Chief Acquisition Officers: Appointments Generally Conform to Legislative Requirements, but Agencies Need to Clearly Define Roles and Responsibilities
Published: 2012-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Federal agencies spent more than half a trillion dollars in fiscal year 2011 through contracts to acquire goods and services in support of their missions, but have historically faced significant acquisition management challenges preventing them from getting the best return on their investments. The SARA legislation requires 16 federal civilian agencies to appoint a Chief Acquisition Officer to advise and assist agency leadership to help ensure that the agencys mission is achieved through the management of its acquisition activities. GAO was asked to examine: (1) how agencies have filled the CAO position; (2) the extent to which CAOs are involved in performing the acquisition management functions set forth in the SARA legislation and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance; and (3) what challenges, if any, agency CAOs report in fulfilling their responsibilities. GAO administered a questionnaire to 16 CAOs, reviewed documentation on CAOs roles and responsibilities, organizational placement, and backgrounds, and interviewed a number of CAOs and other acquisition officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Most agencies have appointed Chief Acquisition Officers (CAO) in accordancewith two of the three key requirements in the Services Acquisition Reform Act of2003 (SARA): that the CAOs be political appointees and have agency SeniorProcurement Executives report directly to them. However, few CAOs haveacquisition management as their primary duty; other areas of responsibilityincluded financial, information, and human capital management.
Several CAOs noted that their additional responsibilities were not a detriment. Rather, they believe that performing multiple roles helps them positively influence acquisition management across their agencies. For example, the CAO at the Department of Commerce stated that his additional responsibilities gave him the ability to integrate planning, budgeting, risk management, human resources, and acquisition to achieve the agencys mission.
CAOs reported varying levels of involvement in the acquisition management functions for which they are responsible. Generally, CAOs see their role as providing high-level oversight of the acquisition function as opposed to day-today management, which they typically delegated to the Senior Procurement Executive or other officials as permitted by the legislation. Many CAOs said that the amount of their involvement is related to several factors, such as the nature of goods and services that the agency buys and whether the agency has a centralized or decentralized acquisition function.
Having clearly defined roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the acquisition process is a key element of an effective acquisition function. Yet at many agencies, the statutory roles and responsibilities of the CAO position are not described in detail in acquisition regulations, policies, or other documentation. These agencies may be missing an opportunity to fully institutionalize the CAO position within their senior leadership structures.
CAOs at the 16 agencies generally did not report facing significant challenges related to the CAO position, such as the level of influence they have in their agencys acquisition process, amount of control over acquisition budget resources, and access to agency leadership. Consistent with our prior work on the acquisition workforce, however, most CAOs reported that not having enough staff to manage acquisitions was moderately to extremely challenging.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Administrator of OMBs Office of Federal Procurement Policy work with the CAO Council to issue guidance directing agencies to more clearly define CAOs roles and responsibilities. The Administrator agreed with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2011, federal agencies collectively spent more than half a  trillion dollars through contracts to acquire goods and services in support  of their missions. With the United States facing increasing fiscal  pressures, there is a need to ensure that federal agencies make the most  efficient and effective use of their resources. However, agencies have  historically faced significant acquisition management challenges that have  prevented them from getting the best return on their investments in goods  and services. To address these challenges, agencies must establish a  strong foundation for an effective, efficient and accountable acquisition  process, which includes proper organizational alignment and committed  agency leadership. To this end, the Services Acquisition Reform Act of  2003 (SARA) requires 16 federal civilian agencies to establish the  position of a Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO) to advise and assist agency  leadership to help ensure that the agency’s mission is achieved through  the management of its acquisition activities.
You asked that we review the implementation of the CAO position at  federal agencies. In response, we examined: (1) how agencies have filled  the CAO position; (2) the extent to which CAOs are involved in performing  the acquisition management functions set forth in the SARA legislation  and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and (3) what  challenges, if any, agency CAOs report in fulfilling their responsibilities.  To address these objectives, we analyzed the SARA legislation and  directives from OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to  identify the key roles and responsibilities of the CAO position. We then  administered a questionnaire by e-mail to the 16 civilian agencies within  the scope of our review. The questionnaire requested information on,  among other things, the CAOs’ organizational reporting relationships,  tenure, involvement in acquisition management functions within the  agency, and challenges experienced in fulfilling their CAO responsibilities.  We received responses from all 16 agencies, though not all agencies  provided responses to each question. We also collected and reviewed  agency organizational charts, acquisition regulations and guidance,  applicable policies and delegation orders, as well as biographical  information, to identify the organizational placement, roles and  responsibilities, and professional background of the CAO position within  the agency. Finally, we conducted follow-up interviews to discuss the  CAO’s roles and responsibilities with CAOs and acquisition officials at  seven agencies: Energy, the General Services Administration (GSA),  Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Interior,  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics  and Space Administration (NASA). We selected a nongeneralizable  sample of agencies for follow-up interviews based upon the following  criteria: review of the questionnaire responses, the agency’s procurement  obligations in fiscal year 2010, and whether the agency’s Inspector  General had identified acquisition-related issues as a major management  challenge. Our review did not assess the effectiveness of individual CAOs  or individual agencies’ acquisition functions. A more complete description  of our objectives, scope, and methodology is provided in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 to July 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Chief Acquisition Officers provide a focal point for acquisition in agency  operations. The SARA legislation requires that CAOs: be noncareer employees; have acquisition management as their primary duty; and have the agency’s Senior Procurement Executive (SPE) report  directly to them without intervening authority, or serve as both CAO  and SPE.
The SARA legislation outlined seven acquisition management functions  CAOs are expected to perform within their agencies. Subsequent to the  enactment of SARA, governmentwide directives and guidance have  assigned CAOs responsibility for additional functions, such as internal  control reviews of the acquisition function under OMB Circular A-123 and  ensuring the quality of federal procurement data. The key functions of the  CAO we reviewed are listed below; additional information on these  functions is also available in appendix II: monitoring and evaluating agency acquisition activities; increasing the use of full and open competition; increasing performance-based contracting; making acquisition decisions; managing agency acquisition policy; acquisition career management; acquisition resources planning; and conducting acquisition assessments under OMB Circular A-123.
The SARA legislation also established a Chief Acquisition Officers  Council that is chaired by OMB’s Deputy Director for Management, and  whose activities are led by the OFPP Administrator.principal interagency forum for monitoring and improving the federal  acquisition system. Its activities include developing recommendations for  the Director of OMB on acquisition policies and requirements; sharing  best practices; and helping to address the hiring, training, and  professional development needs of the acquisition workforce.
Our prior work has emphasized the need for strong, effective leadership  and the appropriate placement of the acquisition function within agencies  among many key factors needed in order to facilitate efficient, effective,  and accountable acquisition processes. Clear, strong, and ethical  executive leadership, including a CAO, is key to obtaining and  maintaining organizational support for executing the acquisition function. Most of the agencies required to appoint a CAO spend a substantial  amount of funding each year through contracts to acquire goods and  services in support of their missions, as shown below in table 1. Yet,  acquisition management challenges persist among many of these  agencies. Among the 16 agencies, 11 had acquisition-related issues  identified as a major management challenge by their respective Inspector  General (IG) in its most recent report on agency management challenges.  Additionally, our high-risk list includes a number of areas related to  acquisition management.
GAO, Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies,  GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2005).
section_title: Agencies Have Established CAOs as a Focal Point for Acquisition, but Most Have Other Management Responsibilities and Short Tenures
paragraphs: The agencies within the scope of our review generally have established  CAOs in a way that satisfies two of three key aspects of the legislation.  The CAOs in place at these agencies are generally political appointees  situated at top levels in their organization, and at most agencies, the  Senior Procurement Executive reports directly to the CAO. However, very  few agency CAOs have acquisition management as their primary duty,  the third key requirement of the SARA legislation. Most of these CAOs  have other significant management responsibilities within their agencies,  such as serving as the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Additionally, some  CAOs and acquisition officials said it was a challenge in determining how  to fill the position within their agency, because the SARA legislation did  not provide an additional leadership slot specifically for the CAO position.  Tenure in the CAO position also has been relatively short, as the average  CAO tenure was about 2 years, and several agencies have had frequent  turnover in CAOs.
subsections: section_title: CAOs Generally Appointed in Accordance with Requirements, but Few Have Acquisition Management as Their Primary Duty
paragraphs: As shown below in figure 1, most agency CAOs are political appointees  and have the Senior Procurement Executives report directly to them, but  few have acquisition management as their primary duty.
Twelve of the 16 agencies had a permanent CAO in place at the time  we administered our questionnaire. Three agencies (Education,  Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Department of Housing and  Urban Development (HUD)) had an acting CAO, and the position was  vacant at Energy, which is currently relying on the Senior  Procurement Executive as its lead acquisition official. All 12  permanent CAOs were political appointees, and 1 of the 3 acting  CAOs was a political appointee.
At 13 agencies, the Senior Procurement Executive reports directly to  the Chief Acquisition Officer without intervening authority. The Senior  Procurement Executive does not report directly to the CAO at 2  agencies—HHS and NASA. Officials at these agencies told us there is  an informal reporting relationship between the two positions. HHS  also noted that despite the indirect organizational relationship  between the two positions, the CAO and Senior Procurement  Executive communicate frequently on the department’s acquisition  policies, priorities, and programs.
Only 3 of the CAOs in place during our review (DHS, GSA, and VA)  reported that acquisition management was their primary duty, another  requirement of the SARA legislation. When asked to estimate the  amount of time spent on their CAO duties relative to their other  responsibilities, the average among the 14 agencies that provided a  response was about 27 percent. Furthermore, only 3 of the 12  permanent CAOs in place during our review had prior experience in  acquisition or procurement prior to serving as CAO. Although SARA  does not require the CAO to have a background in acquisition, this is  one of many factors that could affect the CAO’s success in the  position.
As shown below in table 2, almost all of the CAOs in our review had  additional management responsibilities and few had an official title of  Chief Acquisition Officer. For example, at the Departments of State,  Agriculture, and Commerce, the Assistant Secretary for Administration  serves as the CAO. These officials’ additional areas of responsibility,  among other things, include financial management, information  management, equal employment opportunity, and emergency  preparedness.
Although acquisition management is supposed to be a CAO’s primary  duty, several CAOs we met with told us that having responsibility for  additional management functions was not a detriment and often helped  them positively influence acquisition management across their agency:
At half of the 16 agencies, the Chief Acquisition Officer also serves in  at least one additional “Chief” officer position. Similar to the SARA  legislation, the legislation that created the Chief Human Capital Officer  (CHCO) and Chief Information Officer (CIO) positions required that  those respective functions be the primary duty of each position. We  have raised concerns in prior work about those positions having  additional significant responsibilities and whether an individual serving  in these positions can deal effectively with an agency’s management  challenges. Although this could be a concern with respect to CAOs  who do not have acquisition management as their primary duty, the  Office of Federal Procurement Policy noted that an agency’s Senior  Procurement Executive provides high-level attention to the  management of the acquisition function.
Some CAOs and acquisition officials also pointed out that the SARA  legislation did not provide agencies an additional position specifically  for the CAO, which created a challenge for agencies to determine how  to fill the CAO position. For example, the NASA CAO noted in her  questionnaire response that the agency has a low allocation of  politically appointed positions. As a result, NASA gave the CAO duties  to the CFO. NASA’s CAO stated that because the agency spends  such a large amount of its budget through obligations on contracts,  her role as the CFO is closely connected with her additional role as  the CAO to effectively conduct acquisition management at NASA.  Furthermore, the NASA CAO thought that having these two functions  integrated was a positive aspect of her current position and helped  her be an effective CAO, as opposed to having acquisition operate in  a separate stovepipe.
The CAO at Commerce emphasized the positive aspects of the  agency’s organizational structure and approach to implementation of  the CAO position. At Commerce, one individual serves in a number of  roles that includes the CFO, CHCO, and Chief Performance Officer as  well as the CAO. The CAO noted that this structure gave him the  ability to integrate planning, budgeting, risk management, human  resources, as well as acquisition to achieve the agency’s mission. As  the individual who ties these functional areas together, he indicated  he has the authority to get other groups within Commerce to work  together. The Commerce CAO also stated that while he oversees the  department’s budget as the CFO, he uses his CAO role to look at  whether components have demonstrated a sound acquisition  management approach in evaluating their budget requests. He also  stated that if he were only the agency CAO he would not have as  much authority in other functional areas to effectively manage the  agency’s acquisition function.
Likewise, the CAO at DHS said that he has oversight of many  different management functions such as finance, budgeting, human  resources, as well as acquisition. While this arrangement may appear  to be in conflict with the statutory requirement that acquisition  management be the CAO’s primary duty, he stated that having a  larger area of responsibility gives him a fuller view of the entire  acquisition cycle from requirements development and contract funding  to service delivery. As a result, he reports that he spends a majority of  his time on acquisition management issues because integrating the  different management functions has a positive impact on the CAO’s  ability to effectively manage acquisitions across DHS.
section_title: Almost All CAOs Are Positioned at Top Management Levels
paragraphs: While the SARA legislation does not specify where CAOs should be  located within their agency’s organization, as shown below in figure 2, we  found that almost all of the 16 CAOs were positioned at their agency’s top  management levels, reporting to either to the agency head or to an official  one level removed from the agency head. The CAO at Energy reports to  the Director of the Office of Management, who is more than one level  removed from the agency head.
The location of CAOs at high levels within their agencies may be by virtue  of their official titles described above in table 2 rather than being  specifically related to the CAO position. Nevertheless, several CAOs and  acquisition officials we met with stressed the value of the CAO position in  having access to agency leadership and other peers in ensuring that  acquisition issues are being considered at top levels within the agency.
Fourteen CAOs reported that they had at least sufficient access to  their agency head, and that the CAO position was appropriately  located for ensuring proper authority over their agency’s acquisition  activities.
Acquisition officials at the Department of Energy, where the CAO  position has been vacant for several years, and whose questionnaire  response noted that the CAO had neither sufficient nor insufficient  access to the agency head, said that it would have been helpful to  have a political appointee in the CAO role who could have high level  interactions with agency leadership, better communicate acquisition  related issues, and build effective working relationships with the CFO,  CIO, and other senior agency officials.
Additionally, acquisition officials with the Department of the Interior  noted that as a political appointee, the CAO can work closely with  other assistant secretaries in the department as well as with peers at  other agencies and OMB. They added that with the CAO placed at the  assistant secretary level, the position can be more focused on  strategic decisions, and can make final decisions on how resources  will be deployed to achieve goals.
Similarly, the HHS CAO said that by virtue of her position, she is able  to interact as a peer with the leaders of the agency’s operating  divisions and communicate the acquisition priorities of the agency and  administration. She added that being CAO affords her a “seat at the  table” to discuss acquisition issues when the agency is making  mission decisions.
section_title: CAO Position Usually Filled by Permanent Official, but Tenures Have Been Short
paragraphs: Twelve of the agencies have had a CAO serving in a permanent capacity  more than two-thirds of the time since enactment of SARA, as shown  below in figure 3. Education and VA have had a CAO serving in a  permanent capacity less than 50 percent of the time. The remaining  time the CAO position has been vacant or held by an official in an acting  capacity.
Despite most agencies’ ability to fill the position with a permanent  CAO, turnover in the CAO position varied among agencies, as  evidenced by the number of acting and permanent CAOs in place  since SARA’s enactment. Half of the agencies have had four or fewer  CAOs in place, while other agencies have had higher turnover in the  CAO position. For example, GSA and Treasury have each had nine  CAOs in place since creation of the CAO requirement. The high  turnover at GSA and Treasury equate to an average tenure for each  CAO of about 10 months at GSA and about 11 months at Treasury  since late 2003. In contrast, Commerce and HHS have had only two  CAOs over the same timeframe, with an average CAO tenure at each  agency of more than 3.5 years.
Since enactment of SARA, the average tenure of permanent CAOs  has been 2.1 years. This is fairly consistent with a recent GAO review  that found an average tenure of about 2.6 years for CIOs at 30 federal  departments and agencies.
While short tenures in the CAO position may be expected given the  political nature of the position, this may work against an individual CAO’s  ability to effectively implement needed changes in the acquisition function  or new acquisition initiatives:
Our prior work has noted that it can take 5 to 7 years to fully  implement major change initiatives in large public and private sector  organizations and to transform cultures in a sustainable manner, yet  frequent turnover of political leadership in the federal government can  make it difficult to obtain sustained attention to make needed  changes.
Among the 76 permanent and acting CAOs that have been in place  since the enactment of SARA, only 3 served in the position for 5 years  or more.
section_title: CAO Involvement in Acquisition Management Functions Varies
paragraphs: CAOs reported they have differing levels of involvement in the  management of their agency’s acquisition activities. For example, most  CAOs indicated they were extremely or very involved in managing  acquisition policy, but only somewhat or not at all involved in making  acquisition decisions or conducting acquisition assessments. Generally,  CAOs saw their role as providing high-level oversight of the acquisition  function as opposed to day-to-day management, for which they typically  relied on the Senior Procurement Executive and other senior procurement  officials. Many CAOs told us that the amount of their involvement is  related to several factors, such as the nature of goods and services that  the agency buys and the extent the agency has a centralized or  decentralized acquisition function. For example, in some agencies, CAOs  are less involved because agency units and bureaus operate more  autonomously with respect to acquisition management. Our review of  acquisition regulations and policies found that the roles and  responsibilities of the CAO position are not described in detail across all  the 16 agencies within the scope of our review. Without clearly defined  roles and responsibilities within each federal agency, it will be challenging  for these agencies to more permanently institutionalize the CAO position  within their organizational structure and realize the benefits from the  added attention it brings to acquisition management.
subsections: section_title: CAO Involvement in SARA Acquisition Management Functions Varied with Most CAOs Focused on High-Level Acquisition Oversight and Policy Management
paragraphs: The SARA legislation broadly outlined acquisition management functions  for CAOs and left it up to each agency how to implement them. Overall,  CAOs reported varying levels of involvement in the various acquisition  management functions we reviewed, as shown below in figure 4:
CAOs reported being most involved in managing the direction of  acquisition policy and least involved in two activities—making  acquisition decisions and conducting assessments of the acquisition  function under OMB Circular A-123.
Only three CAOs (Agriculture, Labor, and DHS) reported being  extremely or very involved in all eight acquisition management  functions.
In contrast, officials at four agencies (Education, Energy, HUD, and  State) who were either serving as the acting CAO, recently appointed  as the new permanent CAO, or serving as the senior procurement  official while the CAO position was vacant, reported being somewhat  or not at all involved in seven or more of the acquisition management  functions.
Many CAOs see their role as providing high-level acquisition oversight  rather than the day-to-day acquisition management that is more typically  provided by other career procurement officials such as the Senior  Procurement Executive and heads of contracting activities. As shown  below in figure 5, a majority of CAOs reported that they delegate day-to- day responsibility for all eight CAO acquisition management functions to  the Senior Procurement Executive and/or other senior procurement  officials such as heads of contracting activities and competition  advocates. The SARA legislation does not preclude CAOs from  delegating these functions, and it is not surprising that there is a high  degree of delegation given that CAOs have other significant management  responsibilities and few had extensive prior experience in acquisition  management.
Several CAOs we met with stated that they delegated acquisition  management functions to others to ensure that these duties are  performed by highly experienced procurement officials. Additionally, they  could focus on other acquisition issues such as program management  and rely on the agencies’ acquisition professionals to manage the  agency’s contract award process and acquisition workforce.
For example, the DHS CAO reported delegating seven of the eight  CAO acquisition management functions to the Senior Procurement  Executive and others, and said that he must take a larger view of the  acquisition function that includes program management while the  Senior Procurement Executive is more focused on the contract award  process and management of contracting officers and contracting  specialists.
CAOs’ delegation of their responsibilities may also be expected given the  roles of other agency officials in acquisition management.
The Senior Procurement Executive position had been in place at  federal agencies for many years before the CAO position was  established. This position is typically filled by a career employee who  is responsible for the management direction of the agency’s  procurement system, including implementation of agency unique  procurement policies, regulations, and standards.  In addition, while increasing the use of full and open competition is  one of the CAO responsibilities outlined in SARA, each executive  agency is also required to designate a competition advocate who is  responsible for promoting full and open competition, among other  things.
Similarly, CAOs are responsible for acquisition career management,  but the Office of Federal Procurement Policy also requires civilian  executive agencies to designate an acquisition career manager who is  responsible for, among other things, managing the development and  identification of the acquisition workforce and providing input  regarding short term and long term human capital strategic planning  for the acquisition workforce.
section_title: CAO Involvement in Acquisition Management May Vary Due to Agency Characteristics and Other Attributes
paragraphs: CAOs we spoke with stated there is no “one-size fits all” solution for how  best to structure the CAO position and integrate the acquisition  management responsibilities outlined by SARA. Many CAOs emphasized  that the level of acquisition management oversight they provide is based  upon several factors, which include the nature of the goods and services  that the agency buys and the amount of decentralization in the agency’s  acquisition function.
For example, the CAO at HHS said that she is very involved in  acquisition policy issues but the oversight of day-to-day acquisition  management issues is handled by other officials because much of  what HHS buys through contracts is done to support their operating  divisions rather than acquisitions of major systems.
The CAOs at both HHS and Interior reported that their agencies have  a decentralized acquisition management structure where heads of  operating divisions and bureaus execute most acquisition authority  within their two agencies. HHS also stated that although the CAO  does not approve acquisition decisions, acquisition management is  achieved through the CAO’s roles in financial management,  performance measurement, and acquisition and grants policy and  accountability.
In comparison, several CAOs at other agencies play a greater role in the  acquisition process. These agencies also tended to have major  acquisition programs and projects.
The CAO at DHS reported having approval authority for individual  acquisitions and since assuming the position in 2010 has revised the  acquisition oversight structure. The CAO stated that these changes in  the oversight structure at DHS are intended to decrease acquisition  program risk and provide better insight into budget, schedule and  performance information for approximately 135 major acquisition  programs for which the CAO serves as the Acquisition Decision  Authority.
CAOs at other agencies who said they are more involved in  acquisition management also reported having some form of decision  authority over certain acquisitions. For example, the CAO at  Commerce serves as co-chair of the agency’s Investment Reviews,  which provide oversight, review, and advice to the Secretary and  Deputy Secretary on both information technology (IT) and non-IT  investments that meet certain criteria. This advice includes  recommendations for approval or disapproval of funding for new  systems and investments, or major modifications to existing systems  or investments.
Similarly, at the Department of Labor, a Procurement Review Board  recommends to the CAO approval or disapproval of various  acquisition decisions that meet certain thresholds or conditions and  serves as a senior-level clearinghouse to review proposed  noncompetitive acquisitions.
section_title: CAO Roles and Responsibilities Not Clearly Defined at Many Agencies
paragraphs: At many agencies, the CAO position was not clearly defined in  documents that would form the basis for more permanently  institutionalizing the CAO within their organizational leadership structure.  Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each stakeholder in the  acquisition process is a key element of an effective acquisition function,  as outlined in GAO’s framework for assessing the acquisition function  within federal agencies. We found that the amount of detail on a CAO’s  agency-specific authorities and responsibilities varies greatly based on  the agency’s Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) supplement and other  policy documentation we collected. As shown in table 3, at some  agencies, the CAO position is described in detail while for others the only  information about the CAO’s authorities and acquisition management  responsibilities under SARA is a passing reference to the legislation that  established the position.
For example, the CAO position is defined or designated in FAR  supplements or acquisition manuals by just 6 of the agencies.
Detail on the CAO’s specific acquisition management responsibilities  was listed in other policy documentation for only 6 of the agencies.
At 7 agencies, the CAO position is not defined in their FAR  Supplement or acquisition manual, nor are the acquisition  management responsibilities listed in other policy documentation.
Additionally, we found that agencies varied in how their acquisition policy  guidance delegates authority for procurement matters with respect to the  CAO. At half of the agencies, authority for procurement matters is  delegated from the agency head through the CAO position to other  agency officials. In contrast, at the other 8 agencies, this authority is  delegated from the agency head directly to other agency officials such as  the Senior Procurement Executive and/or bureau heads, bypassing the  CAO. This may be due to agencies neglecting to update their acquisition  policies and regulations since creation of the CAO position or to reflect a  more recent organizational change.
For example, the GSA Organizational Manual still refers to an Office  of the CAO that reports to the Administrator, which, according to the  CAO in place during our review, did not reflect the organizational  reporting structure in the agency.
This lack of fully defined CAO roles and responsibilities, and at some  agencies, outdated policies, may be an obstacle to ensuring that the CAO  position is more permanently institutionalized within the agencies’  acquisition management and senior leadership structures.
section_title: CAOs Reported Few Significant Challenges and Generally Did Not Identify Changes Needed to Improve Their Effectiveness
paragraphs: CAOs at the 16 agencies generally did not report facing significant  challenges related to the CAO position, such as the level of influence they  have in their agency’s acquisition process, amount of control over  acquisition budget resources, and access to agency leadership. However,  most CAOs reported that not having enough staff to manage acquisitions  was moderately to extremely challenging. As GAO and others have  reported in recent years, the capacity and capability of the federal  government’s acquisition workforce to oversee and manage contracts has  been a challenge. Most CAOs did not believe any changes were needed  to improve their effectiveness and also felt that they had the appropriate  degree of authority to effectively fulfill their acquisition management  functions.
subsections: section_title: Aside from the Sufficiency of Acquisition Staff, CAOs Reported Few Significant Challenges
paragraphs: We asked agency CAOs to indicate how much six management and  resource issues that we identified challenged them in carrying out their  responsibilities. As shown below in figure 6, CAOs generally answered  that most areas we identified were not challenges for them.
No CAOs reported being very or extremely challenged by their  employment status (career official versus political appointee) in  fulfilling their acquisition management functions or in having sufficient  access to agency leadership.
The CAOs at DHS, HHS, and State reported five of these areas as  being not at all challenging. In contrast, the CAO at GSA and the  career acquisition official at Energy reported being moderately to  extremely challenged in most of the areas.
Despite the lack of challenges reported by CAOs related to most areas,  11 CAOs reported the sufficiency of staff to manage acquisitions as a  moderate to extreme challenge. These responses echo concerns from  our prior work that the capacity and the capability of the federal  government’s acquisition workforce to oversee and manage contracts  have not kept pace with increased spending for increasingly complex  purchases. Additionally, 6 of the 16 agencies’ IGs have identified the  acquisition workforce as a source of serious management challenge in  their most recent management challenge reports issued during 2011.  However, none of the CAOs at these 6 agencies reported the sufficiency  of acquisition staff as extremely or very challenging.
section_title: Majority of CAOs Said No Additional Changes Needed to Improve Their Effectiveness
paragraphs: When asked if any other changes were needed to improve their  effectiveness, 10 out of 16 CAOs reported that no changes were needed.  Six CAOs did provide some suggestions. For example, Energy’s  response to our questionnaire stated that the CAO position needs  improved resource support and full engagement with the agency’s senior  leadership team. At EPA, the CAO responded that it would be helpful if  there were a better understanding of the contracting process by agency  management. The GSA CAO, who left the position during our review,  believed that returning the CAO position to a direct report to the GSA  Administrator would improve the position’s effectiveness at her agency.  Following the completion of our CAO questionnaire, GSA appointed an  Acting CAO who reports to the Acting GSA Administrator. CAOs at  Transportation, Interior, and HUD reported that more budgetary resources  and acquisition workforce staff are needed to improve their effectiveness.  Despite these responses and other issues raised in our report, almost all  the CAOs believed that they had the appropriate authority to fulfill their  acquisition management responsibilities.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: More than 8 years after the enactment of the SARA legislation, there is  wide variation in how agencies have implemented the CAO position. On  one hand, agencies have generally filled the CAO position with political  appointees who sit at relatively high levels within their agencies in a  position to ensure that acquisition is receiving attention from agency  leadership. Many CAOs and acquisition officials we met with cited this as  a key benefit of the CAO position. On the other hand, there are  inconsistencies in the implementation of the law across agencies, with  very few CAOs having acquisition management as their primary  responsibility, although many CAOs cited the benefits to integrating  acquisition management with their additional responsibilities. The CAO  position is only one factor of many in an efficient, effective, and  accountable acquisition function in agencies. Having an experienced  Senior Procurement Executive is another. There is no one-size-fits-all  approach to how to organize an effective acquisition function, and a  CAO’s role should be suited to the nature and volume of an agency’s  acquisition activities. Yet, agencies should ensure that they are  maximizing their chances for success by having CAOs that are in a  position to influence agency leadership and serve as a strong advocate  for acquisition management, which includes having clearly defined roles  and responsibilities for the CAO. Not all agencies have these, however,  and may be missing an opportunity to ensure that the CAO position is  fully institutionalized within agencies’ acquisition management and senior  leadership structures. Given CAOs’ short tenures, a lack of defined roles  and responsibilities could hinder a CAO’s ability to maximize time in the  position and serve as an effective advocate for acquisition management.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To strengthen the functions of CAOs in acquisition management, we  recommend that the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement  Policy, working with the CAO Council, issue guidance to agencies  directing them to ensure that CAO roles and responsibilities are more  clearly defined in accordance with law and regulations, tailored to suit the  agency’s acquisition activities, and documented as appropriate.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We sent copies of a draft of this report to OMB and the 16 agencies within  the scope of our review. OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy  provided comments via e-mail, in which it concurred with our  recommendation. The office also suggested that the report further  highlight the role of the Senior Procurement Executive in providing day-to- day leadership of an agency’s acquisition function. We considered this  suggestion and made changes to the report as appropriate.
We received communications from each of the 16 agencies, with 15  providing no substantive comments. HHS provided additional information  on the roles and responsibilities of the CAO, which we incorporated into  the draft. HHS’s written comments are reproduced in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and  the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Health and  Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development,  the Interior, Labor, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans  Affairs; the administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency and  the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Acting  Administrator of General Services. In addition, this report will be available  at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or by e-mail at woodsw@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to assess: (1) how agencies have filled the Chief  Acquisition Officer (CAO) position; (2) the extent to which CAOs are  involved in performing the acquisition management functions set forth in  the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003 (SARA) legislation and  Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and (3) what  challenges, if any, agency CAOs report in fulfilling their responsibilities for  acquisition management. Our review did not assess the effectiveness of  individual CAOs or individual agencies’ acquisition functions.
To address our objectives, we reviewed the SARA legislation and  directives from OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy to identify the  key roles and responsibilities of the CAO position. We also reviewed  previous GAO work on assessing the acquisition function and the  implementation of other chief officer positions in the federal government.  To learn more about CAOs’ characteristics, as well as CAOs’ involvement  in acquisition management functions and challenges faced in fulfilling  their responsibilities, we developed and administered a questionnaire by  e-mail in an attached Microsoft Word form to the 16 civilian agencies  within the scope of our review. We pretested the questionnaire to ensure  that the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to understand.  We also solicited comments on the draft questionnaire from members of  the Chief Acquisition Officers Council. The questionnaire requested  information on, among other things, the CAOs’ reporting relationships,  involvement in acquisition management functions within the agency, the  extent to which the CAO had delegated their acquisition management  responsibilities to other officials, and challenges identified by GAO that  CAOs may have experienced in fulfilling their responsibilities. We sent the  questionnaire to agencies in November 2011. All questionnaires were  returned by March 2012. We received responses from all 16 agencies,  though not all agencies provided responses to each question.
To provide additional information on CAOs’ characteristics, involvement in  acquisition management functions and challenges faced, as well as to  corroborate information provided in the questionnaire responses, we  collected and reviewed agencies’ organizational charts that showed the  CAO’s position relative to the head of the agency and other senior  officials; letters of delegation or other documents that formally designate  the appointment of the CAO, the CAO’s resume or curriculum vitae  describing their qualifications and experience related to the CAO position;  applicable policies, guidance, position descriptions or functional  statements for both the CAO and Senior Procurement Executive  positions; applicable policies or orders that delegate the CAO’s  responsibilities to other acquisition officials; agency acquisition function  assessments performed under OMB Circular A-123; Acquisition Human  Capital Plans or similar documents; agency strategic plans and  performance reports; agency-specific acquisition regulations and  acquisition manuals; and descriptions of acquisition metrics or  performance measures the agency tracks. We also asked each agency to  supply the name, time in office, and circumstances (whether they were in  an acting or permanent position and whether they were a career  employee or political appointee) of each of the individuals who had  served as agency CAO and Senior Procurement Executive since  enactment of the SARA legislation in November 2003.
To complement information gathered through the questionnaire and  agency documentation, we conducted follow-up interviews to discuss the  CAO’s roles and responsibilities with CAOs and acquisition officials at  seven agencies: Commerce, Department of Homeland Security (DHS),  Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Interior, Energy, GSA,  and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We used  a nongeneralizable sample of agencies based upon the following criteria:  review of the questionnaire responses, the amount of procurement  spending as a portion of the agency’s fiscal year 2010 budget, and  whether the agency’s Inspector General had identified acquisition-related  issues as a major management challenge. We also met with officials from  OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy to discuss the roles and  responsibilities of agency CAOs.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 to July 2012 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Key Responsibilities of CAOs
paragraphs: Description  Monitoring the performance of acquisition activities and acquisition  programs of the executive agency, evaluating the performance of those  programs on the basis of applicable performance measurements, and  advising the head of the executive agency regarding the appropriate  business strategy to achieve the mission of the executive agency  Increasing the use of full and open competition in the acquisition of  property and services by the executive agency by establishing policies,  procedures, and practices that ensure that the executive agency receives a  sufficient number of sealed bids or competitive proposals from responsible  sources to fulfill the Government’s requirements at the lowest cost or best  value considering the nature of the property or service procured.
Increasing appropriate use of performance-based contracting and  performance specifications  Making acquisition decisions consistent with all applicable laws and  establishing clear lines of authority, accountability, and responsibility for  acquisition decision-making within the executive agency  Managing the direction of acquisition policy for the executive agency,  including implementation of the unique acquisition policies, regulations,  and standards of the executive agency  Developing and maintaining an acquisition career management program in  the executive agency to ensure that there is an adequate professional  workforce  As part of the strategic planning and performance evaluation process,  assessing the requirements established for agency personnel regarding  knowledge and skill in acquisition resources management and the  adequacy of such requirements for facilitating the achievement of the  performance goals established for acquisition management; developing  strategies and specific plans for hiring, training and professional  development to rectify any deficiency in meeting such requirements; and  reporting to the head of the executive agency on the progress made in  improving acquisition management capability.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, John Oppenheim (Assistant  Director); Matthew Drerup; Kristine Hassinger; Lauren Heft; Jean  McSween; Roxanna Sun; and Robert Swierczek made key contributions  to this report.