Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations
Published: 2007-10-04T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This testimony addresses (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism or how they should do so. In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with developing a plan to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June of 2006. According to NCTC, Department of State, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, implementing guidance for the plan is under development, and they would not discuss the contents of the plan or the guidance. LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports, and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance program. However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring systems and formal structures for sharing information and collaborating. We also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full range of training and assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to submit this statement for the record on U.S. law  enforcement efforts to help foreign nations to combat terrorism abroad.  In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, combating terrorism has become  the nation’s top national security goal and the highest strategic objective  of U.S. embassies worldwide. Law enforcement agencies (LEA) from the  departments of State (State), Justice (Justice), and Homeland Security  (DHS)—including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration  and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and State’s Bureau of Diplomatic  Security (DS)—operate from U.S. embassies overseas and assist foreign  nation governments on a broad array of law enforcement issues, such as  investigating crime, reducing illegal drug activity, controlling borders and  immigration, and protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from attack.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of national  strategies that have called for using all elements of national power to  combat terrorism, including changing the role of LEAs. In particular, these  strategies have directed that law enforcement activities be increasingly  focused on the prevention of further terrorist attacks, including helping  foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This includes  technical assistance, such as antiterrorism training and the provision of  technologies used to identify terrorist threats, and operational assistance,  such as joint U.S.-foreign nation investigations and operations against  terrorists.
This statement discusses the findings from our recent report regarding   (1) the guidance for LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism, and  (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance. I should  point out that our review was limited to U.S. law enforcement efforts  overseas. It did not focus on U.S. domestic law enforcement efforts or  other instruments of national power—including military, intelligence,  diplomatic, and financial—currently being used to combat terrorism.
During the course of our review, we analyzed the National Security  Strategy of the United States of America, the National Strategy for  Homeland Security, and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. We  discussed this and other guidance with representatives from State, Justice,  and DHS, along with embassy and LEA officials involved with working  with foreign nation counterparts. We also reviewed State, Justice, and  DHS strategic plans and annual performance reports and conducted  detailed work in four countries with key roles in combating terrorism  where we met with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials. We also  met with officials from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to  brief them on our observations and to determine the status of ongoing  efforts to develop a plan to use all elements of national power, including  LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials would not discuss the plan, its  contents, or any issues raised in our report. During the course of our work  we experienced considerable delays obtaining information from Justice  and State, which resulted in our report being issued several months later  than initially planned. We were eventually able to obtain information  sufficient for answering our objectives. The work used to support this  statement was conducted in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: State, Justice, and DHS each include LEAs that operate from U.S.  embassies. LEAs abroad work on a wide array of law enforcement issues,  including those that cover criminal enterprises, drug cartels, visa and  immigration fraud, financial crimes, criminal and terrorist threats against  U.S. embassies and personnel, and fugitive capture and extraditions. In  this statement, we are focused primarily on ICE, FBI, and DS operations  abroad, although in our report we also reviewed the overseas counter- terrorism activities of the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service;  Customs and Border Protection; and the U.S. Secret Service.
ICE investigates threats to U.S. border security and works to eliminate the  potential threat of terrorist acts against the United States. The FBI is  charged with protecting the United States from terrorist attacks;  preventing, disrupting, and defeating terrorist operations; and expanding  operational partnerships with foreign nation law enforcement and  intelligence agencies to disrupt and prevent terrorism. DS is State’s law  enforcement arm and is responsible for protecting U.S. embassies,  diplomats, and their families from criminal and terrorist attacks.
The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act created the NCTC and charged it with  integrating all instruments of national power—including diplomatic,  financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement  activities—within and among agencies, with the ultimate goal of  preventing future attacks against America and its interests worldwide. The  NCTC is a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and  reports to the Director on matters of intelligence collection and analysis;  however, on matters of strategic operational planning for  counterterrorism, the Director of the NCTC reports directly to the  President. As a result, the NCTC works under the policy direction of the  NSC on matters of counterterrorism planning.
section_title: National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance, but Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: A series of national strategies have provided broad guidance for U.S. LEAs  to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.  However, the strategies lack essential elements of a strategic plan and for  facilitating interagency collaboration, and they do not clearly delineate  what role, if any, the various LEAs should play in assisting foreign nations  to combat terrorism. The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act requires the NCTC  to develop U.S. governmentwide strategic operational plans to combat  terrorism, which should include the mission, objectives, tasks to be  performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and  assignment of roles and responsibilities among participating agencies.  NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a  general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006, but the  implementing guidance for the plan was still under development.
subsections: section_title: National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assist Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level guidance  for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute  terrorists. For example, the National Security Strategy, issued in 2002 and  updated in March 2006, states that the United States will continue to  encourage regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates  the terrorists, and help ensure that foreign nations have the law  enforcement, military, political, and financial tools necessary to disrupt  and destroy terrorist operations before they reach American borders.
Additionally, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security primarily  focuses on domestic efforts to secure America from further terrorist  attacks. It clarifies the role of LEAs in the post 9/11 world, stating that,  “Our Nation’s highest law enforcement objective must be the prevention of  terrorist acts—a significant shift from pre-9/11 objectives.” The strategy  also notes that, in a world where the terrorist threat pays no respect to  traditional boundaries, the American strategy for homeland security  cannot stop at the country’s borders.
It also calls for a sustained and systematic international agenda to counter  the global terrorist threat and improve homeland security, and identifies a  number of initiatives in this area, including (1) intensifying international  law enforcement cooperation and helping foreign nations fight terrorism  and (2) augmenting the FBI’s overseas presence by increasing the number  of LEGATs around the world. It states that Justice, in cooperation with  State, is to work with foreign nation counterparts on these law  enforcement issues.
Also, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in 2003 and  updated in 2006, focuses on the United States’ efforts to combat terrorism  abroad. It also provides greater detail on the objectives and strategies for  U.S. LEAs in working with their foreign nation counterparts. According to  the strategy, the United States is to:    Expand, where appropriate, the U.S. law enforcement presence abroad to  further the investigative and operational assistance related to the  interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist suspects.
Increase technical and operational assistance efforts to help foreign nation  LEAs acquire the necessary capabilities to fight terrorism through a variety  of means, including (1) improved legislation, (2) technical assistance,   (3) new investigative techniques, (4) intelligence sharing, and (5) law  enforcement training.
Enhance operational assistance to expand international cooperation to  combat terrorism through expanded sharing of law enforcement  information.
In 2006, the White House released updates of the National Security  Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Both updated  strategies reinforce the basic concepts of using U.S. LEAs to assist foreign  nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists abroad. For  example, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism supports intensifying  training and other types of assistance to improve foreign nation LEA  capacities to identify and disrupt terrorists threats, as well as  implementing legal reforms aimed at ensuring that foreign nations have  the necessary laws to carry out this effort, and that investigators,  prosecutors, and judges have the capacity to effectively prosecute  terrorists using these new laws. The strategies state that this approach has  succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists since the  9/11 terrorist attacks.
section_title: The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration
paragraphs: Our past work has stressed the importance of developing a strategy to  combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives, priorities,  outcomes, milestones, and performance measures. In March 2003, we  reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be  accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each  objective, ensure that funding necessary to achieve the objectives is  available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and  identify needed improvements. For example, our past work has found that  identifying clear roles and responsibilities for each federal agency  combating terrorism is a major challenge in implementing national  strategies related to terrorism.
In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)  requires each federal agency to develop strategic plans that cover a period  of at least 5 years and include the agency’s mission statement; identify the  agency’s general goals and objectives; and describe how the agency  intends to achieve those goals through its activities and human, capital,  information, and other resources. Under GPRA, strategic plans are the  starting point for agencies to set annual performance plans for programs  and to measure the performance of the programs in achieving those goals.  Our past work has found that GPRA has the potential for greatly  enhancing agency performance. For example, managers can use  performance information to identify problems in existing programs, to try  to identify the causes of problems, and to develop corrective actions.
Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency  collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1) define  and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or  joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding needs by leveraging  resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible  policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency  boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on  results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts  through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual  accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management  systems. We have specifically noted that, given the number of agencies  involved in U.S. government efforts to combat terrorism, it is particularly  important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies.
We found that while the national strategies, as well as their updates in  2006, provided broad guidance, they lacked key strategic elements,  including those to promote LEA collaboration in assisting foreign nations  to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, none of the  three national strategies established joint agency strategies that would  capitalize on the unique capacity of each LEA to combat terrorism.  Further, none of them identified funding needs or leveraged resources;  reached agreement on roles and responsibilities; or established  procedures to operate across agency boundaries. Moreover, none of the  strategies included mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on their  overall results, nor did they reinforce agency accountability for  collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.
section_title: NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implementing Guidance Is Still under Development
paragraphs: In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act,  creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic operational  plans to combat terrorism using every element of national power,  including those of U.S. LEAs. Under the act, the NCTC is expected to (1)  conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities; (2)  integrate all instruments of national power in such planning, including law  enforcement, diplomatic, military, intelligence, and financial activities; (3)  assign roles and responsibilities to lead departments and agencies; (4)  ensure that agencies have access to intelligence and intelligence support  needed to execute their counterterrorism plans and accomplish their  assigned activities; and (5) monitor implementation of these operational  plans.
In June 2006, the NCTC Director testified before Congress that the lack of  a detailed plan to ensure full implementation of the national security  strategy had been a void that stretched back for decades. According to the  director, what has long been missing is a plan to ensure that national  strategies are implemented at the operational level in a coordinated,  integrated fashion, and that there has been no formal process to translate  the national strategies into strategic and tangible objectives, assigned to  lead agencies, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined. In addition,  there has been no plan to ensure the coordination, integration, and  synchronization of joint departmental operations, or any effort to monitor  the combined impact of the multiple agencies engaged in implementing  the national security strategy.
NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a  general plan, which was approved by the President in June of 2006.  According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance for the plan was still  under development as of May 2007, and they would not discuss the plan,  its contents, or the implementing guidance.
section_title: Several Factors Limit LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists
paragraphs: Although some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help  foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, most LEAs have  not been given clear guidance for helping foreign nations to identify,  disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We found that LEA efforts to assist  foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists have been  hindered because the LEAs generally lacked (1) clearly articulated roles  and responsibilities from NCTC to assist foreign nations; (2) guidance on  setting funding priorities and providing resources; (3) performance  monitoring systems to assess LEA progress; (4) formal structures to  coordinate LEA operational and technical assistance to foreign nation  LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs assessments to tailor LEA  technical and operational assistance to specific foreign nation needs.
subsections: section_title: Some LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: Some LEAs have increased their efforts to help foreign nations combat  terrorism. For example, the FBI is attempting to operationally assist  foreign nations to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks before they occur,  and it has responded to specific terrorist attacks by assisting foreign  nations to identify and prosecute the suspected terrorists. In addition, new  programs have been specifically designed to assist foreign nations to  identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats, such as the DHS Container  Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, some existing technical assistance  programs, like State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, have been  expanded in an effort to improve foreign nation capabilities. While this list  is not all inclusive, these represent some significant U.S. efforts to use U.S.  LEAs to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We found that these  three efforts were limited by a variety of factors.
We found that the FBI has both responded to specific terrorist attacks by  operationally assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify and prosecute  terrorists involved in those attacks, as well as tried to proactively assist  foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one  country we visited, the FBI provided limited but vital operational  assistance to locate terrorist suspects and provided key evidence for their  successful prosecution. In another country we visited, the FBI was  working proactively with ICE and with foreign nation counterparts to  track suspicious migrants and identify and disrupt potential terrorists  before they entered the United States. However, as we will discuss below,  we found that the impact of the FBI’s efforts to combat terrorism has been  limited in some posts overseas.
DHS’s CSI effort targets for inspection at foreign seaports high-risk cargo  shipments before they leave for the United States. It was created after the  9/11 terrorist attacks and requires U.S. law enforcement personnel to be  physically colocated with foreign nation LEAs to identify and disrupt  terrorist threats to America. In 2005, we reported that CSI had led to  improved information sharing between U.S. and foreign customs staff and  a heightened level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness of  the need to identify and disrupt terrorist threats. However, we also found  that several issues limited its effectiveness, such as the inability to fully  staff some ports because of diplomatic constraints.
section_title: LEAs Lack Clear Roles and Responsibilities
paragraphs: Despite such actions, we found that most LEAs have not been given clear  guidance for helping foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute  terrorists. We found that neither NCTC nor the executive departments  have clearly translated the national strategies’ broad strategic objectives to  agency-specific roles and responsibilities. In addition, we found that, with  one exception, neither Justice, DHS, nor State had issued guidance to their  component LEAs to implement this new national security goal of assisting  foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. Only Justice  had issued some guidance to the FBI. As a result, most U.S. LEAs lacked  clearly defined roles and responsibilities for implementing their efforts to  assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
We found problems because of this lack of guidance on roles and  responsibilities. For example:    Although Justice told us in February 2007 that the FBI was designated the  lead federal LEA on investigating terrorism-related crimes abroad, this  view was not shared by the other LEAs or even the FBI itself. LEAs,  including DHS’s ICE, Justice’s FBI, and State’s DS all told us there was no  lead LEA charged with using the combined capabilities of federal LEAs to  assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities  between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations  intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to  the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. ICE was responsible for tracking special  interest aliens, while the FBI was responsible for identifying terrorists  trying to enter the United States. Because it was unclear whether some of  these special interest aliens were migrants or potential terrorists—and ICE  and FBI were not given clear guidance to determine which LEA had the  lead role—foreign nation and agency officials noted instances where joint  U.S.-foreign nation investigations or operations were poorly coordinated.  As a result, ICE and FBI, unknowingly working with different foreign  nation LEAs, moved in on the same subject. According to the foreign  nation law enforcement and FBI officials, such actions may have  compromised several of their investigations.
DS’s Regional Security Officers (RSO) have been given no post 9/11  guidance from State on how to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt,  and prosecute terrorists, and RSOs voiced confusion about this role. In  three of the four countries we visited, RSOs told us that they were not  working with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists,  while in another country, the RSO played a critical role in embassy efforts  to help the foreign nation capture and prosecute terrorists responsible for  attacks against Americans and others.
At the four embassies we visited, we found State had not provided  guidance on how to use LEA assets to assist foreign nations to identify,  disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission  at each embassy we visited voiced their concern that, despite combating  terrorism being the embassy’s highest priority, they received little to no  guidance on how to design a coordinated assistance program using the full  capacities of U.S. technical and operational assistance from LEAs, and  ensure that LEAs had the necessary goals, skills, capabilities, and time to  work closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorists attacks.
In commenting on our findings in February 2007, officials from DHS,  Justice, and State agreed that there had been a lack of clear guidance  instructing LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and  prosecute terrorists. Officials noted that the NSC and now the NCTC have  the authority to compel U.S. LEAs to work together in a coordinated,  systematic fashion to help stop terrorist attacks. Officials said that no  executive department has the authority to direct the LEAs from other  departments to focus on this goal, and they noted that recommendations  to individual agencies would not result in a unified multidepartmental  effort to help foreign nations combat terrorism.
section_title: LEAs Lack Guidance on Prioritizing Funds
paragraphs: Officials from DHS, Justice, and State told us that they are attempting to  fund a broad array of LEA activities abroad with limited staffing and funds,  and without guidance from the NSC on reprioritizing funds from other  activities. As a result, their efforts to assist foreign nations to identify,  disrupt, and prosecute terrorists have been hindered. For example,    DHS officials from ICE and Customs and Border Protection said they were  limited in their ability to undertake new overseas counterterrorism  initiatives or to fully staff existing positions already approved by  embassies.
Although FBI’s Strategic Plan states that it will expand the role of its  LEGAT offices to undertake joint investigative and operational  partnerships with foreign nation LEAs to identify and stop terrorist attacks  against U.S. interests, we found several problems that reduced their ability  to meet this goal. For example, the LEGATs in three of the four countries  we visited said they generally lacked the resources, time, and staff to  develop the close, collaborative relationships necessary to conduct joint  investigations or operations.
A 2006 report from State’s Office of Inspector General found that State  lacked adequate resources to meet its mandate to coordinate all U.S.  counterterrorism assistance abroad, and was too under-funded to provide  advice, coordination, and action on counterterrorism issues to its  embassies.
In all four countries we visited, terrorist transit and border vulnerabilities  were identified as primary terrorist threats; yet, in three of these countries,  funding had not been realigned to support this effort, so the respective  embassies could not provide specific assistance to address these needs.
In all four countries we visited, there was more funding to assist foreign  nations combat illegal drugs and crime than to combat terrorism, despite  the fact that efforts to combat terrorism were the highest priority of each  embassy. For example, in one country with an extremely high terrorist  threat to American interests globally, State provided more than six times  the amount of funding to stop illicit drugs and crime ($220.2 million) than  it did for antiterrorism assistance ($34.5 million) from fiscal years 2002 to  2006.
section_title: LEAs Lack Performance Monitoring Systems
paragraphs: DHS, Justice, and State officials said that they lacked systems to assess  their performance and progress in assisting foreign nations to identify,  disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result, none of the LEAs had in  place a method for determining progress or documenting their  accomplishments in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and  prosecute terrorists, either for technical or operational assistance.
Because the LEAs lack such a monitoring system, they could not provide a  comprehensive list of key accomplishments in assisting foreign nations to  identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists from 2001 to 2005. As a result, we  could not conduct a full assessment of the LEAs’ progress in these efforts.
section_title: LEAs Lack Mechanisms to Foster Joint Collaboration
paragraphs: We found that neither NCTC, State, Justice, nor DHS had developed  policies to facilitate joint LEA investigations and operations abroad. As a  result,    LEAs told us that the embassies had not been reoriented to harness the  combined capabilities of all LEAs in a collective effort to prevent another  terrorist attack on the United States or its interests.
In three of the four embassies we visited, we found that the embassies  generally retained pre-9/11 structures for information sharing among  LEAs. Although embassies generally use law enforcement working groups  to share information, we found they were not focused on joint  investigative or operational efforts to identify and disrupt terrorist acts.  For example, in one country we visited with an extremely high terrorist  threat, an FBI official told us that the law enforcement working group had  never been asked to try to identify or disrupt any of the terrorists on the  most wanted lists of the departments of State or Defense, or of the foreign  nation itself.
section_title: LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments
paragraphs: In each country we visited, we found that there were no comprehensive  needs assessments being conducted that consider all U.S. assistance  available for addressing the country’s needs in combating terrorism. As a  result, we found that State, Justice, DHS, and their LEAs may not be  targeting their full range of training and assistance to help foreign  countries to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example,    According to embassy officials in three of the four countries we visited,  terrorist transit across their borders was a key vulnerability. However,  there was no comprehensive effort by State, Justice, DHS, or their LEAs to  provide training to the foreign nation border patrols, immigration officers,  and customs agents to identify and disrupt terrorists transiting their  borders.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: In closing, the enhanced missions of LEAs to work with foreign nations to  combat terrorism and the creation of the NCTC are potentially significant  steps to resolving some of the serious national security problems  identified by the 9/11 Commission. However, in our recent report, we  found important gaps between the broad goals of the national strategies  and what was actually being implemented in the field. While the national  strategies articulated changes in the direction and emphasis of overseas  LEA activities, they have not provided specific roles, objectives, or  mechanisms for determining success. As a result of these and other  weaknesses, LEAs, a key element of national power, are not being fully  utilized abroad to help protect U.S. citizens and interests from future  terrorist attacks. Looking forward, the United States needs to develop  clear implementing guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA  activities assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. As such, it is  imperative that the NCTC plan for combating terrorism be clear in  assigning roles and responsibilities and ensuring that each LEA has the  means, the incentives, and the procedures to work with other agencies to  assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
section_title: Recommendations to Improve U.S. LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism
paragraphs: In our report, we recommended that the NCTC ensure that the  implementing guidance for the NCTC’s plan for combating terrorism  articulates a clear strategy for using LEAs to help foreign nations combat  terrorism. We also recommended that State, Justice, and DHS explore  enhancements to overseas coordination mechanisms and develop clear  guidance and performance monitoring to enhance efforts to help foreign  nations combat terrorism. NCTC stated it had already begun to implement  our recommendations. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations.
State and Justice stated they would consider ways to improve overseas  coordination, but did not indicate whether they concurred with our other  recommendations.
I would be pleased to meet with you or your staff to answer any questions  you may have or to discuss this statement.
subsections: section_title: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at  (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to  this statement include: Dave Maurer, Assistant Director; Edward J.  George; J. Addison Ricks; and Joe Carney.
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