Radiation Portal Monitors: DHS's Fleet Is Lasting Longer than Expected, and Future Acquisitions Focus on Operational Efficiencies
Published: 2016-10-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
Radiation portal monitors scan cargo and vehicles for radiation—helping prevent terrorists from smuggling nuclear material into the United States. The Department of Homeland Security had planned to replace its aging fleet of nearly 1,400 monitors, but recent studies indicate that these monitors could operate until at least 2030.
As a result, DHS now plans to selectively upgrade its monitors at high-volume ports. Those monitors will allow Customs and Border Protection officers to better distinguish between real threats and nuisance alarms from naturally occurring radiation, allowing officers to carry out other mission-critical duties.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials to carry out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. Terrorists could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device that could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and other infrastructure. DHS's fleet of almost 1,400 RPMs helps secure the nation's borders by scanning incoming cargo and vehicles for radiological and nuclear materials. DHS began deploying RPMs to seaports and border crossings in fiscal year 2003. As RPMs began to approach the end of their expected 13-year service lives, DHS raised concerns over the sustainability of the fleet, the ability to maintain current scanning coverage, and the need for fleet recapitalization.
GAO was asked to report on the sustainability of the RPM fleet. This report provides information on (1) DHS's assessment of the condition of its RPM fleet and how, if at all, that assessment has changed over time; and (2) DHS's plans for meeting detection requirements in the future. GAO reviewed agency documentation, analyzed data on RPM age and condition, and reviewed budget justifications. GAO interviewed DHS officials and officials from a national laboratory on the current status of the RPM fleet and DHS's plans for future RPM acquisitions.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report. These comments are incorporated as appropriate in the final report.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) assessment of its fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPM)—large, stationary radiation detectors through which vehicles and cargo containers pass at ports of entry—shifted over time and, as a result, DHS has changed the focus of its RPM replacement strategy. During fiscal years 2014 and 2015, as some RPMs began to reach the end of their estimated 13-year service life, DHS began planning for replacing the entire fleet of almost 1,400 RPMs. However, as of September 2016, the fleet remains nearly 100 percent operational and recent studies indicate that the fleet can remain operational until at least 2030 so long as proactive maintenance is carried out and RPM spare parts remain available. As a result, in 2016, DHS changed the focus of its RPM replacement strategy to selective replacement of RPMs—using existing RPMs that have been upgraded with new alarm threshold settings or purchasing enhanced, commercially available RPMs—to gain operational efficiencies and reduce labor requirements at some ports.
During fiscal years 2016 through 2018, DHS plans to replace approximately 120 RPMs along the northern U.S. border with upgraded RPMs and, during fiscal years 2018 through 2020, plans to replace between 150 and 250 RPMs at select high-volume ports with enhanced, commercially available RPMs. Specifically, DHS plans to replace some legacy RPMs—those that cannot be upgraded with the new alarm thresholds—at northern U.S. land border crossings with RPMs from existing inventory that have been upgraded. This upgrade enables improved threat discrimination and minimizes “nuisance” alarms created by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) in commonly shipped cargo such as ceramics, fertilizers, and granite tile. Improved discrimination between NORM and threat material will create efficiencies for the movement of cargo through ports and minimize time that DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers spend adjudicating the nuisance alarms. DHS is also planning limited replacement of upgraded RPMs at select high-volume ports with enhanced, commercially available RPMs that offer nuisance alarm levels significantly lower than even the upgraded RPMs. Currently, upgraded RPMs at some high-volume ports do not reduce nuisance alarm rates enough to implement remote RPM operations—which allows CBP officers to carry out other duties at the ports when not responding to an RPM alarm—because of the high number of vehicles and cargo containers passing through the ports daily.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials to  carry out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. Terrorists  could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a  radiological dispersal device (also called a “dirty bomb”). The detonation  of an improvised nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds  of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and other physical  infrastructure for miles. A radiological dispersal device would be less  damaging but could nonetheless inflict hundreds of millions of dollars in  socioeconomic costs if a large part of a city had to be evacuated until  extensive radiological decontamination was completed. The Department  of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) is responsible for securing the U.S. border against dangerous  goods. To detect and interdict smuggled contraband—including illicit  nuclear and radiological materials—CBP scans incoming cargo and  vehicles for elevated radiation levels at seaports, land border crossings,  airports, and international mail facilities throughout the United States  using its fleet of almost 1,400 deployed radiation portal monitors (RPM)— large, stationary radiation detectors through which vehicles and cargo  containers pass.
Such scanning is part of a broader effort spearheaded by DHS’s  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The mission of DNDO is to  counter the risk of nuclear terrorism against the United States by  continuously improving capabilities to deter, detect, respond to, and  attribute attacks, in coordination with domestic and international  partners. To fulfill its mission, DNDO’s activities are focused on  developing the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, which is a  multilayered framework encompassing approximately 74 independent  federal programs, projects, or activities, as well as partnerships with local,  state, tribal, and territorial governments; the private sector; and  international partners. This framework comprises an integrated system of  radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear  smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United  States.
Under the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE  Port Act), DHS is required to scan all cargo containers that pass through  the 22 seaports with the greatest volume of cargo containers for radiation  and to have a strategy for deployment of radiation detection capabilities at  all other U.S. ports of entry. DHS began acquiring RPMs in fiscal year  2002 and began deploying them in fiscal year 2003. DHS initially  projected RPMs to last 10 years, after which they would need to be  replaced or refurbished—at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars—to  avoid a decrease in the percentage of vehicles and cargo containers  scanned at seaports and land border crossings. You asked us to examine  the sustainability of the RPM fleet and review DHS’s plans for meeting  detection needs in the future. This report describes (1) DHS’s  assessment of the condition of its RPM fleet and how, if at all, that  assessment has changed over time and (2) DHS’s plans for meeting  detection requirements in the future.
To address both of our objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, our  past work, and reports by DHS and others on the Global Nuclear  Detection Architecture and DHS’s radiation detection activities. We also  visited the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), which provides  scientific and technical expertise related to RPMs, to learn more about the  condition of the RPM fleet, including planned upgrades to older RPMs,  and to learn about characteristics of enhanced, commercially available  RPM technologies. To describe DHS’s assessment of the condition of its  RPM fleet and how, if at all, that assessment has changed over time, we  collected agency summary data on RPM inventory, including acquisition  dates, deployment history, and vendors, as well as data on RPM  maintenance and calibration history. We assessed the reliability of these  data by interviewing DHS staff about data sources and data quality  control steps taken by the agency, and we determined that these data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We interviewed  officials from DNDO and CBP headquarters to learn about the fleet’s  condition and how DHS has assessed it; the steps DHS has taken to  budget for needed improvements; and existing or projected shortfalls in  scanning coverage, among other things. In addition, we visited one land  border crossing and two seaports to learn more about RPM operations  and the condition of RPMs in deployed settings. To describe DHS’s  plans for meeting detection requirements in the future, we reviewed  agency strategic plans, program management plans, project plans,  budget documents, acquisition plans, and other agency documents  relevant to the RPM program. We interviewed DNDO and CBP  headquarters officials regarding scanning requirements; planned system  upgrades, replacements, and decommissionings; and agency plans for  meeting detection requirements in the future.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 to October 2016,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Under the SAFE Port Act, DNDO is required, among other functions, to  develop, in coordination with other federal agencies, an enhanced Global  Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO serves as the primary entity in the  United States to develop programs and initiatives related to the Global  Nuclear Detection Architecture, identify any gaps in it, and improve  radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. DNDO also assists DHS  agencies with implementing the domestic portion of the Global Nuclear  Detection Architecture, including deployment of radiation detection  equipment at ports of entry along the U.S. border. Accordingly, DNDO  acquires and deploys RPMs and provides for associated scientific and  technical expertise, with assistance from the Department of Energy’s  national laboratories, including PNNL and Los Alamos National  Laboratory. CBP operates the RPMs and maintains them after their first  year of deployment.
As of August 2016, CBP operates approximately 1,300 RPMs, which can  detect radiation but cannot identify the type of material causing an alarm,  as well as almost 2,700 handheld radiation detectors, which can identify  the sources of radiation. RPMs are the primary means by which CBP  scans cargo and vehicles at U.S. ports of entry for nuclear and  radiological material. Before leaving a port of entry, most cargo  containers and vehicles first travel through an RPM. (See fig. 1.)
If an alarm is triggered, the cargo container or vehicle is directed to a  secondary inspection area for further inspection and clearance by a CBP  officer using a handheld radiation detector that can identify the source of  the radiation. (See fig. 2.)
RPM alarms can result from naturally occurring radioactive materials  (NORM), which are often emitted from certain consumer and trade goods,  such as ceramics, fertilizers, and granite tile. RPM alarms from NORM  are termed “nuisance” alarms by DHS and require CBP officers to spend  time determining that the source of the alarm is NORM and not nuclear or  radiological threat materials before the cargo container or vehicle can  leave the port. Although fewer than 2 percent of cargo containers have  historically set off an RPM alarm, according to DHS, with more than 20  million cargo containers and more than 100 million vehicles passing  through the nation’s ports annually, nuisance alarms account for  hundreds of thousands of alarms per year.
To reduce nuisance alarms and decrease the need for secondary  scanning by CBP officers, in 2014 and 2015, CBP developed and  deployed a new set of RPM alarm threshold settings, with support from  DNDO and scientists at PNNL. This upgrade, which is referred to as  revised operational settings, is implemented during calibration. It  optimizes RPM effectiveness by tuning the threshold settings of individual  RPMs to account for local background radiation and common NORM  passing through the RPMs. These new threshold settings result in a  similar sensitivity to materials that pose a threat but significantly reduce  nuisance alarms from NORM. According to CBP, as of the end of fiscal  year 2015, DNDO and CBP had upgraded RPMs at 28 seaports and 15  land border crossings, which has reduced nuisance alarms by more than  75 percent, on average, at these sites.
Before fiscal year 2015, DHS had acquired 1,706 RPMs, including 384  from Ludlum Measurements, Inc. (Ludlum) and 1,322 from Leidos  Holdings, Inc. (Leidos). The Ludlum RPMs were the first to be acquired  and were deployed beginning in fiscal year 2003, and the Leidos RPMs  were first acquired and deployed in fiscal year 2004. (See table 1.)
Ludlum and Leidos RPMs have comparable designs—both use  specialized detection panels made of plastic as well as helium-filled  tubes—and provide similar technical capacity to detect nuclear and  radiological materials. However, because of limitations in the design of  the plastic panels in the Ludlum RPMs that DHS acquired, these RPMs  cannot be upgraded with the revised operational settings and thus do not  have the threat discrimination capabilities equal to the upgraded Leidos  RPMs. Threat discrimination refers to the ability of the RPM to distinguish  between radiation emitted from NORM and radiation emitted from  radioactive materials that could be used in a nuclear device or a dirty  bomb.
As of August 5, 2016, DHS had 1,386 RPMs deployed—including 277  Ludlum RPMs and 1,109 Leidos RPMs—with the remaining RPMs in  storage. Of the deployed RPMs, 885 were at northern and southern  border crossings; 320 were at seaports; and 181 were at airports, ferry  terminals, or other facilities. (See table 2.) According to DHS officials, the  actual number of deployed RPMs varies on a day-to-day basis in  response to port reconfigurations and expansions and because DHS  periodically decommissions RPMs that are infrequently used.
As of August 2016, 100 percent of cargo containers and vehicles entering  land border crossings and nearly 100 percent of cargo containers passing  through seaports are scanned by RPMs, according to DNDO. However,  as we found in 2012, significant technological and logistical challenges  exist for scanning cargo at airports and international rail ports of entry,  and as of August 2016, some cargo containers that enter through these  pathways are not being scanned by RPMs. Scanning of air cargo is  primarily carried out with handheld radiation detectors, and scanning of  international rail cargo is mainly conducted with such detectors and  radiographic imaging systems. Radiographic imaging systems use  gamma rays or X-rays to produce an image of cargo to detect anomalies,  such as high-density material or hidden cargo, but they do not detect  radioactivity.
subsections: section_title: DHS Changed Its Assessment of the Condition of the RPM Fleet and Consequently Altered Its RPM Replacement Strategy During Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015, DNDO Used a 13-Year RPM Service Life Estimate to Plan and Budget for RPM Replacements
paragraphs: DHS’s assessment of its RPM fleet shifted over time, and as a result DHS  has changed the focus of its RPM replacement strategy. More  specifically, in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, DHS began planning to  replace the full fleet based on a conservatively estimated 13-year service  life. However, recent DNDO studies indicate the fleet can remain  operational until at least 2030, with proactive maintenance and sufficient  availability of spare parts, so DHS has refocused its strategy on selective  replacements to improve efficiency.
Before the RPMs began to reach the end of their estimated service life,  DNDO commissioned a field study assessing how well the RPM systems  were aging and a separate study specifically assessing the aging of the  RPM’s key component—the plastic detection panels. These studies  were published in 2011 and both concluded that the original 10-year RPM  service life estimate should be updated. One of the studies concluded  that the plastic detection panels could last up to 20 years—with 13 years  as a conservative estimate of the panels’ life spans. The other study  concluded that the panels would last between 15 and 20 years and that  the RPMs could be sustained for an extended period with routine  inspections, maintenance, and repairs as needed. According to DNDO  officials, after these studies were published, DNDO began using a 13- year service life estimate for RPM life-cycle planning and budgeting  purposes. Echoing one of the studies, a DNDO management official told  us that the 13-year RPM service life was considered a conservative  estimate that resulted in an acceptable level of risk to the program. The  official further stated that although the 13-year estimate contained a great  deal of uncertainty, DHS was trying to ensure that the necessary steps  would be taken to keep the fleet fully functional.
DNDO used the 13-year service life estimate for its RPM program  planning and budget justifications throughout fiscal years 2014 and 2015,  including in the following cases:
DNDO’s RPM Program Management Plan for fiscal years 2014  through 2019, published in January 2014, stated that more than 500  of the then-deployed RPMs would reach the end of their service lives  by 2019 and would require either refurbishment or replacement. The  plan outlined DNDO’s efforts to extend the service life of the RPMs  while working on a strategy for RPM replacement.
DHS’s budget justification for fiscal year 2015 referred to RPMs  exceeding the end of their estimated service lives as part of a  discussion of RPM program needs.
DHS’s June 2014 Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic  Plan of Investments highlighted a need for significant funding  increases to replace RPMs as they reached the end of their estimated  service lives. The plan projected significant decreases in RPM  scanning coverage—the percentage of vehicles or cargo containers  scanned—beginning in fiscal year 2016 based on the service life  estimate, anticipated port expansions and reconfigurations, and  projected budget levels. Specifically, the plan projected that RPM  scanning coverage at seaports would fall from 100 percent in fiscal  year 2014 to 69 percent in fiscal year 2019. For land border crossings,  it projected a decrease from 98 percent scanning coverage to 39  percent over the same period.
In its February 2015 update to its RPM Program Management Plan,  DHS again emphasized the need for RPM replacements because RPMs  would begin reaching the end of their estimated 13-year service lives. In  addition, the plan stated that projected budget levels through fiscal year  2019 were sufficient for the program to begin to replace the RPMs  reaching the end of their service life. The plan also highlighted the  importance of efforts to extend RPM service life to retain the ability to  perform required scanning. DHS’s budget justification for fiscal year 2016  referred to the 13-year RPM service life as it called for increased funding  for replacements based on service life concerns. The budget justification  stated that funding increases would address sustainability of aging RPMs  and ensure compliance with the SAFE Port Act as DHS formulates a  long-term strategy for the replacement of RPMs at the end of their life  cycle.
Furthermore, in October 2015, a senior DNDO official told us that DNDO  was using 13 years as a conservative estimate for RPM service life.  Fiscal year 2016 House and Senate appropriations committee reports  discussed the need for RPM replacement, and specifically referenced  RPM aging issues. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 increased  funding for acquisition and deployment of radiological detection systems,  including RPMs, to $113 million from $73 million in the previous year.  This money can be used through fiscal year 2018.
section_title: DHS’s Recent Assessments Indicate the Fleet Is Sustainable, and DHS Has Shifted Its Replacement Strategy to Focus on Efficiency
paragraphs: According to DHS data, as of August 2016, DHS’s RPM fleet remains  almost 100 percent operational, even as almost 20 percent of the RPMs  have reached the end of their original estimated 13-year service life and  another 40 percent are within 2 years of that date. DNDO and PNNL  officials we interviewed told us that, based on more recent studies and  analysis, they believe the RPM fleet can last at least 20 years longer if it  is properly maintained and spare parts remain available. Specifically, a  January 2015 study by CBP’s Data Analysis Center that examined 8  years of RPM performance data concluded that the fleet is in acceptable  condition and will operate effectively for several years. The study also  noted that the functionality of the plastic detector panels does not  degrade significantly over time. A May 2015 DHS study—carried out  expressly to determine the best alternatives for replacing RPMs as they  began to reach the end of their service lives—concluded that, assuming  proper maintenance and parts availability continues, the concept of RPM  life span is not useful, in part because there has been no measurable  operational degradation of the RPM fleet. The study noted that CBP  intends to continue to maintain RPMs at nearly 100 percent operability,  resulting in no loss of functionality as they age. The study found no  reason to believe that parts would become obsolete or unavailable, and  noted that, under RPM maintenance contracts, parts are replaced or  repaired as soon as they are observed to have failed. The study  concluded that the RPMs could operate until 2030 at current levels of  functionality, and stated that any decision to replace the systems should  be predicated on the need for improved functionality rather than because  of concerns over aging. Underlying this conclusion was an assumption  that maintenance costs would not increase appreciably over the period  evaluated.
DNDO officials we interviewed explained that CBP has maintenance  contracts with the RPM vendors that ensure the fleet can remain nearly  100 percent operational for many years. Furthermore, CBP and PNNL  track maintenance data for trends in component failure rates that might  indicate problems with the fleet or any significant maintenance cost  increases, and officials told us that no troubling trends exist. In March  2016, Leidos confirmed to CBP in writing that it is capable of and  committed to supplying parts for its RPMs until at least 2021 and expects  to be able to do so through 2026. In addition, officials told us that they  have not faced any barriers to replacing RPM components to date. For  instance, CBP has replaced more than 1,100 computer interface boards  and more than 1,200 vehicle presence sensors since 2007. CBP officials  that we interviewed indicated that they have no reason to believe that  parts will not remain available as long as the RPMs are still in use.
Based on the new conclusions about RPM service life, in 2016 DNDO  changed the focus of its strategy from replacing the RPM fleet because of  aging to selective replacement of RPMs at specific sites to gain  operational efficiencies, as discussed later in this report. This change is  reflected in DHS’s budget justification for fiscal year 2017 in which DHS  focused its funding request on the need to replace some upgraded Leidos  RPMs to gain further operational efficiencies. Consistent with the stated  planning assumptions, DNDO has not used funds received in fiscal year  2016 for RPM acquisitions.
section_title: DHS Plans to Replace RPMs at Selected Ports of Entry to Gain Operational Efficiencies
paragraphs: DHS plans to replace legacy RPMs at selected ports of entry with RPMs  that have greater threat discrimination capabilities to gain operational  efficiencies and reduce labor needs while continuing to meet detection  requirements. Specifically, from fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2018,  DHS is planning to replace more than 120 Ludlum RPMs at northern U.S.  land border crossings with upgraded Leidos RPMs from existing  inventory. The Ludlum RPMs are among the oldest in the fleet, with most  acquired in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Replacing them with upgraded  Leidos RPMs would allow for improved threat discrimination—an RPM’s  ability to distinguish between radiation emitted from NORM and radiation  emitted from materials that pose a threat—which, according to DHS  officials we interviewed, is expected to minimize CBP officer time spent  responding to nuisance alarms. DHS therefore expects to be able to  redirect some CBP officers to other critical law enforcement duties, such  as interdiction of smuggled currency, illicit drugs, or other contraband, at  border crossings where upgraded Leidos RPMs are installed.
CBP officials told us in May 2016 that DHS will study the operations at  each land border crossing before deciding on RPM replacement to  ensure the benefits outweigh the costs. DNDO and CBP replaced Ludlum  RPMs with upgraded Leidos RPMs at two sites—one seaport and one  land border crossing—in fiscal year 2015. In total, 22 Ludlum RPMs were  replaced with 20 upgraded Leidos RPMs. DNDO did not carry out a cost- benefit analysis before these RPM replacements. CBP officials explained  that one site was the last remaining seaport where Ludlum systems were  deployed. These officials explained that the second site resulted from a  public-private partnership agreement initiated by a port authority to  address operational concerns in which the private entity paid for the  majority of labor costs associated with the replacement. DNDO provided  us with documentation of a cost-benefit analysis for a third site, a land  border crossing where CBP is considering replacing Ludlum RPMs with  upgraded Leidos RPMs, and indicated that DNDO is in the final stages of  completing an analysis addressing the remaining northern land border  crossings.
GAO Recommended That the Department  of Homeland Security (DHS) Examine Use  of Optimization Techniques to Maximize  Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) Potential  In 2009, we examined DHS’s Domestic  Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO)  development and testing of a new type of  RPM and, among other things, found that  DNDO had not completed efforts to fine-tune  the current fleet of RPMs to provide greater  sensitivity to threat materials. We  recommended that DNDO do so before  spending billions of dollars acquiring new  RPMs. (See GAO-09-655.) Beginning in 2014,  DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) took action to upgrade some of its  RPMs by optimizing RPM threshold settings.  CBP estimates that the upgraded RPMs  prevent more than 200,000 alarms from  naturally occurring radioactive materials per  year at the sites where the upgrades have  been implemented, allowing for 88 CBP  officers to be redirected to other high-priority  mission areas, according to CBP officials. In  addition, 70 percent of the sites where the  upgrades were implemented reported safety  improvements, according to an agency  survey. These improvements were attributed  to such things as reduced congestion and  better traffic flow.
During fiscal years 2018 through 2020, DHS is planning to replace  upgraded Leidos RPMs at selected high-volume ports of entry with  between 150 and 250 enhanced, commercially available RPMs that have  even greater ability to discriminate between NORM and materials that  pose a threat. According to DNDO and CBP officials, the improved threat  discrimination offered by these new, enhanced RPMs will further reduce  nuisance alarms and may enable high-volume ports of entry to implement  remote RPM operations. Under remote operations, RPM scanning lanes  would be monitored from a centralized location at each port using video  cameras and traffic control devices, with CBP officers dispatched to  inspection areas only in response to an RPM alarm. The staff formerly  stationed at each RPM scanning site would be reassigned to other  mission needs within a port of entry.
CBP officials told us that, although CBP has yet to make a final  determination, implementing remote operations would require a reduction  of nuisance alarms to about one or two alarms per lane per day on  average. Currently, upgraded Leidos RPMs—which have reduced  nuisance alarms by more than 75 percent, on average, across the sites  with the upgrades—provide alarm levels under one per day at many sites,  according to CBP data. However, the data indicate that some high- volume ports of entry have lanes with higher nuisance alarm rates.  According to a DHS analysis, the new, enhanced RPMs will provide  nuisance alarm levels up to 99 percent lower than the legacy RPMs  without upgrades, which is expected to be low enough to implement  remote operations at these high-volume sites. (See fig. 3.)
According to DNDO and CBP officials, RPM acquisition decisions will be  informed by several factors, including available budget levels,  performance of the upgraded Leidos RPMs, performance of new,  enhanced RPMs as they are deployed, and the status of port expansions  and reconfigurations. DNDO and CBP have conducted, or are planning,  studies of nuisance alarm rates at sites with upgraded Leidos RPMs and  new, enhanced RPMs. For example, DNDO and CBP collaborated on a  preliminary study of nuisance alarm rates at ports of entry where  upgraded Leidos RPMs are operating. Officials told us that further studies  are necessary before DNDO and CBP determine how many of these sites  will need new, enhanced RPMs to achieve nuisance alarm rates low  enough to implement remote operations. According to CBP officials, CBP  is also planning to test remote operations using new, enhanced RPMs.  Specifically, according to officials, CBP has begun planning a pilot project  at a seaport in Savannah, Georgia, to demonstrate the feasibility of  remote operations using a test lane outfitted with a new, enhanced RPM.
In addition to RPMs deployed as replacements, DHS estimates that, over  the next several years, it will need to deploy approximately 200 RPMs  because of port expansions and reconfigurations across the country.  According to DHS officials, some of these will be Leidos RPMs out of  existing inventory and some will be newly acquired, enhanced RPMs,  depending on the scanning requirements at each individual site and the  availability of the Leidos RPMs in inventory.
According to DHS data, the agency had 143 upgraded Leidos RPMs in its  inventory as of September 30, 2015, as well as approximately 85 low-use  or no-use RPMs (75 Leidos and 10 Ludlum) expected to be available.  DHS inventory data indicate that this existing RPM inventory would be  adequate to support the planned replacements at the northern land  border and the added RPM deployments for port expansions and  reconfigurations through the end of fiscal year 2017. According to DNDO,  starting in fiscal year 2018, when DHS plans to begin acquiring the  enhanced RPMs, the upgraded Leidos RPMs that the new, enhanced  RPMs replace will be used for the northern land border replacements and  the anticipated port expansions and reconfigurations.
According to DNDO officials, DNDO is following the DHS acquisition  directive as it plans for acquisition of the enhanced RPMs. This document  directs DNDO to follow a four-phase acquisition life-cycle framework. The  directive’s implementing instruction outlines a series of “acquisition  decision events” that include certain milestones. For example, prior to  approval of an acquisition, DNDO must, among other things, develop a mission need statement outlining the capability need or gap that the an analysis of alternatives that explores the alternatives for  addressing the identified need; a life-cycle cost estimate for the assets being acquired; and a test and evaluation master plan outlining how the program will  ensure that the acquisition will deliver the capabilities needed by the  program.
As of August 2016, DNDO has completed an analysis of alternatives for  the planned RPM acquisition, and officials told us that other required  documentation is in process or waiting for management approval.  Officials stated that DNDO plans to issue a request for proposals to  industry before the end of the current calendar year and that the initial  acquisition of the enhanced RPMs is planned for fiscal year 2018.
DNDO and CBP have also recognized that the enhanced RPMs may be  suitable for scanning of international rail crossings. DNDO has identified  the lack of RPM scanning of international rail crossings as a concern for  at least a decade and as a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture  capability gap since 2014. In 2007, Congress directed the Secretary of  Homeland Security to develop a system to detect both undeclared  passengers and contraband, with a primary focus on the detection of  nuclear and radiological materials entering the United States by railroad.  In 2012, DNDO carried out an analysis of alternatives to identify solutions  for international rail RPM scanning. Agency officials have cited  technological and logistical challenges as key factors preventing RPM  scanning of rail cars crossing the border. Specifically, according to DHS  officials, international rail traffic represents one of the most difficult  challenges for radiation detection systems, in part because of the length  of the trains (up to 2 miles), the distance required to stop moving trains,  and the difficulties in separating individual cars for further examination. In  addition, the gamma ray or X-ray scans used to detect rail cargo  anomalies, such as high-density material or hidden cargo, can interfere  with RPM scanning if the two are in close proximity, which can cause  nuisance alarms from the RPMs. In June 2015, CBP conducted a  successful cargo-scanning demonstration project at an international rail  port of entry using systems that integrate X-rays and enhanced RPM  scanning technologies. This demonstration project showed the feasibility  of adding RPM scanning to international rail crossings. DNDO and CBP  are jointly planning an acquisition of these integrated systems and plan to  deploy them at international rail crossings beginning as early as fiscal  year 2018.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or oakleys@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix I.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Shelby S. Oakley, (202) 512-3841 or oakleys@gao.gov.
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Ned Woodward (Assistant  Director), Rodney Bacigalupo, Antoinette Capaccio, Michael Krafve,  Cynthia Norris, Steven Putansu, and Kevin Tarmann made key  contributions to this report.