Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders
Published: 2013-11-19T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Maritime borders are gateways to our nation's maritime transportation system of ports, waterways, and vessels--which handle billions of dollars of cargo annually. An attack on this system could have dire consequences and affect the global economy. In addition, criminals could use small vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and other contraband across U.S. maritime borders. Within DHS, the Coast Guard is responsible for many homeland security efforts in the maritime domain, including conducting port facility and commercial vessel inspections and coordinating maritime information-sharing efforts, among other things. In addition, CBP is responsible for screening incoming vessels' crews and cargo to facilitate the flow of legitimate trade and passengers.
This testimony identifies key factors important to secure the maritime borders, and discusses progress and challenges in related DHS programs. This statement is based on products GAO issued from July 2003 through October 2013.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO's prior work has identified several key factors important to secure the maritime borders. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components have made progress (e.g., coordinating with partners), and in some cases also experienced challenges with their related maritime security programs.
Maintaining robust maritime domain awareness. It is critical that federal agencies maintain maritime domain awareness--the understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard has developed systems--including information-sharing and vessel-tracking systems--to enhance maritime domain awareness. GAO's prior work has found that the Coast Guard has made progress in developing its systems, but that it also experienced some challenges. For example, in July 2011, GAO reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building a system intended to enable the sharing of information among its new offshore vessels and aircraft. GAO recommended that the agency take actions to address this challenge. DHS concurred and stated it planned to take actions.
Assessing risks coming from foreign ports . The security of maritime borders also depends upon security at foreign ports where cargo bound for the United States originates. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the Coast Guard have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports, foreign vessels entering U.S. ports, and the cargo carried by these vessels from these ports. In September 2013, GAO found that CBP has taken steps to enhance the security of U.S.-bound cargo, but CBP does not periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States. GAO recommended that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from these ports. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation and reported that it planned to take actions to address it.
Conducting maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations . Along the coasts and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction, and operations are conducted to ensure the security of the maritime borders. For example, CBP's Office of Air and Marine is to provide maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities. In March 2012, GAO found that the office did not meet its national performance goal and did not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as high priority. GAO made recommendations to help ensure that the office's assets and personnel are best positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address threats, among other things. DHS concurred and reported that it planned to take action to address the recommendations by the end of March 2014.
Measuring performance. In securing our maritime borders, DHS and its component agencies have faced challenges in developing meaningful performance measures . For example, GAO's prior work found that they have experienced challenges collecting complete, accurate, and reliable data; among other things. In January 2011, GAO reported that both CBP and the Coast Guard tracked the frequency of illegal seafarer incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied considerably between the two component agencies and between the agencies' field and headquarters units. GAO made a recommendation to improve the accuracy of DHS data, and DHS concurred and has made progress in addressing the recommendation.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to strengthen its maritime security programs. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions under way, to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss key aspects of a secure maritime  border. Maritime borders are gateways to our nation’s maritime  transportation system of ports, waterways, and vessels, which handle  billions of dollars of cargo annually. Accordingly, maritime borders are  critical to our national security. For instance, an attack on this system  could have a widespread affect on global shipping, international trade,  and the global economy, and an attack on a domestic port could have  dire consequences because of the size of ports and their general  proximity to metropolitan areas. Further, criminals could use small  vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and other contraband across U.S.  maritime borders. Balancing maritime security concerns with the need to  facilitate the free flow of people and commerce remains an ongoing  challenge for the public and private sectors alike.
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast  Guard has much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety and security  of U.S. maritime interests and leading homeland security efforts in the  maritime domain. In this capacity, the Coast Guard conducts port facility  and commercial vessel inspections, coordinates maritime information- sharing efforts, and promotes maritime domain awareness, among other  things. Also within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is  responsible for screening incoming vessels’ crews and cargoes for the  presence of contraband, such as weapons of mass destruction, illicit  drugs, or explosives, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and  passengers. Several other DHS components, such as the Transportation  Security Administration, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and the  Federal Emergency Management Agency, also have roles in securing our  maritime borders.
My statement today identifies key factors that are important to secure the  maritime borders and discusses progress and challenges in related DHS  programs. Specifically, I will address the following factors: (1) maritime  domain awareness; (2) risks from foreign ports; (3) international  partnerships in global supply chain security; (4) maritime surveillance,  interdiction, and security operations; (5) partnerships and coordination  along the coasts and in ports; and (6) measuring performance.
My statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from July  2003 through October 2013 related to maritime, port, vessel, and cargo  security and other related aspects of maritime border security. To perform  the work for our previous reports and testimonies, we visited domestic  and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security  plans, and other documents; and interviewed officials from the federal,  state, local, private, and international sectors, among other things. The  officials we met with represented a wide variety of stakeholders including  the Coast Guard, CBP, port authorities, terminal operators, vessel  operators, foreign governments, and international trade organizations.  Further details on the scope and methodology for the previously issued  reports and testimonies are available within each of the published  products. We conducted the work on which this statement is based in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Several Factors Are Important to Secure Maritime Borders and DHS Has Made Progress to Address Them, but Challenges Remain
paragraphs: Our prior work has identified several key factors important to securing the  maritime borders, which include (1) maintaining robust maritime domain  awareness, (2) assessing risks coming from foreign ports, (3) leveraging  international partnerships, (4) conducting maritime surveillance,  interdiction, and security operations, (5) coordinating with partners along  the coast and in ports, and (6) measuring performance. Our prior work  has also shown that DHS and its components have made progress, and  in some cases experienced challenges, with their programs to address  these factors.
subsections: section_title: Maintaining Robust Maritime Domain Awareness
paragraphs: To ensure the security of our maritime borders, it is critical that federal  agencies maintain robust maritime domain awareness. According to the  National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, the maritime  domain provides an expansive pathway around the world that terrorist  organizations could exploit for moving equipment and personnel, as well  as a means for launching attacks. Timely awareness of the maritime  domain and knowledge of threats helps the Coast Guard to detect, deter,  interdict, and defeat adversaries. For example, according to the Coast  Guard, maritime domain awareness played a key role in allowing it to  interdict narcotics, intercept thousands of alien migrants, detain hundreds  of suspected smugglers, board foreign vessels to suppress illegal fishing,  and rescue thousands of people.
To enhance maritime domain awareness, the Coast Guard works with its  maritime partners to facilitate the sharing and dissemination of a wide  array of information and intelligence to better secure the nation’s maritime  transportation system against potential threats. The Coast Guard has  made progress in developing its maritime domain awareness systems— including its Common Operational Picture—by increasing user access  and adding data sources. The Coast Guard also has related systems  that can be used to provide enhanced maritime domain information to  Coast Guard units and port partners. However, as we previously reported,  the Coast Guard experienced challenges in developing and implementing  these systems. For example, in July 2011, we reported that the Coast  Guard had not met its goal of building a single, fully interoperable  Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,  Surveillance, and Reconnaissance program system intended to enable  the sharing of information among its new offshore vessels and aircraft. In  addition, in February 2012, we reported that the intended information- sharing capabilities of the Coast Guard’s WatchKeeper software—which  was designed to gather data to help port partner agencies collaborate in  the conduct of operations and share information, among other things— met few port partner agency needs. This is, in part, because the Coast  Guard did not determine these needs when developing the system.  Further, in April 2013, we reported that, among other things, the Coast  Guard had not followed its own information technology development  guidance when developing one of its new maritime domain awareness  systems, known as Coast Guard One View. We recommended, and the  Coast Guard concurred, that it take actions to address these challenges.  DHS stated that it planned to take actions to address these  recommendations, such as developing necessary acquisition  documentation.
In addition to its own systems, the Coast Guard also relies on systems  operated by other entities to help it track vessels and enhance maritime  domain awareness. For example, to track vessels at sea, the Coast  Guard uses a long-range identification and tracking system and an  automatic identification system that broadcasts information on the vessels  and their locations. To track vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland  waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard operates a land-based automatic  identification system and also obtains information from radar and  cameras in some ports. In March 2009, we reported on the challenges of  tracking small vessels using available technologies. For example, we  reported that although the Coast Guard and other agencies may have  technology systems that can track small vessels within some ports, these  did not always work in bad weather or at night. In September 2012, we  reported that the expansion of vessel tracking technology to all small  vessels may be of limited utility because of, among other things, the large  number of small vessels, the difficulty in identifying threatening actions,  and the challenges associated with getting resources on scene in time to  prevent an attack once it has been identified. DHS and its components— such as the Coast Guard and CBP—have started or completed initiatives  to improve maritime domain awareness in order to address small vessel  security risks, including an initiative to help CBP better track small vessels  arriving from foreign locations and another initiative to assist the Coast  Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites.
section_title: Assessing Risks Coming from Foreign Ports
paragraphs: The security of maritime borders also depends, in part, upon security at  foreign ports where cargo and vessels bound for the United States may  originate. CBP and the Coast Guard have developed models to assess  the risks of cargo carried by these vessels, foreign ports, and foreign  vessels entering U.S. ports. In particular, CBP developed the Container  Security Initiative (CSI) program that places officials at select foreign  ports to use intelligence and risk assessment information to determine  whether U.S.-bound cargo container shipments from those ports are at  risk of containing weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist  contraband. CBP’s selection of the initial 23 CSI ports in 2002 was  primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound containers, but beginning in  2003, CBP considered more threat information when it expanded the  number of CSI ports. In our September 2013 report, we reported that  CBP had not assessed the risk posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to  the United States since 2005. In 2009, CBP developed a model that  ranked 356 potential expansion ports for a related program on the basis  of risk, but it was not implemented because of budget cuts. We found in  September 2013 that by applying CBP’s risk model to fiscal year 2012  cargo shipment data, CSI did not have a presence at about half of the  ports CBP considered high risk, and about one fifth of the existing CSI  ports were at lower risk locations. As a result, we recommended that CBP  periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that  ship cargo to the United States and use the results to inform any future  expansion of CSI and determine whether changes need to be made to  existing CSI ports. DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported  that by December 2014 it plans to develop a process for conducting  periodic assessments of the supply chain security risks from all ports that  ship cargo to the United States and use information from the  assessments to determine if future expansion or adjustments to CSI  locations are appropriate.
While CBP is focused on the security of the cargo shipped to the United  States from foreign ports, the Coast Guard is focused on the security of  ports and the vessels arriving in the United States. Under the  International Port Security program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign  ports to evaluate their antiterrorism security measures against established  international standards. We reported in October 2007 that the Coast  Guard had found that most of the over 100 countries it visited had  substantially implemented international standards. More recently, the  Coast Guard reported in November 2013 that it had visited over 150  countries. In September 2012, we reported that the Coast Guard had  made progress with implementing its International Port Security program  despite a number of challenges. For example, we reported that the  Coast Guard was able to alleviate sovereignty concerns of some  countries by including a reciprocal visit feature in which the Coast Guard  hosts foreign delegations to visit U.S. ports. Further, as we reported in  September 2013, the Coast Guard developed a risk-informed model— that it updates annually—as part of its International Port Security program  to regularly assess the potential threat foreign ports pose to the maritime  supply chain and make operational decisions. According to the Coast  Guard International Port Security Program: Annual Report 2012, the  Coast Guard uses the model to make informed decisions on how to  engage each country with the International Port Security program,  including (1) how often to visit ports, (2) how many staff to assign to a  particular visit, and (3) whether the country requires assistance.
In addition to assessing the security of foreign ports, the Coast Guard  also uses the results of the International Port Security program to help  determine which arriving foreign vessels to board and inspect through its  Port State Control program. In particular, according to the Coast Guard’s  International Port Security Program: Annual Report 2012, the Coast  Guard is to use risk-based criteria to identify which foreign vessels  entering U.S. ports and waterways it considers to be at risk of  noncompliance with international or domestic regulations, and perform  compliance examinations of these vessels. The risk-based criteria used to  make these decisions include the vessel’s management, the flag state  under which the vessel is registered, and the vessel’s security compliance  history resulting from previous examinations.
section_title: Leveraging International Partnerships in Global Supply Chain Security
paragraphs: International partnerships based on international standards are another  key aspect of secure maritime borders. For example, the International  Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was developed after the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to establish measures to enhance  the security of ships and port facilities with a standardized and consistent  security framework. The ISPS Code requires facilities to conduct an  assessment to identify threats and vulnerabilities and then develop  security plans based on the assessment. The requirements of this code  are performance based; therefore, compliance can be achieved through a  variety of security measures. Additionally, in collaboration with 11 other  members of the World Customs Organization, CBP developed the  Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE  Framework), which is based, in part, on the core concepts of CBP  programs and provides standards for collaboration among customs  administrations and entities participating in the supply chain. The SAFE  Framework was adopted by the 173 World Customs Organization  member customs administrations in June 2005; and as of our last report  on this topic in July 2008, 154 had signed letters of intent to implement  the standards.
CBP and the Coast Guard also leverage relationships with private  industry stakeholders and foreign partners to promote the security of  maritime borders, given that protecting domestic ports begins outside the  United States where inbound shipments enter the supply chain. For  example, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)  program is a voluntary program that enables CBP officials to work in  partnership with private companies to review and approve the security of  their international supply chains. Companies that join the C-TPAT  program commit to improving the security of their supply chains and  agree to provide CBP with information on their specific security  measures. In addition, the companies agree to allow CBP to verify,  among other things, that their security measures meet or exceed CBP’s  minimum security requirements. This allows CBP to ensure that the  security measures outlined in a member’s security profile are in place and  effective. In April 2008, we reported that the C-TPAT program holds  promise as part of CBP’s multifaceted maritime security strategy. We  also reported that the program allows CBP to develop partnerships with  the trade community, which is a challenge given the international nature  of the industry and resulting limits on CBP’s jurisdiction and activities, and  provides CBP with a level of information sharing that would otherwise not  be available. However, our reports raised concerns about the overall  management of the program and challenges in verifying that C-TPAT  members meet security criteria. We recommended that CBP strengthen  program management by developing planning documents and  performance measures, and by improving the process for validating  security practices of C-TPAT members. CBP agreed with these  recommendations and has addressed them.
Additionally, through mutual recognition arrangements with foreign  partners, the security-related practices and programs established by the  customs or maritime security administration of one partner are recognized  and accepted by the administration of another. Both CBP and the Coast  Guard have entered into such arrangements. For example, CBP can  expand the reach of its supply chain security programs (such as C-TPAT)  through mutual recognition arrangements. According to the World  Customs Organization, mutual recognition arrangements allow customs  administrations to target high-risk shipments more effectively and  expedite low-risk shipments by, for example, reducing redundant  examinations. As we reported in September 2013, mutual recognition  arrangements may allow the Coast Guard to allocate resources more  efficiently and reduce risks. For example, we further reported that the  Coast Guard signed a memorandum of understanding with the European  Union that establishes a process for mutually recognizing security  inspections of each other’s ports. According to DHS documents and  Coast Guard officials in Europe, by signing this memorandum of  understanding, the Coast Guard plans to reassign some International Port  Security officials from Europe to Africa, where certain countries are  having more difficulties than others in implementing effective antiterrorism  measures in their ports. Further, we reported that one trade-off of signing  the memorandum of understanding is that Coast Guard’s International  Port Security officials will not have the same opportunities to have face- to-face interactions and share port security information and practices  directly with their European Union counterparts as in the past. Despite  this trade-off, Coast Guard officials stated that entering into such  arrangements increases efficiencies and noted that they intend to  negotiate additional memorandums of understanding with other foreign  governments that have strong port inspection programs.
section_title: Conducting Maritime Surveillance, Interdiction, and Security Operations along the Coast and in Ports
paragraphs: Along the coast and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction, and  security operations are conducted to ensure the security of maritime  borders. For example, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine provides maritime  surveillance and interdiction capabilities. Its strategic assumptions include  the ability to provide a 24-hour, 7-day a week response to border  penetrations anywhere along the U.S. border, with a 1-hour response  time for areas designated as high priority. We reported in March 2012  that as of May 2011, the Office of Air and Marine had placed about half of  its air assets on the southwest border region and the remainder in the  northern and southeast regions, while marine resources were distributed  fairly evenly across the northern, southwest, and southeast regions.  Further, our analysis of the Office of Air and Marine’s fiscal year 2010  performance results indicate that they did not meet its national  performance goal to fulfill greater than 95 percent of Border Patrol air  support requests and did not provide higher rates of support in locations  designated as high priority based on threats. We made recommendations  to help ensure that the Office of Air and Marine’s assets and personnel  are best positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address  threats, and to help DHS better leverage existing resources, eliminate  unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies. DHS concurred with  these recommendations, and described actions it was taking, or planned  to take to address them, including making strategic and technological  changes in its assessment of the mix and placement of its resources by  the end of March 2014.
In addition to CBP’s Office of Air and Marine interdiction and response  activities, the Coast Guard conducts a number of activities to deter  potential threats to the United States’ maritime borders. For example, the  Coast Guard escorts a certain percentage of high-capacity passenger  vessels—cruise ships, ferries, and excursion vessels—and energy  commodity tankers to protect against an external threat, such as a  waterborne improvised explosive device. The Coast Guard also provides  additional security response capabilities through its Maritime Safety and  Security Teams and Maritime Security Response Teams. Created by the  Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Maritime Safety and  Security Teams constitute a maritime security antiterrorism force. The  teams are managed as assets that may be deployed nationwide, and are  responsible for safeguarding the public and protecting vessels, harbors,  ports, facilities, and cargo in U.S. territorial waters. The teams are to  maintain readiness to deploy to events such as terrorist threats or  incidents and storm recovery operations, and routinely deploy to national  special security events such as Super Bowls and presidential  inaugurations. They are also to enforce security zones around high- interest vessels in transit and at other times when additional levels of  security are needed within the nation’s ports and waterways. The Coast  Guard’s Maritime Security Response Team complements the Maritime  Security and Safety Team, and is charged with maintaining a high  readiness posture 365 days a year. The Maritime Security Response  Team is the Coast Guard’s advanced interdiction force for  counterterrorism and law enforcement operations of a high-risk nature.  The team provides a variety of advanced capabilities or skills, including  addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and vertically  deploying from helicopters to engage potentially hostile personnel.
section_title: Coordinating with Partners along the Coast and in Ports
paragraphs: Along the coast and in ports, partnerships and coordination among  various stakeholders contribute to the security of the maritime borders. To  target the threat of transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the  coastal borders, the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan, established  in 2011, directs CBP, the Coast Guard, and U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations to utilize the  fusion of their intelligence, planning, and operations capabilities through  the formation of Regional Coordinating Mechanisms. The Coast Guard  serves as the lead agency responsible for planning and coordinating  among components. We reported in September 2013 that, according to  the Coast Guard, there were 32 Regional Coordinating Mechanisms as of  June 2013 that aligned with Coast Guard sectors’ geographic areas of  responsibility. In addition to the lead agencies, other stakeholders  include the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement  Administration; the U.S. Attorney’s Office; state, local, and tribal law  enforcement agencies; and foreign law enforcement agencies.
In ports, Area Maritime Security Committees consist of key stakeholders  who (1) may be affected by security policies and (2) share information  and develop port security plans. These committees, which are required by  Coast Guard regulations that implement the Maritime Transportation  Security Act of 2002, also identify critical port infrastructure and risks to  the port, develop mitigation strategies for these risks, and communicate  appropriate security information to port stakeholders. Recommended  committee members include a diverse array of port stakeholders,  including federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private sector  entities such as terminal operators, yacht clubs, shipyards, marine  exchanges, commercial fishermen, trucking and railroad companies,  organized labor, and trade associations. Area Maritime Security  Committees also are to serve as forums for developing Area Maritime  Security Plans. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 required  the Coast Guard to develop Area Maritime Security Plans—to be updated  every 5 years—for ports throughout the nation. The Coast Guard  develops these plans for each of the 43 geographically defined port areas  with input from applicable governmental and private entities, and the  plans are to serve as the primary means to identify and coordinate Coast  Guard procedures related to prevention, protection, and security. In  March 2007, we reported that there was a wide variance in ports’ natural  disaster planning efforts and that Area Maritime Security Plans—limited to  security incidents—could benefit from unified planning to include an all- hazards approach. We recommended that DHS encourage port  stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards planning.  DHS concurred with our recommendation and implemented it through the  fiscal year 2007 Port Security Grant Program supplemental program,  which was designed, in part, to facilitate the development of a Port-Wide  Risk Management/Mitigation and Business Continuity/Resumption of  Trade Plan.
section_title: Measuring Maritime Security
paragraphs: Another important aspect of a secure border is measuring maritime  security. In the DHS component agencies’ implementation of the various  maritime security related programs I have described today, and as we  have previously reported, one of the challenges that DHS and its  component agencies have faced has been the lack of adequate  performance measures. The following are some of the performance  measurement challenges we have reported on:
Lack of reliable and accurate data: DHS and its component agencies  have experienced challenges collecting complete, accurate, and  reliable data. For example, in January 2011, we reported that both  CBP and the Coast Guard tracked the frequency of illegal seafarer  incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied  considerably between the two component agencies and between the  agencies’ field and headquarters units. As a result, the data DHS  used to inform its strategic and tactical plans were of undetermined  reliability. We recommended that CBP and the Coast Guard  determine why their data varied and jointly establish a process for  sharing and reconciling records of illegal seafarer entries at U.S.  seaports. DHS concurred and has made progress in addressing the  recommendation.
Not using data to manage programs: DHS and its component  agencies have not always had or used performance information to  manage their missions. For example, we reported in February 2008  that Coast Guard officials used their Maritime Information for Safety &  Law Enforcement database—the Coast Guard’s primary data system  for documenting facility inspections and other activities—to review the  results of inspectors’ data entries for individual maritime facilities, but  the officials did not use the data to evaluate the facility inspection  program overall. We found that a more thorough evaluation of the  facility compliance program could provide information on, for example,  the variations we identified between Coast Guard units in oversight  approaches, the advantages and disadvantages of each approach,  and whether some approaches work better than others. We  recommended that the Coast Guard assess its Maritime Information  for Safety & Law Enforcement compliance data, including the  completeness and consistency of the data and data field problems,  and make any changes needed to more effectively utilize the data.  The Coast Guard agreed and has reported taking actions to address  the recommendation. These actions include hiring a full-time  management and program analyst to consistently review the data for  trends and gaps, and developing training resources, help desks, and  conferences, among other things, to help field personnel track  changes to Maritime Information for Safety & Law Enforcement and to  improve data entry time and consistency.
Lack of outcome-based performance measures: DHS and its  component agencies have also experienced difficulties developing  and using performance measures that focus on outcomes. Outcome- based performance measures describe the intended result of carrying  out a program or activity. For example, although CBP had  performance measures in place for its C-TPAT program, these  measures focused on program participation and facilitating trade and  travel and not on improving supply chain security, which is the  program’s purpose. We made separate but related recommendations  in July 2003, March 2005, and April 2008 that CBP develop outcome- based performance measures for this program. CBP concurred,  and, in response to our recommendations, identified measures to  quantify actions required and to gauge C-TPAT’s impact on supply  chain security. The Coast Guard has faced similar issues with  developing and using outcome-based performance measures. For  example, we reported in November 2011 that the Coast Guard  developed a measure to report its performance in reducing maritime  risk, but faced challenges using this measure to inform decisions.  The Coast Guard reported it has improved the measure to make it  more valid and reliable and stated it believes it is a useful proxy  measure of performance, but notes that developing outcome-based  performance measures is challenging because of limited historical  data on maritime terrorist attacks.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and members of the  subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at  (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement  include Christopher Conrad (Assistant Director), Christine Hanson  (Analyst-in-Charge), Tracey Cross, and Jeff Jensen.
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