State Department: Challenges Facing the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Published: 2009-12-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: This testimony discusses the Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security), which is responsible for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400 embassies, consulates, and domestic locations. Since the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, the scope and complexity of threats facing Americans abroad and at home has increased. Diplomatic Security must be prepared to counter threats such as crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. The statement today is based on a GAO report that was issued on November 12, 2009. It will discuss (1) the growth of Diplomatic Security's missions and resources and (2) the challenges Diplomatic Security faces in conducting its work. To address these objectives in our report, GAO (1) interviewed numerous officials at Diplomatic Security headquarters, several domestic facilities, and 18 international postings; (2) analyzed Diplomatic Security and State budget and personnel data; and (3) assessed challenges facing Diplomatic Security through analysis of interviews with personnel positioned domestically and internationally, budget and personnel data provided by State and Diplomatic Security, and planning and strategic documentation. GAO conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to November 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that GAO plans and performs the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. GAO believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 1998, Diplomatic Security's mission and activities--and, subsequently, its resources--have grown considerably in reaction to a number of security incidents. As a consequence of this growth, we identified several challenges. In particular (1) State is maintaining a presence in an increasing number of dangerous posts, which requires additional resources; (2) staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational challenges--such as inadequate facilities, language deficiencies, experience gaps, and the difficulty of balancing security needs with State's diplomatic mission--further tax Diplomatic Security's ability to implement all of its missions; and (3) Diplomatic Security's considerable growth has not benefited from adequate strategic guidance. In our report, we recommend that the Secretary of State--as part of the agency's Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR) or separately--conduct a strategic review of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities address its priority needs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss the Department of State’s (State)  Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security), which is responsible  for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400  embassies, consulates, and domestic locations. Since the 1998 bombings of  U.S. Embassies in East Africa, the scope and complexity of threats facing  Americans abroad and at home has increased. Diplomatic Security must  be prepared to counter threats such as crime, espionage, visa and passport  fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism.
My statement today is based on a GAO report that was issued on  November 12, 2009. I will discuss (1) the growth of Diplomatic Security’s  missions and resources and (2) the challenges Diplomatic Security faces in  conducting its work.
To address these objectives in our report, we (1) interviewed numerous  officials at Diplomatic Security headquarters, several domestic facilities,  and 18 international postings; (2) analyzed Diplomatic Security and State  budget and personnel data; and (3) assessed challenges facing Diplomatic  Security through analysis of interviews with personnel positioned  domestically and internationally, budget and personnel data provided by  State and Diplomatic Security, and planning and strategic documentation.  We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to November  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In brief, Mr. Chairman, we found that, since 1998, Diplomatic Security’s  mission and activities—and, subsequently, its resources—have grown  considerably in reaction to a number of security incidents. As a  consequence of this growth, we identified several challenges. In particular  (1) State is maintaining a presence in an increasing number of dangerous  posts, which requires additional resources; (2) staffing shortages in  domestic offices and other operational challenges—such as inadequate  facilities, language deficiencies, experience gaps, and the difficulty of  balancing security needs with State’s diplomatic mission—further tax  Diplomatic Security’s ability to implement all of its missions; and   (3) Diplomatic Security’s considerable growth has not benefited from  adequate strategic guidance. In our report, we recommend that the  Secretary of State—as part of the agency’s Quadrennial Diplomatic and  Development Review (QDDR) or separately—conduct a strategic review  of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities address its  priority needs.
subsections: section_title: Diplomatic Security’s Mission and Resources Have Grown Considerably Since 1998
paragraphs: Because of a number of security incidents, Diplomatic Security’s missions  and resources have grown tremendously in the past decade. The growth in  Diplomatic Security’s mission includes key areas such as enhanced  physical security and investigations. Following the 1998 attacks on U.S.  Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Diplomatic Security determined that  more than 85 percent of U.S. diplomatic facilities did not meet its security  standards and were therefore vulnerable to terrorist attack; in response,  Diplomatic Security added many of the physical security measures  currently in place at most U.S. missions worldwide, such as additional  barriers, alarms, public address systems, and enhanced access procedures.  Since 1998, there have been 39 attacks aimed at U.S. Embassies,  Consulates, or Chief of Mission personnel (not including regular attacks  against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad since 2004). The nature of some of  these attacks has led Diplomatic Security to further adapt its security  measures. Moreover, the attacks of September 11, 2001, underscored the  importance of upgrading Diplomatic Security’s domestic security  programs and enhancing its investigative capacity. Furthermore, following  the onset of U.S. operations in Iraq in 2003, Diplomatic Security has had to  provide security in the Iraq and Afghanistan war zones and other  increasingly hostile environments such as Pakistan.
Diplomatic Security funding and personnel have also increased  considerably in conjunction with its expanding missions. Diplomatic  Security reports that its budget has increased from about $200 million in  1998 to $1.8 billion in 2008. In addition, the size of Diplomatic Security’s  direct-hire workforce has doubled since 1998. The number of direct-hire  security specialists (special agents, engineers, technicians, and couriers)  increased from under 1,000 in 1998 to over 2,000 in 2009, and the number  of direct-hire civil service personnel increased from 258 to 592. At the  same time, Diplomatic Security has increased its use of contractors to  support its security operations worldwide, specifically through increases  in the Diplomatic Security guard force and the use of contractors to  provide protective details for American diplomats in high-threat  environments.
section_title: Dangerous Environments, Staffing Shortages, and Reactive Planning Challenge Diplomatic Security
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security faces several policy and operational challenges. First,  State is maintaining missions in increasingly dangerous locations,  necessitating the use of more resources and making it more difficult to  provide security in these locations. Second, although Diplomatic Security  has grown considerably in staff over the last 10 years, staffing shortages in  domestic offices, as well as other operational challenges further tax  Diplomatic Security’s ability to implement all of its missions. Finally, State  has expanded Diplomatic Security without the benefit of solid strategic  planning.
subsections: section_title: Maintaining Missions in Iraq and Other Increasingly Dangerous Posts Significantly Affects Diplomatic Security’s Work
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security officials stated that maintaining missions in dangerous  environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan requires more resources and  increases the difficulty for Diplomatic Security to provide a secure  environment.
Keeping staff secure, yet productive, in Iraq has been one of Diplomatic  Security’s greatest challenges since 2004, when security for the U.S.  Embassy in Baghdad transferred from the U.S. Department of Defense to  Diplomatic Security. The U.S. mission in Baghdad—with 1,300 authorized  U.S. civilian personnel—is one of the largest in the world. Maintaining  Diplomatic Security operations in Iraq has required approximately   36 percent of its entire budget each fiscal year since 2004 and, as of  September 2008, required 81 special agents to manage security operations.  To support security operations in Iraq, Diplomatic Security has had to  draw staff and resources away from other programs. Earlier in 2009, we  reported that Diplomatic Security’s workload—and thus its resource  requirements—will likely increase as the U.S. military transitions out of  Iraq.
U.S. policymakers’ increased focus on Afghanistan poses another  significant challenge for Diplomatic Security. The security situation in  Afghanistan has deteriorated since 2005, and the number of attacks there  increased from 2,388 in 2005 to 10,889 in 2008. Afghanistan is Diplomatic  Security’s second largest overseas post with a staff of 22 special agents in  2009. Diplomatic Security plans to add an additional 25 special agents in  2010, effectively doubling the number of agents in Afghanistan.
In addition to operating in the Iraq and Afghanistan war zones, State is  maintaining missions in an increasing number of other dangerous posts— such as Peshawar, Pakistan, and Sana’a, Yemen—some of which State  would have previously evacuated.
section_title: Diplomatic Security Faces Operational Challenges That Affect Its Ability to Implement Important Activities
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security’s ability to fully carry out its mission of providing  security worldwide is hindered by staffing shortages in domestic offices  and other operational challenges such as inadequate facilities and  pervasive language proficiency shortfalls.
subsections: section_title: Some Diplomatic Security Offices Operate with Severe Staff Shortages
paragraphs: Despite Diplomatic Security’s staff growth over the last 10 years, some  offices have been operating with severe staffing shortages. In 2008,  approximately one-third of Diplomatic Security’s domestic suboffices  operated with a 25 percent vacancy rate or higher. Several offices report  that this shortage of staff affected their ability to conduct their work. For  example:    The Houston field office reported that, for 6 months of the year, it  operated at 50 percent capacity of nonsupervisory agents or lower, and for  2 months during the summer, it dipped down to a low of 35 percent. This  staffing gap happened while the field office was experiencing a significant  increase in its caseload due to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.
As a result, the Houston field office management reported that this  combination overwhelmed its capabilities and resulted in a significant  backlog of cases.
The New York field office reported that the number of special agents there  dropped to 66 in 2008 from more than 110 agents in 2007. As a result, the  office had to draw special agents from other field offices to cover its heavy  dignitary protection load.
In 2008, the Mobile Security Deployment (MSD) Office was authorized to  have 94 special agent positions, but only 76 were filled. Furthermore,  Diplomatic Security officials noted that not all staff in filled positions are  available for duty. For example, in 2009, 22 agents assigned to MSD were  in training. As a result of the low level of available staff, Diplomatic  Security reported that many posts go for years without updating their  security training. Officials noted that this lack of available agents is  particularly problematic given the high number of critical threat posts that  are only 1-year tours that would benefit from frequent training.
State officials attributed these shortages to the following three factors:   Staffing the Iraq mission: Staffing the Iraq mission in 2008 required 16  percent of Diplomatic Security’s staff. In order to provide enough  Diplomatic Security special agents in Iraq, we reported that Diplomatic  Security had to move agents from other programs, and those moves have  affected the agency’s ability to perform other missions, including  providing security for visiting dignitaries and visa, passport, and identity  fraud investigations.
Protection details: Diplomatic Security draws agents from field offices,  headquarters, and overseas posts to participate in protective details and  special events, such as the Olympics. Recently, Diplomatic Security’s role   in providing protection at such major events has grown and will require  more staff.
Normal rotations: Staff take home leave between postings and sometimes  are required to take training before starting their next assignment. This  rotation process regularly creates a labor shortage, which affects  Diplomatic Security’s ability to meet its increased security demands. In  2005, Diplomatic Security identified the need for a training float— additional staff that would allow it to fill critical positions and still allow  staff time for job training—but Diplomatic Security has not been able to  implement one. This is consistent with our observation that State has been  unable to create a training float because its staff increases have been  absorbed by the demand for personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Diplomatic Security requested funding to add over 350 security positions  in fiscal year 2010. However, new hires cannot be immediately deployed  overseas because they must meet training requirements. In addition to  hiring new special agents, Diplomatic Security established the Security  Protection Specialist (SPS) position in February 2009 to create a cadre of  professionals specifically trained in personnel protection who can provide  oversight for the contractor-operated protective details in high-threat  posts. Because of the more targeted training requirements, Diplomatic  Security would be able to deploy the SPS staff more quickly than new hire  special agents. However, Diplomatic Security has had difficulty recruiting  and hiring a sufficient number of SPS candidates. According to senior  Diplomatic Security officials, it may cancel the program if it cannot recruit  enough qualified candidates.
section_title: Other Operational Challenges Impede Diplomatic Security’s Ability to Fully Implement Its Missions and Activities
paragraphs: Diplomatic Security faces a number of other operational challenges that  impede it from fully implementing its missions and activities, including:  Inadequate buildings: State is in the process of updating and building  many new facilities. However, we have previously identified many posts  that do not meet all security standards delineated by the Overseas Security  Policy Board and the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism  Act of 1999.
Foreign language deficiencies: Earlier this year, we found that 53 percent  of Regional Security Officers do not speak and read at the level required  by their positions, and we concluded that these foreign language shortfalls  could be negatively affecting several aspects of U.S. diplomacy, including  security operations. For example, an officer at a post of strategic interest  said because she did not speak the language, she had transferred a  sensitive telephone call from a local informant to a local employee, which  could have compromised the informant’s identity.
Experience gaps: Thirty-four percent of Diplomatic Security’s positions  (not including those in Baghdad) are filled with officers below the  position’s grade. For example, several Assistant Regional Security Officers  with whom we met were in their first overseas positions and stated that  they did not feel adequately prepared for their job, particularly their  responsibility to manage large security contracts. We previously reported  that experience gaps can compromise diplomatic readiness.
Host country laws: At times, host country laws prohibit Diplomatic  Security from taking all the security precautions it would like outside an  embassy. For example, Diplomatic Security officials said that they prefer  to arm their local guard forces and their special agents; however, several  countries prohibit this. In cases of attack, this prohibition limits  Diplomatic Security’s ability to protect an embassy or consulate.
Balancing security with the diplomatic mission: Diplomatic Security’s  desire to provide the best security possible for State’s diplomatic corps  has, at times, been in tension with State’s diplomatic mission. For  example, Diplomatic Security has established strict policies concerning  access to U.S. facilities that usually include both personal and vehicle  screening. Some public affairs officials—whose job it is to foster relations  with host country nationals—have expressed concerns that these security  measures discourage visitors from attending U.S. Embassy events or  exhibits. In addition, the new embassies and consulates, with their high  walls, deep setbacks, and strict screening procedures, have evoked the  nickname, “Fortress America.”
section_title: Although Some Planning Initiatives Have Been Undertaken, Diplomatic Security’s Growth Has Been More Reactive Than Strategic
paragraphs: Although some planning initiatives have been undertaken, neither State’s  departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic  plan specifically addresses its resource needs or its management  challenges. Diplomatic Security’s tremendous growth over the last 10  years has been reactive and has not benefited from adequate strategic  guidance.
State’s strategic plan does not specifically address Diplomatic Security’s  resource needs or management challenges, as required by the Government  Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and other standards. While State’s  strategic plan for 2007-2012 has a section identifying security priorities and  goals, we found it did not identify the resources needed to meet these  goals or address all of the management challenges we identified in this  report.
Diplomatic Security has undertaken some planning efforts at the bureau  and office level, but these efforts also have limitations. First, Diplomatic  Security creates an annual bureau strategic plan. While this plan lists  priorities, goals, and indicators, these elements are not always linked  together. Further, the plan does not identify what staff, equipment, or  funding would be needed. Second, Diplomatic Security has created a Visa  and Passport Security Strategic Plan to guide its efforts to disrupt  individuals and organizations that attempt to compromise the integrity of  U.S. travel documents. Third, Diplomatic Security reported that it is  currently examining all of its security programs to determine how funding  and personnel resources are distributed and support its goals. Finally,  Diplomatic Security uses established security standards and staffing  matrixes to determine what resources are needed for various activities.  However, while these various tools help specific offices or missions plan  their resource requests, they are not useful for determining overall bureau  needs.
Several senior Diplomatic Security officials noted that Diplomatic Security  remains reactive in nature, stating several reasons for its lack of long-term  strategic planning. First, Diplomatic Security provides a support function  and must react to the needs of State; therefore, it cannot plan its own  resources until State determines overall policy direction. Second, while  State has a 5-year workforce plan that addresses all bureaus, officials  stated that Diplomatic Security does not use this plan to determine its  staffing needs. Finally, past efforts to strategically plan Diplomatic  Security resources have gone unheeded. For example, Diplomatic  Security’s bureau strategic plan for fiscal year 2006 identified a need to (1)  develop a workforce strategy to recruit and sustain a diverse and highly  skilled security personnel base and (2) establish a training float to address  recurring staffing problems. However, as of September 2009, Diplomatic  Security had not addressed either of those needs.
Diplomatic Security officials stated they hope to participate in a new State  management initiative, the Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development  Review (QDDR). This review, which will be managed by a senior  leadership team under the direction of the Secretary of State, is designed  to provide the short-, medium-, and long-term blueprints for State’s  diplomatic and development efforts and offer guidance on how State  develops policies, allocates its resources, deploys its staff, and exercises  its authorities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In our report, we recommended that the Secretary of State—as part of the  QDDR or as a separate initiative—conduct a strategic review of the  Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities  address State’s priority needs. This review should also address key human  capital and operational challenges faced by Diplomatic Security, such as    operating domestic and international activities with adequate staff;    providing security for facilities that do not meet all security standards;    staffing foreign missions with officials who have appropriate language    operating programs with experienced staff, at the commensurate grade    balancing security needs with State’s need to conduct its diplomatic  mission.
State agreed with our recommendation and noted that, although it is  currently not planning to perform a strategic review of the full Diplomatic  Security mission and capabilities in the QDDR, the Under Secretary for  Management and the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security are  completely committed to ensuring that Diplomatic Security’s mission will  benefit from this initiative.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee  may have at this time.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at  (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to  this testimony include Anthony Moran, Assistant Director; Miriam Carroll  Fenton; Joseph Carney; Jonathan Fremont; and Antoine Clark.
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