Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process
Published: 2009-10-01T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses the key recommendations from the two reports we recently released, which include (1) the need for a fully developed strategic framework for the reform process that includes outcome-focused performance measures to show progress and (2) more transparency in annually reporting to Congress on the timeliness and quality of the clearance process. This testimony is based on our review of the Joint Reform Team's plans, as well as our work on DOD's security clearance process, which includes reviews of clearance-related files and interviews of senior officials at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOD, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and OPM. In addition, this statement is based on key practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations. We conducted our work on both reports between March 2008 and May 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is difficult to gauge progress of reform, or determine if corrective action is needed, because the council, through the Joint Reform Team, has not established a method for evaluating the progress of the reform efforts. Without a strategic framework that fully addresses the long-standing security clearance problems and incorporates key practices for transformation--including the ability to demonstrate progress leading to desired results--the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decision makers the extent of progress that it is making toward achieving its desired outcomes, and the effort is at risk of losing momentum and not being fully implemented. In addition to limited visibility over timeliness of clearances, the executive branch's annual reports to Congress on the personnel security clearance process have provided decision makers with limited data on quality, and the executive branch has missed opportunities to make the clearance process transparent to Congress. For example, we independently estimated that 87 percent16 of about 3,500 investigative reports prepared by OPM that DOD adjudicators (employees who decide whether to grantclearance to an applicant based on the investigation and other information) used to make clearance decisions, for initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, were missing required documentation. Because neither OPM nor DOD measures the completeness of their investigative reports or adjudicative files, both agencies are limited in their ability to explain the extent to which or the reasons why some documents are incomplete. Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in the time needed to complete the clearance process and in the overall costs of the process and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. We have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process and emphasized that attention to quality could increase reciprocity--accepting another federal entity's clearances--and the executive branch, though not required to include information on quality in its annual reports, has latitude to report appropriate information. We are encouraged that, while the 2009 report did not provide any data on quality, unlike previous reports it did identify quality metrics that the executive branch proposes to collect.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss the key findings in two  reports that we recently released on the personnel security clearance  process. As you know, we conducted our review of personnel security  clearance reforms in response to a request from the Chairman of the  House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and you, Madam  Chairwoman. We conducted a separate review on the existing personnel  security clearance process within the Department of Defense (DOD) under  the authority of the Comptroller General. This is the third in a series of  hearings in which you have asked GAO to testify; and this Subcommittee’s  oversight has helped focus attention on the need for security clearance  reform.
Personnel security clearances are used to verify that national security  information—which in some cases could cause exceptionally grave  damage to U.S. national defense or foreign relations if disclosed—is  entrusted only to individuals who have proven reliability and loyalty to the  nation. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the nation’s  defense and intelligence needs grew, prompting increased demand for  personnel with security clearances. According to officials from the Joint  Reform Team, about 2.4 million people—excluding some of those with  clearances who work in areas of national intelligence—currently hold  clearances, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducted  about 750,000 national security investigations in fiscal year 2008. We have  previously reported on delays and backlogs in security clearance  processing, lack of reciprocity among agencies, and incomplete  investigations. As a result of these long-standing issues, we have  designated the Department of Defense’s (DOD) personnel security  clearance program a high-risk area since 2005.
In response to concerns about delays in processing clearances and other  issues, Congress, including the House Permanent Select Committee on  Intelligence, set goals and established requirements for improving the  clearance process in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention  Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Those requirements include, among other things,  improving the timeliness of the clearance process, achieving interagency  reciprocity, establishing an integrated database to track investigative and  adjudicative information, and evaluating available technology for  investigations and adjudications. IRTPA also requires the executive branch  to provide a report to Congress, by February 15 of each year, on the  progress made during the preceding year toward meeting IRTPA’s  requirements for security clearances, including the length of time agencies  take to complete investigations and adjudications, a discussion of  impediments to the implementation of IRTPA’s requirements, and any  other information or recommendations the executive branch considers  appropriate. While DOD and other executive branch agencies responsible  for investigating and adjudicating clearances for federal personnel,  military servicemembers, and government contractors have made  significant progress toward improving the timeliness of the clearance  process and evaluating the use of available technology in clearance  processing, problems related to the quality of clearance investigations and  adjudication determinations and in the use of information technology  persist.
The Joint Reform Team was established to coordinate efforts to achieve  IRTPA timeliness goals and improve the processes related to granting  security clearances and determining suitability for government  employment. In its April 2008 report, the Joint Reform Team called for an  executive branch governance structure to ensure accountability and  sustain reform momentum. In addition to the April 2008 report, the Joint  Reform Team has provided two other key reports, which collectively  communicate the reform effort’s plans for reforming the security  clearance process. First, in December 2008, the Joint Reform Team issued  a report on the progress of the reform efforts and provided further details  on the plans to implement reforms. Most recently, in March 2009, the Joint  Reform Team finalized an Enterprise Information Technology Strategy to  support the reformed security and suitability process and its associated  milestones described in the April and December reports. Figure 1  highlights key events related to security clearance reform.
My statement today will highlight the key recommendations from the two  reports we recently released, which include (1) the need for a fully  developed strategic framework for the reform process that includes  outcome-focused performance measures to show progress and (2) more  transparency in annually reporting to Congress on the timeliness and  quality of the clearance process. My statement is based on our review of  the Joint Reform Team’s plans, as well as our work on DOD’s security  clearance process, which includes reviews of clearance-related files and  interviews of senior officials at the Office of Management and Budget  (OMB), DOD, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and  OPM. In addition, this statement is based on key practices and  implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations.
We conducted our work on both reports between March 2008 and May  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Initial Reform Efforts Have Partially Aligned with Key Practices but Lack a Fully Developed Strategic Framework with Outcome-Focused Performance Measures to Show Progress
paragraphs: Initial joint reform efforts have, in part, aligned with key practices that we  have identified for organizational transformations, such as having  committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but reports  issued by the Joint Reform Team do not provide a strategic framework  that contains other important elements of a successful transformation,  such as a mission statement and long-term goals with related outcome- focused performance measures to show progress, and do not identify  obstacles to progress and possible remedies. In September 2002, GAO  convened a forum to identify and discuss practices and lessons learned  from major private and public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions,  and transformations that can serve to guide federal agencies as they  transform their processes in response to governance challenges.  Consistent with some of these key practices, in June 2008 Executive Order  13467 established the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance  Accountability Council, commonly known as the Performance  Accountability Council, as the head of the governmentwide governance  structure responsible for achieving reform goals, driving implementation,  and overseeing clearance reform efforts. The Deputy Director for  Management at OMB—who was confirmed in June 2009—serves as the  chair of the council. The Executive Order also designated Executive  Agents for Suitability and Security. The Joint Reform Team, while not  formally part of the governance structure established by Executive Order  13467, works under the council to provide progress reports to the  President, recommend research priorities, and oversee the development  and implementation of an information technology strategy, among other  things. Membership on this council currently includes senior executive  leaders from 11 federal agencies. In addition to high-level leadership, the  reform effort has benefited from a dedicated implementation team—the  Joint Reform Team—to manage the transformation process from the  beginning.
Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the current  reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is difficult to gauge  progress of reform, or determine if corrective action is needed, because  the council, through the Joint Reform Team, has not established a method  for evaluating the progress of the reform efforts. Without a strategic  framework that fully addresses the long-standing security clearance  problems and incorporates key practices for transformation—including  the ability to demonstrate progress leading to desired results—the Joint  Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decision makers the  extent of progress that it is making toward achieving its desired outcomes,  and the effort is at risk of losing momentum and not being fully  implemented.
In addition to the key practices, the personnel security clearance joint  reform reports that we reviewed collectively also have begun to address  essential factors for reforming the security clearance process, which  represents positive steps. GAO’s prior work and IRTPA identified several  factors key to reforming the clearance process. These include                    (1) developing a sound requirements determination process, (2) engaging  in governmentwide reciprocity, (3) building quality into every step of the  process, (4) consolidating information technology, and (5) identifying and  reporting long-term funding requirements. However, the Joint Reform  Team’s information technology strategy, which is intended to be a cross- agency collaborative initiative, does not yet define roles and  responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability. GAO’s prior  work has stressed the importance of defining these roles and  responsibilities when initiating cross-agency initiatives. Also, the joint  reform reports do not contain any information on initiatives that will  require funding, determine how much they will cost, or identify potential  funding sources. Without long-term funding requirements, decision makers  in both the executive and legislative branches will lack important  information for comparing and prioritizing proposals for reforming the  clearance processes. The reform effort’s success will be dependent upon  the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these  key factors moving forward.
Therefore, we recommended that the OMB Deputy Director of  Management, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability  Council, ensure that the appropriate entities—such as the Performance  Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team— establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include (1) a  mission statement and strategic goals; (2) outcome-focused performance  measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform effort toward  meeting its goals and addressing long-standing problems with the security  clearance process; (3) a formal, comprehensive communication strategy  that includes consistency of message and encourages two-way  communication between the Performance Accountability Council and key  stakeholders; (4) a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for the  implementation of the information technology strategy among all agencies  responsible for developing and implementing components of the  information technology strategy; and (5) long-term funding requirements  for security clearance reform, including estimates of potential cost savings  from the reformed process that are subsequently provided to decision  makers in Congress and the executive branch.
In oral comments on our report, OMB stated that it partially concurred  with our recommendation to establish a strategic framework for the joint  reform effort. Further, in written agency comments provided to us jointly  by DOD and ODNI, they also partially concurred with our  recommendation. Additionally, DOD and ODNI commented on the specific  elements of the strategic framework that we included as part of our  recommendation. For example, in their comments, DOD and ODNI agreed  that the reform effort must contain outcome-focused performance  measures, but added that these metrics must evolve as the process  improvements and new capabilities are developed and implemented  because the effort is iterative and in phased development. We continue to  believe that outcome-focused performance measures are a critical tool  that can be used to guide the reform effort and allow overseers to  determine when the reform effort has accomplished its goals and purpose.  In addition, DOD and ODNI asserted that considerable work has already  been done on information technology for the reform effort, but added that  even clearer roles and responsibilities will be identified moving forward.  Regarding our finding that, at present, no single database exists in  accordance with IRTPA’s requirement that OPM establish an integrated  database that tracks investigations and adjudication information, DOD and  ODNI stated that the reform effort continues its iterative implementation  of improvements to systems that improve access to information that  agencies need. They also acknowledged that more work needs to be done  to identify long-term funding requirements.
section_title: Executive Branch Reporting Does Not Provide Congress Full Visibility over Timeliness or Quality of Clearances
paragraphs: While our work also found that DOD and OPM met timeliness  requirements for personnel security clearances in fiscal year 2008, the  executive branch’s 2009 required report to Congress does not reflect the  full range of time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions. Currently,  80 percent of initial clearance decisions are to be made within 120 days, on  average, and by December 2009 a plan is to be implemented under which  to the extent practical 90 percent of initial clearance decisions are to be  made within 60 days, on average. Under both requirements, the executive  branch can exclude the slowest percentile, and then report on an average  of the remaining clearances. The most recent report stated that the  average time to complete the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for  military and DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days, on average.  However, without taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances, we  analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 and found that  39 percent still took more than 120 days. By limiting its reporting on  timeliness to the average of the fastest 90 percent of the initial clearance  decisions made in fiscal year 2008, the executive branch did not provide  congressional decision makers with visibility over the full range of time it  takes to make all initial clearance decisions and the reasons why delays  continue to exist.
In addition to limited visibility over timeliness of clearances, the executive  branch’s annual reports to Congress on the personnel security clearance  process have provided decision makers with limited data on quality, and  the executive branch has missed opportunities to make the clearance  process transparent to Congress. For example, we independently  estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports prepared  by OPM that DOD adjudicators (employees who decide whether to grant a  clearance to an applicant based on the investigation and other  information) used to make clearance decisions, for initial top secret  clearances adjudicated in July 2008, were missing required documentation.  We found, however, that DOD has not issued formal guidance clarifying if  and under what circumstances adjudicators can adjudicate incomplete  investigative reports. For DOD adjudicative files, we estimated that 22  percent were missing required documentation of the rationale for  granting clearances to applicants with security concerns. Because neither  OPM nor DOD measures the completeness of their investigative reports or  adjudicative files, both agencies are limited in their ability to explain the  extent to which or the reasons why some documents are incomplete.  Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in the time needed to  complete the clearance process and in the overall costs of the process and  may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to  prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. We  have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of  the clearance process and emphasized that attention to quality could  increase reciprocity—accepting another federal entity’s clearances—and  the executive branch, though not required to include information on  quality in its annual reports, has latitude to report appropriate information.  We are encouraged that, while the 2009 report did not provide any data on  quality, unlike previous reports it did identify quality metrics that the  executive branch proposes to collect.
Because the executive branch has not fully addressed quality or the full  range of time to complete clearances in its reports, it has missed  opportunities to provide congressional decision makers with full  transparency over the clearance process. Therefore, in our recent report,  we recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at OMB, as  the Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, include (1)  comprehensive data on the timeliness of the personnel security clearance  process and (2) metrics on quality in future versions of the IRTPA-required  annual report to Congress. We also recommended that DOD clarify its  guidance to specify when adjudicators can use incomplete investigative  reports in adjudication decisions and that OPM and DOD measure the  completeness of their investigation and adjudication documentation to  improve the completeness of future documentation. In commenting on a  draft of our report, OMB concurred with both of our recommendations to  that agency, commenting that it recognized the need for more reporting on  timeliness and quality. OMB described some steps that the Performance  Accountability Council is taking to address our recommendations,  including developing measures to account, more comprehensively, for the  time it takes to complete the end-to-end clearance process. In its written  comments, DOD also concurred with both of the recommendations  directed to the department, and described specific steps it expects to  implement later this year to address the recommendations. Finally, in its  written comments, OPM did not indicate whether it concurred with the  one recommendation we made to that agency. Instead, OPM highlighted  improvements it has made in reducing delays in the clearance  investigations process since DOD transferred this function to OPM in 2005.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: In my statement, I have highlighted recommendations from the two  reports we recently released that, if implemented, will help the responsible  agencies continue to guide the security clearance reform effort and  improve the clearance process. We are encouraged that the Joint Reform  Team’s efforts during the past year have included several actions to  improve the process, and we recognize that OPM and DOD are currently  meeting IRTPA timeliness requirements, which represents significant and  noteworthy progress. At the request of your Subcommittee, we will  continue to monitor ongoing joint reform efforts with a focus on  reciprocity and information technology advances, as well as efforts by the  responsible agencies to implement our related recommendations, and we  will continue to assess the impact of those efforts on the security  clearance process governmentwide. Although the high-level leadership  and governance structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from  previous attempts at clearance reform, it is important to note that, in June  2009 the administration confirmed a vital leadership component necessary  for sustaining the momentum achieved to date. OMB’s new Deputy  Director for Management will play a crucial role in deciding how to  implement the recommendations contained in the reports we recently  released, as well as prior recommendations on this issue, and in leading  the reform effort in his role as chair of the Performance Accountability  Council.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  happy to respond to any questions that you or members of the  Subcommittee may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Brenda S.  Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at (202) 512-3604,  or farrellb@gao.gov. Key contributors to this statement include David  Moser (Assistant Director), Lori Atkinson, Joseph M. Capuano, Sara  Cradic, Susan Ditto, Cindy Gilbert, Shvetal Khanna, James P. Klein, Greg  Marchand, Shannin O’Neil, and Sarah Veale. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this testimony.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce  Delays But Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain  Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed  to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, D.C.:  May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 22,  2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness  and Quality. GAO-09-261R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.
Personnel Security Clearance: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T.  Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February  27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found For Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed To  Improve The Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record  Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security  Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances  for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.  GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.