Foreign Assistance: Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan
Published: 2003-07-18T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The circumstances of armed conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan differed in many respects, but in all three cases the United States and the international community became involved in the wars and post-conflict assistance because of important national and international interests. Over the past 10 years, GAO has done extensive work assessing post-conflict assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo and, more recently, has evaluated such assistance to Afghanistan. GAO was asked to provide observations on assistance efforts in these countries that may be applicable to ongoing assistance in Iraq. Specifically, GAO assessed (1) the nature and extent of post-conflict assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan; (2) essential components for carrying out assistance effectively; (3) challenges to implementation; and (4) mechanisms used for accountability and oversight.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--as well as in Iraq--is part of a broader, long-term assistance effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and democracy-building measures. While the post-conflict situations in these countries have varied, they have certain conditions in common--most notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance operations take place. During years of work on post-conflict situations, GAO found that three key components are needed for effective implementation of assistance efforts: a secure environment where humanitarian and other civilian workers are able to perform their tasks; a strategic vision that looks beyond the immediate situation and plans for ongoing efforts; and strong leadership with the authority to direct assistance operations. GAO also observed a number of challenges to implementing assistance operations, including the need for sustained political and financial commitment, adequate resources, coordinated assistance efforts, and support of the host government and civil society. Finally, GAO found that the international community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability in and oversight of assistance operations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s observations on assistance  efforts that followed military conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.  Although circumstances differed in many respects, in all three cases the  United States and the international community became involved in the  military conflicts and post-conflict assistance efforts in pursuit of  important national and international interests, such as the need to prevent  conflict in the Balkans from destabilizing Europe or to combat terrorists  and their supporters in Afghanistan.
My comments today will cover observations on (1) the nature and extent  of post-conflict assistance in these three locations; (2) the essential  components for carrying out assistance effectively; (3) challenges to  implementation; and (4) mechanisms used for accountability and  oversight. My testimony is based primarily on GAO reports over the past  10 years on post-conflict assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent  report on post-conflict food aid and agricultural assistance to Afghanistan.  (See app. I.) These comments should provide useful context in the  subcommittee’s oversight of post-conflict assistance to Iraq.
Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and  Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, is part of a broader, long-term assistance  effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and  democracy-building measures. The post-conflict situations in these  locations have varied, but they have certain conditions in commonmost  notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance  operations take place. We found that a secure environment, a strategic  vision, and strong leadership are the key components needed for effective  implementation of assistance efforts. In addition, we observed a number of  challenges to these efforts, including the need for sustained political  commitment, adequate human and financial resources to carry out  operations, coordinated assistance, and the support of the host  government and civil society. Our work also showed that the international  community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for  accountability and oversight with regard to assistance operations.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In Bosnia, conflict raged from 1992 through 1995 and involved the Federal  Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups.  All were fighting for control of specific territories tied to each group’s  definition of its own state. During this time an estimated 2.3 million people  became refugees or were internally displaced. NATO forces intervened in  the conflict to support international humanitarian and peacekeeping  operations beginning in 1993, culminating in a month-long bombing  campaign against Bosnian-Serb forces in July 1995. This pressure and U.S.- led negotiating efforts resulted in a cease-fire and negotiation of the  Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. About 54,000 NATO-led  troops were deployed beginning in late 1995 to enforce the military  aspects of the agreement and provide security for humanitarian and other  assistance activities. Currently, about 12,000 international troops remain in  Bosnia to provide security, including 1,800 U.S. soldiers.
The conflict in and around the Serbian province of Kosovo between  Yugoslav security forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents fighting for  Kosovo’s independence took place from early 1998 through mid-1999.  NATO initiated a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999 to  end Yugoslav aggression and subsequently deployed about 50,000 troops  to enforce compliance with cease-fire and withdrawal agreements.  Currently, there are about 25,000 NATO-led peacekeeping troops in  Kosovo, including about 2,500 U.S. soldiers.
The conflict in Afghanistan extends back to the Soviet Union’s 10-year  occupation of the country that began in 1979, during which various  countries, including the United States, backed Afghan resistance efforts.  Three years after Soviet forces withdrew, the communist regime fell to the  Afghan resistancebut unrest continued. The Taliban movement emerged  in the mid 1990s, but was removed by coalition forces in late 2001 for  harboring al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on  September 11. In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement was signed, which  provided for interim governance of the country. Currently, about 4,600  International Security Assistance Force troops provide security for the city  of Kabul and the surrounding area and approximately 11,000 U.S.-led  coalition forces continue to fight remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda.
section_title: Nature and Extent of Post-Conflict Assistance
paragraphs: GAO’s work over the past 10 years on Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent  work on Afghanistan, indicate that post-conflict assistance is a broad,  long-term effort that requires humanitarian, security, economic,  governance, and democracy-building measures. For Bosnia and Kosovo,  forces led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided overall  security, and the international community developed country-specific and  regional frameworks for rebuilding the country and province, respectively.  Bosnia’s plan included the 3- to 4-year, $5.1 billion Priority Reconstruction  Program, which provided humanitarian, economic, and other assistance  based on needs assessments conducted by the World Bank and other  international organizations. A number of international organizations  involved in the Bosnia peace operation, including the Office of the High  Representative, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and  Cooperation in Europe, helped develop government institutions and  supported democracy-building measures and police training. In Kosovo, a  U.N. peace operation oversaw assistance through (1) the United Nations  and other donors for housing winterization, refugee relief, and other short- term needs; (2) the medium-term Reconstruction and Recovery Program  devised by the European Commission and the World Bank; and (3)  programs to build a judiciary, a police force, and government institutions.  The Bosnia- and Kosovo-specific programs were complemented in 1999 by  the Stability Pact, which focused on encouraging democratization, human  rights, economic reconstruction, and security throughout the region.
For Afghanistan, the World Food Program’s (WFP) food assistance effort  constituted the largest portion of humanitarian assistance in the post- conflict period. To determine the needs of the Afghan people, WFP  conducted and continues to undertake periodic rapid food needs  assessments and longer-term food and crop supply assessments. Based on  the results of these reviews, WFP designs short-term emergency  operations focusing on free distribution of food, as well as longer-term  recovery operations including health, education, training, and  infrastructure projects. Owing to the size of WFP’s effort and its years of  experience in Afghanistan, WFP provided much of the logistics support for  other organizations operating in Afghanistan during 2002 and 2003. A  range of humanitarian and longer-term development assistance is being  provided through broad assistance programs developed by the United  Nations and other multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental  organizations. These programs include infrastructure rehabilitation,  education, health, agriculture, and governance projects, among others.
Post-conflict assistance efforts differ in the extent of multilateral  involvement. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty  Organization is responsible for enforcing the military and security aspects  of peace operations under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolutions  1031 and 1244, respectively. The United Nations, the European Union, and  other international organizations are responsible for rebuilding political  and civic institutions and the region’s economies under U.N. resolutions  and the Dayton Peace Agreement. In Afghanistan, the United States is one  of many bilateral and multilateral donors of aid helping to implement the  Bonn Agreement. In contrast, in post-conflict Iraq, the United States and  Britain are occupying powers under international law and are recognized  as such in U.N. Security Resolution 1483. The obligations of occupying  forces as enumerated in international conventions include respecting the  human rights of the local population; ensuring public order, safety, and  health; protecting property; and facilitating humanitarian relief operations,  among others.
While the post-conflict situation in each location has varied, certain  similarities are apparent, chief among them that assistance efforts  continue to be provided in volatile and highly politicized environments  where local parties have competing interests and differing degrees of  support for the peace process. In Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb parties  continue to oppose terms of the peace agreement, such as the freedom of  ethnic minority refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their  prewar homes. In Kosovo, groups of Kosovar Albanians and Serbs retain  unauthorized weapons and commit acts of violence and intimidation  against ethnic minorities in violation of the peace agreements. In  Afghanistan, warlords control much of the country and foster an  illegitimate economy fueled by the smuggling of arms, drugs, and other  goods. They also withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in customs  duties collected at border points in the regions they control, depriving the  central government of revenue to fund the country’s reconstruction.
section_title: Essential Components for Effective Post- Conflict Assistance
paragraphs: Our work has consistently shown that effective reconstruction assistance  cannot be provided without three essential elements: a secure  environment, a strategic vision for the overall effort, and strong  leadership.
subsections: section_title: Secure Environment
paragraphs: In Bosnia and Kosovo, humanitarian and other civilian workers were  generally able to perform their tasks because they were supported by large  NATO-led forces. In Bosnia, the NATO-led forces enforced the cease-fire,  ensured the separation and progressive reduction of the three ethnically  based armies from more than 400,000 soldiers and militia to 20,000 by  2003, and disbanded paramilitary police units. In Kosovo, the NATO-led  force provided security by (1) ensuring that uniformed Yugoslav security  forces withdrew from Kosovo as scheduled and remained outside the  province and (2) monitoring the demilitarization and transformation of the  Kosovo Liberation Army. Despite the relative security in these two  locations, various paramilitaries continued to operate, and sporadic  violent incidents occurred against international workers and the local  population. From 1996 through 2002, eight humanitarian workers were  killed in Bosnia and from 1999 to 2002, two humanitarian workers were  killed in Kosovo as a result of hostile action.
In contrast, throughout the post-conflict period in Afghanistan,  humanitarian assistance workers have been at risk due to ongoing security  problems caused by domestic terrorism, long-standing rivalries among  warlords, and the national government’s lack of control over the majority  of the country. The 4,600-troop International Security Assistance Force  operates only in Kabul and surrounding areas, while the mission of the  approximately 11,000-troop (9,000 U.S. and 2,000 non-U.S. troops), U.S.-led  coalition force is to root out the remnants of the Taliban and terrorist  groupsnot to provide security. In 2002 and 2003, the deteriorating  security situation has been marked by terrorist attacks against the Afghan  government, the Afghan people, and the international  communityincluding humanitarian assistance workers. Among the  incidents were attempted assassinations of the Minister of Defense and the  President; rocket attacks on U.S. and international military installations;  and bombings in the center of Kabul, at International Security Assistance  Force headquarters, and at U.N. compounds. On June 17, 2003, the U.N.  Security Council expressed its concern over the increased number of  attacks against humanitarian personnel, coalition forces, International  Security Assistance Forces, and Afghan Transitional Administration  targets by Taliban and other rebel elements. These incidents have  disrupted humanitarian assistance and the overall recovery effort. Since  the signing of the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, four assistance  workers and 10 International Security Assistance Force troops were killed  due to hostile action.
section_title: Strategic Vision
paragraphs: In our years of work on post-conflict situations, a key lesson learned is  that a strategic vision is essential for providing assistance effectively. In  Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement provided a framework for overall  assistance efforts, but lacked an overall vision for the operation. This  hindered both the military and civilian components of the peace operation  from implementing the peace agreement. For example, the Dayton  Agreement determined that the military operation in Bosnia would  accomplish its security objectives and withdraw in about 1 year but did  not address the security problem for the ongoing reconstruction efforts  after that time. Recognizing this deficiency, NATO, supported by the  President of the United States, subsequently provided an overall vision for  the mission by first extending the time frame by 18 months and then tying  the withdrawal of the NATO-led forces to benchmarkssuch as  establishing functional national institutions and implementing democratic  reforms.
In Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement sets out a framework for establishing  a new government. In addition, multilateral, bilateral, and  nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance and  longer-term development assistance have each developed independent  strategies, which have resulted in a highly fragmented reconstruction  effort. To bring coherence to the effort, the Afghan government developed  a National Development Framework and Budget. The framework ’provides  a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and broadly establishes national  goals and policy directions. The budget articulates development projects  intended to achieve national goals. However, despite the development of  these documents, donor governments and assistance agencies have  continued to develop their own strategies, as well as fund and implement  projects outside the Afghan government’s national budget.
section_title: Strong Leadership
paragraphs: Our work also highlights the need for strong leadership in post-conflict  assistance. In Bosnia, for example, the international community created  the Office of the High Representative to assist the parties in implementing  the Dayton Agreement and coordinate international assistance efforts, but  initially limited the High Representative to an advisory role. Frustrated by  the slow pace of the agreement’s implementation, the international  community later strengthened the High Representative’s authority, which  allowed him to annul laws that impeded the peace process and to remove  Bosnian officials who were hindering progress.
In Afghanistan, WFP recognized the need for strong leadership and  created the position of Special Envoy of the Executive Director for the  Afghan Region. The special envoy led and directed all WFP operations in  Afghanistan and neighboring countries during the winter of 2001–2002,  when the combination of weather and conflict was expected to increase  the need for food assistance. WFP was thus able to consolidate control of  all resources in the region, streamline its operations, and accelerate  movement of assistance. WFP points to creation of the special envoy as  one of the main reasons it was able to move record amounts of food into  Afghanistan from November 2001 through January 2002. In December 2001  alone, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food, the single largest  monthly food delivery within a complex emergency operation in WFP’s  history.
section_title: Challenges to Implementing Assistance Operations
paragraphs: Among the challenges to implementing post-conflict assistance operations  that we have identified are ensuring sustained political and financial  commitment, adequate human resources and funds to carry out  operations, coordinated assistance efforts, and local support.
subsections: section_title: Sustained Political and Financial Commitment
paragraphs: Ensuring sustained political and financial commitment for post-conflict  assistance efforts is a key challenge because these efforts take longer, are  more complicated, and are more expensive than envisioned. In Bosnia,  reconstruction continues after 8 years, and there is no end date for  withdrawing international troops, despite the initial intent to withdraw  them in 1 year. Corruption is difficult to overcome and threatens  successful implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. In Kosovo,  after 4 years, there is still no agreement on the final status of the  territory—whether it will be a relatively autonomous province of Serbia or  a sovereign entity. This makes it impossible to establish a time frame for a  transition in assistance efforts. Moreover, providing this assistance costs  more than anticipated. Total U.S. military, civilian, humanitarian, and  reconstruction assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo from 1996 through 2002  was approximately $19.7 billiona figure that significantly exceeded  initial expectations.
In Afghanistan, the preliminary needs assessment prepared by the  international community estimated that between $11.4 billion and $18.1  billion in long-term development assistance would be needed over 10  years to rebuild infrastructure and the institutions of a stable Afghan state.  Others have estimated that much more is required. For January 2002  through March 2003, donors pledged $2.1 billion. However, only 27  percent, or $499 million, was spent on major development projects such as  roads and bridges; the remainder was spent on humanitarian assistance.  Consequently, more than a year and a half of the 10-year reconstruction  period has passed and little in the way of reconstruction has begun. For  fiscal year 2002, U.S. assistance in Afghanistan totaled approximately $717  million. The Department of Defense estimates that military costs in  Afghanistan are currently about $900 million per month, or $10.8 billion  annually.
section_title: Shortfalls in Providing Resources
paragraphs: Another challenge to effectively implementing assistance efforts is  ensuring sufficient personnel to carry out operations and follow-through  on pledged funds. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community has  had difficulties providing civilian staff and the specialized police for  security in the volatile post-conflict environment. For example, operations  in Bosnia had a 40 percent shortfall in multinational special police trained  to deal with civil disturbances from returns of refugees or from efforts to  install elected officials. These shortfalls sometimes threatened security in  potentially violent situations. In Kosovo, U.N. efforts to establish a civil  administration, create municipal administrative structures, and foster  democracy were hindered by the lack of qualified international  administrators and staff. Delays in getting these staff on the ground and  working allowed the Kosovo Liberation Army to temporarily run  government institutions in an autocratic manner and made it difficult to  regain international control.
In Afghanistan, inadequate and untimely donor support disrupted WFP’s  food assistance efforts. When the operation began in April 2002, WFP had  received only $63.9 million, or 22 percent, of required resources. From  April through June—the preharvest period when Afghan food supplies are  traditionally at their lowest point—WFP was able to meet only 51 percent  of the planned requirement for assistance. WFP’s actual deliveries were,  on average, 33 percent below actual requirements for the April 2002  through January 2003 period. Lack of timely donor contributions forced  WFP to reduce rations to returning refugees and internally displaced  persons from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms. Lack of donor support also  forced WFP and its implementing partners to delay, in some cases for up  to 10 weeks, compensation promised to Afghans who participated in the  food-for-work and food-for-asset-creation projects. WFP lost credibility  with Afghans and nongovernmental organizations as a result. Similarly,  resource shortages forced WFP to delay for up to 8 weeks in-kind  payments of food in its civil service support program, which aimed to help  the new government establish itself.
section_title: Coordinated Assistance Efforts
paragraphs: Coordinating and directing assistance activities between and among  multiple international donors and military components has been a  challenge. In Bosnia, 59 donor nations and international  organizationsincluding NATO, the United Nations, the Organization for  Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the World Bank,  and nongovernmental organizationshad a role in assistance activities  but did not always coordinate their actions. For example, the United  Nations and NATO initially could not agree on who would control and  reform the Bosnian special or paramilitary police units. For the first year  of post-conflict operations, these special police forces impeded assistance  activities. The NATO-led force finally agreed to define these special police  forces as military units and disbanded them in 1997. In Kosovo, the need  for overall coordination was recognized and addressed by giving the  United Nations a central role in providing overall coordination for  humanitarian affairs, civil administration activities, and institution  building.
In Afghanistan, coordination of international assistance in general, and  agricultural assistance in particular, was weak in 2002. From the beginning  of the assistance effort, donors were urged to defer to the Afghan  government regarding coordination. According to the United Nations,  Afghan government authorities were responsible for coordination, and the  international community was to operate and relate to the Afghan  government in a coherent manner rather than through a series of disparate  relationships. The Afghan government’s attempt to exert leadership over  the reconstruction process in 2002 was largely ineffective primarily  because the bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental assistance  agenciesincluding the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture  Organization, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and othersprepared  individual reconstruction strategies, had their own mandate and funding  sources, and pursued development efforts in Afghanistan independently.  In addition, according to the international community, the Afghan  government lacked the capacity and resources to be an effective  coordinator, and thus these responsibilities could not be delegated to it. In  December 2002, the Afghan government instituted a new coordination  mechanism, but this mechanism has not surmounted conditions that  prevented effective coordination throughout 2002.
section_title: Ensuring Local-Level Support and Participation
paragraphs: Another challenge is ensuring that local political leaders and influential  groups support and participate in assistance activities. In Bosnia, the  Bosnian-Serb leaders and their political parties opposed the Dayton Peace  Agreement and blocked assistance efforts at every turn. For example, they  tried to block the creation of a state border service to help all Bosnians  move freely and obstructed efforts to combat crime and corruption, thus  solidifying hard-line opposition and extremist views. In mid-1997, when  donor nations and organizations started linking their economic assistance  to compliance with the Dayton Agreement, some Bosnian-Serb leaders  began implementing some of the agreement’s key provisions.
Although Afghanistan’s central government is working in partnership with  the international community to implement the Bonn Agreement and  rebuild the country, warlords control much of the country and foster an  illegitimate economy. They control private armies of tens of thousands of  armed men, while the international communityled by the U.S.  militarystruggles to train a new Afghan national army. Meanwhile, the  Taliban regime was not party to the Bonn Agreement, and remnants of the  regime continue to engage in guerilla attacks against the government and  the international community.
section_title: Mechanisms Used for Accountability and Oversight
paragraphs: Over the course of our work, we found that the international community  and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability  in and oversight of assistance operations.
First, the international community has monitored the extent to which post- conflict assistance achieved its objectives through reports from the United  Nations and the international coordinating mechanisms. Individual donors  and agencies also have monitored their respective on-the-ground  operations. For example, the United States monitors aid through the U.S.  Agency for International Development and USAID’s inspector general.
In Bosnia, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)—a group of 59  countries and international organizations that sponsors and directs the  peace implementation process—oversaw humanitarian and reconstruction  programs, set objectives for the operation, monitored progress toward  those goals, and established mission reconstruction and other benchmarks  in the spring of 1998. The High Representative in Bosnia, whose many  responsibilities include monitoring implementation of the Dayton  Agreement, reports to the Peace Implementation Council on progress and  obstacles in this area.
In Kosovo, the High-Level Steering Group (comprised of Canada, France,  Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the  European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International  Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and  Development) performed a similar guidance and oversight role. It set  priorities for an action plan to rebuild Kosovo and to repair the economies  of the neighboring countries through the Stability Pact. Moreover, the U.N.  interim administration in Kosovo was responsible for monitoring and  reporting on all aspects of the peace operation, including humanitarian  and economic reconstruction efforts.
In Afghanistan, WFP has used a number of real-time monitoring  mechanisms to track the distribution of commodities. Our review of WFP  data suggested that food distributions have been effective and losses  minimal. WFP data indicated that in Afghanistan, on average, 2.4  monitoring visits were conducted on food aid projects implemented  between April 2002 and November 2003.
In addition to WFP monitors, private voluntary organization implementing  partners who distribute food at the local beneficiary level make  monitoring visits in areas where WFP staff cannot travel due to security   concerns. During our visits to project and warehouse sites in Afghanistan,  we observed orderly and efficient storage, handing, and distribution of  food assistance. (Because of security restrictions, we were able to conduct  only limited site visits in Afghanistan.) WFP’s internal auditor reviewed its  monitoring operations in Afghanistan in August 2002 and found no  material weaknesses. USAID has also conducted periodic monitoring of  WFP activities and has not found any major flaws in its operations.
Over the past 10 years, GAO has evaluated assistance efforts in 16 post- conflict emergencies, including those in Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo,  and Afghanistan. Specifically, these evaluations have focused on  governance, democracy-building, rule of law, anticorruption, economic,  military, food, agriculture, demining, refugee, and internally displaced  person assistance projects. In broader terms, our work has examined the  progress toward achieving the goals of the Dayton Peace Agreement and  the military and political settlements for Kosovo, as well as the obstacles  to achieving U.S. policy goals in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  respond to any questions you or other members may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Susan Westin at  (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this testimony were Phillip J. Thomas,  David M. Bruno, Janey Cohen, B. Patrick Hickey, Judy McCloskey, Tetsuo  Miyabara, and Alexandre Tiersky.
section_title: Appendix I: Selected GAO Reports on Post- conflict Situations
paragraphs: Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles  to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability.  GAO-03-607. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-03-792R. Washington, D.C.: May 15,  2003.
Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key  Efforts Are Lagging. GAO-02-569. Washington, D.C.: June 13,  2002.
Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations.  GAO-02-707R. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002.
U.N. Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal  Years 1996-2001. GAO-02-294. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 2002.
Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful  Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  T-NSIAD-00-219. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000.
Bosnia Peace Operation: Crime and Corruption Threaten  Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  GAO/NSIAD-00-156. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2000.
Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting  Regional Stability. NSIAD-00-125BR. Washington, D.C.: April  24, 2000.
Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and  Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force.  GAO/NSIAD-99-19. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 1998.
Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton  Accelerated as International Involvement Increased.  GAO/NSIAD-98-138. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 1998.
Former Yugoslavia: War Crimes Tribunal’s Workload  Exceeds Capacity. GAO/NSIAD-98-134. Washington, D.C.:  June 2, 1998.