Large Truck Safety: Federal Enforcement Efforts Have Been Stronger Since 2000, but Oversight of State Grants Needs Improvement
Published: 2005-12-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: About 5,000 people die and more than 120,000 are injured each year from crashes involving large trucks. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has several enforcement programs to improve truck safety and funds similar enforcement programs in states through its Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). Following concern by Congress and others in 1999 that FMCSA's enforcement approach was ineffective, the agency committed to take stronger actions. This study reports on how FMCSA's enforcement approach has changed, how it makes decisions about its enforcement approach, and how it ensures that its grants to states contribute to the agency's mission of saving lives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FMCSA has made considerable strides in strengthening its enforcement programs and actions. For example, it almost doubled the number of on-site safety reviews (called compliance reviews) at carriers' bases of operations, from approximately 6,400 in 1998 to 11,300 in 2004. Further, it has increased the average civil penalty by about 75 percent (from $820 to $1,400) over the same period. FMCSA generally maintained its firmer approach to enforcement at a time when it took on the additional responsibilities of conducting homeland security-related reviews of hazardous materials carriers and safety reviews of new carriers. To a large extent, FMCSA follows key effective management practices in making decisions about its enforcement approach. For example, its enforcement approach addresses major risk areas that contribute to (or cause) crashes, and targets its enforcement resources at the motor carriers with the greatest crash risk. FMCSA also has a broad range of enforcement goals and performance measures that it uses to provide direction to--and track the performance of--its enforcement programs. Furthermore, FMCSA is working to obtain additional information on crash risk factors and on the costs and effectiveness of its enforcement programs, as well as alternative approaches that it needs to further refine and set priorities for its programs. However, because FMCSA does not measure the effect that one of its key enforcement tools--civil penalties--has on carriers' compliance with safety regulations, it lacks the information needed to make sound decisions about any changes to its use of civil penalties. MCSAP is designed to improve safety by employing a performance-based approach; however, FMCSA's oversight for these grants is inadequate. In reviewing the 61 program goals set by the seven states that received the largest MCSAP grants, we could not determine whether states substantially met almost two-thirds of these goals due to missing performance information, among other reasons. Further, although FMCSA requires that its various offices periodically review grant activities for adequacy of oversight, few of these reviews are being completed. For example, in the past 3 years, FMCSA's service centers have assessed only 15 of the agency's 52 field division offices (29 percent). FMCSA did not conduct these reviews for various reasons, including a curbed oversight role for service centers and markedly reduced headquarters staffing for MCSAP.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: About 5,000 people die each year as a result of crashes involving large  trucks, and over 120,000 more are injured. Compared to a crash involving  only cars, a crash involving a car and a truck is more likely to result in a  fatality because of the difference in weight between the two vehicles. In  this respect, although large trucks are involved in only 4 percent of all  accidents, they are involved in 12 percent of all fatalities from vehicle  crashes. These crashes may result from errors by truck and passenger  vehicle drivers, vehicle condition, and other factors.
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) within the U.S.  Department of Transportation shoulders the primary federal responsibility  for reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving large trucks.  FMCSA’s primary means of preventing these crashes is to develop and  enforce regulations to help ensure that drivers and motor carriers are  operating in a safe manner. FMCSA uses several enforcement activities to  improve truck safety, such as conducting inspections of motor carriers’  operations at their places of business—and of drivers and vehicles at the  roadside—to ensure compliance with safety regulations. FMCSA also funds  and oversees similar enforcement activities at the state level through its  Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). MCSAP was  appropriated $188 million, or about 38 percent, of FMCSA’s $501 million  appropriation for fiscal year 2006.
FMCSA was created in 2000 in response to concerns raised by Congress,  the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General, and us. One of the  Inspector General’s concerns was over the lax enforcement of safety  regulations by FMCSA’s predecessor, the Office of Motor Carriers, within  the Federal Highway Administration, in the late 1990s. FMCSA publicly  committed to increasing both the amount of effort devoted to enforcement  against carriers and the severity of action when safety problems are found.  In addition, in 1999 we reported that FMCSA did not have sufficient  information about the factors that contribute to truck crashes to help the  agency set priorities for its activities. In a similar vein, in 2000, we found  that the agency’s ability to set priorities for its safety activities was limited,  in part, by the agency’s lack of knowledge about the safety impact of its  activities. In fiscal year 2003, the Office of Management and Budget  identified challenges to program accountability within MCSAP.
The Senate report for the Department of Transportation’s fiscal year 2005  appropriation directed us to examine the effectiveness of FMCSA’s truck  safety enforcement activities. Accordingly, and as discussed with Senate  Appropriations Committee staff members, this report focuses on:  how FMCSA’s safety enforcement approach, programs, and actions have   the extent to which FMCSA follows key effective management practices  in making decisions about its safety enforcement approach; and  the extent to which FMCSA ensures that its grants to states contribute  to the agency’s mission of saving lives and reducing injuries by  preventing truck crashes.
To examine how FMCSA’s enforcement approaches, programs, and actions  have changed since 2000, we reviewed legislation and FMCSA regulations,  program guidance, and plans. We also reviewed congressional reports  related to the creation of FMCSA, and assessments of the agency’s  enforcement efforts by the Department of Transportation’s Office of  Inspector General and by us. We analyzed data from FMCSA on its  enforcement activities, such as the number of reviews of carrier  compliance with safety regulations (referred to as “compliance reviews”).  We also analyzed FMCSA data on enforcement actions, such as civil  penalties assessed from fiscal year 1995 (before FMCSA committed to be  more aggressive) through 2004 (the latest full year for which data are  available). Finally, we discussed these issues with industry and safety  advocates.
To determine the extent to which FMCSA follows key effective  management practices in making decisions about its enforcement  approach, we determined the extent to which the agency incorporated  several key elements that are important for effective program management:  (1) use of program goals, including goals that describe the intended  outcomes of programs; (2) a well-defined approach for achieving goals; and  (3) performance measures that demonstrate contributions to program  goals. We identified elements of effective program management by  reviewing our reports on this topic, Office of Management and Budget  guidance, and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. We  reviewed FMCSA documents about the agency’s activities and plans related  to each of these elements, and we also interviewed agency officials.
To assess the extent to which FMCSA ensures that its MCSAP grants  contribute to the agency’s mission, we reviewed regulations and FMCSA  guidance relating to the design of the grant program. We also discussed  with FMCSA officials how accountability is built into the grant program.  We assessed FMCSA’s planning and oversight of seven state MCSAP  grantees in fiscal year 2004 (the latest full year for which information was  available), including whether FMCSA obtained sufficient information to be  able to determine whether grantees substantially met their objectives. We  then discussed our assessment with FMCSA officials responsible for grant  activities in those states. The seven states represent about 27 percent of  MCSAP grant funding in fiscal year 2004. Because we chose these states  judgmentally (representing the largest grantees), we cannot project our  findings nationwide. Reviewing a larger number of grantees would not have  been practical due to resource constraints.
As part of our review, we assessed internal controls and the reliability of  FMCSA’s data on its program activities and enforcement actions that were  pertinent to this effort. We determined that the data elements were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our work from  October 2004 to December 2005 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. (See app. I for additional information on  our scope and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The trucking industry is an important component of the nation’s economy.  Of all manufactured goods and raw materials shipped across the country,  close to three-fourths of their value and nearly two-thirds of their tonnage  are transported by trucks. In 2002, trucks transported more than $6.2  trillion and 7.8 billion tons of goods and materials (these are the latest data  available). The increased demand for transporting freight and the  deregulated nature of the trucking industry have resulted in a growing  industry. In recent years, the numbers of carriers, trucks, drivers, and  vehicle miles traveled have been increasing. (See fig. 1.) The motor carrier  industry comprises approximately 677,000 interstate carriers operating  some 7.9 million large trucks and employing several million drivers.
Carriers frequently enter and exit the industry; in 2004, the industry had a  net gain of approximately 31,000 interstate carriers.
There are more fatalities each year resulting from passenger vehicle  crashes than from truck crashes; however, the likelihood that a fatality will  occur is greater for crashes that involve large trucks. In 2004, 5,190  fatalities resulted from large truck crashes while 38,531 fatalities resulted  from passenger vehicle crashes (based on preliminary data). Although  large trucks are involved in 4 percent of all accidents, they contribute to 12  percent of the fatalities. As a result, fatality rates—the number of fatalities  per 100 million vehicle miles traveled—involving truck crashes are  consistently higher when compared to passenger-vehicle-only crashes. (See  fig. 2.)
Large-truck fatality rates have generally been falling since the mid-1990s— from 2.76 in 1995 to 2.29 in 2004 (based on preliminary data). Although  there has been a reduction in the fatality rate, the number of fatalities has  increased in each of the last two years, reaching 5,190 in 2004. According to  FMCSA, truck crashes result in costs totaling more than $20 billion  annually.
In an attempt to reduce the number and severity of crashes involving large  trucks, FMCSA was created by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act  of 1999. FMCSA assumed almost all of the responsibilities and personnel of  the Federal Highway Administration’s Office of Motor Carriers. The  agency’s primary mission is to reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities  involving large trucks by (1) issuing, administering, and enforcing federal  motor carrier safety regulations and hazardous materials regulations; (2)  providing education and outreach for motor carriers and drivers regarding  the federal motor carrier safety regulations and hazardous materials  regulations; (3) gathering and analyzing data on motor carriers, drivers, and  vehicles; (4) developing information systems to improve the transfer of  data; and (5) researching new methods and technologies to enhance motor  carrier safety.
FMCSA’s goal is to reduce the fatality rate for crashes involving trucks by  41 percent between 1996 and 2008, from 2.81 to 1.65 fatalities per 100  million vehicle miles traveled. FMCSA was on track to meet this goal  through 2002, when the fatality rate of 2.30 was slightly below the agency’s  interim target of 2.32. However, the 2003 fatality rate of 2.31 was higher  than the agency’s interim target of 2.19, and in 2004 the gap between the  fatality rate (based on preliminary data)—2.29—and the agency’s interim  target—2.07—grew. FMCSA has an additional goal to reduce the number of  serious, reportable hazardous materials incidents involving trucks by 20  percent (from 463 to 370) between 2000 and 2010.
FMCSA programs are intended to contribute to these goals by addressing  safety in motor carrier operations through identifying and enforcing safety  regulations that target high-risk carriers and large-commercial-truck  drivers, improving safety information systems and commercial motor  vehicle technologies, strengthening commercial motor vehicle equipment  and operating standards, and increasing safety awareness. Although each  of these activities plays a role in FMCSA’s overall safety approach, FMCSA  considers enforcement to be its primary approach for reducing the number  of crashes, fatalities, and injuries involving trucks. Most of FMCSA’s  enforcement programs focus on two parties that greatly influence the  safety of truck operations—motor carriers and truck drivers. (See table 1.)  In each fiscal year from 1996 through 2004, FMCSA, on average, initiated  3,800 enforcement cases against motor carriers following compliance  reviews, and FMCSA and its MCSAP partners placed, on average, about  180,000 drivers and about 450,000 vehicles out of service following  roadside inspections. In addition to its traditional enforcement approach,  FMCSA, in conjunction with the National Highway Traffic Safety  Administration, recently funded a pilot program in Washington state that  combined education and enforcement with the purpose of improving the  driving behavior of passenger-vehicle drivers when in the vicinity of trucks.
In addition, FMCSA has several information systems and a program to help  it identify high-risk carriers and drivers and to assist it in enforcing safety  regulations.
The Safety Status Measurement System evaluates the safety of carriers  by analyzing four broad categories—accidents, drivers, vehicles, and  safety management—and assigns an overall score to the carrier. FMCSA  then targets its compliance reviews at carriers that pose the greatest  risk.
The Performance and Registration Information Systems Management  program (PRISM), a grant-funded program, is a federal and state  cooperative effort that, by revoking or denying registration of carriers’  vehicles, aims to ensure that carriers placed out of service by FMCSA do  not operate.
The Enforcement Management Information System is a database used  by FMCSA to monitor, track, and store information related to  enforcement actions.
The Motor Carrier Management Information System is an information  system used by FMCSA as a central repository to compile inspection,  crash, compliance review, safety audit, and registration data.
Gotham is a web-based system that compiles information from the  Motor Carrier Management Information System, the Enforcement  Management Information System, and field offices to supply  information and performance measures to field managers.
When FMCSA discovers a violation of the safety regulations, it may use one  of several enforcement actions depending on the nature of the violation.  (See table 2.) An enforcement action may require the violating party to  correct the unsafe practice or operation, pay a civil penalty, or suspend  operations.
FMCSA has approximately 1,050 full-time equivalent employees, of which  nearly 850 work at 52 division offices throughout the U.S. and its  territories. The division offices oversee 56 MCSAP grantees—one grantee  in each of the fifty states, one in the District of Columbia, and one each in  the U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Marianas,  Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Much of the work carried out in the  field involves conducting reviews either at the roadside or at a carrier’s  place of business. For fiscal year 2006, FMCSA was appropriated $501  million. Over half of these funds are slated for distribution to states in the  form of grants, the largest under MCSAP.
MCSAP provides financial assistance to states to reduce commercial motor  vehicle-involved accidents, fatalities, and injuries through consistent,  uniform, and effective commercial motor vehicle safety activities. Initially,  MCSAP primarily funded state roadside inspections as a method of  improving commercial motor vehicle safety. However, the program has  evolved over the past two decades to fund several other safety initiatives in  support of its goal, including compliance reviews, traffic enforcement, new  entrant safety audits, border grants, and other safety initiatives. The  recently-enacted Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation  Equity Act: A Legacy for Users authorized an average annual funding level  of $200 million for MCSAP—more than twice the amount available in the  previous authorization.
The responsibility for the administration and the oversight of MCSAP is  shared among the various levels of FMCSA. Division offices in each state  have the primary responsibility for overseeing state programs. They work  closely with the states to develop commercial vehicle safety plans and  monitor the states’ activities to ensure program goals are being met, and  are also responsible for ensuring that grant funds are spent for  reimbursable expenses. MCSAP responsibilities of the regional service  centers and headquarters differ from those of the division offices. The  service centers act as an intermediary between the division office and  headquarters. They assist in clarifying policy for the division offices and  they organize training and goal-setting meetings related to the grant  program. Headquarters responsibilities center on establishing and  communicating agency priorities for MCSAP, issuing and updating MCSAP  policy guidance, and carrying out financial management activities.
section_title: FMCSA’s Enforcement Programs and Actions Have Been Stronger Since 2000
paragraphs: In response to criticisms in 1999 that its enforcement programs were  ineffective at improving safety, FMCSA has strengthened its enforcement  approach. Its enforcement approach has evolved to supplement strong  enforcement with additional measures to encourage carriers to comply  with safety regulations.
subsections: section_title: FMCSA Committed to a Stronger Enforcement Approach
paragraphs: During the 1990s, FMCSA believed that adopting a partnering approach  with the trucking industry—marked by an increased emphasis on  education and less emphasis on traditional enforcement programs—would  lead to improved large truck safety. However, while implementing this  approach, the fatality rate from crashes involving large trucks continued to  increase. The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General criticized  FMCSA in a report stating that the approach was ineffective and that the  agency needed to emphasize traditional enforcement programs. Moreover,  we reported then that FMCSA lacked an understanding of the effectiveness  of its enforcement programs.
In response to the criticism, FMCSA publicly committed to strengthen its  enforcement approach by committing to increase its emphasis on  enforcement programs and actions. Through the Transportation Equity Act  for the 21st Century in 1998 and the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act  of 1999, Congress broadened the government’s enforcement authority,  allowing it to implement this new emphasis. This legislation made it easier  for FMCSA to revoke carriers’ operating authority. Furthermore, the  legislation increased the allowable civil penalty from $1,000 to $10,000 for  certain violations.
Subsequently, the agency has come to believe that combining strict  enforcement with education and outreach will lead to greater  improvements in safety. This approach seeks to identify higher risk  operators and apply education and enforcement where needed. For  example, the agency has a program—geared toward new entrants to the  industry—to encourage awareness of the federal motor carrier safety  regulations. However, FMCSA officials told us that the agency is committed  to applying strict enforcement to egregious offenders who demonstrate  non-compliance with the regulations or unsafe driving practices. FMCSA  has also made progress in assessing the effects of its enforcement  programs on safety in terms of reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities. We  discuss these efforts in more detail below.
Finally, FMCSA has restructured its organization to allow enforcement and  education programs to work more closely together. For example, FMCSA  moved the program manager for education and outreach from the Office of  Communications to the Office of Enforcement and Program Delivery in  order to increase collaboration between FMCSA’s education and  enforcement staff. FMCSA officials have emphasized that although they are  taking steps to increase the role of education, they do not plan to return to  the partnering approach—i.e., in which education is the primary focus— that characterized the mid-1990s.
section_title: FMCSA’s Programs Have Mirrored Its Stronger Enforcement Approach
paragraphs: The number of compliance reviews was higher in 2004 than in 1998.  Before the creation of FMCSA, the number of compliance reviews  conducted dropped 31 percent between fiscal years 1995 and 1998—from  approximately 9,200 to 6,400. (See fig. 3.) Demonstrating its commitment in  1999 to follow a stronger enforcement approach, FMCSA set and met its  goal of doubling the number of compliance reviews. In this respect, the  number of compliance reviews more than doubled from approximately  6,400 in 1998 to more than 13,400 in 2001. The number of compliance  reviews began to decrease in fiscal year 2002, largely as the result of  additional homeland security responsibilities to review hazardous  materials carriers in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks  on the United States. The agency completed almost 31,000 homeland  security-related visits in fiscal year 2002. The number of these visits  decreased to less than 2,000 in fiscal year 2003, when FMCSA began  targeting the reviews at the most vulnerable carriers as identified by the  agency’s risk assessment.
Another factor affecting FMCSA’s ability to conduct compliance reviews  was its responsibility for implementing the new entrant audit program in  2003. From fiscal year 2003 through August 2005, FMCSA conducted almost  54,500 new entrant audits. Despite these additional responsibilities of  conducting visits of hazardous materials carriers and new entrants, the  agency has still conducted more compliance reviews than were carried out  in the late 1990s. In 2004, the agency conducted approximately 11,300  compliance reviews, 77 percent more than in fiscal year 1998.
Despite an increase in the number of compliance reviews, the agency has  still been unable to review a larger proportion of the industry’s carriers.  This is because the industry has grown faster than has FMCSA’s ability to  conduct compliance reviews. (See figs. 1 and 3.)
In 1995, FMCSA performed about 9,200 compliance reviews, reaching  about 2.7 percent of the nation’s estimated 350,000 carriers.
In 1998, when FMCSA conducted its lowest number of compliance  reviews—about 6,400—the industry had grown almost 40 percent to an  estimated 480,000 carriers. As a result, FMCSA’s compliance reviews  covered only about 1.3 percent of the industry.
Then, in 2000, as FMCSA doubled the number of compliance reviews,  the number of carriers increased by almost 80,000 from the 1998 level,  resulting in 2.4 percent of carriers receiving compliance reviews in 2000.
In fiscal year 2004, FMCSA reviewed about 1.7 percent of the carriers—a  smaller proportion than the proportion reviewed in the mid-1990s— despite increasing the number of compliance reviews by 77 percent  from the late 1990s. This is because the trucking industry had continued  to grow steadily to about 677,000 carriers in 2004.
In fiscal year 2005, FMCSA expressed its intent to once again increase the  number of compliance reviews. As discussed in more detail later in this  report, FMCSA is also exploring potential changes to its compliance review  program, in part because it is concerned that the program reaches only  about 2 percent of carriers each year.
Roadside inspections have also increased. In the late 1990s, FMCSA  and the states continued to increase the number of roadside inspections,  even as compliance reviews were decreasing. During that time period,  FMCSA and states nearly doubled the number of roadside inspections  conducted from 1.3 million to 2.3 million. (See fig. 4.) The number of  roadside inspections increased steadily through 2000, when FMCSA and  state inspectors conducted about 2.5 million inspections. In its fiscal year  2005 and 2006 budgets, FMCSA set its goal for roadside inspections at 2  million—about 1 million less than were conducted in 2004—bringing the  number of expected roadside inspections back to pre-2000 levels.  According to an FMCSA official, FMCSA set these lower goals in 2005 and  2006 with the anticipation that the number of roadside inspections would  decrease as states shifted resources from roadside inspections to conduct  increasing numbers of audits of new entrant carriers. However, the  anticipated decrease in roadside inspections did not occur because some  states hired additional staff to conduct the audits of new entrants and  therefore did not have to use their roadside inspection staff to conduct  these audits. An FMCSA official also told us that the agency is no longer  seeking to increase the annual number of roadside inspections based on its  analysis indicating that the inspection program is no longer leading to  annual increases in the industry-wide level of compliance with safety  regulations.
FMCSA intends to make new entrant audits more enforcement- oriented. The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act established the new  entrant audit program to educate carriers that are new to the industry  about safety regulations and encourage their compliance. This act was in  response to a 1988 FMCSA-commissioned study that pointed to a higher  rate of violations of safety regulations and higher crash rates among  carriers that had recently entered the motor carrier industry. In fiscal year  2003, the agency began implementing the new entrant audit program and  conducted 7,000 audits. As FMCSA fully implemented the program in 2004,  this number increased to more than 25,000.
FMCSA believes that in the audit’s current form, the “pass rate” does not  accurately reflect new entrant carriers’ level of safety. Currently, carriers  can fail one-third of the audit sections and still pass the audit, resulting in a  pass rate of more than 99 percent. FMCSA plans to improve the program  by employing stricter criteria for carriers and increasing the threshold for  carriers to pass, demonstrating the agency’s approach of using strict  enforcement where needed. The agency plans to publish a proposed  regulation for public comment in March 2006.
section_title: FMCSA’s Enforcement Actions Have Increased
paragraphs: FMCSA has initiated more enforcement cases and identified higher  numbers of serious violations. FMCSA calculates a “rate of  enforcement,” which is the percent of compliance reviews that result in an  enforcement case. Since 2000, the rate of enforcement has increased from  30 percent to 46 percent of compliance reviews. (See fig. 5.) Further, the  number of serious violations (FMCSA calls these “acute violations”) that  FMCSA has identified is consistently higher than in the 1990s. In 1998, the  agency identified approximately 710 serious violations of the regulations.  This number increased by 64 percent to approximately 1,160 violations in  2000. The number of serious violations peaked in 2003 when FMCSA  identified more than 1,800 violations.
According to an FMCSA official, the increase in the number of serious  violations identified resulted from FMCSA’s improved targeting of  compliance reviews of high-risk carriers. In 2004, the number dropped to  about 1,500—out of about 14,800 total violations—but was still more than  double the 1998 number.
FMCSA has applied its authority to place carriers out of service.  Between 2001 and 2004, the number of carriers prohibited from operating  increased from about 170 to about 1,700. (See fig. 6.) Before 2001, FMCSA  prohibited motor carriers from operating if the agency found that the  carrier posed an imminent hazard. FMCSA has explained that because the  definition of “imminent hazard status” was vague and limited in scope, the  agency ordered very few motor carriers to cease operating. In 2001, based  on authorities given it by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act,  FMCSA began prohibiting carriers from operating if they failed to correct  operational problems or pay a civil penalty.
The size of proposed civil penalties was higher in 2004 than in  1998. From 1995 through 1998, the average civil penalty proposed for  each violation decreased by 10 percent from $910 in 1995 to $820 in 1998.  (See fig. 7. All amounts are in 2004 dollars.) A key criticism by the  Department of Transportation’s Inspector General during that time was  that carriers had begun to see these civil penalties as little more than a cost  of doing business. In response, FMCSA pledged to levy larger civil penalties  and, in 1999, implemented the authorities that Congress gave the agency.  From 1998 to 2000, the average civil penalty levied per violation increased  by more than 80 percent to almost $1,500. In recent years, FMCSA has  modified its view of civil penalties, citing that they are only one tool to  reach compliance. Accordingly, the average civil penalty for each violation  has dropped slightly to approximately $1,400 in 2004, but this represents a  drop of about 3 percent and does not bring the amount of civil penalties  back to the levels of the late 1990s. While the civil penalties have been  higher since 2000, the agency still has considerable latitude under law to  assess larger civil penalties. As discussed later in this report, FMCSA does  not know whether or how much its civil penalties are increasing carriers’  compliance, and therefore the agency has a limited ability to determine  whether the dollar amounts of the penalties are at the most effective levels.
FMCSA has assessed higher civil penalties for more serious offenses. The  agency has four categories of violations: acute, critical, non-record  keeping, and record keeping.
Acute violations are so severe that FMCSA will require immediate  corrective actions by a motor carrier regardless of the overall safety  status of the motor carrier. An example of an acute violation is a carrier  failing to implement an alcohol or drug testing program for drivers.
Critical violations are serious, but less severe than acute violations and  most often point to gaps in carrier management or operational controls,  such as not maintaining records of driver medical certificates.
Non-record keeping violations are related directly to driver or carrier  actions. An example is a driver operating a motor carrier under the  influence of drugs or alcohol.
Record keeping violations involve a driver or carrier failing to maintain  required documentation. An example of a record keeping violation is  failure of the carrier to maintain a record of all accidents for one year.
In line with FMCSA’s commitment to stricter enforcement for more serious  violations, since 2000, acute violations, which FMCSA identifies as the  most serious violation, and non-record keeping violations have been  assessed penalties that are about five times higher than record keeping  violations, as shown in figure 7. Further, the average civil penalty per  violation of critical violations has consistently been more than twice the  average civil penalty per record keeping violation.
We also assessed the degree to which FMCSA reduced its initial civil  penalty assessment. We found that the average final assessment has been  80 percent or more of the initial assessment during this past decade. (See  fig. 8.) Further, since 2000, the first fiscal year after FMCSA promised to be  stronger on enforcement, acute violations were reduced slightly less than  overall violations.
In recent years, FMCSA has applied a new approach to civil penalties. With  first-time offenders and other carriers with less serious violations, FMCSA  has reduced civil penalties in cases where the carrier agrees to come into  compliance and make additional safety-related improvements. The agency  has specified that any carrier receiving a reduction in its civil penalty must  remain in compliance for several years. If the carrier violates safety rules  again, it is then responsible for paying the entire originally assessed civil  penalty or FMCSA will place the carrier out of service. FMCSA does not  currently maintain information on the subpopulation of first time  offenders, and therefore it has not assessed the results of this new policy.  In November 2005, FMCSA began issuing and tracking notices to first-time  offenders and other carriers with less serious violations that describe the  violations and the corrective actions required, without assessing a civil  penalty. This tracking should give FMCSA the ability to assess the results of  the policy.
section_title: FMCSA Has a Well- Defined Enforcement Approach and Has Efforts Underway to Help It Refine and Set Priorities for Its Enforcement Programs
paragraphs: To a large extent, FMCSA follows key effective management practices in  making decisions about its enforcement approach. FMCSA’s enforcement  approach addresses major risk factors that contribute to or cause crashes,  and FMCSA targets its enforcement resources at the motor carriers that it  assesses as having the greatest crash risk. FMCSA has a broad range of  goals and performance measures that it uses to provide direction to—and  track the performance of—its enforcement programs, but it does not have  a measure of the effectiveness of one of its primary enforcement actions:  civil penalties against motor carriers. FMCSA has made several  refinements to its enforcement programs based on agency studies of  factors that affect crash risk and on evaluations of the effectiveness of the  programs themselves. FMCSA is also working to obtain additional  information on crash risk factors, and on the costs and effectiveness of its  enforcement programs, needed to help it further refine and set priorities  for the programs.
subsections: section_title: FMCSA’s Enforcement Approach Addresses Many of the Major Factors that Cause or Contribute to Truck Crashes and Targets High-Risk Carriers
paragraphs: FMCSA’s enforcement approach includes goals and programs that address  many of the major factors that cause or contribute to truck crashes. (See  table 3.) For example, motor carrier operations—including hiring unsafe  drivers and inadequate vehicle maintenance practices—have been  identified as one of a number of interacting factors that can contribute to  crashes. To address this, FMCSA conducts compliance reviews of motor  carriers’ operations and takes enforcement actions against carriers found  to have violations of the safety regulations. FMCSA also addresses vehicle  condition and driver factors (such as fatigue) by conducting roadside  inspections of drivers and their trucks. Another factor that has been  identified is unsafe driving by passenger-vehicle drivers in the vicinity of  trucks. To address this factor, FMCSA and the National Highway Traffic  Safety Administration are jointly funding a pilot program in Washington  state in 2005 to educate passenger-vehicle drivers about how to drive safely  in the vicinity of trucks and to take enforcement action against drivers who  drive unsafely.
Because FMCSA’s resources do not allow it to conduct compliance reviews  of each of the estimated 677,000 motor carriers and roadside inspections of  each of the industry’s millions of vehicles and drivers, FMCSA’s  enforcement approach targets high-risk carriers and their vehicles and  drivers. As discussed above, FMCSA uses information about carriers’ safety  performance (including crash history and results of roadside inspections  and compliance reviews) to identify unsafe carriers that it then targets for  additional compliance reviews; many states also use the information to  target their roadside inspections of drivers and their trucks. Because  carriers that have drivers with more convictions tend to have higher crash  rates, FMCSA is working to incorporate these driver conviction histories  into its targeting system.
section_title: FMCSA Has a Broad Range of Enforcement Goals and Performance Measures but It Does Not Measure the Effectiveness of Its Civil Penalties
paragraphs: FMCSA has a broad range of goals and related performance measures that  it uses to provide direction to—and track the progress of—its enforcement  programs, but it does not measure the effect that one of its key  enforcement actions—civil penalties against motor carriers—has on  carriers’ compliance with safety regulations. Without such a performance  measure, FMCSA does not know whether or how much its civil penalties  are increasing carriers’ compliance, and it lacks the information needed to  make sound decisions about any changes to its use of civil penalties.
FMCSA’s budget request for fiscal year 2006 includes a “logic model” that  describes how its enforcement programs are expected to result in the  desired end outcome of reductions in truck crashes, injuries, and  fatalities. (See fig. 9.) The model follows one type of structure for such  models, in which outputs (in this case, enforcement activities and actions)  result in intermediate outcomes (increased compliance with safety  regulations), which in turn result in end outcomes (increased safety).
For each component of its enforcement program logic model—outputs,  intermediate outcomes, and end outcomes—FMCSA has various goals and  performance measures. (See table 4.) The Government Performance and  Results Act of 1993 calls for agencies to establish goals, including outcome  goals, and performance measures for both outputs and outcomes, and we  have reported that it is a useful practice for federal programs to set  intermediate outcome goals in order to help show a program’s contribution  to desired end outcomes. FMCSA describes some of its enforcement goals  and performance measures in its annual budget requests that it submits to  Congress, and it describes some of its other enforcement goals and  performance measures in its 2003 report entitled Measuring the FMCSA’s  Safety Objectives from Year 2000 to 2002. FMCSA intends to update this  report annually beginning in February 2006. In addition, FMCSA reports its  progress on several of its enforcement performance measures in a  quarterly progress report that it posts on its Web site. Finally, FMCSA uses  an information system to internally track several performance measures  related to its management of enforcement cases.
FMCSA has output goals for its enforcement programs that specify how  many of certain types of activities, such as compliance reviews and  roadside inspections, it intends to complete. FMCSA also tracks many  performance measures related to its use of enforcement actions, such as  the number of vehicles, drivers, and motor carriers it places out of service;  the number and average dollar amount of civil penalties that it assesses  against motor carriers; and the average dollar amount of civil penalties that  have been reduced during FMCSA’s negotiations with carriers. FMCSA  does not set goals linked to these performance measures because it  believes that such goals could bias the decisions of enforcement personnel.  We agree that such goals could result in undesirable behavior.
FMCSA has set an output goal related to another aspect of its enforcement  actions—how long it takes the agency to close its enforcement cases. In  May 1999, FMCSA set a goal of eliminating by January 1, 2000, the backlog  of 1,200 enforcement cases that had been forwarded by one of FMCSA’s  regional offices to FMCSA’s headquarters office. As the Department of  Transportation’s Inspector General has noted, a large backlog undermines  the integrity of the enforcement process, since (1) FMCSA considers only  closed enforcement cases when targeting motor carriers for a compliance  review, and therefore high-risk motor carriers are less likely to be selected  if they have an open enforcement case, and (2) FMCSA assesses smaller  civil penalties against carriers with open cases than those with closed  cases, and therefore it may not assess appropriate civil penalty amounts  against carriers with multiple enforcement cases. FMCSA did not meet its  goal of eliminating the backlog of cases in headquarters, but it did reduce  the backlog by a commendable 70 percent—to 363 cases in September  1999. As of October 2005, the backlog in headquarters stood at 140 cases,  and the service centers that replaced FMCSA’s regional offices had an  additional combined backlog of 667 cases. Reducing these backlogs is one  of FMCSA’s four highest priorities for improving commercial motor vehicle  safety in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. However, FMCSA does not have a goal  that specifies how much it would like to reduce the backlogs or by what  date, as required by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act.
FMCSA has several intermediate outcome goals and performance  measures related to the effects that its enforcement programs have on  increasing carriers’ and drivers’ compliance with safety regulations.  However, FMCSA does not measure the effect that one of its key  enforcement actions—civil penalties against motor carriers—has on  carriers’ compliance or safety. In addition, FMCSA’s intermediate goals do  not include numerical targets that would help the agency plan its programs  and make adjustments should it not meet the targets. FMCSA’s  intermediate outcome goals include: (1) ensuring that commercial motor  vehicles have optimum safety performance; (2) ensuring that all  commercial motor vehicle drivers are fully qualified, safe, alert, and  healthy; and (3) increasing the safety performance of the worst offending  motor carriers to meet the norm. FMCSA has many performance measures  related to these goals, including ones that reflect the average numbers of  vehicle-out-of-service violations and driver-out-of-service violations per  roadside inspection and the percentage of compliance reviews with no  violations of acute or critical regulations.
The performance measures that address motor carrier performance  capture the effects of FMCSA’s compliance reviews, but they do not  indicate the effect on compliance of civil penalties against carriers that  result from compliance reviews. This is because the performance measures  do not distinguish between those compliance reviews that result in a civil  penalty and those that do not, and either type of compliance review can  increase carriers’ compliance. Without a measure of the effectiveness of  its civil penalties, FMCSA does not know whether or how much the civil  penalties are increasing carriers’ compliance, and it lacks the information  needed to make sound decisions about any changes to its use of civil  penalties. Several years ago, FMCSA did attempt to develop measures of  the effectiveness of its enforcement actions, including civil penalties, but it  was not satisfied with the results of the effort.
FMCSA’s performance measures of the end outcomes of its enforcement  programs are crashes, injuries, and fatalities avoided due to compliance  reviews, roadside inspections, and traffic enforcement—the difference  between the actual numbers of crashes, injuries, and fatalities, and how  many would have occurred in the absence of these enforcement programs.  Because the numbers that would have occurred in their absence cannot be  observed, FMCSA uses analytical models to estimate the programs’  impacts. Using its compliance review impact model, FMCSA estimates  that about 9,200 compliance reviews conducted in 2002 prevented about  1,400 crashes, about 1,100 injuries, and about 60 fatalities in the 12 months  following the compliance reviews. Using its combined roadside  inspection and traffic enforcement impact model, FMCSA estimates that  about 3 million roadside inspections (about 800,000 of which included  enforcement of traffic laws) conducted in 2004 prevented about 19,000  crashes, about 14,000 injuries, and about 700 fatalities. According to an  FMCSA official, FMCSA also plans to develop a model to estimate the  impact of new entrant safety audits.
section_title: FMCSA’s Enforcement Goals Do Not Describe Expected Contributions to FMCSA’s Fatality Rate Goal
paragraphs: In addition to goals for its enforcement programs, FMCSA has a primary  safety goal that is agencywide—that is, FMCSA seeks to achieve the goal  through its various efforts, including enforcement, education and outreach,  and research and technology. FMCSA’s primary safety goal is to reduce the  rate of fatalities involving large trucks per 100 million miles of truck travel  by 41 percent from 2.81 in 1996 to 1.65 in 2008. FMCSA expects its  enforcement programs, as the agency’s primary means of reducing truck  crashes, to help meet the fatality rate goal. Furthermore, for three of its  enforcement programs (compliance reviews, roadside inspections, and  traffic enforcement), FMCSA has goals for avoiding fatalities, and, as  mentioned above, it also has measures of how many fatalities these  programs avoid. However, the goals do not describe the program’s  expected contributions to the fatality rate goal. We have reported that  program goals should demonstrate programs’ contributions to meeting  agencywide goals. Currently, the goals state that the programs are  expected to avoid fatalities, but they do not include targets that specify  how many fatalities are expected to be avoided each year. However, in  order to demonstrate expected contributions to reducing the fatality rate,  the goals would need to have numerical targets that increase from year to  year; these targets should also be commensurate with the resources the  agency expects to receive.
Similarly, in order to demonstrate the enforcement programs’ estimated  contributions to any reductions in the fatality rate, FMCSA would need to  compare its estimates of fatalities avoided from year to year. For example,  based on FMCSA’s estimates of fatalities avoided, its enforcement  programs avoided 19 more fatalities in 2002 compared to 2001 (848  fatalities avoided in 2002 compared to 829 fatalities avoided in 2001). This  estimated increase in fatalities avoided represents the estimated  contribution that FMCSA’s enforcement programs made to the overall  reduction of 172 truck-crash-related fatalities that occurred from 2001 to  2002 (from 5,111 fatalities in 2001 to 4,939 fatalities in 2002). Turning to  fatalities per 100 million truck miles traveled, the rate declined from 2.45 in  2001 to 2.30 in 2002. Based on the estimated increase in fatalities avoided  by FMCSA’s enforcement programs in 2002 compared to 2001, these  programs contributed 0.02 to the total decrease of 0.14 in the fatality rate.  Because we did not assess the quality of these models, we are not  suggesting that FMCSA’s enforcement programs had these illustrated  results. Rather, this is an example of the kind of analysis FMCSA could  employ in order to demonstrate its enforcement programs’ estimated  contributions to any reductions in the fatality rate.
section_title: FMCSA Has Made Several Refinements to Its Enforcement Programs and It May Make Additional Refinements Depending on the Outcomes of Studies
paragraphs: FMCSA has made several refinements to its enforcement programs based  on agency studies of factors that affect crash risk, and on evaluations of the  effectiveness of the programs themselves, and it is exploring additional,  potentially substantial, refinements to its enforcement approach. FMCSA  plans to conduct additional analyses of crash risk factors and on the costs  and effectiveness of its enforcement programs to help it further refine and  set priorities for its programs.
FMCSA has made several refinements to its enforcement programs based  on agency studies of factors that affect crash risk. To date, only one such  refinement has been based on the results of FMCSA’s most substantial  effort to understand the causes of, and contributing factors to, large truck  crashes—its Large Truck Crash Causation Study, which FMCSA began in  2001. This study was required by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act  with the intent of providing information that would help FMCSA and the  states identify and set priorities for programs and other measures likely to  lead to significant reductions in crashes involving commercial motor  vehicles. Congress also required FMCSA, in designing and conducting the  study, to consult with experts on crash causation, research methods, and  other relevant topics. To meet this requirement, FMCSA requested the  Transportation Research Board to form a committee to review the study’s  design and provide advice to FMCSA on study methods. The committee  expressed several concerns about FMCSA’s design, and FMCSA revised the  design in response to some of these concerns. Based on preliminary  results from the study indicating that truck and car driver factors (such as  fatigue, inattention, and misjudgment) are much more likely than vehicle  factors (such as defective brakes and worn tires) to be the critical reason  for crashes involving a truck and a car, FMCSA has decided to shift the  focus of some of its inspections from the truck to the driver, and has  called on states to institute “driver inspection strike forces” in high-crash  corridors. FMCSA plans to conduct more formal analyses of data from the  study over the next several years, and, depending on the results, it may  make additional refinements to its enforcement programs. Other examples  of refinements to its enforcement programs that FMCSA has made based  on studies of factors that affect crash risks include:  Safety of new entrants: Based on studies indicating that new motor  carriers had higher crash rates and lower rates of compliance with  safety regulations, in 1999 Congress directed FMCSA to develop a  program to ensure that new entrants would operate safely. As discussed  previously, in 2003 FMCSA initiated such a program that emphasizes  educating new entrants about their obligations under the safety  regulations, rather than taking enforcement actions when safety  deficiencies are identified. FMCSA intends to strengthen the  enforcement component of the new entrant program.
Share the Road Safely: Based on studies indicating that, in fatal crashes  involving a car and a truck, errors by car drivers are more frequently  cited in police reports than are errors by truck drivers, in 1991,  Congress directed FMCSA to develop a program to educate drivers  about how to drive safely in the vicinity of trucks; in 1994, FMCSA  initiated the Share the Road Safely program for this purpose. Many  highway safety experts believe that programs such as Share the Road  Safely are more likely to produce substantial changes in drivers’  behaviors if the education efforts are combined with local law  enforcement programs to increase compliance with traffic laws. FMCSA  agrees that enforcement should be a part of the program, and in 2005 it  began to pilot test a combined education and enforcement approach in  Washington state.
To its credit, FMCSA has also made several refinements to its enforcement  programs based on agency evaluations of the effectiveness of the programs  themselves. The Government Performance and Results Act calls for  agencies to evaluate the results of their programs, and we have suggested  that agencies use information on the performance of their programs to  identify opportunities for improvement. Examples of refinements to its  enforcement programs that FMCSA has made based on its evaluations of  the effectiveness of the programs include:  Roadside inspections: Based on its analysis indicating that the  inspection program is no longer leading to annual increases in the  industry-wide level of compliance with safety regulations, an FMCSA  official also told us that the agency is no longer seeking to increase the  number of roadside inspections from year to year.
Safety of new entrants: Based on (1) its analysis indicating that new  entrant safety audits—which currently emphasize education—have not  had a major impact on crash rates and (2) data showing that less than 1  percent of audited new entrants were failing the audit despite the fact  that many new entrants were operating without comprehensive  knowledge of the requirements and without being in compliance with  the safety regulations, FMCSA intends to increase the level of  compliance required to pass the audit and to avoid an enforcement  action. FMCSA plans to publish a proposed regulation to this effect in  March 2006.
Compliance reviews: Based on its 2002 evaluation indicating that  inconsistencies and bottlenecks in its compliance review process were  reducing its efficiency and effectiveness, FMCSA made several changes  in 2003 aimed at improving compliance review policies, procedures,  training, software, and supporting carrier data. Specific examples  include:  FMCSA discouraged repeat visits to high-risk motor carriers that had  received unsatisfactory safety ratings during a review conducted  within the past 12 months because the agency believed that not  enough time had elapsed to show whether safety improvements had  taken effect.
FMCSA (1) discouraged safety investigators from their earlier  practice of favoring violations of drug and alcohol regulations over  violations of hours of service regulations when they choose which  violations to document for enforcement because crash data and  FMCSA’s survey of its field staff suggest that hours of service  compliance is more important for safety, and (2) revised its  operations manual to encourage FMCSA’s state division offices to  document the maximum number of parts of the regulations where  major safety violations are discovered, rather than penalizing motor  carriers for a few violations in a particular part at the expense of  other parts.
FMCSA has not evaluated the impact that these and other changes  have had on the efficiency and effectiveness of the compliance  review process, but an FMCSA official told us that the agency  believes such an evaluation would be worthwhile and that it will  consider conducting one.
FMCSA is either conducting, or plans to conduct, several additional  evaluations of its enforcement approach, programs, and supporting  programs. Depending on the results of these evaluations, FMCSA may  make refinements to each of these. For example:  Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010: Under this initiative, FMCSA is  evaluating its current approach to monitoring and assessing the safety  of the motor carrier industry, including its enforcement approach, with  the intent of developing and implementing new approaches. FMCSA  began the initiative because it believes that the centerpiece of its current  oversight and enforcement approach—the compliance review  program—is resource intensive; reaches only about 2 percent of a  growing motor carrier population each year; does not adequately reflect  the impact that people involved in motor carriers’ operations, such as  managers, owners, and drivers, have on safety; and is impeded by  delayed, incomplete, and inaccurate data on the safety performance of  carriers. As a starting point for this initiative, FMCSA developed a  preliminary proposal for a new framework for its oversight and  enforcement programs. In contrast to FMCSA’s current enforcement  approach, which considers only the results of compliance reviews in  determining whether to assess civil penalties against carriers, the  proposed framework also considers, among other things, indications of  unsafe driving from traffic violations, crash records, and the results of  roadside inspections. FMCSA intends to refine and begin  implementation of the framework over the next several years.
Roadside inspections: FMCSA is evaluating the effectiveness of  alternative truck inspection strategies being utilized by states, such as  building temporary inspection sites, using no fixed sites at all, mobile  enforcement using wireless communications technologies, and use of  sophisticated information systems and different kinds of sensing  technologies. FMCSA expects the results of its evaluation to be  published in December 2005. As part of a separate evaluation, FMCSA  plans to review alternatives to its current approach to vehicle roadside  inspections, such as requiring motor carriers to inspect their vehicles  more frequently than the current requirement of once a year and having  third-parties conduct inspections.
PRISM: FMCSA is evaluating the effectiveness of its PRISM program,  including assessing whether states that have implemented PRISM have  achieved greater safety improvements than states that have not, and  identifying ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the  program. FMCSA plans to complete the evaluation in August 2006.
Monitoring drivers’ hours of service: FMCSA is evaluating the costs  and benefits of requiring electronic on-board recorders for monitoring  drivers’ hours of service, as required by a July 2004 federal appeals court  ruling that criticized the agency for not having conducted such an  assessment.
Drug and alcohol testing: In the next several years, FMCSA plans to  study whether the effectiveness of the agency’s efforts to ensure  compliance with its regulations prohibiting certain uses of drugs and  alcohol by drivers is being adversely affected by (1) how motor carriers  are selecting drivers for random testing, (2) whether carriers are  actually testing each driver selected, and (3) tests in which bogus  samples are submitted. FMCSA may make policy, regulatory, and  enforcement changes depending on the findings of the study.
Share the Road Safely: In March 2006, FMCSA plans to complete an  evaluation of the effectiveness of the ongoing Share the Road Safely  pilot program in Washington state that FMCSA is jointly funding with  the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The pilot combines  education and enforcement to improve the safety of car drivers’ driving  behavior in the vicinity of trucks. If the results of the evaluation are  favorable, FMCSA intends to extend the program to other states.
Border safety programs: FMCSA plans to conduct an evaluation of its  border safety audit and compliance review programs in 2007. Border  safety audits and compliance reviews can result in revocation of a motor  carrier’s authority to operate in the U.S., and FMCSA plans for its  evaluation to cover this enforcement aspect of the program.
In addition to its ongoing and planned program evaluations, FMCSA plans  to develop a tool to help the agency set priorities for its enforcement  programs by comparing their cost-effectiveness. The tool would produce  estimates of cost-effectiveness by combining information from the models  that FMCSA currently uses to estimate the impact of compliance reviews,  roadside inspections, and traffic enforcement in terms of reductions in  crashes, injuries, and fatalities with information on the costs of these  programs. We have reported that considering information on both the costs  and effectiveness of programs gives agencies a basis for focusing their  efforts and improving their performance, and the Office of Management  and Budget has guidelines for considering both the costs and benefits when  making decisions to initiate, renew, or expand programs which would  result in a series of measurable benefits or costs extending for  three or more years into the future. FMCSA officials told us that the tool  could also cover new entrant safety audits and certain education and  outreach programs. As part of a separate effort, FMCSA has developed  preliminary estimates of the average cost of a compliance review and the  average cost of a roadside inspection. However, the estimates are not based  on consistent assumptions, and an FMCSA official told us that the agency  intends to reassess the costs for purposes of its prioritization tool.
As recommended by the Office of Management and Budget, FMCSA also  plans to start evaluating the costs incurred and the benefits realized by its  existing regulations, beginning with evaluations of two regulations in 2006.  Finally, in 2006 FMCSA plans to identify long-term trends in the motor  carrier industry and how these trends could affect the agency’s ability to  meet its strategic goals and objectives over the next 20 years. FMCSA  intends to use the results of this effort to support its policy development  and strategic planning. We are encouraged by FMCSA’s ongoing and  planned efforts to obtain additional information on crash risk factors and  on the costs and effectiveness of its enforcement programs because these  efforts address long-standing core deficiencies that we identified in 1999  and 2000. We believe that the efforts will, if effectively implemented,  provide FMCSA with a sound basis to refine and set priorities for its  enforcement programs.
section_title: MCSAP Is Designed to Improve Safety but Program Oversight Is Inadequate
paragraphs: MCSAP employs a performance-based approach to truck safety by  encouraging states to analyze data to identify safety problems and target  their grant activities to achieve reductions in truck crashes, injuries, and  fatalities. However, FMCSA has not adequately overseen the development  of states’ safety plans. For example, FMCSA’s grant planning meetings, in  which it communicates priorities and how to develop plans with  quantifiable goals, were conducted for less than a third of the states in  fiscal year 2004, and FMCSA division offices that work with states did not  sufficiently monitor and ensure states’ progress towards safety goals. As a  result, we were unable to determine whether states substantially met many  of their safety goals. Furthermore, FMCSA has not completed its various  oversight reviews of MCSAP in the past 3 years, as required by agency  policy, and which, if carried out, could have helped to identify problems  both with how states administer and the agency oversees the grant  program. The agency, though, has recently taken steps to improve its  grantee review program and strengthen its oversight of MCSAP.
subsections: section_title: MCSAP Employs a Performance-Based Approach to Improve Safety
paragraphs: Since 1997, FMCSA has employed a performance-based approach for  funding state commercial vehicle safety activities through MCSAP. The  performance-based approach entails states analyzing data to identify  commercial vehicle safety problems in their respective jurisdictions and  targeting their grant activities to achieve FMCSA’s primary goal of reducing  truck crashes, injuries, and fatalities. As part of this approach, states must  also demonstrate how their proposed goals and activities further other  FMCSA goals, such as improving data quality and timeliness. In their safety  plans, states are required to measure and evaluate their performance,  which fosters accountability.
Since 2000, FMCSA has convened several meetings to assist states in  developing their plans. First, every spring, each service center is expected  to hold a planning meeting attended by the state representatives and  division office staff that administer and oversee the grant program. Service  center and headquarters staff are to communicate the priorities for and  changes made to the grant program for the coming year. The states are to  reflect these priorities and changes in their safety plans. In addition, the  Volpe National Transportation Systems Center is to provide states with  training at planning meetings on analyzing data and developing goals,  activities, and performance measures to address safety problems. Some  states, such as New York and North Carolina, have also partnered with  universities to conduct additional research and analysis on commercial  vehicle safety. Finally, FMCSA’s National Training Center conducts a  MCSAP grants management training course that addresses, among other  topics, how to develop safety plans, including goals, activities, and  performance measures.
Second, FMSCA conducts two examinations of the states’ draft safety plans  to ensure completeness, and that goals and activities are measurable and  support FMCSA’s mission. Initially, division office staff are to use a  standardized checklist to ensure that states’ safety plans incorporate the  required elements. These elements include an identification of safety  problems based on data analysis; goals, performance measures and  activities that address state and agency priorities; evaluations of state  progress towards the previous year’s goals and activities; and certification  of compatibility of state’s motor carrier safety regulations with federal  regulations. If any of the required elements are missing or unclear, the  division office staff are expected to return the safety plan to the state for  revision. FMCSA officials explained that after the division office staff  approves the safety plan, they are to forward it for review by a “technical  review panel” comprised of several service center and division office staff  in that region before it is finalized and forwarded to headquarters.
FMCSA staff at division offices, service centers, and headquarters consider  these planning meetings and safety plan examinations to be valuable  components of the grant program. We did not analyze the degree to which  these meetings and safety plan examinations improved the states’ safety  plans.
To further encourage improvements in commercial vehicle safety, FMCSA  awards MCSAP incentive funds over and above the basic program funds to  states that meet agency-specified safety criteria, such as reducing the  number of commercial-vehicle-involved fatal accidents or the commercial  vehicle fatal accident rate. States can also receive incentive funds if they  meet other agency-specified safety performance criteria, such as the timely  uploading of accident or inspection data, or checking the status of  commercial driver licenses during all roadside inspections.
section_title: FMCSA’s Inadequate Planning and Oversight of Its State Grant Program Resulted in Uncertainty About Whether States Met Many of Their Safety Goals
paragraphs: Although MCSAP employs a performance-based approach to improving  safety, it remains unclear whether the states we reviewed substantially met  a majority of their safety goals. Using safety plans, quarterly reports,  evaluations of previous years’ efforts, and other monitoring information on  states’ activities, we assessed the extent to which seven state grantees  substantially met their safety goals in fiscal year 2004. Of the 61 goals in  states’ safety plans, we could not determine whether 61 percent of these  goals were substantially met. Of the remaining goals, we determined that  23 percent were substantially met, while 16 percent were not.
We could not determine whether a majority of states’ safety goals were  substantially met because FMCSA did not thoroughly conduct three  important oversight activities intended to help FMCSA make its own  determination of states’ progress towards their safety goals. First, FMCSA  did not adequately carry out planning activities for 2004 MCSAP grants  designed to ensure that states’ safety plans included all of the key  elements—quantifiable national and state goals, performance measures,  and evaluations—needed to gauge whether state goals had been met. In  this regard, planning meetings—where states receive assistance in  developing goals, activities, and performance measures to address safety  problems—were convened by only one of the four service centers. The  meetings were not convened by three service centers because one did not  have a state programs staff person to convene the meeting, another  interpreted headquarters guidance to suggest that division offices work on  MCSAP planning directly with states without service center assistance, and  the third was constrained by states’ budget restrictions at the time.  Headquarters officials told us that they had expected planning meetings to  occur that year. We also found that only one service center held technical  review panels to ensure that safety plans included all of the key elements  described above. One service center did not have a state programs staff  person to convene a panel, while two service centers did not hold technical  review panels because they believed their curbed oversight role of the  service centers from fiscal years 1999 through 2003 implied that they  should not conduct technical review panels. At the time, agency leadership  restructured the agency to create a more direct relationship between  headquarters and the division offices. Therefore, officials at these two  service centers told us they felt that they did not have the authority to  conduct many of their previous oversight activities. However, agency  officials told us that they did not suspend technical review panels during  that time period. Officials at the fourth service center—which originated  the concept of the technical review panel—also acknowledged the curbed  oversight role of service centers, but that they had conducted a panel for  fiscal year 2004 because of their recognition that strong management  should be maintained in their state grant programs. According to agency  officials, current agency leadership, however, has encouraged service  centers to assume a greater oversight role.
Second, FMCSA division offices did not follow program guidance that  requires ensuring that state safety plans incorporate key elements to  adequately gauge states’ performance. We found that goals or performance  measures were not quantifiable, or were missing from various portions of  the safety plans for the seven states we reviewed. When asked about this,  staff from two of the division offices told us that quantifiable goals or  performance measures in their safety plans are not always needed.  However, we believe these key elements are critical because, without them,  FMCSA would not be able to objectively assess whether states’ goals had  been substantially met. In contrast, staff from the other division offices  with whom we spoke responded that they did not realize that multi-year  goals should incorporate annual performance measures, or that goals and  performance measures in the safety plans were not quantifiable or were  missing. These staff agreed that incorporating such information into the  safety plans would be appropriate and responded that they would consider  doing so in the future.
Finally, because FMCSA division offices did not adequately monitor states’  progress towards safety plan goals, they did not obtain the information that  would have enabled both them and us to determine whether state safety  goals were substantially met. Offices monitor states’ progress by reviewing  quarterly reports, safety plan evaluations, and data reports, and through  phone calls, E-mails and in-person meetings. For example, one of the seven  states we examined—the sixth largest overall grantee in fiscal year 2004— did not submit required quarterly reports to its respective division office for  several years. This was due to the responsible state staff person’s belief  that it was unnecessary to complete them. The division office followed-up  with the state about this issue, but no further corrective action, such as  withholding the state’s future grant funding, was taken by the agency. The  division office also reported that because the lead agency was in the  process of changing, a new staff person would be assuming the  responsibility and that they expect the quarterly reports to once again be  submitted. In addition to the omission of quarterly reports, we found that  three of the largest grantees did not include evaluations of both national  and state goals in their safety plans, despite this being a program  requirement. When we asked the respective division offices about this, they  responded that this omission was not of concern because their office had a  general sense of the states’ progress through their monitoring. However,  the information that these offices provided to support their monitoring  effort, for the most part, did not allow us to assess whether the state had  met its goals. Agency officials believe that some of the required  information—such as quarterly progress reports and yearly evaluations— may no longer be necessary given their regular communication with states  and access to information regarding state activities. However, given that  MCSAP relies on a performance-based approach, the agency would not be  able to adequately measure how grant funds are contributing to improving  safety without this information. All of the division offices provided us with  records of their monitoring, including data reports and E-mails. However,  for the most part, their records did not provide enough information about  states’ progress for us to determine whether certain safety goals had been  substantially met. Additionally, only one division office we reviewed  formally tracks its state’s activities by the goals specified in the safety plan,  and this office has only recently begun to do so.
Some division office staff conveyed their concerns regarding states’ safety  plans. The staff of two division offices recognized that their states’ 2004  safety plans were not complete in terms of the key elements we discussed  and that future improvements were needed. As a result, both division  offices have explained that they are working more closely with the states to  highlight these key elements in order to strengthen subsequent safety  plans. Furthermore, the staff of all seven division offices generally  understood the inability to gauge state performance based on the issues we  identified and responded that they would consider our comments in the  development of their states’ 2006 safety plans.
section_title: FMCSA Has Not Completed Various Oversight Reviews of Its Grant Program but Has Taken Steps to Improve Its State Review Program
paragraphs: FMCSA guidance states that three MCSAP-related reviews are to be  conducted every 3 years: (1) division offices are to review their respective  state grantees, (2) service centers are to review the division offices in their  region, and (3) headquarters is to review the four service centers. Agency  officials told us that the purpose of these reviews is to identify any  weaknesses in the administration, monitoring, or oversight of the grant  program by a state, division office, or service center. The reviews also  identify best practices that could be applied to other states, division offices,  or service centers.
We found that FMCSA division offices reviewed only 19 of 56 grantees (34  percent) in the past 3 years. Of the completed reviews, issues cited include  the incompatibility of various state motor carrier safety regulations with  federal regulations, the need to better integrate performance-based  approaches to state safety plans, missing quarterly reports and narratives  that address a prior year’s goals, and less-than-comprehensive annual  evaluations of safety plan goals. Among the seven largest grantees, we  followed up with the three division offices that had not completed reviews  in the last 3 years to learn why they were not conducted. Two of these three  division offices did not conduct reviews due to reorganization of the lead  agency within their respective states. However, given that reviews tend to  last between a week and several weeks and that there is a 3-year period to  conduct state reviews, division offices would have had sufficient time to  complete a review either before or after the reorganization. The third  division office cited conducting a series of smaller “process” reviews as  fulfilling the state review. When we asked headquarters about several  division offices not conducting reviews of states, agency officials  responded that they were disappointed many of the reviews had not been  completed. However, they said they are taking steps—such as creating an  implementation schedule of reviews to be conducted—to ensure that  future state grantee reviews are completed in a timely fashion.
The agency has also not reviewed division offices and service centers, as  required by agency policy. In the past 3 years, the four service centers  reviewed only 15 of 52 division offices (29 percent). We found that a  contributing factor to the lack of reviews was the curbed oversight role of  the service centers (as noted earlier) that was attributable to agency  restructuring. The restructuring was designed to create a more direct  relationship between headquarters and the division offices. We also learned  that, among the four service centers, one did not conduct any division  office reviews during the past 3 years because it believed that it should not  conduct the reviews given the curbed oversight role of the service centers  during part of that time period. Furthermore, headquarters has also not  reviewed any of the service centers in over 3 years. Staff in headquarters  cited a lack of staff and time as their primary reason for not completing  these reviews. Headquarters staff devoted to MCSAP have steadily  decreased over the past 11 years, from 11 full-time employees in 1995 to 4  full-time employees in 2005.
In a majority of the 15 division office reviews conducted, service centers  identified gaps in the monitoring and oversight responsibilities of division  offices. Some of the recommendations from these reviews address  commonly identified division office performance issues, including (1) not  tracking, recording, or retaining information on their monitoring activities;  (2) not providing consistent feedback to states about findings from  monitoring activities; (3) not following-through to ensure improvements  were made or tracking or recording any corrective actions that needed to  be, or have been taken, by the state; and (4) not conducting grantee reviews  as required by agency policy. Furthermore, two of the four service centers  did not keep track of the division offices that have conducted state grantee  reviews, and therefore they did not have the information to know which  division office reviews had not been completed and what types of  monitoring problems had been identified. Although we did not evaluate the  extent to which division office reviews are necessary for the agency to  conduct adequate oversight, we believe that the frequency with which  monitoring problems were identified suggests the usefulness of these  reviews. Lastly, we learned that headquarters does not keep track of  whether division offices conduct state reviews.
In addition to identifying gaps in monitoring and oversight, the agency also  identifies what it considers to be best practices during its reviews of  division offices. We have suggested that the sharing of best practices can be  helpful in improving grantee performance. However, the agency has not  fully shared those best practices among other division offices. Several best  practices of division offices were identified during these reviews. Among  them were (1) the development and use of an automated monitoring of  state grant activities, (2) the convening of regular formal meetings with the  state, (3) the development of a detailed quarterly report format that  includes progress made towards safety plan goals, and (4) the hiring of an  administrative grants manager. However, only two of the four service  centers have actively circulated best practices from state reviews to  division offices. The other two service centers told us that they intend to  circulate these best practices in the future.
In recognizing that the way in which states are reviewed has not been  recently revised to reflect changes in MCSAP, and that it would like the  reviews to have a greater focus on the financial aspects of the program,  FMCSA has taken steps to improve its state grantee review program. In  December 2004, the agency completed a draft plan for the new review  program. The proposed program would be carried out by a joint team of  division office, service center, headquarters, and contractor staff that  would assist the division offices, and is comprised of three parts: a  regulatory review, a financial review, and a performance review. The  performance review would compare states’ activities with the goals  specified in their safety plans, and would emphasize the monitoring of  performance. After a review is completed, a draft report of findings,  recommendations, and other information would undergo review by the  division office and the state. FMCSA plans for this program to follow a 4- year cycle for conducting the reviews. Agency officials told us that they  have piloted this review program in four states, and officials expect the  program will be fully implemented by the first quarter of fiscal year 2006.  To ensure that this improved review program follows a 4-year cycle,  FMCSA officials told us that they plan to schedule the reviews several years  in advance and track which ones have been completed. Because this  proposed review program is in the planning stage, we did not assess  whether it is likely to address the problems we found.
Further, FMCSA has several other efforts underway to strengthen the  agency’s oversight of MCSAP. First, agency officials noted that a newly  created senior position to manage and oversee the service centers was  recently filled, and that FMCSA plans to request three additional MCSAP  staff in headquarters as part of its budget request for fiscal year 2007.  Second, agency officials told us that they plan to incorporate an  expectation of completing oversight reviews in the individual performance  plans of all division office, service center, and headquarters staff that are  responsible for MCSAP. Third, recent legislation requires that the agency  report annually to Congress on the effectiveness of the grant program.  Finally, FMCSA has two studies underway that relate to agency oversight of  MCSAP: one to determine the effectiveness of division offices’ activities,  and the other to assure the quality of the agency’s grant operations.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In making decisions about its enforcement approach, FMCSA follows many  of the effective management practices we identified related to performance  management. We believe that it is noteworthy that FMCSA has begun to  refine its enforcement approach based on information about the causes of  crashes, that it plans to develop a tool to help it set priorities for its  enforcement programs based on estimates of their cost-effectiveness, and  that it has conducted—and continues to conduct—program evaluations of  its enforcement programs, including evaluations that are assessing  alternative approaches to enforcement. These efforts, if implemented  effectively, should provide FMCSA with a reasonable basis for setting  priorities for—and further refining—its enforcement programs in ways that  reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities in a cost-effective manner. However,  because the agency’s goals and measures for its enforcement programs do  not describe expected and estimated contributions to FMCSA’s overall goal  of reducing the large-truck fatality rate, FMCSA and the public do not have  a sense of how much the programs contribute to any reductions in the  fatality rate that may occur over time. The absence of this kind of  information makes it more difficult for FMCSA to make adjustments to its  enforcement programs that could help achieve its fatality rate goal. In  addition, because FMCSA does not know how much its civil penalties  increase carriers’ compliance with safety regulations, it lacks the  information it needs to make sound decisions about any changes to its use  of civil penalties; it also may be missing opportunities to increase carrier  compliance, and ultimately safety, that could result from such changes.  Furthermore, without targets specifying by how much it expects to reduce  its backlog of enforcement cases and by when, Congress and other  interested parties find it more difficult to hold the agency accountable for  achieving this goal—one of the agency’s four highest priorities for  improving commercial motor vehicle safety in fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
FMCSA’s overall framework establishing performance and accountability  for MCSAP is sound. It establishes expectations for safety improvements  by grantees to help further the department’s goal of saving lives and  contains several mechanisms to help ensure that these expectations will be  met. This is important, as MCSAP represents almost half of FMCSA’s  budget and the agency counts on it to materially contribute to saving lives.  However, we found that the execution of these expectations has, too often,  not been met, and aspects of how the agency actually works with states to  oversee performance need strengthening. These conditions ranged from  planning opportunities forgone, to differing perspectives about  performance requirements on the part of division office and service center  staff, to unfulfilled reviews of performance. While there are various reasons  underlying the conditions that we found, all contributed to the end result of  FMCSA not being in a position to determine whether states focused their  attention on, and carried out, activities that could lead to lives saved.  Further, the steps taken by the agency to strengthen safety plans and  improve reviews of states performance are promising, but FMCSA should  also assess its own oversight of the program.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making five recommendations aimed at improving FMCSA’s  enforcement programs and MCSAP oversight:  To help ensure and demonstrate that FMCSA’s enforcement programs  contribute to the agency’s goal to reduce the large truck fatality rate, we  recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FMCSA  administrator to set goals for its enforcement programs that are  designed to clearly demonstrate these contributions.
To improve FMCSA’s ability to establish the most effective structure of  civil penalties, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation  direct the FMCSA administrator to develop and implement one or more  measures of the effectiveness of its civil penalties against motor  carriers.
To improve the consistency and effectiveness of FMCSA’s truck safety  enforcement, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct  the FMCSA administrator to develop and include in its strategy and  annual plans a specific numeric or measurable goal to eliminate the  agency’s backlog of enforcement cases, as required by the Motor Carrier  Safety Improvement Act of 1999.
To improve accountability for use of MCSAP grant funds, we  recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FMCSA  administrator to ensure that existing mechanisms, such as planning  sessions, reviews of draft state plans, and periodic monitoring of states’  progress, to the extent possible, are carried out and result in clarity of  goals and performance measures and assessments of safety  improvements made.
To improve FMCSA’s oversight of MCSAP grantees, we recommend that  the Secretary of Transportation direct the FMCSA administrator to (1)  assess, upon implementation, whether the improved performance  review of state activities are meeting the agency’s intended goals; (2)  incorporate MCSAP oversight as a segment of the effectiveness study of  division offices; and (3) assess the oversight activities of service centers.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for  review and comment and received comments from FMCSA officials.  FMCSA generally agreed with the report’s findings and agreed to consider  our recommendations. FMCSA offered several corrections, which we  incorporated in this report.
We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees and  subcommittees with responsibilities for commercial motor vehicle safety  issues; the Secretary of Transportation; the Administrator, FMCSA; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. This report will be available at no charge  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: In determining how the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration  (FMCSA) used its enforcement authority to address noncompliance with  the federal motor carrier safety regulations, we reviewed legislation,  congressional reports leading to the creation of FMCSA, FMCSA  regulations, manuals, guidance, and assessments of the agency’s  enforcement efforts by the Department of Transportation Office of  Inspector General, and our own assessments. In addition, we obtained  information from FMCSA about enforcement policies, the implementation  of these policies and procedures, and analyzed enforcement data; we  focused on fiscal years 1995 through 2004 in our efforts. We chose 1995  because it represented a period in which FMCSA partnered with industry  and provided a 10-year period from which to observe changes in FMCSA’s  policies and actions. We discussed these requirements and the agency’s  implementation of them with FMCSA, industry and safety advocacy groups,  and transportation researchers.
We also analyzed FMCSA data on compliance reviews, roadside  inspections, new entrant safety audits, homeland security-related visits of  hazardous materials carriers, out-of-service orders and orders to cease  operations, and civil penalties occurring between fiscal years 1995 and  2004. We used 2004 as the most recent year in our analysis because it is the  most recent year for which complete data are available.
In calculating the percentage of the motor carrier industry that receives  compliance reviews, we used FMCSA’s estimates of the annual size of the  interstate motor carrier industry. This number is an estimate due to the fact  that carriers are not required to report the closing of their operations to the  department. This estimate has improved with the development of the new  entrant audit program because FMCSA is able to identify non-interstate  carriers and remove them from the total count.
In determining total civil penalties assessed, we used the average civil  penalty per violation, rather than the average civil penalty per enforcement  case. We did this to observe how FMCSA treated different types of  violations, such as recordkeeping and non-recordkeeping. We made  several adjustments to FMCSA’s data. First, we removed all motor coach  cases from the dataset, because this report only focuses on large truck  safety. During the past decade, passenger carriers have accounted for  slightly more than 1 percent of enforcement actions. Second, we excluded  all cases that the agency closed without enforcement or that remained  open as of July 2005 (the end of our fieldwork). Between 1995 and 2004, an  average of 145 cases was closed annually without enforcement, and an  average of 19 cases was left open. FMCSA chooses to close a case without  enforcement when the agency decides to cease seeking to collect a civil  penalty. This can happen for several reasons, but frequently it is due to a  carrier declaring bankruptcy. Excluding these cases ensured that the  agency had completed the enforcement process before we analyzed the  data. Since in many cases that are closed without enforcement the carrier  is not formally charged with a civil penalty, the data tend to be skewed by  including these cases. Third, we adjusted all civil penalties for inflation  using 2004 dollars.
In determining the reliability of FMCSA’s data, we performed electronic  testing for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and we  interviewed officials from FMCSA’s data analysis division who are  knowledgeable about the data and how they were entered. FMCSA  determined that the 1995 data on roadside inspections were not reliable.  Due to this determination, we did not use these data. For the remainder of  the data, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  types of analysis we present in this report.
In assessing the extent to which FMCSA follows key effective management  practices in making decisions about its enforcement approach, we  reviewed our reports on performance management, guidance from the  Office of Management and Budget, and the Government Performance and  Results Act to identify key effective management practices for agency  decision making. The key practices that we identified were related to  strategy, goals, performance measures, and decision making that considers  the factors that contribute to large-truck crashes as well as the costs and  effectiveness of agency programs. We obtained information on FMCSA’s  enforcement strategy, goals, and performance measures through  discussions with FMCSA officials, and from FMCSA documents, including  its budget request for fiscal year 2006 (which also serves as FMCSA’s  strategic plan, performance plan for fiscal year 2006, and performance  report for fiscal year 2004). We also reviewed a report entitled Measuring  the FMCSA’s Safety Objectives from Year 2000 to 2002 and reports on  FMCSA’s estimates of the impact of its enforcement programs. We obtained  information on FMCSA’s completed and ongoing crash causation studies  and program evaluations, as well as how the results of some of these  studies and evaluations have influenced FMCSA’s decisions about  refinements to its enforcement programs, through discussions with FMCSA  officials or from FMCSA documents, including program evaluation plans  and reports, and statements of work for planned evaluations. We also  attended FMCSA’s October 2004 public session in Falls Church, Virginia,  designed to obtain input on its Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010  initiative, which is intended to develop a new framework for overseeing  truck safety.
In assessing the extent to which FMCSA ensures that its Motor Carrier  Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) grants contribute to the agency’s  mission, we reviewed regulations and FMCSA guidance relating to the  design of the grant program and discussed with FMCSA officials how  accountability is built into it. We assessed FMCSA’s planning and oversight  of seven MCSAP state grantees in fiscal year 2004 (the latest full year for  which information was available). These states—California, Georgia,  Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas—comprised 27 percent  of all MCSAP grants awarded for that year. Because we chose these states  judgmentally (representing the largest grantees), we cannot project our  findings nationwide. Reviewing a larger number of grantees would not  have been practical due to resource constraints. To increase the reliability  of our assessment, two analysts independently assessed whether states  substantially met their goals. They then discussed their results and  resolved any differences. We then discussed our assessment with FMCSA  officials responsible for grant activities in those states. We also reviewed all  four regional service centers to determine how they conduct their oversight  activities. Finally, we attended a planning meeting for the fiscal year 2006  safety plans to gain a better understanding of how agency priorities are  conveyed and how the agency provides assistance to the states in  developing safety plans.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgements
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, James Ratzenberger, Assistant  Director; Mallory Barg Bulman; Craig Fischer; David Goldstein; Tina Won  Sherman; and Gregory Wilmoth made key contributions to this report.