Army Corps of Engineers: Cost Increases in Flood Control Projects and Improving Communication with Nonfederal Sponsors
Published: 2013-12-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated almost $1.7 billion to the Corps for its Civil Works program to construct a wide range of projects, including flood control projects. Flood control projects require congressional authorization and appropriations. Nonfederal sponsors, such as a state or local government, also provide funds. When Congress approves a project for construction, it authorizes a total cost for the project based on estimates prepared by the Corps, and this authorized cost provides the basis for the project's maximum cost.
GAO was asked to review issues related to flood control projects. This report examines (1) the extent to which cost increases occurred and the primary factors that contributed to the differences between estimated and actual costs, (2) the extent to which the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to nonfederal sponsors, and (3) Corps guidance on communication with such sponsors and ways, if any, to improve such communication. GAO surveyed Corps officials on all 87 flood control projects identified by the Corps as budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to 2012, selected 8 for further review covering each Corps division, reviewed project documents and Corps communication guidance, and interviewed Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The majority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) flood control projects budgeted for construction from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced cost increases, including inflation. Specifically, 59 of 87 flood control projects during this period experienced increases from their original authorized cost to their current estimated project cost or their total expenditures at closeout, according to information provided by Corps officials. However, according to a Corps official, as of September 2013, no projects had cost increases that exceeded their maximum allowable cost as defined by law. Various factors other than inflation contributed to cost increases among the 8 projects GAO selected for further review. Factors included design changes, less than optimal federal funding, underestimated costs, and contract cost changes. For example, 6 of the 8 projects had design changes due to unforeseen site conditions and changes in design criteria following Hurricane Katrina. According to Corps officials, receiving less than optimal federal funding increased the costs of 3 of the 8 projects GAO reviewed. Corps officials also said that receiving less than optimal federal funding meant that 2 projects had to break up their work into smaller segments, and 1 project had to extend its completion schedule. The Corps has some efforts under way intended to better manage costs.
The extent to which the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to nonfederal sponsors varied among the 8 projects GAO selected for further review. Specifically, Corps officials and sponsors told GAO that the Corps usually communicated Corps policy changes affecting projects by telephone or email as soon as they occurred. In addition, the Corps' communication with the sponsors on project scope and design changes was generally effective among the projects, according to Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors with whom GAO spoke. However, some sponsors told GAO the Corps was less timely in providing updated cost information. For example, a representative of one sponsor told GAO that the sponsor had not received the required quarterly cost report on a regular basis.
The Corps has guidance regarding communication between the Corps and its nonfederal sponsors. Specifically, Corps guidance directs project delivery teams to develop a project management plan that includes a communications plan. However, GAO found that 3 of the 8 projects GAO reviewed did not have a communications plan as called for by guidance. Because the communications plan provides a framework for the Corps and nonfederal sponsors to establish a communications strategy and determine the needs of the project delivery team, without such a plan, the Corps may be missing opportunities to assess their communication needs. Developing such a plan may help Corps or sponsor staff understand the team's communications needs when they join the project delivery team; for projects where there is significant turnover, understanding the team's needs is especially important.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Corps take steps to ensure compliance with its guidance calling for communications plans. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: For fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) received  an appropriation of almost $1.7 billion for its Civil Works program to  construct a wide range of water resources projects, including flood control  projects, such as levees, floodwalls, dams, and reservoirs. Flood control  projects require congressional authorization and appropriations. The  Corps also typically receives funds from each project’s nonfederal  sponsor, which may be a state, tribal, county, or local government or  agency. When Congress approves a flood control project for construction,  it authorizes a total cost for the project based on cost estimates prepared  by the Corps, and this authorized cost provides the basis for the project’s  maximum allowable cost. The Corps must seek new spending authority  from Congress before spending more than the maximum allowable cost.  In an era of budgetary constraints, cost increases in Corps flood control  projects can delay the completion of the projects.
You asked us to review issues related to the costs of flood control  projects and the Corps’ communication with its nonfederal sponsors. This  report examines (1) the extent to which cost increases occurred in flood  control projects budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to  2012 and the primary factors that contributed to the differences between  estimated and actual costs; (2) the extent to which the Corps  communicated with and provided updated information to its nonfederal  sponsors on changes to Corps policies, project scope and design, and  estimated versus actual costs; and (3) Corps guidance on communication  with nonfederal sponsors and ways, if any, suggested by Corps officials  and sponsors to improve such communication. For purposes of this  report, a flood control project refers to a project with structural features  such as levees, floodwalls, channels, dams, and reservoirs that is  constructed for the purpose of managing the risk of flooding along rivers  and coastal areas.
To determine the extent to which cost increases occurred in flood control  projects and the primary factors that contributed to differences between  estimated and actual costs, we reviewed relevant provisions of the laws,  regulations, policies, and procedures governing the Corps’ process for  developing flood control projects and generating cost estimates. We also  interviewed officials at Corps headquarters and its cost engineering  center of expertise. The Corps identified 87 new or ongoing flood control  projects that were budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004  to 2012, and we surveyed Corps officials associated with the projects to  obtain project cost estimates at key milestones, the current total project  cost or total expenditures at project closeout, and the primary reasons for  cost increases. We received responses from Corps officials for all 87  projects, for a 100 percent response rate. From those 87 projects, we  selected a non-probability sample of 8 projects that were budgeted for  construction in any fiscal year from 2009 to 2012 for further review. This  sample included 1 project randomly selected from each of 7 divisions  and 1 project judgmentally selected from the New Orleans District that  also met our selection criteria. The 8 projects were the Brays Bayou  project in Texas, the Little Calumet River project in Indiana, the Larose to  Golden Meadow project in Louisiana, the Monarch-Chesterfield project in  Missouri, the Muddy River project in Massachusetts, the Napa River  project in California, the Roanoke River Upper Basin project in Virginia,  and the Turkey Creek Basin project in Kansas and Missouri. For these 8  projects, we reviewed project documents and interviewed Corps officials  and representatives of nonfederal sponsors to obtain more detailed  information about project cost increases and the reasons for those  increases.
To determine the extent to which the Corps communicated with and  provided updated information to its nonfederal sponsors, we interviewed  Corps district officials and sponsors of the eight projects selected for  further review to obtain information on the communication that occurred  on those projects. To examine Corps guidance on communication with  nonfederal sponsors and ways, if any, suggested by Corps officials and  sponsors to improve such communication, we reviewed Corps civil works  guidance on communication with nonfederal sponsors, interviewed Corps  headquarters officials and district officials and sponsors of the eight  projects selected for further review, and obtained copies of  communications plans, if available, for the eight projects. Because this is  a non-probability sample, the experiences and views of Corps officials  and sponsors of the eight projects are not representative of, and cannot  be generalized to, all Corps flood control projects. Appendix I contains  more detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology of  our review.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to December 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Corps is the world’s largest public engineering, design, and  construction management agency. Located within the Department of  Defense, the Corps has both military and civilian responsibilities.  Through its Civil Works program, the Corps plans, designs, constructs,  operates, and maintains a wide range of water resources projects for  purposes such as flood control, navigation, and environmental  restoration. The Civil Works program is organized into 3 tiers: a national  headquarters in Washington, D.C.; 8 regional divisions that were  established generally according to watershed boundaries; and 38 districts  nationwide (see fig. 1).
Corps headquarters primarily develops policies and provides oversight.  The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, appointed by the  President, establishes the policy direction for the Civil Works program.  The Chief of Engineers, a military officer, oversees the Corps’ civil works  operations and reports on civil works matters to the Assistant Secretary of  the Army for Civil Works. The eight divisions, commanded by military  officers, coordinate civil works projects in the districts within their  respective geographic areas. Corps districts, also commanded by military  officers, are responsible for planning, engineering, constructing, and  managing projects in their districts. Districts are also responsible for  coordinating with the nonfederal sponsors, which may be state, tribal,  county, or local governments or agencies. Each project has a project  delivery team of civilian employees that manages the project over its life  cycle. The team is led by a project manager and comprises members  from the planning, engineering, construction, operations, and real estate  functions.
In addition, the Civil Works program maintains a number of centers of  expertise to assist Corps division and district offices. One of these  centers is the Cost Engineering and Agency Technical Review Mandatory  Center of Expertise located in Walla Walla, Washington, which provides  technical support and assistance to the districts on cost engineering  issues, such as developing cost estimates and performing mandatory  agency technical reviews of cost estimates included in all decision  documents.
The Corps’ Civil Works program receives funding annually through the  Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act or an omnibus  appropriations act. These acts have typically appropriated a sum to each  civil works appropriation account, including investigations, construction,  and operation and maintenance, to fund projects related to the nation’s  water resources. The funds appropriated to the Corps are “no year”  funds, which means that they remain available to the Corps until spent.  Historically, committee reports accompanying each annual appropriations  act have specifically listed individual investigations, construction, and  operation and maintenance projects, and the amount of funds designated  for each project.
subsections: section_title: Continuing Contract Authority
paragraphs: Through fiscal year 2005, applicable law and an Army policy allowed the  Corps to enter into, and commit the federal government for the full  amount of, contracts that spanned more than one fiscal year (called  “continuing contracts”), even though the Corps may not have received  appropriations to cover the full contract amount at the time the contracts  were awarded. However, beginning with the fiscal year 2006 Energy and  Water Development Appropriations Act, Congress limited the use of the  Corps’ continuing contract authority. In response, the Corps developed  new continuing contract clauses that limited the government’s obligations  to only the funds available at a specific time for the contracts, as opposed  to any anticipated future funding, and required the contractor to stop work  when the available funds were exhausted.
section_title: Process for Developing Flood Control Projects
paragraphs: The major steps in developing a flood control project are shown in   figure 2.
Usually, the Corps becomes involved in flood control projects when a  local community perceives or experiences a flooding problem that is  beyond its ability to solve and contacts the Corps for assistance. If the  Corps does not have the statutory authority required for studying the  problem, the Corps must obtain authorization from Congress before  proceeding. Studies have been authorized through legislation, typically a  Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), or, in some circumstances,  through a committee resolution. Next, the Corps must receive an  appropriation to study the project, which it seeks through its annual  budget request to Congress.
After receiving authorization and an appropriation, studies are conducted  in two phases: reconnaissance and feasibility. A Corps district office  conducts a reconnaissance study at full federal expense to determine if  the problem warrants federal participation in a feasibility study and how  the problem could be addressed. During this phase, the Corps also  assesses the level of interest and support from nonfederal entities that  may become sponsors. If the Corps determines that further study is  warranted, the district office typically seeks agreement from the local  sponsor to share costs for a feasibility study. The target for completion of  the reconnaissance phase is 6 to 12 months from initial obligation of  federal funds to a signed feasibility cost-sharing agreement.
Cost sharing for feasibility studies for flood control projects is 50 percent  federal and 50 percent nonfederal. The cost of a feasibility study is  established through negotiation of the project management plan, which is  an agreement between the Corps and the nonfederal sponsor that  defines project objectives and project-specific quality control procedures.  The purpose of the feasibility study is to further investigate the problem  and make recommendations on whether the project is worth pursuing and  how the problem should be addressed. Corps guidance states that typical  feasibility studies should be completed in 18 to 36 months. According to  the Corps, the district office conducts the study and the needed  environmental studies and documents the results in a feasibility report  that includes a total project cost estimate based on the recommended  plan. The Chief of Engineers reviews the report and decides whether to  sign a final decision document, known as the Chief’s Report,  recommending the project for construction. The Chief of Engineers  transmits the Chief’s Report and the supporting documentation to  Congress through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and  the Office of Management and Budget. Congress may authorize the  project’s construction in a WRDA or other legislation. When Congress  approves a flood control project for construction, it typically authorizes a  total cost for the project based on estimates prepared by the Corps.
Most projects are authorized during the preconstruction engineering and  design phase. This phase usually overlaps with the feasibility phase. The  purpose of the preconstruction engineering and design phase is to  complete any additional planning studies and all of the detailed, technical  studies and designs needed to begin construction of the project. Once the  project has been authorized for construction and funds have been  appropriated, the district enters into a cost-sharing agreement with the  local sponsor. The degree of cost sharing required can vary by project  but, since the passage of WRDA 1986, construction costs of flood control  projects can be shared under a formula of 65 percent federal and 35  percent nonfederal. The Corps seeks funds to construct the project  through the annual budget process. After Congress appropriates funds,  the construction phase can begin. Construction is generally managed by  the Corps but performed by private contractors. During construction,  Congress may enact scope or cost changes.
A flood control project can take many years to complete. Once  construction is completed, the Corps usually turns over operation and  maintenance of the project to the nonfederal sponsor, which then bears  the full cost.
section_title: Maximum Project Cost
paragraphs: When Congress authorizes a specific amount of money for a project, this  authorized project cost provides the basis for the project’s maximum cost.  Section 902 of WRDA 1986, as amended, defines the maximum project  cost as the sum of (1) the authorized cost, with the costs of unconstructed  project features adjusted for inflation; (2) the costs of modifications that  do not materially alter the scope of the project, up to 20 percent of the  authorized cost (without adjustment for inflation); and (3) the cost of  additional studies, modifications, and actions authorized by WRDA 1986  or any later law or required by changes in federal law. The maximum cost  is known as the 902 limit.
As interpreted by the Corps, the 902 limit applies to the following types of  flood control projects unless the project’s authorization states otherwise:
Projects authorized by WRDA 1986 and any subsequent WRDA or  other authorizing law.
Projects authorized before WRDA 1986 with new construction  authorized after the act’s passage if the project was completely  reauthorized. If only a project component was authorized after WRDA  1986, then only that component would be subject to the 902 limit.
Projects authorized before WRDA 1986 and modified by any  subsequent law, unless specified in later legislation.
Each district with an ongoing construction project is to update the 902  limit established for the project to account for inflation every time a new  cost estimate or benefit-to-cost ratio is calculated. If the project’s  estimated costs are approaching the 902 limit, the project delivery team  may start preparing a post-authorization change report to seek an  increase in the project’s authorized cost. If the project’s actual costs  reach the 902 limit, construction must stop until the project gets a new  authorization that increases the project’s costs and, therefore, its 902  limit.
section_title: A Majority of Projects Experienced Cost Increases Due to Various Factors
paragraphs: The majority of the Corps flood control projects budgeted for construction  from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced cost increases, including  inflation. However, no projects had cost increases that exceeded their  maximum allowable cost, or 902 limit, as defined by law. Various factors  other than inflation contributed to cost increases among the eight projects  we selected for further review. The Corps has some efforts under way  intended to better manage costs.
subsections: section_title: At Least Two-thirds of Flood Control Projects Experienced Cost Increases
paragraphs: At least two-thirds of the 87 flood control projects budgeted for  construction from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced increases,  including inflation, from their original authorized cost to their current  estimated project cost or their total expenditures at closeout, according to  information provided by Corps officials. Specifically, 59 projects had cost  increases, including 12 completed projects and 47 that were  uncompleted. In addition, 7 projects had cost decreases, including 3  completed projects and 4 uncompleted projects. One uncompleted  project experienced no change from its authorized cost to its current total  project cost. We were unable to compare costs for 20 projects—3  completed and 17 uncompleted—because they did not have an  authorized cost or total expenditures at closeout or were undergoing  reevaluation and did not have a current total project cost estimate.
Based on survey responses, of the 59 projects with cost increases, 34  had maximum allowable cost limits as defined in Section 902 of WRDA  1986. According to the Corps official responsible for tracking 902 limits,  as of September 2013, none of those 34 projects had cost increases that  exceeded its 902 limit. In addition, according to survey responses, 13 of  the 59 projects did not have 902 limits because the project (1) was  authorized before WRDA 1986, (2) had no authorized cost, or (3) had a  not-to-exceed limit, to which the 902 limit does not apply. The remaining  12 projects we reviewed were completed and, therefore, our survey  question regarding 902 limits did not apply.
Similarly, survey responses indicated that 29 of the 59 projects with cost  increases had received at least one additional authorization from  Congress that increased the project’s authorized cost and, therefore, its  maximum allowable cost if the project was subject to the 902 limit. A  Corps flood control project can receive an increase in its authorized cost  in one of two ways. First, the Corps can submit a post-authorization  change report with a new total project cost estimate to Congress. Based  on this report, Congress can then reauthorize the project at a higher cost  in legislation, such as a WRDA. Second, Congress can also reauthorize a  project without having received a post-authorization change report from  the Corps. In either case, if the project’s actual costs reach its 902 limit  before congressional action, construction must stop until the project gets  a new authorization that increases the project’s costs.
section_title: Various Factors Contributed to Cost Increases on Eight Projects
paragraphs: Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors from the eight projects selected  for further review identified various factors other than inflation that  contributed to cost increases on all eight of the projects. Some of these  projects were impacted by more than one factor. Appendix III contains  detailed information on the eight projects. The factors identified were as  follows:
Design changes. Design changes due primarily to unforeseen site  conditions and changes in design criteria following Hurricane Katrina  contributed to increased costs on six of the projects we reviewed.  Specifically, on four projects, design changes occurred due to  unforeseen site conditions. Corps officials on the Turkey Creek project  said that a tunnel that could not be accessed prior to construction was  found to be in such poor condition that it had to have major  rehabilitation work performed. Work to fix the deteriorated tunnel cost  $10 million more than had originally been estimated. Corps officials  on the Little Calumet project said during construction they  encountered a former landfill along one portion of the river that had  not been discovered during the preconstruction site investigation. This  condition did not provide a usable foundation for a levee, so the  design had to be changed to convert the section from a levee to a  sheet pile wall. These changes increased costs by approximately  $645,000, according to a post-authorization change report dated  March 2012. On the Napa River project, after the initial designs were  completed in 1997, a vineyard was planted next to an area that had  previously been identified as a flowage easement. The Corps had to  analyze various alternatives and decided to build a levee encircling  the vineyard. Building this additional levee cost $200,000, but it was  able to serve as a disposal area for some of the material excavated  from the project. Finally, on the Roanoke River project, the sponsor  said that the Corps spent several years redesigning portions of the  project following the discovery of areas contaminated with hazardous  waste. Several sections of the project relating to river channels had to  be dropped as a result of the redesign.
Other projects we reviewed had to have portions redesigned because  the Corps changed its design criteria following Hurricane Katrina.  Specifically, the Corps updated its guidance on the design of I-walls  used as flood barriers. On projects that were either in the design  stage or under construction, but with unconstructed features, officials  had to determine whether their designs met the new criteria. For  example, on two projects we reviewed, portions of the project had to  be redesigned to comply with the new criteria. Corps officials on the  Little Calumet project said that costs increased significantly because  the new criteria required the redesign of three sections of the project.  However, officials were unable to specify by how much costs  increased. According to a Corps official, detailed cost estimates of the  preliminary designs were not prepared. The official added that cost  estimates used during planning were initial estimates and did not  provide a reliable basis with which to compare the cost of the  redesigned sections. Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors of the  Larose to Golden Meadow project said the changes in design criteria  could significantly increase the costs to construct elements of the  project. Corps officials said they are in the process of preparing a  post-authorization change report and, therefore, could not provide an  estimate of the increases at the time of our report. Corps officials  expect the report to be completed in 2014.
Less than optimal federal funding. According to Corps guidance, the  Corps is to include project funding in its budget submission at a level  that a project can use effectively and efficiently in a given fiscal year,  which we refer to in this report as optimal federal funding. Receiving  less than optimal federal funding increased the costs of three of the  eight projects we reviewed, according to Corps officials. Officials for  two projects—Napa River and Turkey Creek—said their projects  received less than optimal federal funding, so they had to break up  the work into smaller segments than initially planned. Officials added  that doing so was more costly because it required contractors to  mobilize and demobilize their construction equipment and crews more  frequently. A Corps official on the Turkey Creek project said that the  cost of issuing additional contracts could be quantified but that the  Corps does not specifically track these types of costs. The official said  that contracts have typically been issued in lump sums, so  mobilization and demobilization costs have not been explicitly broken  out. In addition, on the Napa River project, a Corps document cited  two instances when modifications were required for ongoing  construction contracts due to a lack of funding, which lengthened the  construction schedule and increased costs by about $12 million.  Similarly, Corps officials on the Larose to Golden Meadow project said  that, over the last several years, the project schedule had been  pushed back because the project had not been receiving optimal  federal funding. The officials added that over the 41 years that the  project has been under construction, they had not consistently  received enough funding, which had resulted in a longer completion  schedule and increased costs. Although the officials could not quantify  by how much, they said costs generally increased due to inflation and  higher material prices. For example, officials said that the cost of steel  sheet piling increased from $3.25 per square foot in 1963 to an  average $40.00 per square foot from 2006 to 2011.
Underestimated costs. Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors of four  projects said that costs increased on their projects due to differences  between early Corps cost estimates and those developed later during  project design. For example, Corps officials on the Larose to Golden  Meadow project said that on one of the pumping plants, they initially  estimated a construction cost of $800,000. But after additional  analysis and geotechnical borings, and in order to handle the actual  site conditions, they redesigned the project features, which raised the  cost to $10.7 million. On the Muddy River project, nonfederal  sponsors said that the Corps’ early cost estimates were too low  because the Corps used national averages that were lower than what  actual costs would be in the New England corridor where the project  was located. As a result, sponsors said that they developed their own  estimates for budgeting purposes of $78.5 million. However, a Corps  official said that the Corps adjusted for regional differences for cost  estimates prepared during the project. On the Brays Bayou project,  the nonfederal sponsor said that differences between the authorized  cost and the cost included in the initial project partnership agreement  resulted from the Corps’ low estimates of land acquisition and  associated costs, pipeline costs, utilities, and bridge adjustments.  However, Corps officials attribute all cost increases since project  authorization to the change from a diversion element to a downstream  channel structure. Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors on the  Roanoke River project agreed that the project’s original cost  estimates, which were used for authorization, were not realistic. Corps  officials said that the feasibility study conducted in the mid-1980s was  not done to the same level of detail as more recent studies. As a  result, the cost estimates developed in the feasibility study were not  as accurate as they could have been.
Corps officials said they have taken actions to improve cost estimates.  For example, in 2007, the Corps established a cost engineering  center of expertise where, according to a Corps official, cost estimates  in decision documents supporting congressional authorization are  reviewed for accuracy and, in 2008, the Corps updated its cost- estimating guidance. Additional guidance issued in draft in 2009  further directs project delivery teams to perform a cost and schedule  risk analysis for all decision documents for projects requiring  congressional authorization with a total project cost estimate  exceeding $40 million, whereby specific cost risk analysis methods  are to be used to develop contingency. According to a Corps official,  performing a cost and schedule risk analysis allows the project  delivery team to identify high-risk areas that could impact a project’s  cost or schedule, as well as areas for early mitigation efforts.
Changes in contract costs. Corps officials said that differences  between contract estimates and actual contract awards can lead to  cost increases. On the Muddy River project, the Corps awarded a  contract for the first phase of the project that was $8 million higher  than the Corps’ original estimate. A Corps official on the project  explained that the cost estimates used by contractors in submitting  bids for the project may have been based on a different set of  assumptions regarding such factors as the future cost of materials  and fuel. The Corps official added that this multiyear contract did not  have an escalation clause for increases in fuel or materials, so the  contractors likely made different assumptions to reduce their risk. In  addition, costs could be affected by contract modifications. For  example, on the Monarch-Chesterfield project, a Corps official said  that several modifications during construction accounted for increased  costs of approximately $1.2 million. Some of these modifications  included additional engineering support for a specialized railroad  closure structure, further design of a pump station, plan changes to  locate a fiber optic cable, and design changes to better accommodate  storm sewers.
Natural events. Natural events, including flooding and hurricanes,  caused damage to two projects—Turkey Creek and Larose to Golden  Meadow. Repairing the damage added to project costs. For example,  a Corps official on the Turkey Creek project said that, during the  construction of the tunnel, the bypass pipe system used to divert the  flow of Turkey Creek was repeatedly washed out due to flooding and  had to be replaced, which increased the total project cost by  approximately $3.5 to $4 million.
Continuing contracts. Corps officials said that the policy change  limiting the use of continuing contracts increased costs on one  project. Corps officials on the Roanoke River project said that, as a  result of breaking the one contract into smaller contracts, costs  increased due to the loss of economies of scale. However, Corps  officials said they could not indicate by how much costs increased  because costs were not calculated for contracting scenarios that did  not occur.
Additional analysis. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil  Works required Corps officials on the Monarch-Chesterfield project to  analyze the probability of the project causing measurable flood  damages outside the protected area. The additional analysis delayed  the start of construction for almost 7 years, and the measures to  address flooding caused by the project added $13 million to the cost  of the project.
section_title: The Corps Has Some Efforts Under Way Intended to Better Manage Project Costs
paragraphs: In a memorandum dated February 20, 2013, the Assistant Secretary of  the Army for Civil Works expressed concerns that civil works projects,  once authorized, did not appear to be managed for completion within  approved cost estimates and also identified a need for a systematic  approach to monitor and manage project cost increases, given continued  fiscal constraints. The memorandum stated that, without controls to  closely track and minimize cost increases on a year-to-year basis, more  projects would be in jeopardy of needing statutory increases in their 902  limits. Because of these and other concerns, the Assistant Secretary of  the Army for Civil Works requested information from the Corps that  included a proposed plan to manage and control costs in the future. In  response, in 2013, the Corps formed the Project Cost Management  Working Group, which identified several actions intended to better  manage costs, such as requiring formal high-level approval of changes  above appropriate thresholds and using formal processes and industry  best practices to reduce overall cost and project duration. A Corps official  said that the Corps developed an interim measure to identify projects that  have exceeded their authorized project cost and reasons for the cost  increase. However, the official said that this interim measure focuses on  those projects eligible for inclusion in the fiscal year 2015 budget  submission and projects in the fiscal year 2013 work plan. The official  said that determining how to integrate the interim measure into the  existing budget and execution processes is planned for fiscal year 2014.
section_title: The Extent to Which the Corps Communicated With and Provided Updated Information to Nonfederal Sponsors Varied
paragraphs: For the eight projects we selected for further review, the extent to which  the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to  nonfederal sponsors varied. Specifically, Corps officials and nonfederal  sponsors told us that the Corps usually communicated changes in Corps  policy as soon as they occurred. The Corps’ communication with the  nonfederal sponsors on project scope and design changes was generally  effective among the projects, according to Corps officials and nonfederal  sponsors we spoke with. However, some sponsors told us the Corps was  less timely in providing updated cost information. The Corps  communicated changes to sponsors as follows:
Corps policy changes. Seven of the eight projects we reviewed were  affected by at least one policy change. Corps officials and nonfederal  sponsors for these projects told us that Corps district officials usually  notified the sponsors by telephone or e-mail as soon as the policy  changes were issued. In some instances, Corps officials also held  meetings to discuss the policy changes with the sponsors. For  example, Corps officials from one project told us they contacted the  sponsor directly to communicate the discontinuation of the use of  continuing contracts. The Corps was ready to award the continuing  contract but instead had to issue smaller contracts, resulting in time  delays and increased costs. A representative of one sponsor also  described instances when he learned about a policy change  unexpectedly. For example, the sponsor told us that the Corps notified  him by telephone about a policy change regarding the use of  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds to construct  the project’s recreational features. Initially, Corps district officials and  the sponsor expected to receive ARRA funding for the construction of  the recreational features. Subsequently, Corps headquarters decided  to not allow the use of ARRA funds for these features. However,  based on the expectation that they would receive ARRA funding, the  Corps district office had already started the competitive bidding  process for construction of the recreational features when the sponsor  learned of the decision made by Corps headquarters. As a result, the  Corps district office had to delay the bidding process, and the sponsor  had to find alternative funding sources for the recreational features.
Scope and design changes. Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors  from six of the eight projects told us they had experienced scope or  design changes on their projects. According to Corps officials and  sponsors of these projects, communication regarding project scope or  design changes was generally effective. For example, Corps officials  from one project told us they conferred with the sponsor on design  changes and regularly communicated with the sponsor through  meetings and telephone calls. The sponsor for this project told us that  Corps officials had quickly communicated any design changes. In  another example, Corps officials on the project stated that design  changes were continually communicated to the sponsor at weekly  meetings. When there were design disagreements between the Corps  and the sponsor, the officials said that Corps engineering staff met  with the sponsor to reach an acceptable solution.
Cost changes. Under Corps guidance, the project partnership  agreement between the Corps and the nonfederal sponsor is to  require the Corps to provide a quarterly cost report to the sponsor.  The report is to include such items as updated projections of project  costs, the amount of the sponsor’s required contribution for the next  fiscal year, and the total financial obligations of the Corps and the  sponsor for any additional work incurred. However, sponsors for two  projects told us the Corps was less timely in providing updated cost  information. Specifically, a representative of a sponsor of one project  told us that the sponsor had not received these reports on a regular  basis and, at times, the Corps provided the report several months  after the fiscal reporting period had closed. And another sponsor told  us, in many instances, the Corps gave the sponsor a week to provide  their share of the funding for cost increases, but the sponsor wanted  the Corps to notify them of cost changes as soon as they occurred.
Corps officials from two projects told us they also used informal  methods to communicate cost changes to sponsors. For example,  Corps officials from one project told us they immediately notified the  sponsor by telephone or in writing if there were new costs during the  design and construction of the project. Officials from another project  said if the sponsor had questions regarding cost changes, the sponsor  would request a meeting. Sponsors from two projects also described  informal means of receiving information from the Corps regarding cost  changes. Specifically, a sponsor from one project told us the Corps  immediately notified the sponsor about potential cost changes via  telephone or e-mail, and the changes were discussed at weekly  meetings. The sponsor of the other project requested to receive cost  change reports before they were officially approved by the Corps.
section_title: Communications Plans Called for by Guidance Were Not Always Developed, and Corps Officials and Nonfederal Sponsors Suggested Ways to Improve Communication
paragraphs: Corps guidance directs project delivery teams to develop a  communications plan for their projects, but three of the eight projects we  selected for further review did not have a communications plan. Further,  the Corps does not have an effective means for ensuring that project  delivery teams have, in fact, developed a communications plan. Corps  officials and nonfederal sponsors we spoke with suggested a variety of  ways to improve their communication.
subsections: section_title: Corps Guidance Calls for Developing Communications Plans, but Some Project Delivery Teams Did Not Always Do So
paragraphs: Corps guidance, issued in 2009, directs project delivery teams to develop  a project management plan that includes a communications plan for each  project phase over the life of a project. Communications plans should be  updated when new stakeholders join a project, or whenever deemed  necessary, according to a headquarters official. The communications plan  provides a framework for the Corps and nonfederal sponsors to establish  a communications strategy and determine the needs of the project  delivery team—specifically, who needs what information, when they will  need it, how it will be given to them, and by whom. According to Corps  guidance, the communications plan may include such items as methods  for (1) evaluating the effectiveness of the project’s communication  strategy and (2) accessing information between scheduled  communications. Communications plan templates are available on the  agency’s internal website for use by the project delivery teams, according  to Corps headquarters officials. Each project delivery team also has the  flexibility to develop a communications plan that meets the specific needs  of the individual project and its sponsors.
We found that three of the eight projects we selected for further review  had not developed a communications plan. A Corps official from one of  the projects told us a plan was not developed as the district office and  nonfederal sponsors handled their communications through an ad hoc  communications group operating during the project’s construction phase.  A Corps official from the second project told us the project management  plan was drafted in 1990, and the agency did not call for a  communications plan at the time. However, according to a headquarters  official, ongoing projects should have developed a communications plan  after the Corps’ guidance regarding communications plans was issued in  2009. The project manager for the third project was unsure why a plan  had not been developed since he had only recently been assigned to the  project. The sponsors of the three projects without a communications plan  agreed that a communications plan would be beneficial. Specifically, one  sponsor noted that communication with the Corps was “excellent,” but  added that communication responsibilities are substantial and should be  formally acknowledged, and another sponsor indicated a communications  plan would have been helpful when a new project manager was assigned.
The Corps’ regulation on managing its business processes recognizes  the importance of project management plans in facilitating and  maintaining effective communication with nonfederal sponsors throughout  a project’s duration. Additionally, a Corps regulation issued in fiscal year  2000 states that district officials are responsible for approving project  management plans, and guidance states that these should include a  communications plan. However, as stated previously, we found that  three of the eight projects we selected for further review had not  developed a communications plan. Because the communications plan  provides a framework for the Corps and nonfederal sponsors to establish  a communications strategy and determine the needs of the project  delivery team, without such a plan, the Corps may be missing  opportunities to assess their communication needs. For example, a  communications plan may help Corps or sponsor staff understand the  team’s communications needs when they join the project delivery team;  for projects where there is significant turnover, understanding the team’s  needs is especially important.
section_title: Corps Officials and Sponsors Offered Suggestions to Improve Communication
paragraphs: Corps officials and sponsors we spoke with generally acknowledged their  communication was adequate but offered suggestions on how  communication could be improved. These suggestions apply to all flood  control projects and fall into the following three categories:
Understand the sponsors’ needs. Most of the Corps officials we spoke  with recognized that sponsors’ needs vary. For example, Corps  officials told us some sponsors had worked with the Corps before and  had a better understanding of the Corps’ processes. Other sponsors  had not partnered with the Corps previously and were unfamiliar with  the federal appropriations process and budget cycle, among other  things. In these cases, Corps officials told us they had to spend more  time educating the sponsor about the agency and its processes. In  addition, Corps officials and sponsors told us the high turnover of  project managers during the life of a project presents a challenge in  terms of communication. For example, one project we reviewed has  had 12 different project managers since 2004. One sponsor from  another project told us that communications with the Corps became  less frequent after a new project manager started. Corps officials from  one project told us the terms of communication with sponsors are set  out in the project’s communications plan, and it is useful to have this  information in writing when project managers change. In addition,  another sponsor suggested face-to-face meetings between the Corps  and sponsors prior to the start of a project and whenever new officials  join the project.
Communicate more frequently. Some Corps officials and nonfederal  sponsors told us that more frequent communication would enhance  overall communication. For example, one sponsor stated that more  proactive communication by the Corps would have helped the  sponsor learn sooner that the Corps had overspent on the project’s  design. The sponsor became aware of the Corps’ overspending when  reviewing a financial report from the agency. Another sponsor stated  that, with more frequent communication, they would expect their input  on project decisions to increase and that more frequent  communication would help the Corps’ understanding of the project  area. Corps officials from another project said that more frequent  communication with sponsors would prevent “surprises.” Further, a  Corps official and sponsors we spoke with said projects benefit from  frequent, face-to-face communication at the start of a project and  throughout the project.
Provide more information. Nonfederal sponsors and Corps officials  suggested communication could improve if the Corps provided more  information about the project. For example, Corps officials and a  sponsor from one project said that, in addition to the quarterly cost  reports, the Corps sends letters to the sponsors explaining the  reasons for any cost increases. Corps officials from another project  said that sponsors liked to periodically receive by e-mail a one-page  summary that includes updates on the project’s status and costs. A  sponsor told us the Corps should respond when sponsors provide  input or ask for information. For example, the sponsor told us the  Corps sent a letter asking the sponsor to pay its share of a cost but  did not provide a description of the cost. However, the sponsor said it  cannot just pay what the Corps asks. Instead, it needs documentation  of how local money is spent.
Corps guidance on communications plans includes many of the  suggestions made by Corps officials and sponsors. For example, the  guidance directs Corps officials to talk with sponsors to understand their  information needs and expectations when developing the project’s  communications plan.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Corps recognizes the importance of having good communication with  nonfederal sponsors of civil works projects. Guidance calling for project  delivery teams to develop a communications plan as part of their project  management plan, and then updating it as needed, provides an  opportunity for the Corps and the sponsors to assess communication  needs throughout the project. However, some project delivery teams have  not developed a communications plan for their projects as called for by  guidance. Without such plans, the Corps may be missing opportunities to  assess and improve communication with its nonfederal sponsors,  especially on projects where there is significant turnover of project  managers.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve communication between the Corps and nonfederal sponsors  of flood control projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army  Corps of Engineers take steps to ensure that flood control project delivery  teams comply with agency guidance to develop communications plans for  flood control projects.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review  and comment. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix IV, the  department concurred with our recommendation. The department stated  that the Corps recognizes the importance of planning and executing  communications for flood control projects and will be taking steps to  address the recommendation. The Corps also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General  of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the appropriate congressional  committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found   on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines (1) the extent to which cost increases occurred in  flood control projects and the primary factors that contributed to the  differences between estimated and actual costs; (2) the extent to which  the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to its  nonfederal sponsors on changes to Corps policies, project scope and  design, and estimated versus actual costs; and (3) Corps guidance on  communication with nonfederal sponsors and ways, if any, suggested by  Corps officials and sponsors to improve such communication. For  purposes of this report, a flood control project refers to a project with  structural features such as levees, floodwalls, channels, dams, and  reservoirs that is constructed for the purpose of managing the risk of  flooding along rivers and coastal areas. Our work focused on flood control  projects budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to 2012  because these projects had gone through the Corps’ project development  processes and had project cost estimates developed by the Corps at key  milestones.
To determine the extent to which cost increases occurred and the primary  factors that contributed to differences between estimated and actual  costs, we reviewed relevant provisions of the laws, regulations, policies,  and procedures governing the Corps’ process for developing flood control  projects and generating cost estimates. We also interviewed officials at  Corps headquarters and its cost engineering center of expertise located  in Walla Walla, Washington. The Corps identified 87 new or ongoing flood  control projects that were budgeted for construction in any fiscal year  from 2004 to 2012. We surveyed Corps officials associated with the  projects to obtain project cost estimates at key milestones, the current  total project cost or total expenditures at project closeout, if applicable,  and the primary factors that contributed to cost increases, among other  things. Because this was not a sample survey, it has no sampling errors.  However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce  errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,  difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of information  available to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing  them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took  steps in developing the questionnaire and collecting and analyzing the  data to minimize such nonsampling errors. For example, social science  survey specialists designed the questionnaire in collaboration with GAO  staff who had subject matter expertise. Then, we pretested the draft  questionnaire with a number of Corps officials to ensure that the  questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to understand. We  received responses from Corps officials for all 87 projects, for a 100  percent response rate. For the 87 projects, we compared the project’s  original authorized cost and its current total project cost or total  expenditures at project closeout, if applicable. Twenty projects did not  have an authorized cost or total expenditures at project closeout, or they  were undergoing reevaluation and did not have a current total project  cost, so we could not compare costs for those projects. We were unable  to quantify the difference between the original authorized cost and the  current total project cost or total expenditures at project closeout for each  of the 67 projects we could compare because we determined that the  survey data were not reliable for that purpose. Specifically, Corps  guidance provided differing definitions of total project cost, and it was  unclear from the survey data whether all respondents had used the same  definition.
From the 87 projects, we selected a non-probability sample of 8 projects  that were budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2009 to 2012  for further review, including 1 project randomly selected from each of 7  divisions and 1 project judgmentally selected from the New Orleans  District that met our selection criteria of projects budgeted for construction  in any fiscal year from 2009 to 2012. We narrowed our selection to  projects that were budgeted for construction during this period to enhance  our ability to speak with people who had worked on the projects and were  knowledgeable about the reasons for cost increases. Table 1 lists the 8  projects selected for further review.
For each project, we interviewed Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors,  reviewed project documents, and prepared a descriptive summary of the  project and the reasons for any cost increases.
To determine the extent to which the Corps communicated with and  provided updated information to nonfederal sponsors, we interviewed  Corps district officials and representatives of the sponsors of the eight  projects selected for further review to obtain information on the Corps’  communication with, and provision of updated information to, the  sponsors regarding changes to Corps policies, project scope and design,  and estimated and actual costs, and analyzed the supporting documents  they provided.
To examine Corps guidance on communication with nonfederal sponsors  and ways, if any, suggested by Corps officials and sponsors to improve  such communication, we reviewed Corps civil works guidance on  communicating with its sponsors and interviewed Corps headquarters  and district officials and representatives of the sponsors of the eight  projects selected for further review. We also obtained copies of  communications plans, if available, for the eight projects. Because this is  a non-probability sample, the experiences and views of the Corps officials  and sponsors of the eight projects are not representative of, and cannot  be generalized to, all Corps flood control projects.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to December 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Flood Control Projects Budgeted for Construction, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2012
paragraphs: Table 2 lists the 87 flood control projects in the eight divisions of the U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers that the agency identified as budgeted for  construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to 2012.
section_title: Appendix III: Descriptions of Eight Flood Control Projects Selected for Further Review
paragraphs: This appendix presents information provided by the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers on the eight flood control projects we selected for further  review. Dollars have not been adjusted for inflation.
subsections: section_title: Brays Bayou, Houston, Texas
paragraphs: The Brays Bayou project is located in the metropolitan area of Houston, in  Harris County, Texas. The project consists of channel improvements and  storm water detention basins on upper Brays Bayou and a diversion  channel in the lower portion of Brays Bayou. The nonfederal sponsor is  the Harris County Flood Control District.
Brays Bayou is part of the Buffalo Bayou Watershed. The feasibility report  for Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries was completed in 1988, and the Chief  of Engineers’ report was signed in 1990. The Chief’s Report gave a total  cost for the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries project of $727,364,000 and  also broke out the costs for each of the six tributary plans within the  project. The estimated total project cost for Brays Bayou was  $299,133,000. The Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1990  authorized the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries project for construction at a  total cost of $727,364,000, but it did not specify an amount for Brays  Bayou.
Funds to initiate preconstruction engineering and design were  appropriated in fiscal year 1990. In 1995, the project was divided into two  separable elements—a detention (upstream) element and a diversion  (downstream) element. Subsequently, section 211(f) of WRDA 1996  authorized Brays Bayou as a demonstration project, which gave the  nonfederal sponsor the lead in designing and constructing the project and  let it be reimbursed for the federal share of the completed discrete  segments approved by the Corps. In 1996, the nonfederal sponsor  obtained approval from the Corps to do a general reevaluation of the  diversion element in the lower portion of Brays Bayou because of  regulatory restrictions on diversions to other watersheds. In the  meantime, the sponsor proceeded with the detention element in the  upstream portion. Funds to initiate construction were appropriated in  fiscal year 1998. The project cooperation agreement for the design and  construction of the detention element was signed in March 2000, and  construction began in June 2000. The sponsor’s general reevaluation  report of an alternative to the diversion separable element was approved  in April 2009. The project cooperation agreement was amended in March  2010 to combine the detention element and an alternative to the diversion  element into one project. The total estimated project cost presented to  Congress for fiscal year 2012 was $571,660,000.
section_title: Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana
paragraphs: The Larose to Golden Meadow project is located in Lafourche Parish,  Louisiana, about 28 miles southwest of New Orleans and about 25 miles  inland from the Gulf of Mexico along Bayou Lafourche. The project  consists of a ring levee approximately 48 miles in length along both banks  of Bayou Lafourche, enlargement of about 3 miles of an existing levee,  and construction of two floodgates that will be used for navigation and  hurricane protection purposes. The nonfederal sponsor is the South  Lafourche Levee District.
Larose to Golden Meadow was originally called the Grand Isle and  Vicinity project. The Chief’s Report for Grand Isle and Vicinity estimated  the total cost of Larose to Golden Meadow at $7,857,000.The Flood  Control Act of 1965 authorized the Grand Isle and Vicinity project for  construction at a federal cost of $5.5 million, but it did not specify the  name Larose to Golden Meadow. Funds to initiate preconstruction  engineering and design were appropriated in fiscal year 1967. The first  general design memorandum was issued in 1972, and funds to initiate  construction were appropriated in fiscal year 1972. A local cooperation  agreement was provided by the South Lafourche Levee District and  accepted on behalf of the United States in 1973, and construction started  in 1976. The project did not have any modifications until WRDA 1999  authorized the conversion of the Leon Theriot floodgate into a lock,  conditional on a determination that the conversion was technically  feasible, environmentally acceptable, and economically justified; such a  determination was documented in an evaluation report approved in 2005.
Section 7015 of WRDA 2007 required the Corps to do a 120-day study to  see what modification would be required to provide the level of protection  necessary to achieve the certification required for a 100-year level of  flood protection in accordance with the National Flood Insurance  Program. The study, which was completed in May 2009, estimated that  the project was as much as 10 feet below the new 100-year level of risk  reduction, and it would cost $681 million to bring the project to the  authorized elevations described in the 1972 general design  memorandum. A post-authorization study, which was started in May  2009, is to determine the cost to complete the project, including bringing  the project into compliance with the new design criteria issued following  Hurricane Katrina and other updated requirements. Since the Larose to  Golden Meadow project was authorized before WRDA 1986, the Section  902 cost limit of WRDA 1986 does not apply. However, the project  delivery team, under its own initiative, was conducting a 902 review as  well. The total estimated project cost presented to Congress for fiscal  year 2012 was $474 million.
section_title: Little Calumet River, Indiana
paragraphs: The Little Calumet River project is located in a primarily urban area in  northwest Indiana, stretching westward to the Indiana-Illinois state line.  The project includes the construction of levees, floodwalls, and closure  and appurtenant structures. The nonfederal sponsor is the Little Calumet  River Basin Development Commission.
A design study of the area was authorized by WRDA 1976. A general  design memorandum for phase 1 was prepared in 1982 that included a  number of preliminary designs to address flooding in the area. A feature  design memorandum detailing the design recommended by the district  engineer was completed in 1983. The July 1984 Chief’s Report sent to  Congress recommended the district engineer’s design. However, WRDA  1986 authorized a design that was referenced in the 1982 Phase I  General Design Memorandum, but not recommended in the Chief’s  Report, at a total project cost of $87.1 million. There was no feasibility  study because the requirement to conduct a feasibility study started in the  1990s. A general design memorandum was signed in April 1989, the local  cooperation agreement was signed in August 1990, funds to initiate  construction were appropriated in fiscal year 1990, and construction  started in September 1990.
In May 1999, Corps headquarters approved a post-authorization change  report to extend the eastern end of the project area, and the project  cooperation agreement was amended to include the scope change. In  2000, the district prepared a post-authorization change report to modify  the project and increase the authorized project cost to $198 million, and  the project cooperation agreement was amended again. Congress  reauthorized the project at $198 million in the Energy and Water  Development Appropriations Act of 2006. Another post-authorization  change report to increase the authorized cost was prepared in March  2012. The report had been approved by the Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Civil Works and was awaiting congressional action in September  2013. In January 2013, the project’s cost to date was $248 million.
section_title: Monarch-Chesterfield, Missouri
paragraphs: The Monarch-Chesterfield project is located along the right bank of the  Missouri River in the vicinity of Chesterfield, Missouri. The project  consists of raising the existing levees on the Missouri River and  Bonhomme Creek along with relief wells, a sheet pile cutoff, and berms to  control underseepage. Other features include roadways, railroad and  roadway closure structures, retaining walls, relocations, pumping stations  with gravity structures, and environmental mitigation features. The  nonfederal sponsor is the Monarch-Chesterfield Levee District.
The feasibility report, which was approved in December 2000, estimated  the total project cost to be $58,090,000. The project was authorized for  construction in WRDA 2000 at a total cost of $58,090,000, subject to the  completion of a favorable Chief’s Report by December 31, 2000. The  Chief’s Report was signed on December 29, 2000. Funds to initiate  preconstruction engineering and design were appropriated in fiscal year  2001, and funds to initiate construction were appropriated in fiscal year  2004. The project cooperation agreement was signed in February 2008,  and construction began the same year. The total estimated project cost  presented to Congress for fiscal year 2012 was $68,688,000.
section_title: Muddy River, Massachusetts
paragraphs: The Muddy River is a 3.5 mile urban waterway located in eastern  Massachusetts in the communities of Boston, Brookline and Newton. The  flood control portion of the project primarily involves dredging sediment to  increase conveyance, removal and replacement of undersized culverts,  and restoration of streambanks. It also has an environmental component.  Phase I involves installing larger box culverts, day-lighting two sections of  the river, and modifying a bridge and culvert headwall for flood risk  management. Phase II involves dredging of the river for both flood risk  management and ecosystem restoration. The nonfederal sponsors are  the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the city of Boston, and the town of  Brookline.
After severe flooding in 1996, the city of Boston, the town of Brookline,  the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Federal Emergency  Management Agency, and nonprofit community groups developed a  comprehensive plan to identify and address issues affecting the river,  which was issued in January 1999. Local interests went to their  congressional delegation and convinced them of the need for a project.  WRDA 1999 directed the Corps to evaluate the study prepared by local  interests to determine whether the plans were in the federal interest,  among other things, and report back to Congress no later than June 30,  2000. The Corp’s draft evaluation report, dated June 2000, determined  that the plan met some of the requirements of a federal project. However,  continued Corps involvement would require preparation of a decision  document that evaluated alternatives and met other requirements. Based  on the Corps’ draft evaluation report, the project was authorized for  construction in WRDA 2000. Once the project was authorized, the Corps  had to prepare the required decision documents. The final report with an  estimated total project cost of $62,830,000 was submitted to Corps  headquarters for approval in September 2003. Corps headquarters  prepared a Chief’s Report, which it forwarded to the Assistant Secretary  of the Army for Civil Works in December 2003. In July 2004, the Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Civil Works expressed support for the flood  control component of the project but determined that the ecosystem  restoration elements had a unit cost that was too high to support as a  federally implementable plan and therefore were not justified. However,  the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works later agreed that the  Corps would build the environmental restoration portion of the project if  Congress provided funding for that purpose.
Funds to initiate preconstruction engineering and design were  appropriated in fiscal year 2001. Funds to initiate construction were first  appropriated in fiscal year 2003, and the project partnership agreement  was signed in 2011. The first construction contract was awarded on  August 10, 2012. However, there was a bid protest, so construction did  not begin until 2013. The total estimated project cost presented to  Congress for fiscal year 2012 was $79,800,000.
section_title: Napa River, California
paragraphs: The Napa River project is located in the city and county of Napa,  California. The Napa River drainage basin is just north of San Pablo Bay  and approximately 40 miles northeast of San Francisco, California. The  project consists of channel modifications to provide the project area with  100-year level of flood protection from Napa River and Napa Creek.  Channel modifications include overbank excavation, vertical walls,  floodwalls, levees, bridges, pumping stations, and flowage easements.  The project also includes recreation trails and major ecosystem  restoration. The nonfederal sponsor is the Napa County Flood Control  and Water Conservation District.
The Napa River Flood Control Project was authorized by the Flood  Control Act of 1965 substantially in accordance with the Chief’s Report at  an estimated cost of $14,950,000. The project received an additional  authorization in WRDA 1976 to modify the scope of the project to include  Napa Creek. The project has no 902 limit because it was authorized  before WRDA 1986.
Funds to resume preconstruction engineering and design were  appropriated in fiscal year 1989. A general reevaluation report was  prepared in 1995. The Final Supplemental General Design Memorandum,  dated October 1998, was approved May 1999. Funds to initiate  construction were appropriated in fiscal year 2000, the project  cooperation agreement was signed in February 2000, and construction  began in December 2000. A Section 215 agreement for construction of a  portion of the project by the nonfederal sponsor was signed in January  2002, and the sponsor completed construction in fiscal year 2002. A  limited reevaluation report, which was approved in August 2005,  determined that, based on the benefit-cost ratio, the project still had a  federal interest. The project cooperation agreement was amended in  2007, which provided the acceleration of the sponsor’s required cash  contribution to the government. The total estimated project cost presented  to Congress for fiscal year 2010—the last year the project was budgeted  for construction—was $402,770,000.
section_title: Roanoke River Upper Basin, Virginia
paragraphs: The Roanoke River Upper Basin project is located on the Roanoke River  in the city of Roanoke, Virginia. The project includes about 6.2 miles of  channel widening, flood proofing at two locations, training walls to prevent  floodwater intrusion into low areas along the river, and a flood warning  system. Recreation facilities consist of a 9.5-mile recreation trail along the  project reach, trail access, and parking areas. The nonfederal sponsor is  the city of Roanoke.
The Chief’s Report was finalized in 1985, and the project was authorized  by WRDA 1986 at a total project cost of $21 million. Funds to initiate  preconstruction engineering and design were appropriated in fiscal year  1986. A general design memorandum, dated May 1989 and approved in  January 1990, was the basis for design and construction of the project.  The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1990,  reauthorized the project for $29 million. The project started receiving  construction funds in 1990, and a local cooperation agreement was  signed in June 1990. A supplement to the local cooperation agreement  was signed in January 1993 to reimburse the sponsor for flood proofing  the hospital. The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act,  2004, increased the authorized total cost to $61.7 million. In 2005, the  first construction contract was awarded for work on the flood control  features. The project was physically completed in October 2011. The  Roanoke Logperch, which is located in the project area, was listed as an  endangered species in 1989 and will be monitored until at least 2015.  Once the monitoring is completed, the project will be fiscally closed out.
section_title: Turkey Creek Basin, Kansas and Missouri
paragraphs: Turkey Creek Basin drains Johnson and Wyandotte Counties in Kansas,  as well as a portion of Kansas City, Missouri. Turkey Creek parallels  Interstate Highway 35 for much of its length and flows through a tunnel  into the Kansas River approximately 3 miles upstream of the Missouri  River. The project consists of approximately 10,000 feet of urban channel  modification, a levee section, the raising of two railroad bridges, 12.7  acres of riparian planting, and four large drainage interceptor pipelines.  The nonfederal sponsors are the city of Kansas City, Missouri, and the  Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas.
Major flooding occurred in the Turkey Creek Basin in 1977 and 1993. The  feasibility study was completed in December 1998, and the project  received its first funding for preconstruction engineering and design in  1998. The Chief’s Report was finalized in 1999, and the project was  authorized by WRDA 1999 at a total project cost of $42,875,000. Major  flooding occurred again in 1998, so the Corps conducted a general  reevaluation from 1999 to 2003 to determine whether any modifications  needed to be made based on information from the 1998 flood. Based on  the findings of the general reevaluation, the project expanded  significantly, and costs increased to $73 million. The Consolidated  Appropriations Resolution, 2003, modified the project to authorize  construction substantially in accordance with recommendations in a final  Chief’s Report if a favorable report was completed by December 31,  2003, at a total project cost of $73,380,000. The act also gave the Corps  the authority to give the sponsor credit for its share of the costs of  construction work completed before the project cooperation agreement  was signed if the work was integral to the project. A final Chief’s Report  was completed in December 2003. Preconstruction engineering and  design was completed in September 2004. Funds to initiate construction  were first appropriated in fiscal year 2004, and a project cooperation  agreement was signed in July 2006 following completion of tunnel work  by the sponsor. In 2009, the Corps finished the tunnel construction  started by the sponsor. The total estimated project cost presented to  Congress for fiscal year 2012 was $108 million.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Anne-Marie Fennell, (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Vondalee R. Hunt (Assistant  Director), Elizabeth Beardsley, Heather Dowey, Cindy Gilbert, Susan  Malone, and Kyle Stetler made key contributions to this report. Important  contributions were also made by Cheryl Arvidson, Dan Royer, and Kiki  Theodoropoulos.