Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges
Published: 2003-06-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The economic well being of the U.S. is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and the federal role and actions in transportation security.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Securing the nation's transportation system is fraught with challenges. The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure. Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, and thousands of private sector companies. Further exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has weakened the transportation industry's financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take a collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and future transportation challenges. Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation starting this summer. DOT is also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system have not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with their security efforts.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the  nation’s transportation system to the terrorist threat. Terrorist events  around the world have also shown that transportation systems are often  targets of attack—roughly one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target  transportation systems. While most of the early attention following the  September 11 attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on the other  modes of transportation has since grown as concerns are voiced about  possible vulnerabilities, such as introducing weapons of mass destruction  into this country through ports or launching chemical attacks on mass  transit systems. The entire transportation industry has remained on a  heightened state of alert since the attacks. For example, as of May 2003, the  Department of Transportation (DOT) had issued over 15 terrorist threat  advisories to different segments of the transportation industry since  September 11.
As requested, this report examines (1) challenges in securing the nation’s  transportation system; (2) actions transportation operators, as well as  state and local governments, have taken since September 11 to enhance  security; (3) the federal role in securing the transportation system and  actions the federal government has taken to enhance transportation  security since September 11; and (4) future actions that are needed to  further enhance the security of the nation’s transportation system. To  address these objectives, we analyzed the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s  recent threat assessment and the administration’s security strategies. We  also analyzed the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and DOT  security-related documents and reports as well as relevant statutes and  regulations. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOT, the National  Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and TSA as well as  representatives from numerous transportation industry associations and  transportation security experts. We selected transportation industry and  state and local government associations that represent the different modes  of transportation and levels of government. We selected transportation  security experts based on their knowledge/expertise and reputation as  being an expert in the transportation security arena. We also consulted  with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate  transportation security experts. Finally, we reviewed our past reports on  homeland, port, transit, and aviation security and other research on  terrorism and transportation security. (See app. I for a more detailed  discussion of our report’s scope and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The nation’s transportation system is a vast, interconnected network of  diverse modes. Key modes of transportation include aviation; highways;  motor carrier (i.e., trucking); motor coach (i.e., intercity bus); maritime;  pipeline; rail (passenger and freight); and transit (e.g., buses, subways,  ferry boats, and light rail). The transportation modes work in harmony to  facilitate mobility through an extensive network of infrastructure and  operators, as well as through the vehicles and vessels that permit  passengers and freight to move within the system. For example, the  nation’s transportation system moves over 30 million tons of freight and  provides approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips each day. The diversity  and size of the transportation system make it vital to our economy and  national security, including military mobilization and deployment.
Given the important role the transportation system plays in our economy,  security, and every-day life, the transportation system is considered a  critical infrastructure. The USA PATRIOT Act defines critical infrastructure  as those “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the  United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets  would have a debilitating impact on security, national economy security,  national public health or safety, or combination of those matters.”   In the  National Strategy for Homeland Security, the administration identifies the  transportation system as one of the 13 critical infrastructure sectors that  must be protected. The administration’s National Strategy for the Physical  Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets defines the  administration’s plan for protecting our critical infrastructures and key  assets, including the transportation system, from terrorist attacks. This  strategy also outlines the guiding principles that will underpin the nation's  efforts to secure the infrastructures vital to national security, governance,  the economy and public confidence. The strategy is designed to serve as a  foundation for building and fostering the necessary cooperation between  government, private industry and citizens in protecting critical  infrastructures.
Private industry, state and local governments, and the federal government  all have roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation system.  Private industry owns and operates a large share of the transportation  system. For example, almost 2,000 pipeline companies and 571 railroad  companies own and operate the pipeline and freight railroad systems,  respectively. Additionally, 83 passenger air carriers and 640,000 interstate  motor coach and motor carrier companies operate in the United States.  State and local governments also own significant portions of the highways,  transit systems, and airports in the country. For example, state and local  governments own over 90 percent of the total mileage of highways. State  and local governments also administer and implement regulations for  different sectors of the transportation system and provide protective and  emergency response services through various agencies. Although the  federal government owns a limited share of the transportation system, it  issues regulations, establishes policies, provides funding, and/or sets  standards for the different modes of transportation. The federal  government uses a variety of policy tools, including grants, loan  guarantees, tax incentives, regulations, and partnerships, to motivate or  mandate state and local governments or the private sector to help address  security concerns.
Prior to September 11, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in  transportation security matters. However, in response to the attacks on  September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security  Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary  responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act  also gives TSA regulatory authority over all transportation modes. Since its  creation in November 2001, TSA has focused primarily on meeting the  aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. With the passage of the  Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20  other agencies, was transferred to the new Department of Homeland  Security (DHS).
Throughout the world, all modes of transportation have been targets of  terrorist attacks. For example, aviation has long been an attractive target  for terrorists. Aircraft hijackings became a regular occurrence in the 1970s,  leading to the first efforts in aviation security. In 1988, a Pan Am flight was  bombed over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 on board. In 1995, a plot to  bomb as many as 11 U.S. airliners was discovered. Most recently, U.S.  aircraft were hijacked on September 11, 2001, and crashed into the World  Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a  field in Pennsylvania, killing about 3,000 people and destroying billions of  dollars’ worth of property.
Public surface transportation systems have also been a common target for  terrorist attacks around the world. For example, the first large-scale  terrorist use of a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 on the Tokyo subway  system. In this attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a subway  train, killing 11 people and injuring 5,500. According to the Mineta  Transportation Institute, surface transportation systems were the target of  more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through 2000.
section_title: The Transportation System as a Whole Faces Numerous Challenges
paragraphs: The United States maintains the world’s largest and most complex national  transportation system. Improving the security of such a system is fraught  with challenges for both public and private entities. To provide safe  transportation for the nation, these entities must overcome issues common  to all modes of transportation as well as issues specific to the individual  modes of transportation.
subsections: section_title: All Modes of Transportation Face Common Challenges
paragraphs: Although each mode of transportation is unique, they all face some  common challenges in trying to enhance security. Common challenges  stem from the extensiveness of the transportation system, the  interconnectivity of the system, funding security improvements, and the  number of stakeholders involved in transportation security.
subsections: section_title: Size and Diversity of Transportation Modes Create Security Challenges
paragraphs: The size of the transportation system makes it difficult to adequately  secure. The transportation system’s extensive infrastructure crisscrosses  the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers  and tons of freight each day. (See fig. 1 for maps of the different  transportation modes.) The extensiveness of the infrastructure as well as  the sheer volume of freight and passengers moved through the system  creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. Furthermore, as  industry representatives and transportation security experts repeatedly  noted, the extensiveness of the infrastructure makes it impossible to  equally protect all assets.
Protecting transportation assets from attack is made more difficult because  of the tremendous variety of transportation operators. Some are  multibillion-dollar enterprises, while others have very limited facilities and  very little traffic. Some are public agencies, such as state departments of  transportation, while some are private businesses. The type of freight  moved through the different modes is similarly varied. For example, the  maritime, motor carrier, and rail operators haul freight as diverse as dry  bulk (grain) and hazardous materials. Additionally, some transportation  operators carry passengers while others haul freight.
section_title: Interconnectivity and Interdependency Also Present Challenges
paragraphs: Additional challenges are created by the interconnectivity and  interdependency among the transportation modes and between the  transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The  transportation system is interconnected or intermodal because passengers  and freight can use multiple modes of transportation to reach a destination.  For example, from its point of origin to its destination, a piece of freight,  such as a shipping container, can move from ship to train to truck. (See fig.  2.) The interconnective nature of the transportation system creates several  security challenges. First, events directed at one mode of transportation  can have ripple effects throughout the entire system. For example, when  the port workers in California, Oregon, and Washington went on strike in  2002, the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by almost 30 percent  during the first week of the strike, compared with the year before. Second,  the interconnecting modes can contaminate each other—that is, if a  particular mode experiences a security breach, the breach could affect  other modes. An example of this would be if a shipping container that held  a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a U.S. port where it was placed on  a truck or train. In this case, although the original security breach occurred  in the port, the rail or trucking industry would be affected as well. Thus,  even if operators within one mode established high levels of security they  could be affected because of the security efforts, or lack thereof, of the  other modes. Third, intermodal facilities where a number of modes connect  and interact—such as ports—are potential targets for attack because of the  presence of passenger, freight, employees, and equipment at these  facilities. (See fig. 3.)
Interdependencies also exist between transportation and nearly every  other sector of the economy. Consequently, an event that affects the  transportation sector can have serious impacts on other industries. For  example, when the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the rail  industry stated that it restricted the movement of many hazardous  materials, including chlorine, because of a heightened threat of a terrorist  attack. However, within days, many major water treatment facilities  reported that they were running out of chlorine, which they use to treat  drinking water, and would have to shut down operations if chlorine  deliveries were not immediately resumed. Additionally, the transportation  system can be affected by other sectors. For example, representatives of  the motor coach industry told us that the drop in the tourism industry has  negatively affected motor coach profits.
section_title: The Number of Stakeholders Creates Challenges
paragraphs: Securing the transportation system is made more difficult because of the  number of stakeholders involved. As illustrated in figure 4, numerous  entities at the federal, state, and local levels, including over 20 federal  entities and thousands of private sector businesses, play a key role in  transportation security. For example, the Departments of Energy,  Transportation, and Homeland Security, state governments, and about  2,000 pipeline operators are all responsible for securing the pipeline  system. The number of stakeholders involved in transportation security  can lead to communication challenges, duplication, and conflicting  guidance. Representatives from several state and local government and  industry associations told us that their members are receiving different  messages from the various federal agencies involved in transportation  security. For instance, one industry representative noted that both TSA and  DOT asked the industry to implement additional security measures when  the nation’s threat condition was elevated to orange at the beginning of the  Iraq War; however, TSA and DOT were not consistent in what they wanted  done—that is, they were asking for different security measures. Moreover,  many representatives commented that the federal government needs to  better coordinate its security efforts. These representatives noted that  dealing with multiple agencies on the same issues and topics is frustrating  and time consuming for the transportation sector.
The number of stakeholders also makes it difficult to achieve the needed  cooperation and consensus to move forward with security efforts. As we  have noted in past reports, coordination and consensus-building is critical  to successful implementation of security efforts. Transportation  stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or interests, which can make  consensus-building challenging. For example, from a safety perspective,  vehicles that carry hazardous materials should be required to have placards  that identify the contents of a vehicle so that emergency personnel know  how best to respond to an incident. However, from a security perspective,  identifying placards on vehicles that carry hazardous materials make them  a potential target for attack.
section_title: Funding Is A Key Challenge
paragraphs: According to transportation security experts and state and local  government and industry representatives we contacted, funding is the most  pressing challenge to securing the nation’s transportation system. While  some security improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trash cans  from subway platforms, most require substantial funding. Additionally,  given the large number of assets to protect, the sum of even relatively less  expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. For example, reinforcing  shipping containers to make them more blast resistant is one way to  improve security, which would cost about $15,000 per container. With  several million shipping containers in use, however, this tactic would cost  billions of dollars if all of them were reinforced. The total cost of enhancing  the security of the entire transportation system is unknown; however, given  the size of the system, it could amount to tens of billions of dollars. The  magnitude of the potential cost is illustrated by several examples:  The President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request for TSA includes about  $4.5 billion for aviation security. According to TSA, this funding will be  used for security screeners, air marshals, aviation related research and  development, and surveillance detection techniques, among other  things.
The total estimated cost of the identified security improvements at eight  mass transit agencies we visited was about $711 million.
The Coast Guard estimates the cost of implementing the new  International Maritime Organization security code and the security  provisions in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 to be  approximately $1.5 billion for the first year and $7.4 billion over the  succeeding decade.
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation  Officials (AASHTO) estimates that enhancing highway and transit  security will cost $2 billion annually in capital costs and $1 billion in  operating costs.
The current economic environment makes this a difficult time for the  private industry or state and local governments to make security  investments. According to industry representatives and experts we  contacted, most of the transportation industry operates on a very thin  profit margin, making it difficult to pay for additional security measures.  The sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry’s  financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. For example,  airlines are in the worst fiscal crisis in their history and several have filed  for bankruptcy. Similarly, the motor coach and motor carrier industries and  Amtrak report decreased revenues because of the slow economy. In  addition, nearly every state and local government are facing a large budget  deficit for fiscal year 2004. For example, the National Governors  Association estimates that states are facing a total budget shortfall of $80  billion this upcoming year. Given the tight budget environment, state and  local governments and transportation operators must make difficult trade- offs between transportation security investments and other needs, such as  service expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the National  Association of Counties, many local governments are planning to defer  some maintenance of their transportation infrastructure to pay for some  security enhancements.
Further exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements is the  additional costs the transportation sector incurs when the federal  government elevates the national threat condition. Industry representatives  stated that operators tighten security, such as increasing security patrols,  when the national threat condition is raised or intelligence information  suggests an increased threat against their mode. However, these  representatives stated that these additional measures drain resources and  are not sustainable. For example, Amtrak estimates that it spends an  additional $500,000 per month for police overtime when the national threat  condition is increased. Transportation industry representatives also noted  that employees are diverted from their regular duties to implement  additional security measures, such as guarding entranceways, in times of  increased security, which hurts productivity.
The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation  security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional  amounts made available. For example, Congress appropriated a total of  $241 million for grants for ports, motor carriers, and Operation Safe  Commerce in 2002. However, as table 1 shows, the grant applications  received by TSA for these security grants totaled $1.8 billion—7 times more  than the amount available. Due to the costs of security enhancements and  the transportation industries’ and state and local governments’ tight budget  environments, the federal government is likely to be viewed as a source of  funding for at least some of these enhancements. However, given the  constraints on the federal budget as well as competing claims for federal  assistance, requests for federal funding for transportation security  enhancements will likely continue to exceed available resources.
Another challenge is balancing the potential economic impacts of security  enhancements with the benefits of such measures. While there is broad  support for greater security, this task is a difficult one because the nation  relies heavily on a free and expeditious flow of goods. Particularly with  “just in time” deliveries, which require a smooth and expeditious flow  through the transportation system, delays or disruptions in the supply  chain could have serious economic impacts. As the Coast Guard  Commandant stated about the flow of goods through ports, “even slowing  the flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant  random selection of imports would be economically intolerable.”
Furthermore, security measures may have economic and competitive  ramifications for individual modes of transportation. For instance, if the  federal government imposed a particular security requirement on the rail  industry and not on the motor carrier industry, the rail industry might incur  additional costs and/or lose customers to the motor carrier industry.  Striking the right balance between increasing security and protecting  economic vitality of the national economy and individual modes will  remain an important and difficult task.
section_title: Individual Transportation Modes Also Confront Unique Challenges
paragraphs: In addition to the overarching challenges that transportation stakeholders  will face in attempting to improve transportation security, they also face a  number of challenges specific to the aviation, maritime, and land  transportation modes. Although aviation security has received a significant  amount of attention and funding since September 11, more work is needed.  In general, transportation security experts believe that the aviation system  is more secure today than it was prior to September 11. However, aviation  experts and TSA officials noted significant vulnerabilities remain,  including:   Perimeter security: Terrorists could launch attacks, such as launching  shoulder-fired missiles, from a location just outside an airport’s  perimeter. Since September 11, airport operators have increased their  patrols of airport perimeter areas, but industry officials state that they  do not have enough resources to completely protect against these  attacks.
Air cargo security: Although TSA has focused much effort and funding  on ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto  planes by passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing  the cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft.  For example, employees of shippers and freight forwarders are not  universally subject to a background check. Theft is also a major problem  in air cargo shipping, signifying that unauthorized personnel may still be  gaining access to air cargo shipments. Air cargo shipments pass through  several hands in going from sender to recipient, making it challenging to  implement a system that provides adequate security for air cargo.  According to TSA officials, TSA is developing a strategic plan to address  air cargo security and has undertaken a comprehensive outreach  process to strengthen security programs across the industry.
General aviation security: While TSA has taken several actions  related to general aviation since September 11, this segment of the  industry remains potentially more vulnerable than commercial aviation.  For example, general aviation pilots are not screened prior to taking off  and the contents of a plane are not examined at any point. According to  TSA, solutions that can be implemented relatively easily at the nation’s  commercial airports are not practical at the 19,000 general aviation  airports. It would be very difficult to prevent a general aviation pilot  who is intent on committing a terrorist attack with his or her aircraft  from doing so. The vulnerability of the system was illustrated in January  2002, when a Florida teenage flight student crashed his single-engine  airplane into a Tampa skyscraper. TSA is working with the appropriate  stakeholders to close potential security gaps and to raise the security  standards across this diverse segment of the aviation industry.
Maritime and land transportation systems have their own unique security  vulnerabilities. For example, maritime and land transportation systems  generally have an open design, meaning the users can access the system at  multiple points. The systems are open by design so that they are accessible  and convenient for users. In contrast, the aviation system is housed in  closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of the  maritime and land transportation systems can leave them vulnerable  because transportation operators cannot monitor or control who enters or  leaves the systems. However, adding security measures that restrict the  flow of passengers or freight through the systems could have serious  consequences for commerce and the public.
Individual maritime and land transportation modes also have unique  challenges and vulnerabilities. For example, representatives from the  motor carrier industry noted that the high turnover rate (about 40 to 60  percent) of drivers means that motor carrier operators must be continually  conducting background checks on new drivers, which is expensive and  time consuming. Additionally, representatives from the motor coach  industry commented that the number of used motor coaches on the market  coupled with the lack of guidance or requirements on buying or selling  these vehicles is a serious vulnerability. In particular, there are  approximately 5,000 used motor coaches on the market; however, there is  very little information on who is selling and buying them, nor is there any  consistency among motor coach operators in whether they remove their  logos from the vehicles before they are sold. These vehicles could be used  as a weapon or to transport a weapon. Federal Motor Carrier Safety  Administration officials told us they have not issued guidance to the  industry on this potential vulnerability because TSA is responsible for  security and therefore would be responsible for issuing such guidance.
section_title: Transportation Operators and State and Local Governments Have Taken Steps to Improve Security
paragraphs: Since September 11, transportation operators and state and local  governments have been working to strengthen security, according to  associations we contacted. Although security was a priority before  September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of  transportation security for transportation operators and state and local  governments. The industry has been consistently operating at a heightened  state of security since September 11. State and local governments have also  made transportation security investments since September 11.
subsections: section_title: Transportation Operators Have Undertaken a Variety of Security-Enhancing Actions
paragraphs: According to representatives from a number of industry associations we  interviewed, transportation operators have implemented new security  measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities.  Some of the most common measures cited include:  Conducted vulnerability or risk assessments: Many transportation  operators conducted assessments of their systems to identify potential  vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure or assets, and corrective actions or  needed security improvements. For example, the railroad industry  conducted a risk assessment, that identified over 1,300 critical assets  and served as a foundation for the industry’s security plan.
Tightened access control: Many transportation operators have  tightened access control to their facilities and equipment by installing  fences and requiring employees to display identification cards, among  other things. For example, some motor carrier operators have installed  fences around truck yards and locked inventory at night.
Intensified security presence: Some transportation operators have  increased the number of police or security who patrol their systems. For  example, transit agencies have placed surveillance equipment, alarms,  or security personnel at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and  other nonpublic places and required employees to wear brightly colored  vests for increased visibility.
Increased emergency drills: Many transportation operators have  increased the frequency of emergency drills. For example, Amtrak  reported that it has conducted two full-scale emergency drills in New  York City and is currently trying to arrange a drill at Union Station in  Washington, D.C. The purpose of emergency drilling is to test  emergency plans, identify problems, and develop corrective actions.  Figure 5 is a photograph from an annual emergency drill conducted by  the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
Developed or revised security plans: Transportation operators  developed security plans or reviewed existing plans to determine, what  changes, if any, needed to be made. For example, DOT’s Office of  Pipeline Safety worked with the industry to develop performance  oriented security guidance. The Office of Pipeline Safety also  encouraged all pipeline operators to develop security plans and directed  operators with critical facilities to develop security plans for these  facilities.
Provided additional training: Many transportation operators have  either participated in and/or conducted additional training on security  or antiterrorism. For example, the United Motorcoach Association is  developing an online security training program for motor coach  operators, using funds from the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program.  Similarly, many transit agencies attended seminars conducted by FTA or  by the American Public Transportation Association.
Some transportation industries have also implemented more innovative  security measures, according to associations we contacted. For example,  the natural gas industry modeled the impact of pipeline outages on the  natural gas supply in the Northeast, which helped to identify vulnerabilities  and needed improvements. The motor carrier industry developed a  program called the Highway Watch Program, supported by the American  Trucking Associations. The program is a driver-led, state-organized safety  system that since September 11 has included a security component.  Specifically, drivers are provided terrorism awareness training and are  encouraged to report suspicious activities they witness on the road to a  Highway Watch Program call center, which is operated 24 hours a day, 7  days a week. The call center then directs the call to appropriate authorities.
section_title: State and Local Governments Have Also Increased Security-Related Efforts
paragraphs: As we have previously reported, state and local governments are critical  stakeholders in the nation’s homeland security efforts. This is equally true  in securing the nation’s transportation system. State and local governments  play a critical role, in part, because they own a significant portion of the  transportation infrastructure, such as airports, transit systems, highways,  and ports. For example, state and local governments own over 90 percent  of the total mileage of the highway system. Even when state and local  governments are not the owners or operators, they nonetheless are directly  affected by the transportation modes that run through their jurisdictions.  Consequently, the responsibility for protecting this infrastructure and  responding to emergencies involving the transportation infrastructure  often falls to state and local governments.
Security efforts of local and state governments have included developing  counter terrorist plans, participating in training and security-related  research, participating in transportation operators’ emergency drills and  table-top exercises, conducting vulnerability assessments of transportation  assets, and participating in emergency planning sessions with  transportation operators. Some state and local governments have also  hired additional law enforcement personnel to patrol transportation assets.  Much of the funding for these efforts has been covered by the state and  local governments, with a bulk of the expenses going to personnel costs,  such as additional law enforcement officers and overtime.
section_title: Congress and Federal Agencies Have Taken Numerous Actions to Enhance Security, but Roles Remain Unclear
paragraphs: The Congress, DOT, TSA, and other federal agencies, took numerous steps  to enhance transportation security since September 11. The roles of the  federal agencies in securing the nation’s transportation system, however,  are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary responsibility for  the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11,  Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the security of all  modes of transportation. However, DOT and TSA have not yet formally  defined their roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of  transportation. Furthermore, TSA is moving forward with plans to enhance  transportation security. For example, TSA plans to issue security standards  for all modes. DOT modal administrations are also continuing their security  efforts for different modes of transportation.
subsections: section_title: Congress and Federal Agencies Have Acted to Enhance Transportation Security
paragraphs: Congress has acted to enhance the security of the nation’s transportation  system since September 11. In addition to passing the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Congress passed numerous pieces of  legislation aimed at improving transportation security. For example,  Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which mandates federal  background checks of individuals operating vehicles carrying hazardous  materials and the Homeland Security Act, which created DHS and moved  TSA to the new department. Congress also provided funding for  transportation security enhancements through various appropriations acts.
For example, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, in part, provided  (1) $738 million for the installation of explosives detection systems in  commercial service airports, (2) $125 million for port security activities,  and (3) $15 million to enhance the security of intercity bus operations. (See  app. IV for a listing of the key pieces of transportation security-related  legislation that has been passed since September 11.)
Federal agencies, notably TSA and DOT, have also taken steps to enhance  transportation security since September 11. In its first year of existence,  TSA worked to establish its organization and focused primarily on meeting  the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. In January 2002, TSA  had 13 employees to tackle securing the nation’s transportation system—1  year later, TSA had about 65,000 employees. TSA reports that it met over 30  deadlines during 2002 to improve aviation security, including two of its  most significant deadlines—to deploy federal passenger screeners at  airports across the nation by November 19, 2002, and to screen every piece  of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2002.   According to  TSA, other completed TSA activities included the following:   recruiting, hiring, training, and deploying about 56,000 federal screeners.  awarding grants for port security; and  implementing performance management system and strategic planning  activities to create a results-oriented culture.
As TSA worked to establish itself and improve the security of the aviation  system, DOT modal administrations acted to enhance security of air, land,  and maritime transportation. As table 2 shows, the actions taken by DOT  modal administrations varied. For example, FTA launched a multipart  initiative for mass transit agencies, which provided grants for emergency  drills, offered free security training, conducted security assessments at 36  transit agencies, provided technical assistance, and invested in research  and development. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration  developed three courses for motor coach drivers. The response of various  DOT modal agencies to the threat of terrorist attacks on the transportation  system has varied due to differences in authority and resource limitations.
In addition to TSA and DOT modal administrations, other federal agencies  have also taken actions to improve security. For example, the Bureau of  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), previously known as the U.S.  Customs Service, has played a key role in improving port security. Since  September 11, the agency has launched a number of initiatives to  strengthen the security of the U.S. border, including ports. The initiatives  are part of a multilayered approach, which rely on partnerships between  foreign nations and the U.S. to identify problems at their source,  cooperation from the global trade community to secure the flow of goods,  and collaboration between federal, state, and local law enforcement and  intelligence agencies to ensure that information is analyzed and used to  target scarce resources on the highest risk issues. Some of the specific  initiatives that CBP has implemented to interdict high risk cargo before it  reaches the U.S. include the following:  Developing and deploying of a strategy for the detection of nuclear and  radiological weapons and materials. The elements of this strategy— equipment, training, and intelligence—are focused on providing  inspectors with the tools to detect weapons of mass destruction in cargo  containers and vehicles. In the maritime environment, this includes the  deployment of radiation portal monitors, personal radiation detectors,  large-scale nonintrusive inspection technology, such as truck and  container x-rays and mobile x-ray vans. Much of the development of this  equipment has been done in partnership with the Department of Energy.  Figure 6 shows new mobile gamma ray imaging devices at ports to help  inspectors examine the contents of cargo containers and vehicles.
Establishing the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C- TPAT), which is a joint government business initiative aimed at securing  the supply chain of global trade against terrorist exploitation. According  to CBP, this initiative has leveraged the cooperation of the owners of the  global supply chain by working with this community to implement and  share standard security best practices.   The members of C-TPAT include  importing businesses, freight forwarders, carriers, and U.S. port  authorities and terminal operators. According to CBP, C-TPAT members  bring 96 percent of all containers coming into the U.S. After the initial  application and training phase of this program, CBP conducts foreign  and domestic validations to verify that the supply chain security  measures contained in C-TPAT participants’ security profiles are  reliable, accurate, and effective. C-TPAT members are strongly  encouraged to self-police such areas as personnel screening, physical  security procedures and personnel, and the security of service  providers.
Launching the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which is designed  specifically to secure the ocean-going sea container. The key elements  of CSI include using advance information to identify high-risk  containers; inspecting containers identified through the prescreening  process as high-risk before they are shipped to the U.S.; using detection  technology to quickly inspect containers identified as high-risk; and  developing and using smarter, more secure containers. According to  CBP, the U.S. has signed agreements with 18 of the countries with the  world’s largest seaports, which allows for the deployment of U.S.  inspectors and equipment to these foreign seaports, and is beginning the  expansion of CSI to other global ports with significant volume or  strategic locations.
section_title: TSA Moves Forward as Its Role in Transportation Security Evolves
paragraphs: TSA is moving forward with efforts to secure the entire transportation  system. TSA has adopted a systems approach—that is, a holistic rather  than a modal approach—to securing the transportation approach. In  addition, TSA is using risk management principles to guide its decision- making. To help TSA make risk-based decisions, TSA is developing  standardized criticality, threat, and vulnerability assessment tools. TSA is  also planning to establish security standards for all modes of transportation  and is launching a number of new security efforts for the maritime and land  transportation modes.
subsections: section_title: TSA Adopts a Systems Approach to Securing All Modes of Transportation
paragraphs: TSA is taking a systems approach to securing the transportation system.  Using this approach, TSA plans to address the security of the entire  transportation system as a whole, rather than focusing on individual modes  of transportation. According to TSA officials, using a systems approach to  security is appropriate for several reasons. First, the transportation system  is intermodal, interdependent, and international. Given the intermodalism  of the system, incidents in one mode of transportation could affect other  modes. Second, it is important not to drive terrorism from one mode of  transportation to another mode because of perceived lesser security—that  is, make a mode of transportation a more attractive target because another  mode is “hardened” with additional security measures. Third, it is  important that security measures for one mode of transportation are not  overly stringent or too economically challenging compared with others.  Fourth, it is important that the attention on one aspect of transportation  security (e.g., cargo, infrastructure, or passengers) does not leave the other  aspects vulnerable.
The systems approach is reflected in the organizational structure of TSA’s  Office of Maritime and Land Security, which is responsible for the security  of the maritime and land modes of transportation. Rather than organize  around the different modes of transportation, such as DOT’s modal  administrations, the office is organized around cross-modal issues. As  figure 7 shows, the Office of Maritime and Land Security has six divisions,  including Cargo Security and Passenger Security. The director of each  division will be responsible for a specific aspect of security of multiple  modes. For example, the Director of Cargo Security will be responsible for  cargo security for all surface modes of transportation.
TSA has adopted a risk management approach for its efforts to enhance the  security of the nation’s transportation system. A risk management  approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the  criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key decisions  in order to link resources with prioritized efforts. Table 3 describes this  approach. As figure 8 illustrates, the highest priorities emerge where the  three elements of risk management overlap. For example, transportation  infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack,  and a likely target would be at most risk and therefore would be a higher  priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable  to attack. According to TSA officials, risk management principles will drive  all decisions—from standard setting to funding priorities to staffing.
Using risk management principles to guide decision-making is a good  strategy, given the difficult trade-offs TSA will likely have to make as it  moves forward with its security efforts. We have advocated using a risk  management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better  prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite  national resources to areas of highest priority. As representatives from  local government and industry associations and transportation security  experts repeatedly noted, the size of the transportation system precludes  all assets from being equally protected; moreover, the risks vary by  transportation assets within modes and by modes. In addition, requests for  funding for transportation security enhancements will likely exceed  available resources. Risk management principles can help TSA determine  security priorities and identify appropriate solutions.
Other transportation stakeholders are also using risk management  principles. For example, the rail industry conducted a comprehensive risk  analysis of its infrastructure, which included an assessment of threats,  vulnerabilities, and criticality. The results of the risk analysis formed the  basis for the rail industry’s security management plan, which identified  countermeasures for the different threat levels. Similarly, the pipeline  industry is using a risk management approach in securing its infrastructure.  The Office of Pipeline Safety and industry associations noted that the  pipeline industry had adopted a risk management approach for safety prior  to September 11. As a result, the industry extended this approach to its  security efforts after September 11.
TSA Is Developing Standard Assessment Tools to Help Make Risk- Based Decisions To help TSA make risk based decisions, TSA’s Office of Threat Assessment  and Risk Management is developing two assessment tools that will help  assess threats, criticality, and vulnerabilities. The first tool will assess the  criticality of a transportation asset or facility. TSA is working with DHS’  Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate to  ensure that TSA’s criticality tool will be consistent with the IAIP’s approach  for managing critical infrastructure. TSA’s criticality tool will incorporate  multiple factors, such as fatalities, economic importance, and socio- political importance, to arrive at a criticality score. The score will enable  TSA, in conjunction with transportation stakeholders, to rank assets and  facilities within each mode. According to TSA, by identifying and  prioritizing assets and facilities, TSA can focus resources on that which is  deemed most important.
The second tool is referred to as the Transportation Risk Assessment and  Vulnerability Evaluation Tool (TRAVEL). This tool will assess threats and  analyze vulnerabilities for all transportation modes. According to TSA  officials, TSA has worked with a number of organizations in developing  TRAVEL, including the Department of Defense, Sandia National  Laboratories, and AASHTO. TSA is also working with economists on  developing the benefit/cost component of this model. TSA officials believe  that a standard threat and vulnerability assessment tool is needed so that  TSA can identify and compare threats and vulnerabilities across the modes.  If different methodologies are used in assessing the threats and  vulnerabilities, comparisons can be problematic. A standard assessment  tool would ensure consistent methodology. Using TRAVEL, TSA plans to  gather comparable threat and vulnerability information across all modes of  transportation, which would inform TSA’s risk-based decision-making.
section_title: TSA Plans to Issue National Security Standards
paragraphs: TSA plans to issue national security standards for all modes of  transportation. The federal government has historically set security  standards for the aviation sector. For instance, prior to the passage of  ATSA, FAA set security standards that the airlines were required to follow  in several areas including screening equipment, screener qualifications, and  access control systems. In contrast, prior to the September 11 attacks,  limited statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure the  security of the maritime and land transportation systems. According to a  TSA report, the existing regulatory framework leaves the maritime and  land transportation systems unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack.  For example, the rail, transit, and motor coach transportation systems are  subject to no mandatory security requirements, resulting in little or no  screening of passengers, baggage, or crew. Additionally, seaborne  passenger vessel and seaport terminal operators have inconsistent levels  and methods of screening, and are largely free to set their own rules about  the hiring and training of security personnel. Hence, TSA will set standards  to ensure consistency among modes and across the transportation system  and to reduce the transportation system’s vulnerability to attacks. TSA  plans to begin rolling out the standards starting summer 2003.
According to TSA officials and documents, TSA’s standards will be  performance-, risk-, and threat-based, and mandatory. More specifically:  Standards will be performance-based. Rather than prescriptive  standards, TSA standards will be performance-based, which will allow  transportation operators to determine how best to achieve the desired  level of security. TSA officials believe that performance-based standards  provide for operator flexibility, allow for operators to use their  professional judgment in enhancing security, and encourage technology  advancement.
Standards will be risk-based. Standards will be set for areas for  which assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate  that an attack would have a national impact. A number of factors could  be considered in determining “national impact,” such as fatalities and  economic damage.
Standards will be threat-based. The standards will be tied to the  national threat condition and/or local threats. As the threat condition  escalates, the standards will require transportation operators to  implement additional countermeasures.
Standards may be mandatory. The standards will be mandatory when  the risk level is too high or unacceptable. TSA officials stated that in  these cases, mandatory standards are needed to ensure accountability.  In addition, according to TSA officials, voluntary requirements put  security-conscious transportation operators that implement security  measures at a competitive disadvantage—that is, they have spent money  that their competitors may have not spent. This creates a disincentive  for transportation operators to implement voluntary requirements. TSA  officials believe that mandatory standards will reduce this problem. In  determining whether mandatory standards are needed, TSA will review  the results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best  practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with  the private sector and other government agencies.
Although TSA officials expect some level of resistance to the standards by  the transportation industry, they believe that their approach of using risk-,  threat-, and performance-based standards will increase the acceptance of  the standards. For example, performance-based standards allow for more  operator flexibility in implementing the standards, compared with rigid,  prescriptive standards. Moreover, TSA plans to issue only a limited number  of standards—that is, standards will be issued only when assessments of  the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that the level of risk is  too high or unacceptable.
TSA also expects some level of resistance to the standards from DOT  modal administrations. Although TSA will establish the security standards,  TSA expects that they will be administered and implemented by existing  agencies and organizations. DOT modal administrations may be reluctant  to assume this role because it could alter their relationships with the  industry. Historically, DOT surface transportation modal administrations’  missions have largely focused on maintaining operations and improving  service and safety, not regulating security. Moreover, the authority to  regulate security varies by DOT modal administration. For example, FTA  has limited authority to regulate and oversee security at transit agencies. In  contrast, FRA has regulatory authority for rail security, and DOT’s Office of  Pipeline Safety has responsibility for writing safety and security regulations  on liquefied natural gas storage facilities. In addition, DOT modal  administrations may be reluctant to administer and implement standards  because of resource concerns. FHWA officials commented that, given the  current uncertainty about the standards and their impacts, FHWA is  reluctant to commit, in advance, to staff or funding to enforce new security  standards.
Because transportation stakeholders will be involved in administering,  implementing, and/or enforcing TSA standards, stakeholder buy-in is  critical to the success of this initiative. Compromise and consensus on the  part of stakeholders is also necessary. However, achieving such consensus  and compromise may be difficult, given the conflicts between some  stakeholders’ goals and interests.
Stakeholders Are Concerned About Pending Standards Transportation stakeholders expressed concerns about TSA’s plan to issue  mandatory security standards for all modes of transportation. A common  concern raised by associations was that standards represent unfunded  mandates, unless the federal government pays for the standards that it  promulgates. According to the industry and state and local government  associations we spoke to, unfunded mandates create additional financial  burdens for transportation operators, who are already experiencing  financial difficulties. TSA officials said they hope to provide grants to  implement the standards; however, it is unclear at this time if grants will be  available.
Another common concern expressed by transportation security experts  and industry associations is that TSA does not have the necessary expertise  or knowledge to develop appropriate security standards for the industry. In  a 2003 report to Congress, TSA recognizes that each transportation mode  has unique characteristics that make various security measures more or  less feasible or appropriate. However, a number of industry associations,  transportation security experts, and DOT modal administrations expressed  concern that TSA does not have a good understanding of the unique  challenges of the modes, such as the need to maintain accessibility in  transit systems, or the possible negative ramifications—both operationally  and financially—of standards. Officials from one DOT modal  administration noted that industry representatives left a meeting with TSA  officials with serious concerns regarding TSA officials’ understanding of  their industry. Senior TSA officials stated that TSA employees have  extensive subject matter expertise in transportation and security issues.  Moreover, TSA officials stated that they will draw on the expertise and  knowledge of the transportation industry and other DHS agencies, such as  the Coast Guard, as well as all stakeholders in developing the standards.
A number of representatives from industry associations also expressed  concerns that TSA may issue mandatory or regulatory standards, especially  since their industries have taken proactive steps to enhance security since  September 11. Industry associations also noted that the majority of  transportation infrastructure in some modes is privately owned. As such,  transportation operators have an economic incentive to ensure the security  of their infrastructure; hence, operators are voluntarily implementing  increased security measures. For example, the pipeline industry worked  with DOT’s Office of Pipeline Safety to develop industry-wide security  guidelines. These guidelines are risk-based and identify countermeasures  that pipeline operators should implement at different threat levels. The  pipeline guidelines are also voluntary. According to pipeline industry  associations, the pipeline industry is implementing these security  guidelines. Representatives from industry associations stated that TSA  should wait to see if industry-developed, voluntary measures are working  before issuing mandatory standards. TSA officials noted that TSA will  review the results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best  practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the  private sector and other government agencies before issuing mandatory  standards.
Finally, industry representatives expressed concern that TSA has not  adequately included the transportation industry in its development of  standards. Many industry representatives and some DOT officials we met  with were unsure of whether TSA was issuing standards, what the  standards would entail, or the time frames for issuing the standards. The  uncertainty about the pending standards can lead to confusion and/or  inaction. For example, Amtrak officials noted that they are reluctant to  spend money to implement certain security measures because they are  worried that TSA will subsequently issue standards that will require  Amtrak to redo its efforts. TSA officials repeatedly told us they understand  the importance of gaining stakeholder buy-in and partnering with the  industry. They also stated that they have conducted outreach to  transportation stakeholders and plan to continue their outreach efforts in  the future. TSA is developing a strategy that will serve as its framework for  communicating with transportation stakeholders and obtaining  stakeholders’ input in TSA’s decision-making. TSA plans to finalize this  strategy in July 2003.
section_title: TSA Is Launching Other Security Initiatives
paragraphs: TSA is also working on a number of additional security efforts, such as  establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC)  program, developing the next generation of the Computer Assisted  Passenger Pre-Screening System, developing a national transportation  system security plan, and exploring methods to integrate operations and  security, among other things. The TWIC program is intended to improve  access control for the 12 million transportation workers that require  unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas of the nation’s  transportation modes by establishing a uniform, nationwide standard for  secure identification of transportation workers. Specifically, TWIC will  combine standard background checks and biometrics so that a worker can  be positively matched to his/her credential. Once the program is fully  operational, the TWIC would be the standard credential for transportation  workers and would be accepted by all modes of transportation. According  to TSA, developing a uniform, nationwide standard for identification will  minimize redundant credentialing and background checks.
section_title: DOT Modal Agencies Are Continuing Forward with Their Security Efforts
paragraphs: As TSA moves forward with new security initiatives, DOT modal  administrations are also continuing their security efforts and, in some  cases, launching new security initiatives. For example, FHWA is  coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and  preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies.  FTA also has a number of current initiatives under way in the areas of  public awareness, research, training, technical assistance, and intelligence  sharing. For example, FTA developed a list of the top 20 security actions  transit agencies should implement and is currently working with transit  agencies to assist them in implementing these measures. FTA’s goal is to  have the largest 30 agencies implement at least 80 percent of these  measures by the end of fiscal year 2003.
FAA is also continuing its efforts to enhance cyber security in the aviation  system. Although the primary responsibility for securing the aviation  system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for protecting the  nation’s air traffic control system—both the physical security of its air  traffic control facilities and the computer systems. The air traffic control  system’s computers help the nation’s air traffic controllers safely direct and  separate traffic—sabotaging this system could have disastrous  consequences. FAA is moving forward with efforts to increase the physical  security of its air traffic control facilities and ensure that contractors who  have access to the air traffic control system undergo background checks.
section_title: TSA’s and DOT’s Roles and Responsibilities Have Not Been Clearly Defined
paragraphs: The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security  have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for  duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with their  security efforts. DOT modal administrations were primarily responsible for  the security of the transportation system prior to September 11. In  November 2001, Congress passed ATSA, which created TSA and gave it  primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation. However,  during TSA’s first year of existence, TSA’s main focus was on aviation  security—more specifically, on meeting ATSA deadlines. While TSA was  primarily focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations  launched various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and  land transportation modes. With the immediate crisis of meeting many  aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more on  the security of all modes of transportation.
Legislation has not defined TSA’s role and responsibilities in securing all  modes of transportation. In particular, ATSA does not specify TSA’s role  and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation  modes in detail as it does for aviation security. For instance, the act does  not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain transit security  requirements. Instead, the act simply states that TSA is responsible for  ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act also did not  eliminate DOT modal administrations’ existing statutory responsibilities  for securing the different transportation modes. Moreover, recent  legislation indicates that DOT still has security responsibilities. In  particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of  Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of rail  and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes.
To clarify their roles and responsibilities in transportation security, DOT  modal administrations and TSA were planning to develop memorandums of  agreement. The purpose of these documents was to define the roles and  responsibilities of the different agencies as they relate to transportation  security and address a variety of issues, including separating safety and  security activities, interfacing with the transportation industry, and  establishing funding priorities. TSA and the DOT modal administrations  worked for months to develop the memorandums of agreement. The draft  agreements were presented to senior DOT and TSA management for review  in early spring of this year. According to DOT’s General Counsel, with the  exception of the memorandum of agreement between FAA and TSA, the  draft memorandums were very generic and did not provide much  clarification. Consequently, DOT and TSA decided not to execute or sign  the memorandums of agreement, except for the memorandum of  agreement between FAA and TSA, which was signed on February 28,  2003.
The General Counsel suggested several reasons why the majority of draft  memorandums of agreement were too general. First, as TSA’s departure  date approached—that is, the date that TSA transferred from DOT to DHS,  TSA and DOT modal administration officials may have grown concerned  about formally binding the organizations to specific roles and  responsibilities. Second, the working relationships between TSA and most  of the DOT modal administrations is still very new; as a result, all of the  potential issues, problem areas, or overlap have yet to be identified. Thus,  identifying items to include in the memorandums of agreement was more  difficult.
Rather than execute memorandums of agreement, the Secretary of  Transportation and the Administrator of TSA exchanged correspondence  that commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration on  security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and Administrator  also agreed to use the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA  as a framework for their interactions on security matters for all other  modes. TSA and DOT officials stated that they believe memorandums of  agreement are a good strategy for delineating roles and responsibilities and  they would be open to using memorandums of agreement in the future.
section_title: Experts and Associations Identified Future Actions to Advance the Security of the Transportation System
paragraphs: Transportation security experts and representatives of state and local  government and industry associations we contacted generally believe that  the transportation system is more secure today than it was prior to  September 11. Transportation stakeholders have worked hard to  strengthen the security of the system. Nevertheless, transportation experts,  industry representatives, and federal officials all recommend that more  work be done. Transportation experts and state and local government and  industry representatives identified a number of actions that, in their view,  should be implemented to enhance security, including clarifying federal  roles and coordinating federal efforts, developing a transportation security  strategy, funding security enhancements, investing in research and  development, and providing better intelligence information and related  guidance. The experts and representatives generally believe that these  actions are the responsibility of the federal government.
Clear federal roles and responsibilities is a core issue in transportation  security, according to transportation experts and associations that we  contacted. The lack of clarity about the roles and responsibilities of federal  actors in transportation security creates the potential for confusion,  duplication, and conflicts. Understanding roles, responsibilities, and whom  to call is crucial in an emergency. However, representatives from several  associations stated that their members were unclear of which agency to  contact for their various security concerns and which agency has oversight  for certain issues. Furthermore, they do not have contacts within these  agencies. As mentioned earlier, several industry representatives reported  that their members are receiving different messages from various federal  agencies involved in transportation security, which creates confusion and  frustration among the industry. They said the uncertainty about federal  roles and the lack of coordination is straining intergovernmental  relationships, draining resources, and raising the potential for problems in  responding to terrorism. One industry association told us, for instance, that  it has been asked by three different federal agencies to participate in three  separate studies of the same issue.
According to transportation experts and associations we contacted, a  national transportation strategy is essential to moving forward with  transportation security. It is crucial for helping stakeholders identify  priorities, leveraging resources, establishing stakeholder performance  expectations, and creating incentives for stakeholders to improve security.  Currently, local government associations view the absence of performance  expectations—coupled with limited threat information—as a major  obstacle in focusing their people and resources on high priority threats,  particularly at elevated threat levels. The experts also noted that modal  strategies—no matter how complete—cannot address the complete  transportation security problem and will leave gaps in preparedness. As  mentioned earlier, TSA is in the process of developing a national  transportation system security plan, which according to the Deputy  Administrator of TSA, will provide an overarching framework for the  security of all modes.
Transportation security experts and association representatives we  contacted believe that the federal government should provide funding for  needed security improvements. While an overall security strategy is a  prerequisite to investing wisely, providing adequate funding also is  essential. Setting security goals and strategies without adequate funding  diminishes stakeholders’ commitment and willingness to absorb initial  security investments and long-term operating costs, an expert emphasized.  Industry and state and local government associations also commented that  federal funding should accompany any federal security standards;  otherwise these standards will be considered unfunded mandates that the  industry and state and local governments have to absorb.
The federal government needs to play a strong role in investing in and  setting a research and development agenda for transportation security,  according to most transportation security experts and associations we  contacted. They view this as an appropriate role for the federal  government, since the products of research and development endeavors  would likely benefit the entire transportation system, not just individual  modes or operators. TSA is actively engaged in research and development  projects, such as the development of the next generation explosive  detection systems for baggage, hardening of aircraft and cargo/baggage  containers, biometrics and other access control methods, and human  factors initiatives to identify methods to improve screener performance, at  its Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey.  However, TSA noted that continued adequate funding for research and  development is paramount in order for TSA to be able to meet security  demands with up-to-date and reliable technology.
Transportation security experts and representatives from state and local  government and industry associations stated that the federal government  needs to play a vital role in sharing information—specifically, intelligence  information and related guidance. Representatives from numerous  associations commented that the federal government needs to provide  timely, localized, actionable intelligence information. General threat  warnings are not helpful. Rather, transportation operators want more  specific intelligence information so that they can understand the true  nature of a potential threat and implement appropriate security measures.  Without more localized and actionable intelligence, stakeholders said they  run the risk of wasting resources on unneeded security measures or not  providing an adequate level of security. Moreover, local government  officials often are not allowed to receive specific intelligence information  because they do not have appropriate federal security clearances. Also,  there is little federal guidance on how local authorities should respond to a  specific threat or general threat warnings. For example, San Francisco  police were stationed at the Golden Gate Bridge to respond to the elevated  national threat condition. However, without information about the nature  of the threat to San Francisco's large transportation infrastructure or clear  federal expectations for a response, it is difficult to judge whether actions  like this are the most effective use of police protection, according to  representatives from a local government association.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: During TSA’s first year of existence, TSA met a number of challenges,  including successfully meeting many congressional deadlines for aviation  security. With the immediate crisis of meeting key aviation security  deadlines behind TSA, it can now examine the security of the entire  transportation system. As TSA becomes more active in securing the  maritime and land transportation modes, it will become even more  important that the roles of TSA and DOT modal administrations are clearly  defined. Lack of clearly defined roles among the federal entities could lead  to duplication and confusion. More importantly, it could hamper the  transportation sector’s ability to prepare for and respond to attacks.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To clarify and define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT modal  administrations in transportation security matters, we recommend that the  Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Homeland Security use a  mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement to clearly delineate their  roles and responsibilities. At a minimum, this mechanism should establish  the responsibilities of each entity in setting, administering, and  implementing security standards and regulations, determining funding  priorities, and interfacing with the transportation industry as well as define  each entity’s role in the inevitable overlap of some safety and security  activities. After the roles and responsibilities of each entity are clearly  defined, this information should be communicated to all transportation  stakeholders.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided DOT, DHS, and Amtrak with a draft of this report for review  and comment. Amtrak generally agreed with our findings and  recommendation and provided some technical comments, which we have  incorporated into this report where appropriate.
DOT and DHS generally agreed with the report’s findings. However, they  disagreed with the conclusion and recommendation that their roles and  responsibilities need to be clarified and defined. The two departments  stated that the roles and responsibilities of each entity is clear—that is,  DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security and DOT will  play a supporting role in such matters. We agree that the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act (ATSA) gave TSA primary responsibility for  securing all modes of transportation. However, neither this act, nor other  legislation defined TSA’s roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of  transportation. Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA’s role and  responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes in  detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate DOT  modal administrations’ existing statutory responsibilities for securing the  different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent legislation clarifies  that DOT still has transportation security responsibilities. In particular, the  Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation  is responsible for the security as well as the safety of rail and the transport  of hazardous materials by all modes.
In addition, although DOT and DHS believe their roles and responsibilities  are clearly defined, transportation security stakeholders we contacted are  not as certain. For example, representatives from several associations  stated that their members were unclear as to which agency to contact for  their various security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain  issues. Representatives from several associations also told us that their  members are receiving different messages from the various federal  agencies involved in transportation security.
Furthermore, as noted in the report, both TSA and DOT are moving  forward with transportation security efforts. As both entities continue with  their security efforts, it is important that the roles and responsibilities of  each entity are coordinated and clearly defined. The lack of clarity can lead  to duplication, confusion, and/or gaps in preparedness. We therefore  continue to recommend that DOT and DHS use a mechanism, such as a  memorandum of agreement, to clarify and define DOT modal  administration’s and TSA’s roles and responsibilities in transportation  security. After the roles and responsibilities of each entity are clearly  defined, this information should be communicated to all transportation  stakeholders.
DOT and DHS also noted that the title of the draft report, Transportation  Security: More Federal Coordination Needed to Help Address Security  Challenges, as well as our conclusions and recommendations place too  much emphasis on coordination. To better capture our conclusions and  recommendations—that is, that the roles and responsibilities of TSA and  DOT in security matters should be clearly delineated and communicated to  all transportation security stakeholders—we have changed the report’s title  to Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address  Security Challenges. However, we disagree that the report places too much  emphasis on the lack of coordination between DOT and DHS. As noted  above, representatives from several associations told us that their  members have received conflicting messages from the federal agencies  involved in transportation security. Moreover, there appears to be a break  down in communication between TSA and DOT about current security  initiatives. For example, although TSA officials stated that they have  informed DOT about their plans to issue security standards, some DOT  officials we met with were unsure as to whether TSA was issuing  standards, what the standards would entail, or the time frames for issuing  the standards.
In addition to their written comments, DHS and DOT provided technical  comments to our draft, which we have incorporated into the report where  appropriate.
See appendixes II and III for DOT’s and DHS’ comments and our responses.
As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the  Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the  Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, the President  and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak, the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will  be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  on (202) 512-2834 or at guerrerop@gao.gov. Individuals making key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our four objectives, we conducted structured interviews with  officials from TSA, Amtrak, and DOT, representatives from the major  transportation industry associations and state and local government  associations, and select transportation security experts. We selected  transportation security experts based on their knowledge/expertise and  reputation as being an expert in the transportation security arena. We also  consulted with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate  transportation security experts. Table 4 shows the federal agencies,  industry associations, transportation security experts, and state and local  government associations that were interviewed. Through these structured  interviews we collected information on the challenges that exist in securing  the transportation system, vulnerabilities of different modes, actions that  transportation stakeholders—including the federal, state, and local  governments and the operators—have taken to enhance security since  September 11, TSA’s and DOT’s ongoing and planned security efforts, roles  and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system,  and future security actions that industry associations and security experts  believe are needed. We synthesized and analyzed the information from the  structured interviews.
In addition to the structured interviews, we analyzed the administration’s  National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for  the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets and the  Federal Bureau of Investigation’s The Terrorist Threat to the U.S.  Homeland: An FBI Assessment. We also reviewed current transportation  security-related research as well as transportation security-related reports  and documents from TSA, Amtrak, and DOT, including strategic planning  documents, memorandums, program descriptions, and budget and  financial documents. We also analyzed security-related documents from  industry associations, including action plans, operational information, and  reports, and the U.S. Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. We also  incorporated the findings of previous GAO reports on port, transit,  aviation, and homeland security.
We conducted our work from February 2003 through May 2003, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Transportation
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Transportation  letter dated June 10, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We agree that the title of the report should be changed. Our conclusions  and recommendation call for the roles and responsibilities of TSA and  DOT in security matters to be clearly delineated and communicated to  all transportation security stakeholders. To more fully capture our  conclusions and recommendations, we have changed the report’s title  to Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed To Help Address  Security Challenges.
However, we disagree that our recommendation advances an “overly  simplistic conclusion that ‘more Federal coordination’ is somehow a  meaningful problem or a key to meeting transportation security  challenges.” Although coordination does not solve all security  challenges, it is a key element in meeting transportation security  challenges. As we have noted in previous reports, coordination among  all levels of the government and the private industry is critical to the  success of security efforts. The lack of coordination can lead to  problems such as duplication and/or conflicting efforts, gaps in  preparedness, and confusion. Moreover, the lack of coordination can  strain intergovernmental relationships, drain resources, and raise the  potential for problems in responding to terrorism. The administration’s  National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy  for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets  also emphasize the importance of and need for coordination in security  efforts. In particular, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection  of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets notes that protecting  critical infrastructure, such as the transportation system, “requires a  unifying organization, a clear purpose, a common understanding of  roles and responsibilities, accountability, and a set of well-understood  coordinating processes.” (Italics added for emphasis.) 2. We disagree that the commitment of TSA and DOT to broad and routine  consultations through numerous formal and informal mechanisms is  working. As we noted throughout the report, representatives from  several associations told us that they have received conflicting  messages from the federal agencies involved in transportation security.  Representatives from several associations also stated that their  members were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various  security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
Moreover, there appears to be a break down in communication  between TSA and DOT about current security initiatives. For example,  although TSA officials stated that they have informed DOT about their  plans to issue security standards, some DOT officials we met with were  unsure as to whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards  would entail, or the time frames for issuing the standards.  3. We do not believe the correspondence exchanged by Secretary Mineta  and Admiral Loy adequately defines the roles and responsibilities of  TSA and DOT in security issues. Rather than delineate the roles and  responsibilities of each entity in security matters, such as determining  funding priorities and interfacing with stakeholders, the  correspondence primarily commits each entity to continued  coordination and collaboration on security measures. In the  correspondence, the Secretary and Administrator also agreed to use the  memorandum of agreement between TSA and the Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA) as a framework for their interactions on security  matters for all other modes. Given the complexities and unique  challenges in securing the different modes of transportation, we do not  believe using the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as  a framework is sufficient. The lack of clearly defined roles and  responsibilities can lead to duplication, confusion, conflicts, and most  importantly, gaps in preparedness.
Although designating a DOT liaison to TSA is a step in the right  direction, the roles and responsibilities of each entity and the  coordinating processes need to be documented. Departures of key  individuals within each entity, such as the designated DOT liaison to  TSA, have the potential to erode informal networks. Given the  importance of security efforts, coordinating processes between TSA  and DOT need to be documented so that they span the terms of various  administrations and individuals. 4. We agree that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)  gave TSA primary responsibility for securing all modes of  transportation. However, neither this act, nor other legislation, has  defined TSA roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of  transportation. Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA’s roles and  responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes  in detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate  DOT modal administrations’ existing statutory responsibilities for  securing the different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent  legislation clarifies that DOT still has transportation security  responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states  that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as  well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all  modes.
To clarify and define DOT’s and TSA’s roles and responsibilities in  transportation security, we believe that these entities should establish a  mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement. Using such a  mechanism would serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles  and responsibilities of each entity. It would also serve to hold each  entity accountable for its transportation security responsibilities.  Finally, it could serve as a vehicle to communicate the roles and  responsibilities of each entity to transportation security stakeholders.
The mechanism—whether it is a memorandum of agreement or other  document—used to clarify and define DOT’s and TSA’s roles and  responsibilities should not be static. Rather, it should be a living  document that changes as each entity’s roles and responsibilities in  transportation security matters evolve and events occur.  5. We disagree that all of DOT’s ongoing security efforts are nonpolicy  making activities. For example, the Research and Special Programs  Administration issued regulations in March 2003 that requires shippers  and carriers of hazardous materials to develop and implement security  plans and to include a security component in their employee training  programs.
While DOT’s role in security efforts may decrease in the future, it seems  unlikely that DOT will be devoid of any security responsibilities in the  future. For example, as noted in the report, the Homeland Security Act  of 2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the  security as well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous  materials by all modes. In addition, the Maritime Transportation  Security Act of 2002 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to train  and certify maritime security professionals and establish a grant  program to fund the implementation of Area Maritime Transportation  Security Plans and facility security plans. Further, although the primary  responsibility for securing the aviation system was transferred to TSA,  FAA remains responsible for protecting the nation’s air traffic control  system—both the physical security of its air traffic control facilities and  computer systems.
Although DOT recognizes that DHS has the lead in transportation  security matters, it could be difficult to distinguish its role in  maintaining transportation operations and improving transportation  service and safety from DHS’ role in securing the transportation  system. Security is often intertwined with transportation operations  and safety. For example, installing a fence around truck yards could be  considered both a safety and security measure. Further security  measures that restrict the flow of passengers or freight through the  transportation system could have serious consequences on  transportation operations. Because of these interactions and overlap,  the roles and responsibilities of DOT and DHS in transportation safety  and security can be blurred. Consequently, we continue to believe the  entities should establish a mechanism to help clarify and delineate their  roles and responsibilities in security matters.
section_title: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
paragraphs: The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland  Security letter dated June 11, 2003.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1. We disagree that the report overstates the lack of coordination between  DHS and DOT and that mechanisms to ensure coordination of  responsibilities is unnecessary. Although DHS and DOT report that they  are coordinating on security matters, based on our discussions with  representatives from state and local government and industry  associations, it appears that there is a need to improve such efforts. As  we noted throughout the report, representatives from several  associations told us that they have received conflicting messages from  the federal agencies involved in transportation security.  Representatives from several associations also stated that their  members were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various  security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.  Moreover, there appears to be a break down in communication  between TSA and DOT about current security initiatives. For example,  although TSA officials stated that they have informed DOT about their  plans to issue security standards, some DOT officials we met with were  unsure as to whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards  would entail, or the time frames for issuing the standards.
We agree that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)  gave TSA primary responsibility for securing all modes of  transportation. However, neither this act, or other legislation, has  defined TSA’s roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of  transportation. Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA’s role and  responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes  in detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate  DOT modal administrations’ existing statutory responsibilities for  securing the different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent  legislation clarifies that DOT still has transportation security  responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states  that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as  well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all  modes.
To clarify and define DOT’s and TSA’s roles and responsibilities in  transportation security, we believe that these entities should establish a  mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement. Using such a  mechanism would serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles  and responsibilities of each entity. It would also serve to hold each  entity accountable for its transportation security responsibilities.  Finally, it could serve as a vehicle to communicate the roles and  responsibilities of each entity to transportation security stakeholders.
The mechanism—whether it is a memorandum of agreement or other  document—used to clarify and define DOT’s and TSA’s roles and  responsibilities should not be static. Rather, it should be a living  document that changes as each entity’s roles and responsibilities in  transportation security matters evolve and events occur.  2. We disagree that the report suggests that the continuation of security  efforts by the DOT modal administrations represents a lack of  coordination. The report credits TSA for meeting a number of aviation  security deadlines during its first year of existence and highlights the  efforts of DOT modal administrations and other federal agencies to  improve the security of all modes since September 11. We also note that  TSA is beginning to assert a greater role in securing all modes of  transportation and DOT modal administrations are continuing or  launching new security efforts. We did not suggest that the continuation  of such efforts by DOT modal administrations represents a lack of  coordination. Rather, we noted that as both entities move forward with  security efforts, it is increasingly important that the roles of TSA and  DOT modal administrations are clearly defined. The lack of clearly  defined roles and responsibilities can lead to duplication, confusion,  conflicts, and most importantly, gaps in preparedness. 3. Our intention is not to suggest that the federal government’s efforts to  secure the non-aviation modes of transportation have been insufficient.  To the contrary, we highlight the efforts by DOT modal administrations  and other federal agencies to secure the maritime and land modes of  transportation. We also recognize that TSA’s aviation security focus  during its first year of existence was primarily due to the ATSA  deadlines.  4. We agree that the newly created DHS brings a number of agencies  responsible for transportation security under one roof, which could  ultimately improve coordination and streamline and strengthen  security efforts. However, this does not solve all the potential  coordination problems we highlight in the report because important  transportation stakeholders—specifically, the DOT modal  administrations—are housed in another department. Because both  DHS agencies and DOT modal administrations are moving forward with  transportation security initiatives, it is critical that the roles and  responsibilities of each entity are clearly delineated and communicated  to all stakeholders and that they coordinate their security efforts. The  lack of such clarification, communication, and coordination could  create problems, such as duplication of efforts and gaps in  preparedness.
section_title: Organizational Chart of the Transportation Security Administration
paragraphs: Admin.
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Steven Calvo, Nikki Clowers, Michelle  Dresben, Glenn Dubin, Scott Farrow, Libby Halperin, David Hooper,  Hiroshi Ishikawa, Ray Sendejas, and Glen Trochelman made key  contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
subsections: section_title: Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies
paragraphs: Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and  Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments, GAO-03-502  (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003).
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of  Homeland Security, GAO-03-594T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003).
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term  Challenges, GAO-03-616T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003).
Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot  Certification Process, GAO-03-248NI (Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003).  (Not for Public Dissemination)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of  Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003)
High Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the  Federal Government and the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, GAO-03-121  (Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003).
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and  DOT’s Enforcement Approach, GAO-03-22 (Washington, D.C.: January 10,  2003).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the  Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.:   December 20, 2002).
Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address  Security Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002).
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and  Implementation Issues, GAO-03-253 (Washington, D.C.: November 22,  2002).
Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and  Assets Remain at Risk, GAO-03-303T (Washington, D.C.: November 19,  2002).
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New  Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO-03-297T (Washington, D.C.: November  18, 2002).
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort  for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2002).
Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, GAO-02-1075T  (Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002).
Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and  Communication Needed, GAO-02-785 (Washington, D.C.: August 26, 2002).
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New  Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T (Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002).
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces  Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-971T (Washington, D.C.:  July 25, 2002).
Critical infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be  Addressed, GAO-02-961T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force  Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports, GAO-02- 955TNI (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots, GA0-02-822R  (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002).
Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection  Equipment, GAO-02-713C (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002). (Classified)
Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond,  GAO-02-538T (Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2002).
Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation’s Air  Transportation System, GAO-01-1164T (Washington, D.C.: September 26,  2001). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Aviation Security: Information on the Nation’s Air Transportation  System Vulnerabilities, GAO-01-1174T (Washington, D.C.: September 26,  2001). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard  Screening Security Operations, GAO-01-1171T (Washington, D.C.:  September 25, 2001).
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for  Assigning Screening Responsibilities, GAO-01-1165T (Washington, D.C.:  September 21, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in  Aviation Security, GAO-01-1166T (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve  Security at the Nation’s Airports, GAO-01-1162T (Washington, D.C.:  September 20, 2001).
section_title: Terrorism and Risk Management
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,  and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-715T (Washington, D.C.:   May 8,  2003).
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a  Results-Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January 17,  2003).
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership,  GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated  Management Issues, GAO-03-250 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued  Management Challenges, GAO-02-1122T (Washington, D.C.: October 1,  2002).
National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges,  GAO-02-1048R (Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002).
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to  Success, GAO-02-1013T (Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More  Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information  Systems, GAO-02-474 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security  Challenges Need to Be Addressed, GAO-02-918T (Washington, D.C.: July 9,  2002).
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership  Will Be Critical to Success, GAO-02-901T (Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002).
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but  May Complicate Priority Setting, GAO-02-893T (Washington, D.C.: June  28, 2002).
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and  Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy,  GAO-02-811T (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002).
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving  National Goals, GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002).
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private  Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland  Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the  Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local  Preparedness, GAO-02-550T (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National  Preparedness Strategy, GAO-02-549T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to  Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-548T (Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National  Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-547T  (Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002).
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership  Sought, GAO-02-490T (Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance  State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-473T (Washington, D.C.: March 1,  2002).
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and  Long-Term National Needs, GAO-02-160T (Washington, D.C.: November 7,  2001).
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide  Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in  Chemical and Biological Preparedness, GAO-02-162T (Washington, D.C.:  October 17, 2001).
Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure  Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001).
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,  GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001).
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and  Inventory Management Are Needed, GAO-01-667 (Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in  Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from  Computer-Based Attacks, GAO-01-1168T (Washington, D.C.: September 26,  2001).
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts,  GAO-01-1158T (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related  Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001).
section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of  Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities  and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government  for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal  programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other  assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding  decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of  accountability, integrity, and reliability.
section_title: Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
paragraphs: The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is  through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and full- text files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older  products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents  using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety,  including charts and other graphics.
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs