Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science and Technology Strategy Need to Be More Robust
Published: 2011-07-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Each year, the United States spends billions of dollars on space-based systems to support national security activities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to develop and issue a space science and technology (S&T) strategy every 2 years addressing S&T goals and a process for achieving these goals, among other requirements. As GAO is required to assess the strategy, this report addresses (1) the extent to which the strategy meets the statutory requirements, (2) if other approaches could be used to enhance the usefulness of the strategy, and (3) the extent of coordination efforts used in developing the strategy. GAO reviewed the strategy for sufficiency with statutory requirements and met with DOD and DNI officials to discuss the analyses and coordination used to support the content of the strategy. GAO also compared the strategy to strategic planning best practices to see if there are ways it could be improved.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The space science and technology strategy addresses eight statutory requirements, and DOD plans to address the two remaining requirements. While the statutory requirements were addressed, additional information that could have enhanced the strategy was not always included. For example, in relation to the strategy's goals, a newly developed implementation plan for the achievement of the goals was not established. Instead, the strategy describes a plan for implementation where DOD components implement the strategy as a routine element of their existing budgetary process. Also, the strategy's new goals were established without any prioritization, and while this was not required, given the breadth and scope of space S&T development activities, it is important that goals be prioritized. For the statutory requirements involving strategy implementation, officials explained that while the requirements to identify S&T projects with associated funding and schedule information were not addressed in the strategy, components and research laboratories conduct these activities as part of the normal DOD budgetary process. While the content of the strategy addresses statutory requirements, it does not address fundamental challenges facing the space S&T community. These challenges have been identified in high-level studies and prior GAO reports and include human capital shortages, growing fiscal pressures, and the difficulty in transitioning space S&T to acquisition programs. In this assessment, GAO identified some strategic planning best practices that, if used, could improve future strategy versions by addressing these fundamental challenges and thereby potentially enhancing the usefulness of the strategy. These practices include identifying required human capital; identifying required funding; prioritizing initiatives; establishing ways to measure progress; and establishing processes for revising goals in the future. Organizations involved in development of the strategy participated in creating its short- and long-term goals; however, their participation in developing other aspects of the strategy was more limited. DOD and DNI officials told GAO that their interpretation of the 2009 statute directing development of the strategy was that it did not require that the intelligence community be involved to the full extent in some aspects of the strategy. Moreover, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) together with the intelligence community, conduct a significant amount of space S&T. Although NASA and NOAA participation is not required, DOD may have missed an opportunity to leverage these agencies' activities and optimize its own S&T spending by involving them in strategy development. GAO was also required to evaluate the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms planned to implement the strategy. However, because the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too early to make such an evaluation.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD and DNI develop a more specific implementation plan; include additional information and prioritization, ways to measure progress, and processes for revision when establishing strategic planning goals; and enhance coordination among the DOD S&T community, the intelligence community, NASA, and NOAA. DOD concurred with the recommendations and DNI had no comment.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Each year, the United States spends billions of dollars to acquire space  systems to support current military and other government operations.  These assets support the national security activities of the Department of  Defense (DOD) and the intelligence community, as well as civil and  commercial activities. Specifically, space assets are used to support a  wide range of military missions including, but not limited to, battlefield  surveillance and management; global command, control, and  communications; missile warning; navigation assistance;  communications, navigation, timing, and positioning; weather and  climatology; and intelligence collection. Given the critical role that space  capabilities play, it is imperative that unique and related space science  and technology (S&T) efforts are sufficient to provide the short- and long- term advanced space technology base, or foundation. A strong  foundation in space S&T should help DOD and the intelligence  community address the most challenging national security problems,  reduce risk in major acquisition programs, maintain technological  superiority over adversaries, maintain a healthy industrial base, and  mitigate vulnerabilities to space systems.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA for  Fiscal Year 2010), building on existing statutory requirements,  establishes requirements for the Secretary of Defense and the Director of  National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly develop a space science and  technology strategy (hereafter referred to as the strategy) and submit the  first strategy to Congress on the date the President submits the budget  for fiscal year 2012 to Congress. Additionally, the strategy is required to  be submitted to Congress biennially on the date the President submits the  budget to Congress for the next fiscal year and is to address short- and  long-term goals of the space S&T programs of DOD; a process for  achieving those goals, including an implementation plan; a process for  assessing progress made toward achieving those goals; and a process  for transitioning space S&T programs to new or existing space acquisition  programs. Coordination with DOD research laboratories and research  components is also required in the development and implementation of  the strategy.
In the past, we have had concerns about DOD strategic planning,  inadequate funding visibility, and the degree to which DOD and DNI have  collaborated on space strategic planning. In 2006, we reported that DOD  generally faced problems with deficiencies in strategic planning for critical  technologies, processes for technology development and transition, and  tools that support transition. We have also identified significant  challenges or barriers for DOD in implementing a previous space S&T  strategy, one of which was inadequate funding visibility. In 2008, we  reported to Congress that we were concerned there was no overarching  strategic guidance in place to link the defense and intelligence  communities’ future space programs, plans, and new space concepts.  Our prior work has also shown that strategic planning is the foundation for  defining what an agency seeks to accomplish, identifying the strategies it  will use to achieve desired results, and then determining how well it  succeeds in reaching results-oriented goals and achieving objectives.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires that we review and assess the  first strategy no later than 90 days after its submission to Congress. In  response, this report addresses (1) the extent to which the strategy meets  the statutory requirements, (2) other approaches or methods that could  be used to enhance the usefulness of the strategy, and (3) the extent of  coordination efforts used in developing the strategy and the effectiveness  of coordination mechanisms planned to implement the strategy. To  address these areas, we reviewed the strategy for its sufficiency with  statutory requirements and met with DOD and DNI officials to discuss and  collect information on the methods, approaches, and analyses used to  support the content of the strategy. We compared the strategy’s contents  to best practices in strategic planning and existing challenges in space  S&T to determine if there are ways to improve it. We also discussed, or  received written responses to questions on, the methods used to  coordinate the development, as well as planned implementation, of the  strategy with officials from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense,  Research and Engineering (formerly the Director, Defense Research and  Engineering); Office of the Director of National Intelligence (including  National Reconnaissance Office officials); Defense Advanced Research  Projects Agency; Missile Defense Agency; Army Materiel Command;  Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,  and Technology; Army Space and Missile Defense Command; Naval  Research Laboratory; Office of Naval Research; Office of the Assistant  Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Research Laboratory;  and Department of Energy. However, since the strategy has only  recently been issued, and given the time constraints of our review, it was  too early to assess whether the mechanisms and processes outlined in  the strategy for its implementation will be effective in supporting and  guiding future space S&T efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 to July 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more  information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In general, the S&T community includes government research  laboratories and testing facilities as well as contractors and academic  institutions that support these facilities. This community conducts  research and development to support military or intelligence applications,  such as space or weapon systems. While intelligence community funding  levels for S&T are classified, DOD uses Research, Development, Test  and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds for S&T work, including space S&T work,  some of which is classified.
Space S&T efforts are undertaken by many government organizations.  While DOD and the intelligence community comprise the vast majority of  organizations involved in space S&T, several civilian government  organizations are also involved, including the National Aeronautics and  Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA), and the Department of Energy (DOE). NASA’s  space S&T efforts are significant and drive advances in space science,  technology, and exploration and often can involve technology transfers to  DOD and other agencies. NOAA, which provides space weather  information to other government organizations and the public, conducts  research in the development of new satellite sensors, creates new  applications for using satellite data, and develops innovative approaches  for handling increased data rates as well as increases in computing  power and data storage. DOE develops sensors that collect space  weather data, and its laboratories often collaborate on space S&T efforts  that are sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,  the Air Force Research Laboratory, or the Naval Research Laboratories.  Strategy developers told us that NASA and NOAA were not consulted in  the development of the strategy because there was no statutory  requirement to do so. According to strategy developers, DOE was  involved in the development of the strategy even though their involvement  was not required.
DOD RDT&E investment is separated into seven discrete investment  categories known as budget activities. Within the DOD S&T community,  the first three categories—which represent basic research, applied  research, and advanced technology development activities, and are  collectively known as S&T activities—use RDT&E funds. Figure 1  describes the three categories of DOD S&T investment.
Congress required DOD to develop and implement a space S&T strategy  in 2004. DOD was not required to collaborate with DNI in developing the  2004 strategy. DOD’s 2004 strategy described six specific investment  areas: assured access to space; responsive space capability; assured  space operations; spacecraft technology; information superiority; and the  S&T workforce. The most significant space S&T goals were identified  within each area, with the exception of S&T workforce. The strategy  stated it would be necessary to successfully develop and demonstrate the  requisite technologies in a relevant environment within the short-term,  defined to be within the next 5 years, and the long-term, defined to be in  the year 2020 or beyond. The 2004 strategy also discussed  implementation mechanisms for the strategy, the importance of  transitioning new technology to fielded capability, and an approach to  assess progress toward achieving the goals. Though there are many  diverse organizations carrying out S&T efforts related to space and a  considerable amount being invested, DOD did not update its space S&T  strategy between 2004 and 2011.
Our review of DOD’s 2004 space S&T strategy found that it provided a  foundation for coordination among space S&T efforts but lacked detail in  key areas needed to achieve the strategy’s goals. We found that DOD  had taken an initial positive step in optimizing investments in space S&T  projects by establishing short- and long-term goals. However, we also  identified significant challenges or barriers for DOD in implementing the  strategy such as inadequate funding visibility, decreased testing  resources, workforce deficiencies, and long-standing incentives that  encourage technology development to take place within acquisition  programs rather than the S&T community. We recommended that the  strategy contain stronger linkages to DOD’s requirements-setting  process, identify additional measures for assessing progress in achieving  strategic goals, address barriers to achievement, and include all efforts  related to space S&T. In addition, we recommended establishing  protocols and mechanisms for enhancing coordination and knowledge  sharing among the DOD S&T community, acquisition programs involved  in space, and DOD intelligence agencies. DOD agreed with our  recommendations.
section_title: Space S&T Strategy Addresses Most Statutory Requirements, but Lacks Robust Detail
paragraphs: Our comparison of the strategy against the statutory reporting  requirements found that the strategy addresses eight statutory  requirements and DOD has plans to address two other statutory  requirements. For two of the requirements involving strategy  implementation, DOD has asserted that its normal budgetary process will  suffice. While the requirements were met, additional information that  could enable DOD to successfully implement the strategy was not  included. See table 1 for our assessment of the strategy.
The contents of the strategy address four primary areas: (1) short- and  long-term goals; (2) goal implementation; (3) goal assessment; and   (4) the transition of space S&T technology to space acquisition programs.  The strategy outlines a total of 54 space S&T goals—30 short-term and  24 long-term, and describes existing, routine DOD processes such as  program planning and budgeting procedures to help implement the  strategy. It also mentions that periodic structured and informal  programmatic and technical reviews are used to assess progress toward  achievement of DOD goals and objectives and describes how there is no  distinct process for transitioning space S&T products toward ultimate  application in acquisition programs, while also describing several  examples considered “success stories” in the transition of space S&T.  While DOD addresses, or plans to address, the statutory requirements, in  some instances, the inclusion of more detailed information could have  allowed an opportunity for more successful implementation of the  strategy. Specifically, in relation to the strategy’s goals, it does not  establish a newly developed implementation plan for the achievement of  the goals. Instead, the strategy describes a plan for implementation  where DOD components essentially implement the strategy as a routine  element of their existing program planning and budgeting procedures  while employing processes that are specifically tailored to each  component’s mission function. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research  and Engineering (ASD (R&E)) officials, who served as leads in  developing the strategy (strategy developers) also cited a program called  Reliance 21 as helping to manage and implement its entire S&T  portfolio, including space S&T. While creation of a newly developed  implementation plan was not a specific statutory requirement, it potentially  could have provided a more delineated, exacting process for successfully  achieving the strategy’s goals.
Also, DOD strategy developers told us that, as part of implementing the  entire strategy, they did not specifically direct DOD components and  research laboratories to meet the statutory requirements to (1) identify  their research projects in support of the strategy that contribute directly  and uniquely to the development of space technology, or (2) inform top  DOD officials of their planned budget and planned schedule for executing  those projects. However, officials explained that research components  and research laboratories would do these activities as part of the normal  DOD budgetary process. DOD strategy developers also told us that their  entire S&T portfolio, including space S&T, is managed using the existing  Reliance 21 process, including implementation planning, execution,  coordination, and review. They further explained that the Reliance 21  S&T Strategic Overview process fosters awareness and joint planning  among senior S&T leadership and enhances coordination among DOD’s  S&T investment managers. In addition, the ASD(R&E), in conjunction with  the S&T Executive Committee, conducts an annual review of all DOD  S&T investments, and Space-related Advanced Technology  Demonstrations are reviewed yearly at the Air Force Applied Technology  Council held as part of the Air Force Space Command Space S&T  Council. Strategy developers further added that cooperation,  collaboration, and partnerships among the S&T organizations are also  achieved through a variety of mechanisms such as technology forums,  workshops, conferences, project and program reviews, international  agreements, partnerships, and on-site liaisons.
Another example where key details were not present in the strategy is the  establishment of 54 total goals without any prioritization. Though  prioritization is not a statutory requirement, given the breadth and scope  of space S&T development activities and issues we have identified in the  past with respect to a lack of coordination and prioritization, it is  important, and indeed a best practice, that goals be prioritized. We have  also identified several, additional strategic planning best practices in the  next section of this report that were not followed in the development of the  strategy. If the strategy had more closely followed these best practices, it  potentially could have allowed for the development of a more robust and  useful space S&T strategy that addresses some of the major challenges  in space S&T.
section_title: Fundamental Challenges Facing the Space S&T Community and Best Practices Not Addressed
paragraphs: While the content of the space S&T strategy meets statutory  requirements, it does not address fundamental challenges facing the  space S&T community. These challenges include human capital  shortages, growing fiscal pressures, and the difficulty in transitioning  space S&T to acquisition programs. While adopting best practices in  strategic planning for future versions of the strategy is not required under  the current statutory requirements, we identified some best practice  elements that could be used to develop well-structured goals in any  strategic plan.
Recent DOD-sponsored and congressional studies have addressed  concerns over the DOD S&T laboratory personnel and the loss of talent in  the space workforce. In addition, our prior reports have identified  challenges facing the space S&T community. We have also consistently  reported on today’s challenging budgetary environment and that many of  DOD’s problems with poor cost and schedule outcomes on acquisition  programs can be attributed to deficiencies (1) in strategic planning for  critical technologies such as S&T investments, and (2) in processes for  technology development and transition to acquisition programs. In fact,  in S&T areas across DOD, we have found challenges in transitioning new  technology from the laboratory to acquisition programs. The new space  S&T strategy acknowledges there is no single process for transitioning  space S&T products, and that transition is tailored to the nature of the  technology being developed and the ultimate application. Strategy  developers told us they recognize that having many different processes  for technology transition to acquisition programs is a fact of life and they  do not endorse a one-size-fits-all approach. However, as we have  previously reported, DOD does not use a process with criteria that would  allow lab and program managers to know when a technology is ready to  transition.
In our assessment, we identified some strategic planning best practice  elements that, while not required for the strategy, should be part of well- structured goals in strategic plans. Most of these strategic planning best  practices are contained in the Government Performance and Results Act  of 1993, designed to provide a basis for the establishment of  government strategic planning and performance management, as well as  the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance designed to  provide specific information to government agencies on the preparation  and submission of strategic plans. We have also discussed DOD strategic  planning best practices in our prior reports. If incorporated, these best  practice elements could improve the usefulness of future strategy  versions and position DOD to better address fundamental challenges in  space S&T. In the absence of these more detailed best practice  elements, the usefulness of the strategy for decision making may be  limited. Adopting these best practice elements in future versions of the  strategy is not required under the current statutory requirements, but we  believe that incorporating them will ultimately improve the foundation the  strategy provides for space S&T.
Identify Required Human Capital: Both the U.S. government and  industry face substantial shortages of scientists and engineers and  difficulty in recruiting new personnel because the space industry is  one of many sectors competing for the limited number of these  professionals. A recent U.S. House of Representatives study  concluded that the space workforce is facing significant loss of talent  and expertise and the challenge exists to smoothly transition to a new  space workforce. Also, a recent study done for DOD on S&T  observed that while the DOD S&T laboratory infrastructure was once  world leading, the flow of research science, technology development,  and engineering expertise is not as robust as it once was and, for the  most part, it has declined to the point where most DOD S&T people  are project managers who monitor research being done by others  outside of DOD. While the discussion of human capital needs is  considered a strategic planning best practice, the strategy does not  include a discussion of the human capital currently engaged in space  S&T or the human capital required to achieve the strategy’s goals.
Identify Required Funding: Our prior work has shown that, in  general, a lack of investment information can adversely affect the  ability to avoid unnecessary duplication, control costs, ensure basic  accountability, anticipate future costs, and measure performance.  Funding required to implement and achieve the goals was not  compiled or included in the strategy. Strategy developers told us that  since they were not required to report funding information, they did not  collect funding information from the various DOD research  laboratories and components involved in space S&T and they did not  impose funding constraints in developing the strategy. In addition, DNI  officials told us there was no attempt to incorporate information on  space S&T funding amounts associated with the intelligence  community in the strategy. Furthermore, strategy developers told us  that achieving top-level visibility for DOD space S&T funding is not a  simple task and would require substantial effort. However, when  asked about the biggest challenge to achieving the goals, strategy  developers told us it was maintaining consistent funding in a funding-  constrained environment. In addition to funding information, neither an  analysis of past trends nor future funding needs were included in the  strategy, both of which could have established a recommended level  of consistent funding. These efforts could potentially help mitigate risk  to space S&T against the backdrop of growing national government  fiscal imbalance and budget deficits that are straining all federal  agencies’ resources.    Prioritize Initiatives: The federal government faces real fiscal  limitations and will have to make difficult choices about upcoming  priorities, but the strategy does not go beyond what was required and  prioritize the goals in a more definitive way than classifying them as  either short- or long-term. We have reported that prioritizing initiatives  enables evaluation in terms of overall importance to the portfolio and  can help decision makers when allocating resources. Strategy  developers told us criteria were not developed to either accept or  reject goals for inclusion in the strategy or to prioritize a goal as either  short- or long-term. Instead, they told us that meetings were convened  to discuss and review draft goals and that the categorization of goals  as either short- or long-term was based upon the professional  judgment of the meeting participants with respect to the current state  of technology and potential to achieve capabilities within nominal time  frames. The strategy currently lists 30 short-term and 24 long-term  goals—22 more goals than were identified in the 2004 strategy—and  gives no indication which ones are more important than the others.  Strategy developers also added that more specific time frames or goal  prioritization were not included in the strategy because that would  require the assignment of resource (i.e., funding) commitments, which  was not required. Since strategy goals were not prioritized, it will be  difficult to determine which space S&T goals are the most important to  the space S&T community if trade-off decisions are necessary.    Establish Ways to Measure Progress: Performance measures can  be used to assess the value of projects relative to goals, demonstrate  results and provide useful information for decision makers. The  strategy did not develop new metrics or performance measures that  could be used to assess whether the strategy’s goals are being  achieved. Rather, the strategy indicates that various periodic  structured, and informal, programmatic and technical reviews are  used to evaluate the effectiveness and quality of space S&T  investments and assess progress toward achievement of objectives  and goals. It is unclear how these reviews can help assess the larger  strategic goals developed in the strategy that are meant to apply to  DOD and the intelligence community. It is also unclear how the  Reliance 21 program helps to specifically assess the progress of, and  provide linkage to, the goals established in the strategy. Further,  Reliance 21 reviews do not involve an examination of space S&T  within the intelligence community. Without established ways to  measure progress toward strategy goals, it will be more difficult to  measure the progress and achievement of space S&T goals and  implement corrective actions if needed.    Establish Process for Revising Goals in the Future: Criteria to  establish and revise goals could help to improve performance and  results. The strategy, however, does not articulate the process to be  used to revise the goals in the future for the next version of the  strategy. Strategy developers told us there were no criteria  established to initially help formulate goals and that the general  consensus of the officials involved determined which goals were  included in the strategy. While this same process could be used to  make revisions to the goals, the absence of criteria will likely make  future revisions more difficult to track and understand, and certainly  more ad hoc.
section_title: Coordination Efforts in Strategy Development Were Limited and Implementation Efforts Are too Early to Assess
paragraphs: Although most organizations involved with the space S&T strategy  participated significantly in developing its short- and long-term goals,  participation among some organizations in developing other aspects of  the strategy was more limited. DOD and DNI officials told GAO that their  interpretation of the 2009 statute directing development of the strategy  was that it did not require that the intelligence community be involved to  the full extent in some aspects of the strategy. Moreover, although their  involvement was not required by the statute, other agencies with  investments in space S&T, such as NASA and NOAA, were not involved  in the strategy’s development. Together, the intelligence community and  these other agencies conduct a significant amount of space S&T  development. By limiting their involvement, DOD may have missed an  opportunity to leverage these activities and optimize its own S&T  spending. Also, since the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too  early to evaluate the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms  planned to implement the strategy.
subsections: section_title: Strategy Development Coordination within DOD Was Limited
paragraphs: According to an ASD (R&E) official, his office served as the lead in  development of the strategy and explained that the methodology began  with identifying DOD, DNI, and other space S&T stakeholders. As  required, strategy developers consulted with the directors of DOD  research laboratories and other DOD research components, as well as  the heads of other DOD organizations that have interests in space S&T.  Officials from most of the DOD laboratories and components said that  they had participated in establishing the strategy goals. Seven of eight  organizations we interviewed reported they were tasked to compile and  submit their goals related to space S&T. Goals included in the final  strategy were based on consensus agreement. Strategy developers  organized the strategy goals under the space functional areas used in the  National Security Space Plan. Goals were categorized as either short- or  long-term, based on the professional judgment of the strategy developers  with respect to the current state of technology and the potential to achieve  the desired capabilities within nominal time frames.
While it is clear that DOD research laboratories and components were  consulted, and most assisted in the development of the strategy, it is also  clear from our discussions with these organizations that their involvement  was typically limited to contributing to the establishment of short- and  long-term space S&T goals. Although workgroups were established to  develop each of the strategy’s sections, responses varied concerning the  level of involvement. Some organizations’ participation in the  development of the strategy’s sections that discuss the implementation,  assessment, and transition of space S&T was limited. Some research  laboratories and components reported playing larger roles in the  workgroups than others.
DOD strategy developers told us that, in developing the strategy, they did  not direct DOD research laboratories or components to identify and  provide a compilation of their space S&T projects being worked on or  planned. On the basis of the statute, they were not specifically required to  do so.  They also were not required to, nor did they ask these research  laboratories and components to, provide planned budget information  associated with their space S&T projects. Officials explained that they did  not believe this was necessary or would provide value to the development  of the strategy and said they have processes in place, such as the  Reliance 21 program, to help facilitate the coordination of space S&T  projects within DOD. Reliance 21, however, is a DOD program and does  not involve reviews of space S&T projects within the intelligence  community.
section_title: Strategy Development Coordination between DOD and the Intelligence Community Was Limited
paragraphs: DNI, while not required to in the development of the strategy, did not  provide a compilation of space S&T projects, nor the associated planned  budget information for assessment as the strategy was being developed.  While the statutory provision for the strategy was amended in 2009 to  require DNI to jointly develop the strategy with DOD, other parts of the  statute do not specifically call for DNI’s involvement. DOD and DNI  officials told us they interpreted this to mean the intelligence community  was not required to be involved to the full extent in some aspects of the  strategy. Specifically, DNI officials told us that they interpret the statute to  apply to the establishment of goals for DOD in the strategy, and that there  is no requirement that these goals take into consideration the goals of the  intelligence community. According to DNI officials, only where the DOD  goals coincide with the already established goals of the intelligence  community do they plan to work jointly toward goal accomplishment.  Further, DNI officials told us that while the strategy addresses plans for  implementing the goals established, these plans only apply to DOD and  the strategy does not include implementation plans for the intelligence  community. While coordination between DOD and DNI was limited in  development of the strategy, strategy developers told us that apart from  the development, they do coordinate regularly with each other on space  S&T projects and also use on-site liaison personnel at the Air Force  Research Laboratory and the National Reconnaissance Office. Strategy  developers also provided some limited information on meetings and  councils in which agencies within the two organizations participate.
Although DOD did coordinate with DNI and the intelligence community,  we believe greater coordination among the stakeholders would allow for  the formation of a single strategic plan to guide this important area. In the  past, we have raised concerns about DOD strategic planning and the  degree to which DOD and DNI collaborate on space strategic planning. In  2008, we reported to Congress that we were concerned there was no  overarching strategic guidance in place to link the defense and  intelligence communities’ future space programs, plans, and new space  concepts. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which served as  the lead agent for DNI and the primary participant from the intelligence  community in the development of the strategy, typically develops  sophisticated space capabilities and is critically important to space  intelligence. While the amount of money NRO spends on space S&T is  classified, it is the premier space reconnaissance organization in the  world and has established a priority to improve this area of investment.
Further, strategy developers stated that they did not coordinate with  NASA or NOAA in developing the strategy because the statute did not  direct that these agencies be involved. NASA and NOAA are both  involved in significant space S&T efforts with NASA’s fiscal year 2012  budget request including over $1 billion for space research and  technology. NASA has a strategic plan of its own with a primary mission  to drive advances in space science, technology, and exploration and can  be involved in technology transfers to DOD and other agencies. While  DOD and DNI did not coordinate with NASA in the development of the  strategy, NASA and DOD periodically coordinate on S&T projects as part  of the National Science and Technology Council. NASA’s procedural  requirements also recommend they search research and technology  literature prior to investing in new research areas to minimize duplication  of effort and look for opportunities to augment research and technology  efforts from other agencies. NOAA conducts research in the  development of new satellite sensors, new applications of satellite data,  new approaches for handling increased data rates, as well as increased  computing power and data storage.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: If done well, strategic planning provides the foundation for the most  important things organizations do each day and fosters informed  communication between organizations and their stakeholders. Strategic  planning provides decision makers with a framework to guide program  efforts and the means to determine if these efforts are achieving the  desired results. While the strategy was a first step, it unfortunately was  not a rigorous, comprehensive strategic plan. Instead, it embraces the  status quo without laying out a path for assuring effective and efficient  progress. The space S&T strategy could have gone beyond statutory  requirements and provided the basis for a rigorous, comprehensive space  S&T program, consistent with economic trends and budgetary constraints  to ensure the United States continues to possess the advantages that  space provides DOD and the intelligence community. Improving  coordination and incorporating changes in future versions would help  ensure the strategy addresses space S&T challenges, and help supports  agency investments. Addressing these kinds of factors would enable  DOD and the intelligence community to have a more effective strategy to  guide this critical area of investment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To optimize government investment in space S&T and address key  challenges, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (who would  direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering and  the DOD Executive Agent for Space) and the Director of National  Intelligence make the following three improvements to enhance the next  version of the space S&T strategy:    Develop a specific implementation plan that provides a detailed  process for achieving the strategy’s goals.  Include information on required human capital; required funding;  prioritization; ways to measure progress against the goals; and  process(es) for revising goals to address the challenges in space  S&T.    Enhance coordination between the DOD space S&T community, the  intelligence space S&T community, and NASA and NOAA in the  development of the strategy so that the space S&T area can be  examined strategically.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all three  of our recommendations to enhance the next version of the space S&T  strategy. DNI did not offer any comments on the draft report provided for  their review.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, the DOD  Executive Agent for Space, the Director of National Intelligence, and the  Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The report also is  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found   on the last page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent the 2011 space science and technology (S&T)  strategy addressed statutory requirements, we compared the strategy  contents to the congressional requirements in 10 U.S.C. Section 2272  and asked the Department of Defense (DOD) and Director of National  Intelligence (DNI) officials for additional details when necessary. We also  met with DOD and DNI officials to discuss and collect information on the  methods, approaches, and analyses used to support the content of the  strategy.
We also identified existing challenges in space S&T documented in prior  government and GAO reports and compared these challenges to the  areas covered by the strategy’s contents. Further, we identified best  practices in strategic planning and compared the strategy’s contents to  these best practices to determine if there were ways to improve it. We  obtained the strategic planning best practices from the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993, Office of Management and Budget  Circular No. A-11, Part 6, Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans,  Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Program Performance Reports,  July 2010, and prior GAO reports.
To determine the extent of coordination efforts used to develop and  implement the strategy, we discussed the coordination methods used in  the strategy’s development with officials from the Office of Assistant  Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering (formerly the Director,  Defense Research and Engineering); Office of the Director of National  Intelligence (including National Reconnaissance Office officials); Defense  Advanced Research Projects Agency; Missile Defense Agency; Army  Materiel Command; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for  Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Army Space and Missile and  Defense Command; Naval Research Laboratory; Office of Naval  Research; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for  Acquisition; Air Force Research Laboratory; and the Department of  Energy. Since the strategy has only recently been issued, and given the  time constraints of our review, it was too early to assess the mechanisms  and processes outlined in the strategy for its implementation.
We also reviewed other relevant high-level space strategic plans  including the National Security Strategy, the National Security Space  Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Space Policy,  the Defense Science and Technology Strategy, the DOD Research and  Engineering Strategic Plan, and the DOD Space Science and Technology  Strategy (2004).
We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 to July 2011 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Art Gallegos, Assistant Director;  Tim Persons; Marie Ahearn; Don Springman; LeAnna Parkey; and Laura  Greifner made key contributions to this report.