (DOD) and the General Services Administration (GSA). Specifically, as of  September 2014, DOD owns or leases 50 percent and GSA owns or  leases 3 percent of the approximately 252,000 federally-owned or -leased  buildings in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. In addition, DOD  (56 percent) and GSA (16 percent) owned or leased buildings account for  about 72 percent of total federal building space in the United States.
Understanding the concerns that seismically deficient buildings located in  earthquake hazard areas pose a public safety threat, you requested that  we review federal earthquake mitigation efforts. Specifically, this report  addresses the following questions:  1.  What actions have select city governments taken to assess and  mitigate seismic risks that could affect buildings in their jurisdictions?  2.  What is the distribution of federal buildings with regard to seismic  hazard areas, and to what extent have select federal agencies  identified and mitigated seismic risks to their buildings?  3.  What are the potential benefits of ShakeAlert, and to what extent are  USGS and stakeholders addressing technical and implementation  challenges, if any, to implementing the system?
To address the first objective, we conducted site visits to four U.S.  cities—Seattle, Washington; Memphis, Tennessee; San Francisco,  California; and Los Angeles, California—selected from among those with  the highest earthquake loss estimates to buildings and seismic hazard  level (probabilities of ground shaking), as identified by FEMA, and to  reflect geographic diversity. For each of these cities, we met with officials  from FEMA regional offices, state and local government, and regional  nonprofit consortia with familiarity of the four cities to discuss mitigation  activities that had been undertaken or are planned. We also toured new  and existing buildings in San Francisco and Los Angeles selected by local  officials to observe examples of the physical mitigation measures  implemented to avoid or reduce damage to structures and related injuries  resulting from earthquake disasters. In addition, for each of the four cities,  we reviewed the relevant state and local policies, hazard mitigation plans,  practices, and other process activities used to reduce risk. Additionally,  we reviewed FEMA’s guidelines about seismic building practices, efforts  to support earthquake mitigation implementation activities at the state and  local level, and education and outreach and promotion of earthquake  preparedness, and prior GAO reports. The findings, while providing  important perspectives that could be beneficial to federal, state, and local  government efforts to mitigate earthquake risks to buildings, are not  generalizable to all U.S. cities.
To address the second objective, we performed a geographic analysis of  the number of leased and owned federal buildings in use or which will be  needed in the future, total building square footage of both leased and  owned federal buildings in use or which will be needed in the future, and  the number of federal employees assigned to work in each area of  earthquake shaking intensity based on the Modified Mercalli Intensity  (MMI) scale. To perform this analysis, we obtained fiscal year 2014  Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) building data from GSA and DOD,  including building size, location, ownership, legal status (which indicates if  the building is owned or leased); status of use (which indicates if the  building is currently being used, will be needed in the future, or has been  or is in the process of being disposed of, or is considered as excess or  surplus); and the date of disposal for buildings that have been disposed  of. We also obtained Office of Personnel Management’s Enterprise  Human Resources Integration (EHRI) database as of September 2014  with federal employee official worksite data and 2014 earthquake shaking  intensity maps from USGS. To assess the reliability of the FRPP data, we  reviewed previous GAO and GSA Office of Inspector General work on  FRPP data reliability and limitations, reviewed FRPP system controls in  place, interviewed GSA and DOD officials regarding data checks, and  conducted electronic testing to determine completeness and that data  element values are consistent with expected values. To assess the  reliability of the EHRI data, we examined existing information about the  overall reliability and system controls, and performed electronic testing.  We found the data elements of interest to this engagement were  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our reporting objectives.
We focused on DOD and GSA efforts to identify and mitigate seismic risk  within their buildings because together they own and lease about 53  percent of all federal buildings by number, about 72 percent of the federal  owned and leased buildings in square feet, and, as of 2013, accounted  for about 68 percent of the annual operating costs for owned and leased  federal buildings. We interviewed DOD (Air Force, Army, and Navy) and  GSA headquarters officials and solicited written responses to questions  regarding the extent to which they identify and mitigate seismic risks to  their federal buildings agency wide. We also visited three DOD  installations—one for each service Air Force, Army, and Navy—which  had a large number of buildings and were located near the above cities  selected because of their high seismic hazard levels. At these  installations, we interviewed facility officials and visited buildings which  had been constructed to modern seismic building codes, seismically  retrofitted, or have not been retrofitted to observe DOD’s seismic risk  mitigation efforts. Furthermore we interviewed GSA facility officials and  seismic engineers in the three GSA regions that cover the above selected  cities and visited GSA buildings which had been seismically retrofitted  and buildings which have not been retrofitted to observe GSA’s seismic  risk mitigation efforts. We also reviewed executive orders, federal law,  and federal standards regarding the requirements for federal agencies to  mitigate seismic risk. Additionally, we interviewed officials and reviewed  seismic mitigation documents from FEMA and USGS who play roles in  federal earthquake risk mitigation efforts and earthquake hazard  identification. Based on our review of the Standards of Seismic Safety for  Existing Federally Owned and Leased Buildings: ICSSC Recommended  Practice 8 (RP 8) and FEMA guidance on earthquake risk mitigation, we  developed questions to determine the extent to which each DOD  component and GSA had implemented key mitigation strategies identified  in those documents. Specifically we asked questions regarding their  compliance with the RP 8 requirement for seismically retrofitting buildings,  including when buildings are being rehabilitated or when a building is  considered exceptionally high risk. We also asked questions to determine  the extent to which they implement less expensive mitigation strategies  identified by FEMA, such as non-structural retrofits, building contents  mitigation, and earthquake drills. We then summarized their responses in  this report.
To address the third objective, we reviewed relevant ShakeAlert  documentation, including policies, plans, and legislation. We also  conducted interviews with USGS officials and other stakeholders of the  ShakeAlert system, including the California Integrated Seismic Network,  Pacific Northwest Seismic Network, and academia, using a standard set  of questions to discuss what, if any, potential benefits, limitations, and  implementation challenges exist. We also visited Japan, which has an  operational earthquake early warning system, to interview officials from  the Japanese government, private sector, and transportation sector to  discuss the implementation challenges they overcame to deploy a  national earthquake early warning system. We also interviewed beta  testers from the companies, government entities, and others that were  participating in ShakeAlert’s beta testing effort to collect their perspectives  on the benefits, limitations, and potential challenges to developing and  implementing ShakeAlert. We selected beta testers from the three  western states—California, Oregon, and Washington—that have entities  involved in the beta testing effort and chose officials from each region to  represent utility companies, emergency management offices, and the  private sector. We then performed a content analysis to identify common  themes related to the limitations and implementation challenges of the  ShakeAlert system. We assessed the results of this analysis against the  Project Management Institute’s The Standard For Program Management,  Third Edition, to determine the extent to which a program management  plan should be established to address key elements, such as those  identified by ShakeAlert stakeholders. Additional details on our scope  and methodology are contained in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to August 2016  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Earthquake Shaking Hazards
paragraphs: According to the USGS, a large portion of the United States’ population  lives in areas vulnerable to earthquake shaking hazards that are sources  of potential harm or loss during earthquakes. The effect of an earthquake  can be described by its intensity. The intensity scale used in the United  States is the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Scale composed of  increasing levels of intensity that range from unnoticeable shaking to  buildings being destroyed (see fig. 1).
Maps showing the probability of earthquake shaking exceeding certain  MMI levels over a specified time period can be used to better understand  the extent to which earthquake shaking can affect people and buildings.  Figure 2 shows a USGS-developed map of the United States which  depicts MMI levels based on a 2 percent probability of an earthquake  exceeding the MMI level in 50 years. The 2 percent in 50 years  probability is the same probability level that the International Code  Council uses to establish seismic provisions within building codes.  Figure 2 also shows the four cities located in high MMI areas we visited  as part of our review. These cities have experienced strong earthquakes  in the past and could potentially sustain substantial damage and  casualties in the future as a result of earthquakes. According to USGS,  over 240 million people in the 48 contiguous states are located in areas  exposed to moderate or greater earthquake shaking. For additional  information on the shaking intensities projected with higher probabilities of  occurring see appendix II.
section_title: Earthquake Risks
paragraphs: Risks to the population located in areas vulnerable to earthquake shaking  hazards include the harm or losses that are likely to result from an  earthquake. These risks are usually measured in terms of expected  casualties (fatalities and injuries), direct economic losses (repair and  replacement costs), and indirect economic losses (income lost during  downtime resulting from damage to private property or public  infrastructure). In any geographic area, three main factors determine  earthquake risks: (1) the level of earthquake hazard, (2) the number of  people and amount of property that are exposed to earthquake hazards,  and (3) how vulnerable these people and property are to the hazards.
The vulnerability of buildings to earthquake hazards is determined by the  prevalence of earthquake-resistant construction, which may vary  significantly from building to building. Buildings that have been  constructed in compliance with the latest seismic building codes and  standards should be more resistant to earthquake damage. Older  structures that were built under earlier, less-effective codes and have not  been retrofitted to meet later standards are likely to sustain more damage  from an earthquake. The extent to which the contents of the buildings are  braced, anchored, or otherwise restrained from falling or moving in an  earthquake can also affect the extent of damages and casualties, thereby  impacting the level of risk.
section_title: Standards for Mitigation of Seismic Risks to Federally-Owned Buildings
paragraphs: Federal law generally requires that all federal buildings newly constructed  or altered with funds appropriated for a fiscal year after September 30,  1989, be constructed—to the maximum extent feasible as determined by  the agency administrator or head—in compliance with the latest edition of  a nationally recognized model building code. Nationally recognized  codes such as the International Building Code include provisions to  ensure that buildings can adequately resist seismic forces during  earthquakes.
In addition, Executive Order 13717 Establishing a Federal Earthquake  Risk Management Standard (February 2016) requires each agency that  owns or leases an existing federal building to adopt the Standards of  Seismic Safety for Existing Federally Owned and Leased Buildings, which  are developed, issued, and maintained by the Interagency Committee on  Seismic Safety in Construction (ICSSC), as the minimum level acceptable  for managing the earthquake risks in that building. The ICSSC  standards identify the common minimum evaluation and mitigation  measures for all federal departments and agencies to ensure that all  federal entities have a balanced agency-conceived and -controlled  seismic safety program for their existing owned or leased buildings. The  current version of these standards was issued as ICSSC Recommended  Practice 8 (RP 8) in December 2011. In particular, these standards  establish building design and construction performance objectives for the  seismic safety of federal buildings, including (1) Life Safety, (2)  Occupancy, and (3) Mission Critical designations as described in table 1.  Executive Order 13717 also provides that new federal buildings must be  constructed using the 2015 edition of the International Building Code  (IBC). It further states that new and existing federal buildings may need to  exceed the minimum life safety codes and standards to ensure that the  buildings can continue to perform their essential functions following  earthquakes and encourages federal agencies to consider going beyond  the codes and standards set out in the order.
RP 8 also identifies FEMA E-74, Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural  Earthquake Damage, as an additional reference that may be useful for  scoping and prioritizing the protection of nonstructural components and  contents because the guidance provides information on the relative risks  posed by nonstructural elements, as well as appropriate mitigation  techniques. In addition, RP 8 cites several FEMA guidance documents for  incrementally retrofitting buildings including FEMA 397, Incremental  Seismic Rehabilitation of Office Buildings. FEMA 397 provides office  building owners who have budgetary constraints and cannot afford  expensive and disruptive seismic rehabilitation projects an affordable  strategy for responsible mitigation measures that can be integrated into  ongoing facility maintenance and capital improvement operations. RP 8  also references FEMA 547, Techniques for the Seismic Rehabilitation of  Existing Buildings as additional guidance on strategies for retrofitting  which are practical and effective.
section_title: Earthquake Early Warning
paragraphs: The technology exists today to detect earthquakes so quickly that an alert  can reach some areas before strong shaking—generated from the  earthquake—arrives. The purpose of an EEW system is to identify and  characterize an earthquake a few seconds after it begins, calculate the  likely intensity of ground shaking that will result, and deliver warnings to  people and infrastructure in harm’s way. USGS is the lead federal agency  responsible for developing and implementing ShakeAlert—the United  States’ EEW system. USGS has been working with western state  governments, academic institutions, and various seismic networks to  leverage existing infrastructure while developing the ShakeAlert system.  USGS’s fiscal year 2017 budget requested $8.2 million, which according  to USGS, will be used to, in part, expand the system. Multiple sources— from academia, a philanthropy foundation, and federal, state, and local  governments—have contributed funding or resources to the development  of ShakeAlert through the purchase and installation of seismometers,  research and development of detection algorithms, and the storage and  maintenance of servers needed to host the system. ShakeAlert is  currently in the beta testing stages in the western United States. Figure 3  illustrates how EEW systems provide advanced warnings.
section_title: Selected Cities Are Taking Actions to Assess and Mitigate Seismic Risks of Their Buildings
subsections: section_title: Methods to Assess Seismic Risks
paragraphs: Local governments have taken actions to protect the health, safety, and  welfare of their citizens against potentially damaging earthquakes.  Proactive efforts to assess and understand seismic risks can help reduce  these risks and create safer, more disaster resilient communities. The risk  assessment process focuses attention on areas most at risk by evaluating  where populations, infrastructure, and critical facilities are vulnerable to  hazards, and to what extent injuries or damage may occur, according to  FEMA. In the four cities we studied—Los Angeles, California; Memphis,  Tennessee; San Francisco, California; and Seattle, Washington—officials  told us about efforts to assess and understand seismic risks. These  efforts fell into several categories including: hazard mitigation planning,  seismic hazard mapping, loss estimating, and identifying vulnerable and  mission critical buildings.
Hazard Mitigation Planning: According to FEMA, mitigation is most  effective when it is based on a comprehensive, long-term plan that is  developed before a disaster occurs. The purpose of mitigation planning  is to identify local policies and actions that can be implemented over the  long term to reduce risk and future losses from hazards. These policies  and actions are identified based on an assessment of hazards,  vulnerabilities, and risks and the participation of a wide range of  stakeholders in the planning process. The assessment can include  gathering information on the types, locations, and potential extent of  natural or man-made hazards and the types and numbers of buildings,  infrastructure, and critical facilities located in hazard areas. The cities that  we studied have conducted hazard mitigation planning and identified  policies and actions to mitigate risk of damage and losses likely to occur  as a result of an earthquake. For example, Memphis is located within  Shelby County and participated in the development of Shelby County’s  2010 multi-jurisdictional hazard mitigation plan, which found that Memphis  is greatly vulnerable to earthquake threats because of the city’s large  clusters of dilapidated buildings and infrastructure. In addition, Seattle,  using a grant funded through FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant  Program, recently completed a seismic risk assessment for a  representative set of city-owned buildings as a demonstration project.  This study helped the city develop a methodology to evaluate seismic  risks, prioritize mitigation actions, and reduce seismic risk over time.
Seismic Hazard Mapping: Seismic hazard maps show the distribution of  earthquake shaking levels that have a certain probability of occurring.  Applications of seismic hazard maps include helping to determine seismic  risks and inform policies and actions intended to mitigate those risks.  These policies and actions may relate to areas such as building code  development, land-use planning, establishing retrofit priorities, and  planning allocation of assistance funds for education and preparedness.  In the cities we studied, we examined how seismic hazard mapping is  being used to support development of policies and actions to mitigate  seismic risks. For example, Seattle has used seismic hazard maps  developed by the USGS that provide the probability of the maximum  ground motion Seattle neighborhoods could face in the next 50 years to  inform its mitigation policy and actions. In addition, Los Angeles and  San Francisco are bound by the State of California’s Alquist-Priolo  Earthquake Fault Zoning Act of 1972 and the Seismic Hazards Mapping  Act of 1990 which requires California’s State Geologist (California’s chief  of the Division of Mines and Geology) to map areas subject to ground  shaking, liquefaction, and landslide hazards.,, Local California  jurisdictions are required to conduct additional studies and take  appropriate mitigation measures for certain development projects in areas  identified as potentially hazardous by the maps.
Seismic Loss Estimation: To aid seismic hazard mitigation planning,  loss estimating tools such as FEMA’s HAZUS program can be used to  determine areas of vulnerability and to help prioritize mitigations that  address these vulnerabilities. HAZUS estimates losses from potential  hazards, including earthquakes, and quantifies these losses in terms of  potential fatalities, injuries, direct property loss and damage, and indirect  economic loss for a certain event scenario or over time (annualized loss).  For example, a 2008 FEMA study based on HAZUS indicates that the  Annualized Earthquake Loss (AEL) to the national building stock is $5.3  billion per year. The majority (77 percent) of average annual loss is  located on the West Coast (California, Oregon, and Washington) with 66  percent ($3.5 billion per year) concentrated in the state of California (see  app. IV for additional information). The cities we studied used HAZUS to  support their seismic hazard mitigation planning efforts, according to local  planning documents we reviewed. For example, San Francisco used  HAZUS in a risk assessment of high-priority city-owned buildings to help  identify those buildings expected to perform “better” or “worse” than  average, and determine the relative earthquake risk within the city’s  portfolio. San Francisco used this analysis to prioritize buildings for  mitigation action or more detailed engineering evaluations.
Building Inventory: As indicated in the preceding example describing  HAZUS, building stock data can be used to assess buildings’ exposure to  seismic risks and estimate losses likely to result from an earthquake. In  addition, information on the type of buildings in the inventory can be used  to develop estimates of costs to mitigate risks, such as structural retrofit  projects. Together, information on estimated losses and mitigation costs  can be used to prioritize efforts to address unacceptable risks. Having an inventory of buildings that includes information such as their location, type  of occupancy and building construction, age, and mitigation needs is  important to determining their exposure to seismic risks and prioritizing  mitigations. In the communities we studied, we found some had  developed building inventories and were using information in the  inventories to prioritize mitigation projects. For example the Los Angeles  Unified School District (LAUSD) conducted a risk assessment of its  facilities and developed a list of 667 potentially at risk K-12 school  buildings, according to LAUSD officials. In addition, Shelby County,  Tennessee, as part of its multi-jurisdiction hazard mitigation plan,  identified mission critical government buildings, including fire and police  service facilities, hospitals, water pumping stations, waste treatment  plants, and electrical power plants.
section_title: Methods to Mitigate Seismic Risk
paragraphs: Officials from Los Angeles, Memphis, San Francisco, and Seattle told us  they have employed a variety of methods that can reduce the risk of  losses from earthquake hazards. As discussed below, these actions  include conducting earthquake drills that provide building occupants the  opportunity to practice how to be safer during earthquakes, utilizing land  use planning to determine how best to develop hazard-prone areas,  requiring compliance with building codes to make new structures more  resistant to earthquakes, and mandating structural and non-structural  retrofits for existing vulnerable structures.
Earthquake Drills: Earthquake drills are actions to inform and educate  building occupants about earthquake risks and potential ways to mitigate  them. For example, according to the State of California’s Governor’s  Office of Emergency Services, most injuries in California earthquakes  occur when building occupants attempt to exit buildings or move to a  different location in the building. Earthquake drills can improve  preparedness and minimize risk of injury during earthquakes. For  example, the Great ShakeOut is a national program which annually  encourages people in homes, schools, businesses, and other buildings to  practice what to do during earthquakes, which is to “drop, cover, and hold  on.” Among the communities we studied, all have participated in a Great  ShakeOut drill.
Land Use Planning: State or local land-use programs can help guide  more prudent development in seismic hazard areas. Land-use planning  may include limiting growth in hazard-prone areas. At the state level, for  example, California law requires the State Geologist to delineate seismic  hazard areas. Cities, counties, or other permitting authorities in the state  are required to regulate certain development projects according to the  hazard level determined for the development site. Regulatory action might  include, for example, withholding development permits for a site until the  geologic conditions are investigated and appropriate mitigation measures,  if required, are incorporated into the development plans. Concerning local  programs, we observed land-use planning regulations or guidance being  used in the cities we studied. For example, the Los Angeles Department  of Building & Safety (LADBS) has established three new “Preliminary  Fault Rupture Study Areas” for several fault lines within the city that have  not yet been mapped by the California Geological Survey. If a proposed  development is found to be in a Preliminary Fault Rupture Study Area,  geologic investigations to determine the presence or absence of an active  fault will be required before building permits are issued by LADBS.
Building Code Enforcement: According to FEMA, many states and local  jurisdictions have adopted the model building codes maintained by the  International Code Council (ICC). ICC maintains the International Building  Code (IBC). These codes incorporate seismic design standards aimed  at preventing loss of life caused by building collapse. Authorities often  use these codes to regulate the design and construction of buildings,  which helps ensure the structures provide the level of protection for which  they were designed. The four cities we studied have adopted these model  building codes and have departments responsible for ensuring  compliance with the building codes. In addition, some of the jurisdictions  we studied have modified or were considering modifying their building  codes to reflect local earthquake risks and require more rigorous actions  to address these risks.
Structural Retrofits: Retrofitting existing structures is an action that can  improve their ability to withstand earthquakes. The vast majority of  seismic-related fatalities have been caused by failure of structural building  components, according to FEMA. Some communities in the United States  have taken steps to retrofit their public buildings and have adopted  ordinances that require seismic upgrades to privately-owned buildings.  While retrofitting may not bring a structure up to code standards for new  buildings, it will help existing structures better withstand seismic activity.  Among the cities we studied, we identified several examples of retrofitting  (see app. III for additional information). For example, since the 1989  Loma Prieta earthquake, San Francisco has completed more than 190  structural retrofit projects to its public buildings, including City Hall, the  Main Library, the historic Ferry Building, library and park facilities, and  various critical facilities, such as police and fire stations.
Nonstructural Retrofits: According to FEMA, most of the damage  caused by several recent U.S. earthquakes has been due to nonstructural  failures. Falling nonstructural building components are responsible for  far more injuries than structural components are for fatalities according to  FEMA officials. Simple mitigation measures can vastly reduce the  potential for non-structural failures, according to FEMA. These mitigation  measures include low-cost efforts such as relocating and bracing  furniture, relocating heavy items to lower shelves, or securing hazardous  chemicals in such a way that they remain in place during an earthquake.  Nonstructural retrofits are particularly important in facilities such as  hospitals where people may be exposed to risk of injury from furniture or  medical equipment being displaced during an earthquake. The State of  California has recognized this risk and requires hospitals to address  hazards from non-structural building components. For example, in all  California hospitals, non-structural components such as medical  equipment and piping must be secured to the structure (see app. V for  examples). In addition, following the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, LAUSD  completed non-structural mitigation projects, including seismic anchoring  and bracing of conduits and mechanical ducts, and securing overhead  lights to prevent them from swinging and falling during future  earthquakes. We toured a high school where LAUSD completed non- structural retrofits, including anchoring or bracing of mechanical ducts, as  shown in figure 4.
section_title: Funding Seismic Risk Mitigation Efforts
paragraphs: Many mitigation measures, such as structural retrofits, can be expensive.  Local municipalities can seek financial assistance for making mitigation  measures through various means, including federal grants, municipal  bonds, and capital improvement program funding. Limited federal  assistance is available to states through several FEMA programs,  including the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Pre-Disaster Mitigation  Grant Program, and the NEHRP Earthquake State Assistance  Program. Some cities we studied used resources from a combination of  sources to fund seismic mitigation measures. For example, since 2008,  voters have approved seven General Obligation bonds totaling $2.8  billion that have funded improvements to the San Francisco’s hospitals,  fire and police stations, and other facilities. These projects were selected,  in part, from a HAZUS analysis used to prioritize projects in a 10-year  capital plan. For instance, HAZUS identified fire stations that were not  previously identified as having seismic hazards, and San Francisco is  prioritizing projects to address these hazards.
section_title: Federal Buildings Are Located in Areas of Varying Seismic Hazard, and DOD and GSA Could Do More to Identify and Mitigate Seismic Risk
subsections: section_title: Almost 40 Percent of Federally Owned and Leased Buildings Are Located in Very Strong to Extreme Earthquake Hazard Areas
paragraphs: As of September 2014, the federal government owned and leased almost  100,000 buildings (about 40 percent of the total approximate 252,000  federal buildings) within the United States that were located in earthquake  hazard areas which could experience very strong (MMI VII) to extreme  (MMI X) shaking (see table 2). Almost 405,000 federal civilian personnel  are assigned to work in buildings located in these earthquake hazard  areas (see table 3). Very strong to severe shaking from earthquakes  (MMI VII and VIII) could cause varying levels of damage to buildings  depending on how well they were designed and constructed. In addition,  earthquakes at this intensity can cause heavy furniture to be overturned  and building components such as chimneys and walls to collapse. Violent  to extreme shaking (MMI IX and X) could cause considerable damage in  most buildings, including the collapse of wood and masonry structures.  Actual damage sustained by a building depends on both the intensity of  shaking and factors such as soil conditions and the building’s structural  design and proximity to an earthquake’s epicenter. For additional  information on the potential exposure of federally-owned and -leased  buildings to earthquake shaking and the total number and size of  federally-owned and -leased buildings by agency see appendix VI.
Figure 5 shows federally-owned and -leased building locations relative to  areas of potential earthquake shaking intensity around the cities we  visited and discussed above—Los Angeles, Memphis, San Francisco,  and Seattle. See appendix VII for additional information on figure 5.
Click on regional maps to see a more detailed view. Click on the  to close. For a noninteractive version see appendix VII.
Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) level MMI earthquake shaking intensity level is based on United States Geological  Survey mapping with a 2 percent probability of exceeding that level in 50 years.
X executive branch agencies which voluntarily report. The data does not include those buildings held by  the legislative branch agencies, judicial branch agencies, or other non-executive branch agencies  such as the United States Postal Service. Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) earthquake shaking  intensity level is based on 2014 United States Geological Survey mapping with a 2 percent probability  of exceeding that level in 50 years. Approximately 2.0 percent of the total number of active and  inactive buildings (1.8 percent of the square feet of buildings) in the FRPP data were not included in  the analysis because they either did not have location information included in the FRPP or the  location information in the FRPP had inconsistencies in the data which did not allow the building to be  accurately located.
section_title: DOD and GSA Have Not Fully Identified Their Exceptionally High Risk Buildings or Developed Comprehensive Seismic Safety Measures
subsections: section_title: Defining and Identifying Exceptionally High Risk Buildings
paragraphs: DOD components and GSA have made varied efforts to define what  constitutes an “exceptionally high risk” building—those that are most  susceptible to earthquake damage—and identify these buildings within  their portfolios. More specifically, GSA recently defined what constitutes  an exceptionally high risk (EHR) building and began evaluating and rating  its buildings in high seismic areas to identify EHR buildings within its  owned-building portfolio. As for DOD components, the Air Force and  Army have defined what constitutes an EHR building, but have not  identified these buildings in their portfolios while the Navy does not have  a current definition of EHR. Executive Order 13717 states that agencies  are to adopt the Standards of Seismic Safety for Existing Federally  Owned and Leased Buildings (ICSSC Standards). The latest version of  the ICSSC Standards is Recommended Practice 8 (RP 8), which requires  agencies to designate buildings that are of exceptionally high seismic risk  and develop a plan to reduce the risks. To do so, agencies must first  define what constitutes an exceptionally high risk building and identify  those buildings. According to RP 8, exceptionally high risk buildings can  be identified by agencies based on factors such as a building’s age,  structure type, location, number of occupants, and importance to mission.  Table 4 provides details on the extent to which DOD components and  GSA have defined and identified exceptionally high risk buildings.
A government-wide effort in the 1990s led by FEMA identified about  2,900 exceptionally high risk federal buildings and proposed a plan for  mitigating the seismic risk of those buildings. However, FEMA’s report— which estimated about $22.9 billion (Fiscal Year 1999 dollars) was  needed to retrofit these and other seismically at risk federal buildings— was never issued to the Congress, as was required by the Order. In  addition, DOD officials told us that they believe the costs of retrofitting the  exceptionally high risk buildings—the estimated $22.9 billion—was too  expensive to pursue. According to Air Force, Army, and Navy installation  officials and GSA regional officials, costs are still a challenge to  identifying and retrofitting seismically at-risk buildings. Navy and GSA  officials said, for example, that the cost to fully evaluate a building for  seismic risk can be very high, ranging from $5,000 to more than $100,000  depending on the level of evaluation required. However, we found that  the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service uses FEMA’s Rapid Visual Screening  tool as a less-costly alternative to quickly screen buildings and identify  those which may need additional evaluation. According to U.S. Fish and  Wildlife Service officials, the cost to complete a rapid visual screening is  about $300 to $625 per building.
DOD officials and GSA officials we interviewed support the creation of a  uniform definition of exceptionally high risk, but one official noted that  agencies might prefer flexibility in the definition and how it is applied. To  take steps toward establishing a common definition of exceptionally high  risk, GSA officials said they presented a proposal this year to the ICSSC  for developing a process to create such a definition that would apply to all  federal agencies and are planning to work with ICSSC to pursue this  effort in fiscal year 2017. However, it is unclear at this time whether this  proposal will be adopted and implemented. The proposal, if implemented,  to define what constitutes an exceptionally high risk building could help  DOD and GSA to more fully and consistently identify such buildings and  evaluate whether there may be unacceptable risks posed by their  buildings. In accordance with RP 8, once EHR buildings are identified,  agencies should develop a plan to mitigate the associated risks. As such,  defining and identifying EHR buildings could afford DOD and GSA  opportunities to develop a plan to mitigate potential earthquake damages  to their building portfolios and protect building occupants.
section_title: Comprehensive Seismic Safety Measures
paragraphs: DOD components and GSA have taken steps to mitigate risk through  disposing of buildings and making seismic retrofits when completing  major building renovations at some buildings, as required in RP 8.  However, DOD and GSA have not developed and implemented  comprehensive seismic safety measures to mitigate the impacts of  earthquakes across their building portfolios. Seismic safety measures can  be employed across agencies’ buildings through various mitigation  efforts, including seismically retrofitting and disposing of buildings, as well  as lower cost mitigation measures like non-structural retrofits, earthquake  drills, and seismic safety inspections.
Seismic Retrofits: According to DOD installation officials and GSA  regional officials, due to limited budgets and the lack of dedicated funding  for seismic retrofits, they generally do not undertake many projects  specifically for the purpose of retrofitting a building to improve seismic  safety. Moreover, according to GSA officials, limiting projects to only  seismic work is not cost effective when considering other building  improvements that are needed and the invasive nature of seismic  upgrades. However, in some cases agencies are required to include  seismic retrofits when renovations are being made for other reasons.  According to the recommended practices in RP 8 that agencies are  required to follow, when agencies reconstruct a building and the  reconstruction cost reaches a specific threshold, agencies are generally  required to include any needed seismic retrofits as part of the  reconstruction. For example, as part of a renovation project, GSA also  seismically retrofitted the historic James R. Browning U.S. Court of  Appeals Building, in San Francisco, California. A GSA agency official told  us that the combined renovation and seismic retrofit cost was about $91  million in 1991. Figure 6 below shows a system installed below the  building that is intended to reduce the amount shaking experienced by the  building during an earthquake.
In another example, we visited a Navy installation in a seismically  hazardous section of Tennessee which had renovated a building because  it was converting its use from a child development center to a Navy band  unit. The project, which was completed in 2010, included seismic retrofits  to comply with ICSSC Standards. Installation officials told us that they  have not been able to secure funding to address seismic deficiencies at  the Security and Fire Department building, which is constructed of  unreinforced masonry (see fig. 7). In addition, these officials told us that  they have limited funding to replace or retrofit buildings and a large  number of unreinforced masonry structures–such as the mission-critical  Security and Fire Department Building–remain exposed to risk of damage  and casualties from earthquakes.
Disposals: In addition to retrofitting buildings, DOD and GSA officials  stated that they have mitigated the seismic risk of their building portfolios  by disposing of some buildings. For example, GSA officials identified four  seismically at-risk buildings in Seattle, Olympia, and Everett, Washington,  totaling almost 500,000 square feet that they have disposed of. In  addition, GSA is considering for disposal another 11 seismically at-risk  buildings in the Seattle area totaling over 2.5 million square feet. Our  analysis of all federal buildings in the U.S. indicated that in fiscal year  2014, agencies disposed of about 1 percent or 991 of federally-owned  buildings (9.6 million square feet) located in very strong (MMI VII) to  extreme (MMI X) shaking intensity zones; however, not all of those 991  buildings may have been at seismic risk because they could have been  constructed to meet seismic building codes. DOD and GSA officials  stated that they do not track that information.
Non-structural Retrofits: According to FEMA, nonstructural failures  have accounted for the majority of earthquake damage in several recent  U.S. earthquakes, and it is critical to raise awareness of potential  nonstructural risks and strategies to mitigate these risks. Further, RP 8  references FEMA guidance that can be used to obtain information on the  relative risks and appropriate mitigation techniques posed by  nonstructural building components. For example, according to FEMA  guidance, for areas with moderate or high seismicity, the risks associated  with many of these components can be reduced by efforts such as  securing tall furniture, heavy objects, falling hazards, or hanging objects  so that they cannot fall onto a person or block an exit; anchoring pipes,  ducts, and equipment to a structural floor, ceiling, or wall; and bracing or  anchoring non-structural building components such as chimneys or signs.  Based on our interviews with agency officials and observations during site  visits, we identified gaps in the extent to which agencies in our review  have implemented these non-structural retrofits. For example:
Air Force: At a new fire station on an Air Force installation in  California, we observed that while the building’s mechanical  equipment had been fastened to the structure, furniture such as a tall  glass trophy case, bookcases, and wardrobe cabinets were not  secured to the wall or floor. As a result, the wardrobe cabinets which  were located in the sleeping rooms are at risk of overturning during an  earthquake and preventing fire station personnel from exiting the  rooms (see fig. 8). Air Force officials stated that the mechanical  equipment, such as the tanks and pipes, were secured because they  were installed as a part of the building construction contract, which  required compliance with seismic provisions in the building code.  However, these officials said that the furniture, such as the wardrobe  cabinets, was installed by others after completion of construction, and  that there are no requirements or contract provisions to ensure that  furniture is properly secured to keep it from being moved during  earthquakes.
GSA: In a multi-tenant federal building we visited in California, we  found filing cabinets and tall furniture were securely fastened in space  occupied by GSA staff; however, these types of items were not  always adequately secured in offices occupied by staff of tenant  agencies in adjacent spaces in the same building. In addition, in a  federal building we visited in Tennessee, GSA’s building manager  was not aware of the results of a seismic assessment prepared for  GSA by an engineering firm, which had identified deficiencies in how  some mechanical equipment was secured. Upon learning of this  assessment at the time of our visit the building manager stated that  work to address these deficiencies could likely be done at a low cost  and could be addressed within the existing maintenance budget.
Earthquake Drills and Seismic Safety Inspections: Earthquake drills  and seismic safety inspections could be beneficial for buildings in all  earthquake intensity areas, according to FEMA, because even the newest  buildings could suffer damage from a large earthquake such as broken  windows, fallen ceilings, and displaced furniture that could cause injury to  those who are not taking protective measures. According to FEMA,  implementing earthquake drills into emergency management programs is  important because knowing what to do and where to go during an  earthquake can be critical to life safety. In addition, FEMA guidance  states that seismic safety inspections, such as those which could be part  of routine housekeeping or maintenance practices, could reduce or  eliminate risks from earthquake damage to equipment, furnishings, and  unsecured objects in buildings. However, based on our interviews with  DOD and GSA officials and observations during site visits, we identified  gaps in the extent to which agencies have implemented earthquake drills  and seismic safety inspections as part of a comprehensive approach to  seismic safety. For example:
Air Force: Officials stated that Air Force instructions provide  installations the authority to develop seismic safety measures such as  earthquake drills and building content inspections; however, those  instructions do not contain specific guidelines concerning measures  installations must take. For example, officials stated the instructions  do not require furniture to be secured. As a result, personnel in some  buildings may be exposed to injuries from furniture overturning during  an earthquake. According to these officials, the extent to which  seismic safety measures have been developed, if any, varies across  installations based on the installations’ assessments of their needs.  Moreover, these officials also told us that they do not know how many  installations have determined that seismic risk is a threat and have  included earthquake preparedness in their Installation Emergency  Management Plan because they do not collect and summarize that  information.
Army: Officials told us that earthquake drills are conducted at facilities  related to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Civil Works  program but did not know which installations, if any, were conducting  earthquake drills at facilities associated with the Army’s military  operations.
Navy: According to Navy officials, most Navy regions exercise their  readiness to respond to an earthquake by holding annual drills— called “Citadel Rumble”—to assess emergency operations staff,  training team members, and other emergency response personnel  reacting to a strong earthquake. Some of these exercises included  “drop, cover, and hold on” drills. Officials also indicated that their  safety programs serve to identify housekeeping measures that can  mitigate seismic risks. For example, according to these officials,  annual “zone inspections” include checking items—such as shelves  being attached to walls, heavy objects being placed low on shelves,  and overhead lights being braced—associated with mitigating seismic  risks. However, information provided by Navy officials from several  installations across the United States stated that their “zone  inspections” did not include any earthquake related preparedness or  earthquake response requirements.
GSA: While GSA conducts earthquake drills and has taken steps to  implement non-structural retrofits and housekeeping tasks to mitigate  seismic risks in some of its building spaces, it does not have a policy  requiring its own agency to conduct routine seismic drills or advise its  tenant agencies’ of the mitigation measures they could take to reduce  seismic risks. For example, we visited the John E. Moss Federal  Building and found unsecured bookcases stored near an exit door  within tenant office space, but found that GSA had taken steps to  secure office furniture within the GSA office space (see fig. 9).
Incorporating seismic safety measures—especially lower-cost mitigations  such as non-structural retrofits, earthquake drills, and seismic safety  inspections—as part of a comprehensive approach could reduce future  earthquake damages. The benefits of implementing comprehensive  seismic safety measures such as non-structural retrofits, earthquake  drills, and seismic safety inspections is documented in ICSSC  Recommended Practice 8 and various FEMA guidance, as discussed  above. In addition, DOD and GSA officials agreed that use of lower-cost  mitigation measures such as non-structural retrofits to secure building  furnishings and mechanical equipment could be incorporated to mitigate  risk at relatively low cost. However, DOD and GSA have not consistently  implemented comprehensive seismic safety measures throughout their  entire building portfolios because, in part, it is not required by DOD and  GSA policies. As such, these agencies could benefit by prioritizing and  implementing comprehensive seismic safety measures that address the  gaps we identified and better enable their facilities to withstand  earthquakes and enhance their capacity to save lives, reduce injuries and  property damages, and reduce operational impacts when an earthquake  does occur.
section_title: ShakeAlert Is Capable of Delivering Earthquake Early Warnings, but Cannot Be Fully Implemented until Challenges are Addressed
subsections: section_title: ShakeAlert System Is Capable of Issuing Early Earthquake Warnings to Enhance Public Safety and Benefit Private Users
subsections: section_title: Public Safety
paragraphs: According to Shake Alert stakeholders we spoke with, the implementation  of an Earthquake Early Warning (EEW) system could have numerous  benefits, including providing warnings to the general public prior to  shaking and giving more time for individuals to take protective measures  such as to “drop, cover, and hold on.” For example, in the western United  States where the system is initially being implemented, EEW is capable of  providing up to a 90 second warning in California and up to a 5 minute  warning in the Pacific Northwest. Stakeholders’ expectations of public  benefits are based in part on the experience Japan has realized in the  operation of its EEW, which has been in place since 2007. For example,  Japanese officials told us that during the 2011 Tohoku-oki magnitude 9  earthquake, several million people near the epicenter received a warning  approximately 15 to 20 seconds prior to shaking. According to the  Japanese Meteorological Agency (JMA), a study intended to assess  Japan’s EEW system’s performance indicated that the vast majority of  these people were able to take advance actions prior to shaking  arriving. ShakeAlert stakeholders in the United States told us that  similar public safety benefits can be achieved through early warnings  provided to transportation providers, school systems, hospitals and first  responders, among others.
Transportation - According to ShakeAlert stakeholders, the EEW  system is capable of providing warnings to the transportation sector,  which could enhance safety of various transportation modes. For  example, according to Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) officials, the  agency has been operationally testing the system since August 2012  as part of ShakeAlert’s beta testing phase. BART officials told us that  they use the system to slow down trains when shaking is expected to  surpass a certain threshold within a specific area. Slowing the trains  down, or stopping them completely, could help prevent additional  damages and potentially save lives during an earthquake. In  reference to rail transportation, the United States is in position to learn  from Japan’s experiences. For example, according to officials in  Japan, in 2004 a high speed “bullet” train was derailed during an  earthquake in Japan, and since that time, the railroad company that  operates these trains has implemented an early earthquake warning  system, distinct from Japan’s national system, to help reduce seismic  risks and improve safety. The system is designed to automatically  shut off power to the train tracks when shaking exceeds a certain  magnitude which causes the trains to slow down and stop. According  to Japanese railroad company officials we spoke with, the system has  operated successfully in slowing trains during earthquakes and  preventing derailments.
Schools - ShakeAlert stakeholders said that the EEW system could be  used to provide warnings to school systems, allowing students to take  protective measures prior to shaking occurring. In reference to  Japan’s experience, for example, its national government instituted a  nationwide educational program to inform students how to react  during an earthquake warning. According to the government officials  involved with this program we spoke with, key implementation actions  included creating and disseminating leaflets to all public  kindergartens, primary schools, and high schools.
Hospitals and First Responders - According to ShakeAlert  stakeholders, hospitals and first responders could use the technology  to help ensure the safety of patients and enable effective response in  the aftermath of a disaster. More specifically, surgeons about to  perform elective surgery could halt or delay a surgery if they were  aware that shaking from an earthquake was about to occur. In  addition, early warnings to first responders would allow them to take  steps such as opening firehouse doors so fire trucks are not stuck  inside when needed for response efforts. Moreover, pre-notice events  would allow additional time for first responders to begin taking steps to  identify where their assistance may be most needed.
section_title: Commercial and Private Sector Use
paragraphs: In addition to public safety benefits, according to ShakeAlert  stakeholders, private companies’ use of ShakeAlert could help prevent  economic losses. For example, a Boeing company official from Seattle  told us that if the federal government commits to funding and  implementing the ShakeAlert system, Boeing plans to consider integrating  an automated capability into its operations that will help mitigate  employee safety concerns and protect against potential losses. In Japan,  we observed how a private company—OKI Engineering—has used  earthquake early warning information to automatically shut down plant  operations, thereby limiting damage from shaking and reducing the time  to recover from the earthquakes. Prior to implementing its automated  shut-down process in 2003, the company experienced two earthquakes  (magnitudes 7.0 and 6.2) that caused $15 million in losses. In addition to  losses suffered from fire and equipment damage, OKI Engineering  experienced approximately 17 days and 13 days lost productivity  following the earthquakes. After it implemented its automated shut-down  process, OKI experienced fewer losses and recovered more rapidly from  earthquakes. For example, according to company officials, two  earthquakes (magnitudes 7.2 and 6.8) in 2008 resulted in the company  experiencing approximately $200,000 in damages and 8 total days of lost  productivity.
section_title: ShakeAlert Stakeholders Identified Implementation Challenges That Have Not Been Addressed
subsections: section_title: Technical Challenges
paragraphs: Blind Zones: According to stakeholders, people and facilities near the  epicenter of an earthquake will not always receive an early warning  because the S-waves (i.e., shaking) will arrive at a given point prior to the  system having ample time to relay the warning to those in harm’s way.  More specifically, in “blind zones,” shaking will arrive prior to the P-waves  reaching distant seismometers, which in turn provide data to ShakeAlert,  allowing the system to issue an alert. According to a USGS official,  increasing the density of seismometers will allow ShakeAlert to more  quickly detect the earthquake and distribute the warning more rapidly,  thereby decreasing the size of potential blind zones. USGS has outlined a  plan to address this issue in its Technical Implementation Plan for  ShakeAlert, which identifies the need for about 440 new and upgraded  seismic stations in California and about 280 new and upgraded stations in  Washington and Oregon. In addition, the plan anticipates that the life  cycle of the stations is approximately 10 years, which means roughly 10  percent of the stations would need to be replaced annually. According to  ShakeAlert’s Technical Implementation Plan, the goal is to build and  operate a network of seismic stations that are no more than 20 kilometers  apart and within 5 kilometers of all mapped fault traces. In addition,  according to the plan, more densely placed stations—about 10 kilometers  apart—would be needed to minimize blind zones in more densely  populated areas. For reference, see figure 10 below, which shows the  2007 (when it became operational) seismic station density of Japan’s  EEW system and the 2016 seismic station density in the western United  States.
False Positives: False positives—or false alarms—are possible.  According to the USGS Earthquake Early Warning Coordinator, the EEW  technology has steadily improved its earthquake detection algorithms,  mitigating the likelihood of false positives. However, false positives can  still occur and their impacts vary across users. For example, a BART  official who has been involved in ShakeAlert’s beta testing told us they  are not overly concerned about false positives disrupting the train  schedule. These officials said that false positives happen occasionally  and result in the slowing of a train for a few seconds, which is a relatively  minor inconvenience. Officials noted that they are tolerant of such  inconveniences because missing an event could result in catastrophic  damage. However, other potential users may not be as tolerant of false  positives. For example, a gas utility company that initiates an emergency  shutdown of service to mitigate the chance of fires occurring during an  earthquake would likely be less tolerant of a false positive that resulted in  a massive shutdown of gas lines.
User Sensitivity: Beta testers currently receiving earthquake early  warnings can set their notification thresholds at different levels. For  example, some beta testers may want to know every time a small  earthquake hits, regardless of whether they will feel shaking or not.  Others may only want to know when strong shaking will occur that could  potentially result in damage. Understanding that users may desire  different notification thresholds and have different tolerances for false  positives, the USGS EEW Coordinator told us that, when the system is  implemented, they expect that each user will be able to establish its own  specific protocols, including at what level of predicted shaking and at what  level of certainty (i.e., predicted accuracy of the warning) it will receive the  notification and choose to take action. This flexibility, along with the  continued scientific research dedicated to improving the accuracy of the  detection algorithms to reduce false positives, could help mitigate  potential disruptions.
section_title: Program Management Challenges
paragraphs: Stakeholder Coordination and Governance: USGS and stakeholders  are expanding an existing governance structure to help manage the  development and implementation of ShakeAlert. Currently, the  development and implementation of ShakeAlert is a shared responsibility  between and amongst the federal government, state governments,  academic research institutions, and regional seismic networks. This could  result in disparate work streams, difficulty in identifying dedicated annual  funding, and limit planning efforts that could, for example, help determine  how the public will receive warnings and educate them on how to react to  such warnings. The development of EEW has been underway for many  years within the California Integrated Seismic Network (CISN), which is  the California region of the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS).  CISN is a collaborative effort among USGS; the California Institute of  Technology; University of California, Berkeley; the California Geological  Survey; and the California Office of Emergency Services (CAL OES).  More specifically, since 2006, the USGS has supported the EEW system  development through partnerships with universities and the State of  California, which have leveraged existing expertise and essential  equipment to develop and implement system requirements, such as the  development of detection algorithms and integration of existing  seismometers owned by different entities. Figure 11 shows the multiple  stakeholders that participate in ANSS, CISN, and the Pacific Northwest  Seismic Network, some of which have already contributed to the  development of the ShakeAlert system.
USGS officials are currently involved in efforts to refine and formalize  these organizational relationships to support implementation of  ShakeAlert. According to USGS, the agency recognizes the need for  improving coordination with the states as a priority going forward.  Specifically, in March 2016, USGS officials told us that they plan to  propose a governance structure for ShakeAlert similar to the existing  ANSS network, which was originally established to coordinate and  establish standards for reporting on earthquake monitoring. USGS  officials believe this existing structure, which has been used for 16 years,  could be expanded to serve as a starting point in developing the  governance structure needed to implement ShakeAlert on a broader  scale. In addition, USGS officials told us that the existing ANSS  governance structure is already being leveraged to help manage the  development of the ShakeAlert system.
USGS’s proposed expansion of the governance structure would include a  management group as well as two working groups. According to USGS  officials, one working group would be constructed to work on technical  challenges, such as minimizing false positives and reducing blind zones  while the other working group would be focused on program management  challenges, such as educating the public on how to react to potential  warnings and establishing a certification process for system users (see  below). Officials from the States of Oregon and California agreed that the  proposed governance structure could be effective in managing the  implementation of the ShakeAlert program. In addition to expanding the  existing ANSS governance structure, other groups have already been  working on select issues to address the known challenges. For example,  officials from CAL OES told us that they are currently working with a  steering committee, which includes State of California officials and USGS,  among others, to determine how they will approach public outreach and  education in the State of California, which might lead it to take a different  approach than other states. Given that USGS is just beginning to reach  out to stakeholders to discuss its proposed governance structure, it is  reasonable to expect that stakeholders will need time to work together to  assign responsibilities and coordinate on key implementation issues and  address associated challenges.
Since USGS is now beginning to expand the existing governance  structure for the purpose of managing ShakeAlert, they have not yet  developed a program management plan to identify dedicated funding  streams in the amounts necessary to develop, implement, and maintain  the system; resolved how the public will be alerted to earthquake early  warnings or educated the public as to how they should react during a  warning; or determined how they will certify users of the system to receive  the warning to make sure they are using it in a responsible manner.
Funding: Stakeholders have not been able to identity a dedicated annual  funding stream for the purpose of developing, implementing, and  maintaining ShakeAlert. Initial USGS estimates indicated that  implementation of an earthquake early warning system for the west coast  would require a capital investment of $38.3 million in addition to recurring  annual outlays of $16.1 million for maintenance and operations.  According to the USGS EEW Coordinator, the agency is now requesting  recurring annual outlays to fund system development, implementation,  and maintenance. However, according to USGS officials, USGS  estimates for system implementation have not considered some program  management costs, such as the cost associated with a public outreach  and education campaign, user certification, or other related costs. To help  support the estimated implementation costs, the President’s fiscal year  2017 budget identifies $8.2 million for USGS’s earthquake early warning  implementation efforts. In addition, CAL OES officials told us that the  State of California is considering the approval of $23 million in a one-time  allocation from the general fund to help, in part, educate California  citizens about the ShakeAlert system and how to react when receiving an  earthquake early warning.
Public Alerting and Education: Stakeholders have not developed a plan  as to how ShakeAlert will alert the public to an earthquake early warning  or begun to educate the public on how to react to such warnings.  According to officials involved with the development and implementation  of the ShakeAlert system, a public outreach and education campaign is  critical to the success of the program. Officials explained that the public  needs to know how to react when provided a ShakeAlert warning;  however, ShakeAlert officials have yet to determine how they will begin  educating the public and when that process will begin. In discussing their  approach to public education, officials from JMA told us that while they  had a limited budget, they successfully conducted a public outreach and  education campaign in 2007. Among their efforts was creating and  distributing many kinds of public relations materials, such as leaflets,  posters, and movies. According to JMA, television programs and  commercials were the most effective. However, JMA officials noted that  the level of education needed in the United States may be different than  what was needed in Japan. In addition, the communication methods for  distributing ShakeAlert warnings to the public still need to be defined. For  example, USGS is considering using FEMA’s Integrated Public Alert and  Warnings System (IPAWS), which is used to provide public safety officials  a way to alert and warn the public about serious emergencies using the  Emergency Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts, among others.  However, according to the EEW Coordinator, there are concerns about  using IPAWS because the system does not immediately announce a  warning and the resulting delays could render ShakeAlert useless during  “short-notice” events where the warning only precedes shaking by a few  seconds.
User Certification: According to the USGS EEW Coordinator, they plan  to implement a certification process to ensure that users who receive  ShakeAlert warnings act responsibly when issuing those warnings;  however, stakeholders have not developed a plan for doing so. For  example, a radio station receiving the warning for the purpose of  broadcasting to its listeners should know how to relay the message  accurately and in a manner that prepares people to take appropriate  action, but does not incite panic. However, currently, according to USGS  officials, USGS and other stakeholders have not defined what the  requirements for certification will be, how this process should be  executed, and how costs will be covered. USGS has begun identifying  potential stakeholders that would form a working group to help determine  how this process could be implemented and managed. In addition, as  related to costs, ShakeAlert officials had considered the possibility of  subscription services to potentially help fund and offset some of the  anticipated costs of the program, such as for certification. In Japan, for  example, the national agency responsible for distributing EEW system  warnings assesses a fee to cover its costs to distribute EEW. In March  2016, a USGS official told us that USGS is not considering the use of  subscription fees.
According to the Project Management Institute (PMI), an effective  governance structure ensures that strategic alignment is optimized and  that the program’s targeted value and benefits are delivered as expected.  Further, according to PMI, establishing a single program governance  board that is accountable for all critical elements of program oversight  within an organization is considered to be the most efficient means for  providing effective and agile governance oversight. PMI also notes that  under certain circumstances, some programs may need to report to  multiple governance boards. These may include, for example, programs  that are sponsored and overseen jointly by private and governmental  organizations, that are managed as collaborations between two private  but otherwise competitive organizations, or that exist in exceedingly  complex environments whose subject matter experts cannot be effectively  assembled into a single program governance board. Under these  circumstances, it is critical that the systems and methods for program  governance and the authority for program decision making be clearly  established.
USGS’s plan to extend the existing governance structure to include  officials from the States of Washington, Oregon, and California could help  provide an effective first step towards overcoming the program  management challenges that were identified by ShakeAlert stakeholders.  More specifically, once the governance structure is expanded, it could  allow USGS and other ShakeAlert stakeholders to begin developing plans  to address the program management challenges identified above.  However, currently, ShakeAlert stakeholders have not established a  program management plan to help manage the development,  implementation, and maintenance of the program, in part, because the  governance structure has yet to be expanded to include many of the key  stakeholders that are needed to help coordinate such issues. USGS has  developed a technical implementation plan that identifies and prioritizes  the technical needs of the system. However, the technical implementation  plan is largely limited to the hardware and software needed to develop  and implement the ShakeAlert system and does not address program  management issues, such as funding, public alerting and education, and  user certification. According to the Project Management Institute, a  program management plan, in part, establishes management controls for  integrating and managing the program’s individual components. Such a  plan could include subsidiary plans, such as how the program would  manage a public outreach and education campaign and the certification  of ShakeAlert users. USGS officials and ShakeAlert stakeholders agreed  that stakeholder participation in the development of these plans will be  beneficial to development and implementation of ShakeAlert. Further,  USGS officials agreed that more detailed plans are needed prior to fully  implementing ShakeAlert in the western United States. Without a program  management plan that addresses the various challenges identified by  stakeholders, ShakeAlert program management officials may not be able  to identify and implement solutions to the challenges that have already  been identified.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Nearly half of all Americans are exposed to potentially damaging ground  shaking from earthquakes, according to USGS, with communities such as  Los Angeles, Memphis, San Francisco, and Seattle being particularly  vulnerable because of their locations in areas where extreme shaking  could occur. These cities have taken actions to assess and mitigate  earthquake risks, including mandating structural retrofits of buildings to  enable them to better withstand shaking and requiring that building  furnishings, equipment, and other nonstructural components be secured  to prevent their displacement and causing damage when shaking occurs.
Because many federally-owned and -leased buildings are located in  earthquake hazard areas where moderate to extreme shaking is  expected, it is important that the federal agencies responsible for these  buildings take steps to assess and mitigate earthquake risks to their  buildings. These steps can include identifying exceptionally high risk  buildings that are most susceptible to damage from earthquakes and  developing a plan to address those risks. Further, for all buildings, making  risk-informed mitigation decisions ranging from structural retrofits to  implementation of lower-cost mitigations such as non-structural retrofits,  seismic safety inspections, and earthquake drills as part of a  comprehensive seismic safety program could better enable agencies to  protect their assets from earthquake damage and reduce injuries to  building occupants. Moreover, while DOD components and GSA have  implemented mitigation measures to varying degrees intended to reduce  earthquake risks, including making structural and non-structural retrofits  to some buildings, these efforts are generally not part of a comprehensive  approach, which results in buildings, or spaces within buildings, having  dissimilar levels of protection against earthquake risks. Until they fully  identify their exceptionally high risk buildings, DOD and GSA will be  unable to fully understand the most significant earthquake risks affecting  buildings for which they are responsible and develop a plan to reduce  those risks—in accordance with RP 8—which could inform prioritizing  funding requests for mitigations such as retrofits. In addition, as a result of  not employing comprehensive seismic safety measures—which include  non-structural retrofits, seismic safety inspections, and earthquake drills— to mitigate earthquake risks where applicable, DOD and GSA are also  missing low cost opportunities to reduce potential damages, injuries, and  casualties from future earthquakes. Limited funding available for  earthquake mitigation efforts makes it critical for agencies to effectively  prioritize high-cost retrofits and to know and understand where low cost  seismic safety measures could be the most effective across their building  portfolios.
Earthquake Early Warning (EEW) technology has the potential to  enhance public safety and benefit users by providing time for protective  measures to be taken before shaking occurs. USGS is currently working  with ShakeAlert stakeholders to expand an existing governance structure  that could help better define these roles and responsibilities and create  the plans needed to fully implement ShakeAlert. To do so, as  ShakeAlert’s governance structure takes shape, stakeholders will need to  coordinate on key program management challenges and make decisions  on issues such as (1) identifying sources of funding to further develop and  implement ShakeAlert; (2) educating and alerting the public; and (3)  determining the extent to which entities need to be certified to use the  system and how to provide such certifications. Developing a program  management plan that establishes management controls for integrating  and managing the program’s individual components could help address  these challenges. Such a plan could include subsidiary plans, such as  how ShakeAlert would manage public outreach, conduct educational  campaigns, and potentially identify dedicated funding streams from  ShakeAlert stakeholders.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen efforts to mitigate earthquake risks to federal buildings, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of GSA  take the following actions:  1.  Define what constitutes an exceptionally high risk building, identify  such buildings, and develop plans to mitigate those risks, including  prioritizing associated funding requests as needed.  2.  To the extent practicable, prioritize and implement comprehensive  seismic safety measures which could include earthquake drills,  seismic safety inspections, and non-structural retrofits to decrease  risks and reduce damage in federally-owned and -leased buildings in  earthquake hazard areas.
Following the expansion of the ShakeAlert governance structure to  include key stakeholders, we recommend that the Secretary of the  Department of the Interior direct the U.S. Geological Survey, working  through the ShakeAlert governance structure, to take the following action:  3.  Establish a program management plan that addresses, among other  things, the known implementation challenges.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce  (NIST), Defense, the Interior (USGS), and Homeland Security (FEMA);  GSA; and NSF for review and comment.  DOD, GSA, and USGS agreed  with our recommendations, as applicable to each agency.
In written comments (see app. IX), DOD said that it is participating in the  ICSSC effort described in this report to develop a common definition for  EHR buildings and will proceed to assess its inventory once a standard  definition is adopted as funding is available. If implemented effectively,  this action should begin to address the recommendation. In addition,  DOD said that it has implemented comprehensive seismic safety  measures on a limited basis and indicated that more comprehensive  implementation would need to compete with other departmental priorities.  More information will be needed over time about DOD’s efforts to  implement comprehensive seismic safety measures to determine whether  its efforts address the intent of the recommendation.
GSA officials said in their written comments that they agreed with the  overall nature of our findings but noted they were concerned about the  extent to which we discussed progress GSA had made to identify its EHR  buildings and prioritize building seismic risk. We modified the text of the  report to provide additional context and information related to the steps  GSA has taken to 1) define what constitutes an exceptionally high risk  building and 2) begin identifying its exceptionally high risk buildings. This  information can be found in Table 4 of the report and in related text.  However, we communicated to the agency our belief that it needed to  continue taking actions to fully meet the intent of our recommendations.  More specifically, GSA will need to continue identifying its EHR buildings  and then develop plans to mitigate the risks that are identified, as well as  implement comprehensive seismic safety measures. GSA officials  subsequently said that they agreed with our recommendations. GSA’s  letter, along with our responses to specific points, is reprinted in app. X.
FEMA provided technical comments, which we included, as appropriate.  USGS, NIST, and NSF did not provide written comments.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, the Interior, and Homeland Security,  the Administrator of GSA, and the Director of the National Science  Foundation, as well as appropriate congressional committees and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Chris P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov, or David J. Wise  at (202) 512-5731 or wised@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix XI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines (1) What actions have select city governments  taken to assess and mitigate seismic risks that could affect buildings in  their jurisdictions? (2) What is the distribution of federal buildings with  regard to seismic hazard areas, and to what extent have select federal  agencies identified and mitigated seismic risks to their buildings? (3)  What are the potential benefits of ShakeAlert and to what extent are  United States Geological Survey (USGS) and stakeholders addressing  technical and implementation challenges, if any, to implementing the  system?
To address the first objective, we conducted site visits to four U.S.  cities—Seattle, Washington; Memphis, Tennessee; San Francisco,  California; and Los Angeles, California – selected from among those with  the highest earthquake loss estimates to buildings and seismic hazard  level (probabilities of ground shaking), as identified by Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and to reflect geographic  diversity. For each of these cities, we met with officials from FEMA  regional offices, state and local government, and regional nonprofit  consortia with familiarity of the four cities to discuss mitigation activities  that had been undertaken or are planned. We also toured new and  existing buildings in San Francisco and Los Angeles selected by local  officials to observe examples of the physical mitigation measures  implemented to avoid or reduce damage to structures and related injuries  resulting from earthquake disasters. In addition, for each of the four cities  we reviewed the relevant state and local policies, hazard mitigation plans,  practices, and other process activities used to reduce risk. Additionally,  we reviewed FEMA’s guidelines about seismic building practices, efforts  to support earthquake mitigation implementation activities at the state and  local level, and education and outreach and promotion of earthquake  preparedness; prior GAO reports; and numerous other reports,  summaries, and studies on earthquake hazard mitigation activities to  provide background and context. The findings, while providing important  perspectives that could be beneficial to federal, state, and local  government efforts to mitigate earthquake risks to buildings, are not  generalizable to all U.S. cities.
To address the second objective, we performed a geographic analysis of  the number of leased and owned federal buildings in use or which will be  needed in the future, total building square footage of both leased and  owned federal buildings in use or which will be needed in the future, and  the number of federal employees assigned to work in each area of  earthquake shaking intensity based on the Modified Mercalli Intensity  (MMI) scale. To perform this analysis, we obtained Fiscal Year 2014  Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) building data including building  size, location, ownership, legal status (which indicates if the building is  owned or leased), status of use (which indicates if the building is currently  being used, will be needed in the future, or has been or is in the process  of being disposed of, or is considered as excess or surplus), and the date  of disposal for buildings that have been disposed of. We also obtained  Office of Personnel Management’s Enterprise Human Resources  Integration (EHRI) database federal employee official worksite data as of  September 2014 and 2014 earthquake shaking intensity maps from  USGS. To assess the reliability of the FRPP data we reviewed previous  GAO and General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector  General work on FRPP data reliability and limitations, reviewed FRPP  system controls in place, interviewed GSA and Department of Defense  (DOD) officials regarding data checks, and conducted electronic testing to  determine completeness and that data element values are consistent with  expected values. To assess the reliability of the EHRI data, we examined  existing information about the data’s overall reliability and system  controls; and conducted manual and electronic testing. We found that the  FRPP and EHRI data elements of interest to this engagement were  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our reporting objectives.
To conduct our geospatial mapping analysis, we used USGS earthquake  shaking mapping with a 2 percent probability of exceeding a given MMI  level in 50 years. We used mapping with this probability of exceedance  because the International Code Council uses 2 percent in 50 year percent  ground acceleration mapping with some adjustments to determine the  Maximum Considered Earthquake (MCER) for the International Building  Code. This report only includes the effects from natural earthquakes. The  effects of induced earthquakes are not incorporated in the MMI maps we  used and are not considered for the purposes of this report. To determine  the MMI level for each of the buildings we used a SAS analytics software  procedure to geocode each building’s location from the FRPP data.  During our analysis we found that approximately 2 percent or 5,036 of the  252,407 owned and leased federal buildings identified as active or  inactive (1.8 percent or 48.6 million square feet of the 2,661 million  square feet of buildings) in the FRPP building data either did not have  location information included in the FRPP or the location information in  the FRPP had inconsistencies in the data which did not allow the building  to be accurately located. As a result, the MMI could not be determined for  those buildings and they were excluded from the MMI results. We  determined that this small percentage of missing data did not materially  affect the results of our work and that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of our reporting objectives.
To determine the extent to which selected federal agencies assessed and  mitigated the seismic risks of their buildings in objective two, we selected  DOD and GSA to review because as of September 2014 they owned and  leased about 53 percent of all federal buildings by number, about 72  percent of the federal owned and leased buildings in square feet, and as  of 2013 accounted for about 68 percent of the annual operating costs for  owned and leased federal buildings. We interviewed DOD (Air Force,  Army, and Navy) and GSA headquarters officials and solicited written  responses to questions regarding the extent to which they identify and  mitigate seismic risks to their federal buildings agency wide. We also  selected three DOD installations–one for each service Air Force, Army,  and Navy–which had a large number of buildings and were located near  the above cities selected because of their high seismic hazard levels. We  visited these installations, one in the State of California, one in the State  of Tennessee, and one in the State of Washington. At these installations  we interviewed facility officials and visited buildings which had been  constructed to modern seismic building codes, seismically retrofitted, or  have not been retrofitted to observe DOD’s seismic risk mitigation efforts.  Furthermore, we interviewed GSA facility officials and seismic engineers  in the three GSA regions—Regions 4, 9, and 10—that cover the above  selected cities and visited GSA buildings which had been seismically  retrofitted and buildings which have not been retrofitted to observe GSA’s  seismic risk mitigation efforts. We also reviewed executive orders,  federal law, and federal standards regarding the requirements for federal  agencies to mitigate seismic risk. Additionally, we interviewed officials  and reviewed seismic mitigation documents from FEMA and USGS who  play roles in federal earthquake risk mitigation efforts and earthquake  hazard identification. During our document reviews and interviews, we  identified and interviewed other federal agencies including the United  States Fish and Wildlife Service, associations including the American  Society of Civil Engineers, and a private industry representative to  provide background and additional information on earthquake mitigation  practices. We limited our selection to those that have experience relative  to earthquake science and its potential impacts on buildings. Based on  our review of the Standards of Seismic Safety for Existing Federally  Owned and Leased Buildings: ICSSC Recommended Practice 8 (RP 8)  and FEMA guidance on earthquake risk mitigation, we developed  questions to determine the extent to which each DOD component and  GSA had implemented key mitigation strategies identified in those  documents. Specifically we asked questions regarding their compliance  with the RP 8 requirement for seismically retrofitting buildings, including  when buildings are being rehabilitated or when a building is considered  exceptionally high risk. We also asked questions to determine the extent  to which they implement less expensive mitigation strategies identified by  FEMA, such as non-structural retrofits, building contents mitigation, and  earthquake drills. We then summarized their responses in this report.
To address the third objective, we reviewed relevant ShakeAlert  documentation, including policies, plans, and legislation. Specifically, we  reviewed USGS documentation, including the Technical Implementation  Plan for the ShakeAlert Production System – An Earthquake Early  Warning System for the West Coast of the United States and other  documents to gather information on the potential benefits and limitations  of the earthquake early warning system, ShakeAlert. We also visited  Japan, which has an operational earthquake early warning system, to  interview officials from the private sector, transportation sector, and  Japanese government to discuss the implementation challenges they  overcame to deploy a national earthquake early warning system. We also  conducted interviews with USGS officials and other stakeholders of the  ShakeAlert system using a standard set of questions to discuss what, if  any, potential benefits, limitations, and implementation challenges exist.  To do so, we interviewed USGS officials; stakeholders from the California  Integrated Seismic Network, and Pacific Northwest Seismic Network, and  academia.
We then identified ShakeAlert beta testers by requesting information from  the three seismology lab coordinators, in partnership with USGS on the  companies, government entities, and others that were participating in  ShakeAlert’s beta testing effort. We then selected beta testers from this  list to interview to collect their perspectives on the benefits, limitations,  and potential challenges to developing and implementing ShakeAlert. In  doing so, we ensured that we selected representatives from each of the  three western states—California, Oregon, and Washington—that have  entities involved in the beta testing effort. To help ensure balance, we  chose officials from utility companies, emergency management offices,  and the private sector from throughout the geographic region. Following  interviews with the selected beta testers, we performed a content analysis  to identify common themes related to the limitations and implementation  challenges, of the ShakeAlert system. More specifically, two analysts  identified and coded recurring themes and engaged two additional  analysts to help resolve any questions or potential discrepancies in  determining how the challenges were grouped. We assessed the results  of this analysis against the Project Management Institute’s The Standard  For Program Management – Third Edition to determine the extent to  which a program management plan should be established to address key  elements, such as those identified by ShakeAlert stakeholders.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to August 2016  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Modified Mercalli Shaking Intensity Maps
paragraphs: In addition to figure 2 shown above in the report, USGS has also mapped  the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) of earthquakes based on a higher  probability of exceedance. For example, figure 12 depicts a map showing  areas where there is a 10 percent chance of an earthquake exceeding the  MMI level in 50 years. A 10 percent in 50 years probability equates to an  earthquake recurring and exceeding a given MMI level about every 475  years. Based on this map and probability, USGS staff estimate over 97  million people in the 48 contiguous states are located in areas exposed to  moderate (MMI = V) or greater earthquake shaking.
In figure 13, the mapping shows a 50 percent chance of an earthquake  exceeding the MMI level in 50 years, and while the shaking intensities are  even less than the 10 percent in 50 year map, this probability equates to  an earthquake recurring and exceeding a given MMI level every 72 years.  Based on this map and probability, USGS staff estimate about 43 million  people in the 48 contiguous states are located in areas exposed to  moderate (MMI = V) or greater earthquake shaking.
section_title: Appendix III: Summary of Seismic Hazard, History, Future Damage Estimates, and Examples of Efforts to Assess and Mitigate Seismic Hazards for Seattle, Memphis, San Francisco, and Los Angeles
subsections: section_title: Seattle
paragraphs: Seismic hazard. Washington State is vulnerable to a variety of  earthquakes because of its location near the collision boundary of two  major tectonic plates, according to the Washington State hazard  mitigation plan. Washington State ranks second (behind California)  among states most susceptible to damaging earthquakes in terms of  economic loss, according to FEMA. Seattle is at risk for earthquakes from  three sources: (1) deep earthquakes like those that damaged the city in  1949, 1965 and 2001; (2) shallow earthquakes along the Seattle Fault;  and (3) huge megathrust earthquakes that could reach magnitude 9.0 but  would be centered outside Seattle.
Deep earthquakes with a magnitude of 6.0 or greater occur in Seattle  about every 30 to 50 years. Deep earthquakes occur at depths of 30-70  km in oceanic crust as it dives under lighter continental crust. Because of  the depth, even buildings located right above them are far enough away  that ground motions are weakened, according to the City of Seattle Office  of Emergency Management (Seattle OEM). The 2001 Nisqually  Earthquake was a deep earthquake, according to Seattle OEM. Shallow  earthquakes with a magnitude of 6.0 or greater occur about every 500  years. Shallow earthquakes occur in the North American plate at a depth  of 0-30 km near the crust’s surface along faults. Intense shaking occurs  near the epicenter but usually diminishes quickly with distance relative to  the other earthquake types. Shallow earthquakes are the type expected  on the Seattle Fault zone, which is the primary but not only source for  shallow earthquakes in Seattle, according to Seattle OEM. Megathrust  earthquakes occur every 200 to 1,100 years, or average every 500 years.  Megathrust earthquakes occur on the interface between the North  American plate and the San Juan de Fuca plate, a small plate extending  from northern California to British Columbia. These are the largest type of  earthquakes in the world, according to Seattle OEM. Recently, geologists  found evidence of massive earthquakes off the Washington coast  (referred to as the Cascadia Subduction Zone) and along the Seattle  Fault. The northernmost strand of the Seattle Fault Zone had long been  thought to lie south of the downtown area. Recent research and a  compilation of existing geophysical and geologic data, however, suggest  that the fault tip may lie directly beneath the downtown area. If the fault  lies directly beneath the downtown area, ground motions there during a  Seattle Fault earthquake may be significantly larger, according to the  2009 Seattle hazard mitigation plan.
Seismic history. Three major earthquakes have struck Seattle since the  beginning of the 20th century (in 1949, 1965 and 2001). The February 28,  2001 magnitude 6.8 Nisqually Earthquake was the last major earthquake  that hit the Puget Sound Region. This was a deep earthquake that was  centered about 10 miles northeast of Olympia and at a depth of about 30  miles. One person died of a stress induced heart attack, 407 people were  injured of which four were considered serious, and estimates place  damage at $2 billion.
Probability of seismic occurrence / estimated damages. Downtown  Seattle has a 5 percent chance of experiencing violent shaking within the  next 50 years, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). The  Seattle Fault is Seattle’s most dangerous source, according to Seattle  OEM. The Seattle Fault ruptured around 900AD causing a 7.2 magnitude  earthquake, massive landslides and a tsunami. The major consequences  from a future earthquake include building collapse, landslides, fires,  liquefaction (where the ground turns liquid under buildings) and potentially  a tsunami. Casualties could exceed 1,000 people and economic damage  could easily run into billions of dollars, according to Seattle OEM. Deep  earthquakes are the most common large earthquakes that occur in the  Puget Sound region, according to Seattle OEM. Earthquakes larger than  magnitude 6.0 occurred in 1909, 1939, 1946, 1949, 1965 and 2001.  Megathrust earthquakes are the greatest risk to the region as a whole,  according to Seattle OEM. A megathrust earthquake could reach  magnitude 9.0 or greater and affect an area from Canada to northern  California. Shaking in Seattle would be strong to very strong and  prolonged, but not as intense as a Seattle Fault earthquake. This area  has a megathrust earthquake about every 500 years.
A magnitude 7.2 Seattle Fault earthquake scenario might result in  structural collapses, landslides, fires, and a tsunami causing 1,200 deaths  and 15,000 severe to critical injuries, according to Seattle OEM. The  earthquake might cause an estimated $20 billion in damage and indirect  losses, including destroying 6,000 buildings, and leaving 21,000 buildings  severely damaged and unsafe to occupy, according to Seattle OEM. A  large Seattle Fault earthquake, similar to the 900AD earthquake, could  trigger a 16 foot tsunami that would strike the Seattle shoreline within  seconds of the earthquake and flood it within 5 minutes. Although  megathrust and deep earthquakes will not directly cause tsunamis in  Seattle these sources could initiate landslides that result in local  tsunamis, according to the City of Seattle. New modeling suggests small  tsunamis in Puget Sound and Hood Canal but strong currents are  predicted to be a big problem from megathrust tsunamis, according to the  USGS. A magnitude 7 Seattle Fault earthquake could cause dozens of  fires. Suppressing the fires would be more difficult because damage to  the water system would reduce water pressure in many parts of the city,  according to the City of Seattle.
Examples of efforts to assess and mitigate seismic risks. Seattle has  a hazard mitigation plan that identifies earthquake risks and the  capabilities needed to mitigate those risks. In addition, Seattle is  implementing a program to retrofit or replace existing fire stations, police  precincts, and community centers to provide seismic upgrades. This effort  is being funded by a levy and a capital improvement program intended to  make these critical facilities more resilient and better able to support  emergency operations in crisis situations.
Seattle obtained funding to upgrade, renovate, or replace 32  neighborhood fire stations using funds from a levy program. Seattle has  approximately 1,160 unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings scattered  around the city and concentrated in historic districts. Seattle has been  working on developing a program whereby URM buildings would be  required to be seismically upgraded, or demonstrate they meet a  proposed standard for seismic resistance. At the time of our study,  Seattle was considering implementing a seismic retrofit policy that would  require URM building owners to apply a “Bolts Plus” standard to reinforce  URMs. The “Bolts-Plus” standard essentially involves the installation of  shear and tension anchors at the roof and floors, and, when required, the  bracing of the unreinforced masonry bearing walls. By anchoring these  components together, building walls are much less likely to collapse,  according to a study prepared for the Seattle Department of Planning and  Development.
section_title: Memphis
paragraphs: Seismic hazard. Memphis is located within the New Madrid Seismic  Zone (NMSZ) which includes eight states (Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,  Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas and Missouri). The NMSZ is  responsible for three of the largest earthquakes in U.S. history, during  1811-1812. These earthquakes were felt strongly over 50,000 square  miles and moderately across 1 million square miles, according to USGS.  The affected area was therefore more than twice that of the 1964 Great  Alaskan Earthquake, the largest earthquake in U.S. history, and  approximately 10 times that of the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake.  Earthquakes in the central and eastern United States affect much larger  areas than earthquakes of similar magnitude in the western United  States. For example, the San Francisco, California earthquake of 1906  (magnitude 7.8) was felt 350 miles away in the middle of Nevada,  whereas the New Madrid earthquake of December, 1811 (magnitude  ~7.5) was felt in Boston, Massachusetts, 1000 miles away, and caused  minor damage in Charleston, South Carolina, and Washington D.C.,  about 700 miles away, according to USGS.
Differences in geology east and west of the Rocky Mountains cause this  strong contrast. At the time of the three earthquakes, the Central United  States was sparsely populated, with very few structures. Currently,  however, the Central United States is densely populated, with major  population centers in the metropolitan areas of Memphis and St. Louis.  Both of these regions are likely to sustain damage from a NMSZ event,  and Memphis, in particular, could see severe damage, according to a  2014 study. Memphis and the surrounding metropolitan area of more  than one million people would be severely impacted. Memphis has an  aging infrastructure, and many of its large buildings, including  unreinforced masonry schools and fire and police stations, would be  particularly vulnerable when subjected to severe ground shaking,  according to USGS.
Relatively few buildings were built using building codes that have  provisions for seismic-resistant design. Soil liquefaction and related  ground failures are likely to occur in downtown Memphis along the  Mississippi River and along the Wolf River that passes through Memphis.
A major earthquake is expected to result in several thousand of fatalities  in Memphis, according to the Tennessee Emergency Management  Agency. The risk for loss of human life due to earthquake hazard in the  region is high according to a 2013 National Earthquake Hazards  Reduction Program (NEHRP) study. Based on risk to life-safety, the  hazard is very similar to coastal California, but there have been  essentially no damaging earthquakes to remind the populace of the  hazard, according to the 2013 NEHRP study.
Seismic history. The western part of Tennessee was shaken strongly by  the New Madrid, Missouri, earthquake of 1811-1812 and by earthquakes  in 1843 and 1895. During 1811-1812, a series of three earthquakes with  magnitudes of approximately 7.5 occurred, according to USGS. On  January 4, 1843, a severe earthquake (intensity VIII) affected  Memphis/Shelby County and other places in western Tennessee. Walls  were cracked, chimneys fell, and windows were broken. Memphis  suffered a magnitude 5.0 earthquake in1865, in which chimneys  collapsed. The city experienced similar damage from a July 19, 1895,  earthquake.
Probability of seismic occurrence / estimated damages. According to  the USGS, the chance that Memphis will experience a magnitude 6.0 or  greater earthquake within a 50-year window is between 25 percent and  40 percent. For a repeat of an 1811-1812 type event, with a magnitude 7  or greater, there is a 7 percent to 10 percent chance. According to a 2009  Mid-America Earthquake Center study, the number of damaged buildings  resulting from a potential 7.7 earthquake in western Tennessee is far  greater than all other states located in the NMSZ. An estimated 264,000  buildings would be moderately or more severely damaged and nearly  107,000 of those buildings would be completely damaged, according to  the Mid-America Earthquake Center study. Furthermore, Shelby County,  Tennessee, which includes Memphis, comprises half of all estimated  building damage in the state primarily due to the major metropolitan area  in and around Memphis, according to the Mid-America Earthquake Center  study. In addition, Shelby County experiences the greatest number of  total estimated casualties, nearly 21,500.
Examples of efforts to assess and mitigate seismic risks. Memphis  participated in the development of Shelby County’s 2010 multi- jurisdictional hazard mitigation plan, which identified actions that can be  taken to reduce vulnerabilities against seismic events, including five  seismic related projects for the Memphis. Four of the five seismic projects  focus on highway bridge and road construction and the fifth project calls  for the development of a multi-jurisdictional comprehensive earthquake  hazard mitigation plan specifically benefiting Memphis.
section_title: San Francisco
paragraphs: Seismic hazard. According to the San Francisco Capital Plan, a number  of factors contribute to San Francisco’s vulnerability to earthquakes. In  addition to being situated between two major earthquake faults (San  Andreas to the west and Hayward to the east), San Francisco has some  of the most dense wood-structured neighborhoods in the country; the  city’s windy conditions could contribute to the spread of fire following  earthquakes in these neighborhoods. San Francisco is also surrounded  by water on three sides which makes it very susceptible to the seismic  impacts of sea level rise. Furthermore, some low-lying areas that were  filled around1900 are particularly at risk for liquefaction, according to  USGS.
Seismic history. The San Andreas and other regional faults, including  the Hayward Fault, have generated 69 recorded magnitude 5.0 or greater  earthquakes since 1800. Of these recorded earthquakes, three (1838,  1906, and the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake) registered at a magnitude of  6.8 or greater. Historically, the San Andreas Fault system is the most  active fault system in Northern California. This fault system is capable of  generating very strong earthquakes of magnitude 7.0 or greater,  according to the San Francisco hazard mitigation plan. The last major  earthquake on the northern portion of the fault occurred in 1906,  according to the San Francisco hazard mitigation plan. Known as the  Great San Francisco earthquake, this event lasted 45 to 60 seconds and  is estimated at magnitude 7.7. It is believed to have caused intensities as  high as XI on the MMI Scale, according to the San Francisco hazard  mitigation plan. The Great San Francisco earthquake and the  subsequent fire resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths and damage  estimated over $500 million, according to USGS. Shaking damage was  extensive throughout San Francisco, but the 3-day fire that followed the  earthquake destroyed the entire downtown area and many of the  surrounding residential neighborhoods, according to USGS.
Probability of seismic occurrence / estimated damages. There is a  strong likelihood that San Francisco will experience a significant  earthquake from one of the known major faults in the next 30 years,  according to the San Francisco hazard mitigation plan. In 2015, the  Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities (WGCEP)  forecasted that the probability a magnitude 6.7 or greater would strike the  San Francisco region was 72 percent over the next 30 years. In  addition, a 2010 Applied Technology Council study of four scenario  earthquakes found depending on the magnitude, location and time of day  of an earthquake, deaths could range from 70 to nearly 1,000, and  injuries requiring medical care could number from 1,900 to more than  14,000. Casualties could be much higher than these estimates if even  one large, densely occupied office or apartment building collapses. In  addition, multistory concrete buildings in the city built before 1980 have  the potential to collapse and kill many people.
Examples of efforts to assess and mitigate seismic risks. The City  and County of San Francisco (San Francisco) Hazard Mitigation Plan  provides seismic hazard profiles for ground shaking and ground failure  (including landslide and liquefaction) that could occur during an  earthquake. The plan includes a list of essential facilities and  infrastructure within San Francisco. In addition, the plan describes  current, ongoing, and completed large-scale seismic mitigation projects  and programs implemented by San Francisco. For example, the plan  includes a project to seismically retrofit fire stations to ensure they are  fully functional after a major earthquake. San Francisco has implemented  or planned mitigation activities, including structural retrofits, at fire and  police stations, animal shelters, courts, and prisons. In addition, pursuant  to the California Seismic Hazards Mapping Act, the San Francisco  Department of Building Inspection (DBI) requires geotechnical reports  prepared by a licensed geologist and geotechnical engineer for projects in  areas with susceptibility to ground failure, including liquefaction and  landslides. DBI requires that foundations and structural systems be  designed to survive these hazards. DBI also has procedures for  requesting additional review of proposed projects which the Department  believes present difficult or unusual issues in areas with the potential for  ground failure. San Francisco policy also requires that equipment such as  book shelves and filing cabinets are bolted or adhered to the wall in  municipal buildings.
section_title: Los Angeles
paragraphs: Seismic hazard. Los Angeles faces one of the greatest risks of  catastrophic loss from earthquakes of any city in the world, eclipsed only  by Tokyo, Jakarta, and Manila according to a 2013 ranking by Swiss Re,  a reinsurance company. There are numerous active and potentially active  faults in southern California that have the potential for generating strong  ground motions in Los Angeles according to the Los Angeles hazard  mitigation plan. The seismic hazards of most concern to Los Angeles  include ground shaking, fault rupture and liquefaction. Recent studies  have identified various vulnerabilities. For example, pre-1980 soft story  (wood frame buildings where the first floor has large openings, such as  tuck-under parking, garage doors, and retail display windows) and non- ductile concrete buildings (parts of the building such as columns and  frame connectors are too brittle and break in strong shaking) pose a  significant risk to life in strong earthquake shaking.
Seismic history. Some 20 earthquakes of magnitude 6.0 or higher have  occurred in Southern California since 1912. The most recent of these was  the magnitude 6.7, 1994 Northridge Earthquake which was centered in  the northwest part of Los Angeles. The earthquake resulted in 57 deaths,  8,000 injuries, and 92,000 plus buildings damaged. The Northridge  Earthquake is the most costly seismic event in the United States since the  1906 San Francisco Earthquake. The infrastructure of the metropolitan  area was severely disrupted. Freeways collapsed, the power systems for  Los Angeles and linked communities as far away as Oregon were  temporarily “blacked out,” and communications were disrupted. In  addition, the earthquake resulted in non-structural damage that was  extensive, and as dangerous as and far more expensive than structural  damage, according to the Los Angeles hazard mitigation plan.
Probability of seismic occurrence / estimated damages. According to  the WGCEP, within the next 30 years the probability is 60 percent that an  earthquake measuring 6.7 or greater will occur in the Los Angeles region.  In Southern California, one of the most damaging USGS scenarios is a  magnitude 7.1 earthquake on the Puente Hills Fault, with building percent  loss of 30% in some census tracts and total predicted building loss of $79  billion ($82.8 billion in total economic loss). It would kill 500 to 2,000  people and displace an estimated 58,000 households. It would cause at  least moderate damage to 569 highway bridges, 2 airports, and over  470,000 buildings.
Examples of efforts to assess and mitigate seismic risks. In 1981,  Los Angeles passed an ordinance requiring the retrofit of unreinforced  masonry buildings given their vulnerability to earthquake damage. This  was the first-ever mandatory retrofit ordinance in the State of California.  Since the ordinance was passed, more than 99 percent of the city’s  unreinforced masonry buildings have been retrofitted or demolished,  according to a 2014 Los Angeles study. More recently, in October 2015,  Los Angeles passed an ordinance requiring retrofits to strengthen two  additional types of buildings that are vulnerable to earthquake damage:  brittle concrete buildings and buildings with large first floor openings, such  as garages or tuck-under parking. In addition, the Los Angeles  Department of Building & Safety (LADBS) has established three new  “Preliminary Fault Rupture Study Areas” for several fault lines within the  city that have not yet been mapped by the California Geological Survey  (CGS). LADBS’s Preliminary Fault Rupture Study Areas are areas where  active faults may exist and present a potential for ground rupture to occur  during a local earthquake. If a proposed development is found to be in a  Preliminary Fault Rupture Study Area, geologic investigations to  determine the presence or absence of an active fault will be required  before building permits are issued by LADBS.
The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is actively prioritizing  mitigation measures to lower the risks that have been identified and has  taken actions to implement mitigation measures at school buildings.  According to the 2014 LAUSD Strategic Execution Plan, LAUSD had 26  completed projects. In addition, an evaluation found that 673 sites, which  included 4,500 out of 13,500 total school buildings, had possible non- structural hazards – such as hangers and seismic bracing deficiencies,  according to LAUSD officials. LAUSD is using the evaluation to prioritize  future mitigation projects, according to LAUSD officials. For fiscal years  2011 through 2015, LAUSD received about $5 million from FEMA’s Pre- Disaster Mitigation grant program and the Hazard Mitigation Grant  Program for LAUSD’s seismic-related mitigation measures, according to  LAUSD. However, the majority of LAUSD’s seismic mitigation funding has  come from various state programs, according to LAUSD officials.
section_title: Appendix IV: Annualized Earthquake Loss Estimates for Metropolitan Areas in the United States
paragraphs: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimates seismic  risk in all regions of the United States by using two interrelated risk  indicators:
The Annualized Earthquake Loss (AEL), which is the estimated long- term value of earthquake losses to the general building stock in any  single year in a specified geographic area (e.g., state, county,  metropolitan area); and
The Annualized Earthquake Loss Ratio (AELR), which expresses  estimated annualized loss as a fraction of the building inventory  replacement value.
The AEL addresses two key components of seismic risk: the probability of  ground motion occurring in a given study area and the consequences of  the ground motion in terms of physical damage and economic loss. It  takes into account the regional variations in risk. For example, the level of  earthquake risk in the New Madrid Seismic Zone is measurably different  from the risk in the Los Angeles Basin with respect to: a) the probability of  damaging ground motions, and b) the consequences of the ground  motions, which are largely a function of building construction type and  quality, as well as ground shaking and failure during earthquakes.  Consequences vary regionally, as well. For example, the earthquake  hazard is higher in Los Angeles than in Memphis, but the general building  stock in Los Angeles is more resistant to the effects of earthquakes.
The AELR is the AEL as a fraction of the replacement value of the  building inventory and is useful for comparing the relative risk of events.  For example, $10 million in earthquake damages in Evansville, Indiana  represents a greater loss than a comparable dollar loss in San Francisco,  a much larger city. The annualized loss ratio allows gauging of the  relationship between AEL and building replacement value. This ratio can  be used as a measure of relative risk between regions and, since it is  normalized by replacement value, it can be directly compared across  metropolitan areas, counties, or states.
A 2008 FEMA study indicates that the Annualized Earthquake Loss (AEL)  to the national building stock is $5.3 billion per year. The majority (77  percent) of average annual loss is located on the West Coast (California,  Oregon, Washington) with 66 percent ($3.5 billion per year) concentrated  in the state of California. The high concentration of loss in California is  consistent with the state’s high seismic hazard and large structural  exposure. The remaining 23 percent (1.1 billion per year) of annual loss is  distributed throughout the rest of the United States (including Alaska and  Hawaii). While the majority of economic loss is concentrated along the  West Coast, the distribution of relative earthquake risk, as measured by  the AELR, is much broader and reinforces the fact that earthquakes are a  national problem. There are relatively high earthquake loss ratios  throughout the western and central United States (states within the New  Madrid Seismic Zone) and in the Charleston, South Carolina area.
As shown in table 5, forty-three metropolitan areas, led by the Los  Angeles and San Francisco Bay areas, account for 82 percent of the total  AEL. Los Angeles County alone has about 25 percent of the total AEL,  and the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay areas together account for  nearly 40 percent of the total AEL.
section_title: Appendix V: Examples of Structural and Nonstructural Enhancements to New and Existing Buildings
paragraphs: We examined examples of seismic retrofit and non-structural seismic  upgrade mitigation projects. For example, the Los Angeles City Hall was  built in 1928 and retrofitted in 2001 for $300 million dollars, according to  Los Angeles officials. The retrofit included renovation of terra cotta tiles  on the dome roof, using concrete to replace unreinforced masonry, and  replacing the cracked floor outside the main hallway (see figure 14). In  addition, the pedestrian bridge connecting City Hall to an adjacent  building was renovated from 1998 to 2001 to include a separation (or  sliding) joint. In the case of an earthquake, the two buildings may not  sway from side-to-side at the same rate or in the same direction. As such,  the separation joint connecting the bridge with City Hall can fall away in  the event of an earthquake, allowing for up to 6 inches of separation. This  is built to ensure that the two buildings will not collide in an earthquake up  to an 8.1 magnitude event. The building is also fitted with base isolators  and dampers (see figure 14). The base isolators are designed to move as  much as 24 inches. See figure 15 for examples of nonstructural  earthquake mitigation enhancements to hospital and school buildings in  California.
See figure 15 for examples of nonstructural earthquake mitigation  enhancements to hospital and school buildings in California.
section_title: Appendix VI: Potential Intensity of Earthquake Shaking on Leased and Owned Federal Buildings by Agency
paragraphs: The following tables provide a detailed overview of the potential MMI  shaking intensity for federal leased and owned buildings by agency.
The following table provides a detailed overview of the number and  square footage of federally leased and owned buildings by agency.
section_title: Appendix VII: Federal Buildings in Four High Earthquake Shaking Intensity Zones of the United States (Corresponds to Fig. 5)
paragraphs: Appendix VII: Federal Buildings in Four High  Earthquake Shaking Intensity Zones of the  United States (Corresponds to Fig. 5)
Figures 16 through 19 include the rollover information in figure 5.
section_title: Appendix VIII: FEMA Publications Which Provide Guidance to Mitigate Earthquake Risks
paragraphs: FEMA has issued several publications to assist building owners in  identifying seismic risk and developing mitigation plans. For example,  FEMA E-74, Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage,  may be useful as a reference for scoping and prioritizing the protection of  nonstructural components and contents and it also provides information  on the relative risks posed by nonstructural elements, as well as  appropriate mitigation techniques.
In addition, FEMA’s Incremental Seismic Rehabilitation series, including  FEMA 397 Incremental Seismic Rehabilitation of Office Buildings,  provides office building owners who have budgetary constraints and  cannot afford expensive and disruptive seismic rehabilitation projects, an  affordable strategy for responsible mitigation action which can be  integrated efficiently into ongoing facility maintenance and capital  improvement operations. The manual was developed based on the  management practices of office building owners of varying sizes located  in various seismic zones in different parts of the United States. It includes  guidance for building owners to address building contents mitigation and  earthquake drills as part of a comprehensive seismic safety program.
Finally, FEMA has also developed additional publications on how  structural and nonstructural earthquake risks can be mitigated for many  building use types. In particular they have issued FEMA P-811  QuakeSmart: Earthquake Publications for Businesses. While the  guidance is directed towards the private sector, it includes actionable and  scalable basic guidance and tools regarding the importance of  earthquake mitigation and simple things that can be done to reduce the  potential of earthquake damages, injuries, and financial losses. See table  11 for a list of publications produced by FEMA which provide guidance to  mitigate earthquake risks for many building use types.
section_title: Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix X: Comments from the General Services Administration
paragraphs: of the report (e.g., see Table 4) to include information about the  Seismic Rating report.    7.  We do not dispute GSA’s comment.  Our reference to FEMA guidance  in the report is to illustrate low-cost opportunities that agencies can  use, as applicable, as part of comprehensive seismic safety programs  to reduce potential damages, injuries, and casualties from future  earthquakes.
section_title: Appendix XI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Mike Armes (Assistant Director),  R. Denton Herring (Analyst-in-Charge), Jeffrey Fiore, Edward George,  Les Locke, Gary M. Malavenda, Kristiana Moore, Samuel Woo, Aaron  Safer-Lichtenstein, Eric Hauswirth, Tracey King, Dominick M. Dale,  Michele Fejfar, Melinda Cordero, Amber H. Sinclair, John Mingus, Katrina  E. Pekar-Carpenter, and Grant Mallie made key contributions to this  report.