Federal Aviation Administration: Agency Is Taking Steps to Plan for and Train Its Technician Workforce, but a More Strategic Approach Is Warranted
Published: 2010-10-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since 2006, air traffic control (ATC) equipment outages and failures at Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) facilities have caused hundreds of flight delays and raised questions about FAA's maintenance capabilities. About 6,100 technicians maintain FAA's current (legacy) facilities and equipment and will be responsible for the Next Generation (NextGen) technologies planned for the next 15 years. Safe and efficient air travel will therefore partly depend on FAA's having technicians with the right skills now and in the future. As requested, GAO reviewed how (1) FAA incorporates key practices of leading organizations in its workforce planning for technicians, (2) FAA's technician training compares with key practices of leading organizations, and (3) the costs of technician training, including travel costs, have changed in recent years. GAO analyzed FAA workforce and training data, compared FAA planning and training practices with criteria identified in prior GAO work, and conducted focus group interviews with FAA technicians and FAA Training Academy instructors.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FAA has followed some key practices of leading organizations in its strategic workforce planning for technicians but lacks a comprehensive, written strategy to guide its efforts. GAO assessed whether FAA followed those practices fully, mostly, or partially, or did not follow them. For example, FAA partially follows one practice--determining critical skills and competencies--because it assesses those skills and competencies its technicians now have to maintain legacy systems, but has just begun to identify those they will need to maintain NextGen systems. FAA also partially develops strategies to close the gap between the technician workforce it needs and the one that it has: It determines staffing needs annually, but lacks a longer-term strategy to address the hundreds of technician retirements projected through 2020. Without a comprehensive, written technician workforce planning strategy, FAA does not have a transparent road map to acquire and retain the right number of technicians with the right skills at the right time. FAA mostly follows other leading workforce planning practices, although it only partially involves key stakeholders--managers, but not technicians--in workforce planning and may thus be missing opportunities for improvement. FAA at least partially follows key practices of leading organizations in its strategic training and development for technicians, but it lacks a strategic training plan, and workload issues limit its ability to fully incorporate key leading practices. With the transition to NextGen, technicians will need to be trained both to maintain new systems and to remain proficient in maintaining the legacy systems that FAA plans to continue operating. FAA has partially implemented a strategic approach to planning for training in that it has established annual training goals and incorporated employees' developmental goals in its planning processes. As noted, however, it has just begun to identify the skills and competencies technicians will need to maintain NextGen systems. FAA mostly follows other key practices for design and development, such as developing a mix of in-house and vendor training. FAA is studying the feasibility of having vendors provide certain courses that are currently offered through the FAA Training Academy and are filled to capacity. FAA partially follows leading practices for implementing training and development, but workload demands often limit technicians' opportunities to attend training. FAA also partially follows leading practices for demonstrating how training and development efforts contribute to improved performance and results. For example, FAA identifies annual training goals, but does not link them to specific performance goals. As a result, it is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its investments in training. Recent compensation costs for instructors at the FAA Training Academy have been roughly stable, while those for student travel to and from the academy and for training courses provided by vendors, exclusive of travel costs, have risen. The higher student travel costs reflect increases in air fares, and vendor training costs have grown as FAA has rolled out more courses for new equipment in preparation for the deployment of NextGen systems. Among other things, FAA should develop a written technician workforce planning strategy that identifies needed skills and staffing, and a strategic training plan showing how training efforts contribute to performance goals. The Department of Transportation provided technical corrections.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the key federal agency  responsible for maintaining the nearly 60,000 pieces of equipment that  help to ensure that the national airspace system operates safely and  efficiently. However, during the last few years, power outages and air  traffic control equipment failures—for example, in Southern California in  2006, at the Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center in 2008, and at the  Salt Lake City Air Route Traffic Control Center in 2009—have caused flight  delays. FAA’s equipment maintenance staff—referred to in this report as  technicians—are responsible for minimizing the frequency, duration, and  impact of such outages. Trained as systems specialists, electronics  technicians, and computer specialists, they maintain, repair, and certify air  traffic control equipment—including radar, navigation, communication,  automation, and environmental systems deployed throughout the national  airspace system. In 2009, FAA had approximately 6,100 technicians. This  minimum technician staffing level was established under a 2000 contract  between FAA and the Professional Airways Safety Specialists (PASS)—the  technicians’ bargaining unit. The 5-year contract, which expired in 2005,  remains in effect until a new contract is established.
Today’s air traffic systems are primarily ground-based, and some date  back to at least the 1970s. To modernize these systems while improving  the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the national airspace system, FAA  plans to develop and deploy satellite-based air traffic management  technologies, collectively referred to as the Next Generation Air  Transportation System (NextGen). FAA has begun to deploy some  NextGen technologies and has set 2025 as a target date for full  implementation of NextGen capabilities. As it transitions to NextGen  technologies, FAA plans to continue operating existing air traffic control  technologies, referred to as legacy systems, while testing and integrating  NextGen technologies. Safe and efficient air travel will therefore depend  on, among other things, FAA’s having a sufficient number of skilled  technicians to ensure that both the legacy and the new systems are  properly maintained and certified throughout the transition. Incorporating  key workforce planning and training practices of leading organizations can  help ensure that FAA has a highly functioning workforce and appropriate  training capabilities as it manages the transition to NextGen.
In light of technicians’ critical role in maintaining the nation’s air traffic  control infrastructure, you asked us to assess the extent to which FAA has  the personnel with the right skills to maintain its equipment and facilities  now and in the near term and how much FAA is spending on technician  training. To achieve these objectives, we addressed the following research  questions: (1) To what extent does FAA incorporate key practices of  leading organizations in its workforce planning for technicians? (2) How  does FAA’s technician training compare with key practices of leading  organizations? (3) How have the costs of technician training, including  travel costs, changed in recent years?
To assess FAA’s workforce planning for technicians, we analyzed FAA  data from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2009 to identify trends in  staffing, hiring, and attrition; reviewed FAA’s workforce planning  documents; and compared the agency’s workforce planning practices with  criteria from our past work. We selected key leading practices, listed in  tables throughout the report, and assessed the extent to which FAA  followed each practice by applying the following scale: “Fully” indicated  that, in our judgment, all or virtually all aspects of the practice were  followed; “mostly” indicated that more than half but less than all or  virtually all were followed; “partially” indicated that less than half but  more than a few were followed; and “minimally” indicated that few or no  aspects of the practice were followed.
To assess training for technicians, we analyzed FAA training data from  fiscal year 2006 through May 2010 to identify trends in course offerings  and determine the number of classes, students, and instructors; reviewed  end-of-course surveys and technician training documents; and compared  FAA’s development and delivery of technician training with key leading  practices identified through our past work, as described above. In  addition, to address both workforce planning and training, we conducted  12 focus group meetings—11 with FAA technicians and 1 with FAA  Academy managers—at 11 locations and conducted semistructured  interviews with FAA managers and PASS union officials. To identify the  focus group locations, we considered the number of technicians at the  facilities, geographic location, notable conditions (such as recent  equipment outages), and agency and PASS recommendations. The  information collected from the focus groups is not generalizable to all FAA  technicians.
To determine how the costs of technician training have changed, including  travel costs, we compiled and compared cost data for training provided at  FAA’s Training Academy in Oklahoma City and by vendors from fiscal year  2005 through May 2010. To address all three questions, we also reviewed  documents from the Department of Transportation’s Office of the  Inspector General, the National Academy of Public Administration, and  PASS. We assessed the reliability of FAA’s workforce and training data  that are pertinent to this effort by reviewing related documentation and  internal controls and interviewing agency officials and determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We could not assess the  reliability of cost data for vendor training, because FAA’s cost accounting  system does not provide costs for vendor training and travel-related  activities. We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 through  October 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains more  detailed information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FAA’s roughly 6,100 technicians are part of the agency’s Air Traffic  Organization (ATO) and are located organizationally within ATO’s  Technical Operations Services. (See app. II for ATO’s organization.)  Physically, the technicians are located throughout the country at  approximately 600 air traffic control facilities, which they are responsible  for maintaining, repairing, and certifying, together with the systems and  equipment the facilities contain. Currently, FAA operates nearly 60,000  pieces of legacy equipment and has begun to deploy NextGen equipment.  Technicians maintain the equipment, certify that it is working properly by  conducting periodic performance checks, and repair malfunctioning  equipment and return it to service. They conduct maintenance under  various approaches depending on the equipment. Those approaches  include (1) periodic maintenance (which includes periodic equipment  inspections, performance checks, and routine maintenance), (2) condition- based maintenance (which includes proactive maintenance tasks to  predict or prevent equipment failures), and (3) run-to-fault maintenance  (which means maintenance is performed after the equipment stops  functioning—an approach that, according to FAA, is normally applied  when other types of maintenance actions will not reduce the probability of  failure or extend the lifetime of the equipment). Since 2007, FAA has used  reliability-centered maintenance to determine the most appropriate  approach and timing for conducting maintenance activities for each type  of equipment. Reliability-centered maintenance requires that data on the  function and performance of specific equipment be collected and  analyzed, including data on the causes and consequences of failure, in  order to determine the maintenance approach needed to keep the  equipment functioning effectively and prevent future failures. For  example, performance data can be analyzed to determine whether a  particular component wears out with age or fails randomly; this  information is then used to decide the maintenance approach most  appropriate for that item. (Fig. 1 shows a technician upgrading lighting on  an approach lighting system.)
As mentioned previously, FAA’s technicians are responsible for  minimizing the frequency, duration, and impact of equipment outages.  Over the last 10 years, the frequency and duration of unscheduled outages  has generally increased. (See figs. 2 and 3.) Age and the resulting  deteriorating condition of equipment and facilities are contributing to the  increase in outages and repair time. According to a senior FAA official, the  number of outages decreased around 2008 because of changes in reporting  practices.
FAA is still determining technician responsibilities and maintenance  requirements under NextGen. A senior FAA official noted that the agency  plans to look at near-term system deployments and new system  requirements to see what maintenance requirements are planned for new  systems in the short term. The initial systems critical to implementing  NextGen—En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) and Automatic  Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)—are currently being  deployed, and FAA expects that several other systems will come online  over the next several years. (See table 1 for FAA’s schedule for deploying  NextGen systems.) Initially, FAA planned to decommission legacy  equipment as it deployed related NextGen equipment, but it has since  decided to retain much of the legacy equipment, according to a senior ATO  manager. As a result, the technicians’ workload will increase in the near  term.
subsections: section_title: Trends in Size of Technician Workforce
paragraphs: Over the last 11 years, staffing levels for technicians reached a high of  6,721 in fiscal year 2001 and, with some fluctuation, dropped to a low of  6,086 at the end of fiscal year 2008—a decline of about 9 percent. At the  end of fiscal year 2009, the number of technicians increased to 6,147,  slightly more than the minimum staffing level established in FAA’s  contract with PASS. (See table 2.) Over the same period, the number of  pieces of equipment increased from 40,360 in 1999 to 63,846 in 2009, while  the number of air traffic control facilities decreased from 651 in 1999 to  581 in 2009. The number of technicians declined slightly during fiscal years  2006 through 2008 because separations exceeded hiring, as shown in   table 3.
During the past 11 years, the number of technician separations—primarily  because of retirements—has averaged about 280 per year. The number  peaked at 366 separations in fiscal year 2006 and then decreased to 211  separations in fiscal year 2009—a decline of 42 percent. (See table 4.)
The number of technicians eligible to retire each year over this period has  ranged from about 800 to about 1,000. In 2005 and 2006, the largest  numbers of technicians retired—about one-third of those eligible each  year. (See table 5.) The relatively low number of technicians retiring in  2009 may be due to the downturn in the economy.
section_title: Technician Training
paragraphs: ATO’s Technical Operations Training and Development Group (Technical  Operations Training) is responsible for training technicians. (See app. II  for ATO’s organizational chart.) Through the Technical Operations  Training and Personnel Certification Program, FAA grants certification to  technicians who have obtained a professional level and are responsible for  the operation and performance of air traffic control facilities and  equipment. The certification program consists of five types of training: (1)  resident training taught in a classroom environment by an instructor; (2)  distance learning, such as correspondence study or computer-based  instruction; (3) refresher training, which can be provided through resident  or distance learning courses, for technicians who hold a certification; (4)  on-the-job training (OJT), providing direct experience in the work  environment where the employee is required to perform his or her duties;  and (5) enhanced hands-on training (EHOT) and demonstration of  proficiency (DoP) training. To obtain certification, technicians must  satisfactorily complete their training—including theory-of-operations  training, OJT in the workplace, or EHOT and DoP—at the training  location or pass a performance examination in the workplace.  Technicians must also receive an endorsement, first by a manager and  then by a second-level manager, that the preceding actions have been  properly completed.
At the beginning of the year, Technical Operations Training works with  FAA’s human resource personnel to obtain an estimate of new hires’  training needs. Technicians are earmarked for a piece of equipment at a  particular facility when they are hired; over the course of their careers,  they may be trained on many pieces of equipment. All new hires must get  one equipment course in their first year, and that training is targeted to the  needs of the facility to which they are assigned. Technicians need to pass  two types of equipment courses to reach the full-performance level. New  hires are at their facility for 30 days for familiarization and then go to the  FAA Academy for theory-of-operations training and one equipment course.  Afterwards, the technician’s manager determines the additional equipment  on which the technician needs training. Training to work on legacy  equipment is provided at the academy, where technicians reside during the  training.
When FAA acquires new air traffic control equipment, it follows an  established process for training technicians. Vendor courses are the  primary source of training for NextGen systems coming into the FAA  inventory. Figure 4 shows how FAA plans and funds technician training.
section_title: FAA Has Adopted Aspects of Some Leading Workforce Planning Practices but Lacks a Strategic Approach to Planning for Its Technician Workforce
paragraphs: FAA’s workforce planning for technicians partially or mostly incorporates  key practices of leading organizations, but no practices are fully  incorporated, and FAA has no comprehensive, written strategy to guide its  efforts. To the extent that the agency does not incorporate leading  practices, it may be limited in its ability to plan effectively for the right  number of technicians with the right skill sets, both now and in the near  term. Table 6 presents our analysis of the extent to which FAA has  incorporated key practices of leading organizations in its workforce  planning.
subsections: section_title: FAA Has Established Current Technician Skills and Competencies and Begun to Determine Those Critical for NextGen
paragraphs: FAA is partially following a leading practice for workforce planning in the  area of determining current and future critical skills and competencies.  (See table 7.)
To establish and maintain an inventory of employee skills and  competencies, FAA assesses technicians’ skills and competencies at hiring  and then biennially. Newly hired and on-board technicians complete  competency-based technical training on legacy systems and equipment to  establish a baseline level of technical proficiency on these systems and  equipment. Additionally, since August 2007, FAA has assessed its  technicians’ proficiency every 2 years as part of an Aviation Safety  Oversight Credentialing Program to ensure that their skills are current and  they remain competent to perform work on the equipment.
FAA’s initial and biennial skills assessments evaluate technicians’  readiness to meet the agency’s current maintenance needs, but FAA has  not determined whether its technician workforce has the skills and  competencies needed to achieve future programmatic results. Such a  determination will be critical as the transformation to NextGen proceeds  and the agency faces organizational as well as technological changes.  FAA’s strategic plan for NextGen—the NextGen Implementation Plan— describes the technology changes planned through 2018 but does not  mention workforce planning—including planning for critical skills and  competencies—for technicians.
FAA officials stated that the agency has started to determine its  maintenance requirements for NextGen equipment. This determination  will affect the skills and competencies that technicians will need under  NextGen. As part of this effort, FAA’s NextGen Integration and  Implementation Office is establishing a workgroup with members  representing relevant FAA divisions and technician subject matter experts.  According to FAA officials, this workgroup will look at changes in FAA’s  maintenance philosophy and NextGen equipment acquisitions and needs,  both leading up to and during implementation. The officials said FAA will  consider these factors as it develops NextGen planning documents that  outline, among other things, changes needed in the technician workforce,  including changes in skills, competencies, and training. In addition,  Technical Operations Training officials have dedicated a staff member to  compile technician job descriptions, tasks, and training courses.  According to the officials, FAA will use this information to develop a skills  and competency model for training purposes (modeling efforts are  discussed later in this report).
section_title: FAA Has an Annual Process for Allocating Its Technician Workforce but Lacks a Succession Planning Strategy for Addressing Impending Retirements and a Staffing Model
paragraphs: FAA’s workforce planning efforts partially address leading practices in  developing strategies to close the gap between needed and actual skills  and competencies. Although FAA has reasonable strategies in place to  allocate staffing annually, it does not have a staffing model and has not  developed succession plans to prepare for impending retirements. (See  table 8.)
FAA has developed annual technician hiring and staff planning strategies  that are derived from the budget—a human capital strategy that takes into  consideration the resources that can be reasonably expected to be  available, following a key practice of leading organizations. The staffing  process, which is discussed in more detail later in this report, begins with  a budgetary dollar amount that is used to determine how many new full- time technician positions can be filled. Top management, with input from  front-line managers in the form of requests based on their facility needs,  then distributes these positions across locations. According to FAA  officials, these recommendations generally take into account FAA’s  equipment inventory and restoration requirements and the varying levels  of trained, certified, and experienced technicians at FAA facilities,  although top management considers these factors in an ad hoc manner.
Foremost among the succession planning challenges ATO faces is the  impending retirement of portions of the technician workforce. We updated  FAA’s 2008 projections with the most current federal personnel data from  the Office of Personnel Management’s Central Personnel Data File (CPDF)  and found that 23 percent of the technicians on staff at the end of fiscal  year 2009 would be eligible for retirement in 2012. Moreover, if the 2009  staffing level remained constant, 31 percent would be eligible for  retirement in 2015 and over 50 percent in 2020. (See fig. 5.) From 2005  through 2009, FAA averaged 236 actual technician retirements annually, or  27 percent of those eligible. If actual retirements, estimated for existing  staff, continued at that rate, FAA could face over 500 retirements in fiscal  year 2015 and about 900 retirements in fiscal year 2020. As discussed  previously, not all technicians that are eligible to retire will do so, and as  seen in figure 5, the gap between the number of technicians who are  eligible to retire and those projected to actually retire will continue to  expand at least through 2020.
FAA does not have succession plans for technicians—that is, FAA lacks a  pipeline to develop new technicians to respond to the impact on  operations of retirements, attrition, and the implementation of midterm  NextGen capabilities. Officials noted that new technicians are brought in  only as others retire or leave the agency; however, this strategy does not  factor in how long it takes new technicians to become fully certified and  acquire skills and abilities on a par with those of the retiring technicians. A  pipeline approach to workforce planning, which would create a steady  flow of trained technicians with some on-the-job experience to replace  experienced technicians as they retire, would help to alleviate the  pressures resulting from FAA’s current approach. In all of the focus groups  we conducted, participants raised concerns about this aspect of FAA’s  workforce planning, noting that when an experienced technician trained  to work on multiple systems is replaced by a new technician trainee, the  new technician cannot fully replace the original employee for years,  placing a burden on other technicians at the facility as well as the training  program. FAA officials acknowledged that it can take 2 to 3 years for new  technicians to attain the skills and abilities of more experienced  technicians. According to FAA’s analysis, 686 full-performance-level  technicians with multiple certifications will be eligible to retire by the end  of fiscal year 2011. (These retirements will also have an impact on training,  as discussed later in this report.)
The expected increase in retirements could also affect FAA’s  implementation of midterm NextGen capabilities, scheduled for  completion by 2018. Currently FAA plans to implement ERAM by 2011 and  the initial segments of several other systems—including SWIM and  DataComm—by fiscal year 2016, as well as continue to operate its legacy  equipment. With both legacy and new systems to maintain, technicians  could have more varied, if not more, responsibilities and therefore need a  wider range of skills, further highlighting the importance of succession  planning. FAA needs to continue to plan for these issues so that it can  minimize the operational impact of projected retirements.
FAA plans to rely on hiring and training to address gaps between the skills  and competencies that its technicians currently have and those that they  will need in the future. Senior FAA officials recognize that, as NextGen  technologies are introduced, technicians will need very broad, and  perhaps difficult-to-find, skill sets that will allow them to maintain both  old and new air traffic control technologies. According to ATO’s strategic  human capital planning document, technicians will continue to need the  majority of their current skills to maintain legacy systems, and they will  need to enhance many of these skills to maintain new computer networks  and automated software tools. ATO’s planning document identifies timely  new hire selections and technical training as integral to maintaining and  acquiring the correct knowledge and skill base for FAA’s technician  workforce. Moreover, the document states, technicians will need a full set  of technical, business, and leadership skills to be successful in a rapidly  changing environment. As the rate of technological change increases, it  will be an ongoing challenge for ATO to acquire and maintain a technically  current workforce able to integrate new technologies and respond  effectively to changes in technology, as well as maintain legacy  technologies. Additionally, to meet this challenge, FAA will have to  address new and expanded training requirements and deliver that training  in a cost-efficient and timely manner.
FAA does not have a staffing model for technicians, and senior officials  told us that FAA is currently not sure how many technicians are and will  be needed to maintain the national airspace system. This uncertainty limits  FAA’s ability to plan strategically for the technician workforce. Senior  FAA officials confirmed that there is no staffing standard for technicians.  They noted that previous efforts to develop a staffing model for  technicians were not completed because of too many variables and that  FAA has not yet identified staffing requirements for the technician  workforce. Those officials pointed to the technicians’ union contract as  the primary factor affecting FAA’s annual technician staff planning  process. They explained that the 6,100 staffing minimum established by  the PASS contract was negotiated and is not based on equipment  inventory or maintenance requirements. They further noted that this  contractual staffing minimum has deterred FAA from implementing  staffing requirements for the technician workforce. The 2000 contract has  not been renegotiated since it expired in 2005; however, as of April 2010,  the parties were reportedly discussing a return to the negotiating table.
Although the negotiated minimum staffing level may preclude changes  below that level, it does not prevent FAA from examining the numbers of  staff and the skills required for its technician workforce now and in the  future. According to the Vice President of Technical Operations Services,  FAA may require more technicians in the future to adequately maintain  both legacy and NextGen systems. Conversely, FAA may require fewer  technicians because of the digital nature of the new equipment and  different maintenance approaches, such as reliability-centered  maintenance. FAA recently hired staff to begin collaboratively developing  an accurate, requirements-based predictive staffing model. A senior FAA  official suggested that FAA will look at various NextGen planning  documents to determine new maintenance requirements. FAA also plans  to look at near-term system deployments and new system requirements to  determine the short-term maintenance requirements for NextGen systems.  Senior FAA officials said that FAA will not be taking as much equipment  out of the national airspace system as previously thought; systems that  were originally planned to be decommissioned are still in service and are  expected to remain in service indefinitely. These officials further noted  that the maintenance process requires administrative and business  management personnel as well as technicians, and the staffing model will  therefore identify and incorporate nontechnical as well as technical  positions. The FAA Reauthorization Bill of 2009 contains a provision that  would require the National Academy of Sciences to study the assumptions  and methods FAA uses to estimate staffing needs for its technicians to  ensure proper maintenance and certification of the national airspace  system. If enacted, this provision could help address FAA’s staffing  approach.
section_title: FAA Has Taken Actions to Streamline the Technician Hiring Process, but May Need to Do More to Develop the Capacity Needed for NextGen
paragraphs: According to our analysis, FAA has mostly developed the capacity needed  to address requirements important to support its technician workforce  planning strategies. (See table 9.)
FAA has taken steps to educate managers and employees on the  availability and use of hiring flexibilities. For example, FAA provides  managers with guidance on special appointing authorities, such as “on-the- spot” hiring and recruitment and retention incentives. Moreover, FAA’s  guidance for using specific hiring flexibilities provides clear and  transparent rules to help ensure that managers and supervisors make fair  and effective use of the flexibilities, further addressing this leading  practice.
FAA has streamlined its process for hiring technicians, further building the  capacity to support its workforce planning strategies. For example, FAA  uses a Web-based automated rating and ranking system for screening  applicants and making candidate selections for technician vacancies.  According to FAA, it has created efficiencies in the hiring process for  technicians by centralizing this function in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,  much as it has done to streamline its hiring of air traffic controllers.  Additionally, according to FAA, it has the ability to expand the use of  temporary pre-employment clearance processing centers to include  technicians. These centers provide a centralized interview site and “one- stop” service for potential new hires, and their use can significantly  shorten the hiring process, which can take up to 6 months, thus allowing  FAA to get qualified applicants into academy training sooner. Managers at  one location we visited nevertheless stated that, although management  tries to hire and train new technicians as quickly as possible, the process  takes time and is still too slow.
For the transition to NextGen, FAA has acknowledged that a new  generation of personnel selection procedures may be needed. According  to FAA, the next generation of selection procedures should be developed  in parallel with the operational evolution of the national airspace system.  Identifying those future requirements will be part of the agency’s overall  strategic workforce planning effort, requiring the continued development  and validation of a methodology for identifying gaps between current and  future knowledge, skills, and abilities, and staffing profiles in safety- critical occupations.
section_title: FAA Has Some Initiatives to Monitor and Evaluate Progress in Technician Workforce Planning Efforts
paragraphs: FAA has partially implemented initiatives—such as developing strategic  human capital goals and analyzing attrition—to monitor and evaluate its  progress in workforce planning for technicians, but it does not have  measures to evaluate the contribution that its technician human capital  strategies have made toward achieving programmatic results. (See table  10.)
FAA has put monitoring and evaluation initiatives in place to assess  progress toward its human capital goals for technicians, such as its hiring,  training, and retention goals. These initiatives are consistent with the  practices of leading organizations and provide information for oversight by  identifying performance shortfalls and options for corrective action. For  example, FAA has a strategic initiative with activity targets and milestones  in its human resource business plan to improve its external recruiting for  several occupations, including technicians, and it has met these targets  and milestones. FAA, as discussed earlier, also has completed an attrition  analysis of its technical operations workforce, which includes  technicians—an important step in identifying and addressing staffing  goals. FAA plans to use this analysis to understand the unique  characteristics of employee subgroups, including technicians, in an effort  to better forecast specific staffing turnover and anticipate needs for new  hires.
However, FAA needs to better link its human capital strategies and  programmatic results to evaluate the contribution that technician human  capital strategies have had on program results. As noted above, the agency  has just begun to identify—and has no strategy to help ensure its  technicians will have—the skills and competencies needed to maintain  NextGen systems; linking FAA’s human capital strategies for the  technician workforce to that workforce’s responsibilities in the transition  to NextGen will be critical as the transformation proceeds. For example, a  workforce plan can include measures that indicate whether the agency  executed its hiring, training, or retention strategies as intended and  achieved the goals for these strategies, and how these initiatives changed  the workforce’s skills and competencies. It can also include additional  measures that address whether the agency achieved its program goals and  the link between human capital and program results. Without periodic  measurement of the extent to which human capital activities contributed  to achieving programmatic goals, FAA lacks information for identifying  performance shortfalls and appropriate corrective actions for effective  oversight.
section_title: FAA Has Involved Management, but not Technicians, in Workforce Planning, Potentially Missing Opportunities to Improve Its Human Capital Strategies
paragraphs: FAA involves top management, but minimally involves technicians, in  developing, communicating, and implementing workforce planning  strategies. (See table 11.)
Consistent with a key leading practice, top management at FAA sets the  overall direction and goals of workforce planning. More specifically, top  FAA management, including resource management groups and service  area directors, conducts FAA’s annual technician staff planning process,  as discussed previously in this report. The resource management groups— ad hoc panels of district managers and representatives from administrative  services and business services—make recommendations several times  annually on the distribution of personnel and funding. The director of each  of three service areas nationwide takes the recommendation made by that  service area’s resource management group and, in conjunction with the  area’s first-line managers, makes staffing allocation decisions.
While FAA has involved top management in developing and implementing  workforce strategies, it has not involved technicians, notwithstanding a  key leading practice calling for the involvement of employees and other  stakeholders. The Vice President of Technical Operations Services, who is  responsible for technician workforce planning, told us that technicians  have not been included in any technician workforce planning efforts. The  president of PASS and participants in all 12 focus groups we held also said  that technicians had not been involved in workforce planning activities. By  not involving employees in strategic workforce planning efforts, FAA may  miss opportunities to develop new synergies and ways to streamline  processes and improve human capital strategies.
FAA does not have a workforce planning communication strategy, a key  practice designed to create shared expectations, promote transparency,  and report progress. FAA has a strategic workforce plan for ATO, but it  does not have one specifically for the technician workforce, although ATO  has designated the technician workforce as mission-critical. In contrast,  FAA does have a strategic workforce plan for nearly 16,000 air traffic  controllers, another mission-critical workforce within ATO, and the only  group of FAA employees larger than the technicians. Previous workforce  planning documents for the technicians—including the National Airspace  System Maintenance Workforce Plan, issued in July 2008—either primarily  emphasized training or were never implemented. According to FAA  officials, Technical Operations is in the process of collaboratively  developing an accurate predictive staffing model, a draft of which will be  completed in about another year. Without a final and public technician  workforce plan, FAA’s approach to communicating about technician  workforce planning has limited potential to create shared expectations,  promote transparency, and report progress.
The technicians we spoke with described what they perceived as a lack of  management communication and support in the area of planning. They  raised concerns about how FAA plans for and communicates staffing and  planning decisions. Negative morale, stemming from such concerns over  management support and planning, could adversely affect FAA’s hiring  and retention of technicians in the future. We have reported previously  that FAA’s consistent ranking near the bottom in published lists of best  places to work in the federal government (viewed as an indicator of  employee morale) could pose challenges in recruiting, motivating, and  retaining employees to replace those retiring and to meet current and  future mission requirements.
The PASS union president also expressed concerns about FAA’s  communication of information on policy changes and new technologies  throughout the agency. He stated that technical bulletins come from other  organizations but not from Technical Operations and that FAA does not  coordinate among the lines of business, resulting in a “stovepipe effect.”  He suggested that FAA dedicate a person as a conduit for communication  to help ensure that information gets passed along, which would help  improve morale. In January 2010, PASS and Technical Operations  management developed the Joint Leadership Team as a joint effort to  rebuild their relationship and improve communication and collaboration.  As part of this effort, through a contractor, PASS and Technical  Operations management have conducted focus groups with employees,  including management, to identify areas of concern that might affect  employee morale. PASS and Technical Operations management plan to  survey field technicians in the next few months to help identify  opportunities to collaboratively address issues.
One way to address leading organizations’ key practices in the area of  stakeholder involvement is to develop comprehensive workforce planning  strategy documents, such as a workforce plan or policy statement, that  reflect the human capital needs of an organization, any new initiatives or  refinements to existing human capital approaches, and data on the  organization’s workforce profile. Without a written workforce planning  strategy, a staffing model, and a more strategic approach, including  succession planning issues related to developing new technicians when  experienced technicians leave, FAA lacks a fully considered analysis of the  appropriate number and composition of its technician workforce, and it  may not be able to meet future maintenance demands. Moreover, as FAA  transitions from legacy to NextGen systems, it risks having too many  technicians with legacy skills and not enough with NextGen skills. As this  transition occurs, strategic plans for identifying and responding to changes  in needed competencies and potential gaps in knowledge and skills will be  critical to ensure that FAA acquires or develops the needed human capital  resources and makes full and efficient use of them.
section_title: FAA’s Ability to Plan for Technician Training Is Limited by Shortfalls in Its Workforce Planning and Identification of Needed Skills and Competencies
paragraphs: FAA at least partially follows key practices of leading organizations in its  training and development for technicians. Table 12 presents our analysis  of the extent to which FAA has incorporated these key practices.
subsections: section_title: FAA Is Identifying Annual Training Goals but Needs to Identify Strategic Training Goals and Those Skills and Competencies Needed to Meet Such Goals
paragraphs: FAA has partially implemented initiatives—such as establishing annual  training goals and incorporating employees’ developmental goals—to plan  for strategic training and development of its technicians. (See table 13.)
FAA is taking action to ensure that its training goals are consistent with its  overall mission, goals, and culture in that it plans to train annually at least  the minimum number of technicians that it believes it needs to maintain  air traffic management facilities; however, FAA has not identified future  training needs beyond the annual cycle and has only just begun to  determine the critical skills and competencies that it will need to maintain  NextGen systems. In previous work, we have found that accountability  mechanisms, such as an active training oversight committee and effective  performance management systems, can help to ensure that sufficient  attention is paid to planning for training and development needs and that  those planning efforts are consistent with an agency’s mission, goals, and  culture. Line managers and supervisors can ensure that employees’  training goals are consistent with the agency’s overall mission and goals by  keeping this alignment in mind as they work with employees to set  training goals and approve employees’ training requests. For  approximately the last 5 years, FAA has maintained a Technical Training  Advisory Council, which includes training program support staff, a  supervisory committee consisting of technician line managers, and  representatives of three ATO service centers. The council meets in  person four times a year and has a monthly teleconference to provide  training feedback to ATO Technical Training and review the agency’s  training needs and goals. However, the president of PASS told us the union  had not been approached in recent years to provide input into training  planning and is not represented on the council. FAA training officials told  us, and the PASS president confirmed, that the union provided a  technician to work in Technical Operations Training to assist with training  coordination between the two organizations through December 2009.
As discussed earlier in this report, FAA has begun to determine the critical  skills and competencies that it will need to maintain NextGen systems;  however, FAA officials stated that the agency has never previously had a  robust competency model for technician training. With the transition to  NextGen, technicians’ training requirements—and thus critical skills and  competencies—will increase, since technicians will have to learn how to  maintain the new systems while remaining proficient in maintaining the  legacy systems that FAA plans to continue operating indefinitely. The  recent assignment of a staff member dedicated to compile technician job  descriptions, tasks, and training courses for Technical Operations Training  supports this effort to develop a skills and competency model. Technical  Operations Training does not have a formal process to identify future  needed skills and competencies beyond those that will be required to  maintain new systems that are turned over in the near term from system  program offices, and it lacks a strategic training plan or other document  that presents a business case for proposed investments in training and  development. When assessing investment opportunities for its training  plan, an agency ought to consider the competing demands it faces, the  resources available to it, and how those demands can best be met with  available resources. Because FAA has not developed a longer-term  strategic plan to prepare for impending retirements and determine how  many technicians it will need to replace those who retire, the agency  cannot determine how many technicians it will need to train in the future  and what certifications will need to be replaced. For example, as  mentioned earlier in this report, 686 full-performance-level technicians  with multiple certifications will be eligible to retire by the end of fiscal  year 2011, and those that do retire will be replaced by new technicians  who might not acquire those skills and abilities for 2 to 3 years.
While FAA has a well-established process to identify current training and  development needs annually and to prioritize training funds annually, its  ability to plan longer-term training and funding is limited by Technical  Operations Training’s dependency on receiving timely and accurate  planning information on FAA systems from the agency’s individual  program offices and NextGen office. Technical Operations Training  officials told us they identify future training needs through coordination  with the system program offices and independently monitor the status of  new systems coming into the FAA inventory by reviewing the agency’s  Capital Investment Plan (CIP) to see when Technical Operations Training  should start planning for training. However, opportunities for  coordination with the program offices have decreased with recent  organizational changes, according to FAA Academy officials. Formerly, the  program offices initially coordinated the contracts for new systems and  equipment, and the academy could work with the program offices to  develop training while the contracts were being negotiated. Now,  however, responsibilities for the contracts have been consolidated within  FAA’s acquisition management offices, and there is less coordination  between the academy and the program offices. Academy officials  recognize that training development and funding for that training must  await equipment development, but they stated that coordination during  the contracting and development process would be extremely beneficial.
To incorporate employees’ developmental goals into the planning process,  employees develop their course requests annually, in conjunction with  their managers. The agency uses individual development plans to identify  specific developmental needs and areas for further enrichment for each  employee. Technical Operations Training officials stated that they do not  solicit additional input for training planning and development from  technicians themselves because the line managers are the best source of  information on training needs for their facilities.
Technicians in our focus groups told us they have had some difficulty  obtaining the training they need for several reasons. First, they said, some  courses on legacy systems needed for advancement have not been  available at the academy. Technical Operations Training officials  acknowledged that some academy courses on legacy systems were  prematurely canceled because their subject matter was incorporated in  course offerings for new systems, and then these new courses were  postponed because of delays in rolling out the new systems. For example,  plans for deploying ERAM led Technical Operations Training to cancel the  training on two legacy systems that ERAM incorporates—En Route  Communications Gateway and the Display System Replacement—but then  ERAM’s deployment was delayed, and no courses were available on the  two legacy systems. Second, technicians said, the recent declines in  technician staffing and a reduction in periodic maintenance under the  reliability-centered maintenance approach have limited their ability to  become familiar with new systems and acquire timely on-the-job training,  as well as maintain proficiency in areas where they have already received  training or gained experience. Finally, technicians told us, they often did  not receive approval to attend the courses they have requested as a  priority to meet their developmental needs. FAA officials stated that  training requests are filled according to a facility’s priority, which is  determined through a number of factors, such as the minimum number of  trained people it takes to maintain the facility, the size of the airport where  the equipment is maintained, or the amount of equipment at a facility that  is operationally essential to maintain air traffic control. When a facility  receives approval for a technician to attend a course and the technician  then cannot attend, Technical Operations Training prioritizes the  remaining requests to determine which technician from which facility  should go instead. FAA officials estimate that, on average, 98 percent of  operationally essential training requests in recent years have been met.  For example, in fiscal year 2009, there were 5,100 requests for training, and  5,100 slots were provided. However, academy officials estimated that 50 to  70 percent of the courses are not filled to capacity. As mentioned below,  technicians are not able to attend all training classes they receive approval  to attend because of workforce staffing issues at their facility.
section_title: FAA Is Still Developing a Mix of Centralized and Decentralized Approaches for Technician Training
paragraphs: According to our analysis, FAA has mostly developed the capacity to  identify design and development initiatives to improve individual and  agency performance. (See table 14.)
FAA offers a mix of in-residence, centralized training at the academy and  external, decentralized training at various locations provided by vendors  whose equipment FAA has purchased. Training at the academy focuses on  legacy equipment, while vendor courses are the primary source of training  for next-generation systems coming into the FAA inventory.
FAA is limited in its choice of training delivery mechanisms because of the  unique and complex nature of air traffic control system components. For  example, the unique configurations of and modifications to FAA  generators make it difficult to replicate their features and teach  technicians how to maintain them at a field office or vendor location  rather than at the academy, according to academy officials. (Fig. 6  illustrates the variety of generators available in the training classroom at  the FAA Academy.) Overall, technicians in our focus groups maintained  that, compared with the training offered at the academy, vendor training  was less informative and more conceptual, offered less hands-on and  problem-solving instruction, and was limited by proprietary considerations  that restricted students’ access to some information. Additionally, they  said, vendors could not teach FAA-specific safety issues or explain how  their systems interacted with other components of air traffic management  systems.
No vendor courses have been approved to replace academy training for  legacy courses, although Technical Operations Training is studying the  feasibility of having vendors provide certain courses that are currently  offered through the academy and are filled to capacity. For example,  evaluations are under way to determine if the engine generator courses  can be taught by approved colleges and universities. In deciding how to  provide these courses, FAA is considering capacity, quality, and cost  criteria. Specifically, FAA is assessing whether (1) the academy courses  have a sufficient number of seats to fulfill the training requests; (2) the  replacement courses meet FAA’s standards for training in the applicable  subject areas; and (3) how the costs of academy training would compare  with the costs of tuition, a per diem allowance, and travel for training at a  local junior college. Technical Operations Training officials told us they  will need to make a business case to ATO management that there will be  cost savings from college training as well as demonstrate that the  technicians’ training needs can be met with that approach.
FAA is also comparing the merits of different training delivery  mechanisms, such as computer-based simulation training, but had adopted  no such mechanisms as of April 2010. Some technicians told us that  emerging FAA maintenance policies limit hands-on interaction with  systems and that the combination of these policies and modifications to  equipment over time make the technicians feel they are no longer qualified  to work on certain systems. For example, some technicians stated that  because they have been away from training for so long, they are unable to  apply their now-dated knowledge and skill when doing their work. Others  stated that preventive maintenance checks served as critical refresher  training and familiarization tools, and they raised concerns about the  effects on their proficiency of less frequent preventive maintenance  checks resulting from the change in maintenance philosophy. Technicians  suggested that different methods, such as the use of simulator training or  the addition of detailed visuals or photographs in training and system  manuals, would greatly aid their job knowledge in lieu of the reduced  hands-on training. Technical Operations Training officials said they were  aware of this issue and intend to evaluate additional methods for  technicians to maintain proficiency, including the use of online videos for  specific pieces of equipment.
section_title: Funding and Workload Issues Limit FAA’s Ability to Implement Training and Development Opportunities
paragraphs: FAA has partially implemented practices—such as adjusting work  schedules so that employees can participate in developmental activities  and taking actions to foster an environment conducive to effective training  and development—when implementing training and development for  technicians. (See table 15.)
FAA provides information on training opportunities to technicians but  does not communicate the importance of training and development and its  expectations for technicians in those areas. FAA publicizes training  information through its comprehensive Web site, known as the FAA  Information Superhighway for Training (FIST). FIST contains training and  certification program information from Technical Operations Training,  including policies and procedures, forms, course descriptions, and  examinations. However, FAA does not use established mechanisms or  written plans to communicate either the importance of training and  development for technicians or its expectations for technician training and  development programs to achieve results. As previously noted, FAA does  not have a strategic training plan for technicians, and the agency has not  included any expectations for, or discussion of, technician training and  development needs in its planning document for NextGen, the March 2010  NextGen Implementation Plan.
FAA is limited in the options it can consider for paying for employee  training and development to academy-provided training and vendor- provided training, primarily because of the unique training requirements of  technicians. In addition, technicians’ workloads limit FAA’s ability to  adjust their schedules for training. Technicians told us their high workload  and a lack of staff to cover the work in their absence impedes their ability  to take time from their positions to obtain training. Technical Operations  Training officials confirmed that three to four times a week, on average,  technicians who have requested and received approval to attend training  have not been able to do so because of staffing issues at their facilities. In  an effort to enhance training, increase technician proficiency, and avoid  burdening technicians in the field while other technicians are in training,  officials told us that they have been working to shorten the training time  for certain technician courses by adjusting training methods and  enhancing demonstrations of proficiency at the academy. In the case of  one course, these efforts reduced the average time for certification from  240 days in fiscal year 2005 to 59 days in June 2007.
FAA does not consistently foster an environment conducive to Technical  Operations Training’s efforts to train and develop employees so that they  can participate fully and apply new knowledge and skills when doing their  work. For example, training is not always timed to coincide with the  introduction of new systems. Technicians told us that they received  training on ERAM—a foundation system for NextGen and one of the most  recent additions to the technician curriculum—over 2 years ago, but the  system has yet to come on line. FAA training officials confirmed that  because of delays in the implementation of ERAM, some technicians were  trained months and even years ago and have not touched the equipment  since. As a result, Technical Operations Training is concerned about  technicians’ proficiency and is evaluating the need to retrain some staff on  ERAM.
section_title: FAA Has a Formal Class Evaluation Process in Place but Needs to Incorporate Performance Data and Technician Feedback in Assessing the Impact of Training on Performance
paragraphs: FAA has partially implemented practices—such as using some types of  performance data to assess the results achieved and incorporating certain  feedback perspectives—for evaluating its training and development of  technicians. (See table 16.)
Technical Operations Training has a formal evaluation program in place  and amends the training or makes recommendations based on trends  observed in student evaluations. For example, student critiques of ERAM  training revealed that students had problems making the connection  between academy equipment used in ERAM training and the actual  equipment installed at their facilities. As a result, training officials recently  identified a need to have training systems installed at the academy that  would replicate the fielded systems whenever possible. Technical  Operations Training also completed an audit on all technicians who had  been trained in a course designated as a prerequisite to the current ERAM  course. Training officials concluded that by the time ERAM was delivered  and ready for commissioning, up to 40 percent of the technicians who had  completed the prerequisite training could have left the technician  workforce and thus a new developmental course would be needed.
FAA partially uses quantitative or qualitative measures to assess  technician training results by using end-of-course evaluations and follow- on evaluations, as discussed below. Successful organizations typically  develop and implement human capital approaches based on a thorough  assessment of their specific needs and capabilities. To assess the results  achieved through training and development, agencies can rely on hard  (quantitative) data, such as indicators of productivity or output, quality,  costs, and time, or soft (qualitative) data, such as feedback on how well a  training program met employees’ expectations. While technicians provide  feedback after completing a course, as discussed below, the additional use  of quantitative data could help strengthen the linkages between training  and development programs and improved performance.
FAA evaluates the effectiveness of its training efforts and incorporates  formal evaluation feedback into the implementation of its training efforts,  but it does not solicit or incorporate feedback from personnel other than  line managers into its planning and design of technician training.  Technicians are required to complete an evaluation for any course they  attend before they can graduate from and become certified in that course.  Additional evaluations go out 3 to 6 months after graduation to both the  technicians and their supervisors for additional feedback. Technical  Operations Training officials stated that the line managers who oversee  the technicians, not the technicians themselves, are the critical training  customers because the line managers are the best source of information  on training needs for their facilities. FAA officials meet with these line  managers to obtain training feedback through an FAA council that meets  four times a year. However, to the extent possible, agencies need to ensure  that they incorporate a wide variety of stakeholder perspectives in  assessing the impact of training on employee and agency performance,  including the receptiveness to and use of results from employees’  feedback on developmental needs. Senior FAA training officials  recognized they needed to develop additional measures to address  supervisory feedback and opinions on training and stated that FAA will be  developing additional measures to address these issues in the future.
section_title: Certain Academy Training Costs Have Been Roughly Stable, while Those Vendor Training Costs That FAA Can Identify Have Risen with the Rollout of Courses for New Equipment
subsections: section_title: Instructor Costs of Academy Training on Established Equipment Have Remained Stable, but Student Travel Costs Have Increased
paragraphs: In the past few years, the academy has provided hundreds of training  classes to thousands of FAA technicians. These courses are taught both by  academy staff and by contractors hired to assist with instruction. The  costs that FAA identified for academy training include those for instructor  services and those for student travel to and from the academy in  Oklahoma City. As shown in table 17, the number of technicians who  received training each year from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2009  fluctuated, while the number of instructors providing that training  declined slightly. Despite the small decline in the number of instructors,  the cost for instructor services rose slightly over the 4 years, likely  because of increases in the cost of salaries, benefits, and contractor fees.  Overall, the data indicate that the instructor-based cost for academy  training has remained fairly stable over the 4-year period, a result  consistent with the relatively stable need for instructors.
Table 18 shows travel costs during the same 4 years for the students who  attended academy courses. The total annual travel costs went up 34  percent from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2009. During that period,  the number of students attending training also rose, resulting in an 18  percent increase in the per student trip cost over the 4 years. In addition,  according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, airfares rose about 16  percent during that period, while hotel fees slightly decreased. Thus, it  appears that the increases in the number of students and in airfares likely  drove the increases in travel costs.
section_title: Costs of Vendor Training on New Equipment Have Risen Quickly as FAA Prepares to Roll Out NextGen Systems, but FAA Is Unable to Account for Travel Costs Associated with Vendor Training
paragraphs: According to data provided by FAA, costs for vendors to provide training  for technicians on new equipment have risen very quickly in the past few  years. This increase has been associated with the rollout of new  equipment related to the implementation of NextGen, which has created  new training needs for technicians. For example, as shown in table 19, the  vendor began to offer courses for Digital Audio Legal Recorder (DALR) in  2007 and for ERAM in 2008. During the period of our review, the total  number of vendor courses rose from fewer than 100 to over 200.  Accordingly, training costs for vendor training have also grown  substantially in the past few years. With other NextGen systems poised to  go online in the near future, these costs may continue to rise as  technicians require further training on other new equipment.
An FAA employee identified by the agency as a subject matter expert told  us the agency’s cost accounting system is unable to accumulate costs for  travel to vendor training courses and report trends in those costs because  the funds for that travel are derived from multiple sources—including the  system program office, a centralized training fund, and in some cases the  local facility. FAA is subject to various laws and standards that have an  effect on its development and use of cost information, including standards  reported in the Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards  (SFFAS) No. 4, Managerial Cost Accounting Standards and Concepts.
While SFFAS No. 4 does not specify the programs, services, or activities  that federal entities should determine costs for, such as travel for vendor- provided training, the standards focus on developing information to help  management and Congress understand the costs of operations and make  informed decisions. The standards also provide that often a combination  of a cost accounting system and cost finding techniques should be used to  provide the cost information that is needed to address specific issues that  arise. The lack of cost data available from FAA’s cost accounting system  or through cost analysis techniques to summarize travel to vendor training  courses limits FAA’s ability to manage the costs of such travel and  evaluate all aspects of technician training costs and benefits. FAA could  help provide information that addresses congressional concerns about the  cost of in-house and vendor-provided training and of the travel related to  those training activities by modifying its cost accounting system or cost  finding techniques.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Technicians possess unique skills and are critical to the safety and  efficiency of the nation’s air transportation system, as well as the  successful implementation of NextGen. FAA is not fully incorporating key  leading practices, such as determining the critical skills and competencies  that will be needed to achieve current and future results, in its strategic  workforce planning for technicians. FAA does not have a comprehensive,  written technician workforce strategy to help it identify and focus on the  long-term technician human capital issues with the greatest potential to  affect mission results. The lack of a written strategy limits transparency,  and thus the ability to evaluate and measure performance, in FAA’s  workforce planning approach. Such a strategy would include, among other  things, approaches to (1) identify the skills and competencies technicians  need to address both current and future needs and (2) anticipate attrition  and hire technicians with the requisite skills and abilities in time to  accomplish agency missions, down to the facility level. FAA’s practice of  hiring replacements for technicians only after a vacancy occurs leaves the  agency vulnerable to skills imbalances, with inexperienced, newly  certified technicians replacing seasoned veterans. While the contractual  staffing minimum has deterred FAA from developing staffing requirements  for the technician workforce, it does not prevent FAA from incorporating  leading practices to provide a strategic focus for technician workforce  planning. Not having such strategies raises the risk of adverse effects on  the safety and efficiency of the nation’s air transportation system.
Furthermore, the training that technicians receive could lack prioritization  because FAA has not developed a strategic training plan. Such a plan  would need to be aligned with a written technician workforce planning  strategy and should incorporate key leading practices in training and  development. Without adequate planning, agencies cannot establish  priorities or determine the best ways to leverage investments to improve  performance. Additionally, including input into planning for any future  NextGen systems training from a wide variety of employees—such as  FAA’s NextGen Integration and Implementation Office, ATO’s Technical  Operations Training and Development Group, technician supervisors,  technical experts, and technicians—could help FAA develop integrated  ways to address specific performance gaps or incorporate necessary  enhancements in the technician training curriculum. Such an inclusive  approach could create opportunities to develop solutions that FAA might  otherwise miss. Finally, the lack of cost data to summarize travel to  vendor training courses does not allow FAA to fully develop information  about the cost of in-house and vendor-provided training and of the travel  related to those training activities and therefore limits FAA’s ability to  manage travel costs and evaluate all aspects of technician training costs  and benefits.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that FAA can hire and retain the technician staff it needs to  install, maintain, repair, and certify equipment and facilities in the national  airspace system, in the current and NextGen environments, we  recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA  Administrator to take the following four actions:  1.  develop and implement a comprehensive, written workforce strategy  or policy for the technician workforce that incorporates the key  leading practices in strategic workforce planning that FAA has not  fully incorporated, such as determining the critical skills and   competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future results; 2.  develop and implement a strategic training plan that is aligned with a  written technician workforce strategy and incorporates key leading  practices in training and development that FAA has not fully  incorporated, such as determining how training and development  efforts are expected to contribute to improved performance and  results; 3. improve planning for any future NextGen systems training by including  input from FAA’s NextGen Integration and Implementation Office,  ATO’s Technical Operations Training and Development Group,  technician supervisors, technical experts, and technicians to develop  an integrated way to address specific performance gaps or incorporate  necessary enhancements in the technician training curriculum; and 4.  consider modifying FAA’s cost accounting system or cost analysis  techniques to develop information about the cost of in-house and  vendor-provided training and of the travel related to those training  activities to assist Congress in understanding the costs of operations  and making informed decisions.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report  for its review and comment. The department provided technical  corrections, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of the  Federal Aviation Administration. In addition, this report will be available  at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions or would like to discuss this work,  please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Individuals making key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)  processes for carrying out workforce planning and training for the  agency’s technician workforce. It describes the processes and discusses  the extent to which FAA’s efforts incorporate key leading practices in  workforce planning and training and how the costs of technician training,  including travel costs, have changed in recent years. Specifically, we  addressed the following questions: (1) To what extent does FAA  incorporate key practices of leading organizations in its workforce  planning for technicians? (2) How does FAA’s technician training compare  with key practices of leading organizations? (3) How have the costs of  technician training, including travel costs, changed in recent years?
To describe the composition of FAA’s technician workforce, we obtained  information on its nature and scope, including job descriptions and job  series information; the current, historical, and projected population of  technicians; hiring trends; the current and projected numbers of  technicians eligible to retire; the number of technicians who retire when  eligible; and data on the geographic locations of work stations. We  summarized FAA and federal personnel data from the Office of Personnel  Management’s Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) on the technician  workforce and developed trends in staffing and attrition for fiscal years  1999 through 2009, as well as retirement projections through fiscal year  2020. We assessed the reliability of the CPDF data by reviewing related  documentation and determined that those data were of sufficient quality to  be used for the purposes of this report. We focused on the technicians in  the 2101 job series because (1) according to FAA data about the technician  workforce, the majority of technicians are in the 2101 job series and (2)  the FAA reauthorization bill refers to systems specialists, the employees  included in the 2101 job series.
To determine the extent to which FAA has incorporated key practices of  leading organizations in its workforce planning and training for  technicians, we sought to compare FAA’s efforts with those of leading  organizations. We selected key leading practices in these areas by  reviewing, in conjunction with subject matter experts, our past work to  identify those most applicable. To determine how FAA’s technician- specific workforce planning and training components and practices  compare with those of leading organizations, we reviewed FAA documents  and regulations that detailed FAA policies and practices in the functional  areas of workforce planning and training. We discussed the structure and  processes of FAA’s workforce planning and training for technicians with  FAA officials responsible for implementing those human capital  procedures within the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) line of business,  where the technicians are located. We interviewed FAA officials at FAA  headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at FAA’s Training Academy in  Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Additionally, we obtained the perspectives of  the bargaining unit that represents FAA technicians on FAA’s workforce  planning and training for technicians through semistructured interviews  with representatives of the Professional Airways Safety Specialists  (PASS), the employee union representing technicians. We assessed the  extent to which FAA followed each practice by applying the following  scale: “Fully” indicated that, in our judgment, all or virtually all aspects of  the practice were followed; “mostly” indicated that more than half but less  than all or virtually all were followed; “partially” indicated that less than  half but more than a few were followed; and “minimally” indicated that  few or no aspects of the practice were followed. We conducted our  comparison of FAA’s practices with leading practices at a high level: More  detailed comparisons could disclose specific leading practices that FAA is  not following, beyond those discussed in this report. We did not assess the  effectiveness of FAA’s workforce planning, because factors other than  FAA’s human capital system may also affect FAA’s performance.
To balance the views of FAA management and obtain perspectives of the  technician workforce on FAA’s workforce planning and training efforts,  we conducted 12 focus group meetings with 101 FAA technicians and 12  academy managers at 11 locations. These meetings involved structured  small-group discussions designed to gain more in-depth information about  specific issues that cannot easily be obtained from single or serial  interviews. Consistent with typical focus group methodologies, our design  included multiple groups with varying characteristics but some similarity  in experience and responsibility. Most groups involved 7 to 10  participants. Discussions were structured, guided by a moderator who  used a standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share  their thoughts and experiences. Our overall objective in using a focus  group approach was to obtain the views, insights, and feelings of FAA  technicians on issues related to their workload, staffing, and training.
We conducted 12 separate focus group sessions—11 with FAA technicians,  including a range of (1) technical specialties (Communications,  Automation, Navigation, Environmental, and Surveillance/Radar), (2)  experience (less senior and more senior staff), and (3) operating  environments (e.g., air route traffic control center , terminal radar  approach control , air traffic control tower, or general national  airspace system ). By including GNAS participants in the focus  groups, we ensured that the perspectives of technicians that perform their  duties at geographically distant, isolated, or smaller facilities were  included. One additional focus group was held with academy managers  from all areas of technician instruction. Table 20 identifies the specialties  included in the focus groups at each location. We traveled to FAA facilities  in Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, and Oklahoma City to  conduct the focus groups.
We developed a guide to assist the moderator in leading the discussions.  The guide helped the moderator address several topics related to  workforce planning (staffing levels, workload issues, the Next Generation  Air Transportation System , contract personnel, reliability- centered maintenance) and training (quality and quantity of training, FAA- provided and vendor-provided training). We assured participants of the  anonymity of their responses, promising that their names would not be  directly linked to their responses.
Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the  extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population, (2)  develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make decisions  about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically representative  samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, they are intended to  generate in-depth information about the reasons for the focus group  participants’ attitudes on specific topics and to offer insights into their  concerns about and support for an issue.
The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is  limited for several reasons. First, the information includes only the  responses of FAA technicians from the 11 selected groups. Second, while  the composition of the groups was designed to ensure a range of  specialties, experience, and operational environments, the groups were  not randomly sampled. Third, participants were asked questions about  their specific experiences with workload, staffing, and training. Other FAA  technicians who did not participate in our focus groups may have different  experiences. Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus  groups, but rather used several different methodologies to corroborate  and support our conclusions.
To determine how training funds, including travel funds, have changed in  recent years, we obtained quantitative cost data (including travel costs)  from ATO and FAA Academy officials from fiscal year 2005 through May  2010 and compared these data for FAA-provided and vendor-provided  training. We also conducted semistructured interviews with FAA  management about technician training costs. We analyzed student travel  costs for academy training obtained from FAA’s DELPHI system and  personnel compensation and benefits of academy instructors data from  the Federal Personnel and Payroll System. However, as FAA’s cost  accounting system is not sufficient to provide costs for vendor training  and travel-related activities, the team had to analyze data provided from  FAA’s Electronic Learning Management System (ELMS) to summarize the  cost of vendor technician training. We presented the data provided by FAA  despite the fact that the data are unaudited at the level of detail needed for  findings presented in table 19. As a result, this report identified a  recommendation for FAA to consider modifying its cost accounting  system or cost analysis techniques to develop information about the cost  of in-house and vendor-provided training, and of the travel related to those  training activities. We assessed the reliability of the data we obtained  electronically by reviewing relevant documentation and internal controls,  and interviewing agency officials, and determined that those data were of  sufficient quality to be used for the purposes of this report.
To develop information on the occurrence and duration of scheduled and  unscheduled outages, we obtained operational performance data from  FAA for fiscal years 2000 through 2009. FAA outage data are collected in  accordance with the reporting guidance contained in FAA Order 6040.15E,  National Airspace Performance Reporting System, and are currently  entered and stored in the Maintenance Management System. These data  are validated and fed into the National Airspace System Performance  Analysis System (NASPAS). NASPAS may be used for facility or service  performance trend analysis. NASPAS is capable of extracting user-defined  outage parameters, performing calculations, and generating graphics for  report writing. To understand how such outages affect the national  airspace system’s efficiency, safety, and costs; industry; and the flying  public, we conducted structured interviews with FAA and PASS officials.  We assessed the reliability of the outage data by reviewing relevant  documentation and interviewing agency officials, and determined that  those data were of sufficient quality to be used for the purposes of this  report.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 to October 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: ATO Organizational Chart
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Teresa Spisak, Assistant Director;  Jessica A. Evans; Maren McAvoy; Taylor Reeves; Amy Abramowitz; Emily  Biskup; Melinda Cordero; Peter DelToro; Bess Eisenstadt; Brandon Haller;  Rich Hung; Bert Japikse; Steven Lozano; Colleen Phillips; Andrew  Stavisky; and John Warner made significant contributions to this report.