Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: A Complete Scope of Work Is Needed to Develop Timely Cost and Schedule Information for the Uranium Program
Published: 2017-09-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
Uranium must be processed to use it in nuclear weapons or reactors. The National Nuclear Security Administration says its uranium processing facilities are outdated and deteriorating.
As part of its overall uranium program, NNSA is planning to build a new processing facility and modernize some existing facilities—at the likely cost of billions of dollars over at least 20 years.
We found that NNSA has made progress developing a scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for the new facility and other program elements, but not for the uranium program as a whole. We recommended that NNSA set a time frame for completing these important steps.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Uranium is crucial to our nation's ability to maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA processes uranium to meet this need. In 2004, NNSA began plans to build a new UPF that would consolidate capabilities currently housed in deteriorating buildings; by 2012, the project had a preliminary cost of $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion. To control rising costs, NNSA changed its approach in 2014 to reduce the scope of the new UPF and move uranium processing capabilities once intended for the UPF into existing buildings. The broader uranium program also includes the needed repairs and upgrades to these existing buildings.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 as amended includes a provision for GAO to periodically assess the UPF. This is the fifth report and (1) describes the status of NNSA's efforts to develop a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for the UPF project, and (2) examines the extent to which NNSA has developed a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and integrated master schedule for the overall uranium program. GAO reviewed program documents on planning, strategy, cost, and implementation and interviewed program officials to examine the program's scope, cost and schedule.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has made progress in developing a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for its project to construct a new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), according to NNSA documents and program officials. As of May 2017, NNSA had developed and approved a revised formal scope of work, cost, and schedule baseline estimates for four of the seven subprojects into which the project is divided. NNSA expects to approve such baseline estimates for the other three—including the two largest subprojects—by the second quarter of fiscal year 2018. NNSA also plans to validate the estimates by then through an independent cost estimate.
NNSA, however, has not developed a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate (i.e., a structured accounting of all cost elements for a program), or integrated master schedule (i.e., encompassing individual project schedules) for the overall uranium program, and it has no time frame for doing so. In particular, it has not developed a complete scope of work for repairs and upgrades to existing buildings in which NNSA intends to house some uranium processing capabilities and has not done so for other key program elements. For example:
The scope of work for a portion of the upgrades and repairs will not be determined until after fiscal year 2018, when NNSA expects to conduct seismic and structural assessments to determine what work is needed to address safety issues in existing buildings.
NNSA has developed an initial implementation plan that roughly estimates a cost of $400 million over the next 20 years for the repairs and upgrades, but a detailed scope of work to support this estimate is not expected to be fully developed except on an annual basis in the year(s) that immediately precedes the work.
Because NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work for the overall uranium program, it does not have the basis to develop a life-cycle cost estimate or an integrated master schedule. Successful program management depends in part on developing a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and an integrated master schedule, as GAO has stated in its cost estimating and schedule guides. In previous work reviewing other NNSA programs, GAO has found that when NNSA did not have a life-cycle cost estimate based on a complete scope of work, the agency could not ensure its life-cycle cost estimate captured all relevant costs, which could result in cost overruns. The revised cost estimate that NNSA is developing for the new UPF will be an essential component of a life-cycle cost estimate for the overall program. However, for other program elements, NNSA has either rough or no estimates of the total costs and has not set a time frame for developing these costs. Federal internal control standards call for management to use quality information to achieve an entity's objectives, and among other characteristics, such information is provided on a timely basis. Without setting a time frame to complete the scope of work and prepare a life-cycle cost estimate and integrated master schedule for the program, NNSA does not have reasonable assurance that decision makers will have timely access to essential program management information—risking unforeseen cost escalation and delays.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that NNSA set a time frame for completing the scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and integrated master schedule for the overall uranium program. NNSA generally agreed with the recommendation and has ongoing efforts to complete these actions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Uranium is crucial to our nation’s ability to maintain its nuclear weapons  stockpile and fuel the U.S. Navy’s fleet of nuclear-powered aircraft  carriers and submarines. To transform uranium ore into a form that can  be used for these purposes, uranium goes through a number of steps that  include mining, conversion, and enrichment. Conversion is the process of  converting mined natural uranium to a gas that can be used for  enrichment, and enrichment is the process of separating uranium-235— the form, or isotope, that undergoes fission to release enormous amounts  of energy in nuclear reactors and weapons—from much of the uranium- 238, the form more prevalent in natural uranium, to increase the  concentration of uranium-235. The National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA), an agency within the Department of Energy  (DOE), is responsible for meeting national needs for enriched and  depleted uranium (a byproduct of the enrichment process) in support of  the nuclear weapons stockpile and the Navy, as part of NNSA’s broader  nuclear security missions. Enriched uranium is processed, for example,  into components that support the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and  re-processed when components eventually need to be replaced.  However, some of NNSA’s uranium processing facilities—located at the  Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and built in  the 1940s and 1950s—are outdated and deteriorating, according to  NNSA and DOE officials and documents. In addition, DOE’s Office of  Inspector General reported in November 2016 on NNSA’s aging uranium  infrastructure, which the office found poses risks to NNSA’s ability to meet  its missions in the future.
In 2004, NNSA initiated plans for the construction of a new Uranium  Processing Facility (UPF), a more modern facility that would consolidate  Y-12’s uranium processing capabilities into a single facility. NNSA’s  efforts to modernize its uranium capabilities, however, have experienced  scope of work changes, cost increases, and schedule delays. As we have  previously found, NNSA has experienced ongoing problems in contract  and project management, including its modernization of uranium  processing capabilities, which have resulted in our designating these  activities as at high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. In June 2012, the  Deputy Secretary of Energy approved $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion in funding  to build the UPF. One month later, the UPF contractor concluded that the  UPF’s processing equipment would not fit into the UPF facility as  designed. Concerned about cost growth and budget constraints for  construction of the facility, NNSA’s Acting Administrator in 2014 directed  that a peer review team be established to develop and recommend an  alternative approach to meet specific NNSA objectives. In April 2014, the  peer review team recommended that NNSA develop an integrated  uranium program to include construction of a new, smaller UPF with  fewer capabilities; infrastructure repairs and upgrades for existing Y-12  facilities; and further development of certain technologies that are  planned for eventual use within Y-12’s new buildings and existing  facilities.
Since 2014, NNSA has planned for the modernization of its uranium  processing capabilities under the auspices of a broader uranium program.  However, DOE’s and NNSA’s requirements for program management are evolving and, as we have previously reported, are somewhat less well  defined than those for project management. (See the list of related GAO  products at the end of this report.) For example, in 2014, we found that  DOE’s order on program and project management, which also applies to  NNSA, requires life-cycle cost estimates for projects, but it does not  explicitly require that life-cycle cost estimates be developed for programs  that include both construction projects and other efforts and activities not  related to construction.
According to our review of NNSA documents and interviews with NNSA  officials, NNSA’s modernization of uranium processing capabilities may  cost several billions of dollars and take at least 2 decades to execute.  Successful program management depends, in part, on developing a  complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and an integrated  master schedule, as we have stated in our cost estimating and schedule  guides, which identify best practices. These best practices call for the  life-cycle cost estimate and integrated master schedule to reflect all  activities necessary to accomplish a program’s objectives—that is, the  estimate and schedule should be based on a complete scope of work. In  our previous work reviewing other NNSA programs, we have found, for  example, that when NNSA did not have a life-cycle cost estimate based  on a complete scope of work, NNSA could not ensure that its life-cycle  cost estimate captured all relevant costs, which could result in cost  overruns.
Section 3123(f) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2013, as amended by section 3126 of the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and section 3118 of the Carl Levin and Howard  P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2015, includes a provision for us to periodically review the new UPF,  including any issues that we determine appropriate with respect to the  requirements, cost, schedule, or technology readiness levels of the  project. This is our fifth report in response to section 3123(f), as  amended. This report (1) describes the status of NNSA’s efforts to  develop a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for the new  UPF project, and (2) examines the extent to which NNSA has developed  a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and integrated master  schedule for the overall uranium program.
To describe the status of NNSA’s efforts to develop a revised scope of  work, cost estimate, and schedule for the new UPF project, we reviewed  NNSA program planning documents, and any updates, concerning cost  estimates and budgets and interviewed agency officials. In addition, we  reviewed NNSA business operating procedures for developing program  requirements and the steps NNSA has taken to identify and update  requirements for the construction of the new UPF. We interviewed  program officials to understand how they defined and adjusted program  requirements and to understand the potential effects of any adjustments  on NNSA’s infrastructure plans.
To examine the extent to which NNSA has developed a complete scope  of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and integrated master schedule for the  overall uranium program, we reviewed NNSA program planning  documents concerning cost estimates, budgets, and implementation of  program activities, such as efforts to repair and upgrade existing Y-12  facilities. We also interviewed NNSA’s uranium program manager and  other program and contractor officials to understand how they defined  and adjusted program requirements and the potential effects of any  adjustments on NNSA’s infrastructure plans. In addition, we met with  officials from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and reviewed  its recent letter regarding facility safety issues at Y-12. We reviewed the  best practices for cost and schedule estimating, identified the benefits of  developing a life-cycle cost estimate and integrated master schedule, and  obtained information from the uranium program manager on the use of  these selected best practices in managing the overall uranium program.  We analyzed the information from documents we reviewed and officials  we interviewed to determine the extent to which NNSA had developed a  life-cycle cost estimate and an integrated master schedule as called for in  our cost-estimating and schedule guides. Our review of the overall  uranium program did not address U.S. efforts to establish a domestic  uranium enrichment capability that provides low-enriched uranium,  which is managed under a separate program. Appendix I presents a more  detailed description of the scope and methodology of our review.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2015 to September  2017, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: This section describes (1) Y-12’s role in NNSA’s Nuclear Security  Enterprise; (2) NNSA policy for setting program requirements; (3) best  practices for program cost and schedule estimating; and (4) best  practices for technology readiness.
subsections: section_title: Y-12’s Role in NNSA’s Nuclear Security Enterprise
paragraphs: NNSA is responsible for managing national nuclear security missions:  ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; supplying nuclear  fuel to the Navy; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation  efforts. NNSA directs these missions but relies on management and  operating contractors to carry them out and manage the day-to-day  operations at each of eight sites that comprise the agency’s nuclear  security enterprise. These sites include laboratories, production plants,  and a test site.
Of NNSA’s eight sites, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee  is the primary site with enriched uranium processing capabilities. Y-12’s  primary mission is processing and storing uranium, processing nuclear  fuel for the U.S. Navy, and developing technologies associated with those  activities, including technologies for producing uranium-related  components for nuclear warheads and bombs. Construction of the 811- acre Y-12 site began in 1943 as part of the World War II-era Manhattan  Project. Y-12’s enriched uranium processing and storage capability is  primarily housed in the following buildings:
Building 9212: This building was constructed in 1945, at the end of  World War II, and includes a number of support and storage facilities  related to uranium purification and casting. According to a 2016  report from the DOE Office of Inspector General, all of the various  support and storage facilities of Building 9212 contain radioactive and  chemical materials in sufficient quantities that an unmitigated release  would result in significant consequences. These facilities do not meet  current safety requirements for such facilities in that they cannot  withstand a seismic event, high wind event, or aircraft crash. The  shutdown of Building 9212 operations that have the highest nuclear  safety risk at Y-12 is a key NNSA uranium program goal. Because of  these risks, according to NNSA officials, NNSA has substantially  reduced the risks from high-hazard materials, such as enriched  uranium in organic and aqueous solutions, with a focus on materials  located in Building 9212. As such, according to these officials, the  remaining material at risk in Building 9212 has been reduced to a  level significantly below the facility’s administrative limit, and NNSA is  implementing a four-phase exit strategy to systematically phase out  mission dependency on Building 9212. The exit strategy includes  actions necessary to remove material hold-up, complete all process  relocations, transition personnel to the UPF, and complete post- operations cleanout of the facility, among other things, according to  NNSA officials.
Building 9215: This building was constructed in the 1950s and  consists of three main structures. Specific activities in Building 9215  include fabrication activities, such as metal forming and machining  operations for highly enriched uranium, low-enriched uranium, and  depleted uranium. NNSA and others, such as the Defense Nuclear  Facilities Safety Board, have raised concerns about the future  reliability of the building, particularly as the amount of deferred  maintenance in Building 9215 has steadily increased over the past  several years. According to NNSA officials, NNSA’s contractor has  hosted a series of technical evaluations that identified and prioritized  needed infrastructure investments over the next 15 years, including  within Building 9215, that are intended to ensure facility reliability  through the 2040s. NNSA is reviewing these initial proposed  investments.
Building 9204-2E: This building, constructed in the late 1960s, is a  three-story, reinforced concrete frame structure. Operations in this  building include the assembly and disassembly of enriched uranium  components with other materials. Also, according to NNSA officials,  radiography capabilities have been successfully relocated out of  Building 9212 and installed in Building 9204-2E. The design used for  this facility predates modern nuclear safety codes.
Building 9720-82 (also called the Highly Enriched Uranium  Materials Facility): This building became operational in January  2010. Built to current safety standards, the facility provides long-term  storage of enriched uranium materials and accepts the transfer of  some legacy enriched uranium from older facilities. According to  NNSA officials, as part of the uranium program NNSA transferred 12.3  metric tons of enriched uranium to this facility in fiscal year 2015, 9.8  metric tons in fiscal year 2016, and anticipates transferring 6 metric  tons in fiscal year 2017.
According to NNSA documents, Y-12’s enriched uranium operations have  key shortcomings including (1) an inefficient workflow, (2) continually  rising operations and maintenance costs due to facility age, and (3)  hazardous processes that could expose workers to radiological  contamination. To address these shortcomings, NNSA developed plans  to replace aging infrastructure at Y-12 and relocate key processing  equipment without jeopardizing uranium production operations. The first  solution, proposed in 2004, envisioned relocating Y-12’s main uranium  processing equipment into a new UPF. NNSA planned to construct this  single, consolidated facility that would be less than half the size of  existing facilities; reduce costs by using modern processing equipment;  and incorporate features to increase worker protection and environmental  health and safety. In 2007, NNSA estimated the UPF would cost from  $1.4 billion to $3.5 billion to design and construct. In June 2012, the  Deputy Secretary of Energy approved an updated cost estimate range for  the UPF of from $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion. However, by August 2012, the  UPF contractor concluded that the uranium processing and other  equipment would not fit into the UPF as designed.
In 2014, because of the high cost and schedule concerns of a solution  focused solely on constructing new buildings, NNSA prepared a high- level strategic plan for its uranium program that is now focused on  ceasing operations in building 9212 through a combination of new  construction, infrastructure investments in existing facilities, upgrades to  and relocation of select processing technologies, and improved inventory  management. This strategy includes replacing certain 9212 capabilities,  with continued operation of 9215 and 9204-2E, and removing a  considerable amount of the scope of work that had been included in the  original UPF plan (as the functions performed in Buildings 9215 and  9204-2E are no longer included within the UPF project). Figure 1 below  depicts the planned transfer of uranium processing capabilities out of  Building 9212 and into a new UPF and existing facilities by 2025 under  the new approach.
Under the new approach, the UPF is to provide less floor space,  compared to the original UPF design, for casting, oxide production, and  salvage and accountability of enriched uranium. NNSA has stated that  this newly designed UPF is to be built by 2025 for no more than $6.5  billion through a series of seven subprojects. NNSA is required to  manage construction of the new UPF in accordance with DOE Order  413.3B, which requires the project to go through five management  reviews and approvals, called “critical decisions” (CD), as the project  moves forward from planning and design to construction and operation.  The CDs are as follows:
CD 0: Approve mission need.
CD 1: Approve alternative selection and preliminary cost estimate.
CD 2: Approve the project’s formal scope of work, cost estimate, and  schedule baselines.
CD 3: Approve start of construction.
CD 4: Approve start of operations or project completion.
section_title: NNSA Policy for Setting Program Requirements
paragraphs: In March 2014, NNSA updated its Business Operating Procedure,  clarifying its policy for developing and maintaining program requirements  on construction programs and projects executed by the agency.  According to this procedure, this program requirements policy is  applicable to most projects constructed for NNSA or managed by NNSA  personnel and that have an estimated total project cost of $10 million or  greater, or the cost threshold determined appropriate by the Deputy  Secretary of Energy. These projects include line item (capital asset)  projects.
According to NNSA’s Business Operating Procedure policy, program  officials should establish the mission- and program-level requirements  that apply to the development and execution of the program or project.  The policy also states that program officials should translate the “need” in  the Mission Need Statement into initial top-level requirements addressing  such concerns as performance, supportability, physical and functional  integration, security, test and evaluation, implementation, and quality  assurance. The policy states that experience has shown that a formal  process resulting in an agreed-upon definition of requirements for new  systems, new capabilities, and updates or enhancements to systems is a  prerequisite to proceeding to system or capability design. Furthermore,  according to the policy, failure to do this results in rework and  unnecessary costs and delays in schedule. NNSA policy states that  Program Requirements Documents shall contain both mission and  program requirements and should include the “objective” value—the  desired performance, scope of work, cost, or schedule that the completed  asset should achieve, as well as the “threshold” value—representing the  minimum acceptable performance, scope of work, cost, or schedule that  an asset must achieve.
NNSA’s requirements policy also states that the development of mission  requirements should include summary documentation on how the  requirements were identified or derived and that the documentation  should contain explanations of the processes, documentation, and  direction or guidance that govern the derivation or development of the  requirements. The policy also states that the basis for the requirements,  where not obvious, should be traceable to decisions or source  documentation and that details relating to the traceability of requirements  may be included in an attachment to the program requirements  document.
NNSA’s uranium modernization efforts under the broader program have  focused on establishing NNSA program requirements, which NNSA  considers in determining its infrastructure plans. In July 2014, NNSA  appointed a uranium program manager to integrate all of the uranium  program’s elements. According to NNSA uranium program officials and  documents, uranium program elements include  construction of the new UPF;  repairs and upgrades to existing facilities; uranium sustainment activities for achieving specific uranium  production capabilities and inventory risk reduction (the strategic  placement of high-risk materials in lower-risk conditions); depleted uranium management; and  technology development, deployment, and process relocation.
section_title: Best Practices for Program Cost and Schedule Estimating
paragraphs: In March 2009, we published a cost estimating guide to provide a  consistent methodology that is based on best practices and that can be  used across the federal government for developing, managing, and  evaluating capital program cost estimates. The methodology outlined in  the guide is a compilation of best practices that federal cost estimating  organizations and industry use to develop and maintain reliable cost  estimates throughout the life of a government acquisition program.
According to the cost estimating guide, developing accurate life-cycle cost  estimates has become a high priority for agencies in properly managing  their portfolios of capital assets that have an estimated life of 2 years or  more. A life-cycle cost estimate provides an exhaustive and structured  accounting of all resources and associated cost elements required to  develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular program. According to  the guide, a life-cycle cost estimate can be thought of as a “cradle to  grave” approach to managing a program throughout its useful life. This  entails identifying all cost elements that pertain to the program from initial  concept all the way through operations, support, and disposal. A life-cycle  cost estimate encompasses all past (or sunk), present, and future costs  for every aspect of the program, regardless of funding source. According  to the guide, a life-cycle cost estimate can enhance decision making,  especially in early planning and concept formulation of acquisition, as well  as support budget decisions, key decision points, milestone reviews, and  investment decisions. The guide also states that a credible cost estimate  reflects all costs associated with a system (program)—we interpret this to  also mean that it must be based on a complete scope of work—and the  estimate should be updated to reflect changes in requirements (which  affect the scope of work). Because of the inherent uncertainty of every  estimate due to the assumptions that must be made about future  projections, once life-cycle costs are developed it is also important to  continually keep them updated, according to the guide.
We also published a schedule guide in December 2015—as a companion  to the cost estimating guide—that identifies best practices for scheduling  the necessary work. According to the schedule guide, a well-planned  schedule is a fundamental management tool that can help government  programs use funds effectively by specifying when work will be performed  in the future and measuring program performance against an approved  plan. Moreover, an integrated master schedule can show when major  events are expected as well as the completion dates for all activities  leading up to these events, which can help determine if the program’s  parameters are realistic and achievable. An integrated master schedule  may be made up of several or several hundred individual schedules that  represent portions of effort within a program. These individual schedules  are “projects” within the larger program. An integrated master schedule  integrates the planned work, the resources necessary to accomplish that  work, and the associated budget, and it should be the focal point for  program management. Furthermore, according to the schedule guide, an  integrated master schedule constitutes a program schedule that includes  the entire required scope of work, including the effort necessary from all  government, contractor, and other key parties for a program’s successful  execution from start to finish. Conformance to this best practice—that  the schedule should capture all activities or scope of work—logically  leads to another key schedule best practice: the sequencing of all  activities. This best practice states that activities must be listed in the  order in which they are to be carried out and be joined with logic.  Consequently, developing a complete scope of work or knowing all of the  activities necessary to accomplish the project’s objectives is critical to  adhering to these best practices. In other words, a schedule is not  complete and reliable if significant portions of the scope of work are not  yet developed or are still uncertain, including over the longer term.
In prior reports from February 2014, November 2014, and August 2016,  we included recommendations concerning NNSA’s development of life- cycle cost estimates or an integrated master schedule for certain projects  and programs, as called for in our cost estimating and schedule best  practice guides. Specifically:  In February 2014, we recommended that to develop reliable cost  estimates for its plutonium disposition program, among other things,  the Secretary of Energy should direct the NNSA office responsible for  managing the program to, as appropriate, revise and update the  program’s life-cycle cost estimate following the 12 key steps  described in our Cost Estimating Guide for developing high-quality  cost estimates.
In our November 2014 report, we recommended that to enhance  NNSA’s ability to develop reliable cost estimates for its projects and  for its programs that have project-like characteristics, the Secretary of  Energy should revise DOE directives that apply to programs to require  that DOE and NNSA and its contractors develop cost estimates in  accordance with the 12 cost estimating best practices, including  developing life-cycle cost estimates for programs.
In August 2016, regarding the preparation of integrated master  schedules, we recommended that to ensure that NNSA’s future  schedule estimates for the revised Chemistry and Metallurgy  Research Replacement project—a key element of NNSA’s plutonium  program—provide the agency with reasonable assurance regarding  meeting the project’s completion dates, the Secretary should direct  the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, in his capacity as the NNSA  Administrator, to develop future schedules for the revised project that  are consistent with current DOE project management policy and  scheduling best practices. Specifically, the Under Secretary should  develop and maintain an integrated master schedule that includes all  project activities under all subprojects prior to approving the project’s  first CD-2 decision.
The agency generally agreed with these recommendations and has  initiated various actions intended to implement them, including revising  certain DOE orders, but it has not completed all actions needed to fully  address the recommendations.
section_title: Best Practices for Technology Readiness
paragraphs: To ensure that new technologies are sufficiently mature in time to be used  successfully, NNSA uses a systematic approach—Technology Readiness  Levels (TRL)—for measuring the technologies’ technical maturity. TRLs  were pioneered by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  and have been used by the Department of Defense and other agencies in  their research and development efforts for several years. As shown in  table 1, TRLs start with TRL 1, which is the least mature, and go through  TRL 9, the highest maturity level and at which the technology as a total  system is fully developed, integrated, and functioning successfully in  project operations.
In November 2010, when NNSA’s original approach was to consolidate Y- 12’s uranium processing capabilities into a single large facility, we  reported that NNSA did not expect to have optimal assurance as defined  by TRL best practices that 6 of the 10 new technologies being developed  for construction of the new UPF would work as intended before project  critical decisions are made. Our November 2010 report also concluded  that because all of the technologies being developed for construction of  the new UPF would not achieve optimal levels of readiness prior to  project critical decisions, NNSA might lack assurance that all technologies  would work as intended. The report further stated that this could force the  project to revert to existing or alternate technologies, which could result in  design changes, higher costs, and schedule delays. In September 2011,  DOE issued a technology readiness assessment guide for the agency,  which states that new technologies should reach TRL 6 by CD 2, when  the scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule baselines are to be  approved. The guide also encouraged project managers to reach TRL 7  prior to CD 3, or when the start of construction is approved. In April  2014, we provided additional information on technology development  efforts for the UPF and identified five additional technology risks since our  November 2010 report. In May 2016, DOE strengthened TRL  requirements and updated DOE Order 413.3B, Program and Project  Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, which states that  project managers shall reach TRL 7 prior to CD 2 for major system  projects or first-of-a-kind engineering endeavors. In August 2016, we  provided an exposure draft to the public to obtain input and feedback on  our technology readiness guide, which identifies best practices for  evaluating the readiness of technology for use in acquisition programs  and projects.
section_title: NNSA Has Made Progress in Developing a Revised Scope of Work, Cost Estimate, and Schedule for the New UPF
paragraphs: NNSA documents we reviewed and program officials we interviewed  indicate that NNSA has made progress in developing a revised scope of  work, cost estimate, and schedule for the new UPF, potentially stabilizing  escalating project costs and technical risks experienced under the  previous strategy. According to NNSA’s 2014 high-level strategic plan for  the uranium program, NNSA changed its strategy for managing the  overall uranium program, including the UPF, that year, which resulted in  the need to develop a new scope of work. NNSA has reduced the scope  of work for construction of the new UPF—the most expensive uranium  program element—as a result of key adjustments NNSA had made to  program requirements. For example, NNSA’s October 2014 revision of  program requirements for construction of the new UPF resulted in the  following changes:
NNSA modified the processing capability for casting uranium initially  intended for construction of the new UPF, which then allowed the  agency to scale back certain capabilities envisioned for the facility,  potentially reducing project costs.
NNSA significantly simplified processing capabilities and reduced  critical technologies needed for construction, due to the reduction in  the scope of work for the new UPF from the 10 technologies the  agency planned to use prior to 2014 to 3, according to program  officials. NNSA officials told us that this change was needed to help  control escalating costs and technical risks.
NNSA integrated graded security and safety factors into the new UPF  design, which resulted in cost savings and schedule improvement for  the UPF project, according to agency officials.
According to NNSA’s fiscal years 2017 and 2018 budget requests, NNSA  expects to approve formal scope of work, cost, and schedule baseline  estimates for construction of the new UPF as the designs for the Main  Process and Salvage and Accountability Buildings subprojects—the two  largest subprojects—reach at least 90 percent completion, which is  consistent with DOE’s order on project management for construction of  these types of facilities.
According to NNSA’s fiscal year 2017 and 2018 budget requests,  construction of the new UPF will occur in distinct phases, by key  subproject. The seven key subprojects are as follows:
Main Process Building Subproject: This subproject includes  construction of the main nuclear facility that contains casting and  special oxide production. Support structures include a secure  connecting portal to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility.
Salvage and Accountability Building Subproject: This subproject  includes work intended to construct a facility for handling chemicals  and wastes associated with uranium processing, as well as  decontamination capabilities, among other things.
Mechanical Electrical Building Subproject: This subproject  includes work intended to provide a building for mechanical, electrical,  heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and utility equipment for the Main  Process and Salvage and Accountability buildings.
Site Infrastructure and Services Subproject: This subproject  includes work intended for demolishment, excavation, and  construction of a parking lot, security portal, and support building.
Process Support Facilities Subproject: This subproject includes  work intended to provide chilled water and chemical and gas supply  storage for the UPF.
Substation Subproject: This subproject includes work intended to  provide power to the new UPF and additional capacity for the  remainder of the Y-12 Plant.
Site Readiness Subproject: This subproject included work to  relocate Bear Creek Road and construct a new bridge and haul road.
As of May 2017, NNSA had developed and approved a revised formal  scope of work, cost, and schedule baseline estimates for four of the  seven subprojects. NNSA expects to approve such baseline estimates for  the all of the remaining subprojects—including the two largest  subprojects—by the second quarter of fiscal year 2018. NNSA also plans  to validate the estimates through an independent cost estimate at that  time. Concurrently with its approval and validation of the formal baseline  estimates—which constitutes CD 2 in NNSA’s project management  process—NNSA intends to approve the start of construction, which  constitutes CD 3 in that process. Table 2 shows estimated or approved  time frames for CD 2, 3, and 4 milestones, as well as preliminary or  (where available) formal cost baseline estimates for each subproject.
section_title: NNSA Has Not Developed a Complete Scope of Work, Life-Cycle Cost Estimate, and Integrated Master Schedule for Its Overall Uranium Program
paragraphs: NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work, life-cycle cost  estimate, or integrated master schedule for its overall uranium program,  and it has no time frame for doing so. In particular, it has not developed a  complete scope of work for repairs and upgrades to existing facilities, nor  has it done so for other key uranium program elements. Therefore, NNSA  does not have the basis to develop a life-cycle cost estimate or an  integrated master schedule for its overall uranium program.
subsections: section_title: Scope of Work for Repairs and Upgrades to Existing Facilities of the Overall Uranium Program Is Not Complete
paragraphs: NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work to repair and upgrade  existing facilities for the overall uranium program, even though these  activities could be among the most expensive and complicated non- construction portions of the uranium program. According to a July 2014  memorandum from the NNSA Administrator, the uranium program  manager is expected to, among other things, identify the scope of work of  new construction and infrastructure repairs and upgrades to existing  facilities necessary to support the full uranium mission. NNSA is still  evaluating a November 2016 initial implementation plan, proposed by the  Y-12 contractor, for the repairs and upgrades that broadly outlines the  scope of work.
We found that some areas of the scope of work are more fully defined  than others. For example, NNSA’s implementation plan identifies the  scope of work to conduct electrical power distribution repairs and  upgrades in buildings 9215 and 9204-2E—which were constructed in the  1950s and 1960s, respectively—beginning in fiscal year 2017. However,  NNSA does not have a complete scope of work to serve as the basis for  its $400 million estimate. Officials we interviewed said that the agency  intends to develop each year the complete and detailed scope of work to  be done in the following year or two, including the work related to  infrastructure investment.
We also found that one significant area of the scope of work that has not  been developed concerns repairs and upgrades to address certain safety  issues confirmed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. For  example, according to the board’s February 2015 letter to NNSA,  earthquakes or structural performance problems in Buildings 9215 and  9204-2E could contribute to an increased risk for structural collapse and  release of radiological material. NNSA officials said they have not fully  developed the long-term scope of work to address the safety issues that  the board confirmed because much of this work depends on the results of  upcoming seismic and structural assessments the agency expects to be  conducted in or after fiscal year 2018. According to these officials, the  need for these assessments was not apparent until after 2014, when  NNSA decided to rely, in part, on aging existing facilities to meet uranium  program requirements. NNSA then had to adjust plans in alignment with  the new circumstances that required repairs and upgrades to these  facilities. According to NNSA program officials, the planned infrastructure  repairs and upgrades will address many, but not all, of the safety issues  identified by the board. For example, NNSA program officials stated that  they do not expect building 9215, which it expects to be in operation  through the late 2030s, to meet all modern safety standards even with  planned upgrades. NNSA officials also stated that planned upgrades  have not been finalized and will focus on the upgrades that balance cost  and risks.
Other aspects of the scope of work for repairs and upgrades have been  developed but may not be stable because NNSA continues to review and  adjust program requirements that affect the scope of work. For example,  during our examination of how NNSA established uranium purification  requirements, NNSA program officials told us that they identified a more  accurate program requirement for purified uranium that increased the  required annual processing throughput capability for purified uranium  from 450 to 750 kilograms. As a result, in August 2016, NNSA program  officials told us that NNSA will need to add to the capacity of the  equipment to be installed in Building 9215 to convert uranium that  contains relatively high amounts of impurities, such as carbon, into a  more purified form—increasing the scope of work for this upgrade. The  uranium program manager told us that, in an effort to make the  requirement more accurate, NNSA changed its approach to determining  the requirement so that it relied less on historical data and more on data  on the purification levels of uranium inventories on hand, among other  considerations. This program manager also told us that accurate and  stable program requirements establish the basis for the infrastructure and  equipment that will be needed to meet program goals, such as processing  uranium for nuclear components necessary to meet nuclear weapons  stockpile needs. The ongoing review of program requirements, with minor  adjustments, is expected and necessary to ensure accuracy, according to  NNSA officials.
section_title: Scope of Work for Other Uranium Program Elements Are Not Fully Developed
paragraphs: We also found that NNSA has not developed complete scopes of work for  other uranium program elements, including uranium sustainment  activities, depleted uranium management, and technology development,  based on our review of documents and discussion with NNSA officials.  NNSA officials we interviewed told us that NNSA is working to develop  these scopes of work, but the agency has no time frames for completion.
subsections: section_title: Uranium Sustainment Activities for Achieving Inventory Risk Reduction
paragraphs: We determined that NNSA has not yet developed the complete scope of  work for activities to reduce the risk associated with and sustain its  uranium inventory, based on our review of program documents and  interviews with NNSA program officials. These activities include efforts to  remove higher-risk materials from higher-risk conditions and strategically  place them in lower-risk conditions. For example, NNSA expects to  reprocess the uranium contained in organic solutions, which is a relatively  higher-risk form of uranium storage, for repackaging and eventual  removal from deteriorating, higher-risk buildings, such as Building 9212.  These reprocessed materials and other materials that are more easily  repackaged, such as nuclear components from dismantled nuclear  weapons, are expected to be relocated to lower-risk storage areas, such  as the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, which became  operational in 2010. NNSA program officials told us that they have  developed a detailed scope of work for the removal of higher-risk  materials from some Y-12 areas but have not developed the complete  scope of work for their removal from other facilities or for transferring  these materials to the storage facility or other interim locations.
section_title: Depleted Uranium Management
paragraphs: NNSA officials we interviewed told us that the agency recognized in  December 2015 that requirements for depleted uranium were incomplete,  which could affect the scope of work for meeting these requirements. In  December 2015, NNSA completed its initial analysis of depleted uranium  needs, by weapon system, to determine potential gaps in material  availability in the future. This initial analysis was an important first step in  defining requirements for depleted uranium, but the program element is in  an early stage of development, according to NNSA program officials.  According to NNSA officials, NNSA is developing the scope of work  necessary to sustain depleted uranium capabilities and infrastructure at  Y-12, and it is evaluating strategies to procure or produce additional  feedstock of high-purity depleted uranium to support production needs.
section_title: Technology Development
paragraphs: NNSA’s broad strategy to replace Building 9212 capabilities by 2025— through plans for the construction of a new UPF under a reduced scope  of work—currently involves plans to install new uranium processing  capabilities in other existing Y-12 buildings, including Buildings 9215 and  9204-2E, and will rely on developing and installing new technologies. Two  of the uranium processing technologies—calciner and electrorefining— are at later stages of development, and the scope of work needed to bring  them to full maturity is relatively straightforward, according to NNSA  program officials. One technology—chip processing—is less mature, but  the remaining activities necessary to potentially develop it to full maturity  have been determined, according to NNSA program officials. Also,  according to these officials, for one technology that has been deferred,  the remaining activities necessary to develop it to full maturity are less  clear.
Calciner technology enables the processing of certain uranium- bearing solutions into a dry solid so that it can be stored pending  further processing in the future. According to a NNSA uranium  program official, NNSA had determined as of May 2015 that the  calciner technology had reached TRL 6—the level required prior to  CD 2 (when scope of work, cost, and schedule baselines are to be  approved) under DOE’s technology readiness guide. After finishing  calciner equipment installation in Building 9212 and project  completion, expected in fiscal year 2022, NNSA plans to conduct a  readiness review to demonstrate that the technology meets TRL 8  (meaning that it has been tested and demonstrated), according to a  NNSA uranium program official.
Electrorefining technology applies a voltage that drives a chemical  reaction to remove impurities from uranium. According to NNSA  documents, using this technology eliminates various hazards  associated with current chemical purification processes, such as using  hydrogen fluoride and certain solvents, and allows a 4-to-1 reduction  in square footage to operate compared with existing technologies. As  of December 2015, NNSA had determined that the electrorefining  technology had reached TRL 6, according to a key NNSA program  official. After finishing electrorefining equipment installation in  Building 9215 and project completion, expected in fiscal year 2022,  NNSA plans to conduct a readiness review to demonstrate that the  technology meets TRL 8, according to a NNSA uranium program  official.
Direct electrolytic reduction technology could convert uranium  oxide to uranium metal using an electrochemical process similar, but  not identical, to electrorefining. It was assessed at TRL 4 as of  September 2014. According to NNSA program officials, NNSA may  pursue direct electrolytic reduction technology as a follow-on to  electrorefining, but NNSA has not determined whether there is a  mission need for this technology. Currently, NNSA has deferred  funding for it until fiscal year 2019.
Chip processing technology converts enriched uranium metal scraps  from machining operations into a form that can be re-used. This  technology is already in use, but NNSA is investigating improved  technology to potentially simplify the process and reduce the number  of chip processing steps, according to NNSA program officials. As of  July 2016, NNSA had determined that the new technology had  reached TRL 5, and the agency plans to reach TRL 6 by June 2017.
section_title: NNSA Has Not Developed Life-Cycle Costs or an Integrated Master Schedule for the Uranium Program
paragraphs: Because NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work for the  overall uranium program, it does not have the basis to develop a life-cycle  cost estimate or an integrated master schedule for the program. As noted  previously, NNSA has made progress in developing a cost estimate for  the new UPF, and this estimate will be an essential component of a life- cycle cost estimate for the overall program. For other program elements,  discussed below, NNSA either has rough or no estimates of the total  costs. According to our analysis of information from NNSA documents  and program officials, these program elements may cost nearly $1 billion  over the next 2 decades.
Repairs and upgrades to existing facilities: NNSA’s contractor’s  implementation plan includes a rough-order-of-magnitude cost  estimate of $400 million over the next 20 years—roughly $20 million  per year—for repairs and upgrades to existing facilities.
Uranium sustainment activities for achieving inventory risk  reduction: Activities to reduce the risk associated with and sustain  NNSA’s uranium inventory are expected to cost roughly $25 million  per year in fiscal years 2017 through 2025 for a total of around $225  million, according to NNSA program officials.
Depleted uranium management: NNSA has not estimated costs for  meeting depleted uranium needs for weapons systems. Current costs  related to managing depleted uranium are broadly shared among  various NNSA program areas. NNSA is exploring options and costs of  increasing the supply of depleted uranium to meet NNSA needs.
Technology development: Estimated costs for development of  technology to be installed in existing Y-12 buildings are roughly $30  million per year in fiscal years 2017 through 2025, for a total of around  $270 million, according to NNSA program officials.
Our cost estimating guide states that a credible cost estimate reflects all  costs associated with a system (program)—i.e., it must be based on a  complete scope of work—and that the estimate should be updated to  reflect changes in requirements (which affect the scope of work).  Because NNSA has not developed the complete scope of work for each  program element and the overall uranium program, NNSA does not have  the basis for preparing a credible life-cycle cost estimate for the program.  Having a life-cycle cost estimate can enhance decision making, especially  in early planning and concept formulation of acquisition, as well as  support budget decisions, key decision points, milestone reviews, and  investment decisions, according to our cost estimating guide. For the  uranium program, a life-cycle cost estimate could better inform decision  making, including by Congress. Uranium program managers indicated  that they plan to eventually develop a life-cycle cost estimate for the  overall uranium program, but they have no time frame for doing so and  said that it may take several years.
In addition, NNSA has not developed an integrated master schedule for  its uranium program as called for in our schedule guide. An integrated  master schedule for the uranium program would need to include  individual schedules that represent portions of effort within the program— that is, program elements. As noted earlier, NNSA has made progress  in developing a schedule for the UPF project and expects to complete  development of schedule baselines for all UPF subprojects in 2018; this  schedule information will be an essential component of an integrated  master schedule for the overall program. For other program elements,  however, NNSA does not have a basis to develop a complete schedule  because, as discussed above, NNSA has not developed a complete  scope of work.
NNSA’s program guidance recommends development of an integrated  master schedule and states that having one supports effective  management of program scope, risk, and day-to-day activities.
Specifically, the guidance states that during the initial phases of a  program, an integrated master schedule provides an early understanding  of the required scope of work, key events, accomplishment criteria, and  the likely program structure by depicting the progression of work through  the remaining phases. Furthermore, it communicates the expectations of  the program team and provides traceability to the management and  execution of the program. However, NNSA’s guidance does not always  explicitly require the development of such a schedule—the guidance  allows for the tailoring of the agency’s management approach based on  the particular program being managed. Uranium program managers  indicated that they plan to eventually develop an integrated master  schedule for the uranium program but were uncertain when this schedule  may be developed. In the meantime, NNSA plans to spend tens of  millions of dollars annually on uranium program activities—including $20  million per year for repairs and upgrades to existing buildings—without  providing decision makers with an understanding of the complete scope  of work, key events, accomplishment criteria, and the likely program  structure.
Under federal standards for internal control, management should use  quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives, and, among other  characteristics, quality information is provided on a timely basis. Without  NNSA setting a time frame for when it will (1) develop the complete scope  of work for the overall uranium program, to the extent practicable, and (2)  prepare a life-cycle cost estimate and integrated master schedule, NNSA  does not have reasonable assurance that decision makers will have  timely access to essential program management information—risking  unforeseen cost escalation and delays in NNSA’s efforts to meet the  nation’s uranium needs.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NNSA is making efforts to modernize uranium processing capabilities that  are crucial to our nation’s ability to maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile  and fuel its nuclear-powered naval vessels. NNSA’s modernization efforts  will likely cost several billions of dollars and take at least 2 decades to  execute. As part of these efforts, NNSA is planning to construct a new  UPF, using a revised approach intended to help control escalating costs  and schedule delays. NNSA has made progress in developing a scope of  work, cost estimates, and schedules for the new UPF.
However, the success of the new UPF approach, which relies on support  capabilities outside of the new UPF project, depends on the successful  completion and integration of many other projects and activities that  comprise the overall uranium program, including repairs and upgrades to  existing Y-12 facilities needed for housing uranium processing  capabilities.
NNSA has not developed a complete scope of work for its overall uranium  program, nor has it set a time frame for doing so. In the interim, NNSA  cannot adhere to best practices, such as developing a credible life-cycle  cost estimate or an effective long-term, integrated master schedule for the  program because of gaps in information about future activities and their  associated costs. Without NNSA setting a time frame for when it will (1)  develop a complete scope of work for the overall uranium program, to the  extent practicable, and (2) prepare a life-cycle cost estimate and an  integrated master schedule for the program, NNSA does not have  reasonable assurance that decision makers will have timely access to  essential program management information for this costly and important  long-term program.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the NNSA Administrator set a time frame for when  the agency will (1) develop the complete scope of work for the overall  uranium program to the extent practicable and (2) prepare a life-cycle  cost estimate and an integrated master schedule for the overall uranium  program.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOE and NNSA for their review and  comment. NNSA provided written comments, which are reproduced in full  in appendix II, as well as technical comments, which we incorporated in  our report as appropriate. In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with  our recommendation. NNSA stated that the recommendation reflects the  logical next steps in any program’s maturity and is consistent with its  existing planning goals. NNSA further stated that while it is too early to  have developed full scope and cost estimates for the entire program at  this point, it fully intends to implement the recommendation at the  appropriate times in the uranium program’s continuing development. In  particular, NNSA stated that it is developing a complete scope of work,  which is necessary for a fully informed program cost estimate, and  anticipates this to be a multiyear effort. Regarding cost estimates, NNSA  said that initial cost estimates it develops will continue to reflect strategies  and emerging risks over the course of the Future Years Nuclear Security  Plan—a 5-year plan typically used as part of the basis for NNSA  congressional budget requests for each fiscal year. NNSA stated that  once stable implementation plans are developed for its activities, it will  consider whether there is value in further extending the time frame for  estimates.  NNSA further stated that it plans to complete an initial  coordinated program schedule by December 31, 2018, and that the  schedule would continue to be updated as plans and strategies evolve.  NNSA also provided additional examples to illustrate the program’s  progress in improving safety, relocating processes, improving  infrastructure, and construction of the UPF, among other things. We  incorporated several of these examples in the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the National  Nuclear Security Administration, and other interested parties. In addition,  the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To describe the status of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s  (NNSA) efforts to develop a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and  schedule for the new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project, we  reviewed NNSA program planning documents, and any updates,  concerning cost and budget and interviewed agency officials to determine  the effect of uranium program strategy revisions on the UPF project’s  scope of work, cost, and schedule. To examine the scope of work for the  UPF project, which directly impacts the project’s cost and schedule, we  reviewed NNSA business operating procedures for developing program  requirements and the steps taken to identify and update requirements,  which would apply to the construction of the new UPF. We interviewed  program officials to understand how they defined and adjusted program  requirements and to understand the potential effects of any adjustments  on NNSA’s infrastructure plans. For example, NNSA officials stated that  they followed key portions of the applicable Business Operating  Procedure (BOP) regarding program requirements for construction  projects. As such, we reviewed those portions of BOP-06.02 that the  officials stated were applicable, including stipulations that requirements  include the “threshold” value (the minimum acceptable performance,  scope of work, cost, or schedule that construction of the new UPF must  achieve), and “objective” value (the desired performance, scope of work,  cost, or schedule that the new UPF should achieve). To review project  requirements for the construction of the new UPF, we reviewed copies of  the most recent requirements revision documents—NNSA’s project and  program requirements documents. Specifically, we reviewed the  requirements to determine whether requirements for the construction of  the new UPF specified both threshold and objective requirements.
To examine the extent to which NNSA has developed a complete scope  of work, life-cycle cost estimate, and integrated master schedule for the  overall uranium program, we reviewed NNSA program-planning  documents concerning cost and budget and interviewed NNSA’s program  manager and other program and contractor officials. We examined  information regarding the broader uranium program, including NNSA’s  efforts to repair and upgrade existing Y-12 facilities and other key  uranium program elements. Specifically, to examine the scope of work for  key elements of the overall uranium program—this scope of work directly  impacts the program’s cost and schedule—we reviewed NNSA planning,  strategy, and implementation-related documents for the program. We  reviewed NNSA business operating procedures for developing program  requirements and the steps taken to identify and update requirements for  unique processing capabilities to be housed in existing facilities external  to the UPF. We interviewed program officials to understand how they  defined and adjusted program requirements and to understand the  potential effects of any adjustments on NNSA’s infrastructure plans. In  particular, we reviewed requirements external to the construction of the  new UPF that were determined to be critical in meeting key program  goals, according to NNSA officials, such as uranium purification  requirements. We interviewed officials to determine the approach/process  used for requirement-setting, the data used, and how NNSA analyzed the  data. In addition, we reviewed detailed program planning documents,  such as the Y-12 Enriched Uranium Facility Extended Life Program  Report and Highly Enriched Uranium Mission Strategy Implementation  Plan to learn about the infrastructure repairs and upgrades NNSA  identified it needs to meet facility safety and other requirements. To  obtain the views of independent subject matter experts on the structural,  seismic, and safety condition of existing Y-12 facilities, we reviewed the  Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 2014 report that addressed the  subject and that included conclusions and recommendations. In  September 2016, we also spoke with board officials to determine if there  were updates, additions, or changes to its letter; the officials said there  were none and that the Y-12 facility structural concerns expressed in the  2014 letter remain.
To further examine the estimated cost and schedule for the overall  uranium program from a broader perspective, we gathered and analyzed  information regarding the extent to which NNSA has developed a life- cycle cost estimate and an integrated master schedule as called for in  best practices. We reviewed best practices for cost and schedule as  described in our Cost Estimating Guide and Schedule Guide. For the  cost estimating guide, GAO cost experts established a consistent  methodology that is based on best practices that federal cost estimating  organizations and industry use to develop and maintain reliable cost  estimates. Developing a life-cycle cost estimate and an integrated master  schedule for the overall program are critical to successfully managing a  program. We identified the benefits of using these best practices and  interviewed program officials to obtain information on the status of their  adherence to these best practices in managing the overall uranium  program.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant  Director), Martin Campbell, Antoinette Capaccio, Jennifer Echard, Cynthia  Norris, Christopher Pacheco, Sophia Payind, Timothy M. Persons, Karen  Richey, Jeanette Soares, and Kiki Theodoropoulos made significant  contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Program Management: DOE Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Policy  and Training Program. GAO-17-51. Washington, D.C.: November 21,  2016.
DOE Project Management: NNSA Needs to Clarify Requirements for Its  Plutonium Analysis Project at Los Alamos. GAO-16-585. Washington,  D.C.: Aug. 9, 2016.
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Budget Estimates  Increased but May Not Align with All Anticipated Costs. GAO-16-290.  Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2016.
Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA Increased Its Budget  Estimates, but Estimates for Key Stockpile and Infrastructure Programs  Need Improvement. GAO-15-499. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2015.
DOE and NNSA Project Management: Analysis of Alternatives Could Be  Improved by Incorporating Best Practices. GAO-15-37. Washington, D.C.:  December 11, 2014.
Project and Program Management: DOE Needs to Revise Requirements  and Guidance for Cost Estimating and Related Reviews. GAO-15-29.  Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25, 2014.
Department of Energy: Interagency Review Needed to Update U.S.  Position on Enriched Uranium That Can Be Used for Tritium Production.  GAO-15-123. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2014.
Nuclear Weapons: Some Actions Have Been Taken to Address  Challenges with the Uranium Processing Facility Design. GAO-15-126.  Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2014.
Nuclear Weapons: Technology Development Efforts for the Uranium  Processing Facility. GAO-14-295. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2014.
Plutonium Disposition Program: DOE Needs to Analyze the Root Causes  of Cost Increases and Develop Better Cost Estimates. GAO-14-231.  Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2014.
Nuclear Weapons: Information on Safety Concerns with the Uranium  Processing Facility. GAO-14-79R. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2013.
Nuclear Weapons: Factors Leading to Cost Increases with the Uranium  Processing Facility. GAO-13-686R. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2013.
Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its  Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and  Technology Readiness. GAO-11-103. Washington, D.C.: November 19,  2010.