United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits
Published: 2005-02-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Oil for Food program was established by the United Nations and Iraq in 1996 to address concerns about the humanitarian situation after international sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program allowed the Iraqi government to use the proceeds of its oil sales to pay for food, medicine, and infrastructure maintenance. Allegations of fraud and corruption have plagued the Oil for Food program. As we have testified and others have reported, the former regime gained illicit revenues through smuggling and through illegal surcharges and commissions on Oil for Food contracts. The United Nations' Independent Inquiry Committee was established in April 2004 to investigate allegations of corruption and misconduct within the Oil for Food program and its overall management of the humanitarian program. In January 2005, the Committee publicly released 58 internal audit reports conducted by the United Nations' Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). GAO (1) provides information on OIOS' background, structure, and resources; (2) highlights the findings of the internal audit reports; and (3) discusses limitations on the audits' coverage.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Before the United Nations established OIOS, the United States and other member states had criticized its lack of internal oversight mechanisms. In 1993, the United States proposed the establishment of an inspector general position within the United Nations and withheld U.S. funds until such an office was established. In 1994, the General Assembly created OIOS and tasked it with conducting audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations of U.N. programs and funds. OIOS has generally provided audit reports to the head of the U.N. agency or program subject to the audit but also provided certain reports of interest to the General Assembly. However, this limited distribution hampered member states' efforts to oversee important U.N. programs. In December 2004, the General Assembly directed OIOS to publish the titles and summaries of all audit reports and provide member states with access to these reports on request. The audit reports released in January 2005 found deficiencies in the management of the Oil for Food program and made numerous recommendations. We identified 702 findings in these reports. Most reports focused on U.N. activities in northern Iraq, the operations of the U.N. Compensation Commission, and the implementation of U.N. inspection contracts. In the north, OIOS audits found problems with coordination, planning, procurement, asset management, and cash management. For example, U.N. agencies had purchased diesel generators in an area where diesel fuel was not readily available and constructed a health facility subject to frequent flooding. An audit of U.N.-Habitat found $1.6 million in excess construction material on hand after most projects were complete. OIOS audits of the U.N. Compensation Commission found poor internal controls and recommended downward adjustments totaling more than $500 million. The United Nations asserted that OIOS had limited audit authority over the Commission. Finally, OIOS audits of the contractors inspecting Iraq's oil exports and commodity imports found procurement irregularities and limited U.N. oversight. OIOS' audits and summary reports revealed deficiencies in the management and internal controls of the Oil for Food program. However, OIOS did not examine certain headquarters functions--particularly OIP's oversight of the contracts for central and southern Iraq that accounted for 59 percent or almost $40 billion in Oil for Food proceeds. The Independent Inquiry Committee noted several factors that limited OIOS' scope and authority. First, OIOS did not believe it had purview over the humanitarian contracts because the sanctions committee approved the contracts. Second, the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program steered OIOS toward programs in the field rather than at headquarters. Third, the Office of the Iraq Program refused to fund an OIOS risk assessment of its program management division. Finally, U.N. management and the Office of the Iraq Program prevented OIOS from reporting its audit results directly to the Security Council.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our review of the internal audit  reports of the United Nations (U.N.) Oil for Food program.
Allegations of fraud and corruption have plagued the Oil for Food  program. As we have testified and others have reported, the former regime  gained illicit revenues through smuggling oil and obtaining illegal  surcharges and commissions on Oil for Food contracts. The United  Nations’ Independent Inquiry Committee was established in April 2004 to  investigate allegations of mismanagement and misconduct within the Oil  for Food program. In January 2005, the Committee released 58 internal  audit reports on the Oil for Food program conducted by the United  Nations’ Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). On February 3, 2005,  the Committee issued an interim report on the procurement of U.N.  contractors, recipients of oil allocations, OIOS structure and activities, and  U.N. management of Oil for Food administrative expenses.
Today, I will (1) provide information on OIOS’ background, structure, and  resources; (2) highlight the findings of the internal audit reports; and (3)  discuss limitations on the audits’ coverage.
To address these objectives, we analyzed the internal audit reports to  determine the reports’ audit coverage, findings, recommendations,  disposition of recommendations, and potential cost savings. We  catalogued the findings to determine common themes related to the  management of the Oil for Food program. We also reviewed the February  2005 Independent Inquiry Committee report. Appendix I contains an  explanation of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this review in January and February 2005 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1996, the United Nations and Iraq established the Oil for Food program  to address growing concerns about the humanitarian situation in Iraq after  international sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program’s intent was to  allow the Iraqi government to use the proceeds of its oil sales to pay for  food, medicine, and infrastructure maintenance, and at the same time  prevent the regime from obtaining goods for military purposes. From 1997  through 2002, Iraq sold more than $67 billion in oil through the program  and issued $38 billion in letters of credit to purchase commodities.
The Oil for Food program initially permitted Iraq to sell up to $1 billion  worth of oil every 90 days to pay for humanitarian goods. Subsequent U.N.  resolutions increased the amount of oil that could be sold and expanded  the humanitarian goods that could be imported. In 1999, the Security  Council removed all restrictions on the amount of oil Iraq could sell to  purchase civilian goods. The United Nations and the Security Council  monitored and screened contracts that the Iraqi government signed with  commodity suppliers and oil purchasers, and Iraq’s oil revenue was placed  in a U.N.-controlled escrow account. In May 2003, U.N. resolution 1483  requested the U.N. Secretary General to transfer the Oil for Food program  to the Coalition Provisional Authority by November 2003. The United  Nations allocated 59 percent of the oil revenue for the 15 central and  southern governorates, which were controlled by the central government;  13 percent for the 3 northern Kurdish governorates; 25 percent for a war  reparations fund for victims of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990; and 3  percent for U.N. administrative costs, including the costs of weapons  inspectors.
In central and southern Iraq, the Iraqi government used the proceeds from  its oil sales to purchase food, medicines, and infrastructure supplies and  equipment. The Iraqi government negotiated directly with suppliers and  distributed food in accordance with its Public Distribution System, a food  ration basket for all Iraqis. In northern Iraq, nine U.N. agencies  implemented the program, primarily through constructing or rehabilitating  schools, health clinics, power generation facilities, and houses. Local  authorities submitted project proposals to the United Nations to consider  and implement. The Iraqi government in Baghdad procured bulk food and  medicines for the northern region, but the World Food Program and the  World Health Organization were responsible for ensuring the delivery of  these items.
From 1997 to 2002, the Oil for Food program was responsible for more  than $67 billion of Iraq’s oil revenue. Through a large portion of this  revenue, the United Nations provided food, medicine, and services to 24  million people and helped the Iraqi government supply goods to 24  economic sectors. In February 2002, the United Nations reported that the  Oil for Food program had considerable success in sectors such as  agriculture, food, health, and nutrition by arresting the decline in living  conditions and improving the nutritional status of the average Iraqi citizen.
section_title: OIOS History, Organization, and Resources
paragraphs: Prior to the creation of OIOS, the United States and other member states  had expressed concern about the ability of the United Nations to conduct  internal oversight. In 1994, the General Assembly established OIOS to  conduct audits, evaluations, inspections, and investigations of U.N.  programs and funds. Its mandate reflects many characteristics of U.S.  inspector general offices in purpose, authority, and budget. Since its  inception, OIOS has submitted its audit reports to the head of the unit  being audited for action and only forwarded to the Secretary General  those reports in which program officials disagreed with audit  recommendations. It also provided certain reports to the General  Assembly. However, in December 2004, the General Assembly passed a  resolution requiring OIOS to publish the titles and summaries of all audit  reports and provide member states with access to these reports on  request.
subsections: section_title: Events Leading to the Creation of OIOS
paragraphs: Before the OIOS was created in July 1994, the United States and other U.N.  member states, the U.S. Congress, and the Government Accountability  Office (GAO) had expressed concern about the United Nations’  management of its resources and had criticized the inadequacies of its  internal oversight mechanisms. In response, the Secretary General  established the Office for Inspections and Investigations in August 1993  under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary General. However, member  states—primarily the United States—wanted a more autonomous  oversight body with greater authority.
In November 1993, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United  Nations proposed the establishment of an “office of inspector general” to  the General Assembly. The office would be headed by an “inspector  general” who, although an integral part of the Secretariat, would carry out  his/her responsibilities independently of the Secretariat and all U.N.  governing bodies. According to the proposal, the office would support  member states and the Secretary General by providing independent advice  based on an examination of all activities carried out at all U.N.  headquarters and field locations financed by the regular budget,  peacekeeping budgets, and voluntary contributions. At the same time, the  new office would have external reporting responsibilities.
In April 1994, Congress enacted Public Law 103-236, which required  certain funds to be withheld from the United Nations until the President  certified that it had established an independent office of inspector general  to conduct and supervise objective audits, investigations, and inspections.  The legislation stated, among other things, that the inspector general  should have access to all records, documents, and offices related to U.N.  programs and operations. The legislation also called for the United  Nations to have procedures to (1) ensure compliance with the inspector  general office’s recommendations and (2) protect the identity of, and  prevent reprisals against, any staff members making a complaint,  disclosing information, or cooperating in any investigation or inspection  by the inspector general’s office.
After a series of negotiations among member states, including the United  States, a compromise was reached. The General Assembly, in July 1994,  approved a resolution creating OIOS within the U.N. Secretariat. OIOS’  mandate reflects many of the characteristics of U.S. inspector general  offices in purpose, authority, and budget. For example, OIOS staff have  access to all records, documents, or other material assets necessary to  fulfill their responsibilities.
OIOS’ reporting mandate calls for it to submit reports to the Secretary  General and the General Assembly. Since its inception, OIOS has generally  submitted its reports to the head of the unit audited. If program officials  disagreed with the report’s recommendations, the report was submitted to  the Secretary General. However, beginning in 1997, OIOS began listing all  its reports in its annual reports to the General Assembly and briefing  representatives of member states interested in a particular report. It also  provided certain reports of interest to the General Assembly. Further  transparency over OIOS audit reports occurred in December 2004 when  the General Assembly approved a resolution calling for OIOS to include in  its annual and semi-annual reports the titles and brief summaries of all  OIOS reports issued during the reporting period. OIOS was also directed  to provide member states with access to original versions of OIOS reports  upon request.
section_title: OIOS Organization and Staffing
paragraphs: As of June 2004, OIOS had 180 posts, including 124 professional staff and  56 general service staff. Staff work in four operational divisions: Internal  Audit Divisions I and II; the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting  Division; and the Investigations Division. The 58 audit reports released on  January 9, 2005, reflect the work of Internal Audit Division I, which  contained a separate unit for Iraq-related work. For 2004, OIOS’ resources  totaled $23.5 million.
OIOS generally conducts four types of activities: audits, evaluations,  inspections, and investigations. Audits determine if internal controls  provide reasonable assurance of the integrity of financial and operational  information and whether rules are followed and resources are  safeguarded. Audits also identify ways to improve the efficient use of  resources and the effectiveness of program management. OIOS’ internal  audit divisions adhere to the Standards for the Professional Practice of  Internal Auditing in the United Nations. These standards regulate issues  related to independence, objectivity, proficiency, management, and the  code of ethics and rules of conduct for auditors.
Inspections address mandates, management issues, or areas of high risk,  make recommendations, and are generally submitted through the  Secretary General to the General Assembly. Evaluations assess the  relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of a program’s outputs and  activities against its objectives. These reports are addressed to the  intergovernmental body—normally the Committee for Program and  Coordination or the General Assembly—that requested the evaluation.
Investigations staff follow up on reports of possible violations of rules or  regulations, mismanagement, misconduct, waste of resources, or abuses of  authority. OIOS also monitors program performance and prepares the  Program Performance Report of the Secretary General, which is submitted  to the General Assembly every 2 years.
The complexity and diversity of the U.N. Oil for Food program and  associated risks called for adequate oversight coverage. In 2000, OIOS  established the Iraq Program Audit Section within the Internal Audit  Division. The Independent Inquiry Committee report stated that the  number of auditors assigned to Oil for Food audits increased from 2 in  1996 to 6 in 2002 and 2003. OIOS’ audit responsibilities extended to the  following entities involved in Iraq operations:    Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) in New York;    U.N. Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq;    U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC);    U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission;    U.N. Human Settlement Program (U.N.-Habitat) Settlement Rehabilitation  Program in northern Iraq;    U.N. Guards Contingent in Iraq; and    U.N. Department of Management.
section_title: Audits Show Recurring Management Weaknesses
paragraphs: The OIOS audits revealed a number of deficiencies in the management of  the Oil for Food program and its assets and made numerous  recommendations to correct these deficiencies. The audits focused  primarily on Oil for Food activities in northern Iraq and at the U.N.  Compensation Commission. OIOS also conducted audits of the three U.N.  contracts for inspecting commodities coming into Iraq and for  independent experts to monitor Iraq’s oil exports.
We identified a total of 702 findings contained in the reports across  numerous programs and sectors. Weaknesses and irregularities were  common in planning and coordination, procurement, and asset and cash  management. Appendix I contains the summary data of our analysis and a  description of our scope and methodology. Our summary below focuses  on key findings for the areas that received the most audit coverage— activities in northern Iraq and the U.N. Compensation Commission. We  also highlight findings from the audits of the inspections contracts.
subsections: section_title: U.N. Oil for Food Program in Northern Iraq
paragraphs: The OIOS audits that reviewed U.N. activities in northern Iraq found  problems with planning and coordination, procurement, and asset and  cash management.
In 2004, OIOS reported that U.N.-Habitat had not adequately coordinated  with other U.N. agencies in providing essential services for its housing  projects. For example, U.N.-Habitat provided high-capacity generators but  had not contacted the U.N. Development Program—the entity responsible  for the power sector—to provide electric power connections. OIOS also  found that about 3,200 houses were unoccupied for extended periods due  to a lack of coordination with agencies providing complementary services.
An August 2000 report noted a lack of planning that resulted in the  questionable viability of some Oil for Food projects in northern Iraq. For  example, six diesel generators were procured in an area where diesel fuel  was not readily available. In addition, local authorities would not accept a  newly constructed health facility subject to flooding. A December 2000  report also noted that highways and a sports stadium were built in  violation of criteria established by the Security Council and the Iraqi  government.
In November 2002, OIOS reported that almost $38 million in procurement  of equipment for the U.N.-Habitat program was not based on a needs  assessment. As a result, 51 generators went unused from September 2000  to March 2002, and 12 generators meant for project-related activities were  converted to office use. In addition, OIOS reported that 11 purchase orders  totaling almost $14 million showed no documentary evidence supporting  the requisitions.
In 2002, OIOS found that the U.N-Habitat program lacked a proper asset  inventory system and that no policies and procedures governing asset  management were evident. As a result, the value of assets was not readily  available. In one case, $1.6 million in excess construction material  remained after most projects were complete.
OIOS also reported that a lack of effective cash management policies  meant that project funds were misused or put at risk. In a March 2000  audit, OIOS reported that the U.N. Development Program’s country office  used $500,000 in project funds for office expenses without authorization or  proper documentation. A February 2002 audit found that the office in Erbil  put at risk $600,000 to $800,000 in cash due to a lack of cash management  policies.
section_title: U.N. Compensation Commission
paragraphs: The U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC), a subsidiary unit of the  Security Council, was established in 1991 to process claims and provide  compensation for losses resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of  Kuwait. Compensation is payable from a special fund that initially received  30 percent of the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales. The claims are resolved by  panels, each of which is made up of three commissioners who are experts  in law, accounting, loss adjustment, assessment of environmental damage,  and engineering, according to UNCC.
The UNCC received more than 2.6 million claims for death, injury, loss of  or damage to property, commercial claims, and claims for environmental  damage resulting from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. As of December  2004, all but about 25,000 of these claims had been resolved, and almost  $19 billion had been paid in compensation, according to UNCC.
In a July 2002 risk assessment of UNCC, OIOS found that controls to  prevent employee fraud were marginal, operations required close  monitoring to prevent possible collusion, possibilities existed for illegal  activities, and payment processing controls were inadequate. The report  concluded that the overcompensation of claims and irregular or fraudulent  activities could lead to significant financial risks.
OIOS audits identified weaknesses in UNCC’s management of claims  processing and payments resulting in recommended downward  adjustments of more than $500 million. For example, in a September 2002  audit, OIOS found potential overpayments of $419 million in compensation  awarded to Kuwait. OIOS identified duplicate payments, calculation  errors, insufficient evidence to support losses, and inconsistent  application of claims methodology.
In a December 2004 audit, OIOS found that using the exchange rate against  the U.S. dollar on the date of the claimed loss, rather than the date of  payment as consistent with U.N. financial rules and regulations, had  resulted in substantial overpayments. OIOS estimated that the likely  overpayments were about $510 million.
Previously in 2002, UNCC had challenged OIOS’ audit authority. In a legal  opinion on OIOS’ authority requested by UNCC, the U.N. Office of Legal  Affairs noted that the audit authority extended to computing the amounts  of compensation but did not extend to reviewing those aspects of the  panels’ work that constitute a legal process. However, OIOS disputed the  legal opinion, noting that its mandate was to review and appraise the use  of financial resources of the United Nations. OIOS believed that the  opinion would effectively restrict any meaningful audit of the claims  process.
As a result of the legal opinion, UNCC did not respond to many OIOS  observations and recommendations, considering them beyond the scope  of an audit. According to OIOS, UNCC accepted about $3.3 million of the  more than $500 million in recommended claims reductions. On the audit of  $419 million in potential overpayments to Kuwait, OIOS noted that it  received the workpapers to conduct the audit 8 days after the award was  made.
section_title: Contracts to Inspect Oil Exports and Commodity Deliveries
paragraphs: To help ensure that the proceeds of Iraq’s oil sales were used for  humanitarian and administrative purposes, the United Nations contracted  with companies to monitor Iraq’s oil exports and commodity imports.  OIOS audits of these contracts revealed procurement problems and poor  contract management and oversight by OIP.
The United Nations contracted with Saybolt Eastern Hemisphere B.V. to  oversee the export of oil and oil products from Iraq through approved  export points. At the time of the audit report in July 2002, the estimated  total value of the contract was $21.3 million, with an annual contract value  of $5.3 million. OIOS found that OIP had made no inspection visits to Iraq  and posted no contract management staff in Iraq. However, OIP had  certified that Saybolt’s compliance with the contract was satisfactory and  approved extensions to the contract. In addition, OIOS estimated that the  United Nations paid $1 million more than was necessary because  equipment costs were already built into the inspectors’ daily fee structure.  OIOS asserted that these costs should have been charged as a one-time  expenditure. OIOS recommended that OIP recover the $1 million paid for  equipment and that future contracts provide for equipment purchases as  one-time expenditures. OIP did not respond to the auditors’ first  recommendation and did not agree with the second recommendation.
The first contract for inspecting imported commodities was with Lloyds’  Register Inspection Ltd.; the initial 6-month contract was for $4.5 million,  and the total value of the contract increased to more than $25 million by  July 1999. Lloyds’ agents were to monitor, verify, inspect, test, and  authenticate humanitarian supplies imported into Iraq at three entry  points.
In July 1999, OIOS found deficiencies in OIP’s oversight of Lloyds’  contract. OIP had certified Lloyd’s invoices for payment without any on- site verification or inspection reports. OIOS reported that Lloyds’ used  suppliers’ manifests to authenticate the weight of bulk cargo and did not  independently test the quality of medicines and vaccines supplied. In  responding to the audit’s findings, OIP rejected the call for on-site  inspections and stated that any dissatisfaction with Lloyds’ services should  come from the suppliers or their home countries.
OIP awarded a new contract to Cotecna Inspection S.A. Similar to Lloyd’s,  Cotecna was to verify that the description, value, quantity, and quality of  supplies arriving in Iraq were in accordance with the criteria established  by the sanctions committee. In April 2003, OIOS cited concerns about  procurement issues and amendments and extensions to Cotecna’s original  $4.9 million contract. Specifically, OIOS found that, 4 days after the  contract was signed, OIP increased Cotecna’s contract by $356,000. The  amendment included additional costs for communication equipment and  operations that OIOS asserted were included in the original contract. OIP  agreed to amend future contracts to ensure that procurement documents  include all requirements, thus eliminating the need to amend contracts.
section_title: Various Factors Affected Audit Coverage and Effectiveness
paragraphs: OIOS’ audits and summary reports revealed a number of deficiencies in  the management and internal controls of the Oil for Food program,  particularly in northern Iraq. The reports also identified problems in  UNCC’s claims processing resulting in significant overpayments. However,  OIOS did not examine certain headquarters functions responsible for  overseeing the humanitarian commodity contracts for central and  southern Iraq. Limitations on OIOS’ resources and reporting hampered its  coverage of the Oil for Food program and its effectiveness as an oversight  tool.
OIOS did not examine certain headquarters functions—particularly OIP’s  oversight of the contracts for central and southern Iraq that accounted for  59 percent or almost $40 billion in Oil for Food proceeds. The Iraqi  government used these funds to purchase goods and equipment for central  and southern Iraq and food and medical supplies for the entire country. As  we reported in 2004, the Iraqi government’s ability to negotiate contracts  directly with the suppliers of commodities was an important factor in  enabling Iraq to levy illegal commissions.
OIP was responsible for examining contracts for price and value at its New  York headquarters. In addition, the U.N. sanctions committee reviewed  contracts primarily to remove dual-use items that Iraq could use in its  weapons programs. However, it remains unclear which U.N. entity  reviewed Iraq contracts for price reasonableness.
OIOS did not assess the humanitarian contracts or OIP’s roles and  responsibilities and its relationship with the sanctions committee. OIOS  believed that these contracts were outside its purview because the  sanctions committee was responsible for their approval. OIP management  also steered OIOS toward program activities in Iraq rather than  headquarters functions where OIP reviewed the humanitarian contracts.
Even when OIOS requested funds to conduct an assessment of OIP  operations, the funds were denied. For example, in May 2002, OIP’s  executive director did not approve a request to conduct a risk assessment  of OIP’s Program Management Division, citing financial reasons. The  Committee also noted that the practice of allowing the heads of programs  the right to fund internal audit activities leads to excluding high-risk areas  from internal audit examination. The Committee therefore recommended  that the Internal Audit Division’s budgets and staffing levels for all  activities be submitted directly to the General Assembly.
In addition, OIOS assigned only 2 to 6 auditors to cover the Oil for Food  program. The Committee found that this level of staffing was low  compared to OIOS’ oversight of peacekeeping operations. In addition, the  U.N. Board of Auditors indicated that 12 auditors were needed for every  $1 billion in U.N. expenditures. The Committee concluded that the Oil for  Food program should therefore have had more than 160 auditors at its  height in 2000. However, the Committee found no instances in which OIOS  communicated broad concerns about insufficient staff levels to U.N.  management.
OIOS also encountered problems in its efforts to widen the distribution of  its reporting beyond the head of the agency audited. In August 2000, OIOS  proposed to send its reports to the Security Council. However, the  Committee reported that the OIP director opposed this proposal, stating  that it would compromise the division of responsibility between internal  and external audit. In addition, the U.N. Deputy Secretary General denied  the request and OIOS subsequently abandoned any efforts to report  directly to the Security Council.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The internal audits provide important information on the management of  the Oil for Food program, particularly in the north, and on the  management of the commission that compensates claims for war damages  with proceeds from Iraq’s oil sales—two areas that have received little  public attention. The reports also broaden the findings of the Independent  Inquiry Committee’s report, particularly with respect to the inadequacies  in the award of the oil and customs inspections contracts. However, many  unanswered questions remain about the management and failings of the  Oil for Food program, particularly the oversight roles of OIP and the  Security Council’s sanctions committee.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee members may have.
section_title: Appendix I: Summary of OIOS Audit Findings and Recommendations
paragraphs: We reviewed the 58 reports released by the Independent Inquiry  Committee to determine the scope of the audits and the issues addressed  in the reports’ findings and recommendations. We created a data base of  information from 50 reports to identify the program elements that the  audits reviewed, the findings of each audit, and the recommendations for  improvement. To identify audit scope, we identified the extent to which  the audits addressed Oil for Food headquarters operations, U.N.  Secretariat Treasury operations in New York, U.N. operations in the  northern Iraq, and the U.N. Compensation Commission for disbursing  claims for damage caused by the 1991 Persian Gulf War. To determine the  range of issues addressed by the audits, we identified the kinds of issues  raised by the findings and determined that the audits addressed the  following issues: (1) procurement and contract management and  oversight; (2) financial management, including financial controls,  management of funds, and procedures for payments; (3) asset  management, including inventory, and the management of fixed assets  such as vehicles, buildings, and supplies; (4) personnel and staffing; (5)  project planning, coordination, and oversight; (6) security; and (7)  information technology. We established a protocol to identify findings for  data input, and we identified specific recommendations in the audit  reports. To ensure consistency of data input, a data base manager  reviewed all input, and all data input was independently validated. Table 1  presents the summary of overall findings and recommendations in OIOS  reports. Table 2 presents these findings by area of U.N. operation.