Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Programs and Implementation of GAO Recommendations
Published: 2011-03-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses our work on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which Congress established on October 3, 2008, in response to the financial crisis that threatened the stability of the U.S. financial system and the solvency of many financial institutions. Under the original TARP legislation, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had the authority to purchase or insure $700 billion in troubled assets held by financial institutions. The Secretary of the Treasury extended the authority originally provided under EESA through October 3, 2010. However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)--signed into law on July 21, 2010--set a new spending ceiling for TARP, in effect prohibiting Treasury from incurring any additional obligations for programs that had not been initiated prior to June 25, 2010. A broad range of activities have been initiated under TARP. Specific initiatives have injected capital into key financial institutions; implemented programs to address problems in the securitization markets; provided assistance to the automobile industry and American International Group, Inc. (AIG); and offered incentives for modifying residential mortgages, among other things. As TARP passes the 30-month mark, U.S. financial markets appear to be less volatile than they were in 2008. But questions about a sustained economic recovery continue, and certain areas of the economy still face significant challenges. For example, foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies continue to linger and small businesses still face tight credit conditions. As a result, TARP has been transformed into a program that focuses primarily on preserving homeownership and improving financial conditions for small financial institutions and businesses. While many other programs have ended and begun winding down operations and some participating institutions have repaid part or all of their TARP funds, the prospect of repayment from some other institutions, both large and small, remains uncertain. This statement is primarily based on our January 12, 2011, report and focuses on (1) the status of TARP programs; (2) Treasury's progress in implementing an effective management structure for TARP, including staffing the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), overseeing contractors, and establishing a comprehensive system of internal controls; and (3) trends in key relevant economic indicators.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Some TARP programs--Capital Assistance Program, Asset Guarantee Program, and Targeted Investment Program--have been terminated. Others, like the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), have closed and are winding down operations, and several programs that focus on preserving homeownership and that have provided assistance to auto companies and AIG remain active. (1) CPP, which closed in December 2009, had $30.8 billion outstanding as of March 9, 2011, and had received about $171 billion in full and partial repayments from CPP participants. However, Treasury faces various oversight and management challenges in addressing missed dividend and interest payments and monitoring repayment requests. (2) Funding of TALF loans by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) closed in June 2010, and no TARP funds had been expended as of March 9, 2011, to purchase collateral from FRBNY because no collateral had been surrendered to TALF LLC. TALF will continue to pose potential risks to Treasury until all loans are repaid to FRBNY and the program is terminated. (3) While the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) remains Treasury's primary program to assist homeowners facing foreclosure, the program had a slow start and has not performed as anticipated. Treasury announced several new programs in 2010. As of March 9, 2011, $1.2 billion, none of it recoverable, had been disbursed for TARP housing programs. Our most recent work shows there is more Treasury can do to better ensure the effective implementation of this program. (4) The Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) had an outstanding balance of just more than $44.2 billion as of March 9, 2011. At that time, approximately $29.5 billion had been repaid, but Treasury still owned 33.3 percent equity in General Motors (GM), 9.2 percent in Chrysler, and 73.8 percent in Ally. While the auto companies' financial conditions have shown signs of improvement, their ability to fully repay the AIFP debt and equity investments depends on a variety of factors, which will require Treasury's ongoing oversight. (5) AIG has continued to receive assistance over the last year provided largely rests with the return that Treasury earns when it sells its common stock in AIG. (6) The Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) continues to be an active program with $15.9 billion disbursed as of March 9, 2011, and $15.2 billion outstanding. Of this investment, Treasury had seen unrealized capital gains of approximately $750 million. Treasury still holds oversight responsibility for the fund managers until the fund no longer holds assets. (7) The Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) and the SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program are small business programs that account for a small portion of TARP funding. CDCI closed in September 2010, and as of March 9, 2011, Treasury had provided about $570 million to 84 CDFIs, 28 of which had already participated in CPP. SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program closed in September 2010, and as of March 9, 2011, Treasury had made 31 purchases of SBA 7(a) securities totaling about $370 million.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Troubled Asset  Relief Program (TARP), which Congress established on October 3, 2008, in  response to the financial crisis that threatened the stability of the U.S.  financial system and the solvency of many financial institutions. Under the  original TARP legislation, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had  the authority to purchase or insure $700 billion in troubled assets held by  financial institutions. The Secretary of the Treasury extended the  authority originally provided under EESA through October 3, 2010.  However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection  Act (Dodd-Frank Act)—signed into law on July 21, 2010—set a new  spending ceiling for TARP, in effect prohibiting Treasury from incurring  any additional obligations for programs that had not been initiated prior to  June 25, 2010.
A broad range of activities have been initiated under TARP. Specific  initiatives have injected capital into key financial institutions;  implemented programs to address problems in the securitization markets;  provided assistance to the automobile industry and American  International Group, Inc. (AIG); and offered incentives for modifying  residential mortgages, among other things. As TARP passes the 30-month  mark, U.S. financial markets appear to be less volatile than they were in  2008. But questions about a sustained economic recovery continue, and  certain areas of the economy still face significant challenges. For example,  foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies continue to linger and small  businesses still face tight credit conditions. As a result, TARP has been  transformed into a program that focuses primarily on preserving  homeownership and improving financial conditions for small financial  institutions and businesses. While many other programs have ended and  begun winding down operations and some participating institutions have  repaid part or all of their TARP funds, the prospect of repayment from  some other institutions, both large and small, remains uncertain.
EESA required GAO to report at least every 60 days on findings from our  oversight of actions taken under the programs. We have been monitoring  TARP programs since their inception and our reports have highlighted  challenges facing many of these programs. To date, we have issued more  than 40 reports and testimonies related to TARP and made more than 60  recommendations to Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal  Reserve System (Federal Reserve) to improve the transparency and  accountability of TARP operations.
This statement is primarily based on our January 12, 2011, report and  focuses on (1) the status of TARP programs; (2) Treasury’s progress in  implementing an effective management structure for TARP, including  staffing the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), overseeing contractors, and  establishing a comprehensive system of internal controls; and (3) trends in  key relevant economic indicators. To do our work, we leveraged our prior  reports, reviewed documents provided by Treasury’s OFS, and conducted  interviews with Treasury and OFS officials. We conducted this  performance audit from March 2010 and January 2011 and updated  selected information in March 2011 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Some TARP Programs, Including Those That Have Ended and Those That Remain Active, Continue to Present Challenges
paragraphs: According to OFS, from the inception of TARP through March 9, 2011, it  has disbursed $410 billion, and received more than $286 billion primarily  from interest, dividends, and principal repayments on direct loans,  repurchases of investments, and sales of investments. OFS reported $150  billion in gross direct loans and investments outstanding as of March 9,  2011 (see table 1).
The reported net cost of TARP transactions from inception through  September 30, 2010, was $18.5 billion; however, the ultimate cost of TARP  will change as a result of (1) differences between the estimated values of  the direct loans and investments as of September 30, 2010, and the  amounts OFS will ultimately realize (as the assumptions and estimates  underlying the valuation of these assets are inherently subject to  substantial uncertainty), and (2) further disbursements, such as those  relating to the housing programs which are not subject to repayment.
subsections: section_title: CPP Investments Present Continued Oversight Challenges for Treasury
paragraphs: Under CPP, Treasury invested $205 billion in over 700 financial institutions  nationwide. Treasury provided capital to qualifying financial institutions  from October 2008 to December 2009 by purchasing preferred shares or  subordinated debentures. In return for its investment, Treasury received  preferred stock or debentures, which provided for dividend payments (if  declared by the issuer) or interest payments, as well as warrants. As table  1 shows, through March 9, 2011, Treasury had received about $171 billion  in full and partial repayments. However, Treasury continues to face  challenges in managing its remaining investments. For example, a growing  number of CPP participants have missed scheduled dividend or interest  payments. As of February 28, 2011, 189 institutions had not made at least  one scheduled dividend or interest payment by the end of the reporting  month in which the payments were due, for a total of 697 missed  payments. Over the past 2 years, the number of CPP institutions missing  dividend or interest payments by quarter has increased steadily from 8 in  February 2009 to 152 in February 2011, or about 27 percent of existing  CPP participants. Although the number of CPP institutions missing  dividend payments is large and increasing, they represent a small share of  the total dollar amount of original CPP investments. Generally, if an  institution has not paid in full a total of six dividend or interest payments,  Treasury has the right to elect two members to the institution’s board of  directors. As of February 28, 2011, 32 institutions had at least six missed  payments that remained unpaid, and Treasury had not yet exercised its  right to nominate directors for these institutions. However, 31 CPP  institutions that have missed at least five payments have agreed to have  Treasury observers attend meetings of their boards of directors. As more  institutions miss scheduled dividend payments, Treasury faces a  significant challenge of determining the extent to which it will exercise its  right to nominate board members. In August 2010, Treasury began  addressing this challenge by publicly releasing information on its policies  and procedures for nominating board members to these institutions. These  plans include using OFS staff to observe board meetings of institutions  missing at least five dividend or interest payments and using a variety of  considerations—such as an institution’s financial condition and function  of its board of directors—to decide whether to nominate a board member.
In addition, in order to protect its interests in CPP investments and  promote financial stability, Treasury has conducted a limited, but growing,  number of exchanges and dispositions. Over the last 2 years, Treasury has  restructured the assistance provided to 16 CPP participants by swapping  its preferred stock for other forms of equity securities or selling the  preferred stock to new investors involved in a merger or capital  restructuring with a CPP institution. OFS finalized policies and procedures  governing exchanges and dispositions of TARP securities, including CPP  investments, in October 2009. OFS stated that it would consider various  factors when assessing an institution’s proposal for an asset exchange,  including the impact on the institution’s capital, the possible impact on  Treasury’s position relative to holders of similar securities, the U.S.  government’s overall economic position, and whether any premiums paid  over market prices are reasonable and consistent with similar transactions  in the marketplace.
Through February 2011, Treasury had received about $171 billion in full  and partial repayments from 146 institutions, including 28 institutions that  exchanged $363 million of their CPP investments for investments under  Treasury’s CDCI program. However, questions about the health of smaller  banks continue, and small institutions participating in CPP may face  challenges in fulfilling the terms needed to exit the program. According to  Treasury data, 75 percent of the total dollar amount of CPP investments in  institutions under $10 billion in assets remains outstanding compared to  only 10 percent for investments in institutions over $10 billion. Our recent  report on CPP identified weaknesses in Treasury’s monitoring of  regulators’ decisions to approve or deny requests to repay CPP  investments. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009  included provisions modifying the terms of CPP repayments to require that  Treasury allow any institution to repay its CPP investment subject only to  consultation with the appropriate federal bank regulator. Treasury  officials indicated that, as a result of these changes, they had not provided  guidance or criteria to regulators on deciding when to allow institutions to  repay CPP investments and had not collected information on the reasons  for these decisions. However, according to Treasury, it helped facilitate  meetings among the regulators in the spring of 2009 at which they  discussed standards for permitting TARP recipients to repay.
Bank regulatory officials said they used existing supervisory procedures  that were generally applicable to capital reductions as a basis for  reviewing CPP repurchase requests. In our recent report, we found that  while the decision ultimately lies with the regulators, without collecting  information on or monitoring regulators’ decisions, Treasury had no basis  for determining whether decisions involving similar institutions were  being made consistently and, thus, whether CPP participants were being  treated equitably. Further, absent information on why regulators made  repayment decisions, Treasury cannot provide feedback to regulators.  Accordingly, we recommended that Treasury periodically collect and  review certain information from bank regulators on the analysis and  conclusions supporting their decisions on CPP repayment requests and  provide feedback for the regulators’ consideration on the extent to which  regulators are evaluating similar institutions consistently. In its response,  Treasury stated that it would consider ways to address the objectives of  our recommendations while also noting the constraints presented by the  law and principles of regulatory independence.
section_title: About Half of the TALF Loans Have Been Repaid, but Continued Monitoring is Important
paragraphs: TALF provided loans to private investors to purchase asset-backed  securities (ABS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) to  encourage the issuance of new securitizations and provide liquidity for  new consumer and business loans. To assist in this effort, Treasury  provides credit protection for TALF. TALF made about $71 billion in loans  from March 2009 through June 2010, with most of them secured by credit  card ABS, auto loan ABS, legacy CMBS, and student loan ABS. According  to the Federal Reserve, more than half of these loans have been repaid.  Moreover, Treasury has not had to disburse any TARP funds to cover  losses from unpaid loans. However, until all loans are repaid to FRBNY, it  is important for Treasury to continue to monitor TALF to anticipate future  needs for credit support.
Treasury has addressed concerns that we raised about Treasury’s role in  TALF, including monitoring risks related to commercial mortgage-backed  securities, formalizing the decision-making process with the Federal  Reserve, and conducting an assessment of how to track and report on  assets that might be surrendered.
section_title: AIFP Illustrates both Progress and Ongoing Uncertainty in Recouping Assistance
paragraphs: From December 2008 through December 2009, Treasury announced $86.3  billion in funding available to help stabilize the auto industry and  disbursed $79.7 billion of this funding, including (1) about $62 billion to  fund Chrysler and GM while they restructured, (2) about $16.3 billion to  provide capital assistance to Ally Financial, and (3) $1.5 billion to a special  purpose vehicle (SPV) created by Chrysler Financial. In return for its  assistance to Chrysler and GM, Treasury received 9.85 percent equity in  the reorganized Chrysler, 60.8 percent equity and $2.1 billion in preferred  stock in the reorganized GM, and $13.8 billion in debt obligations between  the two companies. In return for its investment in Ally Financial, Treasury  received preferred shares equaling ownership of more than half of Ally  Financial by the end of 2009 and almost three-quarters by the end of 2010.
As of March 9, 2011, approximately $29.5 billion had been repaid and  Treasury owned 33.3 percent equity in GM, 9.2 percent in Chrysler, and  73.8 percent in Ally. A substantial portion of these repayments come  from GM, via its initial public offering (IPO). In total, Treasury sold over 412 million of its shares in GM’s IPO, for which it received $13.5 billion in   In March 20 net proceeds to repay the government’s initial investment. Treasury sold $2.7 billion of trust preferred securities in Ally Financial.
Since emerging from bankruptcy in the summer of 2009, Chrysler and GM  have shown signs of progress in returning to profitability; however, their  ability to fully repay the AIFP debt and equity investments depends on a  variety of factors, which will require Treasury’s ongoing oversight. One  sign of progress is that vehicle sales increased substantially for both  companies in January and February of 2011 compared to the prior year (23  percent and 49 percent for GM; 23 percent and 13 percent for Chrysler). In  addition, in 2010 both companies released financial statements that,  according to Treasury officials, exceeded Treasury’s projections for  revenues, operating earnings, and cash flows. Also, GM held an IPO in late  2010 and Chrysler expects to hold an IPO in 2011. Nevertheless, while  GM’s and Chrysler’s financial conditions have improved, each faces  challenges that could affect their financial future. For example, although  sales are improving, volumes are highly dependent on economic and  market conditions—such as unemployment levels, consumer confidence,  and credit availability—that currently remain fragile. Similarly, high fuel  prices could negatively impact sales of the companies’ most profitable  vehicles such as pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles. Furthermore, the  companies’ U.S. pension plans are underfunded, and they will face large  future payments to their pension plans to make up this underfunding.
Ally Financial, a bank holding company, has also shown signs of an  improved financial condition, posting $1.1 billion in profit in 2010, but the  government’s ability to recoup its investment in Ally relies on the health of  the auto industry, as well as the company’s ability to compete with other  credit providers. Ally Financial’s chief executive officer noted that the  recent conversion of $5.5 billion of Treasury’s shares to common equity  should help the company in its efforts to conform its capital structure to  that more typical of a bank holding company. Treasury also reported the  conversion may improve Ally’s ability to raise debt financing. Regardless,  Ally Financial could face increased competition for its business in the  future, including potentially from GM, which acquired Americredit, an  auto finance company. Treasury officials noted they are confident Ally  Financial will hold an IPO and expected that it would likely take Treasury  a year or 2 to sell all of its shares.
In our ongoing monitoring of AIFP, we have made several  recommendations to help Treasury monitor and assess its investment in  the auto companies, and we are working with Treasury to help ensure  their implementation. We are continuing to monitor the financial  condition of the industry, and are reviewing the current financial condition  and outlook of GM and Chrysler in ongoing work. As part of that ongoing  work, we also are reviewing the status of the federal government’s efforts  to assist workers and communities that have relied on the auto industry  for their economic viability.
section_title: Treasury’s Exposure to AIG Under TARP is Tied to the Current and Future Health of the Company and the Insurance Industry
paragraphs: In November 2008, Treasury began providing assistance to AIG, and with  the closing of AIG’s recapitalization plan in January 2011, this assistance  has risen still further, but AIG has recently started repaying its debt to  Treasury. On January 14, 2011, AIG closed on a plan to recapitalize the  company, which included several transactions that terminated FRBNY’s  direct assistance to the company while increasing Treasury’s equity  interests to $67.8 billion, which included owning about 92.2 percent of the  company. On March 8, 2011, AIG repaid $6.9 billion to Treasury, which  included $1.4 billion for Treasury’s remaining preferred interests in the  American Life Insurance Company (ALICO) SPV and $5.5 billion for  Treasury’s remaining preferred interests in the AIA Group Limited (AlA)  SPV, leaving Treasury with preferred interests of $11.3 billion in the AIA  SPV. This repayment reduced the outstanding balance of AIG’s assistance  to $58.7 billion.
Since early 2009, we have been monitoring the status of federal assistance  to AIG and the company’s financial condition using GAO-developed  indicators and have issued three reports that have included information on  them. In our January 2011 report, our indicators showed that AIG’s  financial condition had generally remained relatively stable or showed  signs of improvement, largely due to the federal assistance from the  Federal Reserve and Treasury. Federal assistance has continued to play a  key role in stabilizing AIG’s liquidity, equity structure, and credit ratings.  The government’s prospects for recouping the assistance it has provided  largely rests with the return that Treasury earns when it sells its common  stock in AIG. We will continue to monitor the government’s investment  and the status of AIG’s repayment efforts. In addition, our ongoing work  on AIG also includes a review of the Federal Reserve facilities  implemented to assist AIG.
section_title: Treasury Has Faced Challenges in Implementing its Making Home Affordable Program and Relatively Few Borrowers Have Received Permanent Loan Modifications
paragraphs: As we have noted in our past reports, Treasury’s efforts to help borrowers  facing potential foreclosures continue to face challenges. Since Treasury  first announced the framework for its Making Home Affordable (MHA)  program over 2 years ago, the number of homeowners facing potential  foreclosure has remained at historically high levels. The Home Affordable  Modification Program (HAMP), the key component under MHA, seeks to  help eligible homeowners avoid foreclosure by reducing their monthly  mortgage payments to more affordable levels—specifically to 31 percent  of the homeowner’s income. As of December 31, 2010, there were a total of  143 active MHA servicers. Through January 2011, $29.9 billion in TARP  funds had been committed to these servicers for modification of non- government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) loans. Based on the MHA  Servicer Performance Report through January 2011, nearly 1.8 million  HAMP trial modifications had been offered to borrowers of GSE and non- GSE loans as of the end of January 2011, and nearly 1.5 million of these  had begun HAMP trial modifications. Of the trial modifications that had  begun, approximately 145,000 were in active trial modifications, roughly  539,000 were in active permanent modifications, roughly 740,000 trial  modifications had been canceled, and roughly 68,000 permanent  modifications had been canceled. Recently, the number of new trial and  permanent modifications started each month has declined (fig. 1). As of  December 31, 2010, $1 billion in TARP funds had been disbursed for  TARP-funded housing programs, of which $840 million has been disbursed  for HAMP-related activity.
In July 2009 and June 2010, we reported on the challenges Treasury faced  in implementing HAMP and made recommendations to improve the  transparency and equitable implementation of the program. For example,  in July 2009 we noted that while Treasury required borrowers with high  levels of total debt to agree to obtain counseling before receiving a HAMP  modification, it was not monitoring whether these borrowers, in fact,  received counseling. In addition, we noted that Treasury had yet to  establish a comprehensive system of internal control for HAMP, including  metrics and benchmarks for servicers’ performance. Three out of the six  recommendations we made in July 2009 have yet to be fully implemented  and, as such, remain open.
In June 2010, we reported on several inconsistencies in the way servicers  treated borrowers under HAMP that could lead to inequitable treatment of  similarly situated borrowers. These inconsistencies involved how servicers  solicited borrowers for the program, how they evaluated borrowers who  were not yet 60-days delinquent on their mortgage payments, and how  they handled borrower complaints. In addition, we noted that while  Treasury had taken some steps to ensure servicer compliance with  program requirements, it had not yet finalized consequences for servicer  noncompliance. We made eight recommendations to improve the  transparency and accountability of HAMP in June 2010. Treasury stated  that it intended to implement some of the recommendations, but little  action has been taken to date.
In addition to the HAMP first-lien modification program, Treasury has  begun implementing several other TARP-funded programs for struggling  homeowners under the MHA program, including the Second-Lien  Modification Program (2MP), the Principal Reduction Alternatives (PRA)  program for borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than the value  of their homes, and the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA)  program for those who are not successful in HAMP modifications. As  noted in the report we are issuing today, the implementation of 2MP,  HAFA, and PRA has been slow and limited activity has been reported to  date (see table 2). This slow pace is attributed in part to several  implementation challenges. For example, servicers told us that the start of  2MP had been slow due to problems with the database Treasury required  them to use to identify potentially eligible loans. Additionally, borrowers  may not be aware of their potential eligibility for the program. While  Treasury recently revised its guidelines to allow servicers to bypass the  database for certain loans, servicers could do more to alert HAMP first-lien  modification borrowers about the new second-lien program.  Implementation of the foreclosure alternatives program has also been  slow due to program restrictions, such as the requirement that borrowers  be evaluated for a first-lien modification even if they have already  identified a potential buyer for a short sale. Although Treasury has  recently taken action to address some of these concerns, the potential  effects of its changes remain unclear.
Our most recent work shows there is more Treasury can do to ensure the  effective implementation of these programs, including ensuring that  servicers have sufficient capacity to implement them and that borrowers  are notified about potential eligibility for second-lien modifications. We  also believe it will be important for Treasury to have clear and accurate  information on the dispositions of borrowers who are denied or fall out  from HAMP modifications. Without accurate reporting of borrower  outcomes, Treasury cannot know the actual extent to which borrowers  who are denied, canceled, or redefaulted from HAMP are helped by other  programs or evaluate the need for further action to assist this group of  homeowners. We continue to believe there are opportunities to improve  the transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of MHA.
section_title: Assets under PPIP Have Shown Positive Returns, but Continued Monitoring is Important
paragraphs: Treasury still has important monitoring responsibilities for PPIP  investments. The legacy securities program of PPIP, announced in March  2009, was designed to facilitate price discovery in markets for these assets,  repair balance sheets throughout the financial system, and increase the  availability of credit to households and businesses through the purchase of  “legacy” residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and CMBS.  Through the program, Treasury and private-sector fund managers and  investors partnered to purchase eligible securities from banks, insurance  companies, mutual funds, pension funds, and other eligible sellers— though the fund managers have sole discretion in making purchases and  investment decisions according to the terms of the agreements between  Treasury and the Public Private Investment Funds (PPIF). Treasury still  holds oversight responsibility for the fund managers until the funds no  longer hold assets.
The eight PPIFs have had positive returns and have invested in a variety of  legacy assets, including CMBS, subprime RMBS, prime RMBS, Alt-A  RMBS, and option adjustable-rate RMBS. The PPIFs paid $228 million in  interest and dividends to Treasury over fiscal year 2010. But returns could  fluctuate over time, as they are subject to market risk factors until the  PPIFs close. As of March 9, 2011, Treasury’s investments accounted for  about $15.9 billion of about $22.4 billion available to fund PPIP. Of this  investment, about $15.2 billion remained outstanding. Treasury had seen  unrealized capital gains of approximately $750 million.
section_title: Treasury Initially Launched Programs under TARP to Assist Small Businesses but Has Shifted These Efforts outside of TARP
paragraphs: Given the importance of small businesses to the overall economy,  Treasury created several programs under TARP to help address small  business credit constraints. The existing TARP programs that are intended  to assist small businesses focused on capitalizing certain depository  institutions and stabilizing secondary markets for SBA-guaranteed loans.  They included:    CDCI, which was announced in October 2009 and closed in September  2010. As of March 9, 2011, Treasury had provided about $570 million to 84  CDFIs, 28 of which had already participated in CPP.
SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program, which was announced in March  2009 and closed in September 2010. As of March 9, 2011, Treasury had  made 31 purchases of SBA 7(a) securities totaling about $370 million.
TALF, which was announced in November 2008 and closed in June 2010.
TALF loans secured by SBA 7(a) and 504 securitizations represented 3  percent of TALF loans. The Federal Reserve estimates that about 850,000  small business loans were financed in part by securities supported by  TALF.
Treasury has taken steps to address concerns we identified about the  implementation of some of these programs. For example, although the  purpose of CDCI was initially unclear to some participants, public  communications about the dual purposes of the program—to assist small  business lending and to support the mission of Community Development  Financial Institutions—was clarified toward the end of the program.
Treasury has addressed concerns that we raised about Treasury’s role in  TALF, including monitoring risks related to commercial mortgage-backed  securities, formalizing the decision-making process with the Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and conducting an assessment  of how to track and report on assets that might be surrendered.
Given concerns about the TARP stigma, Treasury shifted its efforts to  assist small businesses outside of TARP by proposing a separate Small  Business Lending Fund. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 created a $30  billion bank capital support program encouraging small and midsize banks  to lend to small businesses and contains metrics for measuring increases  in small business lending. We are currently reviewing the fund, as required  by the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010.
section_title: OFS has Made Progress in Staffing Key Positions, but Needs to Finalize Its Workforce Plan
paragraphs: OFS has continued to make progress in staffing key positions, managing  its contracts, and maintaining internal controls. While OFS’s  organizational structure has stabilized as it moves into maintenance mode,  more could be done to address retention of key staff as TARP winds down.  Treasury continues to rely on a network of financial agents and  contractors for certain activities and will likely do so as the program  comes to a close. Finally, Treasury has taken steps to develop a system of  internal control.
subsections: section_title: OFS Staffing Has Stabilized, but OFS Has Not Finalized a Plan for Addressing Staff Retention Challenges as TARP Winds Down
paragraphs: In the last year, OFS staffing and its organizational structure have  stabilized. Over the past 2 years, the number of OFS employees has  increased steadily with the number of employees increasing and the  number of detailees decreasing. In addition, Treasury has filled key  leadership positions in OFS, including the position of Chief of the  Homeownership Preservation Office. However, this stability is uncertain  as OFS faces new challenges. For example, the Assistant Secretary of  Financial Stability resigned in September 2010 and this key leadership  position is temporarily filled.
With more than 200 employees, staffing at OFS remains important. As we  have seen, some programs are still being implemented and others, while  having been closed or terminated, have assets that must be managed,  repaid, and divested. More than half of OFS’s employees, including key  leaders, are term appointments (many with 4-year term limits). OFS has  begun to take steps that will help to retain staff. OFS is also addressing  succession planning for critical senior positions, and in response to our  recommendation in the January 2011 report is finalizing its Human Capital  Strategic Plan. According to OFS, this plan is a roadmap to ensure that  OFS manages its workforce effectively and continues to attract, develop,  and retain high caliber employees.
section_title: Treasury Continues to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Financial Agents and Contractors and Is Addressing Conflicts-of-Interest Requirements
paragraphs: Since the inception of TARP, Treasury has continued to rely on private- sector resources to assist OFS with a variety of activities. Treasury has  used two mechanisms for engaging private-sector firms. First, Treasury  has exercised its statutory authority to retain 15 financial agents  (depository and related financial institutions designated to perform  assigned functions on its behalf). Second, Treasury has entered into  contract and blanket purchase agreements under the Federal Acquisition  Regulation for a variety of legal, investment consulting, accounting, and  other services and supplies. According to Treasury’s data, as of September  30, 2010, Treasury had 81 contracts and blanket purchase agreements, up  from 39 from the previous year. In total, Treasury had 96 financial agency  agreements and contractual arrangements with a total potential value of  almost $841 million, as of September 30, 2010.
When Treasury set up OFS in 2008 and quickly began to implement  numerous TARP initiatives, OFS lacked complete procurement procedures  and internal controls to oversee its growing number of contractors and  financial agents, as well as a comprehensive compliance system to  monitor and fully address vendor-related conflicts of interest. We made a  series of recommendations between December 2008 and June 2009 that  were intended to strengthen Treasury’s management and oversight of its  vendors and improve the transparency of contracted operations. One year  after implementation, OFS had put in place an appropriate infrastructure  to manage and monitor its network of financial agents and contractors, as  well as a system to oversee conflicts of interest that may arise with  financial agents or contractors seeking or performing work under TARP.  OFS has continued to make management and oversight enhancements.
section_title: OFS Has Taken Steps to Develop a System of Internal Control for TARP Programs
paragraphs: Treasury has taken steps to develop an internal control system to ensure  compliance with program requirements, including limitations on executive  compensation, stock repurchase, and dividends. OFS’s Office of Internal  Review has a key role in helping to ensure such compliance. Treasury also  relies on financial agents to perform additional oversight responsibilities.  Although Treasury has generally developed an overall system of internal  control for compliance with program requirements, we have identified  areas in which certain controls for specific programs, such as HAMP,  could be improved. In particular, Treasury has not fully implemented our  recommendation to develop a comprehensive system of internal control  for HAMP, including developing benchmarks or goals for specific HAMP  performance measures such as conversion and redefault rates. We will  continue to monitor Treasury’s actions to address identified deficiencies.
In addition, our 2010 financial audit report concluded that although certain  internal controls could be improved, OFS maintained, in all material  respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of  September 30, 2010. These controls provided reasonable assurance that  misstatements, losses, or noncompliance material in relation to the  financial statements would be prevented or detected and corrected on a  timely basis. Our opinion on internal control over financial reporting is  based on criteria established under 31 U.S.C. §3512 (c), (d), commonly  known as the Federal Manager’s Financial Integrity Act.
section_title: Indicators Suggest That Credit Markets Have Largely Held the Gains They Achieved since October 2008
paragraphs: The concerted actions by Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and others since  the crisis began have been credited with helping to avert a more severe  financial crisis, but the ultimate impact of the interventions on the  economy as a whole remains to be seen. Since the passage of EESA,  indicators generally suggest that credit markets have improved and while  the effectiveness of the TARP programs have varied, some have reportedly  had the desired effects, especially if stabilizing the financial system and  restoring confidence was considered to be the principal goal of the  intervention. However, the strength of the economic recovery remains  uncertain, and the ultimate impact of the interventions on the real  economy remains to be seen.
While movements in most of these indicators during the second year of  TARP are likely more reflective of other non-TARP market developments,  some metrics we have monitored for programs with later start dates  (PPIP, HAMP, and to a lesser extent TALF) show some improvements. For  example, PPIP indicators show substantial improvement and TALF  indicators continue to improve. However, indicators for MHA continue to  highlight the challenges in the area of residential housing. Finally, our  indicators suggest that credit markets have largely held the gains achieved  since October 2008, despite the unwinding of TARP programs, the early  termination of TARP’s authority, the general exit from other government  interventions, and the turmoil in Europe. Over time, analysis of the exits  from remaining TARP programs will provide a more complete assessment  of the resilience of the financial system.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the  opportunity to discuss these critically important issues and would be  happy to answer any questions that you may have. Thank you.
For further information on this testimony, please contact Thomas J.  McCool on (202) 512-2642 or mccoolt@gao.gov, or Orice Williams Brown  on (202) 512-8678 or williamso@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Continues to Face  Implementation Challenges and Data Weaknesses in Its Making Home  Affordable Program, GAO-11-288, March 17, 2011.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Third Quarter 2010 Update of  Government Assistance Provided to AIG and Description of Recent  Execution of Recapitalization Plan. GAO-11-46. January 20, 2011.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Programs and Implementation  of GAO Recommendations. GAO-11-74. January 12, 2011.
Financial Audit: Office of Financial Stability (Troubled Asset Relief  Program) Fiscal Years 2010 and 2009 Financial Statements.  GAO-11-174. November 15, 2010.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Opportunities Exist to Apply Lessons  Learned from the Capital Purchase Program to Similarly Designed  Programs and to Improve the Repayment Process. GAO-11-47.   October 4, 2010.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Bank Stress Test Offers Lessons as  Regulators Take Further Actions to Strengthen Supervisory Oversight.  GAO-10-861. September 29, 2010.
Financial Assistance: Ongoing Challenges and Guiding Principles  Related to Government Assistance for Private Sector Companies.   GAO-10-719. August 3, 2010.
Management Report: Improvements are Needed in Internal Control Over  Financial Reporting for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.   GAO-10-743R. June 30, 2010.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury’s Framework for Deciding to  Extend TARP Was Sufficient, but Could be Strengthened for Future  Decisions. GAO-10-531. June 30, 2010.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Further Actions Needed to Fully and  Equitably Implement Foreclosure Mitigation Programs. GAO-10-634.  June 24, 2010.
Debt Management: Treasury Was Able to Fund Economic Stabilization  and Recovery Expenditures in a Short Period of Time, but Debt  Management Challenges Remain. GAO-10-498. May 18, 2010.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Update of Government Assistance  Provided to AIG. GAO-10-475. April 27, 2010.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Automaker Pension Funding and  Multiple Federal Roles Pose Challenges for the Future. GAO-10-492.   April 6, 2010.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Home Affordable Modification Program  Continues to Face Implementation Challenges. GAO-10-556T.   March 25, 2010.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Needs to Strengthen Its  Decision-Making Process on the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan  Facility. GAO-10-25. February 5, 2010.
Financial Audit: Office of Financial Stability (Troubled Asset Relief  Program) Fiscal Year 2009 Financial Statements. GAO-10-301.  December 9, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Continued Stewardship Needed as  Treasury Develops Strategies for Monitoring and Divesting Financial  Interests in Chrysler and GM. GAO-10-151. November 2, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Capital Purchase Program Transactions  for October 28, 2008, through September 25, 2009, and Information on  Financial Agency Agreements, Contracts, Blanket Purchase Agreements,  and Interagency Agreements Awarded as of September 18, 2009.   GAO-10-24SP. October 8, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: One Year Later, Actions Are Needed to  Address Remaining Transparency and Accountability Challenges.   GAO-10-16. October 8, 2009.
Debt Management: Treasury Inflation Protected Securities Should Play a  Heightened Role in Addressing Debt Management Challenges.   GAO-09-932. September 29, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Government Assistance  Provided to AIG. GAO-09-975. September 21, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Actions Needed to Make the  Home Affordable Modification Program More Transparent and  Accountable. GAO-09-837. July 23, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Capital Purchase Program Transactions  for October 28, 2008, through March 20, 2009, and Information on  Financial Agency Agreements, Contracts, Blanket Purchase Agreements,  and Interagency Agreements Awarded as of June 1, 2009. GAO-09-707SP.  June 17, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: June 2009 Status of Efforts to Address  Transparency and Accountability Issues. GAO-09-658. June 17, 2009.
Auto Industry: Summary of Government Efforts and Automakers’  Restructuring to Date. GAO-09-553. April 23, 2009.
Small Business Administration’s Implementation of Administrative  Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.   GAO-09-507R. April 23, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Capital Purchase Program Transactions  for the Period October 28, 2008 through March 20, 2009 and  Information on Financial Agency Agreements, Contracts, and Blanket  Purchase Agreements Awarded as of March 13, 2009. GAO-09-522SP.  March 31, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: March 2009 Status of Efforts to Address  Transparency and Accountability Issues. GAO-09-504. March 31, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Efforts to Address  Transparency and Accountability Issues. GAO-09-296. January 30, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. January 22, 2009.
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Additional Actions Needed to Better  Ensure Integrity, Accountability, and Transparency. GAO-09-161.  December 2, 2008.
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