Arlington National Cemetery: Actions Taken and Steps Remaining to Address Contracting and Management Challenges
Published: 2012-01-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington) contains the remains of more than 330,000 military servicemembers, their family members, and others. In June 2010, the Army Inspector General identified problems at the cemetery, including deficiencies in contracting and management, burial errors, and a failure to notify next of kin of errors. In response, the Secretary of the Army issued guidance creating the position of the Executive Director of the Army National Cemeteries Program (ANCP) to manage Arlington and requiring changes to address the deficiencies and improve cemetery operations. In response to Public Law 111-339, GAO assessed several areas, including (1) actions taken to improve contract management and oversight, (2) the Armys efforts to address identified management deficiencies and provide information and assistance to families regarding efforts to detect and correct burial errors, and (3) factors affecting the feasibility and advisability of transferring jurisdiction for the Armys national cemeteries to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The information in this testimony summarizes GAOs recent reports on Arlington contracting (GAO-12-99) and management (GAO-12-105). These reports are based on, among other things, analyzing guidance, policies, plans, contract files, and other documentation from the Army, Arlington, and other organizations and interviews with Army and VA officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active during fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 under which contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on Arlingtons behalf. These contracts supported cemetery operations, construction and facility maintenance, and new efforts to enhance information technology systems for the automation of burial operations. The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different levels to provide for more effective management and oversight of contracts, establishing new support relationships, formalizing policies and procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated contracting staff to manage and improve its acquisition processes. However, GAO found that ANCP does not maintain complete data on its contracts, responsibilities for contracting support are not yet fully defined, and dedicated contract staffing arrangements still need to be determined. The success of Arlingtons acquisition outcomes will depend on continued management focus from ANCP and its contracting partners to ensure sustained attention to contract management and institutionalize progress made to date. GAO made three recommendations to continue improvements in contract management. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred and noted actions in progress to address these areas.
The Army has taken positive steps and implemented improvements to address other management deficiencies and to provide information and assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for ensuring accountability over remains and improving its capability to respond to the public and to families inquiries. Nevertheless, the Army has remaining management challenges in several areasmanaging information technology investments, updating workforce plans, developing an organizational assessment program, coordinating with key partners, developing a strategic plan, and developing guidance for providing assistance to families. GAO made six recommendations to help address these areas. DOD concurred or partially concurred and has begun to take some corrective actions.
A transfer of jurisdiction for the Armys two national cemeteries to VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal government. However, several factors may affect the advisability of making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits, potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on Arlingtons unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved its management, it may be premature to move forward with a change in jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement exist that entail less disruption. GAO identified opportunities for enhancing collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national cemeteries. GAO recommended that the Army and VA develop a mechanism to formalize collaboration between these organizations. DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In the reports, GAO made several recommendations to help Arlington sustain progress made to date.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Army’s progress in  addressing contracting and management challenges identified at  Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington), opportunities for collaboration  between the Army and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), as well  as steps remaining to ensure sound management of the cemetery going  forward. Beginning in 2009, the Army’s management of Arlington came  under intense scrutiny following the discovery of burial errors and the  identification of serious contracting and other management deficiencies  affecting cemetery operations. In June 2010, the Army Inspector General  (Army IG) reported on numerous deficiencies and made more than 100  recommendations for corrective action, which covered a span of issues,  including cemetery policies and procedures, management and training,  command structures, information assurance compliance, and  contracting.  After the Army IG’s inspection findings were released, the  Secretary of the Army assigned new leadership to Arlington, including the  new position of Executive Director of the Army National Cemeteries  Program (ANCP), and issued Army Directive 2010-04 requiring a  number of changes to address the identified deficiencies and improve  cemetery operations. In the time since these actions, the Army has taken  positive steps to address critical areas and implement improvements, and  we continue to be encouraged by these efforts. However, our work points  to the need for further action to ensure that the positive changes made  thus far are institutionalized and will prove lasting over the long term.
Our statement today is based on two reports issued on December 15,  2011, as required by Public Law 111-339. The first discusses (1) the  number, duration of, and dollar amount spent on current contracts used to  support operations at Arlington and (2) the extent to which the Army has  put processes and procedures in place to provide for the effective  management and oversight of contracts supporting Arlington. The  second discusses (1) the Army’s efforts to address identified  management deficiencies; (2) the Army’s process for providing  information and assistance to families regarding efforts to detect and  correct burial errors; and (3) factors that may affect the feasibility or  advisability of transferring jurisdiction for the Army's two national  cemeteries to VA, as well as issues related to collaboration between  these agencies.
For these two reports we conducted work at Arlington and other offices  and agencies within the Department of the Army, including the Military  District of Washington, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, the Army  Contracting Command, the Mission and Installation Contracting  Command (MICC), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),  among others. We also conducted work at VA and contacted veteran  service organizations and private industry associations. We reviewed  documents pertaining to previously identified deficiencies, including the  Army IG’s 2010 inspection and investigation of Arlington, the results of  two follow-up inspections conducted by the Army IG in 2011, and Army  Directive 2010-04. We obtained information from knowledgeable officials  about the steps taken to respond to the Army IG's findings and to  implement the Army's directive. In addition, we analyzed data from  contracting offices and other sources on contracts active during fiscal  years 2010 and 2011 and above $100,000 and reviewed contract files;  analyzed guidance, policies, plans, and other documentation from  Arlington and other organizations; and interviewed agency officials to  assess efforts to improve contract management. To identify factors that  may affect the feasibility or advisability of transferring jurisdiction for the  Army’s national cemeteries to VA, we reviewed our prior work on federal  government reorganization, reviewed the legislative history of the  National Cemeteries Act of 1973, and obtained pertinent documents and  interviewed officials from the Army and VA, including the Secretary of the  Army and VA’s Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs. We conducted this  work from March 2011 through December 2011 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit work. We believe that the evidence obtained provides  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: Management of Arlington Contracts Improved, but Additional Steps Are Needed to Ensure Continued Progress
paragraphs: The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different levels  to provide for more effective management and oversight of contracts  supporting Arlington, including improving visibility of contracts,  establishing new support relationships, formalizing policies and  procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated contracting staff to  manage and improve acquisition processes. While significant progress  has been made, we have recommended that the Army take further action  in these areas to ensure continued improvement and institutionalize  progress made to date. These recommendations and the agency's  response are discussed later in this statement.
Arlington does not have its own contracting authority and, as such, relies  on other contracting offices to award and manage contracts on its behalf.  ANCP receives contracting support in one of two main ways, either by (1)  working directly with contracting offices to define requirements, ensure  the appropriate contract vehicle, and provide contract oversight, or (2)  partnering with another program office to leverage expertise and get help  with defining requirements and providing contract oversight. Those  program offices, in turn, use other contracting arrangements to obtain  services and perform work for Arlington. Using data from multiple  sources, we identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active  during fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011  under which these contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on  Arlington’s behalf. These contracts and task orders supported cemetery  operations, such as landscaping, custodial, and guard services;  construction and facility maintenance; and new efforts to enhance  information technology systems for the automation of burial operations.  Figure 1 identifies the contracting relationships, along with the number of  contracts and dollars obligated by contracting office, for the contracts and  task orders we reviewed.
At the time of our review, we found that ANCP did not maintain complete  data on contracts supporting its operations. We have previously reported  that the effective acquisition of services requires reliable data to enable  informed management decisions.leadership may be without sufficient information to identify, track, and  ensure the effective management and oversight of its contracts. While we  obtained information on Arlington contracts from various sources,  limitations associated with each of these sources make identifying and  tracking Arlington’s contracts as a whole difficult. For example:   Without complete data, ANCP  Internal ANCP data. A contract specialist detailed to ANCP in  September 2010 developed and maintained a spreadsheet to identify  and track data for specific contracts covering daily cemetery  operations and maintenance services. Likewise, ANCP resource  management staff maintain a separate spreadsheet that tracks  purchase requests and some associated contracts, as well as the  amount of funding provided to other organizations through the use of  military interdepartmental purchase requests. Neither of these  spreadsheets identifies the specific contracts and obligations  associated with Arlington’s current information technology and  construction requirements.
Existing contract and financial systems. The Federal Procurement  Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) is the primary system used  to track governmentwide contract data, including those for the  Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army. The Arlington funding  office identification number, a unique code that is intended to identify  transactions specific to Arlington, is not consistently used in this  system and, in fact, was used for only 34 of the 56 contracts in our  review.  In October 2010 and consistent with a broader Army initiative,  ANCP implemented the General Fund Enterprise Business System  (GFEBS)  to enhance financial management and oversight and to  improve its capability to track expenditures. We found that data in this  system did not identify the specific information technology contracts  supported by the Army Communications-Electronics Command, Army  Geospatial Center, Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon  Systems Support office, and others. Officials at ANCP and at the  MICC-Fort Belvoir stated that they were exploring the use of  additional data resources to assist in tracking Arlington contracts,  including the Virtual Contracting Enterprise, an electronic tool  intended to help enable visibility and analysis of elements of the  contracting process.
Contracting support organizations. We also found that Army  contracting offices had difficulty in readily providing complete and  accurate data to us on Arlington contracts. For example, the National  Capital Region Contracting Center could not provide a complete list of  active contracts supporting Arlington during fiscal years 2010 and  2011 and in some cases did not provide accurate dollar amounts  associated with the contracts it identified. USACE also had difficulty  providing a complete list of active Arlington contracts for this time  frame. The MICC-Fort Belvoir contracting office was able to provide a  complete list of the recently awarded contracts supporting Arlington  with accurate dollar amounts for this time frame, and those data were  supported by similar information from Arlington.
The Army has also taken a number of steps to better align ANCP contract  support with the expertise of its partners. However, some of the  agreements governing these relationships do not yet fully define roles and  responsibilities for contracting support. We have previously reported that  a key factor in improving DOD’s service acquisition outcomes—that is,  obtaining the right service, at the right price, in the right manner—is  having defined responsibilities and associated support structures. Going  forward, sustained attention on the part of ANCP and its partners will be  important to ensure that contracts of all types and risk levels are  managed effectively. The following summarizes ongoing efforts in this  area:
ANCP established a new contracting support agreement with the  Army Contracting Command in August 2010. The agreement states  that the command will assign appropriate contracting offices to  provide support, in coordination with ANCP, and will conduct joint  periodic reviews of new and ongoing contract requirements. In April  2011, ANCP also signed a separate agreement with the MICC, part of  the Army Contracting Command, which outlines additional  responsibilities for providing contracting support to ANCP. While this  agreement states that the MICC, through the Fort Belvoir contracting  office, will provide the full range of contracting support, it does not  specify the types of requirements that will be supported, nor does it  specify that other offices within the command may also do so.
ANCP signed an updated support agreement with USACE in  December 2010, which states that these organizations will coordinate  to assign appropriate offices to provide contracting support and that  USACE will provide periodic joint reviews of ongoing and upcoming  requirements. At the time of our review, USACE officials noted that  they were in the process of finalizing an overarching program  management plan with ANCP, which, if implemented, provides  additional detail about the structure of and roles and responsibilities  for support. USACE and ANCP have also established a Senior  Executive Review Group, which updates the senior leadership at both  organizations on the status of ongoing efforts.
ANCP has also put agreements in place with the Army Information  Technology Agency (ITA) and the Army Analytics Group, which  provide program support for managing information technology  infrastructure and enhance operational capabilities. Officials at ANCP  decided to leverage this existing Army expertise, rather than  attempting to develop such capabilities independently as was the  case under the previous Arlington management. For example, the  agreement in place with ITA identifies the services that will be  provided to Arlington, performance metrics against which ITA will be  measured, as well as Arlington’s responsibilities. These organizations  are also responsible for managing the use of contracts in support of  their efforts; however, the agreement with ANCP does not specifically  address roles and responsibilities associated with the use and  management of these contracts supporting Arlington requirements.  Although officials from these organizations told us that they currently  understand their responsibilities, without being clearly defined in the  existing agreements, roles and responsibilities may be less clear in  the future when personnel change.
ANCP has developed new internal policies and procedures and improved  training for staff serving as contracting officer’s representatives, and has  dedicated additional staff resources to improve contract management.  Many of these efforts were in process at the time of our review, including  decisions on contracting staff needs, and their success will depend on  continued management attention. The following summarizes our findings  in this area:
Arlington has taken several steps to more formally define its own  internal policies and procedures for contract management. In July  2010, the Executive Director of ANCP issued guidance stating that the  Army Contracting Command and USACE are the only authorized  contracting centers for Arlington. Further, ANCP is continuing efforts  to (1) develop standard operating procedures associated with  purchase requests; (2) develop memorandums for all ANCP  employees that outline principles of the procurement process, as well  as training requirements for contracting officer’s representatives; and  (3) create a common location for reference materials and information  associated with Arlington contracts. In May 2011, the Executive  Director issued guidance requiring contracting officer’s representative  training for all personnel assigned to perform that role, and at the time  of our review, all of the individuals serving as contracting officer’s  representatives had received training for that position.
ANCP, in coordination with the MICC-Fort Belvoir contracting office is  evaluating staffing requirements to determine the appropriate number,  skill level, and location of contracting personnel. In July 2010, the  Army completed a study that assessed Arlington’s manpower  requirements and identified the need for three full-time contract  specialist positions. While these positions have not been filled to date,  ANCP’s needs have instead been met through the use of staff  provided by the MICC. At the time of our review, the MICC-Fort  Belvoir was providing a total of 10 contracting staff positions in  support of Arlington, 5 of which are funded by ANCP, with the other 5  funded by the MICC-Fort Belvoir to help ensure adequate support for  Arlington requirements. ANCP officials have identified the need for a  more senior contracting specialist and stated that they intend to  request an update to their staffing allowance for fiscal year 2013 to fill  this new position.
Prior reviews of Arlington have identified numerous issues with contracts  in place prior to the new leadership at ANCP. While our review of similar  contracts found common concerns, we also found that contracts and task  orders awarded since June 2010 reflect improvements in acquisition  practices. Our previous contracting-related work has identified the need to  have well-defined requirements, sound business arrangements (i.e.,  contracts in place), and the right oversight mechanisms to ensure positive  outcomes. We found examples of improved documentation, better  definition and consolidation of existing requirements for services  supporting daily cemetery operations, and more specific requirements for  contractor performance. At the time of our review, many of these efforts  were still under way, so while initial steps taken reflect improvement, their  ultimate success is not yet certain.
section_title: Army Has Made Progress in Addressing Other Management Deficiencies at Arlington, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: The Army has also taken positive steps and implemented improvements  to address other management deficiencies and to provide information and  assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad  range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for ensuring  accountability over remains, taking actions to better provide information- assurance, and improving its capability to respond to the public and to  families’ inquiries. For example, Arlington officials have updated and  documented the cemetery’s chain-of-custody procedures for remains, to  include multiple verification steps by staff members and the tracking of  decedent information through a daily schedule, electronic databases, and  tags affixed to urns and caskets entering Arlington. Nevertheless, we  identified several areas where challenges remain:
Managing information-technology investments. Since June 2010,  ANCP has invested in information-technology improvements to  correct existing problems at Arlington and has begun projects to  further enhance the cemetery’s information-technology capabilities.  However, these investments and planned improvements are not yet  guided by an enterprise architecture—or modernization blueprint.  Our experience has shown that developing this type of architecture  can help minimize risk of developing systems that are duplicative,  poorly integrated, and unnecessarily costly to maintain. ANCP is  working to develop an enterprise architecture, and officials told us in  January that they expect the architecture will be finalized in  September 2012. Until the architecture is in place and ANCP’s  ongoing and planned information technology investments are  assessed against that architecture, ANCP lacks assurance that these  investments will be aligned with its future operational environment,  increasing the risk that modernization efforts will not adequately meet  the organization’s needs.
Updating workforce plans. The Army took a number of positive steps  to address deficiencies in its workforce plans, including completing an  initial assessment of its organizational structure in July 2010 after the  Army IG found that Arlington was significantly understaffed. However,  ANCP’s staffing requirements and business processes have  continued to evolve, and these changes have made that initial  workforce assessment outdated. Since the July 2010 assessment,  officials have identified the need for a number of new positions,  including positions in ANCP’s public-affairs office and a new security  and emergency-response group. Additionally, Arlington has revised a  number of its business processes, which could result in a change in  staffing needs. Although ANCP has adjusted its staffing levels to  address emerging requirements, its staffing needs have not been  formally reassessed. Our prior work has demonstrated that this kind of  assessment can improve workforce planning, which can enable an  organization to remain aware of and be prepared for its current and  future needs as an organization. ANCP officials have periodically  updated Arlington’s organizational structure as they identify new  requirements, and officials told us in January that they plan to  completely reassess staffing within ANCP in the summer of 2012 to  ensure that it has the staff needed to achieve its goals and objectives.  Until this reassessment is completed and documented, ANCP lacks  assurance that it has the correct number and types of staff needed to  achieve its goals and objectives.
Developing an organizational assessment program. Since 2009  ANCP has been the subject of a number of audits and assessments  by external organizations that have reviewed many aspects of its  management and operations, but it has not yet developed its own  assessment program for evaluating and improving cemetery  performance on a continuous basis. Both the Army IG and VA have  noted the importance of assessment programs in identifying and  enabling improvements of cemetery operations to ensure that  cemetery standards are met. Further, the Army has emphasized the  importance of maintaining an inspection program that includes a  management tool to identify, prevent, or eliminate problem areas. At  the time of our review, ANCP officials told us they were in the process  of developing an assessment program and were adapting VA’s  program to meet the needs of the Army’s national cemeteries. ANCP  officials estimated in January that they will be ready to perform their  first self-assessment in late 2012. Until ANCP institutes an  assessment program that includes an ability to complete a self- assessment of operations and an external assessment by cemetery  subject-matter experts, it is limited in its ability to evaluate and  improve aspects of cemetery performance.
Coordinating with key partners. While ANCP has improved its  coordination with other Army organizations, we found that it has  encountered challenges in coordinating with key operational partners,  such as the Military District of Washington, the military service honor  guards, and Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall. Officials from these  organizations told us that communication and collaboration with  Arlington have improved, but they have encountered challenges and  there are opportunities for continued improvement. For example,  officials from the Military District of Washington and the military  service honor guards indicated that at times they have experienced  difficulties working with Arlington’s Interment Scheduling Branch and  provided records showing that from June 24, 2010, through December  15, 2010, there were at least 27 instances where scheduling conflicts  took place. These challenges are due in part to a lack of written  agreements that fully define how these operational partners will  support and interact with Arlington. Our prior work has found that  agencies can derive benefits from enhancing and sustaining their  collaborative efforts by institutionalizing these efforts with agreements  that define common outcomes, establish agreed-upon roles and  responsibilities, identify mechanisms used to monitor and evaluate  collaborative efforts, and enable the organizations to leverage their  resources. ANCP has a written agreement in place with Joint Base  Myer-Henderson Hall, but this agreement does not address the full  scope of how these organizations work together. Additionally, ANCP  has drafted, but has not yet signed, a memorandum of agreement  with the Military District of Washington. ANCP has not drafted  memorandums of agreement with the military service honor guards  despite each military service honor guard having its own scheduling  procedure that it implements directly with Arlington and each service  working with Arlington to address operational challenges. ANCP, by  developing memorandums of agreement with its key operational  partners, will be better positioned to ensure effective collaboration  with these organizations and help to minimize future communication  and coordination challenges.
Developing a strategic plan. Although ANCP officials have been  taking steps to address challenges at Arlington, at the time of our  review they had not adopted a strategic plan aimed at achieving the  cemetery’s longer-term goals. An effective strategic plan can help  managers to prioritize goals; identify actions, milestones, and  resource requirements for achieving those goals; and establish  measures for assessing progress and outcomes. Our prior work has  shown that leading organizations prepare strategic plans that define a  clear mission statement, a set of outcome-related goals, and a  description of how the organization intends to achieve those goals.  Without a strategic plan, ANCP is not well positioned to ensure that  cemetery improvements are in line with the organizational mission  and achieve desired outcomes. ANCP officials told us during our  review that they were at a point where the immediate crisis at the  cemetery had subsided and they could focus their efforts on  implementing their longer-term goals and priorities. In January, ANCP  officials showed us a newly developed campaign plan. While we have  not evaluated this plan, our preliminary review found that it contains  elements of an effective strategic plan, including expected outcomes  and objectives for the cemetery and related performance metrics and  milestones.
Developing written guidance for providing assistance to families. After  the Army IG issued its findings in June 2010, numerous families called  Arlington to verify the burial locations of their loved ones. ANCP  developed a protocol for investigating these cases and responding to  the families. Our review found that ANCP implemented this protocol,  and we reviewed file documentation for a sample of these cases. In  reviewing the assistance provided by ANCP when a burial error  occurred, we found that ANCP’s Executive Director or Chief of Staff  contacted the affected families. ANCP’s Executive Director—in  consultation with cemetery officials and affected families— made  decisions on a case-by-case basis about the assistance that was  provided to each family. For instance, some families who lived outside  of the Washington, D.C., area were reimbursed for hotel and travel  costs. However, the factors that were considered when making these  decisions were not documented in a written policy. In its June 2010  report, the Army IG noted in general that the absence of written  policies left Arlington at risk of developing knowledge gaps as  employees leave the cemetery. By developing written guidance that  addresses the cemetery’s interactions with families affected by burial  errors, ANCP could identify pertinent DOD and Army regulations and  other guidance that should be considered when making such  decisions. Also, with written guidance the program staff could identify  the types of assistance that can be provided to families. In January,  ANCP provided us with a revised protocol for both agency-identified  and family member-initiated gravesite inquiries. The revised protocol  provides guidance on the cemetery's interactions with the next of kin  and emphasizes the importance of maintaining transparency and  open communication with affected families.
section_title: Formal Collaboration between the Army and VA Could Lead to Improvements across All National Cemeteries
paragraphs: A transfer of jurisdiction for the Army’s two national cemeteries to VA is  feasible based on historical precedent for the national cemeteries and  examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal government.  However, we identified several factors that may affect the advisability of  making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits,  potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on Arlington’s  unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army has taken steps to  address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved its management, it  may be premature to move forward with a change in jurisdiction,  particularly if other options for improvement exist that entail less  disruption. During our review, we identified opportunities for enhancing  collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their  strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national cemeteries.
Transferring cemetery jurisdiction could have both benefits and costs. Our  prior work suggests that government reorganization can provide an  opportunity for greater effectiveness in program management and result  in improved efficiency over the long-term, and can also result in short- term operational costs.told us they were not aware of relevant studies that may provide insight  into the potential benefits and costs of making a change in cemetery  jurisdiction. However, our review identified areas where VA’s and the  Army’s national cemeteries have similar, but not identical, needs and  have developed independent capabilities to meet those needs. For  example, each agency has its own staff, processes, and systems for  determining burial eligibility and scheduling and managing burials. While  consolidating these capabilities may result in long-term efficiencies, there  could also be challenges and short-term costs.
At the time of our review, Army and VA officials  Potential transition challenges may arise in transferring cemetery  jurisdiction. Army and VA cemeteries have similar operational  requirements to provide burial services for service members, veterans,  and veterans’ family members; however, officials identified areas where  the organizations differ and stated that there could be transition  challenges if VA were to manage Arlington, including challenges  pertaining to the regulatory framework, appropriations structure, and  contracts. For example, Arlington has more restrictive eligibility criteria for  in-ground burials, which has the result of limiting the number of  individuals eligible for burial at the cemetery. If Arlington cemetery were to  be subject to the same eligibility criteria as VA’s cemeteries, the eligibility  for in-ground burials at Arlington would be greatly expanded. Additionally, the Army’s national cemeteries are funded through a  different appropriations structure than VA’s national cemeteries. If the  Army’s national cemeteries were transferred to VA, Congress would have  to choose whether to alter the funding structure currently in place for  Arlington.
Burial eligibility at VA’s national cemeteries is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 2402 and 38  C.F.R. § 38.620. Burial eligibility at Arlington is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 2410 and 32  C.F.R. § 553.15.
Mission and vision statements. The Army and VA have developed  their own mission and vision statements for their national cemeteries  that differ in several ways. Specifically, VA seeks to be a model of  excellence for burials and memorials, while Arlington seeks to be the  nation’s premier military cemetery.
Military honors provided to veterans. The Army and VA have varying  approaches to providing military funeral honors. VA is not responsible  for providing honors to veterans, and VA cemeteries generally are not  involved in helping families obtain military honors from DOD. In  contrast, Arlington provides a range of burial honors depending on  whether an individual is a service member killed in action, a veteran,  or an officer.
Ceremonies and special events. Arlington hosts a large number of  ceremonies and special events in a given year, some of which may  involve the President of the United States as well as visiting heads of  state. From June 10, 2010, through October 1, 2011, Arlington hosted  more than 3,200 wreath-laying ceremonies, over 70 memorial  ceremonies, and 19 state visits, in addition to Veterans Day and  Memorial Day ceremonies, and also special honors for Corporal Frank  Buckles, the last American servicemember from World War I. VA  officials told us that their cemeteries do not support a similar volume  of ceremonies, and as a result they have less experience in this area  than the Army.
During our review, we found that there are opportunities to expand  collaboration between the Army and VA that could improve the efficiency  and effectiveness of these organizations’ cemetery operations. Our prior  work has shown that achieving results for the nation increasingly requires  that federal agencies work together, and when considering the nation’s  long-range fiscal challenges, the federal government must identify ways  to deliver results more efficiently and in a way that is consistent with its  limited resources. Since the Army IG issued its findings in June 2010,  the Army and VA have taken steps to partner more effectively. The  Army’s hiring of several senior VA employees to help manage Arlington  has helped to foster collaboration, and the two agencies signed a  memorandum of understanding that allows ANCP employees to attend  classes at VA’s National Training Center.
However, the Army and VA may have opportunities to collaborate and  avoid duplication in other areas that could benefit the operations of either  or both cemetery organizations. For example, the Army and VA are  upgrading or redesigning some of their core information technology  systems supporting cemetery operations. By continuing to collaborate in  this area, the agencies can better ensure that their information-technology  systems are able to communicate, thereby helping to prevent operational  challenges stemming from a lack of compatibility between these systems  in the future. In addition, each agency may have specialized capabilities  that it could share with the other. VA, for example, has staff dedicated to  determining burial eligibility, and the Army has an agency that provides  geographic-information-system and global-positioning-system  capabilities—technologies that VA officials said that they are examining  for use at VA’s national cemeteries.
While the Army and VA have taken steps to improve collaboration, at the  time of our review the agencies had not established a formal mechanism  to identify and analyze issues of shared interest, such as process  improvements, lessons learned, areas for reducing duplication, and  solutions to common problems. VA officials indicated that they planned to  meet with ANCP officials in the second quarter of fiscal year 2012, with  the aim of enhancing collaboration between the two agencies. Unless the  Army and VA collaborate to identify areas where the agencies can assist  each other, they could miss opportunities to take advantage of each  other’s strengths—thereby missing chances to improve the efficiency and  effectiveness of cemetery operations—and are at risk of investing in  duplicative capabilities.
section_title: Summary of Recommendations for Further Improvements at Arlington National Cemetery
paragraphs: The success of the Army’s efforts to improve contracting and  management at Arlington will depend on continued focus in various  areas. Accordingly, we made a number of recommendations in our  December 2011 reports. In the area of contracting, we recommended that  the Army implement a method to track complete and accurate contract  data, ensure that support agreements clearly identify roles and  responsibilities for contracting, and determine the number and skills  necessary for contracting staff. In its written comments, DOD partially  concurred with these recommendations, agreeing that there is a need to  take actions to address the issues we raised, but indicating that our  recommendations did not adequately capture Army efforts currently  underway. We believe our report reflects the significant progress made by  Arlington and that implementation of our recommendations will help to  institutionalize the positive steps taken to date.
With regard to our recommendation to identify and implement a  method to track complete and accurate contact data, DOD noted that  Arlington intends to implement, by April 2012, a methodology based  on an electronic tool which is expected to collect and reconcile  information from a number of existing data systems. Should this  methodology consider the shortcomings within these data systems as  identified in our report, we believe this would satisfy our  recommendations.
DOD noted planned actions, expected for completion by March 2012  that, if implemented, would satisfy the intent of our other two  recommendations.
With regard to other management challenges at Arlington, we  recommended that the Army implement its enterprise architecture and  reassess ongoing and planned information-technology investments;  update its assessment of ANCP’s workforce needs; develop and  implement a program for assessing and improving cemetery operations;  develop memorandums of understanding with Arlington’s key operational  partners; develop a strategic plan; and develop written guidance to help  determine the types of assistance that will be provided to families affected  by burial errors. DOD fully agreed with our recommendations that the  Army update its assessment of ANCP's workforce needs and implement a  program for assessing and improving cemetery operations. DOD partially  agreed with our other recommendations. In January, ANCP officials  provided us with updates on its plans to take corrective actions, as  discussed in this statement.
With regard to implementing an enterprise architecture, DOD stated  that investments made to date in information technology have been  modest and necessary to address critical deficiencies. We recognize  that some vulnerabilities must be expeditiously addressed.  Nevertheless, our prior work shows that organizations increase the  risk that their information technology investments will not align with  their future operational environment if these investments are not  guided by an approved enterprise architecture.
Regarding its work with key operational partners, DOD stated that it  recognizes the value of establishing memorandums of agreement and  noted the progress that the Army has made in developing  memorandums of agreement with some of its operational partners.  We believe that the Army should continue to pursue and finalize  agreements with key operational partners that cover the full range of  areas where these organizations must work effectively together.
With regard to a strategic plan, DOD stated that is was in the process  of developing such a plan. As discussed previously, ANCP officials in  January showed us a newly developed campaign plan that, based on  our preliminary review, contains elements of an effective strategic  plan.
Regarding written guidance on the factors that the Executive Director  will consider when determining the types of assistance provided to  families affected by burial errors, DOD stated that such guidance  would limit the Executive Director's ability to exercise leadership and  judgment to make an appropriate determination. We disagree with this  view. Our recommendation does not limit the Executive Director's  discretion, which we consider to be an essential part of ensuring that  families receive the assistance they require in these difficult situations.  Our recommendation, if implemented, would improve visibility into the  factors that guide decision-making in these cases.
Finally, we recommended that the Army and VA implement a joint  working group or other such mechanism to enable ANCP and VA’s  National Cemetery Administration to collaborate more closely in the  future. Both DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation. As noted,  VA stated that a planning meeting to enhance collaboration is planned for  the second quarter of 2012.
Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Portman, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Brian Lepore, Director,  Defense Capabilities and Management, on (202) 512-4523 or  leporeb@gao.gov or Belva Martin, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing  Management, on (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this testimony. Individuals who made key contributions  to this testimony include Tom Gosling, Assistant Director; Brian Mullins,  Assistant Director; Kyler Arnold; Russell Bryan; George M. Duncan,  Kathryn Edelman; Julie Hadley; Kristine Hassinger; Lina Khan; and Alex  Winograd.
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