Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Better Manage Automatic Test Equipment Modernization
Published: 2003-03-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The services have billions of dollars worth of outdated and obsolete automatic test equipment (ATE) used to test components on military aircraft or weapon systems. Department of Defense (DOD) policy advocates the development and acquisition of test equipment that can be used on multiple types of weapon systems and aircraft and used interchangeably between the services. At the request of the Subcommittee's Chairman, GAO examined the problems that the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are facing with this aging equipment and their efforts to comply with DOD policy.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD and the services face growing concerns regarding obsolete automatic test equipment, given the high costs of modernizing or replacing it and its potential effect on aircraft readiness. The Navy and Air Force, for example, estimate that they will spend billions of dollars to modernize or replace this equipment, much of which was acquired in the 1970s and 1980s. In the meantime, the aging testers are becoming increasingly out of date and more difficult to support. When the testers do not work properly, maintenance can suffer and readiness can be adversely affected. Since 1994, DOD policy has advocated the acquisition of test equipment that can be used on multiple weapon systems and aircraft and can be used interchangeably between the services; progress in this regard has been slow. For example, although the Navy set out in 1991 to replace 25 major tester types with one standard tester by 2000, budget cuts and delays in developing software have resulted in delays in completing the replacement of these obsolete testers until 2008. The Air Force has only recently initiated a test equipment modernization plan. However, little evidence suggests that consideration is being given to the acquisition of equipment that would have common utility for more than one weapon system as DOD policy advocates. For procurement of new weapon systems, the Air Force is giving little consideration to the use of a common tester, while a common tester is planned for use as the primary tester for the Joint Strike Fighter. Although DOD tasked the Navy as its Executive Agent for automatic test equipment in 1994, the agent has made only limited progress in achieving compliance across all the services with DOD policy advocating the development of common systems. While the Executive Agent can point to some successes in individual systems, its officials acknowledged that the organization does not have sufficient authority or resources to fully implement the policy and achieve the maximum commonality possible.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: One of the major challenges facing the military services is that of  modernizing billions of dollars’ worth of aging and increasingly obsolete  automatic test equipment (ATE) used to troubleshoot and diagnose  components of aircraft or weapon systems. Since 1994, Department of  Defense (DOD) policy has advocated a reduction in the proliferation of  testers that are unique to one type of weapon system or aircraft, favoring  the development or acquisition of testers that (1) are interoperable within  a service and between the services and (2) can be used on many different  components of multiple types of aircraft and weapon systems. As the  services modernize ATE, they are challenged to adhere to DOD policy and  reduce the number of unique testers.
ATE with its test program sets, including test software, an interface device  that connects the ATE to the item being tested, and documentation make  up an automatic test system. (See fig. 1.)
ATE is used by the services at all maintenance levels (from flight lines  for routine maintenance to depots for major overhauls and factories for  production and acceptance testing) to test electronic systems and  components that are difficult or impossible to test manually, to isolate  system malfunctions, and to verify that systems are operating properly.  These testers can be made to examine a single aircraft system, various  components of an aircraft, or multiple components of different aircraft.
Because of your concerns regarding DOD’s continued reporting of spare  parts shortages and the potential impact that ATE obsolescence could  have on the readiness of military aircraft, you asked us to determine  whether DOD and the services are giving adequate attention to ATE  modernization efforts. Specifically, our objectives were to identify  (1) what problems the Air Force and Navy are facing with their ATE  and (2) how successful DOD, the Air Force, and the Navy have been in  addressing the proliferation of unique testers.
Our review included ATE for aircraft managed by the Air Force and the  Navy and included information on ATE acquisition for two fighter aircraft  currently under development: the multiservice Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)  and the Air Force’s F/A-22. Our scope and methodology are described in  more detail in appendix I. We performed our review from January 2002  through March 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: It is estimated that DOD employs more than 400 different tester types.  This equipment is used to diagnose problems in aircraft avionics and  weapon system components so that the component can be repaired and  replaced on the aircraft or put into the supply system for future use. For  example, testers may be used to diagnose problems with aircraft radars,  guidance and control systems, or weapon systems. According to DOD, the  department spent over $50 billion in its acquisition and support of ATE  from 1980 through 1992, and the procurement was characterized by the  proliferation of testers designed to support a specific weapon system or  component. These testers are quickly becoming obsolete and more  difficult and costly to maintain because they may no longer be in  production and parts may not be readily available. Over the years, various  studies have criticized the continued proliferation of unique ATE and  highlighted the need for the development and acquisition of testers that  can be used to test more than one system or component.
In September 1993, the House Appropriations Committee recommended  that the Secretary of Defense develop a DOD-wide policy requiring ATE  commonality among the services, along with a formal implementation  mechanism with sufficient authority, staffing, and funding to ensure  compliance. In 1994, DOD established a policy stating that managers  of DOD programs should select families of testers or commercial  off-the-shelf components to meet all ATE acquisition needs and that the  introduction of unique testers should be minimized. DOD designated the  Navy at that time as its Executive Agent to oversee policy implementation  in all services, and identified a goal of reducing life-cycle costs and  providing greater ATE commonality and interoperability. Additional DOD  guidance published in 1996 and 1997 required that all ATE acquisitions be  part of the approved families of testers or commercial off-the-shelf.
section_title: Aging ATE Presents Major Challenges to DOD
paragraphs: DOD faces major challenges with aging and increasingly obsolete ATE.  These problems include the high costs of maintaining and replacing  ATE and the declining availability of spare parts for the aging testers. In  addition, several DOD organizations, including the Navy Inspector  General, have suggested that aging and obsolete ATE may adversely affect  aviation readiness.
subsections: section_title: Modernization Costs Are Substantial
paragraphs: Departmentwide estimates of funds needed for ATE modernization and  acquisition are not readily available. However, according to Air Force and  Navy ATE managers, most of the services’ ATE is obsolete and will need to  be upgraded or replaced over the next several years. Our study confirmed  that replacement and modernization costs would be substantial. The Navy,  for example, spent about $1.5 billion from fiscal years 1990 through 2002  for the acquisition of its primary family of testers and plans to spend an  additional $430 million through fiscal year 2007. Additionally, the Navy  estimates that it plans to spend $584 million through fiscal year 2007 to  adapt existing test program sets necessary to perform specific tests of the  various aircraft components supported by this family of testers. The Navy  also anticipates spending an additional $584 million to develop program  test sets for new weapon system requirements.
Information on the Air Force’s spending for ATE modernization is  somewhat sketchy, as limited data are available centrally for individual  weapon systems. According to a recent study done for the Air Force, the  service has not developed a plan that allows modernization funding  requirements to be determined. However, estimates are available for  selected systems. The F-15 fighter program office, for example, is spending  approximately $325 million on just one tester that will be fielded in 2004. It  also plans to upgrade its electronic warfare tester, which is one of seven  primary testers for the aircraft, at a cost of over $40 million. A 2002 study  of B-52 bomber ATE identified obsolescence issues associated with six of  the aircraft’s seven major testers that will require more than $140 million  in the near future. Similarly, the upgrade of a unique B-1 bomber tester is  expected to exceed $15 million, even though the Air Force is considering  replacing this tester and has already begun planning the acquisition. The  latest estimate for the new tester is $190 million. Current ATE estimates  for the F/A-22, which is still under development, are not available.  However, estimates made early in the development phase exceeded  $1.5 billion.
section_title: Readiness Could Be Adversely Affected
paragraphs: ATE is becoming increasingly out-of-date and more difficult to support.  And, according to service officials, using this outdated equipment to  perform required tests in a timely manner is becoming increasingly  challenging. Although the services could not quantify the extent that tester  problems affect readiness, service officials noted that without adequate  test equipment to diagnose problems, components cannot be repaired in  a timely manner and the mission capability of military aircraft can be  adversely affected. In August 2000, the Navy Inspector General identified  shortfalls in ATE as having a negative impact on naval aviation and, in  particular, on the availability of repaired components. During the same  time frame, a Navy operational advisory group, recognizing the importance  of ATE in maintaining readiness, ranked support equipment, including  ATE, as one of its top 20 readiness issues.
We have issued several reports in the recent past addressing the shortage  of spare parts—a potential result of ATE problems. In addition, according  to DOD readiness reports, only 28 percent of Air Force, Navy, and Marine  Corps key aircraft models met their readiness goals in fiscal year 2002.  Although difficulties in meeting these goals are caused by a complex  combination of interrelated logistical and operational factors, the shortage  of spare parts was a major cause. ATE plays a significant role in the supply  of available spares, since this equipment affects both how many parts are  taken out of service for repair and how quickly they are repaired and  returned. We reported that maintenance and repair facilities routinely  work around spare parts shortages by removing a working part from one  aircraft to replace a nonworking part in another aircraft, a practice called  “cannibalization.” And, although the services do not record increases in  cannibalizations that are caused by ATE problems, the services use  cannibalization as a routine maintenance practice when testers are not  available or not working properly.
In July 2001, we reported that as a result of ATE not working properly,  unfilled requisitions were adversely affecting the mission capability of F-14  aircraft. In another case, more than 1,200 Air Force B-1 bomber  components were backlogged and could not be repaired because of the  same reason. Although we were unable to measure specific reductions in  the readiness of F-14 and B-1 aircraft as a result of this problem, mission  capable rates for the B-1 in fiscal years 1998-2002 averaged approximately  55 percent, compared with the goal of 67 percent, while mission capable  rates for the F-14D, during the same period, averaged 67 percent,  compared with a goal of 71 percent. Additionally, the Air Force’s 2002 B-52  study concluded that six of the seven major testers used to test B-52  components need to be modified or replaced or the availability of the  aircraft will be adversely affected as early as 2006. Air Force officials  believe that similar problems will continue unless the service undertakes a  major ATE modernization or replacement program.
section_title: DOD Has Had Limited Success in Fostering Commonality
paragraphs: Since the early 1990s, DOD policies have addressed the need for  commonality in ATE acquisition and modernization. Although the services  have been making some progress, efforts to comply with these policies  have been slow. For example, although the Navy has developed a single  family of testers to work on many of its aircraft components, after  11 years, the replacement of its obsolete testers aboard aircraft carriers  and shore maintenance facilities has not been completed. In addition,  strategic planning for the modernization of automatic test equipment at  Navy depots has only recently been initiated.
Historically, the Air Force has not had a service-level ATE standardization  policy and has essentially pursued unique ATE solutions for each weapon  system. Since individual aircraft program offices have been doing their  own planning for modernization, the Air Force has given little  consideration to having common ATE or testers that are interoperable  with those of other services. Planning for the Air Force’s latest aircraft  acquisition, the F/A-22, calls for the development of automatic test  equipment that will be unique to that aircraft. In August 2002, the Air  Force initiated a planning effort to determine its long-term servicewide  ATE modernization needs.
subsections: section_title: The Navy Has Been Slow in Fielding Its Common Tester
paragraphs: According to Navy reports, obsolete ATE results in higher backlogs and  increased flying hour costs, and adversely affects aircraft readiness. The  Navy recognized years ago, and prior to the establishment of DOD’s  1994 ATE standardization policy, that its ATE was becoming obsolete.  In the 1980s the Navy embarked upon an ATE standardization program to  replace 25 of its testers with one standard ATE family, the Consolidated  Automated Support System (CASS), to minimize unique types of testers.  The Navy designed CASS to be used at maintenance activities both ashore  and afloat. In 1991, the Navy began to produce CASS for the general  purpose testing of equipment such as radios, radars, and electro-optics.  (See fig. 2.)
CASS’s replacement of 25 types of obsolete testers, in support of  2,458 weapon system components, was scheduled for completion by  fiscal year 2000. However, according to Navy officials, because of budget  cuts that caused delays in developing the test program sets, only 4 of the  25 have been completely replaced by CASS, and 8 test sets have been  partially replaced. Navy officials told us that the completion schedule has  slipped to fiscal year 2008 for aircraft carriers and shore maintenance  facilities and could be much longer for aviation depots.
The Navy reports that the replacement of these testers with CASS  stations, when complete, will reduce the number of test-related enlisted  occupational specialties from 32 to 4, thus reducing training requirements.  In addition, CASS will reduce the requirement for test equipment  operators aboard each aircraft carrier from 105 to 54, and at the same  time reduce space requirements for testers from 2,700 to 1,900 square feet.  Spare parts needed to repair testers will be reduced from 30,000 to 3,800.  According to Navy officials, however, the revised completion schedule will  not allow for the timely replacement of aging ATE, and these delays will  adversely affect aircraft readiness.
In addition to schedule slippage, the original CASS equipment was  fielded about 10 years ago, uses 15-year-old technology and, according  to Navy ATE program managers, is in need of an upgrade. Accordingly,  by 2006, the first production units will have reached the point where wear  and obsolete components will drive supporting costs to unacceptable  levels and create a need for replacement and modernization. The Navy  has begun modernization planning for CASS, including upgrades through  fiscal year 2014.
Integrating CASS into Navy depots may further delay ATE commonality  within the service. For example, a 2001 Navy report, addressing total ATE  ownership costs, noted that the depots have not maximized the use of  CASS because of the limited availability of capital investment funds. In  addition, at one depot we found some reluctance to use CASS. This depot  had four CASS stations that had never been used—two were delivered in  1999 and installed in December 2000 and February 2001, while two others  delivered in 2000 were still in crates. Depot officials said that they had  elected not to put the equipment on-line, as they wanted to avoid paying  for overhead and maintenance, especially without the workload to justify  their use. They also noted that the development of the test program sets  needed to use the CASS has been slow, thereby slowing the fielding of the  equipment. The Navy has only recently begun a servicewide planning  effort to modernize its depot-level testers and determine how best to  integrate CASS into its depot maintenance strategy.
section_title: Air Force’s Approach Has Resulted in Limited Commonality
paragraphs: Unlike the Navy, the Air Force has not made commonality a priority but  has pursued unique ATE solutions for each weapon system. In addition,  it has only recently initiated efforts to collect information on ATE in  its inventory, including the equipment’s condition and its need for  modernization or replacement. Because the Air Force has not made  concerted efforts to use one system to service multiple aircraft platforms,  it has not taken advantage of efficiencies and potential savings such as  those expected by the Navy as a result of CASS.
Although the Air Force is developing plans to modernize its ATE, and  although its policy is to consider developing common testers, it does not  yet have an overall plan to guide its modernization efforts and has made  limited progress in this area. Furthermore, it does not have a process in  place to ensure that commonality is given adequate consideration in its  ATE acquisition and modernization.
The Air Force has been primarily upgrading—rather than replacing—aging  ATE; leaving ATE management up to individual program managers. In  most cases, it relies on contractors to provide support for ATE, leaving it  vulnerable to contractors who may decide to stop supporting testers when  maintaining them is no longer profitable.
In early 2001, the Air Force organized the Warner Robins Air Logistics  Center Automatic Test System Division to work with program offices  on ATE issues. The Division has recently initiated efforts to establish a  database of all contractors that are capable of supporting existing ATE  to help identify emerging supportability issues. Although the office is  responsible for fostering the adoption and use of common families  of testers, it has no final decision-making authority regarding ATE  modernizations and no control over funding decisions on these matters.  Division officials told us that they work with individual project offices to  encourage them to use common ATE, but individual project offices make  the final decisions.
In our opinion, leaving these ATE decisions to the individual Air Force  project offices has led to some questionable and unnecessary  expenditures. For example:    The Air Force will spend approximately $325 million to replace a tester for  the F-15 with one that has been under development for almost 10 years  and is already obsolete. The new tester, called the Electronic System Test  Set, is not expected to be fielded until 2004. However, this electronic tester  already needs an upgrade that will cost more than $24 million. Because the  new tester will not be able to perform all the required tests, the Air Force  will have to keep the old tester too.
The Air Force is spending over $15 million for an interim modernization of  its intermediate automatic test equipment for its B-1 aircraft while, at the  same time, a new tester is being developed. If the Air Force had taken  the necessary steps to replace this obsolete tester in a timely manner,  these duplicative costs could likely have been avoided, and overall ATE  modernization costs reduced. According to an Air Force official, the  program office should have begun the acquisition of a replacement tester  several years ago, but funding was not available. The service is now  considering acquiring a replacement tester estimated to cost $190 million.
The Air Force’s Warner Robins Air Logistics Center Automatic Test  System Division is developing a strategic plan that is expected to serve  as a management plan for meeting long-term ATE needs. The Division  plans to develop a baseline of its current tester capabilities, address  supportability and sustainability issues, and determine whether tester  failures adversely affect the availability of aircraft weapon systems. In  addition, it will evaluate replacement and modernization alternatives,  taking into account life-cycle costs and the potential for developing  common testers. The plan’s implementation is expected to take years  to complete.
section_title: Services’ Approaches in Developing Testers for Two New Aircraft Differ
paragraphs: While most of our work focused on ATE for the current aircraft inventory,  we also wanted to see how the services were approaching development of  testers for two new aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter and the F/A-22. We  found that very different approaches are being taken in the development  of ATE for these two aircraft. The JSF, for example, will have a single  tester, made up almost entirely of commercial components, which will test  all components on the aircraft. The F/A-22 project office has no assurance  that commonality is being considered in its tester development or that  DOD’s policy to minimize unique ATE development is being followed.
The JSF originated in the early 1990s through the restructuring and  integration of several tactical aircraft and technology initiatives already  under way. The goal was to use the latest technology in a common family  of aircraft to meet the future strike requirements of the services and  U.S. allies. The JSF support strategy is built upon a single tester to be  used by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as by foreign  partners, to test all avionics and weapon systems on the aircraft.
The JSF tester, referred to as the LM-STAR, is made up almost entirely  of commercially available components, contributing to readily available  spares and less complicated upgrades. It will be used during development  and after the aircraft is fielded. Vendors participating in the development  of avionics and weapon system components for the aircraft are required  to produce these components so that their testing can be done by the  LM-STAR. A total of $99 million has been allocated for the purchase and  support of 88 of these testers during the development phase. While a final  decision has not been made on whether maintenance support for the  aircraft will be provided by the contractor or at a military facility, the  system project office is taking steps to ensure that this tester can be  used regardless of where maintenance is accomplished.
By contrast, Air Force F/A-22 program officials told us that they have not  made a decision as to what testers will be used to support this new  aircraft, which began development in 1991. The project office has not  ensured that all components for the F/A-22 can be tested with a single  tester. Project officials told us that the F/A-22 is a very complex aircraft  and that opportunities to take advantage of common equipment will be  limited. Yet, the same contractor that is developing the F/A-22 is also  involved in the JSF, which is also very advanced and complex and which  uses a common family of testers. While current projections of ATE costs  are not available, estimates made early in the F/A-22 development phase  exceeded $1.5 billion.
section_title: DOD Oversight Needs Strengthening
paragraphs: In 1993, the House Appropriations Committee recommended that a  DOD-wide policy be adopted requiring that the introduction of unique ATE  be minimized and that DOD establish an oversight system with sufficient  authority, staffing, and funding to ensure compliance. DOD established a  policy requiring the services to minimize unique types of testers to reduce  redundant investments and lessen long-term costs, leveraging its  investments in testers across the entire DOD establishment. In 1994,  DOD appointed the Navy as its Executive Agent for ATE to oversee the  implementation of this policy. As part of the tasking, the Executive Agent  for ATE was directed to establish a process so that programs proposing  not to use the DOD-designated standard of ATE families would have to  request a waiver. In accordance with the direction provided by DOD, the  Executive Agent established a waiver process. According to data provided  by the Executive Agent, since its inception, 30 requests for waivers were  submitted for their review. Our analysis indicated that 15 of these requests  resulted in waivers or concurrence. The remaining requests were never  finalized, were returned to the originating office for further action, or were  determined not to require waivers. According to Executive Agent officials,  the Executive Agent makes recommendations concerning the waiver  requests, but it does not have the authority to disapprove them.
Executive Agent officials told us however, that they have no assurance  that all tester acquisitions and modifications are identified or that all  required waivers are requested. As a result, they may not be aware of all  ATE modifications or acquisitions or they may not be made aware of  such until the process is already under way and it is too late to affect  any change. For example, the Air Force did not request a waiver for a  $77 million modification to ATE supporting the low altitude navigation and  targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN). LANTIRN is a pod system that  supports the F-15, F-16, and F-14 aircraft in low-level navigation and lazing  targets. In its technical comments on our draft report, however, Air Force  officials indicated that owing to the nature of the LANTIRN modification,  a DOD waiver was not required. We continue to believe, however, that  the Executive Agent should be notified of tester modifications of  this magnitude.
In addition to having no assurance that all tester acquisitions and  modifications are identified, Executive Agent officials told us they do  not have the necessary enforcement authority or resources to effectively  implement the waiver process even when they know of the planned  acquisition or modification. For example, Executive Agent officials held  several discussions with F/A-22 program officials, early in the development  phase, concerning the use of common testers; however, there was no  evidence of the Executive Agent’s involvement in F/A-22 ATE development  since November 1994. Executive Agent officials do not know whether  common testers are being considered.
As DOD’s Executive Agent for ATE, the Navy has achieved some success  in encouraging the development of common testers and in dealing with  technical issues affecting all services. In September 1998, the Executive  Agent for ATE reported that DOD had avoided $284 million in costs by  implementing DOD’s policy and cited one example in which the Army  and the Navy achieved savings of $80 million by jointly developing an  electro-optics test capability. Navy officials also told us that they believe  ATE planning for the Joint Strike Fighter, which calls for vendors to use  standardized test equipment or equipment having commercially available  components, can also be considered an accomplishment. In addition, the  Executive Agent established integrated process teams to research  technical issues dealing with tester commonality, such as efforts to  develop open systems architecture. In this regard, DOD provided funds  to the Executive Agent during fiscal years 1995 to 1998 for its research  and development efforts. Currently, the Navy is leading a joint service  technology project aimed at demonstrating that the most advance  technologies can be combined into a single tester. The Executive Agent  also implemented a process whereby ATE modernization and acquisitions  would be reviewed for compliance with DOD policy, and developed the  ATE Selection Process Guide and the ATE Master Plan to aid the services  in complying with DOD’s ATE policies.
ATE officials, responsible for oversight of ATE, noted that their role is  essential; however, its current placement in one service (the Navy)  makes it difficult to ensure other services comply with DOD guidance.  A report recently prepared by a joint service working group noted  continuing problems in the implementation of DOD policy, including  ATE obsolescence, delays in modernization efforts, a lack of ATE  interoperability among the services, upgrading difficulties, rising support  costs, proliferation of equipment that is difficult to support, and systems  that are not easily deployed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The services have made limited progress in achieving DOD’s commonality  goals for ATE, as established in the early 1990s. The department does not  have a joint service forum or body that can oversee the total scope of  ATE acquisition and modernization and better promote ATE commonality  and the sharing of information and technology across platforms and  services. DOD does not have sufficient information concerning the  magnitude of the services’ modernization efforts or a departmentwide  approach to accomplish ATE modernization in the most cost-effective  manner. Without such an approach, the department faces a very expensive  and time-consuming ATE modernization effort, with the continued  proliferation of unique testers. It will also have no assurance that  resources are allocated in the most effective manner to exploit  commonality and commercially available technology and products. A  single entity within DOD—rather than in one service—may be in the  best position to provide overarching oversight and coordination between  the services in planning for the modernization of ATE. We believe that  high-level management commitment within DOD and all the services will  be needed to achieve a cultural change that fosters the development of  common ATE.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reemphasize the policy that  common ATE be developed to the maximum extent possible. We also  recommend that the Secretary reconsider whether placing its Executive  Agent for ATE in the Navy—or any single service—is the most effective  way to implement the policy. Wherever the Executive Agent is placed  organizationally, we recommend that the Secretary give it authority and  resources to  include representatives from all of the services, with a scope to include the  oversight of ATE acquisition and modifications for all weapon systems;    establish a mechanism to ensure that all ATE acquisitions and  modernizations are identified in an early enough stage to be able to  provide a comprehensive look at commonality and interoperability and to  ensure a coordinated effort between service entities;    direct the services to draw up modernization plans for its review so it can  identify opportunities to maximize commonality and technology sharing  between and within the services; and    continue efforts to research technical issues dealing with tester  commonality such as the development of open system architecture and  other joint service applications.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Department of Defense provided written comments on a draft of this  report, which are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The department  also provided technical comments which we have incorporated, as  appropriate, into the report. DOD concurred with our recommendations  and agreed that it should reemphasize the policy that common automatic  test equipment be developed to the maximum extent possible. DOD  indicated that it would propose that an ATE acquisition policy statement  be included in the next issuance of DOD Instruction 5000.2, “Operation  of the Defense Acquisition System,” April 5, 2002. DOD also agreed to  reconsider whether the placement of its Executive Agent in the Navy—or  any single service—is the most effective way to implement its ATE policy.  The department further concurred that an Executive Agent for ATE  should have the authority and resources to direct the services to draw  up modernization plans for its review to maximize commonality,  interoperability, and technology sharing between the services. In this  regard, DOD agreed that there should be a mechanism to ensure all  automatic test equipment acquisitions and modernizations are identified in  an early enough stage in order to have a coordinated effort among service  entities. Finally, DOD agreed that the Executive Agent for ATE should  include representatives from all services. DOD intends to use its authority  recently published in DOD Directive 5100.88, “DOD Executive Agent,”  September 3, 2002, to reconsider the placement of the Executive Agent  and to provide it with sufficient authority, resources, and mechanisms to  carry out its responsibilities. In addition, DOD intends to include the  funding for the Executive Agent as part of the Planning, Programming,  Budgeting and Execution process and to identify such funding separately  so that it is visible within the DOD budget.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to  interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Navy,  the Air Force, and the Army; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies  available to other interested parties on request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov/. If  you or your staff have any questions about the report, please contact me  at (757) 552-8100.
Key contributors to this assignment were Ken Knouse, William Meredith,  Harry Taylor, Hugh Brady, and Stefano Petrucci.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We reviewed and analyzed available reports, briefings, documents, and  records and interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense  and at Air Force and Navy headquarters organizations, Washington, D.C.;  the Naval Air Systems Command located at Patuxent River, Maryland;  Air Force Material Command and system program offices located at  Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Warner Robins Air Logistics  Center, Georgia; the North Island Naval Aviation Depot, California; the  Navy’s Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department, Oceana Master Jet  Base, Virginia; and the intermediate maintenance department aboard an  aircraft carrier based in San Diego, California. The Army was not included  in the scope of this study because our focus was primarily on fixed-wing  aircraft and because of the Army’s efforts to standardize its automatic test  equipment (ATE) around a single family of testers, a situation similar to  that of the Navy’s.
To identify the problems that Air Force and Navy aviation (including  Marine Corps) is facing with regard to ATE, we interviewed personnel  responsible for policies and oversight, obtained applicable regulations and  other guidance, and analyzed data provided by the services on various  testers. We provided a proforma for the Air Force’s and Navy’s use in  documenting their inventory of ATE, identifying obsolete testers, and  providing estimates of modernization and replacement time frames and  cost. The Navy’s data on ATE were provided by the central office that  manages common test equipment—PMA-260, within the Naval Air Systems  Command, and the Air Force’s Automatic Test System Division at Warner  Robins Air Logistics Center. We also discussed obsolescence issues and  ATE problems with the managers of shore-based, aircraft carrier, and  depot maintenance activities. We reviewed and analyzed our prior reports  and ongoing efforts, and reports of other organizations to provide a  historical and contextual framework for evaluating ATE policies and  issues, for documenting readiness rates of selected aircraft, and  documenting the processes put in place by the Department of Defense  (DOD) to oversee the services’ efforts to acquire and modernize ATE.
To determine how successful DOD and the services have been in  addressing the proliferation of unique testers, we held discussions with the  responsible offices within each service and DOD, analyzed regulations and  guidance, and reviewed studies and other documentation. We focused our  work concerning this objective at the Navy office designated as DOD’s  Executive Agent for Automatic Test Equipment—PMA-260 within the  Naval Air Systems Command—and the Air Force’s Automatic Test System  Division at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center. At these offices, which  have responsibility for ATE acquisition or sustainment, modernization,  and oversight, we held discussions with responsible officials, obtained  documentation regarding responsibilities and decisions, and reviewed files  for specific ATE acquisition and modernization programs. We also  obtained information from individual system program offices, for selected  aircraft, located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and selected Navy and  Air Force depots and intermediate maintenance facilities. Because we  found that Air Force testers are generally unique to specific aircraft, we  selected the F-15, B-1B, and B-2 for more detailed analysis, as these are  considered to be front-line aircraft depended upon heavily by the Air  Force to accomplish its mission. We also obtained information on ATE  acquisition for two fighter aircraft currently under development: the Joint  Strike Fighter and the F/A-22.
We performed our review from January 2002 through March 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Defense Inventory: Better Reporting on Spare Parts Spending Will  Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-03-18. Washington, D.C.:  October 24, 2002.
Defense Inventory: Improved Industrial Base Assessments for Army  War Reserve Spares Could Save Money. GAO-02-650. Washington, D.C.:  July 12, 2002.
Defense Inventory: Trends in Services’ Spare Parts Purchased from the  Defense Logistics Agency. GAO-02-452. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Defense Logistics: Opportunities to Improve the Army’s and Navy’s  Decision-Making Process for Weapons Systems Support. GAO-02-306.  Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2002.
Military Aircraft: Services Need Strategies to Reduce Cannibalizations.  GAO-02-86. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2001.
Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the  Public Depot System. GAO-02-105. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Defense Logistics: Air Force Lacks Data to Assess Contractor Logistics  Support Approaches. GAO-01-618. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2001.
Defense Inventory: Navy Spare Parts Quality Deficiency  Reporting Program Needs Improvement. GAO-01-923. Washington, D.C.:  August 16, 2001.
Army Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and  Maintenance Effectiveness. GAO-01-772. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Navy Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and  Maintenance Effectiveness. GAO-01-771. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Air Force Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and  Maintenance Effectiveness. GAO-01-587. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2001.
Defense Inventory: Information on the Use of Spare Parts Funding Is  Lacking. GAO-01-472. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2001.
Defense Inventory: Approach for Deciding Whether to Retain or  Dispose of Items Needs Improvement. GAO-01-475. Washington, D.C.:  May 25, 2001.
Military Aircraft: Cannibalizations Adversely Affect Personnel and  Maintenance. GAO-01-93T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2001.
Defense Inventory: Army War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements Are  Uncertain. GAO-01-425. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001.