Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters
Published: 2006-05-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. history. Despite a large deployment of resources at all levels, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate. GAO has a body of ongoing work that covers the federal government's preparedness and response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This statement summarizes key points from GAO's report on the military's response to Katrina (GAO-06-643), which was issued earlier this month. It addresses (1) the support that the military provided in responding to Hurricane Katrina along with some of the challenges faced and key lessons learned; (2) actions needed to address these lessons, including GAO's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense; and (3) the extent to which the military is taking actions to identify and address the lessons learned. In its report, GAO made several recommendations to improve the military response to catastrophic disasters. The recommendations called for updating the National Response Plan to reflect proactive functions the military could perform in a catastrophic incident; improving military plans and exercises; improving National Guard, Reserve, and active force integration; and resolving response problems associated with damage assessment, communication, search and rescue, and logistics issues. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred with all of the recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives, but it also faced several challenges that provide lessons for the future. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, DOD's initial response relied heavily on the National Guard, but active forces were also alerted prior to landfall. Aviation, medical, engineering, and other key capabilities were initially deployed, but growing concerns about the disaster prompted DOD to deploy active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. Over 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active personnel participated in the response. However, several factors affected the military's ability to gain situational awareness and organize and execute its response, including a lack of timely damage assessments, communications problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, unexpected logistics responsibilities, and force integration issues. A key lesson learned is that additional actions are needed to ensure that the military's significant capabilities are clearly understood, well planned, and fully integrated. As GAO outlined in its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, many challenges that the military faced during Katrina point to the need for better plans and more robust exercises. Prior to Katrina, disaster plans and exercises did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully identify the military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example, the National Response Plan made little distinction between the military response to smaller regional disasters and catastrophic natural disasters. In addition, DOD's emergency response plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. It did not account for the full range of assistance that DOD might provide, address the respective contributions of the National Guard and federal responders, or establish response time frames. National Guard state plans were also inadequate and did not account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe, and they were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover, none of the exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina had called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities to respond to a catastrophic hurricane. Without actions to help address planning and exercise inadequacies, a lack of understanding will continue to exist within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in response to a catastrophe; the timing of this assistance; and the respective contributions of the active, Reserve, and National Guard forces. DOD is examining the lessons learned from a variety of sources and is beginning to take actions to address them and prepare for the next catastrophe. It is too early to evaluate DOD's actions, but many appear to hold promise. However, some issues identified after Katrina, such as damage assessments, are long-standing, complex problems that cut across agency boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require sustained attention from the highest management levels in DOD and across the government.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for your hearing  on how the Department of Defense (DOD) is preparing for the upcoming  hurricane season and applying lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.  Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation’s  history and, because of its size and strength, will have long-standing  effects for years to come. Prior catastrophic disasters and the actual  experience after Katrina have shown the need for DOD to contribute  substantial support to state and local authorities given its extensive  capabilities and expertise in key areas such as damage assessment and  communications. As you know, under the National Response Plan, DOD is  generally assigned a supporting role in disaster response but, even in this  role, has specific planning responsibilities in anticipation of being called  upon in a disaster. Within DOD, the 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense  and Civil Support envisioned a reliance on National Guard and Reserve  forces for homeland missions, including disaster response, but recognized  that active duty forces may also play a role depending on the nature of the  event. Individual states have their own disaster response plans which  typically include substantial supporting roles for their National Guards.
In anticipation of and in the days following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall,  the military took many proactive steps and mobilized significant  resources—both active duty and National Guard forces—that saved many  lives and greatly enhanced response efforts. At the same time, as local,  state, and federal governments responded in the days following Katrina,  confusion surfaced as to what responsibilities the military has and what  capabilities it would provide in planning and responding to a catastrophic  event. While this experience underscored the importance of the military,  especially in the wake of a catastrophe, it also identified some areas  requiring more attention to enhance future military responses. As the  nation is quickly approaching the 2006 hurricane season, sorting out the  relevant lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina for the military, putting  them in the context of the military’s role in the complex disaster response  mission, and then following though with needed changes is vital.
This statement is based on our report issued earlier this month, entitled  Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the  Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters (GAO-06-643), and  summarizes the key points from that report, including (1) the support that  the military provided in responding to Hurricane Katrina along with some  of the challenges faced and key lessons learned; (2) actions needed to  address these lessons, including our recommendations to the Secretary of  Defense; and (3) the extent to which the military is taking actions to  identify and address the lessons learned. The work supporting our report  reflects our travel to the affected areas, interviews with officials who led  the response efforts at both the federal and state levels, and extensive  analysis of data and documents from numerous military organizations that  provided support to the Hurricane Katrina response operations. We  conducted our review from September 2005 through April 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In  addition to our recently completed review of the military response, we  have published several products on Hurricane Katrina and prior disasters,  and currently have a large body of ongoing work to address preparation,  response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to hurricanes Katrina  and Rita.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: About 9 months prior to Katrina’s landfall, the NRP was issued to frame  the federal response to domestic emergencies ranging from smaller,  regional disasters to incidents of national significance. The plan generally  calls for a reactive federal response following specific state requests for  assistance. However, the NRP also contains a catastrophic incident annex  that calls for a proactive federal response when catastrophes overwhelm  local and state responders. The NRP generally assigns DOD a supporting  role in disaster response, but even in this role, DOD has specific planning  responsibilities. For example, the NRP requires federal agencies to  incorporate the accelerated response requirements of the NRP’s  catastrophic incident annex into their own emergency response plans.
Within DOD, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which  was issued in June 2005, envisions a greater reliance on National Guard  and Reserve forces for homeland missions. The military response to  domestic disasters typically varies depending on the severity of an event.  During smaller disasters, an affected state’s National Guard may provide a  sufficient response, but larger disasters and catastrophes that overwhelm  the state may require assistance from out-of-state National Guard or  federal troops. For Katrina, the response heavily relied on the National  Guard, which is consistent with DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and  Civil Support. This represents a departure from past catastrophes when  active duty forces played a larger role in response efforts.
During disaster response missions, National Guard troops typically  operate under the control of the state governors. However, the National  Guard Bureau has responsibility for formulating, developing, and  coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army and Air National  Guard personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication between  the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the National Guard in U.S. states  and territories. Although the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does not  have operational control of National Guard forces in the states and  territories, he has overall responsibility for National Guard Military  Support to Civil Authorities programs. The U.S. Northern Command also  has a mission to provide support to civil authorities. Because of this  mission, U.S. Northern Command was responsible for commanding the  federal military response to Hurricane Katrina.
section_title: The Military Response Was Massive but Faced Several Challenges, Which Provide Lessons for the Future
paragraphs: During its massive response to Hurricane Katrina the military faced many  challenges, which provide lessons for improving the future military  response to catastrophic natural disasters. Issues arose with damage  assessments, communications, search and rescue efforts, logistics, and the  integration of military forces.
subsections: section_title: The Military Response Was Massive
paragraphs: In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the military mounted a massive response  that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts. Military  officials began tracking Hurricane Katrina when it was an unnamed  tropical depression and proactively took steps that led to a Katrina  response of more than 50,000 National Guard and more than 20,000 federal  military personnel, more than twice the size of the military response to  1992’s catastrophic Hurricane Andrew. By the time Katrina made landfall  in Louisiana and Mississippi on August 29, 2005, the military was  positioned to respond with both National Guard and federal forces.
Prior to Katrina’s landfall, active commands had published warning and  planning orders and DOD had already deployed Defense Coordinating  Officers to all the potentially affected states. DOD also deployed a joint  task force; medical personnel; helicopters; ships from Texas, Virginia, and  Maryland; and construction battalion engineers. Many of these capabilities  were providing assistance or deploying to the area within hours of  Katrina’s landfall. DOD also supported response and recovery operations  with communications equipment and many other critically needed  capabilities. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster  prompted DOD to deploy large active duty ground units beginning on  September 3, 2005, 5 days after Katrina’s landfall.
Prior to landfall, anticipating the disruption and damage that Hurricane  Katrina could cause, the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi activated  their National Guard units. In addition, National Guard officials in  Louisiana and Mississippi began to contact National Guard officials in  other states to request assistance. While National Guard forces from  Louisiana and Mississippi provided the bulk of the military support in the  first days after landfall, most of the Guard response to Hurricane Katrina  came later from outside the affected states. The National Guard Bureau  acted as a conduit to communicate requirements for assistance in  Louisiana and Mississippi to the adjutants general in the rest of the  country. The adjutants general of other states, with the authorization of  their state governors, then sent their National Guard troops to Louisiana  and Mississippi under emergency assistance agreements between the  states. Requirements for out-of-state National Guard or federal assistance  were increased because thousands of National Guard personnel from  Mississippi and Louisiana were already mobilized for other missions and  thus unavailable when Hurricane Katrina struck their states. The National  Guard troops that had been mobilized from within the affected states were  able to quickly deploy to where they were needed because they had  trained and planned for disaster mobilizations within their states. The  deployment of out-of-state forces, though quick when compared to past  catastrophes, took longer because mobilization plans were developed and  units were identified for deployment in the midst of the crisis. At the peak  of the military’s response, however, nearly 40,000 National Guard  members from other states were supporting operations in Louisiana and  Mississippi—an unprecedented domestic mobilization.
section_title: Challenges Provide Lessons for the Future
paragraphs: While the military response to Katrina was massive, it faced many  challenges, which provide lessons for the future, including the need for the  following:    Timely damage assessments. As with Hurricane Andrew, an underlying  problem in the response was the failure to quickly assess damage and gain  situational awareness. The NRP notes that local and state officials are  responsible for damage assessments during a disaster, but it also notes  that state and local officials could be overwhelmed in a catastrophe.  Despite this incongruous situation, the NRP did not specify the proactive  means necessary for the federal government to gain situational awareness  when state and local officials are overwhelmed. Moreover, DOD’s planning  did not call for the use of the military’s extensive reconnaissance assets to  meet the NRP catastrophic incident annex’s requirement for a proactive  response to catastrophic incidents. Because state and local officials were  overwhelmed and the military’s extensive reconnaissance capabilities  were not effectively leveraged as part of a proactive federal effort to  conduct timely, comprehensive damage assessments, the military began  organizing and deploying its response without fully understanding the  extent of the damage or the required assistance. According to military  officials, available reconnaissance assets could have provided additional  situational awareness during Hurricane Katrina, and in September 2005,  considerable surveillance assets were made available to assess damage  from Hurricane Rita, primarily because of the lessons learned from  Hurricane Katrina.
Improved communications. Hurricane Katrina caused significant  damage to the communication infrastructure in Louisiana and Mississippi,  which further contributed to a lack of situational awareness for military  and civilian officials. Even when local officials were able to conduct  damage assessments, the lack of communication assets caused delays in  transmitting the assessments. Under the NRP, the Department of  Homeland Security has responsibility for coordinating the  communications portion of disaster response operations. However,  neither the NRP, the Department of Homeland Security, nor DOD fully  identified the extensive military communication capabilities that could be  leveraged as part of a proactive federal response to a catastrophe. DOD’s  plan addressed internal military communications requirements but not the  communication requirements of communities affected by the disaster.  Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and the Department of  Homeland Security and DOD waited for requests for their assistance  rather than deploying a proactive response, some of the military’s  available communication assets were never requested or deployed. In  addition, some deployed National Guard assets were underutilized  because the sending states placed restrictions on their use.  Communications problems, like damage assessment problems, were also  highlighted following Hurricane Andrew.
Coordinated search and rescue efforts. While tens of thousands of  people were rescued after Katrina, the lack of clarity in search and rescue  plans led to operations that according to aviation officials, were not as  efficient as they could have been. The NRP addressed only part of the  search and rescue mission, and the National Search and Rescue Plan had  not been updated to reflect the NRP. As a result, the search and rescue  operations of the National Guard and federal military responders were not  fully coordinated, and military operations were not integrated with the  search and rescue operations of the Coast Guard and other rescuers. At  least two different locations were assigning search and rescue tasks to  military helicopter pilots operating over New Orleans, and no one had the  total picture of the missions that had been resourced and the missions that  still needed to be performed.
Clear logistics responsibilities. DOD had difficulty gaining visibility  over supplies and commodities when FEMA asked DOD to assume a  significant portion of its logistics responsibilities. Under the NRP, FEMA is  responsible for coordinating logistics during disaster response efforts, but  during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA quickly became overwhelmed. Four days  after Katrina’s landfall, FEMA asked DOD to take responsibility for  procurement, transportation, and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel, and  medical supplies. However, because FEMA lacked the capability to  maintain visibility—from order through final delivery—of the supplies and  commodities it had ordered, DOD did not know the precise locations of  the FEMA-ordered supplies and commodities when it assumed FEMA’s  logistics responsibilities. As a result of its lack of visibility over the meals  that were in transit, DOD had to airlift 1.7 million meals to Mississippi to  respond to a request from the Adjutant General of Mississippi, who was  concerned that food supplies were nearly exhausted.
Better integration of military forces. The military did not adequately  plan for the integration of large numbers of deployed troops from different  commands during disaster response operations. For example, a Louisiana  plan to integrate military responders from outside the state called for the  reception of not more than 300 troops per day. However, in the days  following Hurricane Katrina, more than 20,000 National Guard members  from other states arrived in Louisiana to join the response effort. In  addition, the National Guard and federal responses were coordinated  across several chains of command but not integrated, which led to some  inefficiencies and duplication of effort. Because military plans and  exercises had not provided a means for integrating the response, no one  had the total picture of the forces on the ground, the forces that were on  the way, the missions that had been resourced, and the missions that still  needed to be completed. Also, a key mobilization statute limits DOD’s  Reserve and National Guard units and members from being involuntarily  ordered to federal active duty for disaster response. As a result, all the  reservists who responded to Hurricane Katrina were volunteers, and they  made up a relatively small portion of the response compared to the  National Guard and active component members. Moreover, the process of  lining up volunteers can be time-consuming and is more appropriate for  mobilizing individuals than it is for mobilizing entire units or capabilities  that may be needed during a catastrophe. After Hurricane Andrew, we  identified this issue in two 1993 reports.
section_title: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Define and Guide Future Military Responses during Catastrophic Natural Disasters
paragraphs: Operational challenges are inevitable in any large-scale military  deployment, but the challenges that the military faced during its response  to Hurricane Katrina demonstrate the need for better planning and  exercising of catastrophic incidents in order to clearly identify military  capabilities that will be needed and the responsibilities that the military  will be expected to assume during these incidents. Prior to Katrina, plans  and exercises were generally inadequate for a catastrophic natural  disaster.
The National Response Plan. The NRP, which guides planning of  supporting federal agencies, lacks specificity as to how DOD should be  used and what resources it should provide in the event of a domestic  natural disaster. The NRP makes little distinction between the military  response to smaller, regional disasters and the military response to large- scale, catastrophic natural disasters. Even though past catastrophes, such  as Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 1989 earthquake in the San Francisco  area, showed that the military tends to play a much larger role in  catastrophes, the NRP lists very few specific DOD resources that should  be called upon in the event of a catastrophic natural disaster. Given the  substantial role the military is actually expected to play in a catastrophe— no other federal agency brings as many resources to bear—this lack of  detailed planning represents a critical oversight.
The DOD plan. When Hurricane Katrina made landfall, DOD’s plan for  providing defense assistance to civil authorities was nearly 9 years old and  was undergoing revision. The plan had not been aligned with the NRP and  had been written before the 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil  Support, which called for a focused reliance on the reserve components  for civil support missions. The plan did not account for the full range of  tasks and missions the military could need to provide in the event of a  catastrophe and had little provision for integrating active and reserve  component forces. It did not address key questions of integration,  command and control, and division of tasks between National Guard  resources under state control and federal resources under U.S. Northern  Command’s control. Moreover, the plan did not establish time frames for  the response.
National Guard plans. At the state level, the plans of the Louisiana and  Mississippi National Guards were inadequate for Katrina and not well  coordinated with those of other National Guard forces across the country.  The Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans appeared to be  adequate for smaller disasters, such as prior hurricanes, but they were  insufficient for a catastrophe and did not adequately account for the  outside assistance that could be needed during a catastrophe. For  example, Joint Forces Headquarters Louisiana modified its plan and  reassigned disaster responsibilities when thousands of Louisiana National  Guard personnel were mobilized for federal missions prior to Hurricane  Katrina. However, the Louisiana plan did not address the need to bring in  thousands of military troops from outside the state during a catastrophe.  Similarly, Mississippi National Guard officials told us that even their 1969  experience with Hurricane Camille, a category 5 storm that hit the same  general area, had not adequately prepared them for a catastrophic natural  disaster of Katrina’s magnitude. For example, the Mississippi National  Guard disaster plan envisioned the establishment of commodity  distribution centers, but it did not anticipate the number of centers that  could be required in a catastrophic event or following a nearly complete  loss of infrastructure. In addition, the National Guard Bureau had not  coordinated in advance with the governors and adjutants general in the  states and territories to develop plans to provide assistance for  catastrophic disasters across the country. Specifically, the bureau had not  identified the types of units that were likely to be needed during a  catastrophe or worked with the state governors and adjutants general to  develop and maintain a list of National Guard units from each state that  would likely be available to meet these requirements during catastrophic  natural disasters.
Exercises. An underlying reason that insufficient plans existed at all  levels is that the disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a  robust exercise program. Such exercises are designed to expose  weaknesses in plans and allow planners to refine them. As a result, when  Hurricane Katrina struck, a lack of understanding existed within the  military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of  assistance and capabilities that the military might provide, the timing of  this assistance, and the respective contributions of the National Guard and  federal military forces. The Homeland Security Council has issued 15  national planning scenarios—including a major hurricane scenario—that  provide the basis for disaster exercises throughout the nation. While DOD  sponsors or participates in no less than two major interagency field  exercises per year, few exercises led by the Department of Homeland  Security or DOD focused on catastrophic natural disasters, and none of  the exercises called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities in  response to a catastrophic hurricane. In addition, although DOD has  periodically held modest military support to civil authorities exercises, the  exercises used underlying assumptions that were unrealistic in preparing  for a catastrophe. For example, DOD assumed that first responders and  communications would be available and that the transportation  infrastructure would be navigable in a major hurricane scenario. Finally,  the First U.S. Army conducted planning and exercises in response to six  hurricanes in 2005. These exercises led to actions, such as the early  deployment of Defense Coordinating Officers, which enhanced disaster  response efforts. However, DOD’s exercise program was not adequate for  a catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude.
Based on our evaluation of the aforementioned plans and exercises, we  made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. First, we  called for DOD to work with the Department of Homeland Security to  update the NRP to fully address the proactive functions the military will be  expected to perform during a catastrophic incident. Second, we  recommended that DOD develop detailed plans and exercises to fully  account for the unique capabilities and support that the military is likely to  provide during a catastrophic incident, specifically addressing damage  assessments, communication, search and rescue, and logistics as well as  the integration of forces. Third, we called for the National Guard Bureau  to identify the National Guard capabilities that are likely to respond to  catastrophes in a state status and to share this information with active  commands within DOD. Finally, we recommended that DOD identify the  scalable federal military capabilities it will provide in response to the full  range of domestic disasters and catastrophes. We also raised a matter for  congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress consider lifting or  modifying the mobilization restriction—10 U.S.C. § 12304 (c)(1)—that  limits reserve component participation in catastrophic natural disasters.
section_title: DOD Is Taking Steps to Address Lessons Learned
paragraphs: DOD has collected lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina from a  variety of sources. Within the department, DOD has a formal set of  procedures to identify, capture, and share information collected as a result  of operations in order to enhance performance in future operations. Even  in the midst of the Hurricane Katrina response operation, officials from  various military organizations were collecting information on lessons  learned and this continued well after most operations had ceased. For  example, communications issues that had surfaced were studied by both  active and National Guard commands that had responded to Hurricane  Katrina. DOD also formed a task force to study the response and is  compiling and analyzing various military and other lessons-learned reports  to help design an improved response to future natural catastrophic events.  According to DOD officials, they have also reviewed White House and  congressional reports identifying lessons to be applied or challenges to be  addressed in future response operations.
As of today, DOD has also begun taking actions to enhance the military’s  preparedness for future catastrophic events. Specifically, in responding to  our recently issued report, DOD generally concurred with our  recommendations for action and told us that it had developed plans to  address them. DOD noted, for example, that the NRP would be revised to  plan for a significant DOD role in a catastrophe and a more-detailed DOD  operational plan that has been in draft would be finalized. Our  recommendations and DOD’s response to them are shown in appendix I.
In addition, DOD said that it was taking several additional actions,  including    colocating specially trained defense department personnel at FEMA  regional offices;  folding support from federal reconnaissance agencies into the military’s  civil support processes;    developing “pre-scripted” requests that would ease the process for civilian  agencies to request military support;    conducting extensive exercises, including the recently completed Ardent  Sentry and other planned events, with FEMA; and    delegating authority for deploying defense coordinating elements and  placing on “prepare to deploy” orders communications, helicopter, aerial  reconnaissance, and patient-evacuation capabilities.
The department plans to complete many of these steps by June 1, 2006— the start of the next hurricane season—but acknowledged that some  needed actions will take longer to complete. Since details about many of  the department’s actions were still emerging as we completed our review,  we were unable to fully assess the effectiveness of DOD’s plans, but they  do appear to hold promise.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: In conclusion, while DOD’s efforts to date to address the Hurricane  Katrina lessons learned are steps in the right direction—and the  department deserves credit for taking them—these are clearly only the  first steps that will be needed. The issues cut across agency boundaries,  and thus they cannot be addressed by the military alone. The NRP  framework envisions a proactive national response involving the collective  efforts of responder organizations at all levels of government. Looking  forward, part of DOD’s challenge is the sheer number of organizations at  all levels of government that are involved, both military and civilian. In  addition, many of the problems encountered during the Katrina response  are long-standing and were also reported after Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  Because of the complexity and long-standing nature of these problems,  DOD’s planned and ongoing actions must receive sustained top- management attention, not only at DOD but across the government, in  order to effect needed improvements in the military’s support to civil  authorities. While the issues are complex, they are also urgent, and  experience has illustrated that the military has critical and substantial  capabilities that will be needed in the wake of catastrophic events.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information regarding this statement, please contact me at  (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions  to this statement include John Pendleton, Assistant Director, Michael  Ferren, Kenya Jones, and Leo Sullivan.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO’s Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to Improve Military Support and DOD’s Response
paragraphs: Department of Defense (DOD) Response (dated May 5, 2006)
Provide the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with  proposed revisions to the National Response Plan (NRP) that will  fully address the proactive functions the military will be expected to  perform during a catastrophic incident, for inclusion in the next NRP  update.
DOD said that it is working with the Department of Homeland  Security to revise the NRP. While DOD stated that the long-term  focus of the U.S. government should be to develop more robust  domestic disaster capabilities within the Department of  Homeland Security, it acknowledged that DOD will need to  assume a more robust response role in the interim period and  when other responders lack the resources and expertise to  handle a particular disaster.
Establish milestones and expedite the development of detailed  plans and exercises to fully account for the unique capabilities and  support that the military is likely to provide to civil authorities in  response to the full range of domestic disasters, including  catastrophes. The plans and exercises should specifically address  the use of reconnaissance capabilities to assess damage, use of  communications capabilities to facilitate support to civil authorities,  integration of active component and National Guard and Reserve  forces, use of search and rescue capabilities and the military’s role  in search and rescue, and role the military might be expected to  play in logistics.
DOD listed a number of steps it is taking to improve its disaster  response planning and exercises and said that consistent with its  Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the active  component should complement, but not duplicate, the National  Guard’s likely role as an early responder. DOD also said that  planning and exercises should include local, state, and federal  representatives and should stress the responders with the  highest degree of realism possible—to the breaking point if  possible.
Direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to work with the state  governors and adjutants general to develop and maintain a list of  the types of capabilities the National Guard will likely provide in  response to domestic natural disasters under state-to-state mutual  assistance agreements along with the associated units that could  provide these capabilities, and make this information available to  the U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and  other organizations with federal military support to civil authority  planning responsibilities.
DOD listed steps the U.S. Northern Command is taking to better  understand the capabilities of National Guard units, and it stated  that the National Guard is creating a database to facilitate  planning its employment in support of the homeland.
Establish milestones and identify the types of scalable federal  military capabilities and the units that could provide those  capabilities in response to the full range of domestic disasters and  catastrophes covered by DOD’s defense support to civil authorities  plans.
DOD noted that it has developed scalable capability packages in  conjunction with pre-scripted requests for assistance and U.S.  Northern Command’s Contingency Plan 2501, which is  scheduled to be signed in the spring of 2006.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.