Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve Visibility Of Combatant Commands' Resources
Published: 2013-05-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: To perform its missions around the world, DOD operates geographic combatant commands each with thousands of personnel. In response to direction from the congressional committees to review the resources of the combatant commands, GAO (1) identified the trends in the resources devoted to DOD's geographic combatant commands and their service component commands, and (2) assessed the extent that DOD has processes in place to manage and oversee the resources of the combatant commands. For this review, GAO obtained and analyzed data on resources, to include authorized positions and mission and headquarters-support costs, for five regional combatant commands' and their service component commands, excluding U.S. Central Command. GAO also interviewed officials regarding commands' manpower and personnel policies and procedures for reporting resources.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's analysis of resources devoted to the Department of Defense's (DOD) geographic combatant commands shows that authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs have grown considerably over the last decade due to the addition of two new commands and increases in authorized positions at theater special operations commands. Data provided by the commands shows that authorized military and civilian positions increased by about 50 percent from fiscal years 2001 through 2012, to about 10,100 authorized positions. In addition, mission and headquarters support-costs at the combatant commands more than doubled from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, to about $1.1 billion. Both authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs at the service component commands supporting the combatant commands also increased. Data on the number of personnel performing contract services across the combatant commands and service component commands varied or was unavailable, and thus trends could not be identified.
DOD has taken some steps to manage combatant commands' resources, but its processes to review size and oversee the commands have four primary weaknesses that challenge the department's ability to make informed decisions.
DOD considers the combatant commands' requests for additional positions, but it does not periodically evaluate the commands' authorized positions to ensure they are still needed to meet the commands' assigned missions.
DOD tracks some assigned personnel; however, all personnel supporting the commands are not included in DOD's personnel management system and reviews of assigned personnel vary by command.
The service component commands support both service and combatant command missions. However, the Joint Staff and combatant commands lack visibility and oversight over the authorized manpower and personnel at the service component commands to determine whether functions at the combatant commands can be fulfilled by service component command personnel.
Each military department submits annual budget documents for operation and maintenance to inform Congress of total authorized positions, full-time equivalents, and mission and headquarters-support funding for all combatant commands that they support. However, these documents do not provide transparency into the resources directed to each combatant command.
GAO's work on strategic human capital management found that high-performing organizations periodically reevaluate their human capital practices and use complete and reliable data to help achieve their missions and ensure resources are properly matched to the needs of today's environment. Until DOD effectively manages the resources of the combatant commands, it may be difficult to ensure that the commands are properly sized to meet their assigned missions, or to identify opportunities to carry out those missions efficiently.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends DOD: require a periodic evaluation of the combatant commands' size and structure; use existing systems to manage and track all assigned personnel; develop a process to gather information on authorized manpower and assigned personnel at the service component commands; and require information in the budget on authorized positions, full-time equivalents, and funding for each combatant command. DOD nonconcurred with GAO's first recommendation, but GAO believes it is still needed to add rigor to the manpower requirements process. DOD concurred with GAO's three other recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: To perform its variety of missions around the world, the Department of  Defense (DOD) operates geographic combatant commands, and each  has thousands of headquarters personnel who assist in coordinating the  department’s military operations combating transnational terrorism,  building foreign partner nations’ military capabilities, and conducting  international disaster-relief efforts and noncombatant evacuations, among  other missions. The geographic combatant commands provide unity of  command over all the United States forces in a specific region. Generally,  the commander of each combatant command has the authority to  organize the structure of each command as necessary to carry out  assigned missions and maintain staff to assist in exercising authority,  direction and control over subordinate commands and other assigned  forces. These subordinate commands include dedicated service  component commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task  forces, each with its own staff, which support the combatant commands in  conducting their operational missions.
In January 2012, the Administration released defense strategic guidance  to direct defense priorities and spending over the coming decade. It is  intended to help guide decisions in determining the size and shape of the  department for the future, with a global presence emphasizing the Asia- Pacific and Middle East regions of the world. One of the principles  outlined in the guidance is the need to examine the existing campaign  and contingency plans in the context of the new strategy so that more  limited resources may be better aligned with current mission  requirements. Further, it states that DOD must continue to reduce the  cost of doing business, which includes reducing the rate of growth in  personnel costs and finding further efficiencies in overhead and  headquarters, in its business practices, and in other support activities. At  a time of growing economic and fiscal constraints, it is critical that DOD  ensure the geographic combatant commands, their subordinate unified  commands and other activities, and respective service component  commands have the appropriate levels of resources to meet current  mission requirements in the most efficient and effective manner possible.
In response to direction from the congressional committees to review the  resources of the combatant commands, this report (1) identifies the  trends in resources devoted to DOD’s geographic combatant commands  and their service component commands, and (2) assesses the extent that  DOD has processes in place to manage and oversee the resources of the  combatant commands.
To conduct this work we identified sources of information within DOD that  would provide data on the resources at the geographic combatant  commands, to include their subordinate unified commands and other  activities, and corresponding service component commands. We focused  our review on five geographic combatant commands—U.S. Africa  Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S.  Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command. Our review excluded  U.S. Central Command and its corresponding service component  commands due to their responsibilities to support military operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan during the past several years. To identify trends in  resources devoted to DOD’s geographic combatant commands, to  include their subordinate unified commands and other activities, and their  service component commands, we obtained and analyzed available  authorized positions and actual assigned personnel (military, civilian, and  contractors) data and operation and maintenance obligations data for  each of the five geographic combatant commands, and their  corresponding service component commands from fiscal years 2001  through 2012. We focused our review on operation and maintenance  obligations—as these obligations reflect the primary mission and  headquarters-support costs of the combatant commands, to include their  subordinate unified commands and other activities, and their  corresponding service component commands—to include the costs for  civilian personnel and service-support contracts. Our review excluded  obligations of operation and maintenance funding for DOD’s overseas  contingency operations not part of DOD’s base budget. Since historical  data was unavailable in some cases, we limited our analysis of trends to  authorized military and civilian positions at the combatant commands  from fiscal years 2001 through 2012 and authorized military and civilian  positions at the service component commands from fiscal years 2008  through 2012. Due to the availability of data, we similarly limited our  analysis of trends in operation and maintenance obligations at the  combatant commands and service component commands to fiscal years  2007 through 2012. We assessed the reliability of the data given these  and other limitations, and we determined it was sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. To determine the extent to which DOD has processes in place  to manage and oversee the resources of the combatant commands, we  obtained and analyzed documentation on DOD’s policies, procedures,  and systems used for determining and validating manpower  requirements and managing personnel at the combatant commands, to  include their subordinate unified commands and other activities, and  corresponding service component commands. We also interviewed  officials at DOD, the Joint Staff, the geographic combatant commands  and some of their respective subordinate unified commands, and the  service component commands to obtain documentation on any steps  DOD had taken to reexamine the size and structure of its combatant  commands and the processes that the combatant commands and their  components use to determine, track and report their manpower and  assigned personnel (military, civilians, and contractors) and mission and  headquarters-support costs.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to May 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based our audit objectives. We believe that the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The department’s Unified Command Plan sets forth basic guidance to all  combatant commanders and establishes the missions, responsibilities,  and areas of geographic responsibility among all the combatant  commands. There are currently nine combatant commands—six  geographic and three functional. The six geographic combatant  commands have responsibilities for accomplishing military operations in  regional areas of the world. The three functional combatant commands  operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique  capabilities to the geographic combatant commands and the military  services. In addition, each geographic combatant command is supported  by multiple service component commands that help provide and  coordinate service-specific forces, such as units, detachments,  organizations and installations, to help fulfill the commands’ current and  future operational requirements. Figure 1 is a map of the areas of  responsibility and headquarters locations of the geographic combatant  commands, to include some of their subordinate unified commands and  their respective service component commands.
According to DOD Directive 5100.03, Support of the Headquarters of  Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands, the military  departments—as combatant command support agents—are responsible  for programming, budgeting, and funding the administrative and logistical  support of the headquarters of the combatant commands and subordinate  unified commands. On an annual basis the three military departments  assess needs and request funding as part of their respective operation  and maintenance budget justification to meet this requirement to support  the combatant commands and subordinate unified commands. The  directive assigns each military department responsibility for specific  combatant commands and subordinate unified commands. Table 1  provides a listing of the combatant commands, their subordinate unified  commands, and the military departments that support them.
Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense,  the commanders of these combatant commands are given authority to  organize the structure of their commands as they deem necessary to  carry out assigned missions and maintain staff to assist them in  exercising authority, direction and control over subordinate unified  commands and other assigned forces. The commands’ structure may  include a principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special  staff group for technical, administrative, or tactical advice and other  groups of staff that are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the  availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics,  preparing long-range or future plans, and integrating communications  systems. The commands may also have liaisons or representatives from  other DOD agencies and U.S. government organizations integrated into  their staffs to enhance the command’s effectiveness in accomplishing  their missions. While the commands generally conform to these  organizational principles, there may be variations in a command’s  structure based on its unique mission areas and responsibilities.
The staff of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or a  joint task force is generally composed of military and civilian personnel  drawn from the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps, personnel from  other DOD components, interagency personnel, and other personnel  associated with contracted services. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff Instruction 1001.01A, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program,  outlines the process for determining and documenting requirements for  manpower at joint organizations, including the combatant commands.  The instruction states that commands should be structured to the  minimum essential size required to meet approved missions and average  workload expected for at least the next 36 months. The commands are to  consider a number of factors when determining manpower requirements,  including the total number of positions needed and the mix of military,  civilian, and contractor support needed. After the commands’ manpower  requirements have been determined and validated, the requirements are  documented on each command’s manning document, called the Joint  Table of Distribution, which contains permanent authorized positions for  military, civilians and other personnel responsible for managing the day- to-day operations of the command. Other processes exist to identify  additional manpower that commands’ may require to shift to a wartime,  contingency or mobilization footing, and that may be required to fill  temporary organizations that are established to meet short-term mission  requirements.
section_title: Geographic Combatant Commands’ Resources Have Grown Considerably over the Last Decade
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2001, the number of authorized military and civilian  positions and mission and headquarters-support costs devoted to the five  geographic combatant commands that we reviewed substantially  increased. In our analysis of data provided by the commands, we found  considerable increases in the number of authorized military and civilian  positions—about 50 percent from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year  2012—and in the costs for mission and headquarters-support—more than  doubling from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2012—at the five  combatant commands that we reviewed. Data on the service component  commands also indicated that authorized military and civilian positions  increased by more than 30 percent from fiscal years 2008 through 2012  and mission and headquarters-support costs increased by more than 40  percent from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. In addition to data on  authorized military and civilian positions, we found that the data on the  number of personnel performing contract services across the combatant  commands and service component commands varied or was unavailable,  and thus trends could not be identified.
subsections: section_title: Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions Has Grown at Combatant and Service Component Commands
paragraphs: The authorized number of military and civilian positions for the five  geographic combatant commands that we reviewed rose from about  6,800 in fiscal year 2001 to more than 10,100 in fiscal year 2012,  primarily due to the addition of new organizations and missions. Our  analysis of data showed that the establishment of U.S. Northern  Command in fiscal year 2003 and U.S. Africa Command in fiscal year  2008 drove the increase in the total number of authorized military and  civilian positions since fiscal year 2001. U.S. Northern Command was  established in fiscal year 2003 to provide command and control over  DOD’s homeland defense mission and to coordinate defense support of  civil authorities. U.S. Africa Command was established in fiscal year 2008  to focus U.S. security efforts within the African continent and strengthen  security cooperation with African countries, which had been primarily the  responsibility of U.S. European Command. At the remaining combatant  commands, our analysis showed growth in the number of authorized  positions in each command’s theater special operations command, which  further drove overall position increases. For example, from fiscal years  2001 through 2012 the number of authorized positions at U.S. Pacific,  European, and Southern Commands’ theater special operations  commands increased by almost 400 positions, largely to fulfill increased  mission requirements. Figure 2 shows the increases or changes in total  authorized military and civilian positions at the five geographic combatant  commands that we reviewed.
The geographic combatant commands have also become much more  reliant on civilian personnel. We found that the number of authorized  civilian positions at the combatant commands almost doubled from about  2,370 in fiscal year 2004 to about 4,450 in fiscal year 2012. In contrast,  the number of authorized military positions decreased about 9 percent  from approximately 6,250 to 5,670 in the same period. This changed the  composition of the commands markedly. In fiscal year 2004, military  positions made up about three-quarters of total authorized positions  supporting the combatant commands that we reviewed; however, due to  the substantial increase in the number of authorized civilian positions the  proportion of military positions at the combatant commands is now just  over half. According to DOD officials, the increase in authorized civilian  positions is due in part to DOD-directed efforts to convert positions filled  by military personnel or contractors to civilians. As part of the Secretary of  Defense’s 2010 efficiency initiative, baselines were established for the  number of authorized civilian positions at the combatant commands for  fiscal years 2011 through 2013. In June 2011, the Secretary of Defense  directed a series of initiatives designed to more effectively manage  combatant command manpower and funding, which further set baselines  for civilian manpower at the combatant commands for fiscal years 2013  through 2017. Any growth above these baselines in fiscal years 2013  through 2017 has to be revalidated by the Joint Staff and military  services, and must be based on workload and funding considerations.  This baseline in civilian positions is reflected in our analysis of the number  of authorized positions at the five geographic combatant commands, with  growth in civilian positions slowing significantly from fiscal years 2011  through 2012. Figure 3 shows changes in the combatant commands’  number of authorized military and civilian positions from fiscal years 2004  through 2012.
The availability of data on the number of contractor personnel or full-time  equivalents varied across the combatant commands, and thus trends  could not be identified. DOD officials stated the department generally  tracks and reports expenditures for contract services, and that the  combatant commands were not required to maintain historical data on the  number of contractor personnel. We found that the combatant commands  had taken initial steps to collect data on contractor full-time equivalents  and reliance on personnel performing contractor services varies across  the combatant commands. For example, U.S. Northern Command  reported having 460 contractor full-time equivalents at its command in  fiscal year 2012, whereas U.S. European Command reported having 169  contractor full-time equivalents supporting the command in fiscal year  2012. Our work over the past decade on DOD’s contracting activities has  noted the need for DOD to obtain better data on its contracted services  and personnel to enable it to make more informed management  decisions, ensure department-wide goals and objectives are achieved,  and have the resources to achieve desired outcomes. In response to  GAO’s past work, DOD has outlined its approach to document contractor  full-time equivalents and collect manpower data from contactors.  However, DOD does not expect to fully collect contractors’ manpower  data until fiscal year 2016. The Secretary of Defense, as part of his  2010 efficiency initiative, directed the department to reduce funding for  service-support contracts by 10 percent per year across the department  for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. In June 2011, the Secretary of  Defense established limits on service support contract expenditures at the  combatant commands in fiscal years 2011 through 2013.
Our analysis of data provided by the military services showed that total  authorized military and civilian positions at the service component  commands supporting the geographic combatant commands we reviewed  increased by about one-third from about 5,970 in fiscal year 2008 to  about 7,800 in fiscal year 2012. The increases in authorized military and  civilian positions at the service component commands supporting U.S.  European Command account for more than one-third of the total increase  in authorized positions across all the service component commands.  Among the services, the Army’s service component commands saw the  greatest increase in authorized positions, accounting for about 85 percent  of the total increase in authorized positions. The service component  commands fulfill dual roles: organizing, training and equipping assigned  service-specific forces while also assisting the combatant commands in  their employment during military operations. According to DOD officials,  service component commands with assigned forces such as Pacific Air  Forces and Army Europe, are likely to have larger staffs than service  component commands that do not have assigned forces, such as Marine  Forces Africa. Figure 4 shows the increase in authorized positions at the  service component commands that we reviewed. Similar to the data on  the number of personnel performing contract services at the combatant  commands, we found that the data on the number of personnel  performing contact services at the service component commands varied  or was unavailable, and thus trends could not be identified. We found that  some service component commands do not maintain data on the number  of personnel performing contract services and others used varying  methodologies to track these personnel, counting the number of  contractors on hand or the number of identification badges issued.
When adjusted for inflation, total mission and headquarters-support costs  from fiscal years 2007 through 2012—including costs for civilian pay,  contract services, travel, and equipment—more than doubled at the five  geographic combatant commands we reviewed. The cost growth, from  about $500 million in fiscal year 2007 to about $1.1 billion in fiscal year  2012, primarily was due to increases in contract services and civilian  pay. For example, U.S. Southern Command’s mission and  headquarters-support costs more than quadrupled from about $45 million  in fiscal year 2007 to about $202 million in fiscal year 2012; more than  half of the increase was attributable to contract services, and 20 percent  of the increase was attributable to civilian pay. In addition, U.S. Pacific  Command’s mission and headquarters-support costs increased from  about $175 million in fiscal year 2007 to about $246 million in fiscal year  2012; about 65 percent of these cost increases was attributable to civilian  pay. Figure 5 shows the overall increase or changes in the mission and  headquarters-support costs at the five geographic commands that we  reviewed from fiscal years 2007 through 2012.
When adjusted for inflation, total mission and headquarters-support costs  increased by more than 40 percent at the service component commands  we reviewed from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. The costs grew from  about $430 million dollars in fiscal year 2007 to about $605 million in  fiscal year 2012. The increase primarily was due to the establishment of  U.S. Africa Command’s supporting service component commands, which  first reported costs in fiscal year 2009. U.S. Africa Command’s mission  and headquarters-support costs were $71 million in fiscal year 2012. In  addition, the service component commands at U.S. European and Pacific  Commands experienced cost increases from fiscal years 2007 through  2012 of about $53 million and $54 million respectively, which accounted  for the majority of the remaining increase in mission and headquarters- support costs. Figure 6 shows the increase in the mission and  headquarters-support costs at the service component commands that we  reviewed from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. The Army’s service  component commands accounted for more than half of the total increase  in mission and headquarters-support costs across all service component  commands over the period. Across the service component commands the  Air Force components account for the majority of the mission and  headquarters support–costs. Air Force officials explained that some of  their service component commands have assigned forces and that the  higher costs at these commands reflect support for the military service’s  organize, train, and equip mission.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Manage Combatant Commands’ Resources, but Its Processes to Review Size and to Oversee Commands Have Weaknesses
paragraphs: While DOD has taken some steps to review the combatant commands’  size and structure and to identify the commands’ resources, DOD’s  processes have four primary weaknesses that challenge its ability to  make informed decisions: (1) the absence of a comprehensive, periodic  review of the size and structure of the combatant commands, (2)  inconsistent use of personnel management systems to identify and track  assigned personnel across the combatant commands, (3) lack of visibility  by the combatant commands and Joint Staff over authorized manpower  and personnel at the service component commands, and (4) lack of  transparent information identifying each combatant command’s personnel  or mission and headquarters-support funding in the military departments’  budget documents for operation and maintenance. Our prior work on  strategic human capital management found that high-performing  organizations periodically reevaluate their human capital practices and  use complete and reliable data to help achieve their missions and ensure  resources are properly matched to the needs of today’s environment.  Without regularly assessing the size and structure of the combatant  commands and without complete information on all of the resources  supporting the combatant commands, DOD cannot ensure that the  combatant commands are properly sized and structured to meet their  assigned missions and cannot ensure that commands are managing  resources efficiently.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Manage Growth in Personnel and Costs at the Combatant Commands
paragraphs: Recognizing that there has been significant growth in the size of the  combatant commands since 2001 due to increases in their assigned  missions, DOD has taken some steps to slow the growth in command  personnel and associated mission and headquarters-support costs. In  November 2007, to improve the links between mission, manpower  requirements, and resource decisions, the Joint Staff was tasked by the  Deputy Secretary of Defense with reviewing the authorized positions  supporting the combatant commands. The review resulted in the  establishment of baselines in the number of major DOD headquarters  activity positions at each of the geographic and functional combatant  commands that could be adjusted based only on the approval of new  missions. However, these baselines apply only to positions performing  major DOD headquarters activity functions, and our prior work found that  DOD’s major headquarters activity data is not always complete and  reliable. In addition, as part of the Secretary of Defense’s 2010  efficiency initiative, the combatant commands, along with other  organizations within the department, were asked to identify efficiencies in  headquarters and administrative functions, support activities, and other  overhead. Specifically, the combatant commands were directed to  perform organizational assessments to identify any disconnects between  the commands’ priorities and their allocation of resources. Based on  these assessments and the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the  combatant commands reduced seven Standing Joint Force  Headquarters to two global Standing Joint Force Headquarters,  decreased their reliance on individual augmentees at two commands,  and consolidated joint task forces at several commands. These changes  eliminated a total of about 530 authorized positions and about 470  temporary personnel in total. In addition, some commands, such as U.S.  European Command and U.S. Northern Command, were directed to  reduce personnel and consolidate staff functions to better align their  available resources with their current missions. Other commands,  however, such as U.S. Africa Command, did not make specific reductions  as part of the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency initiative.
In 2011, DOD announced that it was studying the regional structure of the  combatant commands, estimating that it could save $900 million from  fiscal years 2014 through 2017 by considering alternatives to the current  construct of regional geographic combatant commands. To achieve the  estimated cost savings, the Joint Staff considered several alternatives to  the current structure that involved merging geographic combatant  commands. However, the Joint Staff has since reviewed and rejected the  proposed options, in part because they believed that merging commands  would not achieve the estimated savings. According to Joint Staff officials,  DOD has reduced funding across all of the geographic and functional  commands by about $881 million during fiscal years 2014 through 2018,  as part of the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2014. As part of  the reductions, officials stated the department plans to reduce civilian  positions at the combatant commands and Joint Staff by approximately  400 positions over 5 years through fiscal year 2018. DOD officials stated  that they would continue to seek additional savings at the combatant  commands in any subsequent directed reviews.
section_title: DOD’s Process for Managing Combatant Commands’ Size and Structure Is Focused on Proposed Increases and Does Not Periodically Evaluate Requirements
paragraphs: DOD has an ongoing process to assess the combatant commands’  requests for additional positions, but does not periodically evaluate  whether authorized positions at the combatant commands’ are still  needed to support their assigned missions. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff Instruction 1001.01A, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program,  outlines a process for determining and validating requirements for  additional manpower at the combatant commands. According to the  instruction, requests for additional positions should be mission driven,  supported by the combatant commands’ priorities, and based on studies  of the capabilities and readiness of the commands’ personnel.  Furthermore, the combatant commands should consider other options  prior to requesting additional positions, such as internally realigning  personnel, using internal funding for contract positions, and utilizing  temporary personnel. As part of their request, the combatant commands  may also rely on manpower studies to support their requests for  additional positions. For example, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Pacific  Command are currently undergoing manpower studies to review their size  and structure as part of DOD’s emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and Middle  East regions of the world. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff Instruction 1001.01A, requests for additional positions are to be  drafted by the commands and submitted to the Director of the Joint Staff.  A team made up of representatives from the Joint Staff and the military  services is then convened to evaluate the request, based on the  command’s mission drivers, capability gaps, internal offsets, and  manpower assessments. This team makes recommendations to the  Director of the Joint Staff and the operations deputies of the military  services, who decide whether or not to endorse the request for additional  positions to support each command’s mission. If the request for additional  positions is endorsed, the authorized positions are initially documented on  the combatant command’s joint table of distribution and the positions get  evaluated, along with DOD’s other resource requirements, to determine  whether or not it will be funded. The combatant commands may also  submit requests to the Joint Staff for minor changes in their authorized  structure to meet changing missions as long as they do not affect the total  number of authorized positions at the command. Figure 7 describes the  process for reviewing and validating proposed increases in authorized  positions at the combatant commands.
While DOD and some military services have policies on manpower  management, we found that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Instruction 1001.01A does not specify a process for reviewing the  combatant commands’ size and structure and focuses on requests for  additional positions or nominal changes in authorized positions.  Specifically, some military service regulations that guide manpower  requirements at the service component commands require manpower to  be periodically evaluated to ensure they still meet assigned missions.  For example, Army Regulation 570-4, Manpower and Equipment Control,  Manpower Management, suggests that Army components’ manpower  requirements be reevaluated by Army commanders and agency heads  every two to five years, and optimally every three years. In addition, DOD  Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management states that  manpower policies, procedures, and structures should be periodically  evaluated to ensure efficient and effective use of manpower resources.  In contrast, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A  suggests that manpower requirements at the combatant commands be  set based on the projection of workload over three years, but it has no  provisions for reevaluating this determination. DOD officials confirmed  that there is no periodic evaluation of the commands’ authorized  positions, in part because there is no process in place to review  authorized positions when there is a change in roles or missions. Our  prior work on strategic human capital management found that high- performing organizations stay alert to emerging mission demands and  remain open to reevaluating their human capital practices in light of their  demonstrated successes or failures in achieving the organization’s  strategic objectives. In addition, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  Instruction 1001.01A does not address personnel associated with  contracted services. As previously stated, DOD Instruction 1100.22,  Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, requires DOD’s  workforce, which includes military and civilian manpower and contractor  support, to be structured to execute missions at a low-to-moderate level  or risk. The purpose of DOD Instruction 1100.22, among other things, is  to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and prescribe procedures for  determining the appropriate mix of manpower within the department.
While DOD is aware of the growth in missions and authorized positions at  the combatant commands since 2001 and has undertaken some efforts to  manage and assess the size and structure of the combatant commands,  these efforts did not constitute a comprehensive and periodic bottom-up  review of the combatant commands’ total workforce. Without a  comprehensive, periodic evaluation of the commands’ authorized  positions, DOD will not be able to ensure that the combatant commands  are properly sized and structured to meet their assigned missions or  ensure that the commands identify opportunities for managing personnel  resources more efficiently.
section_title: Combatant Commands Are Inconsistent in Their Use of the Existing Personnel Management System to Identify and Track Their Total Assigned Personnel
paragraphs: DOD has an electronic system to document and review information about  authorized positions and assigned military and civilian personnel at the  combatant commands, but the commands are not consistently inputting  complete information on all assigned personnel. All of the combatant  commands that we reviewed use to some extent the Electronic Joint  Manpower and Personnel System (e-JMAPS) to manage their  commands’ manpower and personnel; however, we found differences  across the commands in how they use the system to manage their  assigned personnel. DOD has identified e-JMAPS as the system of  record to document the combatant commands’ organizational structure  and according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction  1001.01A, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program, the system should  be used to track the manpower and personnel required to meet the  combatant commands’ assigned missions. The instruction states e- JMAPS should provide visibility over joint personnel by allowing the Joint  Staff and combatant commands to maintain, review, modify, and report all  personnel actions in the system, to include changes in authorized  positions or updates to personnel arriving at or departing from the  command. In January 2012, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff issued a  memo identifying e-JMAPS as the authoritative data source for DOD and  for congressional inquiries of joint personnel, stating that e-JMAPS must  accurately reflect the manpower and personnel allocated to joint  organizations, such as the combatant commands, to provide senior  leaders with the necessary data to support decision making in a fiscally  constrained environment. According to Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government, policies, procedures, and mechanisms to  effectively manage an organization—including accurate and timely  documentation of an organization’s transactions and resources and  effective management of an organization’s workforce—are important  factors in enabling an organization to improve accountability and achieve  their missions.
Our review found that the commands vary in the types of personnel that  each enters into e-JMAPS and that some commands exclude certain  personnel from the system when managing personnel who support the  command. All of the combatant commands we reviewed said that they  use e-JMAPS to manage and track authorized military and civilian  positions within the command, and where appropriate, other temporary  personnel. To fulfill temporary or short-duration mission requirements,  additional personnel—such as activated reservists, civilian overhires, and  interagency personnel—may be needed to support the commands’  authorized manpower. However, the commands varied in their use of e- JMAPS to track these additional personnel because Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A does not clearly state that temporary  personnel, such as civilian overhires and activated reservists, should be  accounted for in e-JMAPS, resulting in the differences in what is tracked  by the commands. While U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern  Command track their civilian overhires and activated reservists in e- JMAPS, U.S. European Command does not, and U.S. Pacific Command  tracks only activated reservists in e-JMAPS. In addition, officials at most  of the combatant commands that we reviewed noted that they do not  account for temporary personnel, such as interagency personnel, in  eJMAPS, and that they primarily use the system to manage personnel  filling authorized positions at the command, which may not include all  command personnel. For example, during the course of our review, U.S.  European Command officials identified approximately 172 civilian  overhires and activated reservists supporting the command in fiscal year  2012 that are not accounted for in e-JMAPS. U.S. Africa Command is the  only command that inputs all assigned personnel, to include civilian  overhires, activated reservists, and interagency personnel, into e-JMAPS  regardless of whether they are filling an authorized position, reflecting  about 250 additional personnel at the command in fiscal year 2012. Our  review also found that 4 out of the 5 geographic combatant commands do  not account for personnel performing contract services in e-JMAPS.  According to DOD officials, personnel performing contract services are  not required to be accounted for in e-JMAPS and those personnel would  be included in the costs reported for contract services. As part of a  department-wide plan to account for contractor services, DOD has begun  efforts to collect contractor-manpower data directly from contractors, but  DOD does not expect to fully collect data on personnel performing  contract services until fiscal year 2016.
Furthermore, according to Joint Staff officials, the combatant commands  do not always input personnel information in a timely manner and civilian  personnel may not be tracked as diligently in e-JMAPS as military  personnel. While Joint Staff officials stated that the accuracy of personnel  data in e-JMAPS has improved, there is no specific guidance requiring  the combatant commands to periodically review and update data on  personnel assigned to the command to ensure that data in e-JMAPS is  accurate and up-to-date. According to some combatant command  officials, command staffs input personnel information in e-JMAPS when  personnel arrive at the command. However, our review confirmed that  there are differences across the combatant commands in how often they  update and review personnel information to ensure its accuracy, and  officials at one command confirmed that while e-JMAPS is their primary  personnel management system, they also rely on military service  personnel systems to track personnel because the service systems are  more accurate and capture more personnel information than e-JMAPS.
While the combatant commands use e-JMAPS to manage some of their  assigned personnel and review personnel data periodically, there is no  DOD guidance requiring that all personnel supporting the commands be  tracked in e-JMAPS or that reviews of personnel occur within specific  timeframes to ensure assigned personnel data is accurate. Without  guidance to require complete and accurate information on all personnel  supporting the combatant commands, and the consistent and timely  review of assigned personnel data in e-JMAPS, DOD and the combatant  commands cannot be assured that e-JMAPS will provide comprehensive  data to inform their personnel decisions.
section_title: DOD Does Not Have a System or Formal Process to Gather Information on Authorized Manpower and Assigned Personnel at the Service Component Commands
paragraphs: In addition to not having complete information on the personnel assigned  to the combatant commands, DOD and the combatant commands do not  have oversight or visibility over authorized manpower or the number of  assigned personnel at the service component commands. As stated  previously, the service component commands often fulfill dual-roles:  organizing, training, and equipping assigned service-specific forces while  also assisting the combatant commands in their employment during  military operations. Some service component commands, such as U.S.  Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa manage large numbers of  assigned forces and operational units, while others, such as Marine  Forces South, manage few, if any, assigned forces. While these service  component commands provide support to the combatant commands, the  service component commands use service-specific personnel  management systems to account for their authorized manpower and  personnel, and DOD does not have a formal process to gather this  information. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publication identifies  the importance of having reliable data on all personnel within a  geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility for visibility of  personnel and for effective planning. Further, our previous work has  highlighted the need for agencies to have valid, reliable data and be  aware of the size of their workforce, its deployment across the  organization and the knowledge, skills and abilities needed for the agency  to pursue its mission.
Even though the combatant commands rely on the service component  commands’ personnel to support their missions and operational  requirements, they do not have oversight or visibility into the service  component commands’ authorized manpower or how the components  determine the size and structure of their staff to support the combatant  commands’ missions. Based on our analysis of data that we gathered, in  fiscal year 2012 there were 7,795 authorized positions at the  headquarters of the service component commands, which was more than  double the 3,817 authorized positions at the headquarters of the  combatant commands. Moreover, the service component commands are  generally structured to perform staff functions that are similar to those of  the combatant commands, such as collecting intelligence, coordinating  operations, performing strategic planning and policy, and supporting  communications. For example, at U.S. Pacific Command, there are about  650 authorized positions dedicated to gathering, analyzing, and  performing intelligence support, while there are about 175 additional  authorized positions within U.S. Pacific Command’s service component  commands dedicated to the same staff function. According to DOD  officials, since headquarters personnel at service component commands  with large numbers of assigned forces are more likely to be focused on  the components’ organize, train, and equip function rather than on solely  supporting the combatant commands missions, these positions may not  necessarily be redundant. However, given the similarities in mission  requirements and staff functions at the combatant and service component  commands, it is important for the combatant commands to have visibility  over the service component command’s authorized manpower to be able  to determine whether these similarities at the combatant and service  component commands are necessary or duplicative.
Moreover, the combatant commands do not have complete information  on personnel assigned to their service component commands. Officials at  the combatant commands and Joint Staff stated that they do not have  visibility over personnel at the service component commands or access to  the service-specific personnel management systems that the service  component commands use, and if they need information to determine  whether personnel at the service component commands can support the  combatant commands’ mission requirements they have to request it from  the service component commands. For example, several combatant  commands we spoke with did not identify any specific processes that they  use to regularly gather information on personnel at their service  components, while officials at U.S. Africa Command stated that they had  only recently begun requesting this information on a monthly basis.  However, as part of the process for validating new manpower  requirements, the combatant commands are required to identify whether  the functions and tasks that they are requesting additional positions for  can be fulfilled by personnel at the service component commands.  Without access to the service-specific personnel data or a process to  regularly gather personnel information, it is unclear how this validation  process can occur expeditiously. According to a Joint Staff official,  officials in that office discuss the personnel and capabilities available  within the service component commands when reviewing the combatant  commands’ requests for additional positions, but they also do not have  direct access to the service component commands’ personnel data  systems to review the personnel assigned to the service component  commands’ headquarters staff. Without a formal process to gather  information on the authorized manpower and assigned personnel at the  service component commands, the combatant commands may not have  the visibility that is necessary to appropriately size themselves to meet  their assigned missions, and are at risk for unnecessarily duplicating  functions between the combatant commands and their service component  commands.
section_title: Budget Documents Do Not Provide Details on Authorized Manpower and Funding For Each Combatant Command
paragraphs: While each military department annually submits budget documents for  operation and maintenance to Congress—including the total authorized  military positions, civilian and contractor full-time equivalents, and the  funding required to support the missions of the combatant commands that  they are the combatant command support agent for—these documents  do not provide transparency into the authorized positions, the full-time  equivalents, or the funding directed to each combatant command.  According to DOD Directive 5100.03, Support of the Headquarters of the  Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands, the military departments  are responsible for funding the mission and headquarters-support costs of  the combatant commands and their subordinate unified commands.  Also, volume 2A, chapter 1 of DOD’s Financial Management Regulation,  7000.14.R states that the military departments must ensure adequate  visibility over the resources of combatant command-directed missions  and other costs for each command. DOD guidance for the submission of  the President’s budget justification materials for Fiscal Year 2013, which  include the military departments’ budget documents for operation and  maintenance, also states that components should report details on  contractor manpower/full-time equivalents in addition to military, civilian,  and reserve manpower data. According to Standards for Internal Control  in the Federal Government, reliable financial reporting, including reports  on budget execution, financial statements, and other reports for internal  and external use, is important for determining whether agencies’  objectives are achieved.
The military departments’ budget documents for operation and  maintenance identify the overall authorized military positions, civilian and  contractor full-time equivalents, and mission and headquarters support  funding to support the combatant commands, but do not provide details  on authorized positions, full-time equivalents, or mission and  headquarters-support costs by command. For example, the Air Force’s  fiscal year 2013 budget document shows that the combatant commands it  supports have about 6,550 authorized military positions and civilian and  contractor full-time equivalents, but it does not separate the data to  indicate the number of authorized positions or full-time equivalents at  each of the five combatant commands that it supports. Similarly, the  Army’s comparable budget document shows about 3,200 total authorized  military positions and civilian and contractor full-time equivalents at all the  commands that it supports, but does not separate the data to display  authorized positions and full-time equivalents at each of the three  commands that it is responsible for. In addition, while the military  departments’ budget documents provide information on the total funding  that all the combatant commands receive for expenses such as civilian  pay, contract services, travel, transportation and other supply costs, they  do not separate these expenses and display them for each command. For  example, the Air Force’s fiscal year 2013 budget document noted a lump  sum of about $285 million for civilian pay for all five combatant commands  that the Air Force supports, and the Army’s comparable budget document  showed a total of about $38 million for travel costs for all of the  commands that it supports. Neither of the military departments’ budget  documents displayed this cost data for each individual combatant  command.
In reviewing DOD budget and policy documents, we found that the  military departments, as the combatant commands support agents, do not  provide detailed information for each combatant command in their budget  documents for operation and maintenance because DOD’s Financial  Management Regulation does not require the military departments to  identify individual combatant commands’ authorized military positions and  civilian and contractor full-time equivalents or the mission and  headquarters-support funding required for civilian pay, contract services,  travel, and other transportation and supply costs. Without detailed  information identifying each combatant commands’ authorized positions,  full-time equivalents, and mission and headquarters-support funding,  decision makers within DOD and Congress may not have complete and  accurate data to conduct oversight of the combatant commands’  resources.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the substantial increase in authorized positions and mission and  headquarters-support costs at the combatant commands and evolving  security challenges facing DOD, effective management and oversight  over the combatant commands’ resources is essential as the department  balances limited resources with future defense priorities. If DOD  performed a comprehensive, periodic evaluation of the combatant  commands’ authorized positions, that review would help the department  to efficiently manage the combatant commands in its efforts to meet the  goals and priorities of the 2012 strategic guidance. Moreover, if DOD had  complete information on all the authorized manpower and personnel  assigned to support the combatant commands and service component  commands, the department would have additional visibility into the  universe of manpower and personnel dedicated to supporting the  combatant command’s assigned missions. This information would aid  DOD officials in decisions on requests for additional manpower, reducing  the potential for overlap and duplication of functions. Further, detailed  information to identify the authorized military positions, civilian and  contractor full-time equivalents, and mission and headquarters-support  funding that each combatant command receives would help decision  makers in DOD and Congress to balance resource priorities in a fiscally  challenging environment. As the department realigns itself to address  new challenges, full awareness of the combatant commands’ authorized  manpower, assigned personnel, and mission and headquarters-support  costs would help the department to provide congressional decision  makers with the information needed for effective oversight and help  ensure the efficient use of resources.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions.
To ensure that the geographic combatant commands are properly sized  to meet their assigned missions and to improve the transparency of the  commands’ authorized manpower, assigned personnel, and mission and  headquarters-support costs, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct:
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A to require a comprehensive,  periodic evaluation of whether the size and structure of the combatant  commands meet assigned missions.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A to require the combatant  commands to identify, manage, and track all personnel, including  temporary personnel such as civilian overhires and activated  reservists, in e-JMAPS and identify specific guidelines and timeframes  for the combatant commands to consistently input and review  assigned personnel in e-JMAPS.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the  combatant commanders and the secretaries of the military  departments, to develop and implement a formal process to gather  information on authorized manpower and assigned personnel at the  service component commands.
The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to revise volume 2A,  chapter 1 of DOD’s Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R to  require the military departments, in their annual budget documents for  operation and maintenance, to identify the authorized military  positions and civilian and contractor full-time equivalents at each  combatant command and provide detailed information on funding  required by each command for mission and headquarters support,  such as civilian pay, contract services, travel, and supplies.
section_title: Agency Comments and our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three of  our four recommendations and non-concurred with one recommendation.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IX. DOD also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as  appropriate.
DOD did not concur with our first recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense require the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A, Joint  Manpower and Personnel Program, to require a comprehensive, periodic  evaluation of whether the size and structure of the combatant commands  meet assigned missions. DOD stated that the combatant commands have  been baselined twice since 2008, and that the commands have already  been reduced during previous budget reviews. We describe in our report  several actions taken by DOD to manage the growth in personnel and  costs at the combatant commands, including establishing manpower  baselines and identifying manpower and personnel reductions. However,  as stated in our report, these actions do not constitute a comprehensive,  periodic, bottom-up review of the combatant commands’ total workforce in  part because DOD’s actions have not included all authorized positions at  the combatant commands. For example, as noted in our report, the  baseline levels established for the combatant commands apply only to  positions in major DOD headquarters activities, and our prior work has  found that the data on such headquarters positions is incomplete and not  always reliable. Furthermore, not all commands have been included in  previous efficiency initiatives. The department also noted that any  periodic review of the combatant commands’ size and structure could  only be triggered by review of the mission of the command, and stated  that requiring a periodic review was not appropriate for inclusion in  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A. However, the  department’s response does not fully explain why the Instruction should  not require periodic reviews to ensure that the resources meet constantly- evolving missions, and we continue to believe that institutionalizing a  periodic evaluation of all authorized positions would help to systematically  align manpower with those missions and add rigor to the requirements  process.
The department concurred with three of our recommendations that the  Secretary of Defense: (1) direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  to revise Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A to  require the combatant commands to identify, manage, and track all  personnel, including temporary personnel such as civilian overhires and  activated reservists, in e-JMAPS and identify specific guidelines and  timeframes for the combatant commands to consistently input and review  personnel data in the system; (2) direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders and secretaries  of the military departments, to develop and implement a formal process to  gather information on authorized manpower and assigned personnel at  the service component commands; and (3) direct the Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller) to revise volume 2, chapter 1 of DOD’s Financial  Management Regulation 7000.14R to require the military departments, in  their annual budget documents for operation and maintenance, to identify  the authorized military positions and civilian and contractor full-time  equivalents at each combatant command and provide detailed  information on funding required by each command for mission and  headquarters-support, such as civilian pay, contract services, travel, and  supplies. In its response to our recommendations, DOD noted that it  plans to issue guidance to require all DOD components to identify,  manage, and track all personnel data, including temporary personnel like  civilian overhires and activated reservists, in e-JMAPS. The planned  guidance will also identify specific guidelines and timeframes for DOD  organizations to consistently input and review personnel data in e-JMAPs.
DOD agreed with our last recommendation regarding DOD’s Financial  Management Regulation, but requested that we revise the language to  require the military departments to capture or delineate the type of  civilians, such as general schedule, foreign service nationals/locally  employed staff, or principal staff assistants, provided by the military  services within each combatant command. DOD’s response also  indicated that the military services suggested the creation of another  budget exhibit to capture contract and full-time equivalent data in lieu of  the current depiction in their annual budget documents for operation and  maintenance. We did not modify our recommendation because, in our  view, our recommended revision to DOD’s Financial Management  Regulation reflects our findings and captures the information needed to  improve visibility over resources devoted to each combatant command,  which is now unavailable. Taking additional steps to require more detailed  reporting, such as delineating the type of civilians authorized, would be at  the department’s discretion but could help to further transparency and  improve oversight.
We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretaries of the military  departments. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix X.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We conducted this work in response to direction from the congressional  committees to review the resources of the combatant commands. This  report (1) identifies the trends in the resources devoted to the Department  of Defense’s (DOD) geographic combatant commands and their service  component commands, and (2) assesses the extent to which DOD has  processes in place to manage and oversee the resources of the  combatant commands.
To conduct this work and address our objectives, we identified sources of  information within DOD that would provide data on the resources at the  geographic combatant commands, to include their subordinate unified  commands and other activities, and corresponding service components  commands. We focused our review on five of the geographic combatant  commands within the department: U.S. Africa Command; U.S. European  Command; U.S. Northern Command; U.S. Pacific Command; and U.S.  Southern Command. Our review excluded U.S. Central Command and its  corresponding service component commands due to their responsibilities  to support ongoing military operations in Afghanistan during the past  several years, which would have inhibited uniform comparisons across  the commands.
To identify trends in the resources devoted to DOD’s geographic  combatant commands, to include their subordinate unified commands  and other activities, and their service component commands we obtained  and analyzed available authorized positions and actual assigned  personnel (military, civilian, and contractors) data and operation and  maintenance obligations data from each of the five geographic combatant  commands and their corresponding service component commands from  fiscal years 2001 through 2012. We focused our review on operation and  maintenance obligations—as these obligations reflect the primary mission  and headquarters-support costs of the combatant commands, their  subordinate unified commands and other activities, and corresponding  service component commands—to include the costs for civilian  personnel, contract services, travel, and equipment, among others. Our  review excluded obligations of operation and maintenance funding for  DOD’s overseas contingency operations not part of DOD’s base budget.  Since historical data was unavailable in some cases, we limited our  analysis of trends to authorized military and civilian positions at the  combatant commands from fiscal years 2001 through 2012 and  authorized military and civilian positions at the service component  commands from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Due to the availability of  data, we similarly limited our analysis of trends in operation and  maintenance obligations at the combatant commands and service  component commands to fiscal years 2007 through 2012. To assess the  reliability of the data, we interviewed DOD officials and analyzed relevant  manpower and financial management documentation to ensure that the  authorized positions and data on operation and maintenance obligations  that the commands provided were tied to mission and headquarters- support. We also incorporated data reliability questions into our data  collection instruments and compared the multiple data sets received from  DOD components against each other to ensure that there was  consistency in the data that the commands provided. We determined the  data was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To determine the extent to which DOD has processes in place to manage  and oversee the resources of the combatant commands, we obtained and  analyzed documentary and testimonial evidence from DOD, the military  departments, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands and their  subordinate unified commands on the policies, procedures and systems  used to manage command resources. We interviewed officials and  obtained documentation on the policies, procedures, and systems used  for determining and validating the commands’ manpower requirements.  We also interviewed officials and obtained documentation on any steps  DOD had taken or planned to take to reexamine the size and structure of  the combatant commands. We obtained documentation on the systems  used to track their authorized manpower and assigned military and  civilian personnel, and contractor full-time equivalents, and also  interviewed officials on how often assigned personnel within the  combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, and other  activities are reviewed to ensure that the data are accurate and up to  date. In addition, we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed  officials from the Joint Staff, geographic combatant commands, and  service component commands on their processes for sharing information  on command authorized manpower and assigned personnel. We also  obtained and analyzed data included in the military departments’ budget  exhibits for operation and maintenance detailing combatant commands’  authorized positions and mission and headquarters-support funding.
We interviewed officials, or where appropriate, obtained documentation at  the organizations listed below:  Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Manpower and Personnel Directorate
Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate  Department of the Air Force
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Personnel
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management
Pacific Air Forces
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial  Management and Comptroller, Army Budget Office
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Manpower and Reserve
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Manpower and Reserve
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Manpower and Reserve  Affairs, Training Readiness and Mobilization
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel G-1, Plans and
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans G-3/5/7;  Operations and Plans, Force Management Directorate
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans G-3/5/7;  Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs G-8, Program
U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency
Army Pacific
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Manpower and  Reserve Affairs)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Financial Management  and Comptroller), Office of Budget
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,  Personnel, Education, and Training)
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, (Integration of  Capabilities and Resources)
Fleet Forces Command
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Navy Pacific Fleet
Marine Forces, Pacific
Marine Forces, South  Unified Combatant Commands and Subordinate Unified Commands
U.S. Africa Command
U.S. European Command
U.S. Northern Command
U.S. Pacific Command
U.S. Special Operations Command
Special Operations Command, Pacific
Special Operations Command, South
U.S. Southern Command  We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to May 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based our audit objectives. We believe that the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Mission and Headquarters- Support Costs in Nominal Terms
section_title: Appendix III: Resources at U.S. Africa Command and its Service Component Commands
paragraphs: Appendix III: Resources at U.S. Africa  Command and its Service Component  Commands Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command Africa and  security cooperation organizations.  Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and are  represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs include civilian pay, contract services,  and travel, among other costs. The mission and headquarters-support costs for AFRICOM  intelligence support, security cooperation organizations, and some costs for Special Operations  Command Africa are programmed and budgeted for by other organizations and those costs are not  reflected in this appendix.  Other includes mission and headquarters-support costs for Special Operations Command Africa,  Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara, and Special Operation Command and Control Element  Horn of Africa. While Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara is a contingency operation, its costs  are funded out of DOD’s base budget.  Air Forces Africa was disestablished in April 2012, but reported some mission and headquarters- support costs prior to its disestablishment. The Navy and Air Force each have one service component  command that supports both AFRICOM and U.S. European Command. Authorized military and  civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs for these two service component  commands are represented in Appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. European Command and its Service Component Commands
paragraphs: Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. European  Command and its Service Component  Commands Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command Europe,  security cooperation organizations, the Commander’s Communications Activities, and other  organizations that have since been disestablished.  travel, and equipment, among other costs. EUCOM could not distinguish which mission and  headquarters-support costs were specific to headquarters or other organizations from fiscal years  2001 through 2007, so these costs are not broken out across these fiscal years. The mission and  headquarters-support costs for EUCOM intelligence support, security cooperation organizations, and  some costs for Special Operations Command Europe are programmed and budgeted for by other  organizations and those costs are not reflected in this appendix.  commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the  combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.
section_title: Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Northern Command and its Service Component Commands
paragraphs: Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Northern  Command and its Service Component  Commands Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and are  represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs include civilian pay, contract services,  and travel, among other costs. The mission and headquarters-support costs for NORTHCOM  intelligence support and security cooperation organizations are programmed and budgeted for by  other organizations and those costs are not reflected in this appendix.  Other includes mission and headquarters-support costs for Joint Task Force Alaska, Joint Task  Force North, Joint Task Force Civil Support, and Joint Task Force Headquarters National Capital  Region.  According to Navy officials, Fleet Forces Command has military personnel dedicated to support  NORTHCOM, but no dedicated civilian support, and its mission and headquarters-support costs  primarily consist of travel costs that cannot be distinguished from its other costs. As a result, Navy  officials said they could not provide mission and headquarters-support costs for Fleet Forces  Command.  commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the  combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.
section_title: Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific Command and its Service Component Commands
paragraphs: Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific  Command and its Service Component  Commands Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command Pacific,  security cooperation organizations, U.S. Forces Korea, Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action  Accounting Command, U.S. Forces Japan, Alaskan Command, Joint Interagency Task Force West,  Center for Excellence in Disaster Management, U.S. PACOM Representative to Guam, and other  organizations that have since been disestablished. According to PACOM officials, a portion of the  command’s authorized military and civilian positions support the unique mission of the Joint Prisoner  of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command to account for all Americans missing as result of past  conflicts. In fiscal year 2012, the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command  accounts for approximately 15 percent or 511 of PACOM’s total authorized military and civilian  positions.  Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and are  represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs include civilian pay, contract services,  travel, and equipment, among other costs. DOD was unable to provide obligations for PACOM prior  to fiscal year 2007. The mission and headquarters-support costs for PACOM intelligence support,  security cooperation organizations, U.S. Forces Korea and some costs for Special Operations  Command Pacific are programmed and budgeted for by other organizations and those costs are not  reflected in this appendix.
section_title: Appendix VII: Resources at U.S. Southern Command and its Service Component Commands
paragraphs: Appendix VII: Resources at U.S. Southern  Command and its Service Component  Commands Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command South,  security cooperation organizations, Joint Interagency Task Force South, and Joint Task Force Bravo.
SOUTHCOM intelligence support, security cooperation organizations, and some costs for Special  Operations Command South are programmed and budgeted for by other organizations and those  costs are not reflected in this appendix.  Other includes mission and headquarters-support costs for Special Operations Command South,  Joint Interagency Task Force South, and costs for the 7th Special Forces Group for travel, supplies,  and transportation of equipment.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Areas of Responsibility and Headquarters Locations of the Geographic Combatant Commands and Some of Their Components
paragraphs: Appendix VIII contains information presented in Figure 1 in noninteractive  format.
subsections: section_title: Geographic Combatant Command U.S. Southern Command
section_title: Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  include Marie A. Mak (Assistant Director), Richard K. Geiger, Cynthia L.  Grant, Oscar W. Mardis, Tobin J. McMurdie, Meghan C. Perez, Carol D.  Petersen, Richard S. Powelson, John Van Schaik, Michael C.  Shaughnessy, Amie M. Steele and Sabrina C. Streagle.