Defense Infrastructure: DOD's Excess Capacity Estimating Methods Have Limitations
Published: 2013-06-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Due in part to challenges DOD faces in reducing excess infrastructure, DOD's Support Infrastructure Management is on GAO's High Risk List of program areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. Since 1988, DOD has relied on the BRAC process as a primary means of reducing excess infrastructure or capacity and realigning bases to meet changes in the size and structure of its forces. In 1998 and 2004, Congress required DOD to submit reports that, among other things, estimated the amount of DOD's excess capacity at that time. Also, in March 2012, DOD testified that it had about 20 percent excess capacity. The methods used to develop such preliminary excess capacity estimates differ from the data-intensive process--supplemented by military judgment--that DOD has used to formulate specific base closure and realignment recommendations.
A Senate Armed Services Committee report directed GAO to review how DOD identifies bases or facilities excess to needs. The objective of this report is to discuss how DOD has estimated its excess capacity, outside of the BRAC process. To do so, GAO reviewed excess capacity estimates from 1998, 2004, and 2012; analyzed DOD's data; reviewed supporting documentation; assessed assumptions and limitations of DOD's analysis; and interviewed DOD officials.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that GAO had properly highlighted the limitations of its approach to estimating excess capacity and contrasted it with the method used to develop BRAC recommendations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense's (DOD) methods for estimating excess capacity outside of a congressionally-authorized Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process have limitations. DOD used similar processes in its excess capacity analyses conducted in 1998 and 2004. This process included three major steps: (1) categorizing bases according to their primary missions and defining indicators of capacity; (2) developing ratios of capacity-to-force structure for DOD's baseline year of 1989; and (3) aggregating the analysis from the installation level across the military services and department-wide.
In both its 1998 and 2004 reports, DOD recognized some limitations with its methods for estimating excess capacity and stated that its analyses lacked the precision necessary to identify specific installations or functional configurations for realignment or closure. In addition, GAO's review of DOD's methods for estimating excess capacity outside of a congressionally-authorized BRAC process identified a number of limitations. First, DOD's approach assigns each installation to only one mission category, even though most installations support more than one mission. This approach effectively excluded significant portions of some bases' infrastructure from the analysis. Second, the services measured capacity for some similar functions differently such as test and evaluation facilities, which makes it difficult for DOD to evaluate excess capacity across the department. Third, DOD did not attempt to identify any excess capacity or capacity shortfall that existed in 1989; hence it is uncertain to what extent DOD's estimates of excess capacity may be overstated or understated. Finally, in instances where DOD's analysis indicated that projected capacity was less than needed capacity--indicating a capacity shortage--within an installation category, DOD treated these cases as having zero or no excess capacity when aggregating the results of its analysis. If DOD had treated those installation categories as having a capacity shortages, DOD's method would have calculated a lower number of bases and consequently a lower percentage of excess capacity across the department than DOD reported to Congress.
DOD's testimony in March 2012 and again in March 2013, that it had about 20 percent excess capacity remaining after the end of BRAC 2005, relied on earlier calculations that the department made in 2004 and 2005. Specifically, these estimates were reached by subtracting DOD's estimate of the amount of capacity that would be eliminated by the approved recommendations from BRAC 2005--3 to 5 percent of plant replacement value--from DOD's 2004 estimate that it had 24 percent excess capacity. However, pre-BRAC estimates of the percentage of bases that may be excess to needed capacity, which is expressed as a percentage of bases, and plant replacement value, which is measured in dollars, are not comparable measures. In March 2013, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) testified that the method upon which DOD's current estimate is based is helpful in determining whether an additional BRAC round is justified, but only through the BRAC process is the Department able to determine specifically which installations or facilities are excess.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Due in part to challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in  reducing excess and obsolete infrastructure, DOD’s Support  Infrastructure Management is on GAO’s High Risk List of program areas  that are vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are  most in need of transformation. Since 1988, DOD has relied on the Base  Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process as one of the primary means  of reducing excess infrastructure or facilities and realigning bases to  meet changes in the size and structure of its forces.
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, has governed the BRAC process since 1990. The law established the  procedures for making recommendations for base closures and  realignments and originally required DOD to submit a 6-year force  structure plan and to base its closure and realignment decisions on that  plan, as well as on selection criteria proposed and established for the  round by DOD. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds, DOD  performed a detailed capacity analysis based on extensive data collection  efforts to identify specific bases capable of accommodating additional  forces in order to develop its proposed list of closures and realignments.  In 1997, after DOD requested another BRAC round, Congress required  DOD to submit a report on, among other things, the need for any  additional BRAC rounds and an estimate of the amount of DOD’s excess   In 2001, when Congress authorized a BRAC round  capacity at the time.
Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX (1990)(10 U.S.C. 2687 note). Throughout this report, we  will refer to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (as amended) as “the  1990 BRAC statute.”
Department of Defense, The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment  and Closure, April 1998.
2013, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary again testified that BRAC 2005  reduced capacity only by about 3 percent and that excess capacity  remains.
Such preliminary estimates of excess infrastructure capacity, which DOD  has developed outside the BRAC process primarily to support the need  for future BRAC rounds, differ from the data-intensive process,  supplemented by the use of military judgment that DOD has used to  formulate the recommendations for specific base closures and  realignments that it has proposed to the BRAC Commission within the  BRAC process. For example, to develop recommendations for the 2005  BRAC round, DOD collected an estimated 25 million pieces of capacity  and military value data from DOD databases and from hundreds of  defense installations. These data were certified as to their accuracy by  hundreds of persons in senior leadership positions across the country.  The DOD Inspector General and the services’ audit agencies also played  an important role in ensuring that the data used in the BRAC analyses  were accurate. In our March 2013 report, Military Bases: Opportunities  Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure Rounds, we  provide a detailed assessment of that process.
In Senate Report 112-173 accompanying the Senate Armed Services  Committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2013, we were directed to review the systems and processes that  DOD uses to identify the extent to which bases or facilities are excess to  needs. The objective of this report is to discuss how DOD has estimated the amount of its excess infrastructure or capacity, outside of the BRAC  process.
To determine how DOD developed its preliminary estimates of excess  capacity, we reviewed excess capacity estimates for the military services,  the Defense Logistics Agency, and DOD as a whole. Specifically, we  obtained and reviewed (1) the written March 14, 2013 testimony by the  Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and  Environment) and transcript from the hearing, and (2) the written March 8,  2012, testimony by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations  and Environment) and the transcript from that hearing, to identify  applicable estimates of excess capacity. We also reviewed DOD’s 1998  and 2004 reports to Congress on excess capacity and we analyzed the  data used in DOD’s analyses, along with other supporting documentation,  and we assessed the underlying assumptions and limitations, if any, of  DOD’s analysis to identify the basis upon which DOD made those excess  capacity estimates. Based on our review of the documentation provided,  we determined that the data was sufficiently reliable to facilitate our  analysis of the assumptions and potential limitations within DOD’s method  for estimating excess capacity. We also interviewed officials in the Office  of the Secretary of Defense to determine the basis for and the  relationship between different excess capacity estimates. We conducted  this performance audit from July 2012 to June 2013 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The first BRAC Commission was chartered by the Secretary of Defense  in 1988, and operated in accordance with processes later established by  the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and  Realignment Act of 1988. Since that time, the BRAC process has  changed in many ways, with a variety of requirements and procedures  mandated by subsequent BRAC statutes or adopted by DOD. Among  these is the requirement that the Secretary of Defense develop a current  force structure plan. DOD’s force structure plan is designed to identify the  number and type of forces that DOD needs to combat the anticipated  threats to the security of the United States. As specified in DOD’s force  structure plan in support of BRAC 2005, the President’s National Security  Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy  provide the focus for the military forces. DOD then analyzes current and  future threats, challenges, and opportunities to develop the force structure  plan. DOD’s planning framework helps determine the capabilities required  to respond to a range of scenarios. The Department then analyzes the  force requirements for the most likely, the most dangerous, and the most  demanding circumstances.
One of the objectives of the first BRAC Commission was to review the  current and planned military base structure in light of force structure  assumptions and, using the process and the criteria the Commission  developed, to identify which bases should be realigned or closed. To  accomplish this, the Commission used a two-phase approach. Phase I  grouped bases into 22 overall categories, such as training bases and  administrative headquarters, and then focused on determining the military  value of bases within each category, each base’s capacity to absorb  additional missions and forces, and the overall excess capacity within the  category. The Commission then ranked the bases to identify those  warranting review in phase II, which focused on assessing the cost and  savings of base realignment and closure options.
The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 substantially  revised the process for DOD base closure and realignment actions within  the United States, establishing an independent Defense Base Closure  and Realignment Commission and providing for BRAC rounds in 1991,  1993, and 1995. One of the key elements of the 1990 BRAC statute was  the requirement that DOD submit a force structure plan and that closure  and realignment decisions be based on that force structure plan and on  the final selection criteria established for the BRAC round. As part of the  BRAC process for 1991, 1993, and 1995, an important step in the military  services’ approach for identifying bases to close or realign was  determining whether excess capacity existed at their bases. The starting  point for this step was comparing changes in the force structure plan to  the base structure of the military services. After applying military value  criteria and other specific BRAC criteria, each of the services  developed their recommendations for closures and realignments for  submission to the BRAC Commission.
In May 1997, the Secretary of Defense announced his intention to ask  Congress to authorize two additional BRAC rounds. Later that year,  Congress enacted section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 1998, which required that the Secretary of Defense  provide the congressional defense committees with a comprehensive  report on a range of BRAC issues, including the need for any additional  BRAC rounds and an estimate of the amount of DOD’s excess capacity.  DOD submitted the required report in April 1998 and estimated that DOD  had 23 percent excess capacity. In the report, DOD also stated that its  method for estimating excess capacity determined the extent to which  reductions in base structure had kept pace with reductions in force  structure since 1989.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 amended  the 1990 BRAC statute by authorizing a BRAC round for 2005, and  required DOD to report to Congress on several BRAC-related issues in  2004 in order for the 2005 round to proceed. The statute directed, among  other things, that the Secretary of Defense provide Congress with a 20- year force structure plan and a worldwide inventory of military installations  and facilities as part of DOD’s fiscal year 2005 budget justification  documents. In addition, as part of the force structure plan and inventory  submission, the Secretary was to prepare (1) a description of the  infrastructure necessary to support the force structure described in the  force-structure plan, (2) a discussion of categories of excess  infrastructure and infrastructure capacity, and (3) an economic analysis of  the effect of the closure or realignment of military installations to reduce  excess infrastructure. DOD provided the required report, which estimated  that the department had 24 percent excess capacity, on March 23, 2004.  In that report, the Secretary of Defense also certified that an additional  round of BRAC was needed and that the round would result in savings by  fiscal year 2011.
Subsequently, an initial part of DOD’s BRAC recommendations  development process for the 2005 round involved an overall capacity  analysis of specific locations or functions and subfunctions at specific  locations. The analysis relied on data calls to obtain certified data to  assess such factors as maximum potential capacity, current capacity,  current usage, excess capacity, and capacity needed to meet surge  requirements. This capacity analysis—in conjunction with the  department’s 20-year force structure plan, military value analysis, and  transformational options; applicable guiding principles, objectives, or  policy imperatives identified by individual military services or joint cross- service groups; and military judgment—was used to identify realignment  and closure scenarios for further analysis, ultimately leading to finalized  recommendations for base realignments and closures.
section_title: DOD’s Methods for Calculating Pre-BRAC Estimates of Excess Capacity Have Limitations
paragraphs: Our review of DOD’s pre-BRAC estimates of excess capacity found that  the methods DOD has used and the resulting estimates have limitations.  DOD used similar methods in 1998 and 2004 to calculate its pre-BRAC  estimates of excess capacity. However, our current review identified a  number of additional limitations with DOD’s methods. For example,  DOD’s approach assigns each installation to only one mission category,  even though most installations support more than one mission. In  addition, to arrive at the excess capacity estimate it provided to Congress  in 2012 and repeated in 2013, DOD subtracted an estimate of excess  capacity that it expected would be disposed of during the 2005 BRAC  round from the amount of excess capacity estimated to exist immediately  before that BRAC round to arrive at the current excess capacity estimate  of about 20 percent. However, because DOD’s pre-BRAC excess  capacity estimate, expressed as a percentage of bases, and plant  replacement value, expressed in dollars, are not measured in the same  units, they are not comparable measures.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Method for Estimating Excess Capacity in 1998 and 2004
paragraphs: DOD based its 1998 and 2004 estimates of 23 percent and 24 percent  excess capacity, respectively, on a method that compared measures of  force structure projected to be in place at the end of the 5-year Future  Years Defense Programs that were current at the time of each estimate,  to associated indicators of capacity. DOD’s 1998 and 2004 technique  consisted of three major steps: (1) categorizing bases according to their  primary missions and defining indicators of capacity, (2) developing ratios  of capacity-to-force structure for DOD’s baseline year of 1989, and (3)  aggregating these various excess capacity indicators that were calculated  at the installation level to the military service level and then department- wide.
To begin DOD’s analysis, each of the military services identified  categories for their bases, identified bases that the services considered  major installations, and categorized their bases according to their  primary missions—such as depots, training, or administration—so that  each installation was included in only one category. Figure 1 shows the  installation categories used by each military service and the Defense  Logistics Agency.
Figure 1. Installation Categories for the Military Services and the Defense Logistics Agency.
The services then defined various indicators of capacity—such as  maneuver base acres or facility square feet—for each installation  category.
Next, DOD divided each services’ indicators of capacity by a measure of  force structure—such as the number of military and civilian personnel  authorized, authorized end strength, or the size of the acquisition  workforce—to develop ratios of capacity-to-projected force structure and  compared them to ratios from 1989, which was used as a baseline. For its  1998 analysis DOD projected force structure through 2003, and for its  2004 analysis DOD projected force structure through 2009 because these  dates marked the end of DOD’s Future Year’s Defense Program  projections that were current at the time the analyses were performed.
For example, as illustrated in Figure 2, in its 1998 capacity analysis, DOD  projected, that in 2003, there would be 6.575 million square feet of  administrative space on Army administrative bases, and DOD projected  that there would be 65,516 military and civilian personnel assigned to  those bases, resulting in a capacity-to-force structure ratio of 100.4.  Similarly, according to its 2004 capacity analysis, DOD projected that, in  2009, there would be 6.121 million square feet of administrative space on  Army administrative bases, and DOD projected that there would be  64,598 military and civilian personnel assigned to those bases, resulting  in a capacity-to-force structure ratio of 94.8.
DOD then calculated the extent to which the ratio of capacity-to-force  structure for each base category differed from the ratio in 1989, which  was used as a baseline. To do this, DOD first calculated an estimate of  capacity it would need for the year in question for each of its various  indicators of capacity. For instance, to continue with the second example  above, DOD calculated an estimate of administrative capacity the Army  would need for 2009. As illustrated in Figure 3, DOD calculated its  needed capacity indicators by multiplying the projected 2009 force  structure measure (64,598 military and civilian personnel in this case) by  the 1989 capacity-to-force ratio (81.3 for Army administrative bases),  which in this case resulted in an estimated needed capacity of 5.25  million square feet of Army administrative space.
To calculate the projected excess capacity for 2009, DOD subtracted a  base category’s estimated needed capacity from its projected 2009  capacity. In our Army administrative base example, DOD subtracted its  estimated needed capacity for 2009 of 5.25 million square feet from its  estimated existing capacity in 2009 of 6.12 million square feet, which  resulted in DOD’s estimate of 0.87 million square feet of excess Army  administrative space or 14 percent of the Army’s existing administrative  space in 2009.
After computing these indicators of excess capacity for each category of  installation for each military service and the Defense Logistics Agency,  DOD then aggregated these indicators departmentwide. Specifically,  DOD first multiplied the number of bases in a category by the percentage  of excess for that category, which resulted in DOD’s estimate of the  number of excess bases in each category. Continuing our Army  administrative capacity example above, as illustrated in Figure 4, the  percentage of excess capacity (in this case, the Army’s estimated 14- percent excess of projected administrative space in 2009) would be  multiplied by the number bases in the category (12 in the case of Army  administrative bases), resulting in an estimated number of excess  administrative bases (1.7 in this case).
As illustrated in Figure 5, to calculate an overall indication of excess  capacity for each DOD component, DOD summed the estimated number  of excess bases for each installation category within a component (22.3 in  the case of the Army) and divided this by the sum of the number of all  bases in all categories for that component (78 in the case of the Army),  which resulted in a percentage of excess bases for the component. In our  example, DOD estimated that 29 percent of the Army’s bases were in  excess to its estimated needed capacity.
Finally, the departmentwide excess was calculated by summing the  estimated number of excess bases for each military service and the  Defense Logistics Agency (65.2), summing the number of bases included  in the analysis (276), then dividing the sum of the excess bases by the  total number of bases in the analysis, resulting in estimated department- wide excess of 24 percent.
section_title: The Methods DOD Used to Estimate Excess Capacity in 1998 and 2004 Have Limitations
paragraphs: DOD recognized some limitations within its method for estimating excess  capacity, stating in both its 1998 and 2004 reports to Congress that the  analysis it performed provided an indication of the type and amount of  excess capacity within the department, but recognizing that the analyses  lacked the precision to identify specific installations or functional  configurations for realignment or closure. In addition, our current review of  DOD’s method for estimating excess capacity outside of a  congressionally-authorized BRAC process identified a number of  limitations.
First, DOD assigned each base to only one installation category, even  though most bases support more than one mission. This approach  effectively excluded significant portions of a base’s infrastructure from the  analysis. For example, in the case of Army maneuver bases, using base  acres as the indicator of capacity does not include about 204 million  square feet of buildings located on the 12 Army maneuver bases in  DOD’s analysis. Another limitation associated with DOD’s method is that  the services measured capacity for some similar functions differently. For  example, the Army and Air Force measured capacity for test and  evaluation facilities in terms of physical total square feet of space, while  the Navy measured its capacity for these facilities in terms of work years.  These differences make it difficult for DOD to assess excess capacity  across the department. A third limitation is that, in using 1989 as a  baseline, DOD assumed that the bases and facilities as they existed in  1989 were appropriately sized to support missions, and DOD did not  identify any excess capacity or capacity shortfall that may have existed at  that time. This approach, in essence, transfers any excesses and  shortfalls that existed in 1989 into DOD’s estimates of future capacity  needs because, as illustrated in Figure 3 above, the capacity-to-force  structure ratio from 1989 was used to calculate the needed capacity for  2009. It is therefore uncertain to what extent DOD’s estimates of excess  capacity are overstated or understated. Finally, in both the 1998 and 2004  analyses, in instances where DOD’s analysis indicated that projected  capacity was less than needed capacity—indicating a capacity  shortage—within a specific installation category, DOD treated these  cases as having zero or no excess capacity. Despite the data showing  capacity shortages, DOD used this data to aggregate the results of its  analysis across the department. If DOD had treated those installation  categories as having capacity shortages, DOD’s estimates would have  resulted in a lower number of excess bases and consequently a lower  percentage of excess capacity across the department than DOD reported  to Congress.
section_title: DOD’s Statements about Remaining Excess Capacity in 2012 and 2013 Relied on Two Earlier Calculations
paragraphs: DOD’s testimony in March 2012 and March 2013, that by its estimates  DOD had about 20 percent excess capacity remaining after the end of  BRAC 2005, relied on earlier calculations that the department made in  2004 and 2005. First, in 2004, using the method described above, the  department estimated that it had 24 percent excess capacity. Then, in  2005, DOD’s report transmitting its recommendations to the BRAC  Commission stated that, while it is difficult to measure the full extent of  the improvements in effectiveness and efficiency of the BRAC 2005  recommendations, four statistics would illustrate the breadth and depth of  the effect of its proposed actions. One of those statistics was the  department’s projection that DOD’s plant-replacement value would be  reduced by 5 percent. After the BRAC Commission reviewed DOD’s  recommendations and made some changes, including reducing the  number of closures at major installations, DOD revised its estimate of  the expected percentage reduction in plant-replacement value and  projected that it would likely be around 3 percent. In 2012, the Deputy  Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) said that  these estimates from 2004 and 2005 suggested that roughly 20 percent  excess capacity remained. However, because DOD’s pre-BRAC excess  capacity estimate, which is expressed as a percentage of bases, and  plant replacement value, which is expressed in dollars, are not measured  in the same units, they are not comparable measures.
In March 2013, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment) testified that the method upon which  DOD’s current estimate of 20 percent excess capacity is based is helpful  in making a broad assessment in determining whether an additional  BRAC round is justified, but it cannot identify specific installations or  functional configurations for realignment or closure. The Acting Deputy  Under Secretary further stated that the specific capacity analysis that is  an integral part of the BRAC process is preferable to aggregate metrics  used in DOD’s pre-BRAC estimates. He further stated that only through  the BRAC process is the Department able to determine excess capacity  by installation and by mission or function in a process that is thorough  and fair.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, which are reproduced in appendix I, DOD stated that we  properly highlighted the limitations of its approach used to estimate  excess capacity. In addition, DOD stated that our report provides proper  context for its methodology by contrasting it with the extensive and  detailed data collection and analysis that DOD has used to develop  BRAC recommendations. DOD concluded that only through the BRAC  process is it able to determine excess capacity by installation and mission  or function in a fair and thorough way.  DOD also provided a technical  comment which we incorporated into our report.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army,  Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the  Director, Office of Management and Budget. This report is also available  at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Harold Reich (Assistant Director),  Ronald Bergman, Timothy Burke, Susan Ditto, Gregory Marchand, Carol  Petersen, Amie Steele, Laura Talbott, John Van Schaik, and John Wren  made significant contributions to the report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment  and Closure Rounds. GAO-13-149. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2013.
GAO’s 2013 High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington,  D.C.: February 2013.
DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve  Greater Efficiencies. GAO-13-134. Washington, D.C.: November 15,  2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency’s Technology Center Construction Project.   GAO-12-770R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings  Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2012.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to  BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012.
Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy  to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan  Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington, D.C.: April 1,  2011.
GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is  Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the  Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2011.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to  Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs.  GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning  Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth.  GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year  2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of  Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are  Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings  Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703.  Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support  Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of  Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.:  March 30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in  Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently  Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January  30, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to  Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen  Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R.  Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.  GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower  Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC  Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations  Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R.  Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T.  Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have  Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159.  Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,  Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of  Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics  Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13,  2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve  Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007.
Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need  for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2004.
Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and  Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.