Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning
Published: 2007-03-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need for security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. This testimony addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being 5 times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security." According to an Army lessons learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. According to officials from Multi-National Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. forces and others. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however, DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed by an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites in future operations planning. DOD's actions generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths. For example, potential adversaries are estimated to have a significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that this situation shows both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations. However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and execution.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss GAO’s report being  released today on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to plan for  the security of former Iraqi conventional weapons sites and the lessons  learned for planning future operations. In March 2003, citing the failure of  Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspectors and other concerns, the United  States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq in an operation known as  Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Commander of the U.S. Central  Command (CENTCOM) was primarily responsible for developing and  executing the war plan for OIF. The war plan’s military priorities included  overthrowing the Iraqi regime by rapidly capturing Baghdad and disarming  Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although WMD stockpiles  were not found, Iraq had hundreds of thousands of tons of conventional  munitions throughout the country at various storage sites. The  widespread looting of some Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites  during OIF has been the subject of media reports. We previously reported  on the looting and dispersal of radiological sources from a number of sites  in Iraq after the invasion and DOD’s efforts to collect and secure those  sources. My statement today addresses (1) the security provided by U.S.  forces over conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, and (2) DOD  actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary’s conventional  munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons  learned.
The observations I will discuss today are based on the unclassified version  of our classified report on this topic. To examine the security over Iraqi  conventional munitions storage sites provided by U.S. forces, we reviewed  field unit reporting and intelligence products and interviewed DOD  officials. We also collected and analyzed the various iterations of OIF  plans, doctrine, and concepts of operations for coverage of the security of  conventional munitions storage sites. To examine DOD’s actions to learn  from its experience with securing conventional munitions storage sites in  Iraq and apply these lessons learned to mitigate risks during future  operations, we interviewed DOD officials about their efforts to identify  and document lessons learned and examined documents on operations in  Iraq. We performed our work from November 2005 through October 2006  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: When the United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq on March 17,  2003, and the Iraqi government no longer functioned, many areas  experienced widespread looting and the breakdown of public services,  such as electricity and water in the cities. U.S. and coalition forces were  then confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and  infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Given the extensive  looting, as we reported in 2005, DOD could not assume that facilities and  items within the facilities would remain intact or in place for later  collection without being secured. Many facilities, such as abandoned  government research facilities and industrial complexes, were no longer  under the control of the former regime and had been looted. For example,  hundreds of tons of explosive materials that had been documented by the  International Atomic Energy Agency prior to March 2003 at the Al Qa Qaa  explosives and munitions facility in Iraq were lost after April 9, 2003,  through the theft and looting of the unsecured installations. We also  reported that regarding radiological sources in Iraq, DOD was not ready to  collect and secure radiological sources when the war began in March 2003  and for about 6 months thereafter.
section_title: U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting
paragraphs: According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons  learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition forces  were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage sites in  Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. These sources indicated  that U.S. and coalition forces were overwhelmed by the number and size  of conventional munitions storage sites, and DOD had insufficient troop  levels to secure these sites because of prewar planning priorities and  certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. Despite war plan and  intelligence estimates of large quantities of munitions in Iraq,  knowledgeable DOD officials reported that DOD did not plan for or set up  a program to centrally manage and destroy enemy munitions until August  2003, well after the completion of major combat operations in May 2003.  The costs of not securing these conventional munitions storage sites have  been high, as looted explosives and ammunition from these sites have  been used to construct IEDs that have killed and maimed people.  Furthermore, estimates indicate such munitions are likely to continue to  support terrorist attacks in the region.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites, Leaving Those Sites Vulnerable to Looting
paragraphs: U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional  munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure these  sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat  operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit reports,  lessons learned reports, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of  Iraq’s conventional munitions varied significantly with the higher estimate  being five times greater than the lower estimate. The commander of  CENTCOM testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations  on September 24, 2003, that “there is more ammunition in Iraq than any  place I’ve ever been in my life, and it is all not securable.”
Furthermore, the sites remained vulnerable from April 2003 through the  time of our review. For example, an assessment conducted from April  2003 through June 2003 indicated that most military garrisons associated  with Iraq’s former republican guard had been extensively looted and  vandalized after the military campaign phase of OIF ended. It concluded  that the most prized areas for looting were the depots or storage areas.  The assessment further concluded that the thorough nature of the looting  and the seemingly targeted concentration on storage areas suggested that  much of the looting in the areas assessed was conducted by organized  elements that were likely aided or spearheaded by Iraqi military personnel.
Moreover, in early 2004, 401 Iraqi sites—including fixed garrisons, field  sites, and ammunition production facilities—were reviewed to assess their  vulnerability and the likelihood that anticoalition forces were obtaining  munitions from those sites. Of the 401 sites, a small number of sites were  considered highly vulnerable because of the large quantity of munitions,  inadequate security, and a high level of looting. The majority of the sites  were assessed as having low vulnerability—not because they had been  secured, but because they had been abandoned or totally looted. The  review considered virtually all the sites to be partially secured at best and  concluded that U.S. and coalition troops were able to guard only a very  small percentage of the sites.
section_title: U.S. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequate Security Because of OIF Planning Priorities and Assumptions
paragraphs: DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S.  forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate security for  conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of OIF planning  priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. According to  DOD officials, ground commanders had two top priorities during major  combat operations that were set forth in the February 2003 OIF war plan.  First, to overthrow the regime, DOD planned for and successfully  executed a rapid march on Baghdad that relied on surprise and speed  rather than massive troop buildup, such as was used in 1991 during the  first Gulf War. This rapid march to Baghdad successfully resulted in the  removal of the regime. Another critical planning priority was finding and  securing the regime’s stockpiles of WMD, which the administration  believed were a threat to coalition forces and other countries in the region.  The OIF war plan assumed that there was a high probability that the  regime would use WMD against U.S. and coalition forces in a final effort to  survive when those forces reached Baghdad. As a result, a CENTCOM  planner for OIF stated that ground commanders had to prioritize limited  available resources against the volume of tasks, both stated and implied,  contained in the war plan.
Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF  war plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being  insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage  sites, including the following:    The Iraqi regular army would “capitulate and provide security.”
The OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and  security forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual  surrender or desertion. As stated in the OIF war plan, the U.S.  Commander, CENTCOM, intended to preserve, as much as possible,  the Iraqi military to maintain internal security and protect Iraq’s  borders during and after major combat operations. According to a  study prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, this  assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat  power deployed to Iraq. On May 23, 2003, the Coalition Provisional  Authority dissolved the Iraqi Army, which the CENTCOM commander  assumed would provide internal security.
Iraqi resistance was unlikely. Although the OIF war plan laid out the  probability of several courses of action that the regime might take in  response to an invasion, the plan did not consider the possibility of  protracted, organized Iraqi resistance to U.S. and coalition forces after  the conclusion of major combat operations. As a result, DOD officials  stated that the regime’s conventional munitions storage sites were not  considered a significant risk.
Postwar Iraq would not be a U.S. military responsibility. The OIF  war planning, according to a Joint Forces Command lessons learned  report, was based on the assumption that the bulk of the Iraqi  government would remain in place after major combat operations and  therefore civil functions, including rebuilding and humanitarian  assistance, could be shifted from military forces to U.S. and  international organizations and, ultimately, the Iraqis, within about 18  months after the end of major combat operations. Therefore, DOD  initially did not plan for an extended occupation of the country or the  level of troops that would be needed to secure conventional munitions  storage sites in particular or the country in general.
Joint assessments further showed that OIF planning assumptions  contributed to security challenges in Iraq. According to a 2006 report by  the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not examine  the consequences of those assumptions proving wrong, further  contributing to insufficient force levels to prevent the breakdown of civil  order in Iraq. The Joint Staff strategic-level lessons learned report also  discussed the effect inaccurate planning assumptions had on force levels.  According to this report, overemphasis on planning assumptions that  could not be validated prior to critical decision points resulted in a force  structure plan that did not consider several missions requiring troops,  such as providing security for enemy conventional munitions storage sites.
section_title: DOD Did Not Set Up a Program to Centrally Manage and Destroy Iraqi Munitions until after the Completion of Major Combat Operations
paragraphs: Despite prewar intelligence assessments of large amounts of conventional  munitions, knowledgeable DOD officials stated that DOD did not set up a  central office until July 2003 or set up a program to centrally manage and  destroy Iraqi munitions until after August 2003. These steps were taken  well after major combat operations were completed in May 2003, because  the department did not perceive conventional munitions storage sites as a  threat. The central office was initially set up to address operational  problems found during an assessment of nine Iraqi sites. This assessment  found that DOD lacked priorities for securing the sites and uniform  procedures and practices for securing and disposing of munitions. It also  uncovered serious safety problems in the handling, transportation,  storage, and disposal of munitions.
In August 2003, the Engineering and Support Center awarded contracts for  the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, and the first demolition of  munitions under the program was conducted in September 2003. The  program’s initial goals were to destroy the stockpiles at six depots and to  have all enemy ammunition outside the depots destroyed or transported to  the depots. The program also was tasked with assisting in the  establishment, management, and transfer of depots to the new Iraqi army.  According to the Engineering and Support Center, the program has  received more than $1 billion and has destroyed or secured more than  324,000 tons of munitions. This number, combined with military disposal  operations, has accounted for more than 417,000 tons of munitions,  leaving an unknown amount of conventional munitions in the hands of  resistance groups or unsecured. This unknown amount could range  significantly, from thousands to millions of tons of unaccounted  conventional munitions.
According to Multi-National Coalition-Iraq officials, unsecured  conventional munitions from the former regime continue to pose a risk to  U.S. forces and others. For example, some conventional munitions storage  sites in remote locations have not been assessed recently to verify whether  they pose any residual risk. These officials also stated that smaller caches  of weapons, munitions, and equipment as well as remaining unexploded  ordnance, scattered across Iraq, represent a more pressing and continuing  risk. These officials said that the coalition is working to reduce this risk by  searching for and finding a growing number of caches, but it will be some  time before it can clean up all the munitions in Iraq. The extent of the  threat from smaller caches, however, is difficult to quantify because the  location or amount of munitions hidden or scattered around the country is  unknown.
section_title: Costs of Not Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites Have Been High
paragraphs: As reported by DOD and key government agencies, the human, strategic,  and financial costs of not securing conventional munitions storage sites  have been high. Estimates indicate that the weapons and explosives looted  from unsecured conventional munitions storage sites will likely continue  to support terrorist attacks throughout the region. Government agencies  also have assessed that looted munitions are being used in the  construction of IEDs. IEDs have proven to be an effective tactic because  they are inexpensive, relatively simple to employ, deadly, anonymous, and  have great strategic value. To illustrate, the Congressional Research  Service reported in 2005 that IEDs caused about half of all U.S. combat  fatalities and casualties in Iraq and are killing hundreds of Iraqis.  Moreover, Multinational Forces in Iraq reported that the attacks against  the coalition and its Iraqi partners continued to increase through July  2006, representing at least 40 percent of all attacks on coalition forces.
section_title: DOD’s Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations
paragraphs: While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we  found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security of  an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic planning  and priority-setting consideration during planning for future operations. A  critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured conventional munitions  storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces, as illustrated by  intelligence assessments that show one potential adversary, for example,  also has considerable munitions stockpiles that would require a sizable  occupying force to secure or destroy. Despite the strategic implications  regarding unsecured conventional munitions storage sites, our analysis  shows that securing those sites generally is not explicitly addressed in  military policy and guidance, particularly at the joint level. We reviewed 17  DOD publications—which Joint Staff officials told us were relevant to our  review—to determine the extent to which each of those publications  contained guidance on the security of conventional munitions storage  sites. A list of these publications can be found in our March 2007 report.  In reviewing these documents, we found little evidence of guidance  regarding conventional munitions storage site security. Although several  publications addressed defeating IEDs during an insurgency after major  combat operations have ended or provided tactical-level guidance on how  to dispose of explosive hazards, including munitions, or make those  hazards safe, none explicitly addressed the security of conventional  munitions storage sites during or after major combat operations as a  tactical, operational, or strategic risk.
Because of DOD’s understandable focus on current operations, the  department’s actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have  emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists  during posthostility operations. The specific actions DOD has taken are  discussed in our report.  These actions are good first steps toward  broadening DOD’s focus beyond the ongoing tactical and operational  counter-IED efforts used against Saddam loyalists, rejectionists, or  external terrorist groups in Iraq to planning and executing strategic  counter-IED campaigns for future operations. However, the actions do not  directly address the strategic importance of securing conventional  munitions storage sites during major combat operations so that they do  not become the source of materials for making IEDs during an occupation  or become used for other forms of armed resistance.
Based on our work, a critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured  conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat  to U.S. forces during future operations. Furthermore, other potential  adversaries are also learning lessons from the United States’ experiences  in Iraq and will likely use asymmetric warfare against U.S. invading forces.  We believe these potential adversaries will likely develop military doctrine  to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States if possible  and try to undermine the United States’ political commitment with  unconventional warfare. Therefore, the number, size, and geographic  separation of an adversary’s munitions storage sites could pose a  significant security challenge during an occupying force’s follow-on  operations. A large amount of munitions in such an adversary’s country  could require an occupying force to dedicate significant manpower to  secure or destroy the contents of the major munitions storage sites.  Furthermore, the remnants of an adversary’s forces, insurgents, or  terrorists could draw from any large conventional munitions storage  network left unsecured by an occupying force.
section_title: Conclusions and Recommendations
paragraphs: In our report, we concluded that a fundamental gap existed between the  OIF war plan assumptions and the experiences of U.S. and coalition forces  in Iraq, contributing to insufficient troops being on the ground to prevent  widespread looting of conventional munitions storage sites and resulting  in looted munitions being a continuing asymmetric threat to U.S. and  coalition forces. The human, strategic, and financial costs of this failure to  provide sufficient troops have been high, with IEDs made with looted  munitions causing about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in  Iraq and killing hundreds of Iraqis and contributing to increasing  instability, challenging U.S. strategic goals in Iraq. Further, DOD does not  appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessed the risk  associated with unsecured conventional munitions storage sites to U.S.  forces and others. Such a survey and assessment combined with  associated risk mitigation strategies—such as providing more troops or  other security measures—could assist DOD in conserving lives and in  meeting its strategic goal to leave a stable nation behind when U.S. forces  ultimately leave Iraq. We recommended that the Joint Chief of Staff  conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured  conventional munitions in Iraq and report ensuing risk mitigation  strategies and the results of those strategies to Congress.
We also concluded that in preparing for future operations DOD’s actions in  response to OIF lessons learned primarily have focused on countering  IEDs and not on the security of conventional munitions storage sites as a  strategic planning and priority-setting consideration for future operations.  Although good first steps, these actions do not address what we believe is  a critical OIF lesson learned, the strategic importance of securing  conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat  operations. Unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can represent  an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would require significant  manpower or other resources during and after major combat operations to  secure. Therefore, since joint doctrine is to present fundamental principles  as well as contemporary lessons that guide the employment of forces, we  believe that it is important that DOD clearly and explicitly address the  security of conventional munitions storage sites in revisions to joint  doctrine. Therefore we recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff  incorporate conventional munitions storage site security as a strategic  planning factor into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including  joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and other directives.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the  department conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding  unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. DOD stated that while it is  imperative that a complete and thorough assessment of conventional  munitions storage sites be conducted, military commanders in theater are  aware of the significant risk posed by the sites, and similar studies and  assessments have been conducted over the past 3 years. DOD also stated  that from a manpower perspective, an in-depth, theaterwide survey is not  feasible without significantly degrading ongoing efforts in Iraq and the  region. As the evidence in our report clearly supports, we made this  recommendation because we did not see any evidence of a strategic-level  survey or an effective, theaterwide risk mitigation strategy to address the  commanders’ awareness of this significant risk or the findings of the  studies and assessments regarding security of conventional munitions  storage sites. Accordingly, the intent behind our recommendation is to  have DOD assess the risks associated with unsecured conventional  munitions sites on a strategic, theaterwide basis to develop an effective  risk mitigation strategy.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the  department report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of  those strategies to Congress. In commenting on this recommendation,  DOD stated that risk mitigation is doctrinally sound; however, the  department and Joint Staff recommend that these briefings to Congress  remain at the strategic level. In making this recommendation, it was not  our intention to detract tactical units from the current warfighting mission  or to suggest congressional oversight is needed for each tactical unit.  Instead, we are recommending that DOD alert Congress of its assessment  and the actions being taken to mitigate the strategic risk associated with  unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the  department incorporate the security of conventional munitions storage  sites as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and  guidance and stated that the Joint Staff will incorporate the appropriate  language in joint doctrine, manuals, and instructions. DOD stated that  (1) Iraq is a separate case and should not be considered the standard for  all future operations and (2) war plans must reflect proper prioritization  based on desired operational effects and resources available as it may not  always be possible or desirable in a resource- and time-constrained  environment to secure all sites or destroy all munitions. We agree with  these statements. The purpose of this report was not to suggest that Iraq  be the standard for all future conflicts or to restrict commanders’ planning  prerogatives. Instead, the report suggests that as DOD incorporates OIF  lessons learned into joint doctrine, it includes what is a key OIF lesson  learned—an adversary’s stockpile of conventional munitions can be an  asymmetric threat to U.S. forces.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my  prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may  have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Davi D’Agostino at  (202) 512-5431. Other individuals making key contributions to this  statement include: Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director, Renee Brown,  Donna Byers, John Van Schiak, and Nicole Volchko.
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