Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor
Published: 2006-06-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq has led to widespread interest by Congress and the public regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment. GAO initiated a series of engagements under the Comptroller General's authority to address these concerns. In March 2006, GAO reported on factors that affected the production and installation of armor for the Army's medium and heavy trucks. This engagement examines issues affecting the production and installation of armor for the Marine Corps' medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation of add-on truck armor in September 2004--8 months after the requirements were identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine Corps installed interim armor that did not provide sufficient IED protection, which Marine Corps officials acknowledged, stating that their intent was to field some level of protection until a more robust armor solution became available. In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in September 2004 with armor that provided enhanced IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading to integrated armor for its 7-ton trucks, which provides improved protection because the armor is built into the body of the vehicle. They expect to complete installation by May 2006. Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months after the Army. Consequently, this delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim armor that met IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did not officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004--2 months after the Army began its truck armor program in November 2003. According to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps fielded the interim armor with only limited IED protection. Second, mission needs restricted the rate at which the Marine Corps could replace its interim armor with add-on armor and install integrated armor. The Marine Corps and DOD have taken actions to improve the timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine Corps is alsotaking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to address the availability of truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD established a joint requirements process to improve coordination and accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions. However, it is unclear whether this process applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes the development of new technology solutions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi  When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi  Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization  Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization  operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that  operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that  time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from  time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from  insurgents using a variety of weapons— including improvised explosive  insurgents using a variety of weapons— including improvised explosive  devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers—and there have been  devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers—and there have been  numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and  numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and  equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in particular, has  equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in particular, has  become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one  become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one  killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of  killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of  dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells, or other types of military  dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells, or other types of military  ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic routes, and  ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic routes, and  are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military personnel.  are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military personnel.
As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and  As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and  the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection  the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection  of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of  of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of  new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to  new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to  include such improvements as add-on and integrated armor for trucks,  include such improvements as add-on and integrated armor for trucks,  body armor, and systems for detecting and defeating IEDs.  body armor, and systems for detecting and defeating IEDs.
In response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the public  In response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the public  regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment for  regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment for  deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-mobility  deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-mobility  multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we initiated  multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we initiated  a series of engagements under the authority of the Comptroller General of  the United States to examine this issue. In April 2005 we reported on  shortages of a number of critical items during OIF, to include certain  protective items such as body armor and armored HMMWVs. We  identified a number of systemic causes for these shortages, including  inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and ineffective distribution  processes. As a result, we made several recommendations to the Secretary  of Defense calling for actions, such as ensuring the accuracy of Army war  reserve requirements and developing and exercising deployable  distribution capabilities, to improve DOD’s system for supplying items to  U.S. forces. In March 2006, we reported on several factors that affected the  production and installation of Army truck armor during OIF and other  current wartime operations. These factors included the Army’s failure to  fully capitalize on previously identified truck armor requirements and  awarding contracts for amounts less than total requirements due to  increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. In our report, we  made a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense calling for the Army  to establish a process for documenting and communicating all urgent  wartime funding requirements for supplies and equipment when they are  identified and the disposition of funding decisions.
This current engagement examines issues affecting the production and  installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Marine Corps  forces during OIF and other ongoing operations in the U.S. Central  Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. Our objectives were to   (1) determine the extent to which Marine Corps truck armor was  produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what  factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what  actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely  availability of truck armor.
In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical  trucks used by Marine Corps forces in the CENTCOM area of  responsibility, which included those in Iraq and Afghanistan. To identify  the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet  identified requirements and what factors affected the time to provide  armor, we visited Marine Corps organizations to obtain data on the  requirements, funding, production, and installation of truck armor kits. We  considered the armor requirement as met for each type of truck when the  quantity of add-on and integrated armor produced and installed on  vehicles equaled the requirement. Based on the information gathered, we  identified factors that affected the time to provide truck armor to deployed  forces. We also identified the Marine Corps’ short-term and long-term  efforts to improve the availability of truck armor. We assessed the  reliability of the data we obtained and determined that they were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our  review from April 2005 to March 2006 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of  our scope and methodology is located in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Marine Corps convoys carrying supplies and equipment in CENTCOM’s  area of responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents  using IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Marine  Corps has undertaken several force protection measures, such as adding  armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq,  Afghanistan, and other CENTCOM locations. The Marine Corps fielded  truck armor after identifying requirements and then designing and  procuring three different levels of armor and fielding that armor in three  different phases.
subsections: section_title: Deployed U.S. Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs
paragraphs: Military convoys operating in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility have been  subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in Iraq  by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at tremendous  risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the region. In May  2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization operations in Iraq that  continue today. However, since that time, the United States has incurred  more casualties than during major combat operations, mostly due to  ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents operating in Iraq. The threat from  IEDs has grown progressively, from single mortar rounds, to multiple  explosives linked together, to suicide car bombs. In the spring of 2004,  nearly every attack from an IED resulted in a coalition casualty. In  particular, U.S. military convoys have been the targets of these types of  attacks. In addition to Iraq, U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan also have  been subjected to IED attacks.
IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a  number of different ways. They can contain commercial or military  explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance  components. For example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been  employed as IEDs in Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many  vehicles—from small sedans to large cargo trucks—stationed along the  roadways. Furthermore, “person-borne” suicide bombs have also been  used, with explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is  specifically modified to conceal and carry this material.
section_title: Outfitting Marine Corps Trucks with Armor
paragraphs: In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars  and rocket launchers, the Marine Corps has undertaken several force  protection measures, including adding armor to a number of medium and  heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other CENTCOM  locations. The trucks being armored by the Marine Corps include the  Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck), the  multipurpose 5-ton truck, and the 22-ton Logistics Vehicle System (LVS).  The MTVR and 5-ton are multipurpose medium trucks that transport all  types of supplies. The LVS is a heavy truck that transports a variety of  supplies and equipment such as bulk liquids (fuel and water), ammunition,  bulk and palletized cargo, and bridging equipment. Appendix II contains a  detailed description of each Marine Corps vehicle and a discussion of  armor production and installation.
section_title: Processes for Developing Wartime Requirements and Solutions
paragraphs: The Marine Corps identified wartime truck armor requirements and  initiated a procurement program to develop armor solutions, which  involved seeking funding from a variety of sources, identifying and  contracting with suppliers for armor materials and components, designing  and testing armor solutions, and installing armor onto trucks.
subsections: section_title: Process for Developing Wartime Requirements
paragraphs: When a need for new equipment is identified by Marine Corps warfighters,  units make official requests through the Marine Corps’ requirements  process by submitting a universal needs statement, which acts as a “work  request” for current and future wartime capabilities. For example, the  universal needs statements for truck armor described an urgent need to  protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the fragmentation effects of IEDs  and other threats and specified the numbers and types of trucks to be  armored. Universal needs statements are forwarded from units to the  Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia,  where they are validated and approved for funding by the Marine  Requirements Oversight Council. Upon validation, the statements are  forwarded to the Program and Review office at Marine Corps headquarters  to obtain funding and to Marine Corps Systems Command for  procurement. The Marine Corps validated its first requirement for truck  armor in January 2004 prior to the deployment of the First Marine  Expeditionary Force to Southwest Asia.
section_title: Development of Truck Armor Solutions
paragraphs: To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Marine Corps  initiated a procurement program to develop armor solutions for its  deployed trucks. The Marine Corps obtained funding for its armor  program from a variety of sources. While the services can reprogram a  small amount of funds from one program budget to another, the majority  of funding had to be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Comptroller) and, in some cases, Congress. Specifically, to  obtain funding for truck armor, the Marine Corps sought approval from  the DOD Comptroller and Congress to reprogram funding from other  procurement or appropriations accounts, requested funding from the  DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund, and requested funding through  supplemental appropriations.
The Marine Corps Systems Command was the activity responsible for  developing truck armor solutions to address validated Marine Corps  requirements. Systems Command’s armoring efforts consisted of a phased  approach to develop and field three distinct levels of armor: interim armor  components, add-on armor kits, and integrated armor. Table 1 shows the  Marine Corps’ armoring phases with the type of armor used in each phase.
The phase one interim armor consisted of commercial off-the-shelf and  Marine Corps depot-produced armor components, such as 3/16-inch high  hard steel (HHS) armor doors, ballistic blankets, and Kevlar/ceramic  panels. Recognizing that the interim armor provided limited protection  from IED fragments, the Marine Corps subsequently produced a more  robust solution of add-on armor for phase two that provided greater  protection against IEDs and roadside bombs. This add-on armor initially  included 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) steel doors and side  panels, and ballistic glass. Later, as the threat became more lethal, the  Marine Corps began producing and installing additional add-on armor  coverage for phase two that included underbodies, roofs, tailgates, rear  cab plates, and gunner shields. To produce add-on armor kits, Systems  Command used its own Logistics Command to produce and ship the add- on armor kits. The Logistics Command obtained the armor panels and  components directly from suppliers and manufactured some parts in its  depot, and shipped kits directly to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility for  installation.
As an improvement over add-on armor already fielded, in phase three the  Marine Corps is currently installing an integrated armor kit for the MTVR.  Unlike add-on armor, integrated armor is a permanent modification and is  designed for the life of the vehicle. Integrated armor provides the greatest  level of protection through more comprehensive coverage. The integrated  truck armor kits are produced by Oshkosh Truck Corporation. Installing  integrated armor is much more complex than add-on armor because it  requires stripping the truck to its frame and rebuilding. It takes a five- person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to complete the installation  of integrated armor.
section_title: Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004
paragraphs: The Marine Corps met its requirements for production and installation of  add-on truck armor in September 2004—-8 months after that initial  requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor  requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first  phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to  armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats.  Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004,  the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by installing interim  armor on all 1,169 trucks. However, the interim armor did not meet  requirements because it did not provide sufficient protection from the  fragmentation effects of IEDs. In the second phase, the Marine Corps  increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met  that requirement in September 2004 with add-on armor that provided the  required IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading  armor protection from add-on armor to integrated armor for 900 7-ton  trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were included in the 1,438 trucks  armored during the second phase.
subsections: section_title: First Phase Requirement Addressed with Interim Armor
paragraphs: In its first phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps validated its initial  requirement to armor 1,169 trucks in January 2004. However, they  addressed the requirement by installing interim armor that did not provide  sufficient protection against IED fragments. Figure 1 shows Marine Corps  production and installation of the interim armor protection over the 2- month period taken to address the initial requirement.
Due to the immediacy of the need for armor and because forces were  preparing to deploy in 2 months, in January 2004 Marine Corps officials  purchased truck armor that was readily available, could be quickly  shipped to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, and was easily installed.  This interim solution consisted of a mix of Kevlar/ceramic armor plates  purchased off the shelf from commercial companies to protect doors, and   3/16-inch HHS armor plates produced by a Marine Corps depot to protect  doors and cargo areas. Officials said the interim armor protected against  the prevalent ballistic threat at the time and was readily available off the  shelf from industry. However, this interim armor did not meet the  validated requirements. Part of this requirement was to address an urgent  need to protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the fragmentation effects of  IEDs. Marine Corps officials said an integral part of the Marine Corps’  armoring strategy was to procure and install armor on all vehicles prior to  going to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, using the best materials  readily available at the time. According to congressional testimony by the  Systems Command’s Commanding General, the Marine Corps always  made clear the fact that they would pursue a more robust solution as  better raw material steel became available. As a result, the interim armor  fielded by the Marine Corps offered limited protection from IEDs and  troops were placed at greater risk as they conducted operations in  vehicles equipped with insufficient protection.
section_title: Second Phase Requirement Met with Add-On Armor
paragraphs: The second phase of truck armoring began in April 2004, when a second  requirement to armor 1,438 trucks with 3/8-inch RHA steel was validated  and then met 5 months later using add-on armor that provided the required  IED protection. To meet this requirement, the Marine Corps had to re- armor the existing 1,169 trucks that had interim armor, plus armor an  additional 269 trucks with the required IED protection. Installation of add- on armor on the trucks was completed in September 2004, 5 months after  establishment of the April requirement and 8 months after establishment  of the initial requirement. Figure 2 shows Marine Corps production and  installation of the add-on armor protection over the 5-month period  needed to meet the April requirement.
Since the time the Marine Corps met its second phase armor requirement  with the installation of 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor, it continued to make  improvements to that armor during the second phase to better protect  against IED fragments. According to officials, the upgrades included  expanding armor coverage to the underbodies, tailgates, roofs, and gunner  shields of the trucks. For example, the Marine Corps installed underbodies  on 87 of the 5-ton trucks and underbodies on all 235 LVS trucks.  Upgraded add-on armor has also been installed on the MTVRs until the  MTVRs with integrated armor could be fielded. According to Marine Corps  officials, this improved add-on armor offers significant protection of  vehicles, including coverage for the seams to better shield against  explosive blasts and fragments.
section_title: Third Phase Requirements To Be Met with Integrated Armor
paragraphs: In the third phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps established two  requirements to armor MTVRs with integrated armor. The first  requirement to armor 1,018 MTVRs was validated in October 2004, but was  reduced to 900 in June 2005 primarily due to the rotation of fewer troops  and trucks in and out of CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. The Marine  Corps plans to install armor on 900 MTVRs for forces in Iraq and  Afghanistan by May 2006. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps had  completed installation of integrated armor on 803 MTVRs. Figure 3 shows  Marine Corps production and installation of the integrated armor  protection.
According to Marine Corps officials, since the MTVR is at the beginning of  its economic life cycle, the Marine Corps decided to armor this truck with  armor that was integrated into the body of the truck. Marine Corps  officials said that only the MTVR trucks will receive the integrated armor  because both of the other types of trucks used (the 5-ton and 22-ton bulk  hauler) are at the end of their economic life cycle and are expected to be  replaced over the next 5 years by the MTVRs and the Logistics Vehicle  System Replacement (LVSR).
section_title: Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces
paragraphs: Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine  Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the  Marine Corps and the Army on truck armor requirements and solutions  resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and  seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army. Second, mission  needs also affected the Marine Corp’s ability to replace its interim armor  with add-on armor and to install integrated armor. As a result, the total  length of time to field add-on armor and integrated armor was stretched  out over a longer period, placing troops at greater risk as they conducted  wartime operations in vehicles without the preferred level of protection.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in Identifying Truck Armor Requirements and Developing Solutions May Have Affected Armor Availability For Deploying Units
paragraphs: A lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in  identifying truck armor requirements and coordinating an armor solution  from industry may have limited the Marine Corps’ ability to field interim  armor that met IED protection requirements and may have contributed to  the time to provide the second phase armor protection to deployed Marine  Corps forces. The Marine Corps began procuring 3/8-inch RHA armor for  effective protection against IED fragments in late February 2004—3  months after the Army identified this armor as a solution for IED  protection in November 2003. After testing many types of armor materials  to protect against IEDs, the Army subsequently issued armor protection  guidance in December 2003 recognizing HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates,  which the Marine Corps purchased for its interim armor solution in  January 2004, as ineffective against IED fragments. The guidance also  stated that 3/8-inch RHA steel offered good protection against IED blasts  and fragments. Marine Corps officials said they were aware of the Army’s  armor protection guidance and had pursued acquiring 3/8-inch RHA steel  in January, but it was not available from industry to meet their needs. As a  result, as an interim solution to meet deployment deadlines, they  purchased the best armor steel available, although it did not provide  sufficient IED protection.
To verify whether a shortage of 3/8-inch RHA steel occurred during the  January and March 2004 time frame, we asked several steel suppliers who  had supplied steel to an Army and Marine Corps steel distributor whether  3/8-inch RHA was in short supply. Industry officials told us that if the  Marine Corps had requested 3/8-inch RHA steel directly from them, they  could have made it available sooner despite a lead time that varied from 30  days to 4 months. In fact, according to industry officials, both the 3/16-inch  HHS and 3/8-inch RHA steel required the same amount of lead time.  Ultimately, in early February 2004, the Marine Corps approached industry  with the assistance of congressional staff, and by the end of February, 3/8- inch RHA steel became available. By March 2004, the Marine Corps began  producing 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor for their second phase armor effort.
A formal process did not exist to require the military services to  coordinate when developing common wartime requirements, such as truck  armor, or share information on research, development, and procurement  efforts supporting solutions to those requirements. Both the Marine Corps  and Army have separate and distinct requirements determination  processes to address their warfighters’ urgent needs. The two services  share information only through informal communication channels, which  may not always occur in the timeliest manner. For example, the Marine  Corps validated its first requirement to armor vehicles against IEDs and  other explosive devices in January 2004, 2 months after the Army had  validated a similar requirement in November 2003. In addition, in  November 2003, the Army had built a prototype armor kit for production  made out of 3/8-inch RHA steel, which is what the Marine Corps officials  said they began seeking 2 months later but were unable to obtain. If both  the Marine Corps and Army had coordinated requirements earlier and had  worked together to purchase 3/8-inch RHA steel from industry in  November 2003, the Marine Corps might have had 3/8-inch RHA available  for its first armor phase instead of the 3/16-inch HHS it used for interim  armor, or might have completed its second armor phase sooner than  September 2004. Without a formal process for coordinating common  urgent wartime requirements and the development of materiel solutions  across military services, the Army and Marine Corps could continue to  develop different solutions with varying degrees of effectiveness in  response to the same warfighter needs.
section_title: Mission Needs Affected Production and Installation of Truck Armor
paragraphs: The production and installation of truck armor was also affected by  mission needs. Specifically, mission needs restricted the rate at which  armor could be installed onto vehicles in the theater of operations.  According to Marine Corps officials, the need to install armor without  jeopardizing theater missions limited the number of vehicles that could be  taken out of action at any one time. As a result, installation rates for the  Marine Corps’ add-on and integrated armor were paced with the rotation  of trucks into the maintenance area as they returned from missions. In  addition, the installation of integrated armor on the MTVR trucks also has  been constrained by lengthy installation times—on average it takes a five- person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to install a single kit. As a  result of these constraints, the installation of add-on and integrated truck  armor was stretched out over a longer period, and the Marine Corps  provided funding and set production rates for add-on armor components  to match the limited rate of installation. Consequently, troops were placed  at greater risk as they conducted operations in vehicles that were  equipped with the interim armor that provided limited protection from  IEDs.
section_title: Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability
paragraphs: The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the  timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment.  For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for  integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine  Corps is also developing a longer-term plan to address the availability of  truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD established the Rapid  Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS)  process to improve coordination of combatant commander wartime  requirements common to multiple services and to accelerate the process  of fielding urgent wartime solutions that are outside the services’  established requirements processes. However, it is unclear whether this  policy applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes  the development of new technology solutions.
subsections: section_title: Marine Corps Is Taking Short-and Long-Term Actions to Improve Armor Availability
paragraphs: The Marine Corps is taking short-term and long-term actions to improve  the availability of truck armor. In the short term, to address current armor  needs for deployed forces in Iraq and other CENTCOM locations, the  Marine Corps accelerated the rate of installation by increasing the number  of installation sites for integrated armor kits. For example, as of August  2005, the Marine Corps had installed integrated armor on 41 MTVRs using  one installation site in Iraq, and as of October 2005 it had installed armor  on 177 MTVRs using two sites—one in Iraq and one in Kuwait. The Marine  Corps opened a third site in November 2005 at the Marine Corps Logistics  Command in Albany, Georgia to further increase installation rates. As a  result of the increased number of installation sites, total installation of  integrated armor increased to 803 MTVRs as of March 2006.
The Marine Corps is also taking longer-term actions to improve the  availability of truck armor for future operations. For example, the Marine  Corps has developed a strategic plan for tactical wheeled vehicles that  addresses future truck armor needs. According to Marine Corps officials,  the plan involves ongoing assessments of the Marine Expeditionary Force  concept of warfare—the need to stay light and expeditionary—and  limitations of available airlift and seabasing that impact the amount of  armor applied to a vehicle. In addition, the Marine Corps is also  investigating future kit-armoring strategies with the Army using the “A” kit  and “B” kit concept identified in the Army’s long-term strategy. Under this  strategy, the Army’s plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two kits.  The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks ready to  accept armor and includes hard-to-install parts and permanent mounting  provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor to be applied  to all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular components that  can be installed and removed by two people. The Marine Corps currently  plans to incorporate this A kit/B kit armor concept onto its LVSR and  MTVR as new vehicles are produced. Marine Corps officials told us that  this concept addresses some of the concerns raised by Marine Corps  officials, such as wear and tear on the vehicles due to the additional  weight of the armor. Other long-term Marine Corps efforts underway  include studies on future armoring needs and solutions. These studies are  evaluating the ground transportation needs of the Marine Corps in an  expeditionary context and will make recommendations regarding the  value of current vehicle systems and necessary changes to develop and  maintain a tactical wheeled vehicle fleet that meets Marine Corps  requirements through 2020. While we did not evaluate these studies, we  did note that they are aimed at identifying longer-term requirements for  truck armor and developing solutions to address these requirements.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination of Requirements across Services
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to improve coordination of urgent wartime needs  across the services by developing the JUONS process. DOD established  the JUONS process in July 2005 to improve coordination of combatant  commanders’ urgent wartime requirements that are outside the services’  established processes to accelerate the fielding of wartime solutions that  may be purchased off the shelf or warrant minor modification. However,  according to Army officials, it is not clear whether the JUONS process  addresses urgent wartime needs that may emerge in the same fashion as  armor. The acquisition of an armor solution was in part an off-the-shelf  purchase combined with some level of research and development of new  technology. According to the JUONS instructions, solutions that involve  the development of a new technology or capability should not be  processed under the instruction’s procedures. However, the instruction  also allows the minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new  or similar mission. Army officials said they were unclear whether urgent  wartime requirements such as armor should be processed under JUONS  given that the armor solution can be described as both an off-the-shelf  solution with minor modification and a solution that required the  development of new technology. For example, according to Army officials,  the recently fielded armor solutions were readily available off the shelf  and required some modification. However, officials also said that the  armor solutions can be described as new and developing technology  because research was needed to identify effective armor protection  standards and new technology was necessary to integrate and apply armor  onto vehicles. As a result, it is not clear if similar future requirements are  to be processed under JUONS or other requirements generation processes.  Until the types of solutions about which the JUONS process applies are  more clearly defined, it is uncertain whether this process would apply to  joint urgent wartime requirements for items needing some level of  research and development, such as truck armor.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The results of our work on Marine Corps truck armor indicate a broader  systemic problem with a lack of synchronization between the Marine  Corps and Army in identifying common urgent wartime requirements and  developing solutions to those requirements. Because there was no formal  process requiring a synchronized approach between the two services for  identifying requirements or developing solutions, the Marine Corps did not  identify a requirement for truck armor or begin developing armor  solutions until 2 months after the Army had done so. A more unified and  coordinated approach between the Marine Corps and the Army might have  allowed the Marine Corps to field a better interim armor solution that  provided sufficient protection against IEDs. In addition, earlier  coordination may also have enabled the Marine Corps to begin developing  and fielding its second phase of armor, which provided the required IED  protection, sooner. Further, due to the lack of a formal process for sharing  requirements information between the services, official documentation  was not available to determine whether the Marine Corps made informed  decisions about the materials it selected for its interim armor or to assess  the basis for these decisions. While the work we performed focused on the  Marine Corps and Army, the lack of a DOD-wide framework for  coordinating wartime requirements and solutions impacts on all of the  military services.
Subsequent to the procurement and installation of Marine Corps add-on  truck armor, DOD established a new joint process, called JUONS, to  ensure that the development of wartime requirements common to the  Marine Corps, Army, and other services are coordinated. However,  because this new process does not apply to the development of new  technologies, it is not clear whether it will improve interservice  coordination when solutions involve some level of research and  development, like truck armor. Without a formal process for coordinating  all common wartime requirements and the development of materiel  solutions across military services, the Army, Marine Corps, and other  services could continue to develop different solutions with varying  degrees of effectiveness in response to the same warfighter needs. It is  likely that DOD will again face urgent wartime requirements common to  multiple services to rapidly develop materiel solutions to improve force  capability or protection of deployed forces. The effective coordination of  common requirements and sharing of information on materiel solutions in  development are critical to ensure the needs of the warfighter are met in  the timeliest and most effective manner possible. Without improved  coordination, deployed military personnel and their missions may be  placed at significant risk because they lack the appropriate equipment at  the critical times it may be needed. Furthermore, until a formal process for  coordinating and sharing information on all common urgent wartime  requirements and solutions is established, Congress and the Secretary of  Defense may be unable to exercise effective oversight of decisions made  to address urgent wartime requirements.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions  about what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address  common urgent wartime requirements, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense take the following two actions: (1) direct the service  secretaries to establish a process to share information between the Marine  Corps and the Army on developed or developing materiel solutions, and  (2) clarify the point at which the JUONS process should be utilized when  materiel solutions require research and development.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with  our recommendations. Regarding the first recommendation that DOD  direct the services to establish a process to share information between the  services on materiel solutions in development, DOD partially concurred,  and stated that it believes that multiple layers of communication already  exist between the Marine Corps and the Army. For example, DOD cited  the Marine Corps’ participation in the Army’s armor kit working group.  DOD also noted that the Marine Corps coordinated with the Army  Research Lab and the Army’s Aberdeen Test Center on armor kit design  and testing. While we agree that the coordination between the Marine  Corps and Army on truck armoring was beneficial to the Marine Corps’  program, these processes were generally informal in nature. As evidenced  in our report, these various layers of communication were not sufficient to  bring the services’ two truck armor programs together in a more uniform  and coordinated approach from the beginning to ensure that requirements  were identified and solutions developed for both services at the same time.  Instead, the Army identified its first truck armor requirements and began  developing solutions in November 2003, while the Marine Corps did not  begin its program until January 2004. As we reported, had the Marine  Corps began seeking truck armor solutions in November 2003, if might  have been able to acquire the preferred type of steel in time for its March  2004 deployment to Iraq given the average lead times for this steel during  this time period and the willingness of industry to work with the Marine  Corps to expedite its availability.
DOD further stated that it believes it met the intent of our  recommendation with the creation of the Army-Marine Corps Board and  the Navy-Marine Corps Board. As noted by DOD, these Boards address  issues at the 3-star level and provide a means to share information  between the services. According to DOD, the Army-Marine Corps Board  was not mature enough to influence the initial development of truck  armor, but in 2005 it was used to coordinate production delivery priority  between the Army and Marine Corps for the up-armored HMMWV. While  we agree that these Boards enhance the coordination between the two  services, they represent an agreement between the services, initiated by  the services. The intent of our recommendation is for DOD to develop a  more comprehensive DOD-wide process that requires synchronization and  coordination between the services in identifying common urgent wartime  requirements and developing solutions to those requirements.
In response to our second recommendation to clarify the point at which  the JUONS process should be utilized, DOD concurred, stating that the  Joint Staff is working on an update to the JOUNS process instruction.  According to DOD, this update will clarify when and if the JOUNS process  can be used when materiel solutions require development of a new  technology or capability. The update is expected to be completed by  September 2006.
DOD provided additional comments related to the context of the report.  Specifically, DOD noted that it believes the Marine Corps exhibited due  diligence in providing armor protection for its deployed tactical wheeled  vehicle fleet. It further described in detail the Marine Corps’ approach to  first develop an interim solution using commercially available materials,  including 3/16-inch HHS, to ensure all vehicles entering Iraq would have at  least some protection until armor with a better level of protection could be  fielded. We agree that the Marine Corps exercised diligence in armoring its  trucks for Iraq and other deployed locations given the circumstances and  we believe this information is accurately presented in the report. However,  as noted in the report, a more unified and synchronized approach between  the Army and the Marine Corps may have improved the availability of the  preferred 3/8-inch RHA for the Marine Corps’ interim armor.
DOD also provided additional comments related to the accuracy of the  report which we have incorporated in the report as appropriate. The  department’s specific comments and our responses to them are discussed  in detail in appendix III. In summary, the department disagreed with our  statements regarding the (1) lack of coordination between the Marine  Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and  solutions, (2) lack of a formal departmentwide process to ensure  interservice coordination, and (3) delays in the Marine Corps’  identification of the requirement for 3/8-inch RHA and its attempts to  acquire and install this improved armor. While we acknowledge that the  Marine Corps made attempts to coordinate with the Army through various  informal processes, evidence showed that the lack of a synchronized  approach between the services led to differing processes within the  services for generating armor requirements and solutions. Similarly, while  we agree that the department had a number of interservice working  groups and committees designed to enhance interservice coordination, we  continue to believe that the lack of a more formal interservice  coordination process precluded the Marine Corps and the Army from  identifying armor requirements and solutions for both services at the same  time. Lastly, while the department refuted our evidence that the Marine  Corps did not identify a requirement for 3/8-inch RHA until April 2004, it  was unable to adequately document its position. See appendix III for a  more detailed discussion of these issues.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army and the  Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the  Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to  others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on   the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we examined the Marine Corps’ programs to  provide armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles,  or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of  responsibility. The Marine Corps trucks we examined included the 5-ton,  Logistics Vehicle System, and Marine Tactical Wheeled Vehicle  Replacement. Descriptions of each of these trucks along with detailed  information on the availability of armor for each truck are included in  appendix II.
To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed  to meet identified requirements and the factors that affected the time to  provide armor, we interviewed Marine Corps officials involved in  identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and acquiring truck  armor for deployed forces. We conducted interviews at the Marine Corps  Systems Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command in  Quantico, Virginia; the Marine Corps Logistics Command in Albany,  Georgia; Army headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and the U.S. Army  Development Test Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We  also collected and analyzed armor supply data such as requirements,  funding levels, production levels, and installations for the period between  January 2004 (when truck armor requirements were first formally  identified) and March 2006, which we obtained from Marine Corps bases  or source documents. We considered the armor requirement as met for  each type of truck when the quantity of add-on or integrated armor  produced and installed on vehicles equaled the requirement. We did not,  however, visit CENTCOM’s area of responsibility to validate the extent to  which armor had been installed and was actually in use by trucks. Based  on the information gathered, we identified factors that affected the time to  provide truck armor to deployed forces.
To determine what actions the Marine Corps and the Department of  Defense took to improve the availability of truck armor for current and  future operations, we interviewed Marine Corps and Joint Staff personnel  to identify short- and long-term efforts. We also reviewed the service’s  studies related to addressing future truck armor needs. However, we did  not evaluate the identified solutions’ potential for success.
We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained for  this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data  and corroborating them with other information gathered from other  Marine Corps organizations. We determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our audit from April  2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring Efforts
paragraphs: We examined the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed  to meet identified requirements for the following vehicles: the  multipurpose 5-ton truck, the logistics vehicle system (LVS), and the  medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck). This  appendix provides an assessment for each of these three truck types. Each  assessment presents a general description of each truck and our  evaluation of the extent to which armor kits were produced and installed  when required.
subsections: section_title: Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks
paragraphs: The Marine Corps multipurpose 5-ton trucks provide transportation,  hauling, and towing of just about everything in the equipment inventory.  These trucks transport troops, supplies, ammunition, construction  materials, and other items. These trucks also tow many types of trailers,  artillery guns, and vans. Almost all Marine Corps units are equipped with  5-ton trucks. As the primary truck transport asset of the Marine Corps, it is  available in cargo, dump, tractor, and wrecker configurations. Figure 4  shows an example of the 5-ton truck in a cargo configuration.
To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for the  5-ton trucks in two phases. The first phase of armoring used interim  armor, which included 3/16-inch HHS doors, Kevlar/ceramic panels, and  ballistic blankets, and offered limited protection against improvised  explosive devices (IEDs). The second phase of armoring used add-on  armor, which offered better protection against IEDs because it included a  better grade steel (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous steel), ballistic glass, and  additional protection for the underbody, tailgate, roof, and other  components. There is also an additional type of armor protection used by  the Marine Corps, called integrated armor. However, integrated armor  requirements were not established for the 5-ton truck because the 5-ton  truck is at the end of its life cycle and is being replaced by MTVRs, or 7-ton  trucks. In addition, according to Marine Corps officials, the 5-ton trucks  make poor candidates for integrated armor because the added weight of  the armor significantly reduces the payload capacity and usefulness of the  trucks.
subsections: section_title: Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: The Marine Corps armored its 5-ton trucks in two phases, responding to  two validated requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase,  to armor 171 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials  said they met this requirement 2 months later, in March 2004, by installing  an interim armor solution before the First Marine Expeditionary Force  was deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to  provide monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our  analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 123 door  sets between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps Logistics  Command Maintenance Center in Albany, Georgia, and procured 3,830  Kevlar/ceramic panels from commercial sources to address the  requirement. According to Marine Corps officials, some of these  Kevlar/ceramic panels were used to armor the 5-ton trucks. Due to the  immediate need for armor prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met  armor needs with the best available materials at the time—3/16-inch HHS  and Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, the armor did not provide sufficient  IED protection.
The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 185 5-ton trucks  (including re-armoring the 171 trucks with interim armor), was validated  in April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5  months later, in September 2004, by installing add-on armor kits that met  requirements for IED protection, but they were unable to provide monthly  data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that,  at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 199 5-ton armored door sets  between April and September 2004 to meet the requirement. Figure 5  shows the requirements and installation levels for both interim armor and  add-on armor for the 5-ton truck over time. As of September 2005, the  Marine Corps had 123 add-on armored 5-ton trucks operating outside  forward bases in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. Eighty-seven of them  also received underbody armor.
section_title: Logistics Vehicle System
paragraphs: The Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) is a heavy tactical transport vehicle  system for fuels and bulk cargos that was first fielded in the mid-1980s. It  is a modular system consisting of a front power unit (cab) that is designed  to have interchangeable rear body units. The truck has an off-road payload  of 12.5-tons and an on-road payload of 22.5-tons. Figure 6 shows the front  body unit, which can tow five different rear body units. Rear body units  include a wrecker, a fifth-wheel semitrailer adapter, a dropside cargo unit,  a self-loading container, and bridge transporter.
The Marine Corps installed armor protection on the LVS in two phases to  meet requirements. The first phase of armoring used interim armor, which  included Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic  blankets, and offered limited protection against IEDs. The second phase of  armoring used add-on armor, which offered better protection against IEDs  because it included a better grade (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous) steel,  ballistic glass, and additional protection for the underbody, tailgate, roof,  and other components. There is an additional type of armor protection  established by the Marine Corps, called integrated armor, but, as with the  5-ton truck, a requirement for this type of protection was not established  for the LVS because it will ultimately be replaced by a new truck called the  Logistic Vehicle System Replacement during the 2008–2009 time frame.
subsections: section_title: Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: The Marine Corps armored the LVS in two phases, responding to two  requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor 204  trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corp officials said they met  this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2 months later, in  March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary Force was deployed to  Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to provide monthly data  on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that, at a  minimum, the Marine Corps produced 105 armored door sets at the Marine  Corps Logistic Command Maintenance Center between April and  September 2004 and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a  commercial company, some of which were used to armor the LVS. Due to  the immediate need for armor prior to deployment, the Marine Corps met  armor needs with the best available materials at the time—3/16-inch HHS  and Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, this armor did not provide sufficient  protection against the fragmentation effects of IEDs.
The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 221 trucks (including  re-armoring the 204 trucks with interim armor), was established in April  2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5 months later,  in September 2004, with add-on armor kits that met the validated  requirements for protection from IEDs, but they were unable to provide  monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis  showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 261 armored door  sets between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps Logistic  Command Maintenance Center and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels  from a commercial company to meet the requirement. According to  Marine Corps officials, some of the Kevlar/ceramic doors were used to  armor the LVS. As of January 2006, Marine Corps fielding data revealed  that 235 LVS trucks operating outside forward bases in CENTCOM’s area  of responsibility had add-on armor. Figure 7 shows the requirements,  production, and installation levels for both interim armor and add-on  armor for the LVS over time.
section_title: Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement
paragraphs: The Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is  designed to replace the existing fleet of 5-ton trucks with a new and more  robust fleet of 7-ton trucks. Figure 8 shows the MTVR as a troop carrier;  however, it is also used as a wrecker, dump truck, cargo carrier, and  convoy escort. According to a Marine Corps official, the service needed to  replace its existing medium 5-ton truck fleet with a vehicle capable of  carrying larger payloads, at a faster speed, over more difficult terrain, and  that can be airlifted. A contract was awarded to Oshkosh Truck  Corporation in December 1998, and production is underway.
To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for the  MTVR in three phases. The first phase used interim armor, which includes  Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic blankets, and  offers limited protection against IEDs. The second phase used add-on  armor, which provides greater protection from IEDs than the interim  armor because it included 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor, ballistic  glass, and additional protection for the underbody, side panels, tailgate,  and other components. The Marine Corps continues to design and produce  improvements to this add-on armor. The final armor phase used integrated  armor that is installed on the vehicle chassis and provides overlapping  seams that prevent penetration from ballistics and IEDs. Figure 9 shows  the requirements, production, and installation of each type of armor on the  MTVR.
subsections: section_title: Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified Requirements
paragraphs: The Marine Corps is armoring the MTVR in three phases, responding to  four requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor  794 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials said they  met this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2 months  later, in March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary Force was  deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to provide  data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that,  at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 174 doors between April and  September 2004 and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a  commercial company for the requirement. An unspecified number of these  Kevlar/ceramic panels were used to armor the MTVR. Due to the  immediate need for armor prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met  armor needs with the best available materials at the time—3/16-inch HHS  and Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, this armor did not provide sufficient  protection against the fragmentation effects of IEDs.
The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 1,032 MTVRs  (including re-armoring the 794 trucks armored with interim armor), was  validated in April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this  requirement 5 months later, in September 2005, by installing add-on armor  kits that met the validated requirements for protection from IEDs.  However, they were unable to provide data on the number of installations  completed. Our analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps  produced 1,966 armored doors between April and September 2004 to meet  the requirement. The Marine Corps also produced 962 cargo panel sets  (i.e., which were steel plated to protect the sides of the cargo unit) to  protect transported troops.
The armor protection installed in the third phase had two requirements.  The first requirement, to armor 1,018 MTVRs (trucks that were already   provided with add-on armor) with integrated armor, was validated in  October 2004. However, in June 2005 this requirement was reduced to  installing integrated kits on 900 MTVRs by May 2006, because fewer trucks  than initially anticipated will be rotated into theater in Iraq and  Afghanistan. Since the MTVR is at the beginning of its economic life cycle,  the Marine Corps made the decision to armor this truck with armor that  was integrated into the body of the truck. Integrated armor is a permanent  modification that requires stripping the truck to its frame and rebuilding. It  takes a five-person crew more than 300 hours to complete a single  installation. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps has installed 803  integrated kits on the MTVRs.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
subsections: section_title: GAO’s Responses to DOD’s Technical Comments
paragraphs: 1.  DOD stated that our statement identifying a number of systemic  causes for shortages in armor such as inaccurate requirements is  misleading and that it implies that the Marine Corps did not consider  the current threat analysis. However, this statement does not refer to  the Marine Corps’s truck armor program. Rather, the statement is from  the introduction of the report, where we discussed our prior work  leading up to this review. Specifically, we noted that in April 2005 we  reported on a number of critical supply shortages during OIF— including armored HMMWVs, body armor, and other items—and  inaccurate requirements was one of the systemic causes identified in  the April 2005 report.  2.  DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps’ interim  armor did not meet requirements, noting that armor protection  requirements changed quickly over time and migrated from a small  arms ballistic focus to a fragmentation focus, as the lethality of IEDs  encountered increased. However, the December 2003 requirement  document that the Marine Corps provided to us during our review  clearly stated the need to protect all vehicles from improvised  explosive devices, mines, and other explosive ordnances. Documents  we obtained from both the Marine Corps and Army recognized IEDs as  a significant threat at the time. In fact, in DOD’s comments to this  report, it noted that “in December 2003, both the Army and Marine  Corps recognized that IEDs, RPGs, 7.62mm projectiles, and mines  were the predominate threats.” Further, in November 2003, the Army  had identified a requirement to protect vehicles from IEDs and  recognized a need to purchase rolled homogenous armor (RHA), a type  of armor that proved effective against both the ballistic and IED threat  after testing many armor types.  3.  DOD disagreed with our statement that a lack of coordination between  the Marine Corps and Army on addressing truck armor requirements  and solutions caused the Marine Corps to make decisions about the  types of armor to use without having all the information that was  available on protective capabilities of various armor types. We  acknowledge that the Marine Corps made attempts to coordinate  through various informal processes, such as the Armor Kit Working  Group Integrated Process Team. However, evidence showed that a  lack of a synchronized approach among the services was due to each  service having separate and distinct processes that generated the  requirements to armor vehicles. The individual requirements processes  led to the Marine Corps validating a requirement to armor vehicles 2  months after the Army validated a similar requirement to armor its  vehicles.
Ultimately, the Marine Corps began seeking RHA armor in February  2004—3 months after the Army began producing armor kits made out  of RHA armor. Marine Corps officials told us that they began seeking  RHA armor from industry earlier—in January 2004—but were told it  was in short supply. However, Marine Corps officials have not  provided documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. For  example, in DOD’s comments to this report, it stated that the first  purchase order for 3/8-inch RHA was on January 12, 2004. However,  when we subsequently requested to see the purchase order, the Marine  Corps noted that it was actually an Army purchase order. According to  the Marine Corps, they made a phone inquiry to a steel vendor in  January 2004, but have not provided documentation to support this  assertion. In addition, we spoke with other steel suppliers about the  availability of RHA during the January and March 2004 time frame.  These industry officials told us that despite lead times for RHA that  ranged from 30 days to 4 months, they could have made RHA available  to the Marine Corps quicker if the Marine Corps had approached them  directly. Moreover, although we agree that formal processes are in  place for the Marine Corps to test armor types through the Army’s  Testing Center (ATC), the Marine Corps coordination with the Army to  install RHA armor kits on vehicles did not occur until the Marine  Corps’ second phase of armoring. Furthermore, while the Marine  Corps cited the Army-Marine Corps Board (AMCB) and the Joint IED  Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) as other examples of Army and Marine  Corps coordination in the development of armor solutions, these  additional avenues for communication were not sufficient to bring the  services’ two truck armor programs together in a synchronized  approach to ensure that requirements were identified and solutions  developed for both services at the same time. We further clarified this  position in the report.  4.  DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps did not  identify a requirement for 3/8-inch RHA until April 2004. It stated that  the need for RHA armor was identified earlier but was in short supply  from industry. While some Marine Corps officials told us that the  Marine Corps was not seeking 3/8-inch RHA for its interim armor,  other Marine Corps officials subsequently told us they became aware  of the need for 3/8-inch RHA in December 2003 and first inquired about  the availability of RHA steel with industry in January 2004. However,  these officials have not provided adequate documentation to support  the assertion or that RHA was not available from industry (see note (3)  above). Further, a Marine Corps Logistics Command report on its  armoring efforts indicated that the Marine Corps did not make the  decision to use 3/8-inch RHA until March 2004. However, it was not  until April 2004 that the Marine Corps officially identified a need for  3/8-inch RHA when it validated the requirement for the second armor  phase. Due to the conflicting information, it remains unclear exactly  when the Marine Corps became aware of the need for RHA.   5.  DOD disagreed with our statement that no formal process was in place  to ensure interservice coordination. DOD acknowledged that there was  no standing joint activity that addressed specific servicewide vehicle  hardening requirements at the time, and cited participation in and  coordination with the AKWG IPT, ATC, AMCB and JIEDDO as  instrumental in developing the Marine Corps’ truck armor solutions.  While we agree that these organizations may have provided valuable  information to the Marine Corps, as stated previously, this  coordination was not sufficient to bring the services together to  identify requirements and develop solutions for both services at the  same time.  6.  DOD disagreed with our statement that troops were placed at greater  risk as a result of the time required to replace the interim armor with  add-on RHA armor and integrated armor. It noted that to accelerate  the replacement of interim armor by taking a larger amount of vehicles  out of service would create inherent risk to the operational  commanders. We did not intend to suggest that the Marine Corps  should have made this decision or that it could have done anything  different given the operational conditions in the theater. Rather, we  were simply stating that because of the time needed to replace the  interim armor with the second generation RHA armor coupled with  mission requirements, the vehicles were operating with less than the  preferred armor solution.  7.  See note (1) and note (2).  8.  See note (6).  9.  See note (3) and note (5).  10. See note (3) and note (4).  11. We agree that attempts were made to share information between the  Army and Marine Corps, but we recommended a DOD-wide formal  process to require interservice coordination (see also note 5).
12. See note (4).  13. In response to our discussion on the Marine Corps’ investigating  future-kit armoring strategies using the “A” kit and “B” kit concept for  armor kits, DOD added that the Marine Corps is now planning to  incorporate this concept on its Logistics Vehicle Replacement (LVSR)  and the MTVR. DOD further noted that the LVSR will be the first  military vehicle to incorporate the A and B kit concept. We  incorporated the current status of this program into the report.
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant Director;  Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard G. Payne,  Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell, Patricia Sari- Spear, Rebecca Shea, John D. Strong, and Gerald Winterlin also made key  contributions to this report.