Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches
Published: 2004-04-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in fundamental changes in the way the United States screens airport passengers and their property. One of the most significant changes was the shift from using private screeners to using federal screeners at all but five commercial airports in the United States. These five airports are part of a pilot program, where private screeners perform screening functions. The mission of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as defined by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is to test the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may provide. GAO was asked to describe (1) the challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program, (2) the operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private screening companies, and (3) the performance of private and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. This testimony is based on our prior and ongoing work on TSA airport passenger and baggage screeners.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those differences. TSA provided the screening contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve efficiencies, and implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum requirements of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. TSA officials said they had not granted contract officials more flexibility because they wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and consistently implemented throughout all airports to achieve consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from the private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to implement. Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only limited operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some airport-specific practices. These practices include screening candidates before they are hired through the assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage screeners more efficiently, and, during the initial hiring, selecting screener supervisors from within their screener workforce rather than relying on the decisions of TSA's hiring contractors. These practices have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not currently available at airports with federal screeners. Little performance data are currently available to compare the performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. The primary source of available performance data is the results of the covert tests performed by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects through screening checkpoints. Although the test results cannot be generalized either to the airports where the tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects and indicate that, in general, private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA recognized the need to improve screener performance and has taken steps in this direction, including enhancing its training programs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) private screening  program. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in  fundamental changes in the way the United States screens airport  passengers and their property. One of the most significant changes was the  shift from the use of private screeners to perform screening functions to  the use of federal screeners at all but five commercial airports in the  United States. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),  enacted on November 19, 2001, mandated the federalization of airport  security screening and required that five airports be part of a pilot  program where screening functions are performed by private screeners.  The mission of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as defined by TSA, is  to test the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport  level that contractors may provide. ATSA also includes a provision that  allows an airport to apply to opt out of using federal screeners beginning  on November 19, 2004.
My testimony today addresses TSA’s implementation and evaluation of the  contract screening pilot program. In particular, I will address (1) the  challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program, (2) the  operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private screening  contractors, and (3) the performance of private and federal screeners in  detecting threat objects. My testimony is based on our prior work and  preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of TSA’s passenger  screening program, all of which have been done in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not  established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in  the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those  differences. TSA has provided the private screening contractors with little  opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve efficiencies, and  implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum requirements of ATSA.  Because TSA requires the pilot screening contractors and Federal Security  Directors (FSD) at airports with federal screeners to operate under the  same procedures, they faced many of the same challenges. For example,  the private screening contractors, like FSDs at airports with federal  screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize the hiring of screeners and  establish assessment centers, where screener applicants are assessed.  The inability to conduct hiring on an as needed basis has limited their  ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. TSA officials stated that  they had not granted contract officials more flexibility because they  wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well coordinated,  and consistently implemented throughout all airports to achieve  consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from the  private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities they would  like to implement.
Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only limited  operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some airport- specific practices. Flexible practices implemented by private screening  contractors include screening candidates before they are hired through the  assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage  screeners more efficiently, and, during the initial hiring, selecting screener  supervisors from within rather than relying on the decisions of TSA’s  hiring contractors. These practices have enabled the private screening  contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not currently available to FSDs  at airports with federal screeners.
Little performance data are currently available to compare the  performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat  objects. The primary source of available performance data is the results of  covert tests performed by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program  Review (OIAPR), in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat  objects through screening checkpoints and in checked baggage. Although  the test results cannot be generalized either to the airports in which the  tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an  indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects and indicate  that, in general, private and federal screeners performed similarly.  Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private  and federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA recognized the need to  improve the performance of both private and federal screeners and has  taken steps in this direction, including enhancing its training programs.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: ATSA created TSA to ensure security for all modes of transportation,  including aviation. ATSA set forth specific enhancements to aviation  security for TSA to implement and established deadlines for completing  many of them. These enhancements included federalizing passenger  screeners at more than 440 commercial airports in the United States by  November 19, 2002; enhancing screener hiring and training standards; and  establishing and managing a 2-year pilot program at 5 airports—one in  each airport security category—where screening of passengers and  property would be conducted by a private screening company and  overseen by TSA. Additionally, ATSA included a provision that allows  airport operators to apply to TSA to use private rather than federal  screeners beginning in November 2004. TSA has acknowledged that one of  its key challenges in 2004 will be designing appropriate criteria for the  potential expansion of contract screening.
As required by ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract  screeners in lieu of federal screeners at 5 commercial airports—one in  each airport security category. ATSA sets forth numerous requirements  regarding the pilot program. Specifically, it requires that  the private screening company be owned and controlled by a citizen of the  United States;  the private screening company, at a minimum, meet employment  standards, compensation and benefits rates, and performance  requirements that apply to federal screeners;    all private screener candidates meet the same minimum qualifications as  federal screeners, including U.S. citizenship, high school diploma or  equivalent, English proficiency, and pass a criminal background check;  and    all private screener candidates undergo the same battery of employment  screening tests that federal screener candidates undergo.
In June 2002, TSA selected the 5 airports that would comprise the contract  screening pilot program. In October 2002, TSA awarded contracts to four  private screening contractors to provide passenger and baggage screening  services. TSA’s role at the airports with private screeners is to provide on- site federal supervision of all passenger and property screening. Table 1  provides a list of the airports participating in the pilot program and the  private contractors responsible for conducting screening operations.
Prior to the passage of ATSA, air carriers were responsible for screening  passengers and most used private security firms to perform this function.  Long-standing concerns existed regarding screener performance in  detecting threat objects during covert tests at passenger screening  checkpoints. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the  potentially dangerous objects Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  undercover agents carried through checkpoints during tests—a level that  was considered “significant and alarming.” In 1987, screeners did not  detect 20 percent of the objects during the same types of tests. In addition,  we reported that FAA tests conducted between 1991 and 1999 showed that  screeners’ ability to detect objects was not improving, and in some cases,  was worsening. In tests conducted in the late 1990s, as the testing objects  became more realistic and the tests more closely approximated how a  terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners’ ability to  detect dangerous objects declined even further. Inadequate training and  poor supervision, along with low wages, rapid turnover, and inadequate  attention to human factors, were historically identified as key  contributors to poor screener performance.
The results I am presenting today are based on preliminary observations of  our ongoing review of TSA’s passenger screening program, which includes  a review of TSA’s efforts to implement and evaluate the contract screening  pilot program. As part of our ongoing review, which we are conducting for  this subcommittee, we interviewed TSA officials and visited all 5 pilot  program airports and 23 airports with federal screeners. During these  visits, we observed screening operations and interviewed FSDs, their  staffs, and, at some airports, airport authority and airline officials. At the   5 pilot program airports, we also interviewed representatives of the private  screening contractors. Additionally, we interviewed representatives of  several aviation associations. We plan to conduct additional analysis  during the remainder of our review, including assessing the results of our  recent survey of all 155 FSDs regarding their screening operations. We will  also review the results of the final report submitted to TSA by  BearingPoint, Inc., which compared the performance of private screeners  to federal screeners.
section_title: Private Screening Contractors Have Had Little Opportunity to Demonstrate Innovations and Achieve Efficiencies
paragraphs: A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not  established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in  the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those  differences. TSA has provided the private screening contractors with little  opportunity to demonstrate innovations and achieve efficiencies. Because  TSA requires the pilot screening contractors and FSDs at airports with  federal screeners to operate under the same procedures, they faced many  of the same challenges. For example, the private screening contractors,  like FSDs at airports with federal screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize  the hiring of screeners and establish assessment centers, where screener  applicants are assessed. The inability to conduct hiring on an as needed  basis has limited their ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. TSA  officials stated that they had not granted contract officials more flexibility  because they wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well  coordinated, and consistently implemented throughout all airports to  achieve consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from  the private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities they  would like to implement.
subsections: section_title: Private Screening Contractors Lack Authority to Determine Staffing Levels and Conduct Hiring
paragraphs: TSA determined the screener staffing needs of the private screening  contractors using the same computer-based staffing model that was used  for airports with federal screeners. This staffing model was based on the  congressionally mandated nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time  equivalent federal screeners. Both the contractors and FSDs at airports  with federal screeners have raised concerns about the adequacy of the  staffing model in accounting for the unique needs of each airport,  particularly given that the model is based on a full-time equivalent ceiling.  Two representatives of the private screening contractors that were at or  near their TSA authorized staffing levels told us in February 2004 that they  were concerned about having adequate staffing levels to meet demand  during the peak 2004 travel season. TSA had required one of these  contractors to lay off screeners in 2003 as part of its nationwide screener  downsizing effort, even though, according to TSA, private screeners do not  count toward TSA’s ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalent screeners. TSA  acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the  screener workforce and hired a consultant in September 2003 to conduct a  study of screener staffing levels, including levels for the 5 pilot program  airports. The study, which TSA initially expected to be completed in April  2004, is now scheduled for completion in May 2004. We will continue to  review TSA’s efforts to determine appropriate staffing levels during the  remainder of our review.
The private screening contractors’ concerns regarding their staffing levels  are compounded by TSA’s requirement that the contractors coordinate  their hiring through TSA headquarters. These contractors, like FSDs at  airports with federal screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize the hiring of  screeners and establish assessment centers—a process that can take  several months. The inability to conduct hiring on an as needed basis has  limited their ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. In one  instance, an FSD for an airport with private screeners stated that in  response to continued attrition at his airport, he notified TSA in advance  that additional screeners would be needed before the peak summer travel  season. However, an assessment center was not opened until mid-June  2003, and the FSD had to request assistance from TSA’s Mobile Screening  Force, a team of TSA screeners deployed around the country where  additional screening staff are needed. These screeners were in place for   2 months while TSA scheduled and conducted screener applicant  assessments and trained candidates who were selected for employment by  the private screening company. The private screening contractor and the  FSD at this airport told us that the inability to hire screeners during the  first several months of the attrition problem contributed to screener  performance issues, such as absenteeism or tardiness, and screener  complacency because screeners were aware that they were unlikely to be  terminated due to staffing shortages.
Pilot program contractors have requested the opportunity to  independently establish and operate assessment centers on an as needed  basis. Accordingly, in December 2003 and February 2004, TSA submitted  to the screening contractors requests for proposals for additional  flexibilities. TSA’s December 12, 2003, request for proposal, which  solicited input from the private screening contractors on potential  program innovations regarding day-to-day operations, was followed by a  more specific request for proposals, dated February 24, 2004, to provide  human resource services, such as screener assessments, qualification,  examination, and selection of security screener candidates. TSA received  proposals from 3 of the private screening contractors, and found that they  were insufficient in meeting the requirements set forth in the request for  proposal.  However, TSA officials said they are providing the contractors  a second chance to clarify their proposals.
section_title: Private Screening Contractors Have Limited Authority to Implement Training
paragraphs: According to TSA, there are three key elements of passenger screening  training: (1) basic training, (2) recurrent (refresher) training, and   (3) remedial training. As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic  screener training program comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of  classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training for all passenger  and baggage screeners. TSA also requires private and federal screeners to  participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per week, averaged over a  quarter. Consistent with ATSA, TSA further requires remedial training for  any private or federal screener who fails an operational test.
Representatives of the private screening contractors stated that a  challenge they face in implementing their screening functions is the  limitations TSA places on them in developing and implementing locally  based training programs. Private screening contractors at the pilot  program airports are required to participate in the basic screener training  provided by TSA’s training contractor and to maintain the same recurrent  and remedial training curriculums used by TSA. To provide training  beyond TSA’s curriculums, the private screening contractors must have  their training reviewed and approved by TSA. Contractors expressed  concern that TSA had either rejected or was slow to approve their  requests to provide additional training outside of TSA’s approved  curriculum. This was of particular concern during the first year of the pilot  program when TSA had not yet deployed a recurrent or supervisory  training program to airports to ensure that screeners were effectively  trained and supervised. TSA officials told us, on the other hand, that the  private screening contractors have yet to submit any requests for approval  of locally developed recurrent training.
Private screening contractors also expressed concerns about the lack of  specific feedback regarding screeners’ performance on the annual  recertification tests, which assess their proficiency in identifying threat  objects and adhering to standard operating procedures. TSA stores the  results of the recertification tests in a database that FSDs can access to  determine whether screeners for their respective airports passed or failed.  However, private screening contractors told us they cannot view how  screeners performed on specific questions. These performance data would  provide private screening contractors with information on the specific  training needs of screeners, and enable them to appropriately tailor  training to address screener performance deficiencies at their airports.
section_title: FSDs at Airports with Federal Screeners Faced Similar Challenges as Contractors
paragraphs: FSDs at airports with federal screeners faced many of the same challenges  as the private screening contractors, particularly regarding imposed  staffing levels, a cumbersome hiring process, and limited flexibility in  implementing local training programs. In September 2003, we reported  that FSDs had little input in determining their screener staffing levels.  Since then, FSDs have continued to express concerns about their limited  role in establishing airport-specific staffing levels and the need for realistic  staffing levels based on the unique needs of each airport. In February 2004,  we reported that many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern  with the lack of a continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost  through attrition, and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as  needed basis. The FSDs also complained of the time lag between their  requests for additional staff and having trained and certified screeners  onboard. Some FSDs reported that this time lag has hindered their ability  to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints and oversee  screening operations at their airports. Contractors at 3 of the pilot  program airports reported difficulties in getting an assessment center  established for hiring at their airport, particularly after the first cadre of  screeners had been hired, trained, and deployed. Likewise, an FSD at an  airport with federal screeners reported that inadequate staffing is his most  critical issue. He stated that to address the staffing inadequacies and  maintain a reasonably acceptable passenger wait time level, FSD staff and  screening management personnel have assisted in staffing of exit lanes,  checking boarding passes, and transporting bags, among other tasks.  However, he noted that these practices are not sustainable in the long  term.
We recently surveyed all 155 FSDs regarding their screening operations.  As of April 13, 2004, we had a response rate of about 90 percent for our  general survey and about 85 percent for our airport-specific survey. We  asked the FSDs the extent to which they needed additional authority to  perform their staffing and screening operations. As shown in table 2, the  overwhelming majority of the FSDs, and in two instances all five of the  FSDs at the pilot program airports, reported that they needed additional  authority to a great or very great extent.
section_title: Flexibilities Have Been Provided to Private Screeners in a Few Areas
paragraphs: Although, overall, TSA has not provided private screening contractors with  much operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some  airport-specific practices. Practices implemented by the private screening  contractors include screening candidates before they are hired though the  assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage  screeners more efficiently, and promoting screener supervisors from  within rather than hiring them directly from the assessment center. These  practices have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve  efficiencies that are not currently available to FSDs at airports with federal  screeners.
subsections: section_title: Contractors Have Greater Role than FSDs in Screener Selection Process
paragraphs: Although the private screening contractors can only hire applicants who  have been screened through the assessment center, the contractors have  greater flexibility than FSDs at airports with federal screeners in weeding  out candidates they deem unsuitable. For example, at one airport,  following the applicants’ successful completion of the first assessment  phase at the assessment center, the private screening contractor  interviews the candidates to assess whether the company thinks they are a  good fit for the job. Individuals whom the contractor agrees to hire are  sent through the second phase at the assessment center and, upon  successful completion of that assessment phase, to training. FSDs at  airports with federal screeners have expressed the need for a role in the  hiring process. Several FSDs told us that it is important for them or their  staff to participate in the hiring process to both build a rapport with the  screeners early in the process and to determine whether the screener  candidates would be a good fit for their airport, thereby possibly reducing  the high levels of attrition. TSA officials told us that they are planning to  redesign and streamline TSA’s hiring process, particularly the assessment  center process, to allow for greater involvement by FSDs and their staff.  Specifically, officials reported that they are beginning to (1) ensure that  the recruiting contractor includes the FSD in recruiting planning, including  obtaining input regarding where and how the contractor recruits; (2) allow  FSDs to participate with TSA’s hiring contractor in the structured  interview of the candidates; and (3) ensure that FSDs swear in the  candidates and provide organizational briefings on their first day of  orientation.
section_title: TSA Allowed Contractor to Hire Baggage Handlers
paragraphs: TSA has also allowed a private screening contractor to hire baggage  handlers to enhance checked baggage screening operations. The  contractor uses baggage handlers instead of trained baggage screeners to  move checked baggage to and from the explosive detection system or  explosive trace detection equipment and onward through the baggage  system. While the baggage handlers still count toward the full-time  equivalent authorized staffing level established by TSA for that individual  airport, both TSA and the contractor report that this flexibility has  provided a means to reduce costs without diminishing security by allowing  trained baggage screeners to devote a greater proportion of time to  screening bags. The contractor officials also told us that while they were  operating below their authorized staffing levels, they were still able to  effectively operate screening checkpoints due in part to their use of  baggage handlers. TSA has not provided FSDs with the authority to hire  baggage handlers, and thus, FSDs at airports with federal screeners where  baggage handlers would be useful are more limited in their ability to  efficiently maximize staffing resources.
This contractor is working with a local university to set up a program  where college students working as baggage handlers would earn a regular  hourly wage and tuition reimbursements in lieu of benefits. Officials at this  company told us that the use of baggage handlers would provide relief to  current full-time screeners by relieving them of time spent carrying bags to  and from checked baggage screening systems and enable them to focus  more on screening functions. While this proposal has yet to be  implemented, it demonstrates how private screening contractors might  use their flexibility to recruit employees. In contrast, TSA officials told us  that the agency has not established a tuition reimbursement program for  federal screeners.
section_title: Selecting Screener Supervisors from Within
paragraphs: TSA describes its screening supervisors as the key to a strong defense in  detecting threat objects. During the initial hiring of screeners, TSA’s hiring  contractor selected screener supervisors for both the airports with federal  and private screeners. However, one of the private screening contractors  did not hire screener supervisors directly through TSA’s assessment center  process, but instead hired all applicants as screeners and, after monitoring  their performance, promoted screeners to the supervisor position. Thus,  rather than accepting the decisions of TSA’s hiring contractor regarding  applicants who would be suitable supervisors, it determined which  screeners should be made supervisors based on actual screener  performance. This decision to promote from within gave the private  screening contractor more decision-making authority in the staffing  selection process. In contrast, many of the FSDs we interviewed and  numerous FSDs who have responded to our FSD survey reported that they  were dissatisfied with the quality of the screening supervisors initially  assigned to the airport. FSDs have attempted to address this performance  gap by conducting subsequent promotions based on their observations of  screeners’ ability to effectively supervise staff.
section_title: Little Information Exists to Measure Differences in Performance of Private and Federal Screeners
paragraphs: Little performance data are currently available to compare the  performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat  objects. The primary source of performance data currently available is the  results of the covert tests performed by TSA’s OIAPR, in which TSA  undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects through screening  checkpoints and in checked baggage. However, relatively limited testing  has been conducted to date. Although the results of the covert testing  cannot be generalized either to the airports in which the tests have been  conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener  performance in detecting threat objects. The results indicate that, in  general, private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically,  the covert testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and  federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA is in the process of  collecting and analyzing additional performance data on screener  performance, including data from the Threat Image Projection (TIP)  system, which places images of threat objects on the x-ray screen during  actual operations and records whether screeners identify threat objects,  and the annual screener recertification program. TSA has recognized the  need to enhance screener performance and has taken steps in this  direction, including enhancing its recurrent training program.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Enhanced Efforts to Measure Screener Performance
paragraphs: TSA recognized the need to strengthen its assessment of the private and  federal screener workforces and has taken action in this vein. Specifically,  TSA has increased its covert testing, fully activated TIP and deployed a  new library of 2,400 TIP images, and implemented the screener  recertification program. However, with the exception of the covert testing  and recent TIP data, data are not yet available to assess how well  screeners are performing; how the performance of federal and private  screeners compare; and what steps, if any, TSA needs to take to improve  performance. In September 2003, TSA also hired BearingPoint, a  consultant, to evaluate the performance of the contract screening  program. The consultant’s report was delivered to TSA on April 9, 2004,  but TSA has not yet publicly released the results of the study.
subsections: section_title: Covert Testing
paragraphs: TSA’s OIAPR conducts unannounced covert tests of screeners to assess  their ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved  procedures. These tests, in which undercover OIAPR inspectors attempt to  pass threat objects through screening checkpoints and in checked  baggage, are designed to identify systematic problems affecting the  performance of screeners in the areas of training, policy, and technology.  Currently, OIAPR’s covert test results are the primary available data  source on screener performance in detecting threat objects. However,  relatively limited testing has been conducted to date. Between September  9, 2002, and February 1, 2004, OIAPR conducted 1,164 checkpoint tests on  passenger screeners at 127 airports and 245 tests on baggage screeners at  119 airports. Of the 1,164 checkpoint tests OIAPR conducted, 98 were  performed at the 5 pilot program airports and 1,066 were performed at  airports with federal screeners. Of the 245 checked baggage tests, 10 were  performed at the 5 pilot program airports and 235 were performed at  airports with federal screeners. Overall, these tests have shown  weaknesses in both private and federal screeners’ ability to detect threat  objects. While the results of OIAPR’s covert tests cannot be generalized  either to the airports in which the tests have been conducted or to airports  nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in  detecting threat objects. The results indicate that, in general, private and  federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the testing identified  weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners to detect  threat objects. Similar testing conducted by the Department of Homeland  Security’s Office of Inspector General has also identified comparable  screener performance weaknesses.
OIAPR initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger rather  than baggage screeners. While OIAPR began conducting covert tests of  passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin conducting covert  tests of checked baggage screeners until January 2003. Consequently,  OIAPR has collected less data related to the performance of baggage  screeners.  OIAPR has increased the number of checkpoint and checked  baggage tests it conducts in recent months. Additionally, TSA is  developing protocols to help FSDs conduct their own airport level  screening testing—a practice that TSA had previously prohibited at all  airports, including those with private screeners.
section_title: TIP System
paragraphs: Another key source of information on screener performance in detecting  threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to test  screeners’ detection capabilities by projecting threat images, including  guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened during actual  operations. Screeners are responsible for positively identifying the threat  image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, TIP  identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records the  screener’s performance in a database that could be analyzed for  performance trends. TSA only recently began collecting and analyzing TIP  data and TIP is not yet available for baggage screening.
TSA is not currently using TIP data as a formal indicator of screener  performance, but instead is using TIP to identify individual screeners’  training needs in terms of identifying threat objects on the X-ray machine.  TSA recently completed deploying and activating TIP with the new library  of 2,400 images at all but 1 of the more than 1,800 passenger screening  lanes nationwide. TSA considers February 2004 to be the first full month  of TIP reporting with the new library of 2,400 images. TSA collected these  data in early March 2004. Officials told us that they plan to analyze at least  3 months of data—February, March, and April 2004—to determine more  precisely how the data can be used to measure screener performance in  detecting threat objects and to validate what the data tells TSA about  screener performance. Additionally, officials stated that they plan to use  TIP as an evaluation tool once sufficient data are collected to establish  firm performance standards.
section_title: Annual Recertification Program
paragraphs: A third indicator of screener performance is the results of the annual  recertification testing. ATSA requires that TSA collect performance  information on all screeners by conducting an annual proficiency  evaluation to ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications and  standards related to the functions that he or she performs. To meet this  requirement, TSA established an annual recertification program comprised  of two assessment components, one of the screener’s knowledge and skills  and the other of the screener’s performance. The knowledge and skills  assessment program consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of standard  operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical  demonstration of skills. As part of the performance assessment, screeners  are rated on both organizational and individual goals, such as maintaining  the nation’s air security, vigilantly carrying out duties with utmost  attention to tasks that will prevent security threats, and demonstrating the  highest levels of courtesy to travelers to maximize their levels of  satisfaction with screening services. To be certified, a screener must have  passed all the applicable modules and have a rating of “met” or “exceeded”  standards on their annual performance assessment.
Screeners have completed all three modules of the knowledge and skills  assessment program. TSA is currently analyzing the results of the fiscal  year 2004 recertification tests and plans to report on the results of the  certification process to TSA’s Acting Administrator in late April 2004. The  report will include the results of all three modules of the knowledge and  skills assessment tests, the outcomes of screener performance  assessments, and the total number of screeners terminated due to failure  to successfully pass the recertification program.
section_title: TSA Efforts to Enhance Performance of Private and Federal Screeners
paragraphs: In October 2003, TSA began implementing a screening performance  improvement program for private and federal screeners. The goal of the  program is to improve screener performance through several training and  management initiatives, including increasing covert testing at screening  checkpoints, completing installation of TIP at all airports, enhancing  screener training, and strengthening supervisors’ skills through leadership  and technical training. As part of TSA’s efforts to enhance screener  performance, TSA requires all screeners to participate in 3 hours of  training per week averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to be  devoted to X-ray image interpretation and the other 2 hours to screening  techniques or reviews of standard operating procedures. TSA recently  provided FSDs at all airports, including airports with private screeners,  with additional training tools. Specifically, according to TSA officials, TSA  has    provided every airport, including the 5 pilot program airports, with at least  one Modular Bomb Set (MBS II) kit—containing components of an  improvised explosive device—and one weapons training kit, in part  because screeners had consistently told OIAPR inspectors that they would  like more training with test objects similar to ones used in the tests;  instituted a program called “Threat in the Spotlight” that, based on  intelligence TSA receives, provides screeners with the latest in threat  information regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past  screening checkpoints;    established video training and fielded the first two videos in the series; and  fielded an Online Learning Center—a Web based tool with 366 self-guided  training courses available to all screening staff, including staff at the 5  pilot program airports.
As we reported in February 2004, staffing shortages and lack of high- speed connectivity at airport training facilities have made it difficult for  screeners to fully utilize these programs. According to TSA officials, the  Online Learning Center is now available via the Internet and the Intranet;  therefore the issues of connectivity have been mitigated. In January 2004,  OIAPR began to gather data on selected training initiatives and to conduct  repeat covert testing at airports. At each of the airports OIAPR visited to  conduct covert tests between January 5, 2004, and February 1, 2004,  OIAPR inspectors interviewed screeners about whether they had  participated in the training initiatives. Based on these interviews, OIAPR  found that the training initiatives they discussed with the screeners had  not been fully implemented at every airport.
TSA officials said that they have begun to focus attention on airports  where screeners performed particularly poorly on covert tests. For  example, TSA officials said that mobile training assist teams were  deployed in November 2003 to identify causes of poor performance at  these airports and work with FSDs to devise and implement solutions.  Additionally, in January 2004, OIAPR began conducting repeat covert  testing at airports to determine whether TSA’s initiatives designed to  enhance screener performance, such as additional recurrent training, have  in fact improved performance. Furthermore, FSDs are to be held  accountable for screening performance and delivery of security.  Specifically, annual performance assessments for all FSDs are to be tied to  the overall performance level of their screeners as well as to their ability  to address deficiencies quickly and adequately.
Despite its efforts to collect screener performance data and enhance  screener performance, TSA officials acknowledged that they had not  established overall performance targets by which to assess whether  screeners within and across airports are achieving a desired level of  performance. However, TSA has made progress in establishing  performance standards for one screening function—X-ray image  interpretation. In March 2004, TSA established interim TIP performance  standards and plans to finalize these standards in May 2004. TSA is  currently considering developing performance indexes for representing  the performance of passenger and baggage screeners. During the  remainder of our review, we plan to continue to examine TSA’s efforts to  measure screeners’ performance, establish performance standards, and  assess the performance of the private screening pilot program. As part of  this effort, we will review the results of the BearingPoint, Inc. evaluation  of the private screening pilot program, which was provided to TSA on  April 9, 2004.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The private screening pilot program was not established in a way to enable  an effective evaluation of the differences in the performance of federal and  private screening and the reasons for those differences. In developing the  pilot program, TSA did not develop an evaluation plan or performance  targets by which to assess how the performance of federal and private  screening compares. Additionally, TSA did not collect data in ways that  would enable it to reach generalizable conclusions about the performance  of private screeners. Further, the program was not designed to achieve its  intended mission, as defined by TSA—to test the effectiveness of  increased operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may  provide. Key operational areas, such as staffing and training have to a  large extent been held constant across all airports, and therefore, are not  within the control of the private screening contractors. Therefore, it is not  surprising that TSA’s available screener performance data indicate little  difference between federal or private screeners in detecting threat objects.  It would have been informative to have an evaluation of a true pilot  program where the private screening contractors were provided with  operational flexibility that could assist in identifying practices that lead to  improved screener performance and higher security at the most efficient  cost to the taxpayer. Without data to better assess the performance of  private screening operations and flexible practices, TSA and airport  operators have little information on which to plan for the possible  transition of airports from a federal system to a private screening  contractor. We will continue our work and make recommendations for  TSA actions, as appropriate, in a future report.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact Information and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin  at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony  include David Alexander, Lisa Brown, Dave Hooper, Christopher Jones,  Thomas Lombardi, Stuart Kaufmann, Maria Strudwick, Cady Summers,  and Susan Zimmerman.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or  other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to  reproduce this material separately.