Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges
Published: 2007-01-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Accessing and retaining high-quality officers in the current environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may be two of the all volunteer force's greatest challenges. The military services use three programs to access officer candidates: (1) military academies, (2) the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). In addition to accessing new officers, the services must retain enough experienced officers to meet current operational needs and the services' transformation initiatives. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the services are accessing and retaining the officers required to meet their needs. GAO also identified steps that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have taken and the impediments they face in increasing officers' foreign language proficiency. For this report, GAO examined actual accession and retention rates for officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as projections for later years. Also, GAO reviewed documents on foreign language training and plans.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing enough officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but are experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like flight officers and medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not meet its needs for officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to struggle with future accessions. To meet its officer accession needs, the Army's traditional approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and academy programs and then compensate for shortfalls in these programs by increasing its OCS accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army nearly doubled the number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1) academy and ROTC shortfalls, (2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a need to expand its officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations such as housing and classroom space may prevent further expansion. In addition, the Army's three accession programs are decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, making it difficult for the Army, using its traditional approach, to effectively manage risks and allocate resources across programs in an integrated, strategic fashion. Without a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual accession goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army's ability to meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more deployable, modular units is uncertain. All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall officer retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many retention challenges. For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers, such as majors, because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. It projects a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually through FY 2013. While the Army is implementing and considering initiatives to improve officer retention, the initiatives are not integrated and will not affect officer retention until at least 2009 or are unfunded. As with its accession shortfalls, the Army does not have an integrated strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls. While the Army is most challenged in retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; but each experienced challenges in occupational specialties such as medical officers. DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. For example, academy and ROTC officer candidates already have demanding workloads and ROTC does not control curricula at host institutions. The services recognize these impediments and are drafting plans to implement DOD's foreign language objectives.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Ensuring the availability of sufficient numbers of trained, high-quality  personnel in an environment of increasing deployments and armed  conflict may prove to be one of the greatest personnel challenges faced by  the U.S. military since the inception of the all volunteer force in 1973.  Unlike the civilian sector, the military recruits, accesses, and trains all of  its own leaders. Therefore, today’s policy decisions and efforts on officer  recruiting influence the future availability of officers. In addition, all of the  services must retain sufficient numbers of experienced, skilled, and  qualified officers to meet their current and future needs.
Before officers can be commissioned at the most junior level, candidates  must complete training programs, some of which take up to 4 years. The  military services use three types of programs that award commissions to  officer candidates after they graduate from a program: (1) military  academies, (2) Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer  Candidate School (OCS) for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps or Officer  Training School (OTS) for the Air Force.
Military academies: The U.S. Military Academy (USMA), U.S. Naval  Academy (USNA), and U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) each run 4- year programs that provide successful candidates with bachelor’s  degrees and commissions as military officers. In addition to completing  their academic courses, the approximately 12,000 officer candidates  who attend the academies each year participate in rigorous military  training activities and mandatory athletic activities. In return for their  free education, the graduates must serve on active duty for 5 years  after graduation.
ROTC: The services’ ROTC units are located at civilian colleges and  universities throughout the country, with some academic institutions  offering ROTC from more than one service. Currently, Army ROTC is  located at 273 academic institutions, Navy ROTC at 71, and Air Force  ROTC at 144. Officer candidates enrolled in ROTC programs must meet  all graduation requirements of their academic institutions and complete  required military training to receive commissions as officers, usually  after 4 years. All officers who received Army or Navy ROTC  scholarships and all Air Force officers who graduated from ROTC must  typically commit to 4 years of active duty military service after  graduation, while Army and Navy officers who did not receive ROTC  scholarships must serve 3 years on active duty.
OCS/OTS: These officer commissioning programs are designed to  augment the services’ other commissioning programs. Because these  programs focus only on military training, they are short, ranging from 6  weeks (Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program) to 14  weeks (Army OCS). Many, but not all, graduates have prior  undergraduate degrees and are obligated to serve a minimum of 2 years  on active duty as officers. Compared to the other services, the Marine  Corps makes more extensive use of its OCS commissioning program.
The general approach that the services use to meet their accession needs  has been to first depend on the service academy and ROTC program.  When these programs are unable to meet a service’s needs for newly  commissioned officers, the service turns to its OCS/OTS program to bridge  the gap. Conversely, during periods of drawdown, all of the commissioning  sources may cut back on their numbers of officer candidates, but the  OCS/OTS program provides the most immediate means for achieving the  downsizing. Unlike the academy and ROTC programs that take up to 4  years to produce an officer, the OCS/OTS program can quickly expand or  retract. In addition, under Title 10, each service directly commissions  officers with particular professional skills, like physicians, dentists,  nurses, lawyers, and chaplains who do not need to attend the major  commissioning programs.
Since its enactment in 1980, the Defense Officer Personnel Management  Act (DOPMA) as codified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code has provided the  basis for the services’ officer career management systems. The original  objectives for DOPMA were to “maintain a high-quality, numerically  sufficient officer corps,  provided career opportunities that would  attract and retain the numbers of high-caliber officers needed,   provide reasonably consistent career opportunity among the services.”  While DOPMA and other provisions of Title 10 outline requirements for  managing the officer corps, the services’ manpower and reserve affairs  offices use additional types of data—including historical continuation  rates and projected changes in the services’ size and missions—to identify  officer accession and retention needs. In addition, the services attempt to  attract an officer corps that reflects the racial and ethnic composition of  the United States. Finally, a new emphasis for officer training is the focus  on foreign language and cultural skills. As outlined in the February 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review Report and other Department of Defense  (DOD) guidance, the department aims to develop a broader linguistic  capability and cultural understanding, which it identified as critical in  prevailing in the Global War on Terrorism and meeting 21st century  challenges.
Within the last decade, DOD has experienced both downsizing and  increases in the size of the forces, including officers. During the 1990s,  each service decreased its number of officers as the Cold War came to a  close. However, post-September 11, 2001, operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan and assignments to other homeland and global commitments  have placed strains on the all volunteer force. In recognition of the  demands placed on the Army and Marine Corps, which have provided the  majority of forces for recent operations, Congress increased the  authorized end strength of the Army by 30,000 since 2004 and the Marine  Corps by more than 7,000 since 2002. While these services’ OCS programs  offer a means for increasing the numbers of newly commissioned officers  in a relatively short period to address a change in end strength, it takes  years to grow experienced leaders, which presents a different officer  career management challenge—officer retention.
We have issued a number of reports that provide policymakers with  information for making informed decisions about the all volunteer force.  For example, in September 2005, we reported on the demographics of  servicemembers in the active and reserve components; and in November  2005, we reported on challenges DOD faces in recruiting and retaining  sufficient numbers of enlisted personnel. In response to your request, this  report assesses the extent to which the services are (1) accessing the  numbers and types of commissioned officers required to meet their needs,  and (2) retaining the numbers and types of officers they need. We also  identified steps that DOD and the services have taken and the  impediments that they face as they attempt to increase foreign language  proficiency among junior officers.
We limited the scope of our work to the four active duty DOD services:  Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Also, we examined actual  accession and continuation rates for fiscal years (FY) 2001, 2003, and 2005  as well as projections for FY 2006, the year when we began our work, and  later years. FY 2001 data represented the situations present immediately  before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and FY 2005 data  represented the most recent fiscal year for which the services had  complete data. FY 2003 data provided information on interim conditions  and allowed us to examine the data for trends and other patterns. To  accomplish our work, we reviewed reports, laws, and DOD-wide and  service-specific officer management guidance—including DOPMA and  other provision of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, defense authorization acts, the  2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and policies and directives—to gain a  comprehensive understanding of officer recruitment, commissioning,  training, and retention. We obtained documents and met with officials  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness (OUSD ), the services’ headquarters, personnel and  manpower commands, service academies, ROTC commands, and  OCS/OTS commands to obtain an integrated understanding of the three  officer-related issues that we were asked to evaluate. We obtained and  analyzed accessions and continuation data from DOD’s Defense  Manpower Data Center, but our assessment of the data’s reliability  identified incorrect information that was severe enough to prevent those  data from being used for this report. As a result, we subsequently  obtained accession and continuation information from the services. While  we did not conduct independent analyses using the services’ databases,  our assessment of their data’s reliability, including a review of relevant  documentation, and a comparison of service-provided information to  similar information from other sources and for other time periods. We  determined that the service-provided data was sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. For our assessment of officer accessions, we  examined information showing the numbers of officers commissioned  from the services’ officer programs during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 for  trends and other patterns and compared the numbers of officers produced  to the staffing needs of the services’ occupational specialty areas. We  found that the services determined their accession needs for each general  category of specialty but did not develop a servicewide total accession  goal for each year. Also, we reviewed internal service documents to  identify potential causes and effects of staffing gaps. In our examination of  officer retention, we performed similar analyses of quantitative  continuation information and reviews of documents to identify patterns,  gaps, and potential causes and effects. Our continuation analyses focused  on four key points in officers’ careers—years 3, 4, 5, and 10—that service- retention experts helped us to identify as when retention decisions are  most likely to occur. Additionally, we met with a number of DOD officials,  including representatives at the officer commissioning programs, and  received a wide variety of reports and other documents to obtain an  understanding of efforts to improve foreign language training. We then  used the information to identify challenges the services face in providing  additional training in their officer commissioning programs. We assessed  the reliability of the data we used and determined that it was sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of our report. We conducted our review from  September 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I contains more detail  on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: For over 30 years, the United States has relied on an all volunteer force to  defend the nation at home and abroad. Before that, the nation relied on the  draft to ensure that it had enough soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen in  wartime. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United  States, DOD has launched three major operations requiring significant  numbers of military servicemembers: Operation Noble Eagle, which  covers military operations related to homeland security; Operation  Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in  Afghanistan and certain other countries; and Operation Iraqi Freedom,  which includes ongoing military operations in Iraq and the Persian Gulf  area. These operations have greatly increased overseas deployments.  Moreover, they are the first long-term major overseas combat missions  since the advent of the all volunteer force in 1973.
To ensure that sufficient forces are available for the services to  accomplish their missions, Congress authorizes an annual year-end  authorized personnel level for each service component. To function  effectively, the services must, among other things, access and retain  officers at appropriate ranks and in the occupational specialties needed to  enable its units to contribute to the services’ missions. The services rely on  monetary and nonmonetary incentives, where needed, to meet their  accession and retention needs.
The careers of military officers are governed primarily by Title 10, which  has incorporated the DOPMA legislation, giving the services the primary  authority to recruit, train, and retain officers. Title 10 specifies the active  duty and reserve service obligations for officers who join the military:    graduates of the service academies must serve a minimum of 5 years on  active duty; and up to an additional 3 years on active duty or in the  reserves;    ROTC scholarship recipients must serve a minimum of 4 years on  active duty and an additional 4 years on active duty or in the reserves;  and    other types of officers have varying service obligations (for example,  pilots must serve 6 to 8 years on active duty, depending on the type of  aircraft, and navigators and flight officers must serve 6 years on active  duty).
Similarly, Title 10 authorizes the services to directly commission medical  specialists and other professionals to meet their needs.
section_title: Services Generally Met Most Accession Needs for Newly Commissioned Officers Despite Some Challenges, but Army Faces Unique Problems with Future Accessions
paragraphs: The services generally met most their past needs for newly commissioned  officers; but the Army faces some unique problems accessing enough  officers to meet its needs and has not developed a strategic plan to  address these challenges. The Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force  generally met their needs for accessing newly commissioned officers in  FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. However, all services experienced problems  recruiting enough medical professionals in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; and  most had problems accessing racial and ethnic minorities to diversify their  officer corps.
subsections: section_title: Services Generally Met Most Overall Accession Needs for Newly Commissioned Officers But Some Shortfalls Found for Each Service
paragraphs: Our analysis of documentary evidence confirmed the services’ reports  that their accession programs generally met their officer needs in selected  recent years, but each experienced some shortfalls in certain ranks and  specialties. The services do not develop overall yearly goals for the total  number of commissioned officers needed. Instead, they adjust the  enrollment in OCS/OTS throughout the year to meet higher or lower than  expected demands for newly commissioned officers by the various  occupational specialty groups of importance to the service. The Army and  the Marine Corps are increasing their numbers of newly commissioned  officers because of their growing end strengths, whereas the Navy and the  Air Force are accessing fewer officers because they are reducing their end  strengths.
The Army did not meet its overall accession needs for newly  commissioned officers in FYs 2001 and 2003, though it met its needs in  2005. The Army has two distinct types of commissioned officers. Most  officers are commissioned in its basic branches or specialty areas, such as  infantry or signal, and are commissioned through major accession  programs. The second type of officers are and those who are directly  commissioned, such as medical professionals.  In FY 2001, the Army  needed 4,100 of these officers in its basic branches and instead it  commissioned 3,791, in FY 2003 it needed 4,500 and instead commissioned  4,433.  In FY 2005, it exceed it goal of commissioning 4,600 of and instead  accessed 4,654 in it basic branches.
During those years it was increasing the number of commissioned officers  entering the service (see table 1). Specifically, the Army commissioned  5,540 officers in FY 2001, 5,929 in FY 2003, and 6,045 in FY 2005. In each of  the examined fiscal years, the Army’s ROTC program accounted for  around half of all newly commissioned officers, with nearly 1,000 of those  officers being accessed annually into the Army despite not being awarded  a scholarship. The Army increased total accessions from FY 2001 to  FY 2005 by nearly doubling the number of officers commissioned through  OCS.
Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from the  commissioning sources found that the Army does not recruit officers to fill  a specific specialty, and instead, officers are placed in general specialty  areas based on the needs of the Army. Some general specialty areas are  more popular than others, and the Army attempts to match an officer  candidate’s preference to the needs of the Army. However, the service’s  needs prevail, and some officers may be placed in specialty areas outside  of their preferences if shortfalls are present.
In contrast, the Marine Corps met its overall accession needs for newly  commissioned officers for the examined fiscal years, while increasing the  number of officers it commissioned in FY 2005 (see table 2). Increasing  accessions by 241 from FY 2003 to FY 2005 represents about an 18 percent  increase in the number of newly commissioned officers. Relative to the  other services, the Marine Corps commissioned a larger percentage of its  officers through programs other than the academy or ROTC program. For  example, in FY 2005, 76 percent of the Marine Corps’s newly  commissioned officers came from OCS or other sources. However, the  Marine Corps has also been increasing the number of officers  commissioned from USNA. The Marine Corps does not have a separate  ROTC program and instead, commissions officers through the Navy ROTC  program.
Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from the  commissioning sources and Marine Corps headquarters identified some  areas where the Marine Corps was challenged to access newly  commissioned officers for some occupational specialties. While the  Marine Corps officials stated that they were challenged in accessing  enough naval flight officers because officer candidates were not familiar  with the position (which involves assisting pilots with aircraft and  weapons systems), the service still recruited the number it needed based  upon our examination of the data.
The Navy also reported meeting its overall needs for commissioned  officers during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. Since FY 2001, the total number  of newly commissioned officers decreased from 4,784 to 3,506, a decline of  nearly 27 percent (see table 3). A large portion of that decrease was  accomplished by reducing the number of officers being commissioned  through OCS, the program that can most easily and quickly be altered to  reflect changing demands for producing commissioned officers.
Despite generally meeting its overall accession needs for newly  commissioned officers, the Navy experienced accession challenges in  some specialty areas. Our independent review and analysis of data and  other materials from the commissioning sources, Navy headquarters, and  accession programs identified some areas where there were gaps between  the numbers of newly commissioned officers needed and the numbers  supplied to specialties by some of the commissioning programs. For  example, USNA did not meet its quota for submarine officers in FY 2005,  but other commissioning programs were able to compensate for the  shortfall. Like the Marine Corps, the Navy faced a challenge in accessing  enough naval flight officers, but the Navy met its overall need for newly  commissioned officers by shifting the number of officers sent to that  specialty by some commissioning sources. For example, Navy ROTC met  its goal for naval flight officers in FY 2005 but not FY 2001 and FY 2003.  The Navy’s OCS made up the difference in those years. According to Navy  officials, some officers who may previously have gone into this specialty  because of poor eyesight have their vision surgically corrected and instead  become pilots.
Like the Marine Corps and the Navy, the Air Force generally met its overall  officer accession needs for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. As with the Navy, the  Air Force decreased the number of newly commissioned officers in  FY 2005 (see table 4). Specifically, the Air Force commissioned over 1,000  fewer officers in FY 2005 than it did in FY 2003, and it is working toward a  plan to have about 9,000 fewer officers servicewide by FY 2011. The recent  decrease in the number of newly commissioned Air Force officers was  largely accomplished by commissioning fewer officers from OTS. Overall,  the Air Force relied on its ROTC scholarship program for most of its  officers and provided scholarships for the vast majority of the ROTC  officer candidates.
Despite meeting its overall needs for newly commissioned officers, the Air  Force encountered challenges in some specialties. Our analyses and  discussions with Air Force accessions officials identified air battle  manager as an area where the Air Force has been challenged. USAFA  expected to provide the Air Force with 10 air battle managers in FY 2005,  but instead, three USAFA graduates became air battle managers. The other  seven positions were filled by Air Force ROTC.
section_title: All Services Had Problems Accessing Officers for Medical Occupations
paragraphs: All of the services have experienced problems accessing enough medical  professionals, including physicians, medical students, dentists, and nurses.  The Army, Navy (which supplies the Marine Corps), and Air Force provide  direct commissions to medical professionals entering the service.
Physicians. All of the services had difficulties meeting their accession  needs for physicians (see table 5) in at least 2 of the 3 fiscal years that we  examined. The Army and the Navy achieved 91 or more percent of their  goals in each year studied, while the Air Force achieved 47 to 65 percent of  its goal during the same 3 years. For each year, the Air Force had a higher  goal than the other two services but accessed fewer physicians.
Our review of the numbers of medical students participating in the  services’ Health Professions Scholarship Program showed that additional  physician-accession problems may appear in future years (see table 6).  The services set their goals for awarding the scholarships based on their  needs for fully trained medical professionals in the future. A medical  student who accepts a scholarship will be commissioned into a military  service upon completion of graduate school. While each service awarded  scholarships to a sufficient number of the medical students who began  their 4-year training in FY 2003 and will be ready for an officer commission  upon graduation in FY 2007, the Army and Navy did not achieve their goals  for awarding scholarships in FY 2005, and they may not access enough  physicians in FY 2009.
Dentists. Similar to the situation with physicians, the services have been  challenged to access enough dentists in recent years (see table 7). No  service met its goals for recruiting dentists in FYs 2001, 2003, or 2005. Both  the Army and the Air Force, however, accessed more dentists in FY 2005  than they had 2 years before, and the Air Force showed improvement in  FY 2005 over their FY 2003 accessions.
Nurses. All of the services have struggled to access enough nurses (see  table 8). Although the Navy exceeded its goal for accessing nurses in 2001,  no service achieved its goal for any other period. In FY 2005, the services  accessed a total of 738 of the 975 nurses (about 76 percent) that they  needed.
While some service officials have stated that medical professional  recruiting is challenging because of concerns over overseas deployments,  other service officials told us that it is also affected by the lack of income  parity compared to the civilian sector. As part of the John Warner National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress approved an  increase in the recruiting bonus for fully trained physicians and dentists,  allowed the services to detail commissioned officers to attend medical  school, extended the authority for undergraduate student loan repayment  for medical professionals, increased the financial benefits student may  receive as part of the Health Professions Scholarship Program, and  required the services to report to Congress on this program and their  success in meeting the scholarship program’s goals.  Another step that  DOD has taken to reduce the medical professional shortfalls is to convert  uniformed medical positions to positions occupied by civilian medical  professionals.  In addition, DOD is considering asking for legislative  authority to shorten the service commitment for medical professionals  from the required 8 years of service on active or reserve duty, to  encourage more medical professionals to join the military. However, these  efforts have not yet been funded and their effect on medical recruiting is  uncertain.
section_title: All Services Had Problems Accessing Newly Commissioned Officers from Some Racial and Ethnic Groups
paragraphs: All services had problems accessing newly commissioned minority officers  to meet DOD’s goal of maintaining a racially and ethnically diverse officer  corps. For every service, African Americans were a smaller percentage— by either 1 or 2 percentage points—of the accessed officers in FY 2005  than they were in FY 2003, but the representation of Asians/Pacific  Islanders increased between the same two periods for every service  except the Navy (see table 9). As points of comparison, we noted in a  September 2005 report that the representation of African Americans in  the officer corps DOD-wide was about 9 percent, as was the  representation of African Americans in the college-educated workforce.  Therefore, the percentages shown in the table indicate that only the Army  met or exceeded the African-American DOD-wide and college-educated- workforce representation levels.
Similarly, recruiting Hispanic officers has presented challenges to the  services. In FY 2005, the Marine Corps accessed a higher percentage of  Hispanic officers than the other services. While the Air Force accessed a  lower percentage than the other services in each of the 2 fiscal years  reported, it doubled its percentage of newly commissioned Hispanic  officers from FY 2001 to FY 2003. However, this percentage of Hispanic  officers accessed is smaller than the percentage of Hispanics in the United  States at the time of the 2000 census (about 13 percent) and the  percentage of Hispanics in the U.S. college population (about 9 percent).
Some ambiguity is present in interpreting the findings for racial and ethnic  groups because of the data. For example, the Air Force findings show  large numbers of officers for whom some data were not available. Despite  these data limitations, service officials explained that many of their  challenges relate to the need for the services to recruit minority officers  from the military-eligible segment of the college population. Navy and Air  Force officials stated that their officer commissioning programs have  more stringent entrance requirements than the other services and  emphasize mathematics and science skills needed for the high-technology  occupations found in their services. Officials from the commissioning  programs in each service further noted that only a small segment of the  African-American college population meets these entrance requirements.  Each service operates a preparatory school in association with its  academy to increase the pool of qualified applicants to enter its academy,  giving primary consideration to enrolling enlisted personnel, minorities,  women, and recruited athletes. Moreover, all officer commissioning  programs, particularly the service academies, must compete with colleges  and universities that do not require a postgraduation service commitment.  In addition, USMA officials stated that citizenship status represented a  barrier to improving the percentage of Hispanic officers. As of the 2000  census, 65 percent of Hispanics were U.S. citizens.
section_title: Army Faces Some Unique Future Officer Accession Problems
paragraphs: While all of the services experienced some specialty- and diversity-related  challenges in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, based on our review the Army  faces some future officer accession problems not shared by the other  services and has not developed and implemented a strategic plan to  overcome these projected shortfalls. Our review, analyses, and discussions  with Army officials indicated that the Army may struggle to meet its future  accession needs. While all the services are contributing forces to  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is providing most of the  forces for these operations. Other unique stressors on the Army’s  commissioning programs include the expansion of the Army’s officer  corps as part of the congressionally authorized 30,000-soldier increase to  the Army end strength and the Army’s need for higher numbers of officers  as part of its ongoing transformation effort to create more modular quickly  deployable units.
Notwithstanding these needs for more officers, some of the Army’s  commissioning programs are not commissioning as many officers as they  had in past years and are commissioning less than the Army had expected.  The Army’s current approach is to first focus on its ROTC program and  academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then compensate for  accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS accessions.  While Army OCS is currently meeting the Army’s needs, Army ROTC and  USMA are not. Army ROTC, for example, experienced a decline in its  number of participants. In FY 2006, the Army calculated that 25,089  students would participate in ROTC. In contrast, 31,765 students were  involved in Army ROTC in FY 2003. Army officials stated that to meet their  current mission they need at least 31,000 participants in the program.  Moreover, the Army uses its ROTC program for commissioning both active  and reserve officers. Although the goal is 4,500 newly commissioned  officers (2,750 active and 1,750 reserve) from Army ROTC in both FYs 2006  and 2007, Army officials project that the program will fall short of the goal  by 12 percent in FY 2006 and 16 percent in FY 2007.
Furthermore, fewer officers may be commissioned from the Army’s ROTC  program in the future because fewer scholarships have been awarded  recently, which Army officials attribute to budget constraints. For  example, in FY 2003, the Army ROTC program had 7,583 officer candidates  with 4-year scholarships; in FY 2004, 7,234; in FY 2005, 6,004. Army ROTC  officials stated that fewer 4-year scholarship recipients means fewer newly  commissioned officers in the future, since scholarship recipients are more  likely to complete the program and receive their commission. Army ROTC  officials believe that while negative attitudes toward Army ROTC are  increasing on college campuses because of opposition to operations in  Iraq, concerns about financing their education may make ROTC  scholarships more attractive to officer candidates.
In addition to challenges with its ROTC program, the Army has recently  experienced difficulties commissioning officers through USMA, and  projections for newly commissioned officers from USMA show that these  difficulties may continue in the future. In FY 2005, USMA commissioned  912 officers, fewer than its mission of 950 officers. Similarly, USMA’s class  that graduated in FY 2006 commissioned 846 graduates, short of the  Army’s goal of 900. While the number of officer candidates who  successfully complete the 4-year program at USMA varies, according to  USMA data 71 percent who began the program in 2002 completed it in  2006 and received their commission. In contrast, in both FY 2001 and in  FY 2003, 76 percent of those who began their course of study 4 years  earlier completed the program and commissioned into the Army; and in  FY 2005, 77 percent. USMA officials told us that the smaller graduating  class in FY 2006 may be the result of ongoing operations in Iraq. The class,  which will graduate in 2010, should have an additional 100 officer  candidates to help address recent shortfalls; however, USMA officials  indicated that facilities and staff limit additional increases.
Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC program, as  well as the Army’s need to expand its new officer corps, have required  OCS to rapidly increase the number of officers it commissions; however,  its ability to annually produce more officers is uncertain. In FY 2006, OCS  was required to produce 1,420 officers, and in FY 2007, the Army’s goal for  OCS is to commission 1,650 officers, more than double the number it  produced in FY 2001. OCS program officials stated that without increases  in resources and support such as additional housing and classroom space,  OCS cannot produce more officers than 1,650 officers, its FY 2007 goal,  limiting the viability of this approach.
Additionally, the Army’s officer accession programs are decentralized  and lack any sort of formal coordination, which prevents the Army from  effectively balancing the results of failure in some officer accession  programs. USMA does not directly report to the same higher-level  command as ROTC or OCS. While ROTC and OCS both report to the same  overall authority, they do not formally coordinate with one another or with  USMA. For example, the Army does not coordinate recruiting and  accession efforts to ensure that accession programs meet Army accessions  goals, nor does it use risk analysis to manage resource allocations among  the programs. USMA relies on its own full-time recruiters and Military  Academy Liaison Officers—reservists, retirees, and alumni who meet with  possible academy recruits and hold meetings to provide information to  students. Officials from Army Cadet Command, which does not  coordinate recruiting efforts with USMA, stated that Army ROTC has a  limited advertising budget that focuses on print media, brochures, and  local print media. In addition, as we previously discussed, Army ROTC has  experienced a decrease in its scholarship funding while the Army’s needs  for its graduates has increased, but the Army has not conducted a risk- based analysis of resource allocations to Army officer accession programs.
Shortfalls in Army officer accessions have been compounded by the  decentralized management structure for the officer accessions programs,  and the Army does not have a strategic plan to overcome these challenges.  Army personnel officials set a goal for each commissioning program.  While those officials attempt to ensure that any commissioning shortfalls  (program outputs) are covered by other commissioning programs such as  OCS, the Army does not coordinate the recruiting efforts of its various  commissioning programs (the input to these programs) to ensure that  officer accession programs meet overall Army needs. While the Army’s has  identified a number of options to increase officer accessions, it does not  have a strategic plan for managing its shrinking accessions pipeline at a  time when the force is expanding and its needs for commissioned officers  are increasing. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993  (GPRA) and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  provide federal agencies with a results-oriented framework that includes  developing a strategic plan. According to GPRA, a strategic plan should  include outcome-related goals and objectives. Moreover, the Standards  emphasize the need for identifying and analyzing potential risks that could  slow progress in achieving goals. This risk assessment can form the basis  for determining procedures for mitigating risks. The Army recognizes that  offering more scholarships could improve its ROTC program accessions  and has proposed increasing available scholarships. However, this is not  part of a broader strategic plan that would realign resources to better meet  the Army’s officer accession needs and minimize risk. Without such an  alternative, given the decentralized management of the officer accession  programs, and without a strategic plan that identifies goals, risks, and  resources to mitigate officer shortfalls, the Army’s ability to meet future  mission requirements is uncertain.
section_title: All Services Except Army Generally Met Past Officer Retention Needs, but All Face Challenges Retaining Certain Officer Groups
paragraphs: While most of the services generally met their past officer retention needs,  the Army faces multiple retention challenges. The Army has experienced  decreased retention among officers early in their careers, particularly  among junior officers who graduated from USMA or received ROTC  scholarships. Moreover, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level  officers because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post- Cold War reduction in both force size and officer accessions. Despite these  emerging problems, the Army has not performed an analysis that would  identify and analyze risks of near term retention problems to determine  resource priorities. Although the other services generally met their past  retention needs, each faces challenges retaining officers in certain ranks  or specialties. Furthermore, each of the services had high continuation  rates among African American and Hispanic officers, but each faces  challenges retaining female officers.
subsections: section_title: Army Faces Multiple Retention Challenges, but Other Services Are Generally Retaining Enough Officers to Meet Their Needs
paragraphs: The Army has encountered retention challenges in the last few years, but  the other services are generally retaining sufficient numbers of officers in  the fiscal years that we examined.
subsections: section_title: Army Faces Challenges to Retain Officers at Junior and Mid-level Ranks and Certain Specialties
paragraphs: Overall, the Army has experienced decreased retention among officers  early in their careers, particularly junior officers who graduated from  USMA or received ROTC scholarships. Additionally, the Army is currently  experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers and has shortages within  certain specialty areas. It is examining a number of initiatives to improve  the retention of its officers, but these initiatives are not currently funded  or will not affect officer retention until at least FY 2009. Moreover, the  Army does not have a strategic plan to address these retention challenges.
The Army has experienced multiple retention problems in recent years for  officers commissioned through USMA and the ROTC scholarship program  and for some occupational specialties despite retaining lieutenants and  captains in FY 2006 at or above its 10-year Army-wide average. Our  comparisons of the Army continuation rates shown in table 10 to those  presented later for each of the other services revealed that the USMA  continuation rates of 68 percent for FY 2001 and 62 percent for FY 2005  were 20 to 30 percentage points lower than the other academies’  continuation rates for the same fiscal year. Caution is needed, however,  when interpreting cross-service findings because USNA and USAFA  produce a large number of pilots who incur additional obligations that may  not allow many of those officers to leave until 8 or more years of service  have been completed. Second, a comparison of the Army’s FY 2001 and  FY 2005 continuation rates for ROTC scholarship officers showed that  rates decreased by 3 percentage points at years 4 and 5.
Our review of the continuation rates in table 10 also revealed three other  notable patterns. First, the total continuation rate for FY 2003 was higher  than the rate for the other 2 years, reflecting the stop-loss policy that  prevented officers from leaving the Army. Second, for each source and  fiscal year, the lowest continuation rate for a commissioning source  typically came in the first year that officers were eligible to leave the  military—for example, year 5 for USMA and year 4 for ROTC scholarship.  Third, since (1) the ROTC scholarship program produces more officers  than any other commissioning source and (2) scholarship officers are  eligible to leave the Army at year 4, that year of service had the lowest or  next lowest total continuation rate for all 3 of the fiscal years that we  examined.
The Congressional Research Service reported that Army projections show  that its officer shortage will be approximately 3,000 line officers in  FY 2007, grow to about 3,700 officers in FY 2008, and continue at an  annual level of 3,000 or more through FY 2013. For example, the Army FY  2008 projected shortage includes 364 lieutenant colonels, 2,554 majors,  and 798 captains who entered in FYs 1991 through 2002. The criteria that  the Army uses to determine its retention needs are personnel-fill rates for  positions, based on officers’ rank and specialty. In addition to the general  problem of not having enough officers to fill all of its positions, the Army  is promoting some junior officers faster than it has in the recent past and  therefore not allowing junior officers as much time to master their duties  and responsibilities at the captain rank. For example, the Army has  reduced the promotion time to the rank of captain (O-3) from the  historical average of 42 months from commissioning to the current  average of 38 months and has promoted 98 percent of eligible first  lieutenants (O-2), which is more than the service’s goal of 90 percent.  Likewise, the Army has reduced the promotion time to the rank of major  (O-4) from 11 years to 10 years and has promoted 97 percent of eligible  captains to major—more than the Army’s goal. Also, the Army is  experiencing a large shortfall at the rank of major, and the shortfall affects  a wide range of branches. For FY 2007, the Army projects that it will have  83 percent of the total number of majors that it needs. Table 11 shows that  the positions for majors in 14 Army general specialty areas (termed  branches by the Army) will be filled at 85 percent or less in FY 2007—a  level that the Army terms a critical shortfall.
Numerous factors may have contributed to the retention challenges facing  the Army. Among other things, Army officials noted that some of the  shortfalls originated in the post-Cold War reduction in forces and  accessions. Although Congress has increased the authorized end strength  of the Army by 30,000 since FY 2004 to help the Army meet its many  missions expanding the mid-level officer corps could prove problematic  since it will require retaining proportionally more of the officers currently  in the service, as well as overcoming the officer accession hurdles that we  identified earlier. Unlike civilian organizations, the Army requires that  almost all of its leaders enter at the most junior level (O-1) and earn  promotions from within the organization. Additionally, as part of our  September 2005 report, the Office of Military Personnel Policy  acknowledged that retention may have suffered because of an improving  civilian labor market and the high pace of operations. Army officers may  have already completed multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan  since the Army is the service providing the majority of the personnel for  those operations. Another reason why the Army may be having more  difficulty than other services in retaining its officers could be related to its  use of continuation pays and incentives. Table 12 shows that the Army  spent less than any other service in FY 2005 on retention-related pays and  incentives for officers.
While the Army has identified some steps that it needs to take in order to  improve officer retention, the actions that have been implemented will  have no immediate effect on retention. The Army has begun guaranteeing  entering officers their postcommission choice of general specialty area  (branch), installation, or the prospect of graduate school to encourage  retention. A number of Army officers commissioned in FY 2006 took  advantage of this initiative, and as a result, have a longer active duty  service obligation. For example, as of May 2006, 238 academy graduates  accepted the offer of a longer service obligation in exchange for the Army  paying for them to attend graduate school. Although the Army believes  that these initiatives will help address future retention problems, none will  affect continuation rates until 2009 at the earliest because servicemembers  are obligated to stay in the Army for at least 3 years. The more immediate  retention challenge for the Army is keeping officers with 3, 4, or 5 years of  service, as we have identified in this report. However, these officers are  not affected by these initiatives.
While the Army staff reported that they are exploring numerous options  for addressing officer retention shortfalls, Army leadership has not  identified which options will be funded and implemented. As noted earlier  in this report, GPRA and the Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government provide a basis for developing a results-oriented  strategic plan. Moreover, GAO’s guidance for implementing a results- oriented strategic plan highlights the importance of for ROTC scholarship  identifying long-term goals and including the approaches or strategies  needed to meet these goals. Without a plan to address both its accession  and retention challenges, the Army will not have the information and tools  it needs to effectively and efficiently improve its retention of officers in  both the near term and beyond.
section_title: Other Services Generally Met Their Past Retention Needs but Will Face Certain Retention Challenges in the Future
paragraphs: The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs  and had higher continuation rates from their major accession programs  than did the Army. While the Navy and Air Force are currently undergoing  force reductions that will decrease the size of their officer corps, all three  services face officer retention challenges in certain ranks and specialties.
The Marine Corps was able to meet its overall retention needs for FYs  2001, 2003, and 2005 by generally retaining more than 9 of every 10 officers  at the four career-continuation points that we examined. Except for the 4- year career mark, our analysis showed that the Marine Corps’s total  continuation rates for all 3 fiscal years typically exceeded 90 percent (see  table 13). Officers who graduated from USNA had the lowest continuation  rates at the end of their fifth year of service, coinciding with the minimum  active duty service obligation for that commissioning source. Likewise,  officers from ROTC scholarship programs had lower continuation rates at  the end of year 4. For example, in FY 2003, the continuation rate was 67  percent; and in FY 2005, it was 79 percent.
With a few exceptions, the Marine Corps met its retention needs and was  able to fill critical specialties and ranks. We found that the Marine Corps  was either under or just meeting its goal for fixed wing aviators (such as  the junior officer level for the KC-130 tactical airlift airplane commanders  and the AV-8 Harrier attack aircraft), rotary wing officers (at the junior  officer level for all rotary wing occupations except one), and mid-level and  senior intelligence, administrative, and communications officers in past  fiscal years. Additional problems were present when we examined FY 2006  continuation data for emerging problems. Although the FY 2006  continuation rate averaged about 92 percent—excluding the fixed and  rotary wing communities—the Marine Corps experienced lower than  normal retention among combat support officers (such as administrative  and financial management officers), combat arms officers (such as  infantry, field artillery, and tank officers) as well as communications,  logistics, and human source intelligence officers. However, FY 2007  projections for these categories of jobs averaged about a 90 percent  continuation rate, excluding fixed wing and rotary wing communities.
While the Navy generally retained sufficient numbers of officers in FYs  2001, 2003, and 2005, Navy officials and our independent review of  documents revealed some areas that were not readily apparent solely by  reviewing the continuation rates for the total Navy and officers entering  through each commissioning program. The continuation rate among Navy  junior officers commissioned from USNA or OCS was 90 percent or better  in years 3, 4, and 5 of service for all 3 fiscal years studied (see table 14).  However, officers commissioned from the Navy ROTC scholarship  program had lower continuation rates at the end of 4 and 5 years of  service, coinciding with their minimum active duty service obligation.  Additionally, the Navy experienced lower continuation rates among  officers, both overall and from each of the training programs, after 10  years of service. This lower rate at the 10-year career point may be  partially explained because pilots incur additional obligations that may not  allow them to leave until 8 or more years of service have been completed.
The Navy’s potential future retention challenges may be eased by the  flexibility that the Navy gains from not having to retain officers in some  specialties at traditional rates since it is going through downsizing.  However, our discussions with the officials who manage the Navy general  specialty areas (termed officer communities by the Navy) and our  independent analyses of retention documents revealed that the medical,  dental, surface warfare, and intelligence communities are experiencing  junior officer losses, which can later exacerbate mid-level shortfalls.  Moreover, several managers of general specialty areas indicated that they  were concerned about using individual Navy officers (rather than Navy  units) to augment Army and Marine Corps units. The managers were  unable to estimate the effect of such individual augmentee assignments on  officer retention. These deployments are longer than the Navy’s traditional  6-month deployments and sometimes occur after officers have completed  their shipboard deployment and are expecting their next assignment to be  ashore with their families.
Our review of documents for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, as well as our  discussions with Air Force officials identified no major past retention  problems. Except for the year 3 and 4 career points in FY 2001, the Air  Force total continuation rates were 90 percent or higher (see table 15).
The Air Force is reducing the size of its officer corps through a planned  downsizing. In FY 2006, the Air Force reduced its force by about 1,700  junior officer positions. By 2011, the Air Force plans to complete an  approximate 13 percent reduction in the number of its officers, totaling  approximately 9,200 officers. The Air Force plans to accomplish the  downsizing through the use of force shaping tools such as selective early  retirement, voluntary separation pay, and other measures. Despite the  need to retain fewer officers, the Air Force anticipates shortages in three  specialties areas—control and recovery officers who specialize in  recovering aircrews who have abandoned their aircraft during operational  flights, physicians, and dentists. Staffing levels for these three specialties  are just below 85 percent.
section_title: While All Services Had High Continuation Rates among African American and Hispanic Officers, Each Service Encountered Challenges Retaining Female Officers
paragraphs: While the services did well retaining African Americans and Hispanic  officers, they did not do as well retaining women. The services want to  retain a diverse, experienced officer corps to reflect applicable groups in  the nation’s population. For the fiscal years and career points that we  examined, African American and Hispanic officers usually had higher  continuation rates than white and non-Hispanic officers, respectively; but  female officers more often had lower continuation rates than male  officers.
When we compared the continuation rate of African American officers to  that of white officers for a specific fiscal year and career point, our  analyses found that the services were typically retaining African  Americans at an equal or a higher rate than whites (see table 16). At one  extreme, 11 of the 12 comparisons (all except for the FY 2003 3-year point)  for the Army officers showed equal or higher rates for African American  officers. Similarly, 8 of the 12 comparisons for both the Navy and Marine  Corps rates as well as 6 of the 12 Air Force rates showed a similar pattern.
Likewise, our analysis showed that the services were typically retaining  Hispanic officers better than non-Hispanic officers (see table 17). In all 12  comparisons of the two groups of Army officers at the four career points  in the 3 fiscal years, the continuation rates for Hispanic officers were equal  to or higher than those for non-Hispanic officers. For 9 of the 12 Navy- based comparisons and 5 of the 12 Marine Corps-based comparisons, the  same pattern was present. While the Air Force supplied information on  Hispanics and non-Hispanic continuation rates for only FY 2005, the same  pattern occurred for 3 of the 4 comparisons.
In contrast, our analyses showed that all services encountered challenges  retaining female officers. In 11 out of 12 comparisons for both the Army  and Navy, our analysis found that male officers continued their active duty  service at a higher rate than female officers (see table 18). For 10 of the 12  Air Force-based comparisons and 6 of the 12 Marine Corps-based  comparisons, the same pattern was present. Furthermore, each service  generally experienced lower continuation rates among its female officers  compared with male officers at years 3, 4, and 5 of service. For example,  overall, the Navy had the greatest difference in continuation rates between  male and female officers who reached years 4 and 5 of service for all fiscal  years studied; female officers averaged at least a 9 percentage point lower  continuation rate than male officers. Similarly, continuation rates among  female Air Force officers averaged almost 7 percentage points lower than  the rate for male Air Force officers; among Army female officers, almost 6  percentage points; and among Marine Corps female officers, almost 4  percentage points.
Retaining women may be particularly challenging in certain occupational  specialties. For example, Navy officials explained that some female  surface warfare officers do not view service as a surface warfare officer as  compatible with family life and have much less incentive to stay in the  Navy even when offered a continuation bonus. DOD officials stated that  the behavior of women is different than men because of family  considerations, and they said it is not surprising that women have different  retention patterns and behavior than men. Retaining female officers at  lower rates than male officers in these critical years may result in negative  consequences such as having a less diverse cadre of leaders. We have  previously reported that DOD has responded positively to most  demographic changes by incorporating a number of family-friendly  benefits; however, opportunities exist to improve current benefits in this  area.
section_title: Steps Are Being Taken to Improve the Foreign Language Proficiency of Junior Officers, but Many Impediments Could Slow Progress
paragraphs: DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language  proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to  achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers.  For example, to address DOD’s foreign language objectives, the service  academies have requested additional funding and teaching positions to  improve foreign language training for officer candidates at the academies.  However, time demands on officer candidates, the inability to control  foreign language curricula at ROTC colleges, hurdles in providing language  training after commissioning, and problems in maintaining language skills  among officers pose challenges to the services in developing a broader  linguistic capacity.
subsections: section_title: DOD and the Services Are Taking Steps to Improve Junior Officers’ Foreign Language Proficiency
paragraphs: DOD has issued guidance and the services have developed plans to  achieve greater foreign language capabilities and cultural understanding  among officers. In February 2005, DOD published its Defense Language  Transformation Roadmap which stated, among other things, that post- September 11, 2001, military operations reinforce the reality that DOD  needs to significantly improve its capability in emerging strategic  languages and dialects. In July 2005, the Principal Deputy in OUSD (P&R)  issued a memorandum that required the services’ assistant secretaries for  manpower and reserve affairs and their deputies to develop plans to  achieve 2 of the Roadmap’s 43 objectives: develop a recruiting plan for  attracting university students with foreign language skills and establish a  requirement that junior officers complete added language training by 2013.  Specifically, the OUSD (P&R) memo stated that (1) 80 percent of junior  officers (O-1 and O-2) will have a demonstrated proficiency in a foreign  language by achieving Interagency Language Roundtable Level 1+  proficiency; and (2) 25 percent of commissioned officers (“non-foreign  area officers”) will have a Level 2 proficiency in a strategic language other  than Spanish or French, with related regional knowledge. The February  2006 Quadrennial Defense Review went further, recommending, among  other things, required language training for service academy and ROTC  scholarship students and expanded immersion programs and semester- abroad study opportunities.
In response to the 2005 OUSD (P&R) memo and the department’s language  objectives, the Marine Corps developed a foreign language training plan  that discussed the costs of achieving the two objectives and offered an  alternative proposal for planning, implementing, facilitating, and  maintaining foreign language and cultural skills of Marine officers and  enlisted personnel. Other services are still drafting their responses to the  OUSD (P&R) memo and DOD’s other language objectives for officers.
In addition, the service academies have requested additional funding and  positions to expand the foreign language training offered to their officer  candidates. USMA already requires all its officer candidates to take two  semesters of a language as part of their core curriculum. Beginning with  the class that entered in 2005 and will graduate in 2009, USMA will require  its officer candidates who select humanities or social science majors to  add a third, and possibly a fourth, semester of foreign language study.  USMA is also expanding its summer immersion, exchange, and semester- abroad programs in FY 2007 to give more officer candidates exposure to  foreign languages and cultural programs. Within the next year, USNA  plans to expand the foreign language and cultural opportunities available  to its officer candidates by developing foreign language and regional  studies majors, adding 12 new regional studies instructors in the political  science department, and adding 12 new language instructors in critical  languages such as Arabic and Chinese. Starting with the class that will  enter in 2007 and graduate in 2011, USAFA will require certain majors to  study four semesters of a foreign language. This change will affect about  half of the academy’s officer candidates. The rest—primarily those in  technical majors like engineering and the sciences—will take at least two  semesters of foreign language, though they currently have no foreign  language requirement.
section_title: Impediments Could Both Slow the Services’ Efforts to Improve Foreign Language Proficiency for Junior Officers and Lead to Negative Recruiting Outcomes
paragraphs: Some service officials, particularly those associated with commissioning  programs, have identified many impediments that could affect future  progress toward the foreign language objectives identified by DOD. These  impediments include the following:    Time demands on officer candidates. Some academy and ROTC  program officials expressed concerns about adding demands on the  officer candidates’ time by requiring more foreign language credits.  Each academy requires its officer candidates to complete at least 137  semester credit hours, in contrast to the approximately 120 semester  hours required to graduate from many other colleges. Reductions in  technical coursework to compensate for increases in language  coursework could jeopardize the accreditation of technical degree  programs at the academies. Similarly, some officer candidates in ROTC  programs may already be required to complete more hours than their  nonmilitary peers. At some colleges, officer candidates may be allowed  to count their ROTC courses as electives only. Academy and ROTC  officer candidates in engineering and other technical majors may find it  difficult to add hours for additional foreign language requirements  since accreditation standards already result in students in civilian  colleges often needing 5 years to complete graduation requirements.
Lack of control over ROTC officer candidates’ foreign language  curricula. While one of the objectives outlined by the Principal Deputy  of OUSD(P&R) indicated that 25 percent of commissioned officers  (non-foreign area officers) will have a Level 2 proficiency in a strategic  language other than Spanish or French, ROTC programs do not have  control over the languages offered at the colleges where their officer  candidates attend classes. For example, out of nearly 761 host and  partner Army ROTC colleges, the Army states that only 12 offer Arabic,  44 offer Chinese, and 1 offers Persian Farsi, all languages deemed  critical to U.S. national security. Even if the ROTC programs could  influence the foreign languages offered, additional impediments  include finding qualified instructors and adapting to annual changes to  DOD’s list of strategic languages. Moreover, if an officer candidate in  ROTC or one of the academies takes a language in college based on  DOD’s needs at that time, the language may no longer be judged  strategic later in the officer’s career. For example, DOD operations in  the Caribbean created a need for Haitian Creole speakers in the 1990s;  however, that language may not be as strategic today because of  changing operational needs.
Language training expensive after commissioning. While language  training after commissioning may appear to be an alternative step to  help the services achieve DOD’s foreign language objectives, the  Marine Corps identified significant costs associated with providing  language training after commissioning. Unlike the other services, the  Marine Corps obtains the vast majority of its officers through OCS or  other, nonacademic sources. The Marine Corps estimated that it would  need an end strength increase of 851 officers in order to extend its  basic 6-month school of instruction by another 6 months and achieve  Level 1+ foreign language proficiency for 80 percent of its junior  officers, a stated goal in the OUSD (P&R) memo. It also estimated a  one-time $150 million cost for military construction plus $115 million  annually: $94.1 million for additional end strength and $21 million for  training costs. The estimates for achieving the 25 percent goal for Level  2 proficiency totaled an additional $163 million, largely because of the  $104 million associated with an end strength increase of 944 officers.
Maintaining foreign language proficiency throughout an  officer’s career. Although DOD offers online tools for language  maintenance, our prior work has shown the difficulties of maintaining  foreign language capabilities. We noted that DOD linguists  experienced a decline (of up to 25 percent in some cases) in foreign  language proficiency when they were in technical training to develop  their nonlanguage skills (such as equipment operation and military  procedures). Proficiency could decline if officers do not have an  opportunity to use their language skills between the times when they  complete their training and are assigned to situations where they can  use their skills.
Additional foreign language requirements could also have a negative effect  on recruiting for the officer commissioning programs. Army, Marine  Corps, and Air Force officials expressed concern that the new foreign  language requirement may deter otherwise-qualified individuals from  entering the military because they do not have an interest in or an aptitude  for foreign languages. Service officials also stated that requiring additional  academic credits for language study beyond the credits required for  military science courses could also be problematic, particularly for  nonscholarship ROTC officer candidates who are not receiving a financial  incentive for participating in officer training. Since at least 63 percent of  Army’s current ROTC officer candidates are not on a ROTC scholarship,  officials said that increasing the language requirement could make it more  difficult to reach recruiting and accession goals as well as the objective of  having 80 percent of junior officers with a minimal foreign language  proficiency.
At the same time, our recent reports raised concerns about foreign  language proficiency in DOD and other federal agencies such as the  Department of State. Service officials recognize the impediments to  foreign language training and are developing plans to implement DOD’s  initiatives. Since many of these problem-identification and action-planning  efforts began in the last 2 years, it is still too early to determine how  successful the services will be in implementing the foreign language and  cultural goals outlined in DOD documents such the Defense Language  Transformation Roadmap and the Quadrennial Defense Review;  therefore, we believe that it would be premature to make any specific  recommendations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While all of the services are challenged to recruit, access, and retain  certain types of officers, the Army is facing the greatest challenge.  Frequent deployments, an expanding overall force, and a variety of other  factors present Army officials with an environment that has made  accessing and retaining officers difficult using their traditional  management approaches. Moreover, delays in addressing its officer  accession and retention shortages could slow the service’s implementation  of planned transformation goals, such as reorganizing its force into more  modular and deployable units, which require more junior and mid-level  officers than in the past. Although the Army has begun to implement some  steps that could help with its long-term officer needs, accessing and  retaining enough officers with the right specialties are critical issues.  Moreover, the limited coordination among the Army’s officer accession  programs presents another hurdle in effectively addressing attrition rates  at USMA, student participation in ROTC, and resource constraints for  OCS. Similarly, the Army has not performed an analysis that would  identify and analyze potential risks of continuing retention problems in the  near term in order to determine priorities for allocating its resources.  Without a strategic plan for addressing its officer shortages, the Army’s  ability to effectively and efficiently set goals, analyze risks, and allocate  resources could jeopardize its ability to achieve future mission  requirements.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order for the Army to maintain sufficient numbers of officers at the  needed ranks and specialties, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a  strategic plan that addresses the Army’s current and projected accession  and retention shortfalls. Actions that should be taken in developing this  plan should include    developing an overall annual accession goal to supplement specialty- specific goals in order to facilitate better long-term planning,   performing an analysis to identify risks associated with accession and  retention shortfalls and develop procedures for managing the risks, and    making decisions on how resources should best be allocated to balance  near- and long-term officer shortfalls.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred  with our recommendation. DOD’s comments are included in this report as  appendix II.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop and  implement a strategic plan that addresses the Army’s current and  projected officer accession and retention shortfalls.  DOD agreed that the  Army does not have a strategic plan dedicated to current and projected  officer accessions and retention. DOD said, however, that the Army  performs analyses, identifies risk, develops procedures to mitigate risks,  and performs other tasks associated with its strategy and planning process  for officer accessions and retention. We recognize that these are important  tasks, however they are not sufficient to correct the Army’s current and  future officer accession and retention problems for the following reasons.  First, as noted in our report, these tasks are fragmented, administered in a  decentralized manner across multiple Army offices, and lack the  integrated, long-term perspective that is needed to deal with the Army’s  current officer shortfalls and future challenges. A more strategic,  integrated approach would allow the Army to (1) establish long-term,  outcome-related program goals as well as integrated strategies and  approaches to achieve these goals and (2) effectively and efficiently  manage and allocate the resources needed to achieve these goals. Second,  some of these tasks are not fully developed. For example, the Army’s  procedures for mitigating risk did not address important considerations  such as the short- and long-term consequences of not implementing the  option and an analysis of how various options could be integrated to  maximize the Army’s efforts. Third, with regard to funding—a key element  in strategic planning, Army officials indicated that they hope to use  supplemental funding to address some of the challenges that we identified,  but they also acknowledged that supplemental funding may be curtailed.  In recent reports, we too noted our belief that supplemental funding is  not a reliable means for decision-makers to use in effectively and  efficiently planning for future resource needs, weighting priorities, and  assessing tradeoffs. Considering all of the limitations that we have  identified in the Army’s current approach, we continue to believe that our  recommendation has merit and that an integrated and comprehensive  strategic plan is needed.
DOD mischaracterized our findings when it indicated our report   (1) asserted that Army officer accessions and retention are down and  (2) implied that recent decreases in accessions or retention have caused  the challenges. On the contrary, our report discussed many factors that  contributed to the Army’s officer-related staffing challenges and provided  data that even showed, for example, an increase in accessions from  FY 2001 to FY 2003 and FY 2005. The first table of our report showed the  Army commissioned 6,045 in FY 2005, an increase of 505 from FY 2001 and  an increase of 116 from FY 2003. Also, our report provides a context for  readers to understand that these increases in accessions would still leave  the Army short of officers because of new demands for more officers.  Among other things, a larger officer corps is needed to lead a larger active  duty force and the reorganization of the force into more modular and  deployable units. With regard to retention, our report does not state that  overall retention is down. Instead, we document retention by  commissioning source, occupation, and pay grade, which revealed  shortages that were not readily apparent at the aggregate level. Our report  shows that the Army has experienced decreased retention among officers  early in their careers, particularly among junior officers who graduated  from USMA or received Army ROTC scholarships. Table 11 of our report  makes the point by showing which types of occupations were over- and  underfilled for officers at the rank of major. We show, for example, that  infantry (an occupational group with a large number of officer positions)  were overfilled (107 percent), but positions in numerous other  occupational groups such as military intelligence (73 percent) were  underfilled. Moreover, as with accessions, as the Army grows, it will be  required to retain officers at higher than average percentages in order to  fill higher pay grades.
DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated in this  report where appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  issue date. At that time we will provide copies of this report to interested  congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make  copies available to others upon request. This report will be available at no  charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or other members of the committee have any additional questions  about officer recruiting, retention, or language training issues, please  contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  the report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We limited the scope of our work to the four active duty Department of  Defense (DOD) services: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Also,  we examined data for fiscal years 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as  projections for the current year (FY 2006 when we began our work) and  future years. FY 2001 data represented the situations present immediately  before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001; and FY 2005 data  represented the most recent fiscal year for which the services had  complete data. FY 2003 data provided information on interim conditions  and allowed us to examine the data for trends.
subsections: section_title: Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the services are accessing the numbers  and types of commissioned officers required to meet their needs, we  reviewed laws and DOD-wide and service-specific officer-management  guidance, including Title 10 of the U.S. Code, including provisions  originally enacted as part of the Defense Officer Personnel Management  Act (DOPMA), defense authorization acts, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense  Review, and policies and directives. To gain a firm background on the  origin and evolution of the all volunteer force, we studied information in  books on the all volunteer force as well as information published by GAO,  DOD, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, and  other organizations such as RAND. We reviewed documents from and  obtained the perspectives of officials in Office Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness, OUSD (P&R), services’ headquarters,  services’ personnel and manpower commands, service academies, Reserve  Officer Training Corps commands, and Officer Candidate Schools and  Officer Training School commands (see table 19). The documents and  meetings with officials allowed us to obtain an integrated understanding of  recruitment and accession procedures, the availability of newly  commissioned officers to fill positions in the military services, and  potential causes and effects of any gaps between the numbers of officers  available and the numbers of positions to be filled. We obtained and  analyzed accessions and continuation data from DOD’s Defense  Manpower Data Center, but our assessment of the data’s reliability  identified incorrect information that was severe enough to prevent those  data from being used for this report. As a result, we subsequently  obtained accession and continuation information from the services. While  we did not conduct independent analyses using the services’ databases, we  did assess the reliability of their data through interviews and reviewing  relevant documentation on service-specific databases.  Comparisons of  service-provided rates with similar information from other sources—such  as information on the number of officer commissioned from the USMA— suggested that the service-provided rates were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. Specifically, we examined information showing  the numbers of officers commissioned from the services’ officer programs  during FY 2001, 2003, and 2005 for trends and other patterns and  compared the numbers of officers accessed to staffing needs. We  performed these comparisons with consideration for the specialty, race,  ethnicity, and gender of the officers.
To assess the extent to which the services are retaining the numbers and  types of officers they need, we reviewed laws and DOD-wide and service- specific policies and directives to gain a comprehensive understanding of  officer retention. To gain a firm background on officer retention, we  examined reports and studies by GAO, DOD, Congressional Research  Service, Congressional Budget Office, and other organizations such as  RAND. Additionally, we met with a number of DOD officials located at the  services’ personnel directorates to obtain an understanding of officer  retention missions, goals, historical trends, and projected forecasts for  each service. We worked with DOD and service officials to identify  differences in the metrics that each service uses to assess retention  success, and to review proposed initiatives for enhancing officer retention  and to address downsizing efforts. We analyzed documents from and  obtained the perspectives of officials in the services’ headquarters,  services’ personnel and manpower commands, service academies, ROTC  commands, and OCS/OTS commands to obtain an understanding of  retention, specifically whether the services are retaining the total numbers  they needed as well as the number of officers needed in specific ranks and  specialties (see table 20). We obtained and analyzed data provided by  service headquarters on officer continuation rates at critical years in an  officer’s service. In our calculation of continuation rates, officers were  considered as having continued in a year if they were on the rolls on the  first day of the fiscal year and the last day. We, in consultation with  retention experts from the four services, chose to examine four key points  in an officer’s career: years 3, 4, 5, and 10. Years 3, 4, and 5 reflect the  minimum active duty service obligation for the major accession programs,  that is, the first year an officer could leave the active duty service through  resignation. For example, the minimum active duty service obligation is 3  years for OCS graduates and officers who were commissioned by ROTC  but did not receive scholarship. Officers who received an ROTC  scholarship have an obligation to serve 4 years, and academy graduates  must serve at least 5 years. Additionally, some officers who receive  specialized training, such as pilots, may be obligated to serve at least a 10- year obligation or 8 years from the completion of pilot training. We also  analyzed continuation rates for subgroup differences broken out by  occupation, race, ethnicity, and gender. Once we identified particular  issues of concern to the service, such as the shortages for mid-level  officers in the Army, we explored these issues in further detail. We relied  on rates provided by service headquarters because of our previously cited  concerns about the Defense Manpower Data Center data. Using the data  reliability-assessment procedures discussed for our accessions work, we  determined that the data were sufficiently reliability for the purposes of  our report.
Finally, to assess the steps taken and impediments confronting the  services in their attempts to increase foreign language proficiency among  junior officers, we reviewed policy materials such as the Quadrennial  Defense Review, DOD policies and directives on officer candidate training,  curricula for the academies, DOD and service memoranda, reports by GAO  and others, and other materials related to language acquisition and  maintenance by military personnel and federal employees. We obtained  additional perspectives about foreign language issues in meetings with  DOD and service officials located in OUSD (P&R), the services’ personnel  directorates, service academies, ROTC commands, OCS/OTS commands,  and the Defense Language Office. In each instance, we discussed the  training programs for officer candidates, the ongoing and proposed steps  to increase language proficiency among junior officers, and the challenges  these programs face in providing officer candidates with the foreign  language and training they need to serve as officers. We conducted our  review from September 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Kurt  A. Burgeson, Laura G. Czohara; Alissa H. Czyz; Barbara A. Gannon;  Cynthia L. Grant; Julia C. Matta; Jean L. McSween; Bethann E. Ritter;  Angela D. Thomas; and Adam J. Yu made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Personnel: Reporting Additional Servicemember Demographics  Could Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-05-952. Washington, D.C.:  September 22, 2005.
Military Education: Student and Faculty Perceptions of Student Life at  the Military Academies. GAO-03-1001. Washington, D.C.: September 12,  2003.
Military Education: DOD Needs to Enhance Performance Goals and  Measures to Improve Oversight of the Military Academies. GAO-03-1000.  Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2003.
DOD Service Academies: Problems Limit Feasibility of Graduates  Directly Entering the Reserves. GAO/NSIAD-97-89. Washington, D.C.:  March 24, 1997.
DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct  Adjudicatory Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-49. Washington, D.C.: April 25,  1995.
DOD Service Academies: Academic Review Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-57.  Washington, D.C.: April 5, 1995.
DOD Service Academies: Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment.  GAO/NSIAD-95-58. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1995.
Coast Guard: Cost for the Naval Academy Preparatory School and Profile  of Minority Enrollment. GAO/RCED-94-131. Washington, D.C.: April 12,  1994.
Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-94-95.  Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1994.
DOD Service Academies: Further Efforts Needed to Eradicate Sexual  Harassment. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-111. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 1994.
DOD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual  Harassment. GAO/NSIAD-94-6. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1994.
Academy Preparatory Schools. GAO/NSIAD-94-56R. Washington, D.C.:  October 5, 1993.
Air Force Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-93-244.  Washington, D.C.: September 24, 1993.
Military Education: Information on Service Academies and Schools.  GAO/NSIAD-93-264BR. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 1993.
Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-93-54.  Washington, D.C.: April 30, 1993.
DOD Service Academies: More Changes Needed to Eliminate Hazing.  GAO/NSIAD-93-36. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 1992.
DOD Service Academies: Status Report on Reviews of Student  Treatment. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-41. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1992.
Service Academies: Historical Proportion of New Officers During  Benchmark Periods. GAO/NSIAD-92-90. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 1992.
DOD Service Academies: Academy Preparatory Schools Need a Clearer  Mission and Better Oversight. GAO/NSIAD-92-57. Washington, D.C.:  March 13, 1992.
Naval Academy: Low Grades in Electrical Engineering Courses Surface  Broader Issues. GAO/NSIAD-91-187. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1991.
DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring  Needed. GAO/NSIAD-91-79. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1991.
Review of the Cost and Operations of DOD’s Service Academies. GAO/T- NSIAD-90-28. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 1990.