Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency's Flexibility Reduces Transparency of Program Cost
Published: 2007-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Over the next 5 years the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) expects to invest $49 billion in the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system's development and fielding. MDA's strategy is to field new capabilities in 2-year blocks. In January 2006, MDA initiated its second block--Block 2006--to protect against attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. Congress requires GAO to assess MDA's progress annually. GAO's March 2007 report addressed MDA's progress during fiscal year 2006 and followed up on program oversight issues and the current status of MDA's quality assurance program. GAO assessed the progress of each element being developed by MDA, examined acquisition laws applicable to major acquisition programs, and reviewed the impact of implemented quality initiatives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: During fiscal year 2006, MDA fielded additional assets for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), enhanced the capability of some assets, and realized several noteworthy testing achievements. For example, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element successfully conducted its first end-to-end test of one engagement scenario, the element's first successful intercept test since 2002. However, MDA will not meet its original Block 2006 cost, fielding, or performance goals because the agency has revised those goals. In March 2006, MDA: reduced its goal for fielded assets to provide funds for technical problems and new and increased operations and sustainment requirements; increased its cost goal by about $1 billion--from $19.3 to $20.3 billion; and reduced its performance goal commensurate with the reduction of assets. MDA may also reduce the scope of the block further by deferring other work until a future block because four elements incurred about $478 million in fiscal year 2006 budget overruns. With the possible exception of GMD interceptors, MDA is generally on track to meet its revised quantity goals. But the deferral of work, both into and out of Block 2006, and inconsistent reporting of costs by some BMDS elements, makes the actual cost of Block 2006 difficult to determine. In addition, GAO cannot assess whether the block will meet its revised performance goals until MDA's models and simulations are anchored by sufficient flight tests to have confidence that predictions of performance are reliable. Because MDA has not formally entered the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition cycle, it is not yet required to apply certain laws intended to hold major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost, give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some level of independent program review. MDA is more agile in its decision-making because it does not have to wait for outside reviews or obtain higher-level approvals of its goals or changes to those goals. Because MDA can revise its baseline, it has the ability to field fewer assets than planned, defer work to a future block, and increase planned cost. All of this makes it hard to reconcile cost and outcomes against original goals and to determine the value of the work accomplished. Also, using research and development funds to purchase operational assets allows costs to be spread over 2 or more years, which makes costs harder to track and commits future budgets. MDA continues to identify quality assurance weaknesses, but the agency's corrective measures are beginning to produce results. Quality deficiencies are declining as MDA implements corrective actions, such as a teaming approach designed to restore the reliability of key suppliers.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Missile Defense Agency’s  (MDA) strategy for acquiring a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)  and its progress in developing and fielding Block 2006—the second  iteration of BMDS.
MDA’s mission is to develop and field an integrated, layered Ballistic  Missile Defense System capable of defending the United States, its  deployed forces, allies, and friends against enemy ballistic missiles  launched from all ranges and during all phases of the missiles’ flight. To  carry out its mission, MDA is fielding missile defense capabilities in 2-year  increments known as blocks. The first block—Block 2004—fielded a  limited initial capability that included early versions of Ground-Based  Midcourse Defense (GMD); Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD); Patriot  Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3); and Command, Control, Battle  Management, and Communications (C2BMC). Each of these components  is an element of the integrated BMDS. During calendar years 2006 and  2007, MDA is focusing Block 2006 to enhance and field four BMDS  elements—GMD, Aegis BMD, Sensors, and C2BMC. Block 2006 is not only  expected to field additional assets, but it also continues the evolution of  Block 2004 by providing improved GMD interceptors, enhanced Aegis  BMD missiles, upgraded Aegis BMD ships, a Forward-Based X-Band  Transportable radar, and enhancements to the C2BMC software.
The National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2002 and 2005  mandate that we prepare annual assessments of MDA’s ongoing cost,  schedule, testing, and performance progress. We issued our most recent  report on March 15, 2007. My statement today will focus on the issues  covered in that report, specifically:    MDA’s progress toward developing the Block 2006 configuration of  the BMDS,  the flexibility granted to MDA and its effect on oversight and  accountability, and  the status of MDA’s efforts to improve its quality processes.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Missile defense is important because at least 25 countries now possess or  are acquiring sophisticated missile technology that could be used to attack  the United States, deployed troops, friends, and allies. MDA’s mission is to  develop and field an integrated, layered BMDS capable of defending  against enemy ballistic missiles launched from all ranges and during all  phases of the missiles’ flight. DOD has spent and continues to spend large  sums of money to defend against this threat. Since the mid-1980s, about  $107 billion has been spent, and over the next 5 years, another $49 billion  is expected to be invested. While the initial set of BMDS assets was fielded  during 2004-2005, much of the technical and engineering foundation was  laid by this prior investment. DOD also expects to continue investing in  missile defense for many more years as the system evolves into one that  can engage an enemy ballistic missile launched from any range during any  phase of the missile’s flight.
To enable MDA to field and enhance a missile defense system quickly, the  Secretary of Defense, in 2002, directed a new acquisition strategy. The  Secretary’s strategy included removing the BMDS program from DOD’s  traditional acquisition process until a mature capability was ready to be  handed over to a military service for production and operation. Therefore,  development of the BMDS program is not segmented into concept  refinement, technology development, and system development and  demonstration phases, as other major defense acquisition programs are.  Instead, MDA initiates one development phase that incorporates all  acquisition activities and that is known simply as research and  development. MDA also has approval to use research and development  funds, rather than procurement funds, to acquire assets that could be  made available for operational use.
To carry out its mission, MDA is fielding missile defense capabilities in   2-year increments known as blocks. The first block—Block 2004—fielded  a limited initial capability that included early versions of GMD, Aegis BMD,  PAC-3, and C2BMC. This was the capability that was put on alert status in  2006. MDA formally began a second BMDS block on January 1, 2006, that  will continue through December 31, 2007. This block is expected to  provide protection against attacks from North Korea and the Middle East.  During the 2-year block timeframe, MDA is focusing its program of work  on the enhancement and fielding of additional quantities of the GMD,  Aegis BMD, and C2BMC elements, as well as fielding a Forward-Based X- Band radar that is part of the Sensors element. When MDA defined the  block in March 2005, shortly after submitting its fiscal year 2006 budget  request to Congress, it also included three other elements—Airborne Laser  (ABL), Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), and Terminal  High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)—that are primarily developmental in  nature. According to MDA, these elements were included in the block even  though they were not expected to be operational until future blocks  because the elements offered some emergency capability during the block  timeframe. In March 2006, MDA removed THAAD from Block 2006.  According to MDA, this action better aligned resources and fielding plans.  The development of two other elements—Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) and  Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)—also continued in fiscal year 2006, but  these elements were not considered part of Block 2006 because, according  to MDA officials, the elements provide no capability—emergency or  operational—during the block.
The bulk of the funding that MDA requests for the BMDS each fiscal year  is for the development, fielding, and sustainment of BMDS elements. For  example, in fiscal year 2006, funding for the nine BMDS elements  collectively accounted for 72 percent of MDA’s research and development  budget. MDA requests funds for each of these elements, with the  exception of C2BMC and THAAD, under separate budget line items. In  addition, MDA issues separate contracts for each of the nine elements.
Prior to beginning each new block, MDA establishes and submits block  goals to Congress. These goals present the business case for the new  block. MDA presented its Block 2006 goals to Congress in March 2005,  shortly after submitting its fiscal year 2006 budget. At that time, MDA told  Congress that the agency expected to field the following assets: up to   15 GMD interceptors, an interim upgrade of the Thule Early Warning  Radar, a Forward-Based X-Band radar, 19 Aegis BMD missiles, 1 new Aegis  cruiser for the missile defense mission, 4 new Aegis destroyers capable of  providing long-range surveillance and tracking, and 8 Aegis destroyers  upgraded for the engagement mission. MDA’s cost goal for the  development of the six elements that compose the block, the manufacture  of assets being fielded, and logistical support for fielded assets was   $19.3 billion. MDA also notified Congress of the Block 2006 performance  goals established for the BMDS. These goals were composed of numerical  values for the probability of engagement success, the land area from which  the BMDS could deny a launch, and the land area that the BMDS could  defend. Fiscal year testing goals were also established by element  program offices, but these goals were not formally reported to Congress.
We examined numerous documents and held discussions with agency  officials. In determining the elements’ progress toward Block 2006 goals,  we looked at the accomplishments of six BMDS elements—ABL, Aegis  BMD, BMDS Sensors, C2BMC, GMD, and STSS—that compose the Block  2006 configuration. Our work included examining System Element  Reviews, test plans and reports, production plans, and Contract  Performance Reports. We also interviewed officials within each element  program office and within MDA functional offices. In assessing whether  MDA’s flexibility impacts BMDS oversight and accountability, we  examined documents such as those defining MDA’s changes to Block 2006  goals, acquisition laws for major DOD programs, and BMDS policy  directives issued by the Secretary of Defense. We examined the current  status of MDA’s quality assurance program by visiting various contractor  facilities and holding discussions with MDA officials, such as officials in  the Office of Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance. We performed our  work from June 2006 through March 2007 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: MDA Has Made Progress with Block 2006, but Scope Has Been Reduced and Costs Have Gone Up
paragraphs: MDA made progress during fiscal year 2006, but it will not achieve the  goals it set for itself in March 2005. One year after establishing its Block  2006 goals, the agency informed Congress that it planned to field fewer  assets, reduce performance goals, and increase the block’s cost goal. It is  also likely that in addition to fielding fewer assets, other Block 2006 work  will be deferred to offset growing contractor costs. MDA is generally on  track to meet its revised quantity goals, but the performance of the BMDS  cannot yet be fully assessed because there have been too few flight tests  conducted to anchor the models and simulations that predict overall  system performance. Several elements continue to experience technical  problems that pose questions about the performance of the fielded system  and could delay the enhancement of future blocks. In addition, the Block  2006 cost goal cannot be reconciled with actual costs because work  travels to and from other blocks and individual element program offices  report costs inconsistently.
During the first year of Block 2006, MDA continued to improve the BMDS  by enhancing its performance and fielding additional assets. In addition,  the BMDS elements achieved some notable test results. For example, the  GMD element completed its first successful intercept attempt since 2002.  The test was also notable because it was an end-to-end test of one  engagement scenario, the first such test that the program has conducted.  Also, the Aegis BMD element conducted a successful intercept test of its  more capable Standard Missile-3 design that is being fielded for the first  time during Block 2006.
In March 2006, soon after the formal initiation of Block 2006, MDA  announced that events such as hardware delays, technical challenges, and  budget cuts were causing the agency to field fewer assets than originally  expected. MDA’s goal now calls for fielding 3 fewer GMD interceptors;  deferring the upgrade of the Thule radar until Block 2008, when it can be  fully upgraded; producing 4 fewer Aegis BMD missiles; upgrading 1 less  Aegis destroyer for the engagement mission; and delivering 3 C2BMC Web  browsers rather than the more expensive C2BMC suites. With the  exception of the GMD interceptors, MDA is on track to deliver the revised  quantities. The GMD program planned to emplace 8 interceptors during  calendar year 2006, but was only able to emplace 4. Program officials told  us that the contractor has increased the number of shifts that it is working  and that this change will accelerate deliveries. However, to meet its  quantity goal, the GMD program will have to more than double its  interceptor emplacement rate in 2007.
MDA also reduced the performance expected of Block 2006  commensurate with the reduction in assets. However, insufficient data are  available to determine whether MDA is on track to meet the new goal.  Although the GMD test program has achieved some notable results,  officials in DOD’s Office of the Director of Operational Test and  Evaluation told us that the element has not completed sufficient tests to  provide a high level of confidence that the BMDS can reliably intercept  intercontinental ballistic missiles. Further testing is needed as well to  confirm that GMD can use long-range tracking data developed by Aegis  BMD to prepare—in real time—a weapon system task plan for GMD  interceptors.
Delayed testing and technical problems may also impact the performance  of the current and future configurations of the BMDS. For example, the  performance of the Block 2006 configuration of the Aegis BMD missile is  unproven because design changes in the missile’s solid attitude and divert  system and one burn pattern of the third stage rocket motor were not  flight-tested before they were cut into the production line. The current  configuration of the GMD interceptor also continues to struggle with an  anomaly that has occurred in each of the element’s flight tests. The  anomaly has not yet prevented the program from achieving its primary test  objectives, but neither its source nor a solution has been clearly identified  or defined. The reliability of some GMD interceptors remains uncertain as  well because inadequate mission assurance/quality control procedures  may have allowed less reliable or inappropriate parts to be incorporated  into the manufacturing process. Program officials plan to introduce new  parts into the manufacturing process, but not until interceptor 18. MDA  also plans to retrofit the previous 17 interceptors, but not until fiscal year  2009. In addition to the performance problems with elements being  fielded, the ABL element that is being developed to enhance a future  BMDS configuration experienced technical problems with its Beam  Control/Fire Control component. These problems have delayed a lethality  demonstration that is needed to demonstrate the element’s leading-edge  technologies. ABL is an important element because if it works as desired,  it will defeat enemy missiles soon after launch, before decoys are released  to confuse other BMDS elements. MDA plans to decide in 2009 whether  ABL or KEI, whose primary boost phase role is to mitigate the risk in the  ABL program, will become the BMDS boost phase capability.
While MDA reduced Block 2006 quantity and performance goals, it  increased the block’s cost goal from about $19.3 billion to approximately  $20.3 billion. The cost increases were caused by the addition of previously  unknown operations and sustainment requirements, realignment of the  GMD program to support a successful return to flight, realignment of the  Aegis BMD program to address technical challenges and invest in  upgrades, and preparations for round-the-clock operation of the BMDS.  Although MDA is expected to operate within its revised budget of   $20.3 billion, the actual cost of the block cannot be reconciled with the  cost goal. To stay within its Block 2004 budget, MDA shifted some of that  block’s work to Block 2006 and is counting it as a cost of Block 2006,  which overstates Block 2006 cost. In addition, MDA officials told us that it  is likely that some Block 2006 work will be deferred until Block 2008 to  cover the $478 million fiscal year 2006 budget overruns experienced by   five of the six element prime contractors. If MDA reports the cost of  deferred work as it has in the past, the actual cost of Block 2006 will be  complicated further. Another factor complicating the reconciliation of  Block 2006 cost is that the elements report block cost inconsistently. Some  elements appropriately include costs that the program will incur to reach  full capability, while others do not.
section_title: MDA’s Flexibility Makes Oversight and Accountability More Difficult
paragraphs: Because the BMDS has not formally entered the system development and  demonstration phase of the acquisition cycle, it is not yet required to apply  several important oversight mechanisms contained in certain acquisition  laws that, among other things, provide transparency into program progress  and decisions. This has enabled MDA to be agile in decision making and  has facilitated fielding an initial BMDS capability quickly. On the other  hand, MDA operates with considerable autonomy to change goals and  plans, making it difficult to reconcile outcomes with original expectations  and to determine the actual cost of each block and of individual  operational assets.
Over the years, a framework of laws has been created that make major  defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and  cost, give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some  level of independent program review. The application of many of these  laws is triggered by a program’s entry into system development and  demonstration. To provide accountability, once major defense programs  cross this threshold, they are required by statute to document program  goals in an acquisition program baseline that as implemented by DOD has  been approved by a higher-level DOD official prior to the program’s  initiation. The baseline provides decision makers with the program’s best  estimate of the program’s total cost for an increment of work, average unit  costs for assets to be delivered, the date that an operational capability will  be fielded, and the weapon’s intended performance parameters. Once  approved, major acquisition programs are required to measure their  program against the baseline, which is the program’s initial business case,  or obtain the approval of a higher-level acquisition executive before  making significant changes. Programs are also required to regularly  provide detailed program status information to Congress, including  information on cost, in Selected Acquisition Reports. In addition, Congress  has established a cost-monitoring mechanism that requires programs to  report significant increases in unit cost measured from the program  baseline.
Other statutes provide for independent program verifications and place  limits on the use of appropriations. For example, 10 U.S.C. § 2434 prohibits  the Secretary of Defense from approving system development and  demonstration unless an independent estimate of the program’s life-cycle  cost has been conducted by the Secretary. In addition, 10 U.S.C. §  2399 requires completion of initial operational test and evaluation before   a program can begin full-rate production. These statutes ensure that  someone external to the program examines the likelihood that the  program can be executed as planned and will yield a system that is  effective and suitable for combat. The use of an appropriation is also  controlled so that it will not be used for a purpose other than the one for  which it was made, except as otherwise provided by law. Research and  development appropriations are typically specified by Congress to be used  to pay the expenses of basic and applied scientific research, development,  test, and evaluation. On the other hand, procurement appropriations are,  in general, to be used for production and manufacturing. In the 1950s,  Congress established a policy that items being purchased with  procurement funds be fully funded in the year that the item is procured.  This is meant to prevent a program from incrementally funding the  purchase of operational systems. Full funding ensures that the total  procurement costs of weapons and equipment are known to Congress up  front and that one Congress does not put the burden on future Congresses  of deciding whether they should appropriate additional funds or expose  weapons under construction to uneconomic start-up and stop costs.
The flexibility to defer application of specific acquisition laws has benefits.  MDA can make decisions faster than other major acquisition programs  because it does not have to wait for higher-level approvals or independent  reviews. MDA’s ability to quickly field a missile defense capability is also  improved because assets can be fielded before all testing is complete.  MDA considers the assets it has fielded to be developmental assets and not  the result of the production phase of the acquisition cycle. Additionally,  MDA enjoys greater flexibility than other programs in the use of its funds.  Because MDA uses research and development funds to manufacture  assets, it is not required to fully fund those assets in the year of their  purchase. Therefore, as long as its annual budget remains fairly level,   MDA can request funds to address other needs.
On the other hand, the flexibilities granted MDA make it more difficult to  conduct program oversight or to hold MDA accountable for the large  investment being made in the BMDS program. Block goals can be changed  by MDA, softening the baseline used to assess progress toward expected  outcomes. Similarly, because MDA can redefine the work to be completed  during a block, the actual cost of a block cannot be compared with the  original cost estimate. MDA considers the cost of deferred work, which  may be the delayed delivery of assets or other work activities, as a cost of  the block in which the work is performed even though the work benefits  or was planned for a prior block. Further, MDA does not track the cost of  the deferred work and, therefore, cannot make adjustments that would  match the cost with the block that is benefited. For example, during Block  2004, MDA deferred some planned development, deployment,  characterization, and verification activities until Block 2006 so that it  could cover contractor budget overruns. The costs of the activities are  now considered part of the cost of Block 2006. Also, although Congress  provided funding for these activities during Block 2004, MDA used these  funds for the overruns and will need additional funds during Block 2006 to  cover their cost. Planned and actual unit costs of fielded assets are equally  difficult to reconcile. Because MDA is not required to develop an approved  acquisition program baseline, it is not required to report the expected  average unit cost of assets. Also, because MDA is not required to report  significant increases in unit cost, it is not easy to determine whether an  asset’s actual cost has increased significantly from its expected cost.
Finally, using research and development funds to purchase fielded assets  further reduces cost transparency because these dollars are not covered  by the full-funding policy as are procurement funds. Therefore, when a  program for a 2-year block is first presented in the budget, Congress is not  necessarily fully aware of the dimensions and cost of that block. For  example, although a block may call for the delivery of a specific number of  interceptors, the full cost of those interceptors is requested over 3 to   5 years. Calculating unit costs from budget documents is difficult because  the cost of components that will become fielded assets may be spread  across 3 to 5 budget years—a consequence of incremental funding.
section_title: MDA Audits Show Improvement in Quality Processes
paragraphs: During Block 2004, poor quality control procedures caused the missile  defense program to experience test failures and slowed production.   MDA has initiated a number of actions to correct quality control  weaknesses, and the agency reports that these actions have been largely  successful. Although MDA continues to identify quality assurance  procedures that need strengthening, recent audits by MDA’s Office of  Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance show such improvements as  increased on-time deliveries, reduced test failures, and sustained  improvement in product quality.
MDA has taken a number of steps to improve quality assurance. These  include developing a teaming approach to restore the reliability of key  suppliers, conducting regular quality inspections to quickly identify and  find resolutions for quality problems, adjusting award fee plans to  encourage contractors to maintain a good quality assurance program and  encourage industry best practices, as well as placing MDA-developed  assurance provisions on prime contracts. For example, as early as 2003,  MDA made a critical assessment of a key supplier’s organization and  determined that the supplier’s manufacturing processes lacked discipline,  its corrective action procedures were ineffective, its technical data  package was inadequate, and personnel were not properly trained. The  supplier responded by hiring a Quality Assurance Director, five quality  assurance professionals, a training manager, and a scheduler. In addition,  the supplier installed an electronic problem-reporting database, formed  new boards—such as a failure review board—established a new  configuration management system, and ensured that manufacturing  activity was consistent with contract requirements. During different time  periods between March 2004 and August 2006, MDA measured the results  of the supplier’s efforts and found a 64 percent decrease in open quality  control issues, a 43 percent decline in test failures, and a 9 percent  increase in on-time deliveries. MDA expanded its teaming approach in  2006 to another problem supplier and reports that many systemic solutions  are already underway.
During fiscal year 2006, MDA’s audits continued to identify both quality  control weaknesses and quality control procedures that contractors are  addressing. During 2006, the agency audited six contractors and identified  372 deficiencies and observations. As of December 2006, the six  contractors had collectively closed 157, or 42 percent, of the 372 audit  findings. MDA also reported other signs of positive results. For example, in  2006, MDA conducted a follow-on audit of Raytheon, the subcontractor for  GMD’s exoatmospheric kill vehicle. A 2005 audit of Raytheon had found  that the subcontractor was not correctly communicating essential kill  vehicle requirements to suppliers, did not exercise good configuration  control, and could not build a consistent and reliable product. The 2006  audit was more positive, reporting less variability in Raytheon’s  production processes, increasing stability in its statistical process control  data, fewer test problem reports and product waivers, and sustained  improvement in product quality.
section_title: Actions Recommended In Our Recent Report
paragraphs: In our March 15, 2007, report, we made several recommendations to DOD  to increase transparency in the missile defense program. These included:    Develop a firm cost, schedule, and performance baseline for those  elements considered far enough along to be in system development  and demonstration, and report against that baseline.
Propose an approach for those same elements that provides  information consistent with the acquisition laws that govern  baselines and unit cost reporting, independent cost estimates, and  operational test and evaluation for major DOD programs. Such an  approach could provide necessary information while preserving the  MDA Director’s flexibility to make decisions.
Include in blocks only those elements that will field capabilities  during the block period and develop a firm cost, schedule, and  performance baseline for that block capability, including the unit  cost of its assets.
Request and use procurement funds, rather than research,  development, test, and evaluation funds, to acquire fielded assets.
DOD partially agreed with the first three recommendations and recognized  the need for greater program transparency. It committed to provide  information consistent with the acquisition laws that govern baselines and  unit cost reporting, independent cost estimates, and operational test and  evaluation. DOD did not agree to use elements as a basis for this reporting,  expressing its concern that an element-centric approach to reporting  would have a fragmenting effect on the development of an integrated  system. We respect the need for the MDA Director to make decisions  across element lines to preserve the integrity of the system of systems. We  recognize that there are other bases rather than elements for reporting  purposes. However, we believe it is essential that MDA report in the same  way that it requests funds. Currently MDA requests funds and contracts by  element, and at this time, that appears to be the most logical way to report.  MDA currently intends to modify its current block approach. We believe  that a management construct like a block is needed to provide the vehicle  for making system-of-system decisions and to provide for system-wide  testing. However, at this point, the individual assets to be managed in a  block—including quantities, cost, and delivery schedules—can only be  derived from the individual elements.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond  to any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For future questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 or francisp@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include Barbara H. Haynes, Assistant Director; LaTonya D.  Miller; Michael J. Hesse; Letisha T. Jenkins; Sigrid L. McGinty; Kenneth E.  Patton; and Steven B. Stern.
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