Military Training: Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges to Address Projected Future Requirements
Published: 2010-07-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Army's and Marine Corps' major training facilities--Army and Marine Corps combat training centers and Army mobilization training centers--have focused on training units for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As troop levels decrease in Iraq and increase in Afghanistan, larger numbers of forces will be training for Afghanistan. To meet future requirements, the services plan to adjust training to train forces on a fuller range of missions. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to report on any challenges the Department of Defense faces as it adjusts training capacities. GAO assessed the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have (1) made adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments to Afghanistan; and (2) developed plans to adjust training capacity to meet future requirements. GAO analyzed service training guidance, future training requirements, and related plans, and interviewed headquarters officials and personnel from the services' major training facilities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Due to similarities in training requirements, the Army and Marine Corps did not need to make significant adjustments at their major training facilities to support the shift in operational priority from Iraq to Afghanistan. While the Army had to adapt training scenarios to more closely resemble the operating environment in Afghanistan, it did not have to adjust trainers, training ranges, and mock towns and villages as these are the same regardless of whether forces are preparing for missions in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Since the summer of 2009, the Marine Corps had withdrawn most of its forces from Iraq and shifted the focus of training at its combat training center to exclusively train forces for missions in Afghanistan. Like the Army, the Marine Corps noted that, because of similarities in training requirements, it had to make few adjustments beyond changing some cultural role players and signs in mock towns and villages to support its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. The Army and Marine Corps face several challenges as they plan to broaden the scope and size of training rotations to meet future training requirements. The Army projects capacity shortfalls at its combat training centers as it seeks to train brigade combat teams to meet future requirements for both ongoing operations and full-spectrum operations--offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The Army has identified the need to conduct 36 to 37 annual training rotations for its brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2011; the centers can currently conduct 28 rotations a year. The Army is developing an exportable capability, expected to increase its capacity by 6 rotations each year when it reaches full operational capability in 2013. However, this will not be sufficient to meet the total projected requirements. To address the gap, the Army plans to give priority to deploying units. The Army has not completed an assessment to determine its full range of options for meeting future brigade combat team training requirements, or the risks associated with not conducting the desired number of training rotations. The Army's force generation model calls for smaller reserve-component units to train for both ongoing and full-spectrum operations, but the Army has not finalized its training strategy for these reserve-component forces. The Army has identified training requirements and locations where deploying forces will train for ongoing operations, but it has not determined where or when it will train its reserve-component contingency forces for full spectrum operations. The Army has the capacity to train 86,000 reserve-component personnel at its seven mobilization training centers each year. It is also conducting enhanced training at other locations, which could expand capacity. Until the Army finalizes its reserve-component training strategy it will not be able to determine whether it can leverage existing resources to meet future training requirements, or whether any excess reserve-component training capacity exists. In the future, the Marine Corps plans to expand training to allow larger numbers of forces to train together, but it lacks sufficient space at its combat training center. It is considering alternatives for acquiring land, ranging in size from approximately 131,000 to 200,000 acres, and expects to reach a decision by fiscal year 2012.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends the Army develop a risk-assessment and mitigation plan to address gaps in training capacity, and assess how it can maximize existing resources to conduct reserve-component training called for under its force generation model. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since 2003, the Army and Marine Corps have focused much of their  training on preparing forces for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and  Afghanistan, training larger numbers of forces for Iraq. However, with the  drawdown in Iraq and increase in troop levels in Afghanistan, the services  are beginning to train more forces to deploy to Afghanistan. The high pace  of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and focus on counterinsurgency  missions has affected the Army and Marine Corps’ ability to train their  forces for a fuller range of missions at their major training facilities—the  Army’s and Marine Corps’ Combat Training Centers (CTC) and the Army’s  mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National Guard.  Recognizing the uncertainty of future conflicts and the need for forces to  have a broader range of skills, the Army and Marine Corps are beginning  to make plans to adjust the training capacity—such as the number of  rotations and related support—at their major training facilities to train  forces for a fuller range of missions.
The House Armed Services Committee report to the Fiscal Year 2010  National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number  of military readiness issues, including any challenges DOD faces in  adjusting training capacity and scope to support larger deployments to  Afghanistan while still preparing forces for deployments to Iraq. In April  2010, we issued a report on the consistency of combat skills training  provided to Army and Marine Corps support forces, and will report  separately on other issues called for in the House report. For this report  we evaluated (1) the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have  made adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger  deployments to Afghanistan while still preparing forces for deployments to  Iraq, and (2) the extent to which the Army and the Marine Corps have  developed plans to adjust training capacity to meet future training  requirements.
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have made  adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments  to Afghanistan—while still preparing forces for deployments to Iraq—we  reviewed Army and Marine Corps training policy and guidance, and we  interviewed headquarters service officials to discuss these documents. In  focusing our review, we also identified the Army’s and Marine Corps’  major predeployment training facilities; specifically the locations at which  these services are conducting final mission-rehearsal exercises that  include live-fire training for units deploying in support of current  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the Army we focused on active  and National Guard brigade combat teams, which prepare and train for  deployment at the Army’s maneuver CTCs. In addition, we focused on the  Army’s mobilization training centers, where National Guard brigade  combat teams that will be split into smaller units in theater conduct  training. Because smaller-sized reserve-component units also conduct  predeployment training at the Army’s mobilization training centers for the  Reserve and National Guard, we included these units in the scope of this  review. We did not include active component units that do not train at  maneuver CTCs since these units generally train at different locations— their home stations where they have training facilities and support. For the  Marine Corps we focused on units training for deployment at its only CTC,  at Twentynine Palms, California.
We obtained and reviewed information from the Army’s and Marine Corps’  major training facilities on the training they conducted in fiscal year 2009  and fiscal year 2010, through April. We interviewed officials at the selected  locations of the services’ major training facilities and at the installations  where the Army’s mobilization training centers for the Reserve and  National Guard are located to discuss adjustments that they made to  support larger deployment to Afghanistan while still training for  operations in Iraq. Specifically, we held discussions with officials from all  four of the Army’s CTCs; the Marine Corps’ only CTC, the Air Ground  Combat Center, located at Twentynine Palms, California; and officials  from the Army’s seven mobilization training centers for the Reserve and  National Guard where the Army currently conducts training and plans to  conduct training in the future. To determine the extent to which the Army  and the Marine Corps have developed plans to adjust training capacity, we  reviewed training guidance and strategies that provided information about  future training requirements for the services, including the Army’s force  generation annex to its campaign plan and the Marine Corps’  expeditionary brigade training requirements. We interviewed Army and  Marine Corps officials to discuss the future training requirements and the  available capacity at their major training facilities. We also examined  existing Army and Marine Corps plans and strategies to adjust capacity to  meet future training requirements. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of  the training programs conducted at these locations.
We assessed the reliability of the data presented in this report.  Specifically, with regard to capacity—the maximum number of training  rotations that can be conducted, or people that can be trained, on a  sustainable basis—we interviewed officials and obtained data from the  Army’s and Marine Corps’ headquarters organizations. In addition, we  interviewed officials and obtained data from the major training facilities to  verify that these data were consistent with the data provided by the  headquarters organizations. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope and  methodology are in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Types of Army and Marine Corps Training
paragraphs: During initial entry training, recruits are trained on service tasks and skills,  including basic military tactics, weapons training, and marksmanship. In  addition, the services have annual training requirements that are focused  on tasks such as crew-served weapons training, reacting to chemical and  biological attacks, and offensive and defensive tactics. Prior to deploying  overseas, units must also complete a set of service-directed  predeployment training requirements, including a mission-rehearsal  exercise.
section_title: Army Force Generation
paragraphs: The Army’s Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) is a cyclical unit- readiness model that affects the types of training that units conduct during  each phase. Through ARFORGEN, the Army builds the readiness of units  as they move through three phases: Reset, Train/Ready, and Available.  The Army uses these phases, which are described in figure 1, to prioritize  resources and coordinate training, personnel, and equipment.
As shown in figure 1, units entering the Available phase may or may not be  deployed to conduct operational missions; units that are deployed in  support of operations are known as deployed forces. Units in the  Available phase that are not deployed are known as contingency forces.  These units may conduct training or exercises with other services,  governmental agencies, or military security forces from other nations. If  units are deployed, they will return to the Reset phase upon  redeployment—regardless of the length of deployment. If they are not  deployed, units will return to the Reset phase after 12 months. There are  no prescribed time lengths for one complete ARFORGEN cycle because  the length of the cycle is driven by the length of active-component  deployments, and reserve-component mobilizations. While current  deployments are typically 12 months long, the Army has also used  deployments of varying lengths, including 6 and 15 months, to support its  ongoing operations. For the Army’s active-component forces the  ARFORGEN cycle is three times as long as its deployments, and for its  reserve-component forces the cycle is five times as long as its  mobilizations.
section_title: Army’s and Marine Corps’ Major Training Facilities and Approaches to Training
paragraphs: The Army maintains four CTCs: the Battle Command Training Program,  Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the National Training Center, Fort Irwin,  California; the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and  the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany. The Battle  Command Training Program trains the command element of a unit. The  National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and the Joint  Multinational Readiness Center, collectively referred to as the maneuver  CTCs, train brigade combat teams—approximately 5,000  servicemembers—during rotations that last for 18 to 25 days.
Since 2003, the Army’s maneuver CTCs have been conducting mission- rehearsal exercises for units prior to their deployments. Each training  rotation is designed to challenge units and their leaders with the  opportunity to face a well-trained opposing force, provide in-depth  analyses of performance to units and their leaders, and create a realistic  training environment, intended to closely parallel actual warfare, including  live-fire training. Training rotations at the maneuver CTCs also include  force-on-force training in a live, virtual, and constructive environment. As  noted in appendix II, the Army’s maneuver CTCs can conduct 28 training  rotations annually for brigade combat teams. In addition to a brigade  combat team, a CTC training rotation may also include Army support units  and personnel or capabilities from other services and agencies.
In addition to the maneuver CTCs, the Army has seven mobilization  training centers for the Reserve and National Guard that are operated by  First Army—which is responsible for training mobilized reservists—that  conduct predeployment training. This training ranges from 15 to 60 days  for reserve-component units varying in size from small detachments—1 or  2 people—to brigade combat teams. Prior to deployment, units conduct  mobilization and collective training at the Army’s mobilization training  centers for the Reserve and National Guard: Fort Dix, New Jersey; Camp  Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort  Stewart, Georgia; Camp Shelby, Mississippi; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Bliss,  Texas; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and Fort Lewis,  Washington.
Before 2008, all deploying brigade combat teams conducted training at an  Army maneuver CTC prior to deployment. However, in 2008, due to the  high operational tempos from the force increase in Iraq, and finite training  capacities, the Army determined that reserve-component brigade combat  teams that would be split into smaller units and assigned other missions,  such as security forces, would conduct training at the Army’s mobilization  training centers. The brigade combat teams that would control battle  space in theater, both active and reserve component, would conduct  training at the maneuver CTCs.
We reported in July 2009 that capacity constraints had limited reserve- component access to facilities at certain Army mobilization training  centers because they also were being used by active-component forces.  Around that time, First Army began to consolidate the Army’s mobilization  training centers for the Reserve and National Guard from 11 to 7.  Specifically, First Army is retaining the locations that are owned by the  reserve component or which have a dedicated training area for mobilizing  reservists. These mobilization training centers will concentrate their  efforts on training specific mission sets required for current operations  while maintaining flexibility to support other missions in the future. As  shown in appendix II, in fiscal year 2009, approximately 89,000  servicemembers were trained at the Army’s mobilization training centers  for the Reserve and National Guard.
The Marine Corps is organized into Marine Air-Ground Task Forces— which include headquarters, ground combat, logistics combat, and  aviation combat elements—that train, exercise, and deploy as fully  integrated combined-arms teams. At the Marine Corps’ CTC, the Air  Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, battalion-sized  units participate in a 28-day exercise that immerses units in an  environment that is continuously updated and is designed to replicate the  current operational conditions using mock urban villages, cultural role  players, and equipment that will be employed in Afghanistan. The exercise  includes two infantry battalions, a combat logistics battalion, and an  aviation combat element in a single rotation that prepares Marines for the  tactics and procedures they are expected to employ in Afghanistan. In  addition, the Marine Corps will occasionally incorporate units from other  services, such as the Air Force and Navy, and other nations to enhance the  training experience.
The Marine Corps can conduct 6 training rotations per year at Twentynine  Palms; in fiscal year 2009 it trained approximately 23,000 servicemembers.  As of April 2010, the Marine Corps has trained approximately 9,800  servicemembers in support of missions in Afghanistan.
section_title: Prior Work
paragraphs: We have previously reported on the Army’s approach to training and  mobilizing its reserve component. In July 2009, we reported that although  the Army was exploring and had several initiatives underway to address  training constraints, it had not identified the total requirements with its  reserve-component training strategy. We recommended that the Army  determine the range of resources and support that are necessary to fully  implement its reserve-component training strategy. DOD partially agreed  with our recommendation, however, as of May 2010, the Army had not  identified the total requirements to fully implement its reserve-component  training strategy.
section_title: Army’s and Marine Corps’ Major Training Facilities Require Few Adjustments to Support Force Increase in Afghanistan
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps have shifted their operational priority from  Iraq to Afghanistan; however, few adjustments were required at the Army’s  major training facilities for a number of reasons, including the similarities  in the Army’s training requirements for both operations. In addition, since  summer 2009, the Marine Corps has been preparing most of its forces for  missions in Afghanistan at its CTC at Twentynine Palms.
subsections: section_title: Similarities in Army Predeployment Requirements and Related Support Result in Few Needed Changes at the Army’s Major Training Facilities
paragraphs: Initially, the Army published separate predeployment training guidance for  forces deploying in support of operations in Iraq and operations in  Afghanistan. However, in September 2007, the guidance was combined  into one document because there were only small differences in the  required training tasks for the two operations. Because of the similarities  in requirements, the Army has had to make few adjustments at its major  training facilities to support the increase in forces deploying to  Afghanistan.
For example, maneuver CTCs have continued to train the same types of  units—brigade combat teams—as the Army has increased its forces in  Afghanistan and reduced its forces in Iraq. The Army’s maneuver CTC and  mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National Guard, which  have dedicated opposing forces and trainers, use these same groups to  train and prepare forces for missions in either Iraq or Afghanistan. These  major training facilities also use the same training ranges, mock towns and  villages, and instrumentation to train for both operations. Officials noted  that they do not change much of the physical appearance of the training  area except for village names and signs within the mock towns and  villages to ensure that the proper language is displayed.
While the equipment used in training varies somewhat for forces deploying  to Iraq and Afghanistan, according to officials, these differences have  required only minimal adjustments and have not affected the mission- rehearsal exercises or number of training rotations being conducted. For  example, the types of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles that  troops train on may vary due to the differing terrain between the two  operations. In Afghanistan units use a lighter-weight all-terrain-capable  version of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles better suited for  the uneven terrain and subpar road conditions, whereas in Iraq units use a  heavier version of the vehicles. According to Army officials, the maneuver  CTCs currently do not have the number of all-terrain-capable Mine  Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles that they prefer for enhancing  collective training; the majority of these vehicles currently are being  deployed to Afghanistan. Therefore, the available vehicles are primarily  being used at the maneuver CTCs to support individual training tasks  required prior to deploying for operations in Afghanistan. As we previously  reported, in instances when units lack the equipment to train on a task  prior to deployment, they are supposed to receive the required training  after they deploy.
Army officials stated that the biggest change in adapting from Iraq to  Afghanistan is in the training scenarios that are used during the rotations.  For example, forces deploying to both Iraq and Afghanistan are provided  training on counter–improvised explosive devices; however, differences in  how the devices are being used in the two countries result in slightly  different training scenarios. Although the development of the initial  training scenarios for Afghanistan took several months, once the scenarios  are developed, they can be tailored for each unit 180 days prior to the unit  arriving at one of the Army’s major training facilities. In addition, officials  noted that the types of cultural role players participating in these  scenarios were also different. For example, regarding languages for Iraq,  role players in training scenarios speak Arabic; for Afghanistan, they speak  Dari and Pashtu.
section_title: Few Adjustments Required at the Marine Corps Training Facility
paragraphs: From 2003 to 2009, the Marine Corps had a significant number of forces in  Iraq. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq, however, the Marine Corps has  shifted its focus to missions in Afghanistan; as of the summer of 2009, the  Marine Corps was conducting limited training for missions in Iraq at its  CTC at Twentynine Palms.
Like the Army, the Marine Corps, because of similarities in training  requirements, had to make few adjustments at Twentynine Palms to  support its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. For example, the  Marine Corps uses the same training ranges, trainers, and mock towns and  villages as it did when training forces for Iraq. However some  modifications, such as changes to the signs in the mock towns and villages  and the addition of Afghan role players, have been made to better replicate  the current environment.
section_title: The Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges in Adjusting Training Capacity to Meet Their Identified Future Requirements
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps face challenges as they look to broaden the  scope and size of their training rotations in the future. The Army projects  capacity shortfalls at its maneuver CTCs to meet its identified future  requirements to train brigade combat teams for both continuing  operations and a broader range of offensive, defensive, and stability  operations. Further, the Army has not developed a plan to use its existing  training capacity to meet these full-spectrum training requirements for its  smaller reserve-component units. In addition, the Marine Corps estimates  that it does not have sufficient training capacity to meet future large-scale  training requirements at its major training facility; however, it is pursuing a  land acquisition to meet its requirements.
subsections: section_title: The Army Has Identified the Need for Extra Capacity by Fiscal Year 2011
paragraphs: As outlined in the Army Training Strategy, the ARFORGEN process calls  for brigade combat teams to conduct training rotations at the maneuver  CTCs. To support this process, the Army has identified the need to  conduct 36 to 37 brigade combat team rotations annually. Seventy-two of  the Army’s 73 brigade combat teams will conduct their rotations at the  maneuver CTCs. The timing of units’ rotations will depend on many  factors, including their component and location.
Specifically, the ARFORGEN process calls for most of the Army’s active  component brigade combat teams to conduct two maneuver CTC rotations  during each ARFORGEN cycle. The first rotation will occur following the  Reset phase and units will focus on their core missions by conducting full- spectrum operations training that includes offensive, defensive, and  stability operations or homeland operations. The second rotation will  occur at the end of the unit’s Train/Ready phase and will focus on either  the unit’s deployment mission—if the unit has been designated for  deployment—or on its core missions if the unit has not been scheduled to  deploy and has instead been designated as a contingency force.
The ARFORGEN process calls for reserve-component brigade combat  teams to conduct one maneuver CTC rotation during their ARFORGEN  cycle. Due to their part-time status following deployments, Army National  Guard brigade combat teams will go into the Reset pool for 12 months— twice as long as active brigade combat teams. As units move into the  available pool after completing the Train/Ready phase of ARFORGEN,  they will conduct a maneuver CTC rotation. If the unit is scheduled to  deploy, its rotation will focus on the deployed mission. If the unit is  designated a contingency force, its rotation will focus primarily on full- spectrum operations.
Under ARFORGEN, forward-deployed brigade combat teams in Europe,  with ready access to the maneuver CTC in Germany, will conduct a CTC  rotation every year regardless of which phase of the ARFORGEN cycle the  unit is in. The brigade combat team in Korea, which is thousands of miles  from the nearest maneuver CTC, will not conduct a maneuver CTC  rotation and will conduct all of its training in Korea.
Based on its projected tempo of operations in fiscal year 2011—12-month  deployments and goals of 1:2 active component and 1:4 reserve  component time-deployed to time-at-home ratios—the Army has identified  the need to conduct 36 to 37 training rotations, as displayed in table 1. In  addition, the table highlights—under different deployment scenarios—the  effect that the ARFORGEN model’s inputs can have on the number of  maneuver CTC rotations that are needed. Specifically, table 1 shows  different deployment periods, ranging from 6 to 15 months, and the  number of maneuver CTC rotations required for each example. The  examples in table 1 are meant to be illustrative; we did not reach any  conclusions regarding these scenarios and recognize that the Army must  consider many factors in determining the length of deployments.
As shown in table 1, adjusting either the deployment length or time- deployed to time-at-home ratios can affect the required number of  maneuver CTC rotations. Army officials have stated that while the current  goal is time-deployed to time-at-home ratios of 1:2 for the active  component and 1:4 for the reserve component, the Army would like to  eventually get to a ratio of 1:3 for the active component and 1:5 for the  reserve component. Example A in table 1 shows that if deployments  remained constant at 12 months but the Army was able to achieve the  desired longer times at home it would reduce its required CTC rotations to  28 or 29 each year. Examples B and C are presented simply to illustrate the  effect of various deployment lengths, which the Army has used in the past,  on the number of required training rotations.
The Army’s maneuver CTCs cannot fully support the number of rotations  called for by ARFORGEN—36 to 37 rotations. As of May 2010, the Army’s  maneuver CTCs can currently conduct 28 brigade combat team training  rotations per year—the National Training Center can conduct 10 rotations,  the Joint Readiness Training Center can conduct 10 rotations, and the  Joint Multinational Readiness Center can conduct 8 rotations. However,  the Joint Multinational Readiness Center’s role in Europe is not limited to  providing maneuver CTC rotations to U.S. Army brigade combat teams;  the Joint Multinational Readiness Center is currently using 4 of its 8  annual training rotations to train multinational partners. Unless the Joint  Multinational Readiness Center uses its entire capability—to conduct 8  annual training rotations—to train U.S. Army brigade combat teams, the  Army will train less than 28 brigade combat teams each year.
According to Army officials at the maneuver CTCs, the maneuver CTCs  could surge to conduct up to 32 rotations in one year but this level is not  sustainable for an extended period because it does not provide enough  time between rotations to properly maintain equipment and vehicles.  Further, the trainers—both observer controller/trainers and opposing  forces, who normally work 7 days per week when units are conducting  their 18-to-25-day maneuver CTC rotations—do not have enough time to  recover between rotations.
section_title: Planned Exportable Training Capabilities Would Add Flexibility and Capacity, but Would Not Fully Address Projected Capacity Shortfalls
paragraphs: According to the Army Training Strategy, one of the Army’s goals is to  develop sufficient maneuver CTC capacity to support the ARFORGEN  training cycle for deploying and contingency brigade combat teams by the  end of fiscal year 2012. To better meet the Army’s demand for maneuver  CTC rotations and to generate trained and ready forces to conduct full- spectrum operations, the Army has developed an Exportable Training  Capability at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center and is developing  an Exportable Training Capability at the National Training Center. The  Exportable Training Capabilities, which are mobile units of trainers and  equipment, will travel to any of 15 designated training areas. Plans call for  this training to be focused on full-spectrum operations for brigade combat  teams as they transition from the Reset to the Train/Ready phase of  ARFORGEN.
The Exportable Training Capability Operational and Organizational Plan  Coordinating Draft, dated February 28, 2007, states that the exportable  capability training is better than the training a unit could conduct at home  station without external support, although not as robust as the training  conducted at the static maneuver CTC locations. For example, the  Exportable Training Capability cannot provide an in-depth level of after- action reporting, and it will not conduct live-fire exercises. In addition,  while the maneuver CTCs have a robust, dedicated opposing force that is  used during training, the Exportable Training Capabilities will rely on  other units to provide a portion of the opposing force resources.  According to this same draft operational and organizational plan, in the  event of a surge the Exportable Training Capability must be prepared to  conduct mission-rehearsal exercises in support of deploying units.
The Army initially planned to develop three Exportable Training  Capabilities—one at the National Training Center, one at the Joint  Readiness Training Center, and one at the Joint Multinational Readiness  Training Center. However, due to personnel constraints, the Army was  only able to develop the Exportable Training Capabilities at the Joint  Multinational Readiness Center and the National Training Center. The  Army designated the Joint Multinational Readiness Center as a dual- mission Exportable Training Capability because it already had employed  its mobile capability to a limited extent into Eastern Europe to conduct  training with multinational partners and had the necessary capabilities to  perform as a mobile capability. In March of 2009 the Joint Multinational  Readiness Center–Exportable Training Capability deployed to Fort Bragg,  North Carolina, and conducted a “proof of principle” for this concept by  conducting a training rotation for a brigade combat team from the 82nd  Airborne Division. With this deployment, the Joint Multinational Readiness  Center–Exportable Training Capability demonstrated that it has increased  flexibility, which could be used to help the Army conduct 28 U.S. Army  brigade combat team rotations by conducting its normal 4 rotations at  Hohenfels, Germany, for the brigade combat teams in Europe and by  deploying to the United States to conduct four additional rotations for  Army brigade combat teams.
The Exportable Training Capability at the National Training Center would  increase the Army’s training rotation capacity for brigade combat teams  and is expected to conduct exportable training at one of the designated  training areas at the same time that training is being conducted at the  National Training Center at Fort Irwin. At full capability, this training  capability is expected to be able to conduct 6 rotations annually, which  would increase the annual maneuver CTC training capacity from 28 to 34  rotations. The National Training Center’s Exportable Training Capability  was initially scheduled to reach its full operational capability in 2010, but,  as we reported in 2007, the Army was unable to meet its timelines due to  personnel shortfalls caused by the Army’s current commitments to  ongoing operations. The Army currently is projecting that its National  Training Center–Exportable Training Capability will reach its initial  operating capability in fiscal year 2012 and full operating capability in  fiscal year 2013.
If the Army is to reach its new goal for full operating capability in fiscal  year 2013, it will need to fill about 300 military positions that are required  for the National Training Center–Exportable Training Capability. To  prepare for the initial training event in October 2011, the Army needs to fill  30 critical personnel positions in the operations group—which includes  planners for the exportable capability—by September 2010. As of April  2010, the Army had filled 13 of these critical positions. The remaining 17  positions are for mid-level officers, who are in short supply throughout the  entire Army and in the Army’s maneuver CTCs’ existing operations groups.  According to Army officials, if all 30 of the critical personnel positions are  not filled by September 2010, the Army will potentially miss its operational  timeline for conducting its initial training rotation, which has already  slipped once. Officials at the maneuver CTCs noted that they expect to see  an improvement in the filling of these positions with a recent transfer of  responsibility for the operations groups from the U.S. Army Training and  Doctrine Command to U.S. Army Forces Command but still expressed  concerns about whether they would meet the September 2010 deadline for  filling the 30 critical personnel positions. These officials said they  eventually expect to see improvements in the filling of these positions with  the continued drawdown in Iraq and the increased time at home of  servicemembers.
To meet its goal of conducting 6 training rotations, the Exportable  Training Capability at the National Training Center will also have to  overcome a number of support challenges. For example, the exportable  capability will have to rely on the designated training areas for support.  Specifically, the training areas will have to fund the initial start-up costs  for facilities or support infrastructure required by the Exportable Training  Capability. Further, the designated training areas will have to provide  administrative support, and the unit conducting training may have to  provide trainers for the exportable capability.
Even if the Army is able to use the Exportable Training Capabilities as  projected and conduct 34 training rotations of various levels each year  beginning in fiscal year 2013, the Army projects that it will fall short of the  36 to 37 rotations it expects to need to train brigade combat teams. To  help address its training capacity shortfalls, the Army has developed a list  that prioritizes the scheduling of units training at its maneuver CTCs. The  list assigns first priority to deploying units, followed by the global  response force / CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and  high-yield explosives) consequence-management reaction force. Lower  priority is assigned to units conducting full-spectrum operations mission- essential tasks and security forces.
However, the Army has not assessed the risks associated with its inability  to conduct the desired number of brigade combat team training rotations  and has not developed a mitigation plan that identifies a full range of  available options for addressing the risks of not conducting the desired  numbers of rotations, within its current resource levels. Without such a  plan, the Army’s brigade combat teams face uncertainties concerning their  ability to conduct CTC rotations or receive support from the Exportable  Training Capability and will need to conduct some type of alternative  training.
section_title: The Army Continues to Develop Its Training Needs for the Reserve Component to Support ARFORGEN
paragraphs: In recent years, the Army has relied heavily on its reserve-component  forces to meet operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. As  described in the 2010 Army Posture Statement, as the Army looks to the  future it must retrain soldiers, leaders, and units to build critical skills  necessary to operate across the full spectrum of operations. Further, the  Army expects that its units will be prepared through the ARFORGEN  model to support both the current operation and a broader range of  missions that could arise outside of the U.S. Central Command area of  responsibility.
As we have previously reported, agencies need to consider how their  training strategy works in conjunction with other already-established  program initiatives and develop mechanisms that effectively limit  unnecessary overlap and duplication of effort to enhance the execution of  that training strategy.  Furthermore, in the Army Training Strategy, the  Army indicated that the service should, to the extent possible, leverage  existing training resources and use innovative training methods to reduce  overhead.  It will also enable the reserve component to establish a  training strategy that increases premobilization readiness, and provide for  seamless transition from premobilization to postmobilization and the  flexibility to provide training to contingency forces within the ARFORGEN  cycle.
In preparation for their deployments, the Army currently trains its smaller  reserve-component units at its mobilization training centers. As the Army  plans to meet its future requirements, its plans call for continuing to train  its smaller reserve-component forces at its seven mobilization training  centers. Prior to attending training at the mobilization training centers  these smaller units may receive training at the Army Reserve’s Combat  Support Training Center, located at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, or with  the Army National Guard’s exportable training capability that it refers to  as the Home Station Culminating Training Event.
While the Army has identified its training requirements for its smaller  reserve-component units that are scheduled to deploy in support of  ongoing operations, the Army is still refining the training requirements for  its smaller reserve-component units that will serve as contingency forces.  Although the Army’s ARFORGEN requirements call for these units to be  trained to operate across the full-spectrum of operations, the Army has not  decided where these smaller units will conduct their collective training  exercises in support of ARFORGEN. However, the Army has existing  training locations that could be utilized to provide this training. For  example, a recent First Army preliminary review indicates that it can train  and support approximately 86,000 reserve-component servicemembers  annually at the seven mobilization training centers. In addition to the  Army’s mobilization training centers, the Army could also utilize the  training capacity at the Army National Guard’s Home Station Culminating  Training Event or the Army Reserve’s Combat Support Training Center.  These training venues provide units with external equipment, resources,  and trainers at a level above what normally could be provided at the units’  home stations. In addition, these training venues make available the  external support that assists units with their ability to conduct training for  both current and full-spectrum operations.
As of April 2010 the Army had not finalized its training strategy, including  where its smaller contingency forces will conduct training. Furthermore,  the Army lacks a complete assessment that outlines how its existing  training capacity can best support its smaller units. Without a complete  assessment, the Army will be unable to determine if it can leverage its  existing training capacity to meet its future training requirements for its  smaller units or whether any excess reserve-component training capacity  exists.
section_title: The Marine Corps Is Reviewing Options to Acquire More Land at Twentynine Palms to Meet Its Future Training Requirement
paragraphs: Currently, the Marine Corps trains its forces at Twentynine Palms before  they deploy to Afghanistan. However, Marine Corps officials, citing lessons  from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and themes outlined in the 2008  Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, identified the need to train  Marine Expeditionary Brigades, about 15,000 Marines, as an integrated  combat team in large-scale training exercises. The Marines currently lack  the training capacity to conduct this training.
In 2004, at the request of the Marine Corps, the Center for Naval Analyses  conducted a study to identify expeditionary brigade training requirements  and the region that could best support these requirements. The study  reviewed three regions: the Southwestern United States, which includes  the Twentynine Palms training facility, the Middle Atlantic Coast, and the  north coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The study’s authors concluded that  while all three locations could support some form of Marine Expeditionary  Brigade–level, live-fire and maneuver training, there was no Department of  Defense range that could provide sufficient space for Marine  Expeditionary Brigades to conduct sustained combined-arms, live-fire and  maneuver training. They further concluded that the Southwestern United  States provided the best training area for an expeditionary training brigade  but found that this level of training could only be fully conducted with an  expansion of the training ranges and airspace at Twentynine Palms.
In 2006, the Marine Corps validated the need for a large-scale Marine  Expeditionary Brigade training exercise and approved the need for a  training area and facility to conduct realistic training for all elements of  the expeditionary brigade. In 2009, the Marine Corps validated training  objectives for the exercise and established a minimum threshold that all  training has to meet. These requirements call for at least two battalion task  forces to converge on a single objective.
After receiving approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to  pursue the establishment of airspace and land acquisition at Twentynine  Palms, the Marine Corps identified six alternatives that, at a minimum,  meet the training threshold. The six alternatives for land acquisition range  in size from approximately 131,000 to 200,000 acres. In addition, the  Marine Corps has also identified a “no-action alternative” which would  provide no additional land or airspace in support of the new training  requirement. According to officials, if the Marine Corps is not able to  acquire land, the threshold level of training will still be met and it will train  the 15,000 person expeditionary brigade, although the entire brigade will  not be physically located at Twentynine Palms during the training. The  Marine Corps is currently conducting its environmental impact assessment  and expects to release its preferred alternative for land acquisition by  fiscal year 2012.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While the operational shift from Iraq to Afghanistan has not required many  adjustments at the Army’s and Marine Corps’ major training facilities, both  services face challenges for the future. The Marine Corps is pursuing  options for acquiring land to support a recent increased requirement to  train about 15,000 Marines as an integrated combat team in large-scale  exercises. The Army is projecting a capacity shortfall as it seeks to expand  the training for brigade combat teams at its maneuver CTCs. To address  this capacity shortfall, the Army is developing exportable training  capabilities, but personnel shortages could delay efforts to achieve full  operational capability by 2013. The Army has not completed an  assessment to determine its full range of options for meeting its future  brigade combat team requirements or the risks associated with not  conducting the desired number of training rotations. Until the Army  develops a plan that examines all the options for meeting its brigade  combat team training requirements or mitigating its capacity shortfalls, it  will not be able to fully implement ARFORGEN. Further, the Army’s  brigade combat teams face uncertainties concerning their ability to  conduct CTC rotations or receive support from the Exportable Training  Capability and may need to conduct some type of alternative training. In  addition, while the Army has identified its training requirements and  locations for its smaller reserve-component units that will be deploying for  ongoing operations, it has not finalized the training requirements for its  smaller reserve-component units that will serve as contingency forces,  including where or when these contingency forces should be trained. As a  result, the Army does not know if its existing training capacity can support  these smaller units as they transition though the ARFORGEN training  cycle to meet future training requirements. Until the Army finalizes its  reserve-component training strategy it will not be able to determine  whether it can leverage existing capacities to meet future reserve- component training requirements, or whether any excess reserve- component training capacity exists.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two  actions:    To address the challenges associated with training its brigade combat  teams for both ongoing operations and a fuller range of missions,  direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a plan to  evaluate the full range of available options for training its brigade  combat teams; assess the risks of not conducting the desired number  of training rotations; and determine how, if necessary, risks will be  mitigated.
To maximize the use of existing resources, direct the Secretary of the  Army to finalize the training requirements for smaller reserve- component units that will act as contingency forces under its Army  Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. The completed training  requirements should identify when smaller units’ training should occur  and include an analysis of existing Army training capacity to determine  whether any excess capacity exists. Specifically, the analysis should  weigh the costs and benefits of using the training capacity that  currently exists at the Army’s mobilization training centers in  conjunction with or as alternatives to its other efforts, such as the  home station culminating training events.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially  concurred with our recommendations.  Specifically, DOD partially  concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Army to address the challenges associated with  training its brigade combat teams for both ongoing operations and a fuller  range of missions  by developing and implementing a plan to evaluate the  full range of available options for training its brigade combat teams;  assessing the risks of not conducting the desired number of training  rotations; and determining how, if necessary, risks will be mitigated. In its  comments, DOD recognized its shortfall in maneuver Combat Training  Center (CTC) capacity to execute its brigade combat team training  strategy and meet global force requirements. DOD stated that in January  2010, the Army initiated a Collective Training Comprehensive Review to  identify and evaluate brigade combat team training options with a specific  focus on the roles and requirements between home stations and CTCs in  the training strategy.  DOD noted that it will discuss the review's findings  and recommendations during an upcoming Army Training and Leader  Development Conference, and develop consensus on future adjustments  to the training strategy or CTC Program based on acceptable levels of risk.   DOD further noted that the Army agrees a risk and mitigation plan is  required to address CTC capacity shortfalls.  However, it believed that  including table 1 in the report, which describes the current and potential  Army maneuver CTC training rotation requirements under various  deployment scenarios, was inappropriate.  Specifically, DOD believed  including the table suggests that the Army should mitigate CTC capacity  shortfalls with longer deployments.  While it noted that longer  deployments would mitigate shortfalls, the Army must consider other  factors, including stress on the force.  We agree that the Army must  consider a number of factors, including deployment length and  deployment to time-at-home ratios, to identify the training capacity  required at its CTCs.  By including the table we are not suggesting that the  Army increase deployment lengths.  Rather, as noted in the report, the  table is presented to illustrate the effect of various deployment lengths,  which the Army has used in the past, on the number of required training  rotations.  However, in light of DOD’s comments, we have clarified the  text further to emphasize that the table is illustrative and does not reach  any conclusions on any of these scenarios.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize the training  requirements for smaller reserve-component units that will act as  contingency forces under its Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model.   DOD noted that the Army is currently addressing these issues and has  been executing a number of mitigating efforts to address training  challenges, such as the Collective Training Comprehensive Review, which  is intended to review all Army collective training requirements and analyze  capacity to determine how best to maximize home-station and the CTCs’  abilities for all Army components. DOD further stated that the Army is  reviewing the training requirements and readiness goals that units are  expected to accomplish as they move through the ARFORGEN cycle.
DOD noted that the Army has just completed the staffing process for a  new Army regulation on ARFORGEN, AR 525-XX, which establishes a  cyclic process to generate trained, ready units for full-spectrum  operations. This Army regulation is supported by AR 350-xx, Reserve  Component Training under ARFORGEN, which is under staff review and  will address the reserve-component specific issues associated with  executing full-spectrum operations training under ARFORGEN.  Further,  DOD noted that the Army is working with the Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the National Guard Bureau, and  the U.S. Army Reserve Command to address specific issues related to  operationalizing the reserve component, such as contiguous training  policies and the best use of all Army training capacity. Additionally, DOD  stated that the Army has validated the Army National Guard’s Exportable  Combat Training Capability, which provides home station culminating  training events for all types of units, and the Army Reserve’s Combat  Support Training Center, which is executed at three Army Reserve sites.
The full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix III.
We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have made  adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments  to Afghanistan while still preparing forces for deployments to Iraq, we  reviewed Army and Marine Corps training policies and guidance, such as  Army regulation 350-50, Combat Training Center Program, the Army’s  Combat Training Center Master Plan, and the Marine Corps’ OIF/OEF  Predeployment Training Continuum, and Marine Corps Order 3502.6,  Marine Corps Force Generation Process. In addition, we interviewed  officials at the Department of the Army–Training Directorate; U.S. Army  Forces Command; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; First U.S.  Army; U.S. Army National Guard; U.S. Army Reserve Command; Marine  Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations–Ground Combat Element Branch;  Marine Corps Training and Education Command; Marine Forces  Command; and Marine Forces Reserve regarding adjustments that were  required at the Army and Marine Corps major training facilities to support  deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. We also reviewed the U.S. Army  Forces Command’s Predeployment Training Guidance for Follow-on  Forces Deploying in Support of Southwest Asia, which outlines the  training requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan, to identify differences in  training requirements between Iraq and Afghanistan, and interviewed  Army officials to discuss these documents. We obtained and reviewed  information from the Army’s and Marine Corps’ major training facilities on  the training they conducted in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010,  through April. We also interviewed officials at the training facilities, and  for the Army’s mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National  Guard, on the installations where the training facilities are located, to  discuss how they are currently using their training facilities to train for  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, we held discussion with  officials from all four of the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTC)— Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; National  Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; Joint Readiness Training Center,  Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Joint Multinational Training Center, Hohenfels,  Germany. While we met with officials from all four CTCs, we only  included the three maneuver CTCs in the scope of our review, as they  conduct live-fire training exercises; the fourth CTC, Battle Command  Training Program, was designed to train the command element and not the  entire unit, and focuses on computer-assisted training exercises. We also  held discussions with officials from the Marine Corps’ training facility at  Twentynine Palms, California, and officials from the Army’s seven  mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National Guard at which  the Army currently conducts training and plans to conduct training in the  future, including Army Support Activity–Dix (formerly known as Fort  Dix), Camp Atterbury, Fort Knox, Camp Shelby, Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, and  Joint Base Lewis-McChord (formerly known as Fort Lewis).
In focusing our review, we also identified the Army’s and Marine Corps’  major predeployment training facilities; specifically the locations at which  these services are conducting final mission-rehearsal exercises that  include live-fire training for units deploying in support of current  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the Army we focused on active  and National Guard brigade combat teams, which prepare and train for  deployment at the Army’s maneuver CTCs. In addition, we focused on the  Army’s mobilization training centers, where National Guard brigade  combat teams that will be split into smaller units in theater conduct  training. Because smaller-sized reserve-component units also conduct  predeployment training at the Army’s mobilization training centers, we  included these units in the scope of this review. We did not include active- component units that do not train at CTCs, since these units generally  train at different locations—their home stations where they have required  training facilities and support. For the Marine Corps we focused on units  training for deployment at Twentynine Palms, California, its only CTC.
To determine the extent to which the Army and the Marine Corps have  developed plans to adjust training capacity, we reviewed service  documentation regarding future training needs, to include the 2009 Army  Campaign Plan, 2010 Army Posture Statement, 2010 National Guard  Posture Statement, 2010 Army Reserve Posture Statement, the Marine  Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, and the 2009-2015 Marine Corps Service  Campaign Plan. To further determine the Army’s future training capacity  requirements at its CTCs we reviewed and assessed Army guidance for the  CTCs to include the 2008 and 2010 Combat Training Center Master Plans,  the 2010 Headquarters Department of the Army Execution Order for the  Establishment of the Exportable Training Capability, and the 2010  Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine  Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command regarding the transfer of  the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center  Operations Groups. We also obtained and reviewed guidance regarding the  Army’s future training requirements for smaller units to include the 2009  Army Training Strategy, the 2009 ARFORGEN Training Support for an  Operational Reserve (Coordinating Draft), First Army Command Training  Guidance for Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010, and the 2008 First Army  Operations Order, which provides command guidance for mobilization,  training, validation, and deployment. In addition, we reviewed Marine  Corps guidance regarding its expanded training requirements at  Twentynine Palms, including the 2010 Marine Corps Force Generation  Process, 2009 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Objective and Threshold  Training Requirements, the Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, the  2009-2015 Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan, and the 2004 Marine  Corps Expeditionary Brigade Exercise Study by the Center for Naval  Analysis.
In addition, we reviewed Department of Army information outlining the  number of training rotations that the Army will need at its maneuver CTCs  to support its identified Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)  requirements for 72 brigade combat teams based on a time-deployed to  time-at-home ratio of 1:2 for the active-component brigade combat teams  and 1:4 for the reserve-component brigade combat teams. To determine  the number of rotations needed under the Army’s ARFORGEN model  portraying a lower deployment demand of 1:3 time-deployed to time-at- home ratio for active-component brigade combat teams and 1:5 for  reserve-component brigade combat teams, we applied the Department of  Army’s data regarding total rotations required under the ARFORGEN  cycle. Based on the time-deployed to time-at-home ratio of 1:3 and 1:5 for  active- and reserve-component brigade combat teams, respectively, we  determined that a total of 28-29 training rotations would be required  annually. We developed an additional ARFORGEN model scenario based  on deployments of 6 months—similar to how the Army deployed in  support of missions before September 2001—but still maintained a time- deployed to time-at-home ratio of 1:3 for the active component and 1:5 for  the reserve component. The total number of required rotations under this  ARFORGEN cycle would increase to 53-54 annually.
To assess the extent to which challenges existed for the Army in meeting  its future training requirements for brigade combat teams, we compared  the total number of training rotations that the Army can conduct annually  at its maneuver CTCs to the desired number of rotations it would conduct  under its force generation cycle—ARFORGEN. The Army has identified a  rotation shortage and developed plans to mitigate this shortage through its  Exportable Training Capability. However, in examining the Exportable  Training Capability we found that the Army would still have a shortage of  training rotations to meet the future training requirements called for in the  Army’s Force Generation model. We interviewed officials with the  Department of the Army, the Combat Training Center Directorate, U.S.  Army Forces Command, the Army’s three maneuver CTCs, and the  Exportable Training Capability at the National Training Center regarding  the likelihood of this capability meeting its current timelines and  milestones and the availability of risk assessments or plans to assist the  Army in conducting its desired number of training rotations in the future.  In addition, to determine if the Army’s reserve component faced  challenges in meeting its future training requirements as prescribed in the  ARFORGEN model, we interviewed officials within the Department of the  Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, First Army, the Army National Guard  Bureau, and U.S. Army Reserve Command to determine if there is an Army  policy identifying when and where the training of reserve-component  contingency forces would occur within the ARFORGEN model. Further,  we interviewed officials to determine the availability of existing Army  resources, including the Army’s mobilization training centers for the  Reserve and National Guard, to support future requirements. In addition,  we reviewed First Army’s preliminary review detailing the availability of  the Army’s mobilization training centers to conduct training for  contingency forces. We interviewed Marine Corps officials within the  Marine Corps Training and Education Command to discuss their recently  established training requirement; specifically to discuss the lessons  learned that prompted this requirement. Further, we interviewed officials  at Marine Corps Forces Command; Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and  Operations; and the Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force to obtain further  information regarding future training requirements and training capacity at  Twentynine Palms. We also reviewed documents, such as the Marine  Corps 2010 Proposed Land Acquisition and Airspace Establishment in  Support of Large Scale Marine Air Ground Task Force Live Fire and  Maneuver Training public information briefing, to obtain information  regarding the Marine Corps land-acquisition timelines and alternatives to  meet its new training requirement.
We assessed the reliability of the data presented in this report.  Specifically, with regard to capacity—the maximum number of training  rotations that can be conducted, or people that can be trained, on a  sustainable basis—we interviewed officials and obtained data from the  Army’s and Marine Corps’ headquarters organizations. In addition, we  interviewed officials and obtained data from the major training facilities to  verify that these data were consistent with the data provided by the  headquarters organizations. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this report.
In conducting this work, we contacted appropriate officials at the  organizations outlined in table 2.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Current Training Capacity at the Army’s Major Training Facilities
paragraphs: As noted in table 3 below, in fiscal year 2009, the Army conducted 28  rotations, training over 120,000 people, at its three maneuver Combat  Training Centers (CTC). Specifically, the National Training Center  conducted 10 training rotations at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint  Readiness Training Center conducted 10 training rotations at Fort Polk,  Louisiana; and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center conducted 8  rotations which were split between its permanent Hohenfels, Germany,  location and unit home-station locations.
As shown below in table 4, in fiscal year 2009, the Army’s mobilization  training centers for the Reserve and National Guard trained nearly 89,000  servicemembers for deployment.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Jerome Brown, Susan Ditto,  Kenya Jones, Lonnie McAllister, Richard Powelson, Terry Richardson,  Michael Silver, and Nicole Volchko.