Warfighter Support: DOD Should Improve Development of Camouflage Uniforms and Enhance Collaboration Among the Services
Published: 2012-09-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2002, the military services have introduced seven new camouflage uniforms with varying patterns and colors--two desert, two woodland, and three universal. In addition, the Army is developing new uniform options and estimates it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace its current uniform and associated protective gear. GAO was asked to review the services' development of new camouflage uniforms. This report addresses: 1) the extent to which DOD guidance provides a consistent decision process to ensure new camouflage uniforms meet operational requirements and 2) the extent to which the services have used a joint approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage costs. To do this, GAO reviewed DOD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO acquisition guidance and key practices, statutory requirements and policies, interviewed defense officials, and collected and analyzed records about uniform development.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether and how to apply Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition guidance for their uniform development and they varied in their usage of that guidance. As a result, the services had fragmented procedures for managing their uniform development programs, and did not consistently develop effective camouflage uniforms. GAO identified two key elements that are essential for producing successful outcomes in acquisitions: 1) using clear policies and procedures that are implemented consistently, and 2) obtaining effective information to make decisions, such as credible, reliable, and timely data. The Marine Corps followed these two key elements to produce a successful outcome, and developed a uniform that met its requirements. By contrast, two other services, the Army and Air Force, did not follow the two key elements; both services developed uniforms that did not meet mission requirements and had to replace them. Without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, the services may lack assurance that they have a disciplined approach to set requirements and develop new uniforms that meet operational needs.
The military services' fragmented approach for acquiring uniforms has not ensured the development of joint criteria for new uniforms or achieved cost efficiency. DOD has not met a statutory requirement to establish joint criteria for future uniforms or taken steps to ensure that uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection for service members, and the services have not pursued opportunities to seek to reduce clothing costs, such as by collaborating on uniform inventory costs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the military departments to establish joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms. The departments asked the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board to develop the joint criteria, but the task is incomplete. If the services do not use joint criteria to guide their activities, one or more service may develop uniforms without certainty that the uniforms include the newest technology, advanced materials or designs, and meet an acceptable level of performance. Further, DOD does not have a means to ensure that the services meet statutory policy permitting the development of service-unique uniforms as long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent practicable, provide service members the equivalent levels of performance and protection and minimize the risk to individuals operating in the joint battle space. Without a policy to ensure that services develop and field uniforms with equivalent performance and protection, the services could fall short of protecting all service members equally, potentially exposing a number to unnecessary risks. Finally, the services may have opportunities for partnerships to reduce inventory costs for new uniforms. The Army may be able to save about $82 million if it can partner with another service. Under DOD guidance, the services are encouraged to actively seek to reduce costs. The Air Force has shown interest in the Army's current uniform development, but none of the services has agreed to partner with the Army on a new uniform. In the absence of a DOD requirement that the services collaborate to standardize the development and introduction of camouflage uniforms, the services may forego millions of dollars in potential cost savings.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD take four actions to improve the development of camouflage uniforms and enhance collaboration among the services: ensure that the services have and use clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, establish joint criteria, develop policy to ensure equivalent protection levels, and pursue partnerships where applicable to help reduce costs. DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations and identified planned actions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The military services spent about $300 million in Fiscal Year 2011 to  procure new camouflage uniforms. The primary goal of camouflage is to  reduce vulnerability of forces to detection in combat; however, over time  the services also have chosen camouflage patterns that are service  specific and distinguish one service from another. Since 2002, the  services have introduced seven new camouflage uniforms with varying  patterns and colors—two desert, two woodland, and three universal. In  addition, each service has introduced a service-specific flame-resistant  uniform in response to urgent warfighter needs. Most of the services’ new  camouflage patterns and colors replaced two Army-developed  camouflage patterns that all military services were using. Specifically, the  services replaced the Army’s four-color woodland camouflage pattern  developed in 1981, known as the Battle Dress Uniform or Combat Utility  Uniform, and its three-color desert camouflage pattern developed in early  1990 and known as the Desert Camouflage Uniform. Further, as part of  the Army’s ongoing camouflage study, the office responsible for uniforms,  Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, plans to present the results of  its camouflage testing to senior leadership by the end of December 2012  on future uniform options. If the Army selects a new uniform, officials  estimated that it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace a new  camouflage uniform and associated protective gear for the entire service.
In May 2010, we reported on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of  ground combat uniforms in response to a mandate in the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. We reported that  combat uniform performance standards developed by some of the  services were not related to specific combat environments; the  introduction of flame-resistant fabric, insect repellent treatment, and the  increased pace of operations in Afghanistan accounted for increases in  uniform production and procurement costs; and government-owned  patents on elements of the Marine Corps’ uniforms presented no legal  barrier to allowing other services to use these elements. In June 2011, we  reported on matters related to the supply of flame resistant fibers for the  production of military uniforms. In response to your request, this report  addresses 1) the extent to which DOD guidance provides a consistent  decision process to ensure new camouflage uniforms meet operational  requirements and 2) the extent to which the services have used a joint  approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection, and manage  costs.
To determine the extent to which DOD guidance ensures the services  follow a consistent decision process to guide the development and  acquisition of their camouflage uniforms, we reviewed key guidance and  service decision-making processes. We reviewed key practices for  federal acquisitions that are included in the Office of Management and  Budget’s (OMB) guidelines and GAO’s framework for assessing  acquisition functions. We compared OMB’s and GAO’s key elements for acquisitions with the decision processes used by the services, and we  identified two elements that are essential for agencies to follow to  produce successful outcomes and were applicable to uniform- development programs. The two elements are clear policies and  procedures that are implemented consistently and a knowledge-based  approach that includes meaningful data to determine whether a product  will meet customer requirements. Additionally, we interviewed relevant  DOD and military service officials, including military service officials  responsible for the management of uniform development and acquisition  policy. Further, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics about the  relevance and flexibility of DOD’s acquisition guidance and how the  services used this or other guidance in their development decisions. We  visited the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy offices responsible  for managing the development or acquisition of its camouflage uniforms  and gathered and analyzed data on the use of policies to support their  decision processes and the testing or cost data that guided decisions  during the development of their camouflage uniforms.
To determine the extent to which the services have used a joint approach  to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage costs, we  reviewed requirements and policies found in DOD guidance and in the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. We also  reviewed data and interviewed officials from the military services and  members of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board to  determine if the services had established criteria for camouflage uniforms  using a joint approach. In addition, we assessed information from DOD  about how DOD officials plan to meet the statutory policy permitting future  uniforms to uniquely reflect the identity of the individual services, as long  as they provide equivalent levels of performance and protection to the  maximum extent practicable. Finally, we reviewed guidance and  interviewed officials with the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support  office to assess how they encourage the services to jointly reduce  development and acquisition costs. Our detailed scope and methodology  appears in Appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to  September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Military Services’ Camouflage Uniforms
paragraphs: Each service has introduced at least one new uniform into inventory in the  last 10 years. Prior to 2002, all four military services were using the  Army’s Battle Dress and Desert Camouflage uniforms. However, since  that time each of the services (including the Army) has developed new  uniforms to address deficiencies that they identified with the existing Army  uniforms. Improvements incorporated into the design of the services’ new  uniforms include improved visual or near-infrared capabilities for  concealment and improved fabric technology. Additionally, each service  introduced a service-specific flame resistant uniform in response to urgent  need requests. For additional information on the development of flame  resistant uniforms by the services, see appendix II. The services also  expected the new uniforms to provide other benefits, such as a unique  appearance to increase the morale of personnel and aid in recruitment.  Figure 1 provides additional information on the development of the  services’ uniforms and is followed by a description of each service’s  development activities.
In April 2000, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed the  development and fielding of a new Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform  (MCCUU). The requirements of the new uniform, developed under the  decision-making authority of the Commander of the Marine Corps System  Command, were to provide Marines with a uniform that increased  durability and combat utility compared to the current uniform, provide  commanders versatility for a variety of missions, and be uniquely Marine.  The Marine Corps spent $319,000 to develop the MCCUU, and began  fielding its new uniforms in June 2002.
Development of the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) began in January 2003  in response to a need for a combat uniform with greater operational utility.  Under the decision authority of the Chief of Staff, the new uniform  included requirements to improve visual or near-infrared capabilities, to  improve morale, and to provide a universal camouflage pattern with  acceptable levels of performance in woodland, desert, and urban terrains.  The Army spent about $3.2 million to develop the ACU in the universal  camouflage pattern and began fielding its new uniform in February 2005.
In 2009, based on concerns from soldiers in Afghanistan, a congressional  conference committee directed DOD to take immediate action to provide  personnel deployed to Afghanistan with a camouflage pattern that was  suited to that environment. The conference committee further directed  the Secretary of the Army to provide a report on the program plans and  budgetary adjustments necessary to provide appropriate uniforms to  deployed and deploying troops to Afghanistan. In response, the Army  developed the Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP)  to address current camouflage requirements and initiated a study of  camouflage for future uniforms. The Army spent about $3.4 million to  develop the OCP and began fielding the uniform in July 2010. As part of  its study of camouflage, the Army is reviewing camouflage to identify  three color variations—desert, woodland, and transitional—as future  uniform options. Additionally, the study will identify one camouflage  pattern for protective gear that blends well with all three uniforms. By the  end of December 2012, the Army plans to brief senior Army leadership on  the results of its study. The Army spent about $2 million through Fiscal  Year 2011 on the development of these uniforms, and reported in  February 2012 that it expects to spend an additional $5 million on  development costs through Fiscal Year 2017. If the Army chooses a new  camouflage uniform, officials estimate that it may cost up to $4 billion over  5 years to replace its uniform and related protective gear.
The Chief of Staff of the Air Force in October 2002 initiated a research  and development project to field a new uniform. The objective was to  design a distinctive uniform that—compared to the current Army Battle  Dress Uniform (BDU)—provided a better fit, and was also easier and less  costly to maintain. According to officials, the program was conducted  under the authority of the Chief of Staff. The Air Force spent about $3.2  million on the development of the Airman Battle Uniform (ABU) and  began fielding its new uniform in January 2007.
In 2006, as part of a broader review of Navy uniforms, the Chief of Naval  Operations announced approval of a concept for new desert and  woodland uniforms for Navy ground forces. In 2009, the Chief of Naval  Operations received approval from Special Operations Command to use  camouflage patterns, developed by Naval Special Warfare Command,for the Navy’s new Type II desert and Type III woodland uniforms. The  Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, oversaw the  $435,000 spent by the Navy on the final design of its two new camouflage  uniforms. The Navy began fielding its Type II desert uniform in February  2011 and its Type III woodland uniform in September 2011.
section_title: DOD Policies
paragraphs: DOD’s acquisition guidance, collectively referred to as the 5000 series,  provides management principles, policies, and procedures to establish  and manage acquisition programs and to help to manage the nation’s  investments in technologies, programs, and products. The primary  objective of defense acquisition is to acquire quality products that satisfy  user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and  operational support, and to do so in a timely manner and at a fair and  reasonable price. The military departments have issued guidance to  implement the DOD guidance. According to DOD Directive 5000.01,  The Defense Acquisition System, an acquisition program is a directed,  funded effort that provides a new, improved or continuing materiel,  weapon or information system, or service capability in response to an  approved need. DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense  Acquisition System, establishes a flexible management framework for  translating capability needs and technology opportunities into acquisition  programs.
In addition, the instruction identifies specific statutory and regulatory  reports and information—such as an acquisition strategy, cost estimates,  test and evaluation activities, and risk assessments throughout the  process to support decisions from design to production. A key tenet of the guidance is that it provides the approving official, the Milestone  Decision Authority (MDA), with the discretion to structure the activities  and reporting requirements of the acquisition process as appropriate and  consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements to achieve  performance, schedule, and cost goals.
Under another DOD Regulation, DOD 4140.1-R, DOD provides guidance  on the development to the delivery of items, and on the key practices in  materiel management within DOD’s supply chain framework. For  uniforms and other clothing and textiles, the regulation includes  procedures on coordination of research and testing activities. It also  encourages DOD components to actively seek to reduce costs by  standardizing basic materials and accessories, such as new clothing  items, and provides information on costs to introduce a new uniform into  inventory. According to Defense Logistics Agency policy, an initial  inventory fee could apply to new items when the cost of introducing a  replacement item into inventory is greater than 10 percent of the cost of  the item being replaced or when a new item is introduced by an individual  organization. The initial inventory fee, charged by the Defense Logistics  Agency, covers the cost of acquiring initial inventory of seven months of  the new clothing and the cost of the remaining inventory being replaced.
Also, DOD issued Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and  Textiles (Class II), in August 2008, in part to prescribe authority, policy,  and responsibilities for the management of clothing and textiles in  peacetime and across the spectrum of military operations. The instruction directed the establishment of the Joint Clothing and Textiles  Governance Board and also made the Director of the Defense Logistics  Agency responsible for ensuring collaboration and DOD-wide integration  of clothing and textiles activities by establishing and chairing the board.  The governance board includes representation from the Office of the  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration and  logistics officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military services, and the  Defense Logistics Agency.
DOD Instruction 4140.63 also describes responsibilities of various DOD  entities in the development, management, and use of clothing and  textiles. Clothing and textiles covered by the instruction include uniforms,  other personal items, and organizational clothing and individual  equipment that belong to the organization and not to the person using it.  In addition, the instruction prescribes policy that the military departments  maintain responsibility for the acquisition, funding, and fielding of new  clothing and textiles in accordance with the management principles,  policies, and procedures in DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense  Acquisition System. Finally, Instruction 4140.63 directs the military  departments to coordinate operational requirements and sourcing with the  Director of the Defense Logistics Agency to minimize duplication and  redundancy.
section_title: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
paragraphs: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the  Secretaries of the military departments to establish joint criteria for future  ground combat uniforms. According to the act, the joint criteria shall  ensure that new technologies, advanced materials, and other advances in  ground combat uniform design may be shared between the military  services and are not precluded from being adapted for use by any military  service due to service-specific proprietary arrangements. The act also  established United States policy that the design and fielding of future  ground combat uniforms may uniquely reflect the identities of the  individual military services as long as the uniforms, to the maximum  extent practicable, provide equivalent levels of performance and  protection for members commensurate with their respective assigned  combat missions and minimize the risk to the individual soldier, sailor,  airman, or marine operating in the joint battle space.
section_title: Military Services Have Not Used a Consistent Decision-Making Process to Produce Effective Camouflage Uniforms
paragraphs: The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether and  how to apply acquisition guidance for their uniform development, and  varied in their use of the guidance. DOD provided no alternative or  additional direction clarifying use of acquisition guidance or other  guidance when developing ground combat uniforms. Consequently, the  services used varying, fragmented processes for managing their uniform  acquisition activities, which have not consistently ensured the  development of effective camouflage uniforms.
subsections: section_title: DOD, OMB and GAO Have Provided Guidance and Key Practices for Effective Acquisition Processes
paragraphs: DOD has provided policy, known as the 5000 series, which is designed to  offer the services a flexible management framework for translating  capability needs and technology opportunities into stable, affordable, and  well-managed acquisition programs. In the context of their uniform  development activities, the services varied in their views as to the  applicability of the 5000 series. For example, the Air Force did not view its  uniform development and fielding activities as an acquisition program,  although it may do so in the future as a consequence of the policy  contained in DOD Instruction 4140.63. The services also varied in their  usage of the acquisition guidance where they determined that it applied.  Under the guidance, the milestone decision authority may tailor the  regulatory information requirements and acquisition process to achieve  cost, schedule, and performance goals, where consistent with statutory  and regulatory requirements. Generally, due to statutory and regulatory  requirements, higher-cost acquisition programs have greater information,  reporting, and procedural requirements than lower-cost programs.  Accordingly, since milestone decision authorities that manage lower-cost  programs generally have fewer statutory or regulatory requirements to  implement, they often have greater flexibility to tailor the guidance. Due to  the flexibility allowed in DOD’s acquisition guidance and varied views as  to its applicability to uniform development programs, we also evaluated  key practices in the Office of Management and Budget’s guidance to  federal acquisition officers on steps to take to assess and achieve  efficient and effective acquisition functions. OMB’s guidance noted that it  was adopting key practices that we reported in 2005, which listed a  framework of cornerstones and elements for an effective acquisition  function.
Specifically, for this review we identified two elements from the OMB and  GAO guidance that we considered essential for agencies to follow to  produce successful outcomes because the two elements most closely  relate to product development activities. The two elements are: clear  policies and procedures that are implemented consistently, and a  knowledge-based approach that includes meaningful data to determine  whether a product will meet customer requirements. We assessed  whether three services—the Marine Corps, Army and Air Force—followed  two key elements that OMB and GAO have determined are key practices  for a decision-making process that produces successful outcomes, and to  what extent each service developed uniforms that met requirements. We  did not assess the Navy’s decision process because it adopted uniforms  developed by Naval Special Warfare Command rather than developing a  new uniform. The development activities of special operation forces, such  as the Naval Special Warfare Command, are outside the scope of this  review. We were not requested to review the uniform program for special  forces.
section_title: Services Varied in their Decision-Making Processes for Acquisitions, and Two New Uniforms Did Not Meet Specific Mission Requirements
paragraphs: The services’ decision-making processes for developing new uniforms  are fragmented and vary in their effectiveness. The Marine Corps used a  decision process that followed the two key elements that we identified as  essential to produce a successful acquisition outcome, and produced a  combat uniform that the Marine Corps officials have found effective.  However, the Army and Air Force did not follow the two key elements,  and they found that their new uniforms did not meet specific mission  requirements. To meet combat requirements, both the Army and Air  Force replaced their uniforms for personnel deployed to Afghanistan with  the OCP uniform.
Without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear policies and  procedures for a knowledge-based approach to developing effective  uniforms, some services may continue to lack assurance that they have a  disciplined process that is capable of delivering uniforms that meet  warfighter requirements.
Marine Corps officials used a decision process that followed two key  elements we found essential to produce a successful acquisition  outcome, and produced a combat uniform that the Marine Corps officials  have found effective and continues to meet Marines’ needs. The Marine  Corps officials used clear policies and procedures that were implemented  consistently, and used a knowledge-based approach that included  collection and use of meaningful data to determine whether a product will  meet warfighter requirements.
Regarding clear policies and procedures, according to officials, the  Marine Corps used the flexible decision framework provided by then- current versions of DOD’s and the Secretary of the Navy’s acquisition  guidance to establish a process designed to ensure that its decisions  would result in a camouflage uniform that met its requirements.so, the Marine Corps developed a number of key documents as tools to  support acquisition planning and decision making. For example, the  Marine Corps developed documents to support decision making in the  five areas described below.
In doing
Acquisition Strategy—First, officials used an acquisition strategy to  highlight deficiencies in the service’s current uniform and assessed  methods for addressing the deficiencies. The service considered  modifying the current uniform or buying a commercially available  uniform, but concluded that the best approach was to begin a new  development program that could rapidly test and evaluate prototypes  of alternative designs that would meet Marine preferences obtained  from field surveys and allow it to develop a unique uniform for the  Marine Corps. Officials provided an action plan and key dates for  developmental testing, testing of prototypes, field evaluations,  production approval, contract award, first article testing, product  verification, full production, initial issuance, and initial operational  capability. Also, the strategy included contracting requirements and a  phased fielding plan to test small lots of uniforms for a limited number  of Marines before building up inventory to meet the needs of all  Marines.
Acquisition Program Baseline—The Marine Corps developed an  acquisition program baseline to seek and receive full funding for new  uniforms, and to list performance, schedule, and cost parameters over  the program’s life cycle.
Risk Assessment—In preparing a risk assessment, the Marine Corps  concluded that risk to cost, schedule, and performance would be low.  The assessment included a 20-year life cycle cost estimate for the  uniform. Further, the scheduled fielding of the uniform would be  deliberately slow to build up inventory before changing over to the  new uniform. The new uniforms were developed with Marine input  both at the conceptual and developmental phases, and the uniforms  were updated based on field input during the first phase of fielding.
Cost Estimate for Program’s Life Cycle—The Marine Corps chose to  prepare a life-cycle cost estimate for the program. Life-cycle costs  include research and development, investment, operation and  support, and disposal. The life-cycle cost analysis was used to assess  program affordability and to support the review and oversight of cost  estimates. Among various assumptions of costs, Marine Corps  officials determined that the 2001 projections of the number of officer  candidates and active and reserve recruits would remain constant  throughout the 20-year life cycle. All told, the Marine Corps estimated  that the 20-year life-cycle costs would be about $502 million in  constant fiscal year 2001 dollars.
Test and Evaluation Master Plan—The Marine Corps Systems  Command created a plan to evaluate different camouflage patterns  and colors. Marine Corps Systems Command and U.S. Army Soldier,  Biological and Chemical Command, conducted testing and evaluation  on camouflage technology and alternative uniform designs to  determine which camouflage and elements of uniform design would  meet user requirements. The plan also included field tests by  approximately 450 Marines to evaluate two designs of the new  uniform for suitability for a number of mission-oriented tasks, such as  helicopter and amphibious operations. The planned tests and  evaluations were to determine durability, function, and preferred  features.
In addition, Marine Corps officials established a process that followed the  federal key practice to use a knowledge-based approach that includes  meaningful data to determine whether a product will meet customer  requirements. A knowledge-based approach includes obtaining sufficient  information about technology, design options, and production capabilities  so that the product will be able to meet various requirements. In April  2000, according to documents, Marine Corps officials decided to replace  the existing combat uniforms with new camouflage combat uniforms to  increase durability and utility for combat over the current BDU and Desert  Camouflage Uniform and to provide Marines with a unique and distinct  combat uniform.
As part of their knowledge-based approach during decision making,  Marine Corps officials considered about 70 camouflage patterns, and  Marine Corps test observers, who were assessing the effectiveness of the  camouflage, narrowed the candidates to eight. The eight were narrowed  to the top three performers, due to what Marine Corps officials described  as patent issues. The Marine Corps chose four colors each for the  patterns for woodland and desert environments based on discussions  with camouflage experts. The Marine Corps Commandant reviewed the  camouflage patterns and officials chose two camouflage patterns for  further testing—Tiger Stripe and Canadian Disruptive Pattern (later  named the Marine Corps Pattern or MARPAT). However, initial field  testing showed that the Tiger Stripe was not an effective camouflage  pattern. After other field tests with woodland and desert colored variations  of the Marine Corps Pattern, Marine Corps officials determined that the  Marine Corps Pattern had performance advantages over the Tiger-Stripe  pattern when used in camouflage uniforms. On the 7-point scale, with 7  being the most effective camouflage, test observers gave average scores  of 5.0 to the Marine Corps Pattern and 4.16 to the Tiger Stripe. In June  2001, the Commander of the Marine Corps Systems Command approved  the MARPAT camouflage pattern for production and deployment of the  new MCCUU uniform.
During the field tests of the MCCUU, evaluators involved 284 Marines  from Marine Expeditionary Forces for an average of 22 days in 2001.  Wearers spent about 8 days in the field, and 14 days on base. The  evaluation led by U.S. Army Soldier, Biological & Chemical Command,  included the following results:
Fit and Comfort: 76 percent were satisfied with the fit of the blouse  and 64 percent were satisfied with the fit of the trousers. Overall,  wearers gave both clothing items 6.3 comfort ratings toward the  maximum positive rating of 7.
Durability: 13 percent reported durability problems with the blouse,  such as Velcro and snaps that did not hold or rips and tears. 25  percent reported durability problems with the trousers, such as  excessive wear and rips at the knees (mostly caused by field training).
Appearance: 98 percent stated the uniform generally was easy to care  for and maintain, and about two-thirds of respondents stated that the  uniform, after laundering, had creases that were sharp enough for  garrison wear.
Mission Suitability: 97 percent stated the uniform was suitable for use  in a tactical environment.
As a result of the field testing, the service adopted the Marine Corps  Pattern and uniform design in the production of its new camouflage  uniforms.
The Army used a decision process for the development of a new uniform  that did not produce a successful outcome, and it had to replace that  uniform in 2010. The Army did not consistently use clear policies and  procedures or use a knowledge-based approach that includes meaningful  data to determine whether the product would meet customer  requirements. Our prior work has shown that the use of policies,  procedures, and a knowledge-based approach is essential to produce  successful outcomes.camouflage patterns, it did not complete the testing before selecting a  pattern. As a result, the Army developed a uniform that proved to provide  ineffective concealment for operations in Afghanistan.
While the Army conducted some testing on  According to officials and documentation, during the decision process to  develop the Army Combat Uniform (ACU)—which ran from 2003 to  2005—the Army used some elements of DOD’s 5000-series policy and  Army Regulation 70-1, which is the military department’s implementing  guidance. The Army identified the approval structure and decision maker  for its development activities. However, the Army did not follow the 5000- series policy or establish alternate policies and procedures on reporting of  testing, performance, and risk to the program to support its decision  making, which could have provided reasonable assurance that its  requirements were met. The Army tailored its development program in a  manner that excluded steps in the process that might have ensured the  use of test and evaluation results to support decision making throughout  the development of the ACU. For example, the Army did not take steps to  establish an acquisition strategy, which can guide the development  activities, or use another mechanism to inform senior leadership about  testing, performance, and risks associated with the development of the  uniform. An acquisition strategy can provide a master schedule for  research, development, testing, production, fielding and other activities;  one of the keys to a successful program is an acquisition strategy that is  carefully developed and consistently followed.
As part of our review, officials from the program office that managed the  program—Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier—told us that officials  briefed the Chief of Staff in March 2004 through the Army Uniform Board  on issues related to the management of fielding the new uniform to  soldiers. Specifically, the briefing included the number of uniforms per  soldier, the cost of the new uniforms, and the timeline for fielding. The  Army did not provide information on testing results or an evaluation of the  performance and risks associated with the development of the uniform.  Developing an acquisition strategy could have provided the Army with a  structured approach to requirements, testing plans, cost estimate data, a  risk assessment of the program, and recommendations to support  decision making.
Similarly, we found that the Army did not employ the key practice of using  a knowledge-based approach to support development decisions that  included obtaining sufficient information about camouflage performance  from testing data. As part of the development of the ACU, the Army  Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center began a  field evaluation in 2002 of the performance of 13 camouflage patterns and  color combinations. However, PEO Soldier officials told us that prior to  the completion of this study the leadership chose a camouflage pattern  and colors for the new uniform without data from the camouflage study.  PEO Soldier leadership could not provide a performance report to support  the selection of the Universal Camouflage Pattern nor explain how the  camouflage pattern was developed. The Universal Camouflage Pattern  was not part of the Natick study and was not tested prior to the decision  by PEO Soldier to use this pattern or prior to the June 2004 approval of  the pattern by the Chief of Staff. The Army began fielding the uniform in  February 2005. Later in 2005, the Army Natick Soldier Research,  Development, and Engineering Center completed its camouflage  evaluation and recommended a different pattern—Desert Brush—as the  most effective universal camouflage pattern. In 2009, a follow-on Army  study found that the Universal Camouflage Pattern of the ACU offered  less effective concealment than the patterns chosen by the Marine Corps  and some foreign military services, such as Syria and China. The test  showed that soldiers wearing the Universal ACU were at greater  operational risk of visibility to enemy forces than soldiers wearing the  Marines’ pattern.
Moreover, soldiers deployed to Afghanistan conveyed concerns about  their uniform, which they indicated provided ineffective concealment in the  Afghan environment. In response to those concerns, in 2009 a  congressional conference committee directed immediate action to provide  combat uniforms suited to that environment. The Army established a  decision process that included a strategy of development and fielding  activities and leadership review of the testing to support a decision on a  new uniform. The Army expedited testing of camouflage patterns suited  for Afghanistan by sending a photo simulation team to Afghanistan to  collect environmental data. Further, the Army surveyed soldiers on  deployment to support its decision making. The Army also considered the  conclusions of the 2005 and 2009 Natick studies.
In 2010, the Army began replacing the ACU for personnel deployed to  Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern  (OCP), and estimated that the replacement would add more than $38.8  million in development and initial fielding costs for fiscal year 2010 and  2011.
For future uniform needs, the Army is conducting a study to choose  environment-specific camouflage patterns for use Army-wide by the end  of December 2012. If the Army chooses a new camouflage uniform,  officials estimate that it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace  its uniform and related protective gear. The leadership of PEO Soldier  told us that, unlike the decision process used to support development of  the camouflage pattern for the ACU, the decision process for future  camouflage uniforms will include a knowledge-based approach and  greater use of DOD policies and procedures to ensure that decisions are  informed, science-based, and data driven. For example, the Army  established an acquisition strategy for conducting the development of  new uniforms, hosted regular meetings to obtain input from other services  and Army organizations, and PEO Soldier regularly provided Army  leadership with information about its development activities.
In 2002, Air Force officials began developing the Airman Battle Uniform  (ABU) for noncombat use to replace two combat uniforms. At the time,  the U.S. military, including the Air Force, was conducting expeditionary  operations worldwide, including Afghanistan. Officials later recognized  that the ABU under development might not meet their needs, and in 2005  they began testing to determine the suitability of the ABU in a combat  environment. We found that the decision process used by the Air Force in  the development of the ABU did not follow the key element of using clear  policies and procedures. Also, the Air Force did not employ a knowledge- based approach including an analysis of the potential requirements for  both combat and base uniforms. As a result, the Air Force developed a  non-combat uniform for wear at the home base. Personnel found that the  uniform’s fabric weight was uncomfortable due to heat buildup, and the  Air Force had to replace the uniform with one constructed from a lighter  fabric.
During our review, Air Force officials told us that they did not follow  DOD’s 5000-series policies. According to Air Force officials, in 2002 Air  Force leadership determined that its development activities for its new  uniform—intended for use only on bases—did not constitute an  acquisition program under the 5000 series and Air Force Instruction 63- 101, entitled Operations of Capabilities Based Acquisition System.  Instead of following a specific policy, the Chief of Staff provided direction  on the development of the uniform during three senior leadership  briefings between 2002 and 2004, according to Air Force officials. In  considering support for his decision making, the Chief of Staff did not  require the Clothing Office to establish a strategy to guide the  development activities, such as documenting deficiencies of the current  combat uniforms and establishing capability requirements for the  replacement uniforms. Also, the Chief of Staff did not use a mechanism to  report how the new uniform would meet capability requirements, as well  as the results of uniform testing, performance evaluation, and risk  assessment. All these procedures could have provided more reasonable  assurance that personnel requirements were met. If the Air Force had  used DOD policies or established an alternative policy that included  procedures to review requirements of the new uniform prior to the start of  development activities, Air Force officials may have determined that  replacing combat uniforms with a non-combat uniform would leave a gap  in uniform capabilities.
In addition, in developing their uniform the Air Force officials did not fully  employ the key practice of using a knowledge-based approach that  included the collection and use of meaningful data to determine whether a  product will meet customer requirements. The Air Force tested the ABU  against other service uniforms in different environments for camouflage  effectiveness and conducted field tests for comfort and durability. We  found that the Air Force’s testing process had weaknesses, such as not  testing different camouflage patterns and fabrics prior to choosing the  tiger-stripe pattern, and using test results of a desert pattern in a  woodland area. Also, officials chose not to implement all of the testing  recommendations from the Air Force’s Air Warfare Center, including one  recommendation to reduce the heat build-up from the uniform.
During the development of the uniform, the Air Force conducted surveys  of personnel to determine their uniform design preferences. Then,  according to Air Force officials and documents, the Chief of Staff directed  the Clothing Office to use a tiger-striped camouflage pattern in a uniform  for all environments with colors complementing the Army’s universal  camouflage uniform, and to use one fabric weight for the trousers and the  blouses worn in hot and cold climates. In contrast, the Marine Corp’s  knowledge-based approach included testing and evaluation of multiple  camouflage patterns and colors from which they selected two top  performing patterns. As a result, the Marine Corps produced two  prototypes for extensive field testing and evaluation. Using this  information, the Marine Corps was able to make knowledgeable decisions  to select the best prototype and to make improvements in the design prior  to production. The Marine Corps selected the same twill fabric weave that  the Air Force selected for the ABU, but the Marine Corps decided to use a  lighter weight fabric than the Air Force did for the uniform jacket as a way  to prevent heat buildup.
In 2005, the Air Force Uniform Board sought testing of the ABU to assess  the uniform’s suitability for use in a combat environment and whether a  second version of the uniform was needed. The Air Warfare Center  produced a test plan, which included the overall test methodology and  measures of uniform effectiveness and performance for concealment and  comfort.
In October 2006, the Air Warfare Center issued a report on its testing of  the combat effectiveness of the ABU. The report concluded that the ABU  camouflage performed well in most environments—never ranking lower  than third among the six uniforms in different environments. However, the  report also concluded that the ABU was not an effective combat uniform  due to trouser fit, heat buildup, and other concerns.
Regarding camouflage effectiveness, the Air Force compared the ABU  performance to five fielded uniforms: Army Combat Uniform, Marine  Corps desert and woodland uniforms, and Army Battle Dress (woodland)  and Desert Camouflage uniforms. However, four of the five uniforms were  environment-specific uniforms not intended for a number of settings for  which they were tested. Specifically, in a tropical forest environment, the  Air Force tests showed that the DCU and Marine Corp desert uniforms  performed worst, and were ranked 5th and 6th respectively out of six  uniforms tested. Similarly, in a desert scrub environment, the Air Force  tests showed that the BDU woodland and Marine Corps woodland  performed worst, ranking 5th and 6th respectively among six uniforms  tested. Our analysis shows that the Air Force used camouflage test  results from settings other than the ones for which they were developed,  which raises questions about the meaningfulness of the report’s  conclusion that the ABU camouflage performed well in most  environments. In 11 of 19 tests, Air Force observers rated the ABU as  marginal or unsatisfactory for concealment 58 percent of the time.
Additionally, the report recommended some design changes to improve fit  and comfort and to improve the ABU’s overall effectiveness for combat  use. As a result, the Air Force incorporated some changes into the final  production design, such as relocating pocket drain holes and redesigning  the trouser crotch, but did not address other recommendations like the  heat buildup. direction for the development of the ABU was for non-combat use rather  than as a combat uniform or as a camouflage-effective garment.
In response, the Clothing Office noted that the original  At the conclusion of our field work, we learned that the Air Force had  begun replacing the ABU with a lighter weight version to address the long  standing complaints by personnel about the heat buildup issue. According  to Air Force officials, the replacement ABU in a lighter weight fabric will be  used by home base and deployed personnel with the exception of those  serving in Afghanistan, where the Army OCP uniform will continue to be  used. If Air Force officials had expanded the knowledge-based approach  for selecting a uniform—such as by ordering extensive testing and  evaluation of varying fabric weights for comfortable wear to support the  decision process—the service may have avoided the need to replace  uniforms with a lighter weight fabric.
In 2010, Air Force Central Command decided that it would be safer for  personnel serving in Afghanistan to wear the Army’s flame resistant OCP  uniform rather than the ABU or its flame resistant uniform. Air Force  Central Command determined that the ABU’s camouflage contrasted with  the Army’s camouflage, increasing the risk of personnel standing out to  enemy forces when Army and Air Force personnel were in a joint  operating environment.
The Air Force allowed personnel to remove interior pockets in the ABU shirt to address  the heat buildup issue. The Air Force web site states that to address the heat issue some  personnel may choose to cut the interior pockets out of the garment, as long as it does not  change the outer appearance of the uniform.
section_title: Military Services’ Fragmented Approach to Developing Uniforms Has Resulted in Inconsistent Protection for Service Members and No Collaboration to Reduce Costs
paragraphs: The military services’ fragmented approach to developing uniforms,  without any joint criteria for meeting combat requirements, has not  ensured that the resulting uniforms provide equivalent levels of  performance and protection for service members, and the services have  not collaborated to reduce the costs for uniforms in inventory. DOD has  reported to the congressional defense committees on planned steps to  develop joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms, but it has not met  the statutory requirement to establish joint criteria. Additionally, there is  no DOD policy to ensure that future service-specific uniforms comply with  statutory policy to provide equivalent levels of performance and protection  and minimize the risk to individual service members operating in the joint  battle space, to the maximum extent practicable. We found that the  services have experienced opportunities to potentially save millions of  dollars in development costs and in initial inventory fees by partnering  with another service in the introduction of new uniforms. At the time of our  review, the services had no partnership agreement to reduce potential  costs on the Army’s new uniforms, and the Navy had decided to field its  uniform before securing a partnership with the Coast Guard that may  have achieved $6 million in cost savings for inventory fees.
subsections: section_title: DOD and Its Components Have Not Met the Statutory Requirement to Establish Joint Criteria for Ground Combat Uniforms
paragraphs: DOD and its service components have not collaborated to establish joint  criteria for ground combat uniforms. A provision in the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the Secretaries of the  military departments to establish joint criteria for future ground combat  uniforms that ensures new technologies, advanced materials, and other  advances in ground combat uniform design may be shared between the  military services and are not precluded from being adapted for use by any  military service due to service-unique proprietary arrangements. The  Secretaries of the military departments were to establish the joint criteria  by February 22, 2011. In June 2010, the Senate Committee on Armed  Services directed the Secretary of Defense to report by August 2010 on  the steps that DOD took and planned to take to implement the  requirement for joint criteria, including the steps the Secretaries of the  military departments took or would take—in conjunction with the Joint  Staff and combatant commands—to update their ground combat uniform  standards and develop operational performance criteria for camouflage.DOD issued a report to congressional committees in February 2012 on  the steps it planned to take to establish joint criteria for ground combat  uniforms, but it has not yet met the statutory requirement to develop joint  criteria.
The Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board, established in 2008,  is the forum the military departments are using to establish joint criteria  for the performance of camouflage uniforms. The governance board was  established by DOD to ensure collaboration and DOD-wide integration of   The DOD instruction on  clothing and textile activities, such as uniforms. clothing and textiles made the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency  responsible for establishing and chairing the board. According to  governance board officials, a working group of the governance board met  in 2010 to begin discussions on the joint criteria. The working group  includes representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the  Joint Staff, and all the military services. However, the group’s leadership  did not meet the February 2011 deadline for issuing joint criteria because,  according to members of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance  Board, members of the working group were unable to obtain consensus.  Our prior work has concluded that successful interagency collaboration,  such as among the military services and defense agencies, requires  commitment by senior officials to articulate their agreements in formal  documents, such as a memorandum of understanding or interagency  guidance.Secretary of Defense, the Director of DLA may be unable to promote  effective interagency cooperation and collaboration among the members  of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board and ensure DOD- wide integration of clothing and textiles activities.
Without high-level commitment from the Office of the  Moreover, in February 2012, Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance  Board officials told us that competing demands to address logistics  efficiency initiatives also delayed the development of the criteria. In its  February 2012 response to the congressional committees, DOD  acknowledged that it could do more to promote and enhance inter-service  collaboration and life-cycle coordination with the Defense Logistics  Agency and provided a plan to develop joint criteria. Governance board  officials told us that they plan to convene a new working group and  complete the joint criteria by December 2012. Further, DOD reported that  the governance board will identify a common set of performance  characteristics to be used across the military departments. Without joint  criteria on the performance of uniforms to guide activities, one or more  service may develop uniforms without knowing whether its uniforms  include the newest technology, the newest materials or designs, and  meet an acceptable level of performance.
Furthermore, the DOD instruction on clothing and textiles also made the  Director of the Defense Logistics Agency—as chairman of the  governance board—responsible for overseeing the development of a  charter to outline the board’s roles and responsibilities. However, the  charter has not been completed. An official told us that the charter has  been drafted and continues to be under review by members. According to  board officials, the governance board has met twice and the officials  believe that the board’s progress is not impeded by the lack of a signed  charter. However, almost four years after the board was created, DOD  has not defined the board’s role. Until the board has a charter outlining its  authorities, the department may continue to experience difficulty in  establishing joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms.
section_title: DOD and Its Components Have Not Developed a Policy to Ensure That Service-Specific Uniforms Provide Equivalent Levels of Protection and Have Not Collaborated to Minimize Risk
paragraphs: Each military department has developed its own standards for combat  uniforms, and DOD does not have a policy to ensure that the services’  fragmented uniform programs comply with statutory policy to provide  equivalent levels of performance and protection and minimize the risk to  individual service members operating in the joint battle space, to the  maximum extent practicable. The National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2010 established policy that the design and fielding of future  ground combat uniforms may uniquely reflect the identity of the individual  services as long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent practicable,  provide equivalent levels of performance and protection for members  commensurate with their respective assigned combat missions and  minimize the risk to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or marine  operating in the joint battle space, among other things. Separately,  under DOD’s instruction on clothing and textile management, the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is  responsible for the development of DOD policy and implementing  guidance on all matters relating to the clothing and textiles supply chain.
We found that the services have not collaborated on uniform  development, and have not ensured that their current service-unique  uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection and  minimize risk to individual service members operating in the joint battle  space. DOD and the Joint Staff have described the modern-day battlefield  as a place with no clearly defined front lines or safer rear area where   In such an environment,  combat support operations are performed. service members wearing uniforms consisting of different camouflage  may be exposed to different levels of risk. For example, the Air Force  requires personnel in Afghanistan to wear a camouflage uniform that best  protects them and enables them to blend with other service members with  whom they operate to minimize risk. However, the Navy requires some  personnel in the desert environment to wear different camouflage  uniforms, potentially exposing them to increased risk.
DOD, Report to Congress on the Review of Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting  the Service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.:, February  2012).
In September 2010, Air Force Central Command decided to enhance the  level of protection of personnel serving in Afghanistan by directing  personnel to wear the Army’s OCP uniform (where available) rather than  the Air Force’s existing ABU and flame-resistant uniform. According to Air  Force officials, this action was taken to reduce the risk of any personnel  standing out in the joint operating environment. Conversely, the Navy  limited the use of its Type II desert uniform in desert environments. In a  2009 administrative message, the Navy stated that the Type II desert and  Type III woodland uniforms would increase the probability of mission  success and survivability in combat and irregular warfare operations.  However, the Navy also indicated that only Naval Special Warfare  personnel and sailors assigned to or directly supporting Naval Special  Warfare units would be authorized to wear the Type II desert uniform.  Although the Navy later revised its guidance on wear of the Type II desert  and Type III woodland uniforms, this restriction and its focus on  personnel from or supporting Naval Special Warfare units largely  remained. As a result of the policy, some Navy units, such as construction  and intelligence units, were issued the woodland Type III uniforms to  wear in desert environments.
In June 2010, the Senate Committee on Armed Services expressed  concern about the Navy’s restricted use of the uniform among its  personnel. In hearings before the Subcommittee on Readiness and  Management Support in April 2010, the Assistant Commandant of the  Marine Corps testified that Marine Corps and Navy discussions prompted  the Navy’s policy to restrict the use of its Type II desert combat uniform.  When the Marine Corps first learned that the new Navy uniform looked  very similar to the Marine Corps’ combat uniform, the Assistant  Commandant testified, the Marine Corps suggested the selection of a  Navy pattern that was different enough to distinguish it from the uniform  worn by the Marines. However, the Assistant Commandant testified, the  Marine Corps Commandant and the Chief of Naval Operations later  reached an agreement that forward-deployed Navy SEALS and similar  personnel could use the Type II desert uniform. The effect of the  agreement, however, is that it does not allow other Navy ground support  units to wear the Type II uniform. According to Navy officials, the Navy did  not approve a waiver requested by the Commander of the Navy  Expeditionary Combat Command to allow expeditionary sailors, not  directly supporting Naval Special Warfare, to wear the desert uniform in a  desert environment. The Navy’s restriction on the use of its Type II desert  uniform appears inconsistent with the department’s prevailing view of the  modern-day battlefield.
DOD has not developed a policy to ensure that future service-specific  uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection and  minimize risk to the individual operating in the joint battle space. In its  February 2012 response to congressional committees about ground  combat uniforms, DOD reported on the Joint Clothing and Textiles  Governance Board’s activities to improve performance of uniforms. As  part of its effort to establish joint criteria and standardize uniforms, the  Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board plans to identify a common  set of performance characteristics. The governance board intends for the  performance characteristics to be used across the military departments to  develop and field the most effective camouflage uniforms and personal  protective gear to ensure maximum protection for the troops. However,  common performance characteristics alone may not fully minimize risk  without also considering the effects of combining different uniforms in the  same battle space. Without a policy to ensure that services develop and  field uniforms with equivalent performance and protection, the services  could fall short of offering equivalent protection for all service members,  and DOD could expose even those service members wearing the most  effective camouflage available to unnecessary risks.
section_title: Military Services Have Not Fully Explored Partnership Opportunities to Reduce Inventory Costs
paragraphs: Although the statutory policy permits the services to pursue unique  uniform designs, the services’ fragmented approach to developing  camouflage uniforms has resulted in numerous inventories of similar  uniforms at increased cost to the supply chain. As presented earlier in this  report, each service now has its own set of camouflaged uniforms—the  Army and Air Force with their universal camouflage ACU, OCP and ABU  uniforms, and the Marine Corps and Navy with their environment-specific  MARPAT and Type I and II woodland and desert camouflage uniforms. In  addition, each service has developed a separate flame resistant version  of its uniforms. Maintaining inventory levels of reserve and contingency  stock for multiple versions of camouflage uniforms, in aggregate, requires  a larger total inventory of uniforms than would be necessary to support a  product line with fewer uniform versions, and the services have not taken  advantage of opportunities to reduce costs through partnering on  inventory management or by collaborating to achieve greater  standardization among their various camouflage uniform versions.
Under DOD’s supply chain regulation on materiel management, DOD  components are encouraged, but not required, to standardize basic  materials and accessories and to standardize uniforms and other clothing  items when possible to reduce costs. However, according to DLA  officials, none of the services has partnered on combat uniforms since  they began separately replacing the BDU and DCU beginning in 2002.  Instead, each of the services generally went its own way in developing or  adopting service-specific camouflage uniforms. For example, the goals for  the Marine Corps’ uniform development program included providing  Marines with a unique combat uniform, the Air Force wanted a utility  uniform with a distinctively Air Force look, the Navy’s goals were to adopt  a set of uniforms that reflected the requirements of a 21st century Navy  and its naval heritage, and the Army wanted a new uniform that would be  more widely accepted by its soldiers than the BDU. The services’  fragmented approaches to uniform development began with the Marine  Corps in 2002 and continued for other services until the Navy was the last  service to replace the BDU in 2011 with camouflage uniforms developed  for naval special forces. During our review, we found that the services  collectively have spent approximately $12.5 million for uniform  development since 2000 or an average of $2.1 million for each of the six  development programs that we reviewed.
In addition, DOD’s supply chain regulation states that any desired  distinctiveness for clothing items should be accomplished by methods  such as using separate items of insignia and patches. However, two  services—the Marine Corps and the Navy—have printed their service  logos on the camouflage-patterned fabric during the manufacturing  process. We have previously reported that the Marine Corps patents on  elements of the uniform do not preclude another service from adopting  the Marine Corps’ uniform. However, given the prevailing military service  culture that places a high value on having distinctive and unique combat  uniforms, the printing of a service’s logo on a uniform’s fabric might make  it difficult for another service to adopt the uniform for temporary mission  needs or as a permanent replacement unless the printed logo was  removed. Conversely, the Army and the Air Force have not found it  necessary to print their service logos on their combat uniforms. The Army,  for example, has been open in allowing members of another service to  wear its uniform to meet mission needs.
We also found that the services have not reduced costs by collaborating  to eliminate inventory fees for new uniforms. When the military services  introduce a new item, the Defense Logistics Agency imposes an initial  inventory fee if the cost of the new item is greater than 10 percent of the  cost of the item being replaced and if the item is introduced into inventory  by only one DOD component. The inventory fee covers the cost of  acquiring initial inventory, according to Defense Logistics Agency officials,  and includes the first four months of inventory, a three-month safety level,  and the cost of the remaining uniforms in inventory being replaced. To  encourage the services to reduce costs by standardizing materials and  eliminating duplication, according to the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop  Support office, officials will waive the initial inventory fee if two or more  services agree to jointly introduce the item into their inventories.
Two military services, the Army and the Navy, have recently experienced  opportunities to potentially save tens of millions of dollars in initial  inventory fees by partnering with another service in the introduction of  new uniforms. The Army is currently testing camouflage patterns to  support the development of new camouflage uniforms for service-wide  use and has estimated that the service could avoid initial inventory fees of  as much as $82 million by partnering with another service or services.  However, during our review none of the services had reached an  agreement to partner with the Army. According to PEO Soldier officials,  they have coordinated with the other services by hosting an Integrated  Product Team to obtain input on their development activities and included  Marine Corps and Navy camouflage uniforms in the baseline testing to  evaluate new camouflage patterns. The Air Force is monitoring the  Army’s activities and Air Force officials stated that they are considering  using the new uniforms if the uniforms meet their requirements.  Nevertheless, we found that Army officials have not reached an  agreement with the Air Force or other services to partner on the joint  introduction of its uniforms to achieve cost savings if the initial inventory  fee applies. If the Army does not partner with at least one service on the  introduction of its new uniforms, it will miss an opportunity to eliminate the  initial inventory fee cost, decrease the life-cycle costs of its uniforms, and  may duplicate effort if the Air Force or another service later decides to  independently develop a new uniform.
The Navy, as part of its acquisition planning in the spring of 2011,  estimated potential cost savings of about $6 million in its initial inventory  fees if it partnered with another service in the introduction of its Type II  desert and Type III woodland uniforms. In March 2011, the Coast Guard  requested approval from the Navy, Naval Special Warfare Command, and  U.S. Special Operations Command to use the camouflage uniforms for  maritime, counter-terrorism, and security missions. The Coast Guard  request stated that the uniform partnership would promote the active  relationship between the Coast Guard and the Navy and provide  interoperability and cooperation in the joint maritime environment. In  August 2011, the Navy revised guidance on the wear of its uniforms,  permitting the Coast Guard to use its Type II desert uniform for Coast  Guard personnel assigned to or directly supporting Naval Special  Warfare, and it approved use of the Type III woodland uniforms for all  other Coast Guard personnel. Nevertheless, Navy officials decided to  field the uniform before establishing a formal partnership with the Coast  Guard. As a result, the Navy incurred $6 million in inventory fees, thereby  increasing the overall life-cycle cost of the uniforms.
In the absence of DOD requirements that the services collaborate to  standardize the development and introduction of camouflage uniforms,  the services may continue to miss opportunities to increase efficiencies  and forego tens of millions of dollars in cost savings.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In the past 10 years, each of the military services independently  introduced at least one service-specific camouflage uniform, and two  services’ uniforms did not meet requirements and needed to be replaced.  DOD has provided the services with guidance for acquisitions through its  5000-series instruction, but all services did not follow that guidance  because they determined it was not applicable to their development and  acquisition of uniforms or they did not apply the guidance in a manner  that would ensure effective outcomes. In addition, DOD did not clarify the  appropriate use of this or other guidance when developing combat  uniforms, resulting in varying, fragmented procedures that did not  consistently produce effective camouflage uniforms. By not following two  key practices for a decision-making process that can produce successful  outcomes, military services developed uniforms that did not meet specific  mission requirements. DOD has provided some additional clarity in the  2008 instruction on the management of clothing and textiles, but the  military services may continue to vary in their application and use of  acquisition guidance. With additional clarity from DOD on the consistent  use of policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, the  services could increase their assurance of having a disciplined process  that is capable of developing uniforms that meet warfighter requirements.
Additionally, the military services have fragmented approaches to  developing uniforms that do not rely on joint criteria for meeting combat  requirements, do not ensure that the resulting uniforms provide equivalent  levels of performance and protection, and do not lead to collaboration to  reduce the costs for uniforms in inventory. Without a high-level  commitment from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of  the Defense Logistics Agency may be unable to promote effective  interagency cooperation and collaboration among the members of the  Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board. If the services developed  and used joint criteria for meeting combat requirements, service officials  could increase assurance that their new uniforms include the newest  technology and the newest materials or designs, and meet an acceptable  level of performance. Also, by completing the board’s charter to outline  the board’s roles and responsibilities, the board could increase the  likelihood that its members would establish the joint criteria for uniforms  required by statute in 2009. The services have not established a means  to assess and ensure that future uniforms will fulfill statutory policy  regarding service-unique uniforms and, as a result, may not be able to  ensure that future ground combat uniforms provide all service members  with equivalent levels of protection and performance or minimize risks  while operating in the joint battle space. Finally, the services’ fragmented  approach to uniform development has resulted in the services not  standardizing camouflage uniforms, not collaborating or partnering on  inventory fees to reduce development and inventory costs, and potentially  not saving on overall procurement costs. Standardizing the development  of camouflage uniforms and partnering to share inventory fees could  increase efficiency in uniform development programs and potentially save  DOD tens of millions of dollars over the life cycles of the services’ combat  utility uniforms.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions:
To better ensure camouflage uniforms being developed by the military  services meet mission requirements, direct the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to ensure that the  services have and consistently use clear policies and procedures and  a knowledge-based approach to produce successful outcomes.
To facilitate the department’s ability to meet the statutory requirement  to develop joint criteria for camouflage uniforms, direct the Secretaries  of the military departments to identify and implement actions  necessary to enable the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance  Board to develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms prior to the  development or acquisition of any new camouflage uniform. These  actions should include efforts to ensure the completion of the Joint  Clothing and Textiles Governance Board’s charter outlining the roles,  responsibilities, and authorities of the board, and establishing a  timeline for developing joint standards.
To address the statutory policy related to camouflage uniforms, direct  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics to develop a policy and establish a timeframe to ensure that  future service-specific uniforms provide equivalent levels of  performance and protection, and minimize risk to service members  operating in the joint battle space.
To take advantage of potential efficiencies and cost savings when  introducing new uniforms, direct the Secretaries of the military  departments to actively pursue partnerships for the joint development  and use of uniforms to minimize fragmentation in the development of  uniforms, and to seek to reduce inventory and overall procurement  costs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In written  comments, reprinted in their entirety in appendix III, DOD concurred with  our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments, which we  have incorporated, as appropriate. In response to our recommendations,  DOD stated that steps will be taken to improve the use of policy and  procedures during development of uniforms, to address statutory  requirements and policy, and take advantage of potential efficiencies and  cost savings.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics to ensure that the services have, and consistently use, clear  policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach to produce  successful outcomes.  DOD said that (USD) AT&L will place additional  emphasis on the importance of following guidance related to the Defense  Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System through oversight by the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance  Board. If DOD completes the Joint Clothing and Textiles Government  Board charter clearly outlining the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of  the Board to include oversight of the services’ uniform development  process, then the action proposed by the department may satisfy the intent  of the recommendation. However, DOD did not specifically identify how the  Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board plans to provide consistent,  long-term oversight to ensure the military services use policies and  procedures to guide their development activities in the future.  As we  discuss in our report, without additional guidance from DOD on the use of  clear policies and procedures for a knowledge-based approach to  developing effective uniforms, some services may continue to lack  assurance that they have a disciplined process that is capable of delivering  uniforms that meet warfighter requirements.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretaries of the military departments to identify and  implement actions necessary to enable the Joint Clothing and Textiles  Governance Board to develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms prior to  the development or acquisition of any new camouflage uniform and  establishing a timeline for developing joint standards. One important  action includes the completion of the Board's charter outlining the roles,  responsibilities, and authorities of the board. DOD stated that the military  departments participate in the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance  Board's efforts to develop joint criteria for camouflage uniforms by  providing appropriate research and development and functional expertise.  DOD stated that draft joint criteria for camouflage uniforms have been  developed and are going through the DOD approval process, which DOD  estimated will be completed in the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year 2013.  Finally, DOD stated that once approved, the joint criteria will be used prior  to the development or acquisition of new camouflage uniforms. While we  are encouraged to learn that DOD has draft joint criteria moving through  the approval process, the development of the joint criteria has been an  ongoing effort for several years—initially to be completed by February  2011, then in December 2012, according to DOD's status report to  congressional committees, and now no later than March 2013, in  response to our recommendation. Because of the difficulties the  department has experienced in developing and approving joint criteria,  our recommendation called for the completion of the Joint Clothing and  Textiles Governance Board's charter as a specific action that DOD should  take to facilitate the department's ability to meet the statutory requirement  to develop joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms. DOD,  however, did not address completion of the Board's charter in its  comments. We continue to believe that completion of the charter to  clearly outline the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Board  would facilitate military department approval of meaningful joint criteria.  Further, we believe that completion of the Board's charter will be critical in  ensuring that the Board can assist DOD in 1) carrying out the oversight of  service uniform development actions and 2) providing additional oversight  and encouraging active partnerships for joint development and use of  uniforms, particularly since DOD has identified the Board as an essential  actor in carrying out three of our four recommendations.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics develop a policy and  establish a timeframe to ensure that future service-specific uniforms  provide equivalent levels of performance and protection, and minimize  risk to service members operating in the joint battlespace. DOD said that  the USD (AT&L) will disseminate policy guidance to the military  departments that will include direction for using joint criteria and ensuring  equivalent levels of performance and protection by the 3rd quarter of  Fiscal Year 2013. If fully implemented, we believe this action would  satisfy our recommendation.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries of the  military departments actively pursue partnerships for the joint  development and use of uniforms to minimize fragmentation in the  development of uniforms, and to seek to reduce inventory and overall  procurement costs. DOD stated that it will use the Joint Clothing and  Textiles Governance Board and the Cross-Service Warfighter Equipment  Board to provide additional oversight and further pursue active  partnerships for joint development and use of uniforms. We believe these  actions, if fully implemented, would satisfy our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Air  Force, Army, and Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which Department of Defense (DOD) guidance  provides a consistent decision process to ensure that new camouflage  uniforms meet operational requirements, we reviewed key guidance and  interviewed relevant DOD and military service officials. We collected and  reviewed the DOD’s and services’ regulations, instructions, policies,  procedures, and other guidance that the services used to structure their  decision processes on the development and acquisition of their  camouflage uniforms. We assessed the decision processes based on  their use of DOD’s 5000-series acquisition guidance, military department  implementing guidance, or other guidance, and OMB’s acquisition  guidance and GAO’s framework for assessing acquisition functions. We  assessed whether three services—the Marine Corps, Army and Air  Force—followed the two key elements that GAO has determined are key  practices for a decision process that produces successful outcomes, and  to what extent each service developed uniforms that met requirements.  We visited the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy offices  responsible for managing the development or acquisition of their  camouflage uniforms and gathered data and reports that the services  used to support their decisions. We interviewed military service officials  responsible for the management of uniform development and acquisition  policy and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics about the flexibility of DOD’s 5000-series  guidance and how the services used this guidance in their development  activities. To determine whether the services’ uniforms met requirements,  we collected data and interviewed service officials to determine if the new  uniforms have been replaced to meet operational needs.
To determine the extent to which the services have used a joint approach  to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage costs, we  reviewed the DOD guidance, the requirement of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that the military departments  establish joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms, and policy  established by the act permitting the design and fielding of service- unique, future ground combat uniforms so long as they, to the maximum  extent practicable, provide equivalent levels of performance and  protection to all service members commensurate with their assigned  combat missions and minimize the risk to the individual service members  operating in the joint battle space, among other things. We collected data  and interviewed relevant officials from the four military services and  officials with the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board from the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics and the Defense Logistics Agency to determine if the services  are using a joint approach to address the requirement and policy and if  they are being met. Specifically, we interviewed governance board  officials and reviewed documents related to the board’s efforts and plans  to develop joint criteria and collect a set of common uniform  characteristics to support development of uniforms and protective gear.  Finally, to determine how the services jointly seek to reduce costs in the  acquisition of uniforms, we gathered data from the Navy and Army on the  estimated cost to introduce their new camouflage uniforms into inventory.  We reviewed DOD’s supply chain materiel management regulation and  other guidance from the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office  on initial inventory fees and how the agency provides the services a  reduced initial inventory fee if a service partners with one or more service.  To assess the reliability of the cost data, we interviewed Navy and Army  officials to understand how the initial inventory fee was determined. The  Defense Logistics Agency confirmed the cost of the Navy’s initial  inventory fee. To verify the Army’s estimate, we obtained data from the  Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office on monthly demand for  uniforms and created our own cost estimate. To ensure that the  computer-generated data from the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop  Support office is reliable, we collected information about the Enterprise  Business System and the Standard Materiel Management System and  interviewed officials who manage the system. We determined that the  data from the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office, the Navy,  and the Army were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our  engagement.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to  September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat Uniforms
paragraphs: Since 2006, each service has developed or adopted flame-resistant  uniforms in response to urgent warfighter needs. See figure 2 for  additional information about the uniforms. Prior to Operation Enduring  Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD personnel with flame  resistant uniforms were mainly aviators, fuel handlers, and combat- vehicle crewmen. These personnel required flame resistant uniforms  because of their potential exposure to fire or other thermal energy. With  the growing prevalence of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat,  all ground forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have been exposed to  the possibility of fire-related injuries. As the threat from IEDs emerged  and continues today, the services have developed flame resistant uniform  capabilities to protect the warfighter.
The Marine Corps developed its Flame Resistant Organizational Gear  (FROG) in response to a July 2006 Urgent Statement of Need to increase  protection against flash flame IED events in Central Command’s area of  responsibility. The Urgent Statement of Need requested burn protection  for the hands, face, and neck. After extensive testing, the Marine Corps  determined that in addition to providing a base layer of protection, the  service also needed to provide an outer layer of protection. The Marine  Corps conducted testing of flame-resistant fabrics in January and  February of 2007 and selected the TenCate Defender™ M fabric for its  flame-resistant uniforms. The Marine Corps spent about $1.5 million in  the development of the FROG through Fiscal Year 2008. The service  began fielding FROG items in February 2007 to all deployed and  deploying Marines.
The Army’s Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FR ACU) was  developed in response to two Operational Need Statements requiring  flame protection clothing capabilities to support operations in Central  Command’s area of responsibility due to greater threats of IEDs with  enhanced accelerants throughout the theater. In August 2006, the Army  received an Operational Need Statement from Multi-National Corps Iraq  which called for an increase in the number of flame-resistant uniforms  already available to be used by soldiers to protect against increased burn  injuries occurring from IED attacks. The Operational Need Statement was  met by issuing Nomex® Combat Vehicle Crewman’s uniforms and  Nomex® Combat Vehicle Crewman’s balaclavas for those soldiers  deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring  Freedom. In addition, as part of its response, the Army tested flame- resistant fabrics in 2006 for future uniforms. In March 2007, an  Operational Needs Statement was submitted by United States Army  Central requesting flame-resistant uniforms to enhance survivability while  conducting missions. The Army developed its FR ACU using the same  flame-resistant fabric, TenCate Defender™ M, identified in its 2006  testing and as the Marine Corps’ FROG. The Army did not provide the  total cost of the development of the FR ACU, but did provide PEO  Soldier’s research and development costs of about $530,000. The Army  began fielding the FR ACU to soldiers in late 2007.
In response to direction from a June 2009 conference committee that  DOD take immediate action to provide personnel deployed to Afghanistan  with a camouflage pattern that is suited to the environment of  Afghanistan, the Army developed the Operation Enduring Freedom  Camouflage Pattern (OCP). The OCP uniform provides increased  camouflage protection to soldiers operating in Afghanistan’s diverse  environments and is printed on the TenCate Defender™ M flame  resistant fabric. The Army spent about $3.4 million through 2009 on  development, began fielding the uniform in July 2010, and it is expected  to be fully fielded by September 2012.
The Air Force’s Airman Battle System-Ground (ABS-G) was developed in  response to a May 2008 Urgent Operational Need for flame-resistant  equipment to be used in ground combat and combat support  environments by personnel performing non-traditional, ground-focused, or  newly emerging missions for the Air Force and in support of other joint  and services’ staffs in Central Command’s area of responsibility. The  ABS-G consists of four layers of flame-resistant clothing: a base layer,  core layer, an outer layer, and an extreme cold-weather layer. In 2007,  the Air Force and Army conducted joint testing of flame-resistant fabrics  to identify alternatives to TenCate Defender™ M based on concerns  about the availability of flame resistant rayon given a projected increase  in demand from both services. The Air Force spent about $1.7 million  between 2007 and 2010 in the development of the ABS-G and began  fielding it in March 2009. However, in September 2010, the Air Force  changed its combat uniform wear policy to enhance the level of protection  for personnel who perform ground combat missions. The updated policy  authorizes personnel conducting ground combat missions beyond the  perimeter of a base to wear the uniform of their assigned or aligned unit— generally the Army’s OCP—and directs all other Air Force personnel  deployed to Afghanistan to wear the Army’s OCP uniform or the FR ACU  if the OCP uniform is not available. If neither uniform is available, the  policy authorizes personnel to wear the ABS-G. Air Force officials stated  that the ABS-G will be transitioned out of the Air Force’s inventory as  soon as the production levels of the Army’s flame-resistant uniforms can  meet Air Force demand.
In response to an Urgent Statement of Need dated February 2011, the  Navy adopted the Marine Corps’ flame resistant uniform for Navy use,  thereby avoiding a duplication of effort and eliminating development  costs. Through the Naval Logistics Integration initiative with the Marine  Corps, the Navy is leveraging the Marine Corps’ flame resistant uniform  and gear and adding its own Type II desert and Type III woodland  camouflage patterns and the legacy Desert Camouflage Uniform patterns  to the FROG uniform for use by the Navy’s expeditionary ground  personnel. The Marine Corps Systems Command’s Program Manager for  Infantry Combat Equipment (PM-ICE) is the program manager for the  Navy expeditionary ground personnel’s flame-resistant uniforms. The  Navy spent about $29,000 for final preproduction review of the uniforms  and had no additional research or development costs because it adopted  the Marine Corps’ flame-resistant uniform. The Navy began fielding  elements of the Navy FROG in September 2011. According to an official,  the Navy plans to begin fielding its FROG in the Type II desert pattern in  2012.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Cary Russell, Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,  (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact name above, key contributors to this report were  Larry Junek, Assistant Director; Elizabeth Morris, Grace Coleman, Susan  Ditto, James Lackey, Tobin McMurdie, Carol Petersen, Richard  Powelson, Michael Shaughnessy, and Amie Steele.