Long-Term Fiscal Challenge: Additional Transparency and Controls Are Needed
Published: 2007-07-25T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony relates to the broader question: How should we deal with our nation's long-term fiscal challenge in order to help ensure that our future is better than our past? This testimony will start with our longer-term fiscal challenge. Then it will turn to the process question you present at this hearing: the reimposition of a statutory PAYGO rule(s) as a step toward dealing with this challenge. Finally it will talk about moving beyond caps and PAYGO to some ideas on how improved transparency and process changes can help in the effort to put us on a more prudent and sustainable long-term fiscal path. As widely reported earlier this month, the Administration now expects the deficit for fiscal year 2007 to be $205 billion, down from its February estimate of $244 billion and last year's deficit of $248 billion. However, because these numbers include the Social Security surpluses, they mask what GAO likes to call the "operating deficit" now estimated to be $385 billion for fiscal year 2007. Clearly lower short-term deficits are better than higher short-term deficits. However, our real challenge is not short-term deficits, rather it's the long-term structural deficits and related debt burdens that could swamp our ship of state if we do not get serious soon. Specifically, while our near-term fiscal picture is better, our long-term fiscal outlook is not. Health care costs are still growing faster than the economy and the population is still aging. Indeed, what we call the long-term fiscal challenge is not in the distant future. The first of the baby boomers become eligible for early retirement under Social Security on January 1, 2008--less than 1 year from now-- and for Medicare benefits in 2011--just 3 years later. The budget and economic implications of the baby boom generation's retirement have already become a factor in Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) 10-year baseline projections and will only intensify as the baby boomers age. Simply put, our nation is on an imprudent and unsustainable long-term fiscal path that is getting worse with the passage of time. Herbert Stein once said that something that is not sustainable will stop. That, however, should not give us comfort. Clearly, it is more prudent to change the path than to wait until a crisis occurs. While restraint in the near term and efforts to balance the budget over the next 5 years can be positive, they are not enough. It is also important that we take steps to address our longer-term fiscal imbalance. The real problem is not the nearterm deficit--it is the long-term fiscal outlook. It is important to look beyond year 5 or even year 10. Both the budget and the budget process need more transparency over and focus on the long-term implications of current and proposed spending and tax policies. GAO will suggest a number of things that it believes will help in this area in this testimony. These remarks are based on our previous work on a variety of issues, including reports and testimonies on our nation's long-term fiscal challenges and budget process reform. These efforts were conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Long-term fiscal simulations by GAO, CBO, and others all show that despite some modest improvement in near-term deficits, we face large and growing structural deficits driven primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. In fact, the long-term fiscal challenge is largely a health care challenge. Although Social Security is important because of its size, the real driver is health care spending. It is both large and projected to grow more rapidly in the future. GAO's current long-term simulations show ever-larger deficits resulting in a federal debt burden that ultimately spirals out of control. Although the timing of deficits and the resulting debt build up varies depending on the assumptions used, both simulations show that we are on an unsustainable fiscal path. The bottom line is that the nation's longer-term fiscal outlook is daunting under any realistic policy scenario or assumptions. Continuing on this unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. Our current path also increasingly will constrain our ability to address emerging and unexpected budgetary needs and increase the burdens that will be faced by future generations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate being invited to testify today as you consider the restoration  of a statutory pay-as-you go rule(s), or PAYGO. As this Committee knows  as well or better than any, this discussion is part of the broader question:  How should we deal with our nation’s long-term fiscal challenge in order  to help ensure that our future is better than our past?
In my testimony today, I will start with our longer-term fiscal challenge.  Then I will turn to the process question you present at this hearing: the  reimposition of a statutory PAYGO rule(s) as a step toward dealing with  this challenge. Finally I will talk about moving beyond caps and PAYGO to  some ideas on how improved transparency and process changes can help  in the effort to put us on a more prudent and sustainable long-term fiscal  path.
As widely reported earlier this month, the Administration now expects the  deficit for fiscal year 2007 to be $205 billion, down from its February  estimate of $244 billion and last year’s deficit of $248 billion. However,  because these numbers include the Social Security surpluses, they mask  what I like to call the “operating deficit” now estimated to be $385 billion  for fiscal year 2007. Clearly lower short-term deficits are better than higher  short-term deficits. However, our real challenge is not short-term deficits,  rather it’s the long-term structural deficits and related debt burdens that  could swamp our ship of state if we do not get serious soon. Specifically,  while our near-term fiscal picture is better, our long-term fiscal outlook is  not. Health care costs are still growing faster than the economy and the  population is still aging. Indeed, what we call the long-term fiscal  challenge is not in the distant future. The first of the baby boomers  become eligible for early retirement under Social Security on January 1,  2008—less than 1 year from now— and for Medicare benefits in 2011—just  3 years later. The budget and economic implications of the baby boom  generation’s retirement have already become a factor in Congressional  Budget Office’s (CBO) 10-year baseline projections and will only intensify  as the baby boomers age. Simply put, our nation is on an imprudent and  unsustainable long-term fiscal path that is getting worse with the passage  of time.
Herbert Stein once said that something that is not sustainable will stop.  That, however, should not give us comfort. Clearly, it is more prudent to  change the path than to wait until a crisis occurs. While restraint in the  near term and efforts to balance the budget over the next 5 years can be  positive, they are not enough. It is also important that we take steps to  address our longer-term fiscal imbalance. The real problem is not the near- term deficit—it is the long-term fiscal outlook. It is important to look  beyond year 5 or even year 10. Both the budget and the budget process  need more transparency over and focus on the long-term implications of  current and proposed spending and tax policies. I will suggest a number of  things that I believe will help in this area in this testimony.
My remarks are based on our previous work on a variety of issues,  including reports and testimonies on our nation’s long-term fiscal  challenges and budget process reform. These efforts were conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: The Nation’s Long- Term Fiscal Challenge
paragraphs: Long-term fiscal simulations by GAO, CBO, and others all show that  despite some modest improvement in near-term deficits, we face large and  growing structural deficits driven primarily by rising health care costs and  known demographic trends. In fact, the long-term fiscal challenge is  largely a health care challenge. Although Social Security is important  because of its size, the real driver is health care spending. It is both large  and projected to grow more rapidly in the future.
GAO’s current long-term simulations show ever-larger deficits resulting in  a federal debt burden that ultimately spirals out of control. Figure 1 shows  two alternative fiscal paths. The first is “Baseline extended,” which  extends the CBO’s baseline estimates beyond the 10-year projection  period, and the second is an alternative based on recent trends and policy  preferences. Our alternative scenario assumes action to return to and  remain at historical levels of revenue and reflects somewhat higher  discretionary spending and more realistic Medicare estimates for  physician payments than does the baseline extended scenario. Although  the timing of deficits and the resulting debt build up varies depending on  the assumptions used, both simulations show that we are on an  unsustainable fiscal path.
The bottom line is that the nation’s longer-term fiscal outlook is daunting  under any realistic policy scenario or assumptions. Continuing on this  unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our  economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. Our  current path also increasingly will constrain our ability to address  emerging and unexpected budgetary needs and increase the burdens that  will be faced by future generations.
As I noted earlier, despite some recent improvements in short-term  deficits, the long-term outlook is moving in the wrong direction. Figures 2  and 3 illustrate just how much worse the situation has become. Both  figures show the potential fiscal outcome under our “Baseline extended”  scenario. Figure 2 shows the fiscal outlook in 2001 and figure 3 shows the  outlook now. The contrast is dramatic. Even with the surpluses of 2001,  we had a long-term problem, but it was more than 40 years out. Although  an economic slowdown and decisions driven by the attacks of 9/11 and the  need to respond to natural disasters have contributed to the change in  outlook, they do not account for the dramatic worsening in the long-term  outlook since 2001. Subsequent tax cuts and the passage of the Medicare  prescription drug benefit in 2003 were major factors.
Figure 3 illustrates today’s cold hard truth: that neither slowing the growth  in discretionary spending nor allowing the tax provisions to expire—nor  both together—would eliminate the longer-term imbalance. This is even  clearer under our alternative scenario based on recent trends and policy  preferences (see fig. 4). Growth in the major entitlement programs— primarily health spending—results in an unsustainable fiscal future  regardless of whether one assumes future revenue will be somewhat  above historical levels as a share of the economy as in the first simulation  (fig. 3) or at historical levels as shown in figure 4.
Rapidly rising health care costs are not simply a federal budget problem;  they are our nation’s number one fiscal challenge. Just last week, GAO  released the results of our latest fiscal modeling efforts showing that state  and local governments—absent policy changes—will also face large and  growing fiscal challenges beginning within the next few years. As is true  for the federal budget, growth in health-related spending—Medicaid and  health insurance for state and local employees and retirees—is the  primary driver of the fiscal challenges facing the state and local  governments. In short, the fundamental fiscal challenges of all levels of  government are similar and linked. Further, escalating health care costs  are also a major competitiveness challenge for American businesses and a  growing challenge for many Americans. As such, solutions to address  these challenges should be considered in a strategic and integrated  manner.
The longer-term fiscal challenge we face is not solely a federal one—it is a  national one. Figure 5 shows both the federal fiscal path and the fiscal  path for the whole of government.
section_title: Mandatory Spending Programs Drive the Long-term Fiscal Outlook
paragraphs: There often seems to be an imbalance between the focus of press coverage  and public debate and what drives the longer-term outlook. Reporting and  debate are often focused on what the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA)  called discretionary—the one-third of the budget that goes through the  annual appropriation process: Is funding for specific programs being cut  or increased? Is “too much” or “too little” being spent in a given area?   I would be the last person to say this isn’t important. Much of what the  American people think of as government is contained in that part of the  budget. Further, as I have said before, I believe that reexamining “the  base” is something that should be done periodically regardless of fiscal  condition—all of us have a stewardship obligation over taxpayer funds.  We have programs still in existence today that were designed 20 or more  years ago—and the world has changed. However, I would suggest that as  constraints on discretionary spending continue to tighten, the need to  reexamine existing programs and activities becomes greater.
Certainly controlling discretionary spending is important, but—as  everyone in this room knows even with the large costs associated with the  “Global War on Terrorism” and Iraq—discretionary spending is not the  part of the budget that drives the long-term fiscal imbalance. As figure 6  shows, mandatory programmatic spending—that is mandatory spending  excluding interest—has grown from 27 percent of the federal budget in  1965—the year Medicare was created—to 42 percent in 1985 to 53 percent  last year. Total mandatory spending including net interest—has grown  from 34 percent in 1965 to 62 percent last year. Both the CBO baseline  estimates and the President’s Budget proposal show this spending growing  even further.
This growth—in particular rising health care spending—will have  significant implications not only for the budget, but also for the economy  as a whole. Figure 7 shows the total future draw on the economy  represented by Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Under the 2007  Trustees’ intermediate estimates and CBO’s 2005 midrange Medicaid  estimates, spending for these entitlement programs combined will grow to  over 15 percent of GDP in 2030 from today’s 8.9 percent. Taken together, it  is clear that Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid represent an  unsustainable burden on the federal budget, our economy, and future  generations. Ultimately, the nation will have to decide what level of  benefits and spending it wants and how it will pay for these benefits.
Although these three programs dominate the long-term outlook, they are  not the only federal programs or activities that bind the future. The federal  government undertakes a wide range of responsibilities, programs, and  activities that may either obligate the government to future spending or  create an expectation for such spending. Part of what we owe the future is  leaving enough flexibility to meet whatever challenges arise. So beyond  dealing with the “big 3,” we need to look at other policies that limit that  flexibility—not to eliminate all of them but to at least be aware of them  and make a conscious decision to reform them in a manner that will be  responsible, equitable, and sustainable. GAO has described the range and  measurement of such fiscal exposures—from explicit liabilities such as  environmental cleanup requirements to the more implicit obligations  presented by life-cycle costs of capital acquisition or disaster assistance.
Last year the U.S. government’s major reported liabilities, social insurance  commitments, and other fiscal exposures continued to grow. They now  total approximately $50 trillion—about four times the nation’s total output  (GDP) in fiscal year 2006—up from about $20 trillion, or two times GDP in  fiscal year 2000. Absent meaningful reforms, these amounts will continue  to grow every second of every minute of every day due to continuing  deficits, known demographic trends and compounding interest costs.  While it is hard to make sense of what “trillions” means, one way to think  of these numbers is that if we wanted to put aside today enough to cover  these promises, it would take $170,000 for each and every American,  including newborns, or approximately $440,000 per American household.  Considering that median household income is about $46,000, the  household burden is about 9.5 times median income.
Just two weeks ago the Office of Management and Budget released its mid- session budget update—showing further improvement in this year’s  budget deficit. This “good news,” however, did not signal any improvement  in the long-term outlook. The problem isn’t this year’s deficit—or even the  deficit in 2012. The problem is that we are on an imprudent and  unsustainable path.
section_title: Budget Controls Step 1: Stop Digging
paragraphs: When I appeared before this Committee in January I noted that I have  previously urged a restitution of the statutory budget controls—including  meaningful caps on discretionary spending and PAYGO on both the tax  and spending sides of the ledger. Given the focus of this hearing, let me  elaborate.
BEA—of which PAYGO was a part—had a number of strengths its  predecessor, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, lacked. Consistent with good  practice in designing incentives, it focused on what Congress and the  administration could control—spending and tax decisions—rather than on  outcomes driven by external changes. In addition, enforcement was  targeted—further encouraging compliance with the discretionary caps and  PAYGO rules. There is broad consensus among observers and analysts  who focus on the budget that the controls contained in the Budget  Enforcement Act constrained spending for much of the 1990s. However,  since the BEA was focused on deficit reduction, its effectiveness  deteriorated with the achievement of near-term surpluses. Although the  BEA statutory PAYGO rules were extended twice, they expired in 2002.
Earlier this year, both the Senate and the House adopted rules reinstating  PAYGO discipline on both sides of the ledger. Then why should we  consider restoration of statutory PAYGO? The obvious answer ties to  enforcement and duration: it may be easier to waive a rule than ignore a  law, and a law can carry a penalty designed to encourage compliance. I  will defer to Director Orszag and some of the technical experts on the next  panel as to the details of how any sequester or enforcement mechanism  should be designed. However, I will note that it should be unpleasant  enough to encourage compliance but not so draconian as to be  implausible. The goal of any penalty should be to encourage compliance,  not to encourage avoidance or merely impose the penalty.
As I have said before, when you are in a hole, the first thing to do is stop  digging. Discretionary caps and PAYGO are designed to stop the digging.  There are two reasons to impose PAYGO on both the direct spending and  the revenue side of the budget. The first is obvious—both affect the  bottom line. The second—and perhaps as important—is that applying  PAYGO only to spending is likely to lead to more programs being designed  as tax preferences. Tax preferences are like a form of back door spending.  As a result, they need to be subject to additional transparency and controls  as well. We have previously reported on these tax expenditures, which are  often aimed at policy goals similar to those of federal spending programs.  Revenues forgone through tax expenditures—unless offset by increased  taxes or lower spending—increase the unified budget deficit and federal  borrowing from the public (or reduce the unified budget surplus available  to reduce debt held by the public). Unlike discretionary spending  programs, which are subject to periodic reauthorization and annual  appropriation, tax expenditures are—like entitlement programs— permanent law and generally not subject to a recurring legislative process  that would ensure systematic annual or periodic review. BEA’s statutory  PAYGO regime applied to both mandatory spending and revenues—and so  limited the ability to create or expand either spending entitlements or tax  expenditures unless offsetting funds could be raised. Since tax provisions  are not as visible in the budget as spending programs, there is already  some incentive to use tax provisions rather than spending programs to  accomplish programmatic ends; imposing controls on spending programs  but not on tax provisions would only increase this incentive. It would be  an unfortunate consequence if the restoration of the PAYGO rule were to  lead to an increase in the portion of the budget on automatic pilot and  therefore reduce both transparency and control.
section_title: Moving Beyond PAYGO: Process and Presentational Changes to Increase Transparency and Focus on Long-Term Consequences
paragraphs: The PAYGO requirement prevented legislation that lowered revenue,  created new mandatory programs, or otherwise increased direct spending  from increasing the deficit unless offset by other legislative actions. While  PAYGO constrained the creation or legislative expansion of direct  spending programs and tax cuts, it accepted the existing provisions of law  as given. It was not designed to trigger—and it did not trigger—any  examination of “the base.” Furthermore, cost increases in existing  mandatory programs were exempt from control under PAYGO and could  be ignored. However, constraining legislative actions that increase the cost  of entitlements, mandatories, and tax expenditures is not enough. Looking  ahead, the budget process will need to go beyond limiting expansions.  Existing programs cannot be permitted to be on autopilot and grow to an  unlimited extent. Since the spending for any given entitlement or other  mandatory program is a function of the interaction between eligibility  rules and the benefit formula—either or both of which may incorporate  exogenous factors such as economic downturns—the way to change the  path of spending for any of these programs is to change their rules or  formulas. In January of last year, we issued a report on “triggers”—some  measure that when reached or exceeded, would prompt a response  connected to that program. By identifying significant increases in the  spending path of a mandatory program relatively early and acting to  constrain it, Congress may avert much larger and potentially disruptive  financial challenges and program changes in the future. A similar approach  could be applied to those tax expenditures that operate in many ways like  mandatory spending programs. Some years ago, Mr. Chairman, you had  suggested a kind of “look back” trigger—a requirement that the President  and the Congress monitor the path of existing entitlements and make an  explicit determination about whether to accept growing costs or to take  action to change the path.
I know it comes as no surprise to anyone in this room that I believe we  need to increase the understanding of and focus on the longer term in our  policy and budget debates. When I was here in January I spoke about  some ideas I had been discussing with a number of Members of the House  and Senate as well as other interested and concerned citizens and groups.  Since then—at the request of some Members—I have had those ideas put  into legislative language as a basis for discussion. Today I’d like to  elaborate a little on some of those ideas. They fall into three broad  categories: increased information and reporting by the executive branch— both in the President’s budget proposal and in other statements for the  public; more information for the Congress, and an annual GAO report.   I will discuss each in turn. A summary of the proposal appears in   appendix I.
I. Executive Branch Reporting & Information  A. Increased Information in the President’s Budget Proposals    Annual Report on Fiscal Exposures: The transparency of  existing commitments would be improved by requiring OMB to  report annually on existing fiscal exposures—including a concise  list, description and cost information. As I noted before, these  exposures range from explicit liabilities to implicit promises  embedded in the structure of current programs. This should be  provided as supplementary information in the President’s budget  along with information on the long-term costs of major tax  expenditures. As appropriate and possible, showing tax  expenditures, related spending programs and related credit  programs that address the same policy area would facilitate  oversight and reexamination by the Congress.
Information over a longer time horizon: (1) The President’s  budget should include an estimate of the impact of any major  spending or tax proposals on these fiscal exposures and on the  long-term fiscal outlook; (2) The budget should provide year-by-year  data for 10 fiscal years rather than the current 5; and (3) The  President’s budget should include a statement of his budgetary  goals for the next decade.
B. Executive Branch Reporting and Information—Summary Annual  Report and Statement of Fiscal Sustainability    Summary Annual Report: One of the things I am proudest of from  my tenure as a public trustee for Social Security and Medicare is the  creation of a Summary Report to accompany the annual Trustees  report. This summary report presents key information in a way  more accessible to the press and lay reader. I believe it has  contributed to improved understanding about the condition of these  programs. As the Comptroller General I sign the audit report on the  Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government (CFS).  Despite the fact that we must disclaim our opinion on the  statements I believe they contain important information. The report  is, however, too thick and very hard to read. I believe the  Department of the Treasury (Treasury) should publish a summary  financial report derived from the information in the audited CFS  and the Comptroller General’s audit report on it within 15 days of  the issuance of that audit report.
Every four years the Treasury should do more—it should prepare  and publish a fiscal sustainability report including information and  an assessment of the long-term fiscal sustainability of our current  spending and revenue path. A number of other Organization for  Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have  begun to do fiscal sustainability reports as a way of looking ahead.  Such a report permits the public and policymakers to look at the full  range of government commitments rather than focusing only on  new proposals.
II. Additional Information for the Congress  If Congress is to balance short-term claims and long-term costs it  must have information about the long-term cost implications of  proposals that would result in a significant increase or decrease in  revenues or spending. I recognize that estimates over a multi- decade period cannot be as precise as short-term estimates and that  some programs are harder to cost out than Social Security.  However, information about the path should be made available.   For example, do costs double every decade?
As the independent auditor of the federal government’s  Consolidated Financial Statements and an agency of the legislative  branch without a day-to-day responsibility in the budget process,   I believe GAO is in an excellent position to pull together periodic  financial and fiscal information in a summary report similar to the  fiscal stewardship report I issued January 31 of this year. If  Congress does impose additional transparency requirements on the  Executive Branch, then we are in a good position to look over how  those requirements were implemented and to suggest what changes,  if any, might be made.
section_title: Meeting the Long- Term Fiscal Challenge Requires Truth, Transparency, Cooperation and Compromise—and Action Should not be Delayed Further
paragraphs: I think we all know that there is no easy way out of the large and growing  longer-term fiscal challenge we face. Economic growth is essential, but we  cannot grow our way out of the problem. Based on reasonable  assumptions the math does not come close to working. I have said that the  first thing to do is stop digging—and the restoration of credible  discretionary caps and PAYGO on both the spending and tax side of the  ledger can help with that. Important as they are, however, they are not  enough.
Fundamental reform of existing entitlement programs will be necessary to  change the path of those programs. The fact that the long-term outlook is  driven primarily by health care costs does not mean that the rest of the  budget should be exempt from scrutiny. We have the opportunity to bring  our government and its programs in line with 21st century realities. Those  who believe we can solve this problem solely by cutting spending or  raising taxes are not being realistic. The truth is we will also need to  reform entitlement programs, re-prioritize and re-engineer other direct  spending programs, and engage in comprehensive tax reform that  generates additional revenue as a percent of the economy (compared to  current and historical levels) in order to get the job done.
section_title: Concluding Remarks
paragraphs: I have long believed that the American people can accept difficult  decisions as long as they understand why such choices are necessary.  They need to be given the facts about the fiscal outlook: what it is, what  drives it, and what it will take to address it. As most of you know, I have  been investing a good deal of time in the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour (FWUT) led  by the Concord Coalition. Scholars from both the Brookings Institution  and the Heritage Foundation join with me and key Concord officials in  laying out the facts and discussing the possible ways forward. In our  experience, having these people with quite different policy views agree on  the nature, scale and importance of the issue—and on the need to sit down  and work together to develop a multi-dimensional solution to our longer- term fiscal challenge—resonates with the audiences.
The specific policy choices made to address this fiscal challenge are the  purview of elected officials. The policy debate will reflect differing views  of the role of government and differing priorities for our country. What the  FWUT can do—and what I will continue to do—is lay out the facts,  debunk various myths, discuss possible options and prepare the way for  tough choices by elected officials. If the American people understand that  there is no magic bullet—if they understand that    we cannot grow our way out this problem;    eliminating earmarks will not solve the problem;    wiping out fraud, waste and abuse will not solve the problem;    ending the “Global War on Terrorism”, exiting from Iraq, or cutting  way back on defense will not solve the problem; and  letting the recent tax cuts expire will not solve this problem;  then they can engage with you in a discussion about what government  should do; how it should do it; and how we should pay for it without  unduly mortgaging the future of our country, children, and grandchildren.  This is a great nation, probably the greatest in history. We have faced  many challenges in the past and we have met them. It is a mistake to  underestimate the commitment of the American people to their country,  children, and grandchildren; to underestimate their willingness and ability  to hear the truth and support the decisions necessary to deal with this  challenge. We owe it to our country, children and grandchildren to address  our fiscal and other key sustainability challenges. The clock is ticking and  time is working against us. The time for action is now.
Chairman Spratt, Mr. Ryan, Members of the Committee, let me repeat my  appreciation for your commitment and concern in this matter. We at GAO  stand ready to assist you in this important effort.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: My remarks are based largely on previous reports and testimonies, such as  Long-Term Budget Outlook: Deficits Matter—Saving Our Future Requires  Tough Choices Today (GAO-07-389T) and Budget Process: Better  Transparency, Controls, Triggers, and Default Mechanisms Would Help to  Address Our Large and Growing Long-term Fiscal Challenge (GAO-06- 761T). We updated these testimonies with the results from our most recent  long-term simulations in The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: April  2007 Update (GAO-07-983R).
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. For further  information on this testimony, please contact Susan J. Irving at   (202) 512-9142 or irvings@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions  to this testimony include Jay McTigue, Assistant Director; Matthew  Mohning, Senior Analyst and Melissa Wolf, Senior Analyst.
section_title: Appendix I: Transparency in Accounting and Budgeting: Legislative Recommendations of the Comptroller General
subsections: section_title: Supplemental Reporting in the President’s Annual Budget Submission
section_title: Summary Financial Report for the General Public
section_title: Statement of Fiscal Sustainability
section_title: Additional Cost Information on Legislative Proposals before Adoption
section_title: GAO Report on the Financial Condition of the U.S. Government
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