Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts
Published: 2004-03-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services. GAO was asked to (1) determine how much funding DOD requested, was appropriated, and was obligated for major UAV development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assess whether DOD's approach to planning for UAVs provides reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided more funding for UAV development and procurement than requested by DOD, and to date the services have obligated most of these funds. To promote rapid employment of UAVs, Congress has provided nearly $2.7 billion for UAV development and procurement compared with the $2.3 billion requested by DOD. Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million--enough to buy 29 Predators. DOD's approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently, although DOD has taken positive steps to improve the UAV program's management. In 2001 DOD established a joint Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To communicate its vision and promote commonality of UAV systems, in 2002, the Task Force published the UAV Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential missions, and provides guidance on emerging technologies. While the Roadmap identifies guidance and priority goals for UAV development, neither it nor other key documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and DOD agencies develop systems that complement each other, perform all required missions, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force serves in an advisory capacity to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, but has little authority to enforce program direction. Service officials indicated that their service-specific planning documents were developed to meet their own needs and operational concepts without considering those of other services. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority to enforce program direction, DOD risks fielding a poorly integrated UAV force structure, which could increase costs and the risk of future interoperability problems.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been  under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs won  considerable acceptance during military operations in Afghanistan and  Iraq in 2002 and 2003. They were used in these operations to observe,  track, target, and in some cases strike enemy forces. These and similar  successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of  Defense (DOD) and the services. In fact, by 2010, DOD plans to have at  least 14 different UAVs in the force structure to perform a variety of  missions.
Given the evolution of UAVs to an operational status, you asked us to  review DOD’s overall planning effort to establish, maintain, and operate  UAVs. As agreed with your office, we (1) analyzed the extent to which  DOD requested, was appropriated and was obligated funds for major UAV  development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assessed  whether DOD’s approach to planning for UAVs provides reasonable  assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into  the force structure.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed DOD  documentation from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2003 for UAV-related  procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation funding. We  obtained and examined key departmentwide strategic documents— including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 UAV Roadmap—to  identify the level of DOD’s strategic planning for UAVs across the  department. Additionally, we met with key Office of the Secretary of  Defense activities and the Joint Staff, as well as key service organizations  involved in developing UAV force structure planning documents. Further  information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
We performed our work from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a  human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic  forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be  expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.  Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle, a flight control station,  information and retrieval or processing stations, and sometimes wheeled  land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms.
subsections: section_title: Evolution of UAV Development and Use
paragraphs: UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions for  many years. After the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane in 1960,  certain UAVs were developed to monitor Soviet and Chinese nuclear  testing. Israel used UAVs to locate Syrian radars and was able to destroy  the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon in 1982. The United States has  used UAVs in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation Enduring Freedom,  and Operation Iraqi Freedom for intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance missions and to attack a vehicle carrying suspected  terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The United States is also considering using  UAVs to assist with border security for homeland security or homeland  defense.
Battlefield commanders’ need for real time intelligence has been a key  reason for the renewed interest in UAVs. According to the Congressional  Research Service, UAVs are relatively lightweight and often difficult to  detect. Additional advantages include longer operational presence, greater  operations and/or procurement cost-effectiveness, and no risk of loss of  life of U.S. service members.
DOD operates three UAV types—small, tactical, and medium altitude  endurance—in its force structure. The Air Force has operated the MQ-1  Predator since 1996 in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  missions, using a variety of sensors and satellite data links to relay  information, and in an offensive combat role using Hellfire missiles. The  Air Force also operates a small UAV called Desert Hawk, a 5-pound aerial  surveillance system used by security personnel to improve situational  awareness for force protection. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have at  various times operated the RQ-2 Pioneer since 1986.   Only operated by the  Marine Corps today, the Pioneer provides targeting, intelligence, and  surveillance. The Marine Corps also operates a small UAV called Dragon  Eye for over-the-hill reconnaissance.  This small, 4.5-pound UAV is  currently in full-rate production.  Originally envisioned to be a joint  Army/Navy/Marine Corps program, the RQ-5 Hunter was cancelled in 1996  after low-rate initial production.  The Army currently operates the residual  Hunters for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Army also  has selected the RQ-7 Shadow to provide intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance at the brigade level, and full-rate production was approved  in 2002. Another system, the Raven, a small, 4-pound UAV is being  purchased commercially off the shelf by both the Army for regular unit  support and the Air Force for special operations.  Numerous other UAVs  of various sizes remain in development. These include the RQ-4 Global  Hawk, a nearly 27,000-pound, jet-powered UAV with a wing span of over  116 feet used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance over an  area of up to 40,000 square nautical miles per day; the RQ-8 Fire Scout, a  vertical takeoff and landing UAV weighing nearly 2,700 pounds; and the  Neptune, weighing under 100 pounds with a wingspan of 7 feet and  optimized for sea-based operations.
In addition, congressional action in recent years has been directed toward  promoting an increase in the number and type of missions on which UAVs  can be used. For example, section 220 of the Department of Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 specifies that it shall be a goal of  the armed forces that one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep  strike aircraft fleet be unmanned by 2010. Moreover, in section 1034 of the  National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, Congress  mandated a DOD report of the potential for UAVs to be used for a variety  of homeland security and counter drug missions. Finally, the fiscal year  2004 Defense Appropriations Conference Report directs that DOD  prepare a second report by April 2004 detailing UAV requirements that are  common to each of the uniformed services.
section_title: Prior GAO Review of UAV Development
paragraphs: Most of our prior work has focused on the development, testing, and  evaluation of unmanned aerial vehicles. As recently as September 2000, we  reported that DOD was deciding to procure certain UAV systems before  adequate testing had been completed. We found that buying systems  before successfully completing their testing had led repeatedly to  defective systems that were later terminated or required costly retrofits or  redesigns to achieve satisfactory performance. Conversely, when DOD  focused UAV acquisition on mature technologies that proved the military  utility of a given vehicle, the department had an informed knowledge base  upon which to base a decision. For example, even though the Predator  UAV was based on the existing Gnat 750 UAV, the department required  Predator’s performance to be validated. As a result, Predator moved  quickly to full-rate production and, at the time of our current review, had  performed a variety of operational missions successfully.
Through our prior work, we have also periodically raised the question of  the potential for duplication of efforts among the services and the  effectiveness of overarching strategy documents and management  approaches to avoid duplication and other problems. For example, in June  2003 we reported that the Air Force and Navy, which previously were  independently developing unmanned combat aerial vehicles, had agreed to  jointly develop a new system for offensive combat missions that met both  of their needs. However, we also pointed out that while one program is  more efficient than two, the participation of two services would increase  the challenges of sustaining funding and managing requirements. Similarly,  as early as 1988, we raised concerns about a variety of management  challenges related to UAV development. At that time, various  congressional committees had expressed concern about duplication in the  services’ UAV programs and stressed the need to acquire UAVs that could  meet the requirements of more than one service, as the Air Force and Navy  have recently agreed to try. In response to congressional direction, DOD  developed a UAV master plan, which we reviewed at that time. We  identified a number of weaknesses in the 1988 master plan, including that  it (1) did not eliminate duplication, (2) continued to permit the  proliferation of single-service programs, (3) did not adequately consider  cost savings potential from manned and unmanned aircraft trade-offs, and  (4) did not adequately emphasize the importance of common payloads  among different UAV platforms. DOD generally concurred with that report  and noted that it would take until 1990 to reconcile service requirements  for acquiring a common family of UAVs.
Since our 1988 report, the overall management of defense UAV programs  has gone full circle. In 1989 the DOD Director of Defense Research and  Engineering set up the UAV Joint Project Office as a single DOD  organization with management responsibility for UAV programs. With the  Navy as the Executive Agency, within 4 years the Joint Project Office  came under criticism for a lack of progress. Replacing the office in 1993,  the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office was created as the primary  management oversight and coordination office for all departmentwide  manned and unmanned reconnaissance. In 1998, however, this office also  came under criticism for its management approach and slow progress in  fielding UAVs. In that same year, this office was dissolved and UAV  program development and acquisition management were given to the  services, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,  Communications and Intelligence was assigned to provide oversight for  the Secretary of Defense.
section_title: Congressional Funding for UAVs Has Met or Exceeded DOD’s Requests
paragraphs: Overall, Congress has provided funding for UAV development and  procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD during the past  5 fiscal years, and the services to date have obligated about 99 percent of  these funds. From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003, DOD  requested approximately $2.3 billion, and Congress, in its efforts to  encourage rapid employment of UAVs by the military services, has  appropriated nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs. In total,   the services have obligated $2.6 billion of the appropriated funds. (See  table 1.)
Generally, the additional funding provided by Congress was targeted for  specific programs and purposes, enabling the services to acquire systems  at a greater rate than originally planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003  the Air Force requested $23 million to acquire 7 Predators, but Congress  provided over $131 million—an increase of approximately 470 percent— enough to acquire 29 Predators to meet operational demands in the war  against terrorism. The Air Force has obligated 71 percent of the Predator  2003 funding during its first program year.
About $1.8 billion (67 percent) of the money appropriated during the fiscal  year 1999-2003 period went for research, development, test and evaluation  of the various models, as shown in table 2.
The programs were generally divided into efforts to develop tactical UAVs  and medium-to-high-altitude endurance UAVs and, until 2002 when the  Predator was armed, were focused on meeting surveillance and  reconnaissance needs. Only three systems—the Army’s Shadow and the  Air Force’s Predator and Global Hawk—have matured to the point where  they required procurement funding during fiscal years 1999 through 2003.  By fiscal year 2003, appropriations totaled nearly $880 million, as shown in  table 3.
DOD estimates that an additional $938 million in procurement funding will  be needed through fiscal year 2005.
section_title: DOD Lacks Assurance That Its Planning Will Efficiently Integrate UAVs into the Force Structure
paragraphs: DOD’s planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide  reasonable assurance that UAVs will be integrated into the force structure  efficiently, although the department has taken certain positive steps to  improve its management of the UAV program. Specifically, DOD created a  joint UAV Planning Task Force and developed a key planning document,  the UAV Roadmap 2002-2027. However, neither the Joint Task Force nor  the Roadmap is sufficient to provide DOD with reasonable assurance that  it is efficiently integrating UAVs into the force structure. Consequently, the  individual services are developing their own UAVs without  departmentwide guidance, thus increasing the risk of unnecessarily  duplicating capabilities and leading to potentially higher costs and greater  interoperability challenges.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Positive Steps to Improve Program Management
paragraphs: Since 2000 DOD has taken positive steps to improve the management of  the UAV program. In October 2001 the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint UAV Planning  Task Force to function as the joint advocate for developing and fielding  UAVs. The Task Force is the focal point to coordinate UAV efforts  throughout DOD, helping to create a common vision for future UAV- related activities and to establish interoperability standards. For example,  the Task Force is charged with developing and coordinating detailed UAV  development plans, recommending priorities for development and  procurement efforts, and providing the services and defense agencies with  implementing guidance for common UAV programs.
Moreover, the development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task  Force’s primary product to communicate its vision and promote UAV  interoperability. The Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military planning  for UAV development from 2002 to 2027 and describes current programs,  identifies potential missions for UAVs, and provides guidance on  developing emerging technologies. The Roadmap is also intended to assist  DOD decision makers in building a long-range strategy for UAV  development and acquisition to support defense plans contained in such  future planning efforts as the Quadrennial Defense Review.
section_title: Current Efforts Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance for Efficiently Integrating UAVs into the Force Structure
paragraphs: While the creation of the joint Task Force and the UAV Roadmap are  important steps to improve management of the UAV program, they are not  enough to provide reasonable assurance that DOD is developing and  fielding UAVs efficiently. The UAV Roadmap does not constitute a  comprehensive strategic plan for developing and integrating UAVs into  force structure. Moreover, the Joint Task Force’s authority is generally  limited to program review and advice but is insufficient to enforce  program direction.
subsections: section_title: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Developing and Fielding UAVs
paragraphs: While DOD has some elements of a UAV strategic-planning approach in  place, it has not established a comprehensive strategic plan or set of plans  for developing and fielding UAVs across DOD. The Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 provides a framework for  establishing strategic-planning and performance measurement in the  federal government, and for ensuring that federal programs with the same  or similar goals are closely coordinated and mutually reinforcing. The  strategic planning requirement of this framework consists of six key  components, described in table 4.
When applied collectively and combined with effective leadership, the  components can provide a management framework to guide major  programs, efforts, and activities, including the development and  integration of UAVs into the force structure.
However, neither the UAV Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents  represent a comprehensive strategy to guide the development and fielding  of UAVs that complement each other, perform the range of priority  missions needed, and avoid duplication. DOD officials acknowledged that  the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not issued any guidance that  establishes an overall strategy for UAVs in DOD. While high-level DOD  strategic-planning documents provide some general encouragement to  pursue transformational technologies, including the development of UAVs,  these documents do not provide any specific guidance on developing and  integrating UAVs into the force structure.
Nonetheless, the Roadmap represents a start on a strategic plan because it  incorporates some of the key components of strategic planning provided  by the Results Act framework as shown by the following:    Long Term Goals—The Roadmap states its overall purpose and what  it hopes to encourage the services to attain. The Roadmap refers to the  Defense Planning Guidance’s intent for UAVs as a capability and  indicates that the guidance encourages the rapid advancement of this  capability. At the same time, it does not clearly state DOD’s overall or  long-term goals for its UAV efforts. Similarly, while it states that it  wants to define clear direction to the services, it does not clearly  identify DOD’s vision for its UAV force structure from 2002 through  2027.
Approaches to Obtain Long-Term Goals—The Roadmap’s  Approach section provides a strategy for developing the Roadmap and  meeting its goal. This approach primarily deals with identifying  requirements and linking them to needed UAV payload capabilities,  such as sensors and associated communication links. The approach  then ties these requirements to forecasted trends in developing  technologies as a means to try to develop a realistic assessment of the  state of the technology in the future and the extent to which this  technology will be sufficient to meet identified requirements. At the  same time, however, the Roadmap does not provide a clear description  of a strategy for defining how to develop and integrate UAVs into the  future force structure. For example, the Roadmap does not attempt to  establish UAV development or fielding priorities nor does it identify the  most urgent mission-capability requirements. Moreover, without the  sufficient identification of priorities, the Roadmap cannot link these  priorities to current or developing UAV programs and technology.
Beyond strategic planning, the Results Act calls for agencies to establish  results-oriented performance measures and to collect performance data to  monitor progress. The Roadmap addresses, in part, key elements of  performance measurement, as shown in the following:    Performance Goals—The Roadmap established 49 specific  performance goals to accomplish a variety of tasks. Some of these  goals are aimed at fielding transformational capabilities without  specifying what missions will be supported by the new capabilities.  Others are to establish joint standards and control costs. Nonetheless,  of the 49 goals, only 1 deals directly with developing and fielding a  specific category of UAV platform to meet a priority mission-capability  requirement—suppression of enemy air defenses or strike electronic  attack. The remaining goals, such as developing heavy fuel aviation  engines suitable for UAVs, are predominantly associated with  developing UAV or related technologies, and UAV-related standards  and policies to promote more efficient and effective joint UAV  operations. Thus, the Roadmap does not establish overall UAV  program goals.
Performance Indicators—Some of the 49 performance goals have  performance indicators that could be used to evaluate progress, such  as the reliability goal for decreasing the annual mishap rate for large  UAVs. However, many other goals have no established indicators, such  as developing standards to maximize UAV interoperability.  Furthermore, the Roadmap does not establish indicators that readily  assess how well the program will meet the priority mission capabilities  needed by the services and theater commanders.
While the Roadmap has incorporated some key strategic-planning  components, it only minimally addresses the other key components.  According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the UAV  Roadmap was not intended to provide an overarching architecture for  UAVs departmentwide. It does, however, provide some significant  guidance for developing UAV and related technologies. In addition to the  49 separate goals, the Roadmap also provides a condensed description of  DOD’s current UAVs, categorizing them as operational, developmental,  and other (residual and conceptual) UAV systems. The Roadmap further  sought to identify current and emerging requirements for military  capabilities that UAVs could address.
In addition to the Roadmap, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council  has reviewed several UAVs and issued guidance for some systems, such as  the Army’s Shadow and the Air Force’s Predator. According to Joint Staff  officials, however, neither the Joint Staff nor the council has issued any  guidance that would establish a strategic plan or overarching architecture  for DOD’s current and future UAVs. In addition, in June 2003 the Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint Capabilities Integration and  Development System to provide a top-down capability-based process.  Under the system, five Functional Capabilities Boards have been  chartered, each representing a major warfighting capability area as  follows: (1) command and control, (2) force application, (3) battle space  awareness, (4) force protection, and (5) focused logistics. Each board has  representatives from the services, the Combatant Commanders, and  certain major functions of the Under Secretary of Defense. Each board is  tasked with developing a list of capabilities needed to conduct joint  operations in its respective functional area. Transformation of these  capabilities is expected, and the boards are likely to identify specific  capabilities that can be met by UAVs. Nonetheless, according to Joint Staff  officials, these initiatives will also not result in an overarching architecture  for UAVs. However, the identification of capabilities that can be met by  UAVs is expected to help enhance the understanding of DOD’s overall  requirement for UAV capabilities.
section_title: Planning Task Force Has Limited Authority
paragraphs: As a joint advocate for UAV efforts, the joint UAV Planning Task Force’s  authority is limited to program review and advice. The Task Force  Director testified in March 2003 that the Task Force does not have  program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and recommended  actions.  Without such authority, according to the Director, the Task  Force seeks to influence services’ programs by making recommendations  to them or proposing recommended program changes for consideration by  the Under Secretary. Nonetheless, according to DOD officials, the Task  Force has attempted to influence the joint direction of service UAV efforts  in a variety of ways, such as reviewing services’ budget proposals,  conducting periodic program reviews, and participating in various UAV- related task teams. For example, the Task Force has encouraged the Navy  to initially consider an existing UAV rather than develop a unique UAV for  its Broad Area Marine Surveillance mission. The Task Force has also  worked with the Army’s tactical UAV program, encouraging it to consider  using the Navy’s Fire Scout as an initial platform for the Future Combat  Systems class IV UAV. The Task Force also regularly reviews services’  UAV program budgets and, when deemed necessary, makes budget change  proposals. For example, the Task Force, in conjunction with other  Secretary of Defense offices, was successful in maintaining the Air Force’s  Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air Force  attempted to terminate it. The Task Force was also successful in  overturning an attempt by the Navy to terminate the Fire Scout rotary  wing UAV program. However, the Task Force cannot compel the services  to adopt any of its suggestions. For example, according to the Director, no  significant progress has been made in achieving better interoperability  among the Services in UAV platform and sensor coordination, but work  continues with the services, intelligence agencies, Department of  Homeland Security, and U.S. Joint Forces Command to this end.
section_title: Developing Service- Specific UAV Force Structures without Clear Departmentwide Strategic Guidance Increases Risk
paragraphs: As they pursue separate UAV programs, the services and DOD agencies  risk developing UAVs with duplicate capabilities, potentially leading to  greater costs and increased interoperability challenges. The House  Appropriation Committee, in a 2003 report, expressed concern that  without comprehensive planning and review, there is no clear path toward  developing a UAV force structure. Thus, the committee directed that  each service provide an updated UAV roadmap. These reports were to  address the services’ plans for the development of UAVs and how current  UAVs are being employed. Officials from each of the services indicated  that their UAV roadmap was developed to primarily address their  individual service’s requirements and operational concepts. However, in  their views, high-level DOD guidance—such as the Joint Vision 2020,  National Military Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance—did not  constitute strategic plans for UAVs that would guide the development of  their individual service’s UAV roadmap. These officials further stated that  the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 UAV Roadmap provided  some useful guidance, especially in regard to UAV technology, but was not  used to guide their UAV roadmap’s development. Moreover, they did not  view the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Roadmap as a  departmentwide strategic plan nor an overarching architecture for  integrating UAVs into the force structure. Moreover, according to the  service officials developing the service-level UAV roadmaps, there was  little collaboration with other services’ UAV efforts.
Thus, DOD has little assurance that the current approach to developing  and fielding UAVs in the services will result in closely coordinated or  mutually reinforcing program efforts, as recommended by the Results Act.  While the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff  have tried to coordinate these efforts through the Joint UAV Planning Task  Force, the absence of a guiding strategy and sufficient authority has made  it difficult to have reasonable assurance that development and fielding are  being done efficiently. If not managed effectively, this process can  potentially lead to the development and fielding of UAVs across DOD and  the services, which may unnecessarily duplicate each other. For example,  the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force are individually developing small,  backpackable, lightweight UAVs for over-the-horizon and force protection  reconnaissance missions. Likewise, both the Marine Corps and Army are  individually pursuing various medium-sized tactical UAVs with both fixed  and rotary wings to accomplish a variety of missions, including tactical  reconnaissance, targeting, communications relay, and force protection.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient program  directive authority to implement the plan, DOD has little assurance that its  investment will result in UAV programs being effectively integrated into  the force structure. Consequently, DOD risks poorly integrating UAVs into  the force structure, which could increase development, procurement, and  logistics costs; increase the risk of future interoperability problems; and  unnecessarily duplicate efforts from one service to the next.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance management control over the UAV program, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:    establish a strategic plan or set of plans that are based on mission  requirements to guide UAV development and fielding by modifying the  Roadmap or developing another document or documents and, at a  minimum, ensure that the plan links operational requirements with  development plans to ensure that the services develop systems that  complement each other, will perform the range of missions needed,  and avoid duplication and    designate the UAV Task Force or another appropriate organization to  oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan; provide this  organization with sufficient authority to enforce the plan’s direction,  and promote joint operations and the efficient expenditure of funds.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred  with our first recommendation and disagreed with the second.  DOD  partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense establish a strategic plan or set of plans to guide the development  and fielding of UAVs by modifying the Roadmap or developing another  appropriate document.  DOD stated that its preferred way to address UAV  planning was through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System, which is a capability-based planning process at the Joint Staff  level that will identify UAV capabilities as needed across the five major  joint warfighting areas through the use of the Functional Capabilities  Boards.
We continue to believe that DOD needs a departmentwide strategic plan  establishing the mission capabilities required of UAVs and the detailed  strategy for effectively developing and acquiring these capabilities.  DOD  acknowledged that its UAV Roadmap is not a broad strategic plan.   Moreover, as we pointed out in our report, DOD recognized in its UAV  Roadmap the need for a focused strategic plan for UAV capabilities,  stating that the Roadmap was “to assist Department of Defense decision  makers in developing a long-range strategy for UAV development and  acquisition in future Quadrennial Defense Reviews and other planning  efforts”—a strategy that has yet to be created.  Such a strategic plan would  provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint UAV Planning  Task Force, or other appropriate authorities with the additional leverage  and guidance to ensure effective oversight of the services’ development  and integration of UAV capabilities into the joint warfighting force  structure.  The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System  process, which DOD referred to, may be a useful tool for DOD to  implement its capabilities-based planning approach.  However, we  continue to believe that a strategic plan for UAVs would be an important  element in assuring UAV decisions and development reflect decisions  made within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System  process and are consistent with the strategic plan’s intent.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to designate the UAV  Planning Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the  implementation of a UAV strategic plan and provide this organization with  sufficient authority to enforce the plan’s direction.  In its response, DOD  indicated that the Secretary of Defense already has the authority needed to  accomplish the intent of our recommendation.  To buttress its point, DOD  identified four actions taken to influence service development, evaluation,  acquisition, and fielding of certain UAVs.
We acknowledge in our report that the formation of the Task Force  represents a step in the right direction for DOD and that the Task Force  has achieved some successes in coordinating some UAV programs.  In our  recent report on the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, in fact, we gave  the Task Force credit for bringing the Air Force and Navy programs  together into a joint program. However, the Task Force has not always  been successful.  For example, no significant progress has been made in  achieving better interoperability among Service UAVs and sensors.  Our  concern is that with UAVs assuming ever-greater importance as key  enabling technologies, and with increasing sums of money being allocated  for a growing number of UAV programs, DOD needs more than a  coordination mechanism.  It needs an organization with authority to  achieve the most cost-effective development of UAVs. Consequently, we  continue to believe that the recommendation is sound, and that to  effectively implement a strategic plan for UAVs, the Secretary needs to  designate an appropriate office with the authority to oversee and  implement the strategy.
DOD’s comments are included in their entirety in appendix II.  DOD  provided technical comments, which we included in our report as  appropriate.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further  distribution of this report until 14 days from its issue date.  At that time,we  will send copies of this report to other appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of  Management and Budget, and it will be available at no charge on GAO’s  Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions  about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4914. Key contributors to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)  requested, received, and used funds for major unmanned aerial vehicle  (UAV) development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003, we reviewed  department and service documentation for major operational UAV  programs, programs that are in procurement, and programs that are under  development and to be procured by 2010. Funding data were obtained  from various sources. We obtained the funding levels that DOD requested  for UAV programs from the justification books used to support DOD’s  budget requests and the DOD Comptroller’s Congressional Funding  tracking database. We also obtained the funding levels appropriated to  service UAV programs by analyzing the services’ Appropriation Status by  Fiscal Year Program and Subaccounts reports. Additionally, we analyzed  these reports to determine the extent to which these appropriated funds  were obligated within their allowed program years. We did not conduct a  comprehensive audit to reconcile the differences in appropriated and  obligated funds.
To assess whether DOD’s approach to developing and employing UAVs  ensures that UAVs will be efficiently integrated into the force structure, we  reviewed key departmentwide strategic documents, such as the Defense  Planning Guidance, to identify the level of DOD’s strategic planning for  UAVs and its impact on service planning. We discussed the level of  strategic planning for UAVs with key DOD and service officials from  organizations with key roles in DOD’s g development, such as the Office of  the Secretary of Defense’s Joint UAV Planning Task Force; the Office of  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,  Communications and Intelligence; the Joint Requirements Oversight  Council; and U.S. Joint Forces Command. We reviewed each service’s  current UAV roadmap and held discussions with officials from service  activities involved in planning and developing their UAV force structure  roadmaps. We also reviewed in detail the Office of the Secretary of  Defense’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, and assessed  the extent to which it establishes an overall DOD management framework  for developing and employing UAVs departmentwide. We used the  principles embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of  1993 as criteria for assessing the UAV Roadmap.
We performed our work from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Fred Harrison, Lawrence E. Dixon,  James Mahaffey, James Driggins, R.K. Wild, and Kenneth Patton also made  major contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of  Cruise Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T.  Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology  Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175.  Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to  the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success. GAO-03-598.  Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow  200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.:  September 26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced  Concept Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Demonstration Approach Has  Improved Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August  30, 1999.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude  Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.:  December 15, 1998.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate  to Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts. GAO/T-NSIAD— 97-138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy  Fleet Use.  GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short Range System Still in  Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of  Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4,  1992.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not  Fit. GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production  of Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September  28, 1990.
Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  Master Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.