Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform Efforts
Published: 2009-09-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Due to concerns about long standing delays in the security clearance process, Congress mandated reforms in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires, among other things, that the executive branch report annually to Congress. Since 2005, the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list due to delays and incomplete documentation. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts much of the government's clearance investigations. In 2007, the Director of National Intelligence and DOD established a Joint Reform Team to coordinate governmentwide improvement efforts for the process. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees these efforts. Based on two recent GAO reports, this statement addresses (1) progress in reducing delays at DOD, (2) opportunities for improving executive branch reports to Congress and (3) the extent to which joint reform efforts reflect key factors for reform. GAO independently analyzed DOD clearances granted in fiscal year 2008, assessed the executive branch's 2006-2009 reports to Congress, and compared three joint reform reports to key transformation practices. GAO previously recommended that OMB improve the transparency in executive branch reporting and establish a strategic framework. OMB concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing delays in making security clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements for DOD's initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within an average of 120 days. In 2008, GAO found that OPM and DOD made initial decisions on these clearances within 87 days, on average. Opportunities exist for the executive branch to improve its annual reports to Congress. For example, the executive branch's 2009 report to Congress did not reflect the full range of time it took to make all initial clearance decisions and has provided little information on quality. Under the current IRTPA requirements, the executive branch can exclude the slowest 20 percent of clearances and then calculate timeliness based on an average of the remaining clearances. GAO analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 without taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances and found that 39 percent took more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance decisions. With respect to quality, although IRTPA grants the executive branch latitude in reporting, the 2006-2009 reports provided little information on quality. However, the 2009 report identified quality measures that the executive branch proposes to collect. GAO has stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process. For example, GAO recently estimated that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. Greater attention to quality could increase instances of reciprocity--an entity's acceptance of another entity's clearances. Initial joint reform efforts reflect key practices for organizational transformation that GAO has identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but the Joint Reform Team's reports do not provide a strategic framework that contains important elements of successful transformation, including long-term goals with outcome-focused performance measures, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. Further, GAO's prior work and IRTPA identified several factors key to reforming the clearance process. These include (1) engaging in governmentwide reciprocity, (2) consolidating information technology, and (3) identifying and reporting long-term funding requirements. However, the Joint Reform Team's information technology strategy does not yet define roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability which is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. Also, the joint reform reports do not contain information on funding requirements or identify funding sources. The reform effort's success will depend upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward. Further, it is imperative that OMB's Deputy Director for Management continue in the crucial role as chair of the Performance Accountability Council, which oversees joint reform team efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the sixth in a series of  hearings that this Subcommittee has held to discuss the federal  government’s personnel security clearance process. As you know, security  clearances are used to verify that national security information—which in  some cases could cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national  defense or foreign relations if disclosed—is entrusted only to individuals  who have proven reliability and loyalty to the nation. Following the  terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the nation’s defense and  intelligence needs grew, prompting an increased demand for personnel  with security clearances. About 2.4 million people currently hold  clearances, and in fiscal year 2008 the Office of Personnel Management  (OPM) conducted about 800,000 national security investigations in which  it collected background information on federal personnel in positions that  require clearances.
In response to concerns about delays in processing clearances and other  clearance issues, Congress set goals and established requirements for  improving the clearance process in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism  Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Those requirements include, among  other things, improving the timeliness of the clearance process, achieving  interagency reciprocity (a government entity’s acceptance of another  government entity’s clearance investigation or determination), establishing  an integrated database to track investigative and adjudicative  information, and evaluating available technology that could be used to  conduct investigations and adjudications. IRTPA also requires the  executive branch to provide a report to Congress, by February 15th of  each year, on the progress made during the preceding year toward meeting  IRTPA’s requirements for security clearances, including the length of time  agencies take to complete investigations and adjudications, a discussion of  impediments to the implementation of IRTPA’s requirements, and any  other information or recommendations the executive branch considers  appropriate.
Since 2005, we have designated the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  personnel security clearance program a high-risk area. We first  designated DOD’s clearance program as a high-risk area in 2005 due,  primarily, to long-standing delays in the process. We found that in fiscal  year 2003, for example, DOD industry personnel needed an average of 375 days to get a clearance and that such delays increase national security  risks, delay the start of classified work, hamper employers from hiring the best-qualified workers, and increase the government’s cost of national  security-related contracts.  We maintained the high-risk designation in  2007 because of continued delays and additional concerns about  incomplete clearance documentation in the investigation and adjudication  phases of the security clearance process. For example, we reported that time that our independent analysis of a sample of 2,259 initial topsecret clearance decisions for DOD industry personnel took an averag e of   325 days to complete. During the 2007 review we also found that 47 of 50 clearance investigative reports and adjudicative files that we analyzed  were missing required documentation. In 2009, despite significant  improvement in reducing delays, we continued to designate this program as a high-risk area due to more stringent timeliness requirements that will  take effect in December 2009 and continuing problems with incomple clearance documentation that I will be discussin g today.
In 2007, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of  Defense (Intelligence) (OUSDI) established the Joint Reform Team to  coordinate governmentwide efforts to achieve IRTPA timeliness goals and  improve the processes related to granting security clearances and  determining suitability for government employment. Currently, the Joint  Reform Team is comprised of cognizant entities within the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB), OPM—which conducts background  investigations for much of the federal government—the Office of the  Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and OUSDI. In accordance with a  recommendation made by the Joint Reform Team, Executive Order 13467  established a Suitability and Security Clearance Performance  Accountability Council, commonly known as the Performance  Accountability Council, as the head of the governmentwide governance  structure responsible for driving implementation and overseeing clearance  reform efforts and appointed OMB’s Deputy Director for Management as  the chair. This governance structure was put in place, in part, to sustain  the momentum of clearance reforms, particularly through the transition to  a new administration.
As indicated in figure 1 (a timeline highlighting key events related to the  security clearance reform efforts), the Joint Reform Team has issued three  key reports, which collectively communicate the reform effort’s plans for  reforming the security clearance process. First, in April 2008, the Joint  Reform Team issued its first report that presented a proposed reformed  security clearance process with more extensive use of information  technology than the current process. In December 2008, the Team issued a  report on the progress of the reform efforts and provided further details  on the plans to implement reforms. Most recently, in March 2009, the Joint  Reform Team finalized an Enterprise Information Technology Strategy to  support the reformed security and suitability process and its associated  milestones described in the April and December reports.
My statement today will highlight the key findings and recommendations  from two reports we issued in May 2009. Specifically, I will discuss   (1) DOD’s and OPM’s progress in reducing delays in the personnel security  clearance process for DOD personnel, (2) opportunities for improving the  executive branch’s annual reports to Congress in terms of timeliness and  quality and (3) the extent to which joint reform efforts reflect essential  factors for reform. To assess the timeliness for completing initial  clearances, we reviewed IRTPA’s requirements; conducted an independent  analysis of the timeliness of 450,000 initial clearances completed in fiscal  year 2008 for military, DOD civilian, and industry personnel; and analyzed  the timeliness data contained in the executive branch’s 2009 annual report  to Congress regarding clearances granted in fiscal year 2008. To assess the  extent to which the executive branch has included transparent  information on timeliness as well as information on quality in its annual  reports to Congress, we analyzed reports that were issued in 2006 through  2009. In addition, we reviewed clearance-related files for completeness  and held interviews with senior officials at OMB, DOD, ODNI, and OPM.  To assess the extent to which joint reform reports address essential  factors for reform, we compared the Joint Reform Team’s reform plans to  key practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational  transformations that we have previously identified. We conducted our  work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DOD and OPM Have Made Significant Progress in Reducing Delays in the Clearance Process for DOD Personnel
paragraphs: Since 2005, DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing  delays in making personnel security clearance decisions and met statutory  timeliness requirements for DOD’s initial clearances completed in fiscal  year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of  initial clearances be made within an average of 120 days. In December of  2008, we conducted an analysis to assess whether DOD and OPM were  meeting the current timelines requirements in IRTPA and examined the  fastest 80 percent of initial clearance decisions for military, DOD civilian,  and DOD industry personnel. We found that these clearance decisions  were completed within 87 days, on average, and well within IRTPA’s  requirements.
IRTPA further requires that by December 2009, a plan be implemented in  which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions are  made within 60 days, on average. We also analyzed the executive branch’s  2009 annual report to Congress, which presented an average of the fastest  90 percent of initial clearance decisions in anticipation of IRTPA’s  December 2009 requirements. The report stated that the average time for  completing the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for military and  DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days. The report also stated that  the average time for completing the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances  for private industry personnel working on DOD contracts in fiscal year  2008 was 129 days. DOD and OMB officials have noted that the existing  clearance process is not likely to allow DOD and other agencies to meet  the timeliness requirements that will take effect in December 2009 under  IRTPA.
section_title: Opportunities Exist to Improve Executive Branch Reporting to Congress
subsections: section_title: Annual Reports Could Benefit from Greater Transparency in Clearance Timeliness Reporting
paragraphs: IRTPA requires that the executive branch report annually on the progress  made during the preceding year toward meeting statutory requirements for  security clearances, including timeliness, and also provides broad  discretion to the executive branch to report any additional information  considered appropriate. Under the timeliness requirements in IRTPA, the  executive branch can exclude the slowest clearances and then calculate  the average of the remaining clearances. Using this approach and  anticipating IRTPA’s requirement that by December 2009, a plan be  implemented under which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial  clearance decisions are made within an average of 60 days, the executive  branch’s 2009 report cited as its sole metric for timeliness the average of  the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances.
We conducted an independent analysis of all initial clearance decisions  that DOD made in fiscal year 2008 that more fully reflects the time spent  making clearance decisions. Without excluding any portion of the data or  taking an average, we analyzed 100 percent of 450,000 initial DOD  clearances decisions made in fiscal year 2008 for military, DOD civilian,  and DOD industry personnel. Figure 2 shows the full range of time it took  DOD and OPM to make clearance decisions in fiscal year 2008.
As you can see, our independent analysis of all of the initial clearances  revealed that 39 percent of the clearance decisions took more than 120  days to complete. In addition, 11 percent of the initial clearance eligibility  decisions took more than 300 days to complete.
By limiting its reporting on timeliness to the average of the fastest 90  percent of the initial clearance decisions made in fiscal year 2008 and  excluding mention of the slowest clearances, the executive branch did not  provide congressional decision makers with visibility over the full range of  time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions and the reasons why  delays continue to exist. In our recent report, we recommended that the  Deputy Director for Management at OMB (who is responsible for  submitting the annual report) include comprehensive data on the  timeliness of the personnel security clearance process in future versions of  the IRTPA-required annual report to Congress.  In oral comments in  response to our recommendation, OMB concurred, recognized the need  for timeliness, and underscored the importance of reporting on the full  range of time to complete all initial clearances. We note, Mr. Chairman,  that you previously submitted an amendment to expand IRTPA’s provision  on reporting on clearance timeliness.
section_title: Annual Reports Could Provide Congress with Greater Visibility over Quality Issues
paragraphs: While IRTPA contains no requirement for the executive branch to report  any information on quality, the act grants the executive branch broad  latitude to include any appropriate information in its reports. The  executive branch’s 2006 through 2009 IRTPA-required reports to Congress  on the clearance process provided congressional decision makers with  little information on quality—a measure that could include topics such as  the completeness of the clearance documentation of clearance decisions.  The 2006 and 2008 reports did not contain any mention of quality, and the  2007 report mentioned a single quality measure—the frequency with which  adjudicating agencies returned OPM’s investigative reports because of  quality deficiencies. The 2009 report does not contain any data on quality  but proposes two measures of investigative report quality and identifies  plans to measure adjudicative quality. Specifically, the discussion of these  measures is included in the Joint Reform Team’s December 2008 report,  Security and Suitability Process Reform, which was included in the  executive branch’s 2009 report.
We have previously reported that information on timeliness alone does not  communicate a complete picture of the clearance process, and we have  emphasized the importance of ensuring quality in all phases of the  clearance process. For example, we recently estimated that with respect  to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation  was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports and some DOD  adjudicative files. We independently estimated that 87 percent of about  3,500 investigative reports that adjudicators used to make clearance  decisions were missing required documentation, and the documentation  most often missing was employment verification. Incomplete  documentation may lead to increases in both the time needed to complete  the clearance process and in overall process costs and may reduce the  assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from  granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. Because the executive  branch has not sufficiently addressed quality in its reports, it has missed  opportunities to provide congressional decision makers with greater  visibility over the clearance process. In our most recent report, we  recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at OMB include  measures of quality in future versions of the IRTPA-required annual  reports. In oral comments, OMB concurred with our recommendation and  emphasized the importance of providing Congress more transparency  about quality in the clearance process.
section_title: Initial Reform Efforts Partially Reflect Key Practices for Organizational Transformation and Essential Factors for Clearance Reform, but Lack a Fully Developed Strategic Framework
paragraphs: Initial joint reform efforts partially reflect key practices for organizational  transformation that we have identified, such as having committed  leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but reports issued by the  Joint Reform Team do not provide a strategic framework that contains  important elements of successful transformation, including long-term  goals with related outcome-focused performance measures to show  progress, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible  remedies. Consistent with some of the key practices for organizational  transformation, a June 2008 Executive Order established the Suitability  and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council, commonly  known as the Performance Accountability Council, as the head of the  governmentwide governance structure responsible for achieving clearance  reform goals and driving and overseeing the implementation of reform  efforts. The Deputy Director for Management at OMB—who was  confirmed in June 2009—serves as the Chair of the Council, and the Order  also designated the Director of OPM and the Director of National  Intelligence as Executive Agents for Suitability and Security, respectively.  Membership on the council currently includes senior executive leaders  from 11 federal agencies. In addition to high-level leadership of the  Performance Accountability Council, the reform effort has benefited from  a dedicated, multi-agency implementation team—the Joint Reform   Team—to manage the transformation process from the beginning. The  Joint Reform Team, while not formally part of the governance structure  established by Executive Order 13467, works under the Council to provide  progress reports to the President, recommend research priorities, and  oversee the development and implementation of an information  technology strategy, among other things.
In addition to the key practices, the three reports issued by the Joint  Reform Team have begun to address essential factors for reforming the  security clearance process that we identified in prior work and that are  also found in IRTPA. These factors include (1) developing a sound  requirements determination process, (2) engaging in governmentwide  reciprocity, (3) building quality into every step of the process,   (4) consolidating information technology, and (5) identifying and reporting  long-term funding requirements.
While the personnel security clearance joint reform reports, which we  reviewed collectively, begin to address essential factors for reforming the  security clearance process, which represents positive steps, the Joint  Reform Team’s information technology strategy does not yet define roles  and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability that is  intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. GAO’s prior work on  key collaboration practices has stressed the importance of defining these  roles and responsibilities when initiating cross-agency initiatives. In  addition, the Joint Reform Team’s reports do not contain any information  on initiatives that will require funding, determine how much they will cost,  or identify potential funding sources. Without long-term funding  requirements, decision makers in both the executive and legislative  branches will lack important information for comparing and prioritizing  proposals for reforming the clearance processes. The reform effort’s  success will be dependent upon the extent to which the Joint Reform  Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward.
Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the current  reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is difficult to gauge  progress of reform, or determine if corrective action is needed, because  the council, through the Joint Reform Team, has not established a method  for evaluating the progress of the reform efforts. Without a strategic  framework that fully addresses the long-standing security clearance  problems and incorporates key practices for transformation—including  the ability to demonstrate progress leading to desired results—the Joint  Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decision makers the  extent of progress that it is making toward achieving its desired outcomes,  and the effort is at risk of losing momentum and not being fully  implemented.
In our May 2009 report, we recommended that OMB’s Deputy Director of  Management, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability  Council, ensure that the appropriate entities—such as the Performance  Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team— establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include (1) a  mission statement and strategic goals; (2) outcome-focused performance  measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform effort toward  meeting its goals and addressing long-standing problems with the security  clearance process; (3) a formal, comprehensive communication strategy  that includes consistency of message and encourages two-way  communication between the Performance Accountability Council and key  stakeholders; (4) a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for the  implementation of the information technology strategy among all agencies  responsible for developing and implementing components of the  information technology strategy; and (5) long-term funding requirements  for security clearance reform, including estimates of potential cost savings  from the reformed process and provide them to decision makers in  Congress and the executive branch.
In oral comments on our report, OMB stated that it partially concurred  with our recommendation to establish a strategic framework for the joint  reform effort. Further, in written agency comments provided to us jointly  by DOD and ODNI, they also partially concurred with our  recommendation. Additionally, DOD and ODNI commented on the specific  elements of the strategic framework that we included as part of our  recommendation. For example, in the comments, DOD and ODNI agreed  that the reform effort must contain outcome-focused performance  measures, but added that these metrics must evolve as the process  improvements and new capabilities are developed and implemented  because the effort is iterative and in phased development. We continue to  believe that outcome-focused performance measures are a critical tool  that can be used to guide the reform effort and allow overseers to  determine when the reform effort has accomplished it goals and purpose.  In addition, DOD and ODNI asserted that considerable work has already  been done on information technology for the reform effort, but added that  even clearer roles and responsibilities will be identified moving forward.
Regarding our finding that, at present, no single database exists in  accordance with IRTPA’s requirement that OPM establish an integrated  database that tracks investigations and adjudication information, DOD and  ODNI stated that the reform effort continues its iterative implementation  of improvements to systems that improve access to information that  agencies need. DOD and ODNI also acknowledged that more work needs  to be done to identify long-term funding requirements.
Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by reiterating that DOD and OPM are  meeting current IRTPA timeliness requirements, which means that 80  percent of initial clearance decisions are made within 120 days, on  average. This represents significant and noteworthy progress from our  finding in 2007, when we reported that industry personnel waited more  than 1 year, on average, to receive a top secret clearance. I would also like  to emphasize that, although the high-level leadership and governance  structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from previous attempts  at clearance reform, it is imperative that OMB’s newly appointed Deputy  Director for Management continue in the crucial role as chair of the  Performance Accountability Council in deciding (1) how to implement the  recommendations contained in our most recent reports, (2) what types of  actions are necessary for developing a corrective action plan, and (3) how  the corrective measures will be implemented.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at  (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this  testimony are David E. Moser, Assistant Director; James D. Ashley; Lori  Atkinson; Joseph M. Capuano; Sara Cradic; Mae Jones; Shvetal Khanna;  James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; and Gregory Marchand.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, D.C.:  May 19, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed  to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. GAO-09-488  Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 22,  2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness  and Quality. GAO-09-261R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.
Personnel Security Clearance: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T.  Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February  27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record  Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security  Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances  for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, but Concerns Remain.   GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
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