Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance
Published: 2008-10-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In September 1999, the government of Colombia announced a strategy, known as "Plan Colombia," to (1) reduce the production of illicit drugs (primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in 6 years and (2) improve security in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed groups. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6 billion to support Plan Colombia. The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) manage the assistance. GAO examined (1) the progress made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction and enhanced security objectives, (2) the results of U.S. aid for the military and police, (3) the results of U.S. aid for non-military programs, and (4) the status of efforts to "nationalize" or transfer operations and funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to Colombia.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years was not fully achieved. From 2000 to 2006, opium poppy cultivation and heroin production declined about 50 percent, while coca cultivation and cocaine production levels increased by about 15 and 4 percent, respectively. These increases, in part, can be explained by measures taken by coca farmers to counter U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. Colombia has improved its security climate through systematic military and police engagements with illegal armed groups and by degrading these groups' finances. U.S. Embassy Bogot? officials cautioned that these security gains will not be irreversible until illegal armed groups can no longer threaten the stability of the government of Colombia, but become a law enforcement problem requiring only police attention. Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion to the Colombian military and National Police. Notably, over 130 U.S.-funded helicopters have provided the air mobility needed to rapidly move Colombian counternarcotics and counterinsurgency forces. U.S. advisors, training, equipment, and intelligence assistance have also helped professionalize Colombia's military and police forces, which have recorded a number of achievements including the aerial and manual eradication of hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the seizure of tons of cocaine, and the capture or killing of a number of illegal armed group leaders and thousands of combatants. However, these efforts face several challenges, including countermeasures taken by coca farmers to combat U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. Since fiscal year 2000, State, Justice, and USAID have provided nearly $1.3 billion for a wide range of social, economic, and justice sector programs. These programs have had a range of accomplishments, including aiding internally displaced persons and reforming Colombia's justice sector. But some efforts have been slow in achieving their objectives while others are difficult to assess. For example, the largest share of U.S. non-military assistance has gone towards alternative development, which has provided hundreds of thousands of Colombians legal economic alternatives to the illicit drug trade. But, alternative development is not provided in most areas where coca is cultivated and USAID does not assess how such programs relate to its strategic goals of reducing the production of illicit drugs or achieving sustainable results. In response to congressional direction in 2005 and budget cuts in fiscal year 2008, State and the other U.S. departments and agencies have accelerated their nationalization efforts, with State focusing on Colombian military and National Police aviation programs. One aviation program has been nationalized and two are in transition, with the largest--the Army Aviation Brigade--slated for turnover by 2012. Two National Police aviation programs have no turnover dates established. State, Defense, Justice, and USAID each have their own approaches to nationalization, with different timelines and objectives that have not been coordinated to promote potential efficiencies.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the  early 1970s to help the Colombian military, the National Police and other  law enforcement agencies, and civilian agencies in their efforts to reduce  illicit drug production and trafficking activities. Despite this assistance, in  the late 1990s, Colombia was the world’s leading producer of cocaine and  had become a major source of heroin used in the United States. In October  1999, the Colombian government announced a 6-year strategy, known as  Plan Colombia, to (1) reduce the cultivation, processing, and distribution  of illicit narcotics in Colombia by 50 percent over a 6-year period, and (2)  improve the security climate in Colombia by reclaiming control of areas  held by a number of illegal armed groups, which in the last decade had  financed their activities largely through drug trade profits.
Plan Colombia’s counternarcotics strategy centered on illicit crop  eradication and interdiction activities and alternative development  projects designed to offer farmers an alternative to growing coca and  opium poppy. Plan Colombia sought to reclaim control of territory  dominated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its  Spanish acronym, FARC) and other illegal armed groups through a variety  of means, including the growth and professionalism of the Colombian  military and National Police, systematic military engagement with  insurgent groups, and an expanded police presence throughout the  country. Plan Colombia also included a number of social, economic, and  judicial reform programs designed to broadly support its drug reduction  and security objectives. In January 2007, the Colombians issued a 6-year  (2007-2013) follow-on strategy, referred to as the Plan Colombia  Consolidation Phase (PCCP), which includes many of the same strategies  and programs initiated under Plan Colombia.
Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than $6 billion  in military and nonmilitary assistance to Colombia. Under the general  guidance and direction of the White House Office of National Drug Control  Policy (ONDCP), the Departments of State (State) and Defense (Defense)  have overseen assistance provided to the Colombian military and National  Police for Plan Colombia’s counternarcotics and improved security  objectives. State has provided most of this assistance, focusing on five  major aviation programs for the Colombian Army, Air Force, and National  Police. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the  Department of Justice (Justice), and State have overseen nonmilitary  assistance for programs that support alternative development, aid to  internally displaced persons and the demobilization of illegal armed  groups, and judicial reform efforts.
Beginning in 2005, Congress called on the Secretary of State to develop a  multiyear strategy to guide anticipated follow-on assistance to Plan  Colombia. Congress directed that this strategy include a detailed  explanation of how State (and the other U.S. departments and agencies  involved) planned to “nationalize” or transfer program operations and  funding responsibilities to the government of Colombia. In response, State  issued a report to Congress in March 2006 that noted the need for  continued and sustained support for military and nonmilitary assistance  programs in Colombia for the short- and mid-term, followed by reductions  as nationalization efforts take hold. State updated this strategy in two  reports to Congress dated April 2007 and April 2008. The April 2007  report included a proposed funding plan illustrating the administration’s  intent to provide an additional $4 billion in assistance under PCCP. The  plan called for a gradual reduction in assistance to the Colombian military  and National Police, an initial increase in funding for nonmilitary  assistance programs, followed by relatively constant funding levels for  nonmilitary assistance through fiscal year 2013. According to State, in  fiscal year 2008, Congress accelerated these plans by reducing  appropriations for Colombian military and police programs (in particular,  aviation programs) by nearly $170 million, while increasing appropriations  for nonmilitary programs (in particular, alternative development projects)  by over $85 million with the expectation that this funding shift will lead to  major reductions in coca growth.
At your request, we examined U.S. assistance efforts since fiscal year 2000  when funding for Plan Colombia was first approved. Specifically, we  examined (1) the progress made toward Plan Colombia’s drug reduction  and enhanced security objectives; (2) program support provided to the  Colombian military and National Police, including specific results and  related challenges; (3) nonmilitary program support provided to Colombia,  including specific results and related challenges; and (4) the status of U.S.  and Colombian efforts to nationalize U.S. assistance and the challenges, if  any, these efforts face.
To address these objectives, we reviewed planning, implementation, and  other documentation related to U.S. counternarcotics and  counterterrorism assistance to the government of Colombia since 2000,  including our prior reports on various Plan Colombia related programs.  (See Related GAO Products at the end of this report.) We met with  officials at Defense, Justice, State, ONDCP, and USAID in Washington,  D.C.; U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; the Joint  Interagency Task Force-South, Key West, Florida; State’s Office of  Aviation at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in  Bogotá, Colombia. In Colombia, we discussed U.S. assistance efforts with  U.S. embassy officials and cognizant Colombian military, police, and  civilian agency officials. We also met with U.S.-funded contractors  assisting with the U.S. programs for the Colombian Army and National  Police, and USAID implementing partners primarily involved in alternative  development programs. We visited several Colombian military and police  bases, including La Macarena, Larandia, Tolemaida, and Tumaco, and  numerous nonmilitary program sites, including alternative development  project sites, throughout Colombia. We also observed an aerial eradication  operation. (See app. I for a more complete description of our scope and  methodology.)
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to October 2008, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: For decades, Colombia was one of Latin America’s more stable  democracies and successful economies. However, by the late 1990s it had  entered a period of sustained crisis due to the emerging strength of the  FARC, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), and paramilitary groups  (primarily, the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC) who were  increasingly financing their activities through profits from illicit  narcotics. These groups were assuming increasing control of the coca  and opium poppy growing areas of the country through wide scale  violence and human rights abuses, which affected to varying degrees each  of Colombia’s 32 departments (see fig. 1). Colombia suffered a severe  economic downturn in the late 1990s as its armed forces and police were  unable to respond to the growing strength of these illegal armed groups,  and levels of murder, kidnapping, extortion, economic sabotage, and illicit  drug trafficking spiraled upward. According to State, in the 7 years prior  to Plan Colombia, coca cultivation had increased by over 300 percent and  opium poppy cultivation had increased by 75 percent.
Despite U.S. and Colombian efforts to counter the drug-trafficking  activities of these illegal armed groups, State reports that Colombia  remains the source for about 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United  States, and the primary source of heroin east of the Mississippi River.  According to State officials, FARC and other illegal groups remain active  in areas where coca and opium poppy are grown and are involved in every  facet of the narcotics business from cultivation to transporting drugs to  points outside Colombia.
subsections: section_title: Plan Colombia Provided a Focus for Counternarcotics and Counterterrorism Efforts
paragraphs: Announced by Colombian President Andres Pastrana in 1999, Plan  Colombia was designed to counter the country’s drug and security crisis  through a comprehensive 6-year, $7.5 billion plan linked to three  objectives: (1) reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security, (2)  promote social and economic justice, and (3) promote the rule of law.  While the latter two objectives were not specifically designed to reduce  the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security, they broadly facilitate  these goals by addressing some of the underlying social and economic  realities that drive individuals toward the illicit drug trade and by  providing a legal framework for bringing drug traffickers and terrorists to  justice.
As shown in figure 2, State and Defense assistance for the Colombian  military and National Police has supported a counternarcotics strategy  focused on reducing illicit narcotics and improving security. Central to this  support have been State-led efforts to provide the Colombians with air  mobility, which supports the full range of military programs and many  nonmilitary programs by providing access and security in remote areas.  Nonmilitary assistance efforts are implemented by USAID, Justice, and,  State, which oversee a diverse range of social, economic, and justice  initiatives.
In January 2007, the government of Colombia announced a 6-year follow- on strategy, the PCCP. This new strategy includes the same three broad  objectives as Plan Colombia. The government of Colombia has pledged to  provide approximately $44 billion for PCCP.  The strategy notes that a  certain level of support from the international community is still essential.  At the time, the United States developed a proposed funding plan of  approximately $4 billion in U.S. support for PCCP for fiscal years 2007  through 2013.
section_title: Security Component of Plan Colombia Expanded
paragraphs: The government of Colombia significantly expanded the security  component of Plan Colombia with its Democratic Security and Defense  Policy in June 2003, which outlined a “clear, hold, and consolidate”  strategy.  The strategy’s main objective was to assert state control over the  majority of Colombia’s national territory, particularly in areas affected by  the activities of illegal armed groups and drug traffickers. Colombian  officials said this new strategy will take years to fully implement. (See fig.  3.)  Expanded authority approved by the U.S. Congress at about the same  time allowed agencies to support this security strategy.
The government of Colombia has taken a number of steps to implement  this strategy, including:  Increasing the size of its military and police from 279,000 in 2000 to  415,000 in 2007.
Conducting a series of offensive actions against FARC under a military  strategy called Plan Patriota, which began in June 2003 with efforts to  clear FARC from areas surrounding Colombia’s capital, Bogotá. In mid- 2004, the military implemented a second, more ambitious phase of Plan  Patriota aimed at attacking key FARC fronts encompassing the southern  Colombian departments of Caquetá, Guaviare, and Meta. Based in  Larandia, Joint Task Force-Omega was established in 2004 to coordinate  the efforts of the Colombian Army, Air Force, and Marines in this area.
Creating the Coordination Center for Integrated Government Action  (CCAI) in 2004 to coordinate the delivery of military and civilian  assistance in 58 targeted municipalities emerging from conflict in 11  regions throughout Colombia.
An updated version of the Colombian defense strategy was released in  coordination with the PCCP strategy in January 2007. Incorporating  lessons learned from the 2003 strategy, this latest strategy focuses on  clearing one region at a time and places a greater emphasis on  consolidating military gains through coordinated civil-military assistance  designed to solidify the government’s presence in previously conflictive  areas by providing a range of government services to local populations.
To implement this strategy, the government of Colombia has taken several  actions, including focusing Joint Task Force-Omega’s efforts in La  Macarena—a traditional FARC stronghold—through a new military  offensive called Plan Consolidacíon. The government also developed a  coordinated military and civilian plan of action called the Consolidation  Plan for La Macarena, which has been in place since October 2007. As part  of this plan, CCAI established a joint civil-military fusion center to  coordinate military, police, economic development, and judicial activities.  If successful, the approach in La Macarena is intended to serve as a model  for similar CCAI efforts in 10 other regions of the country. It represents a  key test of the government’s enhanced state presence strategy and a  potential indicator of the long-term prospects for reducing Colombia’s  drug trade by systematically re-establishing government control  throughout the country.
section_title: U.S. Funding for Plan Colombia
paragraphs: Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, the United States has provided over $6  billion in military and nonmilitary assistance to Colombia. (See table 1.)
Most State assistance for Colombia is overseen by its Bureau for  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), though  the Bureau for Political and Military Affairs is responsible for FMF and  IMET funds. State/INL’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S.  Embassy Bogotá oversees daily program operations. State’s Office of  Aviation supports the NAS with advisors and contract personnel who are  involved with the implementation of U.S. assistance provided to the  Colombian Army’s Plan Colombia Helicopter Program (PCHP) and the  National Police’s Aerial Eradication Program. The Military Group in the  U.S. Embassy Bogotá manages both Defense counternarcotics support and  State FMF and IMET funding. USAID and Justice have full-time staff based  in Bogotá to oversee and manage their nonmilitary assistance programs.  U.S. agencies are supported in their efforts by an extensive U.S.-funded  contract workforce, which provides a range of services from aviation  program support to alternative development project implementation.
section_title: U.S. Nationalization Efforts
paragraphs: From the outset of Plan Colombia, Congress has stated that U.S.  assistance efforts should be nationalized over time and has followed  through with a number of specific reporting requirements and budget  decisions to help ensure this objective is achieved. Beginning in 2004,  Congress signaled that U.S. program administrators should begin the  process of drawing down support for U.S. financed aviation programs in  Colombia, which it noted accounted for a significant portion of U.S.  assistance to Colombia.
In 2005, House appropriators requested that the administration develop a  multiyear strategy defining U.S. program and nationalization plans going  forward under the PCCP. The administration responded in March 2006  with a report to Congress that outlined program achievements under Plan  Colombia and a broad outline of planned nationalization efforts beginning  with U.S. financed aviation programs. Follow-on reports issued in April  2007 and April 2008 further refined the administration’s plans by providing  a proposed funding plan illustrating how U.S. assistance efforts would be  reduced from 2007 through 2013 as the Colombians assume greater  responsibility for programs funded and managed by the United States.
section_title: Plan Colombia Did Not Fully Meet Its Drug Reduction Goals, but Major Security Advances Have Been Achieved
paragraphs: Plan Colombia’s goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and  distribution of illegal narcotics by targeting coca cultivation was not  achieved. Although estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin  production were reduced by about 50 percent, coca cultivation and  cocaine production increased, though data from 2007 indicate that cocaine  production slightly declined. Colombia’s security climate has improved as  a result of progress in a number of areas, but U.S. and Colombian officials  cautioned that current programs must be maintained for several years  before security gains can be considered irreversible.
subsections: section_title: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Fully Achieved
paragraphs: From 2000 to 2006, estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin  production declined about 50 percent, but coca cultivation and cocaine  production increased over the period. To put Colombia’s 6-year drug  reduction goal in perspective, we note that although U.S. funding for Plan  Colombia was approved in July 2000, many U.S.-supported programs to  increase the Colombian military and police capacity to eradicate drug  crops and disrupt the production and distribution of heroin and cocaine  did not become operational until 2001 and later. Meanwhile, estimated  illicit drug cultivation and production in Colombia continued to rise  through 2001, with estimated cultivation and production declining in 2002  through 2004. However, the declines for coca cultivation and cocaine  production were not sustained. In addition, the estimated flow of cocaine  towards the United States from South America rose over the period.
subsections: section_title: Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Production Reduced by About 50 Percent Since 2000
paragraphs: As illustrated in figure 4, estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin  production levels in 2006 were about half of what they had been in 2000.
As illustrated in figure 5, coca cultivation was about 15 percent greater in  2006 than in 2000, with an estimated 157,000 hectares cultivated in 2006  compared to 136,200 hectares in 2000.  State officials noted that extensive  aerial and manual eradication efforts during this period were not sufficient  to overcome countermeasures taken by coca farmers as discussed later in  this report. U.S. officials also noted the increase in estimated coca  cultivation levels from 2005 through 2007, may have been due, at least in  part, to the Crime and Narcotics Centers’ decision to increase the size of  the coca cultivation survey areas in Colombia beginning in 2004 and  subsequent years.
As illustrated in figure 6, estimated cocaine production was about 4  percent greater in 2006 than in 2000, with 550 metric tons produced in  2006 compared to 530 metric tons in 2000. However, in September 2008,  ONDCP officials noted that cocaine production did not keep pace with  rising coca cultivation levels because eradication efforts had degraded  coca fields so less cocaine was being produced per hectare of cultivated  coca. ONDCP also announced that estimated cocaine production rates in  Colombia for 2003 through 2007 had been revised downward based on the  results of recent research showing diminished coca field yield rates. On  the basis of these revised estimates, ONDCP estimated cocaine production  decreased by almost 25 percent from a high of 700 metric tons in 2001 to  535 metric tons in 2007.
As illustrated in figure 7, in 2000, the interagency counternarcotics  community estimated that 460 metric tons of cocaine was flowing towards  the United States from South America. In 2004, the interagency began  reporting low and high ranges of estimated flow. Using the midpoints of  these ranges, the estimated flow of cocaine to the United States in 2004  was about 500 metric tons; in 2005 it rose to over 625 metric tons; in 2006  and 2007, it was about 620 metric tons.
Reductions in Colombia’s estimated cocaine production have been largely  offset by increases in cocaine production in Peru and to a lesser extent  Bolivia. Although U.S. government estimates suggest that South American  cocaine production levels have fluctuated since 2000, production in 2007  was 12 percent higher than in 2000. See appendix III for more detail about  the interagency counternarcotics community’s estimates of coca  cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.
section_title: Plan Colombia Achieved Important Security Advances
paragraphs: Since 2000, U.S. assistance has enabled the Colombians to achieve  significant security advances in two key areas. First, the government has  expanded its presence throughout the country, particularly in many areas  formerly dominated by illegal armed groups. Second, the government,  through its counternarcotics strategy, military and police actions, and  other efforts (such as its demobilization and deserter programs) has  degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and weakened their  operational capabilities. These advances have contributed to an improved  security environment as shown by key indicators (see figs. 8 through 10)  reported by the government of Colombia.
One central tenet of Plan Colombia and follow-on security plans is that  Colombian government must reassert and consolidate its control in  contested areas dominated or partially controlled by illegal armed groups.  According to an analysis provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defense in  February 2008, the government was in full or partial control of about 90  percent of the country in 2007 compared with about 70 percent in 2003.  U.S. officials we spoke to generally agreed that the government of  Colombia had made major progress reasserting its control over large parts  of the country and that Colombia’s estimates of enhanced state presence  were reasonably accurate.
subsections: section_title: Illegal Armed Group Finances and Operating Capabilities Have Been Degraded
paragraphs: U.S. and Colombian officials and some observers agree that Plan  Colombia’s counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts have degraded  the finances and operating capacity of illegal armed groups, including  FARC, paramilitaries, ELN, and other drug-trafficking organizations.
However, these officials also cautioned that FARC, while severely  weakened, remains a threat to Colombia’s national security.
FARC’s Capabilities and Finances Have Been Significantly  Reduced, but It Remains a National Security Threat  According to U.S. and Colombian officials and some reports, FARC’s  capabilities and finances have been substantially diminished as a result of  U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics efforts and continued pressure from  the Colombian military. According to the Drug Enforcement  Administration, since 2000, FARC has been Colombia’s principal drug- trafficking organization, accounting for approximately 60 percent of the  cocaine exported from Colombia to the United States. According to  ONDCP, FARC membership has declined from an estimated high of 17,000  in 2001 to an estimated force of  8,000 or less today. In June 2007, ONDCP  reported that Colombia’s antidrug efforts reduced FARC’s overall profits  per kilogram of cocaine from a range of $320 to $460 in 2003 to between  $195 and $320 in 2005.
According to State and embassy officials, and nongovernmental observers,   the number of FARC combatants and its capabilities have been  dramatically reduced by continuous assaults on its top leadership, the  capture or killing of FARC members in conflictive zones, and a large  number of  desertions. In 2007, the Colombian Ministry of Defense  reported that it had captured or killed approximately 4,600 FARC  combatants and about 2,500 had demobilized. According to the Colombian  Ministry of Defense, as of July 2008, over 1,700 FARC have demobilized  this year—over two-thirds of the total for all of 2007. U.S. Military Group  officials told us FARC now avoids direct combat with Colombian security  forces and is limited to hit and run terrorist attacks.
Nonetheless, Defense and Colombian officials caution that FARC remains  a national security threat, exercising control over important parts of the  country, such as Meta, which serves as a key transport corridor linking  many of the coca cultivation areas in the eastern part of the country with  the Pacific ports used to transport cocaine out of the country. According  to U.S. military group officials, the government of Colombia’s goal is to  reduce FARC’s members, finances, and operating capabilities so it no  longer poses a national security threat. To achieve this goal, Colombian  President Uribe has accelerated the pace of all activities to help ensure  this happens by 2010 when his current term ends. However, according to  U.S. Military Group officials, FARC will not reach the point where it can  no longer pose a significant threat to Colombia’s government until the  number of combatants is reduced to less than 4,000. In February 2008, U.S.  Military Group officials told us that they estimated that this point could be  reached in 18 months, but not without continued U.S. support.
AUC Has Demobilized, but Remnants Remain a Threat  Beginning in late 2003, AUC entered into a peace accord with the  government of Colombia to demobilize and lay down its arms. From 2003  to 2006, AUC paramilitary members reported to demobilization centers  around the country. According to USAID officials, approximately 32,000  paramilitary soldiers and support staff entered the demobilization process.
However, according to Defense officials, former midlevel officers of AUC  have taken advantage of the vacuum created by the demobilization of AUC  to form or join regional criminal bands engaged in drug trafficking, which  threaten to destabilize the political system and civilian security. According  to a May 2007 report by the International Crisis Group, estimates of the  total number of individuals involved in these criminal bands range from  3,000 to 9,000, with many of the members former AUC. These include the  “Aguilas Negras,” (Black Eagles), which operates in northeastern  Colombia along the border with Venezuela, and the “Nueva Generacíon  Organizacíon” (New Generation Organization), which operates in the  department of Nariño. According to Defense officials, while homicides and  kidnappings throughout Colombia have decreased, fighting among illegal  armed groups has resulted in an increase in violence and internal  displacement in certain regions of the country, such as the southern  Colombian department of Nariño.
ELN Has Been Weakened and Drug-Trafficking   Organizations Have Been Fragmented  According to U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials, a number of  factors, including Colombian counternarcotics efforts, military pressure,  and competition with FARC, have combined to weaken ELN. According to  U.S. military group officials, in 2000, ELN was estimated to number  approximately 5,000 combatants; it is currently estimated to number  between 2,200 and 3,000.
According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, in addition to the  insurgent and paramilitary groups that engage in drug trafficking, other  major drug trafficking groups operate in Colombia. These include the  North Valle de Cauca group based in the southwestern Colombian  department of Valle de Cauca and the North Coast group based in the  Caribbean cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta. According to  Drug Enforcement Administration officials and reports, Colombian law  enforcement successes, including the arrest and extradition of major  traffickers, have helped fragment these groups, forcing them to become  “niche” organizations, specializing in limited aspects of the drug trade in  order to avoid being identified, arrested, and prosecuted. Nevertheless,  according to a 2006 Drug Enforcement Administration report, these  organizations are increasingly self-sufficient in cocaine base production,  have a firm grip on Caribbean and Pacific smuggling routes, and dominate  the wholesale cocaine markets in the eastern United States and Europe.
section_title: U.S. Assistance Promotes Colombian Military and Police Counternarcotics and Security Objectives
paragraphs: State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion from fiscal years 2000 to  2008 to the Colombian military and police to support Plan Colombia’s  counternarcotics and security objectives (see table 2). U.S. assistance to  the Colombian military has focused on developing the capabilities of the  Colombian Army’s Aviation Brigade and the creation of an Army  Counternarcotics Brigade and mobile units that focus on counternarcotics,  infrastructure protection, and counterinsurgency missions. State and  Defense also provided extensive support for the Air Force’s Air Bridge  Denial Program; and Navy and Marine interdiction efforts. U.S. support  for the National Police has focused on its Aerial Eradication Program and  Air Service. Other U.S. assistance supported the creation of mobile  squadrons of rural police (referred to as “Carabineros”), which have  helped establish (1) a police presence in 169 Colombian municipalities  that had no police presence in 2002, and (2) specialized interdiction  programs that attack cocaine labs and narcotrafficking in the ports.
This support has led to a range of accomplishments since 2000 including  increasing the cost of doing business for both coca farmers and drug  traffickers by eradicating illicit drug crops and seizing finished product;  destroying hydrochloride laboratories; demobilizing, capturing, and killing  thousands of combatants; and the capture or killing of several high-profile  leaders of FARC and other illegal armed groups. Program officials noted,  however, that a number of challenges have diminished the effect U.S.  assistance has had on reducing the flow of cocaine to the United States,  including the countermeasures taken by coca farmers to mitigate the  effect of U.S. and Colombian eradication programs.
subsections: section_title: Army Aviation Brigade
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense have provided over $844 million  to help expand and maintain an Army Aviation Brigade that has seen  almost a threefold increase in the number of aircraft it manages and a near  doubling in its total personnel since 2000. Increased air mobility has been  described by the Colombian Ministry of Defense as a key outcome of U.S.  support for Plan Colombia. Air mobility is needed to conduct spray  operations and move Army Counternarcotics Brigade personnel to  eradication sites to provide needed security. Air mobility is also needed to  transport different Colombian army units waging security operations  against FARC and other illegal armed groups where rapid deployment is  essential for delivering combat troops to the point of attack.
The brigade consists of three fleets of helicopters. The first, referred to as  the Plan Colombia Helicopter Program or PCHP, consists of 52 U.S.  aircraft—17 UH-1Ns, 22 UH-IIs, and 13 UH-60L Blackhawks—that State  provided to the Colombians under a no-cost lease. The second fleet,  commonly referred to as the FMS fleet, consists of 20 UH-60Ls, which  Colombia acquired through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The  third fleet consists primarily of Russian and U.S. aircraft leased by the  Army Aviation Brigade, along with aircraft that have been nationalized.
State, with assistance from Defense, has provided the PCHP fleet with the  essential support components needed to manage a modern combat  aviation service, including infrastructure and maintenance support;  contract pilots and mechanics; assistance to train pilots and mechanics;  flight planning, safety, and quality standards and procedures; and a  logistics system. Defense provides a Technical Assistance Field Team to  support the brigade’s FMS fleet. The team is contracted to provide  oversight of FMS fleet maintenance activities and to help train brigade  mechanics working on these helicopters. Defense also is providing the  Ministry of Defense with a logistics system and a limited aviation depot to  enable the Colombians to perform certain depot-level repairs on their  helicopters. Appendix II describes these support services in more detail.  Figure 11 illustrates some examples.
According to U.S. and Colombian officials, a key challenge facing the  brigade is to train and retain enough pilots and mechanics to manage the  brigade without continued U.S. support—a challenge we have noted  previously. In June 2003, we reported that the Colombian Army could not  maintain the PCHP helicopters because it did not have sufficient numbers  of qualified pilots and mechanics. At that time, U.S. officials expected  they would have enough trained entry level pilots by December 2004.    They also told us that 54 maintenance personnel required basic training,  but noted that it would be 3 to 5 years before these mechanics would be  qualified to repair helicopters.
We found that the Army Aviation Brigade is still understaffed. According  to State, as of June 2008, a total of 43 contract pilots and 87 contract  mechanics were needed to operate the PCHP program. U.S. officials  expect that almost all of these contract personnel will be replaced with  Colombian Army personnel by 2012, at which time U.S. program officials  said all program support to the Army Aviation Brigade would consist of  technical support. According to the Commander of the Army Aviation  Brigade, however, the Colombians are buying 15 additional UH-60  Blackhawks through the FMS system for delivery starting in October 2008  and, in July 2008, the United States loaned 18 UH-1Ns from PCHP’s  inventory to Colombia. These additional helicopters will strain U.S.  efforts to help the Colombians ensure they have enough trained pilots and  mechanics to meet their needs. Military Group and NAS officials told us  that current U.S. funding and training plans can accommodate Colombia’s  planned FMS purchase and the 18 loaned UH-1Ns. These officials  cautioned, however, that any additional Colombian aircraft purchases will  have a significant impact on future funding and training requirements.
While the Colombian Army has not had difficulty retaining pilots, the lack  of a dedicated career path that provides an incentive for pilots to remain  with the brigade could adversely affect retention. According to a U.S.  Embassy Bogotá report, the lack of a warrant officer program means that,  to earn promotion, Army Aviation Brigade officers must command ground  troops, taking them away from being helicopter pilots. This lack of a  dedicated career path may be a problem as more junior staff progress in  their careers. According to the Commander of the Army Aviation Brigade,  the Colombian Army has approved plans to establish a career path for  military and police aviators by creating a warrant officer program.
However, the Ministry of Defense and the Colombian legislature must  approve this before the program can begin.
section_title: Army Ground Forces
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense have provided over $104 million  to advise, train, and equip Colombian ground forces, which grew by almost   50 percent during this period.  This assistance supported the creation of an  Army Counternarcotics Brigade, Army mobile units, and a Joint Special  Operations Command. Each pursues various counternarcotics and  counterinsurgency missions under a national joint command structure.
subsections: section_title: Counternarcotics Brigade
paragraphs: The Army’s Counternarcotics Brigade was originally established in 1999 to  plan and conduct interdiction operations against drug traffickers in   southern Colombia. U.S. and Colombian officials credit the brigade with  providing the security needed to conduct aerial and manual eradication  operations, along with drug and precursor seizures and the destruction of  base and hydrochloride laboratories.
The brigade’s initial focus was on the departments of Putumayo and  Caquetá where, at the time, much of Colombia’s coca cultivation was  located. Subsequently, the brigade was designated a national asset capable  of operating anywhere in Colombia. The brigade’s mission was also  extended to include counterinsurgency operations in line with expanded  program authority passed by Congress in 2002 that allowed U.S. assistance  to be used for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism purposes.  Defense provided the brigade with training, equipment, and infrastructure  support including the construction of facilities at Tres Esquinas and  Larandia, while State assistance provided the brigade with weapons,  ammunition, and training. The brigade carries out ground interdiction  operations and provides ground security for the National Police’s aerial  and manual eradication efforts. The brigade is supported by the Army  Aviation Brigade, which provides air mobility. According to State and U.S.  military group officials, the brigade now provides its own training and  most of its equipment. Beginning in fiscal year 2004, State reduced the  amount of funding for the brigade from approximately $5 million to $2.2  million in fiscal year 2007. It is scheduled to remain at this level in fiscal  year 2008.
section_title: Mobile Army Brigades and Special Forces Units
paragraphs: Defense provided support has helped equip mobile Army brigades and  joint special forces units which, according to Defense officials, seek to  establish “irreversible” security gains against FARC and other illegal  armed groups. In particular, this assistance (1) enabled the Army to form  mobile brigades for counterinsurgency efforts, such as Joint Task Force- Omega in central Colombia, and (2) facilitated the establishment of a  Joint Special Forces Command made up of a commando unit, an urban  hostage rescue unit, and a Colombian Marine special forces unit.
According to Defense officials, U.S. assistance to the mobile brigades  consisted primarily of intelligence and logistics support, training,  weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and infrastructure support including a  fortified base in La Macarena, which is the home base for Joint Task  Force-Omega’s mobile units. This assistance has helped the Colombian  Army conduct mobile operations throughout Colombia, a capacity that  Defense officials said generally did not exist at the outset of Plan  Colombia. According to a senior U.S. Military Group official, the mobile  brigades’ effectiveness can be seen in the number of combatants from  illegal armed groups captured and killed or who have surrendered. For  example, Joint Task Force-Omega documentation provided by the  Colombians show that, as of February 2008, the task force had captured  over 1,000 combatants, killed almost 100, and persuaded about 400 to  surrender. The United States continues to provide support for the Army’s  mobile brigades, but U.S. officials expect this support to be reduced as the  brigades become increasingly self-sufficient.
U.S. support has helped the Colombian military establish a Joint Special  Forces Command that also operates under the direction of the General  Command of the Armed Forces. The support consisted of training,  weapons, ammunition, and infrastructure support, including for the  command’s principal compound near Bogotá. According to Defense  officials, the command includes approximately 2,000 soldiers from five  units made up of Colombian Army, Air Force, and Marine components. It  is tasked with pursuing high-value targets and rescuing hostages in urban  and rural environments. U.S. officials described this command as similar  to the U.S. Special Operations Command and said that, prior to 2004, the  Colombian military did not have the capability to conduct joint special  forces operations. According to U.S. officials, the command has been  involved in a number of high-profile operations, including the recent  rescue of 15 hostages that included three U.S. citizens.
section_title: Infrastructure Security Strategy
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2000-2008, Congress provided over $115 million to help  Colombia implement phase one of its infrastructure security strategy,  designed to protect the first 110 miles of the nearly 500 mile-long Caño  Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline from terrorist attacks. In prior years,  insurgent attacks on the pipeline resulted in major economic losses for  both the Colombian government and oil companies operating in the  country. For instance, in 2001, the pipeline was attacked 170 times and  forced to shut down for over 200 days, resulting in approximately $500  million in lost revenues, as well as considerable environmental damage.  According to State, there was only one attack made on the entire length of  the pipeline in 2007.
U.S. support provided for both an aviation component and a ground  combat support element and included two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters,  eight UH-II helicopters, and related logistics support and ground  facilities. Nearly $30 million was used for U.S. Special Forces training and  equipment provided to about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers assigned to  protect this portion of the pipeline.
In December 2007, the United States transferred operating and funding  responsibility for the infrastructure security strategy to Colombia— including nine helicopters.
section_title: Air Interdiction
paragraphs: Beginning in fiscal year 2003, State has provided over $62 million in  assistance to enable the Colombian Air Force to implement the Air  Bridge Denial (ABD) program, which is designed to improve the  Colombian government’s capacity to stop drug trafficking in Colombian  airspace by identifying, tracking, and forcing suspicious aircraft to land so  that law enforcement authorities can take control of the aircraft, arrest  suspects, and seize drugs. The program was expanded in 2007 to include  surveillance of Colombia’s coastal waters to strengthen the Colombian  government’s capacity to address the emerging threat posed by  semisubmersible vessels.
To support the program, State and Defense have provided the Colombian  Air Force with seven surveillance aircraft, which monitor Colombian  airspace for suspicious traffic, infrastructure support at four ABD bases  located across Colombia, contract aviation maintenance support, training,  ground and air safety monitors, and funding for spare parts and fuel. The  program also utilizes a network of U.S. detection resources including five  in-country radars, over-the-horizon radars located outside Colombia, and  airborne radar systems. In June 2007, the United States began nationalizing  the ABD program, including transferring the title of surveillance aircraft  and responsibility for operating and maintaining the five radars located in  Colombia. According to NAS officials, the United States is training  Colombian Air Force ground and air safety monitors and maintenance  personnel and expects to nationalize the program by 2010, with only  limited U.S. funding in subsequent years.
According to NAS officials, suspicious aircraft tracks dropped from 637 in  2003 to 84 in 2007. In 2007, the Colombian Air Force forced three  suspected drug-trafficking aircraft to land and each aircraft was seized;  however, according to a senior NAS official, the crews escaped, and no  cocaine was found. In the same year, the ABD program was expanded to  include a maritime patrol mission. While conducting a maritime patrol,  ABD aircraft assisted in the sinking of two self-propelled  semisubmersibles, which resulted in the arrest of seven individuals and  the seizure or destruction of approximately 11 metric tons of cocaine. In  our September 2005 report, we noted that the stated purpose of the  program (the seizure of aircraft, personnel, and drugs) was rarely  achieved, though the program did succeed in reducing the number of  suspicious flights over Colombia—a valuable program outcome, according  to U.S. and Colombian officials.
section_title: Coastal and River Interdiction
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided over $89 million to help  sustain and expand Colombian Navy and Marine interdiction efforts.  According to Defense, from January to June 2007, an estimated 70 percent  of Colombia’s cocaine was smuggled out of the country using go-fast  vessels, fishing boats, and other forms of maritime transport. State and  Defense support for the Colombian Navy is designed to help improve their  capacity to stop drug traffickers from using Colombia’s Caribbean and  Pacific coasts to conduct drug-trafficking activities. State and Defense  support for the Colombian Marines is designed to help gain control of  Colombia’s network of navigable rivers, which traffickers use to transport  precursor chemicals and finished products. According to Colombian  Ministry of Defense officials, the number of metric tons of cocaine seized  by the Navy and Marines represented over half of all cocaine seized by  Colombia in 2007.
State and Defense assistance to the Colombian Navy provided for  infrastructure development (such as new storage refueling equipment for  the Navy station in Tumaco), the transfer of two vessels to Colombia, eight  “Midnight Express” interceptor boats, two Cessna Grand Caravan  transport aircraft, weapons, fuel, communications equipment, and  training. State assistance also helped the Colombian Navy establish a  special intelligence unit in the northern city of Cartagena to collect and  distribute time-sensitive intelligence on suspect vessels in the Caribbean.  In 2007, the unit coordinated 35 interdiction operations, which resulted in  the arrests of 40 traffickers, the seizure of over 9 metric tons of cocaine,  and the seizure of 21 trafficker vessels including one semisubmersible  vessel. The U.S. Embassy Bogotá credits this unit for over 95 percent of all  Colombian Navy seizures in the Caribbean, forcing traffickers to rely more  on departure sites along the Pacific Coast and areas near Venezuela and  Panama.
The Colombian Navy faces certain challenges. First, it generally lacks the  resources needed to provide comprehensive coverage over Colombia’s  Pacific coastline. For example, according to Colombian Navy officials, the  Navy has only three stations to cover all of Colombia’s Pacific coastline.  Second, according to U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials, these services lack  adequate intelligence information to guide interdiction efforts along the  Pacific coast. According to embassy officials, the United States is working  with the Colombians to expand intelligence gathering and dissemination  efforts to the Pacific coast, in part by providing support to expand the  Navy’s intelligence unit in Cartagena to cover this area. Third, traffickers  have increasingly diversified their routes and methods, including using  semisubmersibles to avoid detection.
For the Colombian Marines, State and Defense provided support for  infrastructure development (such as docks and hangars), 95 patrol boats,  weapons, ammunition, fuel, communications equipment, night vision  goggles, and engines. Colombia’s rivers serve as a vital transport network  and are used to transport the precursor chemicals used to make cocaine  and heroin, as well as to deliver the final product to ports on Colombia’s  Caribbean and Pacific coasts. According to State, up to 40 percent of the  cocaine transported in Colombia moves through the complex river  network in Colombia’s south-central region to the southwestern coastal  shore.
According to U.S. Southern Command officials, the key challenge facing  the riverine program is a general lack of resources given the scope of the  problem. The Colombian marines maintain a permanent presence on only  about one-third of Colombia’s nearly 8,000 miles of navigable rivers. U.S.  embassy planning documents have set a goal of helping the Colombian  Marines achieve a coverage rate of at least 60 percent by 2010.
section_title: National Police Eradication Program
paragraphs: Since the early 1990s, State/INL has supported the Colombian National  Police Aerial Eradication Program, which is designed to spray coca and  opium poppy. Since fiscal year 2000, State has provided over $458 million  to support the program, which increased its spray operations about  threefold. The Aerial Eradication Program consists of U.S.-owned spray  aircraft and helicopters, as well as contractor support to help fly, maintain,  and operate these assets at forward operating locations throughout  Colombia. As of August 2008, these aircraft included 13 armored AT-802  spray aircraft; 13 UH-1N helicopters used as gunships or search and  rescue aircraft; four C-27 transport aircraft used to ferry supplies and  personnel to and from the various spray bases; and two reconnaissance  aircraft used to find and identify coca cultivation, and plan and verify the  results of spray missions. A typical spray mission consists of four spray  aircraft supported by helicopter gunships to protect the spray aircraft  along with a search and rescue helicopter to rescue downed pilots and  crew. In addition, ground security is provided as needed by the Army  Counternarcotics Brigade.
U.S. funded counternarcotics efforts, which focused on aerial spraying, did  not achieve Plan Colombia’s overarching goal of reducing the cultivation,  production, and distribution of cocaine by 50 percent, in part because coca  farmers responded with a series of effective countermeasures.  These  countermeasures included (1) pruning coca plants after spraying; (2) re- planting with younger coca plants or plant grafts; (3) decreasing the size  of coca plots; (4) interspersing coca with legitimate crops to avoid  detection; (5) moving coca cultivation to areas of the country off-limits to  spray aircraft, such as the national parks and a 10 kilometer area along  Colombia’s border with Ecuador; and (6) moving coca crops to more  remote parts of the country—a development that has created a “dispersal  effect” (see figures 12 and 13).  While these measures allowed coca  farmers to continue cultivation, they have increased the coca farmers and  traffickers’ cost of doing business.
NAS officials said Colombia and the United States have taken several  actions to address this issue. For instance, the government of Colombia  initiated a program in 2004 to manually eradicate coca. Since 2004, the  amount of coca manually eradicated increased from about 11,000 hectares  to about 66,000 hectares in 2007. According to NAS officials, in response to  congressional budget cuts in fiscal year 2008, the embassy reduced its  aerial eradication goal to 130,000, compared with 160,000 in 2007. This  reduction may be offset by a planned increase in manual eradication  efforts from 66,000 hectares in 2007 to 100,000 hectares in 2008. However,  manual eradication efforts require significant personnel, security, and  transportation, including air mobility resources. Through the end of May  2008, Colombia reported that about 28,000 hectares had been manually  eradicated. In addition, manual eradication often takes place in conflictive  areas against a backdrop of violence, which makes full implementation of  this strategy even more problematic. According to State, despite  protection measures taken, manual eradicators were attacked numerous  times—by sniper fire, minefields, and improvised explosive devices—and  through August 2008, 23 eradicators were killed, bringing to 118 the total  number of eradicators killed since 2005.
National Police Air Service  Since fiscal year 2000, State provided over $463 million to help expand and  sustain the Police Air Service (known by its Spanish acronym, ARAVI).  Similar to the role played by the Army Aviation Brigade, ARAVI provides  air mobility support for a range of National Police functions including  aerial and manual eradication efforts that require gunship and search and  rescue support for the spray planes, as well as airlift support for the  manual eradication teams and associated security personnel. In addition,  ARAVI provides airlift for the National Police’s commandos unit, known as  Junglas. According to NAS officials, ARAVI consists of 61 NAS-supported  aircraft and 30 National Police-supported aircraft. Key program support  elements include hanger and taxiway construction upgrades to the Air  Service’s operating base outside of Bogotá; the provision of contract  mechanics; training; and funding for spare parts, fuel, and other  expenses. Appendix II describes these support services in more detail.
According to NAS officials, in addition to enabling ARAVI to better  manage its aviation assets, ARAVI has become self-sufficient in some  areas. For instance, it provides its own entry-level pilot and mechanic  training and can plan and execute its own operations. However, U.S. and  contractor officials said that ARAVI still continues to suffer from major  limitations. According to NAS and contractor officials, ARAVI:    Receives approximately 70 percent of its total maintenance and operating  funding from State. According to Embassy Bogotá officials, the Colombian  Ministry of Defense often underfunds the service on the assumption that  State will make up the difference.
Lacks some specialized maintenance personnel. For instance, according to  State-funded U.S. contractor personnel, in February 2008, the service only  had about half of the required number of quality control inspectors. To  make up the shortfall, the service relies on quality control inspectors  provided by the contractor.
Has high absentee rates. This is a problem that we have reported on in the  past. For example, according to data supplied by the contractor, during  the second week of February 2008, only 25 percent of the technicians and  40 percent of the assigned inspectors were present to service ARAVI’s UH- 60s.
section_title: National Police Interdiction Efforts
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, State provided over $153 million to strengthen the  National Police’s efforts to interdict illicit drug trafficking. According to  State, in fiscal year 2007, it focused most of its assistance on equipping and  training the Junglas, but also provided assistance for maritime, airport,  and road interdiction programs.
The Junglas consist of 500 specially selected police divided into three  companies based at Bogotá, Santa Marta, and Tulua, as well as a 60-man  instructor group based at the National Police rural training center.  Described by U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials as being widely considered as  one of the best trained and equipped commando units in Latin America,  they are often the unit of choice in operations to destroy drug production  laboratories and other narcoterrorist high value targets, many of which are  located in remote, hard-to-find locations. State support for the Junglas  consisted of specialized equipment typically provided to U.S. Army Special  Forces teams, such as M-4 carbines, mortars, helmets, and vests, as well as  specialized training provided in Colombia and the United States.
According to State, in 2006 and 2007, the Junglas were responsible for  more than half of all the hydrochloric and coca base laboratories  destroyed by the National Police, and seized over 64 metric tons of  cocaine during the same period.
State also supported the National Police’s maritime and airport security  programs to strengthen the National Police’s capability to protect against  illicit cargo—primarily narcotics—smuggled through Colombia’s principal  seaports and airports. State assistance included funding for training,  technical assistance, and limited logistical support (including K-9 support)  for port security units at eight Colombian seaports and six airports.  According to State, units based at Colombia’s principal seaports and  airports seized more than 13 metric tons of illicit drugs in 2006; a figure  that rose to over 22 metric tons in 2007.
section_title: Reestablishing a Police Presence in Conflictive Zones
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, the United States provided over $92 million to help  the Colombians establish Carabineros squadrons. The Carabineros were  initially created to provide an immediate State presence in conflictive  areas reclaimed by the Colombian military. According to State, the  Colombians currently have 68 Carabineros squadrons, each staffed with  120 personnel. The squadrons provide temporary support as other  government services and a permanent police presence are established in  reclaimed areas. State support consisted of training, weapons,  ammunition, night vision goggles, metal detectors, radios, vehicles, and  other items including some limited support for permanent police stations  The Carabineros supported President Uribe’s goal of re-establishing a  State presence in each of the country’s 1,099 municipalities (169  municipalities had no police presence prior to 2002). Though a July 2007  U.S. Embassy Bogotá report noted there are now police stations in every  municipality throughout Colombia, these often consist of a small number  of police who are responsible for areas covering hundreds of square miles  of territory. Despite these limitations, State noted that in contrast to  earlier years, no police stations were overrun in 2007. NAS officials  attributed this development to improved based defense training, defensive  upgrades, and the increased police presence that Carabinero squadrons  provide in rural areas.
section_title: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance Promotes Social and Economic Progress and the Rule of Law, but Is Not Directly Linked to Reductions in Drug Production
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided nearly $1.3 billion  for nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, focusing on the promotion of (1)  economic and social progress and (2) the rule of law, including judicial  reform. To support social and economic progress, the largest share of U.S.  nonmilitary assistance has gone toward alternative development, which  has been a key element of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and has  bettered the lives of hundreds of thousands of Colombians. Other social  programs have assisted thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs)  and more than 30,000 former combatants. Assistance for the rule of law  and judicial reform have expanded access to the democratic process for  Colombian citizens, including the consolidation of state authority and the  established government institutions and public services in many areas  reclaimed from illegal armed groups. (See table 3.)
Nevertheless, these programs face several limitations and challenges. For  example, the geographic areas where alternative development programs  operate are limited by security concerns, and programs have not  demonstrated a clear link to reductions in illicit drug cultivation and  production. In addition, many displaced persons may not have access to  IDP assistance, the reintegration of former combatants into society and  reparations to their victims has been slow, and funding to continue these  programs is a concern. Finally, Colombia’s justice system has limited  capacity to address the magnitude of criminal activity in Colombia.
subsections: section_title: Alternative Development Has Benefited Many Colombians, but USAID Does Not Track Progress in Drug Reduction and Sustainability
paragraphs: USAID provided more than $500 million in assistance between fiscal years  2000 and 2008 to implement alternative development projects, which are a  key component of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia. USAID’s   goal for alternative development focuses on reducing the production of  illicit narcotics by creating sustainable projects that can function without  additional U.S. support after the start-up phase is implemented. In recent  years, USAID modified its alternative development strategy to emphasize  sustainability. With regard to its strategic goal, alternative development  projects face two key challenges—USAID currently has almost no  alternative development projects in areas where the majority of coca is  grown, and a government of Colombia policy prohibits alternative  development assistance projects in communities where any illicit crops  are being cultivated.
subsections: section_title: USAID Modified Its Alternative Development Approach to Emphasize Sustainability
paragraphs: USAID’s original alternative development strategy in 2000 focused on  encouraging farmers to manually eradicate illicit crops and providing  assistance to those who did through licit, short-term, income-producing  opportunities. These efforts were concentrated in the departments of  Caquetá and Putumayo, where, at the time, most of Colombia’s coca was  cultivated and where U.S. eradication efforts were focused. However,  USAID and its implementing partners found it difficult to implement  projects in the largely undeveloped south where the Colombian  government exercised minimal control. As a result, in February 2002,  USAID revised its approach to support long-term, income-generating  activities, focus more attention and resources outside southern Colombia,  and encourage private-sector participation. In 2004, we reported that the  revised alternative development program had made progress but was  limited in scope and may not be sustainable.
USAID revised its alternative development strategy beginning in 2006 to  focus on specific geographic corridors, improve coordination, and  increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable projects. The geographic  corridors are in six regions in the western part of Colombia where the  government has greater control and markets and transportation routes are  more developed. However, the corridors are not in primary coca  cultivation areas. USAID officials told us that the alternative development  corridors are intended to act as a magnet, providing legal economic  opportunities to attract individuals from regions that cultivate illicit crops,  while also preventing people within the corridors from cultivating coca.
USAID’s current strategy is carried out through two major projects—Areas  for Municipal Level Alternative Development (ADAM) and More  Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS). ADAM  works with individuals, communities, and the private sector to develop  licit crops with long-term income potential, such as cacao and specialty  coffee. ADAM also supports social infrastructure activities such as schools  and water treatment plants, providing training, technical assistance, and  financing of community projects. It emphasizes engagement with  communities and individual beneficiaries to get their support and focuses  on smaller scale agricultural development with long-term earning  potential. For example, under ADAM, USAID provided infrastructure  improvements to a facility that processes blackberries in order to increase  capacity and continues to provide technical assistance to farmers who  grow blackberries for the facility.
MIDAS promotes private-sector led business initiatives and works with the  Colombian government to make economic and policy reforms intended to  maximize employment and income growth. USAID encourages public and  private-sector investment in activities that raise rural incomes and create  jobs, and it provides training and technical assistance to the Colombian  government at the local and national levels to expand financial services  into rural areas, build capacity of municipal governments, and encourage  the Colombian government’s investment in programs. For example,  MIDAS worked with the Colombian government to lower microfinance  fees and provided technical assistance to private lenders, which led to  increased availability of small loans in rural areas that can be used to start  up small- and medium-sized businesses.
Overall, alternative development beneficiaries we talked with told us their  quality of life has improved because they faced less intimidation by FARC  and had better access to schools and social services, even though they  generally earned less money compared with cultivating and trafficking in  illicit drugs.
section_title: Alternative Development Challenges
paragraphs: One challenge facing alternative development programs is their limited  geographic scope. Alternative development programs are largely focused  in economic corridors in the western part of Colombia, where, according  to USAID officials, a greater potential exists for success due to access to  markets, existing infrastructure, and state presence and security.  Currently, USAID has almost no alternative development projects in  eastern Colombia, where the majority of coca is grown. (See fig. 14.) While  the majority of the Colombian population lives within the USAID  economic corridors, the lack of programs in eastern Colombia nonetheless  poses a challenge for linking alternative development to reducing the  production of illicit drugs. The USAID Mission Director told us that the  mission intends to expand the geographic scope of alternative  development programs as the government of Colombia gains control over  conflictive areas. However, the lack of transportation infrastructure in  most coca growing areas limits the chances of program success and future  expansion. USAID and other U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials emphasized  that alternative development programs have benefited from security gains  made possible through the Colombian military’s enhanced air mobility, but  large areas of Colombia are still not secure.
According to USAID officials, another challenge is the government of  Colombia’s “Zero Illicit” policy, which prohibits alternative development  assistance projects in communities where any illicit crops are being  cultivated. Acción Social officials said the policy is intended to foster a  culture of lawfulness and encourage communities to exert peer pressure  on families growing illicit crops so that the community at large may  become eligible for assistance. However, USAID officials expressed  concern that the policy limits their ability to operate in areas where coca is  grown. The policy also complicates USAID’s current strategy of working in  conflictive areas like Meta, where coca is cultivated in high  concentrations. One nongovernmental organization official told us the  policy is a major problem because if one farmer grows coca in a  community otherwise fully engaged in and committed to growing licit  crops, then all aid is supposed to be suspended to that community.  However, USAID officials told us programs have only been suspended a  few times due to this requirement.
USAID collects data on 15 indicators that measure progress on alternative  development; however, none of these indicators measures progress  toward USAID’s goal of reducing illicit narcotics production through the  creation of sustainable economic projects. Rather, USAID collects data  on program indicators such as the number of families benefited and  hectares of legal crops planted. While this information helps USAID track  the progress of projects, it does not help with assessing USAID’s progress  in reducing illicit crop production or its ability to create sustainable  projects.
In 2004, USAID officials said a new strategy was being developed that  would allow for the creation of new performance measures. But, USAID  did not develop indicators that are useful in determining whether  alternative development reduces drug production. For example, while  USAID intends for coca farmers in eastern Colombia to move to areas with  alternative development projects, USAID does not track the number of  beneficiaries who moved out of areas prone to coca cultivation.
In addition, while the current alternative development strategy is designed  to produce sustainable results, USAID does not collect tracking data on  beneficiaries who have received assistance to determine whether they  remain in licit productive activities or which projects have resulted in  sustainable businesses without government subsidies. The contractor  responsible for implementing USAID’s alternative development programs  told us USAID does not monitor the necessary indicators and, therefore,  cannot determine the extent to which projects are contributing to  reducing coca cultivation or increasing stability.
section_title: Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons Is Limited
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, State’s Population Refugee and Migration (PRM)  bureau reports it has provided $88 million in short-term, humanitarian  assistance to support IDPs and other vulnerable groups (such as Afro- Colombians and indigenous peoples). PRM provides humanitarian  assistance for up to 3 months after a person is displaced, providing  emergency supplies as well as technical assistance and guidance to the  government of Colombia and local humanitarian groups to build their  capacity to serve IDPs.
In addition, from fiscal years 2000 to 2007, USAID has provided over $200  million for longer term economic and social assistance to support IDPs  and vulnerable groups. USAID assistance has focused on housing needs  and generating employment through job training and business  development and has also included institutional strengthening of  Colombian government entities and nongovernmental organizations  through technical assistance and training in areas such as delivery of  housing improvements and subsidies and the provision of health care.  According to USAID, more than 3 million people have benefited from this  assistance.
However, according to State and USAID officials, the number of newly  displaced persons in Colombia continues to rise, and it can be difficult to  register as an IDP. According to the United Nations High Commissioner  for Refugees, Colombia has up to 3 million IDPs—the most of any country  in the world. Acción Social reports it has registered over 2.5 million IDPs.  But State PRM officials report that international and non-governmental  organizations estimate that between 25 and 40 percent of IDPs are not  registered. Acción Social officials disagreed and estimated under- registration to be 10 percent. In any case, Acción Social officials said that  the agency’s budget is not sufficient to provide assistance to all the IDPs  registered.
section_title: AUC Combatants Have Demobilized, but Reintegration and Reparations Have Been Slow
paragraphs: In 2003, the Colombian government and AUC entered into a peace accord  to demobilize. State data indicate the United States has provided over $44  million for USAID programs for monitoring and processing demobilized  AUC combatants, the verification mission of the Organization of the  American States, reparations and reconciliation for victims of paramilitary  violence, and the reintegration of adult and child ex-combatants into  Colombian society. USAID also supports the National Commission on  Reparation and Reconciliation, which was created to deliver reparations  and assistance to victims.
From 2003 to 2006, according to USAID, approximately 32,000 AUC  members demobilized. Most were offered pardons for the crime of raising  arms against the Colombian state and were enrolled in a government of  Colombia reintegration program. AUC leaders and soldiers who had been  charged, arrested, or convicted of any major crime against humanity (such  as murder and kidnapping) were offered alternative sentencing in  exchange for providing details of crimes in depositions to Colombian  officials. USAID assisted the government of Colombia in the creation of  37 service centers, mostly in large cities, at which ex-combatants could  register for health services, job training, and education and career  opportunities, and has assisted the service centers in tracking the  demobilized soldiers’ participation in the reintegration process. USAID  also assisted with AUC identity verification, criminal record checks, initial  legal processing, documentation of biometric data (such as pictures,  thumbprints, and DNA samples), and issuance of a registration card.
U.S. and Colombian officials report that the AUC demobilization has  enhanced security through reductions in murders, displacements, and  human rights abuses. Depositions have uncovered thousands of crimes,  hundreds of former combatants are serving jail sentences for their crimes,  and victims of paramilitary violence are beginning to see resolution to  crimes committed against them and their families.
In April 2008, the government of Colombia began allowing some FARC  deserters to receive benefits similar to those received by AUC. FARC ex- combatants who cooperate with Colombian authorities may receive  pardons; enter a reintegration program; and have access to training,  medical benefits, and counseling.
Despite the progress made, Colombian and USAID officials told us the  reintegration of demobilized combatants has been slow, and many may  have returned to a life of crime. The reintegration program is the primary  system to prevent the demobilized from joining the ranks of criminal  gangs. However, USAID officials estimate that approximately 6,000 of the  demobilized have not accessed the service centers. Moreover, Colombian  officials told us many businesses have been reluctant to hire the ex- combatants, and the majority has not found employment in the formal  economy. Criminal gangs recruit heavily from the ranks of the  demobilized, and Colombian officials estimate about 10 percent (or 3,000)  have joined these illegal groups.
In addition, a senior Colombian official reported that reparations to the  victims of paramilitary violence have been slow. Ex-combatants have not  been forthcoming about illegally obtained assets—which can be used to  pay for reparations—and often hide them under the names of family or  acquaintances. Victims of paramilitary violence have criticized the  reparations process as slow and expressed resentment of the benefits paid  to demobilized paramilitaries under the reintegration program. Initially,  victims could not receive reparations unless there was a conviction, which  required a lengthy judicial process. But, in April 2008, Colombia began to  provide compensation to over 120,000 paramilitary victims without the  requirement for a conviction.
section_title: USAID Support for Democracy
paragraphs: Since fiscal year 2000, State data indicates that USAID has provided over  $150 million to support the rule of law in Colombia through human rights  protection, the creation of conflict resolution centers, and training of  public defenders, among other activities.
USAID has provided more than 4,500 human rights workers protection  assistance such as communications equipment and bullet proof vests, as  well as technical assistance, training, equipment, and funding to programs  that protect union leaders, journalists, mayors, and leaders of civil society  organizations. USAID also created and provides assistance to Colombia’s  Early Warning System, to alert authorities of violent acts committed by  illegally armed groups. According to USAID, since its inception in 2001,  the Early Warning System has prevented over 200 situations that may have  caused massacres or forced displacements.
By the end of 2007, USAID achieved its goal of creating 45 justice sector  institutions known as Justice Houses, and has trained over 2,000  conciliators who help to resolve cases at Justice Houses; these  conciliators have handled over 7 million cases, relieving pressure on the  Colombian court system. USAID has also refurbished or constructed 45  court rooms to ensure they are adequate for oral hearings under the new  criminal justice system, and is developing 16 “virtual” court rooms, by  which the defendant, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders can all  participate via closed circuit television.
USAID has trained 1,600 public defenders since 2003, including training in  a new criminal procedure code, and the Colombian government now pays  all of the defenders’ salaries.
However, these programs face challenges in receiving commitments from  the Colombian government and addressing shortfalls in equal access to  justice for all Colombians. USAID officials expressed concern about the  Colombian government’s ability to fund the Early Warning System— USAID currently pays 95 to 98 percent of the salaries. According to USAID  officials, a letter of understanding between USAID and the Colombian  government calls for Colombia to pay 100 percent in 2011. In addition, the  45 Justice Houses in Colombia are located in large cities primarily in the  western half of the country, with almost no Justice Houses in the less  populated eastern half of the country where high rates of violence and  crime occur. However, USAID plans to assist the Colombian government  in strengthening state presence in rural areas of Colombia through the  construction of 10 new regional Justice Houses in rural, post conflict  areas.
Since the beginning of 2007, USAID and Defense have committed   $28.5 million for two programs that support Colombia’s “Clear, Hold and  Consolidate” strategy: (1) the Regional Governance Consolidation  Program and (2) the Initial Governance Response Program. Both  programs directly support the Coordination Center for Integrated  Government Action (CCAI), which was created in 2004 to integrate several  military, police, and civil agencies and to coordinate national-level efforts  to reestablish governance in areas that previously had little or no  government presence. USAID works to increase the operational capacity  of CCAI by providing direct planning and strategic assistance; for example,  USAID hired a consulting firm to develop a detailed operational plan for  CCAI’s activities in Meta. USAID also assists CCAI with projects designed  to reinforce stability in areas formerly controlled by insurgents and  quickly build trust between the government and local communities in  Meta—such as La Macarena.
USAID officials said Colombia’s consolidation strategy may serve as a  model for future program activities throughout Colombia; however, CCAI  faces challenges that could limit its success. CCAI does not have its own  budget and relies on support, funding, and personnel from other agencies  within the Colombian government. While Defense officials estimate that  CCAI spent over $100 million from Colombian government agencies in  2007, it often faced delays in receiving the funding. Also, security remains  a primary concern for CCAI because it operates in areas where illegal  armed groups are present. For example, CCAI representatives in La  Macarena do not travel outside of a 5-kilometer radius of the city center  due to security concerns.
section_title: Justice Support for Rule of Law
paragraphs: Justice has provided over $114 million in fiscal years 2000 through 2007   for programs intended to improve the rule of law in Colombia, primarily  for the transition to a new criminal justice system and training and related  assistance for investigating human rights crimes and crimes confessed to  by former combatants during the AUC demobilization.
About $42 million was for training, technical assistance, and equipment to  support the implementation of a new accusatory criminal justice system.  In 2004, Colombia enacted a new Criminal Procedure Code, which began  the implementation of an oral accusatory system involving the  presentation and confrontation of evidence at oral public trials, similar to  the system used in the United States. Justice training has included  simulated crime scenes and court proceedings to develop the necessary  legal and practical understanding of the oral accusatory system. Justice  reports it has trained over 40,000 judges, prosecutors, police investigators,  and forensic experts in preparation for their new roles.
According to Justice, the new accusatory system has improved the  resolution of criminal cases in Colombia. Under the old system, trials took  an average of 5 years; this has been reduced to 1 year under the current  system. According to Justice, the new system has led to an increase in the  conviction rate of 60 to 80 percent, with Colombia reporting 48,000  convictions in the first 2 years of implementation. Furthermore, the  number of complainants and witnesses increased since implementation,  which suggests a greater public confidence in the new system.
Justice also provided about $10 million for fiscal years 2005 to 2007 to  both the Fiscalia’s Justice and Peace Unit and Human Rights Unit to  support the AUC demobilization under the Justice and Peace Process. The  Justice and Peace Unit oversees the process through which demobilized  paramilitaries give depositions that detail their knowledge of the  paramilitary structure and of crimes such as mass killings or human rights  abuses. Justice has provided more than $2 million in equipment, including  video recording technology, to aid in the processing of approximately  5,000 depositions at the Justice and Peace offices in Bogotá, Medellin, and  Barranquilla. The unit also collects and processes complaints filed by  victims of paramilitary violence. The Human Rights Unit is tasked with the  investigation and prosecution of human rights violations, such as attacks  on union leaders, forced disappearances, and mass graves, as well as the  investigation and prosecution of demobilized paramilitary members  suspected of human rights violations.
According to Colombian officials, depositions have led to the confession  of over 1,400 crimes that the government had no prior knowledge of, as  well as the locations of an estimated 10,000 murder victims in 3,500 grave  sites. Over 1,200 victims’ remains have been recovered through  exhumations, and the human identification labs continue to work on the  identification of the remains using DNA testing. According to Justice, the  depositions of 25 paramilitary leaders have been initiated and, in May  2008, 15 leaders were extradited to the United States. The Justice and  Peace Unit has received over 130,000 victims’ claims.
Justice also provided about $10 million from fiscal years 2005 to 2007 to  increase the capacity for the Colombian government to investigate  criminal cases. Justice provided vehicles and funds for investigators to  travel to crime scenes and collect evidence; specialized forensic training  and equipment for Colombian exhumation teams that unearth victims’  remains based on information uncovered in depositions; and training,  technical assistance, and DNA processing kits to Colombian human  identification labs to streamline and improve DNA identification  efficiency. Justice is also funding a project to collect DNA samples from  10,000 demobilized AUC members and enter the data into a DNA  identification database, which could later be compared with DNA found at  crime scenes. Additionally, funds were allocated to contract 30 attorneys  to assist with the analysis and processing of thousands of complaints from  paramilitary victims. Finally, Justice provided specialized criminal training  in the areas of money laundering and anticorruption.
Despite U.S. assistance toward improving Colombian investigative and  prosecutorial capabilities, Colombian officials expressed concern that  they lack the capacity to pursue criminal cases due to a lack of personnel,  air mobility, and security, particularly given that most of the paramilitary  killings and other AUC crimes occurred in rural areas too dangerous or  too difficult to reach by road. In particular:    Fiscalia and Justice officials said neither the Justice and Peace Unit nor  the Human Rights Unit have enough investigators and prosecutors to fully  execute their missions. For example, 45 prosecutors from the Human  Rights Unit have to cover more than 4,000 assigned cases. From 2002 to  2007, the unit produced less than 400 convictions. Further, thousands of  depositions and victim complaints, which Colombian officials say are  likely to reveal additional crimes, have yet to be processed by the Fiscalia.  As of October 2007, over 3,000 known grave sites had not been exhumed  and less than half of the recovered human remains had been identified.   Justice has provided assistance to expand the unit, including regional units  in 7 cities outside of Bogotá. Moreover, Justice reported in September  2008 that the Human Rights Unit has received an additional 72 prosecutors  and 110 investigators, but noted that more investigators are needed.
According to Colombian and U.S. officials, criminal and human rights  investigations and exhumation of graves often require hours and  sometimes days to complete. The investigators often have to go to  conflictive areas that are impossible to access without sufficient  transportation resources. For example, in remote areas investigators often  need army or police helicopters. The Colombian National Policehave  programmed over 15,600 flying hours for their helicopters for 2008;  however, police officials stated that none of these hours were allocated for  Fiscalia investigations.  U.S. officials confirmed Fiscalia’s need for  additional transportation resources, including funding for commercial  transportation as well as assets provided by Colombian security forces.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Transfer Program Operations and Funding Responsibilities to Colombia Have Had Mixed Results
paragraphs: From the outset of Plan Colombia, Congress made clear that it expects all  U.S. support programs would eventually transition to Colombia. With the  completion of Plan Colombia and the start-up of its second phase,  Congress reiterated this guidance and called on State and other affected  agencies to increase the pace of nationalization with a focus on the major  aviation programs under Plan Colombia that are largely funded by State.  In response to this guidance and budget cuts to fiscal year 2008 military  assistance to Colombia instituted by Congress, State and Defense have  accelerated efforts to nationalize or partly nationalize the five major  Colombian military and National Police aviation programs supported by  the United States. Apart from these efforts, State has taken action to  nationalize portions of its nonaviation program support, and State and  Defense are seeking to transfer a portion of the assistance Defense  manages in other program areas to the Colombians by 2010. Justice and  USAID view their efforts as extending over a longer period than U.S.  support to the Colombian military and have not yet developed specific  nationalization plans; however, each agency is seeking to provide its  Colombian counterparts with the technical capabilities needed to manage  program operations on their own. U.S. nationalization efforts collectively  face the challenges of uncertain funding levels and questions pertaining to  Colombia’s near-term ability to assume additional funding responsibilities.
subsections: section_title: State Has Defined Nationalization Plans for the Army Aviation Brigade and Plans to Provide Ongoing Support for National Police Aviation Programs
paragraphs: State has initiated the transfer of program funding and operations for the  Army Aviation Brigade to the Colombians—by far the largest aviation  program funded by State. Nationalization efforts have centered on a  contractor reduction plan created by State in 2004 to eliminate the  Colombians’ reliance on U.S. contract pilots and mechanics (see fig. 18).  This process, however, will not be completed until at least 2012 when  State expects the Colombians will have enough trained pilots and  mechanics to operate the brigade on their own. Contract pilot and  mechanic totals provided by State indicate that the plan is on track. U.S.  officials added that the transfer of U.S. titled aircraft and the termination  of U.S. support for other costs, such as parts and supplies, will occur by  2012 as part of this plan.
In contrast to the Army Aviation Brigade, State has not developed   contractor reduction plans for the National Police’s Air Service or Aerial  Eradication Program—the second and third largest aviation programs  supported by State, which work together to address U.S. and Colombian  counternarcotics objectives. U.S. Embassy and State program officials  explained that State’s assistance to the police is expected to continue for  the indefinite future, subject to congressional funding decisions, to sustain  a partnership with the police which predates Plan Colombia. However,  State has taken certain steps, such as training Colombian mechanics to  replace contract personnel, to reduce the Colombian’s dependence on U.S.  assistance. As of June 2008, only 3 of the Colombian National Police’s Air  Service 233 pilots were contract personnel, while 61 out of 422 mechanics  were contractors. For the Colombian National Police’s Aerial Eradication  Program, as of June 2008, 61 out of 76 pilots were contract personnel,  while 166 out of 172 mechanics were contract staff. NAS plans to institute  a series of efforts, including the training of spray plane mechanics, to  increase the ability of the Colombians to assume a greater share of total  program costs.
section_title: Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Cuts Accelerated Nationalization Efforts
paragraphs: U.S. nationalization efforts were accelerated in the wake of the fiscal year  2008 budget cuts instituted by Congress but remain focused on State  funded aviation programs. Based on discussions with the Colombians   beginning in 2007, the United States identified six key elements of NAS  aviation programs as a starting point for accelerated nationalization  efforts, which supplement the steps described above. As show in table 4,  these six areas cut across U.S. supported aviation programs in Colombia.  U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials estimated that these actions could result in  nearly $70 million in annual program savings. NAS is currently seeking to  identify additional budget savings by reducing its aerial spray program and  through a wide assortment of “efficiencies” they expect to implement.  State officials noted that these reductions and efficiencies will lead to  diminished eradication and interdiction results.
State has made significant progress in nationalizing nonaviation programs,  including support for interdiction efforts (seaport, airport security, base  security and roads, and Junglas operations) and programs designed to  extend the Colombian government’s presence throughout the country  (mainly, reestablishing a National Police presence in all municipalities);  and an individual deserter program, which supplements the formal  demobilization and re-integration programs managed by USAID. NAS  largely describes all of these programs, with regards to U.S. funded  employee or contractor involvement, as being fully nationalized or nearly  nationalized with only limited U.S. oversight or technical assistance being  provided.
section_title: Defense and State are Working on a Transition Strategy
paragraphs: Defense nationalization efforts are managed by the U.S. military group in  Bogotá. A senior military group official noted that Defense’s  nationalization efforts are based on limited draw downs in Defense  managed funds which include both State FMF funds and Defense’s  counternarcotics budget. The U.S. government is seeking to establish a  strategic partnership with Colombia by 2010 whereby the Colombian  Ministry of Defense will accelerate its efforts to assume increased funding  and management responsibilities for programs currently supported with  U.S. military assistance. The same official noted that the Military Group   has closely coordinated this nationalization strategy with the Colombian  military at all levels since November 2007.
According to Defense officials, the 2008 cuts in FMF and Defense funding   led to a reexamination of plans to transition some program funding and  implementation responsibilities to the Colombians. In line with this  reexamination, the U.S. Military Group in Bogotá and State’s Bureau for  Political and Military Affairs are developing a report to Congress which  will detail their strategy to reduce FMF and Defense counternarcotics  support over the next several years with an initial focus on 2010 when it is  hoped the Colombians will reach a point of “irreversibility” with regards to  security advances against the FARC and other illegal armed groups.
section_title: USAID and Justice Efforts Focus on Sustainability and Will Take Years to Implement
paragraphs: USAID and Justice are focusing on the sustainability of projects and  providing the Colombians with the technical capabilities to manage their  own programs; however, neither agency has developed comprehensive  transition plans. USAID and Justice efforts to transfer program and  funding responsibilities differ significantly from State and Defense since,  with limited exceptions, they do not have physical assets to turn over to  the Colombians. Rather, their efforts center on training and capacity  building to allow the Colombians to ultimately manage their own  programs.
USAID efforts focus on developing sustainable nonmilitary assistance  programs, increasing the capacity of the government of Colombia to  design and manage similar projects, and transferring any support  activities, as warranted. USAID is seeking to create sustainable projects, in  part, by increasing financial participation by the Colombian government,  private sector, and project beneficiaries. For example, USAID alternative  development projects are funded 70 percent to 90 percent by outside  groups, on average, and have over $500 million in public and private funds.
USAID is also seeking to increase the Colombians’ ability to design and  manage their own assistance programs by involving relevant government  of Colombia staff in project design and implementation activities. For  example, USAID provides technical assistance to the government of  Colombia on financial policy reforms that seek to expand financial  services to underserved groups and isolated regions. USAID also provides  training to Colombian banks, credit unions, and nongovernmental  organizations to establish and expand financial services for these groups.  USAID has made efforts to transfer specific program operations and  funding responsibilities for several projects. For example, USAID is  transferring the Human Rights Early Warning System, which was originally  funded entirely by USAID. Under an agreement, the government of  Colombia currently funds 30 percent of this program and is supposed to  assume full operational and financial responsibilities of this program in  2011. In addition, USAID will now contribute no more than 50 percent  toward the construction of Justice Houses, which were initially  constructed entirely with USAID funds.
Justice efforts focus on building the capacity of the Colombian  government in several areas, such as increasing the ability of the  government to investigate and prosecute crimes, as well as provide  protection to witnesses and legal personnel. Justice officials describe the  process as one of creating an enduring partnership with the Colombian  government through the provision of training and technical assistance.  Justice conducts many “train the trainers” programs designed to enhance  the ability of the Colombian government to continuously build institutional  knowledge in certain program areas.
section_title: Uncertain U.S. Assistance Levels and Government of Colombia Funding Complicate Nationalization Efforts
paragraphs: Both U.S. and Colombian officials said the congressionally mandated cuts  to military assistance in 2008 and uncertainty over future years’ funding  complicate the process of planning and implementing nationalization  efforts. In addition, while Colombia’s economic outlook has improved in  recent years, its ability to appropriate funds quickly or reallocate funds  already approved is limited.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Congressionally Mandated Spending Cuts Altered Nationalization Plans
paragraphs: State noted in its April 2008 multiyear strategy report to Congress that the  fiscal year 2008 budget significantly changed the mix of U.S. assistance to  Colombia by reducing eradication, interdiction, and FMF programs and  increasing support for economic development, rule of law, human rights,  and humanitarian assistance. The report notes agreement with Congress  on the importance of increasing support for nonmilitary programs, but  State expressed concern regarding Colombia’s ability to use this  assistance without the security that air mobility assets provide. The report  also notes State’s concern about the need to “ensure a smooth and  coordinated transition of financial and operational responsibilities to the  government of Colombia for interdiction, eradication, and  counterterrorism programs.”
The Colombian Vice Minister of Defense stressed that the budget cuts  mandated by Congress could not be fully absorbed within Colombia’s  current budget cycle and added that the Ministry of Defense is severely  restricted in its ability to reprogram funds or request emergency spending  from the central government. He also said that unplanned cuts of this  magnitude put major programs at risk, in particular programs aimed at  providing the Colombians with air mobility capabilities needed to support  drug reduction, enhanced state presence, and a range of social and  economic programs.
Both U.S. and Colombian officials are working on a detailed  nationalization agreement that would outline next steps, transition plans,  key players and responsibilities, and potential funding sources. In line  with this objective, the Colombians have formed an Office of Special  Projects to head up all nationalization efforts involving the Ministry of  Defense. The office Director told us that, while all prior attempts at  nationalization planning have not been implemented, the government of  Colombia has begun a serious effort to plan for nationalization. According  to the Director, this effort includes (1) developing an inventory of all U.S.  assistance provided to Colombia in order to identify potential candidates  for nationalization, (2) prioritizing the list and working with the Ministry of  Financing and the National Planning Department to ensure that adequate  funds will be made available to finance these priority items, and (3)  discussing the prioritized list with U.S. representatives.
section_title: Colombia’s Ability to Assume Program Costs Has Improved
paragraphs: Despite an improving economy and growth in public-sector resources, the  Colombians have issued a call for international assistance to help fund a  portion of PCCP from 2007 through 2013 noting that even a “single year  without international support would force a retreat on the important  advances that have been made so far.” The call for assistance is similar to  that issued by the Colombians at the outset of Plan Colombia, when  internal security concerns and poor economic conditions limited the  Colombian government’s ability to fund its counternarcotics and  counterterrorism objectives. The PCCP plan calls for spending by  Colombia to total almost $44 billion from 2007 through 2013, with $6  billion of this total devoted to counternarcotics and counterterrorism  operations and the balance devoted to social, economic, and rule of law  efforts.
When Plan Colombia was first announced in 1999, a combination of  domestic and foreign events limited Colombia’s economic growth and its  ability to fully fund the costs of its plan. As noted in a November 2007  assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),  Colombia’s financial system experienced a period of stress, during the late  1990s, characterized by the failure of several banks and other financial  institutions, as well as by the severe deterioration of the system’s financial  health. The situation was exacerbated by violent conflict and, in 1999, the  country’s gross domestic product fell by 4.2 percent, the first contraction  in output since the 1930s. In 2003, we reported that Colombia’s ability to  provide additional funding to sustain the counternarcotics programs  without a greatly improved economy was limited.
Improvements in Colombia’s security environment and economy have  allowed the government to significantly increase spending levels in a  number of areas. Colombia’s $130 billion economy grew at 6.8 percent in  2006, the highest rate in 28 years and two points faster than the Latin  American average. Colombia has reduced its inflation rate from 16.7  percent in 1998 to 4.5 percent in 2006. According to the CSIS report,  Colombia has improved its economy through a combination of fiscal  reforms, public debt management, reduction of inflation, and  strengthening of the financial system—policies that, along with three  successive International Monetary Fund arrangements, have placed the  country on a path of sustainable growth while reducing poverty and  unemployment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While Plan Colombia’s drug reduction goals were not fully met, U.S.  assistance has helped stabilize Colombia’s internal security situation by  weakening the power of illegal armed groups to hold disputed areas that  largely correlate to the major coca growing regions in the country. State  anticipates that billions of dollars in additional aid will need to be  provided to Colombia through at least 2013 to help achieve a desired end- state where drug, security, social and economic welfare, and civil society  problems reach manageable levels.
One principal challenge is determining which combination of military and  nonmilitary programs will have the greatest affect on combating the drug  trade in Colombia. Program activities in the past have relied heavily on the  use of aerial spraying as a key tool for driving down coca cultivation  levels, and the vast bulk of U.S. counternarcotics assistance has gone to  eradication and interdiction efforts. However, coca cultivation reduction  goals were not met. As a result, Congress directed a decreased emphasis  on aerial eradication, while directing that more be spent on alternative  development and in other nonmilitary program areas. However, USAID  does not currently measure the effect alternative development has on this  goal or the extent to which its programs are self-sustaining.
Congress has renewed its call for accelerated nationalization efforts on the  part of State and other U.S. agencies operating in Colombia. Both State  and Defense are engaged in reducing assistance for military and police  programs. USAID and Justice officials agree that sustainable nonmilitary  programs will take years to develop, however, both agencies have begun  to nationalize some portions of their assistance. While high-level planning  for nationalization has taken place and several discrete planning efforts  are in place or are under development, U.S. nationalization efforts are not  guided by an integrated plan that fully addresses the complex mix of  agency programs, differing agency goals, and varying timetables for  nationalization. Such a plan should include key milestones and future  funding requirements that take into account the government of Colombia’s  ability to assume program costs supported by the United States.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the  Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, and Administrator of USAID, and  in coordination with the government of Colombia, develop an integrated  nationalization plan that details plans for turning over operational and  funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to Colombia. This  plan should define U.S. roles and responsibilities for all U.S.-supported  military and non-military programs. Other key plan elements should  include future funding requirements; a detailed assessment of Colombia’s  fiscal situation, spending priorities, and ability to assume additional  funding responsibilities; and specific milestones for completing the  transition to the Colombians.
We also recommend that the Director of Foreign Assistance and  Administrator of USAID develop performance measurements that will help  USAID (1) assess whether alternative development assistance is reducing  the production of illicit narcotics, and (2) determine to what extent the  agency’s alternative development projects are self-sustaining.
section_title: Agency Comments and Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the departments of Defense,  Homeland Security, Justice, and State; ONDCP; and USAID for their  comments.  Defense, State, ONDCP, and USAID provided written  comments, which are reproduced in appendixes IV through VII.  All except  Homeland Security provided technical comments and updates, which we  incorporated in the report, as appropriate.
In commenting on our recommendation to the Secretary of State, State  agreed that it should continue to improve the coordination of  nationalization efforts among Defense, other executive branch agencies,  and the government of Colombia. State noted that its annual multiyear  strategy report (which it first provided to Congress in 2006) offers the  most useful format to address our recommendation. While State’s annual  report is useful, it does not incorporate and rationalize the complex mix of  agency programs, funding plans and schedules, differing agency goals, and  varying timetables for nationalization as we recommend. State did not  address how it intends to address these more detailed elements with  Defense, Justice, and USAID. We continue to believe that an integrated  plan addressing these elements would benefit the interagency and the  Congress alike, as future assistance for Colombia is considered.
In commenting on our recommendation to the Administrator of USAID,  USAID stated that the measures it has are sufficient to gauge progress  towards its strategic goals. However, USAID went on to say that better  measures/indicators to assess alternative development projects could be  developed. The USAID mission in Colombia noted that it is working with  the USAID missions in Bolivia and Peru, which also manage alternative  development programs, to identify new indicators to help measure  progress. The USAID/Colombia mission also stated that  USAID/Washington should lead an effort, in conjunction with the field and  other interested agencies, to develop common indicators that would  enhance USAID’s ability to measure alternative development performance.   We concur. In making our recommendation, we concluded that USAID’s  measures were largely output indicators that did not directly address  reducing illicit drug activities or the long-term sustainability of USAID’s  efforts. An overall review such as USAID/Colombia suggests may help  address this shortcoming.
ONDCP and State commented that our draft report left the impression that  little or no progress had been made with regards to Plan Colombia’s  counternarcotics goal. In response, we modified the report title and  specific references in the report to better reflect that some progress was  made; primarily, opium poppy cultivation and heroin production were  reduced by about 50 percent. However, coca cultivation and cocaine  production have been the focus of Colombian and U.S. drug reduction  efforts since 2000. Neither was reduced; rather, both coca cultivation and  cocaine production rose from 2000 to 2006. However, at ONDCP’s  suggestion, we added current information that suggests cocaine  productivity (cocaine yield per hectare of coca) in Colombia has declined  in recent years.
Finally, ONDCP also commented that the report did not adequately  address the full range of program goals associated with Plan Colombia and  the progress made towards achieving these goals. We disagree. In  characterizing and summarizing Plan Colombia’s goals and U.S. programs,  we reviewed reports prepared by State as well as our prior reports, and  discussed the goals and associated programs with U.S. officials both in  Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, and with numerous  government of Colombia officials. We addressed U.S. assistance provided  for nine specific Colombian military and National Police programs to  increase their operational capacity, as well as numerous State, Justice, and  USAID efforts to promote social and economic justice, including  alternative development, and to promote the rule of law, including judicial  reform and capacity building. We also note that State, USAID, and Defense  did not raise similar concerns.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense and State; the  Attorney General; the Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID  Administrator; and the Director of ONDCP. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available  at no charge on the GAO web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We examined U.S. assistance efforts since 2000 when funding for Plan  Colombia was first approved. Specifically, we examined (1) the progress  made toward Plan Colombia’s drug reduction and enhanced security  objectives; (2) program support provided to the Colombian military and  National Police, including specific results and related challenges; (3)  nonmilitary program support provided to Colombia, including specific  results and related challenges; and (4) the status of U.S. and Colombian  efforts to nationalize U.S. assistance and the challenges, if any, these  efforts face.
subsections: section_title: Drug Reduction and Enhanced Security
paragraphs: To address the progress made toward Plan Colombia’s drug reduction and  enhanced security objectives, we reviewed various U.S. and Colombian  government reports and met with cognizant officials to discuss trends and  the nature of the data. For trends in drug cultivation, production, and flow  we relied primarily on U.S. agencies’ information and officials. For trends  in security data on government territorial control, homicides, kidnappings,  and ridership on Colombian roads, we relied on data reported by the  Colombian Ministry of Defense and other Colombian government  ministries.
subsections: section_title: Drug Reduction
paragraphs: To evaluate trends in Colombian drug cultivation and trafficking since  calendar year 2000, we reviewed various studies, such as the National  Drug Threat Assessment produced each year by the National Drug  Intelligence Center. We reviewed various strategy documents produced by  the United States that are the basis for overall drug control efforts, such as  the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) annual National  Drug Control Strategy, and the Department of State’s (State) annual  International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).
To track changes in coca cultivation and cocaine production trends in  Colombia we relied on the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement  (IACM), an annual interagency study designed to advise policymakers and  resource analysts whose responsibilities include detection, monitoring,  and interdicting illegal drug shipments.
To track changes in the combined amount of cocaine flowing towards the  United States from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, we relied on IACM.
Because no similar interagency flow assessments are done for heroin, we  obtained estimates of production and seizures from State’s INCSR and the  National Drug Threat Assessments.
To understand how these estimates were developed, we discussed the  studies and overall trends in the illicit drug threat from Colombia with  officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency in Arlington, Virginia; the  Drug Enforcement Administration in Arlington, Virginia; the Central  Intelligence Agency’s Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), Langley,  Virginia; the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Key West, Florida; and  the Narcotics Affairs Section and the U.S. Military Group, U.S. Embassy,  Bogotá, Colombia. We also met with and discussed these overall trends  with Colombian officials in the Ministries of Defense, including the Deputy  Minister of Defense. In addition, we compared the patterns and trends for  the cultivation, production, and movement of cocaine and the cultivation  and production of opium and noted that they were broadly consistent.
We determined cultivation, production, and illicit narcotics flow data have  some limitations, due in part to the illegal nature of the drug trade and the  time lag inherent in collecting meaningful data. With regard to estimates of  coca cultivation and cocaine production levels in Colombia, we noted that  CNC expanded the number of hectares surveyed for coca cultivation  beginning in 2005 in response to concerns that coca farmers were moving  their operations to avoid aerial spray operations. Between 2004 and 2006,  CNC’s survey area rose from 10.9 million hectares to 23.6 million hectares.  This change complicates the process of comparing pre-2005 cultivation  levels with later year estimates. In addition, because of methodological  concerns, the IACM began reporting in 2004 its estimated flow of cocaine  as a range rather than a point estimate. Notwithstanding these limitations,  we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to provide an  overall indication of the relative magnitude of, and general trends in,  Colombia’s illicit drug trade since 2000.
section_title: Security
paragraphs: To evaluate security trends, we used data provided primarily by the  government of Colombia. To assess its reliability, we interviewed  knowledgeable officials at the U.S. Embassy Bogotá and compared general  patterns across data sets. We met with and discussed these overall trends  with Colombian officials in the Ministries of Defense (including the  Deputy Minister of Defense) and Justice (including the Colombian  Attorney General). Some civil society representatives expressed concern  that Colombian officials may be pressured to present favorable statistics,  and that some information may be exaggerated. Nonetheless, U.S. officials,  both in Washington, D.C., and Bogotá expressed confidence that the data  illustrate overall trends that are widely accepted as accurate. U.S. officials  added that while specific checks on the validity of these data are not  conducted, data provided by Colombia are consistent with independent  U.S. Embassy Bogotá reporting on Colombia’s political, military, and  economic environment. As a result, we determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable to indicate general trends in government territorial  control, homicides, kidnappings, and ridership between 2000 and 2006.
section_title: U.S. Assistance to the Colombian Military and National Police
paragraphs: To assess program support provided to the Colombian military and  National Police since 2000, including results and related challenges, we  reviewed and analyzed congressional budget presentations, program and  project status reports, our prior reports, and related information. We also  reviewed program and budgetary data from the various departments and  agencies in Washington, D.C., that manage these programs and met with  officials responsible for these programs, including officials from State and  Defense, as well as the Office of National Drug Control Policy. We met  with cognizant U.S. officials at the U.S. Southern Command headquarters,  Miami, Florida; State’s Office of Aviation Programs headquarters, Patrick  Air Force Base, Florida; and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Key  West, Florida. At the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia, we met with U.S.  officials with the Narcotics Affairs Section, the U.S. Military Group, and  the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as U.S.-funded contractor  representatives assisting with the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, the  National Police Air Service, and the police aerial eradication program. In  Bogotá, we also met with Colombian Ministry of Defense military and  police commanders and other officials, including the Deputy Minister of  Defense. We visited facilities and met with Colombian Army commanders  at the Army’s Aviation Brigade headquarters in Tolemaida, the  Counternarcotics Brigade headquarters in Larandia, and Task Force- Omega’s operating base in La Macarena; and Colombian Marine  commanders at their operating base in Tumaco. We also visited facilities  and met with Colombian National Police commanders and other officials  at its main base in Guaymaral (near Bogotá) and a police operating base in  Tumaco, where we observed an aerial eradication mission in southern  Nariño.
To evaluate the reliability of funding and performance data (beyond the  drug cultivation, production, and flow, as well as security indicators  discussed above) provided by U.S. and Colombian officials, we analyzed  relevant U.S. and Colombian data sources and interviewed cognizant  officials to determine the basis for reported information. We performed  cross-checks of the data by comparing internal and external budget  reports (such as State and Defense Congressional Budget Justifications),  agency performance reports, and classified information sources. We  determined that the cost and performance data provided were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of our report.
section_title: U.S. Assistance for Nonmilitary Programs
paragraphs: To assess nonmilitary program support provided since 2000, including  results and related challenges, we reviewed our prior reports along with  pertinent planning, implementation, strategic, and related documents and  met with cognizant U.S. officials at State and Justice and the U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID) in Washington, D.C., and the U.S.  Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. To review the progress of alternative  development programs, we met USAID officials and contractors in  Washington, D.C., and in Colombia. We reviewed pertinent planning  documentation including USAID strategic plans for 2000-2005 and 2006-  2007, as well as progress reports produced by USAID’s prime contractor.  We observed alternative development programs in the departments of  Bolivar, Huila, Popayán, and Santander. To review efforts on internally  displaced persons and demobilization, we met with officials from USAID,  Justice, and State’s Population Refugee and Migration Bureau in  Washington, D.C., and in Colombia. We interviewed government of  Colombia officials from Acción Social, the National Commission on  Reconciliation and Reparations, the Ministry of Interior and Justice, the  Fiscalia, the Superior Council for the Judiciary, Inspector General’s Office,  the Public Defenders Directorate, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the  Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. We also met with the High  Commissioner for Reconciliation and Reintegration in Colombia, and with  civil society and private-sector representatives both in Washington, D.C.,  and Colombia regarding human rights issues. We observed programs in the  cities of Bogotá, Cartagena, and Medellin.
To evaluate the reliability of funding and performance data provided by  U.S. and Colombian officials, we analyzed relevant U.S. and Colombian  data sources and interviewed cognizant officials to determine the basis for  reported information. We performed cross-checks of provided data against  internal agency budget documents and external U.S. budget reports (such  as State, USAID, and Justice Congressional Budget Justifications), agency  performance reports, and Colombian reports and studies. We determined  that the cost data provided by U.S. agencies was sufficiently reliable for  our purposes.
We did note certain limitations with regard to the performance data we  received from U.S. agencies. Because of the difficult security situation in  Colombia, U.S. agencies must often rely on third parties to document  performance data. In particular, the USAID Office of Inspector General  raised some concerns in May 2007 regarding the consistency with which  alternative development performance goals had been defined, but was  nevertheless able to use the data to determine whether overall goals had  been met. Consequently, we determined that the data on families that have  benefited from alternative development assistance, infrastructure projects  completed, hectares of licit agricultural crops developed, and private- sector funds leveraged by USAID activities were sufficiently reliable to  allow for broad comparisons of actual performance in 2007 against the  goals that had been set, but that these data could not be used for very  precise comparisons.
section_title: Efforts to Nationalize
paragraphs: To determine the status of U.S. and Colombian efforts to nationalize U.S.  assistance, we reviewed planning and strategic documents related to  nationalization, including a memorandum of understanding between the  United States and Colombia regarding the transfer of programs. We met  with State and Defense officials in Washington, D.C.; State’s Office of  Aviation Programs at Patrick Air Force Base; and U.S. Southern Command  in Florida. We met with a special consultant to State who was conducting  a strategic review of State programs in Colombia. In Colombia, we met  with designated U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials responsible for managing  U.S. nationalization efforts, along with an ambassador appointed by State  to lead negotiations with Colombia regarding current and planned steps in  the nationalization process. We discussed the implications of  nationalization with Colombian government officials from the National  Planning Department, the Ministry of Defense (in particular, the Office of  Special Projects charged with leading the ministry’s nationalization  efforts), the Colombian Army and National Police, the Ministry of Interior  and Justice, and AcciÓn Social.
Finally, the information and observations on foreign law in this report do  not reflect our independent legal analysis but are based on interviews with  cognizant officials and secondary sources.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Support Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade and Police Air Service
paragraphs: State and Defense officials told us that the Army Aviation Brigade has  been provided with essential support services needed to manage a modern  combat aviation service, including infrastructure and maintenance  support; contract pilots and mechanics; assistance to train pilots and  mechanics; flight planning, safety, and quality control standards and  procedures; and a logistics system. Table 5 describes these support  services in more detail.
Similar to the Army Aviation Brigade, State has provided key program  support elements to the Colombian National Police’s Air Service. These  elements include contract mechanics; mechanics training; the  construction of helipads and hangers; and funding for spare parts, fuel,  and other expenses. Table 6 describes these support services in more  detail.
section_title: Appendix III: Estimated Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000–2007
paragraphs: As illustrated in figure 19, the estimated number of hectares of coca under  cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru has varied since 2000 from an  estimated 187,500 hectares to 233,000 hectares in 2007, and averaged  about 200,000 hectares since 2000. As noted in our report, these changes  were due, at least in part, to the Crime and Narcotics Center’s decision to  increase the size of the coca cultivation survey areas in Colombia from  2004 to 2006.
The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community uses the number of  hectares of coca under cultivation to help estimate the amount of 100  percent pure cocaine that can be produced in each country.  Essentially,  the community calculates production efficiency rates for turning coca leaf  into cocaine and applies it to the total number of hectares under  cultivation.  As illustrated in figure 20, the total amount of estimated pure  cocaine produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru has fluctuated since 2000  but has risen from 770 metric tons in 2000 to 865 metric tons in 2007, and  averaged about 860 metric tons per year since 2000.
In 2008, the interagency counternarcotics community reduced Colombia’s  estimated cocaine production efficiency rate for the years 2003 through  2007. The community attributed the reduced efficiency to Colombia’s  efforts to eradicate coca. However, according to Drug Enforcement  Administration officials, the interagency had also raised the production  efficiency rate in Peru for 2002 through 2005 due to better processing  techniques, which offset much of the reduction in Colombia. The Drug  Enforcement Administration also noted that it has not reassessed the  cocaine production efficiency rate in Bolivia since 1993, but expects that  Bolivia has improved its processing techniques and is producing more  pure cocaine than the interagency has estimated.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: Following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s comment  letter dated September 17, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  The transfer of these assets was not highlighted as a significant  example of nationalization during the course of our review when we  met with Defense officials in Washington, D.C., or the U.S. Military  Group in Bogotá. Nonetheless, we added a statement to report  progress in this area.  2.  We incorporated Defense’s observation that the Strategic Partner  Transition Plan addresses both Foreign Military Financing and Defense  counternarcotics funding. As noted in our report, however, State’s  Political-Military Bureau declined to provide us a copy of the plan until  it is formally released to Congress. As a result, we were not able to  independently assess the plan’s content and scope.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State
paragraphs: Following are GAO’s comments on the State Department’s comment letter  dated September 17, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comment
paragraphs: 1.  We included additional information on coca cultivation and cocaine  production patterns in the final report. We also note that 2007 coca  cultivation and cocaine production data did not become available until  after this report was released for agency comments, and we have  added it, as appropriate.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy
paragraphs: Following are GAO’s comments on the Office of National Drug Control  Policy’s comment letter dated September 17, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We disagree. In characterizing and summarizing Plan Colombia’s goals  and U.S. programs, we reviewed reports prepared by State as well as  our prior reports, and discussed the goals and associated programs  with U.S. officials both in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in  Bogotá, and with numerous government of Colombia officials. We  addressed U.S. assistance provided for nine specific Colombian  military and National Police programs to increase their operational  capacity, as well as, numerous State, Justice, and USAID efforts to  promote social and economic justice, including alternative  development, and to promote the rule of law, including judicial reform  and capacity building. We also note that State, USAID, and Defense did  not raise similar concerns.    2.  The drop in potential cocaine production that ONDCP cites compares  2001 (when coca cultivation and production peaked) to 2007. Our  report compares 2000 (when U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was first  approved) to 2006 (Plan Colombia’s drug reduction goal was tied to 6- year time period). We also note that 2007 coca cultivation and cocaine  production data did not become available until after this report was  released for agency comments, and we have added it, as appropriate.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
paragraphs: Following are GAO’s comments on the U. S. Agency for International  Development’s comment letter dated September 11, 2008.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We modified the report to note USAID has initiated nationalization  efforts for each of its major program areas and several major projects.   However, we note that USAID’s nationalization efforts are program  and project specific and are not integrated with the range of other U.S.  government efforts, as we recommend should be done.   2.  We believe we fairly characterized USAID’s assistance role in the  counternarcotics strategy for Colombia. However, we did not intend to  imply that USAID alternative development programs are social  programs. We intended to note that USAID’s assistance supports social  infrastructure, such as schools and other community projects. We  clarified the text where appropriate.  3.  We only intended to note that most coca growing areas do not receive  USAID assistance for various reasons, including restrictions by the  government of Colombia. USAID resources are scarce and must be  deployed to the areas most likely to achieve sustainable results. We  added text to note that the majority of the Colombian population lives  within the geographic areas where USAID operates. However, the fact  that the majority of coca is cultivated outside of USAID’s economic  corridors poses challenges for USAID’s strategic goal of reducing the  production of illegal drugs.    4.  We endorse and commend USAID/Colombia’s attempt to work at both  the mission level and with USAID/Washington to develop common  indicators which would enhance USAID’s ability to assess the  performance of alternative development projects.  5.  We recognize key indicators such as increased gross market value and  number of families benefited are useful in determining the impact of  USAID programs at a family or farm level. However, these indicators  do not measure the sustainability of the projects, such as whether  families or businesses have continued in legal productive activities  after USAID assistance has ended.   6.  We agree that outside support for USAID alternative development  projects is a key component of creating self-sustaining projects.   However, this point does not address the fact that USAID does not  currently collect and report data on whether USAID supported  activities continue after its involvement ends.
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the above named individual, A.H. Huntington, III, Assistant  Director; Joseph Carney, Jonathan Fremont, Emily Gupta, Jose Peña, an Michael ten Kate made key contributions to this report. Technical  assistance was provided by Joyce Evans, Jena Sinkfield, and Cynthia  Taylor.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries  Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability  Plans Are Needed. GAO-08-784. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics  Efforts, but the Flow of Illicit Drugs into the United States Remains  High. GAO-08-215T. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2007.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics  Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States,  GAO-07-1018. Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2007.
State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic Approach for  Managing Its Aviation Fleet. GAO-07-264.  Washington, D.C.:   February 2, 2007.
Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug  Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for  Transit Zone Operations. GAO-06-200. Washington, D.C.: November 15,  2005.
Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia’s Caño Limón-Coveñas  Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-971.  Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented  New Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear.   GAO-05-970. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to  Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable.   GAO-04-726. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004.
Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being  Addressed, but State’s Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be  Improved. GAO-04-918.  Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2004.
Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for  U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed. GAO-03-783.  Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Drug Control: Financial and Management Challenges Continue to  Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia.  GAO-03-820T. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2003.
Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colomb GAO-03-319R.  Washington, D.C.: January 8, 2003. ia.
Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops  in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles.  GAO-02-291. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2002.
Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit  Zone Interdiction Efforts. GAO-02-13. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2002.
Drug Control: State Department Provides Required Aviation Program  Support, but Safety and Security Should Be Enhanced. GAO-01-1021  Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2001.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce  Results. GAO-01-26. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2000.
Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia. GAO-01-76T.  Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2000.
Drug Control: U.S. Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.   GAO/NSIAD-00-90R. Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2000.