Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Manage Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure Performance, but Additional Actions Would Enhance Its Efforts
Published: 2010-04-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Terrorist attacks on surface transportation facilities in Moscow, Mumbai, London, and Madrid caused casualties and highlighted the vulnerability of such systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary federal agency responsible for security of transportation systems. This testimony focuses on the extent to which (1) DHS has used risk management in strengthening surface transportation security, (2) TSA has coordinated its strategy and efforts for securing surface transportation with stakeholders, (3) TSA has measured the effectiveness of its surface transportation security-improvement actions, and (4) TSA has made progress in deploying surface transportation security inspectors and related challenges it faces in doing so. GAO's statement is based on public GAO products issued from January to June 2009, selected updates from September 2009 to April 2010, and ongoing work on pipeline security. For the updates and ongoing work, GAO analyzed TSA's pipeline risk assessment model, reviewed relevant laws and program management documents, and interviewed TSA officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS has taken actions to implement a risk management approach but could do more to inform resource allocation based on risk across the surface transportation sector--including the mass transit and passenger rail, freight rail, highway, and pipeline modes. For example, in March 2009, GAO reported that TSA had not conducted comprehensive risk assessments to compare risk across the entire transportation sector, which the agency could use to guide investment decisions, and recommended that TSA do so. TSA concurred, and in April 2010 noted planned actions. GAO has also made recommendations to strengthen risk assessments within individual modes, such as expanding TSA's efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security strategy, including potential sabotage to bridges, tunnels, and other critical infrastructure. DHS concurred and is addressing the recommendations. TSA has generally improved coordination with key surface transportation stakeholders, but additional actions could enhance its efforts. For example, GAO reported in April 2009 that although federal and industry stakeholders have taken steps to coordinate their freight rail security efforts, TSA was not requesting another federal agency's data that could be useful in developing regulations for high-risk rail carriers. GAO recommended that DHS work with its federal partners to ensure that all relevant information, such as threat assessments, is shared. DHS concurred with this recommendation and recently stated that TSA has met with key federal stakeholders regarding sharing relevant assessment information and avoiding duplication. TSA has developed national strategies for each surface transportation mode, but using targeted, outcome-oriented performance measures could enable TSA to better monitor the effectiveness of these strategies and programs that support them. For example, GAO reported in June 2009 that TSA's mass transit strategy identified sectorwide goals, but did not contain measures or targets for program effectiveness. Such measures could help TSA track progress in securing transit and passenger rail systems. GAO also reported in April 2009 that TSA's freight rail security strategy could be strengthened by including targets for three of its four performance measures and revising its approach for the other measure, such as including more reliable baseline data to improve consistency in quantifying results. GAO recommended in both instances that TSA strengthen its performance measures. DHS concurred and noted planned actions. Preliminary findings from GAO's ongoing review of pipeline security show that TSA has taken some actions to monitor progress, but could better measure pipeline security improvements. GAO expects to issue a report by the end of 2010. GAO reported in June 2009 that TSA had more than doubled its surface transportation inspector workforce and expanded the roles and responsibilities of surface inspectors, but faced challenges balancing aviation and surface transportation priorities and had not completed a workforce plan to direct current and future program needs. TSA has initiated but not yet finished a staffing study to identify the optimal size of its inspector workforce.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss  key surface transportation security issues. Surface transportation modes  include mass transit, freight rail, pipeline, and highway systems. Terrorist  attacks on surface transportation systems in Moscow, Mumbai, London,  and Madrid that caused significant loss of life and disruption have  highlighted the vulnerability of transportation facilities to terrorist attacks  worldwide. While there have been no successful terrorist attacks against  U.S. surface transportation systems to date, securing these systems is a  significant undertaking. In the United States, the surface transportation  system includes more than 100,000 miles of rail, 600,000 bridges, more  than 300 tunnels, and 2 million miles of pipeline. Securing these systems is  further complicated by the number of private and public stakeholders  involved in operating and protecting the system and the need to balance  security with the expeditious flow of people and goods. Further, surface  transportation systems generally rely on an open architecture that is  difficult to monitor and secure due to its multiple access points, hubs  serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, lack of access barriers. An  attack on these systems could potentially lead to significant casualties due  to, for example, the high number of daily passengers, especially during  peak commuting hours. In the 2011 budget request for the Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA),  $137.6 million of the $8.2 billion total request is for surface transportation  security, while $6.5 billion is requested for aviation security, including the  Federal Air Marshal Service.
My testimony today focuses on the extent to which (1) DHS has used a  risk management framework to guide efforts to strengthen the security of  the surface transportation sector, (2) TSA has coordinated its strategy and  efforts for securing the surface transportation sector with other federal  entities, states, and private-sector stakeholders, (3) TSA has measured the  effectiveness of its surface transportation security-improvement actions,  and (4) TSA has made progress in deploying surface transportation  security inspectors, and what challenges, if any, it faces in these efforts.
This statement is based on related public GAO reports issued from  January 2009 through June 2009. All of this work was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, and  our previously published products contain additional details on the scope  and methodology for those reviews. In addition, this statement includes  preliminary observations based on ongoing work assessing the security of  the nation’s pipeline systems for this committee. This ongoing work, which  will be completed later this year, is assessing, among other things, TSA’s  risk assessment efforts and performance measures for this area of surface  transportation. For our ongoing review of pipeline security, we reviewed  relevant laws and program management and planning documents,  including pipeline performance measures, and interviewed TSA Pipeline  Security Division officials to discuss, among other things, their  identification of the most critical pipeline systems and their development  and use of the pipeline risk assessment model and performance measures.  We also analyzed TSA’s pipeline risk assessment model by measuring the  strength of the relationship between the frequency of Corporate Security  Reviews for each pipeline system and that system’s ranking based on risk.  We determined that the data we analyzed were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this statement. Specifically, we reviewed related  documentation, interviewed knowledgeable agency officials, and tested  those data to identify missing information or outliers. Our ongoing work  related to pipeline security is being conducted in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition, this  statement contains selected updates conducted from September 2009  through April 2010 on TSA’s efforts to implement our previous  recommendations regarding surface transportation security. In conducting  these updates, we obtained new information from TSA regarding the  agency’s efforts to enhance its surface transportation inspections and  meet legislative requirements, among other things. We conducted these  updates in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the security  of surface transportation systems, including developing a national strategy  and implementing security programs. However, several other agencies,  including DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the  Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Transit Administration  (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), also play a role in  helping to fund and secure these systems. Since it is not practical or  feasible to protect all assets and systems against every possible terrorist  threat, DHS has called for using risk-informed approaches to prioritize its  security-related investments and for developing plans and allocating  resources in a way that balances security and commerce.
In June 2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan  (NIPP), which established a six-step risk management framework to  establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for Critical  Infrastructure and Key Resources protection so that federal funding and  resources are applied in the most effective manner to deter threats, reduce  vulnerabilities, and minimize the consequences of attacks and other  incidents. The NIPP, updated in 2009, defines risk as a function of three  elements: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Threat is an indication of  the likelihood that a specific type of attack will be initiated against a  specific target or class of targets. Vulnerability is the probability that a  particular attempted attack will succeed against a particular target or class  of targets. Consequence is the effect of a successful attack. In May 2007,  TSA issued the Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TS-SSP),  which documents the risk management process to be used in carrying out  the strategic priorities outlined in the NIPP. As required by Executive  Order 13416, the TS-SSP also includes modal implementation plans or  modal annexes that detail how TSA intends to achieve the sector’s goals  and objectives for each of the six transportation modes using the systems- based risk management approach.
To address the objectives and goals laid out in the TS-SSP, TSA uses  various programs to secure transportation systems throughout the  country, including Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)  teams and Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI). VIPR teams  employ a variety of tactics to deter terrorism, including random high- visibility patrols at mass transit and passenger rail stations using, among  other things, behavior-detection officers, canine detection teams, and  explosive-detection technologies. STSIs, among other things, conduct on- site inspections of U.S. rail systems—including mass transit, passenger  rail, and freight rail systems—to identify best security practices, evaluate  security system performance, and discover and correct deficiencies and  vulnerabilities in the rail industry’s security systems.
In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11  Commission Act (9/11 Commission Act) was signed into law, which  included provisions that task DHS and other public and private  stakeholders with security actions related to surface transportation  security. Among other things, these provisions include mandates for  developing and issuing reports on TSA’s strategy for securing public  transportation, conducting and updating comprehensive security  assessments for public transportation agencies, and ensuring that  transportation modal security plans include threats, vulnerabilities, and  consequences for transportation infrastructure assets including mass  transit, railroads, highways, and pipelines.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Some Actions to Implement a Risk Management Approach but Could Do More to Inform the Allocation of Resources across the Surface Transportation Sector
paragraphs: In March 2009, we reported that TSA has taken some actions called for by  the NIPP’s risk management process, but has not conducted  comprehensive risk assessments across aviation and four major surface  transportation modes. In 2007, TSA initiated but later discontinued an  effort to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for the entire  transportation sector, known as the National Transportation Sector Risk  Analysis. Consequently, we recommended that TSA conduct  comprehensive risk assessments for the transportation sector to produce a  comparative analysis of risk across the entire transportation sector, which  the agency could use to guide current and future investment decisions.  DHS and TSA concurred with our recommendation, and in April 2010 TSA  identified planned actions, including integrating the results of risk  assessments into a comparative risk analysis across the transportation  sector. TSA officials stated in April 2010 that the agency has revised its  risk management framework, TS-SSP, and modal annexes. They added  that these documents are undergoing final agency review.
In addition, we have previously reported that while TSA has collected  information related to threat, vulnerability, and consequence within the  surface transportation modes, it has not conducted risk assessments that  integrate these three components for individual modes. For example, we  reported in June 2009 that TSA had not conducted its own risk assessment  of mass transit and passenger rail systems that combined all three risk  elements, as called for by the NIPP. Thus, we recommended that TSA  conduct a comprehensive risk assessment that combines threat,  vulnerability, and consequence. DHS concurred with this  recommendation, and in February 2010, DHS officials said that TSA had  undertaken a Transportation Systems Sector Risk Assessment that would  incorporate all three elements of risk. In April 2010, TSA stated that this  risk assessment is under review. Similarly, the Administration’s  Transborder Security Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) Surface  Transportation Subcommittee’s recently issued Surface Transportation  Security Priority Assessment recognized that assessing transportation  assets and infrastructure and ranking their criticality would help target the  use of limited resources. Consequently, this subcommittee recommended  that TSA identify appropriate methodologies to evaluate and rank surface  transportation systems and critical infrastructure.
We have also identified other opportunities to improve TSA’s risk  management efforts for surface transportation. For example, in April 2009,  we reported that TSA’s efforts to assess security threats to freight rail  could be strengthened. Specifically, we noted that while TSA had  developed a freight rail security strategy, the agency had focused almost  exclusively on rail shipments of toxic inhalation hazards (TIH), such as  chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, which can be fatal if inhaled, despite  other federal and industry assessments having identified additional  potential security threats, such as risks to bridges, tunnels, and control  centers. We reported that although TSA’s focus on TIH has been a  reasonable initial approach given the serious public harm these materials  potentially pose to the public, there are other security threats for TSA to  consider and evaluate as its freight rail strategy matures, including  potential sabotage to critical infrastructure. We recommended that TSA  expand its efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security  strategy. DHS concurred with this recommendation and has since reported  that TSA has developed a Critical Infrastructure Risk Tool to measure the  criticality and vulnerability of freight railroad bridges. As of April 2010, the  agency has used this tool to assess 39 bridges, some of which transverse  either the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers, and intends to assess 22  additional bridges by the end of fiscal year 2010.
Further, we reported in June 2009 that the Transit Security Grant Program  (TSGP) risk model includes all three elements of risk, but can be  strengthened by measuring variations in vulnerability. DHS has held  vulnerability constant, which limits the model’s overall ability to assess  risk and more precisely allocate funds to transit agencies. We also found  that although TSA allocated about 90 percent of funding to the highest-risk  agencies, lower-risk agency awards were based on other factors in  addition to risk, such as project quality. For example, a lower-risk agency  with a high-quality project was more likely to receive funding than a  higher-risk agency with a low-quality project. We recommended that DHS  strengthen its methodology for determining risk by developing a cost- effective method for incorporating vulnerability information in its TSGP  risk model. DHS concurred with the recommendation, and in April 2010  TSA stated that it is reevaluating the risk model for the fiscal year 2011  grant cycle. Further, TSA is evaluating the feasibility of incorporating an  analysis of the current state of an asset, including its vulnerability, in  determining fiscal year 2011 grant funding.
Additionally, we are currently conducting an assessment of TSA’s efforts  to help ensure pipeline security; the resulting report will include an  evaluation of the extent to which TSA uses a risk management approach  to help strengthen pipeline security. Our preliminary observations found  that TSA has identified the 100 most-critical pipeline systems in the United  States and produced a pipeline risk assessment model, consistent with the  NIPP. Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission Act requires that risk assessment  methodologies be used to prioritize actions to the highest-risk pipeline  assets, and we found that TSA’s stated policy is to consider risk when  scheduling Corporate Security Reviews—assessments of pipeline  operators’ security plans. However, we found a weak statistical correlation  between a pipeline system’s risk rank and the time elapsed between a first  and subsequent review. In addition, we found that among the 15 highest  risk-ranked pipeline systems, the time between a first and second  Corporate Security Review ranged from 1 to 6 years for those systems that  had undergone a second review. Further, as of April 2010, 2 systems  among the top 15 had not undergone a second review despite more than 6  years passing since their first review. TSA officials told us that although a  pipeline system’s relative risk ranking is the primary factor driving the  agency’s decision of when to schedule a subsequent Corporate Security  Review, it is not the only factor influencing this decision. They explained  they also consider the geographical proximity of Corporate Security  Review locations to each other in order to reduce travel time and costs, as  well as the extent to which they have worked with pipeline operators  through other efforts, such as their Critical Facility Inspection Program.  Better prioritizing its reviews based on risk could help TSA ensure its  resources are more efficiently allocated toward the highest-risk pipeline  systems. We expect to issue this report by the end of this year.
section_title: TSA Has Generally Improved Coordination with Key Stakeholders but Additional Actions Could Enhance Current Efforts to Improve Surface Transportation Security
paragraphs: TSA has developed several initiatives to improve coordination with its  federal, state, and private sector stakeholders. However, we have  previously reported that TSA’s coordination efforts could be improved.  For example, we reported in April 2009 that federal and industry  stakeholders have taken a number of steps to coordinate their freight rail  security efforts, such as implementing agreements to clarify roles and  responsibilities and participating in various information-sharing  mechanisms. However, federal coordination could be enhanced by more  fully leveraging the resources of all relevant federal agencies, such as TSA  and FRA. For example, we reported that TSA was not requesting data on  deficiencies in security plans and training activities collected by FRA,  which could be useful to TSA in developing regulations requiring high-risk  rail carriers to develop and implement security plans. To improve  coordination, we recommended that DHS work with federal partners such  as FRA to ensure that all relevant information, including threat  assessments, is shared. DHS concurred with this recommendation and  stated that it planned to better define stakeholder roles and  responsibilities to facilitate information sharing. Since we issued our  report, DHS reported that TSA continues to share information with  security partners, including meeting with FRA and the DHS Office of  Infrastructure Protection to discuss coordination and develop strategies  for sharing relevant assessment information and avoiding duplication.
In addition, we reported in January 2009 that although several federal  entities, including TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, have efforts underway to  assess the risk to highway infrastructure, these assessments have not been  systematically coordinated among key federal partners. We further  reported that enhanced coordination with federal partners could better  enable TSA to determine the extent to which specific critical assets had  been assessed and whether potential adjustments in its methodology were  necessary to target remaining critical infrastructure assets. We  recommended that to enhance collaboration among entities involved in  securing highway infrastructure and to better leverage federal resources,  DHS establish a mechanism to systematically coordinate risk assessment  activities and share the results of these activities among the federal  partners. DHS concurred with the recommendation. In February 2010, TSA  officials indicated that the agency had met with other federal agencies that  conduct security reviews of highway structures to identify existing data  resources, establish a data-sharing system among key agencies, and  discuss standards for future assessments. The Administration’s Surface  Transportation Security Priority Assessment also highlighted the need  for federal entities to coordinate their assessment efforts. That report  included a recommendation to establish an integrated federal approach  that consolidates capabilities in a unified effort for security assessments,  audits, and inspections to produce more thorough evaluations and  effective follow-up actions for reducing risk, enhancing security, and  minimizing burdens on assessed surface transportation entities.
We also reported in February 2009 that TSA, which has the primary federal  responsibility for ensuring the security of the commercial vehicle sector,  had taken actions to improve coordination with federal, state, and industry  stakeholders with respect to commercial vehicle security. These actions  included signing joint agreements with DOT and supporting the  establishment of intergovernmental and industry councils. However, we  also reported that additional opportunities exist to enhance security by  more clearly defining stakeholder roles and responsibilities. For example,  some state transportation officials stated that DHS and TSA had not  clarified states’ roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation  sector or communicated to them TSA’s strategy to secure commercial  vehicles, which in some cases has caused delays in implementing state  transportation security initiatives. Industry stakeholders also expressed  concerns with respect to TSA communicating its strategy, roles, and  responsibilities; leveraging industry expertise; and collaborating with  industry representatives. As a result, we recommended that TSA  establish a process to strengthen coordination with the commercia vehicle industry, including ensuring that the roles and responsibilities of  industry and government are fully defined and clearly communicated, and  assess its coordination efforts. DHS concurred with this recommendatio n  and in April 2010 reported that its TS-SSP Highway Modal Annex is under  s  review and is expected to delineate methods to enhance communication and coordination with stakeholde rs.
section_title: Using Targeted, Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures Could Help TSA Better Monitor Strategy and Program Effectiveness
paragraphs: In accordance with Executive Order 13416 and requirements of the 9/11  Commission Act, DHS, through TSA, has developed national strategies for  each surface transportation mode. However, we have previously reported  the need for TSA to strengthen its evaluation of the results of its efforts  through the use of targeted, measurable, and outcome-based performance  measures. Our prior work has shown that long-term, action-oriented goals  and a timeline with milestones can help track an organization’s progress  toward its goals. The NIPP also provides that DHS should work with its  security partners, including other federal agencies, state and local  government representatives, and the private sector, to develop sector- specific metrics.
Using performance measures and an evaluation of the effectiveness of  surface transportation security initiatives can help provide TSA with more  meaningful information from which to determine whether its strategies are  achieving their intended results, and to target any needed improvements.  For example, in January 2009, we reported that TSA’s completion of a  Highway Security Modal Annex was an important first step in guiding  national efforts to protect highway infrastructure, but it did not include  performance goals and measures with which to assess the program’s  overall progress toward securing highway infrastructure. As a result, we  recommended that TSA establish a time-frame for developing performance  goals and measures for monitoring the implementation of the annex’s  goals, objectives, and activities. Similarly, in June 2009, we reported that  TSA’s Mass Transit Modal Annex identified sectorwide goals that apply to  all modes of transportation as well as subordinate objectives specific to  mass transit and passenger rail systems, but did not contain measures or  targets on the effectiveness of operations of the security programs  identified in the annex. As a result, we recommended that TSA should, to  the extent feasible, incorporate performance measures in future annex  updates. DHS concurred with both of these recommendations. In February  2010, TSA indicated that the updated annex would incorporate  performance measures among other characteristics we recommended, and  as of April 2010, the annex is under review. We will continue to monitor  TSA’s progress in addressing these recommendations.
We also reported in April 2009 that three of the four performance  measures in TSA’s Freight Rail Modal Annex to the TS-SSP did not identify  specific targets to gauge the effectiveness of federal and industry  programs in achieving the measures or the transportation-sector security  goals outlined in the annex. We also reported that TSA was limited in its  ability to measure the effect of federal and industry efforts on achieving  the agency’s key performance measure for the freight rail program, which  is to reduce the risk associated with the transportation of TIH in major  cities identified as high-threat urban areas. This was because the agency  was unable to obtain critical data necessary to consistently calculate  cumulative results for this measure over the time period for which it  calculated them—from 2005 to 2008. In particular, some baseline data  needed to cumulatively calculate results for this measure were historical  and could not be collected. As a result, the agency used a method for  estimating risk for its baseline year that was different than what it used for  calculating results for subsequent years.
Consequently, to help ensure the strategic goals of the modal annex are  met and that TSA is consistently and accurately measuring agency and  industry performance in reducing the risk associated with TIH rail  shipments in major cities, we recommended that TSA ensure that future  updates (1) contain performance measures with defined targets that are  linked to fulfilling goals and objectives; and (2) more systematically  address specific milestones for completing activities and measuring  progress toward meeting identified goals. We further recommended that  TSA take steps to revise the baseline year associated with its TIH risk  reduction performance measure to enable the agency to more accurately  report results for this measure. DHS concurred with these  recommendations and has indicated that it will incorporate them into  future updates of its Freight Rail Modal Annex, which will be designed to  more specifically address goal-oriented milestones and performance  measures. In April 2010, TSA stated that the agency has revised its modal  annexes and that these documents are undergoing final agency review.
In addition to developing performance measures to assess the success of  its security strategies, we have also identified the need for TSA to develop  or enhance its performance measures for specific programs such as the  TSGP, VIPR program, and pipeline security programs. Specifically, in June  2009, we reported that the TSGP lacked a plan and milestones for  developing measures to track progress of achieving program goals. While  FEMA—which administers the grants—reported that it was beginning to  develop measures to better manage its portfolio of grants, TSA and FEMA  had not collaborated to produce performance measures for assessing the  effectiveness of TSGP-funded projects, such as how funding is used to  help protect critical infrastructure and the traveling public from possible  acts of terrorism. We recommended that TSA and FEMA collaborate in  developing a plan and milestones for measuring the effectiveness of the  TSGP and its administration. DHS concurred with our recommendation,  and in November 2009, FEMA stated that it will take steps to develop a  plan with milestones in coordination with TSA. Likewise, the  Administration’s Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment  discussed the importance of establishing a measurable evaluation system  to determine the effectiveness of surface transportation security grants  and recommended that TSA coordinate with other federal agencies,  including FEMA, to do so.
In June 2009, we reported that TSA had measured the progress of its VIPR  program in terms of the number of VIPR operations conducted, but had  not yet developed measures or targets to report on the effectiveness of the  operations themselves. TSA program officials reported, however, that  they were planning to introduce additional performance measures no later  than the first quarter of fiscal year 2010. They added that these measures  would gather information on, among other things, (1) interagency  collaboration by collecting performance feedback from federal, state, and  local security, law enforcement, and transportation officials prior to and  during VIPR deployments; and (2) stakeholder views on the effectiveness  and value of VIPR deployment. In April 2010, TSA reported that the VIPR  program introduced four performance measures for fiscal year 2010; these  measures will be reported quarterly.  TSA has also stated that it has  identified performance targets for these measures, which it will revisit  when baseline program data is available.
As part of our ongoing review of TSA’s efforts to help ensure pipeline  security, we are assessing the extent to which TSA has measured efforts to  strengthen pipeline security. While our work has not been completed, our  preliminary observations have identified that TSA has taken actions to  measure progress as called for by the NIPP, but could better measure  pipeline security improvements. More specifically, our preliminary  observations have identified that effective performance measurement data  could better inform decision makers of the extent to which pipeline  security programs and activities have been able to reduce risk and better  enable them to determine funding priorities within and across agencies.  Also, developing additional performance measures—particularly outcome- based measures—that assess the effects of TSA’s efforts in strengthening  pipeline security and are aligned with transportation-sector goals and  pipeline security objectives could better enable TSA to evaluate security  improvements in the pipeline industry. Our upcoming report that will be  issued later this year will provide additional details.
section_title: TSA Has More Than Doubled Its Surface Transportation Inspector Workforce but Faces Challenges in Balancing Priorities and Directing Current and Future Workforce Needs
paragraphs: Over the past two years, TSA has reported having more than doubled the  size of its Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, expanding  the program from 93 inspectors in June 2008 to 201 inspectors in April  2010. Inspectors have conducted baseline security reviews that assess,  among other things, the overall security posture of mass transit and  passenger rail agencies and the implementation of security plans,  programs, and measures, and best practices. However, TSA has not  completed a workforce plan to direct current and future inspection  program needs as the program assumes new responsibilities associated  with the implementation of certain provisions of the 9/11 Commission Act  by passenger and freight rail systems.
Since establishing the inspection program in 2005 to identify and reduce  vulnerabilities to passenger rail and ensure compliance with passenger rail  security directives, TSA has expanded the roles and responsibilities of  surface inspectors to include additional surface transportation modes— including mass transit bus and freight rail—and participation in VIPR  operations. For example, TSA reported that as of April 2010 its surface  inspectors had, among other things, conducted security assessments of  142 mass transit and passenger rail agencies, including Amtrak, and over  1,350 site visits to mass transit and passenger rail stations to complete  station profiles, which gather detailed information on a station’s physical  security elements, geography, and emergency points of contact. However,  we also reported that TSA faced challenges in the following areas:    Balancing aviation and surface transportation priorities: We  reported in June 2009 that TSA has reorganized its field unit and  reporting structure since establishing the inspection program, and  surface inspectors raised concerns about its effect. These  reorganizations placed TSA’s surface inspectors under the command of  Federal Security Directors and Assistant Federal Security Directors for  Inspections—aviation-focused positions that historically have not had  an active role in conducting surface transportation inspection duties.
According to TSA, these changes were designed to support its pursuit  of a multimodal workforce and ensure a more cohesive and  streamlined approach to inspections. However, we noted that surface  inspectors raised concerns that these changes had resulted in the  surface transportation mission being diluted by TSA’s aviation mission.  Among these concerns is that the surface inspectors were being  assigned airport-related duties, while aviation inspectors had been  assigned surface responsibilities that had affected performance in  conducting follow-up inspections to determine progress mass transit  and passenger rail systems had made in addressing previously- identified weaknesses. TSA officials reported that they had selected  their current command structure because Federal Security Directors  were best equipped to make full use of the security network in their  geographical location because they frequently interacted with state and  local law enforcement and mass transit operators, and were aware of  vulnerabilities in these systems.
Workforce Planning: At the time of our June 2009 report, TSA did not  have a human capital or other workforce plan for its Surface  Transportation Security Inspection Program, but the agency had plans  to conduct a staffing study to identify the optimal workforce size to  address its current and future program needs. TSA reported that it had  initiated a study in January 2009, which, if completed, could provide  TSA with a more reasonable basis for determining the surface  inspector workforce needed to achieve its current and future workload  needs. However, in March 2010, TSA officials told us that while they  were continuing to work on the staffing study, TSA did not have a firm  date for completion.
Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I look forward to answering  any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at  this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Steve Lord at  (202) 512- 4379 or at lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony  include Jessica Lucas-Judy, Assistant Director; Jason Berman; Martene  Bryan; Chris Currie; Vanessa Dillard; Chris Ferencik; Edward George;  Dawn Hoff; Jeff Jensen; Valerie Kasindi; Lara Kaskie; Daniel Klabunde;  Nancy Meyer; Jaclyn Nelson; Octavia Parks; Meg Ullengren; and Lori  Weiss.
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