Emergency Management: Observations on DHS's Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters
Published: 2008-06-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act was enacted in November 2002, creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve homeland security following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The act centralized the leadership of many homeland security activities under a single federal department and, accordingly, DHS has the dominant role in implementing this national strategy. This testimony discusses the status of DHS's actions in fulfilling its responsibilities to (1) establish policies to define roles and responsibilities for national emergency preparedness efforts and prepare for the transition between presidential administrations, and (2) develop operational plans and performance metrics to implement these roles and responsibilities and coordinate federal resources for disaster planning and response. This testimony is based on prior GAO work performed from September 2006 to June 2008 focusing on DHS's efforts to address problems identified in the many post-Katrina reviews.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS has taken several actions to define national roles and responsibilities and capabilities for emergency preparedness efforts in key policy documents and has begun preparing for the upcoming transition between presidential administrations. DHS prepared initial versions of key policy documents that describe what should be done and by whom (National Response Plan in 2004), how it should be done (the National Incident Management System in 2004) and how well it should be done (the interim National Preparedness Goal in 2005). DHS subsequently developed and issued revisions to these documents to improve and enhance its national-level policies, such as the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2007 which was the successor to the interim National Preparedness Goal. Most recently, DHS developed the National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan, which became effective in March 2008. This framework describes the doctrine that guides national response actions and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities involved in response efforts. Clarifying roles and responsibilities will be especially critical as a result of the coming change in administrations and the associated transition of key federal officials with homeland security preparedness and response roles. To cope with the absence of many political appointed executives from senior roles, DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific responsibilities in the transition between presidential administrations and recently provided information to this Committee on its transition plans. To assist in planning to execute an efficient and effective administration transition, DHS has also contracted with the Council for Excellence in Government to identify key roles and responsibilities for the Department and its homeland security partners for responding to disasters during the transition between administrations. DHS is still developing operational plans to guide other federal agencies' response efforts and metrics for assessing federal capabilities. Two essential supplements to the new National Response Framework--response guides for federal partners and an integrated planning system--are still under development. Also, DHS is still establishing a process to measure the nation's overall preparedness based on a list of targeted capabilities and has not yet completed an inventory of all federal response capabilities. The measures and metrics associated with these targeted capabilities are not standards, but serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise activities. However, DHS policy does not direct development of these capabilities to address national priorities for federal agencies. For example, for the national priority to "Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities" the National Preparedness Guidelines state that communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are consistent with measures and metrics established for targeted capabilities; federal agencies' interoperability is not addressed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) preparedness to lead federal  efforts to prepare for, prevent, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and  recover from all domestic disasters, whether natural or man-made,  including acts of terror. My remarks today focus on the preparation for  and response to major and catastrophic disasters which require  substantial federal coordination with and assistance to state and local  responders. My statement is grounded in the work GAO has done to-date  on DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in  preparing for, responding to and recovering from major disasters and  catastrophes.
The need for federal leadership in homeland security efforts was never  greater than in the hours and days following the attacks of September 11,  2001, which ultimately led to the creation of DHS and the establishment of  the Department’s roles to provide strategic, national leadership as the  focal point for federal response and coordination. This role is defined in  law and executive order and described in federal emergency management  strategies, policies, and procedures. In order to provide the coordinated  national homeland security effort directed by the Congress and the  President, DHS must provide leadership across a broad spectrum of  stakeholders including: federal agencies and departments, and DHS’s own  components; state, local and tribal governments, their emergency  management agencies and other state agencies; sector-specific businesses  and industry; voluntary organizations; and academia. It is an enormous  challenge and responsibility. In leading national preparedness efforts, DHS  through FEMA is responsible for developing national-level policies and  doctrine to guide the efforts of these stakeholders to establish operational  plans to carry out their roles and responsibilities and build, measure, and  sustain their ability to do so effectively.
The effectiveness of DHS and FEMA in assuming these responsibilities  was severely tested—and in some cases clearly found wanting—in the  aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season and its catastrophic impact on the  Gulf Coast. Numerous reports, along with our own observations,  identified concerns about leadership of the federal response to Hurricane  Katrina and questions regarding the roles, and responsibilities of DHS,  FEMA and other federal agencies, as well as state and local officials and  non-governmental organizations. As we reported in September 2006,  effective preparation and response for catastrophic disasters requires that  roles and responsibilities be clearly defined and understood and that  responsible officials know what capabilities are needed to fulfill their roles  and responsibilities, develop the operational plans to implement those  roles and responsibilities, and establish, realistically test, and maintain the  needed capabilities. To address many of the issues and problems  highlighted by the Katrina response, Congress passed the Post-Katrina  Emergency Management Reform Act of October 2006 (Post-Katrina Act),   which charged FEMA with the primary responsibility for coordinating and  implementing key aspects of federal emergency preparedness and  response.
The Post-Katrina Act defines a catastrophic incident as any natural  disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in  extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely  affecting the population (including mass evacuations), infrastructure,  environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an  area. Effective federal preparation for and response to such an event  requires planning, coordination, cooperation, and leadership within DHS  and between DHS and other federal agencies—civilian and military— as  well as state and local governments, and the private and nonprofit sectors  who have resources and capabilities needed for the response.
Today, I’d like to briefly discuss the status of DHS’s actions in fulfilling its  responsibilities to:    establish policies to define roles and responsibilities for national  emergency preparedness efforts and prepare for the transition between  presidential administrations; and    develop operational plans and performance metrics to implement these  roles and responsibilities and coordinate federal resources for disaster  planning and response  My observations on DHS’s and FEMA’s development of policies, plans and  metrics to lead federal efforts in this statement are based on our prior  work, focusing on DHS’s efforts to address problems identified in the  many post-Katrina reviews from September 2006 to June 2008, as well as  related work by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). We have  issued a number of GAO reports that have examined a wide variety of  operational and management issues, made observations and  recommendations, and followed up on our reports assessing DHS’s  leadership capabilities in working with other federal agencies. Examples  relevant to the hearing today include our reviews of emergency  communications interoperability, evacuations of disadvantaged  populations, national preparedness for pandemic flu, and coordination  with the Department of Defense (DOD).
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DHS’s federal leadership role and responsibilities for emergency  preparedness as defined in law and executive order are broad and  challenging. To increase homeland security following the September 11,  2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the  National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002, and signed the  Homeland Security Act in November 2002 creating DHS. The act  centralized the leadership of many homeland security activities under a  single federal department and, accordingly, DHS has the dominant role in  implementing the strategy. As we noted in our review of DHS’s mission  and management functions, the National Strategy for Homeland Security  underscores the importance for DHS of partnering and coordination. For  example, 33 of the strategy’s 43 initiatives are required to be implemented  by 3 or more federal agencies. If these entities do not effectively  coordinate their implementation activities, they may waste resources by  creating ineffective and incompatible pieces of a larger security program.
In addition, more than 20 Homeland Security Presidential Directives  (HSPDs) define DHS’s and other federal agencies’ roles in leading efforts  to prepare for and respond to disasters, emergencies, and potential  terrorist threats. Directives that focus on DHS’s leadership role and  responsibilities for homeland security include HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 which  are summarized below:    Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), issued on February  28, 2003, identifies the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal  federal official for domestic incident management and directs him to  coordinate the federal government’s resources utilized in response to or  recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies.  The Secretary of DHS, as the principal federal official, is to provide  standardized, quantitative reports to the Assistant to the President for  Homeland Security on the readiness and preparedness of the nation—at  all levels of government—to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover  from domestic incidents and develop and administer a National Response  Plan (NRP). To facilitate this role, HSPD-5 directs the heads of all federal  departments and agencies to assist and support the Secretary in the  development and maintenance of the NRP. (The plan was recently revised  and is now called the National Response Framework.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), issued in December  2003, called for a new national preparedness goal and performance  measures, standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, as well  as a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness. According to  the HSPD, the Secretary is the principal federal official for coordinating  the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the United States. In  cooperation with other federal departments and agencies, the Secretary  coordinates the preparedness of federal response assets. In addition, the  Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate federal civilian  departments and agencies, is to develop and maintain a federal response  capability inventory that includes the performance parameters of the  capability, the time (days or hours) within which the capability can be  brought to bear on an incident, and the readiness of such capability to  respond to domestic incidents. Last year, the President issued an annex to  HSPD-8 intended to establish a standard and comprehensive approach to  national planning and ensure consistent planning across the federal  government.
After the hurricane season of 2005, Congress passed the Post-Katrina  Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, that, among other things,  made organizational changes within DHS to consolidate emergency  preparedness and emergency response functions within FEMA. Most of  the organizational changes, such as the transfer of various functions from  DHS’s Directorate of Preparedness to FEMA, became effective as of March  31, 2007. According to the act, the primary mission of FEMA is to:  “reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all  hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made  disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based,  comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness,  protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.” The act kept FEMA  within DHS and enhanced FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy  within DHS. As a result of the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA is the DHS  component now charged with leading and supporting the nation in a risk- based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness,  protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.
section_title: DHS Has Issued and Revised National- Level Preparedness Policies to Define Roles and Responsibilities
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Taken Action to Revise National Preparedness Policies But Should Plan for Better Integrating Stakeholders in the Future
paragraphs: DHS has taken action to define national roles and responsibilities and  capabilities for preparedness and response which are reflected in several  key policy documents: the National Response Framework, (what should  be done and by whom); the National Incident Management System (NIMS)  (how it should be done), and the National Performance Guidelines (how  well it should be done). To implement requirements of the Homeland  Security Act of 2002 and HSPDs 5 and 8, DHS issued initial versions of  these documents in 2004 (NIMS and the National Response Plan) and 2005  (National Preparedness Goal) and has developed and issued revisions  intended to improve and enhance these national-level policies. Most  recently, the National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the  National Response Plan, became effective in March 2008; it describes the  doctrine that guides national response actions and the roles and  responsibilities of officials and entities involved in response efforts. The  NRF also includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which describes an  accelerated, proactive national response to catastrophic incidents, as well  as a Supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex—both designed to  further clarify federal roles and responsibilities and relationships among  federal, state and local governments and responders. Together, these  documents are intended to provide a comprehensive structure, guidance,  and performance goals for developing and maintaining an effective  national preparedness and response system.
Because there are a range of federal and nonfederal stakeholders with  important responsibilities for emergency preparedness and response, it is  important that FEMA and DHS include these stakeholders in its  development and revisions of national policies and guidelines. Today we  are issuing a report on the process DHS used to revise the NRF, including  how DHS integrated key stakeholders. DHS included non-federal  stakeholders in the revision process during the initial months when issues  were identified and draft segments written, and during the final months  when there was broad opportunity to comment on the draft that DHS had  produced. However, DHS deviated from the work plan it established for  the revision process that envisioned the incorporation of stakeholder  views throughout the process and did not provide the first full revision  draft to non-federal stakeholders for their comments and suggestions  before conducting a closed, internal federal review of the draft. DHS’s  approach was also not in accordance with the Post-Katrina Act’s  requirement that DHS establish a National Advisory Council (NAC) to  incorporate non-federal input into the revision process. Although the NAC  was to be established within 60 days of the Act (i.e., December 4, 2006),  FEMA, which assumed responsibility for selecting members, did not name  NAC members until June 2007 because of the additional time needed to  review hundreds of applications and select a high quality body of advisors,  according to the FEMA Administrator. The NAC’s first meeting took place  in October 2007 after DHS issued the revised plan for public comment. We  are recommending that, as FEMA begins to implement and eventually  review the 2008 National Response Framework, the Administrator develop  and disseminate policies and procedures describing the conditions and  time frames under which the next NRF revision will occur and how FEMA  will conduct the next NRF revision. These policies and procedures should  clearly describe how FEMA will integrate all stakeholders, including the  NAC and other non-federal stakeholders, into the revision process and the  methods for communicating to these stakeholders. FEMA agreed with our  recommendation.
The importance of involving stakeholders, both federal and non-federal,  was underscored in our review of The National Strategy for Pandemic  Influenza (National Pandemic Strategy) and The Implementation Plan for  the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (National Pandemic  Implementation Plan) which were issued in November 2005 and May 2006  respectively, by the President and his Homeland Security Council. Key  non-federal stakeholders, such as state and local governments, were not  directly involved in developing the National Pandemic Strategy and  Implementation Plan, even though these stakeholders are expected to be  the primary responders to an influenza pandemic. While DHS collaborated  with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other  federal agencies in developing the National Pandemic Strategy and  Implementation Plan, we found that there are numerous shared leadership  roles and responsibilities, leaving uncertainty about how the federal  government would lead preparations for and response to a pandemic.  Although the DHS Secretary is to lead overall non-medical support and  response actions and the HHS Secretary is to lead the public health and  medical response, the plan does not clearly address these simultaneous  responsibilities or how these roles are to work together, particularly over  an extended period and at multiple locations across the country. In  addition to the two Secretaries, we observed that the FEMA Administrator  is now the principal domestic emergency management advisor to the  President, the Homeland Security Council, and the DHS Secretary,  pursuant to the Post-Katrina Act, adding further complexity to the  leadership structure in the case of an influenza pandemic. Most of these  leadership roles and responsibilities have not been tested under pandemic  scenarios, leaving it unclear how they will work. We therefore  recommended that DHS and HHS work together to develop and conduct  rigorous testing, training, and exercises for pandemic influenza to ensure  that federal leadership roles are clearly defined and understood and that  leaders are able to effectively execute shared responsibilities to address  emerging challenges, and ensure these roles are clearly understood by all  key stakeholders. We also recommended that, in updating the National  Pandemic Implementation Plan, the process should involve key non- federal stakeholders. DHS and HHS agreed with our recommendations,  and said that they were taking or planned to take actions to implement our  recommendations.
section_title: Presidential Transition Period Poses Challenges for DHS Leadership of National Preparedness Efforts
paragraphs: As we noted in our report on the preparation for and response to  Hurricane Katrina issued in September 2006, clearly defined and  understood roles and responsibilities are essential for an effective,  coordinated response to a catastrophic disaster.
In any administration, the number of political appointees who depart rises  as the President’s term nears an end. Many cabinet secretaries and agency  heads —in addition to the DHS Secretary and the FEMA Administrator— have response responsibilities in a major or catastrophic disaster, which  could occur at any time. As political appointees depart, it is therefore  essential that there be career senior executives who are clearly designated  to lead their respective department and agency responsibilities for  emergency response and continuity of operations. It is also important that  they clearly understand their roles and responsibilities and have training  to exercise them effectively.
DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific responsibilities  in the transition between presidential administrations and recently  provided information to this Committee on its transition plans. DHS has  also contracted with the Council for Excellence in Government to map key  roles and responsibilities for responding to disasters during the transition  between administrations. The Council is to produce a visual mapping of  these roles, plus supplementary documentation to support/explicate the  mapping. Once those materials had been developed, the Council plans to  hold a series of trainings/workshops for career civil servants in acting  leadership positions and nominated political appointees based on the roles  mapped out by the Council. In addition, the project includes training and  workshops for those in acting leadership positions outside DHS.
section_title: DHS Has Not Yet Developed Comprehensive Operational Plans and Metrics to Coordinate Federal Response Resources
subsections: section_title: DHS Still Developing Ways to Lead National Planning
paragraphs: DHS is responsible for, but has not yet completed, leading the operational  planning needed for an effective national response. Two essential  supplements to the new National Response Framework—Federal Partner  Response Guides and DHS’s Integrated Planning System—are still under  development. The partner guides are designed to provide a ready  reference of key roles and actions for federal, state, local, tribal, and  private-sector response partners. According to DHS, the guides are to  provide more specific “how to” handbooks tailored specifically to the  federal government and the other non-federal stakeholders: state, local  and tribal governments, the private sector and nongovernmental  organizations. DHS has not established a schedule for completing these  guides.
On December 3, 2007, President Bush issued Annex I to HSPD-8, entitled  National Planning. The Annex describes the development of a national  planning system in which all levels of government work together in a  collaborative fashion to create plans for various scenarios and requires  that DHS develop a standardized, integrated national planning process.  This Integrated Planning System (IPS) is intended to be the national  planning system used to develop interagency and intergovernmental plans  based upon the National Planning Scenarios. The National Response  Framework states that local, tribal, state, regional, and federal plans are to  be mutually supportive. Although the Annex calls for the new system to be  developed in coordination with relevant federal agencies and issued by  February 3, 2008, DHS has not yet completed the IPS, and HSPD-8 Annex 1  (i.e. the White House) does not lay out a timeframe for release of the IPS.
According to FEMA’s Administrator, the agency’s National Preparedness  Directorate, in coordination with its Disaster Operations Directorate and  the DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination, has begun to develop a  common federal planning process that will support a family of related  planning documents. These related planning documents will include  strategic guidance statements, strategic plans, concept plans, operations  plans, and tactical plans. The Annex to HSPD-8 is designed to “enhance  the preparedness of the United States by formally establishing a standard  and comprehensive approach to national planning” in order to “integrate  and effect policy and operational objectives to prevent, protect against,  respond to, and recover from all hazards.” According to the Administrator,  FEMA continues to be a significant contributor to the draft IPS, and will  also be involved in developing the family of plans for each of the national  planning scenarios as required by the Annex.
In following up on the status of recommendations we made after  Hurricane Katrina related to planning for the evacuation of transportation  disadvantaged populations, we found that DHS’s leadership in this area  had led to the implementation of some, but not all of our  recommendations. For example, we recommended that DHS clarify  within the National Response Plan that FEMA is the lead and coordinating  agency to provide evacuation assistance when state and local governments  are overwhelmed, and clarify the supporting federal agencies’  responsibilities. In April 2008, we noted that DHS’s draft Mass Evacuation  Incident Annex to the National Response Framework appears to clarify  the role of FEMA and supporting federal agencies, although the annex is  still not finalized. Similarly, we recommended that DHS improve its  technical assistance by, among other things, providing more detailed  guidance on how to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation  of transportation disadvantaged populations. DHS had developed basic  guidance on the evacuation of transportation disadvantaged populations  and was currently working on targeted guidance for states and localities.  However, we had also recommended that DHS require, as part of its grant  programs, all state and local governments plan, train, and conduct  exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations,  but DHS had not done so. DHS agreed to consider our recommendation.
We also recommended that DHS clearly delineate how the federal  government will assist state and local governments with the movement of  patients and residents out of hospitals and nursing homes to a  mobilization center where National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)   transportation begins. DHS and HHS have collaborated with state and  local health departments in hurricane-prone regions to determine gaps  between needs and available resources for hospital and nursing home  evacuations and to secure local, state, or federal resources to fill the gaps.  Based on this analysis, HHS and DHS contracted for ground and air  ambulances and para-transit services for Gulf and East Coast states.
At a more tactical level of planning, FEMA uses mission assignments to  coordinate the urgent, short-term emergency deployment of federal  resources to address disaster needs. Mission assignments may be issued  for a variety of tasks, such as search and rescue missions or debris  removal, depending on the performing agencies’ areas of expertise.  According to DHS, the Department has agreements and pre-scripted  mission assignments with 31 federal agencies for a total of 223  assignments that essentially pre-arrange for the deployment of health  equipment, a national disaster medical system, military equipment, and a  whole host of other services in the event that they are necessary to  support a state or a locality. FEMA officials said these assignments are  listed in the operational working draft of the “Pre-Scripted Mission  Assignment Catalogue,” which FEMA intends to publish this month.
We have previously made recommendations aimed at improving FEMA’s  mission assignment process and FEMA officials concurred with our  recommendations and told us that they are reviewing the management of  mission assignments. In addition, reviews by the DHS OIG regarding  mission assignments concluded that FEMA’s management controls were  generally not adequate to ensure that deliverables (missions tasked) met  requirements; costs were reasonable; invoices were accurate; federal  property and equipment were adequately accounted for or managed; and  FEMA’s interests were protected.
According to the DHS OIG, mission assignment policies, procedures,  training, staffing, and funding have never been fully addressed by FEMA,  creating misunderstandings among federal agencies concerning  operational and fiduciary responsibilities and FEMA’s guidelines regarding  the mission assignment process, from issuance of an assignment through  execution and close-out, are vague. Reflecting upon lessons learned from  Hurricane Dean, the California wildfires, and the national-level  preparedness exercise for top officials in October 2007, FEMA’s Disaster  Operations Directorate formed an intra/interagency Mission Assignment  Working Group to review mission assignment processes and procedures  and develop recommendations for the management of mission  assignments, according to the OIG. Most recently, we reported on  mission assignments for emergency transit assistance and recommended  that DHS draft prescripted mission assignments for public transportation  services to provide a frame of reference for FEMA, FTA, and state  transportation departments in developing mission assignments after future  disasters. DHS agreed to take our recommendation under consideration.
section_title: DHS Still Developing Ways to Define and Measure Federal Agencies’ Capabilities
paragraphs: DHS issued an update to the national goal for preparedness in National  Preparedness Guidelines in September 2007 to establish both readiness  metrics to measure progress, and a system for assessing the nation’s  overall preparedness and response capabilities. However, DHS has not yet  completed efforts to implement the system and has not yet developed a  complete inventory of all federal response capabilities. According to the  September 2007 Guidelines, DHS was still establishing a process to  measure the nation’s overall preparedness based on the Target  Capabilities List (TCL), which accompanies the Guidelines. Our ongoing  work on national preparedness and the national exercise program is  reviewing DHS’s plans and schedules for completing this process.
In the Guidelines, the description for each capability includes a definition,  outcome, preparedness and performance activities, tasks, and measures  and metrics that are quantitative or qualitative levels against which  achievement of a task or capability outcome can be assessed. According to  the Guidelines, they describe how much, how well, and/or how quickly an  action should be performed and are typically expressed in a way that can  be observed during an exercise or real event. The measures and metrics  are not standards, but serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise  activities. However, the Guidelines do not direct development of  capabilities to address national priorities to federal agencies. For example,  for the national priority to “Strengthen Interoperable and Operable  Communications Capabilities” the Guidelines state that interoperable and  operable communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the  states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are  consistent with measures and metrics established in the TCL; federal  agencies’ interoperability is not addressed.
Prior disasters and emergencies, as well as State and Urban Area  Homeland Security Strategies and status reports on interoperable  communications, have shown persistent shortfalls in achieving  communications interoperability.  These shortfalls demonstrate a need  for a national framework fostering the identification of communications  requirements and definition of technical standards. State and local  authorities, working in partnership with DHS, need to establish statewide  interoperable communications plans and a national interoperability  baseline to assess the current state of communications interoperability.  Achieving interoperable communications and creating effective  mechanisms for sharing information are long-term projects that require  Federal leadership and a collaborative approach to planning that involves  all levels of government as well as the private sector. In April 2007, we  reported that DHS’s SAFECOM program intended to strengthen  interoperable public safety communications at all levels of government  had made limited progress in and had not addressed interoperability with  federal agencies, a critical element to interoperable communications  required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004. We concluded that the SAFECOM program has had a limited impact  on improving communications interoperability among federal, state, and  local agencies. The program’s limited effectiveness can be linked to poor  program management practices, such as the lack of a plan for improving  interoperability across all levels of government, and inadequate  performance measures to fully gauge the effectiveness of its tools and  assistance. We recommended, among other things, that DHS develop and  implement a program plan for SAFECOM that includes goals focused on  improving interoperability among all levels of government. DHS agreed  with the intent of the recommendation and stated that the Department was  working to develop a program plan.
DHS had also not yet developed a complete inventory of federal  capabilities, as we reported in August 2007, in assessing the extent to  which DHS has met a variety of mission and management expectations. As  a result, earlier this year Senate Homeland Security and Governmental  Affairs Committee sent letters requesting information from 15 agencies  with responsibilities under the National Response Framework to respond  in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident. The committee asked for  information on a variety of issues—for example, about evacuation,  medical care, intelligence, forensics, and tracking fallout—to assess  agencies’ current capabilities and responsibilities in the event of a nuclear  attack. Other federal agencies also need this information from DHS; in  reviewing the Department of Defense’s (DOD) coordination with DHS, we  reported in April 2008 that DOD’s Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has  difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part  because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from DHS  on the specific requirements or capabilities needed from the military in the  event of a disaster.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any  questions that your or other members of the subcommittee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact William O.  Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202) 512- 8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above the  following individuals from GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team  also made major contributors to this testimony: Chris Keisling, Assistant  Director; John Vocino, Analyst-in-Charge, and Adam Vogt,  Communications Analyst.
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