Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps
Published: 2006-08-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO has reported in recent years on a number of human capital issues that have hampered the Department of State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy priorities and objectives, particularly at posts central to the war on terror. In 2002, State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to address shortfalls in the number and skills of State employees. This report discusses State's progress in (1) addressing staffing shortfalls since the implementation of DRI and (2) filling gaps in the language proficiency of foreign service officers and other staff. To accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed staffing and language data and met with State officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since implementing the DRI. However, the initiative did not fully meet its goals, and mid-level vacancies remain a problem at many posts, including some critical to the war on terror. State implemented various incentives to attract more mid-level officers to these locations, including offering extra pay to officers who serve an additional year at certain posts. However, it has not evaluated the effectiveness of these incentives and continues to have difficulties attracting qualified applicants. Mid-level positions at many posts are staffed by junior officers who lack experience, have minimal guidance, and are not as well-equipped to handle crises as more seasoned officers. This experience gap can severely compromise the department's readiness to carry out foreign policy objectives and execute critical post-level duties. State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities, but serious language gaps remain. State initiated a number of efforts to improve its foreign language capabilities. However, it has not evaluated the effectiveness of these efforts, and it continues to experience difficulties filling its language-designated positions with language proficient staff. Almost one third of the staff in these positions do not meet the language requirements. The percentage is much higher at certain critical posts--for example, 60 percent in Sana'a, Yemen. Several factors--including the perception that spending too much time in one region may hinder officers' and specialists' promotion potential--may discourage employees from bidding on positions where they could enhance and maintain their language skills over time and limit State's ability to take advantage of those skills and the investment it makes in training. Gaps in language proficiency can adversely impact State's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and execute critical duties.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In recent years we have reported on a number of human capital issues that  have hampered the Department of State’s (State) ability to carry out the  President’s foreign policy priorities and objectives, particularly at posts  central to the United States’ war on terror. For example, we reported that  State’s permanent positions were understaffed and that the impact of  staffing shortfalls was felt most at hardship posts, including posts in  Africa and the Middle East and others of strategic importance to the  United States, such as China and Russia. In particular, we found that  State’s assignment system did not effectively meet the staffing needs of  hardship posts and that State had difficulty filling positions there,  particularly at the mid-levels. Where such staffing gaps existed, new or  untenured officers worked well above their grade levels. We also reported  that State had shortages in staff with critical foreign language skills,  making it more difficult to combat international terrorism and resulting in  less effective representation of U.S. interests overseas. To address  shortfalls in the number and skills of foreign service officers (FSO), State  implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), beginning in 2002,  to hire, train, and deploy additional staff.
This report discusses State’s progress in (1) addressing staffing shortfalls  since the implementation of DRI, and (2) filling gaps in the language  proficiency of FSOs and other staff.
To assess State’s progress in eliminating staffing gaps, we examined  documentation on State’s recruitment efforts, and analyzed staffing,  vacancy, and assignment data. To assess State’s progress in filling gaps in  the language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, we analyzed language  proficiency data for specific posts, specialties, and grades. We also  compared the language proficiency of staff in language-designated  positions with the requirements for the positions. We met with officials at  State’s Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Foreign  Service Institute, and six regional bureaus. To observe post staffing and  language proficiency firsthand, we conducted fieldwork in Abuja and  Lagos, Nigeria; Sana’a, Yemen; and Beijing, China. We selected the posts in  (1) Nigeria because of the low number of staff applying for each position;  (2) in Sana’a because of the low number of staff applying for each  position, because it requires staff proficient in Arabic, which is a difficult  to learn language, and because of Yemen’s importance to the war on  terrorism; and (3) in Beijing because it requires staff proficient in Chinese,  which is also a difficult language to learn, and because of its strategic  importance to the United States. We performed our work from August  2005 to May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Appendix I provides more information on our scope  and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Department of State is the lead agency in formulating and  implementing U.S. foreign policy. The department represents the United  States in about 172 countries, operating approximately 266 embassies,  consulates, and other posts. During several years in the 1990s, State lost  more staff than it hired, and the resultant shortfalls of staff and skills  endangered diplomatic readiness. To address these shortfalls, in 2002,  State implemented DRI, a $197 million effort designed to address a range  of goals. In particular, the goals of DRI were to hire 1,158 new foreign and  civil service employees over a 3-year period, support training  opportunities for staff, enhance the department’s ability to respond to  crises and emerging priorities overseas and at critical domestic locations,  improve State’s hiring processes to recruit personnel from more diverse  experiences and cultural backgrounds, and fill critical skill gaps. Table 1  shows DRI hiring goals for fiscal year 2002 through fiscal 2004.
As of October 2005, State had about 19,000 American employees, including  FSOs, also called generalists; foreign service specialists; and civil servants.  FSO generalists help formulate and implement the foreign policy of the  United States and are grouped into five career tracks: management,  consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. Foreign service  specialists provide support services at overseas posts worldwide or in  Washington, D.C., and are grouped into seven major categories:  administration, construction engineering, information technology,  international information and English language programs, medical and  health, office management, and security. Civil service employees support  the foreign policy mission from offices in Washington, D.C., and across the  United States.
About 65 percent of Foreign Service employees serve overseas. State’s  policy is that foreign service employees are to be available for service  worldwide. The process of assigning Foreign Service staff to their  positions begins when the staff receive a list of upcoming vacancies for  which they may compete. Staff then submit a list of positions for which  they want to be considered, or “bids,” and consult with their career  development officer. The process varies, depending on an officer’s grade  and functional specialty. Figure 1 describes this process.
About 64 percent of full-time FSOs serving overseas are assigned to  hardship posts. State defines hardship posts as those locations where the  U.S. government provides differential pay incentives—an additional 5 to 35  percent of base pay, depending on the severity or difficult of the  conditions—to encourage employees to bid on assignments at these posts  and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter there. A  hardship differential is established for a location only when that location  involves extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive physical  hardship, or notably unhealthful conditions affecting the majority of  employees officially stationed or detailed there. Living costs are not  considered in differential determination. Among the conditions that State  considers in determining hardship pay are poor medical facilities,  substandard schools for children, severe climate, high crime, political  instability, physical isolation, and lack of spousal employment  opportunities. Some hardship posts have greater difficulty in attracting  qualified bidders than others. In response to severe staffing shortages at  such posts, State established the Service Need Differential (SND)  Program, which began with the 2001 summer assignments cycle. Under  this program, an employee who accepts a 3-year assignment at a post  designated for SND is eligible to receive an additional hardship differential  over and above existing hardship differentials, equal to 15 percent of the  employee’s base salary. However, chiefs of mission, principal officers, and  deputy chiefs of mission are not eligible to receive SND regardless of the  length of their tours. Entry-level employees on 2-year tours directed by the  Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) are also  ineligible for SND. State’s geographic bureaus initially identified the posts  designated to offer SND in 2001 and may add or remove posts once per  year. The program included 38 posts the first year. Table 2 lists the fiscal  year 2006 SND posts.
In addition, in 2002, State established a working group to examine  incentives to encourage bidding on hardship posts. The working group  evaluated over 80 suggestions and ideas, such as requiring hardship  service for promotion to the senior foreign service and allowing  employees to negotiate shorter tours of duty. State implemented about 25  of the suggestions.
subsections: section_title: State’s Foreign Language Requirements
paragraphs: As of October 2005, State had 3,267 positions—43 percent of all foreign  service positions overseas—designated as requiring some level of foreign  language proficiency. These positions span about 69 languages. State  places the required languages into three categories based on the amount of  time it takes to learn them.
Category I languages are world languages, such as Spanish and French,  which relate closely to English. Fifty-five percent of the language- designated positions require proficiency in a world language.
Category II languages, such as Albanian or Urdu, are languages with  significant linguistic or cultural differences from English. State refers to  such languages as “hard” languages. Twenty-nine percent of the language- designated positions require proficiency in a hard language.
Category III, the “superhard” languages, include Arabic and Chinese, and  are exceptionally difficult for native English speakers to learn. Sixteen  percent of the language-designated positions require proficiency in a  superhard language. Figure 2 shows the percentage of language-designated  positions by category.
State’s philosophy is to hire officers with a wide range of skills that it  believes are predictors of success in the foreign service. It does not hire  exclusively for skills that State can train, such as foreign languages. As a  result, State’s primary approach to meeting its language requirements is  through language training, primarily through classes provided at its  training arm, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). FSI’s School of Language  Studies offers training in more than 60 languages. FSI also provides full- time advance training in superhard languages at FSI field schools and  programs overseas. In addition, overseas posts offer part-time language  training through post language programs funded by the regional bureaus  and their posts. Although State’s main emphasis is on enhancing its foreign  language capability through training, it does have special mechanisms to  recruit personnel with foreign language skills. For example, applicants  who pass the oral assessment can raise their ranking by passing a language  test in any foreign language used by State. Additional credit is given to  candidates who pass a test in languages that State has deemed as critical  needs languages, including Arabic; Chinese; Korean; Russian; Turkic  languages (Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkish, Turkmen, and Uzbek);  Indic languages (Urdu, Hindi, Nepali, Bengali, Punjabi); and Iranian  languages (Farsi/Persian, Tajiki, Pashto). Officers hired under this  initiative must serve in a post that requires the language for which they  were recruited, for their first or second tour.
section_title: State Has Made Progress Addressing Staffing Shortfalls; but Critical Gaps Remain at Hardship Posts
paragraphs: Although DRI brought in a large number of new FSOs, it made minimal  impact in addressing the staffing gaps at hardship posts, largely because of  new staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. The department has  implemented new incentives to address the chronic mid-level shortfalls at  hardship posts; however, since implementing these incentives, State has  not yet evaluated their effectiveness. In our review, we found that mid- level staffing gaps persist; bids for mid-level positions at hardship posts  have not increased significantly since we reported in 2002; and positions  normally held by mid-level officers are typically staffed by junior officers,  sometimes on their first assignment, with few mid-level officers to provide  supervision or guidance. Recently, State launched the Global  Repositioning Initiative, which will move positions from places like  Europe and Washington D.C., to critical posts in areas such as Africa and  the Middle East. However, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of  this initiative, and State’s reluctance to direct its employees to serve in  locations where they have not bid on, means that these redirected  positions may remain vacant.
subsections: section_title: State Has Made Progress in Decreasing Staffing Shortages but Has Not Fully Met Its Goals
paragraphs: Since 2002, under its DRI, State has increased its number of permanent  positions and available staff worldwide for both the foreign and civil  service, but these increases were largely offset by urgent staffing demands  at critical posts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2002, State  had more than 500 unstaffed foreign service positions; in 2005, there were  fewer than 200 such openings. However, the deficit in civil service staffing  has increased. In 2002, State had over 800 unfilled civil service positions;  in 2005, there were over 1,700 such positions. State hired most of its new  staff through DRI, bringing in more than 1,000 new employees above  attrition, thus achieving its numerical hiring goals. These employees were  hired primarily to allow staff time for critical job training—also referred to  as a “training float”—to staff overseas posts, and to be available to  respond to new emerging priorities. However, according to State’s Human  Resources officials, DRI’s goals became quickly outdated as new pressures  resulted from staffing demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the  department has currently levied what it calls an “Iraq tax” on all its  bureaus in order to support its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the  past 2 years, bureaus have had to give up a total of 280 mid-level generalist  and specialist positions for Iraq, and it is anticipated that another such tax  will be imposed for 2007.
section_title: Effectiveness of Hardship Incentives Has Not Been Measured
paragraphs: Beginning in 2001, in an effort to address the growing number of mid-level  vacancies at hardship posts, State created a series of incentives—including  extra pay and negotiated tour lengths—to attract mid-level employees to  hardship posts around the world. For example, the SND Program offers  employees an extra 15 percent pay for an additional year of service at the  most difficult to staff posts. While State has information on the number of  officers actually enrolled in the program, it was not able to provide data on  the number of eligible officers who did not. State’s Director General and  officials from its HR/CDA said that State has not completed any formal  evaluations of the incentives; instead, officials from the HR/CDA meet  informally to discuss how well the incentives are working. Without formal  evaluations, the department has not been able to systematically measure  whether the extra hardship pay incentive has had a significant impact on  staffing at hardship posts. Senior officials with whom we spoke in  Washington, D.C., and FSOs at hardship posts had mixed views on  whether the SND program has been effective. Some officers stated that the  pay differential was indeed a factor in their decision to bid on the post.  However, several former ambassadors and the Executive Director of the  Bureau of African Affairs said they believe the program has not attracted  additional bidders to African posts. These officials stated that the  incentive has had limited impact at posts that were already offering a 25  percent pay differential because the additional incentive is offset by the  harsh conditions at such posts.
While it may be too early too assess the effectiveness of more recently  implemented initiatives, such as negotiated tour lengths, former and  current ambassadors with whom we spoke stated that this initiative may  not benefit posts. In particular, they noted that although negotiating a  shorter tour length might initially attract bidders to hardship posts, such  frequent rotations negatively affect a post’s ability to carry out the United  States’ foreign policy goals. For example, according to State, the average  length of tours at posts in the Muslim world is about 22 percent shorter  than those elsewhere. Noting the prevalence of 1-year tours in the Muslim  world, a senior official at State said that officers with shorter tours tend to  produce less effective work than those with longer ones.
In addition to incentives, State has implemented a new career  development program—the Generalist Career Development Program— that stipulates service at a hardship post as a requirement for  consideration of promotion to the senior foreign service. The new  requirements include a mandatory tour at a 15 percent differential or  greater hardship post. Officials from HR/CDA stated that it was too early  to tell whether this new requirement for promotion to the senior foreign  service will be effective in attracting mid-level officers to hardship posts.
section_title: Staffing Gaps for Key Mid- Level Positions Persist; Positions Filled by Junior Officers in Stretch Positions
paragraphs: State’s largest staffing gaps continue to be at mid-level. These and other  gaps are exacerbated by continued low bidding for positions at hardship  posts. Furthermore, many mid-level vacancies are filled by junior officers.  Staff have cited family issues and the lack of locality pay comparable with  what they would receive in Washington, D.C., as being among the key  disincentives to bidding for hardship positions.
subsections: section_title: Staffing Gaps at the Mid-Level Persist
paragraphs: As of December 2005, State had a combined deficit of 154 officers, with  the largest staffing deficits continuing to affect mid-level positions across  all career tracks. Table 3 shows staffing surpluses and deficits by career  track for foreign service generalists as of December 31, 2005.
In 2003, State officials told us that it would take about 9 to 10 years to  eliminate the mid-level gap. Officials whom we met with more recently  said it would take several years for DRI hiring to begin addressing the mid- level staffing shortages because the earliest DRI hires are just now being  promoted to the mid-level. On average, it takes approximately 4.3 years for  a junior officer to receive a promotion to the mid-level. According to  State’s comments on this report, the department expects to eliminate mid- level deficits by 2010.
section_title: Mid-Level and Other Staffing Gaps Exacerbated by Low Bidding for Positions at Hardship Posts
paragraphs: Although bidding for hardship posts with the smallest pay differentials has  increased slightly since we last reported on this issue in 2002, it remained  about the same for posts with the highest differentials, such as those with  20 and 25 percent. Figure 3 shows the average number of bids on FS-02,  FS-03, and tenured FS-04 mid-level positions at overseas posts by  differential rate for the 2005 summer assignments cycle. Overall, posts in  Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia continue to receive the lowest  number of bids, averaging about 4 or 5 bids per position, while posts in  Europe and the Western Hemisphere receive the highest bids, averaging 15  and 17, respectively. For example, in 2005, posts in Bujumbura, Burundi;  Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and Calcutta, India;  received, on average, between zero and two bids per mid-level officer  position. In addition, we found that in the 2005 assignments cycle, 104 mid- level positions had no bidders at all, including 67 positions in Africa and  the Middle East.
Consular positions in the posts with the highest hardship differential (25  percent) continued to receive some of the lowest number of bids in 2005.  As shown in figure 4, consular positions at 25 percent differential posts  received, on average, only 2.5 bids per position compared with 18 for  nonhardship posts. Low numbers of bids at hardship posts have resulted  in positions remaining vacant for long periods of time. For example, a  senior consular position in Lagos, Nigeria, has been vacant since July 2001,  and a consular chief position in Shenyang was vacant from December 2003  until August 2004. Such gaps negatively impact a post’s ability to carry out  its mission.
In 2005 consular and public diplomacy positions were the hardest to fill,  with 91 percent of the vacancies in these two tracks at the mid-level.  Although the department has seen an increase in spending on U.S. public  diplomacy programs, several embassy officials stated that they do not  have the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. Moreover, these  staffing gaps also limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers  receive, because many officers are sent to fill a position quickly and never  benefit from full training, ultimately limiting the success of their public  diplomacy outreach efforts. Further, due to staffing shortages in consular  sections around the world, there are fewer staff to implement the new  interview requirements and screening procedures for visas, resulting in  extensive wait times for applicants for visa interviews at consular posts  overseas. From November 2004 through May 2005, there were 63 posts  reporting wait times of 30 or more days on a given month, signaling a  significant resource problem for State.
section_title: Many Mid-Level Positions Are Staffed by Junior Officers
paragraphs: In order to fill vacancies, primarily at hardship posts, State sometimes  allows stretch assignments, which enable staff to bid for a position at  either a higher grade than their current grade level (called an “upstretch”)  or a lower grade (a “downstretch”). Often, upstretch assignments are  offered as a reward and career-enhancing opportunity for staff who have  demonstrated outstanding performance, and many officers successfully  fulfill the duties requested of the higher grade level. However, a 2004  report by State’s Inspector General found that in many African posts, for  example, there were significant deficiencies in the ability, training, and  experience of FSOs serving in upstretch assignments.
At posts we visited in early 2006, we found staffing conditions similar to  those we reported on in 2002, when we found experience gaps and other  staffing shortfalls at hardship posts. For example, in 2002, we reported  that, in the 10-officer consular section in Lagos, only the consul had more  than one tour of consular experience. In addition, we reported that the  office had many unfilled mid-level positions, many of which were at the  time being staffed by first-tour junior officers and civil service employees  who had never served overseas. In our most recent visit, we found that the  consulate in Lagos was staffed by a mix of officers, including numerous  junior officers in stretch positions.
Moreover, many officers in stretch positions at hardship posts continue to  lack the managerial experience or supervisory guidance needed to  effectively perform their job-duties. Junior officers in consular sections at  hardship posts consistently reported that they lack management guidance.  In addition, junior officers in stretch assignments at the various posts we  visited stated that, without mid-level officers to guide them, many times  they can only turn to senior management, including the ambassador, for  assistance. According to a 2004 State Inspector General report, more time  is spent by senior staff, including ambassadors, on operational matters,  and less time is devoted to overall planning, policy, and coordination than  should be the case. Many junior officers also stated that, although they  were filling stretch positions at the mid-level, they were not allowed to  receive management training from State due to their lower grade status.  According to one officer, she requested management training to help her  manage staff in accordance with her role as acting chief of a key section of  the embassy, but was denied the opportunity because, despite her current  assignment, she was not a tenured mid-level officer.
Senior management at posts we visited shared some of these concerns. A  former Deputy Chief of Mission in Nigeria stated that it is extremely  difficult for junior officers to work in stretch assignments when there are  few mid-level officers to guide them. Ambassadors at these posts also  stated that, although many junior officers entering the foreign service are  highly qualified, they did not have sufficient training to handle some of the  high stress situations they encounter and often end up making mistakes.  For example, according to the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria—the third  largest mission in Africa with nearly 800 employees—the embassy  presently had only three senior officers at the time of our visit, and public  affairs were handled entirely by first tour junior officers. Also, according  to U.S. officials in Beijing, the mid-level consular manager positions in  Shenyang and Chengdu, China—two locations with high incidence of visa  fraud—were held by first tour junior officers at the time of our visit. We  observed similar shortages and employees staffed above their grades in  consular sections in Africa and China when we reported on staffing of  hardship posts in 2002. Consular chiefs in Beijing raised concerns about  the lack of management guidance and supervision available to junior  officers due to the lack of mid-level officers at constituent posts in China.  One consular chief stated that the lack of adequate supervision at  constituent posts requires that he or his deputy frequently travel to the  posts outside of Beijing to provide guidance to the junior officers. Another  was concerned that her caseload limited the amount of guidance she was  able to give to her constituent posts.
Other areas, such as regional security, are also compromised as a result of  mid-level vacancies. Security officers at one hardship post told us that,  without mid-level staff, they sometimes lack the resources to adequately  perform basic duties, such as accompanying the ambassador on  diplomatic travel or, as was the case during a recent visit by the First Lady,  providing adequate personnel to accompany her staff. Former  ambassadors with whom we spoke expressed serious concerns about the  department’s diplomatic readiness and conveyed their belief that a post’s  ability to carry out critical duties is significantly compromised when the  proper staffing levels, and particularly well-trained officers, are not in  place.
section_title: Family Issues and Locality Pay Discourage Bidding at Hardship Posts
paragraphs: Many of the overseas staff we whom we met cited family considerations— child-related and spousal employment concerns, in particular—as the  greatest obstacle to attracting mid-level officers to hardship posts. The  spouses and other household members of FSOs who responded to a State  internet survey listed spousal employment as the primary reason why  officers do not bid for hardship posts. In many hardship posts, it is  extremely difficult for spouses to find employment, particularly in China  and most of South Asia, where bilateral work agreements are not in place.  State officials told us that the department has recently initiated new  programs to mitigate this problem, such as providing fellowships for  spouses to continue their professional development, offering online  courses or entrepreneurial workshops to encourage small business  development, or training spouses to find employment in the local  economy. The department plans to expand these programs in the future  with a particular emphasis on spouses in hardship locations.
The survey respondents also listed child-related issues as a major factor in  the officers not bidding for positions. A particular concern is that many  hardship posts do not have appropriate schooling for American children,  thus limiting options for employees with families. In Sana’a, Yemen, for  example, post positions are only available to staff with children under age  5 or over 21 due to a lack of schools. This has been an outstanding  concern for the Sana’a post, and post officials told us that post  management is heavily engaged in trying to find a solution to the problem.  In addition, the number of unaccompanied posts has increased in recent  years, making it difficult for employees with families to bid on them. As of  April 2006, there were 21 unaccompanied and limited accompanied posts  and more than 700 positions at such posts. Moreover, State officials said  that this number will probably increase due to increasing security  concerns around the world.
Lastly, officers and State personnel we interviewed both, at hardship posts  and in Washington, D.C., consistently cited the lack of locality pay as a  deterrent to bidding at hardship positions. In 2002, we reported that the  differences in the statutes governing domestic locality pay and differential  pay for overseas service had created a gap in compensation penalizing  overseas employees. This gap grows every year, as domestic locality pay  rates increase, creating an ever-increasing financial disincentive for  overseas employees to bid on hardship posts. After accounting for  domestic locality pay for Washington, D.C., a 25 percent hardship post  differential is eroded to approximately 8 percent. As estimated in our 2002  report, differential pay incentives for the 15 percent differential hardship  posts are now less than the locality pay for Washington, D.C., which is  currently 17 percent and can be expected to soon surpass the 20 percent  differential hardship posts. Currently, there is legislation pending in  Congress to alleviate the locality pay disparity by providing FSOs  stationed outside the United States with locality-based pay equal to that of  Washington, D.C. However, there has been no final action in Congress  regarding this legislation since 2005.
section_title: State Reluctant to Use Directed Assignments
paragraphs: Despite chronic staffing shortages at hardship posts, especially at the mid- level, State is reluctant to use its authority to direct assignments based on  risk and priorities at particular posts; rather, it assigns employees to posts  for which they have expressed interest. According to State officials, State  has rarely directed FSOs to serve in locations for which they have not bid  on a position, including hardship posts or locations of strategic  importance to the United States, due to concerns of an increase in poor  morale or lower productivity. With continuing budgetary limitations, it will  be increasingly difficult for the department to increase financial incentives  for hardship posts; moreover, given the lack of an increase in bidders, the  effectiveness of such incentives is questionable. State’s Global  Repositioning Initiative, announced in January 2006, will move positions  from Washington and Europe to critical posts in Africa, South Asia, and  the Middle East. However, there is no guarantee that these positions will  be filled because bidding will continue to be on a voluntary basis.  Throughout the past decade, some State officials have urged the  department to employ a more aggressive strategy to ensure that employees  serve where their skills are needed most. Additionally, despite concerns of  an increase in low morale, several officials whom we spoke with at  hardship posts believe that in order to effectively address these persistent  staffing gaps, State needs to direct assignments more often, particularly to  hard-to-fill posts.
section_title: State Has Made Progress in Increasing Its Foreign Language Capabilities, but Significant Language Gaps Remain
paragraphs: State has made several efforts in recent years to enhance its foreign  language capabilities, in particular by increasing the number of its  language-designated positions and its efforts to recruit and hire staff with  foreign language skills, as well as by creating additional language  requirements and incentives for staff. However, significant foreign  language gaps remain, and State has not assessed the effectiveness of its  efforts to increase its language capabilities.
subsections: section_title: State Has Increased the Number of Language- Designated Positions and Made Efforts to Enhance Foreign Language Capabilities
paragraphs: State has made several efforts to improve its foreign language capabilities,  including creating additional language-designated positions and enhancing  recruiting efforts. State has increased the number of language-designated  positions by 27 percent. In 2001, there were 2,581 (29 percent) of all  foreign service positions that required some level of foreign language  proficiency. As of October 2005, there were 3,267 positions (43 percent)  that required some level of foreign language proficiency. These positions  span about 69 languages. State has also enhanced its efforts to recruit and  hire FSOs with language skills. For example, State’s Office of Recruitment  has targeted its recruiting outreach efforts to universities with strong  language programs and conferences of language professionals, as well as  associations and professional organizations, such as the Arab American  Institute, that have members already fluent in critical needs languages. In  addition, State offers bonus points on the foreign service exam to  candidates who demonstrate proficiency in critical needs languages. State  then requires these officers to serve in positions that will employ their  language skills during their first or second assignment. As of April, 2006,  almost 80 percent of entry level officers who received additional exam  points for their critical language skills were assigned to locations that  could utilize their language within their first or second tour.
State has also implemented career development criteria, effective January  1, 2005, that require, among other things, foreign language proficiency as a  prerequisite for consideration for promotion. Specifically, in order to  become eligible for promotion to the senior foreign service, generalists  must demonstrate the ability to read and write a foreign language at a  general professional level. State’s career development criteria for some  specialists also contain language proficiency requirements. In addition to  these requirements, State has developed financial incentives for officers  with certain proficiency levels in critical languages. Moreover, State has  enhanced its overseas language programs through various initiatives,  including expanded use of overseas language schools and post language  programs, as well as by increasing the number of weeks of training offered  in certain critical languages and by providing language immersion courses  for officers transitioning to new posts.
section_title: State Continues to Have Shortages of Staff Proficient in Foreign Languages
paragraphs: Despite its efforts to enhance the language capabilities of its staff, State  continues to fill language-designated positions with staff who do not meet  the proficiency requirements. Even some officers who met the  requirements told us their language ability was not adequate for them to  effectively perform their job-related responsibilities. Furthermore, some  officers believe that State’s assignment and promotion system hindered  their ability to maintain their language skills over time. Officials whom we  met with at several posts described a number of situations in which the  posts’ operations were adversely effected by their lack of language  proficiency. State has not assessed the effectiveness of its efforts to  increase its language capabilities or conducted a risk assessment to  prioritize the allocation of foreign language resources.
subsections: section_title: Some Staff Do Not Meet the Language Requirements for Their Positions
paragraphs: State assesses language proficiency based on a scale established by the  federal Interagency Language Roundtable. The scale has six levels—0 to  5—with 5 being the most proficient (see table 4). Proficiency requirements  for language-designated positions at State tend to congregate at the second  and third levels of the scale. When proficiency substantially exceeds one  base skill level yet does not fully meet the criteria for the next base level, a  plus sign (+) designation may be added.
We compared the language proficiency of staff in all language-designated  positions as of October 2005 with the requirements for the positions, and  our analysis showed that 71 percent of all worldwide language-designated  positions were filled by individuals who met the position’s proficiency  requirements, while 29 percent of the positions were not. Language  deficiencies exist world-wide, but were among the greatest in the Middle  East, a region of great importance to the war on terror, where 37 percent  of all language-designated positions were filled by staff without the  language skills required of their positions. The skills gap was even greater  at some critical posts; for example, 59 percent in Cairo, Egypt; and 60  percent in Sana’a, Yemen. See appendix III for the worldwide percentages  of staff filling language-designated positions that did not meet the language  speaking and reading requirements of their positions.
To further illustrate how skill gaps differ among languages of varying  levels of difficulty, we analyzed data on superhard, hard, and world  language-designated positions. Our analysis showed that the greatest  deficiencies existed for positions requiring superhard languages, such as  Arabic, compared with hard and world languages. Almost 40 percent of  superhard language-designated positions worldwide (465 positions) were  filled by individuals who did not meet the language requirements of their  position; this figure was 30 and 25 percent for hard and world language  designated positions, respectively. Further, the highest percentage— almost 40 percent—of superhard positions filled by officers that did not  meet the speaking and reading language requirements were among  positions requiring Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese. (See fig. 5).
25% (393)
62% (289)
38% (176)
75% (1162) (66) (80)
60% (120) (25) (38)
Further analysis of Arabic and Chinese, two languages spoken in regions  of strategic interest to the United States, showed that the percentage of  staff that did not meet language requirements for their positions varied by  career tracks. For example, 100 percent of the staff filling positions in the  management career track requiring Arabic and 88 percent of the staff  filling positions in the management career track requiring Chinese did not  meet the language requirements of their positions.
Foreign service specialists—staff who perform security, technical, and  other support functions—also had high percentages of staff that did not  meet the Chinese or Arabic language requirements of their positions. In  particular, 72 and 75 percent of specialist positions requiring Chinese and  Arabic, respectively, were filled by staff who did not meet the language  requirement. (See table 5). Six of the specialists we met with in Beijing  said they did not receive sufficient language training before arriving at  post. State officials have acknowledged that foreign service specialists  have not received the required amount of training, and FSI officials  attributed this situation to time constraints. Most specialists only have  enough time to participate in FSI’s Familiarization and Short-term Training  language courses designed for beginners with 2 months or less time to  devote to training. State’s Director General, in a cable issued in January  2006, stated that the department has been shortsighted in not providing  training to specialists, especially office management specialists, and stated  that required training would be available for specialists in the future.
Some officers whom we met with who attained the proficiency  requirements for their assignments stated that they were not sufficiently  fluent to effectively perform their jobs. For example, the 50 language- designated, junior officer consular positions at posts requiring Chinese  require proficiency at a speaking level of 2 and reading level of 0. Consular  officers we met with in China who tested at that level said they could ask  appropriate questions during consular interviews, but could not always  understand the answers. They pointed out that Spanish or French  language-designated consular positions require a level-3 speaking and  reading language proficiency. Moreover, a survey of junior officers  currently serving in China revealed that most of the officers not interested  in serving in China again cited language issues as the primary reason.  According to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Sana’a, the level-3 Arabic  speaking and reading proficiency requirements for senior officers do not  provide staff with the proficiency needed to participate in debates about  U.S. foreign policy. He described an instance when he was asked to appear  as an embassy spokesperson on an Arabic language media program. The  program, which involved a debate format and addressed U.S. politics,  lasted 1 hour and was conducted entirely in Arabic. The official said that,  given his 4+proficiency in Arabic, he was the only official at the embassy  capable of engaging in such a debate.
According to a State Inspector General report on Embassy Tel Aviv, the  duties inherent in consular positions require staff to have better speaking  and reading Hebrew language skills than the required level 2. Therefore,  the Office of the Inspector General recommended that entry-level officers  be given the opportunity to study Hebrew for 4 weeks in Tel Aviv before  they begin work at the embassy. Another Inspector General report said  that staff in Cairo who speak Arabic below the required level-3 would  prefer to be able to speak at a more advanced level to conduct effective  public outreach. Officials from the Foreign Service Institute agreed that a  level-3 speaking and reading language proficiency in Arabic and Chinese  was more appropriate for junior officers assigned to consular positions,  but they explained that language-designated position requirements are set  at a level officers can realistically achieve in the limited amount of time  available to obtain training.
section_title: State’s Assignment and Promotion System May Hinder Efforts to Improve Its Foreign Language Capability
paragraphs: Several FSOs we met with said they believe State’s current assignment and  promotion system may hinder officers’ ability to enhance and maintain  their language skills over time, as well as State’s ability to take advantage  of those skills and the investment it makes in training. For example, State’s  requirements for tenure stipulate that junior officers work in a variety of  regions and jobs to prepare them for careers as generalists, while State’s  assignment regulations do not allow junior officers and specialists to serve  consecutive tours at the same post. As a result, junior officers are often  assigned to second tours that do not utilize the language skills they  acquired for their first tour. For example, according to FSI, assignments to  Russian-speaking posts would be complemented by assignments  elsewhere in the world or Washington, D.C., to provide the broader  experience required at the senior level. There is also a perception among  some officers that spending too much time in one region can lead to being  labeled as too narrowly specialized, which could adversely impact the  officers’ career. However, a senior State official asserted that the belief  that regional specialization hurts an officer’s career is untrue, and, further,  that State’s new career development plan supports regional specialization.
In addition, the short length of some tours, such as 1-year unaccompanied  assignments, may not give an officer sufficient time to master a language.  According to State’s Inspector General, as long as unaccompanied  assignments are restricted to 1 year, there is little incentive for officers to  seek extensive language training. In an effort to make better use of the  department’s training investment, the FSI has encouraged officers and  specialists to take FSI courses to refine their language skills and achieve  greater facility when dealing with the local community. But officers in  both Yemen and China stated that State’s assignment system does not  allow for sufficient time between assignments to utilize FSI’s continued  language training. Compounding this problem, officers stated that their  language skills often diminish when a new assignment takes them to a  region requiring different language skills. According to FSI, the need to fill  gaps at posts, the lack of a training float, and other circumstances  particular to individual staff—such as family issues, learning difficulties  and aptitude, and application—hinder FSI’s language training efforts.
section_title: Lack of Foreign Language Capability May Adversely Effect State’s Operations
paragraphs: State’s foreign language gaps may negatively impact posts’ operations.  According to the Assistant Secretaries of State for Education and Cultural  Affairs and Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, deficits in foreign  language education negatively affect our national security, diplomacy, law  enforcement, intelligence gathering efforts, and cultural understanding by  preventing effective communication in foreign media environments,  impeding counter-terrorism efforts, and limiting our capacity to work with  people and governments in post conflict zones. We found examples of this  negative impact involving a variety of officers and specialists serving in  language-designated positions without the required foreign language skills.
Consular officers: Officials at one high visa fraud post that we visited  stated that, due to language skill deficiencies, consular officers sometimes  adjudicate visas without fully understanding everything the applicants tell  them during visa interviews. In Jakarta, where almost all visa interviews  are conducted in Indonesian, the consul general position was filled, at the  time of our review, by an officer with a language waiver, making  supervision and monitoring of the six first tour junior consular officers  problematic.
Economic and political officers: An economic officer in a superhard  language-speaking country had been conducting several important  negotiations in English with foreign government officials over a number of  months with little results. When the officials began discussing the same  issue in the host country language, the whole tenure of the negotiations  changed. According to the officer, one of the foreign government officials  who did not understand English, and was therefore silent throughout the  initial meetings, had actually been the most valuable source of information  all along, yet could only convey that information when the meeting was  conducted in his own language. Additionally, according to senior officials  in two of the countries we visited, officers without fluent language skills  who accompany them to high-level meetings often produce inaccurate  notes. Since these notes provide a basis for the embassy’s reporting, the  officials spend a great deal of time correcting notes rather than addressing  more pressing concerns. Furthermore, in Beirut, State’s Inspector General  reported that most of the political and economic officers did not receive  the Arabic-language training needed to work professionally in Lebanon,  limiting opportunities to expand their contacts to the less sophisticated  urban areas and into the countryside.
Public diplomacy officers: Officers at many posts cannot communicate  effectively with foreign audiences in local languages, hampering their  ability to cultivate personal relationships and explain U.S. foreign policy.  According to a recent GAO report many public diplomacy officers in the  Muslim world cannot communicate with local audiences as well as their  positions require. For example, an information officer in Cairo stated that  his office does not have enough Arabic speaking staff to engage the  Egyptian media effectively. According to a State Inspector General  inspection report on the U.S. embassy in Damascus, public affairs officers  need Arabic language skills to maintain and expand contacts with  nongovernmental, human rights, and civil society groups, but the language  training offered in Damascus fails to prepare them for the idiomatic Arabic  spoken in the country.
Management officers: According to one ambassador we met with, a senior  level embassy official, who did not have sufficient speaking and reading  language requirements for his position, met with a prime minister, but was  unable to participate fully in the top-secret discussion without an outside  translator present. However, because the prime minister would not speak  freely with the translator present, the meeting was not productive.
Foreign service specialists: A regional security officer stated that lack of  foreign language capability may hinder intelligence gathering because  local informants are reluctant to speak through locally hired interpreters.
section_title: State Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Efforts
paragraphs: State has yet to evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve its  foreign language capabilities. In 2002, we reported that State did not know  whether its language incentives had helped to close skill gaps for certain  languages. We recommended that State adopt a strategic, results-oriented  approach to its human capital management and workforce planning. We  recommended an approach that included setting strategic direction,  assessing agency gaps in foreign language skills, developing an action  plan, and monitoring its implementation and level of success. In response,  State described a number of activities it was undertaking as examples of  how it had addressed many of the elements of workforce planning.  However, we noted that State still needed to develop an action plan for  correcting foreign language shortfalls and institute a monitoring process to  assess the action plan’s implementation and performance.
In 2003, we reported that State had not established numerical targets for  the number of individuals with hard-to-learn language skills it aimed to  hire. We also reported that State could not provide current or historical  data showing the number of individuals it hired as a direct result of its  targeted outreach efforts. We further recommended that State collect and  maintain data on the effectiveness of its efforts to address language gaps.  At the time of that review, State said that it maintains data on its  recruitment efforts. More recently, State’s Director of Recruitment,  Examination, and Employment told us that State has made greater use of  technology to track the results of its outreach efforts. However, State was  not using these data to routinely and systematically evaluate the  effectiveness of its efforts. For example, when we asked for data to  demonstrate whether the percentage of new hires with foreign language  skills had increased since our last review, State initially told us that such  data were not available. State also told us that it still could not link the  results of its hiring to its targeted outreach efforts. In its comments on this  report, State provided a skills gap analysis, which it submitted to the  Office of Management and Budget under the President’s Management  Agenda, as an example of how it evaluates the effectiveness of its efforts  to increase the language proficiency of its FSO generalists and specialists.  This submission included targets for increasing the number of officers  who speak and read a language at a level 3 or above in fiscal year 2007.  However, these targets were not linked to individual languages.
GAO’s internal control standards instruct agencies to identify risks that  could impede the efficient and effective achievement of their objectives  and assess their impact. State has not conducted an assessment that would  prioritize the resources it devotes to specific languages based on risk.  However, a number of potential risks are associated with not having staff  with the right language skills at critical posts, including the risks of (1)  adjudicating visas to the wrong applicants, thereby jeopardizing U.S.  national security; (2) missing opportunities to advance U.S. foreign policy  positions due to ineffective communication with foreign media  environments; and (3) compromising U.S. intelligence gathering as a result  of lost information from potential informants. State’s Director General has  said that State has not conducted the type of risk assessment that would  potentially reallocate resources from one area to another based on  strategic importance. Instead, State refines its critical needs languages list  on a yearly basis.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Despite the progress made under the DRI, critical gaps in staffing at  hardship posts and shortages of staff with foreign language proficiency in  critical languages continue to impact State’s diplomatic readiness. State  has provided a variety of incentives and taken a number of other actions to  attract staff to hardship posts and to improve its foreign language  capabilities since we last reported on this issue in 2003; however, State has  not evaluated these efforts. Further, some mid-level positions at hardship  posts continue to remain vacant for years, and we found that bids for such  positions have not increased significantly. Moreover, State has resisted  using its authority to direct staff to hardship posts to fill critical vacancies.  Similarly, State has not conducted the type of risk assessment of its  critical language needs that would allow it to reallocate limited staffing,  training, and other resources to fill critical language gaps in areas of high  priority. Because State does not currently have a sufficient level and mix  of staffing and language resources to immediately fill all of its gaps in  these areas, choices must be made about diplomatic readiness priorities,  given the risk and strategic interests in particular regions and countries.  Without taking a risk-based approach to the allocation of these limited  resources, these gaps will continue to compromise State’s ability to carry  out its foreign policy objectives and execute critical mission functions,  including reaching out to foreign audiences in regions of critical  importance to the war on terror.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance staffing levels and skills at hardship posts as well as the  language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, this report recommends that  the Secretary of State take the following five actions:    Consider using directed assignments, as necessary, using a risk-based  approach, to fill critical positions with fully qualified officers who have the  skills and experience necessary to effectively manage and supervise  essential mission functions at hardship posts;   Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the department’s incentive  programs for hardship post assignments, establishing specific indicators of  progress and adjusting the use of the incentives based on this analysis;   Consider an assignment system that allows for longer tours, consecutive  assignments in certain countries, and more regional specialization in  certain areas, in order to hone officers’ skills in certain superhard  languages and better leverage the investment State makes in language  training;   Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve the  language proficiency of its FSOs and specialists, establishing specific  indicators of progress in filling language gaps and adjusting its efforts,  accordingly; and   Conduct a risk assessment of critical language needs in regions and  countries of strategic importance, make realistic projections of the staff  time and related training float necessary to adequately train personnel to  meet those needs, and target its limited resources for language training, as  needed, to fill these critical gaps.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments  and our responses to specific points are reprinted in appendix IV. State  generally concurred with the report’s observations, conclusions, and  recommendations. For example, State said it would consider using  directed assignments when necessary and evaluate the effectiveness of its  incentives programs. The department also stated that it is examining its  assignment system and expects to make significant changes that will  address many of the concerns noted in this report. State described a  number of programs that it has initiated to address staffing and foreign  language shortfalls. State cited the Generalist Career Development  Program and its Global Repositioning Initiative as examples of efforts to  encourage service at hardship posts and enhance foreign language  proficiency.
State commented that it is evaluating the effectiveness of its efforts to  improve the language capabilities of its staff. However, while State is  evaluating some components of its efforts to enhance language  capabilities, it is not doing so routinely and systematically. For example, it  did not compile data to determine whether the percentage of new hires  with language skills had increased until we requested it, and State  acknowledged that the department still could not link the results of its  hiring to its targeted outreach efforts. In addition, State commented that it  conducts a risk assessment when the department reassesses its language  needs when realigning positions to support administration priorities,  conducts annual reviews of language designations of positions, and  modifies its critical language requirements to align with its diplomatic  strategies. However, State does not conduct the type of assessment that  we are recommending, which would allocate language resources based on  the strategic importance of a country or region and the risks associated  with not having language-proficient staff at posts in those locations.
We are sending this report to other interested Members of Congress and to  the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Department of State’s (State) progress in eliminating staffing  gaps, we  reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports, reviewed documentation on the goals and results of the Diplomatic  Readiness Initiative (DRI) and reports on incentives to attract bidders to  hardship posts,   analyzed staffing and vacancy data, including State surplus/deficit reports,    analyzed 2004 and 2005 bidding data to determine the average number of  bids per posts by hardship differential and by career track, and interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources and Bureau of  Consular Affairs and six regional bureaus regarding vacancy and staffing  issues.
To determine the total staff surplus/deficit at the Department of State, we  analyzed State staffing data and compared the number of positions in each  career track with the number of FSOs in each track. To calculate the  deficit for the mid-level officers, we used data for FS-01, FS-02, and FS-03.  For example, if the total number of employees in the consular career track  is 1,055 and the total number of consular positions is 1,866, the deficit in  officers would be 811. We analyzed data for each career track to determine  the surplus/deficit for each.
We analyzed bidding data to determine the average number of position  bids by posts, the median average bid for each differential rate, and the  areas of specialization that are difficult to staff. For these analyses, we  used the mid-level bidding data for the 2005 summer assignments cycle. In  order to compare 2005 data with 2002 data from our previous report and  remain consistent, we used FS-04 tenured, FS-03, and FS-02 bid data. To  obtain the average number of bids for each post, we took the total number  of bids received on all positions at each post and divided it by the total  number of positions to be filled at the post. For example, in the 2002  summer assignments cycle, Lagos had eight positions to be filled and  received a total of 11 bids, resulting in an average of 1.38 bids for this post.
To obtain the median bid at each differential rate, as represented in the  line in figure 3, we arranged in ascending order the average bid for each  post at the corresponding differential rate and used the middle average  bid. For example, assuming there are only five posts at the 25 differential  rate and their average bids are 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16, the median of the average  bids is 7. The bidding data include the number of positions to be filled at  each post and the number of bids received for each position. We used the  mid-level bidding data because mid-level positions comprised 56 percent  of the total foreign service workforce. We also used the bidding data for  the summer assignments cycle because, according to State officials, most  employees are transferred during this cycle, compared to the winter cycle.  Although we analyzed data for the two cycles, we provided information for  only the 2005 cycle because the results for 2004 were similar.
To assess State’s progress in filling gaps in the language proficiency of  foreign service officers and other staff, we performed the following:  reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports;   analyzed data on the foreign language requirements of State and its efforts  to enhance its foreign language capability;   analyzed worldwide data on language-designated positions by post,  languages, career track, specialty, and grade;   analyzed data on the language proficiency of staff at specific posts by  career track, specialty, and grade; and interviewed officials of the Office of Recruitment and the Office of  Resource Management and Organizational Analysis of the Bureau of  Human Resources, State’s Office of Inspector General, and the Foreign  Service Institute (FSI) regarding the hiring and training of language  proficient staff.
We compared the number of language designated positions in fiscal year  2001 with the number in 2005 to determine whether the number of  language-designated positions had increased, decreased, or remained the  same. We also compared staff’s language proficiency skills with their  position’s language requirements to determine whether they met the  requirements for the positions. For this analysis we considered language- designated generalist and specialist positions that were filled as of  October, 2005. We compared the positions’ speaking and reading  requirements against their occupants’ tested scores in the designated  languages. In cases where the occupants of language-designated positions  had no tested score, we deemed that they had failed to meet the  requirements. Several posts had “dual-language” positions; for example,  Tunis had a number of positions that could either be filled by an Arabic or  a French speaking officer. For some dual-language positions, the  occupants tested for both languages, and in those instances we selected  either the designated primary language, according to State’s records, or  the secondary language if the occupant failed to meet the primary  language’s requirements but met the second language’s requirements. In  our tabulations, we classified those dual language positions according to  the ones we selected, which were usually, but not always, the designated  primary languages. There were a number of dual language positions whose  occupants met the requirements for both languages. As our analysis was  designed to test whether the positions’ requirements were being met, not  to estimate the number of occupants with language abilities at each post  or for each language, we did not include those secondary languages. For a  few positions, State had created two sets of language requirements; when  that occurred, we compared the higher of the requirements against the  tested scores.
We obtained bidding, assignment, and foreign language data from State’s  Global Employee Management System (GEMS) database, which tracks  State personnel actions. The data in GEMS are compiled from a variety of  sources. For example, the Office of Career Development and Assignments  (HR/CDA) in State’s Bureau of Human Resources enters data in GEMS on  the results of the bidding and the assignment of employees to overseas  posts. FSI provides the data on the language proficiency of FSOs and  specialists. We reviewed the data for reasonableness and interviewed  officials from the Office of Resource Management and Organizational  Analysis and HR/CDA, and officials of the Foreign Service Institute  concerning the reliability of the data. The officials stated that all  employees are knowledgeable about their data, which serves as a  reliability check on the system. Based on our analysis of the data and  discussions with the officials, we determined the data are sufficiently  reliable for our purposes.
We conducted fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria; Sana’a, Yemen; and  Beijing, China, to study the impact of staffing and language gaps at  selected posts. We developed a matrix containing information on staffing  vacancies, number of bids per position, officers in stretch positions,  foreign language requirement, and the foreign language capabilities of staff  in language-designated positions to identify potential fieldwork locations.  We selected the posts in Nigeria because of the low number of staff  applying for each position. We selected Sana’a because of the low number  of staff applying for each position, because it requires staff proficient in  Arabic, which is a difficult language to learn, and because of Yemen’s  importance to the war on terrorism. We selected Beijing because it  requires staff proficient in Chinese, which is also a difficult language to  learn, and because of its strategic importance to the United States. We  performed our work from August 2005 to May 2006 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Department of State Staffing
paragraphs: As of September 30, 2005, the Department of State (State) had about  19,000 full-time American employees, including foreign service generalists,  foreign service specialists, and civil servants. Table 6 illustrates State’s    staffing by position type, as of September 30, 2005.
section_title: Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency at Language-Designated Positions
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated July 17, 2006.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We have modified our discussion of staffing at posts in Nigeria and  China to show that there is a mix of officers.  2.  Any analysis of bidding data will necessarily involve “snapshots” in  time. Our analysis of the 2005 bidding data was intended to  demonstrate whether posts with higher hardship differentials have  difficulty attracting applicants compared to posts with low or no  differentials. Our approach was identical to the one we used in 2002,  and State raised no such concerns then. Our analysis shows that State  has not made much progress since 2002 in attracting employees to bid  on hardship posts.  3.  We acknowledge that State has a system for identifying its language  requirements. However, State continues to fill language-designated  positions with staff who do not meet the language requirement. As  noted in this report, foreign language gaps may negatively impact  posts’ operations. For example, consular officers at one post told us  they sometimes adjudicate visas without fully understanding  everything the applicants tell them during visa interviews. A risk-based  approach will allow State to make choices given its current mix of  staffing and language resources.  4.  State did not provide these reports to us until after our report was  drafted, and we did not have sufficient time to assess them. The  language competency assessment State provided shows the total  number of officers with certain levels of proficiency in critical needs  languages and corresponding ratios of officers with language  proficiency to language designated positions. The assessment also  establishes out-year targets for increasing the number of officers with  level-3 language proficiency. However, it does not break out the data  and targets by individual language. Thus, State’s overall targets could  be achieved, even if serious proficiency gaps remained for some  languages but not for others. We also note that the report does not  include targets for specialists. Further, State has acknowledged that it  has not collected data to link its recruitment efforts to the number of  people it hires with foreign language skills.  5.  Our analysis of the language proficiency of officers in language  designated positions is based on State’s own established requirements  for these positions, whether for generalists or specialists. We provided  information on the language proficiency of the two different groups for  Arabic and Chinese, and we noted that specialists had some of the  highest percentages of staff that did not meet their position’s  requirements. We further noted that State’s Director General had  stated, in a cable issued in January 2006 that the department had been  shortsighted in not providing sufficient language training to specialists.  We have included additional information on the overall percentages of  officers meeting language requirements for the two different groups.  6.  We have included additional information on the percentages of officers  meeting either the speaking or reading requirement, but not both  requirements. We note that the differences are only 3 percentage  points.  7.  We added a statement to the discussion of 1-year tours noting that  employees may extend their tours.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgment
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Michael Courts, Assistant  Director; Joseph Carney, Martin de Alteriis, Gloria Hernandez-Saunders,  Julia Roberts, Josie Sigl, and La Verne Tharpes made key contributions to  the report.