Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization
Published: 2006-09-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to anticipate and counter global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has responsibility for seven mission areas including nuclear deterrence and integrated missile defense. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1) implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and (2) defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with other Department of Defense (DOD) commands and organizations. To assess progress, GAO compared USSTRATCOM's efforts with lessons learned in implementing successful organizational transformations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since its establishment in 2002, USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions by taking a wide range of actions such as developing concepts of operations for its new missions, establishing processes and procedures, and identifying and obtaining personnel and resources needed to begin operations. However, further steps are needed to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the command's leadership recognizes the need to build on progress to date and has some additional actions underway to expand and enhance capabilities in its seven mission areas, GAO identified several areas in which more specific actions are needed to help the command achieve its vision. Specifically, the command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its exercise program but has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide USSTRATCOM with several planning, training, and evaluation tools. In addition, most of USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not established clear criteria for determining when they will reach full operating capability. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM has not developed performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the command and in each of its mission areas. GAO's prior work examining organizational change and defense transformation shows that each of these tools is important for transforming organizations to increase their likelihood of success, particularly when multiple organizations are involved in mission execution. Developing plans in each of these areas should help the command demonstrate it can provide added value to the combatant commanders and give the President an expanded set of military options for responding to future threats--two key DOD goals. USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations that have responsibility for the daily management of operations. However, it has not fully clarified roles and expectations of its service component organizations and had not developed a commandwide approach for enhancing outreach to other DOD organizations. While USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its service component organizations, because this guidance has not been specific or well documented, the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not fully understand their expectations in providing support to the command. In addition, while USSTRATCOM conducts some outreach with other combatant commands and organizations, it lacks a commandwide approach to effectively manage outreach activities. GAO has previously found that it is essential for organizations to develop a comprehensive communication strategy that seeks to engage customers and stakeholders. Providing additional guidance and developing a communications strategy should help USSTRATCOM's service component organizations to better understand their roles and enable the command to build effective relationships with other commands.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2002, following a series of high-level Department of Defense (DOD)  studies including the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear  Posture Review, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the  creation of a new unified command, the United States Strategic Command  (USSTRATCOM), to effectively and efficiently anticipate and counter the  diverse and increasingly complex global threats the United States faces for  the foreseeable future. USSTRATCOM was initially assigned responsibility   for nuclear deterrence, space, and computer network operations.   The President, in January 2003, expanded USSTRATCOM’s global  responsibilities and capabilities to include global strike planning and  execution; integration of global ballistic missile defense; oversight of  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and global command and  control; and DOD information operations. In January 2005, the Secretary  of Defense also assigned the command with responsibilities for integrating  and synchronizing DOD’s efforts in combating weapons of mass  destruction. Each of USSTRATCOM’s seven missions has a significant role  in implementing DOD’s New Triad concept for transforming U.S. strategic  capabilities. DOD envisions that the combination of capabilities provided  by these global missions would potentially add value for the combatant  commanders in conducting operations in and across regional areas and  provide the President and Secretary of Defense with an expanded range of  military options for responding to future threats, including those involving  weapons of mass destruction.
The set of diverse global missions assigned to USSTRATCOM span  multiple levels and lines of authority, cross combatant command regional  boundaries, and intersect with various national and international  organizations. Under USSTRATCOM’s most recent reorganization, which it  began implementing in late 2004, the command has assigned day-to-day  operations and management responsibility for most of its mission areas to  five new subordinate organizations. These new organizations are  geographically dispersed and most are aligned with key DOD agencies or  military services to provide leadership and access to their competencies,  such as the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare  partnering with the National Security Agency.
USSTRATCOM is attempting to transform its organization to better meet  the security challenges of the new century and effectively anticipate,  counter, and eliminate the emergence of unconventional threats overseas  and at home. In our prior work to identify useful practices and lessons  learned in implementing successful organizational mergers and  transformations, we found that in successful transformations,  organizations undergo a change of their cultures to become more results- oriented, client- and customer-oriented, and collaborative in nature. Such  high-performing organizations create a culture that includes moving from  outputs to results; stovepipes to matrixes; hierarchical to flatter and more  horizontal structures; an inward to an external focus on customers and  other stakeholders; reactive behavior to proactive approaches; hoarding  knowledge to sharing knowledge; and protecting “turf” to forming  partnerships. To successfully transform, an organization must  fundamentally reexamine its processes, organizational structures, and  management approaches.
At your request, we reviewed the progress made by USSTRATCOM in  developing and integrating its missions to provide new capabilities and  expand U.S. options for responding to global threats. Specifically, we  assessed the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in   (1) implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and   (2) defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships  with other DOD commands and organizations.
To obtain information on USSTRATCOM’s efforts to implement and assess  its new missions, define its organization, and establish relationships with  other organizations, we reviewed USSTRATCOM, DOD, Joint Staff, and  military service guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status reports,  and other pertinent documentation. We observed a major USSTRATCOM  command exercise, Global Lightning, in November 2005, at the command’s  headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska; discussed the results with  participating officials; and reviewed the command’s after-action report and  associated documentation. We also interviewed USSTRATCOM officials at  headquarters; subordinate mission organizations; Army, Air Force, and  Marine Corps service components; and the Navy Fleet Forces Command.  In addition, we reviewed organizational assessments prepared by think  tanks, such as LMI Government Consulting and RAND Corporation, and  discussed the assessments with their staffs to obtain their perspectives on  USSTRATCOM’s approach for organizing and managing its missions. We  also obtained and analyzed information on USSTRATCOM’s budget and  authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring the resources,  staff levels, and skills needed to implement the command’s missions (see  apps. I and II).
We assessed the reliability of the data used in our analyses, and  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We  conducted our review from May 2005 through June 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix III  for a more complete description of our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM’s global missions provide a wide range of capabilities that  are intended to respond to a dramatically changing security environment  brought about by emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric threats  to U.S. national security. Unlike the command’s nuclear deterrence and  space operations missions, the command’s global strike; integrated  ballistic missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;  information operations; global command and control; and combating  weapons of mass destruction missions had not been previously assigned to  a unified command. These newer missions have been performed, mostly  ad hoc, by multiple DOD organizations and the military services but did  not have a primary joint sponsor and central focus within DOD.
The command’s most recent reorganization, begun in late 2004, shifted the  day-to-day planning and execution responsibility for most of its missions  from its headquarters to several new subordinate organizations.  USSTRATCOM intends that its latest organizational construct will provide  greater focus, continuity, and performance for its missions and better  accommodate the execution of the command’s global responsibilities by  reducing organizational layers and enabling communication and  information to flow more easily from the most senior levels of leadership  to those producing the information. The command envisions that this new  organizational construct will reduce the cycle time for reaching and  implementing decisions for its missions, increase the effectiveness of the  products and services it provides in support of the regional combatant  commands, and provide improved access to all of the command’s  capabilities. USSTRATCOM, for example, has recently established a joint  space operations center, under its Joint Functional Component Command  for Space and Global Strike, to more effectively respond to requests from  regional combatant commands for space capabilities. As shown in figure 1,  the current USSTRATCOM organization is comprised of a command  headquarters, service component or supporting commands, joint  functional component commands, centers, and task forces.
Under the new organization, USSTRATCOM’s headquarters would focus  primarily on overseeing tasks for command and control; strategic-level  integration; and advocacy, including developing strategy and plans,  managing command and control operations and support, and advocating  for mission capabilities. It also has responsibility for designating  objectives; assigning missions, tasks, forces, and resources; defining policy  and concepts; and providing direction to the command’s subordinate  organizations. Additionally, USSTRATCOM headquarters has  responsibility for planning and deploying forces for the command’s  nuclear mission.
The reorganization created four new joint functional component  commands for (1) space and global strike; (2) integrated missile defense;  (3) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and (4) network  warfare. These commands have day-to-day responsibilities for operational  and tactical-level planning and execution and management of forces. The  new organization also includes the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating  Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joint Information Operations Center, and  Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations that work with the  command, the unified commands, and mission partners to provide  operational solutions to mission-related problems.
The command has also geographically aligned many of its subordinate  organizations with supporting military services and Defense agencies to  leverage the expertise and resources in their respective mission areas. For  example, the command has partnered and co-located its Joint Functional  Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  with the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Washington, D.C., area to take  advantage of the agency’s capabilities and improve access and  coordination with DOD and national intelligence agencies. To further  strengthen the partnership between the organizations, the commander of  the component command is also the Director of the Defense Intelligence  Agency. In response to intelligence information requests from the  combatant commanders, the agency would globally prioritize intelligence  collection requirements and the joint functional component command  would then prioritize and task the appropriate intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance assets to best meet those requirements. Appendix IV  provides additional information about the command’s key mission  organizations.
Additionally, the reorganization established new command relationships  with the military services to better focus service support. USSTRATCOM  accesses capabilities from each of the services through its three service  component commands—the Army Forces Strategic Command, Air Force  Forces Strategic Command, and Marine Corps Forces Strategic  Command—and the Commander, U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command.  Unlike the other services, the Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting  command rather than a designated service component command to  USSTRATCOM. However, Fleet Forces Command’s overarching  responsibilities in supporting USSTRATCOM are consistent with those of  the other service components. Each service command acts as the primary  focal point for its respective service capabilities and has responsibilities  for ensuring that forces provided to USSTRATCOM are organized, trained,  and equipped to support the command in carrying out its missions and  providing the administrative chain of command and control for its  respective service forces.
Because of its expanded set of missions, USSTRATCOM’s budget has  grown significantly from $276.8 million of total obligation authority in  then-year dollars in fiscal year 2003 to $500.4 million in fiscal year 2006,  excluding appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM  service component commands and other supporting agencies. The  command’s annual budget is expected to increase to $551.4 million by  fiscal year 2011. Table 1 details the command’s historic and projected  budget by major appropriations account from fiscal years 2003 through  2011. The command’s budget is comprised mostly of operation and  maintenance funding, with lesser amounts of research and development  and procurement funding associated with programs for intelligence,  information operations, network warfare, command and control, and  planning systems. Appendix I provides more details about  USSTRATCOM’s budget.
Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM’s authorized number of military  and civilian positions has increased by about 300. As of October 2005, the  command’s overall authorized personnel level was composed of   2,947 military and civilian positions, of which 91 percent were filled. Of the  2,947 positions, military positions comprise about 72 percent of the  positions (2,122), with the Air Force providing the largest number of  positions (1,256). Civilian positions make up the remaining 28 percent  (835). The command has begun to fill positions in its new mission  organizations from within its existing authorized personnel levels by  transferring positions from its headquarters to the new organizations over  a 3-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. The command’s authorized  personnel levels are made up of a relatively few number of skills, although  the mix of military skills has changed since 2002. Additional information  about USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel levels is in appendix II.
section_title: USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, but Efforts Are Incomplete
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions and  has taken a number of positive actions in each of its mission areas to  prepare or update concepts of operations, plans, guidance, and policy;  identify resources needed for mission planning and execution; and  establish an organization to more effectively manage its responsibilities  and provide the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the  command’s actions are consistent with the useful practices and lessons  learned with high-performing organizations undergoing successful  transformations that we have identified in our past work. However, further  steps are needed to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad  goals envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the  command. While the command has taken initial steps to include its new  missions in its exercise program, USSTRATCOM has not yet fully  developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support  available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide  planning, training, and exercise tools. In addition, while USSTRATCOM’s  leadership has provided general guidance to its mission organizations, it  has not provided specific information or identified consistent  requirements for achieving full operating capability and most of the  command’s new mission organizations have not established clear criteria  for determining when they have reached this milestone. Also, while the  command has adopted some key management principles, the command  has not yet developed strategic goals and outcome-oriented performance  measures and criteria for assessing results across the command and in  each of its mission areas.
subsections: section_title: USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing Its New Missions
paragraphs: Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM has made progress in  implementing its new missions and has taken a wide range of positive  actions to integrate these missions into its organization, such as  developing various plans, concepts, and guidance; establishing procedures  and processes; identifying personnel and funding resources; developing  new relationships; building communication networks; and providing  education, training, and exercises. For example, the command has  prepared concepts of operations for its missions and organization, such as  operations for network warfare and global integrated missile defense, and  has recently approved a concept of operations describing the processes it  will use in integrating its diverse capabilities and providing warfighting  options to regional combatant commands. Additionally, USSTRATCOM  has taken other actions, including (1) establishing collaboration tools and  processes to improve communication for planning, execution, and  evaluation among its organizations and customers; (2) creating various  processes and groups within the command to advocate for the capabilities  necessary to accomplish its missions, such as advocating for modification  of the Trident II missile to provide an improved near-term conventional  global strike capability; and (3) upgrading and expanding its facilities,  such as improvements to the command’s headquarters command center.  The command has also taken actions to demonstrate the value added of its  missions for other combatant commands and DOD organizations. For  example, to implement its mission responsibilities for preventing and  defending against intrusions into DOD’s critical information network  systems, the command’s Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations  has recently instituted stringent use controls and trained system users to  improve security and reduce vulnerabilities for these systems.
As its missions have matured, USSTRATCOM has also undertaken several  reorganizations to more effectively manage its responsibilities and provide  the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the actions the  command has taken to implement its latest reorganization are consistent  with the useful practices and lessons learned with high-performing  organizations undergoing successful transformations that we have  identified in our prior work, including establishing a matrixed, horizontal  organizational structure that provides a greater external focus for its  customers, forms partnerships with key organizations, and openly shares  information. As discussed earlier, its latest reorganization intends to  leverage essential competencies of associated components and key  supporting agencies and decentralize the responsibility of its headquarters  for the day-to-day planning and execution of its primary mission areas to  several interdependent mission organizations. While the command’s  mission organizations differ in the extent of their maturity, USSTRATCOM  has focused considerable attention over the past year on establishing their  responsibilities, command and agency relationships, and operational  competencies, and assigning personnel to these new organizations. Its  senior leadership has also taken an active and visible role in supporting  the organizational changes underway.
section_title: USSTRATCOM’s Exercise Program Has Not Fully Integrated Support Available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM has restructured its exercise program to better incorporate  its missions and has conducted a few training exercises involving all of its  missions and new organizations. While the command is taking steps to  address the challenges in more fully including its missions in its exercises,  it has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates  exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s   Joint Warfighting Center, which can provide planning, training, and  exercise tools.
subsections: section_title: Exercise Program Must Overcome Challenges
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM restructured its exercise program in 2003. It began  incorporating its newer missions into its exercises beginning in   November 2004 and brought together all of its missions in the same  exercise in its two most recent exercises, Global Lightning in   November 2005, and Global Thunder in April 2006. Global Lightning is an  annual USSTRATCOM-sponsored command-post exercise, which involves  the commander and his staff in testing and validating the communications  within and between headquarters and simulated forces in deterring a  military attack and employing forces as directed. The annual Global  Thunder exercise is the command’s main nuclear deterrence field training  exercise, which uses actual forces in training commanders, staff, and  individual units at all levels of their warfare skills. Another command-post  exercise, Global Storm, is designed to cover the command’s missions that  are most relevant in the early stages of conflict, such as information  operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The  command plans to conduct this exercise annually depending on  scheduling and resource considerations.
The command faces challenges in effectively executing its exercise  program across its missions and new organizations. However, the  command is taking some actions to overcome these challenges, and some  of these challenges should lessen over time as the command’s missions  and organizations mature. First, many of the command’s operational  concepts, directives, and instructions used in designing and executing  exercises have not yet been approved, developed, or revised to reflect its  new organization. For example, at the time of the November 2005 Global  Lightning exercise, some USSTRATCOM mission organizations were  executing their processes and procedures without the benefit of complete  and approved doctrine because several key concepts of operations for its  missions, such as the concept of operations for horizontally integrating its  missions, were still in draft form. According to USSTRATCOM officials,  the command has to prepare plans for an exercise many months in  advance even if its doctrine continues to evolve. The officials said that  USSTRATCOM incorporates any changes to doctrine and guidance as it  develops its exercise plan, but these changes are more difficult to make as  the plan becomes more complete and the exercise nears. A USSTRATCOM  official told us that doctrine and guidance should become more stable and  change less frequently as the command’s missions, organization, and  processes mature.
Second, several of the command’s new mission organizations are still  being established, which has affected their ability to fully participate in the  command’s recent exercises and identify exercise objectives. For example,  at the time of the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, the new joint  functional component commands had existed for less than 1 year, and the  Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction had been established  for only 3 months. According to the Chief of Staff for the intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance component, the component was not able  to establish full connectivity during the exercise because it was still  operating out of temporary facilities. Further, the new mission  organizations were too immature, did not have staff in place, and lacked  the established processes and procedures needed to plan their own  objectives for the November 2005 exercise, according to USSTRATCOM  officials. Instead, the new organizations’ exercise objectives for the  November 2005 Global Lightning exercise were established by the  command’s headquarters and linked to a broader set of critical tasks and  responsibilities. Moreover, while the command’s Center for Combating  Weapons of Mass Destruction personnel participated extensively in the  November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, no specific exercise objectives  had been developed for the center’s mission area. To begin addressing the  challenge of increasing involvement of its new organizations in exercise  development, the command has advocated the establishment of an  exercise or training group within each of its mission organizations and  some groups have been created, such as in the space and global strike and  integrated missile defense components. Additionally, in preparation for  the next Global Lightning exercise in fall 2006, the mission organizations  plan to be more involved in preparing exercise objectives for their mission  areas and intend to send their personnel to training workshops conducted  by the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to learn how  to develop these objectives.
Third, the command has found it difficult to design an exercise that fully  covers all of its responsibilities because its missions are so diverse and  their relevancy to the exercise is dependent on the type and stage of a  particular crisis. USSTRATCOM’s intent is to design its exercises so as to  integrate the unique and interdependent capabilities of its global missions  to provide a range of options throughout the various stages of a crisis and  possible conflict. For example, the command has found that some of its  missions, such as information operations, quickly become overlooked  during its exercises as events move from crisis into actual conflict.  Moreover, the command believes that its exercise program needs to place  greater emphasis on the early stages of a crisis because much of  USSTRATCOM’s daily operations are conducted before and just after a  crisis has begun. To foster greater inclusion of its missions into its  exercises, the command used a series of brief, scripted training events that  preceded its first Global Lightning exercise in November 2004 to provide  opportunities to incorporate some of its missions, particularly intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance. During the November 2005 Global  Lightning exercise, the command incorporated a timeline that extended  from the early to the later stages of conflict to allow designers to prepare a  scenario suitable for a more complete range of the command’s missions.  The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, also has directed that the  annual Global Thunder exercise and other training events incorporate  multiple missions to provide additional evaluation opportunities.  Additionally, the command has designed its Global Storm exercises to  specifically focus on those missions that are most pertinent before conflict  begins.
section_title: Long-term U.S. Joint Forces Command Support Not Fully Identified
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM has not fully made use of the exercise support available  from the U.S. Joint Forces Command. While USSTRATCOM has taken  steps to obtain greater assistance from the Joint Forces Command’s Joint  Warfighting Center to help the command address its challenges in  executing a robust exercise program, the command and the center have  not reached agreement on the extent of support the center will provide.  Our past work has shown that robust exercise programs are important for  assessing and improving mission capabilities, particularly when multiple  organizations are involved in mission execution. Moreover, DOD’s  recently issued Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training  supports an increased training focus for many missions assigned to  USSTRATCOM, including combating weapons of mass destruction, global  strike, information operations, and ballistic missile defense.
U.S. Joint Forces Command has lead responsibility for joint force training,  and is responsible for helping combatant commanders to identify training  requirements and methods, and for assisting them with executing  exercises and other training events. As part of U.S. Joint Forces  Command, the Joint Warfighting Center provides support to combatant  commands in identifying requirements, objectives, methods, and tools for  planning, implementing, and evaluating exercises. The center trains  combatant command staff to better design exercise objectives that are  clearly linked to the command’s essential tasks. It can also send  independent observer teams to an exercise to assess the command’s  performance and prepare after-action reports and related assessments.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall  responsibility for ensuring that DOD’s joint training programs and  resources are sufficient to produce ready forces and overseeing the  implementation of DOD’s training transformation strategy.
USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain greater assistance from the   Joint Warfighting Center in recent exercises. The command, for example,  obtained limited support from the center during its April 2006 Global  Thunder exercise, including teams to observe the participation and  activities of its space and global strike component. However,  USSTRATCOM’s requirements have not been typically identified far  enough in advance for the center to assign staff and commit resources in  providing the full range of requested support. For example, command  officials told us that USSTRATCOM sought extensive Joint Warfighting  Center support for the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, but the  center had already committed to supporting a U.S. Northern Command  exercise that was scheduled over the same time period. The center was  able to provide USSTRATCOM indirect support, such as providing  simulated video news clippings to add context to the events in the  exercise scenario, when the command linked its Global Lightning exercise  to the U.S. Northern Command exercise.
USSTRATCOM’s relationship with the Joint Warfighting Center is still  developing. In the past, the center had a limited working relationship with  USSTRATCOM and involvement in its exercises because the command’s  exercises had been largely focused on its nuclear deterrence mission,  which limited the involvement of other DOD organizations. As a result, the  center had not included the level of support for USSTRATCOM’s program  that it provided to other combatant commands in its past plans. However,  to provide Joint Warfighting Center observers with access to more areas  and aspects of its exercises, including activities involving the command’s  nuclear deterrence mission, USSTRATCOM is changing its security  procedures to grant center observers temporary clearances during the  exercises.
The Joint Warfighting Center’s recent support for USSTRATCOM’s  exercise program has helped the command to better define its  requirements for future support, but these requirements continue to  evolve. USSTRATCOM officials told us that since requirements for future  support from the center have traditionally been determined from prior  support experience, the command’s limited relationship with the center in  the past and the recent restructuring of the command’s exercise program  have not yet provided a basis for determining the support needed from the  center. The officials said that the specific requirements for the center’s  assistance would be easier to determine as more exercises with the  center’s involvement are completed. According to a USSTRATCOM  official, a key exercise objective in its April 2006 Global Thunder exercise  was to expose center personnel on a limited scale to the command’s  exercise program. At the same time, the command would gain exposure to  the services provided by the center. A center official told us that this type  of interaction with the center would help USSTRATCOM to better define  and identify its future requirements for center support.
Over the long term, USSTRATCOM plans to seek much greater support  from the center but has not yet fully defined its requirements. While the  Joint Warfighting Center currently supports only one of USSTRATCOM’s  exercises each fiscal year, USSTRATCOM officials told us that the center  has committed to supporting both of its annual Global Lightning and  Global Thunder exercises for fiscal year 2007, including the use of  observation teams to help the command evaluate its performance.  However, as of March 2006, center officials told us it was unclear how the  center would adjust its current resources to support the November 2006  Global Lightning exercise because of the timing of that exercise and its  linkage to a U.S. Pacific Command exercise, for which the center is  already planning to provide support. In the long term, a center official told  us that while the center plans to provide greater support to  USSTRATCOM, the center can better plan and make resources available if  it is provided with well-defined requirements 3 to 5 years in advance as  other commands do. As a result, without fully providing the U.S. Joint  Forces Command with well-defined requirements to plan the necessary  resources to support USSTRATCOM’s program, USSTRATCOM may not  be able to receive the supported needed to execute a robust exercise  program to effectively implement its missions.
section_title: New USSTRATCOM Organizations Lack Adequate Direction and Criteria for Declaring Full Operating Capability
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM had provided overall guidance to each of its subordinate  organizations for assessing two key milestones–initial operating capability  and full operating capability–used to implement these organizations.  However, this guidance does not fully establish clear and well-documented  objectives, goals, or criteria to use in determining when these milestones  have been achieved. Our prior work shows that it is important that  organizations undergoing major transformations provide clear and  complete guidance to subordinate organizations on the requirements and  expectations for successful implementation of organizational changes.  Each of the new subordinate mission organizations has already declared  initial operating capability—the first milestone in implementing these  organizations. However, without applying specific criteria, such as the  extent to which mission organizations are staffed and trained and their  mission tasks implemented, in determining when full operating capability– the second milestone–is achieved, the command may not have an accurate  understanding of the extent to which its mission organizations are  prepared to effectively carry out their missions.
After its most recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM issued  implementation directives that provide general guidance for establishing  each of the five new subordinate organizations. The directives broadly  describe the organizations’ responsibilities, authorities, tasks, personnel  and resources requirements, and schedules for implementation.  Additionally, the command prepared an implementation plan that  summarizes the implementation directives and provides additional  direction for establishing the new subordinate organizations, including  timelines and implementation tasks. USSTRATCOM also created a  reorganization management team working group comprised of  representatives from headquarters and the new organizations to assist  with and coordinate the reorganization activities.
USSTRATCOM’s implementation guidance calls for each new  organization to declare initial operating capability and full operating  capability, which are key milestones used to indicate the organization’s  progress in implementing plans, procedures, and structures and achieving  the readiness required to perform its missions. In addition, the guidance  provides some general criteria to follow before declaring initial operating  capability or full operating capability. For example, the guidance requires  that prior to the initial operating capability milestone, each new  organization would develop a mission statement; a detailed concept of  operations for the organization to manage and execute its assigned forces  and missions, including personnel requirements; and a task hand-over plan  for the transfer of functions from headquarters. The guidance also requires  formal updates on the new organizations’ progress toward achieving the  milestones during quarterly command conferences.
Table 2 shows that each of the new organizations stated that it had  achieved initial operating capability in 2005. The Joint Functional  Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense achieved full  operating capability in February 2006 and the other four organizations  plan to reach this milestone between September 2006 and January 2007.
While the implementation guidance provides general criteria for achieving  initial and full operating capability, it lacks clarity and specificity for  reaching these milestones. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has  delegated authority for establishing the new mission organizations and  decisions for declaring initial and full operating capability to the senior  leaders of these organizations. Headquarters representatives of the  reorganization management team told us that a good deal of subjectivity is  involved in deciding when each milestone has been achieved. In addition,  we found that the commander or director of each new organization has  interpreted the milestones differently when developing the organization’s  approach and assessment criteria for achieving the milestones. For  example, the criteria used by each organization to determine initial  operating capability last year varied greatly among the organizations:    The commander of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  component declared reaching the milestone based on such factors as the  component having its deputy commander in place, establishing the  component’s online Web portal that facilitates external communication  across various classified links, and beginning its intelligence campaign  planning support for three regional combatant commands.
The commander of the integrated missile defense component declared  reaching the milestone based on completing preparation of several  documents, for example, ballistic missile defense emergency activation  plans and a supporting plan for one of the command’s contingency plans;  undertaking the process of making operational several required functions,  such as ballistic missile defense situational awareness and operational  oversight of the ballistic missile defense command and control system;  and assuming responsibility for performing most of its directed tasks.
The acting deputy commander of the network warfare component told us  the component declared initial operating capability on the basis that its  mission responsibilities were already being performed by a predecessor  organization that became the new component.
Space and global strike component officials told us that the component  based its initial operating capability decision largely on the results of its  performance in events before and during USSTRATCOM’s November 2005  Global Lightning exercise. However, the component did not publish and  make available the criteria that would be used to evaluate the component’s  performance during the exercise, according to the component’s chief of  staff.
Similarly, the objectives, goals, and criteria that would be used for  determining full operating capability vary among the organizations.  According to network warfare component officials, the component plans  to base its full operating capability decision on 8 to 10 items that were  explained during a briefing to USSTRATCOM officials in early 2005, which  include the component having adequate staffing and funding; its tactics,  techniques, and procedures guidance approved; and its functions, tasks,  and authorities clearly defined. The chief of staff for the space and global  strike component told us that the component has considerable criteria for  evaluating full operating capability. For example, several concepts of  operations related to the component’s mission areas contain tasks that the  component needs to perform. Other criteria include such goals as setting  up a training program for new staff and developing a visual information  panel in its command center. However, the official said that the  component has not clearly assembled all of its criteria to make them  readily accessible to those outside the component. The integrated missile  defense component, which declared full operating capability in   February 2006, used criteria that included the component’s assuming  responsibilities and tasks delineated in the USSTRATCOM implementation  directive, completing facility construction, getting staff trained and  certified, developing approved joint mission essential tasks, and initiating  reporting of operational readiness. The component considered its full  participation in USSTRATCOM’s November 2005 Global Lightning exercise  and the incorporation of the lessons learned from the exercise into its  participation in a subsequent U.S. Pacific Command exercise as critical  factors for declaring full operating capability.
Additionally, although the target dates for declaring full operating  capability are soon approaching, some of the new organizations have not  fully developed the criteria that will be used to assess their milestone  decisions. Although the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of  Mass Destruction plans to achieve the milestone in December 2006, center  officials told us in February 2006 that the center is still deciding how to  define full operating capability. Similarly, the deputy commander for the  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component told us in   April 2006 that the component, which plans to reach the milestone in  September 2006, has not fully decided on the criteria it would use because  the selection of criteria has not been a high priority among the  component’s implementation activities. However, the official told us that  the component needs to have its criteria approved about 3 months before  it decides to declare its milestone achieved.
section_title: USSTRATCOM Has Not Fully Implemented a Results-oriented Management Approach for Evaluating its Performance
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM has adopted some key management practices, but the  command has not yet fully developed a results-oriented management  approach for continuously assessing and benchmarking its performance in  achieving desired outcomes and for identifying actions to improve  performance. Our prior work and the work of others show that  organizations undertaking complex transformations can increase their  likelihood of success by adopting a results-oriented management  framework, which includes key management practices and results- oriented management tools to guide implementation efforts and progress  toward achieving desired outcomes. These tools and practices include  establishing long-term goals and objectives and performance measures  and criteria for assessing results and value added; strong and inspirational  leadership to set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear,  consistent rationale for implementing the framework; and timelines to  achieve results. While USSTRATCOM uses different techniques to review  its progress in implementing its missions and responsibilities, these  techniques do not provide the range of quantifiable metrics and criteria  needed to fully assess the command’s progress toward achieving its goals  and objectives and value added.
The command’s senior leadership has taken an active role in articulating  and supporting the command’s transformation, a factor that we have  identified in prior work as critical to success. The Commander, U.S.  Strategic Command, has addressed a variety of audiences to discuss the  need for changing the way the command is organized in order to be more  effective, and has described the needs and reasons for change in command  concepts of operations and guidance. USSTRATCOM has also prepared  guidance that assigns responsibility and describes the processes for  implementing and integrating its missions. For example, to support its  most recent reorganization, the command has prepared a draft integrating  guidance document intended to provide a consolidated, objective  framework describing how the command is organized, as well as its  responsibilities, relationships, and processes. It also has issued a more  detailed horizontal command-and-control integration concept of  operations to identify how it brings together all of its missions and  capabilities to support national objectives. Our prior work has shown that  successfully transforming organizations have leaders who define and  articulate a compelling reason for change; set the direction, pace, and tone  for transformation; and assign accountability for results.
The command has also created a collection of first principles to better  align the command with national defense priorities, focus its efforts for  integrating and synchronizing its missions, and provide advocacy for its  missions as they mature. Table 3 provides USSTRATCOM’s nine  principles, which include establishing a globally focused organization built  to collaborate with all elements of national power; establishing  operationally interdependent components; and embracing effects-based  operations. The command also identified areas of emphasis that contain  several key objectives for mission support, such as (1) for combating  weapons of mass destruction, integrate and enable capabilities across the  DOD enterprise; (2) in organizing for the global fight, embrace horizontal  integration; and (3) for global force management, optimize the  employment of low-density and high-demand intelligence, surveillance,  and reconnaissance systems.
However, USSTRATCOM has not yet developed clear, well-defined,  outcome-based goals and measures to indicate how the command will  measure success, track the progress it is making toward its goals, and give  its leaders critical information on which to base decisions for improving  the command’s implementation efforts. While the command’s first  principles and areas of emphasis provide direction for better focusing its  implementation efforts, these principles are process-oriented, tactical  goals, rather than long-term, results-oriented strategic goals and objectives  that can provide the basis for determining the command’s performance  and progress.
Our prior work has shown that long-term strategic goals and objectives are  important for an organization to explain the results it expects, what it  intends to accomplish, and how these goals would be assessed. Outcome- based performance measures should be objective and results oriented  with specific target levels to meet performance goals. Measuring  performance allows organizations to track progress toward goals and  provides crucial information on which to base organizational and  management decisions.
The command has adopted some processes and metrics to monitor its  performance and provide information on its progress in implementing its  missions; however, these processes and metrics are largely subjective and  do not provide the command with the full range of both quantitative and  qualitative outcome-based performance measures it needs to fully assess  progress in achieving its goals. Organizations use evaluation and  corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to  improve performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those  goals that were not met. In contrast, USSTRATCOM’s current processes  result in largely subjective assessments and are intended to support more  limited purposes. For example, according to an official responsible for  coordinating the command’s readiness reporting, the command has  adapted its readiness reporting process to include inputs from each of the  command’s mission organizations and service components. The official  said that this process gives the USSTRATCOM commander access to a  broad perspective on the command’s overall readiness. However, the  readiness reports resulting from the process discuss the commander’s  subjective assessment of USSTRATCOM’s ability to execute its missions,  based on short-term internal and external factors affecting the command’s  operations. Similarly, the command’s annual training assessments are  subjective evaluations, based on observations of prior training, exercises,  real-world operations, and other factors, which are used to set priorities  for future training priorities.
USSTRATCOM senior officials told us that the command has not yet  established strategic goals and outcome-based performance metrics to  fully assess the command’s progress because the command is still sorting  out the implementation of its new organizational construct. Although  command officials stated they believe such metrics are needed and the  command should begin to develop them, they have not yet developed a  process or assigned responsibility for developing metrics. While the  development of such metrics will present a significant challenge due to the  complex nature of the command’s missions, such an effort is needed so  that the command can assess its progress and identify areas that need  further improvement. For example USSTRATCOM officials believe they  can and should develop metrics to assess the extent to which they are  efficiently allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  systems to optimize the use of high-demand aircraft. Without developing  strategic goals and the full range of outcome-based performance  measures, the command will lack a process to evaluate its performance,  identify areas that may need improvement, and take corrective actions.
section_title: USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a Commandwide Outreach Strategy
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM has not clarified the roles and responsibilities of its service  component organizations and lacks a commandwide outreach strategy for  enhancing its relations with other DOD organizations. Since its most  recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its  service component commands. However, the command’s guidance is not  always specific and service officials believe that additional guidance from  USSTRATCOM would help to more clearly define their responsibilities,  expectations, and relationships with the command, particularly with its  new mission organizations. In addition, USSTRATCOM lacks a  commandwide strategy to effectively manage and coordinate its external  outreach activities with the large number of commands and organizations  it interacts with in executing its diverse missions. Without clear service  component guidance and a comprehensive communications strategy,  USSTRATCOM’s service components will not have complete information  on the command’s expectations for their support and the command may  not have the most effective approach for building relationships, promoting  its capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to other  combatant commands and organizations.
subsections: section_title: USSTRATCOM’s Guidance to Its Service Components Is Not Specific
paragraphs: While USSTRATCOM has provided broad guidance to its service  components, Army, Navy, and Air Force component officials told us they  lack specific guidance that clarifies and provides more detailed  information on their responsibilities, requirements, expectations, and  relationships with the command and, particularly, its newer mission  organizations. Our prior work has shown that it is important for  organizations undergoing significant change to provide clear and complete  guidance to their subordinate organizations. Without clearly defined,  specific guidance, it can be difficult for the service components to  effectively organize, plan, and identify resources to provide the expected  support. Moreover, the lack of this guidance can also limit the  understanding that USSTRATCOM’s headquarters and its organizations  have about the components’ organizations, organizational relationships,  and range of support they provide.
USSTRATCOM has provided guidance to its service components in its  concepts of operations, orders, plans, and other documents and through  meetings and other activities between command and service component  staffs, such as conferences, videoconferences, and command exercises.  Guidance and expectations have also been provided during routine and  crisis-oriented collaborative planning activities among the command’s  organizations and service components. However, USSTRATCOM Army  component officials told us that much of the command’s overall guidance,  such as USSTRATCOM’s standing operational order for its global strike  mission and its overarching concept of operations, is too general and often  does not provide enough specific information for the service components  to fully understand the command’s requirements and expectations.
Our review of USSTRATCOM guidance found that key guidance lists the  overarching responsibilities for the command’s service components, such  as providing support for the command’s operations and planning and  advocacy activities. Some mission-specific guidance, such as the concept  of operations for the space and global strike missions, provides additional  responsibilities for each of the components that relate to a specific  mission area or organization. In particular, this concept of operations  assigns the Air Force service component responsibility for establishing an  operations center for global strike planning and execution, and for  performing day-to-day command and control of space forces assigned to  the command. In contrast, much of the remaining guidance we reviewed  provided few specific details on what is expected or required to carry out  the components’ responsibilities, such as the type of military personnel  skills, planning systems, or secure communications lines that are needed  to effectively support the command.
Additionally, several guidance documents we reviewed that contain  references to the services are still in draft, such as the command’s  integrating guidance, or need revision as a result of the command’s recent  reorganization. For example, in 2004 the command drafted a concept for  integrating its missions that included detailed annexes describing the how  the command’s service components were to monitor global events  affecting U.S. interests; analyze, evaluate, and communicate information;  predict likely consequences of military operations on U.S. and adversary  forces; and plan and execute operations in support of each of the  command’s mission areas. However, according to a USSTRATCOM official  the command leadership decided not to include specific expectations for  its service components following the decision to reorganize the command  and establish the joint functional component commands in late 2004. As a  result, the command’s most recently drafted guidance does not yet  completely reflect service responsibilities and expectations and unique  support that may be required to support USSTRATCOM’s new  organization. According to USSTRATCOM officials, the command does not  plan to provide additional formal guidance to its service component  organizations at this time.
The relationships between the command’s service components and new  subordinate mission organizations are still evolving. Army component  officials told us that USSTRATCOM’s new mission organizations have not  yet developed a full understanding of the Army service component’s  responsibilities, and as a result, USSTRATCOM’s expectations may not be  consistent with the support that can be provided by the Army. For  example, the acting chief of staff for USSTRATCOM’s Army service  component told us that according to the Joint Staff’s Unified Action  Armed Forces policy publication, which clarifies all command  relationships and other authorities, the Army’s service component has  responsibility for providing Army personnel with training in service- related tasks. The official told us the USSTRATCOM command assumed  that training in the use of joint systems, such as secure communications  lines operated by the USSTRATCOM command for integrated missile  defense, would be done by the service component. However, the  respective USSTRATCOM command is responsible for providing any joint  training to service personnel. The official said the Army could provide this  training if USSTRATCOM defined this requirement in its guidance.
Army component officials also told us that the Army can better respond to  USSTRATCOM requirements when expectations are more clearly  described in guidance and related documents. For example,  USSTRATCOM cited a requirement in its draft concept of operations for a  small Army detachment to be assigned to USSTRATCOM’s intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance command. The Army provided this type  of detachment based on that requirement. Similarly, the head of the   Eighth Air Force’s air operations center, which is part of the  USSTRATCOM Air Force service component, told us that the component  has clear guidance about its responsibilities to provide direct support to  USSTRATCOM’s space and global strike command, and therefore, has a  clear understanding of what is required to support the component. The  space and global strike command has provided information on the direct  support expected from the Air Force in its concept of operations.  However, the official said the requirements and expectations for  supporting other USSTRATCOM mission organizations, such as the Joint  Functional Component Commands for Intelligence, Surveillance, and  Reconnaissance and Network Warfare, are not as clearly known because  USSTRATCOM has not yet provided guidance on the required Air Force  support for those organizations.
According to Navy Fleet Forces Command officials, USSTRATCOM has  not provided clear and specific guidance on the command’s  responsibilities and expectations, despite its unique relationship to  USSTRATCOM. Officials of the Navy Fleet Forces Command told us that  the Fleet Forces Command has a unique relationship to USSTRATCOM  because it is a supporting command and not a traditional service  component. The officials said their command is not formally assigned to  and under USSTRATCOM’s operational chain of command, but rather  their command provides advice to USSSTRATCOM on the best use of  Navy forces and capabilities in support of its missions. The officials said  that clear and specific guidance is necessary to provide an understanding  of their command’s unique relationship to USSTRATCOM headquarters  and organizations. In March 2006, USSTRATCOM, in consultation with the  Fleet Forces Command, did issue a command instruction that clarifies the  Fleet Forces Command’s relationship with USSTRATCOM and its  responsibilities, which include taking part in the command’s collaborative  planning processes, participating in its exercise program, and helping  USSTRATCOM prepare its readiness review reports. However, while this  document helps to clarify the Navy component’s support responsibilities,  it neither sets priorities for the Fleet Forces Command nor includes  mission-specific requirements.
According to service officials, USSTRATCOM’s unique organization,  complex planning processes, and global focus are very different than more  traditionally organized combatant commands that have clearly defined  geographic areas of responsibility. In contrast to more traditional regional  combatant commands, USSTRATCOM has constructed a collaborative  planning process, which is globally focused, and involves a much broader  range of military capabilities. As this planning process continues to evolve,  the role and involvement of the service components will change. For  example, the director of the Army component’s planning and exercise  group told us that USSTRATCOM’s new mission organizations have not  always provided well-documented requirements for certain Army  capabilities, which has delayed the Army component’s ability to provide  the needed capabilities to these organizations. The official told us that in  the summer of 2005 the Army component had difficulty in both staffing its  office and initially providing information operations capabilities to support  command missions because USSTRATCOM had not documented the Army  requirements for these capabilities. The Army official said that although  the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has been satisfied with the  Army’s support for this mission area, greater clarity about  USSTRATCOM’s expectations would have helped the Army component to  better identify its authorized personnel requirements and ensure that the  required Army capabilities were more quickly available.
Unlike the other service components, however, the Marine Corps Forces  component is satisfied with the guidance that has been provided,  according to a Marine Corps component official. The official said the  component does not need additional guidance at this time because the  component has a more limited role and fewer responsibilities than the  other services in supporting USSTRATCOM and its organizations. The  official said that the Marine Corps’ component of about 20 people largely  serves as a conduit to USSTRATCOM to ensure Marine Corps  representation and provide inputs, when needed, on command issues.
section_title: USSTRATCOM Lacks a Coordinated, External Outreach Strategy
paragraphs: While USSTRATCOM routinely conducts outreach with other combatant  commands and organizations, it lacks a common approach across the  command because it has not developed a comprehensive, commandwide  outreach strategy to effectively manage these activities. Without an  outreach strategy, the command and its organizations do not have a  consistent, coordinated approach to use in developing and expanding  relationships, educating other organizations on the command’s  capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to other  commands and organizations.
In our prior work in identifying key practices adopted by organizations  undergoing successful transformations, we found that it is essential for  organizations to adopt a comprehensive communication strategy that  reaches out to customers and stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage  them in the organization’s transformation. In particular, successfully  transformed organizations have found that by communicating information  early and often, organizations are able to build trust and increase  understanding among their stakeholders about the purpose of planned  changes. Organizations use these communication strategies to provide a  common framework for conducting consistent and coordinated outreach  throughout their organizations by clearly presenting the organization’s  rationale, specific objectives, and desired outcomes of outreach efforts.  These strategies also cover the range of integrated information activities to  be implemented and clearly articulate how all the various components of  the strategy will be coordinated and managed in order to achieve the  objectives most efficiently and effectively. Additionally, outreach  strategies provide measurable criteria against which to evaluate the  outcomes of organizations’ outreach efforts and determine whether any  adjustments are necessary.
subsections: section_title: Command Considers External Outreach Essential
paragraphs: Because USSTRATCOM supports or is supported by a large number of  commands and organizations in executing its diverse set of global  missions, the command considers its external outreach efforts essential to  (1) develop effective relationships and communications, (2) promote and  educate others about the value of its missions and capabilities, and   (3) obtain information on how the command can best support other  organizations. USSTRATCOM and its organizations regularly use a wide  range of methods and activities to promote its missions and capabilities to  combatant commands, military services, and DOD and other government  organizations. These methods and activities include conferences and  symposia, exercises and training events, senior leadership visits, exchange  of liaison staff, routine meetings, and voice and electronic communication.  The command has also established a strategic knowledge integration Web  site, which is called SKIWeb, on DOD’s classified computer network to  provide information about the command and the status of its activities and  allow open exchange among its staff and other individuals with access to  the network.
While USSTRATCOM officials told us that USSTRATCOM has developed  good working relationships with other combatant commands and  organizations across DOD since its establishment in 2002, they believe that  the command’s missions, capabilities, and authorities are not yet fully  understood by others. The USSTRATCOM commander’s summary report  for its November 2005 Global Lightning exercise states that while the  command has expended a great amount of effort in developing processes  and strategies to integrate the command’s missions, the organizations it  supports, particularly other combatant commands, have a vague  understanding of the “value added” by USSTRATCOM capabilities. The  report states that USSTRATCOM’s ability to provide capabilities and  influence global events are not clearly understood, nor do some other  commands’ headquarters completely understand how to access that  capability. For example, in observing the Global Lightning exercise,   U.S. Central Command and other participants told us that they were  unsure of value added by USSTRATCOM in planning for global strike  operations in their theater. However, USSTRATCOM officials said  USSTRATCOM brings the full range of capability options into global strike  planning, particularly nonkinetic capability options such as computer  network operations; other commands are just beginning to see the  potential value of these options.
Additionally, USSTRATCOM has also had to change the perceptions held  by other organizations that the command is responsible only for nuclear  deterrence, which was the case with the previous U.S. Strategic Command,  but has other essential missions that are global in scope and span all levels  of military operations. While some missions, such as nuclear deterrence  and military space, are well practiced and have established histories and  interactions with outside organizations, others, such as its combating  weapons of mass destruction and intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance missions, are less mature and still evolving. Further, many  of USSTRATCOM authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities are still  being refined, clarified, and demonstrated to other organizations in  exercises and training events and in real-time military activities. For  example, the deputy commander of USSTRATCOM’s intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance command told us that USSTRATCOM’s  evolving role in providing support for decisions on allocating intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance assets is not yet clear to all of the  regional combatant commands. The official said that some combatant  commands have concerns about how USSTRATCOM responsibilities could  affect their ability to exercise operational and tactical control over any  assets assigned to their commands. According to the official, these  commands do not yet understand that USSTRATCOM’s role is to provide  overall management for these assets rather than control their operational  use.
Moreover, DOD commands and organizations are still getting acquainted  with USSTRATCOM’s new organizational construct, particularly the new  subordinate organizations that are responsible for the day-to-day  management of several command missions. The command’s new  organization does not follow the headquarters-centric model, in which  information flows vertically, that is used by other combatant commands.  According to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, horizontal flows  of information and command and control run counter to traditional  military thinking, which prefers a vertical chain of command. While the  new organizational structure has the potential to greatly expand the  command’s opportunities to conduct external outreach, relationships and  communication links are still being developed or reestablished with other  organizations.
section_title: Outreach Efforts Lack Common Approach
paragraphs: Each of the command’s organizations conduct numerous outreach  activities daily, but these efforts are often not well coordinated and  consistently conducted to achieve the most optimal benefit for the  command. We also found that USSTRATCOM does not have an approach  for comprehensively collecting information on the needs and priorities of  the combatant commands and other stakeholders who use its capabilities,  information which USSTRATCOM could then use to determine how it can  provide the most effective level of support.
USSTRATCOM has recognized the need to develop a comprehensive  outreach strategy to increase understanding among other combatant  commands about the specific capabilities and contributions that the  command can provide to their operations. Both of the command’s  summary reports for its October 2004 and November 2005 Global  Lightning exercises recommended development of an outreach strategy  for identifying USSTRATCOM capabilities for the benefit of combatant  commands and stakeholders. The November 2005 report recommended  that the strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting  effective outreach and education of the command’s capabilities. The  report also recommended (1) improving the command’s SKIWeb Web site  to allow outside users to more easily identify capabilities, (2) providing  briefings and seminar support to the Defense and interagency community,  and (3) developing outreach products to provide key information about  the command. The report states that much of the understanding and  credibility of the command can be achieved though an effective outreach  plan that is focused at other commands, at the interagency level, and with  the services to demonstrate and provide understanding about its global  support capabilities. USSTRATCOM headquarters officials told us that the  command does not have any current plans to develop an outreach strategy  as recommended in each of the two exercise reports.
To provide the most effective level of support to other combatant  commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command recently developed an approach  that could serve as a best practice in identifying the priorities of the  commands it supports for inclusion in an external outreach strategy.  Under U.S. Joint Forces Command’s approach, the command asks each of  the other combatant commands to provide a list of its top priorities for the  type and level of support needed from the command in the coming year.  These lists are incorporated into the command’s annual plans and are used  to make adjustments in its activities and resources to best meet the needs  of its customers. During the year, the command schedules periodic  updates with staffs of the other commands to determine to what extent the  command is addressing these priorities or whether the priorities have  changed. A USSTRATCOM headquarters official responsible for  coordinating the command’s priorities with the U.S. Joint Forces  Command told us that approach has been helpful for USSTRATCOM in  communicating the command’s priorities for support. The official said that  USSTRATCOM added to the effectiveness of the approach by preparing a  detailed matrix that identified and ranked the command’s priorities and  provided contact information for command staff.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: USSTRATCOM has been assigned a new role in providing the President  and the Secretary of Defense with an expanded set of military options to  more effectively respond to emerging global, transregional, and  asymmetric threats to U.S. national security, including those involving  weapons of mass destruction. While the command has made progress in  implementing its global missions, its ability to strengthen implementation  efforts and ensure that its leadership has critical information on the  effectiveness of its missions and organizations will continue to be limited  until it identifies long-term support requirements for its exercise program;  establishes clear, consistent criteria for assessing the establishment of its  newest mission organizations; and fully implements a results-oriented  approach for evaluating its progress. The U.S. Joint Forces Command  offers a range of capabilities and resources for supporting command  exercises. Until it clearly identifies the long-term support it requires from  the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Forces Command  incorporates these requirements into its plans, USSTRATCOM will  continue to lack a robust exercise program, which is essential for  evaluating its capabilities and identifying areas in need of improvement.  Additionally, absent clear, consistent guidance from the command, four  new mission organizations that have not yet achieved full operating  capability are establishing their own criteria for this milestone, which  results in different understandings of what it means to reach this  milestone and how it would be evaluated. Without establishing clear,  consistent criteria at major points in implementation, the command cannot  create a foundation on which to assess and measure the success of these  organizations even after full operating capability has been declared.  Further, while the command has adopted some elements of a results- oriented management approach, without a process that includes criteria  and benchmarks for measuring the progress toward mission goals at all  levels of its organization, the command will be limited in its ability to  adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding its mission areas, measure  the success of its efforts, and target shortfalls and gaps and suggest  corrective actions, including any needed adjustments to future goals and  milestones.
Similarly, without complete and clearly articulated expectations and  requirements, the service components will not have the information  needed to fully determine the personnel, resources, and capabilities  required to support the command and respond to its requests and tasks in  a timely way. In addition, in the absence of a commandwide  communications strategy to conduct consistent, coordinated outreach to  other commands and organizations, USSTRATCOM cannot effectively  develop and expand relationships, foster education about its capabilities,  and provide the most effective level of support to other commands and  organizations. Lastly, without incorporating into its external outreach  strategy a systematic tool to help identify the priorities of the combatant  commands and organization it supports—similar to one used by the   U.S. Joint Forces Command—USSTRATCOM is limited in its ability to  fully address the priorities for support of the other commands and  organizations, improve feedback, and identify resources needed to  respond to these priorities.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To better determine and obtain the assistance that can be provided by the   U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center in supporting  USSTRATCOM’s exercise program, we recommend the Secretary of  Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to fully identify  and request in a timely manner the long-term services and resources  required from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center  to support the command’s program and to reach agreement with the   U.S. Joint Forces Command on the support to be provided. We further  recommend that the Secretary direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces  Command, (1) in the near term, to make any possible adjustments among  the Joint Warfighting Center’s current resources to more fully support  USSTRATCOM’s exercise program; and (2) in the long term, incorporate  USSTRATCOM requirements for support in the center’s plans to provide  the full range of assistance necessary to help USSTRATCOM execute a  robust exercise program.
To strengthen USSTRATCOM’s efforts to implement its missions and  provide greater visibility of its progress, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to take the  following four actions:    Provide clear and complete guidance to the Joint Functional Component  Commands for Space and Global Strike, Intelligence, Surveillance, and  Reconnaissance, and Network Warfare, and the USSTRATCOM Center for  Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction that clearly defines full  operating capability and provides specific, common criteria for  determining what is required and how it will be assessed. This guidance  should be developed, in consultation with these organizations, before each  organization declares full operating capability.
Develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management process for  continuously assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress  in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to  enhance the command’s efforts to implement and integrate its missions.  Develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate  performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down  through the command; assign clear leadership with accountability and  authority to implement and sustain the process; and develop and ensure  that goals and objectives are clear and achievable and timelines are  established. Set a specific time frame for completing development of this  process.
Provide additional guidance to the command’s service components that  clearly defines and provides more specific information about their  responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and expectations for  supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate mission  organizations. Set a specific time frame for approval of this guidance.
Develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to  guide and coordinate USSTRATCOM’s efforts to conduct outreach with  other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations to  develop effective relationships and communications, promote and educate  others about the value of its mission and capabilities, and obtain  information on how the command can best support other commands and  organizations. This strategy should include the command’s rationale,  specific objectives, desired outcomes, and strategies for conducting  outreach with other commands and organizations, and criteria against  which the command can evaluate the success of its efforts.
section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: Given the importance of the new role assigned to USSTRATCOM by the  President and the Secretary of Defense to provide an expanded set of  military options to more effectively respond to emerging threats to   U.S. national security, Congress should consider requiring the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop a longer-term,  comprehensive and transparent, results-oriented management process for  continuously assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress  in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to  enhance the command’s efforts to effectively carry out its missions, as  outlined in our recommendation to DOD. In developing this process, the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should   develop and ensure that long-term goals and objectives are clear and  achievable and milestones and timelines for achieving desired outcomes  are established;   develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate  performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down  through the command; and   assign clear leadership with accountability and authority to implement and  sustain the process.
The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should set a specific time  frame for developing and implementing this process. Additionally, the  Commander should periodically report to Congress on the command’s  progress in achieving desired outcomes.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: DOD’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy  provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD generally agreed  with our three recommendations regarding U.S. Joint Forces Command’s  support of USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. DOD did not agree with our  other four recommendations that USSTRATCOM provide clear and  complete guidance to its joint functional component commands on  achieving full operating capability; develop a comprehensive results- oriented management process to assess and benchmark the command’s  overall progress; provide additional guidance to its service components;  and develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy.   In regard to these four recommendations, DOD commented that measures  are already in place that address the issues raised by the report. We  disagree that the actions taken by USSTRATCOM to date fulfill the intent  of our recommendations and are complete. While USSTRATCOM has  taken some positive actions on these issues, we do not believe that the  command’s actions go far enough, are specific enough, or are sufficiently  transparent in improving evaluation of the command’s progress in  implementing its mission areas, providing more complete guidance to its  mission and service component organizations, and strengthening its  external communications with other organizations and commands.  Therefore, we believe our recommendations are still warranted and we  have added a matter for congressional consideration for Congress to  direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop and  implement a longer-term results-oriented management process for  assessing the command’s overall progress and periodically reporting to  Congress its progress in achieving desired outcomes. DOD’s comments are  reprinted in their entirety in appendix V and more specific information on  DOD’s comments on our recommendations and our assessment of these  comments follows below.
DOD generally agreed with our recommendations regarding  USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. Specifically, DOD agreed with our  recommendation that USSTRATCOM should identify and request, in a  timely manner, the long-term services and resources required from the  U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to support  USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. In its comments, DOD said that while  the center had provided limited exercise planning, execution, and  assessment support to USSTRATCOM, the command and the center have  steadily built a relationship over the past year to support USSTRATCOM’s  seven mission areas and are jointly solving problems that hindered the  center’s support in previous USSTRATCOM exercises. The department  partially agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint  Forces Command, in the near term make any possible adjustments among  the Joint Warfighting Center’s current resources to more fully support  USSTRATCOM’s program. DOD commented that the Office of the Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is currently  conducting an in-depth review of the joint training programs to determine  how it can provide better flexibility and synergism through joint training  investments. DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander,  U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the long term, incorporate  USSTRATCOM’s requirements for support into the Joint Warfighting  Center’s plans. DOD commented that its current review of joint training  programs intends to match, to the greatest extent possible, joint training  requirements and resources, including the training support provided by  the U.S. Joint Forces Command. DOD also said while USSTRATCOM’s  requirements must compete with other training priorities for joint training  funding, the center can better plan and make resources available if  USSTRATCOM provides the center with well-defined requirements   3 to 5 years in advance.
DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander,   U.S. Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to its joint  functional component commands that clearly defines full operating  capability and provides specific, common criteria for determining what is  required and how it will be assessed. DOD commented that the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has provided specific guidance in  the form of a tailored implementation directive that assigns specific duties,  responsibilities, tasks, and authorities to the components. DOD also said  that the Commander is continuing to work closely with the component  commanders to develop, implement, and assess the measures of progress  by which full operating capability will be declared and will report to the  Secretary of Defense when the milestone is achieved for each mission  area. We believe that the command’s tailored implementation directives do  not go far enough in providing clear and specific criteria for assessing  whether specific duties, responsibilities, tasks, and authorities assigned to  each organization have been met. For example, during our review we  found that the components had different interpretations as to what criteria  might apply for declaring full operating capability. We believe that it is  important for USSTRATCOM and its organizations to have a clear  definition of full operating capability and the criteria, or measures of  progress, in place as early as possible, by which the achievement of the  milestone will be assessed for each of the new mission organizations.  These criteria should be complete and readily accessible so the command  and its mission organizations will have confidence in the extent that  planned capabilities will be achieved at full operating capability. After  declaring full operating capability, each of the new organizations will  require further actions to more completely implement and enhance their  mission capabilities and responsibilities. Establishing clear, documented  criteria for assessing and measuring success for declaring full operating  capability can provide a baseline and a sound foundation for assessing the  future progress of the organization in carrying out its mission  responsibilities.
DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM  develop a comprehensive results-oriented management process for  continually assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress  in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to  enhance the command’s efforts to implement and integrate its missions. In  its comments, DOD stated that a variety of directives, including concepts  of operations, articulate the command’s goals and objectives. The  department also stated that the command conducts periodic exercises,  external inspections, and in-progress reviews to help assess the  command’s effectiveness in making operational the assigned mission areas  and achieving stated objectives. While these actions by USSTRATCOM  may be helpful to the command’s leadership, they do not represent a  comprehensive and transparent plan for assessing progress in achieving  desired outcomes. Moreover, DOD interpreted our recommendation as  being directed at the metrics to be used by the command’s organizations in  declaring full operating capability for its missions, which are scheduled to  occur by early 2007. However, our recommendation calls for creation of a  longer-term, comprehensive, results-oriented management process that  would provide the command with a framework for continuously assessing  its future progress in achieving desired outcomes in each of its mission  areas and the command’s overall goals and objectives. Because of the  importance of the command’s new role in providing expanded military  options for addressing emerging threats, we continue to believe that  creation of a results-oriented management process that establishes   long-term goals and objectives, milestones and timelines for achieving  desired outcomes, performance measures that clearly demonstrate  performance results, and clear leadership to implement and sustain the  process is needed. Therefore, we have included a matter for congressional  consideration to require the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to  develop such a process that would improve transparency and  accountability of the extent to which the command is achieving desired  outcomes in each of its mission areas.
DOD also did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander,  U.S. Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to the command’s  service components that clearly defines and provides more specific  information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and  expectations for supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate  mission organizations. In its comments, DOD said that the duties and  responsibilities of USSTRATCOM and its service components are  documented in Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces.   The department also stated that day-to-day liaison activities between the  command and the services are provided by on-site service component  representatives. While broad guidance is provided in the Joint Staff’s  Unified Action Armed Forces publication on the relationships and  authorities of the military services in supporting combatant commanders  and by USSTRATCOM in various documents, we continue to believe that  additional guidance from the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to the  command’s service components is needed to provide clear and specific  information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and  expectations for supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate  mission organizations, particularly since the components have expressed a  desire for further guidance from the command. As USSTRATCOM  continues to implement its new organization and develop capabilities in  each of its mission areas, this additional guidance can strengthen  relationships with the services by (1) providing better information for the  components in effectively organizing, planning, and identifying resources  to support the command; and (2) increasing understanding among the  command’s headquarters and its organizations about the components’  organizations, organizational relationships, and the range of support they  provide.
Lastly, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM  develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to  guide and coordinate the command’s efforts to conduct outreach with  other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations. DOD  commented that USSTRATCOM provides and promotes insight to all its  activities through its classified Web site; maintains a senior officer  representative at each of the combatant commands and with the Joint  Staff; and, as a supporting command, conducts continuous liaison  activities with other combatant commands. DOD also stated that Web- based mission area training for USSTRATCOM missions is available on the  U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Web site. However, as discussed in our  report, we found that while USSTRATCOM organizations routinely  conduct outreach activities to promote its missions and capabilities, these  activities are often not well coordinated and consistently conducted to  achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. Both of USSTRATCOM  commander’s summary reports prepared after its two most recent Global  Lightning exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the command  develop a comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding  among other combatant commands about the specific capabilities and  contributions that the command can provide to their operations. The  November 2005 Global Lightning report also recommended that the  strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting effective  outreach and education of the command’s capabilities. Therefore, we  continue to believe that USSTRATCOM needs a commandwide  communications strategy to provide a framework to effectively manage  these activities and a common approach for conducting consistent and  coordinated outreach across the command.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the  Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Commander, U. S. Joint  Forces Command. We will make copies available to others upon request.  In addition the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-4402  or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  Staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in  appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United States Strategic Command’s Budget
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on trends and changes we identified  in the United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) historic and  projected budget, from fiscal years 2003 through 2011.
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To perform our analysis, we identified trends and changes in  USSTRATCOM’s budget since its establishment in October 2002 by  obtaining and analyzing the command’s historic, current, and projected  funding for fiscal years 2003 through 2011. We used data prepared to  support the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request, which were the  most current official data available when we conducted and completed  our work. We also discussed with USSTRATCOM officials anticipated  changes to the budget resulting from the fiscal year 2007 President’s  budget request, and efforts taken by the command to identify how its  funding is allocated by mission responsibility and subordinate  organization. We took steps to assess the reliability of the data used in this  analysis, including (1) performing electronic testing of required data  elements, (2) comparing the data to another independently prepared data  source, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the  data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Strategic Command Military and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on trends and changes we identified  in the United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) military and  civilian authorized personnel levels since its establishment in   October 2002. Our analysis shows that USSTRATCOM’s overall authorized  personnel level has remained relatively stable since 2002, and that the  percentage of filled military and civilian positions has increased. The  command is transferring positions to its new mission organizations from  its headquarters organization, rather than increasing its overall  commandwide authorized personnel level. Although the command has  expanded the number of professional military skills of its authorized  personnel, the majority of its military positions encompass relatively few  types of skilled positions. We also determined that while Air Force and  Navy military positions continue to make up most of USSTRATCOM’s  authorized personnel, the proportion of civilian positions is increasing.
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine how USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel level has  changed since its establishment in 2002, we obtained and reviewed  USSTRATCOM projections and historic data that identify (1) the number  of authorized civilian and military positions assigned to USSTRATCOM,  (2) the number of authorized positions filled by individuals assigned to the  command, and (3) the professional military skills associated with the  command’s military positions. The data we obtained include  USSTRATCOM positions assigned to the command’s headquarters near  Omaha, Nebraska, its mission organizations, and to various other locations  and assignments. We also obtained the command’s projections for  authorized personnel levels for the new mission organizations, and  discussed these projections with officials responsible for managing the  command’s authorized personnel. In our analysis, we did not consider  staff positions from organizations that are supporting several of  USSTRATCOM’s mission organizations, such as the Air Force Space  Command, Eighth Air Force, Army Space and Missile Defense Command,  Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Threat  Reduction Agency, and Defense Information Systems Agency. The data  also do not include part-time reservists or contractors. We took steps to  assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis, including   (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) comparing  the data to another independently prepared data source, and   (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
section_title: Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address the extent to which the United States Strategic Command  (USSTRATCOM) has made progress in implementing its new missions and  assessing mission results, we reviewed a wide range of Department of  Defense (DOD) and command documentation including USSTRATCOM  guidance, plans, directives, speeches and testimony statements, and  reports; implementation plans and directives for creating its new mission  organizations; and documentation related to DOD’s implementation of its  New Triad concept to transform U.S. strategic capabilities. We also spoke  with various officials involved in the command’s implementation efforts  about their roles, related plans, and actions. When possible, we met with  the command and other organizations’ senior leadership to discuss and  obtain their views on various command issues, including:    Commander, U.S. Strategic Command;    Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,  Surveillance, and Reconnaissance/Director, Defense Intelligence Agency;    Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Network  Warfare/Director, National Security Agency;    Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated  Missile Defense/Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command;    Commander, Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations/Director,  Defense Information Systems Agency;    Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass  Destruction/Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency;    Commander, Air Force Space Command; and    Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has a robust exercise  program for demonstrating its capabilities, we reviewed the command’s  annual training plan, which describes the command’s individual exercises,  establishes an exercise schedule, and sets expectations for the  participation of the command’s mission organizations. For the   November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, we reviewed the exercise plan,  collection management plan, after-action report, and final exercise report.  We also observed that exercise and discussed the exercise results with the  participants. We also reviewed the collection management plan and the  after-action report prepared for the April 2006 Global Thunder exercise,  and after-action reports prepared for the April 2005 Global Thunder,  October 2004 Global Lightning, and October 2003 Global Guardian  exercises. We obtained guidance from the Joint Staff that describe the  roles and responsibilities of U.S. Joint Forces Command for supporting  combatant command exercises. In addition we held discussions with  command officials from the exercise and training branch and with other  exercise observers to obtain their views on USSTRATCOM efforts to plan  and schedule its exercises. We also met with officials from the new joint  functional component commands as well as the Joint Task Force for  Global Network Operations and the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating  Weapons Of Mass Destruction to identify challenges to more fully  including their missions in the commands exercises and assist in our  understanding of the extent to which the command’s mission  organizations were able to participate in the command’s exercises.  Command officials also briefed us on the evolution of the command’s  exercise program since its establishment, and plans for the future. Finally,  we met with officials from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint  Warfighting Center to determine the extent to which they have been  involved in identifying requirements, objectives, methods, and tools for  planning, implementing, and evaluating USSTRATCOM exercises to  strengthen the design and execution of the command’s exercises, such as  participant training and independent observer team support and  evaluation.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM and its mission  organizations had developed criteria for assessing their progress toward  achieving full operating capability, we reviewed documents from the  command and each of the new mission organizations. These documents  included the command’s implementation directives for each new mission  organization and the overarching command reorganization  implementation plan for the current reorganization. We also reviewed  briefings from each of the mission organizations that gave status  information on the organizations’ efforts towards achieving full operating  capability. We held discussions with USSTRATCOM officials who were  part of the command’s reorganization management team and with the  senior leadership, when possible, to determine their roles and  management approach in assisting the mission organizations’ efforts to  reach full operating capability and to obtain an understanding of what  reaching full operating capability means as a milestone in developing the  new USSTRATCOM organization. We met and held discussions with the  senior staff of each mission organization on their criteria for measuring  the organization’s progress toward full operating capability.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a results- oriented management approach to establish goals, continually track its  progress, achieve better synergy among its missions, and gauge the results  of its efforts, we reviewed key documentation and interviewed officials to  determine what steps, if any, the command has taken to develop and  follow this approach. We reviewed relevant GAO reports that identified  and reviewed management approaches of other government and private  sector organizations. We used the practices and implementation steps  identified in these approaches as criteria for reviewing USSTRATCOM  documents and for discussions with command officials about their  approach to transforming the USSTRATCOM organization. We then  compared USSTRATCOM’s approach against these examples of success  that we had identified in other organizations to determine the extent to  which USSTRATCOM had these elements in place.
We reviewed key USSTRATCOM documents, including its first principles   (i.e., its long-term goals) related to reporting on the command’s  performance and those from its biannual readiness reporting and its  annual training assessments. We reviewed the command’s implementation  plan and related directives for establishing USSTRATCOM’s joint  functional component commands. We compared these documents to  implementation plans used by other organizations, including the   U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Northern Command, and reorganization  plans, such as the Report to Congress on the Plan for Organizing the  National Nuclear Security Agency and the Department of Homeland  Security Reorganization Plan, to determine any differences in the  elements and details for implementation that were considered in these  plans and the extent to which they had developed, used, or planned to use  outcome-based performance goals and measures.
To assess the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress defining  organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with other  DOD commands and organizations, we obtained and reviewed relevant  documents and spoke with various officials involved in implementing and  advocating for the command’s new missions about its roles and related  plans and actions. To determine the extent to which the command has  clarified the roles and expectations of its service component  organizations, we reviewed command documentation including draft  integrating guidance, concepts of operations, orders, plans, and other  documents. We met with officials from each of the command’s service  component/supporting commands and discussed the extent to which they  believed the command’s guidance and expectations was sufficiently clear  about their supporting roles. We also discussed with command officials  the extent to which guidance was provided to the service components  through meetings and other activities.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a  common approach and comprehensive strategy to enhance its outreach to  numerous DOD organizations on which its success depends, we met with  the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and with officials in the  command’s directorate responsible for advocacy. We also met with senior  leadership in all of the subordinate mission organizations to understand  the extent to which a clear, coordinated, and unified outreach strategy is  in place and to identify the range of methods and activities the command  and its subordinate mission organizations use to engage and promote its  missions and capabilities with combatant commands, military services,  and DOD and other government organizations. We met with officials at the  U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Northern Command and discussed  command relationships, the ways that USSTRATCOM officials performed  outreach with these organizations, sought their viewpoint on lessons that  should be learned in communicating the command’s missions and  responsibilities, and their perspectives on USSTRATCOM progress. During  USSTRATCOM’s Global Lightning exercise in November 2005, we also  obtained insights from participants on the command’s effectiveness at  performing its outreach activities.
We also reviewed several GAO reports that addressed key practices  organizations should implement during a significant reorganization or  transformation. We used the reports to identify successful communication  and outreach practices employed by other U.S. and foreign government  organizations. We reviewed the USSTRATCOM commander’s summary  report for its November 2005 Global Lightning exercise to identify any  lessons learned, from participating in the exercise with two other  combatant commands, on the success of the command’s outreach efforts.
During our review, we obtained and analyzed USSTRATCOM budget and  authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring the resources,  personnel levels, and skills needed to implement the command’s missions.  We took steps to assess the reliability of the data used in these analyses,  including (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements,   (2) comparing the data to other independently prepared data sources, and  (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. For  additional methodological details about how we performed our analyses,  see appendixes I and II. We performed our work from May 2005 through  June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards.
In conducting our work, we contacted officials at the command’s  headquarters, service, and functional components; think-tank  organizations; and other relevant stakeholders. Table 6 provides  information on the organizations and offices contacted during our review.
section_title: Appendix IV: United States Strategic Command Organizations and Responsibilities
paragraphs: The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) organization is  comprised of a command headquarters, joint functional component  commands, task forces, and centers, which are located around one of four  metropolitan areas: Omaha, Nebraska; Colorado Springs, Colorado;   San Antonio, Texas; and Washington, D.C.
Each of the command’s organizations is supported by a primary Defense  agency or service partner organization. Table 7 shows the primary  responsibilities and related information for key USSTRATCOM  organizations.
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant  Director; Alissa H. Czyz; David G. Hubbell; Amanda M. Leissoo;   Kevin L. O’Neill; Roderick W. Rodgers; and Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Analyst- in-Charge, made key contributions to this report.