Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites
Published: 2003-03-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Terrorists and countries of concern may be able to gain access to poorly secured weapons of mass destruction at sites throughout Russia. To address this threat to U.S. national security, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) have obligated more than $1.8 billion since 1992. GAO was asked to report on U.S. programs to help improve security at sites where Russia stores (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, GAO assessed U.S. plans to address security threats at sites in Russia, U.S. progress in implementing those plans, and the primary challenges facing DOD and DOE.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Departments of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in helping improve the security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass destruction against the threat of theft or diversion because Russia is not providing needed access to many sites. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future. DOE plans to help secure Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008; however, the department lacks access to many sites. As a result, most of DOE's expenditures in the past 2 years went to functions other than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously installed equipment and developing nuclear security regulations. While important, these efforts do not advance DOE's objective of protecting all buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. DOD and DOE have pursued different approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites. DOE recently scaled back its plans, and the two agencies will face coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will secure sites in both of their plans. DOD has made little progress in securing dangerous pathogens at the 49 sites where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs. Russia has consistently refused DOD access to sites and has closed some sites to U.S. security programs. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement to implement this assistance have also stalled. DOD's efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on a destruction facility that will not be complete until 2006. It may be 40 years before Russia's nerve agent stockpile can be destroyed. DOD has improved security at two sites, but two thirds of Russia's stockpile remains vulnerable to theft.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In response to your request on January 17, 2002, we assessed U.S. efforts to enhance security at sites  in Russia that store (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous  biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the  Secretary of State, and other interested parties.
If you have questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or  christoffj@gao.gov or Mr. Robinson at (202) 512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov. GAO contacts and staff  acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI.
subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the largest arsenal of  weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the world. Unclassified U.S.  estimates of the current number of Russia’s nuclear warheads range from  18,000 to 25,000, and Russia inherited an estimated 600 metric tons of the  uranium and plutonium that could be used to build nuclear devices. Russia  also assumed control of more than 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons  and an extensive complex of sites used in research on dangerous biological  pathogens, such as smallpox and anthrax, and the development of those  pathogens as biological weapons.
In the closed Soviet system, security systems emphasized heavy  surveillance of site workers with severe penalties imposed on those who  violated security procedures. The Soviets relied on closed cities and  physical security measures to stem any threats posed by outsiders.  However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent social,  political, and economic changes in Russia not only revealed gaps in the  physical security surrounding sites containing WMD but made evident  weaknesses in Russia’s ability to deter threats from inside those  complexes. A senior member of the Russian Ministry of Defense stated in  1999 that the greatest threat to nuclear warhead security stems from  insider knowledge of security systems and procedures. Both enhanced  insider threat and decreased ability to protect against external threat have  created opportunities for agents from countries of concern to obtain WMD.
In response to this threat, Congress authorized the Department of Defense  (DOD) to establish the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in  1992 to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan secure and protect  nuclear weapons. Members of Congress were concerned that nuclear  weapons or materials might be lost, stolen, or sold and that nuclear  scientists and technicians might be persuaded to sell their knowledge to  nations or terrorists seeking to develop such weapons. Between 1992 and  2003, Congress authorized $6.4 billion for a wide array of threat reduction  and nonproliferation programs implemented by DOD, the Department of  Energy (DOE), the Department of State, and other agencies. As shown in  figure 1, these appropriations have been directed into destruction and  dismantlement, demilitarization (the conversion of military facilities and  research to civilian purposes), and security efforts. Most funds have been  for programs in Russia.
Destruction and dismantlement projects, for which $2.65 billion has been  appropriated, are designed to help with the elimination of nuclear,  chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles. For example,  DOD has helped Russia destroy missiles and submarines to meet arms  control requirements and is currently helping Russia design a destruction  facility for its chemical weapons stockpile. In addition, DOD has financed  the destruction of silos that contained intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Demilitarization efforts—projects that encourage Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,  and Kazakhstan to convert military facilities and research to civilian  purposes—have been appropriated $1.1 billion. These include funds to pay  scientists of the former Soviet Union who once developed nuclear,  chemical, and biological weapons and missile systems to conduct peaceful  research. Demilitarization funds also support projects that seek to convert  defense facilities in the former Soviet Union to factories that produce  civilian products such as medical treatments.
Security programs have been appropriated $2.65 billion from 1992 through  2002. These efforts help Russia and other former Soviet nations secure  their WMD. For example, DOD and DOE have provided Russia with fences,  sensors, video surveillance systems, and computerized inventory control  systems.
As shown in figure 2, as of September 2002, DOD and DOE had obligated a  total of $1.8 billion to upgrade security at sites where Russia has WMD  material. Most of these funds have been used to help secure nuclear  warheads and nuclear material. Two percent of these funds have been used  to address security threats at chemical weapons storage sites and institutes  with dangerous biological pathogens.
Since 1995, DOD has obligated $796 million to enhance security at Russian  nuclear weapons sites. The department has installed fences, developed  warhead inventory control systems, and upgraded railcars used to  transport warheads. In 1998, DOD expanded its program by providing  assistance to improve security over sites in Russia with dangerous  biological pathogens. As of September 2002, DOD had obligated about $14  million for these programs. In 1999, Congress became concerned about the  threat of chemical weapons and appropriated $20 million for security  enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites in Russia. DOD had  obligated $19.8 million of these funds as of September 2002.
In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to  secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material. In 1995, DOE  established the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)  program. Under MPC&A, DOE has installed modern nuclear security  systems with three components:   physical protection systems such as fences around the buildings  containing nuclear materials; metal doors protecting rooms where  material is stored; and video surveillance systems to monitor storage  rooms;  material control systems such as seals attached to nuclear material  containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the  containers and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into  areas containing nuclear material; and   material accounting systems such as inventories of nuclear material and  computerized databases to track the amount and type of nuclear  material contained in specific buildings.
DOE has obligated $835 million for these programs since 1995. In 1998, at  Russia’s request, DOE expanded the scope of its efforts with the Russian  Navy from protecting naval reactor fuel to helping secure nuclear  warheads. Since 1999, when DOE started working with the Russian Navy to  protect sites where warheads are stored, DOE has obligated $159 million  for this effort.
subsections: section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management,  the Budget, and International Security, Committee on Governmental  Affairs, U.S. Senate, asked us to report on U.S. programs to help improve  security at Russian WMD sites. To address these issues, we assessed U.S.  efforts to enhance security at sites in Russia that store (1) weapons-usable  nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological  pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, we assessed U.S.  plans to address these security threats at WMD sites in Russia; U.S.  progress in implementing these plans, and the primary challenges and  unresolved issues facing DOD and DOE in their efforts to secure Russian  sites. Our review focused on U.S. efforts to secure WMD material and did  not include U.S. programs to employ WMD scientists or destroy WMD  material.
To assess U.S. efforts to help secure weapons-usable nuclear material in  Russia, we reviewed program documents from DOE and the Russian  Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM). We also visited two sites in Russia  that have received security assistance from DOE: the Moscow State  Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Russian naval fuel storage  Site 49. We requested visits to the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates  Plant and the nuclear weapons complex facility at Mayak (also known as C- 65), but were denied access by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. We  were able to meet with managers from these sites outside their facilities.  We also visited Los Alamos National Laboratory to observe U.S.  approaches to securing nuclear material. We collected and analyzed  reports and other publications on nuclear material security issues from the  federal government and nongovernmental organizations. Our analysis of  DOE’s financial spending patterns was based on our previous work and  budget data on fiscal year 2001 and 2002 appropriations, obligations, and  expenditures, which we obtained from DOE. We met with officials from  DOE; Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories;  the Ministry of Atomic Energy in Russia; Gosatomnadzor, the Russian  nuclear regulatory authority; and site officials from the Moscow State  Engineering Physics Institute, the Russian Navy’s Site 49, Novosibirsk  Chemical Concentrates Plant, and Mayak.
To assess U.S. efforts to help secure nuclear warheads in Russia, we  reviewed program documentation from DOE, DOD, the National Security  Council, and Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National  Laboratories. During our site work in Russia, we visited several locations  related to securing nuclear warheads:   We visited two Russian Navy sites where DOE had installed security  improvements. During these visits, we toured inside the facilities, saw  the security equipment DOE had installed, and spoke with officials from  the Russian Navy.
We visited the Fissile Material Storage Facility, where Russia says it will  store plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads. At the time of our  visit, the facility was still under construction, so we were not able to see  all of the planned security features in place. During our visit, we spoke  with officials from DOD, which is financing the construction of the  facility, and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, which will operate  the site after it is completed.
We visited a factory in Russia, where the United States pays to have  railcars refurbished and repaired. We saw the factory and met with  factory officials.
We visited the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC), where  we saw examples of the security systems DOD plans to install at  warhead storage sites in Russia and some of the equipment the Russian  Ministry of Defense uses to screen personnel who work with nuclear  warheads. During this visit, we met with officials from the Russian  Ministry of Defense and DOD.
We also visited a location in the United States where nuclear warheads are  stored to gain an understanding of how the United States secures its own  warheads. During our work, we met with officials from DOD and DOE, the  National Security Council, Sandia, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore  National Laboratories, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and the Russian  Navy.
To assess U.S. efforts to help secure dangerous biological pathogens in  Russia, we reviewed program documents from DOD; the Department of  State; the National Security Council; the Russian Ministry of Health; the  International Science and Technology Center; and four former WMD  facilities where the United States has developed biosecurity assistance  programs. We collected and analyzed reports and other publications on  biosecurity issues from the federal government and nongovernmental  organizations, and we met with officials from the United States Army  Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases and Sandia Laboratory  to discuss their approaches to biosecurity. We also met with officials of  DOD and the Department of State, the National Security Council, the  Russian ministries of Health and Science, Industry and Technology, the  International Science and Technology Center, and DOD biosecurity  contractors Bechtel and SAIC. We visited all four former Soviet biological  weapons facilities in Russia that now receive U.S. biosecurity assistance:  (1) State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector), (2) the  State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk), (3) the  Russian Research Institute of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and  (4) the Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov). At these facilities, we met with  directors and scientists to discuss biosecurity issues, and we toured the  facilities.
Our review of DOD’s biosecurity program focused on assistance provided  since 1998 to improve the security of biological sites in Russia. DOD has  other programs to address the risks posed by the spread of dangerous  pathogens or biological weapons expertise from Russia, including  collaborative research projects with former Soviet biological weapons  scientists and projects to enhance safety at biological sites. Congressional  appropriations for DOD’s Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention  (BWPP) projects in the former Soviet Union that include biosecurity,  biosafety, and collaborative research assistance have grown from $17  million in 2002 to $55 million in 2003.
To assess U.S. efforts to help secure chemical weapons in Russia, we  reviewed program documents from DOD and the Russian Munitions  Agency, the executive agency in Russia charged with securing and  destroying chemical weapons. We visited both chemical weapons storage  sites in Russia that now receive U.S. security assistance: Kizner and  Shchuch’ye. At these facilities, we met with base commanders and security  personnel, we toured the facilities to observe the installed U.S. security  upgrades, and we were shown U.S.-funded security equipment for site  perimeter upgrades that had yet to be installed. We collected and analyzed  reports and other publications on chemical weapons security issues from  the federal government and nongovernmental organizations. We visited  Anniston Chemical Activity and Edgewood Chemical Activity to see and  discuss the U.S. approach to chemical weapons security with officials  there. We met with officials from DOD, the Russian Munitions Agency, as  well as officials from the two chemical weapons storage sites in Russia that  are receiving U.S.-funded security upgrades.
We performed our work from April 2002 through March 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Lack of Access to Nuclear Material Sites Hinders Program Completion
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE) plans to secure all weapons-usable  nuclear material in Russia by 2008. Over the past 10 years, DOE has made  steady progress toward this goal and has nearly completed its work at  civilian sites and naval fuel storage sites. However, DOE has made limited  progress in securing nuclear material in Russia’s nuclear weapons  complex, a network of sites involved in the construction of nuclear  weapons where most of the material is stored. Because it lacks access to  most of these sites, DOE has shifted its new spending on the program from  improving physical security over buildings with nuclear material to other  programs, such as transportation security and guard force equipment and  training. DOE faces significant challenges to continued progress with its  program, in particular the lack of access to many of the most sensitive sites  in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Although DOE and MINATOM signed  a new access agreement in September 2001, DOE has not gained access to  sites where work is planned but not yet begun.
subsections: section_title: DOE Plans to Secure All Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material by 2008
paragraphs: Weapons-usable nuclear material is highly enriched uranium or plutonium  that can be used directly in a nuclear weapon without further enrichment  or processing. This material is considered to be highly attractive to theft  because it (1) is not very radioactive and therefore relatively safe to handle  and (2) can easily be carried by one or two people in portable containers.  Terrorists and countries seeking nuclear weapons could use as little as 25  kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to build  a nuclear weapon.
DOE estimates that Russia has about 600 metric tons of weapons-usable  nuclear material. Russia stores weapons-usable nuclear material at three  types of sites: (1) civilian sites, which produce or store nuclear fuels and  materials for civilian application and research; (2) naval fuel storage sites,  where the Russian Navy stores stockpiles of highly enriched uranium to be  used as reactor fuel in submarines and icebreakers; and (3) the nuclear  weapons complex, a network of 10 nuclear cities that fabricate, refurbish,  or dismantle nuclear weapons and their components. Most weapons-usable  nuclear material in Russia is in the nuclear weapons complex. MINATOM  oversees operations at sites in the weapons complex and at some civilian  sites.
DOE plans to improve security over Russia’s entire stockpile of weapons- usable nuclear material to protect against both internal and external  threats by 2008. In 1998, DOE issued guidelines that provide criteria for  effectively reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia. The  guidelines provide a categorization scheme for ranking the relative threat  posed by different types and quantities of material, which is used to  determine the extent and type of upgrades necessary to secure the  material. DOE has determined that 243 buildings at 40 sites in Russia  (including central alarm stations) require improved security systems to  better protect weapons-usable nuclear material from theft. Although DOE  may not yet have identified all buildings, DOE’s assessment serves as a  relatively stable baseline for planning, budgeting, and measuring the  progress of its assistance.
DOE is installing security improvements that protect against both the  internal and external threats of theft. DOE installs security upgrades in two  phases—rapid upgrades and comprehensive upgrades. Buildings that  contain material of high proliferation threat receive both rapid and  comprehensive upgrades, and buildings with material of less concern only  receive rapid upgrades. According to DOE officials, rapid upgrades are  primarily designed to delay and detect external adversaries. They include  bricking up windows in storage buildings; installing strengthened doors,  locks, and nuclear container seals; establishing controlled access areas  around nuclear material; and implementing procedures that require the  presence of two people when nuclear material is handled. Comprehensive  upgrades include electronic sensors, motion detectors, and closed circuit  television systems to detect intruders; central alarm stations, where guards  can monitor cameras and alarms; and computerized material accounting  systems. According to DOE officials, these comprehensive upgrades secure  against both internal and external threats.
DOE has developed time frames for completing the program, including  schedules for individual sites, to assist in planning and budgeting. In our  February 2001 report, we reported that DOE anticipated completing  security improvements in Russia at all buildings with nuclear material by  2010. In fiscal year 2001, the Congress appropriated $101.1 million to help  protect Russian weapons-usable nuclear material. Congress increased the  appropriation for the program to $163.3 million in fiscal year 2002, and after  the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, further increased DOE’s  appropriation by $150 million. Because of these additional funds, DOE  revised its time frame for protecting all weapons-usable nuclear material in  Russia to 2008. Specifically, DOE plans to complete its work at naval fuel  storage sites in 2006, at civilian sites in 2007, and at the nuclear weapons  complex in 2008.
section_title: DOE Has Made Uneven Progress Securing Nuclear Material in Russia
paragraphs: DOE’s progress in protecting weapons-usable nuclear material has varied  widely, depending on the type of site. As of January 2003, DOE had  completed security improvements at most of the buildings at civilian sites  and naval fuel storage sites. In contrast, DOE has not started work at the  majority of the buildings in the nuclear weapons complex, which contains  most of the remaining unprotected weapons-usable nuclear material in  Russia. Although DOE has now protected 38 percent, or about 228 metric  tons, of Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear material, the vast majority of the  remaining material is at sites in the nuclear weapons complex where, due  to Russian national security concerns, DOE has not gained access and  begun work. Because DOE has been largely unable to start new work in the  weapons complex, most of DOE’s new spending for fiscal years 2001 and  2002 was on programs other than installing security improvements at  buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material.
subsections: section_title: Progress in Nuclear Weapons Complex Lags
paragraphs: As seen in figure 3, DOE has made the least progress in providing security  at Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, where it has completed work at only  14 of the 133 buildings, or 11 percent. DOE has not started work at the  majority of the remaining buildings in the nuclear weapons complex  because MINATOM has not provided the necessary access.
As of January 2003, DOE’s efforts to install security systems at all three  types of sites have protected 38 percent of Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear  material. The vast majority of the remaining material is in the nuclear  weapons complex, where some buildings hold several tons of uranium or  plutonium. Due to lack of access, DOE is installing security improvements  in the nuclear weapons complex at a much slower pace than it anticipated  when it issued its first cost and schedule estimate in 2000. At that time,  DOE planned to complete these upgrades by 2010. For example, DOE  originally anticipated beginning at least preliminary work in fiscal year  2001 at Russia’s four nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly sites (the  most sensitive parts of the nuclear weapons complex). As of January 2003,  according to DOE officials, work had not begun at any of these sites.  Progress at weapons complex sites where DOE has access can  dramatically increase the amount of material protected. For example, since  February 2001, DOE has increased the amount of material it has secured at  the Mayak Production Association, from 15 metric tons to 28 metric tons.
In contrast to Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, DOE has made  significant progress protecting buildings at civilian and naval fuel storage  sites and is nearing completion of its security upgrades at these sites. As of  January 2003, DOE had completed work at 78 percent (85 of 110) of the  buildings at these locations. DOE’s progress at the civilian and naval fuel  storage sites has been facilitated by generally good access to buildings with  weapons-usable nuclear material because Russia has fewer national  security concerns about these sites. For example, at Novosibirsk Chemical  Concentrates Plant, one of the largest civilian sites, DOE had adequate  access to construct a single storage facility to replace nine dilapidated  buildings that stored nuclear material. Furthermore, at one site in Russia’s  civilian sector where DOE suspended work in 1999 due to lack of access,  negotiations resumed for providing assistance in 2001, according to DOE  officials. DOE has since been granted access and made several trips to the  site and anticipates beginning work at that site early in 2003.
section_title: DOE’s Increased Funding Went to Other Objectives
paragraphs: Because progress in installing security upgrades to buildings in the nuclear  weapons complex has been slowed, the majority of DOE’s additional  funding in 2001 and 2002 shifted to transportation security, guard force  support, and other assistance. These other assistance efforts included  supporting the operation and maintenance of security systems already  installed at sites, converting highly enriched uranium to a form that cannot  be used for weapons, and developing nuclear regulations. As seen in figure  4, expenditures for security enchancements at buildings at civilian, naval  fuel, and nuclear weapons complex sites decreased from the average of 72  percent in fiscal years 1993 to 2000 to 43 percent in fiscal years 2001 and  2002. The majority of DOE’s expenditures during fiscal years 2001 and 2002  were for activities other than securing buildings such as securing material  during transport and maintaining previously installed equipment. While  these efforts are important, they do not directly advance DOE’s goal of  securing all buildings in Russia with weapons-usable nuclear material by  2008.
section_title: Access to Sensitive Sites Remains a Barrier to Completing Security Improvements by 2008
paragraphs: DOE’s lack of access to many buildings that store weapons-usable nuclear  material, in particular to buildings in the nuclear weapons complex, is the  greatest challenge to providing assistance to improve nuclear material  security in Russia. As set forth in its guidelines for improving nuclear  material security in Russia, DOE requires access to the buildings to design  security systems and confirm their installation. However, despite DOE’s  efforts to gain access since 1995, MINATOM has continued to deny DOE  access to buildings in the nuclear weapons complex due to Russia’s  concerns about national security and laws that protect state secrets.
As of January 2003, DOE had obtained or anticipated obtaining access to 35  of the estimated 133 buildings in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex with  nuclear material. At the remaining 98 buildings (74 percent of the total),  DOE had no access to design or confirm the installation of security  systems. The level of access changed little since our February 2001 report,  which also found that DOE did not have access to about three quarters of  the buildings in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Russian officials in the  nuclear weapons complex told us that it is very unlikely they would ever  grant DOE physical access to the most sensitive areas.
As a result of the lack of access, DOE has not been able to improve security  at many buildings containing hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable  nuclear material—the majority of the remaining nuclear material in Russia.  DOE has placed much of this material in its highest threat category and  would make it first priority for receiving security improvements if DOE had  access. The lack of access is likely to prevent DOE from accelerating  completion of security improvements in the nuclear weapons complex  from 2010 to 2008. In addition, DOE has not been able to confirm the  installation of security improvements at several sites in the nuclear  weapons complex where it funded security improvements before a stricter  policy requiring access to buildings receiving assistance was enforced. For  example, DOE spent approximately $1 million to install rapid and  comprehensive upgrades at a building in Snezhinsk (also known as  Chelyabinsk-70) where DOE has never had access. A DOE official said that  DOE would not have approved assistance to that building under the current  access policy.
To gain access to buildings in the weapons complex where it had not been  allowed to work, DOE signed an access agreement with MINATOM in  September 2001. In April 2002, DOE stated that this agreement would  enable DOE to begin new work at several buildings in the weapons  complex where it lacked access. However, the agreement did not facilitate  DOE’s access to these buildings. The agreement only described  administrative procedures, such as specifying which DOE personnel are  allowed to make site visits and the number and duration of those visits.  DOE and Russian officials stated that this agreement did little to improve  DOE’s access to new buildings, and in some cases, the agreement reduced  U.S. access. In fact, during our July 2002 visit, MINATOM used the  agreement as a rationale for denying GAO access to two sites in Russia on  the grounds that GAO staff were not on the access list.
DOE is exploring the use of alternative access procedures, as allowed in its  access policy. For example, at Snezhinsk, DOE used video and photographs  instead of physical access to conduct a vulnerability assessment for part of  a building where DOE did not have access. (DOE officials said that they  had access to the rest of the building.) However, DOE has not yet expanded  the use of alternative access beyond this building. In addition, DOE has  proposed building new central storage facilities at some sites in the nuclear  weapons complex as a way to accelerate security upgrades. Instead of  improving security at many separate buildings, DOE would pay to build or  convert one building to store the nuclear material from other buildings.  DOE has agreed in principle to such an approach, at least at one site in the  nuclear weapons complex, but DOE and MINATOM have not reached a  final agreement or begun construction on a central storage facility.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: DOE has made progress installing improved security systems for 38  percent of the weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. However, DOE  will likely be unable to complete its work in Russia by 2008, as currently  planned, largely due to Russia’s lack of cooperation on access to sensitive  sites in the nuclear weapons complex. Because DOE has made little  progress gaining access to new sites in the Russian weapons complex, it  has shifted its funding from securing buildings with nuclear material to  other program objectives. These other efforts, such as supporting the  operation and maintenance of the security systems, are essential to the  long-term success of the program and can contribute to the overall security  of Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear material. Nevertheless, the trend  toward these supporting activities raises potential concerns about the  program’s focus and direction. While these other program activities are  needed and relevant, they do not directly advance DOE’s objective of  securing all buildings in Russia with weapons-usable material. In addition,  in light of Russia’s long-standing and continued unwillingness to allow  access to most of the sites in the weapons complex, DOE needs to  seriously reconsider its ambitious goal of protecting all of Russia’s  weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: Given the current lack of access to many nuclear weapons complex sites,  the Secretary of Energy should reassess the department’s expedited plans  to provide security enhancements to Russian facilities housing weapons- usable nuclear material.
section_title: DOD and DOE Have Had Mixed Success Protecting Nuclear Warheads
paragraphs: DOD and DOE plan to improve security of nuclear warheads at Russia’s  storage sites and rail transfer points, where warheads are stored apart from  their delivery vehicles. However, the departments do not know the total  number of sites they plan to assist because Russia has provided only  limited information about site locations and security conditions. DOE has  scaled back its plans to assist operational sites, which support deployed  nuclear weapons, to comply with January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines  that preclude assistance to most operational sites out of concern that U.S.  assistance could enhance Russia’s military capability. DOD’s and DOE’s  progress in improving security at nuclear warhead sites has been mixed.  DOD has made limited progress because its counterpart, the 12th Main  Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, has installed less than half  of the fencing DOD has provided to protect sites against external threat. In  addition, the Ministry has not provided access to sites so that DOD can  address internal threats. In contrast, DOE has improved security at 33 of 36  sites because the Russian Navy has provided sufficient access to these  sites. However, DOE has improved security at some sites that would have  been prohibited from receiving assistance under U.S. interagency  guidelines.
subsections: section_title: DOD and DOE Are Addressing Different Segments of Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Sites
paragraphs: Russia stores its nuclear warheads at three types of sites—storage sites,  operational sites, and rail transfer points. Table 1 provides an overview of  plans that the DOD and DOE have to improve security at Russian nuclear  warhead sites.
DOD and DOE both provide assistance to improve nuclear warhead  security in Russia because they work with different branches of the  Russian military. DOD has focused on improving security at storage sites  under the command of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of  Defense, the branch of the Russian military specifically responsible for  warhead security and maintenance. In contrast, DOE has focused on  improving security at Russian Navy sites, which include storage,  operational, and rail transfer sites, and has recently considered expanding  its assistance to Strategic Rocket Forces sites. DOE efforts to increase  security at operational sites, which support deployed nuclear weapons,  raised concerns in the Administration that security assistance might  enhance the military capability of Russia’s offensive nuclear force.  However, the Administration did not have a policy balancing the benefit of  increasing security at operational sites against the possibility of enhancing  military capability. In January 2003, U.S. interagency guidelines precluded  DOD and DOE assistance to most operational sites. The guidelines allow  the departments to improve security at storage sites and rail transfer points  that support warhead storage, consolidation, dismantlement, or force  reductions, where security assistance it less likely to enhance operational  capability. The guidelines do not support assistance to operational sites  where mated or unmated warheads may be handled in the course of  training or deployment. While DOD’s security plans included only storage  sites and therefore complied with the guidelines, DOE has scaled back its  plans to comply with the guidelines.
subsections: section_title: DOD Plans to Improve Security at All Storage Sites
paragraphs: DOD has focused on improving security at all of Russia’s storage sites,  including both the large national stockpile sites and smaller sites at Navy,  Air, and Strategic Rocket Forces bases. In 1995, DOD and the Russian  Ministry of Defense signed an agreement and began discussions on  improving security at Russia’s nuclear warhead sites. DOD chose to focus  on storage sites because it works solely with the 12th Main Directorate of  the Russian Ministry of Defense, which has jurisdiction over the large  national stockpile sites and shares jurisdiction over the smaller storage  sites located at military bases. According to DOD officials, the storage  sites may contain warheads for both tactical and strategic weapons and  warheads that Russia has slated for dismantlement.
The 12th Main Directorate has not provided DOD with information on the  total number or location of storage sites because it considers this  information to be classified or sensitive. However, the Directorate has  stated that it needs 123 kilometers of new perimeter fencing for 52  geographic locations throughout Russia. DOD has used this information to  estimate the total magnitude of security needs at Russia’s storage sites and  to develop its assistance plan. DOD estimates that security improvements  under this plan will be complete by 2010.
DOD has considered expanding its assistance to rail transfer points,  locations used to transfer warheads between trains and trucks and for  temporary warhead storage. While the U.S. interagency guidelines permit  assistance to rail transfer points, DOD has not yet developed a security  assistance plan for rail transfer points because the 12th Main Directorate  has provided little information on these sites. DOD officials stated that  warheads are most vulnerable at rail transfer points. The absence of a  security plan for these sites is a significant gap in DOD’s current plans for  enhancing security around Russian nuclear warheads.
section_title: DOE Is Improving Security at Russian Navy Sites
paragraphs: DOE is addressing security at 36 Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites: 5  storage sites, 27 operational sites, and 4 rail transfer points. DOE estimates  that it will complete security improvements at the existing sites by 2006.  However, the U.S. interagency guidelines prohibited security assistance to  most operational sites. As a result of the guidelines and its own internal  review of assistance to operational sites, DOE has scaled back its plans for  enhancing security at Navy operational sites. At these sites, warheads may  be mated with delivery vehicles in preparation for deployment or loaded  onto ballistic missile submarines. Prior to the interagency guidelines, DOE  officials provided security assistance to Russian Navy sites because they  believed that security improvements to such sites would not enhance  Russia’s military capability. In 2002, DOE also began work in response to a  request from the Russian Ministry of Defense for assistance in securing  Strategic Rocket Forces nuclear warhead sites.
section_title: DOD and DOE Plan to Address External and Internal Security Threats
paragraphs: DOD and DOE have plans to provide a range of security improvements to  address both external and internal threats. Examples of security  improvements that protect primarily against external threat include new  perimeter fencing with sensors to detect intruders trying to penetrate the  fence, new guard towers and fighting positions to better detect and defend  against intruders, and reinforced vehicle entrance gates. Security  improvements that protect against both internal and external threats  include access control systems that limit the site personnel who can enter  nuclear warhead storage areas and other systems that detect unauthorized  entry into bunkers by site personnel or outsiders.
DOD and DOE install security improvements in two phases. During the first  phase, DOD and DOE provide quick fixes and rapid upgrades, respectively,  to improve the security of site perimeters to protect against external  threats. During the second phase, DOD and DOE provide comprehensive  upgrades—the full range of security improvements that protect against  external and internal threats. The first phase costs about $1 million per site  and requires little analysis of existing security conditions. Comprehensive  upgrades cost about $10 million per site and require vulnerability  assessments—site-specific evaluations of the security conditions—to plan  and design the improved security systems. Both DOD and DOE require  physical access to a site before providing comprehensive upgrades.
DOD has other programs to help secure warheads that Russia plans to  dismantle and to improve the reliability and effectiveness of the guard  forces that protect nuclear warhead sites. The programs include  transportation security enhancements, a computerized warhead inventory  system, a facility to store nuclear material from dismantled warheads, and  equipment for guard forces and to test guard forces for drug and alcohol  abuse. For additional information on these programs, see appendix III.
section_title: Progress to Improve Security Has Been Mixed
paragraphs: DOD and DOE have made mixed progress in securing nuclear warheads in  Russia. DOD has made limited progress in securing storage sites. In  contrast, DOE has made significant progress in improving security at  Russian Navy sites, but many of the operational sites DOE has assisted  would have been prohibited from receiving assistance under the January  2003 U.S. interagency guidelines.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Improving Security at Storage Sites
paragraphs: Since beginning discussions with the Russian Ministry of Defense in 1995  on providing security assistance to nuclear warhead sites, DOD has made  limited progress in improving security at the storage sites where it has  focused its efforts. DOD purchased 123 kilometers of perimeter fencing to  meet the requirements defined by the Russian Ministry of Defense for the  storage sites under its jurisdiction. The Russian Ministry of Defense agreed  to install the fencing at its own expense but has made limited progress in  doing so. The fencing consists of three layers, including sensors to detect  intruders, and protects primarily against threats from outsiders.
DOD began delivering the fencing in late 1997, but the Ministry of Defense  reported in spring 2002 that it had installed about one third of the fencing— 42 kilometers at 52 locations—and was more than 2 years behind schedule  in installing the remainder. The Ministry of Defense has not provided DOD  with the location or number of sites where fencing has been installed, but  has indicated only the number of kilometers of fencing installed.  Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has not updated the amount of  fencing installed since spring 2002 or given DOD a revised estimate of the  completion date for installing the fencing. According to DOD, the Ministry  of Defense lacks funding to cover the cost of paying experienced  contractors to install the fencing, which DOD estimates to be about $1  million per kilometer. DOD will not pay to install the fencing because the  Ministry of Defense has not provided DOD access to the sites.
DOD has not yet provided comprehensive upgrades—security systems that  protect against internal and external threats—at any of the storage sites.  DOD has tested and evaluated the comprehensive upgrades at the Security  Assessment and Training Center (SATC) near Moscow, but Russia has not  provided DOD access to the sites for the purpose of installing the upgrades.  DOD requires physical access to the sites because the installation of  comprehensive upgrades demands a greater level of design and security  expertise. In September 2002, in anticipation of reaching an agreement on  access with the Russian Ministry of Defense, DOD signed a contract for $83  million to install the comprehensive upgrades at eight storage sites.  According to DOD, work at these sites is expected to begin spring 2003.  DOD was unable to sign this contract earlier in 2002 as originally planned  because, in January 2002, the administration temporarily suspended the  Cooperative Threat Reduction program after it refused to certify that  Russia was complying with arms control agreements. This resulted in an 8- month suspension of contracting for new nuclear warhead security  projects.
section_title: DOE Has Improved Security Over Most Russian Navy Sites
paragraphs: Since DOE began providing assistance to Russian Navy nuclear warhead  sites in 1999, it has installed security improvements at 33 of the 36 sites  where the Navy requested assistance. At all 33 sites, DOE installed rapid  upgrades that primarily protect against external threats. As of January  2003, DOE had also installed comprehensive upgrades that protect against  internal threats at 8 of the 33 sites. At five sites, DOE started but had not yet  completed comprehensive upgrades. The rapid upgrades include installing  or repairing perimeter fencing, replacing guard towers around the  perimeter of the sites to provide better protection for the guard forces, and  installing vehicle barriers at entrance gates. The comprehensive upgrades  are based on site-specific vulnerability assessments and include systems to  detect and assess intruders, control personnel access to the sites, and  improve the ability of guard forces to respond to alarms.
The 33 sites that received upgrades include the 5 storage sites over which  the Russian Navy and the Ministry of Defense share jurisdiction. The  remaining sites include 4 rail transfer points and 24 operational sites— facilities where nuclear warheads are mated to delivery vehicles, piers for  loading and unloading nuclear weapons onto ballistic missile submarines,  and piers where ballistic missile submarines loaded with nuclear weapons  are docked.
The January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines precluded further DOE  assistance to many operational sites. The guidelines permitted assistance  to storage sites and rail transfer points that support warhead storage,  consolidation, dismantlement, or force reductions. However, while it  allowed for exceptions, the policy prohibited assistance to operational  sites where mated or unmated warheads may be handled in the course of  training or deployment, such as piers where submarines loaded with  nuclear weapons are docked. The change in policy reflected concern that  U.S. assistance might enhance Russia’s military capability. To implement  this policy, DOE curtailed its plans to provide comprehensive security  improvements at operational sites where it had already installed rapid  upgrades. In addition, DOE will not provide further assistance to  operational sites that do not meet the policy’s guidelines.
section_title: DOD and DOE Face Challenges in Securing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Sites
paragraphs: The departments face two challenges in securing Russia’s nuclear warhead  sites. The Russian Ministry of Defense has not allowed DOD to have access  to Russia’s nuclear warhead sites. In addition, in spite of the U.S.  interagency guidelines, DOD and DOE face challenges in coordinating their  programs.
subsections: section_title: DOE Has Had Sufficient Access to Install Security Improvements, but DOD Has Not
paragraphs: DOD and DOE require physical access to nuclear warhead sites to help  design security improvements and confirm that Russia has installed  security improvements as agreed before paying for the work. In particular,  they require access to site perimeters, entry control facilities, and guard  facilities where the bulk of the security improvements are installed. DOD  and DOE officials said that they do not require access inside the bunkers or  other areas where nuclear warheads are stored because they provide  minimal security improvements to those areas.
With the exception of visits to two sites that were used to demonstrate how  DOD would assess security needs and install security improvements, the  Russian Ministry of Defense has denied DOD access to nuclear warhead  sites to install security improvements. This lack of access has blocked DOD  from installing comprehensive upgrades, the full set of security  improvements that protect against both internal and external threats of  theft, despite DOD’s investment of $35 million to test and evaluate these  security improvements at the Security Assessment and Training Center  near Moscow. In addition, while DOD has purchased perimeter fencing for  the sites, it will not pay for installation without site access, even though  Russia is behind schedule in installing the fencing with its own funds.
DOD signed an access agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense in  February 2003 and plans to begin providing comprehensive security  improvements at eight of the storage sites in spring 2003. The access  agreement provides for limited access by DOD representatives to Ministry  of Defense nuclear warhead sites where the Ministry requests DOD  security assistance. However, given previous delays and setbacks in gaining  Russia’s permission to visit nuclear warhead sites, additional delays  beyond spring 2003 are possible. For example, the Russian government  approved a law in spring 2002 that would allow DOD access to nuclear  warhead sites; however, negotiations with the Ministry of Defense on  procedures for implementing the law took longer than expected and  prevented DOD from obtaining access to sites as soon as it anticipated.
Unlike DOD, DOE has obtained sufficient access to Russia’s nuclear  warhead sites to provide both rapid upgrades and comprehensive security  improvements. DOE has visited most of the Russian Navy nuclear warhead  sites—some sites as many as four times—to gather information to help  design security systems and observe the security improvements it has paid  to install. As part of this review, we also obtained access to two Navy sites  and saw vehicle barriers, perimeter fencing, guard towers, and entry  control facilities provided by DOE. Nevertheless, DOE has not visited 9 of  the 33 nuclear warhead sites where it has provided assistance. The Ministry  of Defense has restricted DOE’s access to some of these sites, and  according to DOE officials, they have not visited other sites because they  can realistically go to a limited number of sites each year. DOE officials  stated that they plan to eventually visit all of the Navy sites where they have  installed security improvements. DOD and DOE officials said various  factors might explain why DOE has received better access from the  Russian Navy than DOD has received from the 12th Main Directorate of the  Russian Ministry of Defense. For example, the Russian Navy may be more  willing to provide access because DOE teams are composed of civilian  security experts, whereas the 12th Main Directorate may be reluctant to  provide access to DOD military personnel. Alternatively, according to DOD  officials, the 12th Main Directorate, under Russian law, may consider its  storage sites to be more sensitive than operational sites.
section_title: DOD and DOE Have Coordinated Their Efforts but Have Followed Different Approaches
paragraphs: DOD and DOE coordinate their efforts to improve nuclear warhead  security in Russia through an interagency working group and a joint  working group with their Russian counterparts. DOD and DOE have  avoided duplication of effort, but they have not followed uniform policies.  Furthermore, they face several implementation issues that will require  continued coordination.
The interagency working group includes key representatives from DOD  and DOE and reports to the National Security Council. The group formed  after DOE began providing assistance to Russian Navy nuclear warhead  sites in 1999 and meets at least once a quarter and frequently every month.  The joint working group meets about every 6 months and includes key  representatives from DOD, DOE, the Russian Navy, and 12th Main  Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. DOD and DOE officials said  that their interagency coordination was initially not good but had  improved, and they pointed to these working groups as a positive  development in coordination. Specifically, the officials said that they had  avoided duplication of assistance, a primary objective of the working  groups.
Despite these efforts, DOD and DOE have pursued two different policies on  assistance to operational sites. While it did not specifically have a policy  against assistance to operational sites, DOD focused on storage sites,  where warheads are stored separate from their delivery vehicles. DOD  officials stated that focusing on storage sites helped avoid potentially  difficult policy decisions that could arise from directly assisting operational  military sites. In contrast, DOE structured its warhead security program  based on requests for assistance from the Russian Navy. Much of DOE’s  security assistance went to operational sites where warheads are deployed  with delivery vehicles because those were the sites for which the Russian  Navy requested upgrades. Only after U.S. interagency guidelines were  issued in January 2003, 3 years after DOE began providing assistance, did  DOE and DOD resolve this difference and institute a common policy that  balanced nuclear warhead security against the possibility of enhancing  Russia’s military capability.
While the U.S. interagency guidelines have resolved this primary issue,  DOD and DOE face other coordination issues. For example, DOD and DOE  have not determined which department will improve security at sites they  both include in their plans. The departments’ plans overlap because the  12th Main Directorate and the Russian military services (the Navy, Air, and  Strategic Rocket Forces) share jurisdiction over many nuclear warhead  sites. For example, five Russian Navy sites are storage sites that fall under  the jurisdiction of the Russian Navy and the 12th Main Directorate. The  Russian Navy requested assistance for these five sites from DOE, and the  12th Main Directorate requested assistance from DOD. Similarly, DOD and  DOE have not resolved which department will improve security at the  Strategic Rocket Forces’ nuclear warhead sites. Initially, DOD included  these sites in its plan, but in 2002 DOE received a request from the Russian  Ministry of Defense for assistance to these sites. DOE is pursuing this  request, has visited two sites, and has requested $24 million from Congress  to help secure Strategic Rocket Forces’ nuclear warhead sites in fiscal year  2004.
DOD and DOE officials said that they do not have a position on which  department should provide security assistance to sites identified in both  their plans. Rather, they said that whichever agency has the best access and  cooperation from their Russian counterpart should install security  improvements. These decisions will be made on a site-by-site basis in the  interagency working group. Since DOD has already purchased perimeter  fencing for the Strategic Rocket Forces sites, DOD officials said that if DOE  provides assistance to those sites, it should avoid duplication of assistance  and use DOD equipment. In addition, under the current policy guidelines, it  is possible that DOD and DOE could both help secure sites for the Strategic  Rocket Forces.
DOD and DOE are also using different vendors to purchase security  equipment for Russian warhead storage sites. For example, DOD and DOE  used different vendors to purchase different alarm communication and  display systems that will perform essentially the same function. According  to agency officials, using different vendors and different systems can have  advantages such as accounting for different weather conditions. However,  they also stated that more training and maintenance are required if  agencies provide multiple, nonstandardized systems. The Departments do  not have a plan to jointly evaluate and deploy equipment that balances the  advantages and disadvantages of using standardized equipment. DOD  officials stated that the equipment DOE uses should be tested at the SATC,  the equipment testing and evaluation center that DOD established near  Moscow. However, DOE officials said that they believed most, if not all, of  the equipment they provide is standardized with DOD equipment and have  not committed to testing the equipment DOE provides at the SATC.
DOD and DOE may need to coordinate their assistance in other areas to  ensure consistent policy. For example, both agencies provide assistance to  improve guard force effectiveness. DOE is considering developing two  guard force training centers for the Russian Navy, and DOD has provided  assistance to use the SATC as a training center for the 12th Main  Directorate.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The approaches that DOD and DOE have taken to improve the security of  Russia’s nuclear warhead sites are complementary but have key  differences. In particular, DOD has focused on Russia’s storage sites, and  DOE has focused on Russian Navy sites that, with some exceptions, are  largely separate from the sites receiving DOD assistance. Furthermore, the  agencies’ different approaches have so far avoided overlap and allowed the  United States to protect a greater number of sites. For example, DOE has  obtained sufficient access to install security improvements at most Russian  Navy sites, including rail transfer points, which are considered to be more  vulnerable to theft than storage sites. In contrast, while DOD has made  limited progress because it has not yet obtained the necessary access, it  has plans in place to improve security at Russia’s storage sites if the  Ministry of Defense provides access under its February 2003 access  agreement with DOD.
However, because DOD and DOE have different approaches to achieving a  common objective critical to U.S. national interests, coordination is  essential. DOD and DOE established mechanisms to share information and  avoid duplication, but they did not, until January 2003, have consistent  plans that balance nuclear warhead security improvements against the  possibility of enhancing the operational capability of Russia’s nuclear  forces. DOD and DOE now have consistent plans to follow as they  implement their programs. However, the departments will need to work  closely together on several areas as they proceed with their efforts to  improve the security of Russia’s nuclear warhead sites. Because of the  different approaches taken by DOD and DOE, it will be important to  address issues such as agency jurisdiction over Russian sites, equipment  standardization, and common approaches to training guard forces.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: The Secretaries of Defense and Energy should develop an integrated plan  to ensure that their related programs to help secure Russia’s nuclear  warheads work together to address implementation issues, such as  determining which department will provide assistance to certain sites and  resolving equipment standardization concerns.
section_title: Department of Defense Assistance to Secure Former Biological Weapons Facilities Has Had Limited Results
paragraphs: DOD has limited information on the location and security of Russian sites  with dangerous biological pathogens because the Russian government has  provided limited access to and information about these sites. While DOD  plans to address internal and external security threats at biological sites in  Russia, it has no time frames for completing this work, and it has not  determined how many biological sites in Russia should receive security  improvements. After more than 4 years of effort, DOD has made little  progress in addressing security concerns at these sites. As of December  2002, DOD had installed security equipment at two sites to protect against  external security threats but had not addressed insider threats by  increasing controls over access to materials or improving physical security  within labs. U.S. efforts to secure biological sites in Russia have faced  significant challenges. For example, the Russian government has closed  many sites to U.S. security assistance programs, and the United States has  been unable to negotiate an agreement with Russia that would expedite  DOD’s ability to provide security assistance.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Plans for Securing Biological Facilities in Russia Are Under Development
paragraphs: DOD’s plans to secure Russia biological sites are based on limited  information about the number, location, pathogen collections, and security  conditions at these facilities. DOD does not know how many sites in Russia  have dangerous biological pathogens. Thus far, DOD has focused its  security program on sites where it has identified dangerous pathogen  collections and where it has access. However, DOD does not know how  many sites it plans to help secure and has no time frames for completing its  work. DOD plans to address both internal and external security concerns at  sites where it has provided assistance.
subsections: section_title: Russia Inherited Most of the Soviet Union’s Biological Weapons Network
paragraphs: During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed the world’s largest and  most sophisticated offensive biological weapons program, a program that  developed weapons to spread smallpox, anthrax, plague, and other  dangerous pathogens. Although it had ratified the Biological and Toxin  Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972, the Soviet Union secretly continued  its biological weapons program for 2 more decades, employing 60,000  personnel at more than 50 sites. They researched and developed a broad  range of pathogens with varying degrees of lethality for humans, animals,  and plants. In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian  President Boris Yeltsin publicly confirmed the program’s existence and  announced its termination. However, Russia has not disclosed the locations  of all of its biological sites and the types of dangerous pathogens stored at  these sites.
In the 1990’s, Russian security systems and supporting infrastructure at  biological sites deteriorated as the Russian government decreased funding  and reduced staff size. At some sites, perimeter security systems are more  than 25 years old and can no longer be repaired. Figure 5 shows unstable  perimeter fencing around a biological site in Russia.
Additionally, biological pathogens are small and difficult to detect, making  them easy to steal. Once stolen, they can be grown almost anywhere.  Russian biological sites have weak internal controls over access to  pathogen collections. For example, as shown in figure 5, a lock and a seal  of string pressed into wax secure an area at a former biological weapons  site where dangerous pathogens are stored.
section_title: DOD Has Limited Information on the Numbers of Russian Sites with Dangerous Biological Pathogens
paragraphs: The Russian government has not provided DOD with a complete inventory  of all the sites in Russia that store dangerous pathogens. The United States  and Russia have collaborative research projects at 49 Russian biological  sites, a number that includes many former biological weapons facilities.  These sites have provided participating U.S. agencies with opportunities to  observe the security needs at these sites. However, DOD has projects  under way and thus direct knowledge of the security needs at only 14 of the  49 sites. DOD’s information on the other sites is limited because DOD  officials have to rely on other U.S. agencies to notify the department if they  observe dangerous pathogen collections or have biosecurity concerns at  the facilities where they operate. However, U.S. agencies have not received  full access to information at the biological sites because the managers of  these facilities are concerned about Russian national security and want to  conceal former participation in the Soviet biological weapons program,  according to a DOD official.
To help focus its assistance, DOD began work on a strategic plan in April  2002. As of January 2003, the draft plan had not been approved by the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. The plan is expected to set policy for  DOD’s biological security assistance and other biological weapons facility  programs, including collaborative research, biological facility safety  projects, and new initiatives to provide early warning of outbreaks of  dangerous diseases in Central Asia. DOD officials said that after the  strategic plan is approved, DOD will prepare an implementation plan with  schedules and deadlines for the biological security project and other  biological weapons facility projects it implements.
Despite uncertainty over the exact number of biological facilities in Russia,  a DOD official estimated that the department may eventually help upgrade  security at about 20 Russian biological sites housing dangerous pathogens.  DOD plans to encourage Russian ministries to consolidate biological  pathogen collections from smaller centers at larger facilities and thereby  decrease the number of facilities that store dangerous pathogens.  According to DOD, not all former bioweapons facilities currently have  dangerous pathogens and therefore would not be considered by DOD for  biosecurity assistance. Currently there is no time frame for completing this  work.
section_title: DOD Plans to Address Internal and External Security Threats
paragraphs: DOD plans to address both internal and external security threats at  biological sites but to date has focused on protecting against external  threats. Biological sites have unique characteristics that make them  especially vulnerable to internal security threats, however. Experts have  stated that there is a greater threat of potential proliferation of dangerous  pathogens from insiders than from an outside attack because biological  pathogens are small and can be smuggled out of a site without detection.  According to a U.S. biosecurity expert, managers at Russian biological sites  have been slow to acknowledge the potential of internal security threats.  For example, officials at the Russian biological sites we visited stated that  they knew their staff well and would notice if an individual posed a security  threat because laboratory staff live and work in close quarters. These  officials recognized the potential for insider security threats and said they  would consider measures to mitigate these threats. According to a DOD  official, the department intends to include measures to improve personnel  screening and install systems to keep track of the pathogen collections.
section_title: DOD’s Biological Security Projects Have Made Little Progress
paragraphs: U.S. efforts to upgrade security at Russian biological institutes have been  directed at facilities with dangerous pathogens that the Russians have been  willing to let DOD assist. Since 1998, DOD has upgraded security at the two  largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia: the State Research  Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State Research  Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk). Also, in 2002, DOD began  assessments for physical security improvements at two additional centers:  the Russian Research Institute of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino)  and the Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov). As of September 2002, DOD  estimates that it had obligated about $14 million to improve security at  Russian biological facilities.
subsections: section_title: Biosecurity Projects Under Way at Four Sites
paragraphs: As of December 2002, biosecurity projects are under way at 4 of the 49  biological sites in Russia that may require assistance. DOD officials stated  that the department’s efforts to help secure biological pathogens started  later than work to secure other WMD because biological pathogen security  was viewed as a lower priority. Also, according to DOD officials,  relationships with the management of biological facilities have to be built  before they will consider U.S. biosecurity assistance. Vector, one of the  world’s two declared sites of smallpox storage, contains a large collection  of viral pathogens. Obolensk maintains a large collection of pathogens that  includes genetically engineered anthrax. Golitsino and Pokrov were part of  the Soviet Union’s extensive bioweapons program that was directed toward  the development of plant and animal pathogens. Other sites, including  Russia’s system of antiplague sites, which are believed to store various  strains of the plague and other pathogens, may have more dangerous  pathogens than Golitsino and Pokrov, but the United States has no access  to them, according to DOD officials.
At Vector and Obolensk, biosecurity projects have improved perimeter and  building entrance security. However, biosecurity assistance provided at  Vector and Obolensk has not addressed the threat of theft by insiders or  improved security over areas where research with hazardous materials is  conducted or collections are stored. At both sites, biosecurity  improvements involved construction and relocation of fences, installation  of electronic sensors, strengthening of entrances to laboratory buildings  where high hazard pathogens were stored or used in research, construction  of guard facilities, and installation of equipment at central alarm stations.  These projects progressed slowly in part because a second set of threat and  vulnerability assessments was required after DOD found the initial set to be  incomplete. At Vector and Obolensk, a second set of threat and  vulnerability assessments was undertaken in September 2002 by a U.S.  contractor and was completed in December 2002.   Figure 7 shows new  fencing installed at Vector and figure 8 shows two cabinets of computer  equipment installed at Obolensk to monitor security video and electronic  sensors.
The projects at the Golitsino and Pokrov agricultural centers illustrate the  slow progress of biosecurity projects. After 2 years of discussion and  planning, initial threat and vulnerability assessments began in September  2002 and were completed in December 2002. DOD has yet to determine  when it will begin security improvements at these sites.
Although DOD’s slow start and Russia’s limited cooperation were major  reasons for the lack of progress in biosecurity assistance, DOD officials  point to the suspension of new projects in 2002 as the cause of further  delays. In January 2002, the administration temporarily suspended the  Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in Russia when it refused to certify  that Russia was complying with arms control agreements. This resulted in  an 8-month suspension of contracting for new biological security projects.  DOD was unable to obligate funds to conduct threat and vulnerability  assessments to initiate a second phase of security assistance at Vector and  Obolensk, nor was it able to start threat and vulnerability assessments at  Golitsino and Pokrov.
section_title: U.S. Biological Security Assistance Projects Face Many Challenges
paragraphs: U.S. efforts to help secure former biological weapons facilities in Russia  face many challenges. First, DOD has been unable to work directly with  Russian biological sites due to stalled negotiations on an interministerial  implementing agreement. Second, the United States does not have access  to former biological weapons sites. As a result, the biological security  program has taken longer and accomplished less than expected.
subsections: section_title: Stalled Negotiations with Russians Have Hampered DOD Work
paragraphs: The United States cannot efficiently provide assistance to Russian  institutes without having an implementing agreement with the Russian  government. According to DOD officials, an implementing agreement  between all the relevant Russian ministries and DOD would expedite the  installation of security projects because DOD could work directly with the  institutes.
Multiple Russian organizations and ministries have jurisdiction over the  military and civilian centers that were part of the former biological  weapons complex in Russia. Jurisdiction resides in nine Russian  government organizations: The Ministries of Defense, Health, Science,  Agriculture, and Education; the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences; the  Russian Academy of Agricultural Science; the Russian Academy of Natural  Sciences; and Biopreparat, an organization that now develops  pharmaceuticals but previously controlled the Soviet Union’s biological  weapons technology centers. In addition, the Ministry of Health has five  antiplague institutes and numerous regional field stations that maintain  pathogen collections and had a lead role in the Soviet Union’s bioweapons  program.
The lack of a single Russian focal point for DOD’s bioweapons security  projects is a major barrier to successfully negotiating an agreement  between the United States and Russia. Since 1992, an umbrella agreement  between the United States and Russia has allowed U.S. Cooperative Threat  Reduction projects for biosecurity, biosafety, and dangerous pathogens, as  it has for nuclear and chemical projects in Russia. However, additional  interministerial implementation agreements are needed to facilitate DOD’s  biosecurity assistance. In 1999, the Russian Government rejected a draft  implementing agreement between DOD and the Ministry of Health on the  grounds that it was not appropriate for that ministry to enter into an  exclusive agreement with DOD. The Russian government similarly rejected  a subsequent U.S.-proposed implementing agreement between the U.S.  Department of Health and Human Services and the Russian Ministry of  Health. The Department of State approached individual Russian ministries  directly and also suggested that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sign  a separate agreement with the United States that would allow  implementing agreements with multiple Russian ministries. None of these  efforts has been successful. Without an interministerial implementing  agreement, DOD cannot begin to directly secure Russia’s former biological  weapons facilities. As a result, DOD has to provide assistance through an  intermediary organization that has an agreement with the Russian  government. DOD has negotiated implementing agreements and avoided  this problem in three Eurasian republics, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and  Uzbekistan, and is finalizing an agreement with Ukraine.
As an alternative to an implementing agreement, DOD has used an existing  program, the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), to begin  security projects at Russian biological sites. However, ISTC was  implementing hundreds of research projects and was unable to accord  DOD projects as high a priority as DOD wished. ISTC is an international  organization in Moscow founded by the United States, Russia, the  European Union and Japan to engage former weapon scientists in peaceful  scientific research. ISTC was created to prevent the proliferation of former  Soviet WMD expertise by offering nuclear, biological and chemical  weapons and missile scientists peaceful research opportunities and thus  discouraging them from selling their expertise to countries of concern or  terrorist groups. The bulk of ISTC’s funding pays scientists for their work,  with some limited spending for laboratory equipment or computers.
ISTC agreed to facilitate DOD’s biosecurity projects in Russia because the  U.S. government had an existing agreement with ISTC that allowed it to  finance a range of research projects and other activities. However, ISTC’s  procurement system was not set up to handle the large contracts necessary  for engineering and construction projects. In addition, approval of all ISTC  proposals, including the biosecurity proposals, took time, partly because  ISTC had to obtain host-government concurrence for each proposal from  the Ministry of Atomic Energy; the Ministry of Industry, Science and  Technology; the Ministry of Defense or the Academy of Science. Also,  according to DOD officials, a shortage of administrative and managerial  staff at ISTC impeded ISTC’s efforts to process DOD’s biosecurity projects.  In 2001, DOD funded additional staff positions at ISTC to help expedite the  processing of its security projects.
According to DOD officials, until an interministerial implementing  agreement is negotiated, DOD biosecurity projects will continue to be  managed through ISTC. Despite frustration with ISTC’s slow pace, DOD  officials stated that ISTC’s role was critical in implementing U.S. assistance  at Russian bioweapons facilities.
section_title: DOD Lacks Access to Many Former Bioweapons Sites
paragraphs: While DOD has identified several former biological weapons sites in Russia  where it would like to provide biological security assistance, the Russian  government has consistently refused to grant DOD access to certain  facilities managed by the ministries of Health, Defense, and Agriculture.  For example, the Russian Ministry of Health maintains five antiplague  institutes and a network of numerous antiplague field stations. These  institutes and stations were part of the former Soviet system of medical  facilities housing dangerous pathogen collections for research and are  completely closed to U.S. assistance programs. Bioweapons experts have  reported that, as part of the Soviet bioweapons program, the anti-plague  network helped identify new virulent strains of pathogens and participated  in research on defensive measures. These facilities specialized in animal  diseases that are communicable to man, such as plague, tularemia, anthrax,  and cholera. According to DOD officials, the ministry was concerned that  participation in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs would be  an admission that the antiplague centers had taken part in the Soviet  biological weapons program. DOD also lacks access to four former  Ministry of Defense biological weapons sites. These laboratories were  involved in pathogen- and toxin-related research and maintained large  pathogen collections. A major animal pathogen institute of the Ministry of  Agriculture also remains closed to biosecurity assistance.
DOD has made some progress in gaining access to one of the four Ministry  of Defense facilities. In August 2002, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar was  instrumental in initiating discussions with the management of the former  Ministry of Defense facility, Kirov-200 (Strizhi), about potential  collaborative research projects, according to a DOD official. The Russian  government has nearly completed a transfer of ownership of the facility  from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Education. This institute’s  new civilian status is expected to enable future security projects with DOD.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: DOD has accomplished little to date to help protect Russian sites with  dangerous biological pathogens because the department has little  information about biological sites in Russia and has received limited  Russian cooperation. Presently, DOD plans to improve security at two sites  that are of lesser security concern than others because the department has  access to those two sites. By targeting sites where it has access, DOD  maintains relationships with the Russian bioweapons establishment, which  is an important objective. However, in the long term, this approach means  that DOD will not be able to improve security at locations with dangerous  pathogens that are of greatest security concern to the United States. DOD  could benefit from DOE’s past experience in assessing site security  requirements around buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material.  Specifically, DOE developed a categorization scheme for ranking the  relative threat posed by different types of material, which it used to decide  on the extent of upgrades to be installed at specific buildings. Without  complete assessments of the locations, pathogen collections, and security  needs at sites in Russia that have dangerous biological weapons, DOD will  have difficulty guiding its program.
section_title: Recommendation
paragraphs: In developing the department’s plan to enhance security at Russian  biological sites, the Secretary of Defense should clearly articulate criteria  the department should use to rank the relative threat posed by different  types of pathogens and review the security under which they are kept to  identify the biological sites that pose the greatest security risks and would  therefore have highest priority for and receive the most extensive U.S.  assistance.
section_title: DOD Has Not Focused on Securing All of Russia’s Chemical Weapons Storage Sites
paragraphs: Since the early 1990s, DOD has focused its nonproliferation efforts on the  construction of a facility to destroy Russia’s 40,000 metric ton stockpile of  chemical weapons. Because construction of the facility was taking longer  than expected, in fiscal year 2000, Congress directed DOD to develop  additional plans to protect Russia’s chemical weapons storage sites. DOD  has since developed plans to address external threats at two chemical  weapons sites that store nerve agent in small portable munitions. DOD  plans to complete this work in fall 2003 but has no plans to extend the  program to the five other sites, three of which store nerve agent and two  that store blister agent. As a result, a large quantity of chemical weapons in  Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion.
subsections: section_title: DOD Plans to Address External Security at Two of Russia’s Seven Chemical Weapons Storage Sites
paragraphs: In 1998, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),  Russia declared that it had stockpiled 40,000 metric tons of chemical  weapons, the largest stockpile in the world. The Organization for the  Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the implementing agency of  the CWC, conducts inspections at chemical weapons facilities and reports  its findings to member states, including the United States. OPCW regularly  inspects Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile.
DOD has information concerning the quantity, location, and physical  security conditions at Russia’s declared chemical weapons storage sites  and has plans to address external security at two sites. However, chemical  weapons are stored at seven sites in Russia (see table 2). Five of these sites  store nerve agent, which is considered the most dangerous form of  chemical weapon. DOD officials stated that two of these sites, Kizner and  Shchuch’ye, pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests  because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light  enough to be transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent  sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites  store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat  to U.S. national security interests. Further, a destruction facility for blister  agents funded mainly by Germany began operation in December 2002.
DOD has focused its efforts on the construction of a chemical weapons  destruction facility at the Shchuch’ye chemical weapons storage site.  According to DOD officials, the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons  stockpile, especially its nerve agents, would significantly reduce the threat  faced by the United States. Planning began in 1994, and completion of the  facility is scheduled for 2006. Russia plans to destroy all its nerve agent  munitions at the facility. As of November 2002, DOD had obligated more  than $218 million on the design and preliminary construction of the  destruction facility. Although the Russian Munitions Agency, which is  charged with the safe storage and destruction of Russia’s chemical  weapons stockpile, plans to destroy all of its declared chemical weapons  by the CWC mandated deadline of 2012, the lack of progress and financial  difficulties thus far make it doubtful that this deadline will be met. Current  estimates, based on the capacity of the facility, indicate that Russia will not  be able to completely destroy its nerve agent stockpile for at least 40 years  unless it builds additional destruction facilities.
In 1999, we reported that the Shchuch’ye destruction facility was behind  schedule and might not fully achieve U.S. objectives. In response, Congress  denied funding for the project in fiscal year 2000 and directed DOD to  address security concerns at Russia’s chemical weapons storage sites.  Congress appropriated $20 million in fiscal year 2000 for security  enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites in Russia. As a result of  this congressional direction, DOD chose to address the external threat at  the two chemical weapons storage sites in Russia that store nerve agent in  small portable munitions, Kizner and Shchuch’ye. Figure 9 shows an  official taking inventory of small nerve agent artillery shells at the  Shchuch’ye storage site.
DOD’s strategy for upgrading chemical weapons site security to address  external threat at these two sites involves two phases. First, a series of  upgrades were installed around individual buildings. Second, upgrades will  be installed around the perimeter of each site and the central alarm  stations. DOD plans to complete these upgrades by fall 2003.
section_title: DOD Is on Track to Complete Work at Two Sites by 2003
paragraphs: As of October 2002, DOD had obligated $19.8 million of its $20 million  appropriation for chemical weapons site security. In November 2001, DOD  began installing the first phase of its security enhancement package for  chemical weapons sites: the installation of microwave sensors and fencing  around individual storage buildings or groups of storage buildings that  contain small portable munitions, according to DOD. These upgrades cost  $220,000 per site and were installed at both Kizner and Shchuch’ye. The  sensors are the primary deterrent to proliferators because they alert guards  to any access to the protected buildings. During our visit to these sites, we  observed that the U.S.-funded fences around individual buildings were  approximately 3 feet high and were primarily designed to reduce the  number of false alarms caused by animals. A total of 8 buildings at  Shchuch’ye and 23 buildings at Kizner have been protected by the first  phase of DOD upgrades. This first phase of upgrades was completed in  February 2002.
In July 2002, DOD began work on the second phase of its security  enhancement package at Kizner and Shchuch’ye. These upgrades include  the installation of enhanced site perimeters with two layers of fencing,  sensors, lights, and closed circuit television cameras and improved central  alarm stations. DOD plans to complete these upgrades by fall 2003. Once  these security upgrades are complete, DOD will have secured 35 percent of  Russia’s stockpile of nerve agent chemical weapons. The remaining 65  percent of nerve agent stocks are stored at three sites where no U.S.- funded security enhancements are planned. In addition, according to DOD  officials, no plans exist to install a personnel reliability program, an  improved accounting system, or other equipment to address insider threats  at any chemical weapons storage site in Russia.
Progress in implementing site security upgrades at chemical weapons  storage sites has been expedited by good access and cooperation from the  Russian government. DOD officials stated that access to Russia’s chemical  weapons storage sites has not slowed the progress of the program and that  they have been able to obtain the information necessary to perform the  work. DOD officials believe that access has been good because Russia has  declared its stockpile and OPCW inspectors are periodically present. We  also had good access to both Kizner and Shchuch’ye when we visited  Russia in July 2002. We were shown examples of the upgrades installed  around individual buildings at both sites, saw the equipment for the site  perimeter upgrades awaiting installation, and had access to portions of the  site perimeters and entry control points.
section_title: Russian Government Wants to Focus on Destruction Not Security; Transportation Security Is an Impending Challenge
paragraphs: DOD officials have expressed concerns about the security of Russia’s  chemical weapons storage facilities, yet no further security upgrades are  planned. One reason is because the Russian government has expressed  little interest in expanding the security enhancement program. The head of  the Russian Munitions Agency, the agency charged with the safe storage  and destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile, stated that his  preference is that the United States fund the completion of the planned  chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye rather than improve  the security around Russia’s chemical weapons storage sites. He  maintained that the only real long-term security for Russia’s chemical  weapons is their destruction, though he was unopposed to an expansion of  the site security upgrade program.
An additional challenge is ensuring that Russia’s chemical weapons have  adequate security as they are transported to the destruction facility. DOD  has not begun discussions with Russia on the security that will be required  for chemical munitions as they are transferred from storage sites to the  planned chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. DOD  officials and security experts acknowledge that dangerous materials are  very vulnerable during transport. Because Russia plans to destroy all of its  nerve agent chemical weapons at the U.S.-funded destruction facility at  Shchuch’ye, Russia will be transporting thousands of metric tons of  chemical nerve agent from five storage sites, most of which are more than  500 miles from the planned facility. According to DOD officials, Russia has  yet to develop a practical plan for securing chemical weapons in transit to  the planned destruction facility. The United States already has programs in  place to aid Russia in securing nuclear weapons and material during  transport. Although this security concern will not arise before the  scheduled completion of the destruction facility in 2006, none of the U.S.  officials we interviewed had assessed the potential implications for  security or whether the United States would need to assist Russia with the  expense of transportation and security of chemical weapons during transit.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: DOD and Russia’s plans for securing only two chemical weapons sites  appears to be based less on an assessment of the potential long-term  security risks of leaving 65 percent of Russia’s nerve agent unsecured, than  on a desire to focus on building a destruction facility. With a lengthy  destruction process yet to begin for Russia’s nerve agent stockpile,  concerns about the security of these weapons will persist. The further  challenge of securing chemical weapons in transit to the planned  destruction facility looms on the horizon, though DOD has no plans to  address it.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: Given the lengthy time frame for the destruction of Russia’s chemical  weapons stockpile, the Secretary of Defense should consider:  reassessing the need to provide improved security at the three sites in  Russia that store nerve agent but have not received U.S. security  assistance; and  working with Russian officials to develop practical plans for securing  chemical weapons while in transit to the planned destruction facility at  Shchuch’ye.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Congress may wish to consider allocating additional funds for improving  security at the three remaining sites in Russia that store nerve agent but  have not received U.S. security assistance.