Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Address High-Risk Travelers and Maritime Cargo
Published: 2015-06-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls for a rapid and coordinated effort that uses U.S. government resources to mitigate threats to homeland security. DHS contributes to the U.S. government's efforts to combat terrorism and works to prevent inadmissible travelers and cargo from entering the United States. DHS's overseas efforts include ensuring visa security, inspecting passengers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights, and identifying high-risk cargo shipments.
This statement addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has aligned resource use abroad with strategic priorities and (2) selected DHS programs abroad aimed at preventing high-risk travelers and maritime containerized cargo from entering the United States. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from 2008 through January 2015, along with selected updates conducted in May 2015 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In September 2013, GAO reported on actions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had taken to align its programs abroad with its resource use and with other U.S. governmental strategic priorities. GAO found that DHS had taken actions to better align its resource use with its programs abroad consistent with requirements set forth in law. Specifically, from 2011 to early 2012, DHS conducted a onetime review of its international footprint—the complete set of DHS resources and efforts it has deployed abroad—and created a department-wide international engagement plan. However, DHS had not established specific department-wide strategic priorities for resource use abroad. Specifically, DHS (1) had not established department-wide strategic priorities for international engagement, such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals; (2) did not have a mechanism for monitoring alignment between resource deployment abroad and strategic priorities; and (3) did not have reliable, comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and had not established a standardized framework to capture these data. GAO recommended that DHS establish department-wide strategic priorities, a mechanism to routinely monitor alignment between strategic priorities and resource deployment abroad, and reliable cost data to provide DHS with critical information to make informed resource deployment decisions. DHS concurred and, as of May 2015, has taken steps to implement GAO's recommendations, such as drafting an international engagement strategy to identify specific department-wide priorities and establishing a common cost framework. DHS plans to finalize this strategy by early summer 2015 and use it a mechanism to facilitate additional footprint reviews in future budget years.
DHS deploys multiple screening and targeting programs designed to help interdict high-risk travelers, such as potential terrorists, and otherwise inadmissible passengers and cargo shipments before they board U.S.-bound commercial vessels. For example, in March 2011, GAO reported on the Visa Security Program (VSP) through which DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deploys personnel to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to conduct security reviews of visa applications, among other things. GAO found that ICE had limited guidance for the program and could improve its program expansion planning. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations to issue guidance and strengthen its planning and took steps to address them. GAO also found that DHS did not collect comprehensive data on all VSP performance measures and track the time officials spent on visa security activities; DHS did not concur with GAO's recommendations to address these limitations. Further, since 2008, GAO has reported on CBP's programs intended to secure the maritime global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailer—and cargo destined for the United States. For example, in September 2013, GAO found that CBP had not regularly assessed foreign ports for risks to since 2005. While CBP took steps to rank ports for risks in 2009, CBP did not use this information to modify where CBP staff were posted. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation to periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports and has plans to conduct such assessments by the end of 2015.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO previously made recommendations to DHS to inform its resource deployment abroad and strengthen screening and targeting programs. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations to inform resource deployment abroad and has actions planned or underway to address them. DHS did not agree with some of GAO's recommendations related to VSP; GAO continues to maintain that all of these recommendations should be addressed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) international programs and activities related to  screening and inspecting passengers and maritime containerized cargo.  The National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls for a rapid, coordinated,  and effective effort that uses the resources of the entire government to  mitigate threats to national and homeland security. DHS—with its  specific knowledge and skills in border and maritime security,  immigration, and law enforcement, among other areas—contributes to the  U.S. government’s efforts to combat terrorism and works to prevent  inadmissible travelers and goods from entering the United States. In  pursuit of this objective, DHS seeks to identify security vulnerabilities and  interdict threats at the earliest possible point in the travel, trade, and  immigration lifecycles to make the nation’s physical borders the last, not  the first, line of defense.
DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism start abroad before travelers and cargo  are approved for departure to the United States. Most notably, DHS  deploys multiple inspection and targeting programs designed to help  interdict high-risk travelers, such as potential terrorists, and otherwise  inadmissible passengers and cargo before they board commercial aircraft  and vessels bound for the United States. DHS also works alongside  foreign government officials to support them in assessing their own  security vulnerabilities at air and sea ports and strengthen their security  infrastructure by providing training and conducting critical infrastructure  assessments, among other things. DHS’s Office of International Affairs  (OIA) has primary responsibility for coordinating all aspects of the  department’s international operations, and for developing, coordinating,  and executing departmental international policy, including negotiating  agreements with other countries, developing policy and programs,  interacting with foreign officials, and working with DHS personnel abroad.
DHS components are generally responsible for making operational  decisions, such as allocating resources and conducting activities that  correspond to their particular missions to meet the department’s mission  needs.
Several DHS components are responsible for implementing programs  aimed at screening, inspecting and, if warranted, preventing high-risk  travelers and cargo from traveling to and entering the United States and  are responsible for deploying staff to certain foreign air and sea ports and  U.S. embassies to meet these objectives. U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP), the federal agency with primary responsibility for  securing U.S. borders, is authorized to vet, target, screen, and inspect  travelers and cargo prior to entering the United States and, in certain  circumstances and locations, before their transit to the United States.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the agency with  responsibility for enforcing U.S. customs and immigration laws,  regulations, and policies, is authorized to investigate a wide range of  domestic and international activities arising from the illegal movement of  people and goods into, within, and out of the United States.
This statement is based on related reports and testimonies we issued  from 2008 through January 2015 that examined DHS’s efforts to target,  interdict, screen, and inspect passengers and maritime containerized  cargo traveling to the United States (see app. I for a list of related GAO  products), and discusses:  the extent to which DHS has aligned resource use abroad with  strategic priorities and  selected DHS programs abroad aimed at preventing high-risk  travelers and maritime cargo from entering the United States.
This statement includes selected updates we conducted in May 2015 on  DHS’s efforts to address our previous recommendations related to DHS’s  management and prioritization of its resources abroad, the visa security  program, and efforts to protect the maritime global supply chain—the flow  of goods from manufacturers to retailers—and containerized cargo. It also  includes preliminary observations on CBP’s international air passenger  predeparture inspections efforts. We are currently reviewing these  programs at the request of the full committee, its subcommittees, and  other Members. Our reports incorporated information we obtained and  analyzed from officials at various DHS components, including CBP and  ICE, such as program plans, policies, and procedures. More detailed  information about our scope and methodology can be found in our reports  and testimonies. For the updates, we collected information from DHS on  actions it has taken to address findings and recommendations made in  prior reports on which this statement is based. We also reviewed recent  DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports on the Visa Security  Program and DHS’s efforts to target and vet foreign nationals. For our  ongoing work on CBP’s international air passenger predeparture  inspection efforts, we analyzed agency-wide policy guidelines and  procedures for operating these programs overseas. We also interviewed  CBP officials to obtain their views on CBP’s roles and responsibilities for  implementing and managing its predeparture inspections programs, as  well as CBP’s plans to expand these programs in the future. We  conducted all of this work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Enhanced Its Resource Alignment, but Could Better Assure Resources Deployed Abroad Support Highest Priorities
paragraphs: In September 2013, we reported on actions DHS has taken to align its  programs abroad with its resource use and with other U.S. governmental  strategic priorities. We found that DHS had taken actions toward  increasing organizational and programmatic alignment for its resource  use abroad consistent with requirements set forth in law. For example,  we found that DHS had established an intradepartmental governance  board to provide a formal organizational mechanism for DHS component  heads and OIA to collaborate and coordinate crosscutting policy issues  related to international engagement. We also found that DHS reviewed its  international footprint—the complete set of resources and efforts DHS  has deployed abroad—with the intention of enhancing organizational and  programmatic alignment. This “footprint review” was led by OIA, in  coordination with component heads, and it evaluated the placement of  resources on the basis of DHS’s strategic mission areas, cost, and  potential for engagement with host nations. Furthermore, in March 2013,  the Secretary of Homeland Security signed DHS’s first International  Engagement Plan to promote common international objectives and  priorities across the department. The plan maps key activities abroad to  DHS’s strategic mission areas, and includes specific strategies in  separate international engagement plans for various regions of the world.
Despite these efforts, we found that DHS could not provide overall  assurance of alignment of its resource use abroad with department-wide  and government-wide strategic priorities. Although DHS has a broad  mission set and decision making about resource use abroad is  decentralized to the components, we found that DHS had not established  specific department-wide strategic priorities—such as specific types of  activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals—for  resource use abroad to help promote organizational alignment in  resource decision making. While DHS’s International Engagement Plan  linked DHS’s strategic missions to the kinds of activities that DHS  conducts abroad, we found that it did not establish specific priorities to  help guide resource decision making. DHS officials from OIA and the  Office of Counterterrorism Policy agreed that DHS’s International  Engagement Plan did not represent a clear priority focus on countries  with factors that represented more immediate threats to the homeland  and did not necessarily serve to identify a clear set of priorities and  principles that would help to guide future resource decisions. To address  these concerns we recommended that DHS establish specific  department-wide priorities for resources abroad. DHS concurred, and as  of May 2015, has started to draft an international engagement strategy to  identify specific department-wide priorities. According to DHS officials,  OIA hopes to use the plan to help inform the department’s fiscal year  2017 budget request and intends to finalize the plan no later than early  summer 2015.
We also found that although OIA conducted a one-time exercise from  2011 to early 2012 to evaluate the department’s international footprint to  try to bring it into better organizational and programmatic alignment, DHS  had not established a routine or ingrained process that would continually  assess the alignment between strategic goals and resource decisions.  For example, we found each of the operational components that we  interviewed, such as CBP and ICE, described different rationales and  methods for deciding where and how many resources to deploy around  the world. At the time of our review, OIA officials stated they had not  devised an approach for implementing a routine, ingrained process with  department-wide methods and metrics, but officials agreed that such  methods and metrics that were meaningful to all of the components would  help provide a coherent strategic overlay to give the department better  assurance of alignment between resource use and strategic priorities. To  address these concerns, we recommended that DHS establish a routine,  institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of the department’s  resource use abroad with the highest department-wide and government- wide strategic priorities. DHS concurred, and as of May 2015, OIA plans  to use the international engagement plan as the foundation of a footprint  review, starting with a specific international region, to identify  opportunities to realign resources with priorities and to identify  crosscutting management efficiencies for the department’s fiscal year  2017 budget request.
In addition, in 2013, we found that DHS did not have comparable cost  data for its programs and activities abroad and had not established a  standardized framework to capture these data to help inform resource  decision making and to achieve management efficiencies when  addressing issues that are common across the department. We found  that each of the components tracked its international expenditures  differently, and according to OIA officials, the effort to collect comparable  information that reliably informs management decision making had been  challenging. According to OIA officials, a standardized reporting  framework for the costs of conducting activities abroad—for example,  salaries, housing, and fees paid to embassies to cover certain  administrative and security costs—across the department could enable  OIA to identify best practices that could lead to cost savings in  international deployments and enhance the ability to assess the  outcomes and cost-effectiveness of programs and activities carried out  abroad. We recommended that DHS establish a common reporting  framework to allow for the collection of reliable, comparable department- wide cost data for resource use abroad. DHS concurred, and, as of May  2015, had established a common cost framework.
section_title: DHS Carries Out Activities Abroad That Help Prevent High- Risk Passengers and Cargo from Traveling to and Entering the United States
paragraphs: DHS conducts various programs and mission activities abroad to prevent  people and cargo posing a threat to the United States from reaching the  homeland. These include, among other things, efforts to ensure visa  security, inspect international passengers prior to boarding a flight bound  for the United States, and identify and target high-risk maritime  containerized cargo shipments before being loaded onto U.S.-bound  vessels. According to DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination and  Planning data, as of May 2015, DHS OIA and DHS operational  components had approximately 1,800 full-time equivalents (FTE) in  almost 80 countries to help combat terrorism and achieve other mission   CBP had 801 FTE employees stationed in 43 countries and ICE  goals.had 380 FTEs in 45 countries.
In September 2013, we reported that DHS seeks to identify security  vulnerabilities and interdict threats at the earliest possible point in the  travel, trade, and immigration lifecycles, such as prior to visa issuance.  CBP, which operates the National Targeting Center (NTC), supports  DHS’s efforts by providing tactical targeting and analytical research of  people and goods prior to their departure to the United States. NTC  monitors the movement of potential terrorists and containerized cargo and  works to prevent them and any weapons of mass destruction or other  contraband from entering the country through land, air, and sea ports.  According to CBP program officials assigned to NTC, NTC staff analyze  various sources of government data, including lists of known terrorists;  data on foreign visitors whose official authorization permitting entry into  and travel within the United States has elapsed; passport, criminal, and  other law enforcement information; immigration records; and cargo  manifest data. Through CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS), CBP  officers identify and target passengers and cargo container shipments for  inspection. Among other things, ATS uses a set of rules that assess  different factors in the data to determine the risk level of a passenger or  shipment. According to CBP program officials assigned to NTC, CBP  makes available information from its databases and ATS to ICE and CBP  officials deployed abroad, among others, to assist with in carrying out  their respective missions as they relate to passengers and cargo, and to  reduce the vulnerabilities associated with the global supply chain.
subsections: section_title: Visa Security
paragraphs: In March 2011, we reported on ICE’s efforts to strengthen visa issuance  procedures. We found that ICE, through the Visa Security Program (VSP), works to prevent terrorists and otherwise inadmissible travelers  from attempting to enter the United States by screening visa applicants  before the travel process begins. Specifically, we reported that VSP is  intended to prevent terrorists, criminals, and other ineligible applicants  from receiving visas. Under VSP, ICE deploys personnel to certain U.S.  embassies and consulates to assist the Department of State’s consular  officers with security reviews of visa applications and investigations of  passport and visa fraud, among other things. ICE is also responsible for  training consular officers regarding specific security threats relating to the  adjudication of individual visa applications or classes of applications. As  of May 2015, ICE reported that it had established 21 visa security units in  15 countries. When reviewing applications for visas under VSP, ICE  agents screen applicant information against CBP immigration data and  ATS targeting and intelligence data to identify applicants that potentially  match records of individuals who are known or suspected threats to the  United States or have immigration violations or derogatory information  related to their criminal histories.
In March 2011, we reported, among other things, on DHS’s efforts to  expand VSP and challenges to VSP operations overseas. In general,  we found that ICE and the Department of State had limited guidance  regarding interactions between consular officers and ICE officials for the  screening and issuance of visas, and that training of consular officers by  VSP agents varied from post to post, with some consular officers at some  posts receiving no training. We also found that ICE lacked performance  measures to accurately evaluate VSP mission objectives. Moreover, we  found that VSP agents performed various investigative and administrative  functions beyond their visa security responsibilities, a fact that at times  slowed or limited visa security activities, and ICE did not track this  information in the VSP tracking system, making it unable to identify the  time spent on investigative and administrative functions. Finally, we found  that ICE’s plans to expand VSP did not cover 11 of 20 additional  diplomatic posts identified by ICE as high-risk.
We made several recommendations to help DHS better manage VSP at  posts overseas. First, we recommended that DHS issue guidance  requiring ICE to provide training for consular officers. DHS concurred and  has issued guidance to enhance the training of consular officers by VSP  offices abroad. Second, we recommended that DHS ensure that ICE  collects reliable data to allow ICE to accurately evaluate VSP  performance and report to Congress on progress toward the VSP mission  objectives. DHS stated that the VSP captured all the required  performance metrics. However, as we reported, we determined on the  basis of our analysis that ICE was collecting some data on the required  performance measures, but that the data were not sufficient to accurately  demonstrate the progress made toward the program’s stated objectives.  We continue to believe that without collecting comprehensive data on the  performance measures identified by ICE, DHS cannot accurately  demonstrate progress of VSP in enhancing national security. Third, we  recommended that DHS develop a mechanism to track the amount of  time spent by ICE on visa security activities and other investigations as  part of VSP, in order to determine appropriate staffing levels and resource  needs for VSP operations at posts overseas. DHS did not concur with this  recommendation and has taken no action to implement it. DHS stated  that ICE tracks case investigation hours through its case management  system, and that adding the metric to the VSP tracking system would be  redundant. However, we found, according to ICE documentation, that ICE  cannot accurately determine the amount of time that VSP agents spend  on investigative and visa security activities because ICE does not  distinguish between the hours logged by VSP agents and hours logged  by other ICE officials at posts abroad and that ICE does not maintain  accurate data on the time VSP agents spend on visa security activities at  posts. Without accurate data to determine the amount of time VSP agents  spend on the visa security activities, ICE is not well positioned to  determine whether the current allocations of staffing and resources at  posts are adequate to carry out the visa security reviews and fulfill VSP’s  objectives. Thus, we continue to believe our recommendation has merit,  and should be fully implemented. Lastly, we recommended that DHS  develop a plan to provide VSP coverage at high-risk posts where the  possibility of deploying agents may be limited. DHS concurred, and ICE  reported that it has enhanced its information technology systems so that  screening and reviewing applicants at all posts worldwide will now be  feasible.
section_title: Passenger Predeparture Inspections
paragraphs: CBP’s efforts to identify high-risk and potentially inadmissible travelers  begin before travelers enter a port of embarkation and continue between  ports of entry until CBP officers officially approve or deny travelers’ entry  into the United States. Specifically, CBP, through its predeparture  inspection programs, screens and inspects travelers destined for the  United States while they are still overseas. These programs utilize  established relationships with host countries and air carriers to work to  prevent passengers who may pose a security threat, have fraudulent  documents, or who are or may be otherwise inadmissible from boarding  flights to the United States. Specifically, CBP operates three pre- departure inspection programs—preclearance; the Immigration Advisory  Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP); and the regional carrier  liaison groups (RCLG). According to senior CBP officials responsible for  overseeing predeparture inspection programs, the United States intends  to expand these programs to additional locations. As of May 2015, DHS  and the Department of State are continuing to work together to determine  which countries the United States might consider for expansion. We are  currently reviewing these programs at the request of the full committee,  its subcommittees, and other Members. We anticipate reporting on the  results of our analyses by early 2016. Preliminary observations from our  ongoing work are as follows.
Preclearance. CBP preclearance locations serve as ports of entry into  the United States where CBP officers are authorized and empowered to  make admissibility decisions about passengers and their accompanying  goods or baggage destined for the United States. According to CBP  program documents and officials, an inspection at a preclearance location  is essentially the same inspection an individual would undergo at a port of  entry in the United States, and CBP officers conducting preclearance  inspections exercise identical authority as CBP officers at domestic ports  of entry to approve or deny admission into the United States. Once  precleared, a passenger is admitted to the United States and will not  require additional CBP inspection upon arrival. However, according to  CBP’s Deputy Director of Preclearance Operations, CBP officers retain  the authority to inspect these travelers and their accompanying goods or  baggage after arriving in the United States should inspection be  warranted. According to CBP program documentation, as of May 2015,  CBP has 568 staff located in preclearance facilities in 15 locations in six  countries.
Immigration Advisory Program and Joint Security Program.  According to CBP program documents and officials we interviewed, under  both IAP and JSP, CBP partners with foreign governments and air  carriers to identify and prevent high-risk travelers, travelers without proper  documents, and other potentially inadmissible travelers from boarding   According to CBP program documentation, as of  U.S.-bound flights. May 15, 2015, CBP has 41 IAP and 11 JSP staff in 11 locations around  the world. IAP officers operate primarily at airports in Western Europe,  and have access to the sterile and boarding areas of the host airports to  question passengers and review their travel documents.IAP concept, CBP launched JSP in two locations in 2009. According to a  senior CBP official responsible for overseeing IAP, under JSP  agreements with these host governments, CBP officers partner with the  host country law enforcement to identify air passengers linked to  terrorism, narcotics, weapons, and currency smuggling. In addition, he  stated that while CBP officers at these locations do not have unescorted  access to the host airport’s sterile area and must be accompanied by  local law enforcement personnel, they do have the ability to question  passengers and review their travel documents. Further, both IAP and JSP  officers themselves may not exercise U.S. immigrations and customs  authorities at the airport as CBP officers stationed at preclearance  locations do. However, a senior IAP and a JSP official stated that officers  work closely with the air carriers and local law enforcement to identify  fraudulent passports and visas and other factors that may render a  passenger inadmissible to the United States and support a no-board  recommendation to the commercial air carrier—i.e., recommending that  the carrier not transport the passenger because the passenger will likely   Building on the  be deemed inadmissible upon arrival in the United States. Moreover,  these officials stated that CBP officers at both IAP and JSP locations can  conduct queries of CBP databases and ATS targeting information and  coordinate with the NTC to confirm whether a traveler is a threat to the  United State or otherwise inadmissible. At JSP locations, CBP officers  use ATS targeting information in conjunction with local law enforcement  and host government data to identify threats, question passengers, and  review travel documents for all travelers arriving at and departing the host  country (including U.S.-bound and foreign-to-foreign commercial flights).
Regional Carrier Liaison Groups. According to CBP officials at NTC,  Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLGs) are to assist commercial  carriers with questions related to document fraud and inadmissibility. As  of May 2015, CBP has RCLGs in New York, Miami, and Honolulu.  According to CBP programs officials at the NTC, each of these locations  assists air carriers in designated parts of the world, and also assists CBP  officers at designated preclearance locations make admissibility  decisions. According to CBP program officials assigned to NTC, RCLGs  use government databases, immigration data, other NTC resources, and  ATS to provide technical real-time assistance to air carriers through their  phone center, and can make no-board recommendations directly to the  air carriers. In addition, according to CBP documentation, RCLGs are to  provide training on U.S. entry requirements, passenger assessment, and  fraudulent document detection, among other things, to air carriers at U.S.  ports of entry and at airports abroad.
section_title: Security of Maritime Cargo
paragraphs: DHS plays a large role in ensuring the safety of maritime containerized  cargo and vessels bound for the United States. Ports are critical  gateways for the movement of commerce through the global supply  chain. The facilities, vessels, and infrastructure within ports, and the  cargo passing through them, all have vulnerabilities that terrorists could  exploit. While there have been no known incidents of containers being  used for terrorism-related purposes, criminals have exploited containers  for other illegal purposes, such as smuggling weapons, people, and illicit  substances. Within DHS, CBP is primarily responsible for maritime supply  chain security and the screening of high-risk maritime cargo. Specifically,  CBP is focused on the security of the cargo shipped to the United States  from foreign ports. From 2008 to January 2015, we reported on DHS’s  efforts to assess potentially risky foreign ports, and target, screen, and  interdict vessels and cargo container shipments destined for the United  States.global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailer— and cargo destined for the United States—the Container Security  Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C- TPAT), and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI).
See 6 U.S.C. § 945. ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results of these risk  assessments to inform any future expansion of CSI to additional locations  and determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports  and make adjustments as appropriate and feasible. DHS concurred with  our recommendation, and in February 2015, CBP officials told us that the  agency plans to conduct periodic assessments of the supply chain  security risks from all ports that ship cargo to the United States.  According to CBP officials, CBP plans to complete the necessary steps to  implement this recommendation by the end of December 2015.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. C-TPAT, operated by  CBP, was established through the Security and Accountability for Every  Port (or SAFE Port) Act of 2006.  C-TPAT is a voluntary public-private- sector partnership with private stakeholders in the international trade  community that aims to secure the flow of maritime cargo bound for the  United States. Under C-TPAT, CBP officials work with member private  companies to review the security of their international supply chains and  improve the security of their cargo shipments to the United States. In  return, C-TPAT members receive various incentives to facilitate the flow  of legitimate cargo, such as reduced scrutiny of their shipments. In 2008,  we reported, among other things, that CBP took steps to improve the  security validation process for C-TPAT applicants and implemented  numerous actions to address C-TPAT management and staffing  challenges.used to help ensure that validation information is consistently collected,  documented, and uniformly applied to decisions regarding the awarding  of benefits to C-TPAT members, and that CBP lacked a systematic  process to ensure that members take appropriate actions in response to  security validation findings. We also found that C-TPAT’s performance  measures were insufficient to assess the impact of C-TPAT on increasing  supply chain security. We made recommendations to CBP to strengthen   However, we found challenges with the technology CBP  C-TPAT program management and oversight. Specifically, we  recommended, among other things, that CBP document key data  elements needed to track compliance with the SAFE Port Act and other  CBP internal requirements and to identify and pursue opportunities in  information collected during C-TPAT member processing activities that  may provide direction for developing performance measures of enhanced  supply chain security. CBP has since implemented these  recommendations by, for example, creating an automated platform to  track and capture the content and communication between CBP and C- TPAT members to ensure that C-TPAT validation report  recommendations are implemented and identifying analytical tools and  data for trend analysis to better assess C-TPAT’s impact on the supply  chain.
Secure Freight Initiative. The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) started as a  pilot program among CBP, the Department of Energy, and the  Department of State intended to test the feasibility of using radiation  detection and nonintrusive imaging equipment to scan 100 percent of  cargo containers bound for the United States before they are loaded onto  vessels at foreign seaports. In 2009, we reported that scanning  operations at the initial SFI ports encountered a number of challenges— including safety concerns, logistical problems with containers transferred  from rail or other vessels, scanning equipment breakdowns, and poor- quality scan images.of these challenges, and CBP officials were concerned that they and the  participating ports could not overcome them. Senior DHS and CBP  officials acknowledged that most, if not all foreign ports, would not be able  to meet the July 2012 target date for scanning all U.S.-bound cargo, and  DHS would need to issue extensions to such ports to allow the continued   Both CBP and GAO had previously identified many  flow of commerce in order to remain in compliance with relevant statutory  requirements. We recommended that DHS, in consultation with the  Secretaries of Energy and State, develop, among other things, more  comprehensive cost estimates, conduct cost-benefit and feasibility  analyses, and provide the results to Congress. CBP stated it does not  plan to develop comprehensive cost estimates since SFI has been  reduced to one port, and CBP has no funds to develop such cost  estimates. We previously reported that, in May 2014, the Secretary of  Homeland Security stated that “DHS’s ability to fully comply with this  unfunded mandate of 100 percent scanning, even in  long term, is  highly improbable, hugely expensive, and in our judgment, not the best  use of taxpayer resources to meet this country’s port security and  homeland security needs.” The Secretary also stated that he instructed  DHS, including CBP, to do a better job of meeting the underlying  objectives of the 100 percent scanning requirement by, in part, refining  aspects of CBP’s layered security strategy  In February 2012, we reported that the scanning challenges continued,  and CBP achieved 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound cargo containers  at only one foreign pilot port where it was being attempted. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Act), enacted in 2007, required, among other things, that by July  2012, 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers be scanned at foreign  ports with both radiation detection and non-intrusive inspection equipment  before being placed on U.S.-bound vessels. In May 2012, the then  Secretary of Homeland Security authorized a 2-year extension (until July  2014) of the deadline for implementing the requirement. Then, in May  2014, the current Secretary of Homeland Security renewed the extension  (until July 2016).
GAO-12-422T.
In addition to the CBP supply chain security programs described above,  we have also reported on CBP’s targeting of high-risk maritime  containerized cargo shipments. Specifically, in January 2015, we found,  among other things, that CBP did not have accurate data on the number  and disposition of each high-risk maritime cargo shipment scheduled to  arrive in the United States. On the basis of our analyses of CBP data for  fiscal years 2009 through 2013, we found that on average each year,  approximately 11.6 million maritime cargo container shipments arrived in  the United States, and less than 1 percent of those shipments were  determined by ATS to be high-risk. CBP targeters at advance targeting  units—responsible for reviewing shipments arriving at ports within their  respective regions—can waive an examination if they determine through  research that (1) the shipment falls within a predetermined category  (standard exception), or (2) they can articulate why the shipment should  not be considered high-risk (articulable reason), such as an error in the  shipment’s data. For example, a shipment could be identified as high-risk  because it is associated with a shipper on a terrorist watch list, but  through further research, CBP officials determine the shipper is not a true  match to the terrorist watch list and, therefore, the shipment should not be  considered high-risk. We found that CBP examined the vast majority of  high-risk shipments, but CBP’s disposition data were not accurate  because of various factors—such as the inclusion of shipments that were  never sent to the United States—and our analyses found that CBP’s data  overstated the number of high-risk shipments, including those not  examined/not waived under CBP policy. We also found that when  determining the disposition of high-risk shipments, CBP’s targeting units  were inconsistently applying criteria to make some waiver decisions and  were also incorrectly documenting the reasons for waivers.
On the basis of our review of CBP policy and visits to selected targeting  units, we determined that CBP has not established uniform definitions for  standard exception waiver categories, some CBP officials were unaware  of existing waiver guidance for articulable reason waivers, and some CBP  targeters across the targeting units we visited were inconsistently and  inaccurately recording waiver reasons in ATS. As a result, we concluded  that CBP could not accurately determine the extent to which standard  exception waivers were used consistently or whether waivers issued for  articulable reasons were being used judiciously, as required by policy. We  recommended, among other things, that CBP define standard exception  waiver categories and disseminate policy on documenting articulable  reason waivers. Further, we recommended that CBP enhance its  methodology for selecting shipments for self-inspections and change the  way it calculates the compliance rate. DHS concurred with our  recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address them.  For example, CBP plans to, among other things, draft an updated,  comprehensive National Cargo Targeting Policy, which is to include  definitions for each of the standard exception waiver categories and  develop an enhanced methodology for selecting shipment samples used  for self-inspection to increase the likelihood that any potential deficiencies  will be identified so that corrective actions can be taken to reduce errors  in the future. According to CBP officials, CBP is working to implement the  recommendations, and is to provide us with an update on the  implementation status by June 5, 2015.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and members of the  subcommittee this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you may have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca  Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key  contributions to this statement included Kathryn Bernet (Assistant  Director), as well as Sara Margraf, Jose Cardenas, Christopher Conrad,  and Martin Wilson.
section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Enhance Its Guidance and  Oversight of High-Risk Maritime Cargo Shipments, GAO-15-294.  Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2015.
Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security  Programs, GAO-14-636T. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2014.
Combating Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure  Resources Abroad Align with Priorities, GAO-13-681. Washington D.C.:  Sept. 25, 2013.
Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by  Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO-13-764.  Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2013.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of  Its Cargo Targeting System, GAO-13-9. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2012.
Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime  Transportation Security Act, GAO-12-1009T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11,  2012.
Visa Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Overstay  Enforcement and Address Risks in the Visa Process, GAO-11-910T.  Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2011.
Border Security: DHS’s Visa Security Program Needs to Improve  Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide,  GAO-11-315. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2011.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade  Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements,  but Some Challenges Remain, GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10,  2010.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist  DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to  Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO-10-12. Washington,  D.C.: Oct. 30, 2009.
Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.- Bound Cargo Containers, GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12,  2008.
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