Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security
Published: 2007-05-10T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in leading and coordinating--with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and private sectors--the nation's homeland security efforts. GAO has conducted numerous reviews of DHS management functions as well as programs including transportation and border security, immigration enforcement and service delivery, and disaster preparation and response. This testimony addresses: (1) why GAO designated DHS's implementation and transformation as a high-risk area, (2) specific management challenges that DHS continues to face, (3) examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and (4) actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and transformation efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 because DHS had to transform and integrate 22 agencies--several with existing program and management challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address its challenges could have serious consequences for our homeland security. Despite some progress, this transformation remains high risk. Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of key management functions that will likely span a number of years. DHS has made some progress in these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure sustainable success. DHS has also issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, but lacks a comprehensive integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, appropriate responsibility and accountability determinations, and a dedicated team to support its efforts. The latest independent audit of DHS's financial statements showed that its financial management systems still do not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for information management, and its human capital and acquisition systems require further attention to ensure that DHS allocates resources economically, effectively, ethically, and equitably. Since GAO's 2007 high-risk update, DHS has continued to strengthen program activities but still faces a range of programmatic and partnering challenges. To help ensure its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued challenges related to such issues as cargo, transportation, and border security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset capabilities. Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency need to continue to develop clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities; necessary disaster response capabilities; accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to conduct advance contracting for emergency response goods, supplies, and services. DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it will address its many management challenges. Such a plan should define the root causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have management support, and provide for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. It should also include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts. DHS may require a chief management official, with sufficient authority, dedicated to the overall transformation process to help ensure sustainable success over time.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to address  management and programmatic challenges facing the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS). I have spoken extensively about the fiscal crisis  our nation faces with the coming retirement of the baby boom generation  and the related growth in entitlement spending. The current financial  condition in the United States is worse than is widely understood and is  not sustainable. Meeting the long-term fiscal challenge will require   (1) significant entitlement reform to change the path of those programs;  (2) reprioritizing, restructuring and constraining other spending programs;  and (3) additional revenues--such as through a reformed tax system. These  efforts will require bipartisan cooperation and compromise.
Irrespective of our fiscal situation, it is important for federal  departments—including DHS—to operate as efficiently and effectively as  possible in carrying out their missions. At the same time, we also face new  and uncertain threats to our security, both overseas and at home, that  require continued attention. Without this focus, the consequences can be  catastrophic. We designated the implementation and transformation of  DHS as a high-risk area in 2003 and continued that designation in our 2005  update. In my testimony today, I will explain why we decided to maintain  this area on our 2007 high risk list, focusing on four areas:    why we originally designated DHS’s implementation and  transformation as a high-risk area,    specific management challenges that DHS continues to face,     examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and    actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and  transformation efforts.
My comments today are based on our wide-ranging work on DHS since the  2005 high-risk update, as well as our institutional knowledge of homeland  security and various government organizational and management issues.  We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. A listing of GAO reports related to the  transformation, management, and program challenges discussed in this  statement are contained in Appendix 1.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In an effort to strengthen homeland security following the September 11,  2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the  National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 and signed  legislation creating DHS in November 2002. The strategy set forth the  overall objectives, mission areas, and initiatives to prevent terrorist  attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to  terrorism; and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from  attacks that may occur.
DHS, which began operations in March 2003, represented a fusion of   22 federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of many  homeland security activities under a single department. Although the  National Strategy for Homeland Security identified that many other federal  departments (and other nonfederal stakeholders) are involved in  homeland security activities, DHS has the dominant role in implementing  the strategy. The strategy identified 6 mission areas and 43 initiatives. DHS  was designated as the lead federal agency for 37of the 43 initiatives, and  has activities under way in 40 of the 43 initiatives.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, represented a  historic moment of almost unprecedented action by the federal  government to fundamentally transform how the nation thinks of  homeland security, including how it protects itself from terrorism. Also  significant was the fact that many of the 22 departments brought together  under DHS were not focused on homeland security missions prior to  September 11, 2001. Rarely in the country’s past had such a large and  complex reorganization of government occurred or been developed with  such a singular and urgent purpose. The creation of DHS represented a  unique opportunity to transform a disparate group of agencies with  multiple missions, values, and cultures into a strong and effective cabinet  department whose goals are to, among other things, protect U.S. borders  and infrastructure, improve intelligence and information sharing, and  prevent and respond to potential terrorist attacks. Together with this  unique opportunity, however, came a significant risk to the nation that  could occur if the department’s implementation and transformation efforts  were not successful.
Mission areas designated as high risk have national significance, while  other areas designated as high risk represent management functions that  are important for agency performance and accountability. The identified  areas can have a qualitative risk that may be detrimental to public health  or safety, national security, and economic growth, or a fiscal risk due to  the size of the program in question. Examples of high-risk areas include  federal governmentwide problems, like human capital management; large  programs, like Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare; and more narrow  issues, such as contracting at a specific agency. The DHS transformation is  unique in that it involves reorganization, management, and program  challenges simultaneously.
section_title: DHS’s Transformation
paragraphs: We first designated DHS’s transformation as high risk in January 2003  based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in  implementing an effective transformation process, developing  partnerships, and building needed management capacity because it had to  effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees into  one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of operational and  management challenges that it inherited from its component legacy  agencies. For example, many of the major components that were merged  into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service,  the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs Service, the  Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, brought  with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human capital,  information technology, and financial management. Finally, DHS’s  national security mission was of such importance that the failure to  effectively address its management challenges and program risks could  have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, the health  and safety of our citizens, and our economy.
Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the  creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large  organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than  DHS, can take years to achieve. On the basis of the need for more  progress in its transformation efforts, DHS’s implementation and  transformation stayed on our high-risk update for 2005, and remained on  the high-risk list in 2007. Further, in November of 2006, we provided the  congressional leadership a listing of government programs, functions, and  activities that warrant further congressional oversight. Among the issues  included were DHS integration and transformation efforts.
section_title: DHS Must Address Key Management Challenges
paragraphs: Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity  of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key management  functions across the department, and partnering with stakeholders across  the public and private sectors. DHS has made some progress in each of  these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure  sustainable success. Apart from these integration efforts, however, a  successful transformation will also require DHS to follow through on its  initial actions of building capacity to improve the management of its  financial and information technology systems, as well as its human capital  and acquisition efforts.
subsections: section_title: DHS Transformation and Integration
paragraphs: Thorough planning is important for DHS to successfully transform and  integrate the management functions of 22 disparate agencies into a  common framework that supports the organization as a whole. Our past  work has identified progress DHS has made in its planning efforts. For  example, the DHS strategic plan addresses five of six Government  Performance and Results Act required elements and takes into account its  non-homeland security missions, such as responding to natural disasters.  Furthermore, several DHS components have developed their own strategic  plans or strategic plans for missions within their areas of responsibility.  For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has  produced an interim strategic plan that identifies its goals and objectives,  and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed a border patrol  strategy and an anti-terrorism trade strategic plan. However, deficiencies  in DHS’s planning efforts remain. A DHS-wide transformation strategy  should include a strategic plan that identifies specific budgetary, human  capital, and other resources needed to achieve stated goals. The strategy  should also involve key stakeholders to create a shared understanding of  goals and priorities. DHS’s existing strategic plan lacks these linkages, and  DHS has not effectively involved stakeholders in the development of the  plan. DHS has also not completed other important planning-related  activities. For example, some of DHS’s components have not developed  adequate outcome-based performance measures or comprehensive plans  to monitor, assess, and independently evaluate the effectiveness of their  plans and performance.
Integrating core management functions like financial, information  technology, human capital, and procurement is also important if DHS is to  transform itself into a cohesive, high-performing organization. However,  DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall  goals, a timeline, appropriate responsibility and accountability  determinations, and a dedicated team to support its management  integration efforts. In 2005, we recommended that DHS establish  implementation goals and a timeline for its management integration efforts  as part of a comprehensive integration strategy, a key practice to help  ensure success for a merger or transformation. Although DHS has issued  guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by  function basis, it has not developed a plan that clearly identifies the  critical links that should occur across these functions, the necessary  timing to make these links occur, how these interrelationships will occur,  and who will drive and manage them. In March 2007 testimony before the  House Homeland Security Committee, DHS’s Undersecretary for  Management supported our recommendation on the need for a  comprehensive management integration strategy for the department. The  Undersecretary stated that he was reviewing DHS’s progress against its  individual plans and guidance for its management functions that would be  part of such a comprehensive strategy. In addition, although DHS had  established a Business Transformation Office that reported to the Under  Secretary for Management to help monitor and look for interdependencies  among the individual functional management integration efforts, that  office was not responsible for leading and managing the coordination and  integration itself. We understand that the Business Transformation Office  has been recently eliminated due to a lack of funding.
In addition to the Business Transformation Office, we have recommended  that Congress continue to monitor whether it needs to provide additional  leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for Management or  create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer (COO/CMO)  position that could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize DHS’s  management initiatives. Legislation was introduced in this session and  passed by the Senate to create a Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security  for Management, a CMO position. On April 24, 2007, I sponsored a forum  on implementing COO/CMO positions in select federal departments and  agencies, as part of a broader study examining issues associated with  implementing these positions in response to a bipartisan request from this  subcommittee. Forum participants included former and current  government executives, and officials from private businesses and  nonprofit organizations. The forum discussion focused on criteria for  determining the type of COO/CMO position that should be established in  selected entities and how to implement the position, including  qualifications, appointment processes, roles and responsibilities, and  reporting relationships. In addition to the forum, we have also learned  about the experiences of organizations that have positions similar to a  COO/CMO through several case study reviews. We expect to issue our full  report to the subcommittee in early September 2007.
Finally, DHS cannot successfully achieve its homeland security mission  without working with other entities that share responsibility for securing  the homeland. Partnering for progress with other governmental agencies  and private sector entities is central to achieving its missions. Since 2005,  DHS has continued to form necessary partnerships and has undertaken a  number of coordination efforts with private sector entities. These include,  for example, partnering with (1) airlines to improve aviation passenger  and cargo screening, (2) the maritime shipping industry to facilitate  containerized cargo inspection, (3) financial institutions to follow the  money trail in immigration and customs investigations, and (4) the  chemical industry to enhance critical infrastructure protection at such  facilities. In addition, FEMA has worked with other federal, state, and  local entities to improve planning for disaster response and recovery.  However, partnering challenges continue as DHS seeks to form more  effective partnerships to leverage resources and more effectively carry out  its homeland security responsibilities. For example, because DHS has only  limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it must continue  to work with the chemical industry to ensure that it is assessing  vulnerabilities and implementing security measures. Also, while TSA has  taken steps to collaborate with federal and private sector stakeholders in  the implementation of its Secure Flight program, these stakeholders stated  that TSA has not provided them with the information they would need to  support TSA’s efforts as they move forward with the program.
section_title: Financial Management and Internal Controls
paragraphs: DHS has made modest progress in addressing financial management and  internal control weaknesses and continues to face significant challenges in  these areas. For example, since its creation, DHS has been unable to  obtain an unqualified or “clean” audit opinion on its financial statements.  The independent auditor’s report cited 10 material weaknesses—i.e.,  significant deficiencies in DHS’s internal controls—showing no decrease  from fiscal year 2005. These weaknesses included financial management  oversight, financial reporting, financial systems security, and budgetary  accounting. Furthermore, the report found two other reportable  conditions and instances of non-compliance with eight laws and  regulations, including the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of  1982, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, and the  Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. While there  continue to be material weaknesses in its financial management systems,  DHS has made some progress in this area. For example, the independent  auditor’s fiscal year 2006 report noted that DHS had made improvements  at the component level to improve financial reporting during fiscal year  2006, although many challenges were remaining. Also, DHS and its  components have reported developing corrective action plans to address  the specific material internal control weaknesses identified.
In addition to the independent audits, we have done work to assess DHS’s  financial management and internal controls. For example, in 2004, we  reviewed DHS’s progress in addressing financial management weaknesses  and integrating its financial systems. Specifically, we identified  weaknesses in the financial management systems DHS inherited from the  22 component agencies, assessed DHS’s progress in addressing these  weaknesses, identified plans DHS had to integrate with its financial  management systems, and reviewed whether the planned systems DHS  was developing would meet the requirements of relevant financial  management improvement legislation. On the basis of our work, we  recommended that DHS (1) give sustained attention to addressing  previously reported material weaknesses, reportable conditions, and  observations and recommendations; (2) complete development of  corrective action plans for all material weaknesses, reportable conditions,  and observations and recommendations; (3) ensure that internal control  weaknesses are addressed at the component level if they were combined  or reclassified at the departmentwide level; and (4) maintain a tracking  system of all auditor-identified and management-identified control  weaknesses. These recommendations are still relevant today.
section_title: Information Technology
paragraphs: A departmentwide information technology (IT) governance framework— including controls (disciplines) aimed at effectively managing IT-related  people, processes, and tools—is vital to DHS’s transformation efforts.  These controls and disciplines include:    having and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as  an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain IT  investments;    defining and following a corporate process for informed decision  making by senior leadership about competing IT investment options;    applying system and software development and acquisition discipline  and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and  maintaining systems;    establishing a comprehensive information security program to protect  its information and systems;    having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities  to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and    centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the  organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer.
DHS has made progress in each of these areas, but additional work is  needed to further enhance its IT governance framework and implement  our related recommendations. For example, the June 2006 version of  DHS’s enterprise architecture, while an improvement over prior versions,  still lacks important architecture content and limits DHS’s ability to guide  and constrain IT investments, among other things. With respect to IT  investment management, DHS has established management structures but  has not, for example, fully implemented key practices needed to  effectively oversee and control department investments—putting the  department at increased risk of its programs not delivering promised  mission capabilities and benefits. DHS stated it is working on improving its  investment management process. DHS has taken other measures to  enhance IT governance as well, such as completing a comprehensive  inventory of its major information systems (though a comprehensive  information security program is still needed), organizing IT leadership  roles and responsibilities under the CIO, and initiating strategic planning  for IT human capital (an area where we have ongoing work to assess  related strategic planning efforts and progress made).
In addition to efforts undertaken in these areas, our reviews of key  nonfinancial systems show that DHS has not consistently employed a  range of system acquisition management disciplines, such as reliable cost- estimating practices and meaningful performance measurements. We have  made a number of recommendations in this and other areas, including  work related to deploying and operating IT system and infrastructure in  support of DHS’s core mission and operations. Implementation of many of  our recommendations has been slow. Until DHS fully establishes and  consistently implements the full range of IT management disciplines  embodied in its framework and related to federal guidance and best  practices, it will be challenged in its ability to effectively manage and  deliver programs.
section_title: Human Capital Systems
paragraphs: DHS has made some progress in transforming its human capital systems,  but more work remains. Some of the most pressing human capital  challenges at DHS include (1) successfully completing its ongoing  transformation; (2) forging a unified results-oriented culture across the  department (line of sight); (3) linking daily operations to strategic  outcomes; (4) rewarding individuals based on individual, team, unit, and  organizational results; (5) obtaining, developing, providing incentives to,  and retaining needed talent; and most importantly, (6) leadership at the  top, to include a chief operating officer or chief management officer.  Moreover, employee morale is low, as measured by recent results in the  2006 Federal Human Capital Survey, which can have an impact on the  progress of DHS’s transformation and integration. DHS scored at the  bottom or near the bottom of all federal agencies in the four areas which  provide the standards of success for agencies to measure their progress  and achievements in managing their workforces. These four areas include  (1) leadership and knowledge management, (2) results-oriented  performance culture, (3) talent management, and (4) job satisfaction.   As we have reported, people are at the center of any serious change  management initiative, and addressing the “people” element and employee  morale issues is the key to a successful merger and transformation.
Strategic human capital management is the centerpiece of any  transformation effort. In 2005, we reported that DHS had initiated strategic  human capital planning efforts and published proposed regulations for a  modern human capital management system. We also reported that DHS’s  leadership was committed to the human capital system design process and  had formed teams to implement the resulting regulations. Since our report,  DHS has finalized its human capital regulations and it is vital that DHS  implement its human capital system effectively. In April 2007, DHS issued  its fiscal year 2007 and 2008 Human Capital Operational Plan, which  identifies five department priorities: hiring and retaining a talented and  diverse workforce, creating a DHS-wide culture of performance, creating  high-quality learning and development programs for DHS employees,  implementing a DHS-wide integrated leadership system, and being a model  of human capital service excellence. DHS officials explained that the  Human Capital Operating Plan encompasses the initiatives of the  previous human capital management system, MAXHR, but also outlines a  more comprehensive human resources program. GAO has not yet  reviewed DHS’s new Human Capital Operational Plan to see if it addresses  our prior recommendations. However, we expect to examine this plan.
Further, since our 2005 update, DHS has taken some actions to integrate  the legacy agency workforces that make up its components. For example,  it standardized pay grades for criminal investigators at ICE and developed  promotion criteria for investigators and CBP officers that equally  recognize the value of the experience brought to ICE and CBP by  employees of each legacy agency. DHS also made progress in establishing  human capital capabilities for the US-VISIT program, which should help  ensure that it has sufficient staff with the necessary skills and abilities to  implement the program effectively. CBP also developed training plans that  link its officer training to CBP strategic goals.
Despite these efforts, however, DHS must still (1) create a clearer  crosswalk between departmental training goals and objectives and DHS’s  broader organizational and human capital goals, and (2) develop  appropriate training performance measures and targets for goals and  strategies identified in its departmentwide strategic training plan. We have  also made recommendations to specific program offices and  organizational entities to help ensure that human capital resources are  provided to improve the effectiveness of management capabilities, and  that human capital plans are developed that clearly describe how these  components will recruit, train, and retain staff to meet their growing  demands as they expand and implement new program elements. We are  completing a review of selected human capital issues and plan to report on  our results soon. This report will discuss information on: attrition rates at  DHS; senior-level vacancies at DHS; DHS’s use of human capital  flexibilities, including the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, and personal  services contracts; and DHS’s compliance with the Federal Vacancies  Reform Act of 1998.
section_title: Acquisition Management
paragraphs: DHS has made some progress but continues to face challenges in creating  an effective, integrated acquisition organization. Since its inception in  March 2003, DHS made early progress in implementing a strategic  sourcing program to increase the effectiveness of its buying power and in  creating a small business program. These programs have promoted an  environment in which there is a collaborative effort toward the common  goal of an efficient, unified organization. Strategic sourcing allows DHS  components to formulate purchasing strategies to leverage buying power  and increase savings for a variety of products like office supplies, boats,  energy, and weapons, while its small business program works to ensure  small businesses can compete effectively for the agency’s contract dollars.  However, DHS’s progress toward creating a unified acquisition  organization has been hampered by policy decisions. In March 2005, we  reported that an October 2004 management directive, Acquisition Line of  Business Integration and Management, while emphasizing the need for a  unified, integrated acquisition organization, relies on a system of dual  accountability between the chief procurement officer and the heads of the  departments to make this happen. This situation has created ambiguity  about who is accountable for acquisition decisions. We also found that the  various acquisition organizations within DHS are still operating in a  disparate manner, with oversight of acquisition activities left primarily up  to each individual component. Specifically, we reported that (1) there  were components exempted from the unified acquisition organization,   (2) the chief procurement officer had insufficient staff for departmentwide  oversight, and (3) staffing shortages led the office of procurement  operations to rely extensively on outside agencies for contracting  support. In December 2005, DHS established an acquisition oversight  program to provide comprehensive insight into each component’s  acquisition programs. This oversight program involves a series of reviews  which are currently being implemented. However, accountability concerns  remain. In March 2005, we recommended that, among other things, the  Secretary of Homeland Security provide the Office of the Chief  Procurement Officer with sufficient resources and enforcement authority  to enable effective departmentwide oversight of acquisition policies and  procedures, and to revise the October 2004 management directive to  eliminate reference to the Coast Guard and Secret Service as being exempt  from complying with the directive. In September 2006, DHS reported on  planned increases in staffing for the Office of the Chief Procurement  Officer, but we expressed concern that the authority of the Chief  Procurement Officer had not been addressed. Unless DHS addresses  these challenges, it is at risk of continuing to exist as a fragmented  acquisition organization. Because some of DHS’s components have major,  complex acquisition programs—for example, the Coast Guard’s  Deepwater program (designed to replace or upgrade its cutters and  aircraft) and CBP’s Secure Border Initiative—DHS needs to improve the  oversight of contractors and should adhere to a rigorous management  review process.
section_title: Programmatic Challenges Facing DHS
paragraphs: DHS continues to face challenges, many of which were inherited from its  component legacy agencies, in carrying out its programmatic activities.  These challenges include enhancing transportation security, strengthening  the management of U.S. Coast Guard acquisitions and meeting the Coast  Guard’s new homeland security missions, improving the regulation of  commercial trade while ensuring protection against the entry of illegal  goods and dangerous visitors at U.S. borders and ports of entry, and  improving enforcement of immigration laws, including worksite  immigration laws, and the provision of immigration services. DHS must  also effectively coordinate the mitigation and response to all hazards,  including natural disaster planning, response, and recovery. DHS has  taken actions to address these challenges, for example, by strengthening  passenger and baggage screening, increasing the oversight of Coast Guard  acquisitions, more thoroughly screening visitors and cargo, dedicating  more resources to immigration enforcement, becoming more efficient in  the delivery of immigration services, and conducting better planning for  disaster preparation. However, challenges remain in each of these major  mission areas.
subsections: section_title: Transportation Security
paragraphs: Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in  effectively executing transportation security efforts. We have  recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)  more fully integrate a risk management approach—including assessments  of threat, vulnerability, and criticality—in prioritizing security efforts  within and across all transportation modes; strengthen stakeholder  coordination; and implement needed technological upgrades to secure  commercial airports. DHS has made progress in all of these areas,  particularly in aviation, but must expand its security focus more towards  surface modes of transportation and continue to seek best practices and  coordinated security efforts with the international community. DHS and  TSA have taken numerous actions to strengthen commercial aviation  security, including strengthening passenger and baggage screening,  improving aspects of air cargo security, and strengthening the security of  international flights and passengers bound for the United States. For  example, TSA increased efforts to measure the effectiveness of airport  screening systems through covert testing and other means and has worked  to enhance passenger and baggage screener training. TSA also improved  its processes for identifying and responding to threats onboard  commercial aircraft and has modified airport screening procedures based  on risk. Despite this progress, however, TSA continues to face challenges  in implementing a program to match domestic airline passenger  information against terrorist watch lists, fielding needed technologies to  screen airline passengers for explosives, and strengthening aspects of  passenger rail security. In addition, TSA has not developed a strategy, as  required, for securing the various modes of transportation. As a result, rail  and other surface transportation stakeholders are unclear regarding what  TSA’s role will ultimately be in establishing and enforcing security  requirements within their transportation modes. We have recommended  that TSA more fully integrate risk-based decision making within aviation  and across all transportation modes, strengthen passenger prescreening,  and enhance rail security efforts. We have also recommended that TSA  work to develop sustained and effective partnerships with other  government agencies, the private sector, and international partners to  coordinate security efforts and seek potential best practices, among other  efforts. While DHS has made significant strides in strengthening aviation  security, it still is in the early stages of developing a comprehensive  approach to ensuring inbound air cargo security.
section_title: Coast Guard Acquisitions and Non-Homeland Security Missions
paragraphs: The Coast Guard needs to improve the management of its acquisitions and  continue to enhance its security mission while meeting other mission  responsibilities. In 2004, we recommended that the Coast Guard improve  its management of the Deepwater program by strengthening key  management and oversight activities, implementing procedures to better  ensure contractor accountability, and controlling future costs by  promoting competition. In April 2006, we reported the Coast Guard had  made some progress in addressing these recommendations. For example,  the Coast Guard has addressed our recommendation to ensure better  contractor accountability by providing for better input from U.S. Coast  Guard performance monitors. However, even with these improvements,  acquisition and contract management issues that we reported on  previously continue to be challenges to the Coast Guard. For example,  within the Deepwater program, an updated class of patrol boats has been  removed from service and its replacement, a new cutter class, has been  delayed due to design concerns. While the Coast Guard recently  announced that it will be taking a more active role in Deepwater  acquisitions and noted that many of the issues that led to these acquisition  problems are being addressed, it is too soon to tell how effective these  changes will be. Further, the Coast Guard has acquisition challenges other  than just the Deepwater program. For example, the Coast Guard's timeline  for achieving full operating capability for its search and rescue  communications system, Rescue 21, was delayed from 2006 to 2011, and  the estimated total acquisition cost increased.
The Coast Guard has made progress in balancing its homeland security  and traditional missions. The Coast Guard is unlike many other DHS  components because it has substantial missions not related to homeland  security. These missions include maritime navigation, icebreaking,  protecting the marine environment, marine safety, and search and rescue  for mariners in distress. Furthermore, unpredictable natural disasters,  such as Hurricane Katrina, can place intense demands on all Coast Guard  resources. The Coast Guard must continue executing these traditional  missions and balance those responsibilities with its homeland security  obligations, which have increased significantly since September 11.
section_title: Border Security and the Regulation of Trade
paragraphs: DHS has made some progress but still faces an array of challenges in  securing the border while improving the regulation of commercial trade.  Since 2005, DHS agencies have made some progress in implementing our  recommendations to refine the screening of foreign visitors to the United  States, target potentially dangerous cargo, and provide the personnel  necessary to effectively fulfill border security and trade agency missions.  As of January 2006, DHS had a pre-entry screening capability in place in  overseas visa issuance offices, and an entry identification capability at   115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. Furthermore, the  Secretary of Homeland Security has made risk management at ports and  all critical infrastructure facilities a key priority for DHS. In addition, DHS  developed performance goals and measures for its trade processing  system and implemented a testing and certification process for its officers  to provide better assurance of effective cargo examination targeting  practices. However, efforts to assess and mitigate risks of DHS’s and the  Department of State’s implementation of the Visa Waiver Program remain  incomplete, increasing the risk that the program could be exploited by  someone who intends harm to the United States. Further, many of DHS’s  border-related performance goals and measures are not fully defined or  adequately aligned with one another, and some performance targets are  not realistic. CBP is not systematically incorporating inspection results  into its cargo screening system because it has not yet fully implemented a  system that will report details on its security inspections nationwide to  allow management to analyze those inspections. Other trade and visitor  screening systems have weaknesses that must be overcome to better  ensure border and trade security. For example, deficiencies in the  identification of counterfeit documentation at land border crossings into  the United States create vulnerabilities that terrorists or others involved in  criminal activity could exploit. We also reported that DHS’s Container  Security Initiative to target and inspect high-risk cargo containers at  foreign ports before they leave for the United States has been challenged  by staffing imbalances, the lack of minimum technical requirements for  inspection equipment used at foreign ports, and insufficient performance  measures to assess the effectiveness of targeting and inspection activities.  We are currently reviewing this program to ascertain what progress CBP  has made in addressing these challenges.
section_title: Enforcement of Immigration Laws
paragraphs: DHS has taken some actions to improve enforcement of immigration laws,  including worksite immigration laws, but the number of resources devoted  to enforcing immigration laws is limited given that there are an estimated  12 million illegal aliens residing in the United States. DHS has  strengthened some aspects of immigration enforcement, including  allocating more investigative work years to immigration functions than the  Immigration and Naturalization Service did prior to the creation of DHS.  Nevertheless, effective enforcement will require more attention to efficient  resource use and updating outmoded management systems. In April 2006,  ICE announced an interior enforcement strategy to bring criminal charges  against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. ICE has also  reported increases in the number of criminal arrests and indictments for  these violations since fiscal year 2004. In addition, ICE has plans to shift  responsibility for identifying incarcerated criminal aliens eligible for  removal from the United States from the Office of Investigations to its  Office of Detention and Removal, freeing those investigative resources for  other immigration and customs investigations. ICE has also begun to  introduce principles of risk management into the allocation of its  investigative resources. However, enforcement of immigration  enforcement laws needs to be strengthened and significant management  challenges remain. DHS’s ability to locate and remove millions of aliens  who entered the country illegally or overstayed the terms of their visas is  questionable, and implementing an effective worksite enforcement  program remains an elusive goal. ICE’s Office of Investigations has not  conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the customs and  immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation by  criminals and terrorists. This office also lacks outcome-based performance  goals that relate to its objective of preventing the exploitation of systemic  vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems, and it does not have  sufficient systems in place to help ensure systematic monitoring and  communication of vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations.  Moreover, the current employment verification process used to identify  workers ineligible for employment in the United States has not  fundamentally changed since its establishment in 1986, and ongoing  weaknesses have undermined its effectiveness. We have recommended  that DHS take actions to help address these weaknesses and to strengthen  the current process by issuing final regulations on changes to the  employment verification process which will reduce the number of  documents suitable for proving eligibility to work in the United States.  Some other countries require foreign workers to present work  authorization documents at the time of hire and require employers to  review these documents and report workers’ information to government  agencies for collecting taxes and social insurance contributions, and  conducting worksite enforcement actions.
section_title: Provision of Immigration Services
paragraphs: Although DHS has made progress in reducing its backlog of immigration  benefit applications, improvements are still needed in the provision of  immigration services, particularly by strengthening internal controls to  prevent fraud and inaccuracy. Since 2005, DHS has enhanced the  efficiency of certain immigration services. For example, U.S. Citizenship  and Immigration Services (USCIS) estimated that it had reduced its  backlog of immigration benefits applications from a peak of 3.8 million  cases to 1.2 million cases from January 2004 to June 2005. USCIS has also  established a focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control  strategy that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is  performing fraud assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud  for certain benefits. However, DHS still faces significant challenges in its  ability to effectively provide immigration services while at the same time  protecting the immigration system from fraud and mismanagement. USCIS  may have adjudicated tens of thousands of naturalization applications  without alien files, and adjudicators were not required to record whether  the alien file was available when they adjudicated the application. Without  these files, DHS may not be able to take enforcement action against an  applicant and could also approve an application for an ineligible applicant.  In response to our report, USCIS recently enacted a policy that requires  the adjudicator to record whether the alien file was available when they  adjudicated the application. In addition, USCIS has not implemented  important aspects of our internal control standards or fraud control best  practices identified by leading audit organizations. Such best practices  would include (1) a comprehensive risk management approach,   (2) mechanisms for ongoing monitoring during the course of normal  activities, (3) clear communication agencywide regarding how to balance  production-related goals with fraud-prevention activities, and   (4) performance goals for fraud prevention.
section_title: Disaster Preparedness and Response
paragraphs: We have reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster  preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Between the time that  FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003 and Hurricane Katrina hit in late  August 2005, its responsibilities had been dispersed and its role within  DHS continued to evolve. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster  management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed  weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and  recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Our analysis showed the need  for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and  responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities;  and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast  and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.  In September 2006, we recommended that Congress give federal agencies  explicit authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic  disasters when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS   (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the  roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership,  implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination  problems; (2) direct that the National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and  its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust  and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and  direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to  ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery  responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in  monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their  responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness  Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and  how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic  disaster.
DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released its Supplement to the  Catastrophic Incident Annex—both designed to further clarify federal  roles and responsibilities and relationships among federal, state and local  governments and responders. However, these revisions have not been  rigorously tested. DHS is working on additional revisions to the NRP and  the National Incident Management System and recently informed Congress  the revisions to the NRP may not be complete by the scheduled June 1,  2007 target date. Thus, it is unlikely that any changes will be clearly  communicated, understood, and effectively tested prior to the 2007  Hurricane Season, which begins in June. DHS has also announced a  number of actions intended to improve readiness and response based on  our work and the work of congressional committees and the  Administration. For example, DHS is currently reorganizing FEMA as  required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act. One major  objective of this reorganization is to integrate responsibility and  accountability for disaster preparedness and response within DHS by  placing the responsibility for both within FEMA. DHS has also announced  a number of other actions to improve readiness and response, such as  mass care and shelter, in which FEMA rather than the Red Cross, will now  have the lead. However, there is little information available on the extent  to which these changes are tested and operational.
Finally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following Hurricane  Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of needs to  confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or ensure that  there were provisions in contracts for response and recovery services to  ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We recommended that DHS  create accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and  flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We  also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement  practices (pre-contracting) and procedures for those federal agencies with  roles and responsibilities under the NRP so that these agencies can better  manage disaster-related procurement, and establish an assessment  process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for their disaster- related procurement needs and the maintenance of capabilities. For  example, we identified a number of emergency response practices in the  public and private sectors that provide insight into how the federal  government can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These  include both developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices  and establishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing  a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the  response with the need. FEMA had taken some action on these  recommendations by entering into advance contracts for various goods,  supplies, and services, such as debris removal. However, DHS has not  implemented our recommendation to develop guidance on advance  procurement practices and procedures for those federal agencies and  other partners, such as the Red Cross, with roles and responsibilities  under the NRP.
section_title: Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS’s Transformation and Integration Efforts
paragraphs: To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a  corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems,  identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for  substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan  should include performance measures, metrics and milestones to measure  their progress. Agencies should also demonstrate significant progress in  addressing the problems identified in their corrective action plan. This  should include a program to monitor and independently validate progress.  Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a  commitment to sustain initial improvements. This would include a strong  commitment to address the risk(s) that put the program or function on the  high-risk list and provide for the allocation of sufficient people and  resources (capacity) to resolve the risk(s) and ensure that improvements  are sustainable over the long term.
In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us a draft corrective action plan for  addressing its transformation challenges. This plan addressed major  management areas we had previously identified as key to DHS’s  transformation—management integration through the DHS management  directorate and financial, information, acquisition, and human capital  management. The plan identified an overall goal to develop and implement  key department wide processes and systems to support DHS’s  transformation into a department capable of planning, operating, and  managing as one effective department.
In the short term, the plan sought to produce significant improvements  over the next 7 years that further DHS’s ability to operate as one  department. Although the plan listed accomplishments and general goals  for the management functions, it did not contain (1) objectives linked to  those goals that are clear, concise, and measurable; (2) specific actions to  implement those objectives; (3) information linking sufficient people and  resources to implement the plan; or (4) an evaluation program to monitor  and independently validate progress toward meeting the goals and  measuring the effectiveness of the plan. As of May 2007, DHS has not  submitted a corrective action plan to OMB. According to an official at  OMB, this is one of the few high-risk areas that have not produced a final  corrective action plan.
In addition to developing an effective corrective action plan, agencies  must show that significant progress has taken place in improving  performance in the areas identified in its corrective action plan. While our  work has noted progress at DHS, for us to remove the DHS  implementation and transformation from our high-risk list, we need to be  able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS has  implemented many of our past recommendations, or has taken other  corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, DHS  has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough  so that Congress can be sure it is economically, efficiently, effectively,  ethically, and equitably using the billions of dollars in funding it receives  annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous  legislative requirements and presidential directives. Our work for  Congress assessing DHS’s operations has been significantly hampered by  long delays in granting us access to program documents and officials, or  by questioning our access to information needed to conduct our reviews.
We have processes for obtaining information from departments and  agencies across the federal government that work well. DHS’s process— involving multiple layers of review by department- and component-level  liaisons and attorneys regarding whether to provide us the requested  information—does not work as smoothly. DHS’s processes have impeded  our efforts to carry out our mission by delaying access to documents that  we require to assess the department’s operations. We have occasionally  worked with DHS management to establish a cooperative process—for  example, reviewing sensitive documents at a particular agency location— in an effort to not only to maintain a productive working relationship with  the department but also to meet the needs of our congressional requesters  in a timely manner. I have spoken to Secretary Chertoff who pledged to  make access a higher priority and have met with Undersecretary  Schneider who also assured us of his cooperation. We are encouraged by  these statements and look forward to better relations with the department.
We recognize that the department has legitimate interests in protecting  certain types of sensitive information from public disclosure. We share  that interest as well and follow strict security guidelines in handling such  information. We similarly recognize that agency officials will need to make  judgments with respect to the manner and the processes they use in  response to our information requests. However, to date, because of the  processes adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often not been able  to do its work in a timely manner. We have been able to eventually obtain  information and to answer audit questions, but the delays we have  experienced at DHS have impeded our ability to conduct audit work  efficiently and to provide timely information to congressional clients.
Finally, to be removed from our high-risk list, any progress that occurs  must be sustainable over the long term. DHS’s leaders need to make and  demonstrate a commitment to implementing a transformed organization.  The Secretary has stated such a commitment, most prominently as part of  his “second stage review” in the summer of 2005, and more recently in  remarks made at George Washington University’s Homeland Security  Policy Institute. However, appropriate follow-up is required to assure that  transformation plans are effectively implemented and sustained, to include  the allocation of adequate resources to support transformation efforts. In  this regard, we were pleased when DHS established a Business  Transformation Office, but we believe that the office’s effectiveness was  limited because the department did not give it the authority and  responsibility needed to be successful. We understand that this office has  recently been eliminated. Further, department leaders can show their  commitment to transforming DHS by acting on recommendations made by  the Congress, study groups, and accountability organizations such as its  Office of the IG and GAO. Although we have also seen some progress in  this area, it is not enough for us to conclude that DHS is committed to and  capable of quickly incorporating corrective actions into its operations.  Therefore, until DHS produces an acceptable corrective action plan,  demonstrates progress reforming its key management functions, and  dedicates the resources necessary to sustain this progress, it will likely  remain on our high-risk list.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my  prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you  or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin,  Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at   (202) 512-8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov or Bernice Steinhardt, Director,  Strategic Issues at 202-512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Other individuals  making key contributions to this testimony include Christopher Conrad,  Anthony DeFrank, and Sarah Veale.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security
subsections: section_title: Implementation and Transformation
paragraphs: High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,  2007).
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-235R  (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities,  but Additional Authority Is Needed, GAO-06-899T (Washington, D.C.:  June 21, 2006).
Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring  the Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts, GAO-06-612  (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006).
Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management  Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate, GAO-06-206  (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2005).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security  Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities,   GAO-05-434 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005).
Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security  Management Challenges, GAO-05-573T (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005).
Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS’s Planning Process  Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability, GAO-05-300 (Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2005).
Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained  Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration, GAO-05-139  (Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005).
Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal  Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices,   GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004).
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons  Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal  Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High  Risks, GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2000).
section_title: Financial Management and Internal Controls
paragraphs: Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to  Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts, GAO-06-553T  (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006).
Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces  Significant Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774. Washington,  D.C.: July 19, 2004).
section_title: Information Technology
paragraphs: Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture Continues to Evolve  but Improvements Needed, GAO-07-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007).
Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and Implement  Policies and Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments,   GAO-07-424 (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007).
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated  Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing  Management Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2006).
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More  Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical  Infrastructure Information, GAO-06-383 (Washington, D.C.:   April 17, 2006).
Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on  Department’s Management of Information Technology, GAO-06-598T  (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006).
Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on  Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization  Program, GAO-05-805 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005.)
Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully  Implement Its Security Program. GAO-05-700 (Washington, D.C.: June 17,  2005).
Information Technology: Federal Agencies Face Challenges in  Implementing Initiatives to Improve Public Health Infrastructure,   GAO-05-308 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment  Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements  Continues. GAO-05-267 (Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005).
Department of Homeland Security: Formidable Information and  Technology Management Challenge Requires Institutional Approach,   GAO-04-702 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2004).
section_title: Human Capital Systems
paragraphs: Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to  Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139  (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.:   July 28, 2006).
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions  in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R  (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006).
Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating,  but Management Improvements Are Still Needed, GAO-06-318T  (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006).
Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training  Important for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 23, 2005).
section_title: Acquisition Management
paragraphs: Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight  Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks,  GAO-06-996 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006).
Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition  Organization, GAO-06-1012T (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006).
Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create  an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179 (Washington, D.C.:  March 29, 2005).
Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of  Special DHS Acquisition Authority, GAO-05-136 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.  15, 2004).
section_title: Transportation Security
paragraphs: Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are  in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington,  D.C.: April 30, 2007).
Aviation Security: TSA's Change to its Prohibited Items List Has Not  Resulted in Any Reported Public Safety Incidents, but the Impact of the  Change on Screening Operations is Inconclusive, GAO-07-623R.  (Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007).
Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Service Drive  Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and  Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634  (Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007).
Aviation Security: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for  Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be  Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007).
Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key  Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T,  (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2007).
Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive  Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened,   GAO-06-795 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006).
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening  Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.:   July 28, 2006).
Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State  Safety Oversight Program, GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006).
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program,   GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked  Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington,  D.C.: April 4, 2006).
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private- Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains, GAO-06-166  (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006).
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006).
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from  Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28,  2005).
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air  Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.)
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to  Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.:  Sept. 9, 2005).
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training  Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed,   GAO-05-781 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6. 2005).
Aviation Safety: Oversight of Foreign Code-Share Safety Program Should  Be Strengthened, GAO-05-930 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2005).
Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted  Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed, GAO-05-928T  (Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005).
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,  but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed,   GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005).
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365  (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005).
section_title: Coast Guard Acquisitions and Non-Homeland Security Missions
paragraphs: Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget,  Performance, Reorganization, and Related Challenges: GAO-07-489T  (Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2007).
Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program  Management and Address Operational Challenges, GAO-07-575T  (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2007).
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets  and Management Challenges, GAO-07-446T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,  2007).
Coast Guard: Efforts to Improve Management and Address Operational  Challenges in the Deepwater Program, GAO-07-460T (Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 14, 2007).
Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland  Security's Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's  Deepwater Program, GAO-07-453T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2007).
United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management and  Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition, GAO-06-623 (Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2006).
Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program  Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted,   GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006).
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and  Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical  Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.)
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T (Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005).
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced  Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security, GA0-05-404  (Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005).
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and  Management Concerns Remain, GAO-05-161 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,  2005).
Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs  Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight,   GAO-04-380 (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004).
section_title: Border Security and the Regulation of Trade
paragraphs: Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and  Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248  (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006).
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks  of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28,  2006).
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated  Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing  Management Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2006).
Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border  Surveillance Technology Program, GAO-06-295 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.  22, 2006).
Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key  Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296  (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006).
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from  Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing, GAO-05-859  (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005).
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and  Marine Assets, GAO-05-543 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 2005).
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of  Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program, GAO-05-801  (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005).
Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest  Differences in Sector Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.:   July 22, 2005).
section_title: Enforcement of Immigration Laws
paragraphs: Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment  Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-06-895T  (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006).
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions  in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R  (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006).
Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and  Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-06-404  (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006).
Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s  Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington,  D.C.: March 28, 2006).
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment  Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-05-813 (Washington,  D.C.: Aug. 31, 2005).
section_title: Provision of Immigration Services
paragraphs: Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien  Files Are Located when Needed, GAO-07-85 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27,  2006).
Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy  Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-259  (Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006).
Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and  Ensure Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21,  2005).
Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call  Centers, GAO-05-526 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.)
section_title: Disaster Preparedness and Response
paragraphs: Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington,  D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and  Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for  the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, GAO-06-834 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6,  2006).
Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance  for Health Facilities Should be Addressed, GAO-06-826 (Washington, D.C.:  July 20, 2006).
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:  FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant  Fraud and Abuse, GAO-06-655 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006).
Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed  to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International  Assistance, GAO-06-460 (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006).
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better  Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies,   GAO-05-577 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005).
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