Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Could Better Measure the Performance of Its Control Centers
Published: 2006-09-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service (FPS) through its control centers (MegaCenters) helps provide for the security and protection of federally owned and leased facilities. This report (1) identifies the services MegaCenters provide, (2) determines how FPS assesses MegaCenter performance and whether FPS links MegaCenter performance measures to FPS-wide measures, and (3) examines how MegaCenters and selected organizations compare in the services they provide. To address these issues, GAO reviewed FPS's performance measures and past MegaCenter assessments, assessed the MegaCenters' performance measures, and interviewed officials and collected relevant information at FPS, the four MegaCenters, and nine selected security organizations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FPS MegaCenters provide three primary security services--alarm monitoring, radio monitoring, and dispatching of FPS police officers and contract guards. These and other services are provided around the clock from four locations--Battle Creek, Michigan; Denver, Colorado; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Suitland, Maryland. With a fiscal year 2006 budget of $23.5 million, the MegaCenters monitor alarms at over 8,300 federal facilities, covering almost 381 million square feet, and have available for dispatch over 7,800 FPS police officers and contract guards. FPS MegaCenter managers assess MegaCenter operations through a variety of means, including reviewing data about volume and timeliness of operations, listening to and evaluating a sample of calls between operators and FPS police officers and contract guards, and receiving informal feedback about customer satisfaction. FPS managers have also developed performance measures for assessing MegaCenter operations. However, these measures are of limited use because they are not always clearly stated or measurable and do not address governmentwide priorities of efficiency, cost of service, and outcome--which are among the attributes that GAO has identified for successful performance measures. In addition, the MegaCenters do not measure a key activity--the time from alarm to officer dispatch--that would link MegaCenter performance to an FPS-wide performance measure. Without this measure, FPS is limited in its ability to evaluate the MegaCenters' contribution to the FPS-wide measure of response time. Nine selected security organizations--including federal and local police and private entities--offer some of the MegaCenters' services as well as provide and assess these services in a manner that is generally similar to the MegaCenters. Like the MegaCenters, many of the selected organizations have centralized their operations. They also use regular call reviews and volume and time measures to assess the quality of the services they provide. A major difference between the MegaCenters and some selected organizations is the use of a computer-aided dispatch system, which enables these organizations to automate many functions.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in  Oklahoma City and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade  Center and the Pentagon, terrorism has threatened the nation’s security,  including the physical security of federal facilities. The Homeland Security  Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a new  federal department with the mission of preventing terrorist attacks within  the United States, which includes safeguarding federal facilities. DHS,  through its Federal Protective Service (FPS), provides law enforcement  and security services to federal agencies that occupy facilities under the  jurisdiction of the General Services Administration (GSA) and DHS,  protecting millions of federal employees, contractors, and citizens.As part  of its approach to facility protection, FPS provides support for its law  enforcement and security services through four control centers known as  MegaCenters that are located in Battle Creek, Michigan; Denver, Colorado;  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Suitland, Maryland.
Because of the important role MegaCenters play in ensuring the safety of  federal facilities and their occupants, our objectives were to (1) identify the  services the MegaCenters provide and how they provide them, (2)  determine how FPS assesses and measures the performance of  MegaCenter operations and how FPS links MegaCenter performance  measures to FPS-wide performance measures, and (3) examine how the  MegaCenters compare to selected security organizations in the services  they provide and in the methods they use to provide them.
To determine the services offered by the MegaCenters and how the  MegaCenters provide these services, we interviewed managers at the four  MegaCenters and the MegaCenter branch chief, toured three  MegaCenters—Denver, Philadelphia, and Suitland, collected information  on services and workload data from MegaCenter management, and  conducted document reviews. To determine how FPS assesses MegaCenter  performance and how FPS links MegaCenter performance measures to  FPS-wide performance measures, we reviewed documentation on FPS’s  performance measures and past MegaCenter assessments and interviewed  MegaCenter management and FPS headquarters officials. We also assessed  the MegaCenters’ 11 performance measures to determine whether they  were consistent with selected attributes of successful performance  measures we have identfied, that is, that they were linked to agency  mission and goals; clearly stated; contained measurable targets; sufficiently  covered the program’s core activities; and addressed governmentwide  priorities of quality, timeliness, efficiency, cost of service, and outcome.
To determine how the MegaCenters compare to selected security  organizations we (1) identified criteria for selecting comparable  organizations and selected four public and five private organizations; (2)  interviewed officials at the nine selected organizations; (3) toured four of  the organizations’ control centers—both public and private—to observe  their security operations, procedures, and technology; (4) collected  detailed service and workload information from the organizations; (5) used  the information gathered to compare the MegaCenters and the selected  organizations with respect to services offered, organizational structure,  quality assessment practices, and technology utilization; and (6)  interviewed officials from security industry standard-setting and  accreditation associations (associations) because these associations were  identified as having information on security industry organizations,  operations, quality assessment practices, and technology utilization  practices. We used two approaches for selecting the private and public  organizations. We selected private organizations from industry lists of the  top 20 largest security service providers and system integrators in terms of  2005 revenue that provided services such as alarm monitoring and access  control. With the help of one of the associations we interviewed, we were  able to make contact with the five security organizations that were selected  as our comparison group. For public organization comparisons, we  selected three federal organizations: U.S. Postal Inspection Service, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Park Police. We selected these  federal organizations because each had a law enforcement branch;  centralized control center(s) that offered, at a minimum, one of the  MegaCenters’ primary services; and nationwide operations, characteristics  most similar to those of the MegaCenters. We also selected the Denver  Police Department to serve as a nonfederal public organization that  provided dispatch and radio monitoring services through a central control  center. Because we judgmentally selected the organizations, the  information we collected from them cannot be generalized. We conducted  our work from October 2005 through September 2006 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
This report summarizes the information we provided to your office during  our August 14, 2006, briefing and, in addition, contains recommendations to  the Secretary of Homeland Security to improve the MegaCenters’  performance measures. The briefing slides are included in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: MegaCenters Provide Alarm and Radio Monitoring and Dispatch from Four Locations
paragraphs: FPS MegaCenters provide federal agencies with three primary security  services—alarm monitoring, radio monitoring, and dispatch—through four  locations using a variety of IT systems. MegaCenters monitor intrusion,  panic, fire/smoke, and other alarms. They also monitor FPS police officers’  and contract guards’ radio communication to ensure their safety and to  provide information, such as criminal background or license plate  histories, to officers upon request. In addition, they exercise command and  control authority by dispatching FPS police officers or contract guards.  MegaCenters also provide a variety of other services. For example, they  notify federal agencies regarding national emergencies and facility  problems and remotely diagnose problems with federal agency alarms.  They also receive and transcribe FPS police officer incident reports.  Individual MegaCenters may also provide unique services not provided by  other MegaCenters, such as facility-specific access control and remote  programming of alarms via the Internet. One MegaCenter also provides an  after-hours telephone answering service for the Drug Enforcement  Administration and for GSA building maintenance emergencies.
The MegaCenters are located in Battle Creek, Denver, Philadelphia, and  Suitland. Each MegaCenter has a sister center with redundant capability as  backup in case of a failure at that MegaCenter. Suitland is paired with  Battle Creek, and Philadelphia is paired with Denver. A force of 1,014 FPS  police officers and 6,842 contract guards is available for the MegaCenters  to dispatch in response to alarms and other emergencies. In fiscal year  2006, the MegaCenters were supported by a budget of $23.5 million, which  accounts for about 5 percent of FPS’s total budget. The MegaCenters are  operated by 23 full-time federal employees—some of whom manage the  centers—and about 220 private contractors to provide around the clock  security services for over 8,300 federal facilities.
The MegaCenters rely on a variety of IT systems, communications systems,  and other equipment to provide their security services. The IT systems  enable MegaCenter staff to, among other activities, monitor alarms and  radio communications of FPS police officers and contract guards. For  communications systems, MegaCenters have regional and national toll-free  numbers for tenants and the public to contact the MegaCenters during  emergencies. Other equipment includes dictation machines, which enable  FPS police officers to dictate reports about incidents that occur at  facilities.
section_title: MegaCenters’ and FPS’s Performance Measures Are Not Linked
paragraphs: MegaCenters use various means to assess operations, but their  performance measures have weaknesses and are not linked to FPS-wide  performance measures. MegaCenter managers assess MegaCenter  operations through a variety of means, including reviewing data about  volume and timeliness of operations, listening to and evaluating a sample  of calls between operators and FPS police officers and contract guards,  and receiving informal feedback about customer satisfaction. FPS  managers also have developed 11 performance measures for assessing  MegaCenter operations:   distribute emergency notification reports (also known as SPOT reports)  within 30 minutes of notification;  review problem alarm reports daily;  obtain regular feedback about customer satisfaction from field   continuously review all SPOT reports and other outgoing information to  ensure 100 percent accuracy;  transcribe dictated offense and incident reports into the database  management system within 8 hours of receipt of the report;  submit reviewed contractor billing reports and time sheets within 7  business days after the last day of the month;  prepare and review contractor reports for quality assurance plan;  maintain completely accurate (nonduplicative) case control numbers;  meet Underwriters Laboratories (UL) guidelines and requirements   test failover of alarm, radio, and telephone systems weekly; and   monitor calls and review recorded call content for adherence to  standard procedures at least monthly.
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal  agencies to, among other things, measure agency performance in achieving  outcome-oriented goals. Measuring performance allows organizations to  track the progress they are making toward their goals and gives managers  critical information on which to base decisions for improving their  progress. We have previously reported on some of the most important  attributes of successful performance measures. These attributes indicate  that performance measures should (1) be linked to an agency’s mission and  goals; (2) be clearly stated; (3) have quantifiable targets or other  measurable values; (4) be reasonably free of significant bias or  manipulation that would distort the accurate assessment of performance;  (5) provide a reliable way to assess progress; (6) sufficiently cover the  program’s core activities; (7) have limited overlap with other measures; (8)  have balance or not emphasize one or two priorities at the expense of  others; and (9) address governmentwide priorities of quality, timeliness,  efficiency, cost of service, and outcome.
We assessed the 11 FPS MegaCenter performance measures against  selected attributes: linkage to mission and goals, clarity, and measurable  targets. Ten of the 11 MegaCenter performance measures were aligned with  FPS’s mission to protect federal properties and personnel and with the  MegaCenter program’s mission to provide high-quality and standardized  alarm monitoring, radio monitoring, and dispatch. We found no link  between timely review of contractor time sheets and billing statements and  FPS’s mission, however, primarily because this measure seems to be  related to administrative activities. In addition, while 6 of the 11  performance measures have measurable targets—a key component for  measuring performance, none of the MegaCenter performance measures  met the clarity attribute because FPS could not provide information about  how managers calculate the measures—a key component in the clarity  attribute. For example, the performance measure that the centers test the  failover ability of alarm, radio, and telephone systems weekly is  measurable because it has a quantifiable target but does not meet the  clarity attribute because FPS could not describe its methodology for  calculating it.
We also assessed whether, collectively, the MegaCenters’ 11 performance  measures sufficiently cover their core program activities (i.e., alarm  monitoring, radio monitoring, and dispatch) and address governmentwide  priorities of quality, timeliness, efficiency, cost of service, and outcome.  Most of the MegaCenter performance measures relate to the three core  activities. For example, regular feedback on customer service and monthly  review of operator calls cover aspects of the dispatch and radio-monitoring  functions. Other performance measures, like distributing emergency  notification reports in 30 minutes, help fulfill other critical support  functions. However, two performance measures—reviewing contractor  quality assurance plans and timely review of contractor time sheets and  billing statements—relate to administrative activities that are not strictly  related to MegaCenter core activities. Additionally, the MegaCenter  performance measures do not collectively address all of the  governmentwide priorities. The MegaCenter performance measures  primarily address the governmentwide priorities of quality and timeliness.
For example, the MegaCenter measures pertaining to transcribing reports  within 8 hours and reviewing recorded calls to see if the operator followed  standard operating procedures address aspects of service timeliness and  quality, respectively. None of the measures relate to the governmentwide  priorities of efficiency, cost of service, and outcome.
Finally, FPS does not link MegaCenter performance measures to FPS-wide  performance measures, specifically the patrol and response time measure.  FPS established FPS-wide performance measures to assess its efforts to  reduce or mitigate building security risks. The performance measures that  FPS established were (1) timely deployment of countermeasures, (2)  functionality of countermeasures, (3) patrol and response time, and (4)  facility security index. The one measure that relates to the MegaCenters— patrol and response time—assesses FPS’s ability to respond to calls for  service and measures the average elapsed time from when a law  enforcement request is received (e.g., alarm, telephonic request from a  building tenant, FPS police officer-initiated call) to the time an officer  arrives at the scene. FPS’s goal is to reduce response times by 10 percent in  fiscal year 2006. The MegaCenters are responsible for part of the patrol and  response activity that is being measured because the MegaCenters receive  alarms and emergency calls and dispatch FPS police officers or contract  guards to the scene. However, although data pertaining to this activity exist  in the MegaCenters’ records management system, they do not measure the  timeliness of this activity, and FPS has not developed a performance  measure that would identify the MegaCenters’ contribution toward meeting  FPS’s measure.
section_title: Nine Selected Organizations Provide Some of the MegaCenters’ Services in a Generally Comparable Manner
paragraphs: The nine selected security organizations generally do not provide all three  of the MegaCenters’ primary services. However, the services these  organizations offer are provided similarly by the MegaCenters with the  exception of a CAD system, which three organizations use and the  MegaCenters do not. The MegaCenters provide three primary services (i.e.,  alarm monitoring, radio monitoring, and dispatch), and the selected  organizations provide all or some of these three main services. For  example, the Park Police provide all three services, while the private  organizations focus on providing alarm monitoring and offer some services  the MegaCenters do not. Like the MegaCenters, all of the private  organizations reviewed have centralized operations: the number of their  national control centers ranges from two to five. Work allocation (i.e., how  incoming alarms and calls are assigned) among centers varies by  organization but overall is similar to the MegaCenter structure. For  example, most of the organizations assign calls and alarms to a specific  center based on the geographic location of the call or signal. However, the  Postal Inspection Service and one private organization are unique because  they are able to allocate workload to centers based on demand and  operator availability. The organizations use a variety of methods to  measure the quality of their services, many similar to methods used by the  MegaCenters. For example, like the MegaCenters, most review a sample of  operator calls on a regular basis. Two entities have established measurable  performance goals for their centers. While there are similarities in the  services offered, number of centers, work allocation, and service quality  appraisals between the organizations reviewed and the MegaCenters, three  organizations use a CAD system, which the MegaCenters do not. A CAD  system is a tool used by the Denver Police Department for dispatching and  officer tracking and by the Postal Inspection Service for officer tracking.  The Park Police also uses a CAD system with limited capabilities at its San  Francisco center and plans to purchase and upgrade the system for all  three of its centers. Selected organizations and associations referred to  CAD systems as being beneficial for dispatching services by allowing for  faster operator response, automatic operator access to standard operating  procedures and response prioritization, and automatic recording of  operator actions enabling easier performance analysis. Since 2003, FPS and  DHS both have assessed MegaCenter technology and have identified needs  for technology upgrades, including the installation of a CAD system for the  MegaCenters. Our guide on IT investment decision making—based on best  practices in the public and private sector—stresses that part of achieving  maximum benefits from an IT project requires that decisions be made on a  regular basis about the status of the project. To make these decisions,  senior managers need assessments of the project’s impact on mission  performance and future prospects for the project. While the MegaCenters  have assessed their technology on many occasions and have determined  that some refreshment is needed, FPS has not yet allocated the funding for  such upgrades.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: FPS MegaCenters play a key role in protecting federal facilities, those who  enter these facilities, and the FPS police officers and contract guards  whose calls the MegaCenters respond to and monitor. How well the  MegaCenters are fulfilling their role and carrying out their responsibilities  is uncertain because they do not generate much of the information that  would be useful for assessing their performance.
To their credit, the MegaCenters have established performance measures  for a number of their activities and operations, and these measures are  aligned with the MegaCenters’ mission. However, the measures have  weaknesses, both individually and collectively, compared with the selected  attributes of successful performance measures that we have identified.  Many of the individual measures are neither quantifiable nor clearly stated,  and collectively the measures do not address the governmentwide  priorities of efficiency, cost of service, and outcome. As a result, FPS  cannot compare performance across the MegaCenters or over time, and  without such information, FPS is limited in its ability to identify shortfalls  and target improvements.
Although FPS has established an FPS-wide performance measure for  response time—from the alarm to the FPS police officer’s arrival on the  scene—that incorporates the MegaCenters’ operations, the MegaCenters  have not established a comparable measure for their operations alone.  Without such a measure, FPS cannot evaluate the MegaCenters’  contribution—from the alarm to the FPS police officer’s dispatch—to the  FPS-wide measure for response time and identify opportunities for  improvement.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director  of the Federal Protective Service to take the following three actions:  establish MegaCenter performance measures that meet the attributes of  successful performance measures we have identified;   develop a performance measure for the MegaCenters that is directly  linked to the FPS-wide response time measure and covers the scope of  the MegaCenters’ operations, from alarm to dispatch; and  routinely assess the extent to which the MegaCenters meet established  performance measures.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, the Department of the Interior,  and the U.S. Postal Service for their review and comment. DHS provided  comments in a letter dated September 6, 2006, which are summarized  below and reprinted in appendix II. DHS also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated into the report where appropriate. The  Postal Service informed us that it had no comments on this report. The  Department of the Interior did not provide comments on this report.
DHS generally agreed with the report’s findings and recommendations.  DHS stated that FPS and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE) have undertaken a comprehensive review of the MegaCenters to  identify, among other things, ways in which performance can be better  measured. DHS noted that through this broad approach, FPS personnel will  be able to generate and track the kind of information necessary to assess  the MegaCenters’ performance. This one-time review may help FPS identify  information needed to assess the MegaCenters’ performance and,  therefore, develop appropriate performance measures.  In order to reliably  assess performance over time, FPS should not only establish appropriate  performance measures, but also routinely assess performance using these  measures.  We therefore clarified our recommendation to include the  routine use of established performance measures to assess the  MegaCenters’ performance.  With regard to the report’s discussion of CAD  system capabilities, DHS said that ICE’s Chief Information Officer is  currently assessing the MegaCenters’ technology requirements and  recognizes that previous studies have identified the need for technology  upgrades.  DHS indicated that the current assessment will have a  meaningful impact on FPS’s technology capabilities.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other  interested congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland  Security, and DHS’s Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs  Enforcement. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202)  512-2834 or sciremj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Briefing for the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, August 14, 2006
paragraphs: Since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City  and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon,  terrorism has threatened the nation’s security, including the physical security of  federal facilities.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), a new federal department with the mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, which includes safeguarding federal facilities.
DHS, through its Federal Protective Service (FPS), provides law enforcement and  security services to federal agencies that occupy almost 9,000 facilities under the  jurisdiction of the General Services Administration (GSA) and DHS, protecting  millions of federal employees, contractors, and citizens.  Under agreement, FPS  authority can be extended to provide its law enforcement and security services to  any property with a significant federal interest.
As part of its approach to facility protection, FPS provides support for its law  enforcement and security services through four control centers (known as  MegaCenters) located in Battle Creek, Michigan; Denver, Colorado; Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania; and Suitland, Maryland.
Because of the important role MegaCenters play in assuring the safety  of federal facilities and their occupants, our objectives were to:  (1) Identify the services the MegaCenters provide and how they  provide them.  (2) Determine how FPS assesses and measures the performance of  MegaCenter operations and how FPS links MegaCenter performance measures to FPS-wide performance measures.  (3) Examine how the MegaCenters compare to selected security  organizations in the services they provide and in the methods they  use to provide them.
Document review: Reviewed the Memorandum of Agreement between GSA and FPS  and other documentation related to MegaCenter services as well as documentation related  to (1) FPS’s request for a computer aided dispatch (CAD) system for the MegaCenters; (2)  past FPS assessments of MegaCenter operations; (3) FPS’s performance measures; and  (4) FPS’s budget for the MegaCenters.
Interviews: Interviewed FPS officials, including MegaCenter branch chief and managers, and staff from the Program Review Office, Financial Management Division, and other offices; Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Budget Enforcement Office; and  officials from selected public and private organizations; officials from security industry standard setting and accreditation associations (associations).
U.S. Customs and Border Protection  U.S. Park Police  U.S. Postal Inspection Service  Denver Police Department  5 private security companies  We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
Remote monitoring of building alarm systems, radio monitoring, and dispatching of FPS police officers and contract guards are the primary services FPS MegaCenters provide. These and other services are provided around the clock from four locations across the  country.  Each MegaCenter has a sister center with redundant capabilities that can serve  as an emergency backup and each is operated by full-time federal employees and private  contractors.  In addition, the MegaCenters have a fiscal year 2006 budget of $23.5 million  and use a variety of information technology (IT) systems and other equipment to provide  their services.
FPS MegaCenter managers assess MegaCenter operations through a variety of means,  including reviewing information on the timeliness and volume of operations, listening to  and evaluating a sample of calls between operators and FPS police officers and contract guards, and receiving informal feedback about customer satisfaction. FPS managers have  also developed performance measures for assessing MegaCenter operations.  Although  these MegaCenter measures reflect some attributes of successful performance measures,  they also contain some weaknesses because they are not always clearly stated or measurable, and do not address governmentwide priorities of efficiency, cost of service,  and outcome.  In addition, they do not directly measure key operations that would link to  FPS-wide performance measures, which are (1) the timely deployment of countermeasures, (2) functionality of countermeasures, (3) patrol and response time, and  (4) facility security index.
The nine selected organizations offer some of the MegaCenters’ primary services, and  they deliver and assess the services they offer in a generally similar manner to the  MegaCenters.  For example, like the MegaCenters, many of these organizations have  centralized their control center operations, have backup capability, allocate workload  among control centers based on geographic location, and use regular call reviews as well  as volume and time measures to assess the quality of the services they provide.  A few  organizations offer services the MegaCenters do not offer.  One difference between the  MegaCenters and the selected organizations is that three of these organizations use a  CAD system, which the MegaCenters do not have.  The MegaCenters have assessed  their technology and have identified the need for a CAD; however FPS has not allocated  funds for such a purchase.
FPS operations are solely funded through security fees and reimbursements collected from federal  agencies for FPS security services.
These security fees consist of basic and building-specific security charges.
The basic security charges cover the security services that FPS provides to all federal tenants  in FPS-protected buildings, which include such services as patrol, monitoring of building  perimeter alarms and dispatching of law enforcement response (MegaCenter operations), criminal investigations, and security surveys.
The building-specific security charges are for FPS security measures that are designed for a  particular building and are based on the FPS  Building Security Assessment and its  designated security level.  Such measures include contract guards, X-ray machines,  magnetometers, cameras, and intrusion detection alarms.  Also, the tenant agencies may  request additional security services such as more guards, access control systems, and  perimeter barriers.
The above two charges are billed monthly to the tenant agencies. The basic security charge  is the same for all tenants regardless of the type of space occupied and is a square footage  rate.  The building-specific security charge reflects FPS cost recovery for security measures specific to a particular building and the billing is handled differently for single- and multi-tenant  buildings.  Single tenant buildings—the tenant agency is billed for the total cost of the security  measures.  Multi-tenant buildings—the tenant agencies are billed based on their pro rata  share of the square feet occupied within the respective building.
FPS uses a reimbursable program to charge individual agencies for additional security services  and equipment that they request above the level determined for their building.
FPS bills the tenant agencies for FPS security fees they have incurred.
The agencies pay the fees into an FPS account in the Department of the Treasury, which is  administered by FPS.  Congress exercises control over the account through the annual appropriations process that sets an annual limit—called obligation authority—on how much  of the account FPS can expend for various activities.
FPS uses the security fees to finance its various activities within the limits that Congress  sets.  The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2006  authorized $487 million in obligation authority for FPS expenses and operations.  Through  FPS’s security fees, funds are to be collected and credited to FPS’s account as an  offsetting collection from tenant agencies.
Under the FPS reimbursable program, agencies request additional security services and  equipment using a funded Security Work Authorization.  Once the services are provided and the  costs are expensed, FPS bills the agency for the costs, and the funds are transferred to the FPS  account to offset the expenses FPS incurred.
The DHS Inspector General reported in 2006 that when FPS was part of GSA it budgeted and  paid for FPS's annual administrative support costs such as financial management, human  capital, and IT using funds beyond those generated by security fees. GSA estimated these FY  2003 support services to cost about $28 million.  According to the report, beginning in FY 2004,  neither DHS’s annual budget request nor DHS’s appropriations set aside funding for FPS's support services.  In FY 2004, as a component of DHS, FPS paid almost $24 million for support  services using funds from security fees only; a year earlier these services had been funded by  GSA using funds not derived from fees.
Before GSA established the MegaCenters, FPS used regional and satellite control centers to monitor alarm systems, dispatch FPS police officers and contract guards, and perform  criminal background checks.  In total, there were 22 regional control centers and 12  satellite control centers, which were located throughout FPS’s 11 regions.  Most regions  had more than 1 control center.
In 1991, GSA conducted an internal review of the control centers.  The review found that because of significant budgetary and personnel constraints over more than a decade, the  control centers no longer performed well enough to ensure safe, effective, and efficient FPS actions to preserve life and property.  GSA contracted with Sandia National Laboratories– the lead laboratory for U.S. Department of Energy security systems– to conduct an in-depth study of the control centers’ operation and make recommendations.
In 1993, Sandia issued its study entitled GSA Control Center Upgrade Program. The  Sandia study identified serious shortfalls and problems that would require a more radical  upgrade of the control centers at a much higher cost than originally believed.  After validating the study’s findings, GSA determined that a multimillion dollar upgrade of all  control centers would be prohibitively expensive.  The study noted that the control centers  could be consolidated to almost any level to achieve economies of scale.  However, the  study recommended against a single national-level control center because a second  center would be needed to continue operations under catastrophe or failover conditions.
Background: Evolution of the MegaCenters,   GSA concluded that the control center problems that the study identified were material weaknesses and reported them to Congress.  FPS conducted an  operational and technical review of the Sandia study’s findings, which provided a  critical assessment of the control centers, a high-level concept of operations for the  centers, and functional specifications for upgrading the centers.  GSA decided to  upgrade 11 control centers—one in each region—and address the weaknesses that  the study had identified.
Within GSA, concerns were raised about the cost of upgrading 11 control centers,  how many control centers were really needed, and whether the centers’ operations  could be outsourced.  GSA established a project team to investigate these concerns. The team contacted several public and private sector organizations that operate control centers.  The team found that the organizations were consolidating their control centers but were unable to assume the operations of FPS control centers.  A  decision was made to consolidate additional centers and the multi-regional control  center or “MegaCenter” concept was developed.  GSA endorsed the MegaCenter concept.  GSA assembled a core project team and hired contractors to design, plan, and supervise the construction of the centers.
subsections: section_title: The selected organizations use a variety of methods to
paragraphs: ensure centers are meeting their goals and providing quality  services, many similar to the MegaCenters.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Mathew J. Scire (202) 512-2834 or sciremj@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Other key contributors to this report were Gerald P. Barnes, Assistant  Director; Deirdre Brown; Bess Eisenstadt; Colin Fallon; Brandon Haller;  Richard Hung; Alex Lawrence; Gail Marnik; and Josh Ormand.