Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round
Published: 2004-05-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended, required the Department of Defense (DOD) to address several base realignment and closure (BRAC) issues in 2004 for the 2005 BRAC round to proceed. The requirements included reporting on a 20-year force structure plan, an inventory of military installations, and separately adopting selection criteria for the upcoming round. The legislation also required DOD to certify whether an additional BRAC round was needed, and, if so, that annual net savings would be realized not later than fiscal year 2011. If the certifications were provided, GAO was required to evaluate DOD's submissions and report to Congress. DOD reported on March 23, 2004, and provided the certifications. In this report GAO evaluates (1) DOD's responsiveness to legislative requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and selection criteria; (3) other key issues included in DOD's report; and (4) DOD's certification regarding the need for an additional BRAC round.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's report to Congress generally addressed all legislative reporting requirements in section 2912 of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended, and separately complied with requirements under Section 2913 in adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. The degree of coverage on some reporting requirements was limited to avoid prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 round. As directed, GAO analyzed DOD's worldwide installation inventory, force structure plan, and selection criteria. While all three are important in setting a framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in guiding DOD's analyses for the 2005 round. The unclassified portion of the 20-year force structure plan, extending through 2009, provides a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions), and reflects limited changes across the military services, even though the services have initiatives under way that could affect future force structure and infrastructure requirements. Today's security environment is evolving, as are force structure requirements along with technology advancements, and defense transformation efforts. The department must consider these factors in its BRAC analyses with appropriate allowances for future uncertainties. DOD's selection criteria closely parallel criteria used in previous rounds, while incorporating the provisions required by legislation authorizing the 2005 round. The analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed through their application in the ongoing BRAC process. GAO addressed other BRAC-related issues such as excess defense infrastructure capacity and BRAC savings because of their importance to DOD's certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round. DOD's excess capacity analysis, completed for the 2004 report, has some limitations that could result in either overstating or understating excess capacity across various functional areas, and make it difficult to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives some indications of excess capacity within the department, the issue warrants a more complete assessment in the BRAC process. That process will also consider joint base use with the potential for better identifying excess capacity. DOD's historical financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 rounds, each of the military departments could achieve annual net savings by 2011, as stipulated by the mandate. While the potential exists for substantial savings from the upcoming round, it is difficult to conclusively project the expected magnitude of the savings because there are too many unknowns at this time. Additionally, improvements are needed in DOD's accounting for savings after BRAC decisions are made. GAO found no basis to question DOD's certification of the need for an additional BRAC round. While clear limitations exist in DOD's assessment of excess capacity, it does point to some areas that warrant additional analysis-and the current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: While the Department of Defense (DOD) continues its work in preparing  for the upcoming base realignment and closure (BRAC) round in 2005,  legislation required DOD to report to Congress on several BRAC-related  issues in 2004 in order for the 2005 round to proceed. The legislation  directed, among other things, that the Secretary of Defense provide  Congress with a 20-year force structure plan and a worldwide inventory of  military installations in its submission of its fiscal year 2005 budget  documentation and separately publish the final selection criteria for the  2005 BRAC round no later than February 16, 2004. Of particular  importance was the requirement that the Secretary of Defense certify the  need for additional base realignments and closures and, if such a need  exists, certify that annual net savings would be realized by each military  department not later than fiscal year 2011. DOD published its final  selection criteria on February 12, 2004, and reported on the other  legislative requirements, including the necessary certifications, on March  23, 2004. The legislation also directed us, if DOD’s certifications were  provided, to submit a report to Congress, within 60 days of the issuance of  DOD’s report, evaluating specific aspects of DOD’s legislatively required  submissions.
In this report, we evaluate (1) DOD’s responsiveness to the legislative  reporting requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure  inventory, and final selection criteria for the 2005 BRAC round, including,  as appropriate, observations on the relative analytical sufficiency and  accuracy of each; (3) other key BRAC-related issues included in DOD’s  report, such as excess infrastructure capacity, estimated savings, and the  economic impact of BRAC on nearby communities; and (4) the Secretary’s  certification regarding the need for an additional BRAC round. While the  mandate did not direct us to address the third objective, we chose to  include this information because of widespread interest in the 2005  BRAC process among Congress and the public and its relevance to the  Secretary’s certification of the need for the 2005 BRAC round.
In performing our review, we conducted work at the BRAC Office in the  Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and  Environment and the Army, Navy, and Air Force BRAC offices. We also  relied on our previous and ongoing work on BRAC-related issues. Because  we were required to report within 2 months after DOD issued its report,  we did not have time to fully assess the accuracy of all data used in the  report; but we did perform limited reliability assessments of key data  contained in DOD’s report and determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report with relevant limitations noted in  our report. We performed our work from March to May 2004 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Further information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 extended the  authority of the 1990 BRAC legislation, with some modifications, to  authorize an additional BRAC round in 2005. Under section 2912 of the  1990 Act and as part of its fiscal year 2005 budget submission, DOD was  required to submit a 20-year force structure plan, an infrastructure  inventory, and a certification that additional closures and realignments  were needed and that annual net savings would be achieved for each  military department by fiscal year 2011. The force structure plan was to be  based on assessments by the Secretary of Defense of the probable threats  to national security between fiscal years 2005 and 2025. Furthermore, the  plan was to be based on the probable end strengths and major military  force units (land divisions, carrier and other major combatant vessels, and  air wings) needed to meet these threats. DOD was also required to prepare  a comprehensive inventory of military installations worldwide that  indicated the number and type of facilities in the active and reserve forces  of each military department.
Using the force structure plan and the infrastructure inventory, the  Secretary of Defense’s submission to Congress was required to address  (1) the inventory necessary to support the force structure, (2) the  categories of excess infrastructure and infrastructure capacity, and (3) an  economic analysis of the effect of the closure or realignment of military  installations to reduce excess capacity. In analyzing the infrastructure  requirements, DOD was to consider the continuing need for and  availability of military installations outside the United States and any  efficiency that may be gained from joint tenancy by more than one branch  of the Armed Forces on military bases. On the basis of the force structure  plan, the infrastructure inventory and the economic analysis, the Secretary  was required to certify whether the need existed for further closures and  realignments and, if so, that an additional round would result in annual net  savings for each military department, beginning not later than 2011.  Collectively, these requirements were to be addressed in a report to  Congress at the time it submitted its fiscal year 2005 budget justification  documentation. The legislation also stipulated that if the certifications  were provided in DOD’s report to Congress, we were to evaluate the force  structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and the final selection criteria,  and the need for an additional BRAC round. We were required to issue a  report not later than 60 days after DOD submitted its report to Congress.
Section 2913 of the 1990 Act, as amended, also required the Secretary of  Defense to publish in the Federal Register the selection criteria for use in  the BRAC 2005 round and to provide an opportunity for public comment.  The legislation required that military value be the primary criteria for  making recommendations to close or realign military installations, and  directed inclusion of a number of considerations in formulating the  selection criteria. The proposed selection criteria were published on  December 23, 2003, with a public comment period ending January 30,  2004. The final criteria were published on February 12, 2004. We were also  required by the legislation to evaluate the final selection criteria as part of  our overall assessment of DOD’s reporting on BRAC issues in 2004. This is  in keeping with GAO’s longstanding role as an independent, objective  observer of the BRAC process.
Legislation authorizing the 2005 round continued the previous legislative  requirement, applicable to earlier BRAC rounds that we review the  Secretary’s recommendations and selection process; it requires us to  report to the congressional defense committees no later than July 1, 2005,  45 days after the last date by which the Secretary must transmit to the  congressional defense committees and the BRAC Commission his  recommendations for closures and realignments. To make an informed  and timely assessment, we have consistently operated in a real-time  setting and have had access to significant portions of the process as it has  evolved, thus affording the department an opportunity to address any  concerns we raised on a timely basis. From our vantage point, we are  looking to see to what extent DOD follows a clear, transparent,  consistently applied process, where we can see a logical flow between  DOD’s analysis and its decision making.
section_title: DOD’s Report Generally Addressed All of the Legislatively Required Information
paragraphs: DOD’s report to Congress generally addressed all of the requirements in  section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as  amended, and separately complied with the requirements in section 2913  for adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. In some  instances, according to DOD officials there were limitations in the data  provided in DOD’s Section 2912 report in order to avoid preempting or  prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 BRAC round. Table  1 details the legislative requirements for DOD’s Section 2912 report,  indicates the pages in DOD’s report where the issues are addressed, and  provides our observations on the extent to which DOD provided the  information required by each subsection in the legislation.
Likewise, as discussed in a subsequent section, DOD also complied with  the requirements of Section 2913 in adapting its selection criteria for the  2005 BRAC round.
section_title: Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and Selection Criteria
paragraphs: While DOD’s worldwide military installation inventory, 20-year force  structure plan, and selection criteria are all important in setting a  framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in  guiding BRAC analyses for the 2005 round. Although DOD provided a  worldwide inventory of installations and facilities for each military  department as required by the legislation, it exceeds the needs of the 2005  BRAC process, which focuses on domestic bases. Further, to the extent  one looks to the inventory as providing a total accounting of DOD facilities  worldwide, it should be noted that the inventory lacks completeness in  that not all overseas installations and associated facilities where U.S.  forces are deployed are included—primarily because some are considered  temporary in nature. The unclassified portion of the force structure plan,  extending through 2009, has more of a macro-level focus reflecting limited  change across the military services, even though the services have a  number of initiatives under way that could affect force structure and  infrastructure requirements. Nevertheless, DOD’s ongoing BRAC  analysis will need to consider the impact of such changes on infrastructure  requirements. The department’s final selection criteria, although  incorporating legislatively directed language, essentially follows a  framework similar to that employed in prior BRAC rounds. The full  analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed through their  application, as DOD completes its data collection and analysis for the  2005 round.
subsections: section_title: Worldwide Installation Inventory Provided but Extended Beyond Requirements for 2005 BRAC Round
paragraphs: As required by the legislation, DOD provided a worldwide inventory of  installations, which included the number and type of facilities in the active  and reserve forces. While the inventory provides a detailed listing of  facilities, it extends beyond the needs of the 2005 BRAC round with its  focus on domestic installations. At the same time, it has some limitations  in terms of a complete inventory for use beyond BRAC because it does not  include all overseas installations. For example, the inventory omits various  installations and associated facilities located in parts of the Middle East,  such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. DOD and military service officials  told us that these installations are considered temporary or classified in  support of contingency operations, and are not included in the database  used to generate the inventory. This limitation should not impact the  conduct of the 2005 BRAC round since the focus is on domestic bases, and  DOD has identified the domestic bases in the database to assess in the  BRAC 2005 round.
The inventory of installations and facilities was derived from DOD’s  Facilities Assessment Database, which is updated annually from the military  services’ real property databases. Because of time constraints, we  performed only limited work on the accuracy of the inventory. Contractors  who maintain the Facilities Assessment Database told us that since 1998  they have validated and verified facility data annually by performing data  queries—such as verifying the size of buildings or the year a facility was  acquired or built—to identify anomalies in the data. Contractor officials  stated the queries have been successful in correcting erroneous data  reported by the services and that the quality of the data has improved  since 1998.
section_title: No Major Force Structure Changes Identified through Fiscal Year 2009 in DOD’s 20-Year Force Structure Plan
paragraphs: As with prior BRAC rounds, DOD has provided Congress with a force  structure plan that will guide or inform BRAC decisions in 2005, except  legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round required development of a  20-year plan instead of a 6-year plan required in prior rounds. DOD’s  Section 2912 report contains the unclassified portion of DOD’s 20-year  plan extending through fiscal year 2009; the remaining years of the plan  are addressed in a classified annex to the report. The unclassified report  provides more of a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions)  reflecting limited changes across the military services, even though the  services have a number of initiatives under way that could affect force  structure and infrastructure requirements, and which will need to be  considered by DOD as it performs its 2005 round analyses. DOD has the  option of modifying its force structure plan, as needed, with its fiscal year  2006 budget submission which would be expected prior to its issuance of  BRAC recommendations.
Table 2 summarizes DOD’s force structure plans at the macro-level  through 2009 by service force units and by end strength. It depicts limited  changes in force units and end strength for active and reserve components  of most services. Exceptions include the Navy, which expects to reduce  personnel but increase the number of ships in its inventory, and the Air  Force, which plans a slight increase in reserve personnel end strength.
While the Army showed no force structure changes through 2009, Army  officials told us that they have a number of initiatives under way that may  affect the force structure and related infrastructure requirements.  Specifically, the Army is restructuring the way it organizes its forces to  achieve greater flexibility by increasing the number of brigade combat  teams from 33 to 43 or more. To achieve these goals while maintaining  global commitments, the Army has been authorized by the Secretary of  Defense to temporarily increase its end strength by 30,000 personnel  through fiscal year 2007. Congress is considering legislation to  permanently authorize this increase. In addition, the Army is in the  process of rebalancing capabilities between the active and reserve  components by moving certain early-deploying and high-demand  capabilities such as military police and civil affairs from the reserve  components into the active force. Although the BRAC statute allows DOD  to submit a revised force structure plan with the fiscal year 2006 budget  submission, Army officials told us that many of the details about this  restructuring would not be completed by this timeframe.
Navy officials told us that their plans include the commissioning of 17 new  ships (13 Arleigh Burke destroyers, 2 submarines, 1 amphibious ship, and  1 littoral combat ship) while decommissioning 2 older ships. Navy officials  indicated that the projected reductions in the number of active personnel  result primarily from decommissioning ships and air squadrons and  changes to crew requirements on some ships, and the projected reduction  in reserve personnel is caused primarily by plans to deactivate 7 maritime  patrol squadrons. Navy officials also noted plans to increase the number of  ships in its inventory in future years but also have efforts under way to  reduce average crew size per ship. Although the force structure plan  shows a planned increase in the number of ships, available information  indicates some uncertainty over the total number of ships the Navy may  expect for its future force structure.
Air Force end strength levels shown in the force plan reflect authorized  levels and not the current over-strength levels, reflecting Air Force  expectations of reducing the current levels to those authorized. While the  Air Force showed minimal force structure changes through 2009, an Air  Force official stated that the service plans to increase the number of  aircraft per squadron as well as increase crew ratios to make more  effective use of fewer but more capable aircraft, which would most likely  reduce future infrastructure requirements. We have previously reported  that the Air Force could not only reduce infrastructure by increasing the  number of aircraft per fighter squadron but could also save millions of  dollars annually by doing so.
We recognize that developing a 20-year force structure plan is a  challenging task for the department, given a host of uncertainties about  the future security environment, potential technology advances and their  application to the future force, and ongoing departmental transformation  efforts. The uncertainties are evident in various ongoing defense  programs. While increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles, for example,  could have far-reaching effects for future defense force structure, we  noted in a recent report that DOD’s approach to planning for developing  and fielding this capability does not provide reasonable assurance that its  investment will facilitate the integration of these vehicles into the force  structure efficiently. Further, DOD officials told us that another  challenging aspect of its force structure planning resides in the longer  term (those years beyond 2009) of the plan. In addition to the uncertainties  cited above, these longer-term years are characterized by additional  unknowns regarding future funding levels that could impact the future  force structure and associated requirements, such as the total number of  ships for the Navy. Despite these inherent uncertainties, however, the  department must factor in relevant assumptions about potential future  force structure changes and surge requirements as it performs its analyses  for the upcoming BRAC round.
section_title: Final Selection Criteria Address Legislative Requirements and Provide Sound Framework for Follow-on BRAC Analyses
paragraphs: The department’s final selection criteria essentially follow a framework  similar to that employed in prior BRAC rounds, with specificity added in  selected areas in response to requirements contained in legislation  authorizing the 2005 BRAC round. The Defense Base Closure and  Realignment Act of 1990, as amended in 2002, required DOD to give  priority to selection criteria dealing with military value, including (1) the  impact on joint war fighting, training, and readiness; (2) the availability  and condition of training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or  air forces throughout diverse climates and terrains and staging areas for  use by the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions; and (3) the ability  to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements.  The legislation also required DOD to give special consideration to other  criteria, many of which parallel those used in prior BRAC rounds.  Furthermore, the legislation required DOD to consider cost impacts to  other federal entities as well as to DOD in its BRAC decision making.  Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004  requires DOD to consider surge requirements in the 2005 BRAC process.  Table 3 compares the 1995 BRAC criteria with that adopted for 2005, with  changes highlighted in bold.
Our analysis of lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds affirmed the  soundness of these basic criteria and generally endorsed their retention  for the future, while recognizing the potential for improving the process by  which the criteria are used in decision making. Notwithstanding our  endorsement of the criteria framework, in a January 27, 2004, letter to  DOD, we identified two areas in which we believed the draft selection  criteria needed greater clarification to fully address special considerations  called for in the legislation (see app. III). Specifically, we noted that the  criterion related to cost and savings does not indicate the department’s  intention to consider potential costs to other DOD activities or federal  agencies that may be affected by a proposed closure or realignment  recommendation. Also, we pointed out the criterion on environmental  impact does not clearly identify to what extent costs related to potential  environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental  compliance activities would be included in cost and savings analyses of  individual BRAC recommendations. We suggested that DOD could address  our concerns by incorporating these considerations either directly, in its  final criteria, or through later explanatory guidance. DOD indicated it  would address our concerns through clarifying guidance rather than a  change to the criteria. We have not yet seen that guidance.
DOD also received a variety of other comments on the draft criteria from  members of Congress, other elected representatives, and the general  public but did not make any changes before issuing the final criteria. Most  of these comments involved the military value criteria (see table 3: 1-4)  and centered on the maintenance of adequate surge capacity; the roles  military installations fulfill in homeland defense missions; the unique  features of research, development, test, and evaluation facilities; and the  preservation of vital human capital in various support functions. In  responding to those comments, DOD expressed the view that the draft  criteria adequately addressed these issues and did not see the need to  make any changes to its draft criteria. For example, DOD said that surge  requirements will be addressed under criterion one, which requires the  department to consider “current and future mission capabilities,” and  criterion three, which requires DOD to consider an installation’s ability to  “accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force  requirements” to support operations and training. Furthermore, DOD  noted that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004  requires the Secretary of Defense to “assess the probable threats to  national security” and determine “potential, prudent, surge requirements”  as part of BRAC 2005. DOD also noted that criterion two recognizes the  role of military installations as staging areas for forces conducting  homeland defense missions.
Collectively, in our view, many of the public comments on DOD’s criteria  expressed concern that the criteria for the 2005 BRAC round focused more  on assessing military value based on military missions and operational  capabilities without recognizing important support capabilities such as  research, development, test, and evaluation. Although modifications to the  criteria might have been made to address some of these concerns, the  absence of such changes does not necessarily mean that these issues will  not be considered in applying the criteria during the BRAC process. For  example, the department has established a variety of joint cross-service  groups to analyze various support functions during the upcoming round  and each group will have to adapt the final criteria for its particular  support area to assess military value related to each functional area. While  our monitoring of the ongoing BRAC process indicates this is occurring,  the effectiveness of these efforts will best be assessed as these groups  complete their work.
section_title: Observations on Other Key BRAC-Related Issues Included in DOD’s Report
paragraphs: Other BRAC-related issues included in DOD’s report—excess  infrastructure capacity, estimated savings for the 2005 round, and the  economic impact of prior BRAC actions on communities—are of  widespread interest to Congress and the public and important to DOD’s  certification regarding the need for a BRAC round. Although the  methodology DOD employed to identify excess capacity has some  limitations, DOD’s report does provides a rough indication that excess  base capacity exists. Further, historical financial data would suggest that,  assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 round, each of  the military departments could achieve annual net savings by 2011. As to  economic impact, our work has shown that many communities  surrounding closed bases from the previous rounds have fared better than  the national average, in terms of changes in unemployment rates and per  capita income, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some  negative effect from the economic downturn in recent years.
subsections: section_title: DOD Analysis Indicates Excess Infrastructure Capacity Exists
paragraphs: While DOD’s analysis of its infrastructure capacity for the 2004 report,  which was completed outside the 2005 BRAC process, gives some  indication of excess capacity across certain functional areas through fiscal  year 2009, the methodology for that analysis has some limitations that  could cause the results to be either overstated or understated, and raises  questions about use of the methodology to project a total amount of  excess capacity across DOD. At the same time, DOD’s methodology did  not consider any additional excess capacity that might occur by analyzing  facilities or functions on a joint or cross-service basis, a priority for the  2005 round. A more complete assessment of capacity and the potential to  reduce it must await the results of the current BRAC analyses being  conducted by DOD.
To estimate excess capacity, the military services and the Defense  Logistics Agency (DLA) compared the capacity for a sample of bases in  1989 with the projected capacity of a sample of bases in 2009. The services  and DLA categorized the bases according to their primary function, and  they identified a variety of indicators, or metrics, to measure capacity for  each functional category. For example, they used total maneuver acres per  brigade to establish capacity for Army training bases, total square feet of  parking apron space to establish capacity for active and reserve Air Force  bases, and total direct labor hours (versus budget or programmed direct  labor hours) to establish capacity for Navy aviation depots. See app. IV for  additional information on how DOD computed excess capacity.
This methodology has some limitations as we reported in 1998 when  DOD used it to project excess capacity in supporting the need for a future  BRAC round. DOD’s use of 1989 as a baseline did not take into account the  excess base capacity that existed in that year prior to base closures in the  1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds. As a result, the percentage of  increased excess capacity reported understated actual excess capacity by  an unknown amount for some functional categories, and may have  overstated excess capacity for other categories. The Congressional Budget  Office (CBO) also reported that the department’s use of 1989 as a  baseline did not take into account the excess capacity that might have  existed in 1989. Furthermore, CBO reported that the approach could  understate the capacity required if some types of base support are truly a  fixed cost, regardless of the size of the force. The methodology also did  not consider any additional excess capacity that might occur by analyzing  facilities or functions on a cross-service basis, a priority for the 2005  round. In addition, capacity for some functions was measured differently  for each service. For example, the Army and Air Force measured capacity  for test and evaluation facilities in terms of physical total square feet of  space, while the Navy measured its capacity for these facilities in terms of  work years. Finally, as we recently noted, the variety of metrics and  differences across the military services makes it difficult to be precise  when trying to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD.
Military service officials told us that they typically use most of the capacity  metrics included in DOD’s report, along with other measures, to assess  excess capacity. For example, these officials stated that the metrics for  depots, industrial, shipyards, logistics bases, and supply are used, along  with other measures, as indicators of excess capacity. However, we found  that some of the metrics used in DOD’s report were less reliable than  others as indicators of excess capacity. For example, the metric for Marine  Corps bases compared the acres at five Marine Corps bases to the total  authorized military personnel for the Marine Corps, and not just the  authorized personnel at the five bases. Marine Corps officials  acknowledged that this was not a requirements-based metric to measure  excess capacity at Marine Corps bases. Likewise, the metric for  administrative space in the Air Force was based on the administrative  space at only one Air Force base. Air Force officials stated that this  occurred because under the methodology each Air Force base could only  be considered in one functional area.
While prior BRAC rounds have focused primarily on reducing excess  capacity, DOD officials have stated this is not the sole focus of the 2005  BRAC round. These officials noted that the 2005 round aims to further  transform the military by rationalizing base infrastructure to the force  structure, enhance joint capabilities by improving joint utilization, and  convert waste to war-fighting capability by eliminating excess capacity.  This approach has the potential to identify greater excess capacity than  previously identified. However, a true assessment of excess capacity must,  of necessity, await the completion of DOD’s ongoing official analyses  under BRAC 2005.
section_title: Extent of Savings from 2005 Round Are Unknown but Could Be Achieved by 2011
paragraphs: DOD’s financial data would suggest that, assuming conditions similar to  those of the 1993 and 1995 rounds, the net annual savings for each of the  military departments for the 2005 round could be achieved by 2011, as  certified by the Secretary in DOD’s report. DOD estimated that it would  accrue net annual savings of $3 billion to $5 billion departmentwide by  2011. While we believe that the potential exists for significant savings to  result from the 2005 BRAC round, it is difficult to conclusively project the  expected magnitude of the savings because there simply are too many  unknowns, such as the specific timing of individual closure or realignment  actions and the extent to which DOD’s efforts to maximize joint utilization  and further its transformation efforts, would impact savings. Finally, to  what extent forces that are currently based overseas may be redeployed to  the United States and what effect that redeployment may have on BRAC  and subsequent savings remains an unknown as well.
The Secretary’s estimate of $3 billion to $5 billion in net annual savings by  2011 was based in part on savings achieved from the 1993 and 1995 BRAC  rounds. The lower estimate assumes that the actions in the 2005 round  would reduce infrastructure by about 12 percent, comparable to the  reduction that occurred in the 1993 and 1995 rounds combined. The higher  estimate assumes that infrastructure would be reduced by 20 percent,  which is about 67 percent higher than the previous two rounds combined.  While we believe the potential for significant savings exists, a more  reliable estimate of savings is not practical until the department has  developed actual closure and realignment proposals.
While DOD’s report estimated net annual savings of $3 billion to $5 billion  could be achieved departmentwide, it did not explicitly indicate the  amount of savings that each service would achieve by 2011. Our analysis  of the savings from the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, however, indicates  that each department accrued net annual savings by the sixth year of  implementation, as seen in table 4.
Another way of looking at net savings is to consider the point at which  cumulative savings exceed the cumulative costs of implementing BRAC  decisions over a period of years. Experience has shown that the  department incurs significant upfront investment costs in the early years  of a BRAC round, and it takes several years to fully offset those cumulative  costs and begin to realize cumulative net savings. The difference in the  terminology is important to understand because it has a direct bearing on  the magnitude and assessment of the savings at any given time. As  previously discussed, each military department achieved net annual  savings during the 1993 and 1995 rounds by the sixth year of  implementation. However, with the exception of the Navy in 1995, the  military departments did not achieve cumulative net savings for both the  1993 and 1995 rounds until after the sixth year of implementation.
Notwithstanding the issues we raise that could affect savings, we continue  to believe that it is vitally important for DOD to improve its mechanisms  for tracking and updating its savings estimates. We have previously noted  that DOD’s BRAC savings estimates have been imprecise for a variety of  reasons such as weaknesses in DOD’s financial management systems that  limit the ability to fully account for the cost of its operations; the fact the  DOD’s accounting systems like other accounting systems are oriented to  tracking expenses and disbursements, not savings; the exclusion of  BRAC-related costs incurred by other government agencies; and  inadequate updating of the savings estimates that are developed.  Improvements can and should be made to address this issue. In its 1998  report to the Congress on BRAC issues, DOD proposed efforts that, if  adopted, could provide for greater accuracy in the estimates. Specifically,  DOD proposed developing a questionnaire that would be completed  annually by each base affected by BRAC rounds during the 6-year  implementation period. The questionnaire would request information on  costs, personnel reductions, and changes in operating and military  construction costs in order to provide greater insight into the savings  created by each BRAC action. DOD suggested that developing such a  questionnaire would be a cooperative effort involving the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, the military services, the defense agencies, the  Office of the DOD Inspector General, and the service audit agencies. This  proposal recognizes that better documentation and updating of savings  will require special efforts parallel to the normal budget process. DOD has  not yet initiated actions to implement this proposal. We strongly endorse  such action. If DOD does not take steps to improve its estimation of  savings in the future, then previous questions about the reliability,  accuracy, and completeness of DOD’s savings estimates will likely  continue. We intend to examine DOD’s progress in instituting its proposed  improvements during our review of the 2005 BRAC process.
section_title: Many Affected Communities Are Recovering from BRAC Actions in Prior Rounds
paragraphs: The department’s report recognized that BRAC actions can affect the local  economies of the surrounding communities. It noted that from 1988  through 1995, realignment or closure actions were approved at 387  locations; and that, in implementing the actions, the department had  sought to minimize any adverse local impacts with a coordinated program  of federal assistance from both DOD and domestic agencies.
Our own work has shown that while the short-term impact can be very  traumatic, several factors, such as the strength of the national and regional  economies, play a role in determining the long-term economic impact of  the base realignment or closure process on communities. Our work has  also shown that many communities surrounding closed bases from the  previous rounds have fared better than the national average, in terms of  changes in unemployment rates and per capita income, with more mixed  results recently, allowing for some negative effect from the economic  downturn in recent years.
Our analysis of selected economic indicators has shown that over time the  economies of BRAC-affected communities compare favorably with the  overall U.S. economy. We used unemployment rates and real per capita  income rates as broad indicators of the economic health of those  communities where base closures occurred during the prior BRAC rounds.  Our analysis included 62 communities surrounding base realignment and  closure sites from all four BRAC rounds for which government and  contractor civilian job losses were estimated to be 300 or more.
We previously reported that as of September 2001, of the 62 communities  surrounding these major base closures, 44 (71 percent) had average  unemployment rates lower than the (then) average 9-month national rate  of 4.58 percent. We are currently updating this analysis and attempting to  assess the impact of the recent economic downturn on these communities.  Our preliminary results indicate that, in keeping with economic downturn  in recent years, the average unemployment rate in 2003 had increased for  60 of the 62 communities since 2001. However, the 2003 unemployment  figures indicated that the rates for these 62 communities continue to  compare favorably with the overall U.S. rate of 6.1 percent; that is, 43 (or  69 percent) of the communities had unemployment rates at or below the  U.S. rate.
In our previous work, we had also reported that annual per capita income  growth rate of affected communities for these 62 BRAC-affected  communities compared favorably with national averages. We found that  from 1996 through 1999, 33 (or 53 percent) of the 62 communities had an  estimated annual real per capital income growth rate that was at or above  the average of 3.03 percent for the nation at that time. Our recent analysis  has also noted that changes in the average per capita income growth rate  of these communities over time compared favorably with corresponding  changes at the national level. This analysis indicates that 30 (48 percent) of  the 62 areas examined had average income growth rates higher than the  average U.S. rate of 2.2 percent, a drop from the rate during the previous  time period.
In our previous report, we identified a number of factors that affected  economic recovery, based on our discussions with various community  leaders. These factors included  robustness of the national economy,    diversity of the local economy,   regional economic trends,    natural and labor resources,   leadership and teamwork,    public confidence,    government assistance, and  reuse of base property.
If history is any indication, these factors are likely to be equally applicable  in dealing with the effects of closures and realignments under BRAC 2005.
section_title: Certification of the Need for an Additional BRAC Round
paragraphs: In transmitting the 2004 report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense  certified the need for an additional BRAC round. The certification was  predicated on the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory  included with the report and was reinforced by the department’s  assessment of excess capacity, economic impact, and a certification that  net annual savings from a 2005 round could be achieved by 2011. The  Secretary’s certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round was echoed by a  separate March 22, 2004, memorandum to the Secretary from the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It stated that the Joint Chiefs  unanimously agree that additional base realignments and closures are  necessary if DOD is to transform the armed forces to meet the threats to  national security and execute national strategy. The Chairman also noted  that “(d)uring this period of transition, we are fundamentally reconfiguring  our forces to meet new security challenges. The military value  requirements that flow from future force structure and future strategy  needs will differ in character and shape from those of today. BRAC offers  a critical tool to turn transformational goals into reality.” We found no  basis to question DOD’s certification of the need for an additional BRAC  round. The need for an additional BRAC round has long been recognized  by various defense officials and studies—and noted in various GAO  products since the time of the 1995 BRAC round. (See app. V for a  summary of key points from selected GAO products.)
The Secretary’s certification of the need for a 2005 BRAC round is  underscored by the department’s desire to realize broader objectives in  the 2005 round, including fostering jointness, transformation, assessing  common business oriented functions on a cross-service basis, and  accommodating the potential redeployment of some forces from overseas  bases back to the United States. Analyses conducted in these areas could  identify opportunities to achieve consolidations and reduce capacity not  previously identified. Having said that, we believe the efficacy and  sufficiency of DOD’s BRAC analyses now under way—considering the  force structure plan, inventory, and selection criteria—can best be  assessed as the BRAC process unfolds.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: While we found no basis to question the Secretary’s certification of the  need for an additional BRAC round, we identified some limitations with  the department’s assessment of excess capacity, completed outside the  BRAC process, to meet the 2004 reporting requirement. While clear  limitations exist in DOD’s assessment of excess capacity, it does  nonetheless point to some areas that warrant additional analysis—and the  current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so.
Today’s security environment is evolving, as are force structure  requirements along with technology advancements, and defense  transformation efforts. The department must consider ongoing force  transformation initiatives in its BRAC analyses as well as factor in  relevant assumptions about the potential for future force structure  changes—changes that likely will occur long after the timeframes for  the 2005 BRAC round. This includes consideration of future surge  requirements. Assuring Congress and the public that this analysis has been  done and that appropriate allowances for future force structure changes  have been incorporated into the process will be key to building public  confidence in the soundness of 2005 closure and realignment  recommendations. Full discussion of these issues by the department in its  report accompanying its BRAC recommendations in 2005 is warranted.  At the same time, consideration of these longer term issues should not  detract from opportunities available to DOD in the upcoming BRAC round  to achieve greater economies and efficiencies in support capabilities and  use of infrastructure through cross-servicing and joint utilization of bases.
Finally, many questions have previously existed about the accuracy and  precision of DOD’s estimates of savings from prior BRAC rounds.  Weaknesses in DOD’s financial management systems have contributed to  this problem and are not likely to be resolved in the near term. At the same  time, we have previously recommended, and DOD has agreed that  improvements can and should be made to the accounting for and periodic  updating of BRAC savings. That notwithstanding, DOD has not made  sufficient efforts to address this issue. DOD needs to provide assurance  that it has plans in place for improvements in this area before it begins  implementing any closure and realignment decisions from the upcoming  BRAC round.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense include in his May 2005  report on recommendations for base closures and realignments a full  discussion of relevant assumptions, and allowances made for potential  future force structure requirements and changes, including the potential  for future surge requirements.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To ensure that the Department of Defense and the military services  improve their tracking and updating of BRAC savings estimates associated  with implementing closure and realignment decisions for the upcoming  BRAC round, Congress may want to consider requiring DOD and the  military services to provide certification that actions have been taken to  implement previously planned improvements for tracking and updating its  BRAC savings estimates. This certification should be submitted with its  fiscal year 2006 budget request documentation.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense (Installations and Environment) agreed with our report. DOD’s  comments are included in appendix VI of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the  Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management  and Budget. The report will also be available to others upon request and  can be accessed at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. In  addition, a list of our key prior reports on base realignments and closures  is included in appendix VII and these reports can be accessed on our Web  site as well.
Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any  questions regarding this report. Additional contacts and staff  acknowledgments are provided in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The scope of this report was determined by the legislative requirements  imposed on us and included in sections 2912 and 2913 of the Defense Base  Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended. Our focus was to  assess the Department of Defense’s (DOD) March 24, 2004, report to  Congress regarding issues associated with the need for an additional  BRAC round as well as the final selection criteria for the upcoming 2005  BRAC round as published in the Federal Register on February 12, 2004.  Because of time constraints, we could not fully assess the accuracy of all  data used in the report but performed limited reliability assessments of  key data contained in DOD’s report and determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, with relevant  limitations noted.
subsections: section_title: DOD Responsiveness to Legislative Requirements
paragraphs: We evaluated DOD’s responsiveness to the legislative reporting  requirements by comparing individual requirements as presented in the  legislation with DOD’s presentation of information in its report and final  selection criteria. Where appropriate, we made judgments as to the extent  to which DOD addressed the requirements, and discussed with DOD  officials those areas where we believed the requirements were not fully  addressed. In some cases, DOD officials from the BRAC Office within the  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) told us that the information  provided was somewhat limited in order to avoid preempting or  prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 BRAC round.
section_title: Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and Selection Criteria
paragraphs: To address the importance of the worldwide installation inventory, force  structure plan, and selection criteria and evaluated, where appropriate, the  analytical sufficiency and accuracy of each, we interviewed DOD officials  to obtain their views on the relative importance and applicability of each  to the BRAC 2005 process and analyzed the corresponding documentation  for analytical sufficiency and accuracy where it was reasonable to do so.
More specifically, to evaluate the worldwide installation inventory, we  interviewed officials from the contracting firm responsible to DOD for  managing its Facilities Assessment Database, the DOD-wide database that  was used to compile the worldwide inventory. Our interest was in  documenting the contractor’s process for validating the real property data  in the database. Because the DOD-wide database draws from the services’  real property databases, we reviewed the contractor’s analysis of  anomalies identified in the services’ real property databases (i.e., the  Army’s Integrated Facilities System, the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ Navy  Facility Assets database, and the Air Force’s Automated Civil Engineer  System) to gain a sense of the relative accuracy of the data. We also  compared the list of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations  receiving the recent data capacity call for the 2005 BRAC round to the  installation inventory to assure ourselves that these installations were a  subset of the worldwide inventory. Furthermore, to determine if the  inventory included all overseas installations, we compared the listed  installations by country to a list of countries where U.S. forces are  currently deployed. We then interviewed a DOD official to verify and  obtain rationale for the absence of some overseas installations in the  inventory.
To evaluate the unclassified portion (fiscal years 2005 through 2009) of  DOD’s 20-year force structure plan as presented in DOD’s 2004 report, we  identified major force unit and personnel end strength changes by service  over the specified time frame and sought out rationale for the increases or  decreases. We discussed with service officials the nature of these changes  and how these revisions would be considered in the BRAC process. We  also interviewed service officials regarding a number of initiatives under  way, such as the Army’s efforts to increase the number of brigades in its  force, that have implications for the future sizing and composition of the  force structure and associated infrastructure for those respective services.  We inquired as to when planned force structure changes stemming from  these initiatives would be incorporated into DOD’s force structure plan.
To evaluate the final selection criteria for the upcoming 2005 round,  we compared the criteria as published in the Federal Register on  February 12, 2004, with those used in the 1995 BRAC round. In so doing,  we noted the differences and evaluated whether the legislatively directed  language regarding selection criteria was incorporated into the revised  criteria for the upcoming round. In addition to discussing with DOD  officials the use of these criteria as part of a framework for conducting its  base analyses for the 2005 round, we relied on our prior work that  reported on lessons learned from previous base closure rounds, which  covered, among other topics, the analytical sufficiency of the selection  criteria. We also referred to a January 27, 2004, letter we sent to the Acting  Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)  commenting on our analysis of the draft criteria that were out for public  comment at that time. Finally, we reviewed the public comments received  on the draft selection criteria and discussed with DOD officials their  rationale for not incorporating any of the suggested changes into the final  selection criteria.
section_title: Excess Defense Infrastructure Capacity, Estimated BRAC Savings, and Economic Impact
paragraphs: While the mandate did not specifically require us to address excess  defense infrastructure capacity, estimated BRAC savings from the 2005  round, and economic impact of communities surrounding base closures in  prior rounds, as discussed in DOD’s 2004 report, we chose to do so  because of widespread interest in Congress and the public and its  importance to DOD’s certification of the need for a BRAC round. In  addition to an analysis of these topics as presented in DOD’s 2004 report,  we relied on prior and ongoing work related to these areas of interest.
More specifically, to evaluate the analytical sufficiency of DOD’s excess  capacity analysis, we interviewed DOD and service officials and reviewed  documentation describing DOD’s methodology. We inquired about the  reasonableness of the various metrics used to develop the capacity  measures for the various functional support areas, such as depots,  identified in the analysis in DOD’s report. We verified the calculations of  increases in each of the functional areas and on an aggregate basis, and  partially verified the data reported by the services in making the  comparisons of capacity between the 1989 baseline year and 2009. DOD’s  BRAC Office provided the services with the 1989 baseline numbers for the  various metrics used to measure capacity. We were unable to verify the  1989 baseline data in DOD’s report for the Army and Department of the  Navy, which had accepted the numbers, because supporting  documentation from DOD’s development of that data had not been  retained from the time that data were first developed in 1998 for an earlier  DOD report. However, we did verify the Air Force’s 1989 baseline numbers  because it revised the DOD-provided 1989 baseline numbers using  available data. We also selectively verified the projected 2009 data in the  analysis.
To evaluate whether DOD’s estimates for expected savings from the  upcoming 2005 round were reasonable, we interviewed a DOD official in  the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) BRAC Office and examined  the methodology, to include assumptions and the underlying basis  employed by DOD in deriving the estimates. Because a key assumption for  building the estimates focused on the probable range of reductions for  aggregate plant replacement value reductions (i.e., the scope of the  infrastructure reduction) that had occurred across a combination of the  1993 and 1995 rounds, we were not in a position to question whether this  assumption would be valid for the 2005 round, given that the analysis for  the 2005 round has not yet been completed. As to whether DOD can  achieve the net annual savings for each military department by 2011, we  reviewed DOD’s historical financial data for the 1993 and 1995 round to  ascertain if the military departments achieved net annual savings by the  final or sixth year of implementation for these rounds. This would  correspond to the year 2011 for the 2005 round and again would assume  that the 2005 round would be similar to that of the 1993 and 1995 rounds.
To evaluate the economic recovery of communities affected by the BRAC  process in the prior rounds, we first performed a broad-based economic  assessment of 62 communities where more than 300 civilian jobs were  eliminated during the prior closure rounds. This work was essentially an  update of similar work we had performed and reported on in April 2002.  We used two key economic indicators—unemployment and real per  capital growth rates—as measures to analyze changes in the economic  condition of communities over time in relation to the national averages.  We chose unemployment and real per capital income as key performance  indicators because (1) DOD used these measures in its community  economic impact analysis during the BRAC location selection process and  (2) economists commonly use these measures in assessing the economic  health of an area over time. While our assessment does provide an overall  picture of how these communities compare with the national averages, it  does not necessarily isolate the condition, or the changes to the condition,  that may be attributed to the BRAC action.
We conducted our work from March to May 2004 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: BRAC 2005 Timeline
subsections: section_title: February 12, 2004
paragraphs: October 20, 2005  (If required)
section_title: Appendix III: GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round
section_title: Appendix IV: DOD’s Methodology for Estimating Excess Capacity
paragraphs: To perform the capacity analysis, the services and the Defense Logistics  Agency (DLA) compared capacity in a sample of bases in 1989 to the  capacity for a sample of bases in 2009. The services then categorized the  bases according to their primary missions and defined indicators of  capacity, or metrics, for each category. DOD divided the metric by  measures of force structure to determine a ratio and calculated the extent  to which the ratio of capacity in 2009 exceeded the ratio in 1989. As an  example, table 5 shows the results for the Army as shown in DOD’s report.  Similar tables appear for the Navy, Air Force, and DLA in DOD’s report.
DOD then took a weighted average of all functional areas to determine  the overall excess capacity for each department. The weights were  computed by the number of bases in a functional area divided by the  total number of bases in all functional areas. Table 6 shows the overall  estimated percentage of excess capacity for each military department and  the DLA.
Likewise, DOD computed a weighted average to estimate an overall  percentage of excess capacity for DOD. The weights were computed from  the number of bases per department divided by the total of all bases  included in the analysis.
section_title: Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO Products Regarding the Need for an Additional BRAC Round
paragraphs: At the time the 1995 BRAC round was being completed and subsequently,  DOD officials, including the Secretary and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of  Staff, recognized that additional excess capacity would remain following  that round and that future base realignments and closures would be  needed. Various GAO products have noted that issue in subsequent years.  The following are selected excerpts from key GAO products.  “Despite these recent BRAC rounds, DOD continues to maintain large  amounts of excess infrastructure, especially in its support functions, such  as maintenance depots, research and development laboratories, and test  and evaluation centers. Each service maintains its own facilities and  capabilities for performing many common support functions and, as a  result DOD has overlapping, redundant, and underutilized infrastructure.  DOD has taken some steps to demolish unneeded buildings on various  operational and support bases; consolidate certain functions; privatize,  outsource, and reengineer certain workloads; and encourage  interservicing agreements—however, these are not expected to offset the  need for additional actions. At the same time, DOD officials recognize that  significant additional reductions in excess infrastructure requirements in  common support areas could come from consolidating workloads and  restructuring functions on a cross-service basis, something that has not  been accomplished to any great extent in prior BRAC rounds.” U.S.  General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior  Base Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 25,  1997, p. 3). “Notwithstanding the results of the four recent BRAC rounds, DOD  officials recognized, even while they were finishing the 1995 round, that  they had missed OSD’s goal in terms of reductions needed through base  closures. DOD calculated that the first three BRAC rounds reduced the  plant replacement value (PRV) of DOD’s domestic facilities by 15 percent.  It established a goal for the fourth round of reducing PRV by an additional  15 percent, for a total of 30 percent. When the Secretary announced his  recommendations for base closures and realignments in 1995, OSD  projected that if all of the Secretary’s recommendations were adopted, the  total PRV would be reduced by 21 percent, nearly a third less than OSD’s  goal.” GAO/NSIAD-97-151, p. 17. “The Secretary of Defense’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which  assessed defense strategy, programs, and policies, included the issue of  future base closures in the infrastructure portion of the review. In his  May 19, 1997, report to Congress on the results of this review, the  Secretary asked Congress to authorize domestic base closure rounds in  1999 and 2001. That recommendation was endorsed by the National  Defense Panel, the independent, congressionally mandated board that is  reviewing the work of the Quadrennial Defense Review and completing  its own review of defense issues.” GAO/NSIAD-97-151, p. 3.
DOD’s Support Infrastructure Management has been designated as High- Risk by GAO since 1997. GAO’s January 2003 update noted that “DOD  plans an additional base closure round in 2005; this could enable it to  devote its facility resources on fewer, more enduring facilities. With or  without base closures, DOD faces the challenge of adequately maintaining  and revitalizing the facilities it expects to retain for future use. Available  information indicates that DOD’s facilities continue to deteriorate because  of insufficient funding for their sustainment, restoration, and  modernization.” U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An  Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).
In commenting on DOD’s investment plans for reversing the aging of its  facilities, we noted that “…because of competing priorities, DOD is not  likely to realize its investment objectives for facilities in the near term.  More specifically, the services do not propose to fully fund all of OSD’s  objectives for improving facilities or, in some instances, the services have  developed funding plans that have unrealistically high rates of increase in  the out-years compared with previous funding trends and other defense  priorities. The base realignment and closure round authorized for fiscal  year 2005, while it carries with it a significant up-front investment cost to  implement realignment and closure decisions, offers an important  opportunity to reduce excess facilities and achieve greater efficiencies in  sustaining and recapitalizing the remaining facilities if sufficient funding  levels are maintained into the future. Additionally, DOD is reexamining its  worldwide basing requirements, which could potentially lead to significant  changes in facility requirements over the next several years. As these  decisions are implemented over the next several years, this should permit  DOD and the services to increasingly concentrate future resources on  enduring facilities.” U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense  Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military  Construction Program, GAO-04-288 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2004).
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VII: Key Prior GAO Reports on DOD’s Base Realignments and Closures
paragraphs: Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming  Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2004.
Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve  Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.
Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior Base  Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2002.
Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains  Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds.  GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.
Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and  Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.
Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds.  GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.
Military Bases: Closure and Realignments Savings Are Significant, but  Not Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations  for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.:  April 14, 1995.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection  Process for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173.  Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1993.
Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed  Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.:  May 15, 1991.
Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and  Closure Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.:  November 29, 1989.
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individuals named above, Nelsie Alcoser, Nancy Benco,  Ray Bickert, Joel Christenson, Warren Lowman, Tom Mahalek, David  Mayfield, Charles Perdue, James Reynolds, and Laura Talbott made key  contributions to this report.