Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems Are Under Way, but Challenges Remain
Published: 2007-10-17T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Control systems--computer-based systems that monitor and control sensitive processes--perform vital functions in many of our nation's critical infrastructures such as electric power generation, transmission, and distribution; oil and gas refining; and water treatment and distribution. The disruption of control systems could have a significant impact on public health and safety, which makes securing them a national priority. GAO was asked to testify on portions of its report on control systems security being released today. This testimony summarizes the cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential impact of attacks on control systems; identifies private sector initiatives; and assesses the adequacy of public sector initiatives to strengthen the cyber security of control systems. To address these objectives, GAO met with federal and private sector officials to identify risks, initiatives, and challenges. GAO also compared agency plans to best practices for securing critical infrastructures.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the serious potential impact of attacks as demonstrated by reported incidents. Threats can be intentional or unintentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. Control systems are more vulnerable to cyber attacks than in the past for several reasons, including their increased connectivity to other systems and the Internet. Further, as demonstrated by past attacks and incidents involving control systems, the impact on a critical infrastructure could be substantial. For example, in 2006, a foreign hacker was reported to have planted malicious software capable of affecting a water filtering plant's water treatment operations. Also in 2006, excessive traffic on a nuclear power plant's control system network caused two circulation pumps to fail, forcing the unit to be shut down manually. Multiple private sector entities such as trade associations and standards setting organizations are working to help secure control systems. Their efforts include developing standards and providing guidance to members. For example, the electricity industry has recently developed standards for cyber security of control systems and a gas trade association is developing guidance for members to use encryption to secure control systems. Federal agencies also have multiple initiatives under way to help secure critical infrastructure control systems, but more remains to be done to coordinate these efforts and to address specific shortfalls. Over the past few years, federal agencies have initiated efforts to improve the security of critical infrastructure control systems. However, there is as yet no overall strategy to coordinate the various activities across federal agencies and the private sector. Further, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lacks processes needed to address specific weaknesses in sharing information on control system vulnerabilities. Until public and private sector security efforts are coordinated by an overarching strategy, there is an increased risk that multiple organizations will conduct duplicative work. In addition, until information-sharing weaknesses are addressed, DHS risks not being able to effectively carry out its responsibility for sharing information on vulnerabilities with the private and public sectors.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to join today’s hearing on the cyber threat  to control systems. Control systems perform vital functions in many of our  nation’s critical infrastructures, including electric power generation,  transmission, and distribution; oil and gas refining and pipelines; water  treatment and distribution; chemical production and processing; railroads  and mass transit; and manufacturing.
In 2003, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace reported that the  disruption of control systems could have significant consequences for  public health and safety and made securing these systems a national  priority. This strategy further states that both the private and public  sectors have a role in securing control systems and directs the Department  of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with the Department of  Energy (DOE) and other agencies, to work in partnership with private  industry in increasing awareness of the importance of efforts to secure  control systems, developing standards, and improving policies with  respect to control systems security.
As requested, our testimony summarizes portions of a report being  released today that discusses (1) the cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the  potential impact of attacks on critical infrastructure control systems;  (2) private sector initiatives to strengthen the cyber security of control  systems; and (3) the adequacy of public sector initiatives to strengthen the  cyber security of control systems. In preparing for this testimony, we  relied on our work supporting the report, which contains a detailed  overview of our scope and methodology. All the work on which this  testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Critical infrastructures are physical or virtual systems and assets so vital  to the nation that their incapacitation or destruction would have a  debilitating impact on national and economic security and on public health  and safety. These systems and assets—such as the electric power grid,  chemical plants, and water treatment facilities—are essential to the  operations of the economy and the government. Recent terrorist attacks  and threats have underscored the need to protect our nation’s critical  infrastructures. If vulnerabilities in these infrastructures are exploited, our  nation’s critical infrastructures could be disrupted or disabled, possibly  causing loss of life, physical damage, and economic losses.
Although the vast majority of our nation’s critical infrastructures are  owned by the private sector, the federal government owns and operates  key facilities that use control systems, including oil, gas, water, energy,  and nuclear facilities.
subsections: section_title: Control Systems Are Used in Many Critical Infrastructures
paragraphs: Control systems are computer-based systems that are used within many  infrastructures and industries to monitor and control sensitive processes  and physical functions. Typically, control systems collect sensor  measurements and operational data from the field, process and display  this information, and relay control commands to local or remote  equipment. Control systems perform functions that range from simple to  complex. They can be used to simply monitor processes—for example, the  environmental conditions in a small office building—or to manage the  complex activities of a municipal water system or a nuclear power plant.
In the electric power industry, control systems can be used to manage and  control the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power.  For example, control systems can open and close circuit breakers and set  thresholds for preventive shutdowns. The oil and gas industry uses  integrated control systems to manage refining operations at plant sites,  remotely monitor the pressure and flow of gas pipelines, and control the  flow and pathways of gas transmission. Water utilities can remotely  monitor well levels and control the wells’ pumps; monitor flows, tank  levels, or pressure in storage tanks; monitor water quality characteristics  such as pH, turbidity, and chlorine residual; and control the addition of  chemicals to the water.
Installing and maintaining control systems requires a substantial financial  investment. DOE cites research estimating the value of the control  systems used to monitor and control the electric grid and the oil and  natural gas infrastructure at $3 billion to $4 billion. The thousands of  remote field devices represent an additional investment of $1.5 billion to  $2.5 billion. Each year, the energy sector alone spends over $200 million  for control systems, networks, equipment, and related components and at  least that amount in personnel costs.
section_title: Control Systems: Types and Components
paragraphs: There are two primary types of control systems: distributed control  systems and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.  Distributed control systems typically are used within a single processing  or generating plant or over a small geographic area, while SCADA systems  typically are used for large, geographically dispersed operations. For  example, a utility company may use a distributed control system to  manage power generation and a SCADA system to manage its distribution.
A SCADA system is generally composed of six components: (1)  instruments, which sense conditions such as pH, temperature, pressure,  power level, and flow rate; (2) operating equipment, which includes  pumps, valves, conveyors, and substation breakers; (3) local processors,  which communicate with the site’s instruments and operating equipment,  collect instrument data, and identify alarm conditions; (4) short-range  communication, which carry analog and discrete signals between the local  processors and the instruments and operating equipment; (5) host  computers, where a human operator can supervise the process, receive  alarms, review data, and exercise control; and (6) long-range  communications, which connect local processors and host computers  using, for example, leased phone lines, satellite, and cellular packet data.
section_title: The Federal Government Plays a Critical Role in Helping Secure Critical Infrastructures and Their Control Systems
paragraphs: Several key federal plans focus on securing critical infrastructure control  systems. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace calls for DHS and  DOE to work in partnership with industry to develop best practices and  new technology to increase the security of critical infrastructure control  systems, to determine the most critical control systems-related sites, and  to develop a prioritized plan for short-term cyber security improvements  for those sites. In addition, DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection  Plan specifically identifies control systems as part of the cyber  infrastructure, establishes an objective of reducing vulnerabilities and  minimizing the severity of attacks on these systems, and identifies  programs directed at protecting control systems. Further, in May 2007, the  critical infrastructure sectors issued sector-specific plans to supplement  the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Twelve sectors, including  the chemical, energy, water, information technology, postal, emergency  services, and telecommunications sectors, identified control systems  within their respective sectors. Of these, most identified control systems  as critical to their sector and listed efforts under way to help secure them.
section_title: Critical Infrastructure Control Systems Face Increasing Risks Due to Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and the Potentially Serious Impact of an Attack
paragraphs: Cyber threats can be intentional and unintentional, targeted or  nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. Intentional threats  include both targeted and nontargeted attacks, while unintentional threats  can be caused by software upgrades or maintenance procedures that  inadvertently disrupt systems. A targeted attack is when a group or  individual specifically attacks a critical infrastructure system and a  nontargeted attack occurs when the intended target of the attack is  uncertain, such as when a virus, worm, or malware is released on the  Internet with no specific target.
There is increasing concern among both government officials and industry  experts regarding the potential for a cyber attack on a national critical  infrastructure, including the infrastructure’s control systems. The Federal  Bureau of Investigation has identified multiple sources of threats to our  nation’s critical infrastructures, including foreign nation states engaged in  information warfare, domestic criminals, hackers, and virus writers, and  disgruntled employees working within an organization.
subsections: section_title: Control Systems Are Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks
paragraphs: Control systems are vulnerable to flaws or weaknesses in system security  procedures, design, implementation, and internal controls. When these  weaknesses are accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited, they  could result in a security breach. Vulnerabilities could occur in control  systems’ policies, platform (including hardware, operating systems, and  control system applications), or networks.
Federal and industry experts believe that critical infrastructure control  systems are more vulnerable today than in the past due to the increased  standardization of technologies, the increased connectivity of control  systems to other computer networks and the Internet, insecure  connections, and the widespread availability of technical information  about control systems. Further, it is not uncommon for control systems to  be configured with remote access through either a dial-up modem or over  the Internet to allow remote maintenance or around-the-clock monitoring.  If control systems are not properly secured, individuals and organizations  may eavesdrop on or interfere with these operations from remote  locations.
section_title: Reported Control Systems Incidents Reveal the Potential for Substantial Impact
paragraphs: Reported attacks and unintentional incidents involving critical  infrastructure control systems demonstrate that a serious attack could be  devastating. Although there is not a comprehensive source for incident  reporting, the following examples, reported in government and media  sources, demonstrate the potential impact of an attack.
Bellingham, Washington, gasoline pipeline failure. In June 1999,  237,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from a 16-inch pipeline and ignited an  hour and a half later, causing three deaths, eight injuries, and extensive  property damage. The pipeline failure was exacerbated by poorly  performing control systems that limited the ability of the pipeline  controllers to see and react to the situation.
Maroochy Shire sewage spill. In the spring of 2000, a former employee  of an Australian software manufacturing organization applied for a job  with the local government, but was rejected. Over a 2-month period, this  individual reportedly used a radio transmitter on as many as 46 occasions  to remotely break into the controls of a sewage treatment system. He  altered electronic data for particular sewerage pumping stations and  caused malfunctions in their operations, ultimately releasing about 264,000  gallons of raw sewage into nearby rivers and parks.
CSX train signaling system. In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus  shut down train signaling systems throughout the East Coast of the United  States. The virus infected the computer system at CSX Corporation’s  Jacksonville, Florida, headquarters, shutting down signaling, dispatching,  and other systems. According to an Amtrak spokesman, 10 Amtrak trains  were affected. Train service was either shut down or delayed up to 6  hours.
Los Angeles traffic lights. According to several published reports, in  August 2006, two Los Angeles city employees hacked into computers  controlling the city’s traffic lights and disrupted signal lights at four  intersections, causing substantial backups and delays. The attacks were  launched prior to an anticipated labor protest by the employees.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, water system. In October 2006, a foreign  hacker penetrated security at a water filtering plant. The intruder planted  malicious software that was capable of affecting the plant’s water  treatment operations. The infection occurred through the Internet and did  not seem to be a direct attack on the control system.
Browns Ferry power plant. In August 2006, two circulation pumps at  Unit 3 of the Browns Ferry, Alabama, nuclear power plant failed, forcing  the unit to be shut down manually. The failure of the pumps was traced to  excessive traffic on the control system network, possibly caused by the  failure of another control system device.
As control systems become increasingly interconnected with other  networks and the Internet, and as the system capabilities continue to  increase, so do the threats, potential vulnerabilities, types of attacks, and  consequences of compromising these critical systems.
section_title: The Private Sector Has Multiple Initiatives Under Way to Help Secure Control Systems
paragraphs: Industry-specific organizations in various sectors, including the electricity,  oil and gas, and water sectors, have initiatives under way to help improve  control system security, including developing standards and publishing  guidance. Our report being released today provides a detailed list of  industry initiatives; several of these initiatives are described below.
Electricity. In 2007, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation  began implementing cyber security reliability standards that apply to  control systems and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers  has several standards working groups addressing issues related to control  systems security in the industry.
Oil and gas. The American Gas Association supported development of a  report that would recommend how to apply encryption to protect gas  utility control systems; and, over the past three years, the American  Petroleum Institute has published two standards related to pipeline  control systems integrity and security and the design and implementation  of control systems displays.
Water. The water sector includes about 150,000 water, wastewater, and  storm water organizations at all levels of government and has worked with  the Environmental Protection Agency on development of the Water  Sector-Specific Plan, which includes some efforts on control systems  security. In addition, the Awwa Research Foundation is currently working  on two research projects related to the cyber security of water utility  SCADA systems.
section_title: Federal Agencies Have Multiple Initiatives to Help Secure Critical Infrastructure Control Systems, but More Remains to Be Done
paragraphs: Over the past few years, federal agencies— including DHS, DOE, and  others—have initiated efforts to improve the security of critical  infrastructure control systems. For example, DHS is sponsoring multiple  control systems security initiatives, including the Control System Cyber  Security Self Assessment Tool, an effort to improve control systems’ cyber  security using vulnerability evaluation and response tools, and the Process  Control System Forum, to build relationships with control systems’  vendors and infrastructure asset owners. Additionally, DOE sponsors  control systems security efforts within the electric, oil, and natural gas  industries. These efforts include the National SCADA Test Bed Program,  which funds testing, assessments, and training in control systems security,  and the development of a road map for securing control systems in the  energy sector. Our report being released today provides a more detailed  list of initiatives being led by federal agencies.
DHS, however, has not yet established a strategy to coordinate the various  control systems activities across federal agencies and the private sector. In  2004, we recommended that DHS develop and implement a strategy for  coordinating control systems security efforts among government agencies  and the private sector. DHS agreed and issued a strategy that focused  primarily on DHS’s initiatives. The strategy does not include ongoing work  by DOE, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, NIST, and others.  Further, it does not include the various agencies’ responsibilities, goals,  milestones, or performance measures. Until DHS develops an overarching  strategy that delineates various public and private entities’ roles and  responsibilities and uses it to guide and coordinate control systems  security activities, the federal government and private sector risk investing  in duplicative activities and missing opportunities to learn from other  organizations’ activities.
Further, DHS is responsible for sharing information with critical  infrastructure owners on control systems vulnerabilities, but lacks a rapid,  efficient process for disseminating sensitive information to private  industry owners and operators of critical infrastructures. An agency  official noted that sharing information with the private sector can be  slowed by staff turnover and vacancies at DHS, the need to brief agency  and executive branch officials and congressional staff before briefing the  private sector, and difficulties in determining the appropriate classification  level for the information. Until the agency establishes an approach for  rapidly assessing the sensitivity of vulnerability information and  disseminating it—and thereby demonstrates the value it can provide to  critical infrastructure owners—DHS’s ability to effectively serve as a focal  point in the collection and dissemination of sensitive vulnerability  information will continue to be limited. Without a trusted focal point for  sharing sensitive information on vulnerabilities, there is an increased risk  that attacks on control systems could cause a significant disruption to our  nation’s critical infrastructures.
section_title: Implementation of GAO Recommendations Would Help Improve Federal Control Systems Security Efforts
paragraphs: Control systems are an essential component of our nation’s critical  infrastructure and their disruption could have a significant impact on  public health and safety. Given the importance of control systems, in our  report being released today, we are recommending that the Secretary of  the Department of Homeland Security implement the following two  actions:  develop a strategy to guide efforts for securing control systems, including  agencies’ responsibilities, as well as overall goals, milestones, and  performance measures and   establish a rapid and secure process for sharing sensitive control system  vulnerability information with critical infrastructure control system  stakeholders, including vendors, owners, and operators.
In its comments on our report, DHS neither agreed nor disagreed with  these recommendations, but stated that it would take them under  advisement. The agency also discussed new initiatives to develop plans  and processes that are consistent with our recommendations.
In summary, past incidents involving control systems, system  vulnerabilities, and growing threats from a wide variety of sources  highlight the risks facing control systems. The public and private sectors  have begun numerous activities to improve the cyber security of control  systems. However, the federal government lacks an overall strategy for  coordinating public and private sector efforts. DHS also lacks an efficient  process for sharing sensitive information on vulnerabilities with private  sector critical infrastructure owners.
Until DHS completes the comprehensive strategy, the public and private  sectors risk undertaking duplicative efforts. Further, without a streamlined  process for advising private sector infrastructure owners of vulnerabilities,  DHS is unable to fulfill its responsibility as a focal point for disseminating  this information. If key vulnerability information is not in the hands of  those who can mitigate its potentially severe consequences, there is an  increased risk that attacks on control systems could cause a significant  disruption to our nation’s critical infrastructures.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer  any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have at this  time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please  contact me at (202) 512-6244, or by e-mail at wilshuseng@gao.gov. Other  key contributors to this testimony include Scott Borre, Heather A. Collins,  Neil J. Doherty, Vijay D’Souza, Nancy Glover, Sairah Ijaz, Patrick Morton,  and Colleen M. Phillips (Assistant Director).
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