Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Needs Framework for Balancing Investments in Tactical Radios
Published: 2008-08-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years--about as much as was spent producing Virginia Class submarines ($10.8 billion) in the same period. Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on superior information and communication capabilities. DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) to deliver the breakthroughs in this area. At the same time as it is developing JTRS, DOD wants to ensure that current forces are equipped with sufficient legacy radios. To address Subcommittee concerns regarding DOD's approach to meeting current and future radio needs, GAO examined this subject. In response, this report addresses (1) how planned investments in key tactical radio systems changed over the last 5 years, (2) why these changes occurred, and (3) the challenges ahead. To assess these topics, GAO's work included reviewing 2003 through 2007 budget requests, legacy radio procurements, and the status of the JTRS program; and interviewing officials from DOD organizations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have shifted dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when JTRS first began system development, DOD planned to invest close to $3 billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007. However, as shown below, actual investments more than doubled and shifted to producing thousands more legacy radios. Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on JTRS and the Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion was actually spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy radios, while $2.5 billion was spent on JTRS development. The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by (1) delays in the development and production of JTRS and (2) urgent demands for more radios to equip current forces. JTRS has encountered significant cost, schedule, and performance problems, causing some users to buy more legacy radios instead. Moreover, the military services' demand for tactical radios soared because of combat operations, the need to equip Guard and Reserve forces with modern radios, and to add more radios per combat unit. Supplemental funding of $5.5 billion paid for most of these legacy radios. Over the next 5 years, DOD faces several challenges in providing needed tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter, including: (1) overcoming technology hurdles, size and power constraints, and security architecture issues to complete JTRS development; (2) managing investments within defined fiscal constraints. A legacy vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while its more capable JTRS replacement is estimated to cost up to 10 times more; and (3) phasing in JTRS without prematurely retiring a relatively young inventory of legacy radios. DOD does not have a strategy to meet these challenges and thus runs the risk of having its future communications capabilities decided ad hoc.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on  The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on  the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years.   the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years.   To put this investment in context, the amount spent on tactical radios is  To put this investment in context, the amount spent on tactical radios is  comparable to the estimated investments made in the Army’s Future  comparable to the estimated investments made in the Army’s Future  Combat Systems ($10.4 billion) and the Navy’s production of Virginia Class  Combat Systems ($10.4 billion) and the Navy’s production of Virginia Class  submarines ($10.8 billion) during the same period.   submarines ($10.8 billion) during the same period.
Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on  Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on  smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and  smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and  communication capabilities.  Moving this information—including  communication capabilities.  Moving this information—including  bandwidth-intensive data and video—to, from, and across the battlefield  bandwidth-intensive data and video—to, from, and across the battlefield  requires breakthroughs in radio technology.  DOD’s existing or “legacy”  requires breakthroughs in radio technology.  DOD’s existing or “legacy”  radios lack the capacity and flexibility necessary to achieve and maintain  radios lack the capacity and flexibility necessary to achieve and maintain  this level of information superiority.  DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical  this level of information superiority.  DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical  Radio System (JTRS), a development program begun in 1997, to deliver the  Radio System (JTRS), a development program begun in 1997, to deliver the  needed breakthrough.  JTRS relies on networked communications to  needed breakthrough.  JTRS relies on networked communications to  improve information sharing, collaboration, and situational awareness,  improve information sharing, collaboration, and situational awareness,  thus enabling more rapid and effective decision making and execution on  thus enabling more rapid and effective decision making and execution on  the battlefield.  It is intended to provide the bandwidth volume to handle  the battlefield.  It is intended to provide the bandwidth volume to handle  the information traffic, emulate different legacy radios, and function as a  the information traffic, emulate different legacy radios, and function as a  router for tactical networks.  The design of some new weapon systems,  router for tactical networks.  The design of some new weapon systems,  such as the Future Combat Systems, depends on a JTRS-equipped  such as the Future Combat Systems, depends on a JTRS-equipped  network.  network.
At the same time DOD is developing JTRS for future forces, it is striving to  At the same time DOD is developing JTRS for future forces, it is striving to  ensure that current forces are equipped with legacy radios to carry out  ensure that current forces are equipped with legacy radios to carry out  assigned missions.  DOD is confronted with the challenge of balancing the  assigned missions.  DOD is confronted with the challenge of balancing the  investment in both current and future radios—a dynamic proposition  investment in both current and future radios—a dynamic proposition  given that current needs change and future capabilities do not necessarily  given that current needs change and future capabilities do not necessarily  proceed predictably.  To determine whether DOD and the military services  proceed predictably.  To determine whether DOD and the military services  are acquiring radios in the most cost-efficient and effective manner and  are acquiring radios in the most cost-efficient and effective manner and  have developed a strategy to balance near- and long-term requirements,  address capability gaps, and determine funding needs, the Subcommittee  requested that GAO study how effectively DOD and the military services  are managing the acquisition of radio systems.  Specifically, we (1)  examined how the services’ planned investments in key tactical radio  systems have changed over the last 5 years, (2) determined why these  changes occurred, and (3) identified challenges that will confront the  services as they plan tactical radio investments to provide desired future  capabilities.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.  We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
To assess tactical radio investments and risks, we reviewed fiscal year  2003 through 2007 budget requests, procurements of legacy radios for that  time period, the current status of the JTRS program, and JTRS migration  plans.  We interviewed agency officials from various DOD and service  organizations and reviewed plans and reports produced by Defense  organizations.  More details about our scope and methodology are in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on  smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and  communication capabilities.  DOD’s existing tactical radio systems lack  the functionality and flexibility necessary to achieve and maintain  information superiority or to support the rapid mobility and  interoperability desired by the armed forces. Most of these radios were  designed with mutually exclusive architectures to perform specific tasks  and can only interoperate with like radios. Their functions are largely  governed by their hardware components. In addition, they operate at low  to medium data rates, have limited networking capabilities, and are not  capable of simultaneous voice, data, and video operations. Furthermore,  the radios have many unique components and parts that require  specialized support and create a logistics burden.
The military services use many different types of tactical radios, including  some that were developed decades ago. The Single Channel Ground and  Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) is the primary means of command  and control for Army combat and support units. Different variants of the  radio are used in vehicles, aircraft, and as “manpack” radios carried by  soldiers. The radios provide voice and limited data capabilities.  The  Marine Corps also uses SINCGARS, but also relies on the AN/VRC-110 and  the AN/VRC-111 radios for its vehicles. These radios have multiple  waveforms, including the SINCGARS waveform, and can be pulled out of  vehicles and used as handheld radios. The Navy and Air Force use a  variety of radios for their airborne platforms; one of the most common is  the AN/ARC-210, a single-channel radio which provides voice and data  communications over a variety of waveforms.  To meet its fixed station  and maritime needs, the Navy uses the Digital Modular Radio, which  operates on multiple waveforms and provides voice and data capabilities,  and other radios. Appendix II provides a more complete list of selected  tactical radios currently in use and their capabilities.
To support new operational and mission requirements, DOD determined  that the large number and diversity of legacy radios in use would require  wholesale replacement or expensive modifications. The JTRS program  was initiated in 1997 to exploit advancements in software-defined radio  technology and provide superior communications and networking  capabilities to the warfighter. Software-defined radios such as JTRS use  software rather than hardware to control how the radio works and, as a  result, offer significant flexibility to meet a wide variety of needs. Rather  than developing radios that are built to different standards and operate on  different frequencies as was the case in the past, DOD will develop JTRS  as a single, interoperable family of radios based on a common set of  standards and applications.  The radios are expected to not only satisfy  the requirements common to the military’s three operational domains—  air, sea, and ground— but be able to communicate directly with many of  DOD’s existing tactical radios.
In addition to supporting interoperability, JTRS is intended to contribute  to DOD’s goal of network-centric warfare operations by introducing new  wideband networking waveforms that dramatically increase the amount of  data and speed at which the data can be transmitted.  The wideband  networking waveform being developed for ground vehicles, for example, is  expected to provide data rates of up to 5 megabits per second or more  which is at least ten times faster than legacy radio systems—akin to  upgrading from a “dial-up” modem to a broadband connection.  As such,  the waveforms would facilitate the use of maps, imagery, and video to  support the decision making of tactical commanders at all echelons.  Table  1 compares the frequency band, nominal channel bandwidth, and data  rates of selected legacy waveforms and new wideband waveforms.
In addition to providing new wideband waveforms, individual JTRS radios  would have the capability to support multiple services (e.g., voice, data,  and video) and operate on multiple channels simultaneously. For example,  a four-channel JTRS radio set intended for a ground vehicle could be  programmed to have channels dedicated to SINCGARS, EPLRS, the  Wideband Networking Waveform, and the Soldier Radio Waveform. All  four channels could be operating simultaneously. Data could also be  transferred from one channel (or network) to another through a “gateway”  device implemented with hardware and software. Furthermore, since  JTRS is expected to operate as a mobile network, each multi-channel JTRS  set will function as a router, meaning that it is responsible for passing  along information (voice, data, and video) from other JTRS radios.
To manage JTRS’ development, DOD established a joint program office,  and service-led product offices clustered by requirements. In 2006, all the  JTRS programs were realigned under the authority of a single JTRS Joint  Program Executive Officer (JPEO). The JPEO established an  organizational structure for JTRS that includes three domains: (1) ground  radios; (2) air, maritime, and fixed station radios; and (3) network  enterprise services and a program for special radios.
In an effort to manage the transition of tactical radios to JTRS, in 1998, the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,  Communications, and Intelligence issued a memorandum directing all  Component efforts to develop and acquire any radio system be held in  abeyance.  Service, command, or agency acquisition executives could  submit requests for exceptions through the JTRS Joint Program Office and  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information  Integration.  The request for exceptions (or waiver policy) was amended  in May 2005.  The amended policy suspended the waiver process and only  required that notifications of plans to acquire radios be provided to the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.
section_title: Investment in Key Tactical Radio Systems Has Shifted Dramatically in Both Size and Composition
paragraphs: Over the past 5 years, investments in key tactical radios systems have  exceeded planned investments by more than double and shifted  dramatically in scope. In 2003, DOD and the services planned to invest  mainly in the development and production of JTRS.  At the same time,  investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small and  diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. However, actual  spending on tactical radios turned out to be very different. Not only did  spending between fiscal years 2003 and 2007 increase significantly, from  about $3.2 billion to about $8.3 billion, it shifted away from procuring  JTRS to procuring tens of thousands of additional legacy radios. See   figure 1.
In 2003, DOD and the services planned to spend approximately $3 billion  on JTRS over the next 5 years—$1 billion for research and development,  and $2 billion to procure the first JTRS radios. The Army and Marine  Corps planned to spend approximately $235 million for legacy radios  between 2003 and 2007. The Army planned to spend approximately $140  million to procure SINCGARS and handheld and “manpack” radios; the  Marine Corps planned to spend about $98 million to procure a variety of  tactical communications systems.
In actuality, DOD and the services invested over twice as much as planned  to develop JTRS capabilities—about $2.5 billion—while no JTRS  networking radios were produced during this time. Legacy radio spending,  on the other hand, ballooned to approximately $5.7 billion, about 24 times  what was planned.  Of this, the Army spent approximately $4.1 billion,  including $2.3 billion on SINCGARS radios and $1.8 billion on handheld  and manpack radios.  The Marine Corps spent $1.6 billion on a variety of  tactical communication systems.
section_title: Dramatic Change in Tactical Radio Investments Is Due Primarily to Delays with JTRS and Near- Term Operational Needs
paragraphs: The dramatic change in the size and scope of tactical radio investments  over the last 5 years is due to two primary factors.  First, cost, schedule,  and performance problems delayed development of JTRS capabilities by  several years. Second, combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have  significantly increased the demand for tactical radios--a demand that could  only be met by buying legacy radios. The demand was driven by a desire to  equip deploying units with modern radios and a change in concept of  operations that calls for more radios per unit.    The resultant investment  in legacy radios evolved from year to year as needs arose and was largely  enabled by the availability of supplemental funding. Although a  notification process was established to help manage the transition from  legacy radios to JTRS, it was not effective in tracking the extent of  investments in legacy radios that occurred.
subsections: section_title: Development and Production of JTRS Delayed by Several Years
paragraphs: As we have previously reported, developing JTRS has proven to be a  significant technical and management challenge.  A few years into system  development, the program experienced considerable cost and schedule  overruns and performance shortfalls, necessitating a major restructuring  of the program in 2006.  As a result, considerably more time and funding  were added to complete the first increment of JTRS.  The revised  schedules for each of the JTRS program components expanded  development times by several years (see Fig. 2).
The production decision for the Ground Mobile Radio variants, for  example, was delayed by 5 years, from 2005 to 2010.  In addition, the start  of system development for the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station  radios was delayed by 2 years. Although the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed  Station program went through a presystem development phase to reduce  technical risks associated with developing airborne networking  capabilities, the program was delayed from starting until costs and  production quantities could be worked out. Overall, the estimated cost to  develop JTRS and its various program components increased from about  $3.5 billion to almost $6 billion through fiscal year 2011.
Problems encountered with JTRS were largely the result of starting system  development with immature technologies, unstable requirements, and  aggressive schedules.  The Army-led JTRS program for ground vehicles  and helicopters, for example, began system development in 2002 with  none of its 20 critical technologies sufficiently matured, requirements not  clearly defined, and a compressed development schedule that allowed too  little time for testing.  As a result, the program struggled to mature and  integrate technologies to meet size, weight, and power constraints and  evolving security requirements for the radios, and was forced to make  design changes to address these issues. Meeting requirements in the JTRS  Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit radio program also proved to be  challenging, given the smaller size, weight, and power needs for these  radios.
DOD restructured the JTRS program to reduce risk and establish a more  incremental approach to developing JTRS capabilities. In restructuring  JTRS, DOD deferred several requirements and radio features to later  program increments.  For example, DOD reduced the number of radio  variants by half (26 to 13) and the number of waveforms by about two- thirds (32 to 11). The original intent of JTRS was to allow most waveforms  to operate on most of the radio variants. By reducing the number of  waveforms per radio variant, DOD expected to reduce costly porting  efforts—software development needed to make a waveform work on  different radio variants—and more readily address size, weight, and power  constraints.
Although JTRS will deliver radios significantly later than initially planned,  the program is still intended to meet the needs of key users such as the  Future Combat Systems (FCS) program.  FCS, which is a large and  complex effort by the Army to develop a suite of new weapon systems and  vehicles linked by a new information network, is depending on several  JTRS variants and wideband waveforms to provide critical  communications and networking capabilities.  However, as we have  reported over the past several years, the FCS program has struggled to  define requirements and mature critical technologies, and is at risk of  incurring further cost and schedule delays.
Several other users depending on JTRS have had to invest in legacy radio  systems to meet their needs because of the delays with the program. For  example:
Army Aviation, which needed JTRS to provide the required  interoperability capability for Future Force and Joint Force operations,  was planning to buy JTRS radios for its helicopters starting in fiscal  year 2006.  Several Army helicopter systems, such as the Longbow  Apache (AH-64D), are being modernized and the Army planned to  integrate JTRS sets into these aircraft.  According to the Army, the  aircraft modernization work could not be delayed until JTRS becomes  available and the aircraft would not be mission capable without a  communications package. As a result, the Army decided to buy an  alternative legacy radio system to fulfill this need. According to Army  estimates, it will spend approximately $310 million between 2005 and  2013 to procure the alternate radio system for various helicopter  programs.
The Air Force and Navy also had to procure legacy communications  systems for various aircraft systems and ships that were either in  production or being upgraded.  The Air Force, for example, requested  AN/ARC-210 radios for the Global Hawk, F-15E, F-16 Block 40/42, and  A-10 aircraft while the Navy requested Digital Modular Radios for new  ship construction in support of the National Defense Sealift Fund.
The Navy is modernizing the AN/ARC-210 radio in part because of the  need to add certain capabilities that will not be filled by the first  increment of JTRS.  For example, it is adding the capability to host a  Joint Precision Approach and Landing System waveform to the  AN/ARC-210.  The new approach and landing system, which is  intended to provide more accurate Global Positioning System (GPS)- based landing guidance for aircraft during all weather conditions, has  been in development in DOD for several years.  The Navy is also  modernizing the AN/ARC-210 to address National Security Agency  (NSA) requirements for cryptographic obsolescence in legacy radio  systems. According to Navy officials, the Navy plans to spend  approximately $50 million in research and development for the  modernization of the AN/ARC-210 radio.
section_title: Combat Operations and Force Modernization Requirements Have Increased the Demand for Tactical Legacy Radios
paragraphs: Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have also been a key reason  for the huge increase in spending on legacy radios by the Army and Marine  Corps. With the build-up of the war, tactical radios have become critical to  conducting operations. According to the Army and Marine Corps, legacy  radios were purchased to ensure units being deployed had modern  communications capabilities. In some cases, newer versions of legacy  radios were purchased to replace older radios and to ensure units were  equipped to wartime readiness levels.  This included, for example,  replacing several thousand Vietnam-era radios that still existed in certain  Army National Guard and Reserve units with SINCGARS radios.  In  addition, as we have previously reported, some Army National Guard  units were equipped at less than wartime readiness levels (often at 65 to 75  percent of requirements) under the assumption that there would be  sufficient time for Guard forces to obtain additional equipment prior to  deployment. While the Army was able to transfer equipment from non- deploying units to deploying units to compensate for some of these  shortages in the near term, the large number of units needed for  deployment required the purchase of additional communications  equipment.
According to Marine Corps officials, before combat operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan started, the Marine Corps had envisioned keeping many of its  aging legacy radios until the introduction of JTRS radios could replace  them. However, as operations got under way, the Marine Corps began  modernizing its inventory of radios, replacing them with newer legacy  radios that provided improved on-the-move and over-the-horizon  communications capabilities. The Marine Corps, for example, replaced  older versions of SINCGARS and other manpack radios with newer multi- band radios that allow a marine to operate a single radio in either VHF,  UHF line-of-site, or UHF SATCOM modes of operation.  In addition, the  Army and Marine Corps needed radios to replace combat losses and to  equip new force protection vehicles being procured, such as up-armored  High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled vehicles and, more recently, the Mine  Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles.
The Army and Marine Corps have also increased the number of radios to  combat and support units based on lessons learned from combat  operations. As a result of attacks against combat and support vehicles that  did not have sufficient communications capabilities, the services have  been pursuing a strategy to equip virtually every vehicle being used in  combat operations with a radio.  For example, very few trucks in logistics  units were supplied with tactical radios; however, the threat to supply  convoys made providing these units with radios more critical.  Furthermore, the services have expanded communications to platoon and  squad levels of the force, purchasing handheld and intra-squad radios for  soldiers who previously had no radios.  For example, a typical Marine  Corps rifle company, which consists of about 180 marines, was equipped  with 9 tactical radios prior to the war in Iraq.  The same rifle company is  now equipped with about 225 radios, most of which are intended for intra- squad communications.
Moreover, since 2004, the Army has also been going through a major force  restructuring—referred to as modularity—that has driven requirements to  field more tactical radios to lower echelon units. In restructuring the force,  the Army has established modular Brigade Combat Teams and Support  Brigades that are designed, equipped, and staffed differently than the units  they replace. The new brigades are intended to be more self-sustainable,  agile, and deployable through the introduction of key enablers such as  enhanced military intelligence and communications capabilities.  In  September 2004, the Army estimated it would need an additional 66,166  SINCGARS receiver/transmitter units to support the modularity initiative.  Without additional tactical radios, the Army could not achieve its intended  design objectives for these brigade units.
According to Army officials, increased demands for equipment, like radios,  are translated into specific quantities the Army refers to as authorized  acquisition objectives. The acquisition objective establishes the total  quantity of a piece of equipment needed to supply and sustain the force  and is not intended to be constrained in terms of available resources. In  the Army, acquisition objectives are derived from force structure reviews  that analyze threat, operational conditions, and force readiness. As shown  in figure 3, since 2002, the Army’s acquisition objective for SINCGARS  ground radios increased steadily, from about 232,000 radio  receiver/transmitter units in fiscal year 2002 to more than 526,000 units in  2007, reflecting the emergence of new requirements for radios. The Army  bought 244,780 SINCGARS between 2003 and 2007 to meet this objective.
section_title: Investment in Tactical Radios Evolved From Year to Year as Supplemental Funding Became Available
paragraphs: The increased demand for legacy radios was largely facilitated through the  availability of supplemental funding, which provided the vast majority of  funding to procure these radios. Between 2003 and 2007, supplemental  funding supplied an estimated 90 percent—$5.5 out of $6.1 billion—of the  funding the Army and Marine Corps received to procure legacy radios (see  figure 4).  DOD and the services requested a relatively small proportion of  funding through the regular budget process.
The reliance on supplemental budgets to acquire tactical radios continued  in fiscal year 2008, with the Army and Marine Corps requesting an  additional $3.3 billion in October 2007. Although Congress did not act on  the budget request, DOD resubmitted the request in February 2008.  In  March 2008, however, the Army informed Congress that it had overstated  its request for SINCGARS funding by $1.7 billion; the Army had requested  funds for 170,756 more SINCGARS, when only 56,000 were needed to meet  its authorized acquisition objective.
Because DOD’s regular budget process is lengthy—it takes 18 months to  plan, develop, and complete an annual budget submission to Congress--  the services should  identify potential offsets when seeking additional  funding in excess of budget-year guidance levels.  Supplemental budgets  provided an opportunity for the services to respond to emerging needs  relatively quickly and to request funding without having to trade against  other ongoing or planned weapon system investments. However, because  supplemental budgets were developed quickly and as one-time requests to  address immediate needs, they offered little visibility into the services  plans for acquiring tactical radios.
The huge increase in legacy radio investments was also facilitated by the  suspension of a JTRS waiver process. In 1998, DOD instituted a waiver  policy in order to control the acquisition of legacy radios in anticipation of  JTRS capabilities becoming available. In May 2005, in response to delays  with the delivery of JTRS products, DOD suspended the waiver policy for  tactical radios. However, in order to maintain visibility into legacy  procurement activities, DOD still required the services to notify the Office  of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information  Integration (Office) prior to any procurement actions to buy tactical  radios. In notifying the Office of procurement actions, the services were  required to identify the requirements necessitating the procurement and  whether any operational impacts would result if the request was  disapproved.  According to data the Office has collected through federal  contract announcements and other means, notifications from the services  have been inconsistent and do not reflect all tactical radio procurements  that took place over the past several years.  In addition, according to a  representative of the Office, notifications that were submitted by the  services did not provide sufficient detail to understand why radios were  being procured or how the procurement actions fit in with other  procurements.
section_title: Strategy for Acquiring Tactical Radios over Next Several Years in Flux
paragraphs: DOD’s original strategy for acquiring tactical radios centered on JTRS as a  replacement for legacy radios and a means to achieve new networking  capabilities. While JTRS has made progress in developing radio products  and waveforms, it must still resolve key technical hurdles that could lead  to further delays in the program. When JTRS actually becomes available,  however, the strategy of replacing legacy radios as previously envisioned  may no longer be an option in view of (1) the potentially smaller market  for JTRS given the large, unanticipated purchase of legacy radios that have  many years of life left and (2) the need to manage investments within  reasonable funding expectations. In addition, while JTRS radios may offer  significant new capabilities, they are much costlier than legacy radios and  in some cases additional large investments are required to fully integrate  them into existing military platforms. These costs may run counter to  recent decisions to significantly increase the numbers of radios issued to  each unit. The high costs of JTRS radios have led to the services to scale  back their plans for acquiring the radios and have also led to recent efforts  to seek lower cost alternatives. Fielding JTRS expeditiously while making  the most out of the large investment in legacy radios will necessitate  striking a balance—both in terms of capability and cost. DOD, however,  does not yet have a strategy for guiding the services’ acquisition of tactical  radios over the next several years.
subsections: section_title: JTRS Program Must Still Resolve Technology Issues
paragraphs: The JTRS program has made progress since being restructured.  Early  prototypes of JTRS ground radio variants and networking waveforms have  been developed and some JTRS capabilities have been demonstrated in a  laboratory environment and, to a lesser extent, during recent field  experiments. However, significant technological challenges remain that  place completion of JTRS development at risk. In particular, designing  JTRS radios that meet operational requirements within required size,  weight, and power constraints has proven to be particularly challenging  for several of the JTRS radio configurations.  Moreover, the transition  from legacy radios that operate at a single level of security and have their  functionality defined in hardware to networked radios that operate at  multiple levels of security and have their functionality defined in software  has raised new concerns about tactical radios’ security architecture— concerns that were not fully appreciated when the JTRS program began.   Whether or not these technical challenges can be overcome will not be  known until major test and evaluation events are conducted in the next  few years.
JTRS radios require significant amounts of memory and processing power,  particularly to run the new transformational networking waveforms that  will enable network-centric operations.  The processing power required to  run these networking waveforms rapidly consumes electric power in the  radios and generates a significant amount of heat, which must be  dissipated to keep the electronic components of the radio operating at a  safe temperature.  Dissipating heat often requires increasing the size and  weight of the radio.  However, keeping size, weight, and power  consumption to an absolute minimum is a critical operational requirement  for JTRS and particularly for the Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit  variants.  For example, the JTRS program is attempting to develop a 2- channel handheld radio weighing no more than 3.8 pounds that is capable  of running the Soldier Radio Waveform, as well as key legacy waveforms.   The challenge of meeting these design constraints has prompted the  program manager to identify size, weight, and thermal management as  high-risk elements for the JTRS 2-channel handheld radio development.   Although the recently started Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed-Station  program should benefit from the system development experiences of the  earlier JTRS programs, its size, weight, power, and thermal issues are  currently seen as a key program risk.
JTRS radios must address stringent security architecture requirements  established by the NSA and must be certified through a multistage process  during their design and development.  Certification is a rigorous and  potentially time-consuming process, and consequently must be factored  into the schedule for each radio’s system development.  While JTRS  developers must be concerned with traditional security issues affecting all  tactical radios, the unique characteristics of JTRS radios have introduced  new complexities into the certification process.  First, because much of  the functionality of JTRS radios is defined in software rather than in  hardware, developers must be prepared to incorporate the features  commonly required for computer security.  Second, JTRS is required to  operate in a networked environment, at multiple levels of security, and  consequently allows greater access to other networks.  Because this  access increases the number of potential users and the likelihood of  threats to the network, developers must be prepared to implement  additional features required to maintain network security.  According to  NSA representatives, JTRS’s open networking capability has raised the bar  for ensuring that its security architecture is sound.
The JPEO continues to identify security certification requirements as a  significant risk element for the development of each variant of JTRS  radios.  For example, following the preliminary design review of the  Ground Mobile Radio in July 2007, NSA informed the JPEO that certain  aspects of the radio's security architecture did not meet the agency's  standards.  In response to these concerns, the JPEO is assessing potential  design modifications to the radio and hopes to have an implementation  plan in place later this year.  The difficulties encountered in meeting  security requirements also contributed to a significant Nunn-McCurdy  unit-cost breach for the Ground Mobile Radio program that was declared  in November 2007.  The breach reflected an increase in the program  acquisition unit cost of about 24 percent above the current program cost  baseline established in 2002. In addition, the need to address NSA security  requirements has recently delayed the Multifunctional Information  Distribution System-JTRS program.  Although NSA concurred with the  design of the system, the program encountered difficulties in meeting the  requirements for security verification testing. This contributed to a  program schedule slip of almost 12 months.
section_title: Services Reconsidering Commitments to JTRS Because of High Costs and Continued Need for Legacy Radios
paragraphs: While JTRS radios are intended to provide a significant increase in  communications and networking capabilities, they will be significantly  more costly than the legacy radios they will replace.  Depending on the  JTRS product, estimated unit costs will range from an average of about  $27,000 for the Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit radios to more  than $1 million for the much larger maritime/fixed station radios. For some  of the JTRS products, the costs are several times more than the legacy  systems they will replace. For example, a fully configured vehicular  version of the Army’s SINCGARS radio costs about $20,000 and the Army’s  Enhanced Position Location Reporting System costs about $20,000 to  $33,000 depending upon its configuration. In contrast, the average cost of  the 4-channel vehicular configuration of the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio— which will be able to perform the function of both of these legacy radios  and will add a transformational networking capability—is about $220,000.   Similarly, according to AN/ARC-210 program office representatives, the  latest generation of the 1-channel AN/ARC-210 radio costs about $80,000,  with most aircraft configured with two of the radios. In contrast, the  average unit cost of the 2-channel airborne configuration of the JTRS radio  is about $480,000.
Moreover, to take full advantage of the new capabilities JTRS can provide,  it must be integrated into existing military platforms.  Integration costs,  which are in addition to the cost of the JTRS radio itself, are borne by the  integrating program and, according to Navy representatives, are most  significant when attempting to fully integrate the networking capabilities  of the JTRS radio into the mission avionics of legacy aircraft.  Unlike  ships, these aircraft do not have the computer architecture to easily  incorporate modern networking capabilities.  Consequently, fully  integrating JTRS into legacy aircraft will require major modifications to  both the hardware and software of the aircraft’s mission avionic systems,  as well as extensive testing and evaluation to ensure that the airworthiness  of the aircraft has not been adversely affected.  According to Navy  representatives, the cost to retrofit and fully integrate JTRS networking  capabilities into four Naval aircraft—the F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, E-2C, and E- 2D—has been estimated to be about $868 million.  Air Force  representatives agreed that full integration of JTRS onto legacy aircraft  would be very expensive.  They noted, however, that as long as integration  of JTRS occurs in conjunction with major modifications or modernization  of these aircraft—during which mission avionic systems are upgraded and  extensive airworthiness must be carried out—the incremental costs of  integrating JTRS would be much less.
While JTRS was originally intended to replace virtually all legacy radios,  this is no longer a practical or affordable investment strategy for DOD and  the services.  JTRS is still critical to networking the force but the strategy  of a wholesale replacement of radios is being reconsidered in light of the  cost and availability of JTRS radios, the recent large investment in legacy  radios, and the need to continue acquiring legacy radios in the near term.   According to the services, the legacy radios purchased in the past several  years provide effective communications capabilities to meet current  operational demands. As these radios are expected to have an operating  life of 10-15 years, the services expect to use a large proportion of them for  many years to come.  Absent JTRS radios, the services plan to continue  purchasing legacy radios over the next several years because of continuing  combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to implement plans to  increase the size of the force. In January 2007, the President announced a  permanent increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps to enhance  overall U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and provide  more forces for the Global War on Terrorism. The planned expansion will  add more than 74,000 soldiers to the Army by 2013 and 27,000 marines to  the Marine Corps by 2011.
DOD and the services have scaled back the number of JTRS radios they  plan to buy (see table 2).  For example, the total planned quantity of JTRS  Ground Mobile Radios was recently reduced from 108,086 radios to 86,512,  a 20 percent decrease.  While a portion of this decrease is due to the fact  that several Army helicopter systems were originally to have received the  Ground Mobile Radio variant but will now receive the Airborne, Maritime,  and Fixed Station radio variant, the decrease is also due to the Marine  Corps reducing its requirement to only 210 radios. According to Marine  Corps officials, they plan to continue investing in legacy radios and defer  spending on fully capable JTRS radios until later.  In addition, the total  planned quantity of JTRS Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit radios  was recently reduced from an original baseline of 328,514—established in  May 2004—to just 95,551, a 71 percent decrease.
Also, although the JTRS Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed-Station program  was only recently approved to start system development, the number of  required radios identified by the services is significantly lower than the  number they initially identified when JTRS was restructured in 2006— 11,040 versus 17,007 radios. Part of this reduction is due to the Navy and  Marine Corps no longer identifying a requirement for airborne radios and  only a modest requirement for maritime/fixed station radios. According to  Navy officials, the requirement for these radios has been deferred because  of the high cost of the radios and because the airborne radio currently  being developed will not include all the requirements desired by the Navy.  The officials indicated that the JTRS restructuring in 2006 resulted in a  scaled-down version of the airborne radio—with fewer channels and  waveforms--that will not include voice capabilities. Voice is essential for  pilots to be able to talk with other pilots and with ground control.  Navy  officials pointed out that while the JTRS airborne radios would provide  enhanced networking capabilities, the lack of voice capabilities would  necessitate keeping a legacy radio (e.g., the AN/ARC-210) in the aircraft  and there would not be space for both radios. The Air Force plans to  install the JTRS airborne radio primarily in larger aircraft that have space  for multiple radios.
The Joint Program Executive Office has begun to look at other options to  acquire less expensive JTRS radios and other tactical radios. These efforts  include:
The JTRS “Rifleman” Radio. This radio is being planned to meet an  emerging Army need for a low-cost handheld soldier networking radio  that can support intra-squad communications and provide position  location information. The radio will be part of the JTRS small form  factor family.  Specifically, it will be acquired as a less expensive  stand-alone variant of the small form factor “C” radio.  Like the basic  small form factor “C” radio, it is intended to be a 1-channel JTRS- compliant radio with networking capabilities that will support  unclassified communications. However, to achieve significant cost  savings, it is intended to rely on commercial (GPS) services, instead of  military GPS services.  The preliminary unit cost estimate for the radio  is about $2,000, which is significantly less than the $8,700 unit cost of  the small form factor “C” radio using military GPS.  The Army has  proposed an initial requirement for 100,000 or more of these radios.  The Joint Program Executive Office hopes to begin production of the  radio in 2009.
A 2-channel JTRS Ground Mobile Radio.  Although the Army still needs  the 4-channel Ground Mobile Radio for its Future Combat Systems,  senior Army leadership has expressed concern about the high cost of  JTRS Ground Mobile Radios for other components of the force.  According to the Joint Program Executive Office, discussions are now  under way with the Army about potential requirements trades that  could be made, leading to a less expensive 2-channel Ground Mobile  Radio variant.
An enhanced legacy 1-channel handheld radio.  To address the  services’ need for near-term radios, the JPEO began offering an  enhanced legacy handheld radio in 2007 that is capable of running  multiple legacy waveforms, including SINCGARS, and meets NSA  security modernization requirements. However, it does not provide the  networking capabilities intended for JTRS handheld radios. The JPEO  established a consolidated contract that provides two competing  versions of the radio built by different contractors. In addition, the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration reinstated the waiver process for handheld  radio procurements, requiring the services to obtain a waiver for  purchasing radios outside of the consolidated contract. By  consolidating purchases across the services in one contract and using  competitively awarded delivery orders, the cost of these radios is  lower than handheld radios purchased separately by each of the  services. Furthermore, to meet the services’ demand for manpack  radios, the JPEO is now planning to acquire an enhanced manpack  radio and provide it to the services through a consolidated contract  with features similar to the contract for 1-channel handheld radios.
section_title: DOD and the Services Lack a Comprehensive Strategy for Investments in Tactical Radios
paragraphs: Fielding JTRS judiciously without prematurely phasing out legacy radios  will necessitate striking a balance between communications capabilities  and available funding. DOD and the services, however, do not have a  strategy to guide decisions on how best to proceed in acquiring tactical  radios over the next several years—one that prioritizes capability needs,  reconciles needs with bounded funding levels, defines an effective  approach to fielding and sustaining tactical radios, and identifies  contingencies for problems that may occur. Five years ago, DOD and the  services had a migration strategy that was relatively straightforward— replace legacy radios as JTRS became available. Now, however, the  market for new tactical radios is quite different and the services must  balance the continued need for legacy radios with the desire to acquire the  advanced networking capabilities expected with JTRS. In addition,  whereas supplemental funding was readily available in the past to meet  the demand for the huge increase in legacy radios, funding in the future  may be more constrained.  While supplemental budgets may be around for  as long as operations continue in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is mounting  pressure to bring non-war related spending into the normal budget  process.
In October 2003, shortly after JTRS was approved to begin system  development, DOD and the services developed a joint migration plan for  the transition from legacy radios to JTRS. The plan articulated key  objectives for the program.  It also identified the initial quantities of radios  that the services planned to procure each year for fiscal years 2003  through 2012, and for 2013 and beyond, and the platform systems that  would use JTRS.  However, the plan was an interim document and  contained numerous gaps, which the department planned to fill through  refinement and periodic updating.  For example, the plan provided very  limited data linking needs to available and expected funding, and said  nothing about associated integration costs.  DOD had envisioned that the  migration plan would be a “living and evolving document,” which would be  updated on a continuing basis and reviewed annually.  As the plan became  progressively more detailed, the department believed it would help to  identify deficiencies where additional purchases of legacy systems might  be required, and ultimately become a comprehensive roadmap for  transitioning DOD to JTRS-based networked communications.  However,  despite the department’s plans to maintain a living document and the more  complex environment that has arisen since it was put in place, the  migration plan has not yet been updated.
Each of the services has taken some steps to update its JTRS migration  plan. Except for the Air Force, however, these efforts are either outdated  or fall short in helping to identify how the services plan to achieve desired  capabilities, balance near- and long-term needs, and prioritize funding.
The 2004 Navy migration plan provided detailed information on the  legacy radios that would be replaced by JTRS sets, the platforms that  those legacy radios supported, the number of legacy radios fielded, the  estimated number of JTRS channels needed to replace the legacy  radios, and yearly acquisition milestones from 2003 to 2020.  The Navy  plan also provided an estimate of how long legacy radios would be  sustained.
The Air Force completed a relatively extensive JTRS migration plan in  January 2007.  In developing the plan, the Air Force used a  prioritization scheme that assessed the availability, operational status,  and suitability of various aircraft platforms for JTRS. The plan also  identified near-term, mid-term, and long-term phases for achieving  needed communications capabilities in terms of specific platforms,  taking into account integration costs and planned procurement  funding.
The Marine Corps’ August 2007 Strategic Radio Plan provides high- level information on plans to evolve from legacy to network-capable  radios, but does not discuss specific quantities or platforms for  migration into JTRS or funding that will be needed.
The Army has not yet developed a JTRS migration plan, but is in the  process of doing so.  Specifically, the basis of issue for the Army’s  JTRS requirements is currently being developed and is scheduled for  completion later this year.  According to Army officials, the basis of  issue will map out the distribution of JTRS products, by type, for each  brigade-sized unit within the Army.
DOD has also begun to lay the foundation for an updated and more  comprehensive JTRS fielding plan.  Specifically, in May 2007 the Joint  Staff’s director for Command, Control, Communication, and Computer  systems approved the first version of the Tactical Wireless Joint Network  concept of operations.  The network concept of operations seeks to evolve  the JTRS concept of operations into an overarching concept document  that will articulate the department’s expectations for operational and  tactical wireless capabilities. The first version primarily focuses on JTRS,  but future versions are expected to incorporate additional joint programs  and concepts in more detail.  The development of the network concept of  operations is an important first step, and is in line with our September  2006 recommendation that the Secretary of Defense develop JTRS  migration and fielding plans that are consistent with a well-developed  concept of operations for using JTRS networking capabilities.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration has also recently begun to develop a new JTRS  migration and fielding plan and has requested each of the services to  provide detailed information on JTRS and legacy radio requirements.  The  plan is intended to provide visibility into the migration to JTRS, as well as  the status of the services’ legacy radio inventories and related legacy radio  procurements.  The fielding plan would also serve as a data point for  reporting to Congress, a tool for the Joint Staff’s assessment of the  supportability of the JTRS concept of operations, and a means to assess  the services’ compliance with the DOD radio acquisition policy. However,  according to representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary, the  input provided by the services has not been linked to operational  architectures that define the communications and networking tasks and  functions that are needed on the battlefield to enable simultaneous,  interoperable operations.  In addition, the services’ input has lacked  sufficient detail regarding current and future requirements, and funding  priorities. As such, a comprehensive plan that balances needs with  available resources, targets where investments in JTRS should be made,  identifies contingencies in the event JTRS encounters further delays, and  provides central direction for acquiring tactical radios over the next  several years is still lacking.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While weapon system investments are normally associated with major  platforms such as aircraft and ships, DOD’s investment in radios rivals the  cost of some of its largest acquisition programs. As DOD looks ahead at its  tactical radio investments over the next 5 years, it faces a less ambitious,  yet more complicated undertaking than it did in 2003.  DOD hopes to  complete development and begin production of JTRS within the next few  years.  Yet, this is a down sized JTRS program that initially offers less  capability than originally planned.  Instead of being able to phase out old  legacy radios as planned, DOD now faces a much larger inventory of  relatively new legacy radios and improved interim radios with much useful  life left in them.  Phasing out these radios will necessarily be more  deliberate given the huge costs already expended and the expected high  price of JTRS sets.  While much of the increased investment in radios since  2003 has been ad hoc, reactionary, and enabled by large supplemental  budgets, this may have been unavoidable.  However, this does not mean  that the next 5 years should follow suit.  Rather, DOD needs to regain  control over tactical radio investments so that the best mix of capabilities  can be procured with a judicious expenditure of funds.  Having an  investment strategy that establishes priorities, discipline, and contingency  plans will be essential to making good decisions, particularly when  predictability is elusive.  While DOD and the services are making a series  of decisions on a case-by-case basis to reconcile JTRS investments with  lower-cost alternatives and relatively young legacy radio inventories, this  approach could make future capabilities a product of such decisions  rather than the strategic choice it should be. DOD does not have such a  strategy today, and its previous migration plans and its waiver/notification  process have been overtaken by events.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DOD’s ability to plan for and manage the development and  fielding of tactical radios across the department, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense    develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for making  sound investment decisions for tactical radios that:  is based on operational architectures that define the  communications and networking functions needed on the  battlefield,    assesses and prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed in  the near- and long-term,    sets bounds for the funding that will be committed to address these  needs,  lays out an effective migration and fielding plan for delivering  capabilities to the warfighter, and  identifies contingencies in case there are further problems and  delays with JTRS.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense reinvigorate the tactical radio notification/waiver process to provide  department wide insight into the continued procurement of legacy and  interim radios. In doing so, consideration should be given to ensuring  clear guidance and procedures are developed and communicated  across the department.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In its letter commenting on the draft of our report, DOD agreed with our  recommendations.  DOD’s letter is reprinted in appendix III.  DOD noted  that our report recommendations are consistent with the measures taken  by the department to develop a comprehensive strategy and plan for  optimizing investments in future systems, such as JTRS, while balancing  the need for further investment in current systems.  As we point out in the  report, DOD has recently taken steps to develop a new migration and  fielding plan for tactical radio systems.  However, DOD did not provide  any additional information on the measures it is taking that are consistent  with our recommendations.  It is important that the additional measures  the Department does take provide a strategic basis for making investment  decisions on tactical radios in the future.  Specifically, the Department’s  plan needs to be linked to operational architectures, prioritize capability  needs, set funding bounds, and identify contingencies to address potential  delays with JTRS.
DOD also provided detailed comments, which we incorporated where  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking  Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that  have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will also send  copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army,  and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will   also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If  you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess how the services’ planned investments in key tactical radio  systems changed over the last 5 years, we compared the services’ fiscal  year 2003 to 2007 tactical radio procurement plans to actual procurements.  To calculate the Army’s spending plans for tactical radios, we utilized the  SINCGARS and Improved High Frequency Family of Radios budget line  items.  It is important to note that the Improved High Frequency Family of  Radios budget line began in fiscal year 2005; prior to this date, the Army  had been utilizing a combination of budget lines to procure handheld and  manpack radios. To calculate Marine Corps plans for tactical radios we  utilized the Radio Systems budget line, which includes a variety of radios.  To determine the actual procurement of legacy radios between 2003 and  2007, we sent out a data call to service acquisition officers.  For the Army,  we obtained actual procurement information from the Program Manager  Tactical Radio Communications System (PMO TRCS) in Fort Monmouth,  N.J.  For the Marine Corps, we obtained more accurate information from  Headquarters Marine Corps Command, Control, Communications and  Computers in Washington, D.C. through comments to our draft report. We  were unable to obtain plans or actual procurement information from the  Navy or Air Force. According to Navy and Air Force officials, these  services do not centrally procure radios.
To assess why tactical radio procurement plans changed, we reviewed and  analyzed samples of tactical radio procurement waivers/notifications  submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and  Information Integration (ASD NII) by the services.  These waivers and  notifications provide information as to why the procurements were  needed.  In addition, we interviewed officials from: Navy’s Program  Executive Office Command, Control, Communications, Computers and  Intelligence (PEO C4I) San Diego, California;  Air Combat Electronics  Program Office (PMA 209) Patuxent River, Md.;  Office of the Chief of  Naval Operations , Directorate for Communication Networks, Arlington,  Va.;  Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.;  Marine  Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va.;  Army Aviation, Arlington, Va.;    Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Arlington, Va.; Office of the  Army’s Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C.;  Office of the  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Rosslyn, Va.; and the  Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Va.
To determine what challenges will confront the services as they plan  tactical radio investments to provide future capabilities, we obtained and  analyzed briefings from JTRS program managers, reviewed the JTRS  Board of Directors quarterly reports for the first and second quarters of  fiscal year 2008, the 2003 JTRS joint migration plan, as well as service  migration plans for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; reviewed the  services’ estimates for future JTRS procurements and interviewed officials  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics; the National Security Agency; the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of  the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff (G-8); and the Office of the Chief of Naval  Operations, Directorate for Air Warfare.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.  We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected Tactical Radios
paragraphs: Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected  Tactical Radios 5 miles (environment  dependent)
ANDVT (PSK); P25   5 miles (environment  dependent)
LSB, USB, AME,  CW, VHF-FM  (environment  dependent) (VHF) SINCGARS,  LOS 30 to 512MHz,  (terrain dependent)
Ground to ground:  10 Km  Ground to air: 40 Km 5W – 5-10Km  (voice)  50W – 10-40Km  (voice)  20 miles  (environment  dependent)
LSB, USB, AME,  CW, VHF-FM  (environment  dependent) (VHF) SINCGARS,  LOS 30 to 512MHz,  (UHF)SATCOM,  (terrain dependent)
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, Greg Campbell, John Oppenheim,  Guisseli Reyes-Turnell, Jeffrey Rose, Jay Tallon, Hai Tran, Alyssa Weir,  and Paul Williams made key contributions to this report.