Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response
Published: 2007-06-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a collaborative arrangement among member states that provides a legal framework for requesting resources. Working alongside federal players, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Guard Bureau, EMAC members deployed an unprecedented level of assistance in response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although EMAC played a critical role in our nation's response to these hurricanes, the magnitude of these events revealed limitations. GAO was asked to (1) examine how the use of EMAC has changed since its inception; (2) assess how well existing policies, procedures, and practices facilitate collaboration; and (3) evaluate the adequacy of the EMAC network's administrative capacity to achieve its mission. GAO examined documents and interviewed officials from 45 federal, state, and local agencies and offices.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since its inception in 1995, the EMAC network has grown significantly in size, volume, and the type of resources it provides. EMAC's membership has increased from a handful of states in 1995 to 52 states and territories today, and EMAC members have used the compact to obtain support for several types of disasters including hurricanes, floods, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The volume and variety of resources states have requested under EMAC have also grown significantly. For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, New York requested 26 support staff under EMAC to assist in emergency management operations; whereas, in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, approximately 66,000 personnel--about 46,500 National Guard and 19,500 civilian responders-- were deployed under EMAC from a wide variety of specialties, most of whom went to areas directly impacted by the storms. EMAC, along with its accompanying policies, procedures, and practices, enables its members to overcome differences to achieve a common mission--streamlining and expediting the delivery of resources among members during disasters. While these policies, procedures, and practices have worked well for smaller-scale deployments, they have not kept pace with the changing use of EMAC, sometimes resulting in confusion and deployment delays. The EMAC network has taken steps to address several of these challenges, but additional improvements can be made in a number of areas including clarifying roles and responsibilities of EMAC members and improving existing systems that track resources deployed under EMAC. In addition, a lack of sufficiently detailed federal standards and policies has led to some reimbursement delays and additional administrative burdens. While the EMAC network has developed a basic administrative capacity, opportunities exist for it to further build on and sustain these efforts. The EMAC network has adopted several good management practices, such as using after-action reports to learn from experiences and developing a 5-year strategic plan. However, the EMAC network can enhance its administrative capacity by improving how it plans, measures, and reports on its performance. FEMA provided $2 million to help build this capacity in 2003, but the agreement has recently expired. FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the process of finalizing a new 3-year cooperative agreement. Such an agreement would enhance the EMAC network's ability to support its collaborative efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita provide powerful examples of how  catastrophic events can overwhelm the capacity of individual states,  requiring them to rely on outside sources for assistance. Over the past 12  years, states affected by disasters such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita have  increasingly relied on the Emergency Management Assistance Compact  (EMAC) as a means to access resources from other states, including  emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first responders. For  example, approximately 66,000 personnel from 48 states, 2 territories, and  the District of Columbia deployed to the Gulf states in 2005 to assist in  response and recovery efforts—by far the largest example of state mutual  assistance to date. While this assistance was state to state, these resources  played a critical role in the nation’s overall disaster response efforts and  cost the federal government hundreds of millions of dollars.
EMAC establishes a structure for member states to request and deploy  assistance, reimburse states that provide assistance, and confer liability  and workers’ compensation protections. As your committee and others  have reported, EMAC enabled an unprecedented level of assistance in  2005 to be deployed to impacted areas in a timely and effective manner.  However, the magnitude of catastrophic events such as hurricanes Katrina  and Rita strained the EMAC process and revealed limitations in the system  to support operations. Responding to disasters involves many actors and  the inclusion of every level of government, as well as the network of  EMAC member states (EMAC network). As a result, effective  collaboration between these members, as well as between the EMAC  network and federal agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management  Agency (FEMA) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), is essential for  states to identify, request, deploy, and reimburse resources under EMAC.
You asked us to determine (1) the extent to which EMAC membership and  usage have changed since its inception in 1995; (2) the degree to which  existing policies, procedures, and practices facilitate collaboration among  EMAC’s members and between the EMAC network and certain federal  agencies; and (3) the extent to which the EMAC network has the  administrative capacity—the ability to provide adequate human capital,  financial, information technology, and other resources to support  operations—to build and sustain the collaborative effort to achieve its  mission.
To determine how EMAC membership and usage have changed, we  reviewed and analyzed membership data and available data detailing  previous activations of the EMAC process, including the volume and type  of resources deployed for each activation. To assess the reliability of the  data, we reviewed additional documents and conducted additional  interviews with local, state, and federal emergency management officials  for selected events captured by the database. In cases where the data were  inaccurate, we supplemented them with data from more reliable sources.  In addition, we selected past disasters for further analysis based on the  type, scale, and timing of the disasters. We interviewed past and present  leaders of the EMAC network and state officials who requested assistance  in previous disasters under EMAC. We also reviewed relevant guidance,  protocols, and law.
To determine the degree to which existing policies, procedures, and  practices facilitated collaboration, we analyzed civilian and military  guidance and laws that specified how the various players were to  coordinate, and we compared them to actual coordination during the  disasters. We also interviewed government officials at the state, local, and  federal levels. Our interviews included officials from 29 states, civilian and  National Guard responders, and EMAC leadership. In addition, we  interviewed officials from localities including Hancock and Harrison  counties, Mississippi, and New Orleans, Louisiana. To assess collaboration  between levels of government, we interviewed officials from FEMA, NGB,  and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, along with the state  and local officials previously mentioned. In assessing the nature and  extent of collaboration among EMAC members and between the EMAC  network and key federal players, we applied criteria we previously  developed regarding successful collaborative practices.
To determine the extent to which the EMAC network has the  administrative capacity to build and sustain the collaborative effort, we  interviewed EMAC leadership and officials from EMAC member states and  analyzed EMAC strategic planning documents and state, federal, and  EMAC after-action reports. For more information on our scope and  methodology, see appendix I. We conducted our work from June 2006  through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Interstate compacts are legal agreements between states that allow them  to act collectively to address issues that transcend state borders.  Interstate compacts that may affect the balance of power between states  and encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States must  have congressional consent. Since the late 1940s, states have entered into  interstate compacts to facilitate the sharing of resources across state lines  in response to disasters. In passing the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950,  Congress encouraged states to enter into interstate agreements that  provided a legal framework for mutual defense aid and disaster assistance.  By the early 1950s, virtually all states and other jurisdictions entered into  defense aid and disaster compacts. However, after years of minimal  financing and public support, the Federal Civil Defense Act did not play a  significant role in facilitating disaster response.
After Hurricane Andrew devastated southern Florida in 1992, Congress  enacted many of the repealed provisions of the Federal Civil Defense Act  into the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act  in 1994. Responding to similar concerns raised following Hurricane  Andrew, the Southern Governors’ Association created the Southern  Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact to enable member  states to provide mutual aid in managing any emergency or disaster that  had been designated as such by the governor of the impacted state. It also  provided for mutual emergency-related activities, testing, and training. In  1995, the Southern Governors’ Association opened membership to all U.S.  states and territories, revising the terms of the agreement and adopting the  new name, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).  Congress consented to the compact in 1996.
subsections: section_title: Member States Provide Governance for EMAC Network While NEMA Provides Administrative Support
paragraphs: EMAC is a mutual aid agreement among member states and is not a  government agency. Overall governance is provided by the EMAC  Committee, whose chair is selected annually by the President of the  National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). Day-to-day work  of the EMAC Committee is carried out by an EMAC Executive Task Force  whose members are elected by the EMAC membership. The Chair of the  EMAC Committee works with the Executive Task Force to develop  policies and issue guidance. NEMA provides administrative oversight for  the EMAC network. Since 2003, NEMA has assigned one person to serve as  the EMAC Coordinator—the only paid employee dedicated full time to  EMAC—as well as a part-time consultant who serves in the position of  EMAC Senior Advisor. Both of these positions have been funded through  a cooperative agreement between FEMA and NEMA to provide  administrative and management support for EMAC.
section_title: Process for Requesting and Providing Assistance under EMAC
paragraphs: EMAC operating protocols outline one process for member states to  request and provide assistance, whether these resources are civilian or  National Guard. The process describes how to request, provide, receive,  and reimburse assistance from other member states in response to a  disaster. Before resources can be deployed under EMAC, the governor of  an impacted state must first declare an emergency. Representatives from  the impacted state then contact EMAC leadership to inform them that  interstate assistance may be needed. If desired, the impacted—or  requesting—state can ask the EMAC leadership to send a team of  emergency management personnel to the state’s emergency operations  center to assist with subsequent resource requests under EMAC. The  requesting state can then request additional resources through the EMAC  network from other member states. These states—often referred to as  assisting states—work with the requesting state to identify resources  required and other details. Once both the requesting and assisting states  approve the final details, resources are deployed to the area of need. Once  the missions have been completed and resources have returned home, the  assisting states prepare formal requests for reimbursement, which are then  sent to, and processed by, the requesting state. Figure 1 provides a  summary of this process.
In cases when a disaster strikes multiple states, FEMA has a standing  agreement with NEMA to request a team of emergency managers to deploy  to its national or regional coordination centers to help coordinate EMAC  network and federal activities, as appropriate.
section_title: Impacted States Can Request Assistance From FEMA to Help Cover Eligible Costs for Missions Under EMAC
paragraphs: Although EMAC is an agreement between states, catastrophic disasters  can overwhelm the resources of an impacted state, requiring it to seek  assistance from the federal government. In the case of a presidentially  declared disaster, impacted states can work with FEMA to seek federal  financial assistance to cover costs associated with emergency response  efforts that may include eligible missions conducted under EMAC. In such  cases, the impacted state prepares project worksheets—a form used to  collect and document information on the scope and estimated cost for  public assistance projects—and submits them to FEMA for review. Once  approved, FEMA will obligate funds for the project to the impacted state,  which in turn reimburses the assisting state directly. As of June 2007,  Mississippi and Louisiana are in the process of seeking financial assistance  from FEMA to cover approximately $200 million for missions conducted  under EMAC.
section_title: NGB Is the Coordinator of National Guard Assets
paragraphs: The National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) mission is to participate with the  Army and Air Force staffs in the formulation, development, and  coordination of all programs, policies, concepts, and plans for the National  Guard. NGB has visibility of all National Guard assets and advises the  states on force availability to support all requirements. NGB serves as a  coordinator between the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and state  National Guard assets. This is achieved through coordinating with state  governors and adjutant generals. NGB also monitors and assists the states  in the organization, maintenance, and operation of their National Guard  units.
Another aspect of NGB’s coordination is working with other DOD  agencies as it carries out responsibilities to address domestic emergencies  assigned in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP). The  purpose of the NRP is to establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards  approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of  activities, including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. In  addition, it contains a catastrophic incident annex that establishes the  strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated proactive  national response to a catastrophic incident, including strategies to rapidly  provide key resources to augment state, local, and tribal response efforts  during a catastrophic event. The NRP also contains a catastrophic incident  supplement with a detailed execution schedule that lists steps that  agencies should take at specific times ranging from within 10 minutes of  the start of an incident time to within 96 hours after the incident occurs.  The purpose of this supplement is to accelerate the delivery of federal and  federally accessible resources and capabilities in support of a response to  a no-notice or short-notice catastrophic incident. These are incidents in  which the response capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction  (including mutual aid from surrounding jurisdictions) will be profoundly  insufficient and quickly overwhelmed.
section_title: EMAC’s Membership and Usage Have Grown Over Time to Include Different Types of Disasters and Responders
paragraphs: Since the inception of the EMAC in 1995, both the number of members and  the volume and types of resources requested have grown considerably.  States activated EMAC in response to a variety of emergencies, including  hurricanes; floods; wildfires; and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  In recent years, the volume and types of resources deployed under EMAC  have also increased. Resources deployed under EMAC represented a  substantial portion of overall out-of-state assistance deployed in response  to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
subsections: section_title: EMAC Membership Has Increased to 52
paragraphs: EMAC membership has grown from a handful of members in 1995 to 52  today. EMAC grew out of the Southern Regional Emergency Management  Assistance Compact, which was created in August 1993 by the Southern  Governors’ Association and the Virginia Department of Emergency  Services following Hurricane Andrew. When EMAC was formed in 1995,  membership consisted of 4 states: Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and  Virginia. Since that time, as figure 2 shows, EMAC membership has grown  to 49 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of  Columbia.
During this period, states have used EMAC in response to a variety of  emergency events, including natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other  disasters and emergencies. For example, the states activated the EMAC  process in response to disasters such as the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes;  tornadoes in Kansas and Kentucky; floods in West Virginia and New  Hampshire; wildfires in Texas and Nebraska; the September 11, 2001  terrorist attacks; and a variety of other disasters and emergencies, such as  the 2003 Rhode Island Nightclub Fire and the Space Shuttle Columbia  Disaster.
section_title: 2004 and 2005 Deployments Exceeded Prior Years
paragraphs: In 2004 and 2005, the number and types of deployments under EMAC  exceeded previous years’ deployments. Although deployment data for 1995  through 2004 are incomplete, EMAC leadership reported that deployments  were higher in 2004 than in previous years. Data compiled by the EMAC  network demonstrate that the total civilian and National Guard  deployments in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes were more  than 25 times the number of the deployments for the 2004 Florida  hurricanes. Figure 3 shows EMAC deployment data for some significant  disasters.
States have made larger requests for assistance under EMAC, and they  have requested a wider range of resources. According to EMAC  leadership, prior to 2004, states primarily requested emergency  management personnel to support their state emergency operations  centers. For example, of the estimated 40,000 people who responded to  the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York, New York officials  requested only 26 emergency management personnel under EMAC to  supplement state emergency management efforts. In 2004, Florida  requested a wider variety of resources from other states under EMAC than  had been requested in previous disasters. It requested first response  personnel, health professionals, logistics support, and emergency  management support for county emergency operations centers. In 2005,  Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, and Florida requested an even  greater variety of resources under EMAC, including 46,503 National Guard  personnel, 6,882 law enforcement responders, 2,825 fire and hazardous  materials responders, and 9,719 other responders, many of whom were  local government assets deployed directly to the impacted areas. Figure 4  shows the variety of civilian personnel deployed under EMAC for selected  significant disasters.
section_title: During the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, Resources Deployed under EMAC Represented a Substantial Percentage of Overall Out- of-State Response
paragraphs: Resources deployed under EMAC in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast  hurricanes constituted a substantial portion of overall out-of-state  response efforts. Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Louisiana and  Mississippi both relied heavily on support from other states to supplement  their own emergency response efforts. Although the exact number of  personnel deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi in response to Hurricane  Katrina is not known, data available on the response during the first 2  weeks clearly indicate that the share of personnel deployed under EMAC  represented a significantly larger share of personnel deployed from out of  state than from any other contributor, including states that are not  members of EMAC; the active component, military; FEMA; the U.S. Coast  Guard; and federal law enforcement. Figure 5 shows the distribution of  out-of-state personnel deployed to impacted states following Hurricane  Katrina.
section_title: EMAC Provides for Successful Collaboration, but Opportunities Exist for Improvement
paragraphs: EMAC, along with its accompanying policies, procedures, and practices,  provides for successful collaboration that enables its members to request  resources and provides timely assistance to states in need. However,  opportunities exist to enhance and sustain collaborative efforts within the  EMAC network and between the network and federal agencies and  nongovernmental organizations. Our previous work identified a number of  steps that can improve collaboration, including (1) clearly articulating  roles and responsibilities; (2) establishing clear, consistent, and  compatible standards; and (3) identifying opportunities to leverage and  share resources. While the compact itself and the policies and procedures  adopted by the EMAC network have clarified roles and responsibilities for  some key operations, coordination can be improved among EMAC  members to reduce confusion and delays when deploying resources.  EMAC members have also adopted protocols, standards, and systems that  work well for smaller-scale deployments, though gaps still exist with  regard to requesting resource needs, tracking resource requests, and  facilitating reimbursement following catastrophic disasters. Finally, some  members have developed practices that may provide models or insights to  other members to enhance their ability to leverage resources under EMAC.
subsections: section_title: EMAC Provides a Framework to Achieve a Common Mission
paragraphs: As we have previously found, to overcome differences in organizational  cultures and established ways of doing business, collaborating  organizations must have a clear and compelling rationale to work  together. This compelling rationale can be imposed through legislation or  other directives or can come from the organizations’ own perceptions of  the benefits they can obtain from working together. Collaborating  organizations must also work across organizational lines to define and  articulate a common outcome consistent with their respective goals.
EMAC provides a framework that helps its members to overcome  differences in missions, organizational cultures, and established ways of  doing business in order to achieve a common outcome—streamlining and  expediting the delivery of resources among members during emergencies.  Each member must enact identical legislation to that of the EMAC  legislation passed by Congress in 1996, ensuring that member states’ goals  are aligned with the goals outlined in the compact. The EMAC language  sets the foundation for members to provide mutual assistance in a disaster  or emergency, regardless whether it is a natural disaster or a man-made  disaster, such as technological hazard, civil emergency, community  disorder, or enemy attack. In addition, the compact language:    outlines responsibilities for the members to formulate procedural plans  and programs for interstate cooperation through EMAC;    affords personnel from assisting states the same duties, rights, and  privileges afforded to similar personnel within the requesting state (except  for the power of arrest);    accepts licenses, certificates, or other permits for skills requested;    provides liability protection to responders from assisting states as agents  of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes;  requires that assisting states provide workers’ compensation for resources  deployed from their states; and    calls for the reimbursement of services rendered through EMAC.
By streamlining legal and other administrative requirements associated  with sharing resources across state lines, EMAC enables states to more  quickly provide emergency assistance in times of disaster than if these  states worked outside of EMAC to seek and provide assistance. For  example, although New York was not a member of EMAC prior to the  September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it joined shortly thereafter. New York  officials stated that they expedited the arrival of the supplemental  assistance by requesting assistance from EMAC members.
section_title: The Lack of Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities in Some Areas Limits EMAC’s Effectiveness
paragraphs: While the compact and its accompanying protocols establish roles and  responsibilities that have worked well for smaller-scale deployments, they  have not kept pace with the growing use of EMAC, sometimes resulting in  delays and limiting EMAC’s overall effectiveness. Our previous work has  shown that defining roles and responsibilities among collaborating  organizations both enhances and sustains collaboration. In doing so,  organizations clarify who will do what, thereby better organizing both joint  and individual efforts and facilitating decision making. In 2004 and 2005,  the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities with regard to  receiving and integrating resources deployed under EMAC resulted in  delays and confusion. During this same period, the EMAC network and  NGB experienced challenges in effectively coordinating, though they have  since made improvements.
subsections: section_title: A Lack of Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities in Some Areas Led to Delays and Confusion
paragraphs: The EMAC network delineates roles and responsibilities for requesting  states to receive and integrate emergency management personnel  deployed under EMAC through its protocols into states’ emergency  operations centers. For example, the EMAC Operations Manual  recommends that requesting states provide workstations, equipment, and  technology for emergency managers deployed to their states’ emergency  operations centers and that these resources be integrated into their states’  emergency operations centers’ organizational charts.
However, the roles and responsibilities of member states have not kept  pace with the changing use of EMAC. While roles and responsibilities do  exist for member states to receive and integrate emergency management  personnel into state emergency operations centers, similar guidelines do  not exist to define the roles and responsibilities of requesting states  regarding how to receive and integrate first responders deployed under  EMAC into impacted areas, leading to confusion and delays—this is  especially important since most of the resources deployed under EMAC in  2004 and 2005 were deployed to areas outside state emergency operations  centers. This, in turn, affected the overall ability of resources deployed  under EMAC to provide the necessary assistance in response to the 2004  Florida hurricanes and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
During the response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, state officials  managing response efforts on the ground were sometimes unaware of  general EMAC policies and unprepared to receive or integrate resources  deployed under EMAC into impacted areas. For example, although  resources deployed under EMAC do not require additional certification to  practice their respective professions in the impacted state, confusion  arose when an emergency medical response team deployed, because  Mississippi state health officials required the medical team to complete  supplemental medical licensure applications. In addition, Florida health  officials told us that they were initially not prepared to receive or integrate  resources deployed under EMAC in response to the 2004 Florida  hurricanes, causing some confusion and delaying deployments. Learning  from their experiences in 2004, Florida officials stated that they resolved  these shortcomings and had policies and procedures in place to receive  and integrate out-of-state resources when Hurricane Katrina was  approaching Florida in 2005.
Local officials we spoke with responsible for receiving and integrating  resources deployed under EMAC—and many state and local responders  who interacted with local officials responsible for receiving and  integrating resources deployed under EMAC—stated that they had limited  or no knowledge of what EMAC was or how it functioned, were not aware  that resources had been requested or deployed to assist them, and did not  have plans for how to employ these resources once they arrived. For  example, local officials from counties in southern Mississippi told us they  were unaware that emergency response teams from Florida or New York  were deployed and were not sure how to employ their assistance. As a  result, rather than providing immediate assistance at full capacity, the  emergency response teams spent critical time briefing local officials on  basic EMAC processes and emergency procedures. In other  circumstances, resources that were deployed to impacted areas  experienced challenges in locating points of contact and integrating into  local command structures. For example, a South Carolina National Guard  Unit deployed under EMAC told us that it “wasted valuable time” waiting  for mission assignments from local authorities following Hurricane  Katrina.
EMAC leadership has taken steps in the past year to address the lack of  clarity regarding roles and responsibilities of states receiving and  integrating assistance. These include updating the EMAC Operations  Manual to include specific language suggesting the need for members to  establish procedures for requesting and receiving assistance. EMAC  leadership has also taken steps to address EMAC knowledge gaps among  state and local officials by creating an ad hoc task force to evaluate and  improve training materials available to member states, such as a brochure  to help personnel deployed under EMAC understand basic EMAC  protocols. However, the EMAC network has not developed as clear  guidance for receiving and integrating resources into impacted areas as it  has for receiving and integrating emergency managers into state  emergency operations centers.
section_title: The EMAC Network and NGB Have Improved Coordination in Response to Challenges Raised in 2005
paragraphs: In 2005, the EMAC network and NGB experienced coordination  challenges. Although both the EMAC network and NGB facilitate the  sharing of resources across state lines, they had limited visibility into each  others’ systems for initiating and fulfilling requests. For example,  emergency management officials responsible for coordinating requests for  assistance under EMAC in the first 3 weeks after Hurricane Katrina made  landfall stated that they were frequently unaware of National Guard  deployments under EMAC until after the resources had already returned  to their home states. In addition, NGB officials responsible for  coordinating deployments of National Guard resources stated that they  were unaware of requests for assistance made through EMAC.
Learning from these challenges, the EMAC network and NGB have begun  to work together to develop a better understanding of their mutual roles  and responsibilities, as well as how they can collaborate to achieve an  outcome that benefits their respective missions. For example, to improve  coordination between the EMAC network and key partners such as NGB,  EMAC leadership created the EMAC Advisory Group in 2006. NGB, along  with other advisory group members, has recently been granted access to  view reports on requests and deployments under EMAC during a disaster.
section_title: Gaps in EMAC and Federal Policies, Standards, and Systems Have Contributed to Delays and Confusion
paragraphs: We previously reported that collaborating organizations need to address  the compatibility of standards, policies, procedures, and data systems in  their efforts to facilitate working across boundaries and prevent  misunderstanding. While the EMAC network has developed protocols,  standards, and systems that have generally worked well for smaller-scale  deployments, gaps emerged with the rapid growth in the number and types  of resources deployed under EMAC. In addition, gaps in federal guidance  and protocols resulted in administrative burdens and reimbursement  delays. We identified challenges in five areas: (1) gaps in EMAC protocols  with regard to communicating resource needs sometimes yielded  deployment delays and confusion among requesting state officials and  resource providers; (2) the lack of a comprehensive system to support the  tracking of resource requests from initial offers of assistance through  mission completion in 2005 caused delays, duplications of effort, and  frustration; (3) existing reimbursement standards are not designed to  facilitate timely reimbursement following catastrophic disasters; (4) the  lack of federal guidance to obtain advance funding resulted in delaying  some state-to-state reimbursements under EMAC; and (5) deployment of  National Guard troops under two different authorities resulted in delays in  reimbursement and additional administrative burdens.
subsections: section_title: EMAC Network Has Developed Standards for Communicating Mission Requirements, but Gaps Remain
paragraphs: To facilitate collaboration in times of a disaster, the EMAC network has  established standard processes and systems regarding how its members  request resources through EMAC. EMAC processes enable members to  solicit assistance through the use of standardized e-mail requests which  are broadcast to everyone in the network, or directly from a specific  member either in writing or verbally. When an assisting state responds to a  request for assistance, the requesting and assisting states communicate  back and forth to negotiate mission details: (1) officials from the  requesting state approve, sign, and fax the request to an assisting state; (2)  officials from the assisting state provide details on the assistance they  intend to provide, sign the request, and fax it back to the requesting state;  and (3) once the agreement is finalized, requesting state officials approve,  sign, and fax the finalized request for assistance back to the assisting state.
Although the EMAC network has developed these basic processes, gaps in  some areas have led to confusion and delays among member states  regarding the effective communication of resource needs when  responding to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. For example, emergency  managers deployed under EMAC to Louisiana told us that they received  repeated requests simply for “search and rescue” teams and that these  initial requests did not initially contain sufficient detail regarding the type  of skills and equipment needed to carry out the particular operation that  was needed. Search and rescue missions can vary significantly—one type  of mission might require an aerial search and rescue team, while another  might require a canine search and rescue team. Therefore, identifying and  then clearly communicating the specific skills and equipment required is  critical. According to these officials, requests that initially omitted critical  mission details had to be clarified, causing delays in resource deployments  of up to 3 or more days as requesting and assisting state officials went  back and forth to clarify these details.
A second shortcoming in how requests were communicated during the  2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes was that requesting states did not provide  sufficient details regarding conditions at the locations to which resources  were deployed. This led to teams arriving in the area of operations without  necessary support for responders. For example, the first firefighters  deployed to New Orleans under EMAC were given incorrect information  regarding the availability of food supplies and housing. Accordingly, these  firefighters were told they would receive transportation, food, and lodging  when they arrived. However, once they arrived at the initial staging area,  they quickly realized that they were not going to receive any of these  resources. As a result, they were delayed at the initial staging area until  they located necessary supplies on their own.
Responding to concerns raised regarding the clarity of resource requests,  the EMAC network has taken several steps to improve its processes and  systems. For example, the EMAC network has adopted changes to the  EMAC Operations Manual that require requesting states to include  additional details such as the type of resources requested, specifying the  particular skills, abilities, or equipment needed. EMAC leadership updated  the basic form used to request assistance so that it now includes additional  mission details, such as the severity of conditions within the area of  operations. EMAC leadership is currently transitioning part of the process  to an online format with templates, pull-down menus, and other tools to  help further specify mission details and improve the consistency of  language used in the request process. The new version of the form to  request assistance more effectively captures personnel deployment  considerations (e.g., recommended immunizations), but it does not  capture equipment considerations (e.g., fuel supplies, maintenance  provisions, and ownership of equipment purchased for the activation).
section_title: Lack of Comprehensive System to Track Resource Requests through Mission Completion
paragraphs: The EMAC network does not have a comprehensive system in place to  support the tracking of resources from initial offers of assistance through  mission completion. Data systems in place to track resource requests and  deployments when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005 did not  provide efficient tracking of resources deployed under EMAC. In addition,  requesting states maintained duplicate and ad hoc systems for tracking  resource requests and deployments. For example, when responding to the  2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes emergency management support personnel  responsible for facilitating requests for assistance recorded the same  mission-related information in two separate systems: an EMAC system  that cataloged all resource requests and a state-specific spreadsheet to  track resource requests solely for that individual state. In 2005, the EMAC  network itself found that these separate systems were often not aligned  with each other and required emergency managers to manually reenter  data into the EMAC system.
Immediate access to these data systems was not given to personnel  deployed to state operations centers to facilitate requests under EMAC,  causing some to create ad hoc systems for tracking requests. In addition,  emergency managers deployed to state emergency operations centers to  facilitate requests under EMAC in the first weeks of the Hurricane Katrina  response efforts told us that they maintained duplicative systems to track  these requests, including using Post-ItsTM and notepads. Emergency  management officials responsible for coordinating assistance provided  under EMAC with other efforts at the federal level did not have accurate  information. In addition, there are no mechanisms in place to ensure that  data electronically cataloged by the EMAC network are complete or  accurate; of the 57 events for which the EMAC process was activated since  1995, the EMAC network has incomplete information for 72 percent of  these events. As a result, aggregate data used to report on activities  conducted by the EMAC network may not accurately reflect the number of  deployments, personnel deployed, or estimated costs of resources  deployed under EMAC.
Officials from assisting states also expressed frustration at not knowing  whether their offers for assistance had been accepted or rejected. For  example, after responding to a broadcast message to EMAC members for  assistance in responding to Hurricane Katrina, emergency management  officials from two states said that they sometimes had to wait several days  before finding out whether their offers to assist were ultimately accepted.  During this period, both states continued to ready their resources for  deployment although it had turned out that their offers to assist were not  selected by the requesting state. Because these officials were not informed  in a timely manner that they were not selected to provide assistance on  these missions, they incurred additional, nonreimbursable costs. As a  result, these officials stated that they were less likely to mobilize resources  in advance of a finalized agreement—resulting in additional time to deploy  once an agreement was reached. In addition, some state officials stated  they were less likely to deploy resources under EMAC in the future as a  result of this lack of communication.
Recognizing the need for a more coordinated data system, EMAC  leadership has taken steps to link requests for assistance with its existing  resource tracking system. EMAC leadership stated that by migrating part  of the request process online, they hope to reduce steps and simplify the  EMAC network’s abilities to capture initial requests electronically.  However, progress remains to be made in developing an integrated system  that incorporates EMAC mission details into the existing resource tracking  system.
section_title: Reimbursement Processes Are Not Designed for Large-Scale Deployments
paragraphs: The EMAC network developed a process for establishing basic standards  and procedures for how states request and make reimbursements. While  these standards and procedures worked sufficiently for smaller-scale  deployments, shortcomings emerged when they were applied to larger- scale deployments in response to catastrophic disasters. These  reimbursement delays caused some assisting states and localities to forgo  or delay expenditures for equipment and other critical purchases. In some  cases, these delays have caused states and localities to reconsider whether  they would provide assistance through EMAC in the future. Following the  2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the EMAC network has taken steps to address  some of the concerns associated with the reimbursement process and  standards.
To facilitate reimbursement between states following a disaster, the EMAC  network developed a process for establishing basic standards and  procedures for how states request and award reimbursements. While  EMAC leadership and state emergency managers stated that this process  has worked reasonably well for smaller-scale deployments, EMAC  members encountered significant challenges with it during the large-scale  deployments in response to the Florida hurricanes of 2004 and the Gulf  Coast hurricanes of 2005. For example, although EMAC standards in effect  during these events required that disbursement of funds be made within 30  days after a mission ended, it took considerably longer to actually do so.  Specifically, assisting states were not completely reimbursed until 10  months after the conclusion of their missions following the 2004  hurricanes, and according to the latest data from provided to us by  Louisiana and Mississippi, 57 percent, or about $119 million, remains  outstanding for missions completed in Mississippi and Louisiana following  the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
One of the causes of these delays is the lack of awareness among EMAC  members regarding recordkeeping requirements and how to process  reimbursement packages. For example, while EMAC protocols state that  the requesting state is obligated to reimburse assisting states for approved  missions deployed under EMAC, assisting states must first file  reimbursement packages with the requesting state documenting their  expenses and providing supporting documentation. After the 2005 Gulf  Coast hurricanes, the lack of awareness of this requirement on the part of  several assisting states resulted in additional burdens for requesting states.  In July 2006, Louisiana officials sent letters to 37 assisting states that had  not yet submitted reimbursement packages with the state—11 months  after Hurricane Katrina. In addition, assisting states were not always fully  aware of the documentation required to support deployment activities. For  example, officials from one state told us that they were not aware that  under EMAC protocols they were expected to complete a predeployment  inventory of all equipment and personnel taken into the impacted area. As  a result, these officials encountered reimbursement challenges because  the state could not document equipment lost during its response to the  2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Reimbursement was further complicated by the lack of consistent  understanding as to what is considered reasonably reimbursable  according to criteria outlined in the EMAC Operations Manual. While  EMAC protocols detailing reimbursement guidelines did identify a number  of broad eligible costs—personnel costs, travel costs, equipment costs,  contractual costs, commodities, and other expenses—they did not provide  any standards for how states were to determine what types of costs under  these broad categories were considered reasonable.
The delays in reimbursing assisting state and local agencies in turn  delayed or eliminated planned expenditures to cover budgetary shortfalls.  For example, officials with the Virginia State Police told us that delays in  receiving reimbursement for $1.8 million in assistance they provided in  response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes forced them to delay or cancel  the maintenance and purchase of critical equipment and supplies, such as  ammunition, uniforms, and office supplies. Additionally, state and local  officials told us that these reimbursement delays have caused them to  reconsider the level of assistance they would be willing to provide through  EMAC in the future.
Following the 2005 hurricane season, the EMAC network has taken steps  to address some of these reimbursement concerns. For example, the  EMAC network recently updated the EMAC Operations Manual to  incorporate additional specificity on the types of costs eligible and not  eligible for reimbursement. The manual also contains new flexibilities,  including the elimination of the 30-day reimbursement requirement and  the option for an assisting state to delay paying actual service providers,  such as state agencies and local governments, until it first receives funds  to cover these expenses from the requesting state.
section_title: Lack of Federal Guidance Delayed Some State-to-State Reimbursements under EMAC
paragraphs: Although EMAC is an agreement between states, the involvement of the  federal government following presidentially declared disasters can affect  state-to-state reimbursements. Under EMAC, requesting states are  obligated to reimburse assisting states for missions performed under the  compact. However, catastrophic disasters can overwhelm the resources of  an impacted state, requiring it to seek financial assistance. While the  EMAC reimbursement process is intended to be independent of any efforts  by a requesting state to seek federal assistance, the federal government,  through FEMA, can offer funding for eligible response efforts following a  presidentially declared disaster. In such circumstances, a requesting state  works with FEMA to obtain financial assistance for eligible missions.   Once it receives this assistance, a requesting state can then reimburse  assisting states for missions performed under EMAC.
Shortly after a presidentially declared disaster occurs, impacted states can  work with FEMA to seek financial assistance while response and recovery  efforts are under way to help cover anticipated costs. In 2004, in an effort  to expedite the reimbursement of localities that responded to the 2004  Florida hurricanes, FEMA developed a process for impacted states to  request and receive advance funding based on disaster estimates included  in an expedited project worksheet. Unlike standard project worksheets,  expedited project worksheets require less specificity as to how funding  should be spent, so long as the expedited project worksheets are  reconciled against actual, authorized spending at a later point. These funds  could be used to reimburse assisting states for responses provided under  EMAC or cover other anticipated costs. According to a senior FEMA  official for the Public Assistance Program, guidance on how to seek  expedited project worksheets does not exist. In 2005, neither Louisiana  officials nor Mississippi officials were aware that such payments existed.  According to Louisiana officials, FEMA officials suggested that they obtain  advance funding of $70 million to alleviate response and recovery costs— including assistance provided under EMAC. These officials added that this  advanced funding enabled them to reimburse assisting states in the  amount of almost $25 million, or slightly more than half of all  reimbursements Louisiana provided to assisting states for missions  conducted under EMAC in response to Hurricane Katrina. In contrast,  Mississippi officials stated that they were not aware that expedited project  worksheets could be used to cover eligible EMAC-related costs.  Accordingly, they did not pursue the same opportunity, and as a result,  Mississippi has only been able to pay 38 percent of the $113 million for  missions provided under EMAC.
section_title: Deployment of National Guard Troops under Two Different Authorities Resulted in Delays in Reimbursement and Additional Administrative Burdens
paragraphs: During Hurricane Katrina, National Guard troops provided assistance in  their State Active Duty status as well as in Title 32 status, and the EMAC  process was used for the deployment of National Guard resources. When  units operate in State Active Duty status, they are under the command and  control of the assisting state’s governor and missions are funded by the  state. When units are in Title 32 status, units remain under the command  and control of the governor and continue to deploy under EMAC, but their  missions are federally funded. Under EMAC, the governor of the assisting  state delegates operational control to the emergency services authorities  of the state receiving assistance. If deemed appropriate, the Secretary of  Defense can approve federal funding of National Guard troops under Title  32.
The first National Guard units that responded after Hurricane Katrina  deployed under State Active Duty status. Then, on September 7, 2005—9  days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana—the Deputy  Secretary of Defense authorized the use of DOD funding for National  Guard troops through Title 32, retroactive to August 29, 2005; all but two  states elected to do so.
While both requesting and assisting states were faced with administrative  burdens and costs as they transitioned from State Active Duty status to  Title 32 status, National Guard units deployed in State Active Duty status  had more administrative requirements than those deployed in Title 32  status. Units that remained in State Active Duty status were required by  EMAC procedures and their state emergency operations plans or other  guidance to maintain cost-supporting documentation throughout their  deployment, which was later used for reimbursement purposes. Following  the disaster, states that deployed National Guard units in State Active Duty  status submitted this documentation to the requesting state to obtain  reimbursement, negotiating the final amount of the reimbursement with  the requesting state. The requesting state, in turn, sought federal  reimbursement through the Public Assistance Program at FEMA.
In contrast, states that deployed their units under EMAC in Title 32 status  were not required to seek reimbursement from the requesting state  directly, but were reimbursed by DOD. In Title 32 status, expenses are  directly tracked against a funding-site code assigned by DOD, which  enables direct payroll payment. Also, a record of equipment and  maintenance costs is kept for reimbursement through charges against the  funding-site code.
Use of Title 32 status in response to Hurricane Katrina reduced the  administrative burdens on both the requesting and the assisting states,  eliminated the need for requesting states to fund National Guard  assistance from outside their states, and reduced the time assisting states  had to wait to be reimbursed. Iowa’s and South Carolina’s experience  during the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes illustrates the difference between  keeping a responding state’s National Guard units in State Active Duty  status and switching to Title 32 status. For those units deployed in State  Active Duty status, Iowa was required to follow standard EMAC processes  for seeking reimbursement as opposed to being directly reimbursed for  missions performed in Title 32 status. It took until October 2006 for Iowa  to be reimbursed for a water purification unit that Iowa’s National Guard  sent to Mississippi while in State Active Duty status in September 2005—9  months from the time the mission was completed. South Carolina National  Guard troops performed a similar mission in Title 32 status, and the state  was reimbursed within a month.
In addition, switching from State Active Duty status to Title 32 status has  associated administrative costs. For example, one state recorded an  estimated $87,000 in administrative costs for National Guard personnel  and material expenses for making such a switch. Some of these costs were  derived from rescinding State Active Duty orders; backing out of state  payroll systems; performing audits to ensure that all data were adjusted  appropriately; correcting faults discovered; compiling, reviewing, and  transmitting troop personnel information for state processing; publishing  Title 32 status orders; and estimating payroll expenses and equipment use  costs.
Following Hurricane Katrina, many reviews of lessons learned focused on  the failure of the federal government to implement the Catastrophic  Incident Annex and Supplement of the NRP, which could have rapidly  provided critical resources to assist and augment state and local response  efforts. However, even if the Catastrophic Incident Supplement had been  implemented, the decision to authorize the use of Title 32 might not have  come any sooner, because the supplement’s execution schedule does not  specify a time at which DOD should consider whether it is appropriate to  authorize the use of Title 32 funding for National Guard response efforts  during an incident.
section_title: States Can Enhance Their Ability to Identify and Request Assistance under EMAC
paragraphs: Some states have developed practices that may provide models or insights  to other members to enhance their ability to leverage resources under  EMAC—including legislation and planning efforts—providing additional  benefits that would not be otherwise available. We have previously  reported that organizations that effectively collaborate look for  opportunities to address resource needs by leveraging each others’  resources, obtaining benefits that would not be available if they were  working separately. To this end, states have found ways to leverage  resources, including: (1) substantially broadening the resource pool from  which they can draw through intrastate mutual aid and other similar  agreements and (2) proactively considering how resources deployed under  EMAC might be able to fill in-state resource gaps. At the same time, states  have identified other scenarios where they will not likely be able to turn to  the EMAC network for assistance, such as an influenza pandemic.
subsections: section_title: The Use of Intrastate Mutual Aid and Similar Agreements Can Broaden the Available Resources Deployed under EMAC
paragraphs: In addition to seeking and providing state-level resources deployed under  EMAC, such as the National Guard, states are able to supplement these  state-level resources with local and county resources through intrastate  mutual aid and similar agreements. Intrastate mutual aid agreements  create a system for mutual aid between participating state counties,  parishes, or other political subdivisions in the prevention of, response to,  and recovery from any disaster that results in a formal state of emergency.  Firefighting, police, and medical personnel and equipment are examples of  emergency response assets that can be leveraged within a state using such  agreements. Through intrastate mutual aid, the types and volume of  resources available under EMAC are substantially greater than those  resources available solely at the state level. For example, in response to  Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Illinois, New York, and Texas were able to  deploy 1,663 local fire and hazardous materials response personnel and  supporting equipment to Louisiana under EMAC—something that would  likely not have been possible without these types of mutual aid.
Thirty-eight states have intrastate mutual or similar agreements in place  that enable states to leverage local resources under EMAC. However, only  16 EMAC members have instituted intrastate mutual aid agreements that  can also leverage private sector resources and 22 can deploy volunteer  resources. For example, Indiana’s intrastate mutual aid agreement  includes a provision to call on state and private sector health professionals  throughout the state. When this provision is applied, as in response to  Hurricane Katrina deployment to Mississippi, through the Indiana  Governor’s Executive Order, the private sector personnel become  temporary employees of the state’s Department of Homeland Security. In  this status, they are eligible to be deployed as a state asset under EMAC  with all rights and licensing recognition afforded permanent state  employees under that compact. Figure 6 shows which states are able to  deploy private sector resources, volunteer resources, or both.
Some states have begun to plan for how interstate resources deployed  under EMAC can supplement in-state resources, thereby improving their  ability to respond to a disaster more quickly and effectively. For example,  the Florida National Guard has a standing Memorandum of Understanding  with North Carolina for the use of C-130 aircraft for medical evacuation of  patients from the Florida Keys if required during a disaster. By having this  agreement in place, Florida is able to bypass the need to solicit assistance  across the EMAC network and reduce the time it would otherwise take to  negotiate mission details.
Other states have also developed prescripted EMAC missions to fill in- state resource gaps. Louisiana, learning from its experiences during the  2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, has been working with neighboring states to  identify resources that can fill gaps identified through in-state planning  efforts. For example, according to Louisiana National Guard officials, they  have developed agreements to request security personnel from Arkansas  and commodity distribution support from Oklahoma. These agreements  include such details as: (1) mission description, (2) number of personnel  required, (3) approximate length of deployment, (4) arrival location,   (5) support/equipment requirements, (6) self-sustaining period (7) lodging  arrangements, and (8) on-site point of contact information.
In addition, as states are more likely to turn to EMAC to fill in-state  resource gaps caused by competing deployments related to national  missions, such as missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, NGB is beginning to  encourage the prescripting of National Guard assets for emergency  response missions across several states. For example, officials from the  Florida and South Carolina National Guards told us that deployments in  support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and  Operation Jump Start have reduced their availability of in-state emergency  assets required for responding to disasters. These officials, citing similar  and pending deployments that may diminish their emergency response  capacity, stated that they expect an increased reliance on interstate  assistance provided under EMAC as a result of such deployments.
While some states have identified situations where they will use EMAC to  supplement in-state resources, others have identified scenarios where they  were unlikely to do so. For example, EMAC leadership and emergency  managers from several states we spoke with cited three reasons why they  believe EMAC would not work well for an influenza pandemic. First, the  officials stated that they would be reluctant to send personnel into a  contaminated area. Second, the officials expressed their concern that  resources would not be available should the pandemic spread to their  respective states. Third, since EMAC member states are not required to  provide assistance under EMAC and states cannot compel emergency  response personnel to participate in any disaster response, these officials  believe that emergency personnel would be reluctant to volunteer to  respond to a pandemic event in another state.
section_title: EMAC Network Has Developed a Basic Administrative Capacity, but Opportunities Exist to Further Support Its Mission
paragraphs: The EMAC network has begun to develop a basic administrative capacity  to support its operations; however, improvements in how it plans, tracks,  and reports on its performance, along with a consistent source of funding,  would help the network achieve its mission. Although the EMAC network  has adopted several good management practices, such as using a  structured approach to learn from past deployments and developing a 5- year strategic plan, opportunities exist to further enhance these efforts by  considering the experience of leading organizations in results-oriented  performance measurement. In addition, the EMAC network and FEMA  entered into a cooperative agreement that provided some federal funding  to help build the EMAC network’s administrative capacity, but this  agreement has recently expired. The EMAC network’s ability to provide  the adequate human capital, information technology, and other  infrastructure required to support the collaborative efforts is likely to be  affected by this loss of funds.
subsections: section_title: EMAC Network Has Recently Begun to Develop a Basic Administrative Capacity to Support the Collaborative Effort
paragraphs: The EMAC network has recently taken steps to develop a basic  administrative capacity to support the sharing of resources between  member states. Prior to 2003, the EMAC network’s administrative  capacity—that is, its ability to provide adequate human capital, financial  resources, and information technology to support its operations—was  very limited and was confined to situations when the EMAC process was  activated in response to a disaster. Under such conditions, emergency  managers from states whose members were serving in EMAC senior  leadership posts would temporarily take on the responsibility of  facilitating requests for assistance between member states, processing  paperwork, and answering questions. There was no dedicated  administrative support available to support routine activities, such as  training, or to maintain regular coordination between the EMAC network  and key federal players.
In 2003, the EMAC network, working through NEMA, entered into a  cooperative agreement with FEMA that enabled it to hire a full-time staff  member to serve as EMAC Coordinator. Among other things, this  individual was tasked with supporting the development of training for  responders deploying under EMAC and creating an information  technology system that would capture mission-level information for each  disaster for which EMAC was activated. In addition, these funds were used  to support other capacity-building activities, including the holding of after- action reviews to capture lessons learned as well as the development of  the EMAC network’s first strategic plan and operations manual.
section_title: EMAC Has Some Planning Mechanisms in Place but Would Benefit from More Specific Objectives and Appropriate Performance Measures
paragraphs: Over the last several years, EMAC leadership has taken steps to adopt a  more systematic and rigorous approach to learning from its past  experiences and planning for the future. These include using after-action  reports following major events to identify ways in which the operation of  the network might be improved and developing a strategic plan to help  ensure that the activities and limited resources of the EMAC network are  contributing to achieve its mission. We have previously reported that a  structured, deliberate approach toward planning that includes long-term  goals clearly linked to specific objectives and appropriate performance  measures can provide a useful tool in helping organizations achieve their  missions.
In 2004 and 2005, the EMAC network conducted the first two of what it  expects to be a series of after-action reviews to analyze its performance  and identify areas where it performed well and issues needing  improvement. As part of this process, the EMAC network contracted with  an outside firm to conduct focus groups of operations and management  personnel who either facilitated requests for assistance on behalf of EMAC  member states or first responders who responded to requests for  assistance. Federal officials from FEMA and NGB also participated in  these sessions. In addition, the outside firm analyzed data from EMAC  databases that cataloged requests for assistance and validated its research  with EMAC leadership. Information from these reports was widely  disseminated among EMAC members and also provided the foundation for  several objectives and tasks contained in the EMAC Strategic Plan.
In 2005, EMAC developed its first 5-year strategic plan to more clearly  identify goals and objectives that would assist it in achieving its mission of  “facilitating the efficient and effective sharing of resources between  member states during times of disaster or emergency.” The plan, which  was updated in 2006, identifies four broad goals: (1) provide leadership on  mutual aid issues, (2) sustain and enhance mutual aid capabilities,   (3) promote mutual aid and strengthen relationships, and (4) align EMAC  capabilities with nationwide preparedness and response priorities. Under  each of these goals is a series of supporting objectives and still more  specific tasks.
This plan represents a significant and positive first step; however, there  are several areas where future efforts could be improved, particularly in  the way the plan measures and reports on performance. We have  previously reported on several key characteristics of effective plans,  including performance measures. Performance plans that include precise  and measurable objectives for resolving mission-critical management  problems are important to ensuring that organizations have the capacity to  achieve results-oriented programmatic goals. Appropriate performance  measures, along with accompanying targets, are important tools to enable  internal and external stakeholders to effectively track the progress the  organization is making toward achieving its goals and objectives. To this  end, organizations may use a variety of performance measures—output,  efficiency, customer service, quality, and outcome—each of which focuses  on a different aspect of performance.
The EMAC leadership stated that they have informal mechanisms that  assess targets for achieving objectives, such as regular status meetings.  However, they do not have a formal implementation or action plan that  operationalizes the goals and objectives outlined in the strategic plan. In  the absence of such a plan, EMAC’s current strategic plan contains no  quantifiable measures or targets for its many goals and objectives. For  example, EMAC’s strategic plan calls for the development of a  comprehensive training program, listing seven key tasks including  evaluating training needs and developing training modules. However, the  plan does not provide milestones for these activities or any performance  measures for assessing whether these activities are in fact having their  intended impact.
The lack of clear and formal performance measures is compounded by the  regular rotation of senior leadership within the EMAC network. As we  have previously reported, sustained focus and direction from top  management is a key component of effective management. Management  control requires that organizations consider the effect upon their  operations if key leadership is expected to leave and then establish criteria  for a retention or mitigation strategy. Each year, the Chair of the Executive  Task Force, responsible for the day-to-day management of EMAC,  changes. EMAC has reduced some of the challenges that may be  associated with such regular transitions by requiring that each new chair  of the Executive Task Force first serve in an observational role for 1 year  before becoming the chair and then serve as a mentor to the incoming  chair following a 1-year term. However, because the leadership changes  annually and there are no formal performance measures to determine  whether goals and objectives are being achieved, it may be difficult to  clearly assess whether the EMAC network is operating effectively and  efficiently. To alleviate potential challenges that may arise by the annual  rotation of its leadership, the EMAC network has recently begun  transitioning more management responsibilities to NEMA.
section_title: A Lack of Funding May Affect the EMAC Network’s Ability to Build and Sustain the Collaborative Effort
paragraphs: Since its inception, the EMAC network has received disparate funding to  sustain its administrative capacity. From 2000 through 2002, the EMAC  network received minimal financial support from its members through  voluntary annual contributions of approximately $1,000 per member. In  2003, FEMA and the EMAC network entered into a 3-year, $2 million  cooperative agreement to fund EMAC operations through May 31, 2007.  This cooperative agreement enabled the EMAC network to develop an  electronic system to collect, manage, and analyze the EMAC process;  coordinate with FEMA on efforts to develop standard resource  deployment packages; improve EMAC training initiatives; and hire one  staff member to coordinate EMAC network operations.
In October 2006, Congress for the first time specifically authorized FEMA  to obligate up to $4 million in grants in fiscal year 2008 to support EMAC  operations and coordination activities. In May 2007, Congress  appropriated $2.5 million to FEMA for interstate mutual aid agreements,  and according to FEMA officials, FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the  process of finalizing a 3-year cooperative agreement to improve the use  and awareness of resource typing among its members, and develop  training programs to improve awareness of EMAC at the federal, state, and  local levels. Present and past EMAC leadership stated that if the EMAC  network does not receive additional funding to support operations, efforts  to build and sustain the administrative capacity will have to be scaled  back. Specifically, they stated that the EMAC network will lose day-to-day  administrative support, there will be no resources to maintain the  electronic systems that facilitate requests under EMAC or the EMAC Web  site, training initiatives organized and led by EMAC leadership will be  suspended, and coordination between the EMAC network and key federal  players will be curtailed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: EMAC’s success relies on effective collaboration among its members. The  compact provides a broad and flexible framework that enables its  members to overcome differences in missions, organizational cultures, and  established ways of doing business in order to achieve a common mission.  The EMAC network has built upon this framework, establishing roles and  responsibilities and developing standards and systems in some key areas.  At the same time, we found that opportunities exist for the EMAC  network—as well as individual members—to make improvements in  several areas, such as (1) developing member roles and responsibilities  regarding how first responders are received and integrated into impacted  areas; (2) continuing to develop electronic systems that enable the EMAC  network to track resources, from request through mission completion;   (3) continuing to improve understanding of reimbursement guidelines and  standards among member states, especially following large-scale  deployments; (4) promoting good practices across the EMAC network that  improve members’ abilities to leverage resources; and (5) enhancing the  EMAC network’s strategic and management planning efforts by  considering more robust performance measures.
In addition to helping states assist one another, EMAC has shown that it  plays a critical role in our nation’s disaster response. However, there will  be times when the EMAC network will be strained, and our nation’s next  large-scale disaster will likely produce similar challenges to those  encountered following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. With this in mind,  opportunities exist at the federal level to help alleviate these challenges.  One way to improve the nation’s overall capacity to respond to disasters is  to build the EMAC network’s administrative capacity through mechanisms  such as cooperative agreements, grants, or training initiatives. In doing so,  planning and coordination within the EMAC network can be enhanced— key elements required for developing the capacities needed to respond to  disasters.
Valuable opportunities also exist to reflect on lessons learned to alleviate  financial and administrative burdens placed on both the assisting and  requesting states in response to catastrophes. Opportunities exist to  reduce confusion among states with regard to seeking and obtaining  advance funding through expedited project worksheets to facilitate timely  reimbursements under EMAC. Additionally, early consideration of  whether it would be appropriate to authorize the use of Title 32 status for  National Guard units responding to catastrophic incidents could decrease  the administrative and financial burdens states endure when switching  between State Active Duty status and Title 32 status.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making the following three recommendations:  To further enhance the administrative capacity required to support the  EMAC network, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  direct the Administrator of FEMA to look for ways to build the  administrative capacity required to support the EMAC network, such as  cooperative agreements, grants, and training initiatives.
In situations involving catastrophic disasters that require significant  assistance from several states and in turn increase the financial and  administrative burdens on EMAC members:    We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop guidance  for impacted states to efficiently seek and obtain advance funding through  expedited project worksheets to facilitate more expedited reimbursement  for those states providing assistance through EMAC to impacted areas.    We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security  work together to amend the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Supplement  Execution Schedule to include early consideration of the use of Title 32 in  situations where the Secretary of Defense deems it appropriate.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security  and the Secretary of Defense for comment. The Director of FEMA’s Office  of Policy and Program Analysis provided oral comments, concurring with  all of our recommendations. FEMA also provided technical comments that  were incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Defense did not  concur with the recommendation that calls for an expedited consideration  of whether to offer Title 32 following catastrophic disasters requiring  significant assistance from several states. DOD’s response is reprinted in  appendix II.
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Reserve Affairs did not concur with our recommendation that  the Secretary of Defense work with the Secretary of Homeland Security to  amend the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Supplement  Execution Schedule to include early consideration of the use of Title 32 in  situations where the Secretary of Defense deems it appropriate. The  Department stated that use of National Guard forces in Title 32 status is an  inherent DOD function and, in accordance with Homeland Security  Presidential Directive-5, outside the purview of the Secretary of Homeland  Security.
We agree that the use of National Guard forces in Title 32 status is an  inherent DOD function, and our recommendation recognizes the authority  of the Secretary of Defense to determine when use of that authority is  appropriate. While making clear that the directive in no way impairs or  affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over DOD, Homeland  Security Presidential Directive-5 also states that the Secretary of Defense  and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish appropriate  relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between  their two departments. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland  Security has responsibility for the National Response Plan, which already  assigns responsibilities to DOD, as a cooperating agency, and changes to  the plan must be coordinated through his department. Our reference to the  Secretary of Homeland Security was simply to acknowledge DHS’s  coordinating role.
DOD also stated that amending the Catastrophic Incident Supplement  Execution Schedule of the National Response Plan as we suggested “could  be interpreted to imply that it is DOD policy to place National Guard  forces into Title 32 status when in fact, the response to the event only  requires National Guard in State Active Duty status.” Our recommendation  does not state that DOD should place National Guard forces into any  particular status. The intent behind our recommendation is to create a  mechanism that would trigger DOD’s consideration of whether  authorization of Title 32 status is appropriate in the earlier stages of an  event, when the event has been designated as “catastrophic” under the  National Response Plan. In our view, a decision point for consideration of  Title 32 status does not imply that the decision should be made in favor of  or in opposition to authorizing Title 32. The Secretary of Defense may  decide that it would not be appropriate to offer Title 32 status, and even if  the Secretary did decide to offer Title 32, states would still be free to  deploy their forces under State Active Duty status if they preferred. In  addition, the Department of Defense would not be precluded from  considering the issue again at a later time. However, a quicker decision  from DOD concerning the appropriateness of Title 32 would, in  circumstances where the authorization of Title 32 was deemed to be  appropriate, allow states to deploy their National Guard forces under a  single status rather than switching statuses in the midst of a catastrophe.  This could enhance state responses because, as our report highlights,  states face additional administrative burdens when they switch their  National Guard forces from State Active Duty status to Title 32 status.
We also provided a draft of this report to the Chair of the EMAC Executive  Task Force and to the Executive Director of NEMA. Relevant sections of  the draft report were provided to state and local emergency offices whose  experiences we reference. Technical suggestions from these groups have  been incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees as well as the Secretaries of Defense and  Homeland Security, members of the EMAC Executive Task Force, the  Executive Director of the National Emergency Management Association,  and state and local officials contacted for this report. We will also make  this report available to others who are interested and make copies  available to others who request them. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Stanley J. Czerwinski at (202) 512-6806 or czerwinskis@gao.gov or   Sharon L. Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Emergency Management Assistance  Compact’s (EMAC) membership and its use have grown since its inception  in 1995, we reviewed a number of disaster responses for which the EMAC  process was activated based on the type, scale, and time frame of the  event from information provided by EMAC officials. We also interviewed  emergency management officials and analyzed sources that provided  additional details for events for which the EMAC process was activated,  including after-action reports. Our work was constrained by data  limitations, since EMAC leadership maintained data only sporadically  prior to 2005, and data capturing deployments under EMAC for disasters  since 2005 were incomplete or inconsistent. To assess the reliability of the  deployment data, we reviewed additional documents and conducted  additional interviews with local, state, and federal emergency management  officials for selected events captured by the database. In cases where the  data were inaccurate, we supplemented them with data from more reliable  sources. For example, in determining the number of civilian and military  personnel deployed through EMAC for the September 11, 2001 terrorist  attack on New York and the 2004 Florida hurricanes, we obtained  additional data from New York and Florida officials. In addition, in  determining the number of out-of-state personnel deployed on September  10, 2005, in response to Hurricane Katrina, we worked with the  Department of Defense (DOD) to obtain more accurate data regarding  National Guard and active component, military deployment figures. We  also attended conferences that addressed interstate compacts and EMAC,  and we conducted literature and legal reviews of mutual assistance  compact structures and governance.
To determine the degree to which existing policies, procedures, and  practices facilitate successful collaboration among EMAC members and  between the EMAC network and federal agencies, we interviewed various  local, state, and federal emergency management officials and analyzed the  procedures and practices they used during their response. We focused on  the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes emergency response since it presented the  largest use of the EMAC process to date, with approximately 66,000  civilian and National Guard responders deployed across several  disciplines. In addition, we also selected a cross section of disasters for  further analysis based on the type, scale, and timing of the disaster. To  gain firsthand knowledge of EMAC procedures, we held a combination of  in person and telephone interviews with some of the actual civilian and  National Guard emergency responders to the 2004 Florida hurricanes and  the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. In addition, we applied criteria for  practices GAO previously developed to assess collaboration among EMAC  members and between the EMAC network and key federal officials.  We  used the first six of these eight practices for this report:    defining and articulating a common outcome;    establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies;   identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;    agreeing on roles and responsibilities;    establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate    developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results;  reinforcing agency accountability for collaboration efforts through agency  plans and reports; and  reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through  performance management systems.
We did not use the last two practices because they were beyond the scope  of this review, and the sixth practice is discussed in our assessment of the  EMAC network’s administrative capacity. We then selected examples that  illustrated and supported the need for improvement in specific areas  where the key practices could be used. We also spoke with individuals  who were responsible for various roles during these disasters such as  resource identification and requests, coordination, and reimbursement.  These discussions were held with officials from the following offices and  commands.
subsections: section_title: Local Officials
section_title: State Officials
paragraphs: California Department of Emergency Management, Sacramento, California    California Highway Patrol, Sacramento, California    California Incident Management Team, Sacramento, California    Colorado Department of Local Affairs – Division of Emergency  Management, Denver, Colorado    Council of State Governments, Midwestern Region, Lombard, Illinois    Delaware National Guard, Wilmington, Delaware    Florida Department of Community Affairs/Division of Emergency  Management, Tallahassee, Florida    Florida National Guard, St. Augustine, Florida    Georgia Homeland Security – Emergency Management Agency, Atlanta,  Georgia  Indiana State Department of Health, Indianapolis, Indiana  Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Johnston,  Iowa  Iowa National Guard, Johnston, Iowa    Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency  Preparedness, Baton Rouge, Louisiana    Louisiana National Guard, Pineville, Louisiana    Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Pearl, Mississippi    Mississippi National Guard, Jackson, Mississippi    Montana Department of Emergency Affairs/Disaster and Emergency  Services Division, Helena, Montana    National Emergency Management Association, Lexington, Kentucky    New Mexico Department of Public Safety/New Mexico State Police, Santa    New York State Emergency Management Office, Albany, New York    North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, Raleigh,    North Carolina Regional Coordinating Team, Raleigh, North Carolina    North Dakota Department of Emergency Services-Homeland Security  Division, Bismarck, North Dakota    Oregon National Guard, Salem, Oregon    South Carolina National Guard, Columbia, South Carolina    South Carolina Department of Emergency Management, West Columbia,    Texas Governor’s Division of Emergency Management, Austin, Texas    Virginia Division of Emergency Management, Richmond, Virginia    Washington D.C. Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.
section_title: Federal Officials
paragraphs: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia    Department of Defense – Office of General Counsel, Arlington, Virginia    Department of Defense – Inspector General, Arlington, Virginia    Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.    Federal Emergency Management Agency – Public Assistance, Washington,  D.C.
National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia    National Guard Crisis Action Team (Army), Falls Church, Virginia    National Guard Crisis Action Team (Air Force), Camp Springs, Maryland  Furthermore, we reviewed the EMAC process through which state and  local assets are requested and activated. In addition, we looked at how the  deployment status of National Guard support affected the timeliness of  reimbursement.
To determine the extent to which the EMAC network has the  administrative capacity to build and sustain the collaborative effort to  achieve its mission, we interviewed a select number of former and current  EMAC leaders as well as emergency management officials from EMAC  member states. We also reviewed and analyzed the EMAC strategic  planning documents and selected after-action reports. We performed  similar reviews of state and federal after-action reports for 2004 through  2006. These discussions and reviews helped us gain an understanding of  EMAC organizational structure and developmental and funding plans.
We conducted our review from June 2006 through June 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
We provided drafts of relevant sections of this report to state and local  emergency management officials whose experiences we reference and we  incorporated their technical corrections as appropriate. In addition, we  requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD and DHS, as well  as the Chair the EMAC Executive Task Force and the Executive Director  of NEMA. Comments from DOD are reprinted in appendix II. Their  comments are addressed in the Agency Comments section of this report.  The Department of Homeland Security provided oral comments,  concurring with all of our recommendations.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Peter Del Toro, Assistant  Director; Michael J. Ferren, Assistant Director; Andrew C. Edelson;  Gwyneth M. Blevins; James A. Driggins; K. Nicole Haeberle; K. Nicole  Harms; Molly E. McNamara; Justin L Monroe; Sheila D. Rajabiun; and  Nathaniel J. Taylor made key contributions to this report.