Bureau of Prisons: Evaluating the Impact of Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer Safety
Published: 2011-04-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) manages more than 209,000 inmates, up 45 percent between fiscal years 2000 and 2010. As the prison population grows, so do concerns about correctional officer safety. As requested, GAO examined the (1) equipment that BOP and selected state departments of corrections (DOC) provide to protect officers, and the officers' and other correctional practitioners' opinions of this equipment; (2) extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of this equipment, and factors correctional equipment experts consider important to the acquisition of new equipment; and (3) institutional factors correctional accrediting experts reported as impacting officer safety, and the extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of the steps it has taken in response. GAO reviewed BOP policies and procedures; interviewed BOP officials and officers within BOP's six regions, selected based on such factors as the level of facility overcrowding; interviewed officials at 14 of the 15 largest state DOCs; and surveyed 21 individuals selected for their expertise in corrections. The results of the interviews cannot be generalized, but provide insight into issues affecting officer safety.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: BOP and 14 state DOCs included in GAO's review provide a variety of protective equipment to officers, but BOP officers and management have different views on equipment. BOP generally provides officers with radios, body alarms, keys, flashlights, handcuffs, gloves, and stab-resistant vests while on duty, but prohibits them from storing personal firearms on BOP property, with limited exceptions. DOC officials in 14 states GAO interviewed provided examples of equipment they allow officers to carry while on duty that BOP does not--such as pepper spray--and officials in 9 of the 14 states reported allowing officers to store personal firearms on state DOC property. BOP and states provide similar equipment to protect officers in an emergency, such as an inmate riot or attack. Most BOP officers with whom GAO spoke reported that carrying additional equipment while on duty and commuting would better protect officers, while BOP management largely reported that officers did not need to carry additional equipment to better protect them. BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of equipment it provides in ensuring officer safety, and correctional equipment experts report that BOP needs to consider a variety of factors in acquisition decisions. Neither the officials nor the experts with whom GAO spoke reported that they were aware of or had conducted evaluations of the effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety, although BOP tracks information necessary to do so in its data systems. By using information in these existing systems, BOP could analyze the effectiveness of the equipment it distributes in ensuring officer safety, thus helping it determine additional actions, if any, to further officer safety and better target limited resources. All of the correctional equipment experts GAO spoke with reported that BOP would need to consider factors such as training, replacement, maintenance, and liability, as well as whether the equipment met performance standards, if it acquired new equipment. These experts suggested that any decision must first be based upon a close examination of the benefits and risk of using certain types of equipment. For example, while state officials reported that pepper spray is inexpensive and effective, a majority of the BOP management officials we spoke with stated that it could be taken by inmates and used against officers. Correctional accrediting experts most frequently cited control over the inmate population, officer training, inmate gangs, correctional staffing and inmate overcrowding as the institutional factors--beyond equipment--most impacting officer safety. These experts suggested various strategies to address these factors, and BOP reported taking steps to do so, such as conducting annual training on BOP policies, identifying and separating gang members, and converting community space into inmate cells. BOP has assessed the effectiveness of steps it has taken in improving officer safety. For instance, a 2001 BOP study found that inmates who participated in BOP's substance abuse treatment program were less likely than a comparison group to engage in misconduct for the remainder of their sentence following program completion. BOP utilizes such studies to inform its decisions, such as eliminating programs found to be ineffective.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that BOP's Director assess whether the equipment intended to improve officer safety has been effective. BOP concurred with this recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)  operates and manages 116 federal prisons and oversees more than 209,000  federal inmates—a population that grew by 45 percent from fiscal year  2000 through 2010. According to its vision statement, BOP seeks to  provide a workplace in which staff perform their duties without fear of  injury or assault; however, as the prison population grows, so do concerns  over inmate aggression and correctional officer (officer) safety. From  fiscal year 2000 through 2010, assaults on staff in BOP facilities increased  from 1,188 to 1,696. During this same period, the number of inmates per  BOP staff member increased from 4.13 in fiscal year 2000 to 4.82 in fiscal  year 2010.
In response to your request, this report describes the equipment available  to protect officers—as well as other institutional factors, such as inmate  overcrowding and staffing shortages—that affect officer safety.  Specifically, the report addresses the following questions:    What equipment do BOP and selected states provide to protect officers  and what are the opinions of BOP officers and other correctional  practitioners regarding this equipment?
To what extent has BOP evaluated the effectiveness of its equipment in  ensuring officer safety, and what do correctional equipment experts report  as important factors when considering the purchase of new equipment?
What institutional factors do correctional accrediting experts report as  most impacting officer safety, and to what extent has BOP evaluated the  effectiveness of the steps it has taken to address these factors?
To address our objectives, we reviewed BOP policies and procedures and  interviewed BOP central management, including officials from the  Correctional Services Branch, who have primary responsibility for security  issues, including protective equipment, as well as officials from BOP’s  Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), who produce reports and  research on corrections-related topics. During these interviews, we  discussed BOP’s existing officer safety practices and the institutional  factors they report as affecting officer safety, among other topics. We  compared BOP’s mechanisms for evaluating the effectiveness of its  practices in ensuring officer safety to BOP’s and DOJ’s mission statements  and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Further,  we visited eight BOP institutions spread across BOP’s six regions and  interviewed BOP officials and 68 officers about the institutional factors  they report as affecting officer safety. In selecting these institutions, we  considered factors such as their location, staff-to-inmate ratio, and level of  overcrowding. In addition, we interviewed officials at 14 of the 15 state  departments of correction (DOC) with the largest inmate populations to  discuss institutional factors they reported as affecting officer safety,  measures implemented to address these factors, equipment used to  protect officers, and their reported effectiveness. We also interviewed  union officials representing BOP officers at the national and local level, as  well as officials from a variety of correctional organizations. During our  work, we also met with correctional equipment experts from DOJ’s  National Institute of Justice (NIJ), NIJ’s National Law Enforcement and  Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC), and the Department of  Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  During these interviews, we obtained the officials’ perspectives on the  factors BOP would need to consider if it acquired equipment for its  officers. The views of these various institutions, officials, and  organizations are not generalizable, but provide valuable insights into  issues affecting officer safety. In addition, we surveyed a panel of 30  correctional accrediting experts who advise the American Correctional  Association’s Commission on Accreditation and obtained 21 responses on  the institutional factors that most affect officer safety and cost effective  strategies to address these factors.
We conducted this work from June 2010 to April 2011 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. See appendix I for further information on our objectives,  scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: BOP’s Institutions and Inmate Population
paragraphs: A component of DOJ, BOP has obligations to confine offenders in a  controlled, safe, and humane prison environment, while providing a safe  workplace where officers can perform their duties without fear of injury  or assault. In fiscal year 2010, $6.2 billion was appropriated for BOP to  carry out its mission. For all 116 of its institutions, BOP has dedicated an  average of almost $17 million annually from fiscal year 2000 through 2010  to expenditures that include protective equipment for its officers.
In fiscal year 2010, BOP oversaw more than 209,000 inmates, housing more  than 170,000 of these inmates in its 116 institutions. In addition, BOP  utilizes privately managed secure facilities; residential re-entry centers— also known as halfway houses; bed space secured through agreements  with state and local entities; and home confinement to house inmates. In  fiscal year 2010, more than 22,000 inmates—or about 11 percent of the  209,000 inmates overseen by BOP—were housed in privately managed  facilities, while more than 14,000—or about 7 percent—were housed in  residential re-entry centers, bed space secured through agreements with  state or local entities, or home confinement.
BOP’s 116 institutions generally have one of four security level  designations: minimum, low, medium, and high. The designations depend  on the level of security and staff supervision the institution is able to  provide, such as the presence of security towers; perimeter barriers; the  type of inmate housing, including dormitory, cubicle, or cell-type housing;  and the staff-to-inmate ratio. Further, BOP designates some of its  institutions as administrative institutions, which specifically serve inmates  awaiting trial, or those with intensive medical or mental health conditions,  regardless of the level of supervision these inmates require.
To determine the institution in which an inmate is confined, BOP  considers the level of security and supervision the inmate requires and  that the institution is able to provide; the inmate’s rehabilitation needs; the  level of overcrowding at the institution; and any recommendations from  the court at the inmate’s sentencing. Table 1 depicts the percentage of  inmates incarcerated in BOP institutions, by security level of the  institution in fiscal year 2010.
Since fiscal year 2000, BOP’s inmate population has grown by 45 percent,  as shown in figure 1.
See appendix II for information on the characteristics of BOP’s inmate  population.
section_title: BOP’s Systems and Processes for Reporting Assaults on Staff
paragraphs: BOP tracks information related to inmate assaults on staff in two data  systems: SENTRY and TRUINTEL.
First created in 1974, BOP’s SENTRY system maintains most of BOP’s  operational and management information, such as inmate data and  property management data, among others. According to the Acting  Director of BOP’s Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), SENTRY was  updated in 1997 to capture reports of inmate incidents, including assaults  on staff. Assaults on staff can include a variety of violent acts. For  instance, BOP officials with whom we spoke provided examples of  assaults, such as stabbing a staff member with a homemade weapon,  punching or kicking staff, or throwing bodily fluids on a staff member.  Assaults are classified as serious or less serious based upon the injury  sustained or intended as a result of the assault. For instance, officials at  one BOP institution reported that they would classify an assault in which  an inmate threw food at an officer as a less serious assault, but an assault  in which the officer was stabbed as a serious assault.
To report an inmate assault on a BOP staff member in SENTRY, BOP  instructs its personnel to follow the procedures for incident reporting and  investigations described in BOP’s Program Statement on Inmate  Discipline and Special Housing Units. Figure 2 depicts this process.
In addition to the information captured in SENTRY, BOP’s TRUINTEL  system—created in October 2009—provides BOP with a number of  capabilities, including an intelligence gathering function that provides real- time information on assaults on staff. Unlike SENTRY, Correctional  Services Branch officials reported that TRUINTEL captures only data from  the initial incident report, and is not updated based on the subsequent  investigation or hearings related to the assault. According to these  officials, TRUINTEL allows managers at BOP institutions to see trends in  incidents, including assaults, across BOP institutions.
The Correctional Services Branch officials stated that if an assault on an  officer occurs, an individual at the institution—generally the lieutenant on  duty—completes a Form 583 Report of Incident (Form 583) in the  TRUINTEL system, indicating that the incident was an assault on staff.  The lieutenant also records information on the incident’s cause, such as  alcohol or a disrespect issue; the inmate(s) involved in the assault;  whether restraints were applied to the inmate; and whether any lethal or  less-than-lethal weapons were used to resolve the incident. The officer  involved in the assault may also submit a description of the incident,  which is entered into the Form 583. After the lieutenant completes the  Form 583, the institution’s captain generally reviews the report before it is  reviewed and finalized by the institution’s warden. Once the warden  finalizes the Form 583, managers across BOP institutions can view the  information in the TRUINTEL system. Further, following any incident  involving an officer’s use of force against an inmate, such as the use of a  less-than-lethal weapon, BOP requires that a Form 586 After Action  Review Report be completed in TRUINTEL. To complete this report, an  after action review committee first meets to review the incident. The  facility’s warden, the associate warden responsible for correctional  services, the health services administrator, and the captain comprise this  review committee and their purpose is to assess the rationale for why the  staff involved took the actions or used the equipment they did. The  committee also determines if these actions, including the use of any  equipment, were appropriate given BOP policy.
Since BOP’s inmate population changes each year, BOP calculates the rate  of inmate assaults—both of a serious and less serious nature—per 5,000  inmates incarcerated based on the information submitted in its SENTRY  system. For example, in fiscal year 2010, the total number of assaults on  staff was almost 1,700, for a rate of about 49 serious and less serious  assaults per 5,000 inmates. Figure 3 displays the serious and less serious  assaults on BOP staff, as recorded in SENTRY from fiscal year 2000  through 2010. As the trends illustrate, less serious assaults have followed a  generally upward trend, while serious assaults have experienced fewer  fluctuations over time.
According to BOP officials from the Correctional Services Branch, upward  trends in assault data may be influenced by a number of factors, including  the number of inmates affiliated with gangs, the staff-to-inmate ratio in the  institutions experiencing assaults, or the opening of additional BOP  institutions because inmates incarcerated in these new institutions are not  familiar with each other, which can lead to initial tension between the  inmates. Correspondingly, the officials explained that the decrease in  assaults may be a result of the inmate population at a new institution  stabilizing and becoming less tense. In addition, the officials reported that  the downward trend in assaults from 2009 to 2010 may be related to BOP  creating Special Management Units (SMU) to house inmates who present  unique security and management concerns, such as those who  participated or had a leadership role in gang activity, by removing them  from other BOP facilities.
section_title: Correctional Officer Safety While Off Duty in Public Settings
paragraphs: While these data systems track inmate assaults on staff while staff are on  duty, officers may also encounter former inmates or inmates’ families or  associates while in the community, including while commuting to and  from work. In part due to these potential threats to officers’ safety in their  communities, the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA)  was passed. LEOSA exempts qualified law enforcement officers and  qualified retired law enforcement officers from state and local laws that  prohibit carrying concealed firearms. BOP staff who have primary and  secondary law enforcement status are “qualified law enforcement officers”  as defined by statute and qualify to carry concealed firearms. However,  with limited exceptions, BOP prohibits anyone, including officers, from  storing personal firearms carried while commuting to and from work on  institution property.
section_title: The Role of Other Entities in Officer Safety
paragraphs: In addition to BOP, other federal government and nongovernmental  organizations also engage in activities that relate to officer safety.
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is DOJ’s research, development, and  evaluation component. In addition to awarding grants and cooperative  agreements to research, develop, and evaluate criminal justice programs,  NIJ coordinates various technical working groups comprised of subject  matter experts who work in the field of criminal justice to address a  variety of law enforcement issues. Three of NIJ’s technical working groups  relevant to officer safety in correctional settings are: Institutional  Corrections, Personal Protective Equipment, and Less Lethal  Technologies. Further, NIJ funds the National Law Enforcement and  Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC), which assists state, local,  tribal, and federal correctional agencies, as well as law enforcement and  criminal justice agencies, in addressing technology needs and challenges,  which can help address officer safety.
In addition, BOP’s National Institute of Corrections (NIC) provides  training, technical assistance, information services, and policy and  program development assistance to federal, state, and local correctional  agencies. The NIC also maintains an extensive library of research and  evaluations related to corrections, including those related to officer safety.
Further, the Office of Law Enforcement Standards within the National  Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency of the  Department of Commerce, helps criminal justice, public safety, emergency  responder, and homeland security agencies make decisions, primarily by  developing performance standards, measurement tools, operating  procedures and equipment guidelines. For instance, NIST has conducted  research on the long-term durability of body armor, which is worn by  correctional officers to ensure their safety.
The American Correctional Association’s (ACA) Commission on  Accreditation provides all accreditations for BOP institutions. The ACA’s  standards provide guidance to all correctional organizations on  correctional issues such as programming, officer staffing, and officer  safety. In order for a correctional institution to be accredited by the ACA,  the institution must show compliance in key areas, including officer safety.
Additionally, the Council of Prison Locals (CPL) is the union that  represents employees within BOP’s bargaining unit, which includes  correctional officers. The CPL is a part of the Association of Federal  Government Employees (AFGE), a union that represents federal  government employees. There are 105 local CPL branches nationwide that  represent employees from BOP’s 116 facilities, and advocate for the  interests of their constituents, including officer safety issues.
section_title: State Departments of Corrections
paragraphs: In addition to BOP’s role in ensuring the safety of federal correctional  officers, state departments of corrections work to ensure the safety of  correctional officers working in state institutions. All 50 states have  agencies that are responsible for housing the state’s inmate populations.  See appendix III for the inmate populations and characteristics in these  states as of December 31, 2009.
section_title: BOP and Selected States Provide a Variety of Protective Equipment to Officers, but Opinions on Impact of Equipment on Officer Safety Are Mixed
paragraphs: BOP and the selected states with whom we spoke provide their officers  with a variety of equipment to protect them. BOP generally requires  officers working within the secure perimeter of its institutions to carry a  radio, body alarm, and keys while on duty. BOP also provides officers  with the option to carry flashlights and wear stab-resistant vests. This  policy regarding the equipment worn or carried by officers is largely  consistent across BOP facilities. Further, with limited exceptions, BOP  prohibits anyone, including officers, from storing personal firearms the  officers carried while commuting to and from work on facility property.  States have discretion over the equipment they make available to their  officers, and officials in the 14 states with whom we spoke provided  examples of three types of equipment they allow their officers to carry  while on duty that BOP generally does not, including pepper spray and  batons. In addition, officials from 9 of the 14 states reported that they  allow their officers to store personal firearms that they have carried when  commuting to and from work on facility property, which BOP generally  does not. However, BOP and states provide similar equipment and  weapons—such as less-than-lethal launchers, shotguns, or rubber  bullets—to protect their officers in an emergency situation, which can  include responding to an inmate riot or attack, removing a noncompliant  inmate from a cell, or capturing an escaping inmate. Most BOP officers  and union officials with whom we spoke reported that carrying additional  equipment while on duty and while commuting to and from work would  better protect officers, while BOP management largely reported that  officers did not need to carry additional equipment in order to better  ensure their safety.
BOP officers working within the secure perimeter of a BOP institution are  generally required to carry a radio, body alarm, and keys while on duty. In  addition, officers have the option to carry a flashlight, handcuffs, latex or  leather gloves, or a stab-resistant vest. These policies are largely  consistent across BOP institutions, although officers in certain posts carry  additional equipment beyond what the typical officer carries. For instance,  officers in armed posts carry a lethal weapon and have the option to wear  a ballistic vest while on duty. Further, institutions can request waivers to  permit their officers to carry or wear additional equipment. According to  BOP officials in the Correctional Services Branch, such waivers are  granted when the institution demonstrates that it has a unique need to  deviate from BOP’s national policy. For example, BOP approved a waiver  for officers working at BOP’s Administrative Maximum (ADX) institution  in Florence, Colorado, which houses inmates requiring the tightest  controls in BOP, to carry batons while on duty. Similarly, officers working  with inmates in SMUs, which house inmates that present unique security  and management concerns, such as those who participated or had a  leadership role in gang activity, were also granted a waiver to carry batons  while on duty. According to BOP, it has granted 5 institutions waivers  related to officers carrying additional equipment. These waivers include  permitting officers in the ADX and SMUs to carry batons inside the  institutions. In addition, BOP granted waivers allowing officers patrolling  the perimeter of 3 institutions located in downtown areas to carry smaller  canisters of pepper spray than those in BOP’s inventory because the larger  size was too cumbersome. Further, BOP reported that it has granted  waivers to 25 institutions permitting them to store less-than-lethal  munitions closer to, or in some cases inside, Special Housing Units (SHU)  in order to provide officers more rapid access to the equipment.
State DOCs determine the type of equipment their officers carry, and  officials in the 14 states with whom we spoke provided examples of three  types of equipment that they made available to their officers working within  the secure perimeter of the institution to carry or wear while on duty that  BOP generally does not. For example, officials from 10 states reported that  their officers were permitted to carry pepper spray. In the case of pepper  spray and other equipment, state officials told us that it may be carried or  worn by all officers in the state; optional for officers; or dependent on the  security level of the institution in which the officer works, the officer’s post,  or the warden’s discretion. Table 2 displays the equipment that BOP  routinely provides to the majority of its officers to carry or wear while on  duty, and the number of officials from the 14 states reporting that their  officers carry or wear this equipment.
According to BOP officials with whom we spoke, officers carry limited  equipment while on duty because BOP stresses the importance of officers  communicating with inmates to ensure officer safety. For instance,  management officials at one BOP institution explained that, regardless of  the amount of equipment officers carry, inmates will always outnumber  officers. Therefore, the officers’ ability to manage the inmates through  effective communication, rather than the use of equipment, is essential to  ensuring officer safety. BOP officials reported that carrying additional  equipment would impede this communication. For example, according to  officials from the Correctional Services Branch, if officers carried  equipment in addition to what BOP currently provides, the officers may  rely more on this equipment than on their communication with inmates to  resolve a situation.
Further, officials in 9 of the 14 states with whom we spoke reported that  they allow their officers to store personal firearms that they have carried  while commuting to and from work on facility property, while BOP, with  limited exceptions, does not allow its officers to store such personal  weapons. Specifically, BOP policy prohibits anyone, including officers,  from bringing personal firearms into or onto the grounds of any BOP  institution without the knowledge or consent of the warden, or storing  personal firearms in any vehicle parked on BOP property. According to an  official from the Correctional Services Branch, BOP does not permit  officers to store personal weapons on BOP property because visitors or  inmates working on the institution grounds may be able to gain access to  the weapon, which would threaten the security of all individuals at the  institution. See table 3 for the state department of corrections’ policies  pertaining to personal firearms storage on facility property.
BOP’s policy prohibiting officers from storing personal firearms on BOP  property is largely consistent across its institutions; however, there are  limited exceptions to this policy. For instance, BOP policy permits  wardens to allow officers to bring personal firearms onto BOP grounds. As  such, in 1995, the warden at BOP’s Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC)  in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico issued a local policy permitting officers to store  personal firearms in a personal weapons locker outside the facility’s  secure perimeter while on duty. According to the policy, to store a  personal firearm in the MDC’s gun locker, officers must first submit a  request to the MDC’s security officer through the MDC’s captain. The  request must contain the brand, caliber, and serial number of each weapon  to be stored, as well as the number and expiration date of the officer’s  permit to carry a firearm. Once the request is approved, the officer  receives a key to a locked box within the personal weapons locker. To  access the personal weapons locker, the officer must first be identified by  staff in the MDC’s control room on a camera located outside the personal  weapons locker. Once identified, the officer is granted access to the  personal weapons locker and must log his or her entry in and out of the  locker in a log book located inside the locker. Figure 4 depicts the MDC’s  personal weapons locker and an open locker.
According to officials at the Guaynabo MDC, the policy was enacted when  the MDC was constructing an armory and requested approval to build the  personal weapons locker attached to the armory; the policy is reviewed  annually. The officials reported that officers at the MDC at the time were  concerned for their safety due to criminal activity surrounding the  institution. For instance, the officials reported that an associate warden at  the institution was the victim of an attempted car jacking when leaving  work.
In addition, officers residing in housing located on BOP property—known  as reservation housing—are prohibited from storing personal firearms in  their housing, and are instead required to place personal firearms in the  institution’s armory for safekeeping. According to BOP, as of January  2011, 32 of its 116 institutions have reservation housing available, and  officers at 14 of these 32 institutions store personal firearms in the  institution’s armory. The number of firearms stored in the armories at  these 14 institutions ranges from 1 to 32, with an average of about 10.
Moreover, BOP has leased parking space for its officers on non-BOP  property at 5 of BOP’s institutions, on which BOP’s policy prohibiting the  storage of personal weapons does not apply. Depending on the laws of the  state in which the officers work, they may legally be able to store their  personal firearms in their cars while on duty.
In contrast to what officers carry on a routine basis, in cases of  emergency, such as an inmate riot or attack, BOP provides officers with  access to a variety of equipment that is largely consistent with what our  selected state departments of corrections provide. This equipment  includes less-than-lethal weapons, protective gear, and lethal weapons.  The equipment is located in specific locations throughout the institutions,  such as in secure control rooms, watchtowers in the institutions’ yards, or  in the institutions’ armories outside the secure perimeter. Table 4 shows  the type of equipment that BOP makes available to its officers in an  emergency and the number of officials in the 14 states with whom we  spoke who also reported making it available.
subsections: section_title: BOP Officers and BOP Management Officials Had Different Opinions Regarding Whether Additional Equipment Would Better Protect Officers
paragraphs: The 68 officers, officials from six unions, and management officials from  BOP’s Correctional Services Branch and the eight BOP institutions with  whom we spoke had different opinions about whether additional  equipment would better protect officers. As shown in figure 5, most  officers and all the union officials with whom we spoke reported that  additional equipment would enhance officer safety, while most  management officials reported that additional equipment would not  enhance officer safety.
These officers and officials who said that carrying additional equipment  would better ensure safety reported that officer safety would be enhanced  if officers carried pepper spray (41 of 45 officers, all union officials, and  management officials from one BOP institution); batons (15 of 45 officers);  TASERs (4 of 45 officers); or a portable phone (1 officer). Moreover, the  officers and officials cited a number of safety benefits to this additional  equipment. For instance, 9 officers, officials from four unions, and  management at one BOP facility reported that carrying additional  equipment would allow officers to defend themselves in case of an attack  by an inmate. Four officers reported that carrying additional equipment  would help officers deter inmates from engaging in disruptive behavior.  For example, 1 officer stated that if an inmate saw an officer carrying a  baton, the inmate would be less likely to do something wrong. Further, 4  officers reported that carrying additional equipment could help officers to  prevent injuries to inmates, as they could break up fights between inmates  more quickly with the additional equipment on hand. However, 7 officers  and officials from two unions expressed the need for officers to be trained  on the additional equipment in order to enhance their safety.
Five officers also reported that the need to carry additional equipment  would depend on the situation. Specifically, 4 of the 5 noted that it could  particularly aid officers whose posts included open recreational yards  where inmates congregate and the potential for fighting or misconduct  was greater.
Eighteen officers and eight BOP management officials that reported that  carrying additional equipment would not enhance officer safety cited  concerns with the additional equipment. Specifically, officers most  frequently cited concerns that the equipment could be taken from the  officer and used against him or her by an inmate. BOP management  officials most frequently reported that carrying additional equipment might  hinder officers’ communication with inmates either because the officer  would be more likely to utilize the equipment to prevent an inmate from  engaging in misconduct than talk with the inmate, or the inmate would  perceive officers carrying additional equipment as more threatening and  be less willing to engage in communication with officers.
Similarly, the 68 officers, officials from six unions, and management  officials from BOP’s Correctional Services Branch and the eight BOP  institutions with whom we spoke had different opinions about whether  safety is a concern for officers while they are commuting to and from  work. As displayed in figure 6, all of the union officials with whom we  spoke reported that safety is a concern for officers when commuting to  and from work, most BOP management officials reported that it was not,  and the officers with whom we spoke were evenly split regarding safety  concerns while commuting to and from work.
The officers and officials reporting safety concerns most frequently cited  the presence of former inmates, inmates’ families, or associates of inmates  in the communities in which officers work who may wish to harm the  officers. For instance, one officer explained that he has confiscated  contraband from inmates during visiting hours, then later saw the visitors  in the community and felt concerned that the visitors might retaliate. In  addition, 2 officers and officials from two unions reported that officers’  safety may be at risk when they are wearing their uniforms, either because  they are recognized as a BOP officer or other law enforcement personnel.  Further, 4 officers, officials from one union and BOP management officials  from one institution cited crime in the community or the lack of security in  the employee parking lot as a safety concern for officers while commuting  to and from work.
The 33 officers who reported that safety while commuting to and from  work was not a concern cited a number of reasons, including living in  close proximity to the institution in which they work; working in an  institution that is in a quiet, non-urban setting; the local community’s  positive perception of officers; and officers’ good relationship with  inmates. Management officials also reported that officers often change out  of their uniforms when commuting to and from work, which mitigates  safety concerns during the commute.
Given the varying opinions regarding officer safety concerns while  commuting to and from work, the officers, union officials, and BOP  management officials with whom we spoke also reported different  opinions about whether allowing officers to carry personal firearms to and  from work and store them on BOP property would enhance officer safety.  As shown in figure 7, most officers and all union officials reported that  being permitted to store personal firearms on BOP property would  enhance officer safety, while most BOP management officials reported  that doing so would not enhance officer safety.
Of the 50 officers reporting that allowing officers to store personal  firearms on BOP property would enhance their safety, 7 told us that they  would not take advantage of this policy if it were instituted, though they  did not elaborate, and another 2 expressed the need for additional training  on the firearms before the policy is implemented. The 7 officers who  indicated to us that allowing officers to store personal firearms on BOP  property would enhance officer safety at another institution reported that  having the ability to carry a personal firearm to work and store it on BOP  property was not necessary to ensure their safety at the current institution  at which they work. However, these 7 officers stated that such a policy  would better ensure the safety of other officers, such as those working at  institutions in large cities.
The 7 officers and six BOP management officials who told us that allowing  officers to store personal firearms on BOP property would not enhance  officer safety explained their reasons. These reasons included officers not  needing to carry firearms during their commute because danger is minimal  if non existent, officers having the potential to misuse firearms if not  properly trained, and inmates potentially obtaining the firearms if stored in  officers’ cars or carried into the facility.
Further, 2 officers at one BOP institution and 2 officers and union officials  at a second BOP institution cited additional safety measures that would  enhance officer safety while officers are commuting to and from work that  did not involve authorization to carry weapons while commuting. Three of  these officers and the union officials reported that increased monitoring of  the parking lot and checks on visitors’ cars would improve officer safety.  One of these three officers and the union officials also stated that posting  a guard at the entrance to an institution would enhance officer safety.  Finally, one officer told us that staggering officers’ shifts with visiting  hours would help improve safety because it would help ensure that  visitors would not be able to identify the officers’ cars and then follow  them while the officers are off duty.
section_title: BOP Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Equipment in Ensuring Officer Safety and Correctional Equipment Experts Suggest Several Factors to Consider in Making Equipment Acquisition Decisions
paragraphs: BOP and states provide a variety of equipment to their officers to ensure  their safety; however, none of the BOP officials, state correctional  officials, and correctional experts with whom we spoke reported that they  were aware of or had conducted evaluations of the effectiveness of  equipment in ensuring officer safety. If BOP were to acquire new  equipment, correctional equipment experts from the National Law  Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC), the National  Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the National Institute of  Justice (NIJ) reported to us that BOP would need to consider factors such  as training, replacement, and maintenance costs; potential liability issues;  whether the equipment met technical performance standards; and the  benefits and risks of using the equipment.
subsections: section_title: BOP Has Not Evaluated How Effectively Its Equipment Helps Ensure Officer Safety
paragraphs: BOP officials from the Correctional Services Branch and BOP’s Office of  Security Technology—which is responsible for identifying and evaluating  new security-related equipment—reported that their offices had not  assessed whether the equipment BOP provides to its officers has improved  the officers’ safety. Similarly, officials from NIJ, DOJ’s research,  development, and evaluation agency, told us that NIJ has not conducted  any evaluations of the effectiveness of the set of equipment that BOP uses  in ensuring the safety of its officers. Moreover, BOP’s NIC, which provides  technical assistance, training, and information to BOP and state and local  correctional agencies, found no record of studies related to officer safety.  In addition, officials from BOP’s Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE),  which conducts research and evaluations on behalf of BOP, reported that  ORE had not conducted such studies.
According to BOP’s mission statement, BOP protects society by confining  offenders in prisons that are, among other things, safe, cost-efficient, and  appropriately secure. Further, BOP states in its vision statement that it will  know that it has realized these goals when, among other things, the  workplace is safe and staff perform their duties without fear of injury or  assault and BOP is a model of cost-efficient correctional operations. In  addition, DOJ stresses the importance of evidence based knowledge in  achieving its mission. For instance, when soliciting federally funded  research in crime and justice, DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP)  states that it supports DOJ’s mission by sponsoring research to provide  objective, independent, evidence based knowledge to meet the challenges  of crime and justice. According to OJP, practices are evidence based when  their effectiveness has been demonstrated by causal evidence, generally  obtained through outcome evaluations, which documents a relationship  between an intervention—including technology—and its intended  outcome, while ruling out, to the extent possible, alternative explanations  for the outcome. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government state that managers need to compare actual performance to  planned or expected results throughout the organization and analyze  significant differences, as well as that program managers need both  operational and financial data to determine whether they are meeting their  agencies’ strategic and annual performance plans and meeting their goals  for accountability for effective and efficient use of resources.
Given that BOP’s SENTRY and TRUINTEL systems maintain data on  inmates and related incidents, including assaults on officers and the  equipment officers utilize in instances where they use force against an  inmate, ORE officials reported that such data would allow them to assess  the effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety, even though they  told us that this assessment may be time intensive. Further, BOP officials  from the Office of Security Technology reported that, while they do not  assess the impact of equipment on officer safety, they obtain information  about the equipments’ performance by obtaining feedback on equipment  from those using it at their facilities, such as during a pilot test, and testing  whether the equipment performs in accordance with the manufacturer’s  intent. While information obtained from these methods helps inform the  officials about staff perspectives on the usefulness of the equipment and  the equipment’s performance, these methods do not provide information  about the equipment’s impact on officer safety. Given BOP’s rising inmate  population and the increasing number of inmates per BOP staff member,  assessing the effectiveness of officer equipment in a range of scenarios  and settings could help BOP better understand which of the equipment it  currently provides—or could provide to officers—improves officer safety.  For instance, such an assessment might indicate whether the use of a  certain piece of equipment appears to prevent injuries, or whether one  type of equipment appears to have a greater impact on reducing assaults  on officers than another. Conducting such an assessment also could better  position BOP to achieve its goal of operating in a cost-efficient manner by  effectively targeting limited resources to those equipment investments that  clearly demonstrate protective benefit.
section_title: Correctional Equipment Experts Report Equipment Costs Such as Training, Maintenance, and Liability, among Other Factors, to Be Important Considerations in Purchasing New Equipment
paragraphs: Officials from the NLECTC, NIST, and NIJ reported that BOP would need  to consider factors such as training, replacement, and maintenance costs;  potential liability issues; and whether the equipment met technical  performance standards if it acquired new equipment, as well as the price  of new equipment. Additionally, these organizations suggested that any  decision must first be based on a close examination of the benefits and  risks of using certain types of equipment.
Officials from the NLECTC emphasized the need to examine other costs  related to equipment acquisition, such as new officer training related to  the equipment, and costs related to the frequency of replacing equipment,  such as canisters of pepper spray that must be replaced once used or other  munitions with contents that must be refilled to maintain their potency.  The NLECTC also explained that there are liability issues a facility or a  state can incur if officers misuse equipment, are subsequently sued by  inmates for their actions, and compelled to pay for associated legal  expenses. Officials from NIST stated that it is important to ensure that any  new equipment considered meets the technical performance standards, if  any, associated with certain types of equipment. For example, officials  noted that adherence to standards when purchasing bulletproof vests is  critical to ensuring that the materials used in vests have been proven to  stop bullets. In addition, experts from NIJ’s Institutional Corrections  Technology Working Group suggested assessing where in the field of  corrections less-than-lethal weapons have been used and whether the  benefits of using certain less-than-lethal weapons outweigh the risks.  Table 5 provides examples of what officials from BOP and the 14 state  DOCs included in this review cited as benefits and risks associated with  the use of specific types of less-than-lethal weapons.
BOP officials from the Correctional Services Branch stated that they first  establish whether new or additional equipment is needed through a variety  of means. For example, officials said they obtain information from BOP’s  Office of Security Technology about the performance of the equipment,  such as through a pilot test; identify trends related to incidents in  institutions’ data; and also review feedback from officers and other BOP  staff on how well the current inventory of equipment is meeting their  needs. Officials stated that the next steps involve reviewing factors such as  equipment benefits, risks, and costs related to training and maintenance.  Officials also noted that before they acquire new equipment it must  undergo a legal review by BOP’s Office of General Counsel.
section_title: Correctional Accrediting Experts Cited Inmate Management and Officer Training among the Institutional Factors Most Impacting Officer Safety, and BOP Has Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Efforts in Ensuring Officer Safety
paragraphs: Equipment available to officers is one important part of officer safety;  however, there are other factors—such as those related to the movement  of inmates throughout the facility and the skills and training of prison  personnel—that impact both officers’ safety and the overall safety of the  institution. BOP has conducted evaluations to measure the impact of  several efforts it has undertaken to address such institutional factors on  officer safety, among other outcomes, and officials report using these  evaluations to inform BOP operations.
subsections: section_title: Correctional Accrediting Experts Reported That Five Factors Most Impact Officer Safety, and Cited a Number of Mitigating Efforts They Perceive as Cost Effective
paragraphs: Throughout our audit work, we asked BOP and state correctional officials  with whom we spoke to identify institutional factors that impact officer  safety, as well as efforts they have made to mitigate these factors’  consequences. We then analyzed their responses and found 14 common  institutional factors the BOP and state officials identified. In order to  determine which of the 14 factors have the greatest impact on officer  safety, we surveyed 30 correctional accrediting experts at the ACA and  asked them to rank which of the factors—if they existed in an institution— would pose the greatest threat to officer safety. We received responses  from 21 experts who also provided examples of efforts to address these  factors that they believe to be cost effective—that is, efforts that strike a  balance between their effectiveness in addressing the factor and their  implementation costs. See appendix IV for a copy of our survey and  appendix V for a full description of each of the 14 factors identified by  BOP and state correctional officials. These experts most frequently  reported that the existence of ineffective inmate management, insufficient  officer training, inmate gangs, correctional officer understaffing, and  inmate overcrowding in an institution would most affect officers’ safety.
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Ineffective Inmate Management: Inmate management refers to the  various strategies employed to control and manage the inmate population  within a facility. For example, if inmates are not managed effectively, there  could be instances where groups of inmates are allowed to congregate,  which could lead to increased tension and violence. In one BOP facility a  race riot between the Aryan Brotherhood and African-American inmates  broke out in the recreation yard on Adolf Hitler’s birthday in April 2008,  resulting in injuries and two inmate deaths. After putting up fences that  separated the recreation yard into sections, the warden reported that  assaults decreased.
Fifteen of 21 correctional experts reported that ineffective inmate  management is one of the most important factors that could jeopardize  officer safety. Further, these experts identified examples of potential cost- effective efforts to manage inmates effectively. One expert reported that  managers should assess the risk of housing certain inmates together. Once  it assesses its population, management can control inmates’ movement  accordingly. Another suggested that institutions utilize video cameras and  a “pass” system, which allows only those authorized to enter or exit (i.e.,  pass through) a certain area, to improve monitoring of inmates’ movement.  Further, 1 expert stated that institutions should control inmate movement  times, and only allow inmates to move when authorized, such as at the top  of the hour, while restricting all other movement unless an inmate is  accompanied by an escort or otherwise authorized in advance.
BOP and state officials reported making efforts to address inmate  management. For instance, BOP employs a direct supervision strategy  where officers interact and communicate frequently with inmates, and  officials from 3 of the 14 states with whom we spoke reported that they  also employ direct supervision over inmates. Officials from another 2 of  the 14 states reported that they employ an indirect supervision strategy  that minimizes the interaction between officers and inmates by having the  supervision take place in a centralized control center within the housing  unit. A lieutenant at a facility in one of these states explained that because  the facility houses a large number of violent inmates, the state has chosen  to apply a less direct supervisory approach to minimize inmate and officer  contact. See appendix III for characteristics of state inmates, including  types of offenses.
Insufficient Correctional Training: Insufficient correctional training  refers to a level of training that does not adequately prepare officers to  fulfill their duties at their assigned post or other collateral duties they may  be asked to perform. For example, one officer we spoke with stated that  he felt that officers did not receive enough self defense training, which he  indicated would have prevented some of the assaults on staff in his facility  since officers would not have to depend on equipment or the backup from  other staff to protect themselves.
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Seven of 21 correctional experts reported that inadequate officer  training—if it exists within an institution—is one of the most important  factors jeopardizing officer safety because it could result in officers not  having the knowledge and skills to perform their duties safely and  effectively. These experts identified some examples of potential cost- effective efforts to address insufficient correctional officer training when  it exists in an institution. Two experts emphasized the need to leverage  training provided by local law enforcement agencies, or training provided  at no cost to the facility, such as curricula offered through NIC. Another  expert recommended that institutions call upon the local law enforcement  community for assistance or sharing of training needs. Both this expert  and 2 others recommended the use of computer-based training to expand  staff access to resources, make training available “anytime,” and combat  officer complacency.
Officials from BOP and the 14 state DOCs all agreed on the importance of  training. However, none of the officials identified their officer training  programs as being insufficient. In addition, 8 of the 68 officers we spoke  with expressed criticisms over the training they receive. To ensure that  their officers receive adequate training, BOP and the 14 state DOCs  included in our review require that officers must complete some form of  training prior to working with inmates in a facility. Such training is usually  conducted through an academy that can last from 2 to 16 weeks,  depending on the prison system. BOP’s training courses at the academy  include self defense, “use of force” policies, and gang control in addition to  any required firearms certification, and officers also receive training at the  facility in which they will be working. In addition, in BOP and 9 of the 14  states with whom we spoke, officers benefit from on-the-job training  programs, usually conducted through a shadowing program with a more  experienced officer or supervisor. Officials from 2 states with whom we  spoke reported that they have such a program and that it has helped them  address staffing issues because officers in training provide additional  support on a given shift. BOP officers are also required to complete some  form of refresher training annually. Further, officers that are members of  their institution’s Disturbance Control Team (DCT) or Special Operations  Response Teams (SORT) receive additional training on a more frequent  basis. Both BOP and state institutions have such teams of officers that are  responsible for various duties.
Inmate Gangs: Inmate gangs are the organized factions of inmates inside  a prison which can be based on an inmate’s race, religion, or geographic  origin, commonly referred to in corrections as security threat groups  (STG). Many STGs parallel existing street gangs, such as the Bloods and  the Crips. These STGs exist primarily to offer protection to their  members from other STGs and to transport and distribute drugs. For  example, the warden at one BOP facility told us that gang participation  often encourages inmates to be violent and defiant towards staff and other  inmates in order to gain respect from other gang members.
Seven of the 21 correctional experts reported that the presence of inmate  gangs in prisons is one of the most important factors impacting officer  safety, and identified some examples of potential cost-effective efforts to  address inmate gangs. According to one expert, institutions should employ  the use of phone systems that allow inmates to call a hotline to talk about  gangs; track and manage gang activity and provide this information to  hotline staff; and provide training to staff receiving this information or  observing suspicious activities. Further, another expert suggested the use  of computer assisted tracking of whom the gang leaders are calling and  whom they are writing. According to the expert, this electronic mapping of  community linkages (prison to the streets) can assist prison staff and law  enforcement in monitoring illegal activity and possibly disrupting it.  Another expert stated that proper supervision and staff training are critical  to controlling gangs, and that gangs cannot be tolerated. In addition, one  expert reported that institutions must not allow any type of gang displays,  and should transfer gang members to different institutions frequently in  order to disrupt gang organization.
Officials at two of the eight BOP institutions and 3 of the 14 states with  whom we spoke described specific efforts to identify and manage STGs  that are important in order to enhance officer safety and prevent prison  violence. For instance, both BOP and the California state prison system  reported that they identify STG members when they enter the system  through clothing insignia, tattoos, or peer associations, and note if the  inmate is identified as a member. One California official reported that the  state strives to segregate inmate STG members from other members of  their own STGs or rival STGs, to the extent possible. Further, an official  from 1 state reported that some of that state’s institutions have a housing  unit program dedicated solely for STG members, where they offer  assistance aimed to rehabilitate the inmates and draw them away from  STGs. Officials in another state prison system with whom we spoke  reported that they manage their STG population by segregating the gang  members.
Correctional Officer Understaffing: Correctional officer understaffing  is the level of staffing of officers that is perceived to be inadequate to  prevent violence and maintain a safe facility, usually measured by the  inmate-to-staff ratio. Specifically, BOP’s ORE conducted a study in 2005  entitled “The Effects of Changing Crowding and Staffing Levels in Federal  Prisons on Inmate Violence Rates,” which found that lower inmate-to-staff  ratios are correlated with increases in the level of inmate violence in BOP  institutions. However, not all officers and officials we spoke with agreed  that understaffing impacted officer safety at BOP institutions. For  instance, the officers we spoke with most frequently reported  understaffing as a factor impacting their safety (39 of 68 officers), with  many citing concerns about staffing levels during the evening and night  shifts when there is no other support staff present in the unit, while  management at two of the eight BOP institutions we visited reported that  the current staffing levels at their institutions are adequate to maintain a  safe facility.
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Despite the potential variation in perceptions, 8 of 21 correctional experts  reported that officer understaffing is one of the most important factors  jeopardizing officer safety and identified some examples of potential cost- effective efforts to address correctional officer understaffing. One expert  commented that prisons need to embrace technologies like cameras on  walls, and utilize better designs to eliminate blind spots. Another expert  stated that in many facilities, correctional officers perform support  functions, such as paperwork, that may be effectively done by other staff  earning lower salaries. However, the expert commented that hiring too  many support staff to perform these functions could affect the ability of a  correctional organization to hire more officers. In addition, another expert  stated that having officers work 12 hour shifts would increase the staff on  each shift. Another expert opined that the most effective strategy is a  careful analysis of the institutional officer posts that involves key  stakeholders, such as management and officers, and establishes  mandatory minimum post numbers, adding more posts only as staffing  levels permit.
Officials at two of the eight BOP institutions and 4 of the 14 states with  whom we spoke reported employing efforts to address officer  understaffing. For example, according to BOP management officials at one  institution that has multiple facilities in one location, called a complex,  management has implemented a staffing plan referred to as consolidation,  which allows them to fill in staffing shortages in one facility with officers  from another facility within a complex. BOP management at this  institution cited consolidation as an economical strategy to fill critical  need posts because they do not have to pay officers overtime. However,  BOP union officials at two complexes we visited and 4 out of 68 officers  we spoke with expressed unease specifically over the consolidation  policy, voicing concerns that at times, they feel less safe if sent to work in  facilities where they were not as familiar with the inmates. For example, at  one complex we visited, an officer reported that he was transferred from a  medium security facility to cover shifts at the high security facility. This  officer shared concerns that because he does not work with high security  inmates on a regular basis, he lacks the opportunity to become familiar  with various inmates who pose a greater security threat.
Inmate Overcrowding: Inmate overcrowding exists when the number of  inmates housed in a facility exceeds the rated capacity of a particular  facility. BOP defines rated capacity as the number of prisoners that the  institution is built to house safely and securely and with adequate access  to services providing necessities for daily living and programs designed to  support prisoners’ crime-free return to the community. In testimony before  the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,  Science, and Related Agencies in 2009, the BOP Director stated that  correctional administrators agree that overcrowding contributes to greater  tension, frustration, and anger among the inmate population, which leads  to conflict and violence as the inmates’ ability to access basic services are  hindered. Further, as BOP described in its 2005 study, where  overcrowded conditions exist, more inmates share cells and other living  units, and are thus brought together for longer periods with more high  risk, violent inmates, creating more potential victims. According to this  report, BOP found that an increase in the inmate population as a  percentage of a facility’s rated capacity directly correlates with an increase  in inmate violence.
Seven of the 21 correctional experts reported that overcrowding is one of  the most important factors jeopardizing officer safety. These experts  identified some examples of potential cost-effective efforts to address  inmate overcrowding. For instance, one expert recommended that inmate  programs be carried out in shifts, from the early morning to the late  evening, in order to split the amount of inmates between idle time and  program time.
To address overcrowding, officials from one of the BOP institutions and 3  of the 14 states with whom we spoke reported converting community  space, such as television rooms, into inmate cells to accommodate a larger  inmate population. This has resulted in trade-offs—to make room in  existing housing units to accommodate growing inmate populations, the  number of televisions inmates have available to watch has been reduced,  which can increase tensions and threaten safety. Further, officials from  three of the eight BOP institutions and 3 of the 14 states with whom we  spoke stated that they have resorted to double or even triple bunking cells  to accommodate the increasing inmate population. This occurs not only  within units that house inmates from the general population, but also in  the special housing units where inmates are sent for administrative  detention or disciplinary segregation. According to BOP, the tradeoff for  accommodating a growing population by double and triple bunking cells is  the increased level of stress and conflict among inmates that results from  living in such close quarters with others.
However, not all prison systems are experiencing overcrowding; in fact  some states, such as Michigan, are experiencing a reduction in their  inmate populations. States have employed a variety of mechanisms to  reduce their inmate populations in order to alleviate overcrowding, such  as reviewing inmates that may be eligible for parole or considering  sentence reductions. An official in Michigan with whom we spoke  attributed the decline in inmate population in his state to the success of  the state’s re-entry programs for inmates, which has reduced recidivism  and violations of parole or probation that often bring former inmates back  to jail.
section_title: BOP Has Evaluated Several Efforts to Address Institutional Factors That Affect Officer Safety and Utilizes the Results of These Evaluations to Inform Operations
paragraphs: BOP’s ORE has conducted evaluations to measure the impact of several  efforts on officer safety, among other outcomes, and officials report using  these evaluations to inform BOP operations. For instance, in 2001, ORE  conducted a study empirically evaluating BOP’s substance abuse  treatment program’s effectiveness in reducing prisoner misconduct, which  is closely related to officer safety. The study found that treatment program  graduates were 74 percent less likely to engage in misconduct between  program graduation and release from prison than a comparison group. In  addition, in a 2008 study of BOP’s pilot faith-based residential program  called Life Connections, BOP’s ORE found that Life Connections  participants were less likely to engage in serious misconduct while in the  program. Further, ORE has recently begun collecting data for a study to  measure the impact of its SMUs—separate housing for inmates presenting  unique security and management concerns, such as those who  participated or had a leadership role in gang activity—on misconduct rates  at both the institutions from which the inmates were removed as well as  the SMUs into which they were placed.
According to the Deputy Assistant Director of BOP’s Information, Policy,  and Public Affairs Division, ORE provides interim data and its final  evaluations to the BOP Director and executive staff members, as well as  NIC—whose director is a member of BOP’s executive staff—and other  DOJ components, such as OJP. Further, ORE requires its staff to publish  their work to make it available publicly to the larger correctional  community. This official reported that BOP’s Director and executive staff  use information from ORE for a variety of purposes, including operational  decision-making and budget formulation. For example, this official  reported that ORE provides the BOP Director and the executive staff with  interim information related to its ongoing SMU evaluation, which provides  BOP management with real-time information to guide its decisions related  to the SMUs. In addition, in its 2011 Budget Justification, BOP cited its  findings from ORE’s study on the Life Connections Program, which  demonstrated reductions in serious inmate misconduct, when providing its  rationale for funding for inmate programs. Further, the official reported  that, when faced with budget constraints, BOP decided to eliminate its  intensive confinement centers—or “boot camps”—after an ORE study  found that BOP’s boot camps were not effective at reducing re-arrest.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: With an increasing inmate population in BOP institutions, officer safety is  continuously at risk. To protect officers from a range of threats, BOP has  taken steps, such as providing additional equipment to officers to access in  an emergency and routinely conducting officer training to enhance on-the- job responsiveness. Further, in limited cases, BOP has obtained  information about the performance of equipment through pilot tests,  officer surveys, and comparisons to manufacturer specifications. In  addition, BOP has conducted studies looking at whether its efforts to  address institutional factors have impacted inmate violence. However, it is  difficult for BOP to determine the impact on officer safety of the  equipment it provides because it has not used the data it already collects  for this evaluative purpose. By conducting evidence-based evaluative  research in what equipment effectively protects officers, BOP could be  better positioned to dedicate resources to equipment that has the greatest  impact on safety.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To capitalize on the data BOP already collects and to further DOJ’s  evaluation efforts, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the  Director of BOP to leverage existing BOP data systems, such as  TRUINTEL and SENTRY, as well as the institutional expertise available  through NIJ and NIC, as appropriate, to assess the impact of the  equipment BOP has provided or could provide to its officers to better  protect them in a range of scenarios and settings.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We received written comments on a draft of this report from BOP, which  are reproduced in full in appendix VI. BOP concurred with our  recommendation and stated that, with the assistance of NIJ and/or NIC, it  will conduct a study to evaluate the impact of protective equipment on  officer safety. BOP and NIJ also provided technical comments on the  report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General and  interested congressional committees. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact David Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or by email at maurerd@gao.gov.  Contact points from our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to  this report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: In this report, we describe the equipment available to protect officers as  well as other institutional factors, such as inmate overcrowding and  staffing shortages, that affect officer safety. Specifically, this report  addresses the following questions:    What equipment do the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and selected states  provide to protect officers and what are the opinions of BOP officers and  other correctional practitioners regarding this equipment?
To what extent has BOP evaluated the effectiveness of its equipment in  ensuring officer safety, and what do correctional equipment experts report  as important factors when considering the purchase of new equipment?
What institutional factors do correctional accrediting experts report as  most impacting officer safety, and to what extent has BOP evaluated the  effectiveness of the steps it has taken to address these factors?
To address all of our objectives, we reviewed existing BOP policies and  procedures, such as BOP Program Statements and institution-specific  policies, to catalogue the equipment BOP provides to officers and the  measures it has implemented to address institutional factors affecting  officer safety system-wide. We also interviewed BOP central management,  such as officials from the Correctional Services Branch, who help ensure  that national policies and procedures are in place that provide a safe,  secure institutional environment for inmates and staff, and the Office of  Security Technology, who identify and evaluate new security-related  equipment. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Office of  Research and Evaluation, who produce reports and also research  corrections-related topics. During these interviews, we discussed BOP’s  existing officer safety practices; the institutional factors they report as  affecting officer safety; their views on the effectiveness of the equipment  BOP provides, and the measures it has implemented to address these  institutional factors; and their mechanisms for evaluating the  effectiveness. We compared BOP’s mechanisms for evaluating the  effectiveness of its practices in ensuring officer safety to BOP’s and DOJ’s  mission statements and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government.
Further, we visited a total of eight BOP institutions in each of BOP’s six  regions. During these visits, we interviewed BOP institutional management  officials and observed officer safety practices so that we could accurately  reflect BOP management views on officer safety. To obtain the views of  officers regarding their safety, we also conducted semistructured  interviews with 68 officers who were on duty at the time of our visit. The  officers were chosen at random, but were generally posted to the  institutions’ housing units or yard. In selecting the institutions to visit, we  considered factors such as their location, staff-to-inmate ratio, level of  overcrowding, number of assaults on staff, and the security level of the  institution. These institutions included Atwater U.S. Penitentiary (USP)  and Victorville Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) in California;  Florence FCC in Colorado; Allenwood FCC in Pennsylvania; Guaynabo  Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Puerto Rico; Beaumont FCC and  Houston Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Texas; and Lee USP in  Virginia. Because we used a nonprobability sample, our results are not  generalizable to all BOP institutions; however, our interviews provided us  with insights into the perspectives of management officials and officers at  BOP institutions regarding officer safety.
In addition, we contacted the 15 state DOCs with the largest inmate  populations and conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 of these 15  DOCs. These states included Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida,  Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina,  Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. During these interviews, state  DOC officials identified equipment their officers use and their perceptions  of the equipment’s effectiveness in protecting their officers. In connection  with our BOP site visits, we also visited state institutions in 5 of these  states: Corcoran State Prison in California, Central Florida Reception  Center in Florida, Graterford State Correctional Institution in  Pennsylvania, Darrington Unit in Texas, and Coffeewood Correctional  Center in Virginia. Due to the overall number of correctional organizations  in the United States, we conducted nonprobability sampling, which limits  the ability to extrapolate the findings in this report to all correctional  organizations. However, this information provided useful insight into state  correctional practices.
We also interviewed union officials from the Council of Prison Locals,  representing BOP officers, including officials at the national union as well  as local union officials at five of the eight BOP institutions we visited, in  order to obtain their perspectives about the institutional factors they  report as affecting officer safety, the measures in place to address these  factors, and the equipment BOP uses to protect officers. In addition, we  interviewed officials from correctional organizations to determine the  institutional factors they report as affecting officer safety, and their  perspectives on the equipment used to protect officers and the  effectiveness of this equipment and BOP and state officer safety practices.  These organizations included the American Correctional Association  (ACA), BOP’s National Institute of Corrections (NIC), and the Association  of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA). We selected these  organizations based on recommendations from the correctional officials  with whom we spoke, including BOP and state officials. As we selected a  nonprobability sample of the officials at correctional organizations, these  opinions are not generalizable. However, they provided important insights  into BOP and state correctional practices. In addition, we conducted a  literature search to identify and obtain evaluations of the effectiveness of  BOP or state officer safety practices, such as those conducted by the  states’ or DOJ’s inspectors general.
In addition, to further address our second objective, we interviewed  correctional equipment experts from the DOJ’s National Institute of  Justice (NIJ), NIJ’s National Law Enforcement and Corrections Training  Center (NLECTC), and the Department of Commerce’s National Institute  of Standards and Technology (NIST). Officials from these organizations  were chosen because of their expertise in correctional equipment. During  these interviews, we obtained the officials’ perspectives on the factors  BOP would need to consider if it acquired additional personal protective  equipment for its officers. As we selected a nonprobabilty sample of  correctional equipment experts, these perspectives are not generalizable.  However, they provided valuable insights into equipment considerations.
In order to further develop our third objective, we identified 14  institutional factors that BOP, state DOCs, and correctional experts  reported as most affecting officer safety. We then surveyed a panel of 30  correctional accrediting experts who serve as audit chairs for the ACA’s  Commission on Accreditation concerning the list of 14 institutional factors  that BOP and state DOC officials perceived as affecting officer safety. The  ACA audit chairs ranked which of these factors most affect officer safety  when the factors exist in a correctional institution. The ACA audit chairs  also provided a list of cost effective strategies that could be used to  address these strategies. The ACA audit chairs were selected based upon  their expertise in advising the ACA Accrediting Commission as to which  correctional institutions in the United States should be accredited,  including BOP institutions. The e-mail-based survey was launched on  December 10, 2010, and by the close of the survey on December 22, 2010,  we had received 21 responses from the 30 experts, for a response rate of  70 percent. We sent one follow up e-mail to the experts on December 16,  2010.
Because our survey was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors;  however, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce  nonsampling errors. For example, differences in how a particular question  is interpreted, the sources of information available to respondents, or the  types of people who do not respond can introduce unwanted variability  into the survey results. We included steps in both the data collection and  data analysis stages for the purpose of minimizing such nonsampling  errors. In addition, we collaborated with a social science survey specialist  to design the survey instrumentation, and the survey was pretested with a  subject matter expert at ACA with over 30 years of experience in  corrections. From this pretest, we made revisions as necessary. See  appendix IV for a copy of our survey.
We conducted this work from June 2010 to April 2011 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Trends in BOP Inmate Characteristics
paragraphs: The figures below depict trends in the characteristics of the Bureau of  Prisons’ (BOP) total inmate population, including inmates housed in  privately managed or contracted facilities, in each fiscal year, from fiscal  year 2000 through 2010.
As figure 8 illustrates, the average inmate age increased by more than 2  years from fiscal year 2000 through 2010.
As shown in figures 9 and 10, the percentage of inmates by race, ethnicity,  and gender has remained relatively constant throughout this period.
As depicted in figure 11, the types of offenses for which BOP inmates are  incarcerated have also remained relatively constant, with drug offenses  comprising more than half the offenses each fiscal year from 2000 through  2010.
As figure 12 illustrates, the length of the sentence imposed on BOP  inmates has been generally stable, with a slight increase in longer  sentences from fiscal year 2000 through 2010.
As shown in figure 13, the percentage of inmates associated with a  Security Threat Group has fluctuated from fiscal year 2000 through 2010.  Specifically, it was generally constant from fiscal year 2000 through 2002,  declined slightly in fiscal year 2003, and then steadily increased until fiscal  year 2008 when it began to decline in fiscal year 2009 and then again in  fiscal year 2010.
section_title: Appendix III: Characteristics of State Inmates
paragraphs: State departments of corrections are responsible for housing the states’  inmate populations. The table and figures that follow depict the  characteristics of state inmates.
Inmate populations in the 50 states vary in size from each other. Table 6  displays the inmate populations in each state.
Figure 14 presents DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates of sentenced  prisoners under state jurisdiction by race and Hispanic origin. As figure 14  shows, the percentage of Hispanic inmates and inmates of “other” races— including American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, other  Pacific Islanders, and persons identifying as two or more races—under  state jurisdiction has been increasing from calendar year 2000 to 2009,  while the percentage of black and white inmates has decreased or stayed  about the same.
Figure 15 presents DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates of sentenced  prisoners under state jurisdiction by gender from December 31, 2000  through December 31, 2009. As depicted in figure 15, the gender  breakdown has remained largely stable over this time period.
Figure 16 shows the DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates of the  sentenced inmate population under state jurisdiction by the type of  offense for which they were convicted, as of the end of 2008, the most  currently available data.
section_title: Appendix IV: Survey Sent to American Correctional Association (ACA) Audit Chairs
paragraphs: Based on responses from Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and state correctional  officials with whom we spoke, we identified 14 common institutional  factors that impact officer safety. In order to determine which of the 14  factors have the greatest impact on officer safety, we sent the survey  below to 30 correctional accrediting experts at the American Correctional  Association (ACA) and asked them to rank which of the factors—if they  exist in an institution—would pose the greatest threat to officer safety.  These experts are the audit chairs for the ACA’s Commission on  Accreditation, who advise the commission as to which federal, state, and  local correctional institutions should be accredited and were therefore  selected based on this knowledge. We received responses from 21 experts,  who also provided examples of efforts to address these factors that they  believed to be cost effective.  1. Which of the following corrections-related positions do you hold? Please  check one answer.
2. In general, how much, if at all, does each of the following affect the  safety of correctional officers or of other staff performing corrections  duties? Please check one answer for each row. a. Ineffective inmate management (e.g., lack of controlled inmate movement,   b. Insufficient information sharing among managers and staff within institutions e. Insufficient inmate programming (e.g., prison industries, drug rehabilitation,     h. Insufficient discipline of inmates following a violation  i. Intoxicated inmates as a result of inmate-manufactured alcohol  j. Disruptive inmate behavior due to the sale and use of illegal drugs  k. Inmate possession and use of unauthorized communication devices,   m. Inmates dissatisfied with food service  n. Population of inmates with characteristics that may lead to increased violent      behavior (e.g., younger age, longer sentences, lack of parole opportunities)
3.If you would like to elaborate on any of the factors above, please do so in  the box below. The box will expand as you type.  4. Which three of the following factors do you believe most affect  corrections officer safety? Please check three and no more than three  factors in the list below. a. Ineffective inmate management (e.g. lack of controlled inmate movement,       insufficient supervision of inmates)  b. Insufficient information sharing among managers and staff within institutions  e. Insufficient inmate programming (e.g., prison industries, drug rehabilitation,       education, recreation)  h. Insufficient discipline of inmates following a violation  i. Intoxicated inmates as a result of inmate-manufactured alcohol  j. Disruptive inmate behavior due to the sale and use of illegal drugs  k. Inmate possession and use of unauthorized communication devices, including   m. Inmates dissatisfied with food service  n. Population of inmates with characteristics that may lead to increased violent       behavior (e.g. younger age, longer sentences, lack of parole opportunities)
5. Besides the factors listed above, if there are any other significant factors  affecting corrections officer safety please describe them in the box below.  The box will expand as you type.  6. The next questions ask you to provide examples(s) of strategies to  address each factor that you believe to be cost-effective. Please answer as  many as you can.  a. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Ineffective  inmate management (e.g., lack of controlled inmate movement,  insufficient supervision of inmates)? The box will expand as you type.  b. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Insufficient  information sharing among managers and staff within institutions? The  box will expand as you type.  c. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Inmate  overcrowding? The box will expand as you type.  d. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Corrections  officer under-staffing? The box will expand as you type.  e. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Insufficient  inmate programming (e.g., prison industries, drug rehabilitation,  education, recreation)? The box will expand as you type.  f. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Corrections  officer complacency? The box will expand as you type.  g. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Insufficient  corrections training? The box will expand as you type.  h. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Insufficient  discipline of inmates following a violation? The box will expand as you  type.  i. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Intoxicated  inmates as a result of inmate-manufactured alcohol? The box will expand  as you type.  j. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Disruptive  inmate behavior due to the sale and use of illegal drugs? The box will  expand as you type.  k. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Inmate  possession and use of unauthorized communication devices, including cell  phones? The box will expand as you type.  l. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Inmate  gangs? The box will expand as you type.  m. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Inmates  dissatisfied with food service? The box will expand as you type.  n. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Population  of inmates with characteristics that may lead to increased violent behavior  (e.g., younger age, longer sentences, lack of parole opportunities)? The  box will expand as you type.  7. If you have any additional comments concerning correctional officer  safety, please type them in the box below. The box will expand as you  type.
section_title: Appendix V: Institutional Factors That Impact Officer Safety and Examples of Mitigating Strategies Either Used by BOP or State DOCs or Suggested by Correctional Accrediting Experts
paragraphs: Table 7 lists the institutional factors that the officers and officials with  whom we spoke reported impacted officer safety. It also provides  examples of strategies to mitigate these factors that BOP or state officials  reported using or that correctional accrediting experts we surveyed  suggested.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Bureau of Prisons
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Joy Gambino, Assistant Director; Jill Evancho, Analyst-In-Charge;  Christian Montz, Julia Becker Vieweg, and Miriam Rosenau. Michele Fejfar  assisted with design and methodology; Willie Commons III provided legal  support; Pedro Almoguera provided economic expertise; and Katherine  Davis provided assistance in report preparation.