Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on Overcoming Acquisition Challenges
Published: 2012-03-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Airborne electronic attack involves the use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or suppress enemy air defense and communications systems. Proliferation of sophisticated air defenses and advanced commercial electronic devices has contributed to the accelerated appearance of new weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic attack capabilities. GAO was asked to assess (1) the Department of Defenses (DOD) strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities, (2) progress made in developing and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, and (3) additional actions taken to address capability gaps. To do this, GAO analyzed documents related to mission requirements, acquisition and budget needs, development plans, and performance, and interviewed DOD officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defenses (DOD) evolving strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements centers on acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission systems and weapons. DOD analyses dating back a decade have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments, but budget realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, DOD canceled some acquisitions, after which the services revised their operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved money, allowing DOD to fund other priorities, but reduced the planned level of synergy among systems during operations. As acquisition plans have evolved, capability limitations and sustainment challenges facing existing systems have grown, prompting the department to invest in system improvements to mitigate shortfalls.
DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats. However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of planned systems. Some programs, such as the Navys EA-18G Growler and the Air Forces modernized EC-130H Compass Call, are in stable production and have completed significant amounts of testing. Other key programs, like the Navys Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile, have required additional time and funding to address technical challenges, yet continue to face execution risks. In addition, certain systems in development may offer capabilities that overlap with one anothera situation brought on in part by DODs fragmented urgent operational needs processes. Although services have shared technical data among these programs, they continue to pursue unique systems intended to counter similar threats. As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to consolidate current acquisition programs across services. However, this consolidation may be hampered by DODs acknowledged leadership deficiencies within its electronic warfare enterprise, including the lack of a designated, joint entity to coordinate activities. Furthermore, current and planned acquisitions will not fully address materiel-related capability gaps identified by DODincluding some that date back 10 years. Acquisition program shortfalls will exacerbate these gaps.
To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the near term, services are evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures for existing systems to enable them to take on additional mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of existing systems and better position operators to complete missions with equipment currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on DOD successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address long-standing coordination shortfalls in this area, including designating electronic warfare as a priority investment area and creating a steering council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. These steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities ahead of departmentwide priorities. DODs planned implementation roadmap for electronic warfare offers an opportunity to assess how closely component research investments are aligned with the departmentwide priority.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD conduct program reviews for certain new, key systems to assess cost, schedule, and performance; determine the extent to which the most pressing capability gaps can be met and take steps to fill them; align service investments in science and technology with the departmentwide electronic warfare priority; and review capabilities provided by certain planned and existing systems to ensure investments do not overlap. DOD agreed with three recommendations and partially agreed with the two aimed at reducing potential overlap among systems. DOD plans to assess coordination among systems, whereas GAO sees opportunities for consolidation, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Airborne electronic attack capabilities are key enablers for U.S. military  operations ranging from irregular warfare to major combat against  potential near-peer adversaries. Airborne electronic attack involves the  use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade (suppress)  enemy air defense and communications systems, either through  destructive or disruptive means. These aircraft employ a variety of  mission systems and weapons to prosecute threats, and they rely on  defensive countermeasures to provide additional protection.
Global proliferation of more sophisticated air defenses and advanced,  commercial digital electronic devices has contributed to the accelerated  appearance of new weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic  attack capabilities and limit U.S. access to theaters of combat. These  weapons—some held by both nation-state and nonstate actors—vary  from advanced, integrated air defense systems to simpler, digital radio  frequency memory devices. As the range of adversary weapons  increases, electronic jammers and other equipment must respond with  improved capabilities or may have to operate farther from the battle,  lessening their effectiveness.
In light of these developments, you asked us to review the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) airborne electronic attack capabilities and investment  plans. In response to this request, we assessed (1) the department’s  strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities; (2) progress  made developing and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack  mission requirements; and (3) additional compensating actions taken by  the department to address capability gaps, including improvements to  tactics, techniques, and procedures and investments in science and  technology. In a separate report, we plan to address the effectiveness of  the department’s governance structure for overseeing its electronic  warfare policies and priorities and the relationship between electronic  warfare and cyber operations.
To assess the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic  attack capabilities, we analyzed documents outlining mission  requirements and acquisition needs including the 2009 Electronic Warfare  Initial Capabilities Document, service roadmaps related to airborne  electronic attack, budget documents, and program briefings. We  corroborated this information through discussions with officials  responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements and  systems, including the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine  Corps requirements branches; U.S. Strategic Command; and the Joint  Staff. To assess progress made developing and fielding systems to meet  airborne electronic attack mission requirements, we analyzed materials  outlining acquisition plans, costs, and performance outcomes including,  capabilities documents, program schedules, test reports, budget  submissions, and program briefings. These same materials afforded  information on key attributes of individual airborne electronic attack  systems, which we used to assess potential overlap among systems in  development. Further, we identified persisting capability gaps by  reviewing DOD analyses related to airborne electronic attack  requirements. To supplement our analyses and gain additional visibility  and perspective into these issues, we conducted numerous interviews  with DOD officials charged with managing airborne electronic attack  requirements and those responsible for developing, acquiring, and testing  airborne electronic attack systems. To assess additional compensating  actions taken by the department to address airborne electronic attack  capability gaps, we reviewed service documents outlining recent  improvements and refinements to tactics, techniques, and procedures for  key airborne electronic attack aircraft. We also reviewed broad agency  announcements to understand ongoing science and technology activities.  We corroborated this information through interviews with the user  community responsible for developing and maintaining operating  procedures for airborne electronic attack systems and with DOD airborne  electronic attack research leaders. A more detailed description of our  scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD invests in electronic warfare capabilities as a means to maintain  unimpeded access to the electromagnetic spectrum during war and  selectively deny adversary use of the spectrum. Traditionally, electronic  warfare has been composed of three primary activities:
Electronic attack: Use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or  antiradiation weapons to attack with the intent of degrading,  neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability.
Electronic protection: Passive and active means taken to protect  personnel, facilities, and equipment from the effects of friendly or  enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Electronic warfare support: Actions directed by an operational  commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of  radiated electromagnetic energy for the purposes of immediate threat  recognition, targeting, and planning, and the conduct of future  operations.
Airborne electronic attack—a subset of the electronic attack mission— involves use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade  (suppress) enemy air defense and communications systems, either  through destructive or disruptive means. These capabilities are  increasingly important and complex as networked systems, distributed  controls, and sophisticated sensors become ubiquitous in military  equipment, civilian infrastructure, and commercial networks— developments that complicate DOD’s ability to exercise control over the  electromagnetic spectrum, when necessary, to support U.S. military  objectives.
Airborne electronic attack systems increase survivability of joint forces  tasked to enter denied battlespace and engage anti-access threats or  high-value targets,a potential near-peer adversary or in irregular warfare. They also enable  access to the battlespace for follow-on operations. Aircraft executing  airborne electronic attack missions employ a variety of mission systems,  such as electronic jammers, and weapons, such as antiradiation missiles  and air-launched expendable decoys. These aircraft also rely on aircraft  self-protection systems and defensive countermeasures for additional  protection. All four services within DOD contribute to and rely upon  airborne electronic attack capabilities using a variety of different aircraft.  Each service is also separately acquiring new airborne electronic attack  systems.   whether involved in major combat operations against  Section 1053 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2010 requires that for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the  Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and  secretaries of the military departments, submit to the congressional  defense committees an annual report on DOD’s electronic warfare  strategy. department’s electronic warfare strategy and organizational structures for  oversight; (2) a list and description of all electronic warfare acquisition  programs and research and development projects within DOD; and (3) for  the unclassified programs and projects, detail on oversight  responsibilities, requirements, funding, cost, schedule, technologies,  potential redundancies, and associated capability gaps, and for the  classified programs and projects, a classified annex addressing these  topics, when appropriate. In response to this requirement, DOD  submitted its first Electronic Warfare Strategy of the Department of  Defense report in October 2010. The department produced its second  electronic warfare strategy report in November 2011.
Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (a) (2009).
section_title: DOD Strategy to Lower Costs Also Reduced Synergy among Systems
paragraphs: DOD’s strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements— including both near-peer and irregular warfare needs—centers on  acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low  observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission  systems and weapons. Department analyses dating back a decade have  identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments in  airborne electronic attack capabilities. However, budget realities and  lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven  changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, the  department canceled some acquisitions, after which services revised their  operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved  money, allowing the department to fund other priorities, but reduced the  planned level of synergy among airborne electronic attack systems during  operations. As acquisition plans for these systems have evolved,  operational stresses upon the existing inventory of weapon systems have  grown. These stresses have materialized in the form of capability  limitations and sustainment challenges for existing systems, prompting  the department to invest in improvements to these systems to mitigate  shortfalls.
subsections: section_title: Airborne Electronic Attack Acquisition Strategy Has Evolved
paragraphs: Key DOD analyses completed since 2002 identified capability gaps,  provided a basis for service investments in airborne electronic attack  systems, and supported an overarching acquisition strategy for achieving  these requirements. The department outlined its findings in reports that  included an analysis of alternatives, a capabilities-based assessment,  and initial capabilities documents. Figure 1 highlights a chronology of  these analyses and identifies key airborne electronic attack components  of each report.
The 2002 Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives established  the primary framework by which the department began investing in new  airborne electronic attack capabilities. The analysis focused on those  capabilities needed to suppress enemy air defenses from 2010 to 2030.  The study identified two primary components required to provide a  complete and comprehensive airborne electronic attack solution:
Core component: A recoverable platform or combination of platforms  operating in enemy airspace. The core component provides the  airborne electronic attack detection and battle management  capabilities for reactive jamming.
Stand-in component: An expendable air platform providing critical  capabilities against certain advanced threat emitters and employed in  threat environments not accessible to the core component.
Subsequent to this analysis, DOD developed a system of systems  strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack mission needs. A system  of systems is a set or arrangement that results when independent and  useful systems are integrated into a larger, connected and interdependent  system that delivers unique capabilities during military operations. The  system of systems strategy established specific roles and operating  responsibilities among the military services in a joint environment and  expanded the basic core and stand-in component needs into four major  capability areas for airborne electronic attack:
Stand-off: Jamming occurring outside of defended airspace. Planned  stand-off systems included the Air Force’s EC-130H Compass Call  aircraft and development of an electronic attack variant of the Air  Force’s B-52.
Modified escort: Jamming occurring inside defended airspace, but  outside of the range of known surface-to-air missiles. Planned  modified escort systems included the Navy’s EA-18G Growler and  EA-6B Prowler aircraft.
Penetrating escort: Jamming occurring inside the intercept range of  known surface-to-air missiles. The department planned to rely on  aircraft equipped with active electronically scanned array (AESA)  radars, including the F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lightning II aircraft to  perform this jamming function.
Stand-in: Jamming occurring inside the “no escape range” of known  surface-to-air missiles. The department planned to rely on  development of recoverable Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J- UCAS) and the Air Force’s Miniature Air Launched Decoy—Jammer  (MALD-J) to provide this function.
As time progressed, budget issues and lessons learned from operations  in Iraq and Afghanistan drove changes to the strategy and program  content. Most notably, the department canceled development of two  major components of the system of systems—the B-52 Standoff Jammer  and J-UCAS—in 2005 and 2006, respectively, citing higher-priority needs  and budget constraints. The B-52-based jamming concept was later  rejuvenated through the Air Force’s Core Component Jammer initiative,  but that program was similarly canceled in 2009. Following these  developments, the department revised operating concepts and joint  service responsibilities, moving away from its system of systems plans in  favor of a family of systems strategy for airborne electronic attack.
A family of systems is fundamentally different from a system of systems.  Under a family of systems construct, independent systems—using  different approaches—together provide capability effects to support  military operations. Unlike the synergy found in a system of systems, a  family of systems does not acquire qualitatively new properties or  necessarily create capability beyond the additive sum of the individual  capabilities of its members. The member systems may not even be  connected into a whole. In the case of airborne electronic attack, DOD  officials stated that a system of systems would have employed a dynamic,  networked capability to share data in real-time among platforms—a  concept known as electronic warfare battle management. Under the  family of systems strategy, officials stated that this process is less  automated and the parts are less connected. Therefore, in making this  strategy change, the department traded some unique, synergistic  capabilities that the system of system’s interdependent components might  have provided in favor of near-term budget savings and other priorities.
Figure 2 outlines the department’s current family of systems strategy for  countering near-peer adversaries. This family of systems includes  traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, and related mission  systems and weapons.
DOD’s 2009 electronic warfare capabilities analysis identified the growth  of irregular warfare in urban areas as presenting challenges to military  operations. The analysis noted that irregular adversaries can exploit  civilian and commercial communications infrastructure to minimize  detection and subsequent attack. According to the department, precise  electronic attack planning and execution are required to ensure that these  threats are defeated while avoiding interruption to U.S. communications  capabilities.
The department has used existing airborne electronic attack systems,  such as the EA-6B and EC-130H, to meet its near-term irregular warfare  needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, officials report that these  platforms are optimized for countering high-end, near-peer threats, and  their use against irregular warfare threats is inefficient and costly.  Consequently, the department has begun investing in new, less  expensive airborne electronic attack systems tailored to counter irregular  warfare threats. These systems are fielded from both traditional fixed- wing aircraft and from unmanned aerial vehicles. Figure 3 illustrates  operations involving these systems.
As DOD’s acquisition plans for airborne electronic attack systems have  evolved, operational stresses upon the current inventory of systems have  grown. These systems date back to the 1970s and 1980s and were  originally designed to counter Cold War era threats. Many of the  department’s existing airborne electronic attack systems face capability  limitations, requiring the department to pursue modernization efforts to  increase the effectiveness of the systems or to identify and develop  replacement systems. Further, existing systems face sustainment  challenges from age, parts obsolescence, and increased operational  stresses from lengthy and sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  According to Air Force and Navy officials, these challenges have reduced  the availabilities of some systems to warfighters. Table 1 identifies the  department’s existing airborne electronic attack systems and related  characteristics, including future replacement systems identified to date.
DOD is taking actions to address capability limitations and sustainment  challenges across several key systems, such as the following:
EA-6B Prowler: Since its introduction in the 1970s, the Navy and  Marine Corps have made significant upgrades to the EA-6B Prowler.  The latest of these upgrades—the Improved Capability electronic  suite modification (ICAP III) provides the Prowler with greater jamming  capability and is designed to improve the aircraft’s overall capability  as both a radar-jamming and HARM platform. By the end of fiscal  year 2012, 32 EA-6Bs will be upgraded to the ICAP III configuration.  Navy officials told us that persistent operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan, however, have degraded the condition of EA-6B aircraft.  In addition, we have previously reported that parts obsolescence  presents the biggest challenge to the EA-6B’s ability to fulfill its  mission role. We noted that although the Navy has made several  structural upgrades to the EA-6B fleet, it is actively tracking a number  of key components, including cockpit floors, side walls, fin pods,  bulkheads, actuators, engine components, landing gear, and avionics  software—all of which are at increasing risk for costly replacement the  longer the aircraft remains in service.
HARM: According to Navy officials, even though HARM has  undergone various block upgrades to provide increased capabilities  since fleet introduction in 1983, advancements in enemy radar  technology have rendered the weapon somewhat ineffective for  typical Navy targets. As a result, the Navy is fielding a major  technological upgrade to HARM through its AARGM acquisition  program. AARGM provides a new multimode guidance section and  modified control section mated with existing HARM propulsion and  warhead sections. The Air Force, similarly, is pursuing modifications  to HARM control sections on missiles in its inventory—a process that  will provide a global positioning system receiver to those units. Air  Force officials stated that they have long sought this receiver  component addition because of vulnerabilities in the HARM targeting  method. This effort is being pursued in conjunction with other  modernization efforts for Air Force F-16CM aircraft.
TALD and ITALD: Navy officials stated that advancements in enemy  integrated air defense systems have decreased the effectiveness of  both TALD and ITALD units. According to program officials, newer  radars can discern from the TALD/ITALD flight profile that the system  is a decoy and not a valid target. The Navy has begun evaluating  TALD/ITALD replacement options under its Airborne Electronic Attack  Expendable program initiative.
EC-130H Compass Call (Baselines 0 and 1): Although the Air Force  initially fielded the EC-130H Compass Call as a communications  jammer supporting suppression of enemy air defenses, the system  has evolved to include irregular warfare missions and radar jamming.  Air Force officials told us that the Compass Call is the most utilized  aircraft within the C-130 family and has been continuously deployed  since 2003 supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,  accelerating the need for the Air Force to replace the center wing box  on each of the 14 aircraft in the Compass Call fleet. Further, Air Force  officials told us that they are increasing the size of the fleet by one  aircraft to alleviate stress on current aircraft and to increase the  availability of airborne electronic attack capability to the Air Force.  According to a fleet viability assessment completed in 2010, the  current size of the fleet is insufficient to meet combatant commander  taskings for Compass Call.
AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System: The Navy’s Low Band  Transmitter upgrade to the AN/ALQ-99 system is intended to replace  three aging legacy transmitters that suffer from obsolescence and  reliability problems. According to Navy officials, persistent use of  these transmitters in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan  has exacerbated system shortfalls. Navy officials told us that they are  also identifying options for improving reliability and resolving  obsolescence issues with the mid and high bands of the AN/ALQ-99  system. However, Navy officials project that even with these  improvements, system capabilities will be insufficient to counter  anticipated evolutions in threat radars and missiles beginning in 2018.  This shortfall is expected to be addressed by the new Next  Generation Jammer.
AN/ALQ-131 and AN/ALQ-184 Pod Systems: The Air Force has  identified obsolescence issues and capability shortfalls affecting these  systems, which provide tactical aircraft self-protection. The Air Force  is pursuing a replacement/upgrades program designed to move the  Air Force to a single, self-protection pod system for its F-16 and A-10  aircraft.
section_title: Acquisitions May Not Produce Sufficient Results
paragraphs: DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its  growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats.  However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by  developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of  several planned systems. Some programs, including the Navy’s EA-18G  Growler and the Air Force’s EC-130H Compass Call modernization, are in  stable production and have completed significant amounts of testing. On  the other hand, the Navy’s AARGM, the Air Force’s Miniature Air  Launched Decoy (MALD), and other programs have required additional  time and money to resolve technical challenges. In addition, certain  airborne electronic attack systems in development may offer capabilities  that overlap with one another—a situation brought on in part by the  department’s fragmented urgent operational needs processes. As military  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to  consolidate current acquisition programs across services; however, this  consolidation may be hampered by leadership deficiencies affecting the  department’s electronic warfare enterprise. Furthermore, current and  planned acquisition programs, even if executed according to plan, will not  fully address the materiel-related capability gaps identified by the  department—including some that date back 10 years.
subsections: section_title: Investments in New Airborne Electronic Attack Systems Have Yielded Mixed Results to Date
paragraphs: DOD investments to develop and procure new and updated airborne  electronic attack systems are projected to total more than $17.6 billion  from fiscal years 2007 through 2016. These systems represent the  department’s planned mix of assets for (1) countering near-peer,  integrated air defense and communications systems and (2) providing  communications and radio frequency jamming against irregular warfare  threats. Table 2 outlines the department’s recent and planned  investments toward developing and acquiring several of these systems.
As table 2 shows, several airborne electronic attack systems are in an  advanced stage of funding. However, under current estimates, over   $6.0 billion in funding is still required to fully deliver these new systems to  the warfighter. Further, the department has not yet identified the full  amount of funding required for certain key systems, such as the Next  Generation Jammer, which could require billions of additional dollars to  field.
Correspondent to their different funding profiles, the department’s new  systems are also in various stages of development, with some  progressing more efficiently than others. Table 3 identifies the mission  role(s), developmental status, and fielding plans for these systems. In  addition, appendix II provides additional details on the status of several of  these programs.
Some airborne electronic attack acquisition programs have reached  stable production with limited cost growth or schedule delays. Two  primary examples include the following:
EA-18G Growler: Acquisition of the EA-18G Growler—a modified  escort jamming platform designed to carry AN/ALQ-99 and future  Next Generation Jammer pods—achieved initial capability in  September 2009, consistent with its 2007 baseline schedule.  Additionally, program costs per aircraft increased less than one-half of  1 percent from 2003 to 2010—an outcome partially attributable to  quantity increases from 90 to 114.
EC-130H Compass Call (Baselines 2 and 3): Modernization of the  EC-130H Compass Call is on schedule for fielding a new increment of  capability, Baseline 2, in 2014 within available funding limitations.  Baseline 2 introduces several new capabilities, including reactive  radar response and the Joint Tactical Radio System terminal that has  been delayed because of testing challenges. However, Compass Call  program officials do not expect the radio system delay to affect the  program’s fielding plans for Baseline 2 aircraft. According to the Air  Force, cost considerations are a primary criterion in developing EC- 130H capability requirements. The program office does not entertain  potential aircraft improvements unless those improvements are  accompanied by full funding. The Air Force is initiating technology  development activities for a subsequent phase of the modernization  program, Baseline 3, and plans to begin production of these aircraft in  2014, with initial fielding scheduled for 2017.
Our previous work has shown that good acquisition outcomes are  achieved through the knowledge-based approach to product development  that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before significant  commitments are made.This model relies on increasing knowledge when developing new  products, separating technology development from product development,  and following an evolutionary or incremental approach to product  development. In this approach, developers make investment decisions on  the basis of specific, measurable levels of knowledge at critical junctures  before investing more money and before advancing to the next phase of   In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time.  acquisition. The good outcomes on the EA-18G and EC-130H programs  can be attributed, in part, to acquisition strategies embodying elements of  best practices.
Other airborne electronic attack acquisition programs have not  progressed as efficiently, however. These systems have proceeded  through product development with lower-than-desired levels of knowledge  and subsequently faced technical, design, and production challenges,  contributing to significant cost growth, fielding delays or both. Most  notably, these systems entered—or are on track to enter—production  before completing key development activities, including achievement of  stable designs. We previously reported that concurrency in development  and production activities limits the ability of an acquisition program to  ensure that the system will work as intended and that it can be  manufactured efficiently to meet cost, schedule, and quality targets.
MALD/MALD-J: MALD was authorized for low rate initial production  in June 2008 with an initial plan for 300 low rate initial production units  in two lots, beginning in March 2009. However, testing failures in 2010  and 2011—coupled with a desire to avoid a potentially costly break in  production—prompted the Air Force to extend MALD low rate initial  production by two additional lots and increase total quantities under  contract to 836. In September 2011, citing “successful completion of  MALD-J engineering and manufacturing development activities,” the  Air Force exercised a priced option to upgrade 240 of its planned  MALD units to the MALD-J configuration, subsequently decreasing  MALD quantities to 596. Because all future production lots are now  planned as jammer-configured decoys (MALD-J), the 596 total  represents the full MALD procurement—without the program having  ever met the criteria necessary to proceed into full rate production.  Since the MALD and MALD-J designs are identical—except for the  addition of a jammer module to MALD-J—the absence of a proven  manufacturing process for MALD introduces schedule risk to  production of MALD-J. This risk is accentuated by continuing  deficiencies affecting the MALD and MALD-J designs, which have  required the Air Force to schedule additional developmental flight  tests for each system in February 2012 to test corrective fixes. To the  extent that this retesting phase shows a need for additional design  changes, the Air Force may be forced to revisit its planned May 2012  production start for MALD-J.
AARGM: The Navy authorized low rate initial production of AARGM  units in September 2008 with initial deliveries scheduled to begin in  January 2010. A total procurement objective of 1,919 units was set  and an initial operational capability scheduled for March 2011.  However, as a result of intermittent hardware and software failures in  testing, the program was decertified for initial operational test and  evaluation in September 2010, and low rate initial production  deliveries were delayed until June 2011. The missile has  subsequently reentered testing, but significant concerns about the  system’s reliability remain. Further, Navy officials stated that the  current program schedule is oriented toward success with virtually no  margin to accommodate technical deficiencies that may be discovered  during operational testing. In the event operational testing reveals new  or lingering major deficiencies, program officials report the planned  April 2012 fielding date will be at risk, and the Navy may be forced to  revisit its commitment to the program.
IDECM: From December 2000 to June 2010, the Navy authorized six  different low rate initial production lots of IDECM Blocks 2 and 3,  providing system improvements to the jammer and decoy  components. Block 2 production units delivered ahead of schedule,  but early Block 3 units encountered operational testing failures; later  resolved, these failures drove production delays to remaining units. In  Block 4, the Navy is introducing significant hardware design changes  to the ALQ-214 jammer component. Ground and flight testing to prove  out these design changes is scheduled concurrent with transition to  production in April 2012, increasing risk that initial Block 4 units will  require design changes and retrofits.concurrency is necessary in order to maintain an efficient production  line transition from Block 3 to Block 4 and to meet the desired June  2014 fielding date. They further noted that transition to Block 4  production will initially be for 19 systems, with production rates  increasing to as many as 40 per year following completion of testing.
section_title: Planned Systems May Offer Capabilities That Overlap, Presenting Opportunities to Consolidate Acquisition Efforts
paragraphs: Certain airborne electronic attack systems in development may offer  capabilities that unnecessarily overlap with one another. This condition  appears most prevalent with irregular warfare systems that the services  are acquiring under DOD’s fragmented urgent operational needs  processes. For example, the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force have all  separately invested to acquire unique systems intended to jam enemy  communications in support of ground forces. Further, Navy and Air Force  plans to separately invest in new expendable decoy jammers—systems  intended to counter near-peer adversaries—also appear to overlap.  Declining military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—coupled with recent  changes in the Air Force’s MALD-J program—afford opportunities to  consolidate current service-specific acquisition activities. The  department’s ability to capitalize on these opportunities, however, may be  undermined by a lack of designated, joint leadership charged with  overseeing electronic warfare acquisition activities.
DOD is investing millions of dollars to develop and procure airborne  electronic attack systems uniquely suited for irregular warfare operations.  Services are acquiring these systems under both rapid acquisition  authorities as well as through the traditional acquisition process. These  systems overlap—at least to some extent—in terms of planned mission  tasks and technical challenges to date. Yet, they have been developed as  individual programs by the different services. Table 4 highlights overlap  among three of these systems.
According to DOD officials, airborne electronic attack limitations in recent  operations, urgent needs of combatant commanders, and the desire to  provide ground units with their own locally controlled assets have all  contributed to service decisions to individually develop their own systems  to address irregular warfare threats. For example, one Marine Corps  official told us that his service is focused on increasing its airborne  electronic attack capacity to meet Marine Air-Ground Task Force  requirements in combat. Marine Corps systems typically equipped to  perform these tasks—especially the EA-6B Prowler aircraft—have  reached their capacity limits responding to combatant commander  taskings. Similarly, Air Force officials stated that ground warfighter  requests for airborne electronic attack capabilities sometimes go  unfulfilled or are delayed because of the overall constrained capacity  during current operations. Further, Army and Marine Corps officials see  operational benefits to providing ground unit commanders with smaller  airborne electronic attack assets—permanently integrated within the  unit—to free up Air Force and Navy assets for larger-scale missions. In  addition, the capabilities offered by current jamming pods, such as the  AN/ALQ-99, are often overkill for the irregular warfare mission needs— such as counter-improvised explosive device activities—facing ground  unit commanders.
Requirements for several of these irregular warfare systems were derived  from DOD urgent needs processes—activities aimed at rapidly  developing, equipping, and fielding solutions and critical capabilities to the  warfighter in a way that is more responsive to urgent requests than the  department’s traditional acquisition procedures. As we previously  reported, the department’s urgent needs processes often lead to multiple  entities responding to requests for similar capabilities, resulting in  potential duplication of efforts. Even under these circumstances, the  services have shown it is possible to take steps to share technical  information among the different programs and services. For instance, the  Army’s CEASAR pod is derived from the AN/ALQ-227 communications  jammer used on the Navy’s EA-18G—an attribute that Army officials state  reduced design risk in the program and provided opportunities for  decreased sustainment costs and reuse of jamming techniques between  the two services. Similarly, Air Force efforts to develop electronic attack  pods flown on MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (prior to that  program’s cancellation) leveraged previous technology investments for  the canceled B-52-based stand-off jammer.
As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down—and the  services evaluate whether to transition their current urgent needs  programs over to the formal weapon system acquisition process— opportunities may exist to consolidate program activities, such as the  Intrepid Tiger II and CEASAR systems that are still demonstration  programs whose transitions to formal acquisition programs have not yet  been determined.
The potential for unnecessary overlap in efforts within the airborne  electronic attack area is not limited to irregular warfare systems. With  respect to near-peer systems, both the Air Force and Navy are separately  pursuing advanced jamming decoys—the Air Force through its MALD-J  program, and the Navy through its planned Airborne Electronic Attack  Expendable initiative.
The two services have held discussions with one another about  combining efforts toward a joint solution, including a meeting between  Navy and Air Force requirements offices and acquisition officials in  December 2010, but they have not yet reached resolution on a common  path forward. According to Navy officials, relatively minor design and  software modifications to what was a planned second increment to the Air  Force’s MALD-J system could produce a system that satisfies both  services’ mission requirements. However, Air Force officials stated that  accommodating the Navy’s mission requirements within the system would  increase program costs and delay planned fielding of the Increment II  system, essentially rendering the planned program unexecutable.  Subsequently, Air Force officials stated that unless Increment II, in its  planned configuration, sufficiently met Navy requirements, they did not  expect the Navy to have any formal role in the program. In July 2011,  however, the Air Force suspended MALD-J Increment II activities  because of a lack of future funding availability. In February 2012, the Air  Force’s fiscal year 2013 budget submission officially canceled the  program. This cancellation affords an opportunity for continued dialogue  between the two services on the potential benefits and drawbacks to  pursuing a common acquisition solution.
In 2009, DOD completed a capabilities analysis that cited electromagnetic  spectrum leadership as the highest priority among 34 capability gaps  identified. The study concluded, in part, that leadership deficiencies, or its  absence, significantly impede the department from both identifying  departmentwide needs and solutions and eliminating potentially  unnecessary overlap among the services’ airborne electronic attack  acquisitions. Specifically, the department lacks a designated, joint entity  to both coordinate internal activities and represent electronic warfare  activities and interests to outside organizations. Acknowledging this  leadership gap, and its relation to acquisition activities, the department  has initiated efforts to organize the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum  Coordination Center under the leadership of U.S. Strategic Command. In  addition, officials representing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Research and Engineering stated that they are considering  actions they might take to improve leadership and oversight of electronic  warfare acquisition activities across the services. In a separate report, we  intend to evaluate planned and existing electronic warfare governance  structures within DOD.
section_title: Planned Systems Will Not Fully Address Capability Gaps
paragraphs: Notwithstanding the considerable investment over the years in new and  enhanced airborne electronic attack systems and subsystems, capability  gaps, some identified a decade ago, are expected to persist, or even  increase, through 2030 as adversary capabilities continue to advance. In  a series of studies since 2002, DOD identified existing current and  anticipated gaps in required capabilities. Some have persisted for years— for example, deficiencies in certain jamming capabilities to provide cover  for penetrating combat aircraft. The analyses found that, in many cases,  new materiel solutions were required to close these gaps. Table 5  outlines primary findings from three major analyses.
The 2002 analysis identified needs for stand-in and core component  jamming capabilities and suggested numerous ways to meet these. The  2004 study revalidated these gaps and outlined 10 potential materiel  solutions to fill those gaps. It also acknowledged the existence of both  near-peer and irregular warfare threats requiring airborne electronic  attack solutions. The Army and Marine Corps requested that the analysis  address irregular warfare threats because of the growing concern over  improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan and the suboptimal  application of existing systems in the inventory to defeat those threats.  The Air Force concluded in its analysis that fulfilling airborne electronic  attack mission needs would require developing and fielding multiple new  systems.
The most recent study, U.S. Strategic Command’s Electronic Warfare  Initial Capabilities Document, identified additional capability gaps affecting  airborne electronic attack. This 2009 analysis built upon a capabilities- based assessment completed a year earlier and outlined mitigation  strategies to address these gaps instead of merely prescribing specific  platform solutions. This approach was consistent with the analysis’s  charter to guide and inform the services’ acquisition programs. However,  the analysis did recommend specific capabilities and system attributes for  the Next Generation Jammer program to consider that would assist in  mitigating some of the gaps identified in the 2009 analysis. The analysis  also concluded that new systems would be needed to close nearly half of  the gaps identified in airborne electronic attack capabilities.
section_title: Improvements to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Investments in Science and Technology Are Helping to Bridge Gaps
paragraphs: To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other  efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the  near term, services are evolving their tactics, techniques, and procedures  for operating existing systems to enable them to take on additional  mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of existing systems  and better position operators to complete missions with equipment  currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on the  department successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and  technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address long- standing coordination shortfalls in this area including designating  electronic warfare as a priority area for investment and creating a steering  council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. However, these  steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities  ahead of departmentwide priorities. DOD’s planned implementation  roadmap for electronic warfare offers an opportunity to assess how  closely component research investments are aligned to the  departmentwide electronic warfare priority.
subsections: section_title: Changing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Existing Systems Can Mitigate Gaps in the Near Term
paragraphs: The refinement of tactics, techniques, and procedures can position the  services to maximize the capabilities of existing systems while new  capabilities are being developed. As Navy airborne electronic attack  operators stated, when a capability gap requiring a new system is  identified, warfighters generally do not have the luxury of waiting for the  acquisition community to develop and field a system to fill that gap. In the  interim, tactics, techniques, and procedures for existing systems must  evolve to provide at least partial mitigation to the threat being faced.  Development and refinement of new ways to use existing equipment  allow the services to maximize the utility of their airborne electronic attack  systems and leave them better positioned to complete missions with the  assets they have available. The following two systems provide examples  where operator communities have refined tactics, techniques, and  procedures to meet emerging threats:
AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System: Navy officials told us that  threats encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan operations have driven  significant changes to how the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System  is employed. In essence, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the  system had to evolve to maximize the system’s capabilities against  irregular warfare threats. According to Navy officials, however, these  adaptations represent only a temporary solution as their application— coupled with increased operational activity—has caused jamming  pods to degrade and burn out at an increasing rate, subsequently  increasing maintenance requirements for the system.
EC-130H Compass Call: According to Air Force officials, EC-130H  tactics, techniques, and procedures have rapidly evolved to  encompass dynamically changing electronic attack threats, which  include irregular warfare. These changes include modifications to both  how the operator employs the aircraft as well as to the range of  threats targeted by mission planners.
Both Navy and Air Force officials emphasized that sustained investments  in tactics, techniques, and procedures offer considerable return on  investment and can provide important, near-term solutions to longer-term,  persistent threats. According to these officials, these investments position  operators to “do more with less”—in effect, offer them the opportunity to  mitigate or counteract a threat without the required new system. However,  limits exist to the extent to which refinements to current operating  approaches for existing systems can bridge capability gaps. For example,  it is increasingly difficult to further optimize AN/ALQ-99 jamming pods to  counter advanced, integrated air defense systems. Specifically, Navy  officials stated that the AN/ALQ-99 has reached its limit in terms of the  underlying architecture’s capability to grow to counter new, sophisticated  types of threats.
section_title: DOD Focusing Science and Technology Investments to Close Gaps in the Long Term, but Coordination Remains a Concern
paragraphs: Investment in the science and technology research base is a longer-term  approach DOD uses to address capability gaps in mission areas.  Electronic warfare, including airborne electronic attack, is supported by  research investments in fields such as sensors, apertures, power  amplifiers, and unmanned aircraft technology that may help address  existing capability gaps. Service components categorize research  investments differently from one another, which complicates efforts to  clearly define funding devoted to airborne electronic attack. Table 6  identifies some of DOD’s current airborne electronic attack-related  research investments.
However, not all investments in these fields will necessarily improve  airborne electronic attack capabilities. Research officials identify the  transition to system development and procurement as one of the primary  goals of defense research programs, but acknowledge, reasonably, that  not every program will successfully develop a transitionable product.  Some acquisition programs, such as the Next Generation Jammer and  the MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod, invest directly in research to  guide the transition process and increase the likelihood of success. But  even with this direct attention, technology maturation and development for  Next Generation Jammer is expected to last 8 to 9 years. Consequently,  current science and technology initiatives represent a long-term  investment in future capabilities and are less suited to meeting existing  needs.
DOD analyses during the past decade have identified coordination  deficiencies that constrain the department’s ability to capitalize on its  science and technology investments. For instance, a 2005 Naval  Research Advisory Committee report found that within the Navy, research  and development efforts were unduly fragmented, with one laboratory or  development activity often being unaware of what another was doing.  Further, this study highlighted the lack of a long-range science and  technology investment planning process within the Navy. Similarly, in  2007, the Defense Science Board reported that although relevant and  valuable science and technology activity was occurring, an overarching,  departmentwide strategic technology plan with assigned responsibility,  accountability, and metrics did not exist. According to the board, DOD’s  science and technology activities and investments should be more  directly informed by the department’s strategic goals and top-level  missions—an objective that would require a closer coupling of  technologists and users, including requirements and capabilities  developers. A 2010 Naval Research Advisory Committee report built on  previous findings noted that stewardship of long-term naval capabilities  was “vague at best” and lacked specific organizational assignment. The  report recognized the Navy as having the lead role within DOD for  electronic warfare, but identified sporadic and uncoordinated execution  across the technical community—noting little evidence of engagement  among the science and technology community at large. Further, the  report advised that closer coordination between operational and technical  communities was essential for the realization of desired long-term  capabilities.
DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address these shortfalls,  including formalizing existing investment processes for several key  science and technology areas. Most notably, in April 2011 the Secretary  of Defense designated electronic warfare as one of seven priority areas  for science and technology investment from fiscal years 2013 through  2017. According to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)), this designation  carries the promise of increased research funding and has prompted  chartering of the interdepartmental Electronic Warfare Priority Steering  Council. This council is made up of research officials from ASD (R&E),  the services, and various defense science and technology groups, such  as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and is charged with  effectively evaluating electronic warfare capability gaps and linking them  with research initiatives necessary to fill them. To support this process,  the council is developing an implementation roadmap to guide  coordination of investments within the electronic warfare area. The  council also facilitates ASD(R&E) coordination with requirements teams  and service/external research offices to determine the specific fields of  inquiry that will be needed to support planning for future electronic  warfare capability needs. Previously, this coordination was handled  informally, whereas the new council provides authority and visibility to the  discussions and decisions made.
Notwithstanding these important steps, services may inevitably face  situations where they have to choose between funding their own, service- specific research priorities and funding departmentwide priorities. As the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering testified in  2011, DOD’s seven priority areas for science and technology investment  are meant to be in addition to the priorities outlined by individual  components (i.e., service research agencies and DARPA). In other  words, departmentwide science and technology priorities do not  necessarily supplant service priorities. Absent strategic direction,  however, services have generally been inclined to pursue their own  research interests ahead of departmentwide pursuits. DOD’s planned  implementation roadmap for electronic warfare offers opportunities to  assess how closely component research investments are aligned to the  departmentwide electronic warfare priority and to coordinate component  investments in electronic warfare.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The rapidity of evolving threats, together with the time and cost  associated with fielding new systems, creates a major challenge to DOD  and its capacity to fill all of its capability gaps. This dynamic makes it  imperative that the department get the most out of its electronic warfare  investments. At this point, that does not appear to be the case. The  systems being acquired have problems and will not deliver as expected;  potential overlap, to the extent that it leads to covering some gaps  multiple ways while leaving others uncovered, drains buying power from  the money that is available; and DOD acknowledges a leadership void  that makes it difficult to ascertain whether the current level of investment  is optimally matched with the existing capability gaps.
Within the airborne electronic attack mission area, budgetary pressures  and related program cancellations prompted the department to change its  acquisition strategy from a system of systems construct—as underpinned  by the 2002 analysis of alternatives—to a potentially less robust, but more  affordable, family of systems. In addition, new systems, including AARGM  and MALD, that are designed to replace or augment legacy assets have  encountered technical challenges while in acquisition, subsequently  requiring the services to delay fielding plans within each program. Other  acquisition programs, including IDECM and MALD-J, are structured with a  high degree of concurrency between development, production, and  testing that position them for similar suboptimal outcomes. Although  individual service decisions to delay or cancel underperforming or  resource-intensive programs may be fiscally prudent, the cumulative  effect of these decisions creates uncertainty as to when, or if, current  departmentwide airborne electronic attack capability gaps can be filled. At  present, even if the department successfully acquires the full complement  of systems outlined in its family of systems strategy, some capability gaps  identified a decade ago may persist. As such, the department can benefit  from reevaluating its capability gaps—using structures like the new  Electronic Warfare Priority Steering Council—to identify which ones are  highest priorities for science and technology investment and to determine  areas where it is more willing to accept mission risk. This analysis, when  coupled with an examination of current service-specific science and  technology investments, can position DOD to realize improved  efficiencies in its electronic warfare research activities and better align  constrained budgets with highest-priority needs. Additionally, because  underperformance in acquisition programs exacerbates existing capability  gaps, realistic assessments of higher-risk programs can provide needed  insight into what capabilities each platform is likely to deliver and when.  Shortfalls in acquisition should not be the deciding factor on which  capability gaps the department accepts.
At the same time, services continue to pursue and invest in multiple  separate airborne electronic attack systems that potentially overlap with  one another. This overlap is most evident in irregular warfare systems,  including the Marine Corps’s Intrepid Tiger II and the Army’s CEASAR  systems, but is also present in Air Force and Navy efforts to develop  expendable jamming decoys through their respective MALD-J and  Airborne Electronic Attack Expendable initiatives. Pursuing multiple  separate acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can result in the  same capability gap being filled twice or more, can lead to inefficient use  of resources, and may contribute to other warfighting needs going  unfilled. Leveraging resources and acquisition efforts across services— not just by sharing information, but through shared partnerships and  investments—can simplify developmental efforts, can improve  interoperability among systems and combat forces, and could decrease  future operating and support costs. Such successful outcomes can  position the department to maximize the returns it gets on its airborne  electronic attack investments.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five  actions:
Given airborne electronic attack programmatic and threat changes  since 2002, complete the following:
Conduct program reviews for the AARGM, IDECM, MALD, and  MALD-J systems to assess cost, schedule, and performance and  direct changes within these investments, as necessary.
Determine the extent to which the most pressing airborne  electronic attack capability gaps can best be met—using the  assets that are likely to be available—and take steps to fill any  potential gaps.
Align service investments in science and technology with the  departmentwide electronic warfare priority, recognizing that  budget realities will likely require trade-offs among research areas,  and direct changes, as necessary.
To ensure that investments in airborne electronic attack systems are  cost-effective and to prevent unnecessary overlap, take the following  actions:
Review the capabilities provided by the Marine Corps’s Intrepid  Tiger II and Army’s CEASAR systems and identify opportunities  for consolidating these efforts, as appropriate.
Assess Air Force and Navy plans for developing and acquiring  new expendable jamming decoys, specifically those services’  respective MALD-J and Airborne Electronic Attack Expendable  initiatives, to determine if these activities should be merged.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, which are reprinted in appendix III, DOD concurred with three  of our recommendations and partially concurred with two  recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments that we  incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation to conduct program  reviews for the AARGM, IDECM, MALD, and MALD-J systems and direct  changes within these investments, as necessary, identifying a March  2012 Navy review of the IDECM program and planned July 2012 Navy  review of the AARGM system. For MALD and MALD-J, DOD plans to  conduct a program review in early 2014, which will coincide with a  planned full rate production decision for MALD-J. In the interim, DOD  intends to continue low rate initial production of MALD-J units. However,  because MALD has experienced significant technical challenges within  the past 2 years, and because DOD plans to invest an additional $176.9  million toward MALD-J production through fiscal year 2014, we believe an  earlier review may be warranted. In its written comments, DOD also  stated that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and  Tactical Systems will chair a meeting to review AARGM, IDECM, MALD,  and MALD-J with the Navy and Air Force to verify progress, but it did not  provide a timetable for this review.
DOD also concurred with our second recommendation to determine the  extent to which the most pressing airborne electronic attack capability  gaps can best be met—using the assets that are likely to be available— and take steps to fill any potential gaps. Most notably, DOD cited plans  for U.S. Strategic Command to annually assess all DOD electronic  warfare capabilities—including current requirements, current and planned  future capabilities, and the supporting investment strategy—and present  this assessment to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Further,  DOD concurred with our third recommendation to align service  investments in science and technology with the departmentwide  electronic warfare priority, noting in its written comments that it expects  implementation roadmaps for priority areas (including electronic warfare)  will serve to coordinate component investments and accelerate the  development and delivery of capabilities.
DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations related to  potentially unnecessary overlap among airborne electronic attack  systems, identifying through its written comments plans for the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Tactical Systems to  review the Intrepid Tiger and CEASAR systems with the Marine Corps  and Army to investigate the efficacy of additional coordination as future  acquisition plans are evaluated. Similarly, DOD noted that following the  expected March 30, 2012, completion of a new Air Force plan related to  developing and procuring an Increment II variant of MALD-J, the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation; and Joint Staff would review Air Force and Navy plans and  assess opportunities for coordination among the MALD-J and Airborne  Electronic Attack Expendable initiatives, should funding be allocated for a  future expendables program. However, the basis for DOD’s partial  agreement on these two recommendations appears to stem from its  desire to achieve efficiencies through increased coordination among  programs—not through consolidation of systems possessing similar  capabilities. We emphasize that coordination is not a substitute for  consolidation—particularly in the current constrained budget  environment—and we encourage DOD to expand the scope of its  planned reviews to include assessments of potential unnecessary  redundancies within these two sets of systems.
Additionally, DOD commented that our draft report overstated the  acquisition duplication among airborne electronic attack systems. Most  notably, DOD pointed to its cancellations of the MQ-9 Electronic Attack  Pod and MALD-J Increment II programs, as outlined in its fiscal year 2013  budget submission, as evidence that duplication was being managed.  These cancellations were announced after we had completed our work  and drafted the report. During the period that our draft report was with the  agency for comment, we revised our report and recommendations, in  coordination with DOD, to account for these recent changes. Most  notably, we revised our fourth and fifth recommendations to remove the  newly canceled MQ-9 Electronic Attack Pod and MALD-J Increment II  systems, respectively, as additional platforms where DOD may identify  opportunities for consolidation. DOD’s written comments were  subsequently crafted in response to our revised set of recommendations.  As noted above, opportunities to reduce duplication further remain. We  also briefly introduced the Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic  Warfare concept, in response to DOD’s comments, while further clarifying  that our report did not evaluate ground- or ship-based electronic warfare  systems.
DOD also commented that our characterization of the family of systems  strategy for airborne electronic attack was misleading, stating that the  system of systems synergies envisioned in 2002 continue to be pursued.  We acknowledge that DOD is considering options to field additional  systems against high-end threats, but we believe that the current  acquisition strategy and its distributed approach is very much in line with  the definition of a family of systems, as outlined by DOD. When DOD  embarked on the system of systems strategy in 2002, it envisioned  fielding certain major systems, such as B-52 Standoff Jammer and   J-UCAS, which were later canceled. Without these planned elements,  there is no evidence to suggest that the remaining systems together  possess capability beyond the additive sum of the individual capabilities  of its members—a characteristic fundamental to a system of systems.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the  Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report evaluates the Department of Defense’s (DOD) airborne  electronic attack capabilities and investment plans. Specifically, we  assessed (1) the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic  attack capabilities, (2) progress made developing and fielding systems to  meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, and (3) additional  compensating actions taken by the department to address capability  gaps, including improvements to tactics, techniques, and procedures and  investments in science and technology.
To assess the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic  attack capabilities, we analyzed DOD’s documents outlining mission  requirements and acquisition needs, including the 2002 Airborne  Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives, 2004 Initial Capabilities  Document for Denying Enemy Awareness through Airborne Electronic  Attack, 2008 Electronic Warfare Capabilities-Based Assessment, 2009  Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, and 2010 Electronic  Warfare Strategy of the Department of Defense report to Congress. We  also reviewed platform-specific capabilities documents, service roadmaps  related to airborne electronic attack, and budget documents to  understand how the family of systems construct evolved over time. To  identify capability limitations and sustainment challenges facing current  airborne electronic attack systems, we reviewed program briefings and  acquisition documentation related to these systems. To further  corroborate documentary evidence and obtain additional information in  support of our review, we conducted interviews with relevant DOD  officials responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements  and overseeing the related family of systems, including officials in the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,  Development and Acquisition; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations— Information Dominance and Air Warfare directorates; Office of the  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Office of the  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements— Electronic Warfare division; Air Force Air Combat Command; Army Office  of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training— Electronic Warfare division; Marine Air-Ground Task Force Electronic  Warfare; U.S. Strategic Command; and Joint Staff. We also held  discussions with DOD officials responsible for sustaining current airborne  electronic attack systems, including officials in (1) Navy program offices  for Airborne Electronic Attack, Advanced Tactical Aircraft Protection  Systems, Direct and Time Sensitive Strike, and Aerial Target and Decoy  Systems and (2) Air Force offices, including the F-22A Raptor and F- 16CM program offices and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center.
To assess progress made developing and fielding systems to meet  airborne electronic attack mission requirements, we analyzed documents  outlining acquisition plans, costs, and performance outcomes, including  capabilities documents, program schedules, test reports, budget  submissions, system acquisition reports, and program briefings. These  same materials afforded information on key attributes of individual  airborne electronic attack systems, which we used to assess potential  overlap among systems in development. Further, we identified persisting  airborne electronic attack capability gaps by reviewing the 2009  Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, along with earlier  analyses related to airborne electronic attack requirements, and  compared the capability needs identified in those documents with current  DOD investments in airborne electronic attack capabilities. To  supplement our analyses and gain additional visibility into these issues,  we conducted interviews with relevant DOD officials responsible for  managing airborne electronic attack requirements, including officials in  the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—Information Dominance and  Air Warfare directorates; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force  for Acquisition; Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for  Operations, Plans, and Requirements—Electronic Warfare division; Air  Force Air Combat Command; Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for  Operations, Plans, and Training—Electronic Warfare division; Marine Air- Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare; U.S. Strategic Command; and  Joint Staff. We also held numerous interviews with DOD officials primarily  responsible for developing, acquiring, and testing airborne electronic  attack systems, including officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the Director,  Operational Test and Evaluation; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation; Office of the Assistant  Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Office  of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Navy program  offices for Airborne Electronic Attack, F/A-18 and EA-18G, Direct and  Time Sensitive Strike, and Advanced Tactical Aircraft Protection Systems;  Army Rapid Equipping Force; and Air Force program offices for  MALD/MALD-J and MQ-9 Reaper Electronic Attack Pod.
To assess additional compensating actions taken by the department to  address airborne electronic attack capability gaps, we reviewed service  documents outlining recent improvements and refinements to tactics,  techniques, and procedures for EA-18G and EC-130H aircraft. We  corroborated this information through interviews with officials from the  Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and Air Force Office of the Deputy  Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements—Electronic  Warfare division charged with refining tactics, techniques, and procedures  for EA-18G and EC-130H aircraft. We also reviewed broad agency  announcements to understand ongoing science and technology activities  related to airborne electronic attack. We supplemented this  documentation review with discussions with officials engaged in science  and technology work tied to airborne electronic attack, including officials  in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and  Engineering, Office of Naval Research, Air Force Research Laboratory,  and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Analyses of Select Airborne Electronic Attack Systems
paragraphs: This appendix provides analyses of 10 selected airborne electronic attack  systems. Figures 4 through 13 show images of each system; tables 7  through 16 provide budget data on each system.
Estimated end of service life: 2020  Mission description: The primary mission of the Prowler is the  suppression of enemy air defenses in support of strike aircraft and ground  troops by interrupting enemy electronic activity and obtaining tactical  electronic intelligence within the combat area. The EA-6B uses the  AN/ALQ-99 radar jamming pod for non-lethal protection by jamming air  defense systems and its AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile for  lethal physical attack of air defense systems.
Status: In 2010, we reported that the Navy had started replacing its EA- 6B aircraft with EA-18G Growlers and expected all Prowlers to be out of  its inventory by 2012. However, the Navy projects Prowlers to remain in  service until 2016 to further meet the joint expeditionary need. According  to the Navy, this is subject to additional change contingent on the fiscal  year 2013 budget. The Marine Corps plans to retire its Prowlers by 2020.  In addition, the most recent upgrade program for the EA-6B—the third  Improved Capability electronic suite modification (ICAP III)—is nearing  completion. ICAP III provides the Prowler with greater jamming capability,  including the ability to perform selective reactive jamming.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Estimated end of service life:  Mid-band: 2024   Low-band: 2026   High-band: 2028  Mission description: The AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System is an  airborne electronic warfare system carried on the EA-6B and EA-18G to  support the suppression of enemy air defenses. The system is capable of  intercepting, automatically processing, and jamming received radio  frequency signals.
Status: Obsolescence issues and advances in adversary technology  have reduced the AN/ALQ-99’s ability to counter emerging threats. The  Navy is developing its Next Generation Jammer program to replace the  AN/ALQ-99 and plans to begin fielding the system in 2020. In the interim,  the Navy is currently replacing three aging legacy low-band transmitters  to resolve obsolescence and reliability problems.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Estimated end of service life: 2053  Mission description: The EC-130H Compass Call is an airborne, wide  area, persistent stand-off electronic attack weapon system able to disrupt  and deny adversary use of the electronic battlespace using offensive  radio frequency countermeasures. Its primary mission is to deny or  disrupt command and control of enemy integrated air defenses, air  defense surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery threats. Its  secondary mission is to support ground and special operations forces by  denying enemy communications and defeating improvised explosive  devices.
Status: The Air Force has evolved the Compass Call since it was first  fielded in 1982 to meet modern and emerging threats, including  commercial communications, early warning radars, and improvised  explosive devices. Upgrades and modernization efforts are completed  during regularly scheduled depot maintenance. In 2003, as a response to  Operation Enduring Freedom, these upgrades transitioned from “Block”  upgrades to “Baseline” upgrades to allow for smaller and more focused  modernization efforts. Currently, the Air Force is completing Baseline 1  upgrades, beginning Baseline 2 efforts, and developing Baseline 3  requirements. In addition, the Air Force is also replacing the center wing  box on all 14 Compass Call aircraft, which will extend the service life of  the fleet. Compass Call has been on continuous deployment in support of  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003; which has accelerated the  need to replace the center wing boxes. Finally, to further alleviate stress  on the fleet, the Air Force plans to procure an additional aircraft,  increasing the size of the fleet to 15 aircraft by fiscal year 2016.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Estimated end of service life: Not available  Mission description: The F-22A is the Air Force’s fifth-generation air  superiority fighter that incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable  airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a supercruise engine.  Originally developed as an air-to-air fighter, additional capabilities will  allow the F-22A to perform multiple missions including destruction of  enemy air defenses, air-to-ground attack, electronic attack, and  intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.
Status: The F-22A, along with the F-35, is expected to fulfill the Air  Force’s requirement for penetrating escort jamming capability. The Air  Force initiated a formal F-22A modernization and reliability improvement  program in 2003 to incrementally develop and deliver increasing  capabilities over time. These increasing capabilities would allow the F- 22A to provide penetrating escort jamming, as envisioned in the airborne  electronic attack family of systems strategy. However, fielding of these  capabilities has been delayed because of reductions in program funding.  In addition, we have previously reported on schedule delays within the  modernization and reliability improvement program and their effect on  fielding additional capabilities within expected time frames. Further delays  in fielding these planned capabilities may affect the Air Force’s ability to  provide sufficient penetrating escort jamming, increasing mission risk.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Mission description: The EA-18G Growler replaces the EA-6B Prowler  as DOD’s tactical electronic attack aircraft. Like the Prowler, the EA-18G  will provide full-spectrum electronic attack to counter enemy air defenses  and communication networks. The EA-18G incorporates jamming  capabilities, such as the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System, and the  use of onboard weapons such as the High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile,  for the suppression of enemy air defenses. The Growler is the Navy’s  platform to fulfill modified escort jamming capability needs.
Status: The Growler program entered full rate production in 2009, with a  planned acquisition of 88 aircraft. However, in 2009, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to buy an additional 26 aircraft,  bringing the total units to be acquired to 114. Through fiscal year 2011,  the Navy placed 90 of 114 planned EA-18G aircraft under contract for  production. Production is slightly ahead of schedule and has incorporated  the increase in total units with limited per-unit cost growth.
In 2010, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, declared the  Growler operationally effective, but also found that the aircraft was  unsuitable for operations based on maintainability concerns. Since then,  the Navy has taken steps to improve the EA-18Gs suitability through  software fixes, and the system recently completed follow-on operational  test and evaluation. In addition, initial deployment of the aircraft in support  of operations in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan recently concluded, and the  Navy is assessing the aircraft’s performance, including the remaining  challenges mitigating electromagnetic interference with the AN/ALQ-99.  Additional software improvements are planned through fiscal year 2018.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Estimated fielding date: 2012  Mission description: AARGM is an air-to-ground missile for carrier- based aircraft designed to destroy enemy radio-frequency-enabled  surface-to-air defense. AARGM is an upgrade to the AGM-88 High Speed  Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and will utilize existing HARM propulsion  and warhead sections with new guidance and modified control sections.
Status: The Navy authorized AARGM production in September 2008,  with deliveries scheduled to begin in January 2010. A total of 1,919 units  were planned, with initial operational capability scheduled for March 2011.  The program began operational testing in June 2010 after a 9-month  delay owing, in part, to concerns about the production representativeness  of test missiles. The Navy halted operational testing in September 2010  after hardware and software deficiencies caused a series of missile  failures.
These testing challenges prompted the Navy to delay AARGM’s planned  initial operational capability date and undertake corrective actions to the  system. These actions included an evaluation of the AARGM system  through laboratory, ground, and flight tests from November 2010 through  June 2011. Following this testing, Navy officials concluded that previous  testing anomalies were successfully corrected but that the system was at  high risk of not meeting suitability requirements during operational testing.  The Navy found that insufficient system reliability and manufacturing  quality controls remain open deficiencies that will likely result in an  excessive number of system failures experienced by operational units,  which could prevent the Navy from effectively executing planned  missions. To address reliability concerns, the Navy instituted a “fly before  you buy” program to screen poor weapons prior to government  acceptance. As of July 2011, one-third of missiles delivered for testing  were returned to the factory for repair.
Recently, the AARGM system resumed operational testing. The Navy  now plans to field the system beginning in April 2012 and make a full rate  production decision and contract award in June and July 2012,  respectively.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Estimated fielding date: 2014 (Block 4)
Mission description: IDECM is a suite of self-protection countermeasure  systems designed for the F/A-18E/F, including onboard jamming and off- board decoy jamming capabilities. The Navy has fielded IDECM in  different blocks dating back to 2002 (Block 1), 2004 (Block 2), and 2011  (Block 3). Each block improved the system’s jamming capabilities, decoy  capabilities, or both. Block 4—the phase of production currently in  development—extends IDECM onboard jamming capabilities to F/A- 18C/D aircraft.
Status: IDECM Block 4 entered development in 2009 and includes  redesign of the ALQ-214 onboard jammer from the component design  used for earlier blocks. This redesign is driven by the need to reduce  weight in order to accommodate the IDECM onboard system on F/A- 18C/D aircraft. Essentially, the new ALQ-214 will perform the same  onboard jammer function as found in IDECM Blocks 2 and 3 but with a  different form and fit. The Navy expects to transition current IDECM Block  3 full rate production to Block 4 units by April 2012. This production  transition will occur concurrent with ground and flight testing of the Block  4 system—a strategy that could drive costly design changes, retrofits, or  both to units in production, in the event that the ALQ-214 redesign effort  does not materialize on schedule. To mitigate this risk, Navy officials  stated that Block 4 full rate production will initially be for 19 systems, with  production rates increasing to as many as 40 per year following  completion of testing. Further, DOD officials report that Block 4 production  will be executed under a firm fixed-price contract—a strategy that DOD  officials state will place the financial burden of any retrofits on the vendor.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Estimated fielding date: 2020 (Mid-band on EA-18G)
Mission description: The Next Generation Jammer will be an electronic  warfare system to support the suppression of enemy air defenses,  replacing and improving the capability currently provided by AN/ALQ-99  Tactical Jamming System. The Navy’s EA-18G will employ the Next  Generation Jammer as the electronic attack payload. In a separate  increment of capability, the Navy plans to integrate the Next Generation  Jammer onto the F-35B, which will eventually replace Marine Corps EA- 6B Prowlers. Each increment of capability will be divided into  developmental blocks—Block 1 for mid-band, Block 2 for low-band, and  Block 3 for high-band frequencies.
Status: The Next Generation Jammer is nearing completion of  technology maturation activities performed by four different contractors  before the program’s entry into the technology development phase. The  Navy plans to enter the technology development phase in the third  quarter of fiscal year 2013, with an engineering and manufacturing  development contract planned for 2015. The Navy has adopted an  evolutionary block approach to fielding the Next Generation Jammer.  Initial operational capability for Block 1, on the EA-18G aircraft, is  scheduled for 2020. The Navy expects to field Blocks 2 and 3 on the EA- 18G in 2022 and 2024, respectively. Fielding dates for the F-35  increment’s blocks are currently undetermined.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.  2012 (MALD—actual)  2012 (MALD-J—estimated)
Mission description: MALD is an expendable decoy able to represent  small, medium, or large aircraft in order to saturate or degrade enemy air  defense systems. MALD-J is a variant of MALD that adds jamming  capability to the decoy and forms the stand-in jamming component for the  airborne electronic attack family of systems. The Air Force plans to  acquire a total quantity of 596 MALD and 2,404 MALD-J units.
Status: The Air Force approved MALD for low rate initial production in  2008. The Air Force expected to procure 300 MALD units in low rate  production before transitioning to full rate production. However, following  flight testing failures in summer 2010—attributable, in part, to design  issues with the fuel filter—and a later test failure in February 2011 caused  by foreign object debris in the fuel line, the MALD system was decertified,  and remaining initial operational testing and evaluation activities were  suspended. After additional corrective actions by the program office to the  MALD design, the system reentered operational testing in July 2011, with  test shots fired in late August 2011. According to Air Force testing  officials, during the last test shot in the August series (OT-8), the engine  for one decoy never started after it detached from the host aircraft,  causing that MALD unit to crash. This operational testing event was the  final one scheduled for MALD, and DOD officials report that, in January  2012, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center delivered the  MALD initial operational test and evaluation report assessing system  performance.
As a result of MALD’s testing shortfalls, the Air Force authorized  additional low rate initial production purchases for MALD quantities—to  the extent that the Air Force will now purchase the entire 596 unit  inventory of MALD quantities under low rate initial production, without  ever authorizing or achieving full rate production. Technical deficiencies  and design changes during low rate initial production prevented  demonstration of an efficient manufacturing capability, which in turn  prevented MALD from meeting the department’s criteria to enter full rate  production. DOD policy states that in order for a system to receive full  rate production approval, the system must (1) demonstrate control of the  manufacturing process and acceptable reliability, (2) collect statistical  process control data, and (3) demonstrate control and capability of other  critical processes. Because the MALD and MALD-J designs are  identical—except for the addition of a jammer module to MALD-J—the  absence of a proven manufacturing process for MALD introduces cost  and schedule risk to production of MALD-J.
Deficiencies affecting the MALD vehicle have already contributed to  MALD-J program delays. The MALD-J low rate initial production decision  review—previously planned for September 2009—was delayed until  September 2011. Operational testing has subsequently been delayed and  is now expected to begin in May 2012. To mitigate this schedule delay,  the Air Force has moved to compress MALD-J operational testing from 15  months to 7 months, which program officials report reflects an increase in  test range priority and decrease in data turnaround time. According to  DOD officials, however, test range execution issues such as aircraft and  test equipment availability could potentially extend MALD-J operational  testing beyond the currently projected completion date. In addition, the Air  Force delayed, and later canceled, plans to develop a second increment  of capability for MALD-J—one intended to provide more advanced  jamming capabilities. Prior to these decisions, the Air Force’s fiscal year  2012 budget submission outlined plans to budget $54.8 million in  research, development, testing, and evaluation funding to MALD-J  Increment II in fiscal year 2013. According to DOD, the Air Force is to  provide a new plan for developing and procuring an Increment II variant of  MALD-J and report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by March 30,  2012.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
Estimated fielding date: To be determined  Mission description: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a family of fifth- generation strike aircraft to replace and complement existing Navy, Air  Force, and Marine Corps aircraft, such as the F-16 and the F/A-18. The  F-35, along with the F-22A, is expected to fulfill DOD’s requirement for  penetrating escort jamming capability.
Status: The F-35 program entered low rate initial production in 2007, with  a planned baseline acquisition of 2,886 aircraft. The program experienced  development challenges, including delays in testing, leading to a  program-wide review. Based on this review, DOD restructured the  program in 2010, increasing the time and funding for development. This  restructure triggered a breach of the critical Nunn-McCurdy cost growth  threshold. Presently, the program plans to procure 2,457 aircraft, and the  services are still reviewing scheduled plans for operational capability and  fielding.
Budget: See the following table for budget information.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Christopher R. Durbin; Laura  Greifner; James Kim; Scott Purdy; Sylvia Schatz; Brian Smith; and  Roxanna Sun.