Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan
Published: 2010-06-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that it spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with few roads, no railway, and only four airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain and weather in Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further challenges to transporting supplies and equipment. In December 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan by August 2010. Today's testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations drawn from ongoing work reviewing DOD's logistics efforts supporting operations in Afghanistan, including (1) the organizations involved and routes and methods used to transport supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan; (2) steps DOD has taken to improve its distribution process, based on lessons learned from prior operations; and (3) challenges affecting DOD's ability to distribute supplies and equipment within Afghanistan, and its efforts to mitigate them. In conducting its audit work, GAO examined DOD guidance and other documentation relating to the processes of transporting supplies and equipment to Afghanistan and met with various cognizant officials and commanders in the United States, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Movement of supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD organizations and using air, sea, and ground modes of transportation. DOD's ability to provide timely logistics support to units deploying to Afghanistan or already in theater depends on its ability to synchronize all of these activities into one seamless process. For example, U.S. Transportation Command manages air and surface transportation from the United States to and around the U.S. Central Command area of operations; U.S. Central Command's Deployment and Distribution Operations Center validates and directs air movements and monitors and directs surface movements within theater; the Air Force's Air Mobility Division assigns and directs aircraft to carry materiel within the theater; and the Army's 1st Theater Sustainment Command monitors strategic movements of materiel and directly influences movements into theater. Most cargo in theater is transported commercially by ship to Pakistan and then by contractor-operated trucks to Afghanistan, but high-priority and sensitive items are transported by U.S. military and commercial aircraft directly from the United States and other countries to logistics hubs in Afghanistan. DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior operations. For example, in response to lessons learned from problems with keeping commanders informed about incoming materiel in Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, which now helps coordinate the movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations. Also, since GAO reported in 2003 that radio frequency identification tags were not being effectively used to track materiel in transit to, within, and from Iraq, DOD developed policies and procedures to increase tag use on cargo traveling through the U.S. Central Command theater of operations, including Afghanistan. Challenges hindering DOD's ability to distribute needed supplies and equipment to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan include difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries and around Afghanistan, limited airfield infrastructure, lack of full visibility over cargo movements, limited storage capacity at logistics hubs, difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment, lack of coordination between U.S. and other coalition forces for delivery of supplies and equipment, and uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for contractors. DOD recognizes these challenges and has ongoing or planned efforts to mitigate some of them; however, some efforts involve long-term plans that will not be complete in time to support the ongoing troop increase. DOD is also working to address these challenges through planning conferences to synchronize the flow of forces into Afghanistan. At these conferences, DOD officials stressed the need to balance and coordinate multiple requirements in order to sustain current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, draw down forces and equipment in Iraq, and increase forces and equipment in Afghanistan.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to provide a statement discussing Department  of Defense (DOD) transportation and logistics issues in Afghanistan. As of  February 2010, approximately 79,000 U.S. troops were deployed in  Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2009, DOD reported that it spent $4 billion to  move troops and materiel into Afghanistan in support of these operations:  $2 billion for air transport, $120 million for sealift, and the balance for port  handling and ground transport. From February through August 2009,  16,000 troops and 5,300 tons of gear were flown into Afghanistan, while  750,000 square feet of materiel—trucks and containers—were transported  by sealift and then trucks.
Afghanistan has been described as the “harshest logistics environment on  earth.” It is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with poorly  developed infrastructure, including few roads, no railway, and only four  airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain and weather in  Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further challenges to  transporting supplies and equipment. Roads are narrow and often  unpaved; some have one-way traffic alternating daily, and some are  treacherous mountain passes. Winter weather, avalanches, and flooding  often create obstacles and can cause delivery delays. Additionally, DOD  does not have access to suitable areas nearby for staging and receiving  equipment going into Afghanistan, such as those it has in Kuwait for  operations in Iraq. While DOD relies on a combination of air and surface  transportation modes to move supplies and equipment into and around  Afghanistan, these austere conditions make airlift a vital part of this  process.
On December 1, 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000  U.S. troops would be sent to Afghanistan by August 31, 2010, with  drawdown efforts in Afghanistan to begin in July 2011. Simultaneously,  DOD plans to draw down forces and equipment from Iraq. From December  2009 through August 2010, approximately 48,000 troops, 20,000 pieces of  rolling stock, and 29,000 containers are planned to be pulled out of Iraq.  Consequently, DOD’s logistics support system will have to accommodate  both operations, requiring extensive planning and coordination. In  February 2009, we testified that DOD’s ability to move equipment and  materiel from Iraq may be constrained, affecting its ability to quickly  deploy these resources in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Specifically, we  reported that the limited availability of facilities in Kuwait and other  neighboring countries may diminish the speed at which equipment and  materiel can be moved out of Iraq. Further, we reported that the ability to  transport personnel and equipment into Afghanistan will likely be  constrained by the infrastructure issues and topography of Afghanistan.
My statement today reflects our preliminary observations drawn from  ongoing work reviewing DOD’s logistics efforts supporting operations in  Afghanistan. Specifically, I will (1) describe the organizations involved and  the routes and methods used to transport supplies and equipment into and  around Afghanistan; (2) highlight some of the steps DOD has taken to  improve the distribution process based on lessons learned from prior  operations; and (3) address challenges that affect DOD’s ability to  distribute supplies and equipment to forces within Afghanistan, as well as  DOD’s efforts to mitigate these challenges.
These preliminary observations are based on the work we have performed  to date. In conducting our audit work, we examined agency guidance,  including DOD Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 18, 2008), which  provides the doctrinal framework for how logistics are to be delivered to  support joint operations across the range of military operations, and U.S.  Central Command guidance on the use of supply routes to Afghanistan. In  addition, we reviewed other documentation and briefings relating to,  among other things, the processes of transporting supplies and equipment  to Afghanistan from various DOD entities, plans for the ongoing troop  increase, and assessments of airfield capabilities. We also analyzed  commanders’ comments from readiness reports prepared by 134 units  deployed to Afghanistan as of January 2010, and selected certain examples  to highlight challenges DOD faces with distributing supplies and  equipment to forces within Afghanistan. However, we were unable to  conduct an independent reliability assessment of the commanders’  comment data from the readiness reports. We met with officials from  several DOD organizations in the United States as well as the U.S. Central  Command theater of operations, including Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan.  In the United States, we met with officials from U.S. Central Command,  U.S. Transportation Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, Surface  Deployment and Distribution Command, Air Mobility Command, and Air  Force Central Command. During our trip to the theater of operations in  December 2009, we met with officials from Army Central Command- Forward, the Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations  Center, Defense Logistics Agency-Forward, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the  Combined Joint Task Force-82, the Air Mobility Division, the 1st Theater  Sustainment Command, and the 143rd Expeditionary Sustainment  Command. We also attended U.S. Central Command-sponsored planning  conferences in support of the troop increase in Afghanistan and  drawdown of forces from Iraq. My statement is based on our reviews and  analysis of DOD guidance, processes, and plans, and on interviews GAO  staff members conducted with DOD officials in the United States, Kuwait,  Qatar, and Afghanistan. We conducted our work from August 2009 through  March 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Many DOD Organizations Are Involved in Distributing Supplies and Equipment by Various Routes and Methods into and around Afghanistan
paragraphs: Distribution of materiel, such as supplies and equipment, into and around  Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD organizations and  utilizing both surface and air modes of transportation over various routes.  DOD’s ability to provide timely logistics support to units deploying to  Afghanistan or already in theater depends on its ability to synchronize  these activities into one seamless process. According to joint doctrine,  distribution is the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the  logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right  time” to support the joint force. As the list below indicates, numerous  organizations play an integral role in ensuring the delivery of materiel to  support operations in Afghanistan:    U.S. Transportation Command is designated as the distribution process  owner for DOD. As such, it coordinates transportation programs for all  organizations involved in moving supplies and equipment into  Afghanistan for DOD. It relies on its military service components—Air  Mobility Command (Air Force), Military Sealift Command (Navy), and  Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (Army)—to provide  mobility assets, such as aircraft, ships, and trucks, and to execute the  movement of materiel. In addition, U.S. Transportation Command  collaborates with the combatant commanders, military services,  defense agencies, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff to  develop and implement distribution process improvements.
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan establishes priorities for movement of materiel  for the Afghanistan theater.
Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan provides command and  control of logistics efforts within Afghanistan to execute U.S. Forces- Afghanistan priorities, including assisting with materiel reception and  movement and with asset visibility.
Army Central Command’s 1st Theater Sustainment Command provides  command and control of logistics efforts within the U.S. Central  Command area of operations by monitoring strategic movements of  materiel and directly influencing movements into theater.
Air Force Central Command’s Air Mobility Division plans, coordinates,  tasks, and executes the movement of materiel using air assets within  theater.
The Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center  bridges the gap between strategic and theater distribution by validating  and directing air movements and monitoring and directing surface  movements within theater.
A combination of surface and air transportation modes are used to move  supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan. According to U.S.  Transportation Command officials, most supplies and equipment bound  for Afghanistan are transported along surface modes, with the remaining  supplies and equipment transported using airlift. The main surface route  uses commercial ships to transport cargo to the seaport of Karachi,  Pakistan, from which it is trucked by contractors into Afghanistan.  Typically, materiel that crosses the northern border at Torkham is  destined for the logistics hub at Bagram, while materiel that crosses the  southern border at Chaman is destined for the Kandahar logistics hub. The  distances from the port of Karachi to Bagram and Kandahar are  approximately 1,210 miles and 690 miles, respectively. Unit equipment— such as specific vehicles and materiel owned by the unit and brought from  home stations—and sustainment materiel—such as food, water,  construction materials, parts, and fuel that are requisitioned by units  already deployed—are transported through Pakistan.
In May 2009, DOD began using an alternative surface route, known as the  Northern Distribution Network, which relies on contracted ships, railways,  and trucks to transport nonlethal sustainment items like construction  materiel through western European and central Asian countries into  Afghanistan. The cargo, originating in the United States and northern  Europe, falls in with the normal flow of commerce that travels along  several routes within the Northern Distribution Network. There are two  main routes within this network: one starts at the Latvian port of Riga or  the Estonian port of Tallinn and connects with Afghanistan via Russia,  Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; the second route starts at the Georgian port  of Poti, bypasses Russia, and reaches Afghanistan through the terrains of  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. U.S. Transportation Command is  currently considering the development of additional Northern Distribution  Network routes to transport materiel into Afghanistan.
Currently, the surface routes through Pakistan are used to a greater extent  than those of the Northern Distribution Network because the latter is a  less mature surface route and the Pakistani ground routes entail fewer  limitations on the types of cargo that can be transported. For example,  U.S. Transportation Command reported that from May through November  2009, more than 4,700 20-foot–equivalent units were transported into  Afghanistan by way of the Northern Distribution Network, but more than  21,500 20-foot–equivalent units were transported using the Pakistani  surface routes. The Northern Distribution Network could, however,  support the movement of significantly more cargo, with a maximum  capacity estimated at around 4,000 20-foot–equivalent units per month.
Military and commercial airlift are used to transport high-priority supplies  and equipment, as well as sensitive items, such as weapon systems and  ammunition, into and around Afghanistan. According to U.S. Forces- Afghanistan, as of December 2009, there were 24 airfields in Afghanistan, 4  of which could support C-5 aircraft and 6 of which could support C-17  aircraft. These aircraft are used to move large quantities of supplies and  equipment. Cargo flown into Afghanistan is typically flown to a logistics  hub, such as Bagram or Kandahar, that is capable of supporting most types  of aircraft. According to Air Mobility Command data, during fiscal years  2008 and 2009, approximately 81,600 and 170,000 short tons of cargo,  respectively, were flown into Afghanistan.
Supplies and equipment shipped to the logistics hubs may subsequently be  transported to units operating at other forward operating bases or combat  outposts using a combination of surface and air transportation modes.  Within Afghanistan, cargo is moved to forward operating bases primarily  by means of contractor-operated trucks, though military trucking assets  are used in some instances. High-priority and sensitive materiel, such as  ammunition, that needs to be transported by air is loaded onto smaller  aircraft and flown to a forward operating base or air-dropped to units  throughout the country.
section_title: DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve the Distribution Process Based on Lessons Learned
paragraphs: DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing  materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior  operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. We reported in August 2005  that two DOD initiatives for improving supply distribution operations—the  establishment of the Central Command Deployment and Distribution  Operations Center and the use of pure packing (that is, consolidation of  cargo for shipment to a single user) for air shipments—were successful  enough to warrant application to future operations. In conducting our  ongoing work reviewing DOD’s logistics efforts supporting operations in  Afghanistan, we found that these initiatives continue to benefit supply  distribution efforts in support of operations in Afghanistan. According to  officials, both these initiatives have helped improve the flow of supplies  into and around the Afghanistan theater of operations.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, senior commanders were unable to  prioritize their needs and make decisions in the early stages of the  distribution process because they did not know what materiel was being  shipped to them, resulting in an overburdened transportation and  distribution system. To address these issues, in January 2004, U.S.  Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment  and Distribution Operations Center, in part to help coordinate the  movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations, including  both Iraq and Afghanistan, by confirming the combatant commander’s  deployment and distribution priorities and by synchronizing the forces,  equipment, and supplies arriving in theater with critical theater lift and  theater infrastructure limitations. Based on the success of the Central  Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, DOD created  similar deployment and distribution operations centers within each of the  geographic combatant commands.
Pure packing has similarly improved DOD’s efficiency. During the early  stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the use of mixed pallets of cargo  created inefficiencies because they had to be unpacked, sorted, and  repacked in the theater of operations before they were shipped forward,  thus lengthening the time it took to deliver supplies to troops. To avoid  these extra processes, in January 2004, U.S. Central Command requested  that all air shipments entering its area of responsibility be pure packed,  meaning that all cargo in a pallet is addressed to the same customer  location. To maximize pallet and aircraft utilization, cargo awaiting  shipment can be held for up to 5 days for the Army and up to 3 days for the  Marine Corps. Cargo is palletized either when it reaches 120 hours of port  hold time or when enough cargo is available to fill a pallet, based on size  or weight limits. As we reported in April 2005, the use of pure packing  potentially leads to longer processing times at the originating aerial ports,  but it reduces customer wait time in theater, thus providing a significant  advantage.
DOD has also established policies and procedures to increase the use of  RFID tags to improve in-transit visibility over cargo. In December 2003,  we reported that DOD did not have adequate visibility over all supplies  and equipment transported to, within, and from the theater of operations  for Operation Iraqi Freedom, in part because RFID tags were not being  used in a uniform and consistent manner. In July 2004, DOD issued policy  directing all DOD components to use RFID tags on all cargo shipments  moving to, from, or between overseas locations. Additionally, U.S. Central  Command policy states that RFID tags must be attached to all unit and  sustainment cargo transported to, within, and from U.S. Central  Command’s theater of operations. U.S. Central Command issued further  guidance requiring RFID tags with intrusion-detection capabilities to be  affixed to containers carrying unit equipment along the Pakistani ground  routes. Some interrogators have been installed within Pakistan to obtain  electronic information from RFID tags as privately contracted trucks  transporting DOD cargo pass by. Officials told us that as a result of these  policies and procedures, the use of RFID tags and DOD’s visibility over  cargo have increased significantly since early operations began in Iraq.
However, we have found that DOD’s visibility over surface movements of  supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan remains limited, as is  discussed below.
section_title: Several Challenges Hinder DOD’s Ability to Distribute Supplies and Equipment to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
paragraphs: Based on our preliminary observations, we note several challenges that  hinder DOD’s ability to distribute needed supplies and equipment to U.S.  forces operating in Afghanistan. These challenges include    difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries and  around Afghanistan;  limited airfield infrastructure within Afghanistan;  lack of full visibility over supply and equipment movements into and  around Afghanistan;  limited storage capacity at logistics hubs in Afghanistan;    difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment in  Afghanistan;  lack of coordination, as well as competing logistics priorities, in a  coalition environment; and    uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for contractors.
DOD has ongoing or planned efforts to help mitigate some of these  challenges. In addition, DOD is working to address these challenges  through planning conferences to synchronize the flow of forces into  Afghanistan. While some of DOD’s efforts will promptly improve its ability  to efficiently distribute supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in  Afghanistan, other efforts involve long-term plans that will not be  completed in time to support the ongoing troop increase that is scheduled  to occur by August 2010.
subsections: section_title: Transporting Cargo through Neighboring Countries and within Afghanistan Poses Special Difficulties
paragraphs: The supply routes through Pakistan, along the Northern Distribution  Network, and around Afghanistan each present unique difficulties in  transporting supplies and equipment. DOD’s ability to support both  current operations and the ongoing troop increase in Afghanistan is  challenged by restrictions on the number of trucks allowed to cross into  Afghanistan daily. Because no U.S. military transportation units operate in  Pakistan, DOD must rely solely on private contractors to transport  supplies and equipment along ground routes through the country and to  provide security of the cargo while in transit. Privately contracted trucks  can transport cargo through Pakistan via two routes: the northern, which  crosses into Afghanistan at the border town of Torkham, and the southern,  which crosses at the border town of Chaman. While Pakistan does not  limit the number of trucks that cross the border at Torkham, it does limit  the number allowed to cross at Chaman to 100 total per day. U.S. Forces- Afghanistan and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command officials  told us that they requested greater security at the Chaman border crossing  after insurgent attacks occurred near the border crossing in 2009. In  response, restrictions were placed on the number of trucks allowed to  cross per day at Chaman, which include trucks transporting cargo in  support of U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. Officials added that there  is often a backlog of trucks waiting to cross at the Chaman border because  of the restrictions. As a result, these backlogged trucks may sometimes be  unable to deliver their cargo and subsequently return to the port of  Karachi to pick up additional supplies and equipment in a timely manner.  The U.S. government is currently negotiating with the Pakistani  government to increase the flow of trucks through the Chaman border  crossing.
The restrictions at the Chaman border crossing and the resulting impact  on the number of available trucks in Pakistan help contribute to a regular  backlog of cargo at the port of Karachi. According to Army Central  Command, nearly half of the cargo waiting to be picked up at Karachi  resides there for several weeks. Officials stated that unit equipment  arriving at Karachi often receives the highest transportation priority. While  unit equipment is essential for U.S. forces to conduct their mission,  sustainment items are also necessary, as they enable forces to maintain  and prolong their operations. If sustainment and other types of cargo  become backlogged at Karachi, U.S. forces may not receive the supplies  and equipment they need in a timely manner to complete or sustain their  mission. According to U.S. Transportation Command, two methods for  mitigating the effects of backlogs at the port of Karachi are prioritizing  cargo flow and increasing the amount of supplies kept on hand in  Afghanistan.
Limitations on what items can be transported through Pakistan and the  amount of damage sustained by cargo transiting through Pakistan also can  delay the delivery of necessary supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in  Afghanistan. Private trucking contractors do not transport sensitive  equipment on the Pakistani ground routes. Instead, such equipment must  be flown into Afghanistan and then be installed onto the vehicles in  Regional Command–East. Additionally, according to Army Central  Command, approximately 80 percent of cargo transiting through Pakistan  arrives in Afghanistan with some level of damage, which, officials noted,  can occur because of a number of factors, including poor roads, rough  terrain, extreme weather, or insurgent and other individual attacks. For  example, U.S. military vehicles may arrive with missing or damaged  engines, slashed fuel lines and empty fuel tanks, broken mirrors or  windows, and deflated tires, according to Army officials. The additional  time needed to repair equipment arriving in Afghanistan further delays  delivery to U.S. forces.
A small percentage of cargo transported along the Pakistani ground routes  is pilfered by insurgents and other individuals, but the exact amount of  pilferage is difficult to determine because of limitations in the way it is  reported.According to DOD officials, approximately 1 percent of cargo  transported on the Pakistani ground routes is pilfered. While the  percentage may be relatively small, officials stated that it represents a  significant loss of money to DOD and a potential risk to the warfighter  until replacements for the pilfered items can be requisitioned and  delivered. Because of the lack of U.S. military transportation units  operating in Pakistan, DOD cannot immediately address pilferage when  and where it occurs in Pakistan. In cases where active RFID tags are  damaged or removed when the cargo is pilfered, officials stated that DOD  can attempt to determine the approximate area where the pilferage took  place based on the last RFID tag signal obtained by an interrogator inside  Pakistan. Additionally, some RFID tags have intrusion-detection  capabilities that provide information on when and where the cargo has  been broken into. With this information, DOD can negotiate with the  private trucking contractors to avoid transporting cargo through locations  inside Pakistan where equipment may be more susceptible to pilfering.
The Northern Distribution Network is an important alternative to the  surface routes through Pakistan, but several logistical and cargo clearance  challenges exist that could limit the amount of cargo transported on its  routes. For example, Northern Distribution Network route transit times,  on average, exceed the Pakistani surface route transit times. Cargo  transiting along the northern route takes approximately 86 days to travel  from the source of supply in the United States or northern Europe to its  destination in Afghanistan, and the southern route takes approximately 92  days. Comparatively, it takes only about 72 days to transport cargo along  the Pakistani surface routes. Additionally, DOD and its contractors must  request and obtain clearance before cargo can transit through Uzbekistan,  a process that should take 20 days to complete. This has been shortened  from 30 days to 20 days, and according to U.S. Transportation Command  officials, they are working to make this delay shorter. Given the long lead  times to deliver cargo and the 20-day notice needed to ship cargo through  Uzbekistan, DOD must plan well in advance to ensure that the necessary  supplies and equipment arrive in Afghanistan when they are needed to  support the warfighter. Furthermore, there are restrictions on the types of  cargo that can be transported through the countries along the Northern  Distribution Network. Specifically, only nonlethal supplies and equipment  can be shipped on the Northern Distribution Network, and DOD primarily  transports nonlethal sustainment supplies on the route. These restrictions  constrain DOD’s ability to transport certain classes of supply or types of  equipment on the Northern Distribution Network as an alternative to the  more expensive airlift or the limited capacity of the Pakistani surface  routes.
Private trucking contractors operating under the Afghan Host Nation  Trucking Contract carry the majority of U.S. supplies and equipment  within Afghanistan, but officials told us that limitations on the available  number of contractors and reliable trucks may impede DOD’s ability to  support the ongoing troop increase. Officials stated that approximately 90  percent of cargo is transported within Afghanistan by private contractors,  and the remaining 10 percent by U.S. military trucks. In addition to  affecting the time it takes to transport cargo to the warfighter, officials  believe that limited contractor availability affects the quality of service.  Contractors in Afghanistan may have little incentive to offer superior  performance when they can expect to continue receiving contracts  because of the high demand and limited supply of host nation trucking  contractors. Additionally, officials told us that some privately contracted  trucks may be unable to safely transport cargo because they are either in  too poor a condition to operate or do not have the capability to transport  the type or size of cargo. In cases where the contracted trucks are unable  to provide adequate transportation, DOD must find an alternative method  to deliver the cargo to its destination—for example, by using a different  private contractor or by transporting the cargo on a U.S. military truck.  Identifying an alternate mode of transportation could delay the delivery of  needed supplies and equipment to U.S. forces. According to Army logistics  officials in Afghanistan, DOD is in the process of increasing the number of  contractors performing under the Afghan Host Nation Trucking Contract  operating in southern and western Afghanistan.
Attacks on cargo being transported through Pakistan and Afghanistan can  also hinder DOD’s ability to provide supplies and equipment to U.S. forces  in Afghanistan. As noted above, DOD relies on private contractors to  transport all cargo through Pakistan and most of the cargo transported  through Afghanistan. There is no U.S. military-provided security for the  transport of the cargo; shipping contractors provide their own security.  Trucks moving along the ground routes through Pakistan and Afghanistan,  as well as those stopped at terminals and border crossings, can be targets  for attack. For example, for 2 consecutive days in March 2009, militants  attacked two truck terminals in Peshawar, Pakistan, damaging or  destroying 31 vehicles and trailers. Our previous work found that DOD  reported that in June 2008 alone, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel  were lost because of attacks or other events.
section_title: Limited Airfield Infrastructure within Afghanistan Constrains the Movement of Supplies and Equipment
paragraphs: Limited airfield infrastructure and capability within Afghanistan  constitutes one of the most difficult challenges DOD faces as it deploys  and sustains the increasing number of U.S. forces in the country,  according to numerous DOD officials we interviewed. DOD airlifts into  Afghanistan a significant amount of cargo, including high-priority items as  well as sensitive equipment that cannot be transported through Pakistan  or on the Northern Distribution Network. However, the small number of  airfields in Afghanistan and the limited types of aircraft that can land at  these airfields may constrain DOD’s ability to deliver certain supplies and  equipment within expected time frames. Bagram Airfield, Kandahar  Airfield, and Bastion Airfield are the three primary airfield hubs in  Afghanistan capable of handling large volumes of cargo and a variety of  different types of aircraft. Bagram and Kandahar have the capability to  land large C-5 and C-17 aircraft as well as the smaller C-130 aircraft, while  Bastion can land C-17s and C-130s. DOD often relies on large aircraft, such  as the C-17, to fly supplies and equipment directly from the United States,  Kuwait, Qatar, and other major distribution points into Afghanistan, but it  is limited to the small number of airfields where these aircraft can land.  Instead of flying directly to a smaller airfield, a large aircraft must first  land at an airfield hub, where its cargo is unloaded, reloaded onto a  smaller aircraft, such as the C-130, and then flown to the smaller airfield.  This process takes considerably more time than flying directly to the final  destination and, as a result, may delay the delivery of supplies and  equipment to the warfighter. Officials stated that the situation will likely  grow more challenging as the demand for cargo increases along with the  additional U.S. forces arriving in Afghanistan. According to U.S.  Transportation Command, there are projects under way or that have been  completed to expand airfield capacity in Afghanistan. For example,  officials at Kandahar Airfield are planning to build ramp space that can  park an additional two C-5 and eight C-130 aircraft. However, other  planned or ongoing projects to expand airfield capacity will not be  completed in time to support the ongoing troop increase, according to Air  Force officials.
Airfields also have only limited space available for aircraft to park after  landing, and sometimes reach capacity. For example, Bagram has the  capacity to park up to one C-5 equivalent and four C-17 equivalents at the  same time. Additionally, officials stated that the current number of aerial  port workers and quantity of materiel-handling equipment at the airfields  in Afghanistan may be insufficient to keep pace with the increased  amounts of cargo being flown into the country to support the ongoing  troop increase. The number of aerial port workers and quantity of  materiel-handling equipment at the airfield determine how quickly parked  aircraft can be unloaded, have their cargo processed, and be serviced and  refueled in order to depart the airfield and allow additional incoming  aircraft to land. Ideally, airfields would have the capability to unload,  process, and service and refuel all of the aircraft parked at the airfield at  the same time, but this is not always the case. For example, Bagram has  the capability to work on up to one C-5 equivalent and three C-17  equivalents at a time, even though it has capacity to park one additional C- 17. Consequently, aircraft that land and park at an airfield with limited  aerial port worker and materiel-handling equipment availability may not  have their cargo unloaded immediately upon arrival, resulting in delayed  delivery of the airlifted supplies and equipment. Furthermore, aircraft  waiting to be unloaded are unable to depart the airfield and pick up cargo  elsewhere, thus potentially delaying the delivery of that cargo as well.  According to DOD, it has sent additional aerial port workers and materiel- handling equipment to Bastion and Mazar-e-Sharif, and additional port  workers have been requested for Bagram, Farah, Shindand, and Kabul.  However, we have not been able to evaluate the impact on cargo  processing and aircraft servicing times at these locations.
Restrictions at airfields outside Afghanistan and competing demands for  available landing times in Afghanistan may also affect the delivery of  supplies and equipment to U.S. forces. Because of their limited capability  to park and unload aircraft, airfields must closely manage the number of  aircraft that land each day in order to avoid exceeding capacity on the  ground, and aircraft bound for Afghanistan must ensure that they have  available time and space to land at the airfield prior to departing from their  originating locations. In some cases, aircraft may not be able to land in  Afghanistan during an available time because they are restricted from  departing their original locations. For example, officials stated that aircraft  departing from Ramstein Air Base in Germany cannot fly during certain  hours of the day because of host nation policy—even though, in order to  arrive at Bagram during certain available landing-time windows, it would  be necessary for aircraft to depart Ramstein during prohibited flying  hours. As a result, aircraft must postpone their departure from Ramstein  and coordinate another available landing time at Bagram that can be  reached by departing Ramstein during normal flying hours. Consequently,  delivery of an aircraft’s cargo to the warfighter may be delayed, and the  aircraft is not being fully utilized while it forfeits an available landing  window and waits on the ground for a new departure time. An additional  difficulty is the competition for available landing times in Afghanistan  among U.S. and coalition airlift, passenger and cargo airlift, and inter- and  intra-theater airlift. These numerous competing priorities cannot all be met  simultaneously, which may result in delaying the delivery of U.S. or  coalition cargo or personnel to Afghanistan. According to U.S. Central  Command, to mitigate the effects of competing priorities, DOD is  coordinating with coalition forces to establish a regional airspace control  management organization that will manage landing slot times at airfields in  Afghanistan.
section_title: Limited Visibility over Surface Movements of Materiel May Hinder DOD’s Ability to Efficiently Manage the Flow of Materiel
paragraphs: DOD’s visibility over surface movements of supplies and equipment into  and around Afghanistan is limited, and this limitation may hinder its ability  to effectively manage the flow of supplies and equipment into the logistics  hubs and forward operating bases. Although requirements are in place and  methods are being used to maintain some visibility over the contractors  and shipments while in transit, DOD lacks full visibility over surface  movements of cargo because of a lack of timely and accurate information  on the location and status of materiel and transportation assets in transit.  According to DOD policies, components must ensure that all shipments  moving to, from, or between overseas locations, which would include  shipping transit points and theater, are tagged to provide global in-transit  visibility. In-transit visibility is provided using various methods, including  active RFID tags attached to cargo containers or pallets, satellite tracking  devices on trucks, and contractor reports.
While visibility has been more consistently maintained on cargo  transported via airlift, challenges remain with meeting requirements for  visibility of surface-moved cargo. Because there are no U.S. military  transportation units operating in the countries along the surface routes to  Afghanistan, DOD must rely solely on in-transit visibility tools like RFID  tags. However, these tools are not always effective in providing adequate  visibility. For example, visibility over cargo being transported to  Afghanistan along the Northern Distribution Network is limited because  agreements with some countries, such as Russia and Uzbekistan, prevent  the use of in-transit visibility systems like RFID technology along the  routes, according to officials. Therefore, DOD must rely on reports  provided by the contracted carriers to track and obtain information about  cargo location. According to Central Command Deployment and  Distribution Operations Center officials, there are challenges with getting  carriers to submit accurate shipment reports in a timely manner. If carriers  do not submit their shipment data to DOD, or if there is a delay in report  receipt, DOD’s visibility of cargo as it moves along the Northern  Distribution Network may be limited.
With regard to cargo transported through Pakistan, visibility exists at the  seaport of Karachi, where cargo is unloaded from ships and loaded onto  contractors’ trucks for surface movement through Pakistan and into  Afghanistan. While satellite technology is used to track unit equipment,  RFID technology is used to maintain visibility over both unit and  sustainment cargo. However, visibility provided by RFID tags becomes  more sporadic once cargo moves out of the port and along the ground  routes. RFID interrogators throughout Pakistan can provide DOD with the  cargo’s RFID data and location if a truck passes within range of the  interrogator. However, only a small number of these interrogators are  along the ground routes between the port of Karachi and the borders with  Afghanistan. Furthermore, since no requirements exist regarding the  routes that drivers must take to the border crossings, a truck’s route may  not fall within range of an RFID interrogator until it arrives at one of the  border crossings into Afghanistan. In addition, occasional errors in data  downloaded onto the tags may cause erroneous information about the  cargo to be reported to DOD. For example, data on a pallet’s interim  transit location may be incorrectly recorded as its final destination on the  RFID tag. To mitigate these issues with electronic data tracking, DOD uses  contract personnel to provide reports about shipments in transit through  Pakistan. Contractors stationed at various points on the Pakistani routes  provide real-time locality information on trucks transporting U.S. cargo  that pass them. Officials reported that this has helped DOD collect more  accurate information about asset locations and incidents along the routes.  However, depending on the route taken, drivers may not always pass  contractors’ stations, and information about a truck and its cargo may not  be available until the truck arrives at the Afghan border crossing.
Visibility over shipments of supplies and equipment is also limited within  Afghanistan. Although policies are in place to maintain visibility of  materiel being transported, they have not been fully implemented. DOD’s  ability to track cargo locations using RFID technology is limited in  Afghanistan because of a limited number of interrogators. Officials stated  that to increase visibility over cargo transported within Afghanistan, all  trucks that provide services under the Afghan Host Nation Trucking  Contract are required to use satellite-based, location-tracking technology  to track their movements over ground routes. However, officials told us  that most host nation truck drivers in Afghanistan are deterred from using  the required tracking system by concerns that insurgents may be able to  track their locations and target their trucks. As a result, they disable the  technology while transporting cargo. Officials noted that the percentage of  truck drivers who comply with the requirement to use the tracking  technology has increased over time, and they expect it will continue to rise  as the drivers become more educated about the contract requirement and  the system’s benefits.
The lack of visibility over supplies and equipment transiting into and  around Afghanistan causes inefficient management of the flow of  incoming trucks to logistics hubs and forward operating bases. This may  result in backlogs of trucks trying to access the bases and delays in  customer receipt of cargo. Without adequate visibility, the arrival of trucks  delivering cargo to bases cannot be effectively metered by DOD or  contractors, resulting in long wait times at base entry control points.  Because of space constraints, only a certain number of trucks can be  allowed on a base at a time. If the available space is filled with incoming  trucks, trucks awaiting entry onto the base must wait outside the base  until space is available for them to enter. Officials stated that backlogs at  Kandahar have resulted in drivers waiting up to 20 days to access the base.  Even when a truck accesses the base, the lack of visibility over materiel  being transported may continue to cause delays in the delivery of supplies  and equipment. Because of minimal visibility over cargo location,  customers awaiting delivery of a shipment may not be aware that their  cargo has arrived at a base, which may cause delays in pickup of the  cargo. At the logistics hub in Kandahar, if the customer is unable to  retrieve the cargo in a timely manner—usually within hours—the driver  must exit the base and repeat the entry process until there is room to  unload cargo and the customer is available to receive it.
section_title: Storage Capacity at Logistics Hubs in Afghanistan Is Limited and Sometimes Not Sufficient to Manage the Movement of Supplies and Equipment
paragraphs: Storage capacity at the primary logistics hubs is limited, and at times it is  insufficient to manage the volume of inbound and outbound supplies and  equipment moving into and around Afghanistan. While some mitigation  plans are being implemented or are already in place to alleviate challenges  with storage capacity and improve the flow of cargo, officials anticipate  that there may be an ongoing lack of storage capacity as the number of  troops deployed to Afghanistan and operations tempo continue to  increase. For example, the confined operating space within the storage  area at Bagram Airfield slows down the speed at which cargo can be  processed. According to officials, outbound cargo storage yards at the  base were temporarily shut down approximately 20 times for about 24  hours each time during periods of high operations tempo in the past year,  because they could not receive outbound cargo until existing cargo was  shipped out. Additionally, officials noted that cargo storage space at the  Bagram logistics hub has decreased because of competing needs of  expanding operations—for example, there is a need for more mail storage,  and more airlift operations have required additional parking for aircraft.  The limited storage space must further be shared among multiple coalition  forces at some logistics hubs, creating competition for storage capacity  and materiel-handling equipment. For example, at Kandahar, officials  estimated that multiple coalition nations, such as the United States,  Germany, and Great Britain, are sharing approximately 2 acres of storage  space for cargo transitioning into and out of the base via air, causing some  strain at times. Much of the unused surface area at Kandahar is uncleared  terrain, making it unfeasible for storing cargo. Additionally, officials said  that many units lack the appropriate materiel-handling equipment needed  to move and store pallets and containers in and around the unfinished  surfaces of Kandahar. These officials reported that as a result, they must  share equipment, such as all-terrain forklifts, with other units and  contractors, thereby further diminishing timely materiel-handling  capability. Consequently, the limited availability of storage space,  infrastructure, and materiel-handling equipment at the logistics hubs may  hinder DOD’s ability to manage the flow of supplies and equipment  associated with the ongoing troop increase.
DOD is developing plans to expand storage capacity at logistics hubs in  order to better manage the flow of incoming supplies and equipment and  to efficiently distribute cargo to support the warfighter. However, these  plans will not be completed in time to support the ongoing troop increase  because of the logistical challenges of base expansion. Officials told us  that there are many time-consuming steps in the expansion process: they  must determine the owners of the land around the base, acquire the  neighboring real estate, clear away mines in the surrounding areas, and  obtain the supplies needed to complete the expansion. While DOD has  begun to implement plans to mitigate challenges, officials stated that there  are no “perfect solutions” to recurrent storage problems at the supply  hubs. They anticipate that storage issues will continue, and significant  improvement may not be realized as troops continue to deploy to  Afghanistan and military operations continue to expand. For example, at  Bagram, aerial port personnel have built structures that enable them to  double-stack pallets of incoming cargo, and they have stored their flatbed  trucks on the flight line in order to make more room for storing supplies  and equipment in the cargo receiving and shipping yards. However,  officials told us that storage capacity for both inbound and outbound  cargo in Bagram’s storage yards remains limited. At Kandahar, officials  said there are plans to establish a logistics base adjacent to the main base.  In the first phase of the base’s two-phase development, U.S. forces will use  interim storage yards for incoming cargo containers and vehicles, and a  transshipment yard for U.S. cargo flowing through Kandahar on its way to  another forward operating base. At the transshipment yard, truck drivers  will unload cargo so it can be readied for movement to its final  destination, thus eliminating the in-gating and customer pickup process at  Kandahar, which can take many days. According to officials, phase one of  the logistics base development is scheduled to be operational in April  2010, and the construction of the entire forward operating base is  scheduled for completion in summer 2010. Officials stated that this  expansion will help alleviate storage issues at Kandahar, allowing the  United States to better prioritize cargo shipments and improve DOD’s  ability to quickly issue supplies and equipment to the warfighter. These  officials noted, however, that the logistics base will not yet be fully  operational during the height of the troop increase.
section_title: DOD Has Experienced Difficulties in Synchronizing the Arrival of Units and Equipment in Afghanistan
paragraphs: DOD experienced difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and their  equipment in Afghanistan during the previous troop increase in 2009, and  the synchronization of units and equipment will likely continue to be a  challenge during the ongoing troop increase. Units arriving in Afghanistan  typically receive the equipment they need to perform their mission from  three primary sources: unit-owned equipment, such as individual  weaponry that is either brought with them or shipped separately from  their home stations; theater-provided equipment, such as retrograde  equipment from Iraq; and new production equipment, such as the Mine  Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle. DOD’s complex task is to  synchronize the arrival of units with the availability of their equipment,  regardless of the source, to enable them to perform their mission as  quickly as possible. However, according to Joint Sustainment Command- Afghanistan, the 2009 troop increase resulted in significant backlogs of  equipment transported on the Pakistani surface routes and by airlift,  leaving some units in southern Afghanistan waiting for as long as several  months to receive the theater-provided equipment necessary to conduct  their mission. As of December 2009, no unit deployed to southern  Afghanistan during the troop increase in the spring and summer of 2009  had yet received all of the theater-provided equipment it was suppose to  be issued. Additionally, officials stated that DOD underestimated the  amount of time required to install vehicles with sensitive items and ensure  that they received necessary maintenance prior to their being delivered to  the warfighter. As a result, some U.S. forces arrived at their forward  operating base or combat outpost without the vehicles necessary to  perform their mission.
Given the numerous challenges we have identified in delivering supplies  and equipment to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, we believe that DOD will  likely face the same difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and  equipment during the ongoing troop increase. For example, one unit  deployed in Afghanistan reported in a January 2010 readiness report that it  did not receive all of its equipment from its home station and had to  perform an upcoming mission despite not having all military equipment  available. Another reported that it lacked mission-essential equipment,  such as bomb-disabling robots that were vital to protect soldiers from  improvised explosive devices they encountered while conducting their  mission. Another unit reported that it had arrived in theater in December  2009 and was still awaiting provision of theater-provided equipment as of  January 2010. While DOD has taken steps to improve the synchronization  of units and their equipment during the ongoing troop increase, at the time  of our review, these steps were just being implemented and we were  therefore unable to evaluate their effectiveness.
section_title: Lack of Coordination and Competing Logistics Priorities in a Coalition Environment May Delay the Delivery of Supplies and Equipment to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
paragraphs: At bases throughout Afghanistan, a lack of centralized coordination  coupled with different and competing demands and priorities between  U.S. and coalition forces may delay the delivery of supplies and equipment  to U.S. forces. Additionally, limited processing and cargo-receiving  capabilities may delay the delivery of supplies and equipment to U.S.  forces. As aircraft carrying supplies and equipment land at coalition  airfields, or host nation trucks arrive at entry control points with  shipments for multiple coalition forces, logistics personnel at those  locations have a limited ability to manage and prioritize the flow of all  troops’ cargo. Specifically, officials at Kandahar told us that they had  waited for days to receive shipments of priority materiel that were waiting  outside the base to be processed for entry onto the base, along with other  coalition forces’ cargo, because the coalition commander of Kandahar  would not allow the U.S. forces’ cargo to be prioritized to enter first at the  control point. However, the officials noted that the planned construction  of a U.S. logistics base adjacent to the existing coalition-run base will  improve DOD’s ability to manage and prioritize the flow of supplies and  equipment and store cargo at Kandahar.
In addition, coalition forces compete for limited amounts of materiel- handing equipment and storage facilities. Officials stated that when  materiel-handling equipment, such as forklifts, is unavailable or  unserviceable, coalition forces have to share what limited equipment is  available to conduct supply operations. Because units sometimes have to  wait to use the available materiel-handling equipment, supply delivery to  U.S. troops may be delayed. Officials did note that efforts to share space  have improved over the past year, indicating that coalition forces are  better coordinating their operations to fulfill the mission in Afghanistan.  However, there is the potential for a future increase in the number of  coalition forces in Afghanistan, which could exacerbate the challenges we  have identified.
section_title: Uncertain Requirements and Low Transportation Priority for Contractors Create Additional Challenges
paragraphs: DOD’s reliance on contractors to support its operations in Afghanistan  creates additional challenges with regard to the distribution of supplies  and equipment, as well as movement of contractor personnel. Contractors  have become an indispensable part of the force, performing a variety of  functions in Afghanistan, such as communication services, provision of  interpreters who accompany military patrols, base operations support  (e.g., food and housing), weapons systems maintenance, and intelligence  analysis. DOD estimated that about 104,000 contractor personnel were  supporting operations in Afghanistan as of September 2009. Further, DOD  anticipates that this number will grow as it increases troop presence in  Afghanistan. As we have previously reported, troop increases typically  include increases in contractor personnel to provide support.
These contractors in Afghanistan rely on the same distribution routes and  methods as do the military forces to deliver the supplies and equipment  they need to perform their mission and sustain their operations. However,  DOD’s ability to manage the flow of materiel for contractors and military  personnel into logistics hubs and forward operating bases, and balance the  use of limited transportation assets and storage capacity between  contractors and military personnel, may be hampered by its lack of good  information on the number of current contractors and lack of good  planning for the coming increase in both contractors and their  requirements. These requirements include contractor access to materiel- handling equipment and storage space for the supplies and equipment  contractors need to perform their mission as well as for life support, such  as housing and food. Since 2003, we have reported that DOD lacked  reliable data on the number of contractor personnel providing services in  environments such as Afghanistan, and our work has found that DOD’s  current system for collecting data on contractor personnel in Afghanistan  does not provide accurate data. Further, during our December 2009 trip  to Afghanistan, we found that there was only limited planning being done  with regard to contracts or contractors. Specifically, we found that with  the exception of planning for the increased use of the Logistics Civil  Augmentation Program, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan had not begun to  consider the full range of contractor services that might be needed to  support the planned increase of U.S. forces. More importantly, the  command appeared to be unaware of its responsibility to determine  contracted support requirements or develop the contract management and  support plans required by guidance. However, we did find some  being done by U.S. military officials at Regional Command–East.  According to planners from Regional Command–East, the command had  identified the types of units that were deploying to its operation al area in  Afghanistan and was coordinating with similar units already in  Afghanistan to determine what types of contract support the units relied  on. Nonetheless, without a complete picture of the number of contrac in Afghanistan and their materiel requirements, DOD may not be in a  position to effectively manage the flow of military and contractor cargo to ensure that all materiel is delivered to the right locations at the right timeto enable both military units and contractors to perform their missions.
Another challenge with regard to contractors is the timely movement o their people and supplies around Afghanistan. When traveling around  Afghanistan, contractor personnel and their equipment are given a low  priority for air transportation as compared with military personnel an d  materiel, and that prioritization can affect the contractors’ ability to  perform their contracts. Contractor personnel have difficulty obtaining  military airlift within Afghanistan, and they spend lengthy amounts o in passenger terminals hoping to catch the first available flight. For  example, according to contractor personnel we spoke with, they fly  military airlift at the lowest priority for seats on flights. A letter from a  military commander is needed in order to fly with a higher priority—a obtaining one takes considerable time and effort. According to these  contractor personnel, the time they spend waiting in passenger terminal can cost the U.S. government both in money paid and lost productivi ty.  Officials from several contractors told us that they factor additional  personnel into their workforce structures because of the difficulties i getting people to and from their work sites. The difficulty in moving  contractor personnel and equipment may be compounded when the increase begins. While some efforts are under way to improve key  infrastructure, such as passenger terminals, it may still take time to  complete these projects. Currently, the passenger terminals in key airlift  hubs such as Kandahar and Bagram are very small, and passengers m experience long wait times between their arrival in the terminal and  boarding their flights. Without a rapid expansion of these facilities, it is  likely that this overcrowding will be compounded by the troop increase During our visit we spoke with multiple people, including military and  . contractor personnel, who had waited anywhere from a few days  week to board a flight.
section_title: DOD Planni Include Consideration of These Distribution Challenges
paragraphs: In addition to the efforts described above to mitigate each of the  challenges we have identified, DOD is also working to address them  through planning conferences intended to synchronize the flow of for ces  into Afghanistan. For example, in December 2009 and January 2010, U.S.  Central Command sponsored two conferences to (1) identify unit equipment available to deploy in support of the troop increase; (2) a ways in which distribution challenges could be overcome in order to  deploy the troops and their required supplies and equipment by August 2010; and (3) plan for the simultaneous drawdown of forces and  equipment from Iraq. Officials from key organizations across DOD,  including U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, U.S.  Forces-Iraq, and Army Central Command, attended both  Throughout both conferences, DOD officials stressed the need to balance  and closely coordinate multiple requirements in order to sustain current  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, draw down forces and equipment f Iraq, and increase forces and equipment in Afghanistan.  conferences.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Because of the unique challenges of Afghanistan, the movement of  supplies and equipment in support of operations there is likely to be  the most complex logistics operations the U.S. military has undergone in  recent history. The challenges are daunting, and the transportation system is heavily strained in maintaining current operations. Now, with the  addition of 30,000 more U.S. troops on the horizon, coupled with an  increase in contractors and a potential increase in coalition forces, these  challenges will only be magnified, and a system that is struggling to  keep  pace with current operations could be further strained. It will, therefo re,  one of  be critical for DOD to develop adequate contingency plans to mitigate the effects of these and other unforeseen challenges, and to react quickly to  overcome significant problems as they occur. Failure to effectively  manage the flow of materiel could delay combat units’ receipt of the  critical items they need to perform their mission, and costly backlogs of  cargo could accumulate throughout the supply system, risking loss of  accountability and control over billions of dollars in assets. We expect to  report more fully on these and other issues at a later date.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact William M.  Solis at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include Cary Russell, Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon; John  Bumgarner; Carole Coffey; Melissa Hermes; Lisa McMillen; Geoffrey Peck;  Bethann Ritter; Michael Shaughnessy; Sarah Simon; Angela Watson;  Cheryl Weissman; Stephen Woods; and Delia Zee.
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