Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts
Published: 2003-09-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The economic well being of the United States is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats to and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and the federal role and actions in transportation security.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Securing the nation's transportation system is fraught with challenges. The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure. Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels and thousands of private sector companies. Further exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has weakened the transportation industry's financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take the collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and future transportation challenges. Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation. DOT is also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system have not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with their security efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the security of our  nation’s transportation system. Almost 2 years have passed since the  attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the  nation’s transportation system to the terrorist threat. Although most of the  early attention following the September 11 attacks focused on aviation  security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown  as concerns are voiced about possible vulnerabilities, such as attempts to  introduce weapons of mass destruction into this country through ports or  launch chemical attacks on mass transit systems. The entire transportation  industry has remained on a heightened state of alert since the attacks.
My testimony today examines (1) challenges in securing the nation’s  transportation system; (2) actions transportation operators, as well as  state and local governments, have taken since September 11 to enhance  security; (3) the federal role in securing the transportation system and  actions the federal government has taken to enhance transportation  security since September 11; and (4) future actions that are needed to  further enhance the security of the nation’s transportation system. My  comments are based on our recent report on the security of the  transportation system that we prepared for several Members of this  Committee as well as a body of our work undertaken since September 11  on homeland security and combating terrorism.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The nation’s transportation system is a vast, interconnected network of  diverse modes. Key modes of transportation include aviation; highways;  motor carrier (i.e., trucking); motor coach (i.e., intercity bus); maritime;  pipeline; rail (passenger and freight); and transit (e.g., buses, subways,  ferry boats, and light rail). The transportation modes work in harmony to  facilitate mobility through an extensive network of infrastructure and  operators, as well as through the vehicles and vessels that permit  passengers and freight to move within the system. For example, the  nation’s transportation system moves over 30 million tons of freight and  provides approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips each day. The diversity  and size of the transportation system make it vital to our economy and  national security, including military mobilization and deployment.
Private industry, state and local governments, and the federal government  all have roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation system.  Private industry owns and operates a large share of the transportation  system. For example, almost 2,000 pipeline companies and 571 railroad  companies own and operate the pipeline and freight railroad systems,  respectively. Additionally, 83 passenger air carriers and 640,000 interstate  motor coach and motor carrier companies operate in the United States.  State and local governments also own significant portions of the highways,  transit systems, and airports in the country. For example, state and local  governments own over 90 percent of the total mileage of highways. State  and local governments also administer and implement regulations for  different sectors of the transportation system and provide protective and  emergency response services through various agencies. Although the  federal government owns a limited share of the transportation system, it  issues regulations, establishes policies, provides funding, and/or sets  standards for the different modes of transportation. The federal  government uses a variety of policy tools, including grants, loan  guarantees, tax incentives, regulations, and partnerships, to motivate or  mandate state and local governments or the private sector to help address  security concerns.
Prior to September 11, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in  transportation security matters. However, in response to the attacks on  September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security  Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary  responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act  also gives TSA regulatory authority over all transportation modes. Since its  creation in November 2001, TSA has focused primarily on meeting the  aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. With the passage of the  Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20  other agencies, was transferred to the new Department of Homeland  Security (DHS).
section_title: The Transportation System as a Whole Faces Numerous Challenges
paragraphs: The United States maintains the world’s largest and most complex national  transportation system. Improving the security of such a system is fraught  with challenges for both public and private entities. To provide safe  transportation for the nation, these entities must overcome issues  common to all modes of transportation as well as issues specific to the  individual modes of transportation.
subsections: section_title: All Modes of Transportation Face Common Challenges
paragraphs: Although each mode of transportation is unique, they all face some  common challenges in trying to enhance security. Common challenges  stem from the extensiveness of the transportation system, the  interconnectivity of the system, funding security improvements, and the  number of stakeholders involved in transportation security.
subsections: section_title: Size and Diversity of Transportation Modes Create Security Challenges
paragraphs: The size of the transportation system makes it difficult to adequately  secure. The transportation system’s extensive infrastructure crisscrosses  the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers  and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the infrastructure as  well as the sheer volume of freight and passengers moved through the  system creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. Furthermore, as  industry representatives and transportation security experts repeatedly  noted, the extensiveness of the infrastructure makes equal protection for  all assets impossible.
Protecting transportation assets from attack is made more difficult  because of the tremendous variety of transportation operators. Some are  multibillion-dollar enterprises, and others have very limited facilities and  very little traffic. Some are public agencies, such as state departments of  transportation, and some are private businesses. Some transportation  operators carry passengers, and others haul freight. Additionally, the type  of freight moved through the different modes is similarly varied. For  example, the maritime, motor carrier, and rail operators haul freight as  diverse as dry bulk (grain) and hazardous materials.
section_title: Interconnectivity and Interdependency Also Present Challenges
paragraphs: Additional challenges are created by the interconnectivity and  interdependency among the transportation modes and between the  transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The  transportation system is interconnected or intermodal because passengers  and freight can use multiple modes of transportation to reach a  destination. For example, from its point of origin to its destination, a piece  of freight, such as a shipping container, can move from ship to train to  truck. (See fig. 1.) The interconnective nature of the transportation system  creates several security challenges. First, the effects of events directed at  one mode of transportation can ripple throughout the entire system. For  example, when the port workers in California, Oregon, and Washington  went on strike in 2002, the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by  almost 30 percent during the first week of the strike, compared with the  year before. Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each  other—that is, if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the  breach could affect other modes. An example of this would be if a  shipping container that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a  U.S. port where it was placed on a truck or train. In this case, although the  original security breach occurred in the port, the rail or trucking industry  would be affected as well. Thus, even if operators within one mode  established high levels of security they could be affected because of the  security efforts, or lack thereof, of the other modes. Third, intermodal  facilities where a number of modes connect and interact—such as ports— are potential targets for attack because of the presence of passengers,  freight, employees, and equipment at these facilities.
Interdependencies also exist between transportation and nearly every  other sector of the economy. Consequently, an event that affects the  transportation sector can have serious impacts on other industries. For  example, when the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the rail  industry restricted the movement of many hazardous materials, including  chlorine, because of a heightened threat of a terrorist attack. However,  within days, many major water treatment facilities reported that they were  running out of chlorine, which they use to treat drinking water, and would  have to shut down operations if chlorine deliveries were not immediately  resumed.
section_title: The Number of Stakeholders Creates Challenges
paragraphs: Securing the transportation system is made more difficult because of the  number of stakeholders involved. As illustrated in figure 2, numerous  entities at the federal, state, and local levels, including over 20 federal  entities and thousands of private sector businesses, play a key role in  transportation security. For example, the Departments of Energy,  Transportation, and Homeland Security; state governments; and about  2,000 pipeline operators are all responsible for securing the pipeline  system. The number of stakeholders involved in transportation security  can lead to communication challenges, duplication, and conflicting  guidance. Representatives from several state and local government and  industry associations told us that their members are receiving different  messages from the various federal agencies involved in transportation  security. For instance, one industry representative noted that both TSA  and DOT asked the industry to implement additional security measures  when the nation’s threat condition was elevated to orange at the beginning  of the Iraq War; however, TSA and DOT were not consistent in what they  wanted done—that is, they were asking for different security measures.  Moreover, many representatives commented that the federal government  needs to better coordinate its security efforts. These representatives noted  that dealing with multiple agencies on the same issues and topics is  frustrating and time consuming for the transportation sector.
The number of stakeholders also makes it difficult to achieve the needed  cooperation and consensus to move forward with security efforts. As we  have noted in past reports, coordination and consensus-building are  critical to successful implementation of security efforts. Transportation  stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or interests, which can make  consensus-building challenging. For example, from a safety perspective,  vehicles that carry hazardous materials should be required to have  placards that identify the contents of a vehicle so that emergency  personnel know how best to respond to an incident. However, from a  security perspective, identifying placards on vehicles that carry hazardous  materials make them a potential target for attack.
section_title: Funding Is Key Challenge
paragraphs: According to transportation security experts and state and local  government and industry representatives we contacted, funding is the  most pressing challenge to securing the nation’s transportation system.  Although some security improvements are inexpensive, such as removing  trash cans from subway platforms, most require substantial funding.  Additionally, given the large number of assets to protect, the sum of even  relatively less expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. For example,  reinforcing shipping containers to make them more blast resistant is one  way to improve security, which would cost about $15,000 per container.  With several million shipping containers in use, however, this tactic would  cost billions of dollars if all of them were reinforced. The total cost of  enhancing the security of the entire transportation system is unknown;  however, given the size of the system, it could amount to tens of billions of  dollars.
The current economic environment makes this a difficult time for private  industry or state and local governments to make security investments.  According to industry representatives and experts we contacted, most of  the transportation industry operates on a very thin profit margin, making it  difficult for the industry to pay for additional security measures. The  sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry’s  financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. For example,  airlines are in the worst fiscal crisis in their history, and several have filed  for bankruptcy. Similarly, the motor coach and motor carrier industries  and Amtrak report decreased revenues because of the slow economy. In  addition, nearly every state and local government is facing a large budget  deficit for fiscal year 2004. For example, the National Governors  Association estimates that states are facing a total budget shortfall of $80  billion for fiscal year 2004. Given the tight budget environment, state and  local governments and transportation operators must make difficult trade- offs between transportation security investments and other needs, such as  service expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the National  Association of Counties, many local governments are planning to defer  some maintenance of their transportation infrastructure to pay for some  security enhancements.
Further exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements is the  additional costs the transportation sector incurs when the federal  government elevates the national threat condition. Industry  representatives stated that operators tighten security, such as increasing  security patrols, when the national threat condition is raised or  intelligence information suggests an increased threat against their mode.  However, these representatives stated that these additional measures  drain resources and are not sustainable. For example, Amtrak estimates  that it spends an additional $500,000 per month for police overtime when  the national threat condition is increased. Transportation industry  representatives also noted that employees are diverted from their regular  duties to implement additional security measures, such as guarding  entranceways, in times of increased security, which hurts productivity.
The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation  security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the  additional amounts made available. For example, Congress appropriated a  total of $241 million for grants for ports, motor carriers, and Operation  Safe Commerce in 2002. However, as table 1 shows, the grant  applications TSA has received for these security grants totaled $1.8  billion—nearly 8 times more than the amount available. Due to the costs of  security enhancements and the transportation industries’ and state and  local governments’ tight budget environments, the federal government is  likely to be viewed as a source of funding for at least some of these  enhancements. However, given the constraints on the federal budget as  well as competing claims for federal assistance, requests for federal  funding for transportation security enhancements will likely continue to  exceed available resources.
Another challenge is balancing the potential economic impacts of security  enhancements with the benefits of such measures. Although there is broad  support for greater security, this task is a difficult one because the nation  relies heavily on a free and expeditious flow of goods. Particularly with  “just-in-time” deliveries, which require a smooth and expeditious flow  through the transportation system, delays or disruptions in the supply  chain could have serious economic impacts. As the Coast Guard  Commandant stated about the flow of goods through ports, “even slowing  the flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant  random selection of imports would be economically intolerable.”
Furthermore, security measures may have economic and competitive  ramifications for individual modes of transportation. For instance, if the  federal government imposed a particular security requirement on the rail  industry and not on the motor carrier industry, the rail industry might  incur additional costs and/or lose customers to the motor carrier industry.  Striking the right balance between increasing security and protecting the  economic vitality of the national economy and individual modes will  remain an important and difficult task.
section_title: Individual Transportation Modes Also Confront Unique Challenges
paragraphs: In addition to the overarching challenges that transportation stakeholders  will face in attempting to improve transportation security, they also face a  number of challenges specific to the aviation, maritime, and land  transportation modes. Although aviation security has received a significant  amount of attention and funding since September 11, more work is  needed. In general, transportation security experts believe that the  aviation system is more secure today than it was prior to September 11.  However, aviation experts and TSA officials noted that significant  vulnerabilities remain. For example:    Perimeter security: Terrorists could launch attacks, such as launching  shoulder-fired missiles, from a location just outside an airport’s perimeter.  Since September 11, airport operators have increased their patrols of  airport perimeter areas, but industry officials state that they do not have  enough resources to completely protect against these attacks.
Air cargo security: Although TSA has focused much effort and funding  on ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto planes  by passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing the  cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. For  example, employees of shippers and freight forwarders are not universally  subject to background checks. Theft is also a major problem in air cargo  shipping, signifying that unauthorized personnel may still be gaining  access to air cargo shipments. Air cargo shipments pass through several  hands in going from sender to recipient, making it challenging to  implement a system that provides adequate security for air cargo.  According to TSA officials, TSA is developing a strategic plan to address  air cargo security and has undertaken a comprehensive outreach process  to strengthen security programs across the industry.
General aviation security: Although TSA has taken several actions  related to general aviation since September 11, this segment of the  industry remains potentially more vulnerable than commercial aviation.  For example, general aviation pilots are not screened prior to taking off,  and the contents of a plane are not examined at any point. According to  TSA, solutions that can be implemented relatively easily at the nation’s  commercial airports are not practical at the 19,000 general aviation  airports. It would be very difficult to prevent a general aviation pilot intent  on committing a terrorist attack with his or her aircraft from doing so. The  vulnerability of the system was illustrated in January 2002, when a teenage  flight student from Florida crashed his single-engine airplane into a Tampa  skyscraper. TSA is working with the appropriate stakeholders to close  potential security gaps and to raise the security standards across this  diverse segment of the aviation industry.
Maritime and land transportation systems have their own unique security  vulnerabilities. For example, maritime and land transportation systems  generally have an open design, meaning the users can access the system at  multiple points. The systems are open by design so that they are accessible  and convenient for users. In contrast, the aviation system is housed in  closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of the  maritime and land transportation systems can leave them vulnerable  because transportation operators cannot monitor or control who enters or  leaves the systems. However, adding security measures that restrict the  flow of passengers or freight through the systems could have serious  consequences for commerce and the public.
Individual maritime and land transportation modes also have unique  challenges and vulnerabilities. For example, representatives from the  motor carrier industry noted that the high turnover rate (about 40 to 60  percent) of drivers means that motor carrier operators must be continually  conducting background checks on new drivers, which is expensive and  time consuming. Additionally, as we noted in our report on rail safety and  security, the temporary storage of hazardous materials in unsecured or  unmonitored rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate destinations  is a potential vulnerability. Specifically, unmonitored chemical cars could  develop undetected leaks that could threaten the nearby population and  environment. In addition, representatives from the motor coach industry  commented that the number of used motor coaches on the market,  coupled with the lack of guidance or requirements on buying or selling  these vehicles, is a serious vulnerability. In particular, there are  approximately 5,000 used motor coaches on the market; however, there is  very little information on who is selling and buying them, nor is there any  consistency among motor coach operators in whether they remove their  logos from the vehicles before they are sold. These vehicles could be used  as weapons or to transport weapons. Federal Motor Carrier Safety  Administration officials told us they have not issued guidance to the  industry on this potential vulnerability because TSA is responsible for  security and therefore would be responsible for issuing such guidance.
section_title: Transportation Operators and State and Local Governments Have Taken Steps to Improve Security
paragraphs: Since September 11, transportation operators and state and local  governments have been working to strengthen security, according to  associations we contacted. Although security was a priority before  September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of  transportation security for transportation operators and state and local  governments. According to representatives from a number of industry  associations we interviewed, transportation operators have implemented  new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing  activities. Some of the most common measures cited include conducting  vulnerability or risk assessments, tightening access control, intensifying  security presence, increasing emergency drills, developing or revising  security plans, and providing additional training. (Figure 3 is a photograph  from an annual emergency drill conducted by the Washington  Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.)
As we have previously reported, state and local governments are critical  stakeholders in the nation’s homeland security efforts. This is equally true  in securing the nation’s transportation system. State and local  governments play a critical role, in part, because they own a significant  portion of the transportation infrastructure, such as airports, transit  systems, highways, and ports. For example, state and local governments  own over 90 percent of the total mileage of the highway system. Even  when state and local governments are not the owners or operators, they  nonetheless are directly affected by the transportation modes that run  through their jurisdictions. Consequently, the responsibility for protecting  this infrastructure and responding to emergencies involving the  transportation infrastructure often falls on state and local governments.
Security efforts of local and state governments have included developing  counter terrorist plans, participating in training and security-related  research, participating in transportation operators’ emergency drills and  table-top exercises, conducting vulnerability assessments of  transportation assets, and participating in emergency planning sessions  with transportation operators. Some state and local governments have also  hired additional law enforcement personnel to patrol transportation  assets. Much of the funding for these efforts has been covered by the state  and local governments, with a bulk of the expenses going to personnel  costs, such as for additional law enforcement officers and overtime.
section_title: Congress and Federal Agencies Have Taken Numerous Actions to Enhance Security, but Roles Remain Unclear
paragraphs: Congress, DOT, TSA, and other federal agencies have taken numerous  steps to enhance transportation security since September 11. The roles of  the federal agencies in securing the nation’s transportation system,  however, are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary  responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake of  September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the  security of all modes of transportation. However, DOT and TSA have not  yet formally defined their roles and responsibilities in securing all modes  of transportation. Furthermore, TSA is moving forward with plans to  enhance transportation security. For example, TSA plans to issue security  standards for all modes. DOT modal administrations are also continuing  their security efforts for different modes of transportation.
subsections: section_title: Congress and Federal Agencies Have Acted to Enhance Transportation Security
paragraphs: Congress has acted to enhance the security of the nation’s transportation  system since September 11. In addition to passing the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Congress passed a number of other  key pieces of legislation aimed at improving transportation security. For  example, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which  mandates federal background checks of individuals operating vehicles  carrying hazardous materials; and the Homeland Security Act, which  created DHS and moved TSA to the new department. Congress also  provided funding for transportation security enhancements through  various appropriations acts. For example, the 2002 Supplemental  Appropriations Act, in part, provided (1) $738 million for the installation of  explosives detection systems in commercial service airports, (2) $125  million for port security activities, and (3) $15 million to enhance the  security of intercity bus operations.
Federal agencies, notably TSA and DOT, have also taken steps to enhance  transportation security since September 11. In its first year of existence,  TSA worked to establish its organization and focused primarily on meeting  the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. In January 2002, TSA  had 13 employees to tackle securing the nation’s transportation system; 1  year later, TSA had about 65,000 employees. TSA reports that it met over  30 deadlines during 2002 to improve aviation security, including two of its  most significant deadlines—to deploy federal passenger screeners at  airports across the nation by November 19, 2002; and to screen every piece  of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2002. According to  TSA, other completed TSA activities included recruiting, hiring, training,  and deploying about 56,000 federal screeners; awarding grants for port  security; and implementing performance management system and  strategic planning activities to create a results-oriented culture.
As TSA worked to establish itself and improve the security of the aviation  system, DOT modal administrations acted to enhance the security of air,  land, and maritime transportation. (See app. I for a table listing the actions  taken by DOT modal administrations since September 11.) The actions  taken by the DOT modal administrations have varied. For example, FTA  launched a multipart initiative for mass transit agencies that provided  grants for emergency drills, offered free security training, conducted  security assessments at 36 transit agencies, provided technical assistance,  and invested in research and development. The Federal Motor Carrier  Safety Administration developed three courses for motor coach drivers.  The responses of the various DOT modal agencies have varied due to  differences in authority and resource limitations.
In addition to TSA and DOT modal administrations, other federal agencies  have also taken actions to improve security. For example, the Bureau of  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), previously known as the U.S.  Customs Service, has launched a number of initiatives aimed at  strengthening the security of the U.S. border. Some of the specific  security initiatives that CBP has implemented include establishing the  Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which is a joint  government business initiative aimed at securing the supply chain of  global trade against terrorist exploitation; and launching the Container  Security Initiative (CSI), which is designed specifically to secure ocean- going sea containers. In addition, CBP has developed and/or deployed  tools to detect weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers and  vehicles, such as the new mobile gamma ray imaging devices pictured in  figure 4.
section_title: TSA Moves Forward as its Role in Transportation Security Evolves
paragraphs: TSA is moving forward with efforts to secure the entire transportation  system. TSA has adopted a systems approach—that is, a holistic rather  than a modal approach—to securing the transportation system. In  addition, TSA is using risk management principles to guide its decision- making. TSA is also planning to establish security standards for all modes  of transportation and is launching a number of new security efforts for the  maritime and land transportation modes.
subsections: section_title: TSA Adopts a Systems Approach and Risk Management Principles
paragraphs: Using the systems approach, TSA plans to address the security of the  entire transportation system as a whole, rather than focusing on individual  modes of transportation. According to TSA officials, using a systems  approach to security is appropriate for several reasons. First, the  transportation system is intermodal, interdependent, and international.  Given the intermodalism of the system, incidents in one mode of  transportation could affect other modes. Second, it is important not to  drive terrorism from one mode of transportation to another mode because  of perceived lesser security—that is, make a mode of transportation a  more attractive target because another mode is “hardened” with additional  security measures. Third, it is important that security measures for one  mode of transportation are not overly stringent or too economically  challenging compared with the measures used for other modes. Fourth, it  is important that the attention on one aspect of transportation security  (e.g., cargo, infrastructure, or passengers) does not leave the other aspects  vulnerable.
TSA has also adopted a risk management approach for its efforts to  enhance the security of the nation’s transportation system. A risk  management approach is a systematic process to analyze threats,  vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to  better support key decisions in order to link resources with prioritized  efforts. (See app. II for a description of the key elements of a risk  management approach.) The highest priorities emerge where the three  elements of risk management overlap. For example, transportation  infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack,  and a likely target would be most at risk and therefore would be a higher  priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable  to attack. According to TSA officials, risk management principles will  drive all decisions—from standard-setting to funding priorities to staffing.
Using risk management principles to guide decision-making is a good  strategy, given the difficult trade-offs TSA will likely have to make as it  moves forward with its security efforts. We have advocated using a risk  management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better  prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite  national resources to areas of highest priority. As representatives from  local government and industry associations and transportation security  experts repeatedly noted, the size of the transportation system precludes  equal protection for all assets; moreover, the risks vary by transportation  assets within modes and by modes. In addition, requests for funding for  transportation security enhancements will likely exceed available  resources. Risk management principles can help TSA determine security  priorities and identify appropriate solutions.
section_title: TSA Plans to Issue National Security Standards
paragraphs: TSA plans to issue national security standards for all modes of  transportation. The federal government has historically set security  standards for the aviation sector. For instance, prior to the passage of  ATSA, FAA set security standards that the airlines were required to follow  in several areas including, screening equipment, screener qualifications,  and access control systems. In contrast, prior to the September 11 attacks,  limited statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure the  security of the maritime and land transportation systems. According to a  TSA report, the existing regulatory framework leaves the maritime and  land transportation systems unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack.  For example, the rail, transit, and motor coach transportation systems are  subject to no mandatory security requirements, resulting in little or no  screening of passengers, baggage, or crew. Additionally, seaborne  passenger vessel and seaport terminal operators have inconsistent levels  and methods of screening and are largely free to set their own rules about  the hiring and training of security personnel. Hence, TSA will set standards  to ensure consistency among modes and across the transportation system  and to reduce the transportation system’s vulnerability to attacks.
According to TSA officials and documents, TSA’s standards will be  performance-, risk-, and threat-based and may be mandatory. More  specifically:    Standards will be performance-based. Rather than being prescriptive  standards, TSA standards will be performance-based, which will allow  transportation operators to determine how best to achieve the desired  level of security. TSA officials believe that performance-based standards  provide for operator flexibility, allow operators to use their professional  judgment in enhancing security, and encourage technology advancement.
Standards will be risk-based. Standards will be set for areas for which  assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that an  attack would have a national impact. A number of factors could be  considered in determining “national impact,” such as fatalities and  economic damage.
Standards will be threat-based. The standards will be tied to the  national threat condition and/or local threats. As the threat condition  escalates, the standards will require transportation operators to implement  additional countermeasures.
Standards may be mandatory. The standards will be mandatory when  the risk level is too high or unacceptable. TSA officials stated that in these  cases, mandatory standards are needed to ensure accountability. In  addition, according to TSA officials, voluntary requirements put security- conscious transportation operators that implement security measures at a  competitive disadvantage—that is, they have spent money that their  competitors may not have spent. This creates a disincentive for  transportation operators to implement voluntary requirements. TSA  officials believe that mandatory standards will reduce this problem. In  determining whether mandatory standards are needed, TSA will review  the results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best  practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the  private sector and other government agencies.
Although TSA officials expect some level of resistance to the standards by  the transportation industry, they believe that their approach of using risk-,  threat-, and performance-based standards will increase the acceptance of  the standards. For example, performance-based standards allow for more  operator flexibility in implementing the standards, compared with rigid,  prescriptive standards. Moreover, TSA plans to issue only a limited  number of standards—that is, standards will be issued only when  assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that the  level of risk is too high or unacceptable.
TSA also expects some level of resistance to the standards from DOT  modal administrations. Although TSA will establish the security standards,  TSA expects that they will be administered and implemented by existing  agencies and organizations. DOT modal administrations may be reluctant  to assume this role because doing so could alter their relationships with  the industry. Historically, the missions of DOT surface transportation  modal administrations have largely focused on maintaining operations and  improving service and safety, not regulating security. Moreover, the  authority to regulate security varies by DOT modal administration. For  example, FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee security at  transit agencies. In contrast, FRA has regulatory authority for rail security,  and DOT’s Office of Pipeline Safety has responsibility for writing safety  and security regulations for liquefied natural gas storage facilities. In  addition, DOT modal administrations may be reluctant to administer and  implement standards because of resource concerns. FHWA officials  commented that given the current uncertainty about the standards and  their impacts, FHWA is reluctant to commit, in advance, staff or funding to  enforce new security standards.
section_title: Gaining Stakeholder Buy- in is Critical for Standards to Work, but Stakeholders Express Concerns
paragraphs: Because transportation stakeholders will be involved in administering,  implementing, and/or enforcing TSA standards, stakeholder buy-in is  critical to the success of this initiative. Compromise and consensus on the  part of stakeholders are also necessary. However, achieving such  consensus and compromise may be difficult, given the conflicts between  some stakeholders’ goals and interests.
Transportation stakeholders we contacted also expressed a number of  concerns about TSA’s plan to issue security standards for all modes of  transportation. For example, industry associations expressed concerns  that the standards would come in the form of unfunded mandates—that is,  the federal government would not provide funding to implement  mandatory standards. According to the industry and state and local  government associations we spoke to, unfunded mandates create  additional financial burdens for transportation operators, who are already  experiencing financial difficulties. Industry representatives also expressed  concern that TSA has not adequately included the transportation industry  in its development of standards. Many industry representatives and some  DOT officials we met with were unsure of whether TSA was issuing  standards, what the standards would entail, or the time frames for issuing  the standards. The uncertainty about the pending standards can lead to  confusion and/or inaction. For example, Amtrak officials noted that they  are reluctant to spend money to implement certain security measures  because they are worried that TSA will subsequently issue standards that  will require Amtrak to redo its efforts. Transportation stakeholders also  raised other concerns about TSA’s plans to issues standards, including  questioning whether TSA has the necessary expertise to develop  appropriate standards and whether mandatory standards, as opposed to  voluntary standards, are prudent.
subsections: section_title: TSA Is Launching Other Security Initiatives
paragraphs: TSA is also working on a number of additional security efforts, such as  establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC)  program; developing the next generation of the Computer Assisted  Passenger Pre-Screening System; developing a national transportation  system security plan; and exploring methods to integrate operations and  security, among other things. The TWIC program is intended to improve  access control for the 12 million transportation workers who require  unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas of the nation’s  transportation modes by establishing a uniform, nationwide standard for  secure identification of transportation workers. Specifically, TWIC will  combine standard background checks and biometrics so that a worker can  be positively matched to his/her credential. Once the program is fully  operational, the TWIC would be the standard credential for transportation  workers and would be accepted by all modes of transportation. According  to TSA, developing a uniform, nationwide standard for identification will  minimize redundant credentialing and background checks.
section_title: DOT Modal Agencies Are Continuing Forward with Their Security Efforts
paragraphs: As TSA moves forward with new security initiatives, DOT modal  administrations are also continuing their security efforts and, in some  cases, launching new security initiatives. For example, FHWA is  coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and  preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies.  FTA also has a number of initiatives currently under way in the areas of  public awareness, research, training, technical assistance, and intelligence  sharing. For example, FTA developed a list of the top 20 security actions  transit agencies should implement and is currently working with transit  agencies to assist them in implementing these measures.
FAA is also continuing its efforts to enhance cyber security in the aviation  system. Although the primary responsibility for securing the aviation  system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for protecting  the nation’s air traffic control system—both the physical security of its air  traffic control facilities and computer systems. The air traffic control  system’s computers help the nation’s air traffic controllers to safely direct  and separate traffic—sabotaging this system could have disastrous  consequences. FAA is moving forward with efforts to increase the physical  security of its air traffic control facilities and ensure that contractors who  have access to the air traffic control system undergo background checks.
section_title: TSA’s and DOT’s Roles and Responsibilities Have Not Been Clearly Defined
paragraphs: The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security  have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for  duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with their  security efforts. DOT modal administrations were primarily responsible  for the security of the transportation system prior to September 11. In  November 2001, Congress passed ATSA, which created TSA and gave it  primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation. However,  during TSA’s first year of existence, TSA’s main focus was on aviation  security—more specifically, on meeting ATSA deadlines. While TSA was  primarily focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations  launched various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and  land transportation modes. With the immediate crisis of meeting many  aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more on  the security of all modes of transportation.
Legislation has not specifically defined TSA’s role and responsibilities in  securing all modes of transportation. In particular, ATSA does not specify  TSA’s role and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land  transportation modes in detail as it does for aviation security. For  instance, the act does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain  transit security requirements. Instead, the act simply states that TSA is  responsible for ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act  also did not eliminate the existing statutory responsibilities for DOT modal  administrations to secure the different transportation modes. Moreover,  recent legislation indicates that DOT still has security responsibilities. In  particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of  Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of rail  and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes.
To clarify their roles and responsibilities in transportation security, DOT  modal administrations and TSA planned to develop memorandums of  agreement. The purpose of these documents was to define the roles and  responsibilities of the different agencies for transportation security and  address a variety of issues, including separating safety and security  activities, interfacing with the transportation industry, and establishing  funding priorities. TSA and the DOT modal administrations worked for  months to develop the memorandums of agreement and the draft  agreements were presented to senior DOT and TSA management for  review in early spring of this year. According to DOT’s General Counsel,  with the exception of the memorandum of agreement between FAA and  TSA, the draft memorandums were very general and did not provide much  clarification. Consequently, DOT and TSA decided not to sign the  memorandums of agreement, except for the memorandum of agreement  between FAA and TSA, which was signed on February 28, 2003.
The General Counsel suggested several reasons why the majority of the  draft memorandums of agreement were too general. First, as TSA’s  departure date approached—that is, the date that TSA transferred from  DOT to DHS—TSA and DOT modal administration officials may have  grown concerned about formally binding the organizations to specific  roles and responsibilities. Second, the working relationships between TSA  and most of the DOT modal administrations are still very new; as a result,  all of the potential issues, problem areas, or overlap have yet to be  identified. Thus, identifying items to include in the memorandums of  agreement was more difficult.
Rather than execute memorandums of agreement, the Secretary of  Transportation and the Administrator of TSA exchanged correspondence  that commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration on  security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and  Administrator also agreed to use the memorandum of agreement between  TSA and FAA as a framework for their interactions on security matters for  all other modes. TSA and DOT officials stated that they believe  memorandums of agreement are a good strategy for delineating roles and  responsibilities and said that they would be open to using memorandums  of agreement in the future.
section_title: Experts and Associations Identified Future Actions to Advance the Security of the Transportation System
paragraphs: Transportation security experts and representatives of state and local  government and industry associations we contacted generally believe that  the transportation system is more secure today than it was prior to  September 11. Transportation stakeholders have worked hard to  strengthen the security of the system. Nevertheless, transportation  experts, industry representatives, and federal officials all recommend that  more work be done. Transportation experts and state and local  government and industry representatives identified a number of actions  that, in their view, the federal government should take to enhance  security, including clarifying federal roles and coordinating federal efforts,  developing a transportation security strategy, funding security  enhancements, investing in research and development, and providing  better intelligence information and related guidance. Specifically:    Clarify federal roles and responsibilities. The lack of clarity about the roles  and responsibilities of federal entities in transportation security creates  the potential for confusion, duplication, and conflicts. Understanding  roles, responsibilities, and whom to call is crucial in an emergency.  However, representatives from several industry associations stated that  their members were unclear about which agency to contact for their  various security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain  issues. Furthermore, they said that they do not have contacts within these  agencies. As mentioned earlier, several industry representatives reported  that their members are receiving different messages from various federal  agencies involved in transportation security, which creates confusion and  frustration within the industry. According to industry representatives and  transportation security experts, uncertainty about federal roles and the  lack of coordination are straining intergovernmental relationships,  draining resources, and raising the potential for problems in responding to  terrorism. One industry association told us, for instance, that it has been  asked by three different federal agencies to participate in three separate  studies of the same issue.
Establish a national transportation strategy. A national strategy is  crucial for helping stakeholders identify priorities, leveraging resources,  establishing stakeholder performance expectations, and creating  incentives for stakeholders to improve security. Currently, local  government associations view the absence of performance expectations— coupled with limited threat information—as a major obstacle in focusing  their people and resources on high-priority threats, particularly at elevated  threat levels. The experts also noted that modal strategies—no matter how  complete—cannot address the complete transportation security problem  and will leave gaps in preparedness. As mentioned earlier, TSA is in the  process of developing a national transportation system security plan,  which, according to the Deputy Administrator of TSA, will provide an  overarching framework for the security of all modes.
Provide funding for needed security improvements. Although an  overall security strategy is a prerequisite to investing wisely, providing  adequate funding also is essential, according to experts we contacted.  Setting security goals and strategies without adequate funding diminishes  stakeholders’ commitment and willingness to absorb initial security  investments and long-term operating costs, an expert emphasized.  Industry and state and local government associations also commented that  federal funding should accompany any federal security standards;  otherwise, mandatory standards will be considered unfunded mandates  that the industry and state and local governments will have to absorb.
Invest in research and development for transportation security.  According to most transportation security experts and associations we  contacted, investing in research and development is an appropriate role  for the federal government, because the products of research and  development endeavors would likely benefit the entire transportation  system, not just individual modes or operators. TSA is actively engaged in  research and development projects, such as the development of the next  generation explosive detection systems for baggage, hardening of aircraft  and cargo/baggage containers, biometrics and other access control  methods, and human factors initiatives to identify methods to improve  screener performance, at its Transportation Security Laboratory in  Atlantic City, New Jersey. However, TSA noted that continued adequate  funding for research and development is paramount in order for TSA to be  able to meet security demands with up-to-date and reliable technology.
Provide timely intelligence information and related guidance.
Representatives from numerous associations commented that the federal  government needs to provide timely, localized, actionable intelligence  information. They said that general threat warnings are not helpful.  Rather, transportation operators want more specific intelligence  information so that they can understand the true nature of a potential  threat and implement appropriate security measures. Without more  localized and actionable intelligence, stakeholders said they run the risk of  wasting resources on unneeded security measures or not providing an  adequate level of security. Moreover, local government officials often are  not allowed to receive specific intelligence information because they do  not have appropriate federal security clearances. Also, there is little  federal guidance on how local authorities should respond to a specific  threat or general threat warnings. For example, San Francisco police were  stationed at the Golden Gate Bridge to respond to the elevated national  threat condition. However, without information about the nature of the  threat to San Francisco’s large transportation infrastructure or clear  federal expectations for a response, it is difficult to judge whether actions  like this are the most effective use of police protection, according to  representatives from a local government association.
section_title: Observations
paragraphs: Securing the transportation system is fraught with challenges. Despite  these challenges, transportation stakeholders have worked to strengthen  security since September 11. However, more work is needed. It will take  the collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet the  continuing challenges and enhance the security of the transportation  system.
During TSA’s first year of existence, it met a number of challenges,  including successfully meeting many congressional deadlines for aviation  security. With the immediate crisis of meeting these deadlines behind it,  TSA can now examine the security of the entire transportation system. As  TSA becomes more active in securing the maritime and land  transportation modes, it will become even more important that the roles of  TSA and DOT modal administrations are clearly defined. Lack of clearly  defined roles among the federal entities could lead to duplication and  confusion. More importantly, it could hamper the transportation sector’s  ability to prepare for and respond to attacks. Therefore, in our report, we  recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary  of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a memorandum of  agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT  in transportation security and communicate this information to  stakeholders.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to  any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.
For information about this testimony, please contact Peter Guerrero,  Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, on (202) 512-2834. Individuals  making key contributions to this testimony included Cathleen Berrick,  Steven Calvo, Nikki Clowers, Michelle Dresben, Susan Fleming, Libby  Halperin, David Hooper, Hiroshi Ishikawa, and Ray Sendejas.
section_title: Appendix I: Key Transportation Security Efforts of DOT Modal Administrations, September 2001 to May 2003
paragraphs: Research and Special Programs  Administration (Office of  Hazardous Materials Safety)
Established regulations for shippers and transporters of certain  hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans and to  require security awareness training for hazmat employees.
Developed hazardous materials transportation security awareness  training for law enforcement, the industry, and the hazmat community.
Published security advisory, which identifies measures that could  enhance the security of the transport of hazardous materials.
Investigated the security risks associated with placarding hazardous  materials, including whether removing placards from certain shipments  improve shipment security, and whether alternative methods for  communicating safety hazards could be deployed.
Established rule for strengthening cockpit doors on commercial aircraft.
Issued guidance to flight school operators for additional security  measures.
Assisted Department of Justice in increasing background check  requirements for foreign nationals seeking pilot certificates.
Increased access restrictions at air traffic control facilities.
Developed computer security strategy.
Provided vulnerability assessment and emergency preparedness  workshops.
Developed and prioritized list of highway security research and  development projects.
Convened blue ribbon panel on bridge and tunnel vulnerabilities.
Activated and deployed port security units to help support local port  security patrols in high threat areas.
Boarded and inspected ships to search for threats and confirmed the  identity of those aboard.
Conducted initial assessments of the nation’s ports to identify vessel  types and facilities that pose a high risk of being involved in a  transportation security incident.
Established a new centralized National Vessel Movement Center to track  the movement of all foreign-flagged vessels entering U.S. ports of call.
Established new guidelines for developing security plans and  implementing security measures for passenger vessels and passenger  terminals.
Used the pollution and hazardous materials expertise of the Coast  Guard’s National Strike Force to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism  and weapons of mass destruction.
Increased port security and terrorism emphasis at National Port  Readiness Network Port Readiness Exercises.
Provided port security training and developed standards and curriculum  to educate and train maritime security personnel.
Increased access restrictions and established new security procedures  for the Ready Reserve Force.
Provided merchant mariner background checks for Ready Reserve  Force and sealift vessels in support of Department of Defense and  Coast Guard requirements.
Provided merchant mariner force protection training.
Conducted 31,000 on-site security sensitivity visits for hazardous  materials carriers; made recommendations after visits.
Initiated a field operational test to evaluate different safety and security  technologies and procedures, and identify the most cost- effective means  for protecting different types of hazardous cargo for security purposes.
Provided free training on trucks and terrorism to law enforcement officials  and industry representatives.
Conducted threat assessment of the hazardous materials industry.
Developed three courses for drivers on security-related information,  including different threats, how to deal with packages, and how to  respond in the case of an emergency.
Research and Special Programs  Administration (Office of Pipeline  Safety)
Developed contact list of operators who own critical systems.
Convened blue ribbon panel with operators, state regulators, and unions  to develop a better understanding of the pipeline system and coordinate  efforts of the stakeholders.
Worked with TSA to develop inspection protocols to use for pipeline  operator security inspections. The Office of Pipeline Safety and TSA  have begun the inspection of major operators.
Created e:mail network of pipeline operators and a call-in telephone  number that pipeline operators can use to obtain information.
Directed pipeline operators to identify critical facilities and develop  security plans for critical facilities that address deterrence, preparedness,  and rapid response and recovery from attacks.
Worked with industry to develop risk-based security guidance, which is  tied to national threat levels and includes voluntary, recommended  countermeasures.
Shared threat information with railroads and rail labor.
Reviewed Association of American Railroads’ and Amtrak’s security  plans.
Assisted commuter railroads with their security plans.
Provided funding for security assessments of three commuter railroads,  which were included in FTA’s assessment efforts.
Reached out to international community for lessons learned in rail  security.
Awarded $3.4 million in grants to over 80 transit agencies for emergency  response drills.
Offered free security training to transit agencies.
Conducted security assessments at the 36 largest transit agencies.
Provided technical assistance to 19, with a goal of 60, transit agencies on  security and emergency plans and emergency response drills.
Increased funding for security research and development efforts.
The U.S. Coast Guard was transferred to DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)).
section_title: Appendix II: Elements of a Risk Management Approach
paragraphs: A risk management approach encompasses three key elements—a threat  assessment, vulnerability assessment, and criticality assessment. In  particular, these three elements provide the following information:    A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the basis  of such factors as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. This  assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential  threats before they materialize. However, even if updated often, a threat  assessment might not adequately capture some emerging threats. The risk  management approach, therefore, uses vulnerability and critical  assessments as additional input to the decision-making process.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by  identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.
A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in  terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and the  economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which structures  or processes are relatively more important to protect from attack. Thus, it  helps managers determine operational requirements and target resources  to the highest priorities while reducing the potential for targeting  resources to lower priorities.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Active Engagements Related to Transportation Security
subsections: section_title: TSA Baggage Screening
paragraphs: Key Questions: 1) What are the status and associated costs of TSA efforts  to acquire, install, and operate explosive detection equipment (Electronic  Trace Detection Technology and Explosive Detection Systems) to screen  all checked baggage by December 31, 2003? 2) What are the benefit and  tradeoffs—to include costs, operations and performance—of using  alternative explosive detection technologies currently available for  baggage screening?
section_title: General Aviation Security
paragraphs: Key Questions: 1) How has security concerns and measures at changed at  general aviation airports since September 11, 2001? 2) What steps has the  Transportation Security Administration taken to improve general aviation  security?
section_title: Banner Pilot Waivers
paragraphs: Key Questions: What are procedures for conducting background and  security checks for pilots of small banner-towing aircraft requesting  waivers to perform stadium overflights? (2) To what extent were these  procedures followed in conducting required background and security  checks since 9/11? (3) How effective were these procedures in reducing  risks to public safety?
section_title: U.S. Coast Guard Budget And Mission Performance
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) What are the levels of effort for USCG’s various  missions? (2) What is USCG’s progress in developing a strategic plan for  setting goals for all of its various missions? (3) What is USCG’s mission  performance as compared to its performance and strategic plans?
section_title: Transportation Security Administration’s Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS-II)
paragraphs: Key Questions: 1) How will the CAPPS-II system function and what data  will be needed to make the system operationally effective? 2) What  safeguards will be put in place to protect the traveling public’s privacy? 3)  What systems and measures are in place to determine whether CAPPS-II  will result in improved national security? 4) What impact will CAPPS-II  have on the traveling public and airline industry in terms of costs, delays,  risks, and hassle, etc.?
section_title: Transportation Security Administration Passengers Screening Program
paragraphs: Key Questions: 1) What efforts have been taken or planned to ensure  passenger screeners comply with federal standards and other criteria, to  include efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger screeners? 2) What  methods does TSA use to test screener performance, and what have been  the results of these tests? 3) How have the results of tests of TSA  passenger screeners compared to the results achieved by screeners prior  to 9/11 and at the 5 pilot program airports? 4) What actions are TSA taking  to remedy performance concerns?
section_title: TSA’s Use of Sole Source Contracts
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) To what extent does TSA follow applicable acquisition  laws and policies, including ensuring adequate competition? (2) How well  does TSA’s organizational structure facilitate effective, efficient  procurement? (3) How does TSA ensure that its acquisition workforce is  equipped to award and oversee contracts? (4) How well do TSA’s policies  and processes ensure that it receives the supplies and services it needs on  time and at reasonable cost?
section_title: TSA’s Efforts To Implement Section 106, 136, And 138 Of The Aviation And Transportation Security Act
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) What is the status of TSA’s efforts to implement section  106 of the Act requiring improved airport perimeter access security? (2)  What is the status of TSA’s efforts to implement section 136 requiring  assessment and deployment of commercially available security practices  and technologies? (3) What is the status of TSA’s efforts to implement  section 138 requiring background investigations for TSA and other airport  employees?
section_title: Implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
paragraphs: Key Questions: 1) How effectively is the port vulnerability assessment  process being implemented, and what actions are being taken to address  deficiencies identified? 2) What progress is being made to develop port,  vessel, and facility security plans? 3) Does the CG have sufficient  resources and an action plan to ensure the plans be completed, reviewed  and approved in time to meet statutory deadlines? 4) What will it cost  stakeholders to comply?
section_title: Assessment of the Portable Air Defense Missile Threat
paragraphs: Key Questions: 1) What is the nature and extent of the threat from  MANPADs? 2) How effective are U.S. controls on the use of exported  MANPADs? 3) How do multilateral efforts attempt to stem MANPAD  proliferation? 4) What types of countermeasures are available to minimize  this threat and at what cost?
section_title: Federal Aviation Administration Designee Program
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) What is the nature, scope, and operational framework  of the designee program? (2) What are the identified strengths and  weaknesses of the program? (3) What is the potential for FAA’s ODA  proposal and other stakeholders’ alternatives to address the identified  program weaknesses?
section_title: Custom Cargo Inspections at Seaports
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) How has Customs developed the Automated Targeting  System (ATS) and the new anti-terrorism rules? (2) How does Customs  use ATS to identify containerized cargo as “high risk” for screening and  inspection to detect cargo that might contain weapons of mass destruction  (WMD)? (3) To what extent is ATS implemented at seaports, including  impact and challenges involved? (4) What is Customs’ plan for assessing  system implementation and performance?
section_title: Enhancement Options for Intermodal Freight Transportation
paragraphs: Key Questions: 1) What are the current and emerging national challenges  to freight mobility and what proposals have been put forth to address  these issues? 2) To what extent do these current and emerging challenges  exist at container ports and surrounding areas and to what extent do the  proposals appear to have applicability to these locations?
section_title: Social Security Administration’s Role in Verifying Identities For State’s Licensing of Drivers
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) What are states’ policies and practices for verifying the  identity of driver’s license/ID card applicants and how might they more  effectively use SSNs or other tools to verify identity? (2) How does SSA  assist states in verifying SSNs for driver’s license/ID card applicants and  how can SSA improve the verification service it provides?
section_title: United States Coast Guard’s National Distress and Response “Rescue 21” System Modernization
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) What are the status, plans, and technical and  programmatic risks associated with the National Distress and Response  System (NDRS) Modernization Project? (2) How is the Coast Guard  addressing concerns with the new NDRS, such as communication  coverage gaps and the inability to pinpoint distressed boaters? (3) How  will Coast Guard’s new homeland security role affect the NDRS project?
section_title: U.S. Border Radiation Detection
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) What is the status of Customs’ plan to install radiation  detection equipment at U.S. border crossings? (2) What is the basis for the  plan’s time frame? (3) What is Customs’ technical capability to implement  the plan? (4) How well is Customs coordinating with other agencies in the  area of radiation detection? (5) What are the results of Customs’  evaluations of radiation detection equipment and how are the evaluations  being used?
section_title: Airline Assistance Determination Of Whether The $5 Billion Provided by P.L. 107-42 Was Used To Compensate The Nation’s Major Air Carriers For Their Losses Stemming From The Events of Sept. 11, 2001
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) Was the $5 billion used only to compensate major air  carriers for their uninsured losses incurred as a result of the terrorist  attacks? (2) Were carriers reimbursed, per the act, only for increases in  insurance premiums resulting from the attacks?
section_title: Effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration’s Research and Development Program
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) What is the budget profile for the Federal Aviation  Administration’s and the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s)  aviation security research and development (R&D) program? (2) How  effective is TSA’s strategy for determining which aviation security  technologies to research and develop? (3) To what extent do stakeholders  believe that TSA is researching and developing the most promising  aviation security technologies?
section_title: Federal Air Marshals
paragraphs: Key Questions: (1) How has the FAM program evolved, in terms of  recruiting, training, retention, and operations since the transfer of program  management to TSA? (2) To what extent has TSA implemented the  necessary internal controls to meet the human capital and operational  challenges of the FAM program? (3) To what extent has TSA developed  plans and initiatives to accommodate future FAM program sustainability,  growth and maturation?
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies
paragraphs: Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).
Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting  and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments,  GAO-03-502 (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003).
Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail  Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed, GAO-03-435 (Washington, D.C.:  April 30, 2003).
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of  Homeland Security, GAO-03-594T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003).
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and  Long-Term Challenges, GAO-03-616T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003).
Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot  Certification Process, GAO-03-248NI (Washington, D.C.: February 3,  2003). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of  Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003).
High Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the  Federal Government and the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, GAO-03- 121 (Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003).
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and  DOT’s Enforcement Approach, GAO-03-22 (Washington, D.C.: January 10,  2003).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002).
Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address  Security Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002).
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and  Implementation Issues, GAO-03-253 (Washington, D.C.: November 22,  2002).
Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and  Assets Remain at Risk, GAO-03-303T (Washington, D.C.: November 19,  2002).
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New  Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO-03-297T (Washington, D.C.: November  18, 2002).
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of  Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: November 12,  2002).
Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, GAO-02-1075T  (Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002).
Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and  Communication Needed, GAO-02-785 (Washington, D.C.: August 26, 2002).
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New  Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T (Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002).
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-971T (Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002).
Critical infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be  Addressed, GAO-02-961T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in  Force Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports,  GAO-02-955TNI (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002). (Not for Public  Dissemination)
Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots, GA0-02-822R  (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002).
Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection  Equipment, GAO-02-713C (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002). (Classified)
Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond,  GAO-02-538T (Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2002).
Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation’s Air  Transportation System, GAO-01-1164T (Washington, D.C.: September 26,  2001). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Aviation Security: Information on the Nation’s Air Transportation  System Vulnerabilities, GAO-01-1174T (Washington, D.C.: September 26,  2001). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations, GAO-01-1171T (Washington, D.C.:  September 25, 2001).
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities, GAO-01-1165T (Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security, GAO-01-1166T (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports, GAO-01-1162T (Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2001).
section_title: Terrorism and Risk Management
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,  and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-715T (Washington, D.C.: May 8,  2003).
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a  Results-Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January 17,  2003).
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership,  GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated  Management Issues, GAO-03-250 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued  Management Challenges, GAO-02-1122T (Washington, D.C.: October 1,  2002).
National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing  Challenges, GAO-02-1048R (Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002).
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to  Success, GAO-02-1013T (Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More  Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information  Systems, GAO-02-474 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security  Challenges Need to Be Addressed, GAO-02-918T (Washington, D.C.: July 9,  2002).
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership  Will Be Critical to Success, GAO-02-901T (Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002).
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but  May Complicate Priority Setting, GAO-02-893T (Washington, D.C.: June  28, 2002).
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and  Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy,  GAO-02-811T (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002).
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving  National Goals, GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002).
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private  Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland  Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the  Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local  Preparedness, GAO-02-550T (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National  Preparedness Strategy, GAO-02-549T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to  Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-548T (Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National  Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-547T  (Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002).
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership  Sought, GAO-02-490T (Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance  State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-473T (Washington, D.C.: March 1,  2002).
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and  Long-Term National Needs, GAO-02-160T (Washington, D.C.: November 7,  2001).
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide  Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in  Chemical and Biological Preparedness, GAO-02-162T (Washington, D.C.:  October 17, 2001).
Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure  Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001).
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,  GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001).
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and  Inventory Management Are Needed, GAO-01-667 (Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in  Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from  Computer-Based Attacks, GAO-01-1168T (Washington, D.C.: September  26, 2001).
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts,  GAO-01-1158T (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001).
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