Unmanned Aerial Systems: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address Air Force and Army Pilot Workforce Challenges
Published: 2016-03-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In recent years, the size, sophistication, and cost of the Department of Defense's (DOD) UAS portfolio has grown considerably, as has the demand for trained UAS pilots.
This testimony discusses, among other things, DOD's progress in (1) taking actions to strengthen the management of Air Force UAS pilots and (2) addressing challenges the Army faces to ensure that its UAS pilots complete their required training and receive high-quality training.
GAO's statement is based on information from its reports issued in April 2014 on the Air Force UAS pilots and May 2015 on Army and Air Force UAS pilot training. For those reports, GAO reviewed DOD guidance on training UAS pilots and other relevant documents, examined nongeneralizeable training records of Air Force UAS units, conducted nongeneralizeable focus groups with active duty UAS pilots who were selected to cover a range of ranks and other factors at 6 installations, and interviewed DOD and military services officials. GAO obtained updates from DOD and military services officials for this statement.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In April 2014, GAO reported on several issues the Air Force faced in managing its UAS pilots, and while the Air Force has taken some actions since then, it has not fully implemented GAO's recommendations to strengthen its management.
Personnel Requirements : GAO reported that the Air Force had not accurately identified the number of UAS pilots required to accomplish its mission nor had it established a minimum number of pilots needed. As of March 2016, the Air Force had not updated personnel requirements and until it does, the Air Force will not know if it is assuming unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing the mission and ensuring pilot safety.
Recruiting and Retaining : GAO reported that the Air Force had faced challenges recruiting UAS pilots and might also face retention challenges in the future. The Air Force has taken steps to recruit more UAS pilots and offers a monthly assignment incentive pay to help retain pilots, but issues related to recruiting UAS pilots may warrant the Air Force's attention.
Alternative Sources : GAO reported that the Air Force had not evaluated the use of alternative personnel populations such as enlisted or civilian personnel to help it sustain required UAS pilot staffing levels. In 2015, the Air Force announced it would test using enlisted personnel but has not formally evaluated using DOD civilian personnel as UAS pilots and thus may lack information on potential options for meeting personnel requirements.
Training : GAO reported that the Air Force had faced challenges training its UAS pilots due to UAS pilot shortages, which impacted its ability to produce new pilots. Fully implementing GAO's recommendations pertaining to management of UAS pilots would better position the Air Force to address its training challenges.
Promotions : GAO reported that the Air Force monitors the promotion rates of UAS pilots but had not analyzed factors that may relate to their low promotion rates. Until the Air Force does this analysis, it is unclear whether its actions to raise promotion rates are appropriate.
The Army has initiated steps to address challenges related to UAS pilots completing their required training and its use of less experienced instructors, which could affect training quality. In May 2015, GAO found that Army unit status reports did not require UAS pilot training information, and thus the Army did not know the extent pilots had been trained and were ready to deploy. GAO recommended that the Army require unit status reports to include UAS pilot readiness information. In March 2016, officials stated that the Army had taken steps to implement the recommendation, but its efforts are ongoing and thus it is too early to know their impact. Also, the Army had waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending a course to become instructor pilots from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015. As a result, Army UAS pilots may not have been receiving the highest caliber of training to prepare them for UAS missions. GAO recommended in May 2015 that the Army mitigate risks posed by waiving prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots, and in March 2016, Army officials stated that they have addressed the underlying causes that led it to waive the prerequisites, but they did not provide information for GAO to be able to determine whether they were continuing to waive these prerequisites.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: In April 2014 and May 2015, GAO made ten recommendations to DOD to improve the Air Force's management of UAS pilots, address Army UAS pilot training challenges, and enhance DOD coordination of UAS pilot training. DOD initiated action on most of these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss some of the  unmanned aerial systems (UAS) pilot personnel challenges that the  Department of Defense (DOD) faces. In recent years, the size,  sophistication, and cost of DOD’s UAS portfolio has grown considerably,  as has the demand for trained UAS pilots. Each of the services flies  various types of UAS. The Air Force flies the MQ-1 (Predator), the MQ-9  (Reaper), and the RQ-4 (Global Hawk) while the Army flies the RQ-7  (Shadow), the MQ-5 (Hunter) and the MQ-1C (Gray Eagle).
We found in our prior work that in recent years, the Air Force has not  provided a sufficient number of UAS pilots to meet requirements due to  several factors including most notably the increase in demand for  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. As a result, the UAS  workload has been performed by fewer pilots working more hours to  accomplish the Air Force mission. In additional in our prior work, we found  that the Army has faced challenges ensuring that its pilots in UAS units  that are not deployed conduct unit training to prepare them to perform  their missions. In April 2014 and May 2015, we reported on these other  issues and made ten recommendations to DOD to improve the Air  Force’s management of UAS pilots, address Army UAS pilot training  challenges, and enhance DOD coordination of UAS pilot training.
I will focus my remarks today on DOD’s progress in (1) taking actions to  strengthen the management of Air Force UAS pilots, (2) addressing  challenges the Army faces to ensure that its UAS pilots complete their  required training and receive high-quality training, and (3) coordinating  the training of UAS pilots within DOD.
My testimony is primarily based on reports we issued on UAS personnel  issues in May 2015 and April 2014. For those reports, we reviewed  service guidance on training UAS pilots and other relevant documents,  examined nongeneralizeable training records of Air Force UAS units,  conducted nongeneralizeable focus groups at 6 installations with active  duty UAS pilots from a range of ranks, and interviewed DOD and military  services officials. We also followed up with OSD, Air Force and Army  officials to determine what actions they had taken in response to the  recommendations we have made. All work on which this testimony is  based was performed in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Air Force Has Made Efforts to Manage UAS Pilots But Further Actions are Needed
paragraphs: The Air Force has made efforts to manage its UAS pilots but has not fully  addressed issues related to: identifying personnel requirements,  recruiting and retention difficulties, the potential use of DOD civilians as  pilots, pilots completing their required training, moving pilots through the  training pipeline, and analyzing pilot promotion rates.
subsections: section_title: Air Force Has Not Accurately Identified the Number of UAS Pilots Required to Accomplish Its Mission
paragraphs: We found in April 2014 that the Air Force had not accurately identified  optimum personnel requirements, or the crew ratio, for the number of  UAS pilots it requires. As a result, Air Force UAS units may be operating  at personnel levels that are too low, which may diminish the combat  capability and flight safety of these units. The Air Force conducted a study  in 2008 to determine the appropriate crew ratio for MQ-1 Predator  squadrons but did not account for all of the flying and administrative tasks  required of those squadrons due to the study’s reporting timeframes.  Based on the study, the Air Force concluded that the crew ratio for MQ-1  Predator squadrons should be 10:1, which calls for 10 UAS pilots to  support one near-continuous 24-hour flight presence of an Air Force UAS  over a particular geographic location. Headquarters Air Force officials  stated that, because of the omitted tasks, the study’s recommended 10:1  crew ratio probably did not provide enough pilots to perform the work in  an MQ-1 squadron. In addition, some UAS unit commanders and UAS  pilots in some of the 10 focus groups we conducted at three Air Force  bases said that the 10:1 crew ratio was too low. High-performing  organizations use complete and current data to inform their strategic  human capital planning and remain open to reevaluating workforce  planning efforts. Consequently, we recommended that the Air Force  update crew ratios for UAS units to help ensure that the Air Force  establishes a more-accurate understanding of the required number of  UAS pilots in its units, and the Air Force concurred with our  recommendation.
The Air Force has taken some actions in response to our  recommendation, but Air Force officials told us that as of March 2016, the  Air Force has not updated its UAS unit crew ratio. In our May 2015 report,  we found that the Air Force had a three-phase personnel requirements  study underway that was designed to update the UAS unit crew ratio. Air  Force officials stated that the preliminary results of the study pointed to  updating the UAS unit crew ratio and increasing the required number of  pilots in UAS units. In May 2015, the officials also stated that they  expected to update the UAS unit crew ratio later in 2015 but has not yet  done so. Without an updated crew ratio, the Air Force lacks information  needed to accurately identify the number of Air Force UAS pilots it  requires and may need additional pilots.
As we also found in April 2014, Air Force documentation showed that  crew ratios in UAS units had not met the 10:1 crew ratio identified in the  2008 study and instead fluctuated between 7:1 and 8.5:1, indicating that  between 7 and fewer than 9 UAS pilots were used to sustain 24 hours of  Predator operations rather than the 10 pilots recommended by the study.  We found that the Air Force operated at these levels in order to provide a  higher number of CAPs to meet the requests made by combatant  commanders. An Air Force instruction states that a crew ratio establishes  the number of personnel required to support a unit mission and that if a  ratio is too low, combat capability is diminished and flight safety suffers.  We recommended at that time that the Air Force establish a minimum  crew ratio in Air Force policy below which UAS units cannot operate  without unacceptable levels of risk to mission accomplishment and safety.  The Air Force concurred with our recommendation and in comments on  our report the Air Force stated that it anticipated that it would implement  our recommendation by February 2015.
We reported in May 2015 that the three-phase personnel requirements  study would also address the recommendation to establish a minimum  crew ratio, but according to Air Force officials that study has not been  finalized. In February 2016, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff of  Operations directed that the Air Force use the 10:1 crew ratio as the  minimum. However Air Force officials stated that due to personnel  shortages, that ratio has not been enforced. As of February 2016, UAS  units had been operating at a 9.4:1 crew ratio, meaning that between 9  and 10 UAS pilots were used to sustain 24 hours of Predator operations  rather than the 10 pilots recommended by the study. Without a minimum  crew ratio established in Air Force policy, the Air Force lacks information  needed to determine when UAS units are operating at crew ratio levels  that expose the Air Force to unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing  its mission and ensuring safety. In addition, UAS pilots may continue to  experience a high pace of operations that limits their time for training and  impacts their quality of life.
section_title: The Air Force Has Taken Steps to Recruit More UAS Pilots, but May Face Retention Challenges and Continues to Rely on Pilots Trained on Manned Aircraft to Meet Requirements
paragraphs: We found in April 2014 that the Air Force faced challenges recruiting UAS  pilots and had not achieved its recruiting goals for UAS pilots in fiscal  years 2012 and 2013. Air Force officials cited a number of reasons for  missing the targets, including that potential UAS pilot recruits had a  limited understanding of the UAS mission because the Air Force lacked  recruiting officials with UAS experience. High-performing organizations  tailor their strategies to the specific needs and challenges of the  workforce to recruit high-quality personnel with critical skills, but the Air  Force had not developed a strategy to address recruiting and retention of  UAS pilots, including increasing the appeal of the UAS pilot career to  potential recruits. As a result, the Air Force risked personnel shortages  and continued reliance on manned-aircraft pilots to fill its personnel  requirements. We recommended that the Air Force develop such a  tailored strategy to recruiting and retaining UAS pilots to help ensure that  the Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels, and the Air  Force concurred.
In 2015, Air Force senior leadership and headquarters officials stated that  the Air Force was in the process of developing strategies to recruit UAS  pilots. The Air Force has taken a number of actions that officials say have  helped improve UAS pilot recruiting. For example, Air Force officials  stated that Headquarters Air Force has efforts underway to educate  potential recruits at the commissioning sources such as the Air Force  Academy on the UAS mission. Officials told us that the Air Force is  providing cadets information on the UAS pilot career and it is assigning  UAS pilots to the Academy so that they can share their on-the-job  experiences with cadets who may be interested in becoming a UAS pilot  In addition, the Air Force began requiring cadets to volunteer to serve in  any of the four aviation-related careers rather than applying for one  specific career. This process allows the Air Force to assign cadets to any  of the four careers based on Air Force needs, among other factors. Air  Force officials stated that the Air Force has also opened up eligibility for  becoming a UAS pilot by removing age requirements and granting  waivers for certain medical requirements.
In April 2014 we also found that the Air Force may face challenges  retaining UAS pilots. Pilots in 7 of the 10 focus groups we conducted at  three Air Force bases indicated that retention of UAS pilots is or will be a  challenge and UAS unit commanders in one location we visited and other  Air Force officials stated that they were concerned with future retention  rates of UAS pilots. As mentioned above, we recommended that the Air  Force develop a tailored strategy that addresses both recruiting and  retention of UAS pilots and the Air Force concurred.
To retain pilots, officials stated that the Air Force pays UAS pilots a  monthly assignment incentive pay which is equivalent to the amount that  manned pilots receive in aviation pay. Also, the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 granted the Air Force the authority  to increase the annual amount that it pays UAS pilots in a retention bonus  from $25,000 to $35,000. A Headquarters Air Force official told us in  January 2016 that the Air Force has not used this authority to pay UAS  pilots the increased amount of this retention bonus for two reasons. First,  OSD has not yet issued related policy that the act required be issued  before the Air Force could begin paying this increased amount. Second,  the Air Force does not have enough data to determine what the retention  patterns of this population will be because most of the pilots who  specialize in flying UAS have not reached the end of their six-year service  commitment. The official stated that the Air Force would like to determine  if retention of this population is a concern before exercising the authority  to offer these pilots the increased retention bonus amount.
Further, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified that the Air Force was  not using the increased amount of the retention bonus. Specifically, he  stated that the Air Force did not use that increased bonus for UAS pilots  because the current amount was commensurate with that of other  critically manned pilot categories. He further stated that the Air Force has  other pilot categories that are even in more crisis than UAS at this point in  time. We will be exploring further with the Air Force their plan to use this  bonus and UAS pilot retention rates. The Air Force is pursuing initiatives  to address shortages in the MQ-1 and MQ-9 pilot community that Air  Force officials say will have a positive impact on retention. For example,  the Air Force is supplementing its UAS pilot population with the Air Force  Reserve and contractor support.
The Air Force has taken positive steps toward improving recruiting and,  according to Air Force officials, has met or nearly met its UAS pilot  recruiting goals for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, which shows progress  toward resolving the recruiting challenges we found in 2014. At the same  time, issues related to recruiting UAS pilots may warrant the Air Force’s  attention. In particular, the recruiting goals themselves may not be  appropriate because, as previously discussed, the crew ratio has not yet  been updated and the crew ratio is used to determine the total number of  UAS pilots the Air Force requires. In addition, in April 2014, we also found  that 42 percent of Air Force pilots flying UAS were manned-aircraft pilots  and manned-aircraft pilot training graduates. Both of those groups are  temporary UAS pilots who serve only one assignment in a UAS squadron.  Air Force officials stated that as of March 2016, those groups represented  around one-third of Air Force UAS pilots. They also stated they anticipate  they will not need to use any manned-aircraft pilot training graduates in  fiscal year 2016 based on the number new UAS pilots that the Air Force  anticipates will join the Air Force in fiscal year 2016. However, if the Air  Force updates the crew ratio and finds it needs to increase the number of  UAS pilots it requires, the Air Force may need to continue relying on  manned aircraft pilots, indicating the continued importance of a strategic  approach to recruiting and retention that is tailored to the needs of the  UAS pilot workforce.
section_title: The Air Force Is Planning to Use Enlisted Personnel to Operate the Global Hawk but has not Evaluated the Possible Use of DOD Civilians
paragraphs: In April 2014, we found that the Air Force had not evaluated whether  using alternative personnel populations such as enlisted or civilian  personnel as UAS pilots is a viable option to help it meet and sustain  required UAS pilot staffing levels. Headquarters Air Force officials had  stated that they had, at times, considered the use of enlisted or civilian  personnel but had not initiated formal efforts to evaluate the potential use  of alternative personnel populations as UAS pilots. We recommended  that the Air Force conduct such an evaluation to identify whether such  alternative populations could help the Air Force meet and sustain required  UAS pilots staffing levels. The Air Force partially concurred with our  recommendation, stating that the Air Force had considered assigning  enlisted personnel as UAS pilots but had decided that the responsibilities  of piloting a UAS were commensurate with the rank of officers.
Subsequently, the Air Force has made progress toward implementing our  recommendation. Even though the Air Force commented on our  recommendation that the responsibilities of piloting a UAS were  commensurate with the rank of officers, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force  directed Headquarters Air Force staff to evaluate the potential of using  enlisted personnel as UAS pilots in fall 2014. Further, the Air Force  announced in December 2015 that it would integrate enlisted personnel  into flying operations for the RQ-4 Global Hawk UAS. In December 2015,  the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated  that the goal of the initiative is to provide an additional avenue for  capability growth and directed development of an implementation plan to  use enlisted personnel to operate the Global Hawk by May of 2016.  However, as of March 2016, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force  has not formally evaluated using DOD civilian personnel as UAS pilots, as  we recommended. Without also evaluating DOD civilian personnel, the  Air Force may lack valuable information on whether additional options  exist for meeting personnel requirements.
section_title: Air Force UAS Pilots Do Not Complete the Majority of Their Continuation Training
paragraphs: In April 2014, we found that the high pace of operations limited the time  the UAS pilot workforce could put toward training and development. In  addition, in May 2015, we found that Air Force UAS pilots do not  complete the majority of their continuation training because they spend  most of their time conducting operational missions due to shortages of  UAS pilots and high workloads. Continuation training includes all training  that takes place once a servicemember reaches their operational unit and  finishes the training required to be considered qualified to perform the  unit’s mission. A core characteristic of a strategic training framework is  that agency leaders and managers consistently demonstrate that they  support and value continuous learning. We found that a nongeneralizable  sample of training records for seven Air Force UAS units showed that, on  average, 35 percent of the pilots in these units completed the continuation  training for all of their seven required missions in fiscal year 2014. In  March 2016, Air Force officials stated that UAS units make efforts to  dedicate time to continuation training but the majority of their time is still  devoted to combat missions based on personnel shortages and high  demand. However, as we noted in May 2015, fully implementing all four  recommendations we made in our April 2014 report pertaining to  management of Air Force UAS pilots should better position the Air Force  to address the UAS pilot shortages that contribute to training challenges.
section_title: The Air Force Faces Challenges Moving UAS Pilots Through the Training Pipeline
paragraphs: In April 2014 we found that the Air Force had reduced the capacity of its  training units by moving instructor pilots to operational units to react to  increasing demand for UAS capabilities. A core characteristic of a  strategic training framework is that agencies should provide appropriate  resources for its training programs. However, In May 2015, we found that  the Air Force had staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air  Force Base at 63 percent of their planned staffing levels due to shortages  of UAS pilots across the Air Force, which Air Force officials stated in turn  impacted the Air Force’s ability to produce new pilots. We also reported  actions the Air Force was taking to increase the number of instructor  pilots, including studying the personnel requirements for the formal  training unit. Air Force officials stated that as of February 2016, the Air  Force had filled 84 percent of its instructor pilot positions at Holloman.  These officials said that there is still a need to increase the number of  instructor pilots, and the Air Force goal is to fill 100 percent of the  instructor pilot slots by fiscal year 2017. Fully implementing our  recommendations pertaining to management of UAS pilots should better  position the Air Force to address the need to increase the number of  instructor pilots.
section_title: The Air Force Monitors UAS Pilot Promotion Rates but Has Not Analyzed Factors Related to Those Rates
paragraphs: In April 2014, we found that the Air Force monitors the promotion rates of  UAS pilots but had not analyzed factors that may relate to their low  promotions rates. The Air Force had found that UAS pilots were promoted  below the average rate for active-duty line officers on 20 of 24 officer  promotion boards between 2006 and 2012 and 2013, depending on rank.  We also found that UAS pilots were promoted at the lowest rate of any  career field on 9 of the 24 boards. Statistical principles call for  researchers to account for potential key factors in analysis because when  they omit key factors, the relationships between other factors may not be  accurately estimated. The Air Force analyzed promotions across a group  of officers –or the Line of the Air Force—including UAS pilots, and found  factors that related to promotions in general. However, the Air Force had  not analyzed the factors related to UAS pilots’ promotions specifically  and, as a result, it did not have the information to determine what factors  may affect their promotions. We recommended that the Air Force include  the career field effect of being a UAS pilot into its analysis to determine  whether and how being a UAS pilot is related to promotions and  determine whether the factors identified in the analysis of Line of the Air  Force officers are also related to UAS pilot promotions.
The Air Force partially concurred with our recommendation, stating that  because the UAS career field is a subsection of the Line of the Air Force,  the factors identified in analysis of the Line of the Air Force are directly  related to UAS pilot promotions, which we acknowledged in our report. As  of January 2016, the Air Force had not taken any steps to implement our  recommendation and when we sought additional information in March  2016, the Air Force did not respond in time for this statement. Without  including the career field effect in its analysis, the Air Force may not be  targeting actions it is taking to raise UAS pilots promotion rates at the  appropriate factors, and information it has reported to Congress may not  be accurate.
section_title: Army Has Not Fully Addressed Challenges Related to UAS Pilots Completing Required Training and the Use of Less Experienced Instructors
paragraphs: The Army has not fully addressed challenges related to UAS pilots  completing their required training and its use of less experienced  instructors, which could affect training quality.
subsections: section_title: Army UAS Pilots in Shadow Units that are Not Deployed Are Not Completing Continuation Training
paragraphs: In May 2015, we found that a 2015 Army review showed that pilots in  most of the Army’s Shadow units did not complete training in their units in  fiscal year 2014. We previously developed a set of core characteristics  for assessing strategic training programs in the federal government.  One of these characteristics calls for agency leaders to demonstrate that  they value continuous learning.  In January 2015, the Chief of Staff of  the Army directed the Army Training and Doctrine Command to evaluate  if unit training was a factor that caused UAS mishaps in combat. The  Army reviewed this issue from January 2015 through March 2015 and  found that UAS pilots in 61 of the 65 RQ-7B Shadow units that were not  deployed in fiscal year 2014 had flown an annual unit average of 150  hours of training, which is about 200 hours less than minimum amount  of training flight hours that an Army unit is required to fly according to the  review. In addition, the review included recommendations to increase  emphasis on training in UAS units including that the Army should (1)  issue guidance to unit commanders on UAS training; (2) ensure that UAS  warrant officers are qualified on their UAS; (3) Increase the amount of  home station training for UAS units; and (4) establish a system to report  UAS training readiness on unit status reports.
We corroborated the Army’s findings in focus groups discussions with  Army UAS pilots and in responses to a questionnaire that UAS unit  commanders provided. Specifically, we found that pilots in all eight of the  focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots stated that they cannot  complete training in their units. For example, a pilot in one of 8 focus  groups stated that during his 3 years as a UAS pilot, he had been  regularly tasked to complete non-training-related activities, and as a result  he completed a total of 36 training flight hours even though the  requirement is that he should have completed 72 flight hours during those  three years. Further, Army UAS pilots in each of the 8 focus groups we  conducted stated that they had difficulty completing UAS pilot training in  units because they spend a significant amount of time performing  additional duties such as lawn care, janitorial services, and guard duty.  Additionally, five of the six Army UAS units that responded to a  questionnaire we administered indicated that their units faced challenges  completing training in their units.
At the time, we did not make any recommendations on this issue. We  noted that while the Army review and our analysis showed that most  Army UAS pilots were not completing training in their units, the Army’s  training shortfalls might be addressed by the high-level interest expressed  by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the recommendations in the Training  and Doctrine Command review, if implemented. We asked the Army to  provide information to update our May 2015 report to show (1) the  amount of unit training that UAS pilots completed in fiscal year 2015, and  (2) actions the Army had taken in response to its internal  recommendations to increase emphasis on unit training. Finally, the Army  did not respond to our request to provide updated information on these  topics for this statement.
section_title: Army Does Not Have Visibility over the Amount of Training that Pilots in Some UAS Units Have Completed
paragraphs: In May 2015, we also found that the Army does not have visibility over the  amount of training that pilots in some Army UAS units have completed.  Another core characteristic of a strategic training framework highlights the  importance of quality data regarding training. However, we found that  Army does not have access to data that would allow it to measure the  amount of training that UAS pilots have completed in Army UAS units.  Army Forces Command officials stated that they need information about  the readiness level of pilots in UAS units to determine if a unit is ready to  deploy and perform its mission. These officials stated that they review  Army unit status reports to determine if a unit is prepared to deploy.  However, officials from Army Headquarters, Army Forces Command and  the Army Aviation Center of Excellence both stated that these reports do  not provide any information on the readiness levels of the UAS pilots in  UAS units because the reports are not required to include this  information. Officials at Forces Command stated that, using these reports,  they have designated units as available for deployment and later learned  that a significant portion of the pilots in those units had not completed  their readiness level training. Without requiring information on the  readiness level of pilots in UAS units as part of unit status reports, Army  Forces Command will continue to lack visibility over the amount of  training that UAS pilots have completed in units. To provide greater  visibility over the extent to which Army UAS units have completed  required training to leaders responsible for deployment decisions, we  recommended that the Army require unit status reports to include  information on the readiness levels of UAS pilots in UAS units and the  Army concurred.
Since we issued our report in May 2015, Army Headquarters officials  stated that the Army had drafted an update to Department of the Army  Pamphlet 220-1 that would require UAS units to report the readiness  levels of the UAS pilots in UAS units. In addition, these officials stated  that the Army was working on updating the unit status reporting software  to enable units to comply with the planned update to the Army pamphlet.  While the steps that Army has taken to date should address our  recommendation, its efforts are ongoing and thus it is too early to know  their impact.
section_title: The Army Has Taken Action to Increase the Number of Instructors, but Its Use of Less Experienced Instructors Could Affect the Quality of UAS Pilot Training
paragraphs: In May 2015, we found that the Army had taken actions to increase the  number of UAS instructors, but it had not fully addressed the risks  associated with using less experienced instructors. In order to increase  the number of its instructors in response to an increase in the number of  UAS units, the Army waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of  the UAS pilots attending the course to become instructor pilots from the  beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015.These  prerequisites—such as a minimum number of flight hours— are important  because they help ensure that UAS pilots volunteering to become  instructors to help ensure that instructors are fully trained and ready to  instruct UAS pilots.
In May 2015, we found that the Army had taken steps to mitigate the risks  of using less proficient UAS instructors. For example, in fiscal year 2015,  the Army stopped waiving course prerequisites related to proficiency,  according to Army Aviation Center of Excellence officials. However, the  Army could continue to waive prerequisites related to experience. As a  result, we found that Army UAS pilots may not have been receiving the  highest caliber of training needed to prepare them to successfully perform  UAS missions. To help ensure that Army UAS pilots receive the highest  caliber of training, we recommended, in May 2015, that the Army take  additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by waiving course  prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots attending the course to  become instructors and the Army concurred.
In February 2016, Army Headquarters officials stated that the Army has  taken additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by waiving course  prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots attending the course to  become instructors. However, the Army did not respond to requests we  made in March 2016 for it to explain these additional steps; nor did the  Army respond to requests we made for it to provide updated statistics to  determine if the Army was continuing to waive these prerequisites. In  addition, an Army official from Training and Doctrine Command stated  that the Army had not provided additional training or preparation for  instructors who previously received a waiver of one of the course  prerequisites to attend the instructor course as we had recommended.
section_title: DOD is Coordinating on Some Aspects of UAS Pilot Training But Still Lacks a Department-Wide Strategy
paragraphs: Some coordination is occurring among the services with respect to UAS  pilot training but DOD has not yet developed a department-wide UAS  training strategy. In May 2015, we found that the actions that the services  had taken were either partially consistent or inconsistent with the key  practices to enhance and sustain agency coordination. We previously  reported that agencies face a range of barriers when they attempt to  collaborate with other agencies. To help agencies overcome these  barriers, we developed a set of key practices that can help enhance and  sustain federal agency collaboration. According to these key practices,  federal agencies can enhance and sustain their coordination if they take a  number of actions including the following.
Agencies should identify the human, information technology, physical,  and financial resources needed to initiate or sustain their coordinated  effort. In May 2015, we found that DOD actions were partially  consistent with this principle. For instance, the Air Force and the Army  provide resources to train all Marine Corps UAS pilots. However, as  we found in May 2015, both the Army and the Air Force are working  on addressing UAS personnel shortages and such shortages may  negatively affect their ability to continue to train Marine Corps UAS  pilots.
Agencies should agree on their roles and responsibilities, including  how the coordinated effort will be led. In May 2015, we found the  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and  the services have not agreed on roles or responsibilities for any of the  services for coordinating on UAS pilot training. The Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and  Logistics established a UAS Task Force in 2007, and its charter states  that its mission is to coordinate critical DOD UAS issues. However, a  task force official stated that the task force does not play a role in  coordinating UAS pilot training among the services.
Agencies should define a clear and compelling rationale for  coordination. In March 2010, we found that DOD had begun to  address UAS training challenges, but had not developed a strategy to  prioritize and synchronize these efforts. We recommended that DOD  establish a DOD-wide UAS training strategy to resolve challenges that  affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for  UAS operations and DOD concurred with that recommendation. The  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness)  tasked the RAND Corporation to draft a DOD-wide UAS training  strategy and provided RAND with guidelines about the content and  purpose of the strategy.  However, these guidelines did not discuss  if or how the services should coordinate on UAS pilot training. In  September 2014, RAND provided a draft of a UAS training strategy to  the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness),  but the draft did not define a rationale for the services to coordinate on  training UAS pilots nor did it more generally discuss service  coordination on training UAS pilots.
In our May 2015 report we noted that the Acting Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Readiness) had stated, in January 2015, that the  services should coordinate their efforts to train UAS pilots and that the  services may have valuable training lessons to share with one another  because the services fly similar UAS. He cited similarities between the Air  Force’s Predator and the Army’s Gray Eagle and between the Air Force’s  Global Hawk and the Navy’s Triton. He stated that if the services  coordinated on training their UAS pilots the department as a whole may  be able to train its UAS pilots more effectively and efficiently. However, as  we found in May 2015, without a DOD-wide UAS training strategy that  addresses if and how the services should coordinate with one another on  training UAS pilots, the services may miss opportunities to improve the  effectiveness and efficiency of this training and may waste scarce funds  on training UAS pilots. We therefore recommended that the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness address how  the services should coordinate with one another in the DOD-wide UAS  training strategy the office was drafting at the time we issued our report,  and DOD concurred with this recommendation.
In March 2016, the Director of Force Training in the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Readiness) stated that DOD had not yet published  the DOD-wide UAS training strategy but the strategy was in the final  drafting phase. He stated that his office held a summit in October 2015  with each of the services and during this summit representatives from  each of the services discussed the draft strategy and how to incorporate  our recommendation into the strategy. He stated that his office was  collecting the services’ comments on the draft strategy and would provide  them to RAND and that RAND is currently revising the strategy. The  Director stated that the current version of the strategy addresses our  recommendation and provides detail on how the services could  coordinate with one another during sustainment and mission readiness  training. However, as of March 2016, the Office of the Assistant Secretary  of Defense (Readiness) has not yet issued the DOD-wide UAS training  strategy.
In summary, the Air Force and the Army have taken actions to implement  the recommendations that we made to address some of the UAS  workforce challenges we identified in 2014 and 2015. However, none of  the recommendations that we have discussed today have been fully  implemented. As you know, in June 2014 the Senate Armed Services  Committee directed the Air Force to implement three of our  recommendations—which address the UAS unit crew ratio, recruiting,  and retention—that we discussed today. In addition, the Committee Chair  and Ranking Member have urged the Secretary of Defense to focus  senior leaders in the department on the UAS pilot training shortfalls in the  Army and Air Force that we also discussed today. Fully implementing our  recommendations would set the Air Force on a positive course toward  helping ensure the high-demand UAS pilot workforce has sufficient  numbers and is well trained. Similarly, as we recommended, greater  visibility over the extent to which Army UAS units have completed  required training and additional training for instructors who previously  received a waiver of one of the course prerequisites would help ensure a  highly skilled future Army UAS workforce. However, without addressing if  and how the services can enhance their coordination efforts on training  UAS pilots in DOD’s forthcoming training strategy, the services may not  be able to achieve additional benefits to the efficiency and effectiveness  of UAS pilot training across the department.
Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member Manchin, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I look forward to  answering any questions.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and  Management at (202) 512-3604 or FarrellB@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions  to this testimony are Lori Atkinson, (Assistant Director), James P. Klein,  Kelly Liptan, Felicia Lopez, Mike Silver, and Erik Wilkins-McKee.
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