Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Additional Management Actions by State and DHS
Published: 2005-09-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In adjudicating a visa application, Department of State (State) consular officers are on the front line of defense against those whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. In October 2002, we identified shortcomings and made recommendations on the role of national security in the visa process. This testimony discusses our report issued today on actions taken since our 2002 report to strengthen the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional management actions. It also discusses our July 2005 report on the status of the assignment of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel to U.S. consular posts overseas.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: State and DHS have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the importance of addressing national security concerns through the visa process, and State has established clear procedures on visa operations worldwide. State has also increased its hiring of consular officers and language proficient Foreign Service officers, and has enhanced training and fraud prevention efforts. Further, consular officers have access to more information from intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However, some areas require additional attention. For example, officers we spoke with said that guidance is needed on DHS staff's roles and responsibilities overseas. In addition, while State has hired more consular officers, it continues to experience shortages in supervisory staff. As of April 30, 2005, 26 percent of midlevel positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level staff. During our February 2005 visits to three consular posts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt--all of which are of interest to U.S. antiterrorism efforts--the visa sections were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide direct oversight. Further improvements are also needed in training and fraud prevention, as well as information sharing with the FBI. In September 2003, DHS assigned visa security personnel to consular posts in Saudi Arabia. According to DHS, State's consular officials, and the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the DHS officers in Saudi Arabia strengthen visa security. However, DHS does not maintain comprehensive data on their activities and thus is unable to fully demonstrate the program's impact. Further, DHS has not developed a strategic plan for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia or for the planned future expansion of the program.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss our reports issued today and in July on  the actions that the Departments of State (State) and Homeland Security  (DHS) have taken to strengthen the nonimmigrant visa process as an  antiterrorism tool. All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers  were issued a visa, which is a U.S. travel document foreign citizens must  generally obtain before entering the country temporarily for business,  tourism, or other reasons. In deciding to approve or deny a visa  application, State’s consular officers are on the front line of defense in  protecting the United States against potential terrorists and others whose  entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. But consular  officers must balance this security responsibility against the need to  facilitate legitimate travel. In October 2002, we identified shortcomings  and made recommendations aimed at strengthening the role of national  security in the visa process, procedures for addressing heightened border  security concerns, staffing, and counterterrorism training of consular  officers. Similarly, staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks  Upon the United States, or the 9-11 Commission, reported that while there  were efforts to enhance border security prior to September 11, no agency  of the U.S. government at that time thought of the visa process as an  antiterrorism tool. Indeed, the 9-11 Commission staff reported that  consular officers were not trained to screen for terrorists.
Today I will discuss the changes made since our 2002 report to strengthen  the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional management  attention. First, I will focus on our report issued today on changes in visa  policy and guidance; consular resources, including staffing and training;  and the extent to which U.S. agencies share information with visa  adjudicators. Second, I will discuss our July 2005 report on the placement  of DHS Visa Security Officers (VSO) at U.S. embassies and consulates  overseas.
In conducting this work, we reviewed relevant legislation and agency  documents, and interviewed State, DHS, and Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) officials in Washington, D.C., as well as visa chiefs and  other consular affairs staff from 25 posts overseas. We observed visa  operations and interviewed U.S. government officials at 8 U.S. consular  posts in seven countries—Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Spain,  Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Our work was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In  addition, GAO has conducted extensive reviews of different aspects of the  visa process and related areas (see appendix I for a list of GAO reports).
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is the primary  body of law governing immigration and visa operations. The Homeland  Security Act of 2002 generally grants DHS exclusive authority to issue  regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration and Nationality  Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to the functions  of U.S. consular officers in connection with the granting or denial of visas.  As we reported in July 2005, the act also authorized the assignment of  DHS employees to U.S. embassies and consulates to provide expert advice  and training to consular officers regarding visa security, among other  things. In particular, the act mandated that VSOs on-site in Saudi Arabia  review all visa applications prior to final adjudication by consular officers.
A September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between State and DHS  further outlines the responsibilities of each agency with respect to visa  issuance. State manages the visa process, as well as the consular corps  and its functions at 211 visa-issuing posts overseas. In addition, State  provides guidance, in consultation with DHS, to consular officers  regarding visa policies and procedures. DHS is responsible for establishing  visa policy, reviewing implementation of the policy, and providing  additional direction. This agreement also broadly defines the DHS officers’  responsibilities in reviewing visa applications at consular posts overseas,  indicating, among other things, that they will provide expert advice to  consular officers regarding specific security threats relating to visa  adjudication and will also provide training to consular officers on terrorist  threats and applicant fraud.
The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains  several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews,  collection of biometrics (fingerprints), and cross-referencing of the  applicant’s name against the Consular Lookout and Support System  (CLASS)  (see fig. 1).
In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an  antiterrorism tool, including    establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing  national security concerns through the visa process;   creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on  how consular officers should use the visa process to screen against  potential terrorists;    performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill  requirements for visa operations; and revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more  emphasis on detecting potential terrorists.
section_title: Visa Process Strengthened, and Further Actions Would Support Ongoing Improvements
paragraphs: Since 2002, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken numerous steps to  strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and increase its  overall efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the Assistant Secretary  in the Bureau of Consular Affairs has taken a leading role in implementing  changes to the visa process and promoting its use as a screen against  potential terrorists. However, additional actions could enhance the visa  process. State has increased and clarified visa policies and guidance, but  additional steps are needed to ensure these changes are implemented.  Additionally, State has increased resources to strengthen the visa process,  including hiring additional consular officers, targeting recruitment, and  expanding training efforts; however, staffing limitations remain a concern,  posts seek further training, and other gaps remain. Lastly, while  interagency information-sharing efforts have increased, consular officers  do not have direct access to detailed information from the FBI’s criminal  records, which would help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers.
subsections: section_title: Visa Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Enhanced, but Additional Steps Needed to Ensure They Are Implemented
paragraphs: We reported in October 2002 that consular officers held differing views on  balancing the need for national security and customer service in the visa  process. In addition, State had not issued comprehensive policy guidance  to posts regarding how consular officers should react to the heightened  border security concerns following the September 11 attacks. Over the  past three years, State has implemented several changes to address these  issues, and consular officials stated that the report and its  recommendations provided a framework for these changes. For example,  in February 2003, Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying national  security as the first priority of the visa process. Consular officers we  interviewed said the guidance was generally clear, and officers at all eight  posts we visited viewed security as the most critical element of the visa  process. In addition, Consular Affairs identified certain areas where  additional guidance was needed to streamline visa procedures. State has  issued more than 80 standard operating procedures, in consultation with  DHS, to inform consular officers on issues such as fingerprinting and  special clearance requirements.
Despite these improvements, some consular officers we interviewed  stated that it has been difficult to synthesize and consistently apply all of  the changes to the visa process. The guidance provided to consular  officers in the field is voluminous and can change rapidly, according to  consular officials. The Consular Affairs Bureau may notify its officers  overseas of policy changes through cables, postings on its internal Web  site, and informal communications. However, the bureau has not  consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs  Manual—State’s central resource for all regulations, policies, and  guidance—to reflect these changes. Throughout 2005, the bureau has  updated several portions of the manual, but, as of June 2005, some  sections had not been updated since October 2004. Consular officials  stated that they are overhauling the standard operating procedures to  eliminate those that are obsolete and incorporate current requirements  into the manual. However, while the Consular Affairs Bureau’s internal  Web site contains all of the standard operating procedures, it also links to  out-of-date sections in the manual. As a result, there is no single, reliable  source for current information.
Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on  certain interagency protocols. Specifically, 15 out of 25 visa chiefs we  interviewed reported that additional guidance would be helpful regarding  the interaction between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and DHS. For  example, DHS personnel stationed overseas work on a variety of  immigration and border security activities and serve in a regional capacity.  However, DHS has not provided guidance to consular officers regarding  the roles and geographic responsibilities for its personnel.
section_title: Resources for Visa Function Increased, but Staffing Shortages and Other Gaps Remain a Concern
paragraphs: In 2002, we found that at some posts the demand for visas, combined with  increased workload per visa applicant, exceeded the available staff. As a  result, we recommended that State perform a fundamental reassessment  of staffing requirements for visa operations. In our report issued today, we  have noted that State has received funding to address staffing shortfalls,  but we continue to see the need for a reassessment of resource needs  worldwide. Through the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative and other  sources, State has increased its Foreign Service officer consular positions  by 364, from 1,037 in fiscal year 2002 to 1,401 in fiscal year 2005. Moreover,  a senior human resource official anticipates that many officers hired under  the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative will begin to reach promotion  eligibility for midlevel positions within the next two years. However, as we  have previously reported in 2003, the overall shortage of midlevel Foreign  Service officers would remain until approximately 2013. As of April 30,  2005, we found that 26 percent of midlevel consular positions were either  vacant or filled by an entry-level officer (see fig. 2). In addition, almost  three-quarters of the vacant positions were at the FS-03 level—midlevel  officers who generally supervise entry-level staff—which consular officials  attribute to low hiring levels prior to the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative  and the necessary expansion of entry-level positions to accommodate  increasing workload requirements after September 11, 2001.
Senior (44)
Vacant (58)
Midlevel (478)
Staffed with entry-level officers (65)
Staffed by at least  midlevel officers (355)
Entry-level (879)
During our February 2005 visits to Riyadh, Jeddah, and Cairo, we observed  that the consular sections were staffed with entry-level officers on their  first assignment with no permanent, midlevel visa chief to provide  supervision. Although these posts had other mid- or senior-level consular  officers, their availability on visa issues was limited because of their  additional responsibilities. For example, the head of the visa section in  Jeddah was responsible for managing the entire section as well as services  for American citizens due to a midlevel vacancy in that position. At the  time of our visit, the Riyadh Embassy did not have a midlevel visa chief.  Similarly, in Cairo, there was no permanent midlevel supervisor between  the winter of 2004 and the summer of 2005, and Consular Affairs used five  temporary staff on a rotating basis during this period to serve in this  capacity. Entry-level officers that we spoke with stated that due to the  constant turnover, the temporary supervisors were unable to assist them  adequately. At the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, entry-level officers expressed  concern about the lack of a midlevel supervisor. Officers in Jeddah stated  that they relied on the guidance they received from the DHS visa security  officer assigned to the post. However, as of July 2005, visa security officers  are stationed only at two consular posts in Saudi Arabia—not at any of the  other 209 visa-issuing posts overseas.
If the Consular Affairs Bureau identifies a need for additional staff in  headquarters or overseas, it may request that the Human Resources  Bureau establish new positions.
In addition, posts can also describe their needs for additional positions  through their consular packages—a report submitted annually to the  Consular Affairs Bureau that details workload statistics and staffing  requirements, among other things. For example, in December 2004, during  the course of our work, the consular section in Riyadh reported to  Washington that there was an immediate need to create a midlevel visa  chief position at post, and State worked with human resource officials to  create this position, which, according to State officials, will be filled by  summer 2005.
However, the current assignment process does not guarantee that all  authorized positions will be filled, particularly at hardship posts.  Historically, State has rarely directed its employees to serve in locations  for which they have not bid on a position, including hardship posts or  locations of strategic importance, due to concerns that such staff may be  more apt to have poor morale or be less productive. Further, though  Consular Affairs can prioritize positions that require immediate staffing,  according to a deputy assistant secretary for human resources, it generally  does not do so. For example, Consular Affairs could choose not to  advertise certain positions of lesser priority during an annual assignment  cycle. However, senior Consular Affairs officials acknowledged that they  rarely do this. According to these officials, Consular Affairs does not have  direct control over the filling of all consular positions and can often face  resistance from regional bureaus and chiefs of mission overseas who do  not want vacancies at their posts. Therefore, due to State’s decision to not  force assignments, along with the limited amount of midlevel officers  available to apply for them, important positions may remain vacant.
subsections: section_title: Improvements Made in Recruitment, Training, and Fraud Prevention, and Additional Actions Would Support Ongoing Initiatives
paragraphs: In 2002, we found that not all consular officers were proficient enough in  their post’s language to hold interviews with applicants. We also found  that training for new consular officers was focused on detecting intending  immigrants through the visa process, with little training given on detecting  possible terrorists. Today we are reporting that State has made a number  of improvements in its recruitment of language proficient Foreign Service  officers, expanded and revamped consular training, and increased the  attention paid to fraud prevention. However, we found that additional  actions would support ongoing improvements. For example,    State has created programs to better target its recruitment of Foreign  Service officers who speak critical languages. For example, in March  2004, State created the “Critical Needs Language Program,” which  increases the opportunities for appointment to the Foreign Service for  new hires proficient in Arabic, Chinese, Indic, Korean, Russian, or  Turkic, and who have passed the Foreign Service Exam. From March  2004 through May 2005, 172 of the 564 Foreign Service officers hired  were proficient in one of these languages. Despite these improvements,  additional actions are needed to fill continuing language proficiency  shortfalls. As of April 30, 2005, State reported that about 14 percent of  consular-coned Foreign Service officers in language designated  positions did not meet language requirements for their position.
State has revamped and expanded consular training to enhance visa  security. For example, in October 2003, the Basic Consular Course was  extended from 26 days to 31 days, and classes were added in analytical  interviewing and fraud prevention. In addition, in March 2002, State  created a new course in advanced name-checking. However, additional  training could further assist consular officers. All of the posts we  contacted reported that additional training on terrorist travel trends  would be helpful, with 16 posts responding that such training would be  extremely helpful. Some posts also reported that additional briefings  on counterterrorism techniques specific to post and fraud prevention  would be helpful.
State has taken several steps to increase its focus on preventing and  detecting fraud in the visa process. For example, by 2004, State’s  Bureau of Diplomatic Security had deployed 25 visa fraud investigators  to U.S. embassies and consulates. In addition, State’s Office of Fraud  Prevention Programs has developed several ways for consular officers  in the field to learn about fraud prevention, including developing an  Internet-based “E-room,” with more than 500 members, which serves as  a discussion group for consular officers, as well as a place to post  cables and lessons learned from prior fraud cases. However, until  recently, the department has not used a systematic process to identify  consular posts with the highest degree of visa fraud. According to State  officials, fraud rankings for consular posts have not been based on an  objective analysis using standardized criteria, but have been self- reported by each post. As a result, previous resources for fraud  prevention, including the 25 visa fraud investigators assigned in 2004,  may not have been allocated to posts with the highest need. We also  plan to report later this year on the internal controls that are in place to  mitigate the risks of visa malfeasance—the provision of a visa in  exchange for money or something else of value—and intend to make  several recommendations to help ensure adherence to these controls.
section_title: Number of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Records in CLASS Increased, but Additional Information Would Help Facilitate Legitimate Travel
paragraphs: The September 11 attacks highlighted the need for comprehensive  information sharing. In January 2005, GAO identified effective information  sharing to secure the homeland as a high-risk area of the U.S. government  due to the formidable challenges the federal government still faces in this  area. With cooperation from other federal agencies, State has increased  the amount of information available to consular officers in CLASS. Name- check records from the intelligence community have increased fivefold  from 48,000 in September 2001 to approximately 260,000 in June 2005,  according to consular officials. Moreover, consular officials told us that, as  of fall 2004, CLASS contained approximately 8 million records from the  FBI. In addition, State has developed more efficient methods of acquiring  certain data from law enforcement databases. For example, State  established a direct computer link with the FBI to send descriptive  information from the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to  CLASS on a daily basis.
While the additional records in CLASS have helped consular officers  detect those who might seek to harm the United States, many consular  officers we interviewed stated that the increased volume of records and  lack of access to other detailed information can lead to visa-processing  delays. In particular, consular officers do not have direct access to  detailed information in the FBI’s criminal history records. Section 403 of  the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 directs the Attorney General and the FBI  to provide State with access to extracts of certain files containing  descriptive information for the purpose of determining whether a visa  applicant has a criminal history record contained in the NCIC Interstate  Identification Index (or Index). The USA PATRIOT Act also states that  access to an extract does not entitle consular officers to obtain the full  contents of the corresponding records. In accordance with this mandate,  FBI officials stated that the bureau provides to CLASS extracts that  contain all available biographical information, such as the date of birth  and height of the person with the criminal record. As a result, when  conducting a CLASS name check, consular officers told us they may not be  able to determine whether an FBI file matches an applicant because the  extracts lack sufficient biographical information. Moreover, in accordance  with section 403, the extracts do not contain details such as charges or  dispositions of the cases, which are necessary to determine if the applicant  might be ineligible for a visa. For example, the information in CLASS  does not distinguish between a conviction for a crime such as kidnapping,  or an acquittal on charges of driving while intoxicated.
Consular officers, therefore, must fingerprint applicants who have a  potential match in the Index for positive identification in FBI records to  then ascertain whether the information contained in the criminal record  would make the applicant ineligible for a visa. In fiscal year 2004, of the  more than 40,000 sets of fingerprints consular officers sent to the FBI for  verification, about 29 percent were positive matches between the  applicant and a criminal record in the Index. State officials we spoke with  estimated that of those applicants who were positively identified, only  about 10 percent were denied a visa based on the information provided by  the FBI. Moreover, fingerprinted applicants are charged an additional $85  processing fee and, as of the spring of 2005, must wait an estimated 4 to 8  weeks for a response from Washington, D.C., before adjudication can  proceed. According to FBI and State officials, the processing delays are  due to inefficiencies in the way the prints are sent to the FBI for clearance  (see fig. 3).
To facilitate more efficient fingerprint processing, State and the FBI are  implementing an electronic fingerprint system whereby consular officers  will scan the applicants’ fingerprints at post and submit them directly into  the FBI’s database. FBI and State officials told us that posts would be  notified if the record in question matched the applicant within 24 hours.  However, thousands of visa applicants could still face lengthier wait times  and additional fingerprinting fees that they would otherwise not have  incurred because consular officers lack enough information at the time of  the interview to determine if the records in CLASS match the applicant.
The FBI and State have discussed several options to help ensure that  consular officers can facilitate legitimate travel; however, each would  require legislative changes and would entail associated trade-offs. These  options include the following:    Consular officials told us that access to additional information in a  criminal history file, such as the charge and disposition of a case,  would allow their officers to determine which crimes are serious  enough to require a positive fingerprint match prior to adjudication.  However, FBI officials noted that there are some technical limitations  on extracting specific pieces of data from the criminal history records.
To avoid some of the technical limitations associated with the Index,  FBI officials stated that it would be easier to provide visa adjudicators  access to the full criminal history records. However, these officials told  us that assurances would need to be in place to prevent misuse of the  information, given its sensitive nature. Indeed, State and the FBI have  already negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at  protecting the information passed from NCIC to CLASS. However,  consular officials indicated that their officers may need access only to  the criminal charge and disposition of the case to adjudicate a visa case  more efficiently.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: In our report issued today, we are recommending, among other things,  that State and DHS, in consultation with appropriate agencies, clarify  certain visa policies and procedures and facilitate their implementation,  and ensure that consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance  national security and promote legitimate travel, including effective human  resources and training. In particular, we recommend that State develop a  comprehensive plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing  worldwide, including an analysis of staffing requirements and shortages,  foreign language proficiency requirements, and fraud prevention needs,  among other things—the plan should systematically determine priority  positions that must be filled worldwide based on the relative strategic  importance of posts and positions and realistic assumptions of available  staff resources. We also suggest that Congress consider requiring State  and the FBI to develop and report on a plan to provide visa adjudicators  with more efficient access to certain information in the FBI’s criminal  history records to help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers.
In commenting on a draft of our report, State noted that it is a fair and  balanced evaluation of the improvements made to the visa process. State  agreed with most of our conclusions, and indicated that it is taking action  to implement the majority of our recommendations. However, State  disagreed with our recommendation that it prepare a comprehensive plan  to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing. State argued that it already  had such a plan. Based on our analysis, we continue to believe it is  incumbent on the department to conduct a worldwide analysis to identify  high-priority posts and positions, such as supervisory consular positions in  posts with high-risk applicant pools or those with high workloads and long  wait times for applicant interviews. As we note in our report, at the time of  our work, the midlevel visa chief positions in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi  Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, were not filled with permanent midlevel officers.  This was a serious deficiency given that the visa sections were staffed with  officers on their first tour. Although State noted that it anticipated  addressing this shortage of midlevel consular officers before 2013, it did  not indicate when that gap would be filled. Moreover, State’s bidding and  assignment process does not guarantee that the positions of highest  priority will always be filled with qualified officers. Therefore, a further  assessment is needed to ensure that State has the right people in the right  posts with the necessary skill levels.
section_title: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of DHS’s Visa Security Program
paragraphs: In September 2003, DHS assigned Visa Security Officers (VSO) to consular  posts in Saudi Arabia and plans to assign staff to other posts to strengthen  the visa process at these locations. As we addressed in our July 2005  report, according to State Department consular officers, the deputy chief  of mission, and DHS officials, VSOs in Saudi Arabia enhance the security  of the visa adjudication process at these consular posts, though several  issues raise concerns about the VSOs’ role and impact. VSOs in Saudi  Arabia provide an additional law enforcement capability to the visa  adjudication process and have access to and experience using important  law enforcement information not readily available to consular officers.  Moreover, VSOs’ border security and immigration experience can assist  consular officers during the visa process. The consular sections in Riyadh  and Jeddah have incorporated the VSOs’ review of all visa applications  into the adjudication process in Saudi Arabia. In addition to reviewing  applications, the VSOs may conduct secondary interviews with some visa  applicants based either on findings from their application reviews or a  consular officer’s request. Despite the VSOs’ positive effect on visa  operations, however, several concerns exist about their role and overall  impact.
The requirement that VSOs review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia  limits the amount of time they can spend on training and other valuable  services. We observed that VSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah must spend a  significant amount of time reviewing all visa applications, including  those of low-risk applicants or individuals who do not pose a threat to  national security, as well as those that have preliminarily been refused  by consular officers. A Visa Security Program official noted that this  mandate is only for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and not  other posts to which DHS plans to expand the program. VSOs, DHS and  State officials, and the deputy chief of mission all agreed that the  mandate to review all applications was forcing the VSOs to spend time  on lower priority tasks, limiting their ability to perform other important  activities, such as providing training or conducting additional  secondary interviews of applicants.
DHS has not maintained measurable data to fully demonstrate the  impact of VSOs on the visa process. The VSOs that were stationed in  Riyadh during our visit estimated that, based on their review of visa  applications, they had recommended that visas be refused after the  preliminary decision to issue a visa by consular officers in about 15  cases between October 2004 and February 2005. In addition, the DHS  officials in Saudi Arabia and in Washington, D.C., were able to provide  anecdotal examples of assistance provided to the consular officers.  However, DHS has not developed a system to fully track the results of  visa security activities in Saudi Arabia. For example, DHS could not  provide data to demonstrate the number of cases for which they have  recommended refusal.
subsections: section_title: DHS’s Planned Expansion of Security Program Delayed
paragraphs: DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program to five additional posts in  fiscal year 2005; however, the assignments of VSOs were delayed at four of  the five selected expansion posts. DHS attributed the delay to resistance  by State, as well as funding problems; State and chiefs of mission  attributed the delays to various outstanding questions about the program.  Following DHS’s initial request in June 2004 to assign 21 VSOs to five  expansion posts, embassy officials raised questions and concerns,  including regarding the criteria used by DHS to select expansion posts, the  reasoning for the number of VSOs requested for the posts, and DHS’s plans  to coordinate with existing law enforcement and border security staff and  programs at post. In 2004 and 2005, DHS provided responses, through  State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, to the questions raised by the chiefs of  mission at four of the expansion posts. According to DHS, the responses  were sufficient to answer the concerns. We reviewed DHS’s responses to  the posts, and identified a number of issues that had not been fully  addressed, such as what criteria DHS would use to demonstrate the  effectiveness of its officers. Nonetheless, the chiefs of mission at three  posts approved DHS’s National Security Decision Directive 38 requests in  March and June 2005, while, as of June 2005, one post had still not  approved the request.
Although DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program in fiscal year  2005 and beyond, it does not a have a strategic plan that defines mission  priorities and long-term goals and identifies the outcomes expected at  each post. We have identified the development of a strategic plan as an  essential component of measuring progress and holding agencies  accountable. The development of an overall strategic plan for the Visa  Security Program prior to the expansion of the program may have  addressed the questions initially raised by State and embassy officials that  led to the delay of the assignment of VSOs. Moreover, a strategic plan  would provide a framework for DHS to address broader questions  regarding the selection criteria for expansion, the roles and  responsibilities of VSOs, and the cost of establishing the program at posts.  Officials from DHS and State, as well as consular officials we contacted  overseas, all agreed that the development of such a plan would be useful  to guide visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and other posts. It would  also be useful to inform the Congress, as well as State and other agencies  who participate in the visa process at consular posts overseas.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: In our July 2005 report, we recommended that DHS develop a strategic  plan to guide the operations of the Visa Security Program in Saudi Arabia  and the program’s expansion to other embassies and consulates. This plan  should define mission priorities and long-term goals and identify expected  outcomes. In addition, the strategic plan and supporting documents should  include the criteria used to select the locations for expansion, justification  for the number of VSOs at each post, costs associated with assigning VSOs  overseas, and their roles and responsibilities in relation to other agencies  at post. In addition, we recommended that DHS develop and maintain  comprehensive performance data that track the results and demonstrate  impact of VSO activities. We also proposed that Congress consider  amending current legislation, which requires the review of all visa  applications in Saudi Arabia, to allow DHS the flexibility to determine  which applications VSOs will review prior to final adjudication by consular  officers. This would allow VSOs to focus on the applications of those who  may pose a risk to national security, providing them time to perform other  tasks that could benefit consular officers.
In commenting on our report, DHS stated that it was taking actions to  implement performance measurements and a strategic plan for the Visa  Security Program, as described in our recommendations. DHS indicated  that it is expanding the tracking and measurement of performance data to  better reflect program results, and is developing a strategic plan that will  integrate the key elements described in our recommendation. Regarding  the matter for congressional consideration to provide DHS with the  flexibility to determine the review of visa applications in Saudi Arabia,  DHS noted that a legislative change should maintain the department’s  authority and discretion in determining the scope of the VSOs’ review.  DHS agreed that it needed to expand some of the VSOs’ activities in Saudi  Arabia, such as providing additional training, which we found were not  being provided because of the volume of work that resulted from fulfilling  the legislative requirement.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The visa process presents a balance between facilitating legitimate travel  and identifying those who might harm the United States. State, in  coordination with other agencies, has made substantial improvements to  the visa process to strengthen it as a national security tool. DHS has also  taken steps to assign personnel to consular posts to provide an additional  layer of security to the visa process in these locations. However, we  identified areas where additional management actions are needed by State  and DHS to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the visa  process.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please call Jess T. Ford, (202) 512- 4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include John Brummet, Assistant Director, and Joseph Carney,  Daniel Chen, Kathryn Hartsburg, and John F. Miller.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Woud Benefit From  Improvements in Saffng and Inormaton Sharng. GAO-05-859. t ifii September 13, 2005.
Border Security: Actons Needed to Strengthen Management of  Department of Homeland Securiy’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801. t July 29, 2005.
Border Security: Stream ned Visas Man s Program Has Lowered Burden  on Foreign Science Students and Schoars, but Further Re nemens fitl Needed. GAO-05-198. February 18, 2005.
Border Securiy: State Department Rollou of Biometric Vsas on Schedue,  i but Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. September 9, 2004.
Border Security: Additional Actons Needed to E minate Weaknesses in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-795. July 13, 2004.
Visa Operatons at U.S. Posts n Canada. GAO-04-708R. May 18, 2004.
Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to  Adjudicae Visas or Scence Studens and Scholars. GAO-04-371. February tfti 25, 2004.
State Departmen: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies Overseas Being  Me  but Gaps Reman inHard-o-Learn Languages. GAO-04-139. November i  t,t 19, 2003.
Border Security: New Polcies and Procedures Are Needed to F  Gaps in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. June 18, 2003.
Border Security: Implicaions of Eliminating the Visa Waiver  Program. GAO-03-38. November 22, 2002.
Technology Assessment: Using Biomerics for Border Securiy. GAO-03- 174. November 15, 2002.
Border Securiy: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Ant errorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. October 21, 2002.
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