DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size
Published: 2004-02-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Terrorist attacks and espionage cases have heightened national security concerns and highlighted the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. However, GAO's past work found that the Department of Defense (DOD) had a clearance backlog and other problems with its process. GAO was asked to address: (1) What is the size of DOD's security clearance backlog, and how accurately is DOD able to estimate its size? (2) What factors impede DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and accurately determine its size? (3) What are the potential adverse effects of those impediments to eliminating DOD's backlog and accurately estimating the backlog's size? GAO was also asked to determine the status of the congressionally authorized transfer of Defense Security Service (DSS) investigative functions and personnel to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD did not know the size of its security clearance backlog at the end of September 2003 and has not estimated the size of the backlog since January 2000. DOD cannot estimate the size of its backlog of overdue reinvestigations that have not been submitted for renewal, but prior estimates of this portion of the backlog suggest it was sizeable. Using September 2003 data from DSS, OPM, and nine adjudication facilities, GAO calculated the size of investigative and adjudicative portions of the backlog at roughly 270,000 and 90,000 cases, respectively. Because these estimates were made using time-based goals that varied from agency to agency, the actual backlog size is uncertain. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate--and accurately estimate the size of--its clearance backlog. Four major impediments slowing the elimination of the backlog are (1) the large numbers of new clearance requests; (2) the insufficient investigator and adjudicator workforces; (3) the size of the existing backlog; and (4) the lack of a strategic plan for overcoming problems in gaining access to state, local, and overseas information needed to complete investigations. Two other factors have hampered DOD's ability to develop accurate estimates of the backlog size. DOD has failed to provide adequate oversight of its clearance program, including developing DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures and using the measures to assess the backlog regularly. In addition, delays in implementing its Joint Personnel Adjudication System have limited DOD's ability to monitor backlog size and track when periodic reinvestigations are due. DOD's failure to eliminate and accurately assess the size of the backlog may have adverse effects. Delays in updating overdue clearances for command, agency, and industry personnel who are doing classified work may increase risks to national security. Slowness in issuing new clearances can increase the costs of doing classified government work. Finally, DOD's inability to accurately define and measure the backlog and project future clearance requests that it expects to receive can adversely affect its ability to develop accurate budgetary and staffing plans. In December 2003, advisors to OPM's Director recommended that the authorized transfer of DOD's investigative functions and personnel to OPM should not occur for at least the rest of fiscal year 2004. That recommendation was based on uncertainties over financial risks that OPM might incur. An alternative plan being discussed by DOD and OPM calls for leaving investigative staff in DSS and giving them training for, and access to, OPM's case management system. A DOD official estimated that using the OPM system, instead of DOD's current system, would avoid about $100 million in update and maintenance costs during the next 5 years. Also, as of December 16, 2003, the Secretary of Defense had not provided Congress with certifications required prior to any transfer.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Recent events, such as the terrorist attacks on the United States on  September 11, 2001, and several high-profile espionage cases have  heightened national security concerns and underscored the need for a  timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. Each year, the  Department of Defense (DOD) processes hundreds of thousands of  security clearance requests for service members, government employees,  and industry personnel who are conducting classified work for the  department and other government agencies. These requests include  (1) periodic reinvestigations for individuals who already hold security  clearances or initial investigations for individuals who have not held  security clearances in the past and (2) adjudications to determine whether  or not individuals are eligible for clearances, based on information  collected during the investigations and reinvestigations.
Historically, DOD’s Defense Security Service (DSS) had conducted almost  all of the department’s security clearance investigations. In 1999, however,  DOD contracted with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and  later with private-sector investigative firms, to process large numbers of  new investigations and reinvestigations. Using information from the  investigations, DOD’s 10 central adjudication facilities provide the  eligibility-for-clearance determinations.
Since at least the late 1990s, the timeliness of DOD’s personnel security  clearance process has been at issue. In our October 1999 report, for  example, we identified serious problems with the adequacy of DOD’s  investigations; this work prompted the department to declare its  investigative function a systemic weakness under the Federal Managers’  Financial Integrity Act of 1982. In our August 2000 report, we noted  that DOD estimated it had a backlog of more than 500,000 overdue  reinvestigations that had not yet been submitted for renewal and found  that DOD had no established method for monitoring or estimating the total  number of periodic reinvestigations that were overdue but not submitted.  Moreover, in our 2001 report, we found that DOD’s adjudicators did not  consistently document adverse security conditions, and we identified  other factors that hindered the effectiveness of the adjudication process.  Along with our reviews, several reports issued in 2000 and 2001 by the  DOD Office of the Inspector General have also documented problems with  various aspects of the security clearance process. In agency comments to  GAO and DOD Office of Inspector General recommendations (see app. I  for recommendations), DOD identified many actions it had taken or  planned to take to address problems in its investigative and adjudicative  processes. For example, in response to a recommendation in our August  2000 report, DOD noted that the Joint Personnel Adjudication System  (JPAS) would be implemented in fiscal year 2001 and would provide an  automated means of tracking and counting overdue but-not-submitted  requests for reinvestigation.
More recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004  authorized the transfer of DOD’s personnel security investigative functions  and 1,855 investigative employees to OPM. Under the Act, a transfer of  functions can only be made after the Secretary of Defense certifies that  certain conditions can be met and that the Director of OPM concurs with  the authorized transfer. Among the conditions requiring Secretary of  Defense certification are “hat the Office of Personnel Management is  fully capable of carrying out high-priority investigations required by the  Secretary of Defense within a timeframe set by the Secretary of Defense”  and “hat the Office of Personnel Management has undertaken necessary  and satisfactory steps to ensure that investigations performed on  Department of Defense contract personnel will be conducted in an  expeditious manner sufficient to ensure that those contract personnel are  available to the Department of Defense within the timeframe set by the  Secretary of Defense.”
You asked us to conduct a follow-up review of DOD’s personnel security  process. As agreed with your office, this report addresses three questions:  (1) What is the size of DOD’s security clearance backlog, and how  accurately is DOD able to estimate its size? (2) What factors impede DOD’s  ability to eliminate the backlog and accurately determine its size? (3) What  are the potential adverse effects of those impediments to eliminating  DOD’s backlog and accurately estimating the backlog’s size? In addition to  answering these three questions, you asked us to determine the status of  the congressionally authorized transfer of DSS investigative functions and  personnel to OPM.
To conduct our work, we reviewed DOD and OPM regulations,  instructions, policy guidance, and available empirical data and procedural  information on the personnel security clearance process. In addition, we  obtained information during meetings with DOD, OPM, and other officials  who are responsible for the oversight, investigative, and adjudicative  functions of the personnel security clearance process. We also referred to  prior GAO, DOD Office of Inspector General, and congressional reports.  We conducted our work from February through December 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Additional information on our scope and methodology is presented in  appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD (I))  was created in 2002 with the passage of the Bob Stump National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. Among the responsibilities of  OUSD (I) are the coordination and implementation of DOD policy for  access to classified information. At the time of our earlier review on the  clearance process, these responsibilities belonged to the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,  and Intelligence (OASD (C3I)).
Classified information is categorized into three levels—top secret, secret,  and confidential—to denote the degree of protection required for  information according to the amount of damage that unauthorized  disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national defense or  foreign relations. The degree of expected damage that unauthorized  disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause is “exceptionally grave  damage” for top secret information, “serious damage” for secret  information, and “damage” for confidential information. To retain access  to classified information, individuals must periodically go through the  security clearance process. The time frames for reinvestigation are every   5 years for top secret, 10 years for secret, and 15 years for confidential.
DOD’s personnel security clearance process has three stages:  preinvestigation, which includes determining if a requirement for access  exists and submitting an investigation request; the actual personnel  security investigation; and adjudication, a determination of eligibility for  access to classified information (see fig. 1). Since 1997, all federal agencies   have been subject to a common set of personnel security investigative  standards and adjudicative guidelines for determining whether service  members, government employees, industry personnel, and others are  eligible to receive a security clearance. In 1998, DOD formally  incorporated these standards and guidelines into its regulations governing  access to classified information.
The security officer begins the preinvestigation stage of the clearance  process by determining whether a position requires access to classified  information. If so, the current or future job incumbent completes a  personnel security questionnaire that asks for detailed information  about a wide range of issues. The impetus for an investigation request  could be a need to (1) appoint, enlist, or induct an individual into the  military; (2) staff a new program or contract with an individual who has  a clearance; (3) replace a cleared job incumbent with someone else;  (4) raise an existing clearance to a higher level; or (5) reinvestigate  a previously cleared job incumbent whose clearance is due for  reinvestigation.
In the investigation stage, investigative staff members seek information  pertaining to the subject’s loyalty, character, reliability, trustworthiness,  honesty, and financial responsibility. The level of clearance is the primary  determinant of the types and sources of information gathered. For  example, an investigation for a top secret clearance requires much more  information than does the type of investigation required to determine  eligibility for either a secret or confidential clearance. The types or  sources of information might include an interview with the subject of  the investigation, national agency checks (e.g., Federal Bureau of  Investigations and immigration records), local agency checks (e.g.,  municipal police and court records), financial checks, birth date and place,  citizenship, education, employment, public records for information such  as bankruptcy or divorce, and interviews with references.
In the adjudication stage of the security clearance process, government  employees in 10 DOD central adjudication facilities use the information  gathered at the investigation stage to approve, deny, or revoke eligibility to  access classified information. Once adjudicated, the security clearance is  then issued up to the appropriate eligibility level, or alternative actions are  taken if eligibility is denied or revoked.
section_title: DOD Unable to Estimate the Size of Its Clearance Backlog
paragraphs: DOD did not know the size of its personnel security clearance backlog and  has not estimated the size of the backlog since January 2000. DOD was  unable to estimate the size of its backlog for overdue reinvestigations that  have not yet been submitted, but our estimates for overdue submitted  investigation requests and overdue adjudications were roughly 270,000 and  90,000 cases, respectively, at the end of September 2003. These estimates  are not based on a consistent set of DOD-wide definitions  and measures; instead, the time limits for defining and measuring the  backlog varied from agency to agency.
subsections: section_title: DOD Unable to Estimate the Number of Overdue Reinvestigations Not Yet Submitted
paragraphs: DOD could not estimate the number of personnel who had not requested  a reinvestigation, even though their clearances exceeded the  governmentwide time frames for reinvestigation (see fig. 2). As we  mentioned earlier, the governmentwide time frames for renewing  clearances are 5, 10, or 15 years depending on an individual’s clearance  level. We, therefore, defined this portion of the backlog as any request for  reinvestigation that had not been submitted within those time frames.
In our 2000 report, we indicated that DOD estimated its overdue but-not- submitted reinvestigation backlog at 300,000 cases in 1986 and 500,000  cases in 2000. Our 2000 report also noted that the 500,000-case backlog  estimate was of questionable reliability because of the ad hoc methods  used to derive it. Between 2000 and 2002, DOD took a number of steps to  reduce this backlog, including mandating the submission of requests and  requiring senior service officials to provide monthly submission progress  reports. On February 22, 2002, DOD concluded this backlog reduction  effort by issuing an OASD (C3I) memorandum directing that “y  September 30, 2002, if a clearance is not based upon a current or pending  investigation, or if the position does not support a requirement for a  clearance, the clearance must be administratively terminated or  downgraded without prejudice to the individual.” DOD is unable to show  that the overdue but-not-submitted reinvestigations backlog was  eliminated by these actions.
section_title: Roughly 270,000 Submitted Requests for Investigations Overdue for Completion
paragraphs: At the end of September 2003, the investigative portion of the backlog  consisted of roughly 270,000 submitted requests for either reinvestigation  or initial investigation that had not been completed within a prescribed  amount of time. We calculated this estimate from information provided in  response to the data requests that we made to DSS and OPM. This number  represents an estimated 163,000 cases at DSS and 107,000 cases contracted  to OPM that had not been completed within the time limits. In our August  2000 report, DOD stated that a vast majority of 94,000 submitted requests  for reinvestigation were overdue for completion, and those cases were  not part of DOD’s estimate of 500,000 overdue but-not-submitted  reinvestigations discussed in the prior section. At that time, DOD had not  included either submitted reinvestigations or initial investigations that  exceeded specified time limits as part of the DOD-wide backlog. An  estimate of the initial investigations exceeding the time limit was not a  focus of that work.
The existence of varying sets of time limits for completing investigations  makes it difficult to develop accurate estimates of the size of DOD’s  investigative backlog.
DSS’s performance goals are 120 days for a periodic reinvestigation for  a top secret clearance, 90 days for an initial top secret clearance, and  75 days for either a secret or confidential clearance being issued  initially. In addition, some requests for investigations receive priorities  over other requests.
OPM has timeliness categories that DOD and other agencies use to  request various types of investigations. The timeliness categories are  35 days for priority investigations, 75 days for accelerated  investigations, 120 days for standard investigations, and 180 days for  extended service agreements.
The lack of a standard set of time limits is a long-standing problem. In  1994, the Joint Security Commission reported on this issue, and among  other things (1) found there was no performance standard for timeliness in  completing investigations and adjudications, (2) stated it repeatedly heard  from the customer community that 90 days is an appropriate standard for  completing an average investigation and adjudication, and (3)  recommended “tandard measurable objectives be established to assess  the timeliness and quality of investigations, adjudications, and  administrative processes and appeals performed by all such organizations  within DOD and the Intelligence Community.”
OPM’s issuance of closed pending cases—investigations sent to  adjudication facilities without one or more types of source data—presents  another ambiguity in defining and accurately estimating the backlog. In  our October 1999 report, we found that DSS had similarly delivered  incomplete investigations to DOD adjudicators. After we recommended  that DOD adjudication facility officials grant clearances only when all  essential investigative work has been done, DSS monitored the cases  returned from the adjudication facilities and identified reasons for the  returns. Overall, about 10 percent of the 283,480 DOD cases fully closed by  OPM in fiscal year 2002 were initially delivered to central adjudication  facilities as closed pending cases. When measuring the timeliness of its  contractors’ performance, OPM defines completed investigations as cases  that (1) have the complete information required for the type of  investigation, (2) are closed pending, or (3) have been discontinued. If the  investigations have not been fully completed within OPM-contracted time  limits, we believe that closed pending cases should be included in the  investigative portion of the backlog.
section_title: DOD-Wide Estimate of Adjudicative Backlog Exceeds Roughly 90,000 Cases
paragraphs: Central adjudication facilities’ responses to our request for adjudicative  backlog estimates as of September 30, 2003, indicated that roughly  90,000 completed investigations had not been adjudicated within  prescribed time limits (see table 1). Differences in the sizes of the backlog  at the various central adjudication facilities are due to a combination of  factors. For example, the military service departments generally perform  more adjudications than do DOD agencies; some facilities have increased  their staffing of government employees to decrease the backlog; and some  facilities have contracted for support services to decrease the backlog. We  later discuss the large number of requests that have resulted over the last  few years. DOD officials attributed this extra adjudicative workload to,  among other things, increased operations related to the war on terrorism.
An ambiguous picture of the adjudicative backlog size is present because  the central adjudication facilities use different time limits to define  when cases become part of the backlog. Applying the backlog criteria  of one central adjudication facility to the completed investigations  waiting adjudication at another facility could increase or decrease the  estimated size of the DOD-wide adjudicative backlog. For instance,  the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office’s goals for completing  adjudications are 3 days for initial investigations and 30 days for periodic  reinvestigations, and any cases exceeding these amounts are considered a  backlog. In contrast, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals’ goal is to  maintain a steady workload of adjudicating 2,150 cases per month within  30 days of receipt, and it considers a backlog to exist when the number of  cases on hand exceeds its normal workload. Thus, if the Defense  Industrial Security Clearance Office’s stricter time limit were applied to  the initial investigations awaiting adjudication at the Defense Office of  Hearings and Appeals, the latter office’s backlog would be larger than that  currently reported.
section_title: Multiple Impediments Slow DOD’s Progress in Eliminating Its Backlog and Generating Accurate Backlog Estimates
paragraphs: We have identified four major impediments that have slowed DOD’s  progress in eliminating its clearance backlog and two impediments that  have hindered its ability to produce accurate backlog estimates.
subsections: section_title: Large Number of Clearance Requests, Limited Staffing, Existing Backlog, and No Strategic Plan for Information- Access Problems Slow DOD’s Efforts to Eliminate the Backlog
paragraphs: In our review of documents and discussions with officials from DOD,  OPM, industry associations, and investigator contractors, we identified  four major impediments that have hampered DOD’s ability to eliminate its  current security clearance backlog. These are: (1) the large number of  new requests for clearances, (2) inadequate investigator and adjudicator  workforces, (3) the mere size of the existing backlog, and (4) the lack of a  strategic plan for overcoming problems by government and contractor  investigators in gaining access to information from state, local, and  overseas sources.
subsections: section_title: Large Number of Requests for Clearances
paragraphs: The large number of requests for security clearances hinders DOD’s efforts  to draw down the number of cases in its current clearance backlog. In  fiscal year 2003, the Secretary of Defense annual report to the President  and Congress noted that defense organizations annually request more than  1 million security checks. These checks include investigations that are part  of the personnel security clearance process as well as other investigations  such as those used to screen some new recruits entering the military.  Other federal agencies are also requesting a growing number of  background investigations according to OPM. In our November 2003  report on aviation security, we noted that OPM had stated that  (1) it received an unprecedented number of requests for background  investigations governmentwide since September 2001 and (2) the large  number of requests was the primary reason for delayed clearance  processing.
Historically, almost all of DOD’s requests for investigations were  submitted to DSS. Starting in 1999, DOD contracted with OPM to complete  a large number of requests for investigations as part of DOD’s effort to  expand its investigative capacity and decrease its investigative  backlog. OUSD (I) estimated that DOD spent over $450 million for the  investigations submitted to DSS and OPM in fiscal year 2003. As table 2  shows, OUSD (I) reported that the actual number of requests submitted  for investigations were approximately 700,000 in fiscal year 2001, more  than 850,000 in fiscal year 2002, and more than 775,000 in fiscal year 2003.  In fiscal year 2003, DSS had responsibility for a larger percentage of the  total DOD investigations workload than it had in the prior 2 fiscal years.  DSS supplemented its federal workforce with contracts to three private- sector investigations firms. As table 2 also indicates, the number of  targeted submissions versus the actual number of submissions that DOD  received varied considerably from year to year. In fiscal year 2001, DOD  received fewer requests than it had expected (82 percent), and in fiscal  years 2002 and 2003, it received more requests than projected (119 and  113 percent, respectively).
DOD personnel, investigations contractors, and industry officials told us  that the large number of requests for investigations could be attributed to  many factors. For example, they ascribed the large number of requests to  heightened security concerns that resulted from the September 11, 2001,  terrorist attacks. They also attributed the large number of investigations to  an increase in the operations and deployments of military personnel and  to the increasingly sensitive technology that military personnel,  government employees, and contractors come in contact with as a part of  their job. While having a large number of cleared personnel can give the  military services, agencies, and industry a large amount of flexibility  when assigning personnel, the investigative and adjudicative workloads  that are required to provide the clearances further tax DOD’s already  overburdened personnel security clearance program.
A change in the level of clearance being requested also increases the  investigative and adjudicative workloads. A growing percentage of all  DOD requests for clearances is at the top secret level. For example, in  fiscal years 1995 and 2003, 17 percent and 27 percent, respectively, of the  clearance requests for industry personnel were at the top secret level. This  increase of 10 percentage points in the proportion of investigations at the  top secret level is important because top secret clearances must be  renewed twice as often as secret clearances (i.e., every 5 years versus  every 10 years). According to OUSD (I), top secret clearances take eight  times the investigative effort needed to complete a secret clearance and  three times the adjudicative effort to review. The doubling of frequency  along with the increased effort to investigate and adjudicate each top  secret reinvestigation adds costs and workload for DOD.
Cost. In fiscal year 2003, the costs of investigations that DOD obtained  through DSS were $2,640 for an initial investigation for a top secret  clearance, $1,591 for a periodic reinvestigation of a top secret  clearance, and $328 for the most commonly used investigation for a  secret clearance. The cost of getting and maintaining a top secret  clearance for 10 years is approximately 13 times greater than the cost  for a secret clearance. For example, an individual getting a top secret  clearance for the first time and keeping the clearance for 10 years  would cost DOD a total of $4,231 in current year dollars ($2,640 for the  initial investigation and $1,591 for the reinvestigation after the first  5 years). In contrast, an individual receiving a secret clearance and  maintaining it for 10 years would cost a total of $328 ($328 for the  initial clearance that is good for 10 years).
Time/Workload. The workload is also affected by the scope of  coverage in the various types of investigations. Much of the  information for a secret clearance is gathered through electronic files.  The investigation for a top secret clearance, on the other hand, requires  the information needed for the secret clearance as well as data  gathered through time-consuming tasks such as interviews with the  subject of the investigation request, references in the workplace, and  neighbors.
section_title: Inadequate Investigative and Adjudicative Workforces Hinder Efforts to Eliminate Backlog
paragraphs: Another impediment to eliminating the large security clearance backlog  is the inadequate size of the federal and private-sector investigative  workforces relative to the large workloads that they face. The Deputy  Associate Director of OPM’s Center for Investigations Services estimated  that roughly 8,000 full-time-equivalent investigative personnel would be  needed by OPM and DOD (together) to eliminate backlogs and deliver  investigations in a timely fashion to their customers. The rough estimate  includes investigators and investigative technicians. However, changes in  the numbers or types of clearance requests, different levels of productivity  by investigators, and other factors could greatly affect this estimated  workforce requirement.
As of December 2003, we calculated that DOD and OPM have around  4,200 full-time-equivalent investigators available as federal employees or  currently under contract. Of this number, DSS indicated that it has about  1,200 investigators and 100 investigative technicians. In addition, DSS has  the equivalent of 625 full-time investigative staff, based on 2,500 mostly  part-time investigators, from its three contractors. DSS equates four of the  part-time investigators to one full-time investigator. Finally, although OPM  has almost no investigative staff currently, its primary contractor has  approximately 2,300 full-time investigators. OPM reported that its primary  contractor is adding about 100 investigators per month, but turnover is  about 70 employees per month.
We believe that DSS’s estimate of the number of full-time-equivalent  investigators working for its contractors is imprecise because (1) an  investigator may work part-time for more than one contractor and  (2) the amount of time devoted to conducting investigations can vary  substantially. These part-time investigators work different amounts of time  each month, according to both their own preference and the number of  assignments they receive from investigation contractor(s). Sometimes they  are unavailable to work for one contractor because they are conducting  investigations for another contractor. Officials from DSS’s investigations  contractors told us that they intend to continue relying largely on staff  employed on an as-needed basis. Some of the private-sector officials  stated that they would incur additional financial risks if they were to use  full-time investigators.
Inadequate adjudicator staffing also causes delays in issuing eligibility-for- clearance decisions. Since we issued our report on DOD adjudications in  2001, the number of eligibility-for-clearance decisions has risen for  reasons such as an increase in the number of completed investigations  stemming from DOD’s contract with OPM and the improved operation of  DSS’s Case Control Management System.
Central adjudication facilities with adjudicative backlogs have taken  various actions to eliminate their backlog. The Defense Office of Hearings  and Appeals hired 46 additional adjudicators on 2-year term appointments,  contracted for administrative functions associated with adjudication, and  is seeking permission from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to  hire some of its term adjudicators permanently. The Navy’s central  adjudication facility contracted with three companies to provide support  and hired an additional 27 full-time-equivalent civilian and military  adjudicators, which helped the Navy eliminate much of its adjudicative  backlog that had grown to approximately 60,000 cases by December 2002.  Because the DOD Office of Inspector General is examining whether the  Navy adjudicative contracts led the contractor’s staff to perform an  inherently governmental function—adjudication—it is unclear whether the  Army and Air Force central adjudication facilities will be able to use  similar contracting to eliminate their backlogs.
The 10 DOD central adjudication facilities are funded by different agencies  and operate independently of one another. As a result, OUSD (I) cannot  transfer backlogged cases from one facility to eliminate an adjudicative  backlog at another facility. In our April 2001 report on DOD  adjudications, we noted that studies issued by the Defense Personnel  Security Research Center, the Joint Security Commission, and the DOD  Office of the Inspector General between 1991 and 1998 had concluded  that the decentralized structure of DOD’s adjudication facilities had  drawbacks. Two of the studies had recommended that DOD consolidate  its adjudication facilities (with the exception of the National Security  Agency because of the sensitive nature of its work) into a single entity.  Currently, OUSD (I) is exploring the possibility of assigning all industry  adjudications to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office instead  of having it share this responsibility with the Defense Office of Hearing  and Appeals.
section_title: Size of Existing Backlog Impedes Prompt Opening of New Requests for Investigation
paragraphs: The current size of the investigative backlog impedes DOD’s ability to  process new security clearance requests within the prescribed time  limits. A new request might remain largely dormant for months in the  investigations queue until other requests that were received earlier have  been completed. This point can be illustrated by examining the results of  miscommunications between OASD (C3I) and DSS regarding assigning  priorities to investigations between March 2002 and March 2003. During  that period, DSS placed a higher priority on completing new—versus old— requests. From March through September 2002, DSS averaged 97 days to  open and complete initial investigation requests for top secret clearances;  100 days, for top secret reinvestigation; 43 days, for secret; and 44 days, for  confidential. For three of the four types of investigations, DSS’s average  completion times were faster than its time-based goals (120 days for a  periodic reinvestigation for a top secret clearance, 90 days for an initial  top secret clearance; and 75 days for either a secret or confidential  clearance being issued initially). Starting in March 2003, DSS again  assigned a higher priority to older requests. However, during those  12 months, from March 2002 to February 2003, the average age of the older  cases increased, and it is impossible to say how much of the increase was  due to the miscommunication regarding priorities, a change in the number  of requests that DSS received, or some other factor.
DSS staff told us that the delays in starting investigations could lead to  additional delays in processing the case, particularly for military personnel  who were being deployed or were moving. Therefore, DSS instituted a  procedure to attempt to meet with individuals requesting an investigation  before they deploy or go on extended training. Delays in starting  investigations can result in extra investigative work to find the individuals  at their new addresses or additional delays if investigators wait for the  individuals to return from deployment or training. In some cases, however,  DOD commands, agencies, and contractors have been able to obtain some  investigations quickly by assigning higher priorities to certain individual  investigations or types of investigations.
section_title: No Strategic Plan for Overcoming Information- Access Problems Slows Investigative Process
paragraphs: The absence of a strategic plan for overcoming problems in gaining access  to information from state and local agencies also slows the speed of  personnel security clearance investigations and, thereby, impedes  reducing the size of the backlog. Investigators face delays in conducting  background checks because of the lack of automated records in many  localities, state and local budget shortfalls that limit how much time  agency staff have to help investigators, and privacy concerns (e.g., access  to conviction records from the courts instead of the preferred arrest  records from law enforcement). This problem of accessibility to state and  local information was identified in an October 2002 House Committee on  Government Reform report. The report recommended that the Secretary  of Defense and the Attorney General jointly develop a system that allows  DSS and OPM investigators access to state and local criminal history  information records. In addition, representatives from one investigations  contractor noted that the Security Clearance Information Act gives only  certain federal agencies access to state and local criminal records, and  therefore private-sector investigators are put at a disadvantage relative to  federal investigators.
Another barrier to the timely closure of an investigation is a limited  investigative capacity overseas, which causes delays in obtaining  information from overseas investigative sources. DSS, OPM, and private- sector investigations contractors do not maintain staffs overseas to  investigate individuals who are currently or were formerly stationed  overseas, who have traveled or lived overseas, or who have relatives living  in foreign countries. Officials at DSS and the central adjudication facilities  told us that they typically ask overseas-based DOD criminal investigations  personnel or State Department and Central Intelligence Agency employees  to supply this type of investigative information as a collateral duty.
DOD has no strategic plan for overcoming access to information problems  and the delays that result, but DOD has made efforts to address selective  aspects of the access problem. For example, DOD supplied us with draft  legislation proposing to provide access to a central repository for driver  licensing records. DOD proposed that this information be used in  personnel security investigations and determinations as well as personnel  investigations with regard to federal employment security checks. Also, an  OUSD (I) official noted that DOD proposed a legislative change for the  fiscal year 2001 authorization bill to allow easier access to records of  criminal history information.
section_title: Oversight Problems and Automation Delays Hinder Accurate Monitoring of Backlog Size
paragraphs: OUSD (I) and its predecessor OASD (C3I) have not provided the oversight  needed to monitor and accurately estimate the various parts of the  backlog that are present throughout DOD. Also, as we documented earlier,  backlog estimates are not based on a consistent set of DOD-wide  definitions and measures. Knowing the accurate size of the backlog is an  important step towards effectively managing and eventually eliminating  the backlog. When we asked for all investigative backlog reports produced  since 2000, OUSD (I) supplied January 2000 estimates as its most recent  report, and the report included only reinvestigations. This finding  regarding the infrequency of reporting contradicts DOD’s concurrence  with our October 1999 recommendation for OASD (C3I) to improve its  oversight of the investigations program and our August 2000  recommendation to design routine reports to show the full extent of  overdue reinvestigations. Our April 2001 report similarly concluded that  OASD (C3I) needed to provide stronger oversight and better direction to  DOD’s adjudication facility officials. After a review of DOD’s personnel  security investigations program, an October 2002 report by the House  Government Reform Committee recommended, “The Secretary of Defense  should continue to report the personnel security investigations program  including the adjudicative process as a material  weakness under the  Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to ensure needed oversight is  provided to effectively manage and monitor the personnel security  process from start to finish.” DOD concurred with our October 1999  recommendation to declare its investigations program as a material  weakness to ensure that needed oversight is provided and that actions are  taken. For fiscal years 2000 through 2003, DOD listed the personnel  security program as a systemic weakness, which is a weakness that affects  more than one DOD component and may jeopardize the department’s  operations.
Delays in implementing the joint adjudication system, JPAS, have greatly  inhibited OUSD (I)’s ability to monitor overdue reinvestigations and  generate accurate estimates for that portion of the backlog. Among JPAS’s  intended purposes are to consolidate DOD’s security clearance data  systems and provide various levels of near real-time input and retrieval of  clearance-related information to OUSD (I), investigators, adjudicators, and  security officers at commands, agencies, and industrial facilities. The DOD  Chief Information Officer identified JPAS as a critical mission system.  When we reported on the reinvestigations backlog in August 2000, the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,  and Intelligence stated that JPAS would be fully implemented in fiscal year  2001 and would be capable of providing recurring reports showing the  accurate number of cleared personnel requiring a periodic reinvestigation  by component and type of investigation. In early December 2003, an OUSD  (I) official said current plans are to have JPAS fully operational by January  2004. The delays are caused by problems such as loading adjudicative data  from each central adjudication facility’s internally developed database and  historical data from the Defense Clearance and Investigation Index.
section_title: Backlogs and Poor Estimates May Lead to Increased National Security Risks, Higher Costs, and Workload Uncertainties
paragraphs: DOD’s failure to eliminate its backlog of overdue reinvestigations may  heighten the risk of national security breaches. Also, backlog-related  delays in issuing initial security clearances may raise the cost of doing  classified work for the U.S. government. In addition, DOD’s inability to  accurately determine the actual size of its clearance backlog and project  the number of clearances needed results in inaccurate budget requests and  staffing plans.
subsections: section_title: Continued Failure to Eliminate Backlog May Lead to Increased National Security Risks and Unnecessary Costs
paragraphs: Delays in completing reinvestigations caused by the backlog and other  impediments may lead to a heightened risk of national security breaches.  Such breaches involve the unauthorized disclosure of classified  information, which can have effects that range from exceptionally grave  damage to national security for top secret information to damage for  confidential information. In 1999, the Joint Security Commission reported  that delays in initiating reinvestigations create risks to national security  because the longer individuals hold clearances the more likely they are to  be working with critical information systems.
Delays in completing initial security clearances may have an economic  impact on the cost of performing classified work within or for the  U.S. government. Although estimates of the total economic costs of delays  in granting clearances are dated, they reflect the extent of an ongoing  problem. In a 1981 report, we estimated that the DOD investigative  backlog could cost nearly $1 billion per year in lost productivity. More  than a decade later, the Joint Security Commission report noted that the  costs directly attributable to investigative delays in fiscal year 1994 could  be as high as several billion dollars because workers were unable to  perform their jobs while awaiting a clearance. While newer overall cost  estimates are not available, the underlying reasons—the backlog and  clearance delays that prevent the employment—for the costs still exist  within DOD. For instance, DSS reported that the average time required to  complete an initial investigation for a top secret clearance was 454 days  for fiscal year 2002 and 257 days for October 2002 through February 2003.
The impact of delays in completing initial clearances affects industry,  which relies on DOD to provide clearances for their employees.  Representatives from one company with $1 billion per year in sales stated  that their company offers a $10,000 bonus to its employees for each person  recruited who already has a security clearance. Such operating costs are  then passed on to government customers in the form of higher bids for  contracts. In turn, the recruit’s former company may need to back-fill a  position, as well as possibly settle for a lower level of contract  performance while a new employee is found, obtains a clearance, and  learns the former employee’s job. Also, industry representatives discussed  instances where their companies gave hiring preference to personnel who  could do the job but were less qualified than others who did not possess a  clearance. The chair of the interagency Personnel Security Working Group  noted that a company might hire an employee and begin paying that  individual, but not assign any work to the individual until a clearance is  obtained. Also, the head of the interagency group noted that commands,  agencies, and industry might incur lost-opportunity costs if the individual  chooses to work somewhere else rather than wait to get the clearance  before beginning work.
section_title: Poor Estimates Can Result in Inadequate Budget and Staffing
paragraphs: DOD’s inability to accurately project its personnel security clearance  workload requirements have created budgeting and staffing difficulties for  DOD units involved in the clearance process. For example, in fiscal year  2000, the services and defense agencies had to limit the number of overdue  reinvestigations that they submitted for investigation because they had not  budgeted the additional funds needed to cover the costs of the increased  workload. Differences between the targeted and actual number of  investigations for fiscal years 2001 to 2003 (see table 2) also document  problems with the current procedures used to project clearance  requirements. Inaccurate projections of personnel security clearance  workloads may have also caused the backlog to be bigger than it might  otherwise be because DSS and the central adjudication facilities did not  adequately plan for increases in workloads.
section_title: Status Update on the Authorized Transfer of DSS Investigative Functions and Personnel to OPM
paragraphs: In December 2003, advisors to the Director of OPM recommended that the  congressionally authorized transfer of DSS investigative functions and  personnel to OPM not occur—at least for the rest of fiscal year 2004—due  primarily to concerns about the financial risks associated with the  transfer. The advisors recommended an alternative plan that is currently  being discussed by DOD and OPM officials. The alternative plan proposes  that DSS investigative functions and employees stay in DOD; use the OPM  case management system, which according to a DOD official would save  about $100 million in costs associated with continuing to update and  maintain DOD’s current case management system; and receive training to  use that system from OPM. As of December 16, 2003, the Secretary of  Defense had not provided Congress with the certifications required before  the transfer can take place.
subsections: section_title: Background of the Authorized Transfer
paragraphs: On February 3, 2003, a DOD news release announced that the Deputy  Secretary of Defense and the Director of the OPM had signed an  agreement that would allow DOD to divest its personnel security  investigative functions and OPM to offer positions to DSS investigative  personnel. The proposal for the transfer of functions and personnel was  included in DOD’s The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act  when that legislative proposal was submitted to Congress on April 10,  2003. Also, the Secretary of Defense’s annual report to the President and  to Congress for 2003 cited the transfer as an effort to “eengineer the  personnel security program by seeking statutory authority to transfer the  personnel security investigation function currently performed by the  Defense Security Service to the Office of Personnel Management, thus  streamlining activities and eliminate redundancy.” The projected savings  were estimated to be approximately $160 million over the fiscal year 2004  to 2009 time frame.
On November 24, 2003, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2004 authorized the transfer of DSS’s personnel security investigative  functions and its 1,855 investigative employees to OPM. Before the  transfer can occur, the Secretary of Defense must certify in writing to the  House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the following five  conditions have been met:    OPM is fully capable of carrying out high-priority investigations  required by the Secretary of Defense within a time frame set by the  Secretary of Defense;    OPM has undertaken necessary and satisfactory steps to ensure that  investigations performed on DOD contract personnel will be conducted  in an expeditious manner sufficient to ensure that those contract  personnel are available to DOD within a time frame set by the  Secretary of Defense;    DOD will retain capabilities in the form of federal employees to  monitor and investigate DOD and contractor personnel as necessary to  perform counterintelligence functions and polygraph activities of the  department;    The authority to adjudicate background investigations will remain with  DOD, and the transfer of DSS personnel to OPM will improve the speed  and efficiency of the adjudicative process; and    DOD will retain within DSS sufficient personnel and capabilities to  improve DOD industrial security programs and practices.
The Director of OPM may accept the transfer, but such a transfer may be  made only after a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date on which the  defense committees receive the certification.
section_title: Current Status of the Authorized Transfer
paragraphs: Senior OPM officials recommended that the Director of OPM should not  accept the transfer of DSS’s investigative functions and personnel, at least  for the rest of fiscal year 2004. The OPM officials reported that OPM is not  currently prepared to accept DSS’s investigative functions and staff  because of concerns about financial risks associated with the authorized  transfer. OPM stated that under its current system of contracting out all  investigations, the contractor assumes all financial risk for completing  investigations at agreed-upon prices. OPM does not believe that current  productivity data for DSS staff is sufficient to indicate whether DSS staff  could provide the services at the price that OPM charges its customers.  Also, OPM believes that the documentation for the financial costs of  automobile leases, office space, and so forth are not currently adequate to  provide OPM with the assurance that it needs to accept 1,855 personnel  into an agency that currently has about 3,000 employees—more than a  60 percent growth in the number of OPM employees.
In a memorandum of understanding that is being finalized at OPM and  DOD, OPM is offering an alternative plan for DSS’s investigative  functions and staff. While we were not provided a copy of the document,  OPM officials described its contents to us orally. Among other things, the  plan—if approved—would include the following:    DSS’s investigative functions and staff would remain part of DOD;    DSS’s investigative staff would receive training from OPM on the use of  OPM’s investigative procedures and OPM’s investigations management  system; and    OPM would allow DOD to use OPM’s investigations management  system and thereby negate the need for DSS’s investigations  management system, which an OUSD (I) official indicated could cost  about $100 million to update and maintain over the next 5 years.
A senior OPM official with whom we spoke was optimistic that the  alternative plan will go to DOD for review and signature before the end of  December 2003. If DOD proposes changes, the plan will need to undergo  re-staffing at OPM and possibly DOD. OPM’s position described above was  verified with the same OPM official on December 16, 2003.
After learning of the alternative plan and the draft memorandum of  understanding, we discussed both with an OUSD (I) official who has been  a key negotiator with OPM. The official verified that OPM had voiced the  concerns regarding risk and was preparing an alternative plan. That DOD  official is optimistic that DOD will be able to provide the assurances that  are needed for the authorized transfer to occur before the end of fiscal  year 2004. DOD’s position was verified with the same OUSD (I) official on  December 16, 2003.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD continues to have a personnel security clearance backlog that  probably exceeds roughly 360,000 cases by some unknown number.  This situation may increase risks to national security and monetary  costs associated with delays in granting clearances. DOD faces many  impediments as it attempts to eliminate its backlog, and these weaknesses  are material to the prompt completion of clearance requests at all stages of  the personnel security process. The large number of clearance requests  being submitted may be the impediment that is least amenable to change.
As we mentioned earlier, worldwide deployments, contact with sensitive  equipment, and other security requirements underpin the need for  personnel to be cleared for access to classified information. Other  impediments to eliminating the backlog are formidable, but more  tractable. Shortages of investigative and adjudicative staff prevent DOD  from quickly completing cases in the existing backlog as well as the  hundreds of thousands of new clearance requests that have been  submitted during each of the last 3 years. Using the rough estimates  provided by an OPM official, the shortage of over 3,500 full-time-equivalent  investigative staff illustrates one area in the clearance process where  supply of personnel is inadequate to meet the demand for services. DOD  has not developed a strategic plan for overcoming problems in accessing  information locally, at the state level, and overseas during investigations;  and this lack of a strategy hinders DOD efforts to quickly complete cases  and efficiently eliminate the clearance backlog.
Basic to designing an efficient means for overcoming the impediments is  obtaining and using accurate information regarding the backlog. Clear  pictures of the backlog size will continue to be elusive if components  continue to use varying backlog definitions and measures. The presence of  a backlog of an imprecise size and impediments throughout the clearance  process suggest systemic weaknesses in DOD’s personnel security  clearance program. Key to generating those reports is the implementation  of the overdue JPAS with its ability to track when reinvestigations are due.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Because of continuing concerns about the size of the backlog and its  accurate measurement and the personnel security clearance program’s  importance to national security, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence take the  following four actions:  Identify and implement steps to match the sizes of the investigative and  adjudicative workforces to the clearance request workload;    Develop a strategic plan for overcoming problems accessing data  locally, at the state level, and overseas;    Develop DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures, and monitor the  backlog at each of the three clearance-process stages using the  DOD-wide measures; and    Complete the implementation of the Joint Personnel Adjudication  System.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, OUSD (I) concurred with  three of our four recommendations and partially agreed with our  recommendation to match workforces with workload. OUSD (I) noted  that (1) DOD is developing tools to predict and validate investigative  requirements; (2) staffing, budgeting, and management of the investigative  and adjudicative resources are the purview of the affected DOD  component and investigative providers; and (3) growing a capable  workforce takes time. We agree with these points, but they do not change  the fact that DOD has historically had a backlog and that these issues must  be dealt with timely and effectively to eliminate the backlog. As our report  points out, implementation delays—such as that with JPAS—hamper  efforts to accurately estimate the backlog and eliminate it. While it is true  that the resources provided by DOD components play an important role in  eliminating the backlog, OUSD (I) also has a critical leadership role  because of its responsibility for the coordination and implementation of  DOD policy for accessing classified information. Finally, the historical and  continuing void between workload demand and capacity suggests that  OUSD (I) needs to take supplemental steps to grow capable investigative  and adjudicative workforces as we have recommended.
DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided  technical comments that we incorporated in the final draft as appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days from  its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the  Office of Personnel Management. We will also make copies available to  appropriate congressional committees and to other interested parties on  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge at the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Key staff members contributing to  this report were Jack E. Edwards, Robert R. Poetta, Frank Bowen, and  Nancy L. Benco.
section_title: Appendix I: Recent Recommendations Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Process
paragraphs: This appendix lists the personnel clearance process recommendations  found in recent reports from GAO, the DOD Office of Inspector General,  and the House Committee on Government Reform. These verbatim  recommendations are arranged according to the issuance dates of the  reports. At the end of each set of recommendations, we provide comments  on whether DOD concurred with the recommendations and the rationale  for nonconcurrences.
Recommendations from U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD  Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose  National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12, Washington, D.C.,  October 27, 1999.
Because of the significant weaknesses in the DOD personnel security  investigation program and the program’s importance to national security,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and  Intelligence) to  report the personnel security investigation program as a material  weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to  ensure that the needed oversight is provided and that actions are taken  to correct the systemic problems in the Defense Security Service  personnel security investigation program;  improve its oversight of the Defense Security Service personnel  security investigation program, including approving a Defense Security  Service strategic plan; and  identify and prioritize overdue reinvestigations, in coordination with  other DOD components, and fund and implement initiatives to conduct  these reinvestigations in a timely manner.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the  Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and  Intelligence) to    develop a corrective action plan as required under the Federal  Managers’ Financial Integrity Act that incorporates corrective actions  and milestones for addressing material weaknesses in the Defense  Security Service personnel security investigative program and  performance measures for monitoring the progress of corrective  actions;    establish a strategic plan that includes agency goals, performance  measures, and procedures for tracking progress in meeting goals in  accordance with sound management practices and the Government  Performance and Results Act;    conduct analyses needed to (1) determine an appropriate workload  that investigators and case analysts can manage while meeting federal  standards and (2) develop an overall strategy and resource plan to  improve the quality and timeliness of investigations and reduce the  number of overdue reinvestigations;  review and clarify all investigative policy guidance to ensure that  investigations comply with federal standards;    establish a process for identifying and forwarding to the Security Policy  Board suggested changes to policy guidance concerning the  implementation of the federal standards and other investigative policy  issues;    establish formal quality control mechanisms to ensure that Defense  Security Service or contracted investigators perform high-quality  investigations, including periodic reviews of samples of completed  investigations and feedback on problems to senior managers,  investigators, and trainers;    establish a training infrastructure for basic and continuing investigator  and case analyst training that includes formal feedback mechanisms to  assess training needs and measure effectiveness, and as a high priority,  provide training on complying with federal investigative standards for  investigators and case analysts; and  take steps to correct the case management automation problems to  gain short-term capability and develop long-term, cost-effective  automation alternatives.
Further, we recommend that the Secretary direct all DOD adjudication  facility officials to (1) grant clearances only when all essential  investigative work has been done and (2) regularly communicate with the  Defense Security Service about continuing investigative weaknesses and  needed corrective actions.
DOD concurred with all of the recommendations and described many  actions already planned or underway to implement the  recommendations.
Recommendations from U.S. General Accounting Office, More  Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance  Reinvestigations, GAO/NSIAD-00-215, Washington, D.C., August 24,  2000.
To improve the management of DOD’s personnel security reinvestigation  program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and  Intelligence) to    design routine reports with key data from the Joint Personnel  Adjudication System database to show the full extent of overdue  reinvestigations, including those overdue but not yet submitted for  update and those in process and    develop appropriate incentives to encourage agency security managers  to keep information in the database current and to submit  reinvestigation requests on time. Changes in existing regulations,  policies, and procedures may be necessary to provide such incentives.
DOD concurred with all of the recommendations. In their comments,  DOD stated that those personnel who have not had a request for their  periodic reinvestigation submitted to the Office of Personnel  Management or the Defense Security Service by September 30, 2002,  would have their security clearances downgraded or canceled.
Recommendations from Department of Defense, Office of Inspector  General Audit Report, Security Clearance Investigative Priorities,  Report No. D-2000-111, Arlington, Va., April 5, 2000.
We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,  Control, Communications, and Intelligence) establish an Integrated  Process Team to   Develop criteria for determining the highest priority mission-critical  and high-risk positions based on their impact on mission-critical  programs. The criteria must also include a review of the special  projects at the Defense Security Service.
Develop a process for relating specific clearance requests to  mission-critical and high-risk positions. This process must identify  specific individuals as they are submitted for initial investigations  and periodic reinvestigations. The process should continually adjust  the highest priority mission-critical and high-risk positions to  actions that may impact them.
We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Service, establish  the process and metrics to ensure expeditious processing of personnel  security clearance investigations in accordance with established  priorities.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,  Communications, and Intelligence) non-concurred with the first  recommendation, stating that the recommendations are beyond the  scope and ability of his Office to implement, especially in the near  future. However, the Defense Security Service concurred with the intent  of the recommendation.
DOD and DSS concurred with the second recommendation.
Recommendations from U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD  Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility  for Top Secret Security Clearances, GAO/NSIAD-01-465,  Washington, D.C., April 18, 2001.
To provide better direction to DOD’s adjudication facility officials,  improve DOD’s oversight, and enhance the effectiveness of the  adjudicative process, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,  Communications, and Intelligence) to    establish detailed documentation requirements to support adjudication  decisions, including all significant adverse security conditions and the  mitigating factors relevant to each condition;  require that all DOD adjudicators use common explanatory guidance,  such as that contained in the Adjudicative Desk Reference;    establish common adjudicator training requirements and work with the  Defense Security Service Academy to develop appropriate continuing  education opportunities for all DOD adjudicators; and    establish a common quality assurance program to be implemented by  officials in all DOD adjudication facilities and monitor compliance  through annual reporting.
DOD concurred with all of the recommendations and described the  actions it planned to take to improve its guidance, training, and quality  assurance program.
Recommendations from Department of Defense, Office of Inspector  General Audit Report, Tracking Security Clearance Requests,  Report No. D-2000-134, Arlington, Va., May 30, 2000.
We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Service, track all  security clearance requests from the time they are received until the  investigative cases are opened. Security clearance requests that are not  opened to investigative cases, and those investigative cases that are  opened without electronic requests should be included in the tracking  process.
Post, weekly, the names and social security numbers of all cases in  process on the Extranet for Security Professionals. This entry for each  name should include, at a minimum, the date that the request was  loaded into the Case Control Management System, the date that the  investigative case was opened, and the date that the case was closed.
DOD and DSS concurred on these recommendations.
Recommendation from Department of Defense, Office of Inspector  General Audit Report, Program Management of the Defense  Security Service Case Control Management System, Report No.  D-2001-019, Arlington, Va., December 15, 2000.
We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,  Control, Communications, and Intelligence) and the Director, Defense  Security Service, prior to making further decisions on the future system  architecture, analyze whether the investment for the Case Control  Management System and the Enterprise System provides the best business  solution when compared to alternative solutions for opening, tracking and  closing personnel investigation cases.
DOD and DSS concurred with this recommendation.
Recommendations from U.S. House of Representatives, Committee  on Government Reform, Defense Security Service: The Personnel  Security Investigations  Backlog Poses a Threat to National  Security, Report 107-767, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2002.
The Secretary of Defense should continue to report the personnel  security investigations program including the adjudicative process as a  material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act  to ensure needed oversight is provided to effectively manage and  monitor the personnel security process from start to finish.
The Secretary of Defense should set priorities and control the flow of  personnel security investigation requests for all DOD components.
The Secretary of Defense should closely monitor the interface between  JPAS and CCMS to ensure effective management of investigative and  adjudicative cases and avoid further backlogs.
The National Security Council should promulgate Federal standards for  investigating and adjudicating personnel security clearances in a timely  manner.
The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General jointly should  develop a system, which allows DSS and OPM investigators access to  state and local criminal history information records.
DOD indicated that it does not plan to respond to these  recommendations.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To estimate the size and accuracy of the Department of Defense-wide  (DOD) personnel security clearance backlog, we obtained separate  estimates of the investigative and adjudicative backlogs from the Defense  Security Service (DSS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and  DOD’s central adjudication facilities. Also, we obtained some DOD-wide  information from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence (OUSD (I)). As part of the estimation process, we observed  the steps used to capture and process investigative information at DSS and  OPM. We obtained additional information regarding issues such as number  of days required to complete an investigation or adjudication, time limits  (i.e., criteria) for completing investigations and adjudications, and data  reliability from DSS, OPM, and the central adjudication facilities during  site visits, through questionnaires, and by interviews. We conducted this  work at OUSD (I), Washington, D.C.; DSS, Fort Meade, Maryland; OPM,  Washington, D.C., and Boyers, Pennsylvania; Army, Navy, Air Force,  National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Staff, and  Washington Headquarters Services central adjudication facilities located  in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area; the Defense Industrial Security  Clearance Office, Columbus, Ohio; and the Defense Office of Hearings and  Appeals, Arlington, Virginia, and Columbus, Ohio. We did not request data  from the National Reconnaissance Office central adjudication facility  because of the sensitive nature of its operations. Reviews of GAO, House  Government Reform Committee, and Joint Security Commission reports  provided a historical perspective for the report. Additional context for  understanding DOD’s personnel security program was obtained through a  review of DOD regulations (e.g., DOD 5200.2-R), federal investigative  standards, and federal adjudicative guidelines.
To identify the factors that impede DOD’s ability to eliminate its backlog  and accurately estimate the backlog size, we reviewed prior GAO, DOD  Office of Inspector General, House Government Reform Committee,  Defense Personnel Security Research Center, and Joint Security  Commission reports. DSS and OPM provided procedural manuals and  discussed impediments while demonstrating their automated case  management systems and provided other information such as workload  data in responses to written questions and in interviews. Interviews  regarding impediments were also held with officials from OUSD (I); nine  central adjudication facilities; the Defense Personnel Security Research  Center; the Chair of the Personnel Security Working Group of the National  Security Council, Washington, D.C.; investigations contractors at their  headquarters: US Investigations Services, Inc.; ManTech; and DynCorp;  and associations representing industry: Aerospace Industries Association,  Information Technology Association of America, National Defense  Industrial Association, and Northern Virginia Technology Council. Our  General Counsel’s office supplied additional context for evaluating  potential impediments through its review of items such as the Security  Clearance Information Act and Executive Order 12968, Access to  Classified Information.
To identify the potential adverse effects of the impediments to eliminating  the backlog and accurately estimating its size, we reviewed prior GAO and  Joint Security Commission reports. We supplemented this information  with recent data from DSS and OPM regarding the number of days that it  took to complete various types of investigations. Also, an interview with  the Chair of the Personnel Security Working Group of the National  Security Council provided a governmentwide perspective on the effects of  delays and backlogs. Industry representatives cited above provided other  perspectives on the economic costs of delays in obtaining eligibility-for- clearance determinations.
For our update on the status of the authorized transfer of DSS’s  investigative functions and staff to OPM, we reviewed the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 and GAO reports on DSS  and OPM operations. In addition, we reviewed planning documents such  as those describing the various transfer-related action teams that OPM and  DOD created; these teams included one that sought to reconcile  differences in the procedures used to conduct personnel security  investigations. We also conducted interviews in December with DOD and  OPM to determine up-to-date perspectives regarding the authorized  transfer from officials representing both agencies.
We conducted our review from February 2003 through December 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for  Top Secret Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance  Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security  Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.:  August 24, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are  Being Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose  National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.:  February 16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations  Pose National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.:  October 27, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History  Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to  Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:  September 7, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access  to and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245.  Washington, D.C.: September 1998.
Privatization of OPM’s Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.  Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.  Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the  Executive Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.:  October 19, 1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM’s Role in  Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.:  June 14, 1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating  Investigations and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101.  Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the  Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Personnel Security Investigations: GAO/NSIAD-94-135R.  Washington, D.C.: March 4, 1994.
Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance  Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 1993.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not  Provided When Access is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162.  Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate  Duplicative Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security  Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.  Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by  Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.:  May 6, 1992.
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security  Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.