Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and Assessment Efforts
Published: 2012-05-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Border Patrol, within DHSs CBP, is the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the national borders between the U.S. ports of entry (POE). DHS has completed a new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan) that Border Patrol officials stated will emphasize risk management instead of increased resources to achieve border security and continue to build on the foundation of the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). This statement highlights key issues from prior GAO reports that discuss Border Patrols progress and challenges in (1) implementing key elements of the 2004 Strategy and (2) achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain operational control of the border. This statement is based on GAO reports issued since 2007 on border security, with selected updates from April and May 2012 on Border Patrol resource needs, actions taken to address prior GAO recommendations, and efforts to develop performance measures. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed agency documents such as operational assessments and interviewed DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAOs prior work has highlighted progress and challenges in various areas related to Border Patrols implementation of its 2004 National Strategy, which could provide insights as Border Patrol transitions to its 2012 Strategic Plan. Border Patrol officials stated that the 2012 Strategic Plan will rely on Border Patrol and federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners working together to use a risk-based approach to secure the border, and include the key elements of Information, Integration, and Rapid Response to achieve objectives. These elements were similar to those in the 2004 Strategy and GAOs past work highlighted the progress and challenges the agency faced obtaining information necessary for border security; integrating security operations with partners; and mobilizing a rapid response to security threats. Border Patrol successfully used interagency forums and joint operations to counter threats, but challenges included assessing the benefits of border technology and infrastructure to, among other things, provide information on situational awareness. For example, in May 2010 GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had not accounted for the effect of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on security. GAO recommended that CBP conduct an analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure on border security, with which CBP concurred. Further, GAO identified challenges in DHS efforts to coordinate with partners that help to secure the border. For example, in December 2010 GAO reported that various northern border security partners cited ongoing challenges sharing information and resources for border security operations and investigations, and that DHS did not have mechanisms for providing oversight. GAO recommended that DHS provide oversight, to which DHS concurred and stated that in January 2012 the department established an intercomponent Advisory Council to provide oversight of compliance with interagency agreements.
GAOs prior work showed that as of September 30, 2010, Border Patrol reported achieving its 2004 goal of operational controlwhere Border Patrol has the ability to detect and interdict illegal activityfor 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders. DHS transitioned at the end of fiscal year 2010 from using operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security to using an interim measure of apprehensions on the southwest border. DHS reported that this interim measure would be used until such time as DHS developed a new goal and measure for border security that will reflect a more quantitative methodology across border locations and the agencys evolving view of border security. As GAO previously testified, this interim measure, while providing useful information on activity levels, is an output measure that does not inform on program results. Therefore, it limits oversight and accountability and has reduced information provided to Congress and the public on program results. DHS stated that it had several efforts underway to establish a new measure used to assess efforts to secure the border but as this measure is under development, it is too early to assess it.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to, among other things, strengthen border security technology, infrastructure, and partnerships. DHS concurred with the recommendations and has reported actions planned or underway to address them. CBP reviewed a draft of information contained in this statement and provided comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work highlighting the  U.S. Border Patrol’s progress and challenges implementing its 2004  National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy) that could be relevant to  the new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic  Plan). Border Patrol, within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is the federal agency with  primary responsibility for securing the national borders between the  designated U.S. land border ports of entry (POE). Border Patrol’s 2004  Strategy to secure the borders focused on ensuring the agency had the  right mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure across locations,  and Border Patrol experienced significant increases in these resources  since 2004. For example, from fiscal year 2004 through 2011, the number  of Border Patrol agents has nearly doubled from about 10,800 to nearly  21,500; and DHS reported that since fiscal year 2006, about $4.4 billion  has been invested in border technology and infrastructure. These  resources were used to support the DHS goal to achieve operational  control of the nation’s borders. The extent of operational control—also  referred to as effective control—was defined as the number of border  miles where Border Patrol had the ability to detect, respond to, and  interdict cross-border illegal activity. DHS last reported its progress and  status in achieving operational control of the borders in fiscal year 2010,  and reported this information to Congress and the public in its Fiscal Year  2008-2010 Annual Performance Report in accordance with requirements  in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).
DHS has completed but not yet publically released a new 2012-2016  Strategic Plan that Border Patrol officials stated will emphasize risk  management instead of increased resources to achieve border security  and that will continue to build on the foundation of the 2004 Strategy.  However, the performance goal and measures that will be used to provide  oversight and accountability for the new strategic plan have not yet been  established. In its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report and  subsequent reports, DHS replaced the border security goal and measure  of operational control with an interim measure of the number of  apprehensions on the southwest border to report its status and progress  in achieving border security to Congress and the public. As of April 2012,  DHS had yet to develop a new goal for border security. DHS reported that  the interim measure of apprehensions on the southwest border would be  used until such time as DHS developed a new goal and measure for  border security that will reflect a more quantitative methodology across  border locations and the agency’s evolving view of border security.
In the past, we have reviewed and reported on a variety of border security  programs and related performance goals and measures supporting the  2004 Strategy that could inform discussions regarding the 2012-2016  Strategic Plan. Today I will highlight key issues on the Border Patrol’s  progress and challenges relevant to  (1) implementing key elements of the 2004 Strategy, and  (2) achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain operational control of the  border.
In addition, appendixes I and II provide information on characteristics of  effective national security strategies and performance measures,  respectively.
My statement is based on prior products issued from 2007 to the present  that examined DHS’s efforts to secure the U.S. borders (see related GAO  products at the end of this statement), with selected updates related to  the Border Patrol’s new strategic plan conducted in April and May 2012.  For those reports and testimonies, we obtained and analyzed documents  and information from officials from various components of DHS; the  Department of Justice (DOJ); the Department of Interior (DOI); the United  States Department of Agriculture (USDA); and Canadian, tribal, state, and  local law enforcement agencies with a vested interest in border security  along the northern or southwest borders. More detailed information about  our scope and methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies.  For the selected updates we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters  officials regarding the forthcoming 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic  Plan and the status of agency efforts to develop performance measures  for assessing the security of the border between the POEs, as well as  reviewed relevant information contained in Border Patrol 2012  Operational Requirements Based Budget Process (ORBBP)—operational  assessments—and other documents. We also reviewed our prior work  on key elements of effective national security strategies and previous  work on key attributes of successful performance measures consistent  with GPRA. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that  we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: Border Patrol Progress and Challenges Implementing Key Elements of Its 2004 National Strategy
paragraphs: The Border Patrol developed its 2004 Strategy following the terrorist  attacks of September 11, 2001, as a framework for the agency’s new  priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from  entering the United States and to support its traditional mission of  preventing aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from  crossing U.S. borders illegally. The 2004 Strategy was designed to  facilitate the buildup and deployment of agency and border resources and  to consolidate the agency into a more centralized organization.
Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that the 2012-2016 Strategic  Plan will rely on Border Patrol and federal, state, local, tribal, and  international partners working together to use a risk-based approach to  secure the border that uses the key elements of “Information, Integration,  and Rapid Response” to achieve Border Patrol strategic objectives. Our  past reviews of border security programs contained information on the  progress and challenges related to implementing these key elements. Our  observations are as follows.
Obtaining Information Necessary for Border Security. Critical to  implementation of the 2004 Strategy was the use of intelligence to assess  risk, target enforcement efforts, and drive operations, according to the  strategy. As part of their intelligence efforts, CBP and Border Patrol  worked to develop and deploy the next generation of border surveillance  and sensoring platforms to maximize the Border Patrol’s ability to detect,  respond, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. Border Patrol  headquarters officials reported that the new 2012-2016 Strategic Plan  also has a focus on information that provides situational awareness and  intelligence developed by blending technology, reconnaissance, and sign- cutting and tracking, to understand the threats faced along the nation’s  borders. Our prior work reviewing CBP’s efforts to deploy capabilities to,  among other things, provide situational awareness along U.S. borders  provides insights that could inform Border Patrol considerations in  implementing its new strategic plan.
As of fiscal year end 2010, Border Patrol reported having substantial  detection resources in place across 45 percent of the nation’s border  miles. The remaining 55 percent of border miles—primarily on the  northern and coastal borders—were considered vulnerable due to limited  resource availability or inaccessibility, with some knowledge available to  develop a rudimentary border control strategy. Our review of Border  Patrol 2012 operational assessments also showed concerns about  resource availability to provide the information necessary to secure the  border. Across Border Patrol’s 20 sectors located on the northern,  southwest, and southeast coastal borders, all sectors reported a need for  new or replacement technology used to detect and track illegal activity,  and the majority (19) reported a need for additional agents to maintain or  attain an acceptable level of border security. Additionally, 12 sectors  reported a need for additional infrastructure.
DHS, CBP, and Border Patrol are continuing to focus attention on  development, acquisition, and deployment of technology and  infrastructure needed to provide the information necessary to secure the  borders, with priority for the southwest border. Our past work highlighted  the continuing challenges the agency faced implementing technology and  infrastructure at the U.S. land borders.
Technology. We previously reported that in January 2011, after 5  years and a cost of nearly $1 billion, DHS ended the Secure Border  Initiative Network (SBInet), a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar technology  effort aimed at securing U.S. borders because it did not meet cost- effectiveness and viability standards. DHS developed a successor  plan to secure the border—the Alternative (Southwest) Border  Technology plan—where CBP is to focus on developing terrain- and  population-based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such  as camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region  beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. In November 2011, we  reported that CBP’s planned technology deployment plan for the  Arizona border, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan,  was expected to cost approximately $1.5 billion over 10  years. However, we also reported that CBP did not have the  information needed to fully support and implement the technology  deployment plan in accordance with DHS and Office of Management  and Budget guidance, among other things.DHS determine the mission benefits to be derived from  implementation of the plan and develop and apply key attributes for  metrics to assess program implementation. DHS concurred with our  recommendation and reported that it planned to develop a set of  measures to assess the effectiveness and benefits of future  technology investments.  Infrastructure. In May 2010, we testified that CBP had not accounted  for the effect of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on   Border fencing was designed to impede people on  border security. foot and vehicles from crossing the border and to enhance Border  Patrol’s ability to detect and interdict violators. CBP estimated that  border fencing and other infrastructure had a life-cycle cost of about  $6.5 billion for deployment, operations, and maintenance. CBP  reported a resulting increase in control of southwest border miles, but  could not account separately for the effect of the border fencing and  other infrastructure. In a September 2009 report, we recommended  that CBP conduct an analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure on  border security.with the Homeland Security Institute (HSI)—a federally funded  research and development center—to analyze the effect of tactical   CBP concurred and reported that it had contracted  infrastructure on the security of the border.had not provided an update on this effort.
As of May 2012, CBP  Integrating Border Security Operations with Federal, State, Local,  Tribal, and International Partners. Leveraging the law enforcement  resources of federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners was a  key element of Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy and Border Patrol’s  implementation of the strategy, on the northern and coastal borders  where Border Patrol had fewer resources relative to the size of the  geographic area, and on the southwest border where Border Patrol used  the assistance of law enforcement partners to conduct surge operations  in high-priority areas. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that  integration of border security operations will be a key element of the  2012-2016 Strategic Plan across all borders. Our prior work reviewing  coordination among various stakeholders with responsibilities for helping  to secure the border provides insights for consideration as Border Patrol  transitions to its new strategic plan.
We previously reviewed Border Patrol efforts to coordinate law  enforcement resources across partners on the northern border and on  federal border lands. On the northern border, we reported in December  2010 that federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners operating in  four Border Patrol sectors we visited stated that efforts to establish  interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a common  understanding of border security status and threats, and that joint  operations helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement  response. However, numerous partners cited challenges related to the  inability to resource the increasing number of interagency forums and  raised concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. We found that  DHS did not oversee the interagency forums established by its  components. Further, we also reported that while Border Patrol and other  federal partners stated that federal agency coordination to secure the  northern border was improved, partners in all four sectors we visited cited  long-standing and ongoing challenges sharing information and resources  for daily border security related to operations and investigations.  Challenges were attributed to continued disagreement on roles and  responsibilities and competition for performance statistics used to inform  resource allocation decisions. DHS established and updated interagency  agreements designed to clarify roles and responsibilities for agencies with  overlapping missions or geographic areas of responsibility, but oversight  by management at the component and local levels had not ensured  consistent compliance with provisions of these agreements. We  previously reported that governmentwide efforts to strengthen interagency  collaboration have been hindered by the lack of agreement on roles and  responsibilities and agency performance management systems that do  not recognize or reward interagency collaboration. Thus, we  recommended, among other things, that DHS provide guidance and  oversight for interagency forums established or sponsored by its  components and provide regular oversight of component compliance with  the provisions of interagency Memorandum of Understandings. DHS  concurred with our recommendation and stated that the structure of the  department precluded DHS-level oversight, but that it would review the  inventory of interagency forums through its strategic and operational  planning efforts to assess efficiency. DHS officials stated that in January  2012 the department established an intercomponent Advisory Council to  address our recommendation that DHS provide oversight of compliance  with interagency agreements.
We also reported in December 2010 that while there is a high reliance on  law enforcement support from partners on the northern border, the extent  of law enforcement resources available to address border security  vulnerabilities was not reflected in Border Patrol’s processes for  assessing border security and resource requirements. We previously  reported that federal agencies should identify resources among  collaborating agencies to deliver results more efficiently and that DHS  had not fully responded to a legislative requirement to link initiatives— including partnerships—to existing border vulnerabilities to inform federal  resource allocation decisions. Development of policy and guidance to  integrate available partner resources in northern border security  assessments and resource planning documents could provide the agency  and Congress with more complete information necessary to make  resource allocation decisions in mitigating existing border vulnerabilities.  Thus, we recommended that DHS direct CBP to develop policy and  guidance necessary to identify, assess, and integrate the available  partner resources in northern border sector security assessments and  resource planning documents. DHS concurred with our recommendation  and has taken action to formulate new policy and guidance in associated  strategic planning efforts.
In our November 2010 report on interagency coordination on northern  federal borderlands in Border Patrol’s Spokane sector and southwest  federal borderlands in Border Patrol’s Tucson sector, we reported, among  other things, that Border Patrol, DOI, and USDA had established forums  and liaisons to exchange information. However, while information  sharing and communication among these agencies had increased in  recent years, critical gaps remained in implementing interagency  agreements to share intelligence information and compatible secure radio  communications for daily border security operations. We reported that  coordination in these areas could better ensure officer safety and an  efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity. In addition, there  was little interagency coordination to share intelligence assessments of  border security threats to federal lands and develop budget requests,  strategies, and joint operations to address these threats. We reported that  interagency efforts to implement provisions of existing agreements in  these areas could better leverage law enforcement partner resources and  knowledge for more effective border security operations on federal lands.  Thus, we recommended that DHS, DOI, and USDA take the necessary  action to further implement interagency agreements. The departments  concurred with our recommendation. In response, Border Patrol issued a  memorandum to all Border Patrol sectors emphasizing the importance of  USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security threats on federal  lands. While this action is a positive step toward implementing our  recommendation, we continue to believe that DHS should take additional  steps necessary to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing  interagency agreements, including provisions to share intelligence and  resource requirements for enhancing border security on federal lands.
Mobilizing a Rapid Response to Border Security Threats. One of the  elements of Border Patrol’s 2004 National Strategy was to improve the  mobility and rapid deployment of personnel and resources to quickly  counter and interdict threats based on shifts in smuggling routes and  tactical intelligence. CBP reported expanding the training and response  capabilities of the Border Patrol’s specialized response teams to support  domestic and international intelligence-driven and antiterrorism efforts as  well as other special operations. Border Patrol headquarters officials  stated that “Rapid Response,” defined as the ability of Border Patrol and  its partners to quickly and appropriately respond to changing threats, will  also be a key element of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan; and in fiscal year  2011, Border Patrol allocated agent positions to provide a national group  of organized, trained, and equipped Border Patrol agents who are  capable of rapid movement to regional and national incidents in support  of priority CBP missions. Our prior work and review of Border Patrol’s  2012 operational assessments provide observations that could inform  Border Patrol’s transition to and implementation of its new strategic plan.
Our review of Border Patrol 2012 operational assessments showed that  Border Patrol sectors had used resources mobilized from other Border  Patrol sectors or provided by law enforcement partners to maintain or  increase border security. Border Patrol, for example, mobilized personnel  and air assets from Yuma sector to neighboring Tucson sector, which  cited that the coordination of operational activities was critical to the  overall success of operations. Similarly, National Guard personnel and  resources have been used to bridge or augment Border Patrol staffing  until new agents are trained and deployed. The Department of Defense  (DOD) estimated costs of about $1.35 billion for National Guard support  of DHS’s border security mission in the four southwest border states  (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) from June 2006 through  September 30, 2011.
However, Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they had not  fully assessed to what extent the augmented mobile response resources  would be sufficient to preclude the need to redeploy personnel and  resources needed to secure higher-priority border locations at the  expense of lower-priority locations, or changes in the type or continued  need of resources from its law enforcement partners. Within Border  Patrol, for example, our review of the 2012 operational assessments  showed that Border Patrol reported difficulty maintaining border control in  areas from which resources have been redeployed. Border Patrol stations  within six of the nine southwest border sectors have reported that agent  deployments to other stations have affected their own deployment and  enforcement activities.
section_title: Border Patrol Progress and Challenges in Achieving Its Strategic Goal for Border Security
paragraphs: The DHS goal and measure of operational control used in conjunction  with the 2004 Strategy provided oversight of five levels of border control  that were based on the increasing availability of information and  resources, which Border Patrol used to detect, respond, and interdict  illegal cross-border activity either at the border or after entry into the  United States (see table 1). The top two levels—”controlled” and  “managed”—reflect Border Patrol’s reported achievement of “operational  control,” in that resources were in place and sufficient to detect, respond,  and interdict illegal activity either at the immediate border (controlled  level) or after the illegal entry occurs (managed level), sometimes up to  100 miles away. The remaining three levels reflected lower levels of  border control, where Border Patrol has less ability to detect, respond to,  or interdict illegal activity due to insufficient resources or inaccessibility.
DHS reported achieving operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of  8,607 miles across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders at the  time it discontinued use of this performance goal at the end of fiscal year  2010 (see fig. 1). Nearly 80 percent of border miles Border Patrol  reported to be under operational control were on the U.S. southwest  border with Mexico. Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles  under operational control using factors such as operational statistics,  third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, resource  deployments and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents. Our  analysis of the 1,107 border miles Border Patrol reported to be under  operational control showed that about 12 percent were classified as  “controlled,” which was the highest sustainable level for both detection  and interdiction at the immediate border. The remaining 88 percent of  these 1,1,07 border miles were classified as “managed,” in that  interdictions may be achieved after illegal entry by multi-tiered  enforcement operations.
Across the 20 Border Patrol sectors on the national borders, Yuma sector  on the southwest border reported achieving operational control for all of  its border miles as of the end of fiscal year 2010. In contrast, the other 19  sectors reported achieving operational control ranging from 0 to 86  percent of their border miles (see fig. 2). Border Patrol officials attributed  the uneven progress across sectors to multiple factors, including a need  to prioritize resource deployment to sectors deemed to have greater risk  of illegal activity as well as terrain and transportation infrastructure on  both sides of the border.
Our analysis of the remaining 7,500 national border miles that Border  Patrol reported as not under operational control at the end of fiscal year  2010 showed that nearly two-thirds of these border miles were  considered at the level of “low-level monitored,” meaning that some  knowledge was available to develop a rudimentary border control  strategy, but border security was vulnerable due to limited resources or  inaccessibility (see fig. 3). The approximate one-third of these border  miles remaining at the higher “monitored” level were judged to have  substantial detection resources in place, but accessibility and resources  continue to affect Border Patrol’s ability to respond. Border Patrol  reported that these two levels of control were not acceptable for border  security. No border miles were classified at the lowest level of  “remote/low activity” as a result of insufficient information to develop a  meaningful border control strategy.
DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome  measure for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual  Performance Report, which since September 30, 2010, has reduced  information provided to Congress and the public on program results.  Citing a need to establish a new border security goal and measure that  reflect a more quantitative methodology as well as the department’s  evolving vision for border control, DHS established an interim  performance measure until a new border control goal and measure could  be developed. As we previously testified, this interim GPRA measure— the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between the ports  of entry (POE)—is an output measure, which, while providing useful  information on activity levels, does not inform on program results and  therefore could reduce oversight and DHS accountability. Studies  commissioned by CBP have documented that the number of  apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency  officials do not compare these numbers to the amount of illegal activity  that crosses the border. CBP officials told us they would continue to use  interim measures for GPRA reporting purposes until new outcome  measures are implemented; as of April 2012 CBP officials did not have an  estimated implementation date for a new border security goal and  measure.
DHS stated that it had three efforts underway to improve the measures  used to assess its programs and activities to secure the border. However,  as these measures have not yet been implemented, it is too early to  assess them and determine how they will be used to provide oversight of  border security efforts. One of two efforts, led by CBP with assistance  from the Homeland Security Institute (HSI), is to develop a Border  Condition Index (BCI) that is intended to be a new outcome-based  measure that will be used to publicly report progress in meeting a new  border security goal in support of GPRA. The BCI methodology would  consider various factors, such as the percentage of illegal entries  apprehended and community well-being. CBP is in the process of  finalizing the BCI measure and did not provide us with a time frame for its  implementation. The second CBP effort is to create a measure of the  change in illegal flow of persons across the southwest border using a  statistical model developed by HSI, which uses data on apprehensions  and recidivism rates for persons illegally crossing the border. DHS  officials said that they had not yet determined whether results from this  model would be used for GPRA reporting in the Fiscal Year 2012 DHS  Annual Performance Plan, or for internal management purposes and  reported to Congress in support of the annual budget request. The third  effort, led by Border Patrol, is to standardize and strengthen the metrics  that had formerly supported the measure of “border miles under effective  (operational) control” that DHS removed as a GPRA goal and measure  beginning in fiscal year 2011. As of April 2012, Border Patrol  headquarters officials were working to develop border security goals and  measures, but did not yet have a target time frame for implementation.
While these new metrics are in development, Border Patrol operational  assessments from fiscal years 2010 and 2012 show that field agents  continued to use a different and evolving mix of performance indicators  across Border Patrol sectors to inform the status of border security.  These performance indicators generally included a mix of enforcement  measures related to changes in the number of estimated known illegal  entries and apprehensions, as well as changes in third-party indicators  such as crime rates in border communities. Border Patrol officials said  that the differences in the mix of performance indicators across sectors  and time reflected differences in sector officials’ judgment of what  indicators best reflect border security, given each sector’s unique  circumstance. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that they were  moving to standardize the indicators used by sectors on each border but  did not yet have a time frame for completing this effort.
Chairwoman Miller and Ranking Member Cuellar this completes my  prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or  the members of the subcommittee may have.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler at  (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  included David Alexander, Cindy Ayers, Charles Bausell, Jr., Frances  Cook, Michele Fejfar, Barbara Guffy, Brian Lipman, Jessica Orr, and  Susan Sachs.
section_title: Appendix I: Characteristics of Effective Security Strategies
paragraphs: We have previously reported on desirable characteristics of effective  security strategies through our prior work on national security planning.  These six characteristics and their elements could assist Border Patrol in  its efforts to ensure that the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan  (2012-2016 Strategic Plan) is an effective mechanism for achieving  results.
Purpose, scope and methodology. This characteristic addresses  why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the  process by which it was developed. Border Patrol could discuss the  specific impetus that led to the new strategic plan, for example, a  terrorist event or changes in the external environment such as  decreases in illegal activity or changes in organizational makeup such  as significant increases in resources and capabilities. In addition to  describing what the strategy is meant to do and the major functions,  mission areas, or activities it covers, a national strategy would  address its methodology, such as which organizations drafted or  provided input to the document. For example, Border Patrol could  identify parties or stakeholders who were consulted in the  development of the strategy, such as federal law enforcement  partners, relevant state and local agencies, and tribal organizations.
Problem definition and risk assessment. This characteristic  addresses the particular national problems and threats the strategy is  directed towards. Border Patrol could develop a detailed discussion of  primary threats—such as the illegal flow of migrants, smugglers, and  other criminals or persons linked with terrorism across the border—as  well as their causes and operating environment. This characteristic  also entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threat to,  and vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations. Border Patrol  could ensure that the strategic plan is informed by a national risk  assessment that includes a comprehensive examination of threats  and vulnerabilities across all U.S. borders, to include key  infrastructures and assets. A discussion of the quality of data  available for this assessment, such as known constraints or  deficiencies in key data on estimated volume of persons illegally  crossing the border, could also be pertinent.
Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance  measures. This characteristic addresses what the strategy is trying to  achieve, steps to achieve those results, and priorities, milestones, and  performance measures to gauge results. For example, Border Patrol  could identify what the strategic plan is attempting to achieve—a  specific end state such as securing the nation’s borders—and identify  and prioritize the specific steps and activities needed to achieve that  end state, such as prioritizing the resourcing of sectors and stations in  high-risk border areas. Identifying milestones and performance  measures for achieving results according to specific time frames could  help to ensure effective oversight and accountability. Border Patrol  could, for example, identify milestones for developing an  implementation plan, with time frames, which would guide the  execution of the strategy and ensure that key steps such as  completing a comprehensive risk assessment or developing  appropriate outcome measures are achieved. This characteristic also  emphasizes the importance of establishing outcome-related  performance measures that link back to goals and objectives. For  example, Border Patrol could develop outcome measures that show  to what extent it has met its goal for securing the nation’s borders.
Resources, investments, and risk management. This characteristic  addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of  resources and investments needed, and where resources and  investments should be targeted based on balancing risk reductions  with costs. A national strategy could include criteria and appropriate  mechanisms to allocate resources based on identified needs. Border  Patrol could develop information on the costs of fully implementing the  strategic plan, as well as a comprehensive baseline of resources and  investments needed by sectors and stations to achieve the mission of  securing the nation’s borders. According to our previous work, risk  management focuses security efforts on those activities that bring  about the greatest reduction in risk given the resources used. The  strategic plan could elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned  previously and provide guidance on how to manage resources and  investments.
Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. This  characteristic addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what  their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to  coordinate their efforts. A strategy could clarify organizations’  relationships in terms of partnering and might also identify specific  processes for coordination between entities. For example, Border  Patrol could build upon relations with federal, state, local, and tribal  law enforcement organizations by further clarifying how these  relationships can be organized to further leverage resources.  Integration and implementation. This characteristic addresses how  a national strategy relates to other strategies’ goals, objectives, and  activities, and to subordinate levels of government and their plans to  implement the strategy. For example, a national strategy could  discuss how its scope complements, expands upon, or overlaps with  other national strategies. Border Patrol could ensure that its 2012- 2016 Strategic Plan explains how it complements the strategies of  other CBP agencies, such as the Office of Air and Marine and the  Office of Field Operations, which oversees the nation’s ports of entry,  as well as U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s overall strategy.
section_title: Appendix II: Characteristics of Effective Performance Measures
paragraphs: Under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Border  Patrol performance measures should be developed in the context of the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission and objectives for  securing the U.S. border. In its Annual Performance Report for fiscal  years 2010-2012, DHS discussed border security under Mission 2:  Securing and Managing Our Borders. Under this mission, there were  interim Border Patrol performance measures supporting Goal 2.1: Secure  U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders, defined as preventing the illegal flow of  people and goods across U.S. air, land, and sea borders. There were two  objectives supporting this goal:
Objective 2.1.1 Prevent illegal entry of people, weapons, dangerous  goods and contraband, and protect against cross-border threats to  health, the environment, and agriculture, while facilitating the safe flow  of lawful travel and commerce.
Objective 2.1.2 Prevent illegal export and exit of weapons, proceeds  of crime, and other dangerous goods, and the exit of malicious actors.
We have previously reported on key attributes of successful performance  measures consistent with GPRA. Some of these attributes suggest that  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol consider  the following in efforts to develop and standardize performance indicators  and metrics:
Measures should cover the core program activities that Border  Patrol is expected to perform. At the broadest level, the DHS goal  suggests measuring Border Patrol outcomes for preventing the illegal  flow of people across the border between the ports of entry, as well as  the illegal flow of goods. Border Patrol metrics comparing estimated  illegal entries to apprehensions could serve to show how its efforts  contribute to stemming the illegal flow of people across the border. As  of April 2012, Border Patrol did not have a metric for performance  related to stemming the illegal flow of goods, such as drugs, between  the ports of entry in support of the border security goal. Border Patrol  headquarters officials stated that they were not likely to develop a  measure, per se, on contraband seizures that would apply across all  sectors. According to these officials, although the Border Patrol plays  a vital role in seizing contraband at the borders, it views this role as  part of the larger security function played by many different agencies  at all government levels.
Measures should be balanced to cover CBP and DHS priorities.
Border Patrol could establish specific performance measures that  support CBP and DHS priorities, such as those listed in the objectives  supporting the overall DHS goal. For example, in measuring the ability  to prevent the illegal flow of persons, Border Patrol, in consultation  with CBP and DHS, could choose to separately measure the illegal  flow of migrants, smugglers, and other criminals, or persons linked  with terrorism, crossing the border between the ports of entry.  Similarly, in measuring the ability to prevent the flow of dangerous  goods, Border Patrol could choose to separately measure the flow of  weapons, illegal drugs, or proceeds of crime, such as bulk cash.  Border Patrol could also establish separate performance measures for  its ability to prevent the entry and exit of persons and goods across  the border.
Measures should link and align with measures of other  components and at successive levels of the organization. DHS  could ensure that performance measures established by Border Patrol  align with measures at the CBP and departmental level, as well as  those established by other components that contribute toward the  goal to secure our borders, such as Customs and Border Protection’s  Office of Field Operations (OFO), which has responsibility for securing  the border at the ports of entry. For example, Border Patrol metrics  estimating the flow of illegal entries between the ports of entry aligns  with OFO metrics to measure for the illegal flow of persons through  the ports of entry, and metrics of both components could be aligned  with an overall effort by CBP to measure the overall flow of persons  illegally crossing the southwest border. DHS could also choose to  establish a performance measure informing on the flow of persons  into the United States who overstay their authorized period of  admission or other means that could similarly link to the overall DHS  estimate of persons illegally residing in the United States. Linking  performance measures such as these across the organization informs  on how well each program or activity is contributing toward the overall  goal to prevent illegal entry of persons, reinforces accountability, and  ensures that day-to-day activities contribute to the results the  organization is trying to achieve.
Measures should reflect governmentwide priorities, such as  quality, timeliness, and cost of service. Border Patrol could  establish performance measures that are consistent with any  measures developed by CBP and DHS to reflect the time frames and  cost efficiencies in securing the border across locations. For example,  CBP and DHS could establish measures that reflect the overall cost or  timeframe to secure the border as indicated by changes in the illegal  flow of persons or goods relative to its investment across components  and programs. At the Border Patrol level, such a measure could  compare the relative cost efficiencies achieved across border  locations that use a different mix of personnel, technology, or  strategies to secure the border.
Measures should have a numerical goal, be reasonably free from  significant bias or manipulation, and be reliable in producing the  same result under similar conditions. As of April 2012, Border  Patrol was working to improve the quality of its border security  measures to reflect a more quantitative methodology to estimate the  number of illegal entries across the border compared to  apprehensions, and other metrics. However, Border Patrol officials  said that comparable performance measures should not be applied to  the northern or coastal borders, providing an inconsistent picture of  security for the majority of U.S. border miles. We reported that in  circumstances where complete information is not available to  measure performance outcomes, agencies could use intermediate  goals and measures to show progress or contribution to intended  results. For example, Border Patrol could lack the detection capability  necessary as a first step to estimate illegal entries across most of the  northern border and some other border locations. In these  circumstances, Border Patrol could choose to establish performance  measures tracking progress in establishing this detection capability.
Once Border Patrol achieves the ability to detect illegal activity across  its borders, it could then transition to measures for reducing the flow  of illegal activity and for interdiction. On the southwest border, Border  Patrol could also choose to establish intermediate measures in  reaching southwest border security goals. Such intermediate  performance measures could include those that use Global  Positioning System data for each apprehension to show Border Patrol  progress in apprehending persons at or close to the border compared  to enforcement tiers located miles away.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Border Security: Observations on Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of a  Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land  Border. GAO-12-657T. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2012.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of  DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30,  2012.
Homeland Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border  Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011  Expenditure Plan. GAO-12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and  Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.:  November 4, 2011.
Border Security: Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased  Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land  Border. GAO-11-856R. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2011.
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key  Southwest Border Technology Programs. GAO-11-448T. Washington,  D.C.: March 15, 2011.
Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for Strengthening the  Federal Government’s Efforts to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling.  GAO-11-407T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2011.
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures  for the Southwest Border. GAO-11-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 15,  2011.
Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of  Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97.  Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a  Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands.  GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010.
Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s  Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling. GAO-11-73.  Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and  Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. GAO-11-6. Washington, D.C.: October  18, 2010.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited  Understanding of Air Exit Options. GAO-10-860. Washington, D.C.:  August 10, 2010.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Border Security Fencing,  Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2010 Expenditure Plan.  GAO-10-877R. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010.
Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien Smuggling along the  Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative Resources and Measuring  Program Performance. GAO-10-919T. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2010.
National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen  Interagency Collaboration. GAO-10-822T. Washington, D.C.: June 9,  2010.
Border Security: Improvements in the Department of State’s Development  Process Could Increase the Security of Passport Cards and Border  Crossing Cards. GAO-10-589. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2010.
Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative Resources  and Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border.  GAO-10-328 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2010)
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed  Investment in Key Technology Program. GAO-10-340. Washington, D.C.:  May 5, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying  Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. GAO-10-651T.  Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.
Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism  Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement, but Additional Efforts  are Needed. GAO-10-41. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2009.
Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of  Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed. GAO-10-13.  Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2009.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of  National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information  Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the  Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but  More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could  Improve Effectiveness. GAO-09-824. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2009.
Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico  Face Planning and Coordination Challenges. GAO-09-709. Washington,  D.C.: June 18, 2009.
Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better Inform Congress by  Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address  Vulnerabilities. GAO-09-93. Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in  Delivering Key Technology Investments. GAO-08-1086. Washington,  D.C.: September 22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges.  GAO-08-1141T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying  Lessons Learned to Future Projects. GAO-08-508T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections  Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.:  January 3, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections  Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-219. Washington: D.C.:  November 5, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet  Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: October 24,  2007.
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