Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Continue to Face Challenges Developing and Acquiring Screening Technologies
Published: 2013-05-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: TSA acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life cycle costs and support a range of aviation security programs, including technologies used to screen passengers and checked baggage. Within DHS, TSA is responsible for establishing requirements for testing and deploying transportation system technologies. Since 2010, GAO has reported that DHS and TSA faced challenges in managing acquisition efforts, including deploying technologies that did not meet requirements and were not appropriately tested and evaluated.
As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the extent to which TSA addressed challenges relating to developing and meeting program requirements, testing new screening technologies, and delivering capabilities within cost and schedule estimates for selected programs, and (2) DHS efforts to strengthen oversight of component acquisition processes. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from January 2010 through January 2013, including selected updates conducted in March 2013 on TSA's efforts to implement GAO's prior recommendations and preliminary observations from ongoing work. To conduct the updates and ongoing work, GAO analyzed documents, such as the AIT road map, and interviewed TSA officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken and is taking steps to address challenges related to developing, testing, and delivering screening technologies for selected aviation security programs, but challenges remain. For example, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA faced challenges developing and meeting key performance requirements for the acquisition of advanced imaging technology (AIT)--i.e., full-body scanners. Specifically, GAO found that TSA did not fully follow Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisition policies when acquiring AIT, which resulted in DHS approving nationwide AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSA's revised specifications. DHS required TSA to notify DHS's Acquisition Review Board (ARB) if AIT could not meet any of TSA's five key performance parameters or if TSA changed a key performance parameter during testing. However, GAO found that the ARB approved TSA for full-scale production without reviewing the changed parameter. DHS officials said that the ARB should have formally reviewed this change to ensure that TSA did not change it arbitrarily. GAO recommended that TSA develop a road map that outlines vendors' progress in meeting all key performance parameters. DHS agreed, and developed a road map to address the recommendation, but faces challenges implementing it--e.g., due to vendor delays. Additionally, in January 2013, GAO reported that TSA faced challenges related to testing and deploying passenger screening canine teams. Specifically, GAO concluded that TSA began deploying these canine teams to airport terminals in April 2011 prior to determining the canine teams' operational effectiveness. In June 2012, DHS and TSA began conducting operational assessments to help demonstrate canine teams' effectiveness. Also, TSA began deploying teams before it had completed an assessment to determine where within the airport the canine teams would be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that on the basis of DHS assessment results, TSA expand and complete testing to assess the effectiveness of canine teams in areas of the airport deemed appropriate. DHS agreed and officials said that as of April 2013, TSA had concluded testing in collaboration with DHS of canine teams in airport sterile areas--in general, areas of an airport for which access is controlled through screening of persons and property--and is testing teams on its own in airport sterile and public areas.
DHS has some efforts under way to strengthen its oversight of component investment and acquisition processes, but additional actions are needed. In September 2012, GAO reported that while DHS had initiated efforts to address the department's acquisition management challenges, most of DHS's major acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver less capability than promised. GAO identified 42 DHS programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the programs' costs increasing from a total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011--an aggregate increase of 166 percent. GAO concluded that DHS recognized the need to implement its acquisition policy more consistently, but that significant work remained. GAO recommended that DHS modify acquisition policy to better reflect key program and portfolio management practices and ensure acquisition programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy. DHS agreed, and in September 2012 officials stated that it was in the process of revising its policy to more fully reflect key program management practices.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made recommendations to DHS and TSA in prior reports to help strengthen its acquisition processes and oversight. DHS and TSA generally concurred and are taking actions to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and members of the  committee:  I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work examining the  Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to develop and  acquire new technologies to address homeland security needs. Within the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), TSA is responsible for securing  the nation’s transportation systems. TSA’s acquisition programs represent  billions of dollars in life cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation  security missions and investments, including technologies used to screen  passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo, among others. For  example, technologies used to screen passengers include advanced  imaging technology (AIT), commonly referred to as full-body scanners,  that screen passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats such as  weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of  clothing, and passenger screening canines trained to detect explosives  being carried or worn by passengers. In addition, technologies used to  screen checked baggage include explosives detection systems (EDS),  which use X-rays with computer-aided imaging to automatically measure  the physical characteristics of objects in baggage. Consistent with its  responsibility, TSA establishes requirements for testing and deploying  these technologies to, for example, screen airline passengers and their  property.
Since 2010, we have reported that DHS and TSA have experienced  challenges in managing their multibillion-dollar acquisition efforts,  including implementing technologies that did not meet intended  requirements and were not appropriately tested and evaluated, and not  consistently completing analyses of costs and benefits before  technologies were deployed for operational use. As requested, my  testimony provides an update on that work, including (1) the extent to  which TSA has addressed challenges relating to developing and meeting  program requirements, testing new screening technologies, and  delivering capabilities within agreed-upon cost and schedule estimates for  select programs, and (2) DHS efforts to strengthen its oversight of  component investment and acquisition processes.
This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from  January 2010 through January 2013, including selected updates  conducted in March 2013 on TSA’s efforts to implement our prior  recommendations. Specifically, to conduct these updates, we obtained  information from TSA on the status of the current EDS acquisition and  upgrades to existing systems, as well as on testing of passenger  screening canine teams. Our previous reports incorporated information  we obtained and analyzed from TSA and DHS officials on efforts to  manage, test, acquire, deploy, and oversee various technology programs,  including program schedules, planning documents, testing reports, and  other acquisition documentation. Our previously published products  contain additional details on the scope and methodology of our reports.
In addition, this statement includes preliminary observations based on  ongoing work we conducted during the winter of 2013 at your request,  assessing the effectiveness of AIT equipped with automated target  recognition (ATR) software. documents and interviewed TSA officials on the status of AIT  development and deployment efforts and milestones. All of our work was  conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For new information that  was based on work not previously reported, we obtained TSA’s views on  our findings and incorporated technical comments where appropriate.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: We plan to issue a report with the results from this work in the fall of 2013. AIT systems  equipped with ATR software display anomalies that could pose a threat using a generic  figure for all passengers. management challenges—into one department.effectively address DHS’s management and mission risks could have  serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. Given the  significant effort required to build and integrate a department as large and  complex as DHS, our initial high-risk designation addressed the  department’s initial transformation and subsequent implementation  efforts, to include associated management and programmatic challenges.  At that time, we reported that the creation of DHS was an enormous  undertaking that would take time to achieve, and that the successful  transformation of large organizations, even those undertaking less  strenuous reorganizations, could take years to implement.
As DHS continued to mature, and as we reported in our assessment of  DHS’s progress and challenges 10 years after the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001, we found that the department implemented key  homeland security operations and achieved important goals in many  areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. result, we narrowed the scope of the high-risk area and changed the  name from Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland  Security to Strengthening the Department of Homeland Security  Management Functions. Recognizing DHS’s progress in transformation  and mission implementation, our 2011 high-risk update focused on the  continued need to strengthen DHS’s management functions (acquisition,  information technology, financial management, and human capital) and  integrate those functions within and across the department, as well as the  impact of these challenges on the department’s ability to effectively and  efficiently carry out its missions.
GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in  Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11, GAO-11-881  (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2011). passenger aircraft. In response to the December 25, 2009, attempted  terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, TSA revised its  procurement and deployment strategy for AIT, commonly referred to as  full-body scanners, increasing the number of AIT units it planned to  procure and deploy. TSA stated that AIT provides enhanced security  benefits compared with walk-through metal detectors, such as enhanced  detection capabilities for identifying nonmetallic threat objects and liquids.  In July 2011, TSA began installing ATR software on deployed AIT  systems designed to address privacy concerns by eliminating passenger- specific images. As of May 2013, TSA had deployed about 750 AIT  systems to more than 200 airports, most of which were equipped with  ATR software. In January 2012, we issued a classified report on TSA’s  procurement and deployment of AIT that addressed the extent to which  (1) TSA followed DHS acquisition guidance when procuring AIT and (2)  deployed AIT units are effective at detecting threats. Pursuant to the FAA  Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, TSA was mandated to ensure  that all AIT systems used to screen passengers are equipped with and  employ ATR software by June 1, 2012. Consistent with provisions of the  law, TSA subsequently extended this deadline to June 1, 2013.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Some Steps to Address Challenges Identified in Developing, Testing, and Delivering Select Screening Technologies
paragraphs: While TSA has taken some steps and is taking additional steps to  address challenges related to developing, testing, and delivering  screening technologies for selected aviation security programs, additional  challenges remain.
subsections: section_title: Developing and Meeting Key Performance Requirements for TSA Screening Technologies
paragraphs: In January 2012, we issued a classified report on TSA’s procurement and deployment of  AIT at airport checkpoints. (ARB) if AIT could not meet any of TSA’s five key performance  parameters or if TSA changed a key performance parameter during  qualification testing. Senior TSA officials acknowledged that TSA did not  comply with the directive’s requirements, but stated that TSA still reached  a “good decision” in procuring AIT and that the ARB was fully informed of  the program’s changes to its key performance parameters. Further, TSA  officials stated that the program was not bound by AD 102 because it was  a new acquisition process and they believed that the ARB was not fully  functioning at the time. DHS officials stated that the ARB discussed the  changed key performance parameter but did not see the documents  related to the change and determined that TSA must update the  program’s key acquisition document, the Acquisition Program Baseline,  before TSA could deploy AIT systems. However, we concluded that,  according to a February 2010 acquisition decision memorandum from  DHS, the ARB gave approval to TSA for full-scale production without  reviewing the changed key performance parameter. DHS officials stated  that the ARB should have formally reviewed changes made to the key  performance parameter to ensure that TSA did not change it arbitrarily.  According to TSA, it should have submitted its revised requirements for  approval, but it did not because there was confusion as to whether DHS  should be informed of all changes. Acquisition best practices state that  programs procuring new technologies with fluctuating requirements pose  challenges to agencies ensuring that the acquisition fully meets program  needs.requirements is not a best practice for system acquisitions already under  way. As a result, we found that TSA procured and deployed a technology  that met evolving requirements, but not the initial requirements included in  its key acquisition requirements document that the agency initially  determined were necessary to enhance aviation security. We  recommended that TSA develop a road map that specifies development  milestones for AIT and have DHS acquisition officials approve the road  map. DHS agreed with our recommendation and has taken actions to  address it, which we discuss below.
DHS acquisition oversight officials agreed that changing key  EDS. In July 2011, we found that TSA revised its EDS requirements to  better address current threats, and had plans to implement these   However, we found that some  requirements in a phased approach. number of EDS machines in TSA’s checked baggage screening fleet  were configured to detect explosives at the levels established in 2005 and  that the remaining EDS machines are configured to detect explosives at  levels established in 1998.requirements, it did not have a plan with the appropriate time frames  needed to deploy EDS machines that meet the requirements. To help  ensure that TSA’s checked baggage-screening machines are operating  most effectively, we recommended that TSA develop a plan to deploy  EDSs that meet the most recent explosive detection requirements  established in 2010 and ensure that new machines, as well as machines  already deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels established in  those requirements. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has  begun taking action to address it. Specifically, in April 2012, TSA reported  that it had awarded contracts to vendors to implement detection upgrades  across the currently deployed EDS fleet to meet the 2010 requirements.  In March 2013, TSA reported that it plans to complete upgrading the  currently deployed fleet by the end of fiscal year 2013. However, our   When TSA established the 2005  recommendation is intended to ensure that EDS machines in use at  airports meet the most recent detection requirements—both previously  deployed units as well as newly procured machines. Until TSA develops  such a plan, it will be difficult for the agency to provide reasonable  assurance that its upgrade approach is feasible or cost-effective.
section_title: Testing New Screening Technologies
paragraphs: As we have reported in the past few years, TSA has not always resolved  problems discovered during testing, which has led to costly redesign and  rework at a later date, as shown in the following examples. We concluded  that addressing such problems before moving to the acquisition phase  can help agencies better manage costs. Specifically:  Canines. In January 2013, we found that TSA began deploying  passenger screening canine teams to airport terminals in April 2011 prior  to determining the teams’ operational effectiveness. According to TSA  officials, operational assessments did not need to be conducted prior to  deployment because canines were being used to screen passengers by  other entities, such as airports in the United Kingdom. In June 2012, the  DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA began  conducting operational assessments to help demonstrate the  effectiveness of passenger screening canine teams. We recommended  that on the basis of the results of DHS’s assessments, TSA expand and  complete operational assessments of passenger screening canine teams,  including a comparison with conventional explosives detection canine  teams before deploying passenger screening canine teams on a  nationwide basis to determine whether they are an effective method of  screening passengers in the U.S. airport environment, particularly since  they cost the federal government more than TSA’s conventional canine  teams.screening canine teams before it had completed an assessment to   Additionally, we found that TSA began deploying passenger  determine where within the airport (i.e., the public, checkpoint, or sterile  areas) the teams would be most effectively utilized. TSA leadership  focused on initially deploying passenger screening canine teams to a  single location within the airport—the sterile area—because it thought it  would be the best way to foster stakeholders’ acceptance of the teams.  However, aviation stakeholders we interviewed at the time raised  concerns about this deployment strategy, stating that passenger  screening canine teams would be more effectively utilized in nonsterile  areas of the airport, such as curbside or in the lobby areas. DHS  concurred with our recommendation to expand and complete testing to  assess the effectiveness of the teams in areas of the airport deemed  appropriate. As of April 2013, TSA concluded testing with DHS S&T of  passenger screening canine teams in the sterile areas of airports, and  TSA is still in the process of conducting its own testing of the teams in the  sterile and public areas of the airports.
GAO-11-740.
List for its acquisition of EDS, which would separate the need for  explosives data from future procurements, and would require that EDS be  certified to meet detection requirements prior to beginning acquisitions of  EDS to meet those requirements.
section_title: Delivering Capabilities within Schedule and Cost Estimates
paragraphs: According to best practices established in prior work on major  acquisitions, realistic program baselines with stable requirements for cost,  schedule, and performance are important to delivering capabilities within  schedule and cost estimates. Our prior work has found that program  performance metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators  of program health and can be valuable tools for improving oversight of  individual programs. According to DHS’s acquisition guidance, the  program baseline is the contract between the program and departmental  oversight officials and must be established at program start to document  the program’s expected cost, deployment schedule, and technical  performance. Best practices guidance states that reliable and realistic  cost, schedule, and performance estimates help ensure that a program  will deliver capabilities on time and within budget.reported in the past few years and on the basis of our preliminary  observations from our ongoing work, TSA has not always developed  accurate baselines for establishing cost, schedule, and performance  estimates.
However, as we have  AIT. In January 2012, we found that TSA did not have clear plans to  require AIT vendors to meet milestones used during the AIT acquisition.  On the basis of our findings, we recommended that TSA develop a road  map that outlines vendors’ progress in meeting all key performance  parameters because it is important that TSA convey vendors’ progress in  meeting those requirements and full costs of the technology to decision  makers when making deployment and funding decisions. While TSA  reported that it hoped vendors would be able to gradually improve  meeting key performance parameters for AIT over time, we concluded  that TSA would have more assurance that limited taxpayer resources are  used effectively by developing a road map that specifies development  milestones for the technology and having DHS acquisition officials  approve this road map. DHS agreed with our recommendation and has  taken actions to address it. For example, in February 2012, TSA  developed a road map that specifies development and deployment  milestones, including the addition of ATR to existing deployed systems,  continued development of enhanced detection capabilities, and  acquisition plans for the next generation of AIT systems (AIT-2). In July  2012, DHS acquisition officials reviewed the AIT road map. However, on  the basis of our preliminary observations from our ongoing work  conducted in March 2013, we found that TSA has fallen behind schedule  as outlined in the AIT road map to install ATR software upgrades to  existing deployed AIT systems because of one of the vendors’ inability to  develop this software in time for the installation of ATR software on all  units by June 2013. TSA subsequently decided to terminate its contract  with this vendor and remove all deployed units from airports. TSA has  also fallen behind schedule as outlined in the AIT road map to acquire  and test AIT-2 systems because of vendors’ inability to provide required  documentation verifying that contractual requirements have been met and  the units are ready to begin testing. Although TSA updated the AIT road  map in October 2012, it subsequently missed some of the key deadlines  specified in the updated version as well. We currently have ongoing work  related to this area and we plan to report the results in the fall of 2013.
EDS. In July 2011, we found that TSA had established a schedule for the  acquisition of EDS machines but it did not fully comply with leading  practices, and TSA had not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS fleet to  meet the current explosives detection requirements. These leading practices state that the success of a large-scale system acquisition, such  as TSA’s EDS acquisition, depends in part on having a reliable schedule  that identifies when the program’s set of work activities and milestone  events will occur, amongst other things. However, we reported that the  schedule for the EDS acquisition is not reliable because it does not reflect  all planned program activities and does not include a timeline to deploy  EDSs or plans to procure EDSs to meet subsequent phases of explosive  detection requirements. On the basis of our findings, we concluded that  developing a reliable schedule would help TSA better monitor and  oversee the progress of the EDS acquisition. DHS concurred with our  recommendation to develop and maintain a schedule for the entire  Electronic Baggage Screening Program in accordance with the leading  practices we identified for preparing a schedule. In July 2011, DHS  commented that TSA had already begun working with key stakeholders to  develop and define requirements for a schedule and to ensure that the  schedule aligns with the best practices we outlined. TSA reported in  March 2013 that it plans to have an updated integrated master schedule  by September 2013.
GAO, Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at the  Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost Estimates, GAO-12-266  (Washington D.C.: Apr. 27, 2012). can be used to support DHS funding and budget decisions. In April 2013,  TSA reported it plans to have an updated integrated master schedule and  revised life cycle cost estimate by September 2013, which, when  completed, will allow it to update its cost estimate for the Electronic  Baggage Screening Program.
section_title: DHS Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen Oversight of Component Acquisitions
paragraphs: In part because of the challenges we have highlighted in DHS’s  acquisition process, strengthening DHS’s management functions remains  on our high-risk list. However, DHS has efforts under way to strengthen  its oversight of component acquisition processes.
We found in September 2012 that while DHS has initiated efforts to  address the department’s acquisition management challenges, most of  the department’s major acquisition programs continue to cost more than  expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver less capability  than promised. We identified 42 programs that experienced cost growth,  schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the programs’ costs increasing from a  total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011—an aggregate  increase of 166 percent. Moreover, we reported that DHS leadership has  authorized and continued to invest in major acquisition programs even  though the vast majority of those programs lack foundational documents  demonstrating the knowledge needed to help manage risks and measure  performance. For example, we found that DHS leadership—through the  Investment Review Board or its predecessor body, the ARB—has  formally reviewed 49 of the 71 major programs. We found that DHS  permitted 43 of those programs to proceed with acquisition activities  without verifying the programs had developed the knowledge in key  acquisition documents as required by AD 102.  DHS officials reported  that DHS’s culture has emphasized the need to rapidly execute missions  more than sound acquisition management practice and that DHS could  not approve the documents in a timely manner. On the basis of our  findings, we concluded that DHS recognized the need to implement its  acquisition policy more consistently, but that significant work remains. We  recommended that DHS modify acquisition policy to better reflect key  program and portfolio management practices and ensure acquisition  programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy. DHS concurred with  our recommendations and reported taking actions to address some of  them. For example, in September 2012, DHS stated that it was in the  process of revising its policy to more fully reflect key program  management practices to enable DHS to more rapidly respond to  programs’ needs by facilitating the development, approval, and delivery of  more specific guidance for programs.
In March 2012, we found that to enhance the department’s ability to  oversee major acquisition programs, DHS realigned the acquisition  management functions previously performed by two divisions within the  Office of Chief Procurement Officer to establish the Office of Program  Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) in October 2011. PARM,  which is responsible for program governance and acquisition policy,  serves as the Management Directorate’s executive office for program  execution and works with DHS leadership to assess the health of major  acquisitions and investments. To help with this effort, PARM is developing  a database, known as the Decision Support Tool, intended to improve the  flow of information from component program offices to the Management  Directorate to support its oversight and management efforts. However, we  reported in March 2012 that DHS executives were not confident enough  in the data to use the Decision Support Tool to help make acquisition  decisions. On the basis of our findings, we concluded that DHS had  limited plans to improve the quality of the data because PARM planned to  check the data quality only in preparation for key milestone meetings in  the acquisition process. We reported that this could significantly diminish  the Decision Support Tool’s value because users cannot confidently  identify and take action to address problems meeting cost or schedule  goals prior to program review meetings.
In February 2013, we reported that DHS updated its Integrated Strategy  for High Risk Management in June 2012, which includes management  initiatives and corrective actions to address acquisition management  challenges, among other management areas. In the June 2012 update, DHS included, for the first time, performance measures and progress  ratings for all of the management initiatives. The June 2012 update also  identified the resources needed to implement most of its corrective  actions, although we found that DHS needs to further identify its resource  needs and communicate and mitigate critical gaps. On the basis of our  findings, we concluded that the strategy, if implemented and sustained,  will provide a path for DHS to be removed from our high risk list. Going  forward, DHS needs to continue implementing its Integrated Strategy for  High Risk Management and show measurable, sustainable progress in  implementing its key management initiatives and corrective actions and  achieving outcomes including those related to acquisition management.  We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to determine if the actions and  outcomes are achieved.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and members of the  committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to  responding to any questions that you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Steve Lord at (202)  512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include Dave Bruno, Assistant Director; Carissa Bryant; Susan Czachor;  Emily Gunn; and Tom Lombardi. Key contributors for the previous work  that this testimony is based on are listed within each individual product.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: High-Risk Series: Government-wide 2013 Update and Progress Made by  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-13-444T. Washington, D.C.:  March 21, 2013.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February  14, 2013.
TSA Explosives Detection Canine Program: Actions Needed to Analyze  Data and Ensure Canine Teams Are Effectively Utilized. GAO-13-239.  Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2013.
Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment  Management to Help Meet Mission Needs. GAO-12-833. Washington,  D.C.: September 18, 2012.
Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Face Challenges Overseeing  Acquisition of Screening Technologies. GAO-12-644T. Washington, D.C.:  May 9, 2012.
Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at the  Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost  Estimates. GAO-12-266. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2012.
Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced  in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs. GAO-12-541T.  Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2012  Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are  Needed to Improve Security. GAO-11-938T. Washington, D.C.:  September 16, 2011.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining  in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11.  GAO-11-881. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2011.
Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and  Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.:  July 15, 2011.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Improve Security, but  Additional Efforts Remain. GAO-11-807T. Washington, D.C.: July 13,  2011.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection  Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions  Are Needed. GAO-11-740. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  16, 2011.
Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex  Acquisitions. GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes.  GAO-10-374T. Washington, D.C.: January 20, 2010.
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