2010 Census: Key Enumeration Activities Are Moving Forward, but Information Technology Systems Remain a Concern
Published: 2010-02-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of information technology (IT) shortcomings and uncertainty over the ultimate cost of the census, now estimated at around $15 billion. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has since made improvements to various IT systems and taken other steps to mitigate the risks of a successful census. However, last year, GAO noted that a number of challenges and uncertainties remained, and much work remained to be completed under very tight time frames. As requested, this testimony provides an update on the Bureau's readiness for an effective headcount, covering (1) the status of key IT systems; (2) steps the Bureau has taken to revise its cost estimates; and (3) the extent to which critical enumeration activities, particularly those aimed at hard-to-count populations, are on track. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Overall, the Bureau's readiness for a successful headcount is mixed. On the one hand, ongoing performance issues are affecting key IT systems, especially a workflow management system essential for the Bureau's field operations and a payroll processing system that will be used to pay more than 1 million temporary workers. Indeed, an important performance test the Bureau held in December 2009 revealed significant performance issues with each system. Bureau officials stated that many of these issues were resolved in further testing; however, others remain unresolved, and new defects were identified. The Bureau is going to great lengths to address these issues. However, little time remains before the systems need to become fully operational. In addition, the Bureau revised its cost estimate from $2.7 billion to $2.3 billion for nonresponse follow-up, the largest and most costly field operation where census workers follow up in person with nonresponding households. However, the Bureau's analyses of cost are not complete. According to the Bureau, it continues to reexamine the cost of two other nonresponse follow-up related operations. On the other hand, the rollout of key enumeration activities is generally on track, and the Bureau has taken action to address some previously identified problems. For example, the Bureau has taken several steps to reduce the number of unreadable fingerprint cards of temporary workers, a problem that plagued an earlier field operation. Among other actions, the Bureau plans to digitally capture a third and fourth set of fingerprints if the first two sets cannot be read for background security checks. The Bureau has also developed new procedures for counting those living in group quarters, such as dormitories and prisons. For example, the Bureau is using a single address list containing both group quarters and housing units, rather than separate lists as in the 2000 Census, to reduce the chance of double counting. The Bureau's 2010 Census communications campaign is also more robust than the one used in the 2000 Census. Key differences from the 2000 campaign include increased partnership staffing, targeted paid advertising based on market and attitudinal research, and a contingency fund to address unexpected events. To increase participation rates, the Bureau plans to mail a second, replacement questionnaire to census tracts that had low or moderate response rates in the 2000 Census. To help ensure a complete count of areas along the Gulf Coast, the Bureau plans to hand deliver an estimated 1.2 million census forms in areas devastated by hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Ike. This effort will help ensure that households--even those that were not on the Bureau's address list but appear inhabitable--will be included in the census. Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to quickly identify the problems affecting key IT systems and test solutions. Further, given the complexity of the census and the likelihood that other glitches might arise, it will be important for the Bureau to stay on schedule, monitor operations, and have plans and personnel in place to quickly address operational issues.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Census Bureau’s (Bureau)  readiness to conduct the 2010 Census. With just over 5 weeks remaining  until Census Day, April 1, 2010, the decade-long process of researching,  planning, testing, and evaluating procedures for the nation’s largest peace- time mobilization has come to a close, and the complex and costly  business of data collection is now underway.
The population count began on January 25, north of the Arctic Circle, in  the Inupiat Eskimo village of Noorvik, Alaska, when the Director of the  Census Bureau took the lead in counting the first 700 or so residents of the  more than 300 million people who reside in our country. The Bureau is  scheduled to mail census forms to most of the nation’s households in mid- March, and simultaneously launch additional operations aimed at counting  people in migrant worker housing, boats, tent cities, homeless shelters,  nursing homes, dormitories, prisons, and other diverse dwellings, all in an  effort to ensure a complete and accurate enumeration. In short, a  successful census will require the near perfect alignment of thousands of  interdependent activities; partnerships with local, state, and tribal  governments and various community and other organizations; and  automated systems, as well as over a million temporary employees, all  laboring under extremely tight time frames.
At this critical juncture, it is important to examine the Bureau’s  preparedness for the headcount, taking stock of the Bureau’s progress  over the course of the decade, and the challenges that still need to be  addressed to ensure a successful enumeration. As you know, the road to  Census Day has been a rocky one, fraught with operational setbacks and  cost overruns. The hurdles the Bureau has experienced to date—including  weaknesses in the Bureau’s information technology (IT) acquisition and  contract management function and uncertainty over the ultimate cost of  the census—now estimated at around $15 billion—led us to designate the  2010 Census a high-risk area in March 2008. In the last year, however, we  testified that the Bureau had made commendable progress in rolling out  key components of the census, making improvements to various IT  systems and certain risk management efforts, among other activities. At  the same time, we cautioned that a number of operations and support  systems still needed to be designed, planned, and tested; little time  remained to address a range of outstanding IT issues; and, perhaps most  importantly, the Bureau faced significant challenges finalizing an  automated system used to manage field data collection known as the  Paper-Based Operations Control System (PBOCS).
As requested, my remarks today will focus on the Bureau’s readiness for  the 2010 Census and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. In  particular, I will update the Subcommittee on the progress the Bureau is  making in addressing issues that prompted us to designate the 2010  Census a high-risk area: (1) the reliability of key IT systems, and (2) the  quality of its cost estimates, as well as (3) a broad range of activities  critical to an effective headcount, some of which were problematic in  either earlier 2010 operations or in the 2000 Census. The activities include  procedures for fingerprinting temporary employees; the Bureau’s efforts to  count people residing in nursing homes, dormitories, and other group  living arrangements known as “group quarters”; the rollout of key  marketing efforts aimed at improving the participation of hard-to-count  populations and how Recovery Act funds are being used as part of that  effort; the Bureau’s plans for a mailing a second, follow-up questionnaire  and the removal of late mail returns; and the Bureau’s plans to secure a  complete count in the hurricane-affected areas along the Gulf Coast.
My testimony today is based on our ongoing and completed reviews of key  census-taking operations. In our review, we analyzed key documents  including plans, procedures, and guidance for the selected activities, and  interviewed cognizant Bureau officials at headquarters and local census  offices. In addition, to examine the Bureau’s group quarters activities, we  observed the group quarters validation operation at Atlanta, Georgia;  Fresno, Los Angeles, and San Bernardino, California; Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C.. We selected these locations because  of their geographic diversity, variety of group quarters, and hard-to-count  populations. We also made onsite observations of certain census  promotional events in Boston, Massachusetts; Washington D.C.; and  Atlanta.
On February 2, 2010, we provided the Bureau with a statement of facts for  our audit work, and on February 5, 2010, the Bureau provided written  comments. The Bureau made some suggestions where additional context  or clarification was needed and, where appropriate, we made those  changes. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In summary, key IT functions—namely the Bureau’s personnel and payroll  system and PBOCS—continue to face performance problems and have not  yet demonstrated the ability to function reliably under full operational  loads. With key deadlines looming, it will be important for the Bureau to  identify the defects affecting the IT systems, test solutions, and quickly  implement changes. Likewise, the Bureau’s analyses of cost are not  complete. While the Bureau has finalized its reexamination of  nonresponse follow-up (NRFU) cost, now estimated at $2.3 billion, it  continues to update the costs for other NRFU-related operations. In other  areas, the Bureau continues to make progress. For example, the Bureau  has improved its fingerprinting procedures for temporary workers, and its  plans to count people in group quarters and to market the census— especially to hard-to-count populations—are generally on track and more  robust compared to similar efforts during the 2000 Census.
The performance of the IT systems notwithstanding, a successful outcome  is far from guaranteed. To be sure, the 2010 Census is unprecedented in its  scope and complexity, and experience from past enumerations suggests  that various glitches are all but inevitable once the headcount is fully  underway. Given this difficult operating environment, as the Bureau well  knows, it will be critical to (1) stay on schedule; (2) closely monitor  operations with appropriate cost, performance, and scheduling metrics;  and (3) have appropriate plans and personnel in place to quickly address  operational issues.
Importantly, I also want to stress, as we have in the past, that the Census  Bureau cannot conduct a successful enumeration on its own. Indeed, the  decennial census is a shared national undertaking, and it is now up to the  general public to fulfill its civic responsibility to mail back the census  questionnaires in a timely fashion. According to the Bureau, each  percentage point increase in the mail response rate saves taxpayers  around $85 million and yields more accurate data compared to  information collected by enumerators from nonrespondents. The bottom  line, Mr. Chairman, is that in a few weeks, a key determinant of the  success of the 2010 Census will be, both literally and figuratively, in the  hands of the American people.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: As you know, Mr. Chairman, the decennial census is a constitutionally  mandated enterprise critical to our nation. Census data are used to  apportion seats and redraw congressional districts, and to help allocate  hundreds of billions of dollars in federal aid to state and local  governments each year.
In developing the 2010 Census, a long-standing challenge for the Bureau  has been the reliability of its IT systems. For example, in March 2009, we  reported that the Bureau needed to develop a master list of interfaces  between systems; set priorities for the testing of interfaces based on  criticality; and develop testing plans and schedules. In the months that  followed, while the Bureau strengthened its management and oversight of  its IT systems, additional work was needed under very tight time frames.
More generally, now that the census has moved to the operational phase, it  will be important for the Bureau to stay on schedule. The enumeration has  several immutable deadlines, and an elaborate chain of interrelated pre- and post-Census Day activities are predicated upon those dates.  Specifically, the Department of Commerce—the Bureau’s parent agency— is legally required to (1) conduct the census on April 1 of the decennial  year, (2) report the state population counts to the President for purposes  of congressional apportionment by December 31 of the decennial year,  and (3) send population tabulations to the states for purposes of  redistricting no later than 1 year after the April 1 census date. To meet  these reporting requirements, census activities need to take place at  specific times and in the proper sequence. A time line of key census  operations is shown in figure 1.
Because of these tight deadlines, as the enumeration progresses, the  tolerance for any operational delays or changes becomes increasingly  small. Consequently, as the enumeration progresses, it will be important  for the Bureau to closely monitor key performance metrics to ensure that  the various operations are on track and quickly address any glitches.
Indeed, the interrelated nature of census activities raises the risk that a  shortcoming in one operation could trigger other activities to spiral  downward. For example, a lower than expected mail response rate would  drive up the follow-up workload, which in turn would increase staffing  needs and costs. Of course the reverse is also true, where a success in one  operation could have a number of positive downstream impacts.
section_title: Key IT Systems Are Experiencing Significant Performance Issues
paragraphs: Although the Bureau has made progress in testing and deploying IT  systems for the 2010 Census, significant performance issues have been  identified with both the workflow management system—PBOCS—as well  as with the Decennial Applicant Personnel and Payroll System (DAPPS),  the automated system the Bureau is using to handle the payroll of the  more than 1 million temporary employees that are to work on the census.
In March 2009, we reported that the Bureau had a number of problems  related to testing of key IT systems, including weaknesses in test plans and  schedules, and a lack of executive-level oversight and guidance. In that  report, we recommended that the Bureau complete key system testing  activities and improve testing oversight and guidance. The Bureau agreed  with our recommendations. Since that time, we have been monitoring and  tracking the Bureau’s progress and, last October, we testified that the  Bureau had taken steps to improve its management and testing of key IT  system for the 2010 Census, such as naming a Decennial Census Testing  Officer whose primary responsibilities include monitoring testing for  decennial census activities. The Bureau had also completed limited end- to-end testing of PBOCS. The Bureau developed this workflow  management system—which is designed to manage the work assignments  and related maps for hundreds of thousands of enumerators—late in the  decade when it moved from handheld computers, which it found  unreliable, to a paper-based approach for some field operations. These  operations include NRFU, when enumerators collect data through  personal interviews from the tens of millions of households that fail to  mail back a census questionnaire.
However, critical performance issues still need to be addressed and  additional testing remains to be completed. For example, in December  2009, the Bureau completed two iterations of a key performance test,  known as the Decennial Application Load Test. For the test, more than  8,000 field staff at about 400 local census offices performed a combination  of manual and automated tests to assess the performance of key IT  systems, including DAPPS and the first release of PBOCS. In the first test,  DAPPS failed, and other key systems, including PBOCS, performed slowly.  There were system communication errors as well.
Bureau officials stated that many of these issues were resolved during the  second iteration of testing; however, others remain to be resolved and new  issues were identified. For example, DAPPS performed slowly during the  second iteration of testing. This issue must be resolved and retested. To  the Bureau’s credit, the performance test helped to identify significant  issues before systems are needed for key field operations.
DAPPS program officials stated that the current version of the program  has been deployed since October 2008 and has been processing payroll for  a smaller number of temporary census employees (about 140,000).  However, three major issues, involving system hardware, software, and  the operating system, were identified as the likely causes of DAPPS system  failure during the first load test. At least one of these issues was known to  exist before the load test, but has not yet been resolved. The officials  stated that they are taking several steps to resolve these issues, including  upgrading and reconfiguring the system, and deploying additional  hardware to support the system. An additional load test is also planned for  DAPPS. The officials stated that they plan to have all issues resolved by  the end of February, and acknowledge that it is critical that DAPPS be  fully functional under a heavy load by mid-March, when the Bureau will  begin hiring a large number of temporary employees (about 600,000) for  NRFU who will need to be paid using the system.
In addition to issues mentioned with DAPPS, the December load test was  not intended to be a comprehensive test of PBOCS, which has multiple  releases at varying stages of development and testing. The first release of  this system was deployed for early census field operations in January 2010,  but it has known defects, such as limited functionality, slow performance,  and problems generating certain progress and performance reports. In  addition, the development and testing of two other releases is needed  before the system is ready for other key field operations, such as the  enumeration of residents in group quarters, scheduled to begin in March  2010.
In recognition of the serious implications that a failed PBOCS would have  for conducting of the 2010 Census, the Bureau has taken additional steps  to mitigate the outstanding risks. For example, in June 2009, the Bureau  chartered an independent assessment team, chaired by the Bureau’s Chief  Information Officer, to monitor and report on, among other things, the  system’s development and testing progress. These efforts are encouraging.  However, the aggressive development and testing schedule presents  various challenges. For example, two of the three releases of PBOCS were  not included in the recent performance test because development of these  releases had not yet been completed. This increases the risk that  performance issues, such as those described above, may reoccur in future  releases of the system and the Bureau’s ability to resolve and retest these  issues before the system is needed for key field operations will be limited.
In addition to DAPPS and PBOCS, the Bureau will rely on six other key  automated systems to conduct the census. Progress has been made with  respect to system testing. However, much system testing remains to be  completed in the next few months, as shown in the following table.
Given the importance of IT systems to the decennial census, it is critical  that the Bureau ensure that DAPPS, PBOCS, and other key systems are  thoroughly tested. The limited amount of time to resolve what are, in  certain cases, significant performance issues creates a substantial  challenge for the Bureau.
section_title: The Bureau Has Revised Its Cost Estimate for Nonresponse Follow- up, but Needs to Complete Additional Updates as Planned
paragraphs: In 2008, we reported that the Bureau had not carried out the necessary  analyses to demonstrate that the then life-cycle cost estimate of about  $11.5 billion for the 2010 Census was credible, and we recommended that  the Bureau better document and update the estimate, to which it generally  agreed. Since then, two early census field operations have experienced  major differences between their estimated and actual costs. For address  canvassing, where census workers verify address lists and maps, actual  costs exceeded the Bureau’s initial estimate of $356 million by $89 million,  or 25 percent. In contrast, for group quarters validation, where census  workers verify addresses of group housing, actual costs were below the  Bureau’s estimate of $71 million by about $29 million, or 41 percent.
Because of cost overruns during address canvassing, as well as concerns  over the increased number of vacant units due to foreclosures, the Bureau  has implemented our recommendation and reexamined the assumptions  and other data used to support the cost estimate for NRFU, the most  costly and labor-intensive of all census field operations. Earlier this  month, the Bureau provided us with the results from that reexamination.  Although we have not fully assessed the Bureau’s analysis, our preliminary  review shows that the Bureau now estimates that NRFU will cost about  $2.3 billion, a decrease of around $400 million (15 percent) from its  previous estimate of about $2.7 billion. In updating the estimate, the  Bureau considered a number of cost drivers. For example, the Bureau  reviewed 1) field work assumptions—such as miles driven per case, pay  rates, hours worked per week, and attrition—which the Bureau updated  based on actual Census 2000 data, national and field tests, and address  canvassing results; 2) factors affecting response rate and hence NRFU  workload—such as the national trend in survey response, use of a  bilingual questionnaire and replacement mailing for 2010, and the vacancy  rate; and 3) enumerator productivity rates, based on regional managers’  concerns over enumerating vacant units and non-English-speaking  households. Further, in its analysis, the Bureau cited holding pay rates for  NRFU temporary staff at 2009 levels, rather than the proposed 2010 pay  rate, as one of the reasons for the reduction in NRFU costs.
According to the Bureau, two cost drivers—workload, based on the mail  response rate, and productivity—are uncertain and could have a  significant effect on the ultimate cost of NRFU. For example, the Bureau  states that if the response rate decreases by 2 percentage points due to  extreme circumstances, such as an immigration backlash, costs could  increase by $170 million. Likewise, if PBOCS continues to experience  performance problems causing 2 weeks of lost productivity, the Bureau  says it would need to hire and train more staff to complete NRFU in order  to deliver the apportionment counts to the President by December 31,  2010, which, according to the Bureau, could increase costs by about $138  million.
As we previously recommended, revising cost estimates with updated data  is an important best practice for cost estimation. However, the Bureau’s  analyses of cost are not complete. While the Bureau has finalized its  reexamination of NRFU cost, it continues to update the costs for other  NRFU-related operations. These operations include the NRFU  Reinterview, a quality assurance procedure designed to ensure that field  procedures were followed and to identify census workers who  intentionally or unintentionally produced data errors. It also includes the  Vacancy/Delete Check operation, which is a follow-up to NRFU and is  designed to verify the status of addresses classified as vacant, or addresses  determined to be nonexistent (deletes) during NRFU, as well as cases  added since the NRFU workload was initially identified. According to the  Bureau, emerging information about the Vacancy/Delete Check operation  suggest that the workload may be much higher than originally expected  and could increase costs from $345 million to $482 million—almost $137  million, or 40 percent. The Bureau said it will update the cost estimates of  both these operations once additional information becomes available.
A reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any program because it  provides the basis for informed investment decision making, realistic  budget formulation, meaningful progress measurement, proactive course  correction when warranted, and accountability for results.
section_title: The Implementation of Key Enumeration Activities Continues to Make Progress
paragraphs: In contrast to the IT systems, the rollout of other activities is going more  smoothly. Indeed, the Bureau has taken steps to address certain previously  identified problems, and its plans to improve the count of hard-to- enumerate groups are generally more robust compared to similar activities  during the 2000 Census. Those activities include procedures for  fingerprinting temporary employees; the Bureau’s efforts to count people  residing in nursing homes, dormitories, and other group living  arrangements known as “group quarters”; the rollout of key marketing  efforts aimed at improving the participation of hard-to-count populations;  the Bureau’s plans for a mailing a second, follow-up questionnaire and the  removal of late mail returns; and the Bureau’s plans to secure a complete  count in the hurricane-affected areas along the Gulf Coast.
subsections: section_title: Bureau Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Number of Unclassifiable Fingerprints of Temporary Workers
paragraphs: The Bureau plans to fingerprint its temporary workforce for the first time  in the 2010 Census to better conduct background security checks on its  workforce of hundreds of thousands of temporary census workers.  However, the Bureau found that during address canvassing, an operation  that the Bureau conducted in the summer of 2009 to verify every address  in the country, 22 percent of the workers (approximately 35,700 people)  hired for the operation had unclassifiable prints. The Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) determined that the issue was generally the result of  errors that occurred when the prints were first taken at the local census  offices.
To fingerprint workers during address canvassing, Bureau employees  captured two sets of fingerprints on ink fingerprint cards from each  temporary worker by the end of the workers’ first day of training. The  cards were then sent to the Bureau’s National Processing Center in  Jeffersonville, Indiana, to be scanned and electronically submitted to the  FBI. If the first set of prints were unclassifiable, then the National  Processing Center sent the FBI the second set of prints. If the results  showed a criminal record that made an employee unsuitable for  employment, the Bureau either terminated the person immediately or  placed the individual in a nonworking status until the matter was resolved.
To help ensure the success of fingerprinting operations for NRFU—which  will peak at approximately 484,000 fingerprint submissions over a 3-day  period from April 28-30, 2010—the Bureau will follow similar procedures,  but has taken additional steps to improve fingerprint image quality. They  include refining training manuals used to instruct local census office staff  on how to take fingerprints, scheduling fingerprint training closer to when  the prints are captured, and increasing the length of training. Further, the  Bureau plans on using an oil-free lotion during fingerprinting that is  believed to raise the ridges on fingertips to improve the legibility of the  prints.
The Bureau has also revised its procedures for refingerprinting employees  when both fingerprint cards cannot be read. During address canvassing, if  both sets of fingerprints were unclassifiable, workers were allowed to  continue working if their name background check was acceptable, and  would be refingerprinted only if they were rehired for future operations.  Under the revised policy, the Bureau plans to digitally capture a third and  fourth set of fingerprints if the FBI cannot classify the first two sets. The  Bureau plans to purchase approximately 1,017 digital fingerprint scanners.  Each local census office will receive a minimum of one machine, with the  remaining scanners to be distributed at the discretion of the Regional  Director. The Bureau estimates that this additional step could reduce the  percentage of workers with unclassifiable prints from 22 percent down to  approximately 10 to 12 percent, or an estimated 60,000 to 72,000  temporary workers for NRFU. We did not receive a response from the  Bureau whether it will allow those workers with unclassifiable prints to  continue to work on NRFU operations.
section_title: Operational Changes Made for 2010 Position the Bureau to More Accurately Classify and Identify Group Quarters
paragraphs: During the decennial census, the Bureau conducts separate operations to  count people residing in group quarters facilities. The Bureau defines  group quarters as “places where people live or stay in a group living  arrangement that are owned or managed by an entity or organization  providing housing and/or services for the residents,” such as boarding  schools, correctional facilities, health care facilities, military quarters, and  college and university housing. According to Bureau estimates, more than  8.1 million people, or approximately 3 percent of the population, live in  group quarter facilities.
During the 2000 Census, the Bureau did not always accurately enumerate  group quarters because, among other reasons, group quarters were  sometimes hard to distinguish from conventional housing units (see fig. 2),  or the address of an administrative building was in a separate geographic  location than where the people actually lived, as was sometimes the case  with prison complexes. For example, in prior work, we found that the  population count of Cameron, Missouri, was off by nearly 1,500 people  because the population of the state’s Crossroads Correctional Center was  inadvertently omitted from the town’s headcount. Similarly, North  Carolina’s population count was reduced by 2,828 people, largely because  the Bureau had to delete duplicate data on almost 2,700 students in 26  dormitories (see fig. 3) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  (UNC). Precision is critical because, in some cases, small differences in  population totals could potentially impact apportionment and/or  redistricting decisions.
The Bureau developed and tested new procedures to address the  difficulties it had in identifying and counting this population during the  2000 Census. For example, the Bureau moved from manual to GPS- generated mapspots, which should reduce the chance of human error and  group quarters populations being counted in the wrong jurisdiction;  moved from a telephone interview to a field verification approach, which  should increase accuracy; and moved to a single address list, which should  reduce the chance of double counting. In addition, following the 2004  Census Test, we recommended that the Bureau revisit group quarter  procedures to ensure that this population was properly located and  counted. The Bureau implemented our recommendation and revised its  group quarters procedures to clearly instruct census workers to properly  correct and delete addresses. Further, to better ensure a more accurate  group quarters count, the Bureau employed a three-prong effort consisting  of those operations shown in table 2.
For the 2010 group quarters operations, the Bureau drew from a number of  sources to build its list of group quarters addresses including data from the  2000 Census, address submissions provided by state and local  governments, Internet-based research, and group quarters located during  door-to-door address canvassing. During the first of the three group  quarters operations (group quarters validation), approximately 25,000  temporary workers identified over 240,000 group quarters facilities from a  workload of over 2 million potential group quarters in both the United  States and Puerto Rico. The remaining approximately 1.76 million  addresses were identified during group quarters validation as conventional  housing units, transitory locations, nonresidential, nonexistent, or  duplicates. All addresses that were verified as housing units or transitory  locations were added to the appropriate address extracts for subsequent  enumeration operations. In addition, over 7,000 addresses from the group  quarters validation workload could not be properly processed in the  Bureau’s database because they were returned with insufficient  information. However, a contingency plan was implemented to ensure  these locations were included in the census.
The changes made to group quarters operations appear promising, and the  Bureau plans to evaluate coverage of the group quarters population.  However, the Bureau will not evaluate each of the three group quarters  operation’s effectiveness, cost, or value added. Such evaluations could be  useful in improving the operations, identifying possibly duplicative  operations, and identifying potential cost savings for 2020. For example,  given the large number of non-group quarters included in the workload for  group quarters validation (about 88 percent), the Bureau may want to  consider ways to begin the operation with a more concise initial workload.  Additionally, in both group quarters validation and group quarters advance  visit operations, census workers personally visit group quarters, verify the  facility contact information, provide confidentiality information, and  collect occupancy numbers. Because these activities appear to be  duplicative, the Bureau may want to reexamine the need to conduct both  operations.
section_title: The Bureau’s Communications Campaign Is Aimed at Hard-to-count Groups
paragraphs: A complete and accurate census is becoming an increasingly daunting  task, in part because the nation’s population is growing larger, more  diverse, and more reluctant to participate. To overcome these challenges,  the Bureau has developed the Integrated Communications Campaign  aimed at, among other things, improving the mail response rate and  reducing the differential undercount. An undercount occurs when the  census misses a person who should have been included; an overcount  occurs when an individual is counted in error. What makes these errors  particularly problematic is their differential impact on various subgroups.  Minorities, renters, and children, for example, are more likely to be  undercounted by the census while more affluent groups, such as people  with vacation homes, are more likely to be enumerated more than once.  As shown in table 3, the 2010 communications campaign consists of four  components: the partnership program, paid advertising, public relations,  and an educational program called Census in Schools.
The 2010 communications campaign’s initial budget of $410 million was  increased by $220 million in additional funds appropriated by the  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). As a  result, the Bureau was able to greatly expand its communications  campaign activities. For example, the Bureau hired about 3,000  partnership staff, over 2,000 more than originally planned, and increased  its paid advertising purchases targeted to specific ethnic or language  audiences by more than $33 million (85 percent) over its initial plan of  about $39 million. The increased funding should enhance the Bureau’s  capacity to reach out to hard-to-count communities. In all, the Bureau  plans to spend about $72 million on paid advertising targeted to specific  ethnic or language audiences, which is about $11 million more than the  almost $61 million the Bureau plans to spend targeting the general  population.
However, even with the additional Recovery Act funds, the Bureau plans  to spend less for some components of the 2010 paid media buys than it did  for 2000, when compared in constant 2010 dollars. For example, although  the total budget for the 2010 paid advertising is $253 million, which is  about $12 million (5 percent) more than 2000, the Bureau plans to spend  about $133 million of it on the total advertising buy (excluding production,  labor, and other management costs), which is about $27 million (17  percent) less compared to the about $160 million spent in 2000. Table 4  shows the Bureau’s 2010 budget for paid media buys by target audience  compared to what was spent in 2000.
Decreased spending on paid advertising may seem like a step in the wrong  direction for promoting census participation. However, by better targeting  paid advertising buys the Bureau expects to reach those who have  historically been the hardest to count. For example, the Bureau based its  decisions on how to allocate spending across different ethnic and  language audiences based on a variety of factors, such as historical  response data for an area, prevalence of hard-to-count households in a  market, population size, and availability of in-market media. The Bureau  also received input from staff in census regional offices, as well as from an  independent 2010 Census advisory group called the Race and Ethnic  Advisory Committee. Further, the Bureau targeted the paid advertising  messages based on market and attitudinal research. For example, the  Bureau’s attitudinal research identified five mindsets people have about  the census, ranging from what Bureau research identified as “leading  edge”—those who are highly likely to respond—to the “cynical fifth” who  are less likely to participate because they doubt that the census provides  tangible benefits. The Bureau used this information to develop messages  to motivate each cohort to participate in the census. To target the cynical  fifth, for example, the Bureau developed advertising that focus on the  message that the census is important to their community.
In addition, as shown in table 5, the Bureau has made other noteworthy  changes to 2010 paid advertising and partnership program activities, which  are aimed at expanding outreach to hard-to-count groups and better  monitoring campaign effectiveness.
In summary, our analysis suggests that the paid advertising and  partnership activities, along with the other components of the Bureau’s  communications campaign, are generally more robust than the Bureau’s  promotional efforts during the 2000 Census in that the entire effort is more  comprehensive, and activities appear to be more data-driven and targeted.  Moving forward, the key challenge facing the campaign is that it must not  only raise awareness of the census, it must also influence behavior, a far  more difficult task.
section_title: Second Census Questionnaire Has Potential to Increase Response Rate, but Will Be Available in English Only
paragraphs: The Bureau’s strategy to mail a second, or replacement, census  questionnaire will be implemented for the first time in 2010 and is an  important step towards improving response and decreasing costs.  According to Bureau studies, mailing a replacement questionnaire  increases overall response from households that do not respond to the  initial questionnaire, which could generate significant cost savings by  eliminating the need for census workers to obtain those responses via  personal visits.
The Bureau plans to mail approximately 30 million replacement  questionnaires to all households in census tracts that had the lowest  response rates in Census 2000 (known as blanket replacement). Also, the  Bureau plans to mail approximately 12 million replacement questionnaires  to nonresponding households in other census tracts that had low-to- moderate response rates in 2000 (known as targeted replacement). In  order to enhance the effectiveness of the replacement mailing, the Bureau  will include a cover letter to distinguish the initial and replacement  questionnaires and thus avoid receiving duplicate responses. However,  replacement questionnaires will be provided in English-only, regardless of  whether the household will receive a bilingual English/Spanish  questionnaire in the initial mailing. According to a Bureau official,  mailing a bilingual replacement questionnaire was logistically impractical  for 2010, given the limitations of the printing process and the five-day time  frame for the targeted replacement mailing. Thus, in looking forward to  the 2020 Census, it will be important for the Bureau to evaluate potential  changes to the mailing strategy that would include, at a minimum, sending  bilingual replacement questionnaires to those households that initially  received a bilingual questionnaire.
The Bureau plans to mail replacement questionnaires between April 1 and  April 10 and develop an initial list of nonresponding households on April 7  (see table 6 for key dates in this process). Because the Bureau will likely  receive replacement questionnaires after April 7, it must be able to  effectively remove these late mail returns from the list of nonresponding  households, or NRFU workload. Removing late mail returns is important  because it prevents enumerators from visiting households that already  returned their census forms, thus reducing NRFU workload and cost, as  well as respondent burden. As shown in table 6, the Bureau plans to  remove late mail returns from the NRFU workload four times using one  automated and three manual processes. The Bureau has some experience  with the manual process because some local census offices did some  testing of late mail removals during the 2000 Census. In addition, they have  developed quality assurance procedures for the manual removal process.  Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to ensure that local  census offices follow these procedures so that households are not  unnecessarily visited by an enumerator or inadvertently removed from the  follow-up workload and missed in the census count.
section_title: The Bureau Has Tailored Operations to Enumerate Hurricane-Affected Areas
paragraphs: The scale of the destruction in areas affected by hurricanes Katrina, Rita,  and Ike has made getting a complete and accurate population count in  parts of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas especially challenging (see fig.  4). Hurricane Katrina alone destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated  300,000 homes. As we have previously testified, the Bureau, partly in  response to recommendations made in our June 2007 report, developed  supplemental training materials for natural disaster areas to help census  address listers, when developing the census address list, identify  addresses where people are, or may be, living when census questionnaires  are distributed. For example, the materials noted the various situations  that address listers might encounter, such as people living in trailers,  homes marked for demolition, converted buses and recreational vehicles,  and nonresidential space such as storage areas above restaurants. The  training material also described the clues that could alert address listers to  the presence of nontraditional places where people are living and provided  a script they should follow when interviewing residents on the possible  presence of hidden housing units.
To ensure a quality count in the hurricane-affected areas, the Bureau will  hand-deliver an estimated 1.2 million census questionnaires in these areas  through the Update Leave operation, where census workers update  addresses and provide a mail-back census questionnaire to each living  quarter in their assigned areas. The Bureau estimates that it will be  delivering questionnaires starting March 1, 2010, to housing units that  appear inhabitable in much of southeast Louisiana, south Mississippi, and  Texas, even if they do not appear on the Bureau’s address list. Occupants  will be asked to complete and return the questionnaire by mail. Census  workers will also identify modifications for the Bureau’s address list,  including additions, deletions, corrections, and spotting duplicate  information. By hand delivering questionnaires, the Bureau hopes to  ensure that housing units that may have been missed will receive and  return questionnaires, ultimately improving the accuracy of the count.  Finally, the Bureau stated that it must count people where they are living  on Census Day and emphasized that if a housing unit gets rebuilt and  people move back before Census Day, then that is where those people will  be counted. However, if they are living someplace else, then they should  be counted where they are living on Census Day.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Mr. Chairman, with less than two months to go until Census Day, the  Bureau’s readiness for the headcount is mixed. On the one hand, with data  collection already underway, the ability of key IT systems to function  under full operational loads has not yet been demonstrated. The issues  facing these systems need to be resolved, and additional testing must take  place, with little time remaining. Likewise, questions remain regarding the  ultimate cost of the 2010 Census, as the Bureau continues to analyze the  cost of NRFU-related operations.
On the other hand, certain operations, such as the communications  campaign and efforts to enumerate group quarters, generally appear to be  on track and more robust compared to similar efforts for the 2000 Census,  better positioning the Bureau for a complete and accurate headcount. In  the coming weeks and months ahead, we will continue to monitor the  Bureau’s progress in addressing these issues, as well as the  implementation of the census as a whole, on behalf of the Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman and members of this Subcommittee, this concludes my  statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you might  have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you have any questions on matters discussed in this statement, please  contact Robert N. Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at  goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include  Peter Beck, Steven Berke, Clayton Brisson, Virginia Chanley, Benjamin  Crawford, Dewi Djunaidy, Vijay D’Souza, Jennifer Echard, Elizabeth Fan,  Ronald Fecso, Robert Gebhart, Ellen Grady, Richard Hung, Kirsten  Lauber, Jason Lee, Andrea Levine, Signora May, Catherine Myrick, Lisa  Pearson, David Powner, Jonathan Ticehurst, Cheri Truett, Timothy  Wexler, and Katherine Wulff.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: 2010 Census: Census Bureau Has Made Progress on Schedule and  Operational Control Tools, but Needs to Prioritize Remaining System  Requirements. GAO-10-59. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.  2010 Census: Efforts to Build an Accurate Address List Are Making  Progress, but Face Software and Other Challenges. GAO-10-140T.  Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2009.  2010 Census: Census Bureau Continues to Make Progress in Mitigating  Risks to a Successful Enumeration, but Still Faces Various Challenges.  GAO-10-132T. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2009.  2010 Census: Communications Campaign Has Potential to Boost  Participation. GAO-09-525T. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2009.  2010 Census: Fundamental Building Blocks of a Successful  Enumeration Face Challenges. GAO-09-430T. Washington, D.C.: March 5,  2009.
Information Technology: Census Bureau Testing of 2010 Decennial  Systems Can Be Strengthened. GAO-09-262. Washington, D.C.: March 5,  2009.  2010 Census: The Bureau’s Plans for Reducing the Undercount Show  Promise, but Key Uncertainties Remain. GAO-08-1167T. Washington,  D.C.: September 23, 2008.  2010 Census: Census Bureau’s Decision to Continue with Handheld  Computers for Address Canvassing Makes Planning and Testing  Critical. GAO-08-936. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.  2010 Census: Census Bureau Should Take Action to Improve the  Credibility and Accuracy of Its Cost Estimate for the Decennial Census.  GAO-08-554. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2008.
Census 2010: Census at Critical Juncture for Implementing Risk  Reduction Strategies. GAO-08-659T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
Information Technology: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk  Management of Decennial Systems. GAO-08-79. Washington, D.C.:  October 5, 2007.  2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges  Need Prompt Resolution. GAO-05-9. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2005.
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