Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Made Progress to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Efforts
Published: 2015-09-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In April 2009, President Obama announced an initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials—such as those that could be stolen by terrorists and used to construct a nuclear device—within 4 years. DOE is primarily responsible for activities under this initiative, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, and the National Security Council (NSC) also have roles. GAO was asked to examine actions taken under this initiative.
This report (1) assesses the extent to which DOE achieved its goals for four key activities under the initiative and (2) examines DOE's goals going forward and assesses challenges that may limit its ability to secure additional vulnerable nuclear materials. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from DOE, NRC, DOD, and State, as well as discussed these issues with officials from NSC and selected foreign government agencies. This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in August 2015.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Energy (DOE) achieved goals for two of its four key activities under the President's 2009 initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years. Specifically, from April 2009 through December 2013, GAO's analysis of DOE's records found that DOE exceeded its goal for removing or disposing of 1,201 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium by more than 400 kilograms, and it exceeded its goal of downblending (i.e., mixing HEU with either depleted or natural uranium, or low-enriched uranium (LEU), to produce a new product that has a lower concentration of uranium-235) 2,700 kilograms of HEU by an additional 2,200 kilograms. However, it missed its goal for providing physical protection upgrades at 43 buildings by 11 buildings and missed its goal of converting 34 foreign reactors to more proliferation-resistant LEU by 11 reactors. DOE officials said that political challenges, including access to key sites, and technical concerns such as delays in the development of LEU replacement fuels for certain high-performing nuclear reactors, complicated its efforts to achieve these goals.
DOE has developed new goals since the end of the 2009 initiative for efforts related to the initiative's four key activities. For example, DOE's goal is to remove or dispose of an additional 1,029 kilograms of fresh and spent HEU, as well as plutonium worldwide from 2014 to December 2019, and convert 27 foreign research reactors and medical isotope production facilities to LEU by the end of fiscal year 2019. However, GAO identified several challenges that may hamper future progress. For example, DOE and other U.S. agencies have not completed an inventory of U.S plutonium overseas as GAO previously recommended in September 2011. DOE and the other agencies did not agree with this recommendation, citing such an effort was impractical and unwarranted. Without such an inventory, the U.S. government is not able to identify where vulnerable weapons-usable materials such as plutonium reside. In addition, DOE has neither completed a prioritization of nuclear materials, including recently identified U.S.-origin HEU, at foreign locations for return or disposition to identify the most vulnerable material stocks to focus efforts on, nor established a time frame for doing so. Another challenge GAO identified is that DOE and other agencies have not visited key sites to determine whether U.S. nuclear material on-site is protected according to international physical security guidelines. Specifically, GAO identified 11 key sites that hold more than 3,500 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU that DOE and other agencies have not visited in more than 20 years to determine whether they are protected according to international physical security guidelines. DOE has taken steps to develop a methodology for selecting and prioritizing physical protection visits but has not yet provided GAO with a time frame for prioritizing and conducting such visits. Without an assessment of the physical security conditions of U.S.-origin nuclear materials at sites containing key quantities of such material, it may be difficult to ensure that such materials are being adequately protected in accordance with international physical security guidelines, and that DOE and U.S. agencies are removing or disposing of the most vulnerable nuclear materials.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO continues to believe that DOE and other U.S. agencies should complete an inventory of U.S. plutonium at worldwide sites as GAO recommended in September 2011. In this report, GAO recommends that DOE complete its prioritization of nuclear materials at foreign locations. GAO also recommends that DOE and other agencies visit sites containing key quantities of U.S nuclear materials that have not been visited in at least 5 years. DOE agreed with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: One of the most serious threats facing the United States and other  countries is the possibility that other nations or terrorist organizations  could steal a nuclear warhead or highly enriched uranium (HEU),  separated plutonium, or other nuclear materials. Vulnerable nuclear  materials stolen from poorly secured stockpiles in various locations  around the world could be used to construct a nuclear device. According  to a 2013 study, roughly 780,000 kilograms of HEU and 226,000  kilograms of separated plutonium exist outside the United States,  including more than 617,000 kilograms of HEU and 120,000 kilograms of  plutonium in Russia. The administration has proposed strengthening and  expanding U.S. efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation risks and improve  nuclear security worldwide. In April 2009, President Obama announced a  new international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials  around the world within 4 years. After this announcement, the National  Security Council (NSC)—the President’s principal forum for considering  and coordinating national security and foreign policy matters with his  senior national security advisors and cabinet officials—issued a document  providing further details regarding the initiative. According to the  document, the initiative’s focus is on programs to secure vulnerable  nuclear materials, specifically site lockdown programs.
The NSC document stated that vulnerable nuclear materials include HEU,  uranium-233, and plutonium that are not secured in accordance with  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international physical security  guidelines. The document further stated the initiative would also seek to  integrate, where and when possible, the most recent revisions of the  international physical security guidelines. These guidelines provide  recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material against  unauthorized removal during its use, storage, and transport, as well as  recommendations for protection against sabotage of nuclear material or  facilities. According to the initiative document, in addition to the NSC, the  agencies involved in the initiative are the Department of Energy (DOE),  Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and the  Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because the key activities  associated with removing and securing HEU and plutonium are primarily  undertaken by DOE, this report focuses on DOE’s contributions, but it  also includes information regarding the contributions of the other federal  agencies involved in the initiative, as appropriate.
U.S.-Origin and U.S.-Obligated Nuclear  Materials   A nuclear cooperation agreement is a bilateral  agreement that establishes the legal framework  for significant civilian nuclear cooperation  between the United States and other parties,  including for the transfer of U.S. exported  nuclear material such as uranium and  plutonium. Nuclear cooperation agreements  must establish certain rights and obligations  that the United States and its partners have  with regard to such cooperation. For example,  these agreements must obligate partner  countries to maintain adequate physical  security and must establish U.S. rights of  approval regarding the transfer, retransfer,  enrichment and reprocessing, and storage of  nuclear materials. U.S.-obligated nuclear  material refers to U.S.-origin nuclear material,  and material produced overseas through the  use of U.S.-origin nuclear material, or U.S.- supplied nuclear reactors. For this report, where  feasible, we will examine the physical security  afforded U.S.-obligated nuclear material, as  well as nuclear material of other origin. For  more information, see GAO-11-920.
We have examined the initiative and assessed U.S. efforts to promote  worldwide nuclear security in prior reports. Specifically, we found in  December 2010 that NSC’s interagency strategy did not include specific  details concerning how the initiative would be implemented, and that  essential details associated with the initiative were unclear, including the  initiative’s time frames and scope of work. In that report, we also found  that the initiative did not include specific details concerning the identity of  vulnerable nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, planned  activities at each location, anticipated timelines, and cost projections. We  recommended that the NSC lead the development of a more detailed  interagency implementation plan for the initiative. Although it provided  technical comments, NSC did not provide a formal written response to the  report or its recommendations. In addition, in September 2011, we found  that U.S. agencies had limited ability to account for, monitor, and evaluate  the security of U.S. nuclear material overseas. In that report, we also  found that many sites with U.S. nuclear material had never been visited  by a U.S. interagency physical protection team. Moreover, we found that  when U.S. teams were granted permission to make such visits from 1994  through 2010, partner countries met international physical security  guidelines only about half of the time. We suggested that Congress  should consider directing DOE and NRC to compile an inventory of U.S.
HEU and separated plutonium overseas. We also recommended that the  Secretary of State facilitate visits where feasible to sites that had not been  visited by a U.S. team, and that the Secretary of Energy develop a more  systematic process for identifying and prioritizing future physical  protection visits. State, DOE, and NRC disagreed with our  recommendations. The status of these recommendations is discussed  later in this report.
You asked us to assess the progress of the 2009 initiative. This report (1)  assesses the extent to which DOE achieved its goals associated with the  initiative’s four key activities and (2) examines DOE’s goals since the end  of the initiative associated with the four key activities and identifies and  assesses challenges, if any, that may limit DOE’s ability to secure as  much vulnerable nuclear material as possible.
This report is a public version of a classified report that we provided to  you in August 2015. DOE deemed some of the information in the  classified report as Secret, which must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, this report omits certain information about  vulnerabilities that remained at the end of the initiative. Although the  information in this report is more limited in scope, the overall methodology  used for both reports is the same.
To conduct this work, we reviewed relevant documents and interviewed  federal officials responsible for implementing the initiative. In particular, to  assess the extent to which DOE achieved its goals associated with the  initiative’s four key activities, we reviewed NSC’s interagency strategy  document to identify the primary objectives of the initiative and determine  how DOE and participating federal agencies were expected to contribute  in meeting these objectives. We also reviewed DOE’s 2009 classified  plan and fiscal year 2010 budget request—which was released in May  2009—to identify the goals DOE had established at the initiative’s start for  contributing to the initiative’s four key activities. We reviewed DOE and  agencies’ documentation regarding these efforts. We interviewed officials  from DOE, DOD, NRC, and State and discussed these issues with NSC  to determine the extent to which these agencies contributed to the  initiative. We also sent a data collection instrument to key offices in DOE,  DOD, NRC, and State to identify how much each agency spent on the  initiative. We adjusted the data for inflation, and all data are in 2014  dollars unless otherwise noted. To assess the reliability of these data, we  manually tested them for missing values, obvious errors, or outliers; we  compared the data with related budget information available in the  agencies’ budget requests. We also included questions in our data  collection instrument and received responses regarding how agencies  compiled the data and maintained their data quality and data systems,  and we interviewed knowledgeable agency officials to discuss the data.  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  this report.
To examine DOE’s goals associated with the four key activities since the  end of the initiative, and to assess any challenges that may limit DOE’s  ability to secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as possible, we  reviewed the agency’s goals as outlined in its fiscal year 2015 budget  request, released in March 2014, as well as relevant agency documents.  We also collected estimated spending data from DOE and other agencies  related to activities going forward. In addition, we interviewed officials  from DOE, DOD, NRC, and State to learn more about how they plan to  contribute to the key activities going forward, as well as challenges that  may lie ahead. To obtain additional information regarding any challenges  that may limit DOE’s ability to secure as much vulnerable nuclear material  as possible, we analyzed key U.S. government data sources, including  records of DOE priorities and returns of nuclear materials, and records of  U.S. physical protection visits. We visited DOE’s Savannah River Site to  meet with officials responsible for some of the nuclear materials returned  to the United States during the initiative. We also visited sites in three  countries that hold or held U.S.-origin HEU in and interviewed foreign  country representatives regarding processes for identifying and returning  vulnerable nuclear materials in accordance with initiative aims. We  identified and analyzed DOE and other U.S. agency information regarding  their programs for ensuring that U.S.-nuclear materials are physically  protected consistent with international security guidelines at foreign  locations, and we reviewed DOE information regarding planned nuclear  material removals and dispositions. Additional details on our objectives,  scope, and methodology can be found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to September  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The NSC document describing the initiative called for a U.S. interagency  effort, with the NSC coordinating U.S. activities to secure and remove  vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. DOE has the largest agency role  in undertaking initiative-related activities. Several offices within DOE  and other U.S. agencies and agency offices are also involved in the  initiative. Specifically,
DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program works to  reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear material located at civilian sites  worldwide. In particular, it has programs to remove or confirm the  disposition of excess HEU and plutonium, including U.S.-origin and  material of other country origin, and convert research reactors and  isotope production facilities to the use of LEU and nonweapons- usable materials. GTRI focuses primarily on the initiative’s key  activities of removing and disposing of HEU and plutonium and  converting reactors and isotope production facilities to the use of  nonweapons-usable material.
DOE’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program  works with Russia, other former Soviet states, and other partner  countries to improve the security of nuclear weapons and HEU and  plutonium at their source and to promote nuclear security best  practices. With respect to the initiative’s key activities, MPC&A is  responsible for verifying the downblending of HEU in Russia to LEU  and for upgrading the physical protection of HEU and plutonium.
DOE’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security  coordinates interagency physical protection visits to partner countries  holding key quantities of U.S.-origin HEU and plutonium to assess  sites’ security status and ensure that the physical protection measures  afforded U.S.-obligated material meet international physical security  guidelines.
DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, both a DOE  component and a member of the Intelligence Community, works with  U.S. agencies and the Intelligence Community to combine reporting  into and manage the Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP),  an interagency effort that provides, among other things, information  regarding the location, quantities, and vulnerabilities of sites storing  HEU and plutonium worldwide.
DOE’s Office of Environmental Management works to complete the  safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five  decades of nuclear weapons development and government- sponsored nuclear energy research. This effort contributes to the  initiative’s key activity of removing HEU and plutonium to secure  locations in the United States.
State manages nuclear nonproliferation programs, supports the  nuclear nonproliferation programs of other U.S. agencies working  overseas, and conducts bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to  address proliferation threats around the world under the Bureau of  International Security and Nonproliferation. State’s primary  contribution to the initiative’s activities includes fostering bilateral and  international cooperation toward initiative objectives.
DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program works to eliminate and  prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The  program contributes to the initiative’s key activities of removing and  securing HEU and plutonium and upgrading the physical protection of  HEU and plutonium by facilitating the safe and secure transport and  storage or elimination, among other things, of nuclear weapons and  weapons-usable nuclear materials.
NRC regulates the export of nuclear materials, including HEU and  plutonium, through licensing, inspection, and enforcement of its  requirements. NRC’s licensing for the export of U.S. nuclear  equipment and HEU and plutonium is conditioned on the partner  country maintenance of adequate physical security measures,  international safeguards, and other relevant criteria. NRC, as a  member of the U.S. interagency group, is involved in the planning and  implementation of physical protection visits to facilities holding or  requesting to receive U.S.-obligated nuclear materials.
The framework for accomplishing the goals of the initiative includes U.S.  laws, agency regulations and programs, and international and bilateral  commitments. Through this framework, the United States works with  other countries to monitor and ensure the physical security of nuclear  materials abroad, and, where feasible, to facilitate the removal of  vulnerable nuclear materials. The United States works with other  countries primarily within the framework of the IAEA, U.S. nuclear  cooperation agreements, U.S.-Russia agreements, and U.S. fuel and  nuclear material return programs. A description of each of these areas  follows:  IAEA: IAEA plays a key role in supporting international efforts to ensure  the security of nuclear materials in a number of ways. IAEA’s international  physical security guidelines provide the basis by which the United States  and other countries generally classify the categories of protection that  should be afforded special nuclear material, based on the type, quantity,  and enrichment of the nuclear material. For example, Category I nuclear  material is defined as 2 kilograms or more of unirradiated or “separated”  plutonium or 5 kilograms of uranium-235 contained in unirradiated or  “fresh” HEU and has the most stringent set of recommended physical  protection measures. Lower quantities of special nuclear material are  referred to as Category II and Category III quantities. In addition, IAEA  aims to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for nonpeaceful  purposes through its safeguards program. Under this program, IAEA  inspects facilities and locations containing nuclear material, as declared  by each country, to verify peaceful use, among other things. IAEA  maintains information on holdings of worldwide nuclear materials for 179  countries but, according to IAEA officials, it does not share this  information with other countries. IAEA also receives some information  regarding the amount and kinds of nuclear material at all sites through its  safeguards activities and International Physical Protection Advisory  Service missions. These missions are conducted at the request of the  host country and enable IAEA to assist countries in strengthening their  national nuclear security regimes; however, this information is not shared  with other countries. According to GTRI officials, the IAEA also supports  DOE efforts to remove vulnerable nuclear material from and convert  research reactors in other countries.
U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements: U.S. nuclear cooperation  agreements and U.S. interagency physical protection visits provide  another mechanism to ensure that U.S.-origin nuclear material overseas  at partner sites is not vulnerable. As of October 2014, the United States  had 21 nuclear cooperation agreements in force for peaceful civilian  nuclear cooperation with partners including foreign countries, the  European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), IAEA, and Taiwan.  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, requires all U.S. nuclear  cooperation agreements to contain guarantees that cooperating parties  will maintain adequate physical security for transferred nuclear material  and any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of  any material, or production or utilization facilities transferred pursuant to  the agreement. However, as we found in our September 2011 report,  U.S. agencies’ ability to monitor and evaluate whether nuclear material  subject to U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement terms is physically secure  and accordingly not vulnerable is contingent on partners granting access  to facilities where nuclear material is stored. As we further reported, U.S.  interagency physical protection teams have conducted physical protection  visits to monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear  material at facilities overseas when permitted.
U.S.-Russian agreements: A series of agreements between Russia and  the United States has established a mechanism to facilitate U.S.  participation in efforts to ensure the security of nuclear materials in  Russia—a country estimated to hold at least 617,000 kilograms of HEU  and 120,000 kilograms of plutonium. In 1991, Congress authorized DOD  to establish the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to  provide nuclear security assistance to Russia and the former Soviet  states. In June 2013, the Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella  agreement—which established an overall legal framework for providing  such assistance—expired, and joint nuclear security activities in Russia  since have been conducted under a 2003 Framework Agreement on a  Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation  (MNEPR). According to GTRI officials, GTRI’s activities to return Russian- origin HEU and plutonium to Russia and convert reactors in Russia is  covered by a May 2004 U.S.-Russia government-to-government  agreement.
U.S. fuel and nuclear material return program: Along with its work with  Russia to help secure and protect former Soviet nuclear material, the  United States has also actively sought to return U.S.-origin and, in some  cases, nuclear material of other origins to the United States. In general,  unirradiated HEU is returned to the Y-12 National Security Complex near  Oak Ridge, Tennessee; spent HEU is returned to either Idaho National  Laboratory in Idaho Falls, Idaho, or the Savannah River Site in South  Carolina; and separated plutonium is returned to the Savannah River  Site. Because the process of returning the nuclear materials to the United  States could potentially affect the environment, these returns are  analyzed under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). DOE  regulations for implementing NEPA dictate that these reviews should start  “as soon as possible” after DOE proposes an action. Since 1996, DOE  has completed several NEPA reviews related to the return of nuclear  materials. In accordance with department policy, DOE pays for returns of  material from non-high income countries but charges high income  countries a fee.
section_title: DOE Achieved Its Goals for Two of Four Key Activities
paragraphs: DOE achieved its goals for the initiative for the key activities of removing  or disposing of HEU and plutonium and downblending HEU; however, it  did not achieve its goals for upgrading the physical protection of HEU and  plutonium at vulnerable sites or for converting reactors and associated  facilities that use HEU to LEU. We used DOE’s fiscal year 2010 budget  request to identify the goals that DOE had established at the initiative’s  start for the four key activities. DOE reported that it had spent more than  $650 million on its efforts during the initiative. Table 1 below summarizes  DOE’s progress toward its goals for the four key activities and the amount  spent for each.
DOE’s GTRI and MPC&A exceeded their goals for the following key  activities during the initiative:  Removing or disposing of HEU and plutonium: DOE’s GTRI exceeded  its goal for removing and disposing of HEU and plutonium. According to  GTRI records, over the course of the initiative (April 2009 through  December 2013), GTRI removed 1,581 kilograms of HEU and plutonium,  exceeding its goal of 1,201 kilograms as reported in DOE’s fiscal year  2010 budget request. GTRI removed all HEU from 11 countries and  Taiwan under the initiative, bringing the number of countries where all  HEU has been removed to a total of 26 plus Taiwan. According to GTRI  officials, these efforts involved close international cooperation with  officials in the country from where the nuclear material was removed.  Appendix IV provides additional details of all HEU and plutonium removed  during the initiative, including the originating country, site, amount and  type of nuclear material, and the month and year the material was  removed. In addition, GTRI officials told us they disposed of additional  materials by assisting in the downblending of 1.5 kilograms of HEU in  Argentina in June 2013 and 33 kilograms of HEU in Kazakhstan in  October 2011. According to GTRI records, it spent approximately $531  million on these removal and disposition efforts.
In addition, GTRI in 2013 reported that it had disposed of other HEU by  verifying the downblending of 1,240 kilograms of HEU in the United  Kingdom and 112 kilograms of HEU in Japan. However, we did not  include these as achievements toward its goal of removing or disposing of  material because, according to GTRI officials, the downblending of HEU  in the United Kingdom occurred many years prior to the initiative, GTRI  was not able to determine that the downblending of material in Japan  occurred during the initiative and, in both cases, it is unclear to what  extent GTRI played an active role in identifying a disposition pathway for  these materials.
Downblending HEU: DOE’s MPC&A exceeded its goal for downblending  2,700 kilograms of HEU. According to MPC&A officials, MPC&A verified  the downblending of 4,900 kilograms of HEU to LEU in Russia during the  initiative. MPC&A officials estimated they spent more than $70 million on  these efforts.
DOE did not achieve its goals for the following key activities during the  initiative:  Upgrading physical protection: DOE did not achieve its goals for  upgrading the physical protection of HEU and plutonium at 43 buildings.  Specifically, according to MPC&A documents, MPC&A upgraded the  physical protection for HEU and plutonium at 32 buildings. According to  these officials, the upgrades of the 32 buildings were completed at three  sites in Russia. MPC&A officials estimated they spent about $33 million  on these efforts. In addition, although it did not set a goal for this activity,  according to GTRI officials, it completed physical protection upgrades at  Mexico’s Salazar site and continued work at South Africa’s Pelindaba site  during the initiative. The work at Pelindaba was completed in January  2015. GTRI reported it spent approximately $16 million for these efforts.
Converting reactors: GTRI did not achieve its goal to convert 34 foreign  reactors from HEU to LEU during the initiative. Specifically, GTRI  converted 23 foreign reactors, 11 fewer than its goal for conversions by  the end of fiscal year 2013. GTRI reported it spent approximately $5  million on these efforts. Appendix V provides more details on reactor  conversions during the initiative, including country, site, and date the  conversion was completed or the reactor was verified as shut down.
GTRI officials told us in July 2014 that political and technical challenges  have complicated efforts to convert research reactors and isotope  facilities. For instance, according to these officials, delays in the  development of LEU replacement fuel to power the European Union high- performance reactors and the development of LEU targets for medical  isotope production processes have posed challenges in meeting goals  but, according to GTRI officials, work continues to ensure that the  objectives will be met as soon as possible.
DOD and other agencies also made contributions toward the initiative.  For example, DOD officials reported that DOD contributed to the removal  of nuclear material by (1) aiding in shipments of Russian warheads from  deployed sites to more central repositories or to facilities for  dismantlement and (2) providing physical protection upgrades and  security efforts at sites during the initiative. DOD officials reported the  agency spent $178 million and $78 million, respectively, in these areas,  bringing the U.S. agency total initiative-related spending in the four key  activities to about $912 million. Moreover, as appendix III further details,  DOE, DOD, and other U.S. agency officials responding to our data  collection instrument indicated that about half of initiative-related  spending was for efforts other than the four key activities supporting site  lockdown programs to remove or secure vulnerable nuclear materials  discussed in this report. DOE, DOD, and other U.S. agencies reported to  us that their agencies spent more than $1 billion on such activities. These  activities included, for example, training on physical protection, protective  force, and transportation security; material control and accounting  training; and constructing nuclear centers of excellence worldwide.
section_title: DOE Developed New Goals Since the Initiative for the Four Key Activities, but Challenges May Hamper Future Progress for Securing HEU and Plutonium
paragraphs: DOE has developed new goals since the end of the initiative for continued  efforts related to the initiative’s four key activities to help secure or  remove HEU and plutonium. However, four challenges may hamper  future progress: (1) access to some countries and sites may continue to  be a challenge, (2) DOE and other U.S. agencies have not completed an  inventory of U.S.-obligated plutonium overseas, (3) DOE has not  prioritized its inventory list of HEU at foreign locations for removal or  disposition, and (4) DOE and other agencies have not visited key sites in  more than 20 years to determine whether U.S.-origin material on-site is  adequately protected.
subsections: section_title: DOE Has Developed New Goals Since the Initiative for the Four Key Activities Going Forward
paragraphs: DOE has developed goals for all four key activities that are expected to  result in securing or removing HEU and plutonium going forward since the  initiative concluded in 2013. DOE included three of these goals in its fiscal  year 2015 budget request. GTRI provided us with information regarding  its goal for removing or disposing of HEU or plutonium. Table 2 shows  DOE’s goals for these activities, as well as its planned spending to  achieve these goals.
More specifically, DOE has developed the following goals since the  initiative ended in 2013:  Removing or disposing of HEU and plutonium: According to DOE  planning documents and information that department officials provided to  us, GTRI’s goal is to remove or dispose of an additional 1,029 kilograms  of fresh and spent HEU, as well as plutonium worldwide from 2014 to  December 2019. GTRI also specified that this 1,029 kilograms of HEU  includes 2 kilograms of spent HEU to be downblended in Argentina and 3  kilograms of spent HEU to be downblended in Indonesia, which would  result in the elimination of HEU in both of those countries. In 2014,  GTRI removed 134 kilograms of HEU and plutonium. In fall 2014, GTRI  gave us a list of nuclear materials it would like to address, either by  removal or disposition. This list, which includes 2,259 kilograms of  materials, far exceeds GTRI’s 1,029 kilograms goal, but GTRI officials  told us they believe 1,029 is a reasonable target for nuclear material  removals during this period.
Downblending HEU: According to MPC&A’s fiscal year 2015 budget  request, MPC&A’s goal was to support the downblending of 5,200  kilograms of HEU in Russia through fiscal year 2019. However, Russian  officials decided in December 2014 to reduce DOE’s scope of work in  Russia and, at that time, announced that the downblending program  would be discontinued.
Upgrading physical protection: According to MPC&A’s fiscal year 2015  budget request, MPC&A had a goal of supporting physical protection  upgrades at 11 buildings in Russia and completing those upgrades by the  second quarter of fiscal year 2015. As of December 2014, MPC&A  completed upgrades at 3 of these buildings. However, MPC&A officials  told us that, because of Russian officials’ decision in December 2014 to  reduce DOE’s scope of work in Russia, activities to support physical  protection upgrades at the remaining 8 buildings at the site are to be  completed by the Russians using Russian funds. Russian officials made  no assurances as to the scope of work in completing these upgrades or  adherence to DOE’s original timelines.
Converting reactors: DOE’s fiscal year 2015 budget request states that  GTRI’s goal is to convert 27 foreign research reactors and medical  isotope production facilities to LEU by the end of fiscal year 2019. GTRI  officials told us in July 2014 that approximately 100 foreign civilian  research reactors and isotope production facilities worldwide currently  use HEU, with about two-thirds of those remaining reactors in Russia.  GTRI officials gave us a list of 13 foreign reactors or medical isotope  production facilities they plan to either convert or verify the shutdown of  from 2014 through 2016.
In addition to DOE’s goals for the four key activities associated with  removing and securing HEU and plutonium since the initiative ended in  2013, other agencies have some plans going forward. Collectively, DOD,  NRC, and State officials told us that they plan to spend $27 million from  2014 through 2019 for initiative-related activities. For example, DOD  officials cited no specific future goals but told us its Cooperative Threat  Reduction program plans to spend $4 million to complete nuclear material  removals at certain Russian sites by dismantling nuclear submarines and  consolidating the nuclear material at secure sites elsewhere in Russia.  Officials from agencies participating in the initiative also stated that, in the  future, the majority of expected spending is to be for efforts other than for  the four key activities. Specifically, officials from DOE and other agencies  told us that they plan to spend almost half, or about $600 million of an  estimated $1.3 billion in planned spending from 2014 through 2019 for  efforts other than the four key activities, such as, for example, training  activities. For example, DOD officials told us that DOD’s Cooperative  Threat Reduction program plans to spend $34 million to assist in  developing nuclear security centers of excellence, which are centralized  locations where countries or regions can send professionals for training in  various aspects of nuclear security, such as physical protection best  practices and emergency preparedness and response.
section_title: Challenges May Hamper Agencies in Four Key Ways
paragraphs: We identified four challenges that may hamper DOE and other agencies’  abilities to meet their goals and maintain progress to secure HEU and  plutonium going forward: (1) access to some countries and sites may  continue to be a challenge, (2) DOE and other U.S. agencies have not  completed an inventory of U.S.-obligated plutonium overseas, (3) DOE  has not prioritized its inventory list of HEU at foreign locations for removal  or disposition, and (4) DOE and other agencies have not visited key sites  in more than 20 years to determine whether U.S.-origin material on-site is  adequately protected.
subsections: section_title: Access Challenges May Continue to Pose Concerns
paragraphs: The first challenge we identified that may hamper future progress is that  U.S. agencies may continue to encounter resistance by major allied and  other countries to allowing access to some sites and agreeing to remove  or secure vulnerable nuclear materials. Some countries have declined to  grant U.S. officials access to sites or have denied permission to return  vulnerable nuclear materials during the initiative. DOE and other U.S.  agency officials told us that they continue to work with countries to secure  additional vulnerable materials. Further details are classified and thus  were omitted from this version of the report.
section_title: DOE and Other U.S. Agencies Have Not Completed an Inventory of U.S.-Obligated Plutonium Overseas
paragraphs: The second challenge that may hamper future progress is that U.S.  agencies may not have complete information about the locations of U.S.- obligated plutonium worldwide. In September 2011, we concluded that  without an accurate inventory of U.S. nuclear materials—in particular,  weapons-usable HEU and separated plutonium—the United States does  not have sufficient assurances regarding the location of materials for  accounting and control purposes. As a result, we recommended that  State, working with DOE and NRC, determine a baseline inventory of  U.S.-obligated HEU and separated plutonium for those partners with  which the United States has transferred material but does not have  annual inventory reconciliation, and establish a process for conducting  annual reconciliations of inventories of nuclear material on a facility-by- facility basis. DOE, NRC, and State did not agree with this  recommendation, but they have taken actions to partially implement it.  Specifically, DOE completed an initial inventory of U.S.-origin HEU  overseas, as published in a June 2013 GTRI report. GTRI has stated  that “particularly troubling” is the high volume and rapid expansion of  worldwide civilian plutonium inventories, which have grown by an  additional 100,000 kilograms in the past 15 years to approximately  310,000 kilograms worldwide. U.S. agencies have not, however,  completed an inventory of all U.S.-obligated separated plutonium stocks  worldwide to determine the amount and locations of potentially vulnerable  plutonium that could be addressed in future DOE efforts. A May 2013  GTRI document noted it planned to account for all civilian plutonium  inventories by the end of 2016. We continue to believe that an inventory  of all U.S.-obligated plutonium overseas is necessary to both identify  nuclear material and to account for and ensure that such material is  protected in accordance with international physical security guidelines.
section_title: DOE Has Not Developed a Prioritized List of HEU at Foreign Locations to Inform Removal or Disposition Efforts
paragraphs: The third challenge that may hamper future progress is that DOE has not  prioritized for return or disposition nuclear material stocks, including newly  identified U.S.-origin HEU overseas from its recent accounting of U.S.- origin HEU overseas. As noted above, DOE completed an initial inventory  of U.S.-origin HEU overseas in June 2013; however, to date, DOE has  not prioritized this list to identify the most vulnerable U.S.-origin HEU  overseas to prioritize for return or disposition. According to GTRI’s June  2013 report summarizing initial inventory information regarding U.S.-origin  HEU at foreign locations, more than 13,000 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU  remain worldwide, including 3,526 kilograms of unirradiated or fresh U.S.- origin HEU and 1,771 kilograms of irradiated U.S.-origin HEU eligible for  return. GTRI officials have stated that its effort at accounting for U.S.- origin HEU overseas identified significant quantities of nuclear material  that could be addressed going forward; its June 2013 report stated that it  would begin prioritizing the removal or disposition of the most attractive  nuclear material the study identified. However, as of March 2015, GTRI  has not identified which stocks it believes are the most attractive and  contain the most vulnerable materials and, therefore, should be priorities  for return or disposition. In March 2015, GTRI officials told us that  GTRI’s priorities for U.S.-origin material, from highest to lowest priority,  consist of (1) removing or confirming the disposition of as much excess  fresh HEU as possible; (2) returning or confirming the disposition of U.S.- origin irradiated HEU that is eligible for return; and (3) working with  international partners to develop disposition pathways for additional  irradiated material that could be attractive to terrorists for a nuclear  weapon. However, as of May 2015, GTRI had neither provided GAO  with a detailed or specific prioritized list of nuclear materials for return as  noted in July 2014 and reaffirmed in January 2015, nor provided a time  frame for doing so.
DOE’s order on internal control calls for “processes for planning,  organizing, directing, and controlling operations designed to reasonably  assure that programs achieve intended results, and decisions are based  on reliable data,” and notably the initiative called for all vulnerable  nuclear material to be secured, with a strategy to identify and prioritize the  most vulnerable sites. In addition, Congress continues to express interest  in securing the most vulnerable nuclear materials. Specifically, a  committee of Congress in June 2013 requested that DOE, among other  things, develop a new strategic plan to secure and dispose of nuclear  materials that pose the greatest terrorism risk to the United States.  Without an updated list of nuclear materials that prioritizes for returns or  disposition, DOE and other U.S. agencies do not have reasonable  assurance that they are prioritizing resources to identify, include, and  address the most highly vulnerable and attractive nuclear materials that  remain outside of the United States, and, where feasible, identify a final  disposition pathway in the United States or elsewhere.
section_title: DOE and Other Agencies Have Not Visited Key Sites in More Than 20 Years to Determine Whether U.S.-Origin Material On-Site Is Adequately Protected
paragraphs: The fourth challenge that may hamper future progress is that DOE and  other agencies have not visited key sites to ascertain whether U.S.-origin  nuclear material is protected in accordance with international physical  security guidelines. This is consistent with the findings in our September  2011 report, which noted that U.S. interagency physical protection  teams had not visited all partner facilities believed to contain Category I  quantities of U.S.-origin nuclear material at least once every 5 years—an  official interagency goal. As a result, we recommended in September  2011 that State work with other agencies to facilitate visits to sites that  had not been visited and that are believed to hold Category I nuclear  material. State did not agree with this recommendation, but it has taken  actions to implement it. In addition, in our September 2011 report, we  found that U.S. agencies did not have a formal process for coordinating  and prioritizing physical protection visits, and we recommended that DOE  work with U.S. agencies to develop formal goals for and a process to  determine which foreign facilities to visit in the future, and we noted the  goals should be formalized and agreed to by all agencies. We additionally  recommended that DOE work with other agencies to review performance  information to determine which countries containing Category I U.S.  nuclear material have been visited in the last 5 years and determine  whether facilities not meeting international physical security guidelines  were revisited in a timely manner. DOE did not agree with these  recommendations either, but it has taken actions to implement them.
In recent years, DOE has worked with U.S. agencies to develop a formal  methodology to prioritize physical protection visits, as detailed in a  September 2012 document. These efforts notwithstanding, information  regarding the security status of some sites storing U.S. nuclear materials  remains unknown. Records of recent U.S. physical protection visits show  that U.S. teams have not visited many sites believed to be storing  Category I or Category II quantities of U.S.-origin HEU in more than 20  years to ascertain whether material there is being protected in  accordance with international physical security guidelines. More  specifically, we identified four Category I and seven Category II sites  holding U.S.-origin HEU that U.S. interagency physical protection teams  have not visited in at least 20 years. Collectively, these sites hold 2,261  kilograms unirradiated U.S.-origin HEU and 1,327 kilograms of irradiated  U.S.-origin HEU.
An NRC official told us in March 2015 that any U.S. material exported to a  partner country would be expected to be maintained in accordance with  the international physical security guidelines NRC references in its  regulations, and that NRC’s regulations provide for the “continuing  review” of previously exported material. In addition, in March 2012, the  DOE Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation testified  that DOE led U.S. interagency teams on visits to ensure that partner sites  meet revision 5 of international physical security guidelines. Without an  assessment of the physical security conditions of the U.S-origin nuclear  material at these Category I and Category II facilities, DOE and U.S.  agencies are not able to determine if this material is protected in  accordance with international security guidelines. In addition, without  information on this material, DOE and U.S. agencies lack reasonable  assurance that they are removing or disposing of the most vulnerable  nuclear materials, in accordance with the stated goals of the president’s  initiative and the expressed interest of a committee of Congress.
In addition to the challenges we identified above, as we reported in our  August 2015 classified report, vulnerabilities remain worldwide after the  conclusion of the initiative in December 2013. For example, our review of  GTRI records indicates that about one-third of the nuclear material stocks  prioritized for removal in 2010 have not been removed. We reviewed  GTRI’s August 2010 list of prioritized stocks for nuclear material removals  and compared them with information regarding the nuclear materials  returned by GTRI through January 2015. Of the 29 specific stocks of  nuclear material deemed “1A” priorities for removal in August 2010,   GTRI has removed 18 as of January 2015, yet more than 1,000 kilograms  of nuclear materials remain at sites that were priorities for removal and  haven’t been removed. In addition, records of recent years’ U.S. physical  protection visits continue to show that some foreign sites are not  protected in accordance with the current international physical security  guidelines. Our analysis of DOE documentation shows U.S. interagency  physical protection teams made 53 assessments from April 2009 through  March 2015 to observe and evaluate the physical protection afforded  U.S.-origin nuclear material of 43 sites. Of these 43 sites, 32 sites— including 17 Category I sites, 10 Category II sites, and 5 Category III  sites—were found to meet international security guidelines when they  were assessed at the time of the initial visit. This represents improvement  since our September 2011 report; however, 6 Category I sites, 6  Category II sites, and 1 Category III site were found to not meet  international physical security guidelines at the time of the initial visit.  Additional details about this and other information regarding  vulnerabilities that remain at the end of the initiative are classified and  were omitted from this version of the report.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOE has made progress under the President’s 2009 initiative to remove  HEU and plutonium from vulnerable sites, verify the downblending of  HEU to LEU, physically protect vulnerable sites, and convert reactors and  production facilities from HEU to LEU. Physical security is a sovereign  nation responsibility and activity, and thus it is important that U.S.  agencies coordinate and cooperate with these nations to gain access to  overseas sites containing U.S.-origin nuclear material. However, while  progress has been made, significant quantities of potentially vulnerable  nuclear materials remain, and DOE and other U.S. agencies may have  opportunities to improve their ability to ensure that as much of this nuclear  material as possible can be secured.
We commend GTRI for taking the initiative to complete an initial inventory  of U.S.-origin HEU overseas as we recommended in September 2011.  However, GTRI’s effort was limited to U.S.-origin HEU exported overseas;  it does not account for U.S.-obligated plutonium overseas, as we  recommended in the same report. An inventory of all U.S.-obligated  plutonium overseas is important to both identify nuclear material and to  account for and ensure that such material is protected in accordance with  international physical security guidelines. Moreover, because DOE and  U.S. agencies have not completed an inventory of all U.S.-obligated  plutonium inventories overseas to determine the amount and locations of  potentially vulnerable plutonium that could be addressed in future DOE  efforts, it is possible that additional quantities of U.S.-obligated plutonium  are vulnerable. As we recommended in September 2011, we continue to  believe that U.S. agencies should complete an inventory of all U.S.- obligated plutonium overseas to determine whether these nuclear  materials are vulnerable, as well as to determine the amounts and  locations of additional quantities of U.S.-obligated plutonium at worldwide  sites that could be addressed in future DOE efforts.
DOE’s GTRI has stated general priorities for returns and dispositions of  HEU at foreign locations. In July 2014, GTRI officials stated they were  undertaking an effort to prioritize information regarding inventories of  HEU, to include U.S.-origin HEU identified in its June 2013 inventory  reconciliation. However, as of May 2015, GTRI had not provided a  detailed or specific prioritized list of nuclear materials, including recently  identified U.S.-origin HEU at foreign locations, for return or disposition, to  ensure that the most vulnerable nuclear materials are returned or  provided a time frame for doing so. DOE’s order on internal control calls  for processes for planning, organizing, directing, and controlling  operations to ensure that programs achieve intended results, and  decisions are based on reliable data, and the initiative called for all  vulnerable nuclear material to be secured, with a strategy to identify and  prioritize the most vulnerable sites. Without an updated list of nuclear  materials that prioritizes inventories for removal or disposition, DOE and  other U.S. agencies do not have reasonable assurance that they are  prioritizing resources to identify, include, and to address the most highly  vulnerable and attractive nuclear materials that remain outside of the  United States, and, where feasible, identify a final disposition pathway in  the United States or elsewhere.
DOE has taken steps to develop a methodology to select and prioritize  physical protection visits, as we had recommended in our September  2011 report. However, similar to our findings in our 2011 report, we found  U.S. agency physical protection teams have not visited some Category I  and Category II U.S.-origin nuclear material in at least 20 years to  determine whether it is protected in accordance with international physical  security guidelines. We do not dispute DOE’s September 2012  methodology to prioritize physical protection visits. Notwithstanding the  new methodology for prioritizing visits, until U.S. physical security teams  visit Category I and Category II sites that have not been visited in many  years, it will be difficult to know whether such materials are being  adequately protected in accordance with current international physical  security guidelines. We recognize that limited access to key major allied  and other countries’ sites has hampered U.S. agency efforts to secure all  vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. However, without information on  the physical security of these sites, DOE will not have reasonable  assurance that DOE or other U.S. agencies are removing or disposing of  the most vulnerable nuclear materials, in accordance with the stated aims  of the President’s initiative and the expressed interest of a committee of  Congress.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making two recommendations to ensure that the global initiative  to remove and secure vulnerable nuclear materials achieves its stated  goals of securing the most vulnerable nuclear materials and ensure that  U.S. agencies are able to secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as  possible:
To ensure that the most vulnerable nuclear materials are given priority  for removal or disposition, we recommend that the Secretary of  Energy complete the prioritization for removal or disposition of  inventories of identified nuclear materials at foreign locations,  including recently identified stocks of U.S.-origin HEU at foreign  locations, to determine priorities for efforts going forward.
To ensure that Category I and Category II U.S.-origin nuclear material  is protected in accordance with international physical security  guidelines, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy work with  U.S. agencies by requesting and, where feasible, undertaking  physical protection visits at partner country sites that hold Category I  and Category II quantities of U.S.-obligated nuclear material that have  not been visited in more than 5 years—particularly those that have not  been visited in 20 or more years.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Energy, Defense,  and State and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their review and  comment. DOE provided written comments, as reproduced in appendix  VI. NRC provided a technical comment on the report, which we  incorporated. DOD and State did not comment on our report.
In its comments, DOE agreed with our recommendations and provided  information on specific actions taken and planned to address each  recommendation, as well as timelines for their completion. Regarding our  first recommendation that DOE complete its prioritization of nuclear  material at foreign locations to identify the most vulnerable materials and  ensure they are given priority for removal and disposition efforts, DOE  stated that it was building on information provided in its 2014 report to  Congress and would complete its revised prioritization list by September  30, 2015. Our second recommendation is that DOE request and, where  feasible, undertake physical protection visits at partner country sites that  hold Category I and Category II quantities of U.S.-obligated nuclear  material that have not been visited in more than 5 years—particularly  those that have not been visited in 20 or more years. DOE stated that it  agrees with the recommendation but considers it closed, as it has  continued to schedule and prioritize visits in an effort to achieve the goal  of visiting all Category I sites every 5 years. However, we disagree with  DOE’s assessment that the department has taken action to close this  recommendation. As our report notes, we identified four Category I and  seven Category II sites that have not been visited in at least 20 years.  DOE’s comments note that, in some cases, visits have not been possible  because access has been delayed or denied due to difficult political  circumstances. However, as we note in the report, it is not clear that DOE  has sought visits to all Category I and Category II sites that have not been  visited in at least 20 years. In addition, DOE has not further identified  which sites on this list or other Category I or Category II sites containing  U.S. nuclear material that have not been visited in at least 5 years that it  considers not feasible to visit due to political challenges. We continue to  believe that our recommendation should be implemented to ensure that  Category I and Category II U.S.-origin nuclear material is protected in  accordance with international physical security guidelines.
In its letter DOE also stated that our evaluation provides a limited view of  the physical protection activities involved in the initiative to secure all  vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in 4 years, and that our  characterization of “Other” to capture financial data for all other MPC&A  activities could be misleading as the category of “Other” encompasses a  broad scope of technical efforts that are nonetheless critical components  of the nonproliferation mission. We disagree that our evaluation provides  a limited view of activities under the initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear  materials. As our report notes, the initiative’s focus is on programs to  secure vulnerable nuclear materials, specifically site lockdown programs.  We further note that our report focuses on four key activities to secure or  remove HEU or plutonium: (1) removing or disposing of HEU and  plutonium to secure locations in the United States or elsewhere; (2)  downblending HEU to LEU; (3) upgrading the physical protection of HEU  and plutonium at vulnerable sites; and (4) converting nuclear reactors and  associated facilities that use HEU to LEU. Our report provided additional  information regarding agency-reported spending for activities that were  not among these four key activities as “other” spending. DOE cites other  activities such as sustainability and training as being critical components  of the nonproliferation mission. We do not disagree. However, as our  report notes, in accordance with the initiative’s stated focus of site  lockdown programs to protect vulnerable nuclear materials, activities such  as MPC&A sustainability activities—such as support for the maintenance,  repair, and logistical services and spare equipment for the improved  security systems—is beyond the scope of the initiative’s stated focus of  site lockdown programs as well as this report.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and State; the Chairman  of the NRC; and other interested parties. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report or need  additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or  trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Key contributors are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report: (1) assesses the extent to which the Department of Energy  (DOE) achieved its goals associated with the 2009 initiative’s four key  activities of removing, downblending, and upgrading the physical  protection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, and  converting facilities that use HEU, and (2) examines DOE’s goals since  the end of the initiative associated with the four key activities and  identifies and assesses challenges, if any, that may limit DOE’s ability to  secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as possible.
To conduct this work, we reviewed relevant documents and interviewed  federal officials responsible for implementing the initiative. In particular, to  assess the extent to which DOE achieved its goals associated with the  initiative’s four key activities, we reviewed the National Security Council’s  (NSC) interagency strategy and the document it circulated to agencies in  2011 to identify the primary objectives of the initiative and how DOE and  participating federal agencies were expected to contribute in meeting  these objectives. We also reviewed DOE’s 2009 classified plan and fiscal  year 2010 budget request—released in May 2009—to identify the goals  that DOE had established at the initiative’s start for contributing to the  initiative’s four key activities. Because the key activities associated with  removing and securing HEU and plutonium are primarily undertaken by  DOE, we focused on DOE’s contributions but also included information  regarding the contributions of other federal agencies involved in the  initiative, as appropriate. In particular, we relied on DOE’s performance  metrics and goals for removing, downblending, and physically protecting  nuclear materials, and converting reactors and production facilities from  HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) as presented in its fiscal year 2010  budget request to assess progress toward achieving goals. We used  DOE’s fiscal year 2010 budget request to identify the goals that DOE had  established at the initiative’s start for contributing to the four key activities  because it was issued in May 2009, 1 month after the start of the initiative  and, in the absence of other annually published forward-looking  information since the initiative’s start, we identified it as a reasonable  indicator of DOE’s expectations and goals to be accomplished in the  initiative.
We interviewed officials from DOE, the Department of Defense (DOD),  the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Department of State  (State) and discussed these issues with NSC officials to determine the  extent to which these agencies contributed to the initiative and their plans  going forward. Through these interviews, we identified challenges these  agencies confronted during the initiative and the challenges that may lie  ahead. We also sent a data collection instrument to relevant offices in  DOE, DOD, NRC, and State to obtain additional information on each  agency’s contribution to the initiative, how much each agency spent on  these efforts, and how they plan to contribute to them. We received  responses from each of the agencies and offices that we sent the data  collection instrument to, namely, DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative  (GTRI), DOE’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A)  program, DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program, State, and NRC.  We analyzed the completed responses to determine how much agencies  spent from May 2009 through December 2013 and to collect agency  estimates of spending for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. We followed up  with agency officials for clarification on questions related to the data as  necessary. While the data collected generally tracked spending by fiscal  year, they do not track completely with the time frame of the initiative,  which ran from April 2009 through December 2013. To address this, we  divided the fiscal year 2009 budget figures in half to account for the 6  months in calendar year 2009 that were a part of the initiative (from April  2009 through September 2009). We did this for all agencies except GTRI,  which provided us with figures pulled from its G2 Financial Management  System that officials said were specific to the months and years of the  initiative. In addition, we accounted for the 3 months of fiscal year 2014  that were a part of the initiative (i.e., October 2013 through December  2013) by dividing the fiscal year 2014 spending figures by 4 and including  one-fourth of those figures in each agency’s totals for initiative spending,  with the exception of GTRI. Although this effort is intended to better  capture the amount of spending during the specific time frames of the  initiative, it is unclear whether the spending was distributed equally  among the months of the fiscal years. Therefore, the numbers that we are  using are estimates. We adjusted the data for inflation, and all data are in  2014 dollars unless otherwise noted. To assess the reliability of the  spending data, we manually tested it for missing values, obvious errors,  or outliers. We then compared the data with related budget information  available in the agencies’ budget requests. We also included questions in  our data collection instrument and received responses regarding how  agencies compiled the data and maintained their data quality and data  systems, and we interviewed knowledgeable agency officials to discuss  the data. Through these efforts, we determined the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report.
We undertook additional efforts to specifically assess each of the four key  activities as follows:
For removing or disposing of HEU or plutonium, we reviewed records  from GTRI of nuclear materials returned, plans for future repatriation  of remaining nuclear materials, the estimated amounts of remaining  nuclear materials, and future priorities. We focused specifically on  GTRI records because GTRI is the program chiefly responsible for  such activity. We compared these efforts with goals achieved during  the initiative to determine the amounts already removed and disposed  of, and we interviewed GTRI officials to discuss these activities, as  well as plans and goals for removals going forward. To determine the  goals GTRI had for removals and dispositions, we reviewed the goals  for removals and dispositions from its fiscal year 2010 budget request  and subtracted the fiscal year 2013 goal for removal from the amount  of nuclear material GTRI reported it had removed in fiscal year 2009  according to its fiscal year 2011 budget request. We subtracted the  amount that GTRI reported it had removed between April 2009 and  September 2009 to avoid double counting that figure. We also  included removals that GTRI made in the 3 months beyond the end of  fiscal year 2013 to try to better capture activities during the initiative  itself, which ended in December 2013.
For downblending, we reviewed DOE documentation of activities in  support of downblending HEU and interviewed DOE’s MPC&A  officials about these efforts. To determine the amount of HEU planned  for downblending during the initiative, we used the fiscal year 2010  budget request numbers. We subtracted 12,600 kilograms (the  amount for fiscal year 2010 that began on October 1, 2009) from  15,300 kilograms (the amount targeted for fiscal year 2013, which  concluded on September 30, 2013) to arrive at 2,700 kilograms as an  estimate for amount planned for downblending during the initiative.
For physical protection, we reviewed DOE information regarding  buildings containing HEU or plutonium secured during the initiative, as  well as information regarding plans going forward, including DOE  information regarding the number of buildings secured at the start of  the initiative and DOE’s fiscal year 2010 budget request. We  compared the records with goals achieved during the initiative and  interviewed DOE officials to discuss these activities, as well as plans  and goals going forward. With regard to spending on this activity,  MPC&A provided us with updates to the spending data they originally  gave us in order to better accommodate the initiative’s activities as we  describe them. Specifically, in the updated data, officials reallocated  spending that they had originally categorized as supporting physical  protection into the “other” category, which includes spending on  efforts that are not among the four key activities of the initiative.  According to MPC&A officials, the reallocated figures actually covered  activities related to material control and accounting, which is not  included in the four key activities.
For conversion of reactors from HEU to LEU, we reviewed lists of  planned and completed reactor conversions from GTRI, as GTRI is  the lead program for this activity. We compared the lists with goals  achieved during the initiative and interviewed GTRI officials to discuss  these activities, as well as any plans and goals for reactor  conversions going forward. To determine the goal for foreign reactor  conversions during the initiative, we reviewed the fiscal year 2010  budget request and subtracted the target for foreign reactor  conversions for fiscal year 2013 from the number of conversions  completed in fiscal year 2008. We excluded foreign reactors that had  already been converted at the time that the initiative started, as well  as two U.S. reactors converted during the time of the initiative, on  which GTRI officials reported they spent $17 million before inflation  (or $18 million in 2014 constant dollars). Without these adjustments,  the goal using the fiscal year 2010 budget request as a basis would  be 34 reactors converted. We then reviewed other DOE documents to  ensure that we addressed foreign conversions that were completed  between the start of fiscal year 2009 in October 2008 and the start of  the initiative in April 2009. We then reviewed DOE priority lists to  determine the number of U.S. reactors that were converted and those  that awaited conversion, in order to ensure that we did not include  those in the goal for the number of foreign reactors converted during  the initiative.
We did not focus on consolidation activities in this report, although such  activities would be included in the stated focus of the NSC’s initiative— site lockdown programs to secure and remove HEU and plutonium—and  NSC officials indicated in July 2014 that consolidation was a core effort of  the initiative. We are not assessing consolidation activities under the  initiative because DOE neither set goals for consolidation activities, nor  did it include any in its budget requests.
To examine DOE’s goals associated with the four key activities since the  end of the initiative, and to assess any challenges that may limit DOE’s  ability to secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as possible, we  collected and analyzed other information where available. Specifically, to  identify goals going forward after the initiative concluded in December  2013, we reviewed the DOE’s performance metrics and goals as  presented in its fiscal year 2015 budget request issued in March 2014, as  well as other information supplied by DOE. We identified and analyzed  DOE and other U.S. agency information regarding its programs for  ensuring that U.S.-nuclear materials are physically protected consistent  with international security guidelines at foreign locations, and we  reviewed DOE information regarding planned nuclear material removals  and dispositions to identify and assess any challenges that may limit  DOE’s ability to secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as possible.  To provide information about any vulnerabilities that may pose challenges  that remained at the end of the initiative, we analyzed U.S. government  data sources. For example, we compared DOE’s August 2010 list of HEU  and plutonium for which DOE set a priority for removal or disposition  under the initiative to DOE records of HEU and plutonium removals and  dispositions to determine how much of the prioritized nuclear material  remained in vulnerable locations to be addressed going forward. We also  reviewed records of U.S. physical protection visits to determine whether  sites with U.S.-origin HEU were following international physical protection  guidelines to secure the material. We reviewed previous GAO reports to  identify and assess U.S. agency progress in implementing  recommendations aiming to improve agency planning and oversight of  vulnerable nuclear materials. We reviewed inventory information  regarding U.S.-origin HEU overseas, in particular GTRI’s June 2013  report, Reconciliation of U.S.-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium Exported to  Foreign Countries for Civilian Use, and we reviewed other information, as  available, to determine disposition plans for these nuclear materials. We  reviewed current U.S. agency criteria for the removals of various types of  nuclear materials and returns of such materials to the United States, and  we compared them with DOE records to identify instances in which  proposed returns of nuclear materials exceed or differ from planned for  types or quantities. We interviewed officials from DOE, DOD, NRC, and  State to learn more about how they plan to contribute to the key activities  going forward, as well as challenges that may lie ahead. We visited  DOE’s Savannah River Site to meet with officials responsible for nuclear  material returns made under the initiative. We also visited key sites in  three countries that hold or held U.S.-origin HEU and conducted  interviews with foreign country representatives to identify any concerns  regarding DOE and U.S. agencies’ ability to return the most vulnerable  nuclear materials in accordance with initiative aims. We prepared and  distributed a standard set of questions to foreign government officials  from countries we did not visit; however, we did not use information  obtained through these question sets as our response rate was low.  Specifically, of the 14 countries that received the survey, 5 responded to  the questions.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2014 to September  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: International Physical Security Guidelines for the Categorization of Nuclear Material
paragraphs: The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) INFCIRC/225/Revision  5 international physical security guidelines document provides the basis  by which the United States and other countries generally classify the  categories of physical protection that should be afforded nuclear material,  based on the type, volume, and disposition of the nuclear material. Table  3 lists the material category according to IAEA’s international physical  security guidelines.
section_title: Appendix III: Agencies’ Spending to Secure Nuclear Materials under the Global Initiative to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials
paragraphs: We distributed a data collection instrument to the Department of Energy’s  (DOE) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), DOE’s Material  Protection, Control and Accounting program (MPC&A), the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Department  of State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ascertain what  initiative-related work agencies performed and how much that work cost.  To that end, the data collection instrument asked agencies to provide a  yearly breakdown of all initiative-related spending from fiscal year 2009  through fiscal year 2014, including what work that spending supported,  where that work occurred, and how much it cost. The data collection  instrument also included questions regarding what agencies planned to  spend from 2015 through 2019, and the projects and locations that the  spending is expected to support. The data collection instrument also  included questions regarding whether agencies had conducted  assessments of their data reliability, if they had found any material errors  in these assessments, whether the spending figures they were providing  were exact or estimates, and—if applicable—how they arrived at the  estimates.
Our analysis of these data indicates that agencies spent over $1.9 billion  in the four key areas of removing, downblending, physically protecting  nuclear materials, and converting reactors and facilities that operate on  highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU), as well as  on associated efforts such as training from April 2009 through December  2013. MPC&A spent the most among agencies we surveyed, with over $1  billion spent, mainly on training and other initiative-related activities that  fell outside the scope of the four key activities addressed in this report.  GTRI spent the next greatest amount, with $553 million, mainly for  removals of vulnerable nuclear materials. DOD’s Cooperative Threat  Reduction program spent about $329 million. The total amount of  spending during the initiative is laid out by agency and activity in table 4  below.
section_title: Appendix IV: Global Threat Reduction Initiative Types of Nuclear Material Return Programs, and Sites, Amounts, and Types of Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Returned
paragraphs: Over the course of the initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear materials,  the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Global Threat Reduction Initiative  (GTRI) removed highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from  around the world, under what may be called the U.S.-origin nuclear  material return program, the Russian-origin nuclear material return  program, and the Gap nuclear material return program. More specifically,  U.S.-origin nuclear material return program. In May 1996, DOE  announced it would create a program to allow certain U.S.-origin nuclear  materials from Training, Research, Isotope General Atomic (TRIGA) and  Material Test Reactor (MTR) reactors, as well as target material  containing uranium enriched in the United States, to be returned the  United States, subject to certain criteria. The February 1996 Final  Environmental Impact Statement conducted to consider the potential  environmental impacts of the program noted that fresh, unirradiated HEU  would be eligible to return under the proposed program, as well as spent  nuclear HEU and in some cases low-enriched uranium (LEU).
Russian-origin nuclear material return program. A May 2004  government-to-government agreement between the United States and  Russia established the program that returns Russian-origin material to  Russia with U.S. government assistance. According to GTRI officials,  Russia performs any necessary environmental reviews to facilitate those  returns to Russian sites.
Gap nuclear material return program. In October 2007, a Secretary of  Energy policy memo established the program to provide for the return to  the United States of other types of spent nuclear materials not covered in  the U.S.-origin nuclear material return program, if the material poses a  threat to national security, is susceptible to use in an improvised nuclear  device, presents a high risk of terrorist theft, and has no other reasonable  pathway to assure security from theft or diversion.
Table 5 below lists all removals over the course of the initiative, the site  the nuclear materials were removed from, the amount removed, the type  of nuclear material, the month and year of removal, and whether the  return was made under the U.S.-origin, Russian-origin, or Gap nuclear  material program.
section_title: Appendix V: Foreign Reactor Conversions and Shutdowns from May 2009 through December 2013
paragraphs: Over the course of the initiative, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office  of Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) helped convert highly  enriched uranium (HEU) reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU),  confirmed the shutdown of additional HEU reactors, and converted the  production of medical isotope facilities utilizing HEU processes. Table 6  lists the 23 reactors and medical isotope production facilities converted  from HEU to LEU or shut down during the course of the initiative,  including the country and facility containing the facility.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Energy
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Dan Feehan (Assistant  Director), Luke Baron, Antoinette Capaccio, Bridget Grimes, Michelle  Munn, Alison O’Neill, and Rebecca Shea made key contributions to this  report.