Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions
Published: 2003-07-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has adjusted its strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the asymmetric threats directed at our homeland by both terrorists and hostile states. GAO was asked to review DOD's domestic missions, including (1) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ; (2) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions have changed since September 11, 2001; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act affects DOD's nonmilitary missions; and (4) the extent to which DOD's organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for domestic military missions and the consequent sustainability of the current mission approach.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. The threat of terrorism has altered some military operations. For example, as of September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. DOD has established new organizations (such as U.S. Northern Command) and implemented a campaign plan for domestic military missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. GAO did not assess the adequacy of the new organizations or the campaign plan because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the campaign plan was only recently completed. DOD's force structure is not well tailored to perform domestic military missions and may not be able to sustain the high pace of operations that preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. While on domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little training value. In addition, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of servicemembers exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased substantially, indicating that the present force structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an unsustainable pace that could significantly erode their readiness to perform combat missions and impact future personnel retention.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense’s (DOD) primary mission is to deter and  prevent aggression abroad and fight to win if these measures fail. This is  accomplished through military presence and power projection. However,  the federal government’s view of the defense of U.S. territory has  dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. DOD has adjusted its  strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military  concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the asymmetric threats  directed at our homeland by both terrorists and hostile states.
You requested us to review DOD’s domestic missions. As agreed with your  office, we (1) determined how DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions  differ; (2) determined how DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions have  changed since September 11, 2001; (3) determined how the 1878 Posse  Comitatus Act affects DOD’s nonmilitary missions; and (4) assessed the  extent to which DOD’s organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for  domestic military missions and the consequent sustainability of the  current mission approach.
To address these objectives we assessed key national and defense  strategies; DOD plans, mission orders, documents (such as training  manuals), and directives; and laws governing DOD assistance to  U.S. civilian authorities. We conducted interviews with knowledgeable  officials including those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the  services and their various commands; U.S. Northern Command; and met  with units performing domestic military missions at various locations  nationwide. We analyzed Army military police and other combat unit  installation security deployments, Air Force fighter wing operational data,  and personnel tempo data. We also attended congressional hearings that  addressed the establishment of new DOD organizations and their roles  and responsibilities. Appendix I has a complete discussion of our scope  and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Every 4 years, as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD conducts  a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force  structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and  other elements of the defense program, and establishes a defense  program for the next 20 years. This process helps ensure that DOD can  effectively support the broader national security strategy of the United  States. The 2001Quadrennial Defense Review Report was issued shortly  after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and outlines a new defense  strategy to (1) assure allies and friends that the United States can fulfill its  commitments, (2) dissuade adversaries from undertaking activities that  threaten U.S. or allied interests, (3) deter aggression and coercion, and  (4) decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails.
Operation Noble Eagle was an immediate response to the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; is intended to directly  defend the homeland; and is ongoing. Operation Noble Eagle  missions include combat air patrols over major American cities and  enhanced security at federal installations. A combat air patrol is an  airborne air defense activity involving fighter aircraft patrolling a given  area. To support fighter coverage, other military activities have included  aerial refueling and airborne early warning; comprehensive radio and  radar coverage of the patrolled area; and command and control centers  to direct fighter pilots when a threatening aircraft is detected. Concerns  about terrorist threats to federal installations increased following the  9-11 attacks; therefore, DOD enhanced installation security to harden  facilities against attacks and deter future attacks through the deployment  of additional personnel (such as military police).
In April 2002, the President approved a revision to DOD’s Unified  Command Plan, creating the new U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern  Command was activated on October 1, 2002, and is scheduled to be  fully operational on October 1, 2003. Its area of responsibility includes  the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the  surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, which  includes Cuba, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos.
Figure 1 displays U.S. Northern Command’s area of responsibility as  indicated by the darkened boundary line.
U.S. Northern Command is responsible for the air, land, and maritime  defense of the continental United States. Its mission is to conduct  operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at  the United States, its territories and interests within assigned areas of  responsibility, and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,  provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities, including consequence  management operations.
In June 2002, the President proposed creation of the Department of  Homeland Security and in November 2002, Congress approved legislation  consolidating 22 federal agencies within the new department. In July 2002,  the administration published the National Strategy for Homeland  Security, which defines homeland security as a “concerted national effort  to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s  vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from  attacks that do occur.” The National Strategy for Homeland Security  broadly defines DOD’s contributions to national homeland security efforts  to include the prosecution of military missions abroad that reduce the  terrorist threat to the United States; military missions conducted within  the United States that DOD conducts under extraordinary circumstances  with support, as needed, by other agencies; and support to U.S. civil  authorities under emergency circumstances, where DOD is asked to act  quickly and provide capabilities that other agencies do not have or for  limited scope missions where other agencies have the lead.
In August 2002, DOD proposed the creation of a new Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Congress approved  it with passage of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2003. The new office establishes a senior civilian officer  within the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a principal focus on the  supervision of the homeland defense activities of DOD (i.e., the assistant  secretary supervises the execution of domestic military missions and  military support to U.S. civil authorities and develops policies, conducts  analyses, provides advice, and makes recommendations for these activities  as well as emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management  matters to the Under Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense).  The assistant secretary also supports the development of policy direction  to the Commander of U.S. Northern Command and guides the  development and execution of U.S. Northern Command plans and  activities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is  also responsible for representing DOD when interacting with federal,  state, and local government entities.
In September 2002, the President released The National Security Strategy  of the United States of America. The strategy identifies U.S. interests,  goals, and objectives vital to U.S. national security; and explains how the  United States uses its political, economic, military, and other elements of  national power to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals  and objectives identified above.
section_title: Key Differences Between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions
paragraphs: Military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration,  acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. Generally, military  missions are those primary warfighting functions that DOD performs in  defense of the nation and at the direction of the President functioning as  the Commander-in-Chief. Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, DOD  provides military capabilities in support of U.S. civil authorities as directed  by the President or Secretary of Defense. Table 1 provides more details on  the key differences.
Military missions involve warfighting functions, such as campaigns,  engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services’ combat forces.  Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples  of overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic  military mission started on September 11, 2001, and ongoing today. In the  latter mission, the President directed the Commander, North American  Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), to order combat air patrols to  identify and intercept suspect aircraft operating in the United States.  Because this is a military mission, DOD is the lead federal agency and is  prepared to apply its combat power, if needed.
Requests for nonmilitary missions generally seek DOD support to help  after the impact of natural or man-made disasters, or assist indirectly with  law enforcement. These requests are evaluated against criteria contained  in DOD’s Directive, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. DOD’s  directive specifies that requests for nonmilitary support be evaluated  against the following criteria:  legality (compliance with laws),  lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces),  risk (safety of DOD forces),    cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget),    appropriateness (whether it is in the interest of DOD to conduct the  requested mission), and  readiness (impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission).
According to DOD, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, it supported over  230 nonmilitary missions, in a variety of settings, such as assisting in  fighting wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, providing support for  national security special events (such as the presidential inauguration and  2002 Olympic Games), and for other purposes. According to DOD, during  this same period, it rejected several missions based on the above criteria.  For example, in November 2001, DOD declined a request from the  U.S. Capitol Police to provide military medical personnel; however, DOD  did not indicate which criteria were used to reach this decision.
section_title: The Threat of Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the threat of another catastrophic terrorist  event has altered some military operations. Before September 11, 2001,  DOD generally emphasized deterring and defeating adversaries through  overseas power projection, and still does. Since then, DOD has deployed  U.S. forces overseas to prosecute the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and  elsewhere. Moreover, The National Security Strategy of the United States  of America, published after September 11, 2001, emphasizes preventing  terrorist attacks against the United States. The strategy states that the  immediate focus of the United States will be those terrorist groups having  a global reach and any terrorist or nation that sponsors terrorism which  attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction. Such threats may  now be subject to a preemptive strike by U.S. military forces if necessary,  to prevent these threats from materializing or reaching the United States.
Some operations associated with domestic military missions have  also changed to proactively respond to terrorist threats. Prior to  September 11, 2001, DOD’s strategy defended air, land, and sea  approaches to U.S. territory from military adversaries presumed to  originate outside the United States. If necessary, DOD had planned to  deploy U.S. military forces within the United States to counter the military  threats. DOD still plans to do so should these threats emerge in the future.  However, the current defense strategy, published in the 2001 Quadrennial  Defense Review Report, states that the highest priority of the U.S. military  is to defend the homeland from attack by any enemy, which includes  terrorists. An example of how domestic military operations have changed  to meet terrorists’ threats can be seen in NORAD operations. Before  September 11, 2001, NORAD primarily focused its attention on aircraft  approaching U.S. airspace and acted to prevent a hostile aircraft from  entering U.S. airspace. Since then, NORAD has expanded its focus so that  it now also monitors aircraft operating within the United States as well as  aircraft approaching U.S. airspace. Also, before September 11, 2001,  NORAD had planned to order Air Force units to intercept military  adversaries’ bombers. NORAD still plans to do so if these threats emerge  in the future. However, as of September 11, 2001, NORAD also orders  combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. In another  example, before the attacks of 9-11, many federal installations operated at  a normal force protection condition or routine security posture that  allowed for open access to the installations, in many cases. However, since  then, DOD has used additional military personnel to enhance security by  verifying identification of all personnel and vehicles entering the  installation and conducting patrols of critical infrastructure on the  installation. Also, in April 2002, the President approved a revision to  DOD’s Unified Command Plan, creating the new U.S. Northern Command,  which has responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States  and other nearby areas. Moreover, DOD continues to support U.S. civil  authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11, 2001.
section_title: The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD’s Role in Civilian Law Enforcement
paragraphs: The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Army and  Air Force “to execute the laws” of the United States except where  authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Federal courts have  interpreted “to execute the laws” to mean the Posse Comitatus Act  prohibits the use of federal military troops in an active role of direct  civilian law enforcement. Direct involvement in law enforcement  includes search, seizure, and arrest. The act does not apply to military  operations at home or abroad, and it does not apply to National Guard  personnel when under the direct command of states’ governors.
Congress has authorized DOD to use its personnel and equipment in a  number of circumstances, for example, to:    assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions   (10 U.S.C. §124 and 10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding 375));    protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection (the Insurrection  Statutes; 10 U.S.C. §§331-334);    assist the U.S. Secret Service (18 U.S.C. §3056 Notes);    protect nuclear materials and assist with solving crimes involving nuclear  materials (18 U.S.C. §831);    assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction  (10 U.S.C. §382); and    assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws  (42 U.S.C. §§97-98).
The President identified as a major homeland security initiative a review  of the legal authority for military assistance in domestic security, which  would include a review of the Posse Comitatus Act. The President  maintained that the “threat of catastrophic terrorism requires a thorough  review of the laws permitting the military to act within the United States in  order to determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts  would benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so,  how.” In addition to this review, Congress directed DOD to review and  report on the legal implications of members of the armed forces operating  on U.S. territory and the potential legal impediments affecting DOD’s role  in supporting homeland security. In March 2003, the Commander of  U.S. Northern Command stated, “We believe the  Act, as  amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no  modification is needed at this time.” According to DOD, on May 29, 2003,  DOD informed Congress of the results of its legal review, which concluded  that the President has sufficient authority to order the military to provide  military support to civilian law enforcement authorities, when necessary.  DOD does not believe that the Posse Comitatus Act would in any way  impede the nature or timeliness of its response.
section_title: DOD Created Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military Missions, but Force Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made
paragraphs: In response to adjustments in its strategic focus, DOD has created new  organizations and is implementing a campaign plan for domestic military  missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. The  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, required that the nation, including  DOD, take extraordinary actions on that day. In the new security  environment, DOD continues to defend the United States at home against  terrorists, which are nontraditional adversaries. We could not assess the  adequacy of the organizational changes and the plan at the time of our  review because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the  campaign plan was only recently completed. However, DOD has not  evaluated its force structure for domestic operations and these forces  remain organized, trained, and equipped to fight overseas military  adversaries. Domestic military missions provide less opportunity to  practice varied skills required for combat and consequently offer limited  training value; thus, some forces have not been tailored to perform their  domestic military missions. In addition, servicemembers are experiencing  high personnel tempo. These factors indicate that the current mission  approach may not be sustainable and risks eroding readiness.
subsections: section_title: New DOD Organizations to Address Domestic Military Missions Were Not Yet Fully Operational
paragraphs: Two new organizations—the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command—together provide  long-term policy direction, planning, and execution capability, but were  not yet fully operational at the time of our review, because they had only  recently been established and were not fully staffed. First, the Senate  confirmed the President’s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Homeland Defense in February 2003. The assistant secretary is to  provide overall supervision for domestic military missions and military  support to U.S. civil authorities. This office was not fully operational at the  time our review was completed, with approximately two-thirds of the staff  positions vacant. Second, U.S. Northern Command was activated only in  October 2002 and was not planned to be fully operational before  October 2003. As of mid-April 2003, only 46 percent of U.S. Northern  Command’s staff positions had been filled. According to a U.S. Northern  Command official, the command was grappling with the need to conduct  its ongoing missions while staffing the command’s remaining positions.  The activation of U.S. Northern Command provides unity of command for  military activities within the continental United States. Prior to  U.S. Northern Command’s activation, U.S. Joint Forces Command  provided military forces to defend U.S. territory from land- and sea-based  threats while NORAD defended the United States from airborne threats  (and still does). The Commander of U.S. Northern Command is also the  Commander of NORAD, thereby providing unity of command for air, land,  and sea missions.
section_title: The U.S. Northern Command Campaign Plan Was Recently Issued
paragraphs: DOD’s planning process requires DOD and the services to staff, train, and  equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign plans and  deliberate plans developed by the combatant commanders, including  the Commander of U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern Command’s  campaign plan was completed in October 2002 and is classified. Since the  plan was only recently completed, the services have had little time to  determine if training and equipment adjustments were needed to support  the plan.
section_title: Forces Continue to Reflect an Overseas Emphasis and May Not Be Able to Sustain Current Personnel Tempo
paragraphs: DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure, which generally  remains organized, trained, and equipped to fight military adversaries  overseas. However, some forces are not well tailored to perform domestic  military missions. When performing domestic military missions, combat  units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat skills through practice  in normal training. Domestic missions to date generally have required only  basic military skills and thus offered limited training value—which can  have an adverse affect on unit readiness. In our review, we found that four  Army military police combat units guarding federal installations in the  United States could not train for battlefield conditions, as the Army  requires. Similarly, Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air  patrols were inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical  maneuvers with the frequency that the Air Force requires. Moreover,  from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of personnel  exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased  substantially, an indicator that the present force structure may not be  sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military  missions. To prevent significant near-term attrition from the force, a key  concern during periods of high personnel tempo, DOD has used its stop  loss authority to prohibit servicemembers affected by the order from  leaving the service. Under high personnel tempo, U.S. forces could  experience an unsustainable pace that may lead to an erosion of unit  readiness for combat if servicemembers leave the service.
subsections: section_title: Forces’ Skills Are Mismatched with Needs of Domestic Military Missions, and Some Forces Lose Critical Training Opportunities
paragraphs: While on domestic military missions, some servicemembers cannot  practice their primary combat training to maintain proficiency. During  Operation Noble Eagle, DOD provided enhanced domestic installation  security and combat air patrols, both of which generally require only basic  military skills but offer little opportunity to practice the varied combat  skills needed for wartime proficiency. As a result, military readiness  may erode. According to Army and Air Force officials, because combat  skills for these units are perishable, to maintain or regain proficiency,  a resumption of normal combat training may be required before  subsequent overseas deployment.
Army training focuses on combat mission performance that replicates  battlefield conditions. To acquire the skills necessary for combat, each  unit commander establishes a mission essential task list consisting of  critical tasks that the unit needs to be proficient on to perform its overseas  wartime mission. However, the four military police units that we reviewed  were often unable to train and, thus, they were unable to maintain  proficiency for their required mission essential tasks due to the long  Operation Noble Eagle deployments. For example, one unit could not  practice for two of its mission essential tasks—to establish and sustain an  internment and resettlement facility, and process and account for  internees—that it performs in combat. In another example, two military  police units could not practice their combat skills, which include providing  battlefield control of roads and logistical pipelines. Instead, the four Army  military police units from the active, reserve, and National Guard we  reviewed were generally guarding gates, checking identification,  inspecting vehicles, and conducting security patrols of critical installation  infrastructure, such as command and control centers, and housing,  shopping, and recreation areas.
Moreover, we found that some Army servicemembers on Operation  Noble Eagle deployments used skills unrelated to their normal missions.  Consequently, their units’ combat proficiency may be at risk. Specifically,  the Army provided over 8,100 Army National Guard personnel from about  100 units to provide installation security at domestic Air Force bases.  However, only one unit, a military police unit, had primary skills relevant  to the mission; the remaining units were comprised of field artillery,  engineer, and infantry personnel that have specialized combat skills such  as providing fire support to tactical combat units; rehabilitating the  combat zone to enhance lines of supply and communication; and  destroying or capturing the enemy or repelling enemy assaults by fire.  None of these units needed its combat skills on its Operation Noble Eagle  missions.
Similarly, the domestic combat air patrol mission represents another  instance where servicemembers cannot always practice their primary  combat training for proficiency. To maintain their warfighting skills,  fighter pilots perform training sorties when not deployed abroad. Training  sorties involve the employment of tactical maneuvers, and the use of  weapons or weapons simulators against other aircraft or ground targets.  For example, an offensive counterair-training sortie is designed to train for  destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy air and missile threats located  in enemy territory. When on a domestic combat air patrol, a pilot may gain  some training benefit by performing certain activities, such as an aerial  refueling or a night landing. However, according to several Air Force  officials, domestic combat air patrols do not constitute adequate training  for overseas combat missions. For example, one Air Force official said  that combat air patrols involve little more than making left turns flying in a  circle in contrast to the difficult, tactical, defensive, and offensive  maneuvers performed while on a training sortie or possibly on a  combat mission.
Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air patrols are  inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical maneuvers  with the frequency that the Air Force requires to maintain proficiency for  their combat missions. For example, in one of the seven most heavily  tasked Air National Guard fighter wings, the average pilot was unable to  meet training requirements in 9 out of 13 months between September 2001  and September 2002. Another wing reported that Operation Noble Eagle  had resulted in a 5-month period when no training was performed. Even  a short-term tasking can inhibit training needed to maintain combat  proficiency. According to Air Force officials, three training sorties are  generally lost for every short-notice, 4-hour domestic combat air  patrol performed.
To mitigate the impact on pilot readiness, the Air Force rotates the  units tasked to perform domestic combat air patrols when a continuous  airborne alert posture is required. In doing so, the Air Force has sought  to ensure that all fighter units are able to train sufficiently for overseas  combat missions, thereby preserving flexibility in the use of these units for  both domestic combat air patrols and for combat missions overseas.  However, it is unclear whether managing the force structure in this way  fully mitigates the impact on pilot training, particularly during periods of  frequently performed domestic combat air patrol missions. According to  one Air Force official, under the current force structure, domestic  combat air patrols operating at levels experienced in the months after  September 11, 2001, would not be sustainable for more than a few weeks  before the units began suffering severe training effects and thus an erosion  in military readiness.
DOD is undertaking planned changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting  System, which are designed to assess the impact of homeland defense and  civil support missions on the readiness of forces to execute their  warfighting mission. In March 2003, we reported that as of January 2003,  DOD had not developed an implementation plan for the Defense  Readiness Reporting System that contained measurable performance  goals, identified resources, suggested performance indicators, or included  an evaluation plan to assess progress in developing this system. Even  though the new system may have the potential to improve readiness  reporting, without an implementation plan there is little assurance that the  new system will actually improve readiness assessments by the time of its  expected full capability, in 2007. Without such a plan, it will also remain  difficult to gauge progress toward meeting the 2007 target date. DOD did  not agree with the recommendations from our March 2003 report that it  (1) develop an implementation plan with, among other things,  performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and  (2) provide annual updates to Congress on the new readiness reporting  system’s development. However, as stated in the March 2003 report, we  retained those two recommendations because we continue to believe that  it is important for DOD to develop an implementation plan to gauge  progress in developing and implementing the new readiness reporting  system and to provide annual updates to Congress.
section_title: High Army and Air Force Personnel Tempo Also Indicates a Potential Imbalance in Force Structure
paragraphs: Personnel tempo data indicate that the current mission approach is  significantly stressing U.S. forces. Between September 2001 and December  2002, personnel tempo increased dramatically for Army and Air Force  personnel due to ongoing missions or commitments around the world and  increasing support for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.  DOD believes that if servicemembers spend too much time away from  home, a risk exists that they will leave the service and that military  readiness may ultimately suffer.
Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces  is engaged in their official duties that makes it infeasible to spend off duty  time at the member’s home, home port (for Navy servicemembers), or in  the member’s civilian residence (for reserve components’ personnel). The  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 requires that  DOD formally track and manage for the number of days that each member  of the armed forces is deployed, and it established two thresholds— servicemembers deployed more than 182 or 220 days away from home out  of the preceding 365 days. The National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2001 established a third threshold, which requires that  servicemembers who are deployed for 401 or more days out of the  preceding 730-day (2-year) period receive a $100 high deployment per  diem allowance.
DOD data indicate that tempo is high and increasing for active, reserve,  and National Guard personnel. For example, in September 2001, over  6,600 Army personnel had exceeded the first threshold, spending  182 to 219 days away from home during the previous 365 days. By  December 2002, that number had risen to over 13,000 (of which Army  Reserve and Army National Guard personnel represented about  20 percent). During the same period, the number exceeding the second  threshold and spending 220 to 365 days away had risen from about 800 to  over 18,000 (which was comprised of about 75 percent Army Reserve and  Army National Guard personnel), as shown in figure 2.
The number of Army personnel exceeding the third threshold of 401 or  more days away from home in the preceding 730 days increased slightly,  starting at about 650 in September 2002 and rising to about 990 (of which  about 35 percent were Army Reserve and Army National Guard personnel)  in December 2002.
The Air Force reported similar trends. In September 2001, about 2,100 Air  Force servicemembers were away from home for 182 to 219 days, but that  had risen to about 8,300 (which were comprised of about 75 percent Air  Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel) by December 2002. Also,  as with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had  risen from about 1,600 to over 22,100 (of which Air Force Reserve and Air  National Guard personnel represented about 70 percent), as shown in  figure 3.
The number of Air Force personnel exceeding the third personnel tempo  threshold of 401 or more days away from home in the preceding 730-day  period also increased during the latter period of 2002, starting at about  3,700 in September 2002 and rising to more than 8,100 (of which Air Force  Reserve and Air National Guard personnel represented about 65 percent)  in December 2002.
DOD believes that the potential exists for retention problems stemming  from high personnel tempo. To prevent servicemembers with key skills  from leaving the services, DOD issued 23 orders since September 11, 2001,  to prevent erosion in combat capabilities that may stem from attrition, an  action known as stop loss authority. These orders affected personnel  with designated individual job skills or, in some cases, all of the  individuals in specific types of units that were critical for overseas combat  and domestic military missions. However, many of the stop loss orders  had been terminated since September 11, 2001. For example, the Navy’s  individual stop loss order went into effect on April 27, 2003, and  subsequently the Navy terminated this order in mid-May 2003. Table 2  shows the estimated number of personnel affected by the stop loss orders  in effect as of April 30, 2003.
Officials from the four services who manage the implementation of these  orders cautioned that they are short-term tools designed to maintain  unit-level military readiness for overseas combat and domestic military  missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not to be used  as a long-term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in capabilities  and requirements, or as a substitute for the routine recruiting, induction,  and training of new servicemembers.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD must balance domestic and overseas missions with a renewed  emphasis on homeland defense. Moreover, current operations both home  and abroad are stressing the forces, as shown in personnel tempo data.  Complicating the situation is the fact that some units are not well  structured for their domestic missions, cannot practice the varied skills  needed to maintain combat proficiency while performing domestic  missions, and receive little training value from their assigned domestic  duties. Therefore, military force readiness may erode and future personnel  retention problems may develop, if action is not taken to address  these problems.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense assess domestic military  mission requirements and determine if steps should be taken to structure  U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions while  maintaining proficiency for overseas combat missions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred  with the need to do an assessment that is expressed in our  recommendation. DOD stated that our draft report provides an accurate  assessment of DOD’s need to balance its domestic and overseas mission  with a renewed emphasis on homeland defense. DOD added that our draft  report describes the stress that high operational tempo could have on  personnel. However, in its comments, DOD stated that it does not believe  that an independent force structure assessment is required to better match  force structure to perceived new domestic support requirements; rather,  DOD stated that force structure changes should be determined through the  ongoing force management processes that will culminate with the fiscal  year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. If DOD can incorporate a force  structure assessment as part of its ongoing force management processes,  then it would generally fulfill the intent or our recommendation.
However, we believe that DOD should examine the merits of taking  actions to alleviate stress on the forces in the near term rather than wait  until the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review because the  missions causing the stress are continuing. Based on our analysis of  personnel tempo trends through December 2002 and on discussions with  officials conducting domestic military missions, we believe that U.S.  military force readiness may erode because of the poor match between the  types of forces needed for the domestic military missions we reviewed, the  forces available, and the limited training value derived from the missions.  Moreover, future personnel retention problems may develop in the  meantime due to the pace of operations, which consequently may become  unsustainable. Additionally, current operations in Iraq, which were not  considered in our analysis of military personnel tempo data, can be  expected to impact a significant portion of the military force structure for  the foreseeable future. Lastly, homeland defense missions are another  factor of military personnel tempo because these missions are ongoing.  Therefore, we believe our recommendation is valid as originally drafted.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with our evaluation of  them. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
We conducted our review from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further  distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we  will send copies of this report to other appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies  available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report please call me  at (202) 512-6020 or e-mail me at deckerr@gao.gov. The GAO contact and  key contributors are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine how the Department of Defense’s (DOD) military  and nonmilitary missions differ and how they have changed since  September 11, 2001, we conducted in-depth interviews with officials from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including but not limited to the  Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the Special Assistant for  Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Reserve Affairs, and the General Counsel; the Joint Staff’s J-3 Directorate  for Operations and J-5 Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy;  U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland  Security; the Director of Military Support; the U.S. Army Reserve  Command; the National Guard Bureau Homeland Defense Office; and the  Army and Air National Guard. We visited and met with officials from  U.S. Northern Command, who also provided detailed responses to our  written questions, which we analyzed and used to continue a dialogue with  the officials. We also analyzed documents prepared by U.S. Northern  Command and the Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security. We  reviewed DOD directives that govern civil support missions, including  DOD Directive 3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities issued  January 15, 1993, and DOD Directive 3025.15 Military Assistance to Civil  Authorities issued February 18, 1997. Also, we analyzed Director of  Military Support data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 to learn about the  types of nonmilitary support that DOD provided to federal agencies. To  better understand DOD’s missions, we reviewed key documents such as  the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and the  Congress for 2002, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, The  National Security Strategy of the United States, the 2001 Quadrennial  Defense Review Report, and the defense strategy issued as part of the 2001  Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
To more fully understand the legal context of DOD’s civil support missions  in the United States, we reviewed laws and defense directives relevant to  DOD’s civilian support activities. We also examined the 1878 Posse  Comitatus Act and its restrictions on direct DOD assistance to civilian law  enforcement. We identified and examined a series of statutory  exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. In addition, we reviewed  DOD’s directives governing civil support missions and assistance to law  enforcement to identify DOD’s criteria for accepting or rejecting requests  for such assistance.
To assess whether DOD’s organizations, plans, and force structure are  adequate to address domestic military missions, we identified DOD’s new  organizations and responsibilities with DOD officials and visited the  U.S. Northern Command, reviewed plans, and compared the types of  domestic missions performed by the forces with their primary missions.  Specifically for DOD’s organizations, we reviewed appropriate documents,  including the U.S. Northern Command Campaign Plan and the April 2002  revision to the Unified Command Plan, and we discussed organizational  changes with knowledgeable officials throughout DOD. We also attended  several congressional hearings that addressed the establishment of new  organizations and their roles and responsibilities. With respect to  understanding how plans address DOD’s domestic missions, we reviewed  our prior audit work related to the review of the 2001 Quadrennial  Defense Review Report and risk management. Also, we discussed DOD’s  planning process with an official at the Office of the Secretary of Defense  and at U.S. Northern Command and we discussed the development of the  campaign plan with U.S. Northern Command officials. To obtain an  understanding of whether forces performing domestic military missions  are tailored to perform these missions, we selected two Operation Noble  Eagle missions performed in the continental United States by DOD forces  since September 11, 2001. Specifically, we reviewed installation security  provided by Army military police units and combat air patrols flown by Air  Force fighter units. We selected these specific missions because: (1) Joint  Force Headquarters for Homeland Security officials indicated that Army  military police combat units were deploying at high rates due to the events  of September 11, 2001, and (2) the combat air patrol mission was the first  domestic military mission performed under Operation Noble Eagle.
To understand installation security missions, we interviewed officials  at U.S. Forces Command; the U.S. Army Reserve Command; and the  U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. We also visited and  interviewed officials at military police combat units that deployed for  these missions, including an Army active duty combat support  company, an Army Reserve internment and resettlement battalion, and  an Army National Guard guard company. We also conducted a 2-day  videoconference with command officials from an Army National Guard  combat support company. We analyzed documentation such as briefings,  mission orders, and training documents from the four units. We selected  these military police units judgmentally based on the deployment data  received from U.S. Forces Command, taking into consideration the  number of days the units had performed installation security; the number  of personnel deployed on the missions; the type of military police unit  involved; whether the unit was from the active Army, Army Reserve, or  Army National Guard; and whether the unit completed its mission or  would do so prior to the conclusion of our review. To better understand  whether the skills required for installation security were well matched to  the unit’s primary wartime missions, we compared the required combat  training for these units to the types of duties they routinely performed for  enhanced installation security. Further, we reviewed Army training  regulations and manuals. We also analyzed data pertaining to the Army  National Guard deployments to Air Force installations in the continental  United States. We determined the types of units that deployed on these  missions, including those most frequently deployed, and we examined the  primary combat training requirements these units must perform to  maintain combat proficiency in their particular specialties.
To gain first-hand information about the combat air patrols, we  interviewed officials at active duty Air Force and Air National Guard  units that performed combat air patrol missions, and analyzed extensive  operational, training, and maintenance data. To gain an understanding  about operational requirements and command and control issues for  combat air patrol missions, we interviewed officials at the Department of  the Air Force; the Air National Guard; the Air Force Reserve Command;  the Air Combat Command; the Continental United States Region,  North American Aerospace Defense Command; and North American  Aerospace Defense Command. We selected units to visit based on their  participation in combat air patrols since September 11, 2001. We obtained  and analyzed flying hours and sortie data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 for  fighter (F15 and F16) wings from Air Combat Command, the Air  National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command. We also  obtained and reviewed Air Force training instructions and unit training  performance reports.
To determine if military personnel experienced increases in time away  from home while performing official military duties, we reviewed data for  personnel tempo for each of the military services and their respective  reserve components for the period October 1, 2000, through December 31,  2002 (the latest data available). The services report their data to the  Defense Manpower Data Center under the direction of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. We obtained the  Army’s data directly from the Army Personnel Command because at the  time of our review, the Defense Manpower Data Center did not have the  Army’s recent data in its information management system. To gain further  insight into the personnel tempo data, we conducted in-depth interviews  with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness, the Defense Manpower Data Center, and the Departments  of the Army and the Air Force. We also reviewed DOD’s use of stop loss  authority by obtaining the stop loss orders and estimates of affected  personnel from officials in the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for  Military Personnel Policy, and each of the military services. We discussed  the estimates with the officials to determine the most appropriate way to  demonstrate the impacts of stop loss orders.
We reviewed the data provided by the Army, Army Reserve, Army National  Guard, Air National Guard, Air Force, Defense Manpower Data Center,  and Army Personnel Command for completeness and reliability. For the  analysis of flying hours and military police deployments, we found and  corrected some errors in the data. Specifically, we found errors in the  Air Force’s flying hour records and corrected the data by incorporating  data provided by the affected unit. For military police deployments we  found duplicate deployments in some cases and eliminated the duplicate  records.
For the analysis of Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and Navy personnel  tempo data, we found and corrected some errors where possible, and did  not use the data or specific fields where the data were unreliable or we  could not correct the problems. Specifically, for the Air Force data, we  eliminated duplicate records and deleted all records of personnel who had  overlapping duty dates. For all services, where the personnel tempo end  date was missing, we assumed the personnel were still away from home  and set the end date to a date after our analytic period. To the extent that  the missing date represents completed duties where the end date had not  been entered, we are overstating the number of personnel and the extent  of days away from home.
Through corroborating evidence from comparisons with other DOD data  files and our corrections, we confirmed that the data we used present a  reliable depiction of the active Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard,  active Air Force, and Air National Guard units involved in Operation Noble  Eagle activities; and Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel  deployments from October 1, 2000, to December 31, 2002.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter  dated June 30, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  DOD stated that it is now studying and implementing significant  changes in the force structure to better support civil authorities during  domestic events. First, during our audit we were not presented with  evidence of such studies as they relate to either civil support or  homeland defense missions. Second, in our follow-up conversation  with a DOD official concerning this statement, the DOD official did not  provide specific information about the scope, content, or completion  dates of the studies. Finally, DOD stated that it has adjusted its  strategic and operational focus to encompass traditional military  threats from hostile states, asymmetric threats posed by terrorists, and  asymmetric threats posed by hostile states. Our draft report  acknowledged the shifts for traditional military threats and the  asymmetric threats posed by terrorists. Based on DOD’s comment, we  added asymmetric threats posed by hostile states.  2.  DOD stated that it is important for the report to note that DOD military  forces are not first responders. Rather, DOD provides support as  directed by the President or Secretary of Defense using defense  capabilities to assist other federal, state, and local authorities in  response to their requests. Additionally, DOD stated that our report  fails to emphasize that DOD is not the long-term solution to the  nation’s domestic prevention, response, and recovery requirements.  Our report clearly states that DOD assesses requests from civil  authorities based upon its own criteria from DOD Directive 3025.15,  Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, and that DOD has some  discretion to accept or reject these requests. Moreover, DOD suggested  that we use this opportunity to recommend a solution involving the  fostering of a more robust state and local response structure. We  disagree. We did not comment on such a solution in our draft report  because this type of assessment was outside the scope of our review.  Ultimately, the President and Congress will determine the future role  of DOD, if any, in domestic response missions.  3.  DOD commented that our draft report does not mention the planned  changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting System. According to  DOD, the system’s changes are designed to assess the impact of  homeland defense and civil support missions on the readiness of  forces to execute their warfighting mission. At DOD’s request, we have  incorporated information about this system on page 17. However, in  March 2003, we reported that as of January 2003, DOD had not  developed an implementation plan for the Defense Readiness  Reporting System that contained measurable performance goals,  identified resources, suggested performance indicators, or included an  evaluation plan to assess progress in developing this system.   4.  DOD commented that our draft report used non-standard terminology,  referring to military missions (what DOD calls homeland defense) and  nonmilitary missions (support to civil authorities). We added language  on page 1 (see footnote 1) to establish the meaning of the terms used  in our report.  5.  DOD stated that it believes it is not clear that homeland defense and  support to civil authorities missions are key factors in high personnel  tempo. On the contrary, our draft report acknowledges that overseas  missions as well as domestic missions contribute to high personnel  tempo. Indeed, current personnel tempo could be even higher than is  depicted in our draft report because the data displaying high personnel  tempo stemming from participation in homeland defense missions or  other deployments after December 2002, or from Operation Iraqi  Freedom, were not yet fully available at the time of our review. In  addition, the personnel tempo data we received from DOD did not  record a servicemember’s assigned operation—for example, Operation  Noble Eagle. However, we added a statement to footnote 28 in our  report that acknowledges this limitation in the personnel tempo data  we received.
DOD also commented that since 9/11/01, increased requirements have  been driven more significantly by overseas operations in Afghanistan,  Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terrorism. While DOD may be  correct, our report discussed personnel tempo, not requirements.  Personnel tempo refers to the amount of time during which a member  of the armed forces is engaged in official duties at a location that  makes it infeasible to spend off duty time at the servicemember’s  home, homeport (for Navy servicemembers), or civilian residence  (for reserve components’ personnel). Therefore, we stand by our  finding that high personnel tempo is an indicator that present force  structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and  overseas military missions and could lead to an erosion of unit  readiness.
Lastly, because the assessment of rotating units to maintain combat  readiness was outside the scope of our review, we could not evaluate  DOD’s statements.  6.  DOD commented that activities such as mobilization and  preparation for war would almost certainly have an impact on the  resources available to respond to homeland defense and support  to civil authorities missions. DOD added that our draft report leaves  the inaccurate impression that this situation is the norm. However,  DOD did not specifically point out where the report suggested such  an interpretation. We disagree that our report leaves an inaccurate  impression, because it does not have statements implying this cause  and effect. However, because servicemembers cannot be in both  domestic and overseas locations at the same time, we believe that  mobilization and preparation for any one mission, even including war,  will necessarily make them unavailable for other missions.
DOD also commented that it is important to note that, even during  Operation Iraqi Freedom, over 200,000 soldiers and airmen were  still available after the mobilization. We agree that a significant number  of personnel have not been mobilized even during Operation Iraqi  Freedom, but it is unclear what DOD’s figure means. DOD did not  provide evidence to support this figure, and we believe that, in any  case, it is tangential to our point—that, in general, some forces are not  optimally suited to perform domestic military missions. We found that  some forces’ skills are mismatched with the needs of domestic military  missions and that these forces lose critical training opportunities.  Thus, DOD’s statement that 200,000 servicemembers were available  does not necessarily signify that these members are well suited for the  missions at hand.
Lastly, we did not discuss overseas missions at length in this report,  because the report reviewed DOD’s domestic military missions.  7.  DOD commented that when identifying Title 10 statutes that allow  federal forces to perform domestic law enforcement missions, the  report does not make clear that these missions are based on worst  case scenarios and are not the norm. We agree that the use of federal  forces to perform law enforcement missions is not the norm. As  suggested by each of the authorized uses of federal forces in domestic  law enforcement roles that we identified, such uses are in fact the  exception rather than the rule. DOD is correct when it states that it  undertakes missions to support civil authorities at the direction of the  President or the Secretary of Defense, and, as DOD has pointed out,  these missions may be undertaken upon requests for assistance from  civil authorities.  8.  DOD disagreed with our statement on page 14 that domestic military  missions to date have offered limited training value because these  missions generally have required only basic military skills. DOD stated  that basic military skills require practice, just as do the more  sophisticated skills. We agree that basic skills also need practice, and  our report made clear that, while performing Operation Noble Eagle  missions (such as domestic installation security and combat air  patrols), forces are able to employ basic military skills. However, our  discussions with service officials revealed that servicemembers were  inhibited from executing the full range of difficult tactical maneuvers  or from replicating battlefield conditions while deployed on Operation  Noble Eagle missions. Moreover, we reviewed DOD training  requirements for all the military skills of these forces, both basic and  advanced, as well as the DOD requirements for their frequency of  practice in order to ensure proficiency. Also, DOD asserts that there  will be ample opportunity to increase readiness prior to operational  employment. However, DOD did not explain how it could predict the  amount of time available to prepare for a future contingency. In any  case, based on DOD’s requirements, we have concluded that overall  combat readiness may erode.
In addition, based on the length or frequency for Operation Noble  Eagle deployments that we reviewed, we concluded that although  basic military skills have been frequently practiced, combat skills have  not generally been practiced. As a result, the combat proficiency of  many servicemembers could be jeopardized. Moreover, because DOD  did not provide specific criteria for what constitutes the limited scope  and duration of domestic missions, we cannot address these  comments. Finally, Operation Noble Eagle began on 9/11/01, is  continuing, and has no known end in sight, which raises questions  about whether this is a “limited duration” mission. Therefore, we stand  by our report as originally drafted.  9.  In its comments, DOD pointed out that we concluded (now on p. 23)  that some units are not well structured for their domestic missions,  cannot practice the varied skills needed to maintain combat  proficiency while performing domestic missions, and receive little  training value from their assigned domestic missions. DOD then  asserts that a temporary reduction in a unit’s effectiveness for its  primary mission due to homeland security or peacekeeping missions is  not necessarily a bad thing. A key DOD official explained to us that  effectiveness refers to the extent to which a unit was successful in  completing a mission to which it was assigned. However, we did not  evaluate the extent to which any military units were successful in  completing assigned missions, thus DOD’s comment missed our point.  We believe that a unit’s readiness may erode in the future from  performing a mission for which it was not designed. DOD also asserted  that the ability of units to prepare for and execute a variety of missions  with inherent capability adds flexibility. While DOD is apparently  asserting that the missions we reviewed are adding flexibility and  enhancing responsiveness, DOD did not explain how practicing the  basic skills of flying aircraft and standing guard adds flexibility.  Consequently, we stand by our conclusion.  10.  DOD commented that the report confused the interpretation and  application of the Posse Comitatus Act with regard to the use of the  military to enforce the laws of the United States. We disagree. Our  report identified and summarized laws associated with the 1878 Posse  Comitatus Act. We explained the laws’ impact on requests for DOD  assistance in domestic law enforcement operations. We also reported  that DOD does not believe the act impedes the nature or timeliness of  its response.   11.  DOD commented that our report indicated that DOD did not complete  a congressionally directed legal review on the use of military forces in  the United States and any legal impediments affecting DOD’s role in  supporting homeland security. We have updated our report to reflect  information that DOD has recently provided to us, although DOD did  not provide this report to us.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Deborah Colantonio, Richard K.  Geiger, Kevin L. O’Neill, William J. Rigazio, Susan K. Woodward,  Michael C. Zola, Rebecca Shea, and Arthur L. James Jr. also made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and  Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces. GAO-03-677T. Washington, D.C.:  April 29, 2003.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to  Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of  Homeland Security. GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership.  GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to  Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations  between Reservists and Their Employers. GAO-02-608. Washington, D.C.:  June 13, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but  Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide  Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal  Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and  National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown  but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO-01-9. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied  Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.  GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources.  GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical  and Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.:  October 20, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk  Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve  Counterterrorism Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.:  May 13, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat  Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues.   GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize  and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:  April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs  Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39.  Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National  Policy and Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-97-254. Washington, D.C.:  September 26, 1997.