2010 Census: Counting Americans Overseas as Part of the Decennial Census Would Not Be Cost-Effective
Published: 2004-08-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has typically counted overseas members of the military, federal civilian employees, and their dependents. However, it usually excluded private citizens residing abroad. In July 2004, the Bureau completed a test of the practicality of counting all overseas Americans. GAO was asked to assess (1) whether the Bureau implemented the test consistent with its design, and (2) the lessons learned from the test results.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Bureau generally implemented the overseas census test on schedule and consistent with its research design. Still, participation was poor, with just 5,390 questionnaires returned from the three test sites--France, Kuwait, and Mexico. Moreover, because of the low response levels, obtaining those questionnaires proved to be quite expensive--around $1,450 per response, which is far costlier on a unit basis than the 2000 Census. Although the two are not directly comparable because the 2000 Census included operations not used in the overseas test, the 2000 Census cost around $56 per household. Further, boosting the response rate globally might not be practical. On the domestic front, during the 2000 Census, the Bureau spent $374 million on a months-long publicity campaign that consisted of television and other advertising that helped yield a 72-percent return rate. Replicating this level of effort on a worldwide basis would be difficult, and still would not produce a complete count. Ensuring a smooth overseas count could also stretch the Bureau's resources. For example, at each test site the Bureau encountered various challenges that needed to be resolved such as French privacy laws. Moreover, managing a complex operation from thousands of miles away also proved difficult. The approach used to count the overseas population in the 2004 test--a voluntary survey that largely relies on marketing to secure a complete count, lacks the basic building blocks of a successful census. The Bureau has done some initial research on alternatives, but all require more extensive review. Given that the Bureau already faces the difficult task of securing a successful stateside count in 2010, having to simultaneously count Americans abroad would only add to the challenges facing the Bureau.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Although more than four million American citizens are believed to reside  abroad, the precise number of overseas Americans is unknown.  The U.S.  Census Bureau (Bureau), the federal agency tasked with counting the  nation’s population every 10 years, has generally included in the census  overseas members of the military, federal civilian employees, and their  dependents (a group known collectively as “federally affiliated”  individuals), but has typically excluded private citizens such as retirees,  students, and business people.
Under the Constitution and federal statutes, the Bureau has discretion over  whether to count Americans abroad. However, in recent years, the Bureau’s  policy of excluding private citizens from the decennial census has been  called into question.  For example, advocates of an overseas census claim  that better demographic data on this population group would be useful for  a variety of policy-making and business purposes, and would better  represent their unique interests in Congress.  Moreover, in January 2001,  Utah sued the Bureau’s parent agency, the U.S. Department of Commerce,  claiming that it lost a congressional seat because the 2000 Census excluded  the state’s 11,000 Mormon missionaries and other private citizens living  abroad.  According to the Congressional Research Service, Utah would  have gained a congressional seat had an additional 855 people been  included in the state’s apportionment totals.  Utah’s suit, however, was  unsuccessful.
As we noted in our May 2004 report on this issue, counting Americans  abroad as an integral part of the 2010 Census would be a monumental task  that would introduce new resource demands, risks, and uncertainties to an  endeavor that was already facing a variety of difficulties.   Specific  challenges include policy questions such as who should be counted and  how should the data be used, as well as logistical difficulties such as  ensuring a complete count and verifying U.S. citizenship.
To assess the practicality of counting overseas Americans, the Bureau held  a test enumeration from February through July 2, 2004, in France, Kuwait,  and Mexico.  As agreed with your offices, we assessed (1) whether the  Bureau implemented the test consistent with its design, and (2) the initial  lessons learned from the test results and their implications for future  overseas enumerations.
To address these objectives, we reviewed applicable planning and other  documents, and interviewed knowledgeable Bureau officials and  representatives of private organizations who helped the Bureau promote  the census at the three test sites.  Further, to review how the Bureau was  implementing the census at the test locations, we made on-site inspections  in Paris, France, and Guadalajara, Mexico.  We conducted our work from  March through July 2004, in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to the Bureau, no accurate estimate exists of the total number of  Americans living abroad.  The Constitution and federal law give the Bureau  discretion to decide whether to count American citizens living abroad.  In  prior censuses, the Bureau has generally included “federally affiliated”  groups—members of the military and federal employees and their  dependents—but has excluded private citizens residing abroad from all but  the 1960 and 1970 Censuses.  The 2000 Census, using administrative  records, found 576,367 federally affiliated Americans residing overseas,  including 226,363 military personnel, 30,576 civilian employees, and  319,428 dependents of both groups.
In response to congressional direction and the concerns of various private  organizations, the Census Bureau launched a research and evaluation  program to assess the practicality of counting both private and federally  affiliated U.S. citizens residing abroad.  The key part of this effort, the  enumeration, took place from February 2004 through July 2, 2004, in  France, Kuwait, and Mexico.  To promote the overseas census test the  Bureau relied on third parties—American organizations and businesses in  the three countries—to communicate to their members and/or customers  that an overseas enumeration of Americans was taking place and to make  available to U.S. citizens either the paper questionnaire or Web site  address.
Currently, the Bureau is processing and analyzing the overseas  questionnaire data and plans to complete an evaluation of the test results in  early 2005.  The Bureau estimates that it will have spent approximately $7.8  million in fiscal years 2003 through 2005 to plan, conduct, and evaluate the  2004 test.  The Bureau has requested additional funds for fiscal year 2005 to  plan for further testing scheduled for 2006.  The Bureau also plans to  include overseas testing in the 2008 dress rehearsal if it were to receive the  necessary funding.
In May 2004 we reported on the design of the overseas enumeration test  and concluded that because of various methodological limitations, the test  results will only partially answer the Bureau’s key research objectives  concerning feasibility (as measured by such indicators as participation and  number of valid returns), data quality, and cost.  Further, we noted that the  Bureau should not decide on its own whether or not to enumerate  Americans overseas, and in fact would need congressional guidance on  how to proceed.  As shown in figure 1, the key decisions facing Congress in  this regard include, in addition to the threshold question of whether  American residing overseas should be counted, how the data should be  used and whether to enumerate this population group as part of the  decennial census.
We also recommended that if further testing were to occur, that the Bureau  resolve the shortcomings of the design of the 2004 test and better address  the objectives of an overseas enumeration.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: As agreed with your offices, our objectives for this report were to assess  (1) whether the Bureau implemented the test consistent with its design,  and (2) the initial lessons learned from the test results and their  implications for future overseas enumerations. To assess the first objective,  we interviewed Bureau officials and compared the Bureau's test plans with  what was actually done at the three test sites.  We visited Paris, France, and  Guadalajara, Mexico, to obtain the views of 12 private, civic, and other  organizations on the implementation of the overseas census test, and/or to  confirm at 36 organizations the availability of census material.  In addition,  to a more limited extent, we interviewed officials from third party  organizations in Kuwait via the telephone or e-mail.  We judgmentally  selected these organizations because they had agreed to display census  promotional materials and, in some cases, had also agreed to do one or  more of the following activities: make available paper copies of the census  questionnaire, publish information in a newsletter, post a link to a Web site,  send outreach e-mail to members, and/or create speaking opportunities to  discuss the census.  The results of these visits are not necessarily  representative of the larger universe of third-party organizations.
To assess the implications of the test results on future overseas  enumerations and the 2010 census, we obtained from Bureau officials  preliminary results of the overseas census by test site and response mode  as well as cost data.  We also interviewed officials from the Bureau and  third-party organizations to determine what lessons were learned from the  test and the implications on future overseas enumeration efforts.
section_title: 2004 Overseas Test Was Generally Implemented as Designed
paragraphs: The Bureau’s design for the 2004 overseas enumeration test was generally  implemented as planned and completed on schedule.  The Bureau’s design  had four key components: the mode of response, the questionnaire  designed specifically for Americans living overseas, three test sites, and an  outreach and promotion program designed to communicate and educate  Americans abroad that a test census was being conducted.  Table 1  describes each of these components in greater detail.
However, while the test was generally implemented as designed, our earlier  report pointed out several methodological limitations with the design, such  as not being able to calculate response rates because the universe of  Americans is unknown or not being able to measure the quality of data  because of the impracticality of developing an address list.  As we discuss  later in this report, it is these methodological limitations that impede the  Bureau’s ability to implement a successful overseas enumeration.
section_title: Overseas Census Test Results Were Disappointing and Costly
paragraphs: Although the 2004 overseas enumeration test ended in early July 2004 and  the Bureau has just begun evaluating the results, the response levels were  poor, and very expensive to obtain on a per unit basis.  The response level  to the overseas enumeration suggests that the current approach to  counting overseas Americans—a voluntary survey that relies heavily on  marketing to get people to participate—by itself cannot secure a successful  head count.  Further, obtaining the additional resources needed to produce  substantially better results may not be feasible, and still not yield data that  are comparable in quality to the stateside enumeration.
subsections: section_title: Response Levels Were Disappointing and Costly to Obtain
paragraphs: The 5,390 responses the Bureau received for this test were far below what  the Bureau planned for when printing up materials and census forms.   While the Bureau ordered 520,000 paper forms for three test sites, only  1,783 census forms were completed and returned.  Of these, 35 were  Spanish language forms that were made available in Mexico.  The  remaining 3,607 responses were completed via the Internet.  Table 2 below  shows the number of census questionnaires that the Bureau printed for  each country and the number of responses they actually received in both  the paper format and via the Internet.
Because of the low response levels, in early April 2004, the Bureau reversed  its decision to not use paid advertising and in May 2004 initiated a paid  advertising campaign in France and Mexico. This included print and  Internet ads in France and print and radio ads in Mexico.  See figure 2 for  examples of the ads used in the paid advertising campaign.
A Bureau official told us the ad campaign for the 2004 overseas test cost  about $206,000.  This official said there were surplus funds available in the  project budget to use for this purpose due to lower than expected  processing and postage costs for the overseas test.  While the Bureau saw  some increase in the number of responses after the paid advertising  campaign began, this official said the increase was slight.
section_title: Return on Investment for Overseas Enumeration is Low
paragraphs: Not only were response levels low, they were extremely expensive to  obtain on a unit basis—roughly $1,450 for each returned questionnaire,  based on the $7.8 million the Bureau spent preparing for, implementing,  and evaluating the 2004 overseas test.  In contrast, the unit cost of the 2000  Census was about $56 per household.  Although the two surveys are not  directly comparable because the 2000 Census costs covered operations not  used in the overseas test, the 2000 Census was still the most expensive  census in our nation’s history.
section_title: Securing a Higher Return Rate Would Be an Enormous Challenge
paragraphs: The main reason for the high unit cost is the low return rate.  However,  significantly boosting participation levels may not be feasible.  The  Bureau’s experience in the 2000 Census highlights the level of effort that  was needed to raise public awareness about the census and get people to  complete their forms.  For the 2000 decennial, the Bureau spent $374  million on a comprehensive marketing, communications, and partnership  effort.  The campaign consisted of a five-part strategy conducted in three  waves beginning in the fall of 1999 and continuing past Census Day (April 1,  2000).  The effort helped secure a 72-percent return rate.  Specific elements  included television, radio, and other mass media advertising; promotions  and special events; and a census-in-schools program.  Thus, over a period  of several months, the American public was on the receiving end of a  steady drumbeat of advertising aimed at publicizing the census and  motivating them to respond.
The Bureau also filled 594 full-time partnership specialist positions.  These  individuals were responsible for mobilizing support for the census on a  grassroots basis by working with governmental entities, private companies,  and religious and social service groups, and other organizations.
Replicating this level of effort on a worldwide basis would be impractical,  and still would not produce a complete count.  Indeed, even after the  Bureau’s aggressive marketing effort in 2000, it still had to follow-up with  about 42 million households that did not return their census forms.   Moreover, because there are no reliable figures on the number of  Americans residing overseas, the Bureau would not have a good measure  of the number of people that did not participate, or the overall quality of the  data.
section_title: Ensuring a Smooth Overseas Enumeration Could Stretch the Bureau’s Resources
paragraphs: The Bureau’s experience in conducting the 2004 overseas test underscored  the difficulties of administering a complex operation from thousands of  miles away.  Not surprisingly, as with any operation this complex, various  challenges and unforeseen problems arose.  While the Bureau was able to  resolve them, its ability to do so should there be a full overseas  enumeration as part of the 2010 Census, would be highly questionable as  far more resources would be required.  This was particularly evident in at  least two areas:  grappling with country-specific issues and overseeing the  contractor responsible for raising public awareness of the census at the  three test sites.
subsections: section_title: Country-specific Issues Created Implementation Problems
paragraphs: The Bureau encountered a variety of implementation problems at each of  the test sites.  In some cases the problems were known in advance, in  others, glitches developed at the last minute.  Although such difficulties are  to be expected given the magnitude of the Bureau’s task, a key lesson  learned from the test is that there would be no economy of scale in ramping  up to a full enumeration of Americans abroad.  In fact, just the opposite  would be true.  Because of the inevitability of country-specific problems,  rather than conducting a single overseas count based on a standard set of  rules and procedures (as is the case with the stateside census), the Bureau  might end up administering what amounts to dozens of separate  censuses—one for each of the countries it enumerates—each with its own  set of procedures adapted to each country’s unique requirements.  The time  and resources required to do this would likely be overwhelming and detract  from the Bureau’s stateside efforts.
For example, during the overseas test, the Bureau found that French  privacy laws restrict the collection of personal data such as race and ethnic  information.  However, these data are collected as part of the decennial  census because they are key to implementing a number of civil rights laws  such as the Voting Rights Act.
Addressing France’s privacy laws took a considerable amount of  negotiation between the two countries, and was ultimately resolved after a  formal agreement was developed.  The Bureau issued and posted on its  Web site an advisory that informed Americans living in France that it was  not mandatory to respond to the questionnaire, the only recipient of the  collected data is the Census Bureau, the data will be kept for one year, and  the respondent has a right to access and correct the data collected.  The  Bureau was able to collect race and ethnic data—generally a prohibited  practice without the respondents’ permission—only after it received  special approval from a French government agency.  Initially, however, it  looked as if the Bureau might have to redesign the census form if it wanted  to use it in France.
In Kuwait, delivery of the census materials was delayed by several weeks at  the beginning of the test because they were accidentally addressed to the  wrong contractor.  Ultimately, the U.S. Embassy stepped-in to accept the  boxes so that the enumeration could proceed.  In Mexico, there was some  initial confusion on the part of Mexican postal workers as to whether they  could accept the postage-paid envelopes that the Bureau had provided to  return the paper questionnaires for processing in the United States.
Because of the small number of countries involved in the test, the Bureau  was able to address the various problems it encountered.  Still, the Bureau’s  experience indicates that it will be exceedingly difficult to identify and  resolve in advance all the various laws, rules, societal factors, and a host of  other potential glitches that could affect a full overseas enumeration.
section_title: On-site Supervision of Contractor Was Problematic
paragraphs: As noted previously, the Bureau hired a public relations firm to develop a  communications strategy to inform and motivate respondents living in the  test countries to complete the census.  The firm’s responsibilities included  identifying private companies, religious institutions, service organizations,  and other entities that have contact with Americans abroad and could thus  help publicize the census test.  Specific activities the organizations could  perform included displaying promotional materials and paper versions of  the census questionnaire, publishing information in a newsletter, and  posting information on their Web sites.  Although the public relations firm  appeared to go to great lengths to enlist the participation of these various  entities—soliciting the support of hundreds of organizations in the three  countries—the test revealed the difficulties of adequately overseeing a  contractor operating in multiple sites overseas.
For example, the public relations firm’s tracking system indicated that  around 440 entities had agreed to perform one or more types of  promotional activities.  However, our on-site inspections of several of these  organizations in Paris, France, and Guadalajara, Mexico, that had agreed to  display the census materials and/or distribute the questionnaires,  uncovered several glitches.  Of the 36 organizations we visited that were  supposed to be displaying promotional literature, we found the information  was only available at 15.   In those cases, as shown in figure 3, the materials  were generally displayed in prominent locations, typically on a table with  posters on a nearby wall.
Five of these 15 organizations were also distributing the census  questionnaire, but the forms were not readily accessible.
However, at 21 sites we visited, we found various discrepancies between  what the public relations firm indicated had occurred, and what actually  took place.  For example, while the firm’s tracking system indicated that  questionnaires would be available at a restaurant and an English-language  bookstore in Guadalajara, none were available.  In fact, the owner of the  bookstore told us that no one from the Census Bureau or the public  relations firm had contacted her about displaying materials for the  overseas test.
At the University of Guadalajara, although the tracking system indicated  that an official had been contacted about, and agreed to help support the  census test, that official told us no one had contacted him.  As a result,  when boxes of census materials were delivered to his school without any  explanatory information, he did not know what to do with them, and had to  telephone the U.S. Consulate in Guadalajara to figure out what they were  for.
Likewise, in Paris, we went to several locations where the tracking system  indicated that census information would be available.  None was.   In fact,  at some of these sites, not only was there no information about the census,  but there was no indication that the organization we were looking for was  at the address we had from the database.
The results of the overseas test point to the difficulties of overseeing the  contractor’s performance.  As census materials were made available at  scores of locations across the three test countries, it would have been  impractical for the Bureau to inspect each site.  The difficulty of  supervising contractors—and any field operation for that matter—would  only be magnified in a global enumeration.
section_title: The Design of the Overseas Census Lacks the Building Blocks of a Successful Census
paragraphs: The Bureau’s experience in counting the nation’s population for the 2000  and earlier censuses sheds light on some of the specific operations and  other elements that together form the building blocks of a successful head  count  (see fig. 4).
While performing these activities does not necessarily guarantee a cost- effective headcount, not performing them makes a quality count far less  promising and puts the entire enterprise at risk. The current approach to  counting overseas Americans lacks these building blocks, as most are  infeasible to perform on an overseas population.  Each is discussed in  greater detail below.
Mandatory participation:  Under federal law, all persons residing in  the United States regardless of citizenship status are required to  respond to the decennial census.  By contrast, the overseas enumeration  test was conducted as a voluntary survey where participation was  optional.  The Bureau has found that response rates to mandatory  surveys are higher than the response rates to voluntary surveys.  This in  turn yields more complete data and helps hold down costs.
Early agreement on design:  Both Congress and the Bureau need to  agree on the fundamental design of an overseas census.  Concurrence  on the design helps ensure adequate planning, testing and funding  levels.  Conversely, the lack of an agreed-upon design raises the risk that  basic design elements might change in the years ahead, while the  opportunities to test those changes and integrate them with other  operations will diminish.  Under the Bureau’s current plans, after the  2006 test, the Bureau would have just one more opportunity to test its  prototype for an overseas enumeration—a dress rehearsal in 2008.  Any  design changes after 2008 would not be tested in a real-world  environment.
The design of the census is driven in large part by the purposes for  which the data will be used.  Currently, no decisions have been made on  whether the overseas data will be used for purposes of congressional  apportionment, redistricting, allocating federal funds, or other  applications.  Some applications, such as apportionment, would require  precise population counts and a very rigorous design that parallels the  stateside count.  Other applications, however, could get by with less  precision and thus, a less stringent approach.
As we noted previously, Congress will need to decide whether or not to  count overseas Americans, and how the results should be used.  The  basis for these determinations needs to be sound research on the cost,  quality of data, and logistical feasibility of the range of options for  counting this population group.  Possibilities include counting  Americans via a separate survey, administrative records such as  passport and voter registration forms, and/or records maintained by  other countries such as published census records and work permits.
The Bureau’s initial research has shown that each of these options has  coverage, accuracy, and accessibility issues, and some might introduce  systemic biases into the data.  Far more extensive research would be  needed to determine the feasibility of these or other potential  approaches.  Once Congress knows the tradeoffs of these various  alternatives, it will be better positioned to provide the Bureau with the  guidance it needs to go beyond research and conduct field tests of  specific approaches. The Bureau can conduct the research, or it can  contract it out.  Indeed, the National Research Council of the National  Academy of Sciences has conducted a number of studies on the  decennial census, including a review of the 2000 Census and an  examination of reengineering the 2010 Census.
A complete and accurate address list:  The cornerstone of a  successful census is a quality address list.  For the stateside census, the  Bureau goes to great lengths to develop what is essentially an inventory  of all known living quarters in the United States, including sending  census workers to canvass every street in the nation to verify addresses.   The Bureau uses this information to deliver questionnaires, follow up  with nonrespondents, determine vacancies, and identify households the  Bureau may have missed or counted more than once.  Because it would  be impractical to develop an accurate parallel address list for overseas  Americans, these operations would be impossible and the quality of the  data would suffer as a result.
Ability to detect invalid returns:  Ensuring the integrity of the census  data requires the Bureau to have a mechanism to screen out invalid  responses.  Stateside, the Bureau does this by associating an  identification number on the questionnaire to a specific address in the  Bureau’s address list, as well as by field verification. However, the  Bureau’s current approach to counting overseas Americans is unable to  determine whether or not a respondent does in fact reside abroad.  So  long as a respondent provides certain pieces of information on the  census questionnaire, it will be eligible for further processing.  The  Bureau is unable to confirm the point of origin for questionnaires  completed on the Internet, and postmarks on a paper questionnaire only  tell the location from which a form was mailed, not the place of  residence of the respondent.  The Bureau has acknowledged that  ensuring such validity might be all but impossible for any reasonable  level of effort and funding.
Ability to follow up with non-respondents:  Because participation in  the decennial census is mandatory, the Bureau sends enumerators to  those households that do not return their questionnaires.  In cases  where household members cannot be contacted or refuse to answer all  or part of a census questionnaire, enumerators are to obtain data from  neighbors, a building manager, or other nonhousehold member  presumed to know about its residents.  The Bureau also employs  statistical techniques to impute data when it lacks complete information  on a household.  Thus, by the end of each decennial census, the Bureau  has a fairly exhaustive count of everyone in the nation.  As noted above,  because the Bureau lacks an address list of overseas Americans, it is  unable to follow up with nonrespondents or impute information on  missing households.  As a result, the Bureau will never be able to obtain  a complete count of overseas Americans.
Cost model for estimating needed resources:  The Bureau uses a  cost model and other baseline data to help it estimate the resources it  needs to conduct the stateside census.  Key assumptions such as  response levels and workload are developed based on the Bureau’s  experience in counting people decade after decade.  However, the  Bureau has only a handful of data points with which to gauge the  resources necessary for an overseas census, and the tests it plans on  conducting will only be of limited value in modeling the costs of  conducting a worldwide enumeration in 2010.
The lack of baseline data could cause the Bureau to over- or  underestimate the staffing, budget and other requirements of an  overseas count.  For example, this was evident during the 2004 overseas  test when the Bureau estimated it would need around 100,000 Spanish- language questionnaires for the Mexican test site.  As only 35 Spanish- language questionnaires were returned, it is now clear that the Bureau  could have gotten by with printing far fewer questionnaires for Mexico.    However, the dilemma for the Bureau is that its experience in the 2004  overseas test cannot be used to project the number of Spanish-language  questionnaires it would need for Mexico or other Spanish-speaking  countries in 2010.  Similar problems would apply to efforts to enumerate  other countries.
Targeted and aggressive marketing campaign:  The key to raising  public awareness of the census is an intensive outreach and promotion  campaign.  As noted previously, the Bureau’s marketing efforts for the  2000 Census were far-reaching, and consisted of more than 250 ads in 17  languages that were part of an effort to reach every household, including  those in historically undercounted populations.  Replicating this level of  effort on a global scale would be both difficult and expensive, and the  Bureau has no plans to do so.
Field infrastructure to execute census and deal with problems:   The Bureau had a vast network of 12 regional offices and 511 local  census offices to implement various operations for the 2000 Census.   This decentralized structure enabled the Bureau to carry out a number  of activities to help ensure a more complete and accurate count, as well  as deal with problems when they arose.  Moreover, local census offices  are an important source of intelligence on the various enumeration  obstacles the Bureau faces on the ground.  For example, during the 2000  Census, the Bureau called on them to identify hard-to-count population  groups and other challenges, and to develop action plans to address  them.  The absence of a field infrastructure for an overseas census  means that the Bureau would have to rely heavily on contractors to  conduct the enumeration, and manage the entire enterprise from its  headquarters in Suitland, Maryland.
Ability to measure coverage and accuracy:  Since 1980, the Bureau  has measured the quality of the decennial census using statistical  methods to estimate the magnitude of any errors.  The Bureau reports  these estimates by specific ethnic, racial, and other groups.  For  methodological reasons, similar estimates cannot be generated for an  overseas census.  As a result, the quality of the overseas count, and thus  whether the numbers should be used for specific purposes, could not be  accurately determined.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The 2004 test of the feasibility of an overseas enumeration was an  extremely valuable exercise in that it highlighted the numerous obstacles  to a cost-effective count of Americans abroad as an integral part of the  decennial census.  Although more comprehensive results will not be  available until the Bureau completes its evaluation of the test early next  year, a key lesson learned is already clear:  The current approach to  counting this population group—a voluntary survey that largely relies on  marketing to ensure a complete count—would be costly and yield poor  results.  The tools and resources the Bureau has on hand to enumerate  overseas Americans are insufficient for overcoming the inherent obstacles  to a complete count, and it is unlikely that any refinements to this basic  design would produce substantially better results, and certainly not on a  par suitable for purposes of congressional apportionment.
What’s more, the Bureau already faces the difficult task of carrying out a  cost-effective stateside enumeration in 2010.  Securing a successful count  of Americans in Vienna, Virginia, is challenging enough; a complete count  of Americans in Vienna, Austria—and in scores of other countries around  the globe—would only add to the difficulties facing the Bureau as it looks  toward the next national head count.   As a result, we believe that any  further tests or planning activities related to counting Americans overseas  as part of the decennial census would be an imprudent use of the Bureau’s  limited resources.
That said, to the extent that Congress desires better data on the number  and characteristics of Americans abroad for various policy-making and  other nonapportionment purposes that require less precision, such  information does not necessarily need to be collected as part of the  decennial census, and could, in fact, be acquired through a separate survey  or other means.  To help inform congressional decision making on this  issue, including decisions on whether Americans should be counted and  how the data should be used, it will be important for Congress to have the  results of the Bureau’s evaluation of the 2004 overseas census test.  Equally  important would be information on the cost, quality of data, and logistical  feasibility of counting Americans abroad using alternatives to the decennial  census.  Once Congress knows the tradeoffs of these various alternatives, it  would be better positioned to provide the Bureau with the direction it  needs so that the Bureau could then develop and test an approach that  meets congressional requirements at reasonable resource levels.
section_title: Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Given the obstacles to a cost-effective count of overseas Americans as part  of the decennial census and, more specifically, obtaining data that is of  sufficient quality to be used for congressional apportionment, Congress  may wish to consider eliminating funding for any additional research,  planning, and development activities related to counting this population as  part of the decennial headcount, including funding for tests planned in 2006  and 2008.  However, funding for the evaluation of the 2004 test should  continue as planned to help inform congressional decision making.
Should Congress still desire better data on the number of overseas  Americans, in lieu of the method tested in 2004, Congress might wish to  consider authorizing and funding research on the feasibility of counting  Americans abroad using alternatives to the decennial census.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To facilitate congressional decision making, we recommend that the  Secretary of Commerce ensure that the Bureau completes its evaluation of  the 2004 overseas census test as planned.  Further, to the extent that  additional research is authorized and funded, the Bureau, in consultation  with Congress, should explore the feasibility of counting overseas  Americans using alternatives to the decennial census.  Potential options  include  conducting a separate survey,   examining how the design and archiving of various government agency  administrative records might need to be refined to facilitate a more  accurate count of overseas Americans, and   exchanging data with other countries’ statistical agencies and censuses,  subject to applicable confidentiality and other provisions.
Consideration should also be given to whether the Bureau should conduct  this research on its own or whether it should be contracted out to the  National Academy of Sciences.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Secretary of Commerce forwarded written comments from the U.S.  Census Bureau on a draft of this report on August 5, 2004, which are  reprinted in the appendix.  The Bureau agreed with our conclusions and  recommendations.  Furthermore, the Bureau noted, “should Congress  request and fund” further research on counting overseas Americans, it  would be equipped to do that research itself.
As agreed with your offices, unless you release its contents earlier, we plan  no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date.  At  that time we will send copies to other interested congressional committees,  the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau.   Copies will be made available to others upon request.  This report will also  be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me on (202) 512-6806 or by e-mail at daltonp@gao.gov or Robert  Goldenkoff, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov.   Key contributors to this report were Ellen Grady, Lisa Pearson, and  Timothy Wexler.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Commerce
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