Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Financial Challenges Highlight Need for Improved Governance and Management
Published: 2009-05-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the retirement future of nearly 44 million people in over 29,000 private-sector defined benefit pension plans. In July 2003, GAO designated PBGC's single-employer pension insurance program--its largest insurance program--as "high risk," including it on GAO's list of major programs that need urgent Congressional attention and agency action. The program remains on the list today with a financial deficit of just over $11 billion, as of September 2008. The committee asked GAO to discuss our recent work on PBGC. Specifically, this testimony addresses two issues: (1) PBGC's financial vulnerabilities, and (2) the governance, oversight, and management challenges PBGC faces. To address these objectives, we are relying on our prior work assessing PBGC's long-term financial challenges, and several reports that we have published over the last two years on PBGC governance and management. GAO has made a number of recommendations and identified matters for Congressional consideration in these reports, and PBGC is implementing some of these recommendations. No new recommendations are being made as part of this testimony.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Financial and economic conditions have deteriorated since we last reported on PBGC's finances. While PBGC's deficit improved for fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year ended just prior to the severe market downturn, and this lower deficit may be a product of conditions that no longer exist. As a result, it is likely that PBGC's net position looks different today. Other recent events have also added to PBGC's financial challenges. These events include: recent legislation that grants funding relief to certain sponsors, developments with PBGC's investment policy, and a concern that a wide array of industry sectors--including the automotive sector--are under financial distress and may expose PBGC to future claims. As a result, the potential for automaker pension plan terminations could dramatically increase not only PBGC's deficit, but also its administrative workload. With mounting financial challenges and the potential for PBGC's workload to dramatically increase, our concerns about PBGC governance and strategic management have become acute, and improvements are needed, now more than ever. PBGC's board has limited time and resources to provide policy direction and oversight. The three-member board includes the Secretary of Labor, as the Chair of the Board, and the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury. These board members have numerous other responsibilities and are unable to dedicate consistent and comprehensive attention to PBGC. With only 3 members, PBGC's board may not be large enough to include the knowledge needed to direct and oversee PBGC. In fact, the new board members have yet to meet, and there has not been a face-to-face board meeting in the last 15 months. In addition, without an appointed director, PBGC's governance structure is further exposed to challenges. Further, PBGC continues to lack a fully-adopted strategic approach to its acquisition and human capital management needs. Although contract employees comprise two-thirds of PBGC's workforce, PBGC's strategic planning generally does not recognize contracting as a major aspect of PBGC activities.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the financial and operational  challenges facing the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).  PBGC operates two pension insurance programs that protect the  retirement income of nearly 44 million American workers in over  29,000 private-sector defined benefit (DB) pension plans. We last testified  on the challenges facing PBGC in September. At that time we noted that  many of the challenges, particularly the financial challenges, facing PBGC  are long-term and structural in nature. In fact, we designated PBGC’s  single-employer pension insurance program, its largest insurance program,  as “high risk” in 2003 because of these financial challenges. The program  remains on the list today with a projected deficit of just over   $11 billion, as of September 2008. However, recent events, particularly the  steep downturn in the financial markets and worsening economic  conditions, have likely further eroded PBGC’s financial position and have  also likely increased the risk that PBGC will have to assume responsibility  for the underfunded plans of large, financially-weak employers.
My statement will discuss the (1) PBGC’s financial vulnerabilities, and   (2) the governance, oversight, and management challenges also facing  PBGC. My statement is based on our prior work assessing PBGC’s long- term financial challenges, and several reports we have published over the  past two years on PBGC governance and management. We conducted our  work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In summary, financial and economic conditions have likely only worsened  since we last reported on PBGC’s finances. While PBGC’s deficit improved  for fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year ended just prior to the severe market  downturn, and it is likely that their net position looks different today.  Other events have occurred that also added to PBGC’s financial  challenges. These events include: recent legislation that grants funding  relief to certain sponsors, developments with PBGC’s investment policy,  and a concern that a wide array of industry sectors—including the highly  visible automotive sector—are under financial distress and may expose  PBGC to future claims. As a result, the potential for automaker pension  plan terminations could dramatically increase PBGC’s deficit, as well as its  administrative workload.
With mounting financial challenges and the potential for PBGC’s workload  to dramatically increase, our concerns about PBGC governance and  strategic management have become acute, and improvements are needed,  now more than ever. PBGC’s board has limited time and resources to  provide policy direction and oversight. The board includes the Secretary of  Labor, as the Chair of the Board, and the Secretaries of Commerce and  Treasury. These board members have numerous other responsibilities, and  are unable to dedicate consistent and comprehensive attention to PBGC.  With only 3 members, PBGC’s board may not be large enough to include  the knowledge needed to direct and oversee PBGC. In fact, the new board  members have yet to meet, and there has not been a face-to-face board  meeting in the last 15 months. PBGC’s governance structure is further  exposed to challenges as it does not yet have an appointed director.  Further, although contract employees comprise two-thirds of PBGC’s  workforce, PBGC’s strategic planning generally does not recognize  contracting as a major aspect of PBGC activities. PBGC still lacks a fully- adopted strategic approach to its acquisition and human capital  management needs.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: PBGC was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of  1974 (ERISA) to pay benefits to participants in private DB plans in the  event that an employer could not. PBGC may pay benefits, up to specified  limits, if a plan does not have sufficient assets itself to pay promised  benefits and the sponsoring company is in financial distress. PBGC’s  single-employer insurance program guarantees benefits up to $4,500 per  month for age-65 retirees of plans terminating in 2009, with lower  guarantees for those who retire before age 65. Currently, PBGC insurance  covers 44 million participants, including retirees, in over 29,000 DB plans.  PBGC pays monthly retirement benefits to more than 640,000 retirees in  3,860 pension plans that have ended, and is responsible for the current and  future pensions of about 1.3 million people. ERISA also requires PBGC to  encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension  plans.
PBGC receives no funds from general tax revenues. Operations are  financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid by sponsors of  DB plans, recoveries from the companies formerly responsible for the  plans, and investment income of assets from pension plans taken over, or  “trusteed,” by PBGC. Under current law, other than statutory authority to  borrow up to $100 million from the Treasury Department, no substantial  source of funds is available to PBGC if it runs out of money. In the event  that PBGC were to exhaust all of its holdings, benefit payments would  have to be drastically cut unless Congress were to take action to provide  support.
The assets and liabilities that PBGC accumulates from trusteeing plans has  increased rapidly over the last 6 years or so. This is largely due to the  termination, typically through bankruptcies, of a number of very large,  underfunded plan sponsors. In fact, 8 of the top 10 firms presenting  claims against PBGC did so from 2003 to 2007. These top 10 claims alone  currently account for over 60 percent of all of PBGC’s claims and are  concentrated among firms representing the steel and airline industries.  Overall, these industries accounted for about three-quarters of PBGC’s  total claims and single-employer benefit payments in 2007.
In 2003, GAO designated PBGC’s single-employer program as high-risk,  meaning that the program needs urgent Congressional attention and  agency action. We specifically noted PBGC’s prior-year net deficit, as well  as the risk of the termination among large, underfunded pension plans, as  reasons for the program’s high-risk designation.
As part of our monitoring of PBGC as a high-risk agency we have  highlighted additional challenges faced by the single-employer program.  Among these concerns were the serious weaknesses that existed with  respect to plan funding rules and that PBGC’s premium structure and  guarantees needed to be re-examined to better reflect the risk posed by  various plans. Additionally, the number of single-employer insured DB  plans has been rapidly declining, and, among the plans still in operation,  many have frozen benefits to some or all participants. Further, the  prevalence of plans that are closed to new participants seems to imply that  PBGC is likely to see a decline in insured participants, especially as  insured participants seem increasingly likely to be retired (as opposed to  active or current) workers.
PBGC has remained high-risk with each subsequent report in 2005, 2007,  and, most recently, 2009. In our 2007 high risk update we noted that major  pension legislation had been enacted which addressed many of the  concerns articulated in our previous reports and testimonies on PBGC’s  financial condition. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) was signed  into law on February 8, 2006 and included provisions to raise flat-rate  premiums and create a new, temporary premium for certain terminated  single-employer plans. Later that year the Pension Protection Act of 2006  (PPA) was enacted; it included a number of provisions aimed at improving  plan funding and PBGC finances. The provisions aimed at improving plan  funding included such measures as raising the funding targets DB plans  must meet, reducing the period over which sponsors can “smooth”  reported plan assets and liabilities, and restricting sponsors’ ability to  substitute “credit balances” for cash contributions. Reforms aimed at  shoring up PBGC revenues included a termination premium for some  bankrupt sponsors, and limiting PBGC’s guarantee to pay certain benefits.  However, the overall impact of PPA remains unclear; PPA did not fully  close potential plan funding gaps, and provided special relief to plan  sponsors in troubled industries. PBGC’s net financial position improved  from 2005 to 2006 because some very large plans that were previously  classified as probable terminations were reclassified to a reasonably  possible designation as a result of the relief granted to troubled industries  such as the airlines.
section_title: PBGC’s Financial Condition Has Likely Worsened Since September 2008
paragraphs: While PBGC’s deficit improved for fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year ended  just prior to the severe market downturn, and it is likely that their net  position looks different today. Since we last reported to Congress on  PBGC, PBGC issued its fiscal year 2008 financials and reported that the  net deficit for its insurance programs was $11.2 billion. In some ways,  this was good news. PBGC’s net deficit reached a peak of $23.5 billion in  2004 largely as a result of a number of realized and probable claims that  occurred during that year. However, the lower 2008 deficit may be a  product of conditions that no longer exist. For example, PBGC’s net deficit  is a resulting difference between its assets and its liabilities. (See figure 1  for the difference between PBGC assets and liabilities for both insurance  programs from 1990 to 2008.) As of PBGC’s September 30, 2008 financial  statement—even before the severe market downturn in October—PBGC  saw an investment return of -6.5 percent over the year, which contributed  to diminishing its assets from the prior year by about $5.5 billion. The net  deficit improved, despite the performance of its assets, because of the  decrease in its liabilities. According to PBGC, the improvement was due  largely to successful negotiations in bankruptcy proceedings, a favorable  change in interest factors used to value PBGC’s liabilities, and the fact that  PBGC saw significant reductions to its liabilities for probable  terminations. PBGC has likely seen its net financial condition hurt by  increased exposure due to declines in funding levels of many large plans,  from the termination of underfunded plans, and by an increase in its  liabilities due to a likely decrease in the interest rates used to value its  liabilities.
The current economic environment has likely increased the exposure  PBGC faces from financially distressed sponsors with large, underfunded  plans. The funding of many large plans has likely eroded as a result of the  lowered financial health of many sponsors, thereby potentially increasing  PBGC’s exposure to probable terminations, developments that the most  recent estimates may not reflect. Estimating PBGC’s future claims has  always been difficult to predict over the long-term due to the significant  volatility in plan underfunding and sponsor credit quality over time.  However, the current economic environment seems to have put sponsors  under particular stress.
There is likely a wide range of industry sectors that have been affected by  the current economic environment, and particularly the automotive sector.  For example, the pension plans of Chrysler and General Motors (GM)  today pose considerable financial uncertainty to PBGC. In the event that  Chrysler or GM cannot continue to maintain their pension plans—such as  in the case of liquidation or an asset sale—PBGC may be required to take  responsibility for paying the benefits for the plans, which, as of the most  current publicly available information, are underfunded by a total of about  $29 billion.
Although it is impossible to know what the exact claims to PBGC would  be if it took over Chrysler’s and GM’s pension plans, doing so would likely  strain PBGC’s resources, because the automakers’ plans represent a  significant portion of the benefits it insures. Further, from an  administrative standpoint, PBGC would be presented with an  unprecedented number of assets to manage as well as benefit liabilities to  administer. For example, GM’s and Chrysler’s plans include roughly  900,000 participants, both those receiving benefits now and those who  have earned benefits payable in the future, which would increase the total  number of PBGC’s current or future beneficiaries by nearly 80 percent.  Even with Chrysler’s bankruptcy and concern about GM’s viability, it is  not certain that PBGC would take over responsibility for either plan. For  example, a number of auto parts suppliers in Chapter 11 with collectively  bargained pension plans have emerged from reorganization without  terminating their pension plans.
While the events surrounding the automakers and their pension plans are  clearly an area of concern for the PBGC, the recession has likely affected  many industry sectors. Although, PBGC’s past claims have been  concentrated to industries like steel and airlines, there is cause for  concern that future claims will come from a much broader array of  industries.
PBGC’s insurance programs held $63 billion in assets as of September 30,  2008, and the Corporation has stated it has sufficient liquidity to meet its  obligations for a number of years. However, to the extent additional claims  from vulnerable industries markedly increase PBGC’s accumulated deficit  and decrease its long-run liquidity, there could be pressure for the federal  government to provide PBGC financial assistance to avoid reductions in  guaranteed payments to retirees or unsustainable increases in the  premium burden on sponsors of ongoing plans.
PBGC’s overall exposure has increased for additional reasons. The  Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 (WRERA), passed  in December, grants funding relief to certain sponsors and delays the  implementation of certain aspects of the PPA. WRERA makes several  technical corrections to PPA and contains provisions designed to help  pension plans and plan participants weather the current economic  downturn. For a number of sponsors, this legislation may mean lower plan  contributions than they would otherwise have had to pay under the phase- in of PPA and, at least temporarily, potentially increase levels of plan  underfunding. As we noted in our 2009 high-risk update on PBGC, this  legislation is likely to increase PBGC’s risk exposure, perhaps  significantly.
Finally, PBGC’s newly-adopted investment policy may expose the  Corporation to additional risk. The new policy reduces the proportion of  PBGC assets allocated to fixed-income investments, such as Treasury and  corporate bonds; increases its proportional holdings in international  equities; and introduces new asset classes, such as private equity,  emerging market debt and equities, high-yield fixed income, and private  real estate. While the investment policy adopted in 2008 aimed to reduce  PBGC’s deficit by investing in assets with a greater expected return, in a  report last summer, we found that the new allocation will likely carry  more risk than acknowledged by PBGC’s analysis.
Our assessment found that, although returns are indeed likely to grow  with the new allocation, the risks are likely higher as well. Although it is  important that the PBGC consider ways to optimize its portfolio, including  higher return and diversification strategies, the agency faces unique  challenges, such as PBGC’s need for access to cash in the short-term to  pay benefits, which could further increase the risks it faces with any  investment strategy that allocates significant portions of the portfolio to  volatile or illiquid assets. According to PBGC the new allocation will be  sufficiently diversified to mitigate the expected risks associated with the  higher expected return. PBGC also asserted that it should involve less risk  than the previous policy. The Congressional Budget Office has also  pointed out such risks, saying that “the new strategy…increases the risk  that PBGC will not have sufficient assets to cover retirees’ benefit  payments when the economy and financial markets are weak.”
PBGC has only implemented portions of the policy. PBGC told us that it  has begun the process of reducing the percentage of its assets in fixed- income investments, but it has not yet begun to increase its portfolio of  certain asset classes, specifically private equity and real estate. PBGC also  told us that the process it follows for its current implementation of the  investment policy follows industry best practices for large transactions.  However, PBGC officials also told us that the intended asset allocation  targets set by the current implementation of this policy could easily be  derailed if PBGC is required to assume the assets of very large and  severely underfunded sponsors.
section_title: Improvements Needed to PBGC’s Governance and Management
subsections: section_title: PBGC’s Governance Structure Needs Improvement
paragraphs: PBGC’s board has limited time and resources to provide policy direction  and oversight. PBGC’s three-member board, established by ERISA,  includes only the Secretary of Labor, as the Chair of the Board, and the  Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury. We noted that the board members  have designated officials and staff within their respective agencies to  conduct much of the work on their behalf and relied mostly on PBGC’s  management to inform these board members’ representatives of pending  issues. PBGC’s board members have numerous other responsibilities in  their roles as cabinet secretaries and have been unable to dedicate  consistent and comprehensive attention to PBGC.
Since PBGC’s inception, the board has met infrequently. In 2003, after  several high-profile pension plan terminations, PBGC’s board began  meeting twice a year (see figure 2). PBGC officials told us that it is a  challenge to find a time when all three cabinet secretaries are able to meet,  and in several instances the board members’ representatives officially met  in their place. Currently, the PBGC board has not met face-to-face in over  one year—since February 2008.
While the PBGC board has met more frequently since 2003, very little time  is spent on addressing strategic and operational issues. According to  corporate governance guidelines, boards should meet regularly and focus  principally on broader issues, such as corporate philosophy and mission,  broad policy, strategic management, oversight and monitoring of  management, and company performance against business plans.  However, our review of the board’s recorded minutes found that although  some meetings devoted a portion of time to certain strategic and  operational issues, such as investment policy, the financial status of  PBGC’s insurance programs, and outside audit reviews, the board  meetings generally only lasted about an hour.
The size and composition of PBGC’s board does not meet corporate  governance guidelines. According to corporate governance guidelines  published by The Conference Board, corporate boards should be  structured so that the composition and skill set of a board is linked to the  corporation’s particular challenges and strategic vision, and should  include a mix of knowledge and expertise targeted to the needs of the  corporation. We did not identify any other government corporations with  boards as small as at PBGC. Government corporations’ boards averaged  about 7 members, with one having as many as 15. In addition, PBGC is also  exposed to challenges as the board, board members’ representatives, and  the director have changed with the recent presidential transition, limiting  the board’s institutional knowledge of the Corporation.
The revision of PBGC’s investment policy provides an example of the need  for an active board to help oversee the Corporation’s challenges and  strategic vision. We found that PBGC board’s 2004 and 2006 investment  policy was not fully implemented. While the board assigned responsibility  to PBGC for reducing equity holdings to a range of 15 to 25 percent of total  investment, by 2008 the policy goal had not been met. Although the PBGC  director and staff kept the board apprised of investment performance and  asset allocation, we found no indication that the board had approved the  deviation from its established policy or expected PBGC to continue to  meet policy objectives. While PBGC’s Board revised the investment policy  in February 2008, the board has not held a meeting to discuss the new  policy’s implementation even though there has been a serious downturn in  investment markets. In May 2009, PBGC officials told us that they have  kept the new Board members—the Secretary of Labor, along with officials  from the Departments of Commerce and Treasury—apprised of the  progress in implementing the new investment policy.
In our July 2007 report on PBGC’s governance structure, we asked  Congress to consider expanding PBGC’s board of directors, to appoint  additional members who possess knowledge and expertise useful to  PBGC’s responsibilities and can provide needed attention. Further,  dedicating staff that are independent of PBGC’s executive management  and have relevant pension and financial expertise to solely support the  board’s policy and oversight activities may be warranted. In response to  our finding, PBGC contracted with a consulting firm to identify and review  governance models and provide a background report to assist the board in  its review of alternative corporate governance structures. The consulting  firm’s final report describes the advantages and disadvantages of the  corporate board structures and governance practices of other government  corporations and select private sector companies, and concludes that  there are several viable alternatives for PBGC’s governance structure and  practices.
section_title: As PBGC Relies Heavily on Its’ Contractor and Federal Workforce, A More Strategic Approach Is Needed
paragraphs: Although two-thirds of PBGC’s workforce includes contractor employees,  PBGC’s strategic planning generally does not recognize contracting as a  major aspect of PBGC activities (see figure 3). Since the mid-1980s,  PBGC has had contracts covering a wide range of services, including the  administration of terminated plans, payment of benefits, customer  communication, legal assistance, document management, and information  technology. As PBGC’s workload grew due to the significant number of  large pension plan terminations, PBGC relied on contractors to  supplement its workforce, acknowledging that it has difficulty anticipating  workloads due to unpredictable economic conditions.
Last summer we reported that PBGC had begun to improve some of its  contracting practices by to updating contracting policies and processes,  upgrading the skills of Procurement Department staff, and better tracking  contracting data. While we reported that PBGC had begun to implement  performance-based contracting that offers the potential for better contract  outcomes, PBGC officials recently told us that the new field benefit  administration contracts will not be performance-based.
PBGC lacks a strategic approach to its acquisition and human capital  management needs. PBGC’s strategic plan does not document how the  acquisition function supports the agency’s missions and goals. Further,  although contracting is essential to PBGC’s mission, we found that the  Procurement Department is not included in corporate-level strategic  planning. Based on these findings, we recommended that PBGC revise its  strategic plan to reflect the importance of contracting and to project its  vision of future contract use, and ensure that PBGC’s procurement  department is included in agency-wide strategic planning. (Appendix I  includes selected GAO recommendations on PBGC Governance and  Management). PBGC disagreed with our recommendation to reflect the  importance of contracting and incorporate its vision for future contractor  use in its strategic planning documents, as it believes its recently issued  strategic plan is sufficiently comprehensive. However, PBGC’s strategic  plan only briefly mentions performance-based contracting, flexible  staffing, and metrics for specific contracts, and therefore we believe that it  does not reflect the important role contracting is playing in achieving  PBGC’s mission.
PBGC also needs a more strategic approach for improving human capital  management. We found that PBGC’s draft strategic human capital plan  does not provide detailed plans for obtaining contract support or  managing the workload fluctuations. While PBGC has made progress in its  human capital management approach by taking steps to improve its  human capital planning and practices—such as drafting a succession  management plan—the Corporation lacked a formal, comprehensive  human capital strategy, articulated in a formal human capital plan that  includes human capital policies, programs, and practices. PBGC is  generally able to hire staff in its key occupations—such as accountants,  actuaries, and attorneys—and retain them at rates similar to those of the  rest of the federal government. However, PBGC has had some difficulty  hiring and retaining staff for specific occupations and positions, including  executives and senior financial analysts. Since our report, PBGC officials  told us that they have provided a human capital plan to the Office of  Personnel Management (OPM) and are awaiting OPM feedback.
The need for a strategic approach to acquisition and human capital  management is essential to ensure that PBGC is able to manage the  administrative fluctuations of a pension insurance corporation. As noted  earlier, General Motor’s and Chrysler’s plans include roughly 900,000  participants, both those receiving benefits now and those who have earned  benefits payable in the future. These participants, if brought under PBGC  administration, would raise the number of PBGC’s current or future  beneficiary population by roughly 80 percent. While it is uncertain whether  an automaker plan would ever be assumed by PBGC, the concentration of  large numbers of plan beneficiaries among just two sponsors illustrates  the potential for a sudden and unprecedented administrative workload at  PBGC.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While PBGC has been on our High Risk list since 2003—and many of its  challenges are long-term in nature—the recession and market down-turn  has magnified the challenges it faces. When we last reported on PBGC’s  financial challenges in September, we specifically mentioned the change in  investment policy as a key challenge going forward. This is still the case,  but even more recent events, such as legislative changes and the plight of  the automakers and other financially weak sponsors in other industries,  have the potential to expose PBGC to claims of a potentially  unprecedented magnitude.
While many of the financial challenges are a result of long-term  weaknesses that are in many ways structural, PBGC does have some  degree of control over challenges it faces with respect to governance,  oversight, and management. GAO has made many recommendations in  these areas, but given the potentially immense financial challenges the  Corporation faces, the need to act is only growing. It is unfortunate that,  during a time of financial crisis, the PBGC board has not met in 15 months.  However, PBGC not only needs a board that meets regularly, but also a  board that can be active and commit the time to understanding the weight  and urgency of the issues facing the Corporation. Ideally, a more robust  board structure would be in place as soon as possible so that the board  can address current challenges and anticipate new ones. The current  situation has important implications for all PBGC stakeholders: plan  sponsors, insured participants, insured beneficiaries, as well as the  government and, ultimately, the taxpayers. PBGC should not have to take  on significant, additional claims from severely underfunded pension plans  before situation is recognized.
Chairman Kohl, Senator Martinez, and Members of the Committee, this  concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any  questions you may have.
section_title: Appendix II: Selected GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
paragraphs: High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January  2009.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Improvements Needed to  Address Financial and Management Challenges. GAO-08-1162T.  Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2008.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Need for Improved Oversight  Persists. GAO-08-1062. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Some Steps Have Been Taken to  Improve Contracting, but a More Strategic Approach Is Needed.   GAO-08-871. Washington, D.C.: August 18, 2008.
PBGC Assets: Implementation of New Investment Policy Will Need  Stronger Board Oversight. GAO-08-667. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2008.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: A More Strategic Approach  Could Improve Human Capital Management. GAO-08-624. Washington,  D.C.: June 12, 2008.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Governance Structure Needs  Improvements to Ensure Policy Direction and Oversight. GAO-07-808  Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007.
PBGC’s Legal Support: Improvement Needed to Eliminate Confusion and  Ensure Provision of Consistent Advice. GAO-07-757R. Washington, D.C.:  May 18, 2007.
Private Pensions: Questions Concerning the Pension Benefit Guaranty  Corporation’s Practices Regarding Single-Employer Probable Claims.  GAO-05-991R. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2005.
Private Pensions: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Long- Term Budgetary Challenges. GAO-05-772T. Washington, D.C.: June 9,  2005.
Private Pensions: Recent Experiences of Large Defined Benefit Plans  Illustrate Weaknesses in Funding Rules. GAO-05-294. Washington, D.C.:  May 31, 2005.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Single-Employer Pension  Insurance Program Faces Significant Long-Term Risks. GAO-04-90.  Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2003.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Single-Employer Insurance  Program: Long-Term Vulnerabilities Warrant ‘High Risk’ Designation.  GAO-03-1050SP. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2003.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Statutory Limitation on  Administrative Expenses Does Not Provide Meaningful Control.   GAO-03-301. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2003.
GAO Forum on Governance and Accountability: Challenges to Restore  Public Confidence in U.S. Corporate Governance and Accountability  Systems. GAO-03-419SP. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
section_title: Appendix III: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further questions about this statement, please contact Barbara D.  Bovbjerg at (202) 512-7215. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include Blake Ainsworth, Charles Ford, Jennifer Gregory, Craig  Winslow, and Susannah Compton.
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