Freight Railroad Safety: Hours of Service Changes Have Increased Rest Time, but More Can Be Done to Address Fatigue Risks
Published: 2011-09-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) overhauled requirements for how much time certain freight railroad workers can spend on the job (called "hours of service"). Changes included limiting the number of consecutive days on duty before rest is required, increasing minimum rest time from 8 to 10 hours, and requiring rest time to be undisturbed. RSIA also provided for pilot projects and waivers. RSIA's changes became effective for freight railroads in July 2009. GAO was asked to assess (1) the impact of these changes on covered train and engine (T&E) employees, including implications for fatigue, (2) the impact of the changes on the rail industry, and (3) actions the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has taken to oversee compliance with hours of service requirements and implement RSIA provisions for pilot projects and waivers. To perform this work, GAO analyzed covered employee work schedules and used models to assess fatigue, surveyed the railroad industry, analyzed FRA inspection and enforcement data, and interviewed federal and railroad officials as well as fatigue and sleep experts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: According to GAO's analysis of covered employee work schedules, RSIA's requirements led to changed work schedules, increased rest time, and reduced risk of fatigue for covered T&E employees. RSIA's consecutive work day limits and rest requirements contributed to work schedule changes and increases in rest time. Increased rest time also led to equivalent decreases in the hours that covered employees worked. Overall, GAO found, using an FRA-validated fatigue model, that the time covered employees spent working at a high risk of fatigue-- a level associated with reduced alertness and an increased risk of errors and accidents--decreased by about 29 percent for employees of class I railroads (those with the largest revenues) and by about 36 percent for employees of selected class II railroads (those with smaller revenues). GAO's analysis also shows that there are further opportunities to reduce fatigue risk. Specifically, RSIA's changes did not result in material decreases in night work, yet scientific literature and GAO's analysis show night work represents a major factor in fatigue risk. As might be expected from changes aimed at improving safety by reducing covered employee fatigue, the railroad industry reported that RSIA's hours of service changes had operational and administrative effects on it, some of which increased some railroads' one-time or ongoing costs. GAO did not determine how RSIA's changes affected railroads' earnings; but the act took effect as the economy was starting to recover from the recession that began in late 2008. Through its industry survey and interviews, GAO found that RSIA's changes affected railroad operations, including changes to crew and train schedules and increases in staffing levels. Railroad officials GAO spoke with attributed these changes to RSIA's consecutive work day limits and rest requirements, both of which acted to reduce people's availability to work. To maintain operations while complying with the law, railroad officials told GAO they, among other things, hired new employees or brought employees back from furlough. GAO estimated that adding people--120 to 500 each by some class I railroads--increased these railroads' annual costs by $11 million to $50 million. Administrative effects reported by railroads included a need for railroads to revise their hours of service timekeeping systems. FRA uses a risk-based approach to oversee compliance with hours of service and other safety requirements, analyzing inspection and accident data to help target inspections to activities where noncompliance is associated with a greater risk of accidents. GAO's analysis of inspection and enforcement data for the years before RSIA took effect and for the following year show it is too early to determine if FRA has changed the priority it assigns to overseeing hours of service requirements or if a change in priority is warranted. FRA has not been able to implement RSIA-required pilot projects because no railroads have chosen to participate. Nor has it approved voluntary pilot projects designed to test the fatigue-reduction potential of alternatives to RSIA requirements. FRA has approved petitions for waivers of compliance with hours of service requirements for some railroads, but is not required by RSIA to collect data on the safety effects of the approved alternatives. Data from pilot projects--if implemented-- and waivers could be used to improve FRA's assessment of fatigue issues. FRA should, among other things, assess the fatigue risk of work performed during night hours and develop data from pilot projects and waivers to help assess fatigue issues. The Department of Transportation raised concerns about findings related to the oversight process and provided additional clarifying information. Based in part on this additional information, GAO withdrew part of a recommendation. GAO also made other clarifications in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Railroads make important contributions to the nation’s economy.  Currently, they account for about 40 percent of all freight carried (as  measured by ton-miles), and, according to the Department of  Transportation (DOT), the demand for freight rail service is expected to  increase 88 percent by 2035. Although railroad safety has improved in  recent years—as evidenced by a nearly 40-percent decline in accidents  from 2001 to 2010—accidents can have significant consequences,  causing deaths, injuries, and property damage. Fatigue can be a factor in  accidents, as in July 2005, when two freight trains collided head-on in  Mississippi, resulting in the deaths of 4 crew members and over $9.5  million in property damages.
To improve railroad safety by reducing the potential for fatigue, laws  dating as far back as 1907 have limited the amount of time that railroads  may require or allow certain railroad employees to remain on duty (called  “hours of service”) and have established minimum rest times between  work shifts. In October 2008, Congress passed the Rail Safety  Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA), which called for an extensive overhaul  of railroad safety requirements, including hours of service requirements.  RSIA generally retained the maximum time train and signal employees  may remain on duty (12 hours), but increased the minimum rest time  between work shifts from 8 hours to 10 hours and limited the number of  consecutive days that train employees may work before having to take a  minimum rest period, among other requirements.  RSIA also required the  Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary) to conduct pilot projects to  analyze practices that may be used to reduce fatigue for train and engine  (T&E) employees and allowed for the approval of waivers of one of the  new hours of service requirements, or for other requirements as part of an  approved pilot project. This authority has been delegated to the Federal  Railroad Administrator (FRA). The new hours of service requirements  became effective for freight railroads in July 2009.
You asked us to review the safety and other impacts of the new hours of  service requirements that were established in RSIA and the federal  government’s role in monitoring and enforcing the new rules. This report  discusses the (1) impacts of the hours of service changes on the covered  T&E workforce, including potential impacts on fatigue, (2) operational and  administrative impacts of the hours of service changes on the railroad  industry, and (3) actions taken by FRA to oversee compliance with hours  of service requirements and implement RSIA provisions related to hours  of service pilot projects and waivers. At the time of our work, hours of  service requirements were still being developed for train employees in the  commuter and intercity passenger rail industry, which DOT issued in  August 2011. Consequently, this report focuses on freight railroad hours  of service issues.
To address the impacts of the hours of service changes on the covered  T&E workforce, including potential impacts on fatigue, we reviewed  literature related to work and rest schedules and their relationship to  fatigue and interviewed experts who had conducted research on fatigue  and work. We then analyzed work schedule data for covered T&E  employees for May 2008 and May 2010. We selected these months to  represent time periods before and after RSIA’s implementation and to  avoid the time period during which the economic recession that began in  late 2008 was causing a rapid contraction in the rail industry. We  discussed the time frames for our analysis with railroad officials, and they  generally agreed with our selection. Our analysis covered work schedules  for T&E employees at all 7 class I railroads and 6 class II railroads that  use electronic hours of service recordkeeping systems. To assist in this  analysis, we acquired two models that FRA has validated for use in  assessing potential fatigue levels of covered railroad workers—the  Fatigue Audit InterDyneTM (FAID) model and the Fatigue Avoidance  Scheduling ToolTM (FAST). To help analyze RSIA’s effects on the covered  workforce at class III railroads, we conducted focused interviews with 69  class III railroads. To address the operational and administrative impacts  of RSIA’s hours of service changes on the railroad industry, we surveyed  all class I and class II railroads and 232 class III railroads. We received  responses from all 7 class I railroads, 14 of 15 class II railroads, and 163  of 232 class III railroads, for an overall response rate of 72 percent. We  also interviewed federal, railroad, and railroad trade association officials,  as well as rail labor representatives.  Unless otherwise specified, all  statistics or coefficient estimates mentioned throughout this report are  significantly different from zero with probability of error less than 0.05. To  address actions taken by FRA to oversee hours of service compliance  and to implement RSIA provisions related to pilot projects and waivers,  we reviewed legislation, regulations, and policy documents and analyzed  FRA data on hours of service inspection and enforcement actions. We  also reviewed information on FRA’s actions to implement pilot projects  related to hours of service issues and analyzed data on petitions for  waivers of hours of service requirements and their status. Finally, we  discussed inspection and enforcement issues with officials in FRA  headquarters and regional offices, and with railroad officials from class I,  II, and III railroads. (For more information on our objectives, scope, and  methodology, see app. I, and for the results of our railroad industry  survey, see GAO-11-894SP.)
We conducted this performance audit from April 2010 to September 2011  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Freight railroads are an important component of the nation’s  transportation system, operating over 700 million train-miles in 2010. The  freight railroad industry is primarily composed of 7 large railroads (called  class I railroads) and about 570 smaller class II and III railroads. Within  the industry, class I railroads predominate, representing about 93 percent  of total freight revenue and about 68 percent of total rail mileage operated  in the United States in 2009. Class II and III railroads include regional and  short line railroads. Regional railroads typically operate 400 to 650 miles  of track spanning several states, while short line railroads typically  perform point-to-point service over short distances. According to the  American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), the  average length of short line service is 90 miles, and over 58 percent of  short line carriers connect with more than 1 class I railroad. As the  association points out, short line railroads generally operate the first mile  and last mile of U.S. freight rail commerce.
Because railroads operate across millions of train-miles every year, safety  is an important concern. In general, railroad safety has improved over the  last 10 years. For example, the approximately 1,800 freight train  accidents reported to FRA in 2010 represents a decrease of nearly 40  percent from the approximately 3,000 train accidents reported in 2001.  Similarly, the number of accidents per million train-miles for all railroads  reported to FRA decreased to 2.6 in 2010 from 4.2 in 2001 (see fig. 1).  Yet this decline is not equal for railroads of all sizes: In 2010, the rate  reported for class III railroads, 7.1 accidents per million train-miles, was  more than twice the rate reported for all railroads. FRA attributed the  difference in accident rates to differences in operations between larger  railroads (which generally operate over longer distances and perform little  switching) and smaller ones (which generally operate over shorter  distances and perform frequent switching). Because RSIA was passed  by Congress in late 2008, FRA officials told us it is too early to tell what  effect, if any, requirements contained in the law may have had on railroad  accident rates. They said it may well take years to identify any particular  effects.
In this report, we do not attempt to draw any correlations between safety outcomes  (such as changes in accident rates) and changes to hours of service requirements  contained in RSIA. accidents (see fig. 2). As for train accidents overall, the rate for  accidents caused by human factors has generally decreased over the last  10 years, and again, the rate is higher for class III railroads than for either  class I or class II railroads (see fig. 3). Although there is a general  downward trend, FRA attributed the decrease since 2008 to changes it  made that year to certain safety regulations to increase railroads’  accountability for implementing and complying with sound operating  procedures. For example, as of January 1, 2009, every railroad was to  have a written program of operational tests and inspections in effect, and  the programs were to emphasize those operating rules that cause or are  likely to cause the most accidents and incidents.
subsections: section_title: Description
paragraphs: 12 consecutive hours of time on duty or 12  nonconsecutive hours on duty if broken by an  interim release of at least 4 consecutive hours, in  a 24-hour period that begins at the beginning of  the duty tour.
12 consecutive hours of time on duty or 12  nonconsecutive hours on duty if broken by an  interim release of at least 4 consecutive hours  uninterrupted by communication from the  railroad likely to disturb rest, in a 24-hour period  that begins at the beginning of the duty tour.
May not be on duty as a train employee after  initiating an on-duty period on 6 consecutive  days without 48 consecutive hours off duty free  from any service for any rail carrier at the  employee’s home terminal. Employees are  permitted to initiate a 7th consecutive day when  the employee ends the 6th consecutive day at  the away-from-home terminal, as part of a pilot  project, or as part of a grandfathered collectively  bargained arrangement.
Railroads permitted to communicate with  covered employees during rest time though  some communications may be considered  service for the railroad.
A railroad may not communicate with covered  employees during the statutory minimum off-duty  period of 10 consecutive hours, except in cases  of emergency. If an employee’s rest is disturbed,  then the statutory minimum off-duty period  begins again from the point of interruption.
Limited to 276 hours of time on duty, in  deadhead transportation to a point of final  release, or any other mandatory activity for the  railroad carrier during a calendar month.
8 consecutive hours (10 consecutive hours if  time on duty reaches 12 consecutive hours).
10 consecutive hours of time off duty free from  communication from the railroad likely to disturb  rest, with additional time off duty if on-duty time  plus time in or awaiting deadhead transportation  to final release exceeds 12 hours; 48  consecutive hours off duty, free from any service  for any railroad carrier, after initiating an on-duty  period for 6 consecutive days. Covered  employees may initiate a 7th consecutive day of  service if the end of a 6th day of service was at  an away-from-home terminal as part of a pilot  project, or as part of a grandfathered collectively  bargained arrangement. If 7 consecutive days  are permitted, mandatory off-duty period  extended to 72 consecutive hours.
Individual railroads are primarily responsible for their own safe operation.  However, FRA is the primary federal agency responsible for formulating  railroad safety policies and regulations and for monitoring and enforcing  railroads’ compliance with hours of service and other requirements. FRA  has issued statutory interpretations related to covered freight railroad  employees’ duty and rest time, as well as regulations governing hours of  service recordkeeping. FRA has also adopted what it views as a data- driven, risk-based approach to monitoring and enforcement. Under the  National Rail Safety Action plan, implemented between 2005 and 2008,  FRA used accident, incident, and other safety data to establish a  framework to direct its regulatory and compliance efforts at the highest  priority risks. The plan outlines a number of initiatives aimed at reducing  the main types of train accidents, including those caused by human  factors or track defects. One of these initiatives, the National Inspection  Plan (NIP), uses accident and inspection data to focus inspections on  areas that, according to the data, are likely to have safety problems  before a serious accident occurs. The NIP provides guidance to each of  FRA’s eight regional offices on how its inspection resources should be  allocated. Additionally, the Office of Railroad Safety issues the National  Safety Program Plan, which provides a means of planning special- emphasis activities, such as inspection activities and initiatives that cross  regional boundaries and are directed at issues of concern for railroads  operating in multiple regions.
To provide oversight, FRA conducts periodic inspections and takes  enforcement action.    FRA inspections address five areas, called disciplines—operating  practices, track, hazardous materials, signal and train control, and  motive power and equipment (such as locomotives and freight rail  cars). Each inspection discipline includes a number of activities  related to specific requirements. For example, inspectors in the  operating practices discipline—who perform about 80 percent of hours  of service inspections—assess railroads’ compliance with hours of  service requirements for train and dispatching service employees.  Typically, inspections are conducted at railroads’ operating sites. For  example, inspections of hours of service recordkeeping and  inspections for compliance with hours of service limitations take place  at duty stations or facilities where records are maintained.   To take enforcement action, FRA inspectors may cite violations and  recommend assessment of civil penalties. FRA’s enforcement  policy, which is designed to concentrate enforcement efforts on the  areas with the greatest potential safety benefits, specifies that before  assessing penalties, inspectors should consider the seriousness of  the condition or act, the potential safety hazards, and the current level  of compliance of the railroad, among other things. FRA has statutory  authority to assess civil penalties in the range of $650 (minimum) to  $25,000 (ordinary maximum) for ordinary violations of its regulations.  FRA may assess a penalty at the statutory aggravated maximum  penalty of $100,000 “when a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of  repeated violations has caused an imminent hazard of death or injury  to individuals, or has caused death or injury.”
In addition to these activities, FRA conducts other types of safety  oversight aimed at reducing train accidents, such as monitoring railroad  safety data, investigating accidents, and reviewing and investigating  complaints, as well as providing training for small railroads. Furthermore,  FRA funds research and development to support its safety oversight, by,  for example, assisting in the development of new regulations and revision  of existing regulations. FRA also has authority to review and approve  petitions for waivers of compliance with safety requirements, including  exemptions from the hours of service laws for railroads with 15 or fewer  covered service employees and waivers of one requirement of the hours  of service law, the consecutive day work limits. Finally, FRA is  authorized to approve pilot projects that may be conducted to  demonstrate the potential safety benefits of alternatives to current safety  requirements.
As of July 2011, FRA had 592 rail safety positions, including about 400  inspectors. In addition, about 170 state inspectors work with FRA as part  of the State Rail Safety Participation Program. As of 2009, the railroad  industry had about 170,000 employees, 140,000 miles of track in  operation, and over 1.3 million freight rail cars. Overall, FRA inspects  about 0.2 percent of railroad operations each year. Its goal is to inspect  all railroads at least once a year, but it does not always assess a  railroad’s compliance with all activities related to the requirements in each  discipline during each inspection.
When the major hours of service changes in RSIA took effect in July  2009, the nation was in the midst of a serious economic recession, and  the railroad industry was experiencing decreases in revenues, traffic, and  staffing levels. For example, operating revenues for class I railroads  decreased from $61.2 billion in 2008 to $47.8 billion in 2009 before  recovering to $58.4 billion in 2010. Revenue ton-miles for class I  railroads followed a similar pattern, decreasing from 1.8 billion in 2008 to  1.5 billion in 2009 before increasing to 1.7 billion in 2010. In addition, the  number of class I railroad T&E employees decreased from about 65,000  in December 2008 to just under 57,000 in December 2009 before  increasing again to about 62,000 in December 2010.
section_title: RSIA’s Requirements Increased Rest Time and Decreased Fatigue Risk While Leaving Opportunities for Further Reductions in Fatigue Risk from Night Work
subsections: section_title: New Hours of Service Requirements Have Led to Changes in Covered T&E Employees’ Work Schedules and Increased Rest Opportunity While Decreasing Hours Worked
paragraphs: RSIA’s new hours of service requirements have led to changes in  covered T&E employees’ work schedules. Both the limits on consecutive  work days without required rest (referred to hereafter as consecutive work  day limits) and the new requirements for rest, including the requirements  for increasing the minimum rest at the end of a shift from 8 to 10 hours,  and for this rest to occur during the 24 hours before the start of a new  shift and be undisturbed (referred to hereafter as the increased rest  requirements) have contributed to the schedule changes. Factors other  than RSIA, such as the economic recession, could have played a role in  these changes. We attempted to mitigate for the effects of the economic  conditions by avoiding choosing months during which the demand for rail  service was rapidly declining and we also only analyzed employees that  worked in both May 2008 and May 2010 under the assumption that these  employees would likely be performing similar work.
Class I and II railroad officials we spoke with said RSIA’s consecutive  work day limits have led some railroads generally to substitute a schedule  with 5 consecutive work days followed by 48 hours of rest, known as a “5  by 2” schedule, for the previously more common schedule with 6  consecutive work days followed by 24 hours of rest, known as a “6 by 1”  schedule. Now, use of the 6 by 1 schedule requires an FRA-approved  waiver of compliance with hours of service requirements. For affected  employees, this schedule change means that during the course of a 7- day period, a day of rest has taken the place of a day of work. RSIA’s  requirements for increased rest also contributed to the schedule changes.  Although RSIA made 10 hours of rest mandatory, some railroad officials  we spoke with said they had instituted 10-hour rest periods for covered  T&E employees before RSIA took effect. However, this policy generally  applied only at home terminals, not at away-from-home terminals.  Railroad officials told us the work schedule changes responded to RSIA  provisions and also addressed economic factors.
Our analysis of hours worked by the same class I covered T&E  employees and covered T&E employees of the participating class II  railroads showed a per-employee increase of about 10 hours in the time  available for rest for the class I employees in May 2010 compared with  May 2008 and a per-employee increase of about 17 hours for the class II  employees in May 2010 compared with May 2008. This increase is  statistically significant. The extent to which covered employees used the  additional time to rest is unknown. Railroad officials told us that some  employees have used the extra rest time to work a second job or to do  other activities that may not involve rest. For example, an official with a  class III railroad told us many of its covered T&E employees have farms  that they work when they are not working on the railroad.
The increased time available for rest under RSIA also led covered T&E  employees to work fewer hours. The same analysis that we used to  determine the increase in available rest time showed the same per- employee decrease in hours worked in May 2010 compared with May  2008—about 10 hours for class I employees and about 17 hours for the  selected class II employees—both of which are a statistically significant  change. For both the class I and class II covered T&E employees  included in our analysis, the total hours worked per employee decreased  from 156 in May 2008 to about 146 in May 2010 for class I employees  and from 169 in May 2008 to about 153 in May 2010 for class II  employees. In addition, for class I covered T&E employees the total  number of work shifts (which includes covered and noncovered service  for the railroad) per employee decreased from 18 in May 2008 to 17 in  May 2010 and class II covered T&E employees saw a decrease from 19  in May 2008 to 18 in May 2010.
Still another effect of RSIA’s increase in rest time may be an increase in  the amount of time some covered T&E employees spent at terminals  other than their home terminal. In responding to our rail industry survey, 6  out of 7 class I railroads reported an increase in the time affected  employees spent at away-from-home terminals. In addition, 7 of 14 class  II railroads reported that they had away-from-home operations, and of  these, 4 reported an increase in the time spent away from home. For the  most part, increased time spent away from home was not an issue for the  153 class III railroads that responded to this question in our survey. Of  these 153 class III railroads, 10 reported an increase in time at away- from-home terminals for their covered employees. According to both class  I railroad and rail labor officials we spoke with, some of the affected  covered employees are not happy with the increased time away-from- home, and the officials suggested that the undisturbed rest requirement  be reduced from 10 hours to 8 hours at away-from-home terminals to  allow covered employees to return home sooner.
section_title: Hours of Service Changes Have Generally Reduced Fatigue Potential for Covered T&E Employees
paragraphs: Initial indications are that RSIA’s changes generally reduced the fatigue  potential for covered T&E employees. According to our analysis of  covered T&E employee work schedules, the potential for covered  employees to work at high risk of fatigue—a level associated with  reduced alertness and an increased risk of errors and accidents— decreased after RSIA took effect. More specifically, our analysis of the  May 2008 and May 2010 work schedules for class I and class II covered  T&E employees using an FRA-validated fatigue model showed that the  percentage of total time worked at high risk of fatigue decreased by 29  percent (3 percentage points) for the class I employees and 36 percent (5  percentage points) for the class II employees (see fig. 4). Further  information on fatigue science and our use of fatigue models appears in  appendix II.
RSIA’s consecutive work day limits and requirement for 10 hours  undisturbed rest time both may have contributed to the reductions in  work-related fatigue indicated by our analysis.    Effects of consecutive work day limits on fatigue. In its March 10,  2011, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regulatory Impact Analysis on  commuter and intercity passenger rail hours of service requirements,  FRA stated that working an increasing number of consecutive days  tends to result in reduced sleep as an employee sacrifices time for  sleep to attend to personal activities. This tendency would apply to  both freight and passenger railroads. FRA’s proposed requirements  for limiting consecutive days of work for commuter and intercity  passenger rail covered T&E employees are based on research from  other industries that shows some evidence of increased fatigue risk  over successive workdays. In FRA’s view, the proposed consecutive  work day limits for commuter and intercity passenger rail covered  employees were reasonable and necessary because of the increased  fatigue risk from working a high number of consecutive days without  rest. Rail labor representatives we spoke with also told us they see  RSIA’s consecutive work day limits as beneficial because they provide  a break for employees in their work schedules.   Effects on fatigue of RSIA’s increased rest requirements. As noted  above, the total time available for rest has increased offering more  opportunity for employees to rest. In addition RSIA’s requirement that  rest be undisturbed may be an additional benefit for employees rest.  According to rail labor representatives we spoke with, crew calls from  railroads during employees’ rest periods were a concern before RSIA  took effect. The representatives told us that covered employees had  complained to them about unnecessary contact by railroads during  their rest periods and said that this contact had been disruptive to  their rest. Since RSIA has taken effect, they said, such complaints  have virtually ceased. It is still early in the implementation process, yet  class I railroad officials and rail labor officials we spoke with said that  RSIA’s requirements, including longer, undisturbed rest time should  contribute to a better rested workforce.
The effects of RSIA’s hours of service changes on fatigue levels for class  III railroads may depend on their operations. We did not analyze class III  covered T&E employee work schedules, since their hours of service and  employee records were largely paper-based. However, interviews with  class III railroads indicated that for some class III railroads, particularly  those that had scheduled daytime operations, fatigue may not have been  an issue prior to RSIA. In interviews, railroad officials with 2 class III  railroads said that fatigue was not an issue for their employees, because  they offered service Monday through Friday during the daytime, with  occasional Saturday service, depending on customer needs. Both of  these railroads had FRA-approved waivers of compliance with hours of  service requirements that permitted 6 by 1 work schedules, so that  periodically scheduling a sixth day of service was not a concern. In  addition, according to these officials, their covered T&E employees  generally travel a maximum of 25 to 50 miles, and their work schedules  always begin and end at the home terminal. In responding to our rail  industry survey, 98 out of 153 (64 percent) of the class III railroads  responded that they had changed crew schedules as a direct result of  RSIA. This change in crew schedules may indicate previous crew  schedules were not compliant with RSIA provisions and changes to the  schedules could have improved fatigue. Again, any improvements would  likely be due in part to RSIA’s consecutive work day limits and increased  rest requirements.
section_title: Opportunities Remain to Address Fatigue Risks from Night Work
paragraphs: Fatigue science has shown that the risk of fatigue is greater for nighttime  work than for daytime work. For example, research on human circadian  rhythms (the natural wake and sleep patterns of the human body) has  shown that people by nature get tired at night and are more likely to have  higher quality, more restorative sleep at night than they are during the  day. Working at night can upset these circadian rhythms and result in  sleep disruption and potential health problems. Fatigue research has  also shown that fatigue increases, or alertness and performance  decrease, during night work and that fatigue risk is substantially greater  for successive night shifts than for successive day shifts.
Eliminating nighttime work in the freight railroad industry would not be  practicable, and RSIA’s requirements had little effect on the amount of  time covered T&E employees work at night. According to our analysis of  the May 2008 and May 2010 work schedules for covered class I and  class II T&E employees, the number of per-employee work hours that  occurred at night for these employees decreased 4 hours per employee  for class I employees and 2 hours for class II employees after RSIA took  effect. In general, the freight railroad industry operates every day of the  year, 24 hours a day. FRA noted in its Regulatory Impact Analysis for the  proposed commuter and intercity passenger rail hours of service rules,  that unlike freight service passenger service may be less affected by night  work fatigue factors because most scheduled commuter and intercity  passenger rail service does not operate during night hours. Additionally,  our analysis of the work schedules for these 2 months showed little  change in the percentage of covered class I T&E employees whose  schedules involved night work—47 percent in May 2008 and 45 percent  in May 2010. For the covered class II T&E employees, that percentage  was the same in both months—34 percent.
Although fatigue science has shown that the risk of fatigue is higher for  night work than for day work, RSIA does not differentiate between the two  in its hours of service requirements for freight railroads. FRA, however,  has differentiated between the two when approving petitions for waivers  of compliance with hours of service requirements. For example, when  railroads have petitioned for a waiver of compliance with hours of service  requirements to allow their employees to work a 6 by 1 schedule with  both day and night shifts, FRA has approved such a schedule for daytime  shifts, but not for shifts that include the hours between midnight and 6  a.m. FRA does not approve these shifts because of the higher risk of  fatigue associated with them. FRA has also differentiated between day  and night work in the final hours of service rules for covered train  employees providing commuter and intercity passenger rail  transportation. Specifically, the rule would not require FRA review and  approval, including an assessment of fatigue risk, for work schedules that  fall within the parameters of preapproved daytime work schedule  templates (generally between 4 a.m. and 8 p.m.). Schedules that include  work between 8 p.m. and 4 a.m., must generally be analyzed using an  FRA approved fatigue model to assess the potential fatigue risk. FRA  review and approval is needed on schedules where fatigue risk is  deemed too great.  For such schedules, railroads must generally take  mitigating action to bring the risk from fatigue to an acceptable level.  Additionally, limitations are placed on the number of consecutive days  that a covered commuter or intercity passenger railroad T&E employee  may work, with the limitations depending on the time of day of the  assignments within the series of consecutive days. In making this  distinction between nighttime and daytime work assignments, FRA has  taken into account the fact that work at night presents a greater risk of  fatigue.
Our analysis of the class I and selected class II covered T&E employee  work schedules for May 2008 and May 2010 shows that the extent that  employees worked hours at night was highly correlated with employees  spending at least 20 percent or more of their work time at high risk of  fatigue. In our analysis the proportion of employees with 20 percent or  more of their work time at high risk of fatigue for class I T&E covered  employees decreased from 14 percent in May 2008 to 10 percent in May  2010 and from 18 percent in May 2008 to 12 percent in May 2010 for  participating class II railroad covered T&E employees. Even though  fatigue risk was reduced after the implementation of the new hours of  service requirements under RSIA, our findings on the correlation between  night work and work hours spent at high risk of fatigue—along with the  fatigue model results discussed previously that showed the decline in  high risk of fatigue based on total hours worked —indicate that because  RSIA did not directly limit the hours worked at night or incorporate night  work into the freight requirements, fatigue might not be addressed under  the new requirements to the fullest extent possible. Taking hours worked  at night into consideration for freight hours of service requirements could  hold promise for mitigating the risk of fatigue.
In addition to analyzing actual work schedules from the class I and class  II railroad T&E employees, we analyzed three consecutive sets of two  hypothetical 6 by 2 work schedules—the maximum number of  consecutive work days allowed under RSIA when not returning home  from an away-from-home terminal—using a fatigue model to further  assess the effects of night work on fatigue. One schedule included only  daytime hours with 10 hour shifts from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. and the other  included nighttime hours with 10 hour shifts from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.  According to our analysis, the percentage of time at high risk of fatigue  was greater for the hypothetical night work schedule than for the  hypothetical day work schedule. The day work schedule had no time  spent at high risk of fatigue, while the night work schedule had a total of  67 hours, or 37 percent of total work time, spent at high risk of fatigue.  Furthermore, the risk of fatigue for the nighttime work schedule was high  for all but one of the work days in the all-night-work schedule, while no  work day in the all-day-work schedule fell into the high risk category (see  fig. 5). The peak fatigue score shown in the figure is the highest fatigue  score achieved on a work schedule day analyzed by the fatigue model.   This does not mean the whole scheduled work time was spent working at  the peak fatigue level.  For example, on the nighttime hours schedule on  day 2 according to the model example employee 2 would have spent 32  minutes working at high risk of fatigue with a peak fatigue score of 72.   However, according to the model output on day 6 example employee 2  spent 8 hours 6 minutes out of a 10 hour shift working at high risk of  fatigue with a peak fatigue score of 119. As our analysis of these  hypothetical schedules indicates, consecutive daytime shifts may present  a lower risk of fatigue than consecutive nighttime shifts.
section_title: New Hours of Service Requirements Have Led to Operational and Administrative Changes That Have Increased Some Railroads’ Costs
subsections: section_title: Operational Changes Have Affected Railroads’ Scheduling, Staffing, and Customer Service
paragraphs: According to our survey results, RSIA’s hours of service requirements led  to a number of effects on railroads’ operations, as would be expected with  any significant change in statutory or regulatory requirements aimed at  improving safety by reducing covered employee fatigue. These effects  included changes in how crews and trains are scheduled, increases in  staffing levels to maintain operations, and reductions in some railroads’  ability to meet customer needs. In general, according to our survey  results, smaller railroads found some of the changes more burdensome  than did larger railroads. In addition, some railroads incurred one-time or  ongoing financial costs, or both, to implement the changes.
According to our survey results, RSIA’s hours of service requirements— especially its consecutive work day limits and increased rest  requirements—substantially changed the way railroads schedule crews.  For example, all 7 class I, 8 of 14 class II (about 57 percent), and 98 of  152 class III (about 64 percent) railroads reported changing crew  schedules as a direct result of RSIA’s hours of service requirements.  Such changes would be expected, given the new requirements. Prior to  RSIA, covered T&E employees on some railroads often worked well  beyond 6 or 7 consecutive days. Officials we spoke with at 1 class I  railroad said its train crews often worked 8 consecutive days followed by  3 days off, and officials at another class I railroad said most of its  employees worked 6 consecutive days with 1 day off, although covered  employees often worked 7 days followed by 3 days off or 11 days  followed by 4 days off. According to officials we interviewed at 1 class II  railroad, a small portion of its covered train employees (about 15 percent)  worked up to 22 consecutive days followed by 8 days off. After RSIA,  covered employees could no longer work for more than 6 or 7  consecutive days without taking required rest. According to railroad  officials, the requirement for 48 hours’ rest following 6 consecutive work  days has been particularly challenging, and some officials told us they try  to avoid working employees 6 consecutive days.
Our survey results indicate that the changes in crew schedules led to  changes in train schedules. Specifically, in responding to our survey, 4 of  7 class I railroads reported changing train schedules as a direct result of  RSIA’s hours of service changes, while 5 of 14 (about 36 percent) class II  railroads and just under half (70 of 153) of class III railroads reported  making this change. Changes in train schedules particularly affected  smaller railroads. According to officials we interviewed from 1 class II  railroad, RSIA’s changes, particularly the additional time needed for  employees to return to work, made it difficult to maintain train schedules  and to respond to changes in train operating plans, which are often  caused by factors such as mechanical problems and traffic levels. RSIA’s  changes reduced their flexibility in such situations. An official from  another class II railroad told us that RSIA’s hours of service changes  meant the railroad had to reduce train service from 7 days a week to 6  days because it did not have enough people available to offer service 7  days a week. While this railroad has since hired people and said it  expects to resume 7-day service, it was not able to do so for over a year.  In some instances, train connections were also affected. For example, a  class II railroad official we interviewed said that delays on some of the  company’s long-distance trains, which the official attributed to RSIA’s  changes, led to delays on local trains that connected with the long- distance trains. Officials from another class II railroad said RSIA’s  changes caused them to hold trains out of their rail yard because, until  March 2011, they did not have enough people to handle them.
While RSIA’s consecutive day limits and increased rest requirements  were focused on reducing fatigue and improving safety, a majority of the  railroads responding to our survey reported that the resulting changes in  crew and train schedules imposed burdens on them, and some of these  railroads reported that the changes increased their costs. As shown in  figure 6, the burden on railroads from changing train schedules could be  very great, especially for smaller railroads. Three of the 4 class I railroads  responding to this survey question reported a moderate to substantial  burden, and over 55 percent of the responding class II and III railroads  reported a substantial to very great burden. For example, as officials we  interviewed from a holding company that owns over 30 smaller railroads  said, the burden imposed by changing crew and train schedules was very  great for some railroads—such as those that serve grain producers during  the harvest season—that need to run trains without interruption at certain  seasons to meet demand. According to the officials, RSIA’s consecutive  work day limits and requirement for more rest between shifts make  uninterrupted service like this very difficult to provide. Finally, according to  our survey results, changes to crew and train schedules entailed financial  costs, particularly for class I railroads. Of the 7 class I railroads, 5  reported incurring financial costs from changing crew schedules and 4  reported incurring such costs from changing train schedules. Fewer class  II and III railroads reported incurring such costs, although half (76 of 152)  of the class III railroads that reported changing crew schedules reported  incurring financial costs for doing so. In some cases, these may have  been one-time costs, such as for upgrading hours of service timekeeping  systems to accommodate new crew schedules. In other cases, they may  have been recurring costs, such as for hiring new employees or bringing  employees back from furlough to address issues related to crew or train  schedules (discussed later in this report). Costs for additional staff could  also be related to service increases responding, at least in part, to  improvements in the economy that followed RSIA’s implementation in  July 2009.
In general, we did not ask the railroads we surveyed to identify specific  dollar amounts incurred as a result of RSIA’s hours of service changes or  to indicate how those amounts may have affected railroad earnings or  profits. We did ask the railroads to identify the average annual wages and  benefits for employees hired or brought back from furlough as a result of  RSIA’s changes (discussed later in this report). During our interviews,  some railroad officials told us it was difficult to separate the financial  effects of RSIA’s changes from those of general economic conditions.  Nevertheless, even though we did not determine the specific financial  effects of RSIA’s changes on railroads, it is likely the changes affected  the costs, revenues, and earnings for some railroads, at least temporarily.  As discussed earlier, such effects are not unexpected given the  magnitude of RSIA’s hours of service changes and the many actions  required by railroads to comply with the law.
In implementing RSIA’s hours of service changes to improve safety and  comply with the law, some railroads reported increasing their staffing  levels in response to the changes they made in crew schedules. In  general, according to railroad officials we spoke with, staffing levels  increased with the changes in crew schedules because, with RSIA’s  consecutive work day limits and increased rest requirements, covered  T&E employees were less available to work. More specifically, because of  RSIA’s requirements for 48 instead of 24 hours’ rest after 6 consecutive  days on duty, and for 10 instead of 8 hours’ rest between shifts,  employees were generally less available for work and more staff were  needed to maintain regular operations. For example, officials we spoke  with from a class II railroad said RSIA’s requirements for 10 hours’ rest  between shifts, and for this rest to be undisturbed, could increase the time  that covered employees were unavailable for work by between 2 and 4  hours and meant, for this railroad, that more staff were needed to provide  pre-RSIA service levels. Additionally, according to an official we spoke  with from a class I railroad, RSIA’s changes meant that this railroad  needed about 200 more T&E employees than it previously did to run the  same amount of business. Although we tried to isolate RSIA’s effects on  railroads’ staffing by asking railroads to identify the extent to which they  hired new employees or brought employees back from furlough as a  direct result of RSIA, we cannot exclude the possibility that some of the  changes they reported were also due to improvements in general  economic conditions that took place from 2009 to 2010.
To address staffing needs, railroad officials we spoke with told us they  called on T&E employees without regular crew assignments, hired new  employees, or brought employees back from furlough to help fill the  staffing gaps. T&E employees without regular crew assignments are  listed on what are called extra boards and are on call to meet crew needs  as they arise, giving railroads flexibility to meet staffing needs when  regular crews are not available to work. All 7 class I railroads use extra  boards, and some smaller railroads may also use them. In addition,  railroads reported hiring new people or bringing people back from  furlough. Some railroad officials we spoke with said these people were at  least initially assigned to extra boards. In responding to our survey, 5 of 7  class I and 7 of 14 class II railroads reported they hired or brought T&E  employees back from furlough as a direct result of RSIA’s requirements.
Proportionally, fewer small railroads reported hiring or bringing employees  back from furlough—about 30 percent (46 of 152) of the class III railroads  responding to our survey. In some instances, hiring decisions at smaller  railroads may have reflected broader economic conditions rather than  specific operating needs. For example, an official we spoke with from a  class III railroad said the company was apprehensive about long-term  hiring because, given the risks of a sudden decline in orders, it might  have to lay employees off after investing in their hiring and training.
According to our survey results, the number of T&E employees railroads  hired or brought back from furlough varied and increased some railroads’  costs. Overall, as would be expected, larger railroads reported hiring or  bringing back more employees than smaller railroads. For those railroads  we surveyed that reported hiring or bringing people back from furlough,  the number of people ranged between 120 and 500 each for the 4 class I  railroads, 5 and 40 each for the 7 class II railroads, and 1 and 30 each for  the 45 class III railroads. In hiring or bringing T&E employees back from  furlough, the railroads incurred ongoing financial costs. According to our  estimates, based on the average annual wages and benefits of T&E  employees reported by the railroads we surveyed, the average annual  cost for the 4 class I railroads ranged from about $11 million to $50  million, and for the 7 class II railroads, it ranged from about $350,000 to  $3 million.
While RSIA’s requirements affected some railroads’ need for staff, the  requirements had other effects on staffing as well, including reduced  flexibility in using managers and reduced ability to provide guaranteed  and other work hours to covered employees:    Reduced flexibility to use managers to perform covered and  noncovered service. Our survey results indicated that RSIA’s  changes may have reduced the ability of some managers to perform  covered and noncovered service. Most of the larger railroads we  surveyed—5 of 7 class I railroads and 12 of 14 class II railroads— reported no reductions in the ability of managers to perform covered  service. In contrast, about 36 percent (54 of 151) of class III railroads  reported a reduction in managers’ ability to perform covered service,  and about 30 percent (46 of 151) reported a reduction in managers’  ability to perform noncovered service. In general, this issue is of  particular importance for smaller railroads. ASLRRA officials told us,  that on small railroads, the same person often performs many  different functions and it is not unusual for railroad managers to  operate trains in place of employees who are sick or on vacation in  addition to performing their managerial responsibilities. However, the  officials said, if managers do perform such work, they come under  RSIA’s hours of service limitations, including the monthly cap on total  work hours. All of their work hours, including the time spent  performing both covered and noncovered service, then falls under the  276-hour cap. The officials said, in some instances, this restriction  could prevent managers from performing their regular managerial  work.   Reduced ability to provide guaranteed work hours to covered  employees. Some railroads, generally by collective bargaining  agreement, guarantee a minimum number of work hours or days to  employees over a certain period (e.g., 2 weeks). In some cases, the  railroads do this to retain a certain class of employee, such as T&E  employees. In general, employees are paid for the guaranteed hours  or days whether they perform the work or not. For a railroad, not  providing work during the guaranteed hours may mean having to pay  for work not performed. For an employee, not meeting guaranteed  hours or days may mean fewer hours worked, even though the  employee may be paid for the time not worked. In responding to our  survey, 4 of the 7 class I railroads reported they were not able to meet  guaranteed work hours as a direct result of RSIA’s requirements,  whereas smaller proportions of class II and III railroads reported this  issue (see fig. 7).   Potentially reduced ability to provide work hours to covered  employees each month. RSIA’s monthly cap on total work hours (276  hours) may have altered how railroads are able to use their workforce  and the number of hours employees work. A number of railroad  officials we interviewed said this cap did not affect their company.  However, the majority of railroads we surveyed reported taking  employees temporarily out of service as a direct result of RSIA’s  hours of service changes. This may have resulted from controls  railroads implemented to prevent covered T&E employees from  exceeding the total monthly work hour cap. For example, in follow-up  work on our survey, we learned that all 7 class I railroads established  internal thresholds to monitor employee work hours to ensure that  employees did not exceed this cap. These thresholds ranged from  250 to 264 hours. We did not determine through our survey and  interviews how many T&E employees may have been taken out of  service because of these thresholds. However, the number of  employees reported by our survey respondents as reaching or  exceeding the total monthly work hour cap in any particular month in  2010 was small and ranged from 0 to 26 for all railroads surveyed.  Whether or to what extent the internal thresholds influenced this  number, prevented employees from exceeding the monthly cap, or  limited work hours is unknown.
Some of the labor organizations we spoke with expressed concerns about  how railroads responded to RSIA’s hours of service requirements. For  example, officials we interviewed from one organization that represents  T&E employees said that a significant portion of its membership had  suffered some salary loss from the changes in hours of service  requirements and added that covered employees were not being  scheduled for more than 252 hours of work in a month in order to avoid  reaching or exceeding RSIA’s cap on total monthly work hours. The  officials said this practice can cost employees as much as 24 hours’ pay  in a month. Officials from unions representing conductors, signalmen, and  yardmasters expressed similar concerns. They primarily attributed  reductions in work hours and lost compensation to RSIA’s impact on crew  schedules as well as to the requirement for 10 hours’ undisturbed rest  and the monthly work hour cap. For example, an official with a union  representing yardmasters told us the requirement for 10 hours’  undisturbed rest precludes employees that work in rail yards from working  swing (third) shifts as well as regular shifts 7 days a week and this  restriction deprives employees of work and reduces earning opportunities.  Union officials also told us the internal threshold some railroads use to  address the monthly work hour cap serves as an artificial cap and  essentially deprives employees of additional work hours and earnings.
The changes that some railroads made to implement RSIA’s hours of  service changes and improve safety may also have limited their ability to  provide service and meet customer needs. As figure 8 shows, over half of  all railroads (98 of 174 railroads) responding to our survey question  reported their ability to meet customer needs was reduced as a direct  result of RSIA’s hours of service changes. In particular, class I (4 of 7)  and class III (87 of 153) railroads reported a reduction. Railroad officials  we spoke with largely attributed these effects to RSIA’s consecutive work  day limits and requirements for increased rest. By affecting crew and train  schedules, the officials noted, the requirements have sometimes acted to  limit railroads’ flexibility to provide train service when and where needed,  especially on weekends.
We did not determine the effects of RSIA’s requirements on changes in  railroad customer service, such as whether railroads lost customers or  customers changed modes of transportation following service changes.  RSIA’s focus was on improving railroad safety but effects on customer  service may have occurred. Officials we spoke with at a class II railroad  said that, in some instances, the hours of service requirements have led  to about a 50 percent loss in weekend crew starts and negative effects on  customer service. On weekends, the officials said, some entire industries  do not receive train service because people are not available to operate  the trains. Officials we spoke with at several other smaller railroads also  told us their weekend service had been affected. For some railroads,  reduced customer service may have been temporary. For example, some  railroads have petitioned FRA for waivers of compliance from hours of  service requirements so they will have the flexibility to provide service for  6 days (e.g., Monday through Saturday), followed by 24 hours’ rest rather  than the RSIA-mandated 48 hours, if customer needs dictate. In addition,  hiring new employees or bringing employees back from furlough may  have permitted some railroads to return to service levels that may have  decreased initially because the railroads lacked available employees.  Officials at one class II railroad told us they believed their ability to keep  up with business levels was severely hampered by the lack of covered  employees caused by RSIA’s hours of service changes. To address the  issue, they brought back all their previously furloughed employees and  hired even more covered employees. As a result, by March 2011, the  officials believed the railroad was getting back to crew levels that were  sufficient to meet business needs.
Some shippers and receivers that use rail to meet their transportation  needs told us their service had been affected by RSIA. We did not  formally survey shippers or receivers that use rail to transport their goods  about the possible effects of RSIA’s hours of service changes, but  responses to questions sent out on our behalf by a trade association (the  National Industrial Transportation League) that represents shippers and  receivers of a wide mix of commodities, including steel, paper, and  agricultural products, indicated that the changes had affected some of  them. Of the 28 shippers and receivers that responded to the questions,  10 said their service had been affected by RSIA’s hours of service  changes, and 7 said their weekend service had been affected. Among the  problems with service cited by these shippers and receivers were less  predictable service, train crew shortages, and switches missed because  crews were unavailable or had “timed out on the clock.” The responses  to these customer service problems varied but included increasing rail  fleets, switching to trucks to compensate for rail inefficiencies, and  increasing inventory or adjusting or shutting down production schedules.
section_title: Administrative Changes Involved Recordkeeping Systems and Claims for Lost Work Opportunities
paragraphs: To implement RSIA’s hours of service changes, railroads also reported  making administrative changes. For example, railroads reported  modifying or creating new recordkeeping systems to account for time  covered by hours of service requirements, spending more time reviewing  hours of service records, and handling more claims for lost work  opportunities.
To accommodate RSIA’s new hours of service requirements and create  the records necessary to comply with the law, railroads of all sizes  reported modifying their timekeeping systems or, in some cases, creating  new systems. According to our survey results, most large railroads (all 7  class I railroads and 12 of 14 class II railroads) primarily reprogrammed or  updated their existing timekeeping systems, which are generally  electronic (see fig. 9). Among other things, officials we spoke with at  some railroads said they established ways to track employees’ total work  and limbo or deadhead hours in a month and, in some cases,  incorporated alerts to prevent covered employees from being contacted  during undisturbed rest periods. Designing a way to prevent contact was  sometimes more difficult than expected because, as officials we spoke  with at one class I railroad said, people other than crew schedulers, such  as company doctors, security personnel, and payroll personnel, may try to  contact a covered employee during a day, and the system has to  preclude all such contacts during an undisturbed rest period. In contrast,  many small railroads we surveyed reported creating new timekeeping  systems. Over half (94 of 151) of the class III railroads reported creating  new timekeeping systems. Officials we interviewed at some of the class  III railroads said their companies have paper-based hours of service  timekeeping systems but use electronic spreadsheets to track covered  employees’ hours of service. In some cases, the electronic spreadsheets  were updated to keep track of such things as total monthly work hours.  Additionally, according to some railroad officials we spoke with, their  changes were sometimes part of a broader effort to better manage both  hours of service and other aspects of their business, such as financial  management.
To demonstrate compliance with RSIA’s hours of service changes, some  railroads reported spending more time preparing or reviewing hours of  service records—work that officials said sometimes limited their ability to  perform other tasks, such as operating their business. Survey  respondents who addressed this question, including those from all 7 class  I railroads and over 70 percent of class II and III railroads (10 of 14 and  115 of 152, respectively), reported the time required for recordkeeping or  recordkeeping review increased as a direct result of RSIA’s hours of  service requirements. Not unexpectedly, the increased time to prepare or  review hours of service records imposed burdens on railroads. In  responding to our survey, 6 of the 7 class I railroads reported the  additional time for recordkeeping or recordkeeping reviews presented  some to a moderate burden, while half (5 of 10) of the class II railroads  and about 40 percent (44 of 111) of the class III railroads responding to  this question reported a substantial to a very great burden. Over time, the  increased efforts to prepare and review hours of service records will likely  become part of the normal routine of a railroad. In addition, creating such  records is part of helping ensure compliance with the law and achieving  its intended safety benefits. However, at least temporarily, some railroads  we spoke with said the increased record preparation and review time  affected how their business is operated. For example, officials we spoke  with at 3 class III railroads, all with paper-based hours of service records,  said the additional information that must be tracked for hours of service  records was a burden and the time spent on tracking left less time for  other activities, including running the railroad. This was one of these  railroads’ main issues with RSIA’s changes. An official we spoke with at a  class I railroad also told us RSIA’s changes added an extra layer of  reporting to the company’s hours of service process, primarily to  accommodate RSIA’s total monthly work hour caps.
Finally, in responding to our survey, some railroads reported that the  timekeeping changes imposed financial costs. In some cases, these may  have been one-time costs, and in others, they may have been recurring  costs. According to our survey results, all 7 class I railroads, 12 of the 14  class II railroads, and 88 of 150 class III railroads incurred financial costs  from introducing or revising hours of service records or recordkeeping  systems. We did not collect information on the specific costs incurred.  However, some railroad officials we interviewed said the costs ranged  into the millions of dollars. According to officials from one class I railroad  we spoke with, it spent about $3 million in 2009 for programming  changes, including changes to its crew monitoring system. Officials we  spoke with at another class I railroad told us it spent about $2 million for  programming and upgrades, including converting from paper to electronic  records for its signal employees. According to the officials, the cost was  primarily for company employees, not a consultant, to do the  reprogramming and was a one-time cost. At some other railroads, the  costs were for work performed by a mix of in-house staff and outside  consultants. Some of the costs were recurring. For example, an official  from a class III railroad told us his company spends an extra $500 a  month for a manager to review and verify the accuracy of hours of service  records.
After RSIA took effect, some covered employees filed claims for lost work  or compensation—that is, requests for payment for work hours or  compensation lost because of RSIA’s consecutive work day limits or other  requirements. Such claims might arise when, for example, an employee  who formerly worked a 6 by 1 shift could no longer do so because RSIA  requires 48 hours’ rest after 6 consecutive days on duty. In responding to  our survey, 5 of 7 class I, 6 of 14 class II, and 22 of 152 class III railroads  reported that the number of claims for missed work opportunities (hours)  or compensation increased as a direct result of RSIA’s hours of service  changes. The remaining class I and II railroads and 128 of the class III  railroads (about 84 percent) said either the number of such claims stayed  the same or the issue was not applicable to them. We did not collect  data on the number of claims filed. However, some railroad officials we  spoke with said the number of claims filed doubled or tripled from the  normal level. For example, a class II railroad official we spoke with  estimated that the number of claims filed at his company each month for  lost work hours increased from about 5 before RSIA took effect to 10 to  15 afterwards. This official also said the number of claims subsequently  went back to 2–3 per month. A class I railroad official told us T&E  employees had filed over 500 claims at this company between July 2009  and May 2010, most of which the company was holding in abeyance until  it had decided how to handle them.
We do not know how many claims may have resulted in payments to  employees or other forms of relief. As noted, one class I railroad we  spoke with had not decided at the time of our review how to resolve the  500 claims filed by its employees, in part because the railroad was still  considering the status of collective bargaining agreements in relation to  RSIA’s legal requirements. Officials from this railroad estimated each  claim filed averaged approximately $200 and the railroad’s potential  liability in paying these claims was about $100,000. At other railroads,  paying compensation may have been more routine. For example, an  official we spoke with at a class II railroad, which was trying to avoid  working employees 6 consecutive days, said the railroad had, in virtually  every instance, paid claims for compensation filed by T&E employees  who had been skipped over for work assignments because they were  approaching 6 consecutive days of work.
section_title: Too Soon to Assess FRA’s Hours of Service Oversight, but Implementation of Pilot Project and Waiver Provisions Could Yield More Data to Address Fatigue
subsections: section_title: FRA Uses a Risk-Based Approach to Oversee Compliance with Hours of Service Requirements
paragraphs: To plan its oversight of railroads’ compliance with hours of service  requirements, FRA applies the same risk-based approach that it uses to  assess compliance generally. This approach relies on a risk-based model  that FRA implemented in 2006. The model analyzes FRA’s inspection  data, together with accident and incident data reported by the railroads  through the Accident and Incident Reporting System, and then generates  the National Inspection Plan (NIP), which is designed to target FRA’s  inspections at the greatest safety risks. The NIP allocates inspection  resources for each FRA region by inspector discipline (such as operating  practices and track), and FRA regions then assign resources to  activities (such as hours of service and drug and alcohol control), within  each discipline with input from inspectors familiar with each railroad’s  operations.  In addition, FRA regional officials can modify the NIP’s  allocation of resources among disciplines based on local input, both  initially and after 6 months.  According to FRA headquarters and regional  officials, decisions about how to allocate resources among inspection  disciplines and activities are based on factors such as complaints, an  inspector’s knowledge of a railroad’s operation at a given location, and  the time and resources available to conduct inspections.  This reliance on  local input reflects FRA’s views that regional officials and inspectors have  detailed knowledge about railroads’ operations that may not be captured  in the data used to develop the NIP and that their input results in a  stronger inspection plan than one based solely on data analysis.
FRA incorporates data from its Accident and Incident Reporting System  into its risk assessment model to help determine the relationship between  noncompliance with safety requirements and risk.  Specifically, FRA  establishes codes for a wide range of violations or conditions, and when  railroads report an accident or incident, they enter two codes into the  system—one for the primary cause and the other for a contributing cause  of the accident or incident.  Neither hours of service violations nor, more  broadly, fatigue are among the coded options that railroads can choose to  enter.  Instead, the options include a large number of actions or  conditions that FRA considers potentially related to fatigue, such as  “failure to release hand brake on cars” and “failure to comply with  restricted speed.”  When FRA investigates an accident or incident with  these codes entered as causes, it then attempts to determine whether  fatigue was a factor.  According to FRA, it does not have a code for hours  of service violations because, in its experience, there is not necessarily a  relationship between hours of service and fatigue—a fatigued individual  can be in compliance with hours of service requirements or, conversely, a  violation of hours of service requirements can occur without an individual  being fatigued.  According to FRA, it does not have a code for fatigue  because it already collects information on fatigue when it investigates an  accident or incident.
section_title: It is Too Soon to Determine if FRA’s Hours of Service Oversight Has Changed under RSIA or Needs to Change
paragraphs: It is too soon since RSIA was implemented to determine if the priority that  FRA assigns to overseeing railroads’ compliance with hours of service  requirements has changed or should change.  The new hours of service  requirements did not take effect for freight railroads until July 16, 2009,  and we collected the inspection data through September 30, 2010, a span  of 14 months.  Hence, the period covered by our audit work is too short  for us to identify any trends in inspection results or enforcement actions  taken since RSIA’s changes went into effect.  Furthermore without trend  information, there is little basis at the current time to know whether the  priority FRA assigns to overseeing hours of service is best aligned with  potential safety risks.
FRA inspectors conduct hours of service inspections and complaint  investigations to determine if covered employees have worked longer  than limited by law. FRA inspectors also review railroads’ hours of service  recordkeeping to assess their compliance with FRA regulations that  specify, for example, how and when the hours worked by covered  employees are to be recorded. According to our analysis of FRA  inspection data, FRA inspectors conducted somewhat fewer hours of  service and hours of service recordkeeping inspections of freight railroads  in fiscal year 2010—the one complete year for which we have data since  RSIA took effect—than they did in fiscal year 2008, the last full year  before RSIA was implemented. (See table 2.) However, the data for fiscal  year 2010 show increases, especially for hours of service inspections,  over the data for fiscal year 2009, the transition year. Furthermore, as the  table shows, the annual numbers for both types of inspections have  varied over the years, especially for hours of service inspections, and  there is no indication thus far of a change in FRA’s emphasis on hours of  service. The data for fiscal year 2010 are consistent with the statements  of some FRA officials, who told us FRA placed no special emphasis on  hours of service issues after RSIA was implemented and has not  changed its hours of service inspections since the change in the law.  According to the officials, inspections focus on factors that cause  accidents, and hours of service issues have caused few, if any, accidents  in recent years. Most railroads responding to our survey also reported  that they did not see a change in FRA’s handling of hours of service  issues. FRA did, however, identify hours of service in the National Safety  Program Plan for fiscal year 2010 as a special-emphasis activity for four  of FRA’s eight regional offices and for the Office of Railroad Safety at  FRA headquarters. Yet in three of these regional offices, the efforts are  focused on signal employees rather than T&E employees, the largest  group of covered employees subject to hours of service limitations.
Overall, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010, hours of service  and hours of service recordkeeping inspections accounted for a very  small percentage of FRA inspections of freight railroads—less than 1  percent of all FRA inspections conducted on freight railroads each year  during this period, as indicated in table 2. Furthermore, although  operating practices inspectors conducted about 83 percent of the hours of  service and about 79 percent of the hours of service recordkeeping  inspections, these inspections accounted for less than 3 percent of all  operating practices inspections conducted at freight railroads during fiscal  years 2005 through 2010 (see fig. 10).
While our analysis does not indicate any notable change in FRA’s overall  emphasis on compliance with hours of service and hours of service  recordkeeping requirements, it may show proportionally greater attention  to the class I railroads, especially for hours of service (see fig. 11). As  previously noted, class I railroads account for over two-thirds of the total  rail mileage operated in the United States. For both hours of service and  hours of service recordkeeping, the number of inspections increased for  the class I railroads and decreased for the class II and III railroads from  fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2010. Again, however, the data are for a  single year, and it is unclear whether any observed change will persist.  According to FRA officials, there are no plans to require additional hours  of service or hours of service recordkeeping inspections unless there is  evidence of an increase in noncompliance on the part of the railroads, or  there is an increase in complaints about violations of the hours of service  laws.
With just one full year’s worth of data since RSIA took effect, we could not  discern any changes in FRA’s hours of service enforcement priorities.  One indicator—the portion of defects identified during inspections that  resulted in violations being processed for enforcement—showed no  consistent direction, fluctuating variously up or down in fiscal year 2009  from fiscal year 2008 and then reversing direction the following year.
Another indicator—enforcement actions taken—also fluctuated, with the  number of hours of service enforcement actions going up in fiscal year  2009 from fiscal year 2008, and then dropping again in fiscal year 2010.  Meanwhile, hours of service recordkeeping enforcement actions took the  opposite path during the same period, first dropping and then rising (see  table 3).
Besides establishing new hours of service requirements, RSIA provided  for pilot projects and waivers of compliance with hours of service  requirements, both of which would create opportunities for FRA and  railroads to analyze the effects on safety of approved alternatives to the  new hours of service requirements. FRA has been unable to implement  two pilot projects mandated under RSIA because no railroads have  chosen to participate, and has not exercised its pre-RSIA authority to  approve voluntary pilot projects designed to examine the fatigue- reduction potential of alternatives to the current hours of service laws  because of flaws in the applications it received. FRA also has the  authority to approve petitions for waivers of hours of service requirements  in certain circumstances and has approved waiver petitions for some  railroads. RSIA required FRA to conduct the mandated pilot projects by  October 2010, and to report on the voluntary pilot projects no later than  December 31, 2012; however, RSIA does not require FRA to analyze or  report on the safety effects of approved waiver petitions, and FRA has not  taken steps to do so.
RSIA required FRA to conduct at least two pilot projects of sufficient size  and scope to analyze specific practices that could be used to reduce  fatigue for T&E and other railroad employees covered by hours of service  requirements. The first pilot project called for the railroad to give a  covered employee at least 10 hours’ advance notice of a shift  assignment. Advance notice of 2 to 4 hours is typical in the industry  today. The second pilot project would have created defined shifts for  covered employees who receive unscheduled shift calls, such that those  employees would be subject to call every other shift, instead of at any  time. FRA has not been able to implement either of these mandated pilot  projects because no railroad has expressed interest in implementing  either project. According to FRA officials, the agency lacks authority to  compel railroads to participate. According to both FRA and railroad  officials, railroads have not chosen to participate in the pilot projects  mandated in the legislation because doing so could put a participating  railroad at a competitive disadvantage. More specifically, both projects  would decrease a railroad’s flexibility to assign covered train employees  to report as circumstances warrant—in the first case by requiring advance  notice of at least 10 hours, rather than the typical practice of 2 to 4 hours  notice, and in the second case by reducing the pool of employees on call  by half. Because freight railroads try to work to accommodate their  customers, often with last-minute scheduling changes, it is important for  them to remain flexible so they can compete with other railroads and  other modes of transportation, such as trucks.
While FRA was unable to conduct the two pilot projects mandated in  RSIA, it still has authority to approve voluntary pilot projects. This  authority, which predates RSIA, allows FRA to approve joint petitions  from railroads and nonprofit employee labor organizations representing  directly affected covered service employees of the railroads for waivers of  compliance with the hours of service law in order to demonstrate the  possible benefits of implementing alternatives to strict adherence to the  law, including requirements for maximum on-duty and minimum off-duty  periods. According to FRA officials, there was little interest in obtaining  waivers for pilot projects prior to the passage of RSIA. Since May 2009,  however, FRA has received five petitions for waivers of compliance with  hours of service requirements in order to implement voluntary pilot  projects. FRA dismissed two of these petitions, because they were not  filed jointly, as required, by a railroad and the employee labor  organizations representing the affected employees. FRA approved two  other petitions for pilot projects requesting waivers, but both were  designed to provide administrative alternatives rather than alternatives to  the requirements concerning maximum on-duty and minimum off-duty  periods. In approving these petitions, FRA noted that because the  proposed pilot projects were administrative in nature, they would not  impinge on the likely performance or safety of the railroads. Finally, FRA  rejected one petition that was designed to identify alternatives to the  hours of service laws for addressing fatigue. This petition, filed by the  ASLRRA on behalf of its members, sought approval for a pilot project that  would, among other things, develop and identify alternative methods to  mitigate the risk of fatigue without strict adherence to the new hours of  service requirements. While acknowledging that ASLRRA raised salient  issues for short-line and small railroads, FRA rejected the petition, noting  that it lacked a thorough explanation of the conditions and controls under  which the pilot project would be operated to ensure the safety of railroad  operations and participating employees. Moreover, according to FRA, the  petition failed to identify what additional relief from the hours of service  laws was necessary to implement the pilot project.
Other than the petition filed by ASLRRA, FRA has received no petitions  for waivers of compliance with hours of service requirements in order to  implement voluntary pilot projects that could demonstrate the fatigue- reduction potential of alternatives to RSIA provisions. Information  gathered from railroads operating monitored pilot projects could be  analyzed to assess the effectiveness of specific practices being used to  reduce fatigue. Such information could also be used to examine the  effects on safety of, for example, increasing rest requirements for some  shifts that extend into night hours, providing fewer hours of rest for  employees resting away from their home terminal, or decreasing rest  requirements for those covered employees working only regular daytime  shifts. The results of such analysis could be used to inform the RSIA- required report to Congress by December 2012 on the effectiveness of  the voluntary pilot projects.
Even though no pilot projects currently afford opportunities for gathering  and analyzing data on the safety effects of alternatives to the new hours  of service requirements, FRA could obtain such data from railroads  operating with approved waivers of compliance with the new hours of  service requirements. FRA has the authority to approve petitions for  waivers of the statutory requirements related to the consecutive work day  limits if a collective bargaining agreement provides for a different  arrangement, and such an arrangement is in the public interest and  consistent with railroad safety. As of June 30, 2011, FRA had received  17 petitions for waivers of compliance with hours of service requirements  and had fully approved 8 of them, including 1 filed by ASLRRA that  covers 142 of its member railroads. In total, 157 railroads have  approved waivers of compliance with hours of service requirements, 2 of  which are class I railroads. The remainder are class II or III railroads. The  approved waivers recognize that the risk of fatigue is greater for night  shifts than for day shifts, as discussed earlier in this report. Specifically,  all of the approved waivers allow scheduled shifts of 6 consecutive work  days followed by 24 hours’ rest (6 by 1 schedules), rather than the 48  hours’ rest (6 by 2 schedules) required by law, provided that the shifts  during those 6 consecutive days do not extend into the hours between  midnight and 6 a.m. Table 4 provides information on the disposition of the  waiver petitions submitted to FRA from May 2009 through June 2011.
RSIA did not require FRA to collect data or report on the safety effects of  approved waiver petitions, as it did for the voluntary pilot projects, and  FRA has not taken steps to do so. According to an FRA official,  establishing a level of fatigue among employees working under the  conditions of one of the approved voluntary waivers would require an  evaluation of the employees’ work and rest schedules using a fatigue  model such as FAST. The easiest way to collect such data, the official  said, would be to have inspectors evaluate these employee schedules at  randomly selected railroads. The official acknowledged that having data  about railroads operating under waivers could help determine the  feasibility of alternatives to RSIA’s current requirements, such as a  modification of the requirement for 48 hours’ rest after 6 consecutive work  days for certain scheduled shifts.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since RSIA was only recently implemented, it is still too early to  determine whether its changes to hours of service requirements will  materially affect freight railroad safety. Initial indications are positive, as  our analysis of selected covered T&E employee work schedules shows.  Rest time for these employees has increased, and the amount of time  they work at a high risk of fatigue has decreased—up to about 36 percent  for some railroads. However, as can be expected of changes in laws to  improve safety, these benefits have also resulted in some costs to both  railroad employees and the industry. Our work shows that some covered  employees saw reductions in their work hours and, according to  information from our survey of the railroad industry and related interviews,  many railroads made changes in crew and train schedules, incurred  additional costs to hire new employees or bring employees back from  furlough to maintain operations and comply with the law, and saw  reductions in their ability to provide service to customers when and where  needed. More important, although the time spent working at a high risk of  fatigue decreased for some T&E employees, RSIA did not address work  performed during night hours, which, according to both scientific literature  and our analysis of covered T&E employee work schedules, represents a  major factor in fatigue risk. Therefore, opportunities for reducing the risk  of fatigue remain, especially since night work is integral to freight rail  operations. Moreover, we believe further analysis of the safety  implications of both day and night work, and of actions that could be  taken to mitigate the associated fatigue risks, could point to opportunities  for trade-offs that would reduce the overall risk of fatigue yet potentially  allow for a relaxation of RSIA provisions that railroads and employees  said were particularly burdensome to them—such as the consecutive  work day limits before mandatory rest.
The federal government also plays an important role in helping promote  safe railroad operations through its inspection and enforcement actions.  FRA’s risk-based approach to oversight is intended to align the agency’s  inspection and enforcement resources with risks. The NIP provides a  good foundation for doing this, including the use of local input to ensure  resources are focused on the specific risks that may lead to accidents.   As we saw from the data, it is too soon to determine if the emphasis FRA  has so far given to hours of service requirements best aligns with the  risks associated with the RSIA changes and this will bear watching going  forward.  Additionally, in our view, FRA is missing opportunities to better  identify the potential costs, benefits, and safety implications of  alternatives to the current hours of service requirements. While voluntary  pilot projects were envisioned in RSIA and offer the opportunity for FRA  and railroads to try alternative approaches and learn from them, interest  from the industry has, to date, been low. Realizing the full benefits from  pilot projects will require additional outreach to the rail industry and other  stakeholders to generate ideas on how pilot projects could be structured  so they generate interest and participation, including ways to minimize  potential competitive disadvantages to participants. Both pilot projects  and waivers could generate information that would be of use in aligning  oversight resources with risks, analyzing fatigue issues, and deciding how  to reduce fatigue risks in the railroad industry, as well as informing FRA’s  December 2012 report to Congress on voluntary pilot projects.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that FRA’s implementation of hours of service requirements in  the freight railroad industry maximizes opportunities to reduce the risks of  accidents and incidents related to fatigue, we recommend that the  Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FRA to take the  following action:    Evaluate and develop recommendations about the relative impact of  consecutive days worked and work performed during night hours on  the potential for fatigue and risk of accidents in the freight railroad  industry. This evaluation should attempt to determine if taking night  work into consideration in the hours of service limitations (such as by  requiring more rest after night work) would enable some relaxation of  the current limits on consecutive days worked before rest is required  in such a way that the same or better overall reduction in fatigue risk  occurs while mitigating negative effects on employees and railroad  operations. In performing this evaluation, FRA should consider  scientific and medical research related to fatigue and fatigue  abatement and data from pilot projects and waivers of compliance  with hours of service requirements that relate to fatigue levels and  consecutive days worked and work performed at night. FRA should  also communicate the results of the evaluation to appropriate  congressional committees for their consideration.
To improve FRA’s targeting of its inspection resources and understanding  of the effect of work hours on fatigue, we recommend that the Secretary  of Transportation direct the Administrator of FRA to take the following  action:    Work with the railroad industry to identify pilot projects that could be  implemented to test the fatigue reduction potential of alternatives to  the current hours of service laws. Also, collect safety indicator and  accident and incident data from participants in pilot projects and  railroads with waivers of compliance with hours of service  requirements to determine the effects of such pilot projects and  waivers on covered employee fatigue and participant safety  performance. FRA should then incorporate the results of both efforts  into the risk assessment process used to determine the allocation of  inspection resources and report the results to appropriate committees  of Congress.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report and the e-supplement to DOT for review  and comment. We met with FRA officials, including the Deputy Chief  Counsel, on September 19, 2011.  DOT expressed concerns about a  portion of our second recommendation that it incorporate activity-level  data into the NIP’s development of inspection priorities and that it add a  code for hours of service issues to the Accident and Incident Reporting  System. According to DOT, the NIP provides a comprehensive framework  to manage hundreds of competing inspection activities—including hours  of service inspections—and incorporating activity-level data as we  suggested would imply a level of precision that does not exist. DOT also  emphasized the value of FRA inspectors’ input into the priority-setting  process and suggested that an increased reliance on data could reduce  FRA’s flexibility and efficiency in responding to and managing local  issues.  In addition, DOT considered adding an hours of service code to  the Accident and Incident Reporting System redundant, since railroads  are already required to report excess service hours to FRA every month.   Furthermore, FRA said that adding such a code would not be helpful,  since an hours of service violation may not indicate fatigue. According to  FRA officials, a covered employee could be fatigued while complying with  hours of service requirements or a covered employee could be  noncompliant with hours of service requirements without being fatigued.   FRA officials told us that accidents and incidents generally occur because  someone misaligned a switch, failed to observe a signal, or failed to take  some other physical action. These may or may not have been caused by  fatigue but adding a code for hours of service would not indicate fatigue  levels.  FRA officials noted that several cause codes in the Accident and  Incident Reporting System can indicate fatigue and that FRA investigators  follow up to assess the role of fatigue when railroads identify those codes  as causes of accidents. FRA officials also noted that a review of recent  reports on rail accidents, including reports from the National  Transportation Safety Board, found none that identified hours of service  as a cause of an accident.
After we met with FRA officials, they provided additional information on  how FRA uses activity-based inspection data (including hours of service  data) to develop the NIP and furnished us with a list of codes included in  the Accident and Incident Reporting System that show some correlation  with fatigue.  In light of our discussions with FRA and our analysis of the  information it subsequently provided, we withdrew the portions of our  second recommendation that FRA incorporate activity-level data into the  risk assessment process and add one or more codes to the Accident and  Incident Reporting System to identify the role of hours of service in  railroad accidents. The information provided by FRA shows that hours of  service activity-based data is being used to develop the NIP and adding  one or more codes to the Accident and Incident Reporting System for  hours of service might not be helpful in identifying broader issues of the  role fatigue plays in accidents.  Rather, such information is more likely to  come from FRA’s accident investigations, which can also identify if  violations of hours of service requirements play a role in rail accidents.
FRA officials also raised concerns about the wording of some definitions  used in our survey of the rail industry about hours of service issues. FRA  questioned whether the rail industry was familiar enough with  requirements of the law so that the definitions we used did not result in  inaccurate responses. We did not change the wording of the definitions  contained in the survey presented in our e-supplement to this report as a  result of FRA’s comments because the e-supplement is meant to present  the survey as it was made available to respondents. We believe the  information provided by the survey is accurate and respondents  understood our survey and RSIA requirements sufficiently to provide  appropriate responses. To this end, we fully pretested the survey prior to  administering it; pretest participants raised no substantive concerns about  the terms defined in the survey. Our e-supplement product (GAO-11- 894SP) contains additional information about FRA’s comments.
DOT also provided technical comments that we incorporated as  appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30  days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report  to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of  Transportation, the Administrator of FRA, and the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget. The report will also be available at no charge  on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: To better understand the changes to freight railroad hours of service  requirements made by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA),  we reviewed the (1) impacts of the hours of service changes on the  covered train and engine (T&E) workforce, including potential impacts on  fatigue; (2) operational and administrative impacts of the hours of service  changes on the railroad industry; and (3) actions taken by the Federal  Railroad Administration (FRA) to oversee compliance with hours of  service requirements and implement RSIA provisions related to hours of  service pilot projects and waivers.
The scope of this engagement was limited to the freight railroad industry.  The RSIA hours of service requirements became effective for these  railroads on July 16, 2009. We did not include commuter and intercity  passenger railroads, since at the time of our work FRA was in the process  of developing new hours of service requirements for these railroads. Our  scope included freight railroads of all sizes. The freight railroad industry is  divided into three classes: I, II, and III, based on their operating revenues.  In 2009, annual operating revenues were at least $378.8 million for class I  railroads, between $30.3 million and $378.8 million for class II railroads,  and less than $30.3 million for class III railroads. The class designation  differs slightly from another designation that FRA uses for accident and  incident reporting, under which railroads are divided into groups. FRA’s  group 1 is equivalent to class I. The division between groups 2 and 3 is  based on the total number of annual work hours reported to FRA. Group  2 railroads report 400,000 or more total annual work hours but are not  class I railroads, and group 3 railroads report less than 400,000 total  annual work hours. According to FRA officials, groups 2 and 3 are not  necessarily the same as classes II and III, but the differences may not be  large. For reporting purposes we use the class designation because (1) it  is a common means of identifying railroads and (2) the railroads included  in class II or III may not be significantly different from those in group 2 or  3, respectively.
The following describes some of the key methodologies we used to  address our objectives.
subsections: section_title: Structured Collection and Analysis of Covered Employee Work Schedules and Use of Fatigue Models
paragraphs: To address the impacts of the hours of service changes on the covered  T&E workforce, including potential impacts on fatigue, we collected and  analyzed covered T&E employee work schedule data and used the  Fatigue Audit InterDyneTM (FAID) biomathematical fatigue model. We  initially requested covered T&E employee work schedules for all 7 class I,  15 class II, and a sample of 86 class III railroads. However, not all the  class II and III railroads we contacted had electronic records; instead,  most maintained paper-based hours of service records. We determined  that the process for collecting and transcribing the paper-based work  schedules into electronic format for analysis was not feasible given our  time and resource constraints. Accordingly, we focused our data  collection on electronic records from class I railroads and those class II  railroads that responded to our inquiries and could provide electronic  hours of service records. In addition, we conducted focused telephone  interviews with 69 randomly sampled class III railroads with 5 or more full- time-equivalent employees covered by hours of service requirements to  obtain information about their operations.
For our analysis of electronic hours of service records, we included all  work schedules for all covered T&E employees that had work schedule  data for both May 2008 and May 2010 and had at least 7 days of  scheduled work in both these months. All 7 class I railroads submitted the  requested records, and 6 class II railroads provided electronic records  that met our requirements. The final data set covers the May 2008 and  May 2010 work records for 52,205 class I covered T&E employees and  963 class II covered T&E employees. We selected May 2008 and May  2010 for our analysis because they represent months before and after  RSIA’s implementation. In addition, choosing the same month for both  years helps to avoid any seasonal differences in the rail industry. We also  discussed the time frames for our analysis with rail industry  representatives, and they generally agreed with our selection. To assess  the reliability of the data provided, we performed tests to detect and  eliminate anomalies such as duplicate records, overlapping shifts, shifts  with start or end time errors, and data for employees who did not work in  both time periods. Where appropriate, we contacted railroads to correct  these anomalies. We also sent a questionnaire to the railroads to obtain  information about the quality control procedures for their electronic  systems. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.
Our analysis of employee work schedules was focused on answering key  questions designed to identify the effects of RSIA’s changes on the  covered T&E workforce, such as whether total work time changed. We  analyzed class I and class II work schedules separately because this  approach allowed us to recognize there may be operational differences  between the two classes of railroads. Among other things, we examined  work schedule data to determine the total hours worked, total shifts  worked, total rest time, and total hours worked at night in both time  periods for both classes of railroad. Total hours worked and total shifts  worked were measures we used to determine if there were impacts on  the amount of work performed. We used total hours of work and total  hours worked at night along with fatigue model outputs as measures for  estimating the impact of night work on fatigue risk levels.
We estimated fatigue risk levels for work schedule data using the FAID  model, a biomathematical fatigue model that has been used for fatigue  analyses of railroad work schedules. FRA has validated FAID, as well as  the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling ToolTM (FAST), for use in analyzing the  railroad employees’ fatigue risk levels—the only two models that FRA had  validated for such use at the time of our work. The FAID model is  commonly used in the railroad industry for fatigue analysis, and FRA has  used FAST to conduct fatigue analyses for regulatory purposes (such as  reviews of petitions for waivers of compliance with hours of service  requirements). We performed separate fatigue model analyses for class I  and class II railroads and included in our analyses all the work schedules  in our final data set for both class I and class II employees.
In conducting our fatigue analyses, primarily using the FAID model, we  established a tolerance level—that is, a fatigue score that, if breached,  indicates a potentially unacceptable level of fatigue risk. We selected a  fatigue score of 70 as the threshold for high risk of fatigue, scores of 61  through 69 for elevated risk of fatigue, and scores below 60 for  acceptable risk of fatigue. Fatigue experts, the rail industry, and FRA  differ on acceptable fatigue risk score thresholds. We selected 70—a  conservative score—as our threshold for high risk of fatigue partly  because FRA, in its FAID validation and calibration report, said a FAID  score greater than 70 would indicate extreme fatigue and partly because  we wanted to err on the side of caution in our use of the model for fatigue  analysis. After our analysis was performed FRA issued its final hours of  service rule for passenger rail employees that set the high fatigue  threshold for FAID at 72. Additionally, we used the FAID model as its  producer and fatigue experts directed, that is, to analyze aggregate-level  data to determine fatigue risk among the covered workforce or to analyze  generic examples of work schedules to determine fatigue risk. We did not  use the fatigue models to determine fatigue risk for individual covered  employees.
To better understand the relationship between night work and fatigue we  examined whether the number of hours employees worked at night was  correlated with spending time at high risk of fatigue according to the  outputs of the FAID fatigue model. In particular we calculated the  correlation between night hours and the incidence of employees spending  at least 20 percent of their hours at high risk of fatigue. We chose the 20  percent of time at high risk to be consistent with FRA’s commuter and  intercity rail final hours of service rule, in which a fatigue model indicating  that 20 percent or more time spent at high risk of fatigue would trigger  further mitigation of a rail work schedule by railroads and approval of  mitgation by FRA. The correlation coefficient was 0.53.
Both the data we collected and the analysis we performed have  limitations. As we discussed earlier, an economic recession began in  2008 and it affected the demand for rail services significantly. For the  months we collected rail workers’ schedules, May 2008 and May 2010,  overall rail operations were different, with considerably higher levels of  overall rail service in 2008. Although our findings on the differences in  work schedules across these time periods may be, in part, a reflection of  the differences in the macroeconomic environment, we attempted to  mitigate that factor in two ways. We avoided choosing months during  which the demand for rail service was rapidly declining. In May 2008, the  recession was not greatly impacting the rail industry and by May 2010,  demand was picking up from its lows during late 2008 and 2009. Also, we  only used employees that worked in both months under the assumption  the same employees would likely be performing similar work tasks in the  two periods.
Additionally, the fatigue models have limitations. In particular, fatigue  models are developed around an average person as the base point.  Fatigue models do not consider situations specific to an individual that  could influence whether an individual’s fatigue levels and score are the  same as or different from those calculated by the model. Finally, the  models incorporate assumptions about sleep time and sleep quality, since  it is not possible to determine how long or how well a specific individual  sleeps during non-work time. Even with these limitations, we determined  that the rail data and fatigue model results were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report.
section_title: Survey of the Railroad Industry
paragraphs: To identify the operational and administrative impacts of the RSIA hours  of service changes on the railroad industry, we conducted a web-based  survey of railroads. To identify survey participants, we used FRA’s 2009  Accident and Incident Reporting database. In general, federal  regulations require that all U.S. railroads report monthly to FRA on  accidents and incidents that occur on their railroads. Exceptions include  such railroads as those that operate freight trains only on track inside an  installation that is not part of the general railroad system of transportation  and rail mass transit operations in urban areas that are not connected to  the general railroad system of transportation. Reports are to be made  about accidents or incidents that occurred during a month or to indicate  that no accidents or incidents occurred. As noted, FRA reports accident  and incident data for class I (excluding the National Railroad Passenger  Corporation, or Amtrak), class II, and class III railroads. To ensure the  reliability of FRA’s database for our purposes, we (1) reviewed federal  regulations to better understand which railroads are required to report  accident and incident data and which railroads might be exempt from  reporting, (2) reviewed relevant database documentation, including FRA’s  guidelines for reporting accidents and incidents, to understand what data  are reported and what controls are used to ensure the reported data are  accurate and reliable, and (3) interviewed FRA officials and reviewed  FRA written responses to our questions to understand the controls FRA  used to ensure the data were accurate and reliable. Based on these  steps, we believe the database was sufficiently reliable for our needs.
We used FRA’s Accident and Incident Reporting database, since it  contained the most recent data available on U.S. railroads at the time we  performed our work. We excluded from the database passenger-related  railroads, tourist and historic railroads that had limited operations,  railroads exempt from reporting, and newly started railroads that had not  yet built up a record of accidents and incidents. The universe of freight  railroads surveyed included all 7 class I railroads, all 15 class II railroads,  and all class III railroads that had five or more full-time-equivalent  employees (based on work hours reported to FRA) covered by hours of  service requirements in 2009. We chose five full-time-equivalent  employees as our threshold to, among other things, eliminate railroads  that (1) might be too small to have hours of service impacts, (2) operate  only part of the year (seasonal or intermittent operators), and (3) have  only a few employees who may be used as needed for operations only  within a plant or other manufacturing facility. The survey selections were  designed to include participants from all three classes of railroads  representing large, medium, and small entities. We calculated the  percentage of full-time-equivalent employees covered by hours of service  requirements based on discussions with FRA officials and estimates of  the percentage of the railroad employee population covered by hours of  service requirements used by FRA in previous rulemakings. Out of the  561 class III railroads in the database, we calculated there were 234 with  five or more full-time-equivalent employees covered by hours of service  requirements. We determined that two of these railroads were not eligible  for the survey because one was not a railroad (it was a centralized  dispatching center for several railroads) and one had ceased operations  in 2009 and, according to an official from this railroad, had no experience  with the RSIA hours of service changes. In total, we surveyed 254  railroads—7 class I railroads, 15 class II railroads, and 232 class III  railroads.
To develop our survey questions, we relied on a comprehensive list of  questions that we used to interview railroads about hours of service  issues before we conducted the survey. We identified key issues from the  railroads’ responses to the questions and used these to develop the  survey questionnaire. In addition, we conducted four pretests of the  survey, one with a class I railroad, one with a class II railroad, and two  with two class III railroads. Two pretests were done in-person and the  other two were done over the telephone. The railroads were selected to  get a variety of large, medium, and small railroads. During the pretests,  we obtained feedback on such things as the type of questions being  asked, the clarity of the questions, and whether additional issues should  be included. We used this feedback to revise the survey instrument,  including adding questions to cover additional issues and clarifying  certain survey questions. After completing the survey questions, we sent  an e-mail announcement of the survey to the 256 railroads initially  included in our survey (including the 2 that we subsequently excluded as  ineligible) on January 10, 2011. These railroads were notified that the  questionnaire was available online and were given unique passwords and  usernames on January 13, 2011. We sent follow-up e-mail messages on  February 1, February 16, and March 16, 2011, to those railroads that had  not yet responded. We conducted the survey from January 13, 2011, to  April 15, 2011.
Because we did not survey a sample of railroads, our survey has no  sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any  survey may introduce nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in  interpreting a particular question, or the type of information available to  some respondents but not others, could introduce unwanted variability  into the survey results. We took steps in the data collection and data  analysis stages to minimize such nonsampling errors. As we previously  indicated, we collaborated with GAO survey specialists to design a draft  questionnaire and pretested versions of the questionnaire with four  members of the survey population. From these pretests, we made  revisions as necessary to reduce the likelihood of nonresponse and  reporting errors on our questions. We examined the survey results and  performed computer analyses to identify inconsistencies and other  indications of error and addressed such issues, where possible. A  second, independent analyst checked the accuracy of all computer  analyses to minimize the likelihood of errors in data processing. In  addition, GAO analysts answered respondents’ questions and resolved  difficulties that respondents had in answering our questions.
The overall response rate for this survey was 72 percent, with 7 out of 7  of class I railroads, 14 out of 15 class II railroads, and 163 out of 232  class III railroads responding. An analysis of the distribution of variables  for the respondents related to the size of the railroads was compared to  the distribution of these variables in the entire population of railroads, and  no important distributional differences were found.
In addition to the data from the survey provided in this report, each survey  question, along with responses to it, is presented in GAO-11-894SP, an  electronic supplement to this report.
section_title: Analysis of FRA Inspection and Enforcement Data
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which FRA conducts inspections of railroads’  compliance with hours of service and hours of service recordkeeping  requirements, we obtained information from FRA’s Railroad Inspection  System for PC. This system allows inspectors to enter inspection data via  their personal computers in order to maintain electronic records. FRA  provided data for all inspections conducted by FRA inspectors from fiscal  year 2005 through fiscal year 2010. We then excluded data for  inspections of all entities that were not freight railroads. From the  remaining data, we identified the number of hours of service and hours of  service recordkeeping inspections that were conducted on freight  railroads during this 6-year period. We analyzed inspection results by  class of railroad and determined the frequency with which deficiency  findings identified during inspections resulted in an enforcement activity.
To identify the enforcement actions FRA has taken in response to  noncompliance with hours of service and hours of service recordkeeping  requirements, we obtained data from FRA’s Railroad Enforcement  System. FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety enters the information related to  violations that have been recommended for citation against railroads and  others in the Violation Generation Tracking System database, which  populates the Railroad Enforcement System, which in turn is used by  attorneys and staff to support the enforcement process. The data we  obtained included all enforcement actions taken by FRA from the start of  fiscal year 2005 through the end of fiscal year 2010. From this  information, we identified all hours of service and hours of service  recordkeeping violations involving freight railroads. We reviewed the data  to identify the extent to which FRA pursues enforcement actions for hours  of service violations, as well as the dollar amount it assesses in the form  of fines and penalties.
To assess the reliability of the inspection and enforcement data provided  by FRA, we reviewed previous GAO reports about FRA’s databases and  FRA’s efforts to ensure the data’s reliability and conducted electronic  testing of required data elements to identify omissions, anomalies, or  obvious errors. In addition, we interviewed agency officials  knowledgeable about the data quality control procedures and the data  produced by the systems. We also determined whether the databases we  used had been audited either internally or by external organizations. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.
section_title: Additional Methodologies
paragraphs: To further address our objectives, we reviewed laws and regulations  related to hours of service issues and reviewed various studies and other  documents. To address impacts of RSIA’s hours of service changes on  the covered T&E workforce, including potential impacts on fatigue, we  reviewed literature related to fatigue and work schedules and reviewed  two reports prepared by FRA to validate the usability of the fatigue  models FAST and FAID to assess the fatigue risk associated with railroad  covered employee work schedules. These two reports provided  information on such topics as how the models assess fatigue levels,  assumptions used in making such assessments, how fatigue scores  relate to the probability of accidents, and limitations of the model results.  This information guided our use of the models to assess fatigue risk in the  work schedules we reviewed. We also reviewed FRA’s March 22, 2011,  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on new hours of service requirements for  commuter and intercity passenger railroads, FRA’s Regulatory Impact  Analysis associated with this rulemaking, and the final hours of service  rules which were issued in August 2011. In particular, we were interested  in FRA’s evaluation of fatigue risk associated with consecutive days  worked and work performed during night hours.
To address FRA’s actions to ensure compliance with hours of service  requirements, we reviewed documentation related to the National Rail  Safety Action Plan, National Inspection Plan, and National Safety  Program Plan. We also obtained selected FRA regional inspection plans  to identify how inspection resources are allocated at the local level.  Finally, we obtained data on petitions filed by railroads and others from  May 2009 through June 2011 for waivers of compliance with hours of  service requirements. These data included information on who filed  petitions, when they were filed, and what their status was as of June  2011. We verified these data with FRA and confirmed the status of each  petition with FRA officials.
To address our objectives, we also interviewed relevant individuals and  organizations, including the following:    Federal officials, including those from the National Transportation  Safety Board, FRA headquarters, and FRA regions 3, 4, 5, and 6. We  selected these regional offices because we were already doing other  work in the regions and the offices are geographically dispersed  across the country. These four regional offices accounted for 60  percent of the hours of service inspections conducted from fiscal year  2005 through fiscal year 2010, and their territories cover all or parts of  23 states. We discussed with FRA the methods and procedures used  to assess the fatigue risk in the railroad industry, the potential  operational and administrative impacts of RSIA’s hours of service  changes on the railroad industry, and the processes and procedures  FRA uses to ensure compliance with hours of service requirements.  We also discussed FRA’s actions to implement pilot projects related  to hours of service and FRA’s handling of petitions for waivers of  compliance with hours of service requirements and the status of these  petitions.   Fatigue and sleep research experts. We interviewed officials from the  firms involved in developing the FAST and FAID models, the Institute  of Behavioral Research and InterDynamics, Inc., respectively, as well  as fatigue and sleep research experts. Our discussions with the model  developers focused on how and why the models were developed,  what assumptions were used in the modeling process, how we should  use the models to assess fatigue risk in the railroad industry, and  what limitations might be associated with the model results. After we  acquired the models, officials from these companies also trained us in  how to use the models and how to interpret their results. We also  interviewed four experts in fatigue research. We spoke with these  individuals about issues related to work and fatigue and factors  relating to the potential for fatigue risk. We also solicited their views   about fatigue models in general and the two fatigue models we  acquired to analyze covered employee work schedules.   Railroad and railroad trade association officials. We interviewed  officials from all 7 class I railroads, 6 class II railroads, and 6 class III  railroads as well as officials from a holding company that was the  parent company for 39 class III railroads and 1 class II railroad. We  discussed such issues as the effects of the hours of service changes  on railroads and the covered workforce and the federal role in hours  of service. We also discussed hours of service issues with officials  from the Association of American Railroads, which represents the  interests of class I railroads and the National Railroad Passenger  Corporation, and the American Short Line and Regional Railroad  Association, which primarily represents the interests of class II and III  railroads. We also spoke with officials from the American Public  Transportation Association about work they were doing to develop  hours of service requirements for commuter and intercity passenger  railroads. We were particularly interested in their views on the  relationship between railroad work schedules and the potential for  fatigue.   Representatives of labor organizations. We interviewed  representatives from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and  Trainmen, American Train Dispatchers Association, United  Transportation Union, Transportation Communications Union,  Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, National Conference of Firemen  and Oilers, and the Transportation Trades Department of the AFL- CIO. These organizations represent various employees that would be  covered by railroad hours of service requirements, including train and  engine employees, signalmen, and dispatchers. According to these  organizations, they represent over 100,000 employees covered by  hours of service requirements. We solicited their views on the effects  of RSIA’s hours of service changes on their members, the benefits of  these changes, and the federal role in monitoring and enforcing hours  of service changes. We also solicited their views on waivers and  exemptions to hours of service requirements for which railroads have  applied.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2010 to September 2011  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: The Development of Biomathematical Models of Fatigue
paragraphs: This appendix discusses (1) why concerns about fatigue in the modern  workplace have increased, (2) the nature of biomathematical models that  have emerged to better understand sleep-work schedules and fatigue,  and (3) GAO’s use of biomathematical fatigue models for analyzing the  effect on workers of RSIA’s hours of service changes.
subsections: section_title: Workplace Fatigue Is a Growing Concern in Modern Industrial Society
paragraphs: Over the past several decades, technology has enabled, and the  globalization of society has increasingly come to expect, round-the-clock  activities. Society has become “24/7.” Planning for sleep is difficult when  work schedules are unpredictable, and work that takes place outside  normal business hours often requires people to sleep when humans are  normally awake. These characteristics of the modern work world have led  to a growing concern about human fatigue and its consequences in the  workplace. These issues are particularly important to the rail industry,  since rail workers often work on short notice and rail operations often  occur at night.
When a person does not get enough sleep, certain areas of the brain  involved in cognition are affected, engendering fatigue and an associated  state of diminished capacity. This diminished capacity can have a variety  of ramifications that may be of concern. For example, when fatigued,  humans have more difficulty maintaining attention, become less  communicative, and have reduced situational awareness. They are then  at greater risk of committing errors in their work, which can ultimately lead  to more accidents. Concern about these effects has led to the  development of tools for better understanding worker fatigue, predicting  its extent, and mitigating its effects.
section_title: Biomathematical Models Have Been Developed to Estimate Workplace Fatigue
paragraphs: Over the past several decades, a science has developed that examines  the nature of human sleep and the effects of sleep deprivation. More  recently—in about the past 20 years—a variety of researchers have  developed tools that are designed to use data on individuals’ sleep-wake  patterns to estimate a variety of outcomes such as fatigue, cognition, and  accident risk. Most of the current models are based on or informed by  what is known as the “two-process model” of sleep regulation, developed  in the early 1980s.
Generally, the two-process model posits that alertness is a function of two  primary factors:    The status of sleep/wake balance. The first factor rises and falls  based on time spent sleeping and time spent awake. The model  essentially posits that a person’s alertness decays during waking  hours and is restored with sleep and that the patterns of decay and  restoration are reasonably predictable. The longer a person is awake,  the more fatigued that person will become, and the associated  reduction in alertness increases the risk of errors and accidents.  Alertness can only be restored through sleep, and the model generally  assumes that the first few hours of sleep contribute the most to  recovery. That is, sleep intensity is greatest when sleep debt is at its  greatest, which is during the first few hours of sleep.   Circadian influence. The second factor is related to circadian rhythm.
Essentially, humans are hard-wired to sleep during the night and to be  awake during the day. When people do sleep during the day, their rest  is seldom as restorative as night sleep. First, it is apparently difficult to  sleep during the day when core body temperatures are higher.  Second, day sleep may be more prone to disruptions that limit its  benefit. Third, the circadian pressure to sleep is highest at night, so  humans tend to be less alert and more prone to lapses in attention at  times when sleep normally occurs. Thus, fatigue—independent of the  first factor, which addresses the extent of sleep deficit—tends to  accrue more quickly when people work at night.
While most of the current biomathematical models of fatigue incorporate  these factors into their analysis, they differ in how the factors are  structured. In particular, there is variation in the assumptions about  function form and other mathematical underpinnings to the models. For  example, there may be differences in how the rate of decay in cognition  with waking hours is formulated, or the manner in which circadian factors  are accounted for in the formulas. Moreover, the models vary in the  specific outputs they provide. And finally, they vary in terms of the inputs  necessary. Some require actual sleep histories, while others infer how  much sleep a person would be likely to obtain from the person’s work  hours.
The development of biomathematical fatigue models is very recent, and  the models have critical limitations that are important for interpreting and  using their outputs. The models provide a suggestion about the alertness  of humans generally, not of individuals. Individuals vary widely in how  they fatigue for a variety of reasons including differences in their personal  circadian rhythms, their health, and social responsibilities.
section_title: GAO Acquired Two Models for Use In Analyzing the Effects of Hours of Service Changes on Rail Worker Fatigue
paragraphs: GAO was asked to examine whether and how RSIA’s changes to the  hours of service laws affect rail worker fatigue. To do this, we determined  that, despite the limitations of the current biomathematical fatigue models,  there was merit in using them to study predicted fatigue based on railroad  workers’ history of work schedules before and after the rules were  implemented. In particular, we determined, through discussions with  several experts in sleep-fatigue research, that using the models to assess  the change in scores for a set of workers after the new law was  implemented was a reasonable use of these models because our focus is  not on the scores of any particular workers, but rather on the trend in  overall scores given changed scheduling patterns.
Through discussion with Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) officials  and others we determined that, at the time of our work, there were only  two current biomathematical fatigue models that had been validated by  FRA for use in assessing fatigue in the rail industry and that were  appropriate to acquire for possible use in our analysis. We acquired both  models. The first, the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling ToolTM (FAST), was  originally developed for military use by Dr. Steven R. Hursh, et al.; the  second, the Fatigue Audit InterDyneTM (FAID) tool, was developed by  Gregory D. Roach, Adam Fletcher, and Drew Dawson from the Centre for  Sleep Research, University of South Australia. In particular, the FRA  validation examined whether the models’ predicted level of fatigue  correlated with rail accidents deemed to have a “human” causal  component, but not with rail accidents that had no identified human  cause. FRA found this relationship for both models.
Both of these models require similar data on railroad workers’ work  schedules and provide generally similar outputs. In particular, both  models require data, by employee, on work shift start and end times for  the period of time to be evaluated. The FAST model also requires  information on the locations of each shift’s start and end, and average  commute times for those locations. Both models operate by taking this  information and inferring the likely sleep employees are obtaining  between their work shifts. After estimating how much time and at what  time of day employees are awake and asleep, the models estimate— depending on the model—scores for elevated fatigue or reduced  effectiveness.
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Sara Vermillion, Assistant  Director; Amy Abramowitz; Elizabeth Eisenstadt; Lorraine Ettaro; Patrick  Fuchs; Kathleen Gilhooly; Christopher Jones; Richard Jorgenson; Mitchell  Karpman; Amanda Miller; Dae Park; and Betsey Ward made key  contributions to this report.