Electronic Warfare: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Oversight
Published: 2012-07-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD has committed billions of dollars to developing, maintaining, and employing warfighting capabilities that rely on access to the electromagnetic spectrum. According to DOD, electronic warfare capabilities play a critical and potentially growing role in ensuring the U.S. militarys access to and use of the electromagnetic spectrum. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD (1) developed a strategy to manage electronic warfare and (2) planned, organized, and implemented an effective governance structure to oversee its electronic warfare policy and programs and their relationship to cyberspace operations. GAO analyzed policies, plans, and studies related to electronic warfare and cyberspace operations and interviewed cognizant DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) developed an electronic warfare strategy, but it only partially addressed key characteristics that GAO identified in prior work as desirable for a national or defense strategy. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on DODs electronic warfare strategy for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015. DOD issued its fiscal year 2011 and 2012 strategy reports to Congress in October 2010 and November 2011, respectively. GAO found that DODs reports addressed two key characteristics: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology and (2) problem definition and risk assessment. However, DOD only partially addressed four other key characteristics of a strategy, including (1) resources, investments, and risk management and (2) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. For example, the reports identified mechanisms that could foster coordination across the department and identified some investment areas, but did not fully identify implementing parties, delineate roles and responsibilities for managing electronic warfare across the department, or link resources and investments to key activities. Such characteristics can help shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocation, and standards in a manner that is conducive to achieving intended results and can help ensure that the department is effectively managing electronic warfare.
DOD has taken steps to address a critical electronic warfare management gap, but it has not established a departmentwide governance framework for electronic warfare. GAO previously reported that effective and efficient organizations establish objectives and outline major implementation tasks. In response to a leadership gap for electronic warfare, DOD is establishing the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center under U.S. Strategic Command as the focal point for joint electronic warfare. However, because DOD has yet to define specific objectives for the center, outline major implementation tasks, and define metrics and timelines to measure progress, it is unclear whether or when the center will provide effective departmentwide leadership and advocacy for joint electronic warfare. In addition, key DOD directives providing some guidance for departmentwide oversight of electronic warfare have not been updated to reflect recent changes. For example, DODs primary directive concerning electronic warfare oversight was last updated in 1994 and identifies the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as the focal point for electronic warfare. The directive does not define the centers responsibilities in relation to the office, including those related to the development of the electronic warfare strategy and prioritizing investments. In addition, DODs directive for information operations, which is being updated, allocates electronic warfare responsibilities based on the departments previous definition of information operations, which had included electronic warfare as a core capability. DODs oversight of electronic warfare capabilities may be further complicated by its evolving relationship with computer network operations, which is also an information operations-related capability. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities and updated guidance regarding oversight responsibilities, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that its management structures will provide effective departmentwide leadership for electronic warfare activities and capabilities development and ensure effective and efficient use of its resources.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD should (1) include in its future electronic warfare strategy reports to Congress certain key characteristics, including performance measures, key investments and resources, and organizational roles and responsibilities; (2) define objectives and issue an implementation plan for the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center; and (3) update key departmental guidance to clearly define oversight roles, responsibilities, and coordination for electronic warfare management, and the relationship between electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations, except that the strategy should include performance measures. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is increasingly dependent on access  to the electromagnetic spectrum—the full range of all possible  frequencies of electromagnetic radiation, including frequency ranges such  as radio, microwave, infrared, visible, ultraviolet, X-rays, and gamma  rays—for a variety of military uses, such as communicating, navigating,  information gathering and sensing, and targeting. DOD has committed  billions of dollars developing, maintaining, and employing warfighting  capabilities that rely on access to the electromagnetic spectrum— including precision-guided munitions and command, control, and  communications systems. DOD ensures control of the electromagnetic  spectrum through the coordinated implementation of joint electromagnetic  spectrum operations, which includes electronic warfare and spectrum  management activities, with other lethal and nonlethal operations that  enable freedom of action in the electromagnetic operational environment.  Electronic warfare, which is the use of electromagnetic energy and  directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the  enemy, is essential for protection of friendly operations and denying  adversary operations within the electromagnetic spectrum throughout the  operational environment. As we previously reported, DOD’s investments  are projected to total more than $17.6 billion from fiscal years 2007  through 2016 for the development and procurement of new and updated  fixed-wing airborne electronic attack systems alone, which are one  element of electronic warfare.
According to DOD, the U.S. military’s access to and use of the  electromagnetic spectrum is facing rapidly evolving challenges and  increased vulnerabilities due to the increasing quality and availability of  electronic warfare capabilities to both state and non-state actors. Also,  DOD has reported that electronic warfare capabilities, which play a critical  and potentially growing role as an enabler for military operations, are  currently stressed and will remain so in the future. Moreover, according to  DOD, near-peer competitors, primarily Russia and China, have fully  recognized the critical nature of electromagnetic spectrum control in  military operations. There also has been recognition among near-peer  competitors of the relationship between electronic warfare and  cyberspace operations, which includes computer network operations.  For example, as noted in the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review  Commission’s 2009 report to Congress, China’s Integrated Network  Electronic Warfare concept incorporates elements of cyberspace  operations in tandem with elements of traditional electronic warfare, and  advocates for the employment of traditional electronic warfare  operations—such as the jamming of radars and communications  systems—in coordination with cyberspace attack operations.
DOD has identified persistent electronic warfare capability gaps, and  these shortfalls have been consistently highlighted by the combatant  commands as some of their highest warfighting priorities. According to a  Center for Strategic and International Studies report, the U.S. Strategic  Command identified 34 capability gaps affecting electronic warfare,  including a lack of leadership across the department. This lack of leadership was identified as the most critical gap. In our recent report on  DOD’s airborne electronic attack capabilities, we found that DOD is  developing multiple systems which provide similar capabilities, and that  the lack of leadership may undermine DOD’s ability to consolidate these  systems. Specifically, we found that all four military services within the  Department of Defense are separately acquiring new airborne electronic  attack systems, but that opportunities may exist to consolidate some  current service-specific acquisition efforts. With the prospect of slowly  growing or flat defense budgets for years to come, the department must  get better returns on its weapon system investments and find ways to  deliver more capability to the warfighter for less than it has in the past.  Therefore, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense conduct  program reviews for certain new, key systems; determine the extent to  which the most pressing capability gaps can be met and take steps to fill  them; align service investments in science and technology with the  departmentwide electronic warfare priority; and review the capabilities  provided by certain existing and planned systems to ensure investments  do not overlap. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations.
You requested that we examine several issues related to DOD’s  electronic warfare capabilities. In March 2012, we issued a report on  DOD’s current and planned airborne electronic attack capabilities and  investment strategies. approach to governing electronic warfare and the relationship between  electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. Specifically, we examined  the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a strategy to manage  electronic warfare and (2) planned, organized, and implemented an  effective governance structure to oversee its electronic warfare policy and  programs, and their relationship to cyberspace operations.
GAO-12-175. operations, we reviewed DOD directives and policies, and the roles and  responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and U.S.  Strategic Command. Additionally, we reviewed and analyzed information  found in policy documents along with information from relevant meetings  with DOD officials against DOD’s directives regarding electronic warfare.  We also interviewed cognizant officials and reviewed DOD policies,  doctrine, reports, plans, and concepts of operation, and outside studies  that discuss the relationship between electronic warfare and cyberspace  operations. See Appendix I for details on our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to July 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Control and Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum
paragraphs: In modern warfare, military forces are heavily dependent upon access to  the electromagnetic spectrum for successful operations. Communications  with friendly forces and detection, identification, and targeting of enemy  forces, among other tasks, are all reliant upon the ability to operate  unhindered in the spectrum. For this reason, control of the  electromagnetic spectrum is considered essential to carrying out military  operations. Figure 1 illustrates the electromagnetic spectrum and some  examples of military uses at various frequencies. For example, infrared or  thermal imaging technology senses heat emitted by a person or an object  and creates an image. Sensor systems utilize this technology to provide  the advantage of seeing not only at night but also through smoke, fog,  and other obscured battlefield conditions.
DOD defines electronic warfare as any military action involving the use of  electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic  spectrum or to attack the enemy. The purpose of electronic warfare is to  secure and maintain freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum  for friendly forces and to deny the same for the adversary. Traditionally,  electronic warfare has been composed of three primary activities:
Electronic attack: use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or  antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with  the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat  capability. Electronic attack can be used offensively, such as jamming  enemy communications or jamming enemy radar to suppress its air  defenses, and defensively, such as deploying flares.
Electronic protection: actions to protect personnel, facilities, and  equipment from any effects of friendly, neutral, or enemy use of the  electromagnetic spectrum, as well as naturally occurring phenomena  that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.
Electronic warfare support: actions directed by an operational  commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of  radiated electromagnetic energy for the purposes of immediate threat  recognition, targeting, and planning; and conduct of future operations.
Electronic warfare is employed to create decisive stand-alone effects or to  support military operations, such as information operations and  cyberspace operations. According to DOD, information operations are the  integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related  capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt,  corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential  adversaries while protecting our own. Information-related capabilities can  include, among others, electronic warfare, computer network operations,  military deception, operations security, and military information support  operations (formerly psychological operations). Electronic warfare  contributes to the success of information operations by using offensive  and defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to  shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarial use of the electromagnetic  spectrum while protecting U.S. and allied freedom of action.
section_title: Cyberspace Operations
paragraphs: Since cyberspace requires both wired and wireless links to transport  information, both offensive and defensive cyberspace operations may  require use of the electromagnetic spectrum. According to DOD,  cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities  where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects  through cyberspace, which include computer network operations, among  others. Computer network operations include computer network attack,  computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation- enabling operations. Electronic warfare and cyberspace operations are  complementary and have potentially synergistic effects. For example, an  electronic warfare platform may be used to enable or deter access to a  computer network.
section_title: U.S. Strategic Command Joint Electronic Warfare Activities
paragraphs: U.S. Strategic Command (Strategic Command) has been designated  since 2008 as the advocate for joint electronic warfare. Strategic  Command officials stated that, in the past, the primary office for electronic  warfare expertise—the Joint Electronic Warfare Center—had several  different names and was aligned under several different organizations,  such as the Joint Forces Command and the U.S. Space Command.
According to Strategic Command officials, in addition to the Joint  Electronic Warfare Center, the command employs electronic warfare  experts in its non-kinetic operations staff and in the Joint Electromagnetic  Preparedness for Advanced Combat organization. According to Strategic  Command officials, the Joint Electronic Warfare Center is the largest of  the three organizations and employs approximately 60 military and civilian  electronic warfare personnel and between 15 and 20 contractors.  Strategic Command officials stated that the Joint Electronic Warfare  Center was created as a DOD center of excellence for electronic warfare  and has electronic warfare subject matter experts. The center provides  planning and technical support not only to Strategic Command but to  other combatant commands and organizations, such as U.S. Central  Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and the  Department of Homeland Security. The Joint Electronic Warfare Center  also provides assistance with requirements generation to the military  services.
section_title: DOD Developed an Electronic Warfare Strategy, but Only Partially Addressed Key Desirable Strategy Characteristics
paragraphs: DOD developed an electronic warfare strategy, but only partially  addressed key strategy characteristics identified as desirable in prior work  by GAO. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010  requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense  committees an annual report on DOD’s electronic warfare strategy for  each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Each annual report is to be  submitted at the same time the President submits the budget to Congress  and is to contain, among other things, a description and overview of  DOD’s electronic warfare strategy and the organizational structure  assigned to oversee the development of the department’s electronic  warfare strategy, requirements, capabilities, programs, and projects. In  response to this legislative requirement, the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued DOD’s 2011  and 2012 fiscal year strategy reports to Congress in October 2010 and  November 2011, respectively.
We previously reported that it is desirable for strategies to delineate six  key characteristics, including organizational roles and responsibilities for  implementing parties as well as performance measures to gauge  results.responsible parties in further developing and implementing the strategy,  enhance the strategy’s usefulness in resource and policy decisions, and  better ensure accountability. The six characteristics are: (1) purpose,  scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment;     (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures;  (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational  roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and  implementation.
The key characteristics of an effective strategy can aid  As illustrated in Figure 3, we found that DOD’s reports addressed two key  characteristics, but only partially addressed four other key characteristics  of a strategy. For example, the strategy reports to Congress included  elements of characteristics, such as a goal and objectives, but did not  fully identify implementing parties, delineate roles and responsibilities for  managing electronic warfare across the department, or identify outcome- related performance measures that could guide the implementation of  electronic warfare efforts and help ensure accountability. Similarly, the  reports provided acquisition program and research and development  project data, but did not target resources and investments at some key  activities associated with implementing the strategy. When investments  are not tied to strategic goals and priorities, resources may not be used  effectively and efficiently. Our past work has shown that such  characteristics can help shape policies, programs, priorities, resource  allocations, and standards in a manner that is conducive to achieving  intended results.
DOD’s fiscal year 2011 report is described here because the fiscal year  2012 report, issued in November 2011, is classified. However,  unclassified portions of this document note that the fiscal year 2011 report  remains valid as the base DOD strategy and that the fiscal year 2012  report updates its predecessor primarily to identify ongoing efforts to  improve DOD’s electronic warfare capabilities and to provide greater  specificity to current threats. The fiscal year 2011 Electronic Warfare  Strategy of the Department of Defense report (electronic warfare strategy  report)—the base electronic warfare strategy—addressed two and  partially addressed four of six desirable characteristics of a strategy  identified by GAO. There may be considerable variation in the extent to  which the strategy addressed specific elements of those characteristics  that were determined by GAO to be partially addressed. Our analysis of  the fiscal year 2011 report’s characteristics is as follows.
Purpose, scope and methodology: Addressed. The fiscal year  2011 electronic warfare strategy report identifies the purpose of the  strategy, citing as its impetus section 1053 of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and articulates a maturing,  twofold strategy focused on integrating electronic warfare capabilities  into all phases and at all levels of military operations, as well as  developing, maintaining, and protecting the maneuver space within  the electromagnetic spectrum necessary to enable military  capabilities. The report’s scope also encompasses data on acquisition  programs and research and development projects. Additionally, the  report includes some methodological information by citing a principle  that guided its development. Specifically the report states that a key  aspect of the strategy is the concept of the electromagnetic spectrum  as maneuver space.
Problem definition and risk assessment: Addressed. The fiscal  year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report defines the problem the  strategy intends to address, citing the challenges posed to U.S. forces  by potential adversaries’ increasingly sophisticated technologies, the  military’s increased dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum,  and the urgent need to retain and expand remaining U.S. advantages.  The report also assesses risk by identifying threats to, and  vulnerabilities of critical operations, such as Airborne Electronic Attack  and self-protection countermeasures.
Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance  measures: Partially Addressed. The fiscal year 2011 electronic  warfare strategy report communicates an overarching goal of enabling  electromagnetic spectrum maneuverability and cites specific  objectives, such as selectively denying an adversary’s use of the  spectrum and preserving U.S. and allied forces’ ability to maneuver  within the spectrum. The report also identifies key activities  associated with the strategy, including developing (1) coherent  electronic warfare organizational structures and leadership, (2) an  enduring and sustainable approach to continuing education, and (3)  capabilities to implement into electronic warfare systems. The report  does not identify performance measures that could be used to gauge  results and help ensure accountability.
Resources, investments, and risk management: Partially  Addressed. The fiscal year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report  broadly targets resources and investments by emphasizing the  importance of continued investment in electronic attack, electronic  protection, and electronic support capabilities. The report also notes  some of the associated risks in these areas, calling for new methods  of ensuring U.S. control over the electromagnetic spectrum in light of  the adversary’s advances in weapons and the decreasing  effectiveness of traditional lines of defense, such as airborne  electronic attack and self-protection countermeasures. The report  identifies some of the costs associated with the strategy by providing  acquisition program and research and development project and cost  data, and notes that part of the strategy is to identify and track  investments in electronic warfare systems, which often are obscured  within the development of the larger weapons platforms they typically  support. However, the strategy does not target investments by  balancing risk against costs, or discuss other costs associated with  implementing the strategy by, for example, targeting resources and  investments at key activities, such as developing electronic warfare  organizational structures and leadership and developing an enduring  and sustainable approach to continuing education.
Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: Partially  Addressed. The fiscal year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report  provides an overview of past and ongoing electronic warfare activities  within the military services and DOD, and identifies several  mechanisms that have or could be used to foster coordination across  the department. For example, it outlines the Army’s efforts to create a  new career field for electronic warfare officers and the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics’  electronic warfare integrated planning team. However, the report  does not fully identify the departmental entities responsible for  implementing the strategy, discuss the roles and responsibilities of  implementing parties, or specify implementing entities’ relationships in  terms of leading, supporting, and partnering.
Integration and implementation: Partially Addressed. The fiscal  year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report describes the  department’s approach to ensuring maneuverability within the  electromagnetic spectrum, thus supporting National Defense Strategy  objectives that rely on use and control of the spectrum. The strategy’s  overarching aim of ensuring electromagnetic spectrum  maneuverability also is consistent with concepts contained in the  department’s electromagnetic spectrum strategy documents—which  collectively emphasize the importance of assured spectrum access.The strategy does not, however, discuss the department’s plans for  implementing the strategy.
DOD’s electronic warfare strategy reports were issued in response to the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 and were not  specifically required to address all the characteristics we consider to be  desirable for an effective strategy. Additionally, DOD’s fiscal year 2011  report states that the strategy is still maturing and that subsequent reports  to Congress will refine the department’s vision. Nonetheless, we consider  it useful for DOD’s electronic warfare strategy to address each of the  characteristics we have identified in order to provide guidance to the  entities responsible for implementing DOD’s strategy and to enhance the  strategy’s utility in resource and policy decisions—particularly in light of  the diffuse nature of DOD’s electronic warfare programs and activities, as  well as the range of emerging technical, conceptual, and organizational  challenges and changes in this area. Further, in the absence of clearly  defined roles and responsibilities, and other elements of key  characteristics, such as measures of performance in meeting goals and  objectives, entities responsible for implementing DOD’s strategy may lack  the guidance necessary to establish priorities and milestones, thereby  impeding their ability to achieve intended results within a reasonable time  frame. As a result, DOD lacks assurance that its electronic warfare  programs and activities are aligned with strategic priorities and are  managed effectively. For example, without an effective strategy, DOD is  limited in its ability to reduce the potential for unnecessary overlap in the  airborne electronic attack acquisition activities on which we have  previously reported.
section_title: DOD Has Not Established an Effective Departmentwide Governance Framework for Managing and Overseeing Electronic Warfare
paragraphs: DOD has taken some steps to address a critical leadership gap identified  in 2009, but it has not established a departmentwide governance  framework for planning, directing, and controlling electronic warfare  activities. DOD is establishing a Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control  Center (JEMSCC) under Strategic Command in response to the  leadership gap for electronic warfare. However, DOD has not  documented the objectives or implementation tasks and timeline for the  JEMSCC. In addition, DOD has not updated key guidance to reflect  recent policy changes regarding electronic warfare management and  oversight roles and responsibilities. For example, it is unclear what the  JEMSCC’s role is in relation to other DOD organizations involved in the  management of electronic warfare, such as the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.  Moreover, we found that DOD may face challenges in its oversight of  electronic warfare as a result of the evolving relationship between  electronic warfare and cyberspace operations.
subsections: section_title: DOD Actions Have Not Fully Addressed a Critical Leadership Gap
paragraphs: DOD has taken some steps to address a critical leadership gap by  establishing the JEMSCC under Strategic Command. However, because  DOD has yet to define specific objectives for the center, outline major  implementation tasks, and define metrics and timelines to measure  progress, it is unclear to what extent the center will address the identified  existing leadership deficiencies. The Center for Strategic and  International Studies reported insufficient leadership as the most critical  among 34 capability gaps affecting electronic warfare. As a result of the  absence of leadership, the department was significantly impeded from  both identifying departmentwide needs and solutions and eliminating  potentially unnecessary overlap among the military services’ electronic  warfare acquisitions. Specifically, the department lacked a joint leader  and advocate with the authority to integrate and influence electronic  warfare capabilities development, to coordinate internal activities, and to  represent those activities and interests to outside organizations.  Mitigating the leadership gap was identified not only as the highest  priority, but also a prerequisite to addressing the other 33 gaps.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies report was one of two  parallel studies commissioned by the Joint Requirements Oversight  Council to assess potential organizational and management solutions to  the leadership gap. These studies considered a number of options,  including an organization under the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an  activity controlled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an  organization at Strategic Command. As a result of these studies, in  January 2011, DOD initiated efforts to establish the JEMSCC under  Strategic Command as the focal point of joint electronic warfare  advocacy. This solution was chosen, in part, in recognition of Strategic  Command’s resident electronic warfare expertise as well as its already  assigned role as an electronic warfare advocate.
In January 2011, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed  Strategic Command to develop an implementation plan for the electronic  warfare center to be submitted for council approval no later than May  2011. The plan was to delineate (1) the center’s mission, roles, and  responsibilities; (2) command and control, reporting, and support  relationships with combatant commands, military services, and U.S.  Government departments and agencies; and (3) minimum requirements  to achieve initial operational capability and full operational capability. The  Joint Requirements Oversight Council subsequently approved an  extension of the center’s implementation plan submission to August 2011.  Subsequently, in December 2011, the oversight council issued a  memorandum that closed the requirement to submit an implementation  plan to the council and stated that Strategic Command had conducted an  internal reorganization and developed a center to perform the functions  identified in the internal DOD study.
In December 2011, Strategic Command issued an operations order that  defined the JEMSCC as the primary focal point for electronic warfare,  supporting DOD advocacy for joint electronic warfare capability  requirements, resources, strategy, doctrine, planning, training, and  operational support. This order provided 22 activities that the center is to  perform. Federal internal control standards require that organizations  establish objectives and clearly define key areas of authority and  responsibility. In addition, best practices for strategic planning have  shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans  outlining major implementation tasks and defined metrics and timelines to  measure progress. Moreover, the independent study prepared for DOD  similarly emphasized the importance of clearly defining the center’s  authorities and responsibilities, noting that the center’s success would  hinge, in part, on specifying how it is expected to relate to the department  as a whole as well as its expected organizational outcomes. However, as  of March 2012, Strategic Command had not issued an implementation  plan or other documentation that defines the center’s objectives and  outlines major implementation tasks, metrics, and timelines to measure  progress. Strategic Command officials told us in February 2012 that an  implementation plan had been drafted, but that there were no timelines  for the completion of the implementation plan or a projection for when the  center would reach its full operational capability. As a result, it remains  unclear whether or when the JEMSCC will provide effective  departmentwide leadership and advocacy for electronic warfare, and  influence resource decisions related to capability development.
According to officials from Strategic Command, the JEMSCC will consist  of staff from Strategic Command’s Joint Electronic Warfare Center at  Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, and the Joint Electromagnetic  Preparedness for Advanced Combat organization, at Nellis Air Force  Base, Nevada. These officials stated that while each of JEMSCC’s  component groups’ missions will likely evolve as the center matures, the  JEMSCC components would continue prior support activities, such as the  Joint Electronic Warfare Center’s support to other combatant commands  through its Electronic Warfare Planning and Coordination Cell—a rapid  deployment team that provides electronic warfare expertise and support  to build electronic warfare capacity. Figure 4 depicts the JEMSCC’s  organizational construct.
DOD has yet to define objectives and issue an implementation plan for  the JEMSCC; however, officials from Strategic Command stated that they  anticipated continuity between the command’s previous role as an  electronic warfare advocate and its new leadership role, noting that  advocacy was, and remains, necessary because electronic warfare  capabilities are sometimes undervalued in comparison to other, kinetic  capabilities.Command’s previously assigned advocacy role, in part, by continuing to  advocate for electronic warfare via the Joint Capabilities Integration and  Development System process—DOD’s process for identifying and  developing capabilities needed by combatant commanders—and by   For example, the JEMSCC will likely build off Strategic  providing electronic warfare expertise. Specifically, Strategic Command  officials stated that the JEMSCC, through Strategic Command, would  likely provide input to the development of joint electronic warfare  requirements during the joint capabilities development process. However,  combatant commands, such as Strategic Command, provide one of many  inputs to this process. Further, as we have previously reported, council  decisions, while influential, are advisory to acquisition and budget  processes driven by military service investment priorities.the JEMSCC’s ability to affect resource decisions via this process is likely  to be limited.
Officials we spoke with across DOD, including those from the military  services and Strategic Command, recognized this challenge. Specifically,  Strategic Command officials told us that for JEMSCC to influence service- level resource decisions and advocate effectively for joint electronic  warfare capabilities, the JEMSCC would need to not only participate in  the joint capabilities development process, but would also need  authorities beyond those provided by the Unified Command Plan, such as  the authority to negotiate with the military services regarding resource  decisions. Similarly, we found that while the officials we spoke with from  several DOD offices that manage electronic warfare, including offices  within the military services, were unaware of the center’s operational  status and unclear regarding its mission, roles, and responsibilities, many  also thought it to be unlikely that the JEMSCC—as a subordinate center  of Strategic Command—would possess the requisite authority to  advocate effectively for electronic warfare resource decisions. These  concerns were echoed by the independent study, which noted that the  center would require strong authorities to substantially influence the  allocation of other DOD elements’ resources.
Additionally, limited visibility across the department’s electronic warfare  programs and activities may impede the center’s ability to advocate for  electronic warfare capabilities development. Specifically, Strategic  Command officials told us that they do not have access to information  regarding all of the military services’ electronic warfare programs and  activities, particularly those that are highly classified or otherwise have  special access restrictions. In addition, Strategic Command officials told  us that they do not have visibility over or participate in rapid acquisitions  conducted through the joint capabilities development process. In our  March 2012 report on DOD’s airborne electronic attack strategy and  acquisitions, we reported that certain airborne electronic attack systems  in development may offer capabilities that unnecessarily overlap with one  another—a condition that appears most prevalent with irregular warfare  systems that the services are acquiring under DOD’s rapid acquisitions   The JEMSCC’s exclusion from this process is likely to limit its  process. ability to develop the departmentwide perspective necessary for effective  advocacy. Moreover, in the absence of clearly defined objectives and an  implementation plan outlining major implementation tasks and timelines to  measure progress, these potential challenges reduce DOD’s level of  assurance that the JEMSCC will provide effective departmentwide  leadership for electronic warfare capabilities development.
section_title: DOD Policy Documents Have Not Been Updated to Include All Oversight Roles and Responsibilities for Electronic Warfare
paragraphs: GAO-12-175 and GAO-12-342SP. assess and evaluate its internal control to assure that the actions in place  are effective and updated when necessary.
DOD’s two primary directives that provide some guidance for  departmentwide oversight of electronic warfare are:
DOD Directive 3222.4 (Electronic Warfare and Command and Control  Warfare Countermeasures)—Designates the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition (now Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)  as the focal point for electronic warfare within the department.  However, the directive was issued in 1992 and updated in 1994, and  does not reflect subsequent changes in policy or organizational  structures. For example, the directive does not reflect the  establishment of the JEMSCC under Strategic Command.
DOD Directive 3600.01 (Information Operations)—Issued in 2006 and  revised in May 2011, this directive provides the department with a  framework for oversight of information operations, which was defined  as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic  warfare, computer network operations, military information support  operations (formerly referred to as psychological operations), military  deception, and operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp  adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting  that of the United States. However, the definition of oversight  responsibilities for information operations has changed, and these  changes have not yet been reflected in DOD Directive 3600.01.
DOD Directive 3222.4 has not been updated to reflect the responsibilities  for electronic warfare assigned to Strategic Command. Both the  December 2008 and April 2011 versions of the Unified Command Plan  assigned Strategic Command responsibility for advocating for joint  electronic warfare capabilities. Similarly, the directive has not been updated to reflect the establishment of the JEMSCC and its associated  electronic warfare responsibilities. Specifically, the directive does not  acknowledge that JEMSCC has been tasked by Strategic Command as  the primary focal point for electronic warfare; rather, the directive  designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics as the focal point for electronic warfare within DOD. As a  result, it is unclear what JEMSCC’s roles and responsibilities are in  relation to those of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics. For example, it’s unclear what JEMSCC’s role  will be regarding development of future iterations of the DOD’s electronic  warfare strategy report to Congress, which is currently produced by the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics. Also it is unclear what role, if any, the JEMSCC will have in  prioritizing electronic warfare investments. Moreover, the directive has not  been updated to reflect the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum issued  in January 2011, which assigned individual capability responsibility for  electronic warfare and computer network operations to Strategic  Command.
DOD Directive 3600.01 provides both the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence with responsibilities that aid in the oversight of  electronic warfare within DOD. However, pursuant to the Defense  Secretary’s January 2011 memo, the directive is under revision to  accommodate changes in roles and responsibilities. Under the current  version of DOD Directive 3600.01, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence is charged with the role of Principal Staff Advisor to the  Secretary of Defense for information operations. The Principal Staff  Advisor is responsible for, among other things, the development and  oversight of information operations policy and integration activities as well  as the coordination, oversight, and assessment of the efforts of DOD  components to plan, program, develop, and execute capabilities in  support of information operations requirements. Additionally, the current  Directive 3600.01 identifies the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as responsible for establishing  specific policies for the development of electronic warfare as a core  capability of information operations.
Under the requirements of DOD acquisition policy, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics regularly collects cost,  schedule, and performance data for major programs.the cost information of electronic warfare systems are reported as distinct  programs, while in other cases, some electronic warfare systems are  subcomponents of larger programs, and cost information is not regularly  collected for these separate subsystems. Additionally, the Under  Secretary—in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force—is  developing an implementation road map for electronic warfare science  and technology. The road map is supposed to coordinate investments  across DOD to accelerate the development and delivery of capabilities.  The road map is expected to be completed in late summer of 2012.
The Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum in January 2011 that  prompted DOD officials to begin revising DOD Directive 3600.01. The  memorandum redefined information operations as “the integrated  employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities  in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or  usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while  protecting our own.” Previously, DOD defined information operations as  the “integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare,  computer network operations, psychological operations, military  deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting  and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial  human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”  According to DOD officials, the revised definition removed the term core  capabilities because it put too much emphasis on the individual core  capabilities and too little emphasis on the integration of these capabilities.
Additionally, the memorandum noted that the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy began serving as the Principal Staff Advisor for information  operations as of October 1, 2010, and charged the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy with revising DOD Directive 3600.01 to reflect these  responsibilities. According to the memorandum, the Principal Staff  Advisor is to serve as the single point of fiscal and program accountability  for information operations. However, according to DOD officials, this  accountability oversight covers only the integration of information  operations-related capabilities and does not cover the formerly defined  core capabilities of information operations, including electronic warfare  and computer network operations. For example, DOD officials stated that  the Principal Staff Advisor for information operations would maintain  program accountability where information operations-related capabilities  were integrated but would not maintain program accountability for all  information-related capabilities. However, the memorandum does not  clearly describe the specific responsibilities of the Principal Staff Advisor  for information operations.
The Secretary’s memorandum directed the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy, together with the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) and  Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, to continue to work to  develop standardized budget methodologies for information operations- related capabilities and activities. However, these budget methodologies  would capture only data related to information operations. For example,  according to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy officials, they do not  collect or review electronic warfare financial data, but may review this  data in the future to determine if it relates to integrated information  operations efforts. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy stated that DOD Directive 3600.01 was under revision  to reflect these and other changes as directed by the Secretary’s  memorandum. Until the underlying directive is revised, there may be  uncertainty regarding which office has the authority to manage and  oversee which programs. Moreover, until this directive is updated, it is not  clear where the boundaries are for oversight of electronic warfare  between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Table 1 compares the oversight roles and responsibilities for electronic  warfare as described in the two DOD directives and the Secretary’s 2011  policy memorandum.
DOD may face challenges in its oversight of electronic warfare because  of the evolving relationship between electronic warfare and cyberspace  operations, specifically computer network operations; both are information  operations-related capabilities. According to DOD, to ensure all aspects  of electronic warfare can be developed and integrated to achieve  electromagnetic spectrum control, electronic warfare must be clearly and  distinctly defined in its relationship to information operations (to include  computer network operations) and the emerging domain of cyberspace.  In the previous section, we noted that DOD’s directives do not clearly  define the roles and responsibilities for the oversight of electronic warfare  in relation to the roles and responsibilities for information operations. The  current DOD Directive 3600.01 does not clearly specify what  responsibilities the Principal Staff Advisor has regarding the integration of  information operations-related capabilities—specifically the integration of  electronic warfare capabilities with computer network operations.
Further, DOD’s fiscal year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report to  Congress, which delineated its electronic warfare strategy, stated that the  strategy has two, often co-dependent capabilities: traditional electronic  warfare and computer network attack, which is part of cyberspace  operations. Moreover, according to DOD officials, the relationship  between electronic warfare and cyberspace operations—including  computer network attack—is still evolving, which is creating both new  opportunities and challenges. There will be operations and capabilities  that blur the lines between cyberspace operations and electronic warfare  because of the continued expansion of wireless networking and the  integration of computers and radio frequency communications. According  to cognizant DOD officials, electronic warfare capabilities may permit use  of the electromagnetic spectrum as a maneuver space for cyberspace  operations. For example, electronic warfare capabilities may serve as a  means of accessing otherwise inaccessible networks to conduct  cyberspace operations; presenting new opportunities for offensive action  as well as the need for defensive preparations.
Current DOD doctrine partially describes the relationship between  electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. Specifically, current joint  doctrine for electronic warfare, which was last updated in February 2012,  states that since cyberspace requires both wired and wireless links to  transport information, both offensive and defensive cyberspace  operations may require use of the electromagnetic spectrum for the  enabling of effects in cyberspace. Due to the complementary nature and  potential synergistic effects of electronic warfare and computer network  operations, they must be coordinated to ensure they are applied to  maximize effectiveness. When wired access to a computer system is  limited, electromagnetic access may be able to successfully penetrate the  computer system. For example, use of an airborne weapons system to  deliver malicious code into cyberspace via a wireless connection would  be characterized as “electronic warfare-delivered computer network  attack.” In addition, the doctrine mentions that electronic warfare  applications in support of homeland defense are critical to deter, detect,  prevent, and defeat external threats such as cyberspace threats.
DOD has not yet published specific joint doctrine for cyberspace  operations, as we previously reported. things, that DOD establish a time frame for deciding whether to proceed  with a dedicated joint doctrine publication on cyberspace operations and  update existing cyber-related joint doctrine. DOD agreed and has  drafted, but not yet issued, the joint doctrine for cyberspace operations.  According to U.S. Cyber Command officials, it is unclear when the  doctrine for cyberspace operations will be issued.
See GAO, Defense Department Cyber Efforts, DOD Faces Challenges in Its Cyber  Activities, GAO-11-75 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2011). proliferation of information and communications technology. According to  a Navy official, the Navy recognizes the evolving relationship between  electronic warfare and cyberspace operations and is moving toward  defining that relationship. However, the Navy first is working to define the  relationship between electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum  operations. In addition, Air Force Instruction 10-706, Electronic Warfare  Operations, states that traditional electronic warfare capabilities are  beginning to overlap with cyberspace areas, which is resulting in an  increased number of emerging targets such as non-military leadership  networks and positioning, navigation, and timing networks.
According to U.S. Cyber Command officials, it is important to understand  how electronic warfare and cyberspace operations capabilities might be  used in an operational setting. Such information could then inform the  further development of doctrine. U.S. Cyber Command officials stated  that they have participated in regular meetings with representatives from  the military services, the National Security Agency, defense research  laboratories, and others, to discuss the relationship of electronic warfare  and cyberspace operations. Moreover, the Under Secretary for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has established steering  committees that are developing road maps for the Secretary of Defense’s  seven designated science and technology priority areas—one of which is  cyberspace operations and another is electronic warfare.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD faces significant challenges in operating in an increasingly complex  electromagnetic environment. Therefore, it is important that DOD develop  a comprehensive strategy to ensure departmental components are able  to integrate electronic warfare capabilities into all phases of military  operations and maintain electromagnetic spectrum access and  maneuverability. DOD would benefit from a strategy that includes  implementing parties, roles, responsibilities, and performance measures,  which can help ensure that entities are effectively supporting such  objectives, and linking resources and investments to key activities  necessary to meet strategic goals and priorities. In the absence of a  strategy that fully addresses these and other key elements, the DOD  components and military services responsible for implementing this  strategy, evaluating progress, and ensuring accountability may lack the  guidance necessary to prioritize their activities and establish milestones  that are necessary to achieve intended results within a reasonable time  frame. Moreover, as a result, DOD may not be effectively managing its  electronic warfare programs and activities or using its resources  efficiently. For example, an effective strategy could help DOD reduce the  potential for unnecessary overlap in the airborne electronic attack  acquisition activities on which we have previously reported.
The military’s increasing reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum— coupled with a fiscally constrained environment and critical gaps in  electronic warfare management—highlights the need for an effective  governance framework for managing and conducting oversight of the  department’s electronic warfare activities. The absence of such a  framework can exacerbate management challenges, including those  related to developing and implementing an effective strategy and  coordinating activities among stakeholders. Without additional steps to  define the purpose and activities of the JEMSCC, DOD lacks reasonable  assurance that this center will provide effective departmentwide  leadership for electronic warfare capabilities development and ensure the  effective and efficient use of its resources. As we previously reported,  DOD acknowledges a leadership void that makes it difficult to ascertain  whether the current level of investment is optimally matched with the  existing capability gaps. Leveraging resources and acquisition efforts  across DOD—not just by sharing information, but through shared  partnerships and investments—can simplify developmental efforts,  improve interoperability among systems and combat forces, and could  decrease future operating and support costs. Such successful outcomes  can position the department to maximize the returns it gets on its  electronic warfare investments. In addition, multiple organizations are  involved with electronic warfare and outdated guidance regarding  management and oversight may limit the effectiveness of their activities.  Both the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics and the JEMSCC have been identified as the focal point for  electronic warfare within the department, yet it is unclear what each  organization’s roles and responsibilities are in relation to one another.  Further, each organization’s management responsibilities related to future  iterations of the electronic warfare strategy report to Congress and  working with the military services to prioritize investments remain unclear.  Updating electronic warfare directives and policy documents to clearly  define oversight roles and responsibilities for electronic warfare— including any roles and responsibilities related to managing the  relationship between electronic warfare and information operations or  electronic warfare and cyberspace operations, specifically computer  network operations—would help ensure that all aspects of electronic  warfare can be developed and integrated to achieve electromagnetic  spectrum control.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s management, oversight, and coordination of electronic  warfare policy and programs, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense take the following three actions:
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy and Strategic Command, and others, as appropriate, to include  at a minimum the following information in the fiscal years 2013  through 2015 strategy reports for electronic warfare:
Performance measures to guide implementation of the strategy  and help ensure accountability. These could include milestones to  track progress toward closing the 34 capability gaps identified by  DOD studies.
Resources and investments necessary to implement the strategy,  including those related to key activities, such as developing  electronic warfare organizational structures and leadership.
The parties responsible for implementing the department’s  strategy, including specific roles and responsibilities.
Direct the Commander of Strategic Command to define the objectives  of the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center and issue an  implementation plan outlining major implementation tasks and  timelines to measure progress.
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in concert with the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics, as appropriate, to update key departmental guidance  regarding electronic warfare—including DOD Directives 3222.4  (Electronic Warfare and Command and Control Warfare  Countermeasures) and 3600.01 (Information Operations)—to clearly  define oversight roles and responsibilities of and coordination among  the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Joint  Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center. Additionally, the directives  should clarify, as appropriate, the oversight roles and responsibilities  for the integration of electronic warfare and cyberspace operations,  specifically computer network operations.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  our first recommendation and concurred with our other two  recommendations. Regarding our recommendation that DOD include in  future strategy reports for electronic warfare, at a minimum, information  on (1) performance measures to guide implementation of the strategy, (2)  resources and investments necessary to implement the strategy, and (3)  parties responsible for implementing the strategy, the department stated  that it continues to refine the annual strategy reports for electronic warfare  and will expand upon resourcing plans and organization roles; however,  the department stated that the strategy was not intended to be  prescriptive with performance measures. As we have previously stated,  the inclusion of performance measures can aid entities responsible for  implementing DOD’s electronic warfare strategy in establishing priorities  and milestones to aid in achieving intended results within reasonable time  frames. We also have noted that performance measures can enable more  effective oversight and accountability as progress toward meeting a  strategy’s goals may be measured, thus helping to ensure the strategy’s  successful implementation. We therefore continue to believe this  recommendation has merit.
DOD concurred with our remaining two recommendations that (1) the  Commander of Strategic Command define the objectives of the JEMSCC  and issue an implementation plan for the center and (2) DOD update key  departmental guidance regarding electronic warfare. These steps, if  implemented, will help to clarify the roles and responsibilities of electronic  warfare management within the department and aid in the efficient and  effective use of resources. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their  entirety appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Commander, U.S.  Strategic Command. In addition, this report will be available at no charge  on GAO’s web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices   of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix  IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage  electronic warfare we evaluated DOD’s fiscal year 2011 and 2012  electronic warfare strategy reports to Congress against prior GAO work  on strategic planning, that indentified six desirable characteristics of a  strategy. The characteristics GAO previously identified are: (1) purpose,  scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment;   (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures;  (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational  roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and  implementation. While these characteristics were identified in our past  work as desirable components of national-level strategies, we determined  that they also are relevant to strategies of varying scopes, including  defense strategies involving complex issues. For example, identifying  organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms is key  to allocating authority and responsibility for implementing a strategy.  Further, goals, objectives, and performance measures provide concrete  guidance for implementing a strategy, allowing implementing parties to  establish priorities and milestones, and providing them with the flexibility  necessary to pursue and achieve those results within a reasonable time  frame. Full descriptions of these characteristics are contained in appendix  II.
We determined that the strategy “addressed” a characteristic when it  explicitly cited all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacked specificity  and details and could thus be improved upon. The strategy “partially  addressed” a characteristic when it explicitly cited some, but not all,  elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of “partially  addressed,” there may be wide variation between a characteristic for  which most of the elements were addressed and a characteristic for  which few of the elements of the characteristic were addressed. The  strategy “did not address” a characteristic when it did not explicitly cite or  discuss any elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references  were either too vague or general. To supplement this analysis and gain  further insight into issues of strategic import, we also reviewed other  relevant strategic planning documents—such DOD’s National Defense  Strategy, Strategic Spectrum Plan, and Net-Centric Spectrum  Management Strategy—and interviewed cognizant officials from  organizations across the department, including the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; U.S.  Strategic Command; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DOD Directive 3222.4, Electronic Warfare and Command and Control Warfare  Countermeasures (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1992, Incorporating Change 2, Jan. 28,  1994). fiscal year 2011 and 2012 electronic warfare strategy reports to  Congress; and classified and unclassified briefings, and studies related  to DOD’s identification of and efforts to address electronic warfare  capability gaps, including DOD’s 2009 Electronic Warfare Initial  Capabilities Document. We also reviewed DOD and military service  reports, plans, concepts of operation, and outside studies that discuss  DOD’s definitions of electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. In  addition, we interviewed cognizant DOD officials to obtain information and  perspectives regarding policy, management, and technical issues related  to electronic warfare, information operations, electromagnetic spectrum  control, and cyberspace operations.
In addressing both of our objectives, we obtained relevant documentation  from and/or interviewed officials from the following DOD offices,  combatant commands, military services, and combat support agencies:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer  Joint Chiefs of Staff
U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland
U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii
U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska  Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center, Offutt Air  Force Base, Nebraska  Joint Electronic Warfare Center, Lackland Air Force Base,  Texas
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations,  Plans, and Training, Electronic Warfare Division
Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center  Electronic Warfare Proponent Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
U.S. Air Force—Electronic Warfare Division
U.S. Marines Corps—Headquarters, Electronic Warfare Branch
U.S. Navy
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information  Dominance Electronic and Cyber Warfare Division
Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Surface Warfare Center,
Naval Sea Systems Command, Program Executive Office for
Navy Fleet Forces Cyber Command, Fleet Electronic Warfare  Center, Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia
Defense Information Systems Agency—Defense Spectrum
National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland  We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to July 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Desirable Strategy Characteristics
paragraphs: We previously identified a set of desirable strategy characteristics to aid  responsible parties in implementation, enhance the strategies’ usefulness  in resource and policy decisions, and to better ensure accountability.Table 2 provides a brief description of each characteristic and its benefit.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Davi M. D’Agostino, Director (retired); Mark A. Pross, Assistant  Director; Carolynn Cavanaugh; Ryan D’Amore; Brent Helt; and Richard  Powelson.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on  Overcoming Acquisition Challenges. GAO-12-175. Washington, D.C.:  March 29, 2012.  2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and  Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.  GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
Defense Department Cyber Efforts: Definitions, Focal Point, and  Methodology Needed for DOD to Develop Full-Spectrum Cyberspace  Budget Estimates. GAO-11-695R. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011.
Defense Department Cyber Efforts: DOD Faces Challenges in Its Cyber  Activities. GAO-11-75. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2011.
Defense Department Cyber Efforts: More Detailed Guidance Needed to  Ensure Military Services Develop Appropriate Cyberspace Capabilities.  GAO-11-421. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2011.
Defense Management: Perspectives on the Involvement of the  Combatant Commands in the Development of Joint Requirements.  GAO-11-527R. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2011.
Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could Reduce  Risk in Development of EA-18G. GAO-06-446. Washington, D.C.: April  26, 2006.
Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed For  Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses. GAO-03-51. Washington, D.C.:  November 25, 2002.
Electronic Warfare: The Army Can Reduce Its Risk in Developing New  Radar Countermeasures System. GAO-01-448. Washington, D.C.: April  30, 2001.