Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination Needed to Improve Visa Process
Published: 2003-07-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly important role in ensuring the national security of the United States. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other agencies, are involved in the visa process. Each plays an important role in making security decisions so that potential terrorists do not enter the country. In two GAO reports, we assessed the effectiveness of the visa process as an antiterrorism tool.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and increased agency coordination and information sharing. In our October 2002 report on the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we found that State did not provide clear policies on how consular officers should balance national security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel when issuing visas; and State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. In our June 2003 report, we found that State had revoked visas for terrorism concerns but that the revocation process was not being used aggressively to alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who entered the country before their visas were revoked might be security risks; and the process broke down when information on revocations was not being shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement officials. These weaknesses diminish the effectiveness of the visa process in keeping potential terrorists out of the United States.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss our recent work on the visa process and  some of the ways we believe this process could be strengthened as an  important part of our country’s border security strategy. Mr. Chairman,  citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States temporarily  for business, tourism, and other reasons generally must apply for and  obtain a U.S. travel document, called a nonimmigrant visa, at U.S.  embassies or consulates abroad before arriving at U.S. ports of entry. In  deciding who should and should not receive a visa, consular officers must  perform a risk assessment that balances the need to facilitate legitimate  travel with the need to protect the United States against potential  terrorists and to deter others whose entry is considered likely to be  harmful to U.S. national interests. Consular officers also need to delicately  balance U.S. national security interests with other interests such as  promoting U.S. business, tourism, education and cultural exchanges, and  the overall health of our economy.
Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly  important role in ensuring the national security of the United States. The  Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other  agencies, are involved in the visa process, with each playing an important  role in making security decisions.
My testimony today is based on two of our recent reports on the visa  process that contained observations and recommendations on ways in  which national and border security could be strengthened through the visa  process, implementation of clear visa policies and guidelines, and sharing  of information and data. The first report focused on the effectiveness of  the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and recommended ways that the  process could be strengthened as a screen against terrorists. The second  report provides examples of how weaknesses in policy and interagency  coordination are affecting border security. In addition to my comments  based on the two reports, I will provide a brief overview of an emerging  visa policy issue that warrants oversight.
subsections: section_title: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool
paragraphs: The September 11 attacks illustrated the vulnerabilities in the visa process  when it became known that all 19 of the terrorist hijackers had been  issued visas to enter the United States. Before the attacks, the State  Department’s visa operations focused primarily on screening applicants to  determine whether they intended to work or reside illegally in the United  States. In deciding on who should receive a visa, consular officers relied  on the State Department’s consular “lookout” system, a name check  system that incorporates information from many agencies, as the primary  basis for identifying potential terrorists. Consular officers were  encouraged to facilitate legitimate travel and, at some posts we visited,  faced pressure to issue visas. The State Department gave overseas  consular sections substantial discretion in determining the level of  scrutiny applied to visa applications and encouraged streamlined  procedures to provide customer service and deal with a large workload.  As a result, according to State Department officials and documents,  consular sections worldwide adopted practices that reduced the review  time for visa applications. For example, some posts decided not to  interview applicants who appeared likely to return to their country at the  end of their allotted time in the United States.
Since the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has introduced some  changes to strengthen the visa process. For example, the State Department  has, with the help of other agencies, almost doubled the number of names  and the amount of information in the lookout system. Further, the  Department began seeking new or additional interagency clearances on  selected applicants to screen out terrorists, although these checks were  not always completed by other U.S. agencies in a thorough or timely  manner. We also observed that consular officers at some of the posts we  visited were spending more time reviewing visa applications and  interviewing applicants; they were able to do so, at least temporarily,  because the number of visa applications decreased dramatically after  September 11.
While these actions have strengthened the visa process, our work in 2002  showed that there were widely divergent practices and procedures among  and within overseas posts regarding (1) the authority of consular officers  to deny questionable applicants a visa, (2) the role of the visa process in  ensuring national security, and (3) the types of changes in posts’ visa  policies and procedures that are appropriate given the need for heightened  border security. Also, the Departments of State and Justice disagreed on  the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. Most consular  officers at the posts we visited stated that more comprehensive guidance  and training would help them use the visa process as an antiterrorism tool  to detect questionable applicants. In July 2002, the Secretary of State  acknowledged that the visa process needed to be strengthened and  indicated that the State Department is working to identify areas for  improvement.
In addition, the State Department has stressed that it must have the best  interagency information available on persons who are potential security  risks in order to make good visa decisions. The additional data received  from the intelligence and law enforcement community has increased  State’s access to information for use in the visa adjudication process. In  addition, State indicated that it will work with Homeland Security to  establish the systems and procedures that will ensure seamless sharing of  information in the future.
We also found that human capital limitations are a concern, as some  consular sections may need more staff if the number of visa applicants  returns to pre-September 11 levels or if State continues to institute new  security checks for visa applicants. At some posts the demand for visas  combined with increased workload per visa applicant still exceeded  available staff, as evidenced by the waiting time for a visa appointment  and in overtime of consular staff. Moreover, several posts we visited  reported that they could manage their existing workload with current  staffing but would need more staff if they faced an increase in either  security clearance procedures or visa applications.
In our October 2002 report, we concluded that the visa process could be  an important tool to keep potential terrorists from entering the United  States but that weaknesses limited its effectiveness as an antiterrorism  tool. The State Department needed to improve implementation of the visa  process to increase its effectiveness and consistency among posts.
To strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we recommended  that the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies,    establish clear policy on addressing national security concerns through  the visa process that is balanced with the desire to facilitate legitimate  travel, provide timely customer service, and manage workloads;   develop comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on how  consular affairs should use the visa process as a screen against  potential terrorists; reassess staffing for visa operations in light of the current and  anticipated number of visa applications and, if appropriate, request  additional human resources to ensure that consular sections have  adequate staff with necessary skills; and   provide consular training courses to improve interview techniques,  recognize fraudulent documents, understand terrorism trends, and  better use the name check system.
To address visa issues requiring coordination and actions across several  agencies, we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security  coordinate with appropriate agencies to    establish governmentwide guidelines on the level of evidence needed  to deny a visa on terrorism grounds under provisions of the  Immigration and Nationality Act; reassess interagency headquarters’ security checks on visa applicants  to verify that all the checks are necessary and promptly conducted, and  provide clear guidance to overseas posts and headquarters agencies on  their roles in conducting these checks;   consider reassessing, on an interagency basis, visas issued before the  implementation of the new security checks;  reexamine visa operations on a regular basis to ensure that the  operations effectively contribute to the overall national strategy for    ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies promptly  provide information to the State Department on persons who may pose  a security risk and, therefore, should not receive visas.
In its response to our recommendations, the Department of State noted  that it has acted on or is currently acting on some of the issues we  reported and continues to reexamine its visa process. Moreover, in  January 2003, the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs reported that  State plans to use our recommendations as a roadmap for improvements  within the Bureau of Consular Affairs and in consular sections around the  world. State has also indicated that it is currently undertaking a number of  initiatives to review visa policies, staffing, and training needs.  Furthermore, State said it is looking at refining various screening  programs and will coordinate with other agencies to reassess interagency  headquarters’ security checks.
section_title: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process
paragraphs: In our recent work on visa revocations, we again found weaknesses  caused by the lack of comprehensive policies and coordination between  agencies. The visa revocation process can be an important tool to prevent  potential terrorists from entering the United States. Ideally, information on  suspected terrorists would reach the Department of State before it decides  to issue a visa; however, there will always be some cases in which the  information arrives after the visa has been issued. Revoking a visa can  mitigate this problem, but only if State notifies the appropriate agencies  and if those agencies take appropriate actions to deny entry or investigate  persons with a revoked visa. In our June 2003 report, we identified the  policies and procedures of several agencies that govern the visa  revocation process and determined the effectiveness of the process. We  focused on all 240 visas that State revoked for terrorism concerns from  September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2002.
Our analysis indicated that the U.S. government has no specific written  policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no  written procedures to guide State in notifying relevant agencies of visas  that have been revoked on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written  procedures that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither  they nor the FBI has written internal procedures for notifying appropriate  personnel to take action on visas revoked by the State Department. State  and INS officials could articulate their informal policies and procedures  for how and what purpose their agencies have used the process to keep  terrorists out of the United States, but neither they nor FBI officials had  specific policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating, or  taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already  entered the country.
The lack of formal, written policies and procedures may have contributed  to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the  probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United  States. At the time of visa revocation, State should notify its consular  officers at overseas posts, the Department of Homeland Security, and the  FBI. State would have to provide notice of revocation, along with  supporting evidence to the appropriate units within Homeland Security  and the FBI, which would allow them to take appropriate action. In our  review of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units  within INS and the FBI did not always receive timely notification of the  revocations; (2) lookouts were not consistently posted to the agencies’  watch lists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism  grounds entered the United States and may still remain in the country; (4)  INS investigators were not usually notified of individuals with revoked  visas who had entered the United States and therefore did not open  investigations on them; and (5) the FBI did not investigate individuals with  revoked visas unless these individuals were also in TIPOFF. For instance:  In a number of cases, notification between State and the appropriate  units within INS did not take place or was not completed in a timely  manner. For example, INS officials said they did not receive any notice  of the revocations from State in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47  cases, the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notice only via a  cable, which took, on average, 12 days to reach the Unit.
In cases in which the INS Lookout Unit had received notification, it  generally posted information on these revocations in its lookout  database within 1 day of receiving the notice. In cases where it was not  notified, it could not post information on these individuals in its  lookout database, which precluded INS inspectors at ports of entry  from knowing that these individuals had had their visas revoked.
Moreover, the State Department neglected to enter the revocation  action for 64 of the 240 cases into its own watch list.
GAO’s analysis of INS arrival and departure data indicates that 29  individuals entered the United States before their visas were revoked  and may still remain in the country. These data also show that INS  inspectors admitted at least four other people after the visa revocation,  one of whom may still remain in the country. However, in testimony on  June 18, 2003, the FBI said that none of these 30 individuals posed a  terrorist threat since they were not in TIPOFF, a State-operated  interagency terrorist watch list that FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking  Task Force monitors. State Department officials told us during our  review that State relied on sources of information in addition to  TIPOFF in making visa revocation decisions. INS inspectors prevented  at least 14 others from entering the country because the INS watch list  included information on the revocation action or had another lookout  on them.
INS investigators said they did not open cases on these individuals with  revoked visas who had entered the United States because their unit had  not been notified that State had revoked visas because of terrorism  concerns and that these persons had entered the country. They added  that, in the 10 cases that were referred to them, they conducted a full  investigation of possible immigration violations. INS officials said that  it would be challenging to remove individuals with revoked visas who  had entered the United States unless they were in violation of their  immigration status. Homeland Security officials said that the issue of  whether a visa revocation, after an individual is admitted on that visa,  has the effect of rendering the individuals out-of-status is unresolved  legally.
FBI officials told us they were not concerned about individuals whose  visas were revoked because of terrorism concerns unless the  individuals’ names were in TIPOFF. They said that they had a system in  place to monitor individuals in TIPOFF who enter the country but that  they would not investigate individuals who were not in TIPOFF based  solely on the revocation notice from State. FBI’s position indicates that  FBI is not taking into account all sources of information that State uses  in determining if a person may pose a terrorism threat.
We concluded that the visa process could be an important tool to keep  potential terrorists from entering the United States. However, there are  currently major gaps in the notification and investigation processes. One  reason for this is that there are no comprehensive written policies and  procedures on how notification of a visa revocation should take place and  what agencies should do when they are notified. As a result, there is  heightened risk that persons who State believed should not have been  issued a visa because of terrorism concerns could enter the country with  revoked visas or be allowed to remain after their visas are revoked  without undergoing investigation or monitoring.
To strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we  recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction  with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General    develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa  revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for  suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information is transmitted  from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies and their  respective inspection and investigation units in a timely manner;   develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law  enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals  whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain  in the United States after revocation; and   determine if persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in  the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat.
In response to our recommendations, the Department of State testified  that the Bureau of Consular Affairs is engaged in an effort to formalize  standard operating procedures. The Department of Homeland Security  also remarked that it was working to better standardize its procedures.  The FBI determined that 47 of the 240 persons with revoked visas were in  TIPOFF and therefore could pose a terrorism threat but that it had no  indication that any of these individuals were in the country.
section_title: Plans to Tighten the Visa Process
paragraphs: The Department of State has recently issued guidance to its posts about  using the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. In May 2003, the Secretary  of State announced that, by August 1, 2003, with a few exceptions, all  foreign individuals seeking to visit the United States would be interviewed  prior to receiving a visa. The purpose of this guidance is to tighten the visa  process to protect U.S. security and to prepare for the eventual  fingerprinting of applicants that State must undertake to meet the  legislated mandate to include a biometric identifier with issued visas. To  comply with the new guidance, some posts may have to make substantial  changes in how they handle nonimmigrant applications. State  acknowledges that posts may find that personnel or facility resources are  not adequate to handle the additional number of interviews. Even though  State expects interview backlogs, the Department has indicated that posts  are to implement the interview requirement with existing resources.
It is not certain what impact the new policy will have on visa issuance.  However, education, business, and government officials have expressed  concern that it was already taking too long to issue visas and that without  a commensurate increase in resources to accommodate the heavier  workload that may result from the new requirement, there could be  serious delays for those seeking to visit the United States. In March 2003,  the House Committee on Science held a hearing on “Dealing with Foreign  Students and Scholars in the Age of Terrorism: Visa Backlogs and  Tracking Systems.” In June 2003, the House Committee on Small Business  held a hearing on “The Visa Approval Backlog and its Impact on American  Small Business. “ In both hearings, higher education and business leaders  and agency officials testified on the negative impacts of delays in issuing  visas. The testimonies also highlighted the difficulties of balancing  national security interests with the desire to facilitate travel. At the request  of the House Committee on Science, we are currently examining the  amount of time taken to adjudicate visa applications from foreign science  students and scholars. As part of this work, we will be looking at how the  new interview policy will affect the process.
Before I conclude my statement, I would like to raise some questions that  the subcommittee may want to consider in its oversight role:    Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice  reached agreement on how best to communicate information on  individuals who should not be issued visas and on individuals whose  visas have been revoked?
Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice agreed  on the level of evidence needed to deny and revoke visas?
Does the Department of State have adequate number of trained staff  for visa processing, especially if the number of visa applicants or  security checks increase?
Do the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice agree on  whether persons who are in the country and have visas that have been  revoked on terrorism concerns should be investigated and, if so, by  which agency?
Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate our two overarching areas of  concern for U.S. visa policy. First, the U.S. government needs to have  clear, comprehensive policies governing U.S. visa processes and  procedures so that all agencies involved agree on the level of security  screening for foreign nationals both at our consulates abroad and at ports  of entry. These policies should balance the need for national security with  the desire to facilitate legitimate travel to the United States. The  Departments of State and Homeland Security should coordinate to  establish governmentwide guidelines on the level of evidence needed to  deny a visa. There should also be a specific policy for the interagency visa  revocation process, including the actions that immigration and law  enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals  with revoked visas who have entered the country.
The second area of concern is the continued need for coordination and  information sharing among agencies. If our intelligence or law  enforcement community is concerned that an individual poses a security  risk, we have to make sure that this information is communicated to the  State Department so that consular officers can deny and, if need be,  revoke visas in a timely manner. Similarly, when State revokes a visa for  terrorism concerns, we have to make sure that full information on the  revocation is communicated to immigration and law enforcement  agencies.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at (202)  512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included  John Brummet, Andrea Miller, Kate Brentzel, Janey Cohen, Lynn Cothern,  and Suzanne Dove.
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