FCC Management: Improvements Needed in Communication, Decision-Making Processes, and Workforce Planning
Published: 2009-12-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Rapid changes in the telecommunications industry, such as the development of broadband technologies, present new regulatory challenges for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to determine (1) the extent to which FCC's bureau structure presents challenges for the agency in adapting to an evolving marketplace; (2) the extent to which FCC's decision-making processes present challenges for FCC, and what opportunities, if any, exist for improvement; and (3) the extent to which FCC's personnel management and workforce planning efforts face challenges in ensuring that FCC has the workforce needed to achieve its mission. GAO reviewed FCC documents and data and conducted literature searches to identify proposed reforms, criteria, and internal control standards and compared them with FCC's practices. GAO also interviewed current and former FCC chairmen and commissioners, industry stakeholders, academic experts, and consumer representatives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FCC consists of seven bureaus, with some structured along functional lines, such as enforcement, and some structured along technological lines, such as wireless telecommunications and media. Although there have been changes in FCC's bureau structure, developments in the telecommunications industry continue to create issues that span the jurisdiction of several bureaus. However, FCC lacks written procedures for ensuring that interbureau collaboration and communication occurs. FCC's reliance on informal coordination has created confusion among the bureaus regarding who is responsible for handling certain issues. In addition, the lack of written procedures has allowed various chairmen to determine the extent to which interbureau collaboration and communication occurs. This has led to instances in which FCC's final analyses lacked input from all relevant staff. Although FCC stated that it relies on its functional offices, such as its engineering and strategic planning offices, to address crosscutting issues, stakeholders have expressed concerns regarding the chairman's ability to influence these offices. Weaknesses in FCC's processes for collecting and using information also raise concerns regarding the transparency and informed nature of FCC's decision-making process. FCC has five commissioners, one of which is designated chairman. FCC lacks internal policies regarding commissioner access to staff analyses during the decision-making process, and some chairmen have restricted this access. Such restrictions may undermine the group decision-making process and impact the quality of FCC's decisions. In addition, GAO identified weaknesses in FCC's processes for collecting public input on proposed rules. Specifically, FCC rarely includes the text of a proposed rule when issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to collect public comment on a rule change, although some studies have noted that providing proposed rule text helps focus public input. Additionally, FCC has developed rules regarding contacts between external parties and FCC officials (known as ex parte contacts) that require the external party to provide FCC a summary of the new information presented for inclusion in the public record. However, several stakeholders told us that FCC's ex parte process allows vague ex parte summaries and that in some cases, ex parte contacts can occur just before a commission vote, which can limit stakeholders' ability to determine what information was provided and to rebut or discuss that information. FCC faces challenges in ensuring it has the expertise needed to adapt to a changing marketplace. For example, a large percentage of FCC's economists and engineers are eligible to retire in 2011, and FCC faces difficulty recruiting top candidates. FCC has initiated recruitment and development programs and has begun evaluating its workforce needs. GAO previously noted that strategic workforce planning should include identifying needs, developing strategies to address these needs, and tracking progress. However, FCC's Strategic Human Capital Plan does not establish targets for its expertise needs, making it difficult to assess the agency's progress in addressing its needs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations affect the daily  lives of every American, from rules governing who may own the morning  newspaper to the networks connecting the last phone call at night. FCC- regulated industries provide Americans with daily access to  communications services, including wireline and wireless telephone  service, Internet access services, and radio and video services. FCC’s  regulatory authority was substantially amended by the  Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Telecommunications Act), with a goal of  fostering competition among companies that used similar technology to  provide services. However, the act did not fully envision the competition  that has subsequently developed among previously distinct industries,  such as wireless service competing with both local and long-distance  wireline service, and video and telephone service providers competing to  offer “bundles” of phone, video, and Internet services. As a result, some  have argued that FCC’s current statutory framework applies different  regulations to competing industries and has become inconsistent with  current market conditions. FCC has acknowledged that its ability to  respond to the evolving marketplace depends upon effective and  transparent communication among FCC staff and with the members of the  public, as well as the assurance that the agency has the information and  expertise needed to adapt to evolving conditions. However, the agency has  faced a series of critiques regarding the interaction among the chairman,  commissioners, and bureau staff; transparency in its decision making; and  workforce and personnel issues. To address these issues, a number of  reforms have been proposed. In June 2009, Chairman Genachowski  appointed a special counsel for FCC reform and directed FCC’s general  counsel and managing director to perform a thorough review of the  existing processes and to make recommendations for improvement. As  part of this process, FCC has launched an internal online forum where  employees can submit ideas for improvement and reform, and FCC is  planning on launching a section on FCC’s Web site that will allow the  public to offer ideas for FCC reform as well.
Seeking information about FCC’s ability to achieve its mission, you asked  us to review FCC’s organization, decision-making process, and personnel  management. Accordingly, this report examines (1) the extent to which  FCC’s bureau structure presents challenges for the agency in adapting to  an evolving marketplace; (2) the extent to which FCC’s decision-making  processes present challenges for FCC, and what opportunities, if any, exist  for improvement; and (3) the extent to which FCC’s personnel  management and workforce planning efforts ensure that FCC has the  workforce needed to achieve its mission.
To describe the challenges FCC’s bureau structure presents the agency in  adapting to an evolving marketplace, we reviewed FCC procedures,  applicable laws, and reviewed academic literature on organizational  theory. To identify the extent to which FCC’s decision-making processes  present challenges for FCC and opportunities for improvement, we  reviewed literature on potential reforms to the federal rulemaking process  and on the commission structure and decision-making process. We  interviewed officials from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal  Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission and  reviewed their internal commission procedures to understand how other  independent regulatory agencies implement the commission decision- making process. We reviewed FCC’s decision-making procedures and  public comment and ex parte rules, and compared certain aspects to  standards established in our internal control standards and other relevant  documents. To determine the extent to which FCC’s personnel  management and workforce planning efforts ensure that FCC has the  workforce needed to achieve its mission, we reviewed our prior products  related to strategic workforce planning and human capital challenges, and  reviewed FCC’s 2007-2011 Strategic Human Capital Plan and FCC- generated data on overall staff levels, hiring, attrition, and retirement  eligibility for the period of 2003 to 2008. We analyzed results from the  Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Federal Human Capital Survey  (FHCS) for 2008 and compared FCC responses on various items with the  results for the rest of government. We determined that the staffing data  provided by FCC and the FCC 2008 FHCS survey data are sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, to address all of these  questions, we interviewed current and former FCC officials, including  commissioners and chairmen, as well as industry, consumer, and  academic stakeholders.
We performed our review from August 2008 to October 2009 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our review objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  review objectives. A detailed discussion of our scope and methodology  appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934  (Communications Act). The Communications Act, as amended, specifies  that FCC was established for the ‘‘the purpose of regulating interstate and  foreign commerce in communications by wire and radio so as to make  available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States . . . a  rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio  communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for  the purpose of the national defense  for the purpose of promoting  safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio  communication.” FCC is responsible for, among other things, making  available rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio  communication services at reasonable charges and on a nondiscriminatory  basis, and more recently, promoting competition and reducing regulation  of the telecommunications industry in order to secure lower prices and  high-quality services for consumers. FCC established six strategic goals to  support its mission:  1.  Promote access to robust and reliable broadband products and  services for all Americans.  2.  Promote a competitive framework for communications services that  support the nation’s economy.  3.  Facilitate efficient and effective use of nonfederal spectrum to  promote growth and rapid development of innovative and efficient  communications technologies and services.  4.  Develop media regulations that promote competition, diversity, and  localism and facilitate the transition to digital modes of delivery.  5.  Promote access to effective communications during emergencies and  crises and strengthen measures for protecting the nation’s critical  communications infrastructure.  6.  Strive to be a highly productive, adaptive, and innovative organization  that maximizes the benefit to stakeholders, staff, and management  from effective systems, processes, resources, and organizational  culture.
FCC’s basic structure is prescribed by statute. FCC is composed of five  commissioners, appointed by the President and approved by the Senate to  serve 5-year terms; the President designates one member to serve as  chairman. No more than three commissioners may come from any one  political party. The commission has flexibility in how it creates and  organizes divisions or bureaus responsible for specific work assigned.  Specifically, the Communications Act, as amended, requires the  commission to organize its staff into (1) integrated bureaus, to function on  the basis of the commission’s principal workload operations, and (2) such  other divisional organizations as the commission deems necessary. FCC  currently consists of seven bureaus that are responsible for a variety of  issues that affect consumers and the telecommunications industry,  including analyzing complaints, licensing, and spectrum auctions, and 10  offices that provide support services for the bureaus and commission.  Appendix II has a detailed description of each bureau and office. Each  bureau is required by statute to include the legal, engineering, accounting,  administrative, clerical, and other personnel that the commission  determines necessary to perform its functions. FCC has identified  attorneys, engineers, and economists as the agency’s main professional  categories. Although FCC has staff offices with concentrations of each  profession (attorneys in the Office of General Counsel, engineers in the  Office of Engineering and Technology, and economists in the Office of  Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis), these professions are also  integrated into the bureaus.
Under the Communications Act, as amended, FCC has broad authority to  execute its functions. The act, as amended, is divided into titles and  sections that describe various powers and concerns of the commission,  with different titles describing the laws applicable to different services.  For example, there are separate titles outlining the specific provisions for  telecommunications services and for cable services. This statutory  structure created distinct regulatory “silos” that equated specific services  with specific network technologies. However, technological advances in  communications infrastructure have led to a convergence of previously  separate networks used to transmit voice, data, and video  communications. For example, telephone, cable, and wireless companies  are increasingly offering voice, data, and video services over a single  platform.
FCC is charged with carrying out various activities, including issuing  licenses for broadcast television and radio; overseeing licensing,  enforcement, and regulatory functions of cellular phones and other  personal communication services; regulating the use of radio spectrum  and conducting auctions of licenses for spectrum; investigating complaints  and taking enforcement actions if it finds that there have been violations  of the various communications laws and commission rules that are  designed to protect consumers; addressing public safety, homeland  security, emergency management, and preparedness; educating and  informing consumers about communications goods and services; and  reviewing mergers of companies holding FCC-issued licenses. The  Telecommunications Act also expanded FCC’s responsibilities for  universal service beyond the traditional provision of affordable,  nationwide access to basic telephone service to include eligible schools,  libraries, and rural health care providers.
Two major laws that affect FCC’s decision-making process are the  Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 (Sunshine Act) and the  Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976: The Sunshine Act applies to  agencies headed by collegial bodies. Under the Sunshine Act, FCC is  required to provide sufficient public notice that the meeting of  commissioners will take place. The agency generally must also release  the meeting’s agenda, known as the Sunshine Agenda, no later than 1 week  before the meeting. In addition, the Sunshine Act prohibits more than two  of the five FCC commissioners from deliberating with one another to  conduct agency business outside the context of the public meeting.
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946: The Administrative Procedure  Act (APA) is the principal law governing how agencies make rules. The  law prescribes uniform standards for rulemaking, requires agencies to  inform the public about their rules and proposed changes, and provides  opportunities for public participation in the rulemaking process. Most  federal rules are promulgated using the APA-established informal  rulemaking process, which requires agencies to provide public notice of  proposed rule changes, as well as provide a period for interested parties to  comment on the notices—hence the “notice and comment” label. The  notice and comment procedures of the APA are intended to encourage  public participation in the administrative process, to help educate the  agency, and thus, to produce more informed agency decision making.  Experts have noted that public participation promotes legitimacy by  creating a sense of fairness in rulemaking, and transparency helps both the  public and other branches of government to assess whether agency  decisions are in fact being made on the grounds asserted for them and not  on other, potentially improper, grounds. APA does not generally address  time frames for informal rulemaking actions, limits on contacts between  agency officials and stakeholders, or requirements for “closing” dockets.
FCC implements its policy initiatives through a process known as  rulemaking, which is the governmentwide process for creating rules or  regulations that implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. When  developing, modifying, or deleting a rule, FCC relies on public input  provided during the rulemaking process.
Before beginning the rulemaking process, FCC may issue an optional  Notice of Inquiry (NOI) to gather facts and information on a particular  subject or issue to determine if further action by the FCC is warranted.  Typically, an NOI asks questions about a given topic and seeks comments  from stakeholders on that topic. If FCC issues an NOI, it must issue a  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) before taking final action on a  rule, unless an exception to notice and comment rulemaking requirements  applies. FCC issues NPRMs to propose new rules or to change existing  rules, and the issuance of an NPRM signals the beginning of the  rulemaking process. The NPRM provides an opportunity for the  stakeholders to submit their comments on the proposal and to reply to the  comments submitted by other stakeholders. A summary of the NPRM is  published in the Federal Register and announces the deadlines for filing  public comments and reply comments. The NPRM also indicates the rules  for ex parte communications between agency decision makers and other  persons during the proceeding. An ex parte presentation discusses the  merits or outcome of a proceeding, and if written, is not served on all the  parties to a proceeding, and if it is oral, it is made without advance notice  to the parties or an opportunity for them to be present. FCC generally  classifies its rulemaking proceedings as “permit-but-disclose” proceedings,  in which ex parte presentations to FCC officials are permissible but  subject to certain disclosure requirements. Generally, the external party  must provide two copies of written presentations to be filed in the public  record. If an external party makes an oral ex parte presentation that  presents data or arguments not already reflected in the party’s written  comments or other filings in that proceeding, then the external party must  provide FCC’s Secretary with an original and one copy of a summary of  the new data or arguments to be filed in the public record. Once FCC  places an item on the Sunshine Agenda, which lists the items up for a vote  at the next open commission meeting, ex parte contacts are restricted,  with several exemptions. In addition, FCC provides the stakeholders the  ability to submit electronic comments via the FCC Web site. After  reviewing the comments received in response to an NPRM, the FCC may  issue a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) seeking  additional public comment on specific issues in the proceeding. Following  the close of the reply and comment period, FCC officials may continue  discussing the issue with external parties through ex parte presentations.  Staff in the bureaus assigned to work on the order begin developing and  analyzing the public record and the information provided in ex parte  contacts to propose an action for the commission to vote on, such as  adopting final rules, amending existing rules, or stating that there will be  no changes. The chairman decides when the commission will vote on final  rules and whether the vote will occur during a public meeting or by  circulation, which involves electronically circulating written items to each  of the commissioners for approval. See figure 1 for an illustration of the  steps in FCC’s rulemaking process.
section_title: FCC’s Current Structure and Informal Coordination Processes Can Limit FCC’s Ability to Efficiently Address Crosscutting Issues
subsections: section_title: Despite Changes to Modernize FCC’s Bureau Structure, Market and Technological Changes Have Created Issues That Span FCC’s Bureaus
paragraphs: Although FCC has established some function-based bureaus and  reorganized its bureaus to reflect some changes in the telecommunications  market, further evolutions and the growth of new technologies have  continued to create crosscutting issues that span several bureaus. FCC’s  bureaus are still somewhat structured along the traditional technology  lines of wireless, wireline, satellite, and media, despite the fact that one  company may provide services that span such distinctions or that  competing services may be regulated by different bureaus. Since the  Telecommunications Act, chairmen have made changes to FCC’s bureau  structure. In 1999 Chairman Kennard issued A New FCC for the 21st  Century, which called for reorganizing FCC’s bureau structure along  functional, rather than technological, lines in order to carry out FCC’s core  responsibilities more productively and efficiently. Subsequently, FCC  consolidated enforcement functions and personnel from the Common  Carrier, Mass Media, Wireless Telecommunications, and Compliance and  Information Bureaus into a new Enforcement Bureau. In addition, FCC  consolidated consumer complaint and public information functions of the  various bureaus into a Consumer Information Bureau.
Chairman Powell also issued a reorganization plan to promote a more  efficient, responsive, and effective organizational structure. This reform  and reorganization plan included creating three new bureaus and one new  office. FCC consolidated the Mass Media Bureau and Cable Services  Bureau into a new overarching Media Bureau, and restructured the  Common Carrier Bureau and renamed it the Wireline Competition Bureau.
Additionally, the Consumer Information Bureau was given increased  policy making and intergovernmental affairs responsibilities and was  renamed the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau. Finally, the  Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis subsumed the Office of  Plans and Policy.
In 2006, under Chairman Martin, FCC established the Public Safety and  Homeland Security Bureau, consolidating existing public safety and  homeland security functions and issues from the Enforcement, Wireless  Telecommunications, Wireline Competition, and Media Bureaus, and the  offices of Engineering and Technology, Strategic Planning and Policy  Analysis, and Managing Director. Figure 2 shows FCC’s current structure  and how the bureaus and offices have changed since the  Telecommunications Act.
Despite these changes in FCC’s organizational structure, the changing  telecommunications market and the development of new technologies  have created new issues that span several bureaus. For example,  broadband services—which became available in the late 1990s—do not fall  exclusively within the jurisdiction of a particular FCC bureau or regulatory  category. As a result, FCC created broadband regulations in a piecemeal  fashion, issuing four separate orders (one for cable modems, one for  facilities-based wireline broadband Internet access, one for broadband  over power line, and one for wireless broadband Internet access) to  regulate competing methods of providing broadband services by the same  standard. The Telecommunications Act allows FCC to classify services as  telecommunications services or information services, the latter being  subject to fewer regulatory restrictions. In 2002, FCC determined that  cable modem service should be categorized as an information service.  Three years after FCC issued the cable modem order and shortly after the  Supreme Court upheld FCC’s regulatory classification for cable modem  service, FCC adopted an order that granted providers of facilities-based  wireline broadband Internet access the same regulatory classification and  treatment as cable modem Internet access providers. In November 2006,  FCC issued an order classifying broadband over power line-enabled  Internet access service as an information service. In March 2007, FCC  issued an order classifying wireless broadband Internet access as an  information service. In addition, as companies that once provided a  distinct service (such as cable and telephone companies) have shifted to  providing bundles of services (voice, video, and data services) over a  broadband platform, new debates have arisen regarding how rules  previously intended for a specific industry and service (such as universal  service, customer retention rules, and video franchising rules) should be  applied to companies now providing multiple services. FCC officials told  us they are currently looking across the agency to identify challenges that  convergence poses to the existing structure and will first focus on how  FCC’s systems, such as its data collection efforts, can be modified to  address these challenges, but they may consider structural changes later.
section_title: FCC Lacks Written Policies for Ensuring the Interbureau Collaboration and Communication Needed to Address Crosscutting Issues
paragraphs: According to agency officials, FCC uses informal interbureau  collaboration, working groups, and task forces to address convergence  and crosscutting issues, but FCC lacks written policies outlining how  interbureau coordination and collaboration is to occur. FCC handles  convergence by holding interbureau meetings to discuss the progress of  items and to address upcoming issues. When a crosscutting item requires  the input of multiple bureaus or offices, one is considered the “lead” and is  responsible for coordinating with all other bureaus or offices that have a  direct concern or interest in the document and ensuring they have the  opportunity to review and comment on an agenda item prior to submission  to the commission. Generally, if a proceeding (such as a petition or draft  order) clearly falls under a specific bureau’s purview, that bureau will  serve as the lead on the issue. The determination of the lead bureau is  made by each bureau’s management or by the precedence of which bureau  handled a particular issue in the past. For example, the Wireless  Telecommunications Bureau would be the lead for items regarding  licensed spectrum rules because it has handled these issues in the past.  FCC officials told us that on more complex issues, or items that do not  have an evident lead bureau, the chairman is ultimately responsible for  selecting the lead bureau. Although FCC relies on this interbureau  coordination, it does not provide specific steps or guidance regarding how  or when this coordination is to occur, with some limited exceptions. FCC  officials confirmed that there are no written policies outlining how the  bureaus should coordinate with one another.
FCC’s lack of written policies and its reliance on informal interbureau  coordination to address issues that span beyond the purview of a single  bureau can result in inefficiencies. For example, one FCC official told us  that while FCC was conducting a merger review of two major media  companies, the review process was delayed because of confusion  regarding which bureau was responsible. Since each of the companies  merging had assets regulated by different FCC bureaus, it was unclear  which bureau was the designated lead and would be responsible for a  specific portion of the merger review process. Although the chairman  eventually designated a lead bureau, the time it took for this to happen  slowed down the process, and the overall lack of coordination made the  process less efficient. Our Internal Control and Management Evaluation  Tool emphasizes the importance of internal communications, specifically  noting the need for mechanisms that allow for the easy flow of information  down, across, and up the organization, including communications between  functional activities.
In addition, the absence of written policies allows interbureau  collaboration and communication to vary from chairman to chairman.  FCC officials noted significant differences between prior chairmen’s  emphasis on bureau interaction. For example, former Chairman Kevin  Martin required staff to seek approval from management before contacting  other bureau and office staff. Current and former FCC officials told us that  such policies limited interbureau collaboration and staff-to-staff  communication. By contrast, then-Acting Chairman Copps instituted a  weekly Chairman’s Office Briefing with bureau and office chiefs, or their  designees, and a representative from each of the commissioners’ offices  with the stated intent of promoting openness, a practice that continues  under Chairman Genachowski. In addition, an FCC official told us that  under Chairman Powell, FCC had a memorandum outlining how one  bureau was to note its concurrence or disagreement with a draft order  prepared by another bureau, but that the practice largely lapsed under  Chairman Martin.
The lack of written policies also allows the chairman complete discretion  when assigning bureau staff to address an item, leading to instances where  all relevant staff were not included in developing an item. For example,  according to FCC officials, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau was  not included in drafting a universal service order that increased the  portion of universal service funding provided by wireless customers. FCC  officials told us the resulting order did not fairly characterize the wireless  industry’s prior efforts, which led the industry to file reconsideration  petitions that required additional time to address. Other officials told us  that in 2008, FCC received filings in its Wireline Competition Bureau and  its Enforcement Bureau regarding allegations that Comcast was  discriminating against customers using peer-to-peer sharing protocols to  exchange videos. FCC officials told us that then-Chairman Martin directed  the Office of General Counsel to draft a resolution without coordinating or  discussing the issue with the other bureaus and that this caused  uncertainty in the Enforcement Bureau regarding how to address pending  complaints.
FCC officials and outside stakeholders stated that communication among  bureaus is necessary for addressing convergence and other crosscutting  issues under the current bureau structure. Three FCC officials told us that  convergence in the telecommunications market requires FCC’s bureaus to  actively communicate with one another so they can address issues that  span multiple bureaus. One of these officials also noted that convergence  makes active communication among bureaus even more important  because if communication fails or does not take place, issues might  inadvertently not be addressed before the information is presented to the  commissioners and their staff.
section_title: FCC Relies on Its Functional Offices to Address Some Aspects of Convergence, but the Chairman’s Influence Over These Offices Raises Independence Issues That Can Affect FCC’s Ability to Rely on Them
paragraphs: FCC’s functional offices, such as the Office of Engineering and Technology  (OET) and the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP),  provide a broader scope than the platform-based bureaus and address  some of the issues posed by convergence, but the chairman’s influence can  affect FCC’s ability to use these offices to address crosscutting issues.
With regard to OET, stakeholders, including commissioners and trade  associations, have raised concerns about whether the chairman’s authority  over office staff impacts OET’s ability to provide independent expertise.  Two commissioners told us that although OET had high-quality staff, the  commissioners question whether the information OET provides is  impartial, since all bureau and office chiefs report to the chairman. One of  the commissioners emphasized that without reliable unbiased information,  it can be difficult to make good decisions on scientific and technical  questions. Additionally, three trade associations also expressed concern  about the independent nature of OET, with one indicating that there is no  way to tell if the information coming from OET is independent of the  chairman or the best of several options.
Similarly, the emphasis FCC places on OSP and the work it does varies  according to the chairman, and in recent years, OSP’s output has  diminished. OSP, working with the Office of Managing Director, is  responsible for developing a strategic plan identifying short- and long-term  policy objectives for the agency; working with the chairman to implement  policy goals; and acting as expert consultants in areas of economic,  business and market analysis, and other subjects that cut across  traditional lines, such as the Internet. One former chief economist told us  that each chairman has discretion over how he will use OSP, and  therefore, the role of the office in providing economic analyses will  depend on whether the chairman values economic research. Another  former chief economist noted that FCC’s emphasis on economic analysis  depends on the chairman’s preferences. OSP is responsible for producing  publicly available work papers that monitor the state of the  communications industry to identify trends, issues, and overall industry  health. However, OSP did not release any working papers between  September 2003 and February 2008 and has not released any working  papers since issuing three in February 2008. Given OSP’s responsibility in  developing a strategic plan that identifies short- and long-term policy  objectives for the agency, a lack of research can put FCC at a distinct  disadvantage in preparing for the future.
To address these issues, some stakeholders we spoke with suggested that  adding more resources to OSP or creating a separate economics bureau  would allow for more independent and robust economic analysis. One  former chief economist told us that although the research function of FCC  is under OSP’s purview, OSP does not have the resources needed, and  providing additional resources would help them produce more  independent and higher-quality analyses. A former chairman expressed  similar concerns about OSP’s resources. Two other former chief  economists suggested that if economists were centralized in one group or  office, then economic analysis would have greater influence in the  decision-making process. Similarly, a researcher found that another  independent regulatory agency’s use of an independent and centralized  Bureau of Economics leads to routine use of cost-benefit analysis during  its investigations and enforcement actions. Finally a trade association  told us that OSP has always been on the periphery of the policy-making  process because it lacks the budget and staff levels to complete  comprehensive industry analysis, and that OSP needs additional resources  to perform more useful policy analysis.
While some stakeholders have suggested consolidating economists in a  centralized bureau, others have noted the need to maintain economic  expertise within the bureaus. Officials from each bureau we spoke with  told us having economists imbedded in each bureau was useful because it  allows the bureaus to access economic expertise more easily. For  example, economists may lead teams on particular issues, review mergers,  gather subscriber data, create economic development policies, manage  industry reporting, and produce economic reports and information, and a  bureau’s ability to function could suffer if the economists were taken out  of the bureau. One study that examined organizational structures for  attorneys and economists in enforcement agencies found that having  economists and attorneys working together in the same division and  organized around a particular industry or sector, as they do at FCC, is  advantageous for a number of reasons. The study found the main  advantage of this structure is that it focuses economic analysis on the  questions of interest to the ultimate decision makers. Additionally, the  strong links between economists and attorneys working in the same  division help to ensure that economists are answering all the legally  relevant questions and the decision makers can direct the efforts of  economists to answer the questions that concern them. However, these  arguments do not necessarily preclude the need to examine OSP’s role and  determine whether it is able to address the economic implications of  broad policy issues.
section_title: Little Consensus Exists on Whether or How to Restructure FCC’s Bureaus and Offices
paragraphs: Several stakeholders have proposed a variety of options for restructuring  FCC. One proposal is to replace industry-based bureaus with bureaus  divided along functional goals. Some stakeholders have expressed  concerns that FCC’s current bureau structure may lead to bureaus  identifying with the industry they regulate, rather than taking an  overarching view of an issue. One trade group representative and a former  FCC chairman stated that this leads to “fiefdoms,” where the staff  members begin to act more like advocates for the industry they are  regulating than as experts looking for the best decision. In addition,  stakeholders stated that the culture of the bureaus may vary—depending  on their history and the industry they regulate—and that this could create  problems if competing services are treated differently based on which  bureau is responsible for regulating the service. In response to such  concerns, some stakeholders suggested that FCC create new functional  bureaus that focus on areas that span a variety of service providers and  industries, such as competition, licensing, and spectrum management. For  example, one former FCC official suggested that FCC could create one  bureau to handle spectrum management issues, which are currently  divided among the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, the Office of  Engineering and Technology, the International Bureau, and the Public  Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. Another stakeholder suggested  FCC structure bureaus along overarching policy goals, such as culture and  values (which would include broad issues such as obscenity, advertising  rules, and public broadcasting) and markets (which would include  allocation of spectrum, competition, and market analysis). The  stakeholder stated that by reorganizing along such lines, FCC would create  departments with technology and industry-neutral responsibilities for key  social mandates, which would better enable FCC to address issues that  span industry lines.
However, a number of stakeholders and FCC officials expressed caution  when discussing restructuring or reforming the bureaus. Restructuring is  often resource-intensive and disruptive for an agency and can impact staff  morale. In addition, it is unclear whether restructuring the bureaus would  improve FCC’s ability to regulate these industries, since the  Communications Act, as amended, establishes different regulatory regimes  based on how a service is provided. Some industry and FCC stakeholders  we interviewed also noted that in some cases, the current bureau structure  works well, such as when issues fall within a specific bureau’s purview.  For example, one FCC official noted that in some cases, it is useful to have  various functions housed in a specific industry-based bureau, explaining  that since rulemaking and licensing functions are housed in the Wireless  Telecommunications Bureau, bureau staff understand the implications of  administering the licensing rules made during the rulemaking process.  Similarly, FCC officials stated that the industry-based bureaus allow staff  to develop in-depth expertise on an issue. For example, an FCC official  stated that the Media Bureau’s video division staff understand how to  address most broadcast licensing and market issues and that splitting up  the staff could result in a loss of group cohesion and institutional  knowledge.
Regardless of the organizational structure FCC decides to pursue, it is  certain that technological advances and marketplace changes will  contribute to an evolving regulatory landscape for the commission. To  anticipate and quickly respond to these changing conditions, FCC will  need mechanisms to ensure that staff can routinely and reliably coordinate  and communicate across bureaus in order to foster and harness FCC’s  collective knowledge on issues that span the bureaus. The absence of  written policies outlining how bureaus should communicate and  collaborate on crosscutting issues has led to inefficiencies in FCC’s  decision-making process by leaving the extent to which interbureau  collaboration occurs subject to the preferences of the chairman.
section_title: Weaknesses in FCC’s Processes for Collecting and Using Information Can Undermine the Transparency and Effectiveness of the Decision-Making Process
subsections: section_title: Inconsistent Policies Regarding Commissioner Access to Bureau and Office Analyses Raise Concerns about the Transparency and Effectiveness of the Decision-Making Process
paragraphs: FCC chairmen have varied in their policies regarding commissioner access  to bureau and office analyses during the decision-making process. For  example, then-Acting Chairman Copps publicly stated that commissioners  would have unfettered access to the bureaus, adding that bureaus should  respond to requests from commissioners’ offices directly and as quickly as  possible, without preapproval from the chairman’s office. In addition,  former Chairman Kennard established internal procedures outlining how  commissioners should receive information from bureaus and offices  during the decision-making process. These procedures specified that  bureau and office chiefs would provide detailed oral briefings or  memoranda on upcoming items upon the request of commissioners and  would solicit feedback from commissioners while developing draft items.  Under Chairman Martin, there was a perception among some FCC  commissioners and staff that the commissioners could not easily access  bureau and office analyses. Stakeholders also told us that some previous  chairmen had similarly limited commissioner access to bureau and office  analyses. One rationale behind such policies was that giving the  commissioners unrestricted access to agency staff could hinder the  decision-making process by allowing commissioners to search for support  among the bureau staff for any given position. Similarly, some  stakeholders expressed concerns about providing commissioners full  access to bureau staff. For example, one FCC official recounted prior  instances in which commissioners requested information that placed  bureau staff in the middle of commission-level policy disputes, and a  former FCC official expressed concerns about commissioners making  requests that could tie up bureau resources.
No explicit statutory or regulatory language exists that outlines  commissioners’ access to internal information. The Communications Act,  as amended, states that it is the duty of the chairman to coordinate and  organize the work of the commission in such a manner as to promote  prompt and efficient disposition of all matters within the jurisdiction of  the commission. In implementing this, FCC’s chairman sets the agency’s  agenda by directing the work of the bureaus and offices to include drafting  agenda items for commission consideration. While FCC’s Agenda  Handbook does specify that the bureaus and offices should provide  commissioners copies of draft items for consideration and editing 3 weeks  before the commission votes on the item at a public meeting, it does not  specify the extent to which commissioners have access to the bureau and  office staff and their analyses, including their ability to ask the staff  questions about draft items or the analyses supporting those items. The  absence of internal policies or statutory requirements has enabled each  chairman to define how and when other commissioners receive bureau  and office analyses during the decision-making process.
Controlling commissioner access to staff analysis and opinions may  subvert the commission decision-making process and raises concerns  among FCC officials and external stakeholders regarding the transparency  and informed nature of the decision-making process. Many stakeholders  we interviewed, including former FCC officials and current FCC  commissioners and bureau officials, noted the importance of bureau  analyses to the commission’s decision-making process, with some stating  that commissioners’ lack of access to bureau analyses can negatively  impact the quality of FCC’s decisions. Two bureau officials explained that  providing commissioners access to information improves FCC’s decisions  by allowing for more informed deliberations. FCC officials also told us  that in situations where commissioners are unable to access information  from the bureaus and offices, commissioners may refuse to vote on an  item, thereby delaying decision making. The ability of the chairman to  exert control over the bureau and office analyses provided to  commissioners has raised concerns as to whether the information  provided reflects the bureaus’ and offices’ independent analyses or the  chairman’s position on an issue. In addition, a current and a former  commissioner stated that the chairman’s ability to influence what  information FCC staff provided to commissioners increased the  commissioners’ reliance on outside sources of information. The former  commissioner noted that this raises concerns about the quality of  information the commissioners may rely on and the transparency of the  decision-making process, since private groups may be providing data that  supports a particular agenda.
Regulatory bodies headed by multimember commissions, such as FCC, are  often advocated and preferred over a department or agency headed by a  single administrator because group decision making under conditions of  relative independence is preferable to dominance by a single individual.  For example, a major review of independent regulatory agencies  concluded that a distinctive attribute of commission action is that it  requires concurrence by a majority of members of equal standing after full  discussion and deliberation, and that collective decision making is  advantageous where the problems are complex, the relative weight of  various factors affecting policy is not clear, and the choices are  numerous. Another study promoted the use of the commission structure  for FCC in particular, stressing that the commission prevents a single  administrator from having undue influence over the sources of public  information. We have also recognized the need to provide decision  makers with the information needed to carry out their responsibilities. Our  internal control standards state that information should be recorded and  communicated to management and others within the entity who need it  and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their  responsibilities.
We also reviewed the policies of other independent regulatory agencies  with regard to commissioner access to staff analyses. Officials at the  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Federal Trade  Commission (FTC) told us that they do not have formal policies ensuring  commissioner access to information, but stated that commissioners have  not experienced problems obtaining information in the past. For example,  an FTC official told us that that the commission has had a long-standing  practice that the commissioners have access to all of the information  needed to perform their duties. However, the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission (NRC) is statutorily required to ensure that commissioners  have full access to the information needed to perform their duties and that  commissioners share “equal responsibility and authority in all decisions  and actions of the commission.” In implementing this policy, NRC has  developed and made publicly available its decision-making procedures,  including commissioners’ rights to information. These procedures outline  the responsibilities of the chairman and the commissioners, how  commissioners receive items from commission staff, and how items are  voted on. Some of the key ways in which NRC’s procedures provide  commissioners access to information include:    Requiring that draft and final analyses by NRC staff are simultaneously  provided to all commissioners, including the chairman.
Establishing that each commissioner, including the chairman, has equal  responsibility and authority in all commission decisions and actions, and  has full and equal access to all agency information pertaining to  commission responsibilities.
Balancing commissioner access to staff analyses with the ability of the  chairman to direct resource expenditures. For example, although  individual commissioners can request information or analyses from NRC  staff, if the request requires significant resources to fulfill and questions of  priority arise, the office or the commissioner can request the chairman  resolve the matter. If the chairman’s decision is not satisfactory to the  requesting commissioner or the office, either can bring the matter for a  vote before the full commission.
NRC officials told us that these long-standing internal procedures, which  are reviewed approximately every 2 years, have been helpful in avoiding  protracted disputes over the prerogatives and responsibilities of the  chairman and the other commissioners and ensuring that access issues are  handled consistently.
section_title: Stakeholders Have Raised Concerns about FCC’s Collection of Information during the Rulemaking Process
subsections: section_title: FCC Typically Does Not Include the Text of a Proposed Rule in Its NPRMs, Which May Limit the Effectiveness of the Public Comment Process
paragraphs: When issuing an NPRM to gather public input before adopting, modifying,  or deleting a rule, FCC rarely includes the text of the proposed rule in the  notice, which may limit the effectiveness of the public comment process.  A 2008 FCC draft order noted that during the period 1990 through 2007,  the commission issued approximately 3,408 NPRMs, 390 (or 11.4 percent)  of which contained the text of proposed rules under consideration.  According to A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking, a resource guide  created by the Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice and  Government and Public Sector Lawyers Division of the American Bar  Association, “most agencies publish the text of the proposed rule when  commencing rulemaking, and some enabling statutes expressly require  that the agency do so.” Widespread concern exists regarding the lack of  details provided in FCC’s NPRMs, which generally ask for comment on  wide-ranging issues, making the NPRM more like a Notice of Inquiry  (NOI). FCC officials told us that FCC uses NPRMs rather than NOIs (the  traditional method of gathering broad input on a topic) so that it can  proceed directly to issuing a rule once one is developed. By contrast, if  FCC used an NOI to gather information, then it would need to issue an  NPRM before issuing a rule. Several stakeholders have stated that such  broad NPRMs limit their ability to submit meaningful comments that  address FCC’s information needs and increase FCC’s reliance on  information provided in ex parte contacts. For example, the Small  Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of Advocacy noted its concerns  about FCC’s use of NPRMs instead of NOIs to collect broad information on  a number of issues. It argues that by issuing an NPRM that lacks specific  proposals, the FCC creates uncertainty in the industry, resulting in  thousands of comments that can only speculate as to what action the FCC  may take and the potential impacts. SBA’s Office of Advocacy adds that  small businesses, in particular, are often overwhelmed by the scope of a  vague NPRM and cannot contribute meaningfully to the rulemaking  process. In addition, part of the value of the public comment process is  derived from external stakeholders’ ability to respond to other groups’  comments, thereby improving the public debate on an item. However, if  parties are unsure of FCC’s intentions due to a lack of specificity in the  NPRM and they submit general comments or wait until the ex parte  process to provide input on an item, public debate can be limited.
The APA requires that an NPRM include “either the terms or substance of  a proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”  Since the public is generally entitled to submit their views and relevant  data on any proposals, the notice must be sufficient to fairly apprise  interested parties of the issues involved, but it need not specify every  precise proposal which the agency may ultimately adopt as a rule. APA’s  requirements are satisfied when the rule is a “logical outgrowth” of the  actions proposed, which means that interested parties “should have  anticipated the agency’s final course in light of the initial notice.”
Although APA does not specifically require that NPRMs contain proposed  rule text, some studies of federal rulemaking have identified the benefits  of providing proposed rule text for public comment. For example, A Guide  to Federal Agency Rulemaking notes that “specific proposals help focus  public comment, and that, in turn, assists reviewing courts in deciding  whether interested persons were given a meaningful opportunity to  participate in the rulemaking … a focused and well-explained NPRM can  educate the public and generate more helpful information from interested  persons.” Similarly, in its analyses of transparent governing and public  participation in the rulemaking process, ICF International recommended  that agencies garner more substantive public comments by issuing an  Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that lays out specific options  under consideration and asks specific questions that are linked to a Web  form.
section_title: Weaknesses in FCC’s ex parte Process Have Negatively Impacted Stakeholder Perceptions of Transparency and Public Participation in FCC’s Decision-Making Process
paragraphs: FCC’s current ex parte process can lead to vague or last-minute ex pa summaries of meetings between FCC and external officials. The APA  places no restriction on ex parte communication between agency decision  makers and other persons during informal rulemaking. However, FCC ha rules about such contacts that are intended to protect the fairness o proceedings by providing an assurance that FCC decisions are not  influenced by off-the-record communications between decision makers  and others. Stakeholders must provide FCC with two copies of written  ex parte presentations and the original and a copy of a summary of the  new information provided during oral ex parte contacts to be filed in the public record. FCC places the burden of preparing and ensuring that an  ex parte summary is complete on the external party. FCC’s ex parte rules provide general guidance on what is sufficient, stating that the summaries  should generally be “more than a one or two sentence description” and not  just a listing of the subjects discussed. When it is unclear whether da ta or  arguments presented in an ex parte contact are already in the public  record, FCC advises that parties briefly summarize the matters disc at the meeting. FCC officials told us that they are in the pr reviewing and potentially changing the ex parte process.
However, stakeholders expressed concerns about the submission of vague ex parte summaries under the current process. For example, an ex parte  summary may simply state that an outside party met with FCC offici als to  share its thoughts on a proceeding. Stakeholders told us that vague  ex parte summaries reduce transparency and public discourse in FCC’s  decision-making process by limiting stakeholders’ ability to determine  what information was provided in the meeting and to discuss or rebut tha information. In 2002, an FCC commissioner stated that she believed that  the “cursory  filings that  routinely permits” are an  apparent violation of its rules requiring more than a one or two sentence  description. Similarly, a former acting chairman noted the need to  “enhance, or at least enforce,” FCC’s ex parte rules so that the public will find more than a brief ex parte letter that only identifies who attended a  meeting, rather than what was said in the meeting.
According to FCC, the ex parte process is an important avenue for FCC in  ess.  collecting and examining information during the decision-making proc FCC has previously told us that it generally does not produce its own  studies to develop a rule. Rather, FCC relies on stakeholders to submit  information and analysis that is then placed in the docket so that FC other stakeholders can critique the information. According to FCC  officials, this results in both transparency and quality information because  each stakeholder has had an opportunity to review and comment on all of  the information in the docket. In addition, according to an official in FCC’s  Office of General Counsel, ex parte meetings allow stakeholders and F to focus on specific issues of interest to FCC and to identify potentia weaknesses in the existing arguments. An official in FCC’s Office of  General Counsel recognizes concerns that some ex parte summaries are  cursory and vague and noted that to address this, FCC periodically sends  reminders to commenters regarding the information required in ex pa rte  summaries and has placed additional information about the required information on FCC’s Web site. In 2000, FCC issued a public notice  reiterating the public’s responsibilities in the ex parte process. This notic stated “the duty to ensure the adequacy of ex parte notices …rests with  the person making the presentation. Staff members have the disc request supplemental filings if they feel that the original filing is  retion to  inadequate, but the obligation to file a sufficient notice must be satisfied  regardless of possible requests by the staff.”
FCC does not proactively determine whether the content of the summaries  is sufficient. Specifically, FCC relies on a complaint-driven process to  ensure that ex parte submissions comply with FCC’s rules. FCC’s Office of  General Counsel reviews ex parte communications if it receives a  complaint. However, since the parties not present at the meeting are  generally unsure as to what occurred, it is difficult for external  stakeholders to determine whether an ex parte submission is sufficiently  detailed. In addition, it can be difficult to determine if an ex parte  summary is sufficient, because if a party is simply restating information it  has already presented, then it can file a short ex parte summary or none at  all. After the Office of General Counsel receives a complaint, it provides  copies to the party referred to in the complaint and to the FCC staff  present during the meeting, and the parties provide a written response to  the office about their version of events. The Office of General Counsel is  responsible for determining whether the issue has been appropriately  resolved. FCC receives, on average, one complaint a month about ex parte  communications.
Other aspects of the ex parte process can challenge stakeholders’ ability  to submit information during FCC’s decision-making process. For  example, one group noted that unlike public comments, which must be  submitted by a specific deadline, the ex parte process does not have a  definitive end date and groups must expend their resources tracking  ex parte submissions until the relevant item is voted on by the  commission. In addition, stakeholders must attempt to determine what  information was provided based on summaries of the ex parte meeting  and submit written responses or attempt to meet with FCC officials to  offer a countervailing viewpoint. This can present a particular burden for  stakeholders with limited resources for tracking and responding to  ex parte contacts. For example, two organizations told us that it is more  difficult for groups that must travel to Washington, D.C., to participate in  person at ex parte meetings than for groups with a presence inside  Washington. One organization told us of instances in which FCC canceled  meetings with them at the last minute, after the group traveled from  outside of Washington, D.C, to meet with FCC.
Several stakeholders also raised concerns regarding prior incidents in  which parties made substantive ex parte submissions just before or during  the Sunshine period, during which external contact with FCC officials is  restricted, and thus, other groups are unable to respond to the information  provided. Although, subject to certain exceptions, external parties are  forbidden from contacting FCC officials after release of the Sunshine  Notice (generally 1 week prior to a vote), FCC officials are allowed to  initiate contact with external parties for additional information on an  agenda item. This can lead to ex parte submissions affecting decisions  without allowing for public comment on the information provided. For  example, during the AT&T BellSouth merger review, an ex parte  communication occurred the day before the scheduled vote. During the  communication, FCC proposed merger conditions and the ex parte  summary was filed the day of the proposed vote, thus preventing public  comment and expert review. However, in response to complaints from the  other commissioners, Chairman Martin delayed the merger vote to allow  for public comment on the new changes. An official in FCC’s Office of  General Counsel told us that there are legitimate concerns about  stakeholders’ ability to respond to ex parte presentations made during the  Sunshine period, pursuant to a Sunshine period exception, but added that  if this occurs, stakeholders can request to be invited by FCC officials to  file a counter ex parte communication. Finally, although parties are  required to file a summary of ex parte contacts with FCC’s Secretary, all  commissioners may not receive a copy of this summary. For example, if a  paper copy is filed shortly before a scheduled vote, there may not be  adequate time for the summary to be scanned and placed in the public  record. FCC officials told us that there is currently no mechanism for  notifying commissioners that ex parte summaries have been filed and  added that commissioners rely on the public record to identify this  information.
Other federal agencies have implemented different guidelines for the  ex parte process. For example, the Department of Transportation (DOT)  issued an order and accompanying procedures, noting the importance of  providing interested members of the public adequate knowledge of  contacts between agency decision makers and the public during the  rulemaking process. DOT establishes that if such contact occurs prior to  the issuance of an NPRM and is one of the bases for the issuance of the  NPRM, the contact should be discussed in the preamble of the notice. In  addition, although DOT recommends holding such contact to a minimum  after the close of the reply comment period, noting that contacts occurring  at this stage of the process tend to be hidden, DOT states that if such  contacts do occur, the meeting should be announced publicly or all  persons who have expressed interest in the rulemaking should be invited  to participate. In addition, DOT requires that records of such contacts be  promptly filed in the public record and states that while a verbatim  transcript is not required, a mere recitation that the listed participants met  to discuss a named general subject on a specified day is inadequate.  Rather, DOT notes that such records should include a list of the  participants, a summary of the discussion, and a specific statement of any  commitments made by department personnel.
Officials from FTC told us that the agency personnel are responsible for  submitting ex parte communications in writing to the FTC Secretary so  that they can be placed on the public record. NRC officials told us that if  comments submitted after the public comment period raise a significant  new idea, NRC would place those comments in the record and might  reopen the comment period to get reactions to the submission. NRC  officials also noted that when NRC issues a request for public comments,  comments received after the due date will be considered if it is practical to  do so, and that NRC does reopen or extend a comment period to give  people more time to consider complex issues.
Stakeholders concerned about FCC’s current ex parte process have  suggested a number of changes. Some of the suggestions included  enhancing FCC’s guidelines regarding ex parte summaries to include  requiring that FCC officials reject incomplete ex parte summaries or  requiring them to certify that the ex parte summaries they receive  accurately capture the substance of the information provided in meetings,  improving FCC’s enforcement of its ex parte requirements, and limiting  FCC’s use of last-minute ex parte contacts to inform its decisions. An FCC  official noted that one possible solution to ex parte submissions made  during the Sunshine period would be to create an automatic right to  respond for other stakeholders, but added that allowing for more contact  during the Sunshine period would run counter to the idea of establishing a  quiet period for the commissioners to consider an issue before voting.  FCC is currently in the process of considering possible revisions to its  ex parte policies and is exploring new methods of collecting public  comment. One method under consideration includes collecting comments  through its www.broadband.gov Web site, which allows members of the  public to comment on a blog, request ex parte meetings, and obtain  information about upcoming workshops. On October 28, 2009, FCC held a  workshop on improving disclosure of ex parte contacts, during which  participants discussed possible revisions to FCC’s current ex parte rules  and processes.
section_title: Some Academic and Industry Stakeholders Think FCC’s Merger Review Process Allows the Agency to Implement Policy Decisions Outside of the Rulemaking Process
paragraphs: Some academic and industry stakeholders have voiced concerns that  FCC’s merger review process allows the agency to implement policy  decisions without going through the rulemaking process. Companies  holding licenses issued by FCC and wishing to merge must obtain approval  from two federal agencies: the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FCC,  which do not follow the same standards when reviewing mergers. While  DOJ is charged with evaluating mergers through an antitrust lens, FCC  examines proposed mergers under its Communications Act authority to  grant license transfers. The act permits the commission to grant the  transfer only if the agency determines that the transaction would be in the  “public interest, convenience, and necessity.” A recent Congressional  Research Service report noted that the public interest standard is  generally considered broader than the competition analysis authorized by  the antitrust laws and conducted by DOJ. The report concludes that the  commission possesses greater latitude to examine other potential effects  of a proposed merger beyond its possible effect on competition in the  relevant market. In addition, FCC negotiates and enforces voluntary  conditions on license transfers under the authority provided by §303(r) of  the Communications Act, which grants the commission the authority to  “prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with the law,  as may be necessary to carry out the provisions” of the act, and §214(c),  which grants the commission the power to place “such terms and  conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may  require.”
Several stakeholders told us that FCC has used its merger review authority  to get agreements from merging parties on issues that affect the entire  industry and should be handled via rulemaking, rather than fashioning  merger-specific remedies. Stakeholders argue that this may lead to one set  of rules for the merged parties and another set of rules for the rest of the  industry. For example, rather than using an industry-wide rulemaking to  address the issue of whether local telephone companies should be  required to provide Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service without  requiring telephone service, FCC imposed this requirement solely on  AT&T and Verizon during merger reviews. One stakeholder stated that by  addressing broad policy issues through merger reviews rather than  rulemakings, FCC is limiting public insight and participation in the  regulatory process. Other stakeholders argue that FCC’s merger review  process provides a needed public interest perspective.
In addition to concerns about FCC’s merger review process, there are also  concerns about how FCC enforces its merger conditions. For example,  one observer noted that despite requests from consumer groups such as  Media Access Project and Public Knowledge, FCC declined to adopt  specific enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with a series of  conditions imposed during the merger review of XM and Sirius, including  an “a la carte” mandate and a requirement to provide noncommercial  channels. FCC officials told us that each bureau is responsible for  ensuring merger conditions are adhered to.
section_title: FCC Faces a Number of Workforce Challenges but Does Not Track the Progress of Its Efforts to Address Those Challenges
subsections: section_title: Declines in the Number of FCC Engineering and Economic Staff and Large Numbers of Retirement- Eligible Staff May Impact FCC’s Ability to Meet Its Mission
paragraphs: As part of the general decrease in FCC staff that occurred from fiscal year  2003 to 2008, the number of engineers and economists at FCC declined.  (See fig. 3.) From fiscal year 2003 to 2008, the number of engineers at FCC  decreased by 10 percent, from 310 to 280. Similarly, from fiscal year 2003  to 2008, the overall number of economists decreased by 14 percent, from  63 to 54. Although the number of engineers and economists has decreased  from 2003 to 2008, the percentage of the workforce comprised of  engineers and economists remained the same.
The overall decline in the number of key occupational staff occurred  during a period of increased need for technical, economic, and business  expertise. New technologies, such as rapid growth in handheld and  wireless devices, are challenging existing regulatory structures. FCC also  cited a number of economic issues that impact the expertise and  workforce required, such as marketplace consolidation and the need to  craft economic incentives for incumbent spectrum users to relocate to  other spectrum.
Additionally, 24 percent of FCC staff responses to the 2008 Office of  Personnel Management (OPM) Federal Human Capital Survey disagreed  with the statement “the skill level in my work unit has improved in the last  year.” This was significantly more than the 17 percent of staff from all  other agencies responding to the survey who disagreed with the statement.  Similarly, several stakeholders we interviewed echoed the importance of  increasing the level of expertise in certain areas at FCC and cited concerns  regarding insufficient numbers of staff.
In addition to the decrease in engineers and economists, FCC faces  challenges in ensuring that its workforce remains experienced and skilled  enough to meet its mission, including a large number of staff who will be  eligible for retirement. FCC estimates that 45 percent of supervisory  engineers are projected to be eligible for retirement by 2011. While FCC  has started hiring a larger number of engineers to replace retiring  engineers and augment its engineering staff, most hires have been at the  entry level. Of the 53 engineers hired in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, 43 were  entry-level hires. During this same period, 30 engineers retired.  Stakeholders stated that recent graduates sometimes have little  experience or understanding of how policies affect industry. Increasing  the number of staff with backgrounds and experience in industry would  help improve FCC’s understanding of industry issues and can lead to  better policies, according to stakeholders. For economists, FCC faces an  even higher share of staff eligible for retirement by 2011. FCC reports that,  as of April 2009, 67 percent of supervisory economists will be eligible to  retire, as shown in table 1. FCC may face challenges in addressing these  impending retirements because 56 percent of nonsupervisory economists  are also eligible to retire, and FCC has not hired any economists in fiscal  years 2007 and 2008.
Despite these trends, it is not clear how significantly the agency has been  impacted in its ability to meet its mission. For example, the 2008 OPM  Federal Human Capital Survey showed that, similar to the rest of  government, 75 percent of FCC staff agreed with the statement that the  workforce has the knowledge and skills necessary to accomplish  organization goals. Agency officials also noted that they can shift staff  from one bureau to another as needs arise and the regulatory environment  changes. For example, as the need for tariff regulation decreased, FCC  shifted staff from that area into other areas. However, an FCC official  indicated that with the decrease in the number of experienced engineers  throughout the agency, more work has shifted to OET. The official added  that if the bureaus had additional resources to recruit and retain more  experienced engineers, then they could handle more complex issues  within the bureau without relying on OET as much. Furthermore,  additional engineering staff would allow the bureau to reduce the amount  of time it takes to conduct analyses and draft items. Additionally, former  FCC officials told us that OSP needs additional resources to fulfill its  mission.
section_title: Recruiting Has Been an Issue at FCC, and Staff Morale and Motivation Issues Could Exacerbate This Challenge
paragraphs: FCC faces multiple challenges in recruiting new staff. One challenge FCC  faces (similar to other federal agencies) is the inability to offer more  competitive pay. Additionally, not having an approved budget and working  under congressional continuing resolutions has hampered hiring efforts  for engineers and economists. Competing priorities may also delay  internal decisions regarding hiring. For example, OSP has not received the  budgetary allocation for hiring new economists in time for the annual  American Economic Association meeting for at least the past 4 years. This  meeting is the primary recruiting venue for recently-graduated economists.  When FCC is not able to hire economists at the annual meeting, the agency  potentially loses out on skilled employees who have been offered  employment elsewhere. FCC officials told us that OSP has received  permission to attend the 2010 American Economic Association meeting  and hire at least one economist.
FCC also faces issues regarding the morale and motivation of its staff.  According to the 2008 OPM Federal Human Capital Survey, FCC staff  responses were significantly lower than other federal agencies’ staff in  areas related to motivation, engagement, and views of senior leadership.  (See table 2.)
Low levels of motivation, commitment, and personal empowerment may  exacerbate the challenges FCC faces in recruiting and maintaining an  experienced staff. For example, stakeholders told us that part of attracting  and retaining professional staff is using and valuing their expertise. If  expertise is not used or valued, as has occurred in some instances at FCC,  then this can have a negative impact on FCC’s ability to recruit top  candidates in a given professional field. FCC officials told us that in  response to the results from the OPM Federal Human Capital Survey, FCC  identified leadership and communication skills as areas of focus. To  address these needs, FCC has developed an internal Web site that provides  a forum for communication and solicitation of information, concerns, and  suggestions from staff within FCC. In support of leadership, FCC is  working to implement an executive leadership program for existing  leaders and an emerging leadership training program to identify potential  leaders within FCC and enhance their skills.
section_title: FCC Has Implemented Initiatives to Recruit and Develop Staff and Takes Actions to Determine Expertise Needs, but It Does Not Track Overall Progress Toward Meeting These Needs
paragraphs: FCC has instituted hiring and staff development programs designed to  recruit new staff and develop the skills of its existing staff. While these  programs are positive steps that can help attract, retain, and train new  staff, it is not clear that these efforts are sufficient to address expertise  gaps caused by retirements. Specific efforts include the following:    FCC University was established to provide the resources needed to  increase the fluency of commission staff in a number of competency areas.  Subject matter experts have been continuously and actively involved in  defining the training needs and evaluating, designing, and delivering  internal courses, and in updating the courses available in the FCC  University catalog.
Excellence in Engineering Program: A program that includes both  basic and advanced courses in communications technology, a graduate  degree program in engineering, and a knowledge-sharing program to  increase the exchange of information among staff. The Excellence in  Engineering award recognizes engineers, scientists, and other technical  staff for outstanding contributions performed in the course of their  work at the commission.
Excellence in Economic Analysis Program: A program to ensure staff  is fluent in the principles of communication economics. The program  consists of ongoing training and development opportunities targeted at,  but not limited to, staff economists, economics training for  noneconomists, and research tools such as data analysis software.  Another component of the program is the Excellence in Economic  Analysis Award, which recognizes outstanding contributions to  economic analysis at FCC based on the impact of the contribution on  FCC policy or its significance for the general base of knowledge in  economics or public policy analysis.
Engineer in Training Program: A combined recruitment and  accelerated promotion program designed to attract recent engineering  graduates and provide them with accelerated promotion opportunities  through successful completion of on-the-job training.
FCC has also pursued a variety of strategies to address new expertise  needs and human capital challenges. In certain cases, FCC has been able  to use direct-hire authority, which streamlines and expedites the typical  competitive placement process. FCC was granted direct-hire authority  from OPM in response to congressionally-mandated requirements for a  national broadband plan. In addition to using direct-hire authority, FCC  used appointing authorities, which are outside of the competitive hiring  processes, such as Recovery Act appointing authority, temporary  consultants, and student appointments, as well as details for staff from  other federal agencies to more quickly ramp up its broadband efforts.
FCC also makes multiple efforts to determine the critical skills and  competencies that are needed to achieve its mission, including meetings  with bureau chiefs, as well as surveys of supervisors and staff. It has set  forth occupation-specific competencies for its three key professional  areas—engineers, attorneys, and economists. As part of FCC’s workforce  planning efforts, bureau and office chiefs identify, justify, and make their  requests for positions, including the type of expertise needed, directly to  the chairman’s office. According to FCC, the chairman’s office considers  these requests from a commissionwide perspective, which includes the  agency’s strategic goals, the chairman’s priorities, and other factors such  as congressional mandates. The chairman’s office communicates the  approval of requests directly to the bureau or office chiefs and informs the  Office of Managing Director of the decision. Human resources works with  bureaus and offices to implement approved hiring.
This process can make it difficult for FCC to develop and implement a  long-term workforce plan because workforce needs are driven by short- term priorities and are identified by compartmentalized bureaus rather  than by a cohesive long-range plan that considers emerging issues. In  addition, an FCC official noted that since FCC is a small agency and  expertise needs change quickly, a particular area could be fully staffed  with no need for additional hiring, but if two staff leave in a short time  period, then an expertise gap could quickly develop and new staff would  need to be hired. FCC officials told us that, because of this, they avoid  laying out specific targets that might be impossible or undesirable to  achieve due to evolving needs. Additionally, FCC officials told us that due  to its size and limited hiring opportunities, it is important for the chairman  and senior leadership to be able to adjust the goals identified in its  Strategic Human Capital Plan.
Without specific targets, FCC cannot monitor and evaluate the agency’s  progress toward meeting its expertise needs. Previously, we identified  several key principles that strategic workforce planning should address,  including    determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to  achieve current and future programmatic results;    developing strategies that are tailored to address gaps in the number,  deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling and  sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies; and    monitoring and evaluating an agency’s progress toward meeting its human  capital goals.
Periodic measurement of an agency’s progress toward human capital goals  provides information for effective oversight by identifying performance  shortfalls and appropriate corrective actions. For example, a workforce  plan can include measures that indicate whether the agency executed its  hiring, training, or retention strategies as intended and achieved the goals  for these strategies, and how these initiatives changed the workforce’s  skills and competencies.
FCC has made efforts to determine the skills and competencies that are  needed to achieve programmatic goals and has developed workforce  hiring and training strategies. In addition, FCC’s current Strategic Human  Capital Plan identifies skills and subspecialties needed in the future  workforce. However, FCC’s Strategic Human Capital Plan does not  establish specific targets for these needs or measures for evaluating its  progress in meeting these skill needs. FCC officials told us they expect to  develop a revised Strategic Human Capital Plan in support of a new FCC  Strategic Plan, which they anticipate completing by the end of fiscal year  2010. Additionally, FCC is also in the process of finalizing an OPM-required  accountability plan to accompany its Strategic Human Capital Plan. It  remains unclear whether FCC’s actions are sufficient to ensure that it  retains a skilled workforce that can achieve its mission in the future.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: FCC regulates the telecommunications industry—an industry that is  critical to the nation’s economy and public safety and that directly affects  the ways in which Americans conduct business, socialize, and get their  news and entertainment. In recent years, the industry has rapidly evolved,  and changing technologies have created new issues that span FCC bureaus  and require the expertise of a variety of FCC staff. These changes highlight  the need for FCC to ensure that its decisions are fully informed by  promoting internal communication and coordination among various  bureaus and offices, ensuring commissioner access to staff analyses,  effectively collecting public input on its proposed policy changes, and  developing methods to ensure it has the staff expertise needed to address  these issues. However, we identified several challenges in these areas.
At the bureau and office level, FCC’s lack of written procedures for  facilitating the flow of information within the agency has in some cases led  to ineffective interbureau coordination and allowed prior chairmen to limit  internal communication among staff.
In addition, it is unclear whether the roles of OET and OSP—two offices  established to provide independent expertise on complex, crosscutting  issues—are clearly defined or are overly subject to a chairman’s  preferences. Without written interbureau coordination procedures or  clearly defined roles and responsibilities, FCC may be limited in its ability  to address crosscutting issues.
At the commission level, the lack of statutory requirements or internal  policies on commissioners’ rights and responsibilities during the decision- making process, including their right to bureau and office analysis, has  allowed some chairmen to control how and when commissioners receive  information from the bureaus and offices. Other independent regulatory  agencies have varied in how they address this issue. Ultimately, if  commissioners do not have adequate access to information, then the  benefits of the commission structure—robust group discourse and  informed deliberation and decision making—may be hampered.
In addition, while FCC relies heavily on public input to inform its  decisions, we found two primary weaknesses in its processes for  collecting that input. First, FCC’s use of NPRMs to pose broad questions  without providing actual rule text can limit stakeholders’ ability to  determine either what action FCC is considering or what information  would be most helpful to FCC when developing a final rule. Second,  although FCC has developed rules intended to protect the fairness of  ex parte proceedings, FCC neither provides detailed guidance on what  constitutes a sufficient ex parte summary, nor has a process for  proactively ensuring that ex parte summaries are complete. If parties are  able to submit vague ex parte summaries that may not fully reflect  meetings between FCC officials and outside parties, then stakeholders will  continue to question whether commission decisions are being influenced  by information that was not subject to public comment or rebuttal and  that, in some cases, is submitted just before a commission vote. FCC is  currently exploring new methods of collecting public comment and  potential revisions to its ex parte process.
Finally, at a time when the telecommunications industry has become  increasingly complex, a large percentage of FCC’s economists and  engineers will be eligible for retirement by 2011, and FCC has faced  challenges in recruiting new staff. FCC has taken several positive steps to  help meet its workforce needs, including instituting hiring and staff  development programs and beginning efforts to identify its current  workforce expertise needs. However, continued focus on identifying and  instituting additional methods that improve its flexibility to meet its  expertise needs, and developing measures for tracking its progress toward  meeting its needs, will help to ensure that FCC is well-positioned to  anticipate and address its current and future workforce and expertise  needs.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We have identified four areas of concern and are making seven  recommendations to address these concerns.
To ensure interbureau coordination on crosscutting issues, we  recommend that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) take the  following two actions:    Develop written policies outlining how and when FCC will  identify issues under the jurisdiction of more than one bureau;    determine which bureau will serve as the lead on crosscutting issues  and outline the responsibilities entailed regarding coordinating with  other bureaus; and    ensure that staff from separate bureaus and offices can communicate  on issues spanning more than one bureau.
Review whether it needs to redefine the roles and responsibilities of the  Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) and the Office of Strategic  Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP) and make any needed revisions.
To clarify FCC’s policies on providing commissioners access to  information from bureaus and offices about agenda items, we recommend  FCC take the following two actions:    Each chairman, at the beginning of his or her term, develop and make  publicly available internal policies that outline the extent to which  commissioners can access information from the bureaus and offices  during the decision-making process, including how commissioners can  request and receive information.
Provide this policy to FCC’s congressional oversight committees to aid  their oversight efforts.
To improve the transparency and effectiveness of the decision-making  process, we recommend that FCC take the following two actions:    Where appropriate, include the actual text of proposed rules or rule  changes in either a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking or a Further Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking before the commission votes on new or modified  rules.
Revise its ex parte policies to include    modifying its current guidance to further clarify FCC’s criteria for  determining what is a sufficient ex parte summary and address  perceived discrepancies at the commission on this issue;    clarifying FCC officials’ roles in ensuring the accuracy of ex parte  summaries and establish a proactive review process of these  summaries; and    creating a mechanism to ensure all commissioners are promptly  notified of substantive filings made on items that are on the Sunshine  Agenda.
To improve FCC’s workforce planning efforts, we recommend that FCC  take the following action:  In revising its current Strategic Human Capital Plan, include targets that  identify the type of workforce expertise needed, strategies for meeting  these targets—including methods to more flexibly augment the  workforce—and measures for tracking progress toward these targets.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: FCC provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III. In  its comments FCC generally concurred with our recommendations and  noted that they have already begun taking steps to address the areas of  concern identified in our recommendations. For example, FCC stated that  it is in the midst of a review of FCC’s existing processes. As part of this  process, FCC is reviewing prior procedures for interbureau  communication, as well as prior and current practices for commissioner  and staff communication. FCC stated that it would identify and  incorporate lessons learned and best practices into future internal  procedures. FCC did not specifically state whether future policies on  commissioner access to bureau and office information during the decision- making process would be made publicly available or provided to FCC’s  congressional oversight committees. We believe these would be important  steps in improving the transparency of FCC’s decision-making process.  FCC also did not specifically discuss our recommendation that it review  whether it needs to redefine the roles and responsibilities of OET and OSP  and make any needed revisions. Regarding the public comment process,  FCC stated that it has worked to include the text of proposed rules in  recently issued NPRMs. However, FCC did not state whether this would be  an ongoing policy. FCC also noted that the Office of General Counsel is in  the midst of reviewing proposals for modifying the current ex parte  process, and stated that this may lead to a rulemaking to address this  issue. Finally, FCC believes that it does not face significant challenges in  recruiting top candidates and stated that its unique mission and the  influence of its regulatory activities on the communications industry and  practices help it attract qualified candidates. However, it concurred that  revisions to the current Strategic Human Capital Plan should include  targets and measures for tracking progress toward these targets. We  recognize FCC’s efforts to enhance internal and external communication,  to update its comment filing system, and to continue to review other  existing processes and workforce planning efforts. However, addressing  our specific recommendations will further enhance FCC’s efforts to date  by promoting internal communication and coordination, clarifying policies  on commissioner access to staff analyses, enhancing FCC’s methods for  collecting public input, and developing methods to ensure it has the staff  expertise it needs. In addition, we provided the Federal Energy Regulatory  Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and Nuclear Regulatory  Commission with a draft of this report for review and comment. They did  not offer any comments on our findings or recommendations, but provided  technical corrections which we incorporated.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairman of  the Federal Communications Commission and other interested parties. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The report examines Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC)  organization, decision-making process, and personnel management. In  particular, the report provides information on (1) the extent to which  FCC’s bureau structure presents challenges for the agency in adapting to  an evolving marketplace; (2) the extent to which FCC’s decision-making  processes present challenges for FCC, and what opportunities, if any, exist  for improvement; and (3) the extent to which FCC’s personnel  management and workforce planning efforts ensure that FCC has the  workforce needed to achieve its mission.
To respond to the overall objectives of this report, we interviewed current  and former officials from FCC, including former chief economists and  chiefs of staff, bureau and office chiefs and acting bureau and office  chiefs, commissioners, and chairmen. In addition, we reviewed FCC  documents, as well as relevant legislation, federal regulations, and GAO  reports on the FCC and areas of focus for this review such as internal  controls and workforce planning. We also interviewed industry  associations representing broadcast and cable television, public television,  consumer electronics, wireless, and telecommunications companies,  public interest groups, and other individuals, such as academics with  extensive telecommunications experience. Table 3 lists the organizations  with whom we spoke.
To describe the challenges FCC’s bureau structure presents the agency in  adapting to an evolving marketplace, we reviewed FCC’s major internal  reorganizations since the Telecommunications Act of 1996. We analyzed  FCC procedures, applicable laws, and reviewed academic literature on  organizational theory and various FCC reform proposals. We also  reviewed academic literature on the commission structure, organizational  theory, and various FCC reform proposals from a number of stakeholders.  We used GAO’s internal control and management tool to identify key  mechanisms for facilitating the flow of information within an  organization.
To determine challenges the commission decision-making process  presents for FCC and opportunities for improvement, we reviewed  literature on federal rulemaking and potential reforms and on the  commission structure and decision-making process. We reviewed FCC  internal decision-making documents and the public comments of current  and former FCC commissioners and former chairmen to determine how  the decision-making process works. We also interviewed officials from  independent regulatory agencies including the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Federal  Trade Commission and, where available, reviewed their internal  commission procedures to understand how other independent regulatory  agencies implement the commission decision-making process. We  reviewed FCC’s decision-making procedures and public comment and  ex parte rules, and compared certain aspects to standards established in  GAO’s internal control standards and other relevant documents. In  addition, we interviewed industry, consumer advocate, and regulatory  representatives to gain their perspectives on providing information to FCC  during the decision-making process and to identify alternative approaches  to the decision-making process. Finally, we reviewed FCC documents,  policy papers from outside stakeholders, letters to the Presidential  Transition Task Team, as well as proposed legislation to determine  proposals for altering FCC’s public comment process.
To examine whether FCC’s personnel management and workforce  planning efforts ensure that FCC has the workforce needed to achieve its  mission, we reviewed prior GAO products related to strategic workforce  planning and human capital challenges. We then reviewed FCC-generated  data on overall staff levels, hiring, attrition, and retirement eligibility over  the period of 2003 to 2008. We also reviewed FCC’s 2007-2011 Strategic  Human Capital Plan to determine the challenges FCC has identified for  addressing future workforce issues, as well as its proposed solutions. We  reviewed FCC’s methods for identifying needed skill sets and  competencies, including surveys of staff and focus groups. We analyzed  results from the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Federal Human  Capital Survey for 2008 and compared FCC’s responses on various items  with the responses of the rest of U.S. government staff.
We performed our review from August 2008 to October 2009 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our review objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: FCC Bureaus and Functions
paragraphs: FCC staff is organized into seven operating bureaus and 10 staff offices.  The bureaus’ responsibilities include: processing applications for licenses  and other filings; analyzing complaints; conducting investigations;  developing and implementing regulatory policies and programs; and taking  part in hearings. FCC’s offices provide support services for the bureaus  and commission.
Office of Inspector General: The Office of Inspector General conducts  and supervises audits and investigations relating to FCC’s operations. The  Inspector General reports to the chairman and informs the chair and  Congress of fraud or any serious problems with the administration of FCC  programs and operations discovered during audits and investigations;  reviews and recommends corrective action, where appropriate; and  reports on progress made in the implementation of those corrective  actions.
Office of Engineering and Technology: The Office of Engineering and  Technology (OET) advises FCC on engineering matters, manages  spectrum, and provides leadership in creating new opportunities for  competitive technologies and services for the American public. OET  allocates spectrum for nonfederal use and provides expert advice on  technical issues before the commission, including helping commissioners  understand the tradeoffs of technical issues. In addition to providing  technical guidance to the commissioners, FCC’s other bureaus rely on  OET to provide leadership on high-level technical and engineering issues  that do not fall within the scope of a particular bureau and to provide  advice on technical issues handled in the bureaus.
Office of General Counsel: The Office of General Counsel serves as the  chief legal advisor to the commission and to its various bureaus and  offices. The General Counsel also represents the commission in litigation  in federal courts, recommends decisions in adjudicatory matters before  the commission, assists the commission in its decision-making capacity,  and performs a variety of legal functions regarding internal and other  administrative matters.
Office of Managing Director: The Office of Managing Director functions  as chief operating official, serving under the direction and supervision of  the chairman. The office develops and manages FCC’s budget and  financial programs, personnel management process and policy, develops  and implements agencywide management systems, coordinates the  commission meeting schedule, and manages the distribution and  publication of official FCC documents.
Office of Media Relations: The Office of Media Relations is responsible  for the dissemination of information on commission issues. The office is  responsible for coordinating media requests for information and  interviews on FCC proceedings and activities and for encouraging and  facilitating media dissemination of commission announcements, orders,  and other information.
Office of Administrative Law Judges: The Office of Administrative Law  Judges is responsible for conducting the hearings ordered by the  commission. The hearing function includes acting on interlocutory  requests filed in the proceedings, such as petitions to intervene, petitions  to enlarge issues, and contested discovery requests. An administrative law  judge, appointed under the Administrative Procedures Act, presides at the  hearing during which documents and sworn testimony are received in  evidence, and witnesses are cross-examined. At the conclusion of the  evidentiary phase of a proceeding, the presiding administrative law judge  writes and issues an initial decision which may be appealed to the  commission.
Office of Legislative Affairs: The Office of Legislative Affairs is the  FCC’s liaison to Congress and provides lawmakers with information  regarding FCC regulatory decisions, answers to policy questions, and  assistance with constituent concerns. The office also prepares FCC  witnesses for congressional hearings and helps create FCC responses to  legislative proposals and congressional inquiries. Additionally, the office is  a liaison to other federal agencies, as well as state and local governments.
Office of Communications and Business Opportunities: The Office of  Communications and Business Opportunities provides advice to the  commission on issues and policies concerning opportunities for  ownership by small, minority, and women-owned communications  businesses. The office works with entrepreneurs, industry, public interest  organizations, individuals, and others to provide information about FCC  policies, increase ownership and employment opportunities, foster a  diversity of voices and viewpoints over the airwaves, and encourage  participation in FCC proceedings.
Office of Workplace Diversity: The Office of Workplace Diversity  advises the commission on all issues related to workforce diversity,  affirmative recruitment, and equal employment opportunity.
Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis: The Office of  Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP) is responsible for working  with the chairman, the commissioners, bureaus, and offices to develop a  strategic plan identifying short- and long-term policy objectives for the  agency. OSP consists of economists, attorneys, and MBAs who serve as  expert consultants to the commission in areas of economic, business, and  market analysis and other subjects that cut across traditional lines, such as  the Internet. The office also reviews legal trends and developments not  necessarily related to current FCC proceedings, such as intellectual  property law, the Internet, and e-commerce issues.
International Bureau: The International Bureau represents the  commission in satellite and international matters. This includes advising  the chairman and commissioners on matters of international  telecommunications policy and the status of the commission’s actions to  promote the vital interests of the American public in international  commerce, national defense, and foreign policy areas. The bureau also  develops, recommends, and administers policies, rules, and procedures for  the authorization and regulation of international telecommunications  facilities and service and domestic and international satellite systems.
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau: The Wireless  Telecommunications Bureau handles all FCC domestic wireless  telecommunications programs and policies—except those involving public  safety, satellite communications, or broadcasting—including licensing,  enforcement, and regulatory functions. Wireless communications services  include cellular telephone, paging, personal communications services, and  other commercial and private radio services. The bureau also regulates the  use of radio spectrum to fulfill the communications needs of business,  aircraft and ship operators, and individuals. The bureau is responsible for  implementing the competitive bidding authority for spectrum auctions.
Enforcement Bureau: The Enforcement Bureau is responsible for  enforcing provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, FCC’s rules and  orders, and the terms and conditions of station authorizations. Major areas  of enforcement that are handled by the Enforcement Bureau are (1)  consumer protection enforcement, (2) local competition enforcement, and  (3) public safety and homeland security enforcement.
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau: The Consumer and  Governmental Affairs Bureau (CGB) develops and implements the  commission’s consumer policies, including disability access. The bureau  conducts consumer outreach and education and maintains a Consumer  Center that responds to consumer inquiries and complaints. CGB also  maintains collaborative partnerships with state, local, and tribal  governments in areas such as emergency preparedness and  implementation of new technologies.
Media Bureau: The Media Bureau develops, recommends, and  administers the policy and licensing programs relating to electronic media,  including cable television, broadcast television, and radio in the United  States and its territories. The Media Bureau also handles postlicensing  matters regarding direct broadcast satellite service.
Wireline Competition Bureau: The Wireline Competition Bureau  develops and recommends policy goals, objectives, programs, and plans  for the commission on matters concerning wireline telecommunications.  The Wireline Competition Bureau’s overall objectives include ensuring  choice, opportunity, and fairness in the development of wireline  telecommunications services and markets; developing deregulatory  initiatives; promoting economically efficient investment in wireline  telecommunications infrastructure; promoting the development and  widespread availability of wireline telecommunications services; and  fostering economic growth.
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau: The Public Safety and  Homeland Security Bureau is responsible for developing, recommending,  and administering the agency’s policies pertaining to public safety  communications issues. These policies include 911 and E911, operability  and interoperability of public safety communications, communications  infrastructure protection and disaster response, and network security and  reliability. The bureau also serves as a clearinghouse for public safety  communications information and takes the lead on emergency response  issues.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Federal Communications Commission
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact listed above, Andrew Von Ah (Assistant  Director), Eli Albagli, Pedro Almoguera, Thomas Beall, Timothy Bober,  Crystal Huggins, Delwen Jones, Aaron Kaminsky, Joshua Ormond, Sarah  Veale, and Mindi Weisenbloom made major contributions to this report.