Pakistan: Reporting on Visa Delays That Disrupt U.S. Assistance Could Be Improved
Published: 2013-05-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Pakistan is a key U.S. partner in the effort to combat terrorism and violent extremism. In fiscal years 2002 through 2012, Pakistan received more than $26 billion in U.S. funding. To travel to Pakistan to implement and oversee programs, U.S. officials are required to obtain a Pakistani visa and, depending on the length of their stay, may need to apply for a visa extension once in Pakistan. U.S. officials have expressed concerns about delays in obtaining Pakistani visas. Congress has also expressed interest in receiving information on Pakistani visa delays, such as requiring that State and DOD certify information regarding timely issuance of visas to officials before providing or reimbursing certain funding for Pakistan.
GAO was asked to review issues related to visa delays. This report examines (1) the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas and the effects of these delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa delays. GAO analyzed data on visa wait times, reviewed planning documents, and met with officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. officials have experienced delays in obtaining Pakistani visas that disrupt the delivery and oversight of U.S. assistance to Pakistan. According to Pakistani Consular Services, and as confirmed by the Department of State (State), the goal of the embassy of Pakistan is to issue visas for U.S. officials within 6 weeks. GAO's analysis of data provided by State, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) found that U.S. officials experience delays in the issuance of both visas to travel to Pakistan and visa extensions. For instance, GAO found that of about 4,000 issued visas, approximately 18 percent took more than 6 weeks, with approximately 3 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. Moreover, of approximately 2,200 visa extensions, about 59 percent took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 5 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. U.S. officials stated that they receive little specific information from Pakistan on the reasons for visa delays, but they noted that visa delays disrupt the effective implementation and oversight of U.S. programs and efficient use of resources in Pakistan. Visa delays also have created staffing gaps for critical embassy positions, such as Regional Security Officers and Marine Security Guards, and have necessitated the cancellation of training to assist the Pakistani government in areas such as antiterrorism, counternarcotics, and law enforcement assistance.
Agencies have taken various steps to address Pakistani visa delays, but reporting to Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the risk of visa delays government-wide. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State to identify and report to Congress on a semiannual basis about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S funds to Pakistan, such as any shortfall in U.S. human resources. In addition, federal standards for internal control state that once agencies identify a risk to their programs, they should collect and analyze information to allow them to develop better approaches to manage it. According to officials, agencies have taken various steps to manage visa delays and their effects. For instance, State has conducted high-level discussions with the Pakistani government regarding visa delays and has reprogrammed $10 million budgeted for antiterrorism trainings in Pakistan, which were canceled due to visa delays, toward other priority initiatives. However, GAO found that State's reporting does not include comprehensive information on the risks of visa delays government-wide. State has reported to Congress that visa delays create challenges to the implementation of its programs in Pakistan. However, State's reports do not include information regarding the risks of visa delays to the human resources of other agencies, although components of DOD, DOJ, and USAID told GAO that they experience staffing gaps caused by visa delays. Reporting comprehensive information about the risks of visa delays could provide a more complete picture of the challenges that the United States faces in managing and overseeing U.S. assistance to Pakistan. More comprehensive reporting may also help to better inform any potential diplomatic discussions between the United States and Pakistan regarding visa delays.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that State consult with U.S. agencies engaged in providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain information on visa delays and include this information in its reporting to Congress. State partially concurred, citing challenges with interagency coordination, but noted that GAO's report has prompted State to improve its tracking of visa applications to Pakistan government-wide.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Pakistan is a key partner in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism and violent  extremism, including efforts to defeat al Qaeda and other terrorist groups  that have used Pakistan to plan attacks on the U.S. homeland and  against U.S. and NATO personnel in Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2002  through 2012, Pakistan received more than $26 billion in U.S. funding,  including assistance to help the government overcome economic and  security challenges that threaten its stability. However, U.S. officials  implementing this assistance report encountering delays in obtaining  visas to travel to Pakistan. For example, in May 2012, we reported that  difficulties in obtaining visas for U.S. officials to travel to Pakistan had  resulted in delays and cancellations of training classes on countering  improvised explosive devices. That same month, the Department of  State (State) Office of Inspector General reported that U.S. officials  operating in Pakistan were subjected to government-initiated  obstructionism and harassment including delayed visa issuances.
You requested that we review issues related to Pakistani visa delays,  including their extent and implications. This report examines (1) the extent  to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas and the  effects of these delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to address  Pakistani visa delays.
To evaluate the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays in  obtaining Pakistani visas, and the effects of these delays, we collected  available data on processing times for official and diplomatic visa  applications to Pakistan in fiscal years 2010 through 2012 from  components of State; the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland  Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ); and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID). To assess the reliability of these data, we  interviewed agency officials responsible for compiling these data and  performed basic reasonableness checks of the data for obvious  inconsistency errors and completeness. When we found discrepancies,  we brought them to the attention of relevant agency officials and worked  with the officials to correct the discrepancies before conducting our  analyses. According to agency officials, these data may not include all  visa applications to Pakistan, because U.S. officials may not have always  involved agency travel offices in processing their applications. Despite  these limitations, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purpose of making broad statements about Pakistan’s visa processing  times for U.S. officials. We determined visa processing times by  comparing the date of each visa application with the date the agency  received the visa. We defined a delay as a processing time exceeding 6  weeks, because, according to the embassy of Pakistan, the stated  processing time for visas for U.S. officials is within 6 weeks of their  application date. Further, to discuss the effects of Pakistani visa delays  on the delivery and oversight of U.S. assistance in Pakistan, including  assistance implemented by U.S. contractors, we examined agency  planning, budget, and oversight documents discussing visa delays and  interviewed DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID officials. To examine the  steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa delays, we  reviewed relevant documents from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID,  including planning and budget documents, available data on visa  processing times, and letters of agreement. We also conducted interviews  with knowledgeable officials to determine the steps agencies had taken to  address the visa delays that they had identified. We compared these  steps with risk assessment standards in our Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government. In addition, we examined  semiannual reports that were prepared by State and submitted to  Congress in compliance with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act  of 2009,information regarding the risks of visa delays affecting U.S. assistance to  Pakistan. The government of Pakistan did not respond to our requests to  discuss visa delays for U.S. officials. See appendix I for a complete  description of our scope and methodology.   to determine the extent to which these reports include  We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: U.S. Assistance to Pakistan
paragraphs: Pakistan is central to U.S. efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al  Qaeda and deny its resurgence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The  United States has sought to secure these interests through  counterterrorism and counterinsurgency cooperation with Pakistan as well  as through a long-term partnership anchored, in part, by civilian and  military assistance. In fiscal years 2002 through 2012, the U.S.  government provided the Pakistani government more than $26 billion in  assistance and reimbursements toward these goals.goals, multiple U.S. agencies provide assistance to Pakistan. Table 1  summarizes example activities of key U.S. agencies providing this  assistance.
To achieve U.S.
section_title: U.S. Officials Experience Delays in Obtaining Pakistani Visas, Which Disrupt Implementation and Oversight of U.S. Assistance to Pakistan
paragraphs: Available agency data show that U.S. officials experience delays in the  issuance of both visas for travel to Pakistan and visa extensions, which  have affected the implementation and oversight of U.S. assistance to  Pakistan. Agencies reported that these delays affect the implementation  of U.S. programs in multiple ways—for example, creating staffing gaps for  critical embassy positions and necessitating the cancellation of training to  assist the Pakistani government in areas such as antiterrorism and  counternarcotics.
subsections: section_title: Data Show Delays in the Issuance of Pakistani Visas to U.S. Officials
paragraphs: Our analysis of available agency data shows that U.S. officials have  experienced delays in obtaining Pakistani visas. According to the  Pakistani embassy, and as reported by State, the embassy’s policy is to  issue visas for U.S. officials within 6 weeks of their application date. We  obtained data from components of DOD, DOJ, State, and USAID on  processing times for U.S. officials’ applications for official or diplomatic   Our analysis of these  Pakistani visas in fiscal years 2010 through 2012.data shows that approximately 82 percent of visas for U.S. officials were  issued within 6 weeks or less. However, about 18 percent of the visas  took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 3 percent  taking 16 weeks or longer. See figure 3 for more information.
Processing time for issued visas varies depending on the agency or  component submitting applications. For instance, for visas issued by the  Pakistani embassy, processing took more than 6 weeks for about 4  percent of applications submitted by USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and  Pakistan Affairs, compared with approximately 33 percent of applications  submitted by State’s Orientation and In-Processing Center.
Moreover, according to U.S. officials, an analysis of issued visas may  underestimate the extent of visa delays. First, it may exclude cases in  which a visa was not issued, including cases where (1) an individual  withdrew a visa application because the visa was not received prior to the  planned departure date or (2) a visa application that had taken longer  than 6 weeks to process was still pending at the Pakistani embassy at the  time of our analysis. For instance, from November 2009 to June 2012,  State’s Special Issuance Agency pulled about 180 passports— representing approximately 10 percent of the Pakistani visa applications  that it submitted during this period—from the Pakistani embassy without  visa issuance, including approximately 140 passports that the agency  pulled after a visa was not issued prior to the individual’s planned  departure date. Further, an analysis of visa processing time may not  include delays that certain DOD officials face in obtaining non-objection  certificates and letters of invitation required for their visa applications. For  instance, DOD officials told us that obtaining this documentation takes  approximately 6 weeks and that visa applications for DOD personnel are  submitted only after a non-objection certificate or letter of invitation has  been obtained. Therefore, visa delays that DOD personnel may  experience are in addition to the wait time to obtain a non-objection  certificate or letter of invitation. For instance, DOD officials told us that in  addition to waiting 4 to 6 weeks to obtain a Pakistani visa, some DOD  travelers have waited months for the documentation that must  accompany the visa application.
U.S. officials also experience delays in obtaining visa extensions after  arrival in Pakistan. The U.S. embassy in Islamabad monitors the visa  status of U.S. officials accredited to the U.S. mission in Pakistan and  processes applications for any required visa extensions for these officials.
According to State, visa extensions are granted by the Pakistani Ministry  of Foreign Affairs. Between 2010 and 2012, the U.S. embassy processed  applications for approximately 2,200 visa extensions for U.S. officials in  Pakistan. Approximately 59 percent of these visa extensions took longer  than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 5 percent taking 16 weeks  or longer. See figure 4 for more information.
Additionally, data from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad show that it never  received approximately 50 visa extensions for which it had applied. U.S.  officials told us that in some of these cases, the applicants experienced  such a lengthy delay in receiving their visa extensions that they decided  to leave Pakistan rather than overstay their initial visa while waiting for the  extension.
In addition to reporting delays related to obtaining visas for U.S. officials,  agencies noted challenges in obtaining visas for contractors assisting in  implementing programs for U.S. agencies in Pakistan.State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and DOJ’s International  Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program rely on contractor  staff to provide training to Pakistani law enforcement personnel. However,  both agencies noted delays in obtaining visas for these instructors. For  example, State reported that it applied for approximately 40 instructor  visas for its Antiterrorism Assistance Program between October and  December 2012 but that no instructors received visas in time to provide  instruction as planned. Similarly, officials of DOJ International Criminal  Investigative Training Assistance Program told us that they have  experienced delays in obtaining visas for their contractor staff. According  to State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  Office of Aviation for Pakistan, it has experienced delays in obtaining  contractor visas, including one visa that it applied for in October 2010 and  that was still pending as of January 2013. In addition, as of February  2013, State told us it had experienced visa wait times of longer than 6  weeks for approximately 30 facilities maintenance contractors overseeing  reconstruction of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad.
Reasons for the delays in processing Pakistani visas are not well  understood. Officials from DOD, DOJ, State, USAID, and the U.S.  embassy in Islamabad said that they receive little specific information  from Pakistan on the reasons for visa delays. Officials from those  agencies stated that factors in the bilateral relationship between the  United States and Pakistan appear to affect the length of visa processing.
section_title: Agencies Have Reported Multiple Effects of Visa Delays on Program Implementation and Oversight in Pakistan
paragraphs: Agencies have identified visa delays as a risk to effective implementation  of U.S. programs in Pakistan. Agencies noted that visa delays cause  staffing gaps, limit opportunities to train Pakistani security personnel,  constrain oversight and monitoring of U.S. programs, and complicate  program planning and implementation.
First, according to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID officials, visa  delays cause staffing gaps for positions at the U.S. embassy in  Islamabad, including those providing security and law enforcement  assistance to Pakistan. For example, DOD officials told us that visas for  key positions have been significantly delayed. Specifically, DOD officials  noted that the visa for the training officer for the International Military  Training and Education program in Pakistan was delayed for several  months, during which the position was vacant. Additionally, they told us  that two individuals scheduled to staff the Defense Attaché Office waited  approximately 8 months for their visas and were ultimately reassigned  because of the delays. State officials also noted staffing gaps due to  delays in obtaining visas for security staff and staff managing  counternarcotics and law enforcement programs. According to State  officials, visa delays particularly affect Regional Security Office and  Marine Security Guard staff, who provide protection for the U.S. embassy  in Islamabad. State noted that visas for approximately 40 Regional  Security Officers and Marine Security Guards were significantly delayed,  some for as long as 9 months. Officials told us that such delays can lead  to staffing gaps and that these gaps cannot always be filled by obtaining  personnel on temporary assignment. Moreover, because embassy  staffing plans are designed to align the number of staff with U.S. foreign  policy priorities, security concerns, and other constraints, staffing gaps  can undermine this alignment. See table 3 for additional examples of  staffing gaps at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad that have resulted from  visa delays.
In addition, according to agency officials, visa delays and related staffing  gaps have limited their opportunities to train Pakistani security personnel.  The officials said that the delays in obtaining visas for instructors  scheduled to train Pakistani officials have caused agencies to postpone  or cancel training in a variety of areas, including antiterrorism,  counternarcotics and law enforcement, use and maintenance of military  equipment, and countering improvised explosive devices. For example, in  the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, State’s Antiterrorism Assistance  program canceled 14 of 31 classes on critical management topics, such  as tactical, negotiation, and investigation skills in combating terrorism,  because of delays in obtaining visas for instructors. In addition, State  continued to operate and maintain its training facility in Pakistan for the  Antiterrorism Assistance program, although the classrooms were empty  because of canceled trainings. Moreover, officials at State’s Bureau of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs told us that visa  delays have disrupted the delivery of law enforcement and rule-of-law  assistance to Pakistan’s criminal justice sector. According to these  officials, the bureau has provided Pakistan with 17 aircraft for  counternarcotics assistance at a value of $50 million. However, officials at  the bureau’s Office of Aviation for Pakistan told us that in June 2010 and  November 2012, respectively, the office placed three C-208 aircraft and  six Huey-II helicopters in storage owing to a shortage of personnel in  Pakistan that had resulted from visa delays. According to these officials,  this personnel shortage limited the office’s ability to train Pakistanis and  perform aircraft inspections and repairs necessary for the proper use of  the equipment. In addition, State officials noted that they had canceled  police and rule-of-law training because of visa delays. DOD officials noted  similar cancellations of counternarcotics training, and several agencies  noted cancellation of training on countering improvised explosive devices.  DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program  officials told us that delays in obtaining visas for instructors were so  pervasive that the program would be forced to reduce training after March  2013, unless it receives new visas for its instructor staff.
Moreover, visa delays have reportedly constrained oversight and  monitoring of U.S. programs in Pakistan. Officials from Inspectors  General for USAID, State, and DOD’s U.S. Central Command stated that  visa delays have disrupted inspections and audits. State and USAID  officials also noted that visa delays create challenges for conducting  monitoring and evaluation of program assistance, including monitoring  and evaluation of antiterrorism and development programs. For instance,  according to State officials, an assessment and evaluation of the Pakistan  Antiterrorism Assistance program in June 2012 was delayed when  several team members were unable to participate in the trip because their  visas were not issued in a timely manner. DHS officials also told us that  because of visa delays, DHS cannot conduct an audit of the inventory of  supplies or replace outdated nonintrusive inspection technology used for  the Secure Freight Initiative in Pakistan, which captures data on  containers bound for the United States and alerts U.S. and Pakistani  officials of security risks.
Further, even when visa delays do not lead to staffing gaps, the delays  complicate program planning and implementation, according to agency  officials. Regarding planning, DOD, State, and USAID officials noted that  visa delays create challenges planning travel to Pakistan, as it is not  unusual for U.S. officials to receive visas very close to the day of their  planned departure. Visa delays also slow program implementation.  USAID officials stated that visa delays can affect programs in Pakistan by  slowing the arrival of technical experts needed to assist with project  design and implementation. Similarly, DOJ International Criminal  Investigative Training Assistance Program officials told us that visa delays  make it very challenging for them to plan courses and training schedules.
Additionally, officials told us that the issuance of visas with travel  restrictions can also create challenges and increase project costs. For  instance, according to officials from USAID, various types of visas  received by U.S. officials create challenges for staff once they are in  Pakistan, as they must constantly monitor their visa status and may have  to leave Pakistan to reset their visas in compliance with Pakistani  immigration regulation. For example, U.S. officials in Pakistan with visas  that allow multiple entries for 1 year, with a maximum stay of 90 days at a  time, must exit Pakistan every 90 days to reset their visas. USAID’s Office  of Inspector General estimated that it has spent approximately $25,000 in  additional travel costs due to delays in receiving visa extensions for staff  traveling on visas that require a reset every 90 days. In addition, State  officials told us that they have experienced challenges in obtaining 1-year  multi-entry visas for staff providing oversight of construction on the U.S.  embassy compound in Islamabad. According to State, the need for staff  to reset their short-term visas limits the efficiency of embassy construction  and adds to the cost of the project. For instance, State reported in May  2012 that these disruptions added approximately $2 million to the  project’s overall cost.
section_title: Agencies Have Taken Various Steps to Address Pakistani Visa Delays, but Reporting on These Delays Could Be Improved
paragraphs: Agencies have taken various steps to address Pakistani visa delays, but  reporting to Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the  risk of visa delays government-wide. The Enhanced Partnership with  Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State, in consultation with DOD, to identify  and report to Congress about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S.  funds, including any shortfall in U.S. human resources, among other  things. In addition, according to federal standards for internal control,  analyzing information on identified risks could help agencies better  manage such risks. According to officials, agencies have taken various  steps to manage visa delays and their effects. For instance, State has  conducted high-level discussions with the Pakistani government  regarding visa delays, and agencies affected by Pakistani visa delays  have shifted training to other countries. However, State’s reporting to  Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the risk of visa  delays government-wide. State has reported visa delays as a challenge to  the implementation of its programs. However, State’s reports do not  include information regarding the risks of visa delays to the human  resources of other agencies, although components of DOD, DOJ, and  USAID told us that they had experienced staffing gaps caused by visa  delays. Reporting comprehensive information about the risks of visa  delays could provide a more complete picture of the challenges to  implementing U.S. assistance and better inform any potential diplomatic  discussions between the United States and Pakistan regarding delays.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Have Taken Steps to Address Visa Delays
paragraphs: Agencies have taken steps to address the effects of delays on their  operations, including reprogramming funds for other priority initiatives,  shifting training to other countries, and tracking information on the status  of obtaining Pakistani visas and visa extensions. According to federal  standards for internal control, analyzing information on identified risks  could help agencies better manage such risks. See table 4 for more  examples of steps that agencies reported having taken to address the  effects of visa delays on their operations.
In addition to taking steps to address the effects of visa delays, officials at  State—the agency responsible for conducting diplomatic discussions with  Pakistan—told us that they had engaged in high-level discussions with  Pakistani officials in an attempt to expedite visa processing times for U.S.  officials. State officials noted that mission leadership in Pakistan have  raised the issue of visa delays, and particular staffing gaps at the U.S.  embassy that have resulted from delays, with Pakistani ministerial  personnel. The U.S. Secretary of State has also discussed visa delays  with the Pakistani Foreign Minister to try to resolve the issue. State  officials told us State will continue to discuss these issues with Pakistan  as warranted by events.
While operations generally continue, agencies noted that their mitigation  actions do not fully resolve the effects of visa delays and that they cannot  implement programs as effectively or efficiently. Staff from the Bureau of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs said that although  they take steps to deliver assistance despite visa delays, the difficulty in  maintaining the continuous presence of in-country staff reduces readily  available subject matter expertise, slows interaction with Pakistani  officials, and lessens the ability to quickly increase staff to address  emerging needs. Regarding efficiency, DOD staff said that shifting  training to third-country locations raises costs significantly, including costs  for airlifting Pakistani personnel and providing funds for insurance and  other incidental needs, and results in the training of fewer Pakistani  personnel. DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development,  Assistance and Training staff similarly noted that although relocating  training has had a positive outcome, it has incurred higher costs for the  U.S. government.
section_title: Reporting to Congress Does Not Provide Comprehensive Information on the Risks of Pakistani Visa Delays Government-wide
paragraphs: In reporting to Congress, State has not provided comprehensive  information on the risks of Pakistani visa delays government-wide. The  Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State, in  consultation with DOD, to identify and report on a semiannual basis to  Congress about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S funds to  Pakistan, including any shortfall in U.S. human resources, among other  things. In compliance with the act, State has produced semiannual  monitoring reports describing the assistance provided to Pakistan during  the preceding 180-day period. State’s report for the period of March 2010  to December 2010 did not cite visa delays as a risk to its programs. In its  reports covering January 2011 to November 2011 and December 2011 to  June 2012, State broadly cited challenges to program implementation due  to visa delays, and in the latter report, State included the example of  disruptions to its antiterrorism training efforts in Pakistan caused by visa  delays. However, State’s reports do not include information regarding the  risks of Pakistani visa delays affecting U.S. human resources for other  State programs and for agencies other than State, although officials from  components of DOD, USAID, and DOJ reported to us that such delays  had caused staffing gaps during this time period. For instance, DOD  experienced visa delays that created staffing gaps affecting its security  assistance office, including a vacancy in the position of the officer  responsible for coordinating military exchange programs, while DOJ  experienced a staffing gap for its Resident Legal Advisor. Information  from DOD, USAID, and DOJ components could be included in State’s  reports, given that officials from these agencies told us that they track  information related to visa delays. Officials of other agency components,  such as DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration and DHS’s U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, told us that they do not retain  data about visa processing times although they maintain information on  their staff’s ability to travel to Pakistan.
In addition, since passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act  in October 2009, Congress has expressed continued interest in receiving  information on visa delays. For instance, in the Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 2012, Congress required State to certify requested  information about the timeliness of issuance of Pakistani visas to U.S.  officials before certain funding for Pakistan could be provided. State  waived the certification requirements for fiscal year 2012 as allowed in the  act. DOD’s fiscal year 2013 appropriation requires a similar certification  from the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State,  before funds may be reimbursed to Pakistan for support provided to U.S.  military operations. Without comprehensive reporting about the risks of  visa delays and related staffing gaps, State’s reporting to Congress may  not provide a complete picture of the challenges the United States faces  in managing and overseeing U.S. assistance to Pakistan, and agencies  may lack information that could help them manage such risks.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although the United States invested more than $26 billion in fiscal years  2002 through 2012 to assist the government of Pakistan, U.S. officials  applying for Pakistani visas continue to face delays that they have  identified as disrupting their efforts to provide assistance. Despite  identifying these disruptions as a risk, State does not report  comprehensive information on the extent of visa delays across the U.S.  government. Complete and consistent reporting of such information could  help the United States diagnose problems related to visa delays, enhance  planning, and improve decision making to address the effects of such  delays. In addition, tracking information on the risks of visa delays could  help State provide more complete information in response to  congressional reporting requirements and may help to inform future  diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Pakistan to  resolve this issue.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve the information provided to Congress and to inform potential  diplomatic discussions, we recommend that the Secretary of State consult  with U.S. agencies engaged in providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain  information on Pakistani visa delays and include this information in  State’s future reporting to Congress.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to State, DOD, DHS, DOJ, and USAID  for their review and comment. State and DOD provided written  comments, which we have reprinted in appendixes II and III, respectively.  State and DOJ also provided technical comments, which we incorporated  as appropriate. DHS and USAID had no comments.
In commenting on our report, State partially concurred with our  recommendation that it should consult with U.S. agencies engaged in  providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain information on visa delays and  include this information in its future reporting to Congress. State noted  that interagency coordination regarding Pakistani visa applications can be  difficult and additional staff would be required for State to coordinate all  U.S. government Pakistani visa applications. In addition, according to  State, it is important to note that certain visa applicants, such as U.S.  officials traveling to Pakistan on short-term assignments and military or  security personnel, experience longer wait times than other applicants.  State noted that reporting to Congress that differentiates between these  applicants would be more effective. However, State stated that our report  prompted State and Embassy Islamabad to improve coordination  procedures to better track visa applications within State and, to the extent  possible, throughout the interagency.
We maintain that reporting of more comprehensive information by State  on the risks of visa delays could better inform Congress regarding the  challenges of implementing U.S. assistance in Pakistan. While we  acknowledge that interagency coordination can be challenging, officials  from various agencies—including DOD, DHS, DOJ, and USAID—told us  they track or maintain information related to visa delays, which could  facilitate State’s efforts to obtain and report such information. Moreover,  our recommendation would not require State to “coordinate all U.S.  government visa applications for Pakistan,” but rather recommends that  State consult with other agencies to obtain information these agencies  already collect regarding visa delays to Pakistan. In addition, we are  encouraged that our report prompted State to develop new procedures to  enhance its tracking of visa applications government-wide. We agree with  State that certain visa applicants may experience longer wait times than  other applicants, including, as we note in our report, those providing  security and law enforcement assistance to Pakistan. We believe that our  recommendation is consistent with State identifying and reporting on  which visa applicants experience longer wait times, and that such  reporting could better inform Congress.
In commenting on our report, DOD agreed with the report’s findings and  observations. DOD also noted that Pakistani officials experience delays  obtaining visas to travel to the United States, which “feed the narrative  that the Pakistanis treat us no differently than we treat them,”  undermining requests for process improvements. While DOD notes that  visa delays experienced by Pakistani officials may affect processing of  visas for U.S. officials, we could not verify whether this has been a  contributing cause because the government of Pakistan did not respond  to our requests to discuss visa delays.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, and officials at DOD, DHS, DOJ, and  USAID. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report reviews issues related to visa delays, including their extent  and implications. Specifically, we examined (1) the extent to which U.S.  officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas and the effects of  these delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani  visa delays.
Our work focused on Pakistani visa applications of the Departments of  Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State),  and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We met with  officials from relevant components of these agencies, including DOD’s  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Defense  Representative Pakistan, U.S. Central Command, and DOD Passport  Matters; DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement; DOJ’s Drug Enforcement  Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, International Criminal  Investigative Training Assistance Program, and Office of Overseas  Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training; State’s Bureau of  South and Central Asian Affairs, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bureau of  Diplomatic Security, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs, and Office of Inspector General; and USAID’s Office  of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs and Office of Inspector General. We  focused on these agencies and components because personnel of these  agencies constituted 99 percent of U.S. officials stationed in Pakistan as  of May 2012.
To evaluate the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining  Pakistani visas, and the effects of these delays, we collected available  data on processing times for official and diplomatic visa applications to  Pakistan in fiscal years 2010 through 2012 from DOD’s Office of the  Defense Representative Pakistan, DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation,  State’s Special Issuance Agency and Orientation and In-Processing  Center, and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. Not all  components had data available for the entire period of fiscal years 2010  through 2012. Although DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation provided  data for the entire period, DOD’s Office of the Defense Representative  Pakistan provided data for December 2009 through September 2012,  State’s Special Issuance Agency provided data for November 2009  through September 2012, State’s Orientation and In-Processing Center  provided data for March 2010 through September 2012, and USAID’s  Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs provided data for December  2010 through September 2012. We also obtained data for January 2010  through December 2012 from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad on  processing times for visa extensions for U.S. officials in Pakistan. We  determined visa processing times by examining the date of a visa  application and the date the visa was received by the agency. We defined  a delay as a processing time exceeding 6 weeks, because, according to  the embassy of Pakistan, the stated processing time for visas for U.S.  officials is within 6 weeks of their application date. To determine the  extent of delays, we grouped processing times into categories by week.  The category “1 week” includes processing times of 0 to 7 days, the  category “2 weeks” includes processing times of 8 to 14 days, and the  category “3 weeks” includes processing times of 15 to 21 days.  Categories continue sequentially in this manner until the “16+ week”  category, which includes processing times of 106 to 440 days.  Additionally, we obtained data on visa processing times for contractors  from DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance  Program and State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs. However, because contractors are not U.S. officials,  we did not combine these data with the data on visa processing times for  U.S. officials. Further, to discuss the effects of Pakistani visa delays on  the delivery and oversight of U.S. assistance in Pakistan, including the  implementation of such assistance by contractors, we examined agency  planning, budget, and oversight documents discussing visa delays,  including mission strategic resource plans and quarterly progress and  oversight reports on the civilian assistance program in Pakistan from  2010 to 2012. Additionally, we interviewed officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ,  State, and USAID to discuss the effects of visa delays on program  delivery and oversight. The government of Pakistan did not respond to  our requests to discuss visa delays for U.S. officials.
To examine the steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa  delays, including steps to address associated risks that they had  identified, we reviewed relevant agency documents, including planning  and budget documents and available data on visa processing times, and  conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials. We compared these  steps with risk assessment standards in our Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government. We also examined semiannual  monitoring reports that State had provided to Congress in compliance  with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.
To assess the reliability of visa processing data, we (1) interviewed  agency officials responsible for compiling these data and (2) performed  basic reasonableness checks of the data for obvious inconsistency errors  and completeness. When we found discrepancies, we brought them to  the attention of relevant agency officials and worked with officials to  correct the discrepancies before conducting our analyses. According to  agency officials, these data may not include all visa applications to  Pakistan, because U.S. officials may not always involve agency travel  offices in processing their applications. Furthermore, as we report, our  analysis of issued visas may understate processing time because it  excludes cases in which a visa was not issued, such as cases in which  (1) an individual withdrew a visa application because the visa was not  received prior to the individual’s planned departure date or (2) a visa  application that had taken longer than 6 weeks to process was still  pending at the Pakistani embassy at the time of our analysis. In addition,  our analysis covers only visa processing time and does not include wait  times to obtain non-objection certificates or letters of invitation. Despite  these limitations, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purpose of making broad statements about processing times for  completed visas. We also make a recommendation to address existing  limitations in reporting of visa delays across agencies.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant  Director), Lina Khan, Lisa Reijula, and Biza Repko made key  contributions to this report. Ashley Alley, Jenny Chanley, Karen Deans,  Carol E. Finkler, Rebecca Gambler, and Mary Moutsos provided  additional support.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Counterterrorism: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges Countering the Use of  Improvised Explosive Devices in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Region.  GAO-12-907T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012.
Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures  for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive  Devices. GAO-12-614. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.
Pakistan Assistance: Relatively Little of the $3 Billion in Requested  Assistance Is Subject to State's Certification of Pakistan's Progress on  Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Issues. GAO-11-786R.  Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2011.
Department of State's Report to Congress and U.S. Oversight of Civilian  Assistance to Pakistan Can Be Further Enhanced. GAO-11-310R.  Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2011.
Accountability for U.S. Equipment Provided to Pakistani Security Forces  in the Western Frontier Needs to Be Improved. GAO-11-156R.  Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2011.
Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development  Assistance in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be  Improved. GAO-10-289. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Afghanistan and Pakistan: Oversight of U.S. Interagency Efforts.  GAO-09-1015T.Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with  Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-263SP.  Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed  over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds.  GAO-08-806. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement Claims  for Coalition Support Funds. GAO-08-932T. Washington, D.C.: June 24,  2008.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in  Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive  Plan and Continued Oversight. GAO-08-820T. Washington, D.C.: May 20,  2008.
Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition  Support Funds Provided to Pakistan. GAO-08-735R. Washington, D.C.:  May 6, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to  Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s  Federally Administered Tribal Areas. GAO-08-622. Washington, D.C.:  April 17, 2008.