Border Security: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Persistent Challenges in Achieving Radio Interoperability
Published: 2015-03-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The lack of communications interoperability—the capability of different electronic communications systems (e.g., radios) to readily connect with one another to enable timely communications—can affect mission operations and the overall effectiveness of agencies responsible for securing the border. DHS continues to face challenges in achieving interoperable radio communications within and among federal, state, and local agencies despite investment by these agencies to improve their radio systems. GAO was asked to evaluate DHS border security and immigration tactical communications (TACCOM) programs and operational impacts resulting from interoperability challenges. This report addresses the extent to which (1) CBP and ICE have upgraded tactical communications equipment and infrastructure along the U.S. southwest border, (2) CBP and ICE have provided tactical communications training to radio users, and (3) DHS has taken actions to improve the interoperability of tactical communications along the U.S. southwest border and what challenges, if any, remain. GAO analyzed DHS documentation; visited four locations, selected for DHS prioritization of technology upgrade projects; and interviewed DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have taken steps to upgrade tactical communications equipment and infrastructure, but could benefit by developing performance and program plans. Specifically, CBP has completed modernization projects in four of the nine sectors that compose the southwest border. Since rolling out upgrades—which include replacing and updating equipment and expanding infrastructure—CBP has not established an ongoing performance monitoring plan to determine whether the systems are working as intended. Without such a plan, CBP is not well positioned to assess whether its radio systems are functioning as intended in each location and are meeting user needs. In addition, ICE has taken some actions to modernize its tactical communications radio systems. However, ICE does not have a program plan to manage its portfolio of projects. By developing a program plan to guide ICE's overall tactical communications modernization program, ICE could better manage its program and achieve its program goals.
Additional efforts are needed to ensure that CBP and ICE agents and officers receive necessary training. CBP provided training to its agents and officers on upgraded radio systems in each southwest border location that received upgrades; however, 8 of 14 CBP radio user groups GAO met with suggested that radio users be provided with additional radio training to enhance their proficiency in using radio systems. Further, CBP does not know how many radio users are in need of training. Developing and implementing a plan to address any skills gaps related to the upgraded radio systems would help ensure more CBP radio users are able to effectively use their radios to accomplish the agency's mission. Further, developing a mechanism to identify CBP radio users in need of training would help CBP improve its ability to monitor radio user training needs. ICE provided training on the upgraded radio systems in one location, but 3 of the 4 ICE radio user groups GAO met with in field locations stated that additional training would help address challenges experienced by radio users. Further, ICE officials stated that they did not track the training that the agency provided. Developing and implementing a plan to address any skills gaps for ICE radio users related to understanding the upgraded radio systems would help ensure more ICE radio users are able to effectively use their radios to accomplish the agency's mission. Further, developing a mechanism to track training provided to ICE radio users would help ensure that the agency can address ICE radio user training needs.
DHS is taking actions to improve tactical communications interoperability among DHS components and with other federal, state, and local agencies, but it is too soon to assess whether these actions will address the various challenges CBP and ICE face in achieving interoperability. Specifically, among other actions, DHS developed a draft DHS Communications Interoperability Plan to more fully understand and address the department's underlying interoperability challenges. This draft plan outlines goals and initiatives aimed at addressing various types of interoperability challenges faced by DHS components, but since the plan has not been implemented, it is too soon to assess the extent to which this guidance will effectively address the interoperability challenges faced by DHS components.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that CBP and ICE develop performance and program plans for their modernization programs, mechanisms to track training, and plans to address skills gaps in understanding radio systems. CBP and ICE concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane  Katrina in 2005, the lack of communications interoperability—the  capability of different electronic communications systems to readily  connect with one another to enable timely communications—hampered  rescue efforts and the overall effectiveness of agency response  operations. As we have previously reported, more than 10 years after the  bipartisan 9/11 Commission reported that improvements to interoperable  communications at all levels of government need to be addressed, the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to face challenges in  achieving interoperable communications within and among federal, state,  and local agencies despite substantial investment by these agencies to  improve their radio communications systems. Within DHS, U.S. Customs  and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) agents and officers responsible for securing the  southwest border depend on land mobile radio systems (radio systems)  for secure, reliable, and timely exchanges of critical information to  effectively carry out their mission. Since large areas of the U.S. southwest  border are remote and composed of rugged terrain, it is vital to the safety  and effectiveness of CBP and ICE agents and officers that their radio  systems enable them to communicate with whomever they need to, when  they need to, and when they are authorized to do so. The lack of  interoperability can affect mission operations and put agents, officers, and  the public at risk when responding officials cannot communicate with one   To effectively carry out their respective missions, CBP and ICE  another.agents and officers require interoperable communications with one  another and with state and local agencies. In 2008, DHS components,  including CBP and ICE, initiated individual tactical communications  (TACCOM) modernization programs to upgrade radio systems that were  past expected service life to improve the performance of these systems  and to help achieve interoperability across federal, state, and local  agencies that are responsible for securing the border.
You asked us to evaluate DHS border security and immigration TACCOM  programs and operational impacts resulting from any interoperability  challenges. This report examines the extent to which  1.  CBP and ICE have upgraded tactical communications equipment and  infrastructure that support the border security and immigration mission  along the U.S. southwest border;  2.  CBP and ICE have provided tactical communications training to radio  3.  DHS has taken actions to improve the interoperability of tactical  communications along the U.S. southwest border and what  challenges, if any, remain.
To address all of our objectives, we visited four locations along the U.S.  southwest border. We selected the Tucson, Rio Grande Valley, and El  Paso Border Patrol sectors based on CBP’s prioritization of these  modernization project sites. We selected the San Diego Border Patrol  sector because it has not yet received modernization upgrades, but has a  significant amount of local collaboration efforts that depend on  communications interoperability. These four locations also represent  geographic diversity along the border in terms of terrain, and state and  local governments. In each of these locations, we interviewed groups of  Office of Air and Marine (OAM) agents, Office of Border Patrol (Border  Patrol) agents, Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers, and ICE agents,  as well as representatives from state and local agencies. In San Diego  sector, we also met with the U.S. Coast Guard, attended a meeting of the  San Diego Regional Coordinating Mechanism, and observed the Joint  Harbor Operations Centers. We met with five to seven groups in each  location; each group comprised between 3 and 14 agents or officers that  were selected based on their availability during our visits. The information  we obtained from these visits cannot be generalized to other Border  Patrol sectors or ICE regions, but provided us with information on the  perspectives of various radio system users who operate along the U.S.  southwest border. We also interviewed knowledgeable agency officials  from the CBP TACCOM program, the ICE TACCOM program, DHS’s  Joint Wireless Program Management Office, and DHS’s Science and  Technology Directorate about CBP’s testing and performance monitoring  efforts as well as to better understand how CBP and ICE prioritized and  implemented upgrades to tactical communications equipment and  infrastructure in locations along the U.S. southwest border.
To address our first objective, we analyzed CBP and ICE documents on  their tactical communications equipment and infrastructure. For example,  we analyzed CBP’s limited user test reports for sectors along the  southwest border and compared CBP’s operational test events against  key acquisition practices established by DHS’s Acquisition Directive 102- 01 and CBP’s TACCOM Test and Evaluation Master Plan dated June  2013. Further, to assess the extent to which CBP monitors radio system  performance, we reviewed daily, weekly, and quarterly reports on radio  system availability, which included information on system outages,  maintained by officials from CBP’s National Law Enforcement  Communications Center (NLECC). We also reviewed internal ICE budget  documentation and ICE’s integrated master schedule, which included  time frames and cost information for 58 ongoing, planned, and completed  ICE modernization projects. Additionally, we evaluated CBP’s  performance monitoring efforts against standards in Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government to determine the extent to  which the agency has developed plans to monitor the performance of its  deployed radio systems to evaluate the effectiveness of these systems.  We also compared ICE’s program management activities against  standards in the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for  Program Management.
To address our second objective, we analyzed the amount and type of  training CBP and ICE provided to radio users in locations along the U.S.  southwest border. For both CBP and ICE, we analyzed samples of  training materials for content of training provided to CBP and ICE radio  users. In addition, for CBP, we analyzed training completion data for all  CBP locations along the U.S. southwest border to determine the  percentage of CBP radio users who received the training from 2009  through 2014. We assessed the reliability of the training data we used by  interviewing officials responsible for recording training completion records  in CBP’s Training Records and Enrollment Network (TRAEN) about  applicable quality control procedures to ensure the accuracy and integrity  of the data. We determined these data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. We compared the extent to which CBP and ICE  met radio user training needs with training guidance established by DHS’s  SAFECOM based on the Interoperability Continuum tool and CBP’s  Operational Requirements Document as well as against standards in  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We also  interviewed groups of CBP and ICE radio users during our site visits to  discuss the extent to which they received training on the functions of the  upgraded radio systems as well as practices and protocols for conducting  interoperable communications with other agencies and to obtain their  views on the extent to which any training they received met their needs.
To address our third objective, we assessed actions taken by DHS to  enhance interoperability among DHS components and compared these  actions with guidance established by DHS’s SAFECOM based on the  Interoperability Continuum tool as well as the draft DHS Communications  Interoperability Plan.radio users we met during our site visits to obtain their views on  challenges they face using the radio systems and conducting  interoperable communications with other agencies as well as any mission  impacts resulting from communication challenges, including the lack of  interoperability. We also interviewed knowledgeable agency officials from  headquarters offices, including Border Patrol, OFO, OAM, and ICE   Further, we interviewed groups of CBP and ICE  Homeland Security Investigations, as well as the CBP and ICE TACCOM  program offices, to obtain their perspectives on the challenges each office  faces in achieving interoperability.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2013 to March  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: CBP and ICE Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: DHS is responsible for securing U.S. borders, in collaboration with other  federal, state, local, and tribal entities. CBP, a component within DHS that  is the lead agency for border security, is responsible for, among other  things, preventing terrorists and their weapons from entering the United  States and for interdicting persons and contraband crossing the border  illegally. Within CBP, OFO is responsible for securing the border at ports  of entry. Border Patrol is the CBP component charged with ensuring  security along border areas between the ports of entry. Additionally,  CBP’s OAM provides air and maritime support to secure the national  border between the ports of entry, within maritime operating areas, and  within the nation’s borders. ICE, a component within DHS, is responsible  for the investigation and enforcement of border control, customs, and  immigration laws. Within ICE, Homeland Security Investigations is  responsible for disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal  organizations engaged in smuggling and other cross-border criminal  activities that seek to exploit the United States’ legitimate travel, trade,  financial, and immigration systems for illicit purposes. DHS, CBP, and  ICE components also coordinate their border security efforts with various  other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. Figure 1 shows the Border  Patrol sectors and ICE regions that represent geographic focus areas for  tactical communications modernization upgrade projects, within the  southwestern United States.
There are 20 Border Patrol sectors across the United States. The 9  Border Patrol sectors that constitute the southwest border are San Diego,  El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, Big Bend, Laredo, Del Rio, and Rio  Grande Valley. There are 26 ICE regions across the United States. The 5  ICE regions that constitute the southwest border are San Diego, Phoenix,  El Paso, San Antonio, and Houston.
section_title: Overview of Land Mobile Radio Networks and Infrastructure
paragraphs: Along the southwest border, CBP and ICE primarily operate on CBP’s  radio network, which is controlled from and by NLECC, located in  Orlando, Florida. A land mobile radio system is the primary voice  communications tool for agents and officers to communicate with one  another and with dispatchers and typically consists of the following: subscriber units: portable radios used for handheld operation and  mobile radios used for vehicular operation;  repeaters: can be portable or fixed and are used for retransmitting  radio user transmissions to extend the range for radio  communications;  fixed site equipment: used to provide single-site and wide-area  coverage for radio operation and includes routers, antennas, and  towers, among other things; and key management facilities: used to provide Over-the-Air Rekeying  (OTAR) to allow for encrypted communications. CBP’s OTAR system  is located at the NLECC and generates, distributes, and manages  national voice and data encryption keys for DHS agencies as well as  other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
Figure 2 illustrates the basic components of a radio system.
section_title: Land Mobile Radio System Requirements and Mandates
paragraphs: DHS radio systems must meet three key requirements, as described  below.
Narrowband mandate. In 1992, Congress passed the  Telecommunications Authorization Act, title I of which established, within  the Department of Commerce, the National Telecommunications and  Information Administration (NTIA).Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information and, as  relevant here, is tasked with advancing policies to foster effective use of   NTIA is led by the Assistant  the radio spectrum by the federal government. NTIA serves as the  President’s principal advisor on telecommunications and information  policy and manages federally assigned spectrum. NTIA has authority to  issue rules and regulations as may be necessary to ensure the effective,  efficient, and equitable use of spectrum both nationally and  internationally. As part of its authority under 47 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2)(A),  NTIA developed the Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal  Radio Frequency Management (NTIA Manual), which is the compilation  of policies and procedures that govern the use of the radio frequency  spectrum by the U.S. government. Federal agencies must comply with  the requirements set forth in the NTIA Manual. With respect to land  mobile systems, pursuant to the NTIA Manual, narrowband frequency  modulation (FM) is conventional FM with channel spacing of 12.5  kilohertz (kHz) or less, instead of 25 kHz. In accordance with the NTIA  Manual, the federal government is required to foster the development of,  and standards for narrowband land mobile systems, and institute plans to  narrowband land mobile systems operating in certain bands according to  a specific schedule. With certain exceptions, the channel bandwidth in  certain frequency bands used by federal agencies for radio systems was  to be reduced from 25 to 12.5 kHz, effective January 1, 2008.reduction in channel bandwidth is referred to as narrowbanding.
Project 25. Since 1989, federal agencies have collaborated with public  safety associations to establish common technical standards, called  Project 25 (P25), for radio systems and devices. The purpose of these  technical standards is to support interoperability among different radio  systems, and to enable seamless communication across federal, state,  and local agencies and jurisdictions. The P25 suite of standards is  intended to promote interoperability by making radio systems and devices  compatible regardless of the manufacturer. DHS Sensitive Systems  Policy Directive 4300A, implementing DHS Management Directive 140- 01, Information Technology System Security, requires compliance with  P25 standards for all DHS tactical wireless communication systems  procurements.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). DHS mandates the protection of  all law-enforcement sensitive voice communications through the use of  encryption. Encryption requires the use of an algorithm and a  cryptographic key to encode messages at the origin and decode  messages at the receiver. Federal departments and agencies are  required to use encryption algorithms approved by the National Institute  of Standards and Technology (NIST), such as the Advanced Encryption  Standard used by DHS, for federal land mobile systems to protect  sensitive information from being compromised.
section_title: Overview of DHS Border Security and Immigration TACCOM Programs
paragraphs: CBP and ICE have separate modernization efforts under each  component’s respective TACCOM program. These modernization efforts  are focused on upgrading existing radio systems equipment and  infrastructure to comply with DHS requirements and expand coverage  and capacity.
CBP TACCOM. The CBP TACCOM modernization program, initiated in  2008, oversees the upgrade and modernization of existing outdated radio  systems, to support more than 44,000 CBP law enforcement personnel in  their daily operations across the nation. Through this program, CBP plans  to modernize existing radio systems with digital technologies that provide  AES while also meeting the federal narrowbanding mandate and P25  standards. For fiscal year 2009, CBP was appropriated $160 million in  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funds  for salaries and expenses, of which $100 million was for the procurement  and deployment of new or replacement nonintrusive inspection systems,  and $60 million was for procurement and deployment of TACCOM  equipment and radios. Under the Recovery Act, CBP also received an  additional $100 million for Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and  Technology (BSFIT), for expedited development and deployment of  border security technology on the southwest border.
ICE TACCOM. The ICE TACCOM modernization program aims to  replace aging legacy tactical communications networks with digital P25  compliant upgrades that provide AES encryption capabilities and meet  the federal narrowband mandate to improve communications,  interoperability, and coordination for ICE personnel during field  operations. Pursuant to the Recovery Act, for fiscal year 2009, ICE  received $20 million for automation modernization, for the procurement  and deployment of tactical communications equipment and radios. In  addition to Recovery Act funds, the TACCOM program is funded out of  the Automation Modernization account for new investments and ICE base  budget for operations and maintenance. The ICE TACCOM program  received $10 million in fiscal year 2009 and $8 million in fiscal year 2011  from the Automation Modernization account and has not received any  funding for its modernization efforts since 2011.
DHS TACNET. In 2009, DHS estimated that it would cost $3 billion and  take two decades to modernize the individual radio systems of all DHS  components, including CBP and ICE. Accordingly, the DHS Acquisition  Review Board mandated DHS components to work with the DHS Office of  the Chief Information Officer to find alternatives to this approach.  Conceived in 2011, the Tactical Communications Network (TACNET) is a  separate program focused on developing next-generation  communications technologies to meet DHS-wide interoperability needs,  such as tactical broadband. However, as we have previously reported,  while such a network would likely enhance interoperability, it would not  support mission-critical voice capabilities for 10 or more years. TACNET  is currently unfunded, but the DHS Acquisition Review Board granted  approval to pursue the technical demonstration project on March 31,   DHS intends for TACNET to eventually leverage this capability to  2011.consolidate individual DHS component TACCOM programs, including the  components’ separate modernization projects.
SAFECOM is a communications program that provides support, including  research and development, to address interoperable communications  issues. Led by an executive committee, SAFECOM has members from  state and local emergency responders as well as intergovernmental and  national public safety communications associations. DHS draws on this  expertise to help develop guidance and policy. Among other activities,  SAFECOM developed the Interoperability Continuum to assist emergency  response agencies and policymakers to plan and implement  interoperability solutions for data and voice communications. This tool  identifies five critical success elements that must be addressed to achieve  a sophisticated interoperability solution: governance, standard operating  procedures, technology, training and exercises, and usage of  interoperable communications.
section_title: DHS Components Have Taken Steps to Upgrade Tactical Communications Equipment and Infrastructure, but Could Benefit by Developing Performance and Program Plans
subsections: section_title: CBP Has Completed Most TACCOM Modernization Projects in Southwest Border Locations, but Could Benefit from Developing a Performance Monitoring Plan
paragraphs: From 2009 through 2013, CBP completed full modernization projects in 4  of the 9 sectors that constitute the southwest border. In these 4 sectors,  Yuma, Tucson, Rio Grande Valley, and El Paso, CBP has upgraded outdated analog tactical communications equipment and  infrastructure to digital systems that meet the narrowband mandate  and are compliant with both P25 interoperability standards and AES  encryption capabilities, and expanded coverage and provided capacity enhancements by  procuring additional equipment and building out new tower sites in  areas where CBP agents operate that were not previously covered  with existing infrastructure.
In 2009, CBP determined that the TACCOM modernization program was  not cost-effective and would take too long to complete. Accordingly, CBP  revised its modernization approach for all remaining sectors, halting the  addition of any new tower sites, and in conjunction with the approval of  TACNET in 2011, adding a project known as Digital in Place (DIP) as a  capstone to this program with the expectation that DIP would provide a  digital baseline for TACNET. The scope of the DIP project entails  upgrading the remaining analog radio sites to the P25 digital systems with  AES encryption capabilities and does not provide additional coverage or  capacity enhancements. This project provides one-for-one replacements  of analog systems with digital systems. CBP plans to implement DIP in  the remaining five sectors along the southwest border that did not receive  full modernization upgrades. As of September 2014, DIP projects have  been completed in three of the five remaining sectors along the southwest  border—Big Bend, Laredo, and Del Rio—and are currently under way in  other locations across the nation. According to CBP, because DIP does  not include new site build-outs or the need to obtain additional frequency  licenses, this approach will greatly reduce the costs associated with the  full modernization approach and will be completed in a relatively shorter  time period. For example, in 2009, CBP estimated that full modernization  of all CBP sites in the nation would cost $1.3 billion for development and  implementation, not including life cycle costs, and would take 20 years to  complete. In comparison, CBP estimated that the total cost, including life  cycle costs, to implement DIP in the remaining sectors would be about  $410 million in addition to the cost of the five original modernization  projects—for a total life cycle cost of approximately $945 million, and  would be completed by 2016. However, according to CBP officials, the  agency currently anticipates that some of the infrastructure upgrades for  these projects will be completed in 2018, because of resource  constraints.
CBP developed a Test and Evaluation Master Plan, dated June 2013, for  the Rio Grande Valley, El Paso, and DIP projects. The plan stated that  the conceptual design for all projects under the TACCOM modernization  program is based on commercial-off-the-shelf proven technology.  According to DHS’s Acquisition Directive 102-01 and its associated  guidebook, operational testing results should be used to evaluate the  degree to which the system meets its requirements and can operate in  the real world with real users like CBP and ICE radio users. Moreover,  this guidance states that even for commercial-off-the-shelf systems,  operational test and evaluation should occur in the environmental  conditions in which a system will be used before a full production decision  for the system is made and the system is subsequently deployed. This  guidance also states that for commercial-off-the-shelf systems,  operational tests should be conducted to ensure that the systems satisfy  user-defined requirements.
CBP initially had plans to conduct operational tests in multiple sectors;  however, it conducted the operational test in one sector, Rio Grande  Valley, and such testing was limited. CBP did not conduct operational  testing in Yuma, Tucson, or El Paso, although the agency did perform  some tests with users in real operational environments for each of these  sectors. According to DHS and CBP officials, formal test plans were not  executed in Tucson or Yuma because of resource constraints and  changing agency priorities. In Rio Grande Valley, CBP conducted a  limited user test, which served as the operational test and evaluation  event to determine whether TACCOM was operationally effective and  suitable for deployment and met user needs. According to the Rio Grande  Valley limited user test report, the radio system tested in Rio Grande  Valley was found to be operationally effective and met the coverage and  availability key performance requirements. However, the limited user test  report also noted that operational suitability—which included  assessments of interoperability, reliability, availability, and  maintainability—was undetermined because insufficient data were  collected to make a definitive determination. The Rio Grande Valley  limited user test report also noted that since testing was conducted only  at a singular focus area, system impacts and CBP agent and officer input  from untested sites remain unknown. CBP officials stated that a separate  operational test and evaluation event was not conducted for the El Paso  focus area because the Rio Grande Valley results were used to evaluate  both sectors, given that the same radio systems were deployed to El  Paso and Rio Grande Valley. Despite these limitations, an official from  the DHS Science and Technology Directorate who oversaw CBP’s  operational testing stated that the operational testing conducted by CBP  in Rio Grande Valley provided reasonable assurance that CBP’s radio  system met key performance requirements in accordance with DHS  acquisition guidance because the agency determined that Rio Grande  Valley best represented the weather and terrain features across all four  southwest border TACCOM project locations, which are the key variables  that could affect test results based on location.
CBP has completed deployment of radio systems to four southwest  border sectors—Rio Grande Valley, El Paso, Tucson, and Yuma—and  has upgraded existing systems in three southwest border sectors—Big  Bend, Laredo, and Del Rio—and both CBP and DHS officials stated that  the agency does not plan to conduct additional testing on the deployed  systems or conduct any operational testing for the DIP projects because  the agency is replacing outdated equipment with commercial-off-the-shelf  technology on a one-for-one basis. Moreover, CBP has taken other  actions to assess the implementation of the systems deployed in those  sectors. For example, in 2012, CBP completed an operational analysis of  upgrades in Tucson and Yuma under the TACCOM modernization  program to determine if the investment in those sectors was meeting its  performance goals. According to the operational analysis report, the  modernization upgrades completed in Tucson and Yuma delivered  quantifiable benefits with the addition of 17 new radio sites, which  provided additional coverage, and the replacement of outdated equipment  with new digital equipment resulted in increased availability of radio  systems. The report also included the results of an end user survey that  was conducted as part of the operational readiness review process in  fiscal year 2011 to assess user satisfaction with the deployed system.  While the user satisfaction survey indicated an acceptable level of  satisfaction with the availability and usability of the system, the report also  noted several operational issues experienced by users during the  transition from the analog system to the digital system, including poor  radio coverage in specific locations, the perception that the old analog  system provided better coverage than the digital system because of  signals fading in a different manner, and users experiencing  communications bleed over between some sites, which occurs when  radio transmissions are overheard by radio users who are not the  intended recipients. However, CBP continued to move forward with the  current modernization approach given the need for immediate  improvements in communications capability and the lack of a viable  alternative technology that could be deployed. Moreover, since the  TACCOM investment would have a life cycle of at least 10 years, the  report concluded that this investment would support CBP radio users  through the transition period needed to establish a next-generation  broadband network. In addition, CBP officials stated that the agency  collects information on radio system availability and maintenance. For  example, CBP NLECC officials track daily system outages for sites that  have been upgraded and provide weekly reports to management on this  information, including how long outages lasted and how issues were  resolved. CBP also tracks and resolves radio hardware issues reported  by users in the field.
While these are positive steps, CBP has not developed an agency-wide  plan to monitor the performance of its radio systems. In particular, CBP  has not yet collected sufficient data to determine how well the systems  are functioning within and across sectors, and has not obtained  perspectives from radio users since the systems were deployed in each  location. Such information could help CBP better identify any challenges  with use of the system and assess system performance. For example,  although CBP collects information on radio system availability and  maintenance, CBP officials stated that they have not used this information  to assess overall system performance to determine the extent to which  upgraded radio systems are meeting user needs or to identify areas in  need of corrective action. According to CBP officials, the agency has not  yet analyzed available data to determine the extent to which upgraded  radio systems are meeting user needs or to identify areas in need of  corrective action because complete operational data have not been  collected for all sites to which radio systems were deployed and because  these data are maintained across different repositories that are not  currently linked together. According to CBP officials, the agency  recognizes the need to collect sufficient data to monitor radio system  performance and is taking steps to address this need by collecting data in  recently modernized sites, including El Paso. Once the data have been  collected, the agency plans to consolidate these data in a central  repository. While this may be a useful practice, a performance monitoring  plan, including information on how data will be collected across all sites  and how these data will be used to monitor the performance of deployed  radio systems, could better position CBP to assess whether its radio  systems are functioning as intended in each location or whether they are  meeting user needs.
Moreover, most of the groups of CBP radio users we met with reported  experiencing challenges relating to operational performance. For  example, 7 of the 10 groups of CBP radio users we met with in the  Tucson, Rio Grande Valley, and El Paso sectors stated that coverage  gaps continued to affect their ability to communicate, even after the  upgrades were completed. Specifically, 2 groups stated that coverage in  some areas seemed to be worse after the upgrades were completed, 4  groups stated that coverage gaps had been reduced but continued to  exist after the upgrades, and 1 group stated that while coverage had  improved in some areas, the group did not receive the coverage  enhancements it expected to receive, especially in critical areas. As  another example, 10 of 14 CBP radio users we met with reported  experiencing challenges related to frequency saturation—whereby too  many users are operating simultaneously on one channel, blocking other  users from being able to access that channel. CBP agents and officers  we met with also reported instances in which operability challenges  delayed or prevented their ability to communicate with agents or officers  from other agencies, which resulted in missed apprehensions of suspects  or inefficient use of resources. Specifically, 1 group of Border Patrol radio  users we met with stated that a common practice is to assign a Border  Patrol agent to work alongside agents or officers from other agencies,  such as ICE, to facilitate interoperability by relaying interagency  communications, which they cited as an inefficient use of agency  resources. According to CBP officials, these challenges may also be  attributed to lack of training or understanding of standard operating  procedures, which we discuss later in this report.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for  agencies to identify, capture, and distribute operational data to determine  whether an agency is meeting its goals and effectively using resources.
This guidance also calls for agencies to ensure that ongoing monitoring  occurs during the course of normal operations to help evaluate program  effectiveness. According to CBP officials, the agency has not yet  developed a performance monitoring plan because the system is not yet  mature, but it is working to establish reliable system performance  measures in the interim, and would initiate a formal performance plan  once the system and support cultures mature. Officials were unable to  provide specific details about what the performance plan would contain or  a time frame for when they would establish the plan. However, as CBP  agents and officers are currently using radio systems on a daily basis and  given the operational testing limitations previously discussed, without a  performance monitoring plan, CBP is not well positioned to identify issues  experienced by current CBP users in a timely manner and actions that  could address those identified issues.
section_title: ICE Has Taken Some Actions to Modernize Technology on the Southwest Border but Does Not Have Complete Information to Effectively Manage Its Program
paragraphs: ICE has 58 completed, ongoing, or planned projects under its TACCOM  modernization program and has taken some actions to modernize its  TACCOM radio systems, including along the southwest border.  Specifically, according to ICE officials, the agency has replaced individual  analog TACCOM radios and equipment with digital systems that comply  with P25 standards and the narrowband mandate, and provide AES  encryption capabilities across all 26 ICE regions, including the southwest  border regions. In addition, while ICE has completed full modernization  projects—which entail expanding coverage and capacity by building new  sites—in other regions across the United States, it has not developed  plans to modernize any southwest border regions. Instead, to meet the  needs of ICE radio users in the southwest border regions, ICE officials  stated that the agency’s strategy has focused on leveraging other agency  infrastructure in areas where ICE does not have infrastructure until  funding is approved to initiate modernization projects in these regions.  For example, in Yuma and Tucson, ICE officials stated that the agency  primarily uses CBP’s radio system. Moreover, ICE is a stakeholder on  CBP’s full modernization and DIP projects since ICE’s primary means of  tactical communication in these locations is on the CBP network.
Specifically, ICE officials stated that the agency provided 76 repeaters for  installation at over 65 CBP sites located in Arizona, New Mexico, and  Texas. Additionally, ICE is converting ICE radio users over to the CBP  digital networks and implementing radio programming changes to enable  ICE radio users to communicate on these networks. ICE officials also  stated that the agency has entered into agreements with certain state and  local agencies to use their channels in areas where ICE lacks radio  coverage and also has a need to communicate daily with these mission  partners.
ICE has developed some documentation for the individual projects, such  as individual project plans, and provided us with an integrated master  schedule for the 58 ongoing, planned, and completed projects. While  these documents have helped ICE manage its individual projects in  specific locations, ICE has not documented an overall plan to manage its  TACCOM modernization program and provide oversight across all  projects. For example, ICE officials were unable to provide documentation  that all TACCOM equipment had been upgraded to digital systems. A  program plan could provide ICE with more information on how TACCOM  resources have been expended and how projects are prioritized in a  manner that meets ICE mission and user needs. CBP’s TACCOM  program developed program plan documentation, such as an acquisition  plan, operational requirements document, and life cycle cost estimate,  among others, to meet the requirements of DHS Acquisition Directive  102-01. However, according to ICE TACCOM officials, the agency has  not developed such documentation because the ICE program was not  required to develop acquisition documentation in accordance with the  DHS acquisition directive because the program was already in  sustainment—e.g., project implementation phase complete—prior to  2008, when the directive was issued.
Best practices in program management call for agencies to document  fundamental program information. According to the Project Management  Institute’s The Standard for Program Management, programs should,  among other things, be defined in terms of expected outcomes, resources  needed, and the complexity of delivering the changes needed to  implement new capabilities across the organization.contains many elements, includes many documents, and formally  expresses the organization’s concept, vision, mission, and expected  benefits produced by the program; it also defines program-specific goals  and objectives. The program plan is the overall documented reference by  which the program will measure its success throughout its duration,  including all phases, customer contracts, new business offers, and long- term goals and objectives. It should include the metrics for success, a  method for measurement, and a clear definition of success.
An overarching TACCOM modernization program plan could better  position ICE to manage its portfolio of projects, including proposed  projects, under the TACCOM modernization program and provide  documentation explaining TACCOM modernization program goals, critical  mission needs, and how specific modernization projects are prioritized  based on these needs. ICE has requested funding for TACCOM  modernization projects along the southwest border in recent fiscal years.  For example, ICE requested funding to modernize two southwest border  regions in its fiscal year 2014 budget request. For fiscal year 2014, ICE  TACCOM requested $21 million for upgrades in San Antonio and  Houston, but did not receive any funding for this year. In its fiscal year  2015 budget request, ICE added two more southwest border regions,  requesting $42 million to fully upgrade four of the five ICE regions along  the southwest border—San Antonio, Houston, El Paso, and Phoenix. program plan could help ICE better oversee its prioritization of individual  projects for resources and funding.
According to officials, while there is a critical need to upgrade San Diego, ICE has not  made any plans to do so until DHS takes over the management and control of the  Integrated Wireless Network. ICE officials stated that they plan to work with CBP to  determine how to upgrade the San Diego Integrated Wireless Network. assigned to the El Paso region in 2009, which increased to 274 agents in  2014; and 292 agents assigned to the Phoenix region in 2009, which  increased to 347 agents in 2014. Additionally, our interviews with groups  of ICE radio users showed that agency efforts to upgrade its TACCOM  technology may not be supporting ICE radio user needs along the  southwest border. For example, two of the three groups of ICE radio  users we met with in Tucson, Rio Grande Valley, and El Paso that  operate on CBP land mobile radio networks stated that coverage was  worse after the upgrades or did not meet ICE radio user needs because  the new system did not provide the capabilities the agency promised to  deliver. The third group stated that CBP’s modernization project upgrades  enhanced coverage in a limited capacity but created new challenges for  ICE because of the increase in communication traffic. Specifically, ICE  radio users in this location stated that since they are using CBP channels,  Border Patrol has priority of use, so when there is too much traffic on a  channel, ICE radio users are unable to access the channel or get kicked  off the system and hear a busy signal when attempting to use their radios.  All four groups of ICE radio users we met with stated that operability and  interoperability challenges frequently compromised their investigations  and resulted in unacceptable risks to officer safety.
According to ICE officials, the agency recognizes that ICE radio user  coverage needs have not been met in the southwest border areas and is  currently taking steps to assess radio user needs in these locations.  Specifically, ICE officials stated that they are soliciting information from  radio users on their operational needs and briefing ICE management to  inform future decisions about ICE coverage and funding needs. However,  ICE officials stated that there are no plans for creating a program plan to  guide and document these efforts. By developing a program plan to guide  ICE’s overall TACCOM modernization program, ICE could more clearly  articulate radio user needs, resource needs, and the goals of the  program, as well as allow officials to identify any corrective actions  needed to ensure that ICE radio systems are meeting ICE user needs.
section_title: Additional Efforts Are Needed to Ensure That CBP and ICE Agents and Officers Receive Necessary Training
subsections: section_title: CBP Training
paragraphs: CBP provided training to Border Patrol, OAM, and OFO agents and  officers on its upgraded digital systems in each southwest border location  that received modernization upgrades, but could do more to ensure it is  meeting the training needs of all CBP radio users. According to the DHS  SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum, effective training and exercise  programs to practice communications interoperability are essential for  ensuring that the technology works and responders are able to effectively  communicate during emergencies. The DHS SAFECOM Operational  Guide for the Interoperability Continuum specifically highlights the  importance of training when new technology is procured, stating “when a  region procures new equipment, that region should plan training and  conduct exercises to learn how to make the best use of that equipment.”CBP’s TACCOM Modernization Operational Requirements Document  states that agents will receive training at the time that equipment is  deployed and that refresher training will be provided as required because  of either system reconfigurations or personnel turnover. This document  further states that user training will be provided in a classroom setting to  agents and officers in the field locations as close to deployment as  possible.
To help ensure radio users understood the functions and capabilities of  the newly upgraded digital systems in each of the four areas along the  southwest border where modernization projects were completed, CBP  provided training to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers on the  functions of radio equipment and systems, encryption policies and  processes for conducting secure communications, unique coverage maps  depicting specific location information where radio users can expect their  radios to operate, how to troubleshoot common technical challenges, and  information about practices and protocols for conducting interoperable  communications with other agencies. However, CBP radio users we met  with reported experiencing communication challenges that they identified  could be addressed with additional training to enhance their skills and  help them overcome these communication challenges. Specifically, 8 of  14 CBP radio user groups we met with suggested that radio users be  provided with additional radio training to enhance their proficiency in  using radio systems. Two groups also noted that CBP agents receive  intensive firearm training and must demonstrate proficiency with their  firearms on a quarterly basis, yet they use their radios far more frequently  than they do their firearms and are not required to demonstrate  proficiency in using their radios. Moreover, although CBP provided  training in each location, 3 groups stated that they did not receive any  formal training and learned how to use their radios on the job. Further,  according to CBP’s limited user test report for Rio Grande Valley, analysis  of user surveys and test team observations indicated that training on the  new TACCOM system can be improved and that full use of TACCOM  capabilities will require better training. Specifically, the test report  indicated that CBP agents and officers received varying degrees of  TACCOM system training, a fact that may affect the ability of the  operational test agent to conduct a thorough evaluation of TACCOM  system training.
According to a CBP official responsible for training, Border Patrol agents  may transfer or be deployed to different sectors, which makes it difficult to  estimate training needs because the agency does not determine whether  agents had received training in a previous duty station or are in need of  training. Further, CBP officials stated that the amount of training provided  to CBP radio users can vary because of availability of funding or locally  based CBP field support personnel, and support from local management  for prioritizing and addressing user training needs. For example, CBP  headquarters officials stated that some local managers may determine  that training is not a priority, or that CBP offices responsible for providing  training do not have sufficient resources to provide training to radio users.  Federal regulations require that agencies establish priorities for training  employees and allocate resources according to those priorities, as well as  develop and maintain plans and programs that, among other things,  identify mission-critical occupations and competencies, identify workforce  competency gaps, and include strategies for closing competency gaps.
By developing and implementing a plan to address any identified skills  gaps related to understanding the new digital radio systems and  interagency radio use protocols, CBP could help ensure that more of its  radio users have the skills needed to overcome challenges that hinder  interoperable communications.
To calculate these percentages, we divided the number of agents trained in each year  by the number of Border Patrol agents (radio users) onboard at the end of the year, for  each sector. they were assigned. For example, they explained that Border Patrol  agents assigned to the El Paso sector may have been deployed to the  Tucson sector for training. Given challenges related to Border Patrol  agents deploying across sectors and since CBP does not specifically  track whether agents in each sector have been trained, CBP was not able  to provide information on the number of Border Patrol agents who had not  received training. However, as shown in figure 3, CBP was able to  provide information on the number of Border Patrol agents who were  trained in each year, by sector. We then compared these numbers with  the number of Border Patrol agents onboard at the end of each year, for  each sector. However, these percentages do not reflect the cumulative  total number of Border Patrol agents that have not received any training,  since agents that were trained in previous years may not need to receive  training in subsequent years.
The amount of training that CBP provided for each OFO field office also  varied by office and year. For example, in 2011, CBP trained 33 percent  of OFO officers assigned to the Tucson field office that year, and 1  percent of OFO officers assigned to the El Paso field office, while in 2013,  CBP trained 46 percent of officers assigned to the El Paso field office that  year and 0 percent of officers assigned to the Tucson field office, as   However, a CBP official responsible for training noted  shown in figure 4.that Border Patrol and OFO training may have been combined for smaller  offices. Further, as noted above, because CBP was unable to provide  information on the number of OFO officers who did not receive training  and officers may not need to receive training each year, these  percentages do not reflect the cumulative total number of OFO officers  who have not received any training.
While CBP mostly provided training in the sectors that completed  modernization upgrades, CBP also provided some training in other  sectors where modernization projects were still under way. For example,  in 2014, CBP trained 76 percent of Border Patrol agents assigned to the  Del Rio sector that year, 39 percent of agents assigned to the Big Bend  sector, and 45 percent of agents assigned to the Laredo sector—sectors  that received DIP upgrades during 2014. CBP also provided some  training in sectors that have not yet received modernization upgrades. For  example, CBP trained about 3 percent of Border Patrol agents assigned  to the San Diego sector in 2011. Developing a mechanism to verify that  all Border Patrol and OFO radio users receive radio training could help  CBP improve its ability to monitor and address radio user training needs.
section_title: ICE Training
paragraphs: ICE provided training on the upgraded digital system in one location, but  has not assessed radio user training needs to identify radio user skills  gaps, developed a plan to ensure training needs are met, or tracked the  training that it provided. As stated above, effective training and exercise  programs to practice communications interoperability are essential for  ensuring that the technology works and responders are able to effectively  communicate during emergencies, according to the DHS SAFECOM  Interoperability Continuum. Also, the DHS OEC Operational Guide for the  Interoperability Continuum specifically highlights the importance of  training when new technology is procured, stating “when a region  procures new equipment, that region should plan training and conduct  exercises to learn how to make the best use of that equipment,” as stated  above. Moreover, ICE’s fiscal year 2013 congressional budget  justification states that the ICE TACCOM modernization project will  provide infrastructure and subscriber unit training for ICE agents and  officers, ensuring users understand how to use the modernized  communications systems to support their mission-critical operations.  According to ICE officials, training was provided to radio users in only one  location along the southwest border—Rio Grande Valley—because of a  lack of resources. However, as stated above, federal regulations require  that agencies establish priorities for training employees and allocate  resources according to those priorities. Moreover, three of the four groups  of ICE radio user groups we met with in field locations stated that  additional training would help address challenges experienced by radio  users. One of these four groups also stated that formal training would  improve their ability to overcome challenges affecting their ability to  communicate, such as not being able to locate proper channels used by  other components. In addition, agents in that user group stated that they  were not aware of all the capabilities of the new digital radio systems.  Without a plan to address radio user skills gaps, ICE is not well positioned  to ensure that it is meeting the training needs of its agents.
Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states  that control activities—such as policies, procedures, and management  supervision—help to ensure that all transactions are completely and  accurately recorded. However, while ICE officials provided training to  radio users in Rio Grande Valley, they stated that they did not track or  record which ICE radio users received this training.it would be beneficial for agents to demonstrate radio proficiency before  entering the field and explained that they plan to improve ICE training  efforts by increasing hands-on radio training during basic training and  developing training for radio users in the field using ICE’s online training  system, which tracks individual employee training records. However,  officials noted that it will be a challenge to develop an online course for  radio training because it would need to be tailored to each location, given  differing channel frequencies in each region. While officials stated that  they are considering these efforts, they did not provide any  documentation for these plans or time frames for when these actions  would be implemented, or any plans for tracking training that is provided  in its current format. Developing a mechanism to verify that all ICE radio  users receive radio training could help ICE improve its ability to monitor  and address ICE radio user training needs.
section_title: DHS Is Taking Actions Aimed at Improving Tactical Communications Interoperability, but It Is Too Soon to Determine Whether These Actions Will Address Persistent Challenges
paragraphs: DHS is taking actions to improve tactical communications interoperability  among DHS components and with other federal, state, and local  agencies, but it is too soon to assess whether these actions will address  the various challenges CBP and ICE face in achieving interoperability.  Achieving tactical communications interoperability is a documented  agency goal. CBP’s TACCOM Operational Requirements Document  states that having interoperable communications among CBP  components and with other federal agencies is a required mission need.  Additionally, according to the DHS Tactical Communications Mission  Needs Statement, DHS must provide users with connectivity and  interoperability that allow all users and mission partners to securely share  the information they need, when they need it, and in a form they can  understand and act on with confidence. To help meet this goal, DHS  established the Joint Wireless Program Management Office (JWPMO) in  2011, which is a coordinating body for the programmatic and technical  functions of eight DHS components that collaborate voluntarily through  this body.future projects, including CBP and ICE’s TACCOM modernization  projects and TACNET.
JWPMO establishes governance procedures for current and  According to the 2012 DHS Operational Analysis Report for the TACCOM  modernization program, DHS’s current approach of modernizing its radio  systems to the P25 standard provides limited interoperability  improvements and most DHS end users do not have interoperable  communications capabilities. In an effort to more fully understand and  address the department’s underlying interoperability challenges, DHS has  developed a draft DHS Communications Interoperability Plan.  Specifically, this draft plan outlines goals and initiatives aimed at  addressing various types of interoperability challenges faced by DHS  components. This draft plan further states that some DHS-internal  standard operating procedures are insufficient and additional DHS- external standard operating procedures are needed to support current  requirements. It also states that key barriers to effective standard  operating procedure development and improvement include procedural  (e.g., unclear authority), proficiency (e.g., limited knowledge), and  awareness issues (e.g., understanding need). This plan calls for DHS  components to improve awareness of standard operating procedures and  to formalize training on TACCOM equipment and standard operating  procedures, among other things.
The draft DHS Communications Interoperability Plan is based on the DHS  SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum, which DHS developed as a guide  for jurisdictions across the nation to track progress in strengthening  interoperable communications. The SAFECOM Interoperability  Continuum identifies five critical success elements that must be  addressed to achieve a sophisticated interoperability solution:  governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training and  exercises, and usage of interoperable communications. The  Interoperability Continuum states that usage refers to how often  interoperable communications technologies are used and identifies four  basic types of interoperability: planned events—such as athletic events  that involve multiple responding agencies; localized emergency  incidents—such as a vehicle collision on an interstate highway; regional  incident management—such as routine coordination of responders across  a region that includes disaster response; and daily use throughout  region—whereby interoperability systems are used every day for  managing routine as well as emergency incidents and users are familiar  with the operation of the system and routinely work in concert with one  another. Similarly, the draft DHS Communications Interoperability Plan  states that during mission operations, DHS components require  interoperability for a variety of scenarios, including planned events, day- to-day operations, and mutual aid operations.
Three of 18 CBP and ICE radio user groups we met with in southwest  border locations stated that interoperability solutions generally work well  during planned events but are not available or do not work well during  unplanned responses to incidents. Moreover, the draft DHS  Communications Interoperability Plan states that for planned events, the  standard operating procedures to achieve interoperability are generally  well documented in advance of the event and then distributed to the  components. However, it further states that standard operating  procedures for interoperability during unplanned events, including day-to- day operations and mutual aid operations, are not well documented and  that an operation is at risk of failure without a vetted, documented, and  standardized procedure. For unplanned events, we found that CBP and  ICE radio users in southwest border locations faced various challenges  relating primarily to a lack of standard operating procedures resulting in  radio users adopting inconsistent practices that hinder the department’s  goal to achieve interoperability, as illustrated by the following examples:
According to CBP and ICE headquarters officials, both components  encourage and allow frequencies and encryption keys to be shared  across DHS components. However, sharing of frequencies and  encryption keys between CBP and ICE radio users, as well as  awareness of policies governing the use of frequencies and  encryption keys, was inconsistent in the locations we visited along the  U.S. southwest border.
According to encryption key subscription data across all  southwestern border areas of responsibility (Arizona, California,  New Mexico, and Texas) through September 2014, we found that  45 Border Patrol radios across all southwest border locations were  programmed with ICE encryption keys, representing less than 1  percent of all Border Patrol agents assigned to southwest Border  Patrol sectors. In addition, we found that 248 ICE radios across all  southwest border locations were programmed with CBP’s  common channel encryption key, representing about 14 percent of  all ICE agents assigned to southwest border regions, while 5 ICE  radios were programmed with the Border Patrol tactical encryption  key, representing less than 1 percent of all ICE agents assigned to  southwest border regions.
According to CBP officials, the DHS common encryption key,  which is intended for interoperability, is programmed into all CBP  radios and should be programmed into all other DHS component  radios for interoperable communications. However, of the 18  groups of CBP and ICE radio users that we met with, 7 groups  stated that CBP and ICE do not share frequencies and encryption  keys, a fact that they said hinders interoperable communications  between these two components. Moreover, of the 7 groups that  stated that CBP and ICE do not share frequencies and encryption  keys, 4 groups suggested that sharing frequencies and  encryptions keys between CBP and ICE would enhance  interoperability between the components. Further, some radio  users we met with either were unaware of the DHS common key  or specifically did not use it for mission operations. For example, 4  of the 18 groups of CBP and ICE radio users we met with  suggested that having a dedicated frequency for interoperability  would improve interoperable communications. Additionally, 3 of  the 18 groups said that they do not use the DHS common key for  mission operations, with 1 group noting that Border Patrol  specifically requires the use of the Border Patrol tactical key for all  mission operations.
CBP officials stated that if ICE radio users do not have CBP  frequencies or encryption keys, it is because they did not request  access or were not aware of frequency-sharing protocols. ICE  officials stated that while sharing is encouraged, local  management is responsible for deciding whether to request  access to specific radio keys. Because these decisions are made  at the local level, local relationships between CBP and ICE  management may affect decisions to request or provide access to  local radios keys. Additionally, ICE officials stated that while the  majority of ICE encryption keys can be shared with CBP, a small  number of these keys are reserved for ICE internal affairs  investigations and could not be shared with other agencies.
CBP and ICE components have multiple names for multiple channels  and encryption keys, adding to the complexity of radio  communications, and hindering communications interoperability  across components. Each CBP component—Border Patrol, OAM, and  OFO—uses different names for the same channels and encryption  keys used in each location, even for national channels. ICE also uses  different names for channels and encryption keys used to  communicate with CBP components. Nine of the 18 groups of radio  users we met with stated that the lack of a standardized channel and  encryption key naming convention across DHS components hinders  communications interoperability and suggested that DHS develop a  standardized naming convention across the department to reduce  confusion among DHS radio users. Specifically, 4 of 4 OAM radio  user groups stated that inconsistent use of channel names often  compromises their ability to provide air support to other CBP  components because of time delays associated with trying to locate  channels being used by other components. Further, 3 of 4 ICE radio  user groups we met with stated that the lack of standardization  particularly affects their ability to complete missions that cross  different areas of responsibility. ICE headquarters officials stated that  it would be difficult to coordinate among independent components to  standardize channel and encryption key names. Accordingly, DHS  would need to require the components to take this action.
Achieving interoperability among DHS components and state and  local agencies presents unique challenges because many state and  local agency radio systems operate on different frequency bands that  are incompatible with federal radio systems. Various solutions are  available for CBP and ICE to communicate with these agencies,  including using portable equipment to connect incompatible radio  systems, calling dispatchers to connect users operating on  incompatible radio systems, using designated interoperability  channels, and loaning federal handheld radios to state or local agency  mission partners. CBP and ICE have each established memorandums  of understanding (MOU) to govern radio communications with state  and local partners that identify specific frequencies that may be used,  provide authority to use those frequencies, and establish basic radio  protocols to facilitate communication. However, radio user groups we  met with stated that understanding and use of these interoperability  solutions varies by location and component, and having consistent  guidance for interagency communications would help ensure radio  users are aware of proper protocols and available mechanisms for  communicating with state and local agencies.
CBP and ICE agents and officers we met with along the U.S. southwest  border reported instances in which the interoperability challenges  discussed above delayed or prevented their ability to communicate,  causing these agents and officers to miss opportunities to apprehend  suspects or risk their safety by continuing to pursue a suspect without  being able to call for backup assistance in the event of an altercation. For  example:
Twelve of the 18 groups of CBP and ICE radios users we met with  stated that communications challenges caused them to miss  apprehending a suspect.
Fourteen of the 18 groups of CBP and ICE radios users we met stated  that they were involved in an incident in which a communications  challenge jeopardized their safety.
According to CBP officials, these challenges may also be attributed to  lack of training or understanding of standard operating procedures. Given  the challenge of coordinating across independent agencies to establish  consistent policies and protocols on sharing and using encryption keys,  labeling channel names, and communicating with state and local  agencies, implementing the draft DHS Communications Interoperability  Plan may help improve interoperability by providing leadership support  and reducing local jurisdictional disagreements. However, since the DHS  Communications Interoperability Plan has not yet been finalized, it is too  soon to assess the extent to which this guidance will effectively address  the interoperability challenges discussed above. According to DHS  officials, the department intends to finalize the plan and aims to  accomplish the goals outlined in the DHS Communications  Interoperability Plan within 3 to 5 years.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Interoperable communications have presented long-standing challenges  for DHS. Thirteen years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,  and more than 10 years after the bipartisan 9/11 Commission reported  that interoperable communications need to be improved at all levels of  government, DHS continues to face challenges achieving interoperable  communications. Achieving interoperability depends on having radio  systems that function as intended in each operating environment. Given  that the limited operational testing conducted by CBP to ensure that its  upgraded radio systems are operating as intended could not make a  definitive determination on operational suitability, and since CBP agents  and officers are currently using radio systems on a daily basis, a  performance monitoring plan would help CBP identify issues experienced  by current CBP users and actions that could address those identified  issues. Moreover, CBP can do more to meet the training needs of all CBP  radio users. Developing and implementing a plan to address any skills  gaps for Border Patrol agents and OFO officers related to understanding  the new digital radio systems and interagency radio use protocols could  help CBP ensure that all its agents and officers operating along the  southwest border have the skills needed to overcome challenges that  affect their ability to communicate with agents and officers from other  components. Further, since CBP does not have a mechanism to verify  that all Border Patrol and OFO radio users receive radio training, the  agency is unable to fully monitor and address radio user training needs.
ICE officials stated that the agency has upgraded its TACCOM radio  equipment but were unable to verify this with documentation. Although  ICE TACCOM officials were able to provide detailed planning  documentation for modernization projects that were completed in other  locations, the agency does not have complete information on how the  program is being managed, including for locations on the southwest  border. Without a program plan to guide ICE’s TACCOM modernization  program efforts, ICE does not have the ability to determine whether its  technology investments are meeting user needs and contributing to  achieving the agency’s mission. Further, ICE has not provided sufficient  training to agents operating along the southwest border to ensure these  agents have the skills needed to overcome the interoperability challenges  they face. Developing and implementing a plan to address radio user  skills gaps, and developing a mechanism to verify that all ICE radio users  receive radio training, would help ensure that the agency can better  monitor and address ICE radio user training needs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that CBP’s land mobile radio systems are functioning as  intended in each location and are meeting user needs, we recommend  that the CBP Commissioner develop a plan to monitor the performance of  its deployed radio systems.
To ensure the ICE TACCOM program is effectively managed, we  recommend that the Assistant Secretary of ICE develop a program plan  to ensure that the agency establishes the appropriate documentation of  resource needs, program goals, and measures to monitor the  performance of its deployed radio systems.
To improve CBP training efforts, we recommend that the CBP  Commissioner take the following two actions: develop and implement a plan to address any skills gaps for CBP  agents and officers related to understanding the new digital radio  systems and interagency radio use protocols, and develop a mechanism to verify that all Border Patrol and OFO radio  users receive radio training.
To improve ICE training efforts, we recommend that the Assistant  Secretary of ICE take the following two actions: develop and implement a plan to address any skills gaps for ICE  agents related to understanding the new digital radio systems and  interagency radio use protocols, and develop a mechanism to verify that all ICE radio users receive radio  training.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On  March 11, 2015, DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in  appendix I and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DHS concurred with our six recommendations and described  actions taken, under way, or planned to address them. Specifically,   In response to our recommendation that CBP develop a plan to  monitor the performance of its deployed radio systems, DHS stated  that CBP will work to complete a CBP Land Mobile Radio System  Performance Monitoring Plan by December 31, 2015.
In response to our recommendation that ICE develop a program plan  to ensure appropriate documentation of resource needs, program  goals, and measures to monitor the performance of its deployed radio  systems, DHS stated that ICE’s Office of the Chief Information Officer  (OCIO) will develop a program to facilitate, coordinate, and maintain  ICE’s deployed radio systems. DHS further stated that in developing  this program, ICE OCIO will ensure that the agency establishes the  proper documentation of resource needs, defines program goals, and  establishes measures to monitor performance. DHS estimated a  completion date of January 31, 2016.
In response to our recommendation that CBP develop and implement  a plan to address any skills gaps for CBP agents and officers related  to understanding the new digital radio systems and interagency radio  use protocols, DHS stated that CBP will work to develop and  implement an action plan to address skills gaps for CBP agents and  officers related to understanding the new digital radio systems and  interagency radio use protocols. DHS further stated that CBP will  explore options such as remote training using virtual learning and  other distributive learning tools to best implement the training. DHS  estimated a completion date of March 31, 2016.
In response to our recommendation that CBP develop a mechanism  to verify that all Border Patrol and OFO radio users receive radio  training, DHS stated that CBP will explore options to verify that all  Border Patrol and OFO radio users receive radio training as part of its  effort to develop and implement an action plan in response to our third  recommendation. DHS estimated a completion date of March 31,  2016.
In response to our recommendation that ICE develop and implement  a plan to address any skills gaps for ICE agents related to  understanding the new digital radio systems and interagency radio  use protocols, DHS stated that ICE Homeland Security Investigations  (HSI) will propose an increase in training for new HSI special agents  at the HSI training academy and plans to provide radios to new  agents to be used during this training. DHS further stated that the ICE  Office of Training will develop online training for ICE personnel. DHS  estimated a completion date of March 31, 2016.
In response to our recommendation that ICE develop a mechanism to  verify that all ICE radio users receive radio training, DHS stated that  ICE will establish a new training plan for all special agents to ensure  they receive proper radio training. DHS further stated that the training  plan will include new users who will receive radios at the academy, as  well as existing users in the field. In addition, DHS stated that in  January 2015, HSI TACCOM personnel met with representatives of  the HSI Academy to discuss these efforts. DHS estimated a  completion date of March 31, 2016.
These planned actions, if implemented effectively, should address the  intent of our recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the CBP Commissioner, the Assistant Secretary of ICE, the  House Homeland Security Committee, the House Subcommittee on  Oversight and Management Efficiency, the House Subcommittee on  Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO web-site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or at gamblerr@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Stephen L. Caldwell, Director;  Kirk Kiester, Assistant Director; Carissa Bryant; Michele Fejfar; Christine  Hanson; Rich Hung; Jon Najmi; Jessica Orr; and Carl Potenzieri made  key contributions to this report.