Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs More Comprehensive Infrastructure and Workforce Data to Improve Enterprise Decision-making
Published: 2011-02-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States intends to invest about $80 billion to maintain and modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities and infrastructure over the next decade. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), maintains the nation's nuclear weapons through its Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). NNSA uses contractors to manage and operate eight separate sites, referred to as the nuclear security enterprise, to achieve the SSP's mission. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to review the SSP. This report focuses on the extent to which NNSA has the data necessary to make informed, enterprisewide decisions, particularly data on the condition of infrastructure, capital improvement projects, shared use of facilities, and critical human capital skills. GAO analyzed agency infrastructure data; reviewed agency directives and guidance; and interviewed DOE, NNSA, and contractor officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In its FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA outlines plans for substantial investments in important nuclear weapons capabilities and physical infrastructure. However, the agency lacks important enterprisewide infrastructure and workforce data needed for informed decision-making. In response to this shortcoming, which NNSA recognizes, the agency is considering the use of computer models that integrate data from across the enterprise, which, if fully realized, may give decision-makers a tool to take a broad and accurate assessment of the situation. Specifically, (1) NNSA does not have accurate, reliable, or complete data on the condition and replacement value of its almost 3,000 weapons activities facilities. This is, in part, because NNSA has not ensured contractor compliance with a DOE directive that requires facility inspections at least once every 5 years. For example, according to data in DOE's Facilities Information Management System (FIMS), as of April 2010, 26 percent of facilities have either an inspection date outside of the 5-year period or no inspection date recorded. NNSA officials stated that they are aware of the limitations of FIMS data and told us that they use a variety of other methods to track site facility conditions, such as budget requests and daily dialogue with federal and contractor personnel at the sites. (2) NNSA has identified 15 ongoing capital improvement projects as necessary to ensure future viability of the program, but the agency does not have estimated total costs or completion dates for all projects. For example, NNSA has not estimated total costs for the largest projects it is conducting--the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. DOE regulations do not require a total cost estimate until the initial design phase is complete, but without reliable cost and schedule data NNSA does not have a sound basis to justify decisions and planned budget increases. (3) NNSA has identified a need to effectively manage facilities used by more than one site--known as shared use assets--and issued a directive in 2009 requiring identification of these assets and a review of the governance plan developed for each designated facility to ensure that the plans align with programmatic priorities and that users enterprisewide have well supported access to these facilities. However, NNSA has not collected data on shared use assets and has not reviewed individual management plans. (4) NNSA lacks comprehensive data on the critical skills and levels needed to maintain the SSP's capabilities. NNSA primarily relies on its contractors to maintain the workforce and, while these efforts may be effective for a specific site, NNSA lacks assurance that the overall program is maintained. Without such data, NNSA cannot forecast the impact of programmatic actions or identify consequences of those actions. NNSA officials told GAO that the agency recently established an Office of Corporate Talent and Critical Skills to bring attention to these issues.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that NNSA take four actions to ensure that it is equipped with the information needed to effectively and efficiently manage the SSP. NNSA stated that it understood and can implement GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Based on policy set forth in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, a  legislatively-mandated review in which the Administration established the  nation’s nuclear weapons requirements and policy, the United States  intends to invest about $80 billion over the next 10 years to support and  modernize the nation’s nuclear weapons capabilities and physical  infrastructure. In response to the review, the National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA)—a semi-autonomous agency within the  Department of Energy (DOE) that maintains the nation’s nuclear weapons  through its Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)—established a FY 2011  Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which provides additional  details on the nation’s nuclear direction. As part of this plan and arms  control treaties, the United States has agreed to reduce the size of its  strategic nuclear weapon stockpile from a maximum of 2,200 to 1,550  weapons. Nonetheless, the remaining weapons in the stockpile continue to  be an essential element of the U.S. defense strategy. As we have reported,  the SSP faces a number of challenges in sustaining the stockpile of nuclear  weapons over the long-term. In particular, these weapons are aging to  well beyond their intended lifespan. Further, many of the facilities  supporting the nuclear weapons program date back to the 1940s and 1950s  Cold War era, and NNSA reported in its Stockpile Stewardship and  Management Plan that they have become difficult and costly to maintain.  In addition, the agency reported that an aging workforce and difficulty in  recruiting personnel with specialized skills are resulting in the loss of  knowledge, capabilities, and skills necessary to sustain the nation’s  nuclear weapons program and maintain the stockpile.
The United States ceased underground nuclear testing in 1992, and current  national policy prohibits the development of newly designed nuclear  weapons. In lieu of testing and producing new weapons, NNSA relies on  science-based activities, such as analytical simulations and laboratory  experiments, to ensure the existing weapons remain safe and reliable. In  addition, NNSA refurbishes weapons in the stockpile to extend their  operational lives. NNSA carries out these activities through several  thousand facilities located at eight geographically dispersed government- owned, contractor-operated sites, which include three national  laboratories, four production sites, and one test site. Collectively, these  sites are referred to as the nuclear security enterprise. At these sites,  nearly 24,000 management and operation (M&O) contractor employees  support the nation’s nuclear weapons through, among other things,  computer modeling, dismantlement of weapons, storage of nuclear  material, weapon component production, and non-nuclear tests and  experimentation on weapons and weapons components. NNSA recognizes  in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan that it must  effectively manage resources dedicated to the nuclear weapons program  to ensure the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable.  To do so, NNSA reported in an internal document that it is committed to  creating an interdependent, efficient enterprise by, in part, integrating and  aggregating data from across the sites to create an interconnected and  comprehensive view of the products, people, and facilities of the  enterprise.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed  GAO to conduct a review of selected elements of the SSP. We briefed the  Senate and House Armed Services Committees of our findings in July 2010.  This report provides the results of additional audit work completed after  our briefing and focuses on the extent to which NNSA has the data  necessary to make informed, enterprisewide decisions, particularly the  extent to which it has identified the condition and value of existing  infrastructure, developed cost estimates and completion dates for planned  capital improvement projects, managed shared use assets within the  enterprise, and inventoried the critical human capital skills needed to  maintain the SSP.
In conducting our work, we reviewed NNSA documents and directives,  including the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the FY 2011 Stockpile  Stewardship and Management Plan; met with DOE, NNSA, and  contractor officials; assessed the reliability of the data provided; and  visited four of the eight enterprise sites. To determine the condition of  nuclear weapons facilities, we reviewed M&O contractor’s 10-year site  plans for each enterprise site and obtained and analyzed data from DOE’s  Facilities Information Management System (FIMS). However, we  determined during our analysis of the data that the inspection dates for  some of its facilities were missing or out of date and the replacement  property values were inconsistent across the enterprise. As a result, we do  not believe the condition index data are sufficiently reliable for presenting  the condition of existing infrastructure. Furthermore, we toured a  nonrandom sample of facilities at the Los Alamos and Sandia National  Laboratories in New Mexico, the Pantex Plant in Texas, and the Nevada  National Security Site. In selecting our site visit locations, we considered  a number of factors, including the type of site (production, laboratory, or  test); missions carried out at the sites; the potential for shared use  facilities; and geographic location. The data we obtained from our site  visits are used as examples and cannot be generalized to indicate  condition throughout the nuclear security enterprise. To determine  NNSA’s plans for improvements to enterprise infrastructure, we collected  and analyzed information from agency officials on all capital improvement  projects identified by NNSA as ongoing projects. To determine the extent  to which NNSA has identified shared use facilities within the enterprise  and how these facilities are managed, we reviewed NNSA’s 2009 facility  governance directive and met with NNSA, Los Alamos, and Sandia officials  to discuss shared use facilities. To determine NNSA’s efforts to maintain  the critical human capital skills of the SSP, we reviewed NNSA’s  Development of the NNSA Critical/Capability Inventory draft report and  the Report of the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear  Weapons Expertise. A more detailed description of our scope and  methodology is presented in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to February 2011  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1993, DOE, at the direction of the President and Congress, established  the SSP to sustain the safety and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear  weapons stockpile without returning to the use of underground nuclear  tests. NNSA administers the program through its Office of Defense  Programs. This responsibility encompasses many different tasks, including  the manufacture, storage, assembly, nonnuclear testing, qualifying, and  dismantlement of weapons in the stockpile. To accomplish the mission of  the program, the Office of Defense Programs relies on private M&O  contractors to carry out various tasks at each of the nuclear security  enterprise sites. (See fig. 1.)  NNSA reimburses its M&O contractors under  cost-reimbursement-type contracts for the costs incurred in carrying out  the department’s missions. The contractors, in turn, may subcontract out  major portions of their work, especially in mission-support areas such as  constructing and maintaining facilities. While most day-to-day activities  are managed and operated by the various contractors, NNSA is  responsible for the planning, budgeting, and ensuring the execution of  interconnected activities across the eight sites that comprise the  enterprise.
Nuclear weapons are technically complex devices with a multitude of  components and over time, a weapon’s reliability could decline unless  mitigating precautions are taken. Since the establishment of the SSP,  NNSA has worked with its M&O contractors to provide data on weapon  phenomena through science-based approaches that assess the safety and  reliability of the weapons in the stockpile and that seek to extend their  operational lives. As a result of these efforts, since 1996, the Secretaries of  Energy and Defense have provided the President with independent reports  prepared individually by the directors of the three weapons laboratories  and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command confirming that the  stockpile is safe and reliable and that there is no need to resume  underground nuclear testing.
During the past 15 years, Congress has made significant investments in the  nation’s stockpile stewardship capabilities, and NNSA has identified a  number of accomplishments it has achieved in fulfilling the SSP mission.  For example, the SSP has completed a life extension program for one  warhead; conducted numerous weapon alterations to address safety,  reliability, or performance issues; and has dismantled more than 7,000  nuclear weapons since fiscal year 1991. Further, the SSP reestablished the  capability to produce plutonium pits—a key component of nuclear  warheads.
In its recently released Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan for  Fiscal Year 2011, NNSA stated that the SSP’s mission is dependent upon  the enterprise’s facilities and physical infrastructure and the critical skills  of its workforce.
Facilities and Infrastructure. NNSA’s real property portfolio dedicated to  its nuclear weapons mission is vast, with thousands of facilities and  associated infrastructure. A number of these facilities are unique national  assets used for research and development. As such, while individual  contractors operate a given facility, its capabilities may be needed to  support users and activities across the enterprise.
NNSA has three categories of facilities and infrastructure that indicate the  extent to which they are critical to the achievement of the SSP. These  categories are:  (1)  Mission critical. Facilities and infrastructure that are used to  perform activities—such as nuclear weapons production, research  and development, and storage—to meet the highest-level SSP goals,  without which operations would be disrupted or placed at risk.  (2)  Mission dependent, not critical. Facilities and infrastructure—such  as waste management, nonnuclear storage, and machine shops—that  play a supporting role in meeting the SSP’s goals, without which  operations would be disrupted only if they could not resume within 5  business days.  (3)  Not mission dependent. Facilities and infrastructure—such as  cafeterias, parking structures, and excess facilities—that do not link  directly to SSP goals but support secondary missions or quality-of- workplace initiatives.
Many of the facilities and infrastructure of the enterprise were constructed  more than 50 years ago, and NNSA has reported that they are reaching the  end of their useful lives. NNSA is undertaking a number of capital  improvement projects to modernize and maintain these facilities. To  identify and prioritize capital improvement project needs, NNSA is to  follow DOE directives and guidance for project management. Among these  is DOE Order 413.3A, which establishes protocols for planning and  executing a project. The protocols require DOE projects to go through a  series of five critical decisions as they enter each new phase of work:    Critical decision 0. Approves a mission-related need.
Critical decision 1. Approves the selection of a preferred solution to meet  a mission need and a preliminary estimate of project costs based on a  review of a project’s conceptual design.
Critical decision 2. Approves that a project’s cost and schedule estimates  are accurate and complete based on a review of the project’s completed  preliminary design.
Critical decision 3. Reaches agreement that a project’s final design is  sufficiently complete and that resources can be committed toward  procurement and construction.
Critical decision 4. Approves that a project has met its completion criteria  or that or that the facility is ready to start operations.
To oversee projects and approve these critical decisions, NNSA conducts  its own reviews, often with the help of independent technical experts.
Critical Human Capital Skills. NNSA reports that sustaining a large  number of critical skills throughout the enterprise is central to the mission  of the SSP. The importance of these critical skills has been of interest to  Congress for a number of years. For example, in the National Defense  Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1997, Congress established the  Commission of Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise  (referred to as the Chiles Commission). Congress tasked the commission  to review ongoing efforts of DOE to attract scientific, engineering, and  technical personnel and to develop a plan for the recruitment and  retention within the DOE nuclear weapons complex. The Chiles  Commission reviewed efforts across the enterprise and developed a  number of recommendations, including the need to develop and  implement a detailed and long-term site-specific and enterprisewide plan  for replenishing the nuclear weapons workforce. NNSA reported in its  response to Congress that it will take a number of actions, including giving  greater attention to ensuring sites devote adequate resources to critical  skills generation, retention, and regeneration.
section_title: NNSA Lacks Key Data Required to Make Informed, Enterprisewide Decisions, but Is Considering the Use of Computer Models That May Help Address Some Shortcomings
paragraphs: NNSA lacks comprehensive data needed for informed enterprisewide  decision-making; however, according to a NNSA official and agency  documents, NNSA is considering the use of computer models that may  help to address some of these critical shortcomings.
subsections: section_title: NNSA Lacks Comprehensive Data Required to Make Informed, Enterprisewide Decisions
paragraphs: We found that NNSA lacks complete data on (1) the condition and value of  its existing infrastructure, (2) cost estimates and completion dates for  planned capital improvement projects, (3) shared use facilities within the  enterprise, and (4) critical human capital skills in its M&O contractor  workforce needed to maintain the SSP.
Facilities and Infrastructure Data. NNSA does not have accurate and  reliable data on the condition and replacement value of its facilities and  other infrastructure. This is in part because NNSA (1) has not ensured  that contractors comply with a DOE directive that requires facility  inspections at least once every 5 years, and (2) does not ensure  consistency among the varying approaches and methodologies contractors  use when determining replacement property value.
DOE requires its sites—including those within the nuclear security  enterprise—to assess the condition of all real property at least once during  any 5-year period. Sites are to use the results of these assessments to  identify maintenance costs, which are then compared to the replacement  property value for the facility. Using this information, DOE is to calculate a  condition index for each of its facilities and other infrastructure. While  DOE requires periodic condition assessments, in our analysis of data in  DOE’s agencywide infrastructure database, the Facilities Information  Management System (FIMS), we found 765 of DOE’s 2,897 weapons  activities facilities, or 26 percent, have not met this requirement—having  either an inspection date outside of the 5-year period or no inspection date  recorded (see table 1). NNSA officials report that FIMS is the only  centralized repository for infrastructure data and that the agency, in part,  relies on these data to support funding decisions.
Further, we found that sites used varying approaches and methodologies  in determining deferred maintenance and replacement property values,  but did so without validation from NNSA that the various methods were  consistent with base criteria and could be aggregated for decision-making  purposes. In fact, during an inspection conducted in July 2008 of one site’s  approach, NNSA found that the methodology for determining deferred  maintenance and replacement property values were “suspect, difficult to  validate, and unreliable.” In addition, the agency stated in the inspection  report that it was concerned that the site’s approach for conducting  inspections was resulting in inconsistent calculation of repair and  maintenance costs from year to year. NNSA conducted a follow-up  assessment in April 2010 and reported that the site had made progress in  addressing the concerns highlighted in the 2008 assessment but significant  efforts are still needed to reach satisfactory levels.
A site official at one location also told us that even though the site  complied with DOE requirements to conduct an inspection of all facilities  at least once every 5 years, NNSA’s data on facility and infrastructure  condition for that site is not always accurate because an inspection from 3  to 5 years ago does not always reflect the rapid degradation of some  facilities. In particular, the official noted that, in the last 2 years, the site  experienced about $36 million of unplanned facility maintenance. NNSA  officials stated that they are aware of the limitations of FIMS data and  know that conditions change more rapidly than can be tracked by 5-year  assessments. As a result, NNSA officials told us the agency also uses a  variety of other methods to track site facility conditions, including budget  requests, regularly updated planning documents, and daily dialogue with  federal and contractor personnel at the sites. However, as we have  reported, agencies that have a centralized database with accurate and  reliable data on their facilities can better support investment decisions in  planning and budgeting.
Data on Capital Improvement Projects. NNSA does not have estimated  total costs or completion dates for all planned capital improvement  projects. While NNSA identified each of its ongoing projects as necessary  to ensure future viability of the program, without more complete  information on these projects NNSA cannot identify how the timing of  these projects impacts other projects or how delays could increase costs  and impact budgetary requirements in future year planning.
NNSA identified 15 ongoing capital improvement projects to replace or  improve existing infrastructure (see app. II for detailed information on  each capital improvement project). The status of these projects range from  preliminary design to completion, with some projects scheduled for  completion in 2022. The estimated cost associated with the ongoing  projects range from $35 million for the replacement of fire protection  piping at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, to up to $3.5 billion for  construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 Plant in  Oak Ridge, Tennessee. However, NNSA does not have key information for  a number of these projects, including initial estimates for cost, amount of  remaining funding needed to complete the project, or completion dates.  NNSA officials offered two explanations for this lack of complete  information. First, they said that the lack of data is due in part to the early  design phase for some of these projects. For example, NNSA’s highest  infrastructure priorities—CMRR and UPF—are still in design and  according to NNSA officials final cost estimates for capital improvement  projects will not be available until design is 90 percent complete. NNSA’s  current estimate prepared in 2007 for UPF indicates the project will cost  between $1.4 and $3.5 billion to construct. As we recently reported, the  2007 figure is more than double the agency’s 2004 estimate of between  $600 million and $1.1 billion. In addition, we reported that the costs for  project engineering and design, which are less than halfway completed,  have increased by about 42 percent—from $297 to $421 million. For  CMRR, as of October 2010, NNSA did not provide us with an estimated  completion cost for the project but based on information reported in the  Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan the agency is using a  planning figure of approximately $8 billion for completion of both UPF  and CMRR. In response to our reports, DOE and NNSA have recently  initiated a number of actions that, if fully implemented, may improve its  management of capital improvement projects.
Second, a NNSA official told us that changes in project scope and  unforeseen complications have hindered the agency’s ability to estimate  costs and completion dates for some projects. For example, an NNSA  official said that the project to upgrade the Radioactive Liquid Waste  Treatment facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory had an initial cost  estimate of $82 to $104 million, but site officials at Los Alamos reported to  NNSA a need to change the building materials used in the original design  estimate. As a result, the NNSA official told us this project is estimated at  over $300 million.
Our prior work has identified persistent problems at NNSA with cost  overruns and schedule delays for capital improvement projects. For  example, we found that NNSA’s National Ignition Facility—a high energy  laser that NNSA reports will improve its understanding of nuclear  weapons—was $1 billion over budget, and over 5 years in delays. As we  have reported, without reliable information on costs and schedules, NNSA  will not have a sound basis for making decisions on how to most  effectively manage its portfolio of projects and other programs and will  lack information that could help justify planned budget increases or target  cost savings opportunities. .  A LANSCE cientit review the      proposand the safety nd ecrity      checklind comment on the prcticl      feasility, environmentsafety nd      helth, nd ecrity aspect of the      propoed work.
Shared Enterprise Assets. NNSA lacks complete data to ensure that  facilities with unique capabilities that are used by more than one site— known as shared assets—are effectively utilized. The enterprise comprises  numerous state-of-the-art research facilities that NNSA describes as being  unique national assets. These shared assets, which are found at the  national weapons labs, plants, and test site, represent a large and  continuing investment of U.S. resources and offer advanced science and  technology capabilities that are desirable for solving problems throughout  the enterprise. NNSA delegates responsibility for operating authority of  these facilities to its M&O contractors, though NNSA broadly defines the  scope of work to be performed at a facility. According to NNSA and site  officials, the process to determine specific users and individual activities  at the facilities are managed by each individual facility. For example, the  Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE)—a powerful proton  accelerator used for, among other things, nuclear weapons research—has  a management plan governing its submission and review process for  shared use of the facility that only applies to LANSCE. Other shared assets  operate under their own management plans.
NNSA has identified a need to effectively manage these assets  enterprisewide to ensure that programmatic priorities are addressed and  that users enterprisewide have well supported access to these facilities. In  February 2009, NNSA developed a directive stating that the Assistant  Deputy Administrators within the Office of Defense Programs will (1)  select and approve the research and development facilities to be  designated as shared assets, and (2) review and concur on the governance  plan developed for each designated facility. However, we found that NNSA  does not have information on which facilities are designated as shared use  assets, and a NNSA official told us the agency has not reviewed individual  management plans throughout the enterprise to ensure that each facilities’  submission and review process for use of the facility provides for adequate  enterprisewide access.
Critical Human Capital Skills. NNSA lacks comprehensive information  on the status of its M&O contractor workforce. Specifically, the agency  does not have an enterprisewide workforce baseline of critical human  capital skills and levels for the contractor workforce to effectively  maintain the capabilities needed to achieve its mission. NNSA officials  said this is primarily because NNSA relies on its contractors to track these  critical skills. While contractor efforts may be effective at a specific site,  these efforts do not ensure long-term survival of these skills across the  enterprise, nor do they provide NNSA with the information needed to  make enterprisewide decisions that have implications on human capital.
NNSA reports in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan that  sustaining a large number of critical capabilities throughout the enterprise  is central to the mission of stockpile stewardship and that maintaining the  right mix of skills is a significant challenge. The agency also reported that  the enterprise is losing critical capabilities, stating that the M&O  contractor workforce has been reduced significantly in the past 20 years,  which has decreased the availability of personnel with required critical  skills. Further, NNSA stated in a 2009 internal human capital critical  skills report that the site-based independent approach to sustaining key  capabilities has not always been sufficient. For example, NNSA reported  that increased retirements and higher than normal turnover rates have  depleted the intellectual and technical knowledge and skills needed to  sustain critical capabilities. Specifically, in that report, NNSA attributed  problems that caused delays on an ongoing life extension program to the  loss of skilled employees.
Over the last several years, there have been many efforts to characterize  the state of the critical human capital skills associated with the enterprise  and to project its availability. In its 2009 internal human capital critical  skills report, NNSA identified some preliminary actions it needs to take to  maintain critical skills, which include (1) identifying enterprisewide  functions and critical skills needs, (2) establishing common language and  definitions across the enterprise, (3) assessing the current state of the  program, and (4) identifying potential solutions to attract and retain  critical skills. These actions are consistent with best practices we reported  on human capital issues. Specifically, our work has shown that the ability  of federal agencies to achieve their missions and carry out their  responsibilities depends in large part on whether they can sustain a  workforce that possesses the necessary education, knowledge, skills, and  competencies. To do so, agencies need to be aware of the number of  employees they need with specific skills, competencies, and levels that are  critical to achieving their missions and goals, and identify any gaps  between their current workforce and the workforce they will need in the  future. Identifying mission-critical occupations, skills, and competencies  can help agencies adjust to changes in technology, budget constraints, and  other factors that alter the environment in which they operate.
Nevertheless, NNSA officials told us that the agency had, until recently,  made limited progress completing these actions. In October 2010,  however, NNSA established the Office of Corporate Talent and Critical  Skills to bring focused attention to meeting critical human capital skills  and announced that the agency hired a director to develop and implement  a critical skills sustainment strategy. The newly hired Director told us that  NNSA has begun the process of reassessing the need for the activities  identified in the 2009 report to be completed but has not yet established  time frames or milestones for completing these efforts. In addition, NNSA  officials stated that the agency sponsors academic outreach programs to  provide a linkage between the agency and the talent that have the skills  needed to complete certain SSP activities.
section_title: NNSA Is Considering the Use of Computer Models That May Improve Its Enterprise Decision- Making Capability
paragraphs: NNSA, recognizing that its ability to make informed enterprisewide  decisions is hampered by the lack of comprehensive data and analytical  tools, is considering the use of computer models—quantitative tools that  couple data from each site with the functions of the enterprise—to  integrate and analyze data to create an interconnected view of the  enterprise, which may help to address some of the critical shortcomings  we identified. A NNSA official told us that if the enterprise modeling  efforts are fully realized it will give decision-makers an additional tool to  take a broad and accurate assessment of the enterprise and to highlight  the interdependencies between various components of the enterprise so  that trade-offs between costs and benefits can be analyzed.
In July 2009, NNSA tasked the eight M&O contractor sites to form an  enterprise modeling consortium. NNSA stated in a 2009 Enterprise  Modeling Consortium Project Plan for FY 2010-2012 that the consortium  is responsible for leading efforts to acquire and maintain enterprise data,  enhance stakeholder confidence, integrate modeling capabilities, and fill  in any gaps that are identified. Since its creation, the consortium has  identified areas in which enterprise modeling projects could provide  NNSA with reliable data and modeling capabilities, including  infrastructure and critical skills. In addition to identifying these areas, a  NNSA official told us its first steps are to build a collection of “trusted data  sources” and inventory of the existing models used throughout the  enterprise. Once the initial phase is complete, the official told us it will  work with the sites to assess the various data collected across the  enterprise, identify any data gaps, and then determine whether an existing  approach can be integrated across the sites to provide NNSA with  consistent and reliable enterprise data.
A NNSA official told us that they are in the process of developing a plan of  action for fiscal year 2011 outlining the next steps and identifying goals  and milestones. As the benefits of these tools depend on the quality of the  data, the official stated that a key action for fiscal year 2011 will be to  determine the accuracy and reliability of data that will populate the  models.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NNSA faces a complex task planning, budgeting, and ensuring the  execution of interconnected activities across the eight M&O contractor  sites that comprise the nuclear security enterprise. Among other things,  maintaining government-owned facilities that were constructed more than  50 years ago and ensuring M&O contractors are sustaining critical human  capital skills that are highly technical in nature and limited in supply are  difficult undertakings. Congress has long insisted that, as prerequisite to  the modernization of the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure,  the current and past administrations develop firm nuclear weapons policy,  requirements, and plans. With the completion of the congressionally- mandated Nuclear Posture Review and the Stockpile Stewardship and  Management Plan, the Administration has made strides to meet  congressional expectations. In doing so, it has pledged billions of dollars  over the next decade to improve key stockpile stewardship capabilities,  modernize and, in some cases, replace aging infrastructure, and maintain a  highly skilled and specialized workforce in order to ensure the continued  safety, reliability, and performance of our nuclear deterrent without  returning to underground nuclear testing. For NNSA to fully meet  expectations, however, it must be able to demonstrate to Congress that it  can effectively manage its program so that planned budget increases are  targeted to areas that will produce demonstrable returns on investments.  While this task is far broader and more challenging than the scope of this  report, certain data related issues are currently hindering NNSA’s  enterprisewide decision-making capabilities and its ability to justify  programmatic choices to Congress. These include the lack of (1)  consistent, accurate, and complete data on the condition of its facilities;  (2) assurance that contractors are in compliance with a DOE directive  (DOE Order 430.1B) requiring facility inspections to ensure that sites’  varying approaches in determining deferred maintenance and real  property values are valid and consistent; (3) information on shared use  assets—although a NNSA directive (NNSA Supplemental Directive M  452.3) identifies the need for the federal and contractor officials to identify  and ensure proper governance of these assets; and (4) comprehensive data  on its M&O contractors’ workforce—to include identification of critical  human capital skills, competencies, and staffing levels—as well as a plan  with time frames and milestones for collecting this data. Continuing to  make decisions without a full understanding of programmatic impact is  not the most effective approach for program management or use of federal  resources.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend the Administrator of NNSA take the following four  actions.
To ensure that NNSA is equipped with the information needed to  effectively and efficiently manage the Stockpile Stewardship Program:    Develop standardized practices for assessing the condition of its facilities  and review the sites’ methodologies for determining replacement value to  ensure consistency, accuracy, and completeness throughout the  enterprise.
Ensure contractor compliance with DOE Order 430.1B: Real Property  Asset Management, which requires routine inspections of all facilities.
Ensure federal and contractor compliance with NNSA Supplemental  Directive NA-1 SD M 452.3: Managing the Operation of Shared NNSA  Assets and Shared National Resources, which requires NNSA’s sites to  identify shared assets and NNSA to review the governance plans  developed for each facility.
Establish a plan with time frames and milestones for the development of a  comprehensive contractor workforce baseline that includes the  identification of critical human capital skills, competencies, and levels  needed to maintain the nation’s nuclear weapons strategy.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided NNSA with a draft of this report for their review and  comment. NNSA provided written comments, which are reproduced in  appendix III. NNSA stated that it understood our recommendations and  believes that it can implement them. NNSA did state, however, that it  believed the report provided an incomplete picture of how the agency  makes enterprisewide decisions concerning facilities and infrastructure. In  response, we added additional details of NNSA’s decision making  processes for facilities and infrastructure (see p. 12). Additionally, NNSA  noted that its shortfall in required inspections occurs primarily in facilities  that are not critical to the SSP mission. We believe that our report  adequately reflects this. We also note that over 1,000 facilities identified by  NNSA as not critical—such as waste management facilities and machine  shops—play important supporting roles in the SSP mission and can, by  NNSA’s own definition, disrupt operations if they are non-functional for  more than 5 business days. Over 150 of these facilities have an inspection  date outside of the required 5-year inspection period or no inspection date  recorded. Finally, NNSA provided us with updated data from its FIMS  database to show that additional inspections of facilities were conducted  since the time of our analysis. We noted this updated data in our report,  but did not independently verify the analysis NNSA conducted (see p. 11).  NNSA also provided other additional technical information, which we  incorporated where appropriate.
NNSA’s letter also described a number of broader management initiatives  that, when fully implemented, could enhance the agency’s enterprise  decision making. While we are encouraged that NNSA is taking these  steps, it is unclear whether the actions identified in the agency’s response  would address the current shortfalls we identified in the data on  infrastructure, capital improvement projects, shared use of facilities, and  critical human capital skills. We continue to believe that our  recommendations would provide decision makers with an increased  enterprisewide knowledge that would be beneficial to understand the  potential impact of programmatic decisions.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3841 or aloiseg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In conducting our work, we reviewed National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA) documents and directives, including the 2010  Nuclear Posture Review and the FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and  Management Plan; met with Department of Energy (DOE), NNSA, and  contractor officials; assessed the reliability of the data provided; and  visited four of the eight enterprise sites. Specifically, to determine the  condition of nuclear weapons facilities, we reviewed management and  operation (M&O) contractor’s 10-year site plans for each enterprise site,  and we obtained and analyzed data from DOE’s Facilities Information  Management System (FIMS). DOE extracted data from FIMS in April 2010,  for all facilities and other structures identified within the database as  supporting NNSA’s nuclear weapon program. As a DOE directive requires  inspection of facilities at least once every 5 years, we further limited our  review to those facilities and other structures built prior to April 2005.  Further, we limited our review to facilities and other structures identified  within FIMS as being in current operational status. We worked with DOE  and NNSA to ensure the data provided to us, current as of April 2010, met  these criteria.  Based on our analysis of this FIMS data, we determined  that data needed to evaluate condition are incomplete, possibly out of  date, and inconsistent across the sites. As a result, we do not believe they  are sufficiently reliable for presenting current property condition.  In  response to our draft report, NNSA provided us with its own analysis of  facility condition based on more recent FIMS data.  We did not, however,   independently verify the analysis, the results of which are noted on p. 11.   We did not independently verify the agency’s analysis of the data.  We  toured a nonrandom sample of facilities at the Los Alamos and Sandia  National Laboratories in New Mexico, the Pantex Plant in Texas, and the  Nevada National Security Site. In selecting our site visit locations, we  considered a number of factors, including the type of site (production,  laboratory, or test), missions carried out at the sites, the potential for  shared use facilities, and geographic location. The data we obtained from  our site visits are used as examples and cannot be generalized to indicate  condition throughout the nuclear security enterprise. To determine  NNSA’s plans for improvements to enterprise infrastructure, NNSA  identified all ongoing capital improvement projects and provided us with  data for these projects. We did not independently confirm or evaluate the  agency’s data. To determine the extent to which NNSA has identified  shared use facilities within the enterprise and how these facilities are  managed, we reviewed NNSA’s 2009 facility governance directive and met  with NNSA, Los Alamos, and Sandia officials to discuss shared use  facilities. We also collected and reviewed governance documents for  several facilities that site officials identified to us as shared use assets. To  determine NNSA’s efforts to maintain the critical human capital skills of  the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), we reviewed NNSA’s  Development of the NNSA Critical/Capability Inventory draft report and  the Report of the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear  Weapons Expertise. In addition, we met with human capital officials at  NNSA, Pantex, the Nevada National Security Site, Los Alamos, and Sandia.  We also reviewed NNSA’s Fiscal Year 2010 Enterprise Modeling  Consortium Project Plan to identify efforts undertaken by the agency to  develop enterprisewide data and analysis tools.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to February 2011  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Ongoing Capital Improvement Projects, as of September 2010
paragraphs: Replace the existing  1952 CMRR facility.
Estimated to be  operational by 2022.
Replace the existing  highly enriched uranium  processing capabilities.
Estimated to be  operational by 2022.
Replace the existing  facility for non-nuclear  production.
Construction is  estimated to begin in  summer 2010.
Provide a base criticality  experiments capability.  For example, it will  provide training for  criticality safety  professionals and fissile  materials handlers.
Completion estimated  in second quarter  fiscal year 2011.
Provide a new high  explosive main charge  pressing facility.
Completion estimated  in September 2016.
Refurbish air dryers;  seismic bracing of  gloveboxes; replace  power supply,  confinement doors,  criticality alarms, water  tank, and exhaust stack.
Support handling of  newly generated TRU  waste.
Continue operation of  existing facilities until  UPF is operational.
Modernize existing  experimental and test  capabilities.
Project proceeding  with a low level of  activity.
Provide two new fire  stations.
Completion is  expected in fiscal year  2011.
Replace existing facility  and provide standalone  capability for use of  accelerated ions.
Completion is  expected in April  2012.
Provide the capability to  maintain existing  components.
Completion expected  in October 2010.
Replace fire protection  piping and install  cathodic protection to  prevent corrosion.
Completion expected  in mid fiscal year  2011.
Replace cooling towers  and chiller equipment at  LANL’s research and  development facilities.
Completed June 2010.
Upgrade the facility in  order to comply with  current codes and  standards.
To be determined.
An NNSA official stated that the Pantex project was delayed for about a year so that a study could be  conducted to determine if this capability could be outsourced. The results of the report are still in  draft, but officials told us the conclusion was that the capability could not be outsourced. As a result of  the delay, Pantex revised the baseline for the costs of the project and the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers are currently planning to award a construction contract in May 2011.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant  Director; David Holt; Jonathan Kucskar; Alison O'Neill, Steven Putansu;  Jeremy Sebest; Rebecca Shea; and Jay Spaan made significant  contributions to this report.