Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed
Published: 2004-06-02T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In October 2001, in response to the Taliban regime's protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States, coalition forces forcibly removed the regime from Afghanistan. In December 2002, Congress passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizing assistance funds to help Afghanistan rebuild a stable, democratic society. The act directed GAO to monitor the implementation of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance. This report analyzes, for fiscal years 2002-2003, (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures in Afghanistan, (2) results of assistance projects, (3) the assistance coordination mechanisms and strategy, and (4) major obstacles that affected the achievement of U.S. goals.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Of the $900 million that the U.S. government spent on nonsecurity-related assistance in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, over 75 percent supported humanitarian efforts, including emergency food and shelter, and over 20 percent supported longer-term reconstruction. USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense spent $508 million, $254 million, and $64 million, respectively, for humanitarian, quick-impact, and some longer-term projects. U.S. funding represented about 38 percent of the $3.7 billion the international community disbursed over the 2-year period. U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance benefited Afghanistan, but longerterm reconstruction efforts achieved limited results by the end of fiscal year 2003 due to late funding. By providing food and shelter to returning refugees and other vulnerable populations, early U.S. assistance helped avert a humanitarian crisis. USAID's and Defense's quick-impact projects also helped rebuild smallscale infrastructure such as schools and bridges. USAID initiated several longerterm reconstruction activities, such as repairing the Kabul-Kandahar road and starting a democracy program. However, because of delays in funding most major assistance contracts were not signed until summer 2003, limiting the results in fiscal years 2002-2003. U.S. coordination mechanisms for Afghanistan assistance were generally effective, but international assistance was not well coordinated in fiscal years 2002-2003. In addition, the United States lacked a complete and integrated assistance strategy, which hampered the U.S. government's ability to focus available resources and hold itself accountable for measurable results. Further, U.S. officials responsible for coordinating efforts lacked complete financial data, which hindered their ability to oversee the assistance. In fiscal years 2002-2003, Afghanistan confronted many obstacles that other postconflict nations have faced, such as multiple competing parties. In addition, security deteriorated and opium production increased, thereby jeopardizing U.S. reconstruction efforts. Lack of staff, poor working conditions, and delayed reconstruction funding further impeded U.S. efforts. In September 2003, to expedite progress, the U.S. government announced the "Accelerating Success" initiative, providing $1.76 billion for reconstruction in 2004.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Twenty-three years of war and destructive domestic policies and more than  5 years of drought destroyed Afghanistan’s government, judicial, economic,  and social institutions and its transportation, health, sanitation, and other  infrastructure. In October 2001, responding to its protection of al Qaeda  terrorists who had attacked the United States, Coalition forces forcibly  removed the Taliban regime. With the passage of the Afghanistan Freedom  Support Act in December 2002, Congress authorized the use of federal  funds for the delivery of humanitarian, development, and security  assistance to Afghanistan. The act articulates U.S. policy goals in  Afghanistan that include the creation of a stable Afghan society that is not a  threat to itself or others and is not a base for terrorism.
Section 106 of the act directs the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to  monitor U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan.   To meet this requirement and provide Congress with a comprehensive  accounting of U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to  Afghanistan for the fiscal year 2002-2003 period, we (1) analyzed U.S.  obligations and expenditures; (2) identified the results of assistance  projects through September 30, 2003; (3) evaluated U.S. and international  assistance coordination mechanisms and the U.S. assistance strategy; and  (4) examined the major obstacles that affected the achievement of U.S.  policy goals and the reconstruction effort.
To address these issues, we collected and analyzed information from the  U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services,  Justice, State, and Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID); the United Nations (U.N.); the Afghan government; and  nongovernmental organizations and private contractors responsible for  implementing U.S. government–funded projects.  This effort included  analyzing data on obligations and expenditures by U.S. government  agencies that provided assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002 and  2003. We conducted reliability checks on the financial data provided by  U.S. agencies and, based on these checks, concluded that the data are  sufficiently reliable for the purposes used. Because the U.S. assistance is  provided as part of a larger international effort, we included information on  the contributions provided by international donors. Finally, we traveled to  Afghanistan in October 2003 to examine U.S. assistance-related operations  in country. While in Afghanistan, we spoke with officials from U.S., U.N.,  and nongovernmental organizations; private contractors; and the Afghan  government. However, the number and location of project sites we visited  in Afghanistan was limited because of Department of State security  restrictions.  We conducted our review from August 2003 through April  2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. (For further details of our scope and methodology, see app. I.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited  natural resources, bordered by  Pakistan to the east and south; Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran to the west  (see fig. 1). At 647,500 square kilometers, Afghanistan is slightly smaller  than the state of Texas; its population, estimated at 27.8 million, is  ethnically diverse, largely rural, and mostly uneducated. The country is  divided into 32 provinces, over 300 districts, and approximately 30,000  villages.
Afghanistan is an extremely poor country. As shown in table 1,  development indicators published by the World Bank and the U.N. rank  Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category, including  malnutrition; infant, child, and maternal mortality; life expectancy; and  literacy.
Over the last 2 decades, political conflicts ravaged Afghanistan. The  country was subject to ethnic rivalry led by provincial warlords,  communist invasion, and fundamental Islamic control, all of which limited  development (see fig. 2). Factional control of the country following the  withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, coupled with the population’s fatigue  of fighting, allowed a fundamental Islamic group, the Taliban, to seize  control of the country. Although the Taliban regime provided some political  stability during the late 1990s, its destructive policies, highlighted in its  repressive treatment of women, and its continuing war with the opposition  Northern Alliance further impeded international aid and development.
In December 2001, less than 2 months after U.S. and coalition forces  forcibly removed the Taliban regime, an international summit in Bonn,  Germany, established a framework for a new Afghan government, which  focused on an ambitious 30-month timeline for writing a new constitution  by the end of October 2003 and holding democratic elections by June 2004.  The framework, known as the Bonn Agreement, was endorsed by the U.N.  Security Council on December 6, 2001, through UN Resolution 1383. (See  app. II for additional information on the Bonn Agreement.)
In December 2002, the United States passed the Afghanistan Freedom  Support Act of 2002 and increased its assistance to Afghanistan.  (See app.  III for details on the types and purposes of the assistance authorized by the  act.) The goal of the U.S. government in Afghanistan is to firmly establish a  democratic nation inhospitable to international terrorism, drug trafficking  and cultivation; at peace with its neighbors; and able to provide its own  internal and external security. U.S. efforts in support of this goal are  intended to help create national security institutions, provide humanitarian  and reconstruction assistance, and reinforce the primacy of the central  government over Afghanistan’s provinces. Title I, Section 104(a) of the act  states that in general, the President is strongly urged to designate, within  the Department of State, a coordinator who shall among other things be  responsible for  designing an overall strategy to advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan;  ensuring program and policy coordination among U.S. agencies carrying  out the policies set forth in this title;  pursuing Afghanistan assistance coordination with other countries and   ensuring proper management, implementation, and oversight by  agencies responsible for Afghan assistance programs.
USAID provides U.S. assistance to underdeveloped countries through U.N.  agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private contractors. The  main organizational units responsible for managing USAID’s reconstruction  programs and operations in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002–2003 were the  agency’s mission in Kabul, Afghanistan; the Bureau for Asia and the Near  East; and the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian  Assistance through the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of  Food for Peace, Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and Office for  Democracy and Governance. Other U.S. government agencies provided  additional assistance, including the Department of Defense through its  provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) located at sites throughout  Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2002–2003, the PRTs ranged in size from 50 to  100 civilian and military personnel, including civil affairs units, force  protection soldiers, and representatives of the Departments of Agriculture  and State and USAID. The teams are intended to deliver assistance that  advances military goals and provide security in an effort to increase the  reach of the Afghan central government in the provinces and allow  assistance agencies to implement projects. By late 2003, Defense  established PRTs in Bamian, Kunduz, Gardez, and Mazar-I-Sharif.
section_title: U.S. Funding Focused on Humanitarian Aid, Represented Sizable Portion of International Assistance
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2002–2003, the United States spent the majority of its  nonsecurity-related funding to Afghanistan on humanitarian and quick- impact projects, and it contributed approximately one-third of the  international funding disbursed in Afghanistan. Of the 10 U.S. agencies  providing assistance to Afghanistan, USAID provided the largest amount,  for both humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and the Department  of State provided the second largest amount, primarily for humanitarian  assistance. USAID and the Department of Defense obligated a total of $283  million for nationwide programs and $564 million for localized program  assistance in 31 provinces. The United States accounted for 38 percent of  the $3.7 billion in nonsecurity-related international funding disbursed in  Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002–2003.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Assistance Focused on Humanitarian and Quick- Impact Projects
paragraphs: The U.S. government obligated $1.4 billion for assistance to Afghanistan in  fiscal years 2002–2003, including $782 million for humanitarian and quick- impact projects and $647 million for strategic, longer-term reconstruction  projects. U.S. agencies spent $900 million, of which $686 million, or over  75 percent, was spent on humanitarian and quick-impact projects and  about $214 million, or over 20 percent, was spent on longer-term  reconstruction needs. (See fig. 3.)
section_title: USAID and State Provided Most U.S. Assistance
paragraphs: Of the 10 U.S. government departments and agencies involved in assistance  to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002–2003,USAID provided the largest  amount of assistance, for both humanitarian and reconstruction needs.   USAID obligated $942 million, of which it spent about $508 million by  September 2003.  It provided both short-term assistance—emergency,  humanitarian, and quick-impact projects—and longer-term reconstruction  and development-oriented assistance, such as revitalizing infrastructure,  improving health and education, strengthening the economy, and  supporting democracy and governance. The Department of State provided  the next largest amount, obligating $287 million in fiscal years 2002-2003  and spending $254 million of that amount. State’s programs were targeted  mainly to refugee and humanitarian assistance, including demining, and  also included funding for counterdrug programs and building a police  force. The Department of Defense obligated $71 million and spent $64  million, primarily for provincial-level, short-term projects implemented  through its PRTs and for humanitarian daily rations that it air-dropped early  in fiscal year 2002. In addition, seven other U.S. government agencies  obligated $128 million and spent $74 million for a variety of both  humanitarian and reconstruction activities. (See fig. 4.)
section_title: Most Funding Supported Provincial Projects
paragraphs: In an effort to expand the reach of the Afghan government—a major U.S.  and Afghan government priority—most USAID and Defense assistance  funding was spent on projects implemented at the provincial level.  Specifically, USAID and Defense obligated $283 million for nationwide  programs and $564 million for provincial-level assistance across 31  provinces. Kabul received the most provincial-level assistance, $70.4  million for 148 projects, while Konar received the least, $121,350 for one  project.  Although assistance was provided in virtually all of Afghanistan’s  provinces, five provinces received approximately half of provincial-level  program assistance. Four of these provinces—Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh, and  Hirat—have major population centers, and the fifth, Badakshan, is  increasingly important to the opium trade. (See fig. 5.)
section_title: U.S. Was Largest International Donor
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2002–2003, international donors pledged $9.7 billion for  assistance to Afghanistan. (See app. V for details.) International  disbursements for the 2-year period totaled approximately $3.7 billion, of  which U.S. obligations accounted for approximately 38 percent, or $1.4  billion—the largest amount donated (see fig. 6). Like U.S. funding, most  international funding was directed to meet humanitarian needs rather than  major reconstruction efforts. According to the Center on International  Cooperation, as of May 2003, $947 million of the international  disbursements had been used to begin reconstruction projects.
section_title: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Helped Avert Famine; Longer- term Reconstruction Efforts Had Limited Results
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2002-2003, humanitarian and quick-impact assistance  benefited Afghanistan, but longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved  limited results.  U.S. humanitarian aid helped overcome emergency  conditions and jump-start the recovery effort.  In addition, quick-impact  projects helped Afghanistan transition from the emergency to the  reconstruction phase. However, because of delayed funding, most major  contracts for reconstruction activities were not signed until summer 2003,  limiting the results achieved by the end of that fiscal year.
subsections: section_title: Humanitarian Assistance Helped Vulnerable Populations and Averted Famine
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2002–2003, to help redress the complex humanitarian crisis  in Afghanistan, the U.S. government provided emergency assistance that  helped avert a famine, significantly reduce the suffering of the most  vulnerable Afghans, and assist the return of refugees. USAID’s Office of  Food for Peace provided Afghanistan with 355,270 metric tons of wheat  and other emergency food assistance (valued at $206.4 million) through P.L.  480, Title II, and the Department of Agriculture provided 79,600 metric tons  of surplus wheat (valued at $38.7 million) through the 416(b) program.  The United States provided most of its food assistance to Afghanistan  through the U.N. World Food Program (WFP), as well as the U.N. Food  and Agriculture Organization and nongovernmental organizations. (See fig.  7.) Over the 2-year period, the United States provided over 60 percent of all  international food assistance received by Afghanistan. According to the  WFP, the food assistance provided by the United States and the  international community helped avert famine in Afghanistan.
USAID also provided other emergency assistance in fiscal years 2002–2003.  According to USAID reports, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance  provided $137.8 million to meet the basic needs of internally displaced  people and other vulnerable Afghans. The funding supported health and  nutrition programs, agricultural and other income-generating rehabilitative  work in rural areas, and logistics for coordinating humanitarian and food  assistance countrywide. According to USAID, the office, through its cash- for-work programs, supported more than 4,000 small rehabilitation  projects, including repairs to approximately 2,600 kilometers of roads,  1,500 wells and irrigation systems, and more than 100 schools and  hospitals, benefiting selected communities throughout the country.
The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration  provided $234 million to assist returning refugees.  This assistance,  disbursed primarily through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,  supported the voluntary return and reintegration of 2.2 million refugees  and internally displaced people to their homes in Afghanistan. The U.S.  assistance also provided shelter; water and sanitation; primary,  reproductive, maternal, and child health care; food and nutrition; primary  education; mine education and awareness; and economic assistance and  training to refugees and internally displaced people.
section_title: Quick-Impact Projects Transitioned U.S. Assistance from Relief to Reconstruction
paragraphs: USAID’s OTI and the Department of Defense’s PRTs implemented small- scale, quick-impact projects. These projects aimed to extend the reach of  the Afghan central government by providing benefits to rural communities  and to facilitate the transition to longer-term reconstruction programs.  Both OTI and the PRTs engaged in clinic and school reconstruction, bridge  rehabilitation, irrigation construction, and other locally determined, small- scale projects.
In fiscal years 2002–2003, OTI expended $18 million for 435 projects. (On  average, each project cost $42,465.) By October 2003, 66 percent of the  projects had been completed. In a November 2003 assessment, OTI  concluded that its efforts had increased the Afghan state’s ability to  function, enhanced the independent media’s ability to promote public  information, and facilitated infrastructure improvements in hundreds of  communities. However, OTI also concluded that these gains had not yet  achieved its objective of building citizen confidence in the ability of the  central Afghan government. Few Afghans interviewed by OTI during the  assessment were aware that the U.S. government or the Afghan central  government had supported a specific project. (See fig. 8 for an example of  an OTI project.)
The Department of Defense’s quick-impact projects were similar in size and  scope to those implemented by USAID’s OTI. In fiscal years 2002–2003,  Defense granted $20 million for 451 projects in Afghanistan through its  PRTs. (On average, the projects cost $45,000 each.) Sixty-four percent of  them were completed by December 2003. The PRTs implemented projects  designed to help (1) advance U.S. military goals, (2) build goodwill among  the local population, (3) increase the visibility of U.S. support, and (4)  extend the reach of the Afghan central government. Although no formal  evaluation of the overall PRT effort had been completed as of October  2003, officials at the Departments of State and Defense said that the  activities of civil affairs teams appeared to have a positive effect on  security and were a useful tool for expanding local support for both the  U.S. presence and the Afghan government. However, the Agency  Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief reported that as currently structured,  the PRTs lack the resources or mandate to either solve the security  situation in Afghanistan or significantly contribute to reconstruction. (Fig.  9 shows one example of a PRT project.)
section_title: Nascent Longer-Term Reconstruction Efforts Achieved Limited Results
paragraphs: USAID’s longer-term reconstruction efforts in fiscal years 2002–2003  achieved limited results because of delays in funding.  To help the Afghan  government extend its influence throughout the country, USAID organized  its longer-term assistance into six sectors: infrastructure rehabilitation,  economic governance, democracy strengthening, education, health, and  agriculture. The agency also integrated elements to promote gender  equity into each sector. Most of the contracts for longer-term  reconstruction assistance in each of the six sectors were not signed until  summer 2003, due to delayed funding, limiting what USAID could achieve  in that fiscal year.
The following presents U.S. efforts in each sector. The goals listed in  figures 10–16 portray USAID’s goals and objectives as stated in early  planning and reporting documents. Since many of the projects created  under the six sectors continued work begun through the quick-impact  projects, USAID has not disaggregated their achievements. We include  information on some quick-impact projects, as well as longer-term  reconstruction projects. Also, since USAID does not track expenditures by  the six sectors, we do not include information on total amounts spent by  sector.
Infrastructure rehabilitation. By the end of fiscal 2003, USAID had built or  rehabilitated several physical infrastructure projects, most notably the  Kabul–Kandahar road. Many of the early physical infrastructure projects  handled through the quick-impact programs used local or low-technology  procedures in order to speed implementation. For example, the OTI  projects applied stone, gravel, and dirt to improve transport over secondary  and tertiary roads.  By contrast, a contract for the longer-term  Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services infrastructure program  (REFS), signed in September 2002, provided engineering and construction  services for the production of paved roads and seismically sound buildings.
The Kabul-Kandahar road, a U.S. presidential priority, represents a  significant political symbol within Afghanistan and is the main transport  route for north-south trade from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. In about  17 months, under the REFS contract, USAID contractors demined, graded,  and installed the first layer of pavement on a segment of highway  stretching 389 kilometers (approximately the distance from Washington,  D.C., to New York, N.Y.).  As a result, travel between the two cities was  reduced from several days to about 6 hours. The road requires two more  layers of asphalt and the construction of bridges and culverts; the  estimated project completion date is October 2004. The prime contractor  for the REFS program was also responsible for constructing schools and  clinics listed as objectives under the education and health sectors.  However, as of the end of fiscal 2003, although OTI and the PRTs built and  rehabilitated schools and clinics, none of the more sophisticated buildings  included in the infrastructure contract had been built.
In addition to the USAID infrastructure projects, State identified  communications as an infrastructure element essential to meeting the long- term security needs of Afghanistan. USAID provided for voice and e-mail  communication between the central government in Kabul and all 32  provinces by installing a high-frequency radio communications network.  The U.S. Trade and Development Agency provided short-term advisors to  create a strategic plan for telecommunications development. By October  2003, two telephone companies had established service in Afghanistan, but  according to USAID and others, connectivity was still unreliable.
Economic governance. When the U.S. government began its reconstruction  efforts in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank— necessary to set fiscal policy and handle the country’s reconstruction cash  flow, respectively—were operating at an elementary level. USAID helped to  reestablish the Ministry of Finance, create a central bank of Afghanistan  and a new currency, and reform the customs process.  To do this, USAID  awarded a contract for its Sustainable Economic Policy and Institutional  Reform Support program in November 2002. Under the program, USAID  helped rehabilitate the ministry building and provided advisors to retrain  the bank’s staff. In addition, USAID helped the central bank establish and  distribute a new national currency (the “afghani”). This involved collecting  and destroying an estimated 13 trillion of the greatly devalued, previously  existing afghanis and the disparate currencies printed by warlords. USAID  supported the commercial bank sector by assisting in legal and regulatory  reform and training financial sector officials. As a result, international  commercial banks began to receive licenses in the fall of 2003. Further,  USAID helped to partially rehabilitate the Kabul customs house and airport  customs facilities, streamline customs processes, and establish a tax  identification number system for traders. Despite these and other efforts  aimed at encouraging the provinces to remit revenue to the central  government, according to the UN and others, warlords continued to keep  large portions in their own regions, undermining the authority of the  central government.
Health care. In November 2002, USAID, with assistance from the UN  Population Fund, Japan’s aid agency, and the European Commission,  completed a comprehensive assessment of health facilities, services,  personnel, and supplies available throughout the country.  This effort  helped Afghanistan's Ministry of Health to establish a national health  strategy and national health priorities. All grants for health sector activities  must address the priorities established in the ministry’s strategy. The study  found that Afghanistan has approximately one health facility per 27,000  inhabitants. It also established that nearly 40 percent of existing basic care  facilities employ no female health workers. (According to cultural norms, it  is taboo for women to receive care from male health care workers.)
Other health achievements included providing grants to NGOs to operate  over 160 health facilities—covering an area where 3.9 million Afghans  live—constructing or rehabilitating 140 health facilities, training over 1,700  health workers, participating in the campaign to immunize 90 percent of  the population against measles, and improving approximately 3,600 rural  potable waterworks. To expand U.S. support for Afghanistan’s health  sector goals, USAID established its Rural Expansion of Afghanistan’s  Community-Based Health Care program through a contract signed in May  2003, as a continuation of previously begun work.
Education.  By the end of fiscal year 2003, USAID, through quick-impact  projects, had repaired or constructed approximately 200 schools, provided  more than 25 million textbooks,  trained over 3,000 teachers, and  supplemented approximately 50,000 teachers’ salaries with vegetable oil.  (The oil represented 26 percent of the teachers’ monthly income.) To assist  Afghanistan with longer-term education goals, USAID created the  Afghanistan Primary Education Program through a contract signed in June  2003. Early efforts in this program included developing and beginning to  disseminate an accelerated learning curriculum for girls, who were not  educated under the Taliban. USAID plans to train 30,000 classroom  teachers between fiscal years 2003 and 2006. The prime education  contractor in charge of the training referred to the educators it will train as  “mentors” because they will not have the same qualifications as formally  trained teachers.
Agriculture. Through quick-impact projects, USAID helped farmers  reestablish agricultural production by distributing approximately 9,300  metric tons of seed and 12,400 metric tons of fertilizer, and by  rehabilitating more than 7,000 rural irrigation structures. USAID also  helped improve the rural economy by repairing over 70 bridges and tunnels  and more than 7,000 kilometers of secondary and tertiary roads and by  employing the equivalent of 1 million Afghans for 1 month.  In July 2003, the  agency awarded a contract for the Rebuilding Agricultural Markets  Program, aimed at increasing the food security and incomes of the rural  population. However, as of October 2003, work under this contract had not  yet begun.
Democracy strengthening. USAID established two democracy and  governance programs, one to help implement the political goals set by the  Bonn Agreement and the other to bolster the civil society, media, and  political parties.  Through the beginning efforts of these programs, in  conjunction with the quick-impact activities, the United States provided  key technical assistance, civic education, and logistics support for the  emergency loya jirga (grand council) to establish the interim government,  and for the second loya jirga to ratify a new constitution.  USAID also  provided over 130 advisers to the Afghan ministries and funded  approximately 880 staff positions. In addition, USAID supported the  creation of radio stations and trained over 320 journalists to aid the  development of a free and independent media.  As of October 2003, USAID  and the international community had helped the Afghan government  establish judicial reform, human rights, and constitutional commissions.  Further, USAID commissioned designs for a provincial courthouse and a  judicial complex in Kabul. USAID’s cooperative agreement with the  Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, establishing  the democracy strengthening program, was not signed until July 2003.
Gender equity.  USAID did not create separate women’s projects but rather  included elements promoting gender equity in its programs. For example,  some quick-impact infrastructure projects incorporated women’s labor into  the construction process. In Kunduz, where USAID helped a community  build a retaining wall, women participated and earned income by making  wire screens to contain rocks placed in the wall by the men. In addition,  USAID facilitated the involvement of women in the loya jirgas (women  accounted for 20 percent of the delegates at the December 2003  constitutional loya jirga) and in the Afghan government by rehabilitating  15 day care centers in ministry buildings to encourage Afghan women to  return to work. USAID also encouraged the return of girls to the classroom  by creating an accelerated education program. USAID also made maternal  care one of its primary health goals. However, Afghan society still limits  women’s travel and work, which complicates attempts to educate, train, or  provide medical care to them, and nearly 40 percent of existing health care  facilities employ no female health workers. Further, several girls’ schools  have been set on fire to protest educating women, and a female loya jirga  representative’s life was threatened when she expressed her negative  opinion about the government’s collaboration with warlords.
section_title: Coordination Mechanisms Established, but U.S. Strategy and Financial Data Were Incomplete; International Assistance Coordination Remained Weak
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2002–2003, the U.S. government established several  mechanisms to coordinate its assistance effort in Afghanistan, but it lacked  a comprehensive reconstruction strategy. Although U.S. agency officials  characterized coordination as effective overall, some problems occurred.  In addition, key operational components of the strategies intended to guide  the reconstruction effort were incomplete or were not drafted until the  latter half of fiscal 2003. Further, coordination officials lacked complete  and accurate financial data needed for effective program management.  Meanwhile, international assistance coordination was weak in 2002, with  limited improvements introduced through the consultative group  mechanism in 2003.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Efforts Were Coordinated, but Minor Problems Occurred
paragraphs: U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002–2003 was coordinated  through a number of mechanisms; however, some problems occurred. U.S.  efforts were coordinated in Washington through the Afghanistan  Reconstruction Office, the Policy Coordinating Committee, the Deputies’  Committee, and the Principals’ Committee, and in Afghanistan through the  U.S. Embassy country team. (See fig. 17.) According to Department of State  officials, interagency coordination among the Afghanistan Reconstruction  Office, agencies delivering assistance, and the embassy country team was  routine and daily. In addition, these officials stated that the formal,  hierarchical, interagency committee structure provided a uniform process  for making policy-level decisions and keeping the President informed.
U.S. officials from several agencies we spoke to stated that, overall, the  U.S. government’s coordination of the Afghan assistance effort in fiscal  years 2002–2003 was effective. According to officials from USAID and the  Departments of Agriculture, State, and Commerce, coordination efforts  were successful and the policy coordination committee succeeded in  bringing all of the agencies together to discuss pertinent issues and make  collective decisions. USAID’s former mission director in Afghanistan  emphasized that the daily meetings of the country team and other  assistance sector–based teams ensured good coordination within the  embassy.
Although U.S. officials stated that coordination among agencies was  generally good, several cited examples of coordination problems. For  example, USAID officials said that whereas USAID worked closely with  Afghan government ministries on the selection and location of projects, the  PRTs focused on projects chosen by local authorities. Consequently, the  PRTs implemented projects that were not included in national plans  developed by the central government. In addition, USAID officials and  Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials confirmed that  coordination problems involving the two organizations’ efforts in  Afghanistan’s health sector had occurred. Specifically, HHS rehabilitated  the Rabia Balkhi Hospital in Kabul, rather than focus efforts on rural health  clinics where the Afghan Ministry of Health and USAID had determined the  need for assistance was greater. In another example, Department of State  staff stated that USAID did not share information on its demining activities  and that staff turnover and inconsistent operating procedures within the  Department of Defense made coordinating demining efforts difficult.
section_title: Strategic Guidance Was Incomplete, Financial Data Was Lacking
paragraphs: The U.S. government’s strategies for directing its reconstruction efforts in  Afghanistan evolved during fiscal years 2002–2003, and key operational  components of the strategies were incomplete or not drafted until the latter  half of fiscal year 2003. In addition, coordination officials lacked complete  and accurate financial data needed for effective program management.
subsections: section_title: Strategic Guidance Evolved Over Time
paragraphs: Various strategies pertaining to U.S. assistance efforts were developed  during the fiscal 2002–2003 period. Several levels of strategies, from the  President’s office down to the USAID mission, are designed to guide U.S.  assistance efforts in Afghanistan, focus resources, and hold agencies  accountable for their efforts. In February 2003, the President published a  broad strategy for meeting the immediate and long-term security needs of  Afghanistan in response to the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act  requirements. The President’s strategy is intentionally broad and,  therefore, lacks operational details, such as time frames and measurable  goals.  In June 2003, 18 months after the signing of the Bonn Agreement, the  Department of State published its first mission performance plan to guide  U.S. efforts in Afghanistan for fiscal years 2003–2006. This plan is  organized around five strategic goals for the reconstruction effort and one  management goal pertaining to Department of State facilities in  Afghanistan. The mission plan provides an estimate, by appropriation  account, of the financial resources needed.  Further, the plan (1) describes  specific tactics and activities to be undertaken and assigns responsibility  for each activity to USAID and other offices of the agencies housed within  the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan and (2) defines baseline data,  performance indicators, and targets for achieving each performance goal.  As the key U.S. agency for reconstruction of Afghanistan, USAID is  responsible for developing a more detailed strategy and subordinate plans  and programs to carry out its responsibilities.
section_title: USAID Strategy Lacked Operational Details
paragraphs: The USAID mission in Afghanistan developed an interim strategy and  action plan in August 2002. However, these documents did not clearly  articulate measurable goals or provide details on time frames, resources,  responsibilities, objective measures, or means to evaluate progress for  each of the sectors targeted by the strategy. USAID directives require that  interim strategies include a description of how or when the strategy would  be replaced by a standard strategic plan. The interim strategy for  Afghanistan does not contain the required description. USAID’s guidelines  and directives state that country-level strategies and plans should address,  among other things, strategic objectives, key country-level problems,  programmatic approaches, baseline data and targets, performance  indicators and the means to measure progress, fundamental assumptions,  and resources required to implement the plan. Although USAID developed  a number of measurable goals for various sectors during fiscal years 2002– 2003, these goals and the resources and methods designed to achieve them  were included in numerous project documents and contracts rather than  stated in a comprehensive strategy as called for by USAID guidelines.
Further, according to USAID officials, although USAID Washington  reviewed the strategy and action plan, the documents were not vetted  through USAID’s standard strategy review process; instead an abbreviated  process was used to assess clarity, feasibility, compliance with agency  policies, delineation of expected results, and congruency with available  resources. The former mission director in Afghanistan stated that the time  and resources needed to develop and approve a strategy through the  normal USAID operating procedures were not available when the strategy  documents were developed and that a waiver for meeting standard  strategy-related requirements was granted in February 2002.
In January 2003, USAID officials responsible for the agency’s efforts in  Afghanistan requested a second waiver and promised to draft a strategy  according to USAID guidelines within 6 months of the waiver’s approval.  According to USAID documents, no strategy was drafted because the  situation in Afghanistan was too dynamic, preventing USAID from taking a  proactive approach to its efforts including the development of a strategy.  A  third waiver was approved in February 2004 that exempts USAID from  developing the strategy until February 2005. As a result, more than 3 years  will have passed between the time USAID began providing postconflict  assistance to Afghanistan and the completion of a USAID assistance  strategy for Afghanistan. The lack of a complete country strategy impedes  USAID’s ability to ensure progress toward development goals, make  informed resource allocation decisions, and meet agency and  congressional accountability reporting requirements on the effectiveness  of agency programs.
section_title: Comprehensive Financial Data Was Not Readily Available
paragraphs: The coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, as well as others  responsible for the coordination of U.S. assistance, lacked complete and  accurate financial data in fiscal years 2002–2003. Program managers need  financial data to, among other things, monitor performance, allocate  resources, and determine whether strategic goals are being met. Further,  relevant information needs to be identified, collected, and distributed in a  form and time frame so that duties can be performed efficiently. Most of  the agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan could not readily provide  complete or accurate data on assistance obligations and expenditures, and  some agencies were unable to disaggregate the information by fiscal year  or province. Consequently, over the course of our review, we worked with  the agencies to obtain reliable data. In fiscal years 2002–2003, the  Coordinator’s office did not require U.S. agencies to regularly report  obligation and expenditure data. As a result, the Coordinator for U.S.  Assistance to Afghanistan lacked information that could have helped  decision-makers manage the overall assistance effort, including the  targeting of resources to key efforts.
section_title: International Assistance Coordination Was Weak
paragraphs: Despite efforts to synchronize multiple donors’ efforts, coordination of  international assistance was weak in 2002 and problems remained in  2003. The Bonn Agreement urged donors to defer responsibility for  assistance coordination to the Afghan government. According to the UN,  coordination is the responsibility of the Afghan government; efforts by the  aid community should reinforce national authorities; and the international  community should operate, and relate to the Afghan government, in a  coherent manner rather than through a series of disparate relationships.
In April 2002, the Afghan government initiated efforts to exert leadership  over the highly fragmented reconstruction process. To accomplish this  task, the government published its National Development Framework,  which provided a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and broadly  established national goals and policy directions. In addition, the Afghan  government established a government-led coordination mechanism, the  implementation group, to bring coherence to the international community’s  independent efforts and broad political objectives. The mechanism’s  structure was based on the National Development Framework. Individual  coordination groups, led by Afghan ministers and composed of assistance  organizations, were established for each of the 12 programs in the  framework.
The implementation group mechanism proved to be largely ineffective. In  August 2002, officials from the Afghan government, the UN, the  Department of State, and USAID, as well as a number of nongovernmental  bodies, expressed concern over the lack of meaningful and effective  coordination of assistance in Afghanistan. For example, the Ministers of  Foreign Affairs, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Irrigation, and  Agriculture stated that the donor community’s effort to coordinate with the  government was poor to nonexistent. The ineffectiveness of the  implementation group mechanism resulted from its inability to overcome  several impediments. First, each bilateral, multilateral, and  nongovernmental assistance agency had its own mandate (established by  implementing legislation or charter) and sources of funding, and each  donor pursued development efforts in Afghanistan independently.  Second,  the international community asserted that the Afghan government lacked  the capacity and resources to effectively assume the role of coordinator  and, that these responsibilities therefore could not be delegated to the  government.  Third, no single entity within the international community  had the authority and mandate to direct the efforts of the myriad bilateral,  multilateral, and nongovernmental organizations providing assistance.
In December 2002, the Afghan government replaced the implementation  group with the consultative group mechanism to increase the effectiveness  and efficiency of assistance coordination in support of the goals and  objectives in the National Development Framework. The consultative  group mechanism in Afghanistan is similar to the implementation group in  (1) its National Development Framework–based hierarchical structure and  stated goals, (2) the role of the Afghan government, and (3) the  membership and leadership of sector-specific groups. (See fig. 18.)
By the end of fiscal year 2003, the consultative group had not surmounted  the conditions that prevented the implementation group from effectively  coordinating assistance. In an August 2003 review of the status of the  consultative group process, the Afghan government stated that the terms of  reference for the sectoral groups were unclear and too broad, the groups  were too large and lacked strong leadership, member commitment was  uneven, and the overall potential of the mechanism was not utilized. In  October 2003, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development stated  that the consultative group process had not yet proven effective, that the  consultative groups were too large to be effective decision-making bodies,  and that assistance organizations continued to implement projects not  included in the Afghan government’s national budget and priorities. The  Minister of Agriculture stated that despite the efforts of consultative groups  to coordinate donor efforts, donor governments and assistance agencies  continued to develop their own strategies and implement projects outside  the Afghan government’s national budget.
section_title: Achievement of U.S. Goals Uncertain Given Precedents, Obstacles
paragraphs: The attainment of the U.S. goal of a stable, democratic Afghanistan  remained uncertain given the historical precedents and the current Afghan  environment, where numerous obstacles threatened reconstruction efforts  in fiscal years 2002–2003. Afghanistan exhibits many of the characteristics  that other nations have faced in their efforts to transition from a  postconflict environment to a stable democracy. In fiscal years 2002–2003,  deteriorating security and increasing opium cultivation in particular  jeopardized U.S. reconstruction efforts, and efforts to counter these  obstacles have had little success.  Other hindrances to U.S. reconstruction  efforts in Afghanistan during this period included small staff size,  inadequate working conditions and equipment, and the timing of funding  for reconstruction activities.  In September 2003, the U.S. government  announced an initiative called “Accelerating Success” to increase funding  and expedite projects.
subsections: section_title: Afghanistan Exhibits Characteristics That Threatened Success in Other Postconflict Nations
paragraphs: Afghanistan displays many of the characteristics that have obstructed  transitions to peace and stability in other postconflict countries.  Analyses  conducted by various experts on postconflict reconstruction have  identified a number of such characteristics, including multiple competing  parties, valuable and disposable resources such as opium, and a weakened  state.  In addition, our past work has shown that despite variations in  postconflict situations, efforts to rebuild require a secure environment,  adequate resources, and the support of the host government and civil  society. Figure 19 compares characteristics of Afghanistan that we—and  experts from the World Bank and other nongovernmental institutions— found to have affected reconstruction in other postconflict countries.
section_title: Pervasive Insecurity Threatened Reconstruction
paragraphs: Terrorist attacks by the Taliban and al Qaeda and the criminal activity of  warlords contributed to the overall environment of insecurity throughout  Afghanistan and threatened the U.S. reconstruction effort in fiscal years  2002–2003. In March 2002, in a report to the UN Security Council, the UN  Secretary General stated that security will remain the essential requirement  for protecting the peace process in Afghanistan.  In a report to the council 1  year later, he identified security as the most serious challenge to the peace  process.  Others in the international community, including the United  States, recognize security as a prerequisite for the implementation of  reconstruction efforts.
According to UN, nongovernmental organization, and U.S. reports, the  security situation deteriorated throughout 2003. Incidents over the 2-year  period included   numerous skirmishes between coalition, al Qaeda, and Taliban troops in  the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan;   the attempted assassinations of the Minister of Defense and the   the assassination of Vice President Qadir;   the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker;  attacks on contractors working on USAID’s Kabul-Kandahar road  project that resulted in 14 injuries and 9 deaths;   rocket attacks on U.S. and international military installations;   sniper fire and grenade attacks on UN and nongovernmental  organization vehicles and offices; and   bombings in the center of Kabul and Kandahar, at the International  Security Assistance Force headquarters, and of UN compounds.
The increase in violence against aid organizations forced suspensions of  assistance activities. For example, attacks against deminers forced the UN  to suspend all humanitarian demining activities in 10 provinces in May 2003  including demining activities along the Kabul–Kandahar road. Similarly, the  killings of three nongovernmental organization staff in August 2003 and a  UN High Commissioner for Refugees staff member in November 2003  resulted in, among other things, the agency’s removing its international  staff and its reduced ability to deliver assistance to refugees and internally  displaced people.
Furthermore, the criminality of the warlords’ private armies continued to  destabilize the country and impede reconstruction, according to the  Department of State, the UN, Human Rights Watch, and other international  experts. The warlords foster an illegitimate economy fueled by the  smuggling of arms, drugs, and other goods. They also, in violation of the  Bonn Agreement, control private armies of tens of thousands of armed men  and illegally withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in customs duties  collected at border points in the regions they control, depriving the central  government of revenues needed to fund the country’s central government  and reconstruction effort. Repeated violent clashes among the warlords  continued throughout fiscal years 2002–2003, forcing USAID and other  assistance agencies to periodically suspend their assistance activities in the  affected areas. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the  United States uses warlord-commanded militias in its continuing  counterinsurgency effort against the Taliban. The militia forces also  provide security for PRTs. For example, troops commanded by one of the  warlords in control of Hirat and its adjoining provinces provide security to  U.S. civil affairs units stationed in Hirat.
The United States and the international community have taken several  steps to improve security in Afghanistan. First, beginning in 2002, the  Department of Defense established PRTs in several locations in  Afghanistan. These company-sized units of 50 to 100 soldiers were charged  with enhancing security over immense geographical areas in an effort to  create a safe environment for reconstruction activities. For example, the  PRT in Gardez, with 77 security personnel and 52 other personnel, had an  area of responsibility that covered five provinces with a total land area of  70,000 square kilometers—an area about the size of South Carolina.  Nongovernmental organization officials, as well as others, have criticized  the size of the PRTs, stating that the units were too small to provide  security for their areas of responsibility or create a secure environment for  reconstruction projects.
In 2002, Department of Defense began funding efforts to help establish a  national army in Afghanistan. As of late fiscal 2003, its efforts to train the  first corps of the new army had fallen behind schedule, due in part to  higher than expected rates of attrition among Afghan recruits. As of  September 2003, approximately 5,500 soldiers had been trained. In 2003,  the Department of State and the German government (the designated lead  nation for police training in Afghanistan) began implementing plans to train  20,000 Afghan police by June 2004 and 50,000 by the end of 2005.  By March  2004, 9,000 officers received training. Finally, the U.S. government  considers the demobilization and reintegration of the warlords’ forces a  prerequisite for improving the country’s security and succeeding in the  international recovery effort. According to the Department of State, this  program is critical to efforts to reduce the destabilizing presence of these  militias. As of March 2004, 5,200 soldiers had been disarmed.
section_title: Opium Production Threatened Stability
paragraphs: The illicit international trade in Afghan opiates also threatened  Afghanistan’s stability during fiscal years 2002–2003.  The drug trade  provided income for terrorists and warlords, fueling the factions that  worked against stability and national unity. According to UN and  International Monetary Fund estimates, in 2002, Afghan farmers produced  3,422 metric tons of opium, providing $2.5 billion in trafficking revenue.   This amount was equal to 68 percent of the total international assistance to  Afghanistan disbursed for that year, or nearly 4.5 times the Afghan  government’s 2003 operating budget. In 2003, UN estimates indicated that  opium production in the country increased to approximately 3,600 metric  tons, the second largest harvest in the country’s history.  Further, heroin  laboratories have proliferated in Afghanistan in recent years. As a result of  the increased poppy production and in-country heroin production, greater  resources were available to Afghan criminal networks and others at odds  with the central government. According to the Department of State, at the  provincial and district levels, drug-related corruption is believed to be  pervasive. Involvement ranges from direct participation in the criminal  enterprise, to benefiting financially from taxation or other revenue streams  generated by the narcotics trade. The International Monetary Fund and  Afghanistan’s Minister of Finance have stated that the potential exists for  Afghanistan to become a “narcostate,” in which all legitimate institutions  are infiltrated by the power and wealth of drug traffickers.
The overall increase in opium production in 2002-2003 occurred despite the  counternarcotics efforts implemented by the Afghan government and a  number of international donors. During the 2-year period, the Afghan  government and the international community, with funding from the United  Kingdom and the United States, instituted alternative livelihood and poppy  eradication programs in Afghanistan. Total U.S. funding dedicated to  counternarcotics was $23.4 million in fiscal 2002. The Department of State  did not request or receive funding for counternarcotics efforts in fiscal  2003. Although the programs failed to stem the increase in opium  production, the long-term effects of these programs remain to be seen.
section_title: Inadequate U.S. Resources Hindered Reconstruction
paragraphs: During fiscal years 2002–2003, limited resources further obstructed U.S.  reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The USAID mission in Kabul was  insufficiently staffed to carry out its responsibilities. In addition,  inadequate working conditions and equipment—including cramped  workspace, limited mobility, and unreliable communications and  transportation equipment—hindered the implementation of assistance  activities. Further, most reconstruction funding was not available until  mid–fiscal year 2003. To help expedite reconstruction efforts and create  more visible results, the U.S. initiated an “Accelerating Success” program in  fiscal year 2004.
subsections: section_title: Lack of Staff Prevented Management and Oversight of Assistance Efforts
paragraphs: The USAID mission in Kabul was inadequately staffed to accomplish its  management and oversight responsibilities. In its August 2002 action plan  for assistance to Afghanistan, USAID stated that the number of positions it  was allotted (12 slots) through the embassy’s staffing allocation process  was clearly inadequate to design and implement the large program planned  for Afghanistan. USAID’s mission in Afghanistan managed a $505 million  program in 2003, one of the largest in the world; however, its staff size is  one of the smallest. On average, an overseas USAID mission has a staff of  73 and a budget of approximately $51 million, or one staff member per  about $700,000.  In Afghanistan, that ratio in fiscal year 2003 was  approximately one staff member per about $13 million. Although USAID/  Kabul indicated in its 2003 staffing plan that it needed 113 staff, only 39 of  these positions were filled during the year.
In its March 2003 risk assessment, USAID’s Inspector General cited delays  in the assignment and retention of qualified personnel as one of three  material weaknesses in USAID’s system of management controls in  Afghanistan. It also reported that the risks associated with this material  weakness were amplified by, among other things, the magnitude of the  funding being provided to Afghanistan and the pressure to implement  projects in extremely short time frames. In August 2003, we reported that  as a result of the decreases in U.S. direct-hire foreign service staff levels,  increasing program demands, and a mostly ad hoc approach to workforce  planning, USAID faces several human capital vulnerabilities, including the  lack of a “surge capacity” to respond to emergencies such as postconflict  situations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Because of the small number of USAID staff in Afghanistan and the  numerous vacancies, staff members were often required to work long  hours and take on additional responsibilities.  For example, from March  2002 through June 2003, USAID’s General Development Officer also  periodically served as USAID’s Acting Deputy Mission Director and Acting  Mission Director and as the Department of State’s Acting Deputy Chief of  Mission and Chargé d’Affaires. During our visit in October 2003, USAID’s  mission had been without a Director for two months. At the time, the  Acting Mission Director was also the Cognizant Technical Officer  overseeing the largest USAID project in Afghanistan. USAID tried to  compensate for the gaps by deploying staff to Kabul on temporary duty.  However, this did not ensure the continuity needed to administer a  program effectively and efficiently.
As a result of the small staff size, staff members were overworked and  found it difficult to keep up with their myriad responsibilities, including  monitoring and evaluating projects. The lack of monitoring was  evidenced by the USAID staffs’ inability to provide us with the exact  location of the projects we asked to visit. In its December 2003 midterm  program assessment of projects in Afghanistan, OTI noted that deficiencies  in monitoring at construction sites contributed to a high rate of faulty  construction, serious post-construction problems, and added costs.
section_title: Inadequate Working Conditions and Equipment Constrained Assistance Efforts
paragraphs: Inadequate working conditions and equipment—such as cramped  workspace, limited mobility, and unreliable communications and  transportation equipment—also hindered the implementation of assistance  activities. In its August 2002 action plan for Afghanistan, USAID stated that  without adequate working and living space, it might not be able to achieve  its goals. In its March 2003 risk assessment for USAID activities in  Afghanistan, USAID’s Inspector General cited unsuitable working and  living conditions as material weaknesses, stating that existing conditions in  Afghanistan were “unsuitable for carrying out program design and  implementation in an effective and efficient manner.” During our visit in  October 2003, we found that staff at the USAID mission faced severe space  constraints. For example, we observed as many as eight USAID staff, their  files, and office furniture and equipment sharing one small office. USAID  took steps to obtain additional space at the embassy and in other U.S.  locations in Kabul, but it was not available during fiscal year 2003.
In addition, Department of State security restrictions, imposed due to  increasing levels of insecurity, severely limited USAID staff’s ability to  travel to field sites and monitor ongoing reconstruction efforts. In its March  2003 assessment, USAID’s Inspector General cited the security restrictions  as another material weakness, stating that staff members are not able to  travel to project sites and monitor project implementation in an adequate  manner with the frequency required. To improve its ability to monitor field  sites, USAID contracted for program managers through the International  Organization for Migration (IOM). Although some IOM staff contracted by  USAID are U.S. citizens, they are not bound by the same security rules as  direct-hire USAID staff and, therefore, can visit projects in the field.  However, despite this action, we found that USAID was unable to  adequately monitor projects.
The limitations on mobility made communications capability essential.  However, according to U.S. and international officials in Afghanistan, e- mail and cellular phone service is intermittently reliable within Kabul and  less reliable between provinces, making it difficult to contact staff and  contractors in the field. PRT staff stated that they lacked adequate mobile  secure communications equipment, and some had to purchase their own  geographic positioning systems.
In addition, PRT staff in the field relied on old vehicles that the United  States leased from local vendors. The frequent breakdown of the vehicles  and the lack of replacement parts severely limited staff’s ability to carry out  their responsibilities.  For example, according to PRT officials we spoke  with, most of the vehicles used are approximately 10 years old—with some  having logged more than 100,000 miles—break down frequently, and are  not designed for the rigorous terrain of Afghanistan. For example, senior  PRT officials in Hirat told us that, in 2003, they made two unsuccessful  attempts to reach Chaghcharan, the capital of Ghor, the province adjoining  Hirat province. During a third attempt, one vehicle experienced 14 flat tires  in 3 days. The PRT staff said that because the vehicles were in such poor  condition, the staff spent much of their time on the road searching for  spare parts and repairing vehicles instead of identifying assistance needs  and implementing projects.
section_title: Funding Delays Slowed Reconstruction Efforts
paragraphs: Although the United States provided significant humanitarian assistance to  Afghanistan in fiscal 2002, very little money was available to USAID for  reconstruction until the second half of fiscal year 2003.  USAID considers  adequate funding a prerequisite for the success of the reconstruction effort.  However, according to USAID officials, because they did not know when  they would receive additional funding, they were unable to develop and  plan for long-term resource-intensive reconstruction projects and instead  focused on short-term projects that required less money; some of these  served as pilots for the longer-term projects begun later in fiscal year 2003.
During fiscal years 2002–2003, funding for reconstruction projects in  Afghanistan was allocated to USAID programming offices in four  increments. According to USAID, an initial allotment for $52 million for  reconstruction was made in February 2002; at the time, the programming  offices were assured that more funding was imminent. About 8 months  later, USAID obtained an additional $40 million; however, some of the  money was used for emergency winterization measures, such as providing  food and shelter, to stave off another humanitarian crisis. Since there was  no Afghanistan— specific request for fiscal 2002, $80 million was  supplemental funding, while the remaining $12 million was reprogrammed  funds from existing assistance accounts. As a result, USAID was able to  initiate only two major reconstruction programs, infrastructure  rehabilitation and the reform and development of economic governance, by  the first anniversary of the Bonn Agreement in late 2002. In contrast, the  rate of funding for rebuilding Iraq was much faster.  Specifically, in less  than 1 month after the U.S. announced an end to major hostilities in Iraq,  USAID obligated $118 million for reconstruction activities from the Iraq  Relief and Reconstruction Fund account.  By the end of December 2003, 7  months later, USAID obligated about $1.5 billion for Iraq reconstruction  from this account.
Although there was no specific request for funding for Afghanistan  included in the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget, funding became  available when Congress appropriated $295.5 million for Afghanistan in  February 2003. USAID officials reported that the allotments from this  appropriation began in April 2003, and USAID targeted about $265 million  toward longer-term reconstruction projects and $30 million for short-term  projects. In April 2003, Congress passed the fiscal 2003 supplemental  appropriations bill that included $167 million for Afghanistan. The  allotments from this appropriation began in June 2003. All of this funding  was used for longer-term reconstruction. (See fig. 20.)
Because of the delays in funding during the 17-month period following the  signing of the Bonn Agreement, USAID had to cancel projects, reallocate  funding from some projects in order to keep other projects operating, and  delay the implementation of 5 of its 7 major reconstruction contracts until  spring and summer of 2003. According to USAID officials responsible for  the management of USAID’s assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002– 2003, if funding had been provided sooner and in greater amounts, major  contracts could have been awarded sooner, a greater number of projects  could have been implemented over the 2-year period, and more results  could have been achieved.
section_title: Rate of International Donor Funding Was Also Slow
paragraphs: The funding provided by the United States in fiscal years 2002–2003 was  part of the larger international reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. The  Afghan government estimated that Afghanistan needs $30 billion over the 5- year period 2004–2008 for what it defines as high-priority reconstruction  efforts. According to the Center on International Cooperation, as of May  2003, $947 million of the international disbursements had been used to  begin reconstruction projects. Despite Afghanistan’s stated need and the  importance that the United States and the international community  assigned to the reconstruction effort, Afghanistan received significantly  less international assistance over fiscal years 2002–2003 than was provided  during the first 2 years of other recent postconflict, complex emergencies  over a similar time period.  According to analyses by the International  Monetary Fund, RAND Corporation, and others, Afghanistan received  about $67 in annual per capita assistance in 2002 and 2003; by contrast, the  annual per capita aid provided during the first 2 years in other recent  postconflict settings was greater. For example, annual per capita assistance  was $256 in East Timor (1999–2001) and $249 in Bosnia (1995–1997). At the  October 19, 2003, meeting of the Consultative Group Standing Committee,  the Afghan government warned the international community that the  reconstruction effort might fail and that success would occur only if the  rate of international obligations were increased and national  reconstruction projects were fully funded.
section_title: Accelerating Success Initiative Designed to Increase Funding for Reconstruction
paragraphs: The U.S. government announced in September 2003  a new initiative called  “Accelerating Success,” to increase funding and expedite the  reconstruction efforts, particularly regarding infrastructure,  democratization and human rights, and security.  The initiative was  designed to be implemented in the 9-months leading up to the presidential  elections planned for June 2004. The U.S. government plans to provide  $1.76 billion for the acceleration effort. Approximately $1 billion of that  amount would provide funding for elections, major and secondary road  construction, health and education programs, economic and budget  support to the Afghan government, senior advisers and technical experts,  and private sector initiatives. The remaining $700 million would be targeted  toward building the Afghan National Army, training and equipping the  police force, expanding the counternarcotics program, and establishing  rule of law. Funding for the initiative was appropriated in November 2003;  however, USAID did not receive the money until January/February 2004,  leaving only 7 months to complete visible reconstruction projects before  the September election. Moreover, the need to evaluate projects quickly  will increase under the initiative, but no additional funds have been  included for this purpose.
In April 2003, prior to the “Accelerating Success” initiative, at the request of  President Karzai, the United States decided to complete the first layer of  pavement of the Kabul-Kandahar road by December 2003 instead of  December 2005.  Under the original plan, the estimated cost to bring the  road up to international standards was $113 million; the United States  pledged $80 million, while Saudi Arabia and Japan each pledged an  additional $50 million. In shortening the timeline by 2 years, the United  States assumed responsibility for 389 kilometers of the 482-kilometer  distance. (See fig. 21.) Consequently, the United States hired several more  subcontractors, increased the labor and security forces, imported  additional equipment, and tapped the world market of asphalt. The first  layer of pavement was completed about 17 months after the contract was  signed, and the road opened on December 16, 2003. By the time in 2004 that  contractors lay the final layers of asphalt, repair the road’s bridges, and  construct the culverts, USAID projects that the road’s total cost to the  United States will be $270 million, more than double the original cost  estimate, due to accelerating the project.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: After 23 years of war, the reconstruction needs of Afghanistan are  immense.  Since the fall of the Taliban regime in October 2001, the United  States has viewed the establishment of a stable, democratic Afghanistan as  essential to U.S. national security.  The United States, in cooperation with  the international community, is attempting to rebuild Afghanistan and help  the country become a stable and functioning democracy. U.S.-led efforts in  fiscal years 2002–2003 helped avert a humanitarian crisis; however,  conditions in Afghanistan, such as the deteriorating security situation, the  relative weakness of the central government, and the increase in opium  production, complicate the longer-term reconstruction process and  threaten its ultimate success. In addition, despite a consensus that  reconstruction assistance is essential to achieving the U.S. goal in  Afghanistan, most funding for reconstruction in fiscal years 2002–2003 was  not allocated until 17 months after the signing of the Bonn Agreement. This  delay, as well as a lack of staff and equipment, further hindered U.S. efforts.  Consequently, overall progress towards Afghanistan’s reconstruction goals  by the end of fiscal year 2003 was limited.
The President’s broad strategy published in February 2003 and reported on  semiannually states that success in Afghanistan demands that the U.S.  government follow a coherent, consistent, and closely coordinated  strategy. However, for most of fiscal years 2002–2003, the United States  lacked such a strategy. In addition, USAID, which provided the majority of  U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, lacked a complete operational strategy to  guide its nonsecurity-related efforts, making it difficult for the agency to  integrate projects, focus available resources, and be held accountable for  achieving measurable results. The need for such a strategy has become  more vital given that, between August 2002 and July 2003, USAID awarded  seven major multiyear reconstruction contracts worth hundreds of millions  of dollars. Further, most of the U.S. agencies providing assistance to  Afghanistan did not have readily available comprehensive financial data on  their efforts, limiting the ability of individuals and institutions charged with  coordinating and overseeing the assistance to execute these  responsibilities.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Administrator of USAID revise its strategy for the  agency’s assistance program in Afghanistan. The revised strategy should,  among other things, (1) contain measurable goals, specific time frames,  and resource levels; (2) delineate responsibilities; (3) identify external  factors that could significantly affect the achievement of its goals; and (4)  include a schedule for program evaluations that assess progress against the  strategy’s goals.
In addition, to improve oversight of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, we are  making two recommendations to the Secretary of State. We recommend  that the Secretary of State direct the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to  Afghanistan to (1) produce an annual consolidated budget report for all  assistance to Afghanistan and (2) semiannually report obligations and  expenditures for the assistance provided, delineated by relevant U.S.  agencies and the bureaus and offices within each agency semiannually.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense  and to the U.S. Agency for International Development. State’s and USAID’s  written comments are presented in appendixes VI and VII, respectively.   State and USAID generally concurred with much of the information  presented on the situation in Afghanistan for the period covered by our  review.  State emphasized that despite security and other challenges,  significant progress had been made, not only with respect to humanitarian  and short-term assistance, but also in advancing long-term security,  reconstruction, and governance objectives.  USAID stated that the report  presented a fair picture of the situation in Afghanistan at the end of fiscal  year 2003, when USAID’s large reconstruction efforts were just beginning.   Both agencies included in their response additional information on more  recent activities taken and progress made.  The Department of Defense did  not provide official written comments, but provided technical comments,  as did USAID, that we have incorporated where appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that USAID revise its operational  strategy for Afghanistan to include details such as measurable goals,  timeframes, and required resources, USAID said that its less  comprehensive interim strategy was appropriate given the situation in  Afghanistan during the early phases of the ongoing efforts.  While we  recognize in the report that the strategy was an interim strategy, the need  for a more complete strategy is vital due to the large increase in USAID  assistance funding for Afghanistan. USAID said that it is committed to  developing a standard strategic plan for Afghanistan during 2004, which  would be consistent with our recommendation.  The Department of State  disagreed with our finding that the United States lacks a complete and  integrated assistance strategy, citing its December 15, 2003 report to  Congress, titled Fiscal Year 2004 Strategic and Financial Plan for  Reconstruction and Related Activities in Afghanistan. In the plan, State  noted that the United States is pursuing a three-fold strategy in  Afghanistan, focusing on security, reconstruction, and governance. We  found that most of the strategies that were published in fiscal years 2002  and 2003 lacked details on funding and other resources, measurable goals,  timeframes, as well as a means to measure progress. However, in the  report, we also cite State’s June 2003 Mission Performance Plan as meeting  many of the requirements for a government-wide operational strategy.  Although the fiscal year 2004 plan cited by State in its comments includes  more details on the U.S. assistance budget for Afghanistan, like some of the  previously published strategies, it lacks operational details, including time  frames, measurable goals, and a means to measure progress toward those  goals.
In response to our recommendation that State produce an annual  consolidated budget for all U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and report to  Congress semiannually on obligations and expenditures, State emphasized  that policymakers are provided with information on U.S. obligations  weekly, and that close interagency collaboration occurs regarding all  funding issues. In addition, State said that it already keeps Congress  regularly informed through staff briefings, hearings, and mandated reports.  We disagree. As we reported, complete and readily accessible obligation  and expenditure data were not available, and consequently, it is difficult for  the Coordinator to determine the extent to which U.S. assistance dollars  are being used to achieve measurable results in Afghanistan. Moreover, we  found that government-wide expenditure data on U.S. assistance to  Afghanistan is not collected, obligation data is collected on an ad hoc basis,  and that the Coordinator’s office experienced difficulty in consistently  collecting complete and accurate obligation data from U.S. government  agencies. Further reporting obligation data alone is insufficient. Obligation  data measures the extent to which contracts have been awarded, orders  placed, and similar transactions, not the extent to which money actually  has been spent on the ground on visible projects. Consequently, reporting  obligations alone does not provide an accurate portrayal of the progress of  the assistance effort. For example, as our report shows, although $647  million was obligated for reconstruction projects in fiscal 2002 and 2003,  less than a third of the total, or $214 million was actually spent.  Regular  reporting of both obligations and expenditures for U.S. assistance to  Afghanistan would provide the Coordinator and Congress a more complete  picture of what funds actually have been spent on visible projects.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees. We are also sending copies to the Administrator of USAID, the  Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. We also will make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at  no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-3149. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgements are  listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Section 106 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 directs GAO  to monitor U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan.   To meet the requirements of the directive and provide Congress with a  comprehensive accounting of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan for fiscal years  2002–2003, we (1) analyzed U.S. obligations and expenditures; (2)  identified the results of assistance projects through September 30, 2003; (3)  evaluated U.S. and international assistance coordination mechanisms and  the U.S. assistance strategy; and (4) examined the major obstacles that  affected the achievement of U.S. policy goals and the reconstruction effort.
We collected data on fiscal years 2002 and 2003 obligations and  expenditures from the U.S. departments and agencies responsible for  implementing U.S. government–funded projects in Afghanistan. These  include U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human  Services, State, and Treasury; the U.S. Trade and Development Agency; and  the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  Because there is  no single repository of financial information for all U.S. assistance in  Afghanistan, we contacted each agency directly. In addition, because the  Department of State does not have a consolidated financial reporting  mechanism for programs in Afghanistan, we contacted each bureau and  office separately—including the Bureaus of Population, Refugees, and  Migration, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; and the  Offices of International Information Programs, Humanitarian Demining  Programs, and Trafficking in Persons.
To determine which funds were applied to humanitarian and quick-impact  projects and which were applied to longer-term reconstruction funding, we  requested the agencies to designate their funding accordingly.  In the case  of USAID, we relied on the stated mission of the responsible funding  bureau to make the determination.  For example, the missions of the Office  of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives include  addressing emergency situations and implementing quick-impact projects,  respectively.
Since USAID did not provide separate financial management records for  fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we, in consultation with USAID, sorted the  obligation and expenditure data by year to arrive at the fiscal year  breakdowns that appear in this report.  The Department of Defense was  unable to disaggregate PRT project data by fiscal year.  The fiscal 2002  obligations and expenditures in the report include only funds spent on  humanitarian daily rations, while the fiscal 2003 figures include all PRT  funds in 2002 and 2003.
To delineate how funding and projects were distributed by province, we  combined information from both USAID and the Department of Defense.   USAID provided the information from a programmatic, rather than a  financial database, as the financial database did not include data by  location. Because the programmatic database had been updated only to  September 17, 2003, the numbers used for figure 5 are less than the total  obligations reported as of September 30, 2003.  However, according to  USAID, it can be assumed that the proportion of assistance by province did  not change during that time lag.  Also as a result of the data being drawn  from a programmatic database, we are unable to show expenditures by  province, because the database tracks only obligations.
To assess the reliability of the obligations and expenditures data from U.S.  agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan, we (1) interviewed officials  at the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID regarding their methods  of gathering, managing, and using data; (2) reviewed USAID’s financial  audit statement; and (3) compared the data we gathered with USAID’s  Congressional Budget Justifications and the Department of State’s 150  account documentation, as well as with the government-wide Afghanistan  assistance compilation done by the Department of State’s Resource  Management bureau. A Department of State official stated that the data  State compiled are not completely accurate, due in part to the lack of a  requirement for all agencies to report to one central office on a regular  basis, which results in variation in the frequency of reporting by individual  agencies and differences in how agencies track data. However, the  Department of State relies on these data for decision-making purposes and  to track how quickly money for Afghanistan is being used.  Based on our  assessment, we conclude that the data are sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of showing, in gross numbers, the level of nonsecurity-related  assistance that the U.S. government provided to Afghanistan in fiscal years  2002 and 2003.
To assess the reliability of the data on the pledges and disbursements made  by international donors, we (1) interviewed the official at the Department  of State who is responsible for compiling these data based on information  provided by the Government of Afghanistan and (2) performed some basic  reasonableness checks of the data against other sources of information.   We determined that the data are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  making a broad comparison of the United States’ contributions to those of  other major donors and the combined total for all other donors.  However,  we also noted several limitations in the data, notably the fact that the data  are largely self-reported by donor nations to the Afghan government and  are affected by differences in exchange rates.  In addition, donors both  over- and under-report due to varying definitions of disbursement.   Furthermore, the data on larger donors are considered more reliable than  the data on smaller donors, according to the Department of State. Due to  these limitations, and the fact that we could not contact each of the donors,  we were unable to determine the reliability of the precise dollars amounts  pledged and disbursed by every donor.  Nevertheless, because these are the  only available data and are used by the Department of State, we present the  dollar amounts reported to have been pledged and disbursed by each donor  in appendix V.
To examine the results of assistance projects through September 30, 2003,  we collected and analyzed information from the Departments of State and  Defense, and USAID in Washington, D.C., which outlined policy goals, basic  strategies, program objectives, and monitoring efforts. We also collected  and analyzed pertinent reports and testimony these agencies presented to  Congress. In October 2003, we traveled to Afghanistan to examine the  implementation of USAID and the Department of Defense’s assistance- related operations. While in country, we spent 13 days in the capital city,  Kabul, interviewing officials from the Afghan Ministries of Finance, Health,  Agriculture, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development; the Afghan  commissions on Human Rights and the Judicial Reform; the UN Assistance  Mission in Afghanistan; the UN Development Program (UNDP); and the  U.S. Departments of State and Defense and USAID. We also met with most  of USAID’s primary implementing partners (including the Louis Berger  Group, Creative Associates, Management Sciences for Health, and Bearing  Point) as well as nongovernmental organizations not funded by the United  States, such as the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and the  Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees. In Kabul, we inspected  Afghanistan’s new banking system, customs house, and the rehabilitation  of the Rabia Balkhi Women’s Hospital. We also spent a total of 7 days in the  Bamian, Kunduz, and Hirat provinces, where we inspected U.S.-funded  projects, implemented primarily by either the OTI or the Department of  Defense’s PRTs. While in the provinces, we met with an Afghan shura  (community council), teachers, and other community members involved in,  or affected by, U.S. reconstruction projects. Constraints placed on our  movement within Afghanistan by the U.S. Embassy due to security  concerns limited the number of project sites we could visit.
To analyze the assistance coordination mechanisms developed by the U.S.  government and the international community, we met with Department of  State staff responsible for assistance coordination and staff from USAID,  and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health and  Human Services, Labor, Treasury, and State involved in the provision of  assistance, to obtain their views on coordination. In addition, we reviewed  the U.S. National Security Strategy, the Department of State/USAID  consolidated strategic plan for 2004-2009, the President’s Security Strategy  for Afghanistan, the U.S. Embassy Kabul Mission Performance Plan, and  USAID’s strategy and action plan for Afghanistan. Using the criteria  contained in the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act and USAID  Automated Directives System, we examined USAID strategies to determine  whether they contained the basic elements of an operational strategy  articulated in the act and in agency guidance. Our analysis of international  coordination mechanisms included a review of UN and Afghan government  documents, including the Afghan National Development Framework and  Budget, pertaining to the international coordination mechanisms utilized in  Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002–2003. In addition, we met with officials  from the Afghan Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Health, and Rural  Rehabilitation and Development to obtain their views on the evolution and  status of the consultative group mechanism.
To analyze the obstacles that affected the implementation of U.S.  reconstruction assistance, we examined analyses of common obstacles  found in postconflict environments produced by the Carnegie Endowment  for International Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies,  the World Bank, Stanford University,  and the RAND Corporation. We also  reviewed as previous GAO work on the subject. We then compared those  obstacles with the conditions present in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002– 2003. In addition, we reviewed reports produced by the Departments of  Defense and State, the UN, the International Crisis Group, Human Rights  Watch, the Bonn International Center for Conversion, as well as a U.N.  Office on Drugs and Crime report on opium production in Afghanistan.  To  analyze other obstacles, including the lack of staff, equipment, and funding,  we spoke with officials from the Department of Defense and USAID.  In  addition, we examined appropriation legislation, USAID’s Congressional  Budget Justifications, and the Inspector General’s risk assessment of major  activities managed by USAID/Afghanistan.  Finally, we visited the USAID  mission in Kabul, Afghanistan, and PRTs in Bamian, Kunduz, and Hirat,  Afghanistan.
We conducted our review from August 2003–April 2004 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Summary of the Key Provisions of the Bonn Agreement
paragraphs: After coalition forces ousted the Taliban government, the United Nations  (U.N.) convened four Afghan groups to establish a blueprint for a  power-sharing, interim government; the Taliban were not included in these  talks. The resulting document, officially entitled the “Agreement on  Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of  Permanent Government Institutions,” commonly called the Bonn  Agreement or the Bonn Accord, was signed in Bonn, Germany on  December 5, 2001.
Establish an Interim Authority by December 22, 2001.
Establish the composition, functions, and governing procedures for  the interim administration.
Convene an emergency loya jirga, or grand council, within 6 months  of December 22, 2001 to decide on the Transitional Authority, which  will govern until the Afghan population elects a representative  government.
Decide on a Transitional Authority by the emergency loya jirga until  such time as a fully representative government can be elected  through free and fair elections within 2 years of the convening of the  emergency loya jirga.
Hold constitutional loya jirga to establish a new constitution within  18 months of December 22, 2001.
II.  Legal framework and judicial system  The 1964 constitution and existing laws and regulations should be  applied until the new constitution is written, excepting   where provisions of 1964 constitution are inconsistent with the Bonn  Agreement, or relate to the monarchy or constitutional, executive,  and legislative bodies  where existing laws and regulations are inconsistent with the Bonn  Agreement, Afghanistan’s international legal obligations, or the 1964  constitution.
The interim authority shall have power to amend existing laws and  regulations.
Afghanistan shall have independent judicial power vested in a Supreme  Court and other courts established by the Interim Administration. A  Judicial Commission established by the Administration shall rebuild the  justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international  standards, the rule of law, and Afghan legal traditions.
Composition: A chairman will preside over the cabinet-style interim  government, which includes five vice chairmen and 24 other members.
Procedures: Decisions will be made by consensus, or by majority vote  where necessary, as long as 22 members are present. If the vote is split  equally, the chairman holds the deciding vote.
Functions: The Interim Authority shall conduct the day-to-day affairs of  state. Among other things, it may, with the assistance of the UN,  establish a single national currency and a central bank, a Civil Service  Commission, a Human Rights Commission, and any other commission  to review matters not covered in the agreement.
IV.  The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the  Emergency Loya Jirga  A 21-member, special, independent commission will be established to  convene an emergency loya jirga within 6 months of the establishment  of the Interim Authority. The emergency loya jirga will decide on a  transitional authority to lead Afghanistan until a fully representative  government is elected within 2 years of the convening of the loya jirga.
Upon official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces, and  armed groups shall come under the command and control of the Interim  Authority.
The Interim Authority and emergency Loya Jirga shall act in  accordance with basic human rights and international humanitarian law.
The Interim Authority shall cooperate in the fight against terrorism,  drugs, and organized crime.
The Interim Authority and Special Independent Commission for the  convening of the emergency Loya Jirga shall ensure the participation of  women and the equitable representation of all ethnic and religious  communities in the Interim Authority and emergency Loya Jirga.
The Interim Authority shall adhere to Security Council resolution 1378.
The Interim Authority shall elaborate on rules of procedure for the  government as appropriate with UN guidance.
section_title: Summary of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002
subsections: section_title: Purposes
paragraphs: Assure U.S. security.
Address humanitarian crisis.
Fight illicit narcotics.
Promote a broad-based, multi-ethnic, gender-sensitive, and fully  representative government.
Support Afghan government’s projects.
Foster civil society.
Support reconstruction (create jobs, clear landmines, rebuild the  agriculture, health care and educational sectors).
Provide resources to the Ministry for Women’s Affairs.
Foster a pluralistic society that respects religious freedom.
section_title: Major types of assistance authorized
section_title: Coordination
paragraphs: Designate a coordinator within the Department of State to:  Design an overall strategy to advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan;  Ensure coordination among U.S. agencies;  Pursue coordination with other countries;  Ensure proper management, implementation, and oversight of   Resolve disputes among U.S. agencies with respect to Afghan  assistance.
section_title: Sunset
paragraphs: Authority expires after September 30, 2006.
section_title: Fiscal Years 2002-2003 Obligations and Expenditures for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance by U.S. Agencies
subsections: section_title: Agency U.S. Agency for International Development Department of State
section_title: Major Donors’ Reported Pledges and Disbursements for Assistance to Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2002-2003
paragraphs: 2 (Continued From Previous Page)
GAO was not able to determine the reliability of the specific dollar figures in this table.  While we  determined that the data are sufficiently reliable for broadly comparing U.S. contributions to those of  major donors, we noted several limitations, namely (a) that they are affected by differences in  exchange rates, (b) donors both over- and under-report due to varying definitions of disbursement, and  (c) the data on larger donors are considered more reliable than the data on smaller donors.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
section_title: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to those named above, Miriam A. Carroll, Martin de Alteriis,  Ernie Jackson, Reid Lowe, and Christina Werth made key contributions to  this report.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
paragraphs: The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of  Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities  and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government  for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal  programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other  assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding  decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of  accountability, integrity, and reliability.
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs