Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Nuclear Security Administration Has Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining Concerns
Published: 2009-09-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Worldwide, about 165 research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program to make security upgrades at foreign research reactors whose security did not meet guidelines established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NNSA's efforts to secure foreign research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected foreign research reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA's security guidelines, and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates the GRRS program with other countries and the IAEA. GAO reviewed NNSA and IAEA documents and visited five of the 22 research reactors in the GRRS program, which were selected on the basis of when upgrades had been completed and because the reactors still possess HEU.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete physical security upgrades at the remaining reactors by 2010 at an additional cost of $6 million. Security upgrades that GAO observed during its site visits include heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel, motion detector sensors and security cameras to detect unauthorized access, and fortified central alarm stations that allow on-site guards the ability to monitor alarms and security cameras and communicate with response forces. Foreign research reactors that have received NNSA upgrades where GAO conducted site visits generally meet IAEA security guidelines; however, in some cases, critical security weaknesses remain. At four of the five reactors visited, GAO identified security conditions that did not meet IAEA guidelines. For example, (1) at two reactors, no emergency response exercises had been conducted between the on-site guard force and off-site emergency response force, and one of these reactors lacked any formal response plans for emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel; and (2) personnel at one research reactor did not search visitors or their belongings before granting them access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present. Furthermore, the government agency charged with regulating the operation of one research reactor has neither developed safety and security regulations nor has the country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories officials responsible for making security upgrades at these reactors acknowledged that these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security at these reactors. Although the officials stressed the importance of NNSA continuing to work with these countries, there are no specific plans to do so after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are completed in 2010. NNSA officials coordinate with foreign government research reactor operators to design, install, and sustain security upgrades. Because the GRRS program is a voluntary and cooperative program, in some cases, NNSA faces challenges obtaining foreign governments' commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one country GAO visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years due to foreign government reluctance in accepting NNSA assistance and delays approving the designed security upgrades. Recently, NNSA has begun working with IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security to establish a sustainability program to help ensure the continued effectiveness of NNSA-funded security upgrades and to help research reactor operators implement security procedures. IAEA plans to conduct pilot programs at three research reactors in 2009 and then expand the program. NNSA will continue to support sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the completion of security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Nuclear research reactors are used for research, training, and  development in many scientific fields, including nuclear engineering,  physics, and medicine. According to the National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the  Department of Energy (DOE), there are about 165 operating research  reactors worldwide that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel.  Concerns exist that terrorists may target research reactors to steal HEU  fuel for use in a nuclear bomb. As little as 25 kilograms of HEU are needed  to construct a nuclear bomb. According to the 2007 National Intelligence  Estimate on the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Homeland Security, al-Qaeda  continues to seek materials for nuclear and radiological weapons and  would not hesitate to use them. Furthermore, the International Atomic  Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides guidelines for the safety and  physical security of civilian nuclear reactors including research reactors,  has determined that the threat of nuclear terrorism remains undiminished  and has concluded that the consequences of a malicious act involving a  nuclear explosive device would be catastrophic. In a January 2009  strategic plan for reducing nuclear and radiological threats worldwide,  NNSA stated that President Obama has identified preventing terrorists  from acquiring nuclear or radiological weapons as the number one  national security priority of his administration.
Starting in 1953, through the Atoms for Peace program, the United States  supplied research reactors and the fuel needed to operate them to many  countries around the world. Similarly, the Soviet Union also assisted  several nations in building research reactors and also supplied them with  fuel. Nuclear technology was provided to these foreign counties in  exchange for a commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. Initially, the  research reactors supplied by the Atoms for Peace program used low  enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which cannot be used in a nuclear bomb,  but many reactors were gradually switched from LEU to HEU fuel. At the  time many of these reactors were built, or subsequently converted to use  HEU, LEU fuels were not capable of producing many of the desired  conditions in research reactors. HEU fuel lasted longer and was less  expensive over time than LEU fuel because the reactors did not need to be  refueled as often. Because of concerns about the threats posed by the  potential theft or diversion of HEU for use in a nuclear bomb, new, more  effective LEU fuels have been and are being developed, which would allow  research reactors to convert from HEU to LEU fuel.
The purpose of DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is to  protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material at civilian sites  worldwide, including research reactors. Administered by NNSA, GTRI has  three goals: (1) to convert research reactors and isotope production  facilities from using HEU to using LEU, (2) to remove and dispose of  excess nuclear and radiological materials, and (3) to protect high-priority  nuclear and radiological materials from theft and sabotage. We reported  on DOE’s progress in achieving the first two goals in 2004.
NNSA seeks to achieve GTRI’s third goal at research reactors worldwide  through its Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program, which is a  voluntary and cooperative program that depends on countries accepting  NNSA assistance to make security improvements. The GRRS program  assesses security, designs security systems, and provides funding for  security upgrades in order to protect vulnerable nuclear material at  research reactors. These upgrades are needed to secure HEU fuel until  permanent threat reduction solutions can be achieved, such as converting  the reactors to LEU fuel and removing the HEU fuel.
Each nation that possesses a research reactor is responsible for the  security of its own research reactors. Since 1972, IAEA has provided its  member states with guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear  material, most recently in 1999. These guidelines contain administrative  and technical measures designed to prevent the sabotage of nuclear  facilities and the theft or other unauthorized diversions of nuclear  material. According to IAEA’s guidelines, a comprehensive physical  protection system to secure nuclear material should include, among other  things,  technical measures such as vaults, perimeter barriers, intrusion sensors,  and alarms;    material control procedures; and    adequately equipped and appropriately trained guard and emergency  response forces.
According to IAEA’s guidelines, member states should ensure that their  national laws ensure the proper implementation of physical protection and  verify continued compliance with physical protection regulations.
Although these IAEA guidelines are not binding on IAEA member states,  the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews applications for  the export of nuclear material, including HEU fuel to foreign research  reactors, to ensure that the recipient country’s physical security measures  are at least comparable to IAEA guidelines for the physical protection of  nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In addition, NNSA has adopted the  IAEA guidelines as a tool to help it determine what security upgrades are  necessary at research reactors in the GRRS program. Using IAEA’s  guidelines, NNSA has developed a GTRI Design Basis Threat (DBT)—an  analysis of the number of adversaries that security forces may face and  how the adversaries may be equipped—that the GRRS program uses to  develop security upgrades at research reactors. Security upgrades are  designed to assist guard forces at research reactors to implement an “alert  and notify” strategy, which relies on off-site response forces to supplement  on-site forces to contain, locate, and neutralize adversaries before they can  successfully sabotage the reactor or steal nuclear material. The alert and  notify strategy is not as stringent as the costly “denial” strategy, which is  used primarily in settings where nuclear weapons or significant nuclear  components are present. With a denial strategy, the security system and  on-site guard forces must detect, delay, respond to, and defeat adversaries  before they gain access to nuclear weapons or components.
In January 2008, we reported on the security of research reactors in the  United States that are regulated by NRC. In response to your request, this  report focuses on NNSA’s efforts to improve security of research reactors  worldwide. Specifically, we examined (1) the status of NNSA’s efforts to  secure foreign research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected research  reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA’s security guidelines,  and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates its GRRS program with  other countries and the IAEA.
subsections: section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant NNSA and IAEA policy,  guidelines, and planning documents. For NNSA, we examined its  Protection and Sustainability Criteria Document, which describes the  DBT—the baseline threat for which security measures should be  developed at research reactors in the GRRS program. In addition, we  reviewed NNSA’s strategic plans for the GRRS program and work  schedules for conducting and completing security work activities. We also  met with NNSA officials responsible for implementing the GRRS program  and with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) technical experts who  provide assistance to NNSA in implementing the program. We also met  with IAEA officials from IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security, Division of  Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology, and IAEA’s Department of  Safeguards.
We reviewed security upgrades at a nonprobability sample of five research  reactors in five different countries—Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico,  Romania, and Serbia. This sample cannot be used to generalize findings  from these countries to all countries in the program. We selected these  reactors based upon whether the reactors still use or store HEU fuel and  when NNSA had completed physical protection upgrades. Four of the five  reactors had already received security upgrades, while work was ongoing  at the fifth reactor. In the course of our work, we visited each of these five  reactors to tour the facilities and inspect security upgrades that had been  made or were in process. During our visits, we interviewed officials  managing the reactors, on-site security officials, police, and other law  enforcement officials responsible for responding to security incidents, as  well as government officials responsible for regulating security at these  reactors. At each of these reactors, we conducted interviews with a  standard set of questions concerning the physical protection of the facility,  the security upgrades that were being made, and the extent of the facility’s  coordination with NNSA and IAEA. We also compared the security  systems at the facilities with IAEA guidelines—particularly INFCIRC 225,  Rev. 4, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.  We also reviewed NNSA documents about each reactor, including reactor  visit reports and vulnerability assessments.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Background
paragraphs: Research reactors are generally smaller than nuclear power reactors,  ranging in size from less than 1 megawatt to as high as 250 megawatts,  compared with the 3,000 megawatts found for a typical commercial  nuclear power reactor. In addition, unlike power reactors, many research  reactors use HEU fuel instead of LEU. Although some research reactors  have shut down or converted to LEU fuel and returned their HEU fuel to  the United States or Russia, about 165 research reactors throughout the  world continue to use HEU. NNSA efforts to convert reactors from HEU to  LEU fuel use and return HEU fuel to the United States and Russia has led  to the conversion of 57 reactors, the shutdown of 7 reactors, the return of  HEU from 59 reactors, and the elimination of all HEU from 46 reactor  facilities. NNSA plans to continue converting reactors and returning HEU  fuel to its country of origin. However, because it will take several years to  convert reactors to LEU fuel use and return the HEU fuel, in the interim  security needs to be ensured at these reactors. Figure 1 shows the interior  of a research reactor in an Eastern European country that still uses  Russian supplied HEU.
As NNSA and its predecessor agencies recognized the threat posed by the  theft or diversion of nuclear materials—including HEU research reactor  fuel—for nuclear weapons’ purposes, it initiated a number of efforts to  address this threat. First, since 1974, DOE has supported a program to  determine whether nuclear material provided by the United States to other  countries for peaceful purposes is adequately protected. Managed by  NNSA’s Division of Nonproliferation and International Security, this  program prioritizes and selects facilities for physical protection  assessment visits, leads such visits to determine if the facility meets IAEA  guidelines for security, and, in the cases where the visited facility does not  meet IAEA guidelines, makes recommendations to improve security.  However, unlike the GRRS program, NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation  and International Security does not fund or install security upgrades at  research reactors overseas. Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,  DOE established the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting  program in 1995 to install improved security systems for nuclear material  at civilian nuclear sites (including research reactors), naval fuel sites, and  nuclear weapons laboratory sites in Russia and nations in the former  Soviet Union. Third, prior to the establishment of NNSA, DOE established  the GRRS program in 1993 to improve the security of research reactors  that are in countries that NNSA considers in need of assistance, as well as  research reactors in countries that are not included in other DOE/NNSA  programs. As shown in Table 1, the GRRS program has identified 22  research reactors in 16 different countries in need of assistance that are  not included in other DOE/NNSA programs. Originally managed by  NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, the GRRS  program was transferred to the GTRI in 2005. The GRRS program is also  beginning to provide security enhancements at research reactors located  at universities in the United States, as requested by the Department of  Homeland Security and the NRC. NNSA officials told us that they believe  the decision to assist in upgrading the security of these reactors was based  partly on our January 2008 report, which found potential security  weaknesses at domestic research reactors regulated by NRC.
section_title: NNSA Has Improved the Security of Research Reactors and Plans to Continue Upgrading the Security of Additional Reactors
paragraphs: As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of  the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of  approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete upgrades or remove all  HEU prior to making upgrades at the remaining 4 reactors and to make  further upgrades at some reactors where initial upgrades have already  been made, spending an additional $6 million before ending physical  security upgrades in 2010. For example, at one research reactor we visited,  NNSA has already spent $760,000 on security upgrades and plans to spend  $650,000 to pay for additional security upgrades, which will enable the  facility to meet IAEA guidelines for security. NNSA also plans to spend an  additional $378,000 for maintenance and sustainability of the security  system at this facility over the next several years. NNSA is planning to  complete all physical protection upgrades at GRRS reactors by the end of  2010.
NNSA prioritizes its schedule for upgrading the security of research  reactors depending on the amount and type of nuclear or radioactive  material at the reactor and other threat factors, such as the vulnerability  condition of sites, country-level threat, and proximity to strategic assets.  To make security upgrades, NNSA works with Sandia security experts to  assess security needs at reactor facilities, design security upgrades and  systems, assists foreign reactor operators in making improvements, and  review security upgrades once they have been made. With NNSA approval,  Sandia works with local firms specializing in installing security systems to  make security upgrades. Security upgrades we observed during our visits  to reactors in the GRRS program included, among other things,    construction of new, heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel;  installation of motion detector sensors and security cameras to detect  unauthorized entry into reactor buildings and provide the ability to  remotely monitor activities in those buildings;  replacement of glass entry doors with hardened steel doors equipped with  magnetic locks and controlled by card readers or keypads; and    upgrades or construction of new fortified central alarm stations that allow  on-site guards to monitor alarms and security cameras, and communicate  with response forces.
Figure 2 shows a newly built fortified central alarm station at a HEU  research reactor. Figure 3 shows the upgraded alarm display and closed  circuit television monitors inside a central alarm station at another HEU  reactor.
In addition, NNSA works with officials in countries included in the GRRS  program to develop emergency plans and training exercises with on-site  guard forces as well as local, regional, and national law enforcement  agencies. For example, at one facility we visited, NNSA officials had  worked with the reactor managers to develop emergency plans, and the  managers routinely test these plans with different elements of the national  emergency responders including the facility guard force, local police,  regional police, and the national–level law enforcement including special  assault teams. IAEA guidelines state that coordination between facility  guards and off-site response forces should be regularly exercised. In  addition, NNSA’s alert and notify strategy relies on off-site response forces  to supplement the on-site guard force to contain, locate, and neutralize  adversaries before they can successfully steal nuclear material or sabotage  the reactor.
The focus of NNSA’s program has been on protecting reactors that use or  store HEU fuel that could potentially be used in an improvised nuclear  device where security does not meet IAEA guidelines. In addition, some  research reactors using LEU fuel—which cannot be used to make a  nuclear bomb but are potential targets of sabotage to release radioactivity  into the area surrounding a reactor—have received security upgrades  because of high levels of terrorist activities in regions where the reactors  are located or because of their proximity to U.S. installations.
section_title: Although Reactors We Visited Generally Met IAEA Guidelines, Some Security Weaknesses Remain That Could Undermine NNSA- Funded Upgrades
paragraphs: The foreign research reactors we visited that have received NNSA  assistance generally met IAEA physical protection guidelines; however, in  some cases, critical security weaknesses remained. The focus of the GRRS  program is to make physical security upgrades in accordance with IAEA  guidelines. For example, IAEA guidelines recommend that nuclear  facilities possessing the highest-risk nuclear materials have intrusion  detection equipment and that all intrusion sensors and alarms should be  monitored in a central alarm station that is staffed continuously to initiate  appropriate responses to alarms. At all four of the research reactors we  visited where NNSA upgrades have been completed, NNSA installed  intrusion detection sensors on all entrances and infrared motion detectors  in areas where nuclear material is stored to detect unauthorized access. In  addition, at these reactors NNSA provided assistance to construct fortified  central alarm stations that are staffed continuously by on-site security  personnel to monitor alarms triggered by these sensors. NNSA is in the  process of providing these same upgrades at the fifth reactor we visited.  Despite these upgrades, the GRRS program has not focused on whether  security planning, procedures, and regulations meet IAEA guidelines at  international research reactors. In contrast, in the United States, the GRRS  program has assisted research reactors to ensure that security planning,  procedures, and regulations meet IAEA guidelines. For example, to meet  IAEA’s guidelines that emergency plans be regularly exercised, the  program has provided emergency first responders with training and  conducted table top exercises simulating emergency conditions. At four of  the five reactors that we visited, we identified the following potential  vulnerabilities that can undermine NNSA-funded upgrades.  Specifically,  IAEA security guidelines state that coordination between on-site guards  and off-site response forces should be regularly exercised. At two reactors,  however, no emergency response exercises had been conducted between  the on-site guard force and off-site response forces, such as the national  police, potentially limiting the effectiveness of these forces in an actual  emergency. In addition, one of these reactors lacked any formal plans for  emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel or to sabotage reactors.
IAEA security guidelines state that all persons entering or leaving reactor  inner areas should be subject to a search to prevent the unauthorized  removal of nuclear material. However, personnel at one research reactor  we visited did not search visitors or their belongings before granting them  access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present, thereby  potentially compromising the security upgrades made through NNSA  assistance.
IAEA security guidelines also state that all vehicles entering or leaving the  protected areas should be subject to search. However, at another reactor  that we visited personnel did not search vehicles that were allowed onto  the site or vehicles exiting the site for potentially stolen nuclear material  or other contraband.
IAEA security guidelines state that the ceilings, walls, and floors of areas  containing vulnerable nuclear material should be constructed to delay  potential adversaries from accessing the material. However, at one facility,  we discovered that protective covers over storage pools that contain HEU  were not being used. These covers, which typically weigh hundreds of  kilograms and must be moved using a crane, provide important protection  for stored HEU by significantly increasing the time required for a potential  adversary to access nuclear material. Although NNSA officials told us that  these covers are not part of the security system, the covers would delay  potential adversaries from accessing the HEU stored in the pool.  Furthermore, the four entrance doors to another research reactor—which  still had HEU fuel at the time that we visited, but has subsequently  returned its HEU fuel—were not upgraded and provided only limited  access delay. These doors were made of wood that is only approximately 1  inch thick. In addition, the locks on these doors are not designed to  prevent a determined attempt to access the research reactor facility.  Officials at this facility told us that they had requested NNSA funding to  replace the doors with hardened steel doors. However, NNSA did not  agree to pay for hardened steel doors because it decided that the HEU fuel  was sufficiently secured in a storage pool with heavy concrete covers.
NNSA program guidance states that establishing and maintaining a reliable  nuclear material inventory and tracking system are important elements for  ensuring adequate security for these materials. However, at one reactor we  learned that the operators of the reactor did not have an effective system  of nuclear material control and accounting for the HEU fuel. For example,  the operators of this reactor neither performed routine inventory checks  on HEU fuel, nor had an exact accounting of the spent HEU fuel stored at  the facility. In this case, NNSA officials told us that a lack of effective  nuclear material accounting at this facility is due to the poor condition of  the reactor fuel storage pool, which is contaminated with cesium that has  leaked from fuel. These officials told us that an inventory will be  conducted as HEU fuel is prepared for shipment back to its country of  origin.
IAEA security guidelines state that unescorted access to protected areas  should be limited to those persons whose trustworthiness has been  determined. However, at another reactor we visited, background checks  were not conducted on personnel with access to areas where nuclear  materials are present.
At the same reactor, according to foreign government officials, the  government agency charged with regulating the operation of the research  reactor had neither developed safety and security regulations, nor had the  country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear  facilities—including licensing, inspections, and emergency exercise  procedures—as called for by IAEA guidelines.
NNSA and Sandia officials responsible for making security upgrades at  these reactors acknowledged that, even with NNSA-funded upgrades,  these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security. These  officials stressed the importance of NNSA continuing to work with these  countries to ensure that research reactors have effective and  comprehensive physical protection systems and procedures consistent  with IAEA guidelines. Furthermore, they expressed the need to eventually  convert these reactors to LEU and return the HEU fuel to its country of  origin, as well as to develop national laws and regulations to ensure the  safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. In addition, Sandia officials  commented that there is no substitute for NNSA and Sandia visits to  reactors that have received physical security upgrades to determine  whether the upgrades have been installed, function as designed, and are  properly maintained. However, these visits generally have not been used  to assist the facilities in developing security policy and procedures that  comply with IAEA security guidelines, and there are no specific plans to  continue these visits after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are  completed in 2010.
section_title: NNSA Coordinates Security Upgrades with Other Countries and IAEA, but Additional Cooperation is Needed to Implement Security Procedures Provided for in IAEA Guidelines
paragraphs: NNSA coordinates with research reactor operators to design, install, and  sustain security upgrades. However, because the GRRS program is  voluntary, NNSA faces challenges in obtaining consistent and timely  cooperation from other countries to address remaining security  weaknesses. With regard to IAEA, NNSA coordinates with the agency to  identify research reactors that are in need of security upgrades and  assistance. In addition, NNSA and IAEA have begun coordinating on a  sustainability project to help ensure that research reactor operators  adequately maintain NNSA funded upgrades by assisting in the  development of equipment testing and maintenance procedures and the  development of emergency response plans.
subsections: section_title: NNSA Coordinates with Other Countries to Implement Upgrades but Faces Challenges in Addressing Security Weaknesses at Some Research Reactors
paragraphs: NNSA officials and the physical security experts at Sandia coordinate with  foreign government research reactor operators to design, install, and  sustain physical security upgrades. To design security systems, NNSA and  Sandia officials assess a research reactor’s current security condition to  identify security weaknesses and verify the amount, type, and location of  nuclear material at the facility. The officials then work with foreign  research reactor operators to design upgrades and use either the DBT  established by the foreign government or a DBT developed by NNSA if the  country has not developed its own DBT for nuclear facilities. Security  upgrades are generally focused on the electronic elements of the security  system used to detect unauthorized access and alert response forces, as  well as access delay features such as hardened steel doors and storage  vaults, instead of on the development of security policies and procedures  provided for in IAEA guidelines.
Sandia officials also work with foreign government research reactor  operators by overseeing the installation of security upgrades. In general,  Sandia works with a security company that is then responsible for  procuring and installing the designed security upgrades. To help ensure  that the security upgrades are being installed properly, Sandia requires the  security company and the foreign research reactor operators to  periodically submit status reports and equipment lists for Sandia’s review.  In some instances, countries will share the cost of installing the upgrades  with NNSA. For example, the government of the Czech Republic provided  $800,000 to upgrade the security at one of its research reactors. Once the  security contractor completes the installation, NNSA and Sandia officials  and foreign government research reactor operators inspect the upgrades  and determine if they were installed and are functioning as designed.
To help ensure that the upgrades are sustained, NNSA and Sandia officials  periodically visit research reactors to review the condition of upgrades  and to determine if supplemental upgrades are needed. According to  NNSA and Sandia officials, these visits are crucial to maintaining a  collaborative relationship with foreign research reactor operators to help  ensure that security upgrades are sustained over the long term. As a result  of recent security assessment visits, NNSA officials said that they are  planning additional upgrades at three reactors we visited where security  upgrades had already been completed. These additional upgrades are to  include, among other things, new closed circuit television cameras, a  device used to provide emergency electrical power, and replacement door  locks; they do not include assistance in developing security policies and  procedures provided for in IAEA guidelines. NNSA officials determined  that supplemental upgrades at the fourth reactor were not needed because  they planned to return the reactor’s HEU to Russia in the summer of 2009,  which was 7 months after the assessment was made.
NNSA has also been purchasing warranty and maintenance contracts for  recently installed upgrades and for certain reactors where upgrades are  several years old and foreign government research reactor operators lack  sufficient funding for maintenance activities. NNSA requires the countries  or reactor operators who receive these warranty and maintenance  contracts to provide written assurance that they will continue to sustain  the upgrades at their own expense after the contract expires, although  NNSA will consider providing additional coverage on a case-by-case basis.  In addition, NNSA is working with IAEA and governments in each of the  countries that received security upgrades at research reactors to develop a  long-term sustainability plan for security systems.
Because the GRRS program is voluntary and cooperative, NNSA officials  told us that in some cases they face challenges in obtaining foreign  governments’ commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely  manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one country  we visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years for two reasons. First,  the country was initially reluctant to accept NNSA assistance and took 2  years to decide whether to accept funding for security improvements.
Second, security upgrades were further delayed at this reactor because of  the country’s delay in approving the design of the security upgrades and  authorizing contractors to work at the reactor site. As a result, a number  of security weaknesses at this facility have not yet been addressed—some  of which NNSA identified as early as 2002. According to NNSA officials,  the agency has been working with the Department of State to overcome  these obstacles.
NNSA officials also told us that they have experienced situations where a  foreign government has refused its assistance to make security upgrades.  Specifically, one country has refused NNSA’s multiple offers to upgrade a  research reactor facility during the past 9 years. NNSA officials said that  they have continued to offer this assistance through both direct bilateral  negotiations and through IAEA. However, this foreign government has yet  to accept NNSA assistance, and NNSA has concerns that known security  weaknesses have not been addressed. In addition, NNSA has experienced  two situations where the foreign government would not accept security  upgrade assistance until agreements were reached with the United States  on other issues related to nuclear energy and security. For example, NNSA  assistance at one research reactor was delayed until the United States  ratified an agreement with the foreign government authorizing and setting  the conditions for transfers of U.S. civil nuclear technology and material to  that government. These issues have been resolved with both foreign  governments. Due to the terrorist threat level in the areas where these  reactors are located, NNSA has decided to forgo making security upgrades  because it would take too long to design and install new security systems.  Instead, NNSA is planning to remove the HEU fuel that is at these two  reactors and return it to its country of origin this year.
section_title: NNSA Coordinates with the IAEA to Identify Research Reactors for the GRRS Program, and Further Cooperation Is Needed to Sustain Upgrades and Implement Security Procedures Provided for in IAEA Guidelines
paragraphs: NNSA coordinates with the IAEA to identify research reactors in need of  security upgrades that could be included in the GRRS program. Fourteen  of the 19 research reactors that received NNSA-funded security upgrades  were previously reviewed by an IAEA team, which recommended security  improvements. According to IAEA officials, if a nation is unable to make  the recommended security improvements itself, IAEA will recommend  that it seek assistance from the GRRS program. In addition, NNSA works  with IAEA to ensure security upgrades are complementary when both  organizations are providing assistance at the same research reactor. For  example, at one reactor we visited, NNSA upgraded the reactor’s central  alarm station and installed new intrusion sensors and cameras. At the  same facility, IAEA is planning to install an X-ray machine and metal  detector at the reactor’s entrance to monitor personnel and packages  entering and leaving the facility. In addition, NNSA officials implementing  efforts to secure research reactors interact regularly with IAEA officials by  holding quarterly coordination meetings. Furthermore, NNSA makes an  annual financial pledge of between $1.6 and $1.9 million to IAEA’s Nuclear  Security Fund, which supports IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security activities,  such as security reviews of international research reactors and other  nuclear facilities.
Further cooperation is needed to sustain NNSA-funded upgrades and  implement security procedures provided for in IAEA guidelines. While  NNSA is planning to complete all physical protection upgrades at GRRS  reactors by the end of 2010, GRRS officials are still concerned about the  continued effectiveness of upgrades and any shortcomings related to  security procedures and planning. Consequently, NNSA has recently begun  working with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to establish a  sustainability program. The purpose of the sustainability program is to  help ensure that NNSA-funded security upgrades are properly maintained  and to help research reactor operators implement security procedures and  planning. To date, NNSA has provided IAEA with $550,000 and paid for a  security expert from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to administer  the sustainability program. Under the sustainability program, IAEA will  help research reactor operators develop    capabilities for properly maintaining and testing installed security  equipment, which will help ensure the future effectiveness of NNSA- funded upgrades;    capabilities to ensure that security procedures are designed, implemented,  and followed by research reactor management and personnel; and    emergency response plans and agreements and procedures with a robust  dedicated off-site response force for assistance in responding to  emergency situations at the research reactor.
In addition, the sustainability program is expected to help foreign  governments strengthen their nuclear security laws and regulations, as  well as the nuclear security inspection process and procedures. For  example, IAEA plans to work with a country to ensure it has an  appropriate nuclear regulatory agency with the legal basis, as well as  inspection and enforcement capabilities, to establish and oversee security  requirements at nuclear facilities. IAEA plans to conduct pilot projects of  the sustainability program at three research reactors in 2009, evaluate the  results of the pilot projects, and then potentially expand the program in  2010 to all reactors in the GRRS program that still possess HEU.  NNSA  will continue to support sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the  completion of security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Nuclear research reactors throughout the world continue to play an  important role in research, education, science, and medicine. However, as  long as some of these reactors continue to use HEU fuel or have HEU fuel  stored on-site, they must be adequately protected from terrorists targeting  them to steal the material or sabotage the reactors. NNSA’s efforts to  secure research reactors in the GRRS program have resulted in physical  security upgrades such as heavily-reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel and  new or improved alarms and intrusion detection sensors. However,  security weaknesses remain at some research reactors in the GRRS  program, many of which are the result of weaknesses in security  procedures and emergency planning. NNSA’s efforts have, to date,  generally not included encouraging the development of effective security  procedures or the development of laws and regulations ensuring the safe  and secure operation of nuclear facilities.
NNSA has taken the first steps toward addressing these security  deficiencies and is starting to work with IAEA to implement a  comprehensive sustainability program to ensure that new security  upgrades installed at these reactors undergo periodic maintenance and  repair. These efforts must continue, even after NNSA completes installing  physical security upgrades at the remaining reactors and ends the GRRS  program in 2010. Because NNSA is working with foreign countries, it is  also important that NNSA work cooperatively with these countries’  governments and IAEA to develop rigorous policies and procedures  governing security at these sites. Ultimately, the most effective security  improvement that can be made at these research reactors is to convert  them to use LEU and to return all HEU fuel to the material’s country of  origin, thereby eliminating the reactors’ attractiveness to terrorists seeking  material to make an improvised nuclear device. We support the effort that  NNSA is now taking to accelerate the schedule to convert reactors to LEU  fuel use and return HEU fuel to its country of origin. The timely removal of  this material from at-risk reactors will be, in the end, the most effective  security improvement NNSA can make.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To resolve remaining security weaknesses at foreign research reactors  that use HEU fuel, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the  Administrator of NNSA to take the following three actions:    While continuing to emphasize and accelerate NNSA efforts to convert  reactors to LEU fuel use and return HEU fuel to its country of origin, we  recommend that NNSA work with foreign government officials and  research reactor operators in countries where security upgrades are in  progress or have been completed to (1) take immediate action to address  any remaining security weaknesses, including those that we identified in  this report; and (2) ensure that security policies and procedures, including  those for emergency response to security incidents, fully meet IAEA  guidelines.
In addition, in cooperation with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Safety, we  recommend that NNSA work with foreign regulatory agencies to  encourage the development, where needed, of national security laws and  regulations to ensure the safe and secure operation of research reactors,  including licensing, inspection, and emergency exercise procedures, as  called for in IAEA guidelines.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided NNSA with a draft of this report for its review and comment.  In its written comments, NNSA states that our report is fair and properly  reflects the progress of the GRRS program to make security upgrades at  vulnerable, high risk research reactors worldwide.  NNSA also outlined the  actions that it plans to take to address the report’s recommendations to  further improve research reactor security.  The complete text of NNSA’s  comments are presented in appendix I.  NNSA also provided technical  clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
To address the report’s recommendations, NNSA stated that it plans to  assist countries in meeting security obligations by 1) ensuring that its  security policies and procedures, including those for emergency response  to security incidents, fully meet IAEA guidelines and 2) working in  cooperation with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to encourage the  development, where needed, of national security laws and regulations to  ensure the safe and secure operation of research reactors We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator of NNSA; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. The report will also be  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in Appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant  Director; Patrick Bernard; Omari Norman; Tim Persons; Ramon Rodriguez;  Peter Ruedel; Rebecca Shea; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Jeanette  Soares made key contributions to this report.