Military Readiness: DOD's Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan
Published: 2016-09-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: For over a decade, DOD deployed forces to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is now supporting increased presence in the Pacific and emerging crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. These deployments have significantly stressed the force.
The House Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that GAO review DOD's efforts to rebuild military readiness. This report (1) describes the factors that affect reported readiness levels and DOD's efforts to manage the impact of deployments on readiness, and (2) assesses DOD's implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts. This report is a public version of a previously issued classified product and omits information DOD identified as SECRET, which must be protected from public disclosure.
GAO analyzed and reviewed data on reported readiness rates and departmental readiness rebuilding efforts. GAO interviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and combatant command officials regarding current demand and readiness rates and challenges with rebuilding military readiness. GAO also conducted separate reviews of the readiness of the military services.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and force structure reductions have degraded military readiness, and the department has efforts under way to manage the impact of deployments on readiness. The military services have reported persistently low readiness levels, which they have attributed to emerging and continued demands on their forces, reduced force structure, and increased frequency and length of deployments. For example, the Air Force experienced a 58 percent decrease in the number of fighter and bomber squadrons from 1991 to 2015 while maintaining a persistent level of demand from the combatant commands for the use of its forces. In addition, the Navy has experienced an 18 percent decrease in its fleet of ships since 1998 and an increase in demand, resulting in the deployment lengths for many ships increasing from 7 months to a less sustainable 9 months. DOD officials have indicated that overall demand has been decreasing since 2013, but the department has reported that the ability to rebuild capability and capacity is hindered by continued demand for some forces. To mitigate the impact of continued deployments on readiness, the Joint Staff has focused on balancing the distribution of forces for high-priority missions with the need to rebuild the readiness of the force. Efforts include revising major plans to better reflect what the current and planned force is expected to achieve and improving the management of DOD's process for sourcing global demands by, among other things, balancing the supply of forces with the minimum required to meet global demands. However, it is too soon to tell what impact implementation of these initiatives will have on DOD's readiness recovery efforts because the department is still working to complete implementation.
DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, but implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts have not fully included key elements of sound planning, putting the rebuilding efforts at risk. Key elements of sound planning for results-oriented outcomes include a mission statement supported by long-term goals, strategies for achieving the goals, metrics, and an evaluation plan to determine the appropriateness of the goals and effectiveness of implemented strategies. In 2014, DOD tasked the military services to develop plans for rebuilding readiness. Each service developed a plan based on the force elements that were experiencing a high pace of deployments or facing challenges in achieving readiness recovery. In 2015, the services reported their readiness rebuilding plans to DOD, which identified readiness goals and timeframes for achieving them, but these goals were incomplete and some of the timeframes have been extended. GAO found that the services have also not defined comprehensive strategies, with the resources required for achieving the identified goals, nor have they fully assessed the effect of external factors such as maintenance and training on readiness rebuilding goals. Moreover, the services have not fully established metrics that the department can use to oversee readiness rebuilding efforts and evaluate progress towards achieving the identified goals. Without DOD incorporating key elements of sound planning into recovery efforts, and amid competing priorities that the department must balance, successful implementation of readiness recovery plans may be at risk.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making five recommendations, including that DOD and the services establish comprehensive readiness goals and strategies for implementing them, as well as associated metrics that can be used to evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving intended outcomes. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The fundamental purpose of the military is to fight and win our nation’s  conflicts, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has recognized the  negative impact that more than a decade of deployments in support of  counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has had on the  readiness of the force. Consequently, DOD has made rebuilding the  readiness of the military force one of the department’s priorities and has  outlined this priority in a key strategic guidance document. Specifically,  the Guidance for the Employment of the Force states that it is an  overarching priority of the department to recover service readiness to  preserve the long-term health of the force. In addition, the 2015 National  Military Strategy suggests that DOD has consumed readiness as quickly  as it has been generated for nearly a generation and that the department  is taking action to better balance achieving immediate operational goals  with improving readiness for potential future contingencies.
The high pace of operations has created challenges for the all-volunteer  force in its ability to respond to current demands. The global security  environment will likely continue to require significant reliance on U.S.  military forces to respond to a range of demands even as the department  faces a period of budget constraints including across-the-board spending  reductions through sequestration and force structure reductions. As a  result, DOD must ensure that the force is poised to meet a range of global  needs.
The House Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for 2016 included a provision for GAO to submit a report  to the congressional defense committees that provides a comprehensive,  independent assessment of DOD’s efforts to rebuild readiness. The  House Report also included a provision that GAO assess the plans of the  Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy to rebuild readiness. We  briefed your staff on our work on the services’ efforts to rebuild readiness  in February 2016 and March 2016 and issued three related service- specific, classified reports in May 2016. As a complement to those  reviews, this report (1) describes the factors that affect reported readiness  levels and DOD’s efforts to manage the impact of continued deployments  on readiness, and (2) assesses DOD’s implementation and oversight of  department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts.
This report is a public version of our June 2016 classified report. DOD  deemed some of the information in the prior report as SECRET, which  must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits  SECRET information and data such as readiness trend data, deployment  data, and selected details of the services’ readiness recovery plans.  Although the information provided in this report is limited in scope, it  addresses the same objectives as the classified report (with the exception  of removing the discussion of readiness levels from the first objective)  and includes the same recommendations. Also, both reports use the  same overall methodology.
To describe the factors that affect reported readiness levels and to  identify steps that the department is taking to manage the impacts of  continued deployments on readiness, we reviewed readiness reporting  documents, including joint force readiness reviews and quarterly  readiness reports to Congress, and analyzed associated readiness data  from 2008 through 2015. These time frames were selected to maximize  available and reliable data and to determine meaningful trends. In  addition, we interviewed officials from the Joint Staff and the six  geographic combatant commands to discuss global demand, and we  obtained and analyzed data on the global demand for forces from the  Joint Staff. We assessed the reliability of readiness data and global  demand data through the use of standard questionnaires, reviews of  service and department-level documentation, and through discussions  with service-level officials on data collection processes and Joint Staff  officials on global demand reform efforts. We concluded that both sets of  data were sufficiently reliable for reporting current and historical readiness  trends and global demand reform efforts.
To assess DOD’s implementation and oversight of department-wide  readiness rebuilding efforts, we reviewed DOD’s plans for managing  rebuilding efforts. We reviewed guidance that the department provided to  the services directing them to establish plans for rebuilding readiness. We  then analyzed the service plans for rebuilding readiness, including  reviewing relevant documents and interviewing officials to identify and  understand the underlying assumptions, the long-term goals and time  frames for achieving these goals, and the interim goals and means to  assess progress. We evaluated the extent to which the services face  challenges in meeting their stated readiness recovery goals within the  time frames identified by analyzing service documents and interviewing  service officials and operational units. We selected several key force  elements from each service to complete a more detailed, though non- generalizable, case study assessment on plans for rebuilding readiness  of specific force elements. We interviewed Office of the Secretary of  Defense and Joint Staff officials to discuss DOD’s role in the readiness  rebuilding effort and changes being implemented to allow the services to  better focus on rebuilding their readiness. We compared DOD’s efforts to  rebuild readiness with the six key elements of sound planning that prior  GAO work identified as critical to facilitating a comprehensive, results- oriented framework. We interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense  and Joint Staff officials to discuss steps being taken to address any  identified gaps between the requirements of a sound strategic plan, such  as the need for long-term goals and strategies, and DOD’s current plan.  Further information on our scope and methodology can be found in  appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to September 2016  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: DOD Readiness Reporting
paragraphs: DOD defines “readiness” as the ability of the U.S. military forces to fight  and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. DOD uses a  variety of automated systems, review processes, and reports to collect  and disseminate information about the readiness of its forces to execute  their tasks and missions. Two of the primary means of communicating  readiness information are the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress—  which is a classified product prepared by the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness with input from the  services, combatant commands, and Joint Staff and details military  readiness on a quarterly basis—and the Joint Force Readiness Review,  which is a classified product prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff and assesses the armed forces’ capability to execute their  wartime missions under the National Military Strategy on a quarterly  basis.
The Joint Staff assesses the department’s overall ability to resource and  execute the missions called for in the National Military Strategy. The  overall assessments, which are classified, are based on joint and force  readiness. Joint readiness focuses on the ability of the combatant  commands to provide, integrate, and synchronize forces assigned to  missions, while force readiness focuses on the ability of the force  providers to provide forces and support capabilities.
The military services organize their forces into units for training and  equipping purposes. Joint guidelines require that commanders assess  their units’ abilities to perform their core competencies, or their ability to  undertake the wartime or primary missions for which they are organized  or designed. These classified assessments are based on four distinct  resource indicators—personnel, equipment availability, equipment  readiness, and how well the unit is trained to conducts its missions.
Joint guidelines also require joint and service unit commands to evaluate,  in near real-time, the readiness of forces to accomplish assigned and  potential tasks through the Defense Readiness Reporting System  (DRRS). The system provides the means to monitor the readiness of  DOD components to provide capabilities to support the National Military  Strategy consistent with DOD priorities and planning direction. Through  DRRS, commanders, military service chiefs, and agency directors assess  the ability of their organizations to accomplish a task to standard, based  on their capabilities, under conditions specified in their joint mission- essential task list or agency mission-essential task list.
section_title: DOD’s Global Force Management Process
paragraphs: In 2005, faced with a situation where its process for providing forces was  not responsive enough to meet operational needs, and where the  department was not able to provide funding to maintain the readiness of  all its forces to do their full range of assigned missions, DOD established  a centralized Global Force Management process. According to the  department, establishment of the process enabled the Secretary of  Defense to make proactive, risk-informed decisions on how to employ the  force. The goal of Global Force Management is to allow officials to  identify the global availability of forces and/or capabilities needed to  support plans and operations.
The department relies on Global Force Management to distribute the  operational forces that belong to the military services among competing  combatant commander requirements. Each combatant command  documents its need for forces and/or capabilities, and then DOD uses the  Global Force Management process in the following ways to meet  identified needs.
A portion of DOD’s operational forces are assigned to the combatant  commands and positioned in the geographic combatant commander’s  theater of operations to provide shorter response times. Combatant  commanders have authority over forces assigned to them until the  Secretary of Defense reassigns the forces.
The combatant commanders receive additional forces to supplement  their assigned forces through the allocation process. These forces are  temporarily transferred to a combatant command to meet operational  demands for both steady state rotational requirements that are  planned in advance and emergent needs that arise after the initial  allocation plan has been approved. They supplement a combatant  commander’s assigned forces in order to mitigate near-term risk.
The Global Force Management process also includes a process to  apportion forces. Apportioned forces provide an estimate of the  services’ capacity to generate capabilities along general timelines for  combatant commander planning purposes. These are the forces that  a combatant commander can reasonably expect to be made  available, but not necessarily an identification of the actual forces that  will be allocated for use when a contingency plan or crisis response  plan transitions to execution.
section_title: DOD and the Services are Taking Steps to Manage the Impact of Continued Deployments on Readiness
subsections: section_title: Persistently Low Reported Readiness Levels Attributed to Various Factors
paragraphs: After more than a decade of conflict, recent budget uncertainty, and  decreases in force structure, U.S. forces are facing significant challenges  in rebuilding readiness. DOD officials noted that it will take a significant  amount of time to realize improvements in readiness as the department  works to address identified challenges. In addition, the individual military  services, which train and equip forces used by the combatant commands,  report persistently low readiness levels. The services attribute the low  readiness levels to various factors. Specifically,
The Army attributes its persistently low readiness level to emerging  demands, lack of proficiency in core competencies, and end strength  reductions. Even as the Army has brought forces back from  Afghanistan, the Army faces increasing emergent demands that strain  existing capacity, such as the deployment of the 101st Airborne  Division in Africa to respond to the Ebola crisis. In addition, other  factors contribute to readiness challenges, including a lack of  familiarity among leaders and units with the ability to conduct  collective training towards core competencies because the Army  focused on counterinsurgency for many years. Finally, the Army is  downsizing to an end strength of 980,000—about a 12 percent  reduction in size. Army leadership testified in March 2015 that any  end strength reductions below this level would reduce the Army’s  capability to support missions identified in defense guidance.
The Navy attributes its persistently low readiness level to increased  lengths of deployments for aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and  amphibious ships, which has created significant maintenance  challenges. The Navy currently has 272 ships, a decrease from 333  ships in 1998—an 18 percent decrease. Even as the number of Navy  ships has decreased, the number of ships deployed overseas has  remained roughly constant at about 100 ships. Consequently, each  ship is being deployed more to maintain the same level of presence.  In addition, the Navy has had to shorten, eliminate, or defer training  and maintenance periods to support high deployment rates.
The Air Force attributes its decline in readiness to continued demands  and a reduced force structure. For example, in 1991 the Air Force had  154 fighter and bomber squadrons, and as of December 2015 the Air  Force had 64 fighter and bomber squadrons—a 58 percent decrease  from 1991 levels. Further, its readiness level has declined because of  persistent demand for forces, a decline in equipment availability and  in experienced maintenance personnel, and the impact of high  deployment rates on units’ ability to conduct needed training.
The Marine Corps attributes its readiness levels to an increased  frequency of deployments to support the sustained high demand for  the force; gaps in the number of unit leaders with the right grade,  experience, and technical and leadership qualifications; and training  shortfalls, including a lack of sufficiently available aircraft to train to  standards, resulting from over a decade of war.
While the services have reported readiness shortfalls across the force,  there have been some readiness gains in select areas, such as Army  Brigade Combat Teams and Marine Corps Infantry Battalions. For  example, beginning in fiscal year 2014, reported readiness levels for  Army Brigade Combat Teams generally improved, but plateaued in fiscal  year 2015. In addition, readiness levels for infantry battalions have  improved over the past 5 years as infantry units resumed training to core  mission-essential tasks after the end of Operations Enduring Freedom  and Iraqi Freedom.
section_title: Global Demands Are Expected to Continue and to Challenge Some Portions of the Force
paragraphs: Though DOD officials indicated that overall demand has been decreasing  since 2013—primarily because of the drawdown of forces in Iraq and  Afghanistan—DOD has reported that the ability of the military force to  rebuild capacity and capability is hindered by continued, and in some  cases increased, demand for some types of forces. Additionally, DOD is  responding to these global demands with a reduced force structure, which  further impacts reported readiness. For example, from fiscal year 2013  through fiscal year 2016, active component end strength decreased by  about 7 percent and reserve component end strength decreased by about  4 percent across the force.
Combatant command demand has consistently exceeded what the  services are able to supply. DOD has spent most of the last decade  responding to near-term combatant command demands, primarily in Iraq  and Afghanistan. Combatant command officials we spoke with  acknowledged that even though demand in support of U.S. Central  Command operations in Iraq and Afghanistan had been decreasing,  overall demand remains high and is likely to remain high in order to  support global needs. For example, U.S. European Command officials  noted that the command’s assigned forces are now staying in Europe and  being used to meet the growing needs of the command, such as the  response to Russian aggression, which officials noted has been the most  significant driver of changes to the command’s needs since February  2014. Moreover, U.S. Pacific Command officials noted that their  operational requirements have steadily increased to ensure adequate  capability exists to address the increasingly unpredictable and  provocative actions of North Korea and China.
Global demands for select force elements, such as the Air Force’s  personnel recovery units, the Army’s division headquarters, and the  Navy’s carrier strike groups, have been persistently high. These high- demand force elements already face challenges in meeting service- established deployment-to-dwell ratios. For example:
Units within the Air Force’s personnel recovery service core function  have experienced challenges maintaining deployment-to-dwell ratio  within the Air Force’s and Office of the Secretary of Defense’s stated  goals of 1:2 and 1:5 for active and service component units,  respectively. Specifically, the HC-130 fixed wing aircraft had a  deployment-to-dwell ratio of approximately 1:1 for the active duty and  1:4 for the reserve component as of January 2016.
The Army has experienced challenges in meeting the demand for  division headquarters during fiscal years 2010 through 2015 and  reports that it will continue to experience readiness challenges at the  active component division headquarters level for the next few years.  As of August 2015, division headquarters had a deployment-to-dwell  ratio of less than 1:1, which requires Secretary of Defense approval  and is in excess of the Army’s goal of 1:2 and the Office of the  Secretary of Defense’s goal of 1:2.
Because of increased demand over the past several years, many  Navy ships have been deployed for 9 to 10 months or longer  compared to the 7 months the Navy reports as a sustainable  deployment length. Moreover, combatant commander demand for  carrier strike groups has grown and the Navy is unable to meet  current demand.
Some portions of the force have experienced reduced demand and  improved readiness. Our analysis shows that some of the decline in  overall force demand can be attributed to the decline in demand for Army  Brigade Combat Teams, which have experienced improved readiness.  For example, as we found in May 2016, Brigade Combat Team demand  decreased by more than two-thirds since fiscal year 2011 and was mostly  met from fiscal years 2010 through fiscal year 2015. In addition,  beginning in fiscal year 2014, reported readiness trends for Brigade  Combat Teams generally improved, but plateaued in fiscal year 2015.
section_title: DOD Is Undertaking Efforts to Reform Its Force Management Process
paragraphs: DOD has undertaken efforts to better manage the demands placed on the  force. Specifically, in 2014 the Joint Staff introduced plans to reform the  Global Force Management process in an effort to address declines in  readiness and capacity across the force. However, at the time of our  report, the department was still working to complete implementation of  Global Force Management reform initiatives and thus it is too soon to tell  what impact implementation of these initiatives will have on DOD’s  readiness recovery efforts.
The department focused its Global Force Management reform on an  effort to transition to a resource-informed process, instead of a process  driven primarily by combatant command demand. The intent is to better  balance the distribution of forces for high-priority missions with the need  to rebuild the readiness of the force. Through Global Force  Management reform, the department expects to be better positioned to  reduce the burden on the force and allow the services time to rebuild  readiness. Global Force Management reform efforts include the following  changes.
Revising combatant command plans: DOD officials noted that in 2015  the department began efforts to revise several major plans in an  attempt to better reflect what the current and planned force is  expected to achieve. This effort to revise major plans, which the  combatant commands were currently undergoing at the time of our  review, has already resulted in some changes.
Implementing the “ceiling and floor” concept: This effort is intended to  balance the availability of forces against combatant commander  requirements. The “ceiling” is the maximum number of forces a force  provider can generate under current funding levels while still  achieving readiness recovery goals and the “floor” is the minimum  force level needed in each combatant commander’s theater of  operations for initial response needs. Forces included in the floor  would only be considered for reallocation if there was a major  operational plan being executed in another geographic area of  responsibility. According to U.S. European Command officials, in an  effort to rebuild service readiness, the services are not allowed to  deploy forces above the identified ceiling without Secretary of  Defense approval, which has resulted in more difficulty in sourcing  combatant command requirements. DOD has reported that the results  of implementing the “ceiling” and “floor” concept would not be fully  realized until fiscal year 2017.
Realigning the force assignment and allocation processes: This effort,  which the department implemented in late 2014, is intended to realign  the Global Force Management assignment and allocation processes  to address the assignment of forces to the combatant commands prior  to allocating additional forces in support of demands throughout the  year. DOD uses the assignment of forces to provide the combatant  commanders a base set of forces in support of both enduring and  emergent requirements, thereby potentially mitigating risk. Realigning  these Global Force Management processes should allow  commanders to better understand the assigned forces they will have  access to before requesting additional forces through the allocation  process and mitigate risks inherent with declining force size and  readiness challenges.
Updating apportionment tables: DOD produces force-apportionment  tables to (1) help leaders assess plans based on projected force  inventory and availability; (2) inform risk estimates; and (3) inform  mitigations. The overarching goal of the force apportionment tables is  to provide improved assumptions to assess risk and produce better,  executable plans. DOD previously required that the tables be  produced annually, but through Global Force Management reform,  and beginning in late 2014, the department began requiring quarterly  updates to the tables. More frequent updates should provide the  combatant commanders with a better representation of the forces  available during planning. According to U.S. Southern Command  officials, while updating the apportionment tables on a quarterly basis  does not provide a sense of unit readiness, it is a helpful tool for  planning purposes.
Establishing a Readiness and Availability Priorities framework: The  Readiness and Availability Priorities framework is intended to inform  risk decisions and Global Force Management policy  recommendations. Through the Readiness and Availability Priorities  framework, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the services and  combatant commands, assess the department’s ability to meet  prioritized mission requirements and evaluate the associated risk  based on force employment decisions that have already been  approved.
We found that the full impact of DOD’s Global Force Management reform  is not known because some elements are in the early stages of  implementation. In the time since portions of the reform have been put in  place, officials have cited limited progress in better managing the  services’ ability to meet combatant command demand. For example, our  analysis of global force management data showed that between fiscal  years 2013 and 2015, the number of combatant command requirements  that the Secretary of Defense considered for sourcing decreased by  about one-third. However, in fiscal year 2015, the department was still  sourcing most combatant commander-identified requirements rather than  making decisions that would have benefited the services’ readiness  recovery efforts. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense provided full or  partial sourcing to more than 90 percent of combatant command  requirements.
section_title: DOD’s Implementation and Oversight of Department-Wide Readiness Rebuilding Efforts Do Not Fully Incorporate Key Elements of Sound Planning
paragraphs: DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, but implementation  and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts has not  fully included key elements of sound planning, which could place  readiness recovery efforts at risk given the continued high pace of  operations and many competing priorities.
Leading practices we identified in our prior work show that sound  strategic planning can enhance an agency’s efforts to identify and  achieve long-range goals and objectives and entails consideration of key  elements during planning efforts. Key elements include (1) a mission  statement; (2) long-term goals; (3) strategies to achieve goals; (4)  external factors that could affect goals; (5) metrics to gauge progress; and  (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives. As  summarized in table 1, however, our analysis of readiness recovery plans  shows that DOD and the services have only partially incorporated these  key elements of sound planning into their readiness rebuilding efforts.
subsections: section_title: Mission Statement: Readiness Rebuilding Is a Mission Priority for DOD and the Services
paragraphs: DOD strategic guidance makes it clear that readiness rebuilding is a  priority that supports the department’s mission of deterring war, and each  service has promulgated guidance highlighting readiness as a mission  priority. Sound planning requires a mission statement that concisely  summarizes what the organization does, presenting the main purposes  for all its major functions and operations. In its strategic guidance, DOD  states that its overarching mission is to provide military forces needed to  deter war and to protect the security of the United States. Further, it has  emphasized that rebuilding the readiness of the force supports its ability  to accomplish the missions and to continue to meet the demands outlined  in the National Military Strategy. Consequently, DOD’s emphasis on  rebuilding readiness is outlined in key strategic guidance. For example,  the Guidance for the Employment of the Force states that it is an  overarching priority to recover readiness in each service while minimizing  deployments. In addition, the Defense Planning Guidance states that  the components are to continue their efforts to return to desired readiness  levels by the end of the Future Years Defense Program. Alongside its  emphasis on recovering readiness, however, DOD has stated that finding  the proper balance between recovering readiness, force structure sizing,  modernization, and future threats is an important component of the  mission and the highest priority of its leadership. Thus, each of these  priorities must be considered within the context of the risk they place on  both the force and the mission.
While each service has promulgated guidance highlighting the need to  rebuild readiness, they have not consistently prioritized the importance of  these efforts. For example:
The Army has identified readiness as its highest priority. The Chief of  Staff of the Army published specific readiness guidance with the  overarching objective of maximizing the readiness of the total force.  In the memorandum, the Chief of Staff noted that readiness was the  service’s number one priority and that there was “no other number  one” priority.
Both the Navy and the Marine Corps emphasize the importance of  rebuilding readiness. Specifically, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations  testified that the Navy’s priority was implementation of the Optimized  Fleet Response Plan, which is designed to support the Navy’s overall  readiness recovery goals. In addition, the Assistant Commandant of  the Marine Corps testified in support of the Marine Corps Posture  Statement that, given the current fiscal environment, the service was  working to maintain a balance between current readiness and  projected future readiness, but that current readiness remains its main  focus.
Air Force leaders have stated that striking a balance between today’s  readiness and future modernization is important, but exceptionally  difficult. Recognizing the impact that combatant commander demand  and uncertain funding, among other things, can have on readiness,  the Air Force does not expect to recover readiness prior to 2020.  However, according to Air Force and DOD strategic guidance, the Air  Force must be prepared to operate in highly contested battle spaces  in the future. Therefore, the Air Force is focusing on recapitalization  and modernization of its aircraft to ensure it is able to meet combatant  commanders’ capability and capacity requirements in the future.
section_title: Long-Term Goals and Strategies: The Military Services Have Not Fully Established and DOD Has Not Validated Complete Goals or Comprehensive Strategies for Readiness Recovery
paragraphs: DOD has linked readiness recovery to its ability to accomplish its  missions. However, the military services have not developed complete  goals or comprehensive strategies for rebuilding readiness that have  been validated to ensure they reflect the department’s priorities. Two  interconnected key elements of sound planning are to establish  comprehensive and specific goals and to establish a strategy to achieve  those goals.
At the department level, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness is responsible for developing plans, programs,  and policies for readiness to ensure forces can execute the National  Military Strategy, as well as oversight of military training and its  enablers. The military services have the authority and responsibility to  man, train, and equip forces for employment, and are also responsible  for identifying critical readiness deficiencies and developing strategies for  addressing the deficiencies. In line with these responsibilities, the  Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Readiness Deputy’s  Management Action Group (Readiness DMAG) in late 2011. The Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness then  charged the Readiness DMAG with synchronizing and coordinating  actions and overseeing the military services’ readiness recovery efforts.  Through the Readiness DMAG, DOD required the services to develop  and implement readiness rebuilding plans that describe each service’s  readiness goals and the time frames within which the goals could be met,  with a focus on improved readiness for the full range of assigned  missions. Each service has established some readiness recovery goals,  but the goals only capture portions of the force and have been extended  over time. Each service has also established readiness recovery  strategies, but these strategies have been incomplete or not  comprehensive and, in many cases, have not fully identified the  resources required to achieve the goals the strategies support.
subsections: section_title: Service Readiness Recovery Plans Do Not Capture the Entire Force and Have Changing Time Frames
paragraphs: In 2015, the services reported their readiness rebuilding plans to DOD,  which included some readiness goals, strategies for achieving the  identified goals, and time frames for when the rebuilding efforts would be  complete. Tasked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness to establish these plans, the services selected  a representation of critical force elements that would allow them to  highlight progress in working toward achieving identified goals. In  response, the services selected force elements that were either  experiencing a high pace of deployments, facing challenges in achieving  readiness recovery, or were key to their respective readiness recovery  efforts. For example, the Navy included ballistic missile submarines,  carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, large surface combatants,  attack submarines, and patrol aircraft. As part of their initial effort, the  services had set goals and time frames for achieving readiness recovery.  However, by the time of our review, many of the goals had been changed  and time frames had been extended. Table 2 outlines the key force  elements that the services’ readiness recovery plans are based on and  the goals and time frames for the plans.
Inconsistencies exist in the individual service readiness recovery goals  and in the time frames for achieving them because of DOD’s decision to  direct the services to develop their own respective readiness recovery  plans without validating them to ensure that they are complete,  comprehensive, and reflect the department’s priorities. For example, the  services established readiness recovery goals, but these goals are only  for portions of the force in each service. For instance, the Army  established specific readiness recovery goals for five force elements  (Brigade Combat Teams, Combat Aviation Brigades, Division  Headquarters, Patriot Battalions, and Terminal High Altitude Area  Defense Batteries). Also, the Army set readiness recovery goals for a  large portion of its overall active component non-brigade Combat Team  force and segments of its active-duty and Army National Guard Brigade  Combat Teams, but these goals do not capture the entirety of the force.  Moreover, the time frames that the services identified for achieving  readiness recovery goals have been extended by some services since  the plans were initially established in 2015; services extended the goals  primarily because of the services’ inability to achieve initially identified  goals with the strategies they outlined.
Additionally, each service has either established or is working to establish  strategies for helping achieve readiness recovery goals, but we found that  some strategies are not comprehensive or complete. For example:
Readiness recovery for the Navy is premised on successful  implementation of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. This plan  seeks to provide a more sustainable force-generation model for Navy  ships, as it reduces deployment lengths and injects more predictability  for maintenance and training into ship schedules. According to Navy  policy, this framework establishes a readiness-generation cycle that  operationally and administratively aligns forces while aligning and  stabilizing manning, maintenance and modernization, logistics,  inspections and evaluations, and training. As of April 2016, the Navy  had established optimized schedules for five of the six elements of the  fleet and had plans to complete the remaining schedule for  Amphibious Ready Groups before the end of May 2016.
The Army’s strategy to achieve readiness goals is evolving, but as  yet, incomplete. A key aspect of this strategy is to develop and  implement a new force generation model called “sustainable  readiness,” which the Army expects to implement in fiscal year 2017.  The Army expects this model will provide increased predictability and  visibility to optimize unit rotations and sustain readiness when units  are not deployed. Additionally, the Army expects the model to  generate more combat power and enabling capability given available  resources, as well as to help define readiness goals.
The Air Force strategy to rebuild readiness is predicated on conditions  of consistent funding and decreasing operational demand. Without  these two conditions being met, the Air Force has stated that  readiness will not improve significantly. For example, the Air Force  identified five influencers of future readiness, which are (1) operational  tempos, as reflected in the ratio of deployment-to-dwell; (2) flying hour  program; (3) critical skills availability, or having the right personnel for  each position; (4) weapons system sustainment; and (5) training  resource availability. Each of these influencers is affected by  operational demand or consistent funding. The Air Force regularly  measures its ability to increase its readiness using the five  influencers. The Air Force found that while problems with any one  area could lead to serious readiness problems, improvement required  balanced efforts across all five areas.
The Marine Corps does not yet have a measurable readiness goal  with an analytical basis, or a specific strategy to meet its current  overall readiness goal. The Marine Corps focuses on five institutional  pillars of readiness, which include high quality people, unit readiness,  capacity to meet combatant commander needs, infrastructure  sustainment, and equipment modernization. In addition, the Marine  Corps has established specific strategies to achieve goals developed  for certain communities, such as aviation. For example, the Marine  Corps issued the Ready Basic Aircraft Recovery Plan and 2016  Marine Aviation Plan in an effort to mitigate current readiness  challenges and recover future readiness for the aviation community.
section_title: Service Readiness Recovery Plans Do Not Fully Consider Resources Needed to Achieve Goals
paragraphs: In overseeing readiness rebuilding efforts, neither the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness nor the Readiness  DMAG has required that the services fully identify the resources required  to support achievement of service-identified goals. A viable readiness  recovery effort will require both DOD and the services to develop and  agree on goals that can guide the efforts of the joint force, and clearly  establish strategies that will result in the achievement of the goals. DOD  has acknowledged challenges with funding, accepting that it is a  constrained resource. However, the department has not identified the  resources needed to fully implement readiness rebuilding efforts, and  thus does not know what achieving readiness recovery will cost.
In addition, adding funding may not help the services recover the  readiness of their forces in some cases. For example, the Air Force’s  Guardian Angel Weapon System, within the Personnel Recovery service  core function area, is lacking experienced active-duty pararescue jumpers  to meet combatant commander demand. To mitigate this problem, the  Air Force continues to recruit new pararescue jumpers, but currently the  least experienced personnel are filled well over authorized amounts, while  mid-career personnel, who are required on all deployments and are  needed to mentor and train new personnel, are filled at about half of their  authorized amounts. Additional funding is not going to help the rebuilding  efforts in the near term, as the units need time—about 7 years—to  develop the least experienced personnel into mid-career and most  experienced personnel, according to Air Force officials. In addition, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations,  and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps have all testified that  DOD will not be able to address readiness problems with money alone,  but that factors such as operational requirements and time must also be  considered.
For each service, the resource requirements needed to fully implement  readiness recovery will vary by force element. For some force elements,  the services understand the barriers to rebuilding readiness and in some  cases have estimated portions of the expected costs. For example, we  found that the Navy has estimated that total ordnance shortfalls across its  aircraft carrier, cruiser, and destroyer force amount to at least $3.3 billion  for items such as torpedoes and guided missiles, which are needed to  fully achieve readiness recovery. In some cases, however, the services  have not quantified or budgeted for the full costs of achieving identified  readiness goals for specific segments of the force because readiness  recovery goals have not been established. For example, lacking clearly  established readiness recovery goals for the non-Brigade Combat Team  portion of the National Guard and for the entirety of the Army Reserve,  the Army is unable to identify the resources that would be required to  achieve such goals. In addition, the Marine Corps has not articulated a  measurable readiness recovery goal with any analytical basis, and as  such, is not able to identify the resources needed to achieve that goal.
section_title: External Factors: Service Readiness Recovery Plans Are Based on Assumptions That Have Not Fully Considered the Impact of External Factors
paragraphs: Another key element of sound planning is understanding key factors that  are external and beyond agency control that could significantly affect  achievement of long-term goals. DOD and the services have identified  potential risks to achieving their readiness recovery goals—such as  budget uncertainty—but they have not fully considered how to account for  these risks, including how they will influence the assumptions on which  the plans are based. Based on our work, we found assumptions in three  areas that are also questionable: (1) availability of funding, (2) ability to  complete maintenance on time, and (3) whether operational tempo and  other factors will allow sufficient time for training.
subsections: section_title: Uncertainty About Funding
paragraphs: DOD has reported that time and sufficient, consistent, and predictable  resourcing are needed to allow the services to rebuild readiness. In an  effort to help the services improve their readiness, Congress appropriated  $1 billion in overseas contingency operations funds in 2016 that were  designated for use in readiness improvement efforts. Like the rest of the  federal government, however, DOD faces across-the-board spending  reductions through sequestration. We previously examined the effects  of sequestration on DOD, noting that the department placed an emphasis  on preserving readiness when implementing spending reductions, but still  expected sequestration to affect plans to improve military readiness by  either delaying or cancelling activities. For example, we found that the Air  Force cancelled or reduced participation in most of its planned large-scale  fiscal year 2013 training events. Moreover, like much of the government,  DOD has been funded through continuing resolutions, which create  uncertainty about both when they will receive their final appropriation and  what level of funding ultimately will be available. Recognizing these  challenges, the Air Force cited funding levels for modernization and  recapitalization as a risk to achieving readiness recovery within identified  time frames, the Army noted that if sequestration were to return without a  commensurate change to DOD’s strategy, the impact would be  devastating to Army readiness, and the Navy noted that stable and  consistent funding is key to implementing the Optimized Fleet Response  Plan, which is the Navy’s plan to rebuild readiness.
section_title: Inability to Meet Maintenance Time Frames
paragraphs: Readiness recovery is premised on the services being able to meet  maintenance time frames, but most of the services expect continued  challenges in doing so. For example, over the last 5 years, shipyards  have not completed the majority of required maintenance on time,  primarily because high deployment rates have led to shortened,  eliminated, or deferred maintenance periods and a growth in maintenance  backlogs. In May 2016, we found that from fiscal years 2011 through  2014, 89 percent of aircraft carrier maintenance periods took more time  than scheduled, which also increased the costs. Recognizing these  challenges, the Navy implemented the Optimized Fleet Response Plan in  2014 in order to provide a more sustainable schedule for ships,  introducing more predictability for maintenance and training. The Navy’s  readiness recovery goal of 2020 assumes successful implementation of  the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. With only a portion of the fleet  having entered this optimized cycle, it is too early to assess its  effectiveness, but as we previously found, the first three aircraft carriers  have not completed maintenance tasks on time, and of the 83 cruisers  and destroyers, only 15 have completed a Chief of Naval Operations  maintenance availability under the Optimized Fleet Response Plan.  Extended deployments to meet global demands have resulted in greater  and more costly maintenance requirements. In addition, the Marine Corps  is facing significant challenges in its aviation maintenance and the Air  Force has significant shortages of maintenance personnel.
section_title: Lack of Time and Resources to Conduct Training
paragraphs: The services’ readiness recovery plans are further premised on the notion  that units would have the time and resources to train to meet the full  range of missions assigned to them. However, the high pace of  deployments, reduced time at home station, and reduced funding for  conducting full-spectrum training has had an effect on individual units’  ability to train and fully recover readiness. For example, the Army has  stated that one of its greatest challenges inhibiting readiness recovery is  difficulty maintaining collective training proficiency in its core  competencies due to a lack of personnel depth and experience. Because  the Army converted almost all Combat Training Center rotations between  2003 and 2012 to focus on counterinsurgency, opportunities to train  thousands of company commanders, field grade officers, and battalion  commanders on their unit’s core competency missions were lost. A key  part of the Army’s plan is to ensure that these soldiers have repeated full  spectrum training experience at combat training centers over the next  several years. However, the Army projects increasing emergent demand  that may jeopardize the Army’s ability to achieve this. In addition, high  deployment rates for Air Force units have resulted in less time for units to  complete their full training requirements. According to Air Force officials,  high deployment rates mean there are fewer aircraft available to train on  at home stations, and often the most experienced personnel are  disproportionally deployed, leaving fewer experienced personnel available  to train less experienced personnel at home stations. Moreover, the Air  Force reported that the availability of training ranges, munitions for  training, and training simulators, among others, were key factors for  readiness rebuilding. The service has reported that while the training  resource availability is relatively healthy in terms of operation and  maintenance funding, substantial funding is required to address long-term  investment shortfalls.
section_title: Metrics and Evaluating Progress: DOD and the Services Track Readiness Trends, but Most of the Services Have Not Established Metrics and DOD Has Not Developed a Method to Evaluate Progress Toward Achieving Readiness Recovery
paragraphs: An element of sound planning is developing a set of metrics that will be  applied to gauge progress toward attainment of the plan’s long-term  goals. These metrics are then used to evaluate the plan through objective  measurement and systematic analysis to determine the manner and  extent to which programs associated with the plan achieve their intended  goals. For example, evaluations can be a potentially critical source of  information in assessing (1) the appropriateness and reasonableness of  goals; (2) the effectiveness of strategies by supplementing metrics with  impact evaluation studies; and (3) the implementation of programs, such  as identifying the need for corrective action.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the  combatant commands, and the military services assess and report,  through various means and using various criteria, the readiness of forces  to execute their tasks and missions. Some key reporting mechanisms  include the Defense Readiness Reporting System, the Joint Forces  Readiness Review, and the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress.  These processes provide snapshots of how ready the force is at a given  point in time. However, most of the services have not fully established  metrics to track progress toward achieving readiness recovery goals.  Using metrics to gauge progress toward the attainment of a plan’s long- term goals would provide the services with an objective measurement to  use at specific points in identifying the extent of progress in attaining  readiness recovery, and would afford the department the opportunity to  know whether the efforts are achieving their intended goals. Specifically,  while most of the services continue to monitor overall operational  readiness through the Defense Readiness Reporting System, they have  not fully developed metrics to measure progress toward achieving their  readiness recovery goals. For example,
The Navy’s readiness recovery plan—the Optimized Fleet Response  Plan—is based on maximizing ship operational  availability. Operational availability measures the amount of time a  ship can get under way and execute a mission. The Navy has  developed long-range ship schedules that project operational  availability output for various force types, such as carrier strike  groups, over the next 9 years. While the Navy’s projections show  some progress towards its operational availability readiness recovery  goals, the Navy has not set specific benchmarks, interim goals, or  milestones that it expects to achieve on an annual basis or otherwise  to evaluate the effectiveness of readiness recovery efforts. Navy  officials said that they have projections for readiness recovery and  that there are some measures in place to keep leadership informed of  readiness recovery efforts, but that they have not set specific  benchmarks, interim goals, or milestones for tracking progress of  readiness recovery efforts.
The Army established thresholds for various metrics that impact  readiness—such as sustainable deployment rates—for the select  force elements that form the foundation for the readiness recovery  plan. However, Army officials told us that these thresholds and  metrics were not intended to be used to track its readiness progress.  Rather, officials told us that the Army planned to use its process for  regularly tracking, reporting, and projecting readiness to measure  progress towards achieving readiness recovery, which includes  periodic reports on readiness. Part of the process includes regularly  monitoring the percentage of Brigade Combat Team and non-Brigade  Combat Team units reporting the highest levels of readiness.  However, the Army’s process does not set interim benchmarks for  readiness recovery. Additionally, the Army does not track, report, or  project readiness against the thresholds and metrics it has  established for specific active component force elements or against its  broader readiness goals for Brigade Combat Team and active  component non-Brigade Combat Team forces.
In early 2016, Air Force officials described operational tempo and  other conditions that are necessary to begin to recover readiness and  stated that until those conditions are met, readiness will not improve  significantly. Once those conditions are met, readiness is expected to  improve over an 8- to 10-year period. The Air Force will continue to  use current readiness metrics, to include operational tempos as  reflected in the ratio of deployment-to-dwell, and critical skills  availability—having the right personnel for each position—to chart  progress towards meeting its readiness recovery goal. However, the  Air Force has stated that it will be at least 2020 before its starting  conditions are met.
The Marine Corps does not yet have a specific strategy or metrics to  track its progress in achieving its overall readiness goal. The Marine  Corps has established specific strategies and accompanying metrics  to achieve goals developed for certain force communities, such as  aviation, one of its most stressed communities. For example, the  Marine Corps’ primary metric for assessing aviation readiness  recovery is having sufficient aircraft available to fully train a squadron.  While Marine Corps officials state that they regularly monitor  readiness through multiple forums, the Marine Corps has not set  specific benchmarks, interim goals, or milestones to evaluate the  effectiveness of overall or force-community-specific readiness  recovery efforts. Marine Corps officials explained that they have not  been required to do so.
Moreover, according to officials, lacking fully developed metrics to assess  the services’ ability to measure progress toward achieving intended goals,  DOD has not developed a method to evaluate readiness recovery efforts.  Without metrics and a method for evaluating the effectiveness of overall  readiness recovery efforts through objective measurement and  systematic analysis, DOD may not be able to ensure that the department  is achieving its intended goals.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With decreased commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, DOD has seen  improvements in the readiness of certain key force elements in recent  years, such as Army Brigade Combat Teams and Marine Corps Infantry  Battalions. DOD still faces low overall readiness rates, however, which  the services expect to persist into the next decade. The department  recognizes the importance of recovering the readiness of the force and  has been taking steps, such as the establishment of service readiness  recovery plans and changes to its force management process, but there  are other areas where the department could refine its approach that might  bring meaningful improvements to the readiness recovery effort.
With the challenges posed by ongoing demand for forces around the  world and the consequent high pace of operations for portions of the  force, decreased time for maintenance and training, and budget  uncertainty, it is important that DOD incorporate sound planning into its  readiness recovery efforts. The effort for recovering readiness supports  the department’s mission of providing military forces needed to deter war  and to protect the security of the United States. However, we found some  fundamental challenges with the overall readiness recovery effort.  Specifically, the services’ readiness recovery plans do not include  comprehensive goals and strategies for achieving the goals, metrics on  which to measure progress against identified goals, and a full  consideration of external factors including how they will influence the  underlying assumptions of readiness recovery. In addition, DOD has not  validated the service-established readiness rebuilding goals, nor does it  have metrics on which it can evaluate readiness recovery efforts to  determine the extent to which they reflect the department’s priorities and  are achieving intended goals. Without metrics against which to measure  the services’ progress toward agreed-upon, achievable readiness  recovery goals, DOD will be unable to determine the effectiveness of  readiness recovery efforts or assess its ability to meet the demands of the  National Military Strategy, which may be at risk.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the department can implement readiness rebuilding  efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretaries of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force  to take the following three actions:
Establish comprehensive readiness rebuilding goals to guide  readiness rebuilding efforts and a strategy for implementing identified  goals, to include resources needed to implement the strategy.
Develop metrics for measuring interim progress at specific milestones  against identified goals for all services.
Identify external factors that may impact readiness recovery plans,  including how they influence the underlying assumptions, to ensure  that readiness rebuilding goals are achievable within established time  frames. This should include, but not be limited to, an evaluation of the  impact of assumptions about budget, maintenance time frames, and  training that underpin the services’ readiness recovery plans.
To ensure that the department has adequate oversight of service  readiness rebuilding efforts and that these efforts reflect the department’s  priorities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  two actions:
Validate the service-established readiness rebuilding goals, strategies  for achieving the goals, and metrics for measuring progress, and  revise as appropriate.
Develop a method to evaluate the department’s readiness recovery  efforts against the agreed-upon goals through objective measurement  and systematic analysis.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on the classified version of this report, DOD partially  concurred with three recommendations and concurred with two  recommendations. The June 2016 classified report and this unclassified  version have the same recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted  in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments,  which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our three recommendations that the  secretaries of the Military Departments (1) establish comprehensive  readiness rebuilding goals and a strategy for implementing identified  goals, (2) develop metrics for measuring interim progress at specific  milestones against identified goals, and (3) identify external factors that  may impact readiness recovery plans. DOD noted that the department  was currently working to define for the services the “ready for what,”  which will provide the target for their readiness recovery goals. DOD  further noted that the department would continue to work with the military  services to refine their goals and the requisite resources, as well as the  metrics and milestones required to implement and track their recovery  strategies. The department raised concerns with our addressing the  recommendation to both the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant  of the Marine Corps in our draft, stating that the Marine Corps is part of  the Department of the Navy. We have revised the recommendation to  reflect this comment.
DOD concurred with our two recommendations that the Secretary of  Defense (1) validate service-established readiness rebuilding goals,  strategies for achieving the goals, and metrics for measuring progress,  revising as appropriate and (2) develop a method to evaluate the  department’s readiness recovery efforts against the agreed-upon goals  through objective measurement and systematic analysis. The department  stated that it would continue to work with the military services to validate  and evaluate their readiness recovery goals and the metrics for  measuring their progress.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff; and the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. In addition,  the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report is a public version of our June 2016 classified report. DOD  deemed some of the information in that report as SECRET, which must  be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits SECRET  information and data such as readiness trend data, deployment data, and  select details of the services’ readiness recovery plans. Although the  information provided in this report is limited in scope, it addresses the  same objectives as the classified report (with the exception of removing  the discussion of readiness level from the first objective) and includes the  same recommendations. Also, the overall methodology used for both  reports is the same.
To describe the factors that affect reported readiness levels and to  identify the steps the department is taking to manage the impact of  continued deployments on readiness, we reviewed and analyzed  readiness data and information from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and each of the  military services. Our analysis covered data from fiscal year 2008 through  fiscal year 2015 to maximize the amount of available and reliable data for  us to determine meaningful trends. We also analyzed data from the Joint  Staff on the global demand for forces to document trends in demand from  fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016. We identified the trend in  overall demand as identified by the combatant commands and identified  the trend in the portion of this overall demand that DOD provided forces  to support. We evaluated the department’s overall strategic-level  readiness assessment (RA) and the RA of each of the military services to  document trends in reported readiness. To determine historical and  current readiness levels and key factors that contributed to those levels,  we analyzed Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress, Joint Forces  Readiness Review documents, and the services’ readiness assessments.  We also conducted interviews with Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Joint Staff, and combatant command officials to discuss global demand  trends, and obtained documentation, such as departmental guidance and  related briefings, and reviewed these documents to understand DOD’s  efforts to reform the departmental process used to source global  demands. We interviewed Joint Staff officials to discuss these reform  efforts and the subsequent impact the efforts had on overall readiness  recovery. In addition, we assessed the reliability of the readiness data  and global demand data through standardized questionnaires, reviews of  documentation, and discussions with officials about data-collection  processes. We concluded that both sets of data were sufficiently reliable  for our purposes of reporting current and historical readiness trends and  of documenting instances where the Secretary of Defense provided  forces in support of requirements in favor of the combatant commands.
To assess DOD’s implementation and oversight of department-wide  readiness rebuilding efforts, we reviewed DOD’s plans for managing  readiness rebuilding efforts as outlined in Readiness Deputy’s  Management Action Group meeting documentation and summaries and a  variety of readiness reporting documents and briefings submitted by the  services, the Joint Staff, and combatant commanders. We reviewed DOD  strategic-level documents and guidance, such as the Guidance for the  Employment of the Force and the Global Force Management  Implementation Guidance, to understand DOD’s investment in readiness  recovery. We then analyzed the service plans for rebuilding readiness,  including reviewing relevant documents and interviewing officials to  identify and understand (1) the underlying assumptions and analysis  behind those plans, (2) the long-term goals and time frames for achieving  these goals, and (3) the interim goals and means to assess progress. We  evaluated the extent to which the service readiness recovery goals face  significant challenges within the time frames identified by analyzing  service documents, including internal readiness recovery projections,  milestones, and risks associated with readiness recovery, and  interviewing service officials and operational units. By reviewing the  service readiness recovery plans and obtaining service officials’ views on  force elements that are key to rebuilding readiness, we selected several  key force elements from each service to complete a more detailed,  though non-generalizable, case study assessment on plans for rebuilding  readiness of specific force elements, including historical reported  readiness and demand and sourcing trends; readiness recovery  strategies; and specific risks to readiness recovery for these force  elements.
We analyzed these documents and reviewed DOD’s efforts to oversee  department-wide readiness rebuilding to determine if they included the  key elements of sound strategic planning that GAO has identified in the  course of our prior work. Specifically, we focused on six key elements that  should be incorporated into sound strategic planning to facilitate a  comprehensive, results-oriented framework. We selected key elements  that the department would benefit from considering in its effort to achieve  readiness recovery and meet the intent outlined in strategic guidance.  Key elements include (1) a mission statement; (2) long-term goals; (3)  strategies to achieve goals; (4) external factors that could affect goals; (5)  metrics to gauge progress; and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor  goals and objectives. We determined these leading practices and the key  elements to be the most relevant to evaluate DOD’s oversight of  department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts. We compared DOD’s  efforts to rebuild readiness with these key elements of sound planning  practices to identify any gaps that may impact DOD’s ability to recover the  readiness of the force.
We interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff officials  to discuss DOD’s role in the readiness rebuilding effort, changes being  implemented to allow the services to better focus on rebuilding their  readiness, and steps being taken to address challenges in achieving  readiness recovery. We also interviewed officials at select combatant  commands to discuss their coordination with DOD for readiness recovery,  as well as any impacts resulting from service readiness recovery efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to September 2016  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key  contributions to this report include Patty Lentini and Kristy Williams,  Assistant Directors; Paul Seely; Mike Silver; Sabrina Streagle; Nicole  Volchko; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Richard Winsor.