Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program
Published: 2009-03-05T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A key mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, which provides equipment, training, fellowships, and other services to its member states. The United States provides approximately 25 percent of the TC program's annual budget. This report addresses the (1) extent to which the United States and IAEA have policies limiting member states' participation in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) any limitations and challenges in IAEA's management of the TC program. To address these issues, GAO interviewed relevant officials at the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE) and IAEA; analyzed IAEA, DOE, and national laboratory data; and assessed State and IAEA policies toward the TC program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Neither State nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria--even though under U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions. Together, these four countries received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. In addition, TC funding has been provided to states that are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)--India, Israel, and Pakistan--and neither the United States nor IAEA has sought to exclude these countriesfrom participating in the TC program. Finally, IAEA member statesare not required to complete comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA--which allow IAEA to monitor declared nuclear activities and detect clandestine nuclear programs--to be eligible for TC assistance, even though U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries to bring such arrangements into force as soon as possible. The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for several reasons. While State has implemented an interagency process to review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, the effectiveness of these reviews is limited because IAEA does not provide the United States with sufficient or timely information on TC proposals. Of the 1,565 TC proposals reviewed by DOE and the U.S. national laboratories for possible proliferation risks from 1998 through 2006, information for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent, consisted of only project titles. IAEA faces several limitations and challenges in effectively managing the TC program. First, the TC program's impact in meeting development and other needs of member states is unclear because IAEA has not updated and revised the program's performance metrics since 2002. Second, the TC program is limited by financial constraints, including the failure of many member states to pay their full share of support to the program's Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). In 2007, the TCF experienced a shortfall of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the $80 million total target budget, because 62 member states did not pay their full expected contributions, including 47 states that made no payment at all. Furthermore, IAEA has not developed a policy for determining when countries should be graduated from receiving TC assistance, including those defined by the UN as high-income countries. Finally, the TC program's long-term viability is uncertain because of limitations in IAEA efforts to track how project results are sustained and because of shortcomings in strategies to develop new TC program partners and donors.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent  international organization based in Vienna, Austria, that is affiliated with  international organization based in Vienna, Austria, that is affiliated with  the United Nations (UN), has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful  the United Nations (UN), has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful  uses of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear technologies and  uses of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear technologies and  materials intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted to weapons  materials intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted to weapons  development efforts. IAEA promotes peaceful uses of nuclear energy  development efforts. IAEA promotes peaceful uses of nuclear energy  through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, to support the  through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, to support the  development of nuclear power, applications in human health, food and  development of nuclear power, applications in human health, food and  agriculture, and nuclear safety, among other areas. All 145 IAEA member  agriculture, and nuclear safety, among other areas. All 145 IAEA member  states are eligible for TC assistance; however, not all countries request  states are eligible for TC assistance; however, not all countries request  assistance. The United States participates as a donor and is the largest  assistance. The United States participates as a donor and is the largest  financial contributor to the TC program, providing approximately 25  financial contributor to the TC program, providing approximately 25  percent of its budget, or about $19.8 million, in 2007.  percent of its budget, or about $19.8 million, in 2007.
The TC program’s mission is to help IAEA member states achieve their  The TC program’s mission is to help IAEA member states achieve their  sustainable development priorities by furnishing them with relevant  sustainable development priorities by furnishing them with relevant  nuclear technologies and expertise. This mission is derived from Articles II  nuclear technologies and expertise. This mission is derived from Articles II  and III of IAEA’s statute. IAEA provides TC support to member states  and III of IAEA’s statute. IAEA provides TC support to member states  through individual projects, which may be implemented on a national,  through individual projects, which may be implemented on a national,  regional, or interregional basis. A few nonmember states receive  regional, or interregional basis. A few nonmember states receive  assistance under some regional TC projects.  assistance under some regional TC projects.
The TC program also plays a role in facilitating Article IV of the Treaty on  The TC program also plays a role in facilitating Article IV of the Treaty on  the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which affirms that all  the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which affirms that all  states party to the treaty have a right to participate in the exchange of  states party to the treaty have a right to participate in the exchange of  equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for  equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for  peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT also requires nonnuclear  peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT also requires nonnuclear  weapon state parties to the NPT (defined as those countries that had not  weapon state parties to the NPT (defined as those countries that had not  manufactured and detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967) to  manufactured and detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967) to  accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material used in peaceful activities  so that the agency can verify that their nuclear programs are not being  used for weapons purposes. Most countries have concluded  “comprehensive safeguards agreements” with IAEA, under which  governments declare their nuclear materials and activities to IAEA. The  agency then verifies and monitors these declarations. IAEA has sought to  further strengthen its verification efforts through a complementary  “additional protocol” to a country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.  Under such protocols, states must provide IAEA with broader information  and wider access rights on all aspects of their activities related to the  nuclear fuel cycle.
In 2007, the TC program disbursed over $93 million in nuclear technical  assistance to 122 countries and territories. TC projects have supported  efforts to eradicate tsetse flies and other insect pests in certain regions,  control communicable diseases in developing countries, and develop  higher-yielding agricultural crops. As of June 2008, 1,290 TC projects were  under way, with each project lasting, on average, 3 to 4 years. A TC project  typically has several components, including equipment procurement,  provision of expert services, training, and fellowships. Each year, about  1,600 individuals around the world are granted fellowships by the TC  program, allowing them to pursue specialized nuclear studies at  universities, institutes, and other facilities outside their home countries.
All TC projects are considered by the Technical Assistance and  Cooperation Committee of IAEA’s Board of Governors—the 35-member  policy-making body for IAEA programs—before they are approved by the  Board of Governors. This approval covers the entire life cycle of the  project. The TC Department and other departments within IAEA’s  Secretariat begin working with the member states to develop project  concepts and proposals approximately 1 year before the project is  approved.
Financing of TC projects is generally supported through the annual  voluntary contributions of member states to IAEA’s Technical  Cooperation Fund (TCF). Each member state is expected to meet an  annual financial pledge to the TCF, which is set as a percentage of the  total fund’s target budget. The U.S. target rate has been set at 25 percent,  while many of the least developed countries are expected to contribute  less than 1 percent of the TCF budget. Contributions to the TCF are  fungible—that is, they are not designated for, and cannot be traced to,  specific TC projects.
In the United States, the two principal agencies involved in TC issues are  the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE). U.S. funding to the TC  program—including its contribution to the TCF, extrabudgetary funding  for specific projects, and “in-kind” contributions—is provided from State’s  budget as part of the overall annual U.S. “voluntary contribution” to IAEA.  In addition to providing funding to IAEA, State coordinates U.S. policy  toward the TC program by working through the U.S. Mission to  International Organizations in Vienna (U.S. Mission).
We reviewed the TC program in 1997 and found that while the vast  majority of TC projects did not involve the transfer of sensitive nuclear  materials and technologies, nuclear assistance was provided to countries  that posed a proliferation risk. Proliferation concerns about the TC  program have persisted because of the assistance it has provided to  certain countries and because nuclear equipment, technology, and  expertise can be dual-use—capable of serving peaceful purposes, such as  the production of medical isotopes, but also useful in contributing to  nuclear weapons development. For example, in 2006, IAEA refused to  support a TC proposal from Iran requesting assistance for a heavy water  reactor near the town of Arak. Iran stated that the reactor was intended  for the production of medical isotopes. The United States and other IAEA  members objected due to concerns that the plant could serve as a source  of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
In our 1997 report, we recommended that the Secretary of State direct the  U.S. interagency group on IAEA technical assistance to systematically  review all proposals for TC projects in countries of concern prior to their  approval by IAEA to determine whether the projects are consistent with  U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals. In response, an interagency process  was established, involving State, DOE, and the DOE national laboratories,  to evaluate proposed and active TC projects for proliferation risks. State  leads the reviews of TC project proposals and ongoing projects. DOE  provides technical input to this process using the technical expertise of  the national laboratories to assess the projects’ proliferation risks and  reports its findings to State.
As agreed with your office, this report assesses the (1) extent to which the  United States and IAEA have policies limiting member states’ participation  in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related  concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and  monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) any limitations and  challenges in IAEA’s management of the TC program.
The scope of our review covered the period from 1997 through 2007  because our previous report on the TC program analyzed programmatic  and financial data through 1996. To address these objectives, we  interviewed key U.S. officials at State, DOE, and the U.S. Mission and  analyzed documentation, such as cables, reports and analyses of the TC  program, financial information, and statements and speeches by U.S.  officials. We interviewed other individuals in the United States involved in  TC program issues, including U.S. national laboratory representatives  involved in conducting proliferation risk assessments of TC projects and  proposals; Argonne National Laboratory staff who support State’s  oversight of the TC program and facilitate TC training and fellowship  programs in the United States; and the U.S. representative to IAEA’s  Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation.
We also interviewed officials at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria,  including representatives from the TC Department and other agency  departments—specifically, the Departments of Management, Safeguards,  and Nuclear Safety and Security. We obtained and analyzed  documentation and data from IAEA, including annual reports, financial  data, program guidance and strategy documents, auditor reports, and  speeches and other statements pertaining to the TC program. We  interviewed knowledgeable IAEA officials on the reliability of TC financial  data and data on the numbers of TC projects and determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
As initially agreed with your office, we intended to assess the extent to  which TC projects have contributed to the safety and security of nuclear  installations around the world. We developed a judgmental sample of TC  projects to serve as the basis for our assessment and interviews with  relevant IAEA officials. However, because IAEA did not provide us with an  opportunity to interview relevant IAEA officials who oversee these  projects, we were unable to sufficiently assess the contributions of the TC  program in improving the worldwide safety and security of nuclear  facilities. In addition, because IAEA restricted our access to information  relating to reviews of TC projects by its Safeguards Department, we were  unable to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of IAEA’s internal review  of TC projects for proliferation concerns. As agreed, we revised the  objectives of our review accordingly.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides more  detailed information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Overall policy direction for the TC program is set by IAEA’s policy-making  bodies—the General Conference and the Board of Governors. The United  States is a permanent member of the Board of Governors, which typically  meets 5 times per year. IAEA’s Secretariat—led by a Director General and  structured into six functional departments—is responsible for  implementing policies established by the Board of Governors and the  General Conference. The Department of Technical Cooperation, which is  headed by a Deputy Director General, is structured primarily around four  regional divisions: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America  and the Caribbean. The department also includes a Division of Programme  Support and Coordination, which is responsible for developing TC  program strategies, communications, and partnerships, and managing  relevant information systems and TC financial resources. In addition, an  external auditor and IAEA’s Office of Internal Oversight Services conduct  annual audits and reviews of the TC program.
Several individuals are involved in the TC project team responsible for  developing and overseeing the project. The team includes (1) a project  officer within the TC Department; (2) a technical officer from each  relevant IAEA department (such as the Department of Nuclear Sciences  and Applications); and (3) a national liaison officer at the country level  who represents the member state, serves as coordinator for TC projects in  the host country, and acts as liaison with host country governments and  institutes.
Typically, the TC program develops and approves new projects on a 2-year  cycle. The most recent set of new proposals were approved in fall 2008.  Member states begin submitting project proposal concepts to IAEA in  September of the year prior to approval. IAEA officials screen concepts  through the fall, and member states develop and refine their proposals  through March of the approval year. By July, IAEA’s Secretariat comes to a  final agreement on TC project proposals that it will back for approval by  the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee and the Board of  Governors. The TC project proposals are discussed with member states in  bilateral and regional group meetings during IAEA’s General Conference,  which is held in September; in November, the Technical Assistance and  Cooperation Committee and the Board of Governors give final approval to  the proposed TC projects.
section_title: The United States and IAEA Do Not Systematically Limit or Prevent TC Assistance to Countries Posing Potential Terrorism and Proliferation Concerns
paragraphs: Neither the United States nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit or deny  TC assistance to countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism, even  though under U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions. In  addition, TC assistance has been provided to countries that are not party  to the NPT, and neither the United States nor IAEA has sought to exclude  these nations from TC assistance. Finally, while the United States has  encouraged IAEA to condition TC assistance to countries according to  their safeguards status, IAEA does not take this factor into account when  allocating program funds. Appendix II provides more detailed information  on the states and territories that received TC assistance in 2007.
subsections: section_title: Four Countries Designated by the United States as State Sponsors of Terrorism Receive TC Assistance
paragraphs: Countries deemed by State as state sponsors of terrorism—meaning the  Secretary of State has determined that the countries’ governments have  repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism—have  been provided nuclear equipment and other assistance through the TC  program. The United States has designated four countries—Cuba, Iran,  Sudan, and Syria—as state sponsors of terrorism, pursuant to several U.S.  laws. According to our review of IAEA data and financial records, 111 TC  projects were approved for these four countries from 1997 through 2007,  and they received approximately $55.7 million in TC assistance over that  period. These projects ranged across a number of areas, from applying  nuclear technologies to treat diseases and improve crop productivity to  assisting nuclear power development. Table 1 shows the dollar amount of  TC assistance each U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism received  from 1997 through 2007.
According to State, the United States has applied several types of  sanctions to these four countries, including restrictions on U.S. foreign  assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, certain controls over  exports of dual-use items, and miscellaneous financial and other  restrictions. These sanctions notwithstanding, direct U.S. nuclear trade  with these countries involving the types of technologies provided by the  TC program might not be permitted under U.S. adherence to other  international nonproliferation controls. For instance, in a 2007 report to  Congress, State concluded that three TC projects involving technology  transfer for the operation and maintenance of the Iranian nuclear power  plant at Bushehr could be subject to multilateral export controls if Iran  were to procure such technology directly from suppliers. The State report  noted, “nder the Nonproliferation Principle of the NSG [Nuclear  Suppliers Group] Guidelines the United States and other responsible  members of the NSG would deny such direct transfers.”
The United States has not sought to systematically exclude or limit the  four U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism from TC assistance. State  officials told us that the department would not recommend withholding  U.S. funding to the TC program because of the support that IAEA provides  to these four countries. They said that it is a long-standing department  policy to pay the full share of U.S. support to the TC program because  doing so helps maintain international political support for and  participation in IAEA, including international support for safeguards. In  addition, because TCF resources are fungible, State officials asserted that  withholding U.S. contributions to the TCF to punish state sponsors of  terrorism would have no practical impact on the TC funding these nations  receive. A U.S. Mission official told us that once the United States provides  its contribution to the TCF, it cedes control over how the funds are  disbursed by IAEA.
Several laws govern U.S. support to the TC program. One restriction under  these laws prohibits U.S. funds contributed to IAEA from being used for  projects in Cuba, except in certain circumstances. Accordingly, State  withholds a portion of its voluntary contribution to the TCF equal to the  U.S. proportionate share of the TC program’s expenditures in Cuba. In  the past, the United States also withheld a proportionate share of its TCF  contribution for Iran, Libya, and Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the  Palestinian Authority. State also must report annually to Congress on all  IAEA programs or projects in certain countries, including Burma  (Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria.
IAEA officials told us that the TC program does not attempt to exclude  countries on the basis of their status as U.S.-designated state sponsors of  terrorism or other political considerations. Under the TC program’s  guiding principles, for example, the provision of TC assistance is not  subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions that are  inconsistent with IAEA’s statute. Moreover, according to the Deputy  Director General for the TC program, requests for TC assistance are  evaluated strictly on technical merits and the contributions of proposed  projects to a nation’s development priorities, subject to the conditions of  the IAEA statute, IAEA guiding principles and operating rules pertaining to  technical assistance, and any relevant decisions by the Board of Governors  and the UN Security Council. This official added that the program seeks to  include as many countries as possible and that “there are no good  countries and there are no bad countries” participating in the program. In  her view, denying or limiting participation of member states in the TC  program was a matter for the Board of Governors to consider.
Other IAEA officials told us that under the agency’s statute, IAEA’s  Secretariat is powerless to limit or condition TC assistance to specific  countries, even in cases where countries have been deemed by the Board of  Governors to be violating their IAEA obligations or in cases where recipient  countries were suspected of being engaged in undeclared, clandestine nuclear  activities. For instance, the Board of Governors determined in September  2005 that Iran had breached its safeguards obligations and was not complying  with IAEA’s statute. However, TC projects in Iran were not restricted until  February 2007 following a UN Security Council resolution on Iran’s nuclear  activities. In addition, in 2008, IAEA’s Director General stated it would be  inappropriate to block approval of a TC project in Syria for a nuclear power  plant feasibility study before IAEA verified claims concerning Syria’s alleged  construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor. According to State officials,  several countries, including the United States, asserted that the approval of  this project would be “wholly inappropriate” when Syria had not provided all  of the cooperation required by IAEA to investigate these allegations. IAEA’s  Board of Governors ultimately approved the project in November 2008. The  United States did not attempt to block approval of the project after receiving  assurances that IAEA would monitor the project closely, report as  appropriate, and ensure that any equipment provided under the project would  be used only for the intended purposes.
Finally, in addition to providing assistance to the four countries the United  States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, the TC program has  also provided nuclear technology and expertise to other countries that the  United States has sanctioned or taken other punitive actions against.  Examples of such countries and the total amounts of TC assistance  provided to them from 1997 through 2007 include the following:    Approximately $7.3 million for Burma, which is subject to targeted U.S.  trade, financial, and other sanctions. The Secretaries of State and of  Energy have declared jointly that the development of nuclear  infrastructure of any kind in Burma would be inappropriate. TC projects  have been approved for Burma to improve nuclear instrument repair and  maintenance services, enhance pest control, and apply nondestructive  testing techniques in construction projects.
Approximately $9.7 million for Belarus, which the United States has  characterized as “a regime of repression in the heart of Europe” and  against which the United States has imposed targeted financial sanctions  and travel restrictions. TC support has been provided to assist Belarus in  minimizing threats posed by radioactive waste at former military sites,  establishing a center of competence on radiation oncology, and  remediating areas affected by the Chernobyl accident.
Approximately $6.1 million for Venezuela, which, among other things,  State has determined to be engaging in diplomacy designed to deliberately  undermine U.S. interests, including deepening relations with Iran and  publicly supporting Iran’s nuclear program. IAEA has approved TC  assistance for Venezuela to help it strengthen its technical capabilities in  radiotherapy, nuclear medicine, and radiopharmaceutical services, and to  more effectively apply nuclear techniques in managing water resources.
Based on our review of recent project summaries, the TC assistance  provided to these countries does not appear to involve support that could  have direct weapons applications. However, as we discuss in the following  section, given the dual-use nature of some nuclear technology and the  absence of more complete information from IAEA, it is difficult for the  United States to make firm judgments about the proliferation risks of TC  proposals and projects.
section_title: Non-NPT Countries Are Receiving TC Assistance
paragraphs: U.S. and IAEA officials have described the NPT as the cornerstone of the  international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a key legal barrier to  nuclear weapons proliferation. However, states that are not party to the  NPT—India, Israel, and Pakistan—received approximately $24.6 million in  TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. India has not received TC  assistance through national-level TC projects but has received TC support  as a participant in regional TC projects. Israel and Pakistan have received  support for 63 national-level projects, as well as for regional TC projects.  For example, national TC projects in Israel and Pakistan have included  assistance to control fruit flies and suppress other pests, enhance nuclear  medicine practices and establish radiation physics courses, and improve  nuclear safety. Table 2 shows the total amount of TC assistance provided  to each of these countries from 1997 through 2007.
The TC program does not differentiate between states based on their NPT  status. IAEA officials told us that creation of IAEA predates the entry into  force of the NPT, and treaty membership is not obligatory for IAEA  membership and receipt of TC assistance under the agency’s statute. India,  Israel, and Pakistan joined IAEA before the NPT entered into force.
State officials told us that the United States does not seek to  systematically limit TC program support to countries that are not  signatories to the NPT. State officials also told us that, in accordance with  statutory requirements, State must annually determine and report to  Congress that Israel’s right to participate in IAEA activities is not being  denied. However in its annual funding pledge to IAEA, State asks that  IAEA give preference to states that are party to the NPT in allocating the  U.S. contribution to the TC program.
section_title: IAEA Does Not Condition TC Assistance on the Basis of the Recipient Country’s Safeguards Status
paragraphs: While U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries to  bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional  protocols with IAEA as soon as possible, neither the United States nor  IAEA has sought to limit TC funding to countries that have not  implemented such agreements. Together, these safeguards measures allow  IAEA to provide assurances that all declared nuclear material is being  used for peaceful purposes and that a country has declared all of its  nuclear material and activities.
Nearly all states receiving TC assistance are nonnuclear weapon state  parties to the NPT. Under Article IV of the NPT, all states party to the  treaty have the right to participate in the exchange of equipment,  materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful  uses of nuclear energy. According to IAEA, Article III of the NPT also  makes it mandatory for all nonnuclear-weapon states to conclude  comprehensive safeguards agreements with the agency. These agreements  are to be concluded by such states within 18 months of their accession to  the treaty. The United States and IAEA have recognized an inherent  linkage between nonnuclear weapon states’ rights to access peaceful  nuclear technology and their obligation to accept safeguards on their  nuclear activities, although State officials told us that to limit TC funding  to states that have not completed comprehensive safeguards agreements  with IAEA could be seen as inconsistent with IAEA’s statute.
IAEA has not conditioned TC assistance provided to recipient states on  the basis of their safeguards status. According to our analysis of IAEA  records, 17 countries and territories that did not have comprehensive  safeguards agreements in force with the agency at the end of 2007 received  approximately $6.7 million, or about 7 percent, of the $93.3 million in TC  assistance disbursed in 2007. This list includes three states and one  nonstate territory that are not party to the NPT—India, Israel, Pakistan,  and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. The  remaining 13 states have all been party to the NPT longer than 18  months—in most cases for more than 10 years—meaning they have not  fulfilled their NPT Article III obligation. Table 3 shows the states and  territories that did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in  effect in 2007 and the amounts of TC assistance they received that year.
In addition, we found that 62 states and territories without an additional  protocol agreement in effect with IAEA received approximately $43.2  million, or approximately 46 percent, of TC assistance in 2007. Without  additional protocols in force, IAEA has limited ability to detect clandestine  nuclear programs, and its inspection efforts remain focused on verifying  declared nuclear material, activities, and facilities. Both State and IAEA  officials have asserted that the additional protocol should become the new  universal safeguards standard. Table 4 lists the states and territories  without additional protocols in effect as of the end of 2007 and the  amounts of TC assistance they received that year.
In its annual pledge of funding to the TC program, State asks that IAEA  consider whether a recipient country has in force a comprehensive  safeguards agreement and an additional protocol when it allocates TC  funds. However, according to IAEA officials, IAEA’s Secretariat is not in a  position to take such considerations into account in the absence of a  decision by its policy-making bodies. The Deputy Director General for the  TC program, for example, told us that such guidelines would need to be  developed by the Secretariat after consultation with and approval by the  member states. IAEA officials stated that while IAEA’s statute, TC  program guidance, and TC program agreements with individual member  states include project- and technology-specific safeguards conditions and  peaceful use obligations, these documents do not require that member  states have comprehensive safeguards agreements or additional protocols  in force to receive assistance.
section_title: The United States Faces Difficulties in Identifying, Assessing, and Resolving TC Program Proliferation Concerns
paragraphs: The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult  for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for several  reasons. First, while State has implemented an interagency process to  review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, consistent with the  recommendation in our 1997 report, the effectiveness of these reviews is  limited because IAEA does not provide the United States with sufficient or  timely information on TC proposals. Second, for TC proposals that DOE  and the national laboratories have identified as having possible  proliferation risks, State was unable to provide us with documentation  explaining how those proliferation concerns were addressed. Finally, State  lacks a formal policy that identifies countries from which the United  States will not accept TC fellows, and IAEA does not systematically  monitor former TC fellows to determine whether they still reside in their  home country and are still involved in peaceful nuclear research related to  their fellowship studies.
subsections: section_title: The United States Does Not Comprehensively Evaluate TC Proposals for Proliferation Concerns because IAEA Does Not Provide Sufficient and Timely Information
paragraphs: DOE and the national laboratories began reviewing TC proposals for  possible proliferation concerns and providing their findings to State as the  result of a recommendation in our 1997 report on the TC program.  However, this review process is deficient because DOE and the national  laboratories receive limited information to conduct their proliferation  assessments and have little time to complete them. According to State,  DOE, and national laboratory officials, the United States has had difficulty  in obtaining detailed information on proposed TC projects during the  proposal development phase. The initial proposal development process is  internal to IAEA’s Secretariat and information is kept confidential between  the recipient country and the agency and is not releasable to third parties,  including the United States. According to State, DOE, and national  laboratory officials, IAEA member state representatives, including U.S.  Mission staff, do not have a formal mechanism to obtain information on  project proposals while they are under development.
DOE and national laboratory officials told us that they attempt to make the  best possible determination of TC proposal proliferation risks on the basis  of all available information. However, in the vast majority of cases, the  information they receive on TC proposals is very limited, according to our  analysis of DOE and national laboratory data. Specifically, we found that  national laboratory officials received only the title of proposed projects for  97 percent—or for 1,519 of 1,565—of proposed TC projects they reviewed  from 1998 through 2006. For the remaining 3 percent, or 46 of the  proposed projects, DOE and the national laboratories were able to obtain  some additional information on the proposed projects. See appendix III for  more specific information on the number of TC proposals reviewed by  DOE and the national laboratories from 1998 through 2006.
DOE and national laboratory officials told us that a TC project proposal  title can occasionally raise proliferation concerns but that the title alone is  generally insufficient to reliably assess proliferation risk. Moreover,  proposal titles can be misleading and obscure more serious proliferation  implications. For instance, the 2006 TC proposal from Iran requesting  assistance for the completion of the Arak heavy water research reactor—a  type of reactor that could be a source of plutonium for nuclear weapons— was entitled “Strengthening Safety Capabilities for the Construction of a  Research Reactor.” Iran asserted that the reactor was intended for the  production of medical isotopes, and the proposal was approved for  funding by IAEA’s Secretariat. However, as a result of objections by the  United States and other nations, the Board of Governors ultimately did not  approve this proposal.
In addition to the limited information on TC proposals available to the  national laboratories, the dual-use nature of some nuclear technology also  complicates efforts to assess TC proposals for proliferation risks. IAEA  applies safeguards to nuclear material, equipment, and facilities provided  through the TC program in four “sensitive technological areas”—uranium  enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, heavy water production, and handling  of plutonium and mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. These four areas relate  to the production and handling of fissile material. However, according to  DOE and national laboratory officials, these four sensitive areas do not  address all technologies related to the production of fissile material. For  example, “nonsensitive” technology associated with the design and  operation of civilian, light water power reactors might prove useful to  countries seeking to design and build a plutonium production reactor. TC  projects providing such technology might therefore raise proliferation  concerns. Other “nonsensitive” skills and expertise that states acquire  through TC assistance might provide basic knowledge useful to weapons,  such as radioactive materials handling, familiarity with chemical processes  and properties of nuclear materials, and use of various instruments and  control systems.
Even in cases where more information on TC proposals was obtained,  national laboratory officials told us that they still often lacked crucial  details—such as equipment specifications—to reliably assess the  proliferation risks. As an example, national laboratory officials told us that  some TC proposals could include requests for procurement of “hot cells”  to produce isotopes—a technology with dual-use implications. However,  without specific technical details of the hot cell, it would not be possible  to determine the potential proliferation risks associated with such a  device.
In addition, DOE and national laboratory officials told us that in recent  years, they have received less information about proposed TC projects.  Moreover, DOE and national laboratory officials told us that such  information is arriving closer to the time when such projects must be  approved by the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee and the  Board of Governors. The lack of full and timely information on TC project  proposals complicates efforts by the United States and other IAEA  member states to make informed decisions about TC proposals, including  whether they raise proliferation concerns. State, DOE, and national  laboratory officials told us that it is preferable to raise potential  proliferation concerns about TC proposals with IAEA officials early in the  development cycle, when such project proposals can be modified more  readily.
In 2004, IAEA’s Safeguards Department began reviewing TC projects for  possible proliferation risks. This review process includes evaluating  proliferation risks of TC project proposals and reviewing all procurement  requests made to the agency under ongoing TC projects. However, IAEA  officials told us that the results of the Safeguards Department reviews are  confidential and are not shared with the United States or other  governments. IAEA officials declined to provide us with certain basic  information regarding the results of these reviews, including the total  number of TC proposals that the Safeguards Department identified as  having possible proliferation concerns.
section_title: State Could Not Substantiate How It Addressed TC Proposals Identified by DOE as Having Possible Proliferation Risks
paragraphs: Under the interagency process for reviewing TC proposals for  proliferation concerns, DOE and the national laboratories provide State  with their assessments of the proposals. State, however, was unable to  provide us with documentation describing the actions it took on the basis  of DOE’s and the national laboratories’ findings or how, if at all, it raised  their concerns with IAEA. According to DOE and the national laboratories’  assessment of TC proposals from 1998 through 2006, 43 of the 1,565 TC  proposals reviewed had some degree of potential proliferation concern or  required additional information to more clearly establish potential  proliferation risk. The 43 project proposals for which the national  laboratories raised potential concerns included, for example, projects to  assist countries in various aspects of developing nuclear power reactors  and research reactors, handling nuclear fuel, and using nuclear techniques  in materials testing and other industrial practices.
We found that IAEA approved at least 34 of these 43 proposals. Of the  remaining 9 proposals, 4 were not approved internally by IAEA’s  Secretariat or—in the case of Iran’s 2006 Arak heavy water reactor  proposal—by the Board of Governors, and 5 proposals in 1998 were  reviewed by ORNL in a classified assessment. We did not determine  whether those 5 proposals were approved by IAEA.
We requested information from State’s Office of Multilateral Nuclear and  Security Affairs describing how it responded to DOE’s and the national  laboratories’ findings of potential proliferation concerns among the TC  proposals they reviewed. However, with the exception of documentation  pertaining to U.S. objections on the Iranian heavy water reactor proposal  in 2006, State was unable to provide us with any records documenting  policy discussions or actions it took to address concerns in other TC  proposals highlighted by DOE and the national laboratories. As a result, it  is unclear what actions, if any, State took to address potential proliferation  concerns of specific TC proposals identified by DOE and the national  laboratories. State officials told us that records substantiating discussions  within State on the DOE and national laboratory findings existed but could  not be retrieved from State’s data and document management systems.
State officials told us that a 2005 reorganization of the department’s arms  control and nonproliferation bureaus resulted in the loss of staff in the  office overseeing IAEA issues, limiting its ability to effectively monitor TC  program developments. Specifically, they said that prior to the 2005  reorganization, there were 14 full-time equivalent personnel working on  IAEA- and NPT-related issues, but that this number was reduced to 5 full- time equivalent personnel due to the reassignment and retirement of  personnel following the reorganization.
section_title: U.S. Policies and IAEA Procedures for TC Program Fellowships Have Several Shortcomings
paragraphs: State has not developed a formal policy that identifies countries that  would not be eligible to send TC fellows to the United States to study  nuclear issues. In addition, IAEA does not have a systematic process in  place to track and monitor former TC fellows to determine, for instance,  whether they still reside in their home country and are still involved in  peaceful nuclear research related to their fellowship studies.
The United States accepts TC fellows and TC project participants from  foreign countries. The acceptance process involves several steps. First,  foreign nationals interested in a TC fellowship apply to IAEA’s TC  Department, which reviews the applications and decides which candidates  to accept or reject. IAEA identifies fellows who would be appropriate to  place in the United States for studies. For approved applications, IAEA  then sends a formal request to the U.S. Mission asking that the applicants  be permitted to study in the United States at a specific institute.
The U.S. Mission forwards the applications to State’s Office of Multilateral  Nuclear and Security Affairs within the International Security and  Nonproliferation Bureau and to the Argonne National Laboratory. The  State office reviews and approves or rejects the applications, and shares  them with other members of the U.S. interagency committee on IAEA TC  issues. In addition, State officials told us that foreign nationals requesting  TC fellowships at DOE facilities would be reviewed against requirements  in DOE orders. The Argonne National Laboratory, under a contract with  State, facilitates placement of fellows approved by State at the institutes  proposed by IAEA or at alternative facilities. The applicants are notified by  IAEA of their fellowship’s acceptance by State and placement at institutes  in the United States.
Once the foreign candidates confirm their acceptance, IAEA instructs  them to apply for a U.S. nonimmigrant visa. State’s Bureau of Consular  Affairs handles the adjudication of these visa applications, and in some  cases, the consular officers will request a security advisory opinion,  known as a Visas Mantis, if there are concerns that a visa applicant may  engage in the illegal transfer of sensitive technology. According to State,  the key role of the Visas Mantis process is to protect U.S. national security,  particularly in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass  destruction, their delivery systems, and conventional weapons.
Data provided to us by State indicated that 1,022 TC program fellows have  studied nuclear issues at universities and other organizations in the United  States from 1997 through 2007. In our review of this data, we found that 23  of the 1,022 fellows were from countries that were not NPT member  states, such as Israel and Pakistan, or were from U.S.-designated state  sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria. The fields of study pursued by these  fellows included entomology, soil and plant science, analytical nuclear  physics, and nuclear medicine.
We questioned State and Argonne National Laboratory officials to clarify  the guidance and criteria State’s Office of Multilateral Nuclear and  Security Affairs uses to approve TC fellowship applicants for the study of  nuclear issues in the United States. State officials told us that there is no  formal policy or set of criteria they use to accept or reject TC fellowship  requests on the basis of an applicant’s country of origin. However, in  response to our inquiry, State prepared a written description of the  informal guidelines and preferences it uses to evaluate fellowship  requests. According to this description, individuals from countries that  have not signed the NPT are not eligible to pursue TC fellowships in the  United States, although fellows from Israel and Pakistan were accepted by  the United States as recently as 2002. Individuals from countries that have  signed the NPT, however, may still “be excluded on the basis of such  things as institutional affiliation or previous history or other political  factors such as human rights concerns in such countries.”
The lack of a formal State policy or guidance on this matter has led to  differing views among U.S. officials about the countries of origin from  which State will approve TC fellows. For instance, Argonne National  Laboratory officials told us that they believed State’s policy was to exclude  fellows from any country the United States had designated as a state  sponsor of terrorism. However, the description prepared for us by State  does not explicitly prohibit fellows from such countries. The most recent  TC program fellow to study nuclear issues in the United States from one of  the U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism—Syria—was in 2001.
In addition, the broad nature of the criteria to exclude fellows—including  “other political factors” in their home countries—could leave fellowship  decisions open to State officials’ subjective interpretation. For example,  State officials told us that one country in Asia would no longer be  permitted to send TC fellows to the United States because it is considered  a wealthy, high-income nation, even though the description of the informal  guidelines provided to us by State do not indicate that economic  conditions in a TC fellow’s home country are a basis for rejection.
With regard to IAEA’s management of TC fellows, the agency does not  have a policy to exclude individuals from certain countries from  participating in the TC fellowship program, including individuals from  nations about which the United States has terrorism or proliferation  concerns. For example, in 2007, IAEA approved 48 fellows and scientific  visitors from Cuba, 12 from Iran, 36 from Syria, and 30 from Sudan.  IAEA’s data did not indicate the countries and institutes where these  fellows and scientific visitors pursued their studies.
We also found shortcomings in IAEA oversight of TC fellowships for  potential proliferation concerns—specifically in detecting the possible  involvement of former TC fellows in weapons-related research activities  after they completed their studies abroad. IAEA officials told us that the  agency does not have a systematic process for tracking the status,  whereabouts, and activities of former TC fellows to determine, for  example, if they remain involved in research related to their TC project,  changed institutes, or have immigrated to other countries.
In 2005, however, IAEA officials surveyed fellows from 2001 and 2002 to  determine their current activities and their views on the quality and impact  of the fellowship program. IAEA followed up with a more in-depth survey  of a sample of former fellows from seven countries. IAEA officials told us  that they hope to conduct more analysis of former TC fellows, primarily to  facilitate networking between former fellows and establish lessons learned  for improved implementation of the program, not to determine whether  former TC fellows could be involved in nuclear weapons efforts.
section_title: Long-Term TC Program Effectiveness Is Limited by Outdated Program Metrics, Financial Resource Constraints, and Sustainability Concerns
paragraphs: IAEA faces several limitations in effectively managing the TC program.  Specifically, IAEA has not been able to accurately portray the TC  program’s achievements in meeting the development and other needs of  member states in a meaningful way because it has not updated and revised  the metrics for assessing program results. In addition, the program’s  impact is limited by financial resource constraints, including the failure of  many member states to pay their full share of support to the TCF. Finally,  the TC program’s long-term effectiveness could be undermined by  shortcomings in IAEA efforts to monitor how TC projects have been  sustained and in recent efforts to sustain the TC program overall by  reaching out to new partners and donors.
subsections: section_title: IAEA Lacks Adequate Metrics to Fully Assess TC Program’s Impact
paragraphs: The goal of the TC program is to help member states achieve their  sustainable development needs through the peaceful application of  nuclear energy. However, IAEA has not updated and revised TC program  performance metrics so that it can more accurately track and assess the  program’s overall impact in meeting member states’ needs. Under a 2002  TC program strategy, IAEA established four strategic objectives and 12  performance metrics to assess program performance between 2002 and  2007. These four objectives were (1) establishing greater linkages between  TC projects and national development plans and greater government  commitment and support to projects; (2) expanding strategic partnerships  to improve the TC program’s visibility in resolving development problems;  (3) increasing the level of funding for technical cooperation activities; and  (4) strengthening the capacity of institutions in member states using  nuclear technologies to become more technically and financially self- reliant. The 12 program performance metrics included having TC projects  create an unspecified number of new partnerships with development  organizations and having an increasing number of member states pay their  full target share of funding to the TCF.
IAEA officials declined to provide us with detailed information explaining  how these performance indicators were established or data substantiating  how they were met. However, according to the TC program’s 2006 annual  report summarizing the program’s progress against each indicator, IAEA  met or exceeded 6 of the 12 performance indicators, did not meet 1, could  not measure 1, and did not provide any assessment information on the  remaining 4 performance goals.
The metrics developed for the program in 2002 are not meaningful  indicators of program results and, therefore, do not provide sufficient  information on the program’s progress in meeting the sustainable  development and related needs of member states. For example, the  performance metric on member state contributions to the TCF conveys  information on program management but does not measure fulfillment of  member state needs, such as the number of additional cancer patients  treated or the number of new nuclear safety regulations promulgated.  Similarly, in its 2007 evaluation of TC activities, IAEA’s internal auditor— the Office of Internal Oversight Services—found that the TC program lacks  a robust, consistent process for assessing the effectiveness of TC projects,  particularly after projects are completed.
IAEA officials acknowledged these weaknesses in the 2002 metrics,  recognized they were out of date, and said that they wanted to develop  more effective results-based metrics. However, to date, the TC program  has not developed new program objectives or performance measures. The  officials noted that a new TC information technology system—the  Program Cycle Management Framework—to plan, implement, monitor,  and report on TC projects will eventually collect information to assess  project results against specific goals and metrics. In addition, according to  the 2009-2011 TC program guidelines, the program needs to operate under  results-based management principles and emphasize the importance of  having program objectives and outcomes be linked to performance  metrics to help measure progress in achieving results in technical  cooperation.
IAEA officials told us that implementing a system of results-based metrics  for the TC program faces challenges—particularly in obtaining reliable  baseline information from member states about the scope of the problems  or needs they hope to address by participating in the TC program. Without  such information, they told us, IAEA cannot establish reliable long-term  performance targets. For example, according to a 2007 evaluation by  IAEA’s internal auditor, almost half of the project performance metrics in  the sample of projects it reviewed were not supported with baseline  information and half did not indicate target values.
section_title: Many Member States Do Not Provide Financial Contributions to the TCF and Some High-Income Countries Receive TC Assistance
paragraphs: We found that the TC program faces financial constraints and limitations  due to, among other things, shortfalls in member state payments to the  TCF and high-income nations receiving TC support. IAEA officials told us  that the TC program is underfunded, while IAEA’s Director General has  commented that program resources are insufficient to keep pace with  country requests for support. Although the size of the TCF and overall  level of funding paid by member states have increased in recent years,  many countries that receive TC assistance still do not pay their full share  of support to the TCF that IAEA expects them to contribute. Specifically,  the TCF experienced a funding shortfall in 2007 of $3.5 million, or 4  percent, of the $80 million total target budget because 62 member states  did not pay their full contributions. Of these 62 countries, 47 states made  no payment at all. Appendix IV lists member states and the amounts they  contributed to the TCF in 2007.
In addition, 13 member states that the UN defined as high-income  countries in 2007—including Israel, Portugal, and Saudi Arabia—received  a total of approximately $3.8 million in assistance from the program, or 4  percent of the $93.3 million in total TC disbursements that year.  Recognizing that the emphasis of the TC program is on providing nuclear  assistance to developing countries, IAEA officials told us that it would be  helpful if more developed countries shifted from TC recipients to donors,  which could allow the program to provide greater support to developing  countries. For example, they stated that some member states have helped  ease budget pressures within the TC program by voluntarily reducing the  assistance they receive and gradually becoming donors. However, IAEA  has not sought to formulate guidelines or criteria for determining when  countries should be graduated from further TC assistance, and IAEA  officials have not reached a consensus on how to pursue this matter.  According to the Deputy Director General for the TC program, IAEA does  not seek to retire specific countries from TC support regardless of their  financial or development status. Nevertheless, other IAEA officials told us  that determining program graduation criteria is a good idea. Appendix II  identifies the countries designated by the United Nations in 2007 as high- income and the amount of TCF assistance they received that year.
In addition, IAEA officials told us that broader issues should be considered in  graduating high-income or highly-developed countries from TC assistance.  Specifically, IAEA officials said that developed nations with more experience  on nuclear issues could play a helpful role in providing nuclear expertise to  less-developed nations in the same region. According to IAEA officials, this  could entail reducing national-level TC project support to developed member  states while continuing to provide support to them through regional projects.  These officials also asserted that graduating states is complicated because the  benefits provided by TC assistance keep countries involved in IAEA,  including the safeguards program.
State and U.S. Mission officials told us that State does not have an official  position on graduating member states from TC assistance. However, these  officials said the idea merited consideration and suggested some countries  whose economic wherewithal and level of nuclear development could  justify graduation, including Brazil, China, Russia, and South Korea.
section_title: IAEA Faces Challenges Sustaining the TC Program
paragraphs: IAEA efforts to sustain TC project results and the TC program overall face  several significant limitations and challenges. First, at the project level,  IAEA does not conduct systematic follow-up to verify that member states  are sustaining the results and activities of completed TC projects. IAEA’s  goal in providing technical cooperation is to help countries become  technically and financially self-reliant so that they do not require future  IAEA assistance to sustain peaceful nuclear skills and technologies. The  Deputy Director General of the TC program stated that achieving  sustainability hinges on having member states commit adequate financial  support, infrastructure, and personnel once the project is completed.
IAEA officials told us that the program does assess sustainability potential of  projects in the proposal development phase. As projects are being developed,  IAEA uses a planning tool, known as a “country programme framework,” to  evaluate how TC project proposals contribute to the host country’s national  development priorities and to assess the host government’s likely commitment  to the project. However, we found that IAEA does not systematically review  completed TC projects to verify whether the project results are being sustained  by the recipient country, through government or other support. For example,  the TC program does not conduct any assessments 2, 3, or 5 years past project  completion, to see whether and how a country is maintaining established TC  nuclear technologies and related skills.
Second, IAEA faces challenges in sustaining the TC program over the long  term because TC funding is distributed across 18 different technical  areas—including nuclear power, nuclear security, food and agriculture,  water resources, and human health—making it difficult for IAEA to set  clear TC program priorities and to maximize the impact of limited program  resources. Appendix V provides a complete list of all the technical areas to  which TC program funding was allocated in 2007. Figure 1 shows the  percentage of funds disbursed by project area.
According to U.S. Mission officials, this allocation of TC funding across  multiple technical areas and the absence of clear program priorities  reduces overall program effectiveness. U.S. Mission officials told us that  IAEA should work to consolidate these areas and identify four or five  future TC program priorities. IAEA officials agreed, but told us that they  have little flexibility to set TC program priorities because they must be  responsive to member state needs which vary across countries and  regions. Nevertheless, TC program officials said they are attempting to  promote priority-setting at the project level—for example, by limiting the  number of projects member states were permitted to submit in 2008, and  by moving away from funding mature nuclear technologies that no longer  require development or in which member states have acquired sufficient  capability to sustain on their own.
In addition, in 2007, IAEA initiated a fundamental review of the challenges  and opportunities facing its programs to 2020 and beyond. As part of this  review, IAEA’s Secretariat identified priorities for the TC program and  other IAEA programs. IAEA also convened a Commission of Eminent  Persons to provide recommendations on the future role and activities of  the agency, including the TC program. In its background report to the  commission, IAEA identified future TC priorities in three main areas— disease prevention and control, food safety and security, and sustainable  management of natural resources and ecosystems—with a lesser focus on  a fourth area, industrial process management. However, IAEA officials  told us that the restructuring of TC priorities and implementing other  recommendations from this review would be contingent on the Board of  Governors’ approval.
Finally, IAEA officials told us that meeting member states’ future demands  for TC assistance—especially as interest in nuclear power grows—will  strain program resources and pose a fundamental long-term sustainability  challenge. As a result, IAEA is developing outreach strategies and has  created an outreach team to attract the support and involvement of donor  organizations and new partners—such as the UN Development Program— in the TC program. However, this effort faces several limitations and  shortcomings.
The TC program outreach effort is narrowly focused on attracting donors  and partners involved in international economic and social development.  Although TC program guidance encourages private sector partnerships,  IAEA officials told us that the new partner outreach effort will not extend  to the private sector because they believed the level of effort to establish  such partnerships would outweigh the expected benefits. Furthermore,  while IAEA’s internal auditors have reported on cases where member  states successfully obtained private sector support to sustain TC  projects—thus alleviating the need for further support from IAEA or the  host government—IAEA officials told us that the TC program does not  systematically assess TC proposals with respect to their commercial  potential. IAEA officials told us that member states are not required to  submit information in their TC proposals—such as a market analysis, a  summary of business plans, or potential private sector investors in project  activities—that IAEA could use to evaluate the long-term commercial  prospects of a TC project.
The TC program’s strategy of focusing its outreach primarily on  international development organizations carries risks because IAEA is not  well recognized as a development organization within the broader  development community. According to the Deputy Director General of the  TC Department, the development community largely perceives IAEA as a  nuclear enforcement body and its development contributions are  overlooked or unknown. In addition, some of the previous partnerships  the TC program has built with international development organizations  have been called into question. For example, a 2007 independent  evaluation of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)  concluded that FAO’s long-standing partnership with IAEA on the use of  nuclear techniques in food and agriculture has ceased to yield a high  return on investment and, therefore, recommended that FAO withdraw  future funding from the joint FAO-IAEA unit. Furthermore, according to  the U.S. representative to the Standing Advisory Group on Technical  Assistance and Cooperation, the TC program faces difficulties in building  relationships with development organizations at the project and country  levels because it does not have a presence in the host countries to  promote the program. For example, this representative told us that the  national liaison officers—who serve as intermediaries on TC projects  between IAEA and the host governments and collaborating institutes— tend to be technical specialists who do not understand their country’s  development needs, do not network with other development  organizations, and are not involved in the governmental processes that set  national development plans and priorities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The world today is dramatically different than when IAEA was created  over 50 years ago. Therefore, certain IAEA policies related to the TC  program, as well as the rights, expectations, and obligations of IAEA  member states that are beneficiaries of the program, merit careful  consideration and, as appropriate, re-examination. In our view, TC  proposals should not be evaluated simply on their technical merits in  isolation from political considerations concerning the countries making  the requests, particularly since the assistance in question involves  supplying nuclear equipment, training, and expertise, some of which is  dual-use in nature. In that regard, we believe that State’s policy of not  encouraging IAEA to systematically limit TC projects in countries that are  U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism communicates a mixed  message on the acceptability of transferring nuclear technologies and  expertise to countries the United States has deemed inherently dangerous.
We recognize that the TC program provides IAEA member states that are  developing countries with many benefits and that not every project funded  by the program poses a proliferation risk. However, the United States does  not have the necessary information available on a timely basis to make  sound judgments about the proliferation risks of many of these projects,  particularly in the project proposal development phase. A better system,  with more complete and timely data provided by IAEA, would help ensure  that projects are fully and appropriately vetted by U.S. agencies and those  that pose a potential proliferation risk are identified early in the project  development process. Until that happens, we will continue to have  concerns about the potential proliferation risks posed by TC projects,  particularly those linked to countries of concern.
With greater transparency and earlier information from IAEA on TC  project proposals, the United States government and other countries could  raise and address proliferation concerns with IAEA’s Secretariat before it  endorses projects for approval by the Board of Governors. We are also  concerned by IAEA’s refusal to share information with the United States  and other member states on findings from its internal proliferation reviews  of TC projects. Furthermore, deficiencies in State’s record-keeping on TC  program matters is troubling because we could not determine what, if any,  actions State took to address concerns identified by DOE and the national  laboratories.
Regarding TC fellowships, State has not established a formal policy  governing the approval of TC fellows from foreign countries interested in  studying nuclear issues in the United States. The absence of such a policy  has allowed individuals from non-NPT countries and individuals from  countries that are U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism who obtain  visas to study in the United States and potentially acquire valuable  information. We also believe IAEA should take steps to improve  monitoring of individuals who have completed fellowships, to track their  whereabouts and ongoing research, and to determine if the knowledge and  information they obtained on TC projects is being applied to strictly  peaceful purposes.
Regarding our management concerns associated with the TC program, we  believe that all member states receiving TC support should provide their  full contribution to the TCF. We also question the need to provide TC  assistance to high-income countries that have the apparent economic  means to finance their nuclear research and development needs  independently. In our view, IAEA could enhance the impact of its limited  resources by developing and applying reasonable “means testing” criteria  in future allocation of TC funding and consider ways in which high-income  countries can be graduated from continued TC assistance. In addition, the  metrics IAEA has used to track TC program performance do not provide  the United States and other member states with sufficient information on  the TC program’s overall value. Development of more meaningful results- based performance measures could allow IAEA to more effectively  demonstrate the TC program’s impact.
Finally, IAEA could enhance the impact of the TC program’s limited  resources by formally setting priorities for future TC funding, as well as  identifying areas that are less urgent because of the availability of mature  nuclear technologies and other donors. In terms of IAEA’s outreach to  potential new TC donors, we believe that the private sector could be a  crucial partner in supporting the TC program generally and in sustaining  the results of TC projects so that member states can become technically  and financially less dependent on IAEA. In our view, IAEA should also  assess TC proposals not only for technical feasibility and host government  support, but also for potential private sector support to sustain project  activities and results.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: If Congress wishes to make known that the United States does not support  IAEA’s policy of permitting TC projects in countries that State has  designated as state sponsors of terrorism, or other countries where other  concerns persist, it could explicitly require—as it currently does with  Cuba and has done in the past with Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under  the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority—that State withhold a  proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary contribution to the TC program  that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF funding that would otherwise be  made available to these countries. Alternatively, if Congress wishes to  obtain additional information before making this decision, it could require  State to report to Congress explaining its rationale for not withholding a  proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated  state sponsors of terrorism.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To address the range of proliferation and management concerns related to  the TC program, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working with  IAEA and member states through the Board of Governors, explore  undertaking the following eight actions:    Establish a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely  information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United  States and other countries—including detailed information on the TC  proposals themselves, as well as the results of IAEA’s internal  proliferation reviews of the proposals—so that proliferation and other  concerns can be identified and addressed early in the project development  cycle.
Promote a regular and systematic process for obtaining, retaining, and  updating information on prior TC project fellows to better track where and  how the knowledge and expertise they have obtained is being applied.
Strengthen the TC program’s mechanisms for collecting member states’  contributions to the TCF to include withholding from nonpaying states a  percentage of TC assistance equivalent to the percentage of their target  rate that they fail to contribute to the TCF.
Establish criteria for determining when member states, especially those  defined as high-income countries, no longer need TC assistance in  particular fields and when such states could be graduated from further TC  support altogether.
Seek to implement new results-based performance metrics for the TC  program that establish specific national, regional, and interregional social  and economic needs and measure the collective impact of TC projects in  meeting those objectives.
Focus the TC program on a more limited number of high-priority technical  areas to maximize the impact of program resources.
Encourage the TC program to reach out to private sector entities as part of  its new partner and donor development strategy.
Request member states to assess in their TC project proposals the  prospects for commercialization of and private sector investment in the  results of the projects. Such steps could include requiring information in  the proposals on potential business plans, marketing strategies, and  strategies for attracting commercial partners once IAEA support has  concluded.
Finally, to clarify and improve U.S. oversight of the TC program, we  recommend that the Secretary of State undertake the following two  actions:    Enhance record-keeping and formally document management actions  regarding the discussion, action, and disposition of TC project proposals  that DOE and the national laboratories identify as having potential  proliferation concerns.
Issue formal guidance with well-defined criteria—such as countries  designated by State as sponsors of terrorism or gross human rights  violators—that State should use as the basis for approving or rejecting TC  fellowship requests for nuclear studies in the United States. This guidance  could include, among other things, a list of specific countries from which  State would not approve TC fellows that could be updated and revised  annually, or as other circumstances warrant.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State and DOE for formal comment.  We also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of facts contained in the  draft report. State provided written comments on the draft report, which  are presented in appendix VI. DOE and IAEA provided technical  comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
State strongly opposed the matter for congressional consideration to  require State to withhold a proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary  contribution to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF  funding that would otherwise be made available to U.S.-designated state  sponsors of terrorism and or other countries of concern. State objected for  a number of reasons, contending that (1) it would be counterproductive to  a separate recommendation we made in the report encouraging all states  to pay their full share to the TCF; (2) it would not stop TC projects in  targeted countries because TCF funding is fungible; (3) Congress has  exempted IAEA contributions from this type of proportionate withholding;  (4) none of the TC projects in state sponsors of terrorism have been  shown to have contributed to a WMD program; (5) there are adequate  safeguards within IAEA’s Secretariat to prevent TC projects from  contributing to a WMD program; and (6) it would negatively impact the  ability of the United States to achieve other critical objectives within  IAEA.
We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is unique or  unprecedented. As we noted in our report, U.S. law currently requires the  withholding of a proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF  for certain projects in Cuba, and has required withholding in the past for  Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian  Authority. However, in order to give Congress greater flexibility and more  information, we have broadened the matter for congressional  consideration to give Congress the option of requiring State to report on  its rationale for not withholding a proportionate share of the U.S.  contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism.
Notwithstanding our modification to the matter for congressional  consideration, we still disagree with State’s specific objections to it for the  following reasons:    We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is  counterproductive to our recommendation to strengthen mechanisms for  collecting member state contributions to the TCF. That recommendation is  geared toward strengthening mechanisms for collecting contributions to  the TCF from member states that are receiving TC assistance. The United  States is the largest donor to the TC program, providing approximately 25  percent of the TCF annual budget, and is not a beneficiary of TC  assistance.
While contributions to the TCF are fungible, we believe there is a  fundamental principle at stake. As we described in our report, the United  States has applied several types of sanctions limiting foreign assistance  and trade to states it has designated as sponsors of terrorism and to other  countries. To avoid the appearance of an inconsistent approach and to  foster greater cohesion in U.S. policy toward such nations, we believe that  it is fair for Congress to consider requiring State to withhold a share of the  U.S. contribution to the TCF for program activities in countries that the  United States chooses not to engage directly in trade, assistance, and other  forms of cooperation.
We are aware that in 1994 U.S. contributions to IAEA were exempted from  the law requiring State to withhold proportionate shares of funding to  international organizations for programs in certain countries. However, we  note that the IAEA exemption was enacted in 1994. In our view, the  proliferation concerns about some countries receiving TC assistance— such as Iran and Syria—have increased rather than diminished since that  time. Furthermore, we note that since the enactment of the 1994  exemption, the law has been further amended to require State to withhold  a proportionate share of funding to IAEA for certain projects in Cuba and  for all projects in Iran if State determines that such projects in Iran are  inconsistent with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will  provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to the development of  nuclear weapons, or are being used as a cover for the acquisition of  sensitive nuclear technology.
We do not believe that State can assert with confidence that TC projects  have not contributed to WMD programs in state sponsors of terrorism. The  absence of evidence showing that TC projects have assisted nuclear  weapons development in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism does  not, in our view, constitute proof that such countries have not exploited  TC assistance to advance possible weapons development skills and  activities. Based on findings in our report—including the limited  information available to DOE and the national laboratories on TC projects  and the inherent dual-use nature of some nuclear expertise and  technology—we believe it is difficult to say with confidence that TC  projects are not contributing indirectly to weapons-related knowledge and  expertise in such countries.
We do not have the same level of confidence as State in the safeguards  within IAEA’s Secretariat to prevent TC projects from contributing to  weapons development.  As we stated in the report, we were unable to  assess the effectiveness of IAEA’s internal process for reviewing TC  proposals and projects for proliferation concerns because IAEA’s  Secretariat declined to provide us with basic information and  documentation regarding the results of its reviews. Furthermore, as  described in the report, IAEA’s Secretariat approved at least one TC  project proposal—involving the Iranian heavy water reactor at Arak—that  State later objected to.
Finally, neither we nor State can conclude with certainty how other states  might react to an increase in the United States’ proportionate withholding  of funding to the TCF and how this would affect U.S. ability to achieve  other objectives within the agency.
State agreed with 7 of our 10 recommendations to improve TC program  management and oversight. It neither agreed nor disagreed with the three  other recommendations that called on State, working with IAEA and  member states through the Board of Governors, to explore (1) establishing  a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely information  sharing on TC proposals between IAEA, the United States, and other  countries; (2) strengthening TC program mechanisms for collecting  member state contributions to the TCF, including withholding a  percentage of TC assistance to recipient countries that fail to pay their  target contribution; and (3) establishing criteria for determining when  member states no longer require TC assistance and could be graduated  from further TC support.
Regarding the recommendation concerning the establishment of a formal  mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely information sharing on TC  project proposals between IAEA and the United States and other  countries, State noted that it would be difficult to implement through  IAEA’s Board of Governors because TC proposals are considered  confidential between IAEA and the recipient state. State commented that a  more achievable goal could be to work with IAEA to ensure that it  publishes a complete listing of project proposals earlier. Because TC  projects can involve transfer of equipment, technology, and expertise that  could potentially contribute to nuclear weapons development, we  continue to believe that TC proposals demand the highest level of scrutiny,  transparency, and information sharing. We question why details of TC  proposals are considered confidential, and believe the United States and  other major donors should have a full understanding of the proposals that  they are being asked to support through their TCF contributions. Finally,  as noted in the report, we found that the quantity of information about TC  proposals currently available to DOE and the national laboratories is  insufficient in many cases—especially in cases where DOE and the  national laboratories obtained only lists of proposal titles—to make  accurate determinations of potential proliferation risks. It is unclear  whether State’s suggestion to work with IAEA to publish the complete  listing of proposed projects earlier would result in sufficient details being  provided to DOE and the national laboratories to allow them to more  reliably assess proliferation risks.
On our recommendation to strengthen the mechanisms for collecting  member state contributions to the TCF, State commented that the rate of  payment to the TCF by member states has improved in recent years.  However, as we noted in the report, many states receiving assistance are  still not paying their full share of contributions to the TCF. We believe  there is room for continued improvement and that mechanisms should  continue to be strengthened toward that end. We believe the  recommendation is sound and should be implemented.
Finally, concerning the recommendation to establish criteria for  determining when member states no longer require further TC assistance  and could be graduated from further TC support, State observed that a  proposal for graduating higher-income TC recipient states based on their  per capita gross national product was put forward in 1997. State noted that  one member state objected to graduating countries based solely on such  criteria. We recognize the political and practical challenges of  implementing a graduation strategy for member states receiving TC  assistance. However, as noted in our report, both State and IAEA officials  supported the principle of graduating countries that no longer require TC  assistance. Moreover, our recommendation does not identify specific  graduation criteria or specify that a member state’s income ranking be the  sole factor to serve as the basis for graduating a state from further TC  support.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees and Members of Congress, the Secretary of  State, and the Secretary of Energy. In addition, this report will be available  at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To review the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Technical  Cooperation (TC) program we assessed the (1) extent to which the United  States and IAEA have policies limiting member states’ participation in the  TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2)  extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC  projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) limitations and challenges in  IAEA’s management of the TC program. We employed several  methodologies to address these objectives.
Our review of the TC program covered the years 1997 through 2007. We  chose this period because our previous report on the TC program reported  on TC programmatic and financial data through 1996. We interviewed key  officials and analyzed documentation, such as cables, presentations,  financial information, and reports and analyses of TC program issues from  the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE). State officials also  provided us with relevant IAEA documentation and information, such as  copies of IAEA’s annual “white books” identifying TC projects approved  by IAEA, as well as information on specific TC projects from IAEA’s “TC- PRIDE” database. We also interviewed officials in the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission’s Office of International Programs who participate in U.S.  interagency meetings on IAEA TC issues. In addition, we met with  representatives from five national laboratories involved in the DOE  Interdiction Technical Analysis Group, a multilaboratory team providing  DOE with technical analysis of proliferation-related issues, including the  TC program. We also visited the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to  obtain documentation and interview current and former ORNL staff  involved in previous and ongoing assessments of TC proposals and active  projects for potential proliferation concerns. In addition, we visited the  Argonne National Laboratory to interview representatives who provide  support and analytical services to State on TC issues, organize training  seminars for foreign nationals involved in TC projects, and facilitate TC  fellowships for foreign nationals to study nuclear issues in the United  States.
We also interviewed officials at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria,  including representatives from the TC Department and other IAEA  departments, including the Departments of Management, Safeguards, and  Nuclear Safety and Security; the Office of Internal Oversight Services; and  the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination. We reviewed and  analyzed information provided by IAEA officials, including presentation  slides, annual reports, internal and external auditor reports, and TC  project brochures. We also reviewed speeches and other statements by  IAEA officials on the TC program and related IAEA issues. IAEA officials  provided us with data on the number of TC projects by year, country, and  technical area, as well as financial information on the TC program over the  past decade. We interviewed knowledgeable IAEA officials on the  reliability of these data, including issues such as data entry, access, quality  control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  review.
Furthermore, we interviewed officials at the U.S. Mission to International  Organizations in Vienna (U.S. Mission) regarding TC program policies and  processes. We also met with officials from the Canadian Permanent  Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna who work on IAEA  issues to gain their perspectives on the TC program. We also conducted  interviews with several nongovernmental experts who have monitored  IAEA and developments in the TC program, and met with and obtained  documentation from the U.S. representative to IAEA’s Standing Advisory  Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation.
We discussed U.S. and IAEA policies and criteria with State and IAEA  officials on the extent to which countries are limited from receiving TC  assistance because of proliferation and related concerns. We also  reviewed (1) speeches, articles, and other statements made by IAEA  officials; (2) annual State reports to Congress on IAEA assistance provided  to some states that the United States has identified as countries of  concern; (3) speeches and statements by U.S. officials; and (4) cables  between State and the U.S. Mission outlining U.S. policy toward the TC  program. We obtained and analyzed the lists of countries that (1) are  designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, (2) are  party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),  and (3) have comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional  protocols in force with IAEA. We cross-referenced each of these lists  against IAEA financial records to determine how much TC support has  been provided to countries that the United States has listed as state  sponsors of terrorism, are not party to the NPT, or do not have  comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements in force with  IAEA.
To assess the extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and  monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns, we interviewed State and  DOE officials regarding their TC program review processes. We also  interviewed representatives from five of the U.S. national laboratories  involved in past and current evaluations of TC proposals and projects for  proliferation concerns. Through DOE, we obtained and analyzed  information from ORNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to  determine the numbers of TC proposals the national laboratories reviewed  each year between 1998 and 2006. We reviewed and verified these data  with DOE and the national laboratory officials, and discussed and verified  the proliferation risks DOE and the national laboratory officials identified  in specific TC proposals. We used IAEA records of approved TC projects  to determine whether TC proposals that the national laboratories had  identified as having possible proliferation risks were approved by IAEA.  Because of IAEA policies that restricted our access to data and related  information on TC proposal and project reviews by IAEA’s Safeguards  Department, we were unable to assess the effectiveness of IAEA’s internal  review of TC proposals and projects for proliferation concerns.
To determine the challenges and limitations in IAEA’s management of the  TC program, we interviewed officials from State, Argonne National  Laboratory, and IAEA, as well as the U.S. representative to IAEA’s  Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation. We  obtained and reviewed relevant IAEA documentation addressing TC  program metrics, such as TC program guidance and strategy documents,  IAEA internal audit reports, and meeting reports by IAEA’s Technical  Assistance and Cooperation Committee. To assess financial resource  challenges facing the TC program, we analyzed financial data from TC  program annual reports between 1997 and 2007—including annual budgets  of the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), annual contributions by  member states to the TCF, and amounts of annual TC assistance provided  to recipient countries and territories—to determine the level of funding  countries contributed to the TCF and the amounts some countries  received from the TC program over the past decade. We used the United  Nation’s (UN) annual Human Development Reports to determine country  income classifications. For each country, we cross-referenced TC financial  data against country income classifications to determine the amounts of  funding countries designated by the UN as “high-income” contributed to  and received from the TC program. Additionally, we reviewed TC program  annual reports to determine the technical areas covered and funded by the  program.
As initially agreed with your office, we intended to assess the extent to  which TC projects have contributed to the safety and security of nuclear  installations around the world. Toward that end, using data provided by  State from IAEA’s TC-PRIDE database, identifying all TC projects funded  in the nuclear security and safety fields since 1997, we developed a  judgmental sample of 22 TC projects (17 national projects and 5 regional  projects) to serve as the basis for our assessment and interviews with  relevant IAEA officials. We selected this judgmental sample by focusing on  projects completed since 2005. Using the data provided by State, we  calculated the average cost of national-level nuclear security and safety  projects completed since that time and selected the 17 projects that  exceeded this average cost. The 5 regional projects in our judgmental  sample were selected by identifying the highest budget project in each of  the five TC program regions completed since 2005. We briefed IAEA  officials on our project selection methodology, and they agreed that it was  fair and unbiased. However, IAEA officials declined to make additional  information available to us on these projects and did not provide us with  an opportunity to interview relevant IAEA officials who oversaw these  projects to discuss their impact and results. As a result of these restrictive  policies, we were unable to sufficiently assess the TC program’s  contributions to improving the safety and security of nuclear facilities  around the world.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation Assistance Recipient States and Territories
subsections: section_title: Total 2007 TC funding received
paragraphs: IAEA  member  state?
U.S.- designated  state sponsor  of terrorism?
NPT  state  party?
Comprehensive  safeguards  agreement in force?
Additional  protocol in  force?
IAEA  member  state?
U.S.- designated  state sponsor  of terrorism?
NPT  state  party?
Comprehensive  safeguards  agreement in force?
Additional  protocol in  force?
IAEA  member  state?
U.S.- designated  state sponsor  of terrorism?
NPT  state  party?
Comprehensive  safeguards  agreement in force?
Additional  protocol in  force?
IAEA  member  state?
U.S.- designated  state sponsor  of terrorism?
NPT  state  party?
Comprehensive  safeguards  agreement in force?
Additional  protocol in  force?
IAEA  member  state?
U.S.- designated  state sponsor  of terrorism?
NPT  state  party?
Comprehensive  safeguards  agreement in force?
Additional  protocol in  force?
As nuclear-weapon states, China and Russia are not obligated under the NPT to accept  comprehensive safeguards on their nuclear activities.
section_title: Appendix III: Numbers of Technical Cooperation Proposals Reviewed by U.S. National Laboratories, Categorized by Level of Proliferation Risk, by Year, 1998 through 2006
section_title: Appendix IV: 2007 Member State Contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund
section_title: Appendix V: 2007 Technical Cooperation Disbursements, by Agency Program
subsections: section_title: Executive management, policy-making and coordination
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Glen Levis (Assistant Director),  Eugene Gray, Simon Hirschfeld, and William Hoehn made key  contributions to this report. Other technical assistance was provided by  Jeffrey Phillips, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, Jay Smale, and Jeanette  Soares.