Defense Acquisitions: Results of Annual Assessment of DOD Weapon Programs
Published: 2008-04-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the largest discretionary items in the budget. The department expects to invest about $900 billion (fiscal year 2008 dollars) over the next 5 years on development and procurement with more than $335 billion invested specifically in major defense acquisition programs. Every dollar spent inefficiently in acquiring weapon systems is less money available for other budget priorities--such as the global war on terror and growing entitlement programs. This testimony focuses on (1) the overall performance of DOD's weapon system investment portfolio; (2) our assessment of 72 weapon programs against best practices standards for successful product developments; and (3) potential solutions and recent DOD actions to improve weapon program outcomes. It is based on GAO-08-467SP , which included our analysis of broad trends in the performance of the programs in DOD's weapon acquisition portfolio and our assessment of 72 defense programs, and recommendations made in past GAO reports. DOD was provided a draft of GAO-08-467SP and had no comments on the overall report, but did provide technical comments on individual assessments. The comments, along with the agency comments received on the individual assessments, were included as appropriate.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: We recently released our sixth annual assessment of selected DOD weapon programs. The assessment indicates that cost and schedule outcomes for major weapon programs are not improving. Although well-conceived acquisition policy changes occurred in 2003 that reflect many best practices we have reported on in the past, these policy changes have not yet translated into practice at the program level. None of the weapon programs we assessed this year had proceeded through system development meeting the best practices standards for mature technologies, stable design, and mature production processes--all prerequisites for achieving planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. In addition, only a small percentage of programs used two key systems engineering tools--preliminary design reviews and prototypes to demonstrate the maturity of the product's design by critical junctures. This lack of disciplined systems engineering affects DOD's ability to develop sound, executable business cases for programs. Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This involves making tough decisions as to which programs should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued; making sure programs are executable; locking in requirements before programs are ever started; and making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable when responsibilities are not fulfilled. Moreover, the environment and incentives that lead DOD and the military services to overpromise on capability and underestimate costs in order to sell new programs and capture funding will need to change. Based in part on GAO recommendations and congressional direction, DOD has begun several initiatives that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide a foundation for establishing sound, knowledge-based business cases for individual acquisition programs and improving outcomes.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) management of its weapon system acquisitions—an area that has  been part of GAO’s high risk list since 1990. We have recently released our  sixth annual assessment of selected DOD weapon programs. The  assessment indicates that cost and schedule outcomes for the DOD’s  major weapon system programs are not improving.
Continuing poor acquisition outcomes have implications for DOD and the  government as a whole. DOD’s investment in weapon systems represents  one of the largest discretionary items in the budget. While overall  discretionary funding is declining, DOD’s budget continues to demand a  larger portion of what is available, thereby leaving a smaller percentage  for other activities. Investment in weapon acquisition programs is now at  its highest level in two decades. The department expects to invest about  $900 billion (fiscal year 2008 dollars) over the next 5 years on development  and procurement with more than $335 billion invested specifically in  major defense acquisition programs. Every dollar spent inefficiently in  acquiring weapon systems is less money available for other budget  priorities—such as the global war on terror and growing entitlement  programs.
My statement today focuses on (1) the overall performance of DOD’s  weapon system investment portfolio; (2) our assessment of 72 weapon  programs against best practices standards for successful product  developments; and (3) potential solutions and recent DOD actions to  improve weapon program outcomes. It is drawn mostly from our annual  assessment of selected DOD weapon programs, as well as  recommendations made in past GAO reports. Our assessment provided  information on 72 individual weapon programs and analyzed overall trends  in DOD acquisition outcomes. The programs assessed—most of which are  considered major acquisitions by DOD—were selected using several  factors: high dollar value, acquisition stage, and congressional interest.   We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 to March 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Major Acquisition Programs Continue to Experience Significant Cost Growth and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: DOD is not receiving expected returns on its large investment in weapon  systems. While it is committing substantially more investment dollars to  develop and procure new weapon systems, our analysis shows that the  2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs is experiencing  greater cost growth and schedule delays than programs in fiscal years 2000  and 2005. For example, as shown in table 1, total acquisition costs for  2007 programs have increased 26 percent from first estimates, whereas  programs in fiscal year 2000 had increased by 6 percent. Total RDT&E  costs for programs in 2007 have increased by 40 percent from first  estimates, compared to 27 percent for programs in 2000. The story is no  better when expressed in unit costs. Based on our analysis for the 2007  portfolio, 44 percent of DOD’s major defense acquisition programs are  paying at least 25 percent more per unit than originally expected. The  percentage of programs experiencing a 25 percent or more increase in  program acquisition unit costs in fiscal year 2000 was 37 percent.
The consequence of cost growth is reduced buying power, which can  represent significant opportunity costs for DOD. In other words, every  dollar spent on inefficiencies in acquiring one weapon system is less  money available for other priorities and programs. Total acquisition cost  for the current portfolio of major programs under development or in  production has grown by nearly $300 billion over initial estimates. As  program costs increase, DOD must request more funding to cover the  overruns, make trade-offs with existing programs, delay the start of new  programs, or take funds from other accounts.
Just as importantly, DOD has already missed fielding dates for many  programs and many others are behind schedule. Because of program  delays, warfighters often have to operate costly legacy systems longer than  expected, find alternatives to fill capability gaps, or go without the  capability. The warfighter’s urgent need for the new weapon system is  often cited when the case is first made for developing and producing the  system. However, on average, the current portfolio of programs has  experienced a 21-month delay in delivering initial operational capability to  the warfighter and, in fact, 14 percent are more than 4 years late.
section_title: DOD Weapon System Programs Continue to Move Forward Without Proper Knowledge about Requirements, Technology, Design, and Manufacturing Processes
paragraphs: In assessing the 72 weapon programs, we found no evidence of  widespread adoption of a knowledge-based acquisition process within  DOD despite polices to the contrary. Reconciling this discrepancy  between policy and practice is essential for getting better outcomes for  DOD programs. The majority of programs in our assessment this year  proceeded with lower levels of knowledge at critical junctures and  attained key elements of product knowledge later in development than  expected under best practices (see fig. 1). This exposes programs to  significant and unnecessary technology, design, and production risks, and  ultimately leads to cost growth and schedule delays. The building of  knowledge over a product’s development is cumulative, as one knowledge  point builds on the next, and failure to capture key product knowledge can  lead to problems that eventually cascade and become magnified  throughout product development and production.
subsections: section_title: Programs Begin without Matching Product Requirements with Available Resources
paragraphs: Very few of the programs we assessed started system development with  evidence that the proposed solution was based on mature technologies  and proven design features. As a result, programs are still working to  mature technologies during system development and production, which  causes significantly higher cost growth than programs that start  development with mature technologies. Only 12 percent of the programs in  our assessment demonstrated all of their critical technologies as fully  mature at the start of system development and they have had much better  outcomes than the others. For those programs in our assessment with  immature technologies at development start, total RDT&E costs grew by  44 percent more than for programs that began with mature technologies.  More often than not, programs were still maturing technologies late into  development and even into production.
In addition to ensuring that technologies are mature, best practices for  product development suggest that the developer should have delivered a  preliminary design of the proposed weapon system based on a robust  systems engineering process before committing to system development.  This process should allow the developer—the contractor responsible for  designing the weapon system—to analyze the customer’s expectations for  the product and identify gaps between resources and those expectations,  which then can be addressed through additional investments, alternate  designs, and ultimately trade-offs. Only ten percent of the programs in our  assessment had completed their preliminary design review prior to  committing to system development. The other 90 percent averaged about  2 1/2 years into system development before the review was completed or  planned to be completed. Programs like the Aerial Common Sensor and  Joint Strike Fighter did not deliver a sound preliminary design at system  development start and discovered problems early in their design activities  that required substantial resources be added to the programs or, in the  case of Aerial Common Sensor, termination of the system development  contract.
section_title: Programs Continue to Move into System Demonstration and Production without Achieving Design Stability
paragraphs: Knowing that a product’s design is stable before system demonstration  reduces the risk of costly design changes occurring during the  manufacturing of production representative prototypes—when  investments in acquisitions become much more significant. Only a small  portion of the programs in our assessment that have held a design review  captured the necessary knowledge to ensure that they had mature  technologies at system development start and a stable system design  before entering the more costly system demonstration phase of  development. Over half of the programs in our assessment did not even  have mature technologies at the design review (knowledge that actually  should have been achieved before system development start). Also, less  than one-quarter of the programs that provided data on drawings released  at the design review reached the best practices standard of 90 percent. We  have found that programs moving forward into system demonstration with  low levels of design stability are more likely than other programs to  encounter costly design changes and parts shortages that in turn caused  labor inefficiencies, schedule delays, and quality problems. Even by the  beginning of production, more than a third of the programs that had  entered this phase still had not released 90 percent of their engineering  drawings.
In addition, we found that over 80 percent of the programs providing data  did not or did not plan to demonstrate the successful integration of the key  subsystems and components needed for the product through an  integration laboratory, or better yet, through testing an early system  prototype by the design review. For example, the Navy’s E-2D Advanced  Hawkeye moved past the design review and entered systems  demonstration without fully proving—through the use of an integration lab  or prototype—that the design could be successfully integrated. The  program did not have all the components operational in a systems  integration lab until almost 2 years after the design review. While the  program estimated it had released 90 percent of the drawings needed for  the system by the design review, as it was conducting system integration  activities, it discovered that it needed substantially more drawings. This  increase means that the program really had completed only 53 percent of  the drawings prior to the review, making it difficult to ensure the design  was stable.
section_title: Programs Enter Production without Demonstrating Acceptable Manufacturing Processes and Weapon System Performance
paragraphs: In addition to lacking mature technologies and design stability, most  programs have not or do not plan to capture critical manufacturing and  testing knowledge before entering production. This knowledge ensures  that the product will work as intended and can be manufactured efficiently  to meet cost, schedule, and quality targets. Of the 26 programs in our  assessment that have had production decisions, none provided data  showing that they had all their critical manufacturing processes in  statistical control by the time they entered into the production phase. In  fact, only 3 of these programs indicated that they had even identified the  key product characteristics or associated critical manufacturing  processes—key initial steps to ensuring critical production elements are  stable and in control.  Failing to capture key manufacturing knowledge  before producing the product can lead to inefficiencies and quality  problems. For example, the Wideband Global SATCOM program  encountered cost and schedule delays because contractor personnel  installed fasteners incorrectly. Discovery of the problem resulted in  extensive inspection and rework to correct the deficiencies, contributing  to a 15-month schedule delay.
In addition to demonstrating that the product can be built efficiently, our  work has shown that production and post-production costs are minimized  when a fully integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated to show it will  work as intended and in a reliable manner. We found that many programs  are susceptible to discovering costly problems late in development, when  the more complex software and advanced capabilities are tested. Of the  33 programs that provided us data about the overlap between system  development and production, almost three-quarters still had or planned to  have system demonstration activities left to complete after production had  begun. For 9 programs, the amount of system development work  remaining was estimated to be over 4 years.  This practice of beginning  production before successfully demonstrating that the weapon system will  work as intended increases the potential for discovering costly design  changes that ripple through production into products already fielded.
Forty programs we assessed provided us information on when they had or  planned to have tested a fully configured, integrated production  representative article (i.e., prototype) in the intended environment. Of  these, 62 percent reported that they did not conduct or do not plan to  conduct that test before a production decision. We also found examples  where product reliability is not being demonstrated in a timely fashion.  Making design changes to achieve reliability requirements after production  begins is inefficient and costly. For example, despite being more than 5  years past the production decision, the Air Force’s Joint Air-to-Surface  Standoff Missile experienced four failures during four flight tests in 2007,  resulting in an overall missile reliability rate of less than  60 percent. The failures halted procurement of new missiles by the Air  Force until the problems could be resolved.
section_title: Absence of Disciplined Systems Engineering Practices Leads to Unexecutable Business Cases
paragraphs: DOD’s poor acquisition outcomes stem from the absence of knowledge  that disciplined systems engineering practices can bring to decision  makers prior to beginning a program. Systems engineering is a process  that translates customer needs into specific product requirements for  which requisite technological, software, engineering, and production  capabilities can be identified. These activities include requirements  analysis, design, and testing in order to ensure that the product’s  requirements are achievable given available resources. Early systems  engineering provides knowledge that enables a developer to identify and  resolve gaps before product development begins. Consequently,  establishing a sound acquisition program with an executable business case  depends on determining achievable requirements based on systems  engineering that are agreed to by both the acquirer and developer before a  program’s initiation. We have recently reported on the impact that poor  systems engineering practices have had on several programs such as the  Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System, F-22A, Expeditionary Fighting  Vehicle, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile and others.
When early systems engineering, specifically requirements analysis, is not  performed, increased cost risk to the government and long development  cycle times can be the result. DOD awards cost reimbursement type  contracts for the development of major weapon systems because of the  risk and uncertainty involved with its programs. Because the government  often does not perform the necessary systems engineering analysis before  a contract is signed to determine whether a match exists between  requirements and available resources, significant contract cost increases  can occur as the scope of the requirements change or becomes better  understood by the government and contractor. Another potential  consequence of the lack of requirements analysis is unpredictable cycle  times. Requirements that are limited and well-understood contribute to  shorter, more predictable cycle times. Long cycle times promote  instability, especially considering DOD’s tendency to have changing  requirements and program manager turnover. On the other hand, time- defined developments can allow for more frequent assimilation of new  technologies into weapon systems and speed new capabilities to the  warfighter. In fact, DOD itself suggests that system development should be  limited to about 5 years.
section_title: Additional Factors Can Contribute to Poor Weapon Program Outcomes
paragraphs: This year, we gathered new data focused on other factors we believe could  have a significant influence on DOD’s ability to improve cost and schedule  outcomes. These factors were changes to requirements after development  began, the length of program managers’ tenure, reliance on contractors for  program support, and difficulty managing software development.
Foremost, several DOD programs in our assessment incurred requirement  changes after the start of system development and experienced cost  increases. Among the 46 programs we surveyed, RDT&E costs increased  by 11 percent over initial estimates for programs that have not had  requirements changes, while they increased 72 percent among those that  had requirements changes (see fig. 2).
At the same time, DOD’s practice of frequently changing program  managers during a program’s development makes it difficult to hold them  accountable for the business cases that they are entrusted to manage and  deliver. Our analysis indicates that for 39 major acquisition programs  started since March 2001, the average time in system development was  about 37 months. The average tenure for program managers on those  programs during that time was about 17 months—less than half of what is  required by DOD policy.
We also found that DOD is relying more on contractors to support the  management and oversight of weapon system acquisitions and contracts.  For 52 DOD programs that provided information, about 48 percent of the  program office staff was composed of individuals outside of DOD (see  table 2). In a prior review of space acquisition programs, we found that  8 of 13 cost-estimating organizations and program offices believed the  number of cost estimators was inadequate and we found that 10 of those  offices had more contractor personnel preparing cost estimates than  government personnel. We also found examples during this year’s  assessment where the program offices expressed concerns about having  inadequate personnel to conduct their program office roles.
Finally, as programs rely more heavily on software to perform critical  functions for weapon systems, we found that a large number of programs  are encountering difficulties in managing their software development.  Roughly half of the programs that provided us software data had at least a  25 percent growth in their expected lines of code—a key metric used by  leading software developers—since system development started. For  example, software requirements were not well understood on the Future  Combat Systems when the program began; and as the program moves  toward preliminary design activities, the number of lines of software code  has nearly tripled. Changes to the lines of code needed can indicate  potential cost and schedule problems.
section_title: The Way Forward: Potential Solutions
paragraphs: Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD  provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This  involves (1) maintaining the right mix of programs to invest in by making  better decisions as to which programs should be pursued given existing  and expected funding and, more importantly, deciding which programs  should not be pursued; (2) ensuring that programs that are started are  executable by matching requirements with resources and locking in those  requirements; and (3) making it clear that programs will then be executed  based on knowledge and holding program managers responsible for that  execution. We have made similar recommendations in past GAO reports.
These changes will not be easy to make. They will require DOD to  reexamine not only its acquisition process, but its requirement setting and  funding processes as well. They will also require DOD to change how it  views program success, and what is necessary to achieve success. This  includes changing the environment and incentives that lead DOD and the  military services to overpromise on capability and underestimate costs in  order to sell new programs and capture the funding needed to start and  sustain them. Finally, none of this will be achieved without a true  partnership among the department, the military services, the Congress,  and the defense industry.  All of us must embrace the idea of change and  work diligently to implement it.
subsections: section_title: Buy the Right Things: Develop and Implement an Investment Strategy
paragraphs: The first, and most important, step toward improving acquisition  outcomes is implementing a new DOD-wide investment strategy for  weapon systems. We have reported that DOD should develop an  overarching strategy and decision-making processes that prioritize  programs based on a balanced match between customer needs and  available department resources---that is the dollars, technologies, time,  and people needed to achieve these capabilities. We also recommended  that capabilities not designated as a priority should be set out separately  as desirable but not funded unless resources were both available and  sustainable. This means that the decision makers responsible for weapon  system requirements, funding, and acquisition execution must establish an  investment strategy in concert.
DOD’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics—DOD’s corporate leader for acquisition—should develop this  strategy in concert with other senior leaders, for example, combatant  commanders who would provide input on user needs; DOD’s comptroller  and science and technology leaders, who would provide input on available  resources; and acquisition executives from the military services, who  could propose solutions. Finally, once priority decisions are made,  Congress will need to enforce discipline through its legislative and  oversight mechanisms.
section_title: Buy the Right Way: Ensure Individual Programs Are Executable
paragraphs: Once DOD has prioritized capabilities, it should work vigorously to make  sure each new program is executable before the acquisition begins. More  specifically, this means assuring requirements for specific weapon systems  are clearly defined and achievable given available resources and that all  alternatives have been considered. System requirements should be agreed  to by service acquisition executives as well as combatant commanders.  Once programs begin, requirements should not change without assessing  their potential disruption to the program and assuring that they can be  accommodated within time and funding constraints. In addition, DOD  should prove that technologies can work as intended before including  them in acquisition programs. More ambitious technology development  efforts should be assigned to the science and technology community until  they are ready to be added to future generations of the product. DOD  should also require the use of independent cost estimates as a basis for  budgeting funds. Our work over the past 10 years has consistently shown  when these basic steps are taken, programs are better positioned to be  executed within cost and schedule.
To keep programs executable, DOD should demand that all go/no-go  decisions be based on quantifiable data and demonstrated knowledge.  These data should cover critical program facets such as cost, schedule,  technology readiness, design readiness, production readiness, and  relationships with suppliers. Development should not be allowed to  proceed until certain knowledge thresholds are met—for example, a high  percentage of engineering drawings completed at critical design review.  DOD’s current policies encourage these sorts of metrics to be used as a  basis for decision making, but they do not demand it. DOD should also  place boundaries on the time allowed for system development.
To further ensure that programs are executable, DOD should pursue an  evolutionary path toward meeting user needs rather than attempting to  satisfy all needs in a single step. This approach has been consistently used  by successful commercial companies we have visited over the past decade  because it provides program managers with more achievable  requirements, which, in turn, facilitate shorter cycle times. With shorter  cycle times, the companies we have studied have also been able to assure  that program managers and senior leaders stay with programs throughout  the duration of a program.
DOD has policies that encourage evolutionary development, but programs  often favor pursuing more revolutionary, exotic solutions that will attract  funds and support. The department and, more importantly, the military  services, tend to view success as capturing the funding needed to start and  sustain a development program. In order to do this, they must overpromise  capability and underestimate cost. In order for DOD to move forward, this  view of success must change. World-class commercial firms identify  success as developing products within cost estimates and delivering them  on time in order to survive in the marketplace. This forces incremental,  knowledge-based product development programs that improve capability  as new technologies are matured.
section_title: Hold People Accountable
paragraphs: To strengthen accountability, DOD must also clearly delineate  responsibilities among those who have a role in deciding what to buy as  well as those who have role in executing, revising, and terminating  programs. Within this context, rewards and incentives must be altered so  that success can be viewed as delivering needed capability at the right  price and the right time, rather than attracting and retaining support for  numerous new and ongoing programs.
To enable accountability to be exercised at the program level once a  program begins, DOD will need to (1) match program manager tenure with  development or the delivery of a product; (2) tailor career paths and  performance management systems to incentivize longer tenures;  (3) strengthen training and career paths as needed to ensure program  managers have the right qualifications for run the programs they are  assigned to; (4) empower program managers to execute their programs,  including an examination of whether and how much additional authority  can be provided over funding, staffing, and approving requirements  proposed after the start of a program; and (5) develop and provide  automated tools to enhance management and oversight as well as to  reduce the time required to prepare status information.
DOD also should hold contractors accountable for results. As we have  recommended, this means structuring contracts so that incentives actually  motivate contractors to achieve desired acquisition outcomes and  withholding fees when those goals are not met.
section_title: Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement
paragraphs: DOD has taken actions related to some of these steps. Based in part on  GAO recommendations and congressional direction, DOD has recently  begun to develop several initiatives that, if adopted and implemented  properly, could provide a foundation for establishing sound, knowledge- based business cases for individual acquisition programs and improving  program outcomes. For example, DOD is experimenting with a new  concept decision review, different acquisition approaches according to  expected fielding times, and panels to review weapon system  configuration changes that could adversely affect program cost and  schedule. In addition, in September 2007 the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued a policy  memorandum to ensure weapon acquisition programs were able to  demonstrate key knowledge elements that could inform future  development and budget decisions. This policy directed pending and  future programs to include acquisition strategies and funding that provide  for two or more competing contractors to develop technically mature  prototypes through system development start (knowledge point 1), with  the hope of reducing technical risk, validating designs and cost estimates,  evaluating manufacturing processes, and refining requirements. Each of  the initiatives is designed to enable more informed decisions by key  department leaders well ahead of a program’s start, decisions that provide  a closer match between each program’s requirements and the  department’s resources.
DOD also plans to implement new practices similar to past GAO  recommendations that are intended to provide program managers more  incentives, support, and stability. The department acknowledges that any  actions taken to improve accountability must be based on a foundation  whereby program managers can launch and manage programs toward  greater performance, rather than focusing on maintaining support and  funding for individual programs. DOD acquisition leaders have told us that  any improvements to program managers’ performance hinge on the  success of the department’s initiatives.
In addition, DOD has taken actions to strengthen the link between award  and incentive fees with desired program outcomes, which has the  potential to increase the accountability of DOD programs for fees paid and  of contractors for results achieved.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: In closing, the past year has seen several new proposed approaches to  improve the way DOD buys weapons. These approaches have come from  within the department, from highly credible commissions established by  the department, and from GAO.  They are based on solid principles. If they  are to produce better results, however, they must heed the lessons  taught—but perhaps not learned—by various past studies and by DOD’s  acquisition history itself. Specifically, DOD must do a better job of  prioritizing its needs in the context of the nation’s greater fiscal  challenges. It must become more disciplined in managing the mix of  programs to meet available funds. If everything is a priority, nothing is a  priority.
Policy must also be manifested in decisions on individual programs or  reform will be blunted. DOD’s current acquisition policy is a case in point.  The policy supports a knowledge-based, evolutionary approach to  acquiring new weapons. However, the practice—decisions made on  individual programs—sacrifices knowledge and realism about what can  done within the available time and funding in favor of revolutionary  solutions.
Reform will not be real unless each weapon system is shown to be both a  worthwhile investment and a realistic, executable program based on the  technology, time, and money available. This cannot be done until the  acquisition environment is changed along with the incentives associated  with it. DOD and the military services cannot continue to view success  through the prism of securing the funding needed to start and sustain new  programs. Success must be defined in terms of delivering the warfighter  capabilities when needed and as promised and incentives must be aligned  to encourage a disciplined, knowledge-based approach to achieve this end.
The upcoming change in administration presents challenges as well as  opportunities to improve the process and its outcomes through sustained  implementation of best practices, as well as addressing new issues that  may emerge. Significant changes will only be possible with greater, and  continued, department level support, including strong and consistent  vision, direction, and advocacy from DOD leadership, as well as sustained  oversight and cooperation from the Congress. In addition, all of the  players involved with acquisitions—the requirements community; the Joint  Chiefs of Staff; the comptroller; the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and perhaps most importantly, the  military services—must be unified in implementing reforms from top to  bottom.
Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Committee and Subcommittee, this  concludes my statement. I will be happy to take any questions that you  may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further questions about this statement, please contact Michael J.  Sullivan at (202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include Ron Schwenn, Assistant Director; Ridge C. Bowman;  Quindi C. Franco; Matthew B. Lea; Brian Mullins; Kenneth E. Patton, and  Alyssa B. Weir.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed  to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System  Quality. GAO-08-294. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO- 07-406SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology  Transition Processes. GAO-06-883. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers  Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November  1, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience  Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368.  Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. GAO-06-257T.  Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to  Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393.  Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon  Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept  Technology Demonstration. GAO-03-52. Washington, D.C.: December 2,  2002.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early  Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,  2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best  Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,  2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better  Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31,  2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better  Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April  26, 2000.
Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System  Programs Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington,  D.C.: August 16, 1999.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can  Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington,  D.C.: July 30, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program  Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. GAO/T- NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1998.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires  Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:  February 24, 1998.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer  Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26,  1996.
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