Defense Logistics: A Completed Comprehensive Strategy is Needed to Guide DOD's In-Transit Visibility Efforts
Published: 2013-02-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD has invested heavily in its logistics operations, estimating that its overall spending on logistics--including supply chain management--was more than $171 billion in fiscal year 2011. GAO has previously reported that one of the most complex and vital tasks facing DOD is managing its supply chain to effectively and efficiently provide spare parts, food, fuel, and other critical supplies in support of U.S. military forces. GAO has identified DOD's supply chain management as a high-risk area and has previously reported that limitations in asset visibility--including the visibility of assets in transit--make it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on the assets that are present in the theater of operations. As part of GAO's work to update its high-risk areas, this report assesses the extent to which DOD (1) is aware of its components' efforts to improve in-transit visibility and (2) has a strategy to achieve in-transit visibility that includes the key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan. To conduct these assessments, GAO obtained and analyzed information from the defense components, reviewed and analyzed relevant defense policies, guidance, and plans regarding in-transit visibility, and interviewed officials from DOD and the defense components.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to improve in-transit visibility of its assets through efforts developed by several of the defense components, but no one DOD organization is fully aware of all such efforts across the department, because they are not centrally tracked. In-transit visibility is the ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD assets and personnel from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations. GAO has previously reported that it is important for organizations to have complete, accurate, and consistent data to inform policy, document performance, and support decision making. Managers striving to reach organizational goals must have information systems in place to provide them with needed information. Based on data from defense components--the Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Central Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the military services--that GAO reviewed, 34 in-transit visibility efforts are being conducted by the components. The department has obligated about $701 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 for these efforts and projected about $455.3 million in costs to be incurred for fiscal years 2012 through 2015--a total of approximately $1.2 billion. Currently, DOD conducts some informal coordination and information sharing regarding its in-transit visibility efforts, but information is not consistently shared through a formal mechanism.
In 2012, DOD began developing a draft strategy for asset visibility and in-transit visibility; however, this strategy includes some but not all key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan. According to DOD officials, the draft strategy, developed in collaboration with all pertinent components, is expected to be completed by June 2013. Officials anticipate that it will be used to guide and integrate related department-wide efforts to improve end-to-end supply chain management and support to the services. According to DOD officials, each component will be expected to develop an execution plan that contains information about its in-transit visibility efforts. The draft strategy indicates that such information is to include descriptions of gaps or challenges within the supply chain, as well as the component's actions or proposed actions to address them. According to GAO's prior work, a comprehensive strategic plan should include a mission statement; a problem definition, scope, and methodology; goals and objectives; activities, milestones, and performance measures; resources and investments; information about organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and a description of key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals. GAO's review of DOD's draft strategy found that it includes one of the seven key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, partially includes four others, and does not include the remaining two. For example, it includes overarching goals and objectives, but it does not include information on DOD's planned resources and investments to achieve those goals or key external factors that could affect the achievement of the goals. Until DOD has finalized a department-wide strategy with all accompanying execution plans, it will not have the information it needs to make well-informed decisions about asset visibility and in-transit visibility, including setting budget priorities for its in-transit visibility efforts across the supply chain in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that as DOD finalizes its in-transit visibility strategy it should ensure that it receives complete information from the components that addresses all key elements of a strategic plan. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested heavily in its logistics  operations, estimating that its overall spending on logistics—including  supply chain management—was more than $171 billion in fiscal year  2011. DOD’s goal in operating its global distribution system is to deliver  the right items to the right place at the right time—and at the right cost.  We have previously reported that one of the most complex and vital tasks  facing DOD is managing its supply chain to effectively and efficiently  provide spare parts, food, fuel, and other critical supplies in support of  U.S. military forces. Maintaining visibility of these assets throughout the  materiel distribution system is critical to ensuring that DOD meets its  stated goal and provides support to the warfighter. DOD’s materiel  distribution system covers four segments—from the movement of  supplies in the continental United States (intracontinental movement),  through strategic and theater movements, to tactical movement on the  battlefield—and must be capable of reaching its military customers  whether they are located on large, well-established bases or at small,  remote outposts.
The performance of DOD’s materiel distribution system relies on many  stakeholders, each with different responsibilities, systems, and  processes. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) serves as  DOD’s single manager for transportation (for other than service-unique or  theater-assigned assets), responsible for providing common-user and  commercial air, land, and sea transportation and terminal management,  among other things. Joint logistics doctrine has established that delivery  from major logistics bases to the point of employment is not a joint  responsibility but rather a service-specific responsibility, as designated by  the geographic combatant commander. DOD components have efforts under way that attempt to address visibility issues in all segments of the  materiel distribution system; however, maintaining in-transit visibility all  the way through to the tactical movement segment remains challenging.  DOD defines in-transit visibility as the ability to track the identity, status,  and location of DOD units and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum,  oils, and lubricants); passengers; patients; and personal property from  origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations.  For the purposes of this report we are referring to the Joint Staff,  TRANSCOM, U.S. Central Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, and  the military services as the components. The military services include the  Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
For our most recent update, see GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283  (Washington, D.C.: February 2013). visibility of supplies and equipment. These challenges include unmet  delivery standards and time lines for cargo shipments; incomplete  delivery data for many surface shipments; inadequate radio-frequency  identification (RFID) information to track all cargo movements to and  within Afghanistan; lack of a common operating picture for distribution  data that integrates DOD’s many transportation information systems;  difficulties in collecting information on all incidents of pilferage of and  damage to cargo; and ineffective tracking and managing of cargo  containers. We stated that these challenges have hindered the  distribution of supplies and equipment to the warfighter and will likely  continue to affect operations in Afghanistan and limit DOD’s visibility and  oversight of the supply chain. We made a number of recommendations to  address these concerns. DOD concurred with five of our  recommendations and partially concurred with another six. Although DOD  acknowledged that several challenges remain, it did not concur with our  four remaining recommendations. DOD did not concur with three of our  recommendations because its view is that TRANSCOM as Distribution  Process Owner does not and should not have any oversight between the  logistics hubs in Afghanistan and the warfighter. DOD also did not concur  with one recommendation because the department believes that  adequate policy and procedures already exist to ensure that content-level  detail is entered onto RFID tags. In July 2011, we also recommended that  DOD develop a comprehensive corrective action plan for improving asset  visibility, and we identified key elements that should be included in such a  plan to maximize its usefulness. However, DOD did not concur with that recommendation, citing its ongoing improvement efforts as sufficient.We continue to believe that all of these recommendations are valid and  should be implemented to improve DOD’s efforts in this area.
Because of ongoing interest in our high-risk areas—including DOD supply  chain management—this report was prepared under the authority of the  Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. This  report assesses the extent to which DOD (1) is aware of its components’  efforts to improve in-transit visibility and (2) has a strategy to achieve in- transit visibility that includes the key elements of a comprehensive  strategic plan.
To determine the extent to which DOD is aware of its components’ efforts  to achieve in-transit visibility, we obtained and analyzed information from  the defense components on efforts covering fiscal years 2009 through  2015. We included U.S. Central Command because we have previously  reported on weaknesses in DOD supply chain management in U.S.  Central Command’s area of responsibility and noted that asset visibility is  one of the focus areas for improvement. cost information for each of the in-transit visibility improvement efforts— including obligations for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 and projected  costs for fiscal years 2012 through 2015. We interviewed officials from the  defense components to clarify the purpose and scope of each effort. To  determine the extent to which DOD has a strategy to achieve in-transit  visibility that includes the key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan,  we reviewed and analyzed relevant defense policies, guidance, and plans  regarding in-transit visibility, and we interviewed officials from the Office  of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration  and from the defense components. We also reviewed DOD’s November  2012 draft of its strategy to improve asset visibility (tracking) and in-transit  visibility to determine whether specific elements of effective strategic  planning were included. To do so, we conducted a content analysis of the  draft strategy. Two analysts independently compared the strategy to the  specific elements, then discussed their individual reviews and reached a  consensus.
We did not include the remaining five geographic combatant commands: Africa  Command, European Command, Northern Command, Pacific Command, and Southern  Command.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 to February  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides  additional details on the scope and methodology of this report.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The performance of DOD’s materiel distribution system relies on many  stakeholders, each with different responsibilities, systems, and  processes. Many organizations within DOD have important roles and  responsibilities for supply chain management, and these responsibilities  are spread across multiple components with separate funding and  management of logistics resources and systems. The Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics serves as the principal  staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters  relating to defense logistics, among other duties, and is the department’s  Defense Logistics Executive, with overall responsibility for improving and  maintaining the defense logistics and supply chain system. The Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, under the  authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, is the principal logistics official  within the senior management of DOD. Within the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration improves the  integration of DOD’s supply chain by developing policy and facilitating the  components’ implementation of supply chain management practices,  among other duties. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Supply Chain Integration develops and directs DOD-wide supply chain  integration functions by establishing and maintaining policies that are  intended to deliver efficient, sustainable, and cost-effective end-to-end  supply chain performance. Each of the military departments is separately  organized, under its own Secretary. Subject to the authority, direction,  and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the military  departments are responsible for, among other things, organizing, training,  and equipping their forces. TRANSCOM, in addition to its responsibilities  for transporting equipment and supplies in support of military operations,  is designated as the distribution process owner for DOD. The role of the  distribution process owner is, among other things, to oversee the overall  effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of department-wide distribution  activities, including force projection, sustainment, and  redeployment/retrograde operations.
DOD has issued a series of policies, strategic planning documents,  instructions, memoranda, and other documents related to logistics and  supply chain management over the last several years. Joint Publication 4- 0, Joint Logistics, provides the doctrinal framework which describes how  logistics is delivered to support joint operations across the range of  military operations. Joint Publication 4-0 also acknowledges the  importance of technology in capturing source data effectively, integrating  those data, and making them more accessible in order to provide the  shared awareness needed to improve planning, decision making, and  assessment. Key policies, guidance, and other documents that address  many aspects of the department’s supply chain from 2003 through 2011  are described in figure 1.
section_title: DOD Is Not Fully Aware of All In- Transit Visibility Efforts across the Department and Lacks a Central Mechanism to Track Their Status
paragraphs: DOD has taken steps to improve in-transit visibility of its assets through  efforts developed by several of the defense components, but no one  organization is fully aware of all such efforts across the department,  because they are not centrally tracked. Based on data we requested and  received from DOD officials in several components, we were able to  compile a list of 34 in-transit visibility efforts that are being conducted by  the components. Currently, DOD conducts some informal coordination  and information sharing regarding its in-transit visibility efforts, but  information is not consistently shared through a formal mechanism.
We have previously reported that it is important for organizations to have  complete, accurate, and consistent data to inform policy, document  performance, and support decision making. Additionally, we have found  that having to incorporate information drawn from multiple sources can  potentially be challenging to those responsible for managing and  integrating that information. Managers striving to reach organizational  goals must have information systems in place to provide them with  needed information. We conducted our own research, in collaboration  with the components, to identify the in-transit visibility efforts across DOD,  because DOD has not identified and does not yet have a ready means for  identifying these efforts. No single defense component could identify all of  the efforts across the department or provide cost figures for them. Based  on our analysis, 27 of the 34 efforts are each led and funded by a single  defense component. For example, the Army leads and funds the Next  Generation Wireless Communications effort, a wireless network that  provides location, condition, and intrusion-detection information on DOD  assets. Of the remaining seven efforts, each is co-led by two or more  components. For example, TRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics  Agency co-led an effort to merge data from several sources into one  system. The 34 efforts are listed in appendix II. Many of these efforts  include increasing the use of automatic identification technology tools  within the department or enhancing computer systems that store and  report data on assets while they are in transit.
Based on information we collected, DOD has obligated about $701 million  for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 for these efforts and projected about  $455.3 million in costs for fiscal years 2012 through 2015—for a total of  approximately $1.2 billion. The Army and TRANSCOM have provided the  largest amount of funding for these efforts, compared to the other  components. Table 1 shows the amount of obligations and projected  costs associated with in-transit visibility efforts, as reported by the  defense components.
In addition, some coordination and information sharing among  components regarding in-transit visibility efforts is taking place through  both department-wide and service-specific activities, according to DOD  officials. These activities include conferences, working groups, and  workshops. The participants in these activities vary based on the focus of  the group. However, participants have included officials from the Office of  the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commands, the four military  services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other government agencies  that support distribution process improvements. DOD officials explained  that these conferences, workshops, and meetings provide opportunities to  discuss challenges that the components are experiencing with in-transit  visibility and the efforts they are taking to address these challenges. For  example, the Marine Corps hosted a logistics summit in November 2011.  The participants included officials from logistics offices in the Army, the  Defense Logistics Agency, TRANSCOM, and the Marine Corps. During  the summit, officials from the various components discussed challenges  and issues related to in-transit visibility—such as methods to mandate  and implement the use of RFID tags on cargo containers, pallets, and  reusable shipping containers and the enforcement of RFID requirements  on cargo shipments transported outside the United States. Additionally,  TRANSCOM officials said that a list of in-transit visibility points of contact  at each component is distributed among the components. According to  these officials, the components use the information in this document to  reach in-transit visibility points of contact in other components so they can  discuss related issues on an ad hoc basis. Officials from the Office of the  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration told  us that recent workshops have consistently included representatives of  the DOD components; these officials believe that the workshops will  increase awareness of all in-transit visibility efforts across the department.  However, these opportunities to share information are informal, and we  found that no one organization was fully aware of all of the in-transit  visibility efforts across the department, because information was not  consistently shared through a formal mechanism.
section_title: DOD’s Draft Strategy to Achieve Asset Visibility and In- Transit Visibility Has Not Been Finalized and Does Not Include Some of the Key Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Plan
paragraphs: In 2012, DOD began developing a strategy for asset visibility and in- transit visibility; however, as of January 2013 the strategy had not been  finalized and did not include some of the key elements of a  comprehensive strategic plan. According to DOD officials, the draft  strategy, developed in collaboration with all pertinent components, is  expected to be completed by June 2013. Officials anticipate that it will be  used to guide and integrate related department-wide efforts to improve  end-to-end supply chain management and support to the services.  According to DOD officials, each component will be expected to develop  an execution plan that contains information about its in-transit visibility  efforts. The draft strategy indicates that such information is to include  descriptions of gaps or challenges within the supply chain and the  component’s actions or proposed actions to address them. Our analysis  shows that the current draft of DOD’s strategy for asset visibility and in- transit visibility fully includes one of the seven elements of a  comprehensive strategic plan, partially includes four others, and does not  include the remaining two. Until DOD has finalized its department-wide  strategy, with all of its accompanying execution plans, it will not have the  information it needs to make well-informed decisions about asset visibility  and in-transit visibility, including setting budget priorities for its in-transit  visibility efforts across the supply chain in an increasingly constrained  fiscal environment.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Recently Focused on Developing an Asset Visibility and In- Transit Visibility Strategy but Has Not Finalized It
paragraphs: DOD has policies, instructions, and other guidance in place that address  supply chain issues such as the use of technology to track the location of  cargo, but these documents have not focused specifically on in-transit  visibility. Recently, DOD has recognized the need to develop a  comprehensive in-transit visibility strategy. The Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration leads and is  overseeing the effort to develop the strategy for improving asset tracking  and in-transit visibility—which encompasses taking advantage of the  automatic identification technology implementation and process  integration to date—and ensuring that in-transit visibility is “truly factory to  foxhole.” The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain  Integration stated that one goal is to refocus department-wide efforts on  measurable actions to improve asset tracking and in-transit visibility using  automatic identification technology as an enabler when requirements for  end-to-end supply chain optimization dictate its use. According to the  draft strategy, it will contribute to achieving the following objectives for  improving asset visibility (tracking) and in-transit visibility:  1.  optimized deployment/redeployment, sustainment, and retrograde   enabled by data capture and collection  3.  unique identification of assets  As of January 2013, this strategy had not been finalized, but the Deputy  Assistant Secretary provided us with an overview and a copy of the draft.  The strategy was developed collaboratively by the Office of the Secretary  of Defense, the Defense Logistics Agency, TRANSCOM, and the  services. As a part of developing the strategy, the components are in the  process of developing execution plans based on a template provided by  DOD that calls for various information about their in-transit visibility  efforts. For example, the draft strategy for asset visibility and in-transit  visibility, dated November 2012, included execution plans from the  Defense Logistics Agency, TRANSCOM, and the Navy. The Army,  Marine Corps, and Air Force have developed draft execution plans but  have yet to submit them for inclusion in the draft strategy, according to  DOD officials.
According to DOD officials, each component will be expected to develop  an execution plan that contains information about its in-transit visibility  efforts. The draft strategy indicates that such information is to include  descriptions of gaps or challenges within the supply chain and the  component’s actions or proposed actions to address them. The draft  strategy currently indicates that the Supply Chain Executive Steering  Committee will conduct periodic progress reviews of the execution plans  and related activities. It also includes a template for the components to  use in developing their execution plans. This template calls for the  identification of each effort’s objectives and activities, a detailed action  plan, and measures of success required by the responsible component to  ensure that DOD’s strategy is successfully executed and expected  outcomes are achieved. Additional detail about information included in the  execution plans is provided in table 2.
According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain  Integration, components were directed to finalize their initial execution  plans by June 2013. TRANSCOM, the Navy, and the Defense Logistics  Agency have provided execution plans. The Army, the Marines Corps,  and the Air Force plan to provide theirs in 2013. Until DOD has compiled  all of these execution plans in its draft in-transit visibility strategy and  finalized the strategy to include all of the elements necessary for a  comprehensive strategic plan, it will not have a comprehensive approach  to guide its planning and investment decisions to achieve desired  outcomes and goals for department-wide in-transit visibility, including the  priority with which to implement these efforts. According to the draft  strategy, DOD intends to continuously update the strategy with new  execution plans as necessary.
section_title: DOD Has Included Some but Not All Key Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Plan in Its Draft Strategy
paragraphs: DOD’s draft strategy for in-transit visibility includes some but not all of the  elements we have identified as necessary for a comprehensive strategic  plan. Our prior work has shown that strategic planning is the foundation  for defining what an agency seeks to accomplish, identifying the  strategies it will use to achieve desired results, and determining how well  it will succeed in reaching results-oriented goals and achieving objectives.  Combined with effective leadership, strategic planning that results in an  integrated and comprehensive strategic plan enables decision makers to  better guide program efforts and determine if these efforts are achieving  the desired results. According to our prior work, a comprehensive  strategic plan should include a mission statement; a problem definition,  scope, and methodology; goals and objectives; activities, milestones, and  performance measures; resources and investments; information about  organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and a description  of key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals.
Our analysis shows that the current draft of DOD’s strategy for asset  visibility and in-transit visibility fully includes one of the seven elements of  a comprehensive strategic plan, partially includes four others, and does  not include the remaining two. Specifically, the draft strategy includes  overarching goals and objectives that address the overall results desired  from implementation of the strategy. Three of the elements we identified  as ‘partially included’ are nearing completion, but our review of the draft  strategy shows that not all components had submitted their execution  plans, which provide key information about the components’ in-transit  visibility efforts and describe gaps or challenges within the supply chain,  as well as the components’ actions or proposed actions to address them.
The draft also does not include information about the resources and  investments that would be required to achieve the goals laid out in the  strategy, nor does it include key external factors—issues external to the  agency and beyond its control—that could affect the achievement of the  strategy’s goals. We have previously reported that it is important to  identify resources and investments—which may include skills and  technology, human, capital, information, and other resources—in order to  be able to monitor efficient use of resources allocated to in-transit visibility  efforts and measure the costs and benefits of these efforts. Additionally,  it is important to identify key external factors that might affect a  comprehensive strategic plan so that a mitigation plan can be  developed.comprehensive strategic plan are included in DOD’s draft strategy.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD recognizes that challenges to in-transit visibility contribute to the  continued inclusion of supply chain management on our high-risk list. The  department has a number of efforts that are designed to improve asset  visibility and in-transit visibility. However, DOD’s awareness of in-transit  visibility efforts, and the resources allocated to them, is limited and DOD  does not have a comprehensive mechanism in place for collecting and  sharing complete, accurate, and consistent information about these  efforts and the organizations conducting them. DOD is currently  developing a strategy to address in-transit visibility challenges and guide  efforts to achieve in-transit visibility of DOD assets. A key component of  this strategy is the inclusion of defense components’ execution plans,  which are based on a template provided by DOD that calls for information  about their in-transit visibility efforts. Until DOD has compiled all execution  plans in the draft and finalized its in-transit visibility strategy to include all  key elements necessary for a comprehensive strategic plan, it will not  have the information it needs to make well-informed decisions about  asset visibility and in-transit visibility, including setting budget priorities for  its in-transit visibility efforts across the supply chain in an increasingly  constrained fiscal environment.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To increase DOD’s awareness of efforts across the defense components  to improve in-transit visibility, and to guide planning and investment  decisions for DOD’s in-transit visibility efforts, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to finalize a department-wide in- transit visibility strategy that will be implemented across the department.
When finalizing this strategy and the accompanying execution plans,  DOD should ensure that  complete, accurate, and consistent information about all in-transit  visibility efforts is captured, tracked, and shared across the  department and  the strategy contains all of the key elements of a comprehensive  strategic plan, including resources and investments and key external  factors.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our  recommendation to finalize a department-wide in-transit visibility  strategy—to be implemented across the department—that ensures  complete, accurate, and consistent information about all in-transit visibility  efforts is captured, tracked, and shared, and contains all of the key  elements of a comprehensive strategic plan. DOD stated that the Office of  the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration will  establish a central repository to ensure that information is shared across  the department after the strategy is finalized. DOD also stated that the  strategy currently being drafted will be finalized by June 1, 2013, and will  include the components’ execution plans, which will contain plans for  implementation, cost and resource requirements, and information on  external factors that may affect the implementation of each effort.
DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the  Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. This report will also be available at  no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. Staff who made major contributions  to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which DOD was aware of its components’  efforts to achieve in-transit visibility, we asked the defense components to  provide us with information about their efforts to address in-transit  visibility covering fiscal years 2009 through 2015. We provided the  defense components with requests for information about the efforts,  including the title of each effort, the purpose, funding obligations,  projected costs, the lead component for each effort, and whether there  were other stakeholder components or agencies. Officials from the  components provided us with information that they compiled from various  offices within their organizations. We analyzed the information provided  and conducted follow-up discussions with officials from each component  to identify the efforts that were specifically related to in-transit visibility  rather than other aspects of asset visibility and to clarify information that  had been provided. To determine which of the efforts reported to us were  related to in-transit visibility, we used DOD’s definition of in-transit  visibility from Joint Publication 1-02. For the purposes of this report, in- transit visibility efforts are systems, devices, or programs that are  intended to improve DOD’s ability to track the identity, status, and location  of DOD cargo (excluding petroleum, oils, and lubricants) from origin to  destination. To determine the total costs for all efforts, we added together  the obligations and projected costs for each effort reported by the  components. We did not assess the reliability of the cost information  provided by the components, because the cost information they provided  did not materially affect our key findings. We interviewed officials to  identify coordination mechanisms, both formal and informal, and to  determine whether components were sharing information across DOD.
To determine the extent to which DOD has a strategy to achieve in-transit  visibility that includes the elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, we  identified draft and existing policies and guidance for in-transit visibility  across various DOD components and assessed whether such policies  and guidance provide a comprehensive strategic plan for in-transit  visibility. Specifically, we evaluated DOD’s November 2012 draft strategy  for improving asset visibility and in-transit visibility and determined  whether it included elements applicable to a strategy for maintaining in- transit visibility of assets in the DOD supply chain. We reviewed prior  GAO reports and testimonies pertaining to DOD supply chain  management, including our reviews of DOD’s prior strategic planning  efforts for asset visibility, and compared the draft strategy and its  elements to criteria on effective strategic planning from our prior reports.  Specific criteria on the elements of a comprehensive strategic plan that  we discussed in previous reports are also discussed in this report. Using  these same criteria, we conducted a content analysis of the draft strategy  to determine whether specific elements of a comprehensive strategic plan  were included. Two analysts independently compared the strategy to the  specific elements. The analysts then discussed their individual reviews  and reached a consensus in areas where they had disagreed. We met  with officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Supply Chain Integration, the Defense Logistics Agency, and  TRANSCOM to discuss features of the draft strategy and ongoing and  possible future strategic planning efforts. We met with officials from the  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain  Integration to discuss the draft strategy and the oversight structure for  DOD’s in-transit visibility efforts (including senior-level logistics  governance bodies) and obtained additional insight and supporting  documentation (e.g., agendas and meeting minutes from these bodies)  on the purpose, status, and implementation of the draft strategy. For both  objectives, we reviewed DOD policies and other documentation, and our  prior work on strategic planning and defense logistics.
section_title: Appendix II: List of In-Transit Visibility Efforts
paragraphs: The table below provides a list of the in-transit visibility efforts reported by  the defense components during the course of our review, a brief  description of each effort, and cost information where available. Where no  cost information is provided, there was no cost during that fiscal period,  the cost was not readily available, or the cost is included with another  effort that is listed in the table below. The list of efforts does not include  working groups, meetings, conferences, detection metrics, standards,  policies, training, or staff actions.
The Navy and the Air Force each have their own Active Radio Frequency Identification (aRFID)  Migration Program. These two programs are included with the aRFID Program and the aRFID  Infrastructure, respectively and are therefore not listed in the table.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kimberly Seay, Assistant  Director; LaToya King; Joanne Landesman; Lisa McMillen; Connie  Sawyer, Jr.; Michael Silver; Amie Steele; and Michael Willems made key  contributions to this report.