Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought
Published: 2002-03-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Enhancing homeland security is a complex effort that involves all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories; thousands of municipalities; and countless private entities. Since September 11, the nation has taken many actions to combat terrorism and enhance homeland security. It is well known that the U.S. military is conducting operations in Afghanistan. Various legislative and executive branch actions to enhance homeland security have been taken or were underway prior to and since September 11. Government and nongovernment activities are looking to the Office of Homeland Security for further guidance on how to better integrate their missions and more effectively contribute to the overarching homeland security effort. Having a common definition can help avoid duplication of effort and gaps in coverage by identifying agency roles and responsibilities. Although the agencies are looking for guidance, they also want to ensure that their unique missions are factored in as guidance is developed. At the same time, some agencies are unsure what they should be doing beyond their traditional missions. Once the national strategy is issued, federal, state, and local government agencies and private sector groups will need to work together to achieve the goals and objectives. Public-private partnerships used to address Y2K concerns can also be used to promote the national strategy.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today our country’s  progress in combating terrorism to enhance homeland security. Protecting  the United States and its citizens from terrorism is a national effort  involving both the government and nongovernment sectors. Such broad- based efforts are inherently difficult to lead and manage. More than 40  federal entities alone are involved in combating terrorism. Enhancing  homeland security becomes even more complex because it involves all 50  states, the District of Columbia, and the territories; thousands of  municipalities; and countless private entities, many of which own the  infrastructure that can be attacked. These organizations have multiple,  specialized missions, distinct organizational cultures, and millions of  employees. Some have both international and domestic components and  operations. Trying to effectively involve them in a single, coordinated  effort makes a monumental undertaking.
Since September 11, our nation has taken many actions to combat  terrorism and enhance homeland security. Today, it is well known that our  servicemembers are conducting operations in Afghanistan in Operation  Enduring Freedom. This operation covers offensive actions in the  Afghanistan theater and the North Arabian Sea, and includes ground, air,  and naval forces, and follow-on operations for certain support activities.  Less well-known perhaps is the Department of Defense’s other primary  ongoing operation, Noble Eagle, which concerns the direct defense of the  U.S. homeland. This operation protects civilian population centers, critical  infrastructure, and special events such as the recently completed Winter  Olympics held in Salt Lake City. To help provide operational forces, the  department has alerted for activation just over 97,000 reserve component  servicemembers and completed the call-up of more than 78,000 Reserve  and National Guard augmentees.
As requested, my testimony will cover three areas. First, I will discuss  progress in enhancing homeland security through legislative and executive  action prior to and after September 11. Second, I will present the  preliminary results of the work we are doing for you and some of your  House colleagues on integrating the efforts of all levels of government and  the private sector into overall homeland security efforts. Finally, I will  discuss an approach that could be helpful in integrating governmental and  private sector organizations into the Office of Homeland Security’s  planned national strategy.
My testimony is generally based on the large body of relevant work that  we have completed or have ongoing.
subsections: section_title: Improvements to Homeland Security Are in Process
paragraphs: Legislative and executive branch action has led to a variety of  governmentwide and agency-specific initiatives, started and ongoing, to  enhance homeland security. Establishment of an Office of Homeland  Security and the office’s planned national security strategy represent  important governmentwide initiatives to address homeland security  concerns. The planned production of new vaccines or expansion of  existing vaccines, additional intergovernmental-planning and  consequence-management efforts, and enhancements to aviation, seaport,  and border security suggest progress in enhancing homeland security.  Moreover, Congress appropriated about $19.5 billion in fiscal year 2002  and about another $9.8 billion contained in a $40 billion emergency  supplemental budget after September 11 to help address homeland  security concerns. The president has requested about $37.7 billion for  fiscal year 2003 for homeland security.
subsections: section_title: Governmentwide Initiatives
paragraphs: In October 2001, the president established a single focal point to  coordinate efforts to secure the United States from terrorist attacks—the  Office of Homeland Security. This is consistent with a recommendation  that we had previously made. The office is charged with broad  responsibilities including, but not limited to (1) working with federal  agencies, state and local governments, and private entities to develop a  national strategy and to coordinate implementation of the strategy;  (2) overseeing prevention, crisis-management, and consequence- management activities; (3) coordinating threat and intelligence  information; (4) reviewing governmentwide budgets for homeland security  as well as providing advice to agencies and the Office of Management and  Budget on appropriate levels of funding; and (5) coordinating critical  infrastructure protection. The office plans to issue its national strategy in  July 2002. The strategy is to be “national” in scope not only by including  states, localities, and private-sector entities, as well as federal agencies;  but also by setting clear objectives for homeland security with  performance measures to gauge progress. Also, the plan is to be supported  by a crosscutting federal budget plan.
In previous work on combating terrorism, we had also recommended that  the Federal Bureau of Investigation work with appropriate agencies to  develop a national-level threat assessment on terrorist use of weapons of  mass destruction. The bureau concurred in July 1999 but never issued the  assessment and has now suspended the effort. We continue to believe that  the threat assessment is needed.
section_title: Production of New Vaccines
paragraphs: Progress has been made and efforts are continuing to enhance U.S.  capability to respond to biological terrorism. Research is underway to  enable the rapid identification of biological agents in a variety of settings;  develop new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals to improve  treatment and vaccination for infectious diseases caused by biological  agents; and develop and test emergency response equipment such as  respiratory and other personal protective equipment. Another initiative  includes the production of 155 million doses of smallpox vaccine to bring  the total number of doses in the nation’s stockpile to 286 million by the  end of 2002, which is enough to protect every U.S. citizen. In addition, the  National Institutes of Health plans to award a contract to accelerate  development of new vaccines against anthrax.
The number of “push packages” in the National Pharmaceutical Stockpilewill increase from 8 to 12. Each push package has quantities of several  different antidotes and antibiotics that can treat and protect persons  exposed to different biological and chemical agents. The push packages  are planned to have enough pharmaceuticals to treat 12 million persons  for inhalation anthrax as compared to the 2 million that could be treated  before the project started. Finally, Mr. Chairman, the concerns you raised  prior to September 11, 2001, about accountability over medical supplies,  including items from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, put  responsible agencies on alert, and they have subsequently improved their  internal controls for these items so they are current, accounted for, and  ready to use.
section_title: Intergovernmental Planning and Consequence Management
paragraphs: As you know Mr. Chairman, federal, state, and local governments share a  responsibility to prepare for a terrorist incident. The first responders to a  terrorist incident usually belong to local governments and local emergency  response organizations, which include local police and fire departments,  emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies. Historically, the  federal government has primarily provided leadership, training, and  funding assistance.
The president’s First Responder Initiative was announced in his State of  the Union address of January 29, 2002. The initiative will be led by the  Federal Emergency Management Agency, and its proposed fiscal year 2003  budget includes $3.5 billion to provide the first responder community with  funds to conduct important planning and exercises, purchase equipment,  and train their personnel. At the request of the Subcommittee on  Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental  Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, we have begun to  examine the preparedness issues confronting state and local governments  and will report back to the subcommittee later this year.
section_title: Aviation and Seaport Security
paragraphs: Progress has been made in addressing aviation security concerns, but  significant challenges will need to be confronted later this year to meet  established goals and time frames. The Congress passed the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act in November 2001, which created the  Transportation Security Administration with broad new responsibilities  for aviation security. The administration faces the daunting challenge of  creating this new organizational structure, which must implement more  than two dozen specific actions by the end of 2002. All actions due to date  have been completed, but formidable tasks remain. For example, the  administration is required to have sufficient explosive detection systems in  place to screen all checked baggage at more than 400 airports nationwide  by December 31, 2002. As of January 2002, fewer than 170 of these  machines had been installed. The administration estimates that about  2,000 additional machines will need to be produced and installed by the  end of the year. Concerns have been raised that the vendors will not be  able to produce sufficient number of machines to meet the deadline. The  administration continues to work to identify ways to fill the gap between  the requirement and the production capability, including considering the  use of noncertified equipment as an interim measure. Also, the  administration needs to hire about 40,000 employees, including more than  30,000 screeners, federal air marshals, and other officials. Achieving this  goal presents a big challenge because a significant number of the current  screening workforce may not qualify for screening positions. Airport  screeners must now be U.S. citizens and be able to speak and read  English. For example, currently up to 80 percent of the personnel in these  positions at Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C., do not  qualify for employment.
While not currently as high-profile as airport security, the vulnerability of  major commercial seaports to criminal and terrorist activity has caused  concern for many years, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,  elevated those concerns again. Even prior to the attacks, this  subcommittee expressed concerns about seaport security and the  potential consequences of a terrorist attack on the successful deployment  of our military forces. Because of these concerns, you asked us to examine  the effectiveness of Department of Defense force protection measures at  critical seaports located within the United States and at overseas  locations, and we will issue our report to you later this year. As part of our  work, some of which I can highlight today, we have observed efforts by  the Coast Guard to improve seaport security since the attacks.
In order to establish a clear indication of how Coast Guard units and  personnel should respond to various threat levels at seaports, the Coast  Guard is developing three new maritime security levels. The first level,  “new normal,” will encompass a greater level of security effort in the ports,  including increased emphasis on security patrols, improved awareness of  all activity in and around seaports, and better information about inbound  vessels and their cargo. The other two security levels will contain  increasingly heightened security measures to be taken if threat conditions  escalate. The Coast Guard has also initiated the “sea marshal” program,  whereby armed Coast Guard teams are placed aboard select commercial  vessels navigating the waters of some of our major ports. A third Coast  Guard initiative underway is the development of a vulnerability  assessment methodology that the Coast Guard plans to use at more than  50 major U.S. seaports to identify vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure  at each port.
Congress is considering legislation to enhance seaport security. The port  and maritime security legislation, which passed the Senate in December,  contains a number of provisions aimed at further improving the state of  seaport security. Among these provisions are establishing local port  security committees, comprised of a broad range of federal, state, and  local governments as well as commercial representatives; requiring  vulnerability assessments at major U.S. seaports; developing  comprehensive security plans for all waterfront facilities; improving  collection and coordination of intelligence; improving training for  maritime security professionals; making federal grants for security  infrastructure improvements; and preparing a national maritime  transportation security plan. Moreover, for fiscal year 2002, Congress  appropriated $93.3 million to the Transportation Security Administration  for port security assessment and improvements.
section_title: Border Security
paragraphs: The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has a number of efforts  underway designed to increase border security to prevent terrorists or  other undesirable aliens from entering the United States. The service  proposes to spend nearly $3 billion on border enforcement in fiscal year  2003, about 75 percent of its total enforcement budget of $4.1 billion. I will  describe some of the service’s efforts to increase security at the nation’s  ports of entry and between the ports, as well as to coordinate efforts with  Canadian authorities to deter illegal entry into Canada or the United  States.
subsections: section_title: Ports of Entry
paragraphs: Currently, the United States does not have a system for identifying who  has overstayed their visa, nor a sufficient ability to identify and locate  visitors who may pose a security threat. Consequently, INS is developing  an entry and exit system to create records for aliens arriving in the United  States and match them with those aliens’ departure records. The  Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement  Act of 2000 requires the attorney general to implement such a system at all  airports and seaports by the end of 2003, at the 50 land border ports with  the greatest numbers of arriving and departing aliens by the end of 2004,  and at all ports by the end of 2005. The USA Patriot Act, passed in October  2001, instructs the attorney general and the secretary of state to focus on  two new elements in designing an entry and exit system—the development  of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of entry, and the  utilization of biometric technology. Legislation now before Congress  would go further by making the use of biometrics a requirement in the  proposed entry and exit system.
Implementing such a system within the mandated deadlines represents a  major challenge for the INS. According to INS officials, important policy  decisions significantly affecting development, cost, schedule, and  operation of an entry and exit system have yet to be made. For example, it  has not been decided whether arrival and departure data for Canadian  citizens will be recorded in the new system. Currently, Canadian citizens  are not required to present documents to enter the United States. The  particular biometric identifier to be used, such as a fingerprint or facial  recognition, has not been determined. Nor has a decision been made on  whether a traveler’s biometric would be checked only upon entry, or at  departure, too.
The INS’ proposed fiscal year 2003 budget states that INS seeks to spend  $380 million on the proposed system in fiscal year 2003. To increase the  detection and apprehension of inadmissible aliens, including terrorists, at  the nation’s ports of entry, the service seeks to add nearly 1,200 inspectors  in fiscal year 2003 to operate more inspection lanes at land ports and air  ports of entry, and examine information on arriving passengers in order to  identify high-risk travelers.
section_title: Between the Ports of Entry
paragraphs: To deter illegal entry between the ports of entry and make our borders  more secure, the INS seeks to add an additional 570 Border Patrol agents  in fiscal year 2003. In response to the September 11 attack, of the 570  Border Patrol positions, INS now seeks to add 285 agents to the northern  border, thereby accelerating a staffing buildup at the northern border. The  remaining half will be deployed to the southwest border. This represents a  departure from previous decisions to deploy most new agent positions to  the southwest border. Along the northern border, the service plans on  maintaining an air surveillance program capable of responding 24 hours a  day 7 days a week. Plus it plans to complete the installation of 67  automated surveillance systems and begin construction of 44 new systems.  In addition, the INS has signed a memorandum of agreement with the  Department of Defense allowing about 700 National Guard troops and  equipment, such as helicopters, to assist in border enforcement duties for  up to 6 months. The agreement allows the use of the troops for such  activities as assisting in surveillance, transporting Border Patrol agents, as  well as managing traffic at ports of entry.
section_title: Coordination with Canada
paragraphs: In December 2001, the United States and Canada signed a Smart Border  Declaration calling for increased coordination to create a border that  facilitates the free flow of people and commerce while maintaining  homeland security. The declaration calls for such actions as (1)  implementing collaborative systems to identify security risks while  expediting the flow of low-risk travelers, (2) identifying persons who pose  a security threat before they arrive at North American airports or seaports  through collaborative approaches such as reviewing crew and passenger  manifests, and (3) establishing a secure system to allow low-risk frequent  travelers between the two countries to cross the border more efficiently.  The INS and other U.S. and Canadian agencies are in the initial stages of  working on developing plans and initiatives to implement the declaration’s  objectives.
section_title: Funding for Homeland Security
paragraphs: Congress has also acted and provided significant homeland security funds.  According to documents supporting the president’s fiscal year 2003 budget  request, about $19.5 billion in federal funding for homeland security was  enacted in fiscal year 2002. Congress added about $9.8 billion more in an  emergency supplemental appropriation of $40 billion following the  September 11 attacks. The funds were to be used for a variety of homeland  security needs including supporting first responders, defending against  biological terrorism, securing U.S. borders, enhancing aviation security,  and supporting Department of Defense support to homeland security,  among other things. The president has now requested about $37.7 billion  for homeland security in his fiscal year 2003 budget request.
section_title: Public and Private Sectors Seek Both Direction From and Partnership With the Office of Homeland Security
paragraphs: Our ongoing work indicates that federal agencies, state and local  governments, and the private sector are looking for guidance from the  Office of Homeland Security on how to better integrate their missions and  more effectively contribute to the overarching homeland security effort. In  interviews with officials at more than a dozen federal agencies, we found  that a broadly accepted definition of homeland security did not exist.  Some of these officials believed that it was essential that the concept and  related terms be defined, particularly because homeland security  initiatives are crosscutting, and a clear definition promotes a common  understanding of operational plans and requirements, and can help avoid  duplication of effort and gaps in coverage. Common definitions promote  more effective agency and intergovernmental operations and permit more  accurate monitoring of homeland security expenditures at all levels of  government. The Office of Homeland Security may establish such a  definition. The Office of Management and Budget believes a single  definition of homeland security can be used to enforce budget discipline.  Although some agencies are looking to the Office of Homeland Security  for guidance on how their agencies should be integrated into the overall  security effort and to explain what else they should be doing beyond their  traditional missions, they also want their viewpoints incorporated as this  guidance evolves. For example, an official at the Centers for Disease  Control and Prevention saw the Office of Homeland Security as both  providing leadership and getting “everyone to the table” to facilitate a  common understanding of roles and responsibilities.
State officials told us that they also seek additional clarity on how they can  best participate in the planned national strategy for homeland security.  The planned national strategy should identify additional roles for state and  local governments, but the National Governor’s Association made clear to  us that governments oppose mandated participation and prefer broad  guidelines or benchmarks.
State officials were also concerned about the cost of assuming additional  responsibilities, and they plan to rely on the federal government for  funding assistance. The National Governors Association estimates fiscal  year 2002 state budget shortfalls of between $40 billion and $50 billion,  making it increasingly difficult for the states to take on expensive, new  homeland security initiatives without federal assistance. As we address the  state fiscal issues through grants and other tools, we must (1) consider  targeting the funds to states and localities with the greatest need, (2)  discourage the replacement of state and local funds with federal funds,  and (3) strike a balance between accountability and flexibility.
State and local governments believe that to function as partners in  homeland security they need better access to threat information. Officials  at the National Emergency Management Association, which represents  state and local emergency management personnel, stated that such  personnel experienced problems receiving critical intelligence information  and that this hampered their ability to help pre-empt terrorists before they  strike. According to these officials, certain state or local emergency  management personnel, emergency management directors, and certain fire  and police chiefs hold security clearances granted by the Federal  Emergency Management Agency; however, other federal agencies, such as  the Federal Bureau of Investigation, do not recognize these clearances.  Moreover, the National Governor’s Association said that intelligence  sharing is a problem between the federal government and the states. The  association explained that most governors do not have a security  clearance and, therefore, do not receive classified threat information,  potentially impacting their ability to effectively use the National Guard and  hampering their emergency preparedness capability. On the other hand,  we were told that local Federal Bureau of Investigation offices in most  states have a good relationship with the emergency management  community and at times shared sensitive information under certain  circumstances.
The private sector is also concerned about costs, but in the context of new  regulations to promote security. In our discussions with officials from  associations representing the banking, electrical energy, and  transportation sectors, they expressed the conviction that their member  companies desire to fully participate as partners in homeland security  programs. These associations represent major companies that own  infrastructure critical to the functioning of our nation’s economy. For  example, the North American Electric Reliability Council is the primary  point of contact with the federal government on issues relating to the  security of the nation’s electrical infrastructure. It has partnered with the  Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Energy to establish  threat levels that they in turn share with utility companies within their  organization. Such partnerships are essential, but the private sector may  be reluctant to embrace them because of concern over new and excessive  regulation, although their assets might be better protected. According to  National Industrial Transportation League officials, for example, transport  companies express a willingness to adopt prudent security measures such  as increased security checks in loading areas and security checks for  carrier drivers. However, the league is concerned that the cost of  additional layers of security could cripple their ability to conduct business  and felt that a line has to be drawn between security and the openness  needed to conduct business.
If it is to be comprehensive, a national strategy should address many of  these issues.
section_title: Y2K Style Partnerships Can Be Useful in Promoting Public-Private Participation for Homeland Security
paragraphs: Once the homeland security strategy is developed, participating public and  private sector organizations will need to understand and prepare for their  defined roles under the strategy. In that connection, Y2K-style  partnerships can be helpful. While the federal government can assign roles  to federal agencies under the strategy, it will need to reach consensus with  the other levels of government and with the private sector on their roles.
As you know Mr. Chairman, the world was concerned about the potential  for computer failures at the start of the year 2000, known as Y2K. The  recognition of the interconnectedness of critical information systems led  to the conclusion that a coordinated effort was needed to address the  problem. Consequently, Congress, the administration, federal agencies,  state and local governments, and private sector organizations collaborated  to address Y2K issues and prevent the potential disruption that could have  resulted from widespread computer failure. Similarly, the homeland  security strategy is intended to include federal, state, and local  government agencies and private sector entities working collaboratively,  as they did in addressing Y2K issues.
The Y2K task force approach may offer a model for developing the public- private partnerships necessary under a comprehensive homeland security  strategy. A massive mobilization with federal government leadership was  undertaken in connection with Y2K, which included partnerships with  state, local, and international governments and the private sector and  effective communication to address critical issues. Government actions  went beyond the boundaries of individual programs or agencies and  involved governmentwide oversight, interagency cooperation, and  cooperation among federal, state, and local governments as well as with  private sector entities and even foreign countries. These broad efforts can  be grouped into the following five categories:
Congressional oversight of agencies to hold them accountable for  demonstrating progress to heighten public awareness of the problem.
Central leadership and coordination to ensure that federal systems were  ready for the date change, to coordinate efforts primarily with the states,  and to promote private-sector and foreign-government action.
Partnerships within the intergovernmental system and with the private  entities, divided into key economic sectors to address such issues as  contingency planning.
Communications to share information on the status of systems, products,  and services, and to share recommended solutions.
Human capital and budget initiatives to help ensure that the government  could recruit and retain the technical expertise needed to convert systems  and communicate with the other partners and to fund conversion  operations.
As we reported in September 2000, the value of federal leadership,  oversight, and partnerships was repeatedly cited as a key to success in  addressing Y2K issues at a Lessons Learned summit that was broadly  attended by representatives from public and private sector entities.  Developing a homeland security plan may require a similar level of  leadership, oversight, and partnerships with state and local governments,  and the private sector. In addition, as in the case of Y2K efforts,  Congressional oversight will be very important in connection with the  design and implementation of the homeland security strategy.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to  answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.  Please contact me at (202) 512-4300 for more information. Raymond J.  Decker, Brian. J. Lepore, Stephen L. Caldwell, Lorelei St. James, Patricia  Sari-Spear, Kim Seay, William J. Rigazio, Matthew W. Ullengren, Deborah  Colantonio, and Susan Woodward made key contributions to this  statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Homeland Security
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and  Long-Term National Needs (GAO-02-160T, November 7, 2001).
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide  Preparedness Efforts (GAO-02-208T, October 31, 2001).
Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal  Preparedness (GAO-02-145T, October 15, 2001).
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach (GAO- 02-150T, October 12, 2001).
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues  (GAO-01-1158T, September 21, 2001).
section_title: Combating Terrorism
paragraphs: Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State  and Local Preparedness (GAO-02-483T, March 1, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Considerations For Investing Resources in  Chemical and Biological Preparedness (GAO-01-162T, October 17, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations  (GAO-01-822, September 20, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism  Program Implementation and Management (GAO-01-909, September 19,  2001).
Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s  Council on Domestic Preparedness (GAO-01-555T, May 9, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal  Response (GAO-01-660T, April 24, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and  National Strategy (GAO-01-556T, March 27, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating  Preparedness and Response (GAO-01-15, March 20, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied  Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14,  November 30, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of  Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and  Biological Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, October 20, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk  Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163,  September 7, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs  (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response  Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO-NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear  (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat  Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, March 11, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness  Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO-NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici  Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, October 2, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize  and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, April 9, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires  Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, December 1,  1997).
section_title: Public Health
paragraphs: Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in  Public Health Protection (GAO-02-235T, November 15, 2001).
Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO-02- 149T, October 10, 2001).
Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO-02-141T,  October 10, 2001).
Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness (GAO-02-129T, October 5,  2001).
Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities (GAO-01-915,  September 28, 2001).
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and  Inventory Management Are Needed (GAO-01-667, September 28, 2001).
West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness  (GAO/HEHS-00-180, September 11, 2000).
Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and  Biological Attacks (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 7, 1999).
Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation  Should Follow Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, August 16,  1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public  Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, March 16, 1999).
section_title: Disaster Assistance
paragraphs: Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration Criteria  and Eligibility Assurance Procedures (GAO-01-837, August 31, 2001).
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key  Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges (GAO-01-832,  July 9, 2001).
FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies  (GAO-01-850, August 13, 2001).
section_title: Budget and Management
paragraphs: Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies (GAO-01-1084SP,  August 2001).