Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program
Published: 2002-11-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other criminals may exploit one of these programs--the Visa Waiver Program--to enter the United States. The program enables citizens of 28 participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. It was created, in part, to promote the effective use of government resources and to facilitate international travel without threatening U.S. security. GAO was asked to review the Visa Waiver Program, including the process for assessing countries' eligibility to participate in the program. GAO was also asked to determine the implications--specifically those affecting national security, foreign relations, tourism, and State Department resources--of eliminating the program. GAO analysts traveled to several visa waiver countries, including Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay, as well as to Argentina, whose participation in the program was recently revoked.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: To ensure that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program pose a low risk to U.S. national interests, the Departments of Justice and State verify each country's political and economic stability and the security of its passport issuance process. However, laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affect the processes for determining eligibility for the program. The new laws expand passport requirements for visa waiver countries and call for a system to monitor visitors' movement into and out of the United States. Whether these requirements will be implemented by the specified deadlines remains uncertain. The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program are difficult to determine. It is clear, however, that eliminating the program could affect U.S. relations with other countries, U.S. tourism, and State Department resources abroad. Although the Departments of Justice and State generally agreed with our report, Justice was concerned that GAO did not fully take into account its progress in meeting certain requirements. State questioned whether GAO considered the border inspection process when discussing the national security implications of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, the  administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have questioned  the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting national security.  Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other criminals may exploit  one of these programs—the Visa Waiver Program—to enter the United  States.
The Visa Waiver Program, established in 1986, enables citizens of 28  participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or  business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa from U.S.  embassies and consulates abroad. Persons traveling to the United States  under the program must have a valid passport issued by the participating  country and be a citizen of that country. According to the program’s  legislative history, Congress created the program, in part, to promote the  effective use of government resources and to facilitate international travel  without threatening U.S. security. Immigration and Naturalization Service  data show more than 16 million admissions into the United States under the  Visa Waiver Program for each of the past 3 years.
To assist in the subcommittee’s oversight of U.S. visa policies and practices,  you asked us to review the Visa Waiver Program. In this report we describe  (1) the process that the Departments of Justice and State established to  assess countries’ eligibility to participate in the program, including the  implications of changes in the law since September 11, 2001, that affect the  process and (2) the major implications of eliminating the program,  specifically implications affecting national security, foreign relations,  tourism, and State Department resources. You also asked us to assess how  the visa process operated prior to September 11, 2001, and what changes  have occurred since then to strengthen the process as a screen against  terrorists. That assessment is contained in our report Border Security:  Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool.
To describe the process for assessing countries’ eligibility to participate in  the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws establishing the program,  relevant congressional reports, regulations and agency protocols governing  the program, Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports,  and other relevant documents. To assess the implications of eliminating the  program as regards U.S. national security and U.S. foreign relations, we  visited U.S. embassies in Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and  Uruguay, and we met with officials of the Departments of State and Justice,  including the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We selected five of these countries because  they were the first countries whose participation in the program was being  evaluated by the Departments of Justice and State. We selected the sixth  country, Spain, to provide a perspective on countries that had not been  evaluated. To assess the economic importance and implications of  international tourism, we reviewed official travel data for 1991–2001 and a  2002 report commissioned by the Department of Commerce. To estimate  the costs that the Department of State would incur if the Visa Waiver  Program were eliminated, we developed a model using Department of State  workload and staffing data and information on biometrics. (See app. I for a  more detailed description of our scope and methodology.)
At the time of the publication of this report, the House of Representatives  and the Senate had passed similar versions of a bill to establish a new  Department of Homeland Security. Under these bills, visa policy-making  authority would be transferred to the new department, while the  administration of visas would be retained by the Department of State.  Some of the issues addressed in this report may become the responsibility  of this new department.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to the program’s legislative history, the Visa Waiver Pilot  Program was created, in part, to improve U.S. foreign relations and to  promote effective use of State Department‘s resources. It was also  intended to facilitate international travel, without posing a threat to the  welfare or security of the United States, and thereby to increase the  number of foreign travelers to the United States. In addition, according to a  statement by President Clinton, the program allowed the State Department  to reallocate scarce department resources from the issuing of visas in low- risk countries to higher priority needs such as visa screening in high-fraud  areas. The law that created the Visa Waiver Pilot Program required that  before implementing the program, the Attorney General establish an  automated arrival and departure tracking system (see page 15 for a  discussion of this system). The law also required that the Attorney General  produce a special arrival and departure form for travelers seeking to enter  the United States under the program, which was made permanent in 2000.  Persons traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program must  have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a  national of that country;  be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor;   have their identity checked at the U.S. port of entry against an  automated electronic database containing information about the  inadmissibility of aliens, to uncover any grounds on which the alien may  be inadmissible to the United States, with no such ground found;   have been determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service  (INS) at the U.S. port of entry to represent no threat to the welfare,  health, safety, or security of the United States;   have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the  program (e.g., stayed in the United States for 90 days or less);   if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation ticket issued  by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S. government to  participate in the program and must have arrived in the United States  aboard such a carrier; and   if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile  abroad to which he or she intends to return.
In addition, the applicant must present a completed and signed visa waiver  arrival and departure form on which he or she waives the right to a hearing,  other than on the basis of an application for asylum, if INS denies the  applicant entry into the United States. All foreign visitors, whether they  have visas or are seeking to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver  Program, undergo inspections conducted by INS inspectors at U.S. airports  and seaports. These inspections are intended to ensure that only  admissible persons enter the United States. The INS inspectors observe the  applicant, examine his or her passport, and check his or her name against  an automated database that contains information regarding the  admissibility of aliens.
Table 1 lists the visa waiver countries, the year each country entered the  program, and the numbers of arrivals to the United States under the  program in 2000.
section_title: Recent Legislative Requirements Could Affect Countries’ Participation in the Visa Waiver Program
paragraphs: The Visa Waiver Program Act includes criteria that a country must fulfill to  be eligible for nomination for, and continued participation in, the program.  Justice and State have established a draft protocol based on these criteria  that spells out the procedures that the agencies must follow in nominating  a country and for assessing participating countries to ensure that they  continue to pose a low risk to U.S. security. The Attorney General, in  consultation with the Secretary of State, may also immediately terminate a  country’s participation in the Visa Waiver Program in the event of an  emergency that threatens U.S. law enforcement or security interests.  Legislation enacted after September 11, 2001, added more requirements for  countries to remain eligible to participate in the program, but full, timely  implementation of these requirements is uncertain.
subsections: section_title: Nomination Process Assesses Countries’ Eligibility to Join the Program
paragraphs: To comply with laws intended to ensure that countries’ participation in the  Visa Waiver Program does not threaten U.S. security and interests, the  Departments of State and Justice have established a draft protocol that  spells out procedures to assess countries’ eligibility to be admitted to the  program. The procedures are comprehensive and cover a variety of  security concerns, including patterns of passport and visa fraud,  assessments of terrorism within the country, and assessments of law  enforcement practices. An Interagency Working Group comprising  representatives from Justice, including the INS, and from State, including  the Bureau of Consular Affairs, developed the protocol. Although the  protocol is in draft, the agencies have used it to assess some countries’  eligibility. (See fig. 1.)
As shown in figure 1, State initiates the process of adding countries to the  program by advising Justice of its intent to nominate a country for  inclusion in the program. State may nominate a country only after it has  determined that the country   has a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for its citizens who apply for  U.S. nonimmigrant visitor visas (ranging from less than 2 percent to less  than 3 percent depending on the years assessed),  has the ability to supply machine-readable passports to its citizens or is  in the process of developing such passports, and  offers visa-free travel for U.S. citizens and nationals.
The protocol requires State to provide Justice with information on the  nominated country, including  patterns of passport fraud, visa fraud, and visa abuse over the past 5   assessments of terrorism within or outside the country by the country’s   evaluations of the impact of the country’s participation on U.S. national  security and law enforcement.
Various Justice components—including the law enforcement agencies (for  example, INS and the FBI), Criminal Division, and Office of Intelligence  Policy and Review—review the nomination, focusing on the effect that the  country’s inclusion would have on U.S. law enforcement and national  security. If no clearly disqualifying objections are raised during this review,  the Secretary of State submits a formal written nomination to the Attorney  General. After a country’s formal nomination, INS leads a team of  representatives from interested agencies to visit the nominated country.  The team reviews the country’s  political, social, and economic conditions;  security over its passport and national identity documents;   immigration and nationality laws, law enforcement policies and  practices, and other matters relevant to law enforcement, immigration,  and national security.
On the basis of the review and site visit, the Interagency Working Group  submits a recommendation to the Attorney General, who, in consultation  with the Secretary of State, then decides whether to admit the country to  the program.
section_title: Evaluation Process Assesses Country’s Continued Participation
paragraphs: The protocol includes an evaluation process, similar to the nomination  process, for periodically assessing the effect on U.S. law enforcement and  security interests of each country’s continued participation in the Visa  Waiver Program. INS is primarily responsible for these evaluations. It  obtains information from a number of other agencies, including State and  intelligence agencies, and other components of Justice. These evaluations  assess the status of factors reviewed during the nomination process,  including       whether the rate at which visa waiver applicants are refused entry at  U.S. ports of entry exceeds specific numerical targets;  demographic, economic, political, and social trends in the program   the security of the country’s procedures for issuing passports; and  legal issues, including how foreign nationals acquire citizenship, law  enforcement considerations, national security (including information on  terrorism), and other matters.
The areas evaluated involve more qualitative than quantitative  assessments. For example, INS examines the security of processes for  issuing passports but uses no quantitative criteria in assessing the process.  However, the protocol does allow the Attorney General, in determining a  country’s risk level, to consider quantifiable data. Such data may include  comparisons between the denial rates of persons presenting passports  purported to have been lawfully issued by a particular visa waiver country  and the denial rates of individuals traveling from the same country with  nonimmigrant visas.
INS has completed the assessments of five countries: Argentina, Belgium,  Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia. The assessment of Uruguay is still pending.  INS selected the countries for assessment on the basis of specific security  concerns. For example, INS selected Argentina because of the economic  crisis and political instability in the country; the Attorney General  subsequently removed Argentina from the program because of those  problems. INS selected Belgium because of repeated thefts of blank  Belgian passports. INS accelerated the scheduling of the evaluations after  the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. However, although INS  completed the field visits to the countries in December 2001, it did not send  the finalized reports with recommendations to Justice until September  2002. The next step in the evaluation process is for the Attorney General, in  consultation with the Secretary of State, to decide whether each country  should remain in the program or its participation should be terminated.
section_title: Attorney General May Immediately Terminate a Country’s Participation
paragraphs: The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may also  immediately terminate a country’s participation in the Visa Waiver Program  in the event of an emergency that threatens U.S. law enforcement or  security interests. The law defines emergencies as  the overthrow of a democratically elected government;  war (including undeclared war, civil war, or other military activity) in   a severe breakdown in law and order affecting a significant portion of  the program country’s territory;  a severe economic collapse in the program country; or  any other extraordinary event in the program country that threatens the  law enforcement or security interests of the United States.
On February 20, 2002, the Attorney General used this emergency provision  to remove Argentina from the Visa Waiver Program because of the  country’s economic crisis, which had raised concerns that the number of  Argentines illegally immigrating to the United States would increase. INS  had reported an increase in the number of Argentine nationals attempting  to remain illegally in the United States after their 90-day period of  admission had expired.
section_title: Recent Laws Affect Process for Assessing Eligibility, but Full, Timely Implementation Uncertain
paragraphs: Laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affect the  process for determining countries’ eligibility to participate in the Visa  Waiver Program. These laws cover passport requirements for visa waiver  countries and reemphasize the requirement for the Attorney General to  establish a system to monitor peoples’ entry into and exit from the United  States. However, it is unclear whether Justice and State will fully  implement these requirements by the deadlines called for under U.S. law.
First, regarding passports, the October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act advanced to  October 1, 2003, the deadline for the requirement that travelers from  participating countries wishing to enter the United States under the Visa  Waiver Program must submit a machine-readable passport. Subsequently,  the May 2002 Enhanced Border Security Act stated that to remain in the  program, a visa waiver country must certify, by October 26, 2004, that it has  a program to issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable passports that  contain biometric and document authentication identifiers. With the  exception of Switzerland and San Marino, all participating countries are  issuing machine-readable passports, but none issue passports that have  biometric identifiers, according to State. Some State and law enforcement  officials in Europe and the United States questioned whether countries  participating in the Visa Waiver Program would be able to certify by  October 2004 that they can issue passports with acceptable biometric  identifiers—particularly since there is not yet an international standard for  biometric identifiers. The Act required that the biometric identifiers  comply with standards established by the International Civil Aviation  Organization. Representatives of several countries, including the United  States, Visa Waiver Program participating countries, and members of the  European Union (EU), have met to work toward developing  recommendations on minimum standards for the application of biometrics  in procedures and documents by the spring of 2003. However, responding  to a State inquiry to visa waiver countries about their plans to issue  passports with biometric identifiers, only 3 of 17 countries had said as of  October 2002 that they would meet the deadline. State plans to incorporate  this information into a report to the Congress on the status of countries’  efforts to include biometric identifiers in their passports. State officials  also told us that in response to the U.S. requirement, European countries  might require U.S. passports to have biometric identifiers. For the system  to be effective in increasing U.S. national security, INS will need to install  machines capable of reading the biometric identifiers at each U.S. port of  entry, of which there are about 390. However, until countries decide which  biometrics they will include in their passport, INS may have a difficult time  ensuring that all ports will have machines that can read the various  biometric identifiers by October 2004.
Additionally, the Enhanced Border Security Act conditioned participation  in the Visa Waiver Program on a country’s timely reporting of its stolen  blank passports to the United States. INS has described problems with  countries’ timely reporting of stolen blank passports, and the Justice  Inspector General concluded that INS does not have a mechanism to  provide systematic, consistent, and timely information about missing  passports to its inspectors. A State official testified that although this  requirement probably will not apply to countries until they are certified for continued participation in the program, State is discussing this requirement  with all countries.
Finally, INS has not yet developed an automated nonimmigrant entry–exit  control system to screen and monitor the arrival and departure of foreign  visitors entering the United States as temporary visitors. Congress has  passed several laws requiring the Attorney General to implement such a  system and has extended the implementation deadline several times. For  example, the 1986 law creating the Visa Waiver Pilot Program required, as a  condition of implementing the program, that an automated nonimmigrant  entry–exit control system to monitor aliens using the program be  established.   The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act reiterated the  requirement, directing that the system be implemented no later than 2001.    INS decided to use an existing automated border inspections system in  conjunction with its arrival–departure system to meet this requirement.  The arrival–departure system includes passenger information  electronically transmitted by air and sea carriers that have an agreement  with INS to transport aliens to the United States. INS began using this  system on October 1, 2002. An INS official recently testified that this new  initiative implements the requirements that had been set forth in the Visa  Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000.
Also, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of  1996 required an entry–exit system that covered all nonimmigrant visitors,  not solely those traveling under the Visa Waiver Program. This act  required the Attorney General to develop an automated entry–exit system  within 2 years of the law’s enactment to collect a record of departure for  every alien departing the United States and match the record of departure  with the record of the alien’s arrival in the United States. Subsequently,  Congress extended the deadline to implement the system at all U.S. ports of  entry to December 31, 2005. After the terrorist attacks of September 11,  2001, the effectiveness of monitoring nonimmigrant visitors came under  additional scrutiny, as authorities considered how to identify and locate  terrorists who might be in the United States. As a result, new laws have  again directed the Attorney General to establish an integrated entry–exit  system. INS and other agencies, including the U.S. Customs Service, State,  and the Transportation Security Agency, are working together to develop  the system. According to Justice, INS has established a multiagency task  force to coordinate all activity associated with the establishment of the  entry–exit system. The systems established as part of the Visa Waiver  Program, as well as a system launched on September 11, 2002, to collect  fingerprints and a photograph from a specific population, are the first step  in the development of the entry–exit system.
section_title: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program Are Uncertain
paragraphs: The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the program are  uncertain; however, eliminating the program could negatively affect U.S.  relations with participating country governments, impede tourism to the  United States, and increase the need for State personnel and facilities  overseas. According to the program’s legislative history, Congress  established the program, in part, to facilitate travel by citizens from  countries that the Attorney General and Secretary of State determined to  pose low risk to U.S. national security. Data showing the extent to which  the program has been exploited are limited, and U.S. government officials  expressed differing opinions about the effect of the program on U.S.  national security.
subsections: section_title: Implications for National Security Are Unclear
paragraphs: The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa Waiver  Program are not clear. While Justice has not systematically collected data  on how frequently potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the  United States, anecdotal information indicates that such individuals have  entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with  valid U.S. visas.   State Department and U.S. law enforcement officials’  opinions varied on the effect of the Visa Waiver Program on U.S. national  security.   Some law enforcement agency officials said that the Visa Waiver  Program negatively affects U.S. national security and that eliminating the  program and requiring visas from current visa waiver travelers would  increase national security. Other officials from Justice and State asserted  that unless the current visa-screening process is improved, for example, by  increased information sharing among U.S. agencies, the effect of the  program on U.S. national security is not certain.
subsections: section_title: Limited Data Available to Show Extent to Which the Program Is Exploited
paragraphs: Justice has not systematically collected data on the extent to which  terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States under the Visa  Waiver Program or committed crimes while in the country. The FBI  operates a nationwide information system dedicated to serving and  supporting local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies. This system  contains 17 databases with information on, among other things, stolen  articles, foreign fugitives, gangs and terrorist members, and wanted  persons. However, crime statistics collected by the FBI do not capture the  criminals’ immigration status. Also, the data that INS collects on aliens it  has removed from the United States for committing crimes include some  information on aliens’ immigration status. According to INS data, 204  (about 0.3 percent) of the 69,580 criminals removed from the United States  during fiscal year 2002 entered under the Visa Waiver Program. The Drug  Enforcement Agency maintains information on domestic drug arrests by  country that shows the arrestees’ country of nationality but not their  immigration status.
While Justice has not systematically collected data on how frequently  potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States,  anecdotal information indicates that such persons have entered the United  States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with a valid U.S. visa. For  example, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national whom the United States  indicted as a co-conspirator in the attacks of September 11, 2001, entered  the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, and the 19 individuals  who carried out the attacks entered with valid U.S. visas.
U.S. law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at posts  overseas expressed different opinions about the effect of the Visa Waiver  Program on U.S. national security. Some INS and other law enforcement  agency officials said that the Visa Waiver Program can facilitate illegal  entry into the United States by inadmissible aliens, including terrorists and  other criminals, because under the program such individuals avoid the  screening that consular officers usually perform on visa applicants abroad.  The lack of consular screening makes the program attractive to  inadmissible aliens, according to INS officials. Aliens traveling to the  United States under the Visa Waiver Program are first screened when INS  inspectors interview them for admission at the U.S. port of entry. These  inspectors have little time to screen each person entering the United States,  according to a report by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector  General. INS inspectors reported that terrorists and criminals who were  intercepted had attempted to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver  Program—rather than applying for a U.S. visa abroad—because they  believed it would give them a greater chance of entering the country.  Some officials in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. embassies in Argentina  and Uruguay said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program would increase  national security, because the visa-screening process is an additional tool  to deter terrorists from entering the United States. One Justice official  stated that the Visa Waiver Program is clearly a vulnerability and that  eliminating the program would increase national security, but at a high cost  in terms of the effect on State resources and U.S. tourism.
Other law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at the  U.S. embassies in Belgium, Italy, and Spain questioned whether eliminating  the Visa Waiver Program and requiring visas would increase national  security. They agreed that the visa-screening process could serve as an  additional tool to screen out terrorists but only to the extent that State had  the necessary overseas resources, including relevant information on  potential terrorists and sufficient staff and facilities to interview all or most  visa applicants. They said that if current visa waiver travelers were  required to apply for visas and State’s current resource levels were not  increased, consular officers would be inundated with paperwork for  routine and low-risk cases and would become less effective and alert in  dealing with cases needing additional scrutiny.   The officials emphasized  that better, timely information and improved data sharing on inadmissible  aliens among U.S. law enforcement, border control, and intelligence  agencies are essential to improving U.S. national security.
section_title: Eliminating the Program Could Affect U.S. Relations with Participating Country Governments
paragraphs: U.S. officials, including those from State as well as from some law  enforcement agencies, said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could  have negative implications for U.S. relations with governments of  participating countries and could impair their cooperation in efforts to  combat terrorism.
Some allies are cooperating significantly in matters ranging from providing  military personnel and access to air bases to support Operation Enduring  Freedom in Afghanistan to freezing terrorists’ financial assets. Examples  are as follows:   Visa waiver countries have provided political and military support to  Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to the International  Security Assistance Force, which is to help the new Afghan Interim  Authority provide security and stability in Kabul. The United Kingdom,  France, Italy, Germany, Australia, Japan, and other visa waiver countries  partnered with the United States in military operations to expel the  Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan, according to government  reports.
EU member states vigorously supported U.S. efforts in the United  Nations to adopt strong resolutions against terrorism and U.S. efforts to  persuade third countries to resist terrorism.
Visa waiver countries have also increased their law enforcement efforts.
The EU strengthened member states’ ability to take action against  terrorists and their supporters—including freezing their assets. The EU  reported that between September 11, 2001, and June 3, 2002, about $100  million of assets belonging to persons and entities sponsoring terrorist actions was frozen throughout the EU. Since September 11, 2001,  authorities in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United  Kingdom have arrested supporters of al Qaeda and other extremist  groups. Also, according to State, Italian authorities arrested the leader  of the group suspected of plotting to bomb the U.S. embassy in Rome.  The government of Singapore detained 13 members of a terrorist group  in December 2001, thereby disrupting a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy  there.
Some U.S. embassy and law enforcement agency officials expressed  concern that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could lessen countries’  cooperation in military and law enforcement operations related to the  global coalition against terrorism. Participating countries may see their  loss of visa waiver status as a sign that the United States views them as  untrustworthy—more as security risks than as allies.
If the United States decides to eliminate visa waiver status for participating  countries, those countries’ governments could begin requiring Americans  to obtain visas before visiting their countries. For example, if the United  States requires a national from an EU member country to obtain a visa  before entering the United States for 90 days or less, the EU may institute a  provisional requirement that U.S. citizens obtain a visa before entering any  of the EU member countries. Thereafter, if the U.S. visa policy continues,  the EU Council may amend regulations to make the visa requirement  permanent.
section_title: Eliminating the Program Could Affect U.S. Tourism
paragraphs: As previously mentioned, Congress created the Visa Waiver Program, in  part, to facilitate international travel and thereby increase the number of  foreign travelers to the United States. A large proportion of international  tourists to the United States comes from Visa Waiver Program countries.  From 1991 to 2000, in terms of both the number of travelers and dollars  spent, tourism from visa waiver countries accounted for more than half of  the overseas visitor market. Visa waiver travelers generally spend more  than other international travelers, and their spending helps to balance the  U.S. trade accounts. Because of direct and indirect economic contributions  from visa waiver travel, elimination of the Visa Waiver Program is a  concern for the travel and tourism industry. One study commissioned by  the Department of Commerce in 2002 estimated that discontinuation of the  Visa Waiver Program will cost the U.S. economy more than $28 billion in  tourism exports from 2003 to 2007.
Travelers from visa waiver countries to the United States totaled  approximately 17.6 million in 2000 and 14.7 million in 2001, according to  the Commerce Department. As a share of total international arrivals,  travelers from visa waiver countries grew from 25 percent in 1992 to 35  percent in 2000 (see fig. 2). Excluding arrivals from Canada and Mexico,  the share of overseas arrivals from visa waiver countries has averaged 68  percent in the last 5 years.
Using data from Commerce and the Travel Industry Association of  America, we calculated that in 2000, travelers from visa waiver countries  spent an estimated $39.6 billion in the United States, accounting for 57  percent of overseas tourist spending. Average spending per traveler from  visa waiver countries in 2000 was $2,253, compared with $1,274 per traveler  for other international tourists to the United States. A range of estimates  from Commerce, the Travel Industry Association of America, and the World  Travel and Tourism Council indicate that visa waiver travelers’ direct and  indirect spending within the United States added between $75 billion and  $102 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product in 2000. According to the  Travel Industry Association of America, international tourism provides  more than one million U.S. jobs, of which more than 60 percent are located  in Florida, California, New York, and Hawaii. The association also  estimates that in 2001, U.S. spending generated from international tourism  contributed $16 billion in tax revenues.
The Department of Commerce commissioned a study in 2002 on the  economic effect of the Visa Waiver Program and estimated that, over a 5-year period, eliminating the program could result in a loss of 3 million  visitors, $28 billion in tourism exports, and 475,000 jobs. The estimates of  this study, together with anecdotal information, support the likelihood of a  negative effect on tourism. According to the Travel Industry Association of  America, the Visa Waiver Program enhances the competitiveness of the  U.S. market as an international destination and elimination of the program  could divert tourists to other destinations that do not require a visa for  entry. Foreign Commercial Service Officers in Belgium and Spain reported  visas to be a significant impediment to travel demand. State officials agreed  that visas are an impediment to both tourist and business travel and added  that any additional requirements, such as the collection of biometric  indicators, could further discourage travel to the United States. The World  Travel and Tourism Council and the World Tourism Organization also view  visa requirements as an important factor in determining levels of tourism.
section_title: Eliminating the Program Would Increase the Need for State Department Resources
paragraphs: Should the Congress decide to require visas from current visa waiver  travelers, State would require more resources, such as personnel and  facilities overseas, to handle the resulting increased visa processing and  biometric collection workload. State estimates that if the individuals now  traveling under the Visa Waiver Program were required to obtain visas, the  number of applications would rise by 14 million. We estimated that State’s  initial costs to process the additional workload would likely range between  $739 million and $1.28 billion, and annual recurring costs would likely  range between $522 million and $810 million. The ranges of our cost  estimates are large because they reflect the uncertainty of key variables in  our cost estimating model, such as costs for consular personnel, space, and supplies; the percentage of visa applicants that State interviews; and the  method by which State collects biometrics. Given this uncertainty, actual  costs could vary significantly.
To estimate the costs of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, we created a  cost model that included information on a number of variables such as  workload and staffing data (e.g., personnel and facility costs) from State’s  Bureau of Consular Affairs and the time and costs involved in collecting  biometrics. We used our model to forecast a range for both additional  initial and recurring costs. Consistent with State assumptions, we assumed  a “low” interview rate of 10 percent (about 1.4 million applicants) and a  “high” interview rate of 95 percent (about 13.3 million applicants). (See  app. I for more details of our methodology and assumptions.)
Figure 3 shows estimated initial costs to State if the Visa Waiver Program  were eliminated. These costs include elements such as hiring, training, and  moving new consular personnel; installing additional equipment to collect  and store biometrics; and building or renovating facilities in all visa waiver  posts.
We estimated that if State were to interview 10 percent of all visa  applicants, initial costs would likely range from $739 million to $821  million. If State were to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants, initial  costs would likely range from $1.12 billion to $1.28 billion.
Figure 4 shows annual recurring costs, which include elements such as  consular personnel salaries, biometric hardware and software  maintenance, facility leasing and maintenance, and supplies.
If State were to interview 10 percent of all visa applicants, recurring costs  would likely range from $522 million to $587 million. If State were to  interview 95 percent of all visa applicants, recurring costs would likely  range from $723 million to $810 million. For fiscal year 2003, State  requested $3.36 billion for ongoing operations related to diplomatic and  consular programs, including the operation of all overseas facilities.
It could take at least 2 to 4 years to put the necessary people and facilities  in place to handle the increased workload, according to State officials.  Using State’s staffing and workload assumptions, we estimated that the  department would need, in addition to the approximately 840 Foreign  Service officers who are currently overseas, more than 350 additional  Foreign Service officers to handle the extra nonimmigrant visa workload if  required to interview 10 percent of all applicants and more than 800  additional officers if required to interview 95 percent of all applicants.  According to consular officials, hiring Foreign Service officers and training  them for general Foreign Service and languages could take a year or more.  It could take several months to hire Foreign Service nationals, depending  on the availability of qualified candidates and their ability to pass the  security background check. In cases where a significant number of new  consular staff were added and new facilities were acquired, posts might  also need to employ administrative staff such as human resource  managers, post security guards, and additional facilities management and  maintenance staff.
A portion of the initial and recurring costs shown in figures 3 and 4 would  be used for new or renovated facilities that the post would need in order to  process an increased number of nonimmigrant visa applications. In some  countries, including but not limited to Belgium, France, Italy, Slovenia,  Spain, and the United Kingdom, State would need additional work and  waiting room space to process applications; this could involve acquiring  new facilities or reopening and renovating additional posts for the  nonimmigrant visa workload. For example, in Italy, State officials said  that they would need to renovate or reopen facilities in Naples, Sicily,  Rome, Milan, and Florence. In some U.S. embassies, such as those in  Slovenia and Uruguay, available space would have to be adapted for  processing the additional workload. Identifying, procuring, and fitting out  lease space can take 24 to 48 months, on average, according to State  officials.
State officials in most countries we visited and analysts in Washington said  that until they acquired additional space for handling nonimmigrant visas,  there would be long lines of visa applicants waiting outside the current  posts, posing a potential security threat for both the applicants and U.S.  embassy officials. Also, if additional space was acquired in unsecured  buildings separate from the embassy, personnel working in such buildings  would be put at risk until the space was upgraded for security. A U.S.  ambassador pointed out that acquiring additional space for visas would  conflict with the department’s efforts to consolidate Americans into joint  space to improve their security and protect them.
Although revenues from the surcharge for machine-readable visas would  not cover the additional initial costs related to the elimination of the Visa  Waiver Program, State could cover additional recurring costs over time.  To pay for the costs associated with the processing and issuing of machine- readable visas and with State’s Border Security Program, State currently  charges applicants a $65 fee each time they apply for a machine-readable  visa. On November 1, 2002, State increased the fee to $100 to compensate  for increases in the actual cost of providing visa service. State officials have  not determined how they will fund the costs of collecting biometrics. The  options they have discussed include requesting an appropriation from the  Congress, passing the cost to the visa applicant, or a combination of the  two.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Justice Department and the State Department provided written  comments on a draft of our report. These comments, along with our  responses to specific points, are reprinted in appendixes II and III.
Justice expressed optimism that the requirements of recent border security  laws will be met. Specifically, Justice stated that it does not anticipate  significant delays in the incorporation of standardized, machine-verifiable  biometrics in the national passports of most Visa Waiver Program  countries. We continue to believe, however, that some countries may be  unable to add biometrics to their passports by the 2004 deadline. Our  assessment is based on the statements of U.S. State Department and law  enforcement officials as well as the responses from several Visa Waiver  Program countries concerning their ability to issue passports with  biometrics.
Justice also stated that our discussion of the entry–exit system leaves the  impression that implementation of the system is not moving forward. We  acknowledge that INS is taking steps to implement the system, and we have  added information on INS’s progress to the report. However, the report  points also out that an entry–exit system covering all nonimmigrant  travelers to the United States has been required since 1996.
State generally concurred with the report and stated that our comments on  the Visa Waiver Program are in keeping with its assessment of the  implications and costs resulting from a blanket suspension of the program.  However, State expressed concern that the report did not discuss the  border inspection process at the U.S. port of entry as an alternative  solution to the visa application process to address perceived weaknesses in  the program. We acknowledge the importance of the inspection process for  aliens seeking to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as  well as with visas. We have added a discussion of the inspection process to  the report. The Justice Department Inspector General and GAO have work  under way that will provide a more thorough assessment of the border  inspection process.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the  Commissioner of the INS, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland  Security. We will make copies available to others on request. In addition,  the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128. Additional GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To describe the process for assessing countries’ eligibility to participate in  the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws establishing the program,  relevant congressional reports, regulations and agency protocols governing  the program, Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports,  and other relevant documents. To assess steps being taken to increase the  requirements for the program and enhance U.S. border security, we  reviewed recent laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the Enhanced  Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Departments of State  and Justice reports, and recent GAO reports.
To describe U.S. national security issues related to the Visa Waiver  Program, we reviewed Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data  on terrorists who entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program  as well as with valid visas. We reviewed State, INS, Federal Bureau of  Investigations (FBI), and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) data and  databases on inadmissible aliens, the immigration status of criminals, the  number of aliens refused entry to the United States, and the reasons aliens  were refused entry. We also examined Justice officials’ testimony before  Congress, the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, and  GAO’s report Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an  Antiterrorism Tool. Given the limited amount of data addressing this issue,  we interviewed officials from State, including the Bureaus of Consular  Affairs and Diplomatic Security, and Justice, including the INS, FBI, and  DEA in the United States and in Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain,  and Uruguay. We selected five of these countries because they were the  first countries whose participation in the program was being evaluated by  the Departments of Justice and State. We selected the sixth country, Spain,  to provide a perspective on countries that had not been evaluated. We  discussed with U.S. officials their views about whether eliminating the Visa  Waiver Program would increase U.S. national security.
To describe the importance of the Visa Waiver Program to U.S. relations  with other countries, we reviewed government reports, including the U.S.  Department of Defense’s Fact Sheet: International Contributions to the  War Against Terrorism, the State Department’s Patterns of Global  Terrorism—2001, and the U.K. Coalition Information Centre’s Campaign  Against Terrorism: A Coalition Update. We reviewed European Union  documents, including European Council positions and regulations. We also  interviewed officials from the Departments of State, including the Bureaus  of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, and Justice, including the INS,  FBI, and DEA in the United States and in Argentina, Belgium, Italy,  Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay. We discussed with them whether eliminating  countries’ participation in the Visa Waiver Program could affect U.S.  relations with those countries and, if so, what the effects might be. Because  of the sensitivity of the issues, in four of the six countries, the State  Department requested that we not meet with representatives from other  countries’ governments or chambers of commerce. We met with the  governments of Argentina and Uruguay and with the American Chamber of  Commerce in Argentina.
To determine whether requiring citizens of visa waiver countries to obtain  visas would affect their decision to travel to the United States, we  examined the existing economic literature on tourism and interviewed  industry experts. We interviewed officials from State, Foreign Commercial  Service Officers in overseas posts, the Department of Commerce’s Office of  Travel and Tourism Industries, the Travel Industry Association of America,  the World Travel and Tourism Council, and the World Tourism  Organization. To determine the contribution of travel from visa waiver  countries to the U.S. economy, we reviewed official travel data for 1991– 2001 from Commerce, a 2002 study from Commerce, and data from the  Travel Industry Association of America and the World Travel and Tourism  Council.
To determine the potential effects that requiring visas and biometrics from  current visa waiver travelers would have on State’s resources, we created a  cost estimating model using workload and staffing data from State’s Bureau  of Consular Affairs and information on the time and costs involved in  collecting biometrics. Such information included analogies to the  Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, averages of  biometric vendor costs, expert opinions from the field of biometrics, and  cost estimates developed by the International Biometrics Group. We  conducted a simulation that varied the cost estimating model  approximately 1,000 times with information on variables such as personnel  and facility costs to forecast a range for both initial and recurring costs.  During our simulation, costs fell below the top of the shaded areas in  Figures 3 and 4 in the report 90 percent of the time, while costs fell below  the bottom of the shaded areas only 10 percent of the time. In other words,  80 percent of the times we varied our simulation, costs fell within our  reported ranges. We chose to report large ranges of cost estimates to  reflect the uncertainty of key variables in our cost estimating model, such  as costs for consular personnel, space, and supplies; the percentage of visa  applicants that State interviews; and the method by which State collects biometrics.We based our estimates on the following assumptions:  All costs were expressed in constant fiscal 2002 dollars.
The amount of additional visa applications for current visa waiver  travelers would remain about 14 million per year.
Cost estimates provided to us by State, such as Foreign Service national  salaries and leasing and maintenance fees, could vary by about 10  percent, barring unforeseen circumstances.
The ratio of Foreign Service nationals needed to assist each Foreign  Service officer with nonimmigrant visa processing is 2.5 to 1 but can  vary between 2 and 4 to 1.
Under a “low interview” scenario, State would interview 10 percent of  all visa applicants and, under a “high interview” scenario, State would  interview 95 percent of all visa applicants. Estimates are based on a 4- minute interview.
Consular officers would capture four flat fingerprints from each visa  applicant at the embassy or consulate and would store the biometric  data in a separate memory storage card from the visa.
Resources would be in place at all visa-issuing posts to collect  biometrics for the current 10.3 million visa applications.
Some Foreign Service nationals would spend time both processing visa  applications and collecting biometrics.
Visa applicants whom State must interview would visit the embassy to  be interviewed and have their biometrics collected on the same day.
We also met with consular officials at the U.S. consulate in Buenos Aires,  Argentina, to determine the effect that the elimination of the Visa Waiver  Program had on their staff and facility levels.   Similarly, we met with  consular officials in U.S. consulates in Brussels, Belgium; Rome, Italy;  Ljubljana, Slovenia; Madrid, Spain; and Montevideo, Uruguay, to determine  how the elimination of the Visa Waiver Program would affect their  resources.
We performed our work from February 2002 through August 2002, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Justice
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice’s letter  dated November 4, 2002.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.
Justice stated that it does not anticipate significant delays in the  incorporation of standardized, machine-verifiable biometrics in the  national passports of most Visa Waiver Program countries. We believe  that some countries may not be able to establish programs to issue the  passports by the 2004 deadline. Our assessment is based on the  statements of U.S. State Department and law enforcement officials in  Europe and the United States. Moreover, our concern is supported by  additional information that we subsequently obtained from the State  Department. As of October 2002, State found that only 3 of the 17  countries discussing their plans for issuing biometric passports would  meet the deadline. Most of the respondents stated that they did not  know if they would meet the deadline. Some of these respondents cited  the lack of an international standard as a reason for the uncertainty.
2.
Justice also commented that our discussion of the entry–exit system  leaves the impression that implementation of the system is not moving  forward. We acknowledge that INS has implemented systems, as of  October 1, 2002, to fulfill the requirement for an automated system to  monitor the entry and exit of aliens under the Visa Waiver Program. We  have added this information to the report. However, we note that there  have been delays in implementing the entry–exit system for Visa Waiver  Program travelers. Implementation of such a system has been required  since 1986. However, the report also points out that an entry–exit  system covering all nonimmigrant travelers to the United States has  been required since 1996. Moreover, the Justice Inspector General has  reported that completion of the entire entry–exit system will take  several years.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated November 7, 2002.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. State commented that the discussion of Zacarias Moussaoui should  include more details. We do not believe additional details are necessary.  We discussed Moussaoui and the 19 individuals who carried out the  attacks of September 11, 2001, merely as examples of anecdotal  evidence about terrorists entering the United States under the Visa  Waiver Program and with visas. 2. State commented that the draft report did not provide detailed  information on the border inspection process. State also commented  that the draft report overemphasizes the visa application as a solution  to perceived weaknesses of the Visa Waver Program and overlooks the  possibility that these weaknesses could be resolved through changes in  border inspection procedures or other means. We acknowledge the  importance of the inspection process for aliens seeking to enter the  United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with visas. We  have added a discussion of the inspection process to the report. The  Justice Department Inspector General and GAO are conducting more  thorough assessments of the border inspection process.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the persons named above, Lyric Clark, Kendall Schafer,  Bruce Kutnick, Mary Moutsos, and Reid Lowe made key contributions to  this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
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