Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development Assistance in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be Improved
Published: 2010-04-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been a recognized safe haven for al Qaeda leadership and a base for the Taliban to launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. The United States, in an effort to assist Pakistan in addressing this threat, pledged $750 million between 2007 and 2011 to support development activities in the FATA region. This report focuses on (1) the extent U.S. development objectives align with U.S. national security goals and Pakistan's objectives, (2) U.S. efforts to track the pledge, (3) U.S. efforts to measure program performance in the FATA, and (4) efforts to monitor assistance in the FATA. GAO reviewed U.S. and Pakistani documents and interviewed U.S. and Pakistani officials in Washington, D.C., and Pakistan. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. national security goals call for development assistance to aid the Pakistani government in addressing terrorist threats emanating from the FATA. GAO found that U.S. development objectives in the FATA are generally aligned with U.S. national security goals and Pakistan's FATA development plans. In September 2007, USAID and Pakistan signed an agreement regarding development activities in the FATA including the creation of joint strategic implementation plans for the seven FATA geographic areas. We found, however, that the U.S. and Pakistan have not yet completed such plans. The U.S. government has implemented two efforts to track its $750 million pledge in accordance with good management practices. State is tallying allocations of U.S. programs in Pakistan's western frontier region (which includes the FATA), and the USAID controller in Islamabad has undertaken an effort to track most, but not all, U.S. development-related obligations and expenditures in the FATA. As of the end of fiscal year 2009, the U.S. government has reportedly allocated over $728 million toward the pledge. USAID and State collect reports on the performance of their FATA-specific programs. However, key elements, such as identification of evaluation efforts and a timeline for reviewing implementing partner reports required by USAID's regulations are missing in its performance management plan for the FATA. Also, State did not collect all the required project performance documentation. Long-term development programs for which performance could be measured against annual targets generally did not achieve targets. Although hampered by security challenges that prevent direct monitoring called for in its guidance, USAID has taken steps to apply a set of indirect monitoring procedures. This includes collecting information from implementing partners and locally employed staff, and the use of a geographic information system. While USAID officials told GAO they use these methods, GAO found that USAID did not always document the use of these monitoring procedures. GAO also found that State has several monitoring procedures, but had not fully documented their use of these procedures.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Pakistan is a key U.S. ally in the fight against terrorism and violent  extremism. Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terrorists have exploited  Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas’ (FATA) loosely governed  and impoverished environment to plan and launch attacks on Afghan, U.S.,  and NATO security forces in Afghanistan, as well as on Pakistani citizens  and security forces in Pakistan. We previously reported in 2008 and 2009  that the United States had not met its national security goals to destroy  terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA. We also  reported that the United States lacked a comprehensive plan to meet these  goals that included all elements of national power—diplomatic, military,  intelligence, economic, law enforcement support, and development  assistance.
Since that time, the United States has increased its focus on the use of  nonmilitary efforts in Pakistan. In addition to the U.S. pledge to provide  $750 million between 2007 and 2011 toward sustainable development  efforts in Pakistan, the U.S. passed the Enhanced Partnership with  Pakistan Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-73) in October 2009, with the goal of  providing $7.5 billion in new nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan over the  next 5 years (2010 to 2014). As the United States considers how it will go  forward with efforts to assist Pakistan in securing, stabilizing, and  developing the FATA and western frontier region, it is vital that continued  oversight and accountability over funds used for these efforts are in place.
This report examines the status of efforts to fulfill the U.S. $750 million  pledge for development assistance in the FATA. Specifically, it examines  (1) the extent to which U.S. development objectives align with U.S.  national security goals and Pakistan’s objectives, (2) U.S. efforts to track  the fulfillment of the U.S. development assistance pledge, (3) efforts to  measure and report the performance of development programs, and (4)  efforts to monitor development assistance in the FATA. GAO has been  mandated under P.L. 111-73 to complete a review of the Pakistan  Assistance Strategy Report submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of  State, and to complete an independent analysis of the President of the  United States’ certification that 1) the Government of Pakistan is  continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle  supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related  materials and 2) the Government of Pakistan, during the preceding fiscal  year, has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making  significant efforts toward combating terrorist groups. We plan to report  separately on these two issues over the next year. In the interim, we  believe this report provides useful insight on the U.S. ability to plan for,  implement, monitor, and evaluate additional development assistance  efforts.
To address our objectives, we reviewed strategic, planning, and program- related documentation from the Department of State (State) and the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), and discussed these  issues with relevant department officials in Washington, D.C. In addition,  we conducted field work in Pakistan, where we met with officials from the  U.S. embassy, Pakistan’s FATA Secretariat, implementing partners  working in the FATA, and others. We determined the amount of U.S.  funding to FATA by analyzing State and USAID budget documents  covering the period from fiscal years 2007 through 2009 and by verifying  the amounts used for the FATA and the western frontier region through  discussions with agency officials. We analyzed the U.S. efforts to measure  and report results of development assistance programs and monitor and  verify activities by reviewing USAID and implementing partner planning  documents, assistance instruments, and reports.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 through April  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our review objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our review objectives. A detailed discussion of  our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Located in northwestern Pakistan, the FATA is situated along the  Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The mountainous, rugged terrain of the  FATA covers approximately 10,500 square miles, roughly the same size as  the state of Maryland. As figure 1 shows, the FATA is comprised of seven  political agencies—Bajaur, Khyber, Kurrum, Mohmand, Orakzai, North  Waziristan, and South Waziristan—along with six frontier regions—Bannu,  Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Peshawar, and Tank.
The culture and socioeconomic status of most FATA inhabitants is distinct  from the Pakistani majority. Pakistan’s population is estimated at about  176 million, and while current FATA data are unavailable, FATA residents  comprised 2 percent of the Pakistani population in the 1998 census. The  FATA is the poorest and least developed region of Pakistan, with about 60  percent of households living beneath the poverty line and an annual per  capita income of roughly $250—half the national average. The overall  literacy rate in FATA is 17 percent, while the national average is 44  percent. Furthermore, there are few opportunities for employment. Most  families take part in pastoral or subsistence agricultural activities. Besides  limiting educational and economic options, the FATA’s forbidding terrain  isolates tribal communities from markets, health services, and outside  influences.
Militant activity and internal conflict have compounded political and  economic challenges, contributing to an unstable security situation in the  FATA. With porous borders, difficult terrain, and weak rule of law, the  FATA is recognized as a safe haven for international terrorists and  militants. Al Qaeda, militant factions of the Taliban, and related extremist  groups operate throughout the FATA, parts of the North West Frontier  Province, and Balochistan. Internal displacement of households has  become an increasingly pressing issue as Pakistani forces mount attacks  on terrorist groups and tribal militia clash with extremist militants. As of  February 2010, USAID reported that according to government of Pakistan  figures, there were over 400,000 displaced households within Pakistan.
The FATA is a semi-autonomous region with a code of laws and  administrative structure that distinguish it from other Pakistani territories  and provinces. The British governed the FATA using the Frontier Crimes  Regulations, which was codified in 1901. It established administrative and  judicial systems that allowed tribes control over internal affairs. This  arrangement continued after the formation of Pakistan, and the FATA is  governed distinctly from the rest of Pakistan. The FATA is administered by  the governor of the North West Frontier Province as an agent of the  president, and political agents serve as intermediaries between the local  people of each FATA agency and the government of Pakistan.
The FATA Secretariat, which was originally formed by the government of  Pakistan in 2002, helps administer Pakistani government programs and  provide services to citizens of the FATA. The FATA Secretariat is divided  into 11 line departments, including health, education, and agriculture,  which work with the political agents to implement development and  public works projects in the FATA. The FATA Development Authority,  which focuses on the creation of public-private partnerships to bolster  economic and social development, was created as a result of a Pakistani  task force convened by the President of Pakistan after 9/11. The task force  recommended a creative, community-based approach to fighting poverty  in the FATA.
In an effort to address the basic needs of the people in the FATA, the  government of Pakistan issued the FATA Sustainable Development Plan in  2006. This 9-year, $2 billion plan states that people in the FATA, in the  absence of sustainable development, were vulnerable to the influence of  extremist factions inhabiting parts of the region. Implementation of the  plan is being coordinated by the government of Pakistan’s FATA  Secretariat with assistance from their FATA Development Authority,  USAID, and other international partners. The plan lays out broad goals in  17 different sectors, including education, health, water supply and  sanitation, and roads.
Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf publicly supported  increasing development efforts in the FATA and, in 2006, met with  President George W. Bush to discuss these efforts. Afterwards, the U.S.  government began to plan to increase U.S. aid for development activities  in the FATA in an effort to combat terrorist influences. In 2007, the U.S.  government publicized a $750 million pledge in support of the FATA  Sustainable Development Plan over the 5-year period from 2007 to 2011.  To fulfill this pledge, the U.S. government created the FATA Development  Program, which aims to “support the Government of Pakistan’s  development efforts to integrate FATA into the mainstream of Pakistan.”
In support of this pledge, State reports that the U.S. government has  allocated $728 million in nonmilitary assistance in Pakistan’s western  frontier region, including the FATA. Based on our analysis of data  provided by State and USAID, the U.S. has an unliquidated obligation  balance of $93 million as of the end of fiscal year 2009 and has disbursed  $109 million. (See fig. 2.)
USAID and State manage the U.S. program of assistance for FATA. USAID  sponsors work to, among other things, improve health, education, and  livelihoods in the FATA. State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and  Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) sponsors work to build roads and bridges,  and develop small water resources in support of border security, law  enforcement, and counternarcotics objectives. State’s Office of the  Director of Foreign Assistance (F Bureau) tracks the funds toward the  pledge. (See table 1 for a description of U.S. departments, agencies,  bureaus, and offices involved in FATA-related assistance.)
section_title: U.S. Development Efforts in the FATA Are Generally Aligned with U.S. National Security and Pakistan’s Development Goals, but Joint U.S.- Pakistan Implementation Plans Are Lacking
paragraphs: The U.S. development objectives in the FATA are generally in alignment  with U.S. national security goals and the government of Pakistan’s  development objectives. The U.S. development objectives in the FATA  support the U.S. core goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and  its safe havens in Pakistan. U.S. development objectives are also in line  with the government of Pakistan’s development objectives, as described in  Pakistan’s FATA Sustainable Development Plan, which aims to address the  basic needs of the people in the FATA. However the governments of the  U.S. and Pakistan have not developed joint strategic implementation plans  for each of the seven FATA agencies—geographic locations in the FATA—  as called for in the Program Assistance Agreement with Pakistan. (See fig.  1 in the Background section for the location of the seven FATA agencies.)
subsections: section_title: U.S. Development Objectives in the FATA Are Generally Aligned with U.S. National Security Goals
paragraphs: The core national security goal, as established by the Obama  administration in March 2009, is to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al  Qaeda, its allies and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return  to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” To achieve this goal, the U.S. strategy  recommended (1) increasing and broadening assistance in Pakistan— including job creation, education, and infrastructure—and (2)  strengthening the government of Pakistan’s capacity, particularly in the  FATA. The U.S. FATA Development Program, which is the primary  mechanism for implementing the U.S. pledge, directly addresses both of  these recommendations. One of the ways the program addresses the first  recommendation is through vocational or on-the-job training. One of the  ways the program addresses the second recommendation is through  improving the core functions—such as financial management—of the  government of Pakistan’s organizations. (See fig. 3.).
To disrupt, dismantle and  defeat al Qaeda and its  safe heavens in Pakistan,  and to prevent their return  to Pakistan or Afghanistan.
Support for development in  Pakistan’s FATA is critical to  meeting U.S. objectives in the fight  against al Qaeda and related  terrorist organizations in Pakistan.
Increasing nd rodening  assnce in Pkin–  inclding, jo cretion,  edtion, nd infrastrctre.
In addition to the FATA Development Program, various other State and  USAID programs are aligned with the core national security goal to  disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan.
section_title: U.S. Development Objectives in the FATA Are Generally Aligned with Pakistan’s Development Objectives
paragraphs: The U.S. FATA Development Program was designed to target three  development objectives for assistance in the FATA. The United States  seeks to  1. improve economic and social conditions in the FATA,  2.  extend the legitimacy of the government of Pakistan in the FATA, and  3.  support permanent, sustainable change in the FATA.
As figure 4 shows, the U.S. FATA Development Program is generally  aligned with Pakistan’s FATA Sustainable Development Plan, which has  five primary objectives. These are  1.  address basic social needs underlying causes of prevailing disparity  2.  explore and diversify available opportunities to make a positive  contribution toward the economic uplift of the area,  3.  monitor and evaluate multisectoral progress to support, assess and  4. improve institutional and financial capacities to allow a scaling-up of  development initiatives already being undertaken, and 5.  manage and maintain ecological and subsistence-support systems to  increase livelihood security for ordinary people.
subsections: section_title: Improving Economic and Social Conditions in the FATA
paragraphs: The first U.S. objective—to improve economic and social conditions in the  FATA—is aligned with the government of Pakistan’s objectives regarding  social needs and economic opportunities. One way the United States is  addressing this objective is through assisting in the delivery of essential  services, such as primary education and basic health care. The United  States also plans to focus on employment generation and skill  development, which addresses the government of Pakistan’s objective to  explore and diversify available economic opportunities.
section_title: Extending the Legitimacy of the Government of Pakistan
paragraphs: The second U.S. objective—to extend the legitimacy of the government of  Pakistan—is aligned with Pakistan’s objectives to build capacity and  assess and strengthen the development efforts. The U.S. plan calls for  providing training to officials in the FATA Secretariat in core operational  functions, including financial management, which addresses the  government of Pakistan’s objective to improve institutional and financial  capacities. It also calls for assisting the FATA Secretariat to develop the  ability to conduct monitoring and evaluation, which addresses the  government of Pakistan’s objective to monitor and evaluate multisectoral  progress.
section_title: Supporting Permanent, Sustainable Change
paragraphs: The third U.S. objective—to support permanent, sustainable change—is  aligned with the government of Pakistan’s objectives to build capacity and  maintain ecological and subsistence-support systems. The United States is  seeking to support the government of Pakistan in establishing an  appropriate legal and regulatory environment for commercial law and  taxation, which supports Pakistan’s objective to improve institutional and  financial capacities. The United States also planned to support the  government of Pakistan in creating laws and policies that ensure the  sustainability of vital forest, water, and mineral resources; this aligns with  Pakistan’s objective to manage and maintain ecological and subsistence- support systems.
section_title: Efforts Have Been Undertaken to Coordinate Development Assistance
paragraphs: To help keep U.S. efforts in line with Pakistan’s objectives, USAID and  State officials routinely engage with various entities of the government of  Pakistan. USAID and State officials work with FATA political agents  during the planning, implementation, and evaluation stages of their  projects. For example, State officials attend review meetings with  government of Pakistan officials to approve potential projects and to  review the progress of ongoing projects. The political agents work with  U.S. officials to identify potential projects. USAID officials told us they  work side by side with the government of Pakistan both to build trust  between the two countries and to assist in building the capacity of the  government of Pakistan in the FATA. For example, USAID consults with  the political agent and other government of Pakistan officials to identify  guiding principles and priorities for each quarter. USAID also noted that  annual work plans are developed for some of its programs in consultation  with the FATA Secretariat.
section_title: USAID and the Government of Pakistan Have Not Developed Joint Strategic Implementation Plans for Each FATA Agency As Called for in Their Agreement
paragraphs: In September 2007, USAID and the government of Pakistan signed an  agreement regarding development activities in the FATA that included a  requirement to develop joint strategic implementation plans for each of  the seven FATA agencies. Despite efforts that have been undertaken to  coordinate the alignment of U.S. and Pakistani objectives, joint strategic  implementation plans have not been developed. The joint implementation  plans were to be developed by the FATA Secretariat, in collaboration with  USAID, for the purpose of putting the government of Pakistan’s  development plan into action in each FATA agency.
According to the agreement, the FATA Secretariat and USAID were to use  the FATA Sustainable Development Plan as a foundation to create  individual implementation plans that would guide development projects in  each FATA agency. For example, the implementation plans were to  prioritize geographic locations and villages that should be particularly  targeted. The implementation plans were also intended to lay out  responsibilities such as stipulating funds control and monitoring  responsibilities. In addition, the implementation plans were to be designed  to assist with tracking performance by laying out objectives, results, and  indicators. According to the agreement, these plans were to include input  from the political agent responsible for the particular FATA agency (e.g.,  Bajaur), as well as local officials, religious leaders, and community leaders  from the location. Additionally, these plans would provide an opportunity  for the government of Pakistan to update and reaffirm their objectives in  each FATA agency over time. The implementation plans were designed to  be reviewed every 6 months to determine progress on annual work plans.  A senior USAID official in Pakistan involved in these efforts said that as of  February 2010, the plans do not exist and did not provide a reason for the  delay. In commenting on this report, USAID noted that developing FATA  level strategies was no longer a relevant and worthwhile activity.
section_title: The United States Has Two Efforts Under Way to Track the Pledge
paragraphs: In accordance with good management practices, the U.S. government has  implemented two efforts to track the $750 million pledge. State’s Office of  the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F Bureau), which is tasked with  ensuring the strategic and effective use of foreign assistance resources,  assumed responsibility for tracking allocations of U.S. funds toward the  U.S. pledge in Pakistan’s western frontier region, which includes the  FATA. In addition, the USAID controller in Islamabad has undertaken an  effort to track the funding of FATA-specific development programs  intended to address the pledge. During the course of our review, USAID  and State undertook steps based on our review to include missing data  from State’s INL Bureau. However, gaps in the data remain that prevent a  more complete picture of U.S. funding of development efforts in the FATA  and fulfillment of its pledge.
subsections: section_title: State’s F Bureau Tracks Allocation of U.S. Funds Toward the $750 Million Pledge
paragraphs: State’s F Bureau identifies allotments that are counted toward the $750  million pledge by collecting data from U.S. government agencies on their  programs and activities in Pakistan’s western frontier region. As  previously discussed, providing assistance to this region is a primary goal  of the United States, so it is appropriate for State and USAID to track  resources allocated to achieve this goal. While the original announcement  of the pledge only mentioned development assistance to the FATA, the  pledge has been expanded to cover the entire western frontier region and  to include other assistance, such as law enforcement. As such, the F  Bureau counts all nonmilitary allocations in Pakistan’s western frontier  region toward the pledge. Using these criteria, the F Bureau identified  $728 million in allocations from fiscal years 2007 through 2009 toward  meeting the $750 million pledge.
The F Bureau categorizes the assistance it counts toward the pledge into  three general areas: development assistance, governance assistance, and  security assistance. Under development assistance, the F Bureau identified  $461 million in allocations as of December 2009 toward the pledge, which  includes activities such as education, health, and livelihoods. INL noted  that USAID transfers to INL for road assistance are also included in the  development category. Under governance assistance, the F Bureau  identified $117 million in allocations as of December 2009 toward the  pledge, which includes activities such as USAID’s FATA Capacity Building  Project, FATA Transition Initiative, and support of national assemblies in  Balochistan. Under security assistance, the F Bureau identified $150  million in allocations as of December 2009 toward the pledge, which  includes activities such as the construction of a Levy training center,  support to the government of Pakistan’s aviation wing in Balochistan, and  law enforcement and antiterrorism training for civilian police and security  forces in the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan. INL noted  that other INL infrastructure assistance under the Border Security  Program and counternarcotics also fall under the security category. (See  fig. 5.)
section_title: The USAID Controller in Islamabad Has Undertaken an Effort to Track Development Assistance in the FATA, However, Gaps Remain That Prevent a More Complete Picture
paragraphs: In accordance with good management and financial practices, the USAID  controller in Islamabad has undertaken an effort to track the funding of  FATA-specific development programs. As discussed earlier, the FATA  Development Program is the primary mechanism for implementing the  pledge. It consists of 10 programs run by USAID and 3 accounts managed  by State’s INL. At the time of our review, the USAID controller in  Islamabad had sought to generate quarterly pipeline reports on the FATA  Development Program. USAID’s FATA pipeline report tracks agreement  amounts (the full value of the agreement over the full term subject to the  availability of funds), obligations, and expenditure data for USAID  activities, as well as allocations, obligations, and liquidations for INL  activities.
According to the USAID FATA pipeline report, USAID has obligated $161  million in FATA Development Program projects and has expended $104  million of those funds. During the course of our review, we observed that  the USAID controller in Islamabad was experiencing difficulties obtaining  INL’s input for inclusion in the FATA pipeline report and suggested that  USAID and INL work together to provide a more complete report. Action  was taken subsequent to our exit meetings with State and USAID officials  in Washington, D.C., to incorporate State data into the FATA pipeline  report. Between fiscal years 2007 through 2009 INL obligated $6 million  toward projects in the FATA Development Program and has expended  $145 thousand of those funds.
Despite this enhancement, the FATA pipeline report still does not capture  all U.S. activities in the FATA, nor does it report all activities that the F  Bureau counts toward the presidential pledge and thus remains an  incomplete reporting tool for development assistance in the FATA. For  example, in addition to the FATA Development Program, USAID oversees  a number of bilateral assistance programs that operate across Pakistan  that also include some activities in the FATA. Although included in the F  Bureau tracking of the U.S. pledge, they are not tracked on the USAID  FATA pipeline report. USAID officials said that although it accounts for  the nationwide program funds on other financial reports, it had not been  routinely tracking the portion of funds obligated or expended that were  specifically attributed to activities in the FATA. USAID estimated it had  obligated about $2 million and expended about $1.4 million of these  nationwide program funds for activities in the FATA during fiscal years  2007 through 2009.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Measure and Report the Performance of Development Programs in the FATA Are Lacking
paragraphs: USAID and State collect reports on the performance of their FATA-specific  programs, as required by federal regulations and agreements with  implementing partners. USAID, however, has not produced a complete  performance management plan for its development activities in the FATA,  as specified in internal regulations. USAID generally collects required  performance planning and reporting documents from implementing  partners. INL did not collect all of the required documentation of how it  tracks project performance. Development programs for which  performance could be measured against annual targets generally did not  achieve those targets. One of the factors that may have affected the  programs is the dangerous security environment in the FATA.
subsections: section_title: USAID Has Not Produced a Complete Performance Management Plan for Its Development Activities in the FATA
paragraphs: USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) requires USAID officials to  produce complete performance management plans for each U.S.  assistance objective, but USAID has not produced a complete plan that  includes all key elements for its development assistance efforts in the  FATA, as shown in table 2. The plan should be comprised of 10 elements,  including a full set of performance indicators with baseline and target  values, that facilitate the management and reporting of program  performance. These performance indicators are reported to the F Bureau  for inclusion in Pakistan’s Mission Performance Plan and Report, which is  discussed later. We found that USAID was in compliance with 1 of the  criteria, not in compliance with 4 criteria, and we were unable to  determine compliance with 5 criteria. Specifically, as table 2 shows, while  USAID identified a set of performance indicators, USAID did not provide a  baseline and target, as required, for each indicator. Neither did the USAID  performance management plan describe the known data limitations for all  of the 41 performance indicators as also required by the ADS. Additionally,  USAID’s performance management plan does not identify possible  evaluation efforts and does not include a timeline for duties such as  assessing the quality of data obtained and reviewing implementing  partners’ reports. Appropriate baseline information and plans for  periodically reviewing program performance allow managers to make  timely assessments and adjust programs to improve performance.
section_title: USAID Collects Required Planning and Reporting Documents from Implementing Partners
paragraphs: USAID implementing partners are generally complying with federal and  contractual planning and reporting requirements. In addition to the ADS  requirement that USAID produce a complete performance management  plan for its development activities in the FATA, the code of federal  regulations requires USAID to collect performance reports from  implementers at least once per year. However, the specific requirements  for each program vary according to the terms established in their grants,  cooperative agreements or contracts. Figure 6 shows that of the ten FATA- specific USAID programs, the nine long-term programs had implementer- developed and USAID-approved performance management plans. The  program managed by USAID’s OTI, which is focused on the delivery of  quick-impact activities, produced substitute documentation. Based on our  analysis of USAID data, implementing partners began tracking  performance within 5 months of program start dates and all have regularly  produced quarterly or monthly performance reports.
section_title: State’s Documentation of Program Performance Was Incomplete
paragraphs: State’s INL agreements with the government of Pakistan transfer the  responsibility for project implementation to various Pakistani entities and  require periodic reviews of performance. However, as figure 7 shows, INL  did not have complete documentation of periodic reviews. The various  agreements with the government of Pakistan outline different ways for INL  to track performance. For example, the agreement to build the Border  Security Roads calls for monthly review meetings while the agreement to  construct the Border Security Bridges calls for monthly performance  reports. We reviewed our sample of INL activities to determine the  completeness of their planning and reporting documentation. INL had  records of eight monthly review meetings over a 2-year period between  U.S. and Pakistani officials for its Border Security Roads project and one  monthly performance report for the Border Security Bridge project. The  Levy Outposts and Frontier Corps Outposts agreements called for monthly  review meetings, while the Frontier Constabulary Outposts agreement  called for monthly periodic reports. INL did not have any documentation  on performance for these projects. The Levy Training Center agreement  and the Counter-narcotics Roads and Small Schemes agreement did not  require periodic performance reports or review meetings. However, INL  had minutes from several review meetings and one monthly performance  report for counternarcotics activities.
Ste home but not ll of the reqired docmenttionSte hd none of the reqired docmenttion State only provided us with a portion of the contract.  uired to produce uarterly or monthly progress reports or  documentation of review meetings. Those that had one or more of the reuired documents for the  period of review, but did not have documentation for every month or uarter were determined to have  “some” documentation.
section_title: State’s F Bureau Reports on Performance of Foreign Assistance Programs in Pakistan
paragraphs: Based on information provided by USAID and State’s INL, the F Bureau  produces the Pakistan Mission Performance Plan and Report to report on  achievements of U.S. foreign assistance programs and provide information  on accomplishments and challenges of U.S. government entities operating  in Pakistan. State’s INL and USAID contribute both narrative and  quantitative performance information to these reports. These reports  compile and report on indicators at a nationwide level, and while they  include some reference to the FATA, they are not intended to include a  complete overview of the U.S. programs’ performance against targets  specifically in the FATA. The 2007 and 2008 performance plans provided  summary narrative of U.S. activities, including the construction of  outposts, roads, and schools; the provision of clean drinking water and  microfinance loans; and training for health workers.
section_title: Several of the Programs with Data on Performance Indicators Did Not Achieve Their Targets
paragraphs: Performance of USAID’s Programs in the FATA: Performance could  not be measured against targets for all ten USAID assistance programs in  the FATA because they did not all include sufficient data on performance  indicators in their most recent annual reporting instruments. Specifically,  two of the nine long-term USAID programs primarily set long-term targets  that coincide with the end of the programs, making assessments of current  performance against targets difficult. Two other long-term USAID  programs did not provide any data on performance indicators in their most  recent annual reporting instrument. As such, success in meeting annual  performance targets could only be determined for five of nine long-term  USAID programs and USAID’s OTI-led quick-impact program that reported  performance primarily against annual targets. As figure 8 shows, the  HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care project reported that over three quarters of  its performance indicators with annual targets met or exceeded their  targets. The performance of the four remaining long-term programs  suggests they encountered more difficulties in meeting their targets, with  less than one third of the performance indicators for three of these  programs meeting or exceeding their targets.
For the USAID OTI activities we reviewed associated with the FATA  Transition Initiative (USAID’s quick-impact program), targets were  generally met. Different from USAID’s long-term programs, USAID’s OTI  program focuses on short-term activities that respond quickly to both local  needs and U.S. foreign policy priorities. Therefore, performance  management plans with annual program indicators are not considered the  best way to measure success in the environment in which OTI operates.
Instead, output indicators are developed in individual plans for each  activity within the program. USAID managed 437 OTI activities, from  which we selected a judgmental sample of 48 activities for review. That  sample was further refined to determine those activities in the most  advanced stage of completion. The resulting 17 activities in our sample  that were closed had a total of 34 performance indicators, 32 of which  met or exceeded their targets (see fig. 9).
Performance of INL Projects in the FATA: While we were able to  identify long-term goals or targets for eight of the nine INL projects, INL  did not provide documentation of performance against intermediate  targets on a project level. In addition, INL did not generally develop  performance indicators or targets for individual activities in its planning  documentation, but in most cases INL set out specific technical  specifications and timelines for activity completion. When work has  finished on an activity, completion certificates are generally required to  certify each activity has been fully completed both physically and  financially to specification. Of the 22 activities in our sample for which INL  officials reported that work was finished, 12 activities had been certified  as completed. Of the remaining 10 programs, seven activities had  photographic or documentary evidence of some progress made, and INL  did not have documentation of progress made for three activities for  which work was considered finished.
section_title: The Difficult Security Environment Hinders the Ability of Implementing Partners to Complete Planned Work
paragraphs: USAID, State and implementing partners noted difficulties in program  implementation were caused by violence in the western frontier region,  such as militant activities and suicide bombings. State’s most recent  annual report on terrorism noted that terrorist attacks were centered on  Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, including the FATA, and that Pakistan  had seen a marked increase of suicide bombings. In most cases  government and military compounds were targeted, and the government  of Pakistan rule of law was challenged throughout the region. Violence  made program implementation a challenge in some areas and impossible  in others. For example, work on the Lower FATA Development Program  was delayed when the implementing partner’s Chief of Party was killed in  Pakistan in November 2008. USAID also noted an attack on U.S. consulate  staff and a tenuous security situation that required the relocation of U.S.  staff to Islamabad. In addition, the Border Security Project’s road  construction halted in November 2008 due to the worsening security  situation and 53 percent of the 62 outposts that were built by the Levy  Outpost project have been destroyed by militants. INL also noted that  these were very small outposts, which were designed to hold 6 to 9 people  to guard the lines of communication.  They were designed and constructed  before the current unrest and no facilities of this nature are currently  being built by INL in the FATA.
section_title: Procedures Developed to Monitor Assistance Programs in the FATA, but Their Use Has Not Been Fully Documented
paragraphs: USAID has developed a set of procedures to monitor implementation and  verify results of their programs in areas too dangerous for U.S. officials to  access. However, USAID is not documenting its use of some procedures  for all of its programs. State’s INL is using a combination of monitoring  procedures, but also is not documenting its use of all of these procedures.
subsections: section_title: USAID Has Alternative Monitoring Procedures to Mitigate Its Difficulty in Directly Monitoring Programs, but Is Not Sufficiently Documenting Monitoring of Long-Term Programs
paragraphs: As part of its regular procedures, USAID designates staff to administer and  monitor foreign assistance awards. Included in staff responsibilities are  visits to project sites and verification of program performance. Due to the  dangerous environment in the FATA, USAID officials have had no direct  access to project sites in the FATA to monitor the implementation of the  assistance programs.
subsections: section_title: Monitoring of Long-Term USAID Programs
paragraphs: Although USAID has established these procedures to monitor programs in  the FATA, it has not consistently documented their use for its long-term  programs. As figure 10 shows, USAID was able to provide documentation  for the use of three of these procedures: implementing partner reports,  monitoring and verification unit reports, and media reports, with evidence  showing a reliance mostly on implementing partner reports.
We identified several reasons for the gaps in USAID’s documentation of its  monitoring efforts. For example, USAID officials noted that while locally  employed staff visit activity sites, they do not write reports to document  what they observe and that the monitoring and verification unit was not  designed to monitor all programs. Additionally, a USAID official noted that  they do not have a system for tracking and cataloging media coverage of  development efforts.
section_title: Monitoring of USAID’s OTI Quick-Impact Development Activities
paragraphs: According to USAID, the three main procedures it uses to monitor its  quick-impact development activites in the FATA are (1) locally employed  staff reports, (2) implementing partner reports, and (3) independent  monitoring unit reports, which are prepared by local nongovernemental  organizations. In addition, USAID may use government of Pakistan  monitoring, media reports, community oversight committees, and  photographs to supplement these reports. A specific monitoring plan is  developed for each development activity.
USAID has generally documented its use of each of these monitoring  procedures for its OTI development activities. In the sample of 15 closed  activities we reviewed, as shown in figure 11, all activities used multiple  procedures to monitor progress.
To enhance USAID monitoring efforts, USAID hired an implementing  partner to develop a geographic information system and train  implementing partners to use it. One purpose of this system is to allow  USAID to track the status of its implementing partners’ development  activities. It will allow USAID to access information on development  activities taking place in the FATA, such as geographic location, type of  project, financial data, and outcomes. During our visit to Pakistan in June  2009, USAID and the implementing partner informed us that the system  would be fully operational by August 2009. As of January 2010, although all  implementers had access to the system it had not been fully populated  with data. In March 2010, USAID informed us that all relevant program  information had been entered into the geographic information system.
section_title: State’s INL Uses a Combination of Monitoring Procedures, but Is Not Documenting All of Its Monitoring Procedures
paragraphs: INL’s activities—including construction of outposts, roads, and small  development projects—in the FATA are generally monitored at various  stages by INL staff. The U.S. government has signed agreements with the  government of Pakistan to carry out INL’s activities. According to these  agreements, INL approves project cost estimates, which include technical  specifications and timelines for project implementation. The agreements  also call for INL to make field visits during implementation— independently or along with government of Pakistan —and verify that  these activities are taking place to monitor the use of U.S. funds.  Additionally, INL also relies on photos of projects to monitor progress.   According to INL, all photos, aside from a few for projects in North and  South Waziristan, were taken by INL personnel. However, some of the  photographs did not have dates, locations, or sources, which made it  impossible for us to determine what activities these photos were intended  to document. Upon project completion, INL is expected to conduct a final  inspection and sign a completion certificate along with government of  Pakistan officials. As shown in figure 12, INL did not always document its  use of its monitoring procedures.
INL reported that it had made arrangements for the government of  Pakistan to provide evidence of monitoring when INL cannot perform on- site monitoring, However, INL had no documentation from the  government of Pakistan.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The FATA is an area of great strategic interest for the United Sates and  Pakistan, and because the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009  authorizes $7.5 billion in new nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan,  accountability for development efforts there takes on particular  importance. Although U.S. agencies have taken steps to track the funds  and align U.S. efforts in the FATA with Pakistan’s development objectives,  the United States continues to face security and access to Pakistani  government document challenges that make monitoring of projects  difficult. Without addressing gaps in planning, performance, and  monitoring documentation, the U.S. government cannot fully and  accurately assess the status of current assistance efforts or accountability  of funds associated with U.S. development efforts in the FATA. Of critical  importance is the completion of the development of joint strategic  implementation plans with Pakistan that would help ensure that U.S. funds  are used in accordance with U.S. national security goals and the needs of  the seven FATA agencies. These plans would aid U.S. officials in  determining specific objectives and priorities for providing sustainable  development assistance based on local needs. Similarly, including all of  the funding data for FATA-related assistance in one document such as  USAID’s FATA pipeline report would present, in a single document, a  more complete picture of U.S. funding of development efforts in the FATA  and fulfillment of its pledge. In addition, developing complete performance  management plans would enhance the ability of the U.S. government to  track progress toward planned results, allocate resources toward  identified priorities, and advance organizational knowledge of which  development activities are likely to be more successful in the FATA and  western frontier region. Finally, it is vital that USAID and State improve  the documentation of their monitoring. Without this information, it is  difficult to accurately assess the status of U.S. assistance efforts and to  ensure proper accountability and oversight over appropriated U.S. funds.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that U.S. development projects associated with the U.S.  pledge and future spending plans for Pakistan continue to be aligned with  our national security goal of assisting Pakistan in addressing terrorist  threats, and have clearly articulated monitoring responsibilities,  indicators, and performance tracking, we recommend that USAID work  with the government of Pakistan to complete the development of joint  strategic implementation plans as originally called for in the agreement  between USAID and the government of Pakistan.
To provide a more complete picture and enhance the tracking of U.S.  assistance for the FATA we recommend that USAID take steps to  incorporate the funding amounts for its nationwide attributed programs  into the USAID controller in Islamabad’s FATA pipeline report.
To improve upon existing efforts to measure the progress of U.S.  development assistance projects associated with the fulfillment of the U.S.  pledge, consistent with ADS requirements, and to provide a basis for  planning future development assistance for FATA, we recommend that the  USAID Administrator include in its performance management plan for the  FATA Development Program:    a calendar of performance management tasks,  the baseline and targeted values for each performance indicator in the  Performance Management Plan, and    a description of the known data limitations for each performance  indicator.
To help ensure that the government of Pakistan is using U.S. funds as  intended, we recommend that the Secretary of State take steps to improve  INL’s performance reporting documentation.
To improve upon U.S. efforts to monitor assistance programs in the FATA,  we recommend that the USAID Administrator take steps to improve  USAID’s documentation of its alternative monitoring efforts related to the  FATA.
We also recommend that the Secretary of State take steps to improve  State’s documentation of its monitoring efforts for programs that cover  FATA and the western frontier region.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of  State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are  reproduced in appendixes V and VI, respectively. The U.S. Agency for  International Development and the Department of State also provided  technical comments and updates that we have incorporated throughout  the report as appropriate.
USAID concurred with our overall recommendation that U.S. assistance in  the FATA should be well planned and documented but noted that they and  the FATA Secretariat have jointly agreed that the development of the  FATA-level strategies was no longer a relevant and worthwhile activity.  USAID noted that they have initiated other measures to ensure that U.S.  funds are being used in accordance with the needs of the seven FATA  Agencies.  While we acknowledge the ongoing efforts to coordinate U.S.  assistance efforts with the government of Pakistan, we do not think these  efforts alone are enough to ensure sufficient oversight and accountability  of U.S. funded development programs in the FATA.  In addition, we  believe that joint U.S. Pakistan strategic implementation plans would help  to ensure that U.S. efforts in the FATA are not only based on the needs of  each of the seven geographic FATA areas, but also U.S. national security  goals.  Additionally, because of the challenging security environment,  developing joint implementation plans could help to ensure clear  implementation and monitoring expectations between the U.S. and  Pakistani government for FATA development projects.  This includes the  extent to which the U.S. will be granted access to project data collected by  the government of Pakistan.
Additionally, USAID concurred with the recommendation to enhance the  tracking of U.S. assistance for the FATA and noted that it is in the process  of working on a system to enhance expenditure monitoring. USAID also  concurred with our recommendations to improve both performance  measurement and monitoring and evaluation and noted that it has taken  steps to implement our recommendations, including increasing the  number of Foreign Service nationals staff at their office in Peshawar in an  effort to enhance monitoring of FATA projects and fully implementing a  geographic information system to address weaknesses identified in our  report.
The Department of State concurred with our overarching recommendation  that assistance programs should align with U.S. national security  objectives and the Government of Pakistan’s requirements and that efforts  to monitor and report on programs, performance, and spending should be  robust and transparent.  State concurred with our recommendation to  improve INL’s performance reporting and noted that it will take the  recommendation under consideration as it refines the existing process and  defines new requirements for performance measurement and reporting.
State also concurred with our recommendation to improve documentation  of its monitoring efforts, highlighted its year-round end use monitoring  program, and noted that our audit prompted INL to initiate new efforts to  improve its monitoring documentation and organization systems,  including labeling all monitoring photos, improving electronic and physical  filing systems, producing electronic minutes of all meetings with  government of Pakistan counterparts, and planning regional training for its  monitoring staff this calendar year.
USAID and State both reiterated the impact that the security environment  in Pakistan has had on U.S. assistance efforts in the FATA and western  frontier region.
We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of the U.S.  Agency for International Development, the Secretary of State, and other  interested parties. The report is also available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this review were to examine (1) the extent to which U.S.  development objectives align with U.S. goals and Pakistan’s objectives, (2)  U.S. efforts to track the fulfillment of the U.S. pledge, (3) efforts to  measure and report the performance of development programs, and (4)  efforts to monitor development assistance in the Federally Administered  Tribal Areas (FATA).
To determine the extent to which U.S. development objectives align with  U.S. goals and Pakistan’s objectives, we obtained copies of the planning  documents for U.S. activities in the FATA, U.S. strategic documents, and  Pakistan’s FATA Sustainable Development Plan. We interviewed relevant  U.S. officials for the planning history of U.S. development assistance  efforts in the FATA. We compared the three objectives for the U.S.  government’s FATA Development Program with the relevant goals and  recommendations described in the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on  U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. We also compared the U.S.  development objectives for the FATA with the primary objectives in the  Pakistani plan.
To determine how the U.S. is tracking the fulfillment of the U.S. pledge, we  interviewed Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) officials. To determine how the U.S. is tracking  allocations counted toward the pledge, we interviewed officials and  obtained data from State’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign  Assistance (F Bureau). To determine U.S. obligations and expenditures for  the FATA Development Program, we interviewed and obtained financial  data from the USAID controller in Islamabad. To determine the tracking  and amounts of funding for USAID’s nationwide programs that were  attributed to the FATA, activities generally counted toward the pledge by  State’s F Bureau, we interviewed and obtained data from the USAID  controller in Islamabad. We also analyzed State documents and  interviewed State officials to determine the amount of Bureau for  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ (INL) obligations  and expenditures applicable to the presidential pledge.
In order to determine how the United States is measuring and reporting  the performance of its development activities in the FATA, we reviewed  federal and agency guidelines for performance planning and reporting  requirements, as well as U.S. assistance agreements with implementing  partners and the government of Pakistan. For this objective, we limited  our focus to the reporting on U.S. activities in the FATA, rather than the  broader western frontier region and compared performance planning and  reporting documentation required against that which was provided. In  addition, we reviewed the ADS Chapter 203 to determine the requirements  for the assistance objective performance management plan. We also  reviewed the most recent annual performance reporting instruments for  each USAID program and INL and F Bureau performance reports to  determine the progress of programs against targets in the programs’ most  recent year of operation. Specifically, in reviewing the long-term USAID  programs we compared performance indicator annual targets against  actual progress made in their most recent year of operation, using their  most recent annual reporting instruments. Indicators were placed in the  following categories based on their level of actual progress: Indicator met  or exceeded target (100% or above); Progress made, more than 50% of  target achieved (51%-99%); Progress made, 50% or less achieved (1%-50%);  Indicator made no progress (0%). In appendix III indicators were further  broken out into quartiles (1%-25%, 26%-50%, 51%-75% and 76%-99%) and  indicators for which progress could not be determined were included (i.e.  indicators such as those for which no target was set or long-term targets  were set, but no annual targets were set). In categorizing the progress  made by performance indicators against targets, the indicators were  weighted equally (whether output, intermediate result or outcome). There  are limitations to this approach, since some indicators may be much more  important than others, and there are likely large qualitative differences  between them. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) program does  not use program-level performance indicators or set annual targets and  INL sets out many technical specifications for their construction activities  in cost estimate documents, but INL did not provide information on  performance indicators. We therefore modified our approach to report on  performance of their programs, studying planning and reporting  documentation on an activity level for OTI and INL, rather than program- wide. In designing the analysis for the OTI and INL activities, we wanted to  ensure that we reviewed a range of programs reflecting differences that  could affect program implementation and results. However, we were not  able to clearly identify a population, which led us to select a judgmental  rather than a random sample. Our judgmental sample consisted of 48 out  of 437 USAID OTI activities and 42 out of 426 INL activities in the FATA  for further analysis based on the following criteria:    geographical location—we ensured each FATA agency in which activities  were taking place was represented in the samples;  type of activity—we included examples of each type of activity including  education, health, road construction, and border outpost construction;    budgeted cost of the activity—we targeted the activities with higher costs;    status of the project—we ensured that both ongoing and completed  activities were represented.
For our analysis of USAID’s OTI program results, we focused on those  activities that had reached the most advanced stage of completion. USAID  defines closed activities as those reported to have finished all work. There  were 17 closed activities in our sample of 48. We eliminated 2 activities  because they were surveys, for which the very use of the monitoring  procedures would be counterproductive, as the attention would possibly  influence responses. The resulting 15 activities we analyzed further  because output targets were set for the end of each activity. We compared  the output targets set for individual activities against actual performance  and placed the output indicators in the same categories used for the long- term USAID programs. To analyze INL’s performance we could not  compare performance indicators against targets as we did with USAID’s  long-term and OTI efforts because INL did not provide information on  indicators. Instead, we compared documentation of activity completion  certification against the activities INL reported as completed – which were  22 of the 42 activities in our sample. For those activities reported as  completed, but not certified, we reviewed reporting documentation for  evidence of progress made. As this is a judgmental sample, we cannot  make generalizations using this analysis. However, given the care taken in  the selection of our sample, we determined that this methodology is  adequate for our purpose of providing insight into program planning and  performance.
To assess U.S. monitoring efforts, we focused on the monitoring of U.S.  activities in the FATA, rather than the broader western frontier region. We  conducted interviews with U.S. officials in the United States and Pakistan  to learn about monitoring procedures and how the United States is  monitoring activities in the FATA. We also reviewed planning and other  documents that described monitoring procedures for U.S. activities. While  in Pakistan, we were able to visit two training programs operating in  Islamabad. However, we were not allowed to conduct site visits of U.S.  projects in the FATA or Peshawar due to security concerns, including a  terrorist attack that occurred in Peshawar during our visit. In order to  verify U.S. monitoring efforts, we requested documentation of monitoring  efforts for the judgmental sample of 48 USAID OTI and 42 INL activities,  described above. We conducted an in-depth analysis of the monitoring  documentation provided by USAID’s OTI and State’s INL and compared  this documentation to the procedures described in monitoring plans and in  interviews with U.S. officials. We also compared USAID’s documentation  of monitoring efforts for long-term programs (on a program-wide basis,  rather than through a sample of individual activities within each program)  against USAID’s monitoring procedures as described in its monitoring fact  sheet.
We interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and in Islamabad,  Pakistan. We interviewed U.S. officials from the F Bureau, State’s South  and Central Asia Bureau, INL, USAID’s Pakistan desk, controller in  Islamabad, OTI, and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. We also interviewed  several of USAID’s implementing partners, representatives from other  international donors, and officials from the government of Pakistan,  including the FATA Secretariat and political agents. In Pakistan we  conducted site visits to a cultural exchange program, one of the livelihood  development programs, a maternal health program, and the capacity  building program, where we observed a demonstration of the geographic  information system.
The information on foreign law in this report is not the product of GAO’s  original analysis, but is derived from interviews and secondary sources.  We conducted our audit work from February 2009 to April 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings, conclusions and  recommendations.
section_title: Appendix II: Descriptions of FATA Development Programs
paragraphs: Appendix II: Descriptions of FATA  Development Programs Lower FATA Livelihood Development Program   The FATA Livelihoods Development Program is a community-based program comprised  of the following components: 1) creating jobs, increasing incomes and teaching  employable skills with a focus on unemployed youth; 2) revitalizing community  infrastructure and essential services; and 3) supporting established businesses and  developing new sustainable businesses.
Upper FATA Livelihood Development Program  The upper FATA Livelihoods Development Program has the same components as the  lower FATA program. It is a community-based program comprised of the following  components: 1) creating jobs, increasing incomes and teaching employable skills with a  focus on unemployed youth; 2) revitalizing community infrastructure and essential  services; and 3) supporting established businesses and developing new sustainable  businesses. The upper and lower FATA programs are under the direction of two  separate implementing partners in geographically separate areas of the FATA.
Links to Learning: Education Support to Pakistan   This program has three goals: 1) to improve teacher education and professional development  through providing institutional and academic support that is centered on student achievement  and learning outcomes; 2) to improve student learning and the learning environment through  developing systems for gauging student learning and achievement, strengthening of  assessment cells at the district and provincial levels and by providing learning tools and  classroom inputs aimed at improving student achievement; and 3) to support governance  reforms and strengthen public sector capacity at the federal, provincial and district levels to  sustain quality teaching and learning.
FATA Capacity Building Development Program  The scope of work for the Capacity Building program is to: 1) develop strategic  approaches to utilize the anticipated significant increase in government of Pakistan and  donor resources expected as a result of the FATA Sustainable Development Plan; 2)  support the building of civilian/paramilitary cooperation in FATA development; 3) build  capacity of FATA institutions to plan, implement and manage funds and to communicate  effectively with constituents and communities to ensure that development initiatives are  aligned with local needs and expectations; and 4) strengthen the capacity of the  indigenous NGO community to deliver resources in support of strategic plans.
Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program  The goal of the Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program is to reduce maternal,  newborn, and child mortality in Pakistan, through viable and demonstrable initiatives and  capacity building of existing programs and structures within health systems and  communities to ensure improvements and supportive linkages in the continuum of health  care for women from the home to the hospital.
Improved Child Health in FATA  The strategic objective of the Improved Child Health in FATA program is to be achieved  through the following three intermediate results: 1) increased access to and availability of  child health services at facility and community levels; 2) improved quality of child health  services at facility and community levels; and 3) increased community knowledge and  acceptance of key child health services and behaviors. The following intervention  packages will be implemented: Immunization, Acute Respiratory Infection, Control of  Diarrheal Diseases, Essential Newborn Care, and Nutrition and Micronutrients.
Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA  The overall goal of the Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA is the complete interruption of  transmission from person to person. Polio eradication in Pakistan cannot be achieved  until transmission of the virus is stopped in FATA. The only way to interrupt transmission  in Pakistan is to increase the coverage of children receiving oral polio vaccine and to  simultaneously nurture community demand and responsiveness to vaccine services.
Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene Project   The Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene program is to be implemented through  three main activities:1) assist the government of Pakistan in designing a comprehensive  hygiene and sanitation promotion strategy for safe water management, hygienic  behaviors, and safe sanitation practices; 2) provide support to governmental agencies  and non-governmental organizations and communities through capacity-building and  training in operations and management of water treatment units, hygiene, and sanitation  promotion, community mobilization, planning, cost-recovery, and water resources  management, to help ensure that investments in hardware and promotional activities will  be sustainable over the long-term; and 3) provide a comprehensive technical review of  water treatment and water quality testing technologies for use at the community and  household levels, and supporting pilot tests of technologies that show potential for  technical, social and economic acceptability.
section_title: Appendix III: Detailed Performance Results for FATA-Specific USAID Programs
paragraphs: The following is a detailed snapshot of program performance measured by  the performance of indicators against their targets, as reported in  programs’ most recent annual reporting instruments. Indicators have been  categorized by the percentage of the target that was achieved. Special  circumstances—such as indicators without targets or targets of zero—are  placed in separate categories to form a complete picture of program  performance.
Livelihoods Development Program: The Livelihoods Development  Program completed its first year of operations in spring 2009 and the  following information was taken from the programs’ first annual reports  The program is being implemented by two separate partners, one  operating in the upper FATA and the other in lower FATA.
Links to Learning: Education Support to Pakistan: This program  completed its second full year of operation in October of 2009. In Year 2 it  reported on 49 performance indicators, 45 of which had life of program (5  year) targets. In the absence of interim targets, GAO could not determine if  performance indicators were on track to meet 5-year goals after two years  of operation.
Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program: This program  completed its first full year of operation in December 2008. The following  represents the progress it reported in its fourth quarterly report.
Improved Child Health in FATA: This program completed its third full  year of operation in September 2009.
Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA: This program completed its first  full year of activity in March of 2009. GAO was unable to measure its short- term success because targets for 11 indicators were life of program targets  or not time sensitive, and therefore difficult to measure. For example, one  performance goal was to hold vaccination campaign reviews after each  campaign, but the number of campaigns was not specified and  performance was not tracked cumulatively in the fourth quarterly report.
Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project: This program  completed its first full year in January 2009 and the data presented is from  its first annual report.
section_title: Appendix IV: Details of INL Documentation of Monitoring for a Sample of 42 Activities
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report  Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development Assistance in Pakistan’s  Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be Improved (GAO-10-289, GAO Code 320656)
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled  “COMBATING TERRORISM:  Planning and Documentation of U.S.  Development Assistance in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need  to Be Improved.”  Enhancing the effectiveness of civilian assistance to Pakistan is  one of the U.S. Government’s top foreign policy and national security priorities. Foreign assistance is vital to help the Government of Pakistan (GOP) overcome the  political, economic, and security challenges that threaten Pakistan’s long-term  stability.  For this reason and in light of the significant increase in foreign  assistance funding for Pakistan, we welcome the GAO review of our programs and  the opportunity to improve upon our efforts.
The Department of State concurs with the overarching recommendation of  the GAO report that assistance programs should align with U.S. national security  objectives and the Government of Pakistan’s requirements and that efforts to  monitor and report on programs, performance, and spending should be robust and  transparent.  The Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and  Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), as the primary State Department entity providing  significant civilian assistance programming in the FATA, has been working since  the 1980s to implement development assistance programs in close coordination  with Pakistani partners.
The Department generally concurs with GAO’s recommendation to improve  INL’s performance reporting and will take the recommendation under  consideration as it refines the existing process and defines new requirements for  performance measurement and reporting.  INL uses well-established procedures to  produce project-level performance documents that set out quantifiable  measurements, which are mutually agreed upon with GOP partners.  These  documents include project proposals and cost estimates (PC-1s), which outline the  project description, justification, objective(s), and target(s), and memoranda of  understanding, which provide USG-GOP agreement on implementation procedures  for specific projects.
The Department generally concurs with GAO’s recommendation that the  Department of State improve documentation of its monitoring efforts.  While the  Department acknowledges that reporting on these efforts needs improvement,  Pakistan-based INL staff conduct regular monitoring and oversight visits to project  sites throughout the FATA, NWFP, and Balochistan as well as other locations  throughout the country, as the security environment permits.  As a testament to this  personalized approach, INL provided GAO with site visit reports, drafted by INL  in-country staff, for 36, and photos taken by INL personnel for 39, of the 42  projects for which GAO requested data.  Three of the six projects lacking site visit  reports and two of the three projects lacking photos are located in North and South  Waziristan, where militant activities and military operations have created a security situation where site visits could not be safely conducted in recent years.
The GAO report did not reference INL’s rigorous End Use Monitoring  (EUM) program, which is a year-round effort overseen by the INL Director and  Management Officer in Pakistan and executed by four locally-employed staff, to  track and monitor all INL assistance provided to Government of Pakistan entities. INL EUM staff members conduct scheduled and unscheduled on-site inspections at  locations throughout Pakistan, process quarterly reports on assistance from  Government of Pakistan partners, and maintain day-to-day contact with relevant  GOP officials.  In recent years, the EUM reports for Pakistan have found that the  vast majority of INL assistance to Pakistani partners is being used as intended and  that recipients’ procedures for tracking locations and use of resources has been  excellent. Given the tenuous security situation, this is an impressive record of  USG employees conducting hands-on field monitoring in a highly difficult  operating environment.  The GAO audit prompted INL to initiate new efforts to  improve its monitoring documentation and organization systems, including  labeling all monitoring photos, improving electronic and physical filing systems,  and producing electronic minutes of all meetings with GOP counterparts.  INL is  also planning regional training for monitoring staff this calendar year.
Finally, the Department of State believes that, as drafted, the GAO report  underestimates the impact of the security environment on the implementation and  monitoring of U.S. Government programs in the FATA and western frontier.
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Hynek P. Kalkus, Assistant  Director; Claude Adrien; Brandon Hunt; Jodi Munson; Bruce Kutnick;  Karen Deans; Virginia Chanley; Martin De Alteriis; Mark Dowling; Jena  Sinkfield; and Holly Dye made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with  Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-263SP.  Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed  over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds.  GAO-08-806. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement  Claims for Coalition Support Funds. GAO-08-932T. Washington, D.C.:  June 24, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in  Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a  Comprehensive Plan and Continued Oversight. GAO-08-820T.  Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2008.
Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition  Support Funds Provided to Pakistan. GAO-08-735R. Washington, D.C.:  May 6, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to  Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s  Federally Administered Tribal Areas. GAO-08-622. Washington, D.C.:  April 17, 2008.