Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain
Published: 2006-09-11T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, a key element of its effort to transform military operations to be network centric. Using emerging software-defined radio technology, the JTRS program plans to develop and procure hundreds of thousands of radios that give warfighters the capability to access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice and video, and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. The JTRS program has encountered a number of problems, resulting in significant delays and cost increases. The program is currently estimated to total about $37 billion. Given the criticality of JTRS to DOD's force transformation, Congress directed GAO to continue its ongoing review of the JTRS program. This report (1) assesses whether a recent restructuring puts the program in a better position to succeed and (2) identifies any risks that challenge the successful fielding of JTRS.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The proposed JTRS restructuring--a plan DOD approved in March 2006--appears to address and reduce program risks that GAO and others have documented in recent years. While still meeting key requirements, including those related to DOD's network centric transformation effort, the revised approach is expected to develop and field capabilities in increments rather than attempting to develop and field the capabilities all at once. Costly and non-transformational requirements will be deferred to later increments. Deferring these requirements will allow more time to mature critical technologies, integrate components, and test the radio system before committing to production. JTRS program management has also been strengthened through the establishment of a Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO). The more centralized management structure should help the program improve oversight and coordination of standards, system engineering, and development of the radios. The real test will be in execution, and, for that, several management and technical challenges remain. First, JPEO must finalize the details of the restructuring, including formal acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and evaluation plans. DOD also needs to develop migration and fielding plans for how JTRS networking capabilities will be used. Completing and obtaining DOD's approval of these activities is needed to ensure the JTRS program is executable. There are also a number of longer-term technical challenges that the JTRS program must address. For example, the proposed interim solutions for enabling network interoperability among different JTRS variants have yet to be developed. In addition, integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has also been a longstanding challenge that must be overcome. Furthermore, operating in a networked environment open to a large number of potential users has generated an unprecedented need for information assurance. This need has resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and still evolving certification process from the National Security Agency. At the same time, the program must address the need to obtain and sustain commitments and support from the military services and other stakeholders--a challenge that has often hampered joint development efforts in the past. The extent to which DOD overcomes these challenges will determine the extent to which the program manages cost, schedule, and performance risks and supports JTRS-dependent military operations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a  major transformation of its military operations—one that will rely on  network centric communications to improve force information sharing,  collaboration, and situational awareness and, thereby, enable more rapid  and effective decision-making and speed of execution on the battlefield.  The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, initiated in 1997, is a key  effort in this transformation. By capitalizing on emerging software-defined  radio technology, the program plans to develop and procure hundreds of  thousands of JTRS radios, which are expected to interoperate with  existing radio systems and provide the warfighter with additional  communications capability to access maps and other visual data,  communicate via voice and video with other units and levels of command,  and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors.
Although JTRS offers the potential to address key communications  shortfalls and significantly improve military capabilities, the program has  encountered a number of problems, including unstable requirements,  immature technologies, and aggressive schedules, which have resulted in  significant cost increases and delays. In August 2003, we reported that the  lack of a strong, joint-management structure presented significant  challenges to the program’s ability to control costs—currently estimated  to total about $37 billion. In response, Congress directed DOD to  strengthen program management, and in February 2005, DOD established  a Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) to manage the JTRS program  and its various components. Following JPEO’s assessment of the program,  the Defense Acquisition Board directed JPEO to come up with a plan to  restructure the JTRS development effort—a plan that DOD approved in  March 2006.
Given the criticality of JTRS to DOD’s force transformation, Congress  directed GAO to continue its ongoing review of the JTRS program. This  report (1) assesses whether the recent restructuring puts the program in a  better position to succeed and (2) identifies any risks that challenge the  successful fielding of JTRS.
We conducted our review from August 2005 to August 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. To assess  program progress and risks, we reviewed program restructuring data from  the JTRS JPEO, including cost, schedule, and performance data. We also  reviewed the fiscal year 2007 budget request and projected future year  budget requests. We interviewed agency officials from various DOD and  service organizations and reviewed reports produced by Defense  organizations. More details about our scope and methodology are in  appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The JTRS program was initiated to exploit advancements in software- defined radio technology and provide battlefield commanders with  superior information capabilities. Since its initiation in 1997, the program  has experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls,  due primarily to immature technologies, unstable requirements, and  aggressive schedules. In an effort to address these problems, the program  was restructured in March of this year. However, due to JTRS’ lengthy  development path, DOD has had to continue buying other tactical radios— currently estimated to cost $11 billion—to support its communication  needs.
subsections: section_title: JTRS Was Initiated to Address Long-Term Military Communications Needs
paragraphs: Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on  smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and  communication capabilities. The single function hardware design of DOD’s  existing radio systems lack the functionality and flexibility necessary to  achieve and maintain information superiority or to support the rapid  mobility and interoperability required by today’s armed forces. To support  new operational or mission requirements, DOD determined that the large  number and diversity of legacy radios in use would require wholesale  replacement or expensive modifications.
Software-defined radios such as JTRS primarily use software rather than  hardware to control how the radio works and, because they are  programmable, JTRS offers significant flexibility to meet a wide variety of  needs. Rather than developing radios that are built to different standards  and operate on different fixed frequencies, as was the case in the past,  JTRS is to be a single, interoperable family of radios based on a common  set of standards and applications. The radios are expected to not only  satisfy the requirements common to the military’s three operational  domains—air, sea, and ground—but be able to communicate directly with  many of DOD’s existing tactical radios. To facilitate interoperability, JTRS  will develop a set of waveforms (software radio applications) designed  with the same operating characteristics as many of DOD’s existing radios.
Depending on operational needs, different waveforms could be loaded  onto a JTRS radio and used to communicate with a variety of other radios.
In addition to supporting interoperability, JTRS is to contribute to DOD’s  goal of network centric warfare operations by introducing new wideband  networking waveforms that dramatically increase the amount of data and  speed at which the data can be transmitted. As such, the waveforms would  facilitate the use of maps, imagery, and video to support the decision- making of tactical commanders at all echelons. Table 1 compares the  frequency band, nominal channel bandwidth, and data rates of selected  legacy waveforms and new wideband waveforms.
In addition to providing new wideband waveforms, individual JTRS radios  would have the capability to support multiple services (e.g., voice, data,  and video) and operate on multiple channels simultaneously. For example,  a four-channel JTRS radio set intended for a ground vehicle could be  programmed to have channels dedicated to SINCGARS, Have Quick, the  Wideband Networking Waveform, and the Soldier Radio Waveform. All  four channels could be operating simultaneously. Data could also be  transferred from one channel (or network) to another through a “gateway”  device implemented with hardware and software.
Figure 1 depicts the JTRS operational overview.
Developing JTRS is a significant challenge. Because JTRS is intended to  operate on the battlefield where there is no fixed infrastructure of cell  towers, fiber optic lines, and other network components such as routers  and switches, the radios must be powerful enough to transmit and relay  information wirelessly over long distances, maintain network linkages and  quality of service while on the move, and ensure that communications and  the network itself are secure. Development of the individual waveforms  and their ability to function effectively on different JTRS sets is critical to  the success of JTRS. The Wideband Networking Waveform, for example,  will require complex software development and include over 1.6 million  lines of software code. To ensure the waveforms perform as intended, they  will go through a rigorous certification process—one that involves testing  the functionality, portability, interoperability, and security aspects of the  waveforms when operating on production representative JTRS radios.
To manage JTRS’ development, DOD established a Joint Program Office  and service-led program/product offices in the late 1990s. Table 2  summarizes the general management structure of JTRS until 2005, at  which time it was changed.
section_title: JTRS Program Restructured to Address Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems
paragraphs: Achieving JTRS’ technical requirements has proven to be a significant  challenge. In 2001, an independent assessment of the program identified  numerous concerns, including the program’s aggressive acquisition  approach and schedule, unstable requirements, and an ambiguous  management decision chain.
In our reviews, we have found similar problems. For example, the JTRS  Cluster 1 program—which includes development of the Wideband  Networking Waveform, the waveform intended to serve as the main  conduit of information among Army tactical units—began development  with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly  defined and stable requirements. As a result, the program struggled to  mature and integrate key technologies and was forced to make major  design changes. These factors contributed to significant cost and schedule  problems that led DOD to stop key development work and propose  restructuring the program. Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios  proved even more challenging, given the radios’ smaller size, weight, and  power needs. Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid  protest also slowed progress of the Cluster 5 program.
Subsequent to our reporting that the JTRS program lacked a strong, joint- management structure for resolving requirements and funding differences  among the services, Congress directed DOD to develop a plan for  managing JTRS’s development under a single joint program office. Under  DOD’s plan, all JTRS programs were realigned under the authority of a  single JTRS Joint Program Executive Officer, established within the Navy’s  Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The JPEO’s assessment of  the JTRS program revealed that  the program evolved from a legacy radio replacement program to a  network centric radio program without a re-baselining of program  impacts; requirements significantly changed and never stabilized;  the complexity of information assurance/security problems were not  anticipated; and  the program was executing at high technical, schedule, and cost risk.
To get the program on track, JPEO was directed by DOD to come up with  a proposal for JTRS that addressed the services’ priority requirements,  was technically doable, and could be executed within a reasonable budget.  In November 2005, JPEO presented three program options reflecting  different sets of capabilities and development costs (see table 3). Each  option included a specific mix of form factors and waveforms for each of  the services. For example, under option 3, the Marine Corps would use   4-channel vehicle radios, capable of operating two or three legacy  waveforms and up to three new waveforms, as well as 2-channel manpack  radios operating one or two legacy waveforms and one or two new  waveforms. The Army would also use 4-channel vehicle radios, but with  the capability to operate three or four legacy waveforms and two or three  new waveforms, as well as 1-channel and 2-channel radios operating the  Soldier Radio Waveform for its sensors and weapons systems. The Air  Force would use a 4-channel Multifunctional Information Distribution  System terminal form factor operating two legacy waveforms and one new  waveform. The Navy would use the same form factor, operating one legacy  and one new waveform, as well as a ship form factor operating one new  waveform.
DOD selected option 3, which establishes a priority for developing a  networking capability mainly through the introduction of transformational  wideband waveforms. Since future JTRS capabilities are still planned,  option 3 also reflects an incremental approach to developing full JTRS  capabilities. The initial option 3 increment is referred to as JTRS  Increment 1.
To implement JTRS Increment 1, JPEO established a new organizational  structure for JTRS that includes three domains and a program for “special  radios.” Table 4 summarizes the general management structure of JTRS  after the program restructuring.
It is likely that the first users of operational JTRS radios will be Navy   F/A-18 aircraft equipped with Multifunctional Information Distribution  System-JTRS radios and Special Operations Forces using the JTRS  Enhanced Multi-Band Intra-Team Radio.  Initially, the radios will operate  legacy waveforms only.
section_title: Delay in JTRS Development Has Required Investments in Other Radio Systems
paragraphs: From the start of JTRS development through the end of this year, DOD  estimates that $11 billion has been required to buy other radio systems.  Of this total amount, $1.3 billion has been used in fiscal years 2005 and  2006 to procure SINCGARS radios to meet urgent operational needs in Iraq  and Afghanistan. In addition, because of delays in the development of  JTRS, several users depending on JTRS have had to make adjustments and  procure interim radios to meet operational needs. For example, the Army  is in the process of procuring radios for several of its existing helicopter  platforms and a new development effort to outfit and equip individual  ground soldiers. Since JTRS development will require at least several more  years, it is likely that the estimated $11 billion investment in legacy radios  will continue to grow. Table 5 shows the annual procurement amounts for  radio systems other than JTRS from 1998 through 2006.
section_title: Program Restructuring Appears to Address Many Concerns with JTRS
paragraphs: The proposed JTRS restructuring approach appears to address past  concerns with the program that GAO and others have documented in  recent years. While still meeting the needs of key users such as Future  Combat Systems, the revised approach is expected to develop and field  capabilities in increments rather than attempting to develop and field the  capabilities all at once. Costly and non-transformational requirements will  be deferred to later increments. In addition, through the establishment of  the JPEO and other structural changes, JTRS program management has  been strengthened and has become more centralized. The centralized  management structure should help the program control development costs  and improve oversight through the coordination of standards, system  engineering, and development of the radios and waveforms. A new  governance structure is also expected to help ensure appropriate oversight  and establish clear lines of accountability while, according to JPEO  officials, the establishment of an information repository is expected to  help facilitate the delivery of waveform and operating system software to  the radios’ hardware developers. These efforts, if carried out, should help  the restructured JTRS program address previous cost, schedule and  performance problems. Table 6 summarizes the significant changes to the  JTRS program as a result of the restructuring.
subsections: section_title: New Approach Emphasizes Developing Capabilities in Increments and Deferring Some Requirements
paragraphs: A central feature of the JTRS program restructuring is its evolutionary  acquisition approach. The program plans to develop capabilities in  increments rather than attempt to field a complete capability all at once,  which was the previous approach. Specifically, the program plans to defer  or reduce costly and non-transformational requirements to later  increments. At the same time, the approach prioritizes the development of  networking capabilities, primarily through the development of three  networking waveforms, and the ability to interoperate with key legacy  radios. These capabilities are critical to key dependent users such as the  Army’s Future Combat Systems and the implementation of DOD’s vision of  network centric operations warfare. Program officials noted several  requirements that were reduced or deferred from the previous program to  later increments:    Reduced number of waveforms: The number of waveforms to be delivered  for the first increment has been reduced from 32 to 11. The waveforms  deferred to later increments are all non-networking legacy waveforms.  Reducing the number of waveforms allows the program to focus the initial  JTRS increment on developing and testing the critical networking  waveforms as well as some of the more commonly-used legacy  waveforms. In addition, the smaller number of waveforms reduces porting  efforts.
Reduced number of radio variants: The number of variants to be  delivered for the first increment has been reduced from 26 to 13. For  example, only 9 of the 15 small form radios will be developed for the first  increment. Reducing the number of variants provides relief in the  hardware design and platform integration work, allowing the program to  focus the initial JTRS increment on developing the variants most critical to  key dependent users such as the Future Combat Systems.
Reduced number of waveform combinations per radio variant: The  original intent of JTRS was that most waveforms would operate on most  radio variants. However, DOD determined that porting 32 different  waveforms onto 26 different variants would have been an immense and  costly undertaking. In addition, operating numerous waveforms  simultaneously on a JTRS radio would have substantially increased power  demands. By reducing the number of waveform combinations per variant,  program officials expect to both reduce porting efforts and more easily  meet size, weight, and power requirements on some variants. In addition,  program officials expect that reducing the number of waveforms operating  on each radio will help to mitigate interference.
Interim solutions for network interoperability: To achieve DOD’s desired  networking capabilities, the waveforms must be able to interoperate  reliably and securely with each other. The optimal solution is to have this  functionality performed inside JTRS radios as it reduces the overall  footprint of the communication network. However, technologies and radio  designs are not mature enough at this point to develop an interoperability  capability that would function inside individual JTRS radios. Thus, for the  initial increment, interoperability between the waveforms may be  facilitated by developing gateway devices that reside outside of the JTRS  radio. This should help developers mitigate integration challenges.
While lesser capabilities will be delivered in the first increment, the  program could still significantly enhance current communications and  networking capabilities through the development of the networking  waveforms and the ability to interoperate with the more commonly used  legacy radios, such as SINCGARS. The incremental approach should also  make the program more achievable by allowing more time to develop and  test key technologies. Figure 2 shows the impact of the expanded schedule  on Increment 1 product milestones. Despite the lengthened schedule, the  program schedules are still intended to address the needs of key users  depending on JTRS such as Future Combat Systems.
section_title: JTRS Program Management Strengthened
paragraphs: With the creation of the JPEO, DOD has established a stronger, more  centralized joint management structure. Under the new management  structure, all JTRS domains—Ground; Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site;  Special Radios, and Network Enterprise—report directly to the JPEO  while the JPEO reports directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. As such, the JPEO controls  development funding and has full directive authority over standards,  systems engineering, and developing radios and waveforms. Such a  comprehensive authority did not exist in the previous structure where  authority was fragmented and the domains reported to individual service  executives. Also, to facilitate more effective management, the JPEO has  realigned various components of JTRS. Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 are now  combined under the new Ground domain while the waveform  development was placed under the newly established Network Enterprise  domain. Meanwhile, DOD removed the Army helicopter requirements from  the JTRS Cluster 1 program and transferred them to the Airborne,  Maritime, and Fixed Site domain. With the new strengthened management  structure, the program is in a better position to manage requirements  growth and control costs.
A key feature of the new management structure is the new governance  model which aims to streamline decision making and empower the  oversight capacity of the JPEO. We previously reported that the existing  management structure had been unable to get the services to reach  agreement over new and changing requirements expeditiously. Under the  prior structure, key decisions were made by consensus, which made it  difficult to resolve interservice differences involving requirements and  funding. This resulted in a lengthy decision-making process. Under the  revised governance structure, stakeholder disagreements are elevated to  and decided by a JTRS Executive Council and later by a JTRS Board of  Directors, if necessary. The purpose is to make the acquisition process  timelier, provide appropriate oversight, and establish clear lines of  accountability.
Another key feature of the new management structure, according to JPEO,  is ensuring greater information sharing among JTRS components takes  place to better facilitate the delivery of waveform and operating system  software to the radios’ hardware developers. JTRS components depend on  several software developers to deliver the required waveforms to their  programs for integration onto their particular radios. This involves  transfers of complex contractor-owned software code. Because  waveforms are such an integral part of the radio’s functionality, delaying  their integration onto the radio’s hardware could have a ripple effect on a  radio’s overall development. To mitigate this risk, the JPEO has  established an information repository where waveform developers would  place their waveform software code for the purposes of information  sharing. Operating system software code—critical to ensuring the  development of a common software architecture—would also be placed in  the repository. DOD intends to hold government-purpose rights to all of  the software specifications in the repository, so that no single contractor  will have complete control over JTRS software development. While the  information repository is new and its usefulness is yet to be determined, it  remains to be seen whether and to what extent the contractors will be  willing to share their software code. If successful, the JPEO expects that  information sharing will not only make available software code to  hardware developers more timely, but will also contribute to technology  innovation as developers attempt to enhance existing software code. In  addition, because the software will be shared with many different vendors,  the JPEO expects to enhance competition among hardware developers.  Furthermore, it is hoped that by developers reusing the same software  code in the information repository, waveforms will be more standardized,  cutting down on development and integration costs.
section_title: Program Uncertainties and Technical Risks Remain
paragraphs: While the restructuring appears to place JTRS in a better position to  succeed, several management and technical challenges remain. The JPEO  must first finalize the details of the restructuring, including completing  formal acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and  evaluation plans. DOD also needs to revise the Concept of Operations so  that it effectively describes how JTRS networking capabilities will be used.  Completing and obtaining DOD’s approval of these activities is needed to  ensure the program is executable. Over the longer term, the program faces  key management and technical challenges that must be overcome. For  example, although the new joint management structure for JTRS is a  significant improvement over the previous fragmented program  management structure, joint development efforts in DOD have often been  hampered by an inability to obtain and sustain commitments and support  from the military services and other stakeholders. Regarding technical  challenges, developing waveforms and porting them to radio hardware is a  complex and lengthy undertaking. The proposed interim technical  solutions enabling network interoperability have also yet to be developed.  In addition, operating in a networked environment open to a large number  of potential users has generated an unprecedented need for information  assurance. This need has resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and  still evolving certification process from the National Security Agency.  Moreover, integrating the radio’s hardware onto diverse platforms and  meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has been a long- term challenge and remains so.
subsections: section_title: Details of the Restructuring yet to Be Finalized
paragraphs: According to program officials, efforts to complete the restructuring have  taken time and delays have occurred in gaining approval to go forward. As  such, important details of the restructuring have yet to be finalized. This  includes completing acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates,  test plans, and obtaining final approval of an amended operational  requirements document. These activities are currently in the process of  being completed. However, until each of these activities is completed and  DOD ensures that requirements are firm, acquisition strategies are  knowledge-based, cost estimates are realistic, and test plans provide  insight into the achievement of the networking capability priorities, there  will be uncertainty as to whether the JTRS program, as restructured, is  executable.
Operational Requirements Document: An Operational Requirements  Document contains the requirements and operational parameters for a  system. The most recent JTRS Operational Requirements Document was  approved in April 2003.  To reflect the restructured approach of achieving  JTRS requirements incrementally, it was necessary to develop an  amendment to the April 2003 Operational Requirements Document.  The  process to develop the amendment has been led by the Joint Staff and  involved input from the requirements community, the services, and other  stakeholders; the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has provided  oversight of the process.  Through the process of developing the  Operational Requirements Document amendment, some ‘”gaps” in  requirements have been identified by some stakeholders.  In particular, the  proposed amendment to the Operational Requirements Document  includes a requirement for certain JTRS sets to be able to interface with a  new satellite system called the Mobile User Objective System.  Some  stakeholders, however, have identified a need for the manpack and  handheld radios to also have this capability.  According to agency officials,  if the capabilities are deferred to later increments, then the Mobile User  Objective System will have to consider options other than JTRS to meet its  terminal requirements.  Also, according to agency officials, the amendment  process is nearly complete.  The amendment to the JTRS Operational  Requirements Document is awaiting final approval from the Vice  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Acquisition strategies: Individual acquisition strategies need to be  developed for each JTRS component. An acquisition strategy outlines the  business and technical management approach to achieve program  objectives within the constraints imposed by resources. A well–developed  knowledge-based strategy minimizes the time and cost required to satisfy  approved capability needs, and maximizes affordability throughout the  program lifecycle. Until the acquisition strategies are complete, there is  less assurance that a well-developed and executable approach is in place.  This could affect program cost estimates, and fielding plans. Furthermore,  an acquisition strategy serves as the basis for other important activities  such as testing plans and contract negotiations. As such, any delay in the  acquisition strategy could have a ripple effect and delay these activities.
Test and evaluation plans: Plans for the overall structure and objectives  of the test and evaluation program are also under development and need  to be completed. Given the radio’s unprecedented performance  capabilities and technical complexity, it is critical that a well-developed  test and evaluation plan be developed. Not only is the testing of individual  radio components important, but testing the network with sufficient scale  is critical to demonstrating transformational capabilities. At this point, it is  not clear how DOD plans to test the entire JTRS network including  interoperability between all the networking waveforms. The Director of  Operational Test and Evaluation recommended that the Army develop a  test and evaluation strategy that supports an evaluation of network  maturity as part of Future Combat Systems’ production.
In addition to the activities that JPEO needs to accomplish to finalize the  restructuring, DOD also needs to complete its revisions to the Concept of  Operations and determine transition and fielding plans for JTRS.  According to JPEO officials, when JTRS development was first initiated,  DOD envisioned replacing virtually all legacy radios with JTRS sets. Since  then, there has been an evolution of thinking in DOD about networked  operations. Although the Concept of Operations for JTRS has gone  through several iterations, according to JPEO the current version does not  effectively provide a joint vision of how JTRS networking capabilities will  be used. How JTRS radios will be used may also be affected by the large  increase recently in fielding thousands of newer versions of legacy radios.  The recent fielding of so many new legacy radios to the current force may  call into question the affordability of replacing them prematurely with  JTRS sets. If sufficient detail is not provided by the Concept of Operations,  then JTRS development efforts may be inadequate and operational goals  may be unfulfilled. Moreover, if migration and fielding plans are not driven  by an effective Concept of Operations, the production costs and quantities  for JTRS may need to be adjusted.
section_title: Untested Management Structure
paragraphs: DOD has historically had difficulty managing joint programs primarily  because of inter-service differences involving funding and requirements.  To succeed, the new JTRS management structure will have to meet those  challenges. According to DOD officials, obtaining the necessary resources  to execute JTRS development will be one such challenge. The proposed  funding arrangement is for the services to individually request and secure  development funding that then gets rolled into a centralized account under  JPEO control. As currently proposed, each service will fund equal shares  unless there are service-unique development efforts, which would be  funded by the proponent services. The services will also be required to  fund the integration of the radio into their respective platforms. Some  agency officials expressed concern whether the services would have the  budget capacity to fund integration once the radio sets were available for  installation. Stakeholders also need to come to agreement on requirements  by obtaining final approval of the amended Operational Requirements  Document. If requirements are not thoroughly vetted through the various  stakeholders and agreed upon, there is greater risk of future requirements  growth or decreased stakeholder support for the program.
Regarding JPEO’s new governance model, the decision-making model is  untested. The JPEO expects the system development decision for the  JTRS Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site product line to be decided  through the new governance structure.
section_title: Program Continues to Face Significant Technical Risks
paragraphs: While the program has reported making progress in maturing technologies  and stabilizing system designs, several technical challenges must still be  overcome to achieve program success.
subsections: section_title: Waveform Development and Portability
paragraphs: The development of waveforms—particularly the networking  waveforms—remains a technically challenging and lengthy effort. This  effort involves complex software development and integration work by  contractors as well as oversight by the government through a series of  rigorous tests and certifications from various authorities, including the  JTRS Technology Laboratory, National Security Agency, and the Joint  Interoperability Test Command. If waveforms are not available as planned,  potential schedule delays or performance impacts could occur to key  dependent users, particularly the Future Combat Systems.
The JTRS program began with the assumption that the Wideband  Networking Waveform would meet the networking waveform needs for all  the services. However, the program underestimated the complexity of  meeting the Wideband Networking Waveform requirements and the  services’ needs within the size, weight, and power constraints of the  various user platforms. As a result, DOD began developing two additional  networking waveforms to address specialized capabilities. The Soldier  Radio Waveform is being designed for radios with severe size, weight, and  power constraints such as the handheld, manpack, and small form radios.  The Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge waveform is being designed to  better enable time critical airborne operations. The networking waveforms  are the core of the JTRS networking capability and their availability is  crucial to the program’s success. The three networking waveforms are in  various stages of development:    Wideband Networking Waveform: The Wideband Networking Waveform— designed for JTRS ground vehicle radios—is the farthest along in  development of the three networking waveforms. Nevertheless, while  initial functionality has been demonstrated through a contractor  demonstration held in the summer of 2005, some technical challenges  remain. The demonstration showed that ground mobile radios operated in  a network with the Wideband Networking Waveform and were able to  connect to the network as well as reconnected when the network was  disrupted. However, the Wideband Networking Waveform also  experienced various performance problems including limited data  throughput, latency, and start-up time. Program officials believe these  performance problems have largely been corrected. Nonetheless, the  demonstrated network linked only 4 users, far fewer than the required   250. In addition, program officials noted that meeting the Wideband  Networking Waveform requirement for voice communications over a  mobile ad hoc network remains challenging.
Soldier Radio Waveform: The Soldier Radio Waveform is a low power,  short range networking waveform optimized for radios with severe size,  weight, and power constraints such as dismounted soldier radios and  small form radios. Currently, the waveform is transitioning from a science  and technology program. Program officials expect to award a sole source  contract in fiscal year 2007 for further development of the waveform.  While the Soldier Radio Waveform has demonstrated some functionality,  program officials noted that it will take significant effort to transition the  waveform from a science and technology project to meet full operational  requirements. In particular, program officials are concerned about the  waveform’s insufficient security architecture and how this may affect  porting it onto a JTRS radio. Given these concerns, the waveform’s  development schedule may be ambitious. Future Combat Systems is the  driver of near-term Soldier Radio Waveform requirements. The success of  the first spin-out of Future Combat Systems is dependent on the delivery  of the certified waveform ported to selected JTRS small form radios.
Joint Airborne Network—Tactical Edge: The Joint Airborne Network— Tactical Edge is an extremely low latency networking waveform optimized  for airborne platforms. Like the Soldier Radio Waveform, the Joint  Airborne Network—Tactical Edge is transitioning from a science and  technology project and program officials expect to award a sole source  contract in fiscal year 2006. For Increment 1, the waveform will initially  operate on a Multifunctional Information Distribution System—JTRS radio  and will have limited capabilities. Program officials expect that it will be  upgraded to full networking functionality in subsequent increments.
After waveforms are developed, they must be ported to radio hardware.  According to agency officials, porting waveforms onto JTRS radios has  been more technically challenging than originally expected. The intent of  JTRS is that waveforms be highly portable meaning that waveforms can be  transported and adapted to a variety of radio platforms at a cost lower  than the cost of redeveloping the waveform again for a radio set with  different hardware components. When waveforms are developed, the  software code is designed to operate on a particular radio’s hardware  architecture. When the same waveform is transported to different  hardware, changes to the software code may be necessary to ensure  proper integration of the waveform onto the new hardware. The more  costly the integration effort is, the less portable the waveform.
Although the JTRS Software Communications Architecture specifies  design rules for waveform software to enhance portability across different  hardware, the limited experience of porting waveforms thus far has shown  significantly higher costs and longer schedules than anticipated. The JPEO  noted that government direction and oversight as well as coordination  between waveform, operating environment, and hardware developers  needs improvement. Officials are also concerned about the porting of the  networking waveforms being developed in science and technology  programs to meet the full requirements for the Soldier Radio Waveform  and the Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge waveform. To make this  happen the waveforms will need to become compliant with the JTRS  Software Communications Architecture, incorporate network  management functions, and develop required security capabilities. Efforts  to rework software to effectively transfer the waveforms, therefore, could  result in cost and schedule problems.
section_title: Interoperability of Networking Waveforms
paragraphs: The proposed interim technical solutions enabling network  interoperability have yet to be developed. To achieve DOD’s desired  networking capabilities, waveforms must be able to communicate and  interoperate with each other. However, technologies and radio designs are  not mature enough at this point to develop an interoperability capability  that would function inside individual JTRS radios. As a result, the program  plans to meet network interoperability requirements for the initial  increment through the use of gateways. A gateway is a separate node  within a network equipped to interoperate with another network that uses  different protocols. As such, key functions facilitating interoperability  between waveforms may be performed outside of the JTRS radio rather  than inside.
At this point, the JPEO is assessing different options to achieve the  gateway function and anticipates that development will start in 2007. The  JPEO expects that the development of the gateway will result in a separate  acquisition decision but is uncertain as to whether it will be acquired  through the forthcoming Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Site system  development contract or through a separate contract. In addition, the  JPEO is uncertain as to whether the gateway will be employed as a  separate piece of hardware or whether it will leverage an existing radio in  the network. According to JPEO officials, employing the gateway as a  separate piece of hardware could result in additional size, weight, and  power risks for some platforms. JPEO officials also noted that without a  fully functioning gateway capability, users operating in separate networks  will not be able to communicate directly with one another. For example, a  ground soldier operating on a Soldier Radio Waveform with a handheld  radio would not be able to call directly for fire support from an aircraft  operating on the Joint Airborne Network—Tactical Edge Waveform with a  Multifunctional Information Distribution System-JTRS radio.
section_title: Hardware Integration/Size, Weight, and Power
paragraphs: Integrating the radio’s hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting their  respective size, weight and power limitations remains a challenge. To  realize full networking capabilities, the radios require significant amounts  of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight, and  power consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the result  of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the radio are not overheated.
While progress has been made in meeting the size, weight, and power  requirements for the ground mobile radios, developers still face some  challenges. The JPEO has already delivered 30 partially functioning  prototype radios—built on production assembly lines—to the Future  Combat Systems program. However, until the ground mobile radios  demonstrate greater Wideband Networking Waveform functionality—a  key source of power consumption—using a fully functioning prototype,  size, weight, and power concerns remain. The delivery of new power  amplifiers that are currently being developed as part of a science and  technology program by the Army’s Communications—Electronics  Research, Development and Engineering Center could help address these  concerns. According to center officials, the power amplifiers are  approaching maturity and have demonstrated significantly higher power  output and improved efficiency over the current amplifier used on the  ground mobile radios. The JPEO expects to begin receiving the new power  amplifiers this September.
Meeting the requirements of the handheld, manpack, and small form  radios continues to be the most challenging of all JTRS components  because of their smaller size, weight, and power constraints. Program  officials expect that the requirements relief provided through the  restructuring should help to address size, weight, and power requirements.  For example, the restructuring reduces the number of waveforms required  to operate on each radio, which is expected to reduce power demands,  thereby reducing the size and weight demands. In addition, like the ground  mobile radios, the JTRS small form radios are also expected to benefit  from the delivery of new wideband power amplifiers. However, these  technologies are still maturing. Moreover, the handheld, manpack, and  small form radio designs are not stable.
section_title: Security
paragraphs: The JTRS requirement to operate applications at multiple levels of security  in a networked environment has resulted in significant information  assurance challenges. Developers not only have to be concerned with  traditional radio security issues but also must be prepared to implement  the features required for computer and network security. One challenge is  that military software defined radio technology capable of processing data  at multiple security levels is immature. In addition, the requirement to  operate in an open networked environment allows greater access to  external networks increasing the number of potential users and the  likelihood of threats to the network. These challenges will require the  development of new technologies, obtaining certification through a  rigorous process by the National Security Agency, and accommodating an  expected growth in security requirements.
The complexities and uncertainties involved with JTRS security  certification were illustrated when the National Security Agency  determined that the design for the Cluster 1 radio was not sufficient to  meet newly identified operational requirements from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense to operate in a networked environment. This resulted  in the need for additional security requirements and significant hardware  design changes to the radio’s security architecture that ultimately resulted  in significant cost increases. National Security Agency officials noted that  one of the key lessons learned from the Cluster 1 experience was that  security requirements need to be considered early in the development of  the radio. As such, the JPEO has taken steps to better coordinate with the  National Security Agency to meet security requirements. Specifically, the  National Security Agency currently has a representative in each JTRS  domain and participates in management reviews, design reviews, vendor  technical exchanges, and weekly conference calls. The National Security  Agency is also expected to be a member of the JTRS Executive Council  and advisory member of the JTRS Board of Directors in the new JTRS  governance structure. Both National Security Agency and JPEO officials  noted that coordination and cooperation between the agencies has  significantly improved since the JPEO was established. In addition,  National Security Agency officials do not expect the other JTRS radios will  encounter the same design problems experienced by the Cluster 1 radio as  contractors now have a greater understanding of security requirements.  Further, the restructured schedules for Ground domain radios appear to  be sufficiently aligned to receive National Security Agency certification in  time to meet the needs of Future Combat Systems.  Nevertheless, because  of the complex software encryption and networking requirements,  security will continue to be a challenge for all JTRS components.
section_title: Spectrum Availability
paragraphs: JTRS radios will require considerable radio spectrum for effective  operations especially when using the new networking waveforms that  could operate within several different bands of radio spectrum. However,  obtaining sufficient radio spectrum allocations is problematic because the  program must compete with other military and civilian users. Radio  spectrum in general is becoming more saturated and demand for spectrum  is increasing. Efforts are underway by the JPEO to work through the  required DOD spectrum certification processes; however, certification of  software defined radios remains a challenge because, according to  spectrum management officials, these processes were designed around  hardware-based radios and may not fully support the certification of  cutting edge technologies such as JTRS.  DOD has recognized the  shortcomings of the existing processes and has taken initial steps to  address them. Most recently, DOD has worked with the National  Telecommunications and Information Administration to stand up a  permanent software defined radio working group that would study how to  proceed.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: U.S. military forces’ communications and networking systems currently  lack the interoperability and capacity DOD believes are needed to access  and share real-time information, identify and react quickly to threats, and  operate effectively as a joint force. JTRS is critical to providing the  capabilities to support DOD’s future vision of net-centric warfighting. Yet,  since its inception, the JTRS development effort has struggled due to  unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations. As a  consequence, DOD and the military services have had to make  adjustments and acquire interim communications solutions to meet their  near-term communications requirements.
The restructuring approach developed by JPEO and approved by DOD  holds promise for delivering much needed communications capability to  the warfighters. However, given the program’s troubled development  history, putting the approach into action will be a challenge and require  strong and continuous oversight. Key details of the JTRS restructuring— including assurance that there are stable operational requirements,  knowledge-based acquisition strategies for each domain’s product lines,  and effective test plans that reflect the priority of developing networking  capabilities—must be finalized and approved by DOD. In addition,  significant programmatic and technical risks—including further  technology maturation, certification of waveforms and radios, and  implementation of the new JTRS governance model—must still be  overcome. Furthermore, detailed migration and fielding plans that are  consistent with a well-developed concept of operations are needed to  ensure an affordable and operationally effective use of JTRS radios in the  future. Any manifestations of these risks will likely increase program  costs, delay fielding, or reduce planned capabilities. To the extent JTRS  delivers less capability than planned, future warfighting concepts may  have to be altered as well as the design of weapons systems such as Future  Combat Systems that are dependent on JTRS.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To enhance the likelihood of success of the JTRS program, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense:    before approving the detailed program plans for each JTRS domain,  ensure that they reflect stable and well-defined requirements; knowledge- based acquisition strategies; clear and meaningful test plans that address  the need to not only test individual JTRS components but the overall  networking capabilities of JTRS as well; and, funding commitments  necessary to execute the program; and    develop JTRS migration and fielding plans that are consistent with a well- developed concept of operations for using JTRS networking capabilities  and effectively balances recent investments in acquiring legacy radios with  future needs.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In its letter commenting on the draft of our report, DOD agreed with our  recommendations.  DOD’s letter is reprinted in appendix II.  DOD noted  that the report recommendations are consistent with the measures taken  by the department to restructure the JTRS program, develop JTRS radios  in an incremental manner, and effectively balance recent investments in  legacy radios with future needs.  While we acknowledge that DOD has  taken measures to put the JTRS program in a better position to move  forward, we continue to believe that additional measures, as outlined in  our recommendations, are needed to ensure that the program will be  successfully executed and achieve its intended objectives.
DOD also provided detailed comments, which we incorporated where  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking  Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and  subcommittees that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for  DOD. We will also send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries  of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management  and Budget. Copies will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site  at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841, or Assistant Director John  Oppenheim at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess whether recent actions taken by DOD puts the JTRS program in  a better position to succeed, we obtained briefings on restructuring  assessments, plans, and decisions, analyzed documents describing  Increment 1 requirements, and interviewed program and product officials  from the Joint Program Executive Office, San Diego, California. To obtain  the perspective of organizations that provide policy guidance, oversight,  and technology support for the JTRS program, we interviewed officials  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics, Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary  of Defense, Networks and Information Integration, Arlington, Virginia;  Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Arlington,  Virginia; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and  Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and, the Army’s Communications- Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort  Monmouth, New Jersey.
To identify the risks that might continue to undermine the successful  fielding of JTRS, we obtained and analyzed briefings from the JTRS  Domain, Program, and Product Managers, as well as the JTRS Technical  Director, San Diego, California. We also reviewed Selected Acquisition  Reports, budget requests, acquisition decision memorandums, and the  JTRS governance structure. We interviewed officials from the National  Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland; Joint Interoperability Test  Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Defense Contract Management  Agency, Anaheim, California; Project Manager for Future Combat Systems  Network Systems Integration, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and, JTRS  contractors in Arlington, Virginia and Anaheim, California.
Our review was conducted from August 2005 through August 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgment
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, Katherine Bittinger, Ridge Bowman,  Karen Sloan, Amy Sweet, James Tallon, Tristan To, Hai Tran, and Paul  Williams made key contributions to this report.