Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border
Published: 2010-12-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The challenges of securing the U.S.-Canadian border involve the coordination of multiple partners. The results of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to integrate border security among its components and across federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners are unclear. GAO was asked to address the extent to which DHS has (1) improved coordination with state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners; (2) progressed in addressing past federal coordination challenges; and (3) progressed in securing the northern border and used coordination efforts to address existing vulnerabilities. GAO reviewed interagency agreements, strategies, and operational documents that address DHS's reported northern border vulnerabilities such as terrorism. GAO visited four Border Patrol sectors, selected based on threat, and interviewed officials from federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian agencies operating within these sectors. While these results cannot be generalized, they provided insights on border security coordination.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to a majority of selected northern border security partners GAO interviewed, DHS improved northern border security coordination through interagency forums and joint operations. Specifically, interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a common understanding of security, while joint operations helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement response. However, numerous partners cited challenges related to the inability to resource the increasing number of interagency forums and raised concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. While guidance issued by GAO stresses the need for a process to ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently, DHS does not oversee the interagency forums established by its components. DHS oversight could help prevent possible duplication of efforts and conserve resources. DHS component officials reported that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border was improved, but partners in all four sectors GAO visited cited ongoing challenges sharing information and resources for daily border security related to operations and investigations. DHS has established and updated interagency agreements, but oversight by management at the component and local level has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of these agreements, such as those related to information sharing, in areas GAO visited. As a result, according to DHS officials, field agents have been left to resolve coordination challenges. Ongoing DHS-level oversight and attention to enforcing accountability of established agreements could help address long-standing coordination challenges between DHS components, and further the DHS strategic vision for a coordinated homeland security enterprise. Border Patrol--a component of DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection--reported that 32 of the nearly 4,000 northern border miles in fiscal year 2010 had reached an acceptable level of security and that there is a high reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zone. However, the extent of partner law enforcement resources available to address border security vulnerabilities is not reflected in Border Patrol's processes for assessing border security and resource requirements. GAO previously reported that federal agencies should identify resources among collaborating agencies to deliver results more efficiently and that DHS had not fully responded to a legislative requirement to link initiatives--including partnerships--to existing border vulnerabilities to inform federal resource allocation decisions. Development of policy and guidance to integrate available partner resources in northern border security assessments and resource planning documents could provide the agency and Congress with more complete information necessary to make resource allocation decisions in mitigating existing border vulnerabilities.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is recommending that DHS enhance oversight to ensure efficient use of interagency forums and compliance with interagency agreements; and develop guidance to integrate partner resources to mitigate northern border vulnerabilities. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been challenged in its  efforts to address the threat of illegal activity on the northern border,  where the extent of illegal activity is unknown, but the risk of terrorist  activity is high. The United States and Canada share the longest common  nonmilitarized border between two countries, spanning nearly 4,000 miles  of land and maritime border from Washington state to Maine. The terrain,  which ranges from densely forested lands on the west and east coasts to  open plains in the middle of the country, is composed of both urban and  sparsely populated lands with limited federal, state, and local law  enforcement presence along the border. Historically, the United States has  focused attention and resources primarily on the U.S. border with Mexico,  which continues to experience significantly higher levels of drug  trafficking and illegal immigration than the U.S.-Canadian border.  However, DHS reports that the terrorist threat on the northern border is  higher, given the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement  coverage. There is also a great deal of trade and travel across this border,  and while legal trade is predominant, DHS reports networks of illicit  criminal activity and smuggling of drugs, currency, people, and weapons  between the two countries. DHS reported spending nearly $3 billion in its  efforts to interdict and investigate illegal northern border activity in fiscal  year 2010, annually making approximately 6,000 arrests and interdicting  approximately 40,000 pounds of illegal drugs at and between the northern  border ports of entry.
Securing the northern border is the primary responsibility of various  components within DHS, in collaboration with other federal, state, local,  tribal, and Canadian law enforcement agencies. Within DHS, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the frontline agency responsible  for interdiction of persons and contraband crossing the border illegally,  and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for  investigating the source of cross-border crimes and dismantling illegal  operations. Other federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian law  enforcement agencies also have responsibilities to detect, interdict, and  investigate different types of illegal activity within certain geographic  boundaries. For example, the U.S. Forest Service, within the U.S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA), has responsibility for the protection of  natural resources and persons on Forest Service lands, including about  400 miles adjacent to the northern border. Similarly, the Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA), within the Department of Justice  (DOJ), conducts investigations of priority drug trafficking organizations,  domestic and foreign, that can include drug smuggling across the border  or ports of entry.
DHS has established partnerships with other federal, state, local, tribal,  and Canadian law enforcement agencies to secure the northern border,  and taken action to improve coordination among its components and  across its partners. To facilitate partnerships and coordination, DHS has  established various mechanisms—such as interagency forums and  agreements—to improve information sharing necessary to achieve a  common understanding of the border security threats and to leverage  resources for achieving an integrated law enforcement response. However,  it is unclear the extent to which these efforts are addressing border  security gaps, and in November 2008 we reported that DHS had not linked  its initiatives to the border vulnerabilities it had identified or informed  Congress about additional resources needed to secure the northern  border. DHS and GAO have also reported long-standing coordination  challenges between CBP’s Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) and  ICE, ICE and DEA, and Border Patrol and Forest Service that may impede  achieving border security goals. This report responds to your request to  review how DHS has coordinated law enforcement resources across law  enforcement partners to improve northern border security and made  progress in addressing past coordination challenges. Specifically, we  answered the following questions:    According to selected northern border security partners, to what extent  has DHS improved federal coordination of border security intelligence  and enforcement operations with state, local, tribal, and Canadian law  enforcement partners?
To what extent has DHS made progress in addressing past coordination  challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, and across DEA and Forest  Service in different locations across the northern border, according to  selected northern border security partners?
What progress has DHS made in securing the northern border, and to  what extent has DHS used its partnerships and coordination efforts to  address DHS’s reported border security vulnerabilities?
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In conducting our work, we interviewed headquarters officials at DHS,  DOJ, the Department of the Interior (DOI), and USDA; analyzed DHS  documentation; and conducted site visits to four northern border  locations. We selected Border Patrol’s Blaine, Spokane, Detroit, and  Swanton sectors to visit as they comprise a mix of differences along the  northern border regarding geography (western, central, and eastern  border areas), threats (terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration),  and threat environment (air, marine, land) as shown in figure 1. We  conducted interviews with federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian  officials relevant to these Border Patrol sectors. Although other northern  border partners do not divide their geographic areas of responsibility by  sectors, for the purposes of this report, we refer to the northern border  partners—such as ICE and DEA—whose area of responsibility overlaps  with these sectors as officials operating within these Border Patrol  sectors. While we cannot generalize our work from these visits to all  locations along the northern border, the information we obtained provides  examples of the way in which DHS and other federal agencies coordinate  their efforts with these northern border partners.
To address the first objective, we reviewed documents that included  relevant legislation affecting the northern border, a past report to  Congress in response to legislated requirements, and agency strategies,  including the DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and CBP’s  Northern Border Strategy. We interviewed DHS headquarters officials  with knowledge of DHS coordination efforts and also interviewed federal,  state, local, tribal, and Canadian officials in the four sectors we visited to  obtain their perspective on DHS coordination efforts focusing on their  participation in interagency forums and joint operations. For a complete  list of northern border partners we interviewed in each sector, see  appendix I. Based on these documents and discussions, we focused on  two interagency forums—the Integrated Border Enforcement Team  (IBET) and the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)—and  joint operations such as the Shiprider Program. Our assessment of these  interagency forums and joint operations are nongeneralizeable as they do  not include an exhaustive list of U.S. and Canadian initiatives to  coordinate the security of the border. However, they were highlighted by  the officials we interviewed as interagency forums that helped to  coordinate information sharing, interdiction, and investigations across  nations and levels of government along with joint operations that  coordinated a federal law enforcement response between the partners in  the air, land, and marine border environments. In addition to these  discussions within each sector, we reviewed documents at the sector level  relevant to northern border coordination including meeting minutes from  interagency meetings and after-action reports for joint operations. We  compared DHS coordination efforts to best practices and federal  guidelines for interagency coordination to determine whether DHS’s  efforts are consistent with such practices.
To address the second objective, we reviewed agreements established  between DHS components, between DHS and DOJ, and between DHS and  USDA to coordinate interdiction and investigation activities, and  interviewed officials from these agencies at headquarters and in the field.  Specifically, we reviewed agreements assigning responsibilities for  interdiction and investigation between Border Patrol and ICE, Border  Patrol and Forest Service, and ICE and DEA. We reviewed documents and  reports documenting coordination challenges between these agencies,  including those prepared by DHS and us, and subsequent corrective action  cited by the departments. As part of our interviews with officials in the  four sectors we visited, we examined the extent to which DHS and its  partners stated that agreements were working to overcome coordination  challenges between agencies and were enhancing the sharing of  information and resources to secure the border. See appendix I for a list of  offices interviewed in the four sectors. We also used work from our  companion review of border coordination on federal lands, to assess  Border Patrol coordination with DOI and the USDA in the Spokane  Sector.
To address the third objective, we analyzed Border Patrol’s 2007 through  2010 Operational Requirements Based Budget Process (ORBBP)  documents that include each sector’s assessment of the border security  threat, operational assessment of border security, and resource  requirements needed to further secure border miles within each sector.  We reviewed these documents to determine the number of border miles  that Border Patrol reported were under effective control, the number of  miles reported as needing outside law enforcement support, and the  extent that use of partner resources were being used to address gaps in  Border Patrol resources. We reviewed guidance headquarters provided to  sectors for development of the ORBBP, as well as direction and  performance indicators provided in CBP’s Northern Border Strategy. We  also interviewed Border Patrol officials in the field who are responsible for  preparing the ORBBP and headquarters officials responsible for reviewing  these documents.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 through  December 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Background
paragraphs: CBP has reported many threats on and vulnerabilities of the northern  border related to illegal cross-border activity. Overall, according to CBP, a  transportation infrastructure exists across much of the northern border  that facilitates ease of access to, and egress from, the border area. CBP  also reports that the maritime border on the Great Lakes and rivers is  vulnerable to use of small vessels as a conduit for potential exploitation by  terrorists, alien smuggling, trafficking of illicit drugs and other contraband  and criminal activity. Also, the northern border’s waterways can freeze  during the winter and can easily be crossed on foot or by vehicle or  snowmobile. The northern air border is also vulnerable to low-flying  aircraft that, for example, smuggle drugs by entering U.S. airspace from  Canada. Additionally, CBP reports that further northern border threats  result from the fact that the northern border is exploited by well-organized  smuggling operations, which can potentially support the movement of  terrorists and their weapons.
subsections: section_title: Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Canadian Law Enforcement Partners on the Northern Border
paragraphs: Northern border security is the primary responsibility of three DHS  components—CBP, ICE, and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—which  reported spending more than $2.9 billion in efforts to secure the northern  border in 2010. Table 1 shows the roles and responsibilities of DHS  components regarding northern border security.
CBP and ICE have several partners that are also involved in northern  border security efforts. These partners include other U.S. federal agencies  such as DOJ’s DEA, which has responsibility for drug enforcement, and  the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has responsibility for  combating terrorism. The Department of Defense (DOD), while not a  partner, also provides support as requested, such as personnel and  technology for temporary joint operations. Partners also include Canadian  law enforcement agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police  (RCMP)—which is responsible for national law enforcement, including  border security—and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), which  is responsible for border security and public safety at the ports of entry.
CBP and ICE also partner with federal, state, local, and tribal entities that  have law enforcement jurisdiction for federal, public, private, or tribal  lands that are adjacent to the border. As shown in figure 2, federal lands  comprise about 1,016 miles, or approximately 25 percent, of the nearly  4,000 northern border miles (excluding the Alaska–Canada border), and  are primarily administered by the National Park Service and Forest  Service. Law enforcement personnel from sovereign Indian nations  located on about 4 percent of the northern border also conduct law  enforcement operations related to border security. In addition, DOI’s  Bureau of Indian Affairs may enforce federal laws on Indian lands, with  the consent of tribes and in accordance with tribal laws. Moreover,  numerous state and local law enforcement entities interdict and  investigate criminal activity on public and private lands adjacent to about  75 percent of the northern border. Although these agencies are not  responsible for preventing the illegal entry of aliens into the United States,  they do employ law enforcement officers and investigators to protect the  public and natural resources on their lands.
Overlap exists in mission and operational boundaries among agencies at  the border that require coordination and collaboration for efficient and  effective law enforcement. One reason for overlap is Border Patrol’s  multilayered strategy for securing the border, which provides for several  layers of agents who operate not only at the border, but also on public and  private lands up to 100 miles from the border. As a result, officials from  other federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies may patrol  in the same geographic area and pursue the same persons or criminal  organizations who violate laws underpinning each agency’s respective  mission. Another reason for overlap is that agencies have separate  responsibility for investigating crimes that are conducted by the same  criminals or organizations.
section_title: DHS Vision for Integrated Homeland Security
paragraphs: Federal legislation and DHS policy have stressed the need for coordination  between DHS components and across other federal agencies and partners  to most efficiently and effectively secure the homeland and its borders.  The 9/11 Commission had determined that limited coordination had  contributed to border security vulnerabilities. In addition, coordination  challenges were also addressed in several GAO and DHS reports. For  example, in both 2004 and 2010, we reported that Border Patrol, USDA,  and DOI were challenged to coordinate border security efforts on northern  federal lands. We also reported in early 2009 that there were significant  challenges to coordination of drug law enforcement efforts between ICE  and DEA. In addition, the DHS Inspector General issued reports on  coordination challenges between Border Patrol and ICE in 2005 and 2007,  citing the shortfalls in information sharing and operational coordination  that have led to competition, interference, and operational inflexibility.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act required  the Secretary of Homeland Security to report to Congress on ongoing  initiatives to improve security along the northern border as well as  recommendations to address vulnerabilities along the northern border.  As DHS reported in response to this requirement, the agency has taken  action to establish or support interagency forums and joint operations  among agencies to strengthen information sharing and coordinate efforts  to secure the border. DHS reiterated its commitment to share information  across agencies in its 2008 Information Sharing Strategy, which provides  full recognition and integration of federal agencies, tribal nations, and  others in the DHS information-sharing environment and in development of  relevant technologies. Also, in its 2008 Report to Congress on the status  of northern border security, DHS listed interagency forums and joint  operations that it established or supports for coordinating efforts among  federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners. DHS, along with its  federal partners, also issued updates and addendums to long-standing  memorandums of agreement (MOA) or understanding (MOU) between its  components and across federal agencies on respective roles and  responsibilities to enhance coordination.
Most recently, DHS outlined its vision for coordination among agencies  and partners for a united homeland security enterprise in its Quadrennial  Homeland Security Review Report (QHSR), submitted to Congress in  February 2010. Cited as a strategic framework for homeland security, the  QHSR is to guide the activities of participants in homeland security toward  a common end. In this regard, it emphasizes a need for joint actions and  efforts across previously discrete elements of government and society  including federal, state, local, tribal, and international entities, among  others, to achieve core homeland security mission areas, including  securing and managing the borders by effectively controlling U.S. air, land,  and sea domains, and safeguarding lawful trade and travel, and disrupting  and dismantling transnational criminal organizations. The efforts  supporting the QHSR include a review to identify mission overlap among  components. In accordance with the QHSR vision, DHS is also developing  a northern border strategic plan to clarify roles and responsibilities among  all law enforcement partners. According to DHS officials, the strategic  plan is in its final stages of review but time frames for completion have not  been solidified.
section_title: DHS Border Security Goals and Assessments
paragraphs: DHS has established performance goals and measures for border control.  The CBP performance measure for effective border control is defined as  the number of border miles where Border Patrol has reasonable assurance  that illegal entries are detected, identified, and classified, and Border  Patrol has the ability to respond and bring these incidents to a satisfactory  law enforcement resolution. DHS reports this performance goal and  measure for border security to the public and to Congress in the DHS  Annual Performance Report.
section_title: DHS Used Interagency Forums and Joint Operations to Improve Border Security Coordination, but DHS Oversight Could Address Emerging Challenges
paragraphs: DHS used interagency forums and joint operations to improve federal  coordination of northern border security efforts with law enforcement  partners from state, local, and tribal governments, and Canada according  to officials we interviewed across four northern border sectors. However,  numerous partners cited challenges related to the inability to resource the  increasing number of interagency forums in their area and raised concerns  that some efforts were overlapping. DHS oversight of interagency forums  established by its components across locations may help address these  challenges and ensure continued benefit of DHS efforts to increase the  national capacity of its partners to secure the northern border.
subsections: section_title: Interagency Forums Improved Binational Coordination of Northern Border Intelligence Information, Resources, and Operations
paragraphs: Interagency forums improved coordination of border intelligence  information, resources, and operations between U.S. federal agencies and  their law enforcement partners in Canada, according to the majority of the  representatives of these entities we interviewed across four northern  border sectors. The 9/11 Commission had determined that limited  coordination had contributed to border security vulnerabilities, and  emphasized the importance of establishing or supporting interagency  forums to strengthen information sharing and coordinate efforts to secure  the border. Two DHS components, CBP and ICE, responsible for border  security interdiction and investigations, respectively, played key roles in  the establishment of the two interagency forums within our review—the  IBET and BEST—and along with USCG and Canada’s RCMP and CBSA are  key participants in both forums. Information about these interagency  forums is presented in table 2.
DHS is working to establish a means to quantify and report on the benefits  achieved through its investment in interagency forums, but in the  meantime officials from 17 offices that participate in interagency forums  across the four sectors we visited commented that interagency forums had  improved coordination among the participants. These officials provided  examples that highlighted benefits in three key areas: (1) facilitating the  sharing of border security intelligence information, (2) facilitating the  sharing of resources such as equipment and personnel; and in some cases,  (3) serving as a tool for deconfliction—or a means to inform partners of  special border security operations that were planned to be conducted in  geographic areas of responsibility common to multiple law enforcement  agencies.
Information Sharing. The IBET or the BEST facilitated exchange of  timely and actionable threat information between U.S. and Canadian  partners leading to improved interdiction and investigation capabilities,  according to officials from 17 of the 18 offices we interviewed. For  example, IBET participation helped to build trust between the core  partners, which resulted in collaborative efforts to secure the border,  according to Canadian CBSA officials from Windsor and Montreal—north  of the Detroit and Swanton sectors respectively. In addition, IBET  membership further strengthened U.S. and Canadian relationships as  participants interacted more frequently through meetings and the  colocation of personnel, which in turn facilitated the exchange of  information according to ICE and Border Patrol officials operating within  the Swanton and Detroit sectors, respectively. As a result, we were told  IBET partners can more easily and quickly obtain information, such as  border entry and exit data and surveillance images that would normally  take several weeks to obtain. For example, Canada’s CBSA forwarded  intelligence on a Canadian national who was smuggling drugs from  Canada to the United States to the BEST, according to ICE officials  operating within the Blaine sector, at which time BEST partners—Border  Patrol and ICE—were able to conduct surveillance and apprehend the  individual, seizing over 500 pounds of marijuana that was backpacked  across the border, and gain further intelligence about other criminal  activity.
Sharing of Resources. The IBET or BEST helped partners leverage  personnel, technology, and other resources for operations to interdict or  investigate cross-border illegal activity, according to officials in 17 of the  18 offices we interviewed. For example, colocation of BEST members  provides U.S. and Canadian officials ready access to the knowledge and  skills of participating agencies, according to ICE officials operating within  the Detroit sector. Another example of a benefit is the pooling of  resources. The IBET operating within the Spokane sector maintains a  centralized resource list that participants can view and request use of  partners’ available technology, equipment, and vehicles, according to ICE  and Border Patrol officials. Radio communications are also facilitated  among participants of the IBET and BEST attended by officials from the  Blaine sector, in that all participants have access to a bank of 10 hand-held  radios on the same frequency, according to an ICE official operating  within the Blaine sector. Officials cited examples of how sharing  personnel and resources helped secure the border. In one example, U.S.  and Canadian IBET partners were conducting joint operations to monitor  over 133 kilometers of unguarded roads in the Swanton sector that were  exploited by criminal organizations smuggling humans, drugs, and other  contraband, according to RCMP officials north of the Swanton sector. The  operation employed Canadian personnel from RCMP and Border Patrol to  patrol the roads using resources such as motion sensor and video  equipment to expand surveillance coverage. U.S. and Canadian IBET  partners also shared sensor hits and video footage from both sides of the  border. As a result of the shared information and resources, partners were  able to determine if illegal activities were going north or south of the  border and had increased awareness to detect and interdict cross-border  crime.
Deconfliction. The IBET or BEST were also used in conjunction with  other interagency forums to deconflict operations planned by various  agencies that operate in geographic areas of responsibility common to  multiple law enforcement agencies, according to officials in all offices we  interviewed. For example, the colocation of BEST members raised  awareness of operations and activities at the border due to the daily and  ongoing information being shared between members, according to ICE  participants in the Blaine and Detroit sectors. IBET participants from the  Spokane sector also had daily telephone conversations to discuss their  operations, and subgroups within the IBET met once a week to share  information and intelligence and discuss operations to prevent  unknowingly interrupting each other, according to a Border Patrol  participant.
section_title: Joint Operations Improved Binational Coordination to Provide an Integrated Law Enforcement Response
paragraphs: DHS components also used joint operations as a means to integrate  federal border security efforts with northern border partners from state  and local governments, tribal nations, and Canada. The 9/11 Commission  stressed the importance of extensive collaboration with international  partners as well as increasing interaction between federal, state, and local  law enforcement through joint efforts that would combine intelligence,  manpower, and operations to address national security vulnerabilities.  Individually, partners had insufficient authority, staff, or assets to conduct  certain types of operations, according to Border Patrol officials in the  Detroit sector, and joint operations allowed partners to leverage these  resources to address existing border security vulnerabilities. For example,  to address vulnerabilities related to different law enforcement authority  across the border, the United States and Canada established binational  agreements that allowed USCG and RCMP law enforcement personnel  under the Shiprider Program to conduct joint vessel patrols in the Blaine  and Detroit sectors that leveraged both U.S. and Canadian authority across  the maritime border. To address vulnerabilities related to insufficient staff  and resources, DHS issued 3-year grants to tribal nations and state and  local governments under Operation Stonegarden to augment Border Patrol  personnel and resources for patrolling the land border, which benefited all  four sectors we visited. DHS components also developed joint operations  for conducting time-limited surge operations for interdiction or  investigations in the air, maritime, or land border environments, including  Operations Channel Watch, Outlook, and Frozen Timber.
DHS tracked the resulting benefits of these joint operations in their after- action reports as reflected in table 3, and all officials from 20 offices who  participated in one or more of these operations across the four sectors we  visited agreed that joint operations made important contributions to  border security. These contributions included an enhanced ability under  Operation Outlook to detect cross-border illegal activity and to inform  future asset deployments in Spokane sector, a show of force under  Operation Channel Watch to deter illegal cross-border activity in Detroit  sector, and across all operations the arrest of smugglers and other  criminals crossing the border, or seizures of narcotics, cigarettes,  currency, and other contraband.
Officials in 5 of the 20 offices raised concerns that, while surge operations  provided short-term benefits, they may not provide an ongoing deterrent  effect or address long-standing border security vulnerabilities. For  example, Border Patrol officials in the Spokane sector said that while  Operation Frozen Timber was a successful joint operation that resulted in  significant arrests and drug seizures, it was not an ongoing effort, and in  their opinion, should be expanded to a more comprehensive concept of  operations to combat and deter cross-border smuggling by air. Likewise,  ICE officials operating within the Detroit sector stated that Operation  Channel Watch demonstrated a show of force on the Great Lakes, but it  was not clear whether conducting this joint operation six weekends a year  would deter sophisticated criminal organizations. Despite these  concerns, after-action reports showed that these time-limited joint  operations had provided some lasting benefits. Operation Outlook, for  example, resulted in information about the continuous and significant  threat of cross-border smuggling in the air environment in the Spokane  sector, and pointed out weaknesses that could be corrected in the  placement and use of air and ground assets.
section_title: DHS Oversight of Interagency Forum Missions and Locations Could Help Ensure Efficient Coordination of Partner Resources
paragraphs: Most northern border partners we interviewed across the four sectors  cited challenges to resourcing the increasing number of interagency  forums being established in their geographic area of responsibility. An  interagency working group convened in 2009 to study the interaction  between the IBET and BEST also raised concerns that the increasing  demand to participate in interagency forums created difficulties in  gathering the resources necessary to participate in the IBET or BEST.  Overall, officials in 21 of the 30 Canadian, U.S. federal, state, and local  offices across the four sectors we visited said that it was difficult to  resource the IBET and BEST, in addition to other interagency forums in  their geographic area.
A CBSA official north of the Swanton sector stated that the office must  balance resources among the three IBET offices within its area of  responsibility and that it could not afford to staff a BEST office with  current resources if one were to open in the area.  ICE officials operating within the Swanton sector stated that there are  two IBETs in their area of responsibility, and while they only have  resources to staff the closest one to their office, they would like to staff  the IBET further away as it is close to a port of entry and has more law  enforcement partners that can further the ICE mission.
Local law enforcement in the Swanton sector, Rouses Point Police  Department, reported that the high level of commitment required by  forums such as the IBET make it difficult for resource-strapped smaller  law enforcement agencies such as their own to participate.
Officials from seven of the nine remaining offices without these concerns  included Border Patrol in the Blaine, Detroit, and Swanton sectors and  ICE operating within the Blaine sector, who said they had sufficient  resources, and local law enforcement in the Detroit sector who said they  would not assign staff to a forum unless it was the most efficient use of the  officer’s time. In addition, an FBI official operating within the Spokane  sector and an official from the Michigan State Police said that while the  number of forums has increased since 9/11, only those that provide the  most value through focused meetings and attract the most participants will  continue to exist.
Of the officials within the 13 offices operating within the Blaine and  Detroit sectors who were named as key members of the IBET or BEST,  more than half cited concerns about mission overlap between the IBET  and BEST that could result in duplication of effort, a concern also  expressed by the DHS Inspector General in a 2007 report, and members  of the IBET/BEST Working Group. ICE headquarters officials stated that  although there are not distinct geographic boundaries of operation for the  IBET and BEST, ICE is addressing concerns of overlapping operations by  developing a strategic plan to lay out the concept of operations,  administrative policies and procedures, and the goals of the BEST. At the  time of our review, ICE had not yet established a time frame for  completion of these efforts as they are in early stages of drafting the plan.  In the meantime, however, officials in 7 of the 13 offices in these forums  located in the Blaine and Detroit sectors were concerned that some BEST  activities to investigate and interdict cross-border illegal activity at the  ports of entry duplicated IBET efforts to conduct these same activities  between the ports of entry.
Border Patrol officials in the Blaine sector said that despite good  working relationships between the IBET and BEST, concerns remain  about overlapping cases because of the ability for cases at the ports of  entry to expand into areas between the ports of entry. Likewise, ICE  officials operating within the Blaine sector agreed that BEST  investigative activity between the ports of entry would be duplicative of  the IBET mission, but disagreed that such overlap had occurred.
RCMP officials north of the Detroit sector reported that there is a  perception of duplication because the BEST in Detroit is expanding its  scope to include investigations between the ports of entry, which is the  domain of the IBET. ICE officials operating within the Detroit sector  said they disagreed with the assumption that a geographic dividing line  could be drawn in conducting investigations. Border Patrol and DEA  officials operating within the Detroit sector said that the reason for  establishing the BEST in their area was unclear. In addition, Border  Patrol officials stated that the IBET serves as their primary forum for  targeting cross-border crime. However, ICE said that while the BEST in  Detroit is a new effort, started in 2009, it provided them with better  support to meet the needs of their mission. This support was provided  through partnerships and colocation with federal and state and local  law enforcement that are not core members of the IBET including the  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the local  police department.
While DHS headquarters officials report that policies governing DHS’s  coordination efforts are under development, DHS does not currently  provide guidance or oversight to its components to establish or assess the  results of interagency forums across northern border locations, according  to officials from the DHS Office of Strategic Plans. We previously reported  that federal agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts  by, in part, developing mechanisms to monitor their results. DHS and  DOJ have developed guidance and provided oversight to help prevent  overlap among interagency forums established under state and local  fusion center programs, to leverage fusion centers that already exist, and  to reduce the downstream burden on state and local partners that have  limited resources. However, DHS officials from the Office of Strategic  Plans said that coordination policies are still in development and that  many organizations within DHS share responsibility for ensuring that  component operations strategically align with the Secretary’s goals and  commitment for efficient operation and integration of partner efforts for  the homeland security mission. These officials stated that headquarters  organizations, including the Management Directorate, the Office of Policy,  and the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, are developing  processes to provide department-level coordination and oversight of those  forums; however, DHS has not provided documentation to support its  plans, thus the scope and the time frames for finalizing this effort are  unclear. Ongoing DHS oversight of the mission and location of interagency  forums established by its components could help prevent duplication of  efforts, and help ensure that DHS is a mindful steward in conserving the  scarce resources of northern border partners. Moreover, this oversight  role could provide opportunities for DHS to determine whether additional  forums are necessary or whether existing forums can be modified to  address emerging needs.
section_title: Additional DHS Action Could Help Address Challenges Hindering Northern Border Coordination among Its Components and with Other Federal Agencies
paragraphs: Federal agency coordination to secure the northern border was reported  to have improved by some Border Patrol, ICE, Forest Service, and DEA  officials operating within the four sectors we visited; however, in all  sectors officials cited problems with others in sharing information and  resources for daily operations. DHS attention to resolving these long- standing coordination challenges could enhance its ability to implement its  strategic vision for a coordinated homeland security enterprise and  improve the federal capacity to secure the northern border.
subsections: section_title: DHS Action Could Help Address Border Patrol and ICE Coordination Challenges
paragraphs: Border Patrol officials in three of the four sectors we visited cited strong  or improved coordination with ICE in sharing information and  coordinating their border security missions, but ICE officials in all but one  sector reported that coordination with Border Patrol remained  challenging. CBP and ICE had developed an MOU between Border Patrol  and ICE in 2004, updated in 2007, to establish and coordinate roles and  responsibilities for interdiction and investigation missions on the border,  and as a mechanism to resolve conflict or disagreements. The 2007 MOU  requires the two agencies to establish a seamless, real-time operational  partnership, with Border Patrol taking the lead on all border-related  interdiction activities, and ICE taking the lead on investigations.
Coordination between Border Patrol and ICE was cited as strong or  greatly improved by Border Patrol officials in two sectors, and ICE  officials in one sector, who cited different reasons for the improvements in  coordination. For example, Border Patrol officials in the Spokane sector  said that there was considerable improvement in their relationship with  ICE since the MOU was established in 2004, and attributed improved  coordination to sector leadership, open lines of communication, and  personal friendships between agents. ICE officials operating within the  Detroit sector said that their relationship with Border Patrol had matured,  and they generally worked well to support each other’s mission. They  cited that improved coordination resulted from colocation of Border  Patrol agents in the BEST and the close relationships of sector leaders  who supported coordination between the components.
However, coordination to exchange information and integrate missions  remained challenging according to ICE officials in all four sectors, and  Border Patrol officials in two sectors, with all citing problems with the  MOU, among other issues. These officials said that the MOU had not been  effective in clarifying roles and responsibilities or resolving disagreements  about the dividing line between interdiction and investigation. These  disagreements surrounded the interpretation and separation of  “intelligence-gathering” activities to support Border Patrol’s interdiction  mission and “investigative” activities that fall under the purview of ICE, as  well as the timing and circumstance surrounding when Border Patrol  should call ICE for investigative support, as shown by the following  examples.
Border Patrol and ICE officials said that the agencies continue to  disagree on whether it is appropriate for Border Patrol agents to  interview persons they apprehend. ICE officials state that Border  Patrol should call ICE first. However, Border Patrol officials stated that  postarrest interviews are within the intelligence-gathering provisions of  the interagency MOU.
Border Patrol and ICE officials continue to disagree on whether border  surveillance falls under ICE’s investigative role. Border Patrol officials  in the Spokane sector provided an example of ICE officials conducting  surveillance of the border, which is the responsibility of Border Patrol  under the MOU; however, ICE officials in all four sectors maintained  that these intelligence gathering activities were an inherent part of the  ICE investigative role.
Border Patrol and ICE officials said that there is disagreement on when  Border Patrol is required to call ICE to inspect seized contraband. For  example, ICE officials operating within the Detroit sector interpreted  the MOU as requiring Border Patrol to notify ICE of the contraband at  the arrest site to inform investigations. However, Border Patrol  officials in the Detroit sector interpreted the MOU as allowing agents to  transport the contraband to the station for identification and calling  ICE once established that it could develop into an investigation. While  Border Patrol officials in the Spokane sector stated that evidence  gathering is an inherent function of their role under the MOU, ICE  officials in the Spokane sector viewed this practice as inappropriate  handling and processing of evidence that hindered ICE’s investigations.
Border Patrol officials in three sectors and ICE officials operating within  two sectors stated that competition for performance statistics was another  barrier to overcoming coordination challenges as these statistics are the  basis for DHS resource allocation decisions. As a result, both Border  Patrol and ICE officials said that agents sometimes worked outside of  their established roles and responsibilities to boost performance statistics,  and disagreed on which component should receive credit for  apprehensions, seizures, and prosecutions.
DHS has plans to revise its performance measures and processes for  resource allocation across components; however, our discussions with  DHS officials have shown that it will be difficult to ensure these revisions  do not exacerbate current challenges to collaboration in support of the  QHSR. For example, officials from the DHS Office of Strategic Plans said  that the department is developing new performance measures for border  security that may require each component to show how their efforts linked  with the efforts of others to secure the border, and that resources would  be distributed across the components according to their relative success.
The coordination challenges between Border Patrol and ICE resulted in a  lack of information sharing and potential inefficiencies, according to  Border Patrol and ICE officials operating within three of the sectors we  visited. Specifically, ICE officials operating within the Detroit, Spokane,  and Swanton sectors said they are reluctant to share intelligence  information with Border Patrol because they are concerned Border Patrol  may adversely affect an ICE investigation. Border Patrol officials in the  Detroit sector said that because they do not believe ICE shares  information with them, coordination with ICE is hindered. Additionally,  these Border Patrol officials stated that, from their perspective, the lack of  information sharing between the agencies resulted in inefficient border  security efforts. Similarly, the Border Patrol officials in the Blaine sector  reported that the lack of information sharing resulted in inefficiencies as  Border Patrol has used its resources to respond to potential cross-border  criminals who were ICE agents engaged in undercover investigations.
These coordination problems between Border Patrol and ICE have been  long-standing and the subject of several studies and reports. We reported  in 2005 that the effectiveness of ICE’s antismuggling strategy would  depend partly on the clarification of ICE and CBP roles in antismuggling  activities. In 2006, the Congressional Research Service reported, after  interviewing agents in Los Angeles and San Diego, that ICE and CBP had  problems with communications that compromised some smuggling  investigations. In both 2005 and 2007, the DHS Office of Inspector  General (OIG) reported on the coordination challenges between CBP and  ICE, including those challenges between Border Patrol and ICE’s  Homeland Security Investigations. The 2005 report concluded that  shortfalls in operational coordination and information sharing had  fostered an environment of uncertainty and mistrust between CBP and  ICE personnel in the field, and instead of collegial interaction, field  officials reported competition, and at times, interference. In its 2007  update, the OIG reported improvement, but additional work was necessary  to address remaining challenges related to improving intelligence and  information sharing, strengthening performance measures, and addressing  ongoing relational issues.
DHS took several actions in response to past findings, but our work for  this review showed that ongoing coordination challenges continue to exist  between DHS components. For example, CBP and ICE issued an  addendum to strengthen the MOU between CBP and ICE, and established  an ICE-CBP Coordination Council to ensure, among other things, that  component policies and procedures supported the roles and  responsibilities outlined in the MOU and were communicated and  implemented in the field. DHS concurred with its OIG’s recommendation  to establish joint CBP-ICE bodies to oversee the implementation of the  MOU’s provisions but did not establish such an oversight body, stating that  the establishment of the Coordination Council and other working groups  would coordinate interagency efforts. The Coordination Council has  since been disbanded, and the DHS officials from the Office of Intelligence  and Analysis and the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning were  unfamiliar with the council and could not provide an explanation for why  it was discontinued. DHS continues to lack an entity to oversee the  implementation of the MOU because the agency relies on CBP and ICE  leaders to hold the field accountable for implementation of established  agreements. Additionally, according to DHS’s Office of Intelligence and  Analysis officials, components often leave coordination challenges for  field leadership to resolve without adequate guidance from headquarters.
DHS component field officials, DHS headquarters officials, and the DHS  OIG acknowledged that there remains a disconnect between headquarters  policy and field implementation that may require DHS-level oversight to  correct. For example, Border Patrol and ICE officials in two of the  sectors we visited said that DHS action, as a higher authority, could help  mitigate different priorities between its components, provide a unifying  direction, and quickly address problems. DHS headquarters officials from  several offices agreed, stating that many DHS components do not  consistently enforce information-sharing practices contained in  interagency agreements, and that field agents are left to resolve  coordination challenges without adequate headquarters guidance.
According to the OIG official we interviewed, DHS oversight of its  interagency MOUs could help promote the “One-DHS” culture.
Although DHS has relied on component-level management to ensure that  components coordinate information and operations in the field, the long- standing and continuing coordination challenges between ICE and Border  Patrol highlight the importance of developing a permanent solution to  oversee and address these challenges. We previously reported that federal  agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to create the means to  monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for  improvement. DHS oversight of MOU implementation, including  evaluating the outstanding challenges and developing planned corrective  actions, could better ensure that the MOUs are facilitating coordination as  intended, and that components are held accountable for adherence to  provisions within established agreements.
section_title: DHS Action Could Help to Address Coordination Challenges with Other Federal Agencies
paragraphs: Border Patrol, ICE, Forest Service, and DEA officials reported ongoing  coordination challenges in the four sectors we visited, despite DHS action  to improve coordination between these federal agencies that have  overlapping missions or operational boundaries. Additional DHS action to  provide oversight and enforce compliance with established agreements  across federal agencies could help further QHSR priorities of unity of  effort and integrated operations in conducting interdiction and  investigation on northern borderlands.
subsections: section_title: Forest Service and Border Patrol Remained Challenged in Coordinating Interdiction Efforts
paragraphs: Border Patrol and Forest Service officials we interviewed in the Blaine and  Spokane sectors reported efforts to improve coordination among these  agencies, but that sharing information on border security intelligence and  operations remained problematic. An interagency agreement  coordinating the missions of these agencies was established in a 2006  MOU among DHS, DOI, and USDA. The MOU outlines respective roles and  responsibilities of each agency when operating on federal lands, providing  Border Patrol’s role to detect and apprehend illegal cross-border activity,  and Forest Service’s role to apprehend and investigate persons conducting  illegal activities on federal lands. The agreement also requires the agencies  and their component offices—including Border Patrol and Forest  Service—to coordinate efforts in a number of areas, including sharing  information about threats and operations.
In the Blaine sector, Forest Service officials reported that coordination  was lacking due to limited interaction and inattention by leadership.  Although the interagency agreement establishes that the agencies are to  prioritize coordination, little coordination was taking place and there was  not an established relationship between the agencies in the Blaine sector,  according to the officials we interviewed. Border Patrol disagreed and  stated that it had assigned a Public Lands Liaison to coordinate operations  on federal lands, but Forest Service officials said that contact had been  minimal, due in part to turnover. While Forest Service officials were  hopeful that coordination could occur through the Border Lands  Management Task Force, they were not receiving information about the  location of Border Patrol assets or operations on Forest Service lands.
In the Spokane sector, officials reported that coordination was strained by  disagreements on roles and responsibilities when operating on Forest  Service land. For example, Forest Service law enforcement officials stated  that surveillance, patrol, and investigation of potential cross-border  criminal activity on federal borderlands are an inherent part of Forest  Service’s mission to safeguard natural resources and public safety.  However, Border Patrol officials stated that Forest Service actions to use  sensors and other resources to monitor cross-border activity have led to  duplication and overlap with Border Patrol’s mission and operation at the  border. While Border Patrol and Forest Service issued a local MOU in 2008  that more specifically defined roles and responsibilities between the two  agencies for the Spokane sector Border Patrol and the Northern Region  Forest Service Office, agency officials in the Spokane sector continued to  disagree on the division of roles and responsibilities when cross-border  illegal activity moves past the border and onto Forest Service land.
Another local-level MOU was issued in 2009 to more specifically address  roles and responsibilities between the agencies on Forest Service lands  patrolled by three Border Patrol stations, but challenges continue in  coordinating border security intelligence and operations between these  agencies.
The coordination challenges between Forest Service and Border Patrol  resulted in a lack of information sharing, inefficiencies, and within the  Spokane sector an overall breakdown of coordination efforts, according to  Forest Service officials operating within the Blaine and Spokane sectors  and Border Patrol officials operating within the Spokane sector. According  to Forest Service law enforcement officials operating within the Blaine  sector, Border Patrol does not share information in a timely manner due to  concerns that Forest Service cannot be trusted with certain types of  information. Border Patrol officials in the Spokane sector cited similar  concerns, and said that Forest Service leadership is reluctant to share  information with Border Patrol. However, Forest Service officials  operating in the Spokane sector disagreed stating that they are willing to  share information with Border Patrol. Officials from both agencies agreed  that these challenges may result in inefficiencies and a breakdown of  coordination, ultimately leading to the risk of a border that is less secure.
DHS action was needed to resolve these coordination challenges between  the agencies, according to Border Patrol officials in the Spokane sector.  Within the Spokane sector, Forest Service officials stated that DHS  headquarters action has not resulted in cooperation or substantive change  in field locations, and we recently reported that action was needed by DHS  and USDA to ensure that established agreements were proactively  implemented to prevent coordination challenges. Specifically, we  recommended that, in part, DHS and USDA take the necessary action to  ensure that personnel at all levels of each agency conduct early and  continued consultations to implement provisions of the 2006 MOU,  including determining agencies’ information needs for intelligence. Both  DHS and USDA agreed with our recommendation and, while CBP stated  that it would issue a memorandum to all Border Patrol sectors  emphasizing the importance of its partnerships, as of October 2010,  additional steps to fully address this recommendation have not yet been  taken.
section_title: ICE and DEA Officials Remained Challenged to Coordinate Investigations
paragraphs: ICE and DEA faced ongoing challenges coordinating northern border  security investigations, according to ICE and DEA officials in all four  sectors. Agreements coordinating the investigative missions of these  agencies include a 1994 MOU between the U.S. Customs Service—a DHS  legacy agency—and DEA. ICE and DEA updated this MOU in the June  2009 interagency cooperation agreement to reflect the current  organization under DHS, and also to harness both agencies’ expertise and  avoid operational conflicts in order to most effectively dismantle and  disrupt trafficking organizations. Although the interagency agreement  establishes that the agencies are to improve information and deconfliction  efforts, the MOU had not yet resulted in improved coordination between  the agencies 1 year after the updated agreement was in place, according to  ICE officials operating in three sectors we visited, and DEA officials  operating in all four sectors. The coordination challenges between ICE and  DEA resulted in a lack of information sharing, or potential inefficiencies,  resulting in the risk of investigations that were delayed or hindered,  according to ICE and DEA officials operating within the four sectors we  visited.
DEA officials we interviewed in all four sectors attributed the  coordination challenges with ICE to different interpretations of the MOU  provisions related to jurisdiction for drug investigations. Although DEA  has full jurisdiction for domestic and foreign drug investigations, as a  result of separate interagency agreements DEA takes the lead on drug  investigations originating between the ports of entry while ICE takes the  lead on drug investigations originating at the ports of entry. These  geographic distinctions can be confusing, according to a DEA official  operating in the Blaine sector. By contrast, ICE officials operating in the  four sectors we visited did not have concerns about differing  interpretations of the roles and responsibilities laid out in the agreement.  Specifically, ICE officials in the Spokane sector stated that both agencies  are investigative so they interpret the roles and responsibilities similarly.
ICE officials we interviewed in all four sectors attributed the coordination  challenges with DEA to separate DEA agreements with Border Patrol and  Canada’s RCMP that, from ICE’s perspective, exclude ICE from exchanges  of intelligence information and operations that could benefit ICE  investigations. According to ICE officials, under the DEA agreement with  RCMP, ICE is excluded from efforts to coordinate international drug  smuggling investigations. Similarly, ICE officials said that per the DEA  agreement with Border Patrol, Border Patrol provides DEA instead of ICE  the right of first refusal in referrals of drug seizures. ICE officials stated  this MOU creates a strain on ICE’s relationships with Border Patrol and  DEA, and also causes confusion that can hinder investigations and create  inefficiencies. DEA headquarters officials disagreed that ICE is excluded  as ICE has access to mechanisms DEA uses to share information with law  enforcement partners, such as the Special Operations Division and the  Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force.
ICE and DEA officials operating within three sectors also attributed the  ongoing coordination challenges between the agencies to overlapping  missions and competition for leading investigations, as both agencies have  a mission to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle  drugs as well as other contraband across the border. A DEA official  operating within the Swanton sector stated that mission overlap creates  too much competition for the same work, as well as receiving credit for  that work. DEA officials operating within the Spokane sector agreed,  stating that competition is an inherent problem when multiple  investigative agencies exist because their budgets are tied to the seizure  and investigation statistics they generate.
Additional DHS action is needed to resolve coordination challenges  between ICE and DEA, according to ICE officials we interviewed in all  four sectors and DEA officials in two sectors we visited, and as  recommended in our previous report. DEA officials operating within the  Spokane sector said that oversight of established agreements was  necessary to ensure that they are implemented and work to facilitate  coordination. According to DEA officials in the Spokane sector, this  oversight should consist of an overarching authoritative body—with no  ties, affiliations, or bias toward a particular agency or political party— tasked with reviewing established MOUs between law enforcement  entities to determine when coordination is being facilitated or hindered.  We previously reported that federal agencies can enhance and sustain  their collaborative efforts by, in part, developing mechanisms to monitor  their results. In addition, we recommended in March 2009 that DOJ and  DHS take action to provide oversight of established interagency  agreements. We also recommended that the agencies develop processes  to periodically monitor implementation of the agreements and make any  needed adjustments. DOJ concurred with the recommendations, but DHS  did not concur to monitor implementation of the agreements, and to-date  this recommendation remains unaddressed. DEA and ICE signed a  revised MOU in June 2009, but according to our work conducted in August  2010, the MOU had not yet resulted in resolution of coordination  challenges in the four sectors we visited. DEA officials at headquarters  commented that, while the 2009 agreement is entering its evaluation  period, not enough time has elapsed since the signing of the agreement to  assess its effectiveness. The challenges we have identified with northern  border coordination between DHS and its federal partners underscore the  importance of implementing past recommendations to ensure oversight  that reinforces accountability when establishing a partnership through a  written agreement.
section_title: DHS Reported Limited Progress in Securing the Northern Border, but Assessing Partner Contributions Could Inform Decisions in Addressing Remaining Vulnerabilities
paragraphs: DHS reported limited progress in securing the northern border, but  processes Border Patrol used to assess border security and resource  requirements did not include the extent that northern border partnerships  and resources were available or used to address border security  vulnerabilities. DHS action to develop guidance and policy for including  partner contributions in these processes could provide the agency and  Congress with more complete information in making funding and resource  allocation decisions.
subsections: section_title: Despite Limited Progress, Most Northern Border Miles Remained Vulnerable to Exploitation and There Is a Reliance on Outside Law Enforcement Support
paragraphs: Few northern border miles had reached an acceptable level of security as  of fiscal year end 2010, according to Border Patrol security assessments.  CBP measures border security between the ports of entry by the number  of miles under effective control of Border Patrol. DHS reports these  results in its annual performance report to Congress and the public, based  on border security assessments conducted by each Border Patrol sector  that are included in each sector’s ORBBP. Our review of these reports for  2010 showed that for the northern border overall, 32 of the nearly 4,000  border miles had reached an acceptable level of control, with 9 of these  miles included in the four sectors we visited. The remaining miles were  assessed at levels that Border Patrol reported are not acceptable end  states. These border miles are defined as vulnerable to exploitation due to  issues related to accessibility and resource availability and, as a result,  there is a high degree of reliance on law enforcement support from outside  the border zone.
CBP also does not have the ability to detect illegal activity across most of  the northern border. Because most areas of the northern border are  remote and inaccessible by traditional patrol methods, CBP’s Northern  Border Strategy states that one of the goals of Border Patrol is to reach full  situational awareness along the northern border. This strategy defines  full situational awareness as an area where the probability of detection is  high; however, the ability to respond is defined by accessibility to the area  or availability of resources, or both. At this level, CBP states that  partnerships with other law enforcement agencies play an important role  in resolving the illegal entries. Our review of sector ORBBP documents for  fiscal year 2010 showed that for the northern border overall, about 1,007 of  the nearly 4,000 northern border miles had reached this definition of full  situational awareness, with 398 of these miles included in the four sectors  we visited. CBP reported that the number of miles under control is  expected to increase as Border Patrol continues to put in place additional  resources based on risk, threat potential, and operational need.
CBP had planned to implement its northern border strategy and reinforce  overall security of the northern border over the next 4 years with a range  of initiatives involving increased staffing, cutting-edge technology,  increased infrastructure, and enhanced interagency partnerships. At the  time of our review, however, CBP had not yet issued an implementation  plan because it was unclear how CBP’s strategy for the northern border  may change in response to the recently issued QHSR and a  departmentwide strategy for the northern border, scheduled for issuance  later this year.
section_title: Including Partner Contributions in Border Security Assessments Could Provide a More Complete Picture of Border Security Risk and Resources
paragraphs: Border Patrol’s National Strategy states that, in part, reliance on border  fencing and personnel help secure control over the southern border, while  on the northern border, partnerships and the sharing of intelligence are  critical to success. While CBP’s Northern Border Strategy states that  these partnerships are crucial to securing the northern border, our review  of the 2010 ORBBPs for the Blaine, Spokane, Detroit, and Swanton sectors  showed that these sectors had identified various levels of additional  personnel, technology, and infrastructure necessary to increase border  control, but did not identify the extent that partnerships and their  resources were available to address border vulnerabilities.
Under Operation Stonegarden, DHS provided approximately $11.2  million in 3-year grants to northern border state, local, or tribal  governments to augment Border Patrol staff and resources on the  border in fiscal year 2010. However, the extent that these additional  staff and resources addressed border security vulnerabilities in the four  sectors we visited was not reflected in the ORBBPs.
The IBET for the Spokane sector maintained a centralized listing of  resources available among its partners, including cameras, satellite  phones, and ground sensors, that Border Patrol also requested in its  ORBBP. However, Border Patrol did not reflect the availability of these  partner resources to address border security vulnerabilities in the  sector.
One reason why partner contributions are not identified and assessed is  because Border Patrol guidance does not require partner resources to be  incorporated into Border Patrol security assessments, or in documents  that inform the resource planning process. The ORBBPs state the  importance of partnerships to border security, and list federal, state, local,  and international partners in the sector. However, partner resources that  were available to address border security gaps in each sector were not  identified despite DHS investment in these efforts. We previously reported  that federal agencies must identify ways to deliver results more efficiently  and in a way that is consistent with multiple demands and limited  resources. To do this, we reported that agencies should, in part, identify  the personnel, technology, and infrastructure resources available among  the collaborating agencies to help identify opportunities to address  different levels of resources by leveraging across partners, thus obtaining  benefits that would not be available if they were working separately.
CBP officials acknowledged the need to link partnership results to border  security goals, but said that the methodologies for border security  assessments and resource requirements documented in the ORBBP were  designed to be Border Patrol–centric. As such, the processes in place  reflect the extent that Border Patrol, exclusive of its partners, had  sufficient resources to detect, apprehend, and achieve an effective law  enforcement resolution. One reason these officials said that partner  contributions are excluded is that the ORBBP is used as a basis for sector  budget requests. Therefore, including partner resources could  disadvantage individual sectors, the Office of Border Patrol, and CBP in  the DHS resource allocation process. However, Border Patrol may still  benefit from identifying partner resources separately from their budget  requests so they have a better understanding of the resources available to  them to help secure the border.
Another reason cited by officials for excluding partner resources is that  these partners are not under the control of Border Patrol, and therefore  cannot be relied upon to sustain the border security mission. As such,  Border Patrol requires a set of resources that are not at risk of being  deployed away from the border if partners have a higher priority or  competing mission. Although these partners’ resources may have  competing missions, they are intended to supplement not sustain the  border security mission. However, identifying how these partner resources  and contributions could supplement Border Patrol’s efforts on the border  could better position CBP to target coordination efforts and make more  efficient resource allocation decisions. Moreover, including partner  resources in their assessments could better demonstrate the extent to  which their coordination efforts can address border security gaps.
The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  periodic comparison and accountability for resources should be made so  that agencies can provide reasonable assurance that their objectives are  being achieved through the effective and efficient stewardship of public  resources. Additionally, we previously reported that DHS has not fully  responded to a legislative reporting requirement to link its initiatives— including partnerships—to existing vulnerabilities to inform decisions on  federal resource allocations. The Implementing Recommendations of the  9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required the Secretary of Homeland Security  to submit a report to Congress that addressed the vulnerabilities along the  northern border, and provide recommendations and resources that would  be required to address them. Our review of the resulting DHS report  submitted to Congress in November 2008 showed a listing of threats,  vulnerabilities, and DHS initiatives to address them, but information was  not provided to link this information and determine the resources needed  to address the remaining security gaps. Our recommendation to DHS to  provide more specific information in these areas in future reports to  Congress remains unaddressed.
Border Patrol and CBP initiatives to update their resource planning  methodology and performance measures provide an opportunity to link  the benefits of partnerships to border security. Border Patrol is developing  a new methodology for its resource planning documents that could be  used to identify the capacity of partners to fill border security gaps.  Defined as an Analysis of Alternatives, this methodology calls for field  commanders to identify alternatives for achieving border control—other  than the resources requested in their resource planning documents.  According to DHS’s Office of Policy, this kind of analysis will directly  support efforts at the department level to bring strategy and resource  allocation into closer alignment, including analysis of capability  requirements derived from the strategy. As Border Patrol continues to  refine the guidance and policy supporting this effort, considering the  extent that this process, among others, could be used to assess available  partner resources and potentially leverage such resources to fill Border  Patrol resource gaps could better position CBP to target coordination  efforts and make more efficient resource decisions. Moreover, current  measures of partnerships having a positive effect on border security goals  are focused on staff and resources CBP provides to partnerships, rather  than how the benefits of partnerships address border security gaps. CBP  officials acknowledged the limitations of the measures and plan to  enhance them pending changes that may be forthcoming in its larger effort  to realign measures under a departmentwide strategy for the northern  border.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Securing the nation’s vast and diverse northern border is a daunting task.  The nature, size, and complexity of the border highlights the importance of  international, federal, state, local, and tribal entities working together to  enhance security. Northern border partners reported benefiting from  collaboration through interagency forums and joint operations, which  have enhanced coordination by facilitating the sharing of intelligence and  leveraging of resources between the northern border partners. However,  DHS oversight of the forums sponsored by DHS could help address  concerns identified by multiple partners and working groups that a lack of  attention may result in duplication of efforts across the northern border  and inefficient use of partners and their limited resources. Additionally,  the challenges we have identified with northern border coordination  between DHS components and among federal partners emphasizes the  need to establish oversight of MOU compliance between Border Patrol  and ICE, and underscores the importance of implementing past  recommendations to ensure oversight that reinforces accountability when  establishing a partnership through a written agreement. We have  previously recommended that ICE and DEA, as well as Border Patrol and  Forest Service, take the necessary steps to uphold implementation of their  MOUs. As a result of our work, we believe it is important for these  agencies to follow through with the recommendations so as to achieve an  effective and coordinated approach to address border security issues.  While DHS has planning efforts underway to streamline northern border  security efforts internally and across its northern border partners, until  such plans are implemented, coordination challenges could be preventing  partners from receiving vital information needed to effectively secure the  border. Finally, by excluding partner resources available to address border  security gaps in its assessment of northern border needs, DHS may be  missing opportunities to target coordination efforts and make more  efficient resource decisions. Integrating partner resources in the DHS  resource planning process, whether through Border Patrol’s Analysis of  Alternatives or other means, may provide a more complete picture of  border security status and resource requirements on the northern border.  Developing policy and guidance to assess the integrated capacity of all  northern border partners could also assist DHS in achieving the vision in  its QHSR to establish a strategic framework for homeland security that  guides all northern border partners to a common end.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure DHS is maximizing the benefits of its coordination efforts  with northern border partners through interagency forums, documented  agreements, and its resource planning process, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security take the following three actions:    Provide DHS-level guidance and oversight for interagency forums  established or sponsored by its components to ensure that the missions  and locations are not duplicative and to consider the downstream  burden on northern border partners.
Provide regular DHS-level oversight of Border Patrol and ICE  compliance with the provisions of the interagency MOU, including  evaluation of outstanding challenges and planned corrective actions.
Direct CBP to develop policy and guidance necessary to identify,  assess, and integrate the available partner resources in northern border  sector security assessments and resource planning documents.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, USDA, DOD, DOI, and DOJ for  their review and comment.  In commenting on our draft report, DHS  concurred with our recommendations and described actions underway or  planned that may directly or indirectly serve to address them.  In regard to  our first recommendation, DHS stated that the structure of the department  precludes using a single headquarters organization to provide DHS-level  guidance and oversight for interagency forums established by its  components.  Instead, DHS said it will review the inventory of interagency  forums through its strategic and operational planning efforts to assess  efficiency and identify challenges consistent with the forthcoming DHS  Northern Border Strategy that will better integrate, coordinate, and  achieve northern border management missions.  Within the context of  these higher-level efforts and any subsequent tactical or operational  assessments or planning, we encourage DHS to provide the guidance and  oversight necessary to ensure that missions and locations of these forums  are not duplicative and consider the downstream burden on northern  border partners.
In regard to our second recommendation that DHS provide oversight of  Border Patrol and ICE compliance with the MOU, DHS stated that it will  recommend that the ICE-CBP Coordination Council be resumed, and that  proper use of the Coordination Council would enable the recommended  DHS-level body to review and evaluate both Border Patrol and ICE  compliance with the MOU.  We note that in the past, the Coordination  Council was unable to improve upon the long-standing coordination  challenges between Border Patrol and ICE.  Thus, to be effective, a  resumed Coordination Council may require changes to its previous  structure, although determining what those changes should be was beyond  the scope of this study.  Nevertheless, we encourage DHS headquarters to  actively work with the Coordination Council and provide the oversight  necessary to address the MOU compliance issues identified in our report.
Finally, DHS stated that our third recommendation to develop policy and  guidance to identify, assess, and integrate partner resources in northern  border security assessments and resource planning would be resolved  through formulation of new policy and guidance resulting from three  foundational documents to be issued later this year; namely, the  departmentwide strategy for the northern border, the Northern Border  Strategy Implementation Plan, and the Shared Vision for Perimeter  Security and Competitiveness between the United States and Canada.  We  encourage DHS to ensure that within the context of these higher-level  strategic efforts and any subsequent tactical or operational assessments or  planning, CBP provide consistent policy and guidance on integrating  partner resources to help ensure that DHS is maximizing the benefits of its  coordination efforts.
In commenting on our draft report, USDA agreed with our  recommendations and stated that it will continue to work closely with  DHS to support northern border efforts and take the actions necessary to  make certain personnel at all levels of the agency implement provisions of  the interagency MOU.
DOD, DOI, and DOJ did not have formal comments on our draft report.   DHS, DOD, and DOJ provided technical comments, and we obtained  technical comments on selected text from state and Canadian officials.   We incorporated these technical comments as appropriate.  Appendix II  contains written comments from DHS.  Appendix III contains written  comments from USDA.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date.  At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of  Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and interested congressional  committees as appropriate. In addition, this report will be available at no  charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
section_title: Appendix I: Officials Operating within the Four Sectors Included in this Review
paragraphs: For the purposes of this review, we interviewed Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) headquarters officials with knowledge of DHS  coordination efforts and also interviewed federal, state, local, tribal, and  Canadian field-level officials in the four sectors we visited—Blaine,  Spokane, Detroit, and Swanton—with a nexus to security efforts along the  northern border to obtain their perspective on DHS coordination efforts.  For information related to the two interagency forums in our review—the  Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) and the Border Enforcement  Security Task Force (BEST)—as shown in table 4 below, we interviewed  18 U.S. federal and Canadian law enforcement officials participating in the  IBET or the BEST, or both, across the four sectors.
To obtain information on the northern border joint operations, we  interviewed officials in 19 offices who participated in one or more of these  operations across the Blaine, Spokane, Detroit, and Swanton sectors.  These officials represented 2 Canadian offices, 9 U.S. federal offices, 7  state and local offices, and 1 tribal office. See table 5 below.
Officials in 30 federal, state, local, and Canadian offices across the four  sectors we visited, shown in table 6 below, provided general information  on the challenges of interagency forums.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant Director,  and Dawn Locke, analyst-in-charge, managed this assignment. Susan  Czachor, Josh Diosomito, and Kelly Liptan made significant contributions  to the work. David Alexander assisted with the design and methodology,  and Frances Cook provided legal support. Jessica Orr, Robert Robinson,  Debbie Sebastian, Neil Asaba, Carolyn Blocker, Lisa Canini, and Richard  Eiserman assisted with report preparation.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a  Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands.  GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010.
Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and  Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement  Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed. GAO-10-41. Washington,  D.C.: December 18, 2009.
Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border  Security Programs and Operations, but Challenges Remain.  GAO-08-542T. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some  Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and  Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations. GAO-07-884T. Washington, D.C.:  September 27, 2007.
Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at  24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies. GAO-07-89.  Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2006.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and  Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005.
Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal  Response. GAO-05-305. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2005.
Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination.  GAO/GGD-00-106. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2000.