Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports
Published: 2005-03-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in the approximately 7 million containers that arrive annually at U.S. seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders by being placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response to this concern, since 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) has deployed radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports through its Megaports Initiative (Initiative). GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in implementing the Initiative, (2) current and expected costs of the Initiative, and (3) challenges DOE faces in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOE's Megaports Initiative has had limited success in initiating work at seaports identified as high priority by DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model, which ranks ports in terms of their relative attractiveness to potential nuclear smugglers. Gaining the cooperation of foreign governments has been difficult in part because some countries have concerns that screening large volumes of containers will create delays that could inhibit the flow of commerce at their ports. DOE has completed work at 2 ports and signed agreements to initiate work at 5 other ports. Additionally, DOE is negotiating agreements with the governments of 18 additional countries and DOE officials told us they are close to signing agreements with 5 of these countries. However, DOE does not have a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the Initiative's efforts. Developing such a plan would lead DOE to, among other things, determine criteria for deciding how many and which lower priority ports to complete if it continues to have difficulties working at higher volume and higher threat ports of interest. Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on Megaports Initiative activities. Of this amount, about $14 million was spent on completing installations at 2 ports. Although DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010, at an estimated cost of $337 million, this cost projection is uncertain for several reasons. For example, the projection is based in part on DOE's $15 million estimate for the average cost per port, which may not be accurate because it was based primarily on DOE's work at Russian land borders, airports, and seaports. Additionally, DOE is currently assessing whether the Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports; if this occurs, total costs and time frames will also increase. DOE faces several operational and technical challenges in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. For example, DOE is currently devising ways to overcome technical challenges posed by the physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations at some ports. Additionally, environmental conditions, such high winds and sea spray, can affect radiation detection equipment's performance and sustainability.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over the past decade, as terrorist activities have spread throughout the  world, the United States has become increasingly concerned about the  threat posed by unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material. Such  material could be stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries  seeking weapons of mass destruction. According to the International  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), between 1993 and 2003, there were 540  confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. A  significant number of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that  could be used to produce a nuclear weapon or a device that uses  conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty  bomb”). Even small amounts of nuclear and radiological materials are  worrisome because as little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8  kilograms of plutonium could be used to build a nuclear weapon, and small  amounts can be smuggled across borders in cars, carried in personal  luggage on aircraft, or placed inside containers aboard cargo ships.
Seaports are critical gateways for international commerce, and maritime  shipping containers play a vital role in the movement of cargo between  global trading partners. In 2002, approximately 7 million shipping  containers arrived at U.S. ports carrying more than 95 percent of U.S.  imports by weight from outside North America. Responding to heightened  concern about national security since September 11, 2001, several U.S.  government agencies have acted to prevent terrorists from smuggling  weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers from overseas locations.  In 2003, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security  Administration initiated its Megaports Initiative (Initiative), the goal of  which is to enable foreign government personnel at key seaports to use  radiation detection equipment to screen shipping containers entering and  leaving these ports, regardless of the containers’ destination, for nuclear  and other radioactive material that could be used against the United States  or its allies. Through the Initiative, DOE installs radiation detection  equipment at foreign seaports that is then operated by foreign government  officials and port personnel working at these ports.
DOE’s Megaports Initiative coordinates with and complements the  Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security Initiative (CSI).  Under CSI, which began operating in January 2002, U.S. Customs officials  stationed in foreign ports review the cargo manifests of containers bound  directly for the United States and attempt to identify containers with  potentially dangerous cargo, such as explosives or weapons of mass  destruction. U.S. Customs officials then request that the host country’s  customs officials inspect these containers before they are loaded on  vessels destined for the United States. CSI and the Megaports Initiative  differ in several important ways. For example, while CSI stations U.S.  personnel in foreign ports, the Megaports Initiative does not. Instead it  installs radiation detection equipment that enables foreign customs  officials to improve the level of sophistication of their inspections by  screening cargo for nuclear and radioactive materials. Also, under CSI, the  United States bears the financial burden for posting its own inspectors at  foreign ports, while participating in the Megaports Initiative requires a  significant financial commitment from a host country because it may need  to hire additional customs agents to operate the radiation detection  equipment DOE provides.
To help decisionmakers identify and prioritize foreign seaports for  participation in the Megaports Initiative, DOE uses a complex model that  ranks foreign ports according to their relative attractiveness to potential  nuclear smugglers. The Maritime Prioritization Model incorporates  information, such as port security conditions, volume of container traffic  passing through ports, the proximity of the ports to sources of nuclear  material, and the proximity of the ports to the United States and is updated  regularly to incorporate new information. When selecting ports for  equipment installations, DOE also considers other factors, including the  likelihood that a potential host country will agree to participate in the  Initiative and the location of significant world events, such as the Olympic  Games. Once DOE selects a port and the host country shows interest in  participating in the Initiative, program officials may conduct a visit to the  port to familiarize themselves with its operations and layout. Prior to  implementation activities at a selected port, DOE and the host country’s  government negotiate an agreement, or memorandum of understanding  (MOU), that outlines the expectations, roles, and responsibilities of both  parties for work at the selected port as well as the long-term use of the  equipment to be installed.
As agreed with your offices, we examined (1) DOE’s progress in  implementing its Megaports Initiative, (2) the current and expected costs of  the Initiative, and (3) the challenges DOE faces in installing radiation  detection equipment at foreign ports. To address these objectives, we  analyzed documentation on the Megaports Initiative from DOE and its  contractors, both at DOE’s national laboratories and in the private sector,  and conducted interviews with key program officials. We also visited  completed Megaports Initiative installations at Rotterdam, the Netherlands,  and Piraeus, Greece, to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment  and to discuss the implementation of the program with foreign officials. In  addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary information, performed a data  reliability assessment of the data we received, and interviewed  knowledgeable program officials on the reliability of the data. We  determined these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report. More details on our scope and methodology can be found in  appendix I. We conducted our review from June 2004 to March 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Megaports Initiative is part of DOE’s Office of the Second Line of  Defense, whose aim is to strengthen the overall capability to detect and  deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials across  international borders. DOE, with the assistance of several DOE national  laboratories and private contractors, generally implements its Megaports  Initiative at foreign seaports in six phases: (1) port prioritization; (2)  government-to-government negotiations and port familiarization; (3)  technical site surveys, site design, and training; (4) final design,  construction, and equipment installation; (5) equipment calibration and  testing; and (6) maintenance and sustainability.
The Maritime Prioritization Model, which is maintained by Sandia National  Laboratories (Sandia), uses unclassified information to rank foreign  seaports for their attractiveness to a potential nuclear material smuggler.  This information is maintained within the model in several categories that  are individually weighted and scored and then combined to provide each  port with an overall score. Ports receiving higher scores are considered  more attractive to a nuclear material smuggler and therefore of potentially  higher interest for inclusion in the Initiative. In May 2004, DOE directed  Sandia to conduct a peer review of the model to determine the validity of  its modeling approach, the appropriateness of the factors used in the  model, and the suitability of the data for selecting and prioritizing foreign  ports for the Initiative. The peer review panel concluded in August 2004,  that the approach used in the design and execution of the model is  conceptually sound and provides a relevant, defensible baseline from  which to pursue bilateral engagements for installing radiation detection  equipment at foreign ports. The panelists noted that the primary strengths  of the model are the ease with which new sources of information relevant  to prioritizing potential nuclear material smuggling routes can be added  and the transparency of the data and calculations used in the model.  Currently, the model ranks about 120 seaports worldwide, and DOE plans  to add an additional 80 ports to the model in fiscal year 2005. DOE officials  noted that the model will continue to evolve to more clearly consider both  volume and threat. DOE also considers other factors when deciding which  specific ports to engage, such as a potential host country’s level of interest  in the Initiative and the location of significant world events, such as the  Olympic Games.
Once DOE selects a port for inclusion in the Initiative, DOE officials and  host country representatives begin to negotiate an agreement or  memorandum of understanding that defines the scope of work and level of  cooperation between DOE and the host country for work at the selected  port or ports. Concurrently, a team of experts from DOE’s national  laboratories visits the selected port to familiarize themselves with the  port’s operations and layout. Discussions are also conducted, as  appropriate, with major port and terminal operators. In many cases the  port-operating companies, along with terminal operators, have an  economic interest in cooperating with the Initiative, since they have the  most to lose in the event terrorists are successful in exploiting weaknesses  of the maritime shipping network to launch an attack using weapons- usable nuclear or other radioactive material.
After an MOU has been signed, the technical site survey, design, and  training phase begins. Initially, one or more site visits are conducted to  gather technical information to determine the degree to which cargo can be  effectively screened in a port, to assess the vulnerabilities of the port to  illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, and to estimate  equipment needs. These visits help DOE determine port security  information, port traffic patterns, shipping volume, training needs, and any  other relevant information. Program officials then develop a port security  report that analyzes the flow of container traffic for all port entry and exit  gates, as well as for cargo that arrives at a port on one ship, is offloaded  onto a dock, and then leaves aboard another ship—known as transshipped  cargo. DOE also performs a cost benefit analysis of the proposed  equipment installations at specific entry and exit gates. On the basis of the  results of these assessments, DOE develops a design requirements package  that includes the port’s layout, proposed equipment needs, and installation  requirements. This information is used to conduct more detailed  engineering surveys to develop the final design. During this phase, DOE  also begins to provide training to foreign customs officials, including  training at the DOE Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency  Response center located at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).  The training focuses on radiation safety, the use of radiation detection  equipment, and alarm response procedures. The training generally consists  of a 1-week course with both classroom learning and simulated field  operations. Training is tailored to each port, and materials are provided in  the working language of the host country.
During the final design, construction, and equipment installation phase,  DOE determines the equipment needs of the port, the specific placement of  the equipment, and any site preparation or construction work to be done at  the port. The equipment that DOE provides through the Initiative is  commercially available, off-the-shelf technology. DOE provides radiation  detection portal monitors, which are stationary pieces of equipment  designed to detect radioactive materials being carried by vehicles or  pedestrians. These portal monitors can detect both gamma and neutron  radiation, which is important for detecting the presence of highly enriched  uranium and plutonium, respectively. In addition, DOE provides portable  radiation detection devices, including handheld devices that can help assist  foreign customs officials conduct secondary inspections to pinpoint the  source of an alarm and to determine the type of radioactive material  present. DOE also provides radiation detection pagers, which are small  detectors that can be worn on a belt to continuously monitor radiation  levels in the immediate area of the customs officials wearing the pagers.  DOE installs the portal monitors at specific locations within the port, such  as terminal entry and exit gates, and integrates the portal monitors with a  central alarm station through the use of fiber optic cable or other methods.
Once installation is complete, the equipment is calibrated and tested before  being turned over to the host country’s government. DOE officials calibrate  the equipment to optimal specifications for the detection of weapons- usable nuclear material. The settings, which determine the equipment’s  sensitivity, are based on a number of factors, including the level of  background radiation of the location, the type of cargo handled at a  specific port, and the potential use of shielding. Once the equipment is  calibrated and tested, the host country’s customs officials can begin to  screen cargo containers for radiation. When a container is scanned, an  alarm will sound if the equipment detects radiation. A monitoring system  logs which monitor set off the alarm, the date and time of the alarm, the  alarm type, the gamma and neutron count for the alarm, any indications of  tampering, an average reading of the background radiation of the area, and  takes a photograph of the container’s identification number. If determined  necessary, the customs official then conducts a secondary inspection with  a handheld radiation detection device to identify the source and location of  the radiation. If the radiation profile of a scanned container’s contents  matches the profile of consumer goods that are known to contain natural  sources of radiation, foreign customs officers may opt not to conduct a  secondary inspection. However, the profile of consumer goods can appear  different from the typical profile if the container is not uniformly packed  with this item or if the container is filled with a combination of consumer  goods. If the customs officials cannot determine the content of the  container after the screening with a handheld radiation device, they may  manually inspect the container or request assistance from other agencies  within their government. Concurrent with the calibration and testing phase,  DOE national laboratory experts travel to the host country to provide  specific in-country training to foreign customs officials in the proper use of  the radiation portal monitors as well as portable radiation detection  equipment.
Once DOE fully turns the equipment over to the host government, the  project moves to the maintenance and sustainability phase. Typically, DOE  plans to fund 3 years of sustainability activities at each port. These  activities include providing refresher training for foreign customs officials;  general maintenance of the radiation detection equipment; spare parts;  and, as negotiated with the host country, periodic evaluation of alarm data  and port procedures to ensure that the equipment is being operated  properly. DOE wants the U.S. government to be informed of any incidents  or seizures that occur as a result of using equipment provided by the  Initiative. Additionally, other technical data may be exchanged to assist  technical experts from both DOE and the host country in their ongoing  analysis of the operational effectiveness of the systems. To date, data  sharing provisions have been incorporated into the agreements signed by  DOE and host country governments.
section_title: DOE’s Megaports Initiative Has Had Limited Success Initiating Work at High Priority Foreign Seaports and Lacks a Comprehensive Long- Term Plan to Guide Its Efforts
paragraphs: DOE’s Megaports Initiative has made limited progress in beginning to  install radiation detection equipment at seaports identified as high priority  by its Maritime Prioritization Model. According to DOE officials, the  Initiative’s limited success in initiating work at certain ports is largely due  to difficulties negotiating agreements with foreign governments, in  particular with countries that have ports ranked as high priority by DOE’s  model, such as China. Further, DOE has completed work at only two ports,  both of which were ranked lower in priority than other ports by DOE’s  model. Given DOE’s limited success in installing radiation detection  equipment at most high priority ports, it is particularly noteworthy that the  Initiative does not have a comprehensive long-term plan that describes how  DOE plans to measure program success, overcome obstacles it faces, and  achieve the goals of the Initiative.
subsections: section_title: DOE Has Signed Agreements to Begin Work at Only 2 of the 20 Highest Priority Ports Identified by an Earlier Version of Its Prioritization Model
paragraphs: DOE has had difficulty reaching agreement with some countries where  high-priority ports are located, such as China, due to a variety of political  factors often outside of DOE’s control. DOE has completed work at two  ports and signed agreements to initiate work at five others, two of which  were ranked in the 20 highest priority ports by DOE’s model. According to  DOE officials, some foreign governments have been hesitant to participate  in the Megaports Initiative for two main reasons: possible interruptions to  the flow of commerce at their ports and reluctance to hire the additional  customs agents necessary to operate and maintain the radiation detection  equipment DOE provides.
First, some foreign governments have concerns that the flow of commerce  at their ports could be disrupted by participating in the Initiative in both the  short- and long-term. For the short-term, some foreign governments have  expressed concern that the flow of commerce at their ports could be  disrupted during the installation of radiation detection equipment. A  related long-term concern is that, by agreeing to participate in the Initiative,  the host country’s customs officials will be screening large volumes of  cargo containers, which could lead to delays or disruptions to the flow of  commerce at the port. To address these concerns, DOE provides  prospective Initiative participants with information on how the radiation  detection equipment would be installed and operated in the country,  including information on the design, construction, training, and  implementation processes. To alleviate concerns about construction  issues, such as the placement of radiation portal monitors, DOE analyzes  the natural choke points that occur in a port and seeks to install equipment  at these locations to avoid the interruption of commerce. According to a  DOE official, to avoid delays in port operations during installation of  equipment, construction work is often performed at night so that normal  port operations are not impeded. To further demonstrate how the radiation  detection equipment is installed and operated, DOE officials show  prospective Initiative participants a video or arrange site visits to the port  of Rotterdam, where DOE has completed equipment installations in a pilot  project at one port terminal, so that they can witness port operations and  have an example of how the equipment will be operated in their country.
A second impediment to negotiating agreements with foreign governments  is their reluctance to hire additional officials (generally customs agents) to  operate and maintain the equipment DOE provides through the Initiative.  Although some foreign governments have large numbers of personnel at  their ports to regulate imports and exports, others lack the staff necessary  to both perform other port functions and operate and monitor the radiation  detection equipment DOE provides. For example, the Dutch government  expressed this reservation before it agreed to participate in the Initiative,  and Dutch officials told us that they will need to hire and train an additional  40-60 customs agents when radiation detection equipment is installed at all  port terminals in Rotterdam. The need for additional workers, combined  with limited financial resources, may prevent some countries from  participating in the Megaports Initiative. However, DOE officials told us  that they do not believe that this impediment would prevent a foreign  government’s participation in the Initiative.
DOE officials told us that they are in the process of negotiating with the  governments of 18 countries to gauge their interest in participating in the  Initiative. According to DOE officials, the Initiative has primarily focused  on engaging countries that have ports ranked in the top 50 by DOE’s model,  but it also pursues ports of special interest that may be ranked lower than  50. DOE plans to begin work at Antwerp and to complete the installations  in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Freeport, Bahamas, and Algeciras, Spain by the end  of fiscal year 2005, but complications may prohibit DOE from meeting this  goal. For example, a DOE official told us that program officials are  currently in the process of determining the impact of the December 2004  tsunami disaster on DOE’s planned work at the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka.  According to a DOE official, resources for project construction and  materials may be affected. If so, DOE may not be able to complete  installation of radiation detection equipment at this port in fiscal year 2005.
Additionally, on March 10, 2005, DOE and the government of Singapore  signed an agreement to include the port of Singapore in the Megaports  Initiative. DOE officials also told us that they are close to signing  agreements to initiate work in five additional countries. Figure 1 shows the  location of the ports DOE completed in fiscal year 2004 and those it plans  to complete in fiscal year 2005.
section_title: DOE Has Completed Installations at 2 Ports That Were Ranked Lower in Priority Than Other Foreign Seaports by DOE’s Model
paragraphs: DOE has completed work at only two ports: Rotterdam, the Netherlands,  and Piraeus, Greece, both of which were ranked lower in priority than  other foreign seaports by DOE’s model. The port of Rotterdam, which is the  largest in Europe and handles an estimated 40 percent of all European  shipments bound for the United States, became part of the Initiative on  August 13, 2003, when DOE signed an MOU with the Dutch government.  DOE installed a limited number of vehicle radiation detection portal  monitors at the largest of Rotterdam’s four terminals, which ships an  estimated 87 percent of all of Rotterdam’s cargo destined for the United  States (see figure 2). Initially, DOE planned to install monitors at all four  terminals at Rotterdam. However, as discussions with Dutch officials  progressed, the Dutch government decided to limit its level of involvement  in the Initiative by permitting DOE to install monitors at only one of  Rotterdam’s four terminals. Additionally, DOE trained 43 Dutch customs  officials at its training center at PNNL and conducted additional onsite  training for other Dutch customs officials. DOE also provided over 20  pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment for use in conducting  secondary inspections.
DOE officials told us that they consider the installation at Rotterdam a pilot  project and believe it to be a success because, as a result of their  experience with it, the Dutch government agreed to pay for the installation  of radiation detection equipment throughout the rest of the port. Dutch  government officials told us that they plan to complete the full installation  of radiation detection equipment at all four Rotterdam terminals by 2006.  Although this type of cost-sharing arrangement is not an established  objective of the Initiative, DOE officials believe that they may pursue other  such pilot projects when a host government requests limited assistance  from DOE. DOE completed the pilot project and the radiation detection  equipment was fully turned over to the Dutch government in April 2004.  During fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to conduct additional training on  secondary inspection methods at Rotterdam for between 20 and 30 Dutch  customs officials and will continue to provide equipment support and  maintenance. Beyond fiscal year 2005, DOE’s involvement at the port will  likely be limited to training and technical consultations on future  equipment installations made by the Dutch government.
While the port of Piraeus, Greece, is not one of the largest container ports  in the world and was not ranked as a high priority by DOE’s model, security  concerns at the port increased prior to the 2004 Olympic Games in Greece.  The heightened importance of Piraeus, which is about 6 miles from the  center of Athens, led DOE to include the port in the Megaports Initiative as  part of its efforts to secure Greece prior to the Olympic Games. Initially,  the Greek Atomic Energy Commission requested assistance from IAEA in  identifying ways to mitigate radiological and nuclear threats during the  Olympics. IAEA then approached DOE to consider including the port of  Piraeus in the Initiative. On October 30, 2003, DOE, the Greek Atomic  Energy Commission, and the Greek Customs Service signed a tripartite  agreement to include Piraeus in the Initiative. Because the design,  construction, installation, training, and equipment testing needed to be  complete before the Olympic Games, DOE executed the project on an  accelerated schedule and, as a result, completed all equipment installations  in July 2004. DOE installed a limited number of vehicle portal monitors at  the cargo terminal in Piraeus (see figure 3), and some portal monitors (for  both vehicles and pedestrians) at the passenger terminal of the port of  Piraeus. Piraeus has one of Europe’s largest ferry terminals, and the Greek  government anticipated an increased volume of passenger traffic  associated with the Olympic Games. DOE officials told us that providing  radiation detection equipment to passenger terminals is normally outside  the scope of the Megaports Initiative, but the potential security issues  surrounding Greece’s hosting of the Olympic Games led DOE to provide  radiation detection equipment to the Piraeus passenger terminal. DOE also  trained 10 Greek customs officials from Piraeus at its training center and  provided additional in-country training to 50 Greek customs officials who  work at the port. In fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to provide additional onsite  training to Greek officials, determine whether any additional equipment  installations are necessary, and evaluate any equipment problems that  arise.
section_title: DOE’s Megaports Initiative Lacks a Comprehensive Long-Term Plan to Guide Its Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Ports
paragraphs: DOE’s Megaports Initiative does not have a comprehensive long-term plan  to guide the Initiative as it moves forward, which is particularly important  given DOE’s recent proposal to expand the Initiative’s scope to include  additional foreign seaports. To set the direction for the Megaports  Initiative, DOE currently uses three planning documents: the Megaports  Initiative Fiscal Year 2005 Program Work Plan, the DOE Future Years  Nuclear Security Program, and the Megaports Initiative Strategy Paper. The  Fiscal Year 2005 Program Work Plan is an evolving planning document that  incorporates day-to-day changes in program activities and documents the  scope of work to be conducted in this fiscal year. This plan also includes a  detailed activity-based budget for the current fiscal year to guide the work  of national laboratories and contractors involved in the Initiative. The  Future Years Nuclear Security Program includes a 5-year financial-based  projection of the number of ports to be completed. Additionally, at a  February 22, 2005, meeting to discuss an early draft of this report, DOE  officials provided us with a copy of the Megaports Initiative Strategy Paper.  This two and one half-page document provides a broad vision for the  Initiative, and describes some factors that may affect program success, but  it contains few details about how DOE plans to achieve the goals of the  Initiative.
These three documents provide some elements that are needed in a long- term plan for the Initiative. Specifically, the DOE Future Years Nuclear  Security Program establishes that the long-term goal for the program is to  install radiation detection equipment at 20 ports by 2010 and provides cost  estimates for the Initiative. In addition, the Megaports Initiative Strategy  Paper describes DOE’s approach for determining which ports to target for  inclusion in the Initiative and states that the Initiative’s mission is to  diminish the probability of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other  radioactive material in the global maritime system that could be used  against the United States, its key allies, and international partners.  However, DOE’s goal of completing 20 ports may not be an adequate  measure toward sufficiently addressing the overall threat of nuclear  smuggling in the international maritime system. As previously stated, DOE  uses its Maritime Prioritization Model to rank foreign ports on their relative  attractiveness to nuclear smugglers and as a tool to help program officials  decide which ports to pursue for inclusion in the Initiative. DOE has annual  performance measures to install radiation detection equipment at a given  number of ports to show progress towards its long-term goal of completing  installations at 20 ports by 2010. While using the number of ports  completed annually provides a broad measure of the Initiative’s progress,  this measure does not take into account whether the ports where  equipment is being installed are of highest priority. That is, DOE has not  tied its annual performance measures of completing a certain number of  ports to the model it uses to determine which ports are of highest priority.
In addition, DOE did not meet its fiscal year 2004 performance measure of  completing three ports through the Megaports Initiative. DOE officials  stated that the Initiative did not meet this measure because of their inability  to sign agreements with foreign governments to install radiation detection  equipment. DOE’s lack of progress in gaining agreements with countries  that contain high-priority ports has led it to initiate work at ports that were  not ranked as highest priority by DOE’s model. Developing a  comprehensive long-term plan for the Megaports Initiative would require  DOE to, among other things, develop criteria for deciding how many and  which lower priority ports to complete, or what other actions may be  warranted, if it continues to have difficulties gaining agreements to install  radiation detection equipment at the highest priority ports. DOE officials  told us that they intend to develop such a plan for the Initiative in the near  future.
section_title: Through the End of Fiscal Year 2004, DOE Had Spent About $43 Million on Megaports Initiative Activities, but Total Program Costs Are Uncertain
paragraphs: Since the inception of the Megaports Initiative in fiscal year 2003 through  the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on Megaports  Initiative activities. DOE spent these funds on such activities as the  completion of a pilot project at Rotterdam, the Netherlands; equipment  installations at Piraeus, Greece; the advanced purchase of equipment for  use at future ports; program oversight; and the development and  maintenance of DOE’s Maritime Prioritization Model (see figure 4).
As figure 4 shows, DOE spent $13.8 million, or 32 percent of program  expenditures, to complete installations at Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and  Piraeus, Greece. DOE also spent an additional $238,000 on activities related  to future equipment installations in Freeport, Bahamas. DOE spent $28.8  million on program integration activities, which are costs not directly  associated with installing equipment at a specific port. Of this amount,  $13.7 million was spent on advanced equipment procurement activities,  which include the purchase and storage of approximately 408 portal  monitors and associated spare parts for use at future installations. DOE  also spent $6.6 million on program oversight activities, such as program  cost and schedule estimating, technical assistance provided by  participating national laboratories, contractor reviews of project work  plans, travel coordination, and translation services. In addition, $1.9 million  was spent on other program integration activities, such as the development  of materials and curricula for training foreign customs agents on the use of  radiation detection equipment.
DOE’s current plan is to install radiation detection equipment at a total of  20 ports by 2010 at an estimated cost of $337 million, but several  uncertainties may affect the Initiative’s scope, cost, and time frames for  completion. First, DOE uses $15 million as its estimate for what an average  port should cost to complete, but this estimate may not be accurate.  Second, DOE is currently assessing whether the Initiative’s scope should  increase beyond 20 ports. Regarding the first uncertainty, DOE officials  told us that the primary basis for their $15 million per port cost estimate  was DOE’s prior experience deploying radiation detection equipment at  Russian land border crossings, airports, and seaports. However, DOE  acknowledged that the cost of doing business in Russia may not be an  accurate basis for developing their per port cost estimate, and DOE has yet  to reevaluate this estimate in light of work it has performed installing  radiation detection equipment at ports. Furthermore, the costs of installing  equipment at individual ports vary and are influenced by factors such as a  port’s size, its physical layout, existing infrastructure, and the level of the  host country’s cooperation with DOE. For example, the port of Antwerp,  Belgium, which is the second largest port in Europe, will be a much larger,  more expensive and complex project than DOE’s two previously completed  installations. According to DOE officials, because of the large physical size  of the port, an estimated 60 radiation detection portal monitors will be  required to complete the installation. The age of the port and the  geographic location of some of the terminals will also create challenges in  integrating information generated from the radiation detection monitors to  the central alarm station where the alarm information will be processed  and evaluated.
Additionally, another factor that may affect DOE’s installation costs at a  particular port is that, as a result of negotiating agreements with foreign  governments, DOE’s level of involvement at specific ports may vary,  affecting the amount of radiation detection equipment DOE installs and,  thereby, its installation costs. For example, although the port of Rotterdam  is the largest port in Europe, the Dutch government chose to limit the  scope of DOE’s involvement at the port to installing equipment at only one  of the port’s four terminals. This resulted in DOE’s costs at Rotterdam  being significantly reduced compared to what it would have cost to install  equipment all four terminals. DOE officials stated that as future  agreements are reached with foreign governments and more port  installations are completed, additional data will be gathered, which could  assist them in refining the average per port cost estimate. By the end of  fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to have completed installations at a total of five  ports and should have additional information with which to reevaluate the  accuracy of its current per port cost estimate. DOE officials told us that  they plan to reevaluate the cost estimate once these ports are completed. A  reevaluation of this estimate would allow DOE to better project individual  port costs, as well as the total future costs of the Initiative. However, if  DOE does not reevaluate its average per port cost estimate it will be  difficult to accurately determine the total future costs of the Initiative and  future annual funding needs.
DOE also is currently assessing whether the Initiative’s scope should  increase beyond 20 ports. DOE officials told us that DOE did not intend for  the Initiative’s initial goal to be static and they believe the scope of the  Initiative will likely increase in the future. Additionally, these officials  stated that if they determine that installing radiation detection equipment  at a total of 20 ports does not sufficiently reduce the risk of illicit trafficking  of nuclear and other radioactive materials, they plan to expand the scope of  the Initiative to include a greater number of ports. In its fiscal year 2006  budget proposal, DOE proposed expanding the scope of the Initiative to 24  ports, but this scope expansion is subject to congressional approval. If the  scope of the Initiative increases, the total costs and time frames for  completion will also increase.
section_title: DOE Faces Several Operational and Technical Challenges in Preventing Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Seaports
paragraphs: In its effort to install radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports,  DOE faces several operational and technical challenges. First, the  capability of radiation detection equipment to detect nuclear material  depends on such factors as how fast containers pass through the radiation  portal monitors and how near the containers are to the detection  equipment. Additionally, some nuclear materials can be shielded with lead  or other materials to prevent radiation from being detected. Compounding  these challenges, DOE faces technical challenges related to ports’ physical  layouts and cargo stacking configurations in its effort to screen cargo  containers for radioactive and nuclear materials. Further, environmental  conditions specific to ports, such the existence of high winds and sea spray,  can affect the radiation detection equipment’s performance and long-term  sustainability.
subsections: section_title: Several Factors Can Affect the Capability of Radiation Detection Equipment to Detect Nuclear Material
paragraphs: Three factors have an impact on the effectiveness of radiation detection  equipment: time, distance, and shielding. The time factor refers to the  amount of time that a radiation detector has to perform the process of  detecting radiological material. For example, trucks carrying cargo  containers are supposed to drive through a vehicle radiation detector at a  uniform controlled speed. Variation from this program requirement can  impact the radiation detection equipment’s performance. The distance  between the radiation detection equipment and the material being scanned  also affects the effectiveness of the equipment. As a general rule, the closer  the nuclear material is to the detector, the better the radiation detection  equipment will perform.
Nuclear materials are more difficult to detect if lead or other metal is used  to shield them. For example, in July 2004, a container that housed a small  amount of radioactive material passed through radiation detection  equipment that DOE had installed at one of the ports it has completed  without being detected due to the presence of the large amounts of scrap  metal in the same container. The host country’s government later received  information about the container, which led to the discovery of the  radioactive source. The host country’s government raised concerns that the  radiation detection equipment did not register an alarm during a scan of the  container and asked DOE to investigate the incident. DOE national  laboratory experts determined that the radiation detection equipment had  been set to program requirements. As a result, DOE national laboratory  officials and the host country’s government decided not to alter the settings  of the radiation detection equipment.
A technical challenge is to detect and identify low-level radiation sources in  the presence of high background radiation levels. Detecting actual cases of  illicit trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated  because one of the materials of greatest concern in terms of proliferation— highly enriched uranium—is amongst the most difficult materials to detect  due to its relatively low level of radioactivity. Uranium emits only gamma  radiation so the radiation detection equipment, which contains gamma and  neutron detectors, will only detect uranium from the gamma detector.  Plutonium emits both gamma and neutron radiation. However, shielding of  nuclear material does not prevent the detection of neutron radiation and,  as a result, plutonium can be detected by neutron detectors regardless of  the amount of shielding. According to DOE officials, a neutron alarm can  be caused by only a few materials, while a gamma alarm can be caused by  a variety of sources including commercial goods such as bananas, ceramic  tiles and fertilizer and nuclear materials, such as plutonium and uranium.
Once DOE finishes installing radiation detection equipment at a port and  hands control of the equipment over to the host government, the United  States no longer has control over the specific settings used by the  equipment or how the equipment is used by foreign government customs  officials. Settings can be changed to decrease the number of nuisance  alarms, which may also decrease the probability that the equipment will  detect nuclear material. Additionally, foreign customs officials may decide  not to perform secondary inspections when alarms sound in order to  increase the flow of traffic through a port. Therefore, the level of effective  use of the equipment is unclear. According to DOE officials, the periodic  maintenance DOE national laboratory official perform on the radiation  detection equipment helps them to ensure that the equipment is set to the  optimal calibrations and operated appropriately. If the equipment settings  have been altered, the DOE officials can inquire about these discrepancies  to the foreign government and work to resolve any problems.
section_title: DOE Is Developing Methods to Overcome Technical Challenges Posed by Ports’ Physical Layouts and Cargo Stacking Configurations
paragraphs: When implementing its Megaports Initiative at foreign ports, DOE has the  specific challenge of trying to screen all cargo passing through a port.  Currently, DOE usually installs radiation detection equipment at locations  within a port where natural choke points occur. These locations slow down  the transport of containers, making them optimal locations for the  installation of radiation detection equipment. At some ports, however, a  high percentage of cargo containers do not leave the port but are gathered  together in the shipyard and then shipped to another location. DOE is  addressing this problem in two ways: (1) by placing radiation detection  equipment within ports to be able to screen cargo that moves between port  terminals and (2) working with Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los  Alamos) to develop a mobile radiation detection system for screening of  this type of cargo. At some ports, DOE plans to place radiation detection  equipment at the exits of each port terminal so that inter-terminal transport  of cargo can be monitored, despite the fact that the cargo does not leaving  the port itself. Additionally, Los Alamos officials are working to fit radiation  detection equipment onto a straddle carrier so that containers that are  awaiting transshipment can be scanned for the presence of radiation. This  carrier would be able to scan containers stacked three containers high  within the shipyard before they are loaded onto the next ship. The straddle  carrier would scan the stacked containers with its radiation detection  equipment to determine if radiological materials are present and follow-up  inspections would then occur if necessary. See figure 5 for a diagram of the  proposed straddle carrier design modified to carry radiation detection  equipment.
According to Los Alamos officials, the modified straddle carrier will be  more effective than a vehicle radiation detection portal monitor because  the distance from the monitor to the container is greatly reduced, which  increases the overall detection capabilities of the system. Los Alamos  officials stated that they plan to test the design in a foreign seaport in  summer 2005. If this testing is successful, DOE plans to implement this  design in other ports that have similar cargo stacking arrangements and  that utilize straddle carriers. However, this technology cannot remedy the  entire problem DOE faces because many ports stack greater than three  containers on top of each other in their shipyards and not all ports have  straddle carriers because they move their containers with other types of equipment and stack them in different configurations. According to a DOE  official, because the straddle carrier solution will not work at all ports,  DOE will continue to seek additional solutions to this problem.
section_title: Environmental Conditions Can Affect Radiation Detection Equipment’s Performance and Sustainability
paragraphs: Another technical challenge specific to ports is coping with environmental  conditions, particularly high winds and sea spray, which can cause  problems for radiation detection equipment. Wind disturbances can vibrate  the equipment and interfere with its ability to detect radiation. For  example, after the pilot project at Rotterdam was completed, the bases of  the radiation detection portal monitors DOE installed had to be reinforced  with steel plates to stabilize them because high winds were causing them to  vibrate and reducing their capability to detect nuclear material. Sea spray  may also affect radiation detection equipment by corroding the equipment  and its components. The corrosive nature of sea spray combined with other  conditions such as coral in the water can accelerate the degradation of  equipment. If the equipment casing becomes corroded, moisture can get  into the equipment and affect its performance and long-term sustainability.  Corrosion and moisture can cause radiation detection alarms to go off  when they should not and not when they should. DOE and national  laboratory officials told us that they are analyzing the problem to identify  methods to alleviate sea spray’s adverse effects on the equipment. At one  port where DOE plans to complete installations in fiscal year 2005, sea  spray is a potentially large problem. In December 2004, DOE convened a  workshop of U.S. government officials and contractors to discuss possible  solutions to the sea spray problem. At this workshop, several options for  addressing the issue were discussed, such as installing special stainless  steel casings, installing bolts and other hardware with protective coatings,  and using nitrogen-filled housings to protect the video cameras. DOE  officials are considering the recommendations from the workshop and how  they should be implemented in this port and at other ports where DOE  plans to install equipment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOE uses a threat- and volume-based analysis to determine which foreign  seaports are of highest priority, and we believe that this is a sound basis for  targeting the expenditure of U.S. funds. While DOE has completed work at  two ports, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Piraeus, Greece, both were  ranked lower in priority than other foreign seaports by DOE’s Maritime  Prioritization Model. In addition, DOE has been unable to reach agreement  with many key countries that have ports ranked as high priority by its  model. If DOE continues to have difficulty gaining agreements to install  radiation detection equipment at its highest priority ports, then this could  raise questions about the Initiative’s effectiveness and about how many  lower priority ports to include. Currently, however, the Initiative’s long- term goal is to install radiation detection equipment at 20 foreign seaports  regardless of their priority. This goal is inconsistent with DOE’s approach  for selecting high-priority ports and does not provide a reasonable measure  of long-term program success. Considering its limited progress at the  highest priority ports, a well thought out plan can be an important guide for  DOE’s efforts in the further implementation of its Megaports Initiative.  However, to date, DOE has not developed such a plan for the Initiative.  Without a comprehensive long-term plan for the Initiative, Congress may  not be able to judge whether DOE is making progress towards achieving  the Initiative’s long-term goals or how best to assist DOE in working toward  its goals. DOE officials told us that they will be developing a plan for the  Initiative in the near future, and we agree that such a plan is needed.
While the cost of installing radiation detection equipment at a port is  dependent on a number of variables, such as the port’s size, physical layout,  and existing infrastructure, the costs of installing equipment at the two  ports DOE has completed to date were significantly less than the $15  million per port cost estimate that DOE used to develop its long-term cost  projection for the Initiative. DOE’s $15 million estimate for the average cost  of installing equipment at a port was based on the department’s prior  experience installing radiation detection equipment at Russian land  borders, airports, and seaports. DOE officials acknowledged that the cost  of doing business in Russia may not be an accurate basis on which to  estimate the costs of installing such equipment at other foreign ports.  Because DOE has not yet reevaluated its per port cost estimate to reflect its  recent experience installing radiation detection equipment at ports, the  accuracy of DOE’s long-term cost projection for the Initiative is  questionable. By the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to have completed  installations at a total of 5 ports, and will have additional information about  the costs of these installations that could assist it in refining its per port  cost estimate and long-term cost projection for the Initiative.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the  Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, take the  following two actions:  Develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of  the Initiative that includes, at a minimum, (1) performance measures  that are consistent with DOE’s desire to install radiation detection  equipment at the highest priority foreign seaports, (2) strategies DOE  will employ to determine how many and which lower priority ports it  will include in the Initiative if it continues to have difficulty installing  equipment at the highest priority ports as identified by its model, (3)  projections of the anticipated funds required to meet the Initiative’s  objectives, and (4) specific time frames for effectively spending program  funds.
Evaluate the accuracy of the current per port cost estimate of $15  million, make any necessary adjustments to the Initiative’s long-term  cost projection, and inform Congress of any changes to the long-term  cost projection for the Initiative.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided the Department of Energy with a draft of this report for its  review and comment. DOE’s written comments are presented as appendix  V. DOE generally agreed with our recommendations. In its written  comments, DOE also provided further clarification on the evolution of its  Maritime Prioritization Model. Specifically, DOE noted that in the early  stages of the Megaports Initiative, it focused on the 20 highest-volume-to- U.S. seaports, which was consistent with the approach taken by the  Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security Initiative. However,  when DOE initially briefed us on its model in July 2004, DOE had changed  its prioritization approach and was focusing almost entirely on a threat- based model. As DOE notes in its comments, it did not present us with  information on modifications to its model until February 22, 2005, which  was after DOE received an early draft of this report for a factual review.  DOE’s new port prioritization approach represents a combination of ports  that ship large volumes of containers to the United States and ports that lie  in regions of interest. DOE also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents of this  report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report  date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the  Administrator, the National Nuclear Security Administration; the Secretary  of Homeland Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and  interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to  others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can be  reached at 202-512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report  include R. Stockton Butler, Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers, Chris  Ferencik, and F. James Shafer, Jr.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We performed our review of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Megaports  Initiative at DOE’s offices in Washington, D.C.; the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) in Washington, D.C.; the Department of State in  Washington, D.C.; Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) in Los  Alamos, New Mexico; Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) in  Albuquerque, New Mexico; and the National Nuclear Security  Administration’s Service Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Additionally,  we visited completed Megaports Initiative installations in Rotterdam, the  Netherlands, and Piraeus, Greece.
To assess the progress DOE has made in implementing its Megaports  Initiative, we reviewed documents and had discussions with officials from  DOE; DHS; Los Alamos; Sandia; DOE’s private sector contractors—SI  International and Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler; and a number of  nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation and port security  experts. In addition, in October 2004, we visited the Netherlands and  Greece to interview Dutch and Greek officials and to see the completed  Megaports Initiative installations at the ports of Rotterdam and Piraeus,  respectively. While in Rotterdam, we spoke with officials from the Dutch  Ministry of Finance, the Dutch Customs authority, the U.S. Embassy in The  Hague, and a U.S. official from Container Security Initiative for the port of  Rotterdam. We toured the Megaports Initiative installations in Rotterdam  and observed the radiation detection equipment DOE installed. When we  visited Piraeus, we interviewed officials from the Greek Atomic Energy  Commission; the Port Authority of Piraeus; the Greek Ministry of Economy  and Finance, Customs Directorate General (Greek Customs Service);  DOE’s contractors—Los Alamos, SI International, and Tetra Tech/Foster  Wheeler; and officials from the Container Security Initiative in Piraeus. We  toured the Megaports Initiative installations at both the passenger and  cargo terminals at the port of Piraeus and observed the radiation detection  equipment DOE had installed. Additionally, while we were in Greece, we  toured (1) two border crossings where DOE had installed radiation  detection equipment through its Second Line of Defense-Core program  (SLD-Core), (2) the SLD-Core installations at the passenger arrival area of  Athens International Airport, and (3) a small research reactor in Athens  that received physical security upgrades from DOE prior to the 2004  Olympic Games.
To better understand DOE’s Maritime Prioritization Model and port  prioritization process, we met with officials from DOE and Sandia National  Laboratories in August 2004 to discuss the components of the model, the  types of data the model uses to rank foreign seaports, as well as the port  prioritization list DOE provided us in July 2004. DOE and Sandia officials  told us that the model was threat-based and that the overall volume of  containers shipped from a given port to the United States accounted for  only 20 percent of the port’s overall prioritization score. In addition, we  reviewed a briefing packet on the model developed by Sandia as well as the  report of the Maritime Prioritization Model Peer Review that was  conducted in August 2004 by members of academia, the intelligence  community, and industry experts. We also visited Sandia National  Laboratories in November 2004 and discussed the model and the results of  the peer review report with a Sandia official in charge of the development  and maintenance of the model. While we did not conduct an assessment of  the model, it is worth noting that we were informed by the DOE project  manager for the Megaports Initiative on January 24, 2005, that the port  prioritization list we were using was still the current operational model that  DOE was using for the Initiative. However, when we met with DOE officials  2 weeks later on February 14, 2005, to discuss their comments on a review  of an early draft of this report they informed us that, because they had  made recent changes to the model, the prioritization list we had been using  was now outdated and no longer accurate. At a February 22, 2005, meeting,  DOE and Sandia officials informed us that the revised model and port  prioritization process, among other things, (1) reduced the emphasis on the  threat of nuclear smuggling at individual ports and placed a greater  emphasis on ports with a high volume of cargo containers that enter and  exit the port by land, rather than cargo that is transshipped and (2)  deemphasized the risk from spent (used) nuclear fuel in a target country.  DOE also provided us with a new prioritization list that showed its 35  highest priority ports listed alphabetically, rather than ranked from highest  to lowest priority.
We also spoke with DOE officials about strategic planning and reviewed  DOE documentation, such as the Megaports Program Work Plan for Fiscal  Year 2005 and DOE’s Future Years Nuclear Security Program. We reviewed  the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the President’s  Management Agenda from fiscal year 2002, and several of our previous  reports on strategic planning and related topics.
To assess the current and expected costs of the Initiative, we reviewed  DOE documents detailing program expenditures, projected costs, and  schedule estimates. We reviewed contract data for expenditures through  the end of fiscal year 2004 and met numerous times with DOE agency  officials to discuss the data. We obtained responses from key database  officials to a number of questions focused on data reliability covering  issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the  accuracy and completeness of the data. Follow-up questions were added  whenever necessary. We also reviewed DOE's 2004 Performance and  Accountability Report. A caveat worth noting is that although DOE gathers  and maintains expenditure data reported by contractors assisting in  implementing the Megaports Initiative, rather than conducting routine  follow-up checks to corroborate the data reported by the contractors, DOE  officials noted that periodic follow-up checks will be conducted, if  necessary. In addition, during the course of our review we found that for  fiscal year 2004, approximately $5.45 million in program expenditures had  been inappropriately costed to the Megaports Initiative, which should have  been costed to the SLD-Core program. As a result, total expenditures for  the Megaports Initiative are $5.45 million less than what is reflected in  DOE's fiscal year 2004 financial reports. DOE officials told us that this  mistake will be corrected and reflected in DOE's fiscal year 2005 financial  reports. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of this report based on work we performed.
To identify challenges DOE faces in installing radiation detection  equipment at foreign ports, we examined documents and spoke with  officials from DOE, Los Alamos, Sandia, Pacific Northwest National  Laboratory, and nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation and  port security experts. We also attended a National Academies of Science  conference on non-intrusive technologies for improving the security of  containerized maritime cargo. Additionally, we attended the National Cargo  Security Council conference on Radiation Detection and Screening.
We conducted our review between June 2004 and March 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: National Laboratory and Contractor Roles
subsections: section_title: DOE National Laboratories
subsections: section_title: Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia)
paragraphs: In addition to developing and maintaining the Maritime Prioritization  Model, Sandia also conducts research related to international threat  information, which is used to maintain the Megaports Design Basis Threat  document. This document contains information on both known maritime  smuggling activities and plans by terrorist organizations seeking to acquire  nuclear and other commodities that have parallels to nuclear smuggling  patterns. Related to this, Sandia maintains a seaport information database  and develops port specific background papers to assist DOE in evaluating  ports for engagement. Furthermore, Sandia officials conduct port  familiarization visits and technical site visits in order to gain a general  understanding of port operations as well as to determine specific  information on the physical layout of the port, security, port traffic,  shipping volume, the host country’s commitment level to implementing the  Initiative, training needs, and other relevant information. This information  is used to develop vulnerability assessments, which help DOE determine  the most cost-effective locations at a seaport in which to install the  equipment.
section_title: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)
paragraphs: PNNL provides specific in-country training to foreign customs officials, as  well as training at DOE’s Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency  Response facility. Training includes hands-on instruction in the use of the  radiation detection equipment and systems provided under the Initiative  and covers operation, maintenance, and appropriate response protocols.  To do this training, PNNL purchases presentation equipment and handheld  radiation detection equipment and develops and maintains training props  and related documentation. Training is tailored to each port and developed  and delivered by technical experts in the form of presentations, manuals,  hands-on practical exercises, field training, videos, and interactive games.  In addition, PNNL provides the Initiative with a certified project manager at  each port who assists the federal project manager in overseeing the  implementation of the Initiative at a given port and is the primary point of  contact responsible for integrating all the work conducted by the  participating national laboratories and contractors.
section_title: Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos)
paragraphs: Los Alamos provides expertise in radiation detection technologies and is  the lead national laboratory for testing and evaluating the performance of  radiation detection equipment. Los Alamos tests the deployed radiation  detection equipment and supports Sandia in performing site surveys and  preparing design requirements documents. In addition, Los Alamos  technical experts analyze portal detection performance data to ensure the  deployed equipment is meeting current detection requirements. Los  Alamos has also conducted equipment testing in order to overcome  challenges associated with scanning transshipped cargo.
section_title: Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge)
paragraphs: Oak Ridge provides technical assistance at DOE headquarters on the  communications infrastructure associated with the installation of radiation  detection equipment at foreign ports and assists with the testing and  evaluation of radiation detection equipment. Oak Ridge officials told us  that a trainer from Oak Ridge will be provided to assist in each of the  classes conducted for foreign customs officials at PNNL’s Hazardous  Materials Management and Emergency Response training facility during  fiscal year 2005.
section_title: Private Contractors
subsections: section_title: TSA Systems
paragraphs: TSA Systems is a private contractor that manufactures the radiation portal  monitors that DOE installs at foreign ports and also provides technical  support to DOE on the equipment. According to TSA officials, each site is  visited yearly to check the monitors for damage and to perform routine  maintenance. In addition, TSA has modified radiation portal monitors to  address challenges specific to particular ports. For example, TSA installed  stabilization plates on portal monitors at Rotterdam to deal with high winds  at the port.
section_title: Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler
paragraphs: Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler is an engineering and construction company  who was the primary contractor in charge installing equipment at  Rotterdam and Piraeus. Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler also led the  construction of the associated infrastructure to support the radiation  detection equipment at these ports.
section_title: Ahtna Government Services Corporation (Ahtna)
paragraphs: Ahtna will be the primary contractor for the design and construction of  future Megaports Initiative installations. Ahtna was not involved in the  installation of equipment in Rotterdam or Piraeus. Ahtna has entered into a  subcontract with the former design build contractor, Tetra Tech/Foster  Wheeler, to support design and construction activities at future  installations.
section_title: Technology Ventures Incorporated
paragraphs: Technology Ventures Incorporated provides logistical support to DOE’s  Megaports Initiative by storing and shipping radiation portal monitors that  DOE procures in advance for installation at future ports.
section_title: SI International
paragraphs: SI International provides DOE with technical support related to the  development and installation of the communications infrastructure  associated with radiation detection equipment installed under the  Initiative. SI International staff provide onsite training to foreign customs  officials in operating and maintaining the communications systems.
section_title: Miratek
paragraphs: Miratek helps DOE manage and maintain budget and expenditure data for  the Megaports Initiative.
section_title: Profiles of Ports Where DOE Has Completed or Initiated Work
subsections: section_title: Rotterdam, the Netherlands
paragraphs: The Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands signed a memorandum of  understanding (MOU) with the Department of Energy (DOE) on August 13,  2003, to include the port of Rotterdam in the Megaports Initiative. The  Netherlands was the first European Union country to join the Initiative.  Rotterdam is Europe’s largest port. The volume of containers passing  through Rotterdam is roughly 7 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU)  annually, about 6 percent of which is shipped to the United States.  Approximately 20 percent of cargo passing through Rotterdam is  transshipped, meaning it does not pass through any natural choke points,  such as vehicle or rail entry and exit gates. Containers at the port are  handled primarily in four container terminals. In addition, the Department  of Homeland Security began conducting Container Security Initiative (CSI)  activities at Rotterdam in June 2002.
section_title: Piraeus, Greece
paragraphs: The Directorate General of Customs and Excise of the Ministry of  Economy and Finance of the Hellenic Republic, the Greek Atomic Energy  Commission, and DOE signed a tripartite agreement on October 30, 2003 to  include the port of Piraeus in the Megaports Initiative. The port is located  in the southwestern Aegean Sea on the innermost point of the Saronikas  Gulf. The port received increased attention because of security concerns  associated with the 2004 Olympic Games. Piraeus was also considered a  significant port for inclusion in the Initiative because it not only serves as a  major seaport for Greece, but also is the third largest passenger port in the  world. The volume of containers passing through Piraeus is about 1.6  million TEUs annually. In addition, roughly 11,000 TEUs were shipped from  Piraeus directly to the United States during 2003. Greece was the second  European Union country to join the Initiative and become fully operational.  CSI also began operations at Piraeus in June 2004.
section_title: Colombo, Sri Lanka
paragraphs: The Ministry of Ports and Aviation of the Democratic Socialist Republic of  Sri Lanka and DOE signed an MOU on July 20, 2004 to include the port of  Colombo in the Megaports Initiative. The port is located on the southwest  coast of the country. The port of Colombo has a high level of container  traffic—over 1.9 million TEUs annually. The port uses cranes to move  containers within and out of the terminals. DOE anticipates using vehicle  monitors to screen all containers imported to Sri Lanka, all export  containers originating in Sri Lanka, and all inter-terminal transshipment  containers as they exit the terminals. CSI became operational at Colombo  in June 2003.
section_title: Antwerp, Belgium
paragraphs: The Federal Public Service of Finance of the Kingdom of Belgium signed an  MOU with DOE on November 24, 2004 to include the port of Antwerp in the  Megaports Initiative. Antwerp is the 4th largest seaport in the world and the  largest port in Belgium. Container traffic through the port is over 5 million  TEUs annually, while traffic to the United States accounts for nearly 5  percent of the total annual container traffic through Antwerp. In 2003,  Antwerp ranked 9th in the world for total volume of container traffic  shipped to the United States. Additionally, there are direct cargo routes  from Antwerp to many major U.S. seaports. The port is geographically split  into a right and a left bank. While the right bank is fully operational, the left  bank has two operational terminals with another two large terminals  currently under construction. When the terminals are completed, the  volume of cargo passing through the port will double. In addition, CSI  began operations at Antwerp in June 2002.
section_title: Algeciras, Spain
paragraphs: The Central Agency for Tax Administration of the Kingdom of Spain signed  an MOU with DOE on December 21, 2004 to include the port of Algeciras in  the Megaports Initiative. The port is located on the southernmost tip of  Spain adjacent to Gibraltar. It is the 25th largest container port in the world  with container traffic through the port being over 2.5 million TEUs  annually. The port is strategically important in its location because, in  addition to being a through route from the Atlantic Ocean to the  Mediterranean, and on to the Far East, the port lies on the crossroads of the  busiest sea-lanes that use the Suez Canal. Spain’s cooperation with DOE  currently includes only the port of Algeciras, the Spanish port DOE was  most interested in. However, the Spanish government wants DOE to  consider installing equipment at the ports of Valencia and Barcelona as  well. Currently, DOE is considering this request, including the possibility of  using a cost-sharing arrangement similar to the one used in Rotterdam. In  addition, CSI became operational at the port in January 2003.
section_title: Freeport, Bahamas
paragraphs: The Ministry of Finance of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and DOE  signed an MOU on December 30, 2004 to include the port of Freeport in the  Megaports Initiative. Freeport has a high level of container traffic moving  through the port. In particular, container traffic to the United States  accounts for over 16 percent of the total annual container traffic through  the port. Additionally, container traffic being shipped from Freeport  accounts for a total of approximately 1.2 percent of all container traffic to  the United States. In addition, CSI is not scheduled to be operational at  Freeport.
section_title: Additional DOE Efforts to Secure Sites in Greece Prior to the 2004 Olympic Games
paragraphs: In addition to the work done by the Megaports Initiative at the port of  Piraeus, Greece, DOE conducted three other efforts to increase security in  Greece prior to the 2004 Summer Olympics. First, the Second Line of  Defense-Core program installed radiation detection equipment at three  land border crossings and at the Athens International Airport to assist  Greek authorities in preventing nuclear smuggling. Second, the  International Radiological Threat Reduction program helped secure 21  sites around Greece that contain radiological sources that could be used to  make a radiological dispersion device (also known as a “dirty bomb”).  Finally, the International Nuclear Materials Security program upgraded the  physical security around Greece’s only nuclear reactor—a small research  reactor used for research and training—located in Athens.
subsections: section_title: Second Line of Defense- Core Program
paragraphs: The Second Line of Defense-Core program (SLD-Core) installed radiation  portal monitors in four locations throughout Greece: three land border  crossing and a large airport. According to DOE officials, the total cost of  these projects was about $15 million. The projects began in October 2003  and were completed in July 2004. DOE and national laboratory officials  also provided technical assistance and training to Greek customs officials  during the period of the Olympic Games. Figure 6 shows an example of the  radiation portal monitors DOE supplied through the SLD-Core program.
In addition to the training provided through the Megaports Initiative to  Greek customs officials working at the port of Piraeus, DOE provided  detailed training to 20 Greek customs officials who work at land border  crossings at the Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency  Response center at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Additionally,  about 400 Greek customs agents were trained at various sites around  Greece. In fiscal year 2005, DOE plans to conduct sustainability work and  additional training at these sites.
Finally, DOE supplied over 450 pieces of handheld radiation detection  equipment some of which were intended for use at Olympic venues. This  equipment included handheld gamma radiation detectors, radioactive  isotope identification devices, and radiation detection pagers (see figures 7  and 8). According to an agreement between the Greek Atomic Energy  Commission and DOE, after the Olympic Games, these handheld devices  were to be distributed to border locations throughout Greece that did not  receive other DOE assistance.
section_title: International Radiological Threat Reduction Program
paragraphs: Through its International Radiological Threat Reduction program, DOE  spent $780,000 to increase security at 21 sites throughout Greece that  contained radiological sources of a type and size that could be used for a  dirty bomb and to provide additional handheld radiation detection  equipment for first responders in Greece. DOE secured sites that included  facilities with blood irradiator units containing cesium chloride sources, a  large industrial sterilization facility, and oncology clinics that had medical  isotopes used in cancer therapy. Figure 9 shows a teletherapy unit  containing a radiological source, which is used to treat cancer.
Additionally, DOE provided handheld radiation detection equipment to  Greece through the Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer project.  Through this project, DOE donated 110 handheld radiological detection  devices that DOE national laboratories had previously deemed surplus.  DOE officials said that Greece was not high on the list of target countries  for assistance through the International Radiological Threat Reduction  program, but because of the increased security needs for the Olympic  Games, DOE expedited assistance to Greece. DOE began this project in  October 2003 and completed the upgrades in May 2004.
section_title: International Nuclear Materials Security Program
paragraphs: DOE spent about $1 million to upgrade the physical security of Greece’s  only nuclear reactor—a small, 5-megawatt research reactor located in  Athens known as the Greek Research Reactor-1. DOE and the Greek  Atomic Energy Commission believed that it was important to upgrade the  physical security of this reactor primarily because the reactor is fueled with  a mix of highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium. This site is the  only location in Greece with weapons-usable nuclear material. The Greek  Atomic Energy Commission is in the process of converting the reactor to  use only low enriched uranium fuel.
To upgrade the physical security of the reactor, DOE installed a new  perimeter detection system that included closed-circuit television,  hardened windows and doors on the reactor building, a new central alarm  station, and enhanced lighting of the building’s perimeter. As an additional  security measure, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission shut down the  research reactor during the period of the Olympics Games.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better  Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate  the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the  United States and Russia. GAO-05-57. Washington, D.C.: November 19,  2004.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce  the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors. GAO- 04-807. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting  Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,  D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target  Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,  D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require  Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,  D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Material, New  Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 18,  2002.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection  Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO- 02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.