Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries
Published: 2005-06-21T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases involved material that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States. This testimony summarizes the results of our previous reports on various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United States and abroad. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) the different U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing radiation detection equipment both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems with coordination among these agencies and programs, and (3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the United States and other countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State, and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat nuclear smuggling by providing radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. The first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense program, which has installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia through the end of fiscal year 2004. In 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative to focus on the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports and to date has completed installations at two ports. Regarding efforts at U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with portable radiation detection devices in 1998 and expanded its efforts to include larger-scale radiation detection equipment after September 11, 2001. This program is continuing under DHS, which reported in May 2005 that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at mail facilities, land border crossings, and seaports. A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling is the lack of effective planning and coordination among the responsible agencies. For example, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination among U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that the Department of State had installed less sophisticated equipment in some countries leaving those countries' borders more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than countries where DOE and DOD had deployed equipment. Since the issuance of our report, the agencies involved have made some progress in addressing these issues. Regarding the deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had not effectively coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve the radiation detection technology. We found that a number of factors hindered coordination, including competition between DOE national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation detection. The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal. Given the inherent limitations of radiation detection equipment and difficulties in detecting certain materials, it is important that the equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes its usefulness. It is also important to note that the deployment of radiation detection equipment--regardless of how well such equipment works--is not a panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training of border security personnel in the use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work assessing U.S.  government efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both at home and in  other countries through the deployment of radiation detection equipment  at border crossings and other points of entry. According to the  International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were  650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological  materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases involved material  that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that  uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty  bomb”). Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly  concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear  material from the former Soviet Union or other countries could fall into  the hands of terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of  September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to  smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States. This  could happen in several ways: nuclear materials could be hidden in a car,  train, or ship; carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked  across an unprotected border. If terrorists were to smuggle a nuclear  weapon or dirty bomb into the United States, the consequences could be  devastating to our national and economic interests.
My testimony today summarizes the results of our previous reports on  various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United States  and in other countries. Specifically, I will discuss (1) the activities of the  various U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing radiation detection  equipment both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems with  coordination and planning among these agencies and programs, and  (3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the  United States and other countries.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in  medicine and industry; in commodities that are sources of naturally  occurring radiation, such as kitty litter; and in nuclear materials that could  be used in a nuclear weapon. The capability of the equipment to detect  nuclear material depends on many factors, including the amount of  material, the size and capacity of the detection device, the distance from  the detection device to the nuclear material, and whether the material is  shielded from detection. Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in  weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated because one of the  materials that is of greatest concern—highly enriched uranium—is among  the most difficult materials to detect because of its relatively low level of  radioactivity. In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources,  which could be used in a radiological dispersion device (or “dirty bomb”),  are highly radioactive and easier to detect. Because of the complexities of  detecting and identifying nuclear material, customs officers and border  guards who are responsible for operating detection equipment must also  be trained in using handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of  an alarm, identify false alarms, and respond to cases of nuclear smuggling.
section_title: Several U.S. Agencies Have Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
paragraphs: Four U.S. agencies have implemented programs to combat nuclear  smuggling both domestically and in other countries by providing radiation  detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal  year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about  $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD,  and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for  installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. Initial  concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were focused on  nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As a result, the  first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling during the late 1990s  concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in  countries of the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe.  Assistance included providing these countries with commercially available  radiation detection equipment such as portal monitors (stationary  equipment designed to detect radioactive materials carried by pedestrians  or vehicles) and smaller, portable radiation detectors. In addition, U.S.  agencies provided technical support to promote the development and  enforcement of laws and regulations governing the export of nuclear­ related technology and other equipment and training to generally improve  these countries’ ability to interdict nuclear smuggling.
One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to  foreign governments is DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, which  began installing equipment at key border crossing sites in Russia in 1998.  According to DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2004, the Second Line of  Defense program had completed installations at 66 sites, mostly in Russia.  Additionally, in 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative, which seeks to  install radiation detection equipment at major foreign seaports to enable  foreign government personnel to screen shipping containers entering and  leaving these ports for nuclear and other radioactive material. In March  2005, we reported that the Megaports Initiative had completed installations  at two foreign ports and is currently working to equip five others with  radiation detection equipment. Other U.S. agencies also have programs to  provide radiation detection equipment and training to foreign  governments, including two programs at the Department of State—the  Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and Export Control and Related  Border Security program—and two programs at DOD—the International  Counterproliferation Program and the Weapons of Mass Destruction  Proliferation Prevention Initiative.
In addition to these efforts at foreign borders, the U.S. Customs Service  began providing its inspectors at U.S. borders and points of entry with  small handheld radiation detection devices, known as radiation pagers, in  fiscal year 1998. After September 11, 2001, this effort was expanded by  DHS’s Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol. In the spring of 2002, DHS  conducted a pilot project to test the use of radiation portal monitors­ larger-scale radiation detection equipment that can be used to screen  vehicles and cargo. In October 2002, DHS began its deployment of portal  monitors at U.S. points of entry. In May 2005, DHS reported that it has  installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at sites  including international mail and package handling facilities, land border  crossings, and seaports.
section_title: U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling in the United States and Other Countries Have Lacked Effective Planning and Coordination
paragraphs: A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling  both domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective planning  and coordination among the agencies responsible for implementing these  programs. Regarding assistance to foreign countries, we reported in 2002  that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some  programs were duplicative, and coordination among the U.S. agencies was  not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of  effective planning and coordination was that DOE, State, and DOD were  pursuing separate approaches to enhancing other countries’ border  crossings. Specifically, radiation portal monitors installed in more than 20  countries by State are less sophisticated than those installed by DOE and  DOD. As a result, some border crossings where U.S. agencies have  installed radiation detection equipment are more vulnerable to nuclear  smuggling than others. We found that there were two offices within DOE  that were providing radiation detection equipment and two offices within  State that have funded similar types of equipment for various countries.  We made several recommendations to correct these problems and, since  the issuance of our report, a governmentwide plan encompassing U.S.  efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries has been  developed; some duplicative programs have been consolidated; and  coordination among the agencies, although still a concern, has improved.
Regarding efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of  entry, we reported that DHS had not coordinated with other federal  agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives such as  attempting to improve the radiation detection technology used in portal  monitors. We also noted that DHS was not sharing data generated by  portal monitors installed at U.S. points of entry with DOE national  laboratories other than Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, which is  DHS’s primary contractor for deploying radiation detection equipment at  U.S. points of entry. Experts from DOE’s national laboratories told us that  achieving improvements to existing radiation detection technologies  largely depends on analyzing data on the types of radioactive cargo  passing through deployed portal monitors. We found that a number of  factors hindered coordination, including competition between the DOE  national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal  agencies with regard to radiation detection. DHS agreed with our  assessment and told us that it would be taking corrective actions.
Additionally, other DOE national laboratories and federal agencies are  independently testing numerous different radiation portal monitors using a  variety of nuclear and radiological materials and simulating possible  smuggling scenarios. However, they are not sharing lessons learned or the  results of these tests with other federal agencies. For example, DOD’s  Defense Threat Reduction Agency has a large testing facility near Sandia  National Laboratories in New Mexico and has pilot tested radiation  detection equipment at entrances to certain military bases. However, it is  unclear how and with whom the results of such testing are shared to  facilitate the development of improved radiation detection technologies. In  April 2005, DHS announced its intent to create the Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office (DNDO) to coordinate U.S. efforts to develop improved  radiation detection technologies. DHS has requested over $227 million in  fiscal year 2006 to initiate this effort. Through DNDO, DHS plans to lead  the development of a national test bed for radiation detection technologies  at the Nevada Test Site.
section_title: Currently Deployed Radiation Detection Equipment Has Limitations
paragraphs: Recently, concerns have been raised about the ability of radiation  detection equipment to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material. As we  have reported in the past, certain factors can affect the general capability  of radiation detection equipment. In particular, nuclear materials are more  difficult to detect if lead or other metal is used to shield them. For  example, we reported in March 2005 that a cargo container containing a  radioactive source passed through radiation detection equipment that  DOE had installed at a foreign seaport without being detected because of  the presence of large amounts of scrap metal in the container.  Additionally, detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-usable  nuclear material is complicated because one of the materials of greatest  concern in terms of proliferation—highly enriched uranium—is among the  most difficult materials to detect due to its relatively low level of  radioactivity.
The manner in which radiation detection equipment is deployed, operated,  and maintained can also limit its effectiveness. Given the inherent  limitations of currently deployed radiation detection equipment and  difficulties in detecting certain nuclear materials, it is important that it be  installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes authorities’  ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials. In our past reports, we have  noted many problems with the radiation detection equipment currently  deployed at U.S. and foreign borders. Specifically, in October 2002, we  testified that radiation detection pagers have severe limitations and are  inappropriate for some tasks. DOE officials told us that the pagers have a  limited range and are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear  material. According to U.S. radiation detection vendors and DOE national  laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively used in conjunction  with other radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors.
In addition, the manner in which DHS had deployed radiation detection  equipment at some U.S. points of entry reduced its effectiveness.  Specifically, we identified a wide range of problems, such as (1) allowing  trucks to pass through portal monitors at speeds higher than what experts  consider optimal for detecting nuclear material, (2) reducing the  sensitivity of the portal monitors in an attempt to limit the number of  nuisance alarms from naturally occurring radioactive materials, such as  kitty litter and ceramics, and (3) not deploying enough handheld radiation  detection equipment to certain border sites, which limited the ability of  inspectors to perform secondary inspections on suspicious cargo or  vehicles.
Regarding problems with the U.S. programs to deploy radiation detection  equipment in other countries, we reported that:
About half of the portal monitors provided to one country in the former  Soviet Union were never installed or were not operational. Officials from  this country told us that they were given more equipment than they could  use.
A radiation portal monitor provided to Bulgaria by the Department of State  was installed on an unused road that was not expected to be completed  for 1-1/2 years.
Mobile vans equipped with radiation detection equipment furnished by the  Department of State have limited utility because they cannot operate  effectively in cold climates or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in  some countries.
DOE has found that environmental conditions at many seaports, such as  the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect radiation detection  equipment’s performance and sustainability.
Environmental conditions are not the only challenge facing DOE and DHS  in installing radiation detection equipment at seaports in the United States  and other countries. One of the biggest challenges at seaports is adapting  the equipment to the port environment while minimizing the impact on the  flow of commerce and people. DOE’s Megaports Initiative had made  limited progress in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign  seaports it had identified as highest priority largely due to concerns of  some countries about the impact of radiation detection equipment on the  flow of commerce through their ports. DHS has faced similar concerns  from port operators in the United States.
It is important to note that radiation detection equipment is only one of the  tools in the toolbox that customs inspectors and border guards must use  to combat nuclear smuggling. Combating nuclear smuggling requires an  integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training, and  intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. In the past, most known  interdictions of weapons-usable nuclear materials have resulted from  police investigations rather than from detection by radiation detection  equipment installed at border crossings. However, there have been recent  reports of incidents where radioactive materials were discovered and  seized as a result of alarms raised by radiation detection equipment.  Because of the complexity of detecting nuclear material, the customs  officers or border guards who are responsible for operating radiation  detection equipment must also be well-trained in using handheld radiation  detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm, identifying false alarms, and  responding to cases of nuclear smuggling. Without a clear understanding  of how radiation detection equipment works and its limitations, inspectors  may not be using the equipment as effectively as possible.
Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation of  radiation detection equipment are important, the United States should not  and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at foreign or U.S.  borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear materials or a nuclear  warhead from reaching the United States. Recognizing the need for a  broad approach to the problem, the U.S. government has multiple  initiatives that are designed to complement each other. For example, DOE  is securing nuclear material at its source through the Material Protection,  Control, and Accounting program, which seeks to improve the physical  security of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union. In addition, DHS  has other initiatives to identify containers at foreign seaports that are  considered high risk for containing smuggled goods, such as nuclear  material and other dangerous materials. Supporting all of these programs  is intelligence information that can give us advanced notice of nuclear  material smuggling and is a critical component to prevent dangerous  materials from entering the United States.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to  any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittees may have.
section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)  512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov. R. Stockton Butler, Julie Chamberlain,  Nancy Crothers, Christopher Ferencik, Emily Gupta, Jennifer Harman,  Winston Le, Glen Levis, F. James Shafer, Jr., and Gene Wisnoski made key  contributions to this statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in  Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign  Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better  Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection  Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New  Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November  18, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear  Smuggling. GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.  GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
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