Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts
Published: 2010-04-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Thousands of gang members in the United States belong to gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street that are also active in Central American countries. Federal entities with responsibilities for addressing Central American gangs include the National Security Council (NSC); the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO was asked to review federal efforts to combat transnational gangs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which the federal government has developed a strategy to combat these gangs, and (2) how federal agencies have implemented the strategy and other programs to combat these gangs, coordinated their actions, and assessed their results. GAO examined federal agencies' antigang plans, resources, and measures; interviewed federal, state, and local officials in seven localities representing varying population sizes and geographic regions; and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials in El Salvador and Guatemala where U.S. agencies have implemented antigang programs. The results of these interviews are not generalizable.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The NSC, in conjunction with State, DOJ, DHS, and USAID, developed a strategy to combat gangs with connections to Central America; however, the strategy lacks an approach or framework to oversee implementation and performance goals and measures to assess progress. GAO previously reported that characteristics such as defining the problem to be addressed as well as the scope and methodology of the strategy; describing agencies' activities, roles, and responsibilities; providing an approach to oversee implementation; and establishing performance measures, among other characteristics, can enhance a strategy's effectiveness. While the antigang strategy contains some of these characteristics, such as identifying the problems and risks associated with the gangs, describing the scope and purpose of the strategy, and defining roles and responsibilities of federal agencies as well as specific implementation activities, it lacks other characteristics such as an approach for overseeing implementation and goals and measures for assessing progress. For example, although agencies coordinate the strategy's implementation through an interagency task force, agency officials reported that this task force does not oversee the strategy's implementation and that no entity exercises oversight responsibility for the strategy's implementation. Similarly, while State and USAID are developing measures to assess the outcomes of their antigang programs, these measures do not encompass all programs under the strategy or track results of the strategy as a whole. Incorporating these characteristics could enhance the accountability of agencies to implement the strategy and provide a means for assessing progress. To carry out the strategy and combat transnational gangs, federal agencies have implemented programs and taken steps to coordinate their actions and develop performance measures to assess results of individual programs; but, coordination could be strengthened in an antigang unit in El Salvador by reaching agreement on Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) role in the unit, the only such unit currently in Central America. Agencies use various interagency groups to coordinate with each other, such as DOJ's Anti-gang Coordination Committee. However, improved coordination at the FBI-initiated antigang unit in El Salvador could enhance information sharing. While the FBI requests information directly from Salvadoran police, ICE requests go to its country attache, then to FBI agents at the unit who pass it on to Salvadoran police, as ICE does not have an agent at the unit. Prior GAO work has shown that agencies should facilitate information sharing and look for opportunities to leverage resources. Although FBI and ICE officials agree that the process could be improved by posting an ICE agent at the unit and have been discussing the possibility since 2008, they have not yet reached agreement on ICE's role. By reaching agreement, the FBI and ICE could strengthen coordination and information sharing. While agencies have established measures to assess programs, as some of the programs are just starting, data collection for many measures is in the early stages.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: According to the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment by the National  Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) and National Drug Intelligence Center  (NDIC), as of September 2008, there were approximately 1 million gang  members in the United States—a 25 percent increase over 2005  membership levels. The assessment found that street gangs that operate  throughout most of the United States are a significant threat that has  become magnified as national- and regional-level street gangs migrate  from urban areas to suburban and rural communities. According to the  assessment, gang members engage in a host of criminal activities such as  homicide, extortion, drug distribution, and other crimes. Gangs such as  the Latin Kings, the Jamaican Posse, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), and 18th  Street, as well as outlaw motorcycle gangs like the Hells Angels, have been  identified by federal law enforcement officials as transnational gangs— gangs whose members are present in and criminally active in more than  one country. Of these, gangs with ties to Central America such as MS-13  and 18th Street have been specifically identified as posing serious threats  to the public safety of communities in the United States and in Central  American countries due to their extremely violent nature, the breadth of  their criminal activities, and their rapid expansion. Our report focuses  primarily on U.S. federal agencies’ efforts to combat these gangs with ties  to Central America.
A wide variety of federal departments and agencies have responsibilities  for addressing the issue of gangs with ties to Central America, including  the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), State  (State), and Defense (DOD), and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID). Under the auspices of the National Security  Council’s (NSC) International Organized Crime Policy Coordinating  Committee (IOCPCC), these departments and agencies have  collaboratively developed an interagency strategy to combat the threat of  criminal gangs with connections to Central America and Mexico. In  addition, these departments and agencies work together and with Central  American countries and nongovernmental organizations to, among other  things, exchange information for use in investigating gang crime, remove  gang members who are illegally residing in the United States, and support  programs to help prevent young people from becoming gang members or  to intervene to provide at-risk youth with alternatives to being part of a  gang. In July 2009 we reported on federal efforts to combat gang crime  within the United States and coordination mechanisms among federal,  state, and local agencies for domestic-based antigang efforts. We discuss  the status of our July 2009 recommendations relevant to transnational  gangs later in this report.
You asked us to examine the extent to which U.S. federal agencies have  taken steps to address the problem of transnational gangs. This report  focuses on U.S. federal agencies’ efforts to combat Central American  gangs, addressing the following questions: (1) To what extent has the U.S.  federal government developed a strategy to combat transnational gangs  with connections to Central America? and (2) How have U.S. federal  agencies implemented this strategy and related programs to combat  transnational gangs with connections to Central America, and to what  extent have federal agencies coordinated these programs and assessed  their results? In addition, we provide information on the leadership  structure and transnational criminal activities of MS-13 and 18th Street  (see app. I) and other U.S. gangs that federal law enforcement agencies  have identified as having transnational connections (see app. II). We also  provide additional details on federal programs for combating transnational  gangs (see app. III) and federal antigang coordinating mechanisms and  entities (see app. IV).
To determine to what extent the U.S. federal government has developed a  strategy to combat transnational gangs with connections to Central  America, we examined the interagency strategy developed by various  federal departments and agencies under the auspices of the NSC, called  the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central  America and Mexico (the Strategy), and compared the contents of the  strategy to select criteria in our prior work on desirable characteristics of  an effective national strategy, including (1) clear purpose, scope, and  methodology; (2) discussion of problems, risks, and threats; (3) desired  goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; and (4)  delineation of roles and responsibilities. We also examined the roles and  activities of the various federal departments and agencies under the  Strategy, including DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, the Department of the Treasury  (Treasury), and USAID, and their component agencies, such as the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within DOJ and U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS, that are responsible for carrying  out efforts under the Strategy. In regard to the NSC, we discussed its role  in developing and implementing the Strategy with a mix of the  departments and agencies that participated in the NSC’s IOCPCC such as  State, DOJ, and USAID.
To determine how U.S. federal agencies have implemented programs to  carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs, coordinated these  programs and assessed their results, we examined a mix of DOJ’s, DHS’s,  State’s, USAID’s, and their component agencies’ plans, performance data,  reports, and assessments for fiscal years 2006 through 2009. We compared  federal agencies’ efforts to coordinate and share information on their  transnational antigang programs to select criteria on effective interagency  collaboration and results-oriented government. In addition, we reviewed  federal agencies’ budget requests for fiscal years 2008 through 2010;  appropriations acts for DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID and supplemental  appropriations acts for those fiscal years; and expenditure plans for U.S.  provision of antigang assistance to countries in Central America. To assess  the reliability of statistical information, such as data on performance and  outcomes, we discussed the sources of the data with agency officials and  reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of data. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. To obtain information on federal efforts to combat the gangs as  well as the extent to which agencies have coordinated their efforts with  other agencies, we interviewed a mix of federal, state, and local law  enforcement officials in seven locations in the United States as well as a  mix of officials from U.S. federal, foreign, and three nongovernmental  agencies in El Salvador and Guatemala. The locations we selected were  based on a mix of criteria that included locations (1) along the U.S.  borders; (2) where U.S. federal agencies have implemented antigang  programs; and (3) where federal law enforcement agencies have  conducted operations involving gangs with connections to Central  America. For our site visits to foreign locations, we consulted with  officials of federal agencies to identify in which foreign locations their  agencies had efforts underway. Of the countries in the region, agency  officials suggested we visit El Salvador and Guatemala because more  antigang initiatives were underway and further along compared to efforts  in other countries. Given this, we selected these countries to obtain more  information on these efforts and evaluate the effect they have had on the  gang problem. To obtain information on the process of how ICE handles  and removes gang members who are in the United States illegally, we  visited ICE’s South Texas Detention Facility in Pearsall, Texas, and  interviewed officials with ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal  Operations. We also observed activities related to gang prevention efforts  in El Salvador and Guatemala, such as those at the youth centers, and  interviewed participants, local government officials involved in the efforts,  and members of the community about their views of the programs and the  programs’ effect. The information we obtained from interviewing officials  in the U.S. and Central American locations cannot be generalized across  all locations in the United States or Central America. However, because  we selected these locations based on a variety of factors, they provided us  with an overview of the agencies’ antigang programs, examples of  coordination and measurements to assess results, and any challenges with  implementation of the programs. Additional details on our scope and  methodology, including the locations we visited, are in appendix V.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through April 2010,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Overview of Gangs with Connections to Central America
paragraphs: Both the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs were formed in Los Angeles,  California. MS-13 was founded by Salvadoran immigrants, many of whom  came to the United States to escape the civil war in their native country in  the 1980s. The 18th Street gang was founded primarily by Mexican  immigrants in the 1960s, though it currently accepts members from other  backgrounds. MS-13’s early membership is reported to have included  former guerrillas and Salvadoran government soldiers whose combat  experience during the Salvadoran civil war contributed to the growth of  the gang’s notoriety as one of the more violent Los Angeles street gangs.  The end of the Central American civil wars and changes in U.S.  immigration laws helped to facilitate the removal of tens of thousands of  Central Americans illegally in the United States to their native countries in  the 1990s, including MS-13 and 18th Street gang members who  subsequently spread their gang culture and operations to those countries.  MS-13 and 18th Street gang members removed from the United States to  Central American countries established gangs in those countries.
Within the United States, NGIC has reported that MS-13 has between 8,000  and 10,000 members nationally. The FBI has reported that MS-13 operates  in at least 42 states and the District of Columbia. Traditionally, in the  United States, MS-13 has consisted of loosely affiliated groups; however,  law enforcement officials have reported the coordination of criminal  activity among MS-13 gang members operating in the Atlanta, Dallas, Los  Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C., metropolitan areas. In the 2009  National Gang Threat Assessment, the NGIC and NDIC indicated that MS- 13 members have been involved in a wide range of crimes within U.S.  communities, including homicide, drive-by shootings, assault, robbery,  weapons trafficking, the transportation and distribution of drugs, identity  theft, and prostitution operations. The 18th Street gang is active in 28  states and has a membership estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000.  According to the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment, in California, for  example, about 80 percent of 18th Street gang members are illegal aliens  from Mexico and Central America. In the United States, 18th Street gang  members have been involved in homicide, assault, robbery, street-level  drug distribution, auto theft, and identification fraud.
Although estimates vary, in the Central American countries of El Salvador,  Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, USAID has estimated that there are  approximately 63,000 gang members, while the U.S. Southern Command  (SOUTHCOM) has estimated total gang membership in Central America to  be approximately 70,000. According to USAID, the majority of these  members belong to MS-13 and 18th Street. Within Central American  countries, these gangs engage in a range of criminal and violent acts,  including homicide, kidnapping, drug smuggling, and extortion, among  other crimes.
section_title: Overview of Federal Agencies’ Missions and Roles in Combating Transnational Gangs
paragraphs: The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national  security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security  advisors and cabinet officials. The council also serves as the President’s  principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government  agencies. As such, under its IOCPCC, the NSC coordinated with other  federal departments and agencies to develop a strategy to combat the  threat of criminal gangs from Central America.
Various other federal departments and agencies play key roles in U.S.  federal government efforts to address transnational gangs. As shown in  figure 1, these departments include DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD.
Within DOJ, seven components have key roles in law enforcement efforts  to combat transnational gangs—the Criminal Division; the 93 U.S.  Attorneys in 94 judicial districts across the nation that operate with  administrative and operational support from the Executive Office for U.S.  Attorneys (EOUSA); and four law enforcement agencies—the FBI; Bureau  of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement  Administration (DEA); and U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol. The  Criminal Division, along with the U.S. Attorneys, is charged with enforcing  most federal criminal laws and can prosecute a wide range of criminal  matters, including those involving transnational gangs and gang  members. The Criminal Division’s International Criminal Investigative  Training Assistance Program and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial  Development, Assistance and Training have been involved in providing  antigang training for law enforcement officials and prosecutors from  Central America. Also part of the Criminal Division is the Gang Unit, a  specialized group of prosecutors charged with developing and  implementing strategies to address gangs. In addition to prosecuting gang  cases, the Gang Unit prosecutors assist U.S. Attorneys on legal issues and  multidistrict cases, as well as work with domestic and foreign law  enforcement to coordinate enforcement strategies. The 93 U.S. Attorneys  prosecute the majority of criminal cases as well as civil litigation handled  by DOJ. EOUSA provides general executive assistance and guidance to  U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) and has a national gang coordinator who  acts as a liaison between the USAOs and other DOJ components involved  in gang prosecution efforts. The FBI’s transnational gang efforts target  violent crime and criminal enterprises associated with transnational gangs.  ATF’s primary involvement with MS-13 and 18th Street is related to gang  members’ illegal possession of, or trafficking in, firearms. DEA targets  gangs in connection with specific drug sources or large-scale suppliers  who distribute illicit drugs to the gangs. The U.S. National Central Bureau  of Interpol is the point of contact for all International Criminal Police  Organization (INTERPOL) matters in the United States, including secure  communications with police authorities in INTERPOL member countries.  As such, among other things, the National Central Bureau receives and  sends out notices to INTERPOL bureaus in other countries concerning  information or the location of gang members or suspects involved in gang  activities.
subsections: section_title: DHS Component Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities for Combating Transnational Gangs
paragraphs: Within DHS, ICE’s Office of Investigations has a National Gang Unit that  manages and coordinates national efforts to combat the growth and  proliferation of transnational criminal street gangs. Gang members who  are involved in crimes with a nexus to the border, or are foreign-born and  are in the United States illegally may be subject to ICE’s dual criminal and  administrative authorities that are used to disrupt and dismantle  transnational gang activities with criminal prosecutions and removal from  the United States. In addition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),  the DHS component that protects U.S. borders against terrorism, illegal  immigration, and drug smuggling, among other threats, has a role in  identifying gang members at the borders. Upon the arrest of a suspected  gang member, CBP will contact ICE and determine if enforcement action  is to be taken by CBP or ICE based upon whether the apprehension took  place between the ports of entry or at a port of entry. CBP has developed  an Anti-Gang Initiative to improve the agency’s awareness of gangs  through increased partnerships with other federal agencies and to provide  gang awareness training for its personnel.
section_title: State and USAID Bureaus’ Roles and Responsibilities for Combating Transnational Gangs
paragraphs: Two State bureaus, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and the  Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, are  involved in efforts to address gang violence in Central America. The  Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is responsible for managing and  promoting U.S. interests in the region and fostering cooperation on issues  such as drug trafficking and crime. The Bureau of International Narcotics  and Law Enforcement Affairs advises the U.S. government on the  development of policies and programs to combat narcotics and crime, and  works with host nations to strengthen their capabilities so that they can  bolster their own effectiveness in fighting drug trafficking and crime  including transnational gangs.
USAID provides economic, development, and humanitarian assistance to  other countries and, with respect to transnational gangs, is the primary  agency responsible for managing gang intervention and prevention efforts  in Central America. These efforts are carried out principally through the  agency’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean and missions in  Central America, with technical assistance and support from the  Democracy and Governance Office of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict  and Humanitarian Assistance. The agency works with foreign governments  and local communities in Central America to support and implement a  broad range of programs focused on, among other things, creating  employment opportunities and alternatives to participating in gangs.
section_title: DOD Roles and Responsibilities for Combating Transnational Gangs
paragraphs: DOD, and specifically SOUTHCOM, has tracked the growth of the gangs in  the Central American countries that are within its area of responsibility.  Although SOUTHCOM does not have any specific programs in place in  Central America to combat transnational gangs, it monitors information on  gangs that either pose a threat to the sovereignty of governments in the  region or are involved in drug trafficking.
section_title: The Mérida Initiative
paragraphs: U.S.-sponsored antigang programs in Central America are being funded in  part by the Mérida Initiative. This initiative was announced by the Bush  Administration in October 2007 as a multinational effort to confront  criminal organizations whose actions affect Mexico, Central America, and  the Caribbean countries of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and spill  over into the United States. Through this initiative, the U.S. federal  government is providing equipment, training, and other assistance to help  these countries address drug and arms trafficking, bulk cash smuggling,  and other crime issues such as gangs and organized crime. For Central  America, funding under the Mérida Initiative is administered by State and  has been allocated to various areas and efforts, including to combat  transnational gangs, improve Central American countries’ judicial systems,  enhance airport and border security in the region, refurbish patrol boats  used by Central American countries for intercepting drug traffickers in  coastal waters, and a broad range of crime prevention programs, including  programs directed at youth at-risk. In fiscal year 2008, the Supplemental  Appropriations Act appropriated $60 million for the Central American  portion of the Mérida Initiative. In fiscal year 2009, the 2009 Omnibus  Appropriations Act appropriated $105 million for Mérida Initiative  activities in Central America. Up to $83 million was appropriated for  Mérida Initiative activities in Central America for fiscal year 2010 by the  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. We recently completed work  looking at the status of funds for the initiative and have work ongoing  examining U.S. counternarcotics and anticrime assistance provided to  Mexico under the initiative. We plan to issue a report on this work later  this year.
As of February 2010, federal agencies were developing a strategy for a  regional security initiative in Central America, called the Central American  Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This new initiative is in accordance  with direction in the conference report accompanying the Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 2010, which removed the Central American portion  from the Mérida Initiative and placed funding for Central American  programs into the new CARSI. Under this new initiative, Central  American programs initially funded by the Mérida Initiative, including  antigang programs under the Strategy, would be subsumed into CARSI.  According to officials from State and USAID, the CARSI strategy is still  under development and officials did not have an estimate as to when it  would be completed.
In addition to funding provided under the Mérida Initiative, federal  agencies have used funding from their operating accounts to implement  antigang programs in Central America and the United States. For example,  in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 the FBI funded $200,000 and $965,000 from its  operating account for establishment of the Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG)  unit in El Salvador and the operations of the MS-13 National Gang Task  Force, an FBI task force that coordinates FBI-led investigations of MS-13  and 18th Street gangs, respectively. Further, ICE uses funding to conduct  transnational gang investigations in the United States and abroad.  According to ICE officials, $20.4 million that Congress directed to be used  for ICE’s antigang activities in fiscal year 2008 funded 119 positions to  expand ICE’s efforts to combat transnational street gangs. Additionally,  USAID officials reported starting their gang prevention programs before  Mérida Initiative funding became available and have used non-initiative  resources to promote antigang and rule-of-law programs in Central  America.
section_title: The Interagency Antigang Strategy Clarifies Roles and Specifies Agency Activities, but Lacks an Approach for Oversight and Comprehensive Measures to Assess Implementation Efforts
paragraphs: Various federal departments and agencies under the auspices of the NSC  developed an interagency strategy for combating gangs with connections  to Central America that defines the roles and responsibilities of federal  agencies in carrying out the strategy, identifies the problems and risks  associated with the gangs, defines its scope and purpose, and identifies  specific activities to be taken to achieve results. However, it lacks other  key characteristics, such as providing an approach or framework to  include an entity for overseeing implementation, and goals and measures  for assessing progress and performance in implementing the strategy.
subsections: section_title: The Antigang Strategy Identifies Roles, Responsibilities, and Activities for Federal Agencies in Combating Transnational Gangs
paragraphs: To respond to the threats criminal gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street  pose to the countries in which they operate, U.S. federal agencies  developed the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from  Central America and Mexico (the Strategy). Issued in July 2007, this  interagency strategy was developed under the auspices of the NSC’s  IOCPCC, comprised of representatives from various federal agencies,  including State, DOJ, DHS, USAID, and DOD. The Strategy is designed to  combat the threat posed by gangs with links to Central America and  Mexico by adopting an approach that integrates law enforcement with  youth crime prevention and interventions that provide alternatives to  gangs. The Strategy is also designed to be regional in scope, with the  United States working with the other countries affected by the gangs to  avoid transferring the gang problem to neighboring countries. To  implement this approach, the Strategy includes five broad categories  under which federal agencies are to take actions to combat transnational  gangs—diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement,  and prevention—and identifies the activities for agencies to implement  under each of these categories. As shown in table 1, for each category, the  Strategy identifies agencies that are to implement the individual activities  and a lead agency to coordinate these activities. Specifically, the Strategy  identifies State as the lead agency for the diplomacy category and, along  with USAID, the lead agency for the capacity enhancement category; DHS  as the lead agency for the repatriation category and, along with DOJ, the  lead agency for the law enforcement category; and USAID as the lead  agency for the prevention category.
As part of our prior work on desirable characteristics of effective national  strategies, we have reported that such strategies are the foundation for  defining what agencies seek to accomplish. As such, we found that  having characteristics like a description of agencies’ activities, roles, and  responsibilities as part of a strategy helps to enhance the strategy’s  effectiveness. Strategies that include characteristics such as these provide  policymakers and implementing agencies with a planning tool that can  better help ensure accountability and more effective results.
In addition to defining activities, roles, and responsibilities of participating  agencies, the Strategy also defines its scope and purpose and identifies the  problems, risks, and threats associated with transnational gangs. In our  prior work, we found that desirable characteristics of effective national  strategies also include a discussion of purpose, scope, problems, risks, and  threats. For example, in defining its purpose and scope, the Strategy notes  that effectively addressing the problem of these transnational gangs  requires close coordination and information sharing among the affected  countries in Central America and Mexico and a comprehensive approach  that includes law enforcement, prevention, intervention, rehabilitation,  and reintegration for gang members, which the five categories of the  Strategy are intended to address. In regards to identifying the problem, the  Strategy states that gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street threaten U.S.  regional interests in fostering stable democracies and the U.S. domestic  interest in protecting U.S. citizens from gang violence and crime. These  characteristics help indicate why the Strategy was developed and identify  the specific national issues and threats toward which the Strategy is  directed.
section_title: The Strategy’s Lack of an Oversight Framework Hinders Efforts to Enhance Accountability
paragraphs: Even as the Strategy contains several characteristics of effective national  strategies, it lacks other characteristics, such as providing an approach for  overseeing implementation of programs and efforts across its different  categories. Our prior work on effective national strategies found that they  include an approach or framework for overseeing their implementation or  describe the organizations that will provide oversight, which enhances the  accountability of agencies and stakeholders to implement programs as  planned. This is especially important for the U.S. antigang strategy given  that (1) there are eight federal departments or agencies involved in  implementing the Strategy; (2) these agencies have wide-ranging missions  and programs—from USAID’s mission to implement gang prevention and  youth intervention programs to ICE’s mission to remove foreign-born gang  members from the United States; and (3) the Strategy specifies 35 different  activities under the five categories that federal agencies are to implement.
With regard to oversight, the Strategy itself does not identify an approach  or framework for providing oversight across agencies’ implementation of  the Strategy’s categories and activities and, according to DOJ, State, and  USAID officials, one does not exist. Although the Strategy designates lead  departments or agencies for each category, such as State leading the  Diplomacy category and USAID leading the Prevention category, the  Strategy does not designate an approach to provide oversight of the  overall implementation of the Strategy across the Strategy’s various  categories. Further, while members of an interagency antigang task force  have discussed agencies’ efforts to implement the Strategy, this task force  is not intended to provide this oversight. According to DOJ, State, and  USAID officials, under the auspices of the NSC, the International Anti- Gang Task Force, which is chaired by DOJ’s Criminal Division and  includes representatives from DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID, has  responsibility for sharing information on the implementation of the  Strategy. However, this task force is not intended to, nor does it, provide  oversight for holding agencies accountable for implementation of their  activities under the Strategy. Additionally, State’s regional gang advisor  stated that no single department or entity has been identified as having  oversight responsibility for the Strategy’s implementation. DOJ officials  did not know why an oversight mechanism was not included in the  Strategy, noting that, as a result, there is no enforcement mechanism to  ensure that agencies are implementing their respective parts of the  Strategy. USAID officials told us that after the Strategy was developed, the  individual within the NSC who had been responsible for coordinating  development of the Strategy stated that the council’s IOCPCC was to  oversee the implementation of the Strategy; however this did not occur in  part because the individual left the council. Additionally, although federal  agencies are developing a strategy for the newly formed CARSI,  participating agencies have not yet determined the oversight framework, if  any, that is to be used for this broader initiative or whether the existing  antigang Strategy will be incorporated into CARSI. Thus, it is too early to  tell whether CARSI will provide an oversight approach for federal  agencies’ antigang programs. Regardless of whether the antigang Strategy  is incorporated into the new CARSI, or whether the NSC or some other  agency or entity is responsible for oversight, establishing an approach or  framework for oversight across the Strategy’s categories could help  enhance the accountability of agencies to implement activities as laid out  in the Strategy and provide visibility over the extent to which agencies’  individual efforts are achieving their intended results under the Strategy.
section_title: The Strategy’s Lack of Performance Goals and Measures Hinders Efforts to Assess Progress
paragraphs: Our prior work found that effective national strategies set clear goals and  related performance measures for assessing progress made in achieving  intended results. The Strategy, however, does not identify the goals that  are to be achieved through its implementation and the associated  measures to track the progress made in achieving those goals, which could  be established and monitored through an oversight approach or  framework. We have reported that performance measurement is important  because decision makers can use performance information to identify  problems or weaknesses in programs, identify factors causing problems,  and modify processes to address the problems. USAID officials told us  that after the Strategy was initially developed, the NSC intended to  establish performance measures for implementation of the Strategy, but  this did not occur in part because the individual within the NSC who had  been responsible for coordinating development of the Strategy left the  council. Although the Strategy itself lacks goals and measures to gauge  results and assess progress across the Strategy’s categories and activities,  State and USAID, for their parts of the Strategy, have begun to develop  mechanisms to assess the results of their efforts being implemented under  the Mérida Initiative, including the initiative’s antigang programs. For  example, for its part, State has drafted four gang-specific performance  measures within the broader set of measures it is developing for the  Mérida Initiative: (1) number of arrests of suspected gang members  completed by police units trained/equipped through Mérida Initiative  funding in countergang strategies, (2) number of arrests and prosecutions  of gang leaders in the region, (3) number of gang-related crime  occurrences and homicides in the region, and (4) number of instances  where gang-related information is passed from the TAG to U.S. law  enforcement for review/action. State officials noted that the department is  working with its embassies to determine if Central American countries will  be capable of providing the department with the requisite data needed to  determine results and outcomes for these measures, as these countries  control much of the data, often in disparate data sets and across various  ministries. As of November 2009, State officials also reported that they  were in the process of reviewing bids from contractors to develop  performance measures for the department’s Mérida Initiative programs,  including its antigang programs, and to work directly with the host nations  to obtain the necessary data to determine the results and outcomes of the  efforts based on these measures.
In addition to the measures State is developing to evaluate the results of  Mérida Initiative-funded programs in Central America, USAID has  developed a Mérida Initiative Central America Results Framework that  includes an effect evaluation to be conducted by Vanderbilt University  through a contractual arrangement with USAID. The agency intends for  this evaluation to assess the long-term effect and measure the results of its  programs in Central American communities that are the focus of USAID  crime prevention efforts under the Mérida Initiative, including those  related to gangs. The evaluation consists of five elements: (1) community  surveys, (2) reviews of demographic data in the communities, (3) focus  groups, (4) interviews with stakeholders such as community leaders, and  (5) community observations such as physical infrastructure. Vanderbilt  University officials are to conduct the evaluations every 18 months in  communities where USAID-sponsored crime prevention activities have  been implemented and communities where no activities have been  implemented, with these latter communities serving as control groups in  order to establish a baseline. Specifically with respect to the surveys,  USAID plans to use the results to gauge the effect of its crime prevention  programs through community and citizen perceptions on safety and  security. To minimize any duplication and take advantage of survey efforts  already underway, USAID officials stated that they plan to incorporate the  survey questions on community and citizen perceptions on safety and  security as part of a broader survey Vanderbilt University will be  conducting in the region in 2010.
Although State and USAID have begun to develop mechanisms to help  assess the outcomes of antigang programs implemented under the Mérida  Initiative, these mechanisms do not encompass all of the Strategy’s  categories and activities, nor do they include the antigang programs of  other federal agencies, such as those of DOJ and DHS. For example, while  the measures State is developing, such as the numbers of arrests of gang  members and leaders in the region, relate to the law enforcement, capacity  enhancement, and prevention categories of the Strategy, these measures  do not encompass the diplomacy or repatriation categories of the Strategy.  According to State and USAID officials as well as officials from the FBI  and ICE, State and USAID have not consulted or worked with DOJ and  DHS agencies such as FBI and ICE in developing these performance  measures because State’s and USAID’s measures are intended to  encompass only their own programs and efforts. According to State,  USAID, DOJ, and DHS officials, each agency focuses on developing  performance-related goals and measures for its own programs as opposed  to other agencies’ antigang programs for which it is not responsible, and,  therefore, less familiar. As a result, the performance measures State and  USAID are developing cannot serve as overall indicators of the federal  government’s progress in implementing the Strategy as they do not take  into account all of the federal agencies’ antigang programs to be  implemented under the Strategy’s five categories, including those  programs led by DOJ and DHS. In the absence of goals and performance  measures or other mechanisms for monitoring and assessing the progress  and performance of agencies’ antigang programs across the categories of  the Strategy, it will be difficult for the federal government to determine if  the overall interagency antigang effort is achieving the intended results  and to hold agencies accountable for implementing the Strategy.
section_title: U.S. Federal Agencies Have Implemented Programs to Combat Transnational Gangs, but Could Take Additional Action to Enhance Coordination Efforts
paragraphs: Federal agencies have implemented a variety of programs to carry out the  Strategy and combat transnational gangs with connections to Central  America. To coordinate their implementation of antigang programs,  agencies use a variety of mechanisms such as interagency committees and  task forces. However, for the antigang unit in El Salvador, coordination  among the FBI, ICE, and Salvadoran law enforcement in sharing  investigative information on gangs could be enhanced by reaching  agreement on ICE’s participation in the unit. Further, although agencies  have taken steps to develop performance measures and obtain data on  those measures to track the results of programs, agencies are just starting  to collect performance data due to the early stage of implementation of  most of these programs. Additionally, federal agencies have identified  various factors that are largely outside their control and that can affect  their implementation of programs, such as challenges facing Central  American countries in sustaining antigang programs.
subsections: section_title: Federal Agencies Have Developed a Variety of Programs to Implement the Interagency Strategy
paragraphs: To carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs with  connections to Central American countries, federal agencies have  developed and implemented a variety of programs in the United States and  in host countries in the region, such as El Salvador and Guatemala. This  variety of programs reflects the different categories of the strategy and  includes diplomatic efforts to establish a coordinated approach to the  gang problem; efforts to facilitate the repatriation of gang members who  are in the United States illegally; mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of  investigative information between U.S. law enforcement agencies and  foreign law enforcement agencies; programs to provide training to Central  American law enforcement officials; and programs to provide recreational  and vocational opportunities for at-risk youth, among others. Additional  details on federal agencies’ antigang programs under each category of the  Strategy are as follows:    Diplomacy: State has led efforts to engage diplomatically with Central  American countries to discuss gang issues. The department has led  discussions with member countries of the Central American Integration  System. Under this initiative, the United States and Central American  countries first held discussions regarding regional gang threats in July  2007, at which time the United States announced the Strategy. The  countries held a second, and the most recent, dialogue in December 2008,  which focused on discussing practical measures to combat the threats of  criminal gangs, narcotics trafficking, and illicit trafficking of firearms in  Central America. At the conclusion, all participating countries signed a  communiqué pledging their continued support in the fight against  transnational threats, including gangs.
Repatriation: ICE has implemented the Electronic Travel Document  system to facilitate the issuance of travel documents for the removal of  illegal aliens, including gang members, to El Salvador, Guatemala, and  Honduras. Under this program, ICE electronically sends travel document  applications to the consular officials of these countries; these officials can  then electronically sign and certify the documents stating that the  countries will receive the illegal aliens to be removed. These documents  are available to ICE electronically through the Electronic Travel  Document system. This program eliminates the need for consular officials  to visit in person the individual awaiting removal from the United States  before issuing documents, helping to reduce the amount of time it takes  for ICE to receive travel documents from foreign countries and ultimately  remove illegal aliens. According to ICE officials, the program can  eliminate approximately 5 to 7 days that an alien would spend in  detention, thus decreasing the cost incurred by the government.
Law Enforcement: In 2005, ICE implemented Operation Community  Shield—a nationwide initiative to arrest and remove criminal alien gang  members from the United States. ICE began the operation to target violent  transnational street gangs through the use of ICE’s broad law enforcement  powers to identify, prosecute, and ultimately remove gang members from  the United States. Although initially focused on MS-13, ICE expanded  Operation Community Shield to target all transnational criminal street  gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. For its part, the FBI has  implemented various programs to facilitate the exchange of information,  such as criminal histories of suspected gang members, between law  enforcement agencies in the United States and Central American  countries. For example, in 2007, the FBI established a joint U.S.- Salvadoran Transnational Anti-Gang unit in El Salvador—called TAG—to  exchange information on gangs and gang members between the  Salvadoran national police and U.S.-based law enforcement agencies for  use in criminal investigations and gang-member prosecutions in both  countries. The unit includes investigators and analysts from the  Salvadoran national police, prosecutors from El Salvador’s Attorney  General’s Office, and two FBI agents. The TAG unit’s exchange of  information on gang members has aided U.S. gang investigations in  locations such as Charlotte, North Carolina; Omaha, Nebraska; and Los  Angeles, California. The FBI plans to establish units like this in Guatemala  and Honduras. Further, in 2006, the FBI began the Central American  Fingerprint Exploitation program to collect and store existing criminal  fingerprint records and other biometric information from the countries of  Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, and Honduras in FBI databases  and make them available to all U.S. local, state, and federal law  enforcement agencies. These records are searched in the FBI’s Integrated  Automated Fingerprint Identification System, with resulting matches  shared with the contributing country for investigative purposes. The FBI  has deployed the system in El Salvador, conducted assessments to  determine how to deploy the system to Belize and Panama, and plans to  conduct more assessments for deploying the system to Guatemala and  Honduras. In addition, beginning in 2008, the FBI, with funding from State,  has implemented the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange  program wherein law enforcement personnel from El Salvador,  Guatemala, and Honduras have visited locations in the United States to  receive antigang training and share investigative practices with U.S. law  enforcement personnel. In exchange, law enforcement personnel from the  United States have visited El Salvador to provide antigang training and  share practices with Central American police. Also related to law  enforcement, ICE, in conjunction with State, established an international  gang task force in Honduras in January 2010. Comprised of four Honduran  police officers and one ICE agent, the task force is charged with  developing intelligence to initiate and support gang investigations in the  United States and Honduras.
Capacity Enhancement: To help enhance the capacity of Central American  governments to address gangs, beginning in 2006, State, DOJ, DHS, and  other agencies have provided antigang training courses to Central  American law enforcement officials through the International Law  Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. The academy provides law  enforcement training to officials from countries in Central and South  America and the Caribbean. The training courses have focused on various  aspects of gang enforcement efforts, such as police investigative  techniques, prosecution, witness protection, and prison gang management,  and participants have included police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff,  border agents, and prevention and rehabilitation officials from El  Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Belize. As another  example of capacity enhancement, USAID has provided technical  assistance and training to police, prosecutors, and judges, among others,  to reform justice-sector institutions in El Salvador to help improve the  investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crimes including those  committed by gangs.
Prevention: USAID has implemented gang prevention, intervention, and  rehabilitation programs in Central American countries to provide youth  with alternatives to joining gangs and assist former gang members’ reentry  into society. For example, through partnerships with faith-based and  nongovernmental organizations and local governments in Central America,  USAID has started youth centers in specific communities to provide a safe  environment for recreational and vocational opportunities for young  people. Figure 2 shows individuals participating in activities at these youth  centers in El Salvador.
Additionally, USAID has sponsored a community-based policing program  in Guatemala to improve the relationship between the police and local  citizens by establishing collaborative partnerships between law  enforcement and the communities they serve to solve problems and  increase trust. According to USAID, the agency plans to expand the  community policing program to five new communities in Guatemala as  well as five communities each in El Salvador and Panama.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Coordinated Their Antigang Programs through Various Mechanisms, but Could Strengthen Coordination by Examining the Establishment and Composition of a Salvadoran-Based Law Enforcement Unit
paragraphs: Federal agencies have taken action to coordinate their antigang programs  and share information with each other through various interagency and  coordinating groups. For example, DOJ has established several entities to  coordinate and share information on gang enforcement efforts, including  transnational gangs, among DOJ and DHS component agencies. These  entities include the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee that is comprised  of representatives from a variety of DOJ components and agencies, as well  as representatives from DHS’s ICE, and meets at least quarterly each year  to report on the status of antigang efforts and disseminate information for  coordination. Another entity used to coordinate, share information and  intelligence on gangs, and serve as a deconfliction center for gang  operations is the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination  Center (GangTECC). GangTECC is comprised of participants from the  FBI, ATF, DEA, and ICE, among other DOJ and DHS components, and has  responsibility for coordinating multijurisdictional investigations of all  gangs except FBI-led investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street  gangs. In addition, the FBI’s MS-13 National Gang Task Force has only FBI  participants and is responsible for coordinating FBI’s multijurisdictional  investigations involving MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. Further, within  Central American countries, federal agencies have mechanisms for  coordinating and sharing information on antigang programs. For example,  in El Salvador at the U.S. embassy, U.S. government agency officials who  are involved in implementing antigang programs, such as officials from  DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD, hold regular meetings to discuss  antigang activities and coordinate their implementation efforts. Appendix  IV provides additional information on the roles and responsibilities of  these and other headquarters-level coordinating entities as well as task  forces that coordinate antigang efforts at the field level within the United  States.
In July 2009, we reported on the benefits and challenges associated with  some of these various coordinating mechanisms. Specifically, we reported  that entities such as the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee, GangTECC,  and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force provide DOJ and DHS with a  means to operate across agency boundaries and facilitate communication  among participating agencies at the headquarters level. However, we also  reported that while some overlaps in mission may be appropriate, the  entities had not clearly identified their roles and responsibilities, resulting  in possible gaps or unnecessary overlaps in agencies’ coordination and  sharing of information on gang enforcement efforts, including those  involving transnational gangs. Specifically, we reported that GangTECC  and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force had overlapping missions and  responsibilities for coordination and deconfliction of multijurisdictional  investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. The two entities  had these overlaps in part because the MS-13 National Gang Task Force  already existed when GangTECC was established in 2006 and was not  dismantled or folded into GangTECC at that time. We reported that both  entities risked unnecessary federal resource expenditures to fund two  entities when a single group could be more efficient. We recommended  that DOJ, in consultation with DHS, articulate and differentiate roles,  responsibilities, and missions of headquarters-level entities, which would  strengthen headquarters-level coordination efforts to help ensure that they  are not expended on overlapping missions. DOJ agreed with our  recommendation and as of February 2010, DHS and DOJ officials reported  that they are discussing ways to streamline processes, modify policies, and  establish cross-cutting performance measures for federal gang programs.
At the field level, FBI and ICE could strengthen their coordination and  sharing of information on gang members and investigations specifically in  El Salvador by reaching agreement on ICE’s participation in the TAG. In  El Salvador, both ICE and FBI contact the Salvadoran national police to  request information and intelligence on gangs to assist in the agencies’  gang investigations. The FBI makes its requests directly through its agents  assigned to the TAG, while ICE’s requests for Salvadoran national police  information on gangs or gang members are sent through ICE’s country  attaché in El Salvador who forwards them to the FBI agents at the TAG.  The FBI agents then pass the requests to Salvadoran national police  officials if the FBI agents do not have the information needed to fulfill  ICE’s requests. FBI and ICE officials stated that this process for  coordinating information requests for the Salvadoran national police  through the TAG has worked well, but that the process could be further  strengthened by ICE’s participation in the TAG unit. Our work on effective  interagency coordination has shown that collaborating agencies should  organize joint and individual efforts and facilitate information sharing.  Collaborating agencies also look for opportunities to leverage each others’  resources, thus obtaining additional benefits that would not be available if  they were working separately. Coordinating in this way could yield  benefits in terms of leveraging efforts already underway and minimizing  any potential unnecessary duplication in federal agencies’ requests for  information on gang members or gang investigations. Various U.S. and  Salvadoran officials have cited potential benefits that could be gained  from ICE and FBI both participating in the TAG. The director of El  Salvador’s national police stated that he would like to see federal law  enforcement agencies other than the FBI involved in the TAG unit,  particularly ICE, because of ICE’s role in managing the removal of gang  members from the United States to El Salvador. The unit chief of FBI’s MS- 13 National Gang Task Force stated that the FBI would also benefit from  ICE participating in the TAG to assist in deconflicting enforcement  operations between the FBI and ICE in El Salvador. ICE’s El Salvador  country attaché stated that having an ICE agent at the TAG would  streamline the current process since an ICE agent would be working  directly at the TAG and be able to better identify possible connections  between FBI and ICE gang cases and requests for information, thereby  expediting information sharing.
The FBI and ICE have discussed signing a joint memorandum of  understanding to provide parameters for ICE’s participation in the TAG.  According to the unit chief of the FBI’s MS-13 National Gang Task Force,  in 2008 the FBI presented ICE with a memorandum of understanding for  ICE to participate in the TAG unit in which the FBI legal attaché would  manage the TAG and coordinate TAG gang investigations with ICE. The  FBI memorandum required ICE to coordinate all of its activities related to  the TAG with the FBI legal attaché. However, according to the head of  ICE’s National Gang Unit, ICE would like to participate in the TAG more  as an equal partner as opposed to being subordinate to the FBI. ICE  officials stated that clarification is needed in regards to the administrative  details on placing an ICE agent at the TAG such as housing and the  location of the ICE agent’s office, as well as agreement on the extent to  which an ICE agent assigned to the TAG could focus on work for ICE- specific investigations as needed.
To help obtain this clarification and try to reach consensus on ICE  participation in TAG, ICE officials stated that as of February 2010 they  have not yet completed the process of drafting language to clarify their  points of concern in the memorandum of understanding and plan to  provide this draft language, once completed, to the FBI for its  consideration. Further, the FBI and ICE have initiated discussions to  conduct an assessment of ICE’s possible participation in TAG by having an  ICE agent who would conduct the assessment assigned to the unit on a  temporary basis. However, as of February 2010, ICE and FBI have not yet  reached agreement on this temporary assignment and ICE’s plans to  conduct the assessment because the two agencies disagree about the type  and scope of the work that the agent would conduct for the assessment.  The FBI and ICE could strengthen their coordination on gang  investigations and enhance the efficiency of their existing process for  exchanging information through the TAG by reaching consensus on ICE’s  participation in the unit. By reaching agreement on ICE’s role, which the  FBI and ICE have been considering since 2008, the two agencies would be  in a better position to leverage their existing resources and information- sharing processes for gang investigations with a nexus to El Salvador.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Established Performance Measures for Their Own Antigang Programs, but Some Programs Are in the Early Stages of Collecting Performance Data
paragraphs: Earlier in this report, we discussed federal government efforts to measure  the results achieved with the overall Strategy. Separately, federal agencies  have established performance measures, such as numbers of arrests of  gang members, for assessing their own individual antigang efforts.  However, as most of these programs are in the early stages of  implementation, agencies’ data on their programs’ performance cannot yet  be used to assess the level of activity or program results across time. For  example, USAID officials said that because most of the Mérida Initiative  funding for its Central American programs was not released to USAID field  missions until July and August 2009, programs funded by the Mérida  Initiative have yet to have any appreciable results to measure. In addition,  several antigang programs in Central America have yet to be fully  implemented. For example, ICE and the FBI are seeking to establish the  Criminal History Information Program in El Salvador, Guatemala, and  Honduras pending the hiring of needed analysts and completion of  interagency agreements—expected to occur by the summer of 2010.
Although federal agencies’ performance data do not yet indicate the level  of progress or results achieved over time, federal agencies have begun to  report data on their levels of activity to date. For example, State has  established measures for the antigang training courses offered through the  International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador, including  tracking data on the number of gang classes offered and the number of  participants successfully completing them. According to State, the  academy has offered 10 gang-related training courses since 2006 with a  total of 416 participants from various countries including El Salvador,  Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. In addition to these measures, State  asks participants to complete course evaluations and uses these  evaluations to make modifications to the antigang training courses, such  as changes in curriculum.
USAID has also established measures for its own antigang programs, as  shown in table 2. For example, USAID has established measures for its  community policing program, such as the number of communities that  have implemented community policing programs.
USAID also requires program contractors to develop performance indexes  for their respective programs. For example, the private contractor  conducting USAID’s Community-based Crime and Violence Prevention  Project plans to review local government records to measure the crime  rate in project-targeted communities. For other efforts related to youth  outreach centers, performance indicators tracked by program contractors  include measures such as the number of youth who have received a job  through the support of the outreach center or because of the skills  acquired through the center.
With regard to its gang enforcement efforts, ICE reports on the number of  gang-related criminal and administrative arrests, among other measures.  As shown in figure 3, the number of criminal and administrative gang- related arrests made by ICE has generally increased since fiscal year 2006,  the first full year that it compiled this information.
As shown in table 3, the FBI has also established various measures for  each of its primary programs to combat transnational gangs. Among  others, these measures include the number of gang cases worked and the  number of countries and officials participating in the Central American  Law Enforcement Exchange Program.
In addition to these measures, the FBI has prepared after-action reports  for the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange Program that  summarize the results of the exchanges, including feedback from program  participants, and has used these reports to modify the program. For  example, according to the FBI, future exchange classes will include more  practical and operational experiences (such as ride-alongs with local  police officers and observation of police operations). Moreover, future  classes will include more allowances for travel time and representation  from more U.S. and foreign police departments.
For the TAG, the FBI did not start to collect data for the unit’s measures,  such as the number of requests for assistance the unit receives, until April  2008, about 6 months after the unit was established. According to FBI  officials, no systematic log or other mechanism was used to track and  record data on the TAG’s activities from September 2007 through April  2008, because, at the start-up of the unit, agents were assigned on a  temporary basis and were primarily focused on establishing and initiating  the operations of the unit. Thus, the FBI lacks information about the unit’s  activity levels for its first 6 months of operation. Since FBI agents have  been stationed at the TAG for 2-year, long-term rotations, these agents  have developed and maintained a log to track the unit’s activities and  assistance provided to FBI offices and other law enforcement agencies.  This data maintained by the TAG is used by FBI, particularly the MS-13  National Gang Task Force, to identify trends in where transnational gang  members are located and traveling to and proactively target specific  geographic areas for gang education or enforcement activities.
section_title: Various Factors Affect U.S. Efforts to Implement Antigang Programs in Central American Countries
paragraphs: Even as agencies have worked to implement antigang programs in Central  America, various factors in the region largely outside of the control of U.S.  agencies pose challenges to the implementation of the programs. These  factors include: the ability of host countries to sustain programs after U.S.  support ends; Central American law enforcement personnel issues; and  legal restrictions in Central American countries, such as El Salvador, that  diminish the benefits of efforts.
Sustainability of programs by host countries: Federal agencies have  identified challenges facing Central American countries in sustaining  antigang programs currently being initiated and implemented in the  region. Specifically, State officials identified several factors outside the  control of U.S. agencies that contribute to the uncertainty as to whether  Central American countries will be able to sustain antigang programs over  the long term. These officials reported that the ability of partner countries  to take responsibility for managing and supporting U.S.-funded antigang  programs is hampered by the fact that these countries often do not have  the financial resources to sustain the programs in the absence of U.S.  funds. State officials said that the ability of foreign countries to sustain  antigang programs is hindered by other factors as well, such as corruption  throughout the countries’ police and judiciary structures; a lack of  investment in police training to make the countries’ police forces more  professional and accountable; the countries’ inability to provide police  forces with equipment such as communications gear and transportation  assets; and the ability of the gangs to quickly adapt to law enforcement  strategies.
To help address these issues, federal agencies have taken steps prior to  implementing these programs to plan for how the programs will be  sustained, particularly after U.S. federal funding ends. For example, State  officials said that when the department first developed and implemented  these programs, it took into account the ability of foreign countries to take  over and manage antigang programs initially funded and managed by the  United States. Specifically, the officials noted that they worked directly  with host country officials to gain an understanding of what programs or  efforts the countries needed and what the countries might be able to  support, both in terms of resources available and a supportive political  climate, and then used that as a starting point to identify and shape the  efforts that would receive U.S. support. According to USAID officials,  USAID also took similar steps to work with host country officials to  identify antigang efforts the countries had planned or were already  underway for which USAID could provide additional support. Officials  stated that they chose this approach because they sought to support local  initiatives and programs whenever possible, as programs already planned  or implemented by the host countries are more likely to be sustained by  the countries themselves. Rather than setting up similar programs that  would compete for resources, providing support for the host countries’  programs helped to broaden the reach of the programs into additional  areas that the host countries may not have had resources for otherwise.  Further, USAID officials reported that they coordinated with the host  countries and other donors to ensure that the host countries would  assume responsibility for the activities when USAID funding expires. In  regard to FBI-led efforts such as the TAG, FBI officials stated that they  also considered the ability of the foreign government to support these  efforts during negotiations between the foreign governments, such as El  Salvador, and the FBI to establish the units.
To help prepare for sustaining antigang programs over the long term,  federal agencies have also taken action after these programs have been  implemented. For example, at the country level, USAID officials work  directly with host government partners and with other donors through  regular donor coordination groups and meetings to identify best practices  for sustaining efforts and incorporating those practices into programs.  Further, FBI officials have discussed with the Salvadoran government  ways for the government to provide the resources and commitment  needed to help sustain the TAG unit over the long term. According to the  unit chief of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force who manages the TAG,  other than what the FBI pays for in the salaries and living expenses of the  FBI agents based at the TAG, the Salvadoran government provides the  other resources necessary to sustain the TAG’s operations.
Screening process for law enforcement personnel and transfer of  personnel: Finding a sufficient number of Central American law  enforcement personnel who can pass the screening process required to  participate in U.S. investigative and information-sharing programs can  complicate the implementation of those programs. For example, in order  to become part of the FBI’s TAG unit, police officers must receive a  background screening before initially joining the unit and undergo a  polygraph every 6 months thereafter. Under the rules of the TAG, if  officers fail the polygraph, they must leave the unit. FBI officials stated  that, as was the case in El Salvador when they set up the TAG in that  country, they expect to face challenges in identifying and successfully  screening a sufficient number of Guatemalan and Honduran police officers  to participate in the units planned for those countries. To address this  challenge, the FBI is planning to establish smaller TAG units in Guatemala  and Honduras (10 officers each instead of the 20 stationed at the  Salvadoran TAG) and set aside more time and resources for screening  Guatemalan and Honduran police officers for the units. FBI officials also  stated that one disadvantage of the first officer exchange with El Salvador  was that of the four participating Salvadoran police officers, only two  officers continued to work on gang investigations in El Salvador after the  exchange was completed with the other two being transferred to different  areas within the Salvadoran police force. Although the FBI has an  agreement with participating countries that requires exchange participants  to be involved in gang investigations for at least 2 years after the exchange  has concluded so they can put into practice the training they received and  share it with their colleagues, FBI officials noted that there is little they  can do to ensure participating countries abide by this requirement.
Legal restrictions: According to officials we interviewed from the FBI and  DOJ’s Criminal Division, Central American countries’ laws can also pose  challenges for conducting gang investigations in the region, or for federal  agencies that may seek the extradition of individuals to face trial for  crimes committed in the United States. According to an FBI official with  the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, legal restrictions in countries such as  El Salvador do not permit law enforcement to conduct electronic  surveillance or wiretaps as part of their investigations. According to this  official, while this restriction has not hindered the ability of the  Salvadoran national police to conduct investigations, it takes more time  and effort to develop and corroborate the evidence through the use of  other investigative methods. According to an official from DOJ’s Criminal  Division, a recent amendment to the Salvadoran constitution now allows  the use of electronic surveillance as a tool in criminal investigations and  the Salvadoran National Assembly is currently considering implementing  legislation. In regard to the extradition of gang members wanted in the  United States, FBI officials noted that countries such as El Salvador have  laws that prohibit the extradition of individuals to other countries where  they could face a more severe punishment than would be given in El  Salvador for the same crime. As an example, the unit chief of the MS-13  National Gang Task Force stated that the FBI had requested the  extradition of a gang leader imprisoned in El Salvador for prosecution in  Baltimore, Maryland, where the individual would have likely faced a  longer prison sentence for the crime. However, the FBI’s request for  extradition was denied, preventing the gang leader from facing the charges  against him in the United States. Nevertheless, DOJ’s Criminal Division  reported that on December 22, 2009, the Supreme Court of El Salvador  voted to permit the first extradition of a Salvadoran national pursuant to  the extradition treaty between the United States and El Salvador.  Officials explained that future extraditions may still be limited by the  penalties applicable to extradited individuals, such as the death penalty  and life imprisonment. To help address these challenges, DOJ’s Criminal  Division continues to work with El Salvador under the existing treaty to  facilitate extradition between the United States and El Salvador.
Despite these challenges, officials from the agencies we interviewed stated  that they continue to work to address or mitigate the effect of these  challenges and to ensure their antigang programs are both sustainable and  effective.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the rapid growth of transnational gangs, their propensity for  violence, and the public safety threats they pose, the response to these  gangs requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach on the part of  federal agencies that have different responsibilities and missions for  combating transnational gangs. The Strategy to Combat the Threat of  Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the Strategy) provides  a roadmap for federal departments and agencies to follow in designing and  implementing efforts to combat the gangs. However, while individual  federal agencies may be familiar with the implementation of their own  antigang programs, or those in the Strategy for which they are responsible,  they do not necessarily have the visibility across the Strategy’s categories  to determine the extent to which the broader strategy is being  implemented. Regardless as to whether it remains a separate effort or is  incorporated into the broader CARSI being developed, incorporating an  approach for overseeing the interagency effort to combat transnational  gangs would help provide visibility by designating an agency or entity to  ensure that the Strategy is being implemented as planned. In addition, as  the Strategy and related antigang efforts are implemented, it will be  important to be able to track the effect the Strategy as a whole is having  against the transnational gang problem. By establishing performance goals  and measures or other mechanisms to evaluate the progress made in  implementing the Strategy, federal agencies, Congress, and other  stakeholders could have more specific information relating to agencies’  performance under the Strategy, thereby enabling them to make more  informed decisions as to what adjustments to the Strategy might be  necessary, if any, to achieve its desired effect. Relatedly, while federal  agencies have taken various actions to collaborate on their transnational  antigang efforts, agencies such as the FBI and ICE can take steps to  further resolve their roles and participation in the TAG unit in El Salvador,  especially given that the FBI and ICE have been discussing this  participation since 2008. By reaching agreement on ICE’s participation in  the unit, both agencies could realize additional information-sharing  benefits not only with each other, but with foreign counterparts, and help  ensure that resources to combat gangs in El Salvador are used efficiently  and effectively.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen oversight and accountability for implementation of the  Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America  and Mexico (the Strategy), we recommend that the Special Assistant to the  President for National Security Affairs, in conjunction with DOJ, DHS,  State, USAID, and DOD, revise the Strategy to include, or include in the  CARSI if the Strategy is incorporated into that initiative    an approach or framework for overseeing implementation of the Strategy  and antigang efforts in Central America, and    performance goals and measures to assess progress made in achieving  intended results under the Strategy.
To strengthen federal agencies’ coordination of antigang efforts and  maximize use of federal law enforcement resources in El Salvador, we  recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland  Security reach agreement on ICE’s role and participation in the TAG unit.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of  Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State  (State); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the  National Security Council (NSC). DHS, DOJ, and USAID provided written  comments on the draft report. DOD, State, and the NSC did not provide  comments.
In their written comments, DHS and DOJ concurred with our  recommendation that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland  Security reach agreement on ICE’s role and participation in the TAG unit  in El Salvador, and outlined steps they have begun to take to address this  recommendation. For example, DHS commented that ICE officials have  reviewed the FBI’s memorandum on the TAG to clarify the roles and  responsibilities of ICE and the FBI within the unit in El Salvador. DOJ also  commented that any agreement on DHS’s participation in the TAG unit in  El Salvador should also address DHS’s participation in future TAG units  that the FBI expects to create in Guatemala and Honduras.
In its written comments, USAID commented that it acknowledges the  importance of increased interagency coordination to help bolster U.S.  government efforts to address the threat of criminal gangs in Central  America and the United States.
DHS’s, DOJ’s, and USAID’s written comments are contained in appendixes  VI, VII, and VIII, respectively. We also incorporated technical comments  provided by DHS, DOJ, and USAID as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Special Assistant to the  President for National Security Affairs; the Attorney General; the  Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Defense; the Administrator of  USAID; selected congressional committees; and other interested parties.  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 if  you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IX.
section_title: Appendix I: Leadership Structure and Key Transnational Criminal Activities of MS-13 and 18th Street
paragraphs: Federal agencies have specifically identified two primary gangs with  connections to Central America—Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th  Street—as posing the most significant public safety threats to the United  States and Central American countries among transnational gangs. This  appendix summarizes information federal agencies have on the leadership  structure and transnational criminal activities of these two gangs.
subsections: section_title: Leadership of the Gangs
paragraphs: Federal agencies have reported that these gangs generally do not have a  centralized leadership structure. Rather, most gang cliques—or local gang  groups—tend to operate in specific areas or communities in the United  States and Central America and have autonomy to function independently  without reporting to a central authority or leadership. However, law  enforcement officials have reported that in some gang cliques activities are  directed by gang leaders incarcerated in Salvadoran prisons. These leaders  communicate by cell phones or coded written messages that are smuggled  in and out of the prisons. Of the five U.S. locations we visited to discuss  gang investigations with federal, state, and local law enforcement, three  reported instances in which gang leaders incarcerated in El Salvador  directed gang members to organize new cliques, coordinate with cliques in  other parts of the country, and carry out criminal activities, including  murder. For example, an investigation in Charlotte, North Carolina, found  that MS-13 clique leaders were sent to establish cliques at the behest of  leaders in El Salvador. Further, according to the FBI, cliques convene  periodically with gang leadership to determine future criminal activities  and punishments for individual delinquent gang members.
section_title: Transnational Criminal Activities of the Gangs
paragraphs: Transnational gangs engage in criminal activities that not only affect local  communities in the United States and Central American countries, but that  also stretch beyond U.S. and Central American borders. For example, in its  2006 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) reported that gang activity has  transcended the borders of Central America, Mexico, and the United  States and evolved into a transnational concern. USAID reported that  while gang activity used to be territorially confined to local  neighborhoods, globalization, sophisticated communications technologies,  and travel patterns have facilitated the expansion of gang activity across  neighborhoods, cities, and countries. Further, the 2009 National Gang  Threat Assessment indicated that U.S. street gangs are expanding their  influence in most regions and broadening their presence outside the  United States to develop associations with criminal organizations in  Mexico and Central America. According to federal agencies, major cross- border criminal activities in which transnational gangs engage include  drug trafficking and distribution, human smuggling, and extortion, among  others.
With regard to drug trafficking and distribution, assessments conducted by  the National Gang Intelligence Center, the National Drug Intelligence  Center, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicate that connections exist between  drug trafficking organizations and MS-13 and 18th Street gangs and these  connections may be expanding. Several agencies also suggested that both  gangs’ connections with prison gangs such as the Mexican Mafia may  provide a link to drug trafficking organizations, as one of the prison gangs’  main sources of income is extorting money from drug distributors outside  prison and distributing various narcotics within and outside the prison  system. Further, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has reported  that drug trafficking organizations have worked with MS-13 and 18th  Street gangs to distribute their narcotics in Central America and the  United States. MS-13 and 18th Street gangs have also been identified as  engaging in retail street distribution of narcotics in the United States, for  example. Although connections between gangs and drug trafficking  organizations exist and may be growing, these connections may not yet  reflect large-scale, organized cooperation between gangs and drug- trafficking organizations. For example, Drug Enforcement Administration  (DEA) officials stated that while individual gangs and gang members might  work with drug trafficking organizations for their own personal gain, DEA  has not observed or obtained evidence of high-level, organized  cooperation between gangs and drug trafficking organizations. Likewise,  the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has reported that because  the Central American drug market is too small for gangs to develop into  major distributors, the gangs lack the maritime capabilities required for  the transport of drugs from Central America, and gangs have limited  involvement in the U.S. narcotics market, the link between Central  American gangs and drug trafficking organizations may not yet be well- developed.
In addition to their involvement in drug trafficking and distribution,  transnational gangs have also been involved in other cross-border crime,  including alien smuggling and extortion. For example, the 2009 National  Gang Threat Assessment indicated that U.S.-based gang members are  increasingly involved in cross-border criminal activity that includes  smuggling illegal aliens from Mexico into the United States. Moreover, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection and the FBI reported that MS-13 is known  to smuggle persons from Central America into the United States from  Mexico. The FBI has also reported that 18th Street may be involved in  human trafficking and alien smuggling. However, the FBI stated that it is  difficult to determine gang members’ roles—whether they are organizing  the border crossings, smuggling other aliens into the country, or being  smuggled themselves.
In addition, federal agencies have reported that extortion and retail drug  distribution provide financial support for both MS-13 and 18th Street.  Cliques have been reported to extort those who conduct illicit activities  themselves, such as prostitution or drug distribution entities, within the  gangs’ territory. In the United States, transnational gang members are  known also to extort money from businesses that operate within gang  territory in exchange for not inflicting harm on the businesses or those  businesses’ owners, family members, or workers. Both MS-13 and 18th  Street gangs also conduct extortion across international borders. For  example, gang members in the United States may extort immigrants with  threats that they will retaliate against family members in Central America  if law enforcement is notified. In some instances, the gangs have coupled  extortion with kidnapping. The FBI has reported that MS-13 has kidnapped  illegal immigrants and then extorted money from their families for the  immigrants’ safe return.
Finally, with regard to links to terrorists, federal agencies have found no  indication that U.S. gangs with transnational ties have routine  relationships.
section_title: Appendix II: Characteristics of Other Transnational Gangs
paragraphs: According to the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), three basic  types of gangs have been identified by gang investigators: street gangs,  prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. The focus of this report has  been on gangs with ties to Central America, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS- 13) and 18th Street, which belong to the “street gang” category. However,  all three categories contain gangs with members who are either present or  criminally active (or both) in more than one country. This appendix  provides examples of other gangs in these categories, including  descriptions of their transnational activities. Most of the information  presented in this appendix is from the April 2008 Attorney General’s  Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban  Areas and supplemented by information obtained from interviews with  agency officials.
subsections: section_title: Street Gangs
paragraphs: According to federal law enforcement, street gangs are typically  associated with a particular neighborhood, town, or city, which they may  incorporate into the name of their gang. However, law enforcement  officials report that several street gangs have attained regional or national  status and operate in a number of states throughout the country. Two  examples of these street gangs that also have transnational connections  include the following:    Florencia 13: Florencia 13 originated in Los Angeles in the early 1960s.
Gang membership is estimated to be more than 3,000. This gang operates  primarily in California, but is expanding to other states. Drug trafficking is  a primary source of income for the gang whose members smuggle cocaine  and methamphetamine from Mexico into the United States for distribution.  Florencia members are also involved in other criminal activities including  assault, drive-by shooting, and homicide.
Latin Kings: Latin Kings is a collection of over 160 structured gangs,  referred to as chapters, operating in 158 cities in 34 states in the United  States. The gang’s membership is estimated to be 20,000 to 35,000. Most  members are Mexican-American or Puerto Rican males whose main  source of income is street-level drug sales. The gang obtains drugs  primarily from Mexican drug trafficking organizations that operate along  the U.S.-Mexico border. Members also engage in other criminal activity  such as assault, burglary, homicide, identity theft, and money laundering.
section_title: Prison Gangs
paragraphs: According to federal law enforcement officials, prison gangs are criminal  organizations that operate within federal and state prison systems as self- perpetuating criminal entities. These gangs also operate outside of prisons  typically through the activities of members who have been released from  prison into communities. Examples of prison gangs with transnational  connections include the following:    Barrio Azteca: Barrio Azteca is one of the most violent prison gangs in the  United States. The gang is highly structured and has an estimated  membership of 2,000. Most members are either Mexican national or  Mexican American males. Barrio Azteca is most active in the southwestern  United States, primarily in federal, state, and local corrections facilities in  Texas and outside of prison in southwestern Texas and southeastern New  Mexico. The gang’s main source of income is derived from smuggling  illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution both  inside and outside prisons. Gang members often transport illicit drugs  across the border for drug trafficking organizations. Gang members are  also involved in other crimes including alien smuggling, arson, assault,  extortion, kidnapping, and weapons violations.
Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos: This is a Hispanic prison gang formed in  Texas in the late 1980s. It operates in most prisons in the state and on the  streets in many communities in Texas, particularly Laredo. The gang is  also active in several cities in Mexico, and its largest contingent in that  country is located in Nuevo Laredo. The gang is structured and is  estimated to have 1,000 members. These members maintain close ties to  several Mexican drug trafficking organizations and are involved in the  trafficking of large quantities of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United  States for distribution.
Mexican Mafia: This gang was formed in the late 1950s within the  California prison system. It is loosely structured and has strict rules that  must be followed by the estimated 350 to 400 members. Most of these  members are Mexican American males who previously belonged to a  Southern California street gang. Mexican Mafia is active in 13 states, but  California remains the power base. The gang’s main source of income is  extorting drug distributors outside prison and distributing illegal drugs  within the prison system and on the streets. Some members have direct  links to Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Other criminal activities  include controlling gambling and homosexual prostitution in prison.
Mexikanemi: The Mexikanemi prison gang was formed in the early 1980s  within the Texas prison system. The gang is highly structured and  estimated to have 2,000 members, most of whom are Mexican national or  Mexican American males who were living in Texas at the time of their  incarceration. This gang poses a significant drug trafficking threat to  communities in the southwest region of the United States, particularly  Texas. Gang members reportedly traffic illegal drugs from Mexico into the  United States for distribution inside and outside of prison. Gang members  obtain these drugs from Mexican drug trafficking organizations.
Surenos: As some individual Hispanic street gang members enter the  prison systems, they put aside rivalries with other Hispanic gangs and  unite under the name Surenos. The original Mexican Mafia members, most  of whom were from Southern California, considered Mexicans from the  rural, agricultural areas of Northern California as weak and viewed them  with contempt. To distinguish themselves from these northern agricultural  workers, members of Mexican Mafia began to refer to the Hispanic gang  members that worked for them as Surenos (Southerners). Surenos gang  members’ main source of income is retail-level distribution of illegal drugs  both within prison systems and in the community, as well as the extortion  of drug distributors on the streets. Some members have direct links to  Mexican drug trafficking organizations and broker deals for Mexican Mafia  as well as their own gang. Other criminal activities of Surenos members  include assault, car jacking, home invasion, homicide, and robbery.
Texas Syndicate: Texas Syndicate is one of the largest and most violent  prison gangs. It is active on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border and  poses a significant drug trafficking threat to communities in the southwest  region. The gang is highly structured and is estimated to have 1,300  members, most of whom are Mexican American males between 20 and 40  years of age. Gang members smuggle illegal drugs from Mexico into the  United States for distribution inside and outside of prison. Gang members  have direct working relationships with drug trafficking organizations.
section_title: Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs
paragraphs: According to federal law enforcement, outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMG)  have been in the United States longer than many other gangs and are most  numerous in the United States. According to the Department of Justice  (DOJ) Gang Unit, there are more than 300 active OMGs in the United  States, ranging in size from single chapters with five or six members to  hundreds of chapters with thousands of members worldwide. DOJ  considers OMGs to be transnational criminal organizations because they  typically maintain chapters in more than one country and engage in illicit  cross-border activities. OMG chapters are found on every continent.
OMGs are highly organized with well-defined hierarchies, defined rules in  the form of either bylaws or constitutions, and clear recruitment,  acceptance, and promotion processes for members. OMGs have a distinct  chain of command, much like a corporation with positions such as  president, vice-president, treasurer, sergeant-at-arms, and road captain at  the chapter level. Generally, OMG organizational structure consists of  individual chapters grouped by geographic region all being headed by a  national president. While national and international presidents may exist,  each regional chapter is run by its own president. The gang leadership  requires loyalty and obedience from members. OMG members may be  governed by a code of ethics, a constitution, or a strict set of bylaws.  Descriptions of major OMGs present in the U.S. follows—including details  on the gangs’ transnational connections.
Hells Angels Motorcycle Club: According to U.S. law enforcement officials,  the Hells Angels are the largest and the most criminally prominent of the  “Big Five” OMGs. The gang includes 2,000 to 2,500 members belonging to  over 230 chapters in the United States and 26 foreign countries. In the  United States, law enforcement officials estimate that Hells Angels has  more than 92 chapters in 27 states with over 800 members. Gang members  produce, transport, and distribute marijuana and methamphetamine and  transport and distribute cocaine, hashish, heroin, and other drugs. Other  crimes perpetrated by Hells Angels members include assault, extortion,  homicide, money laundering, and motorcycle theft.
Bandidos: U.S. law enforcement authorities consider the Bandidos and  Hells Angels to be the two largest OMGs in the United States. This gang  has approximately 900 members belonging to over 93 chapters in the  United States, with a total of 2,000 to 2,500 members when the  membership in 13 other countries is added to U.S. membership. Bandidos  is involved in transporting and distributing cocaine and marijuana and  producing, transporting, and distributing methamphetamine. The gang is  most active in the Pacific, southeast, southwest, and west central regions  of the United States and is expanding in these regions by forming new  chapters and allowing members of support clubs to form or join Bandidos  chapters.
Mongols Motorcycle Club: According to law enforcement officials, the  Mongols Motorcycle Club is an extremely violent OMG that poses a  serious criminal threat to the Pacific and southwest regions of the United  States. Mongols members transport and distribute cocaine, marijuana, and  methamphetamine and frequently commit violent crimes including assault,  intimidation, and murder to defend Mongols territory and uphold its  reputation. Most of the club’s 300 members are Hispanic males who live in  the Los Angeles area, and many are former street gang members with a  long history of using violence to settle grievances. The club also maintains  ties to Hispanic street gangs in Los Angeles. In the 1980s, the Mongols  OMG seized control of southern California’s OMG activity from the Hells  Angels and today is allied with the Bandidos, Outlaws, and Pagan’s OMGs  against the Hells Angels.
Outlaws: Outlaws has more than 1,700 members belonging to 176 chapters  in the United States and 12 foreign countries. U.S. law enforcement  officials estimate that Outlaws has more than 86 chapters in 21 states with  over 700 members in the United States. Outlaws are the dominant OMG in  the Great Lakes Region of the United States. Gang members produce,  transport, and distribute methamphetamine and transport and distribute  cocaine and marijuana. Other criminal activities engaged in by Outlaws  include arson, assault, explosives operations, extortion, fraud, homicide,  intimidation, kidnapping, money laundering, prostitution, robbery, theft,  and weapons violations. Outlaws compete with the Hells Angels for  membership and territory.
Vagos Motorcycle Club: The Vagos OMG has hundreds of members in the  United States and Mexico and poses a serious criminal threat to those  areas in which chapters are located. Law enforcement reports that Vagos  has approximately 300 members among 24 chapters in California, Hawaii,  Nevada, Oregon, and three chapters in Mexico. Club members produce,  transport, and distribute methamphetamine and distribute marijuana.  Vagos members also have been implicated in other criminal activities  including assault, extortion, insurance fraud, money laundering, murder,  vehicle theft, weapons violations, and witness intimidation.
Black Pistons: This OMG is the official support club of the Outlaws  Motorcycle Club. Established in 2002 with the backing of the Outlaws,  Black Pistons has expanded rapidly throughout the United States and into  Canada and Europe. The club has an estimated 70 domestic chapters in 20  states and an unknown number of foreign chapters in Belgium, Canada,  Germany, Great Britain, Norway, and Poland. The exact number is  unknown but is estimated to be more than 200 in the United States. The  Outlaws OMG uses Black Pistons chapters as sources of prospective new  members. The Outlaws also uses Black Pistons chapters to conduct  criminal activity, especially transporting and distributing drugs. Black  Piston members also engage in assault, extortion, fraud, intimidation, and  theft.
section_title: Appendix III: Federal Agencies’ Programs to Address Transnational Gangs with Connections to Central America
paragraphs: Federal agencies have developed and implemented a wide range of  programs to combat transnational gangs in the United States that have  links to Central America. As shown in table 4, some of these efforts  directly combat the gangs while others seek to improve criminal justice  systems to increase the ability of Central American countries to apprehend  and prosecute criminals including gang members (such as Community  Policing and Justice Sector Reform). As also shown in table 4, other efforts  are aimed at improving educational and employment opportunities of  youth to reduce the motivation for joining gangs (such as Youth Centers).
section_title: Appendix IV: Federal Agencies’ Entities and Mechanisms for Coordinating Transnational Antigang Efforts
paragraphs: Federal agencies have coordinated their programs to combat transnational  gangs through working groups at the interagency level, coordinating  groups within Central American countries, and federally led antigang task  forces at the local level. For example, at the headquarters level, through  the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), representatives of the  Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,  Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and Bureau of Prisons (BOP), among  other components, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) coordinate and share information on gangs that  are a threat to U.S. communities. Table 5 provides additional information  about headquarters-level entities’ coordination of antigang efforts. These  coordinating entities have different roles and responsibilities, but in  general, they serve as mechanisms for deconflicting cases; providing law  enforcement agencies with information on gangs and gang activities,  including transnational gangs; and coordinating participating agencies’  strategies and task forces.
In localities we contacted, law enforcement agencies obtained assistance  from the antigang coordinating entities to support their investigations of  MS-13 and 18th Street gangs and gang members. For example, in one  location we visited, the National Gang Intelligence Center provided an  analyst to an FBI antigang task force to help that task force analyze MS-13  gang data for an ongoing investigation. At another location, the FBI  antigang task force obtained assistance from the TAG unit in El Salvador  to help identify two MS-13 gang members who were in a Salvadoran prison  and communicated with MS-13 gang members in the United States to  direct the gang members’ criminal activities. Additionally, DOJ’s Gang Unit  has assisted with the prosecution of MS-13 and 18th Street gang cases in  the United States. For example, in one location we contacted, the Gang  Unit assisted the local U.S. Attorney’s Office with the prosecution of a  gang case under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  The Gang Unit provided this assistance because, according to the U.S.  Attorney’s Office, the office did not have enough experienced attorneys  who were familiar with using the Act to prosecute gang members.
At the field level, federal law enforcement agencies utilize task forces to  coordinate their gang enforcement efforts. For example, the FBI’s Violent  Gang Safe Streets Task Forces coordinate with federal, state, and local law  enforcement to investigate all active gang threats, but have conducted  investigations on MS-13 and 18th Street gangs across the country. In  locations we contacted, including Omaha, Nebraska; Los Angeles,  California; and Charlotte, North Carolina, FBI task forces investigated MS- 13 gangs and determined that gang members in those locations were  communicating with gang members in El Salvador. Similar to the FBI’s  Violent Gang Safe Street Task Forces, ATF’s Violent Crime Impact Teams,  which partner ATF with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies  to reduce firearms-related violent crime including gang crime, may  investigate gangs with transnational connections in specific locations. For  example, in 2007 ATF led an investigation in Baltimore, Maryland,  involving MS-13 gang members who committed murder and robbery.  Through its task force, ATF coordinated this investigation with other  agencies including FBI, ICE, the United States Attorneys’ Office, local  police agencies, and the Salvadoran national police to investigate and  prosecute these gang members. In addition, through Operation  Community Shield, ICE works primarily with state and local law  enforcement agencies to investigate gangs whose members are foreign- born or in the United States illegally, or both, or have been involved in  crimes with a nexus to the U.S. borders.
section_title: Appendix V: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine to what extent the U.S. federal government has developed a  strategy to combat transnational gangs with connections to Central  America, we examined the interagency strategy, called the Strategy to  Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico  (the Strategy), and compared the contents of the Strategy to select criteria  in our prior work on desirable characteristics of an effective national  strategy, including (1) clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2)  discussion of problems, risks, and threats; (3) desired goals, objectives,  activities, and performance measures; and (4) delineation of roles and  responsibilities. In regard to the National Security Council (NSC), we  discussed its role in developing and implementing the Strategy with a mix  of the departments and agencies that participated in the NSC’s  International Organized Crime Policy Coordinating Committee (IOCPCC)  such as the Department of State (State), the Department of Justice (DOJ),  and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We also  examined the roles and activities of the various federal agencies under the  Strategy including DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),  State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of the Treasury  (Treasury), and USAID and their component agencies. To do this we  reviewed antigang program documents and interviewed officials from  DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, Treasury, and USAID in headquarters as well as  component agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  within DOJ and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within  DHS to obtain their views about the framework, including the different  categories, of the Strategy.
To determine how U.S. federal agencies have implemented programs to  carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs, coordinated these  programs, and assessed their results, we examined a mix of DOJ’s, DHS’s,  State’s, USAID’s, and their component agencies’ plans, performance data,  reports, and assessments for fiscal years 2006 through 2009. We compared  federal agencies’ efforts to coordinate and share information on their  transnational antigang programs to criteria in our prior work on effective  interagency collaboration and results-oriented government. To assess the  reliability of statistical information we obtained, such as data on program  performance and outcomes, we discussed the sources of the data with  agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of  data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report. In addition, we examined federal agencies’ funding  allocated to transnational antigang programs. In particular, we reviewed  agencies’ budget requests for fiscal years 2008 through 2010;  appropriations acts for DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID for those fiscal years;  and expenditure and other plans for the Mérida Initiative. To obtain  information on federal efforts to combat the gangs as well as the extent to  which the agencies coordinated their efforts with other agencies, we  interviewed a mix of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in  seven U.S. locations—Baltimore, Maryland; Charlotte, North Carolina;  Laredo and McAllen, Texas; Los Angeles, California; Nashville, Tennessee;  and Omaha, Nebraska—and U.S. federal, foreign, and three  nongovernmental agencies’ officials in El Salvador and Guatemala. To  understand the process of how ICE handles and removes gang members  who are in the United States illegally, we visited ICE’s South Texas  Detention Facility in Pearsall, Texas, and interviewed officials with ICE’s  Office of Detention and Removal Operations. We selected the U.S.  locations and El Salvador and Guatemala based on a mix of criteria that  included locations (1) along the U.S. borders, (2) where U.S. federal  agencies have implemented antigang programs, and (3) where federal law  enforcement agencies have conducted operations involving gangs with  connections to Central America. For our site visits to foreign locations, we  consulted with officials of federal agencies to identify in which foreign  locations their agencies had efforts underway. Of the countries in the  region, agency officials suggested we visit El Salvador and Guatemala  because more antigang initiatives were underway and further along as  compared to efforts in other countries. Given this, we selected these  countries to obtain more information on these efforts and evaluate the  effect they have had on the gang problem. We selected the South Texas  Detention Facility because it was the facility identified by ICE officials for  handling the most gang members awaiting removal. More specifically, in  the U.S. locations we interviewed officials from some of the following  federal agencies: the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and  Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); U.S.  Attorneys’ Office; ICE; and in Laredo, Texas, U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP). We also interviewed a mix of state and local law  enforcement officials in Charlotte, North Carolina; Los Angeles, California;  Nashville, Tennessee; and Omaha, Nebraska. In Guatemala and El  Salvador, we interviewed a mix of officials from the following federal  agencies: DOJ’s Office of International Affairs, FBI, DEA; ICE; State;  USAID; the State-sponsored International Law Enforcement Academy; and  DOD. We also interviewed a mix of officials from Salvadoran and  Guatemalan government agencies, including the countries’ national police  and the Salvadoran prosecutors’ office. We also observed some of the  activities related to USAID-sponsored prevention efforts in El Salvador  and Guatemala such as the youth centers and interviewed participants,  local government officials involved in the efforts, and members of the  community about their views and the effect of the programs. Additionally,  we interviewed officials from intergovernmental and nongovernmental  organizations such as the Organization of American States, Washington  Office on Latin America, the Central American Coalition for Prevention of  Youth Violence, the Centro de Formacion y Orientacion, and the Instituto  Universitario de Opinion Publica to obtain their perspectives on the gang  problem in Central America. We also interviewed officials from  contractors and companies such as Creative Associates International, Inc.,  and Pepsi Co. that have partnered with USAID or participated in USAID  efforts to establish gang prevention programs and provide employment  opportunities for ex-gang members in countries such as El Salvador and  Guatemala. The information we obtained from interviewing officials in the  U.S. and Central American locations cannot be generalized across all  locations in the United States or Central America. However, because we  selected these locations based on a variety of factors, they provided us  with an overview of the agencies’ antigang programs, examples of  coordination and measurements to assess results, and any challenges with  implementation of the programs.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through April 2010  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Justice
section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the United States Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant  Director; Heather Dowey; Sally Gilley; Mike Harmond; Chris Hatscher;  Michael Lenington; Amanda Miller; Janet Temko; and Adam Vogt made  significant contributions to this report.