Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed
Published: 2009-09-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: An Arabic version of this product is available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-190 . The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital partner in combating terrorism. The strong diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, founded more than 70 years ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, that were carried out in large part by Saudi nationals and killed thousands of U.S. citizens. GAO was asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies' assessment of and the Saudi government's views on progress toward the goals of this strategy. GAO analyzed relevant U.S. and Saudi strategy, planning, and evaluation documents related to efforts since 2005, and discussed these efforts with subject matter experts and U.S. and Saudi officials in Washington, D.C., and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. GAO submitted a copy of this report to intelligence agencies, the National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury for their review and comment.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The U.S. government strategy to collaborate with Saudi Arabia on counterterrorism utilizes existing diplomatic and security-related efforts to create an active antiterrorism coalition by enhancing the Saudi government's ability to combat terrorists and prevent financial support to extremists. These objectives are contained in Department of State's (State) Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, and also reflected in a January 2008 report from State to the Congress on its strategy for Saudi Arabia. The MSPs include performance targets to measure progress on efforts to combat terrorism and its financing, such as providing security training to the Saudi government, strengthening Saudi financial institutions, and implementation of relevant Saudi regulations. U.S. and Saudi officials report progress on countering terrorism and its financing within Saudi Arabia, but noted challenges, particularly in preventing alleged funding for terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. In April 2009, State assessed progress related to its goal of building an active U.S.-Saudi antiterrorist coalition as "on target." U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in enhancing the Saudi government's ability to combat terrorists, and note the Saudi government's efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda's terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. However, these officials noted Saudi Arabia's neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against U.S. and Saudi interests. U.S. and Saudi officials also report progress on efforts to prevent financial support to extremists, citing, for example, the Saudi government's regulations on sending charitable contributions overseas, and the arrest and prosecution of individuals providing support for terrorism. However, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals and charitable organizations to support terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia, and noted limited Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorists' use of cash couriers as challenges. Despite these concerns, some performance targets related to countering terrorism financing were removed from State's current MSP. According to State officials, these changes were made either because a specific target was no longer considered feasible or because progress was made toward the target.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital  partner in combating terrorism and advancing other U.S. foreign policy  priorities, such as achieving security in Iraq, advancing the Israeli- Palestinian peace process, and ensuring stability in world oil markets. The  strong diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi  Arabia, founded more than 70 years ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda  attacks of September 11, 2001, that were carried out in large part by Saudi  nationals and killed thousands of U.S. citizens. Nevertheless, the United  States and Saudi Arabia currently have an ongoing dialogue on a range of  counterterrorism issues, which include high-level discussions and  working-level collaboration.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States  (9/11 Commission) was established in 2002 to prepare a full account of the  circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,  including alleged Saudi links to the attacks. The 9/11 Commission’s 2004  report found no evidence that the Saudi government funded Al Qaeda, but  noted that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda raised funds from Saudi  individuals and charitable organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia. In  addition, media reports continue to contain allegations that some Saudi  individuals and charitable organizations support terrorism and violent  extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. In 2003 and 2004, a series of terrorist  attacks against both Saudi and U.S. interests were launched in Saudi  Arabia, prompting the Saudi government to intensify its efforts to combat  terrorism, including targeting sources of violent extremism within the  country.
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States openly  engage the government of Saudi Arabia to build a cooperative  counterterrorism relationship. In August 2007, the President signed the  Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,  which required that the President of the United States report on a long- term strategy to work with the Saudi government to, among other things,  combat terrorism through such measures as preventing the financing of  terrorists by Saudi institutions and citizens. Additionally, it required that  the report provide an assessment of Saudi Arabia’s progress in these areas  since 2001. Also, at the request of the Congress, in 2005, we reported on  allegations that Saudi private entities and individuals had financed or  supported violent extremism. In our report, we noted that the threat of  global propagation of violent extremism was emerging not only from Saudi  sources, but also from sources in other countries, such as Iran, Kuwait,  and Syria, as well as from indigenous groups within some countries. In  2005, we also reported on U.S. government efforts to combat terrorist  financing abroad that included standards setting and training and technical  assistance in areas such as preventing cash couriers, which refers to  criminals’ cross-border movements of cash.
This report provides information on U.S. and Saudi efforts to address  alleged terrorism and terrorism financing since 2005. Specifically, we  report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing,  and (2) U.S. government agencies’ assessment of and Saudi government  views on progress toward the goals of the U.S. strategy to collaborate with  and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant U.S.  strategy, planning, and evaluation documents related to U.S.-Saudi efforts  to counter terrorism and terrorism financing efforts since 2005. While we  did not assess the key elements of a strategy as identified by GAO for the  U.S. counterterrorism strategy related to Saudi Arabia as stated in the  Mission Strategic Plans (MSP), we used the performance targets stated in  these documents as criteria against which we assessed progress. Further,  we obtained and examined documentation from Saudi officials regarding  their domestic activities to counter terrorism and its financing. We  discussed U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism efforts with U.S. officials from the  Departments of State (State), Treasury (Treasury), Homeland Security  (DHS), Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), Energy (DOE), National Security  Council (NSC), and the intelligence community; Saudi officials from the  Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C.; and subject matter  experts from a variety of academic institutions and nongovernmental  organizations. Additionally, we traveled to Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi  Arabia, where we visited the Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Center for  Advisory and Care in Riyadh—a counseling program designed to  reeducate violent extremists—and met with U.S. officials from State,  Treasury, DOJ, DOD, and DHS; Saudi officials from the Saudi Arabian  Monetary Agency (SAMA), and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior,  and Islamic Affairs; and representatives from the Saudi charitable  organization the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. (See appendix I for a  complete description of our scope and methodology.)
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through September  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In this report we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S.  mission in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to reinstate, in consultation with  relevant U.S. agencies, performance measures related to preventing the  flow of alleged financial support, through mechanisms such as cash  couriers, to terrorists and extremists outside Saudi Arabia.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State concurred with our  recommendation, and committed to reinstating performance indicators  relating to Saudi enforcement of cash courier regulations in its Mission  Strategic Plan for Saudi Arabia. DOD stated that it concurs with our  report. We also received technical comments from DOD, DOE, NSC, State,  Treasury, and the intelligence community. Additionally, consistent with  our protocols, we provided a copy of the draft report to Saudi officials,  who described the report as a fair and detailed review of U.S. and Saudi  efforts and offered technical comments. We incorporated technical  comments as appropriate.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
paragraphs: Saudi Arabia is known as the birthplace of Islam and is the site of Islam’s  two holiest shrines located in Mecca and Medina. (See figure 1 for a map  of Saudi Arabia.) Millions of Muslims from all over the world visit Mecca  to undertake the pilgrimages of hajj and umrah. Like hajj, charitable  giving, or zakat, is one of the five pillars or duties of Islam. Zakat, a form  of tithe or charity payable for those in need, is an annual flat rate of 2.5  percent of a Muslim’s assessable capital. Zakat is broader and more  pervasive than Western ideas of charity, functioning as a form of income  tax, educational assistance, and foreign aid.
Islam is a source of political legitimacy and guidance for the Saudi  government, and the country is governed on the basis of Islamic law or  Sharia. As far back as the mid-eighteenth century, the founder of the Saudi  ruling dynasty, Muhammad bin Saud, allied himself with the conservative  Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. The teachings of Abdul  Wahhab, which called for a strict interpretation of Islam, form the basis of  Islam as practiced by the majority of people in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi government is a monarchy headed by the king of Saudi Arabia,  who also serves as the Prime Minister and the Custodian of the Two Holy  Mosques in Mecca and Medina. The current king is King Abdullah bin  Abdulaziz Al-Saud. The king is expected to retain consensus of important  elements in Saudi society, such as the Saudi royal family and religious  leaders. The Saudi royal family consists of thousands of members, some of  whom head government ministries.
In the mid-1940s, Saudi Arabia started large scale oil production, and by  the 1970s an increase in oil prices led to a rapid increase in Saudi Arabia’s  per capita income, making it comparable to that of developed countries  during this time period. In part, this prosperity, combined with the Islamic  religious obligation toward charitable giving or zakat, led to the  establishment of charitable organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia,  known as multilateral charitable organizations. These organizations— which include the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of  Muslim Youth—were established in the 1960s and 1970s by Saudi royal  decree to spread Islam and provide humanitarian assistance around the  world, and received funds from the Saudi government and citizens.
section_title: U.S.-Saudi Relations
paragraphs: Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have a long  historical context. Since the establishment of the modern Saudi state in  1932, and throughout the Cold War, the governments of the United States  and Saudi Arabia developed a relationship based on shared interests,  including energy production and combating communism. For instance,  both Saudi Arabia and the United States became major supporters of the  Afghan mujahideen’s struggle against the Soviet invasion in 1979.  However, U.S. foreign policies related to the Middle East, such as the  Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have at times tested U.S.-Saudi government  relations and fueled a growing anti-American sentiment among some  segments of the Saudi population, as well as in many countries with  predominantly Muslim populations. (See figure 2 for more information on  the historical development of U.S.-Saudi relations.) As we have reported  previously, this negative perception of U.S. foreign policy, as well as  other factors such as economic stagnation, a disproportionate youth and  young adult population, and repressive and corrupt governments in  certain Middle Eastern countries, have contributed to the global spread of  an extremist ideology promoting hatred, intolerance, and violence that  threatens U.S. national security interests.
According to the U.S. government and experts, some Saudi individuals and  charitable organizations have knowingly or unknowingly provided  financial assistance for terrorism and violent extremism. For example,  according to a report by the 9/11 Commission, some charitable  organizations, such as the Saudi-based Al Haramain Islamic Foundation,  had been exploited by extremists as funding mechanisms to further their  goal of violence against non-Muslims. U.S. government and other expert  reports have linked some Saudi donations to the global propagation of  religious intolerance and support to terrorist activities. For example,  Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda have Saudi roots and accumulated millions  of dollars using legitimate charities, nongovernmental organizations, and  mosques, as well as businesses such as banks and other financial  institutions, to help raise and move their funds. However, experts agree  that it is difficult to determine the extent to which donors are aware of the  ultimate disposition of the funds provided.
section_title: Saudi Government Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Terrorism Financing, 2003- 2005
paragraphs: Although the Saudi government took actions to combat terrorists  following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Al Qaeda’s attacks against  Saudi and U.S. citizens in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2004 marked a turning  point in the Saudi government’s efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism  financing, as the Saudi government came to see Al Qaeda as a threat to the  Saudi regime. Between 2003 and 2005, the Saudi government reported that  it took a number of actions to combat terrorism and terrorism financing  within the Kingdom, some with U.S. assistance, such as increasing the size,  training, and professionalism of Saudi security forces. The Saudi and U.S.  governments also undertook joint designations of several branches of the  Al Haramain Foundation as financiers of terrorism under UN Security  Council Resolution 1267. (See appendix III for key Saudi agencies  involved in efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism financing within  Saudi Arabia.)
section_title: U.S. Assistance to Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism and Terrorism Financing
paragraphs: Since 2005, several U.S. agencies have conducted training and provided  technical assistance to improve the capacity of the Saudi government to  combat terrorism and its financing. These efforts have included enhancing  the investigative capability of Saudi ministries and assessing the security  of Saudi oil installations, among others. U.S. agencies involved in these  efforts include DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ, State, and Treasury, as well as the  intelligence community. (See appendix IV for U.S. agencies providing  training and technical assistance to Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and  terrorism financing.)
section_title: Legislative Reporting Requirements
paragraphs: The Congress has enacted several laws that require U.S. agencies to report  on terrorism and terrorism financing issues, including those related to U.S.  collaboration with Saudi Arabia. (See table 1 for the selected legislation  and its requirements.)
section_title: U.S. Government Strategy Is to Create an Active Antiterrorism Coalition with Saudi Arabia, but Some Targets to Measure Progress toward This Goal Have Been Removed
paragraphs: In January 2008, in response to the Implementing Recommendations of the  9/11 Commission Act of 2007, State submitted to the Congress a report on  the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist Saudi Arabia in areas  including countering terrorism and terrorism financing. The goals and  objectives contained in the January 2008 document coincide with the  plans for collaboration with Saudi Arabia contained in State’s Mission  Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia for fiscal years 2006 to 2009. To  measure progress toward the goal of building an active antiterrorist  coalition, the MSPs contain a number of performance targets; however,  some of the targets relating to countering terrorism financing were  removed, even though U.S. agencies continue to work on those issues in  collaboration with the Saudi government.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Government Strategy Is to Create an Active Antiterrorism Coalition with Saudi Arabia
paragraphs: Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. mission in  Saudi Arabia reported expanding its ongoing efforts to collaborate with  the government of Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism. State’s MSPs,  previously called Mission Performance Plans, for fiscal years 2006 to 2009  contain goals related to expanding the Saudi government’s ability to  counter terrorism and preventing financial support to extremists.
According to State documents, the MSP is developed each year by the  overseas missions to facilitate long-term diplomatic and assistance  planning and provide a strategic plan to set country-level U.S. foreign  policy goals, resource requests, and performance targets. State reports  that its Washington-based bureaus draw on MSPs to gauge the  effectiveness of policies and programs in the field and formulate requests  for resources.
In January 2008, State submitted to the Congress a report on U.S. strategy  for collaborating with Saudi Arabia on countering terrorism and terrorism  financing in response to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11  Commission Act of 2007. According to this document, the goal of  strengthening the U.S. government’s counterterrorism partnership with  Saudi Arabia is to be achieved through bilateral cooperation to enhance  the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists and to prevent  financial support to extremists. The goals and objectives contained in the  January 2008 document coincide with the plans for collaboration with  Saudi Arabia contained in MSPs for Saudi Arabia. According to State  officials, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence  approved the 2008 document. Moreover, officials from various agencies  we met with—including Treasury, DOJ, and DHS—noted they are active  participants in interagency strategic discussions on collaboration with  Saudi Arabia regarding countering terrorism and terrorism financing.
According to Saudi officials, the Saudi government agrees with U.S. goals  to counter terrorism and terrorism financing in Saudi Arabia. Additionally,  Saudi officials told us that generally there has been strong collaboration  between U.S. and Saudi agencies, highlighting areas such as information  sharing and training of security forces. However, Saudi officials noted  some concerns related to U.S. implementation of certain efforts to counter  terrorism financing. For example, Saudi officials expressed concern about  some designations of individuals and organizations as supporters of  terrorism, specifically suggesting that these designations may violate the  right to a fair legal process. Additionally, Saudi officials noted concerns  regarding past public statements by senior Treasury officials, such as  those in April 2008, that individuals based in Saudi Arabia are a top source  of funding for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. However,  according to Saudi officials, since Treasury placed a deputy attaché in  Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2008, there has been a significant  increase in information sharing and decrease in issues of concern.
In addition, the Saudi government has developed its own strategy to  combat terrorism, which Saudi officials characterized as focusing on three  areas or pillars: “men, money, and mindset.” The “men” pillar of the  strategy focuses on arresting or killing terrorists. The “money” pillar of the  strategy focuses on measures to counter terrorism financing, such as  tightening controls on financial transactions and cash couriers, as well as  imposing restrictions on Saudi-based charities. Finally, the “mindset” pillar  of the strategy focuses on preventing extremism by addressing the  ideology that is used to recruit and indoctrinate potential terrorists. Saudi  officials stated that the “mindset” pillar is the most challenging aspect of  its counterterrorism strategy and will be a long-term challenge.  Nonetheless, Saudi officials told us the Saudi government is committed to  combating extremist ideology through programs such as public  information campaigns and terrorist rehabilitation programs.
section_title: The U.S. Mission Has Established Targets to Measure the Effectiveness of Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Its Financing; Some Performance Targets Related to Terrorism Financing Were Removed from the MSP
paragraphs: The MSP for Saudi Arabia contains goals, performance indicators, and  performance targets for counterterrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia. While  the MSP is a State document, officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, and Treasury  told us they were aware of relevant portions of the document. According  to the fiscal year 2009 MSP for Saudi Arabia, the highest priority U.S. goal  is to strengthen its antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia. Performance  of this goal is measured by the indicator “Saudi effectiveness on measures  to combat terrorism and terrorism financing activities.” To build an active  antiterrorist coalition with the government of Saudi Arabia, the U.S.  Mission to Saudi Arabia focuses on objectives related to (a) enhancing the  Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists, and (b) preventing  financial support to extremists. To measure progress toward the goal of  building an active antiterrorist coalition, the MSP contains a number of  performance targets each fiscal year. (See figure 3 for MSP objectives and  targets for fiscal years 2006 to 2009.)
On an annual basis, the U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia releases an updated  MSP, which may contain revised performance targets related to building  an active antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia. State officials told us  that MSP performance targets are periodically revised to ensure each  fiscal year’s targets are most relevant to assessing progress toward U.S.- Saudi efforts to counter terrorism and terrorism financing. Specifically,  between fiscal years 2006 and 2009, certain performance targets were  added, removed, or updated to reflect the change in conditions in Saudi  Arabia. For instance, new performance targets were added for fiscal year  2009 that did not exist in previous years, including enhancing Saudi- Yemeni cooperation and conducting trials for terror suspects. In addition,  the fiscal year 2008 target related to the public condemnation of terrorism  by the Saudi government and religious leaders was omitted in fiscal year  2009 because, according to State officials, it had been met.
However, some targets related to preventing financial support to  extremists were removed from the MSP, even though U.S. agencies  reported that efforts to address these issues are important and ongoing.  Specifically, a performance target related to the establishment of a Saudi  Charities Commission existed in the MSP from fiscal years 2006 to 2008,  but was removed for fiscal year 2009. According to State officials, the  performance target related to the Charities Commission was dropped  because State determined that other strategies to regulate charitable  organizations in Saudi Arabia might be more effective than a commission.  Likewise, a target related to implementation of cash courier regulations  was part of the MSP in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, but was removed in  fiscal years 2008 and 2009. According to State, the performance target  related to cash courier regulations was dropped because the Saudi  government had made progress instituting and enforcing these regulations.  However, according to officials from DHS—which takes the lead on issues  such as cash couriers—they were not consulted on the decision to remove  the target related to cash couriers and stated that this target should be  reinstated in the MSP. As a result, the MSP lacks targets against which U.S.  agencies can monitor and assess performance in certain areas of U.S.  concern related to countering terrorism financing. According to State and  Treasury officials, even though targets related to these activities were  removed from MSPs, enforcement of regulations to prevent terrorism  financing are still important U.S. goals, which U.S. agencies pursue  through diplomatic or training activities.
section_title: U.S. Agencies and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Combating Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Challenges Persist, Particularly in Preventing Alleged Funding for Terrorism and Violent Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia
paragraphs: U.S. agencies and Saudi officials report progress countering terrorism and  terrorism financing within Saudi Arabia, but noted challenges, particularly  those related to preventing the flow of alleged financial support to  extremists outside Saudi Arabia. In April 2009, the U.S. embassy assessed  progress towards its goal of building an active antiterrorist coalition with  Saudi Arabia as “on target.” With regard to counterterrorism efforts, U.S.  and Saudi officials report progress enhancing the Saudi government’s  ability to combat terrorists, and assess that these efforts have disrupted Al  Qaeda’s terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. While citing progress, U.S.  and Saudi officials noted Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a  base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against U.S. and  Saudi interests. With regard to preventing financial support to extremists,  U.S. and Saudi officials also report progress, citing, among other  examples, the Saudi government’s implementation of cash courier  regulations, ban on the transfer of charitable funds outside the Kingdom  without government approval, and arrest and prosecution of individuals  providing ideological or financial support to terrorism. Despite these  gains, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals  and multilateral charitable organizations, as well as other individuals  visiting Saudi Arabia, to support terrorism and violent extremism outside  Saudi Arabia. Moreover, both Saudi and U.S. officials cited limited Saudi  enforcement capacity and terrorist financiers’ use of cash couriers as  challenges to Saudi efforts to prevent financial support to extremists.
subsections: section_title: U.S. and Saudi Officials Report Progress Combating Terrorists in Saudi Arabia
paragraphs: U.S. and Saudi officials report progress enhancing the Saudi government’s  ability to combat terrorists and assess that Saudi efforts have disrupted Al  Qaeda’s terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. The U.S. embassy’s MSP  for fiscal year 2008 lists three performance targets related to enhancing  the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists. These targets  specifically pertain to (1) prevention of successful terrorist strikes in Saudi  Arabia, (2) improved U.S.-Saudi cooperation on critical infrastructure  protection, and (3) public condemnation of terrorist activities by Saudi  government and religious leaders. U.S. officials report progress on these  performance targets in fiscal year 2008, as well as the completion of  related targets in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. While citing progress, U.S.  and Saudi officials noted Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a  base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks, which could  challenge gains made in combating terrorists in Saudi Arabia. (See figure 4  for a summary of reported progress related to MSP performance targets.)
Officials from State report that there have been no successful terrorist  strikes in Saudi Arabia since February 2007. Officials attributed this  outcome, in part, to Saudi law enforcement actions. Experts we  interviewed also cited decreased popular support for Al Qaeda, due to  Muslim casualties caused by the organization, as a factor in the declining  number of attacks. Both U.S. and Saudi officials cited strong intelligence  and security cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi governments related  to counterterrorism. Moreover, experts with whom we spoke generally  agreed that the Saudi government is serious about combating terrorism.
State officials report that, while there was a major terrorist incident in  Saudi Arabia in August 2009, there have been no attacks on energy  infrastructure since 2006 and no successful terrorist strikes in Saudi  Arabia since February 2007. On August 27, 2009, a suicide bomber  attempted to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Assistant Minister of Interior for  Security Affairs, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who is also the head of  Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism efforts. While the bomber, a Saudi  national who was on the Saudi government’s “most wanted” list, was killed  during the attack, no one else suffered serious injuries. According to the  Saudi embassy, the attacker was from a region bordering Yemen and had  offered to coordinate the return of Saudi fugitives in Yemen. Al Qaeda in  the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the attack. Officials from  State and the Saudi embassy told us that, while a major attack, the strike  was not successful, as the Prince was not seriously harmed. Similarly, a  White House press release described the attack as unsuccessful. DOD  noted, however, that Saudi authorities did not disrupt this plot. The White  House press release also stated that the attack underscores the continued  threat posed by Al Qaeda and the importance of strong counterterrorism  cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia has also undertaken law enforcement activities, including  arresting and prosecuting terror suspects. According to State reporting,  since May 2003, the Saudi government has killed or captured Al Qaeda’s  operational Saudi-based senior leadership, as well as most of the  network’s key operatives and many of the Kingdom’s most wanted  individuals. Between 2003 and 2008, U.S. and Saudi officials report the  Saudi government arrested or killed thousands of terrorism suspects,  including those suspected of planning attacks on Saudi oil fields and other  vital installations. Further, the Saudi government has published three  “most wanted” lists, and U.S. and Saudi sources report Saudi Arabia has  captured or killed a number of suspects on these lists. In 2008, the Saudi  government announced terrorism trials for approximately 1,000  individuals indicted on various terrorism-related charges. In July 2009, the  Saudi government announced that 330 suspects had court trials, of whom  seven were acquitted and the rest received jail terms ranging from a few  months to 30 years. Saudi officials noted that the convictions can be  appealed in the Saudi supreme court. U.S. and Saudi officials told us, and  State reports, that such trials could help combat terrorist ideologies.
Moreover, the U.S. and Saudi governments have implemented joint  activities to strengthen Saudi law enforcement capabilities, such as State- led training to strengthen the Saudi government’s antiterrorism  investigative management and VIP protection capability. Apart from joint  training courses, U.S. officials told us they have close working-level  relationships with their Saudi counterparts and noted that Saudi security  cooperation is significant. State, Treasury, FBI, DOD, and DHS officials  told us that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies have benefited  and continue to benefit from Saudi information on individuals and  organizations. The former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia described U.S.- Saudi counterterrorism cooperation as among the most productive in the  world.
subsections: section_title: U.S. and Saudi Governments Report Extensive Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Protection
paragraphs: U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in cooperation on protecting  critical infrastructure targets, such as oil installations, in Saudi Arabia.  Officials cited the signing of a technical cooperation agreement between  the United States and Saudi Arabia in May 2008, as well as activities to  implement the agreement, as evidence of deeper cooperation.
U.S. officials told us that the protection of critical Saudi infrastructure,  particularly energy production facilities, has been a priority since 2006,  following an unsuccessful terrorist attack at the Abqaiq oil facility, one of  the world’s largest oil processing facilities located in Saudi Arabia.  According to State reporting, critical infrastructure protection is a vital  national interest, as a successful terrorist attack that disrupts Saudi oil  production would have a devastating impact on the U.S. and global  economies.
In May 2008, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Saudi Arabian Minister of  Interior signed a technical cooperation agreement to provide U.S.  technical assistance to Saudi Arabia in the area of critical infrastructure  protection. A joint operational entity called the Office of Program  Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) was established to  implement the agreement, consisting of representatives from State, DOD,  DOE, and the Saudi Arabian government. The Saudi Arabian government  agreed to fully fund the agreement’s implementation, including all  expenses incurred by U.S. agencies for services and contractor costs.  OPM-MOI is assisting the Saudi government in identifying critical  infrastructure vulnerabilities; developing security strategies to protect  critical infrastructure; and recruiting and training a new MOI force, the  Facilities Security Force, to protect its critical infrastructure. State is the  lead agency for the implementation of the agreement, DOE is contributing  expertise in conducting facility assessments and developing security  strategies for Saudi energy production facilities, and DOD will contribute  expertise in training and equipping the Facilities Security Force, which is  intended to have more than 35,000 personnel when fully developed.  According to U.S. officials, the current focus of OPM-MOI is protecting  critical infrastructure related to oil production. However, officials told us  OPM-MOI could expand to cooperate with the Saudi government in a  number of other areas, including border security, maritime security, and  cyber security. Other U.S. agencies, such as DHS and the Coast Guard, are  expected to participate in OPM-MOI as the critical infrastructure mission  expands.
section_title: Saudi Leaders Have Publicly Condemned Terrorist Activities and Implemented Programs to Combat Extremism
paragraphs: Saudi government and religious leaders have publicly condemned  terrorism and terrorism financing. Several high-ranking Saudi government  leaders have spoken out against terrorism and extremism. In his remarks  at the UN’s Culture of Peace conference in November 2008, King  Abdullah bin Abdulaziz noted that “terrorism and criminality are the  enemies of every religion and every culture.” In July 2008, the King made  similar remarks at the World Conference on Dialogue in Madrid. Many  other members of the Saudi government, including the Ministers of Islamic  Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, have issued statements against  terrorism and extremism since 2001.
Moreover, religious leaders, such as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia,  have issued a number of statements critical of terrorism. In the spring of  2008, the Grand Mufti issued a statement on the evils of terrorism and  warned Saudi citizens not to listen to those who use religion to promote  terrorism. In October 2007, he delivered a sermon cautioning young Saudis  not to travel abroad to participate in jihad. In the same speech, he urged  Saudi citizens not to finance terrorism and to be mindful of how their  charitable contributions are distributed. Later that same year, the Grand  Mufti stated that terrorists should be subject to severe punishment in  accordance with Islamic law. According to State, other Saudi Islamic  scholars and officials also voiced support for the Grand Mufti’s statement.
Further, in May 2009, the Second Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia  organized the first national conference on “intellectual security,” which  was to address the “intellectual abnormality” that, according to the Saudi  government, is “the main reason for terrorism.” The conference resulted in  a communiqué stressing the importance of moderation, tolerance, cross- cultural dialogue, nonviolence, and the establishment of national  strategies for promoting those values. The declaration pointed out the  moderate nature of Islam and warned against the dangers of embracing  deviant ideologies. The Deputy Prime Minister also expressed hope that  the small number of Saudis participating in deviant groups abroad would  renounce their beliefs and return home, noting, Saudi Arabia “is ready to  welcome its citizens if they decide to opt for the correct path.”
section_title: Saudi Activities to Combat Extremism
paragraphs: In addition to public statements by Saudi government and religious  figures, the Saudi government has implemented a number of domestic  activities designed to undermine extremist ideology within the Kingdom.  These activities include the following:    Initiating a media campaign: According to U.S. and Saudi officials, the  Saudi government has implemented an extensive media campaign against  extremist thought. State reports this campaign includes the use of  advertisements, billboards, text messages and the Internet. (Figure 5  shows examples of Saudi Arabia’s public outreach campaign.)
See http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-883/ for a video of a Saudi  government-sponsored TV advertisement designed to counter terrorism.
Distributing publications and other materials: Officials from the  Saudi Ministries of Islamic Affairs and Interior told us Saudi Arabia had  produced a variety of books and pamphlets designed to combat extremist  ideology. Saudi officials estimate that approximately 1.8 million books  have been prepared as part of this effort. (Figure 6 shows a sample of  Saudi literature to combat extremism provided to GAO by Saudi  officials.) Additionally, according to Saudi officials, the Saudi  government distributes, via mosques and schools, CDs and cassette tapes  with lectures and seminars addressing the issues of terrorism and  extremism.
Monitoring religious leaders: According to State reporting and Saudi  officials, the Saudi government continues to monitor the preaching and  writings of religious leaders, and to reeducate those who advocate  extremist messages. Saudi officials from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs  told us their monitoring has covered approximately 20,000 of Saudi  Arabia’s estimated 70,000 mosques, including all of the large mosques that  hold Friday prayers.Additionally, Saudi officials told us they have held  hundreds of seminars and lectures in mosques to help ensure that religious  leaders preach a moderate message to the public.
Monitoring school teachers: According to officials from the Saudi  Ministry of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi government monitors for school  teachers who teach extremism. Once identified, such teachers are put  through reeducation programs.
Monitoring Internet sites: According to Ministry of Interior officials,  Saudi authorities are monitoring Internet chat rooms that could be sources  of militant recruitment. In September 2008, Saudi authorities reported the  arrest of three Saudi citizens and two expatriates for promoting militant  activities on Internet forums, engaging online users in dialogue, spreading  misleading information, and recruiting youth to travel abroad for  inappropriate purposes. According to Saudi reports, the Ministry of  Interior called on all Saudis to be vigilant and urged them not to listen to  those who promote corruption and sedition. In addition, the Ministry  published the online usernames utilized by the suspects.
Encouraging dialogue: The Saudi government reports that it supports  the activities of the Sakinah (or Tranquility) Campaign, which is an  independent nongovernmental organization that engages in dialogue, via  the Internet, with Internet users who have visited extremist Web sites.  Additionally, in 2008, the King of Saudi Arabia also initiated a series of  conferences to promote interfaith dialogues. The first conference was  hosted by the Muslim World League in Mecca in June 2008 and consisted  of 500 Muslim scholars from around the world. The second conference  was held in Madrid, Spain, in July 2008 and included 300 delegates  representing different faiths, including Islam, Buddhism, Christianity,  Hinduism, and Judaism. Finally, the King of Saudi Arabia was joined by  other heads of states at a Special Session of the UN General Assembly on  interfaith dialogue in November 2008.
section_title: Saudi Rehabilitation Programs
paragraphs: The Saudi government operates rehabilitation programs to reeducate  those arrested for supporting terrorism or extremism, as well as those  returning from the U.S. detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, to  reintegrate them into society. Rehabilitation programs take place both in  Saudi prisons and in halfway houses outside of prisons, known as  aftercare centers. In March 2009, we visited the aftercare center—called  the Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advisory and Care—in Riyadh and  spoke with staff members as well as participants of the program, including  those arrested for terrorism and violent extremism in Saudi Arabia and  those formerly detained at Guantanamo Bay. Staff members told us the  rehabilitation center seeks to “reeducate” its participants by engaging  them in religious debates and providing psychological counseling. The  program generally consists of one-on-one and group sessions between an  offender and religious scholars, psychiatrists, and psychologists about  their beliefs. Program officials attempt to persuade the offenders that their  religious justification for their actions is based upon a corrupted  understanding of Islam. Psychological counseling includes traditional  methods as well as activities such as art therapy. Staff members told us the  program draws heavily on participants’ family and tribal relations. Family  members can visit and telephone the rehabilitation center, and  rehabilitation participants are allowed leave to attend family events such  as weddings and funerals. For instance, when we visited the center, we  spoke with family members visiting their relatives. Those who complete  the program, and are deemed eligible for release, are provided social  support to assist with their reintegration into society, such as counseling,  job opportunities, and stipends. Moreover, these social services are  extended to the family and tribal members of released participants, as a  way to involve participants’ larger social network in their rehabilitation.  Saudi officials told us that individuals generally participate in the program  for 6 to 8 months.
Saudi officials report such rehabilitation programs, including those in  prisons and an aftercare center, have treated 4,300 individuals overall.  Specifically, Saudi officials told us that, as of March 2009, the aftercare  center had served approximately 250 individuals, with a recidivism rate of  about 20 percent. Experts with whom we spoke generally praised the  Saudi rehabilitation program, but offered some caution on the  methodology used to measure its results. State reports it is monitoring  these rates closely. Saudi officials told us that former Guantanamo  detainees account for most of the individuals who have recidivated from  the aftercare center. For example, in January 2009, two former  participants at the center appeared in an Al Qaeda recruiting video filmed  in Yemen. One of the individuals in the video has since turned himself in to  Saudi authorities. Saudi officials acknowledge such cases illustrate the  difficulties associated with assessing which participants should be  released from the rehabilitation center, but told us they are working to  refine their assessment criteria. U.S. and Saudi officials with whom we  spoke told us that, despite the challenges associated with recidivism,  Saudi rehabilitation programs have demonstrated some positive results.  Moreover, U.S. officials told us these activities, among others, demonstrate  the Saudi government’s commitment to undermining extremist ideology  within the Kingdom. (See http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-883/ for  a video of GAO’s visit to a Saudi government operated rehabilitation  center.)
section_title: Despite Significant Gains in Combating Terrorists in Saudi Arabia, Instability in Yemen Is a Concern
paragraphs: While U.S. and Saudi officials told us that Saudi Arabia had made progress  in enhancing its ability to combat terrorists, they assessed that political  instability in Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, could create challenges to  counterterrorism efforts. U.S. and Saudi officials expressed concern that  Yemen, due in part to lack of government control and proximity to Saudi  Arabia, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch  attacks against Saudi and U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia. For example, as  noted previously, in August 2009, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula— which is based in Yemen—claimed responsibility for the failed  assassination attempt against Saudi Arabia’s Assistant Minister of Interior  for Security Affairs. State has listed Yemen as a terrorist safe haven in its  Country Reports on Terrorism since 2005. In April 2009, in its Country  Reports on Terrorism, State reported that, despite some successes against  Al Qaeda, the response of the government of Yemen to the terrorist threat  was intermittent due to its focus on internal security concerns. Moreover,  State noted that border security between Saudi Arabia and Yemen  remained a problem. Saudi officials also cited political instability in  Yemen, as well as the porous border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, as  challenges to their counterterrorism efforts. To address this issue, the  Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia told us that the Saudi government  is providing Yemen assistance in a number of areas, including  counterterrorism, education, and health. Saudi officials also stated that  Saudi Arabia is building an electronic fence on the Saudi-Yemen border.
section_title: U.S. and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Preventing Financial Support to Extremists, but Concerns Remain about Individuals’ and Multilateral Charitable Organizations’ Ability to Support Terrorism and Violent Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia
paragraphs: U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in preventing financial support to  extremists, citing improved Saudi regulation and enforcement capacity.  Between fiscal years 2006 and 2008, the U.S. embassy’s MSP listed a  number of performance targets related to preventing financial support to  extremists, which include (1) the United States providing additional  training and Saudi banks increasing reporting to the Saudi Financial  Investigation Unit, (2) the Saudi government providing accounting of  assets seized from individuals and organizations designated as terrorists  by the United Nations (UN) 1267 Committee and taking legal action  against nationals and groups providing financial or ideological support to  terrorists, (3) the Saudi Charities Commission naming senior staff and  beginning operations, and (4) the Saudi government implementing and  enforcing cash courier regulations. U.S. officials report progress on  several of these performance targets. However, U.S. officials remain  concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable  organizations, as well as other individuals visiting Saudi Arabia, to support  terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials also  noted that limited Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorist financiers’ use  of cash couriers pose challenges to Saudi efforts to prevent financial  support to extremists. (For a summary of reported progress related to  MSP performance targets from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008, see  figure 7.)
In 2005, the government of Saudi Arabia established the Saudi Financial  Investigation Unit, which acts as Saudi Arabia’s financial intelligence unit  (FIU). Located in the Ministry of Interior, the Saudi FIU receives and  analyzes suspicious transaction reports and other information from a  variety of sources, such as banking institutions, insurance companies, and  government departments.
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which is the FIU for  the United States, and the FBI have provided training to the Saudi FIU  since its establishment in 2005. According to Treasury officials, these  training activities were designed to build the capacity of the Saudi FIU and  assist it in meeting international standards, with the ultimate goal of  having the Saudi FIU attain membership in the Egmont Group, an  international body of financial intelligence units. Saudi officials told us  that the capacity of the Saudi FIU has increased since 2005. For instance,  they noted the number of suspicious transaction reports they analyze grew  from approximately 38 per month in 2006 to 110 per month in 2008, while  the staff of the FIU has grown from approximately 80 individuals in 2006  to 130 individuals in March 2009. Moreover, since 2005, Saudi officials told  us the Saudi FIU had conducted information exchanges with FIUs in the  United States and a number of countries in the region, and said they  expected these exchanges to increase once the Saudi FIU becomes a  member of the Egmont Group. Similarly, Treasury officials told us Saudi  Arabia’s membership in the Egmont Group would assist in preventing  financial support to extremists by facilitating information exchanges  between the Saudi FIU and its counterparts. In May 2009, the Saudi FIU  met the requirements for membership and became an official member of  the Egmont Group.
subsections: section_title: The Saudi Government Has Initiated Legal Action against Terrorist Financiers, but the United States Has Reported the Need for Further Action
paragraphs: According to U.S. officials and State reporting in 2007 and 2008, the Saudi  government has taken legal action against terrorist financiers, based on its  laws and regulations related to combating terrorist financing. In 2003, the  Saudi Arabian government enacted an anti-money laundering law, which  provided a statutory basis for considering money laundering and terrorism  financing as criminal offenses. That same year, the Saudi Arabian  Monetary Agency (SAMA) issued updated anti-money laundering and  counterterrorist financing guidelines for the Saudi banking and nonbank  financial system. The guidelines contain a number of provisions, such as  requiring that banks (1) have mechanisms to monitor all types of  “Specially Designated Nationals” as listed by SAMA, (2) strictly adhere to  SAMA guidance on opening accounts and dealing with charity and  donation collection, and (3) use software to monitor customers to detect  unusual transaction patterns. Additionally, SAMA has also issued “know  your customer” guidelines, requiring banks to freeze accounts of  customers who do not provide updated account information. In July 2004,  members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Gulf  Cooperation Council assessed Saudi Arabia’s legal and regulatory  practices with respect to countering terrorism financing. They found  Saudi Arabia to be compliant or largely compliant with most FATF  benchmarks—a set of internationally recognized legal and regulatory  benchmarks on money laundering and terrorism financing.
Since 2007, U.S. and Saudi officials report that the government of Saudi  Arabia has arrested and prosecuted a number of individuals suspected of  financing terrorism. For instance, State reports that the Saudi government  arrested 56 suspected terrorist financiers in 2008 and prosecuted 20 of  them. According to Saudi embassy reports, over 40 people were arrested  in 2007 for providing financial support to terrorists. As noted earlier in this  report, in July 2009, the Saudi government announced the convictions of  330 terrorism suspects who were charged with crime, including affiliation  with terrorist organizations as well as facilitating and financing terrorism.  U.S. officials we spoke with cited these arrests, as well as those against  terrorist cells more generally, as having a disruptive effect on financing  networks. Despite these gains, State notes in its most recent Country  Report on Terrorism that the United States continues to “urge the  government of Saudi Arabia to pursue and prosecute terrorist financiers  more vigorously.”
Moreover, State’s 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report  (INCSR) cited the Saudi government as “partially compliant” on  obligations related to UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism  financing. UN 1267 requires its signatories to impose certain restrictions  on individual or entities associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, such as  freezing their assets and preventing their entry or transit through  signatories’ territories (travel ban). In April 2009, State reported that the  Saudi government had taken action against individuals designated by the  UN 1267 Committee by freezing their accounts and seizing their assets.  Moreover, State reports that SAMA provides the names of suspected  terrorists and terrorist organizations designated by the UN 1267  Committee to all financial institutions under its supervision. Related to the  UN 1267 travel ban provision, State officials told us that the Saudi  government’s enforcement of this provision had not been consistent,  particularly during hajj. According to Saudi officials, the Saudi  government’s policy is to allow all Muslims to visit the Kingdom during  hajj to fulfill their religious obligations and to not arrest individuals during  their pilgrimage. However, Saudi officials noted they would share  information with the United States about certain individuals, such as those  designated under UN 1267, visiting the Kingdom for religious obligation.
section_title: The Saudi Charities Commission Is Not Yet Operational, but the Saudi Government Has Issued New Regulations Targeting Saudi Charities and Multilateral Charitable Organizations
paragraphs: State and Treasury have reported that some Saudi charitable organizations  have been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups. In  2002, the Saudi government announced its intention to establish a National  Commission for Relief and Charitable Work Abroad, commonly known as  the Charities Commission, to oversee all private Saudi charitable activities  abroad. U.S. officials told us, and Saudi officials confirmed, that the Saudi  Charities Commission is not operational. Although the Charities  Commission is not operational, the Saudi government has established  regulations barring Saudi charitable organizations from sending  contributions abroad via banks and other formal financial channels  without first receiving the approval of the Saudi government. Saudi  officials told us these regulations are preferable to a Charities  Commission, as they more effectively prevent the flow of funds outside of  Saudi Arabia. Similarly, some U.S. officials and experts with whom we  spoke stated that the current ban might be preferable to a Saudi Charities  Commission, as a ban may be more effective in preventing financial  support from reaching extremist groups. Other U.S. officials noted that  while more effective oversight of charitable organizations is needed, it is  not necessary that such oversight take the form of a Charities  Commission.
Rules related to the banking activities of charitable organization in Saudi  Arabia were first adopted in 2003, and updated in 2008. However, there is  some disagreement over whether these rules apply to all Saudi charitable  organizations. According to U.S. officials, and State reporting, charitable  organizations in Saudi Arabia include organizations termed “charities”— which tend to operate within the Kingdom—and organizations dubbed  “multilateral” charitable organizations—which are based in Saudi Arabia  but have branches in other parts of the world. Multilateral charitable  organizations based in Saudi Arabia include the Muslim World League, the  International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and the World Assembly  of Muslim Youth. The 2003 rules applied to charitable organizations and  prohibited them from making cash disbursements and transferring money  outside of Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials have testified that the 2003  regulations did not apply to multilateral organizations. While State  reported in the 2006, 2007, and 2008 INCSRs that the government of Saudi  Arabia stated the 2003 regulations applied to international charities, each  report also contained language recommending the Saudi government  enhance its oversight of charities with overseas operations.
Despite the ban on charities transferring money outside of Saudi Arabia  enacted in 2003, a number of charitable organizations with links to Saudi  Arabia have been designated by Treasury since 2005 as financing terrorist  activities. In August 2006, Treasury designated branches of the IIRO in  Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as a Saudi national employed as the  Executive Director of the Eastern Province Branch of IIRO, for facilitating  fundraising for Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups. Further, from 2002  to 2004, the United States designated 13 branches of the Al Haramain  Islamic Foundation (Al Haramain), including several branches that were  designated by both the U.S. and Saudi governments. In 2004, the Saudi  government announced that Al Haramain was being dissolved. In June  2008, Treasury noted that despite Saudi government efforts, which had  largely prevented Al Haramain from operating in its own name, the  organization’s leadership had attempted to reconstitute itself and parts of  Al Haramain continued to operate. Thus, in June 2008, Treasury  designated all branches of Al Haramain, including its headquarters in  Saudi Arabia, for having provided support to Al Qaeda as well as other  terrorists and terrorist organizations.
After these designations, in rules dated December 2008, the government of  Saudi Arabia updated its banking regulations to include specific language  related to multilateral organizations, including Muslim World League,  IIRO, and World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The rules state that transfers  from the accounts of these multilateral organizations to any party outside  of the Kingdom shall not be allowed without approval from SAMA, and  that any contributions approved for transfer may only be used in ways as  specified by SAMA. Saudi officials from SAMA and the Ministry of Foreign  Affairs with whom we spoke told us that no charitable contributions,  including those from multilateral charitable organizations, can be sent  abroad through bank accounts without the approval of the Saudi  government. Moreover, Saudi officials told us that, as of July 2009, the  Saudi government had not approved any transfer of funds from charities  and multilateral charitable organizations to support charitable activities  outside of Saudi Arabia. While the Saudi government has not approved the  transfer of funds, they have approved overseas transfers of in-kind  humanitarian assistance, such as medical supplies or blankets, through the  Saudi Red Crescent Society. State reporting acknowledges the Saudi  government tightened controls on charitable giving in September 2008.  Officials from World Assembly of Muslim Youth confirmed that the ban on  charitable contributions leaving Saudi Arabia through a formal financial  network applies to their activities, and that contributions to their  organization have declined as a result. While the Saudi government has  regulations related to the transfer of charitable contributions through the  formal financial system, World Assembly of Muslim Youth officials stated  they have moved money out of Saudi Arabia by providing cash to  individuals or contractors to implement charitable projects outside the  Kingdom. State and Treasury officials noted that, despite the tightened  regulations on the formal financial system, they are still concerned about  the ability of multilateral charitable organizations to move money out of  the country, and in the 2009 INSCR, State reports that multilateral  organizations operate “largely outside of the strict Saudi restrictions  covering domestic charities.”
According to U.S. officials and State reporting, a proposal for the Charities  Commission is still under review by Saudi officials. However, the most  recent MSP for Saudi Arabia no longer contains a performance target  related to the operation of a Saudi Charities Commission. U.S. officials  told us that, even in the absence of this target, the regulation of charitable  organizations is still a priority that U.S. agencies pursue through  diplomatic and information-sharing activities with the Saudi government.
section_title: Saudi Arabia Has Issued Cash Courier Regulations, but Concerns Remain about Implementation of These Regulations
paragraphs: In late 2005, the Saudi government enacted stricter customs declaration  laws that regulate the cross-border movement of cash, jewels, and  precious metals. The regulations state that money and gold in excess of  60,000 Saudi riyals (equivalent to $16,000 U.S. dollars) must be declared  upon entry and exit from Saudi Arabia using official customs forms.
That same year, representatives from DHS’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) conducted training for 46 Saudi officials on topics  related to bulk cash smuggling. ICE officials told us the goal of this  training was to introduce Saudi officials to interdiction and investigative  techniques designed to support enforcement of the Saudi customs  regulations.
In 2007, State reported concerns related to the enforcement of Saudi  Arabia’s customs declaration laws. For example, Saudi customs had not  issued the necessary declaration forms. State officials with whom we  spoke told us that the Saudi government had improved its enforcement of  the laws, including distributing declaration forms and posting signs, which  we observed during our visit to the Kingdom (see figure 8). Additionally,  State has reported that the Saudi government’s new cash courier  regulations have resulted in the investigations of several individuals.
According to ICE officials, although they have tried to persuade the Saudi  government to conduct operational training related to preventing bulk  cash smuggling, the Saudi government did not express interest in  undertaking such an exercise until 2008. ICE officials noted that, in  addition to classroom training, it considers operational training necessary  to ensure proper enforcement of customs declaration laws designed to  prevent bulk cash smuggling. Moreover, ICE officials said that they do not  have information—such as the number of seizures and prosecutions—that  would allow them to assess progress with regard to the Saudi  government’s efforts to prevent bulk cash smuggling. In its 2009 INCSR,  State reported that the Saudi government has adopted stricter regulations;  however, information collected by Saudi customs on cash declarations  and smuggling is not shared with other governments, and the  implementation and effectiveness of the customs regulations remain in  question.
Despite concerns about the Saudi government’s enforcement of customs  declaration laws that include cash courier regulations, the MSP  performance target related to cash couriers was removed from the MSP  after fiscal year 2007. U.S. officials told us that, despite the omission of the  target from the MSP, Saudi implementation and enforcement of cash  courier regulations are important U.S. objectives that U.S. agencies pursue  through training and diplomatic activities with the Saudi government.
Further, in the 2008 and 2009 INCSRs, State reported that, in addition to  bulk cash, some instances of terrorist financing in Saudi Arabia have  allegedly involved informal mechanisms, such as hawala. U.S. and Saudi  officials told us, and State reports, that hawala and money services  businesses apart from banks and licensed money changers are illegal in  Saudi Arabia. In 2005, State reported that SAMA consolidated the eight  largest money changers into a single bank. Further, State notes that Saudi  banks have created fund transfer systems that have attracted customers  accustomed to using hawala. According to State, this creates an advantage  for Saudi authorities in combating terrorism financing, as senders and  recipients of fund transfers through this formal financial sector are  required to clearly identify themselves.
section_title: Despite Progress, U.S. Officials Remain Concerned about the Ability of Saudi Individuals and Multilateral Charitable Organizations to Support Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outside of Saudi Arabia
paragraphs: Despite reporting progress in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to combat terrorism  financing, U.S. officials expressed concern regarding the ability of Saudi  individuals and multilateral charitable organizations, as well as other  individuals visiting Saudi Arabia, to support terrorism and violent  extremism outside Saudi Arabia. Officials stressed this funding allegedly  comes from individuals or multilateral charitable organizations, not from  the Saudi government, and that the government of Saudi Arabia is  pursuing terrorism financiers and cooperating with the United States to  counter terrorism financing. Further, experts we spoke with agreed that  there is no indication that the Saudi government is providing funding for  terrorism.
Officials from State, Treasury, and DHS stated that alleged support from  some Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations for  terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia remains a cause  for concern. According to the 2009 INCSR, Saudi individuals and Saudi- based charitable organizations continue to be a significant source of  financing for terrorism and extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. For  example, Treasury officials have noted that Saudi-based individuals are a  top source of funding for Al Qaeda and associated terror groups, such as  the Taliban. Moreover, there have been concerns that during hajj—when  an estimated 2 to 3 million Muslims visit Saudi Arabia—non-Saudi  individuals associated with extremists groups could exchange funds to  support terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. Saudi  government officials acknowledged that Saudi individuals could  potentially fund terrorism, but, according to these officials, such  individuals do so in violation of Saudi laws and regulations. Related to  charitable contributions, Saudi officials told us that no funds have been  approved for overseas transfer. Saudi officials also told us that if a Saudi- affiliated multilateral charitable organization raises funds abroad, it is the  host country government’s responsibility to ensure such funds are used  appropriately, and stated that they have directed their embassies abroad to  cooperate with host country governments in this effort.
U.S. and Saudi officials cited challenges associated with efforts to prevent  financial support to extremists, including limited Saudi enforcement  capacity and the use of cash couriers by terrorist financiers. First, U.S. and  Saudi officials noted enforcement capacity presents a challenge to U.S.- Saudi efforts to prevent financial support to extremists. While noting  progress, U.S. and Saudi officials told us that key Saudi enforcement  agencies, particularly those agencies that enforce financial regulations,  could benefit from increased training and technical assistance to build  their capacity. For instance, U.S. and Saudi officials stated that, while the  Saudi FIU has expanded its capacity since its creation in 2005, more  training in financial analysis could be beneficial to the organization.
Second, U.S. and Saudi officials told us that preventing financial support  to extremists is made more challenging by terrorist financiers’ use of cash  couriers. According to U.S. and Saudi officials, some individuals and  multilateral charitable organizations have allegedly increased their use of  more informal financial transaction methods, such as couriering cash  across borders, in response to Saudi Arabia’s adoption of regulations  making transactions in the formal financial sector more challenging.  Though Saudi Arabia has implemented cash courier regulations, Saudi  officials noted that motivated individuals can circumvent such regulations  by moving amounts of cash that are below legal declaration limits. U.S.  officials concurred, noting circumvention of regulations as an inherent  challenge in regulating the use of cash couriers in any country. U.S. and  Saudi officials also cited the prevalent use of cash for transactions as a  challenge, particularly in Saudi Arabia. According to these officials,  because large numbers of people in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region use  cash, an individual traveling with or declaring large amounts of cash may  not raise suspicion. Moreover, challenges associated with preventing the  circumvention of cash courier regulations increase during hajj, which,  despite efforts by the Saudi government, presents logistical enforcement  challenges because of the large number of people involved. Dealing with  the challenges inherently associated with the use of cash, according to  Saudi officials, requires using intelligence to target specific individuals  who may be using cash to fund terrorism or violent extremism and  educating the public not to give cash to individuals they do not know, even  for allegedly worthy causes.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: According to State, goals and performance targets in country-specific  Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) are used to assess effectiveness of U.S.  policies and programs in the field and to formulate requests for resources.  According to U.S. officials, since 2005, several targets to assess progress of  the U.S. government’s counterterrorism and antiterrorism financing  collaboration with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been met. However,  some performance targets, specifically those related to combating  financing of terrorism, were removed from the MSP for Saudi Arabia even  though U.S. agencies remain concerned about the ability of Saudi  individuals and multilateral charitable organizations to fund terrorist  organizations in other countries. U.S. agencies stated that, despite the  omission of these targets, they continue to engage with the government of  Saudi Arabia on efforts to prevent financial support to extremists. Given  that State uses MSP targets to assess progress in countering terrorism and  terrorism financing in Saudi Arabia, it is important that the U.S. mission  include targets related to key areas of concern to more effectively  prioritize U.S. efforts and to formulate resource requests for these  activities.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S. mission in the  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to reinstate, in consultation with relevant U.S.  agencies, performance measures related to preventing the flow of alleged  financial support, through mechanisms such as cash couriers, to terrorists  and extremists outside Saudi Arabia.
section_title: Agencies Comments, Third-Party Views, and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State and DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which  are reproduced in appendices V and VI, respectively. State concurred with  our recommendation and committed to instructing the U.S. Embassy,  Riyadh, in consultation with key interagency partners, to ensure that the  Mission Strategic Plan reflect the continued importance of cooperation to  combat terrorism financing, including by reinstating performance  indicators related to Saudi enforcement of cash courier regulations. DOD  also concurred with the report. In addition, we received technical  comments from DOD, DOE, NSC, State, Treasury, and the intelligence  community. Additionally, consistent with our protocols, we provided a  copy of the draft report to Saudi officials, who described the report as a  fair and detailed review of U.S. and Saudi efforts and also offered  technical comments. We incorporated technical comments as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 5 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Departments of State,  Treasury, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, the intelligence  community, and the National Security Council. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we were asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy  to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter  terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies’  assessment of and the Saudi government’s views on progress toward the  goals of the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia.
Our work focused on the efforts of the intelligence agencies; the  Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS),  Justice (DOJ), State (State), and the Treasury (Treasury); and the National  Security Council (NSC) to collaborate with Saudi Arabia to combat  terrorism and terrorism financing since 2005. Within these agencies and  executive offices, we met with officials from several relevant components  that are monitoring or working with the Saudi government on efforts to  combat terrorism and its financing, including DHS’s Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE); DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);  State’s bureaus of Coordinator of Counterterrorism; Economic, Energy,  and Business Affairs; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement  Affairs; and Near Eastern Affairs; and Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and  Financial Intelligence, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the  Internal Revenue Service. We focused on these agencies and components  as a result of previous work undertaken by GAO regarding efforts to  address violent extremism, our review of information since GAO’s  previous work indicating which agencies were involved in efforts to  collaborate with Saudi Arabia, and discussions with U.S. agency officials  regarding the agencies with which they collaborate.
To examine the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing,  we reviewed relevant U.S. strategic documents, including the U.S.  Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia, Report Pursuant to Section 2043(c) of  the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act,  and Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia (previously called  Mission Performance Plans) for fiscal years 2005 to 2011. While we did not  assess these documents for key elements of a strategy as identified by  GAO, we used the performance targets stated in these documents as  criteria against which we assessed progress. In addition to documents  from U.S. agencies, we obtained documents detailing the Saudi  government’s approach to combating terrorism and terrorism financing  from Saudi officials, and reviewed public information available on the  embassy Web site. We discussed the U.S. government strategy to  collaborate with and assist Saudi Arabia with officials from DOD, DHS,  DOJ, State, and Treasury, as well as representatives from the Saudi  embassy, including the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.  Furthermore, while in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, we discussed the U.S. strategy  to collaborate with Saudi Arabia with officials from the U.S. embassy,  including the then ambassador, as well as representatives from the Saudi  government, including representatives from the Ministries of Foreign  Affairs, Interior, and Islamic Affairs. We met with Saudi officials from  these ministries as they are involved in efforts to combat terrorism and  extremism.
To report U.S. government agencies’ assessment of progress toward the  goals of the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia, we reviewed relevant U.S. planning and evaluation  documents, including MSPs for Saudi Arabia, Country Reports on  Terrorism, and International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume  II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, among others. Additionally,  we developed and administered a data collection instrument to agencies  providing training and technical assistance to the Saudi government— including State, Treasury, DOJ, DHS, DOD, and DOE—to obtain  information on programs and activities, including goals, description,  indicators, assessments, and associated funding. We corroborated  information reported to us in the data collection instrument with  information obtained during interviews with agency officials and reported  in agency evaluation documents. Further, we obtained and examined  documentation from Saudi officials regarding their domestic efforts to  counter terrorism and terrorism financing, including Rules Governing the  Opening of Bank Accounts and General Operational Guidelines in Saudi  Arabia, Third Update, December 2008, and reviewed public information  available on the embassy Web site. Although we report on Saudi efforts to  combat extremism, we did not independently verify all of these activities.  In Washington, D.C., we discussed progress on U.S.-Saudi  counterterrorism efforts with U.S. officials from DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ,  State, Treasury, and the intelligence community; as well as with Saudi  officials from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. We also interviewed  subject matter experts from a variety of academic institutions and  nongovernmental organizations to obtain their assessments of progress.  We selected experts who met at least one of the following criteria: (1)  produced research focusing on Saudi Arabia; (2) traveled to Saudi Arabia;  and, (3) were recognized as experts in the professional community, as  determined by the recommendation of other experts. State concurred with  our list of experts. Additionally, we traveled to Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi  Arabia, where we visited the Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Center for  Advisory and Care—a counseling program designed to reeducate violent  extremists—in Riyadh, and met with U.S. officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ,  State, and Treasury; Saudi officials from the Saudi Arabian Monetary  Agency and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Islamic Affairs;  and representatives from World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The  information on foreign laws in this report is not a product of our original  analysis, but is based on interviews and secondary sources.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through September  2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Time Line of Key Events in U.S. and Saudi Relations, 1750-2004
subsections: section_title: Alliance between Muhammad bin Saud and a conservative Muslim leader
paragraphs: Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the precursor to the modern  Saudi state, strikes an alliance with the conservative Muslim  leader, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. This marks the start of  the close association between Saudi political and religious  establishment.
Abdul Aziz Al Saud expands Saudi power to other regions of the  Arabian Peninsula, including Riyadh and the holy Muslim city of  Mecca.
The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is formally established  under the reign of King Abdul Aziz Al Saud with a system of  government based on Islamic law.
United States and Saudi Arabia establish diplomatic relations.
Saudi Arabia starts large scale oil production after World War II.
The meeting between King Abdul Aziz and President Franklin D.  Roosevelt to discuss oil and security is considered the start of  more robust U.S.-Saudi relations.
In 1948, Israel is established with support from the United  States and overwhelming Arab opposition.
U.S. and Saudi governments pursue some common national  security objectives, including combating the global spread of  communism. U.S. administrations consider the Saudi monarchy  as an ally against nationalist and socialist governments in the  Middle East.
United States provides military training assistance to Saudi  Arabia under the terms of the Defense Assistance Act of 1949  and the Mutual Security Act of 1951.
The Muslim World League, one of several multilateral charitable  organizations, is established with headquarters in Saudi Arabia  to promote Islam and extend economic aid to Muslim nations.
Oil production in the 1970s makes Saudi Arabian per capita  income comparable to that of other developed countries. As the  price of oil rises, Saudi Arabia’s wealth and political influence  increase.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is established after the ouster of the  Shah, signaling the rise of political Islam as a challenge to  existing regimes in the region.
The Soviet army invades Afghanistan in December, prompting  opposition from some Arab governments as well as from the  United States and its allies.
Religious extremists seize the Grand Mosque of Mecca; the  Saudi government regains control and executes the  perpetrators.
Volunteers from some Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia,  join the Afghan mujahideen (the name given to Afghan  resistance fighters) in their fight against the Soviets. The United  States and Saudi Arabia play a leading role in supporting the  mujahideen.
The United States establishes military installations in Saudi  Arabia during the U.S.-led and Saudi-supported ouster of the  Iraqi army from Kuwait. The bases draw intense opposition from  Al Qaeda, which was founded 3 years earlier.
Terrorists, some with links to Al Qaeda, use a car bomb to  attack the World Trade Center in New York City killing 6 people  and injuring 1,042.
Citing his support of extremist movements, Saudi Arabia strips  Osama bin Laden of Saudi citizenship.
Saudi authorities arrest hundreds of Islamists who have been  openly critical of the Saudi government.
Saudi terrorists use a truck bomb to attack the Riyadh  headquarters of the U.S.-operated training center of the Saudi  National Guard resulting in the death of 5 Americans, among  others.
Terrorist bombings at U.S. military complex in Khobar, eastern  Saudi Arabia, kill 19 Americans and wound many others. The  attack is conducted by Saudi Hizaballah.
The Taliban rise to power in Afghanistan in 1996, imposing a  strict interpretation of Islamic law on Afghan society. In 1997,  Saudi Arabia becomes one of three countries to recognize the  Taliban regime.
The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1267  imposing financial and other sanctions applying to individuals  and entities associated with Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and/or  the Taliban.
Dissatisfaction in Saudi Arabia and many parts of the Arab world  with U.S. policies related to the second Palestinian intifada (or  uprising). Frustrated by a lack of U.S. response to Israeli- Palestinian violence, in a letter to President Bush in 2001, Saudi  Crown Prince Abdullah warns of a serious rift between the two  governments.
Al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole harbored in Yemen kills 17  American soldiers.
On September 11th, the World Trade Center in New York and  the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. are the targets of terrorist  attacks, and a hijacked plane crashes in Pennsylvania. The  attacks are carried out by 19 Al Qaeda hijackers, including 15  Saudi nationals.
Saudi Arabia condemns the attack and withdraws its official  recognition of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which is  an ally of Al Qaeda.
U.S. forces, along with those of several allies and Afghanistan’s  Northern Alliance, topple the Taliban regime and remove the  safe haven for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Some Al Qaeda  survivors return to their countries of origin, including Saudi  Arabia.
The United States and its coalition of allies begin military  operations in Iraq in March. Saudi Arabia publicly opposes the  U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but reportedly allows the U.S.-led  forces the use of military facilities in the Kingdom in support of  operations in Iraq. However, virtually all U.S. troops are  withdrawn from the Kingdom by August.
Several terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia, including attacks in  May and November on residential compounds, kill dozens of  people.
Iraqi insurgency attracts foreign fighters, including Saudi  nationals.
A series of terrorist attacks throughout Saudi Arabia results in  dozens of victims. The targets include Saudi Arabia’s oil  infrastructure and the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. Saudi security  forces intensify their antiterrorist campaign, with casualties on  both sides, including Abdulaziz al-Mughrin, the head of Al  Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.
section_title: Appendix III: Saudi Ministries and Agencies that Have Functions Related to Countering Terrorism and Terrorism Financing
paragraphs: Primary ministry responsible for efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism  financing. It has issued “most wanted” list of terrorists and its security forces  have killed or arrested terrorist suspects. The ministry also includes  investigative units and oversees the Saudi rehabilitation program for  terrorism suspects. The ministry oversees public security, coast guards, civil  defense, fire stations, border police, and special security and investigative  functions, including criminal investigation.
This unit, which is within in the Ministry of Interior, was created in 2005 and  tasked with handling money laundering and terror finance cases. All banks  are required to file suspicious transaction reports with this unit. It collects and  analyzes these reports and other available information and makes referrals  to relevant Saudi agencies, including the Mabahith for further investigation  and prosecution.
Also referred to as the General Investigation Directorate, it investigates  cases related to terrorism, among other activities.
Serves as the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It plays a central  role in overseeing all anti-money laundering and combating financing of  terrorism programs and supervises all banking, securities, and insurance  activities in the country.
Oversees political, cultural, and financial international relations; monitors  diplomatic relations. Signs bilateral agreements, including those related to  counterterrorism, and coordinates efforts with other governments.
Oversees government finance, including budgeting and expenditure of all  ministries and agencies; controls national economic growth, zakat, income  tax, and customs.
Oversees all Islamic affairs, including maintenance of mosques and  monitoring of clerics. The ministry is reported to have dismissed a large  number of extremist clerics and sent them to be reeducated.
Oversees all schools, including physical infrastructure and curriculum. One  of its priorities is to increase awareness and religious tolerance among  teachers.
section_title: Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies Providing Training and Technical Assistance to Saudi Arabia, 2005-2008
paragraphs: Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies Providing Training  and Technical Assistance to Saudi Arabia,  2005-2008 Along with State and DOE, assists the Saudi government with the protection of critical  infrastructure assets, such as oil installations, through the Office of Program  Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI)—a U.S.-Saudi joint organization.
Along with DOD and State, assists the Saudi government with the protection of critical  infrastructure assets, such as oil installations, through OPM-MOI. DOE has provided  training to Saudi officials on conducting facilities assessments, as well as performed joint  assessments of key facilities.
Provided training to Saudi Customs officials on interdiction and investigation related to  bulk cash smuggling.
Provided training to Saudi officials, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on  financial investigation techniques.
Leads the U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia.
Provided training to Saudi government officials related to building investigative capability  and consulted on oil installation security.
Along with DOD and DOE, assists the Saudi government with the protection of critical  infrastructure assets, such as oil installations, through OPM-MOI.
Through the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, provided training to, and conducted  assessments of, the Saudi Arabian Financial Investigation Unit.
Through Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigations, provided training to Saudi  officials on financial investigation techniques.
Engages in information sharing with Saudi ministries.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director),  Ashley Alley, Alexandra Bloom, Joe Carney, Tom Costa, Martin de Alteriis,  Mark Dowling, Jonathan Fremont, Etana Finkler, Phillip Farah, Joel  Grossman, Julia Jebo, Charles M. Johnson, Jr., Bruce Kutnick, Elizabeth  Repko, Mona Sehgal, and James Strus made key contributions to this  report. Elizabeth Curda, Davi D’Agostino, Muriel Forster, Barbara Keller,  Eileen Larence, Armetha Liles, Sarah McGrath, and Theresa Perkins also  provided technical assistance.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of  Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington,  D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to  Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s  Federally Administered Tribal Areas. GAO-08-622. Washington, D.C.:  April 17, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: State Department’s Antiterrorism Program Needs  Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes.  GAO-08-336. Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to  Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.  GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007.
Terrorist Financing: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Deliver Counter- Terrorism-Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad.   GAO-06-632T. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S  Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical  Assistance Abroad. GAO-06-19. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2005.
International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies’ Efforts to Address  Islamic Extremism. GAO-05-852. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2005.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from  Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859.  Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005.
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of  Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801.  Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess  Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms. GAO-04-163.  Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2003.
Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to  Address the Overseas Threat. GAO-03-165. Washington, D.C.: May 23,  2003.