Nextgen Air Transportation System: Mechanisms for Collaboration and Technology Transfer Could Be Enhanced to More Fully Leverage Partner Agency and Industry Resources
Published: 2011-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is developing and implementing a broad transformation of the national airspace system known as the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen is a complex undertaking that requires new technologies and supporting infrastructure and involves the activities of several agencies as well as private industry. This report provides information on the effectiveness of (1) FAA's and the federal partner agencies' mechanisms for collaborating and leveraging resources to develop and implement NextGen, and (2) FAA's mechanisms for working with and transferring technology to or from private industry. To do this, we assessed FAA and partner agency mechanisms against applicable agreements, the agencies' own guidance for these activities, as well as applicable key practices that GAO has reported can enhance federal collaborative efforts.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Some mechanisms for FAA and partner agency collaboration are effective, though others fail to ensure research and technology from the partner agencies and industry are fully used by FAA. Some mechanisms used by FAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for coordinating research and transferring technology are consistent with several key practices in interagency coordination. For instance, FAA and NASA use research transition teams to coordinate research and transfer technologies from NASA to FAA. The design of these teams is consistent with several key practices GAO has identified in previous work that can enhance interagency coordination, such as identifying common outcomes, establishing a joint strategy to achieve that outcome, and defining each agency's role and responsibilities. This allows the agencies to overcome differences in mission, culture, and ways of doing business. However mechanisms for collaborating with other partner agencies do not always ensure that FAA effectively leverages agency resources. For example, the mechanisms used by FAA, DOD, and DHS have not yet resulted in a full determination of what research, technology, or expertise FAA can leverage to benefit NextGen. Further, collaboration between FAA, DOD, and DHS may be limited by differing priorities. Finally, FAA and the Joint Planning and Development Office--an interagency organization created to plan and coordinate research for NextGen--have not fully coordinated the partner agencies' research efforts, though they are working to address research gaps. A lack of coordination could result in a duplication of research or an inefficient use of resources. Numerous mechanisms are available to FAA to collaborate with industry to identify and transfer technology to advance NextGen, but some lack flexibility and outcomes can be unclear. Within its Acquisition Management System (AMS), FAA may use several mechanisms at various stages to conduct outreach, collaborate with private-sector firms, or transfer technology. In particular, FAA may use several types of research and development agreements between itself and the private sector as mechanisms to facilitate technology transfer. However, stakeholders said that the system can lack flexibility, in some circumstances, to consider alternative technologies or new ideas once the process is underway.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made recommendations in the past to improve FAA's AMS system. FAA has begun to implement these recommendations. FAA is beginning to use a new, possibly more flexible, contracting vehicle--Systems Engineering 2020--to acquire the research, development, and systems engineering support to integrate NextGen concepts. FAA also reviews unsolicited proposals as a mechanism for private industry to offer unique ideas or approaches outside of the competitive procurement process. However, FAA's unsolicited proposal process is not a significant source of new technology for FAA. Other mechanisms such as outreach events with private industry and NextGen test facilities might enhance knowledge and result in technology transfer, but outcomes, such as specific benefits, from some of these mechanisms can be unclear. GAO recommends that FAA and the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS) work together to develop mechanisms that will enhance collaboration and technology transfer between the agencies. GAO and others have outstanding recommendations related to interaction with industry that FAA has begun to address and GAO makes no further recommendations in this report. DOD and DHS concurred with the recommendation, while FAA did not comment on whether or not it agreed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts that, by 2031, the  annual number of airline passengers in the United States will increase 78  percent—from 712.6 million in 2010 to about 1.27 billion in 2031. To meet  these growing demands, while simultaneously improving safety, efficiency,  and environmental performance, FAA is developing and implementing a  broad transformation of the national airspace system (NAS), known as the  Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen is a  complex undertaking that requires new technologies—including new  integrated ground and aircraft systems—as well as new procedures,  processes, and supporting infrastructure to create an air transportation  system that will rely on satellite-based surveillance and navigation, data  communications, and improved collaborative decision-making.  Transforming the nation’s air transportation system impacts and involves  the activities and missions of several federal agencies. In recognition of  this, NextGen was designed as an interagency effort to ensure  coordination across agencies and leverage various agencies’ expertise,  research, technologies, and funding to advance NextGen while avoiding  duplication. Federal partner agencies identified in NextGen’s initial  legislation include FAA; the Department of Commerce; the Departments  of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS); and the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). FAA is the lead  implementer and its Joint Planning and Implementation Office (JPDO) is  the primary agency planner. In addition to these federal partner agencies,  NextGen was also intended to be developed in collaboration with the  aviation and aeronautics industries and other private-sector stakeholders  to facilitate coordinated research activities, to transfer technologies from  FAA and partner agencies to the private sector, and to take advantage of  research and technology developed by the private sector that could meet  NextGen needs, as appropriate.
FAA is currently implementing foundational systems and technologies that  will create the NextGen midterm system through 2018. According to a  senior FAA official, these planned NextGen improvements are estimated  to cost the government $11 to 12 billion, and result in aircraft equipment  costs to private aircraft operators of $5 to 7 billion. While many of the  specific capabilities and technologies for the midterm system have already  been identified and some have been developed, additional knowledge,  data, technologies, and integration of systems will be needed to finalize  the midterm system. Furthermore, some specific capabilities and  technologies that will make up the long-term vision for NextGen (beyond  2018) have yet to be decided. Technology transfer and transition efforts  undertaken by FAA in coordination and collaboration with its partner  agencies and private industry will help determine how NextGen evolves  and develops over the mid- and long-term. Because JPDO, as the primary  inter-agency planner, must coordinate the NextGen activities of six  agencies, collaboration amongst these agencies is a key component to the  successful implementation of NextGen. However, Congress and others  have raised questions about whether FAA may be missing opportunities to  leverage existing research and technologies being developed and used  within the partner agencies and the private sector—opportunities that  could potentially reduce the time frames, risks, and costs associated with  NextGen development.
You asked that we review how FAA coordinates with the NextGen partner  agencies and private industry to research, develop, and transition the  technologies needed to deliver NextGen capabilities. This report provides  information about (1) the effectiveness of FAA’s and the federal partner  agencies’ mechanisms for collaborating to research, develop, and transfer  technologies for NextGen and leverage agency resources, and (2) the  effectiveness of FAA’s internal processes, outreach activities, and other  mechanisms for working with and transferring technology to or from  private industry.
To understand FAA’s mechanisms for collaborating with its federal  partner agencies, we obtained and analyzed relevant supporting  documentation from FAA, the partner agencies, and other organizations  involved in NextGen research, development, and transfer. We interviewed  officials from FAA, the partner agencies, and other relevant organizations,  including the MITRE Corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  Lincoln Laboratories, and FAA’s Research, Engineering, and Development  Advisory Council. We also interviewed officials from JPDO, which was  created to facilitate research coordination and technology transfer with  partner agencies as well as the private sector. To provide information on  the mechanisms FAA uses to work with private industry, we obtained and  analyzed relevant documentation from FAA, JPDO, the NextGen Institute,  and private-sector entities. We interviewed FAA officials in the Office of  Research and Technology Development, officials involved in FAA’s  processes for evaluating unsolicited proposals from private industry, and  officials from FAA’s NextGen Solution Integration Group. To gather  perspectives from the private sector, we interviewed representatives from  various firms in the aviation and aeronautics industry, as well as industry  associations, including the Boeing Company; Honeywell International Inc.;  Raytheon Company; RTCA Inc.; the General Aviation Manufacturers  Association; Lockheed Martin Corporation; the Aerospace Industries  Association; AirDat LLC; ATH Group Inc.; Appareo Systems; Avidyne  Corporation; Crown Consulting, Inc.; and L3 Communications  Corporation. We also interviewed officials from six companies that  submitted unsolicited proposals for aviation technologies to FAA, which  FAA responded to in 2009 and 2010. To support both objectives, we visited  and interviewed officials at the NASA North Texas Research Station and  Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and interviewed the Director of the  FAA Technical Center. These locations are all NextGen test facilities that  FAA and industry use for the evaluation of NextGen concepts and  technology and where technology integration and testing can take place  without affecting day-to-day air traffic operations.
For both objectives, we compared FAA and partner agency mechanisms to  research, transition, and transfer technology against applicable laws and  agreements, the agency’s own criteria and guidance for these activities,  and because effective transfer of research and technology requires  effective collaboration, we applied key practices that GAO has reported  can enhance and sustain federal collaborative efforts. These key practices  include such things as (1) defining and articulating a common outcome;  (2) establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identifying and  addressing needs by leveraging resources; (4) agreeing on roles and  responsibilities; (5) establishing compatible policies, procedures and other  means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) developing mechanisms to  evaluate, monitor, and report on results; (7) reinforcing agency  accountability for results; and (8) reinforcing individual accountability for  results. We discuss these criteria to the extent that they apply to  technology transfer-related stakeholder collaboration issues that we  identified during our review.
We performed our work from May 2010 to June 2011 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient and  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The NAS consists of a wide assortment of technologies operated by FAA,  other federal agencies, such as DOD, and industry participants such as  airlines. Technology transfer may be defined as the process by which  technology or knowledge developed by one entity is applied and used by  another. Technology transfer may involve the transfer of equipment,  research, architecture, knowledge, procedures, or software code, or  involve data integration. Technology transfer also encompasses the  process by which research is transitioned from one entity and then  developed and matured by another through testing and additional applied  research until ultimately deployed. This report focuses on the mechanisms  used to transfer research and technology between partner agencies and  private industry and FAA, which can include the transfer of FAA and  partner agency research to the private sector to develop a technology, or  the transfer of research or technology developed by partner agencies or  the private sector to FAA.
Since the origination of the NextGen effort, several mechanisms intended  to facilitate coordination and technology transfer among FAA and partner  agencies have been established. Congress created JPDO within FAA as the  primary mechanism for interagency and private-sector coordination for  NextGen. JPDO’s enabling legislation states that JPDO’s responsibility  with regard to technology transfer is “facilitating the transfer of  technology from research programs such as the National Aeronautics and  Space Administration program and the Department of Defense Advanced  Research Projects Agency program to federal agencies with operational  responsibilities and to the private sector.” JPDO developed an Integrated  Work Plan that recommends primary and support responsibilities to  partner agencies for research and development of various technological  aspects of NextGen. (See fig. 1.) JPDO is also responsible for overseeing  and coordinating NextGen research activities within the federal  government and ensuring that new technologies are used to their fullest  potential in aircraft and the air traffic control system. The memorandums  of understanding among the partner agencies also require that the partner  agencies have the mechanisms in place to coordinate and align their  NextGen activities, including their NextGen-related budgets, acquisitions,  and research and development. The legislation also directed the Secretary  of Transportation to establish a Senior Policy Committee, to be chaired by  the Secretary, to provide NextGen policy guidance and review, and to  facilitate coordination and planning of NextGen by the partner agencies.
To help implement the responsibilities described in the legislation, each  partner agency assigned a liaison to JPDO—as well as staff to JPDO in  some cases. In addition, several working groups were created to facilitate  collaboration between partner agencies and the private sector, and the  NextGen Institute was created to be a forum for private industry  involvement in NextGen planning and other activities. As initial NextGen  planning was completed, and the focus turned to implementation, JPDO’s  role has changed to focus on long-term research past 2018. Furthermore,  in 2010 a new JPDO Director was appointed (the office’s fourth Director in  its 7 years of existence) and JPDO was moved organizationally within FAA  to raise its prominence within FAA and enable it to better serve as a  mechanism for interagency collaboration.
Because NextGen implementation also requires expertise, research, and  technology from the private sector, FAA has developed processes and  mechanisms for interacting with the private sector. FAA views its  Acquisition Management System (AMS) as the primary mechanism for  transferring research and technology from the private sector. FAA’s AMS  establishes policy and guidance for all aspects of the acquisition lifecycle,  and the AMS contracting process is designed to help FAA procure  products and services from sources offering the best value to satisfy FAA’s  mission needs.
section_title: Some Mechanisms for Partner Agency Collaboration Are Effective, While Others Fail to Ensure Resources Are Being Leveraged
subsections: section_title: FAA and NASA Use a Variety of Mechanisms to Coordinate Research and Transfer Technology; Some Are Consistent with Key Practices in Interagency Coordination
paragraphs: election, assignment, nd chedling of  ircrft to rnw to imltneously  optimize opertion crossltiple irport. created four research transition teams as mechanisms to transition the  complicated technologies that do not fit within a single FAA office’s  purview under FAA’s structure. The teams cover approximately half of all  research and development activities conducted by NASA’s Airspace  Systems Program—a group assigned to directly address fundamental  NextGen needs. Each team addresses a specific issue area that (1) is  considered a high priority, (2) has defined projects and deliverables, and  (3) requires the coordination of multiple offices within FAA or NASA.  Involving planning and operational personnel early is meant to avoid  making decisions in isolation that may waste resources and time.
Consistent with key practices that can help enhance and sustain  interagency collaboration, these teams identify common outcomes,  establish a joint strategy to achieve that outcome, and define each  agency’s role and responsibilities, allowing FAA and NASA to overcome  differences in agency missions, cultures, and established ways of doing  business. Each research transition team develops and documents a plan  that defines the scope of its efforts and the products to be developed. The  plans outline a delivery schedule and the maturity level to which products  will be developed. They also identify how products will be used by FAA in  its investment decision process, describe what NASA will provide to FAA,  and what FAA’s involvement will be related to the conduct of research.  For example, one team’s plan includes development of a decision support  tool to help manage the assignment and scheduling of runways at multiple  airports to optimize operations. For this product, NASA is scheduled to  deliver technical papers in 2012 and a software prototype in 2013. At the  time of the scheduled transition to FAA in 2014, the tool should be at a  prescribed level of technical maturity and FAA will make an  implementation decision later that year.
Most of the four research transition teams have not yet delivered products  and, while stakeholders are optimistic, whether technologies developed by  these teams are ultimately implemented will largely depend on how well  coordination occurs across multiple FAA offices involved in  implementation. Research transition teams’ products identified for  development are expected to be transferred to FAA predominantly from  2012 through 2015. As of April 2011, NASA has delivered two final  products and several interim informational products to FAA—including  concept feasibility papers, an algorithm related to efficient flow in  congested airspace, and data from a joint simulation. Going forward,  stakeholders and participants with whom we spoke generally expressed  optimism about the research transition teams’ ability to transfer NASA  work to FAA and into NAS. However, some stakeholders noted that  success requires high-level commitment from each agency and effective  team leads. Specifically, one NASA official noted that FAA’s research  transition team leads do not have the authority to make final decisions  about the implementation of a given technology. Therefore, the success of  the team’s product will ultimately depend on that team lead’s ability to  work across various FAA offices to negotiate and coordinate a solution.
FAA and NASA also use other technology transfer mechanisms—including  interagency agreements and test facility demonstrations—which have  historically faced challenges at the point where the technology is handed  off from NASA to FAA, but have nonetheless resulted in successful  transfer and implementation of technology. Past technology transfer  efforts between NASA and FAA faced challenges at the transfer point  between invention and acquisition, referred to as the “valley of death.” At  this point in the process, NASA has had limited funding at times to  continue beyond fundamental research, but the technology was not  matured to a level for FAA to assume the risks of investing in a technology  that had not yet been demonstrated with a prototype or similar evidence.  FAA and NASA officials have said the transition is still a challenge, but  both are working to address this issue through interagency agreements  that specify a commitment to a more advanced level of technological  maturity of research than NASA has conducted at times in the past. Both  interagency agreements and test facility demonstrations were used in the  development and transfer of the Traffic Management Advisor, a program  NASA developed, which uses graphical displays and alerts to increase  situational awareness for air traffic controllers and traffic management  coordinators. Through an interagency agreement, the two agencies  established the necessary data feeds and two-way computer interfaces to  support the program. NASA demonstrated the system’s capabilities at the  NextGen test facility in North Texas where it also conducted operational  evaluations. NASA successfully transferred the program to FAA, which,  after reengineering it for operational use, deployed it throughout the  United States.
In some instances, the mechanisms FAA and NASA use to collaborate and  transfer technologies have resulted in implementation of that technology  in the NAS—as with Traffic Management Advisor; in others, the  mechanisms have resulted in less tangible outcomes but nonetheless  represent successful transfer in our view. For example, according to NASA  officials, much of what is transferred between NASA and FAA is technical  knowledge (e.g., an informational report or an algorithm) as opposed to a  piece of hardware or new software. These products may not necessarily  lead to immediate deployments, but the knowledge transferred may inform  future decisions, lead to applied research, or be the precursors to future  operational trials.
In other instances, these mechanisms may produce a proven technology  that is ultimately not implemented by FAA, but can be successfully  transferred to the private sector. For example, NASA developed a decision  support tool intended to assist controllers in identifying the most optimal  route given wind conditions. Though operational evaluation testing was  successful, FAA chose not to pursue full-scale development of the  capability because it ultimately did not consider the capability to be a  controller function. However, Boeing has since leveraged NASA’s work to  develop Boeing Direct Routes, a service that uses advanced software  algorithms to automatically alert an airline’s operations centers and flight  crew when a simple, more fuel-efficient path is available, permitting the  operations center to propose those routes to FAA controllers for approval.  Boeing predicts that the service will result in measurable decreases in  aircraft fuel usage and emissions. In this case, even though FAA—NASA’s  intended customer—did not deploy the technology, it was successfully  transferred to the private sector and will be used in the NAS to produce  anticipated benefits consistent with NextGen goals.
section_title: FAA and Commerce Have Made Progress in Developing Mechanisms to Coordinate on Research and Transfer Technologies
paragraphs: FAA primrily reponle for the ir trffic  mgement-wether integrtion process nd  for directing rerch nd development of  vition-pecific wether informtion nd  fnctionlity.
Collaboration between FAA and Commerce, specifically the National  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has been facilitated  by the creation of the NextGen Executive Weather Panel (the Executive  Panel). Weather has a tremendous impact on aviation operations and  accounts for approximately 70 percent of all air traffic delays. Assimilating  weather information into air-traffic management decisions so that  decision-makers can better identify areas where and when aircraft can fly  safely is a key goal of NextGen. It also requires significant collaboration  and coordination across agencies and the private sector to transfer the  data, knowledge, and technology necessary. (See sidebar and fig. 2.)
NASA  involved as jor developer of  ir trffic mgement tool nd techniq,  nd wether integrtion methodologie.
Federal partner re o to involve the  privte ector in deciion tht mffect them.
In order to improve communication and coordination related to NextGen  weather, the Senior Policy Committee approved the Executive Panel to act  as the primary policy and decision-making body for NextGen weather  issues. The Executive Panel is composed of high-level representatives  from FAA, NOAA, DOD, NASA, and JPDO. According to one JPDO official,  the Executive Panel is akin to the research transition team construct used  by FAA and NASA in that it provides senior executive level oversight and  coordination of interagency activities related to delivering NextGen  weather capabilities. While the Executive Panel provides a forum for  senior level direction, it has not connected researchers from NOAA with  program and operation staff at FAA or identified specific technology  development transition plans as the FAA and NASA teams have.
Progress is also being made in defining each agency’s roles and  responsibilities, though this task has not been completed. For instance,  FAA and NOAA have a memorandum of understanding from 2004 that  generally establishes the responsibilities of each agency for meeting  aviation weather requirements, and in 2010, the agencies jointly completed  an integrated management plan for NextGen Network-Enabled Weather  and the NextGen 4-D Weather Data Cube. In addition, the two have come  to agreements on financial responsibility for some weather projects. For  example, FAA and Commerce have come to an overall agreement that the  National Weather Service will fund the development of the NextGen 4-D  Weather Data Cube and FAA will fund the development of the NextGen  Network-Enabled Weather capability, which is expected to connect to the  Cube for weather data.  There is also agreement that funding for any  research and development or capabilities that are aviation unique (e.g.,  turbulence forecasting) would need to be negotiated between the two  agencies.  However, FAA and Commerce have not developed an  overarching strategy that would identify those specific capabilities in  advance. Development of a research management plan is one step  expected to facilitate the process to meet NextGen weather needs by the  partner agencies, clarify roles and responsibilities, and improve the  process for transitioning FAA weather research into National Weather  Service operations. Similar to other agencies, any lack of coordination  between FAA and Commerce could result in duplicative research and  inefficient use of resources at both agencies.
FAA and Commerce use additional mechanisms to coordinate their  research and have transitioned some weather technology. For instance,  FAA, NOAA, and NASA have held joint research program reviews in each  of the last 2 years to enhance collaboration and identify duplications in  efforts, according to FAA. Researchers from several of NOAA laboratories  and forecast centers have also collaborated with FAA in research  planning, development, and assessment as well as implementation of  research results through interagency agreements. According to NOAA  officials, it has worked with FAA to coordinate and align program goals  and requirements to meet NextGen weather needs and in the last 2 years,  FAA transitioned two weather technologies to NOAA’s National Weather  Service. In addition, a team from FAA and NOAA’s National Weather  Service, sponsored by JPDO, has begun to develop the functional  requirements for NextGen aviation weather systems and continue to work  together on additional weather-related planning efforts.
section_title: Mechanisms for Collaborating on Research and Technology Development Efforts with DOD and DHS Do Not Ensure That Resources Are Fully Leveraged
subsections: section_title: FAA and DOD Mechanisms Have Yet to Fully Determine What Research, Technology, or Expertise DOD Has to Support NextGen Activities
paragraphs: DOD has not completed an inventory of its research and development  portfolio related to NextGen, impeding FAA’s ability to identify and  leverage potentially useful research, technology, or expertise from DOD.  JPDO has recommended that DOD have primary responsibility for 6  research and development activities and provide support for an additional  47. In December 2007, DOD designated the Air Force as the lead service  for the agency’s NextGen involvement, and, in the formal agreement that  established roles and responsibilities for JPDO and the partner agencies,  DOD agreed to develop mechanisms to align its NextGen-related research  and development efforts with JPDO’s Integrated Work Plan. Air Force  officials expected to have completed a comprehensive list of DOD’s  NextGen-related research and development activities and programs, as  well as a roadmap to facilitate technology transfer by November 2009. In  June 2010, the DOT Office of the Inspector General recommended that  FAA develop a plan to identify research and technologies from DOD’s  research and development portfolio that could be used for NextGen and  establish a mechanism to coordinate and transfer that information to the  appropriate FAA program or development offices. According to JPDO, it  has established contacts with various DOD organizations, but has only  begun to develop a plan to review and identify DOD research and  technologies potentially useful for NextGen. As of March 2011, DOD had  compiled a preliminary but incomplete list of its NextGen-related research  and development. According to DOD officials, the office underestimated  the size and complexity of the task. As a result of progress made during  2010 and 2011, it has become clear that the original tasking was not the  ideal approach. Instead, DOD plans to form technical teams with  representatives from the research and development bodies within each  agency to identify critical NextGen research and development needs and  using that list of specific needs, identify programs that may address them.  This process is currently being applied to the area of unmanned aircraft  systems in an interagency effort led by JPDO.
At the same time, DOD’s ability to identify potentially useful research and  technology may be impeded by FAA’s inability to identify the scope of its  needs. Though JPDO has identified the research and development  activities needed to deliver NextGen, according to DOD officials, FAA has  not provided, in some cases, enough specificity of its NextGen  technological gaps, so that DOD can help identify where its research and  development efforts and expertise may provide benefit. As we have  previously reported, a key aspect of successful agency coordination is  identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources. Collaborating  agencies can accomplish this by identifying the human, information  technology, and physical and financial resources needed to initiate or  sustain their collaborative effort. However, without an inventory, DOD,  JPDO, and FAA have been unable to identify all the resources at DOD that  may be useful for NextGen, or the budgetary resources that DOD puts  toward NextGen-related activities. Lack of coordination between FAA  and DOD could result in duplicative research and inefficient use of  resources at both agencies.
Although DOD has liaisons at FAA and JPDO, according to DOD and JPDO  officials, communication challenges continue to impede coordination and  collaboration between the agencies. DOD has assigned a liaison to JPDO  with experience in net-centric operations, one of the areas in which  stakeholders view DOD expertise as an important contribution to  NextGen. DOD also co-chairs JPDO’s Net-Centric Operations Working  Group and contributes as a member of various other JPDO committees,  boards, and working groups. In addition, in 2010 DOD assigned a liaison  from the Air Force Research Laboratory to FAA’s NextGen and Operations  Planning, Research and Technology Development Office to act as a  conduit into DOD’s research base. We have previously reported that as  agencies bring diverse cultures to collaborative efforts, it is important to  address those differences in a way that will enable a cohesive working  relationship and create the mutual trust required to enhance and sustain  such a collaborative effort. In particular, according to DOD officials,  differences in terminology and culture across agencies create  communication challenges between FAA and DOD. DOD research plans  were developed according to DOD needs, using DOD’s terminology, not  with potential connection to NextGen and civil aviation in mind. To  understand the extent to which DOD research can address NextGen  needs, DOD officials stated that subject matter experts from both FAA and  DOD with extensive knowledge of DOD research and NextGen would  need to review the existing research, determine what connections exist to  NextGen plans, and develop a method of communicating and translating  how DOD research supports NextGen activities. Existing mechanisms for  collaboration between FAA and DOD are not currently designed or  equipped to accomplish this task.
section_title: DHS’s Collaboration with FAA and JPDO on NextGen Has Been Limited in Certain Areas of NextGen Research, and the Agencies Have Yet to Fully Determine What Can Be Leveraged to Support NextGen
paragraphs: DHS’s collaboration is important in several areas of NextGen research,  particularly related to unmanned aircraft systems and cyber security;  however, thus far, DHS’s participation has been limited in these key areas.  DHS plans to use unmanned aircraft systems to monitor the nation’s  borders and plays a key role in the initiative to safeguard federal  government systems from cyber threats and attacks, including conducting  and coordinating cyber security research and development. DHS has  collaborated with the partner agencies on NextGen as the co-chair of  JPDO’s Aviation Security Working Group, one of nine working groups that  JPDO established to solve problems and make fact-based  recommendations to be integrated into NextGen. According to DHS  officials, it helped develop the security component of NextGen planning  and has been an active participant, since JPDO’s inception, through the  working group it co-chairs. DHS has also been involved in NextGen  integrated surveillance planning and coordination efforts in collaboration  with FAA and DOD. Though these are steps toward identifying common  outcomes and joint strategies, in other important areas DHS has had  limited participation in NextGen. JPDO has recommended that DHS be the  agency with primary responsibility for 19 research and development  activities and provide support for an additional 18. Many of the activities  for which DHS is primarily responsible are related to baggage screening  and other security functions, not air traffic management functions where  FAA would be the implementer. However, like DOD, DHS has not  identified and aligned its NextGen-related research and development  activities as it agreed to do in the formal agreement that established the  roles and responsibilities of JPDO and the partner agencies, and has not  identified the budget figures associated with NextGen activities. In  addition, according to DHS officials and other partner agencies, DHS was  not involved in early planning for activities at JPDO specifically related to  cyber security. DHS officials commented that sometimes DHS does not  participate in events either because it is not invited or because it does not  choose to participate. Limited collaboration between DHS and FAA could  result in conflicts in NextGen priorities and needs in the future. As we  have previously reported, that lack of collaboration can result in  marginalizing NextGen areas that affect DHS. Further, given DHS’s  responsibility for cyber security, lack of coordination in this area could  result in FAA not fully leveraging technologies developed by DHS.
DHS and JPDO collaboration efforts may improve with the assignment of a  new executive representative. In October 2010 DHS’s executive  representative to JPDO left the agency, and DHS did not initially identify a  replacement. According to one JPDO official, participation in work on  integrated surveillance began to lag at that point, although according to  DHS, its efforts through JPDO’s Aviation Security Working Group  continued. DHS assigned a new executive representative and back-up in  January 2011 and integrated surveillance work has resumed.
section_title: FAA and Partner Agencies Are Working to Address Research Gaps
paragraphs: FAA and partner agencies are working to address previously identified  research gaps, though coordination is an issue in some areas. In 2008  JPDO conducted a cross-agency gap analysis intended to identify major  differences between NextGen planning documents and partner agency  plans and budgets. JPDO identified gaps in key research and  implementation focus areas that are critical to NextGen and involved joint  agency missions and expenditures. The areas where gaps were identified  included unmanned aircraft systems, human factors, and airspace security.  According to FAA’s chief scientist for NextGen development, efforts are  underway in each of these areas. For instance, FAA, in partnership with  JPDO, and the partner agencies are defining the research and development  needs for operating unmanned aircraft systems in domestic airspace and  are developing a joint concept of operations and research roadmap. In late  2010, JPDO sponsored a workshop on unmanned aircraft systems that  brought together subject-matter experts and executives from FAA, JPDO,  DOD, and NASA. The workshop focused on critical and cross cutting long- term research and development issues and was a step toward JPDO’s goal  of having the technologies, procedures, standards, and policies in place to  achieve full integration of unmanned aircraft systems. However, DHS,  which will be one of the primary operators of these systems in domestic  airspace, did not participate. A lack of coordination could result in a  duplication of research or an inefficient use of resources.
With regard to human factors, as we have previously reported, FAA and  NASA are coordinating their NextGen human factors research using a  variety of mechanisms—including research advisory committees,  interagency agreements, and research transition teams. In addition, FAA  has also created a human factors portfolio to identify and address priority  human factors issues. In addition, in February 2011, FAA and NASA  completed a cross-agency human factors plan as JPDO and we  recommended. Finally, with respect to airspace security, according to  FAA, it is engaging with both DOD and DHS through JPDO sponsored  events. However, FAA is unable to move forward with some of its airspace  security research and development because DHS has not involved the  appropriate personnel needed to move the issue area beyond the concept  development phase.
section_title: Numerous Mechanisms Are Available to Collaborate with Industry and to Identify and Transfer Technology, but Some Lack Flexibility and Outcomes Can Be Unclear
subsections: section_title: FAA’s Acquisition Management System Provides a Framework for Technology Identification, Development, and Transfer, but Can Lack Flexibility
paragraphs: Broadly speaking, FAA’s Acquisition Management System (AMS) provides  a framework for FAA to undertake research and development of concepts  and technologies, progress that technology to a point where FAA can  define the requirements to meet its needs, and then either identify existing  technology that meets those needs or request proposals from industry to  develop the technology. Within the AMS, FAA may use several  mechanisms at various stages to conduct outreach, collaborate with  private sector firms, and transfer technology. (See table 1.) In particular,  FAA may use several types of research and development agreements  between itself and the private sector as mechanisms to facilitate  technology transfer. These agreements include cooperative research and  development agreements, memorandums of agreement, memorandums of  understanding, and other transaction authority. Cooperative research and  development agreements allow FAA to share facilities, equipment,  services, or other resources with private industry, academia, or state and  local government agencies and are part of meeting FAA’s technology  transfer program requirements. Within FAA’s Research and Technology  Development Office, as of January 6, 2011, there are over 20 such  agreements with industry or academia. Prior to pursuing an acquisition,  the agency is required under the AMS to conduct a market analysis to  determine if the needed capability exists in the marketplace or has to be  obtained through the acquisition process. A market analysis may be  conducted as FAA moves forward with an acquisition. FAA may publicly  request proposals from private industry to develop the technology, and  any private sector entity can submit its proposal for meeting FAA’s  requirements and compete against other entities for the contract award.
However, under some circumstances, stakeholders said that AMS can lack  flexibility for FAA to consider alternative technologies or new ideas for  certain technologies or sub-systems within an acquisition once the process  is underway. According to several industry stakeholders we spoke with, if  they have a technology they believe is worth considering to improve some  aspect or meet some need of a system that is being developed at FAA— such as a piece of software or some data that may be relevant to improve  decision-making—there is no clear entry gate for getting that technology  considered. Other stakeholders said that FAA has difficulty considering  technologies that cut across programs and offices, and one stakeholder  said that such ideas may not be considered because there is no clear  “home” or “champion” within FAA for the technology. Similar issues have  been encountered for technologies that NASA developed, which resulted  in the creation of the research transition teams discussed previously. In  the past, we have recommended that FAA improve its ability to manage  portfolios of capabilities across program offices. However, on the other  hand, at a certain point, FAA must be able to commit resources, finalize  plans, and stop considering alternatives in order to move forward with  implementing a new system. Furthermore, according to these officials,  once FAA makes a decision to pursue a particular technological path, it  can become costly to change course; therefore, any benefits of changing  course must be weighed against the costs. Nonetheless, industry  stakeholders suggested that additional avenues to consider alternative  technologies could be made available and could result in technologies that  enable FAA to meet its mission more efficiently. We have made  recommendations to FAA over the years to improve its AMS process.
To address this issue at least in part, FAA has recently designed another  contracting tool to provide it with research and development and systems  engineering support to integrate NextGen concepts, procedures and  technologies into the NAS, which may provide some additional flexibility  for collaboration and technology transfer with industry. The Systems  Engineering 2020 (SE 2020) contracts are a set of multiple award, up to 10- year umbrella contracts worth approximately $6.4 billion. Under SE 2020,  FAA will be able to have participating firms support NextGen  implementation activities such as concept exploration, modeling and  simulation, and prototype development. By pooling engineering expertise  under a single contracting vehicle, FAA believes it will be able to more  quickly obligate funds and issue task orders, which is intended to result in  implementing NextGen more quickly. FAA officials believe that this  process, by structuring the umbrella contract to include small businesses,  would encourage the participation of more small businesses in its efforts  to implement NextGen. Firms that have not been selected will not be able  to participate in the SE 2020 program. However, according to some  industry officials, the program’s ability to more quickly obligate funds and  issue and complete task orders has yet to be fully demonstrated, and  stakeholders we spoke with expressed concerns about whether FAA’s  efforts to expedite the work will mean missing out on the expertise of  excluded companies.
FAA also has an unsolicited proposal evaluation process that is designed  as a mechanism for private industry to offer unique ideas or approaches  outside FAA’s competitive procurement process; however, it has not  proven to be a significant source of new technology for FAA. From 2008 to  2010, FAA received 56 unsolicited proposals from private industry and  rejected all but one of them. The most common reasons for rejection,  according to FAA, were that the proposals were not unique and innovative  or that FAA already had an effort in place to meet that requirement. (See  table 2.) In general, we found that FAA’s reasons for rejecting proposals  met FAA’s established criteria for evaluating unsolicited proposals.  However, FAA evaluators told us that FAA’s “unique and innovative”  criterion for an unsolicited proposal was a difficult criterion to meet for  proposals, because technologies often build on previous technologies.  Furthermore, if a firm submitting an unsolicited proposal is to receive a  sole source contract, competitive procurement principles require that it  must be found that no other company can provide the technology but the  company submitting the unsolicited proposal. If this is not the case,  competitive proposals must be sought. Some participants told us that  technologies should not be eliminated from consideration even if their  application is not entirely unique and contracts to implement them might  have to be awarded competitively. FAA evaluators commented that there  was little guidance on how to interpret the criteria, including the unique  and innovative criterion in particular, for evaluating unsolicited proposals.  Some suggested that additional guidance on applying criteria or a review  panel could be set up to assist in reviewing the ideas contained in these  proposals.
Participants also told us that the process, in some cases, is not  collaborative, which may hinder FAA from leveraging potentially valuable  technologies. Other participants explained that FAA’s written response  sometimes did not reflect a full understanding of what a company was  offering, so in these cases the companies would have liked an opportunity  to clarify the merits of their proposal. Although FAA says that companies  whose proposals are rejected can meet with the program offices to discuss  reasons for rejection, some companies told us this opportunity was not  always provided. Where there are disagreements between FAA and  companies submitting unsolicited proposals over FAA’s stated reason for  rejection of a proposal, FAA is not required to discuss why a submission  was rejected or how it might be improved.
section_title: FAA’s Mechanisms for Industry Collaboration Can Enhance Knowledge and Lead to Transferring Technology, but Outcomes Are Not Always Clear
subsections: section_title: Outreach Events with Private Industry
paragraphs: FAA conducts various outreach events with its research stakeholders,  including those in industry, to exchange information among stakeholders  currently engaged in collaborative technology projects and to  communicate NextGen’s direction to potential collaborators. From 2008  through 2010, over 300 outreach events were held during which FAA  presented technical information focused on planned or on-going NextGen  projects and programs. Seminars, conferences, and industry days are  designed to inform industry about where FAA is headed with regard to  NextGen and any changes that may have occurred in NextGen’s direction  in the last year. The identification of technologies for use in NextGen is  not necessarily a goal of many of these efforts. Although technology  identification or transfer may not occur at these events, they can create  and reinforce working and personal relationships between leading experts  and researchers in the air traffic management research and development  community, create opportunities to share available research results, and  maintain consensus between FAA and industry on major issues.
Some FAA and industry events, however, have had more of a collaborative  purpose, creating opportunities for information and technical exchanges.  Technical interchange meetings, workshops, and demos are designed to  address select technical issues and have been used to try and identify  existing technologies or to communicate to private sector stakeholders  specific technological or research needs that they can address. These  meetings can result in the identification of existing technologies that can  be used by FAA to meet a specific need. For example, FAA’s Global  Navigation Satellite System Program Office recently sponsored a  workshop for a broad range of industry and partner agency stakeholders  to come together to discuss needs and potential solutions for a back-up  system that could support the Global Positioning System if satellites  became unavailable. The purpose of the workshop was to collaboratively  work with partner agencies and industry to identify existing technologies  and systems that can be modified to provide a viable backup system. One  industry participant we spoke with told us that the workshop was highly  collaborative and had positive results in terms of focusing on technology  that could be leveraged by FAA. However, according to participants in  other events, it is often unclear what happens after these events in terms  of taking the next steps to transfer knowledge or technology or working  with FAA to develop solutions. FAA keeps documentation of what occurs  at these meetings, including information on outcomes from the event. Our  review of this documentation found that few events documented concrete  outcomes or identified next steps to further develop ideas or technologies  identified and discussed at an event.
section_title: NextGen Institute
paragraphs: JPDO is reassessing the role and structure of the NextGen Institute as a  mechanism for collaboration and technology transfer with industry. The  DOT Inspector General recommended in June 2010 that JPDO determine  whether there is a continued need for the Institute and, if there is, to  redefine its roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication with other  private-sector organizations. The NextGen Institute was established in  March 2005 as the mechanism through which JPDO would access private- sector expertise in a fair and balanced framework that embraces all  individuals, industry, and user segments for application to NextGen  activities and tasks. However, participation in the Institute diminished  over time as funding was uncertain. Recently, a new Executive Director  was named for the Institute, and the JPDO is working closely with the new  Executive Director and the Institute Management Council—which  oversees the policy, recommendations, and products of the NextGen  Institute—to identify a course of action that is embraced by industry  stakeholders. According to several private-sector stakeholders we spoke  with, the NextGen Institute could serve as a valuable mechanism for FAA  and industry collaboration if properly designed and structured.
section_title: RTCA Efforts
paragraphs: While not necessarily a technology transfer mechanism, RTCA—a private,  not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based  recommendations within the aviation community on communications,  navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management system issues—is a  key source of FAA and industry collaboration. For example, in 2009 RTCA  convened the NextGen Midterm Implementation Task Force at the request  of FAA, which brought together key stakeholders in the aviation  community. The Task Force reached a consensus within the aviation  community to focus on implementing capabilities in the NAS that take  advantage of existing technologies and capabilities aboard aircraft. In  addition, RTCA has recently created the NextGen Advisory Committee,  which is comprised of top-level executives representing various parts of  the aviation and aerospace industries, as well as airports, air traffic  management, and various other public and private stakeholder groups.
section_title: FAA’s NextGen Test and Research Facilities
paragraphs: Some NextGen test facilities serve as a forum in which private companies  may learn and partner with each other, and eventually, enter into  technology acquisition agreements with FAA with reduced risk. The FAA  Technical Center test facility in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the Embry  Riddle test facility in Daytona, Florida, provide places where integration  and testing with industry can take place without affecting day-to-day air  traffic operations. They also enable industry and government to ensure  that new technologies will integrate with systems currently in the NAS  and, according to a senior FAA official, allows FAA to leverage private  sector funding, expertise, and technologies. For example, in November  2008, several companies, including Lockheed Martin and Boeing, were  involved in an FAA demonstration at Embry Riddle on how current and  forecasted weather information can be integrated into FAA’s traffic  management and en route automation systems. Also at Embry Riddle,  Lockheed Martin is funding some work in conjunction with US Airways on  a new time-based traffic flow management system designed to provide  increased gate-to-gate air traffic predictability.
The success of these test facilities as opportunities to leverage private- sector resources depends in large part on the extent to which the private  sector perceives benefits to their participation. Representatives of firms  participating in test facility activities told us that tangible results in terms  of implementation of technologies developed were important to maintain  private sector interest and that it was not always clear what happened to  technologies that were successfully tested at these sites. In June 2010, the  DOT Inspector General also reported that demonstrations may not provide  a clear path to implementation and are sometimes not outcome-focused.  We have also reported that FAA should increase its focus on performance  and outcomes. One of the difficulties cited by officials at these test  facilities was that if a technology being tested did not have a place in one  of the NAS Enterprise Architecture Infrastructure Roadmaps, then there  was no implementation plan for that technology and no next steps to get  that technology into the NAS. For example, NASA was developing the  Precision Departure Release Capability, a software technology that links  Traffic Management Advisor to other information to better plan flight  departures by minimizing delays once passengers have boarded the plane.  This technology, however, was not a capability or technology that was a  part of the Enterprise Architecture Roadmap, and NASA had difficulty  finding support for it, its merit and FAA’s interest in pursuing it  notwithstanding. According to NASA officials that worked on the  capability, the process for getting a technology into a roadmap was not  transparent to participants at the test facilities and it took considerable  time and effort to eventually get the capability included in the roadmap  and garner support.
To advance aviation partnerships and the development and transfer of  aviation technologies, the concept for a Next Generation Aviation  Research and Technology Park was developed through a collaborative  effort by local, county, state, and federal agencies; academia; and private  sector interests. As a result of this effort, the FAA entered into a lease and  memorandum of understanding with the South Jersey Economic  Development District to build a Next Generation Research and  Technology Park adjacent to the William J. Hughes Technical Center near  Atlantic City, N.J. The lease transfers control of 58 acres of FAA property  for construction of the complex. The Park is a partnership that is intended  to engage industry in a broad spectrum of research projects, with access  to state-of-the-art federal laboratories. The establishment of this park will  help encourage the transfer of scientific and technical information, data,  and know-how to the private sector and is consistent with FAA’s  technology transfer program order. The park will offer a central location  for the FAA’s industry partners to perform research, development, testing,  integration and verification of the technologies, concepts, and procedures  required by NextGen. According to FAA, this private-sector engagement in  research has the potential to save significant time and expense in bringing  new products to market and reducing the time to deliver NextGen  components. The Park is intended to complement the NextGen  demonstration capabilities at Embry Riddle Aeronautics University in  Daytona, Florida. Advanced NextGen technologies developed and tested  at the Technical Center will be demonstrated in an operational  environment at Daytona then returned to the Technical Center for  integration with the current NAS and other components of NextGen.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Transforming the nation’s air transportation system is a technically  complex undertaking that will affect FAA’s activities and missions, and  those of federal partner agencies and the private sector. NextGen’s  success is dependent, in significant part, on FAA’s ability to leverage the  research and technology efforts of these agencies and firms. While much  has been done to develop mechanisms for effective research and  technology transfer, some mechanisms have not been successful in  ensuring that FAA is leveraging the research and technologies of its  partners. In particular, FAA and DOD have yet to completely identify  DOD’s potentially beneficial research and technology. In addition, FAA  and DHS’s collaboration in identifying areas for joint research and  technology development is limited.
Effective transfer of research and technology requires effective  collaboration, and we have previously found that interagency  collaboration is enhanced when agencies, among other things, define  common outcomes, identify and address needs, establish joint strategies,  agree on roles and responsibilities, and establish compatible policies,  procedures and other means to operate across agency boundaries. FAA’s  collaborative mechanisms with DOD and DHS fall short of fulfilling these  criteria. FAA’s ability to identify potentially useful DOD and DHS research  and technology has been impeded because DOD and DHS have not  completely identified research and development in their portfolios that is  applicable to NextGen, while DOD’s ability to identify potentially useful  research and technology may be impeded because FAA has not made clear  the scope of its needs with enough specificity. Further, communication  between DOD and FAA has been hampered by differing vocabularies and  terms, and mechanisms have not yet been developed to help the agencies  work across agency boundaries. While we have noted these issues in  several reports over the years and the DOT Inspector General has made  recommendations for FAA to develop a plan to review DOD’s research, we  find that much remains to be done in this area to improve the  communication and collaboration between the agencies. Unless FAA and  its partner agencies communicate and jointly identify ongoing research  and technology development that is relevant to NextGen efforts, FAA will  not be able to fully leverage the potential of its partner agencies’ research  and technology development efforts.
In this report, as well as in a previous report, we note that FAA and its  partner agencies have struggled to develop an integrated budget document  that tracks partner agencies’ involvement in NextGen, determines whether  funding is adequate for specific efforts, and tracks the overall cost of  NextGen. Failure to complete this effort makes it difficult for FAA and the  Congress to understand the extent to which FAA is leveraging the research  efforts of its partners to achieve the NextGen vision. We have an open  recommendation to FAA with regard to developing this integrated budget  and are monitoring actions related to our recommendation. We are  therefore not making recommendations in this report about this issue.
We also discuss several issues throughout the report with respect to how  FAA collaborates with the private sector to transfer research and  technology. For example, while FAA conducts market analysis, holds  numerous events with industry, enters into various collaborative  agreements, and has numerous mechanisms—such as the NextGen  Institute, demonstrations, and testing facilities—to collaborate with  industry and provide opportunities for technology transfer, it is not always  clear what comes out of these mechanisms, and some in industry have  indicated that, despite all of these collaborative activities, it is not always  evident what are the “entry points” to FAA for getting technologies or  ideas considered. Nonetheless, numerous mechanisms exist, and  additional mechanisms are being reconsidered, or are still under  development, such as the NextGen Institute and the Research and  Technology Park. We also found that FAA’s AMS process can limit FAA’s  ability to consider alternatives in some cases, and that FAA has difficulty  considering technology solutions that cut across several programs or  offices at FAA. We have made several recommendations to FAA over the  years to address these issues. We have recommended that FAA improve its  AMS process, improve its ability to manage portfolios of capabilities  across program offices, and increase its focus on performance and  outcomes, which FAA has begun to implement Moreover, the DOT  Inspector General made a recommendation in 2010 for FAA to reassess the  current role and continued need for the NextGen Institute and to ensure  that it is a useful resource and not duplicative with other mechanisms  designed to work with private industry. We are therefore not making any  further recommendations to FAA in these areas, but encourage FAA to  continue its efforts to address existing recommendations.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To more fully leverage the potential of NextGen partner agencies’ research  and technology development efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of  Transportation direct the Administrator of the FAA to work with the  Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to develop mechanisms  that will further clarify NextGen interagency collaborative priorities and  enhance technology transfer between the agencies. These mechanisms  should focus on improving interagency communication about the specific  needs, outcomes, and existing research that FAA has for NextGen, and the  existing research and technology development portfolios that may be  applicable to NextGen within DOD and DHS. These mechanisms should  aim to improve the ability of the agencies to leverage resources or transfer  knowledge or technology among each other consistent with the key  practices for successful collaboration that we lay out in this report.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Transportation,  Defense, Homeland Security, and Commerce, NASA, and the Office of  Science and Technology Policy. The Department of Transportation  provided technical comments by e-mail, which we incorporated as  appropriate, but did not comment whether or not it agreed with our  recommendation. The Department of Defense provided written comments,  which are reproduced in appendix I. DOD concurred with our  recommendation and highlighted the existing mechanisms it has that  support agency collaboration and technology transfer. The Department of  Homeland Security provided written comments, which are reproduced in  appendix II. DHS also concurred with our recommendation and mentioned  a newly formed mechanism—the Air Domain Awareness Board—that will  support technology transfer discussions among DHS, FAA, JPDO, and  other stakeholders in relation to NextGen. These mechanisms are positive  steps toward NextGen technology transfer among the partner agencies.  However, as our recommendation further states, DOD and DHS should  ensure that relevant research and development activities that could  support NextGen are identified within these or other mechanisms, and  that appropriate steps are taken to develop mechanisms to effectively  transfer any identified research and technology.  Because the mechanisms  DOD and DHS identified have not yet demonstrated these results, we  believe that fully implementing the recommendation is still important  beyond the existing mechanisms used by DOD and DHS.  The Office of  Science and Technology Policy provided one technical comment by e-mail,  which we incorporated.  The Department of Commerce and NASA had no  comments.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested  congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the  Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, NASA, DOD, DHS,  Commerce, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other  parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, individuals making key  contributions to this report include Andrew Von Ah (Assistant Director),  Richard Hung, Bert Japikse, Delwen Jones, Kieran McCarthy, Josh  Ormond, Taylor Reeves, Richard Scott, Maria Stattel, and Jessica Wintfeld.