Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Partners Are Addressing Labor Commitments, but More Monitoring and Enforcement Are Needed
Published: 2014-11-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States has signed 14 FTAs, liberalizing U.S. trade with 20 countries. These FTAs include provisions regarding fundamental labor rights in the partner countries. USTR and DOL, supported by State, are responsible for monitoring and assisting FTA partners' implementation of these provisions.
GAO was asked to assess the status of implementation of FTA labor provisions in partner countries. GAO examined (1) steps that selected partner countries have taken, and U.S. assistance they have received, to implement these provisions and other labor initiatives and the reported results of such steps; (2) submissions regarding possible violations of FTA labor provisions that DOL has accepted and any problems related to the submission process; and (3) the extent to which U.S. agencies monitor and enforce implementation of FTA labor provisions and report results to Congress. GAO selected CAFTA-DR and the FTAs with Colombia, Oman, and Peru as representative of the range of FTAs with labor provisions, among other reasons. GAO reviewed documentation related to each FTA and interviewed U.S., partner government, and other officials in five of the partner countries.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Partner countries of free trade agreements (FTA) that GAO selected—the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the FTAs with Colombia, Oman, and Peru—have taken steps to implement labor provisions and other initiatives to strengthen labor rights. For example, U.S. and foreign officials said that El Salvador and Guatemala—both partners to CAFTA-DR—as well as Colombia, Oman, and Peru have acted to change labor laws, and Colombia and Guatemala have acted to address violence against union members. Since 2001, U.S. agencies have provided $275 million in labor-related technical assistance and capacity-building activities for FTA partners, including $222 million for the four FTAs GAO reviewed. However, U.S. agencies reported, and GAO found, persistent challenges to labor rights, such as limited enforcement capacity, the use of subcontracting to avoid direct employment, and, in Colombia and Guatemala, violence against union leaders.
Since 2008, the Department of Labor (DOL) has accepted five formal complaints—known as submissions—about possible violations of FTA labor provisions and has resolved one, regarding Peru (see fig.). However, for each submission, DOL has exceeded by an average of almost 9 months its 6-month time frame for investigating FTA-related labor submissions and issuing public reports, showing the time frame to be unrealistic. Also, union representatives and other stakeholders GAO interviewed in partner countries often did not understand the submission process, possibly limiting the number of submissions filed. Further, stakeholders expressed concerns that delays in resolving the submissions, resulting in part from DOL's exceeding its review time frames, may have contributed to the persistence of conditions that affect workers and are allegedly inconsistent with the FTAs.
Five Labor Submissions Accepted by DOL Regarding Free Trade Agreements
In 2009, GAO found weaknesses in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR) and DOL's monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions. In the same year, the agencies pledged to adopt a more proactive, interagency approach. GAO's current review found that although the agencies have taken several steps since 2009 to strengthen their monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, they lack a strategic approach to systematically assess whether partner countries' conditions and practices are inconsistent with labor provisions in the FTAs. Despite some proactive steps, they generally rely on labor submissions to begin identifying, investigating, and initiating steps to address possible inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions. According to agency officials, resource limitations have prevented more proactive monitoring of all FTA labor provisions. As a result, USTR and DOL systematically monitor and enforce compliance with FTA labor provisions for only a few priority countries. USTR's annual report to Congress about trade agreement programs provides limited details of the results of the agencies' monitoring and enforcement of compliance with FTA labor provisions.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: DOL should reevaluate its submission review time frame and better inform stakeholders about the submission process. USTR and DOL should establish a coordinated strategic approach to monitoring and enforcement labor provisions. USTR's annual report to Congress should include more information of USTR's and DOL's monitoring and enforcement efforts. The agencies generally agreed with the recommendations but disagreed with some findings, including the finding that they lack a systematic approach to monitor and enforce labor provisions in all FTAs. GAO stands by its findings.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: As global economic competition has intensified, concerns in the United  States that competitors’ labor practices may disadvantage U.S. workers  and producers have become acute. Recent U.S. free trade agreements  (FTA) contain a provision requiring partner countries to commit to respect  internationally accepted core labor rights, such as freedom of association  and the right to bargain collectively. FTAs phase out barriers to trade  with particular countries or groups of countries and contain rules and  other commitments to improve access for services and investment. FTAs  represent a major component of U.S. trade policy, as the United States  has signed 14 FTAs with 20 countries covering, according to the  Department of Commerce, more than 35 percent of all U.S. imports—$2.3  trillion in 2013. The status of the implementation of FTA labor provisions  is of particular relevance, as the United States is negotiating the Trans- Pacific Partnership—a trade agreement with 11 Pacific Rim countries, in  which the administration is seeking to negotiate high-standard labor  provisions. The effective implementation of labor provisions is also  relevant as Congress considers renewal of the President’s lapsed Trade  Promotion Authority, most recently in effect from 2002 through 2007.
In 2009, we reported significant challenges connected with the  enforcement of labor provisions in four FTAs. U.S. agencies responsible for the monitoring and implementation of labor  provisions in the FTAs in many cases engaged in only minimal oversight  and assistance with FTA partner countries to address these challenges.  We recommended that the Department of Labor (DOL), in consultation  with other agencies, initiate regular contact with all FTA partners’  ministries of labor to review implementation of FTA labor provisions and  to develop ongoing priorities and plans for technical cooperation on labor  matters. We also recommended that the Office of the U.S. Trade  Representative (USTR), in cooperation with other agencies, prepare  updated plans to implement, enforce, monitor, and report on compliance  with and progress under the FTAs’ labor provisions and that these plans  should reflect ongoing trade developments, be provided to Congress, and  be summarized in USTR’s annual trade agreements report. In 2012, both  agencies were taking actions to address the recommendations.
GAO, International Trade: Four Free Trade Agreements GAO Reviewed Have Resulted  in Commercial Benefits, but Challenges on Labor and Environment Remain, GAO-09-439  (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2009). Our 2009 report reviewed implementation of the U.S.  FTAs with, respectively, Chile, Jordan, Morocco, and Singapore. (State) supports USTR and DOL in discharging their responsibilities and  also monitors labor conditions in each partner country. In some instances,  the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supports partner  countries in implementing FTA labor obligations and initiatives by  administering technical assistance projects, carried out by USAID’s  implementing partners. In 2009, USTR announced that it would take  steps jointly with DOL and State to improve interagency cooperation;  proactively monitor the implementation of labor provisions; and address  identified problem areas, including foreign practices that would constitute  violations of FTA requirements. Furthermore, the President’s 2014 Trade  Policy Agenda indicates that the administration will focus on  implementation of the numerous agreements into which the United States  has entered and that the United States will work with key trading partners  around the world to address specific labor issues.
You asked us to assess the current status of the implementation of FTA  labor provisions as well as the United States’ and trade partner countries’  responses to related challenges, such as reported violence against  unionists in some partner countries. This report examines the following  (see app. I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology):  1)  steps that selected partner countries have taken, and U.S. assistance  they have received, to implement FTA labor provisions and other  labor initiatives and the reported results of such steps;  2)  complaints—known as submissions—about possible violations of FTA  labor provisions that DOL has accepted and any problems related to  the submission process; and  3)  the extent to which USTR, DOL, and State monitor and enforce  partner countries’ implementation of FTA labor provisions and report  results to Congress.
In addition, appendix II describes reported violence against labor  unionists in selected FTA partner countries as well as steps that the  countries have taken to address such occurrences. Appendix III describes  U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor implementation of other labor initiatives.
For our review, we selected four FTAs—the Dominican Republic-Central  America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the United  States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Colombia FTA), the  United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement (Oman FTA), and the United  States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (Peru FTA). We also visited five  partner countries—El Salvador and Guatemala, both of which are  CAFTA-DR partners; Colombia; Oman; and Peru. We selected these  FTAs and countries in part because of the extent of known labor issues in  each country; because of the timing of the FTAs’ entry into force; and to  reflect regional dispersion across Central America, South America, and  the Middle East. In addition, we selected the Colombia and Peru FTAs in  part because the labor chapters in those agreements contain provisions  reflecting labor language as delineated in the May 10, 2007, Bipartisan  Trade Agreement on Trade Policy, popularly known as the May 10th  Agreement. However, the results of our review of these selected FTAs  and partner countries cannot be generalized to all FTAs and partner  countries.
To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant documents, including  the labor chapters of the four selected FTAs; labor submissions received  by DOL; labor rights reports and trade agreement reports compiled by  U.S. agencies, international organizations, and FTA stakeholders; and  documents pertaining to U.S. monitoring and enforcement plans. In  addition, we reviewed documentation related to labor conditions in partner  countries that we obtained from partner country governments as well as  from business associations, labor unions, the International Labour  Organization (ILO), and nonprofit organizations. We interviewed  representatives of these organizations; relevant foreign government  officials; and U.S. agency officials in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala,  Oman, and Peru during fieldwork in those countries. We also interviewed  U.S. agency representatives in Washington, D.C., and Geneva,  Switzerland. We collected data on U.S. funding for labor assistance programs in FTA partner countries from 2001 to 2013 and on reported  violence against unionists in Colombia—the only selected FTA partner  country with such data—and we assessed these data’s reliability by  interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data sources and  by tracing the data to source documents. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing U.S. assistance  for implementation of labor provisions in FTA partner countries and  describing general trends in reported violence against unionists in  Colombia. (See app. I for further details of our scope and methodology.)
We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to November 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: FTA Labor Provisions and Other Initiatives to Address Labor Concerns
paragraphs: The current and prior administrations have expressed concerns that poor  labor standards in FTA partner countries may affect workers in the United  States and other parts of the world, incentivizing a global “race to the  bottom” that unfairly distorts global markets and prevents U.S. businesses  and workers from competing on a level playing field. According to DOL, to  address such concerns, each FTA signed in the past decade, including  those we selected, contains a “labor chapter” that differs in detail across  the FTAs but generally includes labor provisions, establishes points of  contact for labor matters, and provides a recourse mechanism for matters  arising from the labor provisions. The provisions in the labor chapters of  the four FTAs that took effect most recently generally reflect the trade  policy template created by the May 10th Agreement.
In FTAs that entered into force from January 2004 through January  2009, including CAFTA-DR and the Oman FTA, the labor chapter  contains a provision that a party shall not fail to effectively enforce its  labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or  inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the parties. Under  CAFTA-DR and the Oman FTA, matters related to this obligation are  the only matters under the respective labor chapters for which parties  can seek recourse through dispute settlement that may result in  possible fines and sanctions. These FTAs also contain a provision  whereby parties commit to “strive to ensure” that the labor rights  enumerated in the respective labor chapter are protected by their  laws; however, matters arising under this provision do not have  recourse through the dispute settlement chapter of the respective  FTA.
In FTAs that entered into force after January 2009, including the  Colombia and Peru FTAs, the labor chapter includes language  echoing the May 10th Agreement that obligates each partner to adopt  and maintain in its statutes, regulations, and practices certain  fundamental labor rights as stated by the ILO. Although the text of  the respective FTAs’ labor chapters varies, this language generally  relates to, for example, the rights to freedom of association and  collective bargaining and the elimination of compulsory or forced  labor. The labor chapters of these FTAs also obligate the parties not  to fail to effectively enforce these labor laws in a manner affecting  trade between the parties. Pursuant to the labor chapters of these  FTAs, if consultations fail, the parties can seek to resolve matters  arising under the labor chapters by pursuing recourse through the  respective FTAs’ dispute settlement chapters, which may result in  possible fines and sanctions.
Working Group of the Vice Ministers Responsible for Trade and Labor in the Countries  of Central America and the Dominican Republic, The Labor Dimension in Central America  and the Dominican Republic: Building on Progress: Strengthening Compliance and  Enhancing Capacity (April 2005), accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.ilo.org/sanjose  /lang—es/index.htm.
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement  Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 262 (Aug. 2, 2005).
Paper detailed six areas of focus and included recommendations to  enhance the implementation and enforcement of labor standards and  to strengthen the region’s labor institutions. According to DOL, the  U.S. government did not participate in preparing or negotiating the  White Paper’s recommendations. The ILO Verification Project, funded  by DOL, was created to monitor implementation of the White Paper  commitments and released verification reports every 6 months  between 2007 and 2010.
Labor Action Plan. Colombia and the United States agreed in 2011  to the Labor Action Plan, in furtherance of Colombia’s commitment to  protect internationally recognized labor rights, prevent violence  against labor leaders, and prosecute the perpetrators of such  violence. The plan listed nine issue areas to strengthen labor rights  that Colombia was required to address before the FTA could receive  congressional approval.  USTR and DOL are jointly responsible for  monitoring Colombia’s ongoing progress in fulfilling these  requirements.
section_title: U.S. Agencies’ Responsibilities Related to Monitoring Implementation of FTA Labor Provisions
paragraphs: The nine areas that Colombia agreed to address under the Labor Action Plan were (1)  creation of a specialized Ministry of Labor; (2) criminal code reform; (3) prohibiting the  misuse of cooperatives; (4) preventing the use of temporary service agencies to  circumvent labor rights; (5) criminalizing the use of collective pacts to undermine the right  to organize and bargain collectively; (6) collecting and disseminating information on the  definition of essential services; (7) seeking the ILO’s assistance in implementing the Labor  Action Plan and working with the ILO to strengthen its presence, capacity, and role in  Colombia; (8) reforming protection programs; and (9) criminal justice reforms. developing and coordinating U.S. trade policy and issuing policy  guidance related to international trade functions. USTR is responsible  to the President and Congress for administering the trade agreements  program, including periodic reporting to Congress as required.  USTR is also responsible for coordinating the administration’s  activities to create a fair, open, and predictable trading environment  by identifying, monitoring, enforcing, and resolving the full range of  international trade issues. According to USTR, this includes asserting  U.S. rights; vigorously monitoring and enforcing bilateral and other  agreements; and promoting U.S. interests, including labor interests,  under FTAs.
DOL. DOL’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs is responsible for  monitoring implementation of FTA labor provisions for all FTAs. The  bureau’s Office of Trade and Labor Affairs is designated as the point  of contact for implementation of the labor provisions of the FTAs as  well as for the labor cooperation mechanisms. Before congressional  approval and implementation of an FTA, DOL’s responsibilities  include preparing reports for Congress, in consultation with USTR and  State, about the partner country’s labor rights protections and child  labor laws and the FTA’s potential effect on employment in the United  States. After an FTA enters into force, DOL’s responsibilities include  receiving, reviewing, and acting on any public complaint submitted  about the partner’s compliance with FTA labor obligations  (submissions).  Both before and after an FTA is implemented, DOL is  responsible for assisting the partner country as needed—for example,  planning, developing, and pursuing cooperative projects related to  labor matters—to strengthen the partner country’s capacity to promote  respect for core labor standards.
In addition, DOL is responsible for convening the FTA labor affairs councils among  partner government’s labor ministries, which oversee the FTA labor chapters, and for  administering the U.S. Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade  Policy. The committee consists of representatives of labor organizations and is tasked  with providing information and advice with respect to negotiation and implementation of  U.S. trade agreements. DOL also administers the National Advisory Committee for Labor  Provisions of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, which consists of 12 representatives (4 from  the business community, 4 from the labor community, and 4 from the public sector).
State. State is responsible for supporting USTR and DOL in  implementing and monitoring FTAs. State’s Bureau of Democracy,  Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) coordinates State’s in-country labor  officers, who are tasked with carrying out regular monitoring and  reporting and day-to-day interaction with foreign governments  regarding labor matters. State annually produces Country Reports on  Human Rights Practices, which includes information about countries’  labor practices. In addition, State participates with USTR and DOL in  the USTR-led interagency team that negotiates FTA labor provisions,  contributes critical input to the research and analysis of reports  produced by DOL, and provides technical assistance funding to  strengthen some countries’ labor capacity. Because USTR and DOL  do not maintain a presence in other countries, they often rely on State  for outreach, monitoring, and reporting activities related to FTA labor  provisions.
USAID. USAID administers technical assistance programs to address  labor-related matters. USAID administers trade-capacity-building  programs globally in both FTA and non-FTA partner countries. In  addition, during the FTA negotiations, USAID provides USTR input on  draft FTA text as well as input on possible trade-capacity-building  programs to address labor-related issues.
section_title: Selected Countries Have Taken Steps, with U.S. Assistance, to Address FTA Labor Commitments and Other Labor Initiatives but Have Limited Enforcement Capacity
paragraphs: Each of the FTA partner countries that we selected for our review has  taken steps to strengthen labor rights pursuant to its FTA with the United  States, and some of these countries have also implemented other labor  initiatives outside the FTA framework. The U.S. government has provided  some technical assistance to help FTA partner countries meet their labor  commitments. However, stakeholders reported that limitations in partner  countries’ capacity to enforce labor laws cause gaps in labor protections  to persist.
subsections: section_title: Selected Countries Have Taken Steps to Implement FTA Labor Commitments and Other Labor Initiatives, Including Strengthening Labor Institutions
subsections: section_title: CAFTA-DR: El Salvador and Guatemala
paragraphs: El Salvador and Guatemala, the CAFTA-DR countries we selected for our  review, have both taken steps to implement labor initiatives responding to  their FTA commitments and areas of focus identified in the White Paper.  According to the ILO, and as reported by DOL, these countries have  addressed these areas of focus by implementing changes to improve  labor protections, such as increasing the number of labor inspectors and  increasing the number of judges and courts that hear labor cases.
El Salvador. According to DOL and ILO verification reports, El Salvador  increased its Ministry of Labor’s enforcement budget by about 120  percent from 2005 to 2010, leading to an increase in the number of labor  inspectors during the same period as well as increases in both the  number of inspections conducted and the number of fines imposed on  employers. Ministry of Labor officials reported that with the increase in  size and budget, which resulted from the White Paper recommendations,  the ministry is now able to accommodate workers’ requests for workplace  inspections and labor inspectors can issue fines for violations not  addressed by employers.Supreme Court in El Salvador, the labor courts have created a  comprehensive statistical system to track labor issues identified in the  White Paper, and unions have successfully advocated for legislation that,  if passed, would speed labor case reviews and allow plaintiffs to  participate more actively.
In addition, according to officials from the  Guatemala. Guatemala has taken some steps to address labor  conditions in accordance with commitments outlined in an Enforcement  Plan that the United States and Guatemala agreed to in 2013 as a result  of negotiations to resolve a labor case initiated through a labor  submission to DOL. The actions that the plan calls for include, among  others, increasing the budget for labor law enforcement at the Ministry of  Labor and verifying employer compliance with court orders.from the Ministry of Labor reported improvements in labor rights  implementation in response to the Enforcement Plan. For example, the  number of labor inspections rose from about 5,000 nationwide in 2011 to  about 36,800 nationwide in 2013. Also, according to ministry officials, the  ministry now conducts labor inspections regularly, rather than in response  to complaints, and has increased its legal education requirements for  labor inspectors, to further fulfill its Enforcement Plan commitments.
section_title: Colombia
paragraphs: According to USTR, Colombia has taken steps to implement labor  protection commitments outlined in the Labor Action Plan, such as  reforming the criminal code to establish criminal penalties for employers  that undermine the right to organize and bargain collectively, enacting  legal provisions and regulations prohibiting the use of temporary service  agencies to circumvent labor rights, and reforming the criminal justice  system. USTR and DOL have reported that the Colombian government  took concrete steps and made meaningful progress under the Labor  Action Plan, which fulfilled the condition for advancing the FTA to  Congress and resulted in the FTA’s entering into force in May 2012. The  government’s steps included securing legislation to establish a separate  labor ministry and expanding its labor inspectorate by hiring additional  inspectors. Additionally, USTR and the Colombian Ministry of Labor  reported that the government enacted a series of laws and ministerial  decrees that expanded labor protections as a result of the Labor Action  Plan. According to USTR and the Colombian Ministry of Labor, these  laws and decrees include, for example, legislation to establish criminal  penalties, including imprisonment, for employers that undermined the  right to organize and bargain collectively as well as new provisions and  regulations to prohibit and sanction with significant fines the misuse of  cooperatives and other employment relationships that undermine  workers’ rights.
section_title: Oman
paragraphs: Oman has taken steps to implement labor protections that have allowed  for unionization and collective bargaining. Officials from Oman’s Ministry  of Manpower—the ministry responsible for labor affairs—reported that  Oman’s interest in entering into a free trade agreement with the United  States helped lead to the introduction of labor reforms, including the  establishment of unions. According to USTR, in order to meet its  commitments made in connection with the FTA, Oman has enacted a  number of labor law reforms including, among others, a royal decree in  2006 that established the right to organize labor unions, allowed for  collective bargaining, prohibited the dismissal of workers for union  activity, guaranteed the right to strike, and guaranteed unions the right to  practice their activities freely and without interference from outside  parties. According to union and Ministry of Manpower officials we met  with in Oman, the General Federation of Trade Unions held its first  election in 2010 and served as the starting point for the union movement  in Oman. The federation serves as an umbrella organization representing  workers from various sectors and, according to union officials, represents  about 200 company-level unions and one sector-level union, established  in 2013 in the oil and gas sector.
section_title: Peru
paragraphs: According to USTR, Peru committed to steps to implement labor  protection commitments in the context of FTA negotiations with the United  States. During our fieldwork, officials at Peru’s Ministry of Labor told us  that Peru recently established a new labor inspection regime and that the  ministry has focused on improving inspections in the workplace. For  example, in 2013, according to Ministry of Labor officials, the ministry  took action to centralize authority for labor inspections and help ensure  that inspectors are applying the same criteria across the country. Ministry  of Labor officials also reported that the ministry took steps to improve  labor inspections by modernizing its information systems to allow for  digital record keeping, with technical assistance provided by USAID.  According to USAID, as a result of these programs, the time required to  adjudicate labor cases has decreased from 2 years to 6 months.   Additionally, according to a 2007 U.S. House of Representatives,  Committee on Ways and Means report, in order to bring Peruvian labor  laws into alignment with the obligations under the FTA, the government of  Peru took steps to change Peru’s legal framework governing temporary  employment contracts, subcontracting and outsourcing contracts, the  right of workers to strike, recourses against unit-union discrimination, and  workers’ right to organize. Ministry of Labor officials reported that the  ministry has progressively increased the number of labor inspectors, in  connection with the commitments Peru made during the FTA negotiation,  to double its labor inspectorate. As of September 2013, the ministry  reported having about 400 labor inspectors on staff nationally.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Have Provided Technical Assistance to Help FTA Partner Countries Meet Labor Commitments, with Largest Amounts for CAFTA-DR
paragraphs: From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2013, the U.S. government  provided a combined total of about $275 million in labor-related  assistance for all FTA partner countries. All CAFTA-DR countries,  Colombia, and Peru received a combined total of about $222 million in  labor-related technical assistance and capacity-building activities since  the passage of implementing legislation for these FTAs. In contrast, the  U.S. government provided about $53 million in labor-related assistance  for all other FTA partner countries during the periods since those FTAs  were implemented.
Figure 1 shows the labor-related technical assistance that U.S. agencies  provided under CAFTA-DR and the Colombia, Oman, and Peru FTAs  during the periods beginning, respectively, with the year that Congress  passed the FTA’s implementing legislation and ending in 2013. Figure 1  also shows labor-related technical assistance that U.S. agencies provided  from 2001 through 2013 under all other FTAs that entered into force in or  after 2001.
CAFTA-DR’s six partner countries have received the largest amounts of  U.S. assistance for labor-related projects undertaken pursuant to the FTA  or independent of the FTA. From 2005, when the CAFTA-DR  implementing legislation was passed by Congress, through 2013, the  U.S. government provided about $170 million for such projects. According  to DOL, this amount included funding appropriated by Congress to fund  labor-capacity-building activities as well as funds appropriated to DOL for  child labor technical assistance projects to assist these partner countries  in addressing labor-related priorities outlined in the White Paper.
According to DOL officials, DOL, State, and USAID established an  interagency group to develop FTA labor-related projects in consultation  with USTR and CAFTA-DR partner governments and to allocate funding  among these projects, with funds transferred from State. DOL reported  that from 2005 to 2013, these three U.S. agencies administered more  than 20 technical assistance projects in support of the White Paper’s  priority issue areas.
subsections: section_title: Colombia
paragraphs: U.S. technical assistance for labor-related projects in Colombia totaled  about $24 million from 2011, when the Colombia FTA implementing  legislation was enacted, through 2013. U.S. agencies provided $9 million  of that amount for projects to combat child labor and about $13 million to  address workers’ rights. DOL has also provided in-kind resources,  sending a staff person with labor expertise to support the Colombian  government in taking initial steps to implement the Labor Action Plan. The  United States is currently funding multiple labor-related projects in  Colombia, including State’s award of about $500,000 to the ILO for the  promotion of core labor rights and DOL’s award of about $7.8 million for  the ILO office in Colombia.
section_title: Oman
paragraphs: Oman has not received U.S. technical assistance specifically for labor- related projects since the FTA was enacted. According to State, the  United States is not involved in any labor-capacity-building or labor- related assistance programs in Oman because of the Omani  government’s reluctance to accept foreign assistance. However, officials  at Oman’s Ministry of Manpower told us that the United States has  provided information and advice on supporting unions and the role of  unions in the economy and has expressed support of ongoing labor  reforms, including the establishment of unions.
section_title: Peru
paragraphs: U.S technical assistance for labor-related projects in Peru totaled about  $27.5 million from 2007, when the Peru FTA implementing legislation was  enacted, through 2013. Of that amount, $13 million was dedicated to  combat child labor, with the remainder dedicated to labor-capacity- building and education projects. USAID officials stated that, for example,  the agency expended $3.3 million over a 3-year period to target labor  issues. Of this amount, $2.7 million was granted to the Solidarity Center,  a labor nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the American  Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),  to strengthen union negotiation capacity, and $600,000 was granted to an  implementing partner—Nathan Associates—for improving information  systems, providing training for labor inspectors, and training judges on the  implementation of labor laws.
section_title: Stakeholders Reported Limited Enforcement Capacity and Gaps in Labor Rights in Selected Partner Countries
subsections: section_title: CAFTA-DR: El Salvador and Guatemala
paragraphs: El Salvador. Stakeholders we met with during our fieldwork in El  Salvador identified concerns related to the enforcement of labor rights.  Further, State and DOL reports show that workers are often unable to  benefit from the legal rights afforded in the labor laws. For example,  according to NGO officials, although labor courts have improved their  ability to process cases, court decisions are often not enforced. U.S.  officials stated that the Ministry of Labor’s increases in its budget and  number of labor inspectors have not improved the labor inspectorate’s  effectiveness. According to Ministry of Labor officials, although the  ministry’s labor inspectors can fine employers for labor law violations, the  ministry does not collect the fines and workers must petition the labor  courts to enforce the penalties. Moreover, according to an ILO official,  although the government of El Salvador has greatly reduced the amount  of time that the courts take to accept a case, resolution of most labor  disputes still takes 2 to 4 years. Officials from the Supreme Court in El  Salvador told us that about 51 percent of labor court sentences are not  enforced, primarily because the plaintiffs do not have the funds required  to continue the claims. Union and NGO officials we met with in El  Salvador emphasized their concerns over enforcement, stating that  because of the length of time the courts take to adjudicate labor cases,  workers often take buyouts from the company and drop the cases. State’s  2013 Human Rights Report echoes these concerns. For example, the  report states that in 2013, the government of El Salvador did not always  effectively enforce the laws on freedom of association and the right to  collective bargaining, and that legal remedies and penalties are  ineffective.
Guatemala. According to stakeholders we met with during our fieldwork  in Guatemala, as well as State reports, concerns related to the  enforcement and application of labor rights persist. According to USTR,  Guatemala has taken steps to address labor reforms outlined in the  Enforcement Plan, but additional steps are needed, including passing  legislation providing for an expedited process to sanction employers that  violate labor laws and implementing a mechanism to ensure payments to  workers in cases where enterprises have closed. Additionally, according  to USTR, Guatemala will need to demonstrate that the legal reforms it  has undertaken and still needs to undertake are being implemented  effectively and are leading to positive changes.reported concerns related to freedom of association—specifically, that  union leaders have been offered monetary compensation to resign from  their jobs and to influence other workers against joining the union. Union  officials we met with also noted that workers have been terminated for  their union affiliation or for not disbanding unions. State’s 2013 Human  Rights Report echoed these concerns, stating that the government of  Guatemala did not effectively enforce legislation on freedom of  association, collective bargaining, or antiunion discrimination. Further,  according to this report, as a result of inadequate allocation of budget  resources and inefficient legal and administrative processes, the relevant  government institutions did not effectively investigate, prosecute, and  punish employers who violated freedom of association and collective   Union representatives  bargaining laws, and the institutions did not reinstate workers illegally  dismissed for engaging in union activities.
section_title: Colombia
paragraphs: Stakeholders we met with in Colombia identified concerns related to the  enforcement of labor rights and not benefiting from rights afforded in the  labor laws. According to USTR, the government of Colombia has made  meaningful progress under the Labor Action Plan, but work remains to  build on this progress and address remaining and new challenges.
According to USTR, the collection of fines for labor violations remains  problematic. USTR and DOL have reported that although Colombia’s  national training and apprenticeship system, Servicio Nacional de  Aprendizaje (SENA), is responsible for collecting fines for labor  violations, until recently SENA has been barred from collecting fines  from companies that filed a judicial appeal. According to a joint  USTR-DOL statement, as of April 2014, SENA was authorized to hold  monetary payment as collateral payment from businesses, pending  the outcome of the judicial appeal of their fines, but had not yet begun  to exercise this authority. Additionally, although the Ministry of Labor  increased the number of inspectors, labor unions and NGOs reported  that this action has not resulted in more effective inspections or  improved working conditions.
USTR has reported that new forms of abusive contracting remain  problematic to the protection of labor rights in Colombia. For example,  according to USTR, although the number of illegal cooperatives has  dropped, many employers have shifted to various forms of  subcontracting, including entities known as simplified stock  companies, to avoid direct employment relationships. ILO, NGO, and labor union officials we met with described this form of  subcontracting as a legal loophole that is used to undermine workers’  rights. According to union officials, a law passed by the Colombian  government in 2013 prohibiting the misuse of cooperatives was also  intended to increase formalized employment and encourage  companies to hire workers directly instead of as temporary labor.
State’s 2013 Human Rights Report noted that the Colombian government  generally enforced applicable labor laws and took steps to increase the  enforcement of freedom-of-association laws. However, the report  identified weaknesses in labor protections in Colombia, echoing concerns  expressed to us by labor union and NGO representatives, related to labor  inspections, collecting fines for labor violations, and employers’ use of  outsourcing contracts.
section_title: Oman
paragraphs: Ministry of Manpower and union officials we met with in Oman reported  that collective bargaining and freedom of association are allowed by law  and largely respected. However, State has raised concerns about the  enforcement of labor law among Oman’s foreign worker population.  State’s 2013 Human Rights Report notes that Oman’s Ministry of  Manpower effectively enforces the labor law as it applies to Omani  citizens but has not effectively enforced regulations related to working  conditions and hours for foreign workers.
section_title: Peru
paragraphs: Despite steps that the government of Peru has taken to address labor  conditions, union and NGO officials we met with reported that  enforcement of labor laws remains weak and labor conditions have not  improved in certain respects. According to State, Peru’s labor laws place  a 5-year limit on the continuous renewal of short-term labor contracts not  leading to permanent employment in most sectors of the economy.  However, State’s 2013 Human Rights Report notes that a sector-specific  law covering nontraditional export sectors such as apparel exempts  employers from this 5-year limit and allows them to hire workers through  indefinite series of short-term contracts. Union officials we met during our  fieldwork also reported poor labor conditions in Peru’s nontraditional  export sectors, which these officials described as not affording the same  labor rights as other sectors in the economy. More generally, according  to NGO officials, Peru’s large informal sector makes it difficult for the  government to enforce labor rights, because informal companies, which  are not registered with the government and therefore are not subject to  labor inspections, typically do not follow labor laws.
State’s 2013 Human Rights Report also identifies continuing labor  concerns in Peru’s nontraditional export sectors, such as the effect of the  use of temporary service contracts and subcontracting on workers’  freedom of association. State’s report also notes that in 2013, penalties  for violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining were  rarely enforced, the judicial process was prolonged, and employers were  seldom penalized for dismissing workers involved in trade union activities.  In addition, union officials whom we met with stated that Peru’s  agricultural law allows for workers to be paid less than the legal minimum  wage and to be continuously hired on temporary contracts for 2- to 3- month periods. These officials stated that this limits workers’ ability to  collectively bargain and exercise freedom of association, because of fear  that if they join a union, their contracts will not be renewed.
section_title: One of Five Labor Submissions Has Been Resolved, but Reporting Deadlines and Limited Public Awareness of the Process Present Problems
paragraphs: DOL has accepted five of six labor submissions—that is, formal  complaints alleging that FTA labor provisions had been violated—that it   and has closed one submission as resolved.  has received since 2008However, DOL did not meet its original deadlines for reviewing and  reporting on any of the submissions, exceeding the established 6-month  submission review time frame by an average of about nine months and  possibly delaying resolution of the submissions. Stakeholders whom we  interviewed in the selected five partner countries generally expressed a  lack of awareness or understanding of DOL’s submission process, which  may have limited the number of submissions filed. Moreover,  stakeholders we interviewed expressed concerns about delays in  resolving labor concerns detailed in the submissions for Guatemala and  Honduras.
subsections: section_title: DOL Announced Its Process for Receiving and Evaluating Submissions in 2006
paragraphs: According to DOL, FTA labor provisions establish official processes for  receiving submissions from interested organizations that believe a trading  partner is not fulfilling its labor commitments. In the United States, DOL  generally receives and reviews submissions made under the labor  chapters of each trade agreement. DOL issued procedural guidelines  pertaining to this function via publication of a Federal Register notice in  2006.acceptance and investigation of submissions. For example, DOL shall  determine whether to accept a submission within 60 days and is to  consider, among other things, whether it contains statements that, if  substantiated, would constitute a failure by the other party to comply with  its commitments under an FTA. If DOL determines that the circumstances  require, the 60-day timeframe can be extended. According to DOL, its  decision to review a public submission does not indicate any  determination as to the validity or accuracy of the allegations contained in  the submission; the submission’s merit is addressed in the public report  that follows DOL’s review and analysis. DOL officials noted that although  DOL has responsibility for investigating submissions, USTR, DOL, and  State work together to engage diplomatically to address concerns.
The guidelines contain deadlines and substantive criteria for  Figure 2 illustrates DOL’s submission process, including the established  time frames for accepting and reviewing submissions.
section_title: DOL Has Closed One of Five Labor Submissions Accepted since 2008
paragraphs: Since 2008, DOL has accepted labor submissions filed under the  Bahrain, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru FTAs and  has closed the Peru FTA submission. The submissions for Bahrain, the  Dominican Republic, and Guatemala—accepted in 2011, 2012, and 2008,  respectively—remain open while the U.S. government engages with the  governments to address the concerns that the submissions raised. The  submission for Honduras, accepted in 2012, remains open while DOL  reviews its allegations. Figure 3 presents information about the five  submissions (see app. III for further details).
section_title: DOL Did Not Meet 6- Month Time Frame for Any Submission, Showing the Time Frame to Be Unrealistic
paragraphs: Although DOL accepted most of the submissions it received within the 60- day time frame established by its guidelines, it did not complete its  reviews of the submission within the established 180-day time frame. A  DOL official we met with indicated that DOL cannot complete within the  180-day time frame the types of comprehensive investigations and  reports it has been providing.
For each of the submissions, DOL determined at the end of the original  180-day review time frame to extend the review period and reported its  findings and recommendations an average of 262 days after the original  time frame had ended. According to USTR and DOL, before DOL  publishes its review of a submission, both agencies engage informally  with the relevant partner country to explore ways to address the concerns  raised in the submission. However, USTR and DOL do not request formal  consultations with a partner country to address DOL’s recommendations  until DOL has issued its report. As a result, extensions of DOL’s review  time frame may delay resolution of the submission.
Bahrain. DOL received the Bahrain submission on April 21, 2011,  and accepted it on June 10, 2011, or 50 days later. In December  2011, DOL extended the submission review period to consider and  review additional information received from the government of Bahrain  and Bahraini workers, amendments made to the Bahraini Trade Union  Law, and labor-related developments in international forums. DOL  issued its report on December 20, 2012, 559 days after accepting the  submission.
Dominican Republic. DOL received the Dominican Republic  submission on December 22, 2011, and accepted it on February 22,  2012, or 62 days later. In August 2012, DOL extended the review time  frame to consider public comments about the submission as well as  information gathered by a Bureau of International Labor Affairs  delegation during a visit to the Dominican Republic. DOL issued its  report on September 27, 2013, 583 days after accepting the  submission.
Guatemala. DOL received the Guatemala submission on April 23,  2008, and accepted it on June 12, 2008, or 50 days later. DOL issued  its report on January 16, 2009, 218 days after accepting the  Guatemala submission.
Honduras. DOL received the submission on March 26, 2012, and  accepted it on May 14, 2012, or 49 days later. On November 2, 2012,  5 days before DOL’s 180-day reporting deadline, DOL extended its  review because of the scope of the submission, the scope of the  alleged labor law violations, and the large amounts of information  received from the Honduran government and stakeholders. As of  September 2014, DOL officials were continuing to review  documentation of the allegations and prepare their report. DOL  officials were unable to estimate when they would issue a public  report.
Peru. DOL received the submission for Peru on December 29, 2010,  and accepted it on July 19, 2011, or 202 days later. On January 20,  2012, 185 days after accepting the submission, DOL concluded that  circumstances required an extension of time for a thorough and  detailed review of the Peru submission. DOL issued its report for the  Peru submission on August 30, 2012, 408 days after accepting it.
Although DOL has periodically reviewed and updated the submission  process since establishing it in 1994, DOL officials told us that they have  not reviewed or adjusted the submission review time frame to reflect the  time it takes DOL to issue its reports after accepting the submissions.  DOL’s extensions of each submission review period since 2008 have  shown this time frame to be unrealistic. Federal standards for internal  control call on agency management to monitor and assess the  effectiveness and efficiency of their operations over time and to promptly  resolve any deficiencies.
section_title: Interviewed Stakeholders Generally Did Not Understand the Labor Submission Process, and U.S. Agencies Have Made Minimal Efforts to Explain It
paragraphs: Our interviews with union and other nongovernmental stakeholders in the  selected partner countries suggested that little or no awareness and  understanding of the FTA labor submission process may have affected  the number of submissions filed. Union representatives we interviewed in  our five case study countries—Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Oman,  and Peru—were generally either unaware of DOL’s labor submission  process or considered it difficult to understand and use. For example, a  union representative in Colombia stated that the union would have filed a  submission if the representative had known about the process. In another  example, representatives of one of the larger El Salvador unions— GMIES, an NGO that monitors the actions of the Salvadorian  government—stated that it was difficult for a “typical worker” to file a  submission with DOL and that the information required for the submission  is generally difficult, if not impossible, to obtain and document. A small  number of union representatives who were aware of the process  attributed their knowledge to information received from AFL-CIO or their  country’s Solidarity Center. For instance, in Guatemala, a representative  of a union that had signed the current Guatemala submission stated that  without the help of the Solidarity Center, the union would have been  unable to locate submission instructions and file the submission.
Moreover, although the government officials we interviewed in the five  countries knew of the labor submission process, only in El Salvador did  these officials express an understanding of how DOL evaluates a  submission and conducts its fact-finding investigations. For example, the  Guatemalan Ministry of Labor officials we interviewed could not provide  information about how the process works or describe the criteria DOL  uses to evaluate a submission’s merits. The Ministry of Manpower  officials whom we interviewed in Oman did not understand the purpose of  the submission process or how submissions could be filed.
In addition, U.S. agencies have made minimal efforts to publicize the  process for nongovernment stakeholders, who are most likely to file  submissions. Federal standards for internal control pertaining to  information and communication call for agencies to have relevant,  reliable, and timely communications relating to internal as well as external  events, to ensure control of their operations. According to DOL officials,  DOL relies exclusively on its website and its 2006 Federal Register notice  to inform the public about the process. Moreover, U.S. officials whom  we interviewed in the countries we visited indicated that they do not  advertise the existence of the submission process. Without additional  efforts to inform nongovernment stakeholders in FTA partner countries  about the DOL labor submission process, U.S. agencies are limited in  their ability to use the submission process as a means of holding FTA  partners accountable for fulfilling their labor commitments.
section_title: Some Stakeholders Expressed Concern about Delays in Resolving Labor Submissions
paragraphs: Several stakeholders we spoke with expressed concerns about delays in  U.S. agencies’ efforts to resolve the matters raised in the Guatemala and  Honduras submissions. Because of the complexity of these matters,  resolving them has proven difficult and time-consuming, according to  USTR. Moreover, according to USTR, no process or time frames for U.S.  agencies’ efforts to engage diplomatically with FTA partners to resolve  labor matters related to DOL submission reports are outlined in any active  FTA that had entered into force or in U.S. implementing guidance.
According to USTR and DOL, they engage with FTA partners through  informal and formal communication to resolve any FTA concerns. For  example, according to a USTR official, USTR has informally engaged with  FTA partners—through labor affairs council discussions, telephone  conversations, and e-mail exchanges—for an average of 6 months  regarding concerns raised in a submission before requesting formal  consultations with the partner government. If an FTA partner does not  address USTR’s and DOL’s labor concerns or is unwilling to informally  engage, USTR and DOL may request formal consultations under the  FTA’s labor chapter. USTR officials stated that an FTA partner’s  willingness to engage determines in part how quickly potential labor  violations are addressed. According to USTR officials, some FTA partners  are willing to engage informally to resolve labor violations, while other  partners engage only after USTR and DOL have jointly requested formal  consultations under the FTA’s labor chapter.
Examples of stakeholders’ concerns include the following.
AFL-CIO representatives in Washington, D.C., who were involved with  the Honduras and Guatemala submissions expressed appreciation of  DOL’s care in investigating cases and were eager to provide requisite  evidence. However, they expressed disappointment that both cases  have taken longer than they anticipated, stating that justice delayed  can mean justice denied when workers’ livelihoods are at stake.
A union representative in Guatemala expressed disappointment that 6  years after the submission was filed, it had not been resolved. He also  said that the steps outlined in the enforcement plan were mainly  administrative and did not address all complaints detailed in the  submission. As a result, according to the union representative, the  conditions of workers identified in the submission have not improved.
Four government officials from CAFTA-DR partner countries whom  we interviewed in Washington, D.C., described DOL’s submission  process as lacking fairness and transparency. According to these  representatives, DOL does not give partner governments clear  information about next steps or access to evidence supporting the  submissions and deprives the countries of the opportunity to respond  to allegations presented by any member of the public. The CAFTA- DR representatives added that in their opinion, DOL conducts the  submission process in an adversarial manner and that the process  therefore does not function as a mechanism for addressing concerns  on a cooperative basis. The representatives noted that this, in turn,  can delay or complicate resolution of problems.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Provide Limited Monitoring, Enforcement, and Reporting on FTA Labor Provisions
paragraphs: Since 2009, USTR and DOL, with State’s assistance, have taken steps  intended to strengthen monitoring and enforcement of FTA partners’  compliance with FTA labor provisions, but their monitoring and  enforcement remain limited. After USTR announced in July 2009 that  the agencies would take a more proactive, interagency approach to  monitoring and enforcing FTA labor provisions, USTR and DOL  developed mechanisms to track labor conditions and practices in priority  trade partner countries. They also took some proactive monitoring steps  with several FTA partners. However, although they jointly address labor  submissions and work together to engage with partner countries  regarding labor concerns, USTR and DOL have not established a  coordinated strategic approach to systematically assess and address  other possible inconsistencies with the FTA labor provisions, such as  concerns that DOL identifies in internal management reports. The lack of  such an approach may be inconsistent with USTR’s 2009 announcement  as well as with best practices for interagency collaboration. Agency  officials cited limited funding and staffing as constraints on their ability to  monitor and enforce FTA labor provisions. USTR’s, DOL’s, and State’s  annual reports to Congress provide information about labor conditions in  partner countries. However, reflecting in part USTR’s and DOL’s limited  monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, the reports generally  do not detail concerns about the implementation of FTA labor provisions  by partner countries that have not been the subject of labor submissions.  .
subsections: section_title: USTR and DOL Pledged in 2009 to Strengthen Monitoring and Enforcement of FTA Labor Provisions
paragraphs: In 2009, USTR made a public statement pledging to address weaknesses  in monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions such as those we  identified in our July 2009 report. In its statement, USTR—which has  principal responsibility for monitoring and enforcing statutory trade  agreements—publicly announced its intention to adopt a proactive,  interagency approach to monitoring and enforcing FTA labor provisions in  cooperation with DOL and State. According to USTR’s announcement,  for example, the agencies would no longer enforce labor obligations only  in response to complaints, would hold trading partners to their obligations  on labor standards, and would work in close partnership to immediately  identify and investigate labor violations. In addition, USTR’s July 2009  announcement stated that the agencies would deploy resources more  effectively to identify and solve problems at the source and would jointly  engage with governments of countries that violate the rules, to quickly  restore workers’ rights, assist partner countries to find a way to fix  identified labor problems, and pursue legal remedies when other options  are closed.
A broad range of activities underpins federal monitoring and enforcement  efforts. For the purposes of this report, “monitoring” refers to federal  activities that are undertaken to identify instances where foreign laws,  regulations, and practices may be inconsistent with trade agreement  provisions; “enforcement” refers to actions taken by USTR to secure  foreign compliance with trade agreements, which can include initiating  dispute settlement procedures that certain trade agreements provide.  When agencies identify possible inconsistencies with FTA provisions,  agencies take a variety of actions to encourage and obtain foreign  compliance with trade agreements. As we previously reported, according  to records and staff at USTR and other agencies, monitoring and  enforcement of trade agreements typically involves several key steps:  identifying compliance problems, setting priorities, gathering and  analyzing information, developing and implementing responses, taking  actions to enforce agreements, and coordinating with other agencies.Systematic implementation of these key steps is necessary to ensure that  the agencies effectively and efficiently accomplish their objective and help  ensure that management's directives are carried out.
In our July 2009 report, we found that U.S. agencies had not proactively  monitored FTA partners’ compliance with labor commitments and did not  consider that they were required to do so.  Moreover, U.S. interaction  with partners regarding labor issues after FTAs entered into force had  been limited, usually in part because of the low priority attached to this  function. Further, we found that U.S. agencies generally gave attention to  problematic labor situations in certain FTA partners’ export sectors only  after media exposure of the situations.
section_title: USTR and DOL Track Partner Countries’ Labor Conditions but Do Not Systematically Monitor and Enforce Compliance with FTA Labor Provisions
paragraphs: GAO/NSIAD-00-76. To identify these five steps, we reviewed agency records and  GAO-09-439. engaged in discussions with partner countries, gathering information  about labor conditions in the countries and responding to FTA labor  concerns. In doing so, the agencies have addressed some of the typical  key elements of monitoring and enforcement that we previously identified,  such as gathering and analyzing information and setting priorities.  However, the agencies’ approach for countries other than Jordan,  Panama, and, to some extent, Colombia and Peru generally does not  incorporate other key elements, such as identifying compliance problems,  developing and implementing responses, and taking enforcement actions.
In October 2012, USTR established the Trade Policy Staff Committee  (TPSC) Subcommittee on Labor Monitoring and Enforcement to focus on  monitoring and enforcing labor provisions in partner countries, with  members from various agencies, including DOL and State. USTR  charged the subcommittee with monitoring and enforcing labor issues in  20 FTA partner countries as well as 146 countries that participate in U.S.  trade preference programs. According to a USTR document, the  subcommittee participates in efforts to enforce labor obligations, such as  through submission reviews, consultation, and dispute settlement under  FTAs. However, according to DOL and State staff who have participated  in the Subcommittee on Labor Monitoring and Enforcement, the  subcommittee’s meetings generally serve as an information-sharing  mechanism rather than a monitoring and enforcement mechanism.  State participants described the subcommittee as an interagency process  for reviewing and discussing labor conditions and assessing risks in trade  partner countries, including FTA and trade preference program partners.  State added that although this process does not entail a regular, detailed  review of each FTA partner country’s compliance with labor obligations, it  facilitates discussion of concerns and development of next steps to  address these concerns based on input from each agency. A USTR  official stated that when the subcommittee met in October 2012 and  February 2013, it decided that an emphasis on overseeing labor  conditions in parts of Africa and Haiti was needed and that monitoring of  FTA labor provisions’ implementation would be based mainly on  addressing DOL labor submissions. USTR officials noted that information  sharing is a key part of its process to assess labor conditions in FTA  partner countries relative to their commitments and to identify matters that  are appropriate for further action.
According to a USTR official, work by the subcommittee and ad hoc  interagency country teams has led to increased actions and engagement  in countries such as Jordan, Panama, Peru, and Morocco, where,  according to USTR, it has conducted, or expects to conduct, high-level  labor meetings and monitoring trips in 2014.  Further, according to USTR  officials, USTR has used input from the subcommittee to develop a matrix  to more comprehensively track monitoring activities and technical  capacity-building assistance across FTA partner countries. USTR officials  indicated that this tool has served as a point of departure for soliciting the  subcommittee’s input on priorities and coordination of future activities. In  addition, according to USTR officials, USTR regularly coordinates and  communicates with other agencies, industry, labor unions, the ILO and  other external stakeholders to identify possible inconsistencies with the  labor provisions of trade agreements.
USTR officials said that the agencies routinely address labor issues  identified in the subcommittee or by other stakeholders through bilateral  consultations and formally established FTA mechanisms, such as the  labor affairs councils established by most FTAs and the FTA free trade  commissions, which are the main forums for bilateral dialogue about FTA  implementation for each FTA. USTR has publicly reported on such  meetings, as we recommended in 2009. However, the labor affairs  councils for most FTAs have in most cases met only once and in two  cases have not met at all since the FTAs entered into force.the FTA free trade commissions’ discussions reportedly do not address  labor issues in depth. For example, officials from the Ministry of Labor in  Peru indicated that in the last free trade commission meeting they  attended, labor issues were not substantively addressed; instead  members of the commission agreed that a meeting on the topic could be  held later in the year.
USTR officials stated that monitoring and enforcement covers a large  spectrum of activities and that in some cases USTR has taken steps to  resolve issues in countries where submissions have not been filed. For  example, according to USTR officials, USTR and DOL negotiated an  implementation plan in 2012 to address concerns regarding foreign  workers in Jordan’s garment sector and have continued to monitor  Jordan’s implementation of its FTA labor commitments. USTR officials  also cited as examples of proactive monitoring and enforcement USTR’s  engagement with Colombia regarding the Action Plan, cooperation with  Panama in passing administrative and legal changes to address labor  concerns as part of the FTA ratification process in 2011, and discussions  with Peru regarding commitments that the government made in 2007 to  improve respect of labor rights for temporary and subcontracted workers.
Our analysis shows that in Jordan and Panama, USTR’s and DOL’s  activities have addressed the typical key elements of monitoring and  enforcement. Regarding Jordan, USTR documents indicate that USTR  and DOL have addressed all key elements of monitoring and  enforcement, such as by putting in place a concrete plan to fix an  identified problem and taking steps to assure that the plan is  implemented. Regarding Panama, USTR documents show that the  agencies took steps to assure that Panama met its commitments both  before and after the FTA entered into effect in 2012 and have been  pursuing steps, such as holding several recent meetings, that may help in  resolving outstanding concerns about implementation of FTA labor  provisions.
However, while USTR’s and DOL’s reported monitoring activities in  Colombia and Peru can assist the countries to be better positioned to  meet their FTA labor commitments and help to better inform USTR of  labor concerns in these countries, the evidence that we examined does  not demonstrate systematic implementation of the typical key elements  for monitoring and enforcement of labor provisions.
Colombia. Documentation that USTR and DOL provided, as well as  evidence that we gathered in Colombia and in interviews with agency  officials, indicates that the agencies took several of the key steps of  monitoring and enforcement. For example, a report that USTR and  DOL jointly prepared in 2014 showed that the agencies have been  gathering and analyzing information, setting priorities, assessing  implementation, and identifying compliance problems. However, we  did not see evidence that a current plan is in place to address the  outstanding concerns that USTR and DOL have identified.
Peru. Documentation that USTR and DOL provided demonstrates a  systematic approach to some, but not all, of the monitoring and  enforcement steps that we identified. Specifically, both agencies have  engaged to some extent with Peru regarding labor matters in the 5  years since the Peru FTA went into effect. The agencies’  documentation shows that at least some of their efforts to gather and  analyze information regarding Peru relate to verifying the  government’s implementation and enforcement of previous reforms,  such as reforms of its labor inspection regime and of its legal  framework for temporary employment and subcontracting. USTR and  DOL documents also show that the agencies have identified several  possible compliance concerns and have engaged with the  government by scheduling meetings and asking questions. However,  we did not see evidence of a plan to resolve outstanding U.S.  concerns. Further, in July 2014, Peru announced that it had enacted  legal changes that rolled back previously implemented improvements  in its labor laws in areas such as health and safety protection for  workers, to improve the business climate and attract investment.
To strengthen its monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, in  2012, DOL established the Monitoring and Enforcement of Trade  Agreements Division within the Bureau of International Labor Affairs’  Office of Trade and Labor Affairs. The division’s objectives are to  ensure that partner governments (1) effectively enforce their labor laws  and implement policies that protect worker rights; (2) understand their  commitments under the FTA labor chapters; and (3) revise or adopt laws,  regulations, and policies consistent with international labor standards.  The division mainly monitors implementation of FTA labor provisions  through its review of FTA labor submissions and through the use of  internal documents called management reports, according to DOL  officials. However, DOL uses management reports to identify labor  concerns rather than to fully assess consistency with FTA labor  provisions.
FTA labor submissions. DOL’s review of the five FTA labor  submissions—for Bahrain, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala,  Honduras, and Peru—that it has accepted since 2008 have led to  recommendations in three of its submission reports that the partners  address alleged violations of FTA labor provisions. According to  USTR officials, labor submissions are a central component of the  FTAs’ framework for monitoring and enforcement of labor obligations  and USTR and DOL invest extensive time and resources in  addressing submissions. For the Bahrain and Guatemala  submissions, DOL, with USTR, formally requested labor consultations  under the FTAs’ labor chapters to address the concerns raised in the  submissions. In Guatemala’s case, after consultations failed to  address the concerns, the U.S. government invoked dispute  settlement proceedings; during these proceedings, the two  governments negotiated the Enforcement Plan, outlining steps that  Guatemala agreed to take. (See app. III for a discussion of DOL’s  monitoring of Guatemala’s implementation of the Enforcement Plan.)
Internal management reports. In 2012, according to DOL staff, DOL  began consistently monitoring FTA-related labor issues in 13 FTA  partner countries. The management reports provide, among other  information, a synopsis of labor conditions in partner countries based  on sources such as State, ILO, the International Trade Union  Confederation, local stakeholders, and the press. The reports include  updated contact information for each partner and identify labor  conditions or practices—for example, related to freedom of  association and collective bargaining—that may be inconsistent with  the FTA labor provisions. They also outline steps that DOL staff  propose to take to address any identified concerns, subject to  approval and resource availability. According to DOL officials, DOL  uses the management reports to identify labor concerns, rather than  potential FTA violations for enforcement purposes, and to facilitate  engagement on technical assistance projects with FTA partner  countries. DOL officials noted that claiming and proving a violation of  FTA labor provisions would be very costly and legally complicated.  The officials explained that when a management report identifies labor  concerns, DOL may request formal or informal consultations with the  partner country’s ministry of labor to discuss these concerns and will  attempt to cooperatively address them. The officials also noted that a  persistent condition may result in a submission from a stakeholder.
section_title: USTR and DOL Lack a Coordinated Strategic Approach to Address Identified Labor Issues
paragraphs: USTR and DOL work together on an ad hoc basis to address labor  concerns identified in submissions and to engage with partner countries  regarding labor matters. However, the agencies have not developed a  coordinated strategic approach to systematically assess and address  other possible inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions, such as the  issues that DOL’s management reports identify, in other partner  countries. This lack of a joint approach may be inconsistent with USTR’s  2009 statement that the agencies would work in close partnership to  immediately identify and investigate labor violations.
Further, while the agencies take steps such as gathering facts from  credible and reliable sources and prioritizing their monitoring of the  partner countries, they have not jointly operationalized other key steps  that we previously identified as typical for monitoring and enforcement of  trade agreements. For example, although DOL’s management reports are  its primary means, other than submissions, of monitoring and identifying  issues that may be inconsistent with FTA labor provisions, the agencies  have not established a coordinated strategic approach to identify and  carry out steps necessary to address issues identified in the reports.  According to DOL, the management reports are available to USTR and  State and the three agencies routinely discuss the reports’ contents.  USTR confirmed that DOL shares information from the reports with the  Subcommittee on Labor Monitoring and Enforcement for discussion and  consideration. However, USTR officials noted that USTR regards the  management reports as one of multiple information sources that it  considers before deciding to engage with a country about a labor  concern, rather than as an indicator of a need to engage with the country.  USTR officials also noted that USTR views the management reports as a  new internal DOL tool and is assessing how best to use these reports in  the interagency process.
Moreover, USTR, DOL, and State have differing perspectives on how to  monitor and enforce FTA labor provisions, according to agency officials.  According to a USTR official, each agency approaches monitoring and  enforcement in relation to its mission, and as a result, some of the 13  countries that DOL has identified internally as priorities differ from  countries that USTR has identified as priorities in the context of the FTAs.  The USTR official stated that USTR must assess whether a labor issue  constitutes a breach of obligations set forth in the relevant FTA before it  pursues dispute settlement, whereas DOL and State—as observers of  labor conditions and human rights, respectively—approach labor issues  more strictly as labor rights concerns. According to a State official, USTR  prefers to address identified partner countries’ labor issues without the  intent to invoke the FTA.
Our prior work identifying best practices for interagency collaboration has  shown that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts  by engaging in eight practices. For example, to achieve a common  outcome, collaborating agencies need to, among other things, not only  define and articulate the outcome but also establish strategies that work  in concert with their partners’ or are joint in nature. Such strategies help in  aligning the partner agencies’ activities, core processes, and resources to  accomplish the common outcome.
section_title: U.S. Agencies Focus Limited Monitoring and Enforcement Resources on a Few Priority Countries
paragraphs: Agency officials cited limited staffing and resources as constraints on their  ability to proactively monitor and enforce implementation of FTA labor  provisions as the number of FTAs increases, leading the agencies to  focus most of their efforts in a few priority countries. The agencies  described enforcement activities as particularly resource intensive. DOL  officials told us that because they had to focus much of their available  resources on enforcing the Colombia Labor Action Plan and the  Guatemala Enforcement Plan, their ability to monitor and enforce FTA  partners’ compliance with their FTAs’ labor provisions in the last year was  limited. Given the staffing and resource constraints that USTR, DOL, and  State officials cited, effective interagency collaboration—including joint  strategies that assist in aligning partner agencies’ activities, core  processes, and resources to more effectively accomplish the common  outcome—is essential to maximize the agencies’ ability to monitor and  enforce compliance with these provisions.
USTR. Staffing and funding constraints have, at times, limited the office’s  engagement with FTA partner countries regarding labor matters,  according to USTR officials. Notably, according to the officials, recent  sequestration-related cuts at USTR sharply limited travel. The officials  told us that USTR’s Office of Labor Affairs has four staff members—an  Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Labor, two Deputy Assistant U.S.  Trade Representatives for Labor, and the Director for Labor Affairs— whose responsibilities include, among others, negotiating labor provisions  in new agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, overseeing  labor matters for 20 FTA partner countries and 120 trade preference  countries, and engaging with countries to address labor complaints.  According to USTR officials, although the Office of Labor Affairs staff has  doubled from two to four since 2008, the number of trade partner  countries for which they are responsible has increased from 14 to 20.  USTR staff stated that because so few staff are available, they cannot  engage with partner countries regarding every labor issue identified and  must address such issues in cooperation with other agencies. USTR staff  also noted that they depend on DOL and State for day-to-day monitoring  of labor conditions in partner countries.
DOL. Resource constraints limit DOL’s ability to monitor implementation  of FTA labor provisions except in partner countries that DOL has  identified as priorities, such as countries cited in labor submissions,  according to DOL officials. DOL reported that in fiscal years 2013 and  2014, the Monitoring and Enforcement of Trade Agreements Division had  five to eight full-time staff, with primary responsibilities that include  monitoring labor conditions in 20 FTA partners and addressing and  following up on labor submissions—for example, assessing  implementation of submission report recommendations and engaging in  consultations with the FTA partner. DOL officials stated that over the past  year, the division’s staff spent 80 percent of their work hours monitoring  implementation of the Guatemala Enforcement Plan; following up on  activities initiated under the Colombia Labor Action Plan; and addressing  labor submissions for Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Bahrain, and   The employees’ remaining work hours were available to  Mexico.monitor and engage with the other 14 FTA partner countries. DOL  officials expressed concern that challenges related to resource limitations  will grow as the number of FTAs increases. For example, according to  DOL and State officials, Vietnam is among the countries participating in  the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations with a poor record of protecting  labor rights.
State. State has limited resources available to support USTR’s and  DOL’s monitoring of FTA labor provisions, according to State officials.  State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)  coordinates State’s in-country labor officers or labor reporting officers,  who carry out regular monitoring and reporting and day-to-day interaction  with foreign governments on labor matters. However, these staff are not  responsible for monitoring implementation of labor provisions in the FTAs.  State informs USTR and DOL about labor concerns identified in FTA  partner countries, through reporting cables and other means, and  supports them in investigating labor submissions and addressing related  recommendations. DRL has seven staff at State’s headquarters in  Washington, D.C., one of whom focuses on trade-related issues, who are  supported by labor affairs officers and labor reporting officers at the  embassies in each of the 20 FTA partner countries. State officials  explained that each of these labor affairs officers and labor reporting  officers has other responsibilities. Overall, the amount of time that these  officers dedicated to labor issues varied from 5 percent (in Australia) to 75  percent (in Mexico).
section_title: U.S. Agencies’ Annual Reports Address FTA Partners’ Labor Conditions to an Extent
paragraphs: USTR, DOL, and State provide required annual reports to Congress that  contain some information about labor conditions in FTA partner countries.  However, the annual reports generally do not detail concerns about the  implementation of FTA labor provisions by partner countries that have not  been the subject of labor submissions, in part reflecting the agencies’  limited monitoring and enforcement of the provisions.statutory responsibility to report to Congress about trade agreement  programs on an annual basis. According to DOL and State, they do not  have such a responsibility, although some of their required reports include  related information.
USTR. Each year, USTR provides Congress with the current Trade Policy  Agenda for the current year, as well as the Annual Report of the  President of the United States on the Trade Agreement Programs. The  agenda and the annual report include information about trade policy  priorities and actions taken to implement FTAs. For example, the 2014  agenda indicates, among other things, that USTR will seek to ensure that  trade partners meet their obligations related to labor rights, will focus on  implementation of FTAs, and will work with key partner countries to  address specific labor issues. The 2013 annual report describes, among  other things, the status of the labor submissions regarding Bahrain,  Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras and USTR’s efforts to  address the concerns that the submissions identify; in some cases,  possible inconsistencies with the FTA may be discussed. However, the  annual report generally does not detail concerns about the  implementation of FTA labor provisions by partner countries that have not  been the subject of labor submissions, reflecting in part USTR’s and  DOL’s limited monitoring and enforcement of these provisions. Including  appropriate information resulting from more extensive monitoring and  enforcement could help inform Congress and other U.S. stakeholders  about the extent to which trade partners are fulfilling their FTA labor  commitments.
DOL. DOL is required to report to Congress every 2 years regarding labor  issues related to CAFTA-DR but is not required to report on the  implementation of labor provisions in other FTAs. For CAFTA-DR, DOL is  required to submit a biennial report to Congress on the progress made by  the CAFTA-DR partner countries in implementing the labor chapter  provisions and labor cooperation and capacity-building activities. DOL’s  2011 report on CAFTA-DR summarizes the progress made by each  CAFTA-DR partner country in implementing these provisions and  activities, although the report generally does not detail concerns about the  implementation of CAFTA-DR labor provisions.
State. Every year, State provides Congress with the annual Country  Reports on Human Rights Practices, which covers all countries receiving  assistance and all United Nations member states, including all U.S. FTA  partners. Each of the country reports includes a section on labor issues,  covering topics such as internationally recognized individual, civil,  political, and worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights and other international agreements. In addition, most of  the country reports for FTA partner countries that we reviewed include  information about unfavorable conditions faced by workers and any  challenges to the partner countries’ implementation of their labor laws.  The reports generally do not—and, according to State, are not intended  to—detail concerns about the implementation of FTA labor provisions.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The United States’ recent FTAs have served as means of securing  commitments from trade partners to uphold and protect internationally  recognized labor rights. Although the FTA partners we selected for our  review have made some progress, with U.S. assistance, in implementing  their FTA labor commitments, enforcement weaknesses and problematic  labor conditions persist. In addition, nongovernment stakeholders we  interviewed in partner countries had little or no awareness of the labor  submission process that DOL established to allow such stakeholders to  register concerns about FTA partners’ labor practices. Further, DOL’s  extensions of its 6-month submission review time frame by an average of  nine months per submission has shown the time frame to be unrealistic.  Moreover, U.S. agencies’ work with the partners to resolve these  concerns has in some cases been very time consuming. For example, 6  years after DOL received the Guatemala labor submission, the  submission remains open, and according to U.S. agencies, Guatemala  has not fully addressed the weaknesses in its labor law enforcement or  the resulting hardships on workers.
Further, although USTR and DOL jointly pledged in 2009 to adopt a more  assertive, interagency approach to monitoring and enforcing FTA labor  provisions, in practice the agencies systematically investigate possible  inconsistencies with these provisions primarily in response to labor  submissions. In addition, despite ongoing interaction between USTR and  DOL—for example, in addressing submissions—they have not developed  a strategic approach to jointly set priorities and coordinate efforts to  respond to labor concerns such as those identified in the DOL  management reports. Without such strategic coordination, and given  constraints on resources, both agencies have focused their monitoring  and enforcement activities, apart from addressing labor submissions, on a  few priority countries. As a result, consistency with FTA labor provisions  in most partner countries is generally not monitored and enforced  systematically. Moreover, USTR may be limited in its ability to report to  Congress regarding concerns about FTA partners’ implementation of their  respective FTA labor commitments.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the capacity of the U.S. government to monitor and enforce  FTA partners’ compliance with mutually agreed FTA labor provisions, we  are making four recommendations to the U.S. Trade Representative and  the Secretary of Labor.
We recommend that DOL reevaluate and adjust, if necessary, its FTA  labor submission review time frame to ensure that it more accurately  reflects the time required to thoroughly investigate and to report on  most labor submissions.
We recommend that DOL take steps to better inform stakeholders in  FTA partner countries about its FTA labor submission process.
We recommend that USTR and DOL, in cooperation with State,  establish a coordinated strategic approach to monitoring and  enforcing FTA labor provisions, to ensure that they systematically  assess the consistency of priority FTA partner countries’ laws,  regulations, and practices with trade agreement labor provisions and  address any identified concerns.
We recommend that USTR ensure that the Annual Report of the  President of the United States on the Trade Agreement Programs,  which USTR provides each year to Congress, includes results of  USTR’s and DOL’s efforts to proactively monitor partner countries’  compliance with FTA labor provisions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our report to USTR, DOL, State, and USAID.  USTR and DOL provided written comments, which are reproduced in  appendixes V and VI, respectively. USTR, DOL, and State also provided  extensive technical comments, which we incorporated or addressed as  appropriate. USAID did not provide comments.
In their written comments, USTR and DOL expressed general agreement  with our recommendations. USTR wrote that it embraced the  recommendation to improve coordination with the Departments of Labor  and State, to identify and address areas of concern, and to ensure that its  reporting to Congress effectively reflects the results of these efforts. DOL  committed to reevaluate its internal submission review process, in  consultation with USTR and State, to determine whether internal  adjustments may be necessary. DOL also said that it will evaluate  additional available actions to expand its ability to inform stakeholders in  FTA partner countries about the FTA labor submission process. Finally,  DOL said that it will evaluate additional options to increase its proactive  monitoring and enforcement of labor provisions in FTAs and its  coordination with USTR and State on such issues.
Nevertheless, USTR and DOL took issue with our findings that the  agencies do not systematically monitor and enforce labor provisions for  all FTA partners and lack a coordinated strategic approach to monitoring  and enforcement. Although we made some adjustments in response to  new information that USTR and DOL provided with their comments, we  maintain that, in general, the two agencies have not systematically  implemented all key elements of monitoring and enforcement with regard  to FTA labor provisions. (See app. V for our full response to USTR’s  written comments and descriptions of our adjustments to the report in  response.) We acknowledge that USTR, DOL, and State generally  collaborate in engaging with partner countries on labor issues and in  addressing submissions. However, the evidence that we reviewed, such  as agendas for interagency meetings and our interviews with USTR and  DOL staff, did not show that the agencies have developed a coordinated,  strategic approach to systematically address possible inconsistencies  with FTA labor provisions in most partner countries that have not been  the subject of labor submissions. For example, we did not see evidence  of a coordinated approach to address issues such as those identified by  USTR in the partner countries it designates as high risk or that DOL  identifies in its management reports.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the content of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the U.S. Trade  Representative, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of State, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines (1) steps that selected partner countries have taken,  and U.S. assistance they have received, to implement free trade  agreement (FTA) labor provisions and other labor initiatives and the  reported results of such steps; (2) complaints—known as submissions— about possible violations of FTA labor provisions that DOL has accepted  and any problems related to the submission process; and (3) the extent to  which the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Department of  Labor (DOL), and Department of State (State) monitor and enforce  partner countries’ implementation of FTA labor provisions and report  results to Congress. In addition, appendix II describes reported violence  against labor unionists in selected FTA partner countries as well as steps  that the countries have taken to address such occurrences. Appendix III  describes U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor implementation of other labor  initiatives. Appendix IV describes the status of labor submissions received  by the Department of Labor.
We chose to concentrate our review on four FTAs and five partners to  these FTAs, so that we could examine the unique set of circumstances  for FTA partner countries with some specificity. The FTAs and partner  countries on which we chose to focus—the Dominican Republic-Central  America-United States (CAFTA-DR), among whose six partner countries  we selected El Salvador and Guatemala; the Colombia FTA; the Oman  FTA; and the Peru FTA—are FTAs that contain labor provisions and  countries with regional dispersion across Central America, South  America, and the Middle East. We also selected CAFTA-DR because of  the CAFTA-DR White Paper labor initiatives, and we selected El Salvador  and Guatemala among CAFTA-DR countries because of the extent of  U.S. assistance for labor programs and, in Guatemala’s case, the FTA- related Enforcement Plan. In addition, we selected the Colombia FTA  because of the Labor Action Plan, and we chose the Colombia and Peru  FTAs because they contain language echoing the Bipartisan Trade  Agreement of May 10, 2007, popularly known as the May 10th  Agreement. However, the results of our review of these selected FTAs  and partner countries cannot be generalized to all FTAs and partner  countries.
In gathering information for each of our objectives, we engaged in three  types of activities:
We obtained information and perspectives from U.S. government,  foreign government, nongovernmental organization (NGO), labor  union, and private sector officials; stakeholders such as umbrella  business associations; and experts.
We obtained information and analysis from legal and secondary  literature sources.
We obtained information through visits to partner countries.
During our visits to Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Oman, and Peru,  we met with U.S. officials; foreign government officials responsible for the  implementation of labor provisions of the FTAs and other labor initiatives;  umbrella business groups, such as chambers of commerce; officials of  international organizations such as the International Labour Organization  (ILO), trade unions, NGOs, and other subject matter experts. Additionally,  we visited Costa Rica to meet with ILO officials in their Central America  regional office, in San Jose. The views expressed by these officials and  organizations cannot be generalized to all officials or organizations  knowledgeable about labor provisions in the selected FTAs.
subsections: section_title: Objective 1: Examine Steps That Selected Partner Countries Have Taken, and U.S. Assistance They Have Received, to Implement FTA Labor Provisions and Other Labor Initiatives and the Reported Results of Such Steps
paragraphs: To examine the steps that the selected FTA partner countries have taken  to implement labor protection commitments under the respective  agreements and other labor initiatives in the context of the respective  FTAs, as well as the reported results of these steps, we obtained,  reviewed, and analyzed documents from a variety of sources, including  the four selected FTAs and their associated labor annexes as well as the  CAFTA-DR White Paper and the Colombia Labor Action Plan. For this  analysis, we included steps taken by partner countries, beginning with  FTA negotiations for each FTA through May 2014. We also reviewed  congressionally mandated reports, such as State’s Country Reports on  Human Rights Practices (Human Rights Reports), of which the 2013  reports were the latest available; USTR’s annual trade agenda and trade  report; and DOL’s biennial Progress in Implementing Chapter 16 (Labor)  and Capacity Building under the Dominican Republic-Central America- United States Free Trade Agreement. In addition, we reviewed reports  submitted to Congress in conjunction with FTA implementing legislation,  such as DOL’s Labor Rights Reports for each of our selected FTAs.
Additionally, we interviewed officials from DOL’s International Labor  Affairs Bureau and the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs; USTR’s Labor  Affairs office; and State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and  Labor. We also interviewed State desk officers responsible for selected  partner countries and labor, political, and economic officers at U.S.  embassies. In each of the selected countries, except Colombia, we  interviewed officials from the relevant ministries, including the ministry of  labor. (Colombia’s Ministry of Labor chose to provide written responses to  our questions.) We did not independently identify or evaluate FTA partner  countries’ enforcement or compliance with laws and procedures but  rather relied on evidence obtained from U.S. and partner government as  well as stakeholder sources. Because of the ILO’s role in interpreting,  assessing, and improving signatories’ compliance with ILO Conventions  and Fundamental Principles, we conducted a series of meetings at the  ILO in Geneva as well as with umbrella organizations participating in the  ILO’s tripartite (government-business-labor) governance structure.
To examine U.S. funding for labor-related assistance projects, we  collected data on such funding obligations—from the date when Congress  passed the respective FTA implementing legislation through 2013—from  relevant officials at State, DOL, and USAID and publicly available data on  trade-related labor assistance from USAID’s Trade Capacity Building  Database. We assessed the reliability of the data by (1) interviewing  agency officials knowledgeable about the data sources and (2) tracing the  data to source documents. We determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of describing U.S. assistance for labor provisions  in FTA countries.
In addition, to identify any changes in levels of reported violence against  workers exercising labor rights in the selected countries and the partner  governments’ responses (see app. II), we obtained, reviewed, and  analyzed documents from USTR, DOL, and State, such as State’s  Human Rights Reports and DOL’s Labor Rights Reports. During our  fieldwork in each selected country, we interviewed U.S. and foreign  government officials, labor unions, and NGOs to learn of any violence  against unionists. Of the countries we selected for review, violence  against unionists was reported only in Colombia and Guatemala. During  our fieldwork in Colombia, we interviewed and obtained information from  entities responsible for collecting and reporting data on violence against  unionists, including the Colombian Prosecutor General’s office; ENS  (Escuela Nacional Sindical)—a labor rights NGO—and State’s Human  Rights and Labor officers at the U.S. embassy in Bogota. We assessed  the reliability of ENS’s and the Colombian Prosecutor General’s data by  (1) interviewing officials from each entity about their criteria and data  collection methodology for determining whether a victim’s union activity  was a motive in the killing and (2) interviewing State’s Human Rights and  Labor officers, who report ENS and Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s  data in the annual Human Rights Report for Colombia. We determined  the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing reported  violence against unionists in Colombia. In Guatemala, we interviewed,  and obtained information from, the Guatemalan Prosecutor General’s  Office, which is responsible for prosecuting crimes against unionists, and  the Guatemalan Ministry of the Interior, which investigates crimes against  unionists at the direction of the Prosecutor General’s Office. Because  Guatemala did not collect data on violence against unionists, we did not  review such data on homicide rates over time. We also interviewed  State’s political officer responsible for labor affairs at its embassy in  Guatemala City, labor unions, and NGO officials. We reviewed ILO  reports and discussed steps by Colombia and Guatemala to address  violence with ILO officials. Our analysis was based on reputable  secondary sources. We did not make any independent determination  regarding the merit of any evidence of violence against unionists.
section_title: Objective 2: Examine Submissions about Possible Violations of FTA Labor Provisions That DOL Has Accepted and Any Problems Related to the Submission Process
paragraphs: To examine labor submissions that have been filed under FTA  agreements and any problems related to the submission process, we  obtained, reviewed, and analyzed documents, including each labor  submission filed with DOL. We interviewed officials from DOL’s Office of  Trade and Labor Affairs—the office responsible for investigating and  reporting on submissions—as well as USTR and State officials who  review DOL’s reports and are involved in following up with FTA partner  countries, if needed. During our fieldwork, we interviewed union and NGO  representatives involved in filing submissions, as well as relevant  government ministries, including the Ministries of Labor in Peru and  Guatemala.
section_title: Objective 3: Examine the Extent to Which USTR, DOL, and State Monitor and Enforce Partner Countries’ Implementation of FTA Labor Provisions and Report Results to Congress
paragraphs: To examine the extent to which USTR, DOL, and State monitor and  enforce implementation of FTA labor provisions and associated  commitments (see app. III) and report results to Congress, we requested,  reviewed, and analyzed documents from each agency. These documents  included strategic plans and documents reflecting monitoring activities,  such as DOL’s management reports for 13 selected FTA partner  countries, State cables, and USTR monitoring documents. In addition, we  interviewed selected members of the USTR-chaired Trade Policy Staff  Committee and its subcommittee on FTA labor monitoring and  enforcement. To examine the resources that USTR, DOL, and State  dedicate to monitoring labor provisions in FTAs, we obtained and  analyzed data on staffing and other resources such as travel. We  interviewed officials from DOL’s International Labor Affairs Bureau and its  Office of Trade and Labor Affairs; USTR; and State’s Bureau of  Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, as well as State’s in-country  labor, labor reporting, political, and economic officers at U.S. embassies  during our fieldwork. In addition, during our fieldwork, we interviewed  officials from the partner countries’ various ministries, including the  ministries of labor, as well as representatives from labor unions and NGO  officials implementing programs funded by U.S. agencies. To determine  whether USTR, DOL, and State report the results of their monitoring  activities to Congress, we reviewed and analyzed the agencies’ reports,  such as USTR’s Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report (2009 to 2013),  DOL Annual Performance Reports (2010 to 2013), and State’s Human  Rights Reports (2009 to 2013).
We conducted this performance audit work from May 2013 to November  2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala
subsections: section_title: Colombia
subsections: section_title: Violence and Threats of Violence against Unionists, Undermining Freedom of Association, Have Been Reported in Colombia
paragraphs: U.S. and Colombian officials and representatives of unions,  nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and private sector groups we met  with reported that violence against unionists continues to exist in  Colombia, which union leaders and NGOs reported undermines workers’  ability to freely associate because of the fear that their union activities  may lead them to become victims of violence. NGO officials in Colombia  reported that although murders of unionists are a serious concern, threats  of violence against union members also create a significant deterrent to  workers organizing, with one NGO official noting a greater impact in rural  areas than in major cities. According to this NGO official, authorities are  less likely to have the capacity to investigate and respond to threats made  in rural areas, with the result that victims flee the area or disengage from  labor activities.
Data collected by the NGO Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS) and the  Colombia Prosecutor General’s Office, as reported in the U.S.  Department of State’s Human Rights Reports, show that murders of trade  unionists have generally decreased over the past decade, although  homicides continue to occur (see fig. 4). as of July 2014 ENS had recorded 35 murders in 2013, compared with  102 murders of union members and labor activists in 2003. This trend  continued in the period since the Labor Action Plan—which contains  specific commitments to address labor violence—was announced in  2011. Labor union officials acknowledged the number of homicides has  decreased, but they noted that violence continues to exist.
ENS and Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s Office have used different methodologies to  determine whether a victim was murdered because of union affiliation. In some cases,  ENS has considered a murder union related, while the Prosecutor General’s Office has  classified the murder as unrelated to union activities. For more information on the  differences in data collection methodologies, see Congressional Research Service, U.S.- Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues, RL34759 (Washington, D.C.: January  2012).
section_title: Colombia Has Taken Agreed Steps to Prevent and Investigate Violence against Trade Unionists, but Unions Report That Violence Persists
paragraphs: The government of Colombia committed to a number of reforms related to  labor violence in April 2011 in the Labor Action Plan. Such commitments  included broadening the scope of the government of Colombia’s  protection program, Unidad Nacional de Protección (UNP), to include  labor activists, union members, and people engaging in efforts to form a  union, increasing the budget for the additional resources necessary to  support the expansion of the protection program, eliminating the backlog  of protection applications awaiting risk assessments, completing future  risk assessments within a 30-day period (as described below), and  reforming the Colombian interagency committee that reviews risk  assessments. In addition, Colombia committed to criminal justice reforms  in the Labor Action Plan, which included assigning 95 additional full-time judicial police investigators to support  the investigations of criminal cases involving union members and  activists; analyzing closed cases of union member homicides to determine  patterns relating to targets, criminal methods, and any evidence of  motives;  identifying budgetary needs for training investigators and prosecutors  on issues related to labor cases; and  instructing investigators to determine whether a homicide victim was  an active or retired union member, or was actively engaged in union  formation and organization, during the initial phase of the  investigation.
According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the  Department of Labor (DOL), in accordance with Colombia’s Labor Action  Plan commitments, the Colombian government has implemented  changes to a number of institutions and programs. For example, union  members, in addition to union leaders, are now included in the UNP’s  jurisdiction. As of April 2014, the UNP protects more than 670 unionists,  with about 24 percent of its budget dedicated to the protection of unionists  and labor activists.
Additionally, USTR has reported that the Colombian government  reformed the risk assessment process at the UNP and eliminated the  backlog of hundreds of applicants to the protection program. During our  fieldwork in Colombia, UNP officials described changes to the risk  assessment process. For example, when an application is received,  instead of a single individual investigating the case, as occurred before  the process’s reform, a committee now conducts interviews and fieldwork  to investigate the nature of the threat and determine a risk score. The  case is then forwarded to another committee, comprising representatives  from organized labor, other vulnerable populations, and government  agencies, that determines the risk level in each case as ordinary,  extraordinary, or extreme. UNP officials reported that, based on the  outcome of the risk assessment, protection measures ranging from  providing a cell phone to providing an armored car and armed  bodyguards are taken. State’s 2013 Human Rights Report notes that  between January 1 and October 31, 2013, the UNP conducted 565 risk  assessments of union leaders or members. Of those, the UNP classified  203, about 36 percent, as having an extraordinary threat or extreme  threat and provided the leaders or members with protection measures.  According to UNP officials, prior to the Labor Action Plan–related reforms,  about 10 to 15 percent of risk applicants were determined to be under  extraordinary or extreme risk. Additionally, according to State,  approximately one-half of the unionists enrolled in the program were  provided with “hard” protection measures that included a bodyguard.
According to USTR, Colombia increased the budget of its Prosecutor  General’s Office, in part to investigate and prosecute cases involving  union members or labor activists as victims. Further, USTR has reported  that the Prosecutor General’s Office has issued a mandate that assigned  over 20 prosecutors exclusively to crimes against union members and  labor activists. In addition, the National Police have assigned an  additional 100 full-time judicial police investigators to support the  prosecutors in investigating cases involving union members and labor  activists. To implement the Labor Action Plan commitments to identify  and effectively prosecute intellectual authors of labor homicides, the  Prosecutor General’s Office created a context and analysis directorate  tasked with investigating the patterns and context of similar cases,  including labor homicides. Officials from this unit we met with during our  fieldwork in Colombia described the unit as taking an integrated approach  to analyzing cases across the spectrum of human rights crimes to  determine common themes and perpetrators.
Despite the actions Colombia has taken to reduce violence against union  members and labor activists, Colombian union and NGO officials, as well  as USTR officials, report that violence and impunity remain problems.  Union members we met with during our fieldwork in Colombia reported  the existence of a high impunity rate for violent crimes against unionists.  According to DOL, of the 100 unionist murders that have occurred since  2011, Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s Office has obtained only one  conviction. Union officials we met with acknowledged that the government  of Colombia has taken positive steps to address violence, that the  number of labor-related homicides has decreased, and that reforms have  been implemented at the UNP. However, they also reported they are  concerned for their safety because of their union activities. Additionally,  union officials voiced the concern that risk was not being assessed at the  UNP in a way that accurately captured the dangers union leaders and  members face. UNP officials we met acknowledged that two union  leaders who were receiving “light” protection were murdered and another  union leader was murdered while he awaited the UNP’s risk assessment.
section_title: U.S. Government Has Provided Assistance to Colombia to Address Violence, Including Violence against Unionists
paragraphs: In support of reducing violence in Colombia, including violence against  unionists, U.S. agencies have funded multiple assistance projects.  According to U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials,  from 2001 to 2010, the agency provided about $11.6 million in funding  through its Human Rights fund to establish and support Colombia’s UNP.  The UNP, which is under the Colombian Ministry of Interior, received  between 10 and 18 percent of its total annual budget from USAID funding  from 2001 to 2005 (ranging from about $916,000 in 2001 to about $2.5  million in 2005). According to USAID, its assistance for the UNP has  steadily decreased as budget support from the government of Colombia  and the effectiveness of the UNP have increased. For example, from  2011 to 2014, USAID provided approximately $150,000 per year in  assistance to the UNP.
In support of Colombia’s Labor Action Plan commitment to seek  cooperation, advice, and technical assistance of the International Labour  Organization (ILO), DOL is currently funding a 5-year (2011 to 2016),  $7.82 million technical cooperation project implemented by the ILO. The  objectives of this project include strengthening the institutional capacity of  the Colombian government to enhance protection measures for trade  union leaders, members, activists, and organizers and combating  impunity for perpetrators of violence against them. Under this project, the  ILO is training Colombian prosecutors, investigators, and judges on labor  rights and investigating crimes against union leaders and labor activists.  In addition, Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s Office officials reported that  the office has received assistance from the U.S. Department of Justice on  broad criminal justice reforms, including transitioning from an inquisitorial  to an accusatory legal system. USTR reports that State has funded, and  the Department of Justice has implemented, assistance to train  investigators and prosecutors throughout Colombia in best practices for  crime scene investigation, including forensic evidence handling,  investigating threats, and prosecutorial management of cases for trial.  The Department of Justice’s and State’s programs are aimed at broader  criminal justice reform; however, Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s Office  reported to us that the reforms apply to investigating and prosecuting  violence against unionists.
section_title: Guatemala
subsections: section_title: Instances of Violence and Threats of Violence against Trade Unionists Have Been Reported in Guatemala
paragraphs: U.S. and Guatemalan government officials and ILO and union  representatives reported that violence against unionists exists in  Guatemala; however, the extent of the problem is unclear because  disaggregated statistics on violence against unionists are not collected.  Nevertheless, a union collected information on 63 cases in which union  leaders or members were killed from 2007 through 2013. The unions  alleged that the motive for these murders was related to the victims’ union  activities and that the government of Guatemala has not done enough to  investigate and resolve the cases. In addition, ILO officials stated that  they have detailed extremely serious and systematic violations of the right  to freedom of association in Guatemala, including murder.
A 2012 ILO complaint against the Guatemalan government cited 63  murders of trade unionists and called for the establishment of an ILO   Guatemalan officials confirmed that violence  commission of inquiry.against trade unionists exists but reported that many of the cases cited in  the ILO complaint were the result of general, extensive violence and  crime in the country rather than violence directed against trade unionists.  According to Ministry of the Interior officials, the ministry’s initial  investigation of the 63 murder cases was unable to identify any link  between the perpetrators’ motives and the victims’ union activity.  Furthermore, as part of a cooperative agreement with the Guatemalan  Attorney General’s Office, the International Commission against Impunity  in Guatemala (CICIG) began a review of the 58 cases cited in the ILO  complaint to ensure the adequacy of the investigations.DOL, as of June 2014, CICIG had completed its review of 56 cases and  concluded that 6 of the cases indicated a possible link to union activity.
In addition, unions reported other violent acts, such as threats, bribes,  and intimidation against union members. According to union  representatives we interviewed, threats of violence begin with harassing  phone calls to a union leader or member. The union representative stated  that if the phone calls do not get the desired results, the harassment is  escalated to include physical intimidation and threats of kidnapping. If the  physical intimidation fails, then kidnapping or murder occurs.
section_title: Guatemala Has Taken Steps to Prevent and Investigate Violence against Unionists in Response to ILO Review
paragraphs: To address the complaint filed by the unions, the ILO initiated the process  to establish commissions of inquiry.  To avoid the establishment of the  commission, the government of Guatemala signed a memorandum of  understanding in March of 2013, committing to take specific steps to  address the issues in the complaint and establishing a plan called the  Road Map that outlined the actions needed. In response, the ILO decided  to postpone the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry and has been  working with Guatemala to implement the Road Map.
According to information that the government of Guatemala provided to  the ILO, as of March of 2014, steps that the government had taken to  address violence against unionists included a cooperative agreement signed with the International CICIG to  support the Public Prosecutor’s Office in analyzing cases of violence  against trade unionists;  the transfer of 20 trained investigators to the Attorney General’s Office  and the creation of the new post of assistant prosecutor in the special  unit investigating crimes against trade unionists;  improvement in the time periods for trial and convictions, including  those for some of the 58 murders reported to the ILO; and  submission by the Ministry of the Interior, in the context of analyzing  assaults on trade unionists, of a draft protocol for implementing  immediate and preventive security measures for trade union leaders,  unionized workers, and workers from trade unions in the process of  being established.
Following are descriptions of some of the Guatemalan government’s  ongoing efforts to address violence against trade unionists.
Cooperative agreement with CICIG. According to a March 2014 ILO  report, the Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office signed a cooperative  agreement with CICIG on September 24, 2013. As part of the  agreement, the Attorney General’s Office established a coordination  mechanism with CICIG for the analysis of specific cases of violence  against trade union members. CICIG agreed to support the Attorney  General’s Office in the analysis of specific cases of violence against union  members, providing recommendations to strengthen the investigation of  those cases. Under the new coordination mechanism, the 58 murder  cases cited in the ILO complaint were transferred to CICIG to continue  the investigation process. In addition, the Attorney General agreed to  cooperate with CICIG in the analysis of crime trends based on landmark  cases of attacks and violence against union members known to the  different units and offices of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
Additional trained investigators. The Ministry of the Interior and the  Attorney General’s Office established interinstitutional links for  cooperation to strengthen the investigations and criminal prosecution.  Through this mechanism, the Ministry of the Interior transferred 20 trained  investigators to the Attorney General’s Office, with the effort to provide  additional support to investigate cases of violence against unionists.
Timely trials and convictions. The government of Guatemala has  worked to improve the length of time it takes to bring perpetrators of  crimes to trial and issue convictions. In regard to the 58 murder cases  cited in the ILO complaint, the Attorney General’s Office provided an  update of the status of the 28 cases that have been brought to court and  reported that extinction of criminal liability has been applied in 4 cases,  arrest warrants have been issued in 13 cases, rulings have been handed  down in 6 cases, and 5 cases are pending trial.
Strengthening analysis of attacks against human rights defenders.  The Attorney General’s Office restructured and strengthened the unit that  analyzes attacks against human rights defenders, a category that  includes unionists. As part of this process, representatives of unionized  workers will meet regularly to study trends in attacks against human rights  defenders and draw up recommendations for investigations by the  Attorney General Office to assist both criminal investigations and the  conviction of the perpetrators. An adequately staffed office will be created  to carry out the relevant investigations.
The government of Guatemala reported several other steps it intends to  initiate or has initiated to address the issues in the ILO complaint. For  example, according to the ILO’s March 2014 report, the Ministry of Labor  and Social Welfare proposed amendments to the Labor Code and other  relevant laws, incorporating the amendments proposed by the ILO  supervisory bodies.also been proposed by the Ministry of Labor to enable the general labor  inspectorate to fulfill its mandate to ensure the effective application of  labor legislation. On the basis of the progress demonstrated in addressing  points in the Road Map reported by the government of Guatemala, the  ILO decided in March 2014 to again postpone the implementation of the  Commission of Inquiry and reevaluate progress in November of 2014.
section_title: U.S. Government Has Provided Assistance to Guatemala for Law Enforcement Reform and to Address Violence, Including Violence against Unionists
paragraphs: The United States has provided some funding through State’s Bureau of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to assist Guatemalan  authorities to provide better protection to unionists. INL provided  Guatemala $2 million dollars in assistance for fiscal years 2012 through  2016 to implement reform and capacity-building projects. The goal of the  INL funding is to increase the investigative capabilities of law enforcement  officers within the Ministry of the Interior. Part of the funding focuses on  defenders of human rights, including addressing violence against trade  unions. Assistance provided by INL has ranged from the provision of  equipment to technical training and exchanges. For example, INL  provided the Ministry of the Interior’s recently established security  division, División de Protección de Personas y Seguridad (DPPS), with  filing cabinets to organize files on union leaders for which it was providing  protection. INL officials stated that DPPS lacked a tracking system and  had rooms stacked with disorganized files and, as a result, could not  accurately track the number of people receiving protection. According to  INL officials, as of December 2013, DPPS was providing protection for  about 1,000 union leaders and members. INL officials also stated that  they had discussed the possibility of creating a risk analysis unit in DPPS,  similar to Colombia’s UNP.
section_title: Appendix III: U.S. Monitoring of Implementation of Other Labor Initiatives
paragraphs: In addition to being responsible for monitoring partner countries’  implementation of free trade agreement (FTA) labor provisions, U.S.  agencies are responsible for monitoring the implementation of labor  initiatives such as the White Paper and the Labor Action Plan, which  were developed in the context of, respectively, the Dominican Republic- Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and  the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Colombia  FTA). U.S. agencies are also responsible for monitoring Guatemala’s  Labor Enforcement Plan, developed in response to a CAFTA-DR labor  submission to the Department of Labor (DOL).
subsections: section_title: CAFTA-DR White Paper
paragraphs: To discharge its responsibility for monitoring implementation of the  CAFTA-DR White Paper projects, in 2007 DOL provided a $10 million  grant to the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Verification  Project. The Verification Project prepared reports every 6 months from  2005 through 2010 regarding the implementation of the White Paper  projects. The Verification Project and most White Paper projects  concluded in 2012.
The ILO Verification Project tracked spending and implementation of  every White Paper project, requiring grant recipients to submit periodic  reports to ILO for the biannual report. ILO staff provided the reports to  DOL, which used the reports to ensure transparency and progress of the  U.S.-funded projects. Entities implementing White Paper projects  included, among others, the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID), partner countries’ ministries of labor and labor courts, and  nongovernmental organizations. According to ILO staff, although the  Verification Project did not measure the impact of the projects on labor  conditions, the reports reflected improvements of government institutions  and other entities and demonstrated the benefit of addressing some  issues faced by workers. ILO officials noted that, besides providing  accountability for the expenditure of funds and tracking the progress of  projects, the Verification Project led to improvements in data gathering  and reporting capabilities of the ministries of labor.
section_title: Colombia Labor Action Plan
paragraphs: The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), in cooperation with  DOL and the Department of State (State), is responsible for monitoring  the implementation of the Colombia Labor Action Plan, most of which  Colombia was required to implement by 2012. The plan listed steps to  improve labor conditions, mutually agreed on by the U.S. and Colombian  governments, that the Colombian government agreed to take before the  President of the United States would put the FTA forward for  congressional consideration. The conditions that the Labor Action Plan  addressed included violence against Colombian labor union members,  inadequate efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of crimes against labor  union members, and insufficient protection of workers’ rights in Colombia.  According to USTR staff, the plan continues to serve as a framework for  cooperation with Colombia. The plan includes regular meetings between  officials from both countries to monitor and implement the plan through  2013, and both governments announced an extension of these meetings  through at least 2014.
On April 2012, USTR announced that the Colombian government had  taken important steps to fulfill the Labor Action Plan and that the FTA  would go into effect. USTR officials did not provide records or  documentation of these steps, stating that they did not request such  records because the website for the Presidency of Colombia supplied  documentation of all actions taken. On reviewing some of the  documentation on the website, we found that the documents were not  structured so as to readily provide information about steps that the  Colombian government had taken to meet its Labor Action Plan  commitments. In written responses to our questions, Colombia’s Ministry  of Labor indicated that the government had met all Labor Action Plan  commitments, and the ministry provided examples of the government’s  actions to meet these commitments.
USTR officials reported that USTR, DOL, and State had engaged  extensively with the Colombian Ministry of Labor and other government  institutions in Colombia to discuss and confirm Colombia’s progress in  implementing each element of the Labor Action Plan. According to USTR,  as of August 2014, USTR and DOL staff had made seven visits to  Colombia since the FTA entered into force to address these issues.  USTR fact sheets and a USTR and DOL report from April 2014 provided  information about Colombia’s accomplishments under the Labor Action  Plan—for example, the report detailed the number of labor inspectors  hired, the number of special prosecutors and investigators hired, and the  number of convictions in cases of violence against labor leaders—as well  as remaining challenges. In addition, according to DOL, a DOL staff  member, detailed to the U.S. embassy in Bogota from 2011 to 2012 to  oversee implementation of the Action Plan, met during that period with  Colombian government officials, nongovernmental organizations, union  representatives, and other stakeholders to discuss the Labor Action  Plan’s implementation, among other topics.
section_title: Guatemala Enforcement Plan
paragraphs: USTR, in cooperation with DOL and State, is responsible for monitoring  implementation of the Guatemala Enforcement Plan, agreed to by the  U.S. and Guatemalan governments in April 2013, to address concerns  identified in a labor submission filed under CAFTA-DR. USTR provided us  with internal documents that it had used to track Guatemala’s progress in  taking the steps required by the plan. For example, USTR provided a  matrix tracking the status of legal instruments required under the  Enforcement Plan; USTR also provided quarterly progress reports  submitted by the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor, identifying steps that the  ministry had taken to address commitments in the Enforcement Plan.  USTR officials said that since 2009, USTR and DOL had directly engaged  with Guatemala on the labor case through 17 trips, including 7 trips that  involved staff at the Assistant Secretary level or higher. In addition,  officials at the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor told us that they had  interacted extensively with DOL and USTR, including through multiple  video-teleconferences, meetings in person, and correspondence, to  update them on progress in implementing the Enforcement Plan.
In April 2014, USTR told us that although it recognized steps that  Guatemala had taken under the Enforcement Plan, it had not seen  sufficient progress to close the case. USTR officials stated that if the  Guatemalan government did not take the steps delineated in the plan by  the specified dates, USTR might decide to pursue arbitration. In  September 2014, USTR announced that the U.S. government was  pursuing dispute settlement proceedings against Guatemala because it  had not met the terms of the Enforcement Plan.
section_title: Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions
paragraphs: The following provides details about the status of the five labor  submissions that the Department of Labor (DOL) has accepted since  2008.
subsections: section_title: Bahrain
paragraphs: In June 2011, DOL accepted a labor submission regarding Bahrain, 50  days after receipt. The submission remains open, with consultations  ongoing. The submission, received from the American Federation of  Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) with a  statement from the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions, alleged  that Bahrain had violated free trade agreement (FTA) labor provisions  regarding the right of association, particularly nondiscrimination against  trade unionists. In December 2012, DOL issued a public report that found  that the government of Bahrain’s actions appeared inconsistent with its  commitments under the labor chapter. Specifically, the report found that  trade unionists and leaders were targeted for dismissal, and in some  cases prosecuted, in part for their role in organizing and participating in a  general strike and that the dismissals reflected discrimination based in  part on political opinion and activities. The report also found sectarian  discrimination against Shia workers. The Department of Labor’s (DOL)  report outlined nine recommendations focused on legal and  administrative changes to Bahraini labor law for the U.S. government to  pursue during consultations with Bahrain and also recommended that the  parties develop a plan of action.
On May 6, 2013, more than 4 months after DOL issued its report, the U.S.  government formally requested cooperative labor consultations with the  government of Bahrain in a joint letter from the Acting Secretary of Labor  and the Acting U.S. Trade Representative. Consultations began when an  interagency delegation met with the government of Bahrain in Manama,  Bahrain, on July 15 and 16, 2013. However, according to DOL, the first  round of consultations did not resolve all issues DOL had identified, and  consultations were ongoing as of September 2014. The Office of the U.S.  Trade Representative (USTR) attempted to schedule second-round  consultations but agreed to a request from Bahrain to delay them. The  United States and Bahrain held a second round of consultations on June  22 and 23, 2014, according to DOL. During the consultations, the two  parties used the recommendations in the DOL report as a basis for jointly  developing an action plan, which includes concrete steps for the  government of Bahrain to address the concerns that the report raises.  USTR officials noted that the allegations raised in the submission are  subject to resolution through the consultation procedures but are not  subject to dispute settlement.
Figure 5 shows the timeline and status of the Bahrain labor submission.
section_title: Dominican Republic
paragraphs: In February 2012, DOL accepted a labor submission regarding the  Dominican Republic, 62 days after receipt. The submission remains open  and unresolved while DOL monitors the Dominican Republic’s progress in  addressing concerns that the submission raises. The submission,  submitted by a private individual, alleged the failure of the Dominican  Republic’s government to enforce its labor laws in the sugar sector as  required under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States  Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The submission alleged nine  violations, ranging from human trafficking and forced labor to retaliatory  firing of workers for affiliation with, or attempts to organize, labor groups  or unions. In September 2013, DOL issued a public report that found  evidence of apparent and potential violations of the Dominican Republic’s  labor laws pertaining to the sugar sector. DOL’s report also identified  significant concerns about procedural and methodological shortcomings  in the inspection process that undermine the government’s capacity to  effectively identify labor violations. In addition, the report cited concerns  regarding freedom of association, the right to organize, and collective  bargaining. DOL’s report offered 11 recommendations to the government  of the Dominican Republic to address the report’s findings and improve  enforcement of Dominican labor laws in the sugar sector and stated that  DOL would reassess the situation in 6 and 12 months after the report’s  publication. The recommendations range from administrative changes to  help the government of the Dominican Republic improve its enforcement  of Dominican labor laws to outreach suggestions for better informing  sugar sector workers about their labor rights.
In April 2014, DOL issued its 6-month assessment, noting that the  Dominican Republic’s Ministry of Labor had committed to measures that,  if instituted, would begin to address some of the recommendations in  DOL’s public report. DOL’s assessment also noted that the government of  the Dominican Republic had not yet indicated plans or taken actions to  address most of the public report’s recommendations.
Figure 6 shows the timeline and status of the Dominican Republic labor  submission.
section_title: Guatemala
paragraphs: In June 2008, DOL accepted a submission regarding Guatemala, 50 days  after receipt. The submission remains open and unresolved and is  currently in arbitration. The submission, from the AFL-CIO and six  Guatemalan worker organizations, alleged that Guatemala had violated  its obligation under CAFTA-DR to effectively enforce its labor laws  regarding freedom of association, the rights to organize and bargain  collectively, and acceptable conditions of work. In January 2009, DOL  issued a public report that found significant weaknesses in Guatemala’s  labor law enforcement. The report outlined 10 recommendations for the  government of Guatemala, including administrative and technical  changes, to address the issues raised in the submission. The report also  recommended that DOL reassess Guatemala’s progress in implementing  the recommendations within 6 months after the publication of DOL’s  report to determine whether further action is warranted.
USTR and DOL engaged with the Guatemalan government in an effort to  address DOL’s recommendations for systemic improvements in the  enforcement of labor laws in Guatemala. In July 2010, after Guatemala’s  actions proved insufficient to address the concerns raised in the report,  USTR and DOL jointly requested cooperative labor consultations with  Guatemala under the CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter. The consultations failed  to resolve the matter, and on May 16, 2011, USTR requested a meeting  of the CAFTA-DR’s free trade commission pursuant to the agreement’s  Dispute Settlement Chapter. The commission met in June 2011 but did  not resolve the dispute, and in August 2011, the United States requested  the establishment of an arbitral panel. After the panel was constituted in  November 2012, the parties agreed to suspend it to allow for additional  negotiation. In April 2013, the parties reached agreement on a  comprehensive 18-point Enforcement Plan with concrete benchmarks  and timelines for implementation. The plan extended the arbitration  panel’s suspension for 6 months, with the possibility of an additional 6- month extension based on Guatemala’s progress in implementing the  plan. In October 2013, 6 months after the signing of the Enforcement  Plan, USTR, in consultation with DOL, determined that Guatemala had  taken sufficient steps to enact the legal instruments called for under the  plan. USTR and DOL granted the 6-month extension, noting that  significant work remained to ensure the full implementation of the  Enforcement Plan.
In April 2014, USTR, in consultation with DOL, granted Guatemala a 4- month extension to continue its implementation of the Enforcement Plan  but retains the right to reactivate the arbitration panel at any point during  this period. In September 2014, the United States reactivated the panel  after determining that Guatemala had not met the terms of the  Enforcement Plan and that concerns over the enforcement of  Guatemala’s labor laws had not been resolved.
Figure 7 shows the timeline and status of the Guatemala labor  submission.
section_title: Honduras
paragraphs: In May 2012, DOL accepted a submission regarding Honduras, 49 days  after receipt. The submission remains open and unresolved, pending  publication of DOL’s report. The submission, from the AFL-CIO and 26  Honduran organizations, alleged that the government of Honduras had  violated its obligation under CAFTA-DR to enforce its labor laws relating  to freedom of association; the right to organize; child labor; the right to  bargain collectively; and the right to acceptable conditions of work in the  Honduran apparel and auto manufacturing, agriculture, and port sectors.  According to DOL officials, DOL has received over 1,200 documents in  Spanish and visited Honduras four times to meet with stakeholders,  reflecting the breadth of the allegations and detailed information reviewed  and analyzed. As of May 2014, DOL was continuing to review  documentation of the allegations and, according to DOL officials, is  preparing its report.
Figure 8 shows the timeline and status of the Honduras labor submission.
section_title: Peru
paragraphs: In July 2011, DOL accepted a submission regarding Peru, 202 days after  receipt, which DOL closed as resolved in August 2012. The submission,  from the Peruvian National Union of Tax Administration  Workers (SINAUT), alleged that Peru’s National Superintendency of Tax  Administration (SUNAT), an executive branch agency of the Peruvian  government that oversees both customs and tax administration, had  failed to comply with Peru’s labor laws as they relate to collective  bargaining, in violation of the United States-Peru Trade Promotion  Agreement. In August 2012, DOL issued a public report finding that  although the Ministry of Labor and Promotion of Employment appeared to  have fulfilled its duties during the collective bargaining processes at issue,  SUNAT had failed to comply with certain elements of the Peruvian  Collective Bargaining Law, including deadlines for launching  negotiations. Further, with regard to all other issues raised in the  submission, DOL determined that important legal ambiguity during the  period at issue prevented a finding that SUNAT had failed to comply with  the law or that the government of Peru had failed to comply with, or  enforce, its own labor laws during that time. DOL’s report did not  recommend formal consultations between the U.S. government and the  Peruvian government. According to DOL, because the government of  Peru had taken important steps to address some of the issues raised in  the submission, including issuing legal instruments to help clarify legal  ambiguity and facilitate collective bargaining, DOL did not believe that  formal consultations were needed to continue positive engagement and  progress on these matters. As a result, DOL closed the submission as  resolved in August 2012.
In September 2011, according to DOL, while it was reviewing the  submission, the government of Peru issued two executive orders that  clarified the parties’ collective bargaining duties in this and similar cases.  DOL’s report on the submission explained that on March 29, 2012, after  applying the recent executive orders, an arbitral panel reached a decision  favorable to SINAUT that contained both economic and noneconomic  awards for the union. Moreover, DOL reported that the government of  Peru appealed the ruling, contending that the ruling reflects a  misapplication and misinterpretation of the Public Sector Budget Law.  According to the DOL report, on appeal, the Peruvian labor courts  overturned the economic elements of the arbitral award, based on a ruling  that those elements conflicted with Peru’s Public Sector Budget Law, but  sustained the noneconomic elements of the award.
Figure 9 shoes the timeline and status of the Peru labor submission.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
subsections: section_title: See Comment 12
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments regarding the Office of the U.S. Trade  Representative’s (USTR) letter dated September 16, 2014.
In its letter, USTR questions our evaluation of its monitoring and  enforcement of free trade agreement (FTA) partners’ compliance with their  labor commitments and expresses concern that we do not give sufficient  credit to U.S. agencies for their multifaceted work to help FTA partners  comply with their labor commitments. We acknowledge in our report that  the agencies have given, overall, greater political and organizational  priority to monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor commitments since we  last reported on this topic in 2009. The evidence that USTR and the  Department of Labor (DOL) provided demonstrate that their monitoring  and enforcement activities have sometimes led to a strengthening of FTA  partners labor laws and practices that might not have occurred absent  these activities. Nevertheless, we stand by our current assessment that  USTR and DOL have not demonstrated a proactive and systematic  approach to monitoring and enforcing FTA partners’ compliance with their  FTA labor commitments, with the exception of a few partner countries. On  the contrary, the evidence that the agencies provided shows that USTR’s  and DOL’s approaches and actions are generally ad hoc and leave  important gaps.
Our review focuses on steps that USTR and DOL have taken, with support  from the Department of State (State), to monitor and enforce the labor  provisions in the FTAs. In reviewing USTR’s and DOL’s monitoring and  enforcement of the provisions in the FTA labor chapters, we looked for evidence that USTR and DOL took steps to ensure that each FTA  partner had the requisite laws in place by the time the President  determined that the FTA could enter into force, as well as evidence that USTR and DOL have taken steps to ensure that the  partners are enforcing their laws and maintaining labor rights in law and  practice since the FTAs entered into force.
Further, because USTR announced in 2009 that it would not wait for  complaints (e.g., labor submissions) to investigate and address possible  inconsistencies with FTA provisions, we looked for evidence that the  agencies had established means or mechanisms to anticipate, analyze,  and resolve problems in the absence of a submission.
We consider the approach to monitoring and enforcement that USTR  outlines in its letter to be broadly compatible with the definitions of  monitoring and enforcement and with the key elements of monitoring and  enforcement that we have identified in our report. That is, enforcement  involves taking action to secure compliance by the partner, and monitoring  and enforcement typically involve six key steps: (1) gathering and  analyzing information, (2) setting priorities, (3) identifying compliance  problems, (4) developing and implementing responses, (5) taking  enforcement actions, and (6) coordinating with agencies.
Following are specific comments in response to USTR’s letter.
Comment 1: Throughout our year-long review process, we requested  documentation of USTR’s monitoring and enforcement of labor provisions.  However, USTR provided a large number of documents very late in the  process and provided most documents only after receiving our draft report.  We thoroughly reviewed and considered all documents that USTR  provided and made changes in our report as appropriate to ensure its  accuracy and completeness. Several of these changes are described in  the comments that follow.
Comment 2: The evidence that we obtained from USTR and DOL does  not support USTR’s assertion that the two agencies actively and  systematically monitored and enforced labor provisions in all 20 FTA  countries, implementing all of the key elements that we identified,  regardless of whether the country had been the subject of a submission.  USTR and DOL submitted evidence that they had taken some of these key  steps in several FTA partner countries, three of which—Colombia, Jordan,  and Panama—were not the subject of labor submissions. In addition, to  support its technical comments about a draft of our report, USTR  submitted further evidence of certain proactive steps, which we have  incorporated in our report as appropriate. However, in the absence of  evidence that USTR and DOL have taken steps to analyze and address  possible inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions in most partner  countries that have not been the subject of a labor submission, we could  not conclude that the agencies had implemented a systematic approach to  monitoring the implementation of all labor provisions in all FTAs. Moreover,  according to DOL—on which USTR relies for day-to-day monitoring of the  FTA partners—the division’s staff spent 80 percent of their work hours in  the past year monitoring implementation of the Guatemala Enforcement  Plan, addressing submissions for five other countries, and following up on  activities initiated under the Colombia Labor Action Plan. This left the  employees’ remaining work hours available to monitor and engage the  other 14 FTA partner countries. With the exception of Colombia,  stakeholders in countries we visited indicated that their recent interactions  with USTR and DOL had been very limited. Stakeholders in these  countries also told us that the FTA labor affairs councils in their countries  had been largely inactive and that the councils’ meetings were considered  a formality.
Comment 3: Having reviewed all of the cables that State provided, we  consider them a useful tool for DOL and State to obtain information about  labor conditions in partner countries. Our report acknowledges that USTR  is an addressee on such cables and is generally well informed about labor  conditions in partner countries as a result of this and other input. Obtaining  and analyzing information from credible sources such as State is integral  to completing the first step of the monitoring and enforcement process.
Comment 4: USTR states that it deploys a range of tools to try to resolve  concerns, whether they were identified formally or informally. However, we  found that USTR’s and DOL’s approach to addressing concerns that were  identified formally, such as by a submission, is more systematic than their  approach to addressing concerns that they have identified informally. For  example, in responding to a labor submission, DOL conducts a formal  review and issues an official report, which generally identifies any possible  inconsistencies with labor provisions in the FTA and contains specific  recommendations to resolve the issue. DOL and USTR typically use the  report’s findings to further engage with the FTA partner country and  develop an action plan, such as in the case of Guatemala. When they  have identified a concern informally, USTR and DOL may engage with the  partner country to discuss the concern, usually in the context of an  established FTA mechanism such as the FTA labor affairs council or free  trade commission. However, we found that USTR and DOL use these  mechanisms infrequently, and USTR and DOL officials told us that except  for a few high-priority countries such as Colombia, the agencies do not  typically perform in-depth analysis of a partner country’s compliance with  its FTA labor commitments unless the country has been the subject of a  submission.
Comment 5: We acknowledge that USTR’s work with Colombia did not  end with the ratification of the FTA. We added text to our report to indicate  our concurrence with this point and to illustrate USTR’s postratification  monitoring and enforcement activities.
Comment 6: We acknowledge that USTR and DOL have engaged  extensively with the government of Colombia to monitor the  implementation of the Labor Action Plan, in the process addressing  several of the key elements of monitoring and enforcement FTAs.  However, we cannot conclude that a systematic approach to monitoring  and enforcement labor provisions is in place, because we did not see  evidence of certain key elements—for example, an approach to respond to  outstanding issues identified since the implementation of the Labor Action  Plan.
USTR also indicates that its level of engagement to monitor and enforce  labor provisions in Colombia is not unique and that USTR and DOL have  engaged with other FTA countries to a similar extent as with Colombia.  However, we did not see evidence of such a level of engagement with  other countries that have not been the subject of a submission. In fact,  DOL reported that in the last year, its monitoring division staff spent 80  percent of their time following up on the Colombia Labor Action Plan  activities and addressing submissions.
Comment 7: We do not assume or indicate that a tailored, country-specific  approach to labor monitoring and enforcement is inappropriate, and we do  not exclude such approaches from our evaluation. We reviewed the  documentation that USTR and DOL provided, looking for evidence that key  elements of monitoring and enforcement have been implemented. We  recognize that USTR and DOL have successfully implemented certain  steps, such as gathering information and identifying compliance problems,  using different methods in different countries. However, we did not see  evidence of an overarching strategy that assures that priorities and  problems are systematically addressed.
Comment 8: We evaluated all evidence that USTR and DOL provided,  including documentation that USTR provided with its technical comments,  and we made changes to our report. Specifically, we incorporated  language acknowledging that in some partner countries, the agencies took  steps before and after FTA ratification that were consistent with key  elements of monitoring and enforcement and that likely contributed to  assuring that the partners met certain labor commitments.
Comment 9: We acknowledge that the labor submission process is a  central component of USTR’s and DOL’s approach to addressing possible  inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions in partner countries and that the  agencies have done extensive work to investigate allegations in the  submissions that DOL has accepted. However, in our view, reliance on  labor submissions to assess compliance and take enforcement actions is  inconsistent with USTR’s 2009 commitment to no longer enforce FTA  partners’ labor commitments “only on a complaint-driven basis” but instead  to “immediately identify and investigate labor violations.”
Comment 10: As stated, the report acknowledges that labor submissions  are a key component of USTR’s and DOL’s monitoring and enforcement of  FTA labor provisions and that the agencies undertake considerable  research and analysis in the process of addressing submissions We  modified the text of the report to clarify that after DOL receives a  submission, it works with USTR and State to engage diplomatically to  address concerns, as well as independently to investigate and analyze the  issues.
Comment 11: We acknowledge that USTR and DOL work together to  address labor concerns identified in submissions and to engage with  partner countries regarding labor matters. Our review of evidence obtained  from the agencies and in FTA partner countries generally confirmed that  USTR and DOL also coordinate on an ad hoc basis. However, the  evidence that we reviewed did not show that the agencies have developed  a coordinated, strategic approach to systematically address the key steps  of monitoring and enforcing labor provisions in all FTAs and to address  labor conditions that may be inconsistent with FTA provisions, such as the  conditions identified in DOL’s management reports. For example, agendas  that USTR provided for two meetings of the interagency Subcommittee on  Labor Monitoring and Enforcement list meeting topics but do not detail  expected actions or outcomes; USTR provided no record, beyond a  general description, of what transpired at the meetings or of any intra- agency correspondence following the meetings. Further, during our  interviews with USTR officials, the officials discussed items that the  interagency process had not produced, such as up-to-date assessments of  risk; agreed-on priorities; and formal action plans for partners other than  Colombia, Guatemala, and Jordan. For example, USTR officials indicated  that a previous interagency effort to develop a comprehensive risk-based  approach had been overtaken by events and not revised. DOL officials  indicated that in general, there had been no discussion of cross-agency  resource use  However, our work on best practices in collaboration has  shown that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by  engaging in the following eight practices: (1) define and articulate a  common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3)  identify and address needs by leveraging resources, (4) agree on roles  and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and  other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop  mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce  agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and  reports; and (8) reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts  through performance management systems.
Comment 12: Our report does not state that USTR should explicitly  accuse partner countries of trade violations in its annual report to  Congress. Our report states that, reflecting in part USTR’s and DOL’s  limited monitoring and enforcement of these provisions, USTR’s annual  report generally does not detail concerns about the implementation of FTA  labor provisions by partner countries that have not been the subject of  labor submissions. Our report also states that appropriate information  resulting from more extensive monitoring and enforcement could help  inform Congress and other U.S. stakeholders about the extent to which  trade partners are fulfilling their FTA labor commitments.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Labor
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kim Frankena (Assistant  Director), Francisco Enriquez (Analyst-in-Charge), Juan P. Avila, Nicholas  Jepson, Jill Lacey, Reid Lowe, Grace Lui, and Oziel Trevino made major  contributions to this report.