Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role
Published: 2011-09-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and the transition from a U.S. military to a civilian-led presence after December 2011 continue amid an uncertain security and political environment. This report is one in a series of reviews regarding the planning and execution of the drawdown. Specifically, this report assesses the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute, and mitigated risk associated with (1) transferring and removing personnel and equipment from remaining bases in Iraq; (2) curtailing unneeded contract services, transitioning expiring contracts, and providing adequate contract oversight; and (3) facilitating and supporting the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. GAO examined relevant DOD planning documents, attended drawdown-related conferences, interviewed State officials and DOD officials throughout the chain of command in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq, and visited several locations in Kuwait and Iraq to observe drawdown operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of actions and associated resources necessary to achieve the drawdown from Iraq, which is well underway with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases transitioned, among other things. However, several factors contribute to making this phase more challenging than the previous drawdown phase. First, DOD will have less operational flexibility in this phase of the drawdown, yet will need to move a greater amount of equipment than in prior drawdown phases. Second, DOD is closing the largest bases with fewer available resources left on site, which creates a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. Although DOD's plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, it has limited visibility over some equipment remaining in Iraq and does not track equipment found on transitioning bases that is not listed on any property accountability record. Without addressing these issues, DOD may miss opportunities to make the drawdown more efficient. DOD has taken action to improve its management of contracts in Iraq, such as enhancing contract oversight and assigning Contracting Officer's Representative responsibilities as a primary duty, although concerns, such as lack of experience among contract oversight personnel, remain. As the drawdown progresses, DOD may face further challenges in ensuring that major contracts transition without gaps in key services. To ensure the continuity of key services while continuing to reduce these services, some units are exploring the option of using local contractors to provide certain services since local contractors do not require extensive support, such as housing, and will not have to be repatriated to their country of origin at the end of the contract, although GAO has previously reported on challenges associated with hiring such firms resulting in the need for greater oversight. Some units also intend to replace contractor personnel with servicemembers to ensure continuity of certain services, such as guard security and generator maintenance. Despite various steps to ease contractor demobilization, DOD faces challenges in demobilizing its contractors, including operational security-driven limits on exchanging information such as base closure dates and ensuring accurate contractor planning. Without taking additional steps to address these challenges, DOD may be unable to effectively implement its demobilization guidance and ensure the effective reduction of contract services to appropriate levels and ultimate demobilization of all its contractors. As the U.S. presence in Iraq transitions to a civilian-led presence, although DOD and State interagency coordination for the transition began late, both agencies have now coordinated extensively and begun to execute the transfer or loan to State of a wide range of DOD equipment, while DOD has taken steps to minimize any impact on unit readiness of such transfers. DOD also has agreed to potentially provide State with extensive contracted services, including base and life support, food and fuel, and maintenance, but State may not have the capacity to fund and oversee these services.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD take further action to (1) acquire and maintain real-time visibility over contractor-managed government- owned equipment; (2) collect data on unaccounted-for equipment found during base transitions; (3) work with contractors to gather and distribute information needed to demobilize their workforces; and (4) officially clarify the scope of DOD's role in post-2011 Iraq, to include the privileges and immunities to be afforded all DOD government personnel. DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The drawdown of all military forces and equipment from Iraq, which DOD  must complete by December 31, 2011 in accordance with the Security  Agreement between the United States and the Government of Iraq, is an  operation of unprecedented magnitude. Over the course of several  months, DOD must redeploy from Iraq about 46,000 military and at least  57,000 contractor personnel, remove or transfer at least four times as  much theater provided equipment as it has during prior drawdown  phases, and transition to the Government of Iraq all remaining bases in  Iraq, including every large installation. This will be the culmination of a  logistics operation that, according to senior DOD officials, is the largest in  scope since the Second World War. In preparing for the current phase of  the drawdown, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) reduced the number of U.S.  forces in Iraq from about 82,000 in June 2010 to 50,000 ahead of the  August 31 timetable established by the President. In addition, USF-I  formally ended its combat mission and transitioned to Operation New  Dawn on September 1, 2010. Under Operation New Dawn, the mission of  U.S. forces includes advising, assisting, and training Iraqi security forces,  partnering with Iraqi forces to conduct counter-terrorism operations,  executing the current phase of USF-I’s drawdown plan, and supporting  the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq.
The drawdown of U.S. forces, the execution of Operation New Dawn, and  the transition from a U.S. military to a civilian-led presence continue  amidst an uncertain security and political environment. In particular,  although DOD reported that attack levels have decreased since the  height of the violence in June 2007, enemy attacks persist and insurgents  and terrorists continue to operate in Iraq. During the past months, al  Qaeda in Iraq has conducted numerous high-profile attacks against Iraqi  government targets throughout the country. In addition, according to the  Department of State (State), a number of other groups have attacked  U.S. government personnel, including several Shia extremist groups  responsible for the recent and frequent attacks on the U.S. Embassy, and  in June 2011, 15 U.S. troops were killed in Iraq, the highest number in 2  years, according to DOD. Further, senior U.S. officials have expressed  concerns about the Iraqi government’s ability to provide for its internal  security and external defense, citing weaknesses in its logistics,  intelligence, and air defense capabilities. Should the Government of Iraq  request that some U.S. forces stay after December 2011, this would  dramatically alter current plans; senior U.S. officials continue to state the  U.S. government would be willing to entertain such a request.
This report is a continuation of our efforts to review the planning and  execution of the drawdown of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq, and  builds upon our prior reports and testimony. Specifically, this report  evaluates the execution of the current phase of the U.S. military  withdrawal from Iraq, which began on September 1, 2010, and will end on  December 31, 2011. Our specific objectives were to determine the extent  to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute, and mitigated risk  associated with (1) transferring and removing personnel and equipment  from remaining bases in Iraq; (2) curtailing unneeded contract services,  transitioning expiring contracts, and providing adequate contract  oversight; and (3) facilitating and supporting the transition to a civilian-led  presence in Iraq. To meet our objectives, we examined relevant DOD  planning documents, including USF-I and U.S. Army Central (ARCENT)  operations orders, attended drawdown-related conferences, spoke with  DOD officials throughout the chain of command in the United States,  Kuwait, and Iraq, and visited several locations in Kuwait and Iraq to  observe drawdown operations. In the U.S. and Iraq, we also spoke with  Department of State officials involved with the Iraq transition. A more  detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is included in appendix  I. We conducted this performance audit from April 2010 through  September 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Security Agreement between the United States and the Government  of Iraq clearly states the objectives for the drawdown from Iraq, and DOD  has further defined the conditions necessary to achieve these objectives.  Time lines for the drawdown were established by the Security Agreement  and further defined by the President of the United States. The Security  Agreement provides that all U.S. forces, a term that includes personnel  and equipment, shall withdraw from Iraqi territory no later than December  31, 2011. In addition, the U.S. government must transition all remaining  bases where it maintains a presence to the Government of Iraq upon  withdrawal. In regards to the retrograde of equipment and base  transitions, the high-level conditions DOD has identified as important to  the achievement of these objectives include the orderly and efficient  movement or transfer, as appropriate, of equipment out of Iraq by the  time lines established by the Security Agreement. Further conditions  include the establishment of a mission capable civilian-led presence in  Iraq by October 1, 2011, which is necessary to enable DOD to focus on  achieving the redeployment of personnel, retrograde of equipment, and  base transition goals by the end of the year.
DOD anticipates that after December 31, 2011, all U.S. personnel  remaining in Iraq, including DOD military personnel and civilians, will  operate under the authority of the Chief of Mission for execution of  security assistance activities. The United States government intends to  stand up a regional diplomatic presence, a large-scale police training  program, and an office of security cooperation (under the Chief of  Mission’s authority) to continue training and equipping the Iraqi security  forces. According to the State Department Iraq Transition Coordinator,  as of June 2011, the plans for the U.S. government presence in Iraq after  2011 include about 16,000 personnel. This official stated that these  personnel will perform a wide range of functions in addition to diplomacy  and security assistance/cooperation, with the majority of personnel likely  comprised of contractor personnel responsible for security and life  support (such as facility operation, food service, laundry, etc.). Besides  meeting requirements for security and life support, other major aspects of  the transition include acquiring the use of property through land use  agreements, repurposing or constructing new facilities, and defining  requirements for and implementing solutions in the areas of logistics,  aviation, equipment, information technology, and contracting/contract  oversight.
The logistics infrastructure supporting the redeployment and retrograde  effort in the Iraqi theater of operations is large and complex, consisting of  military organizations operating in both Iraq and Kuwait. It is through  Kuwait’s three seaports and two airports that the majority of U.S. forces  and all of DOD’s sensitive equipment, such as combat vehicles, flow from  the theater of operations. DOD also uses commercial shipping firms to  retrograde units’ nonsensitive material and equipment, such as individual  equipment and spare parts, through ports in Jordan and Iraq, and uses an  airport in Iraq in addition to airports in Kuwait to facilitate the  redeployment of military personnel. Myriad logistics organizations in both  Iraq and Kuwait support these operations, including elements of U.S.  Central Command (CENTCOM), USF-I, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT),  U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, the  Defense Logistics Agency, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, Army  Materiel Command, and U.S. Air Forces Central Command. Many of  these organizations have command relationships with each other, and  their activities are synchronized through the issuance of written orders  that define each organization’s drawdown tasks, among many other  things. In the case of the drawdown from Iraq, such orders and  associated activities comprise DOD’s plans.
U.S. forces in Iraq rely on contractor personnel to provide a wide range of  services including managing dining facilities, repairing military vehicles,  providing trucks and drivers for transporting supplies, and maintaining  airfields. Military units, such as the “mayors” who oversee base  operations, communicate their needs for contracted services to the  appropriate contracting personnel, who in turn seek to fulfill these  “requirements” through contracting vehicles such as orders,  modifications, or new contracts. According to DOD data, as of May 30,  2011, there were approximately 61,000 contractor personnel in Iraq.  Approximately 52 percent of these contractor personnel are working  under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the largest  single contract supporting operations in Iraq and Kuwait. The day-to-day  activities of LOGCAP contractor personnel in Iraq are overseen by  contracting officers’ representatives (COR) managed by the Defense  Contract Management Agency (DCMA), which administers the contract in  Iraq on behalf of the LOGCAP Program Office, U.S. Army. The remainder  of the contractor personnel primarily work under contracts awarded by  CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command and perform a  range of services. Although contracting officers are responsible for  providing contract oversight, day-to-day oversight of contractors is  generally the responsibility of CORs, who ensure that the government  receives the agreed-upon services at the agreed-upon quality, avoids  poor outcomes, and minimizes fraudulent practices. CORs typically  come from military units and perform their duties as an added  responsibility.
subsections: section_title: Prior GAO Work
paragraphs: GAO has issued several reports over the past 3 years addressing the  drawdown of forces and equipment from Iraq. In September 2008, we  reported on the progress of drawdown planning, and concluded that DOD  had not adequately defined roles and responsibilities for executing the  drawdown, resulting in multiple teams engaged in retrograde operations  without a unified or coordinated chain of command. We recommended  that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM and the  military departments, take steps to clarify the chain of command over  logistical operations in support of the retrograde effort. Since that time, a  number of DOD organizations have issued plans outlining a phased  drawdown from Iraq that meet time frames set forth in the Security  Agreement and presidential guidance while being responsive to security  conditions on the ground. Furthermore, partially in response to our  recommendation, DOD has created several organizations to achieve unity  of effort over retrograde operations.
After the publication of our September 2008 report, we continued to  monitor DOD’s progress in planning for and executing the drawdown. In  November 2009, we testified before the Commission on Wartime  Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan outlining several unresolved issues  that had the potential to impede the effective execution of the  drawdown. Following that testimony, we issued a report in April 2010  that went into greater detail on the progress of the drawdown and  identified challenges that could impact its efficient execution. We  recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate  authorities to take action in regards to planning for achieving unity of  effort in operational contract support, mitigating the risks of contract  transitions and insufficient contract oversight personnel, and clarifying  the capacity of Kuwait as a temporary staging location for equipment.  DOD concurred with all of our recommendations and stated that it is  taking steps to address each one. For example, since our April 2010  report, DOD conducted an analysis of the benefits and costs of a prior  planned transition to a new LOGCAP contract and decided not to make  the transition based on its findings.
section_title: DOD Has Conducted Robust Planning for the Current Drawdown Phase and Execution Is Under Way, but Visibility and Tracking of Some Equipment Remain a Challenge
paragraphs: DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of  actions and associated resources necessary to achieve its objectives for  the drawdown from Iraq. The current phase of the drawdown is well under  way with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases  transitioned, among other things. Further, DOD successfully completed  the previous drawdown phase, demonstrating the ability to plan and  execute complex drawdown operations. However, several factors,  including limited operational flexibility and the need to move a greater  amount of equipment and close the largest bases with fewer available  resources create a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD  faced during the prior drawdown phase. DOD’s existing plans and  processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, but DOD continues to face  challenges maintaining real-time visibility over some equipment and  tracking unaccounted for equipment remaining after bases undergo the  transition process.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Planning Processes Facilitated the Successful Execution of the Previous Drawdown Phase, but Completing the Current Phase Will Be More Challenging
subsections: section_title: Successful Execution of Previous Drawdown Phase
paragraphs: The completion of the prior drawdown phase, conducted between June  and August 2010, demonstrated DOD’s ability to plan and execute  complex drawdown operations. Several contributing factors enabled the  successful reduction of military forces to 50,000 in accordance with the  August 31, 2010 time line and removal of non-mission-essential  equipment from Iraq.    Use of modeling tools and metrics. The models and projections run  by the Army’s Responsible Reset Task Force, ARCENT Comptroller  staff, and the CENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center  helped to more accurately predict the personnel and cargo flows out  of Iraq, enabling the positioning of necessary resources and as a  whole ensuring that sufficient capacity was in place to meet logistics  requirements. Based on the known amount of equipment in Iraq, USF- I, in conjunction with other DOD organizations, set monthly targets for  the reduction of rolling and containerized nonrolling stock, and DOD  organizations in Kuwait created and refined a set of tools to track the  activities conducted to meet these targets and provide the visibility  necessary to make adjustments. For example, Army field support  brigade and Responsible Reset Task Force personnel worked  together to refine the flow chart used to track the movement of  equipment through the critical nodes associated with the retrograde of  equipment through Kuwait, such as wash racks, that could become  limiting factors if stressed beyond capacity.    Emphasis on end-to-end equipment movements. DOD took steps  to ensure that non-mission-essential equipment removed from Iraq to  Kuwait received rapid disposition. When we visited Kuwait soon after  the completion of this prior phase, the equipment lots were orderly  and largely empty because equipment had been shipped to its final  destination, such as Afghanistan or the United States, with the  exception of the lot dedicated to the storage of Mine Resistant  Ambush Protected vehicles. Further, ARCENT was actively reducing  the backlog of containers at the lot reserved for unserviceable  equipment unloading and sorting. Further, by the time of our visit in  March 2011, DOD had resolved the problems that had resulted in  nearly 60 frustrated containers languishing in one lot we found  during our visit to Kuwait in September 2010. The frustration was  primarily due to lack of customs documentation and poor container  packing practices associated with a pilot program to send  unserviceable equipment directly to a depot in the United States.    Employment of commercial shipping and alternative air ports for  the removal of equipment and redeployment of personnel. DOD’s  use of commercial “door-to-door” shipping through Jordan and, to a  lesser extent, Iraq itself, for the majority of nonsensitive unit  equipment, and the use of Al Asad Air Base in Iraq for unit  redeployments directly to the United States successfully alleviated  pressure on the Kuwait-based redeployment and retrograde  infrastructure. For example, DOD officials we spoke with in  September 2010 after the previous phase of the drawdown noted that  approximately 30 percent of containerized cargo went through the  Jordanian port of Aqaba, while 20 percent went through the Iraqi port  of Umm Qasr.    Successful pilot of the partial self-redeployment concept. Partial  self-redeployment of equipment and personnel consists of a military  unit “road marching” from its location in Iraq to camps in Kuwait.  During the road march, which is conducted as a military operation, the  unit drives its own vehicles and provides for its own security, rather  than scheduling movements for these vehicles via contracted  transportation. As usual, the unit arranges for the shipment of its non- sensitive equipment via door-to-door moves through ports in Jordan  and Iraq. DOD employed this concept with the 4th Stryker Brigade,  2nd Infantry Division, which departed Iraq in August 2010, just prior to  the change of mission. According to DOD officials, partial self- redeployment reduces demand on critical transportation assets and  will be employed during the current drawdown of forces.
DOD has conducted robust planning for the sequence of actions  necessary to achieve its objectives for the drawdown. As they have for  prior drawdown phases, the major commands involved in conducting the  drawdown have issued extensive written plans. In particular, USF-I issued  its Operations Order (OPORD) 11-01 and ARCENT issued its supporting  OPORD 11-01. These plans include many annexes, appendixes, and  tabs that provide a high level of detail. For the first time USF-I’s  operations order includes an annex W that addresses the operational  contract support issues specific to the drawdown, such as contract  descoping and contractor demobilization. Among many other things,  these plans include detailed roles, responsibilities, and tasks for military  units and logistics staffs that pertain to completing the retrograde and  transfer of equipment and necessary base transitions by the established  dates. For example, these plans and their supporting documentation set  forth the order of base closures and time lines that must be met to  achieve operational objectives. Other planning materials go into further  details on the ways DOD plans to achieve its objectives for the  drawdown. For example, USF-I’s “Base Closure Smart Book” provides a  series of templates, instructions, and operating procedures that cover the  entire base transition process.
DOD continues to use the war-gaming process to further refine the  sequence of drawdown actions and to identify and mitigate associated  resource shortfalls. In particular, DOD employs “rehearsal of concept”  drills, synchronization conferences, and focused “deep dive” analyses to  round out its drawdown planning activities. For example, DOD has held  several rehearsal of concept drills in Kuwait and Iraq that focus on the  logistics aspects of the current drawdown phase, which are attended by  senior leadership and planning officials from USF-I, ARCENT, other Army  staff and components, as well as various elements within the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, and State Department personnel, among others.  During these conferences, attendees study all the steps the various  commands will have to take to meet the drawdown objectives to reveal  any outstanding issues and unmitigated risks and determine solutions.  For example, during the ARCENT-hosted rehearsal of concept drill held in  March 2011, participants analyzed the amount of equipment that will have  to be moved every week between March and December 2011 and  matched these requirements with available capacity. Such conferences  provide a process by which planners are able to reschedule equipment  movements to less demanding periods should requirements exceed  available resources and capacity at a particular time and set the stage for  ongoing monitoring of key indicators such as Redistribution Property  Assistance Team (RPAT) capacity. Under the process, should key  resources such as transportation assets still be deemed insufficient,  participants can set decision points for acquiring additional capacity. In  addition, participants can take steps to synchronize key activities,  including ensuring that services like those provided by Defense Logistics  Agency-Disposition Services, which conducts disposal, demilitarization,  and re-utilization of unserviceable equipment, do not end before or while  they are still needed to facilitate the drawdown.
DOD has made substantial progress in executing the drawdown since our  April 2010 report and the current phase of the drawdown is well under  way. In terms of military personnel and contractors, 46,000 and 61,000  continue to conduct operations or work under DOD contracts out of pre- drawdown levels of 134,100 and 125,163 respectively, as of June 2011.  In regards to equipment, as of May 2011 DOD had retrograded 2.36  million pieces since May 2009, or approximately 69 percent of the amount  of equipment that was in Iraq in May 2009. Of the total number of bases,  DOD had closed or transitioned 452, leaving 53. According to senior DOD  officials, base transition activities are proceeding ahead of schedule and  U.S. forces are proactively removing nonmission essential equipment and  materiel such as excess ammunition, although the level of effort required  to complete the transition of the remaining bases will be higher than it has  been for the smaller bases that have closed to date. In addition to the  retrograde of equipment, DOD continues to make progress in transferring  equipment to the Government of Iraq, with over 38 percent of about  48,000 items of equipment provided to Iraq as of May 2011 under the  United States Equipment Transfer to Iraq program. DOD intends to  complete all of its planned transfers, excluding Foreign Excess Personal  Property, by December 2011. For the category of non-excess equipment  for which DOD obtained special statutory authority to transfer, on which  we have previously reported, senior DOD officials state that the  department has requested an extension of the relevant authority as part  of its fiscal year 2012 legislative proposals, which they state will help  ensure the completion of these transfers as planned. Figure 1 shows the  personnel and equipment that has been retrograded during all prior  drawdown phases, as well as what remains for DOD to redeploy,  retrograde, or transfer, as appropriate, prior to December 31, 2011.
section_title: Logistical Challenges Characteristic of the Current Drawdown Phase
paragraphs: Beyond the uncertain security environment and potential for increased  violence as indicated earlier, which could affect DOD’s retrograde  operations and base transitions, DOD will face greater risks and  challenges to its ability to complete the current drawdown phase than it  faced earlier at least in part due to three primary factors:    DOD will have less operational flexibility. Like the prior drawdown  phase, the current phase will peak during the final months before  DOD intends to achieve its operational objectives. During the prior  drawdown phase, DOD set monthly equipment retrograde targets to  achieve a notional goal for amount of equipment remaining in Iraq by  August 31, 2010, but had the ability to address any unanticipated  requirements after that date. However, in this final phase, DOD must  now achieve its equipment retrograde goals by a specific date and, as  a result, cannot leave United States forces’ equipment in Iraq to be  dealt with after December 31, 2011. DOD therefore lacks the flexibility  it was able to draw upon in retrograding equipment during the prior  drawdown phase in case unexpected challenges arise.    Equipment retrograde and base transition requirements are  greater than during prior drawdown phases. DOD will need to  move and transfer a larger amount of equipment during the current  phase of the drawdown than in the prior drawdown phase. For  example, the unit responsible for processing theater-provided  equipment for retrograde estimated that it will have to process an  amount of this equipment four times greater than the amount  associated with the prior drawdown phase. Further, DOD has yet to  complete the transition of any of its large bases. Of the 53 bases  remaining to be transferred in Iraq, 11 are considered large bases. All  of these transitions are projected to occur prior to December 31, 2011,  after which the current Security Agreement ends. According to DOD  officials, each of these remaining base transitions will be more  complex, time consuming, and likely ripe for unanticipated challenges  than such transitions have been to date due to the scope of activities  necessary to complete the transitions.    DOD will have fewer available resources. DOD’s infrastructure in  Iraq that supports its equipment retrograde and base transition efforts,  such as materiel handling equipment and military personnel, will  simultaneously decrease as USF-I exits Iraq. Base-level personnel  with whom we met expressed serious concerns with the sufficiency of  military, civilian, and contractor personnel to set the conditions for  transitioning the base according to the schedules required by USF-I’s  plan. For example, officials were concerned that as living standards  decrease on bases in Iraq and new job opportunities open elsewhere,  contractors will be unable to remain fully staffed and thus less likely to  complete their work and demobilize by the required date. In addition,  DOD officials cite the collapsing support infrastructure in Iraq as a  challenge for the current phase, noting concerns regarding the  availability of key transportation resources, such as aviation assets,  flatbed trucks, and heavy equipment transporters.
section_title: DOD’s Drawdown Plans and Processes Reduce Risk, but DOD Faces Challenges Associated with Limited Visibility and Data Pertaining to Some Equipment
paragraphs: Because DOD has fewer resources with which to meet a higher level of  requirements amidst less operational flexibility, existing challenges  associated with unanticipated requirements may be magnified. However,  according to DOD officials, flexibility inherent to the plans and planning  processes discussed earlier in this report mitigate the lack of operational  flexibility and challenges inherent to doing more with less. For example,  according to these officials, written modifications to plans through  fragmentary orders and an adjustable requirements projection process  allow for continual updates and adjustments necessary as conditions  change. In addition, USF-I officials cite further risk mitigation built into  current planning, such as 30 days of additional time added to each of the  remaining bases’ transition schedules to account for unanticipated delays.  In addition, senior DOD officials cite as risk mitigation the raising of the  dollar value limit, from $15 million to $30 million per installation, of  certain equipment that can be transferred to the Government of Iraq as  Foreign Excess Personal Property in conjunction with a base closure or  return, in accordance with DOD’s prioritized excess equipment disposition  process. In these ways, DOD accounts for the fluid nature of the  operational environment and unforeseen operational requirements  associated with the current drawdown phase. Notably, however, last- minute adjustments, such as those made in response to initially  unanticipated retrograde requirements and associated transportation  needs, may increase costs since buying contracted transportation could  be more expensive in the short-term. On the whole, DOD officials assert  the department will meet its objectives for removing or transferring all  equipment by December 31, 2011.
DOD also has been responsive to risks identified via our continued  oversight. For example, during the course of our work, we found that  Army guidance did not make clear whether units can turn unserviceable  equipment in to RPAT yards as opposed to Defense Logistics Agency- Disposition Services sites. Because redeploying units are typically very  busy, especially if they are leaving a transitioning base, we found that  they were turning such equipment in to RPAT yards because it is more  convenient, according to RPAT officials. However, officials noted that  because units sometimes turn in such equipment without paperwork and  have even removed identifying markings such as serial numbers to avoid  retribution, determining disposition for these items has been a time  consuming and unanticipated challenge for the RPAT yards. In response  to our findings, the Army rapidly issued guidance to clarify and reinforce  the equipment disposition processes for the drawdown from Iraq,  including the turn-in of unserviceable equipment. In addition, according  to the Defense Logistics Agency, Expeditionary Disposal Remediation  Teams were established in April 2011 and started traveling with RPAT  teams to process unserviceable assets and train the Army on filling out  paperwork for unserviceable turn-ins. In regards to containers, which is a  category of equipment for which we have previously reported DOD lacked  full visibility, USF-I reports that a recent audit in Iraq found that the  container system of record was significantly more accurate than  previously reported to us. Given the reasons for the poor initial accuracy,  including lack of discipline in recording containers’ status as they changed  locations, the challenge for USF-I will be to maintain this level of accuracy  as the pace of the drawdown increases.
DOD has taken numerous and robust actions to mitigate the risk to  completing an efficient and orderly drawdown of forces, but continues to  lack real time visibility over contractor-managed, government-owned  (CMGO) equipment and does not collect complete data on the amount  of previously unaccounted-for equipment being found as bases transition,  which may increase the likelihood that unanticipated requirements for  retrograding or transferring this equipment will emerge. Joint doctrine  cites the importance of joint logistics environmentwide visibility over  logistics resources (including equipment), describing that visibility as a  desired attribute of logistics information systems, in part, because it  provides the knowledge necessary to make effective decisions. In this  vein, DOD drawdown-related orders highlight such visibility as a priority  for effectively and efficiently achieving drawdown objectives. For  example, one drawdown order identifies the maintenance of asset  visibility as a key task to ensure accountability and to help reduce cases  of fraud, waste, and abuse.
As we previously reported, over time DOD has improved accountability  and visibility for much of its equipment in Iraq but, as of April 2010,  continued to face challenges with CMGO equipment. Specifically,  officials responsible for property accountability cited the Federal  Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirement that contractors track  equipment through their own systems as a limiting factor to these officials’  ability to maintain real-time visibility. Because these systems are not  linked to government systems, government personnel have been required  to periodically request contractor-tracked information and rely on regular  government-conducted physical inventories to ensure accurate visibility,  which limits such visibility to points in time. Subsequent to our April 2010  review, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Logistics continued to  raise this as a challenge from a drawdown planning and execution  perspective. However, according to officials in the Office of the  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  responsible for DOD equipment accountability policy, allowing contractors  to track CMGO equipment using government systems as well as their  own systems would remove critical checks and balances, thus  heightening the potential for fraud, and a DOD memorandum suggests  that the establishment of separate accountable property records by DOD  components for contractor-acquired property could increase the likelihood  of double-counting. As a result, CMGO equipment can still only be  tracked in real time by government personnel, such as those responsible  for executing the drawdown, after the equipment has been “delivered” to  the government, which often may not occur until contract performance  ends. Therefore, real-time visibility over this category of equipment during  the drawdown remains an issue. For example, USF-I estimated that its  confidence in its total equipment visibility was only 80 percent as of June  2011, primarily due to shortfalls in its visibility over CMGO equipment,  according to DOD officials. According to Army data, such equipment  comprises over a third of the Army equipment remaining in Iraq.
To facilitate the drawdown, DOD has taken near-term actions to mitigate  the lack of real-time visibility over CGMO equipment and improve the  management of this property. First, USF-I coordinated with contractors  to conduct full property inventories and submit a property re-allocation  plan at least 120 days prior to the end of the contract performance period.  According to senior DOD officials, all contractors overseen by DCMA  have submitted these plans. These officials stated that the plans provide  a starting point inventory by location and contract of all CMGO property  and, according to DOD, illustrate DOD’s ongoing efforts to address  CMGO issues. However, the information on equipment provided by the  re-allocation plans still represents a “point in time” and does not provide  real-time visibility while the assets are re-allocated. Similarly, while senior  DOD officials expect that the results of the latest USF-I-performed wall-to- wall property inventory, scheduled to complete by the end of June 2011,  will increase the level of confidence in CMGO visibility beyond the current  80 percent primarily by ensuring that all similar items, such as fire trucks,  are consistently recorded, such visibility will only be an accurate snapshot  as of that date—before much of this equipment will be leaving Iraq.  Second, USF-I’s Contracting Fusion Cell, which was established in March  2011 to centralize the reporting of contractor demobilization milestones  from all bases within Iraq, manages a new database that tracks contractor  personnel and equipment. According to USF-I officials, the intent is for the  database to provide real-time data so that USF-I can track over time how  much CMGO equipment needs to leave Iraq. However, DOD officials  have expressed concern that the new database faces similar data  reliability and completeness challenges as other systems being used in  Iraq to track contractor information face, as discussed in more detail later  in this report.
DOD’s continued need to rely on the results of physical inventories to  obtain accurate planning data may increase the likelihood that  unanticipated requirements associated with the retrograde or transfer of  CMGO equipment will emerge. In particular, as the CMGO equipment re- allocation, transfer, and retrograde processes continue, previously  unaccounted-for property may be brought to record in a contractor’s  accountability system—yet remain invisible to the government unless it  conducts further inventories. According to a senior DOD official, officials  in Iraq recently discovered that one contractor had been using 200  CMGO trucks it had obtained from another contractor, yet had never  transferred these vehicles to its own property record. Because these  trucks were not on the contractor’s list of equipment, they had not been  included in prior inventories. As a result, these trucks were not factored  into DOD’s drawdown plans until they were properly added to the  contractor’s equipment tracking system and checked by USF-I. According  to DOD officials, USF-I is developing a standard operating procedure to  address abandoned property that contractors might leave behind and  decrease the time to obtain disposition instructions for such property from  months to days, which may help mitigate the risk posed by unanticipated  requirements. Nevertheless, as the number of forces in Iraq continues to  decline, USF-I’s ability to conduct regular equipment inventories may  become more limited, and, as a result, this kind of property may not  become visible to drawdown planners until late in the drawdown process.  Senior Army officials responsible for property accountability expressed  concerns that CMGO equipment that contractors may deliver to the  government and abandoned contractor equipment will comprise the  greatest proportion of unaccounted equipment DOD will need to rapidly  address during the drawdown, likely at the last minute. Some common  CMGO items, such as materiel handling equipment, are expensive, in  high demand in Afghanistan, and take a relatively large amount of  resources, such as transportation assets, to move. DOD officials  acknowledge that accountability and visibility of CMGO equipment needs  to be re-examined and have noted that additional steps, likely in the form  of policy and training, will be required. Without developing a means to  achieve and maintain real-time visibility over critical CMGO property that  retains the important checks and balances inherent to DOD’s current  accountability processes, DOD will continue to face challenges ensuring  the efficient retrograde and transfer of such property as it completes the  drawdown in Iraq and begins the drawdown in Afghanistan.
The transition of large bases in Iraq will likely exacerbate the challenges  posed by the lack of real time visibility over CMGO property. In particular,  DOD officials in Iraq remain concerned that the total amount of previously  unaccounted-for equipment that DOD will need to address will likely  increase. For example, after the completion of one of the largest base  transitions to date, USF-I officials said that they were surprised at the  amount of unaccounted-for equipment that was left over at the end of the  transition process. Beyond CMGO equipment, Army data demonstrates  that the increase over the past 2 years apparent in “found-on- installation” equipment rates is at least partially attributable to base  closures in Iraq, but other factors, including the implementation of the  Army’s Property Accountability Campaign, have also likely contributed,  according to Army officials. Although Army officials view this increase  positively because the Army can now account for this equipment, they  also told us that Army-tracked found-on-installation data cannot be used  as the sole indicator for leftover unaccounted-for equipment because  such property may also represent equipment that was not properly  entered into the Army’s property accountability system of record due to a  lack of proper accompanying documentation. According to Army officials,  USF-I has in the past tracked the amount of unaccounted-for equipment  that was found remaining on bases that closed. For example, these  officials previously identified such equipment as amounting to between 3  percent and 5 percent of all equipment on a base. However, based on  their communication with USF-I, these officials now say that USF-I no  longer tracks these data. As a result, DOD drawdown planners may lack  an accurate planning factor for unaccounted-for government equipment  and abandoned contractor equipment left over after the remaining bases  in Iraq transition. Without continuing to track these data, DOD may  therefore miss an opportunity to enhance the fidelity of its drawdown  projections and improve its processes to reduce the amount of such  property.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Contract Management and Oversight in Iraq, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: DOD has taken action to improve its management of contracts in Iraq,  such as enhancing contract oversight through command emphasis and  assigning COR responsibilities as a primary duty in certain instances.  However, other concerns, such as lack of experience among contract  oversight personnel, remain. As the drawdown progresses, DOD may  face further challenges in ensuring that major contracts transition without  gaps in key services, and in effectively implementing its guidance for  descoping contracts and demobilizing contractor personnel and  infrastructure. Specific challenges for DOD include providing certain  information, such as base closure dates, to contractors, obtaining  information from contractors such as accurate personnel headcounts, and  ensuring sufficient resources to facilitate full contractor demobilization.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Contract Management and Oversight but Some Concerns Remain
subsections: section_title: Contract Requirements Management
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to address several of our findings related to issues  affecting contract management for the drawdown. For example, we  reported in April 2010 that USF-I guidance may not allow sufficient time  for all contracted services needed during the drawdown to be put on  contract in a responsible manner, which could lead to potential waste and  service delays. Specifically, we found that standard operating  procedures for requirements validation in Iraq only stated that personnel  should submit requirements for contracted services at least 90 days prior  to the date that funding is needed. However, this may not allow for  sufficient time to obtain new contracted services and could lead to  inefficient contracting practices. In March 2011, USF-I revised its financial  management guidance to clarify time lines for submitting packages to the  command’s requirement validation process. Specifically, the guidance  informs units that, for requirements over a certain dollar threshold, they  should consider the time it could take to obtain bids for new contracts,  mobilize contractors, and perform other tasks associated with validating  requirements, and adjust their submittal plans to USF-I accordingly,  potentially 150 to 180 days before the start of the contract’s period of  performance. In addition, USF-I issued an order that informed units to  submit requirements to the Contract Review Board at least 90 days prior  to the end of the contract’s period of performance for units with existing  contract options or 120 to 135 days prior to the start of the period of  performance for new contracts. Further, by requiring paperwork for late  submissions explaining failure to comply, the order provides an additional  incentive for units to submit their requirements for contracted services  within the specified time frames. As a result, DOD has taken steps that  could reduce the risks of poor outcomes that may follow from a lack of  timely planning for contracted services, such as undefinitized contract  actions, increased costs, lengthened schedules, underperformance, and  service delays.
In addition, we reported in April 2010 that USF-I’s predecessor,  Multinational Force-Iraq, had in its drawdown plans delegated the  responsibility for determining contract support requirements to contracting  agencies, such as Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan  (CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command’s  predecessor), rather than to operational personnel such as combat force  commanders, base commanders, and logistics personnel, among  others. Further, we reported that, in accordance with joint doctrine and  Army guidance, when planning for contractor support, planners must be  aware of the operational principle of centralized contracting management  to achieve unity of effort. We reported that centralized management can  be achieved through means intended to synchronize and coordinate all  contracting support actions being planned and executed in the  operational area. USF-I has taken steps to ensure inclusion and  coordination in determining contract support requirements for contract  descoping and contractor demobilization between contracting support  organizations and operational units. For example, USF-I, in preparation  for the drawdown, issued an order requiring the senior tactical  commander at each base to control and manage the accountability and  drawdown of contracted support on their base. The order requires that  these commanders, in conjunction with requiring activities and in  coordination with contracting organizations, identify every service  contract, task order, or service function operating within their base and  determine a cessation date for each service and establish demobilization  milestones. In a different order, USF-I instructed units to work with  contracting organizations to identify and eliminate duplicate contracted  services and to work with the Regional Contracting Center chief and other  contract support organizations to determine the best contracting approach  going forward. Such steps may help DOD improve its unity of effort in  contract management as the drawdown progresses and ultimately  concludes.
DOD has also taken steps to improve contract oversight for the  drawdown. For example, DOD has taken some steps to provide a  sufficient number of trained contract oversight personnel to oversee  contracts supporting the drawdown. We previously reported that DOD has  had difficulties providing enough contract oversight personnel to deployed  locations and training military personnel on how to work effectively with  contractors in operations. In Iraq, we spoke with contracting officials  from CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command and  several Regional Contracting Centers, as well as officials from DCMA,  LOGCAP, and the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, and none  reported experiencing contract oversight personnel shortfalls. DCMA  employs a risk-based approach to contract oversight, allocating oversight  personnel, such as CORs, and more frequent audits for contracts  depending on the risk of mission failure and contractor problems. For  example, according to DOD officials, DCMA has required monthly audits  and assigned oversight personnel to contracts deemed medium to high  risk, and depending on the contract, may conduct an audit every other  month for those deemed low risk. Further, according to senior contracting  officials, USF-I has taken steps to ensure that commanders and other  senior leaders within the chain of command understand the importance of  having CORs available and sufficiently trained to provide oversight during  the drawdown. Several contracting officials said that they have seen an  overall improvement in the following areas:    Assignment of oversight functions as a primary duty: According  to contracting officials in Iraq, many units recognize the need to have  CORs perform their oversight duties in a full-time capacity. For  instance, contracting officers responsible for contracts at Victory Base  Complex and Joint Base Balad, a major air base north of Baghdad,  said that units have CORs who work full time on overseeing contracts,  such as the contract to provide bottled water to U.S. bases in Iraq. We  also met with CORs from Air Force and Army units who stated that  their primary roles were to provide contract oversight.    Command emphasis on oversight: Several contracting officials  attributed improvements in contract oversight to efforts by senior  leaders to place a greater focus on issues involving operational  contract support. For example, in October 2010, the USF-I  Commanding General issued a memorandum describing the  importance of the COR’s oversight function and the need to ensure  that CORs have the necessary training, time, and experience to  perform their duties, citing our prior work.
Improved training: CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting  Command (through Regional Contracting Centers) has held regularly  scheduled training in Iraq and Kuwait to ensure that CORs and other  contracting personnel have the training and certification necessary to  perform their contract-related responsibilities. Several CORs told us  that they received a combination of classroom and online instruction,  while others only received online instruction. However, several CORs  told us that they did not find the online instruction to be effective in  preparing them to perform their oversight responsibilities. Some  were also provided training before they deployed to Iraq. Senior  contracting officials said that they have a surplus of personnel trained  as CORs in Kuwait and Iraq in case additional oversight personnel are  necessary.    Contractor demobilization preparation: In February 2011, the  Regional Contracting Centers began holding demobilization  orientations, developed by CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support  Contracting Command in conjunction with DCMA, during which  contract oversight personnel can discuss issues affecting contract  demobilization, such as the need to obtain decisions from  commanders on which contracts to descope and when to conduct  such actions.
Nevertheless, DOD continues to experience some challenges ensuring  full contract oversight. Army guidance states that CORs usually serve in  their position as an extra duty, depending upon the circumstances, and  senior DOD officials told us that assigning COR responsibilities as an  extra duty is desirable because the government can take advantage of  the individual COR’s expertise associated with his or her primary duties.  However, Army guidance also recognizes that it is a key duty that cannot  be ignored without creating risk to the government. In addition, USF-I’s  drawdown guidance states that units should make every effort to ensure  that contracts considered critical to their mission, or contracts with  exceptionally large footprints, have dedicated COR oversight and,  accordingly, requires units to provide full-time COR support for such  contracts. In Iraq during the drawdown, contract oversight has been  hindered in at least some instances in which CORs’ primary duties have  limited their ability to concentrate fully on their contract oversight duties.  For example, contractors have reported to contracting officials instances  in which CORs were not available on site during some of the previous  base closures, and their absence hindered the resolution of certain  contractor demobilization issues. According to an October 2010 Center  for Army Lessons Learned document, the quality of inputs from CORs  declined during the previous drawdown as CORs refocused on their  primary duties. However, senior DOD officials noted that the other duties  CORs typically perform, such as force protection, may at times trump  their COR duties.
section_title: DOD Faces Challenges in Conducting Major Contract Transitions and Ensuring Orderly Contractor Demobilization
subsections: section_title: Ensuring Continuity of Services during Upcoming Major Contract Transitions May Be Challenging
paragraphs: As the drawdown progresses, units may encounter challenges when  transitioning one contract to another. We have previously reported on  contract transition issues as challenges, and one of the major lessons  learned from the prior drawdown phase is the need to synchronize such  transitions with ongoing operations to mitigate the risk of service  disruption. In 2010 an Army battalion stationed in Kuwait, responsible  for providing theater sustainment-level maintenance, experienced a labor  strike, service disruptions, accidents that resulted in deaths, and other  challenges that unit leadership attributed in large part to the transition of a  major maintenance contract. Also contributing to these challenges was  the intensity of operational activities at the time, which included the peak  of efforts needed to complete the prior drawdown phase, the build-up of  forces in Afghanistan, and the reconstitution of the Army’s prepositioned  equipment in Kuwait. These challenges added to the unit missing some  required delivery dates for equipment intended for use in Afghanistan.  The extent to which the unit meets required delivery dates is a key  measure of mission success, according to unit personnel. During our  March 2011 visit, several senior military officials in Kuwait expressed  concerns with the transition of the major line haul (trucking) contract in  Kuwait. According to these officials and DOD data, this contract, which is  critical for transporting equipment between Iraq and Kuwait, is expected  to complete its transition during a period of heightened operational  activity.
The LOGCAP transition in Iraq will also be challenging. In April 2010 we  recommended that DOD analyze the benefits, costs, and risks of  transitioning from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and other service contracts  in Iraq to determine the most effective and efficient means for providing  essential services during the drawdown, recognizing that the department  was not required to make the transition. DOD concurred with our  recommendation, conducted the analysis, and decided not to conduct the  transition to LOGCAP IV. Unlike during the prior drawdown phase,  however, DOD’s only option for maintaining LOGCAP services in Iraq  after December 2011 is to transition to LOGCAP IV and DOD has  approved an internal Action Memorandum to potentially allow State to use  LOGCAP at its sites after 2011 as appropriate and feasible. Altogether,  LOGCAP IV support is planned for 12 sites that are currently LOGCAP- supported and seven sites, including locations in Erbil and Basrah, that  do not currently have LOGCAP services. After a projected task order  award date of July 31, 2011, the transition will occur in two phases, with  base and life support functions, such as dining facilities and laundry  services, expected to transition first during a projected 100-day period,  followed by transportation and materiel handling functions. The Army  projects LOGCAP IV to have initial operating capability (base and life  support) by October 1, 2011, and full operating capability by December  31, 2011.
Although the circumstances are different, like we found in our April 2010  report, the transition will carry risks. For example, a base in Iraq is  expected to lose its bulk fuel and airfield operations capabilities needed  during the transition until the new LOGCAP services are in place due to  the length of time needed to complete transition tasks. In addition,  because of the amount of work necessary to prepare sites DOD and  State anticipate to be used after December 31, 2011, the existing  contractor risks not completing its construction projects before the  transition, according to senior LOGCAP program management officials.  The transition will be made even more complex by the need to maintain  base life support and transportation services to within days of base  closures, according to LOGCAP program management documentation.  Transitioning the transportation component of LOGCAP will have its own  unique challenges, including a complex and time-consuming property  disposition process and uncertain requirements to support State. To  mitigate such risks, LOGCAP program management is taking steps, such  as working with CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command  and the Contracting Fusion Cell to validate property and material  requirements on a location-by-location basis, according to LOGCAP  program officials. In addition, according to LOGCAP documentation and a  senior DOD official, LOGCAP is projected to transition first at the seven  post-2011 locations where its services are currently not provided to  account for additional complexity associated with standing up LOGCAP at  the new sites. Finally, according to DOD officials, contractual actions such  as period of performance extensions, where feasible, may help mitigate  any potential service gaps.
To facilitate the drawdown, DOD has taken steps to plan contract  “descoping,” which, for the purposes of this report, we define as a  reduction in services commensurate with declining needs, and contractor  demobilization, which, in the context of the drawdown, we define as the  contractor’s actions to reduce and ultimately end its presence and  footprint if not needed to support the U.S. government’s presence in Iraq  after 2011. At the theater level, CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support  Contracting Command, under the direction of USF-I, established the  “Contracting Fusion Cell” in March 2011, and USF-I issued a fragmentary  order directing the Cell to centralize the reporting of contractor  demobilization milestones from all bases within Iraq; measure, assess,  and report contractor demobilization milestones; and provide guidance  and assistance to units, staff elements, and contracting activities as  required. Since its establishment, the Contracting Fusion Cell has  participated in a Rehearsal of Concept drill and a contracting summit to  review and analyze issues affecting contractor demobilization. We  attended the contracting summit and observed USF-I staff, units from  across Iraq, and other stakeholders review major issues concerning  contract requirements and demobilization for participating units and  bases. As mentioned in the previous section, the Contracting Fusion Cell  also employs a database in which division commanders input data on  each of their active contracts, including counts of contractor personnel  and equipment. Several senior military officials said that this database  has been useful in providing data to plan the movements of personnel  and equipment for the drawdown. However, some contracting officials  noted that the same issues that have affected other efforts to capture  accurate and reliable data on the contractor population in Iraq, such as  the general lack of available data for personnel on firm fixed price  contracts and challenges counting contractors that are on leave or out of  the country on emergencies, are likely to affect the Contracting Fusion  Cell’s database as well.
DOD has also improved contractor demobilization planning based on  lessons learned from the prior drawdown phase. According to an October  2010 Center for Army Lessons Learned document, one lesson learned  from the Senior Contracting Official-Iraq was that contractors needed  more guidance regarding closing contractor camps (referred to as  “mancamps”) during the prior drawdown phase. This document stated  that there were occasions when contractors left Iraq mancamps and  associated facilities without proper close out, abandoned equipment,  failed to repatriate personnel (especially third country nationals), failed to  obtain proper Iraq exit visas, did not return government furnished  equipment, did not close out in the appropriate contractor accountability  system, and did not return badges. Since at least November 2010,  CENTCOM has required all contracts and solicitations in Iraq to include a  templated contractor demobilization clause that addresses the above- listed issues. CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command  has also developed a template for CORs to ensure that contractor  demobilization plans adhere to certain time frames. Moreover, USF-I has  included in its guidance examples of cessation of services and contract  demobilization schedules and a demobilization worksheet. However,  according to senior contracting officials, there is no standard  demobilization plan that contractors can submit. To address this shortfall,  a senior contracting official stated in April 2011 that the office of the  Senior Contracting Official-Iraq planned to develop a demobilization plan  template for contractors.
At the unit level, mayor cells are working with units, DOD contracting  activities (such as Regional Contracting Centers, LOGCAP, and DCMA),  and contractors performing work on their respective bases to identify and  determine when certain contract requirements can be reduced and  ultimately terminated. For example, the mayor cell for Joint Base Balad  has established a set of milestones and time lines to descope contracts  and demobilize contractors performing work on the base. One contract  planned for descoping involves airfield sweepers. Joint Base Balad  officials said that they plan on reducing the number of contracted airfield  sweepers after the base’s fighter (F-16 squadron) mission ends and have  also identified a date after which the services will no longer be needed.  Additionally, senior officials in charge of Contingency Operating Base  Marez, a U.S. base in northern Iraq, are planning to end their contract for  security personnel to coincide with their base transition plans. The  Contracting Fusion Cell, DCMA, and Regional Contracting Centers  monitor the progress of contract descoping and demobilization through  tools that track milestones and time lines for each of their respective  contracts. For instance, these organizations are tracking the submission  of contractor demobilization plans, which are required by a CENTCOM- Joint Theater Support Contracting Command clause.
Units are taking further steps to ensure the continuity of key services  while continuing to descope contracts. For example, as bases begin  descoping contracts and demobilizing contractor personnel in preparation  for base transition, some units are exploring the option of using local  contractors to provide certain services. According to senior military  officials, since local contractors do not require extensive base life support,  such as housing, and will not have to be repatriated to their country of  origin at the end of the contract, they can be employed to provide certain  services that would otherwise have to be discontinued. However, we have  previously reported on challenges hiring local national contractors,  including the need for greater oversight due to Iraqi firms’ relative lack of  experience, limited capacity and capability, unfamiliarity with U.S. quality  standards and expectations, and lack of quality control processes that  U.S. firms have in place. Some units also intend to replace contractor  personnel with servicemembers to ensure continuity of certain services,  such as guard security, airfield vegetation removal, and generator  maintenance and are conducting “troop-to-task” analysis to determine  which servicemembers will perform these tasks and how many will be  needed. For example, the mayor cell at Joint Base Balad has developed  plans to reduce contractor personnel for the base’s incinerator operations  and eventually replace them with servicemembers. Officials from one  mayor cell noted that these additional tasks may further tax unit personnel  who are in short supply and busy meeting other priorities.
Although major contractor demobilizations have yet to occur, early  indications suggest that DOD faces several challenges as it implements  its contractor drawdown guidance. DOD has guidance in place to facilitate  the descoping of contract services and contractor demobilization. In  particular, USF-I’s drawdown guidance states that contracting  organizations in Iraq are to work with the requiring activities (typically  military units) and base leadership to ensure all contracts and task orders  are adequately scoped to meet mission requirements and are scheduled  to cease or terminate when no longer required. It also provides time  frames by which contractors must be notified to complete key tasks and  cease providing services. However, without taking additional steps to  address the challenges discussed below, DOD may be unable to  effectively implement its guidance and ensure the effective reduction of  contract services to appropriate levels and ultimate demobilization of all  its contractors.    Providing information to contractors. Guidance in a USF-I  fragmentary order requires senior tactical commanders at each base  to notify all contractors with the base closure or transition date no later  than 180 days prior to the base closure or transition so the contractors  can start preparing their personnel and equipment for redeployment.  However, LOGCAP program officials were unable to provide base  transition dates to subcontractors because base closure dates and  other information relevant to demobilization are classified, which  limited the contractors’ ability to plan their demobilization tasks such  as replacing third country national personnel with local national  personnel to ensure continuity of service while downsizing their  infrastructure. An annex to USF-I’s drawdown guidance also states  that in most cases contractors must be notified in writing 45 to 120  days in advance of the service cessation date. Nevertheless,  according to senior contracting officials, contractors have expressed  concerns about the lack of clarity on when to reduce services and  which contracted services will be needed as USF-I proceeds with the  drawdown. According to senior contracting officials, some contractors  reported instances in which they were notified only a few weeks in  advance to transition to a new location, affecting their ability to plan.  Fluid base transition dates may exacerbate this challenge. For  example, according to a senior contracting official, the date for the  transfer of a U.S. base to the Government of Iraq changed eight times  within 3 weeks, which made it difficult to plan for the termination of  contracts at the base and contractor demobilization.    Obtaining accurate and sufficient information from contractors.
According to DOD officials, as part of demobilization planning,  contractors submit property re-allocation plans that list property in-use  and excess to the contractors’ needs as well as contractors’ plans for  re-allocating the property, among other things. Contractors submit  these plans in conjunction with joint government/contractor inventories  conducted 120 days prior to base transition. However, according to  several contracting officials, some contractors had provided mayor  cells with draft or incomplete plans, some of which contained  inaccurate information and incorrect assumptions, on how they intend  to redistribute their property in preparation for base transitions. USF-I  drawdown guidance also requires senior tactical commanders at  every base in Iraq to account for all task orders, contracts, and service  functions on their bases, to include contractor employee headcount  data and report such information on a regular basis to the Contracting  Fusion Cell. However, several base management officials told us  that because they do not have direct contact with or visibility over  subcontractors, they cannot ensure that contractor personnel are not  being undercounted during contractor headcounts, which may hinder  planning for the resources needed to complete contractor  demobilization.    Sufficiency of resources to complete contractor demobilization.
According to USF-I guidance, in addition to preparing a demobilization  plan, key tasks that contractors need to perform to complete  demobilization include participating in joint property inventories of  CMGO property at least 120 days prior to base transition, as well as  scheduling and coordinating transportation, among other things. In  regards to coordinating transportation, USF-I is working to include  contractor personnel requirements in its planning but, according to  senior contracting officials, contractors have expressed concerns  about the availability of resources to redeploy their personnel and  move their equipment as the drawdown progresses. Contractors have  also expressed concern about their ability to communicate with  government personnel during demobilization, according to these  officials.
section_title: DOD and State Are Coordinating to Establish and Support the Post-2011 U.S. Government Presence in Iraq, but Key Elements of This Presence May Not Be Well Understood throughout DOD
paragraphs: DOD and State interagency coordination for the transition began late, but  both agencies have now coordinated extensively to plan for the transfer  or loan to State of a wide range of DOD equipment, and DOD has taken  steps to minimize any impact on unit readiness of such transfers. DOD  also has approved an internal Action Memorandum to potentially allow  State to use DOD contracts to obtain services such as base and life  support, food and fuel, and maintenance, as appropriate and feasible  within funding constraints, but agreements between State and DOD have  not been finalized and State may not have sufficient funding or capacity to  oversee these contracted services. Further, State is taking steps to  replace services that DOD will no longer provide, but these services will  be different because State’s mission in Iraq will be different than DOD’s  mission. In terms of scope, DOD plans a robust post-2011 presence as  part of an Office of Security Cooperation operating under Chief of Mission  authority. However, the extent to which DOD’s personnel would receive  status protections such as privileges and immunities and the limited  nature of the anticipated engagement model with Iraq may not be fully  understood throughout the department.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Coordinated Extensively with State to Plan for the Provision of Equipment and Contracted Services to Support the Post-2011 U.S. Government Presence in Iraq
subsections: section_title: DOD and State Have Conducted Extensive Interagency Coordination for the Transition, Although Such Coordination Occurred Late
paragraphs: In addition to redeploying its military personnel and retrograding or  transferring its remaining equipment, during the drawdown DOD aims to  facilitate the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, and, to that end,  has engaged in formal interagency coordination with State at various  levels within the two departments. One of the principle objectives of this  coordination has been to define State’s needs for external support and  determine how DOD can best meet those needs. For example, DOD and  State established the “Ad Hoc Senior Executive Steering Group on the  DOD to State Transition” in September 2010 to assess State’s needs in  the logistics and sustainment areas, define requirements, and manage  solutions, in particular those anticipated to be provided by DOD. Co- chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program  Support and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Logistics  Management, this group meets biweekly. According to these two officials,  the meetings greatly facilitated State’s ability to develop its requirements  for DOD support, including equipment. In addition, both State and,  according to DOD officials, DOD, have designated a senior-level official  responsible for the transition. For example, the State Department Iraq  Transition Coordinator coordinates State’s aspects of the transition from  military to civilian operations in Iraq. On the ground in Iraq, multiple USF-I  personnel, including planners and logisticians, are embedded as liaisons  within Embassy Baghdad’s Management Cell for Transition, and  interagency transition cells are in place at all sites that are anticipated to  transition to State throughout Iraq. Finally, USF-I stood up separate  working groups for transitioning operations and base-level sustainment,  which include State participation. Coordination at these multiple levels  helped facilitate, for example, the identification and planning for the 310  out of the more than 1,000 Joint USF-I / U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint  Campaign Plan-specified tasks DOD currently performs in Iraq that State  anticipates assuming after the transition.
The coordination outlined here occurred late in the process and the  delays have made the transition more challenging than it otherwise could  have been, compounding State’s relatively limited capacity to plan, as  noted by senior DOD officials and acknowledged by senior State officials.
As a result, for example, State’s Inspector General found that the initial  lack of senior level DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C. dedicated  to the Iraq transition process contributed to the inability of operational  level DOD and State officials to obtain timely decisions on key transition  issues. During our travel to Iraq, numerous officials at numerous levels  cited the critical importance of planning early to minimize challenges in  conducting future similar transitions, such as will be necessary in  Afghanistan.
DOD and State interagency coordination has facilitated the identification  of State’s requirements for DOD equipment and identified efficient  solutions to meet these needs. In an April 2010 memo to DOD, State  presented its assessment that it lacked the resources and capability to  provide technology, vehicles, and aircraft to adequately meet the extreme  security challenges in Iraq. The justification for DOD equipment transfer  accompanying the memo suggested that, without the transfer of DOD  military equipment, the security of State personnel in Iraq would be  degraded significantly and one could expect increased casualties. To that  end, according to State officials, State initially requested about 23,000  individual pieces of equipment encompassing a wide range of items. To  meet these needs, DOD established an “Equipping Board” with members  from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and military  services. According to Equipping Board participants, State’s initial request  did not fully reflect the actual capabilities State needed. These officials  said that DOD subject matter experts in areas such as medical and  airfield logistics assisted State officials in defining State’s requirements in  these areas, reducing the request to around 3,800 individual pieces of  mostly standard military equipment worth approximately $209 million. In  addition to cutting potential costs to State by reducing the overall number  of items requested, the board also created efficiencies by, for example,  substituting requests for expensive equipment such as new CT scan  machines and night vision goggles for older versions already in Iraq that,  while less capable, will nevertheless meet State’s needs, according to  DOD officials. In addition to DOD military equipment, State has also  expressed needs for nonstandard equipment in Iraq. Aside from 60  Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, this equipment  includes mainly low-value items, such as containerized housing units,  desk chairs and other office equipment, which USF-I plans to transfer  after screening the items for USF-I, CENTCOM, and service  requirements. In terms of the number of total items, the scope of non- standard equipment transfers is projected to be much larger than the  transfer of standard DOD military equipment.
DOD plans to provide military equipment to State through various means,  and for non-excess equipment has taken steps to mitigate any impact on  readiness. According to DOD documentation, 32 percent of the total State  request will be comprised of excess defense articles provided at no cost,  such as collapsible fabric fuel tanks, 7.5-ton cranes, and speakers; and  about 6 percent will be items loaned, including the MRAPs and biometric  equipment; and about 62 percent will be non-excess equipment provided  to State through sales from stock, including items such as aircraft flares,  radios, and medical equipment. According to DOD officials involved in the  process, the non-excess equipment items for State were assigned a risk  level to determine their potential impact on readiness if transferred. For  example, 101 out of 185 medical item types were deemed to be at high  risk of affecting readiness. According to DOD officials, for the high-risk  items, State intends to pay full acquisition value to facilitate rapid  replacement, versus the low-risk items, for which State plans to pay  depreciated value. In addition, according to DOD officials, DOD has taken  steps to accelerate the procurement of some of the high-risk items to be  transferred to State. Finally, the MRAPs DOD intends to loan to State are  coming out of requirements for Army Prepositioned Stocks rather than  unit stocks. According to DOD, these factors will minimize any impact on  unit readiness of transferring or loaning equipment to State. Remaining  issues to be resolved include determining how to replace loaned  equipment that is destroyed or severely damaged during the course of its  use, since, according to DOD officials, State will likely have to request  additional procurement funding if it determines that a replacement is  necessary.
In addition to equipment transfers and loans, through the interagency  coordination process, DOD has approved an internal Action  Memorandum to potentially support State’s post-2011 presence in Iraq by  allowing State to use DOD contracts to obtain needed services as  appropriate and feasible, but agreements between State and DOD have  not been finalized. First, State anticipates obtaining base and life support  such as dining facility and laundry operations through an order on the  Army’s LOGCAP contract. The Army projects that between 4,500 and  5,500 contractor personnel will be necessary to provide these services to  State. Second, State anticipates relying on a DOD contract to provide 100  DOD contractor personnel to maintain some of the equipment transferred  and loaned by DOD, including major items such as vehicles, under a  contract DOD already plans to have in place to support its own personnel  in Iraq. Third, State anticipates obtaining food and fuel through Defense  Logistics Agency contractors. Finally, DOD intends to provide various  capabilities such as information technology support and the contracted  capability to detect incoming rocket or mortar fire and provide warnings.  According to DOD and State officials, using DOD’s existing contracting  mechanisms for these services would be more efficient than if State were  to award its own contracts. Documentation including DOD’s initial  estimates valued the support requested by State at about $575 million per  year, for which, under the proposed terms of a draft interagency  agreement, State would reimburse DOD. However, DOD’s documentation  raised concerns about State’s ability to fund these services, given the  amounts designated for these purposes in State’s budget requests.  According to State, the time frame for LOGCAP support is subject to  negotiation with DOD, after which it may either award its own contract or  use local supply options if conditions permit.
According to State documentation, State currently faces shortfalls in  personnel with sufficient experience and expertise to perform necessary  contract oversight. As a result, State plans to use DOD support for certain  contract management and oversight functions. In particular, the  Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contra Audit Agency (DCAA) intend to provide contract pricing, administration, and audit services for the LOGCAP contract, and, according to DOD  officials, Army Materiel Command has agreed to provide management  functions for the maintenance contract. Projected requirements for these  functions include 47 DCMA personnel supporting State operations, as  well as 3 DCAA and 3 Army Materiel Command civilians. State wouldprovide CORs to oversee the DOD contractors. According to State, th e  COR function is one that is normally part of the duties of a Foreign  Service officer or specialist position at embassies abroad and CORs are  identified as part of the normal assignment cycle. As of early July 201 State documentation identified 35 individuals to perform COR duties  associated with 136 LOGCAP oversight areas across locations in Ira such as dining facilities operation and firefighting services. COR positions for 31 oversight areas remained to be filled, including air operations  throughout Iraq.  q,  In addition to receiving contract support through DOD, in some cases  State intends to directly contract for services that it currently receives  through DOD, particularly in the medical, aviation, information technology,  and security areas. For example, State recently awarded a contract that  State documentation indicates will provide for seven health units, one  large Diplomatic Support Hospital, and three small Diplomatic Support  Hospitals in large part to replace medical services that DOD has provided  to date in Iraq. In addition, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security will  conduct static security activities at U.S. facilities with only a State  presence remaining in Iraq past December 31, 2011. According to DOD  and State officials, DOD, through CENTCOM, would be responsible for  security on the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) sites under  the proposed terms of a draft Memorandum of Understanding between  DOD and State. According to testimony from the Under Secretary of  State for Management before the Wartime Contracting Commission,  static and movement security for State’s Embassy in Baghdad alone will  cost nearly $2.5 billion over the next 5 years. Even with the increase in  such capacity, the drawdown of military forces will result in lost protective  security capabilities for State because State’s mission in Iraq is  significantly different than DOD’s mission. As a result, State will rely to a  greater extent on the Government of Iraq for certain types of security  activities. For example, State will deploy a “sense and warn” platform that  will allow for advance warning in case of incoming fire such as rockets  and mortars, but will not include the capability to fire back at the  attackers, as DOD currently fields at its bases—which will become an  Iraqi responsibility.
section_title: DOD Is Currently Negotiating for Authority for Its Continued Presence in Iraq, but the Scope of the Proposed Mission and Protections for DOD Personnel Are Not Well Understood within DOD
paragraphs: According to DOD and State officials, the scale of the combined DOD and  State presence in Iraq after December 2011 will be unprecedented. A  June 2011 DOD report to congressional committees projected nearly  20,000 DOD contractor personnel to be spread across all post-December  2011 sites in Iraq. However, DOD and State now expect this number to  be lower, and state that current plans call for an estimated total number of  U.S. government direct hires and contractors in the range of 16,000 to  17,000 personnel. As stated recently by a Department of State official  before the House Armed Services Committee, about 14,000 of those  personnel will likely be contractor personnel operating under both DOD  and State. According to DOD and State, the expected number of  personnel has changed from the earlier projection due to the fact that  plans are continually being refined and because contracts have since  been awarded. DOD and State expect that the exact number of personnel  in Iraq after December 2011 will continue to change as contracts are put  in place and requirements are further refined. In addition to providing  contract support services to State as discussed earlier, DOD personnel  intend to operate an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), which  would be funded by both DOD and State. As of June 2011, DOD planning  documents called for DOD personnel to remain at 10 sites countrywide.  Six of these sites would be OSC-I only sites staffed by DOD personnel  and contractors. DOD and State personnel, including those implementing  the police training program under State’s Bureau of International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, would be colocated at the four  remaining sites. DOD’s activities under OSC-I will include the fielding,  administration, and oversight of an estimated 157 military or civilian  personnel and Security Assistance Teams comprised of 763 military,  civilian, or contractor personnel. According to a report from the State  Department’s Office of Inspector General and senior DOD officials,  OSC-I’s mission would include advising, training, and equipping Iraqi  forces, supporting professional military education; planning joint military  exercises; and managing foreign military sales programs involving $6.1  billion in Iraqi funds and $2 billion in U.S. funds through the Iraqi Security  Forces Fund. Under this mission, DOD’s planned activities include  Security Force Assistance, which is a new subset of security cooperation  described in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review as encompassing  activities to train, equip, advise, and assist host countries’ forces in  becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and  protecting their resources and territories. DOD also intends to provide  for the management, security, and sustainment of its sites and some  construction DOD officials refer to as “site improvements” to enhance the  sites’ suitability. According to senior DOD officials, with the exception of  one site near the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the OSC-I presence in Iraq  will not remain longer than 3 years.
According to senior DOD officials, in the absence of an Iraqi request for  an extended U.S. military presence, the U.S. government is not  attempting to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement with the  Government of Iraq in regards to the post-December 2011 U.S. presence.  Rather than negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement, DOD is preparing  to stand up OSC-I, though it does not yet have final approval from the  Government of Iraq to establish such a presence. According to State  officials, this leaves the Strategic Framework Agreement as the  overarching basis for OSC-I’s activities. Nevertheless, DOD is  proceeding with preparations for the OSC-I sites, including construction,  absent land use agreements with the Government of Iraq with the  assumption that these agreements will be forthcoming. This carries some  risk; for example, State officials noted that approximately $18 million was  obligated to prepare an Embassy Branch Office in Mosul that was  subsequently “indefinitely postponed” as an enduring site due in part to a  lack of buy-in from the Iraqi government. According to State officials,  while State is working to recoup some of those funds from the contractor,  State officials stated that they expected to recoup only about $8 to $10  million, although the exact amount had not yet been determined.  According to State documentation and senior State officials, as of June  2011, the Government of Iraq had not formally signed any agreements for  the OSC-I-only sites. According to DOD and State officials, delays  associated with forming a government after Iraq’s March 2010  parliamentary elections have hindered the negotiation of these  agreements. In particular, Iraq continues to lack both a Minister of  Defense and a Minister of Interior with whom to negotiate these  agreements and others.
The scope of DOD’s proposed mission in Iraq after 2011 and the extent to  which DOD personnel conducting these activities will be ensured  protections may not be not well understood throughout the department.  According to senior DOD officials and State officials, without a request  from the Government of Iraq for a follow-on U.S. military presence, all  U.S. government activities in Iraq, including those performed by DOD  military, civilian, and contractor personnel, will occur under Chief of  Mission authority, as approved by the National Security Deputies  Committee in May 2010. Additionally, according to senior DOD and State  officials and DOD documentation, DOD and State anticipate that direct- hire, full-time DOD military and civilian personnel working under OSC-I  can be accredited to the diplomatic mission as administrative and  technical staff, with some status protections such as privileges and  immunities provided under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic  Relations. Notwithstanding DOD’s intent to operate under Chief of  Mission authority, a CENTCOM information paper dated February 2011,  coordinated with DOD’s Office of the General Counsel, makes the  assumption that, absent clarification from the Secretary of Defense, the  157 DOD personnel would operate under the direction of the CENTCOM  commander, rather than the Chief of Mission. The information paper also  raised some questions regarding the feasibility of notifying OSC-I  personnel to the Government of Iraq as part of the administrative and  technical staff. This apparent incongruity has contributed to a lack of  understanding within the Department of the precise scope of DOD’s  mission in post-2011 Iraq and the status protections that will be afforded  to DOD personnel. For example, senior DOD officials stated that a variety  of organizations within DOD continue to push for a role in post-2011 Iraq  even though these organizations’ activities are not part of the anticipated  engagement model based on Chief of Mission authority, which, according  to those officials, could limit the range of activities DOD can perform in  Iraq. Similarly, due to uncertainty regarding status protections, Army  officials expressed concern that DOD would be unable to prevent one of  its military or civilian personnel from languishing in an Iraqi jail if, for  example, he or she were to be involved in an accident in which an Iraqi  dies. Further, senior USF-I officials have expressed frustration with  differing legal opinions on such issues. Without officially clarifying these  issues or without a status of forces or other agreement that includes such  details, DOD personnel may lack clarity as to the scope of DOD’s mission  in Iraq after December 31, 2011, and the department may be less able to  ensure unity of effort among its organizations and with State in  completing the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. DOD may  therefore risk an uncoordinated approach in defining and implementing  the range of activities its OSC-I personnel will perform.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The drawdown of U.S. military forces and equipment from Iraq, an  operation governed by the time line set forth in the Security Agreement, is  an operation of unprecedented magnitude, and will occur amidst an  uncertain political and security environment as well as the ongoing  transition to a civilian-led U.S. government presence in Iraq. Much has  been done to facilitate the drawdown. DOD has conducted detailed  planning for the sequence of actions and associated resources necessary  to mitigate risk and to achieve its goals of transferring and removing  personnel and equipment from the remaining bases in Iraq. In addition,  DOD has taken steps to improve its management and oversight of  contracts in Iraq by issuing new guidance, developing metrics and  milestones for tracking key dates and progress, establishing a cell to  provide a common operating picture for all contracts in Iraq, and working  to ensure a sufficient number of CORs are available to conduct oversight.  To help facilitate the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, DOD has  engaged in interagency coordination with State at various levels, and both  agencies are working closely to coordinate the provision of equipment  and services needed to support the transition. However, without taking  further action in regards to its visibility over CMGO equipment and in  tracking equipment that is brought to record during the completion of base  transitions, DOD may not be able to take advantage of further  opportunities to reduce the likelihood of unanticipated requirements and  to refine its drawdown projections. Further, challenges DOD faces in  implementing its contractor demobilization guidance, including providing  key information to contractors and ensuring robust contractor  demobilization planning, may hinder the base transition process if  contractors miss key dates or demobilize in a less than orderly fashion.  Finally, DOD and State’s ability to ensure a timely, coordinated approach  to defining and implementing OSC-I may suffer absent an official  clarification on the scope of DOD’s activities in post-2011 Iraq in  accordance with the anticipated engagement model and the extent to  which all DOD government personnel will receive status protections such  as privileges and immunities, since DOD may lack a status of forces or  other agreement after December 31, 2011.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions.
To help ensure that DOD will be able to complete the orderly and efficient  retrograde and transfer of its equipment and transition of its bases in Iraq  by minimizing unanticipated requirements,   direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army and  the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to approve and  implement, as appropriate, a process, to include associated policy  and training, for acquiring and maintaining real-time visibility of  CMGO equipment before it is delivered to the U.S. government  that meets the needs of operational forces while retaining  oversight features inherent to DOD’s current accountability  processes; and    direct the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq take steps to collect  accurate data on equipment that is found during the large base  closure process but not recorded in any property book, and, as  appropriate, refine the projection for equipment needing to be  retrograded and transferred based on these data.
To maximize its ability to achieve an orderly and efficient drawdown of  contracted services in Iraq, direct the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, to  (1) assess the risk of providing all contractors, including their  subcontractors, with the information—such as base transition dates— required to descope services and demobilize their workforces, against the  risk of contractors’ inability to meet milestones without it and take the  appropriate actions based on this assessment; (2) take appropriate  measures, such as enforcement of guidance laid out in the template to be  developed by the office of the Senior Contracting Official-Iraq, to ensure  robust contractor planning associated with demobilization; and (3) engage  contractors to ensure that total personnel headcounts accurately reflect  all personnel, including those working under subcontracts.
To ensure that the U.S. government activities in Iraq after December  2011 reflect the appropriate unity of effort and focus DOD and State’s  efforts on implementing a coordinated approach to defining and  implementing the activities to be undertaken by OSC-I, issue a  memorandum clarifying the command structure of any DOD elements  remaining in Iraq post-2011 and the scope of DOD activities authorized in  post-2011 Iraq in accordance with an approved engagement model,  including guidance regarding actions or decisions that will be taken in the  event adequate privileges, exemptions, and immunities are not obtained  for such DOD elements.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our four  recommendations listed above, but asked that our last recommendation  be reworded to clarify the timing of our recommendation. We agreed to  modify the recommendation to specify that the guidance should be  completed once the engagement model is finalized. The Department of  State also provided a number of informal technical comments that we  considered and incorporated, as appropriate. The Department of State  did not provide formal written comments.
In its comments regarding our first recommendation, DOD stated that it  agrees that accountability of contractor-managed government-owned  equipment is important. DOD further commented that USF-I has  developed a Base Transition Smart Book that defines CMGO procedures  and provides a series of templates, instructions, and operating  procedures that cover the entire base transition process. While the Base  Transition Smart Book may define CMGO procedures, as we note in our  report, these procedures do not provide real-time visibility over this  category of equipment and we continue to believe that DOD needs to  develop a process which will allow real-time visibility of CMGO equipment  before it is delivered to the U.S. government. Regarding our second  recommendation, DOD commented that it agrees that the collection of  accurate data of found equipment is necessary to refine projections for  equipment retrograde, and noted that the Base Transition Smart Book  provides guidance on how to manage found equipment and update  projections for closure. However, as we note in our report, USF-I no  longer tracks unaccounted-for equipment that was found remaining on  bases that closed. As a result, DOD drawdown planners may lack an  accurate planning factor for unaccounted-for government equipment and  abandoned contractor equipment left over after the remaining bases in  Iraq transition. Therefore we continue to believe that USF-I should take  additional steps to collect data on equipment that is found during the base  closure process, and use this data to refine the projection for equipment  needing to be retrograded and transferred. In response to our third  recommendation, DOD commented that it acknowledges the risks  associated with providing any contractor critical transition information  about base closures and timelines. DOD said that it will address this risk  using a vigorous vetting process and security background checks. DOD  also commented that it will make certain that demobilization planning  captures the associated requirements concerning contractors and their  materiel and it further noted that the accountability of all contractor  personnel, both prime contractors and their subcontractors, will be  maintained through continued Synchronized Predeployment Operational  Tracker (SPOT) compliance and the periodic contractor census  conducted under the purview of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq. As we  have noted in previous reports, however, agency-reported data in SPOT  and the census should not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions  about the number of contractor personnel due to limitations such as  incomplete and inaccurate data. As a result, DOD cannot ensure that  contractor personnel are not being undercounted during contractor  headcounts, and we continue to believe that additional action to engage  with contractors is necessary. Regarding our last recommendation, DOD  concurred with the intent of our recommendation but asked that we  modify the wording of the recommendation to clarify that the guidance  should be developed after the engagement model has been finalized. We  agree with DOD’s suggested change and therefore modified our  recommendation accordingly.
The department also provided an informal technical comment that we  considered and incorporated, as appropriate. A complete copy of DOD’s  written comments is included in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretary of the Army. This  report also is available at no charge on our Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
D.C.: Sep. 15, 2011).
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  planned for, begun to execute, and identified and mitigated risks  associated with transferring and removing personnel and equipment from  the bases remaining open past August 31, 2010, we reviewed and  analyzed the major plans that guide the execution of the drawdown,  including those published by U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) and U.S. Army  Central (ARCENT). We also reviewed other relevant documents,  including command briefings, the Security Agreement between the United  States and the Republic of Iraq, as well as DOD joint doctrine.  Additionally, we obtained data and documentation and spoke with officials  at many organizations and levels involved in the preparation and  execution of drawdown plans to include: the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, USF-I, and ARCENT. We also spoke with officials and obtained  data and documentation from a range of supporting commands, including  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Logistics; Army Materiel  Command; Army Sustainment Command; Defense Logistics Agency;  Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; CENTCOM Deployment  Distribution Operations Center; CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support  Contracting Command; Defense Contract Management Agency; Air Force  Contract Augmentation Program; and the Logistics Civil Augmentation  Program Office. In support of this effort, we traveled to Kuwait in  September 2010 and March 2011. We also traveled to Iraq in April 2011.  During these trips we spoke with officials, attended planning conferences,  obtained data and documentation, and observed the processes instituted  to facilitate the drawdown. We also traveled to Sierra Army Depot to  observe the culmination of retrograde operations, as well as to U.S. Army  Combined Arms Support Command to discuss the institutionalization of  lessons learned from the drawdown. To address Department of State  issues impacting the drawdown of forces from Iraq, we obtained  documentation and spoke with officials at the U.S. Department of State as  well as Embassy Baghdad. Throughout the engagement, the team relied  upon staff working from our Baghdad Field Office to conduct interviews  with officials in theater, attend planning conferences, and to periodically  refresh key information.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute,  and identified and mitigated risks associated with curtailing unneeded  contract services, transitioning expiring contracts, and providing adequate  contract oversight, we reviewed contracting-specific planning documents,  memoranda, and other sources of guidance issued by DOD and  subordinate organizations. We also met with contracting officials in  Kuwait and Iraq to discuss how military units in Iraq intended to terminate  contracted services and demobilize the contractor workforce, while  maintaining sufficient oversight on contracts supporting military  operations in theater. In addition, we visited three military bases in Iraq  and met with the mayor cells to obtain information on contract descoping  and demobilization issues specific to those bases and the impact those  issues have on the base transition process. We selected these locations  because they are all large bases and because travel was possible during  the time frame of our visit. We also met with contracting officers’  representatives (COR) from one base to discuss the challenges that they  have encountered in the performance of their contract oversight duties.  To supplement our analysis, we observed several contracted services,  such as debris removal from Camp Victory and incinerator management  at Joint Base Balad, and reviewed plans on how bases intended to end  contracted services and demobilize the contractor work force in keeping  with base transition plans. Further, we observed ARCENT and USF-I  rehearsal of concept drills, a contracting summit organized by USF-I and  CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, and a  demobilization orientation session to collect information on contracting  issues relevant to the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq and the transition  to a civilian-led presence in Iraq after December 2011.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute,  and mitigated risk associated with facilitating and supporting the transition  to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, we reviewed transition-specific planning  documents, briefings, and memoranda. We also met with DOD and State  officials involved in transition efforts to discuss how DOD and State were  coordinating efforts, as well as to discuss the status of activities underway  in support of the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. For example,  we met with a team of State officials and military liaisons at the Embassy  in Baghdad responsible for managing the transition. We also held  meetings with the DOD team of officials responsible for coordinating the  provision of DOD equipment to State. In addition, we discussed transition  efforts during our meetings with officials from a myriad of military  commands and DOD organizations, including USF-I, ARCENT, Army  Sustainment Command, Defense Logistics Agency, CENTCOM-Joint  Theater Support Contracting Command, Defense Contract Management  Agency, and the LOGCAP Program Office, among others. To supplement  our analysis, we also met with DOD and State officials involved with  transition work at a large base in Iraq to observe construction status and  to discuss issues associated with the transition. We selected this location  based on its status as a large base and because travel was possible  during the timeframe of our visit. The team also relied on staff working  from the Baghdad Field Office to conduct interviews with officials in  theater involved in transition efforts, as well as to attend periodic update  meetings, and to regularly update key information.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key  contributions to this report include Carole F. Coffey, Grace A. Coleman,  Gilbert H. Kim, Anne M. McDonough-Hughes, Jason M. Pogacnik, David  A. Schmitt, Michael Shaughnessy, Michael Willems, and Matthew R.  Young.