Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building Runways and Actions to Address Them
Published: 2003-01-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Aviation experts believe that building runways is one key way to address airport capacity issues and prevent delays that can affect the entire U.S. economy, but runway projects are often controversial and time-consuming. GAO was asked to examine how much time airports spend completing runways, what challenges airports and other stakeholders experience during this process, and what airports and other stakeholders have done to address challenges related to runway projects. GAO analyzed the results of surveys from 30 airports on 32 runway projects and visited 5 airports in order to interview numerous runway project stakeholders. The Department of Transportation agreed with GAO's characterization of the challenges associated with building runways and some of the initiatives taken to address these challenges. They did express some concerns related to GAO's analysis of the time airports spent or estimated spending in developing runways, and suggested that GAO acknowledge additional FAA efforts to improve the runway process. We believe that our approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time taken to build runways; however, we clarified our discussion about the length of time. We also added information regarding initiatives undertaken by FAA.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The amount of time airports spend planning and building their runways can vary because of numerous factors. In light of this variation, for the 32 runway projects we analyzed, we used median rather than average time. The median time was about 10 years for runways that had been completed and was estimated to be about 14 years for those not completed. Most airports and stakeholders we visited and surveyed said they faced a variety of challenges that had delayed their runway projects. While the level of challenges that airports faced varied in part depending on the proximity of the airport to a major city and the amount of community opposition to the runway, some common themes emerged, including challenges related to the following: reaching stakeholder agreement on purpose and need for the runway; completing the environmental review process; reaching agreement on noise mitigation and other issues; and designing and constructing the runway. Although there may be no single solution to the challenges involved in developing runways, the federal government and airport authorities have undertaken a number of initiatives in this area. Recently, the President issued an Executive Order that is directed at streamlining the environmental review of transportation infrastructure projects, including runways. In addition, two federal legislative initiatives designed to streamline the runway process were considered in the 107th Congress. In addition, FAA has undertaken a number of initiatives directed at streamlining parts of the process. Airports have also undertaken initiatives in this area, including involving stakeholders such as community groups early in the process, and reaching early agreement on how best to mitigate noise and other runway impacts. These initiatives may be a step in the right direction, but it is too early to assess their impact on the runway process.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Although the events of September 11, 2001, diverted the aviation industry’s  attention from airport flight capacity to security issues, aviation experts  believe that addressing capacity issues must be brought back to the  forefront to prevent costly flight delays and their negative effect on the U.S.  economy. According to a recent report on the impact on civil aviation, the  flight congestion and delay problems that were experienced in 2000 had a  significant effect on the entire U.S. economy and were felt not only in the  commercial aviation industry but also in the tourism and related supplier  industries. The report found that in 2000, commercial aviation delays  resulted in over $9 billion in negative economic effects on the entire U.S.  economy and cost commercial airlines over $3 billion. In addition, the  report stated that if there were no new investments in airport construction  (including new runways) or in the air traffic system beyond 2000, delays  could potentially cost the U.S. economy $13.5 billion in 2007 and $17.2  billion in 2012.
Building runways can involve years of planning, an extensive  environmental review phase, and the design and construction of the actual  runway. Airport authorities who want to build a runway must also  coordinate with numerous stakeholders, including airlines, federal and  state officials, and community groups. In addition, they may face legal  challenges from opponents of the runway that can take years to resolve.  Nonetheless, according to FAA, despite these challenges, building new  runways is widely regarded as the most effective way to increase capacity  in the national airspace system and is critical to the entire U.S. economy.  This report provides information on the process for building runways,  taking into consideration the needs of the system and the concerns of the  various stakeholders. Specifically, as agreed with your offices, we address  the following questions: 1. How much time do airports spend building their runway projects, and  what challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience during  this process? 2. What have airports and other stakeholders done or proposed to do to  address the challenges they experienced in building runways?
To determine the amount of time that airports spent to complete runway  projects, along with challenges that airports and other stakeholders faced  during this process and initiatives to address these challenges, we surveyed  30 airports that had built or planned to build a total of 32 runways between  1991 and 2010. Based on survey responses, we selected 5 airports that were  diverse in size, location, and challenges at which we conducted in-depth  site visits in order to understand the perspectives of numerous  stakeholders. At these locations, we interviewed airport, airline, federal  and state, and community officials about their experiences. We also visited  the Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Canada, to gain a  perspective on the Canadian runway development process. A more detailed  explanation of the scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The decision to build runways has traditionally elicited strong and often  emotional reactions among stakeholders, both negative and positive.  Generally, these reactions are directed at the decision to build a runway— usually in response to the perceived environmental or economic impacts  that the proposed project will have on the surrounding communities. Often,  opponents to a runway project base their opposition on the belief that the  negative impact of the runway on their quality of life will outweigh the  projected benefits of the project. At other times, opponents contend that  alternatives such as high-speed rail, regional airports, or demand  management are better alternatives to resolving delay issues than building  new runways. In contrast, proponents of new runway projects generally  contend that building new runways can increase the level of service and  reduce delay at the airport, can result in a positive economic impact to the  region served by the airport, and in some cases can reduce noise pollution  by distributing flights over a larger geographical area.
Airports that plan to build runways must comply with what can become a  complex process involving three general phases that often overlap:  planning, environmental review, and design and construction. In addition,  airports can be involved in legal actions that can occur in any or all of the  three phases.
The first phase in the runway development process is planning. According  to FAA guidance, airports should begin planning for a new runway when  the airport has reached 60 to 75 percent of total annual flight capacity.  During the planning phase, airport authorities and local officials begin by  identifying the type of development needed at a specific airport and the  proposed project’s estimated cost and benefits, in both political and  economic terms. Some of the planning tasks include establishing the  purpose and need for the runway (for example, assessing the capability of  current facilities, reviewing and refining aviation demand forecasts, and  evaluating options to accommodate forecast demands), coordinating land  use issues with community planning boards, and preparing capacity  enhancement plans, master plans, airspace reviews, cost benefit analyses,  and airport layout plans. Further, most airports consider numerous  alternatives for increasing capacity or reducing delay before deciding on a  project to pursue. During this phase, airports will begin addressing how to  fund the proposed project.
The environmental review phase, which often overlaps with planning, is the  second phase in the runway development process. This phase typically  begins with a determination by FAA of the extent to which a proposed  project will affect the quality of the environment. To make this  determination, FAA examines the proposed project and its possible  environmental impacts on air and water quality, on noise, and on historical  lands. FAA will make one of three determinations. If the agency determines  that the scope of the project is such that it will not directly affect the  environment, it will issue a categorical exclusion. If FAA determines that a  project will have a measurable effect on the environment, but that its  impact will not exceed guidelines established in the agency’s  Environmental Handbook, it will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact  (FONSI). After issuance of a FONSI, runway projects can begin applying  for necessary permits, such as those that may be required under the Clean  Air Act or the Clean Water Act. Where potentially significant impacts are  obvious, FAA will proceed directly to the preparation of an environmental  impact statement (EIS) rather than start with the airport sponsors’  environmental assessment.
If FAA determines that a proposed project will have significant  environmental effects, it will issue a notice of intent to prepare an EIS. An  EIS includes an analysis of the potential environmental effects of a  proposed project and how to mitigate significant impacts. Council on  Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations do not require that all impacts be  mitigated; agencies are required to disclose impacts that will not be  mitigated, and the reason. After the draft EIS is completed, FAA provides it  to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which publishes a notice of  its availability in the Federal Register, where it is made available for review  and comment to federal, state, and local agencies and the public for at least  45 days. Public hearings, if necessary, usually occur during the review and  comment period. At the end of the public comment period, FAA responds  to comments received on the draft and prepares the final EIS. Once FAA  approves the final EIS, the document is printed, distributed, and once again  filed with EPA. EPA subsequently publishes notice of the availability of the  final EIS in the Federal Register. According to CEQ regulations, FAA can  not issue a Record of Decision (ROD) for at least 30 days after the  publication of the final EIS. Once the final EIS has been issued, it takes FAA  an average of about 3 months to issue a ROD. The ROD, which is the final  step of the environmental review process, summarizes the administrative  record of the agency’s proposals, alternatives, analysis, findings/  determinations, decisions, actions, and mitigation measures that were  made a condition of approval of the EIS. If, however, FAA finds that the  revised draft differs significantly from the initial draft, the agency may  issue a supplemental draft EIS and release this document for further review  and comment. In addition, other factors that may lead to a supplemental  EIS include a change in the proposed action, a change in the agency’s  decision, or new reasonable alternatives not previously evaluated. A  supplemental draft EIS can occur anywhere in the environmental process.
In addition to the requirements above, airport sponsors may be required to  obtain environmental permits/approvals from other state, local, and federal  agencies before they can begin construction of the proposed project. These  permits/approvals cover various federal and state requirements related to  wetlands, water and air quality, coastal zone management, and endangered  species, among others. These requirements arise from various regulations,  including the federal Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act. For example, the  Army Corp of Engineers requires permits when proposed projects have an  impact on wetlands under the Clean Water Act. State and local agencies  may also be responsible for requiring permits dealing with air and water  quality. Similar to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process,  the permitting process may include a public review and comment period.  Project opponents may initiate litigation once the final EIS has been  approved and the FAA has issued a favorable ROD. However, a lawsuit can  be filed at any time during the planning, environmental, and design and  construction phases.
Following the completion of the permit process, project sponsors generally  begin the final phase of the runway development process—the design and  construction phase. This phase includes a myriad of tasks, such as project  engineering, financing, contracting, land acquisition, site preparation, and  actual project construction. This phase also includes construction tasks  related to mitigating noise, wetland, and other environmental impacts.  According to FAA, it is common for airport sponsors to begin runway  design while the environmental process is underway in the interest of  saving time by undertaking these actions concurrently. Once construction  of the runway has been completed, FAA certifies the runway for operation  and commissions it for service. Figure 1 illustrates the main steps involved  in the runway development process.
section_title: Some Airports Have Spent Many Years Building Runways and Have Faced a Variety of Challenges
paragraphs: The amount of time that airports spend planning and building their  runways can vary because of a number of factors. For example, although it  is relatively straightforward to determine the beginning and ending of the  environmental and the design and construction phases of the process,  there is no consensus about what constitutes the beginning of the planning  phase. Consequently, the length of time and the number of activities  considered by some airports to be part of the planning phase vary. Airports  also described a variety of challenges that they said delayed their projects.  Many of these challenges related to reaching stakeholder agreement,  completing the environmental review phase, mitigating the impact of noise,  or designing and constructing the actual runway.
subsections: section_title: Completed Runways Took a Median of 10 Years to Build, and Unfinished Runways May Take Even Longer
paragraphs: As shown in figure 2, airports we surveyed reported spending a wide range  of time in completing runway projects. In general, airports reported  spending less time on completed projects than they estimate they will  spend on those projects not yet completed; for example, airports reported  that about half of the completed runways took 10 years or less but  estimated that almost all the projects that were not yet completed (16 out  of 17) would take 10 years or more. According to the airports with  uncompleted projects, a number of factors contributed to the time spent,  such as community opposition and difficulties in dealing with  environmental requirements.
Figure 3 shows that the median time spent on completed runway projects  was about 10 years, while the median time airports estimated they would  spend on runway projects not yet completed was about 14 years. Similarly,  the median time spent on the planning and environmental phases for  airports that had completed these phases was significantly shorter than the  median time airports estimated would be spent on those phases for  projects that they had not yet completed. This may have been because the  three projects in the planning phase and the five projects in the  environmental phase were experiencing challenges that the airports  believed would delay the completion of the respective phases. Moreover,  the median time spent on the environmental phase of projects that had  completed their environmental requirements under a FONSI was about 2.7  years, while the median time spent on the environmental phase of projects  that had completed their environmental requirements with an EIS was  about 3.7 years. This difference is likely attributable to the greater number  of requirements that accompany an EIS as compared with a FONSI.
In May 2001, the Department of Transportation issued a report to the  Congress on an environmental review of airport improvement projects that  reported results similar to our analysis. As a part of its analysis, FAA  measured the average time that elapsed between the start of planning and  the start of construction for 10 airports that received approval for a new  runway between 1996 and 2000. FAA found that the average time from thestart of planning until the start of construction was about 10 years. The  report also stated that the average time to complete an EIS for a new  runway was 3.25 years from the beginning of the EIS process to the  issuance of the Record of Decision—or about one-third of the 10-year time.  According to FAA, there can be a considerable lag from the inception of the  runway process until the runway is completed and in operation. FAA added  that these delays occur as part of the process that airports sometimes go  through in seeking to achieve consensus and the political will to move  forward while contending with local public and political opposition to  runway development. According to FAA, numerous examples can be found  where runway development has been delayed 5, 10, or more years while  plans are revised, discarded, or shelved until political and/or economic  factors can be satisfied. FAA stated that these actions make it difficult to  determine how long it takes to build a runway.
section_title: Several Themes Emerged among the Challenges That Airports Described
paragraphs: Most airports that we surveyed and visited described significant factors  that delayed their runway projects. In many cases, the challenges they  described were interrelated. For example, several airports said they faced  significant community opposition, which affected their ability to reach  stakeholder agreement and to complete the environmental review phase.  Although many of the airports we surveyed experienced similar types of  challenges, some airports, such as those in Boston, Atlanta, and Seattle,  faced a heightened level of challenges because of their locations in urban  areas with a large number of residences very close by. Some of the specific  challenges identified by airports and other stakeholders we visited include  the following: Reaching stakeholder agreement. Reaching consensus on the purpose  and need for a runway was described by several airports as being  particularly challenging. In order to reach this consensus, airports  generally must meet numerous times with stakeholders who may have  differing opinions about the runway project or uses of land surrounding the  airport. For example, airport officials in Los Angeles and Boston described  challenges related to working with community interest groups and local  metropolitan planning organizations that opposed the runway projects and  advocated using means other than building a new runway to address  capacity issues, such as developing regional airports, building new airports,  or pursuing alternative transportation modes like high-speed rail.
Some airports described challenges related to reaching agreement with  stakeholders other than community groups. For example, stakeholders in  Seattle said that reaching agreement was challenging on issues such as  where the runway should be located or the coordination of sometimes  inconsistent land use plans among various planning groups. Officials at  Boston’s Logan Airport said they could not reach agreement with FAA, a  key stakeholder on all runway projects, regarding what was needed to  satisfy the environmental review process. Specifically, Logan Airport  officials disagreed with FAA’s decision to extend its environmental process  by requiring a supplemental EIS because they believed that environmental  issues had been settled during the initial analysis. They believed that FAA’s  decision to require the supplemental draft stemmed from significant public  and political pressure from those opposed to the project.
Completing the environmental review phase. Of the 30 airports we  surveyed, 13 stated that one of their most significant challenges in planning  and building their runways was complying with environmental  requirements. Under the current process, airports must comply with over  40 federal laws, executive orders, and regulations that often overlap with  the environmental requirements mandated by some states. For example,  federal law requires the governor of each state to certify that federally  funded runways conform to local air quality standards, a requirement  known as the Governor’s certification. In addition, the Clean Air Act  requires FAA to determine whether emissions from each airport project  conform to its state’s plan for implementing national air quality standards.  According to officials from the American Association of Airport Executives  and Airports Council International, many state air quality plans contain  unrealistically low airport emissions budgets, and few realistically  anticipate reasonable airport growth. They believe that coordinating  airport development activity with the state air quality plans causes a major  source of delay and risk to airport projects. The officials also noted that the  Governor’s Certificate requirement duplicates requirements found in the  Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.
Moreover, several airports, including those in Boston, Atlanta, Houston,  and Minneapolis-St. Paul, commented that obtaining the permits necessary  to complete the environmental review was a challenge that delayed their  projects, because permitting agencies often took much longer than  expected. Boston Logan officials stated that they experienced delays  because the permitting agencies did not agree on the order in which the  permits should be issued. For example, the coastal zone management  agency was unwilling to issue its permit until FAA issued the ROD;  however, FAA was unwilling to issue the ROD until the coastal permit was  issued. According to FAA officials, the agency was able to obtain a  satisfactory assurance from the state permitting agency that allowed FAA  to move forward with the issuance of the ROD. As a result, according to  FAA officials, they were able to avoid a significant delay.
Mitigating the impact of noise and other issues. As we reported in  October 2000, mitigating the potential impact of aircraft noise on the  surrounding community continues to be a significant challenge for airports  that are building new runways. One of the reasons is that community  concerns with aircraft noise are generally already high around many  airports, and adding new runways adds to the already heightened concern.  Another reason, according to some stakeholders, why mitigating noise is  particularly challenging for several of the airports is because they do not  participate in FAA’s voluntary Part 150 Noise Compatibility Program, which  provides funding to airports to help mitigate the impact of noise on the  communities. Several other airports also told us that their noise problems  are the result of incompatible land uses (existing or planned) around the  airports.
In addition to mitigating the impact of noise on the surrounding  community, officials at Sea-Tac Airport said that they were equally  challenged to mitigate the impact of the project on wetlands, particularly  because two key stakeholders had conflicting views on how this should be  done. According to Sea-Tac officials, the state of Washington has a strong  preference that mitigation measures for wetland and stream impacts be  located in the same water basin where the impacts occur. However,  because of concerns about attracting wildlife, and the danger to aircraft of  bird strikes, FAA strongly advises that airports avoid locating wetlands  within 10,000 feet of runways.
Design and construction of the runway. Several airports commented  that they also faced some challenges during the design and construction  phase of their runways. For example, Dallas-Fort Worth officials stated that  adverse weather conditions created construction problems for them, as the  region’s high temperatures made it difficult to ensure that concrete poured  for the runway would cure properly. Airport officials at Sea-Tac also  described challenges related to the design and construction phase. For  example, before Sea-Tac can build its runway it has to import 17 million  cubic yards of dirt to the airport to extend a plateau for a foundation. Thus,  the airport authority has to find suitable, nonpolluted fill dirt to use for the  foundation. Once the dirt is located, it must be transported to the airport  over an indirect route using trucks that the airport is required to clean  before they leave the airport. Finally, the airport authority is to use  extensive mitigation measures to ensure that moving the dirt will not  adversely affect the surrounding communities and wetlands.
Appendixes II through VI provide a detailed description of how various  challenges have affected runway projects at the Boston, Dallas, Memphis,  Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle airports, according to airport authorities  and other stakeholders.
section_title: A Number of Initiatives Are Underway to Address Challenges Related to Building Runways
paragraphs: While there may be no single solution to all the challenges associated with  planning and building runways, the federal government and airports have  undertaken a number of initiatives to address the challenges related to  such issues as duplicative environmental requirements, stakeholder  differences, and noise mitigation. Primarily, these initiatives focused on  streamlining the environmental review process and improving cooperation,  communication, and coordination among major stakeholders.
subsections: section_title: Federal Initiatives Focus on Streamlining the Environmental Review Process to Reduce Duplication
paragraphs: One initiative designed to address a significant issue identified by airports  and other stakeholders—the extensive and often duplicative environmental  review requirements—is Executive Order 13274, entitled Environmental  Stewardship and Transportation Infrastructure Project Reviews, which was  signed by the President on September 18, 2002. The order directs agencies  that conduct required environmental reviews with respect to  transportation infrastructure projects, including runways, to formulate and  implement administrative, policy, and procedural mechanisms that enable  the agencies to ensure completion of such reviews in a timely and  environmentally responsible manner. The order also states that the  Secretary of Transportation shall  designate a list of high-priority transportation infrastructure projects to  receive expedited agency reviews; chair an inter-agency task force to monitor and expedite environmental  reviews of high-priority transportation infrastructure projects, and  identify and promote policies that can effectively streamline the  environmental review process; and   prepare an annual report to the President describing the results of the  expedited reviews, and provide recommendations.
Executive departments and agencies shall take appropriate actions, to the  extent consistent with applicable law and available resources, to promote  environmental stewardship in the nation’s transportation system and to  expedite environmental reviews of high-priority transportation  infrastructure projects. The Secretary has stated that the Department of  Transportation will work with federal and state agencies to reduce  duplicative and overlapping requirements and promote effective strategies  for enhancing the timeliness of the decisionmaking process.
Proposed legislation was introduced in the 107th Congress to address  several of the concerns raised by a number of airports and other  stakeholders we surveyed and visited—H. R. 4481, the Airport Streamlining  Approval Process Act of 2002, and S. 633, the Aviation Delay Prevention  Act. H.R. 4481, the House bill, focused on capacity-enhancement projects  and was generally directed at streamlining the runway development  process, while the Senate bill was directed at reducing aviation delays.  Table 1 summarizes some of the key provisions in H.R. 4481 and S. 633 that  sought to address the challenges the airports identified.
In responding to our survey, seven airports stated that eliminating the  governor’s certificate requirement would reduce duplicative environmental  requirements. In an August 2000 report to the Congress on aviation and the  environment, we suggested that Congress may wish to consider eliminating  the state air quality certification requirements in airport legislation  becauseit is duplicative of protections offered under the Clean Air Act.  FAA officials stated that they agreed with our suggestion and believed that  a parallel situation exists with respect to state water quality certification,  which is largely duplicative of protections under the Clean Water Act. Both  the House and the Senate bills would have eliminated the Governor’s  Certificate requirement.
section_title: FAA Initiatives Focus on Streamlining the Planning and Environmental Review Processes
paragraphs: FAA has identified and undertaken several initiatives directed at  streamlining the planning and environmental review processes and  improving cooperation, communication, and coordination among major  stakeholders. Some of the initiatives have been implemented, and others  are currently underway. FAA officials believe that the initiatives, if  successful, will provide measurable improvements in the amount of time  and resources spent in the planning and environmental review phases of  the process.
FAA has undertaken several initiatives to improve the planning and  environmental processes that the agency believes will help ensure that  runway projects are completed in a timely manner. With respect to  planning, FAA prepared an internal Memorandum of Agreement in  September 2002 to standardize the procedures for establishing  multidisciplinary teams to participate in major airport planning studies.  The agency has plans to update its guidance on airport master plans and to  upgrade an airspace and ground capacity simulation model in fiscal year  2003, and to update its guidance on airport terminal planning and design by  the end of fiscal year 2004. With respect to streamlining the environmental  review process, FAA began implementing several initiatives in January  2001 that are designed to produce measurable improvements. FAA began  establishing multidisciplinary EIS teams for new EISs at large hub primary  airports, reallocating staff resources and seeking airport reimbursable  agreements to support environmental work, and increasing the use of  consultants to assist FAA with coordination and administration of EISs.
To increase coordination and assign accountability for runway  development tasks to key stakeholders, FAA began another initiative in  August 2001 as a part of its Operational Evolution Plan—a 10-year plan to  expand and modernize the nation’s airport system. FAA developed detailed  plans called Runway Template Action Plans to provide a standard set of  tasks that must be considered when developing new runways. FAA has  completed Runway Template Action Plans for 12 airports that are expected  to complete new runways by 2008. According to FAA officials, the agency  has met the deadlines for its commitments at all of the airports, and no  runway completion date has changed as a result of FAA actions since the  program began.
While the Executive Order and the proposed legislation were designed to  address challenges some of the airports experienced, it is too early to  assess their impact; the Executive Order was only recently signed, and the  legislation did not pass in the 107th session of Congress. Nonetheless,  several stakeholders, including airports we surveyed and visited, supported  efforts consistent with these initiatives. Further, FAA officials believe that  the initiatives FAA has taken and proposed will yield measurable  improvements in the runway development process—particularly with  respect to the planning and environmental review phases of the process.
section_title: Airports Have Undertaken Some Initiatives to Address Challenges
paragraphs: Airports we visited and surveyed described a number of actions they have  taken to address the challenges they faced in building their runways. These  actions included proactive approaches to working with stakeholders to  plan for and mitigate various impacts of the runway projects on  neighboring communities. For example, the Louisville airport used an  unusual approach to deal with the needs of neighboring homeowners who  would be required to move in order to be outside the noise parameter levels  posed by the new runway. After reaching agreement on the market value  that the airport would pay for each home, the airport offered these  residents a choice: residents either could move to a new home of equal  value in a new community development being built by the airport, or they  could participate in the traditional relocation program, where the airport  purchases the home and the family relocates to a home and location of its  choosing. Airport officials stated that this approach worked well for both  the airport and the displaced residents. According to airport officials, the  residents benefited because those who wished to stay together as a  community (which was the preference of many) were able to do so, and the  airport saved approximately $17,000 per home on those homes built in the  new community development.
A Washington State Department of Transportation official stated that  minimizing controversy over the uses of land needed for expanding runway  capacity could be important in avoiding lengthy project delays. The  department developed an Airport Land Use Compatibility Program,  implementing a 1996 amendment of the Washington State Growth  Management Act—the state’s land-use planning law. The law requires cities  and counties to identify, site, and protect essential public facilities  (including airports) from incompatible land use, such as encroaching  development. In other words, when developing local land-use plans, cities  and counties must ensure that their plans do not adversely affect these  facilities. As part of the land-use compatibility program, certain state  transportation officials provide consultations, including mediation,  between airport sponsors and community representatives (often municipal  or county planning staff) to balance the state’s dual interest of promoting  aviation and ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its residents. The  approach to facilitating airports’ future expansion includes several steps,  including the development of planning-based solutions and the integration  of those solutions into a legally enforceable document, such as a  comprehensive development plan—rather than the Airport Master Plan,  which is not binding on land-use authority—in order to increase the  probability that the solutions will succeed.
In Minneapolis, the airport attempted to build consensus throughout the  project by considering mitigation agreements that were more liberal than  those required by FAA. For example, the airport has been pursuing a liberal  noise-mitigation strategy in order to better address community concerns  about noise impacts. The airport chose to keep residential blocks together  for noise-mitigation measures, whether or not the entire block fell within  the same noise contour. In other words, if one residence in a block lay  within the 65-decibel Day Night Average Sound Level (DNL) noise contour,  every residence on the block received similar mediation measures.  Another challenge for which the airport had to develop a solution was  mitigating the noise impacts on a National Wildlife Refuge located within  the flight path of the new runway. The refuge contains an educational  center and is a popular location for bird watching. The refuge contended  that the usefulness of the center and bird watching activities would be  severely impacted by noise from the runway. The airport and the refuge  were ultimately able to negotiate an agreement whereby the airport  authority would pay the organization $26 million for the right to conduct  flight operations over the refuge.
In Dallas-Fort Worth, the airport chose to implement a four-stage approach  to mitigating the noise impacts of the runway project: 1) direct land  acquisition for properties located in the runway protection zone, 2) direct  land acquisition of certain properties for noise mitigation, 3) sound  proofing structures for noise mitigation, and 4) acquisition of aviation  easements. Airport officials noted that the first three stages of the  mitigation plan are standard among most runway projects and, in the case  of acquiring properties in the runway protection zone, required of all  airports. However, with respect to aviation easements, the airport  undertook an approach that it considered to be extraordinary at the time.  The airport offered residents 25 percent of the fair market value of their  property to acquire easements for noise impacts. The easements are  attached to the property deed, affecting the current property owner and all  future owners of that property.
Overall, the airports that described these initiatives believed they had a  positive impact on their runway projects. Other airports described similar  initiatives that they believed were helpful in facilitating the completion of  the various phases of their projects. It may be helpful for other airports to  consider these initiatives when faced with similar challenges; however, the  wide variety of situations faced by airports and the differing levels of  community opposition or environmental issues each airport faces make it  difficult to determine whether an effort undertaken successfully by one  airport will have the same positive results at another airport.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided the Secretary of Transportation with a copy of a draft of this  report. FAA officials agreed with our characterization of the challenges  associated with building runways and our identification of some of the  initiatives to address these challenges. However, they did express some  concerns related to our analysis of the amount of time airports spent or  estimated spending in developing their runways, as compared with the  results of FAA’s 2001 study. They also suggested that GAO include more  acknowledgment of their efforts in trying to improve the runway  development process. Regarding FAA’s concerns, we believe our approach  was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time it takes airports to  build runways. However, we clarified our discussion on the length of time  by focusing on the median time rather than the average time because this  approach minimizes the impact of outlying airports that may have taken a  very long or a very short time to build their runways. We also compared our  analysis of the time taken by airports to build runways with FAA’s study.  See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of the comparative analysis.  Finally, we included information regarding several initiatives that FAA has  undertaken to streamline and improve the planning and environmental  processes. We also made technical changes throughout the report as  appropriate.
We performed our work from April 2001 through December 2002 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you release its contents earlier, we plan  no further distribution of this report until 10 days after the date of its  issuance. At that time, we will send copies of this report to congressional  committees with responsibilities for the activities discussed in this report;  to the Secretary of Transportation; and to the Administrator of the Federal  Aviation Administration. We will make copies available to others upon  request. This report is also available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding the contents of this report,  please call me or Tammy Conquest at (202) 512-2834. Other key  contributors to this report were Ruthann Balciunas, William Chatlos, David  Hooper, Gary Lawson, David Lehrer, and Alwynne Wilbur.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our primary methods for addressing our two research questions—first,  how much time do airports spend building their runway projects and what  challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience during this  process, and second, what have airports and other stakeholders done or  proposed to do to address the challenges they experienced in building  runways—-were to conduct a nationwide survey of airports that built new  runways between 1991 and 2000 or planned to build new runways by 2010,  and to perform site visits at five airports. The survey population included  30 airports, 16 of which had built their airports between 1991 and 2000, and  14 of which had planned to build new runways by 2010. The survey,  conducted in February 2002, provided data on the amount of time that 30  airports spent in planning and building 32 runway projects; on key factors  that accelerated or delayed the projects; and on initiatives that airports  have taken to address the challenges they faced during the process.
Based on our analysis of the survey responses, we judgmentally selected  five airports at which to conduct site visits, to develop a more in-depth  understanding of the experiences and challenges they faced. We  subsequently visited Boston Logan, Dallas-Fort Worth, Memphis Shelby  County, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle-Tacoma Airports, where we  interviewed the airport authority, FAA, hub airlines, state agencies,  metropolitan planning organizations, and local community and  environmental groups about their experiences with the runway projects. In  addition, we also interviewed officials from Lester B. Pearson International  Airport in Toronto, Canada, and Transport Canada to gain an understanding  of the Canadian runway development process.
We also compared our analysis with FAA’s May 2001 report. While the  results of the two studies are similar, there are some methodological  differences between the two studies. First, our measurement begins at the  start of planning and ends with the completion of the runway. In contrast,  FAA’s measurement begins with planning but ends with the beginning of  the design and construction phase. Second, GAO’s analysis is based on the  median time, which minimizes the impact of runways that take a very long  or a very short time to complete; FAA’s estimate, however, is based on the  average time, which does not account for the impact of outliers. Based on  our survey responses, when considering the average time, we found that  airports that had completed their projects took 12.25 years and airports  that had not yet completed their projects estimated that their projects  would take about 16 years. Third, our survey allowed the airports to  determine the beginning and end of each of the process phases, whereas  FAA selected specific events for analysis. For example, FAA’s analysis  based the end of the environmental review phase on the issuance of the  ROD. Certain airports responding to GAO’s survey included federal and  state permits as part of the environmental process. FAA’s May 2001 report  found that federal and state permits can take 6 to 12 months or more to  complete after the ROD. Finally, each of the two analyses examined a  different universe of airports. FAA analyzed data on 10 airports that had  projects approved between 1996 and 2000. GAO analyzed data on over 30  runway projects that were completed, or expected to be completed,  between 1991 and 2010. GAO’s analysis included 6 of the 10 airports that  FAA analyzed.
We also interviewed officials from FAA, Airports Council International, the  Airline Transport Association, and the National Association of State  Aviation Officials to obtain information on the process for building  runways and to identify what actions have been taken to address  challenges related to planning and building runways.
We conducted our work from April 2001 through December 2002 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Airport Site Visits
paragraphs: To gain additional perspective on the runway development process, we  visited five airports that had significant positive or negative experiences in  going through the runway development process; some of the airports  identified initiatives to overcome these challenges. We also included  airports that were in various stages of completing their runway projects,  and in various parts of the country. We asked the airports to share their  experiences in the process of building new runways, as well as those  events that either significantly delayed or accelerated the completion of the  runway projects. We identified several key factors—the amount of time  that transpired, how this time compared with the airports’ expectations of  the process timeline, how key stakeholders’ timeliness compared with the  airports’ expectations, and the significant events that either delayed or  accelerated the completion of the runways. In addition, we considered the  airports’ responses to other questions, as warranted. We also visited the  Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Canada, to gain an  understanding of the Canadian runway development process and of the  airport’s experiences in building runways. The overarching factor leading  to selection was the airports’ experiences that appeared appropriate for  other airports to draw upon. These experiences, both positive and negative,  are intended to yield lessons that other airports can emulate or avoid. Table  2 shows the airports we selected and the phase of each project as of  December 2002.
Appendixes II through VII contain a summary of the results of our visit to  each airport, including background information and status of the runway  project. The summaries also highlight significant events and experiences  for each specific location, based on our discussions with the airport  authorities and key stakeholders. While each of the airports we visited  experienced challenges within several broad themes noted earlier  (resolving stakeholder differences, completing extensive environmental  requirements, and addressing issues related to runway design and  construction), those broad themes were not necessarily the most important  at that specific site. Consequently, we highlight different experiences at  each site. For example, the Boston airport’s legal challenges were much  more extensive than were those at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport.  We  discuss Boston’s legal challenges at length, while we mention those at  Minneapolis-St. Paul as they applied to other experiences.
subsections: section_title: General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport – East Boston, MA
paragraphs: Boston’s Logan International Airport is operated by the Massachusetts Port  Authority (Massport). According to FAA, airport, state, and airline officials,  Logan plays a critical role in the New England economy, and it serves as the  region’s long-haul and international gateway airport. According to  Massport officials, in 2000, the airport handled 27.4 million passengers and  contributed about $6.6 billion to the regional economy, supporting about  100,000 jobs. It was North America’s nineteenth-busiest in terms of  passenger traffic. Logan is consistently ranked as one of the nation’s most  delayed airports. In 2000, Logan was the sixth-most delayed airport overall  and second-most delayed for arrivals. Logan is served by all the major U.S.  carriers. The top carriers are U.S. Airways, American, and Delta, with  roughly equal shares of passenger traffic. The airport is primarily an origin  and destination point, with about 90 percent of the passengers beginning or  ending their trips at Logan.
In good weather, Logan generally operates on a north-south, three-runway  configuration with a capacity of about 120 flight operations per hour.  However, during adverse weather conditions (such as northwest or  southeast winds in excess of 10 knots per hour, which occur about one- third of the year), the airport can be reduced to as few as 60 to 90  operations per hour on an east-west, one- or two-runway operation.  Massport believes that its proposed 5,000-foot, unidirectional runway will  avoid the significant reduction in efficiency during adverse weather  conditions and help mitigate weather-related delays. Massport views the  runway as a capacity-neutral airfield enhancement, which means that the  proposed runway will decrease delays without increasing the airport’s top  capacity of about 120 flights per hour. The Massachusetts Executive Office  of Environmental Affairs administers the Massachusetts Environmental  Policy Act, the state’s environmental protection act. In its Final  Environmental Impact Report certificate, the Secretary, Massachusetts  Executive Office of  Environmental Affairs, stated that the central  environmental question is not whether the project is accommodating or  generating demand per se, but rather whether Massport is operating the  airport in a manner that avoids, minimizes, or mitigates environmental  impacts in light of its obligations under MEPA. An official from the  environmental office stated that the project might increase airfield  capacity, but that an airport capacity determination was beyond the scope  of its review. Figure 4 shows the existing Logan runway configuration,  including the proposed runway project.
We selected Logan Airport as a site-visit location, in part, because its  runway project has been in the planning phase since 1969. Further, a state  court injunction against building new runways at the airport has been in  place since the mid-1970s (FAA approved an EIS for a runway in the same  general location on the airfield in the late 1960s). Further, because of the  injunction, Massport decided not to actively pursue the project until the  project was reinstituted in 1995, based on an FAA Capacity Enhancement  Study. Logan is an example of an airport that has spent a long time in the  process, and it has gone through several iterations of the EIS review  process.
We interviewed officials at Massport, who were the main sponsors of the  new, sixth runway at Logan. We also interviewed officials at FAA’s New  England Region, American Eagle Airlines, Massachusetts Executive Office  of Environmental Affairs, and the Massachusetts High Technology Council.  We also gathered information from Communities Against Runway  Expansion, the primary community interest group.
section_title: Current Status of the Runway Project
paragraphs: FAA issued its ROD indicating that the project had satisfied all federal  environmental requirements on August 2, 2002. However, the airport can  not yet begin constructing the runway because of an existing state court  injunction.  Moreover, opposition groups appealed the ROD in August 2002  in the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., arguing, among other  things, that FAA did not adequately analyze the noise and air quality  impacts on neighboring communities.
section_title: Stakeholders Cite Community Opposition as a Major Challenge and Say Efforts to Address This Issue Were Unsuccessful
paragraphs: Massport and other stakeholders we interviewed (American Eagle Airlines,  Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, FAA, and the  High Technology Council) said that the lack of agreement among  stakeholders—particularly with regard to responding to the strong ongoing  community opposition to the runway project—has presented a major  challenge. Communities Against Runway Expansion and other local  community groups surrounding the airport opposed the project because of  a number of issues, including the impact of the runway on noise, emissions,  economic growth, and endangered species. Opponents to the project also  question the intended use of the runway (for example, delay reduction  versus capacity enhancement). According to FAA, Massachusetts  Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, American Eagle Airlines, the  High Technology Council, and Massport officials themselves, the public  appears to distrust Massport. These stakeholders added that much of the  opposition stems from the fact that the airport is located in downtown  Boston rather than from plans for a new runway, and that community  groups opposed to the project are not likely to change their position.  According to an American Eagle Airlines official, FAA should help  community groups understand the economic benefits of the project on  their communities.
Massport said it has attempted to address this challenge through extensive  public participation and review efforts, but that these have not been  successful. FAA, Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs,  and the airlines have agreed that Massport involved the public throughout  most of the lengthy process, and that the public was able to express its  concerns to Massport through the public meetings and the required public  comment periods on FAA’s decisions. According to Massport, in response  to public pressure, FAA created a special review panel and required  Massport to undertake a supplemental Draft EIS as a means to further  expand public participation. As part of the public outreach process,  Massport provided $350,000 for technical assistance to the Community  Advisory Council. Communities Against Runway Expansion, on the other  hand, stated that Massport’s efforts toward communication were for  appearance only—that the airport authority spoke to them but did not  listen to their concerns. All agreed that extensive communication did not  lead to cooperation and consensus.
section_title: Stakeholders Say Meeting Extensive Environmental Requirements Has Been Challenging Because of Community Opposition
paragraphs: Massport and FAA prepared a joint Draft Environmental Impact Report and  Draft EIS to meet state and federal requirements. According to Massport,  this joint effort is a common approach for streamlining the environmental  review process. The joint state and federal permit process lasted over 7  years. Stakeholders said this is partly attributable to community opposition  and to the effect of this opposition on the process.
In 1995, in what it described as an effort to conduct the environmental  analysis with input from all concerned parties, Massport established the  Airside Review Committee, which included representatives from the 24  communities surrounding the airport and from 11 business and industry  organizations. However, according to both FAA and Massport, this effort  was suspended for about 18 months between 1996 and 1998, when the  entire runway project stalled because of a change in Massport leadership  and priorities. In 1998, according to Massport officials, the airport  attempted to pick up the environmental review process where it had been  suspended. Community groups complained that they had not been part of  the recent process and appealed to FAA that the Draft EIS was no longer  accurate, complete, or up-to-date. Massport believes it did try numerous  times to meet with the Airside Review Committee, but to no avail.
The state approved the Draft Environmental Impact Review in May 1999  and the final Environmental Impact Review in June 2001. However, FAA  requested a Supplemental Draft EIS rather than approving the Draft EIS.  FAA officials stated that the agency did so because it needed to address  several issues, including changing technology and the high level of  concerns expressed by project opponents in public comments to the Draft  EIS. Massport, the Massachusetts High Technology Council, and American  Eagle Airlines all believe that FAA’s decision was unreasonable. Massport  officials contended that the project had already undergone 5 years of public  process, that continuation was unlikely to help achieve local consensus,  and that they believed it had not.  FAA officials, however, believe that it did  result in a better, more informative EIS document.
Individuals, communities, action groups, and business groups submitted  comments  during public information meetings and hearings and in  response to the Draft EIS and Final EIR documents that were extensive.  For example, about 800 people attended the two April 2001 public hearings  for the Supplemental Draft EIS document and about 850 comment letters  were received during the 75-day comment period.
The Supplemental Draft EIS took about 1 year to complete, and it delayed  the filing of the Final EIS by about 1.5 years, according to Massport. During  this time, in another attempt to develop agreement among stakeholders,  FAA chaired a city and commonwealth Task Force to request further  comments to the Draft EIS for incorporation into the Supplemental Draft  EIS. Although this group met, analyzed, and discussed many runway issues,  not all stakeholders were pleased with its outcome. For example,  Communities Against Runway Expansion stated that the products of the  panel’s work, the Supplemental Draft EIS and the Final Environmental  Impact Review, were inaccurate and inconclusive, and they justified the  runway without proposing a viable alternative.
In late June 2002, FAA issued the Final EIS for public comment, as required  by the NEPA process. FAA received approximately 100 comment letters  raising 42 main issues, ranging from general opposition to a concern about  the adequacy of technical analyses. FAA said that it responded to the  comments as required and issued its final approval, the ROD, in August  2002. In both the Final EIS and the ROD, FAA included a restriction (which  Massport officials said was unprecedented) that the proposed runway be  used only when winds create conditions in which the usefulness of other  current runways is limited. FAA considers this wind restriction a  mitigation measure, as it would ensure that the runway was not used to  increase capacity during good weather. Many stakeholders—including  proponents and opponents—view this restriction as a compromise  designed to achieve consensus, but others, such as community groups,  maintain that the wind restriction does not go far enough to mitigate the  environmental effects of this project. Communities Against Runway  Expansion continued to contest FAA’s approval in the press and in federal  court and, through an urgent message on its Web page, urged others to  respond to the Final EIS. Moreover, Massport and Massachusetts Executive  Office of Environmental Affairs officials said that, by issuing the ROD with  wind restrictions, FAA could reactivate the state environmental review  process because the approved project differs significantly from what  Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs approved in  2001. Subsequently, the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs chose  not to reexamine the environmental document because it did not believe  that the wind restriction significantly changed the environmental impacts  of the runway.
FAA, Massport, and American Eagle Airlines said that, during the length of  time spent attempting to get all of the environmental approvals needed,  some assumptions made early on in the process have been called into  question. For example, concerns have been raised that traffic forecasts  may not materialize, that the increasing use of Regional Jets may change  the equipment mix more than planned, and that the 5,000 foot runway may  not be long enough to be as useful as hoped. They believe that these issues  played a part in triggering FAA’s Supplemental Draft EIS process. However,  a Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs official stated  that it is not possible to “freeze” the process to figure out all the answers  before making a decision. According to many stakeholders, the  environmental review process is a continuous cycle in which comments  require additional study, which leads to revisions, which lead to more  comments, which lead to additional study. They contend that the circuitous  nature of the process is the primary source of delay. The Massachusetts  environmental permit process has important time triggers that allow for the  process to come to an end. Massport believes that if similar triggers were in  place at the federal level, many of the delays encountered during the EIS  process could have been avoided.
section_title: Litigation Added Time to Process
paragraphs: Massport first suggested, and actually began construction on, a new 3,830  foot runway in the same general location on the airfield almost 30 years ago  (May 1974). Massport took the position that the 1974 runway project did  not require a state environmental review because 1) both the Massport  Board and the Commonwealth Office of Transportation and Construction  determined it had no environmental impact and 2) the project commenced  before July 1, 1973, the effective date of the Massachusetts Environmental  Policy Act. The City of Boston and the Massachusetts Secretary of  Environmental Affairs both disagreed and sued Massport. The Suffolk  Superior Court enjoined Massport from proceeding with the 1974 Runways  Project, pending the preparation, filing, and review of a final EIR as  directed by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs.
On June 15, 2001, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs determined that  Massport’s Final EIR submitted in March 2001 adequately and properly  complied with the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental  Affairs. Massport went to court to get the injunction lifted. The court began  considering this injunction in late January 2003. Groups opposing the  project declared victory because the motion to lift the injunction went to  trial. A second lawsuit, regarding runway development in Plymouth County,  located southeast of the airport, resulted in a summary judgment in favor of  Massport. This matter is now under appeal. Plymouth County includes the  cities of Hull, Hingham, and Cohasset, all in the flight path of the over-the- water operations. These local municipalities alleged that the state  environmental permit was invalid because Massport misled the  Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs about the  project’s impact by providing incomplete and inaccurate technical data.  Table 3 summarizes the history of the Boston Logan runway project.
section_title: Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport – DFW, TX
paragraphs: In 2001, the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport was the fourth-busiest  North American airport in terms of passengers. Both American Airlines and  Delta Airlines run hub operations at the airport, with about 70 percent and  19 percent of the airport’s annual operations, respectively. According to the  airport’s Chief Executive Officer, the airport provides $12 billion in annual  economic activity for North Texas.
The Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Board (the Board) governs the airport. The  Board is composed of 12 members, 11 of whom are appointed by the  councils of the airport’s owner cities in accordance with each city’s  ownership interest in the airport; 7 represent the city of Dallas, and 4  represent the city of Fort Worth. The 12th member is a nonvoting member  representing the neighboring host cities of Coppell, Euless, Grapevine, and  Irving on a rotating annual basis (the member is from a particular city every  fourth year). The Board may enter into contracts without approval of the  City Councils, but its annual operating budget requires City Council  approval of the owner cities.
The airport lies within the city limits of the four host cities. It obtained the  freedom to pursue independent development through state legislation  known as the Texas Municipal Airports Act. It covers over 29 square miles,  and its real property consists of over 18,000 acres. The current  configuration is seven runways—five north-south parallel, two diagonal.  Four of these runways are over 11,000 feet in length. This configuration  allows the airport to land four planes simultaneously. In good weather, the  airport generally operates with a capacity of about 260 to 270 operations  per hour. Airport revenue is shared with the surrounding cities based upon  the location of the enterprise. For example, the rental car franchises are  located in Euless, so that city receives a portion of the car rental tax  revenues.
The seventh runway was designed to reduce delays as well as to increase  overall aircraft operations capacity. Airport officials developed the 1991  DFW Airport Development Plan, which included two new runways in  response to market demand, to maintain the highest level of service for  their customers. Figure 5 shows the existing Dallas-Fort Worth  International Airport configuration, including the proposed eighth runway  and several proposed extensions.
We selected the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport for a site visit  because the airport, which was completed in February 1974, is one of the  most recently constructed airports in the United States (only Denver is a  more recently constructed large hub airport). The airport completed its  seventh runway in 1996, and had planned to complete an additional eighth  runway before more sophisticated demand-delay studies were completed.  Furthermore, the airport reported in our survey that many elements of the  runway development process took less time than expected.
We interviewed officials at the following: Dallas-Fort Worth International  Airport, the sponsor of the new runway projects; the four host cities  surrounding the airport—Coppell, Euless, Grapevine, and Irving; FAA  Southwest Regional Office and Airports District Office; North Central  Texas Council of Governments; and the Texas Commission on  Environmental Quality. We attempted to contact American Airlines, but  airline officials said that too much time had passed since the early phases  of the project for its response to be meaningful.
subsections: section_title: Current Status of the Two Runway Projects
paragraphs: The seventh runway was commissioned in October 1996. All activities for  the proposed eighth runway have been temporarily suspended while  airport officials explore the implications that recent economic and industry  events will have for runway need.
section_title: Airport Officials Described Extensive Environmental Review Process as Challenging
paragraphs: According to the airport Chief Executive Officer, the environmental review  process for the seventh runway required the airport to coordinate the  activities of 19 federal agencies and 15 state agencies, and this process was  further complicated by the lack of prime contacts and personnel changes at  reviewing agencies. Public controversy and public demands for  information exceeded the airport’s expectations and necessitated a highly  detailed environmental review. According to airport officials, this review  included an analysis of 12 project alternatives, although many were not  equally viable or would not survive the review process. According to these  officials, the airport will probably include two alternatives in future  reviews—build/no build—and then add specific alternatives for study if  reviewers request that additional alternatives be examined. Officials felt  that preparing an analysis of alternatives in this way will likely be less  costly and time-consuming than would preparing alternatives that, in their  opinion, clearly have no relevance.
section_title: The Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Used Some Unique Approaches to Mitigate Runway Impacts
paragraphs: The Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport chose to implement a four- stage approach to mitigating the off-airport noise impacts of the runway  project: 1) direct land acquisition for properties located in the runway  safety area; 2) direct land acquisition of certain properties for noise  mitigation; 3) sound-proofing structures for noise mitigation; and 4)  acquisition of aviation easements. The airport offered 25 percent of the  fair market value of the property to acquire aviation easements. According  to airport officials, the easements were written so that residents who  accepted them still have legal standing to take the airport to court over  noise impacts. Airport officials estimated that final mitigation costs would  be about $176 million. The last of the real estate settlements were paid out  in 2002. The final cost of the mitigation program exceeded the runway cost  by a wide margin.
The airport created an independent agency, the Action Desk, before  beginning the mitigation plan implementation. The Action Desk was the  main point of contact for property owners to provide and obtain  information and to file concerns and complaints. This office developed a  database of property-owner information and disseminated a newsletter.  According to airport officials, this approach was highly effective in  providing property-specific information to property owners that countered  misinformation about the project and allayed fears. The airport also hired a  consultant to manage the mitigation process, and it established an appeals  process by which property owners could contest the acquisition process.  The appeals council was composed of airline employees, local residents, a  local clergy member, and airport board members. The airport Chief  Executive Officer had final approval of any appeals.
section_title: Stakeholder Experiences, from Start to Finish, Were Many and Varied
paragraphs: The Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport still maintains its Capacity  Enhancement Team, first established in the 1970s, composed of officials  from FAA, the airport, and the airlines. The airport refers to the team as a  “three-legged stool.”  Each of the groups is equally important to supporting  this stool.  If one of the “legs” doesn’t provide support, the stool falls over.  Airport officials, FAA, and even local governments made reference to this  team during our visit. The team’s responsibility is to recommend how the  airport should address increases in airfield efficiency, safety, and capacity.
According to airport officials, one of the biggest factors contributing to the  successful completion of the seventh runway project was the staff  dedicated to the project from FAA, the Department of Justice, and various  consultant teams. These stakeholders were assigned to the project. The  dedicated team provided the airport with single points of contact and  reduced the potential for misinterpretation or ambiguity, as well as  continually reeducated the participants. This experience was in contrast to  the difficulties the airport experienced in coordinating the input from over  30 agencies in the environmental review process. Airport officials wished  that they had kept the Environmental Protection Agency involved  throughout the process, rather than only at the beginning and at the end.  They also suggested that FAA limit the time frame for agency comments,  and thereby eliminate lengthy comment periods. The Environmental  Protection Agency took 260 days to review the EIS, which is considerably  longer than the 60 to 90 days that the airport expected.
FAA officials thought that holding many more public information meetings  than required also contributed to the success of the project, especially  during the environmental review process. This way, FAA and others  answered questions or comments and addressed concerns before the  official comment period began. FAA also repeated the airport’s suggestion  that FAA should adhere to the comment deadlines.
The four communities surrounding the airport had both positive and  negative experiences while working with the airport. Three cities  challenged the ROD on the basis that its noise analysis and mitigation plan  were insufficient. (The ROD was upheld 23 months later.) Grapevine felt  that the airport broke long-standing promises. According to Grapevine  representatives, the plan that the airport originally presented would have  placed the area subsequently developed by Grapevine outside projected  flight patterns. Currently, if the airport continues with its plan for the eighth  runway, flights will go directly over the city of Grapevine. Irving realized  that asking for no airport expansion was probably unreasonable, and “you  really have to cut the best deal you can.” The best possible runway  development process should make the city whole. Euless will be more  affected by the eighth runway. While Euless initially joined forces with two  cities to contest the ROD, it withdrew its challenge. The Euless City  Manager stated that he appreciated the positive economic impact of the  airport on the North Central Texas economy and believed the airport needs  additional capacity to support that economic impact. If the eighth runway  does become a reality, the City Manager expects the same mitigation plan  that Irving received for the seventh runway, which he considered fair. The  fourth community, Coppell, did not challenge the ROD. According to the  Coppell City Manager, Coppell realized that it had to do its part to approve  the runway somehow, because the airport is seen as vital to the economies  of Coppell as well as to the region. The manager felt that airport staff were  professional, knowledgeable, and helpful and never held things out to be  different from reality. For example, the airport put together a task force to  work with the communities affected by overflights.
section_title: Litigation Delayed Process
paragraphs: The surrounding communities of Irving, Grapevine, Euless, and Coppell  challenged the airport, asserting that the cities had the rights to control  zoning on the airport property that fell within their municipal boundaries.  The municipalities wanted to zone the land for “government use.”  Such  zoning would require that the airport obtain the approval of the city boards  prior to doing any construction on airport property. The airport objected,  and took the cities to court. The cities won the case, and also won the  subsequent appeal. The Texas State Legislature ultimately passed the Texas  Municipal Airports Act, which stated that the airport sponsors and not the  municipalities control zoning on airport property. According to the Chief  Executive Officer, while the act can apply to any Texas municipal airport,  the wording of the act leaves little doubt that it applies specifically to the  Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. The Chief Executive Officer also  felt that the support of the local business community was crucial in the  development and implementation of the project. For example, the business  community provided support to the airport in the state legislature. This  case resulted in nearly 7 years of litigation in state courts and ended when  the Texas Supreme Court denied hearing the complaint.
In addition to the zoning suit, the surrounding municipalities filed suit  contending that the FAA ROD was based on an inadequate environmental  impact study. According to the airport’s General Counsel, the cities  surrounding the airport alleged that FAA and airport officials did not  properly follow the environmental review process, primarily because the  airport did not use a proper methodology in determining single-event noise  impacts. The U.S. Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia upheld the  ROD after 23 months of argument, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied  hearing the case. The runway construction was delayed 23 months pending  the resolution of the case.
section_title: Memphis International Airport
paragraphs: The Memphis International Airport is a medium-size hub airport that has  significant levels of both commercial passenger traffic and cargo traffic.  According to FAA data, this airport was among the 31 busiest U.S. airports  in 2001. Memphis is one of three major hubs operated by Northwest  Airlines. Federal Express is based in Memphis, and along with other cargo  airlines operating there, Memphis has served as the busiest cargo airport in  the world for the past several years. Additionally, Memphis has claimed the  distinction of being the number one hub airport in the United States for on- time flights. The Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority operates the  Memphis and two general aviation airports. The authority is managed by a  seven-member county board composed of commissioners who must be  qualified community leaders in the fields of aviation, engineering, or  finance. Of the airlines operating at Memphis, three account for about 60  percent of the operations. Northwest and Federal Express each accounts  for slightly more than 20 percent of the operations, while Northwest  Airlink—a commuter airline—accounts for slightly less than 20 percent.
Memphis currently has four runways, three of which are parallel and run  north and south, including the new runway on the east side of the airport,  developed between 1984 and 1997, which was the focus of our study. The  fourth runway runs east and west and is located north of the other  runways. The addition in 1997 of the new 9,000 foot runway (18L/36R)  raised the airport’s maximum capacity in good weather from 131 to 145  operations per hour (about 11 percent) and in bad weather from 84 to 99  operations per hour (about 18 percent). However, the runway was  constructed mainly to counteract the capacity reduction incurred by the  reconstruction and extension of an existing runway, and to help the  combination of commercial and cargo air service work at the airport.  Figure 6 shows the existing Memphis airport configuration.
We selected the Memphis Airport for study because it had quite recently  experienced all phases of the runway development process—planning,  environmental, and design and construction. In addition, unlike most other  airports in our study, it had a significant proportion of its operations  devoted to cargo, and it was the only medium-size hub airport we visited.
We interviewed airport officials from the Memphis-Shelby County Airport  Authority who were the sponsors of the runway project. We also  interviewed officials at FAA Memphis Airport District Office; Federal  Express Airlines, which accounted for about 20 percent of the airport’s  operation but about 50 percent of its landed weight; Northwest Airlines,  Memphis’s leading commercial airline; neighboring business community  and residential representatives; Tennessee Department of Transportation,  Aeronautics Division and Highway Division; and Tennessee Department of  Environment and Conservation.
subsections: section_title: Status of the Runway Project
paragraphs: FAA commissioned the runway in 1997.
section_title: Airport Officials Stated That They Faced Challenges Reaching Consensus among Stakeholders on Project Funding Issues and Decisionmaking
paragraphs: A Memphis Shelby County Airport Authority official stated that the airport  faced challenges reaching agreement among airlines regarding project  funding during the development of their runway project. Specifically,  during the planning phase, a funding disagreement arose between the two  airlines that were the biggest airport users—one a passenger airline and  one a cargo airline. The passenger airline objected to the airport’s initial  proposal to fund a major portion of the project using passenger facility  charges, which are collected only by commercial passenger airlines and not  by cargo airlines, as it believed that this approach would disproportionately  benefit the cargo airlines. Ultimately, the airport authority was able to  negotiate an agreement with the airlines in which project funding was  based on landing fees, which are proportionate to the gross landed weight  at the airport and therefore apply to both passenger and cargo aircraft.
The disagreement among airlines regarding project funding highlighted a  broader issue regarding the establishment of the overall decisionmaking  process at the airport, according to an airport official. The Memphis airport  uses a Majority-in-Interest Agreement that stipulates how the airlines (and  other airport tenants) are involved in the airport’s decisionmaking process.
As some airline fees are based on landed weight, some airports’ agreements  base each airline’s vote on its proportion of landed weight, giving more  power to those airlines with the greatest landed weight and highest fees.  However, the Memphis airport chose to structure its voting process to  prevent any one airline from dominating the decisionmaking process.  According to its Majority-in-Interest Agreement, a vote to approve or reject  a proposal, such as any that addressed the runway completed in 1997, must  have represented more than 51 percent of signatory airlines’ landed weight  and more than 51 percent of the number of signatory airlines serving the  airport. This approach allowed all airlines to participate in runway project  decisions affecting them. Additionally, after 1996, the airport started using  an “inverted” Majority-in-Interest Agreement, whereby the airport may  proceed with projects unless an airline requests a formal vote and the  majority of airlines vote to disapprove the project. This approach— supported by the two hub airlines at the airport—gives the airport more  flexibility in project development than would an approach requiring  airlines to affirmatively approve every significant project step.
section_title: Extensive Requirements Raised Challenges Regarding Wetlands Mitigation and Land Acquisition during Construction of Runway
paragraphs: Airport officials said that extensive environmental and land acquisition  requirements presented challenges during the construction of the runway  project. The airport was required to mitigate a wetland area called  Hurricane Creek and a series of small, adjacent marshy areas on its  property that needed to be relocated because of impacts associated with  the construction of the runway and adjacent developable land. Airport  officials said wetlands attract birds that must be “harvested” through  periodic hunting because of the danger that birds represent to jet airplanes,  and that airport workers do not like being exposed to the poisonous snakes  in the creek as they work to maintain the relocated wetlands. According to  airport officials, it was necessary to relocate a portion of the existing creek  to construct the new runway, and to straighten the remainder of the creek  to maximize the use of remaining developable airport property. The airport  proposed a concrete-lined channel for the relocated creek based on a City  of Memphis standard. However, state governmental authorities required  the airport to obtain an aquatic alteration permit from the state and  requested that it relocate the creek in its natural state so that animals such  as frogs and poisonous snakes in the creek bed would still have their  habitat. According to an official from the Tennessee Department of  Environment and Conservation, this type of requirement is fairly typical for  airports that are expanding into areas containing water. Another state  environmental official said that the airport’s concrete lined-channel  approach had no habitat for living species and would be a direct conduit  for pollutants. Ultimately, large wire baskets filled with medium-sized  rocks were used along the new stream alignment, and four artificially  constructed habitat structures were added in the channel bottom to  support fish that had been in the stream before it was altered.
Airport officials stated that acquiring land for the runway project took  longer than they expected because of litigation and requirements  associated with acquiring the land. According to airport officials, for the  new runway, the airport acquired a road and adjacent property next to the  airport that previously contained gas stations and industrial property. Some  of the acquired properties contained underground tanks that had  previously leaked chemicals into the ground. The state environmental  agency required the airport to clean up the polluted properties prior to  constructing the project, although the airport did not cause the residue  problems.
section_title: Site-Specific Challenges Involved Relocating Other Infrastructure
paragraphs: During the construction phase, the Memphis airport faced a challenge in  attempting to relocate a road that lay adjacent to the airport and in the path  of the new runway. According to airport officials, the City of Memphis  preferred that the airport be responsible for relocating the road to ensure  that the work was done in a timely manner. After the new runway project  was completed in 1997, the airport had a subsequent project to reconstruct  and extend an existing runway by 2,700 feet to permit use by larger planes  used for international flights. An airport boundary road had to be lowered  to allow for the proper clearance of the flight path for the extended runway  over the boundary road. According to airport officials, the City of Memphis  owned the road and had widened it about 15 years earlier; the road could  have been lowered for an additional $250,000. However, the city refused to  fund the additional project cost at that time. When the airport asked for  funding from the Federal Highway Administration to assist in lowering the  highway, the agency determined that no funds were available to meet the  airport’s required time schedule, and it could not fulfill the request.  Ultimately, the airport accomplished the project with FAA and bond funds.
On another roadway project through the center of the airfield, the airport  worked with the Tennessee Department of Transportation to widen and  lower a portion of an existing road passing under an existing taxiway, the  original center runway, and two additional taxiways. The state  transportation agency chose to be responsible for the design and  construction of a new roadway to match the city’s current road plan. The  airport notified the city that the taxiway and runway would be closed to air  traffic because of airport reconstruction, and it offered the opportunity to  accomplish the needed street improvements at the least cost. The airport  funded and constructed two taxiway crossings over the existing road in the  same general time period, and it contributed funds toward the cost of a  replacement tunnel and a portion of the lowered and widened roadway  needed to accommodate the eastern taxiway. According to airport officials,  the airport was responsible for these improvements at a cost of $17 million.  They said that the airport complied with state requests at a cost and time  greater than was planned for by the airport because of the state  transportation agency’s jurisdiction and power over factors that can slow  down or stop an airport’s project.
section_title: Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport
paragraphs: The Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (Minneapolis-St. Paul)  ranked as North America’s tenth-busiest airport in terms of passenger  traffic during 2001. The Metropolitan Airports Commission (Commission)  broke ground in May 1999 for the new north-south runway. This runway,  the airport’s fourth, is expected to add about 25 percent additional capacity.  According to the Commission Chairman at the groundbreaking, the new  runway is vital to the economic growth of Minnesota and the region.
The Commission owns and operates the Minneapolis-St. Paul International  Airport and six reliever airports. The Commission reports directly to the  Minnesota legislature and governor. Northwest Airlines, the major hub  carrier serving Minneapolis, accounts for nearly 80 percent of annual  operations. Several other airlines account for the remaining traffic.  Northwest is headquartered in the neighboring community of Eagan, Minn.
The configuration is two parallel northwest-southeast runways, one  crosswind runway, and the new north-south runway. In good weather, the  airport operates with a capacity of 115 to 120 operations per hour. The  runway was originally scheduled for completion in December 2003, but the  terrorist events of September 11, 2001, forced the airport to delay  completion until November 2004—an 11 month delay. Airport officials cited  reduced cash flow as the primary reason for this delay. They also said that  the new runway would accommodate future demand, increase runway  capacity, relieve congestion, and reduce delays. Figure 7 shows the existing  airport configuration, including the new runway.
We selected Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport as a site-visit  location because it is one of the nation’s busiest airports with an active  runway project; its project was in the construction phase; it had detailed  and comprehensive planning and environmental phases; and its Executive  Director has been a prominent speaker regarding airport issues.
We interviewed Commission officials who were the main sponsors of a new  fourth runway at the airport. We also interviewed officials at FAA’s  Minneapolis Airport District Office; Northwest Airlines, which had a  majority of the air operations at the airport; Minnesota Department of  Transportation Office of Aeronautics, which is responsible for promoting  safety zones around the airport; and the Metropolitan Council, which had a  key role in the planning process. Additionally, we interviewed  representatives of the cities of Eagan, Richfield, and Bloomington, which  surround the airport and are impacted by the runway project.
subsections: section_title: Current Status of the Runway Project
paragraphs: The Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport is in the construction phase  for its fourth runway (Runway 17/35).
section_title: Stakeholders Agree That Comprehensive Mitigation Plans Are Essential but Difficult to Develop
paragraphs: According to both FAA District Office and airport officials, the Commission  worked hard at building consensus throughout the project and entered into  numerous mitigation agreements to resolve issues. The prevailing  philosophy was to do whatever was necessary to make the project  successful. Commission officials, communities, airlines, and other  stakeholders worked together to achieve this. For example, when  developing noise contour maps, the Commission chose to include an entire  city block if the noise contour intersected any part of the block. If one  residence received sound insulation measures because it lay within the Day  Night Noise Level (DNL) 65 contour, every house on the block received  identical remediation measures. According to Minneapolis–St. Paul airport  officials, the effort represented good comprehensive community  involvement. The Commission spent considerable resources trying to keep  all stakeholders satisfied. According to airport officials, the Commission  and FAA also tried to avoid having the project go into litigation, viewed as  an unproductive use of time and resources and the worst scenario in the  process. In the long run, the FAA District Office, the state Department of  Transportation, and Commission officials agreed that consensus building,  while taking longer than expected in the project’s early stages, saved time  in the long run.
However, often what was good for one community was bad for another  community. At least one community accused the Commission of buying  communities off, neighborhood by neighborhood. For example,  Minneapolis was “made happy” by eliminating the north parallel runway  from consideration. A National Wildlife Refuge located near the airport was  “made whole” through the payment of over $26 million; however, the  noise will continue over the refuge. According to FAA officials, this cost  was required to mitigate the impact on refuge property protected under 49  U.S.C. 303(c), formerly known as section 4(F) of the DOT Act. The  opposition viewed the process as achieving “traveling” consensus—just  moving the problem around. Opposition groups described the process as  one seeking cooperation for appearances only—a “divide and conquer”  approach.
section_title: Stakeholders Believe That Mitigation Funding Should Be More Flexible to Include More Communities
paragraphs: Stakeholders impacted by the runway said that they would be more  supportive of the project if the airport authority would increase the level of  noise mitigation on the surrounding community. The FAA concluded, as  indicated in its Minneapolis-St. Paul ROD, that federal-funds eligibility for  future residential sound insulation measures is generally limited to the DNL  65+ contour. However, it said that FAA might extend federal-funds  eligibility for the residential insulation program to include the area out to  the DNL 60 contour if there are applicable local standards. For the  Minneapolis airport, FAA plans to evaluate this extension through a future  Commission-initiated Federal Aviation Regulations Part 150 Noise  Compatibility Plan. The Commission submitted an updated noise  compatibility plan to FAA in November 2001 and withdrew it in May 2002,  prior to an FAA decision. Mitigation efforts continue in the DNL 65+  contour area; time frames released to the public called for the extended  (DNL 60-64) program to be completed in phases between 2005 and 2012. A  major factor in Northwest Airlines’ objection to paying for the additional  mitigation measures was that the future had changed significantly enough  since September 11, 2001, to reevaluate these additional measures.
section_title: A Nationwide Low Frequency Noise Policy Is Not in Place
paragraphs: The impact of low frequency noise on the surrounding community is an  issue for the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport, which is close to neighborhoods,  according to the Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise (FICAN). According to the City of Richfield official, the Commission  received $10 million in FAA Airport Improvement Program funds for noise  mitigation activities for the west side of the new runway (the City of  Richfield lies west of the new runway), pending FAA’s review of the noise  impacts of the project. The $10 million was earmarked in the 2001  Department of Transportation Appropriations Act conference report.
In December 1998, the City of Richfield and the Commission agreed to  undertake a detailed study of existing and potential impacts of low  frequency aircraft noise in communities around the airport. In order to  develop a consistent low frequency noise policy, FAA turned to FICAN for  input on the review of this study and technical aspects of the issue— particularly for an assessment of the problem and metrics to evaluate it.  Low frequency noise was discussed at the committee meeting held in June  2001. Commission and Richfield experts attended. The Committee released  its findings in August 2002 and basically said that additional data are  needed to determine whether any relationship exists between low  frequency noise and human annoyance. According to FAA officials, FAA is  reluctant to fund low frequency noise mitigation until the alleged adverse  impacts are conclusively validated and national standards established.
section_title: Some Communities Question Justification of State Zoning Laws
paragraphs: According to the Minnesota Department of Transportation, FAA, the  Commission, and community officials, Minnesota has state safety zones  that go beyond the federal Runway Protection Zone limits. Within these  safety zones, certain types of development are prohibited. The  establishment of safety zones involves issues of safety, land use, and  encroachment that can impact not only the development of an airport  runway but also the development of land surrounding the airport. Some  communities around the airport question whether the safety zones are  beneficial for them. Although not all stakeholders oppose Minnesota’s  strict zoning, The Commission authorized and funded a consultant study to  research the need for the state safety zones as well as the approaches that  the other 49 states have taken. The consultant’s April 2002 report, sent to  the Joint Zoning Board, found no justification for the strict zoning.
The application of a grandfather clause in the use of state-created safety  zones presents an additional challenge to the communities surrounding the  airport. Under the terms of the grandfather clause, if a residential area  existed in the state zones in 1978 or earlier, it was allowed to remain in  place and not be removed by the airport. However, business expansion in  the general area around the airport is subjected to state safety zone  restrictions. Communities are unhappy because it makes no sense to the  community leaders to leave residences closer to the runway itself but not  permit businesses to expand in an area further away from the airport.  Businesses feel that, although their property was not acquired, the impact  is the same, since expansion is forbidden.
section_title: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
paragraphs: The Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Sea-Tac) is the primary air  transportation hub of Washington State and the northwestern United  States. It is the 17th-busiest passenger airport, the 20th-busiest cargo  airport, and among the 31 busiest hub airports in the United States. Located  12 miles south of downtown Seattle and 20 miles north of Tacoma, it is the  primary provider of international and domestic air carrier service in the  region surrounding the Seattle/Tacoma area. Its primary service market is  the Puget Sound region, composed of four counties and approximately 3.5  million people. About three-fourths of the air travelers using Sea-Tac  Airport are origin and destination passengers who begin or end their trip at  the airport. The remaining flights are connecting flights. The airport is a  significant employer in the region, with 20,000 airport employees.
Sea-Tac currently has two parallel runways. Our primary focus was on a  runway development project for a new third parallel runway first  considered in Sea-Tac’s plans in 1989, and which the Port of Seattle  approved in 1992. The project has proceeded through several steps of the  environmental review process, and it is currently scheduled for completion  in 2006. Sea-Tac’s sole purpose for adding this 8,500 foot parallel runway,  which would be separated by 2,500 feet from the furthest parallel runway,  is to address constraints attributable to Seattle’s poor weather, and  although the new runway would increase capacity, airport officials do not  consider the runway project to be a capacity-enhancing project. During  periods of reduced weather conditions, which occur about 44 percent of  the time, Sea-Tac can use only one of the two existing runways for arrivals  because of the narrow spacing between them, thereby causing delays. The  number of flights that can be accommodated drops from about 60 arrivals  per hour in good weather to 48 or fewer in poor weather. The new runway,  which is planned to have much greater separation from other runways,  would allow independent landings on two runways at the same time, which  reduces delays. Figure 8 shows the existing Sea-Tac airport configuration,  including the proposed runway.
We selected Sea-Tac Airport for study because it was an airport with a  significant amount of both passenger and cargo operations and it had  experienced significant planning and environmental issues during the  development of its runway project. Additionally, in constructing the  planned runway, Sea-Tac is expanding the plateau where the airport is  located—undertaking one of the most significant landfill and embankment  projects in the United States (about 17 million cubic yards). According to  Sea-Tac officials, this earth-moving project is producing several  accompanying environmental considerations.
We interviewed officials from Sea-Tac, who were the sponsors of the  runway project. We also interviewed officials at the FAA Seattle Airports  District Office; Alaska Airlines; Puget Sound Regional Council; Airport  Community Coalition; Regional Commission on Airport Affairs;  Washington State Department of Transportation Aviation Division;  Washington State Department of Ecology; the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers; and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
subsections: section_title: Status of the Runway Project
paragraphs: As indicated above, the runway project for the new third parallel runway at  Sea-Tac has completed environmental review and has received state and  Corps wetland fill permits. However, according to Sea-Tac officials, both  permits are currently in litigation and under appeal. Sea-Tac has begun  constructing the foundation that will be required to support the third  runway.
section_title: Simplifying Purpose and Need May Help Reduce the Circuitous Nature of the Review Process
paragraphs: Sea-Tac officials stated that continual review of the purpose of and need for  their runway project, as well as alternatives to it, presented a significant  challenge to moving forward in the process. They stated that reducing the  number of reviews could reduce the amount of potential delay in the  process. The purpose and need was established and reviewed by the  airport, FAA, consultants, and the local Metropolitan Planning Organization  during the planning and environmental process; it was then re-reviewed by  the Corps of Engineers (Corps) during the permitting process under  Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. FAA officials questioned the  usefulness of the Corps’ review of the project’s purpose and need, stating  that the extra review created frustrations for other stakeholders and added  time to the process when the purpose and need had already been  established. Additionally, FAA officials said that aviation expertise is  needed to analyze the alternatives, and the Corps has no such expertise.  According to Corps officials, the Corps is required to ensure that  alternatives have been adequately considered. Corps officials said that  their review of the alternatives was justified because it had been a  considerable time since the EIS had been developed, and it wanted to  determine if the events of September 11, 2001, had changed the relative  benefits of the alternatives. Officials from the Puget Sound Regional  Council, the metropolitan planning organization in the Seattle area,  suggested that the Corps could have been included more in the early  consideration of alternatives, but acknowledged that the Corps’ limited  resources made early participation difficult. FAA officials, however, believe  that the Corps did participate in the development of alternatives in its role  as a cooperating agency during the development of the EIS.
Sea-Tac Airport, while not specifically citing purpose and need, said that a  clear federal policy of encouraging runway development and moving  projects through the regulatory process would help ensure that adequate  airport capacity is in place to reduce growing air traffic delays. It suggested  that such a commitment could be similar to the one the federal government  took in developing the interstate highway system and national railroads. A  task force could be created to identify runway projects that are critical to  the national air transportation system. Such an approach could help  expedite implementation of decisions already made at the local level.  Additionally, they suggested that Congress could adopt a policy of directing  all organizations to achieve a balance between environmental, economic,  and social goals, coupled with statutory deadlines for decisionmaking.  They contend that such an approach, now used by other countries, would  help agencies make difficult decisions and get needed runways built.
section_title: A Compatible Land Use Program May Help to Reduce Opposition
paragraphs: A Washington State Department of Transportation official stated that  minimizing controversy over the uses of land needed for expanding runway  capacity could be important in avoiding lengthy project delays. The  department developed an Airport Land Use Compatibility Program,  implementing a 1996 amendment of the Washington State Growth  Management Act—the state’s land use planning law. The law requires cities  and counties to identify, site, and protect essential public facilities  (including airports) from incompatible land use, such as encroaching  development. In other words, when developing local land use plans, cities  and counties must ensure that their plans do not adversely affect these  facilities.
As part of the land use compatibility program, certain state transportation  officials provide consultations, including mediation, between airport  sponsors and community representatives (often municipal or county  planning staff) to balance the state’s dual interest of promoting aviation and  ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its residents. The approach to  facilitating airports’ future expansion includes several steps, including the  development of planning-based solutions and the integration of those  solutions into a legally enforceable document such as a comprehensive  development plan (rather than the Airport Master Plan, which is not  binding on a land use authority).
section_title: New Mitigation Approaches and Increased Community Interaction Could Help Foster Community Support
paragraphs: In Seattle, the Airport Communities Coalition, representing several  communities near Sea-Tac Airport but not the city of SeaTac, said that  expanding the scope of mitigation beyond direct environmental  applications would go far in building community support for runway  projects. They said that the airport’s use of heavy trucks over local roads to  haul dirt for its landfill project for the runway caused significant  deterioration of the community’s roads, for which it has not been  reimbursed. Similarly, when the airport acquires residence and business  locations in order to mitigate noise or wetland impacts, these buyouts  deplete the tax base in the community where the properties are based,  resulting in negative economic impacts for which the community is not  reimbursed. Therefore, the community has no reason to support the  runway project. However, they said that the community would have  reasons to support the project if some funding were provided to mitigate  the economic damage to the community. An organization official said that  the Department of Defense reimburses communities for economic loss  when it acquires property within the community to build military bases.  Officials at the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs, a citizens’ group in  the greater Seattle metropolitan area, stated that that the airport could do  more to mitigate economic impacts. However, they also said that  expanding the scope of mitigation would not diminish their opposition to  the runway project.
According to the Airport Communities Coalition, communities seek to  contribute meaningful input into the airport expansion process; however,  when they are not allowed to do so, they are forced to file lawsuits against  airports and other stakeholders over decisions that have been made.  Officials at both the Coalition and the Regional Commission believed that  the planning process used by the airport and the Puget Sound Regional  Council needed to include meaningful input from the communities near the  airport. An official at the Regional Commission stated that there should be  a citizen’s advisory committee with genuine input into the airport’s  expansion projects early in the planning process. The official suggested  that the federal government should provide the incentive for the  establishment of such a committee by providing federal funds only when  such a committee was established. In the official’s view, the success of such  an approach would be contingent on the airport’s taking the committee’s  views into account and substantively addressing them. These community  organizations have filed several lawsuits against the airport, the Puget  Sound Regional Council, and FAA, based on objections to their approach  for addressing environmental issues. An Airport Communities Coalition  official said that the community filed lawsuits in part, to get the airport to  listen to the needs of the community and to negotiate solutions. The official  noted that communities near other airports had successfully used such an  approach. Sea-Tac and FAA officials stated that there was extensive  community involvement beyond that required by law.
An official at the Airport Communities Coalition said that the public  hearing process on environmental matters gives stakeholders the ability to  voice concerns but, because of the limited time allocated to each person,  does not give those convening the hearing an ability to understand the  concerns or allow citizens to have an impact on the project. The thrust of  FAA’s 2001 best practices guide seems to agree with the coalition official;  the guide states that periodic informal workshops during the planning and  environmental processes tend to provide better forums for community  consultation than do formal public hearings. Understandable information  on the project and its environmental impacts should be made available at  the workshop, and knowledgeable stakeholders such as the airport, FAA,  and EIS consultants should be present to answer questions. In the guide,  FAA notes that strong local opposition tends to slow down the  environmental process and that a citizens’ advisory committee in some  locations has been useful in improving working relationships and  communication between the airport and the community. FAA said that such  a committee may be established on either a permanent basis or for the  duration of a specific project’s planning and environmental review. FAA  added that factors that help build local consensus and address opposition  include, among others: 1) open and frank dialogue on the aviation need and  the airport proprietor’s initial planning, including possible alternatives; 2)  an effective forum for constructive exchanges on expected benefits,  impacts, alternatives, and mitigation prospects; and 3) serious  consideration of community concerns and views, including project  adjustments that have merit and are possible, as well as responses to  community proposals that cannot be accommodated, and the reasons why.  A SeaTac official emphasized that the airport did include public outreach  beyond that required by environmental regulations. For example, such  efforts included public information sessions and community open houses,  among others.
section_title: Extensive Regulatory and Legal Requirements Posed Resource Challenges
paragraphs: Stakeholders may have limited staff and resources to address the extensive  regulatory and legal requirements of the process, leading to delays. For  example, officials from FAA’s Seattle office said that when an endangered  species of fish was identified at Sea-Tac Airport, 20 months elapsed before  officials from the federal Fish and Wildlife Service and the state  Department of Marine Fisheries approved actions to address the conditions  of endangered species. Both agencies had limited staff to review and  analyze the discovery and the approach for addressing it. FAA officials said  that they understood that the Corps had only six staff members to review  about 1,000 water quality permits, and according to state aviation  department officials, the Corps had a significant backlog in processing  permit applications.
Additionally, an official from the state Department of Ecology said that the  Sea-Tac runway project had been a significant drain on resources at the  agency. The agency has had difficulty finding sufficient resources to  complete environmental reviews and must redirect personnel from other  functions. The official said that, because of the shortage of state funds,  applicants wanting reviews to proceed quickly will have to bear the burden  of funding water quality reviews. Sea-Tac officials noted that additional  staff resources are needed in regulatory agencies in order to process  environmental permits in a timely manner and, aside from adding federal  funding, funding could be provided by project proponents. The airport  acknowledged that agencies were reluctant to accept funding because of a  concern with potential conflicts of interest. The airport suggested that  Congress could make guidelines under which the agencies could remain  impartial. The purpose of allowing such funding would not be to curry  favor but to work efficiently with the federal government to get runways  built. They asserted that these staff would work exclusively under FAA’s  supervision and would be under no obligation to the airport. They  contended that this proposal would provide a mechanism for airports to  bear the financial cost of accelerated project reviews.
section_title: Site-Specific Issues Involve Safety and Environmental Challenges
paragraphs: A major site-specific challenge involves the construction of a large plateau  to enable the airport to construct the new runway. According to Sea-Tac  officials, in order to bring the new runway site up to the elevation of its  other two runways, a 17–million cubic yard landfill and embankment is  being built. The embankment will require three retaining walls to reduce  impacts on a nearby creek and wetlands and to accommodate safety areas  at the ends of the runway. The walls are mechanically stabilized, using  concrete panels and layers of galvanized reinforced strips that bind to and  reinforce the embankment material in a coherent way. According to the  Port, this type of wall is highly earthquake resistant, and it has been used  successfully elsewhere in the United States. In April 2002, Sea-Tac Airport  officials said that the communities surrounding the airport were concerned  that the wall will collapse or will be unable to withstand an earthquake.  However, according to airport officials, the airport used the services of  consulting engineers, geotechnical consultants, and earthquake engineers  from companies and the University of Washington, and sought advice from  a technical review board in developing the wall design to ensure that it is  safe. The airport has also held public hearings in an attempt to enlighten  the public about the durability and safety of the wall project.
section_title: Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada
paragraphs: The Lester B. Pearson International Airport (Pearson) is the primary  commercial airport serving the Toronto area. The Greater Toronto Airports  Authority manages the day-to-day operations of the Pearson airport, as well  as managing its capital infrastructure projects. The Greater Toronto  Airports Authority was established in March 1993 as a community  initiative, was reconstituted in accordance with Canadian Airport Authority  guidelines, and was recognized by the Minister of Transport in November  1994 as the airport authority responsible for Pearson airport. The airport  authority is a private, not-for-profit corporation. Its 15-member Board of  Directors is composed of nominees from the City of Toronto, the Province  of Ontario, the Government of Canada, and four regional municipalities.  The airport authority assumed control of the management, operation, and  maintenance of Pearson on December 2, 1996.
Pearson Airport is the busiest airport in Canada and the 16th-busiest in  North America, having served 28 million passengers in 2001. With regard to  international passengers, Pearson was ranked as the 2nd-busiest in North  America and 17th-busiest in the world in 2001. To handle the projected  demand for air travel through the airport, the airport authority developed a  $4.4 billion (Canadian) development plan for the improvement of the  airport’s infrastructure—the Airport Development Program (ADP), which  includes new runway projects, among other infrastructure projects. Figure  9 shows the existing Pearson airport configuration.
We chose Pearson Airport as a site visit to learn about the runway  development process used in Canada, and because the airport had three  runway projects that met the criteria we used to select airports in the  United States—one runway completed in 1997, one completed in October  2002, and one planned for future implementation. The three additional  runways were approved for development as warranted by demand in 1993  by Transport Canada after a lengthy Environmental Assessment Review  process in 1990–1992.
subsections: section_title: Status of Runway Projects
paragraphs: As noted above, Pearson Airport completed the construction of a new  runway in 1997, completed the construction of a second new runway in  2002, and has a third runway in the planning stages, to be constructed when  capacity demands warrant another runway.
section_title: Airport Development Process in Canada Differs from U.S. Process
paragraphs: The airport development process in Canada differs from the U.S. process in  several distinct ways. Pearson Airport was one of the first airports in  Canada to attempt to build additional runways since the airports were first  constructed to serve the Canadian military during World War II. As a result,  there was no established runway development process in place—Transport  Canada officials had to learn about the process as they progressed through  it. In the broadest sense, there are three pieces of legislation that affect the  process—the Aeronautics Act, the Fisheries Act, and the Environmental  Act.
The environmental phase differs greatly from that employed in the United  States. Prior to the development of the EIS, the airport authority begins the  process with scoping. The scoping process is a public process. According  to airport officials, every project goes through environmental screening  (equivalent to an Environmental Assessment) as a part of the planning  process. When the Pearson project went through the screening process, the  airport authority was responsible for conducting environmental screening.  However, current legislation requires that the screening results be available  to the public.
The Minister of Transport and the Minister of the Environment  cooperatively choose an Environmental Review Panel consisting of  government officials and knowledgeable local residents (that is,  academics.) The panel begins by developing a list of issues that it believes  the EIS must identify. The issues and, therefore, the requirements of the  EIS will vary from airport to airport. Airport officials referred to the  process as “organic”—changing from airport to airport, project to project.  The airport authority is responsible for preparing the EIS documents, and it  submits them to the panel for review. The panel reviews the environmental  impact documents and convenes hearings to hear testimony in order to  formulate its opinions regarding the environmental impacts of the project  and accompanying mitigation measures. The hearings are judicial in nature,  and attendees have never resorted to shouting or histrionics. According to  airport officials, the hearings were well balanced between opponents and  proponents of the projects. With respect to the EIS, the focus of the  environmental hearings was medium-term capacity enhancement  projects—the three runways at Pearson. The issues that the panel  considered depended greatly on their perception of the issues raised during  the hearings. The members of the panel did not work on the EIS full-time,  and did not have the requisite expertise to conduct their reviews—the  panel either hires knowledgeable consultants or develops the necessary  knowledge. This process takes a long time.
Once the EIS is completed, the panel reviews the document, develops a  series of recommendations, and submits them to the Minister of  Environment. The Minister of Environment then makes a final  determination and submits recommendations to the Minister of Transport.  The Minister of Transport has sole discretion as to whether to implement  the recommendations of the Minister of Environment. The Minister of  Transport makes the final determination, and it is incumbent upon the  airport authority to respond to the final recommendations.
The design and construction process in Canada does not differ  substantially from that in the United States. The airport must prepare  preliminary engineering and final design, and then construct the runway  infrastructure. Finally, in summary, airport officials believed that the  process went very well and did not believe that they would proceed  dramatically differently if they were to go through the process again.  However, both airport and Transport Canada officials noted that the  recently passed Canadian Environmental Assessment Act will result in  changes to the existing process.
section_title: Canadian Airports Face Many of the Same Challenges as U.S. Airports
paragraphs: Airports in Canada seeking to add capacity by constructing new runways  face many of the same challenges that airports in the United States face,  including environmental issues, wetlands mitigation issues, and the  impacts of noise on the surrounding communities. These impacts generally  lead to some community opposition to the proposed project. Canadian  airports are also subject to site-specific constraints attributable primarily  to the northern climate.
Because of the northern climate, airport operations in Toronto require  extensive ice removal in the winter months, resulting in the use of a large  quantity of Glycol that can cause an environmental impact on surrounding  wetlands. The airport straddles both the Etobicoke and Mimico Creek  watersheds, covering 1,640 hectares of land. Most of the airport, including  runways, cargo areas, Terminal Three, Terminal One aprons, and infield  areas, drains to Etobicoke Creek. According to the Toronto and Region  Conservation Authority, although runoff contamination from these sources  is a concern, significant progress has recently been made to mitigate the  airport's impact on water quality through the expanded use of wastewater  and storm water recovery and containment systems. Airport officials cited  their wastewater treatment facility as contributing greatly to allaying the  concerns of residents over ground and surface water contamination, and  they stated that the airport has never exceeded contaminant limits.
The Council of Concerned Residents, a coalition of three residents’  associations near the airport, opposed the expansion of the airport  fundamentally on the premise that the projects would increase the noise  impacts on their communities. In 1993, the group filed a lawsuit against the  airport claiming that the proposed project was illegal for three reasons: 1) a  1973 order precluded the Toronto airport from expanding beyond its  borders; 2) a federally approved airport master plan and the local  municipality’s land use plan stipulated that they were based on the  assumption that the airport would have no more than three runways; and 3)  the Environmental Review Panel stated that the project should not be  pursued because the adverse social impacts of the project outweighed the  capacity gains at the airport. According to Transport Canada officials,  Canada’s noise mitigation standards are very similar to FAA’s Federal  Aviation Regulations Part 150 programs in the United States. According to  airport officials, neither Transport Canada nor the airport authorities are  required to acquire noise-sensitive properties surrounding the airport.
According to airport authority officials, airports in Canada face a shortened  construction season because of the sometimes severe winter weather  associated with the northern climate. Therefore, airports seeking to  construct runways must take the climate into account when entering into  the construction phase of the runway development process. Airports must  schedule construction tasks such that weather-dependent tasks such as  concrete construction are scheduled during the warmer months, and  reserve climate-independent tasks for the winter months.
section_title: Survey of Airports
paragraphs: The following section provides a copy of the survey that we sent to airports  that have built a runway between 1991 and 2000 or planned to do so by  2010. Where appropriate, we have summarized their responses to each  question. In instances where summarized answers are not possible—such  as dates—we have listed the number of airports that answered the  question.
In total, we sent 39 surveys to 34 airports—Dallas-Fort Worth, Detroit,  Indianapolis, Louisville, and Washington Dulles received more than one  survey, because each had more than one runway that met our criteria. We  excluded five surveys because the airports reported that their projects did  not meet our selection criteria. For our statistical analysis, we excluded  responses from five airports—Kailua-Kona, Little Rock, Reno, Sacramento,  and one of the two surveys sent to Washington Dulles—because their  responses indicated that their projects did not meet our criteria. The  primary reason why their responses were dropped from our statistical  analysis was that they planned only runway extensions or no new runways  during our time frame. We did, however, rely on their responses during the  remainder of our review. In total, we received 32 out of a potential 34  responses from 30 airports—a response rate of 94 percent. Table 8 lists the  airports we surveyed.
section_title: Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects
paragraphs: The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) is an agency of the legislative branch that reviews federal programs for the U.S. Congress.  We have been asked by the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to review what long-term improvements can be made to enhance capacity in the National Airport System, particularly as it relates to building runways.
As part of our study, we are asking a select group of 34 airports for information on their experiences with building runways and how the process could be improved. Your airport was selected because you built a runway between 1991 and 2000 or plan to build a runway before 2010. If you have more than one runway that meets these criteria, you have received one survey for each runway. Your responses will help us better understand the various phases of runway construction and the challenges you had or foresee in the future. We will present the results of this survey in our report.
We have made every effort to minimize the amount of information we are requesting by using other data sources when available. Your participation is important and will enable us to report to the Congress on what works well and what can be improved to expedite the building of runways. Please have appropriate staff respond to these questions including consultants that may have assisted in this project. Please return your completed survey, within the next 15 working days or by January 11, 2002, in the enclosed pre-addressed, postage-paid envelope, or fax your response to David Lehrer at (312) 220-7726. In the event that the envelope is misplaced, the return address is: Mr. David Lehrer U.S. General Accounting Office 200 W. Adams Street, Suite 700 Chicago, IL  60606-5219 EMAIL: lehrerd@gao.gov Your responses to this survey should pertain to the airport and runway stated below, unless the questions ask you to do otherwise.  If you have any questions, please call either David Lehrer (312) 220-7667 or Gary Lawson at (202) 512-3649.
Thank you very much for taking time to complete the survey. 1. Airport Name: ______________________________________ 2. Runway of interest is: ____________________ ___________ 3. Name and phone number of person(s) completing this survey: a. Name: ______________________________ Telephone: (_____) _____ - ____________ b. Name: ______________________________ Telephone: (_____) _____ - ____________ 4. Name of a person we may call if we have questions: a. Name: ___________________________________ Telephone: (_____) _____ - ____________ b. Best times of day to call: ________________________________________________________ EXPERIENCES WITH PLANNING AND BUILDING RUNWAYS 5. Please provide the start and completion dates for each of the following phases of your runway project and _  (month/year) _  (month/year) _Begin Master Plan______ (event/task) _Complete Master Plan_   _ (event/task) b. Environmental process N=31 _  (month/year) _  (month/year) _Begin EIS_______ ______ (event/task) _Record of Decision_    ____ (event/task) _  (month/year) _  (month/year) _ First Lawsuit Begun_   __ (event/task) _ Last Lawsuit Settled ____ (event/task) d. Design and construction N=27 _  (month/year) _  (month/year) _Begin Design____ _   _____  (event/task) _Commission Runway______ (event/task)
Due to the differences in reporting, summarized responses are not possible. Event/task listed is the most common response provided for each phase.
If necessary, provide clarifying information for your response: 6. For each of the tasks listed below, please indicate to what extent it took more or less time than expected (i.e., as compared to your timeline and schedule at the beginning of the project).  Please indicate ‘not applicable’ for those tasks that have not yet taken place.
Much longer than expected (25% longer  or greater)
Longer than expected (up to 25% longer)
Less than expected (up to 25% less)
Much less than expected (25% less  or greater)
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