Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities
Published: 2009-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide, has become essential to U.S. national security and a key tool in an expanding array of public service and commercial applications at home and abroad. The United States provides GPS data free of charge. The Air Force, which is responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process of modernizing GPS. In light of the importance of GPS, the modernization effort, and international efforts to develop new systems, GAO was asked to undertake a broad review of GPS. Specifically, GAO assessed progress in (1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) acquiring the ground control and user equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite capabilities, and evaluated (3) coordination among federal agencies and other organizations to ensure GPS missions can be accomplished. To carry out this assessment, GAO's efforts included reviewing and analyzing program documentation, conducting its own analysis of Air Force satellite data, and interviewing key military and civilian officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users could be adversely affected. In recent years, the Air Force has struggled to successfully build GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals; it encountered significant technical problems that still threaten its delivery schedule; and it struggled with a different contractor. As a result, the current IIF satellite program has overrun its original cost estimate by about $870 million and the launch of its first satellite has been delayed to November 2009--almost 3 years late. Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program to prevent repeating mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to deploy the next generation of GPS sa this schedule is optimistic, given the program's late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contracto tellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. GAO's analysis found that r. Of particular concern is leadership for GPS acquisition, as GAO and other studies have found the lack of a single point of authority for space programs and frequent turnover in program managers have hampered requirements setting, funding stability, and resource allocation. If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in 2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level of GPS service that the U.S. government commits to. Such a gap in capability could have wide-ranging impacts on all GPS users, though there are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for and minimize these impacts. In addition to risks facing the acquisition of new GPS satellites, the Air Force has not been fully successful in synchronizing the acquisition and development of the next generation of GPS satellites with the ground control and user equipment, thereby delaying the ability of military users to fully utilize new GPS satellite capabilities. Diffuse leadership has been a contributing factor, given that there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all procurements and fielding related to GPS, and funding has been diverted from ground programs to pay for problems in the space segment. DOD and others involved in ensuring GPS can serve communities beyond the military have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and coordinate among the many organizations involved with GPS. However, GAO identified challenges to ensuring civilian requirements and ensuring GPS compatibility with other new, potentially competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Global Positioning System (GPS)—a space-based satellite system that  provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide—has  become essential to U.S. national security and a key component in  economic growth, transportation safety, homeland security, and critical  national infrastructure in the United States and abroad. GPS is integrated  into nearly every facet of U.S. military operations, and the number of civil  users is increasing. Other countries are now developing their own  independent global navigation satellite systems that could offer  capabilities that are comparable, if not superior to GPS.
The U.S. government, which plans to invest more than $5.8 billion from  2009 through 2013 in the GPS space and ground control segments  currently under development, provides GPS service free of charge. The  Department of Defense (DOD) develops and operates GPS, and an  interdepartmental committee—co-chaired by DOD and the Department of  Transportation—manages the U.S. space-based positioning, navigation,  and timing infrastructure, which includes GPS. DOD also provides most of  the funding for GPS.
The Air Force, which is responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process  of modernizing GPS to enhance its performance, accuracy, and integrity.  The modernization effort includes GPS IIF and IIIA, two satellite  acquisition programs currently underway that are to provide new space- based capabilities and replenish the satellite constellation; the ground  control segment hardware and software; and user equipment for  processing modernized GPS capabilities.
In light of the global economic and national security importance of GPS,  the ongoing GPS modernization effort, and the international efforts to  develop new systems, you asked us to undertake a broad review of the  program and efforts to replenish and upgrade capability. Specifically, we  assessed progress in (1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) acquiring the ground  control and user equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite  capabilities, and (3) coordinating among federal agencies and other  organizations to ensure broader GPS missions can be accomplished.
To assess the acquisition of satellite, ground control, and user equipment,  we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DOD  officials from offices that manage and oversee the GPS program. We also  reviewed and analyzed program plans and documentation related to cost,  schedule, requirements, program direction, and satellite constellation  sustainment, and compared programmatic data to GAO’s criteria compiled  over the last 12 years for best practices in system development. We also  conducted our own analysis, based on data provided by the Air Force, to  assess the implications of potential schedule delays we identified in our  assessment of the satellite acquisition. To assess coordination among  federal agencies and the broader GPS community, we interviewed OSD  and DOD officials from offices that manage and oversee the GPS program,  officials from the military services, officials from the Department of  Transportation and other civil departments and agencies, and officials at  the U.S. Department of State and at various European space organizations.  We also analyzed how civil departments and agencies coordinate with  DOD on GPS civil requirements, and how the U.S. government coordinates  with foreign countries. Additional information on our scope and  methodology is in appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from  October 2007 to April 2009 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: GPS is a global positioning, navigation, and timing network consisting of  space, ground control, and user equipment segments that support the  broadcasts of military and civil GPS signals. These signals each include  positioning and timing information, which enables users with GPS  receivers to determine their position, velocity, and time, 24 hours a day, in  all weather, worldwide. GPS is used by all branches of the military to  guide troops’ movements, integrated logistics support and battlespace  situational awareness, and communications network synchronization. In  addition, bombs and missiles are guided to their targets by GPS signals  and GPS is used to locate military personnel in distress. Early in the  development of GPS, the scope was expanded to include complementary  civil capabilities.
Over time, GPS has become a ubiquitous infrastructure underpinning  major sections of the economy, including telecommunications, electrical  power distribution, banking and finance, transportation, environmental  and natural resources management, agriculture, and emergency services in  addition to the array of military operations it services. For instance, civil  agencies, commercial firms, and individuals use GPS to accurately  navigate from one point to another. Commercial firms use GPS to route  their vehicles, as do maritime industries and mass transit systems. In  addition to navigation, civil departments and agencies and commercial  firms use GPS and GPS augmentations to provide high-accuracy, three- dimensional positioning information in real time for use in surveying and  mapping. The aviation community worldwide uses GPS and GPS  augmentations to increase the safety and efficiency of flight. GPS is also  used in the agricultural community for precision farming, including farm  planning, field mapping, soil sampling, tractor guidance, and crop  scouting. GPS helps companies and governments place satellites in precise  orbits, and at correct altitudes, and helps monitor satellite constellation  orbits. The precise time that GPS broadcasts is crucial to economic  activities worldwide, including communication systems, electrical power  grids, and financial networks.
subsections: section_title: GPS System Description
paragraphs: GPS operations consist of three segments—the space segment, the ground  control segment, and the user equipment segment. All segments are  needed to take full advantage of GPS capabilities.
The GPS space segment consists of a constellation of satellites that move  in six orbital planes approximately 20,200 kilometers above the earth. GPS  satellites broadcast encrypted military signals and civil signals. In recent  years, because numerous satellites have exceeded their design life, the  constellation has grown to 31 active satellites of various generations.
However, DOD predicts that over the next several years many of the older  satellites in the constellation will reach the end of their operational life  faster than they will be replenished, thus decreasing the size of the  constellation from its current level and potentially reducing the accuracy  of the GPS service.
The GPS ground control segment is comprised of a Master Control Station  at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado; an Alternate Master Control Station  at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; 6 Air Force and 11 National  Geospatial-Intelligence Agency monitoring stations; and four ground  antennas with uplink capabilities. Information from the monitoring  stations is processed at the Master Control Station to determine satellite  clock and orbit status. The Master Control Station operates the satellites  and regularly updates the navigation messages on the satellites.  Information from the Master Control Station is transmitted to the satellites  via the ground antennas.
The GPS user equipment segment includes military and commercial GPS  receivers. These receivers determine a user’s position by calculating the  distance from four or more satellites using the navigation message on the  satellites to triangulate its location. Military GPS receivers are designed to  utilize the encrypted military GPS signals that are only available to  authorized users, including military and allied forces and some authorized  civil agencies. Commercial receivers use the civil GPS signal, which is  publicly available worldwide.
section_title: GPS Modernization
paragraphs: In 2000, DOD began an effort to modernize the space, ground control, and  user equipment segments of GPS to enhance the system’s performance,  accuracy, and integrity. Table 1 shows the modernization efforts for the  space and ground control segment.
Full use of the military and civil GPS signals requires a ground control  system that can manage these signals. Newer software will upgrade the  ground control to a service oriented—or “plug and play”—architecture  that can connect to broader networks. In order to utilize the modernized  military signal from the ground, military users require new user equipment  with this capability, which will be provided by the military GPS user  equipment program.
section_title: Broader Management Structure
paragraphs: The 2004 U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT)  policy established a management structure to bring civil and military  departments and agencies together to form an interagency, multiuse  approach to program planning, resource allocation, system development,  and operations. The policy also encourages cooperation with foreign  governments to promote the use of civil aspects of GPS and its  augmentation services and standards with foreign governments and other  international organizations. As part of the management structure, an  executive committee advises and coordinates among U.S. government  departments and agencies on maintaining and improving U.S. space-based  PNT infrastructures, including GPS and related systems. The executive  committee is co-chaired by the Deputy Secretaries of the Department of  Defense and the Department of Transportation, and includes members at  the equivalent level from the Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland  Security, Interior, Agriculture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Figure 2 describes the  National Space-Based PNT organization structure.
The departments and agencies have various assigned roles and  responsibilities. For example, DOD is responsible for the overall  development, acquisition, operation, security, and continued  modernization of GPS. It has delegated acquisition responsibility to the Air  Force, though other DOD components and military services are  responsible for oversight, some aspects of user equipment development,  and for funding some parts of the program. The Department of  Transportation has the lead responsibility for the coordination of civil  requirements from all civil department and agencies. The Department of  State leads negotiations with foreign governments and international  organizations on GPS positioning, navigation, and timing matters or  regarding the planning, operations, management, and/or use of GPS. (See  app. III).
section_title: Air Force Faces Significant Challenges in Acquiring GPS Satellites
paragraphs: The Air Force’s GPS IIF acquisition initially was not well executed, and  currently poses technical problems. The Air Force is implementing lessons  learned from the GPS IIF effort as it starts the GPS IIIA program.  However, based on our analysis, the GPS IIIA program faces a compressed  schedule along with new challenges to deliver the satellites on time. A slip  in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could increase the likelihood that  the GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to  provide the level of GPS service the U.S. government has committed to  provide. This would not only have implications for military users but also  for the larger community of GPS users, who may be less aware and  equipped to deal with gaps in coverage. However, the Air Force is  evaluating different approaches that could potentially reduce the risk of  degrading the GPS service.
subsections: section_title: The IIF Program Was Not Well Executed, and Still Poses Technical Problems
paragraphs: The GPS IIF contract was awarded during an era of acquisition reform that  centered on an approach called Total System Performance Responsibility  (TSPR). TSPR gave a contractor total responsibility for the integration of  an entire weapon system and for meeting DOD’s requirements. This  approach was intended to facilitate acquisition reform and enable DOD to  streamline a cumbersome acquisition process and leverage innovation and  management expertise from the private sector. However, DOD later found  that TSPR magnified problems on a number of satellite acquisition  programs because it was implemented in a manner that enabled  requirements creep and poor contractor performance. For GPS IIF, the  TSPR approach resulted in relaxed specifications and inspections of the  contractor, loss of quality in the manufacturing process, and poor-quality  parts that caused test failures, unexpected redesigns, and the late delivery  of parts. The contractor did not provide data on design drawings and  statistical process control techniques were not used to monitor  production.
According to GPS program officials, the GPS IIF program was also  negatively impacted by multiple contractor mergers, acquisitions, and  moves. In 1996, shortly after Rockwell won the IIF contract, the company’s  aerospace and defense units, including the Seal Beach, California, facility  where the IIF satellites were to be manufactured, were acquired by  Boeing. In December 1997, Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas and  took over its Delta launch vehicle unit in Huntington Beach, California,  and subsequently GPS work was moved to that facility. In October 2000,  Boeing acquired Hughes Electronics Corporation’s space and  communications business and related operations. Boeing took over the  Hughes facility in El Segundo, California, and once again, GPS work was  moved to another facility. As these events occurred, the prime contractor  consolidated development facilities to remain competitive. In addition, the  prime contractor lost valuable workers and knowledge, causing  inefficiencies in the program.
Shortly after the IIF contract was awarded in 1996, the Air Force also  added requirements. For example, the government decided to accelerate  the fielding of new civil and military GPS signals. Flexible power  capabilities were added to IIF several years later. These new requirements  drove design changes and resulted in technical issues and cost overruns  that impacted the schedule.
According to a GPS IIF program official, the combination of significant  requirements additions, loss of engineering expertise, parts obsolescence,  and fundamental design changes together caused the contractor to “lose  the recipe” for the IIF space vehicle. In essence, by the completion of the  design phase, the IIF space vehicle was to be built in a third location, by  different people, in a way that was not initially anticipated. In addition, the  program suffered from a lack of management continuity. Since the  program’s inception, the IIF program has had seven different program  managers, the first five of whom only served 1 year each.
According to a former deputy program director of the GPS program office,  past GPS programs seemed to operate well for a number of reasons. The  programs (1) never added major modifications to ongoing programs and  (2) had no qualms in terminating contractors if work did not meet  standards, business practices, or major milestones. Furthermore, the GPS  program performed more on-site contract management to increase  communications. This approach eliminated surprises like cost and  schedule overruns and held the contractor to a high level of performance.  Lastly, the former director noted that it was important to balance the  responsibility assigned to the program managers with the authority they  needed to properly implement the program. Prior GAO reviews have  identified all of these practices as essential to program execution.
subsections: section_title: Air Force Improves Oversight of IIF, but Technical Issues Lead to More Delays
paragraphs: The Air Force has since taken action to improve the IIF program. In 2006,  the program office increased its personnel at the contractor’s facility to  observe operations and to verify that corrective measures were being  taken to address deficiencies in the contractor’s cost and schedule  reporting system (also known as earned value management). The Air  Force increased the number of personnel to work on the contractor site,  which included military and civilian personnel, as well as Defense  Contract Management Agency personnel and system engineering  contractors. Greater presence at the contractor’s factory has enabled the  government to find out about problems as they happen and work with the  contractor to come up with solutions and resolve issues quicker,  according to GPS program officials.
Nonetheless, the program has experienced more technical problems. For  example, last year, during the first phase of thermal vacuum testing (a  critical test to determine space-worthiness that subjects the satellite to  space-like operating conditions), one transmitter used to send the  navigation message to the users failed. The program suspended testing in  August 2008 to allow time for the contractor to identify the causes of the  problem and take corrective actions. The program also had difficulty  maintaining the proper propellant fuel-line temperature; this, in addition to  power failures on the satellite, delayed final integration testing. In  addition, the satellite’s reaction wheels, used for pointing accuracy, were  redesigned because on-orbit failures on similar reaction wheels were  occurring on other satellite programs—this added about $10 million to the  program’s cost.
As a result of these problems, the IIF program experienced cost increases  and schedule delays. The launch of the first IIF satellite has been delayed  until November 2009—almost 3 years late. According to the program  office, the cost to complete GPS IIF will be about $1.6 billion—about $870  million over the original cost estimate of $729 million.
In addition, in 2006 we testified that diffuse leadership over military space  acquisitions was another factor contributing to late delivery of capability  and cost growth. We noted that the diverse array of officials and  organizations involved with a space program has made it difficult to pare  back and control requirements. GPS was one example we cited. According  to the Air Force, in 1998 the government decided to accelerate the fielding  of new civil and military GPS signals and added requirements for these  signals to the IIR and IIF GPS satellites. These new requirements drove  design changes and resulted in technical issues, cost overruns, and  program delays.
section_title: Problems Experienced in GPS IIF Seen in Other Space System Acquisitions
paragraphs: The problems experienced on the IIF program are not unlike those  experienced in other DOD space system acquisitions. We have previously  reported that the majority of major acquisition programs in DOD’s space  portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that  have driven up costs, caused delays in schedules, and increased technical  risk. DOD has restructured several programs in the face of delays and  cost growth. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100  percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment without realizing a  better return on investment. Along with the increases, many programs are  experiencing significant schedule delays—as much as 7 years—postponing  delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so  disappointing in some cases that DOD has gone back to the drawing board  to consider new ways to achieve the same, or less, capability.
Our work has identified a variety of reasons for the cost growth, many of  which surfaced in GPS IIF. Generally, we have found that DOD starts its  space programs too early, that is before it has assurance that the  capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within resources and time  constraints. We have also tied acquisition problems in space to inadequate  contracting strategies; contract and program management weaknesses; the  loss of technical expertise; capability gaps in the industrial base; tensions  between labs that develop technologies for the future and current  acquisition programs; divergent needs in users of space systems; and other  issues that have been well documented.
We also noted that short tenures for top leadership and program managers  within the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have  lessened the sense of accountability for acquisition problems and further  encouraged a view of short-term success. Several other studies have  raised similar issues. In 2003, a study conducted for the Defense Science  Board, for example, found that government capabilities to lead and  manage the space acquisition process have seriously eroded, particularly  within program management ranks. A 2005 Defense Science Board study  focused specifically on the future of GPS found that the program was  hampered by sometimes overlapping, sometimes disconnected roles of  Office of the Secretary of Defense staff components, the Joint Staff, and  the Air Force. More recently, a commission formed pursuant to the John  Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,   concluded in 2008 that there is currently no single authority responsible  for national security space—which includes GPS—below the President  and that within DOD authorities are spread among a variety of  organizations, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air  Force, the other military services, the Missile Defense Agency, and the  National Reconnaissance Office with no effective mechanism to arrive at a  unified budget and set priorities. A study chartered by the House Select  Committee on Intelligence also recently found leadership for space  acquisitions to be too diffused at higher levels and that there are critical  shortages in skilled program managers. While recent studies have made  recommendations for strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no  major changes to the leadership structure have been made in recent years.  In fact, an “executive agent” position within the Air Force which was  designated in 2001 to provide leadership has not been filled since the last  executive resigned in 2005.
GPS IIF acquisition problems have not been as extreme as those  experienced on other efforts such as the Space Based Infrared System  (SBIRS) and the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental  Satellite System (NPOESS). At the same time, however, the program was  not as technically complex or ambitious as these efforts.
section_title: DOD Is Implementing Lessons Learned from the GPS IIF Program as It Starts the GPS IIIA Program, but Schedule Is Optimistic
paragraphs: The Air Force is taking measures to prevent the problems experienced on  the GPS IIF program from recurring on the GPS IIIA program. However,  the Air Force will still be challenged to deliver IIIA on time because the  satellite development schedule is compressed. The Air Force is taking the  following measures:    using incremental or block development, where the program would follow  an evolutionary path toward meeting needs rather than attempting to  satisfy all needs in a single step;    using military standards for satellite quality;    conducting multiple design reviews, with the contractor being held to  military standards and deliverables during each review;    exercising more government oversight and interaction with the contractor  and spending more time at the contractor’s site; and    using an improved risk management process, where the government is an  integral part of the process.
In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics specified additional guidance for the GPS IIIA program. This  includes  reevaluating the contractor incentive/award fee approach;    providing a commitment from the Air Force to fully fund GPS IIIA in  Program Objectives Memorandum 2010;  funding and executing recommended mitigation measures to address the  next generation operational control segment and the GPS IIIA satellites;    combining the existing and new ground control segment levels of effort  into a single level of effort, giving the Air Force greater flexibility to  manage these efforts;    not allowing the program manager to adjust the GPS IIIA program scope to  meet increased or accelerated technical specifications, system  requirements, or system performance; and    conducting an independent technology readiness assessment of the  contractor design once the preliminary design review is complete.
Table 2 below highlights the major differences in the framework between  the GPS IIF and GPS III programs.
While these measures should put the GPS IIIA program on sounder  footing, the program is facing serious obstacles—primarily in terms of its  ability to deliver satellites on schedule. At present, the GPS IIIA program is  on schedule and program officials contend that there is no reason to  assume that a delay is likely to occur. They point out that the Air Force is  implementing an incremental development approach and GPS IIIA, the  first increment of GPS III, is not expected to be as technically challenging  as other space programs. In addition, program officials point out that the  Air Force began risk reduction activities in 1998, and has made a  concerted effort to exert more oversight over its contractors and ensure  key decisions are backed by sufficient knowledge about technologies,  design, and production.
We recognize that these steps offer the best course for GPS to be  completed on time. However, we believe there is still considerable risk  that the schedule may not be met for the following reasons.
First, the GPS IIIA program got off to a late start. The program was  originally scheduled to begin development in August 2007. However,  according to GPS program officials, the Air Force shifted funds from GPS  III to other commitments in its space portfolio and to address problems in  other programs. The Defense Space Acquisition Board approved formal  initiation of the GPS IIIA acquisition in May 2008.
Second, when compared to other DOD satellite programs, the GPS IIIA  program schedule appears highly compressed. The Air Force is planning to  launch the first GPS IIIA satellite in 2014 to sustain the GPS constellation.  To launch in 2014, the Air Force has scheduled 72 months from contract  award to first satellite launch. This schedule is 3 years shorter than the  schedule the Air Force has so far achieved under its IIF program. In fact,  the time period between contract award and first launch for GPS IIIA is  shorter than most other major space programs we have reviewed (see fig.  3). Moreover, GPS IIIA is not simply a matter of replicating the IIF  program. Though the contractor has had previous experience with GPS, it  is likely that the knowledge base will need to be revitalized. The  contractor is also being asked to develop a larger satellite bus to  accommodate future GPS increments IIIB and IIIC. In addition, the  contractor is being asked to increase the power of a new military signal by  a factor of 10. In our opinion, there is little room in the schedule to  accommodate difficulties the contractor may have in meeting either  challenge. In addition, the GPS III program office still has not been able to  fill critical contracting and engineering positions needed to assist in  satellites design and contractor oversight—both of which functions are to  receive more emphasis on this program than in the past. Consequently, the  concerns that GPS IIIA could experience a delay are not unreasonable.
However, according to DOD officials, the incremental approach to GPS  acquisition should significantly lower the risk of schedule delays.  Nonetheless, no major satellite program undertaken in the past decade has  met its scheduled goals.
Third, we compared the Air Force’s GPS IIIA schedule to best practices  associated with effective schedule estimating. Past GAO work has  identified nine practices associated with effective schedule estimating. We  analyzed the Air Force’s GPS IIIA schedule according to these practices  and found that one was met, one was not met, and the other seven  practices were only partially met. The practices deal with how well the  schedule identifies key development activities, the times to complete these  activities, as well as the amount of float time associated with each of these  activities—float time is the amount of time a task can slip before affecting  the critical path. Further, the practices assess how well activities have  been integrated with other tasks and whether reserve times have been  allocated to high-risk activities. The primary purpose of all scheduling  activities is to establish a credible critical path. The best practices have  been designed to support that goal. Because the GPS IIIA schedule does  not follow all of the best practices, the reliability of the critical path  identified in the schedule is diminished.
section_title: A Delay in GPS III Could Severely Impact GPS Users
paragraphs: Delays in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites will increase the risk that  the GPS constellation will decrease in size to a level where it will not meet  some users’ needs. If the GPS constellation falls below the number of  satellites required to provide the level of GPS service that the U.S.  government has committed to providing, some military and civilian  operations could be affected. DOD is evaluating different approaches that  could potentially mitigate the gap. However, procurement of additional  GPS IIF satellites does not appear to be feasible.
subsections: section_title: A Delay in GPS III Could Affect GPS Constellation Performance
paragraphs: The performance standards for both (1) the standard positioning service  provided to civil and commercial GPS users and (2) the precise positioning  service provided to military GPS users commit the U.S. government to at  least a 95 percent probability of maintaining a constellation of 24  operational GPS satellites. Because there are currently 31 operational GPS  satellites of various blocks, the near-term probability of maintaining a  constellation of at least 24 operational satellites remains well above 95  percent. However, DOD predicts that over the next several years many of  the older satellites in the constellation will reach the end of their  operational life faster than they will be replenished, and that the  constellation will, in all likelihood, decrease in size. Based on the most  recent satellite reliability and launch schedule data approved in March  2009, the estimated long-term probability of maintaining a constellation of  at least 24 operational satellites falls below 95 percent during fiscal year  2010 and remains below 95 percent until the end of fiscal year 2014, at  times falling to about 80 percent. See figure 4 for details.
The probability curve in figure 4 was generated using unique reliability  curves for each operational satellite in the current on-orbit GPS  constellation, and block-specific reliability curves for each production  (unlaunched) GPS satellite, including IIR-M, IIF, IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC  satellites. (See app. I for a more complete description of the approach  used to generate this probability curve.) Because the reliability curves  associated with new blocks of GPS satellites are based solely on  engineering and design analysis instead of actual on-orbit performance,  this estimated long-term probability of maintaining a 24-satellite  constellation could change once actual on-orbit performance data become  available. For example, while the block IIA satellites were designed to last  only 7.5 years on average, they have actually lasted about twice as long. If  GPS IIF satellites were to last twice as long as their currently estimated  mean life expectancy of 11.5 years, the probability of maintaining a larger  constellation would increase, but the long-term probability of maintaining  the 24-satellite constellation would not improve significantly. Moreover,  program officials provided no evidence to suggest that the current mean  life expectancy for IIF satellites is overly conservative.
A delay in the production and launch of GPS III satellites could severely  impact the U.S. government’s ability to meet its commitment to maintain a  24-satellite GPS constellation. The severity of the impact would depend  upon the length of the delay. For example, a 2-year delay in the production  and launch of the first and all subsequent GPS III satellites would reduce  the probability of maintaining a 24-satellite constellation to about 10  percent by around fiscal year 2018. This significant gap in service would  persist for about 2 years before the constellation began to recover.  Moreover, this recovery—that is, the return to a high probability of  maintaining a 24-satellite constellation—would take an additional 2 to 3  years. Consequently, a 2-year delay in the production and launch of GPS III  satellites would most likely result in a period of roughly 5 years when the  U.S. government would be operating a GPS constellation of fewer than 24  satellites, and a 12-year period during which the government would not  meet its commitment to maintaining a constellation of 24 operational GPS  satellites with a probability of 95 percent or better. For example, the delay  in GPS III would reduce the probability of maintaining a 21-satellite  constellation to between 50 and 80 percent for the period from fiscal year  2018 through fiscal year 2020. Moreover, while the probability of  maintaining an 18-satellite constellation would remain relatively high, it  would still fall below 95 percent for about a year over this period. See  figure 5 for details.
The impacts to both military and civil users of a smaller constellation are  difficult to precisely predict. For example, a nominal 24-satellite  constellation with 21 of its satellites broadcasting a healthy standard  positioning service signal would continue to satisfy the availability  standard for good user-to-constellation geometry articulated in the  standard positioning service performance standard. However, because  the GPS constellation has been operating above the committed  performance standard for so long, military and civil users have come to  expect a higher level of service, even though this service is not committed  to them. Consequently, some users may sense an operational impact even  if the constellation were to perform at or near its committed standards. In  general, users with more demanding requirements for precise location  solutions will likely be more impacted than other users. During our  interviews with military, civil, and commercial representatives, several  examples of possible impacts of a smaller GPS constellation were  discussed.
The accuracy of precision-guided munitions that rely upon GPS to strike  their targets could decrease. To accomplish their mission, military forces  would either need to use larger munitions or use more munitions on the  same target to achieve the same level of mission success. The risks of  collateral damage could also increase.  Intercontinental commercial flights use predicted satellite geometry over  their planned navigation route, and may have to delay, cancel or reroute  flights.
Enhanced-911 services, which rely upon GPS to precisely locate callers,  could lose accuracy, particularly when operating in “urban canyons” or  mountainous terrain.
Another important consideration is that both the standard positioning  service and precise positioning service performance standards assume  that users have unobstructed visibility to nearly the entire sky, an  assumption that does not hold for the large number of users operating in  moderately mountainous terrain, in the “urban canyons” of large cities, or  under forest foliage.
section_title: Different Approaches Are Being Evaluated that Could Potentially Mitigate the Gap
paragraphs: The Air Force is aware that there is some risk that the number of satellites  in the GPS constellation could fall below its required 24 satellites, and that  this risk would grow significantly if the development and launch of GPS  IIIA satellites were delayed. Consequently, an Air Force Space Command  representative informed us that the command has established an  independent review team to examine the risks and consequences of a  smaller constellation on military and civil users. However, at this time, Air  Force representatives believe that the best approach to mitigating the risk  is to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the current schedule for GPS  IIF and III is maintained. Those steps include a commitment from the Air  Force to fully fund GPS IIIA in the fiscal year 2010 Program Objectives  Memorandum, and use of an incremental development approach toward  meeting needs. This incremental approach would place a premium on  controlling schedule risk by, among other things, deferring consideration  of civil requirements for subsystems like the Distress Alerting Satellite  System (DASS) and the Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR) payloads to GPS IIIB  or GPS IIIC satellite blocks.
Options for developing lower-cost alternatives to current GPS satellites  appear to be very limited. For example, in 2007 the Air Force Scientific  Advisory Board examined whether small satellites—which can be  developed more quickly and at relatively low cost—might help meet some  PNT mission requirements. The board concluded that small satellites may  eventually have operational utility in augmenting GPS III capabilities, with  emphasis on enhancing the utility of the GPS M-code signal’s capabilities  against jamming. However, the need for an extensive control segment  infrastructure to monitor and control these small satellite augmentations,  combined with the need to develop, produce, and install user equipment,  would make it very challenging to field a near-term small satellite  augmentation for PNT. With respect to providing basic PNT services, the  board noted that studies of PNT satellite constellations, performed at  different times and by different organizations in the United States and  elsewhere, demonstrate that a robust constellation of relatively powerful  satellites operating at medium earth orbit is the best way to provide  continuous worldwide PNT services; this is a performance set that small  satellites currently cannot provide.
According to Air Force representatives, the procurement of additional IIF  satellites is not feasible, and initiating development of an alternative full- scale, satellite-based PNT system appears to be impractical. Such a system  would likely be very expensive and would compete with GPS III  development for funding, making it harder for the Air Force to meet its  commitment to fully fund GPS IIIA development. Moreover, the GPS III  system development contract was awarded in accordance with an  approved GPS III acquisition strategy, which selected one alternative from  two competing contractors’ designs; an alternative system development  would be, in effect, a significant deviation from that approved strategy.  Finally, it seems unlikely that the award of a separate system development  contract with another contractor would have any real impact on reducing  the risk of delivering GPS IIIA requirements on the current schedule.
In the event that this strategy proves unsuccessful and the schedule for  GPS III slips, additional measures could be considered. For example,  excluding random failures, the operational life of a GPS satellite tends to  be limited by the amount of power that its solar arrays can produce. This  power level declines over time as the solar arrays degrade in the space  environment until eventually they cannot produce enough power to  maintain all of the satellite’s subsystems. However, according to Air Force  representatives, the effects of this power loss can be mitigated somewhat  by actively managing satellite subsystems—shutting them down when not  needed— thereby reducing the satellite’s overall consumption of power. It  would also be possible to significantly reduce the satellite’s consumption  of power by shutting off a secondary GPS payload. This would buy  additional time for the navigation mission of the satellite at the expense of  the mission supported by the secondary payload. The 2004 U.S. Space- Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) policy affirmed PNT as  the primary mission for the GPS constellation, and stated that no  secondary payload may adversely affect the performance, schedule, or  cost of GPS, its signals, or services. Nevertheless, at this time the Air  Force has no intention of shutting off the secondary GPS payload.  Moreover, until there is a more immediate risk that the constellation will  fall below its required size, there is no reason to take this step.
Military and civil users might also take steps in response to a smaller GPS  constellation. While a smaller GPS constellation could result in a  significant reduction in positioning and navigation accuracy at certain  times and locations, these times and locations are usually predictable in  near-real time. Consequently for military users, who must rely upon GPS’s  precise positioning service, a smaller constellation could require changes  in its approach to mission planning to ensure that operations are  conducted at times when GPS accuracy is relatively high, or changes in  tactics employed during a mission. For example, military users could  utilize a larger number of (or more powerful) munitions to achieve an  equivalent level of mission effectiveness.
For civil and commercial users, one possible impact of a smaller GPS  constellation could be an increased use of other positioning, navigation,  and timing services, including those expected to be offered through  Europe’s Galileo system by the middle of the next decade. U.S.  government officials at the various civil agencies and departments clearly  understand what the government has committed to through GPS and they  all have designed programs to function with this limit, with augmentations.
section_title: New Satellite Capabilities Will Not Be Leveraged Because of Delayed Delivery of Ground and User Equipment Capabilities
paragraphs: To maximize the benefit of GPS, the deployment of its space, ground  control, and user equipment capabilities must be synchronized so that the  full spectrum of military assets—weapons, aircraft, and ships, for  example—and individual users can take advantage of new capabilities  such as added protection from jamming. However, because of funding  shifts and diffuse leadership, the Air Force has not been successful in  synchronizing space, ground control, and user equipment segments. As a  result of the poor synchronization, new GPS capabilities may be delivered  in space for years before military users can take advantage of these  capabilities.
subsections: section_title: Air Force Has Deferred the Delivery of Ground Control Capabilities
paragraphs: The Air Force used funding set aside for the ground control segment to  resolve GPS IIF development problems, causing a delay in the delivery of  new ground control capabilities. The GPS ground control segment has  evolved over time from the Operational Control Segment (OCS) to the  current Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP). GPS IIIA satellites are to be  controlled by a future ground control system called Next Generation  Control Segment, or OCX. OCS was supposed to control and exploit GPS  IIF space capabilities. However, because of the addition of new  requirements and technical issues on the IIF program, funding was  diverted from OCS to GPS IIF satellite development efforts. As a result, the  delivery of new ground control capabilities will occur later than originally  planned.
Table 3 below illustrates satellite functions and capabilities that have yet  to be made operational through the ground control segment. For example,  in 2005 the Air Force began launching its GPS IIR-M satellites that  broadcast a second civil signal (the L2C). Unfortunately, the ground  control segment will not be able to make the second civil signal  operational until late 2012 or 2013.
By delaying the delivery of ground control capabilities, the Air Force has  created an imbalance between the capabilities offered by GPS satellites  and the ability to exploit and make operational these capabilities through  the ground control segment.
section_title: Synchronization Problems Will also Delay Fielding of Improved GPS Capabilities to Military Users
paragraphs: GPS satellites that will broadcast the modernized military signal require  military user equipment capable of receiving and processing the signal so  that military users can take advantage of the improved military  capabilities. Before the modernized military signal can be considered  initially operational, it must be broadcast from at least 18 satellites, which  is expected to occur in 2013. For full operational capability, it must be  broadcast from 24 satellites, which is expected to occur in 2015.  Consequently, the new military signal will be made operational by the GPS  satellites and ground control system in about 2013, but the warfighter will  not be able to take full advantage of this new signal until about 2025— when the modernized user equipment is completely fielded. See figure 6  for our analysis of the gap between when the modernized military signal  will be available on the GPS satellites and when the military services will  be able to take advantage of it.
The Air Force will spend the next several years developing prototype  cards and production-ready receiver hardware for selected platforms  within the space, air, ground, and maritime environments. Even after this  is done, the services will still need to add the new user equipment to other  platforms, which could take 10 or more years. This is due to the fact that  the integration and installation of the new user equipment on the  remaining platforms has to be coordinated with existing upgrade  schedules for those platforms. As a result, the services’ ability to achieve a  joint military navigation warfare capability, an essential element in  conducting future military operations, may not be realized until 2025 based  on user equipment delivery schedules.
Funding issues are a contributing factor in the delay in fielding new user  equipment. According to Air Force officials, the GPS program office  focused on developing the satellites, particularly when technical problems  arose. Funding was diverted from the user equipment program to the GPS  satellite program to fix problems, which resulted in delays in the  development and acquisition of the user equipment.
Diffused leadership has been particularly problematic in terms of DOD’s  ability to synchronize delivery of space, ground control, and user  equipment assets. The responsibility for developing and acquiring GPS  satellite and associated ground control segments and for acquiring and  producing user equipment for selected platforms for space, air, ground,  and maritime environments falls under the Air Force’s Space and Missile  Systems Center. On the other hand, responsibility for acquiring and  producing user equipment for all other platforms falls on the military  services. Figure 7 illustrates how the responsibilities for developing,  acquiring, and producing GPS user equipment are divided among the  services.
Because different military services are involved in developing user  equipment for the weapon systems they own and operate, there are  separate budget, management, oversight, and leadership structures over  the space and ground control and the user equipment segments. As such,  there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all the  procurements and fielding related to GPS. A 2008 U.S. Strategic Command  Functional Solutions Analysis, conducted to provide recommendations for  solutions to positioning, navigation, and timing gaps, noted that the Air  Force is responsible for developing and integrating military GPS user  equipment for select platforms, and that integration and testing of these  platforms is required to be complete so that the user equipment is  available for procurement when the military signal becomes operational.  However, this analysis showed no military service program office  commitment of resources for procuring military GPS user equipment in  service programming documents. Furthermore, DOD’s management  attention has been focused on delivering space capabilities. Only recently  has DOD begun to shift its focus by recognizing that the user equipment  segment needs to play an equal role in the overall GPS synchronization  effort.
subsections: section_title: Efforts to Speed up Delivery of User Equipment Face Obstacles
paragraphs: There have been various recommendations to accelerate the fielding of  modernized military user equipment, though there are obstacles in the way  of implementation. In October 2005, the Defense Science Board  recommended that DOD initiate an aggressive program to introduce  antijam enhancements as soon as possible. In August 2006, OSD issued a  GPS User Equipment Development and Procurement Policy, which  mandated that certain equipment categories have the modernized GPS  user equipment by the time the 24th military code satellite is declared  operational. In June 2007, representatives from the Combatant Commands,  U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command requested that  an aggressive schedule be established for all GPS segments to achieve  military code initial operational capability by fiscal year 2013. In March  2008, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council recommended that the Air  Force adjust the development and acquisition of the modernized GPS user  equipment to ensure that warfighters can use space-based capabilities.  Recommendations included amending programmatic schedules and  funding profiles to incorporate military code capabilities at or before the  initial operational capability date.
To accelerate the delivery of the new user equipment, the Air Force  increased the user equipment budget by $272 million for fiscal years 2009  through 2011. In the conference reports accompanying the Department of  Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, conferees recommended an  additional $63.2 million in funding for GPS user equipment. However, the  additional funds will not speed up development of the new user equipment  to a large extent, because the program office is experiencing technical  issues in developing the prototype cards. The major technical issue is with  the difficulty in moving to a new security architecture, Protection of  Navigation, which will provide information assurance.
According to a GPS program office official, OSD, the Air Staff, U.S.  Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and the GPS program  office are looking at ways to get some of the modernized military user  equipment to the field sooner. However, there are challenges with this  approach, particularly because certain security requirements—antispoof,  antijam, and antitamper—should be met before user equipment can be  fielded in conflict situations. According to an official at the GPS program  office, meeting these security requirements is proving to be technically  challenging, and attempting this at an accelerated rate is risky.
section_title: Prudent Steps Taken so GPS Can Meet Broader Needs but Challenges Exist in Coordinating Requirements and Ensuring Compatibility
paragraphs: GPS has produced dramatic economic and security improvements both for  the United States and globally. Ensuring that it can continue to do so is  extremely challenging given competing interests, the span of government  and commercial organizations involved with GPS, and the criticality of  GPS to national and homeland security and the economy. On the one  hand, DOD must ensure military requirements receive top priority and the  program stays executable. In doing so, it must ensure that the program is  not encumbered by requirements that could disrupt development, design,  and production of satellites. On the other hand, there are clearly other  enhancements that could be made to GPS satellites that could serve a  variety of vital missions—particularly because of the coverage GPS  satellites provide—and there is an expressed desire for GPS to serve as the  world’s preeminent positioning, navigation, and timing system. In addition,  while the United States is challenged to deliver GPS on a tight schedule,  other countries are designing and developing systems that provide the  same or enhanced capabilities. Ensuring that these capabilities can be  leveraged without compromising national security or the preeminence of  GPS is also a delicate balancing act that requires close cooperation  between DOD, the Department of State, and other institutions.
Because of the scale and number of organizations involved in maximizing  GPS, we did not undertake a full-scale review of requirements and  coordination processes. However, we reviewed documents supporting  these processes and interviewed a variety of officials to obtain views on its  effectiveness. While there is a consensus that DOD and other federal  organizations involved with GPS have taken prudent steps to manage  requirements and optimize GPS use, we also identified challenges in the  areas of ensuring civilian requirements can be met and ensuring that GPS  is compatible with other new, potentially competing global space-based  positioning, navigation, and timing systems.
subsections: section_title: The Process for Approving GPS Civil Requirements Is Rigorous but Untested
paragraphs: The 2004 U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT)  policy provides guidance for civil involvement in the development of  requirements for the modernization of GPS capabilities and the  requirements process includes an entry point for civil requirements. This  entry point is the Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements  (IFOR), working groups consisting of a civil and a military panel. The  IFOR receives proposed GPS requirements from civil agencies and assists  in developing and validating them. From this point, the proposed  requirement follows a DOD and civil path to validation with involvement  from various interagency boards and councils. Figure 8 illustrates this  formal process for submitting, considering, and validating civil GPS  requirements.
While the process for approving civil requirements on GPS has existed  since 2001, DOD and civil agencies consider it rigorous but relatively  untested because no civil unique requirements have completed the initial  step in the process. Civil agencies have submitted two proposed  requirements to the process; however, these requirements are not directly  related to the GPS mission. Instead, they would add hardware to the GPS  satellites and thus are considered secondary mission requirements.
However, according to civil agencies, the analyses and documentation  called for under the process are confusing and time-consuming.
While GPS remains critical to national security and military operations,  government policy calls for GPS planning to consider integration of civil  requirements for the civilian infrastructure. The process for considering  civil GPS requirements is intended to maintain fiscal discipline by ensuring  only critical needs are funded and developed. Specifically, the process  requires that civil agencies internally identify and validate their proposed  requirements, and conduct cost, risk, and performance analyses. Our past  work has shown that requirements add-ons are a major source of  acquisition instability. In this case, the formal process also requires that  the agency proposing the requirement pay the costs associated with  adding it to the GPS III satellites, thereby forcing agencies to separate  their wants from needs.
subsections: section_title: Civil Agencies Find the GPS Requirements Process Confusing
paragraphs: According to the civil agencies that have proposed GPS requirements, the  formal requirements approval process is confusing and time-consuming.  Specifically, they stated that DOD’s documentary and analysis standards  are new to civil agencies and therefore difficult and time-consuming for  them to manage. Some agencies have reported that it is costly for them to  pay for the more detailed supporting analyses requested by DOD. For  example, one civil agency had to withdraw and resubmit a proposal for  new GPS requirements because it lacked necessary information, including  a cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, civil agencies’ submitted  requirements have necessitated that DOD perform further studies on  compatibility and integration issues to ensure that the proposed  requirements will not adversely affect the primary GPS mission.
The two civil requirements that have entered the requirements process are  the Distress Alerting Satellite System (DASS) and the geodetic  requirement implemented by Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR). Both are joint  civil and military mission requirements and would be potential secondary  payloads on GPS. DASS is an electronic unit that will receive beacon  signals identifying a distressed individual’s location and transmit this  location data to emergency responders. The SLR laser retroreflector,  which weighs less than 7 pounds, is being considered for inclusion starting  with increment IIIB satellites. Scientists would aim a laser to the reflector  to more precisely determine the satellite’s position, ultimately allowing for  more precise measurements on the ground. This SLR capability would  support users who need to make very accurate measurements for  scientific applications.
Distress Alerting Satellite System: The Coast Guard submitted the DASS  requirement to the IFOR in 2003. Early in the review process, a debate on  whether DASS was a civil or military requirement ensued. The IFOR  decided to have military and civil panels review the requirement and  resubmit it through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System (JCIDS) process. It took a total of 5 years to resolve the debate and  prepare and resubmit the package. In July 2008, the civil agencies  submitted DASS requirements and an analysis of alternatives to the IFOR  for review. To date, a decision has not yet been made as to if and when the  capability will be inserted on GPS satellites.
Satellite Laser Ranging: In April 2007, NASA submitted the SLR  requirements package along with an analysis of alternatives to the IFOR.  The IFOR officially accepted the SLR package into the IFOR process in  August of that year. However, in June 2008, DOD opposed implementation  of the SLR capability due to integration and compatibility concerns with  the GPS satellites. A joint Air Force and NASA working group was  established to resolve the integration and compatibility issues and report  back to the IFOR by June 2009 prior to moving the requirement from the  IFOR into the JCIDS process.
DASS supporters have stated that the GPS constellation is the ideal  platform for search and rescue capabilities. The current search and rescue  capability is expected to degrade by 2017 and completely fail by 2020.  More urgently, supporters say that the Canadian government’s offer to  provide DASS hardware at a $90 million cost savings to the United States  must be acted upon by August 2009 or Canada may provide this  component to a developing foreign satellite navigation system. The SLR  capability, until recently, existed on two GPS satellites. One satellite was  decommissioned, and hence according to NASA does not meet its or other  civil agencies’ needs to perform scientific and geodetic applications.  According to NASA, the SLR would need to be implemented on most of  the GPS constellation to meet geodetic requirements for science and other  user requirements. If the DOD does not include DASS and SLR on GPS  satellites, U.S. users of these capabilities may be dependent on foreign  systems which already include, or have plans to include, both DASS-like  and SLR capabilities in their satellite navigation systems.
section_title: Coordinating GPS Activities with the International Community also Presents Challenges
paragraphs: The U.S. government—specifically the State Department—is faced with  challenges in ensuring GPS is compatible and interoperable with other  new, potentially competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and  timing systems. While the U.S. government has engaged a number of other  countries and international organizations in cooperative discussions, only  one legally binding agreement has been established. Furthermore, some  U.S. manufacturers of GPS receivers stated that European Union  manufacturers may have a competitive advantage over U.S. companies  with respect to the manufacture and sale of Galileo-capable receivers,  though officials with the European Commission disagree. In addition,  Department of State officials have expressed concerns over the limited  number of technical experts available to support activities under these  cooperative arrangements. Without these resources, officials are  concerned that it may be difficult to continue to ensure the compatibility  and interoperability of foreign systems.
subsections: section_title: Joint Statements of Cooperation Made and One Agreement Established
paragraphs: The United States has made joint statements of cooperation with  Australia, India, Japan, and Russia to promote compatibility and  interoperability and mutual interests regarding the civil use of GPS and its  augmentations and established an executive agreement with the  European Community (see table 4 for a list of types of cooperative  arrangements with other countries). The joint statements and executive  agreement were sought to avoid interference with each others’ systems,  and to facilitate the pursuit of common civil signals. Under the national  space-based PNT policy, it is the Department of State’s role to promote the  civil aspects of GPS and its augmentation services and standards with  foreign governments and other international organizations. The  Department of State leads negotiations with foreign governments and  international organizations regarding civil and, as appropriate, military  space-based PNT matters including, but not limited to, coordinating  interagency review of international agreements with foreign governments  and international organizations regarding the planning, operation,  management, and or use of the GPS and its augmentations. While most of  the cooperative arrangements are joint statements that express the parties’  intent to cooperate on GPS-related activities, the United States and the  European Commission have established an executive agreement that is  considered binding under international law.
According to the executive agreement with the European Community,  subject to applicable export controls, the United States and the European  Commission are to make sufficient information concerning their  respective civil satellite-based signals and augmentations publicly  available on a nondiscriminatory basis, to ensure equal opportunity for  persons who seek to use these signals, manufacture equipment to use  these signals, or provide value-added services which use these signals.
In 2006, the European Commission publicly released draft technical  specifications for its open service. The draft document requests  manufacturers to obtain a commercial license from the European  Commission to sell and import products designed to work with the  European satellite navigation system, Galileo. While this licensing  requirement applies to all manufacturers, some U.S. companies stated that  some foreign user equipment manufacturers who are members of the  Galileo consortia may have an unfair advantage over U.S. companies. This  is because the Galileo consortia currently have access to testing hardware  and may be able to introduce their products more quickly into the  marketplace once they are granted a commercial license.
Officials with the European Commission told us that they do not believe  the license restrictions or the knowledge gained from testing the Galileo  systems are discriminatory. They further stated that the restrictions in  obtaining a commercial license to sell user equipment apply to all  companies, not just U.S. companies and they have not yet issued licenses  to any company. In the meantime, a U.S. and European Commission  working group on trade and civil applications is discussing the licensing  issue.
However, U.S. firms have raised concerns to the Department of Commerce  (Commerce) on the lack of information from the European Commission  relating to the process for obtaining a license to sell Galileo equipment.  According to Commerce, U.S. firms have asserted that they are not aware  of how, where, or when to apply for such a license, despite repeated  inquiries to the U.S.-European Commission trade working group and direct  contacts with European Commission officials—and the timeline for the  licensing process is unknown. Commerce further noted that U.S.  manufacturers wanting to enter the Galileo market are hesitant to invest in  technology that is not officially licensed and that could possibly be banned  from sale. It takes industry 18 to 24 months to develop a market-ready  receiver, and the first operational Galileo satellite is scheduled for launch  in 2010. U.S. firms are concerned they will not have their products ready  by that time and will lose their market share to European companies with  inside access to technology and/or licensing information.
section_title: State Officials Believe International Efforts Lack Dedicated Resources
paragraphs: According to Department of State officials, the department lacks dedicated  technical expertise to monitor international activities. The Department of  State relies on a small pool of experts from DOD and the seven civil  agencies represented on the National Executive Committee for Space- Based PNT. These experts are often in high demand because they work on  other GPS-related activities and in some cases have other assigned duties  that are unrelated to GPS. According to the Department of State, in many  cases these experts and those in other agencies must continually justify to  their managers that their attendance at international meetings is  important. Given the progress made in working with foreign governments  to establish arrangements, share information, and ensure compatibility  and interoperability with GPS, Department of State officials would like  DOD and civil agencies to dedicate funding and staff positions to  international activities accompanied by a sustained level of senior  management support and understanding of the importance of these  activities. Without an expanded pool of technical expertise and related  resources, Department of State officials stated they are concerned that  ongoing international efforts to ensure compatibility of foreign systems  with GPS could be jeopardized.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: GPS has enabled transformations in military, civil, other government, and  commercial operations and has become part of the critical infrastructure  serving national and international communities. Clearly, the United States  cannot afford to see its GPS capabilities decrease below its requirement,  and optimally, it would stay preeminent. Over the past decade, however,  the program has experienced cost increases and schedule delays. While  the Air Force is making a concerted effort to address acquisition problems,  there is still considerable risk that satellites will not be delivered on time,  leading to gaps in capability. Focused attention and oversight are needed  to ensure the program stays on track and is adequately resourced, that  unanticipated problems are quickly discovered and resolved, and that all  communities involved with GPS are aware of and positioned to address  potential gaps in service. But this is difficult to achieve given diffuse  responsibility over various aspects of the GPS acquisition program.  Moreover, disconnects between the space, ground control, and user  equipment components have significantly lessened the military’s ability to  take advantage of enhancements, particularly as they relate to assuring the  continuity of service during military engagements. Without more  concentrated leadership attention, such disconnects could worsen,  particularly since (1) both the ground control and user equipment  programs have been subject to funding shifts to pay for problems affecting  the satellite segment, and (2) user equipment programs are executed by  separate entities over which no one single person has authority. Lastly,  ensuring that GPS can continue to produce dramatic improvements to civil  agencies’ applications, calls for any weaknesses that are identified in the  civil agency GPS requirements process to be addressed.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Because of the criticality of the GPS system and potential delays, and  given the importance of GPS to the civil community, we are making the  following recommendations.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense appoint a single  authority to oversee the development of the GPS system, including  DOD space, ground control, and user equipment assets, to ensure  that the program is well executed and resourced and that potential  disruptions are minimized. The appointee should have authority to  ensure DOD space, ground control, and user equipment are  synchronized to the maximum extent practicable; and coordinate  with the existing positioning, navigation, and timing infrastructure  to assess and minimize potential service disruptions should the  satellite constellation decrease in size for an extended period of  time.
We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and  Transportation, as the co-chairs of the National Executive  Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing,  address, if weaknesses are found, civil agency concerns for  developing requirements, and determine mechanisms for  improving collaboration and decision making and strengthening  civil agency participation.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD concurred with our first recommendation to appoint a single  authority to oversee the development of the GPS system, including space,  ground control, and user equipment assets, to ensure that the program is  well executed, resourced, and that potential disruptions are minimized.  DOD stated that it has recognized the importance of centralizing authority  to oversee the continuing synchronized evolution of the GPS. According to  DOD, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has reaffirmed that the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD NII))  is designated with authority and responsibility for all aspects of the GPS.  DOD further stated that the U.S. Air Force is the single acquisition agent  with responsibility for synchronized modernization of GPS space, ground  control, and military user equipment.
In concurring with our recommendation on appointing a single authority  to oversee the development of the GPS system, DOD asserts that ASD NII  is designated with authority and responsibility for all aspects of GPS, and  that the Air Force is the single acquisition agent responsible for  synchronizing GPS segments. In addition, responsibility for acquiring GPS  military user equipment acquisitions falls under various officials within the  military services. We agree that given the diversity of platforms and  equipment variations involved, it would not be realistic for the Air Force to  unilaterally produce a “one-size-fits-all” solution. However, this does not  obviate the need for a single authority to oversee the development of all  GPS military user equipment to better ensure greater coordination with  deployed satellite capabilities. Without an approach that enables a single  individual to make resource decisions and maintain visibility over  progress, DOD is at risk of facing the same issues in synchronizing the  delivery of GPS assets and wasting capability that will be available in  space but not on the ground. In addition, DOD may still want to consider  establishing a means by which progress in developing the satellites and  ground equipment receives attention from the highest levels of leadership  that is the Secretary and perhaps the National Security Council, given the  criticality of GPS to the warfighter and the nation, and the risks associated  with not meeting schedule goals.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation to address, if  weaknesses are found, civil agency concerns for developing requirements  and determine mechanisms for improving collaboration and decision  making, and strengthening civil agency participation. DOD acknowledged  that it employs a rigorous requirements process and is aware of the  frustration civil agencies face when using this process. DOD further  indicated that it worked to put in place an interagency requirements plan,  and is currently in the process of jointly coordinating the Charter for an  Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements to provide venues to  identify, discuss, and validate civil or dual-use GPS requirements. Finally,  DOD noted that it will continue to seek ways to improve civil agency  understanding of the DOD requirements process and work to strengthen  civil agency participation. We support DOD’s efforts to inform and educate  other civil agencies on the requirements process. As it undertakes these  efforts, DOD should ensure that it is taking a more active role in directly  communicating with civil agencies to more precisely identify concerns or  weaknesses in the requirements process.
The full text of DOD’s comments may be found in appendix IV. We also  received technical comments from the other departments and NASA,  which we incorporated where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 8 days from  the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  Secretaries of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security,  Interior, State, and Transportation; the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration; and interested congressional committees. The report will  also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report or need additional information,  please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report.  The major contributors are listed in  appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite, ground control,  and user equipment acquisition programs and determine whether GPS  capabilities are being synchronized, we reviewed and analyzed program  plans and documentation related to cost, schedule, requirements, program  direction, and satellite constellation sustainment, and compared  programmatic data to GAO’s criteria compiled over the last 12 years for  best practices in system development. We also interviewed officials from  Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center GPS program office; Air Force  Space Command; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of the  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;  Assistant Secretary of Defense Office of Networks and Information  Integration; United States Strategic Command; 2nd Space Operations  Squadron; and the services.
To determine the extent to which the Air Force had effectively developed  and maintained the GPS IIIA integrated master schedule, we reviewed the  program’s schedule estimates and compared them with relevant best  practices to determine the extent to which they reflects key estimating  practices that are fundamental to having a reliable schedule. In doing so,  we interviewed GPS program officials to discuss their use of best practices  in creating the program’s current schedule.
To assess the status of the GPS constellation, we interviewed officials  from the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center GPS program office,  Air Force Space Command, and the 2nd Space Operations Squadron. To  assess the risks that a delay in the acquisition and fielding of GPS III  satellites could result in the GPS constellation falling below the 24  satellites required by the standard positioning service and precise  positioning service performance standards, we obtained information from  the Air Force predicting the reliability for 77 GPS satellites—each of the 31  current (on-orbit) and 46 future GPS satellites—as a function of time. Each  satellite’s total reliability curve defines the probability that the satellite will  still be operational at a given time in the future. It is generated from the  product of two reliability curves—a wear-out reliability curve defined by  the cumulative normal distribution, and a random reliability curve defined  by the cumulative Weibull distribution. For each of the 77 satellites, we  obtained the two parameters defining the cumulative normal distribution,  and the two parameters defining the cumulative Weibull distribution. For  each of the 46 unlaunched satellites, we also obtained a parameter  defining its probability of successful launch, and its current scheduled  launch date. The 46 unlaunched satellites include 2 IIR-M satellites, 12 IIF  satellites, 8 IIIA satellites, 8 IIIB satellites, and 16 IIIC satellites; launch of  the final IIIC satellite is scheduled for March 2023. Using this information,  we generated overall reliability curves for each of the 77 GPS satellites. We  discussed with Air Force and Aerospace Corporation representatives, in  general terms, how each satellite’s normal and Weibull parameters were  calculated. However, we did not analyze any of the data used to calculate  these parameters.
Using the reliability curves for each of the 77 GPS satellites, we developed  a Monte Carlo simulation to predict the probability that at least a given  number of satellites would be operational as a function of time, based on  the GPS launch schedule approved in March 2009. We conducted several  runs of our simulation—each run consisting of 10,000 trials—and  generated “sawtoothed” curves depicting the probability that at least 21,  24, 27, and 30 satellites would still be operational as a function of time. We  compared the results for a 24-satellite constellation with a similar Monte  Carlo simulation that the Aerospace Corporation performed for the Air  Force. We confirmed that our simulation produces results that are within  about 2 percent of the Aerospace Corporation’s results for all times  between October 2008 and April 2024. Using 10,000 trials per run, the  results of different runs of the same Monte Carlo simulation can vary by  about 1 to 2 percent; consequently we concluded that we had successfully  replicated the Aerospace Corporation’s results. We then used our Monte  Carlo simulation model to examine the impact of a 2-year delay in the  launch of all GPS III satellites. We moved each GPS III launch date back by  2 years. We then reran the model and calculated new probabilities that at  least 18, 21, and 24 satellites would still be operational as a function of  time.
To assess impacts of a potential GPS service disruption on particular types  of military and civil GPS users, we interviewed numerous military and civil  GPS representatives and reviewed studies provided by civil agencies.
To assess the coordination and collaboration among federal agencies and  the broader GPS community, and to determine the organization of the PNT  community, we analyzed documents from and conducted interviews with  officials in Washington, D.C. at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Networks and Information Integration; SAF/USA (Air Force  Directorate of Space Acquisitions); National Aeronautics and Space  Administration; the Departments of Transportation, State, Commerce, and  Homeland Security; the Space-Based National PNT Coordination Office;  and the U.S. GPS Industry Council. We also interviewed a private sector  GPS expert at Stanford University, and GPS industry representatives. To  analyze how the U.S. government coordinates with foreign countries on  GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems), we met with representatives  of and reviewed documents from the U.S. Department of State and  European Space Agency (ESA) in Washington, D.C. To obtain information  on efforts by Australia, China, Japan, and Russia to develop GNSS, we met  with Department of State officials, reviewed materials provided by these  countries’ representatives at GNSS conferences, and consulted the official  government space agency Web sites. We also traveled to Europe to meet  with experts in satellite navigation at the European Space Agency, French  Space Agency (CNES), European Commission Directorate-General for  Energy and Transport Satellite Navigation Unit, and European GNSS  industry experts. In addition, we attended a conference in Berlin, Germany  to learn about international coordination on PNT systems and  applications.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 to April 2009 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those  standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,  appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: International Global Satellite Navigation Systems
paragraphs: In addition to the Global Positioning System (GPS), there are other space- based global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) in operation and in  development. Russia has a system, GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite  System). There are currently 20 GLONASS satellites in orbit, and the  Russians expect to have a full constellation of 24 satellites in orbit by 2010  and ultimately to expand to a 30-satellite constellation. The European  Union (EU) is developing its own GNSS program, Galileo. Originally  started as a public-private partnership, the program now is completely  funded by the public sector. The EU has 2 test satellites in orbit now, and  plans to have a 27-satellite constellation with 3 spares by 2013. China also  is in the process of developing its own GNSS, Compass (also called  Beidou). China currently has 3 satellites in orbit, and plans to increase the  constellation for coverage of the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 and for  worldwide coverage by 2015. Table 5 lists the non-U.S. global navigation  satellite systems currently in development.
section_title: Appendix III: Cooperation Between U.S. and Foreign Entities
paragraphs: During 2007, the Department of State signed joint statements of  cooperation in the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) with  Australia and India. The Australia joint statement expresses the parties’  intention to promote interoperability between GPS and Australia’s  Ground-based Regional Augmentation System and Ground Based  Augmentation System. The India joint statement expressed the parties’  intention to promote GPS and India’s GPS and GEO-Augmented  Navigation system. An executive agreement with the European  Community and its member states has been in effect since 2004 that  expresses the intention that GPS and Galileo will be interoperable at the  user level for the benefit of civil users around the world. This cooperation  has resulted in working groups that are reviewing technical, trade, and  security issues. The technical issues described in the executive agreement  involve GPS-Galileo radio frequency compatibility and interoperability and  the design and development of the next generation of systems. For trade, a  working group is determining how to maintain nondiscriminatory trade  practices in the global market for goods and services related to space- based PNT, and a group was appointed to review the security issues  concerning GPS and Galileo.
The United States and Russia initiated cooperation in 2004, with the  parties expressing their intent to work together to maintain and promote  civil interoperability at the user level between GPS and Russia’s GLONASS  system. Two working groups have been established to address: (1) radio  frequency compatibility and interoperability for enhanced PNT and (2)  technical interoperability between the search-and-rescue capabilities  planned for GPS and GLONASS.
The United States and Japan have had a relationship since signing a joint  statement in 1998. In the joint statement, the parties expressed their intent  to promote and facilitate civilian uses of GPS. Japan is developing MTSAT- based Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), a geostationary satellite  system similar to the U.S. Wide Area Augmentation System. The United  States and Japan most recently met in November 2008 to discuss the civil  use of GPS and Japan’s MSAS and Quasi-Zenith Satellite System.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
paragraphs: GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED MARCH 12, 2009  GAO-09-325 (GAO CODE 120696)   “THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM:  SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES  IN SUSTAINING AND UPGRADING WIDELY USED CAPABILITIES”
RECOMMENDATION 1:  The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense appoint a single  authority to oversee the development of the Global Positioning System (GPS) system, including  space, ground, and user assets, to ensure that the program is well executed and resourced and that  potential disruptions are minimized.  (p. 43/GAO Draft Report)
DOD RESPONSE:  Concur with comment.  The Department has recognized the importance of  centralizing authority to oversee the continuing synchronized evolution of the GPS.  To that end,  the Deputy Secretary of Defense has reaffirmed that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) is the Department’s Principal Staff Assistant  to oversee Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, and, specifically, is designated with authority  and responsibility for all aspects of the Global Position System (GPS).  This designation is  contained in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 4650.05, issued on February 19, 2008.  A  formal Department of Defense Instruction is now in final coordination to further define the  oversight processes to be employed in executing DoDD 4650.05, and completion is expected by  May 2009.  Further, under oversight of the ASD(NII), the U.S. Air Force is the single acquisition  agent with responsibility for synchronized modernization of GPS space, ground control, and  military user equipment.  The Air Force acquires and operates the GPS space and control  segments and provides the fundamental system design and security requirements necessary for  acquisition of GPS user equipment and applications in support of diverse missions across the  Department.  Given the diversity of platforms, and equipment form factors involved, it is  impossible for the Air Force to unilaterally produce a “one-size-fits-all” solution applicable to all  DoD missions.
RECOMMENDATION 2:  The GAO recommends that Secretary of Defense, as one of the  Position Navigation and Timing executive committee co-chairs, address, if weaknesses are  found, civil agency concerns for developing requirements and determine mechanisms for  improving collaboration and decision making and strengthening civil agency participation.   (p. 43/GAO Draft Report)
DOD RESPONSE:  Concur with comment.  The Department is aware that we employ a rigorous  requirements process in support of our extensive operational and acquisition responsibilities and  that the process is a source of frustration for civil agencies without similar processes in place.   In  an effort to address the issue, we have worked with the civil agencies to put in place a GPS  Interagency Requirements Plan, jointly approved by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, who is in charge of our process, and the Department of Transportation (DOT), acting on  behalf of all civil agencies.  Further, we are now in the process of jointly coordinating the  Charter for an Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements (IFOR) to provide meeting  venues to identify, discuss, and validate civil or dual use GPS requirements for inclusion in the  DoD GPS acquisition process.  Finally, we sponsor educational outreach opportunities for civil  agencies to become more fully acquainted with the DoD requirements process, including a day- long “Requirements Process Summit” jointly conducted by the Joint Staff and DOT on April 29,  2008.  We will continue to seek ways to improve civil agency understanding of the DoD  requirements process and work to strengthen civil agency participation.
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Art Gallegos (Assistant Director), Greg Campbell, Jennifer Echard,  Maria Durant, Anne Hobson, Laura Hook, Sigrid McGinty, Angela  Pleasants, Jay Tallon, Hai Tran, and Alyssa Weir.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed  to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System  Quality. GAO-08-294. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2008.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon  System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes.  GAO-07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology  Transition Processes. GAO-06-883. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers  Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November 1,  2005.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon  Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February  11, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early  Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,  2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to  Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,  2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better  Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31,  2000.
Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System  Programs Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington,  D.C.: August 16, 1999.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can  Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington,  D.C.: July 30, 1999.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires  Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:  February 24, 1998.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer  Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26,  1996.