Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives
Published: 2005-10-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Recent military operations have required that the Army rely extensively on Army National Guard forces, which currently comprise over 30 percent of the ground forces in Iraq. Heavy deployments of Army National Guard forces and their equipment, much of which has been left overseas for follow-on forces, have raised questions about whether the Army National Guard has the types and quantities of equipment it will need to continue supporting ongoing operations and future missions. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard has the equipment needed to support ongoing operations and (2) the Army can account for Army National Guard equipment left overseas. GAO also assessed the Army's plans, cost estimates, and funding strategy for equipping Guard units under its modular and rotational force initiatives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and threatens the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources prior to deployment and (2) current operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles. To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its nondeployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the Guard's inventory of more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as night vision equipment, trucks, and radios. Further, as equipment requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, the Army has been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying units need until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard to transfer needed equipment quickly. To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account for only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to track equipment Guard units left overseas and develop replacement plans, but they have not yet been completed. The Army Guard estimates that since 2003 it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than $1.2 billion, overseas to support operations. Without a completed and implemented plan to replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will likely face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will not have assurance that the Army has an effective strategy for addressing the Guard's equipping needs. Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within the Army's modular force by 2008, they are not expected to be equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing operations. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard's units, but this estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the estimate. In the short term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, which may affect the availability of equipment needed for modular conversions. Until the Army fully identifies the Guard's equipment requirements and costs for both the near and long term, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the affordability and effectiveness of the Army's plans.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the  subsequent launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army National  Guard has been called upon to play a significant role in supporting active  Army forces overseas while, at the same time, taking on new homeland  defense missions, such as protecting critical infrastructure—all of which  require that the Army National Guard have sufficient quantities and types  of equipment items. In addition, the Army National Guard must use its  allotted equipment to perform other domestic responsibilities, including  responding to natural emergencies or incidents of civil unrest. Historically,  the Army National Guard has been structured as a follow-on force that  supports the active Army in overseas conflicts, and as such, Guard units  have not been resourced with all of the equipment and personnel they  require for their missions. Instead, it was assumed that there would be  sufficient time for units to obtain the remainder of their resources prior to  deployment. However, Army National Guard members now comprise 31  percent of the ground forces in Iraq. While Army officials anticipate Guard  involvement to decline somewhat in 2006, the tempo of operations over  the long term remains uncertain. The post-September 11 increase in the  Army National Guard’s responsibilities, particularly its increased  involvement in overseas operations, raises concerns about whether the  Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to continue to support  operations in the future.
The Army recognizes that it needs to transform its forces, including the  National Guard, to better meet the emerging threats of the 21st century  and is undertaking two initiatives designed to enhance the capability of  active and reserve forces. One of the Army’s key initiatives—called the  modular force initiative—is a multibillion dollar effort to restructure the  entire Army. It involves increasing the flexibility and responsiveness of the  force by converting from a division-based structure to smaller brigade  combat teams and increasing the pool of units available for deployment. In  addition, the Army is in the process of developing a rotational force model  in which active and reserve forces would progress through a cycle of  increasing readiness, culminating in the availability of a specified number  of units for deployment if needed. The Army also hopes the model will  increase deployment predictability for Army National Guard soldiers, who  have been heavily involved in recent operations and must balance their  military duties with civilian careers.
The challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in managing its  reserve forces and allocating its resources across services and programs  are some of the many issues that we have highlighted to Congress as the  nation entered the 21st century. We have previously reported on how the  Army National Guard and Army Reserve have been used in recent  operations. In 2004, we reported on the effect of the continuing high use  of National Guard forces and challenges to prepare the Guard for future  overseas and domestic missions. In addition, we recently testified on the  Army’s plans to convert to a modular force. And, in August 2003 and  September 2004, we reported on several reserve mobilization issues,  including the limited use of the individual ready reserve and long-term  availability issues.
In response to your request that we examine Army National Guard  equipment issues, the objectives of this report are to assess the extent to  which (1) the Army National Guard has the types and quantities of  equipment needed to support the Global War on Terrorism and (2) the  Army can account for Army National Guard equipment that has been  transferred to the active component in theater and its plans for replacing  this equipment. We also examined the Army’s plans for converting the  Army National Guard to a modular force and implementing a rotational  force model to determine how Army National Guard units will be equipped  for future missions and the estimated costs of the conversion.
To address these objectives, we analyzed data on the types and quantities  of Army National Guard equipment that have been used in support of the  Global War on Terrorism and the equipment status of nondeployed units;  the extent to which Army National Guard equipment has been retained  overseas in the theater of operations; and the Army’s plans to create a  modular force and its new rotational force model. We interviewed officials  in the DOD, the Department of the Army, and the National Guard Bureau  to obtain information on how equipment needs have evolved, the extent to  which equipment has been transferred to the active component and the  Army’s plans for replacing it, and the Army’s plans to include the Army  National Guard in the modular force initiative and the rotational force  model. We supplemented this information with visits to Army commands  and conducted a case study of unit equipment experiences by visiting two  units, the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed in  February 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which  deployed in May 2005. We selected these units because they allowed us to  evaluate how the process used to prepare units has changed with  subsequent rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. We conducted our  review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards between December 2004 and August 2005 and determined that  the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and  methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix  I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard  of the United States are two components of the armed forces Selected  Reserve. The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity responsible for  the administration of both the Army National Guard and the Air National  Guard. The Army National Guard, which is authorized 350,000 soldiers,  makes up more than one-half of the Army’s ground combat forces and one- third of its support forces (e.g., military police, transportation units). Army  National Guard units are located at more than 3,000 armories and bases in  all 50 states and 4 U.S. territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard  members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend  per month and 2 weeks per year. However, after September 11, 2001, the  President authorized reservists to be activated for up to 2 years.  As of July  2005, more than 70,000 Army National Guard personnel were activated  under this authority to support ongoing operations. The Guard also  employs some full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in  administrative, training, and maintenance tasks.
Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under  three general statutory frameworks: Title 10 or 32 of the United States  Code or pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 10  status, Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under  federal command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being  ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or under appropriate  circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32 status  are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the status in which  National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal  mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-funded and  under state command and control. Under state law, the governor may  order National Guard personnel to perform state active duty to respond to  emergencies, civil disturbances, and for other reasons authorized by state  law.
While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state missions,  the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, and  these take priority over state missions. The Global War on Terrorism, a  federal mission, is a comprehensive effort to defeat terrorism and protect  and defend the homeland and includes military operations such as  Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  As we reported in our November 2004 report on the National Guard, the  Army National Guard’s involvement in federal operations has increased  substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks, and Army National  Guard members have participated in overseas warfighting operations in  Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and  homeland missions, such as guarding Air Force bases. Figure 1 shows that  while the number of activated Army National Guard personnel has  declined since its peak in December 2004 and January 2005, it continues to  provide a substantial number of personnel to support current operations.   As of July 2005, about 35,500 of the 113,000 soldiers, or nearly one-third of  the soldiers serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, were Army National  Guard members. In a June 30, 2005, testimony before the Senate Armed  Services Committee the Army’s Chief of Staff said that the Army National  Guard’s participation in overseas operations is expected to decrease  somewhat in the near future. Although the Army National Guard is  expected to continue its participation in ongoing operations, decisions as  to the level of participation have not been made.
The Department of the Army is responsible for equipping the Army  National Guard. DOD policy requires that equipment be provided to units  according to their planned wartime mission, regardless of their  component. However, based on the Army’s funding priorities, the most  modern equipment is usually provided to units that would deploy first.  Later deploying units, such as most Army National Guard units, are  equipped with older items from the Army’s inventory as active forces  receive newer and more modern equipment. Army National Guard units  are responsible for conducting some maintenance of their equipment.
section_title: Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall Equipment Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units
paragraphs: While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting  the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the  equipment inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units and equipment  shortages threaten the Guard’s ability to prepare forces for future  deployments. Among nondeployed National Guard units, the amount of  essential warfighting equipment on hand has continued to decrease since  we last reported on the Army National Guard in 2004. Equipment  shortages have developed because most Army National Guard units are  still structured with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to deploy.  To ready deploying units for overseas missions, the Guard has had to  transfer large numbers of equipment items from nondeployed units—a  practice that has left nondeployed units with increasing shortages of  equipment and made it difficult to prepare units for future missions and  maintain readiness for any unplanned contingencies. Moreover, the  equipment requirements for deploying Army National Guard units have  evolved as the nature of current operations has changed. This has meant  that in some cases, the Army National Guard has had little time to identify  sources of equipment and transfer needed items to deploying units. The  Army is adapting some of its processes to help units address the evolving  equipment requirements.
subsections: section_title: The Army National Guard’s Initial Equipment Shortages and the Continuing Need for Fully Equipped Forces for Current Operations Have Resulted in Critical Equipment Shortages
paragraphs: Most Army National Guard units mobilized for recent overseas operations  had equipment shortages that had to be filled so that the unit could meet  the combatant commander’s equipment requirements for their mission.  These shortages exist because the Army, following DOD planning  guidance, has historically equipped all Army units, including the Army  National Guard, according to a tiered resourcing strategy. Under tiered  resourcing, those units expected to deploy overseas early in a conflict  receive first priority for equipment, and most Army National Guard units  were expected to deploy after the active component units to serve as  follow-on forces. The Army therefore accepted some operational risks by  providing lower priority Army National Guard units with less equipment  than they would need for their mission under the assumption that there  would be time to provide additional equipment to these units before they  would be deployed. For example, Army National Guard enhanced separate  brigades are generally supplied with about 75 percent of the equipment  they require for their warfighting missions and divisional units, which  comprise the majority of the Guard’s combat forces, are supplied with  about 65 percent. In addition to being given less equipment, most Army  National Guard units did not have priority for the newest, most modern  equipment, so much of the Guard’s equipment is older and less modern  than that of the active Army and is not always compatible with more  modern items.
However, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required  Army National Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the  equipment they are expected to need and with equipment that is  compatible with active Army units. As an increasing number of Army  National Guard forces have been needed to support current operations,  the Army National Guard has supplied the equipment its deploying units  need to meet combatant commander requirements by transferring  equipment from within the Army National Guard. The Army National  Guard first tries to identify the needed equipment within the same state as  the deploying unit. If the equipment cannot be found within the state, the  National Guard Bureau requests the equipment from Army National Guard  units across the United States. If the equipment is not available in the  Army National Guard, the Army National Guard notifies the Army that the  equipment is not available, and the Army takes over the task of providing  the equipment to the mobilized unit.
For example, although the 30th Brigade Combat Team needed about 8,810  night vision goggles to deploy, it only had about 40 percent of its  requirement on hand when it was alerted to prepare to deploy, so the  Army National Guard had to identify and transfer about 5,272 pairs of  goggles to fully equip the unit. In another case, the Army tasked the  National Guard to convert 40 nonmilitary police units, including field  artillery companies, to security units capable of performing selected  military police missions in Iraq during 2004 and 2005. While a military  police company typically has 47 humvees in its inventory, field artillery  companies have only about 3 humvees that are suitable for this new  mission. Therefore, the converted units had to obtain armored humvees  from other units already in Iraq because the Army National Guard had  depleted its inventory of armored humvees.
As current operations have continued, the pool of equipment from which  the Army National Guard can draw has been reduced because so many  items have been transferred to deploying units or left overseas. Shortages  of some equipment items have forced the Army National Guard to take  measures that have further exacerbated existing shortages in nondeployed  units to provide training equipment for deploying units. For example,  because the Army National Guard’s supply of armored humvees was  depleted, the Army directed the Army National Guard to transfer more  than 500 humvees from nondeployed Guard units to create training sets  for units to use when preparing for deployment.
Significant numbers of equipment transfers have persisted as operations  overseas have continued. We previously reported that as of June 2004 the  Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of  equipment to ready units for recent operations. By July 2005, the number  of equipment items transferred among Army National Guard units had  grown to more than 101,000. As a result of these transfers, the equipment  readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard units has declined. As  figure 2 shows, the percentage of nondeployed units that reported having  the minimum amount of equipment they would need to deploy dropped  from 87 percent in October 2002 to 59 percent in May 2005. However, this  estimate includes units that have older, less modern equipment referred to  as substitute equipment. While these substitute items are useful for  training purposes, commanders may not allow these items in the theater of  operations because they may not be compatible with the equipment other  units are using and cannot be sustained logistically in theater. In addition,  this estimate includes units that have equipment that is undergoing  maintenance after returning from deployment or was left overseas, so  these items are not readily available for deployment. The National Guard  Bureau estimates that when substitute items, equipment undergoing  maintenance, and equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are  subtracted, its nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of  essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005.
With respect to some equipment items, transfers of equipment to  deploying units have depleted the inventories of many key items in  nondeployed units. Table 1 shows selected items needed for current  mobilization for which inventory levels in nondeployed Guard units have  fallen below 20 percent of authorized levels.
As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment  transfers had reduced its inventory of more than 220 items to less than 5  percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 items. Among  these 220 high-demand items are generators, trucks, and radios.
While the Army can supply deploying forces with additional equipment  after they are mobilized, nondeployed units will be challenged to maintain  readiness for future missions because they do not have the equipment to  train with or to use for other contingencies. The effect of equipment  shortages on nondeployed units’ ability to perform homeland defense  missions is not known because, as we reported in 2004, DOD has not  developed requirements or preparedness standards and measures for the  homeland missions in which the Army National Guard is expected to  participate. However, as previously reported, some of these items such as  humvees, night vision goggles, and chemical protective suits are useful for  the Guard’s domestic missions, such as responding to potential terrorist  threats.
section_title: Evolving Equipment Requirements Challenge Efforts to Equip Units for the Global War on Terrorism
paragraphs: As current military operations have evolved, equipment requirements for  the Global War on Terrorism have continued to change. This has  challenged Guard units preparing to deploy because equipment  requirements are not defined and communicated to them until close to  their deployment dates. Equipment that was not considered essential for  some units’ expected missions has become important for ongoing  operations, and units have been required to have equipment that is newer  than or different from that on which they have been trained. For example,  the 30th Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina, which deployed in  the spring of 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team from Georgia,  which deployed in 2005, were directed to deploy as motorized brigade  combat teams with humvees instead of the heavy-tracked equipment, such  as Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks, with which they had trained for  their expected missions. Overall, the combatant commander required that  the 30th Brigade deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom with more than 35  types of items that were previously not authorized for the unit, including  different radios and weapons.
Due to changing conditions in theater and a desire to tailor a unit’s  equipment as closely as possible to its expected mission, the Army has  continued to modify equipment requirements after units are alerted. These  changes have resulted in requirements not being communicated to some  Army National Guard units in a timely manner so that the units could be  equipped as efficiently as possible for current operations or be provided  ample time for training. In some instances, Army National Guard units  have not known exactly what equipment they would require to deploy and  what they could expect to receive in theater until close to their  deployment dates, which has made it more difficult for Army National  Guard officials to gather the equipment deploying units need to fill  equipment shortages. For example, the 48th Brigade Combat Team, which  was preparing for deployment in May 2005, had still not received a  complete list of all of the equipment it would need at the time of our visit  in April 2005. Because officials did not know exactly what they would  need to take with them overseas, the brigade packed and transported 180  different vehicles to be shipped to theater. When officials learned that this  equipment was already available in theater, these vehicles had to be  shipped back to the brigade’s mobilization station at Fort Stewart,  Georgia.
In some cases, delays caused by the changing equipment requirements  reduced the amount of time units had to train with their new equipment.  For example, the 30th Brigade did not have a chemical agent identification  set to train with until its final exercise before deploying, and it did not  have access to a Blue Force Tracker, a digital communications system that  allows commanders to track friendly forces across the battlefield in real  time, for training until the unit was in theater. In some cases, the 30th  Brigade did not receive some items until they could be transferred from  nondeployed units or they were provided in theater. For example, the unit  received the 4,000 ceramic body armor inserts needed to protect soldiers  from small arms fire upon arrival in Kuwait. According to Army officials,  in such instances units may undergo training upon arrival in the theater of  operations to acquaint them with new equipment. However, we did not  evaluate the adequacy of the training units received in the theater of  operations.
section_title: Army Has Adapted Its Equipping Process to Better Address Critical Equipment Shortages and Evolving Equipment Requirements for Ongoing Operations
paragraphs: To address critical equipment shortages and the evolving equipment  requirements for current operations, the Army has adapted its equipping  process in two ways. First, rather than having units bring all their  equipment to the theater of operations and take it back to their home  stations when they return home, the Army now requires units, in both the  active and reserve components, to leave certain essential equipment that is  in short supply in theater for follow-on units to use. This is intended to  reduce the amount of equipment that has to be transported from the  United States to theater, to better enable units to meet their deployment  dates, and to maintain stocks of essential equipment in theater where it is  most needed. While this equipping approach has helped meet current  operational needs, it has continued the cycle of reducing the pool of  equipment available to nondeployed forces for unplanned contingencies  and for training.
Second, the Army has instituted a process, known as a predeployment site  survey, to allow large units preparing to deploy to send a team to the  mission area to determine equipment needs. The team generates a list of  equipment, known as an operational needs statement, which the unit will  need in theater but was not previously authorized and will need to obtain  before deployment. Once the Army has approved the items, the unit can  obtain them through transfers from other units or procurement. Over the  course of current operations, the Army has improved the operational  needs statement process by pre-approving packages of equipment that are  in high-demand for current operations so that deploying units do not have  to request these items separately. For example, more than 160 items, such  as interceptor body armor; Javelin, a medium antitank weapon system;  kits to add armor to humvees; and night vision goggles, among other items,  are pre-approved. For example, in 2003, the 30th Brigade Combat Team  prepared about 35 lists of additional equipment it would need to deploy in  January 2004. By the time the 48th Brigade was preparing for deployment  in 2005, changes to the process resulted in the unit preparing only one  operational needs statement.
In addition, an existing Army program, the Rapid Fielding Initiative, has  provided individual equipment to soldiers, including those in the Army  National Guard, more quickly than the standard acquisition process by  fielding commercial-off-the-shelf technology. The Army provides 49 items  such as body armor, helmets, hydration systems, goggles, kneepads, and  elbow pads through this initiative to units preparing to deploy at their  home stations and in theater.
Filling shortages in deploying units has left nondeployed forces with  worsening equipment shortages and hampers their ability to train for  future missions. Growing shortages make it unclear whether the Guard  will be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for  missions overseas or at home.
section_title: Army’s Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard’s Ability to Prepare and Train Units
paragraphs: The Army National Guard estimates that, since 2003, it has left more than  64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support  continuing operations.  But, the Army lacks a full accounting of this  equipment and has not prepared plans to replace it as required under DOD  policy. As a result, the Guard is challenged in its ability to prepare and  train for future missions. The policy reflected in DOD Directive 1225.6,  Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005, requires a replacement plan  for reserve component equipment transferred to the active component for  more than 90 days. According to Army officials, the Army did not initially  track the Guard’s equipment or prepare replacement plans in the early  phases of the war because the practice was intended to be a short-term  measure and there were other priorities. In addition, the Army did not  have a centralized process to develop plans to replace the equipment Army  National Guard units left overseas and transfers of equipment between  units were only documented at the unit level in unit property records.
However, as operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment  retained in theater has increased, which has further exacerbated the  shortages in nondeployed Army National Guard units. For example, when  the North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from its  deployment to Iraq in 2005, it left 229 humvees, about 73 percent of its pre- deployment inventory of those vehicles, for other units to use. Similarly,  according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois Army National  Guard units were required to leave almost all of their humvees, about 130,  in Iraq when they returned from deployment. As a result, the units could  not conduct training to maintain the proficiency they acquired while  overseas or train new recruits. In all, the National Guard reports that 14  military police companies left over 600 humvees and other armored trucks  which are expected to remain in theater for the duration of operations.  While the Army has now instituted processes to account for certain high- demand equipment items that are being left in theater for the duration of  the conflict and expects replacement plans for this equipment to be  developed by August 2005, it does not appear that these replacement plans  will account for all items transferred to the active component because the  Army has not been tracking all Guard equipment left in theater in a  centralized manner.
In June 2004, six months after the first Army National Guard units left  equipment overseas when they returned from deployment, the Army  tasked the Army Materiel Command with overseeing equipment retained  in theater. However, according to Army and National Guard officials, the  Army Materiel Command developed plans to track only certain high- demand equipment items that are in short supply, such as armored  humvees and other items designated to remain in theater for the duration  of the conflict. However, Guard units have also left behind equipment that  was not designated to stay for the duration of the conflict, but which may  remain in theater for up to three years, such as cargo trucks, rough terrain  fork lifts, and palletized load trucks, which the Army Materiel Command  does not plan to track. Of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army  National Guard estimates Guard units have left behind, the National Guard  Bureau estimates that as of July 2005, the Army Material Command was  only tracking about 45 percent of those items. Given the lack of tracking of  all Guard equipment left in theater, it is not clear how the Army will  develop replacement plans for these items as required by DOD policy.
In May 2005 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs  requested that the Army submit a replacement plan for all Army National  Guard equipment retained in theater by June 17, 2005. The Assistant  Secretary noted that while the exact amount of equipment transferred  between the reserve and active components is unknown, overall the  magnitude of these transfers has been significant and was an area of  concern. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs  subsequently extended the date replacement plans were due to August 15,  2005. According to Army officials, the equipment tracked by individual  units may eventually be returned to the Guard. However, Army and Army  National Guard officials said that even if it is eventually returned,  equipment condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use during current  operations and some of it will likely need to be replaced. The National  Guard estimates it will cost at least $1.2 billion to replace the equipment it  has left in Iraq, if it is not returned or is not useable. Until the Army  develops plans to replace the equipment, including identifying timetables  and funding sources, the National Guard will continue to face critical  equipment shortages which reduce readiness for future missions.
section_title: Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces
paragraphs: Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within  the Army’s modular force by 2008, but they are expected to convert with  the equipment they have on hand and will lack some equipment for these  designs until at least 2011. However, the Army is modifying the designs it  tested and found to be as effective as current brigades to include the  equipment it can reasonably expect to have based on current funding  plans. As a result, Army National Guard units will continue to lack  equipment items and have to use less modern equipment to fill gaps until  at least 2011 and will not be comparably equipped with their active duty  counterparts. While the Army estimated in June 2005 that it would cost  about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard’s units, this estimate did  not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide  detailed information to support the estimate. Further, it has not developed  detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard’s equipment requirements  as it progresses through the new rotation cycle used to provide ready  forces for ongoing operations. The Army is quickly implementing its  initiatives to transform its forces into modular units and a rotational cycle  of deployment without detailed plans and cost estimates because it views  these initiatives as critical to sustaining current operations. In the short  term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for  equipment, which may delay when units will receive the equipment needed  for modular conversions. In 2004 and 2005, the Army published and  subsequently updated the Army Campaign Plan, to establish the broad  goals, assumptions, and time frames for converting to the modular force  and implementing the rotational force model. However, the plan does not  include detailed equipping plans, cost estimates, or resources needed for  implementing the modular and rotational deployment initiatives. Our  analysis of best practices in strategic planning has shown that detailed  plans, which describe how the objectives will be achieved and identify  resources, facilitate success and avoid unintended consequences, such as  differing assumptions among key leaders in DOD and Congress about  priorities or program performance. Until equipping requirements for  implementing the modular designs and the rotational model are specified,  costs are better defined, and funding is identified, the Guard faces risks as  it prepares to implement the Army’s restructuring while supporting the  high pace of operations at home and overseas.
subsections: section_title: Army National Guard Units Will Continue to Face Equipment Shortfalls That May Delay Transformation to Modular Designs and Hinder Comparability with Active Forces
paragraphs: The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and  capable of achieving a wide range of missions. To this end, in 2004, the  Army began to reorganize its forces from a structure organized around  divisions to one based on standardized, modular brigades that can be  tailored to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. The  Army is in the process of developing and approving detailed designs,  including equipment requirements, for active and reserve combat units,  support units, and warfighting headquarters so that the first Guard units  can begin their scheduled conversions in September 2005. Among the  goals of the new structure are to maximize the flexibility and  responsiveness of the force by standardizing designs and equipment  requirements for both active and reserve units and maintaining reserve  units at a higher level of readiness than in the past. However, under  current plans, Guard units will continue to be equipped with items that  may be older than their active counterparts and less capable than the new  modular unit designs require. The Army’s initial estimate for converting  Guard units to modular designs is about $15.6 billion through 2011, but  this estimate is incomplete because it does not include the costs for  converting all units to the new structure or the full costs of equipping them  for the design the Army tested and determined was as effective as current  brigades. Moreover, the Army has not developed plans to equip Guard  units to the tested modular unit design and instead plans to equip them for  a less modern design. Without a detailed equipping plan that identifies  funding priorities over time, the Army National Guard is likely to continue  to face challenges in its ability to train and maintain ready forces in the  future.
The Army expects that the new modular brigades, which will include  about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel, will be as capable as the current brigades  of between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel through the use of enhanced military  intelligence capability, introduction of key technology enablers, such as  weapons and communications systems, and by having support capabilities  contained in the brigade itself instead of at a higher echelon of command.  The Army tested the new modular brigade designs and found that they  were as effective as current brigades. However, the Army has modified the  tested designs based on the equipment it can reasonably expect to provide  to units undergoing conversion based on its current inventory of  equipment, planned procurement pipelines, and other factors, such as  expected funding. At the time of this report, the Army had not tested the  modified designs to determine whether they are as capable as the current  brigades or the tested design. The Army plans to equip modular Guard  units for the modified design by 2011. In the meantime, modular Guard  units are expected to continue the practice of using approved substitute  equipment and will initially lack some of the key enablers, such as  communications systems, which are the basis for the improved  effectiveness of modular units.
As of June 2005, the Army had approved modified designs for the 25 Army  National Guard brigade combat teams and 25 support brigades scheduled  to convert to the modular structure between 2005 and 2007, and all eight  warfighting headquarters converting between 2005 and 2008. Under  current plans, all the Army National Guard units will be converted to the  modular organizational structure by 2008 with the exception of 3 support  brigades which will be converted in 2011. The Army expects to complete  modular designs for the remaining 9 brigade combat teams and 15 support  brigades by September 2005. The Army had originally planned to convert  Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request of the Army  National Guard, accelerated the plan so that Guard units would share the  new standardized organizational designs with the active component at  least two years earlier, avoid training soldiers for the previous skill mix,  and better facilitate recruiting and retention efforts.
However, our work indicates that accelerated modular conversions will  exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls. There are significant shortfalls  in the Army’s ability to equip Guard units for the modified design in the  short term for three key reasons. First, according to current plans, the  units are expected to convert to their new designs with the equipment they  have on hand. However, because of existing shortages and the large  number of equipment items that deployed units left in Iraq or that need  repair or replacement due to heavy use, units will not have the equipment  needed to reach even the modified design. For example, converted Guard  units expect initially to be without some equipment items, such as  unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel ground and airborne radio  systems, and Javelin antitank missiles that provide the basis for the  improved capability of the new brigades. Second, the Army has not  planned funding to provide equipment to the additional Guard units  converting to the modular structure on the accelerated schedule. Although  most Guard units are scheduled to be reorganized by 2008, they are  expected to receive equipment for their new designs on a slower schedule,  and in some cases are not expected to receive their equipment until 2 to 3  years after they reorganize. The lack of detailed plans for equipping Army  National Guard units makes it difficult to determine how the Army intends  to transition Guard units from the old to the new organizational structure  effectively.
Finally, the Army’s cost estimates for converting Guard units to the  modular structure are incomplete and likely to grow. The Army’s current  cost estimate for converting all its active and reserve units to the modular  force is $48 billion, a 71 percent increase from its initial rough order of  magnitude estimate of $28 billion made in 2004. Of the $48 billion, the  Army estimated in June 2005 that Army National Guard modular  conversions would cost about $15.6 billion. This estimate included costs to  convert all eight of the Guard’s warfighting headquarters and 33 of the  Guard’s 34 combat units between 2005 and 2011. It also includes  procurement of some high-demand equipment such as tactical unmanned  aerial vehicles, humvees, and antitank guided-missile systems. During our  work, we obtained summary information on the types of cost and key  assumptions reflected in the Army’s estimates; however, we were unable  to fully evaluate the estimate because the Army did not have detailed  supporting information.
Our work highlighted several limitations to the Army’s cost estimate for  Army National Guard modular force conversions. First, the estimate was  based on a less modern design than both the modified design that the  Army plans to use in the near term and the tested design it intends to  evolve to over time. The estimate assumes that Guard units will continue  to use substitute equipment items that may be older and less capable than  that of active units and does not include costs for all the technology  enablers that are expected to provide additional capability for modular  units. As a result, the estimate does not include costs for all the equipment  Guard units would require to reach the capabilities of the tested modular  brigade design. Second, the estimate does not include costs for 10 of the  Guard’s support units, nor does it include military construction costs  associated with the Guard’s 40 support units. According to the Army  National Guard, military construction costs for converted support units  are expected to near the $1.4 billion in military construction costs already  included for the Guard’s warfighting headquarters and combat units.  Furthermore, current cost estimates assume that Guard equipment  inventories will be at prewar levels and available for modular conversions.  However, this may not be a reasonable assumption because, as discussed  previously, Army National Guard units have left large amounts of  equipment overseas – some of which will be retained indefinitely and the  Army has not provided plans for its replacement.
Further, the Army has currently identified funding sources for only about  25 percent ($3.9 billion) of the current estimate— $3.1 billion programmed  in the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program and $.8 billion  expected from fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding. Approval for funding  the remaining $11.7 billion is pending within DOD. However, equipping  priorities and the amount designated for equipment have not been  decided.
In the long term, according to the Army, the intent is to equip all active and  reserve component units to the tested design over time. However, it will  take until at least 2011 under current plans for the Army National Guard  units to receive the equipment they will need for the modified designs  which are still less modern than the one the Army tested and found as  effective as current brigades, and the pace of operations may further delay  equipping Guard units. Moreover, the Army does not have detailed plans  or cost estimates that identify the funding required for equipping Guard  units for the tested design. Without detailed plans for when Guard units  will get the equipment they need for the tested design, it is unclear when  the Army National Guard will achieve the enhanced capabilities the Army  needs to support ongoing operations. Further, without more complete  equipment requirements and cost estimates, the DOD and Congress will  not have all the information they need to evaluate funding requests for the  Army National Guard’s transition to the modular force.
section_title: Army Plans for Equipping Army National Guard Units Under Its Rotational Force Model Are Not Complete
paragraphs: The Army’s initiative to transform into a rotational force, which is  intended to provide units with a predictable cycle of increasing readiness  for potential mobilization once every 6 years, involves a major change in  the way the Army planned to use its reserve forces and has implications  for the amount and types of equipment that Army National Guard units  will need over time. Historically, Army National Guard units have been  provided only a portion of the equipment they needed to train for their  wartime missions because they were generally expected to deploy after  active units. However, current military operations have called for the Army  National Guard to supply forces to meet a continuing demand for fully  equipped units, a demand the Army National Guard met through transfers  of equipment to deploying units and which undermined the readiness of  nondeployed units. Under the rotational force concept, the Army would  provide increasing amounts of equipment to units as they move through  training phases and near readiness for potential deployment so they would  be ready to respond quickly with fully equipped forces if needed. However,  the Army has not yet finalized equipping requirements for Army National  Guard units as they progress through the rotational cycle. In addition, it is  not clear how the equipment needed to support units in the new rotational  cycle will affect the types and quantities of items available for modular  conversions and affect the pace of the Army National Guard’s  transformation. Without firm decisions as to requirements for both the  new modular structure and rotational force model and a plan that  integrates requirements, the Army and Army National Guard are not in the  best position to develop complete cost estimates or to determine whether  the modular and rotational initiatives are working together to reach the  goal of improving Army National Guard readiness.
While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units according  to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational force model,  it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items required in each  phase. Under this proposal the Army National Guard will have three types  of equipment sets: a baseline set, a training set, and a deployment set. The  baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the  equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount  called for in the unit design, but plans call for it to provide at least the  equipment Guard units need for domestic missions. Training sets would  include more of the equipment units will need to be ready for deployment,  but units would share the equipment that would be located at training sites  throughout the country, so the equipment would not be readily available  for units’ state or homeland missions. The deployment set would include  all equipment needed for deployment including theater specific equipment,  items provided through operational needs statements, and equipment from  Army prepositioned stock. At the time of this report, the Army was still  developing the proposals for what would be included in the three  equipment sets and planned to publish the final requirements in December  2005.
Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged in operations  or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular conversions. As a  result, the requirements of ongoing operations will continue to drain the  Army National Guard’s equipment resources and affect the pace at which  equipment will be available for nondeployed units to transform to their  new design. At the present time, it is not clear how the equipment  requirements associated with supporting deployment under the new  rotational readiness cycle will affect the types and quantities of equipment  available to convert the Army National Guard to a modular force. Until the  near-term requirements for the rotational force and long-term  requirements for a modular force are fully defined, the Army and Army  National Guard will not be in a position to prioritize funding to achieve  readiness goals in the near and long term. Further, although Army leaders  have made it a priority to ensure that Army National Guard units have the  equipment they need to continue to perform their domestic missions, it is  not possible to assess whether units will have the equipment they need  until unit designs and training set configurations are finalized and  homeland defense equipment requirements are known.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Evolving equipment requirements for the Global War on Terrorism have  challenged the Army National Guard in equipping its units for deployment  while trying to maintain the readiness of its nondeployed force for training  and future missions. While strategies such as transferring needed  equipment from nondeploying units to ready deploying units, completing  operational needs statements, and leaving equipment overseas when  Guard units return home have helped to equip deploying units, these  strategies may not be sustainable in the long term, especially as the  Guard’s equipment inventories continue to diminish. In the meantime, as  the Army National Guard’s equipment stocks are depleted, risks to its  ability to perform future overseas and domestic missions increase.
The Army’s lack of accountability over the Guard’s equipment stocks  retained in theater has created a situation in which deploying Guard units  face considerable uncertainty about what equipment they need to bring  overseas and what equipment they will have for training when they return  from deployment. DOD Directive 1225.6 requires a plan to replace reserve  component equipment that is transferred to the active component, but the  Army has not prepared these plans. Without a replacement plan, the Army  National Guard faces depleted stocks of some key equipment items  needed to maintain readiness and is unable to plan for how it will equip  the force for future missions.
Supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National  Guard equipment inventories, which will likely delay the pace of its  transformation to a modular force. Further, current modular plans for the  Guard’s conversion will not provide for equipping Guard units to the less  modern modified design and there are no plans to equip the Guard for the  design the Army found as capable as current brigades. As a result, Guard  units will continue to face equipment shortages and have to use older  equipment than their active counterparts. If units are not comparable, the  Army National Guard will have to continue its current practice of  transferring equipment to fill the shortfalls in deploying units, thereby  undermining the readiness of nondeployed forces. With lower readiness of  Guard forces, the nation faces increased risk to future overseas  operations, unplanned contingencies, and the homeland missions the  Guard may be called upon to support.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that  addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global  War on Terrorism and addresses how the Army will transition from short- term equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. This plan  should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it complies with  existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component equipment  readiness and provide a plan to replace depleted stocks resulting from  equipment transferred to the active Army, so that the Guard can plan for  equipping the force for future missions.
We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary  of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective  integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model and  modular force initiatives. This plan should include:  the specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding strategy  for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force and the  extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of equipment and  equipment levels as the active modular units,    an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard’s units will need for  their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle, and    how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if full  funding is not provided on the expected timeline.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written  comments on a draft of this report.  The department agreed with our  recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement them.    DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.  DOD also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan and  funding strategy to Congress that addresses the equipment needs of the  Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism, specifically  addressing how the Army will transition from its short-term equipping  measures to long-term equipping solutions.  In its comments, DOD said  that the Army needs to determine how Army National Guard forces will be  equipped to meet state disaster response and potential homeland defense  requirements as well as federal missions and include these requirements in  its resource priorities.  DOD also said that the Army is working to  implement stricter accountability over equipment currently left in theater  and to comply with DOD guidelines which require replacement plans for  these items.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan  to Congress that details the effective integration of the Army National  Guard into the Army’s rotational force model and modular force  initiatives.  DOD said that the Army plans to develop resourcing  alternatives to mitigate potential risks should full funding for  transformation initiatives not be realized.  DOD also agreed that readiness  goals for the Army National Guard in the 6-year rotational model need to  be established and that the Army’s equipping strategy for the Army  National Guard must include the resources required to be prepared to  carry out both their federal and state missions.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days  from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of  Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and  the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available  at no charge on the GAO web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed  documentation and interviewed officials from the Army National Guard,  the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, and the Office of  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. We supplemented  this information with visits to the United States Army Forces Command,  the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of  the United States. We also developed case studies of two units: the 30th  Brigade Combat Team located in North Carolina and the 48th Brigade  Combat Team in Georgia. These states were chosen to provide  representative examples of how Army National Guard units were prepared  for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in support of the Global War  on Terrorism. The 30th Brigade Combat Team was one of the first National  Guard units to deploy for Operation Iraqi Freedom and had just returned  from deployment when we visited in March 2005. The 48th Brigade  Combat Team was preparing for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom  at the time of our visit in April 2005. In both states we met with unit  logistics staff who had visibility over how the unit prepared for  deployment.
To examine the extent to which Army National Guard units have the  equipment needed for the Global War on Terrorism, we obtained and  analyzed data on critical shortages and the types and quantities of  equipment transferred from nondeployed units to deploying units from the  National Guard Bureau and our two case study states. Additionally, we  supplemented these data with interviews, briefings, and documentation  from officials at the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army,  the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the  U.S. Army Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component  Command, and the First Army of the United States. We did not examine  whether shortages of particular items were the result of industrial base  issues. To understand the processes the Army adapted to equip units as  equipment requirements evolved for the Global War on Terrorism, we  interviewed officials from and analyzed data provided by the 30th Brigade  Combat Team in North Carolina, the 48th Brigade Combat Team in  Georgia, the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, the U.S.  Army Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command,  and the First Army of the United States.
To assess the Army National Guard equipment retained in theater, we  analyzed Army National Guard data and the Guard’s estimate of the cost to  replace the equipment if it is not returned. Additionally, we interviewed  officials and reviewed documentation and data from the Army National  Guard, Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Army Forces Command, and the  Coalition Forces Land Component Command about the lack of reliable  data and whether any plans exist to replace the Guard’s equipment. We  supplemented data on how much of the Army National Guard’s equipment  has been left in theater with briefings and reviewed internal Army  messages regarding the accountability and visibility of this equipment.
To evaluate how the Army National Guard has been integrated into the  Army’s plans for a modular structure and force generation model, we  interviewed officials at the Army National Guard, the Department of the  Army, and U.S. Army Forces Command. We reviewed documents such as  the Army Campaign Plan, the Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army’s  force generation model, and numerous briefings on the Army’s plans for a  modular force and the new force generation model. Additionally, we  interviewed Guard officials from both of our case study states about the  units’ plans to convert to modular force given Army time frames and cost  estimates.
To assess the reliability of data used during the course of this engagement,  we interviewed data sources about how they ensured the accuracy of their  data and reviewed their data collection methods, standard operating  procedures, and other internal control measures. In addition, we reviewed  available data for inconsistencies, and, when applicable, performed  computer testing to assess data reliability. We determined that the data  were sufficient to answer each of our objectives.
We conducted our review between December 2004 and August 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant  Director; Frank Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; Tina  Morgan Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and Suzanne  Wren also made major contributions to this report.