NASA: Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space Station
Published: 2007-07-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses the challenges faced by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle. NASA is in the midst of one of the most challenging periods in its history. As part of its Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is simultaneously developing a range of new technologies and highly complex systems to support future exploration efforts, completing assembly of the space station, and retiring the space shuttle. This is NASA's biggest transition effort since landing humans on the moon more than 3 decades ago and then initiating the Space Shuttle Program a few years later. Taken together, these efforts create significant challenges in terms of managing investments, launch and other facilities, workforce, international partners, and suppliers. Clearly, any delays or problems in completing and sustaining the space station itself, may well have reverberating effects on NASA's ability to ramp up efforts to develop technologies needed for future exploration or to support other important missions. GAO has undertaken a body of work related to NASA's transition efforts that include NASA's industrial supplier base, its workforce challenges, development of new crew and cargo spacecraft, and NASA's assembly and sustainment activities related to the ISS. This statement focuses on the preliminary results of on-going efforts, as well as other GAO work completed to date. Specifically, it will address the following challenges: (1) executing plans to use the shuttle to complete the ISS; (2) maintenance of the shuttle workforce through retirement of the shuttle; and (3) filling the gap between the shuttle and new NASA-developed vehicles to service the ISS. NASA's ability to overcome these challenges will be critical to ensuring the availability of the International Space Station as a viable research entity into the future. While these results and findings are preliminary, many have been echoed in other studies and identified by NASA itself. Our work is being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NASA plans to finish assembling the ISS in 2010 and operate the station until 2016. The station is scheduled to support 6-person crew capability as early as 2009. The shuttle was to be the primary means for ISS re-supply and crew rotation. NASA's international partners were planning to augment the shuttle's capabilities with their cargo and crew spacecraft. Following the Columbia disaster in 2003, the President set a new "vision" for NASA that called for the shuttle's retirement in 2010 upon completing ISS assembly. As part of the Vision, NASA is developing new crew and cargo vehicles, currently scheduled to be available in the 2015 timeframe. One of the vehicles--the Crew Exploration Vehicle--will carry and support only crews traveling to low earth orbit and beyond and will also be capable of ferrying astronauts to and from the ISS. However, since these systems are not scheduled to become operational until 2015, NASA plans to rely on international partners and commercial providers to make up the 5-year gap in ISS logistics and crew rotation resulting from the shuttle retirement.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges faced by the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the  International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle. NASA is in the  midst of one of the most challenging periods in its history. As part of its  Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is simultaneously developing a range  of new technologies and highly complex systems to support future  exploration efforts, completing assembly of the space station, and retiring  the space shuttle. This is NASA’s biggest transition effort since landing  humans on the moon more than 3 decades ago and then initiating the  Space Shuttle Program a few years later. Taken together, these efforts  create significant challenges in terms of managing investments, launch and  other facilities, workforce, international partners, and suppliers. Clearly,  any delays or problems in completing and sustaining the space station  itself, may well have reverberating effects on NASA’s ability to ramp up  efforts to develop technologies needed for future exploration or to support  other important missions.
GAO has undertaken a body of work related to NASA’s transition efforts  that include NASA’s industrial supplier base, its workforce challenges,  development of new crew and cargo spacecraft, and NASA’s assembly and  sustainment activities related to the ISS. My statement today focuses on  the preliminary results of on-going efforts, as well as other GAO work  completed to date. Specifically, I will address the following challenges:   (1) executing plans to use the shuttle to complete the ISS; (2) maintenance  of the shuttle workforce through retirement of the shuttle; and (3) filling  the gap between the shuttle and new NASA-developed vehicles to service  the ISS. NASA’s ability to overcome these challenges will be critical to  ensuring the availability of the International Space Station as a viable  research entity into the future. While some of these results and findings  are preliminary, many have been echoed in other studies and identified by  NASA itself. Our work is being conducted in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: NASA plans to finish assembling the ISS in fiscal year 2010 and operate the  station until 2016. The station is scheduled to support 6-person crew  capability as early as 2009. The shuttle was to be the primary means for  ISS re-supply and crew rotation. NASA’s international partners were  planning to augment the shuttle’s capabilities with their cargo and crew  spacecraft. Following the Columbia disaster in 2003, the President set a  new “vision” for NASA that called for the shuttle’s retirement in 2010 upon  completing ISS assembly. As part of the Vision, NASA is developing new  crew and cargo vehicles, with the crew vehicle currently scheduled to be  available in the 2015 timeframe. One of the vehicles—the Crew  Exploration Vehicle—will carry and support only crews traveling to low  earth orbit and beyond and will also be capable of ferrying astronauts to  and from the ISS. However, since these systems are not scheduled to  become operational until 2015, NASA plans to rely on international  partners and commercial providers to make up the 5-year gap in ISS  logistics and crew rotation resulting from the shuttle retirement.
section_title: Aggressive Launch Schedule for Space Shuttle
paragraphs: As we have begun our review of ISS assembly, several issues related to  NASA’s space shuttle manifest have come to our attention. First, the  shuttle planning manifest dated January 2007 projects that NASA will  launch 16 missions before retirement of the shuttle in 2010—one of those  has already been launched. Of the 15 remaining missions, one will service  the Hubble Telescope and 2 are designated as contingency missions.  Assuming the contingency flights are included, on average, NASA will  need to launch one shuttle every 2.7 months—an aggressive schedule  when compared to recent launch timeframes. In the past, with three  shuttles, NASA launched a shuttle every 3.7 months on average after the  Challenger accident in 1986. Since the Columbia accident in 2003, NASA  has averaged 10.8 months between launches. For the remainder of  calendar year 2007, NASA has three launches planned, which will total  four missions for the year. Due to vehicle traffic constraints, the minimum  required time between shuttle launches to ISS is 35 calendar days, so while  the manifest is aggressive, it is achievable.
Additionally, the current shuttle manifest leaves little room for unexpected  delays caused by weather damage or launch debris, which have proven to  impact the shuttle launch schedule significantly. For example, in 2007, hail  damage to the external fuel tank caused an unexpected three month delay  in a shuttle launch. While there are limits to the planning NASA can do for  such events, the tight schedule constraints leave little room for significant  delays as a result of such occurrences.
As evidence of the increasing pressure NASA is experiencing with regard  to the shuttle manifest, the ISS program office is planning for certain cargo  elements to be launched on the two final shuttle flights even though NASA,  as an agency, still considers these flights contingency missions. NASA is  also being forced to consider the possibility of canceling delivery of some  portions of the ISS. Specifically, NASA determined that if the schedule  slips, the Cupola observatory and the Node 3 connector built for hardware,  oxygen and waste storage may be slipped to contingency flights. If that  occurs and those flights do not launch, those elements may not be  assembled on ISS as originally planned.
Finally, NASA officials explained that since only the shuttle is large  enough to deliver certain large Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) to the  ISS, they must be launched prior to retirement of the shuttle. These ORUs  are replacement segments for those segments operating on the ISS that fail  or reach the end of their life. The officials noted that NASA originally  planned to use the shuttle to launch and retrieve certain large ORUs that  are critical for ISS operations. After being brought back to Earth, the plan  was to repair and refurbish the ORUs and return them to service on the  ISS. However, with the shuttle no longer available to transport those ORUs  after 2010, NASA changed its strategy for providing them to ISS from a  refurbishment approach to a “launch and burn” approach. They suggested  that under the new strategy, NASA would build enough ORUs to cover the  ISS planned mission life and use them up over time. Large ORUs that  originally were to be launched and returned on the shuttle would have to  be pre-positioned on the ISS before the shuttle retires.
There is still much to be worked out with NASA’s change in strategy for  positioning ORUs to cover the space station's planned mission life. For  example, the program office is still assessing the implications of restarting  production lines to produce additional spares. This involves examining  whether the right equipment, materials, expertise, and data is still  available—an endeavor that the ISS program office acknowledged would  be challenging. We will continue to monitor changes to the shuttle  manifest as they occur.
section_title: Shuttle Workforce Challenges
paragraphs: The space shuttle workforce currently consists of approximately   2,000 civil service and 15,000 contractor personnel. NASA must maintain   a workforce with necessary critical skills to manage the shuttle program  through its completion. In response to GAO recommendations, NASA has  undertaken several initiatives to attempt to address its potential workforce  drain.
In 2005, we reported that NASA had made limited progress toward  developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a critically skilled shuttle  workforce to support space shuttle operations. We reported that  significant delays in implementing a strategy to sustain the shuttle  workforce would likely lead to larger problems, such as funding and  failure to meet NASA program schedules. Accordingly, we concluded that  timely action to address workforce issues is critical given their potential  impact on NASA-wide goals such as closing the gap in human spaceflight.  At the time we performed our work several factors hampered the ability of  the Space Shuttle Program to develop a detailed long-term strategy for  sustaining the critically skilled workforce necessary to support safe space  shuttle operations through retirement. For example, the program’s focus  was on returning the shuttle to flight, and other efforts such as  determining workforce requirements were delayed. In our report, we  recommended that NASA begin identifying the Space Shuttle Program’s  future workforce needs based upon various future scenarios. Scenario  planning could better enable NASA to develop strategies for meeting  future needs. NASA concurred with our recommendation. The agency  acknowledged that shuttle workforce management and critical skills  retention will be a major challenge as it progresses toward retirement of  the space shuttle and as such has acted to respond to our  recommendation.
For example, since we made our recommendation, NASA developed an  agency wide strategic human capital plan and developed workforce  analysis tools to assist it in identifying critical skills needs. NASA also  developed a human capital plan specifically for sustaining the shuttle  workforce through the retirement and, then transitioning the workforce.  According to agency officials, currently NASA is mapping the available  skills of the Space Shuttle workforce with the skills it will need for future  work so that it can better plan and implement workforce reassignments.  NASA’s senior leaders recognize the need for an effective workforce  strategy in order to sustain the shuttle workforce through the shuttle’s  retirement, which coincides with the completion of the ISS. Clear, strong  executive leadership will be needed to ensure that the risks associated  with the transition of the shuttle workforce are minimized.
section_title: Filling the Gap between the Shuttle and New NASA- Developed Vehicles to Service the International Space Station
paragraphs: NASA has several options for filling the gap between the shuttle, which  will retire in 2010 and new NASA-developed vehicles that are not expected  to come on-line until 2015. The first relies on new vehicles developed  within the U.S. commercial space sector. The second relies on vehicles  developed by international partners—both new and legacy systems. There  are considerable challenges with all options NASA is examining.
subsections: section_title: NASA Dependence on Commercial Development
paragraphs: NASA is working with the commercial space sector to develop and  produce transport vehicles that can take equipment and ultimately crew to  and from the space station during the gap between the space shuttle and  the crew launch vehicle. Rather than buy these vehicles outright, NASA  plans to help fund their development and purchase transportation services  or perhaps even the vehicles themselves when they are needed. This  program is known as Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS).  Currently, NASA has seven COTS agreements—all are in the initial phases  of raising private funds for the development. NASA funding has been  provided to two companies, Rocketplane Kistler (RpK) and Space  Exploration Technologies (SpaceX). NASA has signed five more Space Act  Agreements which facilitates sharing technological information, but these  agreements are unfunded by NASA.
There are two phases to the COTS program, the first phase entails  technical development and demonstration and the second phase may  include the competitive procurement of orbital transportation services for  ISS logistical support. NASA officials noted that both RpK and SpaceX met  their first milestone to demonstrate financial progress by obtaining private  funding. However, RpK missed its second milestone in May 31, 2007 and  had to renegotiate its Space Act Agreement milestone with NASA.
The International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force (IISTF)  reported in February 2007 that the design, development, and certification  of the new COTS capability for ISS re-supply was just beginning. IISTF  stated that, “if similar to other new program development activities, it  most likely will take much longer than expected and will cost more than  anticipated.” Our work has generally found space and other complex  system development efforts—including NASA-sponsored efforts—often  encounter schedule delays and technical problems when they are seeking  to obtain significant advances in technologies, move forward amid  changing requirements or with other unknowns, and/or are managed  without adequate oversight, In our opinion, risks may be high in these  partnerships, given that the suppliers do not have long-standing  relationships with NASA or other government agencies and the  development of the COTS vehicles represent totally new endeavors for  most of these companies. As such, it will be exceedingly important for  NASA to establish sound program management and oversight controls  over these endeavors, establish clear and consistent guidance, limit  requirements changes, and ensure it has adequate visibility into the  progress being made by the COTS suppliers. Our review will examine the  extent to which these measures are being taken. As you know, GAO has  identified contract management as a high risk area for NASA. Actions  designed to enhance program management and oversight are being  implemented, but it may take years to complete them. This may make it  even more difficult for NASA to successfully manage and oversee its  relationship with the COTS suppliers. If NASA relies on these development  efforts without adequate oversight, the programs could fall short of cost  and schedule estimates, result in downgraded performance, and ultimately  impact overall sustainment of the ISS.
section_title: NASA Dependence on International Partners
paragraphs: NASA has suggested that some supply activities during the gap can be  conducted by vehicles under development or currently in operation by  international partners—specifically, Europe, Japan and Russia—but these  vehicles have constraints. Our ongoing review will assess these constraints  in greater detail.
To begin with, new vehicles being developed by the European and  Japanese space agencies are very complex. Currently, the first test flight  for the European vehicle is likely to happen in January 2008. The Japanese  vehicle will not have its first operational flight until 2009. According to  NASA officials, both the European and Japanese vehicle developments  experienced technical hurdles and budgetary constraints, but both  partners are committed to fulfilling their roles as partners in the ISS  program. They do have confidence that the European vehicle will be  available for ISS operations before retirement of the shuttle, but they are  not as confident about the Japanese vehicle being ready by that time.
NASA reliance on these vehicles to augment re-supply activities after 2010  assumes that further delays in their development will not occur. NASA’s  expectation is that these vehicles will be developed in parallel with  commercial developments. The agency’s preference is to use commercially  developed vehicles, rather than rely on the vehicles developed by the  international partners to cover the capability gap after retirement of the  shuttle fleet.
NASA also plans to continue working with Russia to provide crew and  cargo support to the ISS, but this has been facilitated through an  exemption to the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act.  Russian vehicles that were already operational were used to rotate crew  and supply ISS during the period after the Columbia accident and a  Russian Soyuz vehicle remains docked to the ISS continuously. The Iran,  North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act exemption expires at the end  of 2011, at which time any exchanges will be subject to the restrictions of  the Act. However, if commercial development does not produce a usable  vehicle by that date, the only vehicle that can support crew transportation  is the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. According to NASA officials, the agency is  planning to request a waiver to gain further exemption beyond 2011 if this  situation occurs.
Additionally, there are challenges related to sharing knowledge with  international partners due to restrictions by the International Traffic in  Arms Regulation (ITAR). This was highlighted by the International Space  Station Independent Safety Task Force, and NASA has been working to  address the concerns laid out in that study. Over the years, GAO has  identified weaknesses in the efficiency and effectiveness of government  programs designed to protect critical technologies while advancing U.S.  interests. While each program has its own set of challenges, we found that  these weaknesses are largely attributable to poor coordination within  complex interagency processes, inefficiencies in program operations, and  a lack of systematic evaluations for assessing program effectiveness and  identifying corrective actions. However, in reviewing in the Joint Strike  Fighter, another complex international system development effort, we also  identified actions that could be taken early in programs to prevent delays  and other problems related to ITAR. Our review going forward will assess  the degree to which challenges in this area remain.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or the other members may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further questions about this statement, please contact   Cristina T. Chaplain at (202) 512-4841. Individuals making key  contributions to this statement include James L. Morrison,   Brendan S. Culley, Masha P. Pastuhov-Purdie, Keo Vongvanith and   Alyssa B. Weir.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.