Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Visibility over Collaborative Field Mechanisms
Published: 2013-09-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DHS is the third-largest department in the federal government, with an annual budget of about $60 billion, 200,000 staff, and a broad range of missions. In 2002, DHS was created from 22 legacy agencies. The geographic overlap of these agencies' legacy field office structures was extensive, underscoring the importance of collaboration among them when conducting missions that crossed across boundaries. As a follow-on to GAO's September 2012 report on DHS's efforts to integrate field operations, GAO was asked to review DHS and key operational components' use of collaborative mechanisms. This report (1) assesses DHS's visibility over collaborative field mechanisms established by component agencies, and (2) describes factors that enhance or impede collaboration within these mechanisms, and the extent to which DHS has collected and disseminated successful collaborative practices.
GAO analyzed selected mechanisms' guidance; conducted 10 mechanism site visits based on their geographic diversity, among other factors; and compared their practices with collaboration practices identified in previous GAO work. GAO also interviewed DHS and component officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Opportunities exist for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance its visibility over collaborative field mechanisms (i.e., multiagency groups such as task forces, committees, and teams that enhance stakeholder collaboration to more effectively and efficiently achieve their missions) established by component agencies. DHS, at the departmental level, has limited visibility over the universe and operation of these mechanisms and does not identify information from them that could further enhance collaboration across DHS and inform future DHS decisions. In the absence of a single DHS regional/field structure, DHS components have created collaborative mechanisms to better integrate field operations by better coordinating their missions and sharing information. However, when GAO sought to identify these mechanisms, in conjunction with DHS, senior DHS officials stated that while they maintain regular visibility over component activities--which may involve these collaborative mechanisms--DHS does not collect information on the types of mechanisms and collaborative practices these mechanisms employ because the mechanisms operate under the components, and thus this information was not readily available at the departmental level. DHS officials stated that primary oversight over the mechanisms is the responsibility of the operational components or mechanism participants. However, DHS's own strategic goals emphasize the importance of cross-departmental integration and coordination to enhance DHS's mission, and DHS could benefit--on a strategic level--from greater awareness of these mechanisms and the collaborative practices they employ. DHS is ultimately accountable for the resources that support these mechanisms, and is responsible for decision making about its overall field structure and for moving the department closer to its goal of greater component unification and integration. By collecting additional information on collaborative mechanisms, DHS could achieve better visibility over the universe of existing mechanisms, and thus be better positioned to analyze or implement any future changes to DHS's regional/field structure.
Participants from each of the collaborative mechanisms GAO reviewed identified several common factors that enhanced their collaboration, which DHS could benefit from collecting and disseminating on a broader scale. For example, participants identified the value of sharing resources, information, and recognition of successful missions as examples of successful collaboration practices they employed. Officials also cited collaboration challenges, including resource constraints, rotation of key personnel, and lack of leadership commitment. As GAO's fieldwork indicated, similar collaboration issues are relevant to multiple components, thus, DHS leadership could benefit from undertaking a review of collaborative mechanisms to solicit and identify promising practices, and then sharing this information among all components. In addition, given DHS's more strategic perspective, a more centralized DHS clearinghouse of collaborative practices information could be more efficient to collect and more easily accessed by a wider range of DHS components than under the current structure, where such information may not be readily shared outside of individual components or mechanisms. Collecting and disseminating information on collaborative practices would allow DHS to inform components about promising practices and lessons learned from which they could benefit.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS (1) collect information on existing collaborative mechanisms for better visibility over them, and (2) collect promising practices from the mechanisms and distribute them to components. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the third-largest cabinet- level department in the federal government, with an annual budget of  about $60 billion, 200,000 staff, and a broad range of missions, including  aviation, maritime, and border security, as well as emergency  management and infrastructure protection, among others. In 2002, when  DHS was created from 22 separate agencies, among other actions, it had  to integrate many disparate agencies—some with long histories of  independent or autonomous operations, and all with distinct operational  cultures—while maintaining their unique strengths and capabilities. This  merger presented significant public policy and management challenges  for DHS. With its establishment, DHS also inherited the legacy field office  structures and authorities of its component agencies, which resulted in an  environment where components were conducting their respective  missions in overlapping geographic regions. These overlapping  component boundaries were especially relevant to DHS’s seven key  operational components—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard  (USCG), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Secret  Service (USSS)—and each component was accustomed to carrying out  its missions within its identified set of geographic regions and system of  field offices.
Further, in November 2010, we reported on the overlap in mission and  operational boundaries that exists among agencies at the northern and  southern borders—a condition that requires coordination and  collaboration for efficient and effective law enforcement. In some cases,  agencies have separate responsibility for investigating crimes that are  committed by the same criminals or organizations in the same geographic  region, making agency collaboration and coordination important to their  mission success. The overlap in geographic and operational boundaries  among DHS components that continues to exist underscores the  importance of collaboration and coordination among these components  when conducting their missions 10 years after beginning operations under  DHS. Agencies not sharing information or coordinating their operations  can lead to competition, interference, and operational inflexibility, as the  DHS Inspector General reported in 2005 and 2007. However,  interagency mechanisms or strategies to coordinate programs that  address crosscutting issues may reduce potentially duplicative,  overlapping, and fragmented efforts. Figure 1 provides an example of the  extent to which geographic boundaries overlap in the southwestern  United States for four of the seven DHS key operational components  discussed in this report—FEMA, CBP, ICE, and USCG.
Recognizing the overlapping geographic and operational boundaries of its  components and the potential coordination and other benefits to be  gained by better aligning its field organizational structure, DHS has  considered potential organizational changes to its field structure twice  since its inception in 2003. These efforts included a recommendation in  DHS’s 2010 Bottom-Up Review Report (BUR) that the department create  a single unified field structure for its key operational components to  improve intra-agency coordination, among other things. However, we  reported in September 2012 that creating a single unified field structure  was no longer DHS’s preferred approach because of operational and  budgetary constraints. We also reported that DHS could have better  documented its examination of the potential costs and benefits of a single  unified field structure. The department agreed with our findings and  acknowledged that its efforts to assess regionalization, colocation,  consolidation, and operational integration options could have been better  documented.
Even without a single unified field structure, increasing regional  collaboration across DHS components may help facilitate more effective  and efficient mission execution. For example, increasing collaboration  across components could facilitate information sharing and allow  agencies to coordinate their patrols within a common geographic region,  allowing them to more effectively and efficiently conduct their missions.  Increasing collaboration within DHS also aligns with both congressional  and executive branch recognition of the need for improved collaboration  across the federal government as indicated by the Government  Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA),  which, among other things, establishes a new framework aimed at taking  a more crosscutting and integrated approach to focusing on results and  improving government performance. Moreover, DHS reported in its fiscal  years 2012-2016 strategic plan that while effective mechanisms exist for  interagency and intradepartmental operational and intelligence  coordination, the department must learn from the successes of the Joint  Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) and other similar constructs  to further integrate and enhance domain awareness across its efforts to  secure the border and expedite lawful travel and trade.
This report is a follow-on to our September 2012 report on DHS’s efforts  to improve collaboration and integrate its field operations. It responds to  your request that we review the extent to which DHS and key operational  components are using collaborative field mechanisms—that is,  multiagency groups such as task forces, committees, and teams that  enhance stakeholder collaboration across the participating agencies in  order to more effectively and efficiently achieve their missions. This  report (1) assesses the extent to which DHS has identified the  collaborative field mechanisms of its key operational components, and (2)  describes factors that participants of selected mechanisms identified that  enhance or are challenges to their collaboration, and assesses the extent  to which DHS has collected and disseminated successful collaborative  practices.
To address the first objective, we contacted DHS officials to identify a list  of collaborative mechanisms that they deemed to be successful examples  of field component collaboration while we also independently identified  such mechanisms. Of the 13 mechanism types ultimately identified, 11  mechanisms focused on law enforcement activities. For these 13  mechanisms, we examined organizational documents related to  mechanism mission, objectives, stakeholder composition, locations, and  date organized, among other things. We also interviewed officials from  the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning about the  establishment and operation of these 13 mechanism types. We analyzed  documentation (i.e., component daily activity reports) obtained from  senior DHS headquarters officials to identify the extent to which the  department has visibility over the collaborative field mechanism  activities—including any plans to increase visibility over the mechanisms  in the future.
To address the second objective, we selected 4 types of collaborative  field mechanisms from the list of 13, including the Regional Coordinating  Mechanism (ReCoM), the Border Enforcement Security Task Force  (BEST), the South Texas Campaign Joint Targeting Team (JTT), and the  Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC). We based our  selection of these 4 types of mechanisms on the following factors:  geographic location, continuity of the mechanism (established for at least  16 months), participation of multiple DHS component agencies, and  variation in the lead component agency. Except for JTT, we selected  mechanism types that existed in more than one location to allow for  geographic comparison—such as BEST, with 35 locations throughout the  United States. Appendix I describes each of the selected mechanisms in  detail. Among these 4 different mechanism types, we then selected 10  individual mechanism sites—3 ReCoMs, 4 BESTs, 1 JTT, and 2 RISCs— for more in-depth review. For each of the selected mechanisms, we  interviewed senior headquarters officials to discuss their views on the  successes and challenges experienced with collaboration, including how  the successes are replicated and communicated across the mechanisms  and how challenges are addressed. At each of the 10 mechanisms we  visited, we gathered information from participants on what they believed  to be promising practices that helped them to succeed as collaborative  mechanisms, as well as the factors they viewed as challenges to their  collaboration. We also discussed their efforts to establish performance  measures to assess mechanism effectiveness. We reviewed planning,  operations, and management integration documents such as strategic  plans, annual performance reports, and memorandums of understanding  or agreements among the participating agencies. We compared these  documents and their responses with the information-sharing and  collaboration practices identified in our past work on this subject. We  interviewed responsible senior DHS headquarters officials to determine  the extent to which the department has collected and reported on the  collaborative practices identified by the mechanisms. We also interviewed  component officials at the selected mechanisms to identify the extent to  which information, such as information about performance, successes,  challenges, and collaborative practices used are provided to DHS  headquarters officials who have departmental-level oversight of these  mechanisms. Appendix II provides a listing and description of the  remaining 9 mechanisms not selected for a more in-depth review. For a  more detailed discussion on our scope and methodology, see appendix  III.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Past DHS Efforts to Integrate Component Field Operations
paragraphs: DHS’s interest in better integrating its legacy agencies has been long- standing, and on several occasions since 2004 the department has  identified an approach or vision for establishing a more unified field  structure to enhance mission coordination among its component agencies  but has not implemented such a structure. As we reported in September  2012, according to senior DHS officials, the fragmentation associated with  each operational component having different boundaries for its area of  responsibility prompted some in DHS and other stakeholders to promote  the idea of a single unified DHS field structure, sometimes referred to as  regionalization. Proponents believed that a more unified structure of  DHS regional offices could foster better collaboration and integration of  multiple components’ operations, making DHS as a whole more  responsive and better prepared to counter man-made or natural threats.  In addition to improving operational effectiveness, proponents of a single  DHS field structure envisioned opportunities for long-term cost savings  through the sharing of assets, including office space.
For example, in 2005 and 2006, DHS considered implementing an  overarching plan to unify its components under a single unified field  structure, but then opted not to pursue this vision because of component  resistance to the concept and significant up-front costs associated with  colocating components. Again, in 2010, DHS chose not to realign its  component regional configurations into a single DHS regional structure,  as recommended in its BUR. In 2012, DHS and component officials  stated that transforming the existing structure into a single unified DHS  system would be a huge undertaking, and those not in favor of large- scale regionalization cited numerous challenges, including budgetary  constraints, and other drawbacks to such a plan. As we reported in  September 2012, while DHS’s intention of improving collaboration among  its agencies is a sound goal—whether through regionalization or other  means—its approach has lacked the systematic analyses and  documentation needed to support its proposals for change. The  department agreed with our findings and acknowledged that its efforts  could have been better documented.
In lieu of a single unified field structure, DHS has proposed other  alternatives for enhancing collaboration among its components in the  field, but has not implemented these proposals. For example, the  department reported plans to harmonize operations and intelligence— utilizing concepts and structures modeled after JIATF-South. In 2012,  DHS identified a new approach for enhancing regional collaboration  among its components through virtual integration—that is, by improving  component agencies’ coordination of mission activities and  communication through the use of technology. According to a senior DHS  official, virtual integration would allow for coordination of component  functions without actually consolidating or merging the functions. DHS’s  intention toward virtual integration was communicated in its fiscal years  2012-2016 strategic plan and reported to us in September 2012.  However, in 2013, DHS officials stated that the department was not  specifically pursuing virtual approaches to regional coordination. DHS  officials also reported that although DHS no longer planned to pursue  virtual collaboration on a larger scale, it was occurring on a more limited  scale, within the department and components, for certain efforts.
section_title: Component Efforts to Integrate Field Operations through Collaborative Mechanisms
paragraphs: In the absence of a unified field structure, DHS’s operational components  have established and utilized collaborative mechanisms, including virtual  approaches, to better integrate their field operations. Specifically, DHS  field components have employed collaborative mechanisms to coordinate  their missions and share information among multiple stakeholders in  order to increase their mission effectiveness and efficiencies. These  mechanisms have both similarities and differences in how they are  structured, which missions or threats they focus on, and which agencies  participate in them, among other things. All of the mechanisms identified  in this report involve multiple DHS components, as well as other federal,  state, and local agency participants, and their purpose is to improve  operational integration, coordination, and efficiency among DHS  components. These mechanisms focus on a range of missions and are  located throughout the United States. Figure 2 shows the states and  territories that contain 1 or more of the 13 collaborative field mechanism  types (including the 4 mechanism types we selected for further study)  involving DHS’s key operational components that we identified in  conjunction with the department and these components.
All 4 mechanism types we selected for a more in-depth review (ReCoM,  BEST, JTT, and RISC) had been established through formal organizing  documents (e.g., a charter or memorandum of understanding); involve  stakeholders from various federal, state, and local agencies; and have an  established lead agency to provide oversight and guidance to  participants. In addition, all 4 of these mechanism types are funded by the  participating agencies—no funding has been allocated or budgeted  specifically for these collaborative mechanisms.
ReCoMs were officially established in 2011 through the Maritime  Operations Coordination Plan, which was signed by their Executive  Team of the Senior Guidance Team, composed of the Director of ICE  Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Commissioner of CBP,  and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The Maritime Operations  Coordination Plan directs these agencies to utilize the fusion of  intelligence, planning, and operations to target the threat of  transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the coastal border.  USCG serves as the lead agency responsible for planning and  coordinating among components, and as of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs  had been established aligning with the USCG sectors’ geographic  areas of responsibility.  In 2005, the first BEST unit was organized and led by ICE HSI, in  partnership with CBP, in Laredo, Texas, and as of June 2013, 35  BESTs had been established throughout the United States. The  BESTs have a mission to identify, disrupt, and dismantle existing and  emerging threats at U.S. land, sea, and air borders.
The first JTT was organized in November 2011 as a CBP-led  partnership among the U.S. Border Patrol, CBP Office of Field  Operations, ICE HSI, and the government of Mexico to support the  South Texas Campaign (STC). The purpose of the STC is to integrate  intelligence, pursue enhanced coordination with the government of  Mexico, and conduct targeted operations to disrupt and dismantle  transnational criminal organizations. As of June 2013, JTTs had  been established across four geographic boundary areas in Del Rio,  Laredo, McAllen, and Houston, Texas.
The first RISC was organized in 2003 to provide a forum for senior  DHS officials to enhance emergency management and homeland  security for all hazards through a collaborative, regional approach  involving federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental organization  and private sector partners. As of June 2013, a RISC had been  established in each of the 10 FEMA regions.
The purpose of all of these selected mechanisms includes increasing  operational effectiveness through greater collaboration and leveraging of  resources and expertise. Our review identified commonalities within the  same type of mechanism across multiple locations, as well as  commonalities across the 4 types of mechanisms that we focused on for  our review. Table 1 provides a summary description of the 4 selected  collaborative field mechanism types that we reviewed and the locations  we visited for each of them.
section_title: Opportunities Exist for DHS to Enhance Its Visibility over Collaborative Field Mechanisms of Its Key Operational Components
paragraphs: DHS, at the departmental level, has limited awareness of the universe of  component field collaborative mechanisms and of the types and quality of  collaborative practices they employ to better coordinate and integrate  mission operations. As a result of its limited visibility over these  mechanisms, DHS headquarters is not well positioned to routinely identify  valuable information obtained from the mechanisms that could inform  decisions about DHS field structures or further enhance collaboration  across components.
According to senior DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning  (OPS) officials, DHS headquarters does not actively catalog or routinely  monitor the universe of collaborative field mechanisms because they are  organized and monitored by their respective lead operational components  or participants. However, although the collaborative mechanisms may be  monitored by individual components, the components do not have the  same high-level perspective—or accountability—as the department as a  whole, to look across all components and assess the state of  collaboration occurring in the field. Moreover, according to senior OPS  officials, their departmental-level office is focused on the specific  outcomes of operational activities and not whether the activities are  carried out by a certain collaborative mechanism, as the collaborative  mechanisms employed to accomplish tasks are not as important as the  end results. Therefore, these DHS headquarters officials believe they  have visibility—primarily through the components—over activities carried  out by collaborative mechanisms, but stated that they have little or no  visibility over the nature of the collaboration itself, since they do not  collect this type of information. OPS officials also noted that the Program  Analysis & Evaluation Division (PA&E), within the Office of the Chief  Financial Officer, which is involved with performance measurement,  monitors whether the operational components are meeting their  performance requirements or goals, but does not track performance or  other information on cross-component field mechanisms. PA&E officials  stated that their division is responsible for strategic-level management  and oversight, not operational-level, and per various laws and policy  frameworks, their division measures performance of higher-level DHS  programs.
DHS’s limited visibility at the departmental level of the number and type of  existing collaborative field mechanisms was demonstrated in part by the  challenges DHS headquarters experienced in providing us with a list of  mechanisms. Specifically, when we asked for a list of formalized  mechanisms that DHS headquarters considered to be successful  examples of field collaboration, this information was not readily available  at the departmental level, according to senior DHS officials. After  consulting with operational component officials, DHS headquarters  provided 6 of the 13 examples that constituted our final list of  mechanisms. We acknowledge that identifying a universe of successful  collaborative field mechanisms can be difficult, in part because of the  relatively large size of DHS and the breadth of activities involving  component agencies. However, systematically collecting information  (e.g., related to operational mission, capabilities, performance, etc.) about  the mechanisms from the component agencies that sponsor them would  yield important information about which mechanisms are effective.
Senior DHS headquarters officials stated that although they have limited  visibility over the universe of collaborative mechanisms and the specific  collaborative practices utilized by the groups, the department does obtain  regular knowledge of component operational activities and results. For  example, senior OPS officials said that they receive situation reports  about daily operational actions broken out by lead component, regardless  of whether the operation is affiliated with a particular collaborative  mechanism. They also noted their DHS Common Operational Picture  (COP), which provides an unclassified consolidated information hub for  homeland security partners to ensure critical terrorism- and disaster- related information is available. However, senior DHS officials agreed  that having increased visibility and additional mechanism information at  the headquarters level could benefit departmental and component efforts  to improve collaboration in the field and better integrate operations. For  example, obtaining and analyzing this information, which DHS has lacked  in recent deliberations about revamping its field structure, could provide  DHS with a stronger basis for decision making regarding the  establishment of new mechanisms, the effective allocation of scarce  resources, or other changes to its field structure. Having some access to  this information gains importance because the potential increase in  mission effectiveness and efficiencies that may have been realized from  earlier regionalization plans that were not adopted could be accomplished  through other means—including through collaborative field mechanisms.
DHS’s limited ability to monitor the collaborative mechanisms operating  under the DHS umbrella is inconsistent with its own departmental-level  strategic goals. Specifically, several key DHS initiatives and documents,  including the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), BUR, and  the DHS fiscal years 2012-2016 strategic plan, contain strategic goals  aimed at greater unification and integration of efforts across individual  DHS components. In particular, DHS’s strategic plan specifically  outlines objectives related to the goals of “improving cross-departmental  management, policy, and functional integration,” as well as “enhancing  intelligence, information sharing, and integrated operations.” DHS’s  limited departmental visibility over these mechanisms is also inconsistent  with elements of the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, which calls for the establishment of control activities, such  as a mechanism to identify and monitor the activities of components  within an organization, to help ensure achievement of the organization’s  objectives. The internal control objective pertaining to effectiveness and  efficiency of operations is of particular relevance to DHS’s oversight of the  collaborative mechanisms and relates more to the assessment of the  efficiency of the mechanisms themselves in addition to the operational- level visibility that we discuss above. Collecting information on the  existing collaborative mechanisms will enable the department to better  monitor these mechanisms. Doing so could also better position DHS to  judge at a more strategic level which mechanisms offer potential for  replication in other geographic or mission areas. Given current budget  constraints, it is important for DHS to identify and promote the most  effective and efficient collaborative field mechanisms as possible.
section_title: Participants Identified Practices That Enhanced or Served as Challenges to Collaboration; DHS Could Benefit from Collecting and Disseminating Promising Practices
subsections: section_title: Participants Identified Common Practices That Enhanced Collaboration, Which DHS Could Benefit from Collecting and Disseminating on a Broader Scale
subsections: section_title: Common Practices That Enhanced Collaboration
paragraphs: During the course of our review, participants from the four selected DHS  collaborative mechanism types provided information on successful  practices that enhanced their collaboration that could be useful for DHS to  collect and disseminate on a broader scale. At each of our 10 site visits,  we asked cognizant participants to identify and provide examples of  collaborative practices or other factors that they considered particularly  important to the success of their group’s collaboration and operations. We  evaluated their responses and summarized them into seven broad  categories, as shown in figure 3, based upon the practices that were  reported most frequently. This summary information provides valuable  insights on approaches for enhancing collaboration among the DHS  component agencies—information that could also be beneficial for DHS  to collect from a larger group of component mechanisms.
Among participants that we interviewed, there was consensus that certain  practices facilitated more effective collaboration, which, according to  participants, contributed to the groups’ overall successes. In many cases,  the same or similar successful collaborative practices were reported by  participants of different mechanism types as well as by participants of the  same mechanism type in different geographic regions. For example,  despite having a different mission focus or operating in different  geographic regions, participants we interviewed from all three ReCoMs,  all four BESTs, the JTT, and both RISCs—the total sample population  that we met with with—identified three of the seven categories of  practices as keys to success: (1) positive working  relationships/communication, (2) sharing resources, and (3) sharing  information.
Furthermore, participants from most mechanisms also drew connections  among the successful collaborative factors. For example, participants  from all 10 mechanisms stated that forming positive working relationships  was tied to better information sharing among them. Specifically, in our  interviews, BEST mechanism officials stated that developing trust and  building relationships helps participants respond quickly to a crisis, and  communicating frequently helps participants eliminate duplication of  efforts. Participants from the ReCoMs, BESTs, and JTT also reported that  having positive working relationships built on strong trust among  participants was a key factor in their law enforcement partnerships  because of the sensitive nature of law enforcement information, and the  risks posed if it is not protected appropriately. In turn, building positive  working relationships was facilitated by another collaborative factor  identified as important by 6 of the 10 mechanisms: physical colocation of  participants. Specifically, participants from the mechanisms focused on  law enforcement investigations, such as the BESTs and JTT, reported  that being physically colocated with members from other agencies was  important for increasing the groups’ effectiveness. Participants from one  of the three ReCoMs we visited also stated that colocation enables  operations planning and database/information sharing. It also helps build  trust and overcome cultural barriers among agency participants.
Successful collaboration practices can help the participating components  mitigate a variety of challenges, and they are generally consistent with the  seven key issues to consider when implementing collaborative  mechanisms that we identified in our 2012 report on interagency  collaboration. DHS leadership could benefit from engaging the  mechanisms—soliciting promising collaboration practices information and  organizing it through the lens of our seven key collaborative issues. As  noted earlier in this report, DHS does not collect this type of information at  the departmental level primarily because the mechanisms operate under  the components. However, collecting promising practices information  from the collaborative mechanisms at the departmental level and  disseminating it to components throughout DHS would inform  components about specific practices from which they could also benefit.  Senior DHS officials agreed with this assessment. In addition, it may be  more efficient for a single DHS departmental-level office to collect and  disseminate this type of information than all the components individually,  especially given DHS’s higher-level, strategic perspective across the  department. Also, given that our fieldwork indicated similar collaboration  issues are relevant to multiple components, a more centralized DHS  clearinghouse of collaborative promising practices information could be  more easily accessed by a wide range of DHS component stakeholders  than under the current structure, where such information is now  stovepiped and may not be readily shared outside of individual  components or mechanisms.
Key features of interagency collaboration include agencies establishing or  clarifying guidelines, agreements, or procedures for sharing information.  Among other things, these guidelines, agreements, and procedures  should identify and disseminate practices to facilitate more effective  communication and collaboration among federal, state, and local  agencies. The benefit of sharing promising practices includes the ability  to replicate positive program outcomes by leveraging the experiences of  different stakeholders with the same or similar goals. Key features of  interagency collaboration also identify the sharing of promising practices  as an example of government agencies building capacity for improved  efficiency. Accordingly, DHS component agencies could benefit from  better access to collaborative promising practices, as this would help  them in their own efforts to leverage the experiences of many  collaborative mechanisms.
section_title: Officials Identified Common Barriers to Successful Collaboration
paragraphs: Participants from the 10 collaborative field mechanisms we visited also  identified challenges or barriers that affected their collaboration across  components and made it more difficult. Using the same approach as that  for eliciting successful collaborative practices, at each of the 10 locations  we visited, we asked cognizant participants to identify challenges to  collaboration that they believed had impeded their groups’ operations or  effectiveness. We evaluated their responses and created three broad  categories, as shown in figure 4, based on the challenges that they  reported most frequently.
Our discussions with participants representing the 10 mechanisms  identified three barriers that participants most frequently believed  hindered effective collaboration within their mechanisms: (1) resource  constraints, (2) rotation of key personnel, and (3) lack of leadership buy- in. For example, when discussing resource issues, participants from 9 of  the 10 collaborative mechanisms said that funding for their group’s  operation was critical and identified resource constraints as a challenge to  sustaining their collaborative efforts. These participants also reported that  since none of the mechanisms receive dedicated funding, the  participating federal agencies provide support for their respective  representatives assigned to the selected mechanisms. This support  included such things as funding for employee salaries, office space, and  law enforcement equipment (e.g., night vision capability and surveillance  vehicles), among other things. A lack of resources also affected state and  local law enforcement participation in some of these collaborative  mechanisms, and mechanism participants explained that ensuring state  and local participation has been challenging because of resource  constraints, which, in some cases, have led to a mechanism missing key  participants. For example, participating agencies fund ReCoM positions  out of their respective operating budgets—no dedicated ReCoM funding  has been provided. As a result, some agencies are not able to participate  (such as state and local law enforcement) because of resource  constraints. Also, there was a majority opinion among mechanism  participants we visited that rotation of key personnel and lack of  leadership buy-in hindered effective collaboration within their  mechanisms. For example, JTT participants stated that the rotation of key  personnel hinders the JTT’s ability to develop and retain more seasoned  personnel with expertise in investigations and surveillance techniques. In  addition to collecting promising practices information from the  collaborative mechanisms and disseminating it to components throughout  DHS, collecting and disseminating information on any ways to address  identified challenges or barriers to collaboration would similarly help  leverage the experiences of other collaborative mechanisms.
Collaborative field mechanism participants could also benefit from DHS  sharing information related to performance measurement. While sharing  such information is not a challenge to collaboration itself, officials from all  mechanisms agreed that establishing metrics that could measure the  impact of their collaboration, including whether the benefits of the  collaborative mechanisms outweigh the costs, were difficult to establish or  did not yet exist. Nonetheless, officials reported that the ReCoMs, BESTs,  and JTT have all undertaken efforts to develop output or outcome  performance measures to track the accomplishments of their  collaborative mechanisms. For example, the fiscal years 2012-2016  BEST Strategic Plan states that BESTs are to be evaluated annually on  their overall performance, which is quantified by output enforcement  metrics (e.g., number of arrests, indictments, convictions, and seizures).  The JTT’s efforts to develop performance measures include identifying  emerging threats, risks, and vulnerabilities in the South Texas corridor  where it operates. Developing output and outcome measures can provide  insight into the performance of each mechanism; however, ReCoM,  BEST, JTT, and RISC officials all stated that is very difficult to develop a  metric that isolates the benefits of their collaboration from the benefits  that they may have achieved operating separately under their respective  agencies. Despite these measurement challenges, ReCoM, BEST, JTT,  and RISC officials were able to provide anecdotal examples of the  positive benefits of their collaboration and coordination. For example,  ReCoM officials in one location told us that they were able to make  significant progress toward meeting their goal of “persistent presence”  along a coastal ship channel because they had coordinated the  schedules of the USCG and CBP Office of Air and Marine resources that  conducted these patrols. BEST and JTT officials stressed the value of  leveraging their participating agencies’ legal authorities to develop more  robust cases, which increased the likelihood that their cases would be  successfully prosecuted, and that convicted criminals would receive  longer sentences. RISC participants in both locations cited their  collaborative mechanisms as important to identifying emergency  response capability gaps across different levels of government and  integrating courses of action to take in response to disasters. Leveraging  mechanism participants’ experiences and insights regarding the  development of performance metrics to quantify their accomplishments  and the impacts of their collaboration, and disseminating promising  practices that they have identified could provide benefits to other DHS  collaborative efforts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Effective collaboration within and among federal agencies is important for  improving operational success, especially in a resource-constrained  environment. DHS component agencies have made progress in  developing and evolving collaborative field mechanisms that have allowed  them to better coordinate mission activities in the field, and these  collaborative efforts are even more important in light of DHS’s decision in  2012 to not pursue a single unified field structure to integrate component  field operations. Given the overlapping geographic areas of responsibility  and authorities, and the many operational activities that DHS components  are conducting, component efforts to collaborate are important. However,  DHS’s limited visibility over the universe of collaborative field mechanisms  operating under its purview reduces its ability to maximize the  effectiveness and efficiency of these mechanisms to enhance cross- departmental management and integrated operations. DHS senior  officials believe the components, not the department, are responsible for  the mechanisms’ oversight because the department is more focused on  strategic rather than operational-level management activities. We agree  that the components are capable of operating and monitoring their  collaborative field mechanisms. However, consistent with its own  departmental-level strategic goals, we believe that DHS could benefit  from greater awareness of the mechanisms themselves and the  collaborative practices that they employ. Not only is the department  ultimately accountable for the resources that support these mechanisms,  it is also responsible for making important decisions about the overall field  structure of its components, and for moving the department closer to its  goal of greater component integration. By collecting information about the  universe of collaborative mechanisms and developing a fuller  understanding of them and the promising practices they employ, DHS  could be in a better position to utilize these practices across components  to help move the department toward its strategic goal of increased  operational integration.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that any future efforts to analyze or implement changes to  DHS’s regional field office structure, including the establishment of  collaborative field mechanisms, are informed by current collaborative  practices, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct  the appropriate department official to take the following two actions: (1)  collect information on the existing collaborative mechanisms to have  better visibility of them, and (2) collect information on promising practices,  including such things as potential ways to address any identified  challenges or barriers to collaboration as well as any identified  performance metrics, from the collaborative mechanisms and disseminate  them to components.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft copy of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security for review and comments. DHS provided official written  comments, which are reprinted in appendix V. In response to our first  recommendation, DHS concurred and stated that the Office of Operations  Coordination and Planning (OPS), in coordination with other DHS  components, as appropriate, will develop a method to enhance the  collection of information on collaborative field coordination and integration  mechanisms. OPS will schedule appropriate data calls to collect the  information and leverage the Homeland Security Information Network as  a means for sharing information among the components. DHS also  concurred with our second recommendation and stated that OPS, in  coordination with other DHS components, as appropriate, will develop  and implement a method of collecting and disseminating information to  the components regarding promising practices, including challenges or  barriers to collaboration, from various field coordination and integration  mechanisms. DHS estimated completion of actions related to both  recommendations by September 30, 2014. DHS provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also changed  some specific descriptions of DHS component operations and removed  others because DHS identified them as sensitive.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of  Homeland Security and interested congressional committees as  appropriate. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.If you or your staff have any  questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9971 or   kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix  VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative Field Mechanisms Selected and Visited
subsections: section_title: Regional Coordinating Mechanism (ReCoM)
paragraphs: The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan was signed in June 2011 by  the senior leadership of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast  Guard (USCG), directing these agencies to form ReCoMs for maritime  homeland security enforcement and intelligence integration. USCG, ICE  HSI, and CBP serve as the lead agencies responsible for planning and  coordinating among stakeholders, and as of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs have  been established aligning with the USCG sectors’ geographic areas of  responsibility. In addition to ICE HSI, CBP, and USCG, ReCoM  stakeholders include other federal, state, local, tribal, and international  agencies including, but not limited to, the Federal Bureau of Investigation  (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Attorney’s Office  (USAO), state agencies, local police departments, and foreign law  enforcement partners.
According to the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan, the ReCoM was  established for each region to coordinate component maritime operational  activities. All ReCoM members are responsible for participating in  integrated planning efforts with a goal to maintain active patrol and  targeted monitoring. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Senior  Guidance Teams (composed of senior USCG, ICE HSI, and CBP  officials) are to assign a working group to monitor ReCoM operational  performance, coordination efforts, and information sharing. Accordingly,  the components must measure the performance of the ReCoMs to ensure  the most effective use of resources.
section_title: Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)
paragraphs: In 2005, the first BEST unit was organized and led by ICE HSI, in  partnership with CBP, in Laredo, Texas, and as of June 2013, 35 BESTs  have been established throughout the United States. BEST stakeholders  include CBP; DEA; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and  Explosives (ATF); FBI; USCG; USAO; and other key state, local, tribal,  and international law enforcement and intelligence resources, which  partner with one another to identify, disrupt, and dismantle existing and  emerging threats at U.S. land, sea, and air borders. The BEST concept is  built upon the guiding principles of colocation and cross-designation.
According to the 2012-2016 BEST Strategic Plan, ICE HSI serves as the  “executive agent” for BEST and provides a standardized platform of policy  and procedure for BEST units, as well as primary resourcing. The BEST  units use qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methods to  efficiently allocate resources. The National BEST unit (NBU) serves as  the programmatic lead on establishment, deployment, and oversight of  the BEST units nationwide, including overseeing policy and  implementation of the BEST program. As stated in the 2012-2016 BEST  Strategic Plan, BEST units are also evaluated annually on their overall  performance, including their effectiveness and efficiency of operations  based on established criteria. The overall success of the BEST program  is measured by its impact on border-related criminal activity levels. The  2012-2016 BEST Strategic Plan also states that the NBU is required to  provide a written evaluation to the ICE HSI Executive Associate Director  and Executive Steering Committee within 90 days following the end of  each fiscal year. These reports, which are to continue through fiscal year  2016, are to include an evaluation of the field metrics, as well as the  implementation of the strategic plan by headquarters, the field offices,  and their BEST units.
section_title: South Texas Campaign Joint Targeting Team (JTT)
paragraphs: The JTT originated in November 2011 as a CBP-led partnership among  the Del Rio area U.S. Border Patrol, CBP Office of Field Operations, and  ICE HSI, and was expanded to support the South Texas Campaign  (STC). The purpose of the STC is to disrupt and dismantle transnational  criminal organizations (TCO). As of August 2013, JTTs had been  established across four geographic boundary areas in Del Rio, Laredo,  McAllen, and Houston, Texas. In addition to ICE HSI, JTT stakeholders  include DEA; FBI; ATF; USAO; U.S. Marshals Service; and state, local,  tribal, and international law enforcement agencies. To the greatest extent  practicable, each participating agency within the JTT is structured to be  colocated and function as a unified team to ensure deconfliction of  intelligence information while focusing on STC targets.
section_title: Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC)
paragraphs: According to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials,  FEMA established the first RISC in 2003 to provide a forum for senior  DHS officials to enhance emergency management and homeland security  for all hazards through a collaborative, regional approach involving  federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental organization, and private  sector partners. According to FEMA officials, the majority of RISCs  include representatives of the following DHS components: FEMA, CBP,  ICE, Federal Protective Service, Science and Technology Directorate,  National Protection and Programs Directorate, Transportation Security  Administration, and USCG, among others. In addition, other federal  agencies representing the emergency support community participate in  RISCs, such as the Department of Transportation, Department of  Defense, and the Department of Agriculture. The authority to establish  RISCs derives from the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform  Act of 2006, which provides the FEMA regional administrators with the  responsibility to ensure effective, coordinated, and integrated regional  preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation activities  and programs for natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man- made disasters (including planning, training, exercises, and professional  development) and perform such other duties relating to such  responsibilities as the Administrator may require. According to FEMA  officials, representatives from the FEMA regions developed a draft RISC  charter in 2010, and several regions subsequently used this document as  a basis for developing their own charters. For example, a FEMA RISC  charter may contain (1) objectives and scope of RISC activities, (2)  membership requirements, (3) annual operating costs, and (4) executive  committee governance.
According to FEMA officials, in general, most FEMA regions convene  RISC meetings on a quarterly or semiannual basis to discuss various  topics, such as making preparedness, protection, response, recovery, or  mitigation more easily accomplished and increasing regional capability.  RISC meetings typically include presentations, workgroups, training  workshops, and panel discussions led by DHS components. During these  RISC meetings, DHS components are able to share lessons learned and  best practices with members, as well as develop plans that identify  resource capabilities and integrated courses of action to take in response  to disasters. One FEMA official explained that FEMA has not developed  any specific performance-reporting requirements regarding the content or  output from RISC meetings; however, the value of the coordination and  communication gained through these meetings supports various planning,  response, and recovery activities.
section_title: Appendix II: Description of DHS Collaborative Field Mechanisms Identified, but Not Visited
subsections: section_title: Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit Terrorist Tracking and Pursuit Group (CTCEU/TTPG) Total number of CTCEU/TTPGs: 1
paragraphs: CTCEU/TTPG was  established in 2003.
Selected agencies  Lead agency:   ICE HSI  Stakeholders:   CBP   DOD   The Office of Biometric Identity  Management (OBIM)   National Counterterrorism Center  (NCTC)   DHS Office of Intelligence and  Analysis (I&A)
Mechanism purpose/description  The CTCEU/TTPG leverages ICE HSI  expertise across partnering agencies  dedicated to promoting national security.  The group leads the DHS National  Security Overstay Initiative in cooperation  with CBP, OBIM, and NCTC to identify  and apprehend nonimmigrants who have  overstayed or violated the terms of their  admission and pose a potential risk to the  national security of the United States, as  well as to prevent terrorists and other  criminals from exploiting the nation’s  immigration system.
section_title: Homeland Security Task Force Southeast (HSTF- SE) Total number of HSTF-SEs: 1
paragraphs: HSTF-SE was  established in 2003.
HSTF-SE is a joint task force that provides  the framework for coordination of a unified  response command and control  organization for all DHS agencies. HSTF- SE is responsible for the development and  execution of Operations Plan Vigilant  Sentry (OVS), which includes interdiction,  detention, protection screening,  processing, and repatriation during a  mass migration from a Caribbean nation.  HSTF-SE is a standing task force that is in  effect at all times, although full activation  of the task force does not occur until a  mass migration plan is implemented.
section_title: Caribbean Border Interagency Group (CBIG) Total number of CBIGs: 1
paragraphs: Lead agency:   None   Stakeholders:   CBP  ICE  USAO  USCG  Puerto Rican Police Department’s  Forces United for Rapid Action  (FURA)
CBIG serves to coordinate the operations  of USCG, CBP, ICE, and USAO, targeting  illegal migration and narcotics trafficking  near Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin  Islands.
CBIG was  established in 2006.
Mechanism purpose/description  OIC provides a centralized location for  CBP, along with federal, state, local, and  international partners, to gather, analyze,  and disseminate operational and strategic  data in the Great Lakes region of the  northern border for use by frontline agents  and officers.
section_title: OIC was established in 2011. National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) Total number of NSARCs: 1
paragraphs: NSARC was  established in 1973.
The purpose of NSARC is to coordinate  interagency search and rescue matters.  NSARC works with other state and local  search and rescue authorities to  coordinate implementation of the national  search and rescue system.
Washington, D.C.
section_title: South Texas Border Intelligence Center (STBIC) Total number of STBICs: 1
paragraphs: STBIC was  established in 2012.
STBIC is a facility designed to intensify  and integrate intelligence gathering and  sharing activity among law enforcement  agencies across South Texas.
section_title: The Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) Total number of ACTTs: 1
paragraphs: ACTT was  established in 2009.
ACTT was established to counter the  threats posed by transnational criminal  organizations operating in the Arizona  corridor. Specifically, ACTT leverages the  capabilities and resources of more than 60  federal, state, local and tribal agencies in  Arizona and the government of Mexico to  combat individuals and criminal  organizations that pose a threat to  communities on both sides of the border.
section_title: Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established Interagency Operations Centers (IOCs) Total number of IOCs: 35
paragraphs: IOC was established  in 2006.
Mechanism purpose/description  Mandated by the Security and  Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006  (SAFE Port Act), IOCs were established to  improve multiagency maritime security  operations and enhance cooperation  among partner agencies at 35 U.S. ports.  Specifically, IOCs transformed the Coast  Guard sector command centers by  upgrading their information management  tools. IOCs also help port agencies to  collaborate on first response, law  enforcement, and homeland security  operations.
section_title: Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established Special Event Working Group (SEWG) Total number of SEWGs: 1
paragraphs: Mechanism purpose/description  SEWG is an interagency forum that  ensures comprehensive, coordinated  interagency awareness of, and federal  support to, special events.
Locations  Washington, D.C.
SEWG was  established in 2004.
We were asked to continue our work on DHS’s efforts to improve  collaboration and integrate its field operations. This report (1) assesses  the extent to which DHS has identified the collaborative field  mechanisms—that is, multiagency groups such as task forces,  committees, and teams that enhance stakeholder collaboration across the  participating agencies in order to more effectively and efficiently achieve  their mission—of its key operational components, and (2) describes  factors that participants of selected mechanisms identified that enhance  or are challenges to their collaboration, and assesses the extent to which  DHS has collected and disseminated successful collaborative practices.
To address the first objective, we contacted DHS officials to identify a list  of collaborative mechanisms that they deemed to be successful examples  of field component collaboration while we also independently identified  such mechanisms. Upon receiving DHS’s list of mechanisms, we  combined this list with our own and sought input from DHS and the seven  key operational component agencies to create a master list of agreed- upon collaborative field mechanisms. Our final list included 13  collaborative mechanisms that DHS and operational component officials  agreed were models of collaboration among component agencies in the  field. The 13 collaborative mechanisms we identified are used by federal  agencies to implement interagency collaborative efforts, such as agencies  colocating within one facility or establishing interagency task forces. In  addition, all of the identified mechanisms involved multiple DHS  component agencies, as well as other federal, state, and local agency  participants, and their purpose was to improve operational integration,  coordination, and efficiencies among DHS agencies. Of those we  identified, 11 of the 13 mechanisms focused on law enforcement  activities. For these 13 mechanisms, we examined organizational  documents related to mechanism mission, objectives, stakeholder  composition, locations, and date organized, among other things. We also  interviewed officials from DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination and  Planning about the establishment and operation of these 13 mechanism  types. We also interviewed DHS officials and analyzed documentation  (i.e., components daily activity reports) obtained from responsible senior  DHS headquarters officials to identify the extent to which the department  has visibility over the collaborative field mechanisms activities—including  any plans to increase visibility over the mechanisms in the future. We  compared DHS’s efforts to identify and collect information on the  collaborative field mechanism with criteria in Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government, which call for the establishment of  control activities, such as a mechanism to identify and monitor the  activities of components within an organization, to help achieve the  organization’s objectives.
To address the second objective, we selected 4 types of collaborative  mechanisms in 10 locations from the list of 13—ReCoM, BEST, JTT, and  RISC. We based our selection of these 4 types of mechanisms on the  following factors: geographic location, continuity of the mechanism  (established for at least 16 months), participation of multiple DHS  component agencies, and variation in the lead component agency.  Except for the JTT, we selected mechanism types that existed in more  than one location to allow for geographic comparisons—such as BEST,  with 35 locations throughout the United States. To describe the factors  that participants of the selected collaborative mechanisms identified that  enhance or are challenges to collaboration, we conducted site visits to  interview operational component officials directly participating in each of  the 4 types of mechanisms, and in total we met with over 55 participants  from 10 mechanisms—including officials from three ReCoMs, four  BESTs, one JTT, and two RISCs. The BEST, ReCoM, and JTT are law  enforcement–focused, while the RISC focuses on emergency  management activities and exercises. For each of the selected  mechanisms, we also interviewed senior headquarters officials to discuss  their views on the successes and challenges experienced with  collaboration, including how the successes are replicated and  communicated across the mechanisms and challenges are addressed. At  each of the 10 mechanisms we visited, we gathered information from  participants on what they believed to be promising practices that helped  them to succeed as collaborative mechanisms, as well as the factors they  viewed as challenges to their collaboration. We also discussed their  efforts to establish performance measures to assess mechanism  effectiveness. While we cannot generalize our work from visits to these  collaborative mechanisms, we chose these locations to provide examples  of the way in which the mechanisms identify, communicate with others,  and address the successes and challenges experienced with  collaboration.
We also reviewed planning, operations, and management integration  documents such as strategic plans, annual performance reports, and  memorandums of understanding or agreements among the participating  agencies. We compared these documents and their responses with the  information-sharing and collaboration practices identified in our past work  on this subject. Our past work on interagency collaboration has  highlighted the importance of agencies establishing or clarifying  guidelines, agreements, or procedures for sharing information. These  guidelines, agreements, and procedures should identify and disseminate  practices to facilitate more effective communication and collaboration  among federal, state, and local agencies. In addition, our prior work has  demonstrated the benefits of sharing promising practices as a means to  replicate positive program outcomes by leveraging the experiences of  different stakeholders with the same or similar goals. We have also  identified the sharing of promising practices as an example of government  agencies building capacity for improved efficiency. At each of the 10  mechanisms we visited, we noted any alignment or divergence from the  mechanisms’ reported successes and challenges with key features  identified in our 2012 report on interagency collaboration. These key  features include seven categories, (1) outcomes and accountability, (2)  bridging organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and  responsibilities, (5) participants, (6) resources, and (7) written guidance  and agreements. We interviewed component officials responsible for  managing the selected mechanisms and determined that our work and  past recommendations related to information sharing and collaborative  practices are still valid and were deemed reasonable by the respective  officials. We then assessed the extent to which the mechanism  participants’ responses regarding integration, coordination, and  collaboration practices utilized by their mechanisms aligned with those  identified in our 2012 report. See appendix IV for a list of key issues to  consider when implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms that  were identified in our 2012 report. We interviewed responsible senior  DHS headquarters officials to determine the extent to which the  department has collected and reported on the collaborative practices  identified by the mechanisms. We also interviewed component officials at  the selected 4 mechanisms to identify the extent to which information,  such as information sharing and collaborative practices are provided to  DHS headquarters officials who are responsible for oversight of the  collaborative field mechanisms.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix IV: Key Issues to Consider when Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms
paragraphs: In September 2012, we indentified 12 mechanisms that the federal  government uses to lead and implement interagency collaboration.  Although these mechanisms differ in complexity and scope, our  September 2012 report notes that these mechanisms all benefit from the  seven features below. Key issues to consider when implementing  collaborative mechanisms are listed under each feature.   1.  Outcomes and accountability
Have short-term and long-term outcomes been clearly defined?
Is there a way to track and monitor progress toward the short-term  and long-term outcomes?
Do participating agencies have collaboration-related competencies or  performance standards against which individual performance can be  evaluated?
Do participating agencies have the means to recognize and reward  accomplishments related to collaboration?  2.  Bridging organizational cultures
What are the missions and organizational cultures of the participating  agencies?
What are the commonalities between the participating agencies’  missions and cultures and what are some potential challenges?
Have participating agencies developed ways for operating across  agency boundaries? How did they develop these ways?
Have participating agencies agreed on common terminology and  definitions?
Has a lead agency or individual been identified?
If leadership will be shared between one or more agencies, have roles  and responsibilities been clearly identified and agreed upon?
How will leadership be sustained over the short term? How will it be  sustained over the long term?   4.  Clarity of roles and responsibilities
Have participating agencies clarified the roles and responsibilities of  the participants?
Have participating agencies articulated and agreed to a process for  making and enforcing decisions?
Have all relevant participants been included?
Do the participants have  full knowledge of the relevant resources in their agency;  the ability to commit these resources;  the ability to regularly attend activities of the collaborative  mechanism; and   the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to contribute?
How will the collaborative mechanism be funded? If interagency  funding is needed, is it permitted?  If interagency funding is needed and permitted, is there a means to  track funds in a standardized manner?
How will the collaborative mechanism be staffed?
Are there incentives available to encourage staff or agencies to
Have participating agencies developed online tools or other resources  participate?   If relevant, do agencies have compatible technological systems?  that facilitate joint interactions?  7.  Written guidance and agreements  If appropriate, have the participating agencies documented their  agreement regarding how they will be collaborating? A written  document can incorporate agreements reached in any or all of the  following areas: accountability, roles and responsibilities, and   resources.
Have participating agencies developed ways to continually update or  monitor written agreements?
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Stephen L. Caldwell, Director,  Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director, and Frederick Lyles, Jr., Analyst-in- Charge, managed this engagement. Chuck Bausell, Eric Hauswirth,  Tracey King, David Lutter, Jess Orr, Janay Sam, and Cynthia Saunders  made significant contributions to the report.