Environmental Contamination: Corps Needs to Reassess Its Determinations That Many Former Defense Sites Do Not Need Cleanup
Published: 2002-08-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that cleaning up contamination and hazards at thousands of properties that it formerly owned or controlled will take more than 70 years and cost as much as $20 billion. These formerly used defense sites (FUDS), which can range in size from less than an acre to many thousands of acres, are now used for parks, farms, schools, and homes. Hazards at these properties include unsafe buildings, toxic and radioactive wastes, containerized hazardous wastes, and ordnance and explosive wastes. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for identifying, investigating, and cleaning up hazards resulting from military use.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that the Corps lacks a sound basis for its conclusion that 38 percent of 3,840 FUDS need no further study or cleanup action. The Corps' determinations are questionable because there is no evidence that it reviewed or obtained information that would allow it to identify all the potential hazards at the properties, or that it took sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards. GAO also found that the Corps often did not notify owners of its determinations that the properties did not need further action, as called for in its guidance, or tell the owners to contact the Corps if evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that cleaning up  contamination and hazards at thousands of properties that it formerly  owned or controlled will take more than 70 years and cost from $15 billion  to $20 billion. These formerly used defense sites (FUDS), now owned by  states, local governments, and individuals, are used for parks, farms,  schools, and homes. Many of these properties, which can range in size from  less than an acre to many thousands of acres, were acquired or used by  DOD more than 30 to 40 years ago and in some cases more than 100 years  ago. Hazards at these properties can include unsafe buildings; hazardous,  toxic, and radioactive wastes; containerized hazardous wastes; and  ordnance and explosive wastes. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)  is responsible for identifying, investigating, and cleaning up such hazards if  DOD caused them.
Since 1984, the Corps has determined that more than 4,000 of the 9,181  properties potentially eligible for its FUDS cleanup program do not have  hazards that require further Corps study or cleanup action. The Corps  made these determinations following a preliminary assessment of eligibility  in which the Corps first established whether the properties were ever  under DOD control and thus eligible for the FUDS program. If a property  met this criterion, the Corps then determined if any hazards caused by  DOD might be present. To make this determination, Corps guidance calls  for (1) obtaining available information on the present and prior uses of the  site from records, owners, and federal, state, and local agencies;  (2) requesting from the current owner both information on any hazards  caused by DOD that might be present and permission to physically inspect the property; and (3) visiting the site to examine it for obvious signs of  hazards. If the Corps does not find evidence that hazards caused by DOD  might be present, the Corps designates the properties as “No DOD action  indicated, Category I” (NDAI). Corps guidance also calls for the owner to  be notified of the NDAI determination. The Corps will reconsider an NDAI  determination, and, if necessary, take appropriate action if evidence of  DOD-caused hazards is found later. However, the Corps does not generally  initiate further review, but relies on owners and federal and state regulatory  agencies for new information about potential hazards caused by DOD.
Depending on the types of hazards, the Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA) or state environmental regulatory agencies may be responsible for  ensuring that the Corps meets applicable cleanup requirements and  standards. EPA and some states have questioned the adequacy of the  Corps’ process for assessing the presence of potential hazards and the  validity of some of its determinations that no DOD action is indicated. In  this context, you asked us to determine the extent to which the Corps  (1) has a sound basis for its NDAI determinations and (2) has  communicated its NDAI determinations to owners and to the regulatory  agencies that may have responsibility and notified the owners that it will  reconsider an NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards is  found later.
To determine if the Corps has a sound basis for its NDAI determinations,  we reviewed a statistical sample of 635 of 4,023 NDAI files at nine Corps  districts selected from 21 of the 22 Corps districts that execute the FUDS  program. These 21 districts accounted for 99.8 percent of the NDAIs at the  time of our review. We excluded 32 of the 635 properties from our analysis  because the files contained evidence that the property either was not  eligible for the FUDS program or that a cleanup project was proposed.  Based on our sample, we estimate that 3,840 of the 4,023 determinations in  our study population met the definition of an NDAI—the property was  eligible for the FUDS program and the Corps determined that no further  study or cleanup action was needed. We reviewed each file to determine if  it contained evidence that the Corps (1) had reviewed or obtained  information on the prior uses of the site that would allow it to identify the  types of hazards potentially resulting from DOD’s use and (2) had taken  sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards. We did not  question the soundness of an NDAI determination based on the absence of  a single piece of information, such as a site map or a record of contact with  an owner. Rather, we based our assessment of the Corps’ efforts on the  totality of the evidence in the file. Our questioning of an NDAI  determination does not mean that the property is contaminated; rather, it  indicates that the Corps’ file did not contain evidence that the Corps took  steps to identify and assess potential hazards at the property that would  support the NDAI determination. To determine whether the Corps  communicated its NDAI determinations to owners and the regulatory  agencies and notified owners of its willingness to reconsider an NDAI  decision, we examined the NDAI files for evidence that the Corps had done  so. The results of our analysis can be projected to the NDAI population in  the 21 districts. The percentages and numbers of questionable NDAIs and  those related to the universe of NDAIs presented in this report are  statistical estimates based on our analysis of 603 NDAI files. We express  the precision of the results of our analysis (that is, the sampling errors  associated with these estimates) as 95 percent confidence intervals. All  percentage estimates have sampling errors of plus or minus 10 percentage  points or less, unless otherwise stated. All other numeric estimates have  sampling errors of plus or minus 10 percent of the value of those estimates  or less, unless otherwise stated.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, DOD is authorized  to identify, investigate, and clean up environmental contamination and  other hazards at FUDS. The environmental restoration program was  established by section 211 of the Superfund Amendments and  Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), which amended the Comprehensive  Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980  (CERCLA). Under the environmental restoration program, DOD’s  activities addressing hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants  are required to be carried out consistent with section 120 of CERCLA.
DOD delegated its authority for administering the FUDS program to the  U.S. Army; in turn, the U.S. Army delegated execution of the program to the  Corps. To be eligible for cleanup under the FUDS program, a property must  have been owned by, leased to, possessed by, or otherwise controlled by  DOD during the activities that caused hazards. These hazards consist of  unsafe buildings, structures, or debris, such as leaning or weakened  load-bearing walls or supports; open-sided platforms or floors more  than 6 feet above the next lower level; and any pit, depression, or tank  that can collect or contain standing water, such as underground missile  silos, septic tanks, and sewers;  hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, which includes contaminants  such as arsenic, certain paints, some solvents, petroleum and some  related products, and toxic pollutants from landfills;  containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, such as  transformers and underground and aboveground storage tanks that  contain petroleum, solvents, or other chemicals; and  ordnance and explosive waste such as military munitions and chemical  warfare agents.
Figure 1 shows examples of the types of hazards that might be found at  FUDS properties.
According to DOD’s fiscal year 2001 report on the status of its various  environmental cleanup programs, there were 9,181 properties identified by  the Corps, the states, or other parties as potentially eligible for cleanup  under the FUDS program. To determine if an identified property is eligible  for the FUDS program, the Corps conducts a preliminary assessment of  eligibility to establish whether the property was ever owned or controlled  by DOD and if hazards from DOD’s use are potentially present. Corps  officials point out that the preliminary assessment of eligibility is not  intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of the FUDS property; instead,  it is a screening effort intended to determine if potential hazards caused by  DOD exist and, if so, whether additional study or cleanup actions are  required to address such hazards. Corps guidance generally calls for staff  to use the following procedures when conducting a preliminary assessment  of eligibility:  obtain available information on the present and prior uses of the site  from real estate and archival records; present and former owners; and  other federal, state, and local agencies;  identify any relevant conditions, such as a release of liability or a  requirement to restore the property, in real estate deeds that would  affect the federal government’s liability;  contact the current owner to obtain permission for an initial survey of  the property to determine if DOD-caused hazards are potentially  present; and  visit the property to examine it for obvious signs of hazards and identify  any areas that may require further study or testing.
At the end of the preliminary assessment of eligibility, the Corps  determines if any further study or cleanup action is needed. If the Corps  determines that no further action is needed, the property is designated as  NDAI. According to Corps guidance, the districts must notify current  owners of the result of the preliminary assessment of eligibility within 30 to  60 days after the final NDAI determination.
Because FUDS properties may have changed significantly since DOD  owned or controlled them, the facilities once present and any potential  hazards that may still exist may not be obvious. For example, former DOD  facilities at a FUDS property may have been renovated, destroyed, or  removed, and areas no longer used may be overgrown with vegetation,  making potential hazards more difficult to detect. As a result, key  components of the Corps’ preliminary assessment of eligibility are  (1) obtaining historical documents, such as maps and photos that can aid  Corps staff in identifying and locating the facilities at the property and  indicate how the property was used (prior uses and the activities that took  place), and (2) conducting an inspection of the property (site visit) to  check for existing hazards caused by DOD.
Although DOD guidance states that CERCLA is the statutory framework for  the environmental restoration program, in recent years EPA has questioned  whether the Corps’ process is consistent with CERCLA, and both EPA and  some state regulatory officials have questioned its adequacy. While the  Corps is required to carry out the program in consultation with EPA, the  Corps is not required to consult with state regulatory agencies until hazards  are discovered. Corps guidance now instructs staff to keep EPA and state  regulatory agencies informed of the status and disposition of each NDAI  determination, but the Corps does not consult with EPA or the states when  making its determination because it considers the preliminary assessment  of eligibility an internal management process. Figure 2 shows the location  of the 4,030 FUDS properties that the Corps has designated as NDAI.
section_title: About 38 Percent of the Corps’ Determinations That No DOD Action Is Indicated Are Questionable
paragraphs: Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that the Corps does not  have a sound basis for about 38 percent or 1,468, of the estimated  3,840 NDAI determinations in our study population because the property  files did not contain evidence showing that the Corps consistently reviewed  or obtained information that would have allowed it to identify all of the  potential hazards at the properties or that it took sufficient steps to assess  their presence. In many cases, when attempting to identify potential  hazards resulting from DOD activities, the Corps apparently did not obtain  relevant information about former DOD activities and facilities at the  properties, such as buildings and underground storage tanks constructed  and used by DOD. For example, based on our review of Corps files, we  estimate that for about 74 percent, or 2,828, of all NDAI determinations,  the Corps did not review or obtain site maps, aerial photos, or ground  photos that could provide information about potential hazards (e.g., a site  map showing an ammunition storage facility could suggest the presence of  unexploded ordnance). Furthermore, in a number of cases, it appeared that  the Corps overlooked or dismissed information in its possession when it  looked for evidence of potential hazards. In addition, we estimate that the  Corps did not conduct a site visit at 686, or about 18 percent, of all NDAI  properties despite Corps guidance that requires site visits to determine if  potential hazards are present. The problems we noted occurred, in part,  because Corps guidance is not specific about what documents the Corps  should obtain, the level of detail required when seeking information on the  prior uses of the FUDS properties and the facilities located at them, or how  to assess the presence of potential hazards.
subsections: section_title: Corps Did Not Consistently Obtain Information Needed to Identify Potential Hazards at FUDS
paragraphs: The files for the NDAI properties that we reviewed did not always indicate  that the Corps reviewed or obtained information that would have aided in  identifying potential hazards at the properties. Information on what DOD  activities occurred, what DOD facilities existed, and where those activities  and facilities were located at FUDS can provide leads about potential  hazards and where they might be. Such information could be obtained from  site maps showing buildings or facilities at the property; aerial and ground  photos; current landowners; or federal, state, and local agencies. However,  although Corps guidance instructs staff to obtain available information on  the present and prior uses of the site, the FUDS manual offers no specific  guidelines on what documents or level of detail to obtain. While our  review indicates that at some sites Corps staff obtained site maps, aerial or  ground photos, or information from owners or other agencies, it appeared  that the Corps did not do so consistently; as a result, potential hazards may  have been overlooked.
The random sample of NDAI files that we reviewed contained little  evidence that Corps staff reviewed or obtained site maps to identify  potential hazards. Maps can provide detailed information on the facilities  that were present when DOD owned or used the site and could aid the  Corps in identifying potential hazards resulting from military activities at  the site. For example, although there were no DOD structures remaining at  an anti-aircraft artillery site whose file we reviewed, a detailed map showed  the exact location of a gun emplacement, an ammunition magazine, a  motor pool area, a mess hall, seven barracks, two administrative buildings,  a communications building, a drainage area, a septic tank, a grease rack,  a 5,000-gallon storage tank, an oil storage facility, a pump house, a  grease trap, two generators, a paint shed, a latrine, and a refueling area.
Obtaining such maps for sites could provide knowledge of site facilities and  could lead Corps staff to identify potential locations of hazardous  substances, ordnance, or unsafe buildings. Without the site map, many of  these facilities might not have been identified as features that were likely to  be located at an anti-aircraft artillery site. Further, without the map, it  might have been difficult to establish the former locations of these facilities  because of the size of the property and the length of time that has elapsed  between DOD’s use and the Corps’ assessment. However, despite the  usefulness of site maps, based on our review, we estimate that for about  77 percent, or 2,972, of all NDAI properties, the files do not contain site  maps or references to a map review.
There was also little evidence that the Corps obtained aerial or ground  photos of the FUDS to identify potential hazards. Photos, like maps, can  provide information that may be useful in identifying potential hazards. In  addition to providing information on what facilities existed and where they  were located when the military owned or used the site, photos can also  provide information on the condition of the facilities when the military was  present. This information is particularly important because if a facility was  in good condition when the military disposed of the property, but has since  been allowed to deteriorate, the Corps is not responsible for cleanup.  Photos can also help the Corps identify areas that were used as landfills or  other disposal sites. However, based on the information contained in the  Corps’ files, we estimate that for about 92 percent, or 3,522, of all NDAI  determinations, the files do not contain aerial or ground photos or indicate  that photos were reviewed as part of the Corps’ process.
In addition, there was little evidence that the Corps used the current owner  (or owners) as a source of information for the majority of the sites that we  reviewed. The current owner has the potential to provide information  about a FUDS property. If the current owner is the person who first  obtained the property from DOD, then the owner might be able to describe  the facilities that were present at acquisition and explain what has become  of those facilities. Even if the current owner is not familiar with the DOD  activities conducted at the site, the owner might be able to describe the  current condition of the property and note any hazards present. Based on  our review of NDAI files, we estimate that the Corps did not contact all the  current owners for about 60 percent, or 2,319, of all NDAI properties in our  study population.
Information on FUDS may also be available from various local, state, and  federal agencies. For example, during a preliminary assessment for one  property in the New York district, the Corps obtained information on  the potential presence of ammunition or explosive wastes from the city   facilities that may have been at the site during military use from a city  environmental office, the port authority transportation department, the  city police department, and the national archives;  site maps from the city library; and  permits issued for underground storage tanks from the city building  department.
However, it appears that the Corps seldom asked these kinds of agencies  for information. For example, a New Jersey state official told us that his  department has 15,000 files on sites within the state, but the Corps has  never gone through the department’s files. We estimate that the Corps  contacted a local, state, or federal agency to obtain information that could  indicate potential hazards for only about 10 percent, or 375, of the 3,840  NDAI properties in our study population.
Camp O’Reilly, a FUDS in Puerto Rico, exemplifies how obtaining historical  information on how a site was used or current information on the condition  of the property could have helped the Corps identify potential hazards.  Camp O’Reilly was a 907-acre military post that included 591 buildings and  other facilities and housed about 8,000 troops from August 1942 to June  1945. In September 1992, the Corps determined that there were no hazards  at Camp O’Reilly that were eligible for FUDS cleanup and designated the  site as NDAI. Yet, there is no evidence in the Corps’ files that the Corps  obtained or reviewed maps, archival photos, or studies, or that it  contacted the current owners to identify potential hazards during its  preliminary assessment of eligibility for Camp O’Reilly. Had the Corps  obtained and made use of historical information, it could have identified a  number of potential hazards. In July 1997, the University of Puerto Rico,  the current owner, contacted the Corps and indicated that several locations  on the property contained hazards caused by DOD use. In a second  assessment—with the aid of the owner’s information, site maps, and  records—the Corps identified three 15,000-gallon underground storage  tanks, an area adjacent to a drinking water source that is “highly”  contaminated with oil by-products, a 12,000-square-foot landfill, and a  concrete structure (15 feet wide, 70 feet long, and 60 feet deep) filled with  water that presents a drowning hazard. These hazards have all been  determined to result from DOD use of the property and are eligible for  cleanup under the FUDS program.
Information on potential hazards found at certain types of FUDS properties  may also be useful in identifying potential hazards at other similar  properties. For example, in August 1994, the Corps issued “Procedures for  Conducting Preliminary Assessments at Potential Ordnance and Explosive  Waste Sites.” This document notes that certain types of former sites are  highly likely to contain unexploded ordnance and that such sites “must not  be determined as  unless strong evidence or extenuating  circumstances can be presented as to why no  contamination is  expected.” The sites specified in the document included Army airfields,  auxiliary airfields, practice bombing ranges, rifle ranges, and prisoner of  war camps. Although these procedures are not referenced in the FUDS  Manual, and we cannot show a cause-and-effect relationship between the  issuance of the procedures and the more frequent identification of  unexploded ordnance as a potential hazard, we found that that Corps staff  identified unexploded ordnance as a possible hazard at these types of sites  more often after the issuance of these procedures. For example, in our  sample, which included 48 auxiliary airfields, unexploded ordnance was  identified as a possible hazard at only 8 of 36 sites that the Corps reviewed  before the procedures were issued. In contrast, for the 12 auxiliary airfields  in our sample that the Corps reviewed after the procedures were issued,  the Corps identified unexploded ordnance as a potential hazard at 10 of the  airfields. Our sample also included 15 prisoner of war camps. Before the  procedures were issued, unexploded ordnance was not identified as a  possible hazard at any of the seven sites the Corps reviewed. After the  procedures were issued, five of the eight prisoner of war camps in our  sample were identified as having potential unexploded ordnance hazards.
The Corps also developed a formal guide for assessing Nike missile sites. In  addition we found that a FUDS project manager in the Corps’ Fort Worth  district developed an informal guide for assessing 14 different types of  FUDS properties that listed the hazards most likely to be found at each. For  example, if a property contained a laundry facility, this informal guide  indicates that staff should look for dry cleaning solvents and tanks.  Similarly, for a property containing an unmanned radar station, staff should  look for underground storage tanks. The Fort Worth project manager told  us that he developed the guide because he did not know what to look for  when he began working in the FUDS program. However, while the use of  such procedures or guides appears to be useful in identifying potential  hazards at certain types of sites, we were able to identify or obtain only the  three guides discussed previously.
section_title: Corps Did Not Take Sufficient Steps to Assess the Presence of Potential Hazards
paragraphs: We found that at times Corps officials overlooked or dismissed  information in their possession that indicated potential hazards might be  present. Often, these problems appear to have involved a failure to act  upon information obtained during identification efforts or a failure to  consider information from owners or from federal, state, or local  environmental agencies. In other cases, the information in the file  suggested potential hazards at the site and did not indicate the basis for the  Corps’ NDAI determination. We also found instances where it appears that  the Corps’ assessment focused on only one of the four potential hazards  included in the Corps’ program—unsafe buildings, structures, or debris;  hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes; containerized hazardous wastes;  and ordnance and explosive wastes. According to several headquarters and  district officials, the FUDS program was focused primarily on cleaning up  unsafe buildings and debris in the early years of the program. Of the NDAI  determinations that we believe lack a sound basis, we estimate that the Corps either overlooked or failed to adequately assess the potential for  hazardous wastes at about 88 percent of the properties, for containerized  hazards at about 78 percent of the properties, and for ordnance and  explosive wastes at about 40 percent of the properties. The following  cases illustrate situations where the Corps overlooked or dismissed  information in its possession that suggested that hazards might be present:  The Corps identified a variety of facilities at Fort Casey, an almost  1,050-acre FUDS property in the state of Washington, and developed  information on prior uses; yet, the Corps apparently failed to use this  information in its assessment of the site. Facilities identified by the  Corps included a coal shed, oil and pump houses, a paint shop, a  gasoline station, a grease rack location, and a target shelter—indicating,  among other things, possible hazardous containerized and ordnance- related wastes. Yet, the file contained no evidence that these facilities  and related potential hazards were considered. The potential hazards  stemming from the use of these facilities were not addressed in  documents or site visit descriptions, and the site was designated as  NDAI. Subsequent to our review, we learned that after the Corps  completed its assessment, the state environmental agency performed  independent reviews in 1999 and 2001, in part to document any threats  or potential threats to human health or the environment posed by this  site. The state reported finding hazardous wastes exceeding state  cleanup levels that were believed to have occurred during DOD  ownership of this site. The state also found what appeared to be fill  pipes normally associated with underground storage tanks—something  the Corps overlooked during its site visit and overall assessment of  this site.
Fort Pickens is an approximately 1,600-acre FUDS property on  the Florida coast that was used to defend against invasion during  World Wars I and II. The Corps identified numerous facilities, including  a power plant building, oil houses, ordnance warehouses, an ordnance  magazine, search light towers, transformers, electric poles, water and  “miscellaneous” facilities, and underground storage tanks. A site visit  revealed open manholes, confirmed the presence of underground  storage tanks and vent pipes and old ammunition lifts with magazines,  and identified a septic tank. The Corps also noted vegetation stress and  attributed this to the local drought. The file contained no evidence that  the Corps assessed the property for possible chemical contamination.  Despite noting the potential hazards associated with these types of  facilities and uses during its assessment and site visit, the Corps  designated the site as NDAI.
The former Othello Air Force Station (Z-40) was a 77-acre aircraft  warning station in the state of Washington. At this site the Corps initially  identified approximately 106 facilities, including a diesel plant; an auto  maintenance shop; a possible 3,000-gallon underground storage tank  and two 25,000-gallon underground storage tanks; a vehicle fueling  station and many other oil, grease, ammunition, and paint storage sites;  a transformer; and “other structures required for operation of a radar  station” that existed during DOD ownership. The presence of these  facilities suggests the potential for both containerized and freestanding  hazardous wastes and ordnance hazards at the property. However, there  was no evidence the Corps considered the former facilities and their  characteristics as potential hazards in reaching their NDAI  determination, and, according to the file, the site visit was “only a  cursory drive-thru inspection.” An independent study of this site by the  state found hazards (i.e., petroleum compounds such as gasoline, diesel,  lube or hydraulic oil; polychlorinated biphenyls; and pesticides) and  some chemicals exceeding state cleanup levels at two locations, which  are believed linked to military ownership.
At the Millrock Repair and Storage Depot of New York, the Corps  identified potential aboveground storage tanks, gas pumps, a dynamite  storage building, and a generator shed. The Corps’ file contained  conflicting trip reports, one indicating potential oil and gas spills and  another indicating that no hazards were found. The initial Corps  proposal for designating the site as NDAI was rejected by the  appropriate Corps district office, and a cleanup project was proposed to  sample for gasoline-related chemicals at the site of former storage tanks  and a gas pump. Subsequently, the proposed project was rejected on the  grounds that there was no evidence that the hazards were related to  DOD’s use of the site. Despite the presence of potential hazards, the file  contains no evidence that the Corps took additional steps to determine  the source of the hazards or that it reported their presence to the  appropriate regulatory agencies.
At the Mount Vernon Municipal Airport in the state of Washington, a  nearly 1,900-acre site previously used by both the Army and the Navy,  the Corps overlooked information in its possession indicating possible  ordnance hazards. In the preliminary assessment of eligibility for this  site, the Corps obtained a map showing conditions of the site on  June 30, 1944, which indicated bomb and fuse storage units. Although  the Corps assessed the site for unsafe buildings and debris and  containerized hazards, the file contained no evidence that the Corps  searched for possible unexploded ordnance despite both guidance  issued by the Corps in 1994, which states that Army airfields are likely to  contain unexploded ordnance, and the presence of the bomb and fuse  storage units, which would also indicate the potential presence of  unexploded ordnance.
We also found that in some cases the files did not contain evidence that  Corps staff conducted a site visit, as required by Corps guidance. A site visit  is one of the primary methods used by the Corps to determine if the  potential hazards are in fact present at a site. For example, if the Corps  identifies underground storage tanks as potential hazards because a site  was once used as a motor pool facility, a site visit can be used to determine  if underground storage tanks are still in place. A typical site visit would  include at least a visual check for signs of filler or vent pipes, which would  normally protrude aboveground if tanks were still present. Without a site  visit, the Corps cannot check for the continued presence of potential  hazards. Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that about  18 percent, or 686, of the estimated 3,840 NDAIs in our study population did  not receive site visits that met Corps requirements: about 428 properties  received no site visits, and about 258 properties received site visits  conducted from the air or from a vehicle, which are not appropriate,  according to Corps program officials.
The following case illustrates a situation where the Corps conducted the  site visit from the air:  At the former Kasiana Island Base Station in Alaska, the site visit  consisted of an over-flight. Although a bunker was noted during the  flyover, the contractor conducting the assessment for the Corps said in  its report that the area was heavily overgrown. In addition, the file  contained no evidence that the Corps tried to identify power sources  (and any associated fuel storage tanks) that were likely present to  operate the searchlight positions and seacoast radar stations located at  the site. Although it was not possible to determine what, if any, hazards  may still exist at the site without being on the ground to check for the  presence of hazards, the file contained no evidence that the Corps took  any further action before designating the site as an NDAI. Subsequent to  designating the site as an NDAI, the Corps revisited the site and found  two underground storage tanks, several 55-gallon drums, and a storage  battery. Tests conducted in the area of the underground storage tanks  showed that diesel products in the groundwater exceeded acceptable  limits.
For some files designated as NDAI, it appeared that Corps staff remained  in their vehicles and took site visit photos from the site’s periphery.  Figures 3, 4, and 5 are examples of such photos for visits to a former Nike  missile site and a former gap filler annex.
According to a 1986 guide developed by the Corps for assessing Nike  missile sites, hazards typically found at Nike sites include petroleum  compounds, paints and solvents, leaking underground storage tanks, and  lead from batteries. The guide also notes that dumping of wastes was  common at Nike sites. On-site dumps were usually located in secluded  areas that “would evade the attention of inspecting military officers,”  according to the guide.
Gap filler annexes are typically unmanned radar sites that are remotely  located. According to the guide developed by Corps staff in Fort Worth,  containerized hazards, such as underground or aboveground storage  tanks containing petroleum, are usually found at such sites. Transformers  containing toxic wastes (polychlorinated biphenyls) have also been found  at similar sites.
Because 30 or more years may pass between the closure of a former  defense site and a Corps site visit, it is likely that potential hazards would  go unnoticed from a vehicle because the area may be too large to see or  may be overgrown with vegetation that could hide any evidence of  potential hazards. In fact, one of the many concerns expressed by state and  EPA officials was that Corps “windshield” or “drive-by” site visits did not  involve a thorough assessment of an entire site. While Corps guidance  requires a site visit, the guidance provides no specifics, only a general  framework for assessing potential hazards. However, Corps officials told us  that site visits conducted from the air or a vehicle are considered  inadequate and would not fulfill the requirement to conduct a site visit.
section_title: Other Factors Contributed to Inadequate Preliminary Assessments of Eligibility
paragraphs: A number of other factors contributed to inadequate preliminary  assessments of eligibility. Corps officials explained that, during the early  stages of the FUDS cleanup program, they were hampered by limited  knowledge of hazards that might be present. They also explained that the  priorities of the program have changed over time. For example, several  Corps officials told us that during its early stages, the program’s focus was  on identifying unsafe building hazards. Later, the focus changed to  identifying and removing containerized hazards—primarily underground  storage tanks. As a result of changing priorities, not all of the potential  hazards were identified and assessed. Moreover, several Corps officials  told us that although hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes are one  category of hazards covered by the program, they cannot propose a project  to clean up such hazards without evidence of their existence. However,  since 1990, sampling soil and water has not been allowed during the  preliminary assessment of eligibility to determine the presence and type of  any contamination that might have been caused by DOD activities.  According to these officials, without sampling to indicate the presence of  hazardous wastes, it is difficult to develop the evidence needed to justify a  cleanup project. As a result, NDAI determinations have been made even  when the presence of hazardous waste was suspected. Some Corps  officials agreed that some of the older NDAI determinations might not be  justified and stated that those determinations may need to be reexamined.
Several district officials indicated that although they would like to  reexamine some of the NDAI determinations, the FUDS program is now  focused on cleaning up hazards already identified, and limited funds are  available for reviewing past NDAI determinations. Although Army guidance  on the FUDS program issued in March 2001 authorized the districts to  reexamine two to five NDAI determinations annually per state in each of  the 22 relevant Corps districts if regulatory agencies request the  reexaminations and if funds are available, funding shortfalls already  hamper the program, according to program officials. For example, the  Corps estimates that at current funding levels—approximately $220 million  in fiscal year 2002—cleaning up the hazards already identified will take  more than 70 years. In its 2001 Funding Strategies report, the Corps  proposed that the Army and DOD increase the annual FUDS program  funding by $155 million to approximately $375 million per year. If the  increased funding were approved and sustained, the Corps could complete  cleanup by 2050.
section_title: Corps Did Not Consistently Notify Owners and Regulatory Agencies about NDAI Determinations and Non-DOD Contamination
paragraphs: In the files we reviewed, we found no evidence that the Corps consistently  notified owners of its NDAI determinations, as required by Corps guidance.  In some cases, the Corps did not notify the owners for several years after it  made the NDAI determinations. In addition, while Corps policy calls for  reconsidering an NDAI determination if evidence is later discovered, it  appeared that the Corps rarely instructed the owners to contact the Corps  with such evidence or told them of the Corps’ policy. Furthermore, the  Corps did not notify federal and state regulatory agencies of its NDAI  determinations because Corps guidance at that time did not require it to do  so, even though these agencies might have regulatory responsibilities or  could have information that might cause the Corps to reconsider its NDAI  determination. The Corps also generally did not notify federal or state  regulatory agencies of potential hazards that it identified but determined  were not caused by DOD’s use. By not routinely notifying the regulatory  agencies of hazards caused by non-DOD users, the Corps lost an  opportunity to assist these agencies’ efforts to protect human health and  the environment.
subsections: section_title: Corps Did Not Consistently Notify Owners about NDAI Determinations
paragraphs: According to Corps guidance, the districts must notify current owners of  the result of the preliminary assessment of eligibility. However, based on  our review of the NDAI files, we estimate that the Corps did not provide  this information to all the current owners at about 72 percent, or 2,779, of  the NDAI properties included in our study population. At one district, a  Corps official stated that owners were sent notification of NDAI  determinations only if they requested it. Further, in spite of the requirement  that owners be notified within 30 to 60 days after a final NDAI  determination, in some cases the Corps did not notify owners for several  years. In one district, notification letters were not sent to owners until  1994, although NDAI determinations had been made as many as 8 years  before. The late-arriving letters caused many owners to call the district  office with questions about their NDAI determinations. As a result, the district decided to stop sending notification letters to owners. In addition,  while Corps policy calls for reconsidering an NDAI determination if  evidence of potential hazards is discovered later, we found that the Corps  rarely instructed the owners to contact the Corps with such evidence or  told them of the Corps’ policy. Based on our review of Corps files, we  estimate that even when the Corps notified the owners of the NDAI  determinations, at about 91 percent of these properties it did not instruct  the owners to contact the Corps with evidence of potential hazards, if  found later. However, because the preliminary assessment of eligibility is  not a comprehensive evaluation of these properties, and the Corps does not  routinely review its past NDAI determinations, owners are an essential  outside source of new information about potential hazards at a given site.  By not notifying owners of the NDAI determinations or advising them to  contact the Corps if evidence of potential hazards is discovered, the Corps  may be reducing its ability to gather new information about potential  hazards and reconsider previous NDAI determinations.
section_title: Corps Did Not Consistently Notify EPA and State Regulatory Agencies about NDAI Determinations and Non-DOD Contamination
paragraphs: Even though EPA and state regulatory agencies might have relevant  statutory responsibilities or could have information that might cause the  Corps to reconsider its NDAI determination, based on our review of Corps  files, we estimate that the Corps did not notify the regulatory agencies of  the NDAI determinations at the time they were made for about 99 percent  of the properties. Although Corps officials told us that they have now  provided copies of all the NDAI determinations to the relevant federal and  state agencies, some EPA and state officials indicated that they have not  yet received copies of the NDAI determinations. Even when notification  was provided, it was often done in a way that did not encourage agencies’  involvement. For example, one state regulatory agency received a bulk  delivery of Corps FUDS summary documents for past NDAI determinations  with no explanation. According to state officials, sending agencies NDAI  determinations made several years earlier limits the agencies’ ability to  provide timely input about potential hazards at a given site. Sending bulk  deliveries of documents with no explanation does not encourage the  involvement of state regulators who might be unfamiliar with Corps  documentation or procedures.
Notifying EPA and state regulatory agencies of NDAI determinations in a  timely and appropriate manner could facilitate regulators’ involvement and  address some of the concerns that these agencies have about the adequacy  of the Corps’ preliminary assessment of eligibility. State regulators told us  that their concurrence with an NDAI determination could increase the  credibility of the Corps’ determination and improve its quality. State  regulators indicated that, in some cases, they could provide the Corps with  information about FUDS sites and properties adjacent to FUDS sites,  including sampling data that could assist the Corps in determining if further  study or cleanup actions by DOD were needed. State regulators also told us  that they could provide the Corps with best practice guidance on  conducting site visits and engaging the public in data-gathering. A state  official also pointed out that his state could assist the Corps in gaining  entry to a property if the owner refused to allow the Corps to conduct a site  visit. Typically, if the owner refuses entry, the Corps designates the  property as NDAI.
EPA and some state regulatory agencies believe that the involvement of  their agencies is crucial to the successful implementation and review of the  Corps’ preliminary assessment of eligibility process. One example where  state involvement has led to the reconsideration of an NDAI determination  is the former Wilkins Air Force Base in Ohio, where a school is now  located. Following increased public interest in school sites that were once  owned by DOD, the state regulatory agency became concerned about the  number of FUDS in the state where schools or school activities are now  located and conducted a file review of all FUDS sites with school-related  activities. Based on new information from the state agency, and after  conducting a joint site visit, the Corps proposed a new project at the  former Wilkins Air Force Base. The Army is taking steps to improve  communication among the Army, regulators, and other stakeholders. In  2000, the Army created the FUDS Improvement Working Group to  (1) address the concerns of regulators and other stakeholders about the  FUDS program and (2) identify new or modified policies and procedures  that will improve communication.
We also noted during our review of NDAI files that the Corps routinely did  not notify regulatory agencies when it identified potential hazards that  were not the result of DOD use. Although, according to a Corps official, it is  “common sense” that the Corps would notify EPA or state regulatory  agencies of non-DOD hazards that it identified during its preliminary  assessment of eligibility, we estimate that at about 246 NDAI properties the  Corps did not notify EPA or state regulatory agencies of non-DOD  hazards. For example, when conducting a site visit in Louisiana in 1986,  Corps staff identified an underground diesel oil storage tank of unknown  size that held approximately 12 inches of diesel oil. The Corps concluded  that this hazard was not the result of DOD activities, but was left by the  Coast Guard. However, the file contains no evidence that the Corps  notified EPA or state regulators of the suspected hazard. An EPA official  told us that the Corps never notified EPA of the hazard at this site, and that  EPA became aware of the hazard only in 2000, as the result of an initiative it  undertook to review Corps FUDS files. While not notifying regulatory  agencies of potential hazards that were not the result of DOD use does  not affect the Corps’ NDAI determination, it presents a lost opportunity  to assist regulators in their efforts to protect human health and  the environment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Corps does not have a sound basis for about a third of its NDAI  determinations for FUDS properties. In making its determinations, the  Corps was handicapped by a lack of information about how these  properties were used and which facilities were present when DOD  controlled the property. In addition, the Corps, at times, apparently  overlooked or dismissed information in its possession that suggested that  hazards might be present. In still other cases, the Corps did not conduct  an adequate site visit to assess the presence of hazards. Because  of inadequacies in the Corps’ process for assessing the presence of DOD- caused hazards at these properties, potential hazards may have gone  unnoticed. The Corps also did not consistently notify owners and  regulatory agencies of its findings and determinations. By not  communicating with these parties, the Corps lost opportunities to obtain  information on potential hazards that were not discovered during their  preliminary assessment of eligibility, which is not comprehensive.
These shortcomings resulted, in part, because Corps guidance does not  specify what documents or level of detail the Corps should obtain when  identifying potential hazards. Also, the guidance does not include  information about typical hazards that might be present at certain types of  properties or specify how to assess the presence of potential hazards. As a  result, the Corps’ assessment that almost 4,000 FUDS require no further  study or cleanup action may not be accurate. In essence, the Corps does  not know the number of additional properties that may require further  study or cleanup actions, the hazards that may be present at these  properties, or the risk level associated with these hazards. Given that one  of the factors used in establishing the Corps’ cleanup priorities is the risk  that each property poses to the public or to the environment, unless the  Corps improves its guidance and reviews past NDAI determinations to  determine which sites should be reassessed, the Corps cannot be  reasonably certain that it has identified all hazards that may require further  study or cleanup action. Without knowing the full extent of the hazards at  these properties, the Corps cannot be assured that the properties it is  currently cleaning up or that it plans to clean up in the future are the sites  that pose the greatest risk. The Corps also cannot estimate how much  additional money and time may be needed to clean up properties that were  not properly assessed.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that all potential hazards are adequately identified and  assessed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps  to develop and consistently implement more specific guidelines  and procedures for assessing FUDS properties. These guidelines and  procedures should  specify the historical documents such as site maps, aerial and ground  photos, and comprehensive site histories that the Corps should try to  obtain for each property to identify all of the potential hazards that  might have been caused by DOD’s use;  include a listing of typical hazards that might be present at certain types  of properties, such as communication facilities or motor pools, and  incorporate the guides already developed for ordnance hazards and  Nike missile sites into Corps procedures;  require that the Corps contact other interested parties—including  federal, state, and local agencies—as well as owners during the  preliminary assessment of eligibility to discuss potential hazards at the  properties; and  provide instructions for conducting site visits to ensure that each site  receives an adequate site visit and that all potential hazards are properly  assessed.
To further ensure that all hazards caused by DOD at FUDS properties are  identified, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, as an initial step,  direct the Corps to use the newly developed guidance and procedures to  review the files of FUDS properties that it has determined do not need  further study or cleanup action to determine if the files contain adequate  evidence to support the NDAI determinations. If there is an insufficient  basis for the determination, those properties should be reassessed.
To ensure that all parties are notified of the Corps’ NDAI determinations,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps to develop  and consistently implement procedures to ensure that owners and  appropriate federal, state, and local environmental agencies are notified of  the results of the Corps’ preliminary assessments of eligibility in a timely  manner. The Corps should also ensure that owners are aware that the  Corps will reconsider an NDAI determination if new evidence of DOD  hazards is found. In addition, when preliminary assessments of eligibility  identify potential hazards that did not result from DOD activities, the  procedures should direct the Corps to notify the appropriate regulatory  agencies in a timely manner.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a copy of this report to the DOD for review and comment. In  written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our  conclusions, but partially agreed with each of the three recommendations  included in this report.
DOD disagreed with our conclusion that the Corps did not consistently  obtain information necessary to identify potential hazards at FUDS  properties. While DOD acknowledged that the Corps did not have  consistent procedures for evaluating FUDS properties during the early  years of the program, the agency stated that it does not believe that such  inconsistencies led to inadequate assessments. Our conclusion that the  Corps did not consistently obtain information necessary to identify  potential hazards at FUDS properties is based on our review of over  600 randomly selected NDAI files at nine Corps district offices. We found  numerous instances where the files did not contain evidence that potential  hazards associated with the property’s prior uses were identified or that  Corps staff looked for hazards other than unsafe buildings or debris.  Furthermore, during our review, several district officials told us that they  would like to reexamine some of the NDAI determinations, but that limited  funding is available for this purpose. DOD also stated that the use of tools  developed in the later years of the program, such as checklists for specific  types of sites, have contributed to a more consistent approach. We agree  that tools such as checklists and guides, which provide information on  potential hazards that might be found at certain types of FUDS properties,  would be useful. However, as we point out in our report, we identified only  three such checklists or guides during our review and they were not  referenced in the Corps’ FUDS manual that provides information and  guidance to staff. For this reason, we recommended that the Corps develop  guidelines and procedures that include a listing of typical hazards that  might be present at certain types of facilities and incorporate the guides  already developed.
DOD also disagreed that the Corps did not take sufficient steps to assess  the presence of potential hazards at FUDS properties. In its comments,  DOD stated that the FUDS eligibility determination was never intended as a  means to characterize all the hazards at a site and cannot be compared to  the CERCLA preliminary assessment/site inspection. We recognize that the  preliminary assessment of eligibility is not, nor is it intended to be, a  comprehensive evaluation of a FUDS property, and our report does not  compare the Corps’ preliminary assessment of eligibility to the CERCLA  preliminary assessment/site inspection. DOD also stated that if the Corps  determines that a property is eligible for the program, an investigation  process is undertaken to determine the extent of DOD-caused hazards at  the site. Actually, all eligible FUDS properties do not automatically proceed  to the investigative phase. In fact, NDAIs, which account for over 4,000 of  the approximately 6,700 properties the Corps has determined are eligible  for the FUDS cleanup program, do not undergo further investigation. Only  properties eligible for the FUDS program and where the Corps believes that  potential hazards caused by DOD may exist undergo further investigation.  However, as we point out in our report, we found instances where Corps  officials appeared to overlook or dismiss information in their possession  that suggested potential hazards might be present, and we included specific  examples where this occurred.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to develop and  consistently implement more specific guidelines and procedures for  assessing FUDS properties. DOD pointed out that the Army, through the  FUDS Improvement Initiative, is currently evaluating the need for any  additional guidance or requirements. Our report describes some of the  shortcomings that we found in the Corps’ guidance, and our  recommendation identifies key areas where we believe that the Corps’  guidelines and procedures should be made more specific.
DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation to use newly  developed guidance and procedures to determine if NDAI files contained  adequate evidence to support the Corps’ determinations. DOD noted that  the Corps would reevaluate an NDAI determination if additional  information were discovered and pointed out that the Army has already  agreed to reevaluate two to five NDAIs per year at each state’s request. Our  report acknowledges both the Corps’ policy of reconsidering an NDAI  determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards is later found and its  plans to reevaluate two to five NDAIs per year at each state’s request. We  do not believe that the Corps should wait to be asked to reconsider its past  NDAI determinations. Under the Defense Environmental Restoration  Program, DOD and the Corps, as the executive agent for the FUDS  program, bear the responsibility of identifying, investigating, and cleaning  up, if necessary, DOD-caused hazards at FUDS properties. Therefore, we  continue to believe that the Corps should undertake a review of NDAI  property files and reassess those properties where the Corps’  determinations are not adequately supported.
In response to our recommendation aimed at improving its notification  procedures, DOD commented that eligibility determination reports are now  routinely provided to the states and, where appropriate, to EPA regional  offices, and that recent efforts have increased coordination and  communication between regulatory agencies and property owners. DOD  also pointed out that the Army plans to include, as part of the FUDS manual  revision, guidance that specifically requires notification of landowners and  regulatory agencies of all NDAI determinations. While DOD did not  specifically comment on our recommendation to develop procedures to  direct the Corps to notify the appropriate regulatory agencies when its  preliminary assessment of eligibility identifies potential hazards that did  not result from DOD activities, DOD indicated in its technical comments  that the Corps will notify the proper authorities of such hazards.
In addition to its written comments, DOD also provided a number of  technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DOD’s comments appear in appendix III.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Corps (1) has a sound basis for its  determinations that more than 4,000 formerly used defense sites need no  further study or cleanup actions and (2) communicated its NDAI  determinations to owners and regulatory agencies that may have  responsibilities and notified the owners that it will reconsider an NDAI  determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards is found later, we  reviewed a statistical sample of 635 NDAI files at nine Corps districts that  execute the FUDS program. The districts selected were (1) Alaska,  (2) Fort Worth, (3) Jacksonville, (4) Louisville, (5) New York, (6) Omaha,  (7) Sacramento, (8) Savannah, and (9) Seattle. The Alaska district was  selected with certainty because it had the highest number of NDAIs when  we began our review. The remaining 8 districts were selected at random  from 21 of the 22 Corps districts that execute the FUDS program, with the  probability of selection proportional to the number of NDAIs in their  districts. The Huntington district was excluded from our study population  because it only had seven NDAIs and was not considered to be a practical  choice to examine if selected. The 21 districts from which we selected our  random sample accounted for 99.8 percent of the NDAI files. Thirty-two of  the properties whose files we selected for review were excluded from our  analysis because the files contained evidence that either the property was  not eligible for the FUDS program or that a cleanup project was proposed.  Each NDAI selected was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account  statistically for all eligible NDAIs in the 21 districts, including those that  were not selected.
We obtained and reviewed the Corps’ policies and procedures and program  documents to obtain information about the preliminary assessment of  eligibility. We also interviewed past and present FUDS program officials  from headquarters and district offices to obtain information about the  practices followed by Corps staff in completing this phase. From the  information provided by these officials and a review of a sample of NDAI  files at the Baltimore district, we developed a data collection instrument  (DCI). The DCI was used to document, in a consistent manner, the  evidence that we abstracted from each file reviewed and our assessment of  the soundness of the Corps’ NDAI determination.
We also contacted environmental officials from 17 states that interact with  Corps districts on the FUDS program. We judgmentally selected these  states to provide a range of opinion and perception of the Corps’  preliminary assessment of eligibility. In addition, we contacted officials  from EPA regional offices that interact with the Corps’ districts included in  our review. These offices included Atlanta (Region 4); Chicago (Region 5);  Dallas (Region 6); Denver (Region 8); Kansas City (Region 7); New York  City (Region 2); San Francisco (Region 9); and Seattle (Region 10).  Appendix I contains additional details on our scope and methodology,  and appendix II presents the results of our review of 603 randomly selected  NDAI files.
We conducted our review from May 2001 through June 2002 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of Defense;  the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the appropriate  congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also  provide copies to others upon request. In addition, the report will be  available, at no charge, on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov/.
section_title: Additional Details on Our Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which the  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (1) has a sound basis for  determining that more than 4,000 formerly used defense sites (FUDS) need  no further study or cleanup and for designating those properties as “No  Department of Defense (DOD) Action Indicated, Category I” (NDAI) and  (2) communicated its NDAI determinations to owners and to the regulatory  agencies that may have responsibility and notified the owners that it will  reconsider an NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards is  found later. To address these objectives, we analyzed a statistical sample  of 603 NDAI files at nine Corps districts that execute the FUDS program.  The districts selected were (1) Alaska, (2) Fort Worth, (3) Jacksonville,  (4) Louisville, (5) New York, (6) Omaha, (7) Sacramento, (8) Savannah, and  (9) Seattle. The Alaska district was selected with certainty because it had  the highest number of NDAIs when we began our review. The remaining  districts were randomly selected, with the probability of selection  proportional to the number of NDAIs in the district. Table 1 provides  additional information on the districts selected for our review, including  the states within their boundaries, the number of FUDS properties  designated as NDAI, the NDAI files we selected for review, and the number  of determinations that we questioned.
We reviewed each selected file to determine if it contained evidence  that the Corps (1) reviewed or obtained information on the buildings,  structures, and other facilities (such as underground storage tanks)  associated with DOD’s use of the site that would allow the Corps to identify  the types of hazards potentially resulting from DOD’s use and (2) took  sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards.
If we did not find evidence in the file that indicated the Corps reviewed or  obtained information on prior DOD uses of the site, we concluded that the  Corps did not identify all of the hazards that might be present at the site.  However, the absence of a single piece of information, such as a site map or  record of contact with an owner, did not automatically cause us to question  the adequacy of the Corps’ efforts to identify the prior uses and the  associated potential hazards. Rather, we based our assessment of the  Corps’ efforts on the totality of the evidence in the file. For example, if  the file did not contain a site map, but the file contained evidence that the  Corps staff made use of a site map during its assessment, we concluded  that the Corps reviewed a site map.
If the file contained evidence that the Corps determined that potential  hazards might be present, but did not take certain actions, such as  conducting a site visit, we concluded that the Corps did not take sufficient  steps to assess the presence of potential hazards at the site. However, if the  file contained evidence that a site visit was conducted, such as the date of a  site visit, we concluded that the Corps conducted a site visit even if the file  did not contain photos or a trip report. If a file contained evidence that the  Corps overlooked or dismissed information in its possession that potential  hazards might be present, we concluded that the Corps did not take  sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards. If we found  either or all of these scenarios when reviewing the files, we determined  that the NDAI determinations were questionable. Our questioning of an  NDAI determination does not mean that the property is contaminated;  rather, it indicates that the Corps’ file did not contain evidence that the  Corps took steps to identify and assess potential hazards at the property  that would support the NDAI determination.
We also reviewed the NDAI files to determine how often the Corps notified  owners and regulatory agencies of its NDAI determinations and of its  policy of reconsidering the determinations if additional evidence of DOD- caused hazards was found later.
We used a data collection instrument (DCI) to document, in a consistent  manner, the evidence that we abstracted from each file and our assessment  of the soundness of the Corps’ NDAI determinations. Each DCI was  independently reviewed and compared to the original file to ensure that the  information documented on the DCI was accurate and that our assessment  of the Corps’ determination was reasonable, i.e., that another person  looking at the information in the file would come to the same conclusion  about the Corps’ determination. We copied the contents of the files to  ensure that any further questions or issues could be researched later and  that we had sufficient evidence to support the information recorded on the  DCI. From the DCIs, we created an electronic database. The members of  our team reviewing the files and the person conducting the supervisory  review changed for each district. While we rotated staff to reduce bias, we  also used this rotation to help increase consistency of judgments. In  addition, we conducted an independent quality check of our database  entries created from the DCIs. For each of the districts visited, we  randomly selected 10 percent of the electronically entered DCIs. An  independent verifier checked 100 percent of the data for every question,  sub-question, and comment box on the DCI, comparing the “hard copy” of  the DCI to the entries found in the database to ensure that there were no  data entry errors. Our error rate was 0.379 percent—less than ½ of 1  percent. All errors found were corrected. In addition, we verified 100  percent of the responses to questions and sub-questions on the DCI that  were key to supporting our findings.
The information presented in this report consists, in part, of statistical  estimates based on our review of randomly selected files. The results of  our analysis are projectable to NDAI determinations nationwide, excluding  the Huntington district. Because we followed a probability procedure  based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of  samples that we could have drawn. Each sample could have provided  different estimates. We therefore express our confidence in the precision  of our particular sample’s results as 95 percent confidence intervals.  Each of these intervals contains the actual (unknown) population value  for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are  95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in the report will  include the true value in the study population.
All percentage estimates from the file review have 95 percent confidence  intervals whose width does not exceed plus or minus 10 percentage points,  unless otherwise noted. All numerical estimates other than percentages  (such as averages or totals) have 95 percent confidence intervals whose  width does not exceed 10 percent of the value of those estimates, unless  otherwise noted. The widths of the confidence intervals are shown as  footnotes to the text, where appropriate.
While the results of our analysis are generally projectable nationwide, we  also used our selected samples to develop case examples of the preliminary  assessments of eligibility conducted by the Corps. These case examples are  for illustration only.
section_title: Results of Our Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI Properties
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  (Corps) has a sound basis for its determinations that more than 4,000  formerly used defense sites (FUDS) need no further Department of  Defense (DOD) study or cleanup and for designating those properties as  “No DOD Action Indicated” (NDAI), we reviewed and analyzed a statistical  sample of 603 NDAI files at nine Corps districts. Table 2 shows the property  name, the FUDS number, and whether we found, based on our review of  the evidence in the file, that the Corps had a sound basis for its NDAI  determination. In those cases where we do not believe that the Corps has a  sound basis, the table includes an explanation for our finding. Our  questioning of an NDAI determination does not mean that the property is  contaminated; rather, it indicates that the Corps’ file did not contain  evidence that the Corps took steps to identify and assess potential hazards  at the property that would support the NDAI determination. In the table, we  use abbreviations for the four types of hazards: building demolition and  debris removal (BD/DR); hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste (HTRW);  containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste (CON/HTRW); and  ordnance and explosive waste (OEW).
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Ian Ferguson, Ken Lightner, Sherry  McDonald, and Aaron Shiffrin made key contributions to this report. Also  contributing to this report were Doreen S. Feldman, Susan W. Irwin,  Cynthia Norris, and Sidney Schwartz.
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
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