Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to BRAC 2005 Results
Published: 2012-03-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has faced long-term challenges in managing and halting degradation of its portfolio of facilities and reducing unneeded infrastructure to free up funds to better maintain the facilities it still uses and to meet other needs. Costs to build and maintain the defense infrastructure represent a significant financial commitment. DODs management of its support infrastructure is on GAOs high-risk list, in part because of the challenges DOD faces in reducing its unneeded excess and obsolete infrastructure. DOD plans to reduce force structure and the President will request that Congress authorize the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process for 2013 and 2015. The Secretary of Defense stated that the BRAC process is the only effective way to achieve needed infrastructure savings.
This testimony discusses (1) key factors and challenges that contributed to BRAC 2005 implementation and results and (2) the most recent estimated costs and savings attributable to BRAC 2005. To do this work, GAO reviewed its previous work and selected documents related to BRAC 2005 such as BRAC business plans that laid out the requisite actions, timing of those actions, and DODs estimated costs and savings associated with implementing each recommendation, briefings on BRAC implementation status prepared by the military services, and budget justification materials submitted to Congress. GAO also interviewed current and former officials from DOD and the BRAC Commission involved in the development, review, and implementation of BRAC recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO identified several factors and challenges that contributed to the Department of Defenses (DOD) implementation of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 and the results achieved. In contrast to other BRAC rounds that were primarily focused on achieving savings by reducing excess infrastructure, the Secretary of Defense identified three goals for BRAC 2005. Specifically, BRAC 2005 was intended to (1) transform the military, (2) foster jointness, and (3) reduce excess infrastructure to produce savings. These goals and the primary selection criterias focus on enhancing military value led DOD to identify numerous recommendations that were designed to be transformational and enhance jointness, thereby adding to the complexity the BRAC Commission and DOD faced in finalizing and implementing the recommendations. Some transformational-type recommendations needed sustained attention by DOD and significant coordination and planning among multiple stakeholders. To improve oversight of implementation of the recommendations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) required business plans for each BRAC 2005 recommendation to better manage implementation. In addition, DOD developed recommendations that were interdependent on each other. However, this led to challenges across multiple recommendations when delays in completing one recommendation led to delays in completing others. Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the relocations of over 123,000 people with about $24.7 billion in new construction or renovation at installations. Given the complexity of some BRAC recommendations, OSD directed the services to periodically brief it on implementation challenges. Furthermore, the scale of BRAC 2005 posed a number of challenges to the Commission as it conducted its independent review. For example, it reported that DODs recommendations were of unprecedented scope and complexity, compounding the difficulty of its review. Moreover, the interdependent nature of some recommendations made it difficult for the Commission to evaluate the effect on installations that were both gaining and losing units simultaneously. Finally, the effect on communities from installation growth has led to challenges. For example, communities experiencing growth were hindered in their ability to effectively plan for off-base support such as adequate roads and schools due to inconsistent information from DOD around the 2007 time frame.
DODs fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress shows that costs to implement the BRAC recommendations grew from $21 billion originally estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005 dollars to about $35.1 billion in current dollars, an increase of about $14.1 billion, or 67 percent. In constant 2005 dollars, costs increased to $32.2 billion, an increase of 53 percent. Costs increased mostly due to military construction as DOD identified the need for new and renovated facilities to enhance capabilities. In 2005, the Commission estimated net annual recurring savings of $4.2 billion and a 20-year net present value savings by 2025 of $36 billion. GAOs analysis shows annual recurring savings are now about $3.8 billion, a decrease of 9.5 percent, while the 20-year net present value savings are now about $9.9 billion, a decrease of 73 percent. As such, DOD will not recoup its up-front costs until 2018.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) latest round of base realignments and closures (BRAC),  commonly referred to as BRAC 2005. GAO has two long-standing roles in  the BRAC process. First, as requested by congressional committees for  the 1988 BRAC round and mandated by law since 1990, we have served  as an independent and objective observer of the BRAC process and have  assessed and reported on DOD’s decision-making processes leading up  to proposed realignment and closure recommendations. We have  operated in a real-time setting and had access to significant portions of  the process as it evolved. Second, once the recommendations became  binding, our role has been to review DOD’s efforts to implement the  recommendations, just as we routinely review the efficiency and  effectiveness of many other congressionally mandated or authorized  programs across the government. As such, we have issued about 50  reports related to the BRAC 2005 round and prior BRAC rounds since  1989 (see related GAO products at the end of this testimony) in addition  to our statutorily required report providing a detailed analysis of the BRAC  2005 selection process and the Secretary of Defense’s proposed  realignment and closure recommendations to the BRAC Commission.
DOD has faced long-term challenges in managing its portfolio of facilities,  halting degradation of facilities, and reducing unneeded infrastructure to  free up funds to better maintain the facilities it still uses and to meet other  needs. DOD has about 500 permanent installations in the United States  that comprise more than 300,000 buildings and about 200,000 other  structures with a replacement value of more than $800 billion. Costs to  build and maintain the defense infrastructure represent a significant  financial commitment. However, closing unneeded defense facilities has  historically been difficult because of public concern about the economic  effects of closures on communities, the perceived lack of impartiality of  the decision-making process, and legal requirements. DOD’s  management of its support infrastructure is on our high-risk list, in part  due to the challenges DOD faces in eliminating unneeded infrastructure.  The BRAC process is designed to overcome obstacles to eliminating  unneeded infrastructure and to help DOD match needed infrastructure to  the force structure and to support military missions.  We reported in 2005  that DOD established and generally followed a logical and reasoned  process for formulating its BRAC 2005 recommendations.
As the Secretary of Defense testified before both the Senate and House  Armed Services Committees 3 weeks ago, the President will request  Congress to again authorize the BRAC process, for 2013 and 2015. The  Secretary acknowledged that the BRAC process is controversial but  stated that it is the only effective way to achieve needed infrastructure  savings, and that the upcoming request comes as a result of DOD plans  to reduce its force structure.
As directed by the House Armed Services Committee in its report  accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, we have  been reviewing BRAC 2005 to monitor implementation of the  recommendations and identify lessons that could be used to improve  future BRAC rounds should Congress authorize additional rounds. My  testimony today is based on work completed to date, and I will identify (1)  key factors and challenges that contributed to BRAC 2005  implementation and results and (2) the most-recent estimated costs and  savings attributable to BRAC 2005. We will also be reporting on lessons  learned from the BRAC 2005 round later this year.
To identify some of the key factors and challenges that contributed to  BRAC 2005 implementation and results, we reviewed our previous work  and key documents related to BRAC 2005, such as BRAC business plans  that laid out the actions and timing of those actions to implement the  recommendations, briefings prepared by the military services on the  implementation status of the recommendations, and other key  documents. We interviewed the Chairman of the 2005 BRAC Commission  and members of the Commission’s executive staff, key military  department officials involved in BRAC 2005, and the former Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) who oversaw  BRAC 2005 when DOD developed the recommendations that were sent  to the Commission. We also interviewed representatives of five of the  seven joint cross-service groups: Headquarters and Support Activities,  Industrial, Medical, Supply and Storage, and Technical. We performed  our work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Basing  Directorate; the military departments; and other relevant offices.
To identify the current estimated costs and savings, we used DOD’s  annual BRAC 2005 budget submissions to Congress to conduct our  analyses of BRAC costs and savings. To evaluate changes in projected  net annual recurring savings from the BRAC Commission’s original  estimates in 2005 through to fiscal year 2011, we used data OSD  provided on estimated savings in fiscal year 2012 because these data  more fully captured the expected savings. We calculated the 20-year net  present value savings by applying the same formulas and discount rate of  2.8 percent that the BRAC Commission used in 2005 to calculate the  savings. Although the Office of Management and Budget prescribes the  use of slightly different assumptions to calculate these estimates today,  we used the factors and assumptions used by the BRAC Commission for  consistency. To assess the reliability of DOD’s BRAC cost and savings  data, we tested computer-generated data for errors, reviewed relevant  documentation, and discussed data quality control procedures with  officials at the OSD Basing Directorate. We determined that the data used  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of addressing the objectives of  this testimony. We performed this work from March 2011 to March 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Congress Established the BRAC Process
paragraphs: The BRAC 2005 process consisted of a series of legislatively prescribed  steps as follows:  DOD proposed the selection criteria. DOD was required to propose the  selection criteria to be used to develop and evaluate the candidate  recommendations, consistent with considerations specified in the statute  authorizing BRAC 2005. The criteria were to be made available for public  comment in the Federal Register. Congress subsequently codified the  eight final BRAC selection criteria used in BRAC 2005. The BRAC  statute directed GAO to evaluate the selection criteria. Figure 1 displays  the eight criteria. Importantly, Congress specified that the first four criteria  relating to enhancing military value were to be the priority criteria.
DOD developed a force structure plan and infrastructure inventory.  Congress required the Secretary of Defense to develop and submit to  Congress a force structure plan laying out the numbers, size, and  composition of the units that constitute U.S. defense forces—for example,  divisions, ships, and air wings—based on the Secretary’s assessment of  the probable national security threats over the ensuing 20 year period,  and an inventory of global military installations. The BRAC statute  directed GAO to evaluate the force structure plan and infrastructure  inventory.
Secretary of Defense was required to provide certain certifications. On  the basis of the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and  accompanying analyses, the Secretary of Defense was required to certify  whether the need existed for the closure or realignment of military  installations. If the Secretary certified that the need existed, he was also  required to certify that the round of closures and realignments would  result in annual net savings for each of the military departments beginning  not later than fiscal year 2011. The BRAC statute directed GAO to  evaluate the need for the 2005 BRAC round.
DOD began to develop options for closure or realignment  recommendations. The military departments developed service-specific  installation closure and realignment options. In addition, OSD established  seven joint cross-service teams, called joint cross-service groups, to  develop options across common business-oriented functions, such as  medical services, supply and storage, and administrative activities. These  closure and realignment options were reviewed by DOD’s Infrastructure  Executive Council—a senior-level policy-making and oversight body for  the entire process. Options approved by this council were submitted to  the Secretary of Defense for his review and approval. DOD developed  hundreds of closure or realignment options for further analysis, which  eventually led to DOD’s submitting over 200 recommendations to the  BRAC Commission for analysis and review. The BRAC statute directed  GAO to analyze the recommendations of the Secretary and the selection  process, and we issued our report to the congressional defense  committees on July 1, 2005.
BRAC Commission performed an independent review of DOD’s  recommendations. After DOD selected its base closure and realignment  recommendations, it submitted them to the BRAC Commission, which  performed an independent review and analysis of DOD’s  recommendations. The Commission could approve, modify, reject, or add  closure and realignment recommendations. Also, the BRAC Commission  provided opportunities to interested parties, as well as community and  congressional leaders, to provide testimony and express viewpoints. The  Commission then voted on each individual closure or realignment  recommendation, and those that were approved were included in the  Commission’s report to the President. In 2005, the BRAC Commission  reported that it had rejected or modified about 14 percent of DOD’s  closure and realignment recommendations.
President approved BRAC recommendations. After receiving the  recommendations, the President was to review the recommendations of  the Secretary of Defense and the Commission and prepare a report by  September 23, 2005, containing his approval or disapproval of the  Commission’s recommendations as a whole. Had the President  disapproved of the Commission’s recommendations, the Commission  would have had until October 20, 2005, to submit a revised list of  recommendations to the President for further consideration. If the  President had not submitted a report to Congress of his approval of the  Commission’s recommendations by November 7, 2005, the BRAC  process would have been terminated. The President submitted his report  and approval of the 2005 Commission’s recommendations on September  15, 2005.
Congress allowed the recommendations to become binding. After the  President transmitted his approval of the Commission’s recommendations  to Congress, the Secretary of Defense would have been prohibited from  implementing the recommendations if Congress had passed a joint  resolution of disapproval within 45 days of the date of the President’s  submission or the adjournment of Congress for the session, whichever  was sooner. Since Congress did not pass such a resolution, the  recommendations became binding in November 2005.
Congress established clear time frames for implementation. The BRAC  legislation required DOD to complete recommendations for closing or  realigning bases made in BRAC 2005 by September 15, 2011—6 years  from the date the President submitted his approval of the  recommendations to Congress. Figure 2 displays the timeline of the  BRAC 2005 round.
section_title: Key Factors and Challenges Affecting DOD and the Commission in BRAC 2005
paragraphs: GAO identified several factors and challenges that contributed to DOD’s  implementation of BRAC 2005 and the results achieved. In contrast to  other BRAC rounds that were primarily focused on achieving savings by  reducing excess infrastructure, the Secretary of Defense identified three  goals for BRAC 2005. Specifically, BRAC 2005 was intended to transform  the military, foster jointness, and reduce excess infrastructure to produce  savings. These goals and the primary selection criteria’s focus on  enhancing military value led DOD to identify numerous recommendations  that were designed to be transformational and enhance jointness, thereby  adding to the complexity the Commission and DOD faced in finalizing and  implementing the BRAC recommendations. Some key challenges that  have confronted or continue to confront DOD or the Commission in  regard to BRAC 2005 are as follows.
Some transformational-type BRAC recommendations required sustained  senior leadership attention and a high level of coordination among many  stakeholders to complete by the required date. The consolidation of  supply, storage, and distribution functions within the Defense Logistics  Agency is an example of an atypical use of the BRAC process. The  supply, storage, and distribution BRAC recommendation is  transformational because it focuses on complex business process  reengineering efforts involving the transfer of personnel and management  functions. As we previously reported, the Defense Logistics Agency was  faced with the potential for disruptions to depot operations during  implementation of the BRAC consolidation recommendation and took  certain steps we have identified as best practices to minimize the  potential for disruption. These included committing sustained high-level  leadership and including relevant stakeholders in an organizational  structure to address implementation challenges as they arose. To  implement the BRAC recommendations, the agency had to develop  strategic agreements with the services that ensured that all stakeholders  agreed on its plans for implementation, and had to address certain human  capital and information technology challenges.
Similarly, another type of transformational BRAC recommendation that  required sustained senior leadership attention was the establishment of  the Navy’s Fleet Readiness Centers. DOD expects this BRAC  recommendation to produce significant savings; however, as we  reported, this BRAC recommendation required sustained senior  leadership attention to ensure effective completion. Our prior work states  that sustained leadership is necessary to achieve workforce  reorganizations and agency goals.
Implementation of some transformational BRAC recommendations— especially those where a multitude of organizations and units all had roles  to play to ensure the achievement of the goals of the recommendation— illustrated the need to involve key stakeholders and effective planning.  For example, to transform the reserve forces in many states, the Army  had planned to implement 44 BRAC recommendations to construct   125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers by September 15, 2011.
As we previously reported, the Army identified several potential  challenges, including completing all of the construction within the  statutory implementation period, changing force structure and mission  requirements that could affect the capacity of the new centers, and  realizing efficiencies based on limited testing of new construction  processes. Conversely, as we also previously reported, the Air Force  used a consultative process that involved stakeholders to assign new  missions to units that would lose flying missions as a result of 37 BRAC  recommendations affecting 56 Air National Guard installations. As a  result of this consultative process, Air National Guard units affected by  BRAC 2005 were assigned replacement missions, of which 83 percent  were highest priority, mission-critical missions, or a new flying mission.  However, implementation of these BRAC recommendations led to other  challenges that required significant stakeholder coordination. These  challenges included the capacity of Air National Guard headquarters to  develop new unit staffing documents, the need to retrain personnel for an  intelligence mission at a rate that exceeded the capacity of the relevant  school, and that Air National Guard Headquarters had not identified  bridge missions for all units that will face a delay between losing their old  flying mission and the startup of their replacement mission.
Establishing a specific organizational structure to overcome likely  obstacles and help achieve desired goals. OSD emphasized the need for  joint cross-service groups to analyze common business-oriented  functions for BRAC 2005, an approach made more important by the  desire to develop transformational BRAC recommendations. As with the  1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, these joint cross-service groups performed  analyses and developed closure and realignment options in addition to  those developed by the military services. However, our evaluation of  DOD’s 1995 round indicated that the joint cross-service groups submitted  options through the military services for approval, resulting in few being  approved. Conversely, the number of BRAC recommendations developed by the joint cross-service groups increased significantly in the  BRAC 2005 round. This was due, in part, to high-level leadership  ensuring that the options were reviewed by a DOD senior-level group,  known as the Infrastructure Steering Group, rather than the military  services. As shown in figure 3, the Infrastructure Steering Group was  placed organizationally on par with the military departments.
DOD had to develop BRAC oversight mechanisms to improve  accountability for implementation of the BRAC recommendations. For the  first time, OSD required the military departments to develop business  plans to better inform OSD of financial and status of implementation  details for each of the BRAC 2005 recommendations and to facilitate  OSD oversight. These business plans included information such as a  listing of all actions needed to implement each recommendation;  schedules for personnel relocations between installations; and updated  cost and savings estimates by DOD based on more accurate and current  information. This approach permitted senior-level intervention if warranted  to ensure completion of the BRAC recommendations by the statutory  completion date. Additionally, OSD recognized that the business plans  would serve as the foundation for the complex program management  necessary to implement the particularly complex transformational BRAC  2005 recommendations, and to delineate resource requirements and  generate military construction requirements.
Interdependent recommendations affected DOD’s ability to meet the  statutory deadline. Many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations were  interdependent and had to be completed in a sequential fashion within the  statutory implementation period. In cases where interdependent  recommendations required multiple relocations of large numbers of  personnel, delays in completing one BRAC recommendation had a  cascading effect on the implementation of other recommendations.  Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the relocations of over 123,000  people with about $24.7 billion in new construction or renovation.  Commission officials told us that unlike prior BRAC rounds where each  base was handled by a single integrated recommendation, in BRAC  2005, many installations were simultaneously affected by multiple  interconnected BRAC recommendations. For example, as we have  previously reported, as part of the BRAC recommendation to close Fort  Monmouth, New Jersey, personnel from the Army’s Communications- Electronics Life Cycle Management Command located at Fort Monmouth  were to relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. To  accommodate the incoming personnel from Fort Monmouth, Army  officials planned to renovate facilities that were occupied at the time by a  training activity that was to relocate to Fort Lee, Virginia, as part of  another BRAC recommendation. However, delays in completing new  facilities at Fort Lee delayed the relocation of the training activity from  Aberdeen, which in turn delayed the renovation of the Aberdeen facilities  to support the Fort Monmouth closure. Similarly, two buildings at Fort  Belvoir, Virginia, were to house certain Army organizations moving from  leased space as part of a BRAC recommendation. However, the buildings  at Fort Belvoir were occupied at the time by the Army Materiel Command,  which was to relocate to Huntsville, Alabama, as part of another BRAC  recommendation. Construction delays at the Huntsville location delayed  the command’s ability to move, which in turn delayed renovation of the  space they were to vacate, consequently holding up the ability of the new  occupants to relocate from the leased space. Given the complexity of  these interdependent recommendations, OSD required the military  services and defense agencies to periodically brief it on implementation  challenges and progress.
Some complex sets of individual actions were combined within individual  BRAC recommendations, complicating the Commission’s review process.  The scale of BRAC 2005 posed a number of challenges to the  Commission as it did its independent review. First, the Commission  reported that it assessed closure and realignment recommendations of  unprecedented scope and complexity. Further, the executive staff of the  BRAC Commission told us that their task was made more difficult and  complex because many of the proposed recommendations put forward for  BRAC 2005 represented the DOD goals of furthering transformation and  fostering jointness, in addition to the more traditional base closures and  realignments. Moreover, many of the proposed BRAC recommendations  that DOD presented to the Commission for review were made up of  multiple individual actions, unlike prior rounds in which each base was  handled by a single integrated recommendation, according to the BRAC  Commission. The executive staff of the Commission also told us that it  was more difficult to assess the costs and the amount of time for the  savings to offset implementation costs since many of the  recommendations contained multiple interdependent actions, all of which  needed to be reviewed. Table 1 compares the number of individual  actions embedded within the BRAC 2005 recommendations with the  number of similar actions needed to implement the recommendations in  the prior rounds. The table shows that the number of individual BRAC  actions was larger in BRAC 2005 (813) than that from the four prior  BRAC rounds combined (387).
Large size of BRAC 2005 may have contributed to the challenges  confronting the Commission. The Commission executive staff that we  interviewed said that they would have benefited from expertise built up  during the multiple successive smaller BRAC rounds that occurred in  1991, 1993, and 1995, since the Commission staff stayed in place from  one round to the next. However, because 10 years had elapsed since the  last BRAC round, many Commission staff were new to BRAC in 2005 and  had steep learning curves. This may have been compounded by the large  number and variety of BRAC actions DOD presented to them for review.  For example, the Commission reported that it struggled to fully  understand the net impact on bases that were both gaining and losing  missions at the same time, as in the interdependent BRAC  recommendations discussed above. While the Commission had the  authority to modify a BRAC recommendation, the Commission staff  expressed concern that rejecting one action of a recommendation could  potentially set off a cascade of effects rippling across several other  proposed recommendations because of the interdependency of the  individual actions.
The effect on communities from installation growth has led to challenges  for the communities to ensure the provision of adequate services to the  installation. DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment and DOD have  devoted more resources to communities experiencing significant growth  as a result of the consolidation that occurred under BRAC 2005. This is a  change from prior BRAC rounds, when Office of Economic Adjustment  assistance was more focused on helping communities cope with the  closure of an installation than its growth. While some of the growth is  attributable to initiatives other than BRAC, including increases in Army  and Marine Corps force structure after 2007 and plans to rebase some  overseas forces to the United States, BRAC has contributed with the  transfer of about 123,000 positions from one installation to another within  the 6-year BRAC implementation period. As we have previously reported,  communities experiencing growth were hindered in their ability to  effectively plan for off-base support such as adequate roads and schools  due to inconsistent information from DOD around the 2007 time frame.  Further, DOD has missed opportunities to offer high-level leadership to  communities affected by the growth, suggesting the need for more  attention to this issue if a future set of BRAC recommendations leads to  installation growth rather than closure.
section_title: Costs to Implement BRAC 2005 Increased as Estimated Savings Decreased
paragraphs: Our analysis of DOD’s fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to  Congress and each annual submission throughout the BRAC 2005  implementation period shows that one-time implementation costs grew  from $21 billion originally estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005 to   In  about $35.1 billion, an increase of about $14.1 billion, or 67 percent.constant 2005 dollars, costs increased to about $32.2 billion, an increase  of 53 percent. According to an OSD analysis of the increase in costs,  about $10 billion of the increase was attributable to construction for  additional facilities, increasing total military construction costs to about  $24.7 billion. In contrast, military construction costs for the four prior  BRAC rounds combined amounted to less than $7 billion. In a March  2010 testimony, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and  Environment) characterized the military construction for BRAC 2005 as a  major engine of recapitalization. Other reasons for the cost increases  include inflation and increased operations and maintenance,  environmental restoration, and other costs.
Some cost increases have been attributed to unexpected expenses. For  example, DOD’s cost to implement the recommendation to close the  Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, D.C., and relocate medical  care functions to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland,  and Fort Belvoir, Virginia, increased from about $989 million to about $2.7  billion due to higher military construction costs and other higher than  anticipated costs for moving and purchasing equipment, as we previously   Moreover, military construction costs to close Fort Monmouth,  reported. New Jersey, increased by $613.2 million from the BRAC Commission  estimate. One part of this recommendation included relocating the U.S.  Army Military Academy Preparatory School from Fort Monmouth to West  Point, New York, and part of the reason for the cost growth was that the  scope of the facility construction increased from approximately 80,000  square feet to more than 250,000 square feet, and planning officials  identified the need to spend additional money for rock removal needed for  site preparation.
GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased While  Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 2009, GAO-10-98R (Washington,  D.C.: Nov. 13, 2009).
9.5 percent decrease from the Commission’s estimate. The 20-year net  present value savings estimated by the Commission in 2005 for this  BRAC round have decreased by 73 percent to about $9.9 billion. Some  recommendations were acknowledged to be unlikely to produce savings  in the 20-year net present value window. For example, the Commission  approved 30 recommendations that were based on perceived high  military value and were not expected to result in 20-year payback.  However, our analysis of DOD’s 2011 BRAC budget data shows that  currently 77 out of 182 Commission-approved BRAC 2005  recommendations, or about 42 percent, are now not expected to pay back  in the same 20-year period. In contrast, only four recommendations DOD  developed in all four prior BRAC rounds combined were not expected to  result in a 20-year payback. Finally, our analysis of the fiscal year 2011  BRAC budget shows that DOD will not recoup its up-front costs to  implement BRAC recommendations until 2018—5 years later than the  BRAC Commission estimates show it would take to pay back. OSD  officials told us that despite producing lower savings than anticipated, the  department expects that the implementation of BRAC 2005  recommendations will produce capabilities that will enhance military  value, defense operations, and defense management.
section_title: Concluding Remarks
paragraphs: As directed by the House Armed Services Committee’s report  accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, we are  continuing to analyze the results from BRAC 2005 to identify lessons  learned. These lessons may be useful as Congress considers whether to  authorize additional BRAC rounds and would similarly be useful to DOD  in implementing recommendations from any future rounds. We will be  reporting these lessons learned later this year.
Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and Members of the  Subcommittee, I thank you for inviting me to testify today. This concludes  my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions that  you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future questions about this statement, please contact me on (202)  512-4523 or LeporeB@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to  this statement include Laura Talbott, Assistant Director; Vijay Barnabas;  John Beauchamp; John Clary; Brandon Jones; Greg Marchand; Charles  Perdue; Robert Poetta; Paulina Reaves; John Trubey; and Erik Wilkins- McKee.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy  to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan  Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington. D.C.: April 1,  2011.
GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is  Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the  Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to  Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs.  GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning  Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth.  GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased while Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year  2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of  Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are  Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings  Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703.  Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support  Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of  Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.:  March 30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in  Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently  Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January  30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to  Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen  Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R.  Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.  GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower  Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC  Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations  Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R.  Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T.  Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have  Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159.  Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,  Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of  Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics  Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13,  2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve  Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and  Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need  for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2004.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming  Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2004.
Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military  Construction Program. GAO-04-288. Washington, D.C.: February 24,  2004.
Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve  Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management  Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and  Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic  Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities  GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Greater Management Emphasis Needed to  Increase the Services’ Use of Expanded Leasing Authority. GAO-02-475.  Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2002.
Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior  Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5,  2002.
Military Base Closures: Overview of Economic Recovery, Property  Transfer, and Environmental Cleanup. GAO-01-1054T. Washington, D.C.:  August 28, 2001.
Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains  Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Military Base Closures: Lack of Data Inhibits Cost-Effectiveness of  Analyses of Privatization-in Place Initiatives. GAO/NSIAD-00-23.  Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1999.
Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds.  GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.
Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and  Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.
Navy Depot Maintenance: Privatizing Louisville Operations in Place Is Not  Cost-Effective. GAO/NSIAD-97-52. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1997.
Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds.  GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.
Military Base Closures: Reducing High Costs of Environmental Cleanup  Requires Difficult Choices. GAO/NSIAD-96-172. Washington, D.C.:  September 16, 1996.
Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not  Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations  for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133S. Washington, D.C.:  April 14, 1995.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection  Process for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173.  Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1993.
Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed  Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.: May  15, 1991.
Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and  Closure Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.:  November 29, 1989.
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