Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation
Published: 2006-09-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key questions for congressional oversight, including what political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw? Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security? If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence?
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006 bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July 2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department reported that the recent upturn in violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that a certain level of security was a prerequisite to accomplishing the political and economic conditions necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing sectarian strife that has resulted in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army units' training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would inform the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security forces.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to assist the Subcommittee in its oversight  of U.S. efforts to improve the security situation in Iraq. The November 2005  U.S. strategy for Iraq states that victory in Iraq is a vital U.S. interest. Since  May 2003, the United States has employed political, economic, and military  measures to stabilize Iraq and help the country achieve the desired end- state: a constitutional, representative Iraqi government that respects civil  rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and  keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. To support these goals,  the United States initially led, and later assisted, Iraq’s political transition  from a dictatorship to a democratically elected government. The United  States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the  U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I).  The Department of Defense  (DOD) has reported obligations of about $227 billion for U.S. military  operations in Iraq for fiscal years 2003 through June 2006. U.S. assistance  appropriated for Iraqi security forces and law enforcement has grown from  $3.24 billion in January 2004 to about $13.7 billion in June 2006. Over the  past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the  United States to achieve its goals in Iraq.
In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment in  Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by  DOD and the State Department. We also present questions for  congressional oversight. To examine trends in Iraq’s security situation, we  reviewed reports by DOD, State, the United Nations (UN), and  nongovernmental organizations, as well as transcripts of MNF-I and U.S.  embassy Baghdad press conferences and interviews. Although we  reviewed classified documents during our completed and ongoing Iraq- related engagements, the information in this statement is based on  unclassified documents only. We also obtained and assessed MNF-I data on  enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners from the  Defense Intelligence Agency. We determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for establishing general trends in the number of attacks. To assess  progress in developing Iraqi security forces, we reviewed DOD and State  reports, as well as MNF-I guidance on Iraqi readiness assessments. Because  of the broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed this work  under my authority as the Comptroller General of the United States to  conduct reviews on my initiative. The work was performed in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) dissolved the  military organizations of the former regime and began the process of  reestablishing or creating new Iraqi security forces, including the police  and a new Iraqi army. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed  responsibility in their areas for recruiting and training some Iraqi defense  and police forces. In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a  multistep plan for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces.  The plan had the objective of gradually decreasing the number of coalition  forces in conjunction with neutralizing Iraq’s insurgency and developing  Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.
Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, coalition forces in  Iraq began to shift responsibilities to Iraqi security forces in February 2004,  earlier than planned. According to the President, senior DOD officials, and  multinational force commanders, Iraqi forces were unprepared to assume  security responsibilities and responded poorly to a series of anti-coalition  attacks in April 2004. In western and central Iraq, insurgents attacked the  multinational force in Fallujah, Baghdad, Ar Ramadi, Samarra, and Tikrit,  while a radical Shi’a militia, the Mahdi Army, launched operations to  dislodge multinational forces and occupy cities from Baghdad to Basra in  the south. Although some Iraqi forces fought alongside coalition forces,  other units abandoned their posts and responsibilities and, in some cases,  assisted the insurgency. MNF-I identified a number of problems that  contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security forces, including problems in  training and equipping them.
In May 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential  Directive, which stated that, after the transition of power to the Iraqi  government, DOD would be responsible for U.S. activities relating to  security and military operations. The Presidential directive established that  the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) would direct all U.S. government  efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces. In the summer of  2004, MNF-I developed and began implementing a comprehensive  campaign plan, which elaborated and refined the original strategy for  transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In April 2006, MNF-I  revised the campaign plan and, in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in  Baghdad, issued a new Joint Campaign Plan that contains the goal of  transitioning security responsibility from MNF-I to the Iraqi security forces  and government. Further details on the campaign plan are classified. In  late August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the United  States is helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current security threats  of international terrorism and insurgency. He noted, however, that the Iraqi  government is developing a long-term security plan to shape the type of  armed forces that the country will need 5 to 10 years from now.
section_title: Trends in Security Conditions
paragraphs: Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and  grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and  more recent Sunni/Shi’a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of  the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The deteriorating conditions threaten  continued progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in  the political and economic areas. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a  militias have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife and large  numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals.
subsections: section_title: Deteriorating Security Threatens U.S. and International Efforts to Assist Iraqi Political and Economic Development
paragraphs: Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners have  continued to increase through July 2006 (see fig. 1). Since 2003, enemy- initiated attacks have increased around major religious or political events,  including Ramadan and elections. Attack levels also follow a seasonal  pattern, increasing through the spring and summer and decreasing in the  fall and winter months. Overall, attacks increased by 23 percent from 2004  to 2005. After declining in the fall of 2005, the number of attacks rose to the  highest level ever in July 2006.  Total attacks reported from January 2006  through July 2006 were about 57 percent higher than the total reported  during the same period in 2005. These data show significant increases in  attacks against coalition forces, who remain the primary targets, as well as  civilians and Iraqi security forces. According to a June 2006 UN report, an  increasingly complex armed opposition continues to be capable of  maintaining a consistently high level of violent activity across Iraq.  Baghdad, Ninewa, Salahuddin, Anbar, and Diyala have been experiencing  the worst of the violence. Other areas, particularly Basra and Kirkuk, have  witnessed increased tension and a growing number of violent incidents. In August 2006, DOD reported that breaking the cycle of  violence is the most pressing immediate goal of coalition and Iraqi  operations.
The security situation has deteriorated even as Iraq has made progress in  meeting key political milestones and in developing its security forces. Since  the CPA transferred power to the Iraqi interim government in June 2004,  Iraq has held an election for a transitional government in January 2005, a  referendum on the constitution in October 2005, and an election for a  Council of Representatives in December 2005 that led to the formation of a  new government in May 2006 (see fig. 2). However, according to the  Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the December 2005  elections appeared to heighten sectarian tensions and polarize sectarian  divides. According to a U.S. Institute of Peace report, the focus on ethnic  and sectarian identity has sharpened as a result of Iraq’s political process,  while nationalism and a sense of Iraqi identity have weakened.
Moreover, according to the Director of National Intelligence’s February  2006 report, Iraqi security forces are experiencing difficulty in managing  ethnic and sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. In addition,  the DIA Director reported that many elements of the Iraqi security forces  are loyal to sectarian and party interests. According to DOD’s August 2006  report, sectarian lines among Iraqi security forces are drawn along  geographic lines, with Sunni, Shi’a, or Kurdish soldiers mostly serving in  units located in geographic areas familiar to their group. Moreover,  according to the report, commanders at the battalion level tend to  command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional background.
On August 7, 2006, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces began phase II of  Operation Together Forward. The operation is an effort to reduce the level  of murders, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorism, and sectarian violence  in Baghdad and to reinforce the Iraqi government’s control of the city. On  August 30, 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that he was pleased  with the operation’s progress, but that there was a long way to go in  bringing security to the neighborhoods of Baghdad. U.S. intelligence  assessments of this operation’s impact are classified.
The State Department reported in July 2006 that the recent upturn in  violence has hindered the U.S. government’s efforts to engage fully with its  Iraqi partners and to move forward on political and economic fronts. State  noted that a baseline of security was a prerequisite for moving forward on  these fronts, which are essential to achieving the right conditions for  withdrawing U.S. forces. For example, Iraqi government efforts to foster  reconciliation have become more difficult with the increase in sectarian  divisions and violence during the spring and summer of 2006. According to  DOD’s August 2006 report, security issues—such as the attempted  kidnapping of a deputy minister and threats to personnel who work with  embassy teams—have made some ministers reluctant to have U.S.  personnel visit them. The report also noted that the security situation in  some provinces has hampered interaction between U.S.-led Provincial  Reconstruction Teams and provincial leaders. Moreover, the UN reported  that the lack of security has hampered reconstruction efforts. The UN  reported that the diplomatic community remains under serious threat as  embassy staff have been abducted and killed and facilities attacked. The  UN noted that improved security is central to the normal ability of  international agencies to provide assistance to the government and people  of Iraq.
As we reported in July 2006, the poor security conditions have also  hindered U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to revitalize Iraq’s economy and  restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors. According to a  State Department report, during the week of August 16-22, 2006, Iraq was  producing 2.17 million barrels of oil per day. This figure is below the Iraqi  Oil Ministry’s goal of 2.5 million barrels of oil per day and the pre-war level  of 2.6 million barrels per day. Over the same time period, electricity  availability averaged 5.9 hours per day in Baghdad and 10.7 hours  nationwide. Electricity output for the week was about 9 percent above the  same period in 2005. U.S. officials report that major oil pipelines continue  to be sabotaged, shutting down oil exports and resulting in lost revenues.  Current U.S. assistance is focused on strengthening the Strategic  Infrastructure Battalions, which are Ministry of Defense forces that protect  oil fields and pipelines. Major electrical transmission lines have also been  repeatedly sabotaged, cutting power to parts of the country. Security  conditions in Iraq have, in part, led to project delays and increased costs for  security services. Although it is difficult to quantify the costs and delays  resulting from poor security conditions, both agency and contractor  officials acknowledged that security costs have diverted a considerable  amount of reconstruction resources and have led to canceling or reducing  the scope of some reconstruction projects.
section_title: Sunni Insurgency and Shi’a Militias Contribute to Increased Sectarian Violence
paragraphs: Although the Sunni insurgency has remained strong and resilient, the  presence and influence of Shi’a militias have grown and led to increased  sectarian violence. According to a July 2006 State Department report, the  Sunni insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq. However, in recent  months, Shi’a militia groups have grown more prominent and threaten  Iraq’s stability. The increase in sectarian violence has led to an increasing  number of Iraqis fleeing their homes. According to the U.S. Ambassador to  Iraq, the demobilization of Shi’a militias requires a corresponding reduction  in the Sunni insurgency.
subsections: section_title: Sunni Insurgency Remains Strong and Resilient
paragraphs: Despite coalition efforts and the efforts of the newly formed Iraqi  government, insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit new  fighters, supply themselves, and attack coalition and Iraqi security forces.  According to a July 2006 State Department report, the Sunni insurgency  remains a pressing problem in Iraq, even after the death of Abu Musab al  Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in early June 2006. As DOD recently  reported, al-Qaeda in Iraq remains able to conduct operations due to its  resilient, semi-autonomous cellular structure of command and control. The  Sunni insurgency consists of former Baathists, whose goal is to return to  power; terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, its affiliates in the  Mujahadeen Shura Council, and Ansar al Sunna; and various other groups  that rely on violence to achieve their objectives.
Sunni insurgents have no distinct leader but share the goal of destabilizing  the Iraqi government to pursue their individual and, at times, conflicting  goals. Although these groups have divergent goals, some collaborate at the  tactical and operational levels.  DOD has reported that the relationships  among insurgents, terrorists, and criminal opportunists are blurred at times  but that the ideological rifts between terrorists and other resistance groups  remain. DOD also reports that many insurgent groups employ a dual-track  political and military strategy to subvert emerging institutions and to  infiltrate and co-opt security and political organizations. These groups  attempt to leverage the political process to address their core concerns and  demands while attacking coalition and Iraqi security forces.
section_title: Presence and Influence of Shi’a Militias Have Grown
paragraphs: The presence and influence of Shi’a militia groups have grown in recent  months, as they have become more prominent and acted in ways that  threaten Iraq’s stability. According to the CENTCOM Commander, as of  early August 2006, these militias are the largest contributors to sectarian  violence in Iraq. As DOD reported in August 2006, the threat posed by Shi’a  militias is growing and represents a significant challenge for the Iraqi  government. The Shi’a militias that are affecting the security situation the  most are the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization.
Mahdi Army: Led by radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, this group  was responsible for attacks against the coalition and two uprisings in  April 2004 and August 2004. The militia committed abuses against Sunni  civilians, which have exacerbated sectarian tensions, and were  implicated in unrest following the February bombing in Samarra.  Evidence exists that the Mahdi Army are supplied by sources outside  Iraq, most notably Iran. As of June 2006, Sadr followers headed four of  Iraq’s 40 ministries—the ministries of health, transportation, agriculture,  and tourism and antiquities. As DOD recently reported, this militia has  popular support in Baghdad and Iraq’s southern provinces and is  tolerated by elements in the Iraqi government.
Badr Organization: This Shi’a militia group is the paramilitary wing of  the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a prominent  political party in the new government. The party was founded in Iran  during the Iran-Iraq war and retains strong ties to Iran. According to  DOD, the Badr Organization received financial and material support  from Iran, and individuals from Badr have been implicated in death  squads. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq is one of  the two largest Shi’a parties in parliament. One of Iraq’s two deputy  presidents and the Minister of Finance are party members.
According to the CENTCOM Commander, Shi’a militias must be controlled  because they are nonstate actors that have the attributes of the state, yet  bear no responsibility for their actions. In many cases, according to DOD,  militias provide protection for people and religious sites, sometimes  operating in conjunction with the Iraqi police in areas where the Iraqi  police are perceived to provide inadequate support. According to a May  2006 DOD report, Shi’a militias seek to place members into army and  police units as a way to serve their interests. This is particularly evident in  the Shi’a dominated south where militia members have hindered the  implementation of law enforcement. Militia leaders also influence the  political process through intimidation and hope to gain influence with the  Iraqi people through politically based social welfare programs. In areas  where they provide social services and contribute to local security, they  operate openly and with popular support.
According to the Director of National Intelligence, Iran provides guidance  and training to select Iraqi Shi’a political groups and provides weapons and  training to Shi’a militant groups to enable anticoalition attacks. Iran also  has contributed to the increasing lethality and effectiveness of anticoalition  attacks by enabling Shi’a militants to build improvised explosive devices  with explosively formed projectiles, similar to those developed by  Lebanese Hezbollah. Iranian support for Shi’a militias reinforces Sunni  fears of Iranian domination, further elevating sectarian violence.
According to the August 2006 DOD report, Sunni Arabs do not have  formally organized militias. Instead, they rely on neighborhood watches,  Sunni insurgents, and increasingly, al-Qaeda in Iraq. The rise of sectarian  attacks is driving some Sunni and Shi’a civilians in Baghdad and in  ethnically mixed provinces to support militias. Such support is likely to  continue, according to DOD’s report, in areas where the population  perceives Iraqi institutions and forces as unable to provide essential  services or meet security requirements.
section_title: Growing Sectarian Violence Has Led to Increased Civilian Deaths and Displacement
paragraphs: According to DOD’s August 2006 report, rising sectarian strife defines the  emerging nature of violence in mid-2006, with the core conflict in Iraq now  a struggle between Sunni and Shi’a extremists seeking to control key areas  in Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic  resources, and impose their own respective political and religious agendas.  The UN reported in March 2006 that the deteriorating security situation is  evidenced by increased levels of sectarian strife and the sectarian nature of  the violence, particularly in ethnically mixed areas. Figure 3 shows the  ethnic distribution of the population in Iraq. Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, and  southwest of Basra are key ethnically mixed areas.
In June 2006, the UN reported that much of the sectarian violence has been  committed by both sides of the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divide and has  resulted in increased civilian deaths. The UN reported that the number of  Iraqi civilian casualties continues to increase, with a total of about 14,300  civilians killed in Iraq from January to June 2006. The overwhelming  majority of casualties were reported in Baghdad, according to the report.  Specifically targeted groups included prominent Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis,  government workers and their families, members of the middle class (such  as merchants and academics), people working for or associated with MNF- I, and Christians. According to the UN, daily reports of intercommunal  intimidation and murder include regular incidents of bodies of Sunni and  Shi’a men found to be tortured and summarily executed in Baghdad and its  surrounding areas. Violence against Kurds and Arabs has also been  reported in Kirkuk, while the abduction and intimidation of ordinary Iraqis  is a growing problem. According to the report, repeated bombings against  civilians, mosques, and more recently against churches are creating fear,  animosity, and feelings of revenge within Iraq’s sectarian communities.
Moreover, according to a July 2006 UN report, the increase in sectarian  violence has resulted in a growing number of Iraqis fleeing their homes.  The UN estimated that about 150,000 individuals had been displaced as of  June 30, 2006. The UN reported that people left their community of origin  primarily because of direct or indirect threats against them or attacks on  family members and their community. According to the report, displaced  persons are vulnerable, lack many basic rights, and compete for limited  services. This in turn can increase intercommunal animosities and can  generate further displacement.
section_title: Shi’a Militia Demobilization Depends on Reduction in Sunni Insurgency
paragraphs: Although U.S. and UN officials recognize the importance of demobilizing  the militias, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq has stated that the demobilization  of the Shi’a militias depends on a reduction in the Sunni insurgency.  According to the Ambassador, a comprehensive plan for demobilizing all  the militias and reintegrating them into Iraqi society is needed to ensure  Iraq’s stability and success. However, the Sunni insurgent groups now see  themselves as protectors of the Sunni community, and the Shi’a militias see  themselves as protectors of the Shi’a community. As DOD reported in  August 2006, Sunni and Shi’a extremists are locked in mutually reinforcing  cycles of sectarian strife, with each portraying themselves as the defenders  of their respective sectarian groups.
section_title: DOD and State Progress Reports Provide Limited Information on the Development of Iraqi Security Forces
paragraphs: DOD and State report progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces  and transferring security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government  in three key areas: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the  number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed  responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and (3) the  assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in aggregate  Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. While all three provide  some information on the development of Iraqi security forces, they do not  provide detailed information on specific capabilities that affect individual  units’ readiness levels. Unit-level TRA reports provide that information. We  are currently working with DOD to obtain these reports because they  would more fully inform both GAO and the Congress on the capabilities  and needs of Iraq’s security forces.
subsections: section_title: Increases in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces and Transferring Security Responsibilities to Them and the Iraqi Government
paragraphs: DOD and State have reported progress toward the current goal of training  and equipping about 325,000 Iraqi security forces by December 2006. As  shown in table 1, the State Department reports that the number of trained  army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to  about 294,000 as of August 2006. According to State, the Ministries of  Defense and Interior are on track to complete the initial training and  equipping of all their authorized end-strength forces by the end of 2006.   The authorized end-strength is 137,000 military personnel in the Ministry of  Defense and about 188,000 in Ministry of Interior police and other forces.  However, as we previously reported, the number of trained and equipped  security forces does not provide a complete picture of their capabilities and  may overstate the number of forces on duty. For example, Ministry of  Interior data include police who are absent without leave. Ministry of  Defense data exclude absent military personnel.
In spring 2005, MNF-I recognized that the number of trained and equipped  forces did not reflect their capability to assume responsibility for security.  MNF-I began to develop and refine the TRA system as a means of assessing  the capabilities of Iraqi security forces. It also started a program to place  transition teams with Iraqi army and special police units.
DOD also assesses progress in the number of Iraqi army units and  provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for the security of  specific geographic areas in Iraq. The joint MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Campaign  Plan calls for the Iraqi army to assume the lead for counterinsurgency  operations in specific geographic areas and Iraqi civil authorities to assume  security responsibility for their provinces.  The transition of security  responsibilities concludes when the Iraq government assumes  responsibility for security throughout Iraq.
As shown in table 2, DOD reports that an increasing number of Iraqi army  units are capable of leading counterinsurgency operations in specific  geographic areas. DOD reports more detailed information on this transition  in a classified format. However, when an Iraqi army unit assumes the lead,  it does not mean that the unit is capable of conducting independent  operations since it may need to develop additional capabilities and may  require the support of coalition forces. According to DOD’s May 2006  report, it will take time before a substantial number of Iraqi units are  assessed as fully independent and requiring no assistance considering the  need for further development of Iraqi logistical elements, ministry capacity  and capability, intelligence structures, and command and control.
Table 2 also shows that one provincial government—Muthanna—had  assumed responsibility for security operations, as of August 2006.  According to a July 2006 State Department report, when a provincial  government can assume security responsibilities depends on the (1) threat  level in the province, (2) capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (3)  capabilities of the provincial government, and (4) posture of MNF-I forces,  that is, MNF-I’s ability to respond to major threats, if needed. Once the  provincial government assumes security responsibilities, the provincial  governor and police are in charge of domestic security. According to an  MNF-I official, MNF-I forces will then move out of all urban areas and  assume a supporting role. In August 2006, DOD reported that security  responsibility for as many as nine of Iraq’s provinces could transition to  Iraqi government authority by the end of 2006.
section_title: Unit-level TRA Reports Provide More Insight into Iraqi Capabilities and Development Needs Than Do Aggregate Data on Overall TRA Ratings
paragraphs: DOD has provided GAO with aggregate information on the overall TRA  levels for Iraqi security forces and the number of Iraqi units in the lead for  counterinsurgency operations. DOD’s aggregate data on the capabilities  and readiness of Iraqi security forces do not provide information on  shortfalls in personnel, command and control, equipment, and leadership.  Unit-level TRA reports provide more insight into Iraqi army capabilities and  development needs in personnel, leadership, and logistics than do the  overall TRA levels that DOD reports in classified format. The TRA rating  for individual Iraqi army units is a key factor in determining the ability of  the unit to conduct and assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations.
According to Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) guidance, the TRA is  intended to provide commanders with a method to consistently evaluate  Iraqi units, as well as to identify factors hindering progress, determine  resource issues, make resource allocation decisions, and determine when  Iraqi army units are prepared to assume the lead for security  responsibilities. The TRA is prepared jointly on a monthly basis by the  unit’s military transition team chief and Iraqi security forces commander.
In completing TRA reports, commanders assess the unit’s capabilities in six  subcategories—personnel, command and control, training,  sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership (see app. 1).  After  considering the unit’s subcategory ratings, commanders then give each  Iraqi army unit an overall TRA rating that describes the unit’s overall  readiness to assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. The overall  ratings go from TRA level 1 through TRA level 4. To be able to assume the  lead for counterinsurgency operations, Iraqi army units are required to  obtain an overall rating of TRA level 2 as assessed by their commanders.  Commanders also provide a narrative assessment that describes key  shortfalls and impediments to the unit’s ability to assume the lead for  counterinsurgency operations and estimate the number of months needed  for the unit to assume the lead. The purpose of the narrative is to clarify  and provide additional support for the overall TRA rating. The aggregate  data on overall TRA ratings for Iraqi security forces are classified.
DOD has provided us with classified data on the aggregate number of Iraqi  units at each TRA level and more detailed information on which Iraqi army  units have assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations. We are  currently working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. These  unit-level reports would provide GAO and Congress with more complete  information on the status of developing effective Iraqi security forces.  Specifically, unit-level TRA reports would allow us to (1) determine if the  TRA reports are useful and if changes are needed; (2) verify if aggregate  data on overall TRA ratings reflect unit-level TRA reports; and (3)  determine if shortfalls exist in key areas, such as personnel, equipment,  logistics, training, and leadership.
section_title: Questions for Congressional Oversight
paragraphs: 1. What are the key political, economic, and security conditions that must  be achieved before U.S. forces can draw down and ultimately withdraw  from Iraq? What target dates, if any, has the administration established  for drawing down U.S. forces? 2. The continued deterioration of security conditions in Iraq has hindered  U.S. political and economic efforts in Iraq. According to the State  Department, a baseline of security is a prerequisite for moving forward  on the political and economic tasks essential to achieving the right  conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces.
Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate in Iraq even as  the country has met political milestones, increased the number of  trained and equipped security forces, and increasingly assumed the lead  for security?
What is the baseline of security that is required for moving forward on  political and economic tasks? What progress, if any, can be made in the  political and economic areas without a significant improvement in  current security conditions?
If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not  reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the  administration propose for stemming the violence?
3.
In February 2006, the Director of National Intelligence reported that  Iraqi security forces were experiencing difficulty in managing ethnic  and sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. The DIA  Director reported that many elements of the Iraqi security forces are  loyal to sectarian and party interests.
How does the U.S. government assess the extent to which personnel in  the Iraqi security forces are loyal to groups other than the Iraqi  government or are operating along sectarian lines, rather than as unified  national forces?  What do these assessments show?
How would DOD modify its program to train and equip Iraqi security  forces if evidence emerges that Iraqi military and police are supporting  sectarian rather than national interests? 4. MNF-I established the TRA system to assess the capabilities and  readiness of Iraqi security forces.
How does DOD assess the reliability of TRAs and ensure that they  present an accurate picture of Iraq security forces’ capabilities and  readiness?
At what TRA rating level would Iraqi army units not require any U.S.  military support? What U.S. military support would Iraqi units still  require at TRA levels 1 and 2?
How does DOD use unit-level TRAs to assess shortfalls in Iraqi  capabilities? What do DOD assessments show about the developmental  needs of Iraqi security forces?
5.
In late August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the  United States is helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current  security threats of international terrorism and insurgency. However, he  noted that the Iraqi government is developing a long-term security plan  to shape the type of armed forces the country will need 5 to 10 years  from now.
What are the current resource requirements for developing Iraqi  security forces capable of dealing with international terrorism and  insurgency? What have been the U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions to  this effort thus far? What U.S. and Iraqi contributions will be needed  over the next several years?
What are the projected resource requirements for the future Iraqi force?
What are the projected U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions for this  effort?
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202) 512- 8979. Key contributors to this testimony were Nanette J. Barton, Lynn  Cothern, Tracey Cross, Martin De Alteriis, Whitney Havens, Brent Helt,  Rhonda Horried, Judith McCloskey, Mary Moutsos, Jason Pogacnik, and  Jena Sinkfield.
section_title: Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on the TRA reports used to assess the  capabilities of Iraqi army units. Commanders provide ratings in each of 6  subcategories (see fig. 4). For each subcategory, a green rating corresponds  to TRA level 1, yellow to TRA level 2, orange to TRA level 3, and red to TRA  level 4. The commanders consider the subcategory ratings in deciding the  overall TRA rating for each unit.