Improper Payments: Government-Wide Estimates and Use of Death Data to Help Prevent Payments to Deceased Individuals
Published: 2015-03-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As the steward of taxpayer dollars, the federal government is accountable for how it spends hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars annually. The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended, requires federal executive branch agencies to (1) review all programs and activities, (2) identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments, (3) estimate the annual amount of improper payments for those programs and activities, (4) implement actions to reduce improper payments and set reduction targets, and (5) report on the results of addressing the foregoing requirements. In general, reported improper payment estimates include payments that should not have been made, were made in the incorrect amount, or were not supported by sufficient documentation.
Implementing strong preventive controls can serve as the frontline defense against improper payments. One example of a preventive control is verifying eligibility through data sharing, which can allow agencies that make payments to compare information―such as death data― from different sources to help ensure that payments are appropriate before they are made.
This testimony addresses (1) issues related to government-wide improper payments and (2) use of death data to help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals. This testimony is primarily based on GAO's body of work related to improper payments and SSA's death data, as well as information obtained from agency financial reports.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Government-wide, improper payment estimates totaled $124.7 billion in fiscal year 2014, a significant increase of approximately $19 billion from the prior year's estimate of $105.8 billion. The estimated improper payments for fiscal year 2014 were attributable to 124 programs spread among 22 agencies. The reported government-wide error rate was 4.5 percent of program outlays in fiscal year 2014 compared to 4.0 percent reported in fiscal year 2013. The increase in the 2014 estimate is attributed primarily to increased error rates in three major programs: the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Medicare Fee-for-Service and Medicaid programs, and the Department of the Treasury's Earned Income Tax Credit program. These three programs accounted for $80.9 billion in improper payment estimates, or approximately 65 percent of the government-wide total for fiscal year 2014.
Agencies continue to face challenges in reducing improper payments. In GAO's report on the Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Report of the United States Government , GAO identified the federal government's inability to determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them as a material weakness in internal control. Some agencies reported in their fiscal year 2014 agency financial reports that program design issues hindered efforts to estimate or recover improper payments. For example, HHS reported that statutory limitations prevent the agency from requiring states to estimate improper payments for its Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. Further, inspectors general at 10 agencies identified noncompliance with improper payment requirements in fiscal year 2013. GAO has reported that strategies for reducing improper payments include analyzing the root causes of improper payments and developing strong preventive and detective controls. Recent laws and guidance support some of these strategies, including the Do Not Pay initiative, a web-based, centralized data-matching service that could help prevent certain improper payments.
Sharing death data can help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals or those who use deceased individuals' identities, but the Social Security Administration (SSA) faces challenges in maintaining these data, and other agencies face challenges in obtaining them. The Social Security Act requires that SSA share its full death file, to the extent possible, with agencies that provide federally funded benefits, provided that the arrangement meets statutory requirements. An agency that does not access SSA's full death file can instead access the publicly available Death Master File, a subset of the full death file that does not include state-reported death data. GAO has reported on payments to deceased individuals that could have been prevented by using SSA's death data in programs related to disaster assistance, farming, and rural housing. While verifying eligibility using SSA's death data can be an effective tool to help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals or those who use their identities, agencies may not be obtaining accurate data because of weaknesses in how these data are received and managed by SSA. In November 2013, GAO reported that SSA needed to take action to address data errors and agency access issues, including assessing the risks that errors in death data pose. GAO also recommended that SSA ensure appropriate agency access by developing written guidance on eligibility requirements for access to the full death file.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the issue of   As the steward of taxpayer dollars, the federal  improper payments.government is accountable for how it spends hundreds of billions of  taxpayer dollars annually. This includes safeguarding those expenditures  against improper payments and establishing mechanisms to recover  those funds when overpayments occur. It is important to note that  reported improper payment estimates may not represent a loss to the  government. For example, underpayments and errors consisting of  insufficient or lack of documentation for a payment are included in  improper payment estimates.
As we previously reported, implementing strong preventive controls can  serve as the frontline defense against improper payments. preventing improper payments increases public confidence in the  administration of benefit programs and avoids the difficulties associated  with the “pay and chase” aspects of recovering overpayments. Sharing  of data―including death data maintained by the Social Security  Administration (SSA)―can allow entities that make payments to compare  information from different sources to help ensure that payments are  appropriate before they are made.
GAO, Improper Payments: Government-Wide Estimates and Reduction Strategies,  GAO-14-737T (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2014).
Our testimony today will focus on (1) issues related to government-wide  improper payments and (2) use of SSA’s death data to help prevent  improper payments.
This statement is primarily based on our body of work issued from May  2012 to February 2015 on improper payments and SSA’s death data, as  well as information obtained from agency financial reports. Each of the  GAO products cited in this statement includes detailed explanations of the  methods used to perform our work. We conducted the work that this  statement is based on in accordance with all sections of GAO’s Quality  Assurance Framework that are relevant to our objectives. The framework  requires that we plan and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient  and appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss  any limitations in our work. We believe that the information and data  obtained, and the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions.
subsections: section_title: Improper Payments Remain a Government-Wide Challenge
subsections: section_title: Improper Payment Estimates Increased in Fiscal Year 2014
paragraphs: Government-wide, improper payment estimates totaled $124.7 billion in  fiscal year 2014, a significant increase of approximately $19 billion from  the prior year’s estimate of $105.8 billion. The estimated improper  payments for fiscal year 2014 were attributable to 124 programs spread  among 22 agencies. Table 1 shows the improper payment estimates,  error rates, and examples of reported root causes for those 12 programs  that had improper payment estimates exceeding $1 billion for fiscal year  2014, which accounted for approximately 93 percent of the government- wide estimate.
When excluding the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Finance  and Accounting Service Commercial Pay program, the reported  government-wide error rate was 4.5 percent of program outlays in fiscal  year 2014, compared to 4.0 percent reported in fiscal year 2013. The  increase in the 2014 estimate is attributed primarily to increased error  rates in three major programs: the Department of Health and Human  Services’ (HHS) Medicare Fee-for-Service, HHS’s Medicaid, and the  Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Earned Income Tax Credit.  These three programs accounted for $80.9 billion in improper payment  estimates, or approximately 65 percent of the government-wide total for  fiscal year 2014. Further, the increases in improper payment estimates for  these three programs were approximately $16 billion, or 85 percent of the  increase in the government-wide improper payment estimate for fiscal  year 2014.
section_title: Agencies Continue to Face Challenges in Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments
paragraphs: IPERIA is the latest in a series of laws aimed at reducing improper  payments. IPERIA directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)  to annually identify a list of high-priority programs for greater levels of  oversight and review, including establishing annual targets and  semiannual or quarterly actions for reducing improper payments. IPERIA  also enacted into law a Do Not Pay initiative, elements of which already  were being developed under executive branch authority. The Do Not Pay  initiative is a web-based, centralized data-matching service that allows  agencies to review multiple databases―including certain death data  maintained by SSA―to determine a recipient’s award or payment  eligibility prior to making payments. Similarly, the Digital Accountability  and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) calls on Treasury to establish  a data analysis center, or to expand an existing service, to provide data,  analytic tools, and data management techniques for preventing or   Effective implementation of the DATA Act  reducing improper payments.and the use of data analytic tools could help agencies to detect, reduce,  and prevent improper payments.
In addition to these legislative initiatives, OMB has continued to play a  key role in the oversight of government-wide improper payments. OMB  has established guidance for federal agencies on reporting, reducing, and  recovering improper payments as required by IPIA, as amended, and on  protecting privacy while reducing improper payments with the Do Not Pay  initiative. For example, the most recent revision to OMB’s guidance for  estimating improper payments directs agencies to report on the causes of  improper payments using more detailed categories than previously  required, such as program design issues or administrative errors at the  federal, state, or local agency level. As we previously reported, detailed  analysis of the root causes of improper payments can help agencies to  identify and implement targeted corrective actions. Although the revised  guidance is generally effective for fiscal year 2015 reporting, OMB has  requested that the four agencies with the largest high-priority programs  implement the revised guidance early―by April 30, 2015―using fiscal  year 2014 information. This includes developing comprehensive  corrective action plans for each program that describe root causes and  establish critical path milestones to meet improper payment reductions;  identifying improper payments using the new, more detailed categories  outlined in the guidance; and developing plans to provide reasonable  assurance that internal controls over improper payments are in place and  are working effectively.
While these efforts are positive steps toward estimating and reducing  improper payments, agencies continue to face challenges. In our report  on the Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Report of the United States  Government, we identified the issue of improper payments as a material  weakness in internal control because the federal government is unable to  determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and  reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them.  We found that not all agencies had developed improper payment  estimates for all of the programs and activities they identified as  susceptible to significant improper payments. Specifically, two federal  agencies did not report estimated improper payment amounts for four  risk-susceptible programs. For example, HHS did not report an improper  payment estimate in fiscal year 2014 for its Temporary Assistance for  Needy Families (TANF) program, which had program outlays of about  $16.3 billion.
Generally, agencies must issue their performance and accountability reports or agency  financial reports by November 15. Fiscal year 2013 was the third year for which IGs were  required to issue annual reports on agencies’ compliance with criteria listed in IPERA. IG  reports on fiscal year 2014 compliance with the criteria listed in IPERA are generally  expected to be issued by May 2015. least one of these two criteria for 3 consecutive years. In addition to the  legislative criteria, various IGs reported other deficiencies in their most  recent annual compliance reports, including risk assessments that may  not accurately assess the risk of improper payments and estimation  methodologies that may not produce reliable estimates. Similarly, we  have found weaknesses in improper payment risk assessments at the  Department of Energy and in the estimating methodology for DOD’s  TRICARE program, which could result in understated estimates of  improper payments.take steps to improve its risk assessments, including revising guidance on  how to address risk factors and providing examples of other risk factors  likely to contribute to improper payments. For DOD’s TRICARE, we  recommended that DOD implement a more comprehensive method for  measuring improper payments that includes review of medical records.  Both agencies concurred with our recommendations.
We recommended that the Department of Energy  In addition to the challenges that we and the IGs reported, some agencies  reported in their fiscal year 2014 performance and accountability reports  or agency financial reports that program design issues could hinder  efforts to estimate or recapture improper payments. These included the  following:
Coordination with states. HHS cited statutory limitations for its state- administered TANF program, which prohibited it from requiring states  to participate in developing an improper payment estimate for the  program. Despite these limitations, HHS reported that it had taken  actions to assist states in reducing improper payments, such as  working with states to analyze noncompliance findings from audits  related to TANF and requiring more accurate information about the  ways states used TANF block grants.
Recovery auditing. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported  that section 281 of the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act  of 1994 precluded the use of recovery auditing techniques.Specifically, the agency reported that section 281 provides that 90  days after the decision of a state, a county, or an area committee is  final, no action may be taken to recover the amounts found to have  been erroneously disbursed as a result of the decision, unless the  participant had reason to believe that the decision was erroneous.  This statute is commonly referred to as the Finality Rule, and  according to USDA, it affects the Farm Service Agency’s ability to  recover overpayments.
While agencies continue to face challenges, there are a number of  strategies that can help agencies in reducing improper payments,  including analyzing the root causes of improper payments to identify and  implement effective preventive and detective controls. Detective controls are critical for identifying improper payments that have already  been made, but strong preventive controls can serve as the frontline  defense against improper payments. One example of preventive controls  is up-front eligibility verification through data sharing, which allows entities  that make payments to compare information from different sources to  help ensure that payments are appropriate. Specifically, one type of data  sharing we are highlighting today is the use of SSA death data.
section_title: Use of Death Information Can Help Prevent Improper Payments, but Agencies Face Challenges in Obtaining Accurate and More Complete Data
subsections: section_title: Programs Can Use Death Information to Help Prevent Improper Payments
paragraphs: Because of its mission, SSA is uniquely positioned to collect and manage  death data at the federal level, and these data can be helpful in  preventing improper payments to deceased individuals or those who use  deceased individuals’ identities. SSA maintains two sets of death data.  The complete file of death data, which we refer to as SSA’s full death  file, includes data from multiple sources―such as funeral directors,  family members, certain federal agencies, and states―and is available to  certain eligible entities. The Social Security Act requires that SSA share  its full death file, to the extent feasible, with agencies that provide  federally funded benefits, provided that the arrangement meets statutory  requirements. A subset of the full death file, which SSA calls the Death  Master File (DMF), is available to the public. However, SSA may not  include death data received from states in the DMF.reported on the value of using SSA’s death data―the full death file, if  possible, or the DMF―to guard against improper payments to deceased  individuals or those who use deceased individuals’ identities. For  example, we have reported on payments to deceased individuals that  could have been prevented by using SSA’s death data in the following  areas.
Disaster assistance. In December 2014, we identified 45 recipients  of Hurricane Sandy disaster benefits from the Federal Emergency  Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individuals and Households Program  that appeared on SSA’s full death file and had applications for the  program dated after the reported date of death. Of these 45 cases,  FEMA officials stated that they submitted 7 for review to determine if  the assistance could be recouped, 2 payments were returned  voluntarily, and 1 was under investigation for fraud. While FEMA  developed a process to review SSA’s DMF, use of the more  comprehensive full death file could have helped to identify likely  deceased individuals who were not listed in the DMF. We  recommended that FEMA collaborate with SSA to assess the cost  and feasibility of checking recipient information against the full death  file. FEMA concurred with our recommendations and stated that it will  work with SSA to determine the feasibility and cost of this effort.
Farm programs. In June 2013, we reported that USDA needed to do  more to prevent improper payments to deceased individuals made  under various farm programs, including those related to farm income,  disasters, conservation, and crop insurance. We found that while one USDA component had developed procedures for reviewing SSA’s  DMF and recovered approximately $1 million, certain payments to  deceased individuals that were deemed to be proper did not have  sufficient support for the decisions. Further, the other two USDA  components we reviewed did not have procedures in place to prevent  potentially improper payments to deceased individuals. We  recommended that USDA strengthen its existing DMF review  processes and establish review processes for its two remaining  components. As of March 2015, USDA reported that it is still working  to address our recommendations.
Rural housing. In May 2012, we reported that USDA could enhance  its efforts to identify and reduce improper rental assistance  payments. We found that USDA’s efforts to identify improper  payments did not examine payments made on behalf of deceased  tenants, among other types of payment errors. When a tenant dies,  rental assistance should either be discontinued or adjusted to reflect a  change in household composition. We found that USDA relied on a  deceased tenant’s landlord or family to provide notification of a  tenant’s death. Failure to report such information could lead the  agency to continue to make rental assistance payments on the  deceased tenant’s behalf. We recommended that USDA complete  steps to use SSA’s DMF to identify these improper payments and to  conduct oversight of program payments. Consistent with our  recommendation, USDA officials told us in March 2015 that they have  been using the DMF since fiscal year 2013 to avoid making payments  on behalf of deceased tenants and are planning to use the DMF to  detect improper payments in future improper payment audits.
section_title: Challenges Exist in Maintaining and Sharing Death Information
paragraphs: While verifying eligibility using SSA’s death data can be an effective tool  to help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals, SSA faces  challenges in maintaining accurate death data, and other federal  agencies face challenges in accessing these data. Inaccuracies in death  data could adversely affect their usefulness in helping agencies prevent  improper payments. In November 2013, we reported on errors and issues  we found and recommended that SSA take specific actions to address  death file data errors and agency access issues, as detailed below.
subsections: section_title: Improving the Accuracy and Completeness of Death Data
paragraphs: SSA receives death reports from multiple sources, but its procedures for  collecting, verifying, and maintaining death reports could result in  erroneous or untimely death information. For example, as we reported in  November 2013, SSA did not independently verify all reports before  including them in its death records. SSA only verified death reports for  Social Security beneficiaries in order to stop benefit payments and did not  verify death reports for nonbeneficiaries. Further, for Social Security  beneficiaries, SSA verified only those reports from sources that it  considered to be less accurate, such as reports from other federal  agencies. SSA did not verify reports from what it considered to be more  accurate sources, such as funeral directors, family members, and states  using the Electronic Death Registration System. SSA considered death  reports submitted by states through this system to be the most accurate  because the information is verified with SSA databases before the reports  are submitted to SSA. Because SSA verifies a limited portion of death  reports, it increases the risk of having erroneous information in its death  data, such as including living individuals or not including deceased  individuals. Figure 1 illustrates SSA’s death report verification procedures.
Additionally, we reported in November 2013 that death reports that did  not match information in SSA’s database of all Social Security number- holders, known as the Numerical Index File (Numident), were not  included in SSA’s death data. SSA also did not attempt to follow up with  the sources of these reports in part because, according to agency  officials, it is unlikely that the sources would have any additional  information. However, by not contacting the source of the death report or  conducting any other outside investigation to resolve the discrepancy, the  risk that death data will be inaccurate or incomplete increases, and  federal benefit-paying agencies relying on these data could make  improper payments as a result.
Further, we found that SSA did not perform additional reviews of reports  of deaths that occurred years or decades in the past. In our November  2013 report, we identified cases in which death reports submitted to SSA  in early 2013 listed dates of death that were more than a year old, and in  some cases, more than 10 years old. This is of concern because, if  these dates of death are accurate, SSA and other agencies may have  been at risk of paying benefits to these individuals for long periods after  they died. SSA officials were not able to explain with certainty why this  was occurring but suggested that some cases might be the result of data  entry errors.
In our November 2013 report, we also identified other instances of  potentially erroneous information in the death data that raise concerns  about their accuracy and usefulness. For example, we found records  where the date of death preceded the individual’s recorded date of birth  and records where the date of death was prior to 1936―the year Social  Security numbers were first issued―although the decedents had Social  Security numbers assigned to them. Other records showed a recorded  age at death of between 115 and 195. Despite these vulnerabilities, SSA  had not performed risk assessments to determine the impact of  erroneous, untimely, or incomplete death information on SSA’s ability to  prevent improper benefit payments. We recommended that SSA conduct  such a risk assessment to identify the scope and extent of errors, ways to  address them, and the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of addressing  various types of errors based on the risk they pose. SSA partially agreed  with our recommendation. According to officials, SSA recently conducted  a risk assessment as a part of redesigning how the agency processes  death reports and compiles the data for dissemination; however, we have  not yet had an opportunity to review the risk assessment.
section_title: Ensuring Appropriate Agency Access to Death Data
paragraphs: Certain federal benefit-paying agencies have obtained SSA’s full set of  death data directly from SSA, including HHS’s Centers for Medicare &  Medicaid Services and Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service, the entities  that administer the three programs with the highest improper payment  estimates in fiscal year 2014. According to SSA officials, agencies  receiving access to the full death file must make a formal request and  have agreements in place with SSA that outline the circumstances of  each data-sharing arrangement. An agency that does not access SSA’s  full death file can instead access the publicly available DMF. However,  the DMF is less complete than SSA’s full death file because state- reported deaths are removed. As we reported in November 2013, the  DMF contained 10 percent fewer records than the full death file because  of the removal of state-reported deaths. SSA officials expect the  percentage of state-reported deaths as a proportion of all of SSA’s death  records to increase over time as more states submit records through the  Electronic Death Registration System.
We also found in our November 2013 report that SSA lacked written  guidelines other than the language in the Social Security Act for  determining whether agencies are eligible to access the full death file,  and SSA’s determinations as to whether agencies met these  requirements varied. In one example, officials stated that SSA would  generally have the authority to share the full death file with the IGs at  benefit-paying agencies for the purpose of ensuring proper payment of  federally funded benefits. In fact, SSA officials approved a request for  access to the full death file for the HHS IG. However, SSA officials also  stated that the Do Not Pay Business Center, operated by Treasury, was  not eligible to receive the full death file. Like the HHS IG, Treasury’s Do  Not Pay Business Center was seeking access to the full death file as part  of its efforts to prevent improper payments. SSA officials provided no  documentation outlining their rationale for this determination but  explained that they were not authorized to provide the state-reported  death data to Treasury to distribute them to other agencies. Because  agencies’ circumstances may differ, this variation in determinations may  not represent inconsistency with the act. However, without written  guidance for explaining SSA’s criteria for approving or denying agencies’  requests for the full death file, potential recipient agencies may not know  whether they are eligible. We recommended that SSA develop and  publicize guidance and the criteria it will use to more systematically  determine whether agencies are eligible to receive SSA’s full death file.  SSA has posted some limited information on accessing the full death file  on its website; however, SSA disagreed with our recommendation and  said it must review all requests on a case-by-case basis to ensure  compliance with the Privacy Act and the Social Security Act. While we  appreciate that agencies may request the full death file for a variety of  intended uses, and we support SSA’s efforts to ensure compliance with  all applicable legal requirements, we continue to believe that developing  this guidance could help to ensure consistency in SSA’s future decision  making, as well as enhance agencies’ ability to obtain the data in a timely  and efficient manner  Further, in November 2013, we found that SSA’s projected  reimbursement amounts for the reasonable cost of sharing death data  varied for different agencies, sometimes because of legal requirements,  but SSA did not share with agencies how these amounts were  determined. While SSA calculated a detailed breakdown of expenses  internally, we found that it provided only a summary of these expenses in  the estimates and billing statements it provided agencies. Consequently,  recipient agencies did not know the factors that led to the reimbursement  amounts they were charged, which could prevent them from making  informed decisions based on the amount they are spending. We  recommended that SSA provide a more detailed explanation of how it  determines reimbursement amounts for providing agencies with death  information from the full death file. SSA partially agreed with our  recommendation, stating that SSA refined its process for estimating the  cost of sharing death data in fiscal year 2013, but it is not a government- wide business practice for federal agencies to share detailed costs for  reimbursable agreements. While we recognize that there may be  limitations on the type of cost details SSA can provide to recipient  agencies, we continue to believe that more transparency in the factors  used to calculate reimbursement amounts could help agencies make  more informed decisions.
In conclusion, with outlays for major programs, such as Medicare and  Medicaid, expected to increase over the next few years, it is critical that  actions are taken to reduce improper payments. While sharing death data  can help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals, further  efforts are needed to help minimize the risks posed by inaccuracies in the  death data and to help ensure that agencies have access to them, as  appropriate.
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the  Committee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Daniel Bertoni, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income  Security issues at (202) 512-7215 or bertonid@gao.gov or Beryl H. Davis,  Director, Financial Management and Assurance, at (202) 512-2623 or  davisbh@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  statement. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this  testimony are Rachel Frisk (Assistant Director), Phillip McIntyre (Assistant  Director), James Healy, Sara Pelton, and Ricky A. Perry, Jr.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Financial Audit: U.S. Government’s Fiscal Years 2014 and 2013  Consolidated Financial Statements. GAO-15-341R. Washington, D.C.:  February 26, 2015.
Improper Payments: TRICARE Measurement and Reduction Efforts  Could Benefit from Adopting Medical Record Reviews. GAO-15-269.  Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2015.
Improper Payments: DOE’s Risk Assessments Should Be Strengthened.  GAO-15-36. Washington, D.C.: December 23, 2014.
Hurricane Sandy: FEMA Has Improved Disaster Aid Verification but  Could Act to Further Limit Improper Assistance. GAO-15-15. Washington,  D.C.: December 12, 2014.
Improper Payments: Inspector General Reporting of Agency Compliance  under the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act.   GAO-15-87R. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 2014.
Federal Data Transparency: Effective Implementation of the DATA Act  Would Help Address Government-wide Management Challenges and  Improve Oversight. GAO-15-241T. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2014.
Improper Payments: Government-Wide Estimates and Reduction  Strategies. GAO-14-737T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2014.
Social Security Death Data: Additional Action Needed to Address Data  Errors and Federal Agency Access. GAO-14-46. Washington, D.C.:  November 27, 2013.
Farm Programs: USDA Needs to Do More to Prevent Improper Payments  to Deceased Individuals. GAO-13-503. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2013.
Rural Housing Service: Efforts to Identify and Reduce Improper Rental  Assistance Payments Could Be Enhanced. GAO-12-624. Washington,  D.C.: May 31, 2012.
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