World Trade Center: Preliminary Observations on EPA's Second Program to Address Indoor Contamination
Published: 2007-06-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster site. As the towers collapsed, Lower Manhattan was blanketed with building debris and combustible materials. This complex mixture created a major concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. In May 2002, New York City formally requested federal assistance to address indoor contamination. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and test program from 2002 to 2003. Several years later, after obtaining the views of advisory groups, including its Inspector General and an expert panel, EPA announced a second test and clean program in December 2006. Program implementation is to begin later in 2007, more than 5 years after the disaster. GAO's testimony, based on preliminary work evaluating EPA's development of its second program, addresses (1) EPA's actions to implement recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector General, (2) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its second plan, and (3) EPA's assessment of available resources to conduct the program. We discussed the issues we address in this statement with EPA.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: EPA has taken some actions to incorporate recommendations from the Inspector General and expert panel members into its second program, but its decision not to incorporate other recommendations may limit the overall effectiveness of this program. For example, EPA's second program incorporates recommendations to expand the list of contaminants it tests for, and to test for contaminants in dust as well as the air. However, it does not incorporate a recommendation to expand the boundaries of cleanup to better ensure that WTC contamination is addressed in all locations. EPA reported that it does not have a basis for expanding the boundaries because it cannot distinguish between normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA did not begin examining methods for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until nearly 3 years after the disaster, and therefore the process for finding distinctions was more difficult. In addition, EPA's second program does not incorporate recommendations to sample heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. According to EPA's plan, the agency chose to offer limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common areas rather than provide more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs) in a smaller number of these areas. EPA's second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of its first program. EPA concluded that a "very small" number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not explain that this conclusion was to be expected because it took over 80 percent of the samples after residences were professionally cleaned. Without this additional information, residents who could have participated might have opted not to do so because of EPA's conclusion. EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources for the second program. EPA stated that it plans to spend $7 million on this program, which is not based on any assessment of costs, but is the funding remaining from the first program. Without careful planning for future disasters, timely decisions about data collection, and thorough communication of sampling results, an evaluation of the adequacy of cleanup efforts may be impossible.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of our  ongoing work on the development of the Environmental Protection  Agency’s (EPA) second program to address World Trade Center (WTC)  indoor contamination. As you know, the September 11, 2001, terrorist  attack on the World Trade Center turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster  site, on a scale the nation had never experienced. The World Trade Center  was a complex of seven buildings on 16 acres surrounding a 5-acre plaza in  Lower Manhattan. The twin towers were at the center of the complex.  Each tower had 110 floors, with approximately 43,200 square feet on each  floor. As the towers collapsed, Lower Manhattan was blanketed in a  mixture of building debris and combustible materials that coated building  exteriors and streets, as well as the interiors of apartments and offices.  This complex mixture gave rise to another major concern: that thousands  of residents and workers in the area would now be exposed to known  hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and  pulverized concrete.
On the day of the attacks, the President signed a major disaster  declaration, which activated the Federal Response Plan. The Federal  Response Plan, now replaced by the National Response Plan, established  the process and structure for the federal government’s assistance to state  and local agencies when responding to any major disaster or emergency  declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency  Assistance Act (Stafford Act). In May 2002, after numerous cleanup, dust  collection, and air monitoring activities were conducted outdoors by EPA,  other federal agencies, New York City and New York State, New York City  formally requested federal assistance to clean and/or test residences in the  vicinity of the WTC site for airborne asbestos.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administered  the Federal Response Plan, provided such assistance, entering into  interagency agreements with EPA in 2002 to develop EPA’s first program.
This program allowed residents of Lower Manhattan living south of Canal  Street (representing over 20,000 residences) to elect to have their home  professionally cleaned, followed by testing, or to have their home tested  only. Approximately 20 percent of the eligible residences participated in  the program. The majority of these residences were professionally cleaned  before they were sampled for asbestos because their owners selected the  clean and test option rather than the test only option. Even though  samples were collected after cleaning in most cases, some residences (less  than 1 percent) were still found to have unsafe levels of asbestos.
EPA’s first program was criticized by several entities; as a result, EPA  developed a second program, which is the focus of our ongoing work and  our testimony today. Let me provide some information on the events  leading up to the second program.
In August 2003, EPA’s Inspector General made recommendations that  addressed EPA’s initial efforts to clean up indoor contamination following  the towers’ collapse, as well as recommendations that focused on EPA’s  future preparedness for large-scale disasters resulting in indoor  contamination. The Inspector General reported that the effort to clean up  indoor WTC contamination was inadequate for multiple reasons. For  example, according to the Inspector General, the WTC cleanup did not  require that entire buildings be systematically cleaned, including heating,  ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. As a result, the  Inspector General concluded, the contaminants in uncleaned apartments  and common areas could enter the air supply system and re-contaminate  cleaned spaces. With regard to future preparedness, the Inspector General  recommended, among other things, that EPA develop protocols for  determining how indoor environmental contamination would be handled  in the event of a future disaster.
The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) indicated in  October 2003 that EPA would organize and lead an expert technical review  panel to address the concerns of the Inspector General and others. In  March 2004, EPA convened the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel,  which met periodically through December 2005. The panel was composed  of 20 individuals from academia and from city and federal health and  science agencies, such as the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety  and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Department of Health and  Human Services (HHS). It also included two representatives from the  Community-Labor Coalition (CLC), which is a network of community,  tenant, labor, and environmental organizations formed after September 11,  2001, to advocate for appropriate health and safety efforts in the recovery  from the WTC attack. The panel’s overall task, as outlined by CEQ, was to  advise EPA on efforts to protect New York City residents and workers  potentially affected by the collapse of the World Trade Center.  Specifically, the panel’s goals were to help guide EPA in (1) identifying any  remaining risks using exposure and health surveillance information; (2)  identifying any unmet public health needs; and (3) determining steps to  further minimize the risks. In addition, the panel was asked to provide  advice for EPA’s second program. Panel members, including the CLC  representatives, submitted individual recommendations to EPA.
After obtaining the views of advisory groups, including the Inspector  General, the expert panel, and the CLC, EPA announced its plan for a  second program in December 2006. This 2006 plan targets residents and  building owners in the same portion of Lower Manhattan as EPA’s first  program. In the 2006 plan, EPA also provided the results of the sampling  from its first program. The second program is set to begin later in 2007. As  of May 10, 2007, EPA told us, 295 residents and building owners had  enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,166 eligible participants  in the first program. Figure 1 shows the chronology of events preceding  the second program.
Our testimony, which is based on our ongoing work evaluating EPA’s  development of its second program, discusses (1) EPA’s actions to  implement recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector  General, (2) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public  in its second plan, and (3) EPA’s assessment of available resources to  conduct the program.
In summary, while we found that EPA has taken some actions to  incorporate recommendations from the Inspector General and expert  panel members into its second program, it decided ’not to incorporate  other recommendations, which may limit the program’s overall  effectiveness. For example, EPA’s second program incorporates  recommendations to expand the number of contaminants tested, from  asbestos only, to three additional contaminants and to test in dust as well  as in the air. However, EPA’s program does not incorporate a  recommendation to expand the boundaries of cleanup to north of Canal  Street and to Brooklyn. EPA reported that it was unable to develop a  method for distinguishing between normal urban dust and WTC dust;  therefore, the agency reported that it cannot assess the extent of WTC  contamination, and has no basis for expanding the cleanup effort. EPA did  not begin examining methods for differentiating between normal urban  dust and WTC dust until May 2004—nearly 3 years after the disaster—and  therefore the process for differentiating was more difficult. In addition,  EPA’s second program does not incorporate recommendations to sample  in HVACs or “inaccessible” locations within apartments and common  areas, such as behind dishwashers. The agency chose to offer more limited  testing in a greater number of apartments and common areas rather than  to provide more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs) in a smaller  number of these areas. Testing in such a restricted manner make  evaluating the adequacy of clean up efforts very difficult, and may  discourage participation. Moreover, this program does not incorporate the  recommendation to test workplaces because, according to EPA officials,  other federal agencies have procedures to address worker safety. We  discussed the issues we address in this statement with EPA.
EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan to allow the  public to make informed choices about their participation. Specifically,  EPA did not fully disclose the limitations in the testing results from its first  program. EPA concluded that a “very small” number of samples from its  first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. However, EPA  did not explain that this conclusion was to be expected because it took  over 80 percent of the samples after residences were professionally  cleaned. In addition, EPA did not fully explain that its conclusion was  based on participation from only 20 percent of the eligible residences.  Without this additional information, residents who could have elected to  participate might have been discouraged from doing so because of EPA’s  conclusion.
EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources to carry out its  second program effectively. Instead of assessing the costs of carrying out  its program and providing resources accordingly, EPA has simply  identified how much money was left over from the first program. Further,  the amount of funding provided for the second program seems  inconsistent with the scale of second program activities. Specifically, the  $7 million EPA plans to spend for the second program’s testing and  cleaning is less than 20 percent of the first program’s funding, despite an  increase in the number and type of contaminants being sampled. EPA  indicated that if demand had exceeded available resources, EPA would  have simply limited participation in the program.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: After the collapse of the World Trade Center and the accompanying spread  of dust resulting from the collapse, EPA, other federal agencies, and New  York City and New York State public health and environmental authorities  focused on numerous outdoor activities, including cleanup, dust  collection, and air monitoring. In May 2002, New York City formally  requested federal assistance to clean and test building interiors in the  vicinity of the WTC site for airborne asbestos. Such assistance may be  made available to state and local governments under the Stafford Act and  the National Response Plan, which establishes the process and structure  for the federal government to provide assistance to state and local  agencies when responding to threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters,  and other emergencies. FEMA, which coordinates the federal response to  requests for assistance from state and local governments, entered into  interagency agreements with EPA to develop and implement the first and  second indoor cleanup programs for residents in Lower Manhattan.
section_title: EPA Incorporated Some Recommendations, but Its Decision Not to Adopt Others May Limit the Second Program’s Effectiveness
paragraphs: In response to recommendations from the Inspector General and expert  panel members, EPA’s second program incorporates some additional  testing elements. For example, EPA is testing for a wider range of  contaminants. In addition to asbestos, EPA will test for man-made vitreous  fibers, which are in such materials as building and appliance insulation;  lead; and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, a group of over 100 different  chemicals that are formed during the incomplete burning of coal, oil, gas,  and garbage. EPA will also test dust as well as the air. In order to test the  dust for these contaminants, EPA had to develop cleanup standards.  However, EPA’s second program does not incorporate the following other  recommendations: (1) broadening the geographic scope of the testing  effort, (2) testing HVACs and “inaccessible” locations, and (3) expanding  the program to include workplaces.
Broadening the geographic scope of testing. EPA did not expand the  scope of testing north of Canal Street, as well as to Brooklyn, as advisory  groups had recommended. EPA reported that it did not expand the scope  of testing because it was not able to differentiate between normal urban  dust and WTC dust, which would have enabled it to determine the  geographic extent of WTC contamination. Some expert panel members  had suggested that EPA investigate whether it was feasible to develop a  method for distinguishing between normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA  ultimately agreed to do so. Beginning in 2004—almost 3 years after the  disaster—EPA conducted this investigation. EPA officials told us that  because so much time had passed since the terrorist attack, it was difficult  to distinguish between WTC dust and urban dust. EPA ultimately  abandoned this effort because peer reviewers questioned its methodology;  EPA decided not to explore alternative methods that the peer reviewers  had proposed. Instead, EPA will test only in an area where visible  contamination has been confirmed by aerial photography conducted soon  after the WTC attack. However, aerial photography does not reveal indoor  contamination, and EPA officials told us that they knew that some WTC  dust was found immediately after the terrorist attacks outside the area  eligible for its first and second program, such as in Brooklyn.
Testing HVACs and in inaccessible areas. In its November 2005 draft plan  for the second program, EPA had proposed collecting samples from a  number of locations in HVACs. In some buildings HVACs are shared, and  in others each residence has its own system. In either case, contaminants  in the HVAC could re-contaminate the residence unless the system is also  professionally cleaned. However, EPA’s second program will not provide  for testing in HVACs unless tests in common areas reveal that standards  for any of four contaminants have been exceeded. EPA explains in the  second plan that it will not sample within HVACs because it chose to offer  more limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common areas  rather than provide more comprehensive testing in a smaller number of  these areas. Similarly, EPA had proposed sampling for contaminants in  “inaccessible” locations, such as behind dishwashers and rarely moved  furniture within apartments and common areas. Again, because it was  unable to differentiate between normal urban dust and WTC dust, EPA  stated that it would not test in inaccessible locations in order to devote its  resources to as many requests as possible. In fact, EPA only received 295  requests from residents and building owners to participate in the second  program, compared with 4,166 eligible participants in the first program.
Expanding the program to include workers/workplaces. According to  EPA’s second program plan, the plan is “the result of ongoing efforts to  respond to concerns of residents and workers.” Workers were concerned  that workplaces in Lower Manhattan experienced the same contamination  as residences. In its second program, EPA will test and clean common  areas in commercial buildings, but will do so only if an individual property  owner or manager requests the service. EPA stated that employees who  believe their working conditions are unsafe as a result of WTC dust may  file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s National  Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. Concerns remain, however,  because these other agencies do not have the authority to conduct cleanup  in response to contaminant levels that exceed standards. In addition,  OSHA’s standards are designed primarily to address airborne  contamination, while EPA’s test and clean program is designed to address  contamination in building spaces, whether the contamination is airborne  or in settled dust. Thus, OSHA can require individual employers to adopt  work practices to reduce employee exposure to airborne contaminants,  whereas EPA’s test and clean program is designed to remove  contaminants from affected spaces.
section_title: EPA Did Not Provide the Public With Sufficient Information to Make Fully Informed Decisions
paragraphs: EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan so that the  public could make informed choices about their participation. Specifically,  EPA did not fully disclose the limitations in the testing results from its first  program. While EPA stated that the number of samples in its first program  exceeding risk levels for airborne asbestos was “very small,” it did not  fully explain that this conclusion was limited by the following factors.
Participation. Participation in the program came from about 20 percent of  the residences eligible for participation. In addition, participation was  voluntary, which may suggest that the sample of apartments was not  representative of all the residences eligible for the program. Those who  chose to participate may not have been at greatest risk.
Contaminants tested. EPA’s cleanup decisions were based only on tests  for asbestos, rather than other contaminants, and the decisions focused on  airborne contamination rather than contamination in dust inside  residences.
Sampling protocol. EPA took over 80 percent of the samples after  professional cleaning was complete. Therefore it is not surprising that  EPA found few samples exceeding its asbestos standard.
EPA also did not explain in its second program plan that its first program’s  test results excluded samples that were discarded because they were “not  cleared”—that is, could not be analyzed because the filter had too many  fibers to be analyzed under a microscope. However, EPA’s final report on  its first program stated that residences with more than one inconclusive  result, such as filter overload, were encouraged to have their residences  re-cleaned and re-tested. EPA did not explain the impact of excluding  these samples or other data limitations from its conclusion that the  number of samples exceeding asbestos standards was very small. Without  providing complete explanations of the data, residents who could have  elected to participate might have been discouraged from doing so.
section_title: EPA Did Not Adequately Assess Resource Needs for the Second Program
paragraphs: EPA did not take steps to ensure that resources would be adequate to  achieve the second program’s objectives. Instead, EPA is implementing  this program with the funding remaining after its first program— approximately $7 million. EPA could not provide us with any basis for  determining whether this funding level is appropriate. EPA officials told us  that they were unable to determine the cost of the program without  knowing the number of participants. However, we note that funds  available for the second program are less than 20 percent of the first  program’s funding, despite an increase in the number and type of  contaminants being sampled.
Almost two-thirds of the panel members told us they did not believe the $7  million for the sampling and cleanup was sufficient. According to one of  the expert panel’s chairmen—a former EPA Assistant Administrator—the  $7 million was sufficient for initial sampling in the second program, but  not for sampling and cleanup. If demand had exceeded available  resources, EPA would have simply limited participation by ranking  program applicants on the basis of their proximity to the WTC site.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Shortcomings in EPA’s second program to test and clean residences for  WTC contamination raise questions about the agency’s preparedness for  addressing indoor contamination resulting from future disasters. The  effectiveness of this program may be limited because some important  recommendations were not incorporated, and because program  implementation will not begin until later this year—more than 5 years after  the World Trade Center collapsed. Furthermore, owing to these factors,  the majority of panel members do not support EPA’s second program,  noting that it was not responsive to the concerns of residents and workers  harmed by the collapse of the WTC towers, it was scientifically and  technically flawed, or it was unacceptable because it would not identify  the extent of contamination. Some panel members questioned the value of  participating in EPA’s program, and even stated that they would  discourage participation.
Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the  Subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. For further  information about this testimony, please contact John B. Stephenson,  Director, Natural Resources and Environment (202) 512-3841, or  stephensonj@gao.gov. Key contributors to this testimony were Janice  Ceperich, Katheryn Summers Hubbell, Karen Keegan, Omari Norman,  Diane B. Raynes, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and Sandra Tasic. Additional  assistance was provided by Katherine M. Raheb.
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