Nuclear Security: Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to Meet the May 2003 Design Basis Threat
Published: 2004-06-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing the material used in nuclear weapons, called special nuclear material, could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003. GAO examined the issues that could impede the ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to fully meet the threat contained in the May 2003 DBT by the department's fiscal year 2006 deadline.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Five Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites contain substantial quantities of Category I special nuclear material, which consists of specified quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. These sites have all developed plans for implementing the May 2003 DBT. However, there are several issues that could make it difficult to implement these plans by DOE's deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006. The Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites approved their DBT implementations plans in February 2004 before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his April 2004 guidance on which sites had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As a result, some sites may be required to shift to enhanced protection strategies, which could be very costly. Consequently, the assumptions in the Office of Energy, Science and Environment DBT implementation plans may no longer be valid, and the plans may need to be revised. The Office of Energy, Science and Environment site plans are based on the May 2003 DBT; however, DOE is now reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise it. Consequently, if the DBT is changed in a way that increases security requirements, some Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites may have to revise their implementation plans to reflect the need to provide for a more stringent defense. The plan for one Office of Energy, Science and Environment site was under funded. Specifically, officials in the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, which is part of the Office of Energy, Science and Environment, told GAO that, for one site, no DBT implementation funding had been requested for fiscal year 2005. Finally, full implementation of these plans will require the successful resolution of complex organizational arrangements between various program and security offices. Consequently, GAO continues to believe, as it recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced implementation plan for meeting the new DBT requirements that includes important programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and the transportation of special nuclear materials.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on physical security at  the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Energy, Science and  Environment (ESE). DOE’s Office of Energy, Science and Environment  comprises nine offices, including the Offices of Environmental  Management (EM); Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE); and  Science (SC) and is headed by the Under Secretary for ESE.
DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site  containing the material used in nuclear weapons—called special nuclear  material—could have devastating consequences for the site and its  surrounding communities. This is particularly true at sites that contain  Category I special nuclear material, which consists of specified quantities  of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the form of assembled  nuclear weapons and test devices, major nuclear components, and other  high-grade materials such as solutions and oxides.
Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences,  DOE’s effective management of its safeguards and security program,  which includes developing safeguards and security policies, is essential to  preventing an unacceptable, adverse impact on national security. For  many years, DOE has employed risk-based security practices. To manage  potential risks, DOE has developed a design basis threat (DBT), a  classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities of  terrorist forces. DOE’s DBT is based on an intelligence community  assessment known as the Postulated Threat. DOE requires the contractors  operating its sites to provide sufficient protective forces and equipment to  defend against the threat contained in the DBT. The DBT in effect on  September 11, 2001, had been DOE policy since June 1999. DOE replaced  the 1999 DBT in May 2003 to better reflect the current and projected  terrorist threats that resulted from the September 11 attacks.
On April 27, 2004, we testified before this Subcommittee on several key  aspects surrounding DOE’s development and implementation of its May  2003 DBT. Specifically, we reported on our examination of (1) the reasons  DOE needed almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, (2) the higher threat  contained in the new DBT, and (3) the remaining issues that needed to be  resolved for DOE to fully defend against the threat contained in the new  DBT. With regard to the issues needing resolution for DOE to fully defend  against the threat contained in the new DBT, we found that DOE had been  slow to resolve a number of significant issues including developing DBT  implementation plans and budgets to support these plans. The need to  fully resolve these issues may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the  threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, we  stated that DOE’s deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by  the end of fiscal year 2006 was probably not realistic for some sites.
Subsequently, you asked us to examine in more detail the issues that could  impede ESE’s ability to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT by  DOE’s fiscal year 2006 deadline. To carry out our objective, we  interviewed DOE and ESE officials, including EM, NE, and SC  headquarters security officials, as well as field security officials. We also  reviewed relevant documents these officials provided to us. In addition,  we reviewed recent reports from DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight  and Performance Assurance for the ESE sites that contain Category I  special nuclear material. We also relied on our previous work on DOE  physical security conducted for this Subcommittee over the last 2 years.  We performed our work from May 2004 to June 2004 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, ESE sites containing Category I special nuclear material have  developed plans for implementing the May 2003 DBT. However, we believe  there are several issues that could make it difficult to implement these  plans by DOE’s deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006. These specific  issues are as follows:    ESE sites approved their implementation plans during February 2004  before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his April 2004 guidance on  which sites had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As a result,  some sites may be required to shift to enhanced protection strategies,  which could be very costly. Consequently, the assumptions in the ESE site  plans may no longer be valid, and the plans may need to be revised.
ESE site plans are based on the May 2003 DBT; however, DOE is now  reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise it. Consequently, if the  DBT is changed to increase security requirements, some ESE offices may  have to revise their implementation plans to reflect the need for a more  stringent defense.
While ESE sites have developed implementation plans, even under the old  assumptions, the plan for one site was under funded. Specifically, NE  security officials told us that for one site no DBT implementation funding  had been requested for fiscal year 2005.
Finally, full implementation of these plans will require the successful  resolution of complex organizational arrangements between various  program and security offices.
We continue to believe, as we recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs  to develop and implement a department wide multiyear, fully resourced  implementation plan for meeting the new DBT requirements that includes  important programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and the  transportation of special nuclear materials.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Five ESE sites collectively contain substantial quantities of Category I  special nuclear material. These include the following:  the Savannah River Site in Savannah River, South Carolina, and the  Hanford Site in Richland, Washington, which are managed by EM; the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and the  Argonne National Laboratory-West which are located in Idaho Falls, Idaho,  and are managed by NE; and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is  managed by SC.
Contractors operate each site for ESE. The ESE program offices that  oversee these sites—EM, NE, and SC—have requested about $397 million  in fiscal year 2005 for security.
Two other organizations are important contributors to DOE’s security  program. The Office of Security in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety  Performance Assurance develops and promulgates orders and policies,  such as the DBT, to guide the department’s safeguards and security  programs. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance  Assurance in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance  supports the department by, among other things, independently evaluating  the effectiveness of contractors’ performance in safeguards and security. It  also performs follow-up reviews to ensure that contractors have taken  effective corrective actions and appropriately addressed weaknesses in  safeguards and security.
The risks associated with Category I special nuclear materials vary but  include the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a  nuclear yield, theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon, and the potential  for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal. Because of these risks,  DOE has long employed risk-based security practices. The key component  of DOE’s well-established, risk-based security practices is the DBT, a  classified document that identifies the characteristics of the potential  threats to DOE assets. The DBT traditionally has been based on a  classified, multiagency intelligence community assessment of potential  terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat. The DBT considers a  variety of threats in addition to the terrorist threat. Other adversaries  considered in the DBT include criminals, psychotics, disgruntled  employees, violent activists, and spies. The DBT also considers the threat  posed by insiders, those individuals who have authorized, unescorted  access to any part of DOE facilities and programs. Insiders may operate  alone or may assist an adversary group. Insiders are routinely considered  to provide assistance to the terrorist groups found in the DBT. The threat  from terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat contained in  the DBT.
DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted  protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all  protective systems at DOE’s most sensitive sites employ a defense-in- depth concept that includes sensors, physical barriers, hardened facilities  and vaults, and heavily armed paramilitary protective forces equipped with  such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor,  and chemical protective gear.
The effectiveness of the protective system is formally and regularly  examined through vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is  a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative  techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective  protection of specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct  such assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts,  such as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and  force-on-force performance testing, in which the site’s protective forces  undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists.
The results of these assessments are documented at each site in a  classified document known as the Site Safeguards and Security Plan. In  addition to identifying known vulnerabilities, risks, and protection  strategies for the site, the Site Safeguards and Security Plan formally  acknowledges how much risk the contractor and DOE are willing to  accept. Specifically, for more than a decade, DOE has employed a risk  management approach that seeks to direct resources to its most critical  assets—in this case Category I special nuclear material—and mitigate the  risks to these assets to an acceptable level. Levels of risk—high, medium,  and low—are assigned classified numerical values and are derived from a  mathematical equation that compares a terrorist group’s capabilities with  the overall effectiveness of the crucial elements of the site’s protective  forces and systems.
Historically, DOE has striven to keep its most critical assets at a low risk  level and may insist on immediate compensatory measures should a  significant vulnerability develop that increases risk above the low risk  level. Compensatory measures could include deploying additional  protective forces or curtailing operations until the asset can be better  protected. In response to a September 2000 DOE Inspector General’s  report recommending that DOE establish a policy on what actions are  required once a high or moderate risk is identified, in September 2003,  DOE’s Office of Security issued a policy clarification stating that identified  high risks at facilities must be formally reported to the Secretary of Energy  or Deputy Secretary within 24 hours. In addition, under this policy  clarification, identified high and moderate risks require corrective actions  and regular reporting.
Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its  safeguards and security policies are being complied with and are  performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments and  are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. DOE Orders also  require field offices to comprehensively survey contractors’ operations for  safeguards and security every year. The Office of Independent Oversight  and Performance Assurance in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety  Assurance provides yet another check through its comprehensive  inspection program. All deficiencies identified during surveys and  inspections require the contractors to take corrective action.
Reflecting the post-September 11 environment, the May 2003 DBT, among  other things, identified a larger terrorist threat than did the 1999 DBT. It  also expanded the range of terrorist objectives to include radiological,  biological, and chemical sabotage. Key features of the 2003 DBT included  the following:    Expanded terrorist characteristics and goals. The 2003 DBT assumes that  terrorist groups are the following: well armed and equipped; trained in  paramilitary and guerrilla warfare skills and small unit tactics; highly  motivated; willing to kill, risk death, or commit suicide; and capable of  attacking without warning. Furthermore, according to the 2003 DBT,  terrorists might attack a DOE facility for a variety of goals, including the  theft of a nuclear weapon, nuclear test device, or special nuclear material;  radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage; and the on-site detonation  of a nuclear weapon, nuclear test device, or special nuclear material that  results in a significant nuclear yield. DOE refers to such a detonation as an  improvised nuclear device.
Increased the size of the terrorist group threat. The 2003 DBT increases  the terrorist threat levels for the theft of the department’s highest value  assets—Category I special nuclear materials—although not in a uniform  way. Previously, under the 1999 DBT, all DOE sites that possessed any  type of Category I special nuclear material were required to defend against  a uniform terrorist group composed of a relatively small number of  individuals. Under the 2003 DBT, however, the department judged the  theft of a nuclear weapon or test device to be more attractive to terrorists,  and sites that have these assets are required to defend against a  substantially higher number of terrorists than are other sites. For example,  a DOE site that, among other things, assembles and disassembles nuclear  weapons, is required to defend against a larger terrorist group. Other DOE  sites, such as an EM site that stores excess plutonium, only have to defend  against a smaller group of terrorists. However, the number of terrorists in  the 2003 DBT is larger than the 1999 DBT number. DOE calls this a graded  threat approach.
Mandated specific protection strategies. In line with the graded threat  approach and depending on the type of materials they possess and the  likely mission of the terrorist group, sites must now implement specific  protection strategies for Category I special nuclear material. In addition,  sites will have to develop, for the first time, specific protection strategies  for facilities, such as radioactive waste storage areas, wastewater  treatment, and science laboratories, against the threat of radiological,  chemical, or biological sabotage.
Addressed the potential for improvised nuclear device concerns. The May  2003 DBT established a special team to report to the Secretary of Energy  on each site’s potential for improvised nuclear devices. Based on the  team’s advice, in April 2004 the Deputy Secretary of Energy designated  whether a site had such a concern. This official designation was intended  to help address the general dissatisfaction with previous DOE policies for  improvised nuclear devices, knowledge of which was carefully controlled  and not shared widely with security officials. For example, some EM sites  had no information at all on their potential for this risk.
section_title: A Number of Issues May Affect the Ability of ESE Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in the New DBT in a Timely Fashion
paragraphs: When we testified before this Subcommittee in April 2004, we stated that  while DOE had issued the final DBT in May 2003, it had only recently  begun to resolve a number of significant issues that could affect the ability  of its sites to fully meet the threat in the new DBT in a timely fashion.  These issues involved issuing additional DBT implementation guidance,  developing DBT implementation plans, and developing budgets to support  these plans. We noted that fully resolving all of these issues might take  several years, and the total cost of meeting the new threats was currently  unknown. Consequently, we stated, full DBT implementation could occur  anywhere from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008, well beyond the  department’s goal of the end of fiscal year 2006. Because some sites would  be unable to effectively counter the higher threat contained in the new  DBT for up to several years, we stated that these sites should be  considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they were under  the old DBT.
After reviewing ESE’s efforts to implement the May 2003 DBT at sites  containing Category I special nuclear material, we continue to be  concerned about whether DOE can meet its fiscal year 2006 deadline for  full DBT implementation. Specifically, while ESE sites that contain  Category I special nuclear material have developed plans for implementing  the May 2003 DBT, as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Energy, we  believe there are four issues that will make it difficult to implement these  plans in a timely fashion.
First, ESE sites approved their implementation plans in February 2004  before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his guidance on which sites  had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As noted previously, the  May 2003 DBT created a special team, composed of weapons designers  and security specialists to report on each site’s improvised nuclear device  vulnerabilities. The results of this report were briefed to senior DOE  officials in March 2004 and the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued  guidance, based on this report, to DOE sites in early April 2004. As a result,  some sites may be required under the 2003 DBT to shift to enhanced  protection strategies, which could be very costly. This special team’s  report may most affect ESE sites, because, in some cases, their improvised  nuclear device potential had not previously been explored. In addition,  ESE security officials told us that confusion exists about how or if this  guidance applies to their sites, and they stated that they are working with  officials from DOE’s Office of Security to resolve this confusion. The  Director of DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance  agreed that additional guidance will be necessary to resolve this  confusion. Consequently, because ESE sites developed their plans well  before this guidance was issued, the assumptions in their plans may no  longer be valid and the plans may need to be revised.
Second, the ESE site implementation plans are based on the May 2003  DBT; however, DOE is now reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise  it. In our April 2004 report, we expressed several concerns about the May  2003 DBT. In particular, we noted that some DOE sites may have  improvised nuclear device concerns that, if successfully exploited by  terrorists could result in a nuclear detonation. However, under the May  2003 DBT, DOE only required these sites to defend against a relatively  small group of terrorists. Because we believed that DOE had not made a  persuasive case for defending against a lower number of terrorists, we  recommended that DOE reexamine how it applies the DBT to sites with  improvised nuclear device concerns. Subsequently, in May 2004, the  Secretary of Energy announced that the department would reexamine the  DBT. Originally, this reexamination was to be completed by June 30, 2004.  However, according to the Director of DOE’s Office of Security and Safety  Performance Assurance this effort will not be completed until August 6,  2004. In addition, the Director stated that the end result of this effort may  only be a plan on how to revise the DBT. Consequently, if the DBT is  changed in a way that increases security requirements, some ESE offices  may have to revise their implementation plans to reflect the need to  provide for a more stringent defense.
Third, in one case ESE does not have adequate resources. Specifically,  while ESE sites have developed implementation plans, even under the old  assumptions, the plan for one site was under funded. NE security officials  told us that for one site no DBT implementation funding had been  requested for fiscal year 2005, even though the site recognized that it  needed to substantially increase its protective forces to meet the new  DBT.
Finally, ESE faces a number of complex organizational issues that could  make DBT implementation more difficult. Specifically:    EM’s Security Director told us that for EM to fully comply with the DBT  requirements in fiscal year 2006 at one of its sites, it will have to close and  de-inventory two facilities, consolidate excess materials into remaining  special nuclear materials facilities, and move consolidated Category I  special nuclear material, which the National Nuclear Security  Administration’s Office of Secure Transportation will transport, to another  site. Likewise, the EM Security Director told us that to meet the DBT  requirements at another site, EM will have to accelerate the closure of one  facility and transfer special nuclear material to another facility on the site.  Because the costs to close these facilities and to move materials within a  site are borne by the EM program budget and not by the EM safeguards  and security budget, obtaining adequate funding could be difficult.
At an Office of Science site, a building that contains Category I special  nuclear material is managed and protected by the Office of Science, while  the material itself belongs to NE. NE is currently planning to remove the  material and process it. After processing, the material will no longer have  to meet the protection requirements for Category I special nuclear  material. Accomplishing this task will require additional security  measures, the planning and funding for which will have to be carefully  coordinated between the Office of Science and NE.
NE sites face similar issues. For example, the NE Security Director told us  that EM currently owns all of the Category I special nuclear material  stored at an NE site. EM is currently planning to have the National Nuclear  Security Administration’s Office of Secure Transportation transport this  material to several other locations by the end of January 2005. According  to the NE site Security Director, NE is counting on the successful removal  of this special nuclear material to meet the department’s fiscal year 2006  deadline for implementing the May 2003 DBT. To implement the May 2003  DBT, NE also needs to consolidate two of its sites into a single national  laboratory, which will, among other things, ensure that it has an adequate  number of protective forces. If the EM special nuclear materials are not  moved and this consolidation is not achieved, the number of protective  forces at this site may not be adequate.
Because of the importance of successfully integrating multiple program  activities with security requirements, we continue to believe, as we  recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to develop and implement a  departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced implementation plan for  meeting the May 2003 DBT requirements that includes important  programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and the  transportation of special nuclear materials.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy  to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee  may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Robin M.  Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841. James Noel and Jonathan Gill made key  contributions to this testimony. Don Cowan and Preston Heard also made  contributions to this testimony.
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