Prepositioned Stocks: Marine Corps Needs to Improve Cost Estimate Reliability and Oversight of Inventory Systems for Equipment in Norway
Published: 2015-09-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: MCPP-N was established in 1981 as part of a DOD agreement to support the defense of Norway and global U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary operations. In 2012 the Marine Corps began transforming MCPP-N from an engineering and transportation capability to a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability, which includes combat vehicles and other tactical equipment, and it expects to complete the transformation in 2016.
Senate Report 113-176 included a provision that GAO review MCPP-N. This report determines the extent to which (1) MCPP-N addresses U.S. European and U.S. Africa command requirements;(2) reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPP-N's sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability; and (3) the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in place to monitor the management of MCPP-N. GAO reviewed agency guidance and plans, analyzed budget estimates, and interviewed Marine Corps, Department of State, and Norwegian Defence officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Marine Corps is changing its mix of equipment at Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway (MCPP-N) to address the U.S. European and U.S. Africa commands' strategic and theater-specific operational requirements. U.S. European Command's posture plan identifies MCPP-N as a key program that can respond to contingencies. While U.S. Africa Command plans that refer to a need to access prepositioned equipment do not specifically identify MCPP-N as an asset to meet that need, both Marine Corps and U.S. Africa Command officials stated that MCPP-N has served and can continue to serve as a global support asset to meet combatant command requirements. The Marine Corps reported that it routinely uses MCPP-N equipment sets to support European and Africa training and exercises.
Marine Corps cost estimates for sustaining the equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability at MCPP-N may not be fully reliable, in that they do not fully meet the four general characteristics for reliable cost estimating—that is, being accurate, well-documented, credible, and comprehensive. For example, the Marine Corps documented its cost estimates, but the documentation did not include the source data used to develop the estimates or the calculations performed and estimating methodologies used. Marine Corps officials stated that they are drafting guidance for developing cost estimates for budget plans and plan to issue it in the fall of 2015, but this guidance will not address the four general characteristics for reliable cost estimating. Without ensuring that this guidance fully addresses those characteristics, the Marine Corps will not be positioned to know whether its budget proposals will meet the goal of sustaining equipment for a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability at MCCP-N.
The Marine Corps could improve its quality assurance procedures for monitoring MCPP-N. Specifically, the service relies upon the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System for data needed to manage its equipment inventory due to limitations in its own system, such as the lack of a warehousing application to effectively manage MCPP-N equipment.The reliance on two different information systems, one of which is owned and operated by a foreign government, creates several management challenges and risks to data reliability for the Marine Corps. For example, it results in a time lag in the accuracy of information in the Marine Corps system until it is manually updated with information from the Norwegian system—a time-consuming process that introduces a vulnerability to errors. The Marine Corps and the Norwegians have taken some steps to mitigate these risks for the interim until the Marine Corps system is capable of replacing the Norwegian system. Additionally, relying on the Norwegian system for management information makes the Marine Corps vulnerable to any weaknesses that may exist within the Norwegian system. However, the Marine Corps has not conducted a quality assurance review of the Norwegian system. Performing such a review would constitute a key step toward mitigating potential weaknesses in the Norwegian system.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Marine Corps (1) incorporate the four characteristics of reliable cost estimates in the forthcoming prepositioning programs budget development policy; and (2) develop, in consultation with the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization, a means to conduct a quality assurance review of the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System. The Marine Corps concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program - Norway (MCPP-N) was  established in 1981 as part of the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  agreement to support the defense of Norway, as well as to support global  U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary operations. In 2005, the United States  and Norway renewed the memorandum of understanding that governs  the prepositioning of MCPP-N equipment. MCPP-N is part of DOD’s  overall prepositioning program, whereby each of the military services  prepositions stocks such as combat vehicles and repair parts worth  billions of dollars at strategic locations around the world. Both afloat and  ashore, prepositioning enables DOD to field combat-ready forces in days,  rather than the weeks it would take if stocks had to be moved from the  United States to the locations of conflicts. Since 1991, equipment stored  in Norway as part of MCPP-N has been withdrawn and relocated within  the geographic areas of either U.S. European Command or of U.S. Africa  Command to support a variety of efforts, such as training and exercises,  humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and contingency operations.  Since 2005 the Marine Corps has spent about $117.6 million to support  MCPP-N, which is its only land-based prepositioning program. Over the  same period of time, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence has contributed  approximately $94.5 million in support of the program. Since 2012 the  Marine Corps has been transforming MCPP-N from an engineering and  transportation capability to a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability,  which includes combat vehicles and other tactical equipment, to enhance  its relevance to DOD’s combatant commands. The transformation is  expected to be completed in fiscal year 2016.
Senate Report 113-176, accompanying the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision that we  review MCPP-N. In this report we determine the extent to which (1)  MCPP-N addresses U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command  requirements; (2) reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPP-N’s  sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force  capability; and, (3) the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in  place to monitor the management of MCPP-N.
To determine the extent to which MCPP-N addresses U.S. European  Command and U.S. Africa Command requirements, we obtained and  reviewed Marine Corps plans and policies on MCPP-N detailing the  program and its support to the Marine Corps and combatant commands;  collected and reviewed combatant command contingency plans  containing information on their strategic and operational requirements,  including the need for a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability. We  focused our review on ground equipment, rather than aviation support  equipment, stored at MCPP-N because the program is transforming the  ground equipment set from an engineering and transportation capability  to a combat capability that supports a Marine Air Ground Task Force. To  determine the extent to which reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPP- N’s sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force  capability, we collected and analyzed projected budget data for MCPP-N  from fiscal years 2015 through 2019 to identify the process and steps  used to develop the budget estimates. We assessed the data to  determine whether they were sufficiently reliable for our purposes and  met GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide criteria for best  practices for reliable cost estimates. Because the budget estimates did  not meet all of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, we  considered them not to be fully reliable. To determine the extent to which  the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in place to monitor  the management of MCPP-N, we obtained copies of quality assurance  instruction documents and collected and analyzed quality assurance  reports. We conducted a site visit to MCPP-N to observe base facilities,  equipment stored in caves, and related logistics movement capabilities.  We interviewed officials at Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps  Blount Island Command, Marine Corps Logistics Command Comptroller,  U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, Marine Forces Europe  and Africa, U.S. Embassy Oslo, Norway, and the Norwegian Defence  Logistics Organization to learn about their roles and responsibilities in  support of the program in Norway.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to September  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives, scope, and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: MCPP-N consists of six climate-controlled caves spread across central  Norway that are used for the storage of U.S.-owned munitions and  ground equipment. In addition, the Norwegian Defence Logistics  Organization manages two aviation maintenance facilities that contain  U.S.-owned aviation support equipment, co-located at Norwegian  airfields, and a pier used for offloading equipment from ships. Figure 1  identifies the locations of these caves, airfield maintenance facilities, and  the pier.
According to Marine Corps officials, the Norwegian government  completed construction of a new pier near the cave at Hammernesodden  in July 2014 to facilitate the ability of large U.S. ships to transport large  combat vehicles and other equipment into central Norway. Marine Corps  and Norwegian officials stated that this pier was paid for solely by the  Norwegian government at a cost of approximately $22.5 million (see  figure 2).
In August 2014 the Navy and the Marine Corps transported a large  shipment of combat and other equipment to Norway in support of a  transformation to a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability, according to  Marine Corps Blount Island Command and Norwegian officials. The  equipment transported for storage in the six caves included variants of  the M1114 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), M1A1  Main Battle Tanks, Tank Retrievers, Armored Breeching Vehicles,  Amphibious Assault Vehicles, and several variants of the Medium Tactical  Vehicle 7 ½-ton trucks. The photographs below (figs. 3 and 4) show the  offloading of the USNS Williams at the newly constructed pier at  Hammernesodden and provide an example of the type of ground  equipment used to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force that can be  found at MCPP-N caves.
subsections: section_title: Program Costs
paragraphs: As part of the 2005 memorandum of understanding between the United  States and Norway, the United States will provide military equipment to  be stored in the Norwegian-built caves, and Norway will provide the  infrastructure to support the program and will maintain the equipment  provided by the United States. Both countries agree to share the  program’s operations and maintenance expenses. Under the cost-sharing  portion of the agreement, each country agrees to match the other’s  financial contributions up to an agreed upon threshold, which in fiscal  year 2014 was $10.5 million each. The cost-sharing agreement does set  a maximum contribution by Norway, limiting its contribution either to half  of the total costs incurred or to the ceiling set in U.S. dollars to be  negotiated, whichever is less. Table 1 below illustrates the Marine Corps  and Navy’s total annual contributions covering the actual direct and  indirect programmatic costs for MCPP-N from fiscal years 2010 to 2014.  According to officials from the office of the Deputy Commandant of the  Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics, the direct costs for MCPP-N  include all operations and maintenance expenses incurred by the Marine  Corps for both ground equipment and aviation support equipment. In  addition, indirect costs cover administrative expenses incurred by Blount  Island Command and other Marine Corps organizations as part of the  execution of the program.
section_title: Organizational Responsibilities
paragraphs: Five organizations are responsible for the support and operation of  MCPP-N. Four Marine Corps organizations are responsible for the  planning, funding, and management of MCPP-N. The fifth organization,  the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization, is responsible for  providing program infrastructure and maintaining MCPP-N equipment  prepositioned in Norway. Table 2 below summarizes the primary roles  and responsibilities of each organization.
section_title: MCPP-N Is Changing Its Equipment Mix to Address U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command Requirements
paragraphs: The Marine Corps is changing its mix of equipment to address the U.S.  European and U.S. Africa commands’ strategic and theater-specific  operational requirements. Both combatant commands have identified in  their contingency plans the need for prepositioned equipment within their  respective geographic areas to support their operational requirements  and capabilities. The U.S. European Command’s Theater Posture Plan  identifies Trondheim, Norway, as a stand-alone prepositioning site for  MCPP-N capable of providing equipment to a wide variety of operations.  In addition, officials from the U.S. European Command stated that they  have developed and are continuing to develop contingency plans that  specifically call upon the Marine Corps to maintain prepositioned  equipment in Europe to support strategic and theater-specific operational  requirements. Although those U.S. Africa Command plans that reference  a need for access to prepositioned equipment do not specifically identify  MCPP-N as an asset to meet that need, both Marine Corps and U.S.  Africa Command officials stated that MCPP-N has served and can  continue to serve as a global support asset to meet combatant command  requirements.
Both U.S. European and U.S. Africa Command identify prepositioned  equipment in their contingency plans as providing capabilities to support  efforts such as crisis response, humanitarian and disaster assistance,  and counter-terrorism activities. The Marine Corps reported that it  routinely uses MCPP-N equipment sets to support European training and  exercises, including the biennial Cold Response exercise in Norway,  which trains U.S., Norwegian, and other NATO-allied military forces to  operate in cold weather environments; and an annual training activity to  carry out security cooperation efforts with the Marine Corps’ Black Sea  Rotational Force and other foreign militaries. Marine Corps officials stated  that MCPP-N equipment has been used to support training and exercises  across the African continent, including the Shared Accord and African  Lion exercises, and could be used for other assistance efforts in Africa.
From February 1991 to March 2014 the Marine Corps reported that it  withdrew equipment from MCPP-N caves in support of training, exercises,  and operations within Europe, Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These  principal end items included tanks, amphibious armored vehicles, light  armored vehicles, trucks, and tractors. Marine Corps officials estimated  during this period that more than 3,000 principal end items were  withdrawn from MCPP-N in support of various training and exercise  events, and more than 2,000 principal end items were withdrawn in  support of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, officials  estimated more than 150 principal end items were withdrawn to support  other contingency operations within the European Command’s  geographic area, ranging from supporting a Special Purpose Marine Air  Ground Task Force in Spain to providing humanitarian assistance in  Turkey and the Republic of Georgia. Marine Corps officials estimated that  about 50,000 non-principal end items such as sandbags, rations, tents,  and cots were withdrawn from MCPP-N over the same period to support  various training and exercises as well as contingency operations in  Europe, Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition, Marine Corps officials  reported that MCPP-N equipment was used to provide humanitarian and  disaster relief assistance in response to a major earthquake in Turkey in  2011 and wildfires in Russia in 2010. Further, Marine Corps officials  stated that the same equipment used for training in cold weather  environments could also support DOD’s Arctic Strategy for potential  military operations in the Arctic regions, although officials stated that the  Marine Corps has conducted no such operations to date.
In January 2012 the Commandant of the Marine Corps issued planning  guidance that called for MCPP-N to be able to support a Marine Air  Ground Task Force. Subsequently, the Marine Corps began its effort to  change the mix of equipment found at MCPP-N storage facilities. This  change occurred as a response to DOD’s efficiency initiatives, to  strengthen the effectiveness of MCPP-N, and to bolster the Marine Corps’  prepositioning capabilities. In addition, as a result of the Department of  the Navy’s decision to discontinue in 2012 a maritime prepositioning ship  squadron located within the Mediterranean, the U.S. European Command  has heightened its reliance on MCPP-N to support its prepositioning  requirements. The Marine Corps guidance specifically calls for MCPP-N  to be able to support a force of approximately 4,500 Marines to respond  to the first 2 weeks of combat at the mid-intensity conflict level of the  range of military operations, and to support theater security cooperation  activities. Marine Corps officials stated that the equipment set at MCPP-N  is intended to provide the capabilities to enable a Marine Corps force to  respond to any type of crisis or operation globally, and thus MCPP-N is  not assigned to any specific combatant command.
To ensure that MCPP-N effectively meets the Marine Corps’ needs and  better aligns with combatant command strategic and theater-specific  operational requirements, the Marine Corps annually updates the mix of  equipment found at MCPP-N storage facilities in Norway. The current  prepositioning objective, which was last revised in February 2015, calls  for MCPP-N to support crisis response-type missions and theater security  cooperation engagement activities for the combatant commands. It also  calls for an equipment set that includes combat equipment such as  HMMWVs, light armored vehicles, amphibious armored vehicles, and  Abrams tanks necessary to support mid-intensity conflicts. Marine Corps  officials stated that as of March 2015 MCPP-N had acquired 63 percent of  the equipment it needed to meet its current prepositioning objective.  Marine Corps officials we interviewed observed, however, that this  attainment level of equipment may change periodically, depending on the  Marine Corps’ identified prepositioning needs, as the prepositioning  objective is generally revised on an annual basis.
section_title: Marine Corps’ Cost Estimates for Funding MCPP-N’s Equipment Sustainment May Not Be Fully Reliable
paragraphs: Marine Corps cost estimates for sustaining the equipment to support a  Marine Air Ground Task Force capability may not be fully reliable, in that  they do not fully meet the four general characteristics for reliable cost  estimating—that is, being accurate, well-documented, credible, and  comprehensive—as identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment  Guide. Reliable cost estimates provide the basis for informed investment  decision making and realistic budget formulation and program resourcing.
subsections: section_title: Marine Corps Develops Program Objective Memorandum for Marine Corps Prepositioning Program - Norway
paragraphs: Each year, the Logistics Plans and Operations Branch of the Deputy  Commandant of the Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics  consolidates the Marine Corps’ portion of direct program costs for  MCPP-N in support of developing a consolidated and comprehensive  budget estimate for the program objective memorandum. This includes  a 5-year budget projection to fund program initiatives—such as the cost- sharing agreement with Norway—and theater security cooperation  requirements for the U.S. European and U.S. Africa Commands. Current  Marine Corps guidance requires budget estimates to contain defendable  funding requirements that extend across multiple fiscal years and support  both short- and long-term program objectives. The Marine Corps’  approved program objective memorandum for MCPP-N for fiscal years  2015 to 2019 includes budget estimates (see table 3) for direct costs for  operations and maintenance.
section_title: Marine Corps Cost Estimates for MCPP-N Are Not Fully Reliable
paragraphs: According to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the cost  estimate is a critical element in the budgeting process that helps decision  makers to evaluate resource requirements at milestones and other  important decision points. Cost estimates establish and defend budgets  and drive affordability analyses. The guide identifies four characteristics  of reliable cost estimates—that is, they should be accurate, well- documented, credible, and comprehensive. Based on our review of the  budget estimates identified in the program objective memorandum budget  for MCPP-N for fiscal years 2015 to 2019, we found that the Marine  Corps’ cost estimates for MCPP-N (1) partially met the “accurate”  characteristic; (2) partially met the “well-documented” characteristic; (3)  did not meet the “credible” characteristic; and (4) partially met the  “comprehensive” characteristic of a reliable estimate. Table 4 provides  more information on our assessment of the program objective  memorandum budget for MCPP-N based on the four characteristics.
We found that the cost estimates partially met the characteristic for  accuracy in that the Marine Corps program objective memorandum  estimates for MCPP-N are updated as part of both the budget execution  and program objective memorandum development processes. However,  officials at the Office of the Deputy Commandant for Installations and  Logistics told us that while Marine Corps components maintain source  data or calculations, the components are not required to include this  information as part of their cost estimate submissions. In addition, the  Marine Corps does not track the variances between planned and actual  costs to demonstrate the accuracy of its cost estimates and how the  program is changing over time. We, therefore, could not assess whether  the estimates were properly adjusted for inflation, nor could we check the  results for accuracy. Without access to cost estimate details, the accuracy  of the estimates cannot be determined.
We found that the cost estimates partially met the well-documented  characteristic in that the documentation provided by the Marine Corps  does not include the source data used to develop the cost estimates for  the program objective memorandum process. The documentation does  not reflect the calculations performed or the estimating methodologies  used by the Marine Corps, and does not describe the step-by-step  process used to develop the estimate. Without well-documented cost  estimates that include calculations and estimating methodologies, the  Installations and Logistics office cannot provide complete answers to  questions about the development of cost estimates or explain the reasons  behind changes to the estimates over time.
We found that estimates did not meet the characteristic for credibility.  Based on our review of the program objective memorandum  documentation for MCPP-N, we did not find documentation to  demonstrate that systematic cross-checks of major cost elements were  performed. Marine Corps Installation and Logistics officials stated that  they do not perform cross-checks to assess the component and  subordinate commands’ proposed budget estimates, and that if questions  arise about the components and subordinate commands’ assumptions  they engage in discussions to understand the reasoning behind them.  However, this method used by the Installations and Logistics office to  determine the accuracy of the components’ and subordinate commands’  assumptions cannot easily be replicated by an independent party. Such  cross-checks of major cost elements can reveal whether applying a  different cost-estimating method produces similar results. Without  credible cost estimates, the Installations and Logistics office may not be  able to determine the level of risk, uncertainty, or confidence associated  with achieving proposed budget estimates. Consequently, management  may have difficulty in identifying the available resources needed to  address budget estimates in future program objective memorandum  cycles to meet MCPP-N program requirements.
We found the cost estimates to be partially comprehensive in that they  included all types of program costs supporting MCPP-N but did not  include a detailed funding plan on the costs to transform the program to  support a Marine Air Ground Task Force. Marine Corps officials stated  that they had no specific funding plan for the transformation because it  was not a fiscally driven event. Officials stated, however, that identifying  all costs associated with the transformation would prove difficult because  they do not track all funding sources that support MCPP-N, such as  transportation costs, which are tracked through a separate budget  account. However, we found that they did identify some costs needed to  support the transformation. For instance, officials identify costs of about  $750,000 for fiscal year 2016 to employ three U.S. contractors in Norway  to manage cryptographic equipment as part of a caretaker detachment.  They also stated that between fiscal years 2012 and 2013 about $2  million was apportioned from another prepositioning program source to  procure support items such as ancillary gear, lubricants, and batteries to  operate and sustain new equipment supporting the Marine Air Ground  Task Force.
We also found that there was no standardized structure for collecting  costs at a level of detail necessary to demonstrate that estimates are  acceptable and reflect justification of resources. While Marine Forces  generally are required to submit budget requests in a specific template to  the Marine Corps’ Logistics Plans and Operations Branch, Blount Island  Command is not required to use any template. Further, the cost- estimating documentation provided within the program objective  memorandum submission did not include specific details on all factors  and assumptions influencing costs, such as inflation indexes and potential  costs arising from the purchase of parts to support new equipment sets  such as tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, light armored vehicles, and  communication capabilities. By not having a standardized structure for  collecting cost estimates across organizations, the Installations and  Logistics office cannot be certain that it has all the information necessary  to ensure that the cost estimates provided are correct.
Marine Corps officials stated that while they have taken some steps to  improve their cost estimates for developing the budget, the current DOD  guidance for developing the program objective memorandum does not  include procedures that embody the characteristics of reliable cost  estimating as identified in GAO’s prior work. In their view, better guidance  would enable them to ensure that subordinate and component commands  understand how to develop and document cost estimates. Officials stated  that in response to recent changes with the consolidation of the program  objective memorandum for prepositioning programs, the Marine Corps  is drafting guidance for assisting in the development of budget plans. As  of May 2015 the draft guidance had not been finalized, but Marine Corps  officials stated they had no plans for the new guidance, which they expect  to issue in the fall of 2015, to address the four characteristics of reliable  cost estimates.
section_title: Marine Corps Reliance on the Norwegian System Poses Management Challenges and Data Reliability Risks, and Quality Assurance Procedures Do Not Include a Review of the System
paragraphs: The Marine Corps relies upon the Norwegian Equipment Information  Management System for data needed to manage its equipment inventory  at MCPP-N due to long-standing limitations in the Global Combat Support  System - Marine Corps. Although the Marine Corps is working to improve  its information system, these solutions will likely take several years to  implement. The reliance on two different information systems, one of  which is owned and operated by a foreign government, creates several  management challenges and risks to data reliability for the Marine Corps.  For example, it results in a time lag in the accuracy of information in the  Marine Corps system until that system is manually updated with  information from the Norwegian system—a process that is time- consuming and vulnerable to the risk of introduction of errors. However,  the Marine Corps and the Norwegians have taken some steps to mitigate  these risks for the interim until the Marine Corps system is capable of  replacing the Norwegian system. Additionally, relying on the Norwegian  system for management information makes the Marine Corps vulnerable  to any weaknesses that may exist within the Norwegian system.
Nevertheless, the Marine Corps has not conducted a quality assurance  review of the Norwegian system. Performing such a review would be  consistent with Marine Corps regulations and federal internal control  standards, and it would constitute a key step toward mitigating potential  weaknesses in the Norwegian Equipment Information Management  System.
subsections: section_title: The Marine Corps Relies on Data from the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System to Manage Its MCPP-N Equipment Inventory
paragraphs: The Marine Corps relies on two different information systems—(1) the  Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps, and (2) the Norwegian  Equipment Information Management System—to maintain visibility and  accountability over prepositioned assets stored at MCPP-N. The Global  Combat Support System - Marine Corps is the service’s enterprise-wide  logistics information management system designed to serve as the  backbone for all logistics information required by a Marine Air Ground  Task Force. The Norwegian Equipment Information Management System  is the data system that the Marine Corps and its Norwegian counterparts  relied on to manage the ground equipment until 2012. Since July 2012,  Blount Island Command has used the Global Combat Support System -  Marine Corps as the official program of record for maintenance, spare  parts, and cost data related to the management of MCPP-N equipment.
However, due to limitations in the Marine Corps’ system, the Marine  Corps continues to rely on the Norwegian system for key inventory  management data. For example, the Global Combat Support System -  Marine Corps lacks a warehousing application and other data  management capabilities that Blount Island Command needs to  effectively manage MCPP-N equipment stored in the Norwegian caves.  As noted earlier, Marine Corps equipment is distributed among six caves.  While the current version of the Global Combat Support System – Marine  Corps can track which cave each piece of equipment is stored in, the  system cannot record the equipment’s specific location within the cave.  According to Norwegian officials, given the size of the caves, having the  equipment’s specific location within each cave is essential for efficient  equipment management. For example, the exact location of the  equipment is critical to conducting efficient inventory checks and  scheduled maintenance, and for withdrawing equipment for training  exercises, humanitarian relief efforts, and contingency operations. As a  result, the Marine Corps is reliant on the Norwegian System for this  information.
These limitations in the capabilities of the Global Combat Support System  – Marine Corps are long-standing issues that the Marine Corps has  recognized and is working to address. For example, as we reported in  March 2014, according to Marine Corps Business System Integration  Team officials, the initial plan was for the first version of the Global  Combat Support System - Marine Corps, referred to as Increment 1, to  include a warehousing application. However, as the rollout progressed  through 2012, the officials stated that technical challenges, cost  increases, and schedule delays caused the Marine Corps to lack  sufficient funds to incorporate the warehousing application in Increment 1.  Over the past several years we have issued a series of reports on the  acquisition of major automated information systems. Our 2014 and 2015  reports included a review of the Global Combat Support System - Marine  Corps and the associated challenges entailed in implementing Increment  1.
According to officials from Blount Island Command, when it became  apparent that Increment 1 would lack the needed warehousing  application, the Marine Corps explored available options with the  Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization. They elected to continue  using the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System  because it contained a warehousing and inventory management  application. Marine Corps Headquarters and Blount Island Command  officials stated that they intend to discontinue their reliance on the  Norwegian system once a warehousing application becomes available on  the Marine Corps’ system. In the meantime, they will rely on the two  information systems to provide all the computer functions necessary for  effective inventory management. Marine Corps officials stated that they  did not know when the warehousing application will become available but  expect it to be incorporated into a future increment, provided that there  are available funds.
section_title: Reliance on Two Information Management Systems to Store Inventory Data Creates Management Challenges and Data Reliability Risks
paragraphs: While Marine Corps and Norwegian officials agree that retaining the  Norwegian system is the best available option until the Marine Corps  system is capable of completely replacing the Norwegian system, several  challenges exist with respect to managing the interface between the two  independent information systems. For example, because these systems  are owned by separate governments, security concerns prevent the  Marine Corps from allowing the systems to directly interact electronically.  Consequently, inventory data from the Norwegian Equipment Information  Management System is required to be manually extracted and uploaded  into the Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps. This results in a  time lag for the accuracy of information in the Marine Corps system, until  it is manually updated with information from the Norwegian system—a  process that is time-consuming and creates the risk for errors. The  Marine Corps and the Norwegians have taken some steps to mitigate the  risks in this process until the Marine Corps system replaces the  Norwegian system. For example, Blount Island Command and Norwegian  Defense Logistics Organization officials stated that they have a process  to identify discrepancies between the two systems and then use a Marine  Corps contractor to validate and enter inventory data from the Norwegian  system to update the Marine Corps system.
The following overview of the flow of inventory data as equipment arrives  and is stored in the six Norwegian caves shows how data reliability  challenges arise from the use of these two systems. Specifically,  equipment designated for MCPP-N is assigned to Blount Island  Command in the Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps. After  undergoing a maintenance process at Blount Island Command to ensure  that it is ready for use, the equipment is shipped to Norway for storage,  and its shipment data are entered into the Marine Corps system. As was  explained and demonstrated to us, when equipment arrives in Norway,  the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization records its receipt and  inventory data in the Norwegian Equipment Information Management  System. Once the Norwegian staff have assigned an equipment storage  location—the designated cave and the equipment’s location within that  cave—they transfer the key data elements that can be added to the  Marine Corps system to an interim database known as the “Change Log.”  Norwegian officials explained that one of their former staff created the  Change Log feature in the Norwegian system in January 2014 to provide  a mechanism whereby Norwegian staff could resolve discrepancies in the  inventory data between the Marine Corps and Norwegian systems, in  consultation with the Marine Corps contractors. The contractors receiving  data from the Change Log are responsible for reviewing and validating  the submitted equipment’s cave location and other inventory data before  updating the record in the Global Combat Support System - Marine  Corps.
According to Norwegian officials, the Change Log has been instrumental  in reducing the backlog of data discrepancies from more than 3,000 in  January 2014 to fewer than 800 in November 2014. They explained that  these discrepancies between the Marine Corps and Norwegian systems  developed largely due to the changing mix of equipment prepositioned at  MCPP-N to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability.  Norwegian officials also reported mismatches in equipment serial  numbers in both systems. They stated that as a result of such problems,  a physical check of the serial number is often required to reconcile the  data discrepancies between the two systems. Norwegian officials  indicated that having its maintenance personnel provide additional  information (documentation and photographs) to reconcile inventory data  between the two systems negatively affects Norwegian maintenance  operations because they have limited time maintenance resources.
The Change Log serves as an application control for information entering  the Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps. Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government state that an application  control should be installed at an application’s interface with other systems  to ensure that all inputs are received and that valid outputs are correct  and properly distributed. The Change Log constitutes a computerized  “edit” built into the interface that helps the Marine Corps to review the  format, existence, and reasonableness of the data from the Norwegian  system before it enters the Marine Corps system.
While the Change Log demonstrates an application control to mitigate  data discrepancies between the two information management systems, it  does not represent a long-term solution. Marine Corps and Norwegian  officials anticipate that data discrepancies will continue to occur whenever  there is a change in the cave location of equipment—such as when it  returns to a cave after maintenance, a training exercise, humanitarian  relief effort, or contingency operation—and also when it enters a cave for  the first time, due to decisions to upgrade or change the mix of  preposition equipment. Until the Global Combat Support System – Marine  Corps is modified to include a warehousing application and can replace  the Norwegian system, Marine Corps and Norwegian officials will  continue to rely on two information management systems that generate  ongoing data discrepancies and related data reliability challenges.
section_title: Marine Corps’ Annual Quality Assurance Inspection Process Does Not Include a Review of the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System
paragraphs: The Marine Corps’ Blount Island Command conducts an annual quality  assurance inspection to monitor, measure, and analyze data to ensure  the effectiveness of MCPP-N. This inspection includes an assessment of  the condition of the equipment and of the maintenance processes, along  with a review of the inventory. However, the quality assurance inspection  does not include a review of the Norwegian Equipment Information  Management System, which serves as one of the key reporting systems  for managing inventory data. Performing such a review would be  consistent with Marine Corps regulations and federal internal control  standards and would constitute a key step toward mitigating potential  weaknesses in the Norwegian Equipment Information Management  System.
The data standards for information systems supporting Marine Corps  prepositioning are provided in Marine Corps Order 3000.17 and state that  data must be accurate and timely, must provide visibility of prepositioning  materiel to planners at all levels, must be maintained to standards at the  source of generation, and must be standardized for both afloat and  ashore prepositioning programs. The Marine Corps Order also  references the Marine Corps Technical Manual for MCPP-N, which states  that Blount Island Command is responsible for developing and  administering the Quality Assurance Program, and that the Quality  Assurance Program shall include a review of shelf life items, scheduled  maintenance and inventory cycles, and the adequacy of reporting  systems.  In addition, the Blount Island Command Quality System  Manual states that Blount Island Command retains the overall  responsibility for exercising sufficient control for processes performed by  external organizations that provide logistics support for MCPP-N.
Federal internal control standards also indicate the need for a quality  assurance review of the Norwegian system. According to those  standards, information systems have two main types of control  activities—general and application controls. General controls are the  policies and procedures that apply to all or a large segment of an entity’s  information systems and facilitate their proper operation, to include  system development and maintenance, security, management, logical  and physical access, access security, and contingency planning.  Application controls are incorporated directly into computer applications to  achieve validity, completeness, accuracy, and confidentiality of  transactions and data during application processing. According to the  standards for internal controls, general and application controls over  computer systems are interrelated. General controls support the  functioning of application controls, and both are needed to ensure  complete and accurate information processing. If general controls are  inadequate, application controls are unlikely to function properly and  could be overridden.
A quality assurance review can entail reviewing selected general and  application controls within the information system through activities such  as:  reviewing operating and database management systems; assessing security controls that protect the system and network from  inappropriate access or unauthorized use; and performing tests on the system to ensure that it has the proper edit  checks to review the format, existence, and reasonableness of data.
Further, the Local Bilateral Agreement for MCPP-N, which serves as an  internal working document between Blount Island Command and the  Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization and outlines roles and  responsibilities for each organization, identifies Blount Island Command  as being responsible for completing annual quality assurance inspections  on the maintenance and storage of equipment managed by the  Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization. Blount Island Command  officials stated that their annual quality assurance review does not focus  on information systems, and they further noted that the Norwegians’  system is foreign-owned and therefore not within their jurisdiction. The  Local Bilateral Agreement does not specifically require the Marine Corps  to conduct a review of the Norwegian System. However, as a working  document the agreement is regularly updated and can be amended to  incorporate additional provisions such as allowing the Marine Corps to  conduct a quality review of the Norwegian system.
The Norwegian Equipment Information Management System provides the  Marine Corps with capabilities not currently available in its own system,  such as the ability to track equipment calibration and a warehousing  function, but Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization officials stated  that they recognized their system has certain vulnerabilities. For example,  during our review of their information system we observed several  weaknesses, including minimal documentation on the system, the lack of  formal training and procedures for staff performing data entry, and the  reliance on a single person, a retired Norwegian staff member, for the  system’s technical programming and maintenance needs. To address  known data entry problems, Norwegian officials are considering a  proposal that would limit the number of data entry points into the  Norwegian system from three locations to one centrally managed  location. However, Norwegian officials stated that they had not conducted  an overall quality assurance review of the information system, thus raising  further questions as to its potential vulnerabilities.
Although the current Local Bilateral Agreement does not contain guidance  and instructions for conducting an assessment of the Norwegian  Equipment Information Management System, the Marine Corps is  responsible for ensuring that the Norwegian system is providing accurate  data on the inventory for stored assets being managed at MCPP-N.  Further, Marine Corps officials stated that they rely on the Norwegian  system to carry out data management functions discussed above.  Without performing a quality assurance review of the Norwegian system,  MCPP-N is at risk for incurring potential vulnerabilities in its inventory  data. If the Marine Corps does not provide a quality assurance review of  the Norwegian system, it may not be able to determine whether inventory  data are complete, accurate, reliable, and reasonably free from error, so  as to ensure that equipment is readily available to support the combatant  commanders’ requirements.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Marine Corps is transforming MCPP-N’s posture from an engineering  and transportation capability to a balanced Marine Air Ground Task Force  capability that supports both the U.S. European and U.S. Africa  commands’ operational requirements to obtain prepositioned equipment  sets capable of supporting crisis response operations and theater security  cooperation activities. While the Marine Corps continues to develop cost  estimates for its budget to determine the level of funding needed to meet  current and future program obligations for MCPP-N, its current methods  do not fully meet the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. The  Marine Corps has taken some steps to improve its efforts in developing  reliable cost estimates by drafting new guidance for subordinate and  component commands to develop budget estimates. While this  represents a positive step, without fully incorporating the four  characteristics of a reliable cost estimate in their draft guidance, the  Marine Corps cannot ensure that its budget planning efforts for MCPP-N  are based upon sound planning that is justifiable, defendable, and  accountable.
Furthermore, the lack of a warehousing application in the Global Combat  Support System - Marine Corps has limited Blount Island Command’s  ability to provide adequate visibility and accountability over prepositioned  inventory stored in Norway, and consequently the Marine Corps  continues to rely on the Norwegian Equipment Information Management  System to manage the warehousing and inventory of equipment. Without  a quality assurance review that assesses the Norwegian system, the  Marine Corps cannot ensure that the inventory data it provides are  accurate and reliable.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better determine the costs needed to sustain the equipment to support  a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability, we recommend that the  Commandant of the Marine Corps direct the Deputy Commandant for  Installations and Logistics to incorporate the four characteristics of  reliable cost estimates in the Marine Corps’ forthcoming prepositioning  programs budget development policy, and specifically to take the  following actions:
To ensure that estimates are accurate and well-documented, require  all relevant departments and subordinate commands to provide  documentation of cost-estimating details that include both source data  and calculations;
To ensure that estimates are credible, implement management  requirements to establish and conduct formal cross-checks of major  cost elements among the relevant departments and subordinate  commands to determine whether they are replicable; and
To ensure that estimates are comprehensive, implement a  standardized structure for collecting all the necessary details used to  develop and support cost estimates from all relevant departments and  subordinate commands.
As part of its quality assurance program for ensuring that the Marine  Corps has accurate and reliable information on inventory data for stored  assets used to support combatant commanders’ requirements, we  recommend that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation  with the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization, take steps to update  the Technical Manual on Logistics Support for the Marine Corps  Prepositioning Program – Norway and the Local Bilateral Agreement, to  incorporate guidance and instructions on conducting a quality assurance  review that assesses the accuracy and reliability of the Norwegian  Equipment Information Management System.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided draft copies of this report to the Department of Defense and  the Department of State. Additionally, we provided relevant portions of the  draft report to the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization to ensure its  technical accuracy. In written comments for DOD on this draft, the Marine  Corps agreed with all four of our recommendations and its comments are  reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The Department of State had no  comments on the draft report. The Norwegian Defence Logistics     Organization generally agreed with the relevant portions of the draft that  we sent them and provided technical comments that we incorporated as  appropriate.
The Marine Corps concurred with our first, second, and third  recommendations—that the Commandant of the Marine Corps direct the  Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics to incorporate the four  characteristics of reliable cost estimates in the Marine Corps’ forthcoming  prepositioning programs budget development policy, and specifically take  actions to ensure that estimates are accurate and well-documented,  credible, and comprehensive. The Marine Corps stated that the  forthcoming Prepositioning Programs Budget Development Order will  address the four characteristics of reliable cost estimates to ensure that  estimates are accurate, credible, and comprehensive, and that the draft  Budget Development Order will be initially staffed to the prepositioning  community at the end of fiscal year 2015, with a target date for publishing  by the end of the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2016. We believe that these  actions, if fully implemented, would address our recommendations.
The Marine Corps also concurred with our fourth recommendation—that   the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Norwegian  Defence Logistics Organization, take steps to update the Technical  Manual on Logistics Support for the Marine Corps Prepositioning  Program – Norway and the Local Bilateral Agreement, to incorporate  guidance and instructions on conducting a quality assurance review that  assesses the accuracy and reliability of the Norwegian Equipment  Information Management System. The Marine Corps stated that it will  incorporate guidance and instructions on conducting a quality assurance  review that assesses the accuracy and reliability of the Norwegian  Equipment Information Management System into the Technical Manual  and Local Bilateral Agreement. The Marine Corps also stated that the use  of the Norwegian system and the Change Log are not long-term solutions  for the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway, and that as soon  as the Global Combat Support System adds a warehousing module,  currently under development, the Marine Corps will implement it in  Norway. We acknowledge the current limitations of the Global Combat  Support System in our report, and we believe that the Marine Corps’  proposed actions regarding efforts to include a quality assurance review  of the accuracy and reliability of inventory data from the Norwegian  system address the intent of our recommendations. We further believe  that these actions, if fully implemented, should help improve the quality of  inventory information until the warehousing module for the Marine Corps  is in place.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the  Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the  Norwegian Defense Logistics Organization. In addition, this report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 (russellc@gao.gov). Contact  points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Senate Report 113-176, accompanying the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision that we  review MCPP-N and determine the extent to which (1) MCPP-N  addresses U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command  requirements; (2) reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPP-N’s  sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force  capability; and, (3) the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in  place to monitor the management of MCPP-N.
To determine the extent to which MCPP-N addresses U.S. European  Command and U.S. Africa Command requirements, we obtained,  reviewed, and analyzed plans, policies, and guidance on MCPP-N  detailing the program and its support to the Marine Corps and combatant  commands, such as the January 2012 Commandant of the Marine Corps  Planning Guidance for Marine Corps Prepositioning Program—Norway.  We also reviewed GAO’s prior work addressing DOD’s management and  reporting of prepositioning. We collected and reviewed a theater posture  plan and contingency plans obtained from the U.S. European Command  and U.S. Africa Command on their strategic and operational  requirements, including the need for a Marine Air Ground Task Force  capability. We also collected documentation from the Marine Corps  containing the type and mix of equipment required to support a Marine Air  Ground Task Force. Further, we reviewed the combatant command plans  to determine the extent to which they rely on prepositioned equipment to  meet theater-specific requirements. We also collected and reviewed unit  after action reports and briefings that provided an evaluation of the  equipment obtained from MCPP-N for training and annual exercises, and  to understand how the equipment met their needs. We collected  documents from the Norwegian Armed Forces on Norway’s role and  relationship with MCPP-N and visited several cave sites in Norway to  observe U.S.-owned equipment stored in support of the Marine Air  Ground Task Force. We focused our review on ground equipment stored  at MCPP-N because the program is transforming the equipment set from  an engineering and transportation to a Marine Air Ground Task Force  capability. We met with and interviewed various DOD and other  organizations that directly or indirectly support MCPP-N. Tables 5 and 6  include a list of the DOD and other organizations we met with and  interviewed during our review.
To determine the extent to which reliable cost estimates exist to fund  MCPP-N’s sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground  Task Force capability and to identify the process and steps used to  develop the budget estimates, we collected and analyzed projected  budget data and supporting budget documentation for MCPP-N from  fiscal years 2015 through 2019. We obtained a copy of the Marine Corps’  program objective memorandum program review briefings from fiscal  years 2015 through 2019 and conducted an analysis to determine how  each cost element associated with budget estimate data was calculated  by examining the basis of the budget estimates and assessing the  strength and quality of the supporting budget documentation provided.
We verified that the parameters used to create the budget estimates were  valid and applicable by posing formal questions and conducting  interviews with officials in the Deputy Commandant for Installation and  Logistics, Logistics Plans and Operations Branch, to understand their  methodology for developing budget estimates, and determining whether  other sources were available for cross-checking those estimates. We  verified that calculations were correct for each cost element, and verified  that elements were accurately summed up to arrive at the overall budget  estimate. We assessed whether the budget estimates were sufficiently  reliable for our purposes and met GAO’s Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide for best practices, and the four general  characteristics of a reliable cost estimate—accurate, credible, well- documented, and comprehensive. Each characteristic consists of several  individual assessments. We assessed each characteristic by assigning  each individual assessment a numerical rating: Not Met = 1, Minimally  Met = 2, Partially Met =3, Substantially Met = 4, and Met = 5. We took the  average of the individual assessment ratings to determine the overall  rating for each of the four characteristics. The resulting average became  the overall characteristic assessment as follows: Not Met = 1.0 to 1.4,  Minimally Met = 1.5 to 2.4, Partially Met = 2.5 to 3.4, Substantially Met =  3.5 to 4.4, and Met = 4.5 to 5.0. A cost estimate is considered reliable if  the overall assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are  substantially or fully met. If any of the characteristics are not met, are  minimally met, or are partially met, the cost estimate does not fully reflect  the characteristics of a reliable estimate. We recorded the results of our  analysis and found that the budget estimates partially met the accurate,  well-documented, and comprehensive characteristics, and that they did  not meet the credible characteristic of a reliable estimate. Because the  budget estimates did not meet all of the characteristics of a reliable cost  estimate, we considered them not to be fully reliable.
To determine the extent to which the Marine Corps has quality assurance  procedures in place to monitor the management of MCPP-N, we reviewed  the May 2009 United States Marine Corps Technical Manual on Logistics  Support for MCPP-N, the 2013 Local Bilateral Agreement between  Blount Island Command and Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization,  and the 2012 Blount Island Command ISO 9001:2008 Quality System  Manual. We obtained examples of annual quality assurance inspection  and work instruction reports and analyzed the reports with the Marine  Corps’ quality assurance procedures to determine how their reviews were  conducted. We also collected studies, reports, and briefings on the Global  Combat Support System – Marine Corps and the Norwegian Equipment  Information Management System to determine how the Marine Corps and  Norwegians rely on these two information management systems to  maintain visibility and accountability over prepositioned equipment in  Norway. We conducted a series of interviews with Marine Corps and  Norwegian officials using a set of standard data reliability questions to  learn about their general and application controls for conducting system  operations and data processing; the chain of custody used to transfer and  record data between two information management systems that do not  interface with each other because of jurisdiction boundaries; and the  quality assurance procedures used to assess the reliability of inventory  data and systems. We interviewed officials from Blount Island Command  and Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization to learn about the  challenges they have encountered in using two information management  systems to support MCPP-N and the management oversight they have  used to mitigate deficiencies. In addition, we conducted site visits at the  Frigard cave, Hammernesodden cave and pier, and the aviation  maintenance facilities at the Vaernes airfield. During these site visits, we  observed and photographed their storage and maintenance facilities;  observed the procedures Norwegian staff followed to enter data into the  Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps and the Norwegian  Equipment Information Management System; observed their data  reconciliation procedures; and observed the manual record keeping they  used to supplement their data entry procedures. While on site, we  obtained copies or photographs of some of their training and reference  materials and data entry procedures. Marine Corps and Norwegian  officials provided us with system demonstrations of the Global Combat  Support System and Norwegian Equipment Information Management  System to acclimate us to both systems’ data management features for  tracking, recording, and storing data on prepositioned equipment. Finally,  we interviewed officials from the Global Combat Support System Marine  Corps’ Business System Integration Team to inquire about the Marine  Corps’ plans to incorporate a warehousing application to allow Marine  Corps organizations to collect inventory data.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to September  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Larry Junek (Assistant Director);  Brian Bothwell; Patricia Farrell Donahue, Ph.D.; Latrealle Lee; Felicia  Lopez; Amie Steele; Sabrina Streagle; John Van Schaik; Cheryl  Weissman; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Richard Winsor made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Prepositioned Stocks: Additional Information and a Consistent Definition  Would Make DOD’s Annual Report More Useful, GAO-15-570.  Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2015.
Prepositioned Stocks: DOD’s Strategic Policy and Implementation Plan.  GAO-14-659R. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2014.
Prepositioned Stocks: Inconsistencies in DOD’s Annual Report  Underscore the Need for Overarching Strategic Guidance and Joint  Oversight, GAO-13-790. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2013.
Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment: DOD Would Benefit from  Developing Strategic Guidance and Improving Joint Oversight.   GAO-12-916R. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2012.
Defense Logistics: Department of Defense Has Enhanced Prepositioned  Stock Management but Should Provide More Detailed Status Reports.  GAO-11-852R. Washington, D.C.; September 30, 2011.
Warfighter Support: Improved Joint Oversight and Reporting on DOD’s  Prepositioning Programs May Increase Efficiencies. GAO-11-647.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2011.
Defense Logistics: Department of Defense’s Annual Report on the Status  of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Further Enhanced to  Better Inform Congress. GAO-10-172R. Washington, D.C.: November 4,  2009.
Defense Logistics: Department of Defense’s Annual Report on the Status  of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Enhanced to Better  Inform Congress. GAO-09-147R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2008.
Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination  Needed to Ensure Viability of the Army’s Prepositioning Strategy.   GAO-07-144. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2007.