U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain
Published: 2006-06-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami raised questions about U.S. preparedness for such an event. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. detection and warning efforts and partners with federal and state agencies in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) to reduce tsunami risks. In 2005, Congress appropriated $17.24 million in supplemental funding to enhance these efforts. This report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential impacts have been assessed, (2) discusses the effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami warning system, (3) describes efforts to mitigate the potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, and (4) assesses NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NOAA has determined that the Pacific coast states of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami hazard. The east and Gulf coasts are relatively low-hazard areas. While high-hazard areas have been identified, limited information exists on the likely impacts of a tsunami in those areas. Some coastal areas lack inundation maps showing the potential extent of tsunami flooding in communities, and others have maps that may be unreliable. State assessments of likely tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have been limited, in part, due to a lack of tsunami loss estimation software, as exists for floods and other hazards. Although federal warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and issue warnings, false alarms and warning system limitations hamper their effectiveness. Some state and local emergency managers have raised concerns about false alarms--the 16 warnings issued since 1982 were not followed by destructive tsunamis on U.S. shores--potentially causing citizens to ignore future warnings. Furthermore, limitations in the Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards may impede timely warnings to communities. For example, signal coverage for these two systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal areas and failure to properly activate them has resulted in warnings being delayed or not transmitted to some locations. NOAA has begun addressing false alarms but, according to agency officials, lacking the states' permission elsewhere, has only conducted "live" end-to-end testing of the warning systems in Alaska to identify problems. The at-risk communities GAO visited have mitigated potential tsunami impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public education, and infrastructure protection, but the level of implementation varies considerably by location. Most of the states and some communities GAO visited have basic mitigation plans identifying tsunami hazards. While all of these locations have multiple warning mechanisms in place, disruptions to key infrastructure such as telephone lines may hamper timely warnings. Furthermore, key educational efforts, such as distributing evacuation maps and developing school curricula have not been consistently implemented. In addition, few states and communities protect critical infrastructure from tsunamis through land-use and building design restrictions. Emergency managers attributed variability in their efforts to the need to focus on more frequent hazards like wildfires and to funding limitations. Furthermore, few communities participate in NOAA's preparedness program, according to NOAA officials, because they perceive the threat of a tsunami to be low. The nationwide expansion of NOAA's tsunami-related activities and NTHMP is under way; however, the future direction of these efforts is uncertain because they lack long-range strategic plans. NOAA has yet to identify long-range goals, establish risk-based priorities, and define performance measures to assess whether its tsunami-related efforts are achieving the desired results.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 killed more than 200,000  The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 killed more than 200,000  people, displaced more than 1.5 million, and caused significant damage in  people, displaced more than 1.5 million, and caused significant damage in  12 countries in Asia and East Africa. Although the earthquake that  12 countries in Asia and East Africa. Although the earthquake that  triggered the tsunami was immediately detected, the existence of a  triggered the tsunami was immediately detected, the existence of a  tsunami was not quickly confirmed, and a warning message was not  tsunami was not quickly confirmed, and a warning message was not  delivered to most of those in the tsunami’s path. As a result, casualties and  delivered to most of those in the tsunami’s path. As a result, casualties and  damage occurred not only near the earthquake’s source, where  damage occurred not only near the earthquake’s source, where  communities had little time to react, but also in distant coastal  communities had little time to react, but also in distant coastal  communities that were impacted by tsunami waves hours later. The  communities that were impacted by tsunami waves hours later. The  devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami has raised concerns  devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami has raised concerns  about the vulnerability and preparedness of U.S. coastal communities and  about the vulnerability and preparedness of U.S. coastal communities and  the ability of our detection and warning systems to help prevent a similarly  the ability of our detection and warning systems to help prevent a similarly  destructive event.  destructive event.
A tsunami is a series of ocean waves typically generated by an underwater  earthquake. A tsunami wave may be very small in the deep ocean, but as it  approaches land can increase to tens of feet in height and reach shore as a  fast-moving wall of turbulent water. Tsunamis pose an inundation threat to  low-lying coastal communities from multiple destructive waves that can  penetrate far inland. Tsunamis are categorized as either distant or local.  Distant tsunamis travel long distances from their triggering events to strike  the coast hours later, allowing time to warn and evacuate threatened  communities. Local tsunamis strike the coast minutes after their near- shore triggering event, allowing little time for warning and evacuation.  However, the frequency of damaging tsunamis in the United States has  been low, compared with other natural hazards, such as hurricanes,  earthquakes, and floods.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) manages  federal tsunami detection and warning efforts. NOAA’s National Weather  Service (NWS) operates two tsunami warning centers whose staff monitor  seismic data and, based on the location and magnitude of earthquakes,  issue warnings when tsunamis are likely. The warning centers transmit a  tsunami warning message to NWS forecast offices and state emergency  management centers, among others. NWS forecast offices transmit the  warning over NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NOAA Weather Radio)  and the Emergency Alert System. NOAA Weather Radio is a nationwide  network of radio stations broadcasting continuous weather information,  including warnings, watches, forecasts and other hazard information, 24  hours a day directly from NWS weather forecast offices. The Federal  Communication Commission’s Emergency Alert System, designed to  provide the President a means to communicate with the American people  in the event of an emergency, can decode and retransmit NOAA Weather  Radio warning messages over radio and television broadcast and cable  systems.
Federal, state, and local government agencies are all involved in efforts to  reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis through education, hazard  assessment, mitigation planning, and other activities. For example, NOAA  operates a tsunami preparedness recognition program known as  TsunamiReady that encourages communities to educate citizens on  tsunami hazards, develop tsunami hazard plans, and establish local  warning systems, among other things. In addition, NOAA provides  leadership and funding for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation  Program (NTHMP). This program, initiated in 1996, has been a partnership  between NOAA; the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS); the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and five states—Alaska,  California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington—to assess tsunami hazards,  improve and coordinate tsunami warning systems, and develop state and  local hazard mitigation programs. For example, under the NTHMP, NOAA  provides funding and technical support to help the states produce  inundation maps showing the extent to which coastal areas may be  flooded by a tsunami. Communities use these maps to help identify people  and property at-risk and to develop strategies for mitigating the hazard.  Furthermore, the Stafford Act, as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act  of 2000, requires all states and localities to develop FEMA-approved  hazard mitigation plans to qualify for certain disaster relief funding. These  plans provide a framework for states and communities to assess their  vulnerability to all hazards and, if a significant tsunami threat exists,  develop approaches to reduce tsunami impacts on people and  infrastructure within their jurisdictions.
In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $17.24 million in supplemental  funds for NOAA to expand and improve its tsunami detection capabilities,  enhance warning center operations and facilities, produce tsunami  inundation forecast models, and expand the TsunamiReady program  participation nationwide. In fiscal year 2006, $9.82 million in  appropriations were designated for tsunami-related activities, and NOAA  requested $21.66 million for fiscal year 2007. NOAA is initially spending  these funds primarily on enhancing its tsunami detection capabilities, for  example, by expanding its network of Deep-ocean Assessment and  Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) detection stations in the Pacific Ocean to  39 stations covering the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the Caribbean  Sea.
To address questions regarding the status of national tsunami  preparedness, this report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the  greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential tsunami impacts  on people and infrastructure have been assessed; (2) discusses the  effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami warning system; (3) describes  ongoing local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate the potential  impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities; and (4) assesses NOAA’s  efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami programs.
In conducting our work, we visited the states participating in the  NTHMP—Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington—as well as  Puerto Rico and Florida. We met with federal, state, and local officials,  reviewed documentation related to tsunami hazard assessment, warning  and mitigation efforts, and analyzed plans for current and future tsunami  preparedness activities. To identify the U.S. coastal areas facing the  greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which their vulnerability to  tsunami impacts has been assessed, we reviewed historic and seismic data  and analysis from NOAA and other federal and state sources. For the  states facing the greatest tsunami hazards, we determined the extent to  which tsunami inundation maps identifying the potential vulnerability of  people and infrastructure have been prepared, and reviewed each state’s  FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plan to determine how and to what  extent tsunami impacts have been assessed.
To discuss the effectiveness of the current federal tsunami warning  system, we visited both of NOAA’s tsunami warning centers and met with  officials to discuss how they conduct their detection and warning  responsibilities and how they measure their effectiveness. In addition, we  visited selected NOAA warning forecast offices, met with officials to  determine how tsunami warnings are disseminated and tracked, and met  with state emergency managers to determine how they receive warnings  and to obtain their views regarding the effectiveness of the warnings. We  also reviewed reports prepared by NOAA and by state emergency  managers that evaluated the effectiveness of warnings issued by NOAA on  June 14, 2005, due to a potentially tsunami-generating earthquake off the  Northern California coastline.
To describe local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate the potential  impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, we initially met with state  emergency managers and reviewed state mitigation documents. Because  comprehensive statewide data on local mitigation activities does not exist,  we next visited selected at-risk communities recommended by state  emergency managers. The communities we visited are Seward and Kodiak,  Alaska; San Mateo County and Crescent City, California; Hilo and  Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon; Mayaguez and Rincon,  Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach, Washington. We  discussed tsunami preparedness efforts with the community emergency  managers, such as planning, warning, education and outreach,  infrastructure protection, and the TsunamiReady program and obtained  documentation of their efforts and activities in these areas. We also met  with NOAA officials involved with the TsunamiReady program and  reviewed program documentation.
To assess NOAA’s efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami  programs, we met with NOAA officials and reviewed plans for NOAA’s  ongoing tsunami activities, as well as schedules for the completion of  NOAA’s Tsunami Program expansion. We also met with National Tsunami  Hazard Mitigation Program participants, including NOAA, USGS, FEMA,  and state representatives and reviewed program documentation to  determine how NOAA is planning for the future management and direction  of its tsunami activities.
We conducted our work between April 2005 and March 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Tsunamis are typically generated by underwater earthquakes—landslides,  volcanic activity, and meteor strikes are other known, but less common,  tsunami sources. Tsunami generating earthquakes usually occur in  subduction zones, such as those found in the Pacific Ocean off the U.S.  western and Alaskan coasts, as well as in the Caribbean. Marked by deep  trenches in the seafloor, subduction zones are formed where one of the  earth’s outer shell of tectonic plates plunges underneath another. Usually  the plates are gradually moving past each other, but friction may  temporarily lock them together, causing stress to build up between the  plates. Sometimes the stress is relieved suddenly in the form of a large  earthquake. As shown in figure 1, the bottom plate dives farther down,  snapping the top plate violently upward, disturbing the overlying seawater.  The size of the resulting tsunami depends on a complex set of factors,  including the size of the earthquake, its depth below the ocean floor, the  depth of the water, the type and amount of seafloor movement and the  energy released.
Once generated, some tsunami waves move quickly inland while other  waves head toward the open ocean, often at speeds up to 600 miles per  hour. Therefore, a tsunami generated by an earthquake off the coast of  Alaska would be a local tsunami for that state’s coastal areas, and could  strike within minutes of the event, while the same event is considered a  distant tsunami for the coast of Washington state, which would not likely  be hit until 3 or more hours later.
While tsunamis can be a high impact natural hazard, the frequency of  damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low, compared with  other natural hazards. According to NOAA’s records, the last tsunami  causing significant impacts was at Skagway, Alaska, in November 1994,  where the landslide and associated tsunami caused one death and $25  million in damages.  According to FEMA, flooding, severe storms, and  hurricanes are the most common and costly causes of disaster  declarations in the United States; at least 10 such events since 1989 have  each required FEMA relief expenditures in excess of a billion dollars.  Although damaging tsunamis are relatively rare, the devastation caused by  the Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrates the need for assessing the threat,  and for monitoring and preparing for an event in at-risk areas, particularly  low-lying, seismically active coastal areas.
The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska, is  responsible for warning Alaska, the west coast and east coast states, and  states along the Gulf of Mexico, while the Richard H. Hagemeyer, Pacific  Tsunami Warning Center in Ewa Beach, Hawaii, is responsible for warning  Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea. These  warning centers use two types of data for determining when to issue a  tsunami warning. First, they receive and analyze earthquake data from  seismic networks operated by NOAA, USGS, the states, and universities to  determine whether to issue a warning. If the seismic data indicate that a  local tsunami may be generated, the responsible warning center issues a  warning based on the earthquake data alone. Second, the warning centers  analyze sea-level data to determine whether a tsunami has actually been  generated, and if not, cancel the warning. The centers receive sea-level  data through a network of DART stations and sea-level gauges, as shown  in figure 2. DART stations consist of a seafloor bottom-pressure recording  system that is capable of detecting tsunamis smaller than 1 inch and is  connected to a surface buoy that transmits the data by satellite to NOAA.  Scientists at the warning centers incorporate the data from the DART  stations into tsunami forecast models to estimate the size of the expected  waves and the potential impact on coastal areas. The tsunami warning  centers have used forecast models they developed, as well as models  developed by NOAA’s Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, which  produce expected tsunami inundations at nine high-risk locations.
A network of federal, state, and local government agencies are responsible  for ensuring that a tsunami warning reaches the public. Figure 3 provides  an overview of the key components of this process. The federal tsunami  warning centers send a warning to NWS forecast offices and state  emergency management centers by multiple means, such as FEMA’s  National Warning System, a dedicated telephone hotline, and NWS’s  satellite-based National Weather Wire Service. The forecast offices, in  turn, transmit the warning over NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency  Alert System (EAS). State emergency managers receive tsunami warnings  from NWS and then warn counties and local communities using multiple  methods, including a dedicated telephone network for state and local  emergency management officials. Finally, county and local officials are  responsible for warning the public and issuing evacuation orders, using a  variety of methods including bullhorns, sirens, and telephone systems.
Federal, state, and local government agencies also conduct hazard  mitigation activities to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis. At the  federal level, NWS operates the TsunamiReady community recognition  program. Initiated in 2000, TsunamiReady is modeled after NWS’s  StormReady program for hurricanes and tornados. NWS meteorologists in  regional forecast offices are responsible for reviewing applications from  coastal communities and ensuring that they meet program requirements in  conjunction with state emergency management officials. NOAA also  provides a chairperson and funding for the NTHMP. From 1998 through  2001, NOAA provided $2.3 million annually for the NTHMP, increasing to  $4.3 million annually in 2002 through 2005, and returning to $2.3 million in  2006. Initially, the five participating states each received less than $100,000  annually from the NTHMP, but in recent years they have each received  approximately $275,000 annually to directly supplement their individual  mitigation efforts, while NOAA and the other federal partners used the  remaining funds to support their own activities under the program. NOAA  estimates that since the program’s inception the states have matched the  NTHMP funding by a ratio of six state in-kind or dollar contributions for  every program dollar.
section_title: The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and Caribbean Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been Comprehensively Assessed
paragraphs: Tsunamis pose the greatest hazard to the coastal areas of the five states  bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S. territories in the Caribbean, but for  many of these areas reliable, comprehensive assessments of potential  tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have not been completed.  Some high-hazard coastal areas do not have tsunami inundation maps— the foundation for evaluating potential tsunami impacts on communities— showing the extent to which a tsunami would penetrate inland and flood  communities, while others have maps that may not be reliable. Progress in  developing these maps has been slow, primarily because accurate maps  are complex and costly for states to produce. Furthermore, states and  communities do not have comprehensive information on the potential  human, structural, and economic impacts of a tsunami. While FEMA has  standardized computer software for estimating losses resulting from  natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, no such tool  exists for assessing tsunamis.
subsections: section_title: The Coastal Areas of the Pacific United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands Face the Greatest Tsunami Hazards
paragraphs: According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both distant and  local tsunami hazards are Hawaii and the west coast states of California,  Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska and the Caribbean Islands of  Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are threatened primarily by local  tsunamis, as shown in table 1. The hazard levels are primarily based on  tsunami source, height, and frequency information since 1900—the most  reliable and accurate information available—from NOAA’s National  Geophysical Data Center tsunami database.
According to NOAA, Hawaii is a high-hazard area for distant and local  tsunamis. Hawaii has experienced many destructive tsunamis because of  its location in the Pacific Ocean, as shown in figure 4, where about 80  percent of all recorded tsunamis have occurred. More than one-half of all  tsunamis recorded in the Hawaiian Islands were generated in the distant  Aleutian regions of the northern and northwestern Pacific Ocean, and  about one-fourth were generated along the western coast of South  America. Hawaii’s local tsunami threat stems from earthquake and  volcanic activity, which cause underwater landslides off the coast. Hawaii  suffered its greatest tsunami death and destruction in 1946, when an  earthquake in the Aleutian Islands generated a tsunami that reportedly  killed 159 people. Hilo, Hawaii suffered the greatest loss—96 deaths and  the destruction of its waterfront area. Since 1946, an additional five  tsunamis—four distant and one local—have caused a reported 63 deaths  and widespread destruction.
NOAA considers the west coast a high-hazard area for distant tsunamis  and medium-hazard area for local tsunamis. Like Hawaii, the west coast  historically has suffered the most destruction from tsunamis generated by  Pacific earthquakes in the distant South America and Aleutian regions. In  California, two tsunamis have caused significant damage. The 1960  Chilean earthquake caused estimated tsunami damages of over $1 million,  and the tsunami generated by the 1964 Alaskan event killed 12 in Northern  California and caused an estimated $15 million in destruction, including  damages inside San Francisco Bay. Oregon and Washington both have  sustained damages in coastal areas from distant tsunamis over the years.  Although distant tsunamis historically have been most common, a local  tsunami generated by the 750 mile long Cascadia subduction zone, lying  just 50 to 100 miles off the coasts of Washington, Oregon, and Northern  California, is considered a major threat. (See fig. 5.) Geologic and other  records from a Cascadia earthquake in 1700 suggest that the fault could  generate a tsunami wave of up to 30 feet that would likely reach the  Oregon coast in 15 to 30 minutes, raising concerns of a catastrophic future  event.
Alaska is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis, but a low-hazard area for  distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local tsunami threat to Alaska is  caused by seismic activity in the Aleutian subduction zone where the  Pacific and North-American tectonic plates collide, as shown in figure 6.  Tsunamis generated by earthquake induced landslides occurring inside  bays have been responsible for most death and damage in Alaska. The  1964 Alaskan earthquake triggered several tsunamis that in some cases  struck land within 2 minutes of being generated. The tsunamis caused 106  deaths in Alaska and caused significant damage in the towns of Kodiak,  Seward, Whittier, and Valdez. Only once has a distant tsunami caused  damage in Alaska; the 1960 Chilean earthquake caused relatively minor  tsunami impacts on Alaskan harbors.
The Caribbean area, including the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the  U.S. Virgin Islands, is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis but a low- hazard area for distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local tsunami  threat posed to the islands comes primarily from the potential for  earthquakes and underwater landslides in the Puerto Rico Trench  subduction zone that lies to the north of both Puerto Rico and the U.S.  Virgin Islands, as shown in figure 7. Puerto Rico’s most devastating event  of the last century occurred in 1918, when an earthquake off the northwest  coast generated a tsunami of more than 15 feet, causing an estimated 140  deaths and about $4 million in property damages. In the town of Aguadilla,  nearly 300 homes were destroyed. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, an 1867  earthquake in the Anegada Trench sent destructive waves into the harbor  of Charlotte Amelie on the island of Saint Thomas, destroying boats, the  wharf, and the waterfront.
According to NOAA, the Atlantic and Gulf state coasts are relatively low- hazard areas for distant or local tsunamis, with few reliable reports of  tsunami waves of any size ever reaching either coast. This is a  consequence of the low level of tsunami generating seismic activity  nearby—the nearest subduction zones are in the Caribbean. Historically,  none of the tsunamis generated in the Atlantic Ocean region has  significantly affected the east coast of the United States. For example, the  1929 Grand Banks earthquake-induced landslide caused a tsunami which  killed 29 in Newfoundland but only resulted in a wave height of 1 foot on  the U.S. coast, and a distant tsunami generated by a massive earthquake  near Lisbon, Portugal in 1755 had no observed impact on the U.S. coast.  The potential distant threat from the collapse of a volcanic island off the  coast of Africa is the subject of scientific debate, and the potential for a  local tsunami-generating collapse of the continental shelf off of the east  coast is being investigated but is unconfirmed. Regarding the Gulf coast,  an earthquake in the Caribbean is considered the most likely source of a  tsunami; however, scientists believe that Florida and Cuba protect the Gulf  from Caribbean tsunamis and that the Gulf is unlikely to propagate a large,  destructive tsunami wave.
section_title: Potential Tsunami Impacts on People and Infrastructure Have Not Been Comprehensively or Reliably Assessed
paragraphs: Because inundation maps are the foundation for evaluating the potential  impacts of tsunami events, producing such maps has been a high priority  since 1996 for NOAA and the five states participating in the NTHMP. To  optimize time and resources, the NTHMP partners agreed that (1) the  states would identify the high-priority communities to be mapped; (2)  NOAA, state, and university tsunami modeling scientists would use models  to produce inundation information for high-priority areas identified by the  states; and (3) state and local officials would produce and publish official  inundation maps. NOAA’s Center for Tsunami Inundation Mapping Efforts  at its Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory assists the modelers and  the states in their efforts.
Although the NTHMP planned to complete mapping for all at-risk U.S.  coastal communities by 1999, progress has been slowed, primarily because  more accurate—but also more complex and costly—mapping techniques  have been adopted by the states. Initially, the NTHMP planned to use  relatively simple modeling technology because this approach would  require fewer resources than the more advanced technique, known as two- dimensional modeling, which requires detailed seafloor and coastal terrain  data to accurately model wave action and impact. Upon comparison of  these two technologies, the NTHMP decided in December 1996 to use two- dimensional modeling techniques for all mapping. While the NTHMP  members recognized that adopting two-dimensional modeling would  reduce the pace of modeling and mapping, they agreed that the decision  would result in products of improved detail, quality, and reliability.
Consequently, in the five states participating in the NTHMP, some coastal  areas currently do not have two-dimensional tsunami inundation maps,  while other coastal areas have inundation maps that predate current  modeling standards and therefore may not be reliable. Specifically:
Alaska has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 5 communities,  while 60 additional communities are prioritized, but have yet to be  mapped;
California has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 11 coastal  counties, excluding some areas such as harbors, while maps are being  produced for the remaining 4 counties;
Hawaii has 66 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current  modeling standards; because the existing maps may underestimate  inundation areas, the state initiated a two-dimensional mapping program  in 2005 that has produced one map;
Oregon has 52 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current  modeling standards; since 1996 the state has produced two-dimensional  maps for 9 communities, and 17 additional communities are prioritized but  have not yet been mapped; and
Washington has two-dimensional maps for its southern coast as well as  many northern areas, while eight additional maps have been prioritized  but remain incomplete for certain coastal bay and Puget Sound  communities.
To effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and localities also need to  assess potential impacts on people and infrastructure. According to FEMA  risk assessment guidance, after mapping how and where hazards will  impact an area, planners should determine what elements of the  population, infrastructure, and economy will be impacted by the hazards  and estimate the potential losses that could occur. According to FEMA,  estimating losses is essential for decision making at all levels of  government, including providing a basis for developing mitigation plans  and policies, emergency preparedness, and response and recovery  planning.
Each of the five Pacific region states, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S.  Virgin Islands, have identified tsunamis as a hazard in their FEMA- approved, all-hazard mitigation plans. To obtain FEMA approval, states  are required to describe and estimate losses—based on their own and  local jurisdiction assessments—for state-owned or -operated buildings,  infrastructure, and critical facilities in areas subject to hazards. According  to FEMA, the agency deliberately took the approach of not being highly  prescriptive regarding the development of the plans—focusing its  requirements more on what should be done rather than how it should be  done—in recognition of the inherent differences among states in terms of  size, resources, capabilities, and vulnerability. For example, states are  highly encouraged, but not required, to consider impacts on vulnerable  populations, in particular elderly, disabled, and low-income persons, and  to analyze the potential economic and human impact that each hazard  would have statewide. FEMA also encourages the use of several tools in  preparing damage assessments, such as HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S.—Multi- Hazard), which is standardized computer software for comprehensively  estimating the likely human, structural, and economic damages from  earthquakes, floods, and hurricane winds. However, HAZUS-MH does not  include a tsunami loss estimation module; and according to FEMA, there is  no similarly reliable tool for estimating tsunami losses.
The National Science and Technology Council’s December 2005 report on  tsunami risk reduction specifically called for FEMA, NOAA, and USGS to  take responsibility for developing a coordinated risk-assessment tool— e.g., HAZUS—for effective use in tsunami risk assessments. The National  Institute of Building Sciences—which produced the existing HAZUS-MH  software for other hazards in partnership with FEMA—has estimated that  developing tsunami loss estimation methods and software would take  about 3 years, at a cost of up to $10 million. A standardized tsunami loss  estimation tool would not only help the existing five NTHMP-member  states conduct risk assessments, but it would also be useful to any  additional states joining the NTHMP as it expands into a national program;  and it could also help the NTHMP and NOAA prioritize tsunami activities  to focus on the areas most vulnerable to tsunami losses.
Because of the lack of tsunami inundation maps, the variability in  approaches that was allowed in the all-hazard plans, and the lack of a  standardized tsunami loss estimation tool, some at-risk states have not  specifically assessed potential tsunami impacts, while other at-risk states  or territories have produced assessments that do not provide complete  loss information for all areas. Consequently, emergency managers in the  at-risk states and territories do not have comprehensive information on  how many and what types of structures would be exposed and damaged,  how many people would likely be injured or killed, or the extent of likely  short- and long-term economic impacts in the event of a tsunami. For  example:
Alaska has not assessed tsunami impacts because the state lacks detailed  inundation information for many at-risk coastal communities;
California assessed impacts from its high-risk earthquake hazard where  tsunamis are identified as a subhazard, but the state has not specifically  assessed tsunami impacts; and
Hawaii assessed tsunami impacts on the state’s critical infrastructure and  estimated the average annualized property loss; but the state did not  estimate injuries, deaths or the overall economic impacts due to tsunamis.
According to NOAA officials, risk assessments for coastal areas requires  the careful analysis of information such as tsunami frequency, site-specific  tsunami inundation levels, and population density; but they acknowledge  that such information is not available for many at-risk areas. Nevertheless,  in March 2006, NOAA developed a preliminary estimate of the tsunami risk  to people on beaches in various areas, including the Pacific region,  Florida’s east coast, and the Caribbean region. Based on historical tsunami  frequency information from the 1700’s to the present, and estimates of  current daily beach attendance, NOAA’s analysis suggests that while large  tsunamis occur more often in the Pacific region, over a 100-year time  frame, the potential loss of life in the Caribbean and Florida regions could  be greater due to higher beach attendance in these warm water locations.
section_title: Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but Warning Systems Have Limitations
paragraphs: NWS’s two tsunami warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and  issue warnings, but the effectiveness of these warnings has been  hampered by frequent false alarms and limitations in the federal systems  that transmit warnings to the local level. Experts warn that false alarms  may generate unnecessary and costly evacuations and cause people to  ignore future warnings. NWS is working to reduce the number and  duration of false alarms, but it has not established any specific  performance targets for reducing them. Furthermore, although the  warning centers quickly transmit tsunami warnings to NWS forecast  offices, the forecast offices do not always send timely warnings to affected  local areas because the two primary federal warning systems—the  Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio—have significant  limitations.
subsections: section_title: NWS Quickly Detects Potential Tsunamis and Issues Warnings, but False Alarms Are a Concern
paragraphs: NWS’s tsunami warning centers’ goal is to issue “timely, accurate, reliable,  and effective” warnings to protect coastal populations from tsunamis.  Based on warning center data, the centers issued timely warning bulletins,  generally within 5 to 10 minutes for local events. The tsunami warning  centers have consistently reduced their average annual time to issue  bulletins—from 11 minutes in 1996 to 6.4 minutes in 2005 for the center in  Alaska, and from 16 minutes in 1996 to 4.5 minutes in 2005 for the center  in Hawaii. According to tsunami warning center officials, more and better  quality seismic data, as well as improved analysis techniques and  computer equipment over the last decade, have enabled faster bulletin  issuance.
While the warning centers are able to detect potential tsunamis and issue  timely warnings, some state and local officials have raised concerns about  their accuracy and reliability due to false alarms. No destructive tsunami  has reached U.S. shores following any of the 16 warnings—primarily for  local tsunamis—issued to states by the warning centers since 1982.  According to warning center officials, their responsibility to provide timely  warnings requires them to broadcast warnings based on limited,  preliminary earthquake information before any resulting tsunami wave is  actually observed. However, according to emergency response experts,  such false alarms can generate costly, potentially dangerous evacuations  and may cause people to ignore critical warnings in the future. For  example, according to the state of Hawaii’s most recent estimate, an  evacuation from a tsunami false alarm in 1996 would have cost the state  $58.2 million in economic losses, or—adjusted for inflation—about $71  million in 2006 dollars.
According to some state and local emergency management officials, a  false alarm occurred in June 2005, when they received a tsunami warning  from NWS that they felt was too broad. On June 14, 2005, the warning  center in Alaska detected a 7.2 magnitude earthquake 90 miles off the  Northern California coast. The center quickly issued a warning for all  coastal areas that were within two hours of the tsunami’s forecasted travel  time, including areas from the northern tip of Canada’s Vancouver Island  to the California-Mexico border. Knowing that it would take hours for the  tsunami to reach his community, a Southern California emergency  management official who received the warning sought to confirm the  tsunami’s existence by contacting his Northern California counterparts  closer to the source. He learned that a destructive tsunami had not been  generated and determined that his community should not evacuate.  According to this official, because his area was not imminently threatened  by a tsunami, it should not have been included in the initial warning. As a  result of the feedback received after the June 14, 2005 event, the warning  center in Alaska has changed its warning protocols so that it will issue a  tsunami warning for only about half of the area that received a warning  during the June event, if a similar situation should occur in the future.
Seismologists outside of NOAA have suggested that the tsunami warning  centers could reduce the duration—and perhaps the number—of false  alarms by relying more on seismic analyses that assess the type and  direction of an earthquake. For example, according to some state and  USGS seismologists, the June 14, 2005, earthquake’s horizontal motion  should have indicated that the generation of a tsunami was highly unlikely,  enabling the warning center to cancel the warning within minutes, rather  than over an hour later. However, a NWS review of the event noted that  horizontal-motion earthquakes can trigger submarine landslides that can  in turn produce tsunamis, so the warning center should not cancel a  warning solely based on seismic analysis. According to warning center  officials, they receive feedback from outside seismologists regarding  warning procedures through organizations such as the NTHMP. However,  some outside seismologists are concerned that warning center  seismologists are reluctant to seek feedback or adopt new analytical  procedures for issuing and canceling warnings.
NOAA expects that false alarms will be reduced with the expansion of the  sea-level data network and through an upgrade of its forecasting tools.  DART stations help reduce false alarms for distant tsunamis because the  stations detect slight changes in deep-ocean waves far from shore that  help forecast how these waves will grow as they approach the coast. In  addition to expanding the DART network, NOAA is upgrading the models  that use DART data to forecast tsunami flooding and is also expanding and  upgrading its network of sea-level gauges that the warning centers use to  confirm or cancel tsunami warnings. The tide gauge expansion plan calls  for deploying a total of 16 new gauges and upgrading 33 gauges by  November 2006.
NOAA acknowledges the importance of reducing tsunami false alarms but  has not yet established performance goals or related metrics for  identifying progress toward this goal, such as tracking the number and  duration of warnings to areas that do not experience destructive tsunamis.  According to NWS officials, they are currently evaluating outcome goals  and performance measures for warnings and other tsunami-related  activities and expect to finalize these goals and measures in 2006.
section_title: Limitations in Federal Emergency Warning Systems Impede Rapid and Comprehensive Tsunami Warning Transmission
paragraphs: Technical gaps and procedural limitations have impeded federal  emergency warning systems from broadcasting rapid and comprehensive  tsunami warnings to affected local areas. For example, technical gaps such  as weak signals and transmitter failures have prevented comprehensive  warning transmission over the EAS and NOAA Weather Radio.  Broadcasting tsunami warnings over EAS and NOAA Weather Radio  requires NOAA-owned transmitters to relay a signal from the NWS forecast  offices to the broadcast stations and NOAA Weather Radio, as shown in  figure 8.
According to NOAA officials, NOAA transmitters provide signal coverage  for 97 percent of the nation’s population; however, some coastal locations  including portions of Hawaii receive such weak signals that NOAA  Weather Radio is unlikely to function. Transmitter failure has also  prevented warnings from being sent over EAS and NOAA Weather Radio.  For example, on June 14, 2005, some coastal communities in Washington  and Oregon did not receive the warning over EAS or NOAA Weather Radio  because transmitters failed to send a signal. A September 2005 test of the  federal tsunami warning systems in California, Oregon, and Washington  found improvements in problematic transmission areas identified during  the June event but uncovered new signal transmission issues in other  areas. NWS is adding new transmitters to improve signal coverage and  refurbishing old transmitters to improve their reliability.
In addition, procedural limitations such as the NWS forecast offices’  inconsistent activation of EAS and NOAA Weather Radio can impede rapid  and comprehensive transmission of tsunami warnings. On June 14, 2005,  the forecast offices responded to the tsunami warning in a variety of ways,  some of which caused delays or nontransmission of EAS or NOAA  Weather Radio warnings to affected local areas. For example, staff in  some NWS forecast offices did not enter a tsunami-specific warning code  into a computer, resulting in EAS and NOAA Weather Radio not activating  rapidly, if at all. According to a subsequent NWS assessment of the event,  guidance to forecast office staff on tsunami warning procedures was  inadequate. Since the June 2005 event, coastal NWS forecast offices in  Washington, Oregon, and California have received guidance that, for  example, lists EAS activation as the proper first step when a tsunami  warning is received.
Although the warning centers conduct monthly tests of their  communication systems to ensure that NWS forecast offices and state  emergency management centers receive the warnings, NWS does not  routinely conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the tsunami warning system  using the actual “live” computer codes rather than test codes. Such an end- to-end test would check the systems and procedures used to transmit an  actual tsunami warning from the tsunami warning center to the public and  identify technical gaps and procedural shortcomings. NWS conducted the  first such end-to-end test of the tsunami warning system in Alaska,  including activation of EAS and NOAA Weather Radio in March 2005. The  test uncovered breakdowns in EAS warning transmission at television and  radio stations whose EAS systems were not set up to use the tsunami  warning code. NWS is working with emergency managers and  broadcasters in Alaska to take corrective actions and retest the system. In  commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that while it supports  broadening end-to-end testing in at-risk states it can conduct end-to end  testing using “live” warning codes for the EAS system only in those states  that permit it to do so. In other states, end-to-end testing is conducted by  using test codes for the EAS system. NOAA said it will continue to  encourage state participation in the end-to-end testing of the tsunami  warning system.
section_title: State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under Way, although Implementation Varies Considerably among Locations
paragraphs: The 12 coastal communities in the six at-risk states and territories that we  visited are taking actions to mitigate tsunami impacts through planning,  warning system improvements, public education, and some infrastructure  protection efforts, although the level of implementation varies  considerably among locations. While state and local tsunami mitigation  plans and warning systems have largely been developed, limitations exist  that have raised concerns about their effectiveness. In addition, key public  education efforts have not been consistently implemented in all coastal  communities we visited, and only a few communities have taken steps to  protect critical infrastructure from potential tsunami damage. Overall,  tsunami mitigation efforts have been mixed due to a number of challenges,  including competing priorities, funding constraints, and lack of authority  to implement legislative or policy changes. Finally, while 7 of the 12  communities we visited participate in NOAA’s TsunamiReady  preparedness program, nationwide few coastal communities have chosen  to participate in the program.
subsections: section_title: State and Local Tsunami Mitigation Plans and Warning Systems Have Been Largely Developed, but Concerns Exist about Warning System Effectiveness
paragraphs: According to FEMA guidance, the purpose of mitigation planning is to  identify natural hazards, consider actions and activities to reduce potential  losses from those hazards, and coordinate the implementation of a hazard  mitigation plan. All six of the states and territories we visited have  developed FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans, a requirement to  qualify for certain disaster-related grant funds under the Stafford Act, as  amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. These plans identify  tsunami hazards and describe in general terms the vulnerability of people  and property to tsunami threats. Most of the state level plans we reviewed  take the additional step of identifying specific actions to mitigate the risks  identified, such as relocating critical facilities out of tsunami inundation  zones. While only 4 of the 12 communities we visited have FEMA- approved plans, each of the four has identified projects to mitigate  tsunami hazards. State and local emergency managers whom we spoke  with cited resource and time constraints as significant barriers to  improving mitigation planning.
All of the states and communities we visited have developed warning  systems, but they have various limitations that may impact their  effectiveness. State and local tsunami warning systems help ensure that all  at-risk residents and tourists are warned about a potential tsunami in a  timely manner. Most of the coastal communities we visited employ some  technologically sophisticated methods to warn residents. For example, 8  of the 12 communities we visited had at least one tsunami warning siren  and three alerted residents by an automated telephone system. However,  local emergency managers told us that inadequate warning siren coverage  was a significant issue in many locations, such as Ocean Shores,  Washington, and on Alaska’s Kenai Peninsula. In addition, many of the  warning methods used by communities—such as sirens and internet-based  messaging systems—are dependent on telephone lines and other  infrastructure that would likely be disrupted by a strong earthquake.  During the June 2005 tsunami warning on the west coast, officials in  several communities noted that telephone lines were overloaded by a  surge of incoming 911 calls from concerned residents, in some cases,  preventing emergency managers from contacting other local officials and  preventing telephone-based warning systems from reaching all residents.  Some emergency managers expressed concern that they do not have  adequate backup systems to receive and disseminate warning messages if  telephone lines fail. Finally, three of the communities we visited rely on  warning methods such as verbal notifications by bullhorns or radio  broadcasts.
State and local emergency managers are aware of the limitations of  existing tsunami warning systems and are involved in a number of projects  to address them. For example, some of the communities we visited have  attempted to obtain additional sirens and replace unreliable ones to  provide better coverage to residents. For Crescent City, California, and  Gold Beach, Oregon, county officials obtained a number of used civil  defense sirens for a nominal cost but reported that installation and  maintenance costs pose additional challenges. Washington state has  provided seven at-risk communities with advanced All Hazard Alert  Broadcasting sirens, but their high cost—approximately $50,000, twice as  much as a new, conventional siren—may be prohibitive for other  communities.more effective communications between emergency management officials  and first responders. For example, some have purchased satellite phones  and digital communications systems that are not vulnerable to earthquake  damages or interoperable radios that ensure that first responders can talk  to each other if telephone lines are disrupted. In coastal areas with high  population and building densities—where roads, bridges, and other  horizontal evacuation methods are limited or where warning time is  short—vertical evacuation to the upper floors of buildings that are capable  of withstanding the initial earthquake and subsequent tsunami can be an  alternative or supplement to horizontal evacuation.
In addition, communities have taken actions to ensure  Most of the states and communities we visited have made efforts to test  their evacuation plans and warning systems, but few comprehensive drills  have been conducted. Recent events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,  have illustrated that robust training and testing are important to identify  problems in advance of an actual event. However, only Seaside, Oregon,  has conducted comprehensive tsunami exercises involving multiple  agencies and full public participation. Five of the communities we visited  have conducted exercises involving multiple agencies in mock tsunami  scenarios to discuss plans and procedures involved in responding to a real  event. While these efforts are useful, their limited scope may not  adequately identify all of the issues that would emerge in an actual event.  For example, in an actual emergency, traffic control and public  evacuations may take substantially longer than estimated. Local officials  told us that more comprehensive drills would be beneficial, but they have  limited funding and staff to plan and conduct them and getting community  involvement is very difficult due to the disruption to the local economy.
section_title: Tsunami Education and Outreach Efforts Have Not Been Consistently Implemented
paragraphs: Education and outreach efforts are important because plans and warning  systems may do little to save lives if the public does not know what to do  when it receives a warning. Two such efforts, distributing evacuation maps  and posting tsunami evacuation signs, raise awareness of tsunami threats  and educate the public on appropriate escape routes. Ten of the 12  communities we visited have either received evacuation maps from the  state or developed their own maps identifying appropriate evacuation  routes. However, only five of the communities reported distributing  evacuation maps to all residents, either by mailing them to all registered  utility customers, publishing them in the local telephone book, or in one  case distributing them door-to-door. A few communities have taken other  actions to reach the public such as posting evacuation maps in police  stations and on grocery store reader boards. Several communities have  made efforts to reach tourists by providing evacuation maps at areas they  frequent, such as the local visitor’s center and distributing tsunami hazard  information and evacuation maps to hotels. Regarding tsunami signs, 9 of  the 12 communities reported posting tsunami hazard or evacuation route  signs in their communities, such as those shown in figure 9, although in a  few locations, local emergency managers reported that the signs are  frequently stolen.
According to emergency management officials and other emergency  preparedness experts, focusing on educating youth—the adults of  tomorrow—has considerable promise for increasing tsunami  preparedness. Specifically, two key efforts—developing and implementing  school curricula and conducting tsunami evacuation drills in schools— may help improve tsunami preparedness now and in the future. Of the six  at-risk states and territories we visited, only two—Oregon and  Washington—have developed tsunami specific curricula and are teaching  them in schools, according to state emergency managers. The  Washington state curriculum is targeted at two age groups—grades K  through 6 and grades 7 through 12—and provides various lessons to help  students plan ahead for a tsunami and protect themselves and their  families when a tsunami occurs. In addition, Hawaii has developed a  tsunami specific curriculum that will be tailored to each of its counties.  Oregon and Hawaii also require schools in tsunami inundation areas to  conduct tsunami drills at least once a year, often in conjunction with  Tsunami Awareness month activities. For example, in Hilo, Hawaii, an  elementary school located in a known tsunami inundation area conducts  an annual evacuation drill in which students practice responding to a  tsunami warning by walking from the school to a safe location. Three of  the communities we visited in Washington, Puerto Rico, and Alaska also  reported conducting tsunami evacuation drills in schools at least once a  year, even though the states do not require them.
All six of the at-risk states and territories we visited have conducted a  variety of education and outreach activities to distribute tsunami hazard  information to communities. For example, the states we visited have  developed a variety of print materials, produced videos, made tsunami  information available on the Internet, and conducted forums and other  workshops to educate citizens on tsunami risks and preparedness. At the  community level, 11 of the 12 emergency managers we visited stated that  forums and workshops have been conducted to educate residents and  tourists about tsunami hazards. However, only two local emergency  managers reported meeting with special needs populations, such as  community hospitals and senior centers, to distribute tsunami hazard  information and encourage them to develop tsunami evacuation plans.
All of the at-risk states and territories acknowledged the need for  additional education and outreach but cited two primary challenges to  increasing and sustaining such efforts. First, many of the state emergency  managers whom we spoke with noted that they are responsible for other,  higher priority hazards—such as floods and wildland fires—that occur  more frequently than tsunamis. Second, the states have limited funding  dedicated to tsunami preparedness activities. Of the approximately  $275,000 in NTHMP funds provided annually to each state, the states have  chosen to use most of it to develop or upgrade existing tsunami inundation  maps rather than for education or outreach efforts. Local emergency  managers echoed these challenges. Moreover, in many areas that depend  on tourism, local emergency managers said that businesses are reluctant  to post tsunami hazard information because it may scare tourists and  negatively impact the economy. Many noted, however, that since the  December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the subsequent June 2005  tsunami warning on the west coast, community interest in workshops and  forums has increased. Local businesses—in particular hotels and motels— have become increasingly interested in receiving tsunami hazard  information to distribute to patrons.
section_title: States and Localities Have Undertaken Few Efforts to Protect Infrastructure from Potential Tsunami Damage
paragraphs: According to tsunami experts, land-use planning and zoning strategies— for example,  designating tsunami hazard areas for open-space uses, such  as parks, and locating new infrastructure and critical facilities (i.e., police  stations, hospitals, and potable water systems) out of tsunami hazard  areas—can mitigate loss of life and property from a devastating tsunami.However, many of the at-risk states we visited have not adopted any land- use planning strategies to address the tsunami threat. Oregon is the only  at-risk state we visited that has passed a land-use statute placing limits on  the construction of certain high occupancy structures within tsunami  inundation areas. Alaska also places restrictions on development in  certain designated “natural hazard” areas, including coastal areas  potentially affected by tsunamis. One at-risk community also has been  successful in implementing a land-use strategy to mitigate future tsunami  losses. The city of Hilo, Hawaii, developed an Urban Renewal Plan—based  on the devastation from the 1960 tsunami—that set aside certain “open  areas” for limited use in order to minimize the danger of loss of life or  damage to property in areas potentially subject to inundation from  tsunamis.
Tsunami experts believe that constructing new buildings in a tsunami  inundation area to better withstand tsunami forces can reduce loss of life  and property damage in cases where land-use planning and zoning are not  feasible. Building design and construction in the United States is governed  at the local level by building codes that establish minimum acceptable  requirements for preserving public safety. Although the Uniform Building  Code contains design requirements and standards for fire, wind, floods,  and earthquakes, it does not include requirements for tsunami-resilient  design. Nonetheless, two communities we visited, Hilo and Honolulu,  Hawaii, have developed guidelines for constructing tsunami-resilient  structures. For example, a 2000 Honolulu building ordinance requires,  among other things, that the inhabitable space in buildings at-risk from  tsunamis must be elevated above the regulatory flood elevation through  the use of posts, piles, piers or shear walls parallel to the expected flow of  a tsunami wave. None of the at-risk states we visited have developed  guidelines for constructing tsunami-resilient structures although  legislation establishing tax incentives for such construction is pending in  Washington. Hawaii’s state legislature is currently considering a bill to  develop a state building code based on the International Building Code,  which, according to state emergency management officials, would  strengthen buildings against tsunamis and other hazards. In commenting  on a draft of this report, FEMA noted that, the International Building Code,  which has replaced the Uniform Building Code as the national model code,  also does not contain specific requirements addressing the tsunami  hazard. However, structures built in conformance with the International  Building Code are likely to perform better during a tsunami because of  other code provisions, particularly seismic requirements.
Several states, including California and Oregon, have adopted laws and  ordinances for retrofitting existing buildings to reduce losses from future  earthquakes. For existing infrastructure, earthquake retrofits may  improve tsunami resistance, or help minimize floating debris that can  damage nearby buildings. Earthquake retrofits could be particularly  important in the case of a locally generated tsunami off the west coast of  the United States, where a magnitude 9.0 or greater earthquake is likely to  precede a tsunami. FEMA has developed guidance for rehabilitating  buildings to resist earthquake forces.
Most of the states and coastal communities we visited have not attempted  to mitigate tsunami risk through land-use planning and infrastructure  requirements for several reasons. First, state and local emergency  managers said that although they recognize the need for additional  infrastructure protections, such decisions typically reside with a  community’s city council or other governing body. Second, many coastal  communities rely on coastal-dependent development such as ports and  harbors that, by their nature, must be situated on the coast; and in other  cases, communities have already built to capacity in tsunami hazard areas,  and relocation is not a practical or cost-effective option. Finally, few states  or coastal communities have adopted tsunami building codes because  model codes generally have not included requirements for designing  tsunami-resilient structures and few have implemented retrofitting  projects because of their high costs.
section_title: Community Participation in NOAA’s TsunamiReady Hazard Preparedness Program Is Limited
paragraphs: Of the approximately 500 coastal communities at-risk from a tsunami in  five Pacific states and Puerto Rico, only 25 communities—including 7 of  the 12 we visited—have been recognized by NWS as TsunamiReady, the  primary federal effort to encourage communities to prepare for tsunami  hazards. According to NWS, the program was developed to provide  minimum standard guidelines for communities to follow and to enhance  tsunami readiness by increasing public awareness and understanding of  the tsunami hazard, among other things. Communities that meet program  standards are provided signs such as those shown in figure 10.
While the majority of at-risk coastal communities have not joined the  TsunamiReady program, we found that four of the five at-risk communities  we visited that are not yet recognized as TsunamiReady do plan to pursue  recognition in the future. Two of the four communities are currently  taking steps to meet program requirements by installing additional  warning infrastructure, such as NOAA Weather Radios. Emergency  management officials generally agreed that the TsunamiReady program is  a good first step toward helping communities mitigate the potential impact  of a tsunami. Specifically, in the TsunamiReady communities we visited,  most officials stated that they sought recognition to increase community  tsunami awareness, and officials noted that the TsunamiReady signs had  helped them move toward that goal. One emergency manager whom we  spoke with stated that the TsunamiReady recognition had “opened doors”  to conduct outreach with hotels and that hotel managers had begun  seeking tsunami hazard information. However, some of the state  emergency managers with whom we spoke expressed three concerns  about the TsunamiReady program: (1) it is too limited in scope—for   example, emphasizing warning infrastructure but not requiring tsunami  specific evacuation and mitigation plans; (2) it should be more focused on  education, particularly regarding the local tsunami threat; and (3) the  name “TsunamiReady” promotes a false perception of readiness, since  preparedness is a continuous process.
NOAA officials believe that the lack of program participation may be due  to community perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived high cost  versus benefit, but the agency has not formally assessed the program to  identify barriers to participation or potential program modifications to  encourage participation. The agency’s 2005 Report to Congress on the  Tsunami Community Preparedness Implementation Plan, identifies  achieving tsunami preparedness recognition for at-risk communities in the  United States as a vital part of its tsunami activities. To that end,  according to the report, the agency has committed to work with each at- risk coastal community across the nation to ensure that community and  emergency management officials fully understand the tsunami hazard and  take action to prepare.
section_title: Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities Is Occurring in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning
paragraphs: A significant expansion of federal tsunami detection, warning, and related  activities, as well as the NTHMP, is under way; however, the future  direction of these efforts is unclear because NOAA has not developed  long-range strategic plans to guide them. In 2005, NOAA combined its  various tsunami-related activities into a single program and is currently  strengthening and expanding certain elements of the program. However,  NOAA has not yet adopted a comprehensive strategic plan that sets  specific program goals and objectives, defines performance measures,  ensures coordination of existing activities, and establishes risk-based  priorities to guide the expansion of the warning program into the future.  Furthermore, with the likely expansion of the NTHMP from 5 state  participants to potentially 28 state and territorial participants in 2006, it  will be difficult for NOAA to ensure that the most threatened states receive  the resources they need to continue and to complete key mitigation  activities without an updated, risk-based strategic plan.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Is Expanding Elements of Its Tsunami Program, but the Program Lacks a Long-Range Strategic Plan
paragraphs: Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami, NOAA’s various tsunami-related  activities, such as warning center operations, the TsunamiReady program,  and tsunami-related research were not managed as a formal, integrated  program within the agency. The administration’s initiative to expand  NOAA’s tsunami activities—and the receipt of supplemental funding from  the Congress for that purpose—led NOAA in April 2005, to establish an  integrated national Tsunami Program. NOAA is strengthening the Tsunami  Program by (1) expanding the Pacific warning center and National Data  Buoy Center facilities by the end of 2005; (2) expanding tsunami warning  center operating hours to 24 hours, 7 days a week in April 2006; (3)  upgrading and expanding water level observation capabilities by  November 2006; (4) expanding and upgrading the earthquake detection  network by the end of 2006; (5) establishing a long-term tsunami data  archive by late 2007; (6) increasing DART tsunami detection stations in the  Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean by early 2008; (7) expanding  TsunamiReady participation nationwide through 2012; and (8) developing  a tsunami forecast system, including 75 inundation forecast models by  2013.
While NOAA has developed a schedule for strengthening elements of the  Tsunami Program, it has not developed a long-range strategic plan that  includes specific detection, warning and mitigation outcome goals, and  performance measures to evaluate progress in achieving them. For  example, NOAA does not have program outcome goals and performance  measures for reducing false alarms or other critical tsunami-related  activities such as mapping, modeling, research, education, and outreach.  Although strategic planning is required for the major functions and  operations of agencies by the Government Performance and Results Act of  1993, it is not specifically required for individual programs within  agencies. However, our work related to the act and the experience of  leading organizations have shown the importance of identifying long-term  goals and establishing performance measures to guide program operations  and help policy makers determine if program activities are achieving the  desired results. In addition, the Department of Commerce’s Inspector  General has identified improving strategic planning as a top priority and  reported on the need for NOAA’s programs to improve how they report  and measure performance toward achieving specific outcomes.
In this context, a strategic plan would provide NOAA a framework for  ensuring that its tsunami-related activities are planned and implemented in  a risk-based manner. Our recent reports have emphasized the importance  of federal agencies using risk-based planning. For example, in a June 2005  testimony on the Department of Homeland Security’s resource allocation,  we reported that the department must carefully weigh the benefit of  activities and allocate resources where the benefit of reducing risks is  worth the additional cost. Any actions taken by NOAA absent risk-based  analysis have the potential to divert funds away from locations, such as  the Pacific and Caribbean regions, where the tsunami hazard—particularly  from local tsunamis—is well documented. Some of NOAA’s activities  designed to strengthen the tsunami program are scheduled in a manner  that raises questions about the extent to which they are risk-based. For  example, there is little historical evidence of tsunamis on the Atlantic  coast or Gulf coast, yet expansion activities already implemented or  scheduled in 2006 include the placement of DART stations in the Atlantic  Ocean, tsunami forecast modeling of an east coast community, and  recognition of new TsunamiReady communities on the east coast. In  addition, NOAA’s initial strengthening efforts emphasize detection and  warning for distant tsunamis, while the greater risk to most locations in  the United States—according to NOAA data as well as the National  Science and Technology Council’s December 2005 report on tsunami risk  reduction—are likely to be posed by local tsunamis. For example, the  deployment of DART stations and warning center enhancements will not  reduce the local tsunami risk as directly as other strategies such as  educating vulnerable populations to immediately head for high ground  when the earth shakes near the coast. According to NWS officials, they are  in the process of evaluating outcome goals and performance measures for  the Tsunami Program, and expect to finalize a strategic plan in 2006. In  commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that it will work with  its partners to begin a risk assessment following the completion of a  tsunami hazard assessment in November 2006, which will improve its  future ability to allocate funds in a manner consistent with established risk  management practices.
section_title: Concerns Exist about the Management and Direction of the Expanded National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
paragraphs: Since its inception in 1996, NOAA has used the Tsunami Hazard Mitigation  Implementation Plan to guide NTMHP activities. The plan has four specific  goals: (1) raise awareness of affected populations, (2) supply tsunami  inundation and evacuation maps, (3) improve tsunami warning systems,  and (4) incorporate tsunami planning into state and federal all-hazards  mitigation programs. In August 2001, an expert panel reviewed the  NTHMP’s progress and performance under the plan and provided a  number of suggestions for improving the program. While the then- chairman of the NTHMP drafted some goals based on the suggestions,  NOAA did not update or revise the plan to incorporate the experts’  suggestions or the proposed goals because, according to the subsequent  chairman, the plan’s four original goals had not yet been achieved.
Five years later, two key issues raised by the expert panel review remain  concerns of the state NTHMP participants. First, the positive impacts of  the program were being largely assumed and not effectively measured.  State members of the NTHMP still believe that more needs to be done to  measure the effectiveness of tsunami mitigation activities—such as  surveys to measure the effectiveness of public education programs.  Second, the NTHMP was “seriously out of balance,” in terms of focusing  on detection and risk assessment at the expense of working with  communities to educate and modify behaviors in ways that could save  lives. State members of the NTHMP remain concerned about the focus on  detection and warning systems improvements, which are perceived as  “federal solutions,” rather than state and local educational and behavioral  activities, such as conducting tsunami preparedness drills, which they see  as key to community preparedness, particularly for local tsunamis.
The NTHMP had planned to conduct another program review and develop  an updated implementation plan in 2006. These plans have been placed on  hold, according to the chairman of the NTHMP, because the decision to  make the NTHMP a nationwide program—likely including representatives  of the 23 states on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts as well as the two  commonwealths and three U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean and  Caribbean Sea—raised significant issues that needed to be settled before  any revisions to the program’s goals and objectives could be considered.However, failing to conduct a program review now means that the  program will not have vital information regarding (1) what has worked or  not worked in implementing the program since 2001 and (2) what tsunami  mitigation activities remain incomplete in the five original Pacific area  states with high tsunami hazards. A program review could contribute to  the development of a risk-based strategic plan that ensures that the  activities that remain uncompleted in areas with the greatest threat get the  highest priority for funding.
According to NOAA officials, the agency expects to implement the nine  recommended actions for the NTHMP and the Tsunami Program  contained in the National Science and Technology Council’s December  2005 report on tsunami risk reduction. The report, developed by NOAA,  USGS, FEMA, and other federal agencies, recommends actions such as  developing standardized and coordinated tsunami hazard and risk  assessments for all U.S. coastal areas, improving tsunami detection and  warning data and infrastructure, enhancing tsunami forecast and warning  capabilities, promoting the development of model mitigation measures,  and increasing outreach to communities. However, because the report and  recommendations were developed without the participation of the  NTHMP members, they question whether the recommendations and  priorities represent the best strategic direction for the NTHMP. All of the  state NTHMP members agree that full participation in program decision  making by individuals with state and local level knowledge of tsunami  mitigation activities is key to the efficiency and success of the NTHMP.
In addition, state NTHMP members are particularly concerned that the  program’s funding decisions and strategic direction may become less risk- based with the inclusion of numerous eastern and southern coastal states  with lower known tsunami hazards. These members want to ensure that  communities facing the greatest threat obtain the greatest benefits from  the program, particularly since many tsunami preparedness activities  remain incomplete and unfunded in the original five at-risk states. For  example, in 2005, the Director of the California Governor’s Office of  Emergency Services estimated that in California alone over the next five  years about $19.5 million was needed for state preparedness activities and  about $7.5 million for local government activities. As such, state NTHMP  members were surprised to learn that some eastern states have already  submitted proposals for NTHMP funding.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In the hazardous Pacific region, NOAA and its federal and state partners  are working to help prepare communities for tsunamis. However, much is  left to be done to improve tsunami hazard assessment, detection, warning,  and mitigation for these areas and other at-risk areas of the United States.  It is particularly important that when at-risk states complete their  inundation mapping, they then conduct comprehensive assessments of the  expected damage from a tsunami. Without this basic information,  emergency managers will not be able to effectively formulate plans to  mitigate potential tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure. In  addition, improved technical capabilities to detect tsunamis will be of  limited value if the warning systems and processes that NOAA depends on  to disseminate this information cannot reliably ensure that all threatened  individuals and communities will receive an accurate and timely warning.
Because tsunamis are an infrequent hazard that may be overlooked due to  higher priority reoccurring natural hazards such as hurricanes and  flooding, NOAA and its federal and state partners face a significant  challenge ensuring that communities are sufficiently engaged in  preparedness activities. The Indian Ocean tsunami, however, has created a  window of opportunity by spotlighting the devastation and destruction  that can result from a lack of planning, preparedness, and education for  such an event—no matter how rare. We believe that federal and state  partners can take advantage of this current sense of urgency and develop a  strategic approach that will ensure that the significantly increased  resources that have been made available to expand U.S. tsunami detection  and preparedness programs are being effectively targeted. As part of this  effort, all federal tsunami-related activities, including the TsunamiReady  program and the NTHMP, should be reassessed to determine how to  increase their effectiveness. Moreover, NOAA needs to address the lack of  long-range, risk-based strategic planning for these activities. Without  strategic planning and performance measures to guide these efforts, the  Congress and the public will lack important information about the extent  to which resources are being directed to activities that are of the greatest  benefit to the most vulnerable communities and to what extent  measurable progress is being made toward the desired results. We believe  U.S. tsunami programs guided by long-term strategic plans with  demonstrable achievements will be better able to sustain their efforts for  vulnerable coastal communities into the future.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help improve national tsunami preparedness, we are recommending  that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to take the  following six actions: work with the FEMA Director and the USGS Director to create  standardized tsunami loss estimation software to help communities  determine the potential impact of tsunamis and identify appropriate  mitigation actions;  reduce the number of tsunami warning false alarms by (1) completing the  planned expansion of tsunami detection stations, (2) reexamining NWS’s  rules dictating when a warning will be issued and to which areas, (3)  establishing a routine process for other federal and state experts to  formally review and comment on the centers’ use of seismic data, and (4)  setting performance goals to guide improvements; work with the states to conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the tsunami  warning system, including NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency Alert  System, to ensure the system will function as intended during a tsunami  emergency;  evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any,  exist to participation and what modifications are needed to encourage  more high-risk communities to participate;  evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well in the past and  what high priority activities remain to be completed and to help inform  strategic planning efforts, and; develop comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami  Program and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program that consider  input from states and federal partners and include metrics for measuring  progress toward achieving program goals.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Departments of  Commerce, Homeland Security and the Interior for their review and  comment. Commerce, representing NOAA, concurred with all six  recommendations and generally agreed with our findings, although it  provided technical and factual clarifications, which we have incorporated  into the report as appropriate. However, in its comments, NOAA suggested  a revision to one of the recommendations with which we disagree. In  response to our recommendation that NOAA evaluate the TsunamiReady  program to determine what barriers, if any, exist to participation and what  modifications are needed to encourage more high-risk communities to  participate, NOAA suggested changing the recommendation’s focus from  “high-risk” to “at-risk” communities. According to NOAA all U.S. coastal  communities should be prepared for a tsunami no matter how rare. While  we agree that preparing all U.S. coastal communities for a tsunami may be  a laudable long-term goal, given the agency’s limited resources, it may be  an unrealistic goal in the short-term. Therefore, we believe that NOAA  should use a risk-based approach and target initial participation in the  TsunamiReady program to those communities that face the greatest risk.  Commerce’s specific comments and our detailed responses are presented  in appendix I.
Homeland Security, representing FEMA, commented on one of the six  recommendations and indicated that while it concurred with the  recommendation that NOAA work with FEMA and USGS to create  standardized tsunami loss estimation software, it was concerned that  FEMA did not have the funding or the staff resources to pursue such a  request and that such a request from NOAA would have to address these  resource needs. Homeland Security also noted that the report did not  mention other programs such as FEMA’s Pre-disaster Mitigation Program  and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, which can be used by states and  communities to fund tsunami mitigation projects. We revised the report to  mention that these programs have funded tsunami mitigation projects.  Finally, Homeland Security stated that the report’s description of the  TsunamiReady program as it relates to response, preparedness, and  mitigation activities is unclear. We believe that we have clearly  characterized the program as providing minimum guidelines that  communities can use to enhance tsunami readiness and therefore have not  revised the report in response to this comment. Homeland Security’s  specific comments and our detailed responses are presented in appendix  II.
The Department of the Interior commented that the report was a thorough  well-researched examination of the nation’s tsunami warning system and  that it correctly recognizes the need for close collaboration at the federal,  state, and local levels to have an effective tsunami warning system.  Interior also said that it supports the need for a risk-based approach to  prioritizing federal investments in this system and is actively collaborating  with NOAA to provide the hazard assessments necessary for such an  approach. In addition, Interior said that one area it felt was inadequately  addressed in the report was the importance of a long-term federal role in  research to improve tsunami warnings and mitigate tsunami risks and  noted that none of our recommendations involved improving or expanding  research. While we agree that tsunami-related research is an important  issue, it was not included in the scope of our review, and consequently,  this report does not cover issues related to tsunami research or offer any  recommendations in this area. Interior’s specific comments and our  detailed responses are presented in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce,  Homeland Security, and the Interior; appropriate congressional  committees; and other interested Members of Congress. We also will make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce
paragraphs: The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Commerce’s letter  dated May 8, 2006.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comment
paragraphs: 1. Having all coastal communities be prepared for a tsunami may be a  worthwhile long-term goal; however, given limited resources, in the  short-term we believe that it is important to prioritize the efforts of the  TsunamiReady program to encourage higher-risk communities to  participate.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland  Security’s letter dated May 12, 2006.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We revised the text to show the correct title for the FEMA Director.  2. We describe FEMA’s Community Rating System in a report footnote.
For this reason, we did not revise the report.  3. We revised the report to indicate that FEMA’s Pre-disaster Mitigation  Program and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program have funded tsunami  mitigation activities.  4. We believe that the report clearly describes the TsunamiReady  program as providing minimum guidelines for communities to use to  enhance tsunami preparedness, not as a program that requires all of  the activities that could be taken to maximize community protection.  For this reason, we did not revise the report.  5. We believe that the report adequately describes the NTHMP’s federal  and state partnership as well as the roles of emergency management  organizations at the federal, state, and local levels, not only for  warning systems, but also for planning, education and outreach, and  infrastructure protection mitigation activities. For this reason, we did  not revise the report.  6. We revised the report to clarify that vertical evacuation should only  occur in buildings that are capable of withstanding the initial  earthquake and subsequent tsunami.  7. We revised the report to clarify the extent to which building codes  address the tsunami hazard.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior
paragraphs: The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of the Interior’s letter  dated May 4, 2006.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comment
paragraphs: 1. The analysis of the federal role in research on tsunami warnings and  mitigation was not included in the scope of this report. Consequently,  we did not examine issues related to tsunami research or offer any  recommendations.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Stephen D. Secrist, Assistant Director;  Brad C. Dobbins; Joel A. Green; Ryan S. Lambert; and Susan M.  Zimmerman made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to the  report were Claudia K. Becker; John W. Delicath; Gregory A. Marchand;  John G. Smale, Jr.; Anne O. Stevens; and Randall B. Williamson.