Military Personnel: Progress Made in Implementing Recommendations to Reduce Domestic Violence, but Further Management Action Needed
Published: 2006-05-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Due to concerns about domestic violence in the military and its adverse effect on mission readiness, Congress required the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a task force to assess the services' response to domestic violence and recommend improvements. The task force issued three reports containing 194 recommendations. The Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act required GAO to review DOD's progress in implementing the recommendations. This report discusses (1) DOD's ability to report on domestic violence incidents and disciplinary actions, (2) the resources DOD has provided to implement the recommendations, and (3) DOD's specific actions to ensure victim confidentiality and the education of commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains. GAO also examined whether DOD has established an oversight framework to monitor implementation.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's ability to report on domestic violence incidents and disciplinary actions taken by commanders is hampered because the systems that the department uses to collect domestic violence information do not contain complete data. DOD's domestic violence database does not capture data from all law enforcement systems and, therefore, does not provide a complete accounting of reported incidents and actions taken by commanders. Notwithstanding the task force's recommendation to report on the number of domestic violence incidents, DOD and the services have not developed any plans to address the data limitations, which do not allow for visibility over domestic violence incidents. Without complete information on reported incidents of domestic violence and the steps taken by commanders to address these incidents, DOD will not know the size and nature of the problems or be able to assess the effectiveness of its actions. DOD has provided about $23 million to implement the recommendations and has made progress in this regard. Specifically, GAO identified 94 recommendations of varying potential importance as completed, 60 as pending further action, and 40 in which no action had been taken because DOD either disagreed with the recommendations or determined that they were not applicable to the department. Nonetheless, DOD faces challenges in completing the pending recommendations in a timely manner because of potential shortages of essential personnel in the office overseeing implementation. In addition, DOD's method of communicating its policy changes resulting from the recommendations has not ensured consistent practices and widespread understanding of the policies among DOD and the services. While DOD is taking steps toward ensuring confidentiality for victims and to train its personnel on domestic violence issues, additional efforts are needed. To ensure victim confidentiality, DOD issued a policy, effective April 22, 2006, allowing victims to report domestic violence to specified people without notifying command. In addition, DOD issued guidance requiring training and is providing several educational options. However, data regarding which chaplains have completed training are not available because the department and the services do not track this training. Chaplains play a special role in assisting domestic violence victims and, without complete training data, DOD may be unable to determine if chaplains have been provided the needed resources to assist victims. DOD has not established an oversight framework to monitor compliance with and evaluate implementation of the task force recommendations. While the task force recommended and DOD's draft domestic violence instruction requires monitoring and evaluation of domestic violence efforts, DOD has not established a process to do so. Without an overall management framework, DOD and Congress have limited visibility and oversight to evaluate DOD's implementation efforts and make needed improvements.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) have expressed concerns  about domestic violence in the military and its adverse effect on unit  morale and mission readiness. DOD defines domestic violence as “n  offense under the United States Code, the Uniform Code of Military  Justice, or State law that involves the use, attempted use, or threatened  use of force or violence against a person of the opposite sex, or a violation  of a lawful order issued for the protection of a person of the opposite sex,  who is (a) a current or former spouse; (b) a person with whom the abuser  shares a child in common; or (c) a current or former intimate partner with  whom the abuser shares or has shared a common domicile.” Further, to  separate criminal from noncriminal incidents, DOD’s definition of  domestic abuse encompasses (1) domestic violence as defined above, or  (2) a pattern of behavior resulting in emotional/psychological abuse,  economic control, and/or interference with personal liberty that is  directed toward a person of the opposite sex who meets the same criteria  as defined for domestic violence. Serious adverse consequences for  servicemembers who commit acts of domestic violence can range from  nonjudicial punishments that could remove a servicemember from normal  duties to criminal sanctions that could result in imprisonment.
Following a number of reported high-profile domestic violence cases  involving soldiers who killed their spouses, Congress required DOD to  take several actions to address concerns about domestic violence in the  military. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2000 required DOD to, among other things, (1) establish a central  database of information on domestic violence incidents reported to a  commander, military law enforcement, or officials responsible for clinical  treatment or support services and the action(s) taken by the commanding  officers when disciplinary measures were required, and to report this  information to the administrator of the database annually; and (2)  establish a Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence to assess the  military’s response to domestic violence and make recommendations for  improvement. The task force issued three reports over the next 3 years,  which collectively contained almost 200 recommendations. To highlight its  concerns, the task force stated in its first report that domestic violence is  an offense against the institutional values of the military services of the  United States that degrades the overall readiness of our armed forces.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required us  to review DOD’s progress in implementing the task force  recommendations. In accordance with that act and agreements with your  offices, this report discusses (1) DOD’s ability to report on domestic  violence incidents in the military and disciplinary actions taken by  commanders to address these incidents, (2) the extent to which DOD has  provided resources to the office overseeing the implementation of the task  force’s recommendations and the extent to which the recommendations  have been implemented, and (3) the specific actions that DOD has taken  on recommendations to ensure the confidentiality for victims of domestic  violence and the education of commanding officers, senior enlisted  personnel, and chaplains. The report also discusses the extent to which  DOD has established an oversight framework to guide and evaluate its  implementation of the recommendations.
To determine DOD’s ability to report on domestic violence incidents in the  military and command disciplinary actions, we reviewed and analyzed  information on and reports from DOD’s Defense Incident-Based Reporting  System, which contains data on criminal incidents of domestic violence,  and the Family Advocacy Program Central Registry. In addition, we  reviewed DOD’s three reports to Congress on reported domestic violence  incidents in the military, which were issued in November 2001 for fiscal  year 2000 data, February 2003 for fiscal year 2001 data, and July 2004 for  fiscal year 2002 data. To assess the reliability of the data in DOD’s systems,  we (1) reviewed existing information about the data and the system that  produced them and (2) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about  the data. We concluded that the data from the Defense Incident-Based  Reporting System database were not reliable enough to enable DOD to  accurately report on the number of domestic violence incidents in the  military.
To determine the extent to which DOD (1) provided resources to the office  overseeing implementation, (2) implemented the task force  recommendations, and (3) established an oversight framework, we  interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials, including those in DOD’s  Family Violence Policy Office and Family Advocacy Program Office, and  analyzed relevant documents and data. These documents and data  included budget information; DOD’s strategic plan for implementing the  task force recommendations; DOD’s Reports on Implementation of  Recommendations of the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence  submitted on August 8, 2005, and February 15, 2006; training materials for  chaplains and commanding officers; and related metrics, applicable laws,  regulations, policy memoranda, and other documents DOD and the  services used to support implementation of the task force’s  recommendations and evaluation of that implementation.
Additionally, we visited at least 2 military installations for each service in  the United States and 5 overseas, for a total of 15 installations. During  these visits, we conducted nongeneralizable small group discussions with  and obtained supporting documentation from various installation officials,  including commanding officers, chaplains, victim advocates, family  advocacy program managers, and staff judge advocates. We also  conducted focus groups with military police and senior enlisted personnel  at these installations. We performed our work in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards from July 2005 through  March 2006. More details on our scope and methodology are presented in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Following a number of high-profile domestic violence cases involving  soldiers stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, who killed their wives,  Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, required the  Secretary of Defense to establish the Defense Task Force on Domestic  Violence. The task force was chartered as a 3-year effort to assist the  Secretary of Defense in identifying ways to prevent domestic violence in  the military, when possible, and in responding more effectively when  domestic violence occurs. In March 2000, 24 members were appointed to  the task force. These members included 12 senior officials from the four  services and 12 senior officials from the civilian sector who were experts  in the area of domestic violence.
The act also required the task force to develop a strategic plan for DOD  that included recommendations for improving DOD’s domestic violence  efforts in areas such as victim safety programs, domestic violence training  for military commanders, and domestic violence responses at overseas  military installations. The task force also assessed and made  recommendations regarding the roles and responsibilities that command,  chaplain, law enforcement, legal, and medical personnel have with regard  to addressing domestic violence incidents. From February 2001 through  February 2003, the task force issued three reports containing 194  recommendations for improving DOD’s response to domestic violence.
The task force identified four primary themes with regard to the  recommendations made in the three reports:    Community collaboration—addresses coordination and collaboration  issues among all military organizations, such as family advocacy and legal  offices, in relation to domestic violence, as well as coordination between  military and civilian communities.
Education and training—addresses training issues for commanding  officers, senior enlisted personnel, Family Advocacy Program staff, and  first responders, such as military police.
Offender accountability—identifies measures to improve individual  offender accountability and program accountability, as well as improve  dispositions and case management.
Victim safety—addresses issues related to victim safety programs,  confidentiality for victims, and other policies to enhance victim safety.
In January 2003, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, the Military Community and Family Policy  Office established the Family Violence Policy Office to coordinate  implementation of the task force’s recommendations, many of which were  aimed at improving DOD’s Family Advocacy Program. The Family  Advocacy Program, also under the Military Community and Family Policy  Office, provides services that contribute to the health of military families,  treats victims of domestic violence, and offers rehabilitation and treatment  for abusers. The Family Advocacy Program Director works in conjunction  with service headquarters managers to oversee the execution of the  program within each service.
section_title: DOD’s Ability to Report on Domestic Violence Incidents and Commander Actions Is Hampered by Incomplete Data
paragraphs: DOD’s ability to report domestic violence incidents involving  servicemembers and the disciplinary actions taken by commanders is  hampered because the data systems that the department uses to collect  domestic violence information contain incomplete data. The National  Defense Authorization Act of 2000 required DOD to develop a centralized  domestic violence database of information on incidents of domestic  violence involving members of the Armed Forces. This includes domestic  violence incidents reported to a commander, a law enforcement authority  of the Armed Forces, or a family advocacy program official. Under the act,  the Secretaries of the military departments are required to report this  information annually to the administrator of the database. DOD is also  required, under Section 591, to report information from the database,  along with its responses to each of the three task force reports. In an  effort to satisfy the legislation, DOD established the central domestic  violence database within its Defense Incident-Based Reporting System.  This database contains domestic violence incidents that are criminal in  nature including: infractions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, state  law, or violation of a protection order.
Although DOD established the central domestic violence database in June  2000, it is not yet fully operational and it does not contain complete  information about reported incidents of domestic violence. DOD officials  stated that the information contained in the database on the number of  incidents is not complete because some of the law enforcement systems  used by the services that feed into the central database are not yet  operational. These are the Air Force’s Office of Special Investigation  system, which is expected to be operational by August 2006; the Army’s  Judge Advocate General Office system, which is still in development; and  the Air Force’s Judge Advocate General Office system, which is expected  to be operational by June 2006. As a result, the central domestic violence  database does not contain any information about domestic violence  incidents that would be captured in these systems.
The central domestic violence database captures incidents of a criminal  nature that were responded to by military law enforcement personnel; but  it does not contain information on incidents reported to Family Advocacy  personnel such as emotional abuse or domestic violence incidents that  occur off the installation. To obtain this information, as required in the  act, DOD must supplement data from the Defense Incident-Based  Reporting System with data from the Family Advocacy Program Central  Registry, which contains clinical data on domestic violence incidents.  However, the Central Registry data system previously provided incomplete  domestic violence data because until January 2006, the Central Registry  only contained reported incidents of abuse involving current spouses. It  did not contain domestic violence data as defined by DOD’s 2004  definition that involved former spouses and intimate partners with whom  the alleged offender shared a child or a common domicile. Therefore, prior  to 2006, DOD did not provide complete information on all reported  instances of domestic violence.
DOD used information from the two systems in preparing its reports to  Congress on the number of incidents of domestic violence in the military  and commanders’ actions taken in responding to them during fiscal years  2000 through 2002. However, DOD officials who have responsibility for  gathering these data acknowledged that the statistics contained in these  reports were questionable. Moreover, they informed us that since the last  report to Congress on fiscal year 2002 incidents, no attempts had been  made to match up the information from the two systems, despite a June 8,  2000, memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness that directed them to do so. Our analysis  confirmed that neither system had complete data to enable DOD to  accurately determine the extent of reported domestic violence incidents in  the military.
Beyond these concerns, our review of information in the Defense Incident- Based Reporting System and supporting service law enforcement systems  revealed that a number of installations were not reporting disciplinary  actions taken by the commanders as required. For example, in the fiscal  year 2002 report that DOD released to Congress, DOD reported that of the  2,173 Army and Air Force incidents for which sufficient evidence existed  to take disciplinary action, 1,027, or 47 percent had no actions listed. DOD  and service instructions require that command disciplinary actions be  entered into the law enforcement systems. Moreover, these systems  contain a data field to record commanders’ actions in responding to  domestic violence incidents. However, during our site visits, we found that  some commander disciplinary actions were not being entered into the data  field and some of the law enforcement officials we interviewed stated that  they were unaware that they were required to do so. These officials  acknowledged the importance of including this information to provide  visibility over what disciplinary actions had been taken and that there was  a field available in the system for them to do so. At one installation, we  found that hard copies of the commander disciplinary actions were  maintained in a file in the Provost Marshall’s office, but this information  had not been entered into the law enforcement database.
Officials who oversee the DOD central domestic violence database and the  Central Registry data system, as well as Family Violence Policy Office  personnel, are aware of the problems with obtaining complete information  about domestic violence incidents and commander disciplinary actions.  However, officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness have not developed a plan for correcting the  deficiencies and ensuring that (1) the central database on domestic  violence in the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System and service law  enforcement systems have complete and accurate data and (2) all  commander disciplinary actions related to domestic violence incidents are  reported into these systems. Without complete data on reported incidents  of domestic violence and the steps taken by commanding officers to  address these incidents, Congress and DOD will lack the visibility and  information needed to understand the magnitude of the domestic violence  problem, identify domestic violence trends, and proactively address these  issues as they emerge.
section_title: Resources Provided and Progress Made, but Challenges Exist to Implementing the Remaining Task Force Recommendations
paragraphs: Over the past 3 years, DOD provided the Family Violence Policy Office  about $23 million, which it has used to make progress toward  implementing many of the task force’s recommendations. Nonetheless,  two challenges—shortages in critical staff and ineffective strategies for  communicating new domestic violence policies— threaten progress and  limit assurance of consistent application of its new policies.
subsections: section_title: Resources Provided for Office Overseeing Implementation of Recommendations
paragraphs: From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005, the Military Community  and Family Policy Office provided the Family Violence Policy Office with  approximately $23 million to implement the task force’s  recommendations. The largest portion, about $17 million, was for funding  a contract to provide victim advocate services and shelter services to  victims of domestic violence. Program analysts from the Military  Community and Family Policy Office told us that this contract provides  on-call services from within the local community, supporting  approximately 45 full-time and 40 part-time on-call advocates each month.  The Family Violence Policy Office was also provided approximately $3  million to train various DOD professionals in 2005. The cost of this training  included funds for a contractor to perform conference planning,  facilitation, and administrative management support services for these  events . Additionally, the Family Violence Policy Office was provided  $400,000 to develop a DOD-wide domestic violence public awareness  campaign. Appendix II provides a detailed breakdown of the expenditures  of the Family Violence Policy Office in implementing the task force  recommendations.
section_title: Progress Made in Implementing Domestic Violence Recommendations
paragraphs: Our analysis of DOD’s actions in implementing the task force  recommendations shows that DOD, as of March 2006, had implemented  almost two-thirds of the recommendations they planned to carry out.  While this shows progress, the recommendations vary in their relative  importance to improving DOD’s efforts to address domestic violence; and  thus, the implementation of some recommendations may not have as  significant an impact on DOD’s efforts as will the implementation of  others. Notwithstanding this point, of the 194 recommendations made by  the task force, we found DOD had completed actions on 94  recommendations, had actions pending on 60 recommendations, and had  not taken actions on 40 recommendations because the department either  disagreed with the recommendations, the recommendation was not  applicable to the department, or DOD felt that the recommended action  was already undertaken. We counted recommendations as completed if  we found evidence of action taken on the recommendation by DOD.  Actions taken included guidance, policy memoranda, training materials, or  other supporting documentation DOD issued to implement the task force  recommendation. Additionally, we found, for the most part,  documentation, focus group discussions, or interviews that showed the  service and installation levels were implementing or had efforts to begin  implementing DOD’s guidance on the completed actions.
Figure 1 shows our analysis of DOD’s implementation status of the 194  recommendations. The recommendations are grouped by the four primary  task force themes previously discussed in this report; recommendations  that did not fit directly into one of these themes were classified as “other.”  The “other” category contains items such as issues related to overseas  installations and program management.
As figure I shows, DOD has made the most progress in implementing  recommendations pertaining to community collaboration and victim  safety. DOD officials stated that their original focus was placed on  addressing victim safety issues, in particular, because it was critical to  ensure victims are protected from further abuse. A listing of all 194  recommendations and our analysis of DOD’s status in completing them are  included in appendix III.
The Family Violence Policy Office believed that they had completed more  recommendations than we identified in our analysis. Specifically, DOD  officials provided a department-level status matrix that indicated that they  had completed 121 of the 194 task force recommendations. Our numbers  differ because DOD identified 27 of the recommendations as complete  when we found DOD actually had stated that it did not agree with 26 of the  recommendations or took no action because the recommendation was  already being done or did not apply to them, and one recommendation was  still pending. For example, the task force recommended that DOD  centrally track military protective orders. DOD essentially disagreed with  the recommendation, stating that it had determined that it would not be  feasible to centrally record and track military protective orders because  there were too few such orders to justify creating another database.  Nevertheless, DOD categorized this recommendation as complete, while  we categorized this recommendation as one with which they disagreed.  We have grouped the 26 recommendations and the one pending action  with those that were identified as requiring no action and pending,  respectively in appendix III, which shows our analysis of DOD’s status for  the recommendations.
section_title: Limited Personnel in Office Overseeing Implementation
paragraphs: Despite its investment to date and reported progress, potential personnel  shortages in the DOD office implementing the recommendations could  hinder the department’s timely implementation of the remaining  recommendations. The personnel in this office have an essential role in  implementing the domestic violence recommendations, with responsibility  for, among other things, (1) drafting, revising, and coordinating DOD  policy in response to domestic violence recommendations; (2) drafting  training curricula and monitoring implementation of those curricula for  family advocacy program staff, health care officials, and law enforcement,  among others; and (3) drafting and coordinating public affairs strategies to  inform the military community about the revised DOD response to  domestic violence in the military.
Officials in the Military Community and Family Policy Office and those in  the Family Violence Policy Office told us that, originally in 2003, five  positions had been provided for the team implementing the task force  recommendations. This included one permanent position for the office  supervisor; one term position for a program analyst; and three positions  for senior-level officers on detail assignments from the services—one each  from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Position descriptions for military  personnel stress that these individuals were to serve as military experts in  implementing domestic violence programs. However, officials in the  Family Violence Policy Office told us the Navy officer retired in 2004, and  the Air Force officer was detailed to another OSD position in 2005. The  Navy did not “backfill” or replace its position, stating that the position was  needed within their service, and officials in the Family Violence Policy  Office stated that OSD had placed the Air Force position within another  area of DOD because OSD had a greater need for that position there. Thus,  since 2005, the Family Violence Policy Office has been reduced to three  positions.
During our review, officials in the Family Violence Policy Office stated that  the officer detailed from the Army is expected to retire in May 2006 and  the term position is expected to expire in July 2006. The office had  requested and obtained approval from the OSD Military Community and  Family Policy Office to fill the Army position and renew the term position,  stating that these positions were needed to complete implementation of  the remaining recommendations in a timely manner. The officials further  noted that the remaining recommendations they will be implementing are  more challenging than those already implemented and will require  personnel experienced in domestic violence issues. For example, they  explained that implementation of the recommendations aimed at  revamping the Case Review Committee and the Offender Intervention  require more research and analysis with experts within and outside of  DOD. Without adequate personnel, the officials estimate that it may take  more than 3 years to implement the remaining 60 task force  recommendations. However, as of March 2006, officials in the Family  Violence Policy Office told us that approval to fill the soon-to-be-vacant  positions had not been obtained from the final approval authority at  Washington Headquarters Services. Retaining key personnel who can  affect the ability of a program to function effectively is a good internal  control principle.
section_title: Implementation Policies Not Effectively Communicated
paragraphs: DOD also faces a challenge in effectively communicating the policies that  it has developed in response to the task force’s recommendations. DOD’s  method of communicating its policy changes has not been effective in  ensuring consistent practices or promoting widespread understanding of  the new policies among DOD and the services.
As of March 2006, DOD had issued 16 directive-type memoranda as interim  guidance to quickly communicate information about changes resulting  from implementation of the task force recommendations. (See app. IV for  a list of these memoranda). Almost all of the directive-type memoranda set  target dates for DOD to issue later guidance implementing the interim  policies. In most cases, final guidance such as a directive was expected to  be issued within 180 days after each memorandum was signed; however,  as of March 2006, the final guidance had not been issued and most of the  interim guidance is now more than 2 years old. Since the memoranda are  interim guidance, they have been communicated to the services and  throughout DOD through mail to the Service Secretaries and informally via  e-mails and special Web pages rather than being formally posted on the  official DOD directives Web site. Under internal control guidance,  organizations should consistently apply policies, and sound management  practices of leading organizations offer federal agencies a methodology for  establishing effective communications to promote consistency. However,  some DOD and service officials we met with stated that existing DOD  guidance was not always consistent with the directive-type memoranda  implementing the task force recommendations and that this inconsistency  has sometimes caused confusion at the installation level. In addition, we  found that information in the directive-type memoranda was not always  communicated to the installations in a timely manner and had resulted in  some of the officials not knowing about and, thus not following current  policies consistently.
We identified several inconsistencies in implementing the  recommendations as a result of DOD’s policy changes not being  communicated effectively, including the following:    DOD’s Family Advocacy Program Directive 6400.1 has not been updated to  reflect DOD’s interim guidance that implements the task force  recommendations, even though a number of the task force  recommendations had called for these changes to be made in this  directive. Family Advocacy officials told us they will not update their  directive until the Family Violence Policy Office issues a new instruction,  incorporating all of the interim guidance issued in the directive-type  memoranda. As a result, some DOD and service officials stated that  inconsistent guidance from these two offices has been a source of  confusion. A prime example is that while DOD’s new definition of  domestic violence was issued in 2004, staff at some of the installations we  visited said that they did not become aware of the definition until late 2005  or January 2006. Consequently, some victims of domestic violence who  were covered under the new definition, since 2004, may not have been  considered for services.
The task force also recommended that DOD establish a policy that written  copies of military protective orders be forwarded immediately to both law  enforcement and family advocacy officials. While DOD initially issued a  policy in March 2004 allowing distribution to law enforcement, it reversed  this policy in July 2004 due to concerns with the military protective order’s  use and dissemination. DOD’s August 8, 2005, status report on  recommendations further stated that the Privacy Act does not allow  distribution of the military protective orders to family advocacy and law  enforcement. This policy change, however, was not effectively  communicated, causing many inconsistent practices throughout the  installations we visited. For example, contrary to the July 2004 guidance,  DOD’s September 2005 domestic violence training materials provided to  commanders, judge advocates, and law enforcement personnel contained  information on leadership responsibilities, which stated that a copy of  each order is to be forwarded to law enforcement and family advocacy.  Further, policy information on DOD’s Web sites that allowed the orders to  be distributed to law enforcement was not changed until we notified DOD  officials of the inconsistency. Additionally, we found inconsistent  practices between the services. For example, the Army’s regulations  allowed distribution of the protective orders to family advocacy and law  enforcement officials. On the other hand, the Navy did not provide copies  to family advocacy. However, a Navy instruction, which predated the  DOD July 2004 guidance, allowed distribution to law enforcement. Navy  officials stated that their guidance will be revised to reflect DOD  requirements not to provide copies to law enforcement, upon release of  DOD’s Domestic Violence instruction. Finally, our discussions with OSD  and service lawyers revealed that they believe providing copies of  protective orders to family advocacy and law enforcement officials would  not be a violation of the Privacy Act.
The task force recommended that “DOD mandate the military services to  provide awareness education to military spouses regarding the transitional  compensation program.” DOD said that no action was required on this  recommendation “ince Congress established the transitional  compensation program; the services have routinely educated dependent  family members about it.” However, during our installation visits we found  inconsistent communication of this information. Discussion groups with  victim advocates and interviews with family advocacy officials revealed  that a few installations elected not to inform military members or spouses  about transitional compensation until a specific victim had a documented,  validated domestic violence case in which they would be eligible to  receive benefits. The victim advocates stated that this was done to prevent  potential abuse of the program. Some of the other installations were quite  liberal about providing information on the program. They said they felt  providing the information may encourage more people to come forward if  they knew help was available.
The task force also recommended that DOD develop guidance for  commanding officers on how to properly document domestic violence  issues in separation papers to help facilitate transitional compensation.  The directive-type memorandum issued by DOD to implement this  recommendation states that commanding officers should be trained on  transitional compensation, but it does not specifically require training  them on how to “properly document separation papers.” Some victim  advocates at installations we visited said that commanding officers do not  always use proper documentation to ensure that victims will receive  transitional compensation and that some victims have been denied these  funds because of lack of documentation. DOD officials in the Family  Violence Policy Office told us that guidance on waiver requirements, as  recommended by the task force, is included in a draft instruction from the  Military Personnel Policy Directorate on transitional compensation. We  found inconsistencies in victim advocates’ knowledge of the waiver  associated with transitional compensation requirements because this  information had not been effectively communicated to the advocates.
DOD officials in the Family Violence Policy Office, Family Advocacy  Program Office, as well as officials in the four services acknowledged that  communication could be a problem and may result in inconsistencies.
They also noted that formal instructions take years to draft and coordinate  and that mailing the interim guidance to service secretaries, e-mailing it to  key points of contacts, and placing the guidance on the Web pages were  the best avenues to follow. However, in our view, without an overall  communication strategy that provides a clear and consistent  understanding of policy among DOD and the services, there may continue  to be confusion and inconsistencies among DOD and the services on  implementing the task force’s recommendations.
section_title: Steps Taken to Ensure Confidentiality and Provide Domestic Violence Training, but Additional Efforts Needed
paragraphs: DOD is taking steps to address specific task force recommendations to  ensure confidentiality for victims of domestic violence and to train  commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains on how to  respond to such incidents. In its efforts to ensure confidentiality, DOD has  developed a restricted reporting policy that allows victims to report  incidents of domestic abuse, which includes domestic violence, to health  care and victim advocacy specialists without mandatory disclosure to  command or law enforcement officials. However, the policy was not  implemented until April 2006. Further, in its efforts to provide additional  domestic violence training, DOD issued guidance requiring training for  commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains, but  tracking and documenting these training efforts have not always occurred.
subsections: section_title: New Restricted Reporting Policy Not Yet in Force
paragraphs: The task force had a number of recommendations asking DOD to explore  options for creating a system of confidential services, privileged  communications, and exemptions to mandatory reporting. The goal of  these recommendations was to provide victims of domestic violence with  access to a credible avenue for receiving support, information, options,  and resources to address the violence in their lives. In response to the task  force’s recommendations, on January 22, 2006, DOD issued its Restricted  Reporting Policy for Incidents of Domestic Abuse to ensure that domestic  violence victims are protected, treated with dignity and respect, and  provided with support, advocacy, and care.
Under the new policy, victims can choose either unrestricted reporting or  restricted reporting. Unrestricted reporting uses current reporting  channels—e.g., chain of command, Family Advocacy Program, or law  enforcement—and is for victims of domestic abuse who want to pursue an  official investigation of an incident. Restricted reporting allows adult  victims of domestic abuse to disclose the abuse to health care providers,  victim advocates, or supervisors of victim advocates, and receive medical  treatment and victim advocacy services without notifying the alleged  offender’s commanding officer or law enforcement. The new policy allows  victims to receive relevant information, medical attention, and support  while having additional time to make a more informed decision about  reporting the incident. The task force found that victims were often  reluctant to seek services because they had fears about the potential  adverse impact the reported incident may have on the servicemember’s  career and the family’s financial well-being, as well as concerns about  their personal safety.
However, the restricted reporting policy did not take effect until April 22,  2006, in order for the services to have time to develop consistent policies  and an implementation strategy. Consequently, at the time of our review, it  was too soon to assess what effects this policy will have on reported cases  of domestic violence. The new policy, nonetheless, was a topic of great  concern during our discussions at the 15 installations included in our  study. Installation commanders, commanding officers, legal officers,  provost marshals or heads of security forces, chaplains, family advocacy  program managers, victim advocates, and health care providers all shared  their views about the advantages and disadvantages of the restricted  reporting policy. Their views varied considerably and ranged from  unequivocal support for the policy, to uncertainty because of licensing and  ethical concerns, to outright objection.
Those who expressed support for the policy said they did so because they  felt the policy promoted victim confidentiality, safety, and support. Some  unit commanders, for example, stated that the policy would allow the  victims to receive medical care and time to decide if they wanted to press  charges. In addition, chaplains at some installations voiced approval for  the policy because it opened another avenue for victims to receive  assistance without getting others involved.
Conversely, officials who objected to the restricted reporting policy said  they did so because they believed the policy would not encourage victims  to “officially” report the incident, and thus would send the wrong message  to aggressors, as well as diminish the commanding officers’ ability to hold  offenders accountable. Specifically, legal officers serving as prosecutors  and commanding officers at several installations told us that they objected  to the policy because, while permitting victims to receive some types of  assistance was positive, it allowed aggressors to remain free from  disciplinary actions and to be able to continue the pattern of domestic  violence. The legal officers also expressed concern about the evidence  that would not be captured at the crime scene when domestic violence  occurs because the incident was not reported immediately.
One area of concern raised during our installation visits dealt with specific  licensing issues and ethical dilemmas. For example, health care providers  expressed concerns that the new restricted reporting policy may conflict  with state licensing requirements mandating them to report incidents of  domestic violence to civilian authorities. They also expressed reservations  about the policy in cases where they had to provide medical aid to a  severely injured individual who appeared to be untruthful about the  source of the injury. While this policy is similar to DOD’s Sexual Assault  Prevention and Response Program policy, many officials in our discussion  groups said that similar reporting may not be appropriate. According to  these individuals, the perpetrator of sexual assault does not usually reside  with the victim; therefore unreported incidents are less likely to place a  victim in a situation for further abuse, unlike domestic violence where a  victim would return home to the alleged abuser. Some of the health care  providers expressed concerns that they might be placed in a position in  which they had to send a battered victim back into a dangerous situation.
During the time of our installation visits—i.e., from October 2005 through  February 2006—the restricted reporting policy was issued and addresses  some of the concerns and issues from our discussion groups. For example,  the policy states that confidentiality will be suspended for specific  reasons, such as to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the  health or safety of the victim or another person or when required by state  statute. While some of the issues are addressed in the policy, the level of  support this policy will provide victims of domestic violence, the potential  impact restricted reporting will have on law enforcement investigations, as  well as the impact the policy will have on a commander’s ability to hold  perpetrators accountable, will be determined during implementation.
section_title: Additional Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Training Is Received
paragraphs: Beyond confidentiality, the task force made over 10 recommendations that  focused on training for commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel,  and chaplains to respond to domestic violence issues. To respond to the  task force recommendations to train commanding officers and senior  enlisted personnel, DOD issued guidance directing the services to require  these officials to receive such training. Specifically, the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued a directive-type  memorandum titled “Domestic Abuse Response and Intervention  Training for Commanding Officers and Senior Enlisted Personnel” in  February 2004. This memorandum required training on specified topics,  such as dynamics of domestic violence, common misconceptions of victim  safety, and responses to alleged domestic abuse. The military services are  addressing this requirement by providing several educational options,  including Web-based training, training at the professional military  education schools, and training at installations led by instructors.
In addressing the task force recommendation to train chaplains, the Office  of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued a  directive-type memorandum titled “Domestic Abuse Training for  Chaplains” on January 29, 2004, which required training for chaplains on  specified topics. One of the primary topics that chaplains received training  on was privileged communication, because of the special role chaplains  play in providing assistance to victims of domestic violence. Chaplains we  spoke with said they received this training at their basic officer’s course,  periodically through continuing professional military education, and at  installations.
While training on domestic violence issues is being provided to  commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains, DOD does  not have complete data on which chaplains have received training because  the Military Community and Family Policy Office did not require tracking  or documenting training provided to chaplains. Although internal control  guidance states that management should document and track agency  initiatives to ascertain if they are achieved and provide follow-up actions,  the Family Violence Policy Office and Family Advocacy Office did not  develop training metrics. Without accurate training data and  documentation, DOD lacks visibility over whether chaplains have been  adequately trained and are being provided with resources that will assist  them in handling domestic violence issues.
Furthermore, during our discussion groups with chaplains, which included  a mix of experienced and junior officers, we found that some chaplains did  not fully understand their responsibilities concerning privileged  communication. For example, the Army regulation states that such  privileged communication is not to be disclosed to third persons other  than those to whom disclosure furthers the purpose of the  communication, or to those reasonably necessary for the transmission of  the communication. The regulation also states that the chaplain and  chaplain assistant will not divulge privileged communication without the  written consent of the person(s) authorized to claim the privilege. Some  Army and Navy chaplains we interviewed stated that they may notify the  chain of command about a privileged communication. For example, one  chaplain mentioned that there was no Army requirement that chaplains  report information discussed during a privileged communication and  others stated that the current Army regulation for chaplains speaks to this.  The chaplain further stated that some Army chaplains had decided for  themselves what they would and would not report and would explain this  to people that they counseled. A Navy chaplain also stated that under  certain conditions he would notify the commanding officer if an individual  admitted being involved in domestic violence, even if the person made the  statement as a matter of religious conscience. Other chaplains in our  discussion groups told us that a breach of privileged communication could  ruin the reputation of chaplains and lead to no one seeking their help.
The task force, in its 2002 report, also had similar findings and  recommended that DOD issue guidance clarifying clergy confidentiality.  An official at the Chaplain Board told us that, since it takes so long to  issue DOD-wide guidance, DOD is not likely to issue additional guidance  addressing confidentiality and privileged communication because the  services have issued guidance, which is consistent with the Military Rules  of Evidence. However, when we discussed privileged communication  with chaplains, many referred to service guidance, as well as the Military  Rules of Evidence; but some were unclear as to what their responsibilities  were. Additional guidance and emphasis during chaplain training could  facilitate a consistent understanding by chaplains of their responsibilities  regarding confidentiality. Without taking action, DOD may be unable to  ensure that all chaplains are prepared to handle private information  provided by victims or offenders, which could deter both from seeking  assistance.
section_title: DOD Has Not Established an Oversight Framework to Monitor Compliance and Evaluate Implementation of Recommendations
paragraphs: DOD has not established an oversight framework to monitor compliance  with and evaluate implementation of the task force recommendations on  domestic violence. The task force’s initial 2001 report recommended that  DOD strategically use regional oversight and monitoring visits at both the  DOD and service levels to improve the department’s oversight of its efforts  to address domestic violence. DOD’s draft domestic abuse instruction  requires the Military Community and Family Policy Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to monitor compliance  with the instruction and periodically evaluate domestic violence efforts.  The draft instruction, however, does not communicate how this should be  done and the Military Community and Family Policy Office has not  established a formal process for doing this.
Officials in the Family Violence Policy Office stated that action on the task  force recommendation for oversight is pending and told us they were  exploring options for addressing it, such as having the DOD Inspector  General perform reviews every 2 or 3 years. These officials and those from  the Family Advocacy Program told us that the services’ headquarters  monitor and evaluate their own installation family advocacy program  offices through their accreditation processes. However, they  acknowledged that the service accreditation reports are not sent to DOD  and that the department has limited visibility into service domestic  violence efforts. The Military Community and Family Policy Office is  considering asking officials from the Family Advocacy Program Office and  the Family Violence Policy Office to go on some of the services’  accreditation visits to provide oversight of the implementation efforts. The  task force mentioned, however, that to be effective, program evaluation  must be ongoing and fully integrated.
Although the DOD Family Advocacy Office has established output metrics  that somewhat relate to certain recommendations, DOD has not  established results-oriented performance measures that could enable it to  evaluate compliance with the recommendations. One example of an  established DOD metric is the number of briefings to new unit  commanders and senior enlisted personnel on domestic abuse and child  abuse. A DOD Family Advocacy Program official stated that this metric is  intended to be an output measure related to the Government Performance  and Results Act and is only indirectly related to a recommendation in the  task force reports. This metric is not a results-oriented performance  measure that would capture the results or evaluate the effectiveness of the  briefings in increasing these officers’ awareness of domestic violence  issues. Without an overall management framework for monitoring and  reporting on implementation, DOD and Congress will continue to have  limited visibility and oversight to evaluate the changes associated with the  recommendations and to make improvements. As a result, DOD may be  unable to ensure that all of the accepted task force recommendations are  implemented to produce the desired improvements in assisting domestic  violence victims and holding offenders accountable.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Understanding the size and nature of domestic violence is essential to  DOD’s ability to improve its response to this important issue. Yet the  department currently lacks the information needed to determine reported  domestic violence incidents. To date, DOD does not have a database  containing complete information on reported incidents and what actions  are being taken to discipline those who commit these violent acts. In  addition, the lack of sufficient personnel threatens the timely  implementation of the pending task force recommendations. Further, the  absence of clear and effective communication of the policy changes made  in response to the task force recommendations has hindered  servicemembers’ awareness of their responsibilities in providing  assistance to victims and holding offenders accountable. The failure to  track the training of the chaplains who respond to domestic violence  incidents impairs DOD’s visibility over whether chaplains are being  provided with the tools to effectively deal with domestic violence and  understand their obligations concerning privileged communications.  Finally, the absence of an oversight framework limits DOD’s ability to  assess its efforts to achieve the desired results in improving the prevention  of and response to domestic violence. Without further management action  to address all of these deficiencies, DOD may be unable to effectively  identify and respond to concerns about domestic violence among  servicemembers.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance implementation of the task force recommendations and  improve the effectiveness of domestic violence efforts, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness to take the following seven actions:    Develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, a comprehensive  management plan to address deficiencies in the data captured in DOD’s  domestic violence database that focuses on ensuring that accurate and  complete data exist and that all instances in the Defense Incident-Based  Reporting System and Family Advocacy Program Central Registry are  matched and reported annually, as required in DOD’s Manual 7730.47-M;  take appropriate steps, in conjunction with the service secretaries, to  ensure all commander actions related to domestic violence incidents are  entered in law enforcement systems;    develop a plan to ensure adequate personnel are available to implement  pending task force recommendations;    establish a communication strategy for effectively informing DOD and  service officials about new guidance implementing the task force  recommendations, to include  issuing a revised DOD family advocacy program directive that is  consistent with interim guidance for implementing the task force  recommendations; and    clearly articulating its policy regarding the distribution of military  protective orders using a method that will ensure consistent  application by all services and DOD;    develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, procedures and  metrics to ensure that accurate, consistent, and timely domestic violence  training data are collected for chaplains;    develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, chaplain guidance  and training materials that highlight and clarify chaplain responsibilities  concerning privileged communication; and    develop and implement, in conjunction with the services, a DOD-wide  oversight framework that includes a results-oriented evaluation plan for  the implemented recommendations, and a process for ongoing monitoring  of and reporting on implementation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of our report (reprinted in app. V), DOD  expressed concern that GAO had attempted to define, differentiate, and  prioritize what it considered important task force recommendations and  had focused on perceived deficiencies rather than progress. The  department further noted that GAO’s review had assumed that DOD  should implement all recommendations of the task force exactly as written  and stated that after each report the department clearly indicated the  recommendations it agreed with, did not agree with, and would study.  DOD also stated that it never suggested that it could not or would not  modify any of the task force recommendations. DOD noted that GAO had  sought to penalize the department for deviating from the narrowest  reading of individual recommendations. We disagree. To the contrary, our  report is very clear on the progress the department has made in  implementing the recommendations. Moreover, the scope and  methodology for our study (explained in app. I) clearly details the  approach that we used to assess this progress. Further, in mentioning that  the recommendations vary in their relative importance to improving  DOD’s efforts to address domestic violence issues, we simply noted that  the implementation of some recommendations may not have as significant  an impact on DOD’s efforts as will the implementation of others.  Additionally, we did not assume that DOD could not modify task force  recommendations. As the report states, when counting recommendations  as being completed by DOD, we included instances where actions taken to  implement the recommendations were different from language that the  task force suggested. Specifically, we stated that completed actions were  grouped into two categories: (1) actions that DOD took that directly  implemented the task force recommendations and (2) completed actions  taken that DOD believed met the intent of the recommendation. We also  made it clear in our report that there were 40 recommendations that DOD  did not take action on because they did not agree with the  recommendation, the recommendation was not applicable to DOD, or the  recommended action was already being done. In addition, we noted in the  report that there were 60 recommendations where DOD had actions  pending.
Regarding our recommendations, DOD concurred that the department  would take steps to ensure commander actions related to domestic  violence are entered into law enforcement databases, develop a plan to  ensure adequate personnel are available to implement pending task force  recommendations, and establish an oversight framework to monitor  progress and implementation of the task force recommendations. DOD  stated that it had issued policy requiring documentation of commander  actions, conducted training to communicate this policy, and would  continue to aggressively communicate this policy to the services. DOD  also indicated that it was committed to providing resources to implement  the task force recommendations and had requested extensions for current  personnel to do so. We believe this approach could satisfy the intent of our  recommendation if DOD has a defined plan to provide personnel in the  event the requested personnel extensions are not granted. DOD said it is  developing an initial oversight process to monitor progress and  implementation and it anticipates completion will be in fiscal year 2007 or  2008. As DOD develops this oversight process, we reiterate the need for it  to include results-oriented performance measures that can enable it to  evaluate compliance with the recommendations.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation calling for the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a  comprehensive management plan to address data deficiencies in DOD’s  domestic violence database. DOD stated that this recommendation is more  appropriately directed to the Military Departments, noting that it requires  the services to submit data, but that the systems used by the services are  insufficient and unfunded. We agree. While we believe the  recommendation is appropriately directed to the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness, who has oversight and stewardship  for the department’s centralized domestic violence database, we have  expanded our recommendation to include the services.
DOD partially nonconcurred with our recommendation to establish a  communication strategy for informing DOD and service officials about  new guidance, to include issuing a revised family advocacy program  directive and reconsidering the task force recommendation on providing  military protective orders to law enforcement and family advocacy  officials and communicating associated policies to the services.  Specifically, DOD agreed with the need to issue a revised Family Advocacy  Program Directive. However, the department disagreed with the need to  reconsider the task force’s recommendation to provide military protective  orders. DOD stated that it has considered the issue of providing the  protective orders to law enforcement and family advocacy officials and  continued to believe there are privacy concerns. Given its position, we are  no longer recommending that the department reconsider the task force’s  recommendation in that regard. However, because of inconsistent  practices found among the services regarding whether distribution of  these orders was allowed to law enforcement and family advocacy  personnel, we continue to believe that the department needs to clarify and  more effectively communicate its policy on this issue and, therefore, we  are revising our recommendation to emphasize this point.
DOD partially nonconcurred with our recommendation to develop, in  concert with the Family Advocacy Director and four service family  advocacy program managers, guidance and training materials clarifying  chaplain responsibilities regarding privileged communications. DOD  stated that the family advocacy program managers were not the  proponents of chaplains’ privileged communications. We agree and have  modified our recommendation to include the services, as well as the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. DOD also stated  that each military department has policy addressing clergy confidentiality  and DOD does not contemplate developing such a policy. DOD further  stated that it has issued policy requiring this training and noted that DOD  and the services will continue to address this issue at relevant training  events. Because we, like the task force, found some chaplains did not fully  understand their responsibilities concerning privileged communications,  we continue to believe that DOD needs to issue a departmentwide policy  on privileged communications, and that DOD and the services need to  develop training materials that highlight and clarify chaplain  responsibilities for these communications.
DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation to develop, in concert with  the Family Advocacy Director, four service family advocacy program  managers, and the chaplaincy board, procedures and metrics to ensure  that accurate, consistent, and timely domestic violence training data are  collected for chaplains. DOD stated that the family advocacy program  managers were not the proponents of chaplain training and that this  recommendation is more appropriately directed to the Military  Departments. We agree. While we believe the recommendation is  appropriately directed to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness, who has oversight over domestic abuse matters, we have  modified our recommendation to include the services. In addition, DOD  further stated that it is inappropriate for the department to engage in  routine operator-level activity such as tracking training statistics.  However, it is important to note that the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness has established metrics for tracking domestic  abuse training for commanding officers and senior enlisted personnel and,  in light of this fact, we continue to believe that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness should also maintain procedures and  metrics on domestic abuse training for chaplains, who play a critical role  in assisting domestic violence victims.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. We will also  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please  contact me at 202-512-6304. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In conducting our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) progress  in implementing recommendations from the Defense Task Force on  Domestic Violence, we contacted officials at the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Family Violence Policy  Office and Family Advocacy Program, Defense Manpower Data Center;  Army’s Military Community and Family Support Center; Commander of  Naval Installations; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for  Force Management and Personnel; and Marine Corps Family Advocacy  Program Office. We made 15 site visits to installations in the United States,  Germany, Japan, and South Korea to collect documentation to assess the  status of DOD’s efforts to implement the Defense Task Force on Domestic  Violence’s recommendations. We selected locations based on the number  of incidents of spouse abuse reported to the Family Advocacy Program  office from 2000 through 2004, suggestions from DOD and service  officials, and location—i.e., at least two installations per service  domestically and at least one per service overseas. At each of these  locations, we interviewed key personnel in positions such as installation  commanders, provost marshals, commanders, legal officers, victim  advocates, family advocacy managers, health care officials, chaplains,  military police, and senior enlisted personnel because they were identified  by the task force as having specific responsibilities pertaining to victim  safety or offender accountability. Table 1 lists all of the installations we  visited.
To determine DOD’s ability to report on domestic violence in the military  and the disciplinary actions taken by commanders to address these  incidents, we reviewed and analyzed laws, directives, and other DOD and  service policies and guidance for reporting domestic violence incidents  including DOD’s Manual for Defense Incident-Based Reporting System  7730.47-M and DOD’s Manual for Child Maltreatment and Domestic  Abuse Incident Reporting System 6400.1-M-1. We also reviewed and  analyzed DOD domestic violence data obtained from the Defense Incident- Based Reporting System, Family Advocacy Program Central Registry, and  reports to Congress on DOD domestic violence. To assess the reliability of  the criminal and clinical data systems, we (1) reviewed existing  information about the data and systems that produced them and (2)  interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We also  reviewed information on the collection methods used to gather, record,  and report the data mentioned above and verified the reliability of the data  in the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System and Family Advocacy  Program Central Registry. We concluded that the data from both data  systems were not complete enough to provide an accurate number of  domestic violence incidents or commander actions.
To determine the extent to which DOD has implemented the  recommendations of the task force as well as the amount of resources  provided to the office responsible for implementing the recommendations,  we reviewed Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence reports and spoke  with members of the defense task force that made the recommendations  to DOD. In addition, we prepared a matrix summarizing the  recommendations; obtained DOD’s status in implementing the  recommendations, along with supporting documentation and evidence to  corroborate implementation; and we interviewed or conducted focus  groups with officials at the selected installations mentioned above to  understand the guidance and training received by the officials and assess  how they are implementing the recommendations. We also obtained from  the installations supporting documentation for many of the implemented  recommendations, including copies of memoranda of agreements with  civilian law enforcement agencies, training materials, and guidance on  military and civilian protection orders. Furthermore, we interviewed  officials at the DOD Family Violence Policy Office, the office responsible  for implementing the recommendations, and examined budget information  to ascertain the funding and resources provided to this office.
To facilitate the data-gathering process for all four questions, we  developed and pretested our questions and data collection instruments at  Fort Mead and Andrews Air Force Base, both located in Maryland. We  identified the content of the instruments through a review of the task force  report recommendations, service guidance, and other policy manuals. We  ultimately used three types of data collection instruments at the 15  installations visited. Specifically:    Focus group protocols were used to solicit information from two  homogeneous groups: military police and senior enlisted personnel. The  focus group protocol was used to increase the likelihood that the  questions were asked and procedures were conducted in a standardized  manner, regardless of which GAO analyst conducted the focus groups  during the 15 site visits. For each focus group we required a minimum of 6- 10 participants. Participants were assured of anonymity and therefore  encouraged to openly share their opinions.
Advanced questions were sent to six types of officials at the installations  we visited: unit commanders, legal officials, Family Advocacy Program  managers, victim advocates, chaplains, and health care officials. The  questionnaires were sent ahead of our visit and these groups were asked  to fill out the questionnaires and return them to us before the interview.
The purpose of the questionnaires was to obtain specific information such  as training and budget information.
Separate discussion group interview protocols were created for eight  types of officials: installation commanders, provost marshals, unit  commanders, legal officials, Family Advocacy Program managers, victim  advocates, chaplains, and health care officials. When possible, we also  interviewed civilian law enforcement officials around the military  installation. While some of the questions were the same or very similar for  some issues, the content of the discussion group interview protocols was  tailored to the type of official interviewed.
To determine the efforts DOD has taken to ensure the confidentiality of  victims and the education and accountability of commanding officers and  chaplains, we used the methodology for the second question as well as  reviewed and analyzed DOD’s recently issued confidentiality policy, which  provides limited confidentiality for victims. We also conducted discussion  groups with commanding officers and chaplains at the installations visited  to ascertain the training these officials have received and to address the  accountability of these individuals. We reviewed and analyzed domestic  violence training materials obtained from installation officials and officials  at the service training schools to determine (1) the efforts DOD takes to  educate commanding officers and chaplains, (2) whether such training is  standardized, and (3) whether the training covers topics recommended by  the task force on domestic violence. Additionally, we reviewed  accreditation reports for installation Family Advocacy Program programs,  where available, and other materials documenting the effectiveness of  training programs, such as reports to DOD on training metrics.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed an overall  framework to guide and evaluate implementation, we interviewed officials  in the DOD Family Violence Policy Office, which is the office responsible  for implementing the defense task force recommendations. We also  reviewed and analyzed DOD regulations and guidance and reports  submitted to the OSD Family Advocacy Program office to ascertain if DOD  has an overall framework to guide and evaluate implementation of the  recommendations. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993  and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provided  model criteria for determining the adequacy of the oversight framework.
We conducted our review from July 2005 through March 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Resources Provided to Implement Task Force Recommendations
paragraphs: The Military Community and Family Policy Office has managed and  provided the Family Violence Policy Office with approximately $23 million  to implement task force recommendations since mid-2003. Table II shows  funding and projects for fiscal years 2003 through 2005.
section_title: Appendix III: 194 Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence Recommendations
paragraphs: Tables 3 through 7 contain the task force recommendations broken out by  descriptive categories: Community Collaboration, Education and Training,  Offender Accountability, Victim Safety, and Other. Each table groups the  recommendations, by our analysis of the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  actions taken. We split the Completed Actions group into two sections (1)  actions that DOD took that directly implemented the task force  recommendations and (2) completed actions taken that they believe meet  the intent of the recommendation. The No Action Required group consists  of recommendations DOD classified as complete, but actually disagreed  with and took no action; recommendations DOD shows as having no  action required because the recommendation was not applicable to DOD;  or those recommendations where DOD indicated that the recommended  actions were already being done. The Pending Actions group consists of  those recommendations in which DOD, at the time of our review, was still  working on or weighing its response. Not all tables contain  recommendations that fit under each group identified above.
section_title: Appendix IV: DOD’s Directive-Type Memoranda and Policy Implementing the Task Force Recommendations
paragraphs: As of March 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued 16  directive-type memoranda to implement the task force’s  recommendations. Table 8 lists the memoranda and dates of issuance.  DOD also issued 3 other memoranda that were not identified as directive- type memoranda but were related to the task force recommendations.  These included the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum titled  “Domestic Violence” dated November 19, 2001; the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Force Management Policy memoranda titled “Enlistment  Waivers for Domestic Violence-Related Convictions” dated January 22,  2002; and the memorandum titled “Domestic Violence Prosecution  Training” dated March 18, 2002.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Laura L. Durland, Assistant  Director; James R. Bancroft; Renee S. Brown; Robert B. Brown; Carissa D.  Bryant; Marion A. Gatling; Nicole Harms; Amanda Miller; J. P. Newton;  Jeanett H. Reid; and Sonja S. Ware made key contributions to this report.