Emergency Alerting: Capabilities Have Improved, but Additional Guidance and Testing Are Needed
Published: 2013-04-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: An effective system to alert the public during emergencies can help reduce property damage and save lives. In 2004, FEMA initiated IPAWS with the goal of integrating the nation's EAS and other public-alerting systems into a comprehensive alerting system. In 2009, GAO reported on long-standing weaknesses with EAS and FEMA's limited progress in implementing IPAWS. Subsequently, FEMA and FCC conducted the first-ever nationwide EAS test in November 2011. GAO was asked to review recent efforts to implement IPAWS and improve EAS. GAO examined: (1) how IPAWS capabilities have changed since 2009 and what barriers, if any, affect its implementation and (2) results of the nationwide EAS test and federal efforts to address identified weaknesses. GAO reviewed FEMA, FCC, and other documentation, and interviewed industry stakeholders and alerting authorities from six locations that were selected because they have public-alerting systems in addition to EAS and experienced problems during the nationwide EAS test.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2009, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken actions to improve the capabilities of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) and to increase federal, state, and local capabilities to alert the public, but barriers remain to fully implementing an integrated system. Specifically, IPAWS has the capability to receive and authenticate Internet-based alerts from federal, state, and local public authorities and disseminate them to the public through multiple systems. For example, since January 2012, publicalerting authorities can disseminate Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages through IPAWS to television and radio stations. Beginning in April 2012, alerting authorities have used IPAWS to transmit alerts via the Commercial Mobile Alert System interface to disseminate text-like messages to mobile phones. FEMA also adopted alert standards and increased coordination efforts with multiple stakeholders. Although FEMA has taken important steps to advance an integrated system, state and local alerting authorities we contacted cited a need for more guidance from FEMA on how to integrate and test IPAWS capabilities with their existing alerting systems. For example, an official with a state alerting authority said that additional guidance from FEMA is needed to determine what systems and policies should be put in place before integrating and testing IPAWS with other public alerting systems in the state's 128 counties and cities. In the absence of sufficient guidance from FEMA, states we contacted are reluctant to fully implement IPAWS. This reluctance decreases the capability for an integrated, interoperable, and nationwide alerting system.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required all EAS participants (e.g., broadcast radio and television, cable operators, satellite radio and television service providers, and wireline video-service providers) to submit a report to FCC by December 27, 2011, on the results of the nationwide EAS test. As of January 2013, 61 percent of broadcasters and cable operators had submitted the required report. Of those, 82 percent reported receiving the nationwide test alert, and 61 percent reported successfully retransmitting the alert to other stations, as required. Broadcasters' and cable operators' reception of the alert varied by state, from 6 percent in Oregon to 100 percent in Delaware. Key reasons for reception or retransmission difficulties included poor audio quality, outdated broadcaster-monitoring assignments, and equipment failure. For example, poor audio quality of the test alert resulted in some broadcasters' receiving a garbled and degraded audio message and others' receiving a duplicate alert that caused equipment to malfunction. According to FEMA officials, the poor audio quality is being addressed, in part, with the deployment of a dedicated satellite network that will become fully operational by fall 2013. However, at the time of our review, FEMA and FCC had taken few steps to address other problems identified in the nationwide test. Furthermore, while FCC rules call for periodic nationwide EAS testing, it is uncertain when the next test will occur. Without a strategy for regular nationwide testing of the relay distribution system, including developing milestones and timeframes and reporting on after-action plans, there is no assurance that EAS would work as intended should the President need to activate it to communicate with the American people.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that FEMA work in conjunction with FCC to establish guidance for states to fully implement and test IPAWS components and implement a strategy for regular nationwide EAS testing. In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided examples of actions aimed at addressing the recommendations. DHS, FCC, and the Department of Commerce also provided technical comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Effective public emergency alerts via various telecommunications modes  are critical in major events such as natural disaster, terrorist attack, or  war. A reliable and comprehensive system to alert Americans during  emergencies can help save lives and reduce damages and hardship. The  Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a national public warning system that  requires broadcasters, cable operators, and other communications  service providers to provide the President with communications capability  to address the American people during a national emergency.
Although EAS was originally designed to alert the public via radios and  televisions, in June 2006, an executive order directed the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) to modernize the nation’s public-alerting  systems to ensure the capability of distributing alerts though a variety of  telecommunications devices beyond broadcast media. The Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within DHS is responsible for  modernizing EAS and implementing the Integrated Public Alert and  Warning System (IPAWS), which is intended to integrate EAS and other  public-alerting systems into a larger network to form a comprehensive  public-alerting system. In September 2009, we reported that EAS  exhibited long-standing weaknesses that limit its effectiveness and that  FEMA had made little progress in implementing IPAWS.2011, FEMA, in conjunction with the Federal Communications  Commission (FCC), conducted the first-ever nationwide test of EAS,  which revealed that some portions of the system did not work as  intended. Building on our previous work, you asked us to provide  information on recent efforts to implement IPAWS and improve EAS. We  examined (1) how the capabilities of IPAWS have changed since 2009  and what barriers, if any, are affecting its implementation and (2) the  results of the nationwide EAS test and federal efforts under way to  address identified weaknesses.
To meet these objectives, we examined federal agency data and reports  since 2009, including FEMA’s inventory and evaluation of public-alerting  systems; the IPAWS program management plan; nationwide EAS test  data and preliminary reports; and various agency orders and rules. To  determine the reliability of the data used in this report, we reviewed  relevant documentation and interviewed agency officials about their  processes for reviewing the data and ensuring their accuracy. We found  the agency data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review.  We met with officials from FCC, FEMA, DHS, and the National Oceanic  and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to understand the agencies’  progress in implementing IPAWS and efforts to address weaknesses  identified from the nationwide EAS test. For both objectives, we also met  with representatives from industry trade groups, including radio and  television broadcasters, cable operators, and wireless service providers,  and an organization representing individuals with disabilities. In six  locations—California, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Oregon, Wisconsin, and the  District of Columbia—we interviewed state and local alerting authorities,  state emergency-communication-committee chairs, the state  broadcasters association, and selected local broadcasters. We selected  these states and the District of Columbia because, among other things,  they have additional public-alerting systems other than EAS, and some  have the ability to provide alerts for individuals with disabilities and limited  English. The selected states also experienced problems during the  nationwide EAS test. Results from our review of the selected states and  localities are not generalizable.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 through April 2013,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed discussion of  our objectives, scope, and methodology appears in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: EAS serves as the nation’s primary alerting system. It provides the  President the capability to issue alerts and communicate to the public in  response to emergencies. It was built on a structure conceived in the  1950s when over-the-air broadcasting was the best-available technology  for widely disseminating emergency alerts. EAS has been upgraded  numerous times since then, including in 2005 to include digital broadcast  television as well as satellite radio and television. EAS was further  expanded to include Internet-protocol-based television in 2007.
FEMA, in partnership with FCC and NOAA, is responsible for operating  and maintaining EAS at the federal level. NOAA’s National Weather  Service and state and local alerting authorities, in conjunction with local  radio and television stations, can also use EAS to disseminate  emergency messages, including weather warnings, America’s Missing:  Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alerts, and other public  emergency communications, targeted to specific regional and local areas  and independent from a presidential alert.
PEP stations are usually private or commercial radio stations, but FEMA also designated  some satellite providers as PEP stations, such as SiriusXM Satellite and National Public  Radio’s Satellite System News Advisory Channel. the country to radio and television stations that rebroadcast the audio and  visual message to other broadcast stations, cable systems, and other  EAS participants until all participants have been alerted. This  retransmission of alerts from EAS participant to EAS participant is  commonly referred to as a “daisy chain” distribution system.
While FEMA is responsible for administering EAS at the national-level,  FCC adopts, administers, and enforces rules governing EAS and the EAS  participants. FCC rules require EAS participants to install FCC-certified  equipment and transmit all national-level alerts; EAS participants can also  voluntarily transmit alerts generated by the National Weather Service or  state and local alerting authorities. EAS participants, through their State  Emergency Communications Committee, may maintain state EAS plans  that contain procedures for the distribution of national-level alerts as well  as other voluntary alerts generated by state and local alerting authorities  and the National Weather Service.relay network of each state, including the monitoring assignments of EAS  participants for all national-level and other alerts.
State EAS plans describe the EAS  On November 9, 2011, FEMA conducted the first-ever nationwide test of  the national-level EAS in response to our prior reports noting the lack of  EAS testing. FEMA conducted the test in conjunction with FCC. In  conducting the test, FEMA initiated a national-level alert to be distributed  through the EAS daisy chain to EAS participants, which include about  26,000 broadcasters, cable operators, and other EAS participants. To  obtain information on the results of the test, FCC directed all EAS  participants to report either electronically or via paper report by December  27, 2011, on whether they received and retransmitted the alert. Although  December 27, 2011, was the deadline, FCC continued to accept paper  reports from EAS participants past the deadline.
In addition to EAS, state and local alerting authorities may own and  operate other warning systems, such as emergency telephone notification  systems, sirens, and electronic highway billboards, to provide public  emergency information. Additionally, NOAA provides alerts through the  NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards system, which is a network of radio  stations broadcasting continuous weather information, including warnings,  watches, and forecasts directly from the nearest National Weather  Service office.
In 2004, FEMA initiated IPAWS to integrate EAS and other public-alerting  systems into a larger, more comprehensive public-alerting system. In  June 2006, the President issued Executive Order No. 13407, entitled  Public Alert and Warning System, adopting a policy that the United States  have a comprehensive, integrated alerting system. The order directs the  Secretary of Homeland Security to “ensure an orderly and effective  transition” from current capabilities to a more coordinated and integrated  system and details the responsibilities of the Secretary in meeting the  President’s directive. As shown in table 1, the executive order  established 10 responsibilities for the Secretary of Homeland Security. It  is FEMA’s intention that IPAWS be the programmatic mechanism to carry  out the executive order.
In addition, in 2006, the Warning, Alert, Response Network Act (WARN  Act) was enacted, which required FCC to adopt relevant technical  standards, protocols, procedures, and other technical requirements to  enable commercial mobile service providers (e.g., wireless providers) to  issue emergency alerts. The act required FCC to establish an advisory  panel called the Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee to  recommend technical specifications and protocols to govern wireless  service providers participation in emergency alerting. In 2008, following  public notice and opportunity for public comment as required by the  Administrative Procedure Act, FCC adopted many of the committee’s  recommendations for wireless providers to transmit alerts and began  developing the Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS), in conjunction  with FEMA.
We previously reported several factors that limited EAS effectiveness and  delayed IPAWS implementation. For example, in 2009, we reported that  a lack of redundancy and testing and gaps in coverage, including  capabilities to reach individuals with disabilities and non-English  speakers, significantly limited EAS reliability and efficiency. We also  reported in 2009 that IPAWS program implementation had stalled, as  state and local governments were forging ahead with their own alerting  systems. We made several recommendations to FEMA to improve  program management and enhance transparency about the progress  toward achieving an integrated public-alerting system. FEMA  implemented all our recommendations, including periodically reporting on  the status of implementing IPAWS to congressional committees and  subcommittees.
section_title: IPAWS Capabilities Have Improved, but Barriers to Implementation Exist
subsections: section_title: FEMA has Increased Federal, State, and Local Alerting Capabilities Since 2009
paragraphs: Since we reported on these issues in 2009, FEMA has taken actions to  improve IPAWS capabilities. In particular, FEMA implemented a federal  alert aggregator in 2010, called the IPAWS Open Platform for Emergency  Networks, which has increased alerting capabilities for authorities at the  federal, state, and local level. The alert aggregator is capable of  receiving and authenticating alerts from public-alerting authorities and  routing them to various public-alerting systems. As of January 2013, 93  public-alerting authorities, including those in at least 35 states, have  gone through the necessary authentication steps with FEMA to use  IPAWS and an additional 110 alerting authorities have applications in  process.compatible software to compose and transmit alerts via the Internet to the   Authorized public-alerting authorities may use IPAWS- alert aggregator using a common standard, called the Common Alerting  Protocol (CAP). According to FEMA, once the alert aggregator verifies  the credentials of the message, an alert may be distributed to the public  through multiple alerting systems, which make up the components of  IPAWS, as follows:
EAS. As of January 2012, public-alerting authorities can disseminate  CAP-formatted EAS alerts through the alert aggregator to television  and radio stations. As of June 30, 2012, FCC required EAS  participants (i.e., radio and television broadcasters, cable operators)  to have in place CAP-compatible equipment and monitor the IPAWS  EAS feed so they can retrieve and retransmit Internet-based EAS  alerts. State and local alerting authorities’ use of IPAWS to send EAS  alerts is voluntary and as of January 2013, no public-alerting  authorities had used IPAWS to send an EAS alert. However,  according to FEMA, state and local alerting authorities had sent 81  EAS test messages via the alert aggregator between January 2012  and January 2013.
All-Hazards Emergency Message Collection System (HazCollect).
NOAA’s HazCollect system connected to IPAWS in September 2012,  and enables federal, state, and local alerting authorities to send non- weather emergency messages through IPAWS to the National  Weather Service’s alerting systems, including NOAA Weather Radio’s  nationwide network of radio stations. Examples of non-weather  emergency message events can include wildfires, hazardous  materials releases, terrorist incidents, AMBER alerts, and public  health emergencies. According to FEMA, EAS participants generally  monitor the NOAA Weather Radio directly for emergency alerts. As a  result, IPAWS with HazCollect provides an alternate means for EAS  participants to receive non-weather alerts from local alerting  authorities, increasing the number of alerting channels and enhancing  the likelihood that the public will receive timely alerts. According to  FEMA, 22 NOAA Weather Radio messages had been sent via the  alert aggregator as of January 2013.
CMAS. Starting in April 2012, public-alerting authorities can use  IPAWS to transmit alerts via the CMAS interface to disseminate  mobile alerts, which are geo-targeted, text-like messages to mobile  phones. These alerts are limited to 90 characters and emit a unique  ring tone and vibration cadence, which is intended to, among other  things, improve capabilities for notifying individuals with disabilities  during an emergency. This new capability is designed to relay  presidential (or national-level), AMBER, and imminent threat alerts to  mobile phones using cell technology that is not subject to the  congestion typically experienced on wireless networks during times of  emergency. Most imminent threat alerts are issued by the National  Weather Service, which began sending severe weather-related alerts  to all regions of the country in June 2012. According to FEMA, as of  January 2013, the National Weather Service had sent 2,667 weather  alerts via CMAS. An additional 3 imminent threat alerts had been sent  from one state related to Hurricane Sandy and 17 AMBER alerts had  been sent from the National Center for Missing and Exploited  Children. While CMAS became operational in April 2012,  participation by wireless carriers is optional under the WARN Act.
Nevertheless, according to CTIA—The Wireless Association, all of the  major wireless carriers have agreed to participate. Some carriers  may still be rolling out CMAS capabilities and not all cell phones are  yet capable of receiving alerts, according to CTIA. Some state and  local alerting authorities we contacted raised concerns about the  degree of granularity for geo-targeting these alerts, which we discuss  later in this report.
Internet services. As of September 2012, Internet web services (e.g.,  Google Public Alerts) and software application developers can  retrieve and redistribute IPAWS alerts to the public through their own  services, such as websites, mobile phone applications, email, and text  messaging. To do so, an alert redistribution service must complete a  memorandum of agreement with FEMA, which then grants them  access to the IPAWS Public Alerts Feed from the alert aggregator.
State and local alerting systems. According to FEMA, existing state  or locally owned and operated public-alerting systems—such as  sirens and emergency telephone notification systems—may also be  configured to receive alerts from IPAWS.
FEMA views the new capabilities for public-alerting authorities to  distribute CAP-formatted messages through the federal alert aggregator  as an added capability, not a replacement, to the traditional national-level  alert (i.e., EAS daisy chain relay distribution system). As a result, FEMA  officials said they anticipate maintaining both systems into the  foreseeable future as parallel alerting systems, as shown in figure 2.  FEMA officials also told us that discussions with the White House are  ongoing to determine use of IPAWS during a presidential alert; however,  at the time of our report, FEMA officials said a national-level alert would  not be disseminated through the federal alert aggregator.
In addition to creating the alert aggregator, FEMA has taken other actions  to implement the IPAWS program and address directives in Executive  Order No. 13407. Specific examples include:
Expanded and modernized PEP stations. To increase direct  coverage of a presidential alert and address executive order directives  to augment infrastructure for the public alert and warning system,  FEMA has expanded the number of PEP stations from 34 in 2009  (directly covering about 67 percent of the American population) to 65  in 2012 (directly covering about 85 percent of the American  population), according to FEMA officials. FEMA plans to further  expand and modernize this network, with the goal of having a total of  77 PEP stations operational by fall 2013, providing direct coverage to  over 90 percent of the American population.they have also added satellite connectivity in 50 PEP stations, with  the goal of a fully operational, dedicated PEP satellite network to all  77 stations by fall 2013. According to FEMA officials, once  operational, this network will be the primary connection between  FEMA and the PEP stations in the event of a presidential alert; the  traditional telephone-based distribution network will provide a  redundant backup connection.
Adopted CAP standard. To address directives in the executive order  that DHS develop alert standards and protocols, FEMA formally  adopted CAP in September 2010. CAP can be used as a single input  to activate multiple warning systems, and is capable of geographic  targeting and multilingual messaging. According to a survey FEMA  conducted of more than 3,300 public-alerting authorities in the United  States from January 2010 through December 2011, 64 percent of the  sites responding used CAP and had IPAWS-compatible Products  in place at the time of the survey. Most public-alerting authorities we  contacted are moving toward adoption of CAP; however, some are  still in the process of implementing new software to interface with  IPAWS or are waiting for vendors to provide upgrades to their existing  systems. In addition, representatives from the broadcast industry told  us, based on experience, that the vast majority of broadcasters are  able to receive CAP-formatted alerts, as required by FCC rules.
Developed IPAWS training and webinars. Executive Order No.  13407 directs DHS to conduct training for the public alert and warning  system. To address this directive, FEMA developed an independent  training course for alerting authorities on IPAWS capabilities, which  has been available online since December 2011. The goal of the  course is to provide public-alerting authorities with increased  awareness of the benefits of using IPAWS for public warnings; skills  to draft more appropriate, effective, and accessible warning  messages; and best practices in the effective use of CAP to reach all  members of their communities. In addition, the IPAWS program office  conducts monthly webinars for developers and alerting practitioners.
Conducted outreach to partners. Since 2009, the IPAWS program  office has made efforts to improve communication and outreach to  stakeholders at all levels, according to FEMA officials. Executive  Order No. 13407 directs FEMA to consult, coordinate, and cooperate  with the private sector, as well as provide public education on IPAWS.  Some government and private stakeholders told us that FEMA’s  communication and coordination efforts have improved significantly  since 2009, although improvements could still be made, especially in  educating the public, as discussed below. According to FEMA  officials, the IPAWS program office works to engage federal entities;  state, local, tribal, and territorial alerting authorities; private sector  industry; non-profit and advocacy groups; and the American people  through working groups and roundtables, conferences,  demonstrations, trainings and webinars, Congressional briefings, and  the IPAWS Web site, among other mechanisms.
For a complete list of actions FEMA has taken to address Executive  Order No. 13407, see appendix II.
section_title: Barriers Remain to Fully Implementing and Using IPAWS
paragraphs: Although FEMA has taken important steps to advance an integrated  alerting system, barriers exist that may impede IPAWS implementation at  the state and local level. Specifically, public-alerting authorities we  contacted, as well as representatives from national trade industry groups,  identified five main barriers at the state and local level. These barriers  include (1) insufficient guidance on how states should fully implement  IPAWS; (2) inability of state and local alerting authorities to test all IPAWS  components; (3) CMAS geo-targeting and character limitations; (4)  inadequate public outreach on IPAWS capabilities; and (5) limited  resources at the federal, state, and local level to fully implement IPAWS.
Insufficient guidance to fully implement IPAWS. While most state  and local alerting authorities we contacted, including representatives  from the National Emergency Management Association, said they  are moving toward implementing IPAWS, some are reluctant to fully  implement the system, citing a need for more information and  additional guidance from FEMA. Specifically, while current IPAWS  training exists to instruct public-alerting authorities on, among other  things, how to draft an appropriate IPAWS alert, state and local  alerting authorities we contacted said additional guidance is needed  on integrating and operating IPAWS with existing state and local  public-alerting systems in their states. For example, officials in one  state said that while they are prepared to use IPAWS, they have not  yet integrated their state and local alerting systems with IPAWS, citing  a need for additional guidance from FEMA and communication within  the state to determine what systems and policies should be put in  place to integrate IPAWS with public-alerting systems in the state’s  128 counties and cities. Although Executive Order No. 13407 directs  DHS to ensure interoperability and the delivery of coordinated public  messages through multiple communication pathways, we found that  none of our selected states had yet integrated their alerting systems  with IPAWS for state or local level alerting, although according to  FEMA, the alerting authorities had gone through the necessary steps  to become authenticated IPAWS originators. Since IPAWS is still in  the early stages of its deployment, officials said that there are no  examples of how to effectively implement IPAWS at the state and  local level. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA officials  noted that they are involved in efforts to conduct case studies with  public-alerting authorities in Nebraska and Nevada to provide  examples of effectively implementing IPAWS at the state level. FEMA  officials said they are working with state and local alerting authorities  as well as system developers and vendors, to address some notable  challenges related to implementing IPAWS, including how states can  manage IPAWS capabilities within their respective states.  Nevertheless, in the absence of additional FEMA guidance, some  states are reluctant to fully implement IPAWS, a reluctance that  decreases the capability for an integrated, interoperable, and  nationwide alerting system.
CMAS enables government officials to target emergency alerts to specific geographic  areas through cell towers (e.g., lower Manhattan), which pushes the information to  dedicated receivers in CMAS-enabled mobile devices. and local alerting authorities we spoke with raised concerns about the  possibility of over alerting the public with mobile alerts since the alerts  may not geo-target the specific area affected. The 90-character  message limitations of these alerts were also raised as a challenge by  FEMA and other alerting authorities to sending out clear and accurate  alerts, as alerts may not contain enough information to be useful. For  example, according to officials in one state, the National Weather  Service issued a flash flood warning via CMAS that was distributed  throughout a large county, which is roughly the size of the state of  Connecticut, when only one small area of the county was affected.  According to state officials, some citizens were confused when they  received this alert as they were not located in the affected area, and  there was very little information contained in the 90-character alert to  clarify the specific area affected. In addition, an evacuation notice  accompanied the flash flood warning, and the local emergency  management authority was unprepared when citizens called them for  additional information. Officials stated that some citizens might  ignore or opt out of future mobile alerts if they received previous alerts  that were not applicable to them. The Commercial Mobile Service  Alert Advisory Committee, which recommended technical standards  and protocols for CMAS in 2007, recommended reviewing and  updating its recommendations periodically based on advances in  technology and experiences in deployment, especially related to geo- targeting. As previously mentioned, FCC plans to have a federal  advisory committee review the CMAS rules, including those related to  geo-targeting and character limits. Technological advancements and  experiences in using the system since 2008 may warrant a review on  a more specific level of geo-targeting and expanded character limits  for mobile alerts than was previously possible. Such changes to  CMAS could make state and local authorities more likely to use these  alerts and the public less likely to opt out of the service.
Insufficient public outreach. According to federal, state, and local  officials we contacted, the public is generally unaware of IPAWS  capabilities, especially alerts sent to mobile phones. Although FEMA  officials told us that a training course to educate the public is under  development, FEMA has conducted limited outreach to date to inform  the general public about IPAWS alerts and capabilities beyond  information on the FEMA website. Executive Order No. 13407 directs  DHS to provide public education on using, accessing, and responding  to the public alert and warning system. Because of limited public  outreach, some state and local alerting authorities expressed concern  that the public may ignore or opt out of receiving IPAWS alerts, even  though these alerts may provide important, life-saving information.  While FEMA has made efforts to improve outreach efforts with IPAWS  stakeholders since 2009, FEMA officials said they have limited  resources and experience in educating the general public on IPAWS.  In previous work, we identified key practices for planning a consumer  education campaign, including (1) defining goals and objectives; (2)  analyzing the situation; (3) identifying stakeholders; (4) identifying  resources; (5) researching target audiences; (6) developing  consistent, clear messages; (7) identifying credible messenger(s); (8)  designing media mix; and (9) establishing metrics to measure  success. Public outreach that includes these key practices could  help ensure that the public is better informed about IPAWS  capabilities.
Limited resources to implement IPAWS. While there is no charge  to send messages through IPAWS, there are underlying costs to  purchasing the software and equipment needed to integrate with  IPAWS, costs that state and local public alerting authorities said can  act as a barrier to implementation in difficult financial times.  According to the FEMA survey of public alerting authorities,  decreased revenues and a lack of grant funding at all levels of  government were reported as primary reasons for authorities’ inability  to purchase and sustain alerting systems. In addition, the FEMA  survey found that while most state-level alerting authorities reported  having full-time staff, many local authorities might only have part-time  or volunteer staff and very limited budgets.
In addition to these barriers, there are some long-standing weaknesses  that continue to limit the effectiveness of the national-level EAS since we  last reported on this topic in 2009, including a lack of redundancy in how  national-level EAS messages are disseminated to the public.  FEMA is  making progress in increasing redundancy between the FEMA operations  center and designated PEP stations through its deployment of a PEP  satellite network. However, FEMA continues to rely solely on radio and  television broadcast for a national-level EAS alert because the national- level EAS is not currently integrated with IPAWS capabilities. As a result,  FEMA lacks alternative means of reaching EAS participants should a  point in the daisy chain distribution system fail. Moreover, large portions  of the population would likely not be reached by a national-level alert— specifically all those who are not watching television or listening to the  radio at the time of the alert. Executive Order No. 13407 directs DHS to  ensure presidential alerting capabilities under all conditions and enable  delivery of coordinated messages to the American people through as  many communication pathways as practicable. In addition, while  Executive Order No. 13407 specifies that the public-alerting system  should provide warnings to non-English speakers and individuals with  disabilities, it remains difficult for a national-level alert to reach these  distinct segments of the population. While the President has never  initiated a national-level alert, according to FEMA, such an alert would be  provided in English and only through radio and television broadcasts,  which may not be accessible to individuals with disabilities.example, according to the National Council on Disability, most disaster  warnings broadcast via radio and television may not be accessible to   For  people with hearing or vision disabilities.CAP-formatted messages to specialized alerting devices for individuals  with disabilities and in non-English languages, could help address some  of these limitations if it were integrated with the national-level EAS.
section_title: Most Reporting EAS Participants Received and Retransmitted the Test Alert, but Federal Efforts to Address Identified Weaknesses Are Limited
subsections: section_title: Results of the Nationwide EAS Test
paragraphs: Our analysis of FCC data found that approximately 82 percent of  reporting broadcasters (radio and television) and cable operators  received the November 2011 nationwide test alert. Although FEMA has  been working to implement IPAWS, the November 2011 nationwide EAS  test used the traditional national-level alert system (i.e., EAS daisy-chain  relay distribution system) and did not include new IPAWS capabilities.Broadcasters’ and cable operators’ reception of the test alert varied  widely by state. As shown in figure 3, the reception of the alert ranged  from approximately 6 percent (in Oregon) to 100 percent (in Delaware)  among the states. FCC, FEMA, broadcasters, and state alerting  authorities in Oregon attributed the low reception rate to the absence of a  PEP station in the state at the time of the test. Without a PEP station,  broadcasters and cable operators in Oregon were directed to monitor a  Portland-based public radio station, which reported receiving poor audio  quality of the alert from its designated monitoring source—the National  Public Radio satellite network.
Once EAS participants received the national-level test alert, they were  required to retransmit the audio signal to other EAS participants, as  designated in state EAS plans, for the daisy chain distribution system to  work. Our analysis of FCC data found that 61 percent of reporting  broadcasters and cable operators were able to retransmit the alert to  stations that were designated to monitor the retransmitting station. The  retransmission rate of the test alert by broadcasters and cable operators  also varied widely among the states ranging from approximately 4 percent  (in Oregon) to 88 percent (in New Jersey). FCC does not know the  potential percentage of the American people who did not receive the alert  because, officials noted, the nationwide EAS test was designed to assess  EAS performance rather than to determine the percentage of public  receipt of the test. Therefore, it is unknown what percentage of the  American people failed to receive the test.
Key reasons for EAS participants’ failure to receive and retransmit the  national-level test alert included (1) PEP station reception failure, (2) poor  audio quality, (3) shortened test length, (4) outdated monitoring  assignments, and (5) equipment failure.
PEP station reception failure. FEMA reported that 3 of the 63 PEP  stations were unable to receive and retransmit the alert due to  technical reasons. These PEP stations were located in New Mexico,  Alabama, and American Samoa. Failures at those stations  significantly contributed to low national-level alert reception rates in  those states and that territory. In particular, our analysis of FCC data  found that nearly 90 percent of broadcasters in New Mexico, almost  70 percent of broadcasters in Alabama, and 100 percent of  broadcasters in American Samoa failed to receive the national-level  alert. According to FEMA, connectivity issues with the specialized  EAS equipment used at the PEP stations were the reasons for the  failure. As previously mentioned, FEMA plans to modernize PEP  stations with a dedicated satellite network, and officials expect this  dedicated network to provide more reliable connection to the PEP  stations when fully operational by fall 2013.
Poor audio quality. FCC also reported that poor audio quality of the  national-level alert signal resulted in problems ranging from some  broadcasters’ receiving a garbled and degraded audio message to  others’ receiving a duplicate alert tone that caused equipment to  malfunction. These audio problems resulted in some stations’ being  unable to retransmit the test alert. According to FEMA, the reported  poor audio quality was due, in part, to a feedback loop that occurred  when equipment at a single PEP station rebroadcasted the original  message back to FEMA. This audio message was then transmitted by  FEMA over the original audio message, degrading the audio.  Therefore, fewer stations were able to receive, and thus retransmit,  the alert to their designated station(s). EAS participants we met with  consistently stated that the poor audio quality during the nationwide  EAS test was a significant problem. For example, state and local  alerting authorities, broadcaster associations, and individual  broadcast stations we contacted stated that connectivity and audio  problems occurred during the nationwide test. Officials from one state  broadcasters association said that broadcasters in their state only  received 10 seconds of the national-level alert signal with only five or  six words of the message and then 20 seconds of dead air for the  remainder of the test. They also stated that problems with the audio  resulted in the alerts not being retransmitted to other stations in their  state.
Shortened test length. The nationwide EAS test was originally  scheduled to last 3 minutes, but was shortened to 30 seconds.  According to an industry trade association, the announcement to  change the test length came about 2 weeks prior to the test. Because  of the shortened test length, some broadcasters and cable operators  were unable to receive or retransmit the national-level alert. According  to FEMA, the test was shortened to mitigate concerns from the cable  industry that the public who could not hear the audio portion of the  test would be unable to tell if the alert was a test or a real alert solely  from the television screen display. More specifically, FCC instructed  broadcasters to use an on-screen slide just before the test to  announce that the following message would be a test and not an  actual alert. However, according to officials from an industry trade  association, some EAS participants, namely some cable operators,  were unable to provide this background screen during the nationwide  test. In these cases, since FCC chose to use a live alert code to  resemble an actual nationwide test, there was no visual cue that a test  was taking place. There was concern that this could adversely affect  some segments of the public, especially individuals who were unable  to hear the audio portion indicating a test was taking place. According  to representatives from industry trade associations, use of a test code  for future nationwide EAS tests could help ensure that all segments of  the population understand that a nationwide test, rather than an actual  national emergency, is taking place.
Outdated monitoring assignments. FCC noted that some state EAS  plans that designate the monitoring assignments are outdated and its  review of the EAS test results revealed some confusion among some  EAS participants of monitoring assignments. We found that as of  February 2013, out of 33 state and District of Columbia EAS plans  available on FCC’s website, 16 state plans were dated 2009 or earlier,  with 3 of these plans dated in the 1990s. Additionally, 18 state plans  were not available on FCC’s website with the link to one website  leading to information completely unrelated to the state. FEMA  reported that if monitoring assignments in the state EAS plans are not  followed or the state EAS plans are not up-to-date, EAS participants  may not receive and relay the messages. According to FEMA, several  EAS participants reported not being able to receive the national-level  alert from their assigned sources, and as a result, they were unable to  relay the alert.
Equipment failures. Because of specific equipment failures, some  broadcasters could not receive or retransmit the national-level alert.  FCC reported that approximately 5 percent of EAS participants  responding to its data collection effort reported that hardware,  equipment, or configuration problems precluded them from receiving  the national-level alert.
section_title: Limited Federal Efforts to Address Identified Issues
paragraphs: At the time of our review, FCC and FEMA had taken limited steps to  address problems identified in the nationwide EAS test. According to  FEMA officials, the poor audio quality that was experienced during the  test is being addressed, in part, with the deployment of a dedicated PEP  satellite network, but the remaining issues have yet to be resolved. FEMA  officials told us that it will take a combination of FCC rulemaking,  developing best practices, and correcting technical issues to address the  problems that were identified during the nationwide test, but implementing  some of these actions could likely take years. According to FCC officials,  a working group, in coordination with FEMA, has been examining these  issues, but neither agency could identify progress made by the group  more than a year after the test. In commenting on a draft of this report,  FCC told us it issued its final report on the results of the nationwide EAS  test on April 12, 2013. According to FCC officials, one of the reasons for  the delay in issuing a final report on the test result was their effort to  collect more data from EAS participants. FCC continued to accept paper  reports on the test results from EAS participants for about a year after the  test was conducted, despite the December 27, 2011 deadline for  electronically submitting the test results. EAS participants and state and  local alerting authorities we contacted said that they were not aware of  FCC taking any actions to address identified issues, and as a result, their  ability to make improvements and prepare for future tests is limited.  Concerning future tests, FCC rules require a nationwide EAS test to be  conducted periodically, but it is uncertain when the next test will occur.  FEMA officials told us that they are continuing to work with FCC in  determining corrective actions from the test results and will not hold  another test until corrective actions are complete. As we have previously  reported, regular nationwide EAS testing is essential to ensure that the  system will work as intended during an emergency.
FCC recognizes that outdated state EAS plans contributed to some of the  reception and retransmission problems during the EAS test, and is being  more proactive in requesting states to submit updated plans. FCC officials  stated that updating state EAS plans would be valuable to ensure that the  monitoring assignments for the broadcast stations remain accurate when  a national-level alert is activated. However, as of October 2012, FCC has  received 7 of 50 updated state EAS plans. Officials stated that they would continue to ask state emergency communications committees to  submit updated EAS plans to review, but that FCC has no authority to  require the filing of EAS plans. As a result, FCC is unable to fully verify  that states are keeping EAS monitoring assignments up to date. In  addition, some EAS participants we spoke with are waiting for more  guidance from FCC, including anticipated changes in rules governing  EAS. For example, FCC officials told us that they plan to issue a notice of  proposed rulemaking sometime in 2013 seeking comment on issues  identified from the nationwide EAS test.
EAS participants and state and local alerting authorities we spoke with  stated that there are several actions that FCC, in conjunction with FEMA,  could take that would assist EAS participants in preparing, conducting,  and reporting on future nationwide EAS test alerts. These actions include  (1) issuing an after-action plan to help identify and address problems that  occurred during the test, (2) conducting regular and frequent testing of  EAS to ensure the system works as intended, and (3) providing guidance  to update state EAS plans to incorporate IPAWS (e.g., guidance could be  EAS plan templates, best practices, good examples).
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: FEMA has made progress since 2009 in developing a more  comprehensive, integrated nationwide public-alerting system. FEMA has  improved the capabilities of IPAWS by bringing the IPAWS alert  aggregator online and integrating it with multiple alerting systems,  including HazCollect and CMAS. However, for IPAWS to become fully  operational, several areas of concern need to be addressed. In particular,  additional guidance for state and local alerting authorities on specific  steps to integrate and test their public-alerting systems with IPAWS  components would help to provide assurance on the interoperability and  effectiveness of IPAWS and facilitate its implementation. Furthermore,  according to public-alerting authorities we contacted, without additional  guidance on IPAWS implementation and consideration of CMAS rules,  state and local alerting authorities we contacted were reluctant to fully  integrate their systems with IPAWS and rely on IPAWS as a  comprehensive public-alerting system. In addition, a concerted effort to  educate state and local governments, the private sector, and the  American people on the functions of the public-alerting system is  necessary to inform them on how to access, use, and respond to  emergency alert messages. Using key practices for conducting a public  education campaign—such as defining goals and objectives, identifying  stakeholders and resources, and developing clear and consistent  messages—could enable FEMA, which has limited experience educating  the general public on IPAWS, to more effectively and efficiently inform the  American people on how to access and respond to potentially life-saving  emergency alerts.
FEMA has also expanded the number of PEP stations and enhanced  satellite connectivity to improve direct coverage and dependability of the  national-level EAS. However, as long as the national-level EAS remains  independent from IPAWS, portions of the population, including individuals  with disabilities and non-English speakers, will be less likely to receive or  fully understand presidential alerts disseminated only through the EAS  daisy chain. If integrated, CMAS, in particular, is capable of providing  alerts in different formats, including emitting unique ring tone and  vibration cadences for those who have hearing or visual impairments,  which would increase the likelihood that individuals with disabilities could  be informed that a national-level alert is being issued. Furthermore,  integrating EAS into IPAWS would provide system redundancy for  national-level alerts.
FEMA and FCC held the first-ever test of the national-level EAS in  November 2011, an important step. However, the results of the  nationwide EAS test—which a number of EAS participants could not  effectively receive or retransmit—show that the reliability of the traditional  EAS system remains questionable. At the time of our review, we found  that FEMA and FCC had taken limited steps to address problems  identified by EAS participants. In addition, some state EAS plans and  monitoring assignments are outdated, in part, because state emergency  communications committees are waiting for more guidance from FCC,  including changes in rules governing EAS. Although states are not  required to update and submit state EAS plans, FCC could help facilitate  the process by providing additional guidance. Finally, while FCC rules call  for periodic nationwide EAS testing, FCC and FEMA currently have not  scheduled another nationwide test. Without ongoing, regular nationwide  testing of the relay distribution system, there is no assurance the EAS  would work should the President need to activate it to communicate with  the American people.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that IPAWS is fully functional and capable of distributing alerts  through multiple pathways as intended, we recommend that the Secretary  of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take the  following four actions:  In conjunction with FCC, establish guidance (e.g., procedures, best  practices) that will assist participating state and local alerting  authorities to fully implement and test IPAWS components and ensure  integration and interoperability.
In conjunction with FCC and NOAA, conduct coordinated outreach to  educate the American public on IPAWS capabilities, especially  CMAS.
Develop a plan to disseminate a national-level alert via IPAWS to  increase redundancy and communicate presidential alerts through  multiple pathways.
In conjunction with FCC, develop and implement a strategy for  regularly testing the national-level EAS, including examining the need   for a national test code, developing milestones and time frames,  improving data collection efforts, and reporting on after-action plans.
To ensure that CMAS is effectively used and that the EAS relay  distribution network is capable of reliably communicating national-level  alerts, we recommend that the Chairman of FCC, in conjunction with  FEMA, take the following two actions:
Review and update rules governing CMAS, including those related to  geo-targeting, character limitations, and testing procedures.
Provide states with additional guidance (e.g., templates of EAS plan)  to facilitate completion of updated state EAS plans that include  IPAWS-compatible equipment.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, FCC, and the Department of  Commerce for their review and comment. In response, DHS concurred  with all of the report’s recommendations to improve IPAWS capabilities.  In its written comments, DHS provided examples of actions FEMA will  undertake to address the recommendations. For example, DHS noted  that FEMA intends to create toolkits for state and local alerting authorities  that will include alerting and governance best practices, technology  requirements, and operation and usage information on IPAWS.  Regarding efforts to improve nationwide EAS testing, DHS indicated that  FEMA plans to work with federal partners, including FCC, to create a  national test code, develop milestones and timeframes for future testing,  improve data collection efforts, and report on after-action plans. See  appendix III for written comments from DHS.
In commenting on the draft report, FCC did not state whether it agreed or  disagreed with the report’s recommendations. FCC noted that it issued a  final report on the results of the nationwide EAS test on April 12, 2013,  and we believe the report includes potential actions that could address  our recommendations in the future. For example, the April 2013 report  includes recommendations for FCC to commence a rulemaking  proceeding on state EAS plans and to encourage the groups that typically  develop state EAS plans to ensure that the plans contain accurate EAS  monitoring assignments. Other recommendations in FCC’s April 2013  report include commencing a rulemaking proceeding to examine  equipment-performance issues during activation of a test, and developing  a new Nationwide EAS Test Reporting System database to improve filing  electronic data from EAS participants. FCC stated that it will conduct a  review of CMAS rules, as we recommended in this report, and also noted  that it will work with FEMA to develop a strategy for regular testing of  EAS. See appendix IV for written comments from FCC.
The Department of Commerce provided technical comments from its  component agency NOAA, and we incorporated them as appropriated. In  the comments, NOAA stated that it believes our report does an accurate  job in assessing the nationwide EAS test results and the current state of  IPAWS. With respect to our recommendation on conducting outreach,  NOAA believes the outreach should be conducted in conjunction with  FCC and NOAA, and we made the suggested revision.
In addition to written comments, DHS and FCC provided technical  comments on the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed upon with your office, unless you publicly announce the  contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days  from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to  appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland  Security, and the Chairman of FCC. In addition, the report is available at  no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report provides information on federal efforts to integrate various  public-alerting systems and modernize the Emergency Alert System  (EAS). Specifically, the report examines (1) how the capabilities of the  Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) have changed  since 2009 and what barriers, if any, are affecting its implementation and  (2) the results of the nationwide EAS test and federal efforts under way to  address identified weaknesses.
To obtain information on both objectives of this report, we interviewed  officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),  Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of Homeland  Security, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  We spoke with representatives from national trade industry groups,  including the National Emergency Management Association, National  Association of Broadcasters, National Cable and Telecommunications  Association, CTIA-The Wireless Association, and National Alliance of  State Broadcasters Associations, to obtain stakeholders’ perspective on  the results of the first nationwide EAS test and federal efforts to  implement IPAWS. We also spoke with representatives from the satellite  industry (DIRECTV), an EAS equipment manufacturer (Monroe  Electronics), and the National Council on Disability to gather their views  on IPAWS implementation and the nationwide EAS test. We conducted  interviews with selected state and local alerting authorities, state  emergency-communication-committee chairs, state broadcasting  associations, and selected local broadcasters. We nonstatistically  selected a sample of six locations—California, Kentucky, Oklahoma,  Oregon, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia—to obtain information  from state and local officials on any barriers to implementing IPAWS and  potential remedies for addressing any identified barriers, as well as to  determine any problems associated with the nationwide EAS test. We  selected these states and locality because some had (1) other public- alerting systems, in addition to the EAS; (2) alerting systems that are  capable of providing alerts for individuals with disabilities and limited  English; and (3) experienced a breakdown of test alert dissemination  during the nationwide EAS test. We also selected these states and  localities because some had been authenticated to be an IPAWS-alerting  authority and they were geographically diverse. To obtain a regional  perspective on implementing IPAWS and testing the EAS, we also spoke  with officials from FEMA regional offices. Because we conducted targeted  interviews, our results are not generalizable to all states and localities.  Table 1 provides more detailed information on the state and localities we  selected and the entities we interviewed.
To obtain information on how the capabilities of IPAWS have changed  since 2009 and what barriers, if any, affect its implementation, we also  reviewed and analyzed agency documents and literature since 2009. We  reviewed documents on IPAWS program planning, including the 2010  IPAWS program management plan, and assessed actions that have been  taken to determine if systems and standards are operational. We also  attended a number of IPAWS webinars to obtain training and information  that are provided to public-alerting authorities. We reviewed FEMA’s  IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Assessment Report, which surveyed  3,314 state, territorial, tribal, and local emergency management agencies  to analyze gaps between existing public-alerting capabilities and IPAWS  and includes recommendations for IPAWS integration. The survey was  conducted mostly by telephone with structured questionnaires over a 2- year period from January 2010 through December 2011 and specific  procedures were followed to identify emergency management personnel  for the sites at each level. We assessed the survey’s methodology and  determined that the estimates from it that we cite are sufficiently valid for  use in our report. Specifically, we assessed the survey methodology  against the Office of Management and Budget’s Standards and  Guidelines for Statistical Surveys. We did not otherwise verify, however,  the findings and conclusions from the report.
To obtain information on the results of the nationwide EAS test and  federal efforts to address any identified weaknesses, we reviewed and  analyzed agency data and documents. Specifically, we examined FCC’s  and FEMA’s preliminary reports on the nationwide EAS test results; FCC  orders and rules on EAS; FCC’s website on the nationwide EAS test;  FEMA’s EAS Best Practices Guide; and briefing documents from FEMA  and NOAA. We analyzed FCC’s data from EAS participants to determine  the percentage of radio and television broadcasters and cable operators  that received and retransmitted the national-level alert on a statewide  basis. We analyzed FCC’s data for 49 states; we did not include Alaska  since it was excused from the nationwide test because of severe weather  conditions. To determine the reliability of the data used in this report, we  reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed agency officials about  their processes for reviewing the data and ensuring their accuracy. We  also ensured that FCC data were sufficiently reliable for our review. We  reviewed and analyzed state EAS plans that were posted on FCC’s  website to determine if the state’s EAS plans were current. We  interviewed FCC officials to confirm that the information on FCC’s website  is current.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 through April 2013,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: FEMA’s Progress Addressing Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security under Executive Order No. 13407
paragraphs: Appendix II: FEMA’s Progress Addressing  Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland  Security under Executive Order No. 13407 Status/progress/timeline  Issued the IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Assessment Report in January 2012. This  report surveyed and assessed public-alerting authorities in the United States between  2009 and 2011.
Formally adopted the Commercial Mobile Alerting System (CMAS) Specification in  December 2009.  Formally adopted the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) standard for IPAWS in  September 2010.
Implemented CMAS. Wireless carriers began issuing geo-targeted CMAS alerts in April  2012; NOAA started sending geo-targeted CMAS messages in June 2012.
Hosted biannual roundtables for industry experts, federal agencies, and advocacy  organizations representing Americans with access and functional needs to discuss  emergency alerting.  Shared lessons learned and best practices for communicating to Americans with access  and functional needs through the EAS to FCC. For example, encouraged FCC to  consider EAS rule changes or clarifications for broadcasters with regard to: (1) display  size, color, background contrast, and speed of text crawl during EAS alert and (2) use of  a test code for future nationwide testing of EAS.
Expanded the number of primary entry point (PEP) stations to 65 total—31 PEP stations  were either modernized or built since 2009. Anticipates a total of 77 PEP stations by fall  2013 directly covering 90 percent of the American people. Added satellite connectivity in  50 PEP stations.  Integrated NOAA alerting systems to allow public-alerting authorities to send non- weather emergency messages through HazCollect; allowed NOAA to send mobile alerts  beginning 2012.
Released IPAWS online training for public-alerting authorities in December 2011. Hosts  monthly webinars for developers and alerting practitioners.  Conducted two statewide EAS tests in Alaska in January 2010 and 2011; conducted the  first nationwide EAS test on November 9, 2011.  Conducted CMAS test in New York City in December 2011. Conducts a required monthly  test of CMAS on the third Wednesday of each month.
Maintains a public website on IPAWS.
Hosts monthly webinars for developers and alerting practitioners.  Participated in federal working groups and roundtables.  Participates in industry conferences, demonstrations, and panels.
Acts as executive agent for EAS, maintaining the PEP stations.
Maintains EAS and PEP stations.  Deploying a dedicated PEP satellite network.
Ensure the capability to distribute alerts on the basis of geographic location, risks, or personal user  preferences.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Federal Communications Commission
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant Director;  Andy Clinton; Jean Cook; Bert Japikse; Delwen Jones; Jennifer Kim; Josh  Ormond; Carl Ramirez; Jerry Sandau; and Andrew Stavisky made key  contributions to this report.