Uranium Mining: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of Financial Assurances
Published: 2012-05-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: From 2005 through 2007, uranium prices increased from about $20 a pound to over $140 a pound, leading to renewed interest in uranium mining on federal land. This interest has raised concerns about the potential impacts that more uranium operations could have on the environment. GAO was asked to (1) compare key agencies oversight of uranium exploration and extraction operations on federal land, (2) determine the number and status of uranium operations on federal land, (3) identify the coverage and amounts of financial assurances for reclaiming current uranium operations on federal land, and (4) examine what is known about the number and location of abandoned uranium mine sites on federal land and their potential cleanup costs. GAO reviewed agency reports and regulations, surveyed relevant agency field staff on the status of these operations, and examined federal data on uranium operations, financial assurances, and abandoned uranium mine sites.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Forest Service, and the Department of Energy (DOE) are the key agencies that oversee uranium exploration and extraction on federal land, but GAO identified three areas where their oversight processes differ. First, these agencies have different processes for notification of uranium exploration or extraction activities on federal land. Second, the agencies require operators to have in place financial assurances to cover the full estimated cost of reclaiming a uranium operation, but they differ in who estimates the value of the financial assurance and the frequency of their reviews of the assurances. Third, under existing authorities, DOE can collect royalties or rents for uranium extraction, but BLM and the Forest Service cannot. DOE has collected about $64 million in rents and royalties from its leasing program since the 1940s.
As of January 2012, a total of 221 uranium operations were on federally managed land, but only 7 were actively extracting uranium and all of these were on BLM land. An additional 29 uranium operations were awaiting federal approval. Of the 202 operations on BLM land, the majority were engaged in either reclamation or exploration activities, according to BLM field officials. In addition, 3 uranium operations were on Forest Service land, and 16 operations were on lease tracts that DOE manages, none of which were actively extracting uranium.
As of January 2012, BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE reported having $249.1 million in financial assurances, and these assurances were generally adequate to cover the estimated reclamation costs for uranium operations on federal land. Nearly all of these assurances ($247.6 million) were for authorized uranium operations on BLM-managed land, with the remaining $1.5 million for authorized operations on Forest Service land and for DOEs lease tracts. BLM and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which is responsible for overseeing some aspects of uranium operations on federal land, do not coordinate efforts to establish and review financial assurances for in situ recovery operations, which use a series of wells to extract uranium. Such operations account for a large percentage of the total financial assurances held by the agencies.
Federal agencies do not have reliable data on the number and location of abandoned uranium mine sites on federal land or a definitive cost for their cleanup. There are likely thousands of abandoned uranium mine sites on federal land, but GAO identified significant limitations in agencies data that make their databases generally unreliable. For example, these databases do not have complete data and do not use a consistent definition of an abandoned mine site. Agencies do not know how many sites will need cleanup, and they do not have information on the total cost to clean up these sites. Based on agencies experiences with cleanup at some sites, cleanup costs could vary significantly from thousands to hundreds of millions of dollars, depending on site-specific conditions and the amount and type of work required at each site.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that federal agencies better coordinate their efforts when establishing financial assurances and develop a consistent definition for abandoned mine sites. The Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, and Energy, along with NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), concurred with these recommendations. In addition, Interior and EPA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: From 2005 through 2007, uranium prices increased from about $20 a  pound to over $140 a pound, which led to renewed interest in uranium  mining—both exploration and extraction—on federal land in the United  States. In early April 2012, prices were about $50 per pound, but  thousands of claims have been filed to explore for and potentially extract  uranium on federal land. This increase in claims filed—the first step in a  potentially lengthy process to explore and extract uranium—has raised  concerns about the potential impacts that an increased level of uranium  exploration and extraction could have on the environment. For example,  during uranium extraction, the waste rock piles that are formed can  introduce radionuclides (such as radium) and heavy metals (such as  selenium and arsenic) into the environment. Before the mid-1970s, many  mines on federal land, including uranium mines, were abandoned without  any reclamation, leaving a costly legacy of abandoned mines that pose  potential health, safety, and environmental hazards. Some of these  hazards include open or concealed mine openings, unstable mine  structures, and toxic or radioactive materials. In 2008, we reported that  from fiscal years 1998 to 2007, the federal government had spent billions  to reclaim abandoned hardrock mines, which include uranium mines.
To mitigate these potential health, safety, and environmental hazards,  mining operators are responsible for addressing safety hazards and  reclaiming the site after their operations have ceased. Activities that address safety hazards can include installing gates over mine openings.   Reclamation activities can include reapplication of topsoil, and reshaping  and revegetation of disturbed soil areas; measures to control erosion,  landslides, and water runoff; measures to isolate, remove, or control toxic  materials; and rehabilitation of fisheries and wildlife habitat. Operators  are required to obtain financial assurances to cover estimated  reclamation costs, and the federal government can use these assurances  to pay for reclamation activities if the operator does not reclaim the site.  Our past work has raised concern about the adequacy of financial  assurances to cover potential reclamation costs for hardrock mining  operations, including uranium, on federal land.
A number of federal agencies are involved in the oversight of uranium  mining activities on federal land. The Department of the Interior’s Bureau  of Land Management (BLM) and the Department of Agriculture’s Forest  Service regulate mining on public domain lands under the General Mining  Act of 1872 and other federal land management laws, including the  Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976. The Department of Energy  (DOE) administers a uranium leasing program on land that has been  withdrawn from the public domain under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.  In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates a newer  form of extraction, known as in situ recovery (ISR), as a form of uranium  milling. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversees or  participates in the remediation of some abandoned mines and sets  environmental standards for certain sites.work with state agencies in overseeing uranium activities. For example,  federal agencies may share responsibilities with states for reviewing  financial assurances.
You asked us to provide information on the status of uranium mining on  federal land. Our objectives were to (1) compare BLM, the Forest Service,  and DOE oversight of uranium exploration and extraction operations on  federal land; (2) determine the number and status of uranium operations  on federal land; (3) examine the coverage and amounts of financial  assurances in place for reclaiming current uranium operations on federal  land; and (4) examine what is known about the number and location of  abandoned uranium mines on federal land and their potential cleanup  costs.
To compare how BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE oversee uranium  exploration and extraction operations on federal land, we reviewed these  agencies’ regulations and associated guidance and spoke with agency  officials about their implementation of these regulations.reviewed NRC and EPA regulations that are relevant to uranium  operations and spoke with officials from those agencies. We also  reviewed memorandums of understanding among the agencies that  delineate their coordination and cooperation in regulating uranium  operations, and we spoke with state mining and environmental quality  officials to discuss their coordination with federal agencies. To determine  the number and status of uranium operations on federal land, we  analyzed data from BLM’s LR2000 database, which is used to collect and   In addition, we  store information on BLM land and programs, including hardrock mining  operations. In addition, we administered a web-based survey to all BLM  field staff with responsibilities for uranium operations and asked them to  provide the status of these operations. Because the Forest Service and  DOE oversee fewer operations, we did not send them our web-based  survey, but instead reviewed agency documents and interviewed staff  from these agencies to determine the number and status of the  operations that they oversee.
To examine the financial assurances in place for uranium operations on  federal land, we analyzed data and available reports from BLM, the  Forest Service, and DOE. We also interviewed officials from these  agencies on the processes in place to review financial assurances. As  part of this analysis, we examined whether the financial assurances in  place were adequate to cover the estimated costs of reclamation; we did  not determine whether the estimated costs of reclamation were sound. To  learn about the number and location of abandoned uranium mines on  federal land, we reviewed data and interviewed officials from BLM, the  Forest Service, EPA, the National Park Service, and DOE, which are all  involved in efforts to clean up abandoned uranium mines. To assess the  reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation from these agencies  on their data and interviewed officials involved in collecting and compiling  these data. We determined that these data were not sufficiently reliable.  Because these data were the only federal data available, we used them  to discuss in general terms the potential number of abandoned mine  sites, and we describe the limitations of these data. To describe the  potential cleanup costs posed by these mines, we identified a series of  key cleanup categories that we and agency officials believe are  representative of the types of actions that may be required at an  abandoned mine. These cleanup categories include actions to (1)  address safety hazards, (2) conduct surface reclamation, and (3)  remediate environmental hazards. Cleaning up an abandoned mine may  involve work that falls across several of these cleanup categories. To  provide a range of potential costs for such cleanup work, we asked  federal officials for information on past work done to clean up abandoned  uranium mines or, if no past work was available, we asked for detailed  estimates. We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 through  May 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed  description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Uranium is a hardrock mineral, and most U.S. uranium deposits are  located in the western half of the United States, specifically in the states  of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. In the  United States, uranium has been primarily used as a fuel for electric  power generation and for nuclear weapons. In 2010, U.S. uranium mines  extracted 4.2 million pounds of uranium, 2 percent more than in 2009,  according to DOE’s Energy Information Administration (EIA).domestic production of uranium is not sufficient to meet domestic  demand, and the United States imports over 90 percent of its uranium  from countries such as Australia, Canada, and Russia.
O) extracted from federal, state,  and private land. material left after the minerals are extracted—waste rock or tailings (a  combination of fluid and rock particles)—is then disposed of, often in a  nearby pile or tailings pond. As described earlier, reclamation activities  can include reshaping and revegetating disturbed areas; measures to  control erosion; and measures to isolate, remove, or control toxic  materials. While uranium mining operations are similar to other hardrock  mining operations in environmental concerns, the wastes produced  require additional environmental controls. Of particular concern is the  presence of the natural by-products of uranium radioactive decay, most  notably radium and the radioactive gas radon, as well as heavy metals,  such as arsenic. All of these byproducts can pose a serious risk to human  health or the environment, especially if they migrate to surface or ground  water, or enter the environment after transforming into dust.
Uranium is extracted using one of three processes—underground mining,  open pit mining, or ISR. Open pit and underground mining are generally  considered conventional uranium extraction processes. In these  processes, uranium ore is removed from the ground and is sent to an off- site processing facility, called a mill, where extracted uranium is  concentrated into a product called yellowcake (U The optimum  extraction process is determined by the size, grade, depth, and geology  of an ore body. Open pit mining is generally used for ore deposits  relatively close to the surface, while underground mining is generally used  for deeper deposits, as shown in figure 1. Open pit mining generally  involves more surface disturbance than underground mining, and the  amount of waste rock removed to reach the mineral is greater. Since the  early 1960s until recently, most uranium has been extracted by using  conventional extraction processes.
Unlike conventional extraction processes, ISR, a mining technique  established in the 1970s and anticipated to become more widely used by  the industry in the future, aims to extract uranium with less surface  disturbance. ISR extracts uranium by injecting oxygenated water and  carbon dioxide or sodium bicarbonate hundreds of feet underground to  dissolve uranium located in a subsurface ore body contained within a  layer of sedimentary rock. Once dissolved, the water and uranium mixture  is pumped to the surface, where the uranium is captured on ion exchange  resins, which are taken to a central facility to be processed into  yellowcake. (See fig. 2.) ISR operations typically involve several  wellfields, which are composed of many injection and production wells,  and these wellfields can spread over hundreds or thousands of acres,  with monitoring wells at periodic intervals above, below, and surrounding  the aquifer to monitor for groundwater contamination outside the aquifer.  According to industry and government documents, ISR is gaining favor as  the approach to extract uranium because it is a more cost-efficient  method for recovering uranium ore that causes less surface disturbance  and is safer for worker health. The primary risk associated with ISR  operations is the potential for contamination of nearby groundwater.  When ISR operations cease, the groundwater is restored by removing  and stabilizing hazardous metals, such as arsenic and selenium, which  may have been disturbed by the operations, and all the wells are plugged.  Experts currently do not agree on how long it will take to restore a  wellfield after production ceases, or if full restoration is achievable. In a  2009 report on groundwater restoration efforts for 22 ISR wellfields on  private land in Texas, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) found that it  was difficult for these operations to restore groundwater to baseline  values for heavy metals, such as uranium and selenium. Specifically,  USGS reported that measured levels of uranium and selenium increased  following restoration efforts in the majority of the wellfields when  compared with baseline values.
Three federal agencies play key roles in overseeing uranium operations  on federal land: BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE. In addition, NRC,  EPA, and the states are responsible for some aspects of uranium  operations on federal, state, and private land.
BLM. BLM manages more than 260 million acres of public lands  located primarily in the western half of the United States. Under the  General Mining Act of 1872 (Mining Act), an individual or corporation  can establish a claim to any hardrock mineral on public land and may  remove all hardrock minerals from the site. Under the Federal Land  Policy and Management Act of 1976, BLM has developed and revised  regulations and issued policies to prevent unnecessary or undue  degradation of BLM land from hardrock operations. BLM issued  regulations that took effect in 1981 that classified hardrock operations  into three categories—casual use, notice-level operations, and plan- level operations—and required reclamation of the sites at the earliest  feasible time. BLM issued revised regulations that took effect in 2001,  to strengthen financial assurance requirements and modify the  reclamation requirements, among other things. BLM delegates  primary responsibility for oversight of hardrock operations to its state  and local field offices.
The Forest Service. The Forest Service manages approximately 193  million acres of national forests and grasslands throughout the United  States. Forest Service regulations, promulgated under its Organic Act  of 1897, among other laws, establish rules and procedures intended  to ensure that hardrock mining operations minimize adverse  environmental impacts on National Forest System surface resources.  Since 1974, the Forest Service has required financial assurances for  mining operations on National Forest System land. The Forest  Service manages hardrock operations through its headquarters, 9  regions, 155 national forests and grasslands, and more than 600  ranger districts.
DOE. DOE manages a uranium leasing program on 31 lease tracts, of  which 29 are currently leased, under the authority of the Atomic  Energy Act of 1954 (as amended). These lease tracts cover about  25,000 acres of land located within the Uravan Mineral Belt in  southwestern Colorado. These leases generally cover a period of 10  years, and DOE offers these leases through a competitive public bid  solicitation, which specifies the lease terms, including the minimum  annual royalties to be collected. DOE awards these leases to those  operators who offer to pay the highest royalty rate, who become  known as lessees. This program began in 1948, when BLM withdrew  certain uranium-rich land from the public domain, and reserved them  for the use of DOE’s predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy  Commission, to secure and develop a supply of domestic uranium for  the nation’s defense needs. DOE manages mining activities, including  exploration and extraction, associated with uranium and vanadium  mining on these lands. In 2005, DOE considered an expansion of  the program in the face of increased demand for uranium, and  initiated an environmental assessment of the program under the  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). DOE  subsequently issued a finding that the expansion would have no  significant impact on the environment. Environmental groups  challenged this finding, and in 2011 a federal court prohibited further  work on the leases as well as the issuance of new leases pending  completion of a new environmental analysis. DOE is in the process  of developing a draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement  that is expected to be released for public comment in late 2012.  According to DOE documents, the lease program has approximately  13.5 million pounds of uranium left to mine.
NRC. NRC is responsible for overseeing uranium milling operations,  which produce yellowcake from uranium ore. ISR is considered a  uranium milling operation by NRC because it produces yellowcake.  NRC reviews ISR license applications, conducts environmental  analyses and inspections, reviews decommissioning plans and  activities, and oversees site reclamation and groundwater treatment.  NRC can relinquish its regulatory authority to a state if the state and  NRC determine that the state has a program that is adequate to  protect public health and safety. NRC licenses and oversees ISR  operations in Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming, while the other  states with major uranium deposits—Colorado, Texas, and Utah— license and oversee operations in their states.
EPA and the states. EPA and the states also have a role in  overseeing some aspects of uranium operations. Under the Clean  Water Act, for example, EPA or the states issue permits to control  pollutants that are discharged into the waters of the United States.  Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Underground Injection Control  (UIC) program is designed to protect underground sources of drinking  water by prohibiting the injection of fluids beneath the surface without  a permit. Specifically, ISR operations require a class III UIC permit  for wells because they inject fluids to dissolve and extract uranium.  Class III wells must be constructed of appropriate materials to handle  the fluid being injected and must be monitored during operations.  When injection activities are complete, the injection wells must be  plugged. In addition, under the Superfund program, established by the  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and  Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, EPA, or, in some instances, other  federal agencies if the contamination is on their land, has the authority  to compel parties responsible for contaminating sites to clean them up  or to clean the sites up itself and seek reimbursement. EPA places  some of the most contaminated sites on the National Priority List, and  resources from a federal trust fund, the Superfund, are available to  pay for long-term cleanup at these sites. In addition, under the  Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, EPA has established  standards for control of radioactive contamination to soil, air, and  groundwater at certain uranium processing sites. NRC regulations  make EPA’s groundwater protection standards generally applicable to  uranium milling sites, including ISR operations.
States may play additional roles in regulating uranium operations on  federal land. In general, states may have their own requirements  governing the review of mining plans, environmental performance  standards, reclamation, financial assurances, and inspection. For  example, many states with uranium deposits require that an operator  provide a financial assurance for the full cost of reclamation for a mining  site. Memorandums of understanding among the federal and state  agencies aim to encourage coordination between states and federal  agencies in overseeing mining operations.
Federal agencies must also comply with NEPA. NEPA requires federal  agencies to analyze the likely environmental effects of proposed projects,  which may include uranium mines, using an environmental assessment  or, if the projects would likely significantly affect the environment, a more  detailed environmental impact statement evaluating the proposed project  and alternatives. An environmental impact statement results in a record of  decision that lays out how anticipated environmental impacts will be  mitigated.
section_title: Agencies Differ in Their Oversight of Uranium Operations on Federal Land
paragraphs: BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE all oversee uranium exploration and  extraction operations on the federal land they manage, but we identified  three areas where their processes differ: (1) notification of exploration or  extraction operations, (2) oversight of financial assurances, and (3)  royalties and rents earned.
subsections: section_title: BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE Have Different Processes for Notification of Exploration or Extraction
paragraphs: BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE require uranium operators to provide  notification of their intent to undertake either uranium exploration or  extraction activities on federal land, but their notification processes differ  slightly. Under regulations for proposed activities on BLM land, “casual  use”—generally defined as activities ordinarily resulting in no or negligible  disturbance to the public lands or resources—is allowed without any notice.
For operations that are greater than casual use but that will disturb 5 acres or  less of land, operators are required to file a notice with the local BLM field  office 15 days before commencing operations. Under the regulations, BLM  has 15 days to review the notice for completeness. To be complete, a notice  must contain specified operator information, a sufficient description and  schedule of the activity, a reclamation plan, and a reclamation cost estimate,  among other information. Once a financial assurance is in place, the  operator may begin operations once it hears from BLM that the notice is  complete, or if it receives no word from BLM after 15 days. According to BLM  guidance, the agency does not approve a notice and therefore is not  required to perform an environmental review under NEPA for a notice.
Operations that constitute more than notice-level surface disturbance must  submit a plan of operations to the local BLM field office for review and  approval, according to BLM regulations. A plan of operations must include,  among other information, specific operator information, a description and  schedule of operations, a reclamation plan, a monitoring plan, and a  reclamation cost estimate. BLM will review the plan within 30 days and then  inform the operator that the plan is complete, that more information is  required, or that additional steps must be completed. Upon completion of  BLM’s review of the plan, including analysis under NEPA and public  comment, BLM will notify the operator that it approves the plan, approves  the plan subject to additional changes or conditions, or that it disapproves  or withholds approval of the plan. Since 2001, BLM has been working on a  draft handbook to guide its state and local field offices when reviewing  notices and plans of operations. In the interim, BLM has issued a series of  Instruction Memorandums to its field staff as guidance.
Like BLM, the Forest Service requires operators to provide notification of  uranium operations, but the Forest Service differs in the activities it will  allow under a notice of intent and plan of operations. Under Forest  Service regulations, no notice is required for certain activity, such as  collection of mineral specimens using hand tools, but a notice of intent is  required for operations that might cause significant disturbance of surface  resources, and a plan of operations is required for operations that will  likely cause such a disturbance, such as use of mechanized equipment  like a backhoe. These standards apply regardless of the acreage  involved. Forest Service officials told us that district forest rangers take  the lead in reviewing and approving notice- and plan-level operations on  Forest Service lands. The Forest Service does not perform environmental  analysis under NEPA for projects that are not likely to cause significant  disturbance, such as under a notice of intent. A NEPA environmental  analysis is initiated only for plan-level operations, because they are more  likely to cause significant disturbance.
DOE’s notification requirements for its lease tracts differ from BLM’s and  the Forest Service’s. DOE officials told us that the majority of its  requirements for uranium operations are contained in its bid solicitation  and in the terms of the lease, which incorporate relevant sections of DOE  regulations. DOE notification requirements for exploration and extraction  on its lease tracts are not contained in federal regulations. Instead, our  review of two DOE lease documents showed that they contained a  section specifying that the operator submit an exploration plan before  beginning any surface disturbance to explore, test, or prospect for  minerals. Furthermore, the leases specify that before developing a mine,  a lessee must submit a separate mining plan to DOE for approval. DOE  officials told us that because they oversee operations through a lease,  they consider their role to be more like that of a landlord than a regulator.  Under a DOE-BLM memorandum of understanding executed in April  2010, DOE has sole authority over the selection of lessees and the  negotiation, issuance, management, and termination of leases. However,  BLM has jurisdictional authority over all other surface and subsurface  uses of the lease tracts and will review and provide comments on lessee  plans as they relate to compliance with BLM regulations. According to  DOE, it assesses specific tracts through the use of an environmental  checklist; however, a more detailed environmental assessment may also  take place. DOE reviews mining plans for consistency with its 2007  programmatic environmental assessment and existing environmental  regulations. Table 1 describes some of the differences in notification  requirements among BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE.
BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE require operators to have financial  assurances in place to cover the full estimated cost of reclaiming areas  disturbed by operations; however, the agencies differ in who is  responsible for initial calculation of these assurances, how frequently they  conduct their review, how the review is documented, and how soon  reclamation must begin after operations cease. (See table 2 for a  summary of financial assurance requirements for the three agencies.)  The full estimated cost to reclaim a site is typically defined as the sum  sufficient for a third-party contractor to perform all necessary work,  including measures to save topsoil for later reuse, control erosion,  recontour the area disturbed, and revegetate or reseed the disturbed  land. The estimate may also include agency administrative costs.
BLM regulations require operators to reclaim land disturbed by uranium  operations. To ensure that this work is performed, since 2001, BLM has  required the operator to provide a financial assurance. Operators must  develop an estimate of the amount of financial assurance needed, which  BLM reviews and adjusts as necessary. BLM does not have a minimum  sum for a financial assurance. BLM uses its Bond Review Report to  determine if the estimated costs of reclamation are adequate for ongoing  operations, to take action to increase or decrease the financial assurance  accordingly, and to certify that financial assurances are adequate to cover  estimated reclamation costs. The Bond Review Report aggregates data  from BLM’s LR2000 database and includes data on the amount of  financial assurances and when they were last reviewed. A BLM  instruction memorandum directs local field offices to review financial  assurances for adequacy every 2 years for notices and every 3 years for  plans of operations. In addition, by December 1 of each year, state BLM  offices must review the Bond Review Report to determine if reclamation  cost estimates for notices and plans of operations within their states are  adequate and were reviewed within appropriate time frames. If the Bond  Review Report indicates that a financial assurance is not adequate to  cover estimated reclamation costs at a site or has not been reviewed  within the appropriate time frame, then the state director must develop a  corrective action plan to address the deficiencies. Following the end of  operations at a site or when a notice expires, BLM regulations require  reclamation of a notice to begin promptly, and reclamation of a plan of  operations to begin at the earliest feasible time. Because BLM does not  have an official definition for these time frames, BLM officials told us that  local field offices have flexibility in determining whether operators are in  compliance. Before a financial assurance is released back to the  operator, the state agency responsible for mine permitting and the BLM  local field office will inspect the site to verify that reclamation is complete.  In some cases, reclamation can take several years, and a financial  assurance may be reduced periodically before being released fully.  Because many operations may involve a mix of federal, state, county, and  private lands, BLM regulations provide the option of joint bonding with the  state. In these cases, the state holds the financial assurance, but it is  also redeemable by BLM.
The Forest Service also directs operators to provide a financial assurance  for the full cost of reclamation. However, in contrast to BLM, the Forest  Service relies on its technical staff at the district, forest, or regional level,  not the operator, to calculate the estimated reclamation costs. It uses  formal agency guidance issued in 2004 to calculate the estimated  reclamation costs and proposes the amount of the financial assurance to  cover those costs to the operator. The Forest Service does not have a  required minimum for financial assurances on its lands. According to  Forest Service guidance, an operator’s financial assurances should be  reviewed annually for adequacy, but a Forest Service official told us that  agency staff do not prepare an annual report documenting these reviews.  Forest Service regulations require that site reclamation begin upon  exhaustion of the mineral deposit, at the earliest practicable time during  operations, or within 1 year of the conclusion of operations, unless a  longer time is allowed by the Forest Service. Forest Service and state  officials will inspect a site to ensure that reclamation is complete before  releasing the financial assurance. A financial assurance may also be  released in increments as reclamation progresses. In most cases, the  Forest Service holds the financial assurances for mining operations on its  land, although a Forest Service official told us that the financial assurance  could be jointly held with the state for larger operations.
DOE also directs its personnel to ensure that the financial assurance  provided by an operator is adequate to cover the estimated cost of  reclamation. Sample lease agreements that we reviewed set a minimum  financial assurance amount and state that DOE personnel will take into  account estimated reclamation costs in setting the financial assurance.  Similar to the Forest Service, DOE generally calculates this as the  estimated amount for a third-party contractor to perform the reclamation  work. The current minimum sum for DOE financial assurances is $5,000,  according to DOE officials. Generally, DOE will perform a financial  assurance assessment whenever the lessee puts forth new plans for a  mining operation. The financial assurance review is filed in the case file  as part of the approval package. Upon expiration of the lease, or early  relinquishment or cancellation of the lease, current DOE lease terms  require lessees to return the site to a condition satisfactory to DOE within  180 days, or a term otherwise agreed to by DOE and the lessee. DOE  guidance states that DOE will release the financial assurance once the  lessee’s reclamation effort is deemed acceptable. Financial assurances  are usually held by DOE, except in cases where disturbance to a DOE  lease tract is minimal as part of a larger project undertaken on private or  state lands.
section_title: Unlike BLM and the Forest Service, DOE Earns Royalties and Rents from Uranium Operations
paragraphs: Under existing statutory authorities, BLM and the Forest Service cannot  collect rents for the use of federal land or charge royalties on hardrock  minerals, including uranium, extracted from that land. BLM does charge  claimants an initial $34 location fee, a $15 processing fee, and an annual  $140 maintenance fee per claim, and also collects these fees for claims  on Forest Service land. In contrast, under the Atomic Energy Act, DOE  may collect royalties and rents for uranium extraction operations on its  lease tracts. DOE establishes the royalties and terms of payment with the  lessee in the lease; typically potential lessees will offer to pay higher  production royalties for lease tracts known to contain higher grades of  uranium.
DOE has collected approximately $64 million in royalties since the  beginning of the lease program in the 1940s. Specifically:
From the first round of leasing, 1949 through 1962, the program  generated $5.9 million in royalties to the federal government from 1.2  million pounds of uranium and 6.8 million pounds of vanadium.
From the second round of leasing, 1974 through 1994, the program  generated $53 million in royalties for the federal government from  production of approximately 6.5 million pounds of uranium and 33.4  million pounds of vanadium.
From the third round of production, 2003 through 2005, the program  generated $4.77 million in royalties for the federal government from  production of approximately 390,000 pounds of uranium and 1.4  million pounds of vanadium.
In addition, current DOE leases require lessees to pay an annual rent.  According to the program’s annual status report, five companies  collectively paid an annual rent of $387,040 in fiscal year 2010. Each  lessee pays an amount according to the size and value of its lease tract.  In lieu of paying this rent, DOE also allows lessees to perform reclamation  work on previously abandoned mine sites. In fiscal year 2010, three  companies negotiated with DOE to perform reclamation work in lieu of  paying rent valued at a total of $101,860.
section_title: Over 200 Uranium Operations Are on Federal Land, but Few Are Actively Extracting Uranium
paragraphs: As of January 2012, a total of 221 uranium operations were on federally  managed land, but only 7 of these operations were actively extracting  uranium and these were all on BLM land.  An additional 29 uranium  operations were awaiting federal approval. Most of the operations—202— were on BLM land; another 3 were on Forest Service land, and the  remaining 16 were on DOE lease tracts.
subsections: section_title: Uranium Operations on BLM Land Are Generally Engaged in Exploration or Reclamation
paragraphs: Of the 221 uranium operations on federal land, 202, or 91 percent, were  on land managed by BLM, according to our analysis of agency data. Of  these 202 operations, BLM’s LR2000 database identified 144 as  authorized, which means BLM has acknowledged an operator’s notice or  has approved its plan of operations and has approved a financial  assurance. These 144 operations included 111 notices and 33 plans of  operations, covering about 13,400 acres, and were primarily located in  Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. The remaining 58 operations on  BLM land were expired notices—that is, operations have ceased except  for reclamation and the financial assurance is held until BLM determines  that reclamation is complete. According to our analysis of LR2000 data,  we also identified 28 uranium operations (11 notices and 17 plans of  operations) that were awaiting BLM’s authorization. Collectively, these  pending operations could involve disturbing up to 24,300 acres of BLM- managed land.
We surveyed BLM staff in 25 field offices across eight states for additional  information on the status of the uranium operations on BLM-managed  land. As shown in table 3, we asked them to provide information on how  many operations were in each of eight possible status categories. (For a  more detailed description of the status categories that we used in our  survey, please see app. I.) Specifically, on the basis of our survey  responses, we determined the following:
Of the 144 authorized operations, 7 operations are actively extracting  uranium—3 mines in Utah, 3 in Wyoming, and 1 in Arizona. In  addition, 60 operations are engaged in exploration, 51 operations are  engaged in reclamation, and 22 are on standby—that is, they are not  actively exploring or extracting uranium.
Of the 58 expired operations, 40 are engaged in reclamation, and  BLM staff did not know the status for 12 operations, in part because  several of these operations had last been inspected in 2002. Most of  the remaining 6 are either in standby or closed status.
Of the 28 operations identified in LR2000 as pending, field staff  reported a status for 12 operations that is inconsistent with BLMs  definition of “pending.” For example, staff reported 2 pending  operations in exploration status, 4 pending operations in reclamation  status, 3 pending operations in standby status, and 3 that were  closed. Seventeen operations listed as pending in LR2000 were  reported by field staff to be in a status that is consistent with the  definition of pending, specifically exploration permitting or extraction  permitting.
In addition, our review of documents for 110 of these operations  confirmed that some of the reported status levels in LR2000 were  inaccurate. For example, we found one notice that was denied in March  2007 that was still listed as pending in LR2000 as of January 2012. In  another instance, a notice was authorized in October 2011 but was still  listed in LR2000 as pending. There were other instances where the  documentation that staff provided to us, such as inspection reports, had  not been entered into LR2000. BLM guidance requires that field staff  update LR2000 within 5 working days of a change in the status of the  operation. Such delays in entering information affect the ability of LR2000  to serve as an effective management tool to track operations. According  to the standards for internal control in the federal government, agencies  are to promptly record transactions and events to maintain their relevance  to management in controlling operations and making decisions.
Of the 7 operations actively extracting uranium on BLM-managed land, 4  are underground mines and 3 are ISR operations. See table 4 for more  information on these operations. BLM officials told us the agency did not  have data on how much uranium these operations were extracting  because it is not authorized to collect this information on uranium or other  hardrock minerals.
We identified three uranium operations on land managed by the Forest  Service in the Manti La Sal National Forest in Utah. Two of these  operations involve uranium exploration, while the third involves the  installation of vent holes for the Pandora underground mine, whose  entrance is located on BLM-managed land. Collectively, these operations  have been authorized to disturb up to 7 acres of land. However, the  Forest Service is currently reviewing a plan to authorize the Canyon Mine  in the Kaibab National Forest in Arizona. This mine’s plan of operations  was initially approved in the mid-1980s and the Forest Service is  determining whether additional, more current environmental analysis  must be undertaken to authorize this operation.
section_title: All 9 Mines on DOE’s Lease Tracts Are on Standby
paragraphs: As part of is uranium leasing program, DOE oversees 31 lease tracts,  which are in a variety of statuses.
Eight tracts have a total of 9 uranium mines on them, all of which are   These  on standby—that is, they are not actively extracting uranium.lease tracts cover about 6,900 acres, but the operations have  disturbed only about 260 acres of land.
Seven lease tracts have approved exploration plans, but no  exploration work is ongoing.
DOE has not approved any exploration or extraction plans for 14  lease tracts.
The remaining 2 lease tracts have not been leased out.
According to DOE officials, no extraction activity has taken place on its  lease tracts since 2006 for two reasons. First, DOE officials reported that  there has been limited incentive to explore or extract uranium on their lease  tracts because there are no uranium processing mills in Colorado near the  lease tracts. Second, in October 2011, a federal district court ordered that  no additional surface disturbance could take place on any DOE lease tracts  until DOE completes an appropriate environmental analysis pursuant to  NEPA.statement is due to be released for public comment in late 2012.
section_title: Agency Data Indicate That Financial Assurances Adequately Cover Nearly All Operations, but BLM and NRC Do Not Coordinate in Establishing Some Assurances
paragraphs: As of January 2012, BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE reported $249.1  million in financial assurances, and these assurances appear to be  generally adequate to cover the estimated reclamation costs for uranium  operations on federal land, according to our analysis of agency data.  Agency data indicate that nearly all of these assurances ($247.6 million of  the $249.1 million) are for operations that are at least partially on BLM- managed land. Although almost all of these financial assurances were  adequate to cover the estimated cost of reclamation, we identified some  issues in how BLM oversees these assurances. We also found the value  of financial assurances for two ISR operations had increased significantly,  but that BLM and NRC did not coordinate their efforts to establish and  review financial assurances for these operations. The remaining $1.5  million in financial assurances is for authorized operations on land  managed by the Forest Service and for DOE lease tracts. According to  our analysis of agency data, these financial assurances are adequate to  cover the current estimated cost of reclamation for the operations that the  two agencies oversee.
subsections: section_title: BLM Had Financial Assurances to Cover Reclamation Costs for Nearly All Operations, but Some Issues Exist Regarding Agency Oversight
paragraphs: As of January 2012, BLM had financial assurances of about $245.5  million for 144 authorized uranium operations, according to our review of  BLM’s Bond Review Report, and the financial assurances were adequate  for all but 2 of the operations. Specifically, we found 1 operation where  BLM field staff reported that the assurance in place was likely inadequate  to reclaim an acid pit lake that had formed at an older, inactive open pit  uranium mine in Wyoming. The operation has in place a financial  assurance in the amount of $126,000, but the operator is in the process  of developing a new reclamation estimate for BLM to review. In addition,  we found 1 operation for which the financial assurance for a plan of  operations in Utah was $16,000 less than the estimated reclamation  costs. In general, we found that most of the financial assurances for  operations on BLM land are for less than $100,000.
During our review of BLM’s data, we identified two issues related to  BLM’s Bond Review Report for overseeing financial assurance of uranium  operations. First, we found inaccuracies in the information included in the  report. Specifically, the Bond Review Report indicated that reviews of the  financial assurances for 5 notice-level operations had not taken place in  over 36 months, which is a year past the frequency that BLM guidance  requires. According to BLM officials, these 5 operations had been  reviewed within the correct time frames, but staff had entered an incorrect  action code into LR2000. We also found other instances during the  course of our review where BLM staff had entered incorrect action codes  into this system. LR2000 accepts hundreds of action codes, yet the  agency does not have comprehensive guidance on all the action codes  that can be used in LR2000.
Second, the Bond Review Report does not include financial assurances  that are in place for expired operations. According to our review of agency  data, there are 58 expired uranium operations on BLM land. One reason  BLM officials offered for why the Bond Review Report does not include  information on expired operations was because the financial assurances  for these operations are smaller. However, the information we reviewed  shows that 43 expired uranium operations had about $2 million in  financial assurances and that some of these expired operations had  assurances that were well above $100,000. In addition, we found the  remaining 15 expired operations did not have any financial assurances in  place. According to BLM officials, because these 15 operations were  established prior to BLM’s 2001 regulations that required financial  assurances for all mining operations, it is reasonable that these  operations do not have financial assurances. Nonetheless, these 15  operations do need to be reclaimed and, according to BLM staff, these  operations may not be receiving the required oversight, which is  evidenced by the fact that several of these operations were last inspected  about a decade ago. The fact that these 15 operations have not been  reclaimed or inspected in almost a decade suggests that oversight of  expired operations could be improved.
section_title: BLM and NRC Do Not Coordinate when Establishing and Reviewing Assurances for ISR Operations
paragraphs: We found that two ISR operations—the Smith Ranch and Highland  operations in Wyoming—account for $213 million in financial assurances,  or 86 percent of the total financial assurances held for uranium operations  on land managed by BLM. According to BLM officials, a portion of the  financial assurances for these two operations also covers activities on  land that is not managed by BLM, such as state or private land. The  required financial assurances for ISR operations on the Smith Ranch and  Highland operations have increased from June 2011 through December  2011—from about $80 million to about $120 million for the Smith Ranch,  and from about $80 million to about $93 million for Highland, although the  size and disturbance of the operations at these two sites has not  significantly changed. According to BLM, NRC, and Wyoming state  officials, this increase is due to a variety of factors, including new  estimates of the additional work necessary to restore the groundwater at  these sites. For example, the estimated number of cycles during which  this groundwater is extracted and treated before being reinjected—known  as a pore volume—has been increased from six to nine. The cost to  restore groundwater at these sites has also increased because the  operator had previously removed equipment necessary to restore the  groundwater so the equipment could be used in other operating wellfields,  and this equipment must now be either returned to these sites or replaced  with other groundwater restoration equipment, according to NRC officials.  In March 2008, the state of Wyoming issued a notice of violation to the  operator for Smith Ranch and Highland that stated that the operator was  not adhering to the schedule for restoring groundwater and that its  estimate of the number of pore volumes and resources needed to restore  the groundwater were too low. As a result, the state concluded that the  total financial assurances in place at the time for the Smith Ranch and  Highland operations—$38.4 million—should be increased immediately to  $80 million to protect the public and that a more realistic estimate of the  cost to reclaim the sites would be close to a total of $150 million.  According to Wyoming state officials we spoke with, this notice of  violation was part of the process of requiring greater financial assurances  for the Smith Ranch and Highland operations that has resulted in these  operations now having a combined $212.7 million in financial assurances.
In examining the efforts to increase financial assurances for these two  sites, we found that BLM and NRC did not coordinate their efforts with  each other. According to Wyoming state officials, BLM field office staff  generally provide comments and concurrence on the proposed financial  assurances that operators submit annually. In contrast, NRC generally  conducts its own independent review of the financial assurances it  believes should be in place. In 2009, NRC and BLM enacted a  memorandum of understanding intended to improve interagency  cooperation in environmental assessments; facilitate the sharing of  special expertise and information; and coordinate the preparation of  studies, reports, and documents. However, this memorandum does not  cover interagency coordination of the review of financial assurances.
Even though the financial assurances for the Smith Ranch and the  Highland operations have increased significantly, the lack of federal  coordination when establishing these financial assurances raises  concerns about the adequacy of these financial assurances and the  financial assurances associated with any future ISR operations that may  be authorized. (For more information on active and pending ISR  operations, see app. II.) According to our review, it appears that both BLM  and NRC have expertise in different areas of the work needed to reclaim  an ISR operation, and better coordination among these agencies would  help ensure that all necessary factors have been considered. Specifically,  BLM primarily has expertise in estimating the cost of reclaiming surface  disturbances at a mining site, and NRC primarily has expertise in  estimating the cost of restoring groundwater contaminated by radioactive  material. NRC officials reported that some of this expertise was  developed through overseeing reclamation activities at uranium  processing mills where groundwater must be restored, buildings  demolished, and monitoring wells plugged. However, NRC officials  acknowledged that the scale of disturbance at an ISR site is much greater  than at a mill, because of the thousands of wells that must be plugged  and the surrounding surface reclaimed. In addition, restoring the  underground water at these mining sites is a complex process because it  must be restored to the background concentration, a maximum  concentration that incorporates standards set by EPA, or alternate  concentration limits as approved by NRC. According to Wyoming state  officials we spoke with, enhanced coordination between the federal  agencies and also with the state could help to leverage each agency’s  particular expertise in reviewing financial assurances for ISR sites. These  state officials told us that this coordination is even more important  because ISR operators have had little experience with restoring  groundwater at ISR wellfields to date in Wyoming. Specifically, at the  Smith Ranch and Highland ISR sites, the state and NRC have approved  groundwater restoration efforts at only 1 of the 19 wellfields according to  Wyoming state and NRC officials.
section_title: The Forest Service and DOE Have Adequate Financial Assurances to Cover Reclamation Costs for Uranium Activity
paragraphs: The Forest Service and DOE have financial assurances for uranium  operations that are adequate to cover the current estimated cost of  reclamation for the sites they oversee, according to our analysis of  agency data. Specifically, the Forest Service reported having about  $42,000 in financial assurances for the three operations on its land, one  of which consists of installing vent holes for a mine on adjacent BLM land,  and the other two were for operations currently conducting exploration.  The Forest Service handbook requires that all active financial assurances  be reviewed annually, and our review found that all had been reviewed  within appropriate time frames.
DOE reported about $1.5 million in financial assurances for its 29 tracts  that have been leased out, with about $1.2 million of this total for a single  lease tract with an inactive open pit uranium mine. Our review of DOE  data indicates that these assurances were adequate as of the last time  they had been reviewed—from 1996 through 2005 for 9 lease tracts and  in 2008 or later for the remaining 22 tracts. DOE officials told us they  had not reviewed some of these financial assurances more recently  because there has been little new activity on the lease tracts in recent  years. DOE officials told us that they generally review financial  assurances when a lessee makes a change to an exploration or mining  plan on a lease tract.
section_title: Federal Agencies Do Not Have Reliable Data on the Number and Location of Abandoned Uranium Mines or Their Associated Cleanup Costs
paragraphs: Federal agencies do not have reliable data on the number and location of  abandoned uranium mine sites on federal lands and the potential cleanup  costs associated with these sites, according to our review of agencies’  databases and discussions with agency staff. We found that agency  databases generally lack complete data and a common definition of an  abandoned mine site, and contain information that has not been verified  through field inspections. In addition, federal agencies do not have  estimates of the potential total cleanup cost for abandoned uranium mine  sites on the land they manage. According to agency officials, the cost to  clean up these sites varies according to site-specific conditions, including  the amount and type of work required at each site, and the total number  of sites needing cleanup.
subsections: section_title: Federal Data on Abandoned Uranium Mines Are Unreliable
paragraphs: There are likely thousands of abandoned uranium mine sites on federal  land where either exploration or extraction may have taken place, but the  available federal data on these sites are generally unreliable. In particular,  we found the following limitations with these data.
Agencies’ databases are incomplete. Three agency databases only  partially track the commodity extracted, and one of them omitted sites  with incorrect geographic coordinates. For example, according to BLM’s  database, there are an estimated 1,189 abandoned uranium mine sites  on BLM-managed land. However, these data are based primarily on  information from three states (Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming) because  the BLM state offices in these states require their local field offices to  enter the commodity that had been previously extracted from these  abandoned mines. Similarly, in the National Park Service’s abandoned  mine database, the commodity field is optional for agency staff to enter.
On the other hand, EPA’s database, which estimates that there are 8,124  abandoned uranium mine sites on federal land, does not include some  sites because they do not have specific geographic coordinates,  according to agency officials. In addition, some of the databases have not  been updated in years and do not track the extent to which extraction  took place at each site, which would help indicate the type of cleanup  work that might be required. For example, the Forest Service database  lists an estimated 1,097 abandoned uranium mine sites; however, the  status of many of these sites has not been updated since they were first  entered in the database in the 1980s. In addition, the Forest Service and  EPA databases do not track which abandoned mine sites have already  been cleaned up. As a result, it is not possible to determine from the  agency data how many sites remain to be cleaned up.
Agencies do not have a consistent definition of an abandoned mine site.  We found agencies do not share a consistent definition of an abandoned  mine site, and even within an agency the definition may not be consistently  applied by various field offices or staff. These inconsistencies pose a  problem when trying to combine multiple databases or to compare data  across multiple agencies. For example, because of a lack of a consistent  site definition, EPA officials told us that the agency faced a challenge in  trying to combine data from multiple sources in order to provide more  complete information on abandoned uranium mine sites. In addition, even  within a single agency, staff may use different definitions of an abandoned  mine site when entering data into a database. For example, a BLM official  told us that field staff may enter each abandoned mine feature, such as a  waste rock pile or a mine opening, as a separate site, instead of grouping  these features into one entry. According to a 2007 EPA report on its efforts  to develop a database on abandoned uranium mine sites, the lack of a  consistent definition leads to problems with determining how many sites  exist, since even a single agency’s database may contain mines meeting a  variety of definitions. In March 2008, we highlighted the lack of a  consistent definition for abandoned hardrock mine sites and the way in  which this inconsistency contributes to a wide variation in estimates of the  number of abandoned mines. At that time, we developed a consistent  definition of an abandoned hardrock mine site, and used it to develop a  more robust estimate of abandoned mines by applying it across multiple  databases. According to EPA officials we interviewed, federal agencies  involved with abandoned mines have used a regular interagency forum,  called the Federal Mining Dialogue, to discuss the issue of a lack of a  common definition of a mine site but have not yet reached agreement on  how to address this issue.
Agency databases contain sites that have not been verified through field  inspections. According to agency officials, field inspection is the best  way to determine an abandoned mine’s location and features, such as  posing physical safety and environmental hazards, to discover new  abandoned mine sites, and to figure out what cleanup may be required  at an abandoned mine site. However, field inspections also require more  resources because agency staff must try to cover large areas of land,  sometimes in risky or inaccessible conditions, such as mountainous or  rocky areas. Currently, the National Park Service and BLM are in the  process of verifying the condition of abandoned mine sites on their land.  According to National Park Service officials, the agency received $3.3  million over 3 years to verify how many abandoned mine sites, including  uranium mines, it has on the land it manages, and to verify cleanup  needs at these sites, a process the agency hopes to complete by  September 30, 2012. On the basis of preliminary results from this field  inspection, National Park Service officials told us that of the 46  abandoned uranium mine sites on their land, 25 remain to be cleaned  up. Since 2009, some inventory efforts of abandoned mines on BLM  land have been under way in Arizona, New Mexico, and Wyoming, but  not all BLM offices in these states require their staff to track the  commodity that was extracted at abandoned mine sites. Table 5 and  appendix III provide more specific information on the limitations of each  agency’s database on abandoned uranium mines.
BLM, EPA, and Forest Service officials told us that their agencies do not  have an accurate number of abandoned mine sites and their location  because no laws or regulations require the agencies to track abandoned  mines and that the agencies do not have sufficient resources to collect  this information. Specifically, officials from BLM and EPA explained that  any tracking of sites is done voluntarily to help with their mission. In  addition, BLM and Forest Service officials told us that they have not had  sufficient funds to conduct field inspection verification on all their known  abandoned mine sites on the lands they manage and that to do so would  be costly, requiring additional financial and staff resources. At current  funding levels, according to a May 2011 draft feasibility study, it will take  BLM 13 years and $39 million to finish inspecting all known abandoned  mine sites on its land, including the ongoing inventory work in Arizona,  New Mexico, and Wyoming.
section_title: Cleanup Costs for Abandoned Uranium Mines Vary Greatly, Depending on Site-Specific Conditions
paragraphs: In addition to not knowing how many abandoned uranium mines are on  federal land, BLM, the Forest Service, EPA, and the National Park  Service do not have information on the total cost of cleaning up  abandoned uranium mines. Officials noted that cleanup costs are  determined not only by the total number of mines that need cleanup, but  also by site-specific conditions, including the amount and type of work  required at each site. Agency officials explained that each abandoned  mine site has distinctive characteristics and requires a unique cleanup  plan based on, among other things, its size, accessibility, the need for  heavy equipment, and the level of contamination.
Agency officials we spoke with generally agreed that cleanup costs at  individual sites could range from several thousand dollars to hundreds of  millions of dollars. These officials also agreed that most of the work is  likely to fall within one of the following three cleanup categories:  addressing safety hazards, conducting surface reclamation, and  conducting environmental remediation. However, officials cautioned that  sometimes cleanup at a site requires work across two or all of these  categories. Figure 3 illustrates some of the activities that can take place in  these cleanup categories.
The agencies also provided us with examples of costs that have been  incurred at 18 abandoned uranium mine sites. Table 6 provides a range  of costs associated with cleanup efforts depending on the type of work  conducted at each site. It is important to note that these cost ranges are  not exhaustive and that some cleanup costs for other abandoned uranium  mine sites could fall outside these cost ranges.
Some examples of the factors that can contribute to the variability in the  costs for cleanup at abandoned uranium mine sites include the following.
Number of safety hazards that need to be addressed: BLM and  National Park Service officials told us that most of the work they have  conducted to date on abandoned uranium mines is designed to  mitigate safety hazards. Costs for this type of work have ranged from  $1,800 to close 2 mine openings in Arches National Park in Utah to  $33,000 to backfill 11 mine openings with waste rock at the  Canyonlands National Park in Utah. A BLM official cautioned that  future costs to address sites with physical safety hazards can be  higher because BLM has generally addressed safety hazards that are  the least costly to clean up because of limited available funding.
Extent to which surface reclamation needs to be conducted: The  primary purpose of activities under this category is to return the land  to as near its previous appearance as possible through recontouring  and revegetating disturbed land. According to DOE documents, the  costs to reclaim the surface ranged from about $2,500 for closing 2  mine openings, recontouring 70 cubic yards of dirt, and revegetating 1  acre of disturbed land at the Nine Mile Hill Mines on BLM-managed  land in Colorado to nearly $98,000 for more extensive reclamation  work at the Hawk Mine Complex on lands managed by BLM in  Colorado. The work at this site primarily focused on the installation  of multiple gates over mine openings, backfilling 500 cubic yards of  surface pits with waste materials, recontouring 6,800 cubic yards of  waste rock materials from 8 waste rock piles, and revegetating 4  acres of disturbed area.
Extent to which environmental remediation must be undertaken: Most  of the activities in this category are designed to mitigate significant  environmental hazards. Officials from BLM, the Forest Service,  National Park Service, DOE, and EPA told us that few abandoned  uranium mine sites have undergone remediation, but cited two  instances in which this work has occurred or is ongoing and proved to  be costly and the costs varied significantly. For example, according  to our review of agency documents, the Pryor Mountain Mine, located  on land managed by the Forest Service in Montana, cost about  $200,000 to clean up, and involved environmental remediation to  remove contaminated soil and waste rock that posed a human health  risk. The site, located close to an Indian reservation and near hiking  trails and campsites, initially presented levels of radioactive  contamination that were up to 369 times higher than normal  background levels. At another site—the 320-acre open pit Midnite  Mine site in Washington state—costs are estimated to be as high at  $193 million by the time remediation is complete, according to EPA  documents. Most of this cost is for treating acid rock drainage in two  large open pits that contain millions of gallons of water and then filling  these pits with 33 million tons of waste materials. Some mine sites  that require environmental remediation also require long-term— defined as longer than 5 years—maintenance and monitoring,  especially if contaminated water requires treatment. For example, one  of the largest costs (approximately $32 million) associated with  environmental remediation at the Midnite Mine site is for monitoring  and treating surface and underground water. EPA estimates that this  water will need to be treated in perpetuity.
Additional information on these and other abandoned uranium mine sites  is presented in appendix IV.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Having adequate financial assurances to pay for reclamation costs for  federal land disturbed by uranium operations is critical to ensuring that  the land is returned to its original state if operators fail to complete the  reclamation as required. BLM, the Forest Service, DOE, and NRC play  key roles in establishing and reviewing these financial assurances for  uranium operations on federal land. We found that nearly all of the  uranium operations on federal land had adequate financial assurances,  according to our analysis of agency data. However, we found some  limitations in agencies’ oversight of uranium operations’ financial  assurances, which raise some concerns about these financial  assurances. In particular, ISR operations account for a large proportion of  financial assurances in place for uranium operations on federal land and  have recently been increasing for some operations, yet there is little  coordination between BLM and NRC when establishing and reviewing  these assurances. This lack of coordination raises concerns about the  adequacy of the financial assurances in place for existing ISR operations  and for those ISR operations that are awaiting approval. Both BLM and  NRC have specific expertise in assessing certain aspects of the  reclamation activities that are required at ISR sites, but have no process  in place to share this information and leverage their expertise. Without  such coordination, the agencies cannot be confident that the assurances  they establish for ISR operations will be adequate to cover the costs of  reclamation.
BLM relies on its LR2000 database and Bond Review Report to provide  information that supports its oversight of financial assurances. However,  data entered into LR2000 are sometimes inaccurate and not always  updated in a timely manner in keeping with BLM’s requirements.  Moreover, the Bond Review Report does not examine expired operations,  yet we found that some of these operations have large financial  assurances in place or have not been inspected in 10 years. Without  complete, timely, and accurate information in LR2000 and the Bond  Review Report, the usefulness of these management tools to BLM may  be diminished and may limit effective oversight of uranium operations.
Finally, identifying the number, location, and cost of cleanup of  abandoned mines is a challenging task for federal agencies. However,  this process has been made more difficult because the agencies have not  been able to reach agreement on a consistent definition for what  constitutes an abandoned mine site. Without a consistent definition, data  collection efforts are hampered and agency databases cannot be  combined to provide a more complete picture of abandoned mines on  federal land.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help better ensure that financial assurances are adequate for uranium  mining operations on federal land, we are recommending the following  three actions.    The Secretary of the Interior and the Chairman of the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission should enhance their coordination on  financial assurances for ISR operations through the development of a  memorandum of understanding that defines roles and promotes  information sharing.    The Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau  of Land Management to take the following actions to improve  oversight of financial assurances:  include information on expired mine operations in the annual Bond  Review Report process, and    develop guidance to ensure accurate and prompt data entry in  LR2000.
To enhance data collection efforts on abandoned mines, we recommend  that the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture and the  Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency work to develop a  consistent definition of abandoned mine sites for use in data-gathering  efforts.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Agriculture, the  Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior, the Environmental  Protection Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for review  and comment. All of these agencies concurred with our  recommendations. In particular, NRC recognized that development of a  memorandum of understanding on financial assurance reviews could be  beneficial to NRC and BLM, and plans to pursue such an agreement with  BLM. NRC noted that development of a memorandum of understanding  that adequately addresses both agencies’ regulatory oversight may be  challenging and stated that the agency may pursue other, less formal  methods of coordination with BLM if a memorandum of understanding  cannot be developed. In addition, DOE stated that a national database for  uranium mining activities would be useful, and the agency agreed there is  a need for federal agencies with uranium mines on their land to have  common definitions and to use these definitions when gathering  information that could be used to determine reclamation needs. Similarly,  EPA agreed that a consistent definition of abandoned mine sites would be  useful, and will work with other relevant agencies to develop a definition,  if possible. Furthermore, EPA commented that our report lacked  specificity with regard to our use of the terms “reclamation” and  “remediation.” We have modified our report to include more specific  definitions of each of these terms and clarified what each of these terms  means in the context of the report. EPA and the Department of the  Interior also provided us with technical comments, which we have  incorporated as appropriate. See appendixes V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX for  agency comment letters from the Department of Agriculture, DOE, the  Department of the Interior, EPA, and NRC, respectively.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Agriculture, the  Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Interior, the Environmental  Protection Agency Administrator, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact us at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix X.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) compare Bureau of Land Management (BLM),  Forest Service, and Department of Energy (DOE) oversight of uranium  exploration and extraction operations on federal land; (2) determine the  number and status of uranium operations on federal land; (3) examine the  coverage and amounts of financial assurances in place for reclaiming  current uranium operations on federal land; and (4) examine what is  known about the number and location of abandoned uranium mines on  federal land and their potential cleanup costs.
To compare BLM, Forest Service, and DOE oversight of uranium  exploration and extraction on federal land, we reviewed federal laws,  regulations, and guidance, as well as prior GAO reports and other studies  on hardrock mining operations. We also spoke with BLM, Forest Service,  and DOE officials in headquarters and field offices, and BLM state offices  in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming—five states with  large uranium deposits. We also reviewed DOE lease contracts. To  understand the interagency relationship among BLM, the Forest Service,  and DOE, as well as the these agencies’ relationship with the states, we  reviewed memorandums of understanding among these parties. We also  spoke with state representatives of mining and environmental agencies in  Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming to discuss  how they coordinate with federal agencies while reviewing uranium  operations and their financial assurances. We discussed relevant issues  for hardrock operations and financial assurances with representatives  from the mining industry, state geological services, and an environmental  group. We also examined relevant regulations from EPA and NRC and  spoke with officials from these agencies.
To determine the number and status of uranium operations on federal  land, we gathered information from BLM, the Forest Service, and DOE.  To identify uranium operations on BLM land, we requested that BLM  provide an extract from its LR2000 database for operations—both notices  and plans of operations—that were in an authorized, expired, or pending  status and listed “uranium” or “uranium and other minerals” as the  commodity that was being targeted. To determine the reliability of these  data, we spoke with a BLM information technology official responsible for  administering the system; BLM state and field office staff who enter  information into the system; and BLM managers at the agency’s  Washington, D.C., headquarters office who use information from the  system. We also reviewed database documentation, and we determined  the LR2000 data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We used  these data to administer a web-based survey to BLM field staff  responsible for overseeing uranium operations in 25 field offices across  eight states—Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South  Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. We asked these staff to provide the status  of these operations based on the most recent information available using  the following eight status levels and definitions, which we developed in  consultation with BLM staff: exploration permitting (e.g., operator is in the process of obtaining  permits to conduct exploration at the site), exploration (e.g., operator is preparing the site for exploration or  conducting exploration work at the site; concurrent reclamation may  also be taking place), extraction permitting (e.g., operator is in the process of obtaining  permits to extract uranium at the site), extraction (e.g., operator is preparing the site for extraction or actively  extracting uranium at the site; concurrent reclamation may also be  taking place),  standby (e.g. operator is authorized to explore or extract, but is not  doing so),  reclamation (e.g., reclamation is taking place at the site following the  end of exploration or extraction activities),  closed (e.g., reclamation is complete and financial assurance has  been released), and other.
As part of this survey, we asked BLM staff to provide copies of the  documentation they consulted when determining the status of the  operation, such as inspection reports or correspondence with operators,  and we used these documents to verify the reported status. For field  offices overseeing a large number of operations, we requested they  provide documents for 10 operations they oversaw, which we selected  randomly. We also asked BLM staff if there had been any uranium  extracted at the operation in the last 5 years. Prior to sending out this  survey, we pretested it with officials from 3 BLM field offices and revised  some of the survey questions based on their input. We received  responses to our survey from all 25 field offices, and we sent follow-up  questions based on their survey responses to clarify certain responses or  to ask for additional information.
Because the Forest Service and DOE oversee fewer uranium operations  than BLM, we did not use our survey to collect information on the status  of these operations; instead, we gathered this information through  interviews with agency officials and agency documents. The Forest  Service compiled information on its uranium operations by contacting  Forest Service officials who were located in National Forests where  uranium operations are located. The Forest Service also provided  documentation on these operations that we used to verify the information  it provided. DOE provided information on its lease tracts that it maintains  as part of its program. We used DOE’s annual status report on its lease  tracts to help to verify the reported status levels along with conversations  with DOE officials. For both the Forest Service and DOE, we used  interviews with officials along with relevant documentation to determine  the reliability of these data, and we determined they were sufficiently  reliable for our purposes.
To examine the financial assurances in place for uranium mining on BLM  land, we reviewed information in BLM’s Bond Review Report, which  aggregates data on financial assurances from BLM’s LR2000 database,  including the required amount of the financial assurance for an operation,  the amount of the financial assurance in place, and when it was last  reviewed. As part of this analysis, we examined whether the financial  assurances in place were adequate to cover the estimated costs of  reclamation; we did not determine whether the estimated costs for  reclamation were sound because that was outside the scope of our  review. Since the Bond Review Report relies on LR2000 data, we used  our data reliability assessment of LR2000 detailed above to help  determine whether the data in the report were reliable. In addition, we  obtained a copy of the specifications that were used to create the Bond  Review Report and examined the report to identify outliers in the data or  incomplete fields and used BLM documents or discussions with BLM staff  to clarify any issues we identified. We determined that BLM’s financial  assurance data in its Bond Review Report were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of our review. Because BLM’s Bond Review Report contains  only information on authorized operations, we gathered information on  financial assurances from LR2000 for the expired operations.
To examine the financial assurances in place for uranium operations on  Forest Service land and DOE’s lease tracts, we examined data provided  by these agencies. Specifically, we compared the financial assurance  amounts that were required with the amounts that were in place. As we  did for our analysis of BLM’s data, we examined whether the financial  assurances in place were adequate to cover the estimated costs of  reclamation; we did not determine whether the estimated costs for  reclamation were sound because that was outside the scope of our  review. To determine the reliability of the data from the Forest Service  and DOE, we interviewed agency staff who gathered these data, and we  used supporting documentation to corroborate the information that was  reported. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
To learn about the number and location of abandoned uranium mines on  federal land, we reviewed data from BLM, the Forest Service, EPA, the  National Park Service, and DOE, which are all involved in efforts to track  and clean up abandoned uranium mines. We received and analyzed data  from databases these agencies maintain on abandoned uranium mines.  We also reviewed pertinent documents that accompanied some of these  databases and other agency documentation, such as studies or reports  that describe the status of abandoned uranium mines on lands managed  or leased by these agencies. We conducted two sets of semistructured  interviews with officials in charge of abandoned mine programs at all of  these agencies—before and after we reviewed the data and  documentation—to gather more information about these databases,  including identifying limitations and determining the reliability of the data  in the databases. We also conducted interviews with officials from the  U.S. Geological Survey, which maintains the data used by the Forest  Service. We also interviewed staff from BLM field offices and state  agencies in the states where most uranium deposits are located to get  more information on the number and location of abandoned uranium  mines and to hear their perspectives on the federal databases. As a result  of our efforts, we determined that these data were not sufficiently reliable  to establish a definite number of abandoned uranium mines. However,  because these were the only federal data available, we have used them  in the report only to discuss in general terms the number of potential  abandoned uranium mine sites that may exist on federal lands, and we  have described the limitations associated with these data.
To describe the potential cleanup costs posed by abandoned uranium  mines, we reviewed relevant literature and conducted semistructured  interviews with officials from the federal agencies in charge of abandoned  mines. On the basis of this information, we identified three distinct  cleanup categories that we and agency officials believe are most  representative of the types of actions that take place at abandoned  uranium mine sites. In developing these categories, we consulted with  officials from all five agencies in charge of cleaning up abandoned  uranium mine sites, and they agreed with our approach and our  categories. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and cleanup  work at a site could fall within multiple categories, especially at larger or  more contaminated sites. These cleanup categories included actions  taken to address safety hazards, which means that most cleanup activities at  the site are intended to mitigate safety hazards;  conduct surface reclamation, which means that most cleanup  activities at the site are intended to return the land to its appearance  before mining activities took place; and  conduct environmental remediation, which means that most cleanup  activities at the site are intended to deal with removing land and water  contamination that poses a threat to the environment and human  health. These activities can also include long-term—defined as longer  than 5 years—maintenance and monitoring.
We also asked officials from these five agencies to provide us with  examples that are illustrative of the range of costs associated with  performing such cleanup work. We asked for examples of sites that have  already been cleaned up and have definitive costs, or information on sites  that have detailed cost estimates. We received 18 examples from the  agencies, which are divided equally across the three cleanup categories.  Fourteen examples are for past work and contain actual cleanup costs; 4  examples, all in the environmental remediation category, are for work that  is still to be completed and are based on estimated costs. For better  comparison purposes, we reported these cost numbers in 2011 dollars.  For each example, we asked for and received documentation that  describes in detail the work performed at each site. For the sites that  have not been cleaned up yet, we received pertinent documentation, such  as records of decision or consent decrees.
To get a better understanding of uranium mining in general, we  conducted site visits to Colorado and Wyoming to examine uranium  operations. We visited these states because they have a variety of  uranium operations involving several federal agencies. In Colorado, we  spoke with BLM, DOE, and state officials involved in overseeing uranium  operations. We also spoke with representatives of a uranium company  and toured some uranium operations including some underground mines  that were on standby on land managed by BLM and a few abandoned  mine sites. In addition, we toured two DOE lease tracts and examined  reclamation work that had been performed on these tracts. In Wyoming,  we met with BLM and state officials involved in overseeing uranium  operations and spoke with representatives of some uranium companies.  In addition, we toured an in situ recovery operation and examined the  various components of this operation.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 through May 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Information on In Situ Recovery Operations on BLM Land That Are Extracting Uranium, on Standby, or Awaiting Federal Authorization
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on in situ recovery (ISR) operations  on land managed by BLM. Some of these operations are not entirely on  federal land, but rather include state and private land. The Forest Service  and Department of Energy officials reported that they do not have any  ISR operations on land they manage.
section_title: Appendix III: Detailed Information on Federal Abandoned Mine Databases
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on federal databases that contain  information on abandoned uranium mines, and the limitations that we  identified for each database.
section_title: Appendix IV: Examples of Cleanup Activities at Abandoned Uranium Mine Sites
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on cleanup activities at 18 abandoned  uranium mine sites. Fourteen sites have been cleaned up and have  actual cleanup costs, while 4 examples provided by agencies are based  on estimates and not on actual cleanup costs.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Agriculture
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of the Interior
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency
section_title: Appendix IX: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
section_title: Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Andrea Brown and Elizabeth  Erdmann (Assistant Directors), Antoinette Capaccio, Julia Coulter, Maria  Gaona, Scott Heacock, Cristian Ion, Rebecca Shea, Carol Herrnstadt  Shulman, and Jena Sinkfield made key contributions to this report.