Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of the Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other Areas of Aviation Security Remain
Published: 2010-03-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 highlighted the importance of detecting improvised explosive devices on passengers. This testimony focuses on (1) the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to procure and deploy advanced imaging technology (AIT), and related challenges; and (2) TSA's efforts to strengthen screening procedures and technology in other areas of aviation security, and related challenges. This testimony is based on related products GAO issued from March 2009 through January 2010, selected updates conducted from December 2009 through March 2010 on the AIT procurement, and ongoing work on air cargo security. For the ongoing work and updates, GAO obtained information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA and interviewed senior TSA officials regarding air cargo security and the procurement, deployment, operational testing, and assessment of costs and benefits of the AIT.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In response to the December 25, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest flight 253, TSA revised the AIT procurement and deployment strategy, increasing the planned deployment of AITs from 878 to 1,800 units and using AITs as a primary--instead of a secondary--screening measure where feasible; however, challenges remain. In October 2009, GAO reported on the challenges TSA faced deploying new technologies such as the explosives trace portal (ETP) without fully testing them in an operational environment, and recommended such testing prior to future deployments. TSA officials concurred and stated that, unlike the ETP, operational testing for the AIT was successfully completed late in 2009 before its deployment was fully initiated. While officials said AITs performed as well as physical pat downs in operational tests, it remains unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 incident based on the preliminary information GAO has received. GAO is verifying that TSA successfully completed operational testing of the AIT. In October 2009, GAO also recommended that TSA complete cost-benefit analyses for new passenger screening technologies. While TSA conducted a life-cycle cost estimate and an alternatives analysis for the AIT, it reported that it has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the original deployment strategy or the revised AIT deployment strategy, which proposes a more than twofold increase in the number of machines to be procured. GAO estimates increases in staffing costs alone due to doubling the number of AITs that TSA plans to deploy could add up to $2.4 billion over its expected service life. While GAO recognizes that TSA is attempting to address a vulnerability exposed by the December 2009 attempted attack, a cost-benefit analysis is important as it would help inform TSA's judgment about the optimal deployment strategy for the AITs, and how best to address this vulnerability considering all elements of the screening system. TSA has also taken actions towards strengthening other areas of aviation security but continues to face challenges. For example, TSA has taken steps to meet the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010, including developing a program to share screening responsibilities across the air cargo supply chain. However, as GAO reported in March 2009, a number of challenges to this effort exist, including attracting participants to the TSA screening program, completing technology assessments, and overseeing additional entities that it expects to participate in the program. GAO is exploring these issues as part of an ongoing review of TSA's air cargo security program which GAO plans to issue later this year. Further, while TSA has taken a variety of actions to strengthen the security of commercial airports, GAO reported in September 2009 that TSA continues to face challenges in several areas, such as assessing risk and evaluating worker screening methods. In September 2009, GAO also recommended that TSA develop a national strategy to guide stakeholder efforts to strengthen airport perimeter and access control security, to which DHS concurred.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Transportation Security  Administration’s (TSA) progress in securing passenger checkpoints and  other areas of commercial aviation. In response to the December 25, 2009,  attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253, the Secretary of Homeland  Security announced five corrective actions to improve aviation security,  including accelerating deployment of the advanced imaging technology  (AIT)—formerly called the Whole Body Imager—to identify materials such  as those used in the attempted Christmas Day bombing. The AITs produce  an image of a passenger’s body that TSA personnel use to look for  anomalies, such as explosives. TSA is deploying AITs to airport passenger  checkpoints to enhance its ability to detect explosive devices and other  prohibited items on passengers. Passengers undergo either primary or  secondary screening at these checkpoints. Primary screening is conducted  on all airline passengers before they enter the sterile area of an airport and  involves passengers walking through a metal detector and their carry-on  items being subjected to X-ray screening. Secondary screening is  conducted on selected passengers and involves additional screening of  both passengers and their carry-on items. While screening passengers at  the checkpoint is a vital layer of security, it is also important to ensure the  security of other areas of commercial aviation, such as air cargo  transported on passenger aircraft, and airport worker screening and  checked baggage screening.
TSA’s passenger checkpoint screening system comprises three elements:  (1) personnel responsible for, among other things, screening passengers  and baggage; (2) the policies and procedures that govern the different  aviation security programs; and (3) the technology used to screen  passengers and baggage. All three elements—people, process, and  technology—collectively help determine the effectiveness and efficiency  of passenger checkpoint screening, and our past work in this area has  addressed all three elements of the system. Similarly, securing the flying  public involves tradeoffs between security, privacy, and the efficient flow  of commerce. Striking the right balance between these three goals is an  ongoing challenge facing TSA.
My testimony today focuses on (1) TSA’s plans to procure, deploy, and test  AITs to enhance the security of the passenger checkpoint, and any  challenges TSA faces in this effort; and (2) TSA’s efforts to strengthen  screening procedures and technology in other areas of aviation security,  and any related challenges the agency faces in these areas.
This statement is based on related GAO reports and testimonies we issued  from March 2009 through January 2010, as well as preliminary  observations based on ongoing work—from October 2008 through  February 2010—to be completed later this year assessing the progress that  DHS and its component agencies have made in addressing challenges  related to air cargo security. To conduct all of this work, we reviewed  relevant documents related to the programs reviewed, and interviewed  cognizant Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA officials. All  of this work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards, and our previously published reports  contain additional details on the scope and methodology for those  reviews. In addition, this statement contains selected updates conducted  from December 2009 through March 2010 on TSA’s effort to procure and  deploy the AIT. For the updates, we obtained information from DHS and  TSA on the AIT and interviewed senior TSA officials regarding the planned  procurement, deployment, operational testing and evaluation, and  assessment of benefits and costs of the AITs. We conducted these updates  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based  on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Airline Passenger Screening Using Checkpoint Technology
paragraphs: Passenger screening is a process by which screeners inspect individuals  and their property to deter and prevent an act of violence or air piracy,  such as the carrying of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or  other prohibited item on board an aircraft or into a sterile area. Screeners  inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated screening locations.  TSA developed standard operating procedures for screening passengers at  airport checkpoints. Primary screening is conducted on all airline  passengers before they enter the sterile area of an airport and involves  passengers walking through a metal detector, and carry-on items being  subjected to X-ray screening. Passengers who alarm the walk-through  metal detector or are designated as selectees—that is, passengers selected  for additional screening—must then undergo secondary screening, as well  as passengers whose carry-on items have been identified by the X-ray  machine as potentially containing prohibited items. Secondary screening  involves additional means for screening passengers, such as by hand  wand; physical pat down; or other screening methods such as the AIT.
section_title: Role of DHS Science & Technology Directorate
paragraphs: Within DHS, both the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA  have responsibilities for researching, developing, and testing and  evaluating new technologies, including airport checkpoint screening  technologies. Specifically, S&T is responsible for the basic and applied  research and advanced development of new technologies, while TSA,  through its Passenger Screening Program (PSP), identifies the need for  new checkpoint screening technologies and provides input to S&T during  the research and development of new technologies, which TSA then  procures and deploys. Because S&T and TSA share responsibilities related  to the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement,  and deployment of checkpoint screening technologies, the two  organizations must coordinate with each other and external stakeholders,  such as airport operators and technology vendors.
section_title: Air Cargo Security
paragraphs: Air cargo can be shipped in various forms, including unit load devices  (ULD) that allow many packages to be consolidated into one container or  pallet; wooden crates; or individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as  loose or break-bulk cargo. Participants in the air cargo shipping process  include shippers, such as manufacturers; freight forwarders, who  consolidate cargo from shippers and take it to air carriers for transport; air  cargo handling agents, who process and load cargo onto aircraft on behalf  of air carriers; and air carriers that load and transport cargo. TSA’s  responsibilities include, among other things, establishing security  requirements governing domestic and foreign passenger air carriers that  transport cargo and domestic freight forwarders.
section_title: Airport Perimeter Security and Access Control
paragraphs: Airport perimeter and access control security is intended to prevent  unauthorized access into secured airport areas, either from outside the  airport complex or from within. Airport operators generally have direct  day-to-day responsibility for maintaining and improving perimeter and  access control security, as well as implementing measures to reduce  worker risk. However, TSA has primary responsibility for establishing and  implementing measures to improve security operations at U.S. commercial  airports—that is, TSA-regulated airports—including overseeing airport  operator efforts to maintain perimeter and access control security.  Airport workers may access sterile areas through TSA security  checkpoints or through other access points that are secured by the airport  operator. The airport operator is also responsible, in accordance with its  security program, for securing access to secured airport areas where  passengers are not permitted. Airport methods used to control access  vary, but all access controls must meet minimum performance standards  in accordance with TSA requirements.
section_title: Increased Deployment of AIT Highlights the Importance of Operational Testing and Cost-Benefit Analysis Prior to Deployment
subsections: section_title: TSA Plans to Procure and Deploy 1,800 AITs by 2014 and Use Them as a Primary Screening Measure
paragraphs: In response to the December 2009 attempted terrorist attack, TSA has  revised its procurement and deployment strategy for the AIT, increasing  the number of AITs it plans to procure and deploy. In contrast with its  prior strategy, the agency now plans to acquire and deploy 1,800 AITs  (instead of the 878 units it had previously planned to acquire) and to use  them as a primary screening measure where feasible rather than solely as  a secondary screening measure. According to a senior TSA official, the  agency is taking these actions in response to the Christmas Day 2009  terrorist incident. These officials stated that they anticipate the AIT will  provide enhanced security benefits compared to walk-through metal  detectors, such as enhanced detection capabilities for identifying  nonmetallic threat objects and liquids. TSA officials also stated that the  AIT offers greater efficiencies because it allows TSA to more rigorously  screen a greater number of passengers in a shorter amount of time while  providing a detection capability equivalent to a pat down. For example, the  AIT requires about 20 seconds to produce and interpret a passenger’s  image as compared with 2 minutes required for a physical pat down. A  senior official also stated that TSA intends to continue to offer an  alternative but comparable screening method, such as a physical pat  down, for passengers who prefer not to be screened using the AIT.
The AIT produces an image of a passenger’s body that a screener  interprets. The image identifies objects, or anomalies, on the outside of the  physical body but does not reveal items beneath the surface of the skin,  such as implants. TSA plans to procure two types of AIT units: one type  uses millimeter-wave and the other type uses backscatter X-ray  technology. Millimeter-wave technology beams millimeter-wave radio- frequency energy over the body’s surface at high speed from two antennas  simultaneously as they rotate around the body. The energy reflected back  from the body or other objects on the body is used to construct a three- dimensional image. Millimeter wave technology produces an image that  resembles a fuzzy photo negative. Backscatter X-ray technology uses a  low-level X-ray to create a two-sided image of the person. Backscatter  technology produces an image that resembles a chalk etching.
As of February 24, 2010, according to a senior TSA official, the agency has  deployed 40 of the millimeter-wave AITs and procured 150 backscatter X- ray units in fiscal year 2009. In early March 2010, TSA initiated the  deployment of these backscatter units starting with two airports, Logan  International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, and Chicago O’Hare  International Airport in Des Plaines, Illinois. TSA officials stated that they  do not expect these units to be fully operational, however, until the second  or third week of March due to time needed to hire and train additional  personnel. TSA estimates that the remaining backscatter X-ray units will  be installed at airports by the end of calendar year 2010. In addition, TSA  plans to procure an additional 300 AIT units in fiscal year 2010, some of  which it plans to purchase with funds from the American Recovery and  Reinvestment Act of 2009. In fiscal year 2011, TSA plans to procure 503  AIT units. TSA projects that a total of about 1,000 AIT systems will be  deployed to airports by the end of December 2011. In fiscal year 2014 TSA  plans to reach full operating capacity, having procured a total of 1,800  units and deployed them to 60 percent of the checkpoint lanes at Category  X, I, and II airports. The current projected full operating capacity of 1,800  machines represents a more than two-fold increase from 878 units that  TSA had previously planned. TSA officials stated that the cost of the AIT is  about $170,000 per unit, excluding training, installation, and maintenance  costs. In addition, in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget submission,  TSA has requested $218.9 million for 3,550 additional full-time equivalents  (FTE) to help staff the AITs deployed in that time frame. From 2012  through 2014, as TSA deploys additional units to reach full operating  capacity, additional staff will be needed to operate these units; such  staffing costs will recur on an annual basis. TSA officials told us that three  FTEs are needed to operate each unit.
Because the AIT presents a full body image of a person during the  screening process, concerns have been expressed that the image is an  invasion of privacy. According to TSA, to protect passenger privacy and  ensure anonymity, strict privacy safeguards are built into the procedures  for use of the AIT. For example, the officer who assists the passenger does  not see the image that the technology produces, and the officer who views  the image is remotely located in a secure resolution room and does not see  the passenger. Officers evaluating images are not permitted to take  cameras, cell phones, or photo-enabled devices into the resolution room.  To further protect passengers’ privacy, ways have been introduced to blur  the passengers’ images. The millimeter-wave technology blurs all facial  features, and the backscatter X-ray technology has an algorithm applied to  the entire image to protect privacy. Further, TSA has stated that the AIT’s  capability to store, print, transmit, or save the image will be disabled at the  factory before the machines are delivered to airports, and each image is  automatically deleted from the system after it is cleared by the remotely  located security officer. Once the remotely located officer determines that  threat items are not present, that officer communicates wirelessly to the  officer assisting the passenger. The passenger may then continue through  the security process. Potential threat items are resolved through a directed  physical pat down before the passenger is cleared to enter the sterile  area. In addition to privacy concerns, the AITs are large machines, and  adding them to the checkpoint areas will require additional space,  especially since the operators are physically segregated from the  checkpoint to help ensure passenger privacy. Adding a significant number  of additional AITs to the existing airport infrastructure could impose  additional challenges on airport operators.
section_title: TSA Recently Reported Efforts to Strengthen Its Operational Test and Evaluation Process, but It Is Not Clear Whether TSA Has Fully Evaluated the Relative Security Benefits and Costs of the AIT
paragraphs: In October 2009, we reported that TSA had relied on a screening  technology in day-to-day airport operations that had not been proven to  meet its functional requirements through operational testing and  evaluation, contrary to TSA’s acquisition guidance and a knowledge-based  acquisition approach. We also reported that TSA had not operationally  tested the AITs at the time of our review, and we recommended that TSA  operationally test and evaluate technologies prior to deploying them. In  commenting on our report, TSA agreed with this recommendation.  Although TSA does not yet have a written policy requiring operational  testing prior to deployment, a senior TSA official stated that TSA has made  efforts to strengthen its operational test and evaluation process and that  TSA is now complying with DHS’s current acquisition directive that  requires operational testing and evaluation be completed prior to  deployment. According to officials, TSA is now requiring that AIT are to  successfully complete both laboratory tests and operational tests prior to  deployment.
As we previously reported, TSA’s experience with the explosives trace  portal (ETP), or “puffers,” demonstrates the importance of testing and  evaluation in an operational environment. The ETP detects traces of  explosives on a passenger by using puffs of air to dislodge particles from  the passenger’s body and clothing that the machine analyzes for traces of  explosives. TSA procured 207 ETPs and in 2006 deployed 101 ETPs to 36  airports, the first deployment of a checkpoint technology initiated by the  agency. TSA deployed the ETPs even though tests conducted during 2004  and 2005 on earlier ETP models suggested that they did not demonstrate  reliable performance. Furthermore, the ETP models that were  subsequently deployed were not tested to prove their effective  performance in an operational environment, contrary to TSA’s acquisition  guidance, which recommends such testing. As a result, TSA procured and  deployed ETPs without assurance that they would perform as intended in  an operational environment. TSA officials stated that they deployed the  machines without resolving these issues to respond quickly to the threat of  suicide bombers. In June 2006 TSA halted further deployment of the ETP  because of performance, maintenance, and installation issues. According  to a senior TSA official, as of December 31, 2009, all but 9 ETPs have been  withdrawn from airports, and 18 ETPs remain in inventory.
Following the completion of our review, TSA officials told us that the AIT  successfully completed operational testing at the end of calendar year  2009 before its deployment was fully initiated. The official also stated that  the AIT test results were provided and reviewed by DHS’s Acquisition  Review Board prior to the board approving the AIT deployment. According  to TSA’s threat assessment, terrorists have various techniques for  concealing explosives on their persons, as was evident in Mr.  Abdulmutallab’s attempted attack on December 25, when he concealed an  explosive in his underwear. While TSA officials stated that the laboratory  and operational testing of the AIT included placing explosive material in  different locations on the body, it remains unclear whether the AIT  would have been able to detect the weapon Mr. Abdulmutallab used in his  attempted attack based on the preliminary TSA information we have  received. We are in the process of reviewing these operational tests to  assess the AIT’s detection capabilities and to verify that TSA successfully  completed operational testing of the AIT.
In addition, while TSA officials stated that the AITs performed as well as  physical pat downs in operational testing, TSA officials also reported they  have not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the original or revised AIT  deployment strategy. We reported in October 2009 that TSA had not  conducted a cost-benefit analysis of checkpoint technologies being  researched and developed, procured, and deployed and recommended that  it do so. DHS concurred with our recommendation. Cost-benefit analyses  are important because they help decision makers determine which  protective measures, for instance, investments in technologies or in other  security programs, will provide the greatest mitigation of risk for the  resources that are available. TSA officials stated that a cost-benefit  analysis was not completed for the AIT because one is not required under  DHS acquisition guidance. However, these officials reported that they had  completed, earlier in the program, a life-cycle cost estimate and an  analysis of alternatives for the AIT as required by DHS, which, according  to agency officials, provides equivalent information to a cost-benefit  analysis. We are in the process of reviewing the alternatives analysis that  was completed in 2008 and life-cycle cost estimates which TSA provided  to us on March 12, 2010, to determine the extent to which these estimates  reflect the additional costs to staff these units. We estimate that, based on  TSA’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and current AIT deployment  strategy, increases in staffing costs due to doubling the number of AITs  that TSA plans to deploy could add up to $2.4 billion over the expected  service life of this investment.
While we recognize that TSA is taking action to address a vulnerability of  the passenger checkpoint exposed by the December 25, 2009, attempted  attack, we continue to believe that, given TSA’s expanded deployment  strategy, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of TSA’s AIT deployment is  important. An updated cost-benefit analysis would help inform TSA’s  judgment about the optimal deployment strategy for the AITs, as well as  provide information to inform the best path forward, considering all  elements of the screening system, for addressing the vulnerability  identified by this attempted terrorist attack.
section_title: TSA Has Made Progress in Securing Air Cargo and Airport Access, but Challenges Remain
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Made Progress in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate, but Faces Participation, Technology, Oversight, and Inbound-Cargo Challenges
paragraphs: As we previously reported in March 2009, based on preliminary  observations from ongoing work, TSA has taken several key steps to meet  the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on  passenger aircraft by August 2010. Among the steps that TSA has taken  to address domestic air cargo screening, the agency has revised its  security programs to require more cargo to be screened; created the  Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), a voluntary program to allow  screening to take place earlier in the shipping process and at various  points in the air cargo supply chain—including before the cargo is  consolidated; issued an interim final rule, effective November 16, 2009,  that, among other things, codifies the statutory air cargo screening  requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act and establishes requirements for entities participating in the CCSP; established a technology pilot progra to operationally test explosives trace detection (ETD) and X-ray  technology; and expanded its explosives detection canine program. m  While these steps are encouraging, TSA faces several challenges in  meeting the air cargo screening mandate. First, although industry  participation in the CCSP is vital to TSA’s approach to move screening  responsibilities across the U.S. supply chain, the voluntary nature of the  program may make it difficult to attract program participants needed to  screen the required levels of domestic cargo. Second, while TSA has taken  steps to test technologies for screening and securing air cargo, it has not  yet completed assessments of the various technologies it plans to allow air  carriers and program participants to use in meeting the August 2010  screening mandate. According to TSA officials, several X-ray and  explosives detection systems (EDS) technologies successfully passed  laboratory testing, and TSA placed them on a December 2009 list of  qualified products that industry can use to screen cargo after August  2010. TSA plans to conduct field testing and evaluation of these  technologies in an operational environment. In addition, TSA plans to  begin laboratory testing for ETD, Electronic Metal Detection (EMD), and  additional X-ray technologies in early 2010, and anticipates including these  technologies on the list of qualified products the industry can use by the  summer of 2010, before proceeding with operational testing. As we  previously reported, based on preliminary observations from ongoing  work, X-ray and ETD technologies, which have not yet been fully tested  for effectiveness, are currently being used by industry participants to meet  air cargo screening requirements. We are examining this issue in more  detail as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s air cargo security efforts, to  be issued later this year.
Third, TSA faces challenges overseeing compliance with the CCSP due to  the size of its current Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) workforce.  Under the CCSP, in addition to performing inspections of air carriers and  freight forwarders, TSIs are to also perform compliance inspections of  new regulated entities that voluntarily become certified cargo screening  facilities (CCSF), as well as conduct additional CCSF inspections of  existing freight forwarders. TSA officials have stated that the agency is  evaluating the required number of TSIs to fully implement and oversee the  program. Completing its staffing study may help TSA determine whether it  has the necessary staffing resources to ensure that entities involved in the  CCSP are meeting TSA requirements to screen and secure air cargo. As  part of our ongoing work, we are exploring to what extent TSA is  undertaking a staffing study.
Finally, TSA has taken some steps to meet the screening mandate as it  applies to inbound cargo but does not expect to achieve 100 percent  screening of inbound cargo by the August 2010 deadline. TSA revised its  requirements to, in general, require carriers to screen 50 percent of  nonexempt inbound cargo. TSA also began harmonization of security  standards with other nations through bilateral and quadrilateral  discussions. In addition, TSA continues to work with Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) to leverage an existing CBP system to identify  and target high-risk air cargo. However, TSA does not expect to meet the  mandated 100 percent screening level by August 2010. This is due, in part,  to challenges TSA faces in harmonizing the agency’s air cargo security  standards with those of other nations. Moreover, TSA’s international  inspection resources are limited. We will continue to explore these issues  as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s air cargo security efforts, to be  issued later this year.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Airport Security, but Faces Challenges That Include Assessing Risk and Evaluating Worker Screening Methods
paragraphs: In our September 2009 report on airport security, we reported that TSA  has implemented a variety of programs and protective actions to  strengthen the security of commercial airports. For example, in March  2007, TSA implemented a random worker screening program—the  Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP)—nationwide to  enforce access procedures, such as ensuring that workers do not possess  unauthorized items when entering secured areas. In addition, TSA has  expanded requirements for background checks and for the population of  individuals who are subject to these checks, and has established a  statutorily directed pilot program to assess airport security technology.
As we reported in September 2009, while TSA has taken numerous steps to  enhance airport security, it continues to face challenges in several areas,  such as assessing risk, evaluating worker screening methods, addressing  airport technology needs, and developing a unified national strategy for  airport security. For example, while TSA has taken steps to assess risk  related to airport security, it has not conducted a comprehensive risk  assessment based on assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and  consequences, as required by DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection  Plan. To address these issues, we recommended, among other things, that  TSA develop a comprehensive risk assessment of airport security and  milestones for its completion, and evaluate whether the current approach  to conducting vulnerability assessments appropriately assesses  vulnerabilities. DHS concurred with these recommendations and stated  that TSA is taking actions to implement them.
Our September 2009 report also reported the results of TSA efforts to help  identify the potential costs and benefits of 100 percent worker screening  and other worker screening methods. In July 2009 TSA issued a final  report on the results and concluded that random screening is a more cost- effective approach because it appears “roughly” as effective in identifying  contraband items at less cost than 100 percent worker screening.  However, the report also identified limitations in the design and evaluation  of the program and in the estimation of costs, such as the limited number  of participating airports, the limited evaluation of certain screening  techniques, the approximate nature of the cost estimates, and the limited  amount of information available regarding operational effects and other  costs. Given the significance of these limitations, we reported in  September 2009 that it is unclear whether random worker screening is  more or less cost effective than 100 percent worker screening. In addition,  TSA did not document key aspects of the pilot’s design, methodology, and  evaluation, such as a data analysis plan, limiting the usefulness of these  efforts. To address this, we recommended that TSA ensure that future  airport security pilot program evaluation efforts include a well-developed  and well-documented evaluation plan, to which DHS concurred.
Moreover, although TSA has taken steps to develop biometric worker  credentialing, it is unclear to what extent TSA plans to address statutory  requirements regarding biometric technology, such as developing or  requiring biometric access controls at airports, establishing  comprehensive standards, and determining the best way to incorporate  these decisions into airports’ existing systems. To address this issue, we  have recommended that TSA develop milestones for meeting statutory  requirements for, among other things, performance standards for  biometric airport access control systems. DHS concurred with this  recommendation. Finally, TSA’s efforts to enhance the security of the  nation’s airports have not been guided by a national strategy that identifies  key elements, such as goals, priorities, performance measures, and  required resources. To better ensure that airport stakeholders take a  unified approach to airport security, we recommended that TSA develop a  national strategy that incorporates key characteristics of effective security  strategies, such as measurable goals and priorities, to which DHS  concurred and stated that TSA is taking action to implement it.
section_title: Project Newton May Result in New Explosives Testing Standards for TSA’s Screening Technology
paragraphs: As we discussed in our October 2009 report, TSA and the DHS Science and  Technology Directorate (S&T) are pursuing an effort—known as Project  Newton—which uses computer modeling to determine the effects of  explosives on aircraft and develop new requirements to respond to  emerging threats from explosives. Specifically, TSA and S&T are  reviewing the scientific basis of their current detection standards for  explosives detection technologies to screen passengers, carry-on items,  and checked baggage. As part of this work, TSA and S&T are conducting  studies to update their understanding of the effects that explosives may  have on aircraft, such as the consequences of detonating explosives on  board an in-flight aircraft. Senior TSA and DHS S&T officials stated that  the two agencies decided to initiate this review because they could not  fully identify or validate the scientific support requiring explosives  detection technologies to identify increasingly smaller amounts of some  explosives over time as required by TSA policy. Officials stated that they  used the best available information to originally develop detection  standards for explosives detection technologies. According to these  officials, TSA’s understanding of how explosives affect aircraft has largely  been based on data obtained from live-fire explosive tests on aircraft hulls  at ground level. Officials further stated that due to the expense and  complexity of live-fire tests, the Federal Aviation Administration, TSA, and  DHS collectively have conducted only a limited number of tests on retired  aircraft, which limited the amount of data available for analysis. As part of  this ongoing review, TSA and S&T are simulating the complex dynamics of  explosive blast effects on an in-flight aircraft by using a computer model  based on advanced software developed by the national laboratories. TSA  believes that the computer model will be able to accurately simulate  hundreds of explosives tests by simulating the effects that explosives will  have when placed in different locations within various aircraft models. As  discussed in our October 2009 report, TSA and S&T officials expect that  the results of this work will provide a much fuller understanding of the  explosive detection requirements and the threat posed by various amounts  of different explosives, and will use this information to determine whether  any modifications to existing detection standards should be made moving  forward. We are currently reviewing Project Newton and will report on it  at a later date.
Madame Chairwoman, that concludes my statement and I would be happy  to answer any questions.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For additional information about this statement, please contact Stephen  M. Lord at (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, staff who made key contributions  to this statement were E. Anne Laffoon and Steve D. Morris, Assistant  Directors; Nabajyoti Barkakati, Carissa Bryant, Frances Cook, Joseph E.  Dewechter, Amy Frazier, Barbara Guffy, David K. Hooper, Richard B.  Hung, Lori Kmetz, Linda S. Miller, Timothy M. Persons, Yanina Golburt  Samuels, Emily Suarez-Harris, and Rebecca Kuhlmann Taylor.
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