Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic Games
Published: 2006-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic Games to take place overseas since September 11, 2001. The United States worked with Italy to ensure the security of U.S. citizens, and it expects to continue such support for future Games, including the 2008 Games in Beijing, China. GAO was asked to (1) discuss the U.S. approach for providing security support for the 2006 Winter Games and how such efforts were coordinated, (2) identify the roles of U.S. agencies in providing security support for the Games and how they financed their activities, (3) review lessons learned in providing security support and the application of prior lessons learned, and (4) identify U.S. efforts under way for providing security support to the 2008 Beijing Games.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In 2004, the United States began planning to provide a U.S. security presence in Italy and security support to the Italian government, and based much of its security strategy on its understanding of Italy's advanced security capabilities. The United States provided Italy with some security assistance, mostly in the form of crisis management and response support. To coordinate U.S. efforts, the U.S. Mission in Italy established an office in Turin as a central point for security information and logistics, and to provide consular services to U.S. citizens during the Games. The U.S. Ambassador to Italy, through the U.S. Consulate in Milan, coordinated and led U.S. efforts in-country, while the Department of State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic efforts. While the interagency working group has been a useful forum for coordinating U.S. security support to overseas athletic events, State and Department of Justice (DOJ) officials have indicated that formal guidance that articulates a charter; a mission; and agencies' authorities, roles, and responsibilities would help in planning for security support to future Games. Nearly 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies provided more than $16 million for security support activities for the Turin Games. The roles of these agencies--which included the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy--included providing crisis management and response support through personnel, equipment, and training and providing security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors. The U.S. Embassy in Rome initially paid for lodging and other administrative support needs, which were reimbursed by the participating agencies, although it struggled to do so. State and DOJ officials indicated that an interagency mechanism for identifying costs and addressing potential funding issues would be useful in providing U.S. security support to future Games. For the Turin Games, agencies applied key lessons learned from the 2004 Athens Games and identified additional lessons for future Games. Key lessons identified from the Turin Games included, the importance of establishing an operations center at the location of the Games, establishing clear roles and responsibilities for agencies in event planning and crisis response efforts, and planning early for several years of Olympic-related expenditures. These lessons learned were communicated by Washington, D.C.- and Italy-based personnel to their counterparts who are preparing for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The United States is currently taking steps to identify the types of security support that agencies may provide to support China's security efforts for the 2008 Summer Games and to ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic Games  to take place overseas since September 11, 2001, in a climate of heightened  concerns about international terrorism. A variety of factors created a  challenging threat environment for the 2006 Winter Games, including  increased security tension worldwide due to the Iraq war; the known  presence of Italy-based international terrorist cells; past al-Qaeda threats  to coalition partners, of which Italy is one; and recent terrorist incidents in  Europe. Despite such security concerns, Italy hosted a safe and secure  event with no terrorist incidents. Although the host government is  responsible for the overall security of the Olympic Games, the United  States worked with the Italian government, in advance of and throughout  the Games, to ensure the security of U.S. athletes, spectators, and  commercial investors. The U.S. government expects to continue working  with host governments to ensure the security of U.S. citizens and interests  at future Games, including the upcoming 2008 Summer Olympics and  Paralympics in Beijing, China.
This report (1) discusses the U.S. approach for providing security support  for the 2006 Winter Games and how such security efforts were  coordinated, (2) identifies the roles of U.S. agencies in providing security  support to the 2006 Winter Games and reviews how they financed their  activities, (3) reviews lessons learned in providing security support and  the application of prior lessons learned, and (4) identifies U.S. efforts  under way for providing security support to the 2008 Beijing Games.
To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and reviewed all available  interagency and agency-specific operations plans for the 2006 Winter  Games and documentation on the U.S. support provided for the 2006  Winter Games. In addition, we interviewed officials at the Departments of  State (State), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD),  and Energy (DOE), and at certain intelligence agencies, and attended  interagency coordination meetings. Also, we traveled to Italy in November  2005 to observe U.S. planning efforts for providing security support to the  2006 Winter Games. While in Italy, we interviewed U.S. officials in Rome,  Milan, and Turin and met with Italian officials in Rome to obtain their  perspective on the security support provided by the United States. Lastly,  we also interviewed an official of a U.S. corporate sponsor of the Olympics  and participated in a security briefing for corporate sponsors to gain their  perspectives on the security support provided by the United States.  Appendix I contains additional details on our objectives, scope, and  methodology. We conducted our review between September 2005 and May  2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the first Winter Olympic Games in 1924, the event has grown from  258 athletes representing 16 countries to, in the case of the 2006 Turin  Olympics, approximately 5,000 athletes and coaches from 85 countries. In  addition, an estimated 1.5 million spectators and 10,000 media personnel  attended the 2006 Winter Olympic Games. While the stated goal of the  Olympic movement is “to contribute to building a peaceful and better  world,” its history includes tragedy and terror as well. At the 1972 Munich  Games, Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli Olympic team, resulting  in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes. The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games were  marred by a pipe-bomb explosion that killed 1 person and injured 110  others.
One of the International Olympic Committee requirements for countries  bidding to host the Games is to ensure the security of the participating  athletes and spectators, which is an increasingly challenging task in  today’s environment of terrorist threats. According to State documents,  Italy spent approximately $110 million on security operations for the 2006  Winter Games. In addition, the Italian government designated 15,000 law  enforcement personnel, along with military and intelligence support, to  provide for overall security for the Winter Games. Italy’s Ministry of  Interior designated the Prefect of Turin as the local government authority  responsible for providing security inside the official venues of the Winter  Games.
Italy faced the challenge of hosting an Olympics amid a heightened  terrorist threat environment. Al-Qaeda has made threats to coalition  partners in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past. Moreover, in March 2004, a  terrorist attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed nearly 200  people, and, in July 2005, a terrorist attack on commuter trains and a bus  in London, England, killed over 50 people and injured more than 700. In  addition, there is a known presence of Italy-based international terrorist  cells and domestic anarchist groups that actively target multinational  corporations, critical infrastructure, and government facilities. Italy has  highly advanced antiterrorism capabilities and has recently taken  additional antiterrorism measures, such as enactment of improved  antiterrorism laws and increased physical security measures. Since 2001,  several extremist plots in Milan and Rome have been detected and  prevented. In addition to these explicit terror threats, Italy has faced  difficult security challenges at other recent major events, such as the  meeting of the Group of Eight in Genoa in 2001, at which activists clashed  violently with Italian police forces, and the funeral of Pope John Paul II in  April 2005.
In planning for the 2006 Winter Games, winter conditions presented  another set of challenges. The Winter Games were located in the remote,  northwest corner of Italy, with venues spread over an extensive land area.  Although smaller in scale than the 2004 Athens Summer Games, the 2006  Winter Olympic venues included mountain locations that were as far as 60  miles away from Turin, with limited access routes to these mountain sites.  (See fig. 1 for locations of venues for the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in  Turin, Italy.) Locating suitable lodging for U.S. security and support  personnel near key venues was necessary. Furthermore, the distance from  the nearest U.S. presence—the U.S. Consulate in Milan, which is located  about a 90-minute drive from Turin—required the establishment of a  temporary U.S. post in Turin to support U.S. security efforts and serve as a  platform for U.S. activities.
Although the host government has the ultimate responsibility for providing  security for the Olympics, the United States has a vested interest in  ensuring the safety of its citizens in all Olympic locations. In 2001, the  United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004 Athens  Summer Olympics, responding both to the heightened worldwide anxiety  following the September 11 attacks and to Greece’s request for  international advice on its security plan. Despite widespread fears of a  potential terrorist attack on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure  event with no terrorist incidents. With the conclusion of the Athens  Games, the United States began planning for security support to the 2006  Turin Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. This security support is  provided by the United States under general executive branch policy  guidance and individual agency authorities. For example, State officials  cited the use of Presidential Decision Directive 62, which extends the U.S.  counterterrorism policy in Presidential Decision Directive 39 to the  protection of Americans overseas. State is the lead agency for ensuring the  protection of American citizens overseas. According to U.S. officials in  Italy, up to 20,000 Americans attended the 2006 Turin Olympics daily.
The next Olympics will be the Summer Games in Beijing, China, August 8  to 24, 2008; followed by the Paralympics, September 6 to 17, 2008. Venues  for these Games will be spread out across seven cities in China, presenting  unique logistical and coordination challenges for security support efforts.  According to State officials, over 1 million spectators are expected to  attend the 2008 Beijing Games, including a large number of Americans.  The next Winter Olympic Games will be held in Vancouver, Canada,  February 12 to 28, 2010, followed by the Paralympics on March 12 to 21,  2010. The close proximity of these Games to the United States presents  distinctive challenges, such as border security issues. In 2012, the United  Kingdom will host the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games in London.  Past terrorist incidents in London and an ongoing terrorist threat climate  are likely to present security challenges for these Games.
section_title: U.S. Security Support Was Based on Italian Security Capabilities, Supported by Coordinated U.S. Government Effort
paragraphs: The security support that the United States provided for the 2006 Winter  Games was largely based on an understanding of Italy’s advanced security  capabilities gained through a long-standing, U.S.-Italian counterterrorism  and military partnership. The U.S. Embassy in Rome led the coordinated  governmentwide effort—delegating responsibility for the coordination of  U.S. activities in Turin to the U.S. Consulate in Milan—and was supported  by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency group.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Security Support Informed by an Understanding of Italian Security Capabilities, but without a Formal Assessment of Italy’s Olympic Security Plans
paragraphs: Following the Athens Games in the summer of 2004, the United States  began planning for (1) the security support it would provide to the Italian  government and (2) the protection of U.S. citizens who would be  participating in or attending the 2006 Winter Games. In October 2004, the  United States held a 3-day interagency conference in Milan for Italy- and  U.S.-based officials who would be working on the 2006 Winter Games to  share lessons learned from the U.S. effort in Athens and to begin  determining U.S. security support for Turin.
The United States largely based its security support approach on its  understanding of Italian security capabilities, gained from long-standing  counterterrorism and military relationships with Italy. In particular, the  United States and Italy have an established partnership as members of the  North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, more recently, as coalition  partners in Iraq. According to U.S. officials, the Italian government’s  sensitivities about formally sharing certain information limited the United  States’ ability to formally assess Italy’s operational plans for providing  security for the 2006 Winter Games. Agency officials noted that this made  U.S. efforts to plan security and emergency contingencies during the  Games more difficult. However, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator  and other key officials were able to use established relationships with  their Italian counterparts to develop a working knowledge of Italy’s plans  and capabilities for providing security to the 2006 Winter Games and to  plan U.S. security efforts. For example, U.S. officials met with their Italian  security and law enforcement counterparts to receive information on  Italy’s security structure and Olympic security integration plan.
In addition, over several months in 2005, State reported that more than 20  technical meetings were held between Italian authorities and U.S.  representatives from the U.S. Mission in Italy and various federal law  enforcement and intelligence agencies to coordinate bilateral cooperation  during the Games. Moreover, Italian government representatives held  meetings in 2005 with representatives from the United States and other  interested governments to discuss Italy’s security plans for the Games. For  example, in September 2005, the Italian government hosted an  international seminar on security concepts for the management of major  sporting events, with law enforcement representatives from 11 countries.  Furthermore, in October 2005, U.S. representatives were invited by the  Italian government to observe its antiterrorism drills testing the efficiency  and response capability of the local law enforcement, emergency, and  rescue systems in four Italian cities.
On the basis of its understanding of Italy’s security capabilities, the United  States identified specific training and security support that could be  provided to support Italy’s security efforts. In March 2005, the Italian  government requested a consolidated list of the offers of U.S. security  assistance, and the interagency working group in Washington identified  the available sources and capabilities among the represented agencies to  prevent duplication of efforts. In the spring of 2005, this interagency  working group provided a comprehensive offer of security support for the  2006 Winter Games, comprising a variety of specific offers from several  U.S. agencies. Italy accepted a number of these offers, including crisis  management expertise, an assessment of Turin’s international airport, and  mapping assistance.
In addition to direct security assistance to Italy, the United States  conducted several exercises to test its own strategies for supporting Italy’s  security efforts and ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens during the 2006  Winter Games. In November and December 2005, the United States  conducted several tabletop exercises to test strategies for ensuring the  protection of U.S. citizens, including a joint crisis management exercise  that focused on a theoretical terrorist attack in Italy and a crisis  management exercise held over several days in Rome, Milan, and Turin to  test U.S. crisis planning and execution in preparation for the Games.  Figure 2 provides a timeline of U.S. security support activities for the 2006  Winter Games.
section_title: U.S. Olympic Security Support Was Coordinated by the U.S. Embassy in Rome and Supported by Interagency Efforts
paragraphs: The U.S. Embassy in Rome—under the leadership of the U.S. Ambassador  to Italy—led the coordinated interagency efforts in Italy under one  centralized U.S. government mission. The U.S. Ambassador delegated the  responsibility for coordinating and overseeing U.S. interagency efforts in  Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. Located approximately   90-minutes away from Turin, the Consulate in Milan oversaw the  establishment of a temporary U.S. presence in Turin to centralize U.S.  agency operations and the efforts of key U.S. officials serving as  designated point persons for coordinating security and logistical  arrangements.
To centralize all U.S. activities in Turin leading up to and during the  Games, the U.S. Mission in Italy established a U.S. Olympic Coordination  Office in Turin to coordinate U.S. security support activities. Under the  direction of the U.S. Ambassador and through the U.S. Consul General in  Milan, this office served as the center for U.S. security operations and  other activities. In particular, during the Games, this office housed a U.S.  Olympic command group, comprising senior representatives from State,  DOD, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The U.S. command  group was responsible for providing—in the event of a request for  assistance by the Italian government—specialized expertise in a variety of  areas, including security operations, crisis operations, terrorism  investigations, consequence management, and intelligence collection and  dissemination. In addition, this office provided limited consular services to  American citizens and included a public diplomacy office to liaison with  press and support VIP visits during the Games.
U.S. efforts in Italy were supported by a Washington, D.C.-based  interagency working group—the International Athletic Events Security  Coordinating Group—which included representatives from the  intelligence community, State, DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ, among others.  Specifically, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Office of the  Coordinator for Counterterrorism serve as cochairs of this interagency  working group. Chaired by State, the interagency working group facilitated  and coordinated, on the domestic side, agencies’ contributions for the  2006 Winter Games. While this interagency working group has been a  useful forum for coordinating the domestic side of U.S. efforts in providing  security support to overseas athletic events, it operates without written  operational guidance and without the authority for tasking participating  agencies in planning for future Olympic Games, according to State and  DOJ officials. Specifically, the interagency working group does not have a  charter or mission statement that establishes the roles and responsibilities  of this group and its members.
U.S officials from State and DOJ indicated that, although U.S. support for  Turin was coordinated through the interagency working group, the group’s  lack of clear authority presents confusion over what direction and  guidance it can provide for U.S. operations in support of future Olympic  Games. This confusion has impacted the efforts of some subgroups  formed, in late 2004, by the interagency working group to provide  guidance in several key areas. For example, of the subgroups that focus on  logistics, transportation security, law enforcement, and intelligence  support, only the intelligence support subgroup meets on a regular basis.  The subgroup for law enforcement support met only a few times, in part  due to the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of participating  members. According to a State official from DS, the interagency working  group relied on U.S. officials in Italy to inform the group of what support  was needed. The same official indicated that clearly defined authorities  and responsibilities for the group’s participating agencies may support the  implementation of effective subgroups in the future. In addition, DS  established a major events coordination unit after the 2004 Athens  Summer Games, in part to coordinate U.S. security support for major  sporting events overseas, according to a State official. However, this unit  does not have written guidance for implementing coordination  responsibilities for future Olympic events and other major sporting  events. Without formal guidance, planning for future Olympic events  could be complicated, as roles and responsibilities will have to be  redefined on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, given the regular turnover of  key staff, such written guidance could facilitate the continuity of future  planning efforts.
To plan and coordinate U.S. security support operations, State and DOJ  officials in Turin worked closely with representatives from the interagency  working group. However, these officials in Turin experienced difficulties  in planning for interagency operations, in part due to problems in  obtaining timely information and decisions from the agencies. For  example, State and DOJ officials had difficulty identifying requirements for  operations, such as space and classification requirements, due to  communication challenges with the interagency community in  Washington. According to State officials in Italy and Washington, the lack  of proper communication capabilities in the U.S. Olympic Coordination  Office in Turin made it difficult to obtain timely information from the  agencies. The interagency working group worked to coordinate responses  to these officials in Turin. However, State and FBI officials in Turin  indicated that many of the agencies did not fully understand the  communication infrastructure and logistical requirements until they sent  representatives to Turin in the fall of 2005. FBI officials have stated that  although the interagency working group works to support the needs of the  U.S. effort overseas, it has no authority to task agencies to meet deadlines,  which leads to confusion over what direction and guidance should be  followed or given by this group.
section_title: Several U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 2006 Winter Games; United States Spent Millions on Security Support Activities, but Lacks Formal Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements
paragraphs: Several U.S. agencies contributed to the U.S. security support effort in  Turin, identifying more than $16 million in costs—over fiscal years 2005  and 2006—to arrange and provide for this support. State initially paid for  agencies’ shared costs, which were reimbursed by funds from the  participating agencies; however, no formal mechanism exists for  coordinating financial requirements associated with providing security  support.
subsections: section_title: Several U.S. Agencies Provided Security Support for the 2006 Winter Games
paragraphs: Approximately 20 U.S. agencies, or their component entities, contributed  to security efforts for the 2006 Winter Games. These contributions ranged  from crisis management and investigative expertise to the provision of  equipment, training, and communications and logistical support. Key  agencies that contributed to the U.S. effort in Turin included State, DHS,  DOD, DOE, DOJ, and intelligence agencies. State coordinated the U.S.  interagency efforts in both Italy and Washington, D.C., and also provided  security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and  commercial investors. See table 1 for key contributions of U.S. agencies  for the 2006 Winter Games.
State operated under Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 39, which  extend U.S. responsibility for protection of Americans overseas and direct  State as the lead agency to ensure the protection of American citizens  overseas. Furthermore, the Omnibus and Diplomatic Security and  Antiterrorism Act of 1986 directs DS to develop and implement policies  and programs for the security of U.S. government operations, including the  protection of all U.S. government personnel (other than those under  military command) on official duty abroad, and the establishment and  operation of security functions at all U.S. government missions. DS is  responsible for the establishment and operation of post security and  protective functions abroad, and for liaisons with host nation officials to  ensure the safety of official U.S. citizens. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is  responsible for assisting private Americans traveling and residing abroad.  Under State’s leadership, other agencies’ individual authorities were used  to provide specific assistance to the Italian government. For example, the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the authority under the  Aviation and Transportation Security Act to deploy federal air marshals on  all select flights from the United States to Italy, and TSA did so for the  2006 Winter Games.
section_title: United States Spent Millions, but Lacks a Formal Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements for Security Support
paragraphs: We surveyed the U.S. agencies identified as contributing security support  in advance of and during the 2006 Winter Games. These agencies identified  more than $16 million in costs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to arrange and  provide security support activities for the 2006 Winter Games, with funds  from multiple accounts. U.S. agencies did not receive specific Olympic- related appropriations during this period. Of the $16 million, agencies  reported to us that they spent more than $5 million in travel costs,  including airfare, lodging, and per diem costs for staff who traveled  overseas in 2005 and 2006 to provide security support for the 2006 Winter  Games. The reported costs during this period do not capture the entirety  of costs for activities in support of the 2006 Winter Games. For example,  while reported costs include the salaries of key personnel who filled  Olympic-related coordination roles, they do not capture the salaries and  benefits of other U.S. officials who worked to support the U.S. effort for  the Games, as part of their regular duties.
State paid for lodging and other administrative support needs associated  with establishing U.S. operations in Turin in advance, often to secure  limited housing at a lower rate, and these costs were later reimbursed by  the participating agencies. Specifically, the U.S. Embassy in Rome paid for  initial deposits on hotels because some agencies in Athens had struggled  to identify available funding—often, several years in advance of the  Games—for their housing and logistics needs. For Turin, some agencies  provided funds to State in advance of the Games, particularly for lodging  deposits, while additional reimbursements were made after the Games.  According to a State finance official in Rome, State provided $140,000 on  lodging contracts and $720,000 on joint administrative services associated  with U.S. interagency operations in Turin. The U.S. Embassy in Rome was  later reimbursed by participating agencies, including State, for their  portion of these joint administrative services.
According to State officials in Italy, although the U.S. Embassy in Rome  was able to fund these expenses, it struggled to cover them, particularly as  costs rose due to the changing requirements of the agencies in outfitting  suitable space for their operations. These changing requirements made it  difficult for budget personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Rome to identify total  joint administrative costs in order to obtain funds from State and other  agencies in a timely manner. Although the interagency working group  coordinates the domestic side of agency support for U.S. efforts at major  international sporting events, it does not have a formal mechanism for  addressing funding issues associated with providing this support. State  and DOJ officials told us that it would be easier to plan and budget for  future Olympic-security support activities overseas, which often begin  several years in advance of the Games, if a framework were available for  identifying costs and determining how these costs will be funded as early  as possible. Such a framework would also be useful for anticipating  resource needs, coordinating budgetary requests, and addressing potential  funding issues associated with providing U.S. security support to future  overseas Games.
Agencies have reported their expenditures associated with providing  security support for both the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006  Winter Games in Turin. Although the total reported expenditures for  providing security support to these overseas Games are not directly  comparable, in part due to the differing sizes of the Games and the  differing nature of U.S. security support, they can be helpful in identifying  future costs. For both Games, State and DOD reported the two largest  portions of costs associated with providing U.S. security support. For the  2004 Summer Games, State and DOD spent $15 million and $12.2 million,  respectively. For the 2006 Winter Games, State and DOD spent $6.9 million  and $6.6 million, respectively. See figure 3 for key agencies’ reported  expenditures for security support to the 2004 Summer Games and the 2006  Winter Games.
The nature of U.S. security support provided by key agencies differed  between the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006 Winter Games in  Turin. For the Athens Games, the majority of costs identified by the  agencies were travel costs for U.S. personnel supporting the Games and  for training programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel.  Agencies reported that they spent more than $9 million on training  programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel, including the  costs for building and executing the consequence management military  exercises and FBI forensics training as well as for translating training  materials and providing translators at the training sessions. For the Turin  Games, U.S. agencies reported that they spent $95,000 on training  programs for Italian officials and security personnel. As previously  mentioned, the majority of the Turin Games costs identified by the  agencies were for U.S. personnel travel and salary, benefits, and related  expenditures for staff who were hired to fill Olympic-related coordination  roles.
section_title: Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and Additional Lessons Were Identified for the Beijing and Other Future Games
paragraphs: Key lessons learned from the 2004 Summer Games were applied in the  planning efforts for Turin, including (1) planning early for U.S. security  support, (2) designating key U.S. officials to lead and deliver unified  messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. resources and interagency operations.  U.S. agencies are currently collecting lessons learned from the Turin  Games, for distribution to agencies involved in security planning for the  Beijing Games and other future Olympic Games. According to U.S.  officials involved in the Turin Games, these lessons include the  importance of (1) establishing a fully equipped, temporary operations  center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is not nearby;  (2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event  planning and crisis response efforts; and (3) planning for Olympic-related  expenditures over several fiscal years.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Government Agencies Applied Key Lessons Learned from the Athens Games to the Turin Games
paragraphs: As we reported in 2005, key lessons learned from the Athens Games that  were highlighted in numerous agency after-action reports and in an  interagency “lessons learned” conference in Milan were applied to the  security planning for the Turin Games. These lessons included the  importance of (1) planning early for U.S. security support, (2) designating  key U.S. officials to lead efforts and deliver unified messages, and (3)  centralizing U.S. agency operations and intelligence activities.
subsections: section_title: Planning Early for U.S. Security Support Activities
paragraphs: Many agency after-action reports from Athens and U.S. officials’  comments indicated the importance of planning early—for providing crisis  response support, counterterrorism and intelligence support, and other  capabilities—coupled with an understanding of host country security  capabilities that an existing and cooperative bilateral relationship affords.  Such early insight enables advance planning of baseline support, including  logistics as well as training and military exercises to enhance the host  country’s capabilities. Furthermore, early planning of baseline U.S.  support enables agencies to coordinate their efforts and plan more  efficiently and effectively, including arranging accommodations, vehicle  rentals, and communications infrastructure. For example, advance  notification of the expected U.S. agency presence would allow for  planning of support infrastructure, including the operations and  intelligence center. U.S. officials planning for the Turin Games identified  the importance of this lesson and began planning immediately after the  Athens Games, almost 1½ years in advance of the Turin Games.
This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games as the United States  has already begun its planning efforts over 2 years in advance of the  Games. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, U.S. officials in Greece; Italy;  and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with their counterparts in  Beijing. The U.S. Mission in Beijing is taking steps to plan for baseline  support and identify the types of security support that the United States  may provide for the Beijing Games. While U.S. agencies are focusing on  the Beijing Games, they also are beginning to assess potential roles for  U.S. security support for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games. These plans  are still in the early stages, although bilateral U.S.-Canada state and federal  security and transportation officials have already met to discuss Canada’s  Olympic planning process. The Vancouver Games, located in close  proximity to the U.S. border, will present new and different challenges for  U.S. security support, such as cross-border security issues.
section_title: Designating Key U.S. Officials to Lead Efforts and Present Unified Message
paragraphs: The designation of certain U.S. officials to serve as point persons for U.S.  security support efforts is another key lesson from Athens that was  applied in Turin. In Athens, the U.S. Embassy had designated individuals  to be responsible for political, security, and logistics arrangements, which  helped to avoid separate requests for assistance from U.S. agencies and  minimized overlap among and overreach by participating U.S. agencies.  Athens- and Washington-based officials recommended this strategy for  future use. In September 2004, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy delegated  organizational responsibility and overall coordination authority for U.S.  efforts in Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. In November 2004,  State appointed an U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator to serve in Turin as  a U.S. focal point for contacts with the host government and to work with  the Consul General to develop and communicate a coordinated U.S.  message, specifically on matters related to security support. This  individual was tasked with crafting and ensuring a consistent message and  setting consistent expectations for the host country and multilateral  community regarding planned U.S. security support efforts. In addition, in  January 2005, an FBI liaison arrived in Italy to serve as the FBI’s point of  contact for its security support efforts in Turin. According to State and FBI  officials, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and FBI liaison worked  closely together in Turin to plan for and coordinate U.S. security support  operations in Turin.
To coordinate the logistical arrangements and needs for U.S. operations in  Turin, State appointed a U.S. Olympic Coordinator who arrived in April  2005. This individual served as a U.S. focal point for contacts with the host  government, the Turin Olympic Organizing Committee, and the U.S.  Olympic Committee and worked with the U.S. Consul General in Milan to  develop and communicate interagency information in a coordinated and  understandable way. In addition, a dedicated Web site was developed as a  ready source of information for Americans on security matters, while also  offering helpful advice on other matters, such as how to replace lost  passports and locate English-speaking pharmacies.
This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games through State’s  appointment of an Olympic Coordinator in June 2005, a Minister  Counselor for Olympic Coordination in December 2005, a Deputy Olympic  Security Coordinator in January 2006, and the U.S. Ambassador’s  designation of an Olympic Coordination Office at the U.S. Mission in  Beijing to coordinate all arrangements—including political, security, and  logistical—for U.S. security support to the 2008 Summer Games.  According to U.S. officials involved in planning for the 2008 Summer  Games, providing consistent, clear, and targeted information for Beijing is  needed to avert possible confusion within the Chinese government  regarding which U.S. agency to speak with to obtain specific assistance.  The strategy also will help ensure that U.S. citizens and interests receive  consistent information on security and other critical issues.
section_title: Centralizing U.S. Activities in One Location
paragraphs: Many U.S. officials noted that the key lesson from Athens that was applied  in Turin was the centralization of all U.S. activities in one location. U.S.  officials involved in the Athens Games recommended that operations and  intelligence centers for future Olympics be colocated to ensure the  efficient delivery and dissemination of information among U.S. agencies.  U.S. officials planning for Turin identified the importance of this lesson  and planned to better centralize resources by colocating all participating  U.S. agencies and their functions in one facility in Turin, including  operations and intelligence activities and consular services for U.S.  citizens. According to U.S. officials who worked on the Turin Games, the  colocation of all U.S. agencies and activities in one facility resulted in good  coordination, and eliminated many planning and operations problems that  had been experienced in Athens.
This lesson has been communicated by Washington-, Athens-, and Italy- based personnel to their counterparts in China and has been incorporated  into planning efforts for the Beijing Games. According to U.S. officials in  Beijing, they are following the Turin model of centralizing U.S. resources,  to coordinate interagency needs that will be specific to the Beijing Games  and to identify any training or security support that may be provided to the  Chinese government. By July 2006, U.S. officials in Beijing plan to have  established a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S.  Embassy in Beijing to coordinate U.S. operations leading up to and during  the Beijing Games.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Identified Additional Lessons Learned in Turin
paragraphs: U.S. agencies have begun to collect lessons learned from the Turin Games  and disseminate them to their Beijing Games counterparts. According to  U.S. officials involved in the Turin Games, key lessons from Turin included  the importance of (1) establishing a temporary, fully equipped, operations  center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is not nearby;  (2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event  planning and operations; and (3) planning early for Olympic-related costs.  Officials at State, DOJ, and other key agencies are currently completing  after-action reports that are expected to highlight aspects of security  support that went well and should be replicated in the future, where  feasible, and what aspects could be improved upon. At the time of our  review, State and DOJ expected to complete their after-action reports in  June 2006. In addition, the Washington-based interagency working group is  completing an after-action report that is expected to discuss issues  specific to the support provided by this group. According to State, the  interagency working group’s after-action report is expected to be  completed later this year.
subsections: section_title: Establishing a U.S. Operations Center at the Location of Games
paragraphs: The lack of a U.S. presence in Turin demonstrated the importance of  establishing a fully equipped operations center at the location of the  Games. Acquiring and outfitting suitable space for an interagency  operations center require advance planning, particularly when a U.S.  presence is not nearby. In Turin, which is a 90-minute drive from the  nearest U.S. Consulate, the U.S. Mission faced unique challenges in  establishing a temporary but suitable space for centralizing interagency  operations, particularly those related to logistics, communications, and  resources. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Milan used its staff to  provide logistical support to the U.S. coordinators in Turin, such as the  establishment of work space and other administrative support services.  Since the U.S. Olympic Coordination Office was not established until July  2005, the U.S. coordinators in Turin worked from their homes and traveled  between Milan and Turin to coordinate the U.S. efforts.
In addition, proper space and classification requirements of participating  agencies were difficult to identify in early planning efforts, in part due to  the lack of proper communication capabilities between U.S. officials in  Turin and U.S. agencies in Washington, D.C. Agency officials in Italy and  Washington attributed this difficulty, in part, to this being the first time  that the United States had attempted to establish a temporary U.S. facility  to coordinate security support provided by all participating U.S. agencies.  Although these challenges were resolved in time for the Turin Games, U.S.  officials in Italy and Washington stated that authoritative decision making  is necessary for budgeting and identifying requirements for setting up an  interagency operation center.
Due to the presence of a U.S. Embassy in Beijing and three U.S.  Consulates near other Olympic venues, U.S. operations in Beijing will not  require the establishment of a fully equipped U.S. operations center.  However, shortage of space at the U.S. Mission requires the establishment  of a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S. Embassy in  Beijing. U.S. officials in Beijing and at the interagency working group in  Washington have begun discussing the communication, infrastructure, and  other logistical requirements for centralizing and coordinating U.S. agency  security support efforts before and during the Beijing Games. In addition,  U.S. officials have held preplanning discussions for the 2010 Vancouver  Games regarding work space and operating requirements.
section_title: Establishing Clear Roles and Responsibilities for U.S. Agencies
paragraphs: The Turin Games and, to some degree, the Athens Games demonstrated  the importance of establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S.  agencies in the planning and operational stages of U.S. security support  efforts. While security support for the Turin Games was generally well- coordinated, U.S. agency officials at State and DOJ have stated that the  overall U.S. effort lacks a clear strategy for security support operations at  future overseas sporting events. These officials indicated that clear  guidance for U.S. agencies’ roles and responsibilities would identify  authorities for decision making and responsibilities during both the  planning and operational stages of the U.S. efforts. U.S. officials in Turin  prepared an operational plan that was approved by the U.S. Mission in  Rome, which outlined the missions of all participating agencies and  identified reporting authorities for U.S. operations. However, according to  State and DOJ officials, although State is the lead agency for ensuring the  protection of American citizens overseas, the United States does not have  a strategy that clearly outlines the authorities responsible for planning  operations at future Olympic Games.
section_title: Planning Early for Several Years of Olympic-Related Costs
paragraphs: U.S. support for the Turin Games demonstrated the importance of  planning early for Olympic-related costs. In particular, State and DOJ  officials noted the importance of identifying early funding sources to make  advance payments on housing and logistical needs. In Turin, State  struggled to identify funds to secure space, communication, and  transportation arrangements, among other expenses, for interagency  operations. Although U.S. officials in Italy were able to secure funding for  housing and space for U.S. operations, they indicated that it was difficult  to obtain timely decisions from the interagency to budget and identify  requirements for the establishment of a U.S. presence in Turin. State  officials in Italy indicated that they were unable to address these issues  until the fall of 2005, when agency representatives came to Italy for  operational planning meetings. According to a State finance official in  Italy, funds for the joint administrative costs were easier to obtain once  the U.S. coordinators in Turin and the interagency were able to identify  operational requirements. In addition, several U.S. officials in Italy and  Washington, D.C., stated that, for future overseas Games, it would be  easier for agencies to identify and plan for their portion of Olympic-related  expenditures if a framework were available for identifying costs and  addressing funding issues associated with providing security support.
U.S. officials in Italy and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with  their counterparts in Beijing. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, they  have already begun to address housing and logistics needs, such as  planning to make initial deposits on hotels early to avoid high costs for  accommodations as the Games draw nearer. However, these officials  indicated potential problems with identifying funds early enough to cover  expenditures for this fiscal year.
section_title: Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Support for 2008 Beijing Games; Efforts Face Unique Challenges
paragraphs: The United States is currently taking steps to coordinate a U.S. security  presence and identify the types of security support that the United States  may provide for the 2008 Beijing Games. U.S.-Chinese counterterrorism  cooperation is limited, and U.S. officials have stated that they lack  knowledge of China’s capabilities to handle security for the Olympics. In  addition, technology transfer and human rights issues present new and  different challenges for U.S. security support to these Games.
The U.S. government, led by State, is actively working to identify and  establish a U.S. security presence to support the interests of its athletes,  spectators, and commercial investors during the Games. The U.S.  Ambassador to China has designated a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office  to be responsible for all arrangements—including political, security, and  logistical—of U.S. efforts for the Beijing Games. In January 2006, State  appointed a U.S. Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator to serve—in this  new office—as a U.S. government point person for U.S. security support  for the Beijing Games. In addition, the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and the  Minister Counselor for Olympic Coordination, appointed by State in June  and December 2005, respectively, serve as the point persons for logistic  arrangements of U.S. efforts. Both the U.S. Deputy Olympic Security  Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator were in Turin to participate  in U.S. security support for the 2006 Winter Games and to learn from their  counterparts in Turin. To ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and  commercial investors, State has taken steps to identify and secure  logistical support. To help identify necessary housing and mitigate high  prices on accommodations, State has begun to identify housing options for  U.S. personnel, coordinating through the interagency group for estimates  of personnel to be temporarily assigned to Beijing during the Games.
While China has not yet requested U.S. security assistance as of May 2006,  State officials have received inquiries from Chinese officials regarding  Olympic security. As of April 2006, discussions between the United States  and China were under way for an assessment to identify security needs  and U.S. security support for the Beijing Games, according to U.S. officials  in Beijing and Washington, D.C. In addition, a working group has been  established between U.S. and Chinese counterparts to discuss issues  related to the operational and intelligence side of security. U.S. officials  have stated that the Chinese have recognized the large size of the U.S.  team and its associated security risks and concerns.
Although recent steps have been taken, U.S. officials have stated that they  lack knowledge of China’s advanced capabilities to handle security for the  2008 Summer Games. In addition, U.S. officials from State and DOJ have  stated that they are uncertain about the extent of assistance China may  request or permit from outside sources. Moreover, U.S. and Chinese  counterterrorism cooperation is limited, and military relations have only  recently resumed. In July 2003, China joined the U.S. Container Security  Initiative, and, in November 2005, the United States and China signed an  agreement related to the U.S. Megaports Initiative, allowing for the  installation of special equipment at Chinese ports to detect hidden  shipments of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The United States  has recently resumed, under the current administration, military-to- military contacts with China.
In planning for the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, logistical challenges  and technology transfers and human rights issues present unique  challenges for U.S. security support. The location of the Beijing Games  presents unique logistical challenges in coordinating U.S. security support.  Whereas past Summer Games have been centered in and around the host  city, the venues for the Beijing Games will be spread across seven Chinese  cities along the country’s eastern border, presenting potential  communication challenges for interagency operations between the U.S.  Embassy Beijing and U.S. Consulates located near Olympic venue sites.  Figure 4 presents the seven venue cities for the Beijing Games—Beijing,  Qingdao, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Qinhuangdao—and  the U.S. embassy and three consulates located at Olympic venue cities.  Unlike the 2004 Summer Games in Athens, U.S. officials have stated the  Chinese are much further ahead in planning for the 2008 Summer Games,  and these officials anticipate that the venues will be completed on time or  ahead of schedule. To prepare for the 2008 Beijing Games, China is  planning to host several events in 2007 to test its preparations for major  event operations.
In addition, any requests for equipment or technology to support security  efforts in China must be addressed under U.S. requirements for the  protection against sensitive technology transfers, because U.S. sanctions  deny the export of defense articles/services, crime control equipment, and  satellites to China. A presidential waiver for exports of equipment for  security of the Beijing Olympics may be considered. U.S. policy makers  and human rights groups have also expressed concern with several human  rights issues in China, including freedom of information, freedom of  religion, and protection of ethnic and minority groups.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In a climate of increased concerns about international terrorism, ensuring  the protection of U.S. interests at future Olympic Games overseas will  continue to be a priority for the United States. For such future Games, U.S.  agencies are likely to continue providing support to host governments in  identifying potential security threats and developing strategies to protect  U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors several years in  advance of and throughout the Olympics. Although each Olympic Games  has its own set of unique security requirements, future coordination of  U.S. security support efforts for Games—under the leadership of State— should efficiently and effectively capture the expertise, knowledge, and  resource requirements of all U.S. agencies. However, there is currently no  formal framework for guiding the development and implementation of U.S.  security support for such Games, particularly the coordinated financing of  U.S. security support and operations.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To enhance planning and preparations for future overseas Olympic and  Paralympic Games, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in  consultation with members of the International Athletic Events Security  Coordinating Group, take the following two actions:    Develop written guidance for providing U.S. government security support  to future Games. This guidance should identify key personnel and target  dates for their assignment and roles and responsibilities, and key steps for  the U.S. Mission and regional bureau to undertake in preparing for and  leading the U.S. efforts at future Games. To formalize the process for  providing security support overseas, we also recommend that State, in  consultation with members of the International Athletic Events Security  Coordinating Group, consider establishing a charter and mission  statement for this group that identifies authorities and responsibilities for  coordinating and supporting U.S. security efforts at future Games.
Develop a finance subgroup as part of the International Athletic Events  Security Coordinating Group, which would bring together budgetary  personnel from the various agencies or component entities that contribute  to security efforts for overseas Games. A formal mechanism, such as a  finance subgroup with established responsibilities, would help the  agencies plan for anticipated resources needs, coordinate their budget  requests, and address potential funding issues for U.S. security support at  future Games.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Energy,  Homeland Security, and State and to the Attorney General for their review  and comment. The Department of State provided written comments on the  draft report, which are reprinted in appendix II. State said that it agreed  with our findings and recommendations, and that it is working to develop  a more efficient plan for coordinating the planning and implementation of  U.S. security support at future major events overseas—including the  development of written guidance and identified roles and responsibilities  for interagency working group members—through an after-action review  of the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group and by  working with the National Security Council, Counterterrorism Security  Group. Furthermore, State said that the interagency working group has  expanded its working subgroups and is considering the inclusion of a  budget subgroup to address potential funding issues for U.S. security  support at future Olympic Games. State also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The Departments of Defense and Justice did not provide written  comments on the draft report; however, they provided technical  comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. The Departments  of Energy and Homeland Security did not provide written or technical  comments.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary  of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, and the Attorney General.  We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128 or ford@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To fulfill our objectives in identifying U.S. security strategies in providing  security support for the 2006 Winter Games, the various roles and  additional costs of the U.S. agencies involved, and the lessons they learned  in supporting the Games, we specifically obtained and reviewed several  documents, such as available operations and mission plans, security  situation reports, and monthly activity reports. In addition, we interviewed  officials at the Departments of State (State), Justice (DOJ), Homeland  Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) and at certain  intelligence agencies. We also conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, and  Turin, Italy.
At State, we interviewed officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,  Coordinator for Counterterrorism office; Overseas Security Advisory  Council; Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; Consular Affairs; and  Public Affairs. We also interviewed the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator  and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator. At DOJ, we interviewed officials in the  Criminal Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  Counterterrorism Division, including the FBI’s Olympic coordinator who  served as its liaison in Turin through the operational period of the Games.  At DHS, we met with officials from the Transportation Security  Administration, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Federal Air Marshal  Service. At DOD, we spoke with officials from the Office of the Secretary  of Defense and European Command. At DOE, we spoke with officials from  the National Nuclear Security Administration. Finally, we regularly  attended and met with the interagency working group—the International  Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group—that includes all agencies  involved in providing support to international sporting events overseas.
During our fieldwork in Italy in November 2005, we obtained documents  and interviewed key U.S. officials from the previously mentioned agencies.  We obtained and reviewed key documents, such as operational and  mission plans. In Rome, we interviewed U.S. officials, including the  Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, Minister Counselor for  Management Affairs, Financial Management Officer, Information  Management Officer, Legal Attaché, Public Affairs Officer, Immigration  and Customs Enforcement Attaché, Transportation and Security  Administration representative, Defense Attaché, and Consular officer.  Additionally, we attended an interagency operations and capabilities  presentation for the Chief of Mission. Also, we met with representatives  from the Italian Ministry of Interior to obtain the Italian government’s  perspective on the security support provided by the United States. During  our fieldwork in Milan, we interviewed U.S. officials, including the Consul  General, Milan; Management Officer; Vice Consul; Public Affairs Officers;  and Consular Officer. In Turin, we interviewed the U.S. Olympic  Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator. We also visited  the U.S. Olympic Coordination Center in Turin and observed preparations  for outfitting the center for the planned operations and intelligence center.  Additionally, to understand the challenges associated with providing  security support to the distant Olympic venues, we visited several of the  Olympics venue sites in Turin, including in Palavela, Pragelato, Sestriere,  and Bardonecchia, Italy.
To determine cost estimates of U.S. security support to the 2006 Winter  Games, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI), based on the  previous DCI we used to obtain cost estimates for the 2004 Athens Games,  to survey agencies identified as contributing to the U.S. effort. A draft DCI  was pretested on two U.S. government agencies. In November 2005, we  sent a preliminary DCI to agencies identified by State as being involved in  the U.S. security support effort and obtained 11 responses. In March 2006,  we sent a final DCI to the agencies previously identified and obtained 20  responses. Except for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the  intelligence community entities did not provide a response to our final DCI  on costs for the 2006 Winter Games. Our DCI requested agencies to  identify how they collected and tracked the data on costs. We conducted  follow-ups with the agencies to clarify information in their responses. We  observed that not all agency components collect and track data in a  consistent manner. Furthermore, the DCI did not attempt to gather  information on the costs of personnel salaries, which are presumed to be a  significant outlay for the agency components involved. To assess the  reliability of the estimates provided, we compared the preliminary results  with the final results and compared this year’s 2006 results with those for  2004. In addition, we considered the cost factors cited by the agencies in  relation to the sums they reported and conducted follow-ups with the  agencies to clarify any questions that arose. We determined that these data  were sufficiently reliable to be reported in aggregated form, rounded to  millions, and attributed to the agencies, as estimated cost outlays and by  category of expenditure, but not in precise, detailed form.
To assess how lessons learned in supporting Greece were applied to the  Turin Games, we gathered information from the various agencies  previously mentioned; reviewed operations plans; attended meetings of  the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C.; and  conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, Turin, and mountain areas of Italy.  To identify lessons learned from the Turin Games, we gathered  information from the various agencies and attended meetings of the  interagency working group. Although after-action reports were not  completed and available at the time of our audit, to identify lessons  learned, we interviewed key officials at State, DOJ, the U.S. Consulate  Milan, and the U.S. Coordination Center in Turin and attended the  interagency working group meetings. To identify how lessons learned in  Turin are being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games, we interviewed U.S.  officials from State and DOJ and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and U.S.  Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing.
To identify efforts under way for providing support to the 2008 Summer  Games in Beijing, we gathered information from the various agencies  previously mentioned; reviewed China’s Mission Performance Plan;  attended meetings of the State-chaired interagency working group in  Washington, D.C.; and interviewed the Deputy Olympic Security  Coordinator and Olympic Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing.
We conducted our work from September 2005 to May 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Key contributors to this report included Diana Glod, Monica Brym, and  Dorian L. Herring. Technical assistance was provided by Jason Bair, Joe  Carney, Martin de Alteris, Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Jena Sinkfield,  George Taylor, and Mike TenKate.