Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency
Published: 1998-11-12T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the status and other aspects of the Domestic Preparedness Program, focusing on: (1) the training and other benefits offered to cities under the program; and (2) the methodology for designing and implementing the program, including the way in which cities were selected to participate, how cities' capabilities and needs were assessed, and the effectiveness of interagency coordination on this and other similar consequence management training and equipment programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO noted that: (1) the training and equipment that the Department of Defense (DOD) is providing to cities through the Domestic Preparedness Program have clearly increased cities' awareness of and should better prepare them to deal with a potential chemical or biological terrorist incident; (2) local officials in the seven cities GAO visited praised the training program's content, instructors, and materials as well as DOD's willingness to modify the program based on suggestions from local officials; (3) they also credited the program with bringing local, state, and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship; (4) in designing the training and equipment program, DOD selected 120 cities based solely on city population; (5) this decision resulted in 14 clusters of 44 cities within 30 miles of at least one other city selected; (6) by dealing with cities, DOD did not build upon the states' existing emergency management and training structures; (7) had it used existing structures that reflect how emergency response is actually organized, DOD could have consolidated training and equipment purchases to cover more jurisdictions in fewer locations than presently planned, at less cost; (8) DOD's loan of equipment in support of the training program has caused frustration and confusion among local officials; (9) the legislation authorized DOD to lend equipment to local jurisdictions, and DOD established a 5-year renewable loan agreement to govern the provision of about $300,000 worth of equipment to each city; (10) this agreement restricts the use of the equipment to training rather than operational purposes and requires the cities to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment; (11) cities were concerned about the lack of federal sustainment money to maintain, repair, and replace the equipment; (12) the program has raised expectations among some local officials that the federal government may provide additional funding for operational equipment; (13) the interagency coordination process provided a valuable information-sharing forum but was of limited success in helping steer the design and development of the program; (14) federal agencies' individual efforts to enhance consequence management of possible incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism are not guided by an overarching strategy for achieving a defined end state; and (15) local officials in most of the cities raised the issue that the many WMD training, equipment, and consequence management programs are evidence of a fragmented and wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Concerned that terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices—Congress authorized the federal government to improve capabilities to respond to such incidents, particularly at the local level. As requested, we reviewed the status and other aspects of the Domestic Preparedness Program, a training, assistance, and equipment loan program led by the Department of Defense (DOD). Specifically, we evaluated (1) the training and other benefits offered to cities under the Domestic Preparedness Program and (2) the methodology for designing and implementing the program, including the way in which cities were selected to participate, how cities’ capabilities and needs were assessed, and the effectiveness of interagency coordination on this and other similar consequence management training and equipment programs. You also asked us to determine the potential cost of equipping and maintaining the capability of a city to respond to a terrorist incident involving WMD. This matter will be the subject of a report to be issued later.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Concerned that WMD are increasingly available to terrorists, Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act (P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996). The act designates DOD as the lead agency to enhance domestic preparedness for responding to and managing the consequences of terrorists’ use of WMD. Under the act, DOD can provide training, exercises, and expert advice to emergency response personnel and lend equipment to local jurisdictions.
The Secretary of Defense designated the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as the policy office and the Secretary of the Army to carry out the Domestic Preparedness Program. Because of its subject matter expertise, the Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) was tasked to implement the program through the Army Director of Military Support. The Director of Military Support and CBDCOM designed a training program to build on the existing knowledge and capabilities of those who would first deal with a WMD incident locally—fire, law enforcement, and medical personnel and hazardous materials technicians. This generally week-long program takes a train-the-trainer approach. On the last day of the week-long program, local officials role-play their responses to a specific terrorism scenario through a tabletop exercise. The act also authorizes (1) funds for DOD to assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in establishing Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMST) to help improve local jurisdictions’ medical response capabilities for a WMD incident; (2) a telephonic link to provide data and expert advice for the use of state and local officials responding to emergencies involving WMD; (3) a rapid response information system, including an inventory of rapid response assets and a database on chemical and biological materials; and (4) a chemical/biological rapid response team.
Agencies that participate in the program include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Public Health Service (PHS), and the Environmental Protection Agency. The act also requires that DOD coordinate with state and local emergency preparedness agencies. Until June 1998, the coordinating body for the Domestic Preparedness Program was the Senior Interagency Coordination Group on Terrorism.
DOD received $36 million in fiscal year 1997 to implement the program. An additional $6.6 million was provided for PHS to establish medical strike teams. DOD’s fiscal year 1998 and 1999 budget estimates are $43 million and $50 million, respectively, to continue the program. DOD estimates that the last 2 years of the 5-year program will cost about $14 million to $15 million each year. DOD expects its portion of the 5-year program to cost at least $157 million, but it expects to incur costs of about $5 million per year in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to conduct program-related exercises. Appendixes I through III show more detailed actual and projected DOD Domestic Preparedness Program costs for fiscal years 1997-99.
section_title: Cities Benefit From Domestic Preparedness Program
paragraphs: Cities that have received training under the Domestic Preparedness Program have a greater awareness of how to respond to a potential chemical or biological terrorist incident. Local officials praised the training program content, instructors, and materials as well as DOD’s willingness to act on constructive criticism and adjust the courses. They also credited the program with bringing local, state, and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship. By December 31, 1998, DOD expected to have trained about one-third of the 120 cities it selected for the program and planned to complete the entire training program by fiscal year 2001. Those trained—fire fighters, hazardous materials technicians, emergency medical services personnel, law enforcement personnel, hospital personnel, and dispatchers—are expected to train other emergency responders through follow-on courses. The seven cities we visited were planning to institutionalize various adaptations of the WMD training, primarily in their fire and law enforcement academies. A related exercise program to allow cities to test their response capabilities also has begun. As authorized under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, DOD is in the process of providing $300,000 in training and operational equipment—personal protection, detection, decontamination, and training aids—selected by each city after it is trained. As of June 1998, nine cities had received equipment and other cities were developing their lists. See appendix IV for DOD’s suggested equipment list.
subsections: section_title: Other Program Aspects Are Being Implemented
paragraphs: The other aspects of the Domestic Preparedness Program either have been implemented or are in process. DOD established a hot line for reporting incidents and requesting technical assistance through the existing National Response Center for hazardous materials spills, and a help line was established through which CBDCOM experts can provide information and advice. The Command also has an internet web site to provide information on the Domestic Preparedness Program. FEMA established the Rapid Response Information System to allow federal and state agencies controlled computer access to a database on federal response capabilities, WMD substances, equipment, and other information. (An internet web site allows general access to an abbreviated version of the system.) A number of city and state officials we interviewed had limited knowledge about these communications systems, and some were skeptical of their value during a crisis. These officials indicated that the systems seemed redundant to existing emergency response reporting channels and information sources, and they did not expect to take the time to use any of these systems in the event of an incident.
In association with the cities of Baltimore and New York, CBDCOM is identifying ways to improve the response to chemical and biological WMD incidents, respectively. The Command is also testing first responder equipment, such as protective clothing and chemical detectors, to enable cities to make more informed decisions about equipment purchases or requests through the DOD equipment program. At the time of our review, DOD had not finalized a joint command structure for a Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team, which is intended to support federal, state, and local agencies in dealing with a WMD incident. The team will comprise existing military units from more than one military service and possibly from National Guard and Reserve units.
PHS continues to establish and equip MMSTs for which the initial 27 program cities are developing concept of operations plans for medical systems. PHS has contracts with the 27 cities and expects them to complete their plans, including how MMSTs are being incorporated into the local emergency response and medical systems, by December 31, 1998. At the time of our review, PHS further planned to establish MMSTs in all 120 program cities. These teams are eligible for unmatched federal funding to acquire an average of $350,000 worth of equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals based on the requirements related to their concept of operations plans.
section_title: Cities Selected Based Upon Population
paragraphs: DOD decided to implement its Domestic Preparedness Program in the 120 largest U.S. cities based on city population (1990 census, revised Apr. 1995). This equated to all U.S. cities with more than 144,000 people at the time. Figure 1 lists the cities DOD selected. The 120 cities represent about 22 percent of the U.S. population and cover at least 1 city in 38 states and the District of Columbia. Twelve states and the U.S. territories have no cities in the program, and 25 percent of the cities are in California and Texas.
DOD took a city approach because it wanted to deal with a single governmental entity that could select the most appropriate personnel for training and to receive equipment. But in selecting cities, DOD did not take into account a city’s existing level of preparedness or financial need. Also, DOD did no analysis to determine whether all cities on the list actually had a perceptible level of threat and risk of terrorism or whether a smaller city with high risk factors might have been excluded from the program due to its lower population. No federal agency determined and assessed cities’ risk factors based on intelligence assessments, critical infrastructure points, national symbols, future special events drawing large crowds, sensitive government or corporate activities, or similar analyses and data to help evaluate cities’ key assets and vulnerabilities to WMD. In fact, in no city we visited did the FBI determine there was a credible threat of a WMD attack, which would be one factor considered in a threat and risk assessment.
section_title: Linking Future Training to Existing Structures Would Be More Efficient and Economical
paragraphs: DOD has set out to deliver training without taking advantage of existing state emergency management structures, mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions, or other collaborative arrangements for emergency response. By delivering the program to cities based on population size, DOD replicates training sessions in nearby cities that also qualified for the program and might even be part of the same response system or mutual aid jurisdiction. Mutual aid agreements, unified emergency service districts, councils of government, hazardous materials response regions, and traditional state roles in fire and emergency management training (as well as links to the federal response system), would allow DOD to consolidate training and could result in far fewer training iterations. Training in fewer locations and taking advantage of existing emergency response structures could hasten the accomplishment of program goals and have the added benefit of reinforcing local response integration. Such an approach could also cover a greater percentage of the population and make effective use of existing emergency management training venues. Under this approach, WMD training could be delivered over the long term through existing state training systems. Table 1 compares the difference in coverage that results from selecting 120 cities, counties, or standard/primary metropolitan statistical areas.
Table 2 shows that DOD could have selected fewer areas to cover 22 percent of the population.
DOD’s approach resulted in clusters of program cities, each of which is to receive training and equipment. Figure 2 shows the location of the cities nationwide and the clustering effect resulting from DOD’s decision to base training delivery on city population.
Figure 3 shows 14 clusters of 44 different cities within 30 miles of at least 1 other program city, or 37 percent of the total number of cities, that DOD selected for the program. Increasing the distance to 60 miles between cities produces 18 clusters involving 58 cities, or nearly half of the total number of cities in the program.
The Southern California area shows the greatest effect of clustering. Under the California Standardized Emergency Management System, there are countywide operational areas within six mutual aid regions (see fig. 4).
In Los Angeles County, the sheriff is in charge of the consolidated interagency response to an incident occurring in any of the 88 cities and 136 unincorporated areas within the county. The Los Angeles county operational area includes the cities of Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Glendale, all of which are treated as separate entities in the Domestic Preparedness Program. Further, the nearby cities of Anaheim, Huntington Beach, Santa Ana, San Bernardino, and Riverside are within 30 miles of at least one other program city and are also treated as separate entities. Through mutual aid and under California’s statewide system, Los Angeles county could conceivably assist or be assisted by these other neighboring cities or any other jurisdictions in the state in the event of a major incident.
Similarly, as shown in figure 5, Virginia has 13 regionalized hazardous materials teams to respond to a WMD incident. Through these regional teams that operate under state control, four adjacent program cities—Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Newport News, and Chesapeake—could assist one another in the event of a WMD incident.
subsections: section_title: B
paragraphs: Texas has four program cities less than 30 miles from each other: Dallas, Fort Worth, Irving, and Arlington. And the Washington, D.C., MMST is based on a metropolitan area council of governments agreement involving six jurisdictions (and two program cities) in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia that would support Washington, D.C., or other metropolitan area first responders in the event of a WMD incident. MMSTs in other cities are also designed to be integrated into the local emergency response and medical systems for that particular area.
In response to comments by state and local officials, DOD began holding regional meetings to introduce the program. Nevertheless, each program city still receives its own training program and training equipment package. Cities may invite representatives from neighboring jurisdictions and state agencies, but classroom space tends to be limited, and if the neighboring city is a program city, it will eventually receive its own on-site training.
States have existing training structures that DOD could have used to deliver its training courses. California’s Specialized Training Institute, for example, provides emergency management training to first responders statewide. In Texas, the state’s Division of Emergency Management conducts training for local first responders, and fire protection training is provided through the Texas Engineering Extension Service. FEMA said that it delivers numerous courses through and in cooperation with state and local fire training academies and emergency managers.
Under current circumstances, it is up to the individual cities whose personnel were trained as trainers to ensure the appropriate courses are delivered to the rank-and-file emergency response personnel. Cities we visited were adapting the DOD courses differently and used different venues to deliver the training. Cities plan to deliver the courses through their local academies and in most cases will also deliver the courses directly. One delivery method that DOD could consider to reach large numbers of first responders while minimizing travel costs is distance learning. For example, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases has successfully used distance learning techniques through satellite-to-television links, and FEMA provides training to emergency responders nationwide through its Emergency Education Network. CBDCOM has been considering distance learning technology to provide training to cities other than the 120 selected for the Domestic Preparedness Program but is not using it to train first responders in multiple cities in the existing program.
section_title: Terms of DOD Equipment Agreement Concern Cities
paragraphs: Because of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislative language authorizing DOD to lend equipment (50 U.S.C. 2312 (e)), DOD provided equipment as a 5-year renewable loan for training purposes rather than giving or granting equipment to the cities. DOD’s loan agreement terms have caused frustration and confusion among local officials. Under the terms of the loan agreement, cities are to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment and are to use it only for training purposes. Officials from some cities we visited viewed the acceptance of the equipment as tantamount to an unfunded federal mandate because DOD is providing no funds to sustain the equipment. At least two cities were reluctant to accept the equipment unless DOD would assure them that the equipment could be used operationally and that DOD did not intend for the equipment to be returned. Although such assurances contradict the loan agreement, DOD program officials acknowledged that DOD will not require cities to repair, maintain, replace, or return the equipment and that cities can use it for operational purposes as well as for training. DOD officials also pointed out that much of the equipment has no more than a 5-year useful life and is largely incompatible with standard military-specification equipment.
Further, expectations have been raised among some local officials that the federal government may eventually provide funds to sustain the program, if not to provide even more equipment toward meeting cities’ perceived operational requirements. DOD officials said that the $300,000 equipment package was intended only for cities’ training needs. Also, DOD wanted to encourage cities to share in the burden of preparing for WMD terrorism by funding additional equipment themselves. DOD’s basis for determining the $300,000 value of the equipment program and allowing all cities the same amount, regardless of their existing capabilities or financial need, is unclear and undocumented. Moreover, no federal agency has made assessments as a part of the program to help determine requirements needed for WMD over and above what is needed for a response to an industrial hazardous materials incident.
section_title: Interagency Coordination Has Been Limited
paragraphs: Congress intended the Domestic Preparedness Program to be an interagency effort with DOD as lead agency. Under FEMA leadership, the Senior Interagency Coordination Group provided a forum for DOD and the other involved agencies to share information. However, in developing the program, some member agency officials stated that DOD did not always take advantage of the experience of agencies that were more accustomed to dealing with state and local officials and were more knowledgeable of domestic emergency response structures. For example, some agency representatives said that they offered suggestions such as taking a metropolitan area approach and coordinating with state emergency management agencies instead of dealing directly and only with cities.DOD made most program decisions and presented them to the Group for discussion. According to DOD, the Group was often unable to form consensus or reach a decision, DOD was obligated to move forward with the program without interagency agreement.
According to participants, the Group did influence two decisions. DOD initially planned to cover 20 cities in the first phase of the program, but the Group raised the number to 27 and gave 7 cities higher priority in terms of timing for the training than their population would otherwise warrant. The Group made this decision to account for special events, geographical balance, and the remoteness of Honolulu, Hawaii, and Anchorage, Alaska, from the continental United States. Also, concerned about an assessment guide that DOD developed for the cities and cities’ presumed negative perceptions, the Group recommended that DOD abandon its plan to have cities conduct formal self-assessments of their capabilities and needs. The Group did not press for a more acceptable assessment methodology, which resulted in the lack of any analytical basis for cities to determine their requirements for a prudent and affordable level of preparedness for WMD or to guide DOD in defining individual cities’ requirements.
In addition, the Senior Interagency Coordination Group did not resolve the issue of similar or potentially overlapping terrorism-related courses. Some agency officials told us that in developing its training program, DOD did not take advantage of existing terrorism-related courses or curriculums. For example, a joint Department of Justice and FEMA 2-day basic concepts course on emergency response to terrorism was being developed at about the same time as the Domestic Preparedness Program. Department of Justice officials described the course as being more detailed and technical than the WMD awareness portion of the 5-day DOD program. They said that the training materials were available if DOD had wanted to use them for the awareness and operations modules of its training program, but a DOD program official said that the materials were draft at the time and could not be used.
FEMA and Department of Justice officials said they made available to DOD materials from existing Emergency Management Institute and National Fire Academy courses or workshops on terrorism-related subjects. Other federal agencies also have training that includes WMD or other terrorism-related topics. DOD did not adopt these materials, and the Department of Justice and FEMA continued developing additional terrorism-related courses as well. Some city and state officials and national first responder organizations faulted DOD for not seeking their input or heeding their advice in the early stages of program development so that DOD could have a better appreciation of state and local emergency management and training structures and incident command systems.
section_title: Strategy Needed to Coordinate and Focus Multiple Training, Equipment, and Response Elements
paragraphs: Some local officials viewed the growing number of WMD consequence management training programs, including the Domestic Preparedness Program, the Department of Justice and FEMA courses, FEMA Emergency Management Institute courses, National Fire Academy courses, and a National Guard Bureau’s National Interagency Counterdrug Institute course, as evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism. Similarly, multiple programs with equipment segments—such as the separate DOD and PHS initiatives and the new Department of Justice equipment grant program—are causing frustration and confusion at the local level and are resulting in further complaints that the federal government is unfocused and has no coordinated plan or defined end state for domestic preparedness.
The DOD and PHS equipment segments of the Domestic Preparedness Program, which were designed and implemented separately, overlap as both include personal protection, decontamination, and detection equipment. The separation of the DOD equipment and, where applicable, the PHS equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals required local officials to develop separate equipment lists and to ensure compatibility and interoperability of the equipment, optimize the available federal funding, and avoid unnecessary duplication. This was particularly important because the two equipment initiatives overlap. According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, DOD intentionally separated the two equipment segments of the program. A joint, coordinated equipment program could have alleviated the administrative burden on city officials and lowered the level of confusion and frustration. Although PHS circulated cities’ proposed equipment lists among the Domestic Preparedness Program’s interagency partners for comments, this coordination at the federal level did little to simplify the process for the cities.
The separation of the two equipment packages also required local officials to deal with two federal agencies’ differing requirements and procedures. Since the PHS equipment program is offered through a contract with unmatched federal funds, the cities had to meet certain requirements, including the development of a concept of operations plan for MMSTs to fit into the local area’s overall medical response system. The DOD equipment loan program required a different process. Other equipment initiatives, such as a new Department of Justice equipment grant program, may add to the local governments’ perception of an unfocused federal strategy.
State and local officials and some national firefighter organizations also raised concerns about the growing number of federal response elements being formed, including the new initiative to train and equip National Guard units for a WMD response role. These officials did not believe specialized National Guard units would be of use because they could not be on site in the initial hours of an incident and numerous other military and federal agency support units can already provide assistance to local authorities as requested. These units include the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and the PHS’ National Medical Response Teams. State and local officials were more supportive of the traditional National Guard role in providing requested disaster support through the state governor. We are currently reviewing the proposed role of the National Guard and reserves in WMD consequence management.
As noted in our December 1997 report and in our April 1998 and October 1998 testimonies, the many and increasing number of participants, programs, and activities in the counterterrorism area across the federal departments, agencies, and offices pose a difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid duplication, fragmentation, and gaps. Recent interagency coordination initiatives to deal with the increasing number of consequence management training and equipment programs are underway both within and outside the National Security Council. A key proposal involves the transfer of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice. We did not examine the effectiveness of these coordination efforts or the details of the proposed transfer of the program to the Department of Justice.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Because DOD has trained only about one-third of the program cities and the FBI and the intelligence community conclude that conventional weapons will be terrorists’ weapons of choice for the next decade, there is adequate time to refocus the Domestic Preparedness Program and to conduct the threat and risk assessments recommended in our April 1998 report. DOD or any subsequent lead agency could improve the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of the Domestic Preparedness Program if it consolidated training on a more regional basis, particularly where it will reinforce existing state, mutual aid, and other similar multijurisdictional emergency response structures. The program could also benefit from involvement of the states, particularly where state or regional training structures are in place and could be leveraged to provide first responder training. Additionally, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislative language providing for the loan of equipment could allow for greater flexibility, given the issues arising from the equipment segment of DOD’s Domestic Preparedness Program and the practical difficulty of implementing DOD’s loan agreements. Moreover, the many federal WMD consequence management training, equipment, and response initiatives could benefit from a coordinated, integrated approach with a defined end state.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense—or the head of any subsequent lead agency—in consultation with the other five cooperating agencies in the Domestic Preparedness Program, refocus the program to more efficiently and economically deliver training to local communities. We also recommend that the Secretary, or the head of any subsequent lead agency, use existing state and local emergency management response systems or arrangements to select locations and training structures to deliver courses and consider the geographical proximity of program cities.
We recommend that the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism actively review and guide the growing number of WMD consequence management training and equipment programs and response elements to ensure that agencies’ separate efforts leverage existing state and local emergency management systems and are coordinated, unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end state.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Congress may wish to amend the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to provide DOD or any subsequent lead agency greater flexibility in the conditions under which it provides the $300,000 worth of equipment to local jurisdictions. That is, the legislation could be amended to allow DOD or any subsequent lead agency to provide equipment to local jurisdictions on such terms and under conditions that it deems appropriate.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD, the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services, and FEMA provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD did not agree with our recommendation to refocus the Domestic Preparedness Program or that Congress should consider amending the program’s legislation to allow greater flexibility on the provision of equipment to local jurisdictions. It also provided specific comments on our findings related to threat and risk assessments. Justice generally agreed with the substance of our report but did not comment specifically on our recommendation to refocus the program. FEMA noted that our report provided an in-depth examination of the program. Health and Human Services and FEMA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The comments of these four agencies and our evaluation of them appear in appendixes VI to IX. We also provided a draft of this report to the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Security Council, and they did not provide comments.
DOD stated that we suggest a regional approach to domestic preparedness but that such an approach is not efficient because the command and control structure is more difficult to define and is less able to control first responder training resources within multi-entity jurisdictions. DOD also stated that it is better to have redundant coverage than to wait until regional first responders can reach the scene of the incident—the bureaucratic process at the city level is such that each city would likely exhaust its integral resources before calling on regional actors for support.
Our report discusses gains in efficiency and effectiveness in delivering training that could occur if DOD or a succeeding lead agency were to take advantage of and reinforce the existing emergency response and training structures at the local and state levels. Our evaluation showed that local jurisdictions, states, and federal agencies are already linked through long-standing emergency response plans and structures with defined command and control systems. A number of localities respond to, or receive back-up support for, emergencies through well-established county or regional response structures and through mutual aid arrangements. Under a more consolidated approach to the training, emergency response personnel from nearby cities who might be called upon to assist one another could receive program training together in one location rather than in separate training sessions.
Further, DOD stated that critical to the goal of helping municipalities establish their own emergency response programs is the ability to interface with a single entity authorized to direct appropriate and competent first responder trainers to attend the instruction. Regarding DOD’s goal of helping municipalities establish their own emergency response programs, we note that the legislation authorized support to improve state and local emergency response agencies’ capabilities and did not mandate that municipalities receive assistance to establish their own emergency response programs. Regarding the selection of training participants, a consolidated approach to delivering training would not prevent participating jurisdictions from selecting appropriate and competent personnel to attend the training sessions. Conversely, DOD’s city-by-city approach does not guarantee that the most appropriate personnel receive the DOD training. Some program cities we visited filled their training slots on the basis of who was available rather than the training qualifications of participants.
DOD also commented that redesigning the program would negatively impact cities’ readiness because cities scheduled to receive training in fiscal year 1999 have already begun to prepare. We do not believe that refocusing the program to use existing emergency response and training structures or to train nearby cities together would materially delay program completion or harm cities’ readiness. First, the cities we visited did not spend lengthy periods in advance of the training to identify training venues or participants. Second, under the approach we recommend, nearby program cities currently in clusters could receive training earlier, if appropriate. The efficiencies gained should compensate for any time spent to reconfigure the program. This approach should enhance readiness. Also, if existing state emergency management training structures were used, the training could be institutionalized statewide and ensure the training is sustained over the longer term.
DOD noted that conducting threat and risk assessments would negatively affect cities’ readiness. However, as discussed in our April 1998 report, it would take only about 2 weeks per city to conduct a threat and risk assessment and determine a prudent and affordable level of response capability. DOD further said that sufficient data is not available to conduct threat and risk assessments, there is no credible pre-attack predictor, and the FBI has not identified a specific WMD threat. As discussed in our April 1998 report, perfect intelligence data or pre-attack predictors are not needed to perform a sound qualitative threat and risk assessment, although threat information would be one factor to consider. Our prior report showed that a multidisciplinary risk assessment team would use the best available intelligence information to generate valid scenarios to perform the risk assessment process.
DOD also stated that the threat and risk methodology described in the report is intended for point targets with controlled perimeters and internal traffic, not for area targets such as cities with virtually no control over entry, exit, or internal traffic. The model highlighted in our April 1998 report has diverse applications and is not limited to point defense applications. Additionally, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection recommended that threat and risk assessments be performed on such nonpoint targets as the telecommunications and banking and finance infrastructures. A rational, businesslike, collaborative assessment by city, state, and federal representatives can help determine the appropriate minimum requirements for preparedness, given the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities for that city. In our view, such assessments are conducive to preparedness and awareness. Assessments can enhance preparedness by helping decisionmakers prioritize and target investments of federal and local resources. Moreover, in nearly every city we visited, local officials told us they would welcome such an assessment because they currently have no sound basis for determining their requirements.
DOD stated that it does not recommend that Congress amend the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to provide greater flexibility for providing equipment to local jurisdictions as it intends to transfer the program lead to another agency—the Department of Justice—as soon as possible. As stated in our report, DOD’s equipment loan agreement terms have caused frustration and confusion among local officials. As a practical matter, because the loan agreement terms are not likely to be fully implemented, we question the benefits of using this type of instrument for providing equipment. Regardless of which agency leads the program to completion, the program would benefit from a more practical, less confusing arrangement for providing equipment to local jurisdictions.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: We reviewed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to determine the Domestic Preparedness Program’s objectives, and we discussed program design, coordination, and implementation with—and obtained documents from—several Department of Defense organizations, including the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the U.S. Army Director of Military Support, and the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command. We discussed the same topics with headquarters and many regional officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Public Health Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Energy and also with the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the International Association of Fire Fighters, the National Volunteer Fire Council, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
We interviewed and obtained documents regarding the Domestic Preparedness Program, including MMSTs, from local officials of emergency management agencies, fire departments, law enforcement agencies, and health departments in New York, New York; Los Angeles, California; Denver, Colorado; Seattle, Washington; Honolulu, Hawaii; Columbus, Ohio; and Washington, D.C. We also interviewed state emergency management officials for most of these locations and obtained information on their organizations for emergency planning and response. We observed domestic preparedness training and examined equipment in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and discussed MMSTs with the Arlington County, Virginia, fire department. We discussed related initiatives with the Department of Justice.
We analyzed Domestic Preparedness Program city clusters based on city center to city center mileage calculations, and we based our analysis of population coverage on 1990 census data, revised in 1994-95. We also obtained information on and examined and analyzed, in the context of program city clusters, state and local emergency response and training systems and structures in California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. We did not analyze and compare the content of program training courses with other agencies’ terrorism-related courses to evaluate the extent of commonality, nor did we fully evaluate other program initiatives to assist cities by providing equipment or training. While we obtained information about PHS’ MMST program, we did not evaluate its implementation.
We conducted our work from October 1997 to August 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until  5 days after its issue date. At that time we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Justice; the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and the Directors of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to other interested parties upon request.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3504. Major contributors to this report were Davi M. D’Agostino, Richard A. McGeary, Marc J. Schwartz, and Madelon B. Savaides.
section_title: DOD Domestic Preparedness Program Costs, by Fiscal Year
section_title: DOD Contractor Costs, Fiscal Year 1997
section_title: DOD Contractor Costs, Fiscal Year 1998
paragraphs: Also includes contractors who provided materials for equipment testing.
section_title: DOD Equipment Categories and Suggested Items
subsections: section_title: Personal Protection
section_title: Detection
section_title: Decontamination
section_title: Training Aids
section_title: Metropolitan Medical Strike Team Equipment Categories
paragraphs: Personal protection (level A maximum protection for entry into contaminated zone and level C protection for decontamination operations)
section_title: Comments From the Department of Defense
paragraphs: The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated October 2, 1998.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comment
paragraphs: 1. We modified the text to reflect DOD’s comments, as appropriate.
section_title: Comments From the Department of Justice
section_title: Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and Human Services’ letter dated September 22, 1998.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We disagree that the lack of valid intelligence depicting an actual threat prevents a threat and risk assessment. The threat and risk process requires assumptions regarding a number of inputs and is not dependent on definitive intelligence on terrorists. 2. This comment pertains to a matter discussed in the draft report that is not included in the final report. 3. We acknowledge in the report that the Department seeks to develop health systems through the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) program, but there is also an equipment segment of the program that overlaps with the equipment segment of the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program. The fact that the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici initiative contains two separate, unintegrated, federally funded equipment components has caused confusion and placed the full burden of coordination on local agencies. 4. We agree that federal agencies should work with locally developed response structures and believe the report is consistent with this comment. 5. Our report suggests that efficiencies can be gained by using and reinforcing existing response structures for domestic preparedness training or by otherwise consolidating training for nearby cities. We believe that federally funded equipment should be allocated as best fits the state and local response structure. The report does not suggest creating new regionalized response systems for a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incident. 6. Both the DOD and the Health and Human Services portions of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici initiative have equipment components. Reference to National Medical Response Team equipment in the draft report was deleted in the final report. 7. The report discusses the design and implementation of DOD’s training program. We did not evaluate the integration of MMSTs into state and local response structures. We do note, however, that the Public Health Service (PHS) plans to replicate MMSTs in all 120 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program cities, which is not clearly leveraging state and local emergency response structures. 8. We modified the text to reflect the Health and Human Services’ comments, as appropriate.
section_title: Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) letter dated September 25, 1998.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. The legislation did not direct FEMA to establish a telephonic link. The Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) established the hot line. FEMA established the Rapid Response Information System. 2. Reference to FEMA’s National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute is made on page 19. We did not review in detail federal training programs other than the Domestic Preparedness Program. 3. We agree that an overarching strategy for consequence management training, equipment, and response initiatives should be developed with full consideration of legislative and statutory requirements. 4. City and state officials commented on the newly established communications systems in general. At the time of our review, they had a limited understanding of the Rapid Response Information System and its intended use. 5. We modified the text to reflect FEMA’s comment, as appropriate. 6. We accurately portrayed the intelligence community’s assessment of the WMD threat. We did not suggest that the domestic preparedness effort be canceled or substantially delayed.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).
Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11, 1997).
State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May 20, 1997).
Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).
Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997).
Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13 Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).
Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).
Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).
Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud (GAO/NSIAD-96-99, May 9, 1996).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89, Mar. 8, 1996).
Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC  20013 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000  or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony.  To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone.  A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.