Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions Are Needed to Address Corrosion Issues
Published: 2007-04-30T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Corrosion can have a deleterious effect on military equipment and infrastructure in terms of cost, readiness, and safety. Recognizing this concern, the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003 required the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate an official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion. Recently, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006 directed GAO to examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion prevention and mitigation programs. In addition, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in acquiring weapon systems. GAO reviewed strategy documents, reviewed corrosion prevention planning for 51 recent major weapon system acquisitions, and interviewed DOD and military service officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD continues to have problems that hinder progress in implementing its corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy. While it has created a Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, that office lacks the ability to oversee and coordinate its efforts throughout DOD, as envisioned by Congress. For example, DOD's office does not review all of the services' proposed funding requests for corrosion programs, even though it is required to do so, because DOD has not directed the services to provide such information and none of the services has a designated official or office to oversee and coordinate servicewide corrosion activities. Without comprehensive reviews of the services' corrosion-related programs and proposed funding requests, the office cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination role. DOD has made some progress in identifying corrosion cost impacts, but it has not identified readiness and safety impacts. It recently completed corrosion cost impact studies for Army ground vehicles and Navy ships, identifying an estimated $4.5 billion in annual corrosion costs. Although the studies provided potentially useful data for reducing these costs, DOD has not developed an action plan to apply these data to developing corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies. Without an action plan, it could miss opportunities to achieve long-term cost savings. DOD has not yet developed results-oriented metrics, although GAO has previously recommended that it do so. Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to address these issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain elusive goals and opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety problems will be lost. Most of the weapon system acquisition programs GAO reviewed had not incorporated key elements of DOD corrosion prevention guidance. GAO found that only 14 of the 51 programs reviewed had both corrosion prevention plans and advisory teams, as encouraged in the DOD guidance. The primary reason most programs did not have these two elements is that they are not mandatory. As a result, these programs may be missing opportunities to prevent and mitigate corrosion.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) spends an estimated $10 billion to     $20 billion each year on corrosion-related maintenance on weapon  systems and infrastructure. Corrosion can affect mission readiness by  taking critical systems out of action. It also affects safety. For example,  since 1985, the Army has reported over 50 aircraft accidents, including 12  fatalities, caused by corrosion. Incorporating corrosion prevention  planning early in the acquisition process is the most effective way to  reduce and perhaps avoid corrosion impacts in terms of costs, readiness  and safety.
In recognition of the harm that corrosion can cause, Congress enacted, as  part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year  2003, legislation that requires DOD to designate a senior official or  organization responsible for preventing and mitigating the corrosion of  military equipment and infrastructure. The authorization act requires the  designated official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts  throughout the department, recommend policy guidance, and review the  corrosion prevention and mitigation programs and funding levels  proposed by each military service that will enable them to make  recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The authorization act also  requires the official to provide oversight and coordination of the efforts  within the Department to prevent or mitigate corrosion throughout the life  cycle of military equipment and infrastructure and to monitor DOD  acquisition practices to ensure that corrosion prevention technologies and  treatments are fully considered during research and development phases  of the acquisition process and are incorporated in each acquisition  program to the extent deemed appropriate. In addition, the authorization  act directs the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a long-term  strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on DOD’s  military equipment and infrastructure. In response to this act, DOD  created the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion Office)  within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics and in December 2003 developed a long-term  strategy to reduce corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure. As  part of the strategy, DOD is developing a corrosion baseline to identify the  effects of corrosion on cost, readiness, and safety.
Since the passage of the Defense Authorization Act of 2003, we have  issued several reports on corrosion. Among other things, we have found  that DOD and the services do not have an effective approach to prevent  and mitigate corrosion, DOD’s long-term strategy falls short of a  comprehensive strategic plan, and the Army is not adequately storing land- based pre-positioned equipment to protect it from corrosion. In 2003, we  recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan for corrosion prevention  and mitigation that included standardized methodologies for collecting  and analyzing corrosion cost, readiness, and safety data; clearly defined  goals, outcome-oriented objectives, and performance measures;  identification of the level of resources needed to accomplish goals and  objectives; and mechanisms to coordinate and oversee prevention and  mitigation projects across the department. In 2004 we further  recommended that DOD accelerate completion of its corrosion baseline,  establish a funding mechanism to implement the corrosion strategy, and  submit to Congress a report identifying the long-term funding and  personnel resources needed to implement the strategy. DOD concurred  with all of these recommendations.
In response to a request of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics, the Defense Science Board issued a report in  October 2004 on DOD’s efforts for corrosion control, referring to “the  importance of leadership commitment and proper incentives for ensuring  corrosion is considered early and often in decisions” and calling for an  increased commitment on the part of DOD to prevent and mitigate  corrosion. This report found that corrosion prevention has not been a  priority across DOD, and it made 17 recommendations, most of which  DOD concurred with. Specifically, DOD concurred on 11, partially  concurred on 4, and did not concur on 2. Appendix I contains a complete  list of Defense Science Board recommendations and DOD’s responses. Of  the recommendations with which DOD concurred, it has taken actions to  incorporate some into its strategy document and to begin implementing  some of those. According to our assessment, only minimal changes have  been made to DOD’s corrosion strategy in response to the  recommendations contained in the report of the Defense Science Board.
The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006 directed us to  examine the effectiveness of DOD’s corrosion prevention and mitigation  programs. Specifically, we examined the extent to which DOD has  implemented its corrosion strategy in its oversight of funding; its  identification of cost, readiness, and safety impacts through its corrosion  baseline study; and its development of results-oriented metrics. In  addition, as agreed with your offices, we evaluated the extent to which  DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in the acquisition of  major weapon systems.
In performing our work, we used the requirements for the DOD corrosion  strategy set forth in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of  Fiscal Year 2003, along with our previous recommendations, as a baseline  for evaluating DOD’s corrosion prevention efforts. We reviewed DOD and  service guidance relating to corrosion prevention, and we interviewed  officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Army, the  Air Force, and the Navy. We also gathered and reviewed information about  corrosion prevention planning from a nonprobability sample of 51 major  defense acquisition programs. The sample was based on the programs  contained in DOD’s Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense Acquisition Program  List. We reviewed documents from these programs, including their  acquisition plans and corrosion prevention plans. A detailed description of  our scope and methodology is presented in appendix II. We conducted our  work from April 2006 through January 2007 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics has been designated DOD’s Corrosion  Executive. The Corrosion Executive is supported by staff assigned to the  Corrosion Office. The Corrosion Office was initially established in 2003 as  an independent activity within the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, reporting directly to  the Corrosion Executive. In 2004, the Corrosion Office was formally  assigned to the Defense Systems Directorate. The direct chain of  command went through the Defense Systems Directorate, which provided  management and administrative support. Following a reorganization of the  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization in 2006, the Corrosion  Office was moved to the Systems and Software Engineering Directorate.  The Corrosion Office no longer reports directly to the Corrosion  Executive. Appendix III depicts DOD’s organizational structure to address  corrosion.
The Corrosion Office is led by the Special Assistant for Corrosion Policy  and Oversight and works closely with the Corrosion Prevention and  Control Integrated Product Team, which has representatives from the  military services and other DOD organizations to accomplish the goals and  objectives of the Corrosion Office. Several working teams have also been  established to conduct work in the seven areas making up the corrosion  strategy: policy and requirements; impact, metrics, and sustainment;  science and technology; communications and outreach; facilities; training  and doctrine; and specifications, standards, and product qualification.
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook contains guidance regarding the  defense acquisition system, which exists to manage the nation’s  investments in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to  achieve the National Security Strategy and support the United States  Armed Forces. This guidebook contains specific guidance regarding  acquisition strategies, which define the approach a program manager will  use to achieve program goals. Among other things, an effective strategy  minimizes the time and cost required to satisfy approved capability needs.  DOD’s directive on the defense acquisition process states that program  managers shall consider corrosion prevention and mitigation when making  trade-off decisions that involve cost, useful service, and effectiveness.
Moreover, on November 12, 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a policy memorandum  stating that corrosion prevention should be specifically addressed at the  earliest phases of the acquisition process by decision authorities at every  level.
section_title: DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in Implementing Its Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategy
paragraphs: DOD has had long-standing problems in funding, identification of impacts,  and development of metrics, and these are continuing. DOD’s  implementation of its long-term corrosion strategy, as required under 10  U.S.C. § 2228(c), has been hindered by weaknesses in these three critical  areas. First, the Corrosion Office does not review the services’ corrosion  programs or annual budget requests, even though this is required by 10  U.S.C. § 2228(b)(3). Second, the Corrosion Office has made only minimal  progress in identifying corrosion impacts. Third, the Corrosion Office has  not developed results-oriented metrics, even though we have previously  recommended that it do so.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Corrosion Office Does Not Review All of the Military Services’ Funding Requests
paragraphs: Although 10 U.S.C. § 2228(b)(3) requires the Corrosion Office within OSD  to review the annual funding requests for the prevention and mitigation of  corrosion for each military service, the Corrosion Office has not done so.  The Corrosion Office does not review comprehensive corrosion data from  the services on their programs and funding requests because (1) DOD has  not required the services to provide budget information to the Corrosion  Office and (2) the services lack an effective mechanism for coordinating  with the Corrosion Office with respect to their corrosion funding requests.  None of the four services has a designated official or office to oversee and  coordinate corrosion activities, including identifying annual servicewide  funding requirements. Without a requirement or mechanism for reporting  service funding information, the Corrosion Office officials said they are  unable to review the services’ complete corrosion-related funding  information, and thus DOD is hampered in its ability to provide oversight  of the services’ funding requests.
The Corrosion Office currently has oversight over only a small portion of  departmentwide corrosion spending that is provided through a separate  appropriations account. The Corrosion Office reviews and selects for  funding the projects that are proposed by the services based on a  combination of criteria, including: whether a project would benefit more  than one service, whether it is projected to be completed within 2 years of  its initial funding, the availability of matching funds; and the return on  investment that it offers. For fiscal year 2006, DOD and the military  services funded about $24 million for corrosion strategy efforts. Of this  amount, $19 million was spent on 29 corrosion-related projects and about  $5 million on contractor support, training, outreach, and other  administrative activities. The DOD Corrosion Office projects a combined  average return on investment of 42.5 to 1 for the $19 million, or a projected  savings of $809 million over the life of the projects.
The services frequently bypass the Corrosion Office to obtain their funding  for corrosion-related efforts. We reviewed the President’s budget  justification for fiscal year 2006 and identified more than $97 million for  service-specific corrosion mitigation-related projects in addition to those  reviewed by the Corrosion Office. These projects had not been submitted  to the Corrosion Office for review, and Corrosion Office officials told us  that they lacked any information about the $97 million and the status of  the associated efforts. Because corrosion-related projects may be included  under other maintenance projects or budget accounts, it is likely that there  is more funding that we have not identified. According to recent corrosion  cost studies conducted by DOD, the annual corrosion costs for Army  ground vehicles and Navy ships alone were identified to be $2.019 billion  and $2.438 billion, respectively. Without comprehensive reviews of the  services’ corrosion-related programs and proposed funding requests, the  Corrosion Office cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination role for the  department.
None of the four services has a designated official or office to oversee and  coordinate corrosion activities, despite a recommendation by the Defense  Science Board that they do so. Currently, multiple offices in the services  are responsible for corrosion programs and related budgets. For example,  several Air Force offices are responsible for corrosion-related matters:  maintenance issues belong to the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and  Control Office, corrosion policy for weapon systems is managed by an  office within the Air Force Maintenance Directorate, and corrosion policy  for infrastructure is handled by the Air Force Civil Engineering  Directorate. None of these offices has comprehensive knowledge about  corrosion activities throughout the Air Force. Without a designated official  or office for corrosion, the services do not have the mechanism or  capability to fully identify their annual servicewide corrosion funding  requirements.
section_title: Progress in Identifying Corrosion Impacts Has Been Minimal
paragraphs: DOD has acknowledged since 2002 that the identification of cost,  readiness, and safety impacts is critical to the implementation of its  corrosion strategy. We recommended in 2003 that DOD complete a study  to identify these impacts, and further recommended in 2004 that DOD  accelerate its efforts in order to complete the baseline prior to its original  estimated date of 2011. According to DOD, the purpose of the study is to  document where corrosion problems exist, identify their causes, and  prioritize them for funding according to their relative severity in terms of  their impact on DOD costs, readiness, and safety.
In August 2004, after developing a cost-estimating methodology, a DOD  contractor began a study to determine the total cost of corrosion for  military equipment and facilities across the services. DOD currently plans  to complete this cost study by 2009, 2 years earlier than originally planned.  The study uses fiscal year 2004 costs as a measurement baseline and  consists of several segments, to be completed sequentially. To date, it has  made some progress in identifying corrosion cost impacts. For example, in  April 2006, DOD completed the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship  corrosion segments of this study. Several segments remain to be  completed, including Army and Marine Corps aviation. Corrosion Office  officials told us that progress has been slower than expected, primarily  because of a lack of corrosion data. Table 1 shows the corrosion cost  segments included in the study and their planned completion dates.
The two completed studies generated data that could be potentially useful  for developing initiatives aimed at reducing long-term corrosion costs, but  DOD lacks an action plan for using these data. For example, the studies  estimate the annual corrosion costs for Army ground vehicles and Navy  ships at $2.019 billion and $2.438 billion, respectively. Costs are segregated  in multiple ways, such as costs incurred at the depot, organizational, and  intermediate maintenance levels; costs incurred while addressing a  corrosion problem (corrective); costs incurred while addressing a  potential problem (preventive); and direct costs incurred on end items or  removable parts. However, the Corrosion Office has not developed an  action plan on how it will use these data, or the data expected from future  cost studies, to develop corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies.  Without an action plan, DOD could miss opportunities for achieving long- term corrosion cost savings.
Finally, although it acknowledges the importance of identifying corrosion  impacts related to readiness and safety, DOD has made virtually no  progress in assessing these impacts. DOD officials told us that they  decided to identify cost impacts before they identify readiness and safety  impacts because more information is available regarding costs, and  identifying cost impacts is an important step towards identifying readiness  and safety impacts. They said that some of their efforts will shift to  readiness and safety as the cost impact study approaches completion.
section_title: DOD Has Not Yet Developed Results- Oriented Corrosion Metrics
paragraphs: In June 2004, we reported that DOD lacked results-oriented metrics in its  corrosion strategy and, as a result, could not effectively monitor progress  toward achieving the goals of the corrosion strategy. In May 2005, DOD  updated its November 2004 long-term corrosion strategy, but the update  still does not contain results-oriented metrics for measuring progress  toward targeted, quantifiable goals. In the strategy update, DOD has  catalogued the aspects of corrosion prevention cost, readiness, and safety  impacts that will need to be measured, but it has not quantified them or  linked them with targets for improvement. For example, on a table entitled  “Potential Revised Metrics Set”, under the column of safety impacts, the  “facilities incidents” entry is linked with the description “events over time  related to corrosion.” No measurable outcomes are associated with either  the designated impact or the description. In addition, DOD officials told us  that they cannot establish quantifiable goals regarding corrosion costs  until they have completed the corrosion cost baseline, which, as noted  earlier, DOD plans to complete sometime in 2009. These officials said that  metrics for readiness and safety will likely take several additional years to  complete because less information is available regarding readiness and  safety impacts than information regarding cost impacts. They told us that  the accompanying definitions and procedures will also take several years  to complete.
section_title: Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not Incorporated Key Elements of Corrosion Prevention Planning
paragraphs: The Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning Guidebook encourages  the establishment of corrosion prevention and control plans and corrosion  prevention advisory teams as early as possible in the acquisition process.  However, only 14 of the 51 programs we reviewed actually had both plans  and advisory teams. DOD acquisition program officials have taken diverse  approaches to corrosion prevention planning. We found that one reason  why most programs did not have corrosion prevention plans or corrosion  prevention advisory teams is that while they are strongly suggested, these  elements are not mandatory.
subsections: section_title: DOD Guidance Encourages Corrosion Prevention Plans and Advisory Teams
paragraphs: The guidebook developed by the Corrosion Office is intended to assist  acquisition program managers in developing and implementing effective  corrosion prevention and control programs for military equipment and  infrastructure. According to the Corrosion Prevention and Control  Guidebook, the corrosion prevention and control plan and the corrosion  prevention advisory team should be established as early as possible in the  acquisition process. DOD officials told us that establishing both a plan and  a team is critical to effective corrosion prevention planning, and they  strongly recommend that corrosion prevention planning begin at the start  of the technology development phase of acquisition (Milestone A), when  the effort is made to determine the appropriate set of technologies to be  integrated into the weapon system. They said it should certainly occur no  later than the system development and demonstration phase (Milestone  B), when the first system and long lead procurement for follow-on systems  may be authorized. According to the guidebook, a corrosion prevention  and control plan should address a number of things, including system  design, including materials and processes to be used for corrosion  prevention and control, and should define the membership and  organization of the corrosion prevention advisory team. The team should  be actively involved in the review of design considerations, material  selections, costs, and any documentation that may affect corrosion  prevention and control throughout the life cycle of the system or facility.  Members should include representatives from the contractors and DOD. In  addition to this DOD guidance, the individual services have issued  guidance that also calls for incorporating corrosion prevention planning  during acquisition of weapon system programs.
section_title: Few Programs Have Both Corrosion Plans and Teams
paragraphs: Most of the acquisition programs we reviewed did not have either plans or  advisory teams for corrosion prevention and control. We reviewed a  nonprobability sample of 51 major defense acquisition programs from the  Army, Navy, and Air Force and found that only 14 of them had both  corrosion prevention and control plans and corrosion prevention advisory  teams. A total of 20 programs had developed corrosion prevention and  control plans, and 18 had established advisory teams. Of the 51 programs,  27 had neither a plan nor an advisory team. Tables 2 and 3 list, by service,  the number of programs we reviewed that had developed corrosion  prevention and control plans and established corrosion prevention  advisory teams. Appendix IV contains information on specific programs  that we reviewed.
section_title: Service Acquisition Officials Cite Diverse Approaches Taken to Corrosion Prevention Planning
paragraphs: Service acquisition officials told us that they retain broad discretion in  developing individual approaches to corrosion prevention planning. We  found that planning is inconsistently performed, and that so many  different approaches are taken within and among the services that DOD is  unable to maintain the oversight needed to ensure that corrosion  prevention is being effectively conducted. For example, the degree to  which corrosion prevention planning is performed depends on the  initiative of the respective acquisition program offices. The Air Force’s C- 17A Globemaster program had a corrosion prevention plan and corrosion  prevention team in place early in the acquisition process, several months  before it obtained approval to proceed with full-scale development. C-17  officials told us that they took a proactive approach to avoid the corrosion  problems experienced by the C-5 and KC-135 programs. In contrast, the  Javelin program managed by the Army has not established a corrosion  prevention plan or corrosion prevention team, even though the system  development and most of its production objectives have been completed.  Javelin program officials told us that they have extensive corrosion  prevention requirements in the system development specification and have  obtained the advice of corrosion prevention experts located at the  Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center.
Further, some program officials told us that specific corrosion prevention  plans and corrosion advisory teams were not needed because other  documents and processes provide the same function. The Navy’s SSN 774  Class submarine program did not have a specific corrosion prevention  plan or corrosion prevention advisory team because the program relied  heavily on detailed specifications and technical documents and on the  experience of similarly designed submarines.
Officials from some programs said it was too early in the acquisition  process for them to have a plan or team, while those from other programs  claimed it was too late. The Air Force KC-135 Replacement program  officials told us they do not have a corrosion prevention plan or team  because their system is still in the early development phase and they have  yet to establish firm dates for their program design reviews. In contrast,  Army High Mobility Artillery Rocket System program officials said that it  is not sensible to have a corrosion prevention plan or team at this time  because their program is currently in full rate production.
Some programs we reviewed did not have a corrosion prevention plan or  team because program officials told us that upgrades to existing weapon  systems may be covered by an existing corrosion prevention plan or team.  On the one hand, the Airborne Warning and Control System Block 40/45  upgrade program is a modification to the prime mission equipment of the  E-3 aircraft. This program does not have its own corrosion prevention and  control team or corrosion prevention advisory team, but rather is covered  by the existing plan and team for the E-3 aircraft. On the other hand, a  different Air Force program we reviewed represents an upgrade to the  avionics system of the existing C-5 aircraft, and its officials told us that  corrosion prevention issues are more appropriately addressed at the C-5  aircraft program level. These officials told us that while the C-5 program  has an existing corrosion prevention advisory team, it does not currently  have a current corrosion prevention plan, though one is under  development and expected to be completed at the end of May 2007.
We found that one reason most programs have not prepared corrosion  prevention plans or established corrosion prevention advisory teams is  that these elements are not mandatory. Major acquisition programs  perform corrosion prevention planning at their discretion, and that may or  may not include having a corrosion prevention plan, a corrosion  prevention advisory team, or both. Further, these programs are not  required to provide the Corrosion Office information regarding corrosion  prevention planning. As a result, the Corrosion Office could not effectively  monitor DOD acquisition practices to ensure that corrosion prevention  technologies and techniques are being fully considered and incorporated  when appropriate. Moreover, these programs may be missing  opportunities to prevent future corrosion and thereby mitigate the impacts  of corrosion on the costs, readiness, and safety of military equipment.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: More than 4 years have passed since Congress enacted legislation  requiring DOD to establish a corrosion prevention and mitigation program,  yet DOD has not met Congress’s expectations. Since the passage of this  legislation, we have issued several reports on corrosion and made  numerous recommendations to strengthen DOD’s ability to combat  corrosion. Further, the Defense Science Board has called for an increased  commitment on the part of DOD to prevent and mitigate corrosion,  referring to “the importance of leadership commitment and proper  incentives for ensuring corrosion is considered early and often in  decisions.”
DOD’s progress in implementing its corrosion strategy has been stymied  by critical weaknesses. These include the absence of DOD guidance  directing the services to provide the Corrosion Office with comprehensive  data about their annual funding requirements for corrosion prevention and  mitigation, the absence of a designated corrosion official or corrosion  office within each of the services, and the absence of a DOD action plan to  guide use of data in the corrosion cost study to achieve long-term cost  savings. Furthermore, the lack of a DOD requirement for all major defense  acquisition programs to have both a corrosion prevention plan and a  corrosion prevention team could lead to inadequate corrosion prevention  and, consequently, long-term corrosion problems throughout the life cycle  of weapon systems. These and other weaknesses that we have raised in  our previous reports severely hinder DOD’s ability to combat corrosion.  Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to addressing these  issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain an elusive goal and  opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety  problems will be lost.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To effectively implement DOD’s corrosion strategy and meet  congressional expectations expeditiously, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics provide the necessary leadership and  commitment to take the following four actions.
To ensure that DOD’s Corrosion Office provides oversight and  coordination of the services’ proposed funding requests for corrosion  prevention and mitigation programs, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics to require the military services to provide comprehensive data  about their annual funding requirements for corrosion prevention and  mitigation efforts to the DOD Corrosion Office, before annual funding  requests are sent to Congress.
Direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to designate a  corrosion official or a corrosion office within each service that is  responsible for corrosion prevention and mitigation, and that the  responsibilities of this official or office include identifying the annual  funding requirements for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts  throughout the service.
To ensure that DOD does not miss opportunities for achieving long-term  corrosion cost savings, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics to develop an action plan for using the information contained in  the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship segments of DOD’s cost impact  study. This plan should be completed as expeditiously as possible and be  updated in time to support the fiscal year 2009 budget request. This plan  should include information on corrosion cost areas having the highest  priority and a strategy for reducing these costs. DOD should develop  comparable action plans for the information to be derived from cost  segments completed in the future.
To improve DOD’s ability to avoid or limit corrosion problems  experienced by weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense:    Require major defense acquisition programs to prepare a corrosion  prevention plan and establish a corrosion prevention advisory team as  early as possible in the acquisition process.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred  with each of our four recommendations. In its response, DOD cited  actions it planned to take which are generally responsive to our  recommendations. In addition, the department provided several technical  comments which we considered and incorporated where appropriate.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix V.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the military  services to provide comprehensive data about their annual funding  requirements for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts to the DOD  Corrosion Office before annual funding requests are sent to Congress.  DOD stated that a draft Corrosion Prevention and Control Department of  Defense Instruction will require the military departments during the  annual internal DOD budget process to submit information on the  proposed corrosion programs and funding levels to the DOD Corrosion  Executive. We believe this action is long overdue and is a step in the right  direction if implemented. However, it remains uncertain when the  instruction will be approved and what it will look like when finalized.  Although the instruction was expected to be approved in November 2006,  according to DOD officials, it is still undergoing revision. In addition, the  draft instruction, as it is currently written, does not provide enough detail  regarding the identification and submission of comprehensive data for  funding associated with all corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts  throughout DOD. For example, the draft instruction does not specify the  type of funding information that is to be obtained by the services and  reported to the DOD Corrosion Office. DOD also commented that  corrosion prevention and mitigation activities are funded through many  different sources, no program elements exist in the military departments  that directly tie to corrosion, and many activities are funded to complete  corrosion-related work but are not identified as such in budget documents.  However, as we stated in our report, we reviewed the President’s budget  justification for fiscal year 2006 and were able to readily identify more  than $97 million for service-specific corrosion mitigation-related projects  for which the Corrosion Office lacked any information.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries of  the Army, Navy, and Air Force designate a corrosion official or a corrosion  office within each service to be responsible for corrosion prevention and  mitigation, and that the responsibilities of this official or office should  include identifying the annual funding requirements for corrosion  prevention and mitigation efforts throughout the service. DOD stated that  the same draft DOD Instruction cited in response to the first  recommendation also specifies that the heads of DOD components shall  designate a senior individual or office for oversight of corrosion matters,  and it directs the Secretaries of the military departments to support this  individual or office. DOD stated that the Air Force has already designated  such an official. The draft instruction as it pertains to each service having  a corrosion executive or a corrosion office responsible for corrosion  prevention and mitigation is responsive to our recommendation if  implemented.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop an action  plan for using the information contained in the Army ground vehicle and  Navy ship segments of DOD’s cost impact study. In response, DOD stated  that it would be impractical to develop an action plan in time to be used  for the 2008 budget cycle. While our recommendation was intended for  DOD to develop an action plan as soon as possible to support near-term  funding decisions for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts, we  agree that DOD can not do this in time to be used for the 2008 budget  cycle. Therefore, we have modified our recommendation to say that DOD  develop an action plan as expeditiously as possible and revise the plan in  time to support the fiscal year 2009 budget request. DOD also stated that  the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan already  includes a requirement to select and fund corrosion research projects and  integrated product team activities to enhance and improve corrosion  prevention and mitigation throughout DOD. DOD further stated that the  Military Departments assess and make priorities regarding corrosion  based, in part, on funding for the “Top Ten” high cost of corrosion- vulnerable systems. While these efforts may have merit, we still believe  that an action plan would provide additional benefits as we recommend.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require every major  defense acquisition program to prepare a corrosion prevention plan and  establish a corrosion prevention advisory team as early as possible in the  acquisition process. DOD stated that a corrosion prevention control plan  will be developed for all ACAT I programs before preliminary design  review and implementation will be reviewed at each milestone. DOD noted  that the establishment of a separate, formal Corrosion Prevention  Advisory Team may not be necessary for all program levels, though such a  team will be established for all ACAT I programs. DOD’s response is  essentially responsive to our recommendation if carried out. In subsequent  discussions DOD officials told us that they partially concurred because the  response in some respects goes beyond our recommendation by requiring  that all ACAT I programs have a corrosion prevention control plan and  corrosion prevention advisory team.
In addition to providing comments to our recommendations, DOD  commented about our statement that the development of metrics for  readiness and safety will likely take several additional years to complete  because DOD officials have placed a higher priority on completing the cost  impact studies. DOD commented that this is an inaccurate and dangerous  assertion and implies that the department holds safety and readiness, the  two linchpins of the operation military mind-set, in lower esteem than  cost. In subsequent discussions, DOD officials told us that they decided to  identify cost impacts before they identify readiness and safety impacts  because more information is available regarding costs, and identifying cost  impacts is an important step towards identifying readiness and safety  impacts. We have modified our report by incorporating this statement.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and  interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available  to others upon request. This report will also be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Defense Science Board Recommendations
subsections: section_title: Divide the responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s corrosion effort between three separate organizations: Defense Systems; Logistics, Materiel, and Readiness; and Installations and Engineering.
section_title: Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to implement its  corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy, including the oversight of  funding; identification of cost, readiness, and safety impacts; and the  development of results-oriented metrics, we reviewed DOD’s funding and  progress for corrosion-related projects that it initiated during fiscal years  2005 and 2006. We reviewed the President’s budget justification for fiscal  year 2006 for corrosion-related efforts and met with DOD officials within  the Comptroller’s Office regarding their oversight of the Corrosion Policy  and Oversight Office’s budget. We also met with DOD officials within the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics to assess their oversight of programs and funding levels of the  military services during the annual budget reviews as well as their  monitoring of the services’ acquisition practices. In particular, we met with  officials with the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office responsible for  managing, directing, and reviewing corrosion prevention and mitigation  initiatives. We met with DOD officials involved with developing DOD’s  long-term strategy to prevent and control corrosion. We obtained their  assessments and perspectives on corrosion prevention and mitigation  programs and strategies; obtained and reviewed DOD policies, procedures,  guidelines, and draft instructions for prevention and mitigation of  corrosion on DOD military equipment and infrastructure; and discussed  additional actions that could be taken to further prevent and mitigate  corrosion. We reviewed DOD’s funding requirements for fiscal years 2005  through 2007 and future year projections.
To assess the extent to which the military services’ have incorporated  corrosion prevention planning in the acquisition of major weapon systems,  we conducted a review of 51 major defense acquisition programs from the  Army, Navy, and Air Force. These 51 programs were selected based on a  nonprobability sample of acquisition programs from the Fiscal Year 2006  Major Defense Acquisition Program List approved by the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Navy programs  were about half of the programs on the list. A program is designated a  major acquisition program either by the Secretary of Defense, or because  it is estimated to require a total expenditure of more than $365 million in  research, development, test, and evaluation funds or require a total  expenditure of more than $2.19 billion in procurement funds. Our program  selection represented the functional capability areas for battle space  awareness, focused logistics, force application, force protection, and joint  training and included air, ground, and sea weapon systems. In particular,  we selected and reviewed 13 Army programs, 25 Navy programs, and 13  Air Force programs. We met with officials responsible for managing the  acquisition programs and with officials having primary responsibility for  overseeing corrosion prevention and mitigation within the respective  services. We obtained and reviewed military service policies and  instructions that establish corrosion prevention and control program  requirements. For the acquisition programs we selected, we obtained and  reviewed documents, including the acquisition strategy, acquisition plan,  and corrosion prevention and control plans, as well as related information  establishing corrosion prevention advisory teams and other reports used  for tracking and monitoring corrosion-related design initiatives and  corrections. In particular, we discussed the barriers that exist to more  effectively employing corrosion control at program initiation and  acquisition.
We also reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science Board  report on corrosion control issued in October 2004, and obtained DOD’s  related responses and actions taken to better address its strategy for  corrosion prevention and mitigation. We met with Corrosion Policy and  Oversight Office officials regarding their concurrence and the related  actions taken to date.
We conducted our work from April 2006 through January 2007 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We  did not validate the data provided by DOD. However, we reviewed  available data for inconsistencies and discussed the data with DOD. We  determined that the data used for our review were sufficiently reliable for  our purposes.
section_title: Appendix III: Organizational Structure of DOD’s Corrosion Activities
section_title: Appendix IV: Corrosion Prevention Planning in Selected Major Defense Acquisition Programs
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Harold Reich, Assistant  Director; Leslie Bharadwaja; Larry Bridges; Tom Gosling; K. Nicole Harms;  Charles Perdue; Cheryl Weissman; and Allen Westheimer made key  contributions to this report.