The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy Objectives
Published: 2007-12-14T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15 U.S. policy objectives to address the DRC's humanitarian, development, economic and natural resource, governance, and security issues and mandated that GAO review actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve these objectives. In this report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges hindering the accomplishment of the objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward the objectives. GAO obtained and analyzed agencies' program documents and met with officials of agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. programs and activities support the Act's policy objectives. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, State, and the Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of the funds were allocated for programs that support the Act's humanitarian and social development objectives, while the remainder was allocated for programs and activities that support the Act's economic, governance, and security objectives. Although U.S. agencies have not acted on the Act's objective of bilaterally urging nations contributing peacekeeping troops to prosecute abusive peacekeepers, U.S. multilateral actions address this issue. The DRC's unstable security situation, weak governance, mismanagement of its vast natural resources, and lack of infrastructure are major interrelated challenges that impede efforts to achieve the Act's policy objectives. For example, the unstable security situation in the eastern DRC has worsened humanitarian and social problems and forced U.S. and NGO staff to curtail some efforts. The lack of roads has prevented deliveries of needed aid. DRC's weak governance structures prevent the country from meeting the requirements for debt relief and discourage private-sector investment, thus hindering economic growth. The U.S. government has not established a process for systematically assessing its progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives. While some U.S. agencies collect information about their respective activities in the DRC, no mechanism exists for assessing overall progress. State and USAID are developing a joint planning and budgeting process that may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However, State's Director of Foreign Assistance has yet to complete the fiscal year 2007 DRC operations plan, which does not include a comprehensive assessment of the collective impact of State and USAID programs and does not address activities funded by other agencies. While a National Security Council-sponsored interagency group discusses DRC policies and helps coordinate some activities, it does not include several relevant agencies and, according to key officials, does not systematically assess progress in the DRC.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Because of its large size, central location in sub-Saharan Africa, and  Because of its large size, central location in sub-Saharan Africa, and  abundant natural resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)  abundant natural resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)  is important to the stability of central Africa and is of long-term interest to  is important to the stability of central Africa and is of long-term interest to  the United States. However, since achieving independence in 1960, the  the United States. However, since achieving independence in 1960, the  DRC—one of the world’s poorest countries—has suffered from despotic  DRC—one of the world’s poorest countries—has suffered from despotic  rule, underdevelopment, economic problems, and conflicts with  rule, underdevelopment, economic problems, and conflicts with  neighboring countries that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 3.9  neighboring countries that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 3.9  million Congolese within the past decade. Government and other armed  million Congolese within the past decade. Government and other armed  forces also committed abuses against thousands of Congolese women and  forces also committed abuses against thousands of Congolese women and  girls. According to the U.S. Department of State, Western nations provided  girls. According to the U.S. Department of State, Western nations provided  the DRC with considerable aid during the Cold War era, but support for  the DRC with considerable aid during the Cold War era, but support for  the DRC fell in the early 1990s owing to concerns about human rights  the DRC fell in the early 1990s owing to concerns about human rights  abuses and the need for internal reforms.  abuses and the need for internal reforms.
U.S. aid to the DRC began to increase again in 2001, following the  U.S. aid to the DRC began to increase again in 2001, following the  initiation of peace talks that led first to the withdrawal of foreign armies  initiation of peace talks that led first to the withdrawal of foreign armies  and then to the installation of a transitional DRC government in 2003.  and then to the installation of a transitional DRC government in 2003.  Subsequently, the U.S. President stated that the United States would work  Subsequently, the U.S. President stated that the United States would work  closely with the transitional government to promote “peace, prosperity  closely with the transitional government to promote “peace, prosperity  and democracy” for all Congolese people. The transition process  and democracy” for all Congolese people. The transition process  culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the DRC’s first  culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the DRC’s first  democratically elected president in more than 40 years. Following the  democratically elected president in more than 40 years. Following the  DRC elections, on December 22, 2006, Congress enacted the DRC Relief,  Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act). The Act  established 15 policy objectives aimed at addressing a range of concerns  regarding humanitarian, social development, economic and natural  resource, governance, and security issues in the DRC. Also, it stated the  Secretary of State should withhold certain assistance to the DRC if the  Secretary determined that the DRC was not making sufficient progress  toward accomplishing these policy objectives. The Act mandated that GAO  review actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve the Act’s policy  objectives.
In this report, we identify (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the  Act’s objectives, (2) major impediments hindering accomplishment of  these objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward  accomplishing the objectives. Because the Act directed us to review  actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve its objectives, we focused on the  fiscal year in which the Act was enacted, and also considered the fiscal  year before its enactment to provide context. In conducting our work, we  analyzed policy, planning, budget, and programming documents describing  U.S. policies and programs in the DRC provided by key U.S. agencies—the  Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), Health  and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury; the Overseas Private  Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID). We identified the amount of funding each agency  allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal years 2006 and 2007; we did not  determine the extent to which each agency obligated or expended its  allocated funds. We also met with representatives from each of these  agencies, the National Security Council (NSC), nongovernmental  organizations (NGO), and other organizations with expertise on DRC- related issues. To identify key challenges hindering the accomplishment of  the Act’s policy objectives, we analyzed relevant policy and program  documents; interviewed U.S. agency officials; conducted a round-table  session with a nonprobability sample of 11 NGOs with a broad range of  experience and expertise implementing programs and projects in the DRC;  and interviewed representatives from other organizations with experience  in the DRC. To examine U.S. efforts to assess progress toward  accomplishing the Act’s policy objectives and to make decisions regarding  additional actions, we reviewed U.S. agency assessments and  implementation documents. Although we did not travel to the DRC, we  conducted several telephone interviews with U.S. embassy and USAID  mission staff located in the DRC. We performed our work from May 2007  to December 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. (See app. I for a more detailed description of our scope  and methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The DRC’s size, location, and wealth of natural resources contribute to its  importance to U.S. interests in the region. With an area of more than  900,000 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the United States east  of the Mississippi River. Located in the center of Africa, the DRC borders  nine nations (see fig. 1). Its abundant natural resources, which constitute  its primary export products, include 34 percent of world cobalt reserves;  10 percent of world copper reserves; 64 percent of world coltan reserves;  and significant amounts of wood, oil, coffee, diamonds, gold, cassiterite,  and other minerals. In addition, rain forests in the DRC provide 8 percent  of world carbon reserves. The DRC has a population of 58 million to 65  million people, including members of more than 200 ethnic groups.
The DRC has had a turbulent history. In 1965, fewer than 5 years after the  nation achieved its independence from Belgium, a military regime seized  control of the DRC and ruled, often brutally, for more than three decades.  It was toppled in 1997 by a coalition of internal groups and neighboring  countries to the east, including Rwanda and Uganda, after dissident  Rwandan groups began operating in the DRC. Subsequent efforts by a new  DRC government to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan  troops prompted a second war in 1998 that eventually drew the armies of  three more African nations into the DRC. According to the International  Rescue Committee, this second war resulted in an estimated 3.9 million  deaths. Beginning in 1999, a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was  deployed to the DRC. After a series of peace talks, the other nations  withdrew all or most of their troops and an interim government was  established. Elections held in 2006 with logistical support provided by UN  peacekeepers culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the  DRC’s first democratically elected president in more than 40 years.
Partially as a result of this turbulent history, the DRC suffers from a wide  range of problems, including acute poverty. The DRC is one of the poorest  and least developed countries in the world. It was ranked 167th of 177  nations surveyed by the UN Development Program in terms of life  expectancy, education, and standard of living, and its ranking on these  measures has declined more than 10 percent over the past decade. The  current life expectancy is 43 years, in part because the DRC suffers from  high rates of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. According to USAID,  more than 2 of every 10 children born in the DRC die before their fifth  birthday (owing in part to chronic malnutrition and low vaccination rates),  and the maternal death rate is the world’s highest. Congolese women also  suffer from the effects of rampant sexual attacks and other forms of  gender-based violence against women, particularly in the eastern regions  of the country. A UN expert reported in July 2007 that widespread  atrocities against women in one eastern DRC province constituted the  worst crisis of sexual violence that the expert had yet encountered. An  international group of donor nations recently concluded that the DRC’s  educational system is failing and in a state of crisis. Most rural children do  not attend school at all, in part because their parents cannot afford to pay  school fees. As a result of such problems, the Fund for Peace ranked the  DRC second on its “failed states” scale, after Sudan.
The DRC’s economic prospects are uncertain. It once derived about 75  percent of its export revenues and 25 percent of its gross domestic  product from its natural resources, but wars and turmoil have reduced its  economy to dependence on subsistence agriculture and informal activities.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that as of 2001, the  DRC’s per capita gross domestic product had contracted to $100 from a  preindependence level of $400, in constant dollars. Although the DRC’s  gross domestic product grew at an average rate of 5.5 percent from 2002  through 2005, growth has recently slowed. Also, the DRC’s prospects are  encumbered by an external debt load of around $8 billion. The value of  this debt—which represents more than 90 percent of the DRC’s gross  domestic product, 300 percent of its exports, and 700 percent of its  government’s revenues—is three times greater than the level of debt that  the World Bank and the IMF consider sustainable. The DRC has not fully  qualified for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor  Country (HIPC) initiative.
The DRC receives assistance from an array of donor nations and  organizations. During 2004 and 2005, the 10 largest donors to the DRC  were the World Bank’s International Development Association, the  European Commission, Japan, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United  States, France, Germany, the IMF, and the Netherlands. The World Bank is  preparing a country assistance strategy to support the DRC’s 2007-2010  poverty-reduction goals. The United States and 16 other donor nations and  organizations are contributing to the World Bank’s effort by preparing a  country assistance framework document that assesses the major  challenges facing the DRC and identifies major areas for donor focus.  Some donor nations and organizations have also begun an effort to  coordinate assistance for reforming the DRC’s troubled army, police, and  judiciary.
According to the Department of State, the United States’ goal for its  assistance to the DRC is to strengthen the process of internal  reconciliation and democratization to promote a stable, developing, and  democratic DRC. The Department of State has also reported that the  United States is seeking to ensure that the DRC professionalizes its  security forces and is at peace; develops democratic institutions; supports  private-sector economic growth and achieves macroeconomic stability;  meets the basic needs of its people; and, with its international partners,  provides relief in humanitarian crises. As described by the Assistant  Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. policy is to support—but not  lead—the efforts of the DRC to address its problems.
In October 2006, continued violence and armed conflict in the eastern  DRC led the President of the United States to issue an executive order  blocking the property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the  DRC. In October 2006, the President reiterated the United States’  commitment to the goal of creating a prosperous Congolese democracy. In  October 2007, the President, meeting with the newly elected president of  the DRC, again cited the importance of democracy and economic growth  in the DRC and noted the need for progress on security and health issues.
Section 102 of the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of  2006 includes 15 U.S. policy objectives for the DRC. Table 1 presents these  objectives in five categories of assistance—emergency humanitarian,  social development, economic and natural resources, governance, and  security.
The National Security Council has established an interagency working  group to focus attention on issues affecting the Great Lakes region of  central Africa, which encompasses the DRC. The group meets bimonthly  and includes officials from DOD, State, USAID, and Treasury. Its mission  is to establish a coordinated approach, policies, and actions to address  issues (such as security) in the DRC and other countries in the region.
To ensure that foreign assistance, including assistance provided to the  DRC, is used as effectively as possible to meet broad foreign policy  objectives, the Secretary of State in 2006 appointed a Director of Foreign  Assistance (DFA), who also serves as the Administrator of USAID. The  DFA is charged with    developing a coordinated U.S. government foreign assistance strategy,  including multiyear country-specific assistance strategies and annual  country-specific assistance operational plans;   creating and directing consolidated policy, planning, budget, and  implementation mechanisms and staff functions required to provide  umbrella leadership to foreign assistance; and   providing guidance to foreign assistance delivered through other agencies  and entities of the U.S. government, including the Millennium Challenge  Corporation and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.
section_title: U.S. Programs and Activities Support the Act’s Policy Objectives
paragraphs: U.S. programs and activities provide support to the Act’s policy objectives.  Most recently, in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, U.S. agencies allocated the  largest share of their funds for the DRC to programs that supported the  Act’s humanitarian and social development goals. Although the U.S.  government has not acted on the Act’s policy objective that it bilaterally  urge nations contributing UN peacekeepers to prosecute abusive  peacekeeping troops, it has taken other steps to address this objective.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Funding for the DRC
paragraphs: Recent U.S. funding for the DRC has focused primarily on the Act’s  humanitarian and development goals. Seven U.S. agencies allocated about  $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the DRC in fiscal years 2006  and 2007, respectively, as shown in table 2.
As shown in figure 2, most of these funds were allocated by State and  USAID.
The agencies allocated about 70 percent of these funds for programs that  would support the Act’s emergency humanitarian and social development  objectives (see fig. 3). They allocated about 30 percent of the funds for  programs and activities that would support the Act’s economic,  governance, and security objectives.
section_title: Humanitarian Assistance
paragraphs: USAID and State have provided humanitarian assistance to help the DRC  meet the basic needs of its citizens and vulnerable populations. The  following examples illustrate these efforts.
USAID has provided emergency food assistance to the DRC, primarily  through the UN World Food Program and Food for the Hungry  International. USAID-funded emergency food assistance included general  distribution of food to internally displaced persons who need food aid;  vulnerable groups such as people infected with, and orphans and widows  affected by, HIV/AIDS; and victims of sexual abuse by soldiers. USAID  emergency assistance also supported road rehabilitation and bridge  reconstruction projects; schools; and the socioeconomic reintegration of  ex-child soldiers, adult combatants, and their families. In addition, USAID  provided emergency supplies, health care, nutrition programs, water and  sanitation improvements, food, and agriculture assistance to vulnerable  populations in the DRC—including malnourished children, war-affected  populations, internally displaced people, and formerly displaced  households—primarily through NGOs. Recent program activities have  focused on road rehabilitation; primary health care and specialized care  services to malnourished children in certain eastern regions; medical care,  treatment, and confidential counseling to victims of sexual and gender- based violence; and access to water and sanitation at health facilities.
State has provided humanitarian assistance to help repatriate, integrate,  and resettle refugees in the DRC. It has also helped fund refugees’ food  needs and supported mental health assistance and market access  programs in areas of high refugee return. In fiscal year 2007, State  supported refugee assistance activities in the DRC, which were  implemented primarily by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, other  international organizations, and NGOs. In addition, State contributed to  overall Africa assistance programs implemented by the UN High  Commissioner on Refugees and the International Committee of the Red  Cross, which help support refugees and conflict victims in central Africa.
section_title: Social Development Assistance
paragraphs: USAID, HHS, and DOL allocated funds to support the Act’s social  development and rehabilitation objectives. The following examples  illustrate these efforts.
USAID has worked through NGOs to improve education, health care, and  family planning. It has implemented activities to reduce abandonment of  children; provide psychosocial support, medical assistance, and  reintegration support to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in  the eastern DRC; train teachers; and increase access to education for  vulnerable children. USAID also funds efforts to train medical staff and  nurses in the management of primary health care, distribute bed nets to  prevent the spread of malaria and polio, provide family planning services,  and support voluntary counseling and testing centers for HIV/AIDS.
HHS has allocated funds for immunization against, and the surveillance  and control of, infectious diseases such as polio, measles, and HIV/AIDS.  HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has also sought to  strengthen the capacity of public health personnel, promote infrastructure  development and improve the quality of clinical laboratories through  grants and cooperative agreements. The Centers for Disease Control and  Prevention have also (1) provided ongoing technical, programmatic, and  funding support through the World Health Organization and the UN  Children’s Fund for the DRC immunization program with an emphasis on  polio eradication and measles mortality reduction, and (2) assisted the  World Health Organization with a recent outbreak of Ebola virus. In  addition, HHS’s National Institutes of Health has granted funds to U.S.  academic institutions to conduct basic and clinical biomedical research,  which involves collaboration with research partners in the DRC.
DOL has allocated funds to address children’s involvement in mining and  related services, small-scale commerce, child soldiering, and other forms  of child labor in the DRC. This effort would build on a recently completed  project that assisted a small number of former child soldiers by fostering  their withdrawal from militias and discouraging their reenlistment.
section_title: Economic and Natural Resource Management Assistance
paragraphs: The Treasury, USAID, State, and USDA have provided support for the Act’s  economic objectives. The following examples illustrate these efforts.
The Treasury has worked with the World Bank and the IMF to relieve the  DRC of some of its foreign debt. The United States provided the DRC with  interim debt relief (primarily through reduced interest payments) in fiscal  years 2005 through 2007, following the DRC’s admittance into the HIPC  debt relief program. Once the DRC qualifies for the completion of its HIPC  debt relief, Treasury plans to pay the budgetary costs of full U.S. bilateral  debt relief to the DRC ($1.3 billion) with $44.6 million allocated in fiscal  year 2006, about $80 million in previously appropriated funds, and about  $178 million in fiscal year 2008 funds.
USAID has allocated funds to support sustainable natural resource  management, forest protection, and biodiversity in the DRC through the  Central African Regional Program for the Environment. The program is a  20-year regional initiative that aims to reduce deforestation and loss of  biological diversity in the DRC and its eastern neighbors. A component of  the U.S.-sponsored Congo Basin Forest Partnership, the program also  promotes forest-based livelihoods in the DRC. USAID has also allocated  funds to encourage productivity in the agricultural, private, and small  enterprise sectors and to support agriculture development. In addition,  USAID’s Global Development Alliance program works with private  companies to promote transparent mining practices and reinvestment into  DRC mining communities.
State has supported efforts to promote transparency in the natural  resource sector by serving as the U.S. representative to the Kimberley  Process Certification Scheme which deals with rough diamond trade, and  the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
USDA has allocated funds to improve agricultural productivity, increase  rural market development, provide credit for agribusiness and rural  infrastructure, and increase access to potable water and water for  irrigation in the DRC.
section_title: Governance Assistance
paragraphs: USAID and State have allocated funds for programs that support the Act’s  governance objectives. The following examples illustrate such assistance.
USAID has allocated funds to organize itinerant court sessions in relatively  inaccessible parts of the DRC. These sessions are intended to bring justice  institutions closer to citizens, facilitate greater access to justice for  vulnerable people, and provide quality legal assistance to the population. It  has also supported an NGO’s establishment of democracy resource  centers to assist political party leaders, civic activists, elected local and  national officials, and government institutions in consolidating good  governance and democracy. To promote judicial independence, USAID  has supported an NGO’s efforts to (1) foster the adoption and  implementation of priority improvements to the DRC’s legal framework,  including laws on sexual violence and the rights of women, and (2)  provide legal assistance activities for victims of sexual and gender-based  violence.
State allocated funds for more than 30 programs by the National  Endowment for Democracy during 2006. Several of these programs were  aimed at informing women of their rights, addressing issues of abuse and  corruption, and promoting political participation. For example, the  endowment used State funds to support the political role of women in one  eastern province before and after the elections, to call attention to the  continued victimization of women in eastern Congo, and to visit detention  centers throughout the DRC to facilitate release of illegally detained men  and women.
section_title: Security Assistance
paragraphs: State, USAID, and DOD programs and activities have provided support for  most of the Act’s security-related policy objectives. The following  examples illustrate these efforts.
State has facilitated a multinational forum, the Tripartite Plus  Commission, to encourage other nations to play a constructive role in the  DRC’s security affairs. The commission provides a forum for the DRC and  the nations on its troubled eastern border—Uganda, Rwanda, and  Burundi—to discuss regional security issues, including militias operating  illegally in the eastern DRC. State has also supported a center where these  nations can share intelligence regarding militias.
USAID has launched programs to promote the reintegration of some  former fighters into Congolese society. The programs are intended to  provide the former fighters incentives to remain in civilian society.
State is refurbishing the DRC’s military officer training school and training  multiple levels of the military, including brigade- and battalion-staff level  officers, on military justice reform, civil-military relations, and other issues  of concern. According to State officials, State funds will be used for an  initial DOD assessment of the military justice sector to identify needs to be  addressed with future funds. State may also use these funds to help train  DRC personnel to combat armed fighters in the eastern regions of the  DRC.
Key State senior-level and program officials informed us that they were  unaware of any U.S. efforts to bilaterally urge nations contributing UN  peacekeeping troops to take steps to help those nations prosecute any of  their peacekeeping troops who may commit abuses in the DRC. State  officials informed us that the United States has encouraged the UN to take  actions to guard against further abuses of DRC citizens by UN  peacekeepers. The United States also supports the Global Peace  Operations Initiative, a 5-year program to train and, as appropriate, equip  at least 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide with a focus on African nations.
section_title: Major Challenges in the DRC Impede Efforts to Achieve the Act’s Policy Objectives
paragraphs: U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several major  challenges that impede U.S. efforts to achieve the Act’s policy objectives.  These challenges include (1) the unstable security situation, (2) weak  governance and widespread corruption, (3) mismanagement of natural  resources, and (4) lack of basic infrastructure. Because these challenges  are interrelated, they negatively impact progress in multiple areas.
subsections: section_title: Unstable Security Situation
paragraphs: The DRC’s weak and abusive security forces have been unable to quell  continuing militia activities in the DRC’s eastern regions, where security  grew worse during 2007. During 2006 and 2007, reports by several  organizations described the security challenge in the DRC.
According to a report by the International Crisis Group, militias control  large portions of the eastern regions of the DRC. The report concludes that  the DRC’s security forces are poorly disciplined, ill equipped, and the  worst abusers of human rights in the DRC.
According to a UN report, the DRC army is responsible for 40 percent of  recently reported human rights violations—including rapes, mass killings  of civilians, and summary executions—and DRC police and other security  forces have killed and tortured civilians with total impunity. The report  states that the DRC has generally promoted, rather than investigated and  prosecuted, army officers suspected of such abuses.
According to a report by Amnesty International, women have been raped  in large numbers by government and other armed forces throughout the  DRC.
According to State, government and other armed forces in the DRC have  committed a wide range of human rights abuses, including forcing children  into the security forces.
The DRC’s unstable security situation has worsened the DRC’s  humanitarian and social problems and impeded efforts to address these  problems, according to NGO representatives, agency officials, and other  sources.
The renewed conflict has prompted increased NGO and UN assistance  programs, including those aimed at addressing basic needs and  psychosocial, legal, and socioeconomic support for victims of sexual and  gender-based violence. NGOs have noted that active combatants typically  commit crimes of sexual violence against women, with 4,500 sexual  violence cases reported in the first 6 months of 2007 alone.
The lack of security in the DRC has impeded efforts to address  humanitarian needs as well as efforts aimed at promoting social  development. U.S. agency officials informed us that the conflict has forced  them to curtail some emergency assistance programs, and NGOs  implementing development and humanitarian assistance activities in the  DRC have reported that the lack of security has resulted in attacks on their  staff or led them to suspend site visits and cancel and reschedule work.  The UN has also stated that although access to displaced populations has  improved somewhat in a few areas, in general it remains difficult because  of the lack of security.
The DRC’s unstable security situation has negatively affected the country’s  economic potential by discouraging investment, which in turn could  worsen security through renewed conflict. DRC donors and the IMF agree  that improved security in the DRC is necessary to strengthen the economy.  Research on the security of property rights confirms this view. World  Bank research has also found that a lack of economic growth increases a  postconflict nation’s likelihood of falling back into conflict. Other  researchers have estimated that a democratic nation is roughly 10 times  more likely to be overthrown if its economy experiences negative growth 2  years in a row.
section_title: Weak Governance and Corruption
paragraphs: By many accounts, corruption in the DRC is widespread, civil liberties are  limited, and the DRC’s governance institutions have been severely  damaged.
State has described corruption in the DRC as “pervasive.” In 2007, an  international donor study concluded that corruption in the DRC “remains  widespread and is taking a heavy toll on public service capacity to deliver  key services.” Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption Perceptions  Index identifies the DRC as one of the 10th most corrupt countries in the  world.
Freedom House in 2007 continued to rate the DRC as “Not Free” and  scored it near the bottom of its scales for civil liberties and political  freedom. USAID has pointed to limited opportunities for Congolese  women to participate in the DRC’s governance.
The World Bank has reported that the DRC’s judicial system is one of the  world’s six weakest in terms of enforcing commercial contracts.
The State Department has described significant failures in the criminal  justice system, as well as “harsh and life-threatening” prison conditions.
Historically weak governance and corruption in the DRC have hindered  efforts to reform the security sector and hold human rights violators  accountable.
According to U.S. officials, the lack of a DRC government office with clear  authority on security issues has impeded efforts to promote security  sector reform. The officials informed us that the absence of clear authority  over security sector issues has hindered efforts to determine both the DRC  government’s priorities for security sector reform and the most effective  role for international donors in promoting security sector reform.
According to the country assistance framework, the DRC has not  established a clear and functioning payroll system for its armed forces.  One NGO reported that much of the $8 million the DRC paid in 2005 for its  soldiers’ salaries was “diverted” and the remainder rarely reached soldiers  in a timely manner. NGOs and media sources have reported that soldiers  have committed human rights abuses as a result. The country assistance  framework states that the DRC Ministry of Defense controls only a small  number of budget items and is not accountable for the defense budget’s  use.
According to one NGO report, efforts to reform the command structure,  size, and control of the security forces have been frustrated by political  manipulation, pervasive corruption, and a failure to hold officials  accountable. A U.S. State Department official told us that efforts to reform  the DRC’s police may be impeded by lack of support from DRC  institutions that suffer from corruption and have no interest in reform.
According to NGO representatives, the lack of an effective judiciary  impedes efforts to hold human rights violators accountable for their  actions, which in turn promotes a “culture of impunity.” One NGO  reported that a severe shortage of DRC judicial personnel—particularly in  the eastern portion of the nation—prevents courts from hearing cases,  public prosecutor offices from conducting investigations, and prisons from  operating. Another NGO stated that the judiciary is subject to corruption  and manipulation by both official and unofficial actors. As a result, courts  have recently failed to hold individuals accountable for human rights  violations, including a massacre of more than 70 people and the reported  rape by police of 37 women and girls in a village in a western province. A  representative of one NGO told us that local government officials had  tortured his organization’s grantees in an effort to stop their democracy  and governance training programs.
Governance problems have also hindered efforts to implement economic  reforms required for debt relief and promote economic growth.
According to Treasury officials and IMF documents, the government’s lack  of commitment to meet certain requirements has jeopardized the DRC’s  ability to receive some interim debt relief, qualify for full debt relief, and  improve the country’s overall economic prospects. To receive the  estimated $6.3 billion in debt relief for which it may qualify under HIPC,  the DRC must meet various conditions that include satisfactory  macroeconomic performance under an IMF-supported program, improved  public sector management, and implementation of structural reforms.  Although donors had expected the DRC to qualify for full debt relief in  2006, the government instead has fallen back into arrears and has failed to  implement needed policies; as a result, IMF has suspended its program  assistance to the DRC. Although IMF has determined that the DRC  cannot sustain its current debt levels, donors do not expect the DRC to  qualify for full debt relief until mid-2008.
The judiciary’s ineffective enforcement of commercial contracts in the  DRC has likely discouraged private sector investment and hence economic  growth. The enforcement of contracts, typically a responsibility of the  judicial system, is important to establishing incentives for economic  activity. According to the World Bank, the DRC’s enforcement of contracts  is among the weakest in the world, such that a company might need to  expend roughly 150 percent of a typical contract’s value to ensure  enforcement through court proceedings.
section_title: Mismanagement of Natural Resources
paragraphs: International donors, NGOs, and the DRC government have focused on  improving natural resource management through increased transparency  and international instruments of enforcement. However, owing in part to  governance and capacity challenges, these efforts have made only limited  progress.
Until recently, the DRC had not met EITI implementation requirements or  followed EITI guidelines, according to U.S. officials. These officials  informed us that the DRC had excluded civil society representatives and  replaced EITI’s Permanent Secretary with a new representative. As a  result, EITI was reviewing the DRC’s signatory status, and key donors  were withdrawing technical assistance. U.S. officials informed us that in  September 2007, EITI granted the DRC additional time to meet threshold  criteria to continue participation in the initiative and that the DRC  subsequently made progress in meeting those criteria.
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has criticized the DRC for  weak internal controls, customs capacity, and ability to track diamonds  extracted by large number of self-employed miners. State and USAID  officials reported that the DRC’s certification process is failing to capture  as much as 50 percent of diamonds mined in the DRC.
U.S. and NGO officials have expressed concern that the DRC is not  enforcing a moratorium on forestry concessions instituted in May 2002. An  NGO reported that after the moratorium took effect, the DRC signed 107  of 156 forestry contracts now under review and that a third of the  contracts involve areas identified for conservation. Although the DRC  government is reviewing mining and forestry concessions signed during  the war, U.S. officials told us that the DRC is conducting the mining  contract review with limited transparency. U.S. and NGO officials  expressed concern that the DRC has not published its terms of reference  or all of the contracts or clearly defined the role of representatives of civil  society.
Mismanagement of the DRC’s natural resources has fueled continued  conflict and corruption, according to U.S. officials, the UN, international  donors, and NGOs.
The DRC’s abundant natural resources are serving as an incentive for  conflict between neighboring countries’ militias and armed domestic  factions. These groups seek to control specific mining sites and illegal  trade networks to finance operations and buy arms. For example, the UN  has reported that profits from Congolese coltan have financed a large part  of Rwanda’s military budget and that gold smuggled into Uganda  continues to finance militias. Such reports are consistent with World Bank  research, which commonly finds that countries with valuable natural  resources have more conflict than countries without such resources.
In addition to fueling conflict, the DRC’s abundance of natural resources  continues to foster corruption as government officials use bribery to share  in resource profits. For example, NGOs have reported that through  extensive bribery and corruption in the mining sector, exports of large  quantities of DRC copper and cobalt have been undeclared and that 60 to  80 percent of the DRC’s 2005-2006 customs revenue was embezzled.  USAID has also reported on the postconflict proliferation of natural  resource contracts based on joint ventures between the DRC government  and private partners, who are receiving a disproportionate share of profits.
section_title: Lack of Basic Infrastructure
paragraphs: The DRC lacks many key elements of basic infrastructure, such as  buildings, equipment, and transportation.
The transportation sector is “broken,” according to one recent  international assessment. The DRC has fewer than 1,740 miles of paved  roads to connect 58 million to 65 million people distributed over more  than 900,000 square miles. According to a recent study prepared by 17  donor nations, no roads link 9 of the DRC’s 10 provincial capitals to the  national capital, and no roads link the DRC’s northern and southern  regions or its eastern and western regions.
About 90 percent of DRC airfields lack paved runways. More air crashes  have occurred in the DRC since 1945 than in any other African state.
International observers have reported that the DRC’s educational and  penal infrastructures are dilapidated.
An international group of donor nations recently identified major  deficiencies in electrification, communications, supplies of clean water,  and credit.
The DRC’s lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in  humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs.
U.S. officials told us that the lack of an adequate in-country transportation  system increases the time required to get supplies to those in need. Such  problems limit access to vulnerable groups and cause delays in providing  humanitarian assistance such as food aid. NGO and U.S. officials  implementing emergency food aid and nonemergency food security  programs in the DRC have reported that excessive delays in delivering  assistance are common because of the lack of roads linking the DRC’s  regions and several of its major cities and ports. One NGO has reported  that it must compete with commercial contracts for the limited space on  the DRC’s troubled rail system and that its commodities and equipment  are often given lower priority.
U.S. and NGO officials also pointed out that the lack of roads in the DRC  has increased the expense or difficulty associated with their programs, in  part because they must increase their reliance on air transport. The  dearth of accessible roads in the DRC has prompted USAID’s emergency  assistance programs to use some of their funds for road rehabilitation  programs, to ensure safe and reliable routes to reach those in need. The  lack of roads and other adequate infrastructure also affects private  companies trying to import and export goods. According to the World  Bank’s Cost of Doing Business survey, DRC’s average export costs in 2006,  at more than $3,100 per container, were the world’s third highest.
State officials told us that the DRC government needs “everything from  bricks to paper.” A USAID official told us that any effort to establish new  provincial legislatures would be hindered by the lack of buildings to house  the legislators or “even chairs for them to sit in.”
An NGO has reported that the DRC judicial system is being undermined by  destroyed infrastructure, equipment shortages, lack of reference texts, and  the dearth of roads, which makes some areas inaccessible to legal  authorities.
A 2007 UN report noted that at least 429 detainees (including some  convicted of human rights violations) had escaped from dilapidated  prisons over the last 6 months of 2006.
International donor nations and organizations concluded in their  assistance framework document that the lack of infrastructure has made  economic development almost impossible in many areas and may stifle the  potential for economic growth and private sector activity in most DRC  provinces.
section_title: U.S. Government Has Not Assessed Its Overall Progress toward Achieving the Act’s Policy Objectives
paragraphs: The U.S. government has not established a process to assess agencies’  overall progress toward achieving the Act’s policy objectives in the DRC.  Although State and the National Security Council (NSC) have developed  mechanisms to coordinate some of the agencies’ activities in the DRC,  neither mechanism systematically assesses overall progress.
Some of the key agencies involved in the DRC monitor their respective  programs. For example, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance  (OFDA) has two program officers in the DRC who regularly visit project  sites and publish quarterly reports on OFDA activities. Their partner  organizations, or implementers, also provide reports and updates on their  projects. Similarly, USAID officials told us that USAID’s Central African  Regional Program for the Environment program has an extensive and  standard set of monitoring and evaluation tools built into all cooperative  agreements with implementers, such as use of satellite imagery and  remote sensing to analyze change in forest cover, one of the principal  “high-level” indicators. DOL informed us that it relies on midterm and final  evaluations, financial and programmatic audits, and biannual technical  and financial reports to monitor its programs. USDA officials informed us  that USDA requires its partner organizations to conduct assessments of  their projects.
However, the executive branch has not established a governmentwide  process to use such information for an assessment of overall U.S. progress  in the DRC. Although State and NSC have developed mechanisms aimed at  providing some degree of coordination among executive branch agencies  active in the DRC, neither mechanism currently provides for the  systematic assessment of overall U.S. progress toward its goals.
A new State-USAID joint planning process is not yet fully operational and  does not include other agencies active in the DRC. State’s newly  established Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who also serves as  USAID’s administrator, has been charged with ensuring that foreign  assistance is being used as effectively as possible to meet broad U.S.  foreign policy objectives. Under DFA’s guidance, State and USAID have  begun to develop a joint planning and budgeting process that, according to  State officials, may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However,  the Office of the DFA has yet to complete its plan for operations in the  DRC during fiscal year 2007, which ended on September 30, 2007. As of  February 2007, the draft country operations plan was incomplete and  consisted of a listing of individual programs that did not include a  systematic assessment of the collective impact of State and USAID efforts  during fiscal year 2007. In addition, the DFA draft plan did not address  activities funded by other agencies, including DOD, HHS, and the  Treasury, although the DFA joint planning process may eventually include  other agencies to some degree. Under the DFA process, the U.S. mission to  the DRC has prepared a mission strategic plan. However, the mission  strategic plan pertains only to currently projected fiscal year 2009  activities and is therefore subject to change before submission of the fiscal  year 2009 budget request in 2008.
The NSC interagency group, intended to help coordinate certain agencies’  activities, does not systematically assess these activities and does not  include several relevant agencies. The NSC group assembles agencies such  the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury to discuss policies  and approaches to addressing the challenges in the DRC. For example,  according to State and NSC officials, these discussions often focus on the  eastern DRC’s unstable security. However, NSC and State officials told us  that the NSC group has not developed systematic tools for assessing the  impact of all U.S. agencies’ efforts to achieve the objectives of the Act.  Also, the NSC effort has not included key agencies involved in the DRC,  such as DOL, HHS, or USDA, in its discussions of policies and approaches.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The DRC appears to be at a crucial point in its turbulent history. After  decades of dictatorship and devastating wars with its neighbors and  internal groups, it has inaugurated its first democratically elected  government in more than 40 years. However, U.S. and NGO officials agree  that several interrelated challenges continue to pose major impediments to  achievement of the Act’s policy objectives in the DRC. Failure to make  near-term progress in addressing the DRC’s unstable security, rampant  corruption, economic mismanagement, and lack of needed infrastructure  could result in further war and instability in a region of importance to U.S.  national interests.
U.S. agencies have initiated a wide range of efforts to help the DRC  establish and maintain peace and stability. However, because the U.S.  government has not established a process to systematically assess its  overall progress in the DRC, it cannot be fully assured that it has allocated  these resources in the most effective manner. For example, a systematic  process for assessing governmentwide progress would allow the United  States to determine whether its allocations, which currently emphasize  humanitarian aid, should focus more on the DRC’s unstable security,  which worsens the country’s other problems and impedes the delivery of  U.S. assistance. Similarly, such a process could give the U.S. government  greater assurance that it has identified additional bilateral or multilateral  measures that may be needed to achieve the Act’s objectives. Given the  DRC’s significance to the stability of Africa, the scope, complexity, and  interrelated nature of its urgent problems warrant an effective  governmentwide response.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for  assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral  actions, we recommend that the Secretary of State, through the Director of  Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S. agencies  implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically  assessing the U.S. government’s overall progress toward achieving the  Act’s objectives.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of  Agriculture, Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, State, and the  Treasury. We also requested comments from the Administrator of USAID  and from the Director of Congressional Relations of OPIC.
We received written comments from State, which are reprinted in  appendix III. In its comments, State endorsed our recommendation. It  further noted that it believed that the recommendation would be met as  DFA’s joint planning and budgeting processes are extended to include all  U.S. agencies engaged in the DRC. State also provided several other  comments, for example, expressing concerns regarding the span of years  addressed in our report and what it characterized as a lack of historical  context. We addressed State’s comments as appropriate in this report.
We also received technical comments on our draft report from DOD, HHS,  DOL, the Treasury, and USAID. We have incorporated these comments  into our report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, and other interested parties. We will  also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to identify (1) U.S. programs in the Democratic  Republic of the Congo (DRC), (2) major impediments hindering  accomplishment of the policy objectives of the DRC Relief, Security, and  Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), and (3) U.S. government  efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the Act’s policy  objectives. Because the Act directed us to review actions taken by U.S.  agencies to achieve its objectives, we focused on the fiscal year in which  the Act was enacted, and also considered the fiscal year before its  enactment to provide context.
To identify U.S. programs in the DRC, we interviewed officials from key  U.S. agencies who have programs in the DRC. These agencies included the  Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), Health  and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury (Treasury); the  Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID). We also reviewed program  documents, budget data, and policy statements. We identified the amount  of funding each agency had allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal years  2006 and 2007 by analyzing official agency submissions to Congress and  related documents. We did not attempt to determine the extent to which  each agency had obligated or expended the funds it had allocated.
To determine the major impediments hindering accomplishment of the  Act’s policy objectives, we reviewed a range of documents, plans, and  assessments provided to us by U.S. agencies with programs in the DRC.  We also interviewed officials from each of these agencies. We reviewed  economic literature and recent reports, program assessments, studies, and  papers written by nongovernmental organizations, international  organizations, multilateral banks, and think tanks. To discuss key  challenges to addressing the Act’s policy objectives, we conducted a  round-table session with a nonprobability sample of 11 nongovernmental  organizations that offer a broad range of experience and expertise  implementing programs and projects in the DRC. For example, we  included panelists from organizations that focus on humanitarian,  democracy, and economic development issues. Additionally, we  interviewed representatives from other organizations with experience in  the DRC. Based on all of these responses, we compared and contrasted the  challenges identified to determine common themes and focused on  challenges that were internal to the DRC. We considered all of these views  as we finalized our analysis of these challenges. We defined challenges as  factors that are internal to the DRC—that is, they represent impediments  to the United States and other donors that are providing assistance  intended to improve the situation in that country.
To examine U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the Act’s  policy objectives, we identified U.S. interagency assessments, reports, and  plans pertaining to programs in the DRC. We also interviewed U.S. agency  officials and a cognizant official of the National Security Council. Although  we did not travel to the DRC, we conducted several telephone interviews  with U.S. embassy and USAID mission staff located in the DRC.
We conducted our work from May 2007 to December 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Examples of Programs by Policy Objective Category
subsections: section_title: Examples of agencies active in each category
paragraphs: Examples of programs pertaining  to each category  (millions of dollars)
Provision of the following to vulnerable populations:    Psychosocial support, medical assistance, and  reintegration support to survivors of sexual and  gender-based violence  Immunization against infectious diseases (e.g.,  polio and measles)
Address children’s involvement in mining and  related services, small-scale commerce, child  soldiering, and other forms of child labor     Establishment of democracy resource centers    Support for promoting political participation    Support for the Central African Regional    Refurbishment of a military officer training school    Training brigade- and battalion-staff level officers  on military justice reform, civil-military relations,  and other issues.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Zina Merritt (Assistant Director),  Pierre Toureille, Kristy Kennedy, Kendall Schaefer, Martin De Alteriis,  Michael Hoffman, Reid Lowe, and Farhanaz Kermalli made key  contributions to this report. Grace Lui provided technical assistance.