Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Changing Requirements, Technical Issues, and Looming Data Gaps Require Focused Attention
Published: 2012-06-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Environmental satellites provide critical data used in forecasting weather and measuring variations in climate over time. NPOESSa program managed by NOAA, DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administrationwas planned to replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. However, 8 years after a development contract for the NPOESS program was awarded in 2002, the cost estimate had more than doubledto about $15 billion, launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant functionality had been removed from the program, and the programs tri-agency management structure had proven to be ineffective. In February 2010, a presidential task force decided to disband NPOESS and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake separate acquisitions.
GAO was asked to evaluate (1) efforts to transfer responsibilities from the NPOESS program to the separate NOAA and DOD programs, (2) NOAAs progress in developing its satellite system, and (3) NOAAs efforts to mitigate key project risks. To do so, GAO analyzed program management, contract, cost, and risk data, attended executive program reviews, and interviewed agency and contractor officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Following the decision to disband the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program in 2010, both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) made initial progress in transferring key management responsibilities to their separate program offices. Specifically, NOAA established a Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program office, documented its requirements, and transferred existing contracts for earth-observing sensors to the new program. DOD established its Defense Weather Satellite System program office and modified contracts accordingly. However, recent events have resulted in major program changes at both agencies. NOAA plans to revise its program requirements to remove key elements, including sensors and ground-based data processing systems, to keep the program within budget. Further, in early 2012, DOD decided to terminate its program and reassess its requirements.
Over the past year, NOAA has made progress in developing its satellite system, but critical decisions and milestones lie ahead. In October 2011, the JPSS program office successfully launched a satellite originally called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). Data from the satellite are currently being calibrated and validated, and NOAA meteorologists started using selected satellite data products in their weather forecasts in May 2012. Further, the three major components of the JPSS program (the flight, ground, and free-flyer projects) are at different stages of development. Within the flight project, development of the sensors for the first JPSS satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors are experiencing technical issues. The ground project is currently in operation supporting NPP and NOAA is planning to upgrade parts of the ground system infrastructure to increase its security and reliability. The free-flyer project, intended to integrate and launch key instruments that could not be accommodated on the JPSS satellites, is still in a planning stage because NOAA has not yet decided which satellites will host the instruments or when these satellites will launch.
The JPSS program office has implemented elements of an effective risk management process; however, the program still faces significant risks. It does not yet have a cost and schedule baseline in place, the program office is not yet fully staffed, and there will likely be a gap in satellite data lasting 17 to 53 months from the time NPP is projected to cease operations and the first JPSS satellite begins to operate. There are also potential satellite data gaps in the DOD and European polar satellite programs, which provide supplementary information to NOAA forecasts. The JPSS program office is managing the first two risks, but NOAA has not established plans to mitigate potential satellite gaps. Until these risks are mitigated and resolved, civilian and military satellite data users may not have the information they need for timely weather forecasting, thereby risking lives, property, and commerce.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making a recommendation to NOAA to establish mitigation plans to address the risk of satellite data gaps. NOAA agreed with GAOs recommendation and noted that the agency is developing a report to address the risk of data gaps.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System  (NPOESS) program was planned to be a state-of-the-art, environment- monitoring satellite system that would replace two existing polar-orbiting  environmental satellite systems. Managed jointly by the Department of  Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),  the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, and the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the program was  considered critical to the nation’s ability to maintain the continuity of data  required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring through  the year 2026.
However, in the 8 years after the development contract was awarded in  2002, the NPOESS cost estimate had more than doubled—to about $15  billion, launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant  functionality had been removed from the program, and the program’s tri- agency management structure had proven to be ineffective. Importantly,  delays in launching the satellites put the program’s mission at risk. To  address these challenges, a task force led by the White House’s Office of  Science and Technology Policy reviewed the management and  governance of the NPOESS program. In February 2010, the Director of  the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced a decision to  disband the NPOESS acquisition and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD  undertake separate acquisitions, with NOAA responsible for satellites in  the afternoon orbit and DOD responsible for satellites in the early morning  orbit. After that decision, both agencies began developing plans for their  separate programs, called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and  the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), respectively.
This report responds to your request that we (1) evaluate efforts to  transfer management and contract responsibilities from the NPOESS  program to the separate NOAA and DOD programs, (2) assess NOAA’s  progress in developing the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) and  JPSS, and (3) evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks.
To evaluate efforts to transfer management and contract responsibilities  from NPOESS programs to separate NOAA and DOD programs, we  compared NOAA’s and DOD’s plans for establishing program  management offices and transferring contracts to each agency’s actual  accomplishments. We also observed NOAA’s monthly program  management briefings and interviewed NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials  to obtain insights into risks, issues, and transition schedules. To assess  progress in developing the NPP and JPSS satellite systems, we  compared NOAA’s plans for key milestones to its accomplishments and  interviewed agency and contractor officials. We also interviewed key  NOAA and DOD satellite data users to determine their experiences in  working with NPP data as well as their plans for working with JPSS data.  To evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks, we compared the  agency’s risk management process to best practices in risk management  as identified by leading systems engineering organizations, and  interviewed agency officials.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 to June 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details  on our objectives, scope, and methodology are provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate  operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is  managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program  (DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. These satellites obtain  environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather  images and specialized weather products. These satellite data are also  the predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which are  a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including  forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products  and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so  that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and  mitigate its effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor  environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought  conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a variety  of studies such as climate monitoring.
Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position relative to  the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in an almost  north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the  weather and climate. Each satellite makes about 14 orbits a day. As the  earth rotates beneath it, each satellite views the entire earth’s surface  twice a day. Currently, there is one operational POES satellite and two  operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that they cross the  equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In  addition, the government relies on a European satellite, called the  Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite, for satellite observations in   Together, the satellites ensure that, for any region  the midmorning orbit.of the earth, the data provided to users are generally no more than 6  hours old. Besides the operational satellites, six older satellites are in  orbit that still collect some data and are available to provide limited  backup to the operational satellites should they degrade or fail. The last  POES satellite was launched in February 2009. The Air Force plans to  launch its two remaining DMSP satellites as needed. Figure 1 illustrates  the current operational polar satellite constellation.
section_title: Polar Satellite Data and Products
paragraphs: Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into a  variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of radiation  wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely determining  information about the earth’s atmosphere, land surface, oceans, and the  space environment. When first received, satellite data are considered raw  data. To make them usable, processing centers format the data so that  they are time-sequenced and include earth-location and calibration  information. After formatting, these data are called raw data records. The  centers further process these raw data records into channel-specific data  sets, called sensor data records and temperature data records. These  data records are then used to derive weather and climate products called  environmental data records. These environmental data records include a  wide range of atmospheric products detailing cloud coverage,  temperature, humidity, and ozone distribution; land surface products  showing snow cover, vegetation, and land use; ocean products depicting  sea surface temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and  characterizations of the space environment. Combinations of these data  records (raw, sensor, temperature, and environmental data records) are  also used to derive more sophisticated products, including outputs from  numerical weather models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is  a simplified depiction of the various stages of satellite data processing,  and figure 3 depicts examples of two different weather products.
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs  would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994  Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the  two satellite programs into a single satellite program—NPOESS—capable  of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. The converged  program, NPOESS, was considered critical to the nation’s ability to  maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global  climate monitoring. NPOESS satellites were expected to replace the  POES and DMSP satellites in the morning, midmorning, and afternoon  orbits when they neared the end of their expected life spans.
To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency  Integrated Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program  management for the converged system and for satellite operations, the  Air Force responsible for acquisition, and NASA responsible for facilitating  the development and incorporation of new technologies into the  converged system.
When the primary NPOESS contract was awarded in August 2002, the  program was estimated to cost about $7 billion through 2018. The  program was to include the procurement and launch of 6 satellites over  the life of the program, with each satellite hosting a subset of 13  instruments. The planned instruments included 11 environmental  sensors, and two systems supporting specific user services (see table 1).  To reduce the risk involved in developing new technologies and to  maintain climate data continuity, the program planned to launch the NPP   NPP was to demonstrate selected  demonstration satellite in May 2006.instruments that would later be included on the NPOESS satellites. The  first NPOESS satellite was to be available for launch in March 2008.
In the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS encountered  significant technical challenges in sensor development, program cost  growth, and schedule delays. By November 2005, we estimated that the  program’s cost had grown to $10 billion, and the schedule for the first  launch was delayed by almost 2 years. These issues led to a 2006  decision to restructure the program, which reduced the program’s  functionality by decreasing the number of planned satellites from 6 to 4,  and the number of instruments from 13 to 9. As part of the decision,  officials decided to reduce the number of orbits from three (early morning,  midmorning, and afternoon) to two (early morning and afternoon) and to  rely solely on the European satellites for midmorning orbit data.
Even after the restructuring, however, the program continued to  encounter technical issues in developing two sensors, significant tri- agency management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost  increases. Because the schedule delays could lead to satellite data gaps,  in March 2009, agency executives decided to use NPP as an operational  satellite. reach about $15 billion and launch schedules that were delayed by over 5  years, the Executive Office of the President formed a task force, led by  the Office of Science and Technology Policy, to investigate the  management and acquisition options that would improve the NPOESS  program. As a result of this review, in February 2010, the Director of the  Office of Science and Technology Policy announced that NOAA and DOD  would no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead,  each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system.  Specifically, NOAA would be responsible for the afternoon orbit and the  observations planned for the first and third satellites. DOD would be  responsible for the early morning orbit and the observations planned for  the second and fourth satellites. The partnership with the European  satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit was to continue as planned.  When this decision was announced, NOAA immediately began planning  for a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit—called JPSS—and  DOD began planning for a new satellite program in the morning orbit— called DWSS.
Using NPP as an operational satellite means that the satellite’s data will be used to  provide climate and weather products.
subsections: section_title: Overview of Initial NOAA and DOD Plans for Replacement Satellite Programs
paragraphs: After the decision was made to disband the NPOESS program in 2010,  NOAA and DOD began planning for their respective satellite programs.  For NOAA, these plans included:  relying on NASA for system acquisition, engineering, and integration; completing, launching, and supporting NPP; acquiring and launching two satellites for the afternoon orbit, called developing and integrating five sensors on the two satellites;  finding alternate host satellites for selected instruments that would not  be accommodated on the JPSS satellites; and providing ground system support for NPP, JPSS, and DWSS; data  communications for MetOp and DMSP; and data processing for  NOAA’s use of microwave data from an international satellite.
In 2010, NOAA estimated that the life cycle costs of the JPSS program  would be approximately $11.9 billion for a program lasting through fiscal  year 2024, which included $2.9 billion in NOAA funds spent on NPOESS  through fiscal year 2010.
Alternatively, DOD planned that its DWSS program would be comprised  of two satellites, the first to be launched no earlier than 2018. Each  satellite was to have three sensors: a Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer  Suite, a Space Environment Monitor, and a microwave imager/sounder.  As of September 2011, DOD planned to conduct a thorough system  requirements review before finalizing DWSS functionality, cost, and  schedule. Table 2 compares the planned cost, schedule, and scope of the  three satellite programs at different points in time.
We have issued a series of reports on the NPOESS program highlighting  technical issues, cost growth, and key management challenges affecting  the tri-agency program structure. For example, in June 2009, we added  to our previous concerns about the tri-agency oversight of the NPOESS  program. We reported that the Executive Committee responsible for  providing direction to the program was ineffective because the DOD  acquisition executive did not attend committee meetings; the committee  did not track action items to closure; and many of the committee’s  decisions did not achieve the desired outcomes. We also reported that  the program’s cost estimates were expected to rise and that the launch  schedules were expected to be delayed. To help address these issues,  we made recommendations to, among other things, improve executive- level oversight and develop realistic time frames for revising cost and  schedule baselines. Agency officials agreed with our recommendations  and took steps to improve executive oversight.
GAO, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address  Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data, GAO-10-558  (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010). identified. For example, NOAA transferred key staff from the NPOESS  program to the JPSS program and coordinated with the Air Force to  negotiate contract changes.
section_title: Agencies Transferred Responsibilities to Their Respective Programs, but NOAA’s Is Being Downsized, and DOD’s Has Been Terminated
paragraphs: Following the decision to disband NPOESS, both NOAA and DOD were  responsible for transferring key management responsibilities to their  respective programs. This entailed (1) establishing separate program  offices for their respective follow-on programs, (2) establishing  requirements for their respective programs, and (3) transferring contracts  from NPOESS to the new programs.
Both agencies made progress on these activities, but recent events have  resulted in major program changes. Specifically, NOAA established its  JPSS program office, established program requirements, and transferred  most sensor contracts. However, the agency now plans to remove key  requirements, including selected sensors and ground systems, to keep  the program within budget. DOD established its DWSS program office  and modified its contracts accordingly before deciding in early 2012 to  terminate the program and reassess its requirements (as directed by  Congress).
subsections: section_title: NOAA Established the JPSS Program and Contracts for Most Components, but Plans to Modify Requirements to Limit Costs
paragraphs: After the February 2010 decision to disband NPOESS, NOAA transferred  management responsibilities to its new satellite program, defined its  requirements, and transferred contracts to the new program. Specifically,  NOAA established a program office to guide the development of the NPP  and JPSS satellites. NOAA also worked with NASA to establish its  program office to oversee the acquisition, system engineering, and  integration of the satellite program. By 2011, the two agencies had  established separate—but colocated—JPSS program offices, each with  different roles and responsibilities. NOAA’s program office is responsible  for programmatic activities related to the satellites’ development, including  managing requirements, budgets, and interactions with satellite data  users. Alternatively, NASA’s program office is responsible for the  development and integration of the sensors, satellites, and ground  systems. In January 2012, both agencies approved a management  control plan that delineates the two agencies’ roles, responsibilities, and  executive oversight structure.
In September 2011, NOAA established its official requirements document  for the JPSS program. This document defines the components of the  program as well as the expected performance of the satellites and ground  systems. Key components include NPP, the two JPSS satellites, the five  sensors, a distributed ground-based network of satellite data receptor  sites, and four ground-based data processing systems. This system is to  deliver 31 satellite data products within 80 minutes of observation on the  first satellite and within 30 minutes on the second satellite.
Over the 2 years since the decision to disband NPOESS, NOAA has also  been working to transfer and refine the contracts for four of the sensors  that are to be launched on the first JPSS satellite from the Air Force to  NASA. The program completed the transfer of all of the contracts by  September 2011 and then began the process of updating the contracts to  match JPSS’ requirements. This process has been completed for three  sensors (CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS). Program officials expect to finalize  changes to the contract for the last sensor (VIIRS) in June 2012.
While NOAA and NASA have made progress in transferring management  and contract responsibilities from NPOESS to the JPSS program, NOAA  recently decided to modify its requirements in order to limit program  costs. From January to December 2011, the agency went through a cost  estimating exercise for the JPSS program. This exercise included  identifying key program elements, documenting assumptions, performing  historical and parametric analysis to determine reasonable estimates for  the elements, seeking an independent cost estimate, and reconciling the  two estimates. At the end of this exercise, NOAA validated that the cost of  the full set of JPSS functions from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year  2028 would be $11.3 billion. After adding the agency’s sunk costs of $3.3  billion, the program’s life cycle cost estimate totaled $14.6 billion. amount is $2.7 billion higher than the $11.9 billion estimate for JPSS  when NPOESS was disbanded in 2010. According to NOAA officials, this  increase is primarily due to a 4-year extension of the program from 2024  to 2028, the addition of previously unbudgeted items such as the free  flyers, cost growth associated with transitioning contracts from DOD to  NOAA, and the program’s decision to slow down work on lower-priority  elements because of budget constraints in 2011.
NOAA’s $3.3 billion sunk costs included $2.9 billion through fiscal year 2010 and about  $400 million in fiscal year 2011.
In working with the Office of Management and Budget to establish the  president’s fiscal year 2013 budget request, NOAA officials stated that  they agreed to fund JPSS at roughly $900 million per year through 2017,  to merge funding for two climate sensors into the JPSS budget, and to  cap the JPSS life cycle cost at $12.9 billion through 2028. Because this  cap is $1.7 billion below the expected $14.6 billion life cycle cost of the  full program, NOAA decided to remove selected elements from the  satellite program. While final decisions on what will be removed are  expected by the end of June 2012, NOAA may discontinue:  support for OMPS operations on JPSS-1; development of two of the three planned Total and Spectral Solar  Irradiance Sensors, the spacecraft for all three of these sensors, and  the launch vehicle for the three sensors; development of the OMPS and CERES sensors on JPSS-2; plans for a network of ground-based receptor stations; planned improvements in the time it takes to obtain satellite data from  JPSS-2 (the requirement was to provide data in 30 minutes; instead,  the requirement will remain at the JPSS-1 level of 80 minutes); plans to install an Interface Data Processing Segment (IDPS) at two plans to support ground operations for DOD’s future polar satellite  program.
NOAA anticipates modifying its official requirements documents to reflect  these changes by the end of 2012. The removal of these elements will  affect both civilian and military satellite data users. The loss of OMPS and  CERES satellite data could cause a break in the over 30-year history of  satellite data and would hinder the efforts of climatologists and  meteorologists focusing on understanding changes in the earth’s ozone  coverage and radiation budget. The loss of ground-based receptor  stations means that NOAA may not be able to improve the timeliness of  JPSS-2 satellite data from 80 minutes to the current 30 minute  requirement, and as a result, weather forecasters will not be able to  update their weather models using the most recent satellite observations.  Further, the loss of the data processing systems at the two Navy locations  means that NOAA and the Navy will need to establish an alternative way  to provide data to the Navy.
section_title: DOD Established and Subsequently Terminated Its DWSS Program
paragraphs: After the February 2010 decision to disband NPOESS, DOD transferred  management responsibilities to its new satellite program, started defining  its requirements, and modified contracts to reflect the new program.  Specifically, in 2010, DOD established a DWSS program office and  started developing plans for what the satellite program would entail. The  DWSS program office, located at the Space and Missile Systems Center  in Los Angeles, California, was given responsibility for the acquisition,  development, integration, and launch of the DWSS satellites. Because  this is considered a major acquisition, it is overseen by the Defense  Acquisition Board and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics.
In August 2010, the agency determined that the DWSS program would  include two satellites and that each satellite would host three sensors.  Over the following year, the program office developed a program plan and  a technical description, and planned to define requirements in early 2012.  Further, the agency started modifying its existing contracts with the  NPOESS contractor to reflect the new program. By May 2011, the  program office had contracted for DWSS activities through the end of  2012.
These efforts, however, have been halted. In early 2012, with  congressional direction, DOD decided to terminate the DWSS program  because it still has two DMSP satellites to launch and it did not yet need  the DWSS satellites.  In January 2012, the Air Force halted work on the program. DOD is currently identifying alternative means to fulfill its future  environmental satellite requirements.
section_title: NPP Is in Orbit and Transmitting Data; Development of the First JPSS Satellite Has Begun, but Critical Steps Remain
paragraphs: In September 2010, shortly after NPOESS was disbanded, NOAA and  NASA established plans for both NPP and JPSS. These plans included  launching NPP by the end of October 2011 and completing an early  on-orbit check out of the NPP spacecraft and sensors (called  commissioning) by the end of January 2012;  completing all NPP calibration and validation activities2013; and developing, testing, and launching JPSS-1 by the end of 2014 and  JPSS-2 by the end of 2017.
Program officials currently estimate that JPSS-1 will launch by March  2017 and JPSS-2 will launch by December 2022. NOAA officials  explained that part of the reason for the change in launch dates is that the  program’s budget under the 2011 continuing resolution was only one third  of what NOAA had anticipated. Thus, program officials decided to defer  development of the first JPSS satellite in order to keep NPP on track.
NOAA officials noted that the JPSS launch dates could change as the agency finalized  its program planning activities.
subsections: section_title: NPP Is in Orbit; Sensor Data Are Being Calibrated for Use
paragraphs: NPP was successfully launched on October 28, 2011. After launch, NASA  began the process of activating the satellite and commissioning the  instruments. This process ended at the beginning of March 2012, which  was a little over a month after the planned completion date at the end of  January 2012. The delay was caused by an issue on the VIIRS  instrument that caused the program to halt commissioning activities in  order to diagnose the problem. Specifically, the quality of VIIRS data in  certain bands was degrading much more quickly than expected. NASA  and the JPSS program office subsequently identified the problem as  contamination on VIIRS mirrors. NOAA and NASA program officials,  including the JPSS director and project manager, reported that this issue  is not expected to cause the instrument to fall below its performance  specifications. Figure 4 depicts an image of Earth using VIIRS data from  NPP.
Program officials are working to complete NPP calibration and validation  activities by October 2013, but they acknowledge that they may  encounter delays in developing satellite products. NOAA is receiving data  from the five sensors on the NPP satellite, and has begun calibration and  validation. According to NOAA and NASA officials, during this time, the  products go through various levels of validation, including a beta stage  (products have been minimally validated, but are available to users so  that they can begin working with the data); a provisional stage (products  are not optimal, but are ready for operational evaluation by users); and a  validated stage (products are ready for operational use). The amount of  time it takes for a product to be fully validated depends on the sensor and  the type of product. For example, NOAA provided a provisional ozone  environmental data record from the OMPS sensor in April 2012 and  expects to provide three beta environmental data records from the CrIS  sensor by October 2012. NOAA’s users began to use validated ATMS  products in May 2012, and NOAA expects that they will increase the  amount and types of data they use in the following months.
section_title: Development of JPSS Is Under Way; Critical Decisions and Milestones Are Pending
paragraphs: The major components of the JPSS program are at different stages of  development, and important decisions and program milestones lie ahead.  NASA’s JPSS program office organized its responsibilities into three  separate projects: (1) the flight project, which includes sensors,  spacecraft, and launch vehicles; (2) the ground project, which includes  ground-based data processing and command and control systems, and  (3) the free-flyer project, which involves developing and launching the  instruments that are not going to be included on the JPSS satellites.  Table 3 shows the three JPSS projects and their key components.
Within the flight project, development of the sensors for the first JPSS  satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors are experiencing  technical issues and the impact of these issues had not yet been  determined. The ground project is currently in operation supporting NPP,  and NOAA is planning to upgrade selected parts of the ground systems to  increase security and reliability. The free-flyer project is still in a planning  stage because NOAA has not yet decided which satellites will host the  instruments or when these satellites will launch. One of these projects  has recently completed a major milestone and one project has its next  milestone approaching. Specifically, the flight project completed a  separate system requirements review in April 2012, while the ground  project’s system requirements review is scheduled for August 2012.
Because development of the sensors for JPSS-1 began during the  NPOESS era, NASA estimates that as of March 2012, all of the sensors  have been at least 60 percent completed. However, selected sensors are  encountering technical issues and the full impact of these issues on cost  and schedule has not been determined. Further, the program has not yet  made a decision on which launch vehicle will be used. NASA and NOAA  officials reported that the technical issues thus far are routine in nature,  and that they plan to select a launch vehicle by the end of 2012. Table 4  describes the current status of the components of the JPSS-1 flight  project.
While NOAA ground systems for satellite command, control, and  communications and for data processing are currently supporting NPP  operations, the agency plans to upgrade the ground systems to improve  their availability and reliability. In 2010, we reported that NPP’s ground  systems had weaknesses because they were developed using outdated  security requirements approved in 1998. These weaknesses were  highlighted soon after NPP was launched, when the communications links  providing satellite data from the satellite receiver in Svalbard, Norway, to  the United States were severed. NOAA immediately established a  temporary backup capability, and plans to upgrade its communications  systems to establish permanent backup capabilities by the end of 2012.  In addition, NOAA plans to enhance the backup capabilities of its data  processing system infrastructure by November 2015.
The instruments in the free flyer project, including the Total and Spectral  Solar Irradiance Sensor and two user services systems (the Search and  Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system and an Advanced Data  Collection system), are currently under development. However, in early  2012, NOAA decided to consider not launching the Total and Spectral  Solar Irradiance Sensor as an option for staying within its budget cap.  Moreover, the agency is still considering its options for the spacecraft that  will carry the other two instruments to space. For example, it is  considering contracting for a spacecraft or having the instruments hosted  on some other organization’s satellite. Table 5 depicts the status of the  components of the free-flyer project.
section_title: JPSS Risk Management Process in Place; Key Risks Remain
paragraphs: The JPSS program has a structured risk management process in place  and is working to mitigate key program risks; however, NOAA faces key  risks involving the potential for satellite gaps and does not yet have  mitigation plans. According to best practices advocated by leading system  engineering and program management organizations, effective risk  management addresses four key areas: preparing for risk management,  identifying and analyzing risks, mitigating risks, and providing executive  oversight.effective risk management process. Specifically, the program  documented its risk management strategy; identified relevant  stakeholders and designated responsibilities for risk management  activities; established and implemented standards for categorizing and  prioritizing risks; instituted a program to identify, track, and mitigate risks;  and established a process for regularly communicating risks to senior  NASA and NOAA management.
The JPSS program office has implemented elements of an  The JPSS program is working to mitigate the risks of a lack of a cost and  schedule baseline and program office staffing shortfalls, but NOAA has  not established mitigation plans to address the risk of a gap in the  afternoon orbit or potential satellite data gaps in the DOD and European  polar satellite programs, which provide supplementary information to  NOAA forecasts. Because it could take time to adapt grounds systems to  receive alternative satellites’ data, delays in establishing mitigation plans  could leave the agency little time to leverage its alternatives. Until NOAA  identifies its mitigation options, it may miss opportunities to leverage  alternative satellite data sources. Moreover, until NOAA establishes  mitigation plans for a satellite data gap, it runs the risk of not being able to  fulfill its mission of providing weather forecasts to protect lives, property,  and commerce.
subsections: section_title: NOAA Is Working to Mitigate Delays in Establishing Cost and Schedule Baselines
paragraphs: NOAA oversaw the establishment of contracts for the JPSS-1 sensors  and spacecraft and NASA is managing the cost, schedule, and  deliverables on these contracts using discrete task orders, but the  agencies have not established a contractual cost and schedule baseline  that would allow them to monitor contractor deliverables within an earned  value management system.established an overall program baseline that delineates the cost,  schedule, and content of the entire program. Under NASA’s acquisition  life cycle, a program baseline is due at the key decision milestone   In addition, program officials have not yet  scheduled to be completed by July 2013. Managing a program without a  baseline makes it more difficult for program officials to make informed  decisions and for program overseers to understand if the program is on  track to successfully deliver expected functionality on cost and schedule.
Program officials acknowledge that the lack of a baseline is a risk, and  they are tracking it through their risk management program. Program  officials explained that after transferring the contracts from the Air Force  to NASA, they needed to definitize the contracts to reflect JPSS program  requirements instead of NPOESS program requirements. The JPSS  program office has completed this process for three sensors (CrIS,  OMPS, and ATMS) and is working to complete the process for one other  sensor (VIIRS) by June 2012. After definitizing each contract to JPSS  requirements and schedules, NASA and the contractors will perform an  integrated baseline review before implementing an earned value  management system. NOAA officials reported that they are working to  establish contractual baselines as rapidly as practical for each of the  contracts.
Program officials also plan to establish an overall program baseline.  Actions planned to mitigate this risk include establishing a stable and realistic 5-year budget profile, which was  completed in December 2011; refining the program requirements to match the expected budget by  October 2012; definitizing contracts to address any changes in requirements in establishing the overall program baseline by the end of November  2012.
section_title: NOAA Is Working to Mitigate Risks in Program Staffing
paragraphs: NOAA and NASA have not yet fully staffed their respective JPSS program  offices. While having a knowledgeable and capable program  management staff is essential to any acquisition program, it is especially  critical given the history of management challenges on the NPOESS  program. However, NOAA has not yet filled 18 of the 64 positions it plans  for the program office, including those for a program scientist and system  engineers for the JPSS satellite, ground systems, and overall mission. In  addition, NASA has not yet filled 6 positions it plans for its ground project.
Until these positions are filled, other staff members are supporting the  workload and this could delay the schedule for implementing  improvements in the ground systems.
Both agencies are actively tracking their respective program offices’  staffing and plans for filling vacancies. According to NOAA officials, the  agency is mitigating this risk by filling three of the vacant positions with  long-term detailees. Further, NOAA plans to fill most of the positions,  including that of the technical director, by July 2012. NASA has started  the process to fill its vacancies, and plans to fill these by the end of  September 2012.
section_title: NOAA Has Not Established Plans to Mitigate an Expected Gap in Satellite Data Continuity
paragraphs: In September 2011, we reported that NOAA was facing a gap in satellite  data continuity; the risk of that gap is higher today. When NPOESS was  first disbanded, program officials anticipated launching the JPSS satellites  in 2015 and 2018 (while acknowledging that these dates could change as  the program’s plans were firmed up). Over the past year, as program  officials made critical decisions to defer work on JPSS in order to keep  NPP on track, the launch dates for JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 have changed.  Program officials currently estimate that JPSS-1 will be launched by  March 2017 and JPSS-2 will be launched by December 2022.
NOAA officials acknowledge that there is a substantial risk of a gap in  satellite data in the afternoon orbit, between the time when the NPP  satellite is expected to reach the end of its life and the time when the  JPSS-1 satellite is to be in orbit and operational. This gap could span  from 17 months to 3 years or more. In one scenario, NPP would last its  full expected 5-year life (to October 2016), and JPSS-1 would launch as  soon as possible (in March 2017) and undergo on-orbit checkout for a  year (until March 2018). In that case, the data gap would extend 17  months. In another scenario, NPP would last only 3 years as noted by  NASA managers concerned with the workmanship of selected NPP  sensors. Assuming that the JPSS-1 launch occurred in March 2017 and  the satellite data was certified for official use by March 2018, this gap  would extend for 41 months. Of course, any problems with JPSS-1  development could delay the launch date and extend the gap period.  Given the history of technical issues and delays in the development of the  NPP sensors and the current technical issues on the sensors, it is likely  that the launch of JPSS-1 will be delayed. Figure 5 depicts four possible  gap scenarios.
According to NOAA, a data gap would lead to less accurate and timely  weather prediction models used to support weather forecasting, and  advanced warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges,  and floods—would be diminished. To illustrate this, the National Weather  Service performed several case studies to demonstrate how its weather  forecasts would have been affected if there were no polar satellite data in  the afternoon orbit. For example, when the polar satellite data were not  used to predict the “Snowmaggedon” winter storm that hit the Mid-Atlantic  coast in February 2010, weather forecasts predicted a less intense storm,  slightly further east, and producing half of the precipitation at 3, 4, and 5  days before the event. Specifically, weather prediction models under- forecasted the amount of snow by at least 10 inches. The agency noted  that this level of degradation in weather forecasts could place lives,  property, and critical infrastructure in danger.
NOAA officials have communicated publicly and often about the risk of a  satellite data gap; however, the agency has not established plans to  mitigate the gap. NOAA officials stated that the agency will continue to  use existing POES satellites, as well as NPP, as long as they provide  data and that there are no viable alternatives to the JPSS program.  However, it is possible that other governmental, commercial, or  international satellites could supplement the data. If there are viable  options for obtaining data from external sources, it would take time to  adapt NOAA systems to receive, process, and disseminate the data. Until  NOAA identifies these options, it may miss opportunities to leverage  these satellite data sources.
section_title: NOAA Has Not Established Plans to Mitigate the Risk That the Polar Satellite Constellation Is Becoming Increasingly Unreliable
paragraphs: Since its inception, NPOESS was seen as a constellation of satellites  providing observations in the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon  orbits. Having satellites in each of these orbits ensures that satellite  observations covering the entire globe are no more than 6 hours old,  thereby allowing for more accurate weather predictions. Even after the  program was restructured in 2006 and eventually terminated in 2010,  program officials and the administration planned to ensure coverage in  the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon orbits by relying on DOD  satellites for the early morning orbit, the European satellite program for  the midmorning, and NOAA’s JPSS program for the afternoon orbit.  However, recent events have made the future of this constellation  uncertain:
Early morning orbit—As discussed earlier in this report, in early  fiscal year 2012, DOD terminated its DWSS program. While the  agency has two more satellites to launch and is working to develop  alternative plans for a follow-on satellite program, there are  considerable challenges in ensuring that a new program is in place   and integrated with existing ground systems and data networks in  time to avoid a gap in this orbit.
DOD officials stated that they plan to launch DMSP-19 in 2014 and  DMSP-20 when it is needed. If DMSP-19 lasts 6 years, there is a  chance that DMSP will not be launched until 2020. Thus, in a best- case scenario, the follow-on satellites will not need to be launched  until roughly 2026. However, civilian and military satellite experts have  expressed concern that the DMSP satellites are quite old and may not  work as intended. If they do not perform well, DOD could be facing a  satellite data gap in the early morning orbit as early as 2014.
Midmorning orbit—The European satellite organization plans to  continue to launch MetOp satellites that will provide observations in  the midmorning orbit through October 2021. The organization is also  working to define and gain support for the follow-on program, called  the Eumetsat Polar System-2nd Generation program. However, in  2011, NOAA alerted European officials that, because of the  constrained budgetary environment, they will no longer be able to  provide sensors for the follow-on program. Due to the uncertainty  surrounding the program, there is a chance that the first European  follow-on satellite will not be ready in time to replace MetOp at the end  of its expected life. In that case, this orbit, too, would be in jeopardy.
Afternoon orbit—As discussed previously, there is likely to be a gap  in satellite observations in the afternoon orbit that could last well over  one year. While our scenarios demonstrated gaps lasting between 17  and 53 months, NOAA program officials believe that the most likely  scenario involves a gap lasting 18 to 24 months.
Figure 6 depicts the polar satellite constellation and the uncertain future  coverage in selected orbits.
The NOAA Administrator and other senior executives acknowledge the  risk of a data gap in each of the orbits of the polar satellite constellation  and are working with European and DOD counterparts to coordinate their  respective requirements and plans; however, they have not established  plans for mitigating risks to the polar satellite constellation. As in the case  of the anticipated gap in the afternoon orbit, NOAA plans to use older  polar satellites to provide some of the necessary data for the other orbits.  However, it is also possible that other governmental, commercial, or  international satellites could supplement the data. For example, foreign  nations continue to launch polar-orbiting weather satellites to acquire data  such as sea surface temperatures, sea surface winds, and water vapor.  Also, over the next few years, NASA plans to launch satellites that will  collect information on precipitation and soil moisture. If there are viable  options from external sources, it could take time to adapt NOAA systems  to receive, process, and disseminate the data to its satellite data users.  Until NOAA identifies these options and establishes mitigation plans, it  may miss opportunities to leverage alternative satellite data sources.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: After spending about $3.3 billion on the now-defunct NPOESS program,  NOAA officials have established a $12.9-billion JPSS program and made  progress in launching NPP, establishing contracts for the first JPSS  satellite, and enhancing the ground systems controlling the satellites and  processing the satellite data. JPSS program officials are currently working  to calibrate NPP data so that they are useable by civilian and military  meteorologists and to manage the development of sensors for the first  JPSS satellite. In coming months, program officials face changing  requirements, technical issues on individual sensors, key milestones in  developing the JPSS satellite, and important decisions on how to  accommodate instruments that are not included on the JPSS satellite.
While the JPSS program office is working to mitigate risks associated with  not having a program baseline or a fully staffed program management  office, NOAA has not established plans to mitigate the almost certain  satellite data gaps in the afternoon orbit or the potential gaps in the early  and mid-morning orbits. These gaps will likely affect the accuracy and  timeliness of weather predictions and forecasts and could affect lives,  property, military operations, and commerce. Because it could take time  to adapt ground systems to receive an alternative satellite’s data, delays  in establishing mitigation plans could leave the agency little time to  leverage alternatives. Until NOAA identifies its mitigation options, it may  miss opportunities to leverage alternative satellite data sources.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Given the importance of polar-orbiting satellite data to weather forecasts,  we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator  of NOAA to establish mitigation plans for risks associated with pending  satellite data gaps in the afternoon orbit as well as potential gaps in the  early morning and midmorning orbits.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We sought comments on a draft of our report from the Department of  Commerce, DOD, and NASA. We received written comments from the  Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA’s comments. In its  comments, NOAA agreed with the report’s recommendation and noted  that the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service— a NOAA component agency—has performed analyses on how to mitigate  potential gaps in satellite data, but has not yet compiled this information  into a report. The agency plans to provide a report to NOAA by August  2012. The department’s comments are provided in appendix II. The  department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
While neither DOD nor NASA provided comments on the report’s findings  or recommendations, they offered technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the Staff Action Officer for the  Space and Intelligence Office within the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provided technical  comments both orally and via e-mail, and a commander within the Navy’s  Oceanographer staff provided oral technical comments. In addition, the  Project Manager of the JPSS flight project—a NASA employee—provided  technical comments via e-mail.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from  the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this report to interested  congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of  Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this  report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)  512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to (1) evaluate efforts to transfer management and  contract responsibilities from the National Polar-orbiting Operational  Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program to the separate  satellite programs being established at the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Department of Defense (DOD),  (2) assess NOAA’s progress in developing the NPOESS Preparatory  Project (NPP) satellite and the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), and  (3) evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks.
To evaluate efforts to transfer responsibilities from NPOESS to the  separate NOAA and DOD programs, we compared the agencies’ plans  for establishing program management offices, developing program  requirements, and transferring contracts to each agency’s actual  accomplishments. We analyzed key program documents, including  acquisition decision memorandums, requirements documents, and the  management control plan. We observed NOAA’s monthly program  management briefings and obtained detailed briefings on efforts to  establish a program cost estimate, NOAA’s fiscal year 2013 budget for  JPSS, and decisions to remove selected program elements. To assess  the reliability of the program’s cost estimate, we compared agency  documentation of the program office estimate and the independent cost  estimate, and interviewed program officials and cost estimators to  understand key aspects of and differences between the estimates. We  determined that the estimates were sufficient for our purposes of  providing summary data. We interviewed program officials from NOAA,  DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), to  obtain information on transition schedules, progress, program  requirements, and challenges.
To assess NOAA’s progress in developing the NPP and JPSS satellite  systems, we compared NOAA’s plans for key milestones to its actual  accomplishments. We reviewed monthly progress reports, draft program  schedules, and the NPP operational readiness review package. We  observed NOAA’s monthly program management briefings to determine  the status of key components. We interviewed both agency and  contractor officials, including officials at Ball Aerospace, Inc. and  Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, Inc. We also interviewed key  NOAA satellite data users, including officials involved in weather  forecasting and numerical weather prediction, to identify their experiences  in working with NPP data as well as their plans for working with JPSS  data.
To evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks, we compared the  agency’s risk management process to best practices in risk management  as identified by the Software Engineering Institute. We reviewed NOAA’s  program risk lists on a monthly basis to obtain insights into management  issues and actions. We interviewed agency and contractor officials to  evaluate actions to address each transition risk. In addition, we  interviewed NOAA satellite data users to determine the impact of any  changes in requirements.
We performed our work at NASA, NOAA, and DOD offices in the  Washington, D.C., area and at contractor facilities in Los Angeles,  California; Aurora, Colorado; and Boulder, Colorado. We conducted this  performance audit from May 2011 to June 2012 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments by the Department of Commerce
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips (Assistant  Director), Kathleen Lovett Epperson, Kate Feild, Nancy Glover, Franklin  Jackson, and Fatima Jahan made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. GAO-12-207SP.  (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2012).
Polar Satellites: Agencies Need to Address Potential Gaps in Weather  and Climate Data Coverage. GAO-11-945T. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,  2011).
Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to  Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate  Data. GAO-10-558. (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010).
Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data  Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making.  GAO-09-772T. (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).
Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data  Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making.  GAO-09-564 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).
Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces  Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data  Continuity. GAO-08-899T. (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2008).
Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces  Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data  Continuity. GAO-08-518. (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2008).
Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges.   GAO-07-1099T. (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2007).
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is  Under Way, but Challenges and Risks Remain. GAO-07-910T.  (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007).
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is  Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain. GAO-07-498.  (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2007).
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases  Trigger Review and Place Program’s Direction on Hold. GAO-06-573T.  (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006).
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems,  Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off  Decisions. GAO-06-249T. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005).
Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and  Schedule Changes. GAO-04-1054. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004).
Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could Affect  Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users. GAO-03-987T.  (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003).
Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Status, Plans, and Future Data  Management Challenges. GAO-02-684T. (Washington, D.C.: July 24,  2002).