Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed
Published: 2005-07-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Securing and defending U.S. airspace is an interagency mission that depends on close interagency coordination and information sharing. GAO was asked to review (1) the threat assessment for U.S. aviation, (2) violations of restricted airspace since September 11, 2001, (3) agencies' individual or coordinated steps to secure U.S. aviation, and (4) interagency policies and procedures to manage the response to restricted airspace violations. GAO will issue a classified report responding to this request later this year. To keep this testimony unclassified, GAO focused on the latter three questions.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration reported about 3,400 violations of restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of which were committed by general aviation pilots. Violations can occur because (1) pilots may divert from their flight plan to avoid bad weather, (2) the Administration may establish newly restricted airspace with little warning, and pilots in the air may be unaware of the new restrictions, or (3) pilots do not check for notices of restrictions, as required. Also, terrorists may deliberately enter restricted airspace to test the government's response or carry out an attack. Federal agencies have acted individually or have coordinated to enhance aviation security. For example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) established a national operations center that disseminates operational- and intelligence-related information, and has enhanced passenger and checked baggage screening, secured cockpit doors, and assessed the risk to some, but not all, commercial airports. Also, few general aviation airport owners have conducted risk assessments. The North American Aerospace Defense Command's mission was expanded to include monitoring domestic air traffic and conducting air patrols. Collectively, the agencies are operating the National Capital Region Coordination Center to secure the National Capital Region. GAO identified gaps in the simultaneous, time-critical, multi-agency response to airspace violations. While it may not be possible to prevent all violations or deter all attacks, GAO identified some gaps in policies and procedures. Specifically, the agencies were operating without (1) an organization in the lead, (2) fully developed interagency policies and procedures for the airspace violations response teleconferencing system, (3) information sharing protocols and procedures, or (4) accepted definitions of a violation. As a result, opportunities may be missed to enhance the security of U.S. aviation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to provide results of GAO’s  work on violations of restricted airspace and the interagency response.  Specifically, I will discuss the unclassified results from our classified  report on violations into restricted airspace that we will issue in  September 2005.
As you know, because of intelligence assessments since the September 11,  2001, attacks, the United States has established additional temporary flight  restrictions over important sites such as selected governmental  operations, national events, and critical infrastructure. Established by the  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), temporary flight restrictions and  other special use airspace measures are national airspace management  tools used to restrict flights into protected airspace. The intent of  establishing restricted airspace is to reduce the number of flights in that  airspace to only those authorized so that the FAA, the Department of  Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and other agencies can  more readily identify an unauthorized aircraft and, if needed, take actions  to deter or defeat it.
Intelligence agencies believe that terrorists remain highly interested in  attacking U.S. aviation with commercial or general aviation aircraft, in  attacking an airport, or in using aircraft to attack targets. Intelligence  agencies differ in their assessments of how significant the threat is from  the use of certain general aviation aircraft in an attack. Our prior work has  shown that the success of interagency efforts depends on melding multi- organizational efforts through central leadership, an overarching strategy,  effective partnerships, and common definitions. Securing and defending  U.S. airspace is a key example of an interagency mission that depends on  close coordination and information sharing between and among the  agencies that share this mission. As many as 7 key government  organizations can be simultaneously involved in responding to a violation  of restricted airspace. TSA is responsible for ensuring that only authorized  pilots, cabin crewmembers, or passengers gain access to an aircraft. Once  airborne, FAA becomes the lead agency and is responsible for managing  traffic entering into or operating in U.S. airspace to ensure safe operations  by monitoring aircraft movements using radar and maintaining  communications with the pilots. Either DOD’s North American Aerospace  Defense Command (NORAD) or DHS is called in to enforce airspace  security if TSA or FAA cannot prevent someone from taking control of an  aircraft without authorization or flying into restricted airspace without  authorization. During a violation, these agencies carry out their  responsibilities simultaneously. This was the case during the incursions  into the National Capital Region restricted airspace during May 2005.
Today I will provide our findings on (1) violations of restricted airspace  since September 11, 2001, (2) agencies’ individual or coordinated steps to  secure U.S. aviation, and (3) interagency policies and procedures to  manage the response to violations of restricted airspace. I will also  summarize our recommendations and the agency comments.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,  federal agencies took immediate steps to secure U.S. airspace. FAA  grounded all air traffic and DOD ordered Air Force fighter jets to fly  patrols over selected U.S. cites to deter and respond to any additional  attacks. In the months after the attacks, the President developed certain  national strategies and directives, and Congress established TSA and gave  it the responsibility to provide security for all modes of transportation.  Congress also later passed and the President signed legislation to protect  the homeland against air, land, and maritime threats, including creating  the DHS to coordinate and lead the national homeland security effort.  After the attacks, interagency coordination increased as FAA, NORAD,  TSA, their parent cabinet departments, and other agencies with homeland  air defense or security roles and missions worked together to meet the  overall goal of protecting U.S. airspace.
NORAD and the FAA have historically been the main contributors to  protecting U.S. airspace. FAA’s primary mission is to safely manage the  flow of air traffic in the United States, but it contributes to air security  through its control of U.S. airspace. About 17,000 FAA controllers monitor  and manage airspace, support the coordination of security operations, and  provide information to military and law enforcement agencies when  needed. Within NORAD, Continental North American Aerospace Defense  Command Region personnel monitor radar data on aircraft entering and  operating within continental U.S. airspace. NORAD also conducts air  patrols in U.S. airspace.
subsections: section_title: Different Classes and Use of Airspace
paragraphs: According to FAA, the agency divides airspace into four categories:  controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other. Controlled airspace may  include special flight restrictions and will have specific defined  dimensions, including altitude ranges, or vertical boundaries, and surface  area, or horizontal boundaries. Any aircraft operating within controlled  airspace must comply with rules governing that airspace or be subject to  enforcement action. Controlled airspace is further divided into classes  ranging from A through E. Each class of airspace has its own level of Air  Traffic Control services and operational requirements that pilots must  follow in order to enter and operate in it. For example, to operate in class  A airspace, pilots must have air traffic controller clearance to enter and  must have communication equipment on board to permit communication  with air traffic controllers. In lesser-restricted airspace, pilots can navigate  by landmarks. Controlled airspace can be further classified with special  flight restrictions. In uncontrolled airspace, class G, air traffic controllers  have no authority or responsibility to control air traffic.
FAA also reserves airspace for special purposes, called Special Use  Airspace, which is normally established to protect important  infrastructure, including military installations. An Air Defense  Identification Zone is restricted airspace in which the ready notification,  location, and control of aircraft are required for national security reasons.
FAA’s other airspace category includes national security areas, military  training routes, and temporary flight restriction areas. A temporary flight  restriction typically restricts flights over specified areas for a specified  period of time. These zones can be established over critical infrastructure,  military operations areas, National Security Special Events, and United  States Secret Service protectees (e.g. such as the President, whose  airspace is protected as he moves throughout the United States).
FAA notifies pilots of temporary flight restrictions through its Notices to  Airmen program. Pilots are required to check for notices before beginning  their flights to avoid any temporary flight restriction zones during their  flights. If pilots violate such a zone, FAA can take actions against them  ranging from suspending the pilot’s certificate to fly in response to a one- time, first-time violation to revocation of the certificate when the violation  is deliberate or otherwise shows a disregard for the regulations.
Temporary flight restrictions are one component of a tiered security  aviation system. The system includes ground procedures, such as TSA  passenger screening procedures, and in-flight security procedures,  including reinforced cockpit doors and Federal Air Marshals on selected  domestic and international flights. Temporary flight restrictions are  considered passive air space control measures intended to keep the flying  public out of the protected airspace so that agencies can more readily  identify and respond to pilots exhibiting hostile intent. A temporary flight  restriction alone will not prevent pilots from entering the protected  airspace.
FAA monitors national airspace traffic to ensure safety and has  established triggers to help identify suspicious aircraft and pilots.  According to FAA procedures, FAA controllers are to advise the pilots to  change their course or altitude if they are on a course toward prohibited or  restricted airspace without authorization, or if they are circling or loitering  over a sensitive area. Sensitive areas include airspace over dams, nuclear  and electrical power plants, chemical storage sites, the location of the  President, or military facilities. Various forms of suspicious pilot and  aircraft activity are being monitored.
If a violation is imminent or underway, responding agencies have only  limited time in which to decide what actions to take. Nonetheless, the  agencies need sufficient time to try to determine the pilot’s intent and, if  necessary, to order, scramble, and launch DOD or DHS aircraft to  intercept the violator.
The response to a violation is managed using a process of recognition,  assessment and warning, interdiction, recovery, and follow-up; which  agency takes these actions depends on the specific nature of the violation.  FAA can report a violation of restricted airspace based on radar tracking.  If the offending aircraft deviates from its planned flight path but is not  heading directly toward the protected asset, FAA may monitor the aircraft  and try to contact the pilot but not interdict the aircraft. Conversely, if  NORAD or FAA perceives the aircraft to be a threat based on its speed,  direction, or other information, NORAD can alert its aircraft and attempt  to intercept the violator. If successfully diverted away from the protected  asset or restricted airspace, Secret Service, FAA, TSA, or local law  enforcement officers may meet the aircraft and interview the pilot upon  landing, to identify any hostile intent. On the other hand, if the offending  pilot does not divert and proceeds to operate in a manner perceived as  threatening, the NORAD pilot can be ordered by the appropriate  authorities to engage the violating aircraft. Figure 1 shows an aircraft  deviating from its planned flight path and shows more highly threatening  and, conversely, less threatening violations of restricted airspace.
section_title: Violations of Restricted Airspace
paragraphs: Our review of an FAA database found about 3,400 reported violations of  restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most  of which were committed by general aviation pilots. According to FAA,  violations occur because (1) pilots may divert from their planned flight  path to avoid bad weather, or may make navigational errors and  consequently enter restricted airspace; (2) FAA may establish airspace  restrictions with little warning, and pilots already in the air may be  unaware of the new restrictions; or (3) pilots may not check for notices of  new restrictions as required by FAA and may consequently enter restricted  airspace without authorization. In addition, terrorists might deliberately  enter restricted airspace to observe the government’s response or to carry  out an attack. FAA investigates pilot deviations into restricted airspace to  determine the reasons for an incident and to determine whether the pilot’s  certificate should be temporarily suspended or permanently revoked.
subsections: section_title: Factors That Contributed to Incursions
paragraphs: As the scope of restricted airspace increases, the number of violations  generally also increases. In addition, a greater concentration of air traffic,  such as in the eastern United States, would affect the number of violations.  FAA has worked with the aviation community to inform them of the  additional restricted areas. Figure 2 shows the percentage of violations of  restricted airspace by area of the United States.
General aviation aircraft pilots accounted for about 88 percent of all  violations of restricted U.S. airspace between September 12, 2001, and  December 31, 2004. Figure 3 shows the percentage of incursions by type of  aircraft.
According to FAA data, pilot error is the biggest contributor to restricted  airspace violations. Pilots may not check for FAA Notices to Airmen that  indicate the location of restricted airspace, or FAA may establish such  airspace with little warning, and pilots may consequently enter the  airspace. Airspace restrictions can move, such as when the President  travels. Notices on the location of newly restricted airspace may be issued  quickly, and pilots may already be in their aircraft or in the air when the  restriction is announced and implemented. Moreover, pilots may fly  around bad weather or may experience equipment problems and  consequently enter restricted airspace to maintain safe operations.
To reduce violations, FAA has conducted safety seminars, provided a toll- free number for pilots to call and check for restricted airspace, identified  the location of restricted airspace on its Web site, and encouraged pilots to  check for and be attentive to notices on restricted airspace.
section_title: FAA Actions to Temporarily Suspend or Permanently Revoke Pilot Certificates
paragraphs: When a pilot enters restricted airspace without authorization, FAA  investigates and decides what actions to take against the pilot. After the  September 2001 attacks, FAA strengthened the actions that it could take.  For example, FAA no longer issues warning notices or letters of correction  to pilots. Instead, FAA will now suspend a pilot’s certificate for 30 to 90  days for a single, inadvertent, first-time violation of a temporary flight  restriction area that was established with a notice. The temporary  suspension’s length depends on the degree of danger to other aircraft and  persons or property on the ground, the pilot’s level of experience, prior  violations record, and certain other factors. If a pilot deliberately enters  restricted airspace without authorization, FAA will revoke the pilot’s  certificate.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Taken Individual and Coordinated Actions to Mitigate the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Aviation
paragraphs: Federal agencies have undertaken individual and coordinated initiatives to  secure U.S. aviation by trying to ensure that only authorized personnel  gain access to aircraft or airports, expanding efforts to educate pilots  about the location of restricted airspace and the circumstances under  which they may enter such airspace, improving the monitoring of domestic  airspace, enhancing their ability to enforce airspace restrictions, and  trying to effectively coordinate a response to each restricted airspace  violation in the event that prevention fails. TSA, FAA, and DOD have  individually and in a coordinated way directed resources to mitigate the  risk of terrorists using commercial aircraft as weapons or targets. Some  of the most publicly visible changes are the advent of TSA operations at  over 400 airports, which include more rigorous passenger screening  procedures.
subsections: section_title: Coordinated Agency Initiatives Taken to Secure U.S. Aviation
paragraphs: The agencies have recognized that individual actions alone are not  sufficient to respond to violations of restricted airspace, and consequently  they have also coordinated their efforts to try and enhance the response to  each violation. The agencies have established the National Capital Region  Coordination Center to enhance the effectiveness of air security and air  defense operations in the national capital region. The center’s primary  mission is to facilitate rapid coordination and information sharing among  participating agencies in preventing, deterring, and interdicting air threats  to the region. To facilitate center operations, the participating agencies  approved a concept of operations plan in May 2005 that identifies agency  roles and missions in securing and defending national capital region  airspace and specifies certain interagency operating protocols.
section_title: Interagency Management of the Response to Airspace Violations Could Benefit from Closing Gaps in Policies and Procedures
paragraphs: The individual and coordinated agencies’ actions represent noteworthy  efforts to counter the threat to U.S. aviation and the homeland. However, it  is important to recognize that it may not be possible to prevent all  restricted airspace violations or to deter all attacks. Airspace security  measures could be challenged. In addition, in some cases, some pilots do  not consult FAA notices on the location of restricted airspace as required  by FAA, and consequently sometimes inadvertently enter restricted  airspace without authorization. Although FAA has established stricter  sanctions against pilots and stepped up its outreach efforts, violations  continued at the time of our review. Consequently, the interagency  management of the response to airspace violations could benefit from  filling gaps in policies and procedures. We also identified gaps in TSA’s  risk assessment of the aviation sector.
subsections: section_title: Gaps in TSA Risk Assessments
paragraphs: TSA has made improvements in airspace security; however, TSA does not  have complete knowledge of the level of risk existing in the commercial  aviation sector. While agency officials told us that they conducted  vulnerability assessments, a component of risk assessments, at many of  the commercial airports, they had not assessed all of them. TSA officials  explained that they had not yet established milestones for specific actions  needed to complete the risk assessments. As a result, TSA lacks assurance  that some airport managers have taken reasonable steps to enhance  security.
General aviation airports and aircraft are also a concern because TSA has  generally not assessed the level of security existing at these airports.  About 19,000 general aviation airports operate in the United States, and  TSA’s overall vulnerability assessments at these airports have been  limited. Most general aviation airports are not required to provide the  same level of screening for pre-boarding passengers as at commercial  airports. TSA has reviewed some general aviation airports for  vulnerabilities and developed risk assessment tools to enable managers to  conduct self-assessments. Nonetheless, the assessments are voluntary, and  the completion of these assessments has been limited. Thus, TSA plans to  outreach to airport managers to promote use of the tool. In a November  2004 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security  direct the Assistant Secretary of TSA to develop an implementation plan  with milestones and time frames to execute a risk management approach  for general aviation, and the agency concurred with our recommendation.
section_title: Gaps in the Interagency Management of Violations
paragraphs: While improvements have been made in the overall management response  to airspace violations, the interagency response to airspace violations  suggests that there are opportunities for further improvement, because  these agencies have not formally developed an interagency program to  institutionalize the defense of restricted airspace. Specifically, the  agencies do not have:    an organization in charge,   interagency policies and procedures,    protocols for information sharing, and    common definitions of restricted airspace violations.
subsections: section_title: Leadership Over the National Capital Region Coordination Center Is Uncertain
paragraphs: Each agency simultaneously acts and commands and controls its own  resources in responding to a violation of restricted airspace. At the same  time, TSA, FAA, and DOD officials told us that, at the National Capital  Region Coordination Center, determining who leads the interagency  response is difficult, may change depending on the nature of the airspace  violation, and may shift during the course of a violation, as the agencies  monitor the intruder’s flight and consider the appropriate response. TSA is  the executive agency for the center, but TSA officials said that they only  resolve or “deconflict” agency issues and do not see themselves as being in  charge of the interagency process for responding to violations of restricted  airspace. At the same time, DOD pointed out that the response at the  center has little or no effect on NORAD’s response, because NORAD and  FAA control National Capital Region airspace. Without central leadership,  the potential exists for a somewhat slower response to a violation as the  agencies decide who is in charge while the violating aircraft continues to  operate in restricted airspace.
section_title: Interagency Coordination Is Occurring, but Policies and Procedures Are Not Well Established
paragraphs: While the interagency coordination achieved at the time our report was  noteworthy, TSA, FAA, DOD, and other agencies had not implemented  certain key policies and procedures that are critical to multi-organizational  success, particularly when they are acting simultaneously in a time-critical  operation. For example, the agencies had not agreed on policies and  procedures to specify who has access to Domestic Events Network- initiated conferences, and under what circumstances. Additionally,  according to FAA, during a violation FAA personnel may not have access  to DOD’s classified teleconference systems if the interagency response  goes beyond a certain national security classification, because FAA  officials may lack appropriate security clearances. In other cases,  according to DOD officials, when a secure conference is taking place, FAA  officials cannot connect themselves into the conference, the originating  party must call them and FAA must subsequently answer the call, in order  to participate. If unable to participate, FAA officials told us that they may  be unable to effectively manage other aircraft in the area in a timely  manner, potentially resulting in aircraft collisions or exposing aircraft  transiting the area to danger if the decision is made to shoot down the  violator.
section_title: Concept of Operations Plan for the National Capital Region Is Completed, but Remaining Airspace Is Not Covered
paragraphs: In April 2005, the agencies completed their interagency concept of  operations plan for the National Capital Region Coordination Center, but  the concept of operations plan does not address when and how  responsibility for response is passed from agency to agency during a  violation. Also, the agencies have not begun to develop a plan covering any  other U.S. airspace. Such plans outline the general concept of program  operations with specific actions and responsibilities to be assigned to  participating agencies in a separate, more detailed plan. Without a concept  of operations plan, the effective passing of responsibility from one agency  to another to respond to a restricted airspace violation cannot be ensured,  potentially leading to confusion and a slower response.
section_title: Information Sharing Protocols and Procedures Have Not Been Established
paragraphs: Information sharing protocols and procedures have not been established  by the agencies or within some parts of FAA. After the agencies complete  the response to an airspace violation, FAA and NORAD officials record the  violation in separate databases. These databases consist of records of  violations that, taken together, could reveal trends indicating testing or  training for an attack. However, neither FAA nor NORAD routinely shares  even parts of its data with the other. Furthermore, the FAA database was  not routinely shared with the agency’s own Strategic Operations Security  Manager, despite the manager’s repeated attempts to obtain access. In May  2005, FAA finally agreed to share parts of the database with its own  Strategic Operations Security Manager. Although the FAA database was  set up for a different purpose, the manager had previously indicated that  he could use information to enhance security; however, he told us that the  FAA department that maintains the database had previously refused to  provide the information, citing the need to protect pilot information.
We also obtained access to key elements of the database and found  information that could suggest approaches to reducing violations of  restricted airspace. For example, we could identify aircraft that repeatedly  violated restricted airspace and the airports from which the flights  originated. Specifically, we found 2 general aviation aircraft that had  accounted for 6 violations each, and 29 airports, 17 of which are in  Maryland and Virginia, that had accounted for about 30 percent of all  airspace violations nationwide. This is the type of information that was not  shared with the FAA Strategic Operations Security Manager, but which  such an office might find useful in light of intelligence agency threat  assessments about the potential for terrorist use of general aviation  aircraft.
Additionally, FAA enforcement actions taken on airspace violations are  not routinely shared with other agencies. Since agencies do not have this  information, they have little knowledge as to the disposition and  effectiveness of their collective efforts, and they may be hampered in their  ability to target limited resources effectively. For example, NORAD air  defense-sector personnel did not have aggregated or general information  about FAA’s administrative enforcement actions against pilots who had  violated restricted airspace in their sectors.
section_title: Common Definitions Have Not Been Accepted
paragraphs: Finally, the potential for confusion exists about what constitutes a  restricted airspace violation because no common definition has been  accepted. FAA and NORAD, the primary agencies collecting airspace  violations data, define it differently. NORAD uses the term “incursion” and  defines different types of incursions depending on various factors,  including airspeed and direction. FAA uses the term “pilot deviation” and  defines it as the actions of a pilot that result in the violation of a Federal  Aviation Regulation or a NORAD Air Defense Identification Zone, a  category of restricted airspace. However, the terms are not synonymous,  and a violation can trigger a response in one agency but not another, even  though multiple agencies share the responsibility for restricted airspace  security and an appropriate, timely response is critical. Moreover, without  a common definition that can be used as a basis for collecting nationwide  data, the agencies may not be aware of the scope and magnitude of  violations, making it potentially more difficult to target resources  efficiently and enhance security.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the fragmented missions of agencies  involved in securing and defending U.S. airspace converged into a broader  interagency mission to protect the airspace. Since September 11, 2001,  several involved agencies took actions that represent noteworthy efforts  to counter the threat to U.S. aviation and the homeland. TSA has  attempted to identify vulnerabilities of aircraft and airports and  consequently implemented and continues to implement security  enhancements. Although TSA is finishing the development of a risk- assessment tool to assess general aviation threats, TSA has not established  milestones with specific actions needed to complete a similar risk  assessment for the commercial aviation sector. Until the assessment is  completed, TSA may lack complete knowledge as to the level of risk in  commercial aviation, and it cannot be assured that commercial aircraft  owners and operators at some airports are effectively targeting resources  to mitigate the risk of terrorists’ using commercial aircraft to attack  population centers and critical infrastructure. Because the interagency  process to manage the response to restricted airspace violations is a time- critical operation, the implications of not having well-developed policies,  procedures, information sharing protocols, and common definitions are  serious. In addition, if information and databases are not appropriately  shared, opportunities to better target limited resources and proactively  identify emerging threats could be missed.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the  Assistant Secretary of TSA to establish milestones with specific actions  needed to complete risk assessments applicable to the commercial  aviation sector.
We further recommend that the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland  Security, and Transportation work together to    determine the extent to which one agency should be in charge of leading  the interagency process of responding to violations of restricted airspace  as they occur;    determine the degree to which interagency policies, procedures, and other  guidance on the Domestic Events Network are needed to evaluate its  effectiveness and identify potential improvements;    develop a concept of operations plan or other relevant document to guide  the interagency process of responding to violations in all U.S. airspace;    establish information sharing requirements and protocols; and    establish common definitions.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and  Transportation work together to determine the extent to which key  elements of FAA’s pilot deviations database could be shared with NORAD.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the  Administrator of FAA to take the following actions:    Obtain necessary security clearances for appropriate FAA personnel to  ensure that they are not excluded from airspace violations conferences  that require such clearances; and    Ensure that FAA shares sufficient data from its airspace violation database  (also known as its pilot deviations database) with FAA’s office of the  Strategic Operations Security Manager to meet the needs of that office.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We received unclassified written comments from DHS, classified written  comments from DOD, and unclassified oral comments from the  Department of Transportation on the classified draft report that we will  issue to you in September 2005. We have included the DHS comments in  their entirety in appendix II and the unclassified portion of DOD’s  comments in appendix III. Each agency also provided technical comments,  and we incorporated them in our draft report and this statement where  appropriate.
DHS and DOD disagreed with our draft report recommendation that the  secretaries of the three departments work together to appoint an  organization responsible for determining the extent to which one agency  should be in charge of countering violations of restricted airspace as they  occur. DHS maintains that each agency should maintain full authority to  execute its own portion of the mission that contributes to the interagency  effort. DHS and DOD both pointed out that the Interagency Airspace  Protection Working Group in the Homeland Security Council addresses  interagency coordination issues, and DHS indicated that the working  group may be a vehicle for addressing the gaps we identified. We note that,  to date, the issues we highlighted in our testimony remain unresolved.  Nevertheless, we revised our recommendation to suggest that the  secretaries of the three departments work together to determine the  extent to which one agency should be in charge of leading the interagency  process of responding to violations of restricted airspace. Ultimately, we  believe that if the agencies can collectively resolve the issues and gaps we  identified in our report, which they acknowledged, then an organization in  charge may not be needed.
As discussed above, DHS agreed or partially agreed with the rest of our  recommendations, while DOD disagreed with most of the  recommendations and agreed with some. Department of Transportation  officials agreed with the recommendations in our draft report.
DHS generally concurred with our recommendation to establish  milestones with specific actions needed to complete risk assessments  applicable to the commercial aviation sector. In its response, DHS said  that it continues to conduct assessments as part of its risk-based  management approach. While these are good first steps, we still believe it  is also important to establish milestones with specific actions needed to  ensure that the assessments are completed within a reasonable time  period and are effectively managed. While DHS disagreed with having a  lead agency, its comments stated that more could be done to coordinate  efforts during violations, but that the focus should be on open  communications to ensure flexibility in responding to the violation. DHS  told us that the Interagency Airspace Protection Working Group meets  regularly and addresses relevant national airspace issues, but we noted  that there is still an absence of an air security strategy, plan, or concept of  operations, and the issues we found that could enhance air security such  as information sharing and common definitions still need to be addressed.  DHS concurred with our recommendations to determine the degree to  which interagency policies and procedures on the Domestic Events  Network are needed; develop a concept of operations for management of  the interagency response to violations in all U.S. airspace; and establish  information sharing requirements and protocols. With regard to our  recommendation to establish common definitions, DHS concurred in part,  citing that each agency’s mission and command and control processes  require that it develop its own definitions for airspace violations. However,  DHS agreed to share its definitions with other agencies. We agree that  sharing definitions is important; however, it is unclear to us whether  simply sharing and not harmonizing definitions would sufficiently reduce  confusion during the interagency operation responding to violations of  restricted airspace. This is especially a concern in a time-critical function  where clear decisions are imperative.
DOD concurred or partially concurred with some of our recommendations  and nonconcurred with others. DOD also noted that we omitted from our  draft report certain DOD procedures officials supplied to us that integrate  DOD’s response to violations of restricted airspace with those of other  agencies. We acknowledge that DOD has internal procedures that discuss  the way DOD interacts with other agencies, and we considered those  procedures as part of our analysis. DOD’s procedures notwithstanding, we  identified a number of potential gaps in the interagency process of  responding to violations of restricted airspace that remain unaddressed.
We recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, and  Transportation work together to accomplish five initiatives. First, DOD  nonconcurred with our recommendation that the three secretaries work  together to identify an organization that would be responsible for  addressing interagency coordination issues. As did DHS, DOD pointed out  that the Interagency Airspace Protection Working Group already  addresses interagency coordination for homeland air defense.  Nonetheless, problems remain. For example, as we point out in our report,  information sharing protocols and procedures have not been established, a  concept of operations plan for airspace outside the national capital region  has not been developed, and common definitions have not been adopted.  DOD also pointed out that TSA hosts agencies at the National Capital  Region Coordination Center. While true, TSA officials told us that they  view their role as one of deconflicting rather than of leading interagency  efforts. As stated earlier, we believe that if the agencies can effectively  resolve the issues and gaps we identified in the interagency process of  responding to violations of restricted airspace without having an  organization in charge, then an organization in charge may not be needed.
Second, DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation that the three  secretaries work together to determine the extent to which one agency  should be in charge of leading the interagency process of responding to  violations of restricted airspace as they occur. DOD stated that our report  is misleading because it implies that having someone in charge would  prevent some airspace violations. DOD also stated that DHS has managed  air security by hardening commercial aircraft cockpit doors, placing  armed Federal Air Marshals on some flights, and taking other actions.  DOD also pointed out that FAA manages airspace for flight safety and  DOD defends domestic airspace. DOD stated that all of these missions  occur at all times and there is never a “lead change.” As discussed above,  we revised and clarified our recommendation to suggest that the  secretaries of the three departments determine the extent to which one  agency should be in charge of leading the interagency process of  responding to restricted airspace violations. Our recommendation is  intended to enhance the response to violations of restricted airspace and  is not premised on the notion that its adoption would prevent the  violations from occurring. Moreover, while steps taken by DHS, FAA, and  DOD to secure aviation, ensure flight safety, and defend homeland  airspace are important contributions, they generally do not contribute to  knowing who is in charge of the response as a violation is occurring. Also,  we agree with DOD that there is never a “lead change,” because the  interagency process lacks central leadership. Finally, we did not  recommend that a specific agency or individual be in charge. We  recommended that the departments study the question of whether it would  be advantageous to have someone in the lead. If the departments  determined that such a change would be beneficial, they would  presumably also determine what, if any, changes in law would be needed.
We acknowledge, however, that if the agencies can effectively resolve the  issues and gaps we identified in the interagency process of responding to  restricted airspace violations, then an organization in charge may not be  needed.
Third, we recommended that the three secretaries determine whether  interagency policies, procedures, or other guidance is necessary to  evaluate Domestic Events Network performance and identify  improvements. DOD nonconcurred and stated that the Domestic Events  Network is not designed for decision making. We note that the network is  a telephone conferencing system that permits communication between the  agencies responding to violations of restricted airspace for the purpose of  deciding on the coordinated response. We are not aware that the agencies  have evaluated network performance to determine whether enhancements  are possible, and our recommendation was intended to promote such an  evaluation. We continue to believe that government initiatives benefit from  appropriate evaluation of performance, and consequently we stand by our  recommendation.
Fourth, we recommended that the secretaries work together to develop a  concept of operations plan for management of violations in all U.S.  airspace. DOD nonconcurred on the basis that the agencies do not manage  violations but respond to them. Nonetheless, DOD agreed that an overall  air strategy and identification of roles and missions for each agency should  be considered. We agree that an overall strategy for securing U.S. air space  would be beneficial, and we believe that if such a strategy is developed, a  concept of operations plan or other relevant document would follow. As a  result of DOD’s comment, we have revised our recommendation to one of  developing a concept of operations plan or other relevant document to  guide the interagency response to violations of restricted airspace.
Finally, DOD concurred with our recommendations that the secretaries  work together to establish information sharing protocols and procedures  and establish common definitions.
We had also recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and  Transportation work together to determine the extent to which key  elements of the FAA’s pilot deviation database could be shared with  NORAD, and DOD nonconcurred. In its comments, DOD stated that it does  not require access to private citizen data contained in the FAA database.  We agree that DOD does not require such information. However, we  recommended that DOD meet with the Department of Transportation to  determine whether any elements would be useful, and if so, to pursue a  means to obtain them. Consequently, we stand by our recommendation.
Department of Transportation officials told us that they agreed with our  recommendations and indicated that a national air security policy should  be established to outline major goals and responsibilities for each of the  agencies with responsibilities for the protection of U.S. airspace.  Department officials also stated that without a national policy, the  agencies would continue to work without unified, common goals.  Transportation officials suggested that a policy coordinating committee be  established for air security to address interagency issues. They also agreed  that information sharing is critical to enhance air security and told us that  they had begun sharing pilot deviations data with the FAA Strategic  Operations Security Manager as we had recommended. We agree with the  Department’s overall comments and believe that this is the type of  dialogue that should take place between the Departments of Homeland  Security, Defense, and Transportation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the  opportunity to discuss these issues. At this time, I would be happy to  address any questions.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In conducting our review of the response to violations of restricted  airspace, we visited key offices within DOD, DHS, and FAA that have  responsibility for oversight and management of U.S. airspace. We  conducted our review in the Washington, D.C., area, at DOD, including the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Defense  Intelligence Agency, and Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Office;  DHS, including the Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,  United States Secret Service, and the Transportation Security  Administration, including the National Capital Region Coordination  Center; FAA Headquarters, Domestic Events Network, Air Traffic Control  System Command Center, and the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar  Approach Control facility. We also met with the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National  Counterterrorism Center, the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration, and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. We did  not review ground-based air defense batteries that are also part of the  homeland air defense system.
We conducted fieldwork at U.S. Northern Command and NORAD,  Colorado Springs, Colorado, as well as NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense  Sector, Rome, New York; Western Air Defense Sector, Tacoma,  Washington; and the Continental U.S. NORAD Region and Southeast Air  Defense Sector near Panama City, Florida. In addition, we visited the Air  Force’s Air Combat Command, Langley, Virginia, and 84th Radar  Evaluation Squadron, Ogden, Utah; Immigration and Customs  Enforcement’s Air and Marine Operations Center, Riverside, California;  and FAA’s Air Traffic Control Center, Fort Worth, Texas.
To determine the extent to which violations of restricted airspace have  occurred since September 11, 2001, we met with NORAD and FAA officials  to obtain relevant data from their incursion and pilot deviation databases,  respectively, and discussed their methods for determining what  constitutes an incursion/pilot deviation. After determining that NORAD’s  database was not adequate to accurately identify the number of violations  of restricted airspace, we obtained relevant portions of FAA’s pilot  deviation database and performed the analysis necessary to develop the  data provided in the report. We reviewed the reliability of the FAA  database to determine the numbers of incursions. We (1) performed  electronic testing of the data elements needed for our analysis and looked  for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, (2) reviewed related  documentation, and (3) interviewed officials knowledgeable about the  data. We noted several limitations in the data, including missing values for  key data elements and the fact that events might be both over- and under- reported due to varying definitions of pilot deviations. We were able to  partially correct for these problems and consequently determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable to illustrate analyses for tracking violations  of restricted airspace. However, because we could not fully correct for  data errors, the data presented should be considered estimates rather than  precise numbers.
To identify the actions taken individually or in coordinated fashion to  secure U.S. airspace and aviation and to mitigate the threat since  September 11, 2001, we interviewed officials at the National Capital  Region Coordination Center; the headquarters of NORAD and its  Continental U.S. NORAD Region and the three continental U.S. based air  defense sectors, TSA, FAA, and Air Combat Command; and the Air and  Marine Operations Center. We discussed and reviewed changes in  operational responsibilities and plans of these organizations both pre- and  post- September 11, 2001. To better understand these actions, we toured  and observed the workings of the National Capital Region Coordination  Center, the air defense sectors, the Domestic Events Network, and the Air  and Marine Operations Center. While at some of these centers, we  observed the agencies’ responses to actual violations of restricted  airspace, the interaction of the agencies involved in responding, and the  steps taken by the various agencies involved to address the violation. We  discussed with agency officials the procedures for responding to  incursions into restricted airspace and reviewed pertinent documentation  relating to those procedures where they existed.
In examining interagency policies and procedures that govern the  management of airspace violations, we first reviewed existing GAO work  that found that the success of interagency efforts depends on melding  multi-organizational efforts through central leadership, an overarching  strategy, effective partnerships, and common definitions. We then  compared the extent to which agencies with responsibility for preventing  or responding to violations of restricted airspace have established an  organization in charge, interagency policies and procedures, protocols for  the sharing of database records documenting violations of restricted  airspace, and common definitions of restricted airspace.
We conducted our review from June 2004 through April 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Brian J. Lepore, Lorelei St. James, James F. Reid, James R. Nelson, Carissa  D. Bryant, Ronald La Due Lake, Rebecca Shea, Michael C. Zola, Cheryl  Weissman, and R.K. Wild made key contributions to this statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, But  Continued Partnership with Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term  Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve Northern  Command’s Mission, but Challenges Remain. GAO-04-622C. Washington,  D.C.: September 8, 2004.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to be  Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. forces for  Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to  Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but  Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
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