Mine Safety: Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners
Published: 2008-04-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2006, several mining tragedies led the Congress to pass the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act). The law required underground coal mine operators to develop emergency response plans that contain several components designed to improve accident preparedness and response, including providing a refuge of air to miners trapped underground after an accident and wireless communications systems. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) is responsible for approving the plans and ensuring their implementation. GAO examined (1) the effectiveness of the approval process, (2) the status of implementation of the plans, and (3) MSHA's efforts to enforce and oversee implementation. To address these questions, GAO reviewed a nonprobability sample of emergency response plans, analyzed MSHA data, and interviewed MSHA officials and members of the mining community.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The effectiveness of MSHA's process for approving underground coal mines' emergency response plans was hampered by several factors, including revisions and delays by MSHA in developing guidance for mine operators on the required components of the plans and the lack of specificity of its guidance, which delayed approval of the plans. MSHA revised its guidance several times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement--providing a refuge of air to miners trapped underground--until 6 months after the initial plans were due. In addition, while the content of the plans may differ because of the unique characteristics of the mines, GAO found that some plans did not specify the protections to be provided and information about these protections varied. For example, some of the plans did not specify whether refuges of air would be provided to miners working in certain areas of the mine to help them survive if they are trapped in the mine after an accident. As a result, it is uncertain whether all of the plans will help ensure that miners will be adequately protected in the event of an accident. Most of the components of the mines' emergency response plans have been implemented but, as of January 2008, two key components remain. First, many mines have not implemented methods of providing air to trapped miners because needed equipment is not available. Second, mines have not begun to implement wireless communications systems or comparable alternatives to meet the June 2009 requirement in the MINER Act because fully wireless technology is not available and MSHA has not determined what technology it will allow mines to use to meet the requirement. The act provides that, where wireless systems are not available, alternatives to wireless communications systems are acceptable. While alternatives are currently available, MSHA headquarters officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what technology would be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement because they wanted to wait and see how new technologies developed by then. Given the delay, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be able to plan for and order the appropriate technology to meet the deadline, thereby missing opportunities to improve the chances of miners trapped in an underground coal mine after an accident to survive until they are able to be rescued. MSHA's district offices have inspected many of the mines for compliance with their emergency response plans and have issued citations to enforce immediate implementation of the plans, but MSHA headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on citations to identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. For example, MSHA headquarters has not analyzed or compared citations issued under the statute or related regulations, which may lead to inconsistent enforcement and assessment of penalties. In addition, MSHA has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of emergency response plans or to identify whether corrective actions are needed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In January 2006, at the Sago mine in West Virginia, 12 men lost their lives  after an explosion prompted them to barricade themselves in the mine to  await rescue, an effort that took almost 2 days to complete. They died  hours after the explosion from the poisonous carbon monoxide gases  produced by the explosion. In the wake of this and other fatal mine  disasters in the United States, the Congress enacted the Mine  Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act) in  an effort to improve the safety of the nation’s underground coal mines. As  part of this act, mine operators were required to develop emergency  response plans that detail how they will ensure the safety of underground  coal miners immediately following any future disasters, such as how they  plan to communicate with trapped miners after an accident. The act  required mine operators to submit their plans to the Department of Labor’s  Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) for approval by August 14,  2006—2 months after the law was enacted. MSHA issued guidance to mine  operators on plan development and assigned responsibility for reviewing  and approving the plans to its 11 district offices. After approving the  emergency response plans, MSHA inspectors in its district offices enforce  mine operators’ compliance with the requirements described in their plans  as part of regular inspections of underground coal mines.
The plans must contain several components designed to help ensure the  safety of miners trapped in a mine after an accident, such as providing  breathable air—air that has not been contaminated by carbon monoxide  or other deadly gases released during an explosion or fire. Generally, mine  operators must implement each component of the plan as soon as the  component is approved by MSHA, rather than waiting for approval of the  entire plan. In addition, by June 2009, the plans must provide for wireless  communications and electronic tracking systems or alternatives to these  systems. The MINER Act also required the National Institute for  Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a research agency within the  Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease Control  and Prevention, to study options for providing refuge to miners trapped  underground after an accident.
To learn about MSHA’s efforts to approve and enforce implementation of  the emergency response plans, you asked us to examine 1) the  effectiveness of MSHA’s process for approving mines’ emergency response  plans, 2) the status of implementation of underground coal mines’  emergency response plans, and 3) the efforts MSHA has made to enforce  implementation of the plans and oversee enforcement and plan quality.
To address these topics, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations,  and agency guidance. We reviewed data provided by MSHA on the  approval and implementation status of the emergency response plans for  all underground coal mines categorized by MSHA as active, producing  mines as of June 21, 2007. Using MSHA’s data on the approval status of the  plans, we selected a nonprobability sample of plans from each of MSHA’s  11 district offices for review. Our sample included both plans that had  been fully approved and those that had only been partially approved.  Because there were so few, we selected many of the partially approved  plans to identify the factors delaying their approval. We also reviewed data  on citations issued by MSHA’s district offices to mine operators for  noncompliance with their plans. To assess the reliability of the data  obtained from MSHA, we reviewed related documentation to corroborate  the data, including the sample of emergency response plans and  completed citation forms, evaluated the data for obvious errors in  accuracy and completeness, and interviewed agency officials  knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. In addition, we  interviewed officials at MSHA’s headquarters and 11 district offices to  learn about the plan approval process, implementation of the plans, and  MSHA’s inspection efforts. We visited two of MSHA’s district offices,  located in West Virginia and Kentucky—the two states with the largest  number of underground coal mines in the United States—and visited  underground coal mines in those states to learn about the equipment and  technologies they used to implement their emergency response plans. In  addition, we consulted with individuals knowledgeable about the field of  mine safety, mine company officials, and union and industry  representatives. We conducted this audit from April 2007 through April  2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for further  information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the “Mine Act”),  Congress created MSHA and gave it primary responsibility for ensuring the  safety and health of mine workers. MSHA’s Coal Mine Safety and Health  program office in headquarters is responsible for carrying out enforcement  activities related to surface and underground coal mines, managing agency  operations, and monitoring the activities of its 11 district offices. MSHA’s  district offices have day-to-day responsibility for activities such as  reviewing and approving mine plans, including emergency response plans,  and for conducting inspections, issuing citations for violations of health  and safety standards, and investigating mine accidents. As of December  2007, MSHA employed 460 underground coal mine inspectors in its 11  district offices. MSHA’s principal enforcement responsibility for  underground coal mines is fulfilled by conducting a minimum of four  comprehensive inspections of every underground coal mine in the United  States each year. When MSHA inspectors observe violations of mandatory  federal health and safety standards, they are required to issue citations, or  in some cases withdrawal orders, to mine operators. The mine operators  generally are required by law to correct the hazardous situation on which  the violation was based within the time frame set by the inspector, even if  the mine operator contests the violation or penalty.
As of June 2007, there were approximately 470 U.S. underground coal  mines categorized by MSHA as active, producing mines. As shown in  figure 1, the number of active, producing mines varies among districts.
The number of active, producing coal mines changes frequently as new  mines open, active mines are temporarily idled, or mines are abandoned.  Some underground mines do not actively produce coal all year; some are  only operated seasonally because of local weather conditions; and  operations at smaller, less cost-effective mines are often suspended when  the price of coal drops below a certain level.
Underground coal mining is a dangerous industry for several reasons. For  example, the presence of methane gas, which is highly explosive and is  often produced in large quantities when coal is extracted, contributes to  the hazardous working conditions. Additional risks include geological  conditions in many areas of the country that make the roofs of mines  unstable, the danger posed by a fire in an underground mine, and flooding  from nearby abandoned mines. The danger posed by these factors has  increased in recent years as miners dig deeper to reach remaining coal  reserves. Further, while the number of underground coal miners was on  the decline in the last half of the 1990s, as shown in figure 2, this trend has  reversed in recent years, exposing more workers to the dangers of  underground coal mining.
In March 2006, a few months after the Sago mine accident, MSHA issued  an Emergency Temporary Standard that required mine operators to  immediately implement certain health and safety improvements designed  to enhance protections for underground coal miners. MSHA issued a final  rule revising the standard in December 2006. In June 2006, the Congress  passed the MINER Act, which required mine operators and MSHA to  undertake reforms, including developing and adopting emergency  response plans, enhancing mine rescue teams, and instituting higher  penalties for the most serious violations.
The MINER Act required that, within 60 days of enactment, underground  mine operators develop and adopt written emergency response plans. The  act also required MSHA to review and approve emergency response plans.
The agency implemented this requirement by issuing guidance for mine  operators to use in developing their plans and by having its district offices  review the plans submitted by mines under their jurisdiction to ensure that  they conformed with the guidance. MSHA is also required to review  approved plans at least every 6 months to ensure that they are updated to  reflect changes in mine operations and advances in technology. The  MINER Act specified several components that mine operators must  include in their emergency response plans, including providing  uncontaminated or “breathable” air for miners after an accident. The  postaccident breathable air component includes two parts: (1) emergency  supplies of air sufficient to maintain trapped miners for extended (long- term) periods and (2) caches of portable breathing devices—known as  self-contained self-rescuers (see fig. 3)—positioned along mine tunnels  leading to the mine entrance to aid in the miners’ escape.  Another  component required by the act is postaccident lifelines—ropes that miners  can use after an accident to find their way out of the mine and to find the  caches of portable breathing devices stored in the mine (see fig. 4).
Table 1 describes all of the components of mines’ emergency response  plans required by the MINER Act.
MSHA’s headquarters allowed district offices to separately approve each  component of a mine’s emergency response plan so that the mine could  begin implementing each component once it was approved, rather than  waiting for approval of the entire plan. Most of the required components  were to be implemented immediately upon approval or within the time  frames set in the approved plan. However, the act gave operators  additional time to implement certain components, including wireless  communications and electronic tracking systems, or their alternatives, and  flame-resistant lifelines, which generally are not required to be  implemented until June 15, 2009.
In addition, the MINER Act required NIOSH to study the utility,  practicality, survivability, and cost of providing various refuge alternatives  in underground coal mines and to report its findings, which it did, by  December 2007. Under its Mining Safety and Health Research program,  NIOSH conducts research on mine safety technology, including research  on advancements in self-contained self-rescuers, communications  equipment, and tracking devices. In 2006, the Congress provided NIOSH  with $10 million in emergency supplemental appropriations for research to  develop mine safety technology.
MSHA and NIOSH are both responsible for getting new safety technology  into the mines. For certain types of mining products, MSHA’s technical  experts conduct evaluations and tests to ensure that they will not cause a  fire or an explosion in a mine before they approve the use of such  products. NIOSH is responsible for developing and adapting new  technologies for use in the mining industry. Based on research findings,  NIOSH may recommend that MSHA issue new safety and health standards.  However, NIOSH does not have the authority to compel MSHA to take  action on its recommendations. In our 2007 report on MSHA, we stated  that coordination between MSHA and NIOSH was primarily informal and  inconsistent and recommended that they develop a formal memorandum  of understanding to guide their agencywide coordination efforts.  However, at the time of our review, such a memorandum had not been  finalized.
section_title: The Effectiveness of MSHA’s Approval Process Was Hampered by Several Factors that Delayed Approval and Resulted in Variations in the Plans
paragraphs: The effectiveness of MSHA’s approval process for underground coal  mines’ emergency response plans was hampered by several factors that  delayed approval of the plans. Specifically, MSHA issued its guidance  multiple times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement until 6  months after the initial plans were due. Once issued, MSHA’s guidance  lacked specificity and, as a result, MSHA district staff we interviewed said  that they had to spend time resolving mine operators’ questions about the  guidance after it was issued. In addition, actions taken by some mine  operators, such as their reluctance to submit adequate plans, further  delayed the approval process. We also found that the plans we reviewed  varied in content and did not always specify the protections to be provided  for miners.
subsections: section_title: MSHA’s Revisions and Delays in Issuing Its Guidance Delayed Plan Approvals
paragraphs: Both MSHA district staff and mine operators we interviewed stated that  MSHA’s revisions of its guidance and delays in issuing the guidance caused  mine operators to revise their mines’ plans several times, delaying plan  approvals. The MINER Act required underground coal mine operators to  develop and adopt written emergency response plans by August 14, 2006.  (See fig. 5 for a timeline of MSHA’s guidance and key events related to the  emergency response plans.) MSHA issued general guidance on the  requirements for the emergency response plan components in July 2006  and revised it twice—in August and October of that year. According to  district officials, by the time MSHA headquarters issued its revised  guidance in October—2 months after mine operators were required to  submit their plans for approval—the districts were in the process of  reviewing and approving the plans. As a result, mine operators had to  revise and resubmit their plans to reflect the revised guidance, and the  districts had to review them to ensure that changes were incorporated.
In addition, in February 2007, 6 months after mines were required to  submit their emergency response plans to MSHA for approval, the agency  issued new guidance on the MINER Act’s requirement that the plans  provide long-term postaccident breathable air for miners trapped  underground. MSHA sought input from the mining community on this  requirement, requesting comments on methods for providing safe and  reliable supplies of postaccident breathable air in the summer of 2006.  However, while MSHA received 11 comments from mine operators or their  representatives during the comment period that closed on October 16,  2006, it did little to act on these comments for several months. One senior  level MSHA official told us that a working group established to develop  this guidance did not begin to do so until January 2007 and that the agency  did not finalize the guidance until February 2007, 4 months after the  comment deadline and 6 months after the deadline for mine operators to  submit their plans to MSHA for approval.
In the absence of written guidance, some district officials we interviewed  said that they provided mine operators with verbal guidance that was  inconsistent with written guidance later issued by MSHA headquarters.  For example, officials in one district told us that they had informed mine  operators, based on discussions with headquarters officials, that they  would be required to provide 48 hours of long-term postaccident  breathable air. However, when headquarters later issued written guidance  requiring mine operators to provide 96 hours of postaccident breathable  air, the district officials had to meet with mine operators to explain the  new guidance and ask them to revise their plans, which delayed approval.
According to MSHA officials, some of the revisions and delays in  developing guidance resulted from the tight time frames specified in the  MINER Act for developing and adopting the plans. MSHA headquarters  and district officials told us that, between the enactment of the MINER Act  in mid-June 2006 and the deadline for submitting emergency response  plans to MSHA for approval in mid-August, there was not enough time to  develop complete guidance outlining what mine operators should include  in their plans. At the same time, MSHA headquarters officials said that they  were also trying to meet the December 2006 deadline for finalizing the  Emergency Temporary Standard the agency issued in March. MSHA  headquarters officials said they needed additional time to interpret the  law, discuss it with key stakeholders from the mining community, and  incorporate the results of these discussions in the guidance. Similarly,  MSHA headquarters officials stated that they needed time to review and  evaluate acceptable methods for meeting the MINER Act’s requirement for  postaccident breathable air before making decisions about the type,  amount, and location of breathable air mines would be required to  provide. However, because of the revisions and delays in issuing the  guidance, mine operators’ ability to provide the equipment and  information needed to protect miners’ safety in the event of an accident, as  intended by the MINER Act, was also delayed.
section_title: The Lack of Specificity of MSHA’s Guidance Also Hampered Approval of the Plans
paragraphs: The effectiveness of the approval process was also hampered by the lack  of specificity of MSHA’s guidance on the emergency response plans’  components, including its guidance on the postaccident tracking, lifelines,  and postaccident breathable air requirements of the MINER Act. As a  result, MSHA’s district staff had to spend time resolving mine operators’  questions about the guidance after it was issued, which further delayed  approval of the plans and the preparedness of mine operators to respond  to an accident. To resolve some of the questions posed by mine operators,  some district officials told us that they asked headquarters staff for  additional guidance but did not always receive a response, and sometimes  the response was not timely. Staff in a few districts said that, if they did  not receive a response from headquarters officials, they made their own  decisions about how to interpret the guidance. In some instances, they  said that headquarters officials later made decisions about the  requirements of the plans that differed from those made by the districts.  As a result, the districts had to ask mine operators to revise their plans to  comply with headquarters’ revised interpretations of the requirements,  further delaying approval of the plans. The following examples illustrate  the impact of MSHA’s guidance:    Although MSHA’s guidance indicated that operators could satisfy the  postaccident tracking requirement by using a dispatcher system, it did  not specify certain aspects of what should be included in the plans. A  few of the district officials we interviewed said that some mine  operators stated in their plans that they intended to divide their mines  into large zones to minimize the number of phones they had to provide  and make it easier for miners to move around the mine without having  to report their location to staff working above ground. However,  because MSHA’s guidance did not specify the allowable sizes of the  zones or provide criteria for determining their appropriate sizes, the  district officials said they had to spend time negotiating with mine  operators to establish smaller zone sizes, which would improve the  chances of identifying the location of trapped miners after an accident.
MSHA’s guidance did not specify the materials mine operators needed  to use to meet the requirement for postaccident lifelines. One district  official told us some of the mine operators in his district wanted to use  existing water lines as lifelines, rather than providing new, flame  resistant lifelines. As a result, the official had to negotiate with them to  resolve this issue. MSHA headquarters later specified in writing that  some water lines were not a suitable option for meeting this  requirement of the MINER Act.
Further, MSHA’s guidance did not specify what methods mine  operators could use or what methods they were prohibited from using  to provide oxygen to and remove hazardous gas from refuge areas. A  few of the district officials we interviewed said that they had many  discussions with mine operators and headquarters officials about  whether MSHA would consider chemically-generated oxygen an  acceptable method for supplying long-term breathable air. Similarly,  some officials were seeking guidance from MSHA headquarters on  acceptable methods of removing hazardous gas from refuge areas  several months after the initial guidance was issued. MSHA’s technical  support division provided additional guidance after researching the  technical issues involved. District officials then had to notify the mine  operators who intended to use these methods that their plans had to be  revised, which delayed their approval.
section_title: Approval of Plans Sometimes Delayed by Mine Operators’ Actions
paragraphs: In addition to the delays caused by issues related to MSHA’s guidance,  actions taken by some mine operators delayed plan approval. While  district officials said that most mine operators were cooperative and  responsive during the approval process, some district officials said some  mine operators submitted initial plans that did not meet all of the  requirements, which contributed to delays in the review process. For  example, a few district officials said that some mine operators used vague  language in their plans. In addition, a few district officials responsible for  reviewing the plans told us that it was difficult to reach some of the mine  operators to discuss deficiencies in their plans or ask them to resubmit  their plans when revisions were needed, further delaying the approval  process. One official added that, once MSHA gave mine operators  deadlines for submitting revisions, the process for reviewing the revisions  moved more quickly.
Some mine operators proposed methods for meeting the requirements of  the MINER Act that took time for MSHA to evaluate because they were  unfamiliar with these methods. For example, a company that owned nine  mines in one district proposed an alternative method of meeting the  postaccident tracking requirement: using telephone answering machines  to track the locations of miners working underground. Since this method  differed from the typical dispatcher system used by other mines, district  staff sought input from headquarters on whether the proposed system was  an acceptable method of complying with the postaccident tracking  requirement for emergency response plans. MSHA’s technical support  division observed the system before making a decision and determined  that it was not sufficient. The process of reviewing such alternative  methods prolonged the approval of some mines’ plans.
By June 2007, MSHA had resolved most of the issues with the mine  operators and approved their plans, but the approval of a few plans was  delayed for several months. After discussion with the mine operators, two  districts reached an impasse with three mines on the postaccident  breathable air component of their plans. However, MSHA subsequently  reached agreement with these mines on their emergency response plans.  As of October 26, 2007, more than a year after the initial deadline for  submitting plans, MSHA had approved all underground coal mines’  emergency response plans that were part of our analysis.
section_title: Mines’ Approved Emergency Response Plans Vary in the Information Provided on Certain Plan Components, Raising Uncertainties about the Protections Provided to Miners
paragraphs: The approved emergency response plans we reviewed varied in the  information provided and, therefore, it is uncertain whether certain  protections will be afforded to all miners. It is understandable that the  content of the plans may differ because there are differences in the  specific characteristics of mines. However, in our review of the plans we  sampled, we found that some plans did not specify the protections to be  provided and the amount of information about these protections varied  from plan to plan. The following examples illustrate the variations in the  plans we reviewed.
Postaccident breathable air. Some of the plans we reviewed specified  the materials that the mine needed to provide long-term postaccident  breathable air for trapped miners, but other plans did not. For example,  the plans we reviewed in three districts included worksheets for mine  operators to complete that specified the quantity of oxygen, number of  compressed air cylinders, and materials needed to remove contaminants  from the air. An official in one of the districts said the district also required  mines that chose refuge chambers as a method of providing long-term  postaccident breathable air to trapped miners to indicate the size and type  of refuge chambers they purchased. The official said they asked for this  information to help ensure that the locations in the mines where the  chambers would be placed were large enough to accommodate the  inflated chambers without puncturing them. In contrast, some of the plans  we reviewed in other districts only indicated the possible options or  combinations of methods of providing breathable air that the mine might  choose; the plans did not indicate the specific methods that the mines  chose for meeting the breathable air requirement or specify the amount of  oxygen, air, or materials needed to remove contaminants from the air. As a  result, it was unclear how the districts determined that the methods  identified in the plans will be sufficient for those mines.
Postaccident breathable air in certain locations of the mine. The  plans we reviewed varied in whether they specified that the mine operator  would provide long-term postaccident breathable air in locations between  the working section of the mine where coal was being extracted and the  entrance of the mine, known as outby locations. For 6 of the 10 districts  with approved plans, all of the approved plans we reviewed either  specified that postaccident breathable air would be provided in these  locations and the method to be used to provide air, or they indicated that  air was not required in these locations and explained why. However, for 4  of the 10 districts with approved plans, some plans did not specify whether  postaccident breathable air was required for miners working in outby  locations or the methods for providing it. As a result, in some mines,  miners working in these locations may not have access to postaccident  breathable air if they become trapped in the mine after an accident.
Postaccident tracking. We also found large differences in the  information contained in the plans we reviewed for the postaccident  tracking component. All of the plans we reviewed for one district detailed  the responsibilities of surface and underground personnel for this  component and described the underground areas or zones to be used in  identifying the location of miners. In contrast, in another district, none of  the plans we reviewed described the responsibilities of the mine personnel  or the zones to be used to identify the location of miners. Without  providing specific information about how to track miners, it was not clear  how the districts determined that the methods identified in the plans will  be sufficient for those mines and how mine operators will identify where  trapped miners are located in the event of an accident.
section_title: While Most Plan Components Have Been Implemented, Two Key Components Have Not
paragraphs: Most of the components of mines’ emergency response plans have been  implemented, but two key components remain. As of January 2008, all  underground coal mines had implemented all or most components of their  emergency response plans. However, few of the mines had implemented  one key component—postaccident breathable air—because needed  equipment was not available. In addition, mines had not begun to  implement another component—wireless communications systems or a  comparable alternative—because fully wireless technology is not available  and MSHA had not determined what alternative technologies mine  operators will be allowed to use to meet this requirement of the MINER  Act, which mines must implement by June 2009.
subsections: section_title: Mines Had Implemented All or Most Components of Their Emergency Response Plans
paragraphs: As of January 2008, all underground coal mines had implemented all or  most of the components of their emergency response plans that were  required to be implemented immediately after approval. Twenty percent of  all underground coal mines had fully implemented all components of their  emergency response plans. The remaining mines had implemented all of  the components, except the requirement for postaccident breathable air.  Specifically, according to MSHA district officials, all mines had  implemented the redundant communication and tracking systems required  by their plans, had provided training on emergency procedures and the use  of self-contained self-rescuers, and had developed procedures for  coordinating and communicating with local emergency responders, as  required. In addition, many mines had installed flame-resistant lifelines,  although the MINER Act generally does not require their installation until  June 2009.
Generally, as with most plan components, mines are using widely accepted  methods to implement the current postaccident communications and  tracking requirements of their emergency response plans and are moving  toward using electronic tracking systems to meet the June 2009  requirement of the MINER Act. To meet the redundant communications  requirement, according to NIOSH, most mines are using hardwired mine  phones and leaky feeder cable systems with handheld radios (see fig. 6).  To meet the postaccident tracking requirement, nearly 90 percent of the  plans we reviewed specified that a dispatcher or equivalent system would  be used to track miners. At the time of our review, according to the  manufacturers we interviewed, approximately 13 mines were installing  electronic tracking systems.
section_title: One Key Component Had Not Been Fully Implemented Because Equipment Was Not Available
paragraphs: As of January 2008, because needed equipment was not available, more  than three-quarters of the mines had not been able to fully implement the  requirement to provide long-term postaccident breathable air for trapped  miners, and one-fifth of the mines had not been able to provide all of the  required self-contained self-rescuers to aid in miners’ escape. According  to MSHA’s guidance, mines can use several alternative methods to provide  long-term postaccident breathable air for trapped miners. These methods  include providing a premanufactured refuge chamber, either hard-sided or  inflatable, that can be easily moved around the mine; building a protected  room in the mine—called a prebuilt safe haven—where breathable air and  survival supplies will be available; and providing a skid that contains  materials for constructing an airtight barricade after an accident,  equipment to provide breathable air, as well as water, food, and other  supplies. As shown in figure 7, most mines planned to use at least one  refuge chamber to provide long-term postaccident breathable air to  trapped miners.
Refuge chambers. Although, according to MSHA, 69 percent of all  underground coal mines had ordered either inflatable or hard-sided refuge  chambers, only 4 percent of these mines had received the chambers as of  January 2008. Manufacturers had difficulty increasing production to meet  the demand from mine operators prompted by enactment of the MINER  Act, and they encountered shortages of needed materials and equipment.  According to the MSHA officials and manufacturers we interviewed,  manufacturing limitations may delay delivery of some refuge chambers  until 2009. In light of these delays, senior MSHA headquarters officials told  us that they were considering requiring mine operators who had not yet  received refuge chambers to make interim arrangements, such as  providing prebuilt safe havens or barricading materials to allow miners to  construct safe havens. In addition, mine operators we interviewed said  they were concerned that, based on NIOSH’s evaluation of the chambers,  MSHA might develop guidance that requires modification or replacement  of the chambers they have ordered, which might further delay their  delivery or increase the costs.
Prebuilt safe havens and skids with barricading materials. Fourteen  percent of the mines opted to build their own safe havens, and 27 percent  opted to provide skids with supplies needed for breathable air, barricades,  and other survival necessities. However, as of January 2008, only 12  percent of the mines using safe havens and 50 percent of the mines using  skids had fully implemented these methods. Unavailable equipment  prevented full implementation for many mines, often because  manufacturers were not able to meet the increased demand for items such  as oxygen tanks, airlock doors, and equipment needed to eliminate carbon  dioxide from refuge areas.
Self-contained self-rescuers. At the time of our review, manufacturers  of self-contained self-rescuers were beginning to catch up with the sudden  increased demand created by the requirements of the MINER Act.  However, as of January 2008, 20 percent of the mines were waiting for  delivery of some of the self-contained self-rescuers required by their plans.
The manufacturers we interviewed told us that they did not expect this  large increase in demand to continue into the foreseeable future and,  therefore, did not greatly increase their production capacity, which limited  the number of units they could produce in the short term.
section_title: MSHA Has Not Determined What Technologies Will Be Acceptable in Meeting the MINER Act Requirement for Wireless Communications Systems
paragraphs: Although the MINER Act requires mines to provide postaccident wireless  two-way communications systems or approved alternatives by June 2009,  MSHA has not determined what technology mine operators will be  allowed to use to meet this requirement. The MINER Act does not define  wireless communications systems, except to state that mines’ emergency  response plans must include provisions for postaccident communications  between underground and surface personnel via a “wireless two-way  medium.” However, the act also states that, if such components cannot be  adopted by mine operators, their plans may instead include alternative  methods that “approximate, as closely as possible, the degree of functional  utility and safety protection” that would be provided by a wireless  system. The Senate committee report on the act stated that the intent of  this requirement is for mine operators to use the most advanced  technology available that works best in their particular mine. The report  also noted that the intent is to avoid interpreting the law so narrowly as to  stifle innovation and delay implementation of methods or equipment that  would have significant safety benefits.
According to NIOSH, the term “wireless,” as used by the global  telecommunications industry, has come to mean that the end user device,  such as a cell phone, is not connected locally by a wire. However, these  systems require a hardwired infrastructure to support communications. In  its research, NIOSH has found that infrastructure-free systems that can  provide wireless two-way communications—which we refer to in this  report as fully wireless systems—do not exist for most underground coal  mines due to operational constraints. According to NIOSH officials, their  research has demonstrated that, for wearable and portable two-way  communications devices to work in most underground coal mines,  infrastructure will be required to support any postaccident  communications systems that will be available in the foreseeable future.
Although researchers and manufacturers have developed fully wireless  communications systems, there are concerns about the viability and  practicality of these systems, and there are significant limitations for their  use in underground coal mines. For example, according to NIOSH,  systems that use antennae placed underground and on the surface above  the mine (referred to as through-the-earth systems) have a very limited  range and most provide only one-way text communication from  individuals on the surface to miners underground. Individuals we  interviewed who were knowledgeable about the mine industry—including  representatives of NIOSH, MSHA’s technical support division, and  companies that develop new technology for use in underground coal  mines—and the research we reviewed indicated that fully wireless two- way communications systems may not be available for many years  because the conditions in the mines make it extremely difficult for  communication signals to cover significant distances.
According to NIOSH, MSHA’s technical support division staff, and  manufacturers, some partially wireless systems in which the coal miner is  not tethered to the infrastructure are available now, and other alternatives  that could enhance communications and the safety of miners in  underground coal mines are nearly ready for use. The use of these partially  wireless communications systems—such as leaky feeder or fiber optic  cable systems—is becoming more widespread in mines. In addition,  NIOSH and manufacturers are developing other options for providing  partially wireless communications in mines, including ethernet networks  and wireless mesh networks. Examples of some of these systems are  shown in table 2.
Although some of these systems are currently available, others are still  being developed, and some components have not yet been approved by  MSHA as being safe for use in underground coal mines. In early 2008,  MSHA approved the first wireless mesh network for tracking miners and is  reviewing the manufacturer’s application for approval of a modification  that would enable two-way text messaging using this network. An MSHA  official responsible for approving equipment for use in underground coal  mines told us that the agency is working with a number of other  manufacturers seeking MSHA’s approval of wireless mesh systems that  would allow two-way voice communications.
NIOSH has developed plans for ensuring that advanced and survivable  communications systems are provided in the mines. Given the progress  that has been made in developing alternatives to fully wireless technology,  NIOSH has developed a phased approach in which underground coal  mines would install systems using partially wireless technology. Mines  could install these improved communications systems alongside  traditional systems, such as mine pager phones, or combine systems that  use one type of technology, such as leaky feeder cable, with those that use  other technologies, such as wireless mesh, to create communications  systems more likely to survive a mine accident. NIOSH officials told us  that their approach is focused on ensuring that mine operators can make  use of existing technologies as they upgrade to more survivable  communications systems.
Similar to NIOSH’s approach, West Virginia requires mines to use wireless  communications systems but defines them as systems that allow  individual communications by a miner through a mine communication and  tracking system without a physical connection. West Virginia allows mines  to use leaky feeder cable and WiFi communications systems to meet this  requirement, both of which are partially, rather than fully, wireless  systems. West Virginia’s state mining office has approved communications  and tracking technologies developed by several manufacturers, but not all  of them have been approved by MSHA for use in underground coal mines.  West Virginia officials said that they expect their mines to have  operational systems to meet this requirement by late 2008.
Despite these advances in partially wireless technology, MSHA had not yet  determined what types of technology will be acceptable for mines to use  to meet the June 2009 requirement for wireless communications. In its  guidance on emergency response plans issued in October 2006, MSHA  defined the term wireless to mean systems with no underground wires that  might be damaged by fire or explosion. As previously noted, according to  NIOSH, such infrastructure-free systems will not be possible for most  mines. MSHA’s guidance noted that specific conditions in each mine  would be taken into account in determining whether the system was likely  to withstand an accident intact. At the time of our review, MSHA officials  told us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what  technology will be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement for  wireless communications because they wanted to wait and see what  technology is available closer to the deadline. As a result, it is uncertain  whether mine operators will be able to plan for and order enhanced  communications systems to meet the deadline. In justifying the delay, one  official expressed concern that manufacturers would stop trying to  develop fully wireless technology if MSHA announced that partially  wireless technology is acceptable. However, some manufacturers told us  that, because MSHA has not determined what technology will be  acceptable, they are concerned that they are investing time and money in  developing technology that may not ultimately be acceptable to MSHA.
section_title: While MSHA’s District Offices Have Enforced Mines’ Implementation of Emergency Response Plans, MSHA Headquarters Has Provided Limited Oversight of Enforcement and Plan Quality
paragraphs: MSHA’s district offices have conducted inspections and issued citations to  enforce implementation of mines’ emergency response plans, but MSHA  headquarters has provided limited oversight of the districts’ enforcement  efforts and the overall quality of the plans. MSHA’s districts have inspected  many mines for compliance and issued citations to enforce  implementation of their emergency response plans, but MSHA  headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on  citations related to emergency response plans to identify potential  problems with implementation or enforcement. In addition, MSHA  headquarters has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of  underground coal mines’ emergency response plans or to identify whether  corrective actions might be needed.
subsections: section_title: District Offices Have Used Inspections and Citations to Enforce Implementation of Plans
paragraphs: In October 2006, MSHA headquarters provided the districts with guidance  stating that inspectors should begin checking for compliance with  approved emergency response plan components during the regular  inspection process. If an inspector finds a mine operator has not  implemented a component of its approved plan, MSHA can cite the mine  for noncompliance with its plan. According to district officials, all of  MSHA’s districts began incorporating individual components of mines’  plans into their regular inspections as soon as the components were  approved. Inspectors were notified of the approval of individual  components of the mines’ plans through updates of the mines’ uniform  mine files, which contain all of the mines’ plans and must be reviewed by  inspectors prior to each inspection.
As of December 2007, inspectors had issued over 350 citations to mine  operators who had not properly implemented the approved components of  their emergency response plans. MSHA inspectors began issuing citations  for noncompliance in November 2006, shortly after MSHA headquarters  issued its guidance. Prior to November 2006, MSHA district offices only  issued citations to mines that had failed to submit or revise their  emergency response plans for approval. From November 2006 through  mid-December 2007, the most frequently issued citations were related to  postaccident communications, postaccident tracking, postaccident  breathable air, and additional plan content. The citations for  noncompliance with the postaccident breathable air component of mines’  plans included violations for not having the required self-contained self- rescuers and supplies for providing oxygen to miners trapped  underground for a long period of time. Figure 8 indicates the percentage  and number of citations issued for noncompliance with each component  of the mines’ emergency response plans.
The reasons for the citations varied; instances of noncompliance cited  included, among other things, mines not installing required equipment or  equipment not functioning properly. Table 3 includes examples of the  conditions cited by inspectors.
MSHA issued more citations to mines beginning in May 2007 when more  plans had been fully approved. Citations issued for failure to submit or  revise a plan were generally issued earlier in light of the August 2006  deadline, and citations issued for long-term postaccident breathable air for  miners trapped underground tended to be issued later, since MSHA did not  provide guidance on this issue until February 2007. Excluding these two  categories, the number of monthly citations increased from 9 in April 2007  to 30 in May 2007 and had increased to nearly 60 by October 2007 (see   fig. 9). According to MSHA’s Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and  Health, the number of citations increased as more approved plans became  eligible for inspection, and will likely decrease as more mines successfully  implement their plans and properly maintain their equipment.
Most citations MSHA issued for violations of mines’ emergency response  plans were promptly addressed by the mine operators. Upon issuing a  citation, the MSHA inspector is required to establish a deadline for  correction of the safety or health hazard identified in the citation. More  than half of the hazards identified in citations issued to underground coal  mines through December 11, 2007, were corrected within a week of being  issued, and one-quarter were corrected on the same day that the citations  were issued (see table 4). About 7 percent of the citations reviewed were  still outstanding at the end of 2007 and pertained to mines’ failure to  comply with their plans’ requirement to provide long-term postaccident  breathable air to trapped miners. Half of these outstanding citations have  not been terminated because the equipment the mine operators planned to  use to meet the requirement was unavailable.
In a November 2007 report, the Department of Labor’s Office of Inspector  General indicated that decreasing inspection resources has made it  difficult for MSHA to complete all required inspections of underground  coal mines. Management officials we interviewed in 4 of the 11 district  offices indicated that they did not have an adequate number of inspectors  to complete the required emergency response plan inspections. However,  several managers also said that this situation will be remedied when newly  hired inspectors become fully qualified to conduct inspections. One  former district manager said that inspectors were able to complete the  required inspections of mines’ emergency response plans but may not have  had time to proactively recommend improved safety practices to mine  operators during these inspections.
section_title: MSHA Has Not Systematically Evaluated Citation Data to Identify Potential Problems with Implementation or Enforcement
paragraphs: MSHA headquarters has not examined the available data on citations to  assess the extent to which each emergency response plan component has  been violated or whether enforcement of the plans may differ across  districts. Senior officials at MSHA headquarters told us that they had not  analyzed the citations related to emergency response plans, apart from  totaling the number of citations issued under the MINER Act. The MSHA  specialist responsible for reviewing the citation data said that MSHA  headquarters analyzes the citation data more to oversee the compliance of  individual mine operators and mines, rather than to oversee districts’  enforcement efforts. As a result, MSHA headquarters officials were not  aware that the number of citations related to emergency response plans  varies across districts. We reviewed the citations issued by MSHA’s 11  district offices for violations of mines’ emergency response plans from  August 15, 2006, through December 11, 2007, and found large differences  in the number of citations issued across districts. For example, as of  December 11, 2007, one district had cited one of its 18 mines for failing to  comply with its emergency response plan; in contrast, three districts had  cited over two-thirds of their mines for noncompliance with their plans.  (See app. II for details on the number of citations issued and the number  of mines cited per district.) When we informed a senior MSHA official of  these differences, he said he was not aware of them or the reasons for  these differences. While some differences can be expected, MSHA has not  identified the causes of these differences or whether they are the result of  inconsistent enforcement, which may warrant corrective actions.
MSHA headquarters also has not analyzed and compared citations issued  under the MINER Act with citations issued under related agency  regulations. Some of the emergency response plan requirements of the  MINER Act are also contained in MSHA’s regulations. For example, both  the MINER Act and MSHA regulations require mines to have lifelines or  equivalent devices. MSHA has not established a clear policy for when  inspectors should cite the emergency response plan requirement of the  MINER Act or the regulations when both apply. We found that both types  of citations have been issued for the same requirement, indicating that it  would not be possible to assess mines’ compliance with a requirement by  evaluating either type of citation in isolation. Specifically, based on our  analysis of MSHA’s citation data, we found that, while inspectors issued  only 14 citations for noncompliance with the lifeline requirements of the  MINER Act, they issued over 150 citations for noncompliance with  regulations regarding lifelines over the same period. One assistant district  manager said that inspectors use the regulations as the basis for citations  because they are more specific than the language of the MINER Act;  therefore, the regulations allow the inspector to better specify the nature  of the violation and defend the citation if it is contested. While data on  citations for noncompliance with the MINER Act and the regulations are  available, MSHA headquarters does not review both data sources and, as a  result, may not have accurate information to reflect the full extent of  operator compliance with emergency response plan requirements.
The option to cite either the emergency response plan requirement of the  MINER Act or regulations for certain kinds of violations could also prevent  MSHA from appropriately considering one of the statutory factors that is used  to calculate penalty assessments. Specifically, MSHA is required to consider the  mine operator’s history of previous violations in assessing penalties. The  formula it uses to assess penalties results in a higher penalty if the mine has  been cited previously five or more times for violating the same statutory  provision or regulation in the preceding 15 months. However, if citations for  repeat violations by the same mine are not issued consistently under the same  provision—either the applicable statute or the regulations—MSHA’s penalty  assessment system will not identify them as repeat violations, even though the  nature of the violation is the same. Therefore, if an inspector issued five  citations to a mine operator for failing to maintain the mine’s lifelines under the  emergency response plan requirement of the MINER Act and subsequently  issued a sixth citation under the regulations, rather than the MINER Act,  MSHA’s penalty assessment system would not flag the violation as a repeat  violation, and the higher penalty assessment would not apply. For example,  MSHA issued two citations to one mine under the MINER Act and assessed the  minimum penalty amount. Between the dates that these two citations were  issued, however, the mine received at least four citations for violations of  regulations that overlapped with the requirements of the MINER Act. Had these  four citations been issued under the MINER Act per MSHA headquarters’  guidance to its districts, rather than under MSHA’s regulations, the penalties  assessed would have been higher to reflect the mine’s repeated violations of the  emergency response plan requirements of the MINER Act.
section_title: MSHA Has Not Provided Sufficient Oversight to Ensure Plan Quality
paragraphs: Although MSHA headquarters has reviewed some of the mines’ emergency  response plans, it has not provided sufficient oversight of the district offices  to ensure that the levels of safety protection required by the plans are  adequate across all of its district offices. Internal control standards for the  federal government advise that internal controls should be designed so that  monitoring is ongoing and ingrained in agency operations. During mine  inspections, inspectors must ensure that the mines are adhering to the  requirements described in the content of their emergency response plans.  However, as discussed earlier in this report, the plans we reviewed varied in  the information provided for certain plan components, such as postaccident  breathable air and postaccident tracking, raising uncertainties about the  protections provided to miners. One senior MSHA headquarters official said  that the district offices have submitted samples of mines’ approved plans to  headquarters but the review of such plans has not been systematic or  comprehensive. He further indicated that such a review would be time- consuming and resource intensive. MSHA headquarters officials said they  plan to review the emergency response plans as part of the agency’s peer  review process, but each district office only undergoes a peer review once  every 2 years. Without monitoring the quality of the plans across all districts,  it is unclear how MSHA headquarters can ensure that its guidance and the  requirements of the MINER Act are applied consistently and that mines are  held to the same standards.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: At the Sago mine, 12 miners died hours after an explosion in the mine after  being exposed to the carbon monoxide that accumulated in the mine. The  MINER Act now requires underground coal mines to develop emergency  response plans to ensure that miners have the tools and technology needed to  protect them in the event of future mine accidents. However, because of  differences in the mines’ emergency response plans, it is not clear that all mines  are being held to the same standards for providing these tools to trapped  miners and, ultimately, for providing the protections needed to ensure the  safety of miners. We understand that not all of the mines’ emergency response  plans will be exactly the same because they must take into account the specific  characteristics of each mine. However, the differences in the plans we reviewed  seemed to reflect a lack of specific guidance, rather than the unique  characteristics of each mine. MSHA’s current guidance will continue to be a  problem as districts approve emergency response plans for new mines and  review compliance with emergency response plans as part of their inspections  of all mines. In addition, despite advances in technology, MSHA has not  developed guidance indicating what technologies it will allow mine operators  to use to meet the June 2009 wireless communications requirement of the  MINER Act because they want to wait and see what will be available. However,  if MSHA does not act soon to determine what will be acceptable, it is not clear  that manufacturers and mine operators will be able to plan and prepare for the  implementation of new technologies before the deadline, thereby missing  opportunities to improve trapped miners’ chances of survival after an accident.  Finally, by not monitoring district offices to determine the quality of the  emergency response plans and district enforcement efforts, MSHA  headquarters officials will not be aware that the district offices may be holding  mines to different standards. As a result, all mines may not be prepared to  adequately protect their miners in the event of an accident.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that new and existing mines are held to the same agencywide  standards in preparing for future accidents, we recommend that the Secretary  of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to develop  and issue additional guidance to district offices to clarify what is required for  key components of the emergency response plans, such as providing  postaccident breathable air for the maintenance of trapped miners.
To improve trapped miners’ chances of survival after future accidents  through the use of advanced technology, we recommend that the  Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and  Health to work with NIOSH to develop guidance for mine operators on  how to meet the June 2009 requirement to provide postaccident wireless  communications systems.
To improve oversight of the enforcement and approval of emergency  response plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the  Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to take steps to ensure that  district offices are consistently applying MSHA’s guidance on approving  and enforcing emergency response plans, such as:    analyzing its citation data by district offices and using the information  to clarify policies across districts if these analyses reveal discrepancies  in policies;   analyzing violations of the MINER Act and related regulations to  identify trends and ensure that the appropriate penalties are being  assessed, particularly for repeat violations; and  reviewing a sample of plans across districts to ensure that the content  of the plans meets a consistent agencywide standard and, if not, take  corrective action by clarifying the guidance.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the  Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services, which are  reproduced in their entirety in appendixes III and IV. Both agencies  concurred with our recommendations and the Department of Health and  Human Services provided technical comments and clarification, which we  incorporated in the report as appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that MSHA issue additional guidance  to its district offices clarifying the requirements for key components of  emergency response plans, the Department of Labor agreed and stated  that MSHA will issue more detailed guidance to district managers,  including checklists that clarify what must be included in reviewing new  emergency response plans and 6-month reviews of the plans. The agency  also noted that, in developing guidance on the breathable air component  of the plans, MSHA needed time to evaluate all available technology to  ensure that breathable air was provided safely in an underground mine  environment. We understand that the safety issues involved warranted  careful consideration and that MSHA needed to obtain input from the  mining community as it developed the guidance. However, as stated in our  report, MSHA, for several months, did little to act on the comments it  received on the draft guidance which made it difficult for its district  offices and mine operators to move forward in providing miners with the  protections intended by the MINER Act.
In response to our recommendation that MSHA work with NIOSH to  develop guidance for mine operators on meeting the June 2009  requirement to provide postaccident wireless communications systems,  both the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services agreed  with the recommendation. The Department of Labor stated that it expects  MSHA to develop guidelines at least 6 months prior to the June 2009  deadline. In its comments, the Department of Health and Human Services  emphasized the need for MSHA to issue its guidance in time for mine  operators to respond quickly, indicating that at least 10 months would be  needed for them to develop plans, order equipment, and install the new  systems. Given the upcoming June 2009 deadline and steps mine operators  and manufacturers must take, the Departments of Labor and Health and  Human Services should work quickly to develop the needed guidance. The  Department of Labor also indicated that our report omitted the fact that  MSHA maintains up-to-date lists of approved equipment on its website.  However, while these lists indicate which equipment has been approved as  safe for use in underground coal mines, they do not address what  equipment will be sufficient to meet the postaccident wireless  communications requirement in the MINER Act.
In response to our recommendation that MSHA provide additional  oversight to ensure that district offices are consistently applying the  agency’s guidance on approving and enforcing emergency response plans,  the Department of Labor agreed. It stated that MSHA plans to review  citations issued by its district offices; provide inspectors with guidance to  help ensure that consistent methods are used in citing statutory provisions  of the MINER Act or regulations violated by mine operators; and formalize  headquarters’ reviews of emergency response plans to ensure consistency  in their content, implementation, and enforcement.
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If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-7215 or lasowskia@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To conduct this work, we interviewed officials at the Mine Safety and  Health Administration’s (MSHA) Coal Mine Safety and Health  headquarters and its 11 district offices to learn about MSHA’s guidance for  approving the emergency response plans, the status of implementation of  the plans, and MSHA’s inspection efforts. In each district, we interviewed  the district manager or assistant district manager, the specialist  responsible for reviewing and approving emergency response plans, and  an underground coal mine inspector. We visited two of MSHA’s district  offices located in West Virginia and Kentucky—the two states with the  largest number of underground coal mines in the United States. We  selected District 3 in West Virginia because of the state’s stringent mine  safety laws. During this visit, we accompanied MSHA officials to observe  conditions in an underground coal mine. We selected District 7 in  Kentucky because of the unique and hazardous conditions in some of its  mines, such as mines that release high amounts of methane. During this  site visit, we accompanied an MSHA inspector to observe a system used by  one mine that incorporated relatively new technology to meet the  requirement for a postaccident tracking system. We also interviewed  officials from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  (NIOSH); MSHA’s Approval and Certification Center; and manufacturers of  refuge chambers, breathing devices, and communications and tracking  technologies to learn about the status of mine safety technology research  and development. In addition, we interviewed the director of MSHA’s  penalty assessment office to determine how citations for violations related  to mines’ emergency response plans are processed.
We examined relevant federal laws and regulations that govern MSHA, the  Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, and NIOSH, as they  applied to our research. Further, we reviewed the decisions that resolved  the cases in which MSHA reached an impasse with mine operators on the  requirements of their emergency response plans mentioned in our report.  Finally, we consulted with outside individuals knowledgeable about the  field of mine safety; mine company officials; and other representatives of  the mining community, including the United Mine Workers of America, the  National Mining Association, and the Bituminous Coal Operators’  Association to obtain their views on mine safety efforts and the new  requirements of the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act  of 2006 (MINER Act) for emergency response plans.
We also obtained and analyzed data provided by MSHA on the approval,  implementation, and enforcement of the emergency response plans that all  underground coal mines were required to submit to MSHA as part of the  MINER Act. Our review included all mines that MSHA categorized as  active, producing mines, which MSHA defines as those mines that operate  on a full-time basis to produce coal.
subsections: section_title: Data on the Approval Status of Mines’ Emergency Response Plans
paragraphs: To determine the approval status of mines’ emergency response plans, we  obtained copies of the tracking reports from each district office used by  MSHA headquarters officials to track the approval status of each  component of the mines’ plans. The reports indicate which components of  each mine’s plan had been approved, as of June 21, 2007. MSHA’s district  offices updated these tracking reports weekly and provided them to MSHA  headquarters. To assess the accuracy and reliability of the data recorded  on the tracking reports, we (1) reviewed a nonprobability sample of  emergency response plans and the supporting approval and deficiency  letters sent by MSHA’s district offices to mine operators that corroborated  the reports provided to us by MSHA’s district offices; (2) ensured that the  data included all mines that became active, producing mines prior to June  21, 2007; and (3) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the  data. We worked with district officials to correct any discrepancies we  found before conducting our analyses. MSHA’s tracking reports contained  data for 462 of 467 mines; for the 5 mines that were omitted, we obtained  the mines’ emergency response plans and supplemented MSHA’s tracking  reports with information for these mines. We verified our assessment of  the approval status of these plans with MSHA. After completing these  steps, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of our review.
We selected the nonprobability sample of mines’ emergency response  plans from mines that were included in the data provided by MSHA. Our  sample included 77 of the plans submitted to MSHA by the 462 mines for  which MSHA was tracking the approval status of their plans as of June 21,  2007. As of June 21, 2007, with the exception of District 1, all of MSHA’s  district offices had fully approved most of their mines’ emergency  response plans. Districts 2 through 11 had fewer than five plans that had  only been partially approved. Therefore, we included all of the partially  approved plans from these districts in our sample to determine why they  had not been fully approved and what factors were delaying their  approval. We also randomly selected a minimum of five fully approved  plans for the mines in these districts and 10 percent of the plans in the four  districts with over 50 mines. Because none of the emergency response  plans for the 12 mines in District 1 had been fully approved as of that date,  we randomly selected a sample of 5 of these 12 partially approved plans  for review. As shown in Table 5, our sample included 63 of the 441 plans  that had been fully approved and 14 of the 21 plans that had been partially  approved as of June 21, 2007.
We also used the 77 plans that we sampled to review the content of the  plans and analyze the differences in the plans. We developed a data  collection instrument to record information on each component contained  in the plans. We used this data collection instrument to analyze and  compare differences across the plans we reviewed.
Because, at the time of our review, MSHA had only recently approved  most of the mines’ emergency response plans, we did not include in the  scope or our work the 6-month reviews of approved plans that the MINER  Act requires MSHA to conduct.
section_title: Data on the Implementation Status of Mines’ Emergency Response Plans
paragraphs: To determine the status of mines’ implementation of the components of  their emergency response plans, we obtained data as of September 2007  from MSHA headquarters detailing whether the mines’ plans had been  partially or fully implemented and what supplies mines had on order. We  obtained these data for 439 of the 449 mines categorized by MSHA as  active, producing mines as of October 30, 2007. We used this more recent  date, rather than the June 2007 date, because it better reflected the  implementation status of the emergency response plans of mines  categorized as active, producing mines. We could not obtain information  on the implementation status of 10 mines’ emergency response plans  because MSHA did not track the status of their plans.
The September 2007 data on the implementation status of the mines’  emergency response plans were compiled by MSHA’s district offices as  part of a one-time request from MSHA headquarters for this information.  In January 2008, we asked the district offices to provide updated  information on the implementation status of the emergency response  plans for each of the 449 mines that were still active, producing mines. We  used the January 2008 data to assess the extent to which mines had  implemented their emergency response plans and the extent to which they  were using certain methods to implement the requirements of their plans,  such as whether they were using refuge chambers to meet the requirement  to provide postaccident breathable air to trapped miners.
We did not independently verify the information provided by MSHA on the  implementation status of each mine’s emergency response plan, but we  assessed its reliability. To assess the reliability of the data provided by  MSHA on the implementation status of each mine’s emergency response  plan, we (1) reviewed MSHA’s citation data to corroborate the data on  implementation of the mines’ emergency response plans and (2)  interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  review.
section_title: Data on MSHA’s Citations
paragraphs: To analyze MSHA’s enforcement efforts, we obtained data from MSHA’s  headquarters office on citations issued by its inspectors for violations of  the emergency response plan section of the MINER Act. The data  represent citations issued from August 15, 2006, through December 11,  2007. We analyzed citations issued to underground coal mines that were  among the 449 categorized by MSHA as active, producing mines as of  October 30, 2007. Many mines may have changed status during that time  frame; therefore, we used the data on the status of each mine as of  October 30, 2007 that we obtained in conjunction with the data on the  status of the implementation of the mines’ plans because obtaining data on  the status of each mine on the date that it received a citation would have  been too cumbersome. We also obtained data on citations issued for  violations of 30 C.F.R. Part 75 during this same general period because  some of the provisions it contains overlap with requirements of the  MINER Act. We reviewed these citations, as well as those issued for  violations of the of the emergency response plan section of the MINER  Act, to obtain a complete picture of MSHA’s enforcement efforts. We also  analyzed whether some of these overlapping requirements posed a  problem for inspectors in deciding how to issue the citations and for  MSHA in assessing accurate penalties. We did not, however, review the  extent to which mine operators contested citations issued by MSHA.
To assess the reliability of MSHA’s citation data, we (1) reviewed a sample  of completed citation forms to corroborate the data provided by MSHA,  (2) performed electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and  completeness, and (3) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about  the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of our review.
We conducted this audit from April 2007 through April 2008 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Citations Issued by MSHA Related to the Requirements of Mines’ Emergency Response Plans
paragraphs: The following tables summarize MSHA’s citations of the MINER Act, by  district, from August 15, 2006, through December 11, 2007. Table 6 shows  the number of citations issued by each district for each component of  mines’ emergency response plans. Table 7 provides additional detail on  citations issued for violations of multiple components of the mines’ plans.  Table 8 indicates the number of mines per district that have been issued  citations under the MINER Act.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Anne-Marie Lasowski, (202) 512-7215 or lasowskia@gao.gov.
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Revae Moran, Assistant Director, and Cady Panetta, Analyst-in-Charge,  managed this report. Other staff who made key contributions to the report  include Alana Finley and Jill Yost. Sheila McCoy provided legal assistance.  Cindy Gilbert and Shana Wallace assisted with the methodology and  statistical analysis. Susanna Compton and Mimi Nguyen helped prepare  the final report and the graphics.