Mobility Capabilities: DOD's Mobility Study Limitations and Newly Issued Strategic Guidance Raise Questions about Air Mobility Requirements
Published: 2012-03-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over the past 30 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $140 billion in its airlift and tanker forces. In 2010, DOD published its Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was intended to provide an understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible military operations. In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense , affecting force structure decisions. This testimony addresses GAOs previous findings on the MCRS-16 and air mobility issues to consider in light of DODs new strategic guidance.
GAOs December 2010 report on the MCRS-16 (GAO-11-82R) is based on analysis of DODs executive summary and classified report, and interviews with DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) provided some useful information concerning air mobility systemssuch as intratheater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refuelingbut several weaknesses in the study raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers. In particular, the MCRS-16 did not provide decision makers with recommendations concerning shortfalls and excesses in air mobility systems. In evaluating capabilities, the MCRS-16 used three cases that it developed of potential conflicts or natural disasters and identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Based on data in the MCRS-16, GAO was able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or an operational reserve, even though the MCRS-16 was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities exist. It also did not identify the risk associated with potential shortfalls or excesses. Identifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources.
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued new strategic guidance in January 2012, which is intended to help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. In the past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning scenarios, which it used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed reducing its mobility air fleet by 130 aircraft, which would leave 593 mobility aircraft in the airlift fleet. According to Air Force officials, the proposals will enable the Air Force to deliver the airlift capabilities required to implement the new strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air Forces document that outlines its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses used to support the reductions. Given the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed from MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air Forces proposal, decision makers would benefit from a clear understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements and DODs ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned air mobility force structure.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO previously recommended that DOD clearly identify shortfalls and excesses in the mobility force structure and the associated risks. DOD did not concur with the recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 identified shortfalls and excesses and included a risk assessment. GAO disagreed, noting for example, that DODs MCRS-16 study did not explicitly identify excess aircraft and did not include mobility system risk assessments when potential shortfalls existed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and members of the  subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss air mobility  issues and supporting analyses. As we have previously reported, over the  past 30 years, DOD has invested more than $140 billion in its airlift and  tanker forces. In 2010, DOD completed the Mobility Capabilities and  Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was to provide senior  leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility capabilities  needed for possible future military operations by identifying the  capabilities and requirements to support national strategy. The MCRS-16  reported on several mobility issues, including intratheater airlift, strategic  airlift, and air refueling in the context of three cases that included a mix of  different types of potential conflicts and natural disasters. DOD concluded  that, with few exceptions, the projected mobility capabilities in 2016 were  sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements. The  MCRS-16 study was prepared in 2010 based on the defense strategy and  planning scenarios current at that time. In January 2012, DOD issued  new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for  21st Century Defense. In the past, DOD has translated strategic  guidance into specific planning scenarios, which it has used in studies  (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force  structure decisions.
My statement today will address our previous findings on the MCRS-16,with an emphasis on air mobility issues, as well as air mobility issues to  consider in light of DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance on defense  priorities. To prepare this testimony, we relied on the findings of our  December 2010 review of the MCRS-16. For that report, we reviewed the  unclassified executive summary and the classified report of the MCRS- 16, the study’s terms of reference, and study plan. We focused our  December 2010 report on the extent to which the MCRS-16 met its study  objectives. In conducting our review, we met with the MCRS-16 study  leaders to obtain further context and information concerning the study as  it was presented in DOD’s report. For this testimony statement, we also  reviewed DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance on defense priorities  and the Air Force’s proposed force structure changes, and contacted  officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Mobility  Command. We conducted work for our report in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained  provided a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objective.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD’s MCRS-16, which was completed in February 2010, was to provide  senior leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility  capabilities needed for possible future military operations and help  leaders make investment decisions regarding mobility systems. The study  was driven by strategy current at the time. The study scope included,  among other things, the way changes in mobility systems affect the  outcomes of major operations and an assessment of the associated risks.  MCRS-16 had several objectives, including to determine capability  shortfalls (gaps) and excessesmobility force structure, provide a risk assessment, and identify the  capabilities and requirements to support national strategy.   (overlaps) associated with programmed  In order to assess mobility capabilities, DOD officials responsible for the  MCRS-16 used three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of military  operations that could be used to inform decisions regarding future  mobility capabilities. The three cases are described below:
Case 1: U.S. forces conduct two nearly simultaneous large-scale land  campaigns and at the same time respond to three nearly  simultaneous homeland defense events.
Case 2: U.S. forces conduct a major air/naval campaign concurrent  with the response to a large asymmetricsignificant homeland defense event. campaign and respond to a
Case 3: U.S. forces conduct a large land campaign against the  backdrop of an ongoing long-term irregular warfare respond to three nearly simultaneous homeland defense events.
Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and  influence over the relevant population(s). required, a potential shortfall would exist and there could be a risk that the  mission might not be accomplished. If DOD had more aircraft than  required, a potential excess could exist, and there could be risk that  resources could be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s January 2012 Strategic Guidance on Defense Priorities
paragraphs: In January 2012, DOD issued Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:  Priorities for 21st Century Defense, which describes the projected  security environment and the key military missions for which DOD will  prepare. DOD may make force and program decisions in accordance with  the strategic approach described in this guidance, which could differ from  the guidance—the National Military Strategy—that was used by the  MCRS-16 to determine requirements. The new strategic guidance is  intended to help inform decisions regarding the size and shape of the  force, recognizing that fiscal concerns are a national security issue. To  support the new strategic guidance and remain within funding constraints,  the Air Force has proposed changes concerning the retirement of aircraft  in its airlift fleet. Specifically, in February 2012, the Air Force proposed to
Retire the oldest 27 C-5 aircraft, thereby reducing the fleet to 275  strategic airlift aircraft—which, according to the Air Force, would  consist of 223 C-17s and 52 C-5s.
Retire the 65 oldest C-130 aircraft—the primary aircraft used in DOD’s   intratheater airlift mission—thereby reducing the fleet to 318 C-130s.
Retire or cancel procurement of all 38 planned C-27 aircraft, which  were intended to meet time-critical Army missions.
section_title: DOD Did Not Clearly Identify Some Important Mobility Issues in the MCRS-16 and Its New Strategic Guidance Raises Questions
paragraphs: While the MCRS-16 included some useful information concerning air  mobility systems, the report did not clearly meet two of its objectives  because it did not provide decision makers with specific information  concerning (1) shortfalls and excesses associated with the mobility force  structure or (2) risks associated with shortfalls or excesses of its mobility  capabilities. Moreover, the MCRS-16 generally did not make  recommendations about air mobility capabilities. These weaknesses in  the MCRS-16 raise questions about the ability of the study to provide  decision makers with information needed to make programmatic  decisions. In addition, DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance could  affect its air mobility requirements. I will first address the issues related to  DOD’s MCRS-16, and then turn to a discussion of the new strategic  guidance.
subsections: section_title: Study Did Not Clearly Identify Shortfalls and Excesses in Air Mobility Systems
paragraphs: The MCRS-16 did not meet its objective to identify shortfalls and  excesses in most of its assessments of mobility systems. For each of the  three cases of potential conflicts or natural disasters DOD used in the  MCRS-16, the department identified the required capabilities for air  mobility systems. However, the MCRS-16 stopped short of explicitly  stating whether a shortfall or excess existed. Moreover, it did not make  recommendations regarding the need for any changes to air mobility  assets based on any shortfalls or excesses. Using DOD data from the  MCRS-16, we were able to discern possible shortfalls or potential  capacity that could be considered excess or used as an operational  reserve even though the MCRS-16 report was ambiguous regarding  whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities existed (see figure).
The C-27 Spartan is a mid-range, multifunctional aircraft. Its primary mission is to  provide on-demand transport of time-sensitive, mission-critical supplies and key personnel  to forward-deployed Army units, including those in remote and austere locations. Its  mission also includes casualty evacuation, airdrop, troop transport, aerial sustainment,  and homeland security.
subsections: section_title: Figure: Potential Shortfalls and Excesses in Air Mobility Capabilities Derived from the MCRS-16
paragraphs: As shown in the figure, the MCRS-16 determined that in each case, there  was unused strategic airlift capacity, but the study did not specifically  state whether the unused capacity represented excesses or identify  excesses by aircraft type. When an excess exists, decision makers need  to know which aircraft and how many could be retired. Specifically, the  MCRS-16 did not identify the required number of C-5s or excesses of C-5  aircraft; but at the time of our report, the Air Force stated its intention to  seek the retirement of 22 C-5s, which it increased to 27 and proposed  again in February 2012. Furthermore, the MCRS-16 did not identify the  most combat-effective or the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft even  though DOD had previously stated that the MCRS-16 would set the stage  to address the cost-effectiveness of its strategic aircraft.
Decision makers rely on studies such as the MCRS-16 so that they can  make informed choices to address mobility shortfalls and excesses. In our  December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify the  shortfalls and excesses in the mobility systems that DOD analyzed for the  MCRS-16 and provide this additional analysis to DOD and congressional  decision makers. In commenting on our draft report, DOD disagreed with  our recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 explicitly identifies  shortfalls and excesses in the mobility system. DOD identified strategic  airlift as an example of an excess. While the MCRS-16 showed that there  was unused capacity associated with strategic airlift, it was not clear from  the study whether this unused capacity could serve as an operational  reserve. If the study had clearly identified an excess in strategic lift  capabilities, decision makers may have chosen to retire aircraft and  reallocate resources to other priorities or to keep an operational reserve  to militate against unforeseen events. Similarly, if the study had identified  a shortfall in strategic lift capabilities, decision makers may have chosen  to accept the operational risk or sought to address the shortfall by  increasing capabilities. DOD has not taken action based on our  recommendation, but we continue to believe that explicitly identifying the  shortfalls and excesses in mobility systems is useful to decision makers in  making programmatic decisions.
section_title: Study Did Not Identify Associated Risks of Shortfalls or Excesses in Air Mobility Systems
paragraphs: The MCRS-16 also did not clearly achieve its study objective to provide   Assessing risk related to shortfalls and excesses is  risk assessments.important—the risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might not  be accomplished, while the risk associated with excesses is that  resources may be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability.  However, the MCRS-16 did not include risk assessments of airlift  systems. For example, the MCRS-16 showed potential excesses in  strategic and intratheater aircraft but did not identify the risk associated  with these potential excesses. Furthermore, the MCRS-16 identified a  reduced intratheater airlift fleet (401 C-130s) in comparison with the  previous fleet (a maximum of 674 C-130s), but it did not describe the level  of risk associated with this reduced fleet size. Concerning air refueling,  the MCRS-16 reported that airborne tanker demand exceeded tanker  capacity by 20 percent in MCRS-16 case two but did not identify the risk  associated with that potential shortfall.
In our December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD provide a risk  assessment for potential shortfalls and excesses and provide this  additional analysis to department and congressional decision makers.  DOD disagreed, stating that MCRS-16 included a risk assessment which  links the ability of mobility systems to achieve warfighting objectives.  Therefore, DOD has not taken action on this recommendation. While  warfighting risk metrics can inform decision makers concerning overall  mobility capabilities, decision makers would benefit from knowing the risk  associated with particular mobility systems as they make force structure  decisions. Quantifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems  could help with decisions to allocate resources, enabling decision makers  to address the most risk at the least cost.
section_title: DOD’s New Strategic Guidance May Affect Required Air Mobility Capabilities
paragraphs: In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S.  Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, that will help  guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. The strategic  guidance is to ensure that the military is agile, flexible, and ready for the  full range of contingencies. However, the strategic guidance includes  changes from previous strategy—for example, U.S. forces will no longer  be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning   In the  scenarios, which DOD has used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to  generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the  new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed changes to the  mobility air fleet, including the retirement or cancellation of procurement  of 130 mobility aircraft. According to Air Force officials, the proposals  ensure that the Air Force can deliver the capabilities required by the new  strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air  Force’s February 2012 document that outlines its proposed aircraft  retirements does not provide details of any analyses. Given the new  strategic guidance—which articulates priorities for a 21st century  defense—it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed  from the MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air Force’s proposal,  decision makers will require additional information concerning what types  of potential military operations are envisioned by the strategic guidance  and to what extent DOD has analyzed its planned force structure using  cases that reflect the new strategic guidance.
section_title: Concluding Remarks
paragraphs: In conclusion, the MCRS-16 study did not fully provide congressional  decision makers with a basis for understanding what mobility systems are  needed to meet requirements, how many are needed, and what are the  risks of having too many or not enough of each aircraft to meet defense  strategy. While DOD disagreed with our recommendations, we continue  to believe that the study missed opportunities to identify specific shortfalls  and excesses and did not provide associated risk assessments. Further,  the MCRS-16 study was completed more than 2 years ago using defense  planning guidance in effect at that time. With DOD’s newly issued  strategic guidance on defense priorities, the department’s potential  scenarios may have changed. Decision makers would benefit from a clear  understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements  and DOD’s ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned  air mobility force structure.
Chairman Akin and Ranking Member McIntyre, and members of the  subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to  answer any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Cary  Russell at (404) 679-1808 or russellc@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key  contributions to this testimony are Alissa H. Czyz, Assistant Director,  James P. Klein, Ronald La Due Lake, Richard B. Powelson, Michael C.  Shaughnessy, Jennifer B. Spence, Amie M. Steele, Joseph J. Watkins,  and Stephen K. Woods.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.