Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa
Published: 2011-03-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Somali pirates have attacked 640 ships and taken more than 3,150 hostages since 2007. A few U.S.-flagged vessels have been affected--most recently the SV Quest, a private yacht on which four Americans were killed in February 2011. The growing frequency and severity of attacks renew the urgency to address the piracy threat. As Somalia is unable to repress piracy, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy in collaboration with international and industry partners. In September 2010, GAO issued a report evaluating the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and the challenges they face, and (2) have collaborated with partners. This testimony is based on the September 2010 report and its objectives, and work GAO conducted in March 2011 to update report findings.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As GAO reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made progress in implementing its plan for countering piracy, in collaboration with industry and international partners. However, piracy is an escalating problem, and the U.S. government has not updated its plan as GAO recommended. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded a prosecution arrangement with the Seychelles. Many stakeholders credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels, but since 2007 the location of attacks has spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast and much harder to patrol Indian Ocean. Also, from 2007 to 2010 the total number of reported hijackings increased sevenfold, and, after dropping in 2008 and 2009, the pirates' success rate rebounded from 22 percent in 2009 to almost 30 percent in 2010. In addition, the number of hostages captured and the amount of ransom paid increased sharply, and pirate attacks have grown more violent. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa as effectively as possible, but as pirate operations have evolved, changes to the plan have not kept pace. The United States has not systematically tracked the costs of its counterpiracy efforts and is unable to determine whether counterpiracy investments are achieving the desired results. According to a statement by an NSS official, the United States is reviewing U.S. piracy policy to focus future U.S. efforts. These recent steps are encouraging because the growing frequency and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa provides a renewed sense of urgency for taking action. GAO's September 2010 report found that U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but they could take additional steps to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has, among other things, collaborated with international partners to support prosecution of piracy suspects and worked with industry partners to educate ship owners on how to protect their vessels from pirate attack. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple U.S. agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable. For instance, the departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect or examine information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. In September 2010, GAO recommended that the NSC identify roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks, and develop guidance to ensure agency efforts work together efficiently and effectively. In March 2011, an NSS official stated that an interagency policy review will examine roles and responsibilities and implementation actions to focus U.S. efforts for the next several years. It is too early to assess this effort's effectiveness in bolstering interagency collaboration in U.S. counterpiracy efforts.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO previously recommended that the NSC (1) update its Action Plan; (2) assess the costs and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and (3) clarify agency roles and responsibilities. A National Security Staff (NSS) official provided a statement that an interagency group is reviewing U.S. piracy policy, costs, metrics, roles, and responsibilities. Agencies also commented to clarify information in this statement.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. response to piracy off the  coast of Somalia. The killing of four Americans in February 2011 by Somali  pirates has renewed a sense of urgency to address the growing frequency  and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa. Piracy threatens ships and  mariners transiting one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes near key  energy corridors and the route through the Suez Canal. Since 2007, 640  ships have reported pirate attacks in this area, and Somali pirates have  taken more than 3,150 hostages and, according to the Department of  Defense (DOD), received over $180 million in ransom payments. While few  U.S.-flagged vessels have been attacked—notably the MV Maersk Alabama  in April 2009, and the SV Quest in February 2011—pirates have attacked or  attempted attacks on chemical and oil tankers, freighters, cruise ships,  fishing vessels, and even warships. In addition to jeopardizing the lives and  welfare of the citizens of many nations, piracy contributes to regional  instability and creates challenges for shipping and freedom of navigation.  This illicit but profitable activity has raised concerns that piracy ransom  proceeds may undermine regional security and contribute to other threats,  including terrorism. See figure 2 in appendix I for a map depicting the vast  area in which incidents of Somali piracy are occurring.
Since 2008, the international community has taken steps to respond to the  growing piracy problem, including patrols by the United States, the North  Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and others in waters  near Somalia; the establishment of a multinational naval task force with a  specific mandate to conduct counterpiracy operations; and several United  Nations Security Council resolutions such as the one that led to the  formation of a multilateral Contact Group to coordinate international  counterpiracy efforts. Recognizing that vibrant maritime commerce  underpins global economic security and is a vital national security issue,  the United States has also developed policies and plans to collaborate with  its international partners and to mobilize an interagency U.S. response. In  December 2008, the National Security Council (NSC) published the  Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan.  The Action Plan seeks to involve all nations, international organizations,  industry, and other entities with an interest in maritime security in taking  steps to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa. The interagency initiatives of  the Action Plan are to be coordinated and undertaken by DOD, as well as  the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation,  and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,  subject to the availability of resources. The international community,  shipping industry, and international military forces also have been  instrumental in efforts to prevent and disrupt acts of piracy off the Horn of  Africa and facilitate prosecutions of suspected pirates. Our recent report  on this subject, published in September 2010, includes more information  on the U.S. agencies and many of the key international and industry  partners involved in the response to piracy off the Horn of Africa with  whom the United States collaborates and coordinates.
My statement today is based largely on our September 2010 report, in  addition to more recent work we conducted in March 2011 to update the  findings in that report. Today, as with our report, I would like to focus on  two issues: first, the extent to which U.S. agencies have implemented the  Action Plan and challenges they face in doing so, and second, the extent  to which U.S. agencies have collaborated among partners in counterpiracy  efforts. For our September 2010 report, we examined counterpiracy plans,  activities, collaborative practices, and data; met with officials at six U.S.  agencies and the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain; and interviewed  industry and international partners. Details on the scope and methodology  used for that review can be found in appendix I of the report. Selected  updates for my statement today include a review of data on the nature and  extent of pirate attacks, hostages taken, and ransom payments made since  our published report. We assessed the reliability of the attack and hostage  data by reviewing the data and interviewing knowledgeable officials as  well as relevant subject matter experts; though the sources and methods  used to develop the ransom data are classified, we compared it to  information provided by other sources. We found these data to be  sufficiently reliable for providing a context for piracy off the Horn of  Africa. We also contacted officials from Coast Guard, DOD, Justice, State,  Transportation, and the Treasury on actions taken since our last report.  We also provided a copy of this testimony to the NSS for comment. We  conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
Since the publication of our report, the piracy situation off the coast of  Somalia has continued to deteriorate. According to a variety of sources,  pirates are expanding their area of operations—north toward the straits of  Hormuz, east toward the coast of India, and south to the coasts of  Mozambique and Madagascar—principally through the increasing use of  larger vessels known as “mother ships.” In addition, the total number of  reported pirate attacks has increased from 30 in 2007 to 219 in 2010. In  addition, pirates are taking an increasing number of hostages and  escalating the level of violence and abuse toward those captives. Officials  also have cited reports of pirates using seafarers on the hijacked mother  ships as “human shields” to fend off attacks from naval vessels. Pirates  also are holding out for higher ransoms, which is leading to longer  negotiations and, hence, longer periods of captivity for those taken  hostage. Finally, officials report that pirates continue to show evidence of  organization, with well-defined networks and hierarchies of financiers,  senior leaders, and seagoing pirate crews. Appendix I provides maps and  graphics demonstrating several of these trends.
subsections: section_title: The United States Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Counterpiracy Plan but Needs to Evaluate Its Efforts and Update Its Plan
paragraphs: As we reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made  progress implementing its Action Plan for countering piracy, in  collaboration with international and industry partners. However, the effort  faces several implementation challenges, and piracy remains a persistent  problem. At the time of our September 2010 review, U.S. agencies had not  evaluated the costs or effectiveness of their counterpiracy efforts or  updated the Action Plan. In commenting on our testimony statement, the  NSS told us that an ongoing interagency review is examining the U.S.  piracy policy needed to guide U.S. efforts. We continue to believe that  actions are needed to update the Action Plan to respond to the evolving  pirate threat, and enhance and sustain interagency collaboration in U.S.  efforts, but currently it is too early to assess the interagency effort.
In collaboration with their international and industry partners, U.S.  agencies have taken steps across the three lines of action established in  the Action Plan to: (1) prevent attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the  maritime domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in ways consistent with  international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag  states, and (3) ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held  accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected  pirates.  The Action Plan establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as  a collaborative one, seeking to involve all countries and shipping-industry  partners with an interest in maritime security. The NSC also establishes  some limits to the scope of the plan by focusing on immediate measures to  reduce the incidents of Somali piracy, rather than longer-term stabilization  of Somalia that the Action Plan asserts is needed to fully repress piracy.
The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection  measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition  patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded a prosecution  arrangement with the Seychelles. However, the U.S. government has  made less progress on tasks related to seizing and destroying pirate  vessels and equipment and delivering suspected pirates for prosecution,  and disrupting pirate revenue and bases ashore. Figure 1 summarizes the  results of our assessment. For more detailed information about U.S.  agencies’ efforts to implement the Action Plan and our analysis of their  progress, see appendix II of our September 2010 report.
Many stakeholders anecdotally credit international, industry, and U.S.  government efforts with preventing and disrupting piracy off the Horn of  Africa, but despite these efforts from 2007 through 2010 pirates greatly  expanded their area of operations, the number of pirate attacks increased,  the number of hostages captured rose substantially, and the size of ransom  payments grew. Appendix I includes graphics illustrating the following  developments:    Area of Operations. Pirates have expanded their area of  operations—north toward the straits of Hormuz, east toward the coast  of India, and south to the coasts of Mozambique and Madagascar—and  now threaten an area of approximately 2 million square miles, an area  much larger and harder to patrol than the Gulf of Aden alone. (See  figure 3 in appendix I.) Pirates are expanding their reach principally  through the increasing use of vessels known as “mother ships.” Mother  ships are often acquired or commandeered by acts of piracy and are  used to store fuel and supplies and to tow skiffs. These mother ships  enable pirates to launch attacks farther off shore and to operate in  rougher seas. A year after the NSC issued its Action Plan, reported  pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden dropped from approximately 83  percent of the 111 reported pirate attacks in the region to 53 percent as  Somali pirates expanded their area of operations to the broader Indian  Ocean. We reported in September 2010 that countering piracy in the  Indian Ocean is more challenging due to the great expanse of water,  and it requires a different approach than that used in the Gulf of Aden.  One U.S. Navy analysis estimated that 1,000 ships equipped with  helicopters would be required to provide the same level of coverage in  the Indian Ocean that is currently provided in the Gulf of Aden—an  approach that is clearly infeasible.
Pirate Attacks. The total number of reported pirate attacks increased  from 30 in 2007 to 219 in 2010. (See figure 4 in appendix I.) Since 2007,  there have been at least eight reported attempted attacks on U.S.- flagged vessels, two of which involved pirates successfully boarding or  hijacking vessels—the attacks on the MV Maersk Alabama and SV  Quest. Although we reported in September 2010 that total attacks in  the first half of 2010 had declined as compared with the same period in  2009, since the issuance of our report, total attacks in 2010 reached  levels similar to 2009. Additionally, while we previously reported the  rate of successful attacks had dropped from 40 percent in 2007 to 22  percent in 2009, the rate had rebounded to almost 30 percent at the  end of 2010. Pirates have maintained the same success rate of attacks  for January and February 2011.
Hostages Captured. Somali pirates captured more than six times the  number of hostages in 2010 than in 2007. (See figure 5 in appendix I.)  Such data show that piracy remains a persistent problem. Moreover, in  a February 2011 meeting of agency and international partners, officials  stated that, since the time of our report, the level of violence has  increased, the average length of time hostages spend in captivity has  grown, and more incidents of hostage abuse have been reported.  Officials have also cited reports of pirates using seafarers on the  hijacked mother ships as “human shields” to fend off attacks from  naval vessels.
Ransom Payments. From 2007 to 2010 the estimated amount of total  ransom payments paid to pirates each year by the shipping industry  grew from about $3 million to more than $75 million, with the average  amount of ransoms paid per vessel increasing from $300,000 in 2007 to  more than $4 million in 2010, according to DOD. As ransoms continue  to rise, pirates continue to have an incentive to carry out attacks.  Furthermore, negotiation periods are lengthening, and hostages are  being held for greater lengths of time. Officials now report the average  length of time needed to negotiate ransoms has increased from 2 to 6  months. In addition, pirates have shown evidence of organization— with well-defined networks and hierarchies of financiers, senior  leaders, and seagoing pirate crews—leading some U.S. officials to  express concerns that funds generated by piracy may attract  extremists or terrorists located in the region. However, as of July 2010,  U.S. agencies monitoring piracy had found no credible link between  pirates and extremist or terrorist organizations.
U.S. agencies have reported taking some steps to respond to the changing  methods and location of pirate attacks, including weekly updates on  piracy incidents to mariners and naval forces, and efforts among coalition  partners to improve coordination in the Somali Basin. At the time we  published our September 2010 report, the Action Plan did not specifically  address certain aspects of pirate operations, such as the expansion to the  broader Indian Ocean or how to apprehend leaders of pirate organizations  and their financiers, and U.S. government officials told us that there were  no plans to reassess or revise the Action Plan. As a result, we  recommended that the Special Assistant to the President for National  Security Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense,  Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury re- assess and revise the Action Plan to better address evolving conditions off  the Horn of Africa and their effect on priorities and plans. In following up  with cognizant departments on the current status of their counterpiracy  efforts, all of the departments provided comments to clarify information in  this statement, and an NSS official provided the following information:  As part of a broader U.S. approach toward the region, the Maritime  Security Interagency Policy Committee (MSIPC) is conducting an  ongoing review of U.S. piracy policy. During this review, the MSIPC is  focusing on the Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:  Partnership and Action Plan and as part of this effort, departments  and agencies are examining and developing metrics, roles and  responsibilities, and implementation actions to serve as the focus of  U.S. efforts for the next several years. In addition, the level of effort  and opportunity costs associated with counterpiracy work is  continuously monitored. The MSIPC has been focused, most recently,  on addressing the costs associated with bringing suspected pirates  either to the United States for prosecution or transferring them to third  party nations.
We also reported in September 2010 that as pirates operations had  evolved, the U.S. government had not systematically tracked the cost or  effectiveness of its counterpiracy activities to determine whether its  investment had achieved the desired results or should be revised.  Specifically, we found that government agencies were not tracking:    Costs of Counterpiracy Efforts. The Action Plan did not  specifically charge the interagency group responsible for monitoring  implementation with tracking the cost of U.S. activities and neither the  interagency steering group nor the federal agencies involved were  performing these tasks. We also reported that DOD provided a partial  estimate of counterpiracy operations undertaken by the U.S. Central  Command which totaled about $64 million in fiscal year 2009 and that  a key cost of counterpiracy operations was the diversion of ships,  crew, aircraft, intelligence assets, and other forces from other global  missions such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. (See  our September 2010 report for a list of selected types of costs incurred  by the U.S. government to counter piracy.)
Measures of Effectiveness. The Action Plan did not define  measures of effectiveness that could be used to evaluate progress  toward reaching its objectives or to assess the relative effectiveness of  the Action Plan’s tasks to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute acts of  piracy. Agency officials have cited several challenges associated with  measuring the effectiveness of U.S. efforts, including the complexity of  the piracy problem, difficulty in establishing a desired end-state for  counterpiracy efforts, and difficulty in distinguishing the effect of U.S.  efforts from those of its international and industry partners.  Nevertheless, we reported that identifying measures of effectiveness  and systematically evaluating agency efforts could assist the U.S.  government in ensuring resources are being targeted most effectively,  weighing its investment of resources against its other interests in the  region, and determining whether adjustments to plans are required.
As a result, in our September 2010 report, we also recommended that the  NSC, in collaboration with the same federal departments, identify  measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts;  and direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to identify the costs of U.S.  counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and personnel costs;  and assess the effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities. In  commenting on the draft of our September 2010 report, DOD stated that  the interagency group charged with monitoring implementation of the  Action Plan was not tracking costs and effectiveness because it was not  specifically charged to do so in the Action Plan. Officials from Coast  Guard, Justice, State, and the Treasury also were not aware of any  systematic efforts to perform these functions. When preparing for this  hearing, State officials informed us that the Secretary of State has since  directed an internal review and re-evaluation of State’s approaches and  actions to counter piracy to determine the options for more effectively  addressing this regional threat and its widespread consequences.  According to State officials, identifying costs and effectiveness, as we  recommended, is to be a critical component of this evaluation. Similarly,  the NSS statement indicated that the policy review underway by the  MSIPC is examining and developing metrics, and addressing the costs  associated with U.S. action toward prosecuting suspected pirates. While  recent steps to begin implementing our recommendations are  encouraging, it is too early to tell what impact, if any, these efforts will  have on the United States’ ability to respond to the dynamic nature of  piracy. We continue to believe that with continual evaluation of U.S.  efforts the United States may be in a better position to achieve its ultimate  goal of repressing piracy.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Worked Collaboratively with Partners but Could Take Key Steps to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration in Counterpiracy Efforts
paragraphs: As we reported in September 2010, U.S. agencies have generally  collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter  piracy; however, U.S. agencies could implement other key practices to  further enhance and sustain collaboration among U.S. interagency  partners. Industry partners play an important role in preventing and  deterring pirate attacks because they are responsible for implementing  self-protection measures on commercial vessels. Our September 2010  report includes more detail on the extent of this collaboration, but we will  highlight a few examples here:    Collaboration with International Partners. U.S. agencies,  primarily State and DOD, have collaborated with international partners  through two organizations established to counter piracy off the Horn  of Africa. First, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia  (Contact Group) serves as an international forum for countries  contributing to the counterpiracy effort to share information that has  facilitated international, military coordination and established a trust  fund to support prosecution efforts. As part of the Contact Group’s  efforts, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration co-chair a  working group on shipping industry coordination, which has reviewed  and updated best management practices for industry self-protection,  and is developing guidance for seafarer training regarding pirate  attacks. Second, in 2008, as the leader of the Combined Maritime  Forces, the U.S. Navy, along with other international partners,  established Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings that are  intended to provide military coordination and information sharing for  naval patrols of pirate-infested waters.
Partnering with Industry. U.S. agencies, primarily the Coast Guard  and the Maritime Administration, have worked with industry partners  to facilitate collaborative forums, share information, and develop joint  guidance for implementing counterpiracy efforts. Most recently, the  Coast Guard issued an updated version of Maritime Security Directive  104-6 in January 2011 amending the area at high risk of piracy and the  Maritime Administration issued an advisory in February 2011 that  addressed the piracy threat to yachts and recreational craft. For those  ship owners who choose or are required to carry armed security  teams, the Coast Guard and State have worked to identify viable  methods for doing so in accordance with applicable U.S., international,  and port-state laws. In addition, the Maritime Administration has  developed training courses to inform vessel crews about how to help  prevent piracy and steps to take if taken hostage.
U.S. government agencies have incorporated other key collaborative  practices, including developing an overarching strategy and establishing  mechanisms to share information with partners. As we reported in  September 2010, the NSC’s Action Plan serves an overarching strategy to  guide U.S. interagency efforts and provides a framework for interagency  collaboration. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, such as a pirate  attack on a U.S.-flagged vessel, the U.S. government uses the existing  Maritime Operational Threat Response process—part of the National  Strategy for Maritime Security—to facilitate a discussion among U.S.  agencies and decide on courses of action. For example, this response  process was activated for both the MV Maersk Alabama and SV Quest  incidents.
Although the NSC and U.S. agencies have taken these collaborative steps,  we reported in September 2010 that the NSC could incorporate two other  key practices—assigning roles and responsibilities and developing joint  implementation guidance—to further enhance interagency collaboration  in counterpiracy efforts. As of July 2010, the NSC had assigned roles and  responsibilities for implementing one of the 14 Action Plan tasks,  providing persistent interdiction to be performed by the U.S. Navy and  Coast Guard. Establishing roles and responsibilities can help agencies  clarify which agencies will lead or participate in activities, help organize  their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. Agencies  could enhance collaboration by developing joint guidance to implement  and coordinate actions on several Action Plan tasks. Effective joint  guidance also addresses how agency activities and resources will be  aligned to achieve goals. In the absence of clearly identified roles and  responsibilities and joint implementation guidance, agencies involved in  countering piracy have made comparatively more progress in  implementing those Action Plan tasks that fall firmly within one agency’s  area of expertise, such as Coast Guard’s enforcement of U.S.-regulated  commercial-vessel compliance with maritime security requirements and  DOD’s interdiction efforts.
In contrast, there are several tasks in the Action Plan for which multiple  agencies have relevant authorities, capabilities, or interests, and on which  less progress has been made. The NSC has not identified roles and  responsibilities for implementing these tasks, and officials have  acknowledged that the agencies have not developed joint guidance to  ensure their efforts work together efficiently and effectively. For example:    Strategic Communication. Multiple agencies are responsible for  communicating with various audiences about piracy, but there is no  governmentwide strategic communication plan in place to guide  agency efforts. According to State officials, State has drafted a  governmentwide counterpiracy strategic communication plan for  interagency review but as of March 2011, the department had not  finalized this plan.
Disrupting Pirate Revenue. Multiple agencies collect or examine  information on pirates’ financial activities, including DOD, Justice,  State, and the Treasury. However, officials agree that information their  agencies gather on pirate finances is not being systematically analyzed,  and it is unclear if any agency is using it to identify and apprehend  pirate leaders or financiers. U.S. efforts to track and block pirates’  finances in Somalia are hampered by the lack of government and  formal banking institutions there. According to Justice officials, as of  July 2010, the United States had not apprehended or prosecuted any  pirate leaders or enablers as provided for in the Action Plan.
Facilitating Prosecution of Suspected Pirates. Agencies face  challenges facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates without  defined roles and joint guidance. For example, after pirate attacks on  the USS Ashland and USS Nicholas, which resulted in the  apprehension of suspects, the U.S. government lacked interagency  procedures for transferring suspects and sharing costs among the  agencies involved, according to U.S. officials.
In September 2010, we reported that by enhancing interagency  collaboration, the NSC can reduce the risk of leaving gaps in its  counterpiracy efforts or the risk that agency efforts may overlap, which  could waste resources that could be applied to combat other threats to  national security, such as terrorism. We also recommended that the NSC,  in collaboration with the same federal departments, clarify agency roles  and responsibilities and develop joint guidance, information sharing  mechanisms, and other means to operate across agency boundaries for  implementing key efforts such as strategic communication, disrupting  pirate revenue, and facilitating prosecution. Doing so could also help  agency officials—who must balance their time and resources among many  competing priorities—more fully and effectively carry out their roles in  helping to repress piracy and avoid duplication of effort. Agency officials  we contacted to prepare for this hearing were unaware of efforts to clarify  agency roles and responsibilities or develop joint guidance for  implementing key efforts. Commenting on our testimony statement,  however, the NSS provided a statement indicating that an ongoing MSIPC  policy review is examining roles and responsibilities and other  implementation actions to guide U.S. counterpiracy efforts. The recent  statement from the NSS official is encouraging and we continue to believe  that actions are needed to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration  in U.S. counterpiracy efforts, but currently it is too soon to know the  impact of the MSIPC review.
In closing, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, while U.S.  agencies have taken a collaborative approach in counterpiracy planning  and have taken many steps, the U.S. government faces escalating  challenges to meeting its objective of repressing piracy. These challenges  include inherent limits on the United States’ ability to influence industry  and international partners and to encourage other states to prosecute  suspected pirates. In addition, the United States must address the problem  of piracy in an environment in which counterpiracy efforts compete with  other high-priority U.S. interests in the region, and, as the NSC has  acknowledged, longer-term efforts to stabilize Somalia are needed to fully  address the root causes of piracy. Such challenges, along with the growing  frequency and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa, provide a renewed  a sense of urgency to implement our recommendations to update the  counterpiracy Action Plan and take other steps to prevent, disrupt, and  prosecute acts of piracy.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may  have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at  202-512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov, or John H. Pendleton at 404-679- 1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. In addition to the contacts named above, Susan Ditto,  Geoffrey Hamilton, Dawn Hoff, Brandon L. Hunt, Farhanaz Kermalli,  Ronald La Due Lake, Patricia Lentini, John Mingus, Amie Steele, and  Suzanne Wren made key contributions to this report. A full list of staff  acknowledgements for the September 2010 report can be found in  appendix VI of that report.
section_title: Appendix I: Maps and Statistics on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
paragraphs: This appendix provides several examples of the vast area in which pirates  operate and how piracy off the coast of Somalia has continued to escalate.  Pirate attacks have expanded from being close to the eastern Somali  shoreline in 2007, to targeting ships in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, and since  2009 expanding east into the Indian Ocean, south toward Madagascar, and  north toward Oman. In addition, pirates have captured more ships and  taken more hostages each year from 2007 through 2010.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and  Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy  off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2010.
Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational  Benefits, but Challenges Remain. GAO-10-433R. Washington, D.C.: April 7,  2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of  National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and  Information Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25,  2009.
Combating Illicit Financing: Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and  Financial Intelligence Could Manage More Effectively to Achieve Its  Mission. GAO-09-794. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information,  but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337.  Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were  Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.
Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization,  Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. GAO-08-351. Washington, D.C.:  February 19, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in  Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity  Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on  a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification.  GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving.  GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and  Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,  D.C.: October 21, 2005.
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