Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities
Published: 2009-01-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State), a global strategy for nuclear detection--a system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities domestically and abroad. GAO was asked to examine (1) DNDO's progress in developing programs to address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling domestically, (2) DNDO's role in supporting other agencies' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, and (3) the amount budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for programs that constitute the global nuclear detection strategy. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documents; interviewed agency, state, and local officials; and visited select pilot program locations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DNDO has made some progress in strengthening radiation detection capabilities to address critical gaps and vulnerabilities in combating nuclear smuggling, which include the land border area between ports of entry into the United States, aviation, and small maritime vessels. However, DNDO is still in the early stages of program development, and has not clearly developed long term plans, with costs and time frames, for achieving its goal of closing these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. For example, DNDO and Customs and Border Protection have been collaborating on radiological and nuclear detection options to better secure the land borders between ports of entry. However, DNDO-sponsored field evaluations to test radiation detection equipment are still not complete and DNDO and CBP may not have all radiation detection equipment in place until 2012. In addition, DNDO is in the first year of a 3-year maritime pilot program, working with the Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies in the Puget Sound, Washington, area to field test equipment and to develop radiological and nuclear screening procedures. However, DNDO has made little progress in (1) developing criteria for assessing the success of the pilot to help determine whether it should be expanded to other locations, and (2) resolving some of the challenges it faces in the pilot program, such as technological limitations of the detection equipment and sustaining current detection efforts. Although DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies' programs to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has worked with DOD, DOE, and State to provide subject matter expertise and exchange lessons learned on radiological and nuclear detection. However, most of DNDO's efforts are modest in scope, reflecting the fact that these agencies have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling. For example, DNDO has been working with State's Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model guidelines that other nations can use to establish their own nuclear detection programs. According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State in fiscal year 2007 for programs included in the global strategy for nuclear detection. Of this amount, approximately $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, $1.1 billion was budgeted for nuclear detection programs at the U.S. border and within the United States, and approximately $577 million was budgeted to fund cross-cutting activities, such as providing technical support to users of the radiation detection equipment. DNDO collected budget data and published them in the Joint Annual Interagency Review, an annual report required by Congress. DOD, DOE, and State officials told GAO that this information is used primarily as a status report of individual programs to combat nuclear smuggling. It is not used as a tool to help plan for or inform the future direction of the strategy or to help establish current or future priorities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Preventing terrorists from using radiological or nuclear material to carry  Preventing terrorists from using radiological or nuclear material to carry  out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. If terrorists  out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. If terrorists  were to carry out such an attack, the consequences could be devastating  were to carry out such an attack, the consequences could be devastating  to national security. Since the events of September 11, 2001, there is  to national security. Since the events of September 11, 2001, there is  heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle radiological and  heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle radiological and  nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States or obtain  nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States or obtain  such materials within the United States. In 2002, Congress established the  such materials within the United States. In 2002, Congress established the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and gave it authority to, among  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and gave it authority to, among  other things, develop and deploy technologies to detect, prevent, and  other things, develop and deploy technologies to detect, prevent, and  interdict nuclear materials or devices from being transported into and  interdict nuclear materials or devices from being transported into and  used within the United States.  used within the United States.
In April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing the Domestic  In April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing the Domestic  Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within DHS, to enhance and coordinate  Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within DHS, to enhance and coordinate  federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear attacks.  federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear attacks.  Congress subsequently passed the Security and Accountability for Every  Congress subsequently passed the Security and Accountability for Every  Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), which established DNDO in statute.  Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), which established DNDO in statute.  DNDO is responsible for coordinating the implementation  United States.
Pub. L. No. 109-347, section 501, 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (2006).
Neither the presidential directive nor the SAFE Port Act, which established DNDO and  directed the agency to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, defined the term  “architecture.” DNDO has interpreted “architecture” as a time-phased, geographic approach  to reducing the risk of a radiological or nuclear attack. For the purposes of this report, we  refer to the architecture as a strategy.
DOD, DOE, and State, among other agencies, are responsible for programs  to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling outside the United States.
In its initial approach, DNDO categorized existing nuclear detection  programs into three main geographic regions—overseas, U.S. border, and  U.S. interior—which it further divided into nine more specific geographic  segments. In addition, agencies identified other programs that support  more than one segment; DNDO categorizes these as cross-cutting. While  DNDO is responsible for developing the global strategy for nuclear  detection, each federal agency that has a role in combating nuclear  smuggling is responsible for implementing its own programs. DNDO  identified 73 federal programs, which are primarily funded by DOD, DOE,  and DHS, that engage in radiological and nuclear detection activities.
Since its inception about 4 years ago, DNDO has been examining nuclear  detection strategies along potential pathways—such as air, land, or sea— for smuggling radiological or nuclear material and identified opportunities  to improve the likelihood of detection and interdiction. Through these  studies, DNDO concluded that potential smuggling pathways outside of  traditional ports of entry—where U.S. government efforts have been  focused—represented critical gaps in the existing nuclear detection  strategy. Specifically, DNDO identified several gap areas, among others,  with respect to detecting potential nuclear smuggling and prioritized its  efforts on three primary pathways: (1) land border areas between ports of  entry into the United States, (2) aviation, and (3) small maritime craft.
These pathways are important because of their size, volume of traffic, and  limited deployment of radiological and nuclear detection capabilities.  Specifically, the United States has more than 6,000 miles of land border  with many locations where people and vehicles can easily enter the United  States. Nuclear weapons and material also can be small and portable  enough to be carried on most aircraft. On average, nearly 2,000  international commercial flights and over 400 international general  aviation flights land in the United States each day. In the maritime  environment, a Coast Guard risk assessment revealed that small boats  pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling than container ships. There are  at least 13 million registered domestic pleasure craft in the United States  and 110,000 commercial fishing vessels. These small boats have  traditionally been used to smuggle drugs and people, but, as occurred in  the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, can be used to deliver a weapon.
GAO was asked to examine (1) DNDO’s progress in developing programs  to address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling domestically,   (2) DNDO’s role in supporting other agencies’ efforts to combat nuclear  smuggling overseas, and (3) the amount budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and  State for programs that constitute the global nuclear detection strategy  and the extent to which the budget information is used for planning  purposes. In addition, we are providing an update on DNDO’s efforts to  implement the recommendation made in our July 2008 testimony, which  presented preliminary observations on the global strategy for nuclear  detection.
To evaluate the status of DNDO’s progress in developing programs to  address critical gaps and its role in supporting other agencies’ efforts to  combat nuclear smuggling overseas, we reviewed and analyzed documents  DNDO used to help create the baseline, or initial strategy, as well as  DNDO-sponsored studies on gaps identified in the strategy. We also  reviewed our previous reports on nuclear and radiological detection. We  interviewed officials from DNDO about steps taken to develop and  improve upon the existing strategy for nuclear detection and interviewed  agency officials from DOD, DOE, and State who manage programs that are  part of the global strategy to obtain their perspectives on how these  programs fit into the global strategy and to learn about any new initiatives  to address gaps and vulnerabilities. In addition, we interviewed officials  from a variety of federal, state, and local agencies—including Customs and  Border Protection (CBP), the Coast Guard, the New York City Police  Department, and local law enforcement participating in the Puget Sound  maritime pilot—to obtain their views on DNDO’s initiatives to combat  nuclear smuggling. We chose the New York City Police Department  because of its efforts to enhance nuclear detection capabilities through the  Securing the Cities initiative and Puget Sound because that was the first  location chosen for the maritime radiological and nuclear detection pilot  program. We also interviewed subject matter experts from the academic  and nonprofit sectors, as well as representatives from the International  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to gain their perspective on efforts to  develop and implement the strategy. To examine the amount budgeted for  the programs that constitute the global strategy for nuclear detection, we  analyzed budget data submitted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State to DNDO  as part of DNDO’s Joint Annual Interagency Review and spoke with  officials from these agencies to discern how this information was used. We  assessed the reliability of these data and determined it was sufficient for  the purposes of this analysis. We conducted this performance audit from  November 2007 through January 2009 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we  plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2006, there were 1,080 confirmed  incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities involving nuclear  and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of these cases involved  weapons-usable material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—that  could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA also reported that 124  cases involved materials that could be used to produce a device that uses  conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty  bomb”). Past confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in highly enriched  uranium and plutonium involved seizures of kilogram quantities of  weapons-usable nuclear material but most have involved very small  quantities. In some of these cases, it is possible that the seized material  was a sample of larger quantities available for illegal purchase. IAEA  concluded that these materials pose a continuous potential security threat  to the international community, including the United States.
Nuclear material could be smuggled into the United States in a variety of  ways: hidden in a car, train or ship; sent through the mail; carried in a  private aircraft or small boat; carried in personal luggage through an  airport; or walked across the border. In response to these threats, U.S.  agencies—including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State—fund, manage, and  implement programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and  the United States. DOD, DOE, and State are responsible specifically for the  overseas programs. Many of these programs started operations prior to  DNDO’s creation and collectively cover all of the geographic regions of the  global strategy. (See fig. 1.)
For example, DOE’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting  program, initiated in 1995, provides support to the Russian Federation and  other former Soviet Union countries to secure nuclear weapons and  weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion. In addition,  during the 1990s, the United States began deploying radiation detection  equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. DOD’s  Cooperative Threat Reduction program was established in the early 1990s  to help address proliferation concerns in the former Soviet Union,  including helping secure sites where nuclear weapons are located. Two  other DOD programs have provided radiation portal monitors, hand-held  equipment, and radiation detection training to countries in the former  Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Similarly, DOE’s Second Line of  Defense program, initiated in 1998, supplies radiation detection  equipment, training, and communication systems to Russia and other  countries. DOE’s Megaports Initiative, also part of the Second Line of  Defense program, began in 2003 and is focused on providing radiation  detection systems at major international seaports. Once the equipment is  installed, it is then operated by foreign government officials and port  personnel working at these ports. State also has programs that provide  radiation detection equipment and training to numerous countries.
Domestically, DHS, in conjunction with other federal, state, and local  agencies, is responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in the United  States and has provided radiation detection equipment, including portal  monitors, personal radiation detectors (known as pagers), and radioactive  isotope identifiers at U.S. ports of entry, as well as in other settings. For  example, DHS has equipped Coast Guard boarding and inspection teams  with portable detection systems and has provided equipment, training, and  assistance in other maritime, air, and land venues. In addition, DOE has  programs to secure nuclear and radioactive sources domestically. For  example, the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program recovers and  manages excess and unwanted radioactive sources that belong to U.S.  licensees. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as 35  states that have signed an agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission, are responsible for regulating the security of radioactive and  nuclear materials within the United States through its Radiological  Materials and Reactor Security Programs.
Several types of radiation detection equipment are used by CBP, the Coast  Guard, and other agencies involved in radiological and nuclear detection  activities: radiation portal monitors, radioactive isotope identification  devices (RIID), and personal radiation detectors, among others. Portal  monitors are stationary or mobile pieces of equipment that can detect  radioactive materials carried by vehicles or transported in cargo  containers. RIIDs are a type of handheld radiation detection equipment  that can detect radiation as well as identify the specific isotope of the  radioactive source. Personal radiation detectors are worn by CBP officials,  Coast Guard boarding teams, and other law enforcement agents. Unlike  portal monitors and RIIDs, personal radiation pagers function primarily as  personal safety devices to alert the individual wearer when he or she is  exposed to an increased level of radiation. Under certain circumstances  these devices also could be used to detect smuggled nuclear material.  However, they can only indicate variations in the general level of radiation  and their sensitivity is limited because of the small size of the detector.  Therefore, they should not be relied upon for that purpose.
All radiation detection devices have limitations in their ability to detect  and identify nuclear material. Detecting attempted nuclear smuggling is  difficult because many sources of radiation are legal and not harmful when  used as intended. These materials can trigger alarms—known as nuisance  or innocent alarms—that may be difficult to distinguish in some cases  from alarms that could sound in the event of a true case of nuclear  smuggling without a thorough secondary inspection. Nuisance or innocent  alarms can be caused by patients who have recently had cancer  treatments, a wide range of cargo with naturally occurring radiation (e.g.,  fertilizer, ceramics, and food products), and legitimate shipments of  radiological sources for use in medicine and industry. Additionally,  detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-useable nuclear  material is complicated: one of the materials of greatest concern in terms  of proliferation—highly enriched uranium—is among the most difficult  materials to detect because of its relatively low level of radioactivity.
DNDO is currently testing the next generation of radiation portal  monitors—the advanced spectroscopic portal monitor, or ASP. We have  repeatedly raised concerns about DNDO’s efforts to develop and test  ASPs. Specifically, we found that testing of ASPs at DOE’s Nevada Test  Site did not represent an objective or rigorous assessment because DNDO  used biased test methods that enhanced the apparent performance of the  ASPs and did not test the limitations of the ASPs’ detection capabilities.  In 2008, we also found that DNDO’s cost estimate to equip U.S. ports of  entry with radiation detection equipment is unreliable because it omits  major project costs and relies on a flawed methodology. Furthermore, the  agency is no longer following the original project execution plan, the  scope of the agency’s current ASP deployment strategy has changed, and  DNDO now plans a much more limited deployment of the ASP than  initially proposed. The current ASP testing is expected to continue into  2009.
section_title: DNDO Is in the Early Stages of Enhancing Domestic Initiatives for Nuclear Detection
paragraphs: DNDO’s ultimate goal is to expand radiological and nuclear detection  capabilities to areas identified as vulnerable to nuclear smuggling. To that  end, in 2005, DNDO identified critical gaps in domestic efforts to prevent  and detect radiological and nuclear smuggling, including, but not limited  to: (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States,   (2) aviation, and (3) small maritime craft. However, DNDO is still in the  early stages of developing initiatives to address these vulnerabilities, and it  has not clearly articulated a long-term plan for how to achieve its goal of  closing these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection  capabilities in the time frames identified.
Land border areas between ports of entry. The United States has more  than 6,000 miles of land border susceptible to illegal crossings by people  and vehicles. DNDO began addressing this gap in 2005 and currently is  jointly working with CBP to equip Border Patrol agents—who are  responsible for patrolling the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico—with  portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment by 2012. Portability  is critical to strengthening radiation detection efforts because it expands  the opportunity to detect a potential radiological threat should a Border  Patrol agent encounter one. To date, as part of a phased approach, DNDO  and CBP have tested and evaluated radiation detection equipment and  CBP developed operating procedures for using the equipment and  resolving radiation alarms along the southern U.S. border. However,  similar tests along the northern U.S. border have been postponed.  Specifically, DNDO and CBP originally scheduled equipment testing along  the southern border for January 2008 and along the northern border for  March 2008. However, they did not actually begin testing along the  southern border until May 2008. According to a CBP official, DNDO  explained that this schedule slip was caused by a delay in selecting the  equipment for the test. DNDO told us that it chose to conduct an  additional review of commercially available detection equipment before  field testing, which caused these tests to be delayed. As a result of  preliminary findings from the field tests, DNDO and CBP decided in  November 2008 to indefinitely postpone the previously scheduled tests  along the northern border. According to these agencies, the preliminary  test results indicated that further technological improvements will be  necessary before the portable radiation detection equipment can be  distributed more widely for use in this environment. Full distribution of  equipment along the land border areas between ports of entry is  contingent on completing these field evaluations and entails providing  detection equipment and operating procedures to all 20 Border Patrol  sectors across the United States. Assuming no further schedule and  technological delays, the radiation detection equipment to help secure the  U.S. land border areas between ports of entry may not be fully in place  until fiscal year 2012. According to DNDO, the agency requested a total of  $33.6 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for such initiatives, but it has  not estimated the total cost for this effort beyond those years.
One of DNDO’s roles in supporting the effort to close gaps in the land  border area between ports of entry is to procure and supply detection  equipment to CBP. However, according to CBP officials, in fiscal year  2008, DNDO did not procure needed radiation detection equipment in a  timely manner. Specifically, CBP’s Office of Field Operations—responsible  for official ports of entry—and its Office of Border Patrol requested  approximately 240 additional RIIDs. However, according to CBP officials,  DNDO did not fill its procurement needs. As of November 2008, only 64 of  the 240 devices requested had been delivered to CBP. This situation is  particularly problematic for the Border Patrol because its agents do not  have enough RIIDs to meet their current patrol needs, according to a  Border Patrol official.
Aviation. Because nuclear weapons and material can be small and  portable enough to be carried on most aircraft, CBP, with the support of  DNDO, has been working on initiatives to screen all incoming  international planes, cargo, and passengers. Although progress has been  made on screening international general aviation, many of the other  initiatives are either in their initial phases or still on the drawing board and  it is unclear how long it will take or how much it will cost to complete  these initiatives. In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, DNDO has requested a total  of $35 million for aviation-related activities;  however, it has not  estimated the costs of these initiatives beyond the near term.
Since December 2007, CBP has been screening 100 percent of arriving  international general aviation aircraft (approximately 400 flights per day)  for radiological and nuclear material. According to DNDO officials, such  efforts are being included in the strategy for the first time. To assist with  the international general aviation initiative, DNDO managed the testing  and evaluation of radiation detection devices in close coordination with  CBP officials to ensure that the technology and operating procedures  would be consistent with CBP’s responsibilities to screen all aircraft  arriving from outside the United States. Specifically, in 2008, DNDO, in  partnership with CBP, tested portable radiation detection equipment for  use in scanning small, medium, and large international general aviation  aircraft and assessed whether CBP screening procedures needed to be  modified.
While CBP has made progress in ensuring that appropriate operating  procedures for using the equipment and resolving radiation alarms are  established and all international general aviation is screened, its other  aviation initiatives have not proceeded as smoothly or have not yet begun.  CBP is working with DNDO on an initiative to screen international air  cargo for radiological and nuclear material and has chosen Dulles  International Airport as the first location for this screening. According to  DNDO, this airport was chosen first because it has one gate through which  all cargo travels. However, because both international and domestic cargo  pass through this gate, the start of operations was delayed until September  2008 due to jurisdictional issues between CBP and TSA—CBP is  responsible for screening international cargo for radiological and nuclear  material and TSA for scanning domestic cargo for explosives. The two  agencies had to reach an agreement allowing CBP to screen all cargo for  radiological and nuclear material, regardless of origin. (Fig. 2 shows cargo  moving through a stationary radiation portal monitor at Dulles  International Airport.)
In October 2008, we visited Dulles to observe this operation, including a  demonstration of radiation detection capabilities. CBP sent a vehicle  containing a small sample of Cesium-137—a radiological material that is  considered a highly attractive source for the purpose of a radiological  dispersal device, or dirty bomb—through the detection equipment.  Cesium-137, which is generally in the form of a powder similar to talc, is  highly dispersible. CBP uses this sample to routinely test equipment.  However, the detection equipment failed to sound an alarm until the  material had passed through it for a third time. CBP officials told us that  this source material triggered an alarm during a test earlier that week, and  attributed the problems with this demonstration to either the shielding of  the source material by the vehicle or to a weak signal given off by the  material because it may be nearing the end of its usable life.
CBP plans to have cargo screening at the 30 U.S. airports that account for  99 percent of incoming international cargo by 2014. However, because  cargo processing at Dulles is simpler than at other airports, due to the  configuration of its cargo area, CBP officials acknowledged that their plan  is very ambitious. According to CBP officials, expanding the cargo  screening initiative to larger, more complicated airports will require CBP  to devise different operational procedures and possibly develop new  detection technology. DNDO and CBP also plan to cooperate with other  federal agencies on an initiative to screen passengers and baggage from  international commercial flights. However, according to DNDO, it is still  working on the basic approach for this initiative, such as where to locate  passenger and baggage scanning equipment in an airport. To date, DNDO  and CBP have initiated a pilot program for screening international  passengers and their baggage at airports. In fiscal year 2008, they  completed site surveys at five airports in order to develop requirements  for testing planned for fiscal year 2009.
Current aviation initiatives focus on radiation detection both prior to  departure from a foreign location and after the aircraft lands in the United  States. Ultimately, DNDO and CBP would like the detection of radiological  and nuclear materials to occur as far outside of U.S. borders as possible— at the point of departure instead of the point of entry. For example, rather  than screening international general aviation once the plane arrives in the  United States, it would be preferrable to screen the plane at the country  from which it departs. However, such a strategy would rely on negotiating  agreements with foreign governments, which could prove challenging  given concerns about sovereignty and rights of access. Furthermore,  DNDO officials were uncertain when and if agreements could be reached  with enough foreign governments to establish a more effective aviation  strategy. As of December 2008, DHS has concluded agreements with  Ireland and Aruba to include radiological and nuclear screening of  international general aviation aircraft in these countries.
Small maritime vessels. A Coast Guard analysis revealed that small boats  pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling than transporting illicit  material in shipping containers, according to a senior Coast Guard  official. These small boats, which include maritime craft less than 300  gross tons, number in the millions. DNDO efforts related to radiological  and nuclear detection on small maritime vessels are part of a larger DHS  effort—the Small Vessel Security Strategy. This strategy recognizes a  number of risks that small vessels pose, including serving as a vehicle to  smuggle weapons or terrorists into the United States, and using the boat  itself as an improvised explosive device. DHS is working to develop a  Small Vessel Security Strategy implementation plan, which will, among  other things, identify needed research, development, and testing, and  recommend actions for future efforts and put the strategy into action. To  address one of the vulnerabilities, DNDO has been working since 2005  with multiple federal agencies, including the Coast Guard and CBP, as well  as state and local agencies, to develop and expand capabilities to detect  radiological and nuclear materials that could be smuggled on small  maritime craft. Coast Guard and CBP are responsible for developing the  screening procedures and making decisions about what vessels are to be  screened; DNDO provides the radiological and nuclear detection  equipment. Coast Guard and DNDO have entered into a Joint Acquisition  Strategy to update the current Coast Guard detection technology  inventory, as well as to acquire new equipment if necessary.
There are a number of challenges associated with radiological detection  capabilities in the maritime environment that have limited DNDO’s ability  to roll this initiative out widely. Specifically, these agencies have a pilot  project underway in Puget Sound, Washington, to field-test equipment and  develop standard operating procedures for detecting and interdicting  radiological and nuclear materials on small vessels. DNDO chose Puget  Sound because of its proximity to Vancouver, Canada, the host of the 2010  Winter Olympics; its military and economic significance; and the large  number of commercial and recreational vessels. DNDO is also expanding  this pilot to San Diego, California, where it has conducted an initial  assessment of the area and briefed officials about the program. DNDO  selected San Diego as a pilot location because of its proximity to Mexico,  geographic configuration, and many military facilities. DNDO is currently  in the first year of a 3-year pilot program; the Puget Sound and San Diego  operations are scheduled to be completed in December 2010. According to  DNDO’s data for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the agency requested   $14.7 million for the pilot project and a total of $54.2 million for these and  other maritime initiatives.
One significant challenge in developing maritime radiological and nuclear  detection efforts is sustaining them beyond the original pilot projects;  DNDO has not yet developed plans for doing so. In addition to the Coast  Guard and CBP, state and local governments play a key role in maritime  law enforcement activities. For example, in Puget Sound, the majority of  the law enforcement personnel and equipment available for radiological  and nuclear detection belong to the 15 state, tribal, and local agencies  participating in the pilot. However, these agencies generally have limited  resources, making it difficult to expand their mission to include  radiological and nuclear detection. Furthermore, these agencies have  competing demands and could choose to fund other priorities. Although  DNDO is providing these agencies with the initial equipment, support,  training, and maintenance during the Puget Sound and San Diego pilots, it  is expecting them to seek funding from federal grant programs to sustain  these initiatives. For many state and local agency officials we spoke with,  the uncertainty of federal resources jeopardizes their ability to continue  radiological and nuclear detection activities. According to one local sheriff  from Washington state, if funding to maintain and support radiation  detection equipment provided during the pilot disappears, his department  will not continue radiological and nuclear detection activities.
Other state and local agencies participating in the Puget Sound pilot also  emphasized the difficulty in keeping personnel trained on detection  equipment without additional federal support beyond the current pilot  project. Because maritime law enforcement personnel may not frequently  need to use the equipment, future training is necessary to ensure that that  they maintain their skills. However, without the additional resources  currently provided by DNDO, state and local agencies would have  difficulty covering the costs associated with ongoing training, including  overtime salaries for personnel who have to take on the regular duties of  those being trained.
Given these state and local concerns, DNDO’s strategy for sustaining such  programs appears problematic. According to DNDO officials, sustaining  the existing pilot programs will be the responsibility of the local  jurisdictions through a well-established federal grants process.  Specifically, DNDO anticipates that funding for these programs will come  from Homeland Security grants, Urban Areas Security Initiative grants,  and the DHS Port Security Grant Program. However, DNDO currently does  not have a plan detailing which locations it would target next for the  maritime program, nor has it estimated the total cost of this initiative.
According to DNDO officials, the office has focused first on just two  locations in order to determine whether maritime screening of small  vessels for radiological and nuclear material is feasible and to gather  lessons learned that can be used to minimize challenges and develop  operating procedures for using the radiation detection equipment and  resolving radiation alarms in other areas. However, DNDO has not  established criteria for assessing the success of this pilot effort to help  determine whether it should be expanded to other locations. Should its  concept for detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear material  smuggled on small maritime vessels prove feasible, DNDO plans to  develop guidance so that state and local law enforcement agencies can  implement their own maritime radiological and nuclear detection  programs.
In addition, unlike radiation detection technology for land or aviation,  technology in the maritime environment is relatively undeveloped and  poses unique challenges. For example, the level of background radiation in  water differs from the level of background radiation on land, which affects  the capability of equipment to detect and identify certain types of  radioactive material. Furthermore, the equipment needs to be water  resistant and designed so that it can be used by agents who need their  hands free to board and climb around ships. To date, DNDO has, among  other things, tested boat-mounted radiation detectors, detection  equipment that can be carried in a backpack, and handheld radiological  detection and identification devices that can withstand exposure to water.  Nevertheless, the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment in the  maritime environment remains limited. For example:    The boat-mounted radiation equipment is unable to indicate the direction  of the radioactive material causing the alarm, making it difficult to identify  the potential threat in an open sea with many small vessels, according to a  local law enforcement officer we spoke with. CBP Air and Marine officers  also expressed uncertainty about how boat-mounted detection equipment,  which has been tested only in a fairly controlled lake environment, will  work in a more turbulent open sea environment, where it is more difficult  to detect and determine radioactive material. DNDO officials told us that a  fiscal year 2009 initiative will assess boat-mounted detection systems in  real-world environments.
The backpack radiation equipment works best when physically worn by  someone, according to a DNDO official. However, Coast Guard officers  already have a difficult time maneuvering through the small passageways  on boats with the current equipment they must wear. (Fig. 3 shows a Coast  Guard officer wearing standard boarding team equipment, without a  backpack.) The backpacks have the potential to further decrease officers’  maneuverability and their ability to inspect boats.
If a hand-held radiological detection and identification device is  accidentally dropped overboard, it does not float and can withstand being  submerged under only 30 feet of water. These handheld devices cost  $15,000 per unit, making them expensive to replace.
DNDO has also delayed in rolling out radiation detection equipment to the  agencies engaged in its maritime initiatives. Although federal, state, and  local agencies in the Puget Sound pilot determined their equipment needs  in April 2008 and submitted this request to DNDO, they have received little  equipment. According to a DNDO official, DNDO was slow to process the  order and once it was placed, the manufacturer was unable to fill the order  in a timely manner and did not immediately notify DNDO of this delay.  According to DNDO, once it was notified of the delay from the vender, it  borrowed units from the Coast Guard so that the pilot could proceed. Of  the 362 personal radiation detectors ordered, 95 had been delivered as of  October 2008. However, the order may not be completely filled until early  2009.
DNDO, in coordination with the Coast Guard, the New York City Police  Department (NYPD), and other state and local agencies, is also engaged in  maritime nuclear detection activities in the New York City area as part of  the Securing the Cities initiative. This initiative is intended to enhance  protection and response capabilities in and around high-risk urban area by designing a system to detect and interdict illicit radioactive materials  that may be used as a weapon. As with the Puget Sound pilot, the agencie involved in the initiative’s maritime activities do not presently have  enough equipment to meet their needs, according to officials particip ating  in the Securing the Cities initiative. For example, the Coast Guard has one  boat, with radiation detection equipment provided by DOE, and the NYPD  has two boats with radiation detection equipment. However, NYPD  officials told us that the NYPD has another 28 boats that need to be  equipped with radiation detection technology and these equipment  purchases depend on the availability of future federal grant funding.
section_title: DNDO Has Limited Role in Influencing U.S. Efforts to Combat Radiologi and Nuclear Smuggling Ov
paragraphs: lthough DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies’ programs to  A combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has exchanged  lessons learned with DOD, DOE, and State and provided technical  expertise on radiological and nuclear detection equipment. Howeve r, most  of DNDO’s efforts are modest in scope and reflect the fact that DOD, DOE,  and State have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling  overseas. DNDO officials told us that their efforts to develop a more  comprehensive approach to global nuclear detection are very comple because each agency has a distinct area of authority. Areas in which  DNDO has been able to contribute to other agencies’ overseas progra include the following:    DOD. DNDO has been working with DOD, among other agencies, to  develop radiation detection equipment and to minimize duplication o f  research efforts. For example, DNDO and DOD are collaborating throu the National Institute for Standards and Technology to develop  interagency standards and common practices for testing and eva radiation detection systems. These standards will be threat based and wi state the minimum detection capability that certain radiation detection  systems should have to perform their purpose.
D addressing gaps in DOE’s overseas radiation detection programs that are similar to those DNDO has been working on domestically. For example,  DOE’s Second Line of Defense program had focused more on placing fixe detectors at particular sites. However, as a result of DOE’s review of its  existing nuclear detection programs and its discussion with other  agencies, including DNDO, DOE officials told us the agency has be work with law enforcement officials in other countries to improve  detection capabilities for the land between ports of entry. DOE officials  OE. DNDO has been collaborating with DOE to develop strategies for  gun to  said they also are considering assisting other countries with the  implementation of mobile detection technologies, similar to thos domestically by CBP. DNDO and DOE also are exchanging lessons learn from both agencies’ efforts to screen aviation, specifically the  development of standard operating procedures for using hand-held  radiation detection equipment. tate. DNDO is working with State on the Global Initiative to Combat  S Nuclear Terrorism—which provides 75 countries with an opportunity t integrate resources and share information and expertise on nuclear o  smuggling prevention, detection, and response—to develop model  guidelines that other countries can use to establish their own nucle detection strategies. DNDO sponsored a Global Initiative workshop in  March 2008 to help 25 countries develop a draft of the model guidelines document. This document, among other things, is intended to raise  awareness about the elements of an effective nuclear detection strat and build consensus for its implementation. In addition, DNDO personne have traveled with officials from State to countries involved in the  department’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, a program to a ssess  and improve the capabilities of countries to combat smuggling of nuclear  and radiological materials, in order to provide advice to these countries on how to build their own capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling. DNDO  also helped State develop questions that these countries could use to  assess their own vulnerabilities.
In  addition to providing the U.S. government agencies engaged in  international nuclear detection programs with knowledge gained f domestic nuclear detection initiatives, DNDO has been directed by thes agencies to develop an inventory of radiation detection equipment  deployed overseas. In a March 2006 report, we recommended that S tate,  working with DOD and DOE, create, maintain, and share a comprehensiv list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment provided to foreign  governments. In December 2006, State, in coordination with DOD, DOE ,  and DHS, issued a strategic plan giving DNDO responsibility for gathering  data on the deployment of radiation detection equipment overseas,  including portal monitors and handheld devices. As part of DNDO’s efforts to develop the global strategy for nuclear detection, it is charge d  with maintaining this database, share information from it at interagency  e  meetings, and provide other relevant government agencies with access to the database. According to DNDO, it collected information on radiation  detection equipment from DOD, DOE, and State most recently in 2007 and  is updating some of the information in 2008 and 2009. A DNDO official also  said that the agency analyzed these data to determine the proximity of  radiation detection equipment to areas with nuclear facilities.
section_title: A Total of $2.8 Billion D Was Budgeted in Fiscal Year 2007 f Programs Associated with Detecting Radiological an d Nuclear Materials
paragraphs: HS, DOD, DOE, and State budgeted a total of $2.8 billion in fiscal year  2007 for the programs included in the global strategy for radiological and nuclear detection, according to DNDO. Nearly the same amount of funds— $1.1 billion—were budgeted for programs and activities to (1) combat  nuclear smuggling overseas and (2) detect nuclear materials primarily a U.S. borders and ports of entry; a smaller portion was budgeted for cross- cutting programs. By agency, the majority of 2007 budgeted funds for the  global strategy for radiological and nuclear detection went to DOE—  62 percent. Although DNDO has detailed information on the budgets fo r  various security and detection programs, it is not using this information t coordinate with other agencies on the overall strategic direction of these  detection efforts.
subsections: section_title: Amounts Budgeted for Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Overseas and to Detect Nuclear Materials Primarily at U.S. Bo and Ports of Entry Were Nearly the Same
paragraphs: According to our analysis of DNDO’s data, of the approximately   $2.8 billion agencies budgeted in fiscal year 2007, about 39 percen t went to  combat nuclear smuggling overseas, while 41 percent went to programs to  detect and secure radiological and nuclear materials at and within U.S.  borders; another 20 percent went to programs that cut across foreign an domestic activities. Figure 4 shows budgets by program focus and by  agency.
Table 1 shows the allocation of these funds by programs to combat  nuclear smuggling overseas and within the United States.  ajority of the budget for programs to combat international nuclear  Programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. DOE received the  m smuggling—$737 million (or approximately 67 percent) of the $1.1 bill total in fiscal year 2007. For all the agencies, the international program s  are largely intended to secure nuclear and radiological materials at their  source or detect them in transit. By agency, key programs include the  following:  DHS budge provides multidisciplinary teams—agents, intelligence analysts, and CBP  officers—to selected foreign seaports in order to protect the United Sta from potential terrorist attacks using maritime cargo shipments and to  help secure the primary system of containerized shipping for international  trade. Another DHS program, the Secure Freight Initiative, is importa to the global strategy for nuclear detection because it provides foreign  countries with radiation scanning systems for containers at ports of  departure and communications infrastructure to transmit radiological a nuclear material data to the United States. This program is designed t the feasibility of 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound container cargo at  seven overseas seaports and involves the deployment of integrated  scanning systems, consisting of radiation portal monitors and RIIDs. ted $139 million for its Container Security Initiative, which  At DOD, 98 percent of its budget for combating nuclear smuggling  o Reduction Program—a program that protects national security by  reducing the present threat and preventing the proliferation of weapons o mass destruction. The Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security Progr a budget of $92.8 million to enhance Russia’s security systems at nuclear  weapons storage sites and capability to account for and track nuclear  weapons scheduled for dismantlement. The Proliferation Prevention  Initiative had a budget of $32.4 million to help countries of the former  Soviet Union prevent the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction o r  related materials across their borders; this initiative provides equipmen logistics support, and training. Finally, the Nuclear Weapons  verseas went to three programs that are part of the Cooperative Threat  t,  Transportation Security Program had a budget of $32.7 million to enhance safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons from operationa l sites and  storage areas to enhanced security storage sites and dismantlement sites  throughout Russia.
At DOE, two progra b Protection, Control, and Accounting Program had a budget of   $414 million. This program provides support to the Russian Feder and other countries of the former of Soviet Union to secure nuc weapons and weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion  from their current location. Second, DOE’s Second Line of Defense— a  cooperative assistance program for deploying radiological and nuclear  detection systems and associated training at international border  crossings, airports, and seaports—had a budget of $183 million. ms account for about 81 percent of the department’s  udget to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. First, the Materials  State budgeted approximately $42 million for its Export Control a R weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventiona weapons by assisting recipient countries in detecting, deterring,  preventing, and interdicting illicit trafficking in weapons and weapons- related items. The program is also designed to provide a wide ra nge of  assistance and support, such as offering licensing and legal and regulato technical workshops, and providing detection equipment and training for  border control and enforcement agencies. elated Border Security program to help stem the proliferation of  Programs to combat radiological and nucl U DOE received most of the budget for programs to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling domestically—$871 million (or 76 percent) of the   $1.1 billion budgeted in fiscal year 2007. By agency, key programs include  the following:  ear smuggling at and within  .S. borders. As with programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas,  At DHS, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals/Radiological Portal Monitors  program had a  acquisition, and deployment of these technologies to ports of entry. The  Securing the Cities initiative, with a fiscal year 2007 budget of $8.47  million, is intended to enhance protection and response capabilities in a around the nation’s highest risk urban areas. Starting with New York City the department will work with state and local officials to develop urb an  and regional deployment and operations strategies, identify appropriate  detection equipment, establish the necessary support infrastructure, and  develop incident management and response protocols. In addition, DHS  budgeted $1.1 million for the West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection  Program, which is evaluating general radiation detection capabilities to be deployed aboard Coast Guard or other law enforcement vessels that  participate in vessel-boarding activities. budget of $209 million to provide systems development,  DOD budgeted $1.6 million for domestic radiation detection programs with $1.1 million directed to its Radiation program uses the best available detection technologies to prevent or  mitigate the effects of radiation exposure on Pentagon personnel and  structures. The remaining funds were budgeted for the department’s Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense, which installed radiologica nuclear sensors at Camp Lejeune.
At DOE, $846 million (or 97 percent) of the $871 million budgeted to  combat nuclear smuggling went to  S ecurity Program, which is intended to protect DOE’s critical assets— nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, special nuclear mate classified information, and DOE facilities from such threats as terrorist  activity, theft, diversion, loss, or unauthorized access. the Nuclear and Radiological Materials  Cross-cutting activities that simultaneously support multiple program DHS had nearly half of the $577 million budgeted for cr activities—about $271 million. By agency, key programs include the  following:  s.
At DHS, the Human Portable Radiation Detection System had a budg $18.1 million to support the development of detection systems and the  acquisition of advanced, hand-held radiation detectors. In addition, DHS  budgeted about $11 million for the Technical Reachback Program, which  provides technical assistance to help personnel operating radiation  detection equipment identify the source that triggered the alarm. Finally,  the Joint Analysis Center had a budget of $1.75 million to collect and  notify appropriate federal, state, and local agencies as early as possi ble of   radiological and nuclear threats and coordinate technical support to  federal, state, and local authorities.
DOD budgeted $94.5 million of the $137 million of its funds budgeted for  cross-cutting programs to support it s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil  Support Teams. These 55 teams are deployed nationwide to support civil  authorities during domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents. In addition, the Nuclear Detection  Technologies Division of DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency was  budgeted $28 million in fiscal year 2007 to develop technologies to detect,  locate, and identify radiological and nuclear weapons and materials to  support search and interdiction missions.
section_title: DNDO’s Joint Annual Interagency Report Is Not Used for Analysis or to Focus Nuclear Detection Priorities
paragraphs: In July 2007, Congress passed the “Implementing Recommendations of the  9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” which required DHS, DOD, DOE, the  Department of Justice, and the Director of National Intelligence to  coordinate the preparation of a Joint Annual Interagency Review of the  Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO collected these program- level budget data in response to a statutory requirement that select  agencies, including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State, annually assess their  capacity to implement their portion of the global nuclear detection  strategy. DNDO issued this report in June 2008 after gathering data from  relevant agencies on programs and budgets in support of each layer of the  global nuclear detection effort. The report provides an overview of the  global nuclear detection strategy and discusses programs and budgets for  combating nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas.
DNDO has collected these data since 2006. It used these data to identify  areas in which new domestic initiatives may be needed. For example, in  the most recent review, DNDO said that programs focused on the land  border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and maritime pathways will  need to grow substantially in the years ahead. However, the Joint Annual  Interagency Review does not serve as a tool to analyze nuclear detection  budgets across agencies in order to ensure that the level and nature of  resources devoted to combating nuclear smuggling are going toward the  highest priority gaps and are aligned with the overall strategic direction of  global detection efforts.
Agency officials said that their program decisions and budget requests are  primarily guided by their agencies’ mission-related needs, rather than by  the overarching goals and priorities of a broader, more comprehensive  global detection strategy. In addition, DOD, DOE, and State officials told  us that the information in the review is primarily used to provide agencies  and Congress with an overview of already established programmatic roles  and responsibilities across the range of programs to combat nuclear  smuggling. Finally, agency officials told us that they do not use the specific  budget data included in the Joint Annual Interagency Review to help  determine whether funding levels are reasonable in terms of individual  agency or governmentwide needs.
section_title: DNDO Has Not Yet Implemented Recommendation from July 2008 Testimony
paragraphs: In July 2008, we testified on the preliminary findings of our work.  Specifically, we found that while DNDO’s initiatives are a step in the right  direction for improving the current efforts to combat nuclear smuggling,  they are not being undertaken within the larger context of an overarching  strategic plan. Although each agency with a role in combating nuclear  smuggling has its own planning documents, an overarching strategic plan  is needed to guide these efforts to address the gaps and move to a more  comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. Our past work has  discussed the importance of strategic planning. We have reported that  strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be accomplished,  identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure  that the funding necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and  employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify  needed improvements. For example, such a plan would define how DNDO  would monitor the goal of detecting the movement of radiological and  nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small  maritime craft or land border areas in between ports of entry. Moreover,  this plan would include agreed-upon processes and procedures to guide  the improvement of the efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and  coordinate the activities of the participating agencies.
DNDO agreed with the need for an overarching strategic plan and believes  that many elements of such a plan exist in DHS and other agency  documents, but noted that solutions for addressing gaps and  vulnerabilities are still under development. As of December 2008, DNDO  had not yet established detailed plans to address those gaps and  vulnerabilities, nor had it integrated all the plan elements into an  overarching strategic plan, as we recommended.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Preventing terrorists from obtaining and smuggling radiological or nuclear  material into the United States is a national security imperative. DNDO has  an important and complex task in this regard—develop a global nuclear  detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling and to keep radiological  and nuclear material and weapons from entering the United States.  However, DNDO has not yet taken steps to work with DOE, DOD, and  State to develop an overarching strategic plan, as we recommended in   July 2008. Given the national security implications and urgency attached to  combating nuclear smuggling globally, we continue to believe that such a  plan needs to be established as soon as possible. Without an overarching  plan that ties together the various domestic and international efforts to  combat nuclear smuggling and clearly describes goals, responsibilities,  priorities, resource needs, and performance metrics, it is unclear how the  strategy will evolve or whether it is evolving in the right direction.
While DNDO has gathered useful program and budget information in its  Joint Annual Interagency Review, we believe it has missed an opportunity  to use this information as a basis for working with other agencies—most  notably DOD, DOE and State—to identify future priorities, and analyze  and help determine future resource allocations. We are not suggesting that  any of the agencies participating in U.S. efforts to combat nuclear  smuggling cede authority to manage its own programs. However, this  information could be used as a tool to better ensure that limited resources  are leveraged to promote program effectiveness and avoid potential  duplicative efforts. By doing so, we believe the federal government will be  better positioned to take a holistic view of global nuclear detection and  develop a plan that helps safeguard investments to date, more closely links  future goals with the resources necessary to achieve those goals, and  enhances the agencies’ ability to operate in a more cohesive and integrated  fashion.
DNDO, for its part, has helped highlight the need to address critical gaps in  efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically. It also has made some  progress in developing and supporting initiatives to close these gaps.  However, remaining challenges are great, funding is uncertain, time frames  are unclear, and the technology may not be available any time soon to  bridge some of these vulnerabilities. Without a plan to guide development  of initiatives to address domestic gaps, it is unclear how DNDO plans to  achieve its objectives of closing these critical gaps, particularly in three  key areas—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small  maritime vessels.
Maritime detection efforts pose unique technological and operational  challenges. DNDO’s maritime pilot is a sensible first step to addressing this  vulnerability. However, DNDO should establish criteria for assessing the  effectiveness of this effort and use the result of this evaluation to  determine the feasibility of expanding this program beyond the pilot stage.  Should the pilot prove worthy of replicating, we believe that DNDO will  need to engage in additional planning to identify next steps to help ensure  that it will be able to roll the program out to other locations in a timely  manner.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that U.S. governmentwide efforts to secure the homeland  are well coordinated, well conceived, and properly implemented, we  reiterate the recommendation we made in our July 2008 testimony to  develop an overarching strategic plan. We also recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions:  In coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy,  and the Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to  guide future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. This effort  should include analyzing overall budget allocations to determine whether  governmentwide resources clearly align with identified priorities to  maximize results and whether there is duplication of effort across  agencies.
Develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear  detection strategy to help ensure the future success of initiatives aimed at  closing gaps and vulnerabilities. This plan should focus on, among other  things, establishing time frames and costs for the three areas of recent  focus—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small  maritime vessels.
Develop criteria to assess the effectiveness, cost, and feasibility of the  maritime radiological and nuclear pilot program.
Should the decision be made to expand the maritime radiological and  nuclear program beyond the pilot, undertake additional planning to  identify next steps, including how and where a broader strategy would be  implemented, what technology would be needed, what organizations  should be involved, and how such efforts would be sustained.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for  comment. DHS and DOD provided written comments, which are presented  in appendixes I and II, respectively. DOE and State provided technical  comments which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD concurred with  the recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in  coordination with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and  Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide  future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOD stated that  greater use could be made of the review associated with the development  of this annual report to guide U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
DHS did not directly comment on our recommendations but noted that the  recommendations aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions.  The department agreed, however, that planning can always be improved  and that the office will seek to continue to do so. DHS also reiterated that  it agreed with a recommendation that we made in our 2008 testimony on  the need for an overarching strategic plan to guide future efforts to combat  nuclear smuggling and move toward a more comprehensive global nuclear  detection strategy. In its comments, DHS noted that work had already  begun on an overarching plan.
DHS also pointed to what, in its view, were a number of shortcomings in  the draft report. Specifically, the department believes that we did not give  enough credit to DNDO’s strategic planning efforts. The department  asserted that we did not clearly and adequately explain the background  and context of DNDO’s efforts to develop a global strategy, what has been  accomplished so far, what challenges it faces, and what remains to be  done. Finally, DHS asserted that the draft contained a number of  inaccuracies and omissions that make it less reliable and useful than it  could be. DHS also provided a number of more detailed comments on  specific issues presented in the draft report. We have addressed those  comments in our detailed responses and incorporated changes where  appropriate.
First, we found no evidence that DNDO engaged in long-term strategic  planning to carry out its initiatives to address gaps in domestic nuclear  detection.  During the course of our review, we specifically asked DNDO  for strategic planning documents used to develop and implement a global  radiation detection strategy. In response, DNDO officials referred to the  more than 4,000 pages of documents provided and stated in their  comments on the report that this material was the basis for their plan.  Although this information documented the efforts put forth by DNDO in  developing its initial strategy and identifying gaps and vulnerabilities, it did  not constitute a plan with clear goals, time frames, and costs.  More  specifically, DNDO commented that we did not mention the DNDO-Coast  Guard Joint Acquisition Strategy as a cornerstone of its small maritime  strategy, that we only mention DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy in  passing in the back of the report, and that we do not mention the DHS  Small Vessel Security Strategy implementation plan.  We revised the report  to include references to the Joint Acquisition Strategy and the  implementation plan. However, we disagree with DNDO’s characterization  that we failed to give the Small Vessel Security Strategy adequate  attention. In fact, the report describes the strategy and how it relates to  efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. We would also point out, however,  that these planning documents cited by DNDO only apply to one specific  critical gap area identified—the small maritime vessel threat.
Second, we disagree with the department’s comment that we did not  clearly and adequately explain the background and context of DNDO’s  efforts to develop a global strategy, what has been accomplished so far,  what remains to be done, and what challenges it faces. Specifically, our  report contains an overview of DNDO’s initial approach in developing a  global strategy, including providing information on steps DNDO has taken  to identify potential pathways for radiological and nuclear material. In  addition, the report identified some of DNDO’s accomplishments in  specific areas, such as working with the other agencies to develop new  radiation detection technologies. Furthermore, we recognize that DNDO  has helped highlight the need to address critical gaps in efforts to combat  nuclear smuggling, and we have reported DNDO’s key initiatives to  improve radiation detection capabilities in areas that had previously  received insufficient attention—land borders between the ports of entry,  aviation, and maritime. The report also recognizes the many challenges  that DNDO faces as it attempts to enhance nuclear detection capabilities,  including technological limitations of detection equipment and sustaining  initiatives beyond their pilot phase. We also believe that DNDO needs to  undertake additional planning so that it can be in a better position to  determine the work that remains. That is why our recommendation to  develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear  detection strategy is so crucial.
Finally, where appropriate, we have incorporated a variety of technical  comments provided by DHS to better characterize DNDO’s role and  accomplishments, and the challenges it faces in developing a global  nuclear detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling. We do not believe  that any of the comments that we incorporated represented a serious flaw  in the content or quality of the draft report and in fact improve the  technical accuracy of the report.  In the few areas where DHS commented  that we were factually incorrect, we have made minor changes to the  report to clarify our point, to correct technical inaccuracies, or to avoid  confusion.  Where appropriate, we have provided additional information to  further support our point, in some cases using information contained in  DHS’s letter.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional  committees and Members of Congress, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the  Secretary of State. The report will also be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3841 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland  Security’s letter dated January 14, 2009.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We agree with DHS that deploying or purchasing ineffective equipment  would be inappropriate. We also agree with DHS that, as we reported,  field evaluations are not complete and that the necessary equipment  may not be deployed until 2012. We discuss the reasons for these  delays on page 14 of the report. In addition, we disagree with DHS’s  assertion that Border Patrol told us that lessons learned from field  evaluations “would help avert large amounts of taxpayer funds for  equipment that would not have been effective.” We do not dispute the  importance of spending taxpayer dollars wisely; however, it was not  expressed to us as such until this letter. 2.  We added language on the highlights page to clarify that CBP is also  responsible for putting radiation detection equipment in place. 3.  We discuss in more depth the technological limitations of detection  equipment and sustaining detection efforts on pages 19 through 21 of  the report. 4.  DHS commented that we have understated the value, importance, and  challenge of technology development efforts needed to arrive at  effective solutions. We disagree. We acknowledge these challenges in  the body of the report and discuss some of the measures DNDO has  taken to develop needed equipment. Furthermore, we disagree with  DNDO’s statement about our findings regarding the status of  sustainability planning. We describe at more length on pages 19 and 20  of the report our concerns with DNDO’s efforts to sustain maritime  initiatives into the future.  5.  While we do not mention the Phased Deployment Implementation Plan  by name, on page 14 we state that DNDO and CBP are jointly working  on measures to better secure the border areas between ports of entry  and that these efforts are part of a phased approach. We have added  clarifying language to the paragraph on page 4 to more clearly  delineate the different roles CBP and DNDO play in this regard.  Furthermore, while we do not disagree with taking a phased approach,  DNDO has not kept to its original schedule and if such delays continue,  it is uncertain whether DNDO and CBP will meet their original goal of  full deployment of equipment by 2012. 6.  We have modified the text on page 16 to include a reference that  efforts to screen aviation for radiological and nuclear materials are  being included in the strategy for the first time. 7.  We have modified the language on page 5 to clarify the roles and  responsibilities of DNDO and CBP. 8.  DHS may have misunderstood the point we were making concerning  maritime screening as compared with land and aviation screening. We  agree that non-port of entry screening will require modifications to  existing screening operations and new equipment. However, we were  told that maritime screening posed unique challenges, which we have  documented on pages 18-21 of this report. 9.  We disagree with DHS that the conclusions we reach regarding the  maritime program are incorrect. Although DHS comments that our  conclusions are incorrect, DHS does not dispute the facts we present.  Namely, DNDO has not established criteria for assessing the success of  pilot efforts and it has no plan detailing which locations it would target  next. Furthermore, during the course of our work we heard repeated  concerns about the sustainability of the maritime radiological and  nuclear screening from state and local law enforcement. Specifically,  we asked the maritime mission area manager if a sustainability plan  existed and we were told no. After our visit to Puget Sound, we  received an e-mail from the manager stating DNDO would begin to  develop a sustainability plan should the decision be made to continue  the initiative. 10. We understand the role of grants in funding these types of activities  and agree with DHS that, according to DNDO, grants are the primary  mechanism it plans to rely on for sustaining radiological and nuclear  detection activities in the maritime environment. We agree with DNDO  efforts to work with the Coast Guard to adapt the Maritime Security  Risk Assessment Model to accommodate more explicitly radiological  and nuclear detection challenges. However, we maintain our concern  that DNDO does not have any detailed plans, including how and where  a broader strategy would be implemented, what technology would be  needed, what organizations should be involved, and how such efforts  would be sustained for this important national security issue.  11. DNDO incorrectly asserted that we did not recognize its contributions  to international efforts. On page 23 of the report we acknowledged  DNDO’s efforts to look for opportunities to work with other agencies  to help strengthen their radiological and nuclear detection efforts,  despite the fact that these programs to combat nuclear smuggling are  well established and are under the purview of another agency. 12. DNDO has misunderstood the reference to its annual assessment of  the global nuclear detection strategy and we believe the text that now  appears on page 6 is consistent with our discussion later in the report.  Our discussion on page 6 focuses on the global strategy, encompassing  radiological and nuclear detection activities across all relevant  government agencies. The reference DNDO makes to text later in the  report focuses specifically on actions taken by DNDO to enhance  domestic detection capabilities. However, we have modified the  language to be clearer about what is being discussed in each place. We  acknowledge that DNDO does not have authority over the budgets of  other agencies and we would not advocate for such authority to be  provided to it. However, DNDO is responsible for enhancing and  coordinating federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear  smuggling domestically and overseas. We believe that the analysis we  are recommending—that DNDO undertake using data collected as part  of the Joint Annual Interagency Review—is consistent with this  requirement. 13. We recommended that DNDO develop a strategic plan to guide the  development of a more comprehensive global nuclear strategy and  delineated what such a plan should contain, including clearly defined  objectives, roles, and responsibilities for meeting the objectives;  necessary funding; and monitoring mechanisms to determine progress  in meeting goals. However, DNDO has not yet produced such a  strategic plan. We acknowledge that combating nuclear smuggling on a  global scale is a large and complex undertaking. We repeatedly asked  DNDO for detailed plans, containing the elements described above, but  did not receive any. 14. We have modified the text on page 12 to recognize the role of the  Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  15. DNDO commented that portal monitors can also be used to monitor  pedestrians, but according to CBP, it does not currently use portal  monitors for this purpose. However, we have modified the text to  reflect that portal monitors are used for screening cargo containers.  With regard to the use of pagers to detect smuggled nuclear material,  we have reported in the past on the limitations of using these devices  and that pagers should not be relied upon to detect smuggled nuclear  material. 16. None of the radiation detection devices discussed in this report use the  active interrogation techniques cited by DHS.  17. DHS commented that including a paragraph on ASPs (now on page 13)  was beyond the scope of this audit and should be removed from this  report.  The scope of our review is presented on pages 3 and 4 of the  report. As such, we agree with DHS that our review did not include an  assessment of DNDO’s efforts to test and procure ASP technology.  However, several prior GAO reports have found significant problems  with DNDO’s work in this area. Reporting the results of our prior work  in the background of this report is appropriate and germane because  portal monitors are a key component of the global nuclear detection  strategy. 18. DHS commented that our findings on DNDO’s lack of long-term plans  are misleading and suggest DNDO has no plans or strategies. We agree  that DNDO has identified gaps and vulnerabilities and has taken some  steps to address these, including jointly working with CBP as  mentioned on page 14 of our report. However, DHS does not dispute  our finding that it has not developed a detailed plan, which clearly  conveys the goals, responsibilities, resource needs, and performance  metrics needed to further its detection efforts. Identifying gaps and  initiating programs are positive steps toward enhancing detection  capabilities, but these efforts alone do not constitute a long-term plan.  Without a detailed, documented plan, DNDO will be unable to  determine whether these new programs are actually succeeding and  addressing the identified gaps. 19. We believe DHS had misconstrued our description of efforts to  implement radiological and nuclear screening at the border areas in  between official ports of entry. We acknowledge that there are a  number of challenges associated with implementing portable detection  equipment for use in the field and appreciate DNDO and CBPs efforts  to develop this capability. However, the fact remains that DNDO has  not kept to its original schedule, and if such delays continue, it is  uncertain whether DNDO and CBP will meet their original goal of full  deployment of such equipment by 2012. 20. Our description of the procurement challenges faced by DNDO and  CBP is an accurate summary of the information we were provided.  One of DNDO’s primary roles is to test and procure needed  radiological and nuclear detection equipment for use by CBP and other  agencies. We were informed by CBP that it did not receive the  equipment it had originally ordered in the agreed upon time frames.
Regardless of whether the equipment was for use at an official border  crossing or for use by Border Patrol officers in the field, the needed  equipment was not procured as requested. In CBP’s technical  comments on a draft of this report, it stressed that its radiological and  nuclear detection equipment procurement funding was handed over to  DNDO in 2006. CBP further stated that it believes that the most  effective way to procure commercial off-the-shelf equipment is for  CBP to have its own radiation and nuclear equipment budget. 21. We have modified the text on pages 15 through 17 to more clearly  delineate roles and responsibilities. 22. We have accurately described what we observed during our visit to  Dulles International Airport. We were told by CBP officials that the  source used in the demonstration was what they use to routinely check  the responsiveness of the portal monitor and successfully did just that  earlier in the week. 23. We believe DHS has misconstrued our statement about detecting  radiological and nuclear material outside the U.S. borders. We are not  minimizing the importance of such a goal. In fact, since DNDO believes  that it is one of the largest and most important vulnerabilities in the  existing detection architecture, it will be even more important that  DNDO develop detailed plans for securing such arrangements with as  many nations as possible. 24. We have listed on page 18 of the report a number of other factors we  were told by DHS officials influenced the decision to pilot the maritime  program in the Puget Sound area.  In response to the draft report, DHS  provided an additional reason for the selection of Puget Sound.  25. We modified the text on page 19 to include the actual funding amount  for the pilot project. 26. See comments 9 and 10.  27. DHS provided new information that the Preventative Radiological and  Nuclear Detection handbook is under development and that DNDO  reached out to state and local entities in its development. This is  another positive step. However, as DNDO stated, this handbook is  currently in draft, undergoing review, and not yet finalized or in use by  any locale. 28. We believe DNDO has incorrectly characterized our finding regarding  detection technologies in the maritime environment. On pages 20 and  21, our report delineates some of the technological limitations, as they  were presented to us by the users of the equipment. We do not assert  that these limitations are insurmountable; only that they exist and  should be taken into consideration when crafting a plan for  radiological and nuclear detection in the maritime environment. 29. The information contained in the report on page 22 is factually  accurate.  30. The information contained on pages 22 and 23 of the report was  obtained through interviews with NYPD officials in the presence of a  DNDO representative. The primary purpose of the statement was to  point out the number of boats with boat-mounted radiation detection  equipment in use at the time of our review. 31. While there are other complexities with developing a global nuclear  detection strategy, DNDO officials repeatedly told us during the course  of our review that a primary complicating factor is the office’s limited  ability to influence other agencies’ programs to combat nuclear  smuggling. 32. We modified the text on page 25 to reflect DNDO’s efforts to update  some of the information. 33. We modified the text on page 25 to reflect the fact that DNDO should  coordinate with other agencies on the overall strategic direction of  detection efforts. 34. In response to our July 2008 recommendation that DNDO develop an  overarching strategic plan, DNDO commented that it has included a  request for strategic planning information as part of its efforts to  develop the next edition of the Joint Annual Interagency Review.  However, DHS did not comment on how this will inform or contribute  to an overarching strategic plan to guide future enhancement to global  nuclear detection.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact person named above, Glen Levis (Assistant  Director), Elizabeth Erdmann, Rachel Girshick, Sandra Kerr, Omari  Norman, Kim Raheb, Rebecca Shea, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and  Tommy Williams made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material Overseas
paragraphs: Nuclear Nonproliferation: Focusing on the Highest Priority Radiological  Sources Could Improve DOE’s Efforts to Secure Sources in Foreign  Countries. GAO-07-580T. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at  Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded  Security Upgrades Is Uncertain. GAO-07-404. Washington, D.C.:   February 28, 2007.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s International Radiological Threat  Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the  Highest Priority Radiological Sources. GAO-07-282. Washington, D.C.:  January 31, 2007.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and  Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed.   GAO-06-93. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2005.
Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery  Efforts and Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions.  GAO-05-672. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to  Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. GAO-03-638.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed  to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites.   GAO-03-482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.
section_title: Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material in the United States
paragraphs: Nuclear Security: DOE and NRC Have Different Security Requirements  for Protecting Weapons-Grade Material from Terrorist Attacks.  GAO-07-1197R. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2007.
Nuclear Security: Actions Taken by NRC to Strengthen Its Licensing  Process for Sealed Radioactive Sources Are Not Effective. GAO-07-1038T.  Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2007.
National Nuclear Security Administration: Security and Management  Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA Act.   GAO-07-428T. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.
Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning Has Complicated DOE’s  Plutonium Consolidation Efforts. GAO-06-164T. Washington, D.C.:  October 7, 2005.
Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded  Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources. GAO-05-967. Washington, D.C.:  September 22, 2005.
Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of  Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at Its Energy, Science and  Environment Sites. GAO-05-934T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2005.
Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely  Consolidate Plutonium. GAO-05-665. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2005.
Nuclear Security: DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy,  Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to  Meet the New Design Basis Threat. GAO-05-611. Washington, D.C.:   July 15, 2005.
Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security  of Sealed Radioactive Sources. GAO-03-804. Washington, D.C.:   August 6, 2003.
section_title: Radiation Detection Programs Overseas
paragraphs: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy  Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United  States. GAO-06-558T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and  Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation  Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.:  March 14, 2006.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in  Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign  Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.  GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
section_title: Container Security
paragraphs: Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port  Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.  GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and  Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection  Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
section_title: Radiation Detection Technology
paragraphs: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Phase 3 Test Report on Advanced  Portal Monitors Does Not Fully Disclose the Limitations of the Test  Results. GAO-08-979. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2008.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Program to Procure and Deploy  Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the  Department’s Previous Cost Estimates. GAO-08-1108R. Washington, D.C.:  September 22, 2008.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure  Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.  GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy  the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported  by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.:   March 14, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the  National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in  Support of DNDO’s Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R.  Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support  the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based  on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the  Monitors’ Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.:   October 17, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear  and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response  Capabilities Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-1015. Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across  Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-940T. Washington, D.C.:  July 7, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns  Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Technology Assessment: Securing the Transport of Cargo Containers.  GAO-06-68SU. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006.
Homeland Security: Limited Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection  Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry. GAO-03-963. Washington, D.C.:  September 4, 2003.
section_title: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security
paragraphs: Nuclear Safety: Construction of the Protective Shelter for the Chernobyl  Nuclear Reactor Faces Schedule Delays, Potential Cost Increases, and  Technical Uncertainties. GAO-07-923. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2007.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some  DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries. GAO-05-828. Washington,  D.C.: August 29, 2005.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and  Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-329. Washington, D.C.:  June 30, 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better  Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium  Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is  Uncertain. GAO-04-662. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.