Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process
Published: 2003-06-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and, where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective visa revocation actions and (2) determine the effectiveness of the process.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism grounds. Further, State, INS, and the FBI do not have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials said they use the revocation process to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the country, but none of the agencies has a policy that covers investigating, locating, and taking action when a visa holder has already entered. This lack of formal written policies and procedures has contributed to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the possibility of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United States. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notifications of all the revocations; names were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had entered the United States either before or after revocation and may still remain; and INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As stated in the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, the  U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the  homeland from future terrorist attacks. The strategy calls for preventing  the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to  identify; halt; and, where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or  other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. In October 2002,  we reported that the visa process should be strengthened as an  antiterrorism tool. We found that the Department of State had revoked the  visas of certain persons as a precautionary measure after it learned that  they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these  individuals may have entered the United States before or after their visas  were revoked.
At your request, we assessed how the visa revocation process is being used  as an antiterrorism tool. Specifically, we (1) determined the policies and  procedures of the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization  Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern  their respective actions in the visa revocation process and (2) assessed the  effectiveness of the visa revocation process, specifically (a) the steps State  took to notify the appropriate units within INS and the FBI of revocations;  (b) the procedures used by the three agencies to post lookouts on these  revocations to their terrorist watch lists; (c) whether any of the individuals  whose visas had been revoked were able to enter the United States before  or after the revocation; and (d) the actions taken by INS and the FBI to  investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear, remove, or prosecute the  individuals who did enter the United States and may still remain in the  country after their visas had been revoked.  Our review covered only visas  that the State Department revoked on terrorism grounds from September  11, 2001, through December 31, 2002.
To identify the policies and procedures governing the visa revocation  process, we interviewed officials from State, INS, and the FBI and reviewed  relevant documents. To evaluate the effectiveness of the visa revocation  process, we reviewed all 240 of State’s visa revocations on terrorism  grounds from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2002. For each of  these cases, we obtained information from the State Department to  determine if, and when, State notified INS and the FBI of the revocations.  We also obtained information from these agencies to determine if, and  when, they posted appropriate lookouts on their terrorist watch lists. We  reviewed INS arrival and departure data to assess whether any of the  individuals whose visas had been revoked had entered the United States  either before or after revocation and whether they may still remain in the  country. Where available, we supplemented the INS data with information  from the State Department. We interviewed INS, FBI, and Department of  Justice officials to discuss what actions INS and the FBI had taken to  investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear, remove, or prosecute  those individuals who may remain in the United States. Appendix I  provides more information on our scope and methodology, including the  limitations to INS and State data that we reviewed.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Our nation’s border security process for controlling the entry and visits of  foreign visitors consists of three primary functions: (1) issuing visas; (2)  controlling entries through inspection of passports, visas, and other travel  documents as well as controlling exits; and (3) managing stays of foreign  visitors—that is, monitoring these individuals while they are in the country.  As shown in figure 1, the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and  Justice play key roles in this process.
The border security process begins at the State Department’s overseas  consular posts, where consular officers adjudicate visa applications for  foreign nationals who wish to temporarily enter the United States for visits  related to business, tourism, or other reasons. At the port of entry, an INS  inspector determines whether the visa holder is admitted to the United  States and, if so, how long he or she may remain in the country. Until  recently, after INS successfully screened and admitted foreign visitors,  these individuals were generally not monitored unless they came under the  scrutiny of INS or a law enforcement agency, such as the FBI, for suspected  immigration violations or other illegal activity.
On March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security assumed  responsibility for many elements of the border security process. For  example, the new department incorporated the INS Inspections Unit into  its Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, which will focus its  operations on the movement of goods and people across U.S. borders. It  also folded the INS National Security Unit into its Bureau of Immigration  and Customs Enforcement, which is designed to enforce the full range of  immigration and customs laws within the United States. According to  Department of Homeland Security officials, the new department also  gained broad authority over the visa process under section 428 of the  Homeland Security Act, covering the development of policies, regulations,  procedures, and any other guidance that may affect visa issuance or  revocation.The State Department remains responsible for managing the  consular corps and the function of issuing visas.
The FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, within the Justice Department, plays  a key role in the border security process. The division includes the Foreign  Terrorist Tracking Task Force, which is now part of the FBI’s Office of  Intelligence. The mission of the task force, an interagency group, is to (1)  deny entry into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of  being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity and (2) aid in supplying  information to locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already  present in the United States. The National Joint Terrorism Task Force is  comprised of 36 federal agencies co-located in the Strategic Information  and Operations Center at FBI headquarters. This task force provides a  central fusion point for terrorism information and intelligence to the 66  Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which include state and local law  enforcement officers, federal agents, and other federal personnel who  work in the field to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism.
At each stage of the process, the responsible departments and agencies rely  on terrorist or criminal watch list systems—sometimes referred to as tip- off or lookout systems—in fulfilling their respective border security  missions.  For example, State relies on its Consular Lookout and Support  System (CLASS) as the primary basis for identifying potential terrorists  among visa applicants. CLASS incorporates information on suspected  terrorists from State’s interagency terrorist watch list, known as TIPOFF, as  well as from the FBI, INS, and many other agencies. Further, INS inspectors  at ports of entry use the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) to  check whether foreign nationals are inadmissible and should be denied  entry into the United States. When a person enters the United States by air  or by sea, INS inspectors are required to check that person against watch  lists before the person is allowed to enter the country. INS inspectors may  check persons arriving at land borders against the watch lists, but they are  not required to do so. The exception is for males aged 16 or over from  certain countries who are required to be checked.
section_title: Visa Revocation Policies and Procedures
paragraphs: Our analysis indicates that the U.S. government has no specific written  policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written  procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa  revocations on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written procedures  that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither they nor the  FBI have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate  personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State  Department.  State and INS officials could articulate their informal policies  and procedures for how and what purpose their agencies have used the  process as an antiterrorism tool to keep terrorists out of the United States,  but neither they nor FBI officials had policies or procedures that covered  investigating, locating, and taking appropriate action in cases where the  visa holder had already entered the country. We summarized how  information on visa revocations would ideally flow among and within these  three agencies on the basis of our interviews with officials from State,  Homeland Security, and the FBI and on our analysis of the current visa  revocation process.
subsections: section_title: Most Policies Are Informal
paragraphs: According to State Department officials, the U.S. government has no  specific written policy on how agencies should use visa revocations as an  antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide the interagency  process for revoking visas on terrorism or other grounds. These officials  explained that prior to September 11, 2001, State revoked only a small  number of visas for terrorism-related reasons. This relatively small number  resulted in State and INS operating in an informal manner when  cooperating on denying admission to revoked visa holders at ports of entry.  State officials said that State and Justice had agreed to informal  notification procedures between the two agencies and had crafted  language for the visa revocation certificates several years ago; however, the  two agencies did not develop formal written procedures. These officials  said that State did not coordinate its visa revocations with the FBI.  In  commenting on a draft of this report, State said that the Visa Office  generally worked under the impression that, under long-standing practice,  INS was passing relevant information onto the FBI as appropriate.
State and INS officials articulated their agencies’ policies on how  revocations help their agencies prevent suspected terrorists from entering  the United States. State officials told us that they envision the revocation  process as taking place before the visa holder enters the country. This  would allow State and other agencies more time to investigate and  determine whether a suspected terrorist is in fact ineligible for a visa on  terrorism grounds before allowing the visa holder to enter the country. As  these officials explained, since the September 11 attacks, State’s Bureau of  Consular Affairs has been receiving a large volume of information on  suspected terrorists from the intelligence community, law enforcement  agencies, overseas posts, and other units within State. The department  reviews this information to determine if a suspected terrorist has a U.S.  visa. If the identifying information is incomplete, as is often the case, State  may have difficulty in determining whether a visa holder with the same or a  similar name as a suspected terrorist is in fact the suspected terrorist. The  department may also lack sufficient proof of a specific act that would  render the suspected terrorist ineligible for a visa, as required by the INA.
In these cases, State would revoke the person’s visa under the Secretary of  State’s discretionary authority, requiring the person to reapply for a visa if  he or she still intended to visit the United States. State would then use the  visa issuance process to obtain additional biographic and other data on the  visa applicant and make a determination on the person’s eligibility.
INS officials viewed the process as a means of notifying INS inspectors to  deny suspected terrorists entry into the United States. These officials did  not view a visa revocation, even if based on terrorism concerns, as a reason  for investigating someone who had already entered the United States. They  said the INA does not specify visa revocation as a reason for removing a  person from the country. (App. II provides more information on legal issues  associated with visa revocations.)
According to Justice and FBI officials, the FBI does not yet have a policy on  how to use the visa revocation process in its counterterrorism efforts. The  FBI has not developed such a policy because the visa revocation  information State sends to the bureau does not indicate that the FBI may  want to take follow-up action in these cases. For instance, the notice of visa  revocation does not explicitly state that the reason for revocation is  terrorism-related.
State and INS had written policies that covered some aspects of visa  revocations. State’s policies and procedures, contained in the Foreign  Affairs Manual, specify when and for what reason a consular officer may  or may not revoke a visa, including for terrorism-related reasons. The  manual instructs consular officers to obtain a security advisory opinion  from the department before determining that a visa holder is ineligible for a  visa on terrorism grounds. In practice, according to State officials, this  means that department officials at headquarters acting under the authority  of the Secretary of Statenot the consular officers at overseas  postsrevoke visas on the basis of terrorism concerns. State Department  officials told us that they follow specific, but unwritten, operating  procedures when the department revokes visas, as described in more detail  later in this report. INS has some general policies related to the posting of  lookouts for inadmissible aliens and for the revocation of visas by  immigration officers at ports of entry.  However, these policies do not call  for specific actions by appropriate INS personnel with regard to visas  revoked by the State Department.
section_title: How the Visa Revocation Process Should Work
paragraphs: Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, State has constantly  received new information on suspected terrorists from the intelligence  community, law enforcement agencies, and overseas posts. In some cases,  State received this information after it had already issued visas to the  individuals in question; the department would then revoke these visas.   Under the INA, the Secretary of State has discretionary authority to revoke  any visa that a consular officer has issued, including cases in which the  Secretary believes that the visa holder may be ineligible for a visa under the  INA’s terrorism provision. According to State Department officials and  documents, State revoked visas held by 240 individuals from September 11,  2001, through December 31, 2002, on terrorism grounds. All of these visas  were revoked as a prudent measure under the Secretary of State’s  discretionary authority because, as discussed earlier, State believed more  research on the individuals was necessary before they should be allowed to  enter the United States. Appendix III provides more information on these  visas and the persons who held them.
Figure 2 shows how information should flow if State were to notify the  appropriate homeland security agencies, that is, those agencies charged  with controlling entry into the United States and investigating potentially  dangerous terrorists, that the individual with the revoked visa may attempt  to enter, or may have already entered, the United States. The diagram is  based on what officials from State, Homeland Security, and the FBI  described as the way the process should work, if all of the agencies  involved were fulfilling their roles.
As the diagram in figure 2 illustrates, State should notify its consular  officers at overseas posts, the Department of Homeland Security, and the  FBI at the time of visa revocation. State should notify its consular officers  so that they would ask for a security advisory opinion before issuing a new  visa to the person whose visa had been revoked. In addition, State would  have to provide notice of the revocation, along with supporting evidence, to  Homeland Security and the FBI. This would allow Homeland Security to  notify its inspectors at ports of entry so that they could prevent the  individuals from entering the United States. It also would allow Homeland  Security and the FBI to determine whether the person had already entered  the country and, if so, to investigate, locate, and take appropriate action in  each case. Depending on the results of the investigations, appropriate  actions could include clearing persons who were wrongly suspected of  terrorism, removing suspected terrorists from the country, or prosecuting  suspected terrorists on criminal charges.
section_title: Weaknesses Existed in the Visa Revocation Process
paragraphs: We identified systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process, many of  which resulted from the informal policies and procedures governing  actions that State, INS, and the FBI take during the process. In our review  of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (a) notification of revocations  did not always reach the appropriate unit within INS and the FBI; (b) State  did not consistently post lookouts on the individuals; (c) 30 individuals  whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States  either before or after the revocation and may still remain in the country;  and (d) INS and the FBI were not consistently taking action to investigate;  locate; or, where appropriate, clear, prosecute, or remove any of the people  who had entered the country before or after their visas were revoked.
subsections: section_title: Inconsistencies in Notification Procedures
paragraphs: There were weaknesses at several junctures of the notification process that  caused information on many visa revocations not to be shared among units  that needed the information at State, INS, and the FBI. Some of these  weaknesses were due to a breakdown in the notification process from  State to INS and the FBI, and some were due to problems in the  distribution of notifications within these agencies to the appropriate unit.
For 43 of the 240 revocations we reviewed, INS Lookout Unit officials said  that they did not receive any notification. In cases where they did receive  notification, some of them were not received at the Lookout Unit in a  timely manner because of slow intraagency distribution of the  notifications. FBI officials said that the agency’s main communications  center received the notifications, but the officials could not confirm if the  notifications were then distributed internally to the appropriate  investigative units at the FBI (see fig. 3).
State Department officials from the Visa Office described the procedures  they use to notify INS, the FBI, and State’s overseas posts of visas that are  revoked by the department in Washington. According to State officials,  once the Deputy Assistant Secretary signs a revocation certificate, the  department is supposed to take the following actions, as soon as possible  after the visa is revoked: (1) notify the INS Lookout Unit via a faxed copy of  the revocation certificate so that the unit can enter the individual into the  National Automated Immigration Lookout System, which is uploaded into  IBIS; (2) notify consular officers at all overseas post that the individual may  be a suspected terrorist by entering a lookout on the person into State’s  watch list, CLASS; and (3) notify the issuing post via cable so that the post  can attempt to contact the individual to physically cancel his visa.  Information-only copies of these cables, which do not explicitly state that  the reason for the revocation is terrorism-related, are also sent to INS’s and  FBI’s main communications centers. State officials told us they rely on INS  and FBI internal distribution mechanisms to ensure that these cables are  routed to the appropriate units within the agencies. According to these  officials, they considered faxing the revocation certificate to be the primary  notification method for the INS Lookout Unit, but the cable was an  additional backup method. The cables were the only notification method  used to inform the FBI of the revocation.
The State Visa Office did not keep a central log of visas it revoked on the  basis of terrorism concerns, nor did it monitor whether notifications were  sent to other agencies. When we asked for a list of all revoked visas  between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2002, Visa Office officials  had to search through the office’s cable database to create such a list. State  Department officials said they did not have fax transmission receipts to  confirm that they sent revocation certificates for each of the 240 cases we  reviewed.  They were able to provide us with 238 revocation cables, almost  all of which addressed informational copies to INS and the FBI. In  commenting on a draft of our report, State said that the Visa Office now  keeps a log of revocation cases and maintains all signed certificates in a  central file.
subsections: section_title: INS Lookout Unit Said It Did Not Consistently Receive Notification
paragraphs: Officials from the INS Lookout Unit provided us with documentation  indicating that they received notification from the State Department in 197  of the 240 cases but did not receive notification in the other 43 cases (see  fig. 4).
Cases in which the Lookout Unit received notification  via faxed revocation certificate  via revocation cable only  Cases in which the Lookout Unit did not receive notification  Lookout Unit officials had documentation to show that 150 faxed  revocation certificates were received in the unit. These faxed certificates  reached the unit, on average, within 1 to 2 days of State enacting the  revocation. For 90 cases, however, the documentation provided to us did  not indicate that the Lookout Unit had received a fax. This was mitigated in  47 of these cases by the receipt of a revocation cable, although this backup  method of notification was less timely than the fax. In cases where the  cable was the only notification received at the Lookout Unit, it took, on  average, 12 days for the Lookout Unit to receive the cable, although in 1  case it took 29 days.  According to an official from the INS communications  center, because the cables were marked “information only,” they were  routed through the Inspections Division first, which then was supposed to  forward them to the Lookout Unit. He told us that if the cables had been  marked as “action” or “urgent,” they would have been sent immediately to  the Lookout Unit. See appendix IV for an example of a revocation cable.
The Assistant Chief Inspector at the Lookout Unit stressed the importance  of timeliness in receiving notification, noting that delays of even a few days  could increase the possibility that an individual with a revoked visa would  travel to the United States before INS inspectors were aware of the  revocation.
section_title: The FBI Received Revocation Cables but May Not Have Distributed Them Internally to the Appropriate Investigative Units
paragraphs: The State Department generally included the FBI as an addressee on the  visa revocation cables. FBI officials with whom we spoke were able to  verify that State’s revocation cables were received electronically in the  FBI communications center, but they were not able to tell us whether this  information was distributed to appropriate coordinating and investigative  units. An FBI official said that after the cables arrived in the  communications center, they became part of the FBI’s Automated Case  Support database and a hard copy of the cable was sent to analysts in  relevant country desk units. The Assistant Director for the Office of  Intelligence told us that for the FBI to take action on the cables, they would  have to be directed to the bureau’s Counterterrorism Division. FBI officials  could not provide evidence that the revocation information reached the  Counterterrorism Division.  Again, the cables did not specify that the  reason for the revocation was related to terrorism.  The cables were  described by State as information only and did not request or specify any  action from the FBI.
section_title: Weaknesses Existed in Visa Revocation Watch List Procedures
paragraphs: In our review of 240 revocations, we identified weaknesses in the steps that  State, INS, and the FBI took to place these individuals on watch lists as a  result of the revocation. The State Department did not consistently post  lookouts on individuals in CLASS after revoking their visas. Moreover,  State had not started to use a new revocation code created in August 2002  that was designed to allow revocation lookouts to be shared between  State’s and INS’s watch lists. The INS Lookout Unit consistently posted  lookouts on its watch list but was only able to do so in cases where it  received notification of the revocation. Some of the lookouts posted by the  Lookout Unit did not contain accurate information due to misinterpretation  of State’s revocation certificates.
As of mid-May 2003, FBI officials could not determine which FBI unit, if  any, added lookouts to their watch lists on individuals with revoked visas  as a result of receiving the revocation notification from State.
subsections: section_title: State Did Not Consistently Post Lookouts on Individuals with Revoked Visas
paragraphs: We reviewed CLASS records on all 240 individuals whose visas were  revoked and found that the State Department did not post lookouts within  a 2-week period of the revocation on 64 of these individuals. Many of the 64  individuals had other lookouts posted on them on earlier or later dates, but  the department had not followed its informal policy of entering a lookout at  the time of the revocation. State officials said that they post lookouts on  individuals with revoked visas in CLASS so that, if the individual attempts  to get a new visa, consular officers at overseas posts will know that they  must request a security advisory opinion on the individual before issuing a  visa. Without a lookout, it is possible that a new visa could be issued  without additional security screening.
According to State Department officials, State and INS agreed to create a  specific code for visa revocation lookouts, the VRVK code, which would be  picked up automatically by INS’s system, IBIS, in its real-time interface  with CLASS. This new code would allow INS inspectors at ports of entry  to see revocation lookouts that State had posted. According to Department  of Homeland Security officials, this code should be State’s primary method  of notifying immigration inspectors at ports of entry that an individual’s  visa had been revoked, rather than the faxed revocation certificate.  State  said that this code was required for all revocation lookouts as of August 15,  2002, yet in our review of CLASS records for the 240 visa revocations, we  saw no evidence that the department was using the VRVK code. The  department did not enter a lookout using the VRVK code for any of the 27  visas it revoked between August 15, 2002, and December 31, 2002.
section_title: INS Consistently Posted Lookouts but Misread Some Information on Revocation Certificates
paragraphs: When the INS Lookout Unit received notification from State, it consistently  posted lookouts in IBIS to indicate that State had revoked the visa. The  Lookout Unit had a policy to post lookouts in IBIS the same day that it  received the notification. In the 43 cases for which Lookout Unit officials  said they did not receive notification, they did not post a revocation  lookout in IBIS because the lookout unit did not have an independent basis  for posting a revocation absent a notification from State.
In 21 of the 240 cases, Lookout Unit officials misread information on State’s  revocation certificate and, as a result, entered incorrect information in IBIS  on individuals who were born in one country but hold citizenship in  another. In 16 of these cases, the revocation certificates clearly listed the  individual’s date and place of birth or nationality, but the lookout unit  entered place of birth or other erroneous information into IBIS’s nationality  field. In the remaining 5 cases where the individuals’ place of birth data  were entered into the nationality field, the revocation certificate did not  clearly state that the country listed was the individuals’ place of birth. A  Lookout Unit official confirmed that this error in the lookout could hinder  an inspector at the port of entry from detecting the person since the  individual’s passport would indicate a nationality different from his place of  birth. Lookout Unit officials said it would be helpful if the State  Department included more information on the revocation certificates,  including country of citizenship, passport numbers, visa foil numbers, and  intended itineraries and addresses in the United States if they were listed in  the visa application. See appendix V for a sample revocation certificate. In  commenting on a draft of this report, State said that additional information  is available to Homeland Security officers at ports of entry through State’s  shared Consular Consolidated Database.
section_title: The FBI Did Not Know If Lookouts Were Posted on Individuals with Revoked Visas
paragraphs: FBI officials could not determine which unit, if any, received the revocation  cables or whether any unit posted lookouts on these individuals as a result  of receiving notification of the revocation from State.  In technical  comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Justice said that the  FBI maintains only one watch list, the Violent Gang and Terrorist  Organization File (VGTOF) that is accessed by local and state law  enforcement officials via the National Crime Information Center.  To add a  person to that list, according to the comments, the following information  must be provided to the FBI:  the person’s full name, complete date of birth,  physical descriptors, at least one numeric identifier, a contact person with  a telephone number, and VGTOF-specific classification information.
section_title: Many Individuals with Revoked Visas Entered the United States before or after Revocation; Some Still Remain
paragraphs: In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found that 30 individuals  whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States  either before or after the revocation and may still remain in the country.  Our analysis of INS arrival and departure information shows that many  individuals had traveled to the United States before their visas were  revoked and had remained after the revocation. Several have subsequently  departed the country, but we determined that 29 of the individuals who  entered before the revocation may still remain in the country.
INS data also show that INS inspectors admitted at least 4 people after their  visas were revoked; 3 of these individuals have since departed but 1 may  still remain in the country. In 1 of these 4 cases, the INS Lookout Unit did  not receive any revocation notice from State; thus, it did not post a lookout  in IBIS that could have alerted an inspector at a port of entry to deny  admission to the individual. In another case, the unit received a notification  cable 4 days after State had signed the revocation certificate, but the  individual had already entered the country 2 days earlier. In the third case,  the unit had posted a lookout the day after the revocation but had  incorrectly entered the individual’s place of birth, which differed from his  nationality, in the nationality field. In the last case, INS had received a  notification from State and had posted lookouts on the INS watch list right  after the revocation, but an INS inspector allowed the individual to enter  the United States 1 month later. INS officials could not explain how an  inspector could miss the lookout and allow this person into the country.
Despite these problems, we noted cases where the visa revocation process  prevented possible terrorists from entering the country or cleared  individuals whose visas had been revoked. For example, INS inspectors  successfully prevented at least 14 of the 240 individuals from entering the  country because the INS watch list included information on the revocation  action or had other lookouts on them. In addition, State records showed  that a small number of people reapplied for a new visa after the revocation.  State used the visa issuance process to fully screen these individuals and  determined that they did not pose a security threat. In one case, for  example, the post took a set of fingerprints from an individual whose name  matched a record in an FBI database. The individual’s fingerprints did not  match those of the individual in the database, so he was cleared and issued  a new visa.
section_title: INS and the FBI Did Not Routinely Take Action on Individuals with Revoked Visas Who Had Entered the United States
paragraphs: The appropriate units in INS and the FBI did not routinely investigate,  locate, or take any action on individuals who might have remained in the  United States after their visas were revoked. INS and FBI officials cited a  variety of legal and procedural challenges to their taking action in these  cases.
subsections: section_title: INS Did Not Routinely Attempt to Locate Individuals with Revoked Visas
paragraphs: In cases where they received the revocation notification from State, INS  Lookout Unit officials said that they did not routinely check to see whether  these individuals had already entered the United States, nor did they pass  information on visa revocations to investigators in the National Security  Unit.The National Security Unit, unlike the Lookout Unit, did not receive  copies of the faxed revocation certificates or cables from the State  Department.  Investigators in this unit said that the Lookout Unit  occasionally notified them about a revocation for an individual with a hit in  TIPOFF, State’s interagency terrorist watch list, but that they were not  typically notified of other visa revocations.
National Security Unit investigators said that they generally did not  investigate or locate individuals whose visas were revoked for terrorism  concerns but who may still be in the United States. These investigators said  that even if they were to receive a revocation notice, the revocation itself  does not make it illegal for individuals with revoked visas to remain in the  United States. They said they could investigate the individuals to determine  if they were violating the terms of their admission, for example, by  overstaying the amount of time they were granted to remain in the United  States, but the investigators believed that under the INA, the visa  revocation itself does not affect the alien’s legal status in the United States.
This issue of whether a visa revocation, after an alien is admitted on that  visa, has the effect of rendering the individual out-of-status is unresolved  legally, according to officials in the Department of Homeland Security’s  Office of the Principal Legal Advisor to the Bureau of Immigration and  Customs Enforcement and Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration  Services. These officials said that the language that the State Department  has been using on visa revocation certificates effectively forecloses the  U.S. government from litigating the issue. The revocation certificates state  that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date the  certificate is signed unless the alien is present in the United States at that  time, in which case it will become effective immediately upon the alien’s  departure from the United States (see app. V). Homeland Security officials  said that if State were to cease using the current language on the revocation  certificates, the government would no longer be effectively barred from  litigating the issue and, if a policy decision were made to pursue an  aggressive litigation strategy, could seek to remove aliens who have been  admitted but have subsequently had their visas revoked.
Attempting to remove these aliens on the underlying reason for the  revocation may not be possible for various reasons, according to INS  officials. First, INS officials stated that the State Department provides very  little information or evidence relating to the terrorist activities when it  sends the revocation notice to INS. Without sufficient evidence linking the  alien to any terrorist-related activities, INS cannot institute removal  proceedings on the basis of that charge. Second, even if there is evidence,  INS officials said, sometimes the agency that is the source of the  information will not authorize the release of that information because it  could jeopardize ongoing investigations or reveal sources and methods.  Third, INS officials state that sometimes the evidence that is used to  support a discretionary revocation from the Secretary of State is not  sufficient to support a charge of removing an alien in immigration  proceedings before an immigration judge. (See app. II.) In commenting on   a draft of our report, State said that most of the time, the information on  which these revocations is based is classified. If an interested agency seeks  to review the information for immigration purposes, it is available from  State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research or the source agency.
National Security Unit investigators told us that, because of congressional  interest, they had investigated and attempted to locate 7 individuals whose  visas were revoked as a result of delayed security checks and who had  entered the country. They found that 4 of the 7 individuals were in the  United States and in compliance with the terms of their admission. One  individual had departed to Canada; the remaining 2 individuals were not  located.
section_title: The FBI Did Not Routinely Investigate Individuals with Revoked Visas
paragraphs: Although the FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force followed up on  many cases in response to congressional interest, FBI officials told us that  the bureau was not routinely opening investigations as the result of visa  revocations on terrorism grounds. They said that State’s method of  notifying the FBI did not clearly indicate that visas had been revoked  because the visa holder was a possible terrorist. Further, the cables were  sent as “information only” and did not request specific follow-up action  from the FBI. State did not attempt to make other contact with the FBI that  would indicate any urgency in the matter. Moreover, the Department of  Homeland Security has not yet requested that the FBI take any action with  regards to visa revocations on terrorism grounds.
In response to congressional interest, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task  Force in late 2002 and early 2003 followed up on the 105 cases of visas that  were revoked as a result of the Visas Condor name check procedures. In  February 2003, we asked the task force for information on these 105 cases.  The task force provided us with some information in a written response on  May 21, 2003. We did not have time to fully evaluate the response before  publication of this report because of the nature and volume of additional  information needed to do so.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The visa process can be an important tool to keep potential terrorists from  entering the United States. Ideally, information on suspected terrorists  would reach the State Department before it decides to issue a visa.   However, there will always be some cases when the information arrives too  late and State has already issued a visa. Revoking a visa can mitigate this  problem, but only if State promptly notifies the appropriate border control  and law enforcement agencies and if these agencies act quickly to (1) notify  border patrol agents and immigration inspectors to deny entry to persons  with a revoked visa and (2) investigate persons with revoked visas who  have entered the country. Currently there are major gaps in the notification  and investigation processes. One reason for this is that there are no  comprehensive written policies and procedures on how notification of a  visa revocation should take place and what agencies should do when they  are notified. As a result, there is heightened risk that suspected terrorists  could enter the country with revoked visas or be allowed to remain after  their visas are revoked without undergoing investigation or monitoring.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with  the Secretary of State and the Attorney General:  develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa  revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for  suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information is transmitted  from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and their  respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely manner;   develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law  enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals  whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain  in the United States after revocation; and   determine if persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in the  United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland  Security, State, and Justice for their comment.
The Department of Homeland Security agreed that the visa revocation  process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool. It indicated that it  looked forward to working with State and Justice to develop and revise  current policies and procedures that affect the interagency visa revocation  process.  Their written comments are in appendix VI.  In addition,  Homeland Security provided technical comments which we have  incorporated in the report where appropriate.
The Department of State did not comment on our recommendations.  Instead, State said that the persons who hold visas that the department  revoked on terrorism grounds were not necessarily terrorists or suspected  terrorists.  State noted that it had revoked the visas because some  information had surfaced that may disqualify the individual from a visa or  from admission to the United States, or that in any event warrants  reconsideration of the individual’s visa status.  State cited the uncertain  nature of the information it receives from the intelligence and law  enforcement communities on which it must base its decision to revoke an  individual’s visa.  State said that it revoked these visas as a precautionary  measure to preclude a person from gaining admission to this country until  his or her entitlement to a visa can be reestablished.
Our report recognizes that the visas were revoked as a precautionary  measure and that the persons whose visas were revoked may not be  terrorists. Although we have not reviewed the intelligence or law  enforcement data provided to State or reviewed by various agencies as part  of the security check process, there was enough concern that these 240  persons could pose a terrorism threat to cause State to revoke their visas.  Our recommendations are designed to ensure that persons whose visas  have been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be denied entry  to the United States and those who may already be in the United States be  investigated to determine if they pose a security threat. State’s comments  are reprinted in appendix VII. The State Department also provided  technical comments that we have incorporated in the report where  appropriate.
The Department of Justice did not provide official comments on the report.  However, it did make technical comments that we incorporated in the  report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of  Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. We will make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this report were John Brummet, Judy  McCloskey, Kate Brentzel, Mary Moutsos, and Janey Cohen.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The scope of our work covered the interagency process in place for visas  revoked by the Department of State headquarters and overseas consular  officers on the basis of terrorism concerns between September 11, 2001,  and December 31, 2002. To assess the policies and procedures governing  the visa revocation process, we interviewed officials from State, the  Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) and reviewed relevant documents.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the actual visa revocation process, we  relied on data provided by State’s Visa Office to determine the total number  of visa revocations from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2002.  Visa Office officials provided us with the names of 240 individuals whose  visas were revoked during that time. These officials were able to provide  documentation on the revocation for 238 of the 240 individuals. They gave  us database sheets from the Consular Consolidated Database, which  provided us with the individuals’ names, biographic data such as dates and  places of birth, passport numbers, and visa information such as issuing  posts and types of visa. In 5 cases, the database sheets did not indicate that  the person held a valid visa at the time of revocation. We kept these cases  in our scope because State provided us with revocation cables for these  individuals, indicating that it had revoked at least one visa for them.  State’s  Visa Office also provided us with 238 revocation cables. We also compared  information in the revocation cable with information contained in  revocation certificates.
To determine if, and when, State notified INS of the revocations, we asked  the Visa Office to provide us with documentation to show that either the  visa revocation was faxed to the INS Lookout Unit or that the revocation  cables were sent to INS. State did not have documentation that it had faxed  any of the certificates. Through examining the cables, we determined  which ones were addressed to INS and when they were sent. To determine  if, and when, INS received these notifications, we asked the INS Lookout  Unit for copies of the revocation certificates and cables it received for each  of the 240 cases. In cases where the Lookout Unit had received a faxed  copy of the revocation certificate, we collected copies of the certificates  and examined the time/date stamp on these documents to determine when  State faxed it to INS. In cases where the Lookout Unit had received a copy  of the revocation cable, we collected copies of these cables and examined  handwritten notations on the cables that reflected when they were received  at the unit.
To determine if, and when, State notified the FBI of the revocations, we  examined copies of the revocation cables we received from State to  determine (1) if the FBI was included as an addressee on the cable and (2)  the date that the cable was sent. To determine whether the FBI had  received these cables, we interviewed FBI officials from the Office of  Intelligence, the National Namecheck Program, and the Counterterrorism  Division.
We obtained information from State, INS, and the FBI to determine if, and  when, they posted lookouts on the individuals with revoked visas on their  agencies’ terrorist watch lists. We asked State to provide us with the  lookouts they posted for each individual in the Consular Lookout and  Support System (CLASS). A CLASS operator entered the individual’s name,  date and place of birth, and nationality in the same way that these data  were listed on the revocation cable or certificate and gave us the printouts  reflecting all of the CLASS records for that entry. We examined the records  to ascertain whether, and when, the department entered the individual into  CLASS and what refusal code was used.
To determine what steps INS took to post lookouts on the individuals with  revocations, we provided the Lookout Unit with the list of 240 individuals  and requested copies of the revocation lookouts from the Interagency  Border Inspection System (IBIS). We examined these records to assess  whether, and when, the INS Lookout Unit posted a lookout on the  individuals.
To assess the FBI’s action to post lookouts on these individuals, we  interviewed officials from the Office of Intelligence to determine whether  any units posted lookouts as a result of receiving notification of the  revocations.
To assess INS’s and the FBI’s actions to investigate; locate; and, where  appropriate, clear, remove, or prosecute the individuals who may have  entered the United States, we first reviewed INS entry/exit data to  determine how many individuals entered the country, either before or after  revocation, and how many may still remain in the country. The INS Lookout  Unit provided us with all records available from the Nonimmigrant  Information System (NIIS) on each of the 240 individuals. This system  records arrivals of foreign citizens through the collection of an I-94 form.  Some aliens are required to fill out and turn in these forms to inspectors at  air and sea ports of entries, as well as at land borders. Canadians and U.S.  permanent residents are not required to fill out I-94 forms when they enter  the United States. Aliens keep one section of the I-94 with them during their  stay in the United States and are required to turn this in when they depart  the country. If aliens fail to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94s when  they depart, NIIS will not have departure information for them. Where  available, we supplemented NIIS data with information regarding certain  cases from INS’s National Security Unit and from the State Department’s  CLASS records. We received additional arrival data on the individuals in  late May 2003 but have not been able to fully evaluate them for this report.  We also interviewed INS and FBI officials to discuss what actions they had  taken to investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear, remove, or  prosecute those individuals who may remain in the United States.
We attempted to review the evidence on which State based the revocations  for a subset of the 240 visa revocations. We could not do so, however,  because the sources of the information—the Central Intelligence Agency  and the FBI—did not grant us access to this information.
We conducted our work from December 2002 through May 2003, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Legal Process for Visa Revocations
subsections: section_title: Authority to Revoke Visas
paragraphs: The legal process for revocations can begin either with the Secretary of  State, the consular officer, or an immigration officer. Under the  Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of State has the  discretionary authority to revoke a visa previously issued to an alien. The  Secretary of State has delegated this discretionary authority to the Deputy  Assistant Secretary for Visa Services. According to State officials, the  department’s discretionary revocation authority is an important and useful  tool for State to use to send questionable aliens back to the consulates to  undergo more scrutiny as they reapply for new visas.
Consular officers may revoke a visa in instances prescribed by regulation  (22 CFR § 41.122). Such instances include if (1) the consular officer finds  that the alien is no longer entitled to nonimmigrant status specified in the  visa; (2) the alien has, since the time that the visa was issued, become  ineligible to receive a visa under the INA; or (3) the visa has been physically  removed from the passport in which it was issued.  Moreover, regulations  also allow immigration officers to revoke visas under certain  circumstances (22 CFR § 41.122). For example, an immigration officer at a  port of entry may revoke a visa if the officer notifies the alien that he or she  appears to be inadmissible to the United States and the alien requests and  is granted permission to withdraw the application for admission.
section_title: Timing and Effect of Visa Revocations
paragraphs: If an alien arrives at a port of entry in the United States and learns that his  visa has already been revoked, as was the case with some of the  revocations that we reviewed, then the alien is deemed inadmissible and  the INS agent can deny the alien admission into the United States. The  authority to refuse admission to such aliens is done under the expedited  removal process allowed under section 235 of the INA. Under section  212(a)(7)(B) of the INA, an alien is inadmissible if he does not have a valid  passport, nonimmigrant visa, or border crossing identification card at the  time of application for admission. Under the INA’s expedited removal  process, if an alien is inadmissible under section 212(a)(7), the inspection  officer may order the alien removed from the United States, without further  hearing or review, unless the alien can demonstrate a credible fear of  returning to his home country.
If, however, the alien is already in the country when his visa is revoked,  then INS is not authorized to simply send the alien home, as it could have  done had the alien arrived at the port of entry with the revoked visa.  Rather, if INS determines that the alien falls within the class of aliens who  are removable on the grounds specified in the INA, INS may institute  removal proceedings against the alien. Such proceedings could be based  either on an immigration violation after admission or on the evidence  relating to the reason for the visa revocation, such as terrorist-related  activities. However, INS officials said that in many of these cases, INS does  not receive much evidence in support of the terrorist charge when they  receive a revocation from State. Without sufficient evidence, INS cannot  institute removal proceedings against these aliens.
Revocation of a visa is not a stated grounds for removal under the INA.  However, the issue of whether a visa revocation, after an alien is admitted  on that visa, has the effect of rendering the alien out-of-status is unresolved  legally, according to officials in the Department of Homeland Security’s  Office of the Principal Legal Advisor to the Bureau of Immigration and  Customs Enforcement and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration  Services. These officials said that the language that the State Department  has been using on visa revocation certificates effectively forecloses the  U.S. government from litigating the issue. The revocation certificates state  that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date the  certificate is signed. However, if the alien is present in the United States at  that time, it will become effective immediately upon the alien’s departure  from the United States. Homeland Security officials said that if State were  to cease using this language on the revocation certificates, the government  would no longer be effectively barred from litigating the issue, and, if a  policy decision were made to pursue an aggressive litigation strategy, the  government could seek to remove aliens who have been admitted but have  subsequently had their visas revoked.
section_title: The Legal Process for Removing an Alien Who Is Already in the Country
paragraphs: If INS does receive sufficient evidence to support a removal charge against  an alien and chooses to initiate removal proceedings, then the alien is  afforded certain due process rights under the INA. For example, section  240 of the INA states that an immigration judge shall conduct proceedings  to determine if an alien is removable. During such proceedings, the alien is  afforded rights that include being apprised of the charges against him and  the basis for them, having a reasonable opportunity to examine the  evidence against him, presenting evidence on his behalf, having the  opportunity to cross-examine witnesses presented by the government, and  filing administrative and judicial appeals. Moreover, during such removal  proceedings, once an alien establishes that he was admitted to the United  States as a nonimmigrant, the government has the burden of proof to  establish by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is removable.
Initiating such proceedings against an alien whose visa has been revoked  on the basis of terrorist-related activities can be challenging, according to  INS attorneys. At some point in the proceedings, either in establishing that  the alien is removable or at the time the alien requests to be released on  bond, the government could be called on to disclose any classified or law  enforcement sensitive information that serves as the basis of the charges  against the alien. According to INS attorneys, this can be challenging since  many times the law enforcement or intelligence agencies that are the  source of the information may not authorize the release of that information  because it could jeopardize ongoing investigations or reveal sources and  methods.
In addition to the general removal proceedings, the INA also contains  special removal proceedings for alien terrorists. These proceedings are  reserved for alien terrorists as described in section 237 (a)(4)(B) of the INA  and take place before a special removal court comprised of federal court  judges. Such proceedings are triggered when the Attorney General certifies  to the removal court that the alien is a terrorist, that he is physically  present in the United States, and that using the normal removal procedures  of the INA would pose a risk to the national security of the United States. If  the court agrees to invoke the special removal procedures, then a hearing is  held before the removal court. Special provisions are made for the use of  classified information in such proceedings to minimize the risk of its  disclosure. However, similar to the removal proceedings under section 240,  the alien has the right to appeal a decision by the removal court. According  to INS officials, this court has never been used since its inception in 1996.
section_title: Detailed Information on Revoked Visas
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on nonimmigrant visas that the State  Department revoked on terrorism grounds from September 11, 2001,  through December 31, 2002—specifically, the nationality of the individuals  whose visas were revoked and the types of visas that were revoked.
As shown in table 1, the individuals holding visas that the State Department  revoked on terrorism grounds came from at least 39 countries. Five  countries—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and Lebanon—accounted  for 53 percent of these individuals. Overall, most of the 240 people were  citizens of countries in the Near East and North Africa region. (Continued From Previous Page)
Table 2 provides information on the types of visas that the State  Department revoked on terrorism grounds. About 70 percent of the visas  were for temporary visits for business, pleasure, or both. Seven of these  visas were in the form of border crossing cards for Canada and Mexico.
section_title: Example of a Revocation Cable the Department of State Sent to the INS and the FBI
section_title: Sample of a Revocation Certificate the Department of State Sent to the Immigration and Naturalization Service Lookout Unit
section_title: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State’s letter  dated June 10, 2003. 1. The scope of our review covered all visas revoked on terrorism concerns  by the State Department, including headquarters officials and State’s  overseas consular officers, from September 11, 2001, through December 31,  2002. State Department officials determined that the total universe of such  revocations consisted of 240 cases during that period and provided  documentation for almost all of them. Headquarters officials, acting under  the authority of the Secretary of State, revoked the visas in all of the cases.  As noted in State’s comments, in none of the cases did State believe that it  had sufficient evidence to support a formal finding of inadmissibility; thus,  all of the revocations were done as a precautionary measure. 2. Pages 10 and 11 of our report include information on this matter. 3. We agree that these individuals may not be terrorists. However, the State  Department has revoked their visas because of terrorism concerns. Our  recommendations are designed to ensure that persons whose visas have  been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be denied entry to  the United States and those that may already be in the United States be  investigated to determine if they pose a security threat. 4. The Departments of State and Homeland Security have different views  on this issue. Homeland Security believes that the language that the State  Department has been using on visa revocation certificates effectively  forecloses the U.S. government from litigating the issue of whether a visa  revocation has the effect of rendering the individual as out-of-status (see p.  25 of our report). Our recommendations, if implemented, would help  resolve these conflicting views.
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