U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance
Published: 2013-03-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The terrorist group AQAP, one of the top threats to U.S. national security, is based in Yemena country facing serious economic and social challenges and undergoing a difficult political transition following civil unrest in 2011. Since 2007, State, DOD, and USAID have allocated over $1 billion in assistance to help Yemen counter AQAP and address other challenges. The three largest U.S. assistance programs in Yemen are USAIDs Food for Peace program, which has provided emergency food aid, and DODs Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, which have provided training and equipment to Yemeni security forces.
In response to a Senate report that directed GAO to review U.S. assistance to Yemen, and following up on GAOs February 2012 report on the types and amounts of such assistance, GAO examined (1) the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of progress made by the Food for Peace and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and (3) key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. GAO reviewed agency documents and met with U.S. and Yemeni officials and implementing partners in Washington, D.C., and Sanaa, Yemen.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed. The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have conducted numerous civilian and security assistance activities in support of these strategic goals. Although some progress has been made since the civil unrest in 2011, obstacles remain to achieving each goal. For example, while there has been an orderly political transition to a new president, key milestonessuch as convening a national dialogue to promote reconciliationhave been delayed. In addition, while Yemeni security forces have retaken territory seized by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2011, the security situation remains unstable.
USAID data indicate that the Food for Peace program exceeded most of its annual targets between fiscal years 2008 and 2011 for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food donations. However, reports to Congress about the program have lacked timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency. With regard to the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has developed an evaluation process to assess the programs effectiveness but has not conducted an evaluation in Yemen, citing security concerns. Consequently, limited information exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these assistance programs and making future funding decisions.
Security conditions and political divisions in Yemen pose key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. First, Yemens unstable security situation constrains U.S. training of Yemeni security forces, restricts oversight of civilian assistance projects, and endangers Yemeni nationals who work for the United States. For example, a Yemeni employee of the U.S. embassy was murdered in October 2012, and other Yemeni staff at the embassy, as well as their families, face threats. Second, because of leadership and coordination challenges within the Yemeni government, key recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use of this assistance until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic goal of improving Yemens security. However, according to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government to replace key leaders of security force units and reorganize security ministries have addressed some of these challenges.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that USAID improve performance reporting on Food for Peace efforts in Yemen and that DOD collect and analyze data on the effectiveness of the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen until security conditions permit an evaluation of these programs. USAID and DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Yemen is an important partner in the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian  Peninsula (AQAP), a terrorist group based in Yemen that continues to  plot against U.S. citizens and interests. Between 2009 and 2012, AQAP  members attempted to blow up several U.S.-bound airplanes using  increasingly sophisticated techniques, from incorporating explosives into  garments in 2009 and 2012 to shipping explosives disguised as printer  cartridges on two U.S.-bound flights in 2010. Further, Yemen faces  substantial economic and social challenges, such as a reported  unemployment rate of nearly 40 percent and, according to the United  Nations, a third of Yemenis suffering from acute hunger. Yemen is also  undergoing a difficult political transition following mass protests in 2011  that culminated in the end of the 33-year rule of former President Ali  Abdullah Saleh. This situation has fostered an attractive recruiting and  training environment for AQAP. To assist in countering the AQAP threat  and to address the various other challenges Yemen faces, the  Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID) have collectively allocated over $1  billion in assistance to Yemen since 2007. Nearly half of this assistance  has funded USAID’s Food for Peace (FFP) program, which has provided  emergency food aid, and DOD’s Section 1206 and Section 1207(n)  programs, which have provided training and equipment to Yemeni  security forces.
Given the threats emanating from Yemen as well as the significant U.S.  investment in assistance to Yemen, a Senate report directed the  Comptroller General to, among other things, review U.S. assistance  efforts in Yemen.toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of progress made by  the FFP and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and (3) key challenges  to U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen. We did not evaluate any covert  programs that the United States may fund in Yemen.
Our report examines (1) the extent of progress made  To address these objectives, we reviewed agency documents related to  U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen—including strategy and planning  documents, fact sheets, progress reporting, and funding information—as  well as relevant documents from U.S. implementing partners, the United  Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the  Yemeni government. We also discussed U.S. assistance efforts with  State, DOD, USAID, National Security Staff, and intelligence community  officials in the Washington, D.C., area. Additionally, we conducted  fieldwork in Sana’a, Yemen, in October 2012, during which we met with  State, DOD, and USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; and  representatives of the Yemeni Ministries of Interior (MOI), Defense  (MOD), and Planning and International Cooperation. See appendix I for a  complete description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Yemen is an important U.S. partner that faces significant humanitarian,  economic, and security challenges. As figure 1 shows, Yemen is  strategically located, sharing a land border with Saudi Arabia, a key U.S.  ally, and a maritime border with a critical shipping lane connecting the  Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The most impoverished country in the  Middle East and North Africa region, Yemen is experiencing a rapidly  growing population, which is estimated at about 25 million; increasing  scarcity of natural resources, including water, and its primary export— oil—in steady decline; extremely high unemployment; and dwindling  revenues that decrease the government’s ability to fund basic operations.  Internal conflicts have displaced over 430,000 Yemenis from their  communities, and a December 2012 United Nations report found that  nearly half of Yemen’s population had limited or no access to sufficient  food. Moreover, Yemen is a safe haven for the terrorist group AQAP,  which the June 2011 National Strategy for Countering Terrorism identifies  as a sustained threat to the United States with both the intent and  capability to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland and U.S. partners.
Adding to these challenges, Yemen’s history has been marked by serious  political tensions, including civil war, secessionist movements, and  conflict between the government and various tribes. As shown in figure 2,  in early 2011, mass protests began against the 33-year regime of  President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh’s government responded by cracking  down on protestors and clashing with troops that had defected to side  with the protest movement. As the Yemeni government focused on  suppressing upheaval in the capital, AQAP was able to take advantage of  the situation by seizing control of portions of southern Yemen. In late  2011, after months of political unrest, Saleh signed a Gulf Cooperation  Council–proposed agreement outlining a transfer of power to his vice  president, Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi. Hadi was elected president in  February 2012, beginning a 2-year transition process that is intended to  lay the groundwork for national elections in February 2014.
According to State, the overarching objective of U.S. policy in Yemen is a  successful democratic transition that promotes political, economic, and  security sector reforms that will enable the Yemeni government to  respond to the needs and aspirations of the Yemeni people. Following the  November 2011 transition agreement, the U.S. government developed a  comprehensive new strategy to support the U.S. policy objective for  Yemen. U.S. agencies are using this strategy to guide assistance  activities during the 2-year transition period (2012–2014) outlined in the  Gulf Cooperation Council–sponsored transition agreement. The primary  agencies providing assistance to Yemen in support of the U.S. strategy  are State, DOD, and USAID. Figure 3 illustrates the five strategic goals of  the U.S. strategy and identifies which goals each agency is providing  assistance to support.
Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, State, USAID, and DOD allocated  more than $1 billion in assistance for Yemen. USAID and State have  provided civilian assistance focused on addressing Yemen’s  humanitarian, economic, and political needs, while DOD and State have  provided security assistance focused primarily on building Yemeni  counterterrorism capacity. Overall, civilian assistance has constituted  approximately 51 percent ($518 million) of the total $1.01 billion in U.S.  assistance, with security assistance constituting the remaining 49 percent  ($497 million). As figure 4 shows, overall U.S. assistance funding  increased annually between fiscal years 2008 and 2010, declined  significantly in fiscal year 2011 because of Yemen’s political turmoil and  insecure environment, and then rose again in fiscal year 2012.
The three U.S. assistance programs in Yemen receiving the largest  amount of allocated funds over the last 6 fiscal years are USAID’s FFP  program, which provides emergency food aid, and DOD’s Section 1206  and 1207(n) programs, which provide Yemeni security forces with training  and equipment for counterterrorism operations. From fiscal year 2007  through 2012, USAID allocated $110 million for Yemen through the FFP  program, while DOD allocated $361 million for its Section 1206 and  1207(n) programs. Together, these programs account for 46 percent  ($471 million of $1.01 billion) of total U.S. assistance to Yemen over this  period. See appendix II for further information on U.S. funds allocated to  these programs.
subsections: section_title: Other Donor Assistance
paragraphs: In addition to the United States, bilateral and multilateral donors have  provided or pledged billions of dollars in assistance to Yemen. Data from  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development show that  between 2007 and 2011, more than 35 bilateral and multilateral donors  disbursed about $2.7 billion in official development assistance for Yemen.  Further, in 2012, donors pledged over $7 billion more in support of  Yemen’s transition and development. This included a pledge of about  $3.3 billion from Saudi Arabia, which State officials identified as the single  largest contributor of aid to Yemen. State officials also noted that Saudi  Arabia provided Yemen with approximately $2 billion in petroleum  products earlier in 2012 to help ease fuel shortages caused by attacks on  key pipelines.
Yemeni officials with whom we met stated that coordination of donor  contributions is challenging but has improved over time. A senior Yemeni  official explained that, of the various bilateral and multilateral donors  providing assistance to Yemen, some coordinate and pool their resources  with other donors before making contributions, but others do not. To  address this, the Yemeni government has developed a mechanism to  align donations with Yemen’s priority needs and minimize overlap.  Additionally, Yemeni officials stated that the government plans to  reallocate its own resources to address needs unmet by donor  contributions.
section_title: Progress toward U.S. Strategic Goals for Yemen Has Been Mixed
paragraphs: Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed,  according to agency officials, agency documents, and international  organizations. Specifically, in regard to the strategic goals: (1) the  government transition in Yemen remains an ongoing process; (2)  although there have been some positive developments to strengthen  governance, the Yemeni government’s ability to provide basic services is  limited; (3) the humanitarian situation remains unstable; (4) the economy  has improved somewhat since 2011 but faces major challenges; and (5)  the security situation has improved in some respects but remains volatile.
subsections: section_title: Political Transition Progressing, but More Slowly than Intended
paragraphs: The government transition in Yemen remains an ongoing process. As part  of the Gulf Cooperation Council–brokered transition agreement signed in  November 2011, the Yemeni government committed to hold early  presidential elections within 90 days, convene an inclusive national  dialogue conference, reform the constitution and electoral system,  reorganize the military, and hold general elections within 2 years of  inaugurating a new president—which took place in February 2012 with  the inauguration of Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi has since  passed several reforms to restructure Yemen’s military and security  institutions and removed many former regime elements from power.  However, the national dialogue conference—a key step in the transition  process—has been delayed from November 2012 to March 2013. This  delay has affected other important steps in the transition process that are  contingent upon the conference being held, such as the formation of a  constitutional committee and the development of a new or revised  constitution. Table 1 provides examples of U.S. assistance supporting the  government transition in Yemen.
Although there have been some positive developments, the Yemeni  government’s ability to provide basic services remains limited. According  to a 2012 Yemeni government report, there were acute weaknesses in  the level of basic services available to Yemenis even prior to the political  unrest in 2011, with only 42 percent of the population receiving electricity,  35 percent receiving security and legal services, 26 percent receiving  water supplies, and 16 percent receiving sanitation services. The political  unrest contributed to further reductions in available government services.  State noted that there continue to be severe strains on the Yemeni  government’s ability to provide public funds and government services  throughout the country. For example, a United Nations report stated that  the health of 1 million people has been compromised due to the  dysfunctional health system in Yemen—700,000 children under 5 years of   USAID officials in Yemen noted that  age and 300,000 pregnant mothers.President Hadi has made commitments to respond to citizens’  grievances. For example, in January 2013, he established two  committees to address land disputes and resolve cases of early dismissal  or retirement of civil, security, and military personnel in the southern  provinces, where grievances have persisted since the civil war in 1994.  Table 2 provides examples of U.S. assistance to strengthen governance  in Yemen.
The humanitarian situation in Yemen remains unstable as a result of  armed conflict, civil unrest, reduction of basic social services, and rising  cost of living. State reported in September 2012 that there were over  550,000 internally displaced persons in Yemen, an increase of nearly  150,000 from the previous year—in part a result of the large number of  people fleeing areas experiencing an increase in armed conflict, such as  the towns that AQAP had seized in the south. The number of internally  displaced persons has since declined to about 430,000 as a result of  stabilizing conditions in parts of Yemen, but, according to United Nations  officials we spoke with in Yemen, some of those returning home are  finding that their property has been damaged and their homes  demolished or booby-trapped. Additionally, a December 2012 United  Nations report found that over half the Yemeni population was without  access to safe water, nearly half the population had limited or no access  to sufficient food, and child malnutrition had increased almost 80 percent  in 2 years to nearly 1 million children. Table 3 provides examples of  U.S. assistance providing humanitarian relief in Yemen.
Yemen’s economy has improved somewhat since 2011 but faces  continuing challenges. According to the International Monetary Fund,  economic activity in Yemen fell by 10 percent and inflation rose to 23  percent in 2011 as a result of the civil unrest, which limited the availability  of basic commodities, bank financing, and imports. The International  Monetary Fund subsequently reported in December 2012 that the Yemeni  economy had improved since 2011 and that the exchange rate had  returned to levels experienced prior to the 2011 unrest. Additionally,  according to the World Food Program, the inflation rate had dropped to  less than 5.5 percent in December 2012. Also, USAID reported that some  gains have been made in improving educational opportunities, increasing  school enrollment rates, and decreasing dropout rates, though there is  still a reported 50 percent adult literacy rate—73 percent for men and 35  percent for women. Other economic challenges include reduced  government revenues and disrupted services due to continuing attacks on  oil pipelines and electricity transmission lines, as well as the anticipated  depletion of oil reserves—the source of 60 percent of the Yemeni  government’s revenue—within a decade. Table 4 provides examples of  U.S. assistance intended to support economic development in Yemen.
The security situation in Yemen has improved in some respects, but  remains unstable. Specifically, State, DOD, and Yemeni officials stated  that the new administration led by President Hadi has been more  aggressive in countering AQAP than the previous administration. Of  particular note, in June 2012, a Yemeni military offensive conducted in  conjunction with tribal militias in southern Yemen removed AQAP from  regions where it had seized control during the civil unrest in 2011.  However, DOD officials stated that AQAP continues to conduct attacks  against the Yemeni government and remains a threat to the United  States, and according to a senior Yemeni MOD official, AQAP’s decision  to change tactics from seizing and holding territory to conducting targeted  assassinations of Yemeni government officials, including in Sana’a,  constitutes a major security challenge. In addition to AQAP, other  destabilizing elements are active in Yemen. For example, a senior  Yemeni MOD official cited the Houthi tribe based in northern Yemen as  another security challenge. Similarly, in January 2013, the U.S.  ambassador to Yemen stated that Iran was destabilizing the region by  assisting secessionists in southern Yemen. As of November 2012, State  described the threat level in Yemen as “extremely high” due to terrorist  activities and civil unrest. As indicators of the continuing tenuous security  environment in Yemen, State noted the mob attack on the U.S. embassy  compound in September 2012, the murders of several U.S. citizens in  2012, a growing trend in violent crime, and continuing piracy near  Yemen’s shores. Table 5 provides examples of U.S. assistance  supporting improvements to security and combating AQAP in Yemen.
section_title: Food for Peace Exceeded Targets, but Performance Reports Have Weaknesses; Section 1206 and 1207(n) Programs Lack Evaluation
paragraphs: Although USAID data indicate that the FFP program in Yemen has  generally exceeded annual performance targets, reporting to Congress  regarding this program has various weaknesses, and DOD has not yet  evaluated its Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance programs in Yemen.  Nearly 50 percent—$471 million of $1.01 billion—of U.S. assistance to  Yemen since 2007 has been allocated through FFP and Section 1206  and 1207(n) programs. While USAID data indicate that, between fiscal  years 2008 and 2011, FFP exceeded annual performance targets three  times for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food  donations, reports to Congress about the program have lacked  timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency.1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has cited security concerns in Yemen  as preventing it from evaluating the programs’ progress in building   With regard to Section  Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. Consequently, limited information  exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these  assistance programs and making future funding decisions.
subsections: section_title: USAID Data Indicate FFP Generally Exceeded Performance Targets, but Reports to Congress on FFP’s Efforts Have Several Weaknesses
paragraphs: Data from USAID indicate that FFP—the largest U.S. civilian assistance  effort in Yemen—has generally exceeded its targets; however, reports to  Congress regarding FFP’s efforts in Yemen have lacked timeliness,  accuracy, clarity, and consistency. As noted earlier, USAID allocated  $110 million through FFP between fiscal years 2007 and 2012— approximately one-fifth of the $518 million in total civilian assistance to  Yemen over this period. Of this $110 million, USAID allocated  approximately $90 million (about 81 percent) to support donations of U.S.  agricultural commodities. As shown in figure 5, data from FFP indicate  that the program exceeded its annual target for the number of  beneficiaries in Yemen of food donations funded in fiscal years 2008,  2009, and 2011, while missing its target in fiscal year 2010. These data  also show that the donations of food that FFP funded between fiscal  years 2008 and 2011 reached a total of about 920,000 beneficiaries in   However, we  Yemen, exceeding the aggregate target of about 887,000.have reported that obtaining accurate food delivery data in some high-risk  areas can be challenging because of security restrictions and limited  resources to conduct monitoring.
The Food for Peace Act mandates an annual report to Congress no later  than April 1 of each year regarding each food donation activity carried out  under the globally focused FFP program. USAID addresses this  mandate through the annual International Food Assistance Report, which  is the primary reporting mechanism for informing Congress of FFP  progress made in Yemen. However, these reports lack timeliness,  accuracy, clarity, and consistency. Such weaknesses provide Congress  with limited information to assist in its oversight of FFP efforts.
Timeliness. The 2011 International Food Assistance Report, which  was due to Congress on April 1, 2012, has yet to be delivered to  Congress, though according to USAID officials they have provided a  draft to the Department of Agriculture for final review. Additionally, as  of February 2013, the 2012 report, which is due to Congress on April  1, 2013, had not yet been drafted.
Accuracy. Some International Food Assistance Reports have not  reported targets accurately. Following our request for data on FFP’s  performance in Yemen, FFP officials found that the International Food  Assistance Reports for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 reported incorrect  targets for Yemen. An FFP official attributed these misreported targets  to a database error that resulted in the number of planned recipients  being double-counted. While FFP provided us with corrected targets for use in our analysis of FFP’s progress in Yemen, it has not yet  reported the corrected figures to Congress.
Clarity. The International Food Assistance Report includes various  types of data that are not clearly defined and could be misinterpreted.  For instance, the report includes data on recipients without stating that  these data reflect the number of planned recipients in Yemen for the  reported year—a target—as opposed to the number of actual  recipients. Additionally, although they appear directly next to the  number of planned recipients, figures on metric tons of food delivered  to Yemen and the associated cost represent actual values, not  planned values, but are not marked as such.
Consistency. The International Food Assistance Report uses  inconsistent measures for reporting planned and actual results. The  report uses the number of planned recipients as targets but measures  actual performance in metric tons and cost. This makes it impossible  to draw an accurate comparison and prevents an evaluation of the  extent of progress made in achieving the planned results.
section_title: DOD Has Not Evaluated Progress of Its Section 1206 and 1207(n) Counterterrorism Assistance Programs in Yemen
paragraphs: Two DOD programs account for the vast majority of U.S. security  assistance to Yemen; however, DOD has yet to evaluate their  effectiveness in building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. As noted  earlier, of the $497 million in total security assistance allocated to Yemen  between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, DOD allocated over 70 percent  ($361 million) to its Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs. DOD has used  this funding to provide various types of equipment and training to Yemeni  security forces. Specifically, through its Section 1206 program, DOD has  assisted several components of the Yemeni MOD. For example, DOD  has provided vehicles, communications equipment, and other support to  the Yemeni Border Security Force to enhance Yemen’s capability to  detect and detain terrorists along its borders; helicopters, maintenance,  and surveillance cameras to Yemen’s Air Force to support  counterterrorism operations; and weapons, ammunition, and boats to  Yemen’s special operations forces to build their counterterrorism  capacity. Similarly, DOD’s Section 1207(n) program aims to enhance the  ability of the Yemeni MOI to conduct counterterrorism activities, providing  radios, vehicles, training, and, as shown in figure 6, weapons. See  appendix III for a complete list of Section 1206 and 1207(n) efforts in  Yemen by fiscal year.
According to federal internal control standards, agencies should have  control activities in place, such as performance reviews, to ensure that  government resources are achieving effective results. In April 2010, we  found that DOD had not evaluated the effectiveness of its global Section  1206 program and recommended that DOD develop a plan to monitor  and evaluate Section 1206 project outcomes. In 2012, in response to  our recommendation, DOD developed and validated an assessment  process to determine the effectiveness of its Section 1206 and 1207(n)  assistance in building partner capacity. This process involves DOD  sending officials and subject-matter experts from Washington, D.C., or  the relevant geographic combatant command to the country under  evaluation. According to DOD, a key element of the assessment process  is observing and interviewing members of the individual units receiving  Section 1206 or 1207(n) assistance to determine the extent to which the  assistance developed their capability. In fiscal year 2012, DOD piloted its  assessment process in Georgia and the Philippines and conducted  assessments in Djibouti, Tunisia, and Poland.
DOD recognizes that assessing Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance  enables the U.S. government to make better decisions about the types of  projects that bring the greatest return on investment in terms of  accomplishing counterterrorism missions and achieving the capabilities  and performance intended through the assistance. However, although  Yemen has received more Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance than any  other country, DOD has yet to evaluate these programs to determine their  effectiveness in developing the counterterrorism capacity of the Yemeni  security forces receiving assistance. DOD headquarters officials  attributed this to safety and security concerns, explaining that, given the  unstable security environment in Yemen, it is not feasible at this time to  send officials to Yemen to observe or interview members of the individual  units receiving Section 1206 or 1207(n) assistance. DOD officials stated  that once the security situation in Yemen improves, they plan to evaluate  Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects using their newly developed  assessment process.
section_title: Security Conditions and Political Divisions in Yemen Challenge U.S. Assistance Efforts
paragraphs: U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen face two significant types of  challenges.complicated U.S. efforts to train and assess the capability of Yemeni  security forces, restricted oversight of civilian assistance projects, and  endangered Yemeni staff who play a key role in providing assistance.  Second, because of political divisions within the Yemeni government, key  recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use of this assistance  until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic goal of  improving Yemen’s security.
subsections: section_title: Unstable Security Situation in Yemen Complicates U.S. Efforts to Provide and Oversee Assistance
paragraphs: Yemen’s difficult security environment continues to challenge U.S.  assistance efforts. Our February 2012 report noted that Yemen’s  deteriorating security situation caused DOD to suspend the majority of its  security assistance activities in 2011 and restricted the ability of USAID  program implementers to access remote sections of the country, thereby  leading USAID to shift its focus to providing civilian assistance in large  urban areas with a more secure and accessible working environment.  According to U.S. and Yemeni officials and implementing partners we met  with during our October 2012 fieldwork in Yemen, insecure conditions  remain the primary impediment to U.S. assistance activities. U.S. officials  cited several areas in which this challenge has affected U.S. efforts:
Constrained ability to train and assess capability of Yemeni security  forces. We reported in February 2012 that DOD stopped the training  component of its assistance in 2011 because it was no longer safe for  U.S. instructors to be in Yemen. While security-related constraints  on providing training remain, DOD has taken steps to mitigate the  effect of the security environment on its training activities by  conducting training outside of Yemen. For example, DOD arranged for  Yemeni personnel to receive helicopter training in Texas and plans to  provide training on a fixed-wing aircraft in Spain in early 2013. DOD  officials stated, however, that because of the unstable security  environment, the level of DOD staffing in Yemen remains lower than it  was prior to the unrest of 2011. As a result, there are currently too few  DOD personnel present in Yemen to embed with Yemeni security  forces, thereby limiting DOD’s ability to assess the extent to which  U.S. security assistance has improved the capability of these forces.  DOD officials explained that before the unrest of 2011, DOD  personnel were embedded with the Yemeni units receiving U.S.  training and equipment, which facilitated their ability to collect real- time information on the units’ capabilities. However, these officials  stated that no DOD personnel have been embedded with Yemeni  security forces since 2011. Similarly, as noted earlier, officials based  in Washington, D.C., who manage DOD’s Section 1206 and 1207(n)  programs stated that, because of security conditions in Yemen, they  are currently unable to travel there to assess the extent to which this  assistance has increased the units’ capacity.
Oversight of civilian assistance programs restricted. In March 2011,  the USAID Inspector General reported that security-related travel  restrictions in Yemen had severely limited the monitoring and  oversight of project activities. During our October 2012 fieldwork in  Yemen, USAID officials stated that the security situation continues to  prevent USAID staff from accessing areas of the country outside of  the capital to conduct monitoring and evaluation of civilian assistance  activities. To address this challenge, USAID has employed a  contractor that hires Yemeni staff to monitor assistance efforts in other  urban areas that U.S. officials are unable to access. However, as  noted below, Yemeni nationals are also subject to significant security  risks, and as the USAID Inspector General reported in March 2011,  the tribal affiliations of Yemeni staff may make it difficult for them to  travel to parts of the country controlled by rival tribes.
Locally employed Yemeni staff endangered. According to senior  officials at the U.S. embassy in Sana’a, locally employed Yemeni staff  members play a critical role in embassy operations—including in U.S.  assistance activities—and provide extremely valuable “institutional  memory.” However, these individuals face considerable risks as a  result of their association with the U.S. government, as demonstrated  by the October 2012 murder of a Yemeni national who was a longtime  embassy employee and other instances of intimidation. Locally  employed staff with whom we met during our October 2012 trip to  Yemen expressed concerns about their safety, with several  individuals citing the threats to them and their families as a serious  disincentive to continuing their employment at the embassy.  According to USAID, the embassy has since provided training in  countersurveillance and personal security to several hundred locally  employed staff. However, the embassy has deemed other steps  proposed by locally employed staff, including telework and the option  of working from implementing partners’ offices, to be unsuitable.
section_title: Leadership and Coordination Challenges in Yemeni Security Ministries Have Limited Use of Some U.S. Security Assistance
paragraphs: According to DOD, leadership and coordination challenges in Yemeni  security ministries have led to limited use of some U.S. security  assistance. DOD officials stated that, until recently, key recipients of U.S.  equipment and training in Yemen had conducted few counterterrorism  operations since the outbreak of political hostilities in Yemen in early  2011. DOD officials attributed this in part to opposition to the Hadi  administration among some leaders at key Yemeni security ministries.  Specifically, according to DOD, two counterterrorism units—one each  within the Yemeni MOD and MOI—have been among the largest  recipients of U.S. security assistance. However, DOD officials noted that  MOI’s counterterrorism unit played a limited role in attacking AQAP  strongholds in southern Yemen, while MOD’s counterterrorism unit did  not make any contribution to those operations. DOD officials stated that  this limited involvement was due in part to the nature of the conflict  against AQAP—an effort to regain control of territory that was more suited  to a response by conventional military forces. However, they added that  the MOI and MOD counterterrorism units were under the leadership of the  former president’s supporters at the time of the operations against AQAP  and were consequently unwilling to strongly support the new president’s  counterterrorism initiatives.
Coordination challenges between MOD and MOI have further limited  MOI’s ability to participate in counterterrorism operations. DOD noted that  MOI has had difficulty receiving replacement parts, equipment, and  vehicles from the MOD logistics system, hindering its ability to conduct  counterterrorism operations outside of the Yemeni capital. For example,  although the United States has provided MOD with spare parts for  Humvee vehicles to share with MOI, a senior MOI official stated that MOD  has not done so, resulting in MOI’s inability to maintain and use its U.S.- provided Humvees as intended, as shown in figure 7.
Similarly, U.S. and Yemeni officials stated that although the United States  has provided helicopters for both MOD and MOI to use in  counterterrorism operations, MOD does not give MOI access to the  helicopters in a timely fashion. Specifically, a senior MOI official stated  that MOD takes approximately 3 months to respond to MOI requests for  access to the helicopters, which are based at an MOD facility. The official  explained that the length of time it takes MOD to approve MOI’s requests  is not conducive to conducting time-sensitive counterterrorism operations.
According to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government  have addressed some of these challenges. In December 2012, President  Hadi announced a number of decrees to, among other things, remove  several key leaders of Yemeni security forces units—including the heads  of the MOD and MOI counterterrorism units—from their current positions.  DOD officials stated that, as of February 2013, a new official had taken  command of the MOD counterterrorism unit, which had also increased its  involvement in counterterrorism operations. In addition, the current head  of the MOI counterterrorism unit had agreed to step down. President  Hadi’s decrees also called for further reorganization of the Yemeni  security ministries—specifically, consolidating the MOD and MOI  counterterrorism units under a newly created Yemeni special operations  command under MOD. As of February 2013, this new special operations  command had been formed, according to DOD, and was overseeing the  MOD counterterrorism unit, while planning was under way for the MOI  counterterrorism unit to be absorbed under the new command. DOD  noted that, as of February 2013, the Yemeni government had yet to  develop a timeline to complete the consolidation.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: AQAP terrorists based in Yemen are a continuing national security threat  to the United States—a threat exacerbated by Yemen’s fragile economic,  social, and political situation. In response, U.S. agencies have invested  more than $1 billion in security and civilian assistance since 2007 in  support of U.S. strategic goals for Yemen. While some progress has been  made toward these goals, significant uncertainties remain regarding  Yemen’s future, underscoring the possibility that Yemen will need further  U.S. assistance as it navigates a difficult transition process. However,  USAID’s reporting to Congress regarding FFP—the largest U.S. civilian  assistance program—has been inaccurate, unclear, and inconsistent.  Moreover, despite the $361 million investment in Section 1206 and  1207(n) assistance since 2007, DOD has not yet evaluated the progress  these programs have made in building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity  and, because of security conditions, has not established a time frame for  completing such an evaluation. As a result, decision makers lack the  information necessary to adequately assess the three largest U.S.  assistance programs in Yemen. This limited information inhibits decision  makers’ ability to oversee these programs, assess their contribution to  U.S. goals, and consider program performance when making future  funding decisions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enable congressional and agency oversight of U.S. assistance  programs in Yemen, inform future funding decisions, and enhance U.S.  assistance efforts, we are making the following three recommendations:  First, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID improve reporting  to Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, such as by improving the accuracy,  clarity, and consistency of data reported.
Second, until DOD is able to conduct an assessment of the Section 1206  program in Yemen, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense collect  and analyze available data regarding the extent to which Section 1206  assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces, such as  information from U.S. personnel posted in Yemen or Yemeni government  officials.
Third, until DOD is able to conduct an assessment of the Section 1207(n)  program in Yemen, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense collect  and analyze available data regarding the extent to which Section 1207(n)  assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces, such as  information from U.S. personnel posted in Yemen or Yemeni government  officials.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State, DOD, USAID, the Departments  of Homeland Security and Justice, the National Security Staff, the Office  of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence  Agency for their review and comment. DOD and USAID provided written  comments, which we have reprinted in appendixes IV and V, respectively.  DOD, USAID, State, and the National Security Staff also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The  Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, the Office of the Director  of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency did not  provide comments.
DOD concurred with our recommendations to collect and analyze  available data on the extent to which Section 1206 and 1207(n)  assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces. DOD also  noted its intent to develop baseline assessments to accompany its  Section 1206 project proposals for fiscal year 2014.
USAID concurred with our recommendation to improve reporting to  Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, noting that it has already taken  several steps to address the timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency  of the International Food Assistance Report. USAID added that it expects  the International Food Assistance Report to remain limited in its  usefulness for gauging progress in any specific country, stating that such  country-specific issues will be addressed through periodic briefings and  other updates to Congress. We maintain that any information USAID  conveys to Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, whether through the  International Food Assistance Report or other means, should be timely,  accurate, clear, and consistent.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, State, DOD, USAID, the Departments of Homeland Security  and Justice, the National Security Staff, the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for  Yemen, we reviewed relevant documents from the Departments of State  (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), including strategy and planning documents, fact  sheets, and progress reporting. Additionally, we examined the Gulf  Cooperation Council–negotiated transition agreement for Yemen, as well  as relevant documents from U.S. implementing partners, the United  Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the  Yemeni government. We did not consider any covert programs that the  United States may fund in Yemen.
To assess the extent of progress made by USAID’s Food for Peace (FFP)  program and DOD’s Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen, we  analyzed funding data on all U.S. assistance activities in Yemen to  determine allocations for these civilian and security assistance programs  in Yemen since fiscal year 2007. To assess FFP’s progress in Yemen,  we compared USAID data on the number of actual beneficiaries to the  number of planned recipients as identified in annual reports jointly  submitted to Congress by USAID and the Department of Agriculture  regarding U.S. food assistance. Recipients and beneficiaries are related  but distinct; specifically, recipients are individuals who receive food  assistance rations, while beneficiaries are individuals who benefit from  food assistance rations. For example, in a food-for-work program, only  one person—the recipient—actually receives targeted food assistance,  but other members of the recipient’s family or community may benefit  from that individual’s participation in the program, making them all  beneficiaries. Given the distinct meanings of the two terms, USAID  cautioned that a comparison of actual beneficiaries and planned  recipients is generally not advisable for FFP efforts. However, USAID  noted that the nature of the FFP programs conducted in Yemen to date is   To assess the extent  such that the terms can be used interchangeably.of progress made by the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen,  we reviewed DOD documents relevant to its new process for assessing  Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance and prior GAO reporting.
To identify the key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen, we  reviewed relevant documents from State, DOD, and USAID, including  strategy and planning documents, fact sheets, cables, and progress  reporting. We also examined several reports by the USAID Inspector  General, including audits and a risk assessment of USAID activities in  Yemen, as well as prior GAO reporting.
Additionally, we discussed our objectives with State, DOD, USAID,  National Security Staff, and intelligence community officials in the  Washington, D.C., area. To obtain a more in-depth understanding of U.S.  assistance efforts in Yemen, we also conducted fieldwork in Sana’a,  Yemen, in October 2012, during which we met with State, DOD, and  USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; and representatives of the  Yemeni Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Planning and International  Cooperation.
To update data on allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated  obligations, and disbursements for the FFP and Section 1206 and  1207(n) programs as reported in appendix II, we collected and analyzed  relevant funding data from State and DOD. Differences between FFP  funding totals shown in figure 8 of this report and the FFP funding   are due to the  information presented in our February 2012 reportfollowing factors:
Totals in this report are more current and include actual values for  fiscal year 2012 rather than estimates.
Totals in this report include funds from the International Disaster  Account that were programmed by FFP in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.
Differences between Section 1206 and 1207(n) funding totals shown in  figure 9 of this report and the Section 1206 funding information in our  February 2012 report are due to the following factors:
Totals in this report are more current and include actual values for  fiscal year 2012 rather than estimates.
Our February 2012 report included data current as of September 30,  2011. Consequently, it did not include data on the Section 1207(n)  program, which was not established until the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 was enacted on December 31,  2011.
DOD considers Section 1206 funding to be disbursed once it awards  a contract. If the final cost of the contract at the time of completion is  different than the expected cost of the contract at the time of award,  the amount of funding that DOD considers disbursed changes  accordingly.
To determine the reliability of the data we collected on the amount of U.S.  assistance to Yemen and the number of targeted recipients and actual  beneficiaries of FFP assistance in Yemen, we compared and  corroborated information from multiple sources; checked the data for  reasonableness and completeness; and interviewed cognizant officials  regarding the processes they use to collect and track the data. We did not  audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them. On the  basis of checks we performed and our discussions with agency officials,  we determined that the data we collected on the amount of U.S.  assistance to Yemen and the actual number of beneficiaries in Yemen of  FFP assistance were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  engagement. With regard to the number of targeted recipients of FFP  assistance in Yemen, we note in this report that annual reporting to  Congress regarding FFP for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 did not  accurately communicate FFP’s targets for Yemen. Consequently, we  collected corrected data on FFP’s targets for Yemen to use in our  assessment of the program’s progress. We determined these corrected  data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: U.S. Funding for Food for Peace (FFP) and Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs to Yemen
paragraphs: From fiscal year 2007 through 2012, the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) allocated $110 million for Yemen through its FFP  program. Figure 8 shows the increase in annual FFP funding to Yemen  over this period.
Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD)  allocated $361 million for Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance to Yemen.  As shown in figure 9, funding for these programs has fluctuated over the   For example, no Section 1206 allocation was made in fiscal year  years.2011 because of the political unrest that began in Yemen early that year.  In contrast, the Section 1206 allocation for fiscal year 2010 and the  combined allocation of Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance in fiscal year  2012 each exceeded $100 million.
section_title: Appendix III: Training and Equipment Provided to Yemen through Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs
paragraphs: Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD)  allocated $361 million in counterterrorism training and equipment to  Yemeni security forces through its Section 1206 and Section 1207(n)  security assistance programs. Table 6 below identifies the efforts that  DOD undertook using Section 1206 and 1207(n) funding as well as the  specific capabilities DOD planned to build through these efforts.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  We modified our report to remove all references to the Global Security  Contingency Fund. 2.  We modified our report to clarify that the discussion of key challenges  to U.S. assistance efforts is not specific to Section 1206 or Section  1207(n) assistance but instead applies to all U.S. assistance efforts.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director),  Aniruddha Dasgupta, Brandon Hunt, Kendal Robinson, Karen Deans,  Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Justin Fisher, Bruce Kutnick, Marie Mak,  Mary Moutsos, and Jeremy Sebest made key contributions to this report.  Cynthia Taylor provided technical assistance.