Next Generation Jammer: DOD Should Continue to Assess Potential Duplication and Overlap As Program Moves Forward
Published: 2013-08-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: At an estimated cost of over $7 billion, the Navy's NGJ program represents a significant investment in airborne electronic attack capabilities. Jammers, like the planned NGJ, fly on aircraft, such as Navy EA-18Gs, and transmit electronic signals that can neutralize or temporarily degrade enemy air defenses and communications, thus aiding combat aircraft and ground forces' freedom to maneuver and strike. Senate Report 112-196 mandated GAO to review the NGJ program and potential duplication. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD assessed whether there is duplication among NGJ, existing capabilities, and other acquisition programs, and (2) NGJ is being managed as a joint solution. GAO reviewed key NGJ requirements and acquisition documents and DOD and military service documents describing airborne electronic attack capabilities.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Generation Jammer (NGJ) program is duplicative using a variety of means, but none of them address all of the system's planned roles or take into account the military services' evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. DOD analyses support its conclusion that the NGJ meets a valid need and is not duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role--suppressing enemy air defenses from outside the range of known surface-to-air missiles. However, these analyses do not address all planned NGJ roles, such as communications jamming in irregular warfare environments, or take into account the military services' evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. According to GAO's analysis, none of the systems that have emerged since DOD completed its NGJ analyses duplicate its planned capabilities; however there is some overlap in the roles they are intended to perform. Redundancy in some of these areas may, in fact, be desirable. However, pursuing multiple acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can result in the same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled. Therefore, continued examination of potential overlap and duplication among these investments may be warranted.
DOD has several ongoing efforts that could provide a mechanism for updating its analysis of potential overlap and duplication to address these shortcomings as the program moves forward. However, GAO found weaknesses in two of these efforts as well.
Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress : DOD could address new duplication issues as they emerge and, if necessary, explain the need for overlapping capabilities in this report. However, to date, the analysis of overlap and duplication in this report has been limited and did not examine potential overlap between capabilities or explain why overlap was warranted.
NGJ Capability Development Document : Redundancies are required to be considered when a capability development document--which defines the performance requirements for an acquisition program--is validated. The draft NGJ capability development document does not identify the systems the Navy considered when analyzing potential redundancies, so it is difficult to evaluate whether its analysis includes existing and proposed programs across all of the NGJ's planned roles.
The NGJ is not being managed as a joint acquisition program, which is a distinction related to funding, but it is expected to provide the Navy with airborne electronic capabilities that will support all military services in both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments. The NGJ's capabilities are not intended to meet all of the military services' airborne electronic attack needs and the services are planning to make additional investments in systems that are tailored to meet their specific warfighting roles. The military services might be able to leverage the NGJ program in support of their own acquisition priorities because it plans to use a modular open systems approach, which allows for components to be added, removed, or modified without significantly impacting the rest of the system. This approach could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its technologies into other systems in the future.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: To help ensure that DODs analysis of potential overlap and duplication is complete, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense: (1) require the NGJ capability development document to discuss potential redundancies between NGJ and existing and proposed programs across all of its planned roles and (2) ensure that the Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress includes information on potentially overlapping capabilities and why that overlap is warranted. DOD agreed to continue to assess duplication and redundancies but not with using the capability development document to do so. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report. DOD agreed with the second recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Airborne electronic attack capabilities are key enablers for U.S. military  operations ranging from irregular warfare to major combat against  potential near-peer adversaries. Airborne electronic attack involves the  use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade (suppress)  enemy air defense and communications systems, either through  destructive or disruptive means. It helps protect aircraft, maritime, and  ground forces from a variety of threats. For example, during major combat  operations, airborne electronic attack helps prevent other systems, such  as fighter jets or naval carriers, from being detected by enemy radars and  targeted by missiles. In irregular warfare environments, it supports ground  troops by performing functions such as jamming enemy communications.  Weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic attack capabilities  are becoming increasingly common and sophisticated. These weapons— held by both nation-state and non-state actors—vary from advanced,  integrated air defense systems to older surveillance radars that are being  upgraded with advanced computers.
One of the current systems used to counter these threats is the AN/ALQ- 99 (ALQ-99), a jamming pod system that operates from EA-6B Prowler  and EA-18G Growler aircraft. Jammers transmit electronic signals that  neutralize or temporarily degrade enemy air defenses and  communications, thus aiding combat aircraft, maritime, and ground  forces’ freedom to maneuver and strike. According to the Department of  Defense (DOD), the capabilities of the ALQ-99 are insufficient to keep up  with rapidly evolving threats and the system is becoming obsolete. As a  result, the Navy is planning to replace the ALQ-99 with a more capable  Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) on its EA-18G aircraft. The NGJ program  was authorized to begin technology development in July 2013, and the  Navy expects the program to cost over $7 billion, including over $3 billion  for research, development, test and evaluation, and over $4 billion for  procurement.
Each of the military departments is making investments in airborne  electronic attack capabilities. In March 2012, we found potential overlap  among airborne electronic attack systems in development, particularly  among systems used for irregular warfare that the services were  acquiring under urgent operational needs processes. While some  redundancy is often desirable, our prior work has shown that pursuing  multiple acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can result in the  same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of  resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled.
We also found that DOD’s ability to identify department-wide needs and  solutions and eliminate potentially unnecessary overlap may have been  undermined by a lack of designated, joint leadership charged with  overseeing electronic warfare acquisition activities. Senate Report 112- 196, which accompanied the bill for the Department of Defense  Appropriations Act, 2013 and was subsequently incorporated into the  Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, directed  GAO to review the NGJ program and potential duplication. This report  examines (1) the extent to which DOD has assessed whether there is  duplication among the NGJ, existing capabilities, and other acquisition  programs, and (2) the extent to which the NGJ is being managed as a  joint solution that supports multiple military services.
To determine the extent to which DOD assessed duplication among the  NGJ, existing capabilities, and other acquisition programs, we reviewed  key NGJ and DOD electronic warfare documents, including the 2004  Airborne Electronic Attack Initial Capabilities Document, the 2009  Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, the NGJ Analysis of  Alternatives, and the DOD’s annual Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to  Congress. We assessed DOD’s analysis of duplication against DOD’s  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Manual.  We also analyzed information provided by the military services regarding  the capabilities and missions of existing and planned airborne electronic  attack systems, and interviewed DOD, military service, program, and  Joint Staff officials. To determine the extent to which the NGJ is being  managed as a joint solution, we reviewed key requirements and  acquisition documents reflecting military service and Joint Staff input into  NGJ requirements and the acquisition program. We also reviewed the  NGJ Analysis of Alternatives and interviewed DOD, military service,  program, and Joint Staff officials to determine whether the NGJ is  intended to be used on multiple platforms.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to August  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our analysis  was limited to information classified no higher than SECRET, but we  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The NGJ is DOD’s program to replace the ALQ-99 tactical jamming  system. The ALQ-99 is a five-pod jamming system that is capable of  automatically processing, and jamming radio frequency signals. It  counters a variety of threats in low-, mid-, and high-band frequency  ranges. Figure 1 shows the radars that operate in different frequency  bands and ranges.
The ALQ-99 was originally flown on EA-6B aircraft, which are expected to  be fully retired in 2019, and is transitioning to the EA-18G, an electronic  attack variant of the Navy’s F/A-18 fighter jet. Figure 2 shows the ALQ-99  on the EA-18G.
EA-6B and EA-18Gs can be based on aircraft carriers or in expeditionary  squadrons that are deployed to land-based locations as needed. The  ALQ-99/EA-6B combination was originally developed for use in major  combat operations, and in 1995, the EA-6B was selected to become the  sole tactical radar support jammer for all services after the Air Force  decided to retire its fleet of EF-111 aircraft. The role of the EA-6B has  continued to expand over time. According to DOD officials, when  Operation Iraqi Freedom began, EA-6Bs were used in irregular warfare  environments along with another aircraft, the EC-130H Compass Call,  because they provided needed jamming capabilities and there were no  other airborne electronic attack assets available for this role. These and  other demands have strained DOD’s airborne electronic attack capacity  and increased the stress on systems, such as the ALQ-99.
Like the ALQ-99, the NGJ will be comprised of jamming pods that will fly  on the Navy’s EA-18G. Its main purpose will be to counter integrated air  defense systems in major combat operations. The EA-18G with NGJ is to  primarily be based on aircraft carriers at sea where it is to be employed in  U.S. Navy carrier strike groups to counter both sea- and land-based  weapon systems. DOD also plans for it to support joint expeditionary  warfare missions. The EA-18G with NGJ is currently planned to primarily  serve in a modified escort role, in which it is expected to jam enemy  radars while the aircraft is outside the range of known surface-to-air  missiles. It is also expected to be capable of conducting stand-off  jamming missions, in which the aircraft is located outside of defended  airspace. In both cases, the idea is to protect or “hide” other systems from  enemy radars. The EA-18G with the NGJ is also intended to be used for  other purposes, such as communications jamming. Figure 3 shows the  NGJ with other airborne electronic attack systems countering enemy air  defense systems.
In July 2013, DOD conducted a milestone A review for the NGJ program,  which is a planned major defense acquisition program, and authorized it  to enter the technology development phase. Subsequent to the  milestone A review, the Navy awarded a $279.4 million contract to  Raytheon for NGJ technology development. Figure 4 shows the time line  for the milestone A review and other key NGJ events.
The NGJ program plans to use an incremental approach to development  in which the most critical capabilities are to be delivered first. In total, the  Navy’s acquisition strategy calls for three increments: mid-, low-, and  high-band. The specific frequency ranges covered by these bands is  classified.
Both federal statute and DOD policies include provisions designed to help  prevent unnecessary duplication of investments. Section 2366a of title 10  of the U.S. Code provides that a major defense acquisition program may  not receive milestone A approval until the Milestone Decision Authority  certifies, after consultation with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,  that if the program duplicates a capability already provided by an existing  system, the duplication provided by such program is necessary and  appropriate. In addition, DOD’s JCIDS Manual directs that initial  capabilities documents, which describe capability gaps that require a  materiel solution, identify proposed capability requirements for which  there exists overlaps or redundancies. Initial capabilities documents  should also assess whether the overlap is advisable for operational  redundancy or whether it should be evaluated as a potential trade-off or  alternative to satisfy identified capability gaps. The manual also states  that, when validating key requirements documents, the chair of the group  responsible for that capability area is also certifying that the proposed  requirements and capabilities are not unnecessarily redundant to existing  capabilities in the joint force. This applies to initial capabilities documents,  capability development documents, and capability production documents,  which helps ensure that potential redundancies are discussed at multiple  points in the acquisition process.
However, assessing duplication among airborne electronic attack  investments is challenging for a variety of reasons. There is a lack of  documentation comparing all current existing and planned airborne  electronic attack capabilities; electronic warfare investments are  distributed among the services; systems in the electronic warfare portfolio  are classified at multiple levels; future needs and threats and plans to  address them change quickly; planned programs of record or upgrades  are not always known until funding is requested; and some overlap  among systems is intentional.
section_title: DOD Analysis of Potential Duplication Does Not Address All NGJ Roles and Planned Acquisition Programs
paragraphs: DOD has assessed whether the planned NGJ program is duplicative  using a variety of means, but none of them address all of the system’s  planned roles or take into account the military services’ evolving airborne  electronic attack investment plans. DOD’s analyses of its airborne  electronic attack capability gaps over the last decade, as well as the NGJ  analysis of alternatives, support its conclusion that the NGJ is not  duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role – the joint  suppression of enemy air defenses. However, these analyses do not  address potential duplication or overlap between the NGJ and other  systems being developed for other roles, such as communications  jamming in irregular warfare environments. The military services also plan  to invest in additional airborne electronic attack systems, so new  duplication issues could emerge. Several ongoing DOD efforts could  provide a mechanism for updating its analysis of potential overlap and  duplication related to the NGJ. However, we found weaknesses in the  execution of some of these efforts.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Cited Its Assessments of Capability Gaps As Evidence That NGJ Is Not Duplicative
paragraphs: According to DOD and Joint Staff officials, the NGJ addresses a clear  capability gap and is not duplicative of other airborne electronic attack  systems. It is a direct replacement for the Navy’s ALQ-99 tactical jamming  system and addresses validated capability gaps. DOD analyses dating  back a decade have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for  service investments in airborne electronic attack capabilities, such as the  NGJ. DOD outlined its findings in reports that included analyses of  alternatives and initial capabilities documents.
None of these documents are specifically assessments of duplication;  they serve other purposes. For example, the two initial capabilities  documents – the 2004 Airborne Electronic Attack and 2009 Electronic  Warfare Initial Capabilities Documents – identified the capability gaps that  the NGJ is intended to address. Table 1 lists key documents and  describes the extent to which they assessed duplication and overlap for  NGJ.
According to DOD and Joint Staff officials, the analyses contained in  these documents provided support for the certification the department is  required to make that the NGJ is not unnecessarily duplicative before  receiving milestone A approval to begin technology development. In  addition, Joint Staff officials stated that they reviewed the NGJ and its  potential capabilities for duplication before endorsing the NGJ Analysis of  Alternatives. We were not able to review the Joint Staff’s analysis due to  its classification level.
section_title: DOD NGJ Analyses Do Not Reflect All of Its Planned Roles or Service Acquisition Plans
paragraphs: DOD analyses of NGJ capabilities and potential duplication do not reflect  all of its planned roles, particularly in irregular warfare environments, or  evolving service acquisition plans. Section 2366a of title 10 of the U.S.  Code provides that a major defense acquisition program may not receive  milestone A approval until the Milestone Decision Authority certifies, after  consultation with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, that if the  program duplicates a capability already provided by an existing system,  the duplication provided by such program is necessary and appropriate.  DOD’s analyses support its conclusion that the NGJ is not duplicative of  existing capabilities in its primary role—the joint suppression of enemy air  defenses in a modified escort setting, which includes defended airspace  outside the range of known surface-to-air missiles. In fact, the NGJ  Analysis of Alternatives found that the planned system would complement  other DOD investments in electronic warfare and stealth. However, these  analyses do not address potential duplication or overlap between the NGJ  and systems being developed for other roles, such as communications  jamming in irregular warfare environments—an area where we have  found potential duplication in our prior work. Most of these systems have  been developed or incorporated into military service investment plans  since these analyses were conducted.
Since the preparation of key NGJ-related documents, DOD has focused  on increasing its airborne electronic attack capabilities and capacity,  resulting in several systems that were not considered in those analyses.  When these analyses were being completed, DOD had few airborne  electronic attack systems and programs of record, none of which were  specifically designed for the irregular warfare environment. Table 2  shows existing and planned airborne electronic attack systems and  whether they were discussed in key NGJ-related documents.
Based on our analysis of DOD airborne electronic attack systems and  missions, none of the systems we reviewed that have emerged since  DOD’s NGJ analysis was completed duplicate planned capabilities;  however, there is some overlap in the roles that the systems are intended  to perform. For example, according to the F-35 program office, some  aircraft with electronic attack enabled AESA radar may be able to perform  some jamming functions in a modified escort role. However, unlike the  NGJ, they are not designed to be dedicated jamming systems. In  addition, NGJ is to be capable of communications jamming in an irregular  warfare type environment, like systems such as CEASAR and Intrepid  Tiger II, which were fielded under rapid acquisition authorities and in very  limited quantities. Army and Marine Corps officials explained that their  systems are a more suitable and economic alternative to the NGJ for  these missions. For example, Army officials stated that the systems the  Army is investing in, such as CEASAR and Multi-Function Electronic  Warfare, would provide the right amount of power for their needs, be  more readily available to units, and cost less. According to DOD, these  systems also provide additional capacity in an area where there has been  significant demand. However, as DOD and the military services continue  to invest in new additional airborne electronic attack capabilities, the  potential for duplication and overlap to occur increases.
section_title: Ongoing DOD Efforts Provide Another Mechanism to Address Potential Overlap and Duplication
paragraphs: DOD has several ongoing efforts that could provide a mechanism for  updating its analysis of potential overlap and duplication related to the  NGJ and other airborne electronic attack investments, including its annual  Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress, a U.S. Strategic  Command review of DOD’s portfolio of electronic warfare systems, and  the NGJ capability development document. However, we found  weaknesses in two of the three efforts.
DOD could address new duplication issues as they emerge and, if  necessary, explain the need for overlapping capabilities in its electronic  warfare strategy report to Congress. Section 1053 of the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires that for each of  fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination  with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and secretaries of the military departments,  submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on  DOD’s electronic warfare strategy. Each report must provide information  on both unclassified and classified programs and projects, including  whether or not the program or project is redundant or overlaps with the  efforts of another military department. DOD has produced two reports in  response to this requirement. In these reports, DOD assessed duplication  of airborne electronic attack systems, including NGJ. However, the  analysis was limited and did not examine potential overlap between  capabilities or explain why that overlap was warranted. DOD officials  explained that the report relied primarily on the military services to self- identify overlap and duplication. Redundancy in some of these areas  may, in fact, be desirable, but pursuing multiple acquisition efforts to  develop similar capabilities can also result in the same capability gap  being filled twice or more, which may contribute to other warfighting  needs going unfilled. This report is supposed to be submitted at the same  time the President submits the budget to Congress, but DOD has not yet  issued its report for fiscal year 2013 and could not provide a definitive  date for when it plans to do so.
The U.S. Strategic Command also has an ongoing review that could help  assess duplication and overlap issues related to the NGJ and other  systems. Joint Staff officials stated that, during the course of our review,  they began in collaboration with U.S. Strategic Command to review  DOD’s portfolio of electronic warfare systems at all levels of classification.  They explained that the review will examine capability requirements in  select approved warfighting scenarios as well as potential redundancy  within the portfolio. According to the Joint Staff, the review should be  completed sometime in fiscal year 2013.
Capability development documents, which define the performance  requirements of acquisition programs, are another vehicle to discuss  potential redundancies across proposed and existing programs. The Navy  must produce and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council must  validate a capability development document for the NGJ program before it  can receive approval to enter system development—currently planned for  fiscal year 2015. The JCIDS manual provides that, when validating  capability development documents, the chair of the group responsible for  that capability area is also certifying that the proposed requirements and  capabilities are not unnecessarily redundant to existing capabilities in the  joint force. The draft NGJ capability development document addresses  potential redundancies by stating that the NGJ is fully synchronized with  existing systems and will be synchronized with future systems, and that  individual airborne electronic attack systems all concentrate on unique  portions of the electromagnetic spectrum—frequency ranges—for  different mission sets. However, the Navy did not identify the systems that  it considered in its analysis, so it will be difficult for others to validate this  conclusion or whether it applies to all of the NGJ’s planned roles.
section_title: NGJ Capabilities Are to Support the Joint Force, but the Military Services Are Also Developing Systems Tailored to Their Specific Needs
paragraphs: The NGJ is not a joint acquisition program, but it is planned to provide  airborne electronic attack capabilities that will support all military services  in both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments. The  NGJ is not intended to meet all of the military services’ airborne electronic  attack needs, and the services are planning to make additional  investments in systems that are tailored to meet their specific warfighting  roles. The military services may be able to leverage the NGJ program in  support of their own acquisition priorities and programs because its  current acquisition strategy is based on a modular open systems  approach, which allows system components to be added, removed,  modified, replaced, or sustained by different military customers or  manufacturers without significantly impacting the remainder of the  system. This approach could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its  technologies into other systems in the future.
subsections: section_title: NGJ Is Not a Joint Acquisition Program, but Its Capabilities Are to Support the Joint Force
paragraphs: Despite its role in joint military operations, the NGJ program is led and  funded by the Navy and is not a joint acquisition program. The definition  of a joint acquisition program is related to whether it is funded by more  than one DOD component, not whether other organizations have  provided input on it. In the case of the NGJ, the Joint Requirements  Oversight Council, which is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, and includes one senior leader from each of the military  services, such as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army or the Vice Chief of  Naval Operations, has validated that the need exists for the program. The  Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Joint Staff have provided input into  the program as part of DOD’s requirements and acquisition processes.  This included collaboration on requirements documents and the NGJ  Analysis of Alternatives. The Air Force’s 2004 Airborne Electronic Attack  Initial Capabilities Document and Strategic Command’s 2009 Electronic  Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, which informed NGJ requirements,  included input from senior-level oversight boards representing all the  military services. In addition, advisors from various parts of the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and all services provided  input into the NGJ Analysis of Alternatives through forums such as  working groups, integrated product teams, and a high-level executive  steering committee.
DOD plans to use Navy EA-18Gs with the NGJ to support multiple military  services in joint operational environments. In the joint operational  environment, each service relies on the capabilities of the others to  maximize its own effectiveness while minimizing its vulnerabilities. For  example, in conducting military operations, U.S. aircraft are often at risk  from enemy air defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles. EA-18Gs can  use the NGJ jamming capabilities in these settings to disrupt enemy radar  and communications and suppress enemy air defenses. Because aircraft,  such as the EA-18G, are to protect aircraft of all services in hostile  airspace, the joint suppression mission necessarily crosses individual  service lines. The system the NGJ is replacing–ALQ-99–has also been  used extensively in irregular warfare environments, including in Iraq and  Afghanistan in response to electronic attack requests from all the military  services.
section_title: Military Services Are Planning to Develop Additional Systems That Are Tailored to Their Roles
paragraphs: DOD has placed an emphasis on increasing airborne electronic attack  capacity and capabilities. While the Navy’s NGJ is expected to provide  airborne electronic attack capabilities to support all military services in  both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments, the  other services are also planning to make additional investments in  airborne electronic attack systems that are tailored to their specific  warfighting roles. The services’ airborne electronic attack plans vary in  part because of these roles. For example, DOD officials explained that  the Navy is responsible for ensuring freedom of navigation in the world’s  oceans and has a key role in force projection; the Marine Corps is a rapid  expeditionary force; the Air Force provides long range strike and close air  support and is responsible for establishing air superiority; and the Army is  the primary force for land operations in war and usually enters a battle  area after the Air Force has established air superiority. Military service  officials characterized their airborne electronic attack plans and the role of  the NGJ in them as follows:
Air Force: The Air Force is focused on developing long range strike  capabilities, enabling the electronic attack capabilities of its F-22A and  F-35 aircraft for penetrating escort roles, and investing in  improvements to self protection systems for its fighter aircraft,  including the F-15 and the F-16. Air Force requirements officials  stated that the planned capabilities of NGJ will complement the other  systems it is developing.
Army: Officials from the Army’s Electronic Warfare Division stated that  although the NGJ-equipped EA-18Gs would have a role in helping to  establish air superiority before the Army enters an area, the Army  plans to rely on its own airborne electronic attack systems to perform  the necessary jamming in support of its ground forces. According to  Army officials, the service plans to invest in less expensive, less  powerful systems that will be readily available at the brigade combat  team level. The Army developed CEASAR, a jamming pod on C-12  aircraft, and is now developing a more capable successor to CEASAR  under the Multi-Function Electronic Warfare program, which is early in  the acquisition process.
Marine Corps: Officials from the Marine Corps’ Electronic Warfare  Branch stated that each Marine Air Ground Task Force commander  must possess its own airborne electronic attack capabilities and the  Marine Corps does not plan to rely solely on Navy EA-18G’s with NGJ  to support its air and ground forces. Historically, the Marines have  relied on their own expeditionary EA-6B squadrons to meet joint  electronic warfare requirements, but the EA-6Bs will be phased out by  2019 and the Marine Corps does not plan to acquire the EA-18G,  which will be equipped with the NGJ. According to the Marine Corps,  it will coordinate the use of NGJ support from the Navy when  appropriate but it expects to rely on its own systems for its core  missions. The Marine Corps plans to upgrade its Intrepid Tiger II  jamming pods to support both communications and radar jamming,  and develop a system to integrate air and ground electronic warfare  units with other payloads designed to be used on any platform.
section_title: Open Systems Approach Could Facilitate Use of NGJ Technologies on Other Systems
paragraphs: The current acquisition strategy for the NGJ program calls for it to be  integrated on one aircraft—the EA-18G—however, the program is  planning on pursuing a modular open systems approach to development  that could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its technologies into  other systems in the future. An open systems approach allows system  components to be added, removed, modified, replaced, or sustained by  the military customer or different manufacturers, in addition to the prime  manufacturer that developed the system. It also allows independent  suppliers to build components that can plug-in to the existing system  through the open connections. Fundamental elements of an open  systems approach include the following:
Designing a system with modular components that isolate  functionality. This makes the system easier to develop, maintain, and  modify because components can be changed without significantly  impacting the remainder of the system.
Developing and using open, publicly available standards for the key  interfaces, or connections, between the components.
According to NGJ program officials, a modular open systems approach  would allow the NGJ to be designed so that it could adapt to threat and  technology changes. It also enables future growth of the system.  Furthermore, Navy officials stated that the approach could make it  possible for NGJ components to be used and modified for application on  significantly different platforms, including unmanned aerial vehicles. This  approach is encouraged by DOD guidance, including its Better Buying  Power initiative, as well as Navy guidance.
The NGJ Analysis of Alternatives also examined integrating the NGJ onto  the F-35, which is being acquired by the Air Force, Marine Corp, and  Navy, but the option was found to be too risky and costly for a near-term  solution. Navy officials explained that, even with an open systems  approach, integrating the NGJ with any platform is difficult. Even the  integration associated with moving the ALQ-99 to the EA-18G was  challenging. The cost of the effort was about $2 billion and took 5 years.  Part of the integration challenge was adapting the operator workload  system because the EA-6B is a four-operator aircraft while the EA-18G is  a two-operator aircraft. The F-35 is a single-operator aircraft, which  officials explained would cause significant integration challenges for the  NGJ.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Airborne electronic attack is an important enabling capability for U.S.  military forces in both major combat operations and irregular warfare  environments. In response to rapidly evolving threats and mission needs,  DOD is making investments to increase both its airborne electronic attack  capacity and capabilities. At an estimated cost of over $7 billion, the NGJ  represents a significant investment in airborne electronic attack  capabilities. Investments of this size must be well-justified and are  required by statute and DOD policy to be examined for unnecessary  redundancy. DOD’s analysis of its airborne electronic attack capability  gaps over the last decade, as well as the NGJ analysis of alternatives,  supports its conclusion that the NGJ meets a valid need and is not  duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role. However, in the time  since DOD completed some of these analyses, the investment plans of  the military services have changed, particularly in the irregular warfare  area. The military services are quick to differentiate their airborne  electronic attack needs and justify individual service, rather than joint or  common, solutions to meet them. While none of the new programs  planned duplicate NGJ capabilities, new areas of overlap and potential  duplication could emerge as these plans continue to evolve. Redundancy  in some of these areas may, in fact, be desirable, but pursuing multiple  acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can also result in the  same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of  resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled.
DOD has mechanisms, such as the Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to  Congress, U.S. Strategic Command Annual Electronic Warfare  Assessment, and NGJ capability development document, that it can use  to continue to assess overlap and duplication between the NGJ and other  airborne electronic capabilities at key points in the acquisition process  and communicate its evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans  to Congress. Identifying existing and planned systems across all of the  NGJ’s planned roles in its capability development document could help  ensure that DOD’s analysis of potential overlap and duplication is  complete. Moreover, providing Electronic Warfare Strategy Reports to  Congress as required and incorporating information on potentially  overlapping systems and why such overlap is warranted would provide  Congress with more complete information about the relationship between  electronic warfare programs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two  actions:
To help ensure that the NGJ does not unnecessarily duplicate existing  or planned capabilities, require the Navy, in coordination with the Joint  Staff, to address overlap and duplication between the NGJ and other  systems in all of its planned roles in the NGJ capability development  document. The NGJ capability development document should identify  the existing and planned systems that the Navy assessed for potential  redundancies to help determine if its analysis was comprehensive.
To provide Congress complete information about the relationship  between electronic warfare programs, ensure that the Electronic  Warfare Strategy Reports to Congress include information on  potentially overlapping capabilities among systems, such as the NGJ  and Electronically Attack Enabled AESA Radar, CEASAR, Intrepid  Tiger II, and Multi-Function Electronic Warfare, and why that overlap  is warranted.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, which are reprinted in full in appendix II, DOD partially  concurred with our first recommendation and concurred with our second  recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments that were  incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to address overlap and  duplication between the NGJ and other systems in all of its planned roles  in the NGJ capability development document. DOD responded that it  concurs with the need to continue to assess unnecessary duplication and  redundancy, but it does not concur with including the assessment in the  capability development document. Rather DOD stated that it will address  unnecessary duplication and redundancy in accordance with its existing  processes, such as the Joint Capabilities Integration Development  System (JCIDS), and statutory requirements. DOD explained that  changes it made to the JCIDS process in January 2012 address the  concerns about potential capability overlaps and redundancies raised in  this and other GAO reports. For example, the revised JCIDS manual  emphasized the role of functional capabilities board in assessing potential  unnecessary capability redundancy prior to forwarding a program’s  requirements documents for approval. In addition, DOD stated that the  Joint Staff is further improving these processes through a pending update  to JCIDS that will include increased emphasis on functional area portfolio  management. DOD also reiterated in its comments and in a classified  enclosure that NGJ’s capabilities are not unnecessarily duplicative.
We acknowledged the existing JCIDS mechanisms that address potential  overlap and duplication in this report and have discussed the value of  effective portfolio management in prior reports. However, as we point out  in our recommendation, documenting the assessments that support these  processes is important because it allows others to determine if DOD’s  analysis was comprehensive. We identified the NGJ capability  development document as the appropriate vehicle to document DOD’s  assessment of potential duplication because DOD already requires that  potential overlap and duplication be considered before the document can  be validated and the program can move forward in the acquisition  process. Finally, while DOD’s current analysis indicates that none of its  current or planned programs duplicate NGJ capabilities, new areas of  overlap and potential duplication could emerge as military service  investment plans continue to evolve.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation regarding providing  complete information about the relationship between electronic warfare  programs in its Electronic Warfare Strategy Reports to Congress. DOD  did not provide details regarding how it plans to implement this  recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the  Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is available at  no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)  assessed duplication among the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), existing  capabilities, and other acquisition programs, we reviewed key NGJ and  DOD electronic warfare documents, including the 2004 Airborne  Electronic Attack Initial Capabilities Document, the 2009 Electronic  Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, the NGJ Analysis of Alternatives  (AOA), and the DOD Annual Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to  Congress, to determine whether potential duplication was considered as  DOD developed NGJ requirements and prepared for initiation of the NGJ  acquisition program. We interviewed DOD, military service, and program  officials and the Joint Staff about how these analyses were conducted.  We assessed DOD’s analysis of duplication against DOD’s Joint  Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Manual. In  addition, we reviewed information up to the SECRET level provided by  the military services regarding the capabilities and missions of existing  and planned airborne electronic attack systems. Our analysis was limited  to non-kinetic airborne electronic attack systems as opposed to kinetic  capabilities which focus on destroying forces through the application of  physical effects.
To determine the extent to which the NGJ is being managed as a joint  solution, we reviewed key requirements and acquisition documents  reflecting military service and Joint Staff input into NGJ requirements and  the acquisition program. We also interviewed DOD, military service, and  program officials to determine the extent to which the military services  provided input into NGJ requirements and the acquisition program. In  addition, we analyzed documents, such as memorandums of agreement  among the military services, and interviewed military service and Joint  Staff officials to obtain an understanding of how NGJ is expected to  operate in the joint force. We also reviewed the NGJ AOA and  interviewed program officials to determine if the system is intended to be  used on multiple platforms.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to August  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our analysis  was also limited to information classified no higher than SECRET, but we  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made  key contributions to this report: Ronald E. Schwenn, Assistant Director;  Teakoe Coleman; Laura Greifner; John Krump; Laura Holliday; Brian  Lepore; Anh Nguyen; Madhav Panwar; Mark Pross; and Roxanna Sun.