Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces
Published: 2003-08-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: On September 14, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that a national emergency existed by reason of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Under section 12302 of title 10, United States Code, the President is allowed to call up to 1 million National Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. GAO was asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following September 11, 2001. GAO examined (1) whether the Department of Defense (DOD) followed existing operation plans when mobilizing forces, (2) the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over the mobilization process, and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. GAO also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces, which make up over 98 percent of nonretired reservists, were available.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel have been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on the front lines in Iraq; tracked terrorists throughout Asia and Africa; maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and participated in a wide range of domestic missions. However, DOD's process to mobilize reservists after September 11 had to be modified and contained numerous inefficiencies. Existing operation plans did not fully address the mobilization requirements needed to deal with the terrorist attacks or uncertain overseas requirements. For example, no previous requirements called for the extended use of National Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air patrols over the nation's capital and major cities. Because DOD could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its mobilizations, it used a modified process that relied on additional management oversight and multiple layers of coordination, which resulted in a process that was slower and less efficient than the traditional process. Under the modified process, the Secretary of Defense signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize over 280,000 reservists compared to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. DOD did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process primarily because it lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel and other resources. DOD's primary automated readiness reporting system could not adequately track the personnel and other resources within the small units that were frequently needed. Also, visibility was lost because some services' active and reserve systems for tracking personnel were incompatible, resulting in ad hoc coordination between active and reserve officials. Both groups often resorted to tracking mobilizations with computer spreadsheets. In addition, some reservists were deployed beyond dates specified in their orders or stayed on alert for more than a year and never mobilized because officials lost visibility. The services have used two primary approaches--predictable operating cycles and advance notification--to provide time for units and personnel to prepare for mobilizations. All the services provide predictability to portions of their forces through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air Force has a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active and reserve forces. The Army prioritizes its units, and lower-priority units generally need extra training and preparation time before deploying. Yet, since September 11, a number of lower-priority units have been mobilized with relatively little advance notice. Despite the large number of lower-priority units within the Army Guard and Reserve, the Army does not have a standard operating cycle to provide predictability to its reserves. Without such a concept, the Army's opportunities to provide extra training and preparation time to its reserve forces are limited. Mobilizations were hampered because one-quarter of the Ready Reserve was not readily available for mobilization. Over 70,000 reservists could not be mobilized because they had not completed their training requirements, and the services lacked information needed to fully use the 300,000 pretrained IRR members.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Mobilization is a complex process used to move the military from its  peacetime posture to a heightened state of readiness to support national  security objectives in time of war or other national emergency. It involves  the activation of all or some of the 1.2 million members of the National  Guard and Reserve components, as well as the assembling and organizing  of supplies and materiel. The process involves many different  organizations and, while reserve component officials have a role in the  process, civilian leaders and active military officials within the Department  of Defense (DOD) take the lead in the process. Active component officials  generate and validate mobilization requirements, and civilian leaders  approve requests to alert, mobilize, and deploy forces. In addition, when  reservists are mobilized they come under the operational control of the  active forces.
On September 14, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that a national  emergency existed by reason of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  His proclamation further stated that he intended to utilize section 12302 of  title 10, United States Code (commonly referred to as the partial  mobilization authority), which allows the President to call up to 1 million  National Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to   2 years.
We were asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists  following September 11, 2001. As agreed with your offices, our review was  focused on the efficiency of DOD’s process for mobilizing reservists from  among its authorized 1.2 million Ready Reserve members. Specifically, we  examined (1) whether DOD followed existing operation plans when  mobilizing reserve forces after September 11, 2001, (2) the extent to which  responsible officials had visibility over the entire mobilization process,  and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to  reservists who were subject to mobilizations and overseas deployments.  You also asked us to determine the extent to which the Ready Reserve  forces were available for mobilization.
To evaluate the efficiency of DOD’s mobilization process, we reviewed  mobilization statutes, regulations, instructions, and guidance. We analyzed  mobilization data obtained during meetings with military and civilian  officials from the offices of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, the services, the reserve component headquarters, and a  number of commands that used mobilized reservists. We also collected  and analyzed information on the roles and responsibilities of key  mobilization officials, the steps of the mobilization process, and the  methods and systems used to track mobilization requirements and  reservists who had been mobilized. To gain first-hand knowledge about  the effects of mobilizations on individual reservists, we interviewed both  unit and individual reservists at sites where they were deployed or  undergoing mobilization processing and training. We also observed DOD’s  2-1/2 day November 2002 symposium where senior military and civilian  officials came together and reviewed the mobilization process. A more  thorough description of our scope and methodology is provided in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and  equipment, activating or federalizing the reserve component, and bringing  the armed forces to a state of readiness for war or other national  emergency. It is a complex undertaking that requires constant and precise  coordination among a number of commands and officials. Mobilization  usually begins with the President invoking a mobilization authority and  ends with the mobilization of an individual Reserve or National Guard  member.
subsections: section_title: Reserve Components and Categories
paragraphs: There are seven reserve components: the Army Reserve, Army National  Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine  Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. Reserve forces can be divided  into three major categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and  the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve had approximately 1.2 million  Guard and Reserve members at the end of fiscal year 2002, and its  members were the only reservists who were subject to mobilization under  the partial mobilization declared by President Bush on September 14,  2001.
Within the Ready Reserve, there are three subcategories: the Selected  Reserve, the IRR, and the Inactive National Guard. Members of all three  subcategories are subject to mobilization under a partial mobilization.
In fiscal year 2002, the Selected Reserve had 882,142 members. Members  of the Selected Reserve are all the personnel who are active members of  the National Guard or Reserve units who participate in regularly  scheduled training. As a result, they draw regular pay for their reserve  service. It also includes individual mobilization augmentees—individuals  who train regularly, for pay with active component units.  In fiscal year 2002, the IRR had 314,037 members. During a partial  mobilization these individuals, who were previously trained during periods  of active duty service, can be mobilized to fill requirements. Each year, the  services transfer thousands of personnel who have completed the active  duty or Selected Reserve portions of their military contracts, but who have  not reached the end of their minimum service obligations, to the IRR.
However, IRR members do not participate in any regularly scheduled  training, and they are not paid for their membership in the IRR.  In fiscal year 2002, the Inactive National Guard had 3,142 Army National  Guard members. This subcategory contains individuals who are  temporarily unable to participate in regular training but who wish to  remain attached to their National Guard units. These individuals were not  subject to mobilization prior to the declaration of a partial mobilization on  September 14, 2001.
section_title: Mobilization Authorities
paragraphs: Most reservists who were recalled to active duty for other than normal  training after September 11, 2001, were mobilized under one of the three  authorities listed in table 1.
DOD had the authority to use section 12304, the Presidential Reserve Call- Up authority, to mobilize reservists in support of contingency operations  in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia prior to September 11, 2001. It  continued to use this authority to mobilize reservists for ongoing  operations in these areas even after the partial mobilization authority  (section 12302) was invoked on September 14, 2001.
The partial mobilization authority has been used to support both domestic  and overseas missions related to the global war on terrorism, including the  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. After invoking section 12302 on  September 14, 2001, the President delegated his mobilization authority to  the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation. The  Secretary of Defense further delegated this authority to the service  secretaries and allowed them to delegate the authority to any civilian  official who was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  When the Secretary of Defense delegated his authority, he set limits on the  numbers of personnel that the services could mobilize. On September 14,  2001, the Secretary of Defense assigned the Army a mobilization cap of  10,000 personnel; the Navy a cap of 3,000; the Marine Corps a cap of 7,500;  and the Air Force a cap of 13,000, for a total cap of 33,500. The caps were  raised several times, but in aggregate they have remained below 300,000  since they were first established.
Since September 11, 2001, the services have also made extensive use of  their section 12301(d) authority. This authority can involve complicated  administrative processing because reservists must volunteer to be  activated, and individuals who are brought on to active duty under this  authority have varying starting and ending dates. However, this authority  provides flexibility that is advantageous to both individual reservists  members and the services. The reservists can schedule their active duty  periods around family and work responsibilities, and the services are not  constrained by the numerical caps and time limitations of other  mobilization authorities.
section_title: Mobilization Process
paragraphs: As figure 1 indicates, mobilization is a decentralized process that requires  the collaboration of many organizations throughout DOD.
The mobilization process typically begins with the component  commanders, who are responsible for commanding their services’ active  and reserve forces within a combatant commander’s area of  responsibility. The component commanders identify requirements for  wars or contingency operations within their areas of responsibility and  submit the requirements to the combatant commanders. The combatant  commanders, who have responsibility and operational control over forces  from two or more services, consolidate the requirements from their  component commanders and develop “requests for forces” (RFF). Each  RFF generally identifies the mission, along with the equipment, personnel,  units, types of units, or general capabilities that are necessary to carry out  the mission. RFFs may be very detailed or very general, depending on the  nature of the mission. Furthermore, RFFs typically contain requirements  that must be filled by more than one service.
The combatant commanders send RFFs to the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, who is the principal military advisor to the President and  the Secretary of Defense on mobilization matters. The Joint Staff validates  and prioritizes requirements from the combatant commanders and then  sends draft deployment orders via E-mail to the supporting commanders,  who will supply forces or equipment. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff considers (1) the assessments of the service headquarters, reserve  component commanders, and supporting combatant commanders;   (2) input from his own staff; and (3) the technical advice, legal opinions,  and policies provided by OSD. The Chairman then makes a  recommendation to the Secretary of Defense concerning the timing of  mobilizations and the units or individuals to be mobilized.
When the Secretary of Defense completes his review of the validated RFF  and is satisfied with the mobilization justification, he authorizes the  deployment of forces, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues  a deployment order. The services then review the approved requirements  on the deployment order and coordinate with applicable force providers  and reserve component headquarters to check the readiness of the units  that had been projected to fill the requirements. If necessary, units or  individuals may be identified to substitute for, or augment, the units and  individuals that were originally projected. When the units or individuals  are firmly identified for mobilization, the assistant secretaries of the  military departments who have responsibilities for manpower and reserve  affairs issues approve the mobilization packages.
Finally, the services issue mobilization orders to units and individuals.  These orders state where and when to report for duty, as well as the length  of duty. In September 2001, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  (Personnel and Readiness), which is responsible for developing the  policies, plans, and programs to manage the readiness of both active and  reserve forces, issued a memorandum containing specific mobilization  guidance. This guidance instructed the military departments to write  mobilization orders for 1 year but allowed the service secretaries the  option of extending mobilizations for a second year.
In subsequent mobilization guidance, issued in January, March, and July  2002, the Under Secretary instructed the services to use volunteers to the  maximum extent possible, so that involuntary mobilizations would be  minimized. In conjunction with the services, the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, which has overall responsibility  for reserve policies and procedures within DOD, set a goal to provide  reservists with 30 days notice prior to mobilization, when operationally  feasible. The services took different approaches when alerting their  reservists prior to mobilization. The Army took the most formal approach  and attempted to provide its reservists with official orders 30 days prior to  their mobilization dates. The other services took less formal approaches  and tried to notify reservists of impending mobilizations and deployments  when requirements were identified or validated, or at some other key  point in the mobilization process.
According to DOD officials, the mobilization process—from the time a  requirement is generated until the time that a reservist reports to a  mobilization site to fill that requirement—can take anywhere from 1 day to  several months, but it normally takes several weeks. Based on our  observations at mobilization processing sites and discussions with  mobilization officials, we found that most reservists were able to complete  their required briefings, screenings, and administrative functions within 24  to 96 hours after reaching their mobilization sites. However, some  reservists required lengthy postmobilization training before they were able  to deploy.
section_title: Reserve Tempo
paragraphs: Unreliable and inconsistent data make it difficult to quantify the exact  change in the tempo of reserve operations since September 11, 2001.  Officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve  Affairs have characterized mobilization data from the early days and  weeks following September 11 as questionable. In addition, because  reservists can perform a wide variety of sometimes-overlapping training  and operational missions, in a variety of voluntary or involuntary duty  statuses, mobilization data have been captured differently over time. For  example, because the state governors mobilized large numbers of National  Guard troops to provide security at their civilian airports, DOD’s  mobilization figures for most of 2002 included state active duty figures as  well as figures for federal mobilizations. However, state active duty was  dropped from DOD’s mobilization figures after the National Guard moved  out of the last civilian airport in September 2002. It is also difficult to fully  capture increases in reserve tempos because mobilization figures that are  based strictly on section 12302 partial mobilization orders ignore the  major contributions of reserve volunteers, some of whom are serving  lengthy tours under section 12301(d) orders. Despite the identified data  challenges, figure 2 uses consistently reported data to demonstrate that  reserve mobilizations have not dipped below 50,000 during any week since  January 2002. Figure 2 also shows the dramatic increase in mobilizations  that began in January 2003 to support operations in Iraq.
Figures 3 and 4 show the mobilizations of each of the services between  January 2002 and July 2003.
Figure 3 shows that between January 2003 and July 2003, the Army had  more reservists mobilized than did all the other services combined.  However, figure 4 shows that the mobilizations were most wide reaching  within the Coast Guard, which had more than one-third of its Ready  Reserve forces mobilized during April 2003.
section_title: Relevant GAO Products
paragraphs: Previously, we reported on several issues surrounding the increased use of  reserve forces. Our June 2002 report noted that maintaining employers’  continued support for their reservist employees will be critical if DOD is to  retain experienced reservists in these times of longer and more frequent  deployments. We assessed the relations between reservists and their  civilian employers, focusing specifically on DOD’s outreach efforts  designed to improve these important relationships. We found that many  employers we surveyed were not receiving adequate advance notice prior  to their reservist employees’ departure for military duty. We reported that  in spite of repeated memoranda from the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Reserve Affairs, advance notification continued to be a problem and  that the services had not consistently met the 30-day advance notification  goal. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to  determine how many orders are not being issued 30 days in advance of  deployments and why, and then take the necessary corrective actions  toward fuller compliance with the goal. DOD agreed with the merit to  studying why the reserve components miss the 30-day goal.
Citing the increased use of the reserves to support military operations,  House Report 107-436 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National  Defense Authorization Act directed us to review compensation and benefit  programs for reservists serving on active duty. In response, we are  reviewing (1) income protection for reservists called to active duty,   (2) family support programs, and (3) health care access. In March 2003, we  testified before the Subcommittee on Total Force, Committee on Armed  Services, House of Representatives, on our preliminary observations  related to this work.
During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, health problems prevented the  deployment of a significant number of Army reservists. To help correct  this problem the Congress passed legislation that required reservists to  undergo periodic physical and dental examinations. The National Defense  Authorization Act for 2002 directed us to review the value and advisability  of providing examinations. We also examined whether the Army is  collecting and maintaining information on reservists’ health. In April 2003,  we reported that without adequate examinations, the Army may train,  support, and mobilize reservists who are unfit for duty. Further, the Army  had not consistently carried out the statutory requirements for monitoring  the health and dental status of Army early deploying reservists. At the  early deploying units we visited, approximately 66 percent of the medical  records were available for review. We found that about 68 percent of the  required physical examinations for those over age 40 had not been  performed and that none of the annual medical certificates required of  reservists had been completed by reservists and reviewed by the units. We  recommended that the Secretary of Defense ensure that for early  deploying reservists the required physical examinations, annual medical  certificates, and annual dental examinations be completed. DOD  concurred with our recommendations.
section_title: DOD’s Mobilizations after September 11, 2001, Were Not Based on Existing Operation Plans
paragraphs: DOD did not follow its existing operation plans after the events of  September 11, 2001, to mobilize nearly 300,000 reservists. DOD’s  traditional mobilization process relies on requirements from operation  plans that have been coordinated with key mobilization officials prior to  the start of the mobilization process. The operation plans in existence on  September 11, 2001, did not include all the requirements that were needed  to respond to the domestic terrorist threat. Overseas operation plans did  not focus on terrorist threats or the uncertain political environment in  southwest Asia. Nor did operation plans adequately address the increasing  requirements for individuals and small, tailored task forces. Because DOD  could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its mobilizations, it  used a modified mobilization process that was slower than the traditional  mobilization process.
subsections: section_title: About 300,000 Reservists Called to Active Duty
paragraphs: DOD has called about 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and  Reserve personnel to active duty since September 2001. These reservists  fought on the front lines in Iraq; tracked down Taliban and al Qaeda  members throughout Asia and Africa; maintained the peace in the Balkans,  Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and participated in domestic missions ranging  from providing security at airports and at the Salt Lake City Olympics to  fighting drug trafficking and providing disaster relief. With many of these  missions—including those associated with the global war on terrorism— expected to continue, reserve force mobilizations are likely to persist for  the foreseeable future. DOD recognized before September 11, 2001, that no  significant operation could be conducted without reserve involvement.
subsections: section_title: Sound Operation Plans Can Help the Efficiency of DOD’s Mobilization Process
paragraphs: DOD’s mobilization process was designed to mobilize reservists based on  the execution of combatant commander operation plans and a preplanned  flow of forces. As a result, the mobilization process operates most  efficiently when operation plans accurately and completely capture  mobilization requirements. However, since DOD develops its operation  plans using a deliberate planning process that involves input and  coordination from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services, the process can  take years, and operation plans have not been quick to respond to changes  in the threat environment.
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, we issued a number of reports  highlighting the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat terrorism  domestically and abroad. For example, we recommended that the federal  government conduct multidisciplinary and analytically sound threat and  risk assessments to define and prioritize requirements and properly focus  programs and investments in combating terrorism. Threat and risk  assessments are decision-making support tools that are used to establish  requirements and prioritize program investments. DOD uses a variation of  this approach. We also reported on DOD’s use of a risk-assessment model  to evaluate force protection security requirements for mass casualty  terrorists’ incidents at DOD military bases.
While DOD’s goal is to conduct mobilizations based on operation plans  developed through a deliberate planning process, the department  recognizes that during the initial stages of an emergency it may have to  resort to a crisis action response rather than adhering to its operation  plans. This is particularly true if the emergency had not been anticipated.
During such crisis response periods, DOD can use a variety of authorities  to position its forces where they are needed. For example, following the  events of September 11, 2001, DOD used voluntary orders and other  available means to get and keep reservists on active duty. As of November  8, 2001, almost 40,000 reservists had been mobilized under the partial  mobilization authority for the global war on terrorism, but almost 19,000  reservists were on active duty and positioned where they were needed  under other federal authorities. By comparison, more than 53,000  reservists were mobilized under the partial mobilization authority for the  global war on terrorism on December 3, 2002, but the reservists on active  duty under other federal authorities had dropped to less than 5,000.
section_title: Operation Plans Did Not Include Requirements to Address the Domestic Terrorist Threat
paragraphs: When DOD moved beyond its crisis action response to the events of  September 11, 2001, it was not able to rely on operation plans to guide its  mobilizations because operation plans did not contain requirements to  address the domestic response to the terrorist threat. According to senior  DOD officials, when terrorists crashed planes into the Pentagon, the World  Trade Center, and a field in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, none of  DOD’s operation plans contained requirements for National Guard troops  to deploy to the nation’s civilian airports. In September 2001, we reported  that some threats are difficult, if not impossible, to predict. Therefore, an  effective antiterrorism program that can reduce vulnerabilities to such  attacks is an important aspect of military operations. We also reported that  the effectiveness of the DOD antiterrorism program was becoming an  important aspect of military operations. However, the effectiveness of the  program had been limited because DOD had not (1) assessed  vulnerabilities at all installations, (2) systematically prioritized resource  requirements, and (3) developed a complete assessment of potential  threats. DOD has been taking steps to improve the program.
Despite the lack of airport security requirements in operation plans,  between November 2001 and April 2002, an average of approximately  7,500 National Guard members were mobilized at the nation’s civilian  airports. During the same period, an average of almost 1,900 National  Guard members were on state active duty, many to provide security at  other key infrastructure sites such as tunnels, bridges, and nuclear power  plants. According to senior Air Force officials, none of the operation plans  that existed on September 11, 2001, contained requirements for the  extended use of Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air patrols  over the nation’s capital and major cities. Yet, reservists were performing  that mission on September 11, 2001, and they continue to support the  combat air patrol mission, particularly when the national threat level is  raised.
According to DOD officials, preexisting service mobilization plans called  for Guard and Reserve forces to move to active duty bases and provide  security at those bases after the active forces had departed from the bases.  However, after September 11, many Guard and Reserve members were on  active duty (voluntarily and involuntarily) at active and reserve bases and  were filling security requirements that were not in any operation plan. For  example, even while active forces remained, two selected Marine Corps  battalions were mobilized for approximately 12 months—one at Camp  Lejeune, North Carolina, and one at Camp Pendleton, California—to  quickly respond to any additional terrorist attacks within the United  States. In addition, the Air Force had to unexpectedly bring reservists on  active duty to provide security for their reserve bases after   September 11. In particular, Air National Guard security forces were  needed to provide security at bases from which the Guard was flying  combat air patrol missions.
section_title: Overseas Operation Plans Did Not Focus on the Terrorist Threat or the Uncertain Political Environment in Southwest Asia
paragraphs: According to DOD officials, requirements in overseas operation plans  focused on traditional operations against national military forces, rather  than on tracking terrorists throughout Afghanistan and around the globe.  For several years, defense planning guidance had been formulated around  the concept that the military had to be ready to fight and win two major  theater wars, generally viewed as one in southwest Asia and one on the  Korean peninsula. According to DOD officials, operation plans for these  areas focused on the threats posed by rogue countries. Moreover, even  after defense planning guidance had begun to indicate a need for the  military to be capability based rather than threat based, operation plans  continued to focus on conventional adversaries.
According to DOD officials, some of the mobilizations that took place in  support of Operation Iraqi Freedom followed the order and timing  established in the relevant operation plan and its associated time-phased  force deployment and data file. However, the order and timing of other  mobilizations changed due to the tenuous political environment and  uncertainties concerning coalition partnerships and access to airspaces, as  well as access to bases in Turkey, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Access-to-base  issues had also arisen during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
section_title: Operation Plans Did Not Adequately Address Increasing Requirements for Individuals and Small, Tailored Task Forces
paragraphs: According to DOD officials, the combatant commanders’ requests for  small, tailored task forces and individuals have been increasing since  September 11, 2001, but the requirements for these small groups and  individuals have not been fully addressed in the combatant commanders’  existing operation plans. Mobilization statistics demonstrate the large  numbers of small groups and individuals that have been mobilized  recently. For example, a DOD report showed that on March 5, 2003, the  services had thousands of reservists mobilized as parts of small units or as  individuals. The Navy had 266 one-person and 152 two-person units  mobilized, and the Army also had hundreds of one-and two-person units  mobilized. The Marine Corps strives to keeps its units intact, and Marine  Corps policy states that detachments must consist of at least two people,  but the Marine Corps had 24 two-person and 22 three-person units  mobilized. The Air Force had just 6 units with less than 20 people  mobilized on that date. However, the services also had 12,682 individual  augmentees mobilized on March 5, 2003—1,438 of them from the Air  Force’s two reserve components.
subsections: section_title: The Modified Mobilization Process Was Slower and Less Efficient Than the Traditional Process
paragraphs: After September 11, 2001, DOD used a modified mobilization process  because existing operation plans had not adequately addressed  mobilization requirements and changing priorities. The modified process  was able to respond to changing priorities and new requirements.  However, because key mobilization officials did not have a lengthy  deliberate planning period to discuss these new requirements and  changing priorities, coordination had to take place during the mobilization  process, thus lengthening the process. Under the modified process, close  to two dozen approvals are needed to mobilize one unit or individual. A  contractor study conducted for the Army Operations Office looked at how  long it took from the time the U.S. Central Command issued a RFF until  the time a deployment order was issued. Preliminary results showed that  the monthly averages from February through June 2002 ranged from 18 to  19 days for this portion of the mobilization process.
Coordination was much more difficult under the modified process due to  the large number of deployment orders. For example, under the modified  process, the Secretary of Defense signed 246 deployment orders to  mobilize over 280,000 reservists between September 11, 2001, and May 21,  2003, compared to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize  over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Gulf War. The longer modified  mobilization process is less efficient than the traditional process primarily  because it relies on additional management oversight and multiple layers  of coordination between the services, OSD, and the Joint Staff during the  validating, approving, and filling of mobilization requirements. Many of  these factors are detailed in the sections below.
section_title: DOD Officials Had Limited Visibility Over the Mobilization Process
paragraphs: DOD officials did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process  primarily because DOD lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel  and other resources. First, DOD’s primary automated readiness reporting  system could not adequately track the personnel and other resources  within the small units that were frequently needed by combatant  commanders. Second, some systems used by the active and reserve  components to track personnel were incompatible. In addition, outdated  mobilization guidance led to communication and coordination problems  amongst the components.
subsections: section_title: Data Systems Unable to Track Readiness of Resources Within Units
paragraphs: DOD officials had limited visibility over the readiness of the entire force  because DOD’s primary readiness reporting data system tracked the  readiness only of large units and not the readiness of resources within the  small units that made up the larger reporting units. These smaller units  were often sufficient to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements  for the small, tailored units that were frequently requested after   September 11, 2001.  Because DOD officials did not have quick access to  readiness information of these small units, they had to coordinate with  reserve headquarters officials and, in some cases, the individual units  themselves to obtain the readiness information needed to determine which  unit would be best able to fill the combatant commanders’ requirements.
The Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) is DOD’s  single automated system for reporting the readiness of all operational  units within the U.S. armed forces. It does not function as a detailed  management information system, but it does provide broad information on  selected readiness indicators and include a commander’s assessment of  the unit’s ability to undertake the missions for which the unit was  organized or designed. Units provide readiness reports to a central site  where the data are processed and stored and then distributed to decision  makers. The information in the system is supposed to support crisis  response planning as well as deliberate planning. However, the services  are only required to register forces that are included in operation plans or  other war-planning documents. Generally, all large units report their  readiness in the system. However, resources within the units are not  necessarily reported. For example, GSORTS could show that a specific  unit is not ready to perform its mission, but fail to capture information that  would indicate that some of the personnel and equipment within the unit  are capable of performing their mission. Such information would benefit  the services in their efforts to assemble the forces needed to meet joint  organizational requirements.
Because the Air Force combined various capabilities into nontraditional  force groups in support of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force, it  recognized the need to report readiness for small “building block” units  that could be combined to provide the needed capabilities. As a result, the  Air Force developed its own readiness reporting system that reported the  readiness of more than 67,000 units in January 2003.
The Army and the Navy do not report readiness at this small unit level.  Consequently, when the combatant commanders submit RFFs that do not  coincide with the forces that are reported in GSORTS, the decision makers  within the services must coordinate with active and reserve component  commanders to determine the readiness of the forces that would be  available to fill the requested requirements.
subsections: section_title: Some Active and Reserve Personnel Tracking Systems Were Incompatible
paragraphs: DOD officials also lost visibility over the mobilization of reservists because  some active and reserve component personnel tracking systems were not  compatible. Some components within the respective services maintain  personnel data in their own data systems for different purposes. In those  cases, both the active and reserve components require data that are  provided only in the other’s data systems. Yet, in some cases, active and  reserve component systems were not always compatible with each other,  resulting in cumbersome workarounds or extensive ad hoc coordination  between active and reserve officials, and, according to DOD officials, the  sometimes outright loss of visibility over the length of reservists’  mobilization or deployment status.
The reserve and active components within some of the respective services  maintain personnel data for different purposes. The individual reserve  components maintain the mobilization data in their respective systems in  order to track and maintain visibility over reservists’ physical location and  mobilization status. The reserve systems also maintain information on  reservists’ mobilization dates. Active components’ systems maintain  personnel data for forces that are under their control. Using a variety of  data systems, the active components track such information as the  number of personnel, the units to which the personnel are attached, and  the location of the unit. However, the active components cannot always  discern between the regular active and mobilized reserve servicemembers  in their data systems.
The services’ active and reserve components have developed their  respective computerized systems to track their personnel data, but they  are often unable to directly transfer information and data between their  systems. Often, these systems do not report information in a standardized  format and are not integrated with each other. For example, while most of  the services provide DOD with unclassified mobilization data, some  services provide classified mobilization data. DOD must then aggregate  selected unclassified information on a separate computer file that can be  used to produce a single consolidated mobilization report.
The incompatibilities between some active and reserve component data  systems required mobilization officials to develop workarounds to acquire  the information needed. Air Force officials cited the lack of a central  automated system to manage and track mobilized reservists as a major  problem that required extensive coordination between active and reserve  components. Some components, like the Air National Guard and the Air  Force Reserve, developed their own mobilization reporting systems to  track the location and status of their reservists using computer  spreadsheets.
The use of local, nonintegrated data systems also affects the validity of  some mobilization data. For example, we requested mobilization data from  the Army Reserve on several occasions during our review, but Army  Reserve officials cautioned us concerning the use of figures from their  computerized database. They stated that the figures were unreliable and  conflicted with the overall number of personnel they thought had been  mobilized. Without an automated means for quickly and reliably capturing  mobilization data, the Army has had to rely on a slow mobilization process  that requires constant coordination between active and reserve  component officials.
The coordination between active and reserve component officials within  the Army and the Navy often takes the form of relatively inefficient  methods to determine the status of mobilized reservists. For example, in  the initial months following September 11, 2001, the Navy had no  automated means to track reservists from their home stations to their  gaining commands. The entire mobilization process was based on paper,  telephone calls, faxes, and e-mail messages.
The lack of compatibility between automated data systems, and the  sometimes cumbersome workarounds undertaken by the services to  obtain reservists’ information, has at times led to the outright loss of DOD  visibility over the length of reservists’ mobilization or deployment status  and resulted in cases where reservists were inadvertently deployed  beyond the original year specified in their orders. Additionally, Air Force  officials told us that their major commands have had trouble filling new  requirements because they cannot consistently determine who has  volunteered and who is already serving on active duty. Because of limited  visibility, some Navy processing personnel did not know in advance which  reservists had been ordered to their mobilization processing sites or when  the reservists were expected to report.
Air Force officials said that they either totally lost or had diminished  visibility over their reservists once they were mobilized and assigned to  active commands. Reserve component officials from the Air Force said  that a tracking system does not exist to effectively monitor reservists from  the time they are mobilized and assigned to an active command to the time  they are demobilized and return to their normal reserve status. As a result,  reservists were deployed beyond their scheduled return dates and were  not able to take the leave to which they were entitled prior to the  expiration of their orders. Reserve officials said that this happened  because replacement personnel had not arrived in time to relieve the  reservists and the active commands were not willing to send the deployed  reservists home until replacements had arrived. In many cases, Air Force  reserve component headquarters said they did not have visibility over the  replacement personnel because these personnel were coming from active  component units.
The Army experienced situations where the lack of visibility contributed  to the breaking of service policies. During the current partial mobilization,  the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)  issued a verbal policy that stated that units were not to be placed on alert  for more than 90 days. The Army’s force providers were to review the list  of units on alert each month and determine whether the units needed to  remain on alert. If the force providers needed to keep any units on alert  beyond 90 days, they could request an extension from the Assistant  Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Table 2 shows  that on March 28, 2003, 204 units had been on alert for more than 90 days  and that 12 units—representing hundreds of Guard and Reserve  members—had been on alert for more than a year. The Assistant Secretary  of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) told us that he was not  aware that the 12 units had been on alert for more than a year. He worked  to resolve this matter as soon as we brought it to his attention.
Some service components developed their own systems to gain visibility  over their mobilized reservists. For example, the Navy adapted a system  from the Marine Corps in February 2003 that provides all Navy  mobilization officials with the capability to track reservists throughout the  mobilization process. Commands now have visibility over the entire  mobilization process and can monitor the status of reservists en route to  their commands, including the reservists’ current locations. Since  implementing this system, the Navy has processed more than 8,000  mobilization orders and 6,000 demobilization orders.
The Marine Corps implemented its system in 1994 to provide visibility over  its reserve forces. This local area network-based system supports the  continuous processing and tracking of newly mobilized Marines. However,  this system is not integrated with the Navy’s system, and data cannot be  exchanged between the two systems. As a result, the Navy is not  automatically made aware of requirements for Navy medical, religious, or  other support personnel who are embedded in Marine Corps units, when  the associated Marine Corps units are mobilized.
section_title: Outdated Mobilization Guidance Led to Communication and Coordination Problems
paragraphs: Finally, key DOD and service guidance—including mobilization  instructions and publications—had not been updated in all instances to  reflect the modified mobilization process, leading to failures in  communication and coordination between components and further  reducing officials’ visibility over the mobilization process. In some  instances where DOD and the services did draft updated guidance to  reflect the modified mobilization process, it was not clear to all  mobilization officials which guidance to follow. The lack of updated  guidance and the appearance of conflicting guidance resulted in situations  where the components were not effectively coordinating and  communicating their mobilization efforts with each other.
OSD and the Joint Staff provide guidance and instructions on the  mobilization policy, roles and responsibilities of mobilization officials, and  mobilization planning and execution. Similar guidance and instructions are  provided by the respective services for planning and executing  mobilization within their respective commands. However, some of DOD’s  guidance failed to clearly identify the steps of the modified mobilization  process, the roles and responsibilities of mobilization officials, and the  flow of information. While the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and  Readiness) has issued several mobilization guidance memorandums since  September 11, 2001, many of DOD’s key mobilization instructions,  directives, and publications have not been updated to reflect current  changes to the mobilization process. For example,    DOD’s “Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and  Procedures” instruction has not been updated since 1986;    DOD’s “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready  Reserve” directive was last updated in 1995; and    DOD’s “Management of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the  Inactive National Guard (ING)” directive was last updated in 1997.
In addition, the Joint Staff had not updated its key mobilization guidance.  The “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning” publication was under  revision when we completed our review, but the update to the 1995  publication had not yet been released.
Within the Air Force, the lack of clear and consolidated guidance hindered  the mobilization process. The service’s mobilization guidance was issued  in 1994, and although several draft revisions to this guidance have been  circulated since September 11, 2001, the guidance has yet to be officially  updated. Officials in both the Air National Guard and the Air Force  Reserve told us that they did not know whether they were supposed to  follow the old “official” instruction or the revised (but unsigned)  instructions. The lack of clear guidance led to situations where Air  National Guard units had been mobilized without the knowledge of the Air  National Guard headquarters’ crisis action teams, consisting of officials  responsible for matching requirements with available units and personnel.  For example, on February 22, 2003, the Air Mobility Command mobilized  the 163rd Air Refueling Wing at the March Air Reserve Base. When we  contacted the Air National Guard crisis action team 3 days later, the team  was unaware that the 163rd had been mobilized. According to a senior  level Air National Guard official, the Air Mobility Command had bypassed  the Guard’s crisis action team and directly notified the unit of the  mobilization. According to this official, the Guard’s crisis action team had  been bypassed on mobilizations directed by both the Air Mobility  Command and the Air Combat Command.
The lack of clear guidance for mobilizing reservists also slowed down the  Army’s mobilization process. On October 24, 2001, the Army issued  guidance on the mobilization process. However, according to senior Army  policy officials, the Army’s initial personnel replacement policy was  unclear. This led to cases where the Army Reserve would send a request  for a requirement to fill an empty position through the entire mobilization  process rather than simply attempt to fill the position with another  qualified individual. Between September 2001 and June 2002, the Army  Reserve submitted 567 requests for just one individual because the initial  person selected could not fill the position. These requests slowed down  the mobilization process as each request was reviewed. The Army recently  drafted a policy to clarify its replacement procedures.
The Navy’s failure to update its guidance on the delegation of mobilization  authority led to a redundancy of efforts. In June 2002, the Secretary of  Defense, under the President’s partial mobilization authority, delegated  mobilization authority to the service secretaries and permitted further  delegation only to civilian officials who were appointed by the President  and confirmed by the Senate. However, the Navy had not updated its  mobilization authority guidance, and consequently the Secretary of the  Navy continued delegating mobilization authority to the Chief of Naval  Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who in turn  continued to approve mobilizations until 2003. When the Assistant  Secretary of the Navy became aware that mobilization authority had been  improperly delegated to military leaders within the Department of the  Navy, he rescinded the delegated authority and reviewed and revalidated  previously approved mobilizations, in addition to all new mobilization  requests.
In some cases, the failure of mobilization guidance to define the roles and  responsibilities of officials participating in the mobilization process also  resulted in delays. For example, the Air Force found that the roles and  responsibilities of its crisis action teams had not been adequately defined  and that there was insufficient coordination between these crisis action  teams during the planning and execution stages of the mobilization  process. This led to different interpretations of the policies concerning the  use of volunteers. Moreover, a lack of an established coordinated process  resulted in delays getting policy, guidance, and tasks to the field. For  example, whereas the requirement is to mobilize within 72 hours, there  were instances where the mobilization process took 9 days.
section_title: The Services Have Two Approaches to Provide Preparation Time for Mobilizations and Deployments
paragraphs: The services have used two primary approaches—predictable operating  cycles and formal advanced notification—to provide time for units and  servicemembers to prepare for upcoming mobilizations and deployments.  All the services provide predictability to portions of their active forces  through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air Force has  a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active and  reserve forces. The Army assigns priority categories to its units, and lower- priority units generally need extra training and preparation time prior to  deploying. Advanced mobilization notice, while important, does not  provide the long lead times made possible by predictable operating cycles.  The increased use of the Army’s reserve forces heightens the need for  predictability so these units and individuals can prepare for upcoming  mobilizations and deployments.
subsections: section_title: Air Force Standard Operating Cycle Provides Predictability to Active and Reserve Forces
paragraphs: The Air Force is the only service that uses a standard operating cycle— providing deployments of a predictable length that are preceded and  followed by standard maintenance and training periods—to bring  predictability to both its active and reserve forces. The Navy and the  Marine Corps have used a variety of operating cycles to bring such  predictability to portions of their forces. Likewise, the Army has used an  operating cycle concept to bring predictability to a portion of its active  force, under its Division Ready Brigade program.
Key officials throughout DOD have acknowledged the importance of  predictability in helping reserve forces to prepare for mobilization and  deployment. Predictability helps units anticipate (1) downtime, so they  can schedule lengthy education and training for personnel and lengthy  maintenance for equipment and (2) the likely periods of mobilization or  deployment, so they can focus on efforts to increase readiness, including  last minute training and the screening of medical, dental, and personnel  records. Predictability helps individual reservists by giving them time to  prepare their civilian employers and family members for their possible  departures.
In the years following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Air Force Reserve  and Air National Guard forces, which already had the highest tempos of  any of DOD’s reserve component forces, faced increasing tempos.  In  August 1998, the Air Force adopted the Expeditionary Aerospace Force  concept to help it manage its commitments while reducing the deployment  burden on its people. This concept established a standard 15-month  operating cycle and divided the Air Force into 10 groups, each containing a  mix of active, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve forces. Two  groups were scheduled to deploy during each of the five, 3-month  increments within the standard 15-month operating cycle. However,  because two groups contained more forces than were generally needed to  cover worldwide contingency operations, and because the predictable  cycles provided reservists with months of advance notice, the Air Force  Reserve and the Air National Guard were able to rely on volunteers to  meet significant portions of their requirements, thus avoiding large-scale  involuntary mobilizations.
While the predictability offered by the Air Force’s standard operating cycle  has proved beneficial during “steady state” operations, the Expeditionary  Aerospace Force concept is not yet able to deal with large and rapid  surges in requirements. When the concept was first implemented, Air  Force officials stated that the expeditionary concept would not be used to  deploy forces to a major war prior to 2007. In the months immediately  following the September 11th attacks and during the buildup for—and  execution of—the 2003 war in Iraq, the Expeditionary Aerospace Force  operating cycles broke down. For example, personnel with certain   high-demand skills were involuntarily mobilized for longer than the  intended 3 months—up to 2 full years, in some cases. However, for much  of 2002, the Air Force used its operating cycles, and it has a plan to return  to normal 15-month operating cycles by March of 2004.
section_title: Preparation Time Is Especially Important to the Army’s Lower-Priority Units
paragraphs: The Army prioritizes its units, and lower-priority units generally need extra  training and preparation time prior to deploying. The Army allocates  human capital and other resources using a tiered resourcing system that is  based on the placement of units in existing operation plans. Units that are  identified as the first to mobilize and deploy are resourced at the highest  level. Units identified for later deployment are placed in subsequently  lower resourcing tiers, based on their planned deployment dates. A unit’s  resource tier affects its priority with respect to (1) recruiting and filling  vacancies, (2) full-time staffing, (3) filling equipment needs,   (4) maintaining equipment, (5) obtaining access to schools and training  seats, and (6) funding for extra drills. Consequently, lower-priority units  need more time to prepare for mobilization and deployment.
The Army’s resourcing strategy is a cost-effective means for maintaining  the Army’s reserve forces when reserve forces will have long lead times to  mobilize. However, a large number of reserve forces were quickly  mobilized—from less than 30,000 on January 1, 2003, to over 150,000 on  March 26, 2003—to respond to the rapid surge in requirements for  operations related to Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on  terrorism. Because existing operation plans had not accurately identified  all mobilization requirements, a number of lower-priority units were  mobilized with relatively little advance notice. For example,   5 transportation companies containing 976 reservists were alerted on  February 9, 2003, and told to arrive at their mobilization stations by  February 14, 2003. On January 20, 2003, four other lower-priority Army  National Guard companies, with over 1,000 reservists, were alerted and  told to report to their mobilization stations by January 27, 2003. If these  units had been able to plan for their mobilizations and deployments based  on a standard operating cycle, they may have been able to complete some  of their mobilization requirements during normally scheduled training  periods prior to their mobilizations.
Despite the large number of lower-priority units within the Army National  Guard and the Army Reserve, the Army does not have a standard operating  cycle concept to provide predictability to its reserve forces. Without such  a concept, the Army’s opportunities to provide extra training and  preparation time to its reserve forces, particularly those with low  priorities, are limited.
section_title: Advanced Notice Is Not As Beneficial As Predictable Operating Cycles
paragraphs: OSD established a goal of providing reservists with at least 30 days notice  prior to mobilization when operationally feasible, but such advanced  notice does not provide the longer lead times made possible by predictable  operating cycles. Nonetheless, OSD’s advanced notice policy was written  in recognition of the benefits of such notice to individual reservists.
The Army, lacking a standard operating cycle to provide predictability for  its reservists, strives to provide its reservists with official written orders   30 days in advance of mobilizations in accordance with DOD’s policy.  However, in the early days following September 11, 2001, this level of  advanced notice was often not possible because reservists were required  immediately. In the weeks and months that followed, advanced notice  increased. Army data covering the mobilizations of over 6,400 personnel  between June and August of 2002 showed that 83 percent of the personnel  had 4 or more weeks advanced notice. However, advanced notice dropped  again in the weeks leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the first  15 days of March 2003, 95 percent of the Army units that were mobilized  received less than 30 days advanced notice, and 8 percent of the units  received less than 72 hours advanced notice. Much of this short notice is  attributable to the extra time that was required to validate and approve  requirements under the modified mobilization process.
While 30 days advanced notice is clearly beneficial to individual reservists,  it does not provide the longer lead times made possible by predictable  operating cycles. As discussed earlier, such cycles allow reserve units,  which typically drill only once every 30 days, to schedule their training and  maintenance so the units’ readiness will build as the mobilization time  approaches.
section_title: Increased Reliance on the Army’s Reserve Forces Heightens the Need for Predictability
paragraphs: While always important, predictability and preparation times are likely to  become even more important when the pace of reserve operations is high.  Figure 3, on page 16, shows the shift that occurred in July 2002 when the  number of Army reservists on active duty exceeded the number of Air  Force reservists on active duty. The figure also shows the dramatic  increase in Army mobilizations in 2003. During calendar year 2002, the  Army had an average of about 30,000 reserve component members  mobilized each week. By February 12, 2003, the Army had more than  110,000 reservists mobilized, and mobilizations peaked in March 2003,  when more than 150,000 of the 216,811 reservists mobilized were members  of the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve. On June 18, 2003, over  139,000 Army reservists were still mobilized, and the Army Manpower and  Reserve Affairs office projected that mobilizations would remain high at  least through the end of 2004. Given its ongoing commitments in Iraq, the  Balkans, Afghanistan, and at home, many of the Army’s reserve  component forces will likely face the same types of high operational  tempos that Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces faced in the  1990s.
As described above, the Air Force has effectively used predictable  operating cycles to help prepare its reserve units and individuals for  mobilization and deployment and to mitigate the negative factors  associated with high operational tempos. However, the Army does not  employ such operating cycles for its reserve forces, thus leaving those  forces with limited time to prepare for the increased mobilization and  deployment demands facing them.
section_title: DOD Has Limited Access to Portions of the Ready Reserve
paragraphs: After September 11, 2001, mobilizations were hampered because about  one-quarter of the Ready Reserve was not readily accessible. Some  Selected Reserve members could not be mobilized due to the lack of  training. Furthermore, the services lack information that is needed to  make full use of the IRR. Finally, OSD and service policies reflect a  reluctance to use the IRR, resulting in situations where Ready Reserve  forces were not readily available for mobilization or deployment.
subsections: section_title: Many Selected Reserve Members Could Not Be Mobilized Due to the Lack of Training
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2002, most of the military’s approximately 880,000 Selected  Reserve members were available for mobilization and deployment, but  over 70,000 Selected Reserve members had not completed the individual  training that is required prior to deploying. By law, members of the armed  forces are not permitted to deploy outside the United States and its  territories until they have completed the basic training requirements of the  applicable military services. The law further stipulates that in time of a  national emergency (such as the one in effect since September 11, 2001)  the basic training period may not be less than 12 weeks, except for certain  medical personnel. The over 70,000 Selected Reserve members who were  not deployable in fiscal year 2002 included personnel who had entered the  service and were awaiting their initial active duty training, personnel who  were awaiting the second part of a split initial active duty training  program, and reservists who were still participating in initial active duty  training programs. Each year between fiscal year 1997 and 2002, 7 to 10  percent of Selected Reserve members were not deployable because they  had not completed their required initial training.
While most members of the Selected Reserve had met the initial active  duty training requirements in fiscal year 2002 and were therefore available  for mobilization, a portion of these personnel belonged to units that would  have required lengthy periods of unit training before they would have been  deployable. In particular, the reserve forces from the Army’s bottom two  resourcing categories generally require lengthy postmobilization training  periods before they are deployable. Because both the Presidential Reserve  Call-up and partial mobilization authorities prevented the services from  mobilizing reservists specifically for training, the Army could not use many  of its tier three and four Guard and Reserve units to meet requirements  that had to be filled immediately. On April 10, 2003, DOD proposed that  Congress change portions of the United States Code to allow the military  departments to order reservists to active duty for up to 90 days of training  in order to meet deployment standards.
section_title: Services Lack Vital Information That Is Necessary to Make Full Use of the IRR
paragraphs: The services lack the vital information necessary to fully use their IRR  pools of over 300,000 pretrained individual reservists. Many of the IRR  members were inaccessible because the services did not have valid  contact information (addresses or phone numbers) for these individuals.  Moreover, the services’ use of three primary access methods—exit  briefings, questionnaires, and screenings—did not obtain the results  necessary to gain and maintain access to their IRR members. Finally, the  services have not developed results-oriented goals and performance  measures to improve the use of their primary methods to access IRR  members.
subsections: section_title: Services Lacked Valid Contact Information for IRR Members
paragraphs: The services could not access many IRR members because they did not  have valid addresses or phone numbers for the members. For example, in  April 2003, the Army estimated that it had inaccurate addresses for more  than 40,400 of its IRR members. When the services were able to contact  their IRR members and obtain the vital information necessary to use its  IRR pool, exemptions and delays often limited the services’ abilities to  fully use these personnel. For example, in February 2003, the Army sent  mobilization orders to 345 IRR members, but 164 of these reservists  requested and were granted exemptions for specific reasons, such as  medical issues, so they did not have to deploy, and another 35 were  granted delays in their reporting dates.
section_title: Services Did Not Obtain the Results Necessary to Fully Access Their IRR Members
paragraphs: The services’ use of their three primary IRR access methods did not obtain  the results necessary to gain and maintain full access to their IRR  members. These methods include (1) briefings provided to members when  they leave active duty or a drilling reserve position; (2) questionnaires to  verify basic member information, such as contact information; and   (3) 1-day screenings to verify member fitness for mobilization.
First, the services brief the members when they leave active duty or a  Selected Reserve position. These briefings are designed to make the  individuals aware of their responsibilities as members of the IRR.  However, mobilized reservists that we spoke with said that IRR  responsibilities had not been clearly explained during exit briefings when  they left active duty. For example, Marine Corps reservists stated that the  separation briefings did not provide the detail necessary for them to fully  understand their commitment and responsibilities when entering the IRR.  They stated individuals conducting these briefings should emphasize that  reservists entering the IRR must keep their reserve component informed  of specific changes, including their home address, marital status, number  of dependents, civilian employment, and physical condition. They added  that reservists assigned to the IRR need to know that they may volunteer  for active duty assignments to refresh or enhance their military skills.
Next, the services send the members questionnaires to verify basic  information—such as current addresses, marital status, and physical  condition—to ascertain whether the reservists are available immediately  for active duty during a mobilization. However, response rates to the  questionnaires have been considered low, as shown in table 3.
The services attributed the low response rate, in part, to incorrect mailing  addresses as indicated by the questionnaires returned as undeliverable.  During fiscal year 2002, for example, the Air Force stated that 12 percent  of the questionnaires mailed out were returned as undeliverable. The Air  Force is the only service that specifically tracks undeliverable rates, but  the Navy estimated a 30 to 40 percent undeliverable rate and the Army  estimated that approximately 30 percent of its questionnaires were  returned as undeliverable. The Coast Guard has not measured the number  of questionnaires returned as undeliverable. Although the Marine Corps  did not send out questionnaires in fiscal year 2002 and could not provide  documented response rates for prior years, a Marine Corps official  indicated that the Corps had experienced about a 10 percent undeliverable  rate in previous years; but he was unable to provide any data to support  the claim. According to this official, most of the returned questionnaires  were mailed to junior enlisted personnel, including lance corporals,  corporals, and sergeants who appeared to change residences more  frequently than senior enlisted personnel or officers.
The services have taken some specific steps to correct bad addresses and  improve servicemember reporting of required mobilization-related  information. Specifically, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps use  commercial contractors to try to update inaccurate address information.  For the last 4 years, a contractor has been regularly matching the Army’s  entire personnel database of bad addresses with a credit bureau’s address  database. For over 10 years, the Army has used another contractor to  update a small number of addresses, one at a time. Despite these efforts,  the Army still had over 40,000 bad addresses in its database as of April  2003, and it recently contracted with its second contractor to do batch  updates rather than one-at-a-time updates. The Marine Corps just started  using its contractor. Finally, the Army and the Coast Guard have  implemented Web-based systems that encourage IRR members to update  critical contact information on the Internet. According to an official  representing the Naval Reserve Personnel Center, the Navy has also  started to create a Web-based screening questionnaire to better track IRR  members. However, these efforts are not linked to a results-oriented  management framework that establishes specific goals to improve access  to accurate addresses and identifies the resources and performance  measures necessary to ensure success.
Finally, the services order a small number of their IRR members to  participate in a 1-day screening event at a specific site to verify they are fit  and available for mobilization. The screening events focus on a specific  number of IRR members to verify their physical existence, condition, and  personal contact data. Even though the total number of IRR members  ordered to report for screening during a fiscal year is relatively small, the  services have met with limited success as the screening event participation  rates in table 4 indicate.
As indicated in table 4, the Army and the Air Force have not conducted  screenings since 2000 and 2001, respectively. An Army Personnel  Command After Action Report concluded that screenings should not be  conducted until clear objectives are established and realistic cost and  benefit assessments are completed. The Air Force also decided not to  conduct screening events. Thus, these two services are not using one of  their three primary methods to gain and maintain access to their IRR  members.
Furthermore, table 3 shows that the participation rates are relatively low.  The services indicated that the low screening event participation rates  were based on the services’ inability to contact members of the IRR  because of incorrect addresses; IRR members who were excused because  of stated conflicts involving work, vacation plans, religious issues, or  physical disabilities among others; and members who ignored orders and  avoided participation in the screening events.
section_title: The Services Lack Results-Oriented Goals and Performance Measures to Improve Use of IRR Access
paragraphs: The services do not have results-oriented goals and performance measures  to improve their reliance on the three primary methods to access IRR  members. Specifically, the services have concentrated their efforts on exit  briefings, questionnaires to update critical information, and periodic  screening events. However, they have not focused on the results of those  activities, as evidenced by persistent low response rates to questionnaires  and low screening event participation rates. By focusing on the execution  of these activities rather than their results, the services have not    established objective, quantifiable, and measurable performance goals to  improve the results of their three primary efforts to access;    established a basis for comparing actual program results with the goals in  order to develop performance indicators to track their progress in  attaining results-oriented goals; and    described the resources and means required to verify and validate  measured values.
section_title: OSD and Service Policies Have Discouraged the Use of the IRR
paragraphs: OSD and service policies have discouraged the use of the IRR because IRR  members do not participate in any regularly scheduled training and thus  are not regularly paid. The policies are also intended to avoid the negative  effects on individual IRR members. For example, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness provided guidance dated July 19,  2002, to the services that emphasized the use of volunteers before  involuntarily mobilizing reservists to minimize the effects of mobilization  on the lives of the reservists, their families, and their employers.
Policies intended to avoid the negative effects on individual reservists may  be disruptive to all reservists as well as to entire units, because they  contribute to situations where individual mobilization requirements are  filled with personnel from reserve units, thus creating personnel shortages  within the units that had supplied the reservists and affecting the units’  readiness to mobilize and deploy. For example, in its reluctance to use the  IRR, the Army filled many of its individual mobilization requirements with  personnel from reserve units. In doing so, the Army created personnel  shortages within the units that had supplied the reservists. In some cases,  the Army had to later locate and transfer replacement personnel into these  units when the units were mobilized, thus transferring several unit  personnel as a result of a single individual requirement. Specifically, the  Army mobilized a combat support hospital unit that was 142 individuals  short, including the commanding officer, of its authorized strength of 509  personnel. To increase the hospital unit’s strength to an acceptable level  for mobilization, the Army took a commanding officer and other needed  personnel from four reserve units. By taking this course of action, the  Army immediately degraded the mission capability and readiness of the  four affected units. The Army compounded this negative effect when it  later mobilized the already significantly degraded unit that gave up its  commanding officer to the hospital unit.
Further, the reluctance of one service to use the IRR can affect other  services. For example, the Air Force’s reluctance to access any of its more  than 44,000 IRR members has left the responsibility for guarding Air Force  bases to over 9,000 Army National Guard unit personnel. According to a  senior Air Force official, the Air Force did not even consider using its own  IRR pool. Because the Army National Guard volunteered for the mission,  the Air Force did not consider mobilizing any of its 3,900 IRR members  who held security force specialty codes.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel  have been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on  the front lines in Iraq; tracked down terrorists throughout Asia and Africa;  maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and  participated in a wide range of domestic missions. However, the process  to mobilize reservists had to be modified and contained numerous  inefficiencies. Existing operation plans did not adequately address the  mobilization requirements needed to deal with terrorist attacks and  overseas requirements. We recognize that some threats are impossible to  predict but until the combatant commanders identify all of the  mobilization requirements that have evolved since September 11, 2001— and create or update their operation plans as necessary to account for  these requirements—DOD risks the continued need for additional  management oversight and coordination between officials to fill  mobilization requirements, thus slowing the mobilization effort and  making it less efficient.
DOD officials also did not have visibility over the entire mobilization  process. Specifically, without the ability to capture the readiness of  personnel and other resources within the small units that were frequently  needed by combatant commanders, the Army and the Navy will continue  to face difficulties in their efforts to assemble the forces needed to meet  joint organizational requirements. Furthermore, until all of the services  develop fully integrated automated systems that provide for the seamless  transfer of reservists’ information between reserve and active  components, the components will continue to face cumbersome  workarounds to obtain the data to track the length of reservists’  mobilization or their deployment status. In addition, until the services  update key mobilization instructions, notices, and publications to reflect  the modified mobilization process, DOD and the services risk continued  mobilization slowdowns and duplication of efforts.
All of the services provide predictability to portions of their active forces  through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air Force has  a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active and  reserve forces. Moreover, the Army’s reserve forces face increasing use to  meet operational requirements. However, without a standard operating  concept to help increase predictability for its units, the Army risks  mobilizing units and individuals that are unprepared for deployment.
Finally, the services have limited access to portions of the Ready Reserve  and are thus forced to spread requirements across the remaining reserve  force, leading to longer or more frequent deployments. Specifically, the  services’ use of their primary IRR access methods—exit briefings,  questionnaires, and screenings—did not obtain the results necessary to  gain and maintain access to their members. Until the services develop  results-oriented goals and performance measures to improve the use of  their primary methods to access IRR members, the services will be unable  to systematically identify opportunities to better access their IRR  members for mobilization. Moreover, OSD and service policies have  discouraged the use of the IRR in order to avoid the negative effects on  individual IRR members. However, until the services review and update  their IRR policies to take into account the nature of the mobilization  requirements and the types of reservists who are available to fill the  requirements, the services will risk the continued disruption to units that  provide individual personnel rather than mobilizing IRR members.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making several recommendations to enhance the overall efficiency  of the reserve mobilization process. Specifically, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify all of the mobilization  requirements that have evolved since September 11, 2001, and create or  update operation plans as necessary, to account for these requirements;  the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to capture readiness information  on the resources within all the units that are available to meet the tailored  requirements of combatant commanders so that these resources will be  visible to key mobilization officials within DOD, the Joint Staff, and the  service headquarters;  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in  conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to  develop a single automated system or fully integrated automated systems  that will provide for the seamless transfer of reservists information,  regardless of whether the reservists are in an active or reserve status;  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of the Air  Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to update their applicable  mobilization instructions, notices, and publications;  the Secretary of the Army to develop a standard operating cycle concept  to help increase predictability for Army reserve units;  the service secretaries to develop and use results-oriented performance  metrics to guide service efforts to gain and maintain improved information  on IRR members; and  the service secretaries to review and update their IRR policies to take into  account the nature of the mobilization requirements as well as the types of  reservists who are available to fill the requirements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred  with our recommendations.  The department specifically concurred with  our recommendations to (1) create or update operation plans as  necessary, to account for mobilization requirements that have evolved  since September 11, 2001, (2) develop an automated system to provide for  the seamless transfer of reservists’ information, (3) update mobilization  notices and publications, (4) develop a standard operating cycle to  increase predictability for Army Reserve and National Guard units,   (5) develop and use results-oriented performance metrics to gain and  maintain information on IRR members, and (6) update IRR policies to take  into account the nature of mobilization requirements and the types of  reservists who are available to fill the requirements.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army and the  Navy capture readiness information on the resources within all units that  are available to meet the tailored requirements of combatant commanders  so that these resources will be visible to key officials within DOD. DOD  stated that the Army and the Navy fully support capturing relevant  information in the DOD readiness reporting system but that combatant  commanders will need to establish resource requirements to include  tailored mission requirements. We agree that improvements in readiness  reporting should be closely linked to efforts to more clearly define  requirements. DOD also stated that the Army is currently developing and  implementing a system to provide visibility on readiness issues in support  of the combatant commanders. We did not evaluate this system because it  was not fully implemented during our review.
DOD also provided technical comments from the Joint Staff, and we  received technical comments from the Coast Guard.  These technical  comments were incorporated in the final draft as appropriate. DOD’s  comments are reprinted in appendix II.
We performed our work between September 2002 and June 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the  Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff; the Secretary of Transportation; and the Commandant of the Coast  Guard. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov or Brenda S. Farrell at  (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Others making major contributions to  this report are included in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To evaluate whether the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services  followed their existing operation plans when mobilizing reserve forces  after September 11, 2001, we reviewed and analyzed a small group of  requests for forces from the combatant commanders and discussed  differences between planned and actual requirements with the  mobilization officials responsible for validating and approving  mobilization requirements. To find out how the services screen and fill  requirements, as well as their procedures for turning generic “capability”  type requirements into actual unit and personnel requirements, we met  with, and collected and analyzed data from, a variety of active and reserve  component offices within each of the services. Specifically, we met with  officials from the following offices or commands:    Department of the Army, Army Operations Center;    Office of the Chief, Army Reserve;    Army National Guard, Headquarters;    U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;    U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;    Department of the Air Force, Headquarters;    Air National Guard, Headquarters;    Air National Guard Readiness Center;    Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;    Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia;    Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center, Langley Air Force Base,    Navy Personnel Command, Millington, Tennessee;    Commander Naval Forces Command, New Orleans, Louisiana;    U.S. Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters,    Marine Forces Reserve, Headquarters, New Orleans, Louisiana;    U.S. Coast Guard, Headquarters; and    U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area Maintenance Logistic Command, Norfolk,  Virginia.
We reviewed our prior work on risk management and issues related to  combating terrorism. We met with RAND Corporation officials to discuss  and coordinate ongoing work related to the requests for forces. We also  met with the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air  Force who are responsible for approving mobilization orders.
To determine the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over  the entire mobilization process, we reviewed sections of the United States  Code, Executive Orders, Secretary of Defense memoranda, Joint Staff  publications, and service instructions related to mobilization. We also met  with senior and key mobilization officials involved with the various phases  of the mobilization process to document their roles and responsibilities  and collect data about the process. We observed a 2-1/2 day DOD  symposium in November 2002, where senior military and civilian officials  came together to review the entire mobilization process. We reviewed  relevant GAO reports and reports from other audit and inspection  agencies. We also met with Army Audit Agency and Air Force Audit  Agency officials. We reviewed the services’ detailed flowcharts, which  documented the mobilization process from different service perspectives.  We also discussed and observed the operation of the classified and  unclassified automated systems that are being used to track mobilized  units and individuals, as well as mobilization requirements. The Office of  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs served as our  primary source for aggregate personnel and mobilization data. However,  data from the early days and weeks following September 11, 2001, are not  reliable. Further, the services captured mobilization data differently over  time, making it difficult to aggregate the data. To present the data  consistently, our figures display data beginning with January 2002.
To evaluate the services’ approaches to provide predictability to reservists  subject to mobilization and deployment, we met with officials from the Air  Force offices that were responsible for the development and  implementation of the rotational Air Expeditionary Force concept and  analyzed data that documented the successes and challenges that the  program had experienced since September 11, 2001. We discussed the   30-day advance notice goal with service officials and officials from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) office, which had issued the goal.  We also discussed efforts to increase advanced warning or predictability  with officials from the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps and, where  data were available, compared alert dates to mobilization dates. To gain  first-hand knowledge about the effects of mobilizations on individual  reservists, we visited a number of sites where reservists were deployed or  were undergoing mobilization processing and training. At these sites, we  collected mobilization data, obtained copies of mobilization processing  checklists, and observed the preparations for deployment that take place  after reservists have been mobilized. Specifically, we met with officials  from the offices or commands listed below:    Army Headquarters, I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington;    4th Brigade, 91st Division (Training Support), Fort Lewis, Washington;    2122nd Garrison Training Support Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington;    2122nd Garrison Support Unit, North Fort Lewis, Washington;    Soldier Readiness Processing Site, Fort Lewis, Washington;    Soldier Readiness Processing Site, Fort McPherson, Georgia;    Central Issue Facility, Fort Lewis, Washington;    Navy Mobilization Processing Site, Millington, Tennessee;    Navy Mobilization Processing Site, San Diego, California;    Marine Corps Mobilization Processing Center, Mobilization Support  Battalion, Camp Pendleton, California;   452nd Air Mobility Wing, March Air Reserve Base, California; and    Coast Guard Integrated Support Command, Portsmouth, Virginia.
While at these sites, we interviewed individual and unit reservists who had  been mobilized, as well as the active duty, reserve, and civilian officials  who were conducting the mobilization processing and training. At the  mobilization processing stations, we observed reservists getting medical,  legal, and family support briefings; having their personnel, medical, and  dental records screened and updated; and receiving inoculations, combat  equipment, camouflage clothing, Geneva Convention Cards, identification  tags, and the controlled access cards that have replaced laminated  identification cards. We also observed weapons qualification training.
To determine the extent to which Ready Reserve forces were available for  mobilization, we reviewed sections of the United States Code and OSD  and service policies on the use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). We  collected and analyzed longitudinal data on the sizes of different segments  of the Ready Reserve. We examined the data for trends, specifically  focusing on the IRR and the portion of the Selected Reserve that was still  in the training pipeline. We also collected and analyzed data from the  commands that are responsible for managing the IRR, specifically  the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Command, St. Louis, Missouri;  the Naval Reserve Personnel Center, New Orleans, Louisiana;  the Air Reserve Personnel Center, Denver, Colorado;  the Marine Corps Reserve Support Command, Kansas City, Missouri; and  the Coast Guard Personnel Command, Washington, D.C.
Officials from these commands also provided data on IRR members that  we analyzed to determine (1) response rates to questionnaires to verify  basic member information and (2) participation rates at 1-day screening  events to verify member fitness for mobilization.
We conducted our review from September 2002 through June 2003 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: James R. Bancroft, Larry J. Bridges, Michael J. Ferren, Chelsa L. Kenney,  Irene A. Robertson, and Robert K. Wild also made significant contributions  to the report.