NASA: Medium Launch Transition Strategy Leverages Ongoing Investments but Is Not Without Risk
Published: 2010-11-22T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has long relied on the Delta II medium class launch vehicle to launch science missions. Delta II, however, is no longer in production, and no other vehicle in the relative cost and performance range is currently certified for NASA use. Thus, NASA faces a potential gap in the availability of medium class launch vehicles that could cause design challenges, delays, or funding issues. GAO was asked to assess (1) NASA's and the Delta II contractor's, steps to ensure resources (budget, workforce, and facilities) are available to support safe Delta II operations through the last planned NASA flight in 2011; (2) NASA's plans and contingencies for ensuring a smooth transition from current small and medium class launch vehicles to other launch vehicles for future science missions; (3) the risks associated with NASA's planned approach to fill the medium launch capability gap; and (4) technical and programmatic implications to science missions if NASA commits to new launch vehicles before they are certified and proven. GAO identified and assessed transition plans and mitigation activities and interviewed responsible NASA and government officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NASA's Launch Services Program (LSP) is taking steps to address risks and ensure the success of the last planned Delta II launched missions through a combination of specific government approvals and targeted government insight into contractor activities and designs. For example, LSP uses government systems engineers with technical expertise to review or repeat the contractors' engineering analyses. This is a key factor in high launch success rates. From 1990 through 2009, LSP has achieved a 98 percent launch success rate. LSP is conducting additional reviews of launch vehicle processing to mitigate risk associated with the remaining Delta II flights. LSP has also identified several specific areas of concern with the remaining Delta II flights--including contractor workforce expertise, postproduction subcontractor support, spare parts, and launch pads--and is taking steps where possible to mitigate risks and ensure the success of the remaining missions. NASA plans to leverage ongoing investments to acquire a new medium launch capability for science missions in the relative cost and performance range of the Delta II. The agency expects to eventually certify the vehicles being developed for space station resupply for use by NASA science missions. NASA has been in coordination with agency and contractor officials responsible for these efforts. Further, the agency revised its policy to allow for faster certification of new providers. Due to an active small class launch vehicle market and NASA's relative low need for vehicles in this class, the agency has no plans to develop additional small class launch vehicles. Rather, the agency will acquire these services through the NASA Launch Services II Contract. NASA's plan has inherent risks that need to be mitigated. NASA has not developed detailed estimates of the time and money required to resolve technical issues likely to arise during the launch vehicle certification process. As these costs are currently unknown, according to Science Mission Directorate officials, NASA has not yet budgeted for them. Further, both space station resupply vehicles have experienced delays and more delays are likely as launch vehicle development is an inherently risky endeavor. Neither potential provider currently has the facilities needed to launch the majority of NASA earth science missions requiring a medium capability. NASA medium class science missions that are approaching their preliminary design review face uncertainties related to committing to as yet uncertified and unproven launch vehicles. Launch vehicle decisions for these missions will be made before new vehicles are certified. Because changing the launch vehicle of a science mission after its preliminary design review is likely to lead to significant cost growth and schedule delays, NASA's intention is to select a launch vehicle and accept the impacts that any delays in the certification process could have to the cost and schedule of the science mission. NASA officials also indicated that future science missions might be asked to accommodate multiple launch vehicle possibilities if the availability of future vehicles is delayed.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that NASA perform a detailed cost estimate based on knowledge gained during launch vehicle certification and adequately budget for potential additional costs. NASA concurred.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) relies on the  U.S. commercial market to provide launch services for its space and Earth  science missions. Over the past decade, NASA has launched 60 percent of  its science missions on the Delta II medium class launch vehicle. The  United States Air Force, which had previously shared Delta II  infrastructure costs with NASA, concluded its use of United Launch  Alliance’s Delta II launch vehicle in August 2009 with the launch of the last  in a series of eight modernized global positioning satellites. NASA now  bears the Delta II infrastructure costs and plans to continue to use the  Delta II as a launch vehicle for three remaining science missions— Aquarius, Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory, and National Polar- orbiting Operational Satellite System Preparatory Project—the last of  which is currently scheduled to be launched in October 2011. NASA  officials indicate that these costs are currently over $45 million a year and  could increase to over $60 million per year, should the launches be  delayed beyond 2012. Further, NASA contends that continuing to use the  Delta II beyond the last projected launch in 2011 would be a significant  expense beyond NASA’s budget.
NASA projects that about 40 percent of science missions through 2020  could be launched on medium class launch vehicles depending on budget  and launch vehicle availability. In addition, no U.S. company is actively  developing a new medium class launch vehicle with all the capabilities  required for science missions. NASA science spacecraft often carry  sensitive instruments that require unique interfaces and special processing  and handling. Although NASA has a continuing need for medium class  launch vehicles for science missions, the agency maintains that its need is  insufficient to sustain the Delta II program at prices traditionally paid.  Therefore, NASA faces a potential gap in the availability of medium class  launch vehicles for science missions as the Delta II goes out of operation.  Until this gap is closed, NASA science missions may face design challenges  or delays due to uncertainties with the missions’ launch vehicle.
Based on your request, we assessed (1) NASA’s and United Launch  Alliance’s steps to ensure resources (budget, workforce, and facilities) are  available to support safe Delta II operations through the last planned  NASA flight; (2) NASA’s plans and contingencies for ensuring a smooth  transition from current small and medium class launch vehicles to other  launch vehicles for future science missions; (3) the risks associated with  NASA’s planned approach to fill the medium launch capability gap; and (4)  technical and programmatic implications to science missions if NASA  commits to new launch vehicles before they are certified and proven.
To conduct our work, we interviewed NASA and United Launch Alliance  officials and obtained, reviewed, and discussed their launch vehicle  transition plans. We compared NASA’s transition strategy to NASA and  national space policies. We reviewed United Launch Alliance’s process for  certifying its processing and manufacturing workforce through the last  NASA Delta II flight. We interviewed officials from Orbital Sciences  Corporation (Orbital) and Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) to  discuss their plans and schedules for certifying their launch vehicles that  are currently being designed to support the International Space Station’s  Commercial Resupply Services contract for future medium class science  missions. We also obtained and reviewed launch manifests, market  projections, cost estimates, workforce estimates, and launch  infrastructure maintenance needs from agency and contractor officials.  We examined implications of committing to new launch vehicles before  they are certified and proven through discussions with NASA’s Launch  Services Program (LSP) and Science Mission Directorate officials,  including various science mission project managers, and through review of  NASA’s systems engineering policy. For our full scope and methodology,  see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2010 to November 2010  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Delta II has historically been NASA’s preferred medium class launch  vehicle for its science missions, launching 36, or nearly 60 percent, of the  agency’s science missions since October 1998. Known as the workhorse of  the launch industry, the Delta II comprises a group of expendable rockets  that can be configured as two or three-stage vehicles and with three, four,  or nine strap-on solid rocket motors depending on mission needs. The  largest configuration is referred to as Delta II Heavy.
The Commercial Space Act of 1998, U.S. Space Transportation Policy, and  National Space Policy of the U.S. require NASA, to the maximum practical  extent, to acquire launch vehicles from the U.S. commercial sector. NASA  uses the NASA launch services contract to acquire small, medium, and  intermediate launch vehicles for NASA’s science, exploration, and  operational missions. The launch services contract is a multiple award  indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) task order contract. The  original launch services contract competition in 2000 resulted in the award  of firm-fixed price IDIQ launch services contracts with not-to-exceed  prices to Boeing Launch Services Incorporated (Boeing) and Lockheed  Martin Commercial Launch Services Incorporated (Lockheed), which later  merged to form United Launch Alliance, for the Delta and Atlas vehicles.  In 2005, NASA awarded Orbital an IDIQ launch services contract for the  small class launch vehicles Taurus, Taurus XL, and Pegasus XL, and in  2008 NASA awarded SpaceX an IDIQ launch services contract for the  small class Falcon 1 and medium class Falcon 9 vehicles. Pursuant to the  “on-ramp” clause in the launch services contract, the original solicitation  remains open during the life of the contract to allow launch services  providers—including contractors who have already been awarded an IDIQ  launch services contract as well as other contractors—to introduce launch  vehicles or technologies that were not available at the time of the award of  the initial contract. See figure 2 for launch vehicles discussed in detail in  this report.
When NASA needs to acquire launch services for science missions, NASA’s  LSP, which is responsible for acquiring launch vehicles for NASA’s Science  Mission Directorate, issues a request for launch service proposals. All  contractors who have been awarded a launch services contract at the time  NASA issues the request for launch service proposals are contractually  obligated to submit a proposal, unless the contracting officer waives the  requirement. NASA considers each proposal according to specified criteria  and awards the task order to the contractor who provides the best value in  launch services that meet NASA’s requirements. The ordering period  under the NASA Launch Services I contract began in 2000 and expired in  summer 2010. On September 16, 2010, NASA announced the award of the  NASA Launch Services II contract which, like the NASA Launch Services I  contract, is a multiple award IDIQ contract. NASA selected four  companies for awards: Lockheed, Orbital, SpaceX, and United Launch  Alliance, and each contract has an ordering period through 2020. Orbital  did not respond to the contract solicitation for its Taurus II vehicle.  According to Orbital officials, it plans to take advantage of the on-ramp  clause of the NASA Launch Services contract in summer 2011. According  to LSP officials, competition between the launch service providers is  intended to lead the providers to sell NASA launch services at prices less  than the negotiated not-to-exceed prices. This competition is limited in the  medium and intermediate classes, however, because of the small number  of providers who have been awarded a contract. For example, United  Launch Alliance is currently the only provider of intermediate class launch  vehicles for Earth orbit escape missions and Space X is currently the only  provider of a medium class launch vehicle on the Launch Services II  contract.
While NASA’s LSP is responsible for acquiring launch services for science  missions, several NASA offices are involved in the development of the new  commercial launch vehicles that NASA plans to use to replace the Delta II.  NASA’s LSP is part of NASA’s Space Operations Mission Directorate but  also supports, and has formal relationships with, the International Space  Station Cargo Crew Services program within the Space Operations Mission  Directorate and the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services program  within NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. See figure 3.
NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS)  program: The COTS program, which began in 2006, is intended to  facilitate the development and demonstration of end-to-end  transportation systems, including the development of launch and  space vehicles, ground and mission operations, and berthing with  the International Space Station. Under this program, NASA  provides funding to SpaceX and Orbital through funded Space Act  Agreements to help offset International Space Station-related  developmental costs of the Falcon 9 and Taurus II, respectively.   Both the SpaceX vehicle, Falcon 9, and the Orbital vehicle, Taurus  II, are medium class launch vehicles similar in capability to the  Delta II. SpaceX plans three demonstration flights under the COTS  agreement, while Orbital plans one such flight. Under these  agreements NASA provides progress payments, offsetting a portion  of the developer’s costs, when the partners meet established  milestones.
NASA’s Cargo Crew Services program: The program is  responsible for acquiring commercial cargo resupply services for  the International Space Station through the Commercial Resupply  Services (CRS) contract with SpaceX and Orbital for flights  beginning in calendar year 2011. NASA has ordered 12 resupply  missions to the International Space Station from SpaceX, and 8  from Orbital. SpaceX and Orbital will use their respective launch  vehicles, Falcon 9 and Taurus II, to provide these services.
section_title: NASA Is Taking Steps to Address Risk and Ensure Success of Remaining Delta II Missions
paragraphs: NASA’s LSP is taking steps to address risk and ensure the success of the  last planned Delta II launched missions. LSP’s risk mitigation strategy uses  established oversight mechanisms to address areas of concern and to  assure the success of all remaining Delta II launched missions. LSP has  issued task orders to United Launch Alliance for the final three Delta II  missions through the Launch Services I contract. LSP exercises oversight  of United Launch Alliance through a combination of specific government  approvals and targeted government insight into contractor activities and  designs. Specific areas requiring government approval include spacecraft- to-launch vehicle interface control documents, mission-unique hardware  and software design, top-level test plans, and requirements and success  criteria for integrated vehicle systems. The government also has insight  into baseline vehicle design, analyses, models and configuration  management, critical flight hardware pedigree and postflight anomaly, and  compliance evaluations.
An important element in LSP’s oversight approach is the use of  engineering review boards to independently review and validate the  competency and adequacy of the contractor’s technical efforts. According  to LSP officials, having government systems engineers with the technical  expertise to review or repeat the contractors’ engineering analyses is a key  factor in high launch success rates. From 1990 through 2009, NASA has  achieved about a 98 percent launch success rate—compared to about a 69  percent success rate for U.S. commercial launches without significant U.S.  government involvement. Likewise, United Launch Alliance officials  indicate that their company has never had a mission failure, successfully  launching 37 missions in a 36-month period from December 2006 through  December 2009.
LSP is taking some additional actions to mitigate risk associated with the  remaining Delta II flights. Due to the current low flight rate of the vehicle,  LSP is conducting targeted field site closeout photo reviews during vehicle  processing for each remaining NASA Delta II mission. According to agency  officials, a closeout photo review includes photographing system  components as assembly and processing steps are completed, and  reviewing photographs to ensure assembly and processing steps were  conducted as required. NASA conducts similar closeout photo reviews on  the Pegasus and Taurus launch vehicle missions for the same reason—low  flight rates.
LSP has also identified several specific areas of concern with the  remaining Delta II flights—including contractor workforce expertise,  postproduction subcontractor support, spare parts, and launch pads—that  must be mitigated where possible to ensure the success of the remaining  missions.
Workforce Expertise: United Launch Alliance is taking steps to  mitigate the risk that workforce expertise may be lost. For  example, it actively tracks the certifications necessary for  assembly, integration, ground operations, processing, and launch  of the Delta II. United Launch Alliance also tracks the current  certifications of the Delta II workforce and provides training  necessary to retain the required certifications. To retain critical  skills, United Launch Alliance uses essentially the same workforce  for the Delta II and Delta IV, a vehicle that shares significant  commonality. LSP officials indicated that the LSP workforce would  remain essentially unchanged through the last missions as LSP is  responsible not only for Delta II but for all NASA science mission  launches.
Postproduction Subcontractor Support: LSP is funding an  approximately $8 million per year, postproduction support  relationship, managed by United Launch Alliance, with key Delta II  subcontractors. According to agency officials, this will ensure that  subcontractors with knowledge and expertise needed to  manufacture or repair subcomponents are available if needed.  United Launch Alliance has contracted with Alliant Techsystems,  Incorporated for solid rocket motors, Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne  for the first stage engine, and Aerojet for the second stage engine  through fiscal year 2011.
Spare Parts: United Launch Alliance has implemented a process,  which has previously been used on the last flights of other vehicles,  to ensure key spare parts are available to support the final Delta II  missions. This process identifies irreplaceable or critical hardware  the unavailability, loss, or damage of which cannot be remedied  without serious impact to program cost, schedule, or technical  performance. United Launch Alliance has identified 28 such items  for Delta II and will mitigate the risk of spare parts availability by  either purchasing additional spares beyond planned needs or  implementing quality assurance activities to minimize risk. In  addition, LSP personnel have been assigned to assess and monitor  Delta II launch vehicle spare parts during the retirement of the  Delta II. United Launch Alliance also indicated the five currently  unsold Delta II vehicles in the heavy configuration could be  cannibalized for parts, if needed, for the remaining NASA Delta II  missions.
Launch Pads: NASA has assumed responsibility for the operation  and maintenance of the Delta II launch pads—Space Launch  Complexes 17A and 17B at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and  Space Launch Complex 2 at Vandenberg Air Force Base—from the  Air Force. NASA will perform continuing periodic maintenance  through the final planned NASA Delta II flights from Space Launch  Complex 17B in September 2011 and Space Launch Complex 2 in  June and October 2011. The cost of ongoing operation and  maintenance is included in the launch services contracts between  LSP and United Launch Alliance. In some instances, however,  efforts beyond continuing maintenance are necessary. For  instance, NASA is recertifying the fuel storage and water deluge  systems at Space Launch Complex 17B. See figure 4.
section_title: NASA Plans to Leverage Falcon 9 and Taurus II Investments to Fill Medium Class Capability Gap While Its Approach for Small Class Vehicles Remains Unchanged
paragraphs: NASA plans to leverage ongoing investments in the COTS and CRS  vehicles—Falcon 9 and Taurus II—to acquire a new medium launch  capability for science missions in the relative cost and performance range  of the Delta II. LSP has been coordinating with NASA and contractor  officials responsible for these efforts. Further, NASA revised its policy  directive on launch vehicle certification to allow the providers to certify  their vehicles more quickly than would have been possible under the  previous policy. Due to an active small class launch vehicle market and  NASA’s relative low need for vehicles in this class, the agency has no  immediate plans to develop additional small class launch vehicles. Rather,  the agency will acquire small class launch services using the NASA Launch  Services II contract.
subsections: section_title: NASA Plans to Leverage Falcon 9 and Taurus II Investments to Fill Medium Class Capability Gap
paragraphs: NASA’s plan to transition from Delta II to other medium class launch  providers is to eventually certify the vehicles being developed for space  station resupply for use by NASA science missions. This plan originated  from a series of studies beginning in 2006 which examined launch market  conditions and assessed whether the agency should continue to fly Delta II  beyond the then-current Delta II manifest. These studies found that NASA  should phase out Delta II, begin working with alternative launch providers  to acquire a new medium class launch vehicle, and use vehicles—such as  Atlas V or Delta IV—as an interim solution until alternative launch  providers are ready. These studies culminated in an August 2009 report to  Congress which laid out NASA’s plans for transitioning to future small and  medium class launch vehicles and discussed contingencies, each of which  could involve additional time or funding, should the preferred solution not  come to fruition as planned. For example, NASA could:    Continue indefinitely to launch medium class science missions on the  Atlas V, which is capable of launching payloads with more size and  mass than Falcon 9 or Taurus II but is about twice as expensive.
Launch multiple missions simultaneously on larger launch vehicles,  which is a viable option in some instances, but according to NASA is  difficult to coordinate due to specific factors such as orbit, destination,  and development and launch schedule.
Use the five remaining Delta II heavy configuration vehicles.
Considering the additional infrastructure and postproduction support  costs that Delta II would require, however, its costs could exceed that  of the Atlas V and further it cannot easily be used for most earth  science missions because of launch facility constraints.
Use foreign launch vehicles or decommissioned excess Department of  Defense (DOD) intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as Minotaur, as  space transportation vehicles. The use of such vehicles, however, is  governed by law and policy and would require time to be approved.
NASA believes that its preferred approach would leverage ongoing NASA  investments in Falcon 9 and Taurus II made by the COTS and CRS  programs and allow it to negotiate discounted prices for increased  quantities of a common launch vehicle.
section_title: NASA’s Launch Services Program Involvement in COTS and CRS Is Intended to Smooth Transition
paragraphs: LSP’s involvement in the COTS and CRS efforts is intended, in part, to  smooth NASA’s transition to future medium class launch vehicles for  science missions by giving LSP detailed, firsthand technical knowledge of  the candidate vehicles. NASA’s LSP has been in coordination with Orbital,  SpaceX, and NASA’s COTS and CRS programs for several years. For  example, in addition to the funded Space Act Agreements under the COTS  program, LSP entered into a nonreimbursable Space Act Agreement with  Orbital for technical insight into the development and design of the Taurus  II in 2008. According to LSP officials, this partnership is expected to result  in the agency gaining a better understanding of the launch vehicle, which  will assist LSP when they begin the certification process for science  missions and will allow Orbital access to NASA expertise for review of  launch vehicle development documentation and independent assessments  of various Taurus II systems and performance. This relationship has  already provided benefits. For example, through this relationship, LSP  persuaded Orbital to include additional engine testing into the Taurus II  test strategy that will ultimately contribute to the certification effort for  science missions. LSP does not have such an agreement in place with  SpaceX; however, LSP may gain insight into SpaceX’s design for Falcon 9  that should provide similar benefits because SpaceX was awarded a NASA  Launch Services contract in 2008 and 2010. SpaceX was awarded a Launch  Services I and II contract, but NASA has not awarded SpaceX any task  orders under those contracts. If NASA had awarded SpaceX a task order,  its technical insight to Falcon 9 would be greater.
In 2007, LSP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the  Commercial Crew and Cargo Program Office which manages the COTS  demonstration missions. Although LSP is not responsible for mission  success, under this agreement it serves in a consulting role. For example,  LSP is a member of the COTS advisory team and provides technical  guidance, mentoring, and lessons learned relating to launch system  development. LSP also attends technical meetings, such as preliminary  design reviews, as requested.
LSP also has a Memorandum of Agreement in place with the International  Space Station program to support the CRS missions. Under the terms of  this agreement, LSP will perform nonrecurring and limited recurring  technical assessments and make recommendations for specific launch  vehicle hardware, software, and analyses. While LSP is not responsible for  mission success, it will perform launch vehicle mission and fleet risk  assessments, focusing on systems that have been historical causes of  mission failure. The assessments that LSP will conduct include  a postflight data review for each flight;  a mission-unique design review for the first flight of each launch  vehicle configuration;  a “test like you fly” hardware qualification assessment for launch  vehicle propulsion, flight controls, and separation systems; and  an assessment of the launch vehicles’ guidance, navigation, and control  design and an assessment of flight software and recurring software  development practices.
Some of these assessments, such as the “test like you fly” hardware  qualification assessment, could be applicable to the eventual certification  process for science missions and LSP technical oversight of new launch  providers, as long as the same launch vehicle configuration is used. This  could shorten the length of time required to certify the vehicles for science  missions.
The formal certification process for each launch vehicle will commence  after LSP awards a task order to the contractor for a science mission.  Under the Launch Services II contract, a vehicle cannot be considered for  a launch service task order for a science mission until it has had a  successful first flight. Falcon 9 had a successful first flight in June 2010,  but has not been awarded a science mission. The Taurus II’s first flight will  be no sooner than September 2011. According to NASA, on average it  takes about 3 years once a task order is awarded to complete certification.  Therefore, if Falcon 9 is awarded one of the first science missions under  the Launch Services II contract, assuming only limited technical  challenges and only minor changes are needed for certification, NASA  could certify Falcon 9 to category 2 by mid 2013 and to category 3 by late  2013 or early 2014. According to NASA, if resources are available, LSP  may proactively begin the formal certification process for Falcon 9 or  Taurus II prior to award of a task order for a science mission under the  Launch Services II contract. See figure 5 for a time line for certifying  Falcon 9 based on a potential task order award in early 2011.
section_title: NASA’s Revision of Certification Requirements Allows Faster Certification of Launch Vehicles
paragraphs: NASA revised its launch policy to enable more certification opportunities  for emerging launch vehicle providers, and according to LSP officials,  these changes could also speed up the certification process. LSP officials  indicate that the former policy could have required 10 or more years to  certify a new vehicle to category 3, the highest level of vehicle  certification, and given the imminent retirement of the Delta II, NASA  considered this gap too large. NASA eventually plans to certify the  Falcon 9 and Taurus II vehicles to category 3. However, NASA may initially  certify the vehicles to category 2, the next highest certification depending  on the payload risk classification of the initial mission or missions to use  the new vehicle. The Science Mission Directorate assigns payload risk  classifications, A through D, with A being least tolerant to risk. See table 1.  The risk posture then becomes a requirement in securing a launch vehicle  through the Launch Services contract.
Under the revised policy, there are three alternative approaches to  certification to category 3, as shown in table 2.
When a category 3 certification is required of one of the new vehicles,  NASA plans to use the certification alternative that requires 3 successful  flights (2 of which must be consecutive) of the same vehicle configuration,  a flight margin verification, and a full vehicle root cause analysis, among  other analyses, to certify the vehicles. If the first NASA mission using one  of the new vehicles only requires a category 2 certified vehicle, then NASA  will use one of the category 2 alternatives as appropriate. Currently,  Orbital has 8 Taurus II CRS missions under contract with NASA, and  SpaceX has 12 Falcon 9 CRS missions under contract with NASA, as well  as commercial contracts. These flights, if successful, may be applied to  NASA’s certification requirements, as long as at least 3 successful flights  are based upon the same vehicle configuration. Changes to a vehicle’s  configuration—the distinct combination of core propulsive stages and  hardware—will reset the number of required successful flights.
section_title: NASA Plans to Rely on Existing Small Class Launch Vehicles Providers
paragraphs: NASA’s near-term plan for small class launch vehicles is to rely on small  class providers through the NASA Launch Services II contract because the  number of small class launch vehicles currently available is sufficient to  meet NASA’s needs. The small class launch services market currently has  five U.S. launch vehicles—SpaceX’s Falcon 1; Orbital’s Taurus and  Pegasus; Lockheed’s Athena; and DOD’s Minotaur—although Minotaur is  not readily available to NASA. NASA’s strategy is to seek competition  without encouraging oversupply, which will allow the market to stabilize  over the next several years. According to agency officials, the fostering of  a small class of launch vehicles is important because new launch service  providers have tended to start with smaller vehicles before moving on to  develop larger ones. However, NASA forecasts only about one science  mission in the small class per year. Because DOD has typically used  Minotaur launch vehicles in the small class, NASA asserts that its needs,  along with the needs of the commercial market, can only provide enough  business to support about one to two providers in the small class.
section_title: NASA Plan to Acquire Future Medium Class Launch Vehicles Includes Inherent Risk
paragraphs: NASA has a reasonable plan for addressing the medium launch capability  gap, but its approach has inherent risks that need to be mitigated. First,  NASA has not developed detailed estimates of the time and money  required to resolve technical issues likely to arise during the launch  vehicle certification process. Second, both Taurus II and Falcon 9 have  already experienced delays and history indicates more delays are likely as  launch vehicle development is an inherently risky endeavor. Finally,  neither potential provider currently has the proper facilities, such as a  West Coast launch site, needed to launch the majority of NASA earth  science missions requiring a medium capability.
subsections: section_title: NASA Lacks Detailed Estimates for Time and Money Needed to Ensure Adequate Resources Are Available
paragraphs: NASA has not prepared a detailed estimate of the potential costs to resolve  technical issues and implement modifications and upgrades required for  NASA’s specific science mission needs that are likely to arise during the  certification process for Falcon 9 and Taurus II. Based on the historical  costs of certifying launch vehicles such as Atlas V, LSP estimates about  $15 million could be required for each vehicle. LSP officials noted that if  serious problems or shortfalls are discovered during the certification  process, or extensive changes need to be made to the basic launch vehicle  design to accommodate science mission needs, these costs could be  higher. For example, if the certification process uncovers inadequacies  with the contractors’ qualification test program or the flight margin  verifications uncover significant differences between predicted and actual  system performance in flight, NASA or the contractor may be faced with  significant cost increases or delays. Ancillary changes to components such  as connectors and payload adapters needed to accommodate the science  mission spacecraft are unlikely to increase estimated costs. According to  NASA officials, relative immaturity of a vehicle and inexperience of a  provider could contribute to higher costs and additional time needed for  certification. Further, any additional work needed may not be achievable  within the expected 3-year time frame of the certification process.
Based on anticipated labor rates, LSP estimates that the total cost to  conduct the assessments necessary to certify each vehicle will be about  $10 million. These costs are in addition to the approximately $15 million  NASA anticipates will be required to resolve technical issues and  implement required modifications and upgrades resulting from the  certification assessment. According to program officials, these costs  would be passed on to the customer, the Science Mission Directorate,  which would determine how to budget for these costs. For example, the  directorate could assign these costs to the first mission to use a new  launch vehicle, or amortize the cost over the first several missions.
However, it is currently undetermined who would pay the costs for fixes  needed to meet NASA’s specific science mission requirements. In the case  of the Atlas V, such costs were shared by NASA, DOD, and the contractor.  The responsibility for these costs will have to be negotiated as needed  between LSP, the Science Mission Directorate, and the contractors. As  additional costs are currently unknown, according to Science Mission  Directorate officials, NASA has yet to budget for them. GAO’s Cost  Estimating Guide, however, indicates that assumptions should be made  about the costs of unknowns and that contingency funding should be  reserved to cover potential costs.
section_title: Schedule Delays with Taurus II and Falcon 9 Have Occurred and More Are Likely
paragraphs: Both SpaceX and Orbital have experienced delays in the development and  testing of Falcon 9 and Taurus II, respectively. We reported in June 2009  that both companies were working under aggressive schedules and their  vehicles were experiencing schedule delays—at the time, the first flight of  the Falcon 9 was scheduled for June 2009 but slipped to June 2010,  whereas the first flight of the Taurus II was scheduled for December 2010  and has now slipped to no earlier than September 2011. Further, our past  work and NASA’s experience indicate that more delays are likely, given  that developing launch vehicles is an inherently complex and risky  endeavor. For example, we reported in 2005 that the Air Force’s Delta IV  Heavy Lift Vehicle’s first operational flight was delayed 6 months, due in  part to design problems discovered in testing. Likewise, according to  NASA, vehicle histories from SpaceX, Orbital, and United Launch Alliance  indicate that the average delay in the third successful launch of a new  vehicle is 31 months from the manifested date of launch. The contractors  for Falcon 9 and Taurus II are not currently awarded any task orders for  science missions; therefore the formal certification process for each has  not begun. Consequently, the schedule and budget of any science mission  that is assigned to one of these vehicles could be negatively impacted if  delays occur in the certification process. While NASA expects these  vehicles will eventually become a viable option for medium class science  missions, it is uncertain how long the process might take.
section_title: SpaceX and Orbital Lack Facilities Necessary to Meet Requirements for Some Science Missions
paragraphs: Neither SpaceX nor Orbital currently has a high-inclination launch site  option for its medium class vehicle, yet the majority of NASA’s Earth  science missions require such a site due to the high inclination required to  achieve a polar orbit. Launches from the East Coast of the United States  are suitable only for low-inclination orbits because major population  centers underlie the trajectory required for high-inclination launches.  High-inclination launches are accomplished from the West Coast because  the flight trajectory avoids populated areas. Orbital is conducting a site  selection survey and its West Coast options include Kodiak, Alaska; Space  Launch Complex 2 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; and Space  Launch Complex 8, also at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, which  Orbital currently uses to launch the Minotaur. According to Orbital  officials, the site selection decision is expected in 2011, with the site ready  for operations as early as 2014. According to SpaceX officials, SpaceX  plans are underway to secure a Falcon 9 launch site at Vandenberg Air  Force Base for high-inclination launches. This capability is planned to be  ready for operation by late 2012. However, if the launch sites are not  available when needed, NASA’s planned science mission manifest could be  negatively impacted, as 12 of the 14 medium class science missions  planned through 2020 that do not yet have assigned launch vehicles  require a high-inclination launch.
section_title: Science Missions in Development Face Uncertainties Related to Committing to Launch Vehicles before They Are Certified and Proven
paragraphs: NASA science missions requiring a medium class launch vehicle that are  approaching their preliminary design review face uncertainties related to  committing to as-yet uncertified and unproven launch vehicles. The  preliminary design review marks the point at which it is demonstrated that  the preliminary design meets system requirements with acceptable risk  and within cost and schedule constraints, and establishes the basis for  proceeding with detailed design. Shortly after the preliminary design  review, a project establishes its commitment baseline which documents  the project’s estimated cost and schedule. From this point on, almost all  changes to baselines are expected to represent successive refinements,  not fundamental changes. NASA program managers indicated that the  launch vehicle of a science mission should be assigned by the preliminary  design review to allow the science mission design team to optimize their  spacecraft based on the operational characteristics of the launch vehicle.  A number of NASA science missions are approaching the preliminary  design review; therefore, decisions need to be made about the launch  vehicle for these missions. However, as indicated by figure 6, some  decisions will have to be made before either the Falcon 9 or Taurus II is  certified for science missions.
The Soil Moisture Active and Passive (SMAP), Joint Polar Satellite System  (JPSS-1), and Ice, Cloud, and land Elevation Satellite (ICESat-2) missions  are approaching their preliminary design reviews and are the first three  missions requiring a medium capability for which a Falcon 9 could  potentially be selected for launch services. Falcon 9 had a successful first  flight in June 2010 and could potentially be certified as a category 3 vehicle  by late 2013 or early 2014. NASA is planning for the imminent release of a  request for launch service proposals for the SMAP mission and tentatively  plans to issue requests for proposals for the JPSS and ICESat-2 missions in  spring 2011. If Falcon 9, the only medium class launch vehicle currently  available under the Launch Services II contract, is selected for any of these  missions, the mission launch date will be tied to a successful certification  of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle. Because the preliminary design review  establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed design, according to  NASA officials, any changes to accommodate a new launch vehicle after  the preliminary design review are fundamental changes and rarely, if ever,  occur. Therefore, NASA’s intention is to select a launch vehicle and  accept any delays and residual cost increases to the science mission  associated with delays in the certification process. According to NASA  officials, changing the planned launch vehicle of a science mission after its  preliminary design review is a fundamental change to the mission design  and would lead to significant cost growth and schedule delays. As figure  6 illustrates, several NASA missions require a launch vehicle decision prior  to the certification of Falcon 9. While NASA expects that Falcon 9 could  be certified to a category 3 prior to the planned launch dates of these  missions, given the relative immaturity of the launch vehicle and the  likelihood of further delays, the schedule for these missions could be at  risk if the Falcon 9, or any other unproven launch vehicle, is selected.
NASA officials indicated that science missions within the next few years  might be asked to design to accommodate multiple launch vehicle  possibilities if the availability of future vehicles is delayed or until the task  order is issued for the particular mission. Science Mission Directorate  officials indicated that while designing to accommodate multiple launch  vehicles is possible, the practice is cumbersome, especially when  continued beyond the preliminary design review. Under this type of design  scenario, every decision is constrained to the worst case performance  characteristic of the competing vehicles. Consequently, overall mission  effectiveness is reduced, because benefits associated with a particular  vehicle are traded away to design to the lesser set of capabilities of  another vehicle. Thus, if the less constrained vehicle is chosen, that  capability is left unused. Ultimately, the scientific benefit of the planned  mission is reduced, because the science payload may have to be adjusted  to accommodate reduced launch capability.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: NASA is taking an appropriate approach to help ensure the success of the  remaining Delta II missions by adequately addressing workforce, support,  and launch infrastructure risks. Nevertheless, an affordable and reliable  medium launch capability is critical to NASA meeting its scientific goals.  NASA has a plan in place for obtaining this capability through Orbital and  SpaceX’s vehicles, but past experience with other development programs  and recent history with both vehicles indicate that maturing and certifying  these vehicles for use by science missions is likely to prove more difficult  and costly than currently anticipated. If the companies are not successful  in delivering, in a timely manner, reliable and cost-effective upgraded  launch vehicles that can be used for NASA science missions, NASA will  lack an affordable domestic launch capability in the medium performance  vehicle class and could be forced to use more costly or time-consuming  options. Further, costs associated with addressing any issues discovered  during the certification process and resulting from the need to delay  missions or use other alternatives will require trade-offs to be made that  will likely impact the number of science missions the agency can afford.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Given the likelihood of delays and additional costs associated with  developing and fielding a medium class launch vehicle fully certified for  science missions and the implications to funding available to support  science missions, we recommend that as LSP gains a more complete  understanding of the detailed designs and actual performance of the  Falcon 9 and Taurus II, the NASA Administrator require,    NASA’s Science Mission Directorate—in conjunction with NASA’s  Space Operations Mission Directorate—to perform a detailed cost  estimate to determine the likely costs of certification and the trade-offs  required to fund these costs. This estimate should at a minimum  examine the need for funds to resolve technical issues with the Falcon  9 and Taurus II launch vehicles discovered through the certification  process. The estimate should also examine the costs associated with  delaying science missions if necessary until launch vehicles are  available or contingencies such as selecting more costly or time- consuming launch options.
Given that NASA’s Science Mission Directorate could have to fund  additional significant costs for certification and the use of contingencies,  we recommend that the NASA Administrator require,  that the costs identified through developing the detail cost estimate are  adequately budgeted for and identified by the Science Mission  Directorate.
Until such time, however, that these costs are better understood, we  recommend that the NASA Administrator require,  the Science Mission Directorate to identify and budget for additional  contingency funding for the projects requiring a medium launch  capability vehicle and approaching their preliminary design review  prior to certification of Falcon 9 and Taurus II that could be impacted  by additional costs associated with certification of these vehicles,  including the need to address technical issues and shoulder delays in  the certification process.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II), NASA  concurred with our recommendations. NASA acknowledged the risks  associated with its transition strategy for medium class launch vehicles  and recognized the importance of developing detailed cost estimates,  budgeting for known costs, and identifying and budgeting additional  contingency funding for unknown costs.  NASA stated that the Space  Operations Mission Directorate will develop detailed estimates of the  costs to certify the new vehicles as well as to resolve technical issues  during certification, and the Science Mission Directorate will estimate the  costs for its missions if certification is delayed. Based on these estimates,  the Science Mission Directorate will appropriately budget for certification  costs and potential contingencies in future budget cycles. Separately,  NASA provided technical comments, which have been addressed in the  report, as appropriate.
We will send copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and interested  congressional committees. The report will be available at no charge on the  GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or at ChaplainC@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made  key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the National Space and Aeronautics Administration’s (NASA)  and United Launch Alliance’s steps to ensure resources (budget,  workforce, and facilities) are available to support safe Delta II operations  through the last planned NASA flight, we interviewed NASA Launch  Services Program (LSP) program officials and United Launch Alliance  program officials and reviewed their launch vehicle transition plans. We  obtained contract documents, launch manifests, risk information sheets,  and engineering review board documentation from LSP to examine  NASA’s planned contracting and technical approach for managing NASA’s  remaining Delta II missions. We also compared NASA’s transition strategy  to NASA and national space policies. We reviewed United Launch  Alliance’s processes for certifying its work force for processing and  manufacturing, launch manifests, market projections, cost estimates,  workforce estimates, and launch infrastructure maintenance needs  through the last planned NASA Delta II flight in October 2011. We also  visited Space Launch Complex 17B at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station,  Florida and visually inspected ongoing efforts to maintain Delta II launch  capability through the last planned Delta II flight from this facility in 2011  and interviewed relevant NASA and contractor personnel at the launch  complex regarding their maintenance efforts.
To examine NASA’s plans and contingencies for ensuring a smooth  transition from current small and medium class launch vehicles to other  launch vehicles for future science missions, we interviewed relevant  program officials and obtained and reviewed agency documents related to  their transition plans. We interviewed officials within NASA’s Exploration  Systems Mission Directorate, Space Operations Mission Directorate, and  Science Mission Directorate regarding these plans. We also discussed  these plans with NASA’s Office of Inspector General. We further  interviewed officials from Orbital Sciences Corporation and Space  Exploration Technologies to discuss their plans for certifying their launch  vehicles, which are currently being designed to support the Commercial  Resupply Services contract for future medium class science missions. We  reviewed the launch providers’ launch vehicle manifests and launch  vehicle histories. We compared the agency’s plans for certifying these  vehicles to relevant NASA policy directives, risk mitigation strategies, U.S.  law, and National Space Policy. We also examined how the agency’s  certification requirements have evolved to facilitate transition to future  launch services providers.
To examine the risks associated with NASA’s planned approach to fill the  medium launch capability gap, we interviewed officials with NASA’s  Launch Services Program and identified and analyzed risks, and their  accompanying mitigation strategies. We interviewed NASA Science  Mission Directorate and Space Operations Mission Directorate and  contractor officials responsible for both the Falcon 9 and Taurus II  development programs and determined where their programs are in the  development process and obtained their estimates of when these vehicles  might be ready to launch science missions. We also reviewed prior GAO  reports and identified risks common to all spacecraft development efforts.
To examine technical and programmatic implications to science missions  if NASA commits to new launch vehicles before they are certified and  proven, we reviewed NASA’s systems engineering policy and interviewed  officials with NASA’s Science Mission Directorate, NASA science mission  project managers, and the Launch Services Program and discussed  potential cost and schedule effects of committing to unproven launch  vehicles.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2010 to November 2010  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from National Aeronautics and Space Administration
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Shelby S. Oakley, Assistant  Director; Dr. Timothy M. Persons, Chief Scientist; Morgan Delaney  Ramaker; Laura Greifner; Kristine R. Hassinger; Carrie W. Rogers;  Roxanna T. Sun; and John S. Warren Jr. made key contributions to this  report.