Federal Air Marshal Service: Actions Taken to Fulfill Core Mission and Address Workforce Issues
Published: 2009-07-23T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: By deploying armed air marshals onboard selected flights, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), a component of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), plays a key role in helping to protect approximately 29,000 domestic and international flights operated daily by U.S. air carriers. This testimony discusses (1) FAMS's operational approach or "concept of operations" for covering flights, (2) an independent evaluation of the operational approach, and (3) FAMS's processes and initiatives for addressing workforce-related issues. Also, this testimony provides a list of possible oversight issues related to FAMS. This testimony is based on GAO's January 2009 report (GAO-09-273), with selected updates in July 2009. For its 2009 report, GAO analyzed policies and procedures regarding FAMS's operational approach and a July 2006 classified assessment of that approach. Also, GAO analyzed employee working group reports and related FAMS's initiatives for addressing workforce-related issues, and interviewed FAMS headquarters officials and 67 air marshals (selected to reflect a range in levels of experience).
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Because the number of air marshals is less than the number of daily flights, FAMS's operational approach is to assign air marshals to selected flights it deems high risk--such as the nonstop, long-distance flights targeted on September 11, 2001. In assigning air marshals, FAMS seeks to maximize coverage of flights in 10 targeted high-risk categories, which are based on consideration of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. In July 2006, the Homeland Security Institute, a federally funded research and development center, independently assessed FAMS's operational approach and found it to be reasonable. However, the institute noted that certain types of flights were covered less often than others. The institute recommended that FAMS increase randomness or unpredictability in selecting flights and otherwise diversify the coverage of flights within the various risk categories. In its January 2009 report, GAO noted that the Homeland Security Institute's evaluation methodology was reasonable and that FAMS had taken actions (or had ongoing efforts) to implement the institute's recommendations. To address workforce-related issues, FAMS's previous Director, who served until June 2008, established a number of processes and initiatives, such as working groups, listening sessions, and an internal Web site for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to management. These efforts have produced some positive results. For example, FAMS revised its policy for airport check-in and aircraft boarding procedures to help protect the anonymity of air marshals in mission status, and FAMS modified its mission scheduling processes and implemented a voluntary lateral transfer program to address certain quality-of-life issues. The air marshals GAO interviewed expressed satisfaction with FAMS's efforts to address workforce-related issues. The current FAMS Director has expressed a commitment to continue applicable processes and initiatives. Also, FAMS has plans to conduct a workforce satisfaction survey of all employees every 2 years, building upon an initial survey conducted in fiscal year 2007. GAO's review found that the potential usefulness of future surveys could be enhanced by ensuring that the survey questions and the answer options are clearly structured and unambiguous and that additional efforts are considered for obtaining the highest possible response rates. To its credit, FAMS has made progress in addressing various operational and quality-of-life issues that affect the ability of air marshals to perform their aviation security mission. However, sustaining progress will require ongoing consideration by FAMS management--and continued oversight by congressional stakeholders--of key questions, such as how to foster career sustainability for air marshals given that maintaining an effective operational tempo can at times be incompatible with supporting a work-life balance.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Federal Air Marshal Service  (FAMS), which has a core mission of deploying trained and armed federal  air marshals to provide an onboard security presence on selected flights  operated by U.S. commercial passenger air carriers. The agency’s cadre of  air marshals grew significantly in response to the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001 (9/11), and pursuant to the Aviation and  Transportation Security Act. Nonetheless, as noted in our January 2009  report, because the total number of air marshals is less than the  approximately 29,000 domestic and international flights operated daily by  U.S. commercial passenger air carriers, FAMS routinely must determine  which flights are to be provided an onboard security presence. To  facilitate making these decisions, FAMS developed an operational  approach—commonly referred to as the agency’s concept of operations— for deploying air marshals on selected flights. As further noted in our  January 2009 report, FAMS also faces challenges in addressing various  operational and quality-of-life issues that affect the ability of air marshals  to carry out the agency’s mission. Such issues range, for example, from  maintaining anonymity during aircraft boarding procedures to mitigating  the various health concerns associated with frequent flying.
With selected updates as of July 2009, this statement summarizes  information presented in our January 2009 report, which addressed the  following questions:    What is FAMS’s operational approach for achieving its core mission of  providing an onboard security presence for flights operated by U.S.  commercial passenger air carriers?
To what extent has FAMS’s operational approach for achieving its core  mission been independently assessed?
To what extent does FAMS have processes and initiatives in place to  address issues that affect the ability of its workforce to carry out its  mission?
Also, as you further requested, this statement presents information on  possible oversight issues related to FAMS.
To address the questions, we reviewed (1) relevant legislation regarding  FAMS’s mission, (2) the agency’s policies and other documentation  regarding the strategy and concept of operations for carrying out that  mission, (3) a July 2006 classified report prepared by the Homeland  Security Institute based on its independent evaluation of FAMS’s concept  of operations, and (4) documentation regarding various working groups  and other initiatives that FAMS had established to address issues that  affect the ability of air marshals to carry out the agency’s mission. Also, we  interviewed FAMS headquarters officials and visited 11 of the agency’s 21  field offices, where we interviewed managers and a total of 67 air  marshals. We selected the 11 field offices and the 67 air marshals based on  nonprobability sampling, which is a method of sampling where  observations are selected in a manner that is not completely random,  generally using specific characteristics of the population as criteria.  Results from a nonprobability sample cannot be used to make inferences  about an entire population because some elements of the population being  studied had no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of  the sample. However, the interviews provided a broad overview of issues  important to air marshals. More details about the scope and methodology  of our work to address the questions are presented in appendix I of our  January 2009 report. In conducting work in July 2009 for this statement,  we requested updated information from the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA), contacted the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) Office of Inspector General to discuss its FAMS-related audits or  inspections, and (3) reviewed FAMS budget data for fiscal years 2009 and  2010.
We conducted the work for this statement in July 2009 in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: FAMS was originally established as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s  to counter hijackers. In response to 9/11, the Aviation and Transportation  Security Act expanded FAMS’s mission and workforce and mandated the  deployment of federal air marshals on high-security risk flights. Within the  10-month period immediately following 9/11, the number of air marshals  grew significantly. Also, during subsequent years, FAMS underwent  various organizational transfers. Initially, FAMS was transferred within the  Department of Transportation from the Federal Aviation Administration to  the newly created TSA. In March 2003, FAMS moved, along with TSA, to  the newly established DHS. In November 2003, FAMS was transferred to  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Then, about 2 years  later, FAMS was transferred back to TSA in the fall of 2005.
FAMS deploys thousands of federal air marshals to a significant number of  daily domestic and international flights. In carrying out this core mission  of FAMS, air marshals are deployed in teams to various passenger flights.  Such deployments are based on FAMS’s concept of operations, which  guides the agency in its selection of flights to cover. Once flights are  selected for coverage, FAMS officials stated that they must schedule air  marshals based on their availability, the logistics of getting individual air  marshals in position to make a flight, and applicable workday rules.
At times, air marshals may have ground-based assignments. On a short- term basis, for example, air marshals participate in Visible Intermodal  Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, which provide security  nationwide for all modes of transportation. After the March 2004 train  bombings in Madrid, TSA created and deployed VIPR teams to enhance  security on U.S. rail and mass transit systems nationwide. Comprised of  TSA personnel that include federal air marshals—as well as transportation  security inspectors, transportation security officers, behavioral detection  officers, and explosives detection canines—the VIPR teams are intended  to work with local security and law enforcement officials to supplement  existing security resources, provide a deterrent presence and detection  capabilities, and introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt  potential terrorist activities.
FAMS’s budget request for fiscal year 2010 is $860.1 million, which is an  increase of $40.6 million (or about 5 percent) over the $819.5 million  appropriated in fiscal year 2009. The majority of the agency’s budget  provides for the salaries of federal air marshals and supports maintenance  of infrastructure that includes 21 field offices.
section_title: FAMS’s Operational Approach to Achieving Its Core Mission Is Based on Risk-Related Factors
paragraphs: FAMS’s operational approach (concept of operations) for achieving its  core mission is based on assessments of risk-related factors, since it is not  feasible for federal air marshals to cover all of the approximately 29,000  domestic and international flights operated daily by U.S. commercial  passenger air carriers. Specifically, FAMS considers the following risk- related factors to help ensure that high-risk flights operated by U.S.  commercial carriers—such as the nonstop, long-distance flights targeted  on 9/11—are given priority coverage by federal air marshals:    Threat (intelligence): Available strategic or tactical information  affecting aviation security is considered.
Vulnerabilities: Although FAMS’s specific definition is designated  sensitive security information, DHS defines vulnerability as a physical  feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to  exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard.
Consequences: FAMS recognizes that flight routes over certain  geographic locations involve more potential consequences than other  routes.
FAMS attempts to assign air marshals to provide an onboard security  presence on as many of the flights in the high-risk category as possible.  FAMS seeks to maximize coverage of high-risk flights by establishing  coverage goals for 10 targeted critical flight categories. In order to reach  these coverage goals, FAMS uses a scheduling process to determine the  most efficient flight combinations that will allow air marshals to cover the  desired flights. FAMS management officials stressed that the overall  coverage goals and the corresponding flight schedules of air marshals are  subject to modification at any time based on changing threat information  and intelligence. For example, in August 2006, FAMS increased its  coverage of international flights in response to the discovery, by  authorities in the United Kingdom, of specific terrorist threats directed at  flights from Europe to the United States. FAMS officials noted that a shift  in resources of this type can have consequences because of the limited  number of air marshals. The officials explained that international missions  require more resources than domestic missions partly because the trips  are of longer duration.
In addition to the core mission of providing an onboard security presence  on selected flights, FAMS also assigns air marshals to VIPR teams on an  as-needed basis to provide a ground-based security presence. For the first  quarter of fiscal year 2009, TSA reported conducting 483 VIPR operations,  with about 60 percent of these dedicated to ground-based facilities of the  aviation domain (including air cargo, commercial aviation, and general  aviation) and the remaining VIPR operations dedicated to the surface  domain (including highways, freight rail, pipelines, mass transit, and  maritime). TSA’s budget for fiscal year 2009 reflects support for 225 VIPR  positions at a cost of $30 million. TSA plans to significantly expand the  VIPR program in fiscal year 2010 by adding 15 teams consisting of 338  positions at a cost of $50 million. However, questions have been raised  about the effectiveness of the VIPR program. In June 2008, for example,  the DHS Office of Inspector General reported that although TSA has made  progress in addressing problems with early VIPR deployments, it needs to  develop a more collaborative relationship with local transit officials if  VIPR exercises are to enhance mass transit security.
section_title: An Independent Assessment Concluded That FAMS’s Approach for Achieving Its Core Mission Was Reasonable; Recommendations for Enhancing the Approach Are Being Implemented
paragraphs: After evaluating FAMS’s operational approach for providing an onboard  security presence on high-risk flights, the Homeland Security Institute, a  federally funded research and development center, reported in July 2006  that the approach was reasonable. In its report, the Homeland Security  Institute noted the following regarding FAMS’s overall approach to flight  coverage:    FAMS applies a structured, rigorous approach to analyzing risk and  allocating resources.
The approach is reasonable and valid.
No other organizations facing comparable risk-management challenges  apply notably better methodologies or tools.
As part of its evaluation methodology, the Homeland Security Institute  examined the conceptual basis for FAMS’s approach to risk analysis. Also,  the institute examined FAMS’s scheduling processes and analyzed outputs  in the form of “coverage” data reflecting when and where air marshals  were deployed on flights. Further, the Homeland Security Institute  developed and used a model to study the implications of alternative  strategies for assigning resources. We reviewed the institute’s evaluation  methodology and generally found it to be reasonable.
Although the institute’s July 2006 report concluded that FAMS’s  operational approach was reasonable and valid, the report also noted that  certain types of flights were covered less often than others. Accordingly,  the institute made recommendations for enhancing the operational  approach. For example, the institute recommended that FAMS increase  randomness or unpredictability in selecting flights and otherwise diversify  the coverage of flights.
To address the Homeland Security Institute’s recommendations, FAMS  officials stated that a broader approach for determining which flights to  cover has been implemented—an approach that opens up more flights for  potential coverage, provides more diversity and randomness in flight  coverage, and extends flight coverage to a variety of airports. Our January  2009 report noted that FAMS had implemented or had ongoing efforts to  implement the institute’s recommendations. We reported, for example,  that FAMS is developing an automated decision-support tool for selecting  flights and that this effort is expected to be completed by December 2009.
section_title: FAMS Has Taken Positive Actions to Address Issues Affecting Its Workforce and to Help Ensure Continued Progress
paragraphs: To better understand and address operational and quality-of-life issues  affecting the FAMS workforce, the agency’s previous Director—who  served in that capacity from March 2006 to June 2008—established various  processes and initiatives. Chief among these were 36 issue-specific  working groups to address a variety of topics, such as tactical policies and  procedures, medical or health concerns, recruitment and retention  practices, and organizational culture. Each working group typically  included a special agent-in-charge, a subject matter expert, air marshals,  and mission support personnel from the field and headquarters. According  to FAMS management, the working groups typically disband after  submitting a final report, but applicable groups could be reconvened or  new groups established as needed to address relevant issues. The previous  Director also established listening sessions that provided a forum for  employees to communicate directly with senior management and an  internal Web site for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to  management. Another initiative implemented was assigning an air marshal  to the position of Ombudsman in October 2006 to provide confidential,  informal, and neutral assistance to employees to address workplace- related problems, issues, and concerns.
These efforts have produced some positive results. For example, as noted  in our January 2009 report, FAMS amended its policy for airport check-in  and flight boarding procedures (effective May 15, 2008) to better ensure  the anonymity of air marshals in mission status. In addition, FAMS  modified its mission scheduling processes and implemented a voluntary  lateral transfer program to address certain issues regarding air marshals’  quality of life—and has plans to further address health issues associated  with varying work schedules and frequent flying. Also, our January 2009  report noted that FAMS was taking steps to procure new personal digital  assistant communication devices—to replace the current, unreliable  devices—and distribute them to air marshals to improve their ability to  communicate effectively with management while in mission status.
All of the 67 air marshals we interviewed in 11 field offices commented  favorably about the various processes and initiatives for addressing  operational and quality-of-life issues, and the air marshals credited the  leadership of the previous FAMS Director. The current FAMS Director, as  noted in our January 2009 report, has expressed a commitment to sustain  progress and reinforce a shared vision for workforce improvements by  continuing applicable processes and initiatives.
In our January 2009 report, we also noted that FAMS plans to conduct a  workforce satisfaction survey of all employees every 2 years, building  upon an initial survey conducted in fiscal year 2007, to help identify issues  affecting the ability of its workforce to carry out its mission. We reported  that a majority (79 percent) of the respondents to the 2007 survey  indicated that there had been positive changes from the prior year,  although the overall response rate (46 percent) constituted less than half  of the workforce. The 46 percent response rate was substantially less than  the 80 percent rate encouraged by the Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) in its guidance for federal surveys that require its approval.  According to the OMB guidance, a high response rate increases the  likelihood that the views of the target population are reflected in the  survey results. We also reported that the 2007 survey’s results may not  provide a complete assessment of employees’ satisfaction because  7 of the 60 questions in the 2007 survey questionnaire combined two or  more issues, which could cause respondents to be unclear on what  issue to address and result in potentially misleading responses, and    none of the 60 questions in the 2007 survey questionnaire provided for  response options such as “not applicable” or “no basis to judge”— responses that would be appropriate when respondents had little or no  familiarity with the topic in question.
In summary, our January 2009 report noted that obtaining a higher  response rate to FAMS’s future surveys and modifying the structure of  some questions could enhance the surveys’ potential usefulness by, for  instance, providing a more comprehensive basis for assessing employees’  attitudes and perspectives. Thus, to increase the usefulness of the agency’s  biennial workforce satisfaction surveys, we recommended that the FAMS  Director take steps to ensure that the surveys are well designed and that  additional efforts are considered for obtaining the highest possible  response rates. Our January 2009 report recognized that DHS and TSA  agreed with our recommendation and noted that FAMS was in the initial  stages of formulating the next workforce satisfaction survey. More  recently, by letter dated July 2, 2009, DHS informed applicable  congressional committees and OMB of actions taken in response to our  recommendation. The response letter noted that agency plans include (1)  ensuring that questions in the 2009 survey are clearly structured and  unambiguous, (2) conducting a pretest of the 2009 survey questions, and  (3) developing and executing a detailed communication plan.
section_title: Congressional Oversight Issues
paragraphs: Federal air marshals are an important layer of aviation security. FAMS, to  its credit, has established a number of processes and initiatives to address  various operational and quality-of-life issues that affect the ability of air  marshals and other FAMS personnel to perform their aviation security  mission. The current FAMS Director has expressed a commitment to  continue relevant processes and initiatives for identifying and addressing  workforce concerns, maintaining open lines of communications, and  sustaining progress.
Similarly, this hearing provides an opportunity for congressional  stakeholders to focus a dialogue on how to sustain progress at FAMS. For  example, relevant questions that could be raised include the following:  In implementing the agency’s concept of operations, how effectively  does FAMS use new threat information and intelligence to modify  flight coverage goals and the corresponding flight schedules of air  marshals?
In managing limited resources to mitigate a potentially unlimited range  of security threats, how does FAMS ensure that federal air marshals  are allocated appropriately for meeting in-flight security  responsibilities as well as supporting new ground-based security  responsibilities, such as VIPR team assignments? What cost-benefit  analyses, if any, are being used to guide FAMS decision makers?
To what extent have appropriate performance measures been  developed for gauging the effectiveness and results of resource  allocations and utilization?
How does FAMS foster career sustainability for federal air marshals  given that maintaining an effective operational tempo is not  necessarily compatible with supporting a better work-life balance?
These types of questions warrant ongoing consideration by FAMS  management and continued oversight by congressional stakeholders.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I look forward to  answering any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee  may have.
section_title: Contacts and Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For information about this statement, please contact Steve Lord, Director,  Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-4379, or lords@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals  making key contributions to this testimony include David Alexander,  Danny Burton, Katherine Davis, Mike Harmond, and Tom Lombardi.
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