Force Structure: Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation before Services Spend Billions on New Capabilities
Published: 2007-01-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts for projecting and sustaining forces without relying on immediate access to nearby land bases and could be the source of billions of dollars of investment. In future security environments, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to encounter situations of reduced or denied access to areas of operation. Even where forward operating bases are otherwise available, their use may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted. GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) DOD has employed a comprehensive management approach to joint seabasing, (2) DOD has developed a joint experimentation campaign plan for joint seabasing, and (3) DOD and the services have identified the costs of joint seabasing options. For this review, GAO analyzed joint requirements documents, experimentation efforts, and service acquisition plans.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: While DOD has taken action to establish a joint seabasing capability, it has not developed a comprehensive management approach to guide and assess joint seabasing. GAO's prior work showed that sound management practices for developing capabilities include involving top leadership, dedicating an implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy. DOD is developing a joint seabasing concept and various DOD organizations are sponsoring seabasing initiatives. However, DOD has not provided sufficient leadership to guide joint seabasing development and service initiatives are outpacing DOD's analysis of joint requirements. DOD also has not established an implementation team to provide day-to-day management to ensure joint seabasing receives the focused attention needed so that efforts are effective and coordinated. Also, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that shares information among the organizations involved in seabasing. Without a comprehensive management approach containing these elements, DOD may be unable to coordinate activities and minimize redundancy among service initiatives. DOD has not developed a joint experimentation campaign plan, although many seabasing experimentation activities--including war games, modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations--have taken place across the services, combatant commands, and other defense entities. No overarching joint seabasing experimentation plan exists to guide these efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation, although it has been tasked with developing a biennial joint experimentation campaign plan for future joint concepts. While the U.S. Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing the plan, it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing or will be able to guide joint seabasing experimentation efforts. Without a plan to direct experimentation, DOD and the services' ability to evaluate solutions, coordinate efforts, and disseminate results could be compromised. While service development efforts tied to seabasing are approaching milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing options. Joint seabasing is going through a capabilities-based assessment process that is intended to produce preliminary cost estimates for seabasing options. However, DOD has not yet begun the specific study that will identify potential approaches, including changes to doctrine and training as well as material solutions, and produce preliminary cost estimates. DOD officials expect the study will not be complete for a year or more. Meanwhile, the services are actively pursuing a variety of seabasing initiatives, some of which are approaching milestones which will guide future program investments. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing options are developed and made transparent to DOD and Congress, decision makers will not be able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Future security environments are expected to become increasingly  Future security environments are expected to become increasingly  complicated through unstable international political relationships,  complicated through unstable international political relationships,  increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of nonstate actors, and  increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of nonstate actors, and  the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a complicated  the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a complicated  operational environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) may  operational environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) may  encounter situations of reduced or denied access to desired areas of  encounter situations of reduced or denied access to desired areas of  operation. Even where overseas bases are otherwise available, their use  operation. Even where overseas bases are otherwise available, their use  may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military use,  may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military use,  or a commander may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the  or a commander may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the  joint force in a host nation. As a result, the capability to project and  joint force in a host nation. As a result, the capability to project and  sustain forces in such antiaccess environments could become increasingly  sustain forces in such antiaccess environments could become increasingly  important in enabling DOD to confront unexpected threats and deter  important in enabling DOD to confront unexpected threats and deter  aggression or seize the initiative.  aggression or seize the initiative.
Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts describing how  Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts describing how  commanders in the future will project and sustain forces for conducting  commanders in the future will project and sustain forces for conducting  joint military operations without relying on immediate access to nearby  joint military operations without relying on immediate access to nearby  land bases. Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly,  land bases. Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly,  command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat  command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat  power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and  power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and  force projection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on  force projection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on  land bases within the joint operations area. Joint seabasing is a scalable  land bases within the joint operations area. Joint seabasing is a scalable  concept with many potential options for achieving its desired capability.  concept with many potential options for achieving its desired capability.  These options range from a single ship to a larger family of amphibious  These options range from a single ship to a larger family of amphibious  and logistics ships, with supporting surface and air connectors, as well a  and logistics ships, with supporting surface and air connectors, as well a  concept of operations and employment options. Enhancing a seabasing  concept of operations and employment options. Enhancing a seabasing  capability is expected to be costly, in light of the many options that could  capability is expected to be costly, in light of the many options that could  be developed to support joint seabasing, and could be the source of  be developed to support joint seabasing, and could be the source of  billions of dollars of investment if DOD chooses an option involving the  billions of dollars of investment if DOD chooses an option involving the  development of new ships. While joint seabasing is one option for how the  development of new ships. While joint seabasing is one option for how the  joint force commander could conduct joint military operations in the  joint force commander could conduct joint military operations in the  future, other means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess  future, other means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess  environment exist and continue to evolve. These include rapid strategic  airlift and fast sealift of forces from the United States to the area of  operation, airfield and port seizure, rapid base construction, and several  others. At a time when DOD is under pressure to control costs, it is  increasingly important for decision makers to evaluate competing  priorities and alternatives to determine the most cost-effective solutions  for conducting future military operations.
Joint seabasing represents a major change in the way DOD would manage  its forces. Inherent in implementing an organizational transformation such  as joint seabasing are possible changes in force structure, acquisition,  logistics concepts, command and control, training, and other factors  important to successful military operations. The concept could also have a  significant effect on near- and long-term funding priorities.
You asked us to conduct a review of DOD’s assessments and plans to  implement joint seabasing, with particular attention to the following three  questions: (1) To what extent has DOD employed a comprehensive  management approach for developing a joint seabasing capability? (2) To  what extent has a joint experimentation campaign plan been developed,  implemented, and used to inform decisions on joint seabasing options?   (3) To what extent have DOD and the services identified the cost of joint  seabasing options so that decision makers can make informed, cost- effective decisions?
To assess DOD’s management oversight and leadership approach for joint  seabasing, we obtained and analyzed briefings and studies on joint  seabasing, reviewed joint requirements policies and procedures,  interviewed DOD and service officials, and compared DOD’s approach  with our prior work on best practices for transformations of large  organizations. To assess the extent to which a joint experimentation  campaign plan has been developed, implemented, and used to inform  decisions on joint seabasing options, we obtained briefings from and  interviewed DOD and service officials on their experimentation efforts,  and examined DOD and service guidance on conducting and leading  experimentation campaigns. To assess the development of cost estimates  for joint seabasing, we obtained and analyzed key briefings, reports, data,  and plans from DOD and the services that included information and  analysis regarding estimated costs related to joint seabasing and  conducted interviews with relevant DOD and service officials. We  compared the cost estimates for joint seabasing to DOD instructions for  developing cost estimates, along with best practices on developing total  ownership costs. We conducted our review from February 2006 through  October 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards and determined that any data used were sufficiently reliable for  our objective. The scope and methodology used in our review are  described in further detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 2002, the Navy’s Sea Power 21 vision stated that shore-based  capabilities would be transformed to seabased capabilities whenever  practical to improve the reach, persistence, and sustainability of systems  that are already afloat. The objective for the United States to maintain  global freedom of action is a consistent theme throughout the National  Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. DOD’s 2006  Quadrennial Defense Review Report further stated that the future joint  force will exploit the operational flexibility of seabasing to counter  political antiaccess and irregular warfare challenges.
The joint seabasing concept is currently going through the Joint  Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), a DOD decision  support process for transforming military forces. Figure 1 shows the  JCIDS process, including the major elements of a capabilities-based  assessment. The purpose of JCIDS is to identify, assess, and prioritize joint  military capability needs. Capabilities represent warfighting needs that are  studied as part of the system’s capabilities-based assessment process. The  process identifies warfighter skills and attributes for a desired capability  (Functional Area Analysis), the gaps to achieving this capability  (Functional Needs Analysis), and possible solutions for filling these gaps  (Functional Solution Analysis). The results of this assessment are used as  the basis for identifying approaches for delivering the desired capability.  When identifying these approaches, cost is one factor that is considered.  One way costs are used to evaluate potential approaches is by developing  total ownership cost estimates. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council  has overall responsibility for JCIDS and is supported by eight Functional  Capabilities Boards (Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness,  Focused Logistics, Force Management, Force Protection, Force  application, Net-Centric, and Joint Training), which lead the capabilities- based assessment process. DOD’s anticipated timeframe for an  operational joint seabasing capability as currently envisioned in the Joint  Integrating Concept is 2015–2025.
The services are either considering or actively pursuing material solutions  to support seabasing. According to service officials and documentation,  these solutions will play a critical role in enhancing current seabasing  capabilities. For example, the Navy and Marines plan to acquire the  Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) along with several supporting  connectors needed for it to be able to achieve its mission. As part of the  seabase, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) will be a squadron of  ships to transport and deliver the personnel, combat power, and logistic  support of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The connectors, which are  envisioned to provide both intertheater lift to the seabase and intratheater  lift within the seabase, include sealift, such as the Joint High Speed Vessel,  Joint High Speed Sealift, and Joint Maritime Assault Connector (this vessel  is intended to replace the Landing Craft Assault Connector), and airlift,  such as the V-22 Osprey and CH-53K heavy lift helicopter. Figure 2  illustrates and describes several sealift and airlift connectors. The Army is  also exploring new capability initiatives for establishing a seabasing  capability. In conjunction with the Navy and Marine Corps, the Army is  developing the Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint High Speed Sealift ships.  Furthermore, the Army is also in the early stages of development of its  Afloat Forward Staging Base, which is a ship concept whose mission  would be providing aerial maneuver with Army forces from the sea. One  option the Army is exploring for the Afloat Forward Staging Base is to add  flight decks to a commercial container ship, along with other alterations,  as a means to provide aerial maneuver to Army forces.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to Guide Joint Seabasing and Integrate Service Initiatives
paragraphs: Although DOD has taken action to begin the development of joint  seabasing, DOD has not fully established a comprehensive management  approach to effectively guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for  projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment and  integrate service initiatives. Specifically, DOD has not fully incorporated  sound management practices—such as providing leadership, dedicating an  implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy—that  our prior work has shown are found at the center of successful  transformations.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Taken Action to Develop Joint Seabasing
paragraphs: DOD has taken action to develop joint seabasing by pursuing it within  DOD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).  JCIDS is a key DOD decision support process that uses a capabilities- based approach to assess existing capabilities, identify capability gaps,  and develop new warfighting capabilities. Within JCIDS, future capability  needs are intended to be developed from top-level strategic guidance such  as the National Military Strategy, a “top-down” approach. Under the  former process, requirements grew out of the individual services’ unique  strategic visions, a “bottom-up” approach. In January 2006 we reported  that JCIDS is not yet functioning as envisioned to define gaps and  redundancies in existing and future military capabilities across the  department and to identify solutions to improve joint capabilities. We  reported that requirements continue to be defined largely from the  “bottom up”—by the services—although DOD uses the JCIDS framework  to assess the services’ proposals and push a joint perspective.
According to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics officials, seabasing is going through the JCIDS  process to become more of a joint concept that is developed through input  from the services, combatant commands, and other DOD organizations.  DOD has produced a Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept that outlines  the concept for joint seabasing and identifies essential capabilities. Under  JCIDS, the capabilities-based assessment follows a structured, four-step  process. The first step in this process, the Functional Area Analysis,  dated October 2005, identified the seabasing tasks, conditions, and  standards needed to meet military objectives. The Functional Area  Analysis identified such critical joint seabasing tasks as providing for  maintenance of equipment in the joint operations area, attacking  operational targets, and building and maintaining sustainment bases in the  joint operations area. The second step of the capabilities-based  assessment, the Functional Needs Analysis, dated November 2006,  provided a prioritized list of joint seabasing capabilities and capability  gaps, and identifies potential mitigation areas from which the identified  capability gaps may be addressed. The 17 seabasing capability gaps  include at-sea assembly, forcible entry, and conducting operational  movement and maneuver. The analyses that are currently being developed  are intended to further define and organize the capability gaps identified in  the Functional Needs Analysis and recommend potential solutions for  consideration in future analyses.
section_title: DOD’s Management Approach Has Not Fully Incorporated Sound Management Principles or Integrated Service Initiatives
paragraphs: Despite pursuing joint seabasing within JCIDS, DOD has not fully  incorporated key sound management practices into its approach for  managing the development of joint seabasing requirements and integrating  service initiatives. In our prior work, we identified several key sound  management practices at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions,  and transformations. These key sound management practices include   (1) ensuring top leadership drives the transformation, (2) dedicating an  implementation team to manage the transformation process, and   (3) establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations  and report related progress. Without a management approach that  contains these elements, DOD may be unable to guide and assess joint  seabasing in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Moreover, without  central coordination, it is unclear whether DOD will be able to effectively  manage billions of dollars of potential service investments in  interdependent complex platforms, connectors, and logistics technologies  that will need to be coordinated using a common set of standards,  requirements, timeframes, and priorities.
First, although joint seabasing capability development is underway, DOD  has not provided sufficient leadership to integrate service initiatives and  guide the development of joint seabasing. While the joint seabasing JCIDS  process is still in the early stages of assessing needed capabilities, the  services have developed their own concepts and approaches for  seabasing, and in some cases systems that will support joint seabasing are  further along than the concept in JCIDS development. For example, the  Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed Vessel  are approaching their second major milestone, or decision point, within  DOD’s acquisition system, which will initiate systems-level development,  whereas the joint seabasing concept is still being refined. Preliminary cost  estimates for both these systems range from nearly $12 billion to over $15  billion. The 2005 National Research Council Committee’s report, Sea  Basing, concluded that developing a system of systems such as seabasing  that is comprised of complex platforms, connectors, and logistics  technologies will require a common set of standards, requirements,  timeframes, and priorities. Various ship, airlift, and sealift connector  components of the seabase will need to interface, and the capabilities of  some of these components will be interdependent. In addition, joint  operations from a seabase will require robust logistics technologies and  command and control. Prematurely developing such systems to meet  individual service requirements rather than joint requirements may result  in initiatives that duplicate each other and systems that are not  interoperable and compatible. Moreover, in addition to the billions of  dollars being spent to procure these systems, it may be costly to realign or  adjust the efforts of the services in the future if they do not meet the joint  requirements of seabasing.
In addition, DOD leadership has not provided an official, unified vision for  joint seabasing to guide the transformation, ensure that focus is  maintained on providing a capability that is the best option for projecting  and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment, and ensure that joint  seabasing is evaluated against competing options. Joint Staff officials told  us that the joint seabasing JCIDS process has been addressing how  seabasing can be used to counter the problem of projecting and sustaining  forces in an antiaccess environment, rather than examining specific  solutions. We reported in 2003 that key practices and implementation  steps for successful transformations include ensuring top leadership  drives the transformation. We found that leadership must set the  direction, pace, and tone for the transformation. Concerns have been  raised by other organizations about the lack of leadership to guide the  development of joint seabasing. For example, the National Research  Council Committee’s report, Sea Basing, stated that “given the complexity  of  and the long- term nature of the major capital investments by Services in new platforms,  development of advanced technologies, and the introduction of  appropriate joint doctrine, such a unifying vision will be essential in order  to best leverage existing currently programmed and future Service  capabilities.” Also, in 2003 the Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea  Basing found that developing the seabase requires persistent, top-down  leadership to coordinate the numerous initiatives—including concepts of  operations, ships, aircraft, weapons, and transportations systems—that  support the seabase. Absent leadership, DOD can not be certain joint  seabasing has been evaluated against competing options for projecting and  sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment. Moreover, without  leadership that has the authority, responsibility, and accountability to  guide joint seabasing and integrate service initiatives, DOD cannot be sure  that ongoing or planned initiatives are cost-effective, fully leveraged,  properly focused, and complement each other.
Second, DOD has not established a dedicated implementation team to  provide day-to-day management oversight. We reported in 2003 that a  dedicated implementation team should be responsible for the day-to-day  management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are  integrated. Such a team would ensure that joint seabasing receives the  focused, full-time attention necessary to be sustained and effective, by  establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities, helping to reach  agreement on work priorities, and keeping efforts coordinated. There are  several groups and DOD organizations tasked with specific responsibilities  for developing joint seabasing within JCIDS; however, none of these  organizations have the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability  to coordinate initiatives and the acquisition of systems that may support  joint seabasing. For example, the Navy was designated the sponsor of the  Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept and is responsible for all common  documentation, periodic reporting, and funding actions required to  support the seabasing capabilities development and acquisition process.  The Force Management Functional Capabilities Board is responsible for  leading the seabasing capabilities-based assessment and oversees the  sponsor (the Navy) in developing documents. The Seabasing Working  Group was organized and tasked by the Joint Staff to assist the Force  Management Functional Capabilities Board in completing the joint  seabasing analyses. The Seabasing Working Group is comprised of  members from the Joint Staff, combatant commands, the services, and  other organizations, and serves as a source of expertise and as a joint  sounding board for collaboration and focusing the direction of the  analyses. According to Joint Staff officials, the working group can ask the  services and combatant commands to participate and provide input to the  analyses, but they have no authority to force their participation in the  development of the analyses nor do they have authority over service  initiatives that may support joint seabasing.
Recommendations have been made for a joint office to manage and lead  joint seabasing by DOD officials, the Defense Science Board Task Force  on Sea Basing, and the Naval Studies Board, but a leadership body has  not been established. In November 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed that a terms of  reference be developed for a Joint Expeditionary Force  Projection/Seabasing Capabilities Office. According to the Terms of  Reference, the office would organize all joint seabasing-related DOD  activities—ranging from experimentation efforts to solutions development  to training—into a coherent direction. In addition, the office would be  comprised of members from each of the four services and the U.S. Joint  Forces Command and would have limited contract authority. However,  DOD officials decided to forgo the joint office and pursue joint seabasing  within the JCIDS process. According to officials from the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, one  reason a joint office was not set up for joint seabasing was because there  was no staff available at the time. According to Joint Staff officials, one  downfall to joint seabasing being developed under the JCIDS process is  that consensus is required on all decisions before moving forward, which  may result in compromising solutions. Although use of the JCIDS process  has encouraged the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to participate with  the Navy in the development of the Joint Integrating Concept and JCIDS  analyses, the services continue to pursue their own initiatives. As  previously mentioned, some of these initiatives are still in the early stages  of concept development, whereas other initiatives are further along in the  acquisition process ahead of joint seabasing. A key official from the  Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing told us that the need for  a joint office to coordinate efforts between the services still exists.  According to the official, the lack of action in setting up a joint seabasing  office makes achieving compatible systems to support joint seabasing  more difficult considering some supporting systems are ahead of joint  seabasing in the development process. The Naval Studies Board also  recommended a joint planning office be set up to “correlate Service  requirements and advise Service procurements” so common capabilities  among the services can be taken advantage of and incompatible  acquisitions will not be made. We and the DOD Office of the Inspector  General have found similar management challenges in DOD’s efforts to  field other joint capabilities such as the Global Information Grid and  network-centric warfare. Without formally designating a dedicated  leadership body to provide day-to-day management oversight by providing  a coherent direction for related activities, establishing clearly defined  roles and responsibilities, helping to reach agreement on work priorities,  and keeping efforts coordinated, DOD’s ability to develop a joint seabasing  capability in an efficient manner may be hindered. Furthermore, without a  dedicated implementation team, it may be difficult for DOD to sustain joint  seabasing development over a long period of time.
Third, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that  encourages communication, shares knowledge, and provides information  to DOD organizations involved in joint seabasing initiatives. We previously  reported that creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is  central to forming the partnerships that are needed to develop and  implement the organization’s strategies. As previously mentioned, there  are numerous groups and DOD organizations involved in joint seabasing  and various initiatives that may affect joint seabasing. The seabasing  working group hosts meetings that provide a forum for discussion on joint  seabasing among members. In addition, it has established a Web site that  posts meeting minutes and various joint seabasing JCIDS analysis  documents. While this Web site provides some transparency into the  analysis process, it does not serve as a central repository for  communicating information on joint seabasing because it does not provide  information on joint seabasing efforts conducted by the services and  combatant commands outside of the JCIDS process. In addition, we found  no evidence of a formal mechanism that communicated joint seabasing  information. Officials from the Navy and Marine Corps told us they face  challenges in determining what organizations are involved in joint  seabasing and what they are doing. According to Marine Corps officials,  this impedes their ability to leverage activities and minimize redundancy.  Furthermore, Joint Staff officials have acknowledged that the lack of a  central, authoritative source of information significantly hindered timely  completion of analyses. For example, the data management tool used to  associate essential seabasing capabilities with the appropriate functional  area did not provide a systematic method for identifying relevant  information and some data was missing. Moreover, they also recognized  that a means for identifying DOD-wide initiatives that affect joint  seabasing needs to be established. In the absence of clear communication  of joint seabasing information throughout DOD via an overall  communications strategy, joint seabasing participants may not be able to  effectively leverage activities and minimize redundancy, and the overall  development of joint seabasing may be impeded.
section_title: DOD Has Not Developed a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan to Inform Decisions About Joint Seabasing
paragraphs: DOD has not developed, implemented, or used an overarching joint  experimentation campaign plan to inform decisions about joint seabasing.  Experimentation campaign plans play an important role in developing  transformational concepts by coordinating and guiding experimentation  efforts using a series of related experiments that develop knowledge about  a concept or capability. Many seabasing experimentation activities have  taken place across DOD and the services; however, an overarching  experimentation campaign plan to coordinate and guide joint seabasing  experimentation does not exist because the U.S. Joint Forces Command— DOD’s leader of joint warfighting experimentation—has not taken the lead  in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation efforts. Additionally, DOD  lacks a systematic means to analyze, communicate, and disseminate  information on joint seabasing experimentation. Moreover, DOD lacks a  feedback mechanism to interpret and clarify results from joint seabasing  experimental activities.
subsections: section_title: Experimentation Campaign Plans Coordinate and Guide Experimentation Efforts
paragraphs: According to military experimentation guides, experimentation campaign  plans play an important role in developing transformational concepts by  coordinating and guiding experimentation efforts using a series of related  experiments that develop knowledge about a concept or capability. Taken  together, the results of these experiments can inform decisions about  future research and technology programs, acquisition efforts, risk,  organizational changes, and changes in operational concepts. A well- planned experimentation campaign provides a framework for much of  what needs to be known about a new concept or capability. According to  defense best practices, key aspects of an experimentation campaign  include: (1) designated campaign leaders; (2) clear campaign focus and  objectives; (3) a spectrum of well-designed and sequenced experimental  activities, including studies and analyses, seminars and conferences, war  games, modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations; (4) data  collection and analyses; (5) broad dissemination of results; and (6) a  feedback mechanism to discuss and interpret results. Experimentation  campaigns that include these aspects can reduce the risk in developing  and fielding a new concept or capability by addressing a spectrum of  possibilities and building upon experimentation activities systematically,  with continual analyses and feedback to interpret the results into useful  information.
Single experiments alone are insufficient to develop transformational  concepts because they can only explore a limited number of variables, and  their contributions are limited unless their findings can be replicated in  other experiments. Campaigns can provide conclusive and robust results  through their ability to replicate findings and conduct experiments in a  variety of scenarios and operating environments. A well-planned  experimentation campaign can mitigate the limitations of a single  experiment by synthesizing outputs from a series of activities into  coherent advice to decision makers.
section_title: Many Seabasing Experimentation Activities Have Taken Place but an Overarching Experimentation Campaign Plan to Guide These Activities Does Not Exist
paragraphs: Many experimentation activities involving seabasing have taken place;  however, an overarching DOD experimentation campaign plan to guide  and coordinate these activities does not exist. All of the services,  combatant commands, and some defense entities have been involved with  seabasing experimentation through war games, studies, workshops,  modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations. For example, in 2004  the Joint Chiefs of Staff led a war game called Nimble Viking that brought  the services together and addressed gaps in their understanding of the  joint seabasing concept. The services conducted studies addressing gaps  in the joint seabasing concept, such as the Navy’s 40 Knot Marine  Expeditionary Brigade study, which identified gaps in conducting forcible  entry operations with Marine Corps forces using seaborne lift capable of  speeds of 40 knots. Moreover, the Marine Corps modeled plans for landing  seabased forces from amphibious ships, the results of which, according to  the Marine Corps, shaved hours off the landing of forces from amphibious  ships. In addition, the U.S. Joint Forces Command and services worked  together in cosponsoring several war games involving joint seabasing,  including Unified Course 2004, Joint Urban Warrior 2004, Pinnacle Impact  2003, and Sea Viking 2004. While many of the reports from these war  games recognized joint seabasing as a potential concept for addressing  antiaccess and force projection issues, they stated that further  experimentation was needed before joint seabasing moved forward.
Additionally, material solutions being developed to support joint seabasing  have undergone planned experimentation and testing activities. For  example, U.S. Transportation Command officials believe that DOD’s Joint- Logistics-Over-the-Shore program could support joint seabasing logistical  operations, such as heavy cargo transfer at sea. To that end, in June 2006  they sponsored a Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise to transfer  equipment and bulk materials from large ships to the beach using smaller  landing craft. Figure 3 shows forces using a barge to move construction  vehicles from ships to shore during a Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore  exercise at Naval Magazine, in Indian Island, Washington.
The Navy’s Program Executive Office for Ships, which manages the  Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed Vessel  programs, reports that the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)  program has planned and is executing a series of jointly coordinated tests  involving modeling and simulation and live demonstrations. According to  the Program Manager, demonstrations included at-sea evaluation of the  Mobile Landing Platform concept and its ability to interface with other  vessels supporting the joint seabase. Additionally, the Navy’s Office of  Naval Research is developing a number of technologies, such as internal  ship cargo handling and ship-to-ship cargo transfers, to address capability  gaps in joint seabasing operations.
Although joint seabasing experimental activities have taken place, an  overarching experimentation campaign plan to coordinate and guide these  activities does not exist because the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not  taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation efforts.  Moreover, involvement in these activities by the services, combatant  commands, and defense entities has been inconsistent due to budget  restraints, other competing priorities, and the lack of timely coordination  and advance notice of events. In May 1998, the Secretary of Defense  designated the U.S. Joint Forces Command as the DOD executive agent for  joint warfighting experimentation. In this role the command is responsible  for conducting joint experimentation on new warfighting concepts and  disseminating the results of these activities to the joint concept  community, which includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint  Staff, combatant commands, services, and defense agencies. The U.S. Joint  Forces Command is also responsible for coordinating joint  experimentation efforts by developing a biennial joint concept  development and experimentation campaign plan. In January 2006, a  memo from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff further underscored  this responsibility by providing explicit direction to the U.S. Joint Forces  Command on developing a campaign plan that provided guidance to the  joint concept community on coordinating joint experimentation efforts,  and capturing and disseminating the results of these efforts. While the  U.S. Joint Forces Command said it is in the process of developing the plan,  it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing.  According to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, other more near-term  priorities, such as improvised explosive devices and urban warfare, have  prevented them from focusing on joint seabasing during the past few  years.
Once the U.S. Joint Forces Command develops and implements the plan,  which it intends to do by fiscal year 2008, it is also unclear the extent to  which this plan will be able to guide and coordinate joint seabasing  experimentation efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command does not  have the authority to direct service and other DOD organizations’  experimentation plans. The services and combatant commands are  responsible for working with the U.S. Joint Forces Command in executing  the joint concept development and experimentation campaign plan, and  for providing them with observations, insights, results, and  recommendations related to all joint experimentation efforts. However,  the services and combatant commands are not required to go through the  U.S. Joint Forces Command before executing their own experimentation  activities. Moreover, the U.S. Joint Forces Command says it does not have  authority to make the services and combatant commands take specific  joint actions. Additionally, there are many entities within the services  involved in joint seabasing experimentation and there are no formalized  leaders coordinating service efforts. As a result, these entities operate  independently and do not coordinate their efforts with the U.S. Joint  Forces Command. This lack of coordination poses risks of duplicating  experimentation efforts and conducting experimentation that does not  build upon previous activities.
Furthermore, no overarching campaign plan to guide joint seabasing  experimentation exists within any other DOD entity. While the Navy and  Marine Corps have seabasing experimentation campaign plans, officials  told us these plans are not overarching within each of the services and it is  unclear the extent to which they are being implemented. For example, a  seabasing experimentation plan exists as part of the Navy’s Sea Trial  Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan; however,  Navy officials said there is not a lot of joint seabasing experimentation  being conducted within this plan and the plan does not encompass all of  the Navy’s efforts. In addition, the Marine Corps has a plan that broadly  focuses on issues that need to be addressed for seabasing capabilities such  as the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed  Vessel. However, its plan does not identify designated leaders and specific  experimentation activities that should take place, nor does the plan  identify timelines, resources, or staff to conduct experimentation. It also  does not contain plans for data collection and analysis or any provisions  for disseminating results. In addition, according to Marine Corps officials,  the plan is not being fully executed due to lack of funding and staff.
Many service officials expressed concern over the lack of coordination  and guidance on joint seabasing experimentation. They stated that the U.S.  Joint Forces Command has not shown much interest in experimentation  for future concepts such as joint seabasing, instead focusing  experimentation efforts on short-term concepts and immediate priorities  such as improvised explosive devices. One service official commented that  there is no single point of contact for joint seabasing at the U.S. Joint  Forces Command. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff states in the  Functional Needs Analysis that more joint experimentation is needed to  inform and further refine capability gaps in the joint seabasing concept.
section_title: DOD Lacks a Systematic Means to Analyze, Communicate, and Disseminate Information on Joint Seabasing Experimentation
paragraphs: DOD also lacks a systematic means to analyze, communicate, and  disseminate information about joint seabasing experimentation across the  department. According to military experimentation guides, a significant  part of an experiment consists of gathering data, interpreting it into  findings, and combining it with already known information. Additionally,  data collection and analysis plans are important to experimentation  because they ensure valid and reliable data are captured and understood,  and that the analysis undertaken addresses the key issues in the  experiment. However, we found no overarching data collection and  analysis plan to guide the analysis of joint seabasing experimentation  results. Furthermore, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s  Program Analysis and Evaluation division described a lack of analysis in  joint seabasing to inform the capabilities-based assessment, which could  lead to inaccurately identifying gaps in implementing the concept. They  said that no comprehensive analytical framework was ever established to  guide development of the joint seabasing concept; consequently, the value  joint seabasing will bring to the warfighter is unknown. Without an  overarching campaign plan, experimental results for joint seabasing are  being obtained and interpreted using different data collection and analysis  methods, which may lead to inconsistent reporting methods. As a result,  experimentation data may be analyzed, interpreted, and shared  inconsistently and with little transparency across the community.
Additionally, DOD and service officials commented on the lack of  sufficient modeling and simulation tools available to provide valid data on  joint seabasing. Modeling and simulation tools play an important role in  experiments. Unlike live demonstrations, modeling and simulation  techniques can inexpensively vary the values of variables to represent a  wide variety of conditions. They also provide a great deal of control over  the variables in the experiment, which allows for replication. The Joint  Chiefs of Staff noted the absence of high-level modeling tools capable of  end-to-end modeling of seabasing in the Functional Needs Analysis,  saying that the absence of this type of modeling precluded effective and  meaningful data to validate warfighter needs and thus limited the depth of  their analysis. Furthermore, officials in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense’s Program Analysis and Evaluation division also commented that  the lack of modeling could result in missing critical gaps in the joint  seabasing concept that have not yet been identified. The Joint Chiefs of  Staff identified the U.S. Joint Forces Command as a possible lead for end- to-end modeling and simulation of joint seabasing because of its role in  joint concept development and experimentation, and its expertise in  developing comprehensive modeling and simulation tools.
While some communication takes place among the entities involved with  developing the seabasing concept, there is no established method for  communicating observations, insights, and upcoming events across the  entire community. DOD and service officials described the joint seabasing  community as an informal community of practice, where the services,  combatant commands, and defense entities invite each other to participate  in their experimentation activities. The U.S. Joint Forces Command and  the services track to some degree the experimental efforts of the joint  seabasing community. For example, the U.S. Joint Forces Command says  it tries to leverage off the services’ efforts by partnering with them in  experimental activities. However, despite this informal community, DOD  and service officials describe a lack of coordination and awareness of  experimental activities. A Marine Corps official stated that some officials  are more aware than others are; but no one is completely aware of what is  going on across the entire community. In fact, many officials we spoke  with were either unaware or had very little advance notice of an upcoming  war game involving seabasing. Without an established communication  method, joint seabasing experimentation efforts are not transparent to the  entire community, which can contribute to a lack of consensus on the  types of activities that take place, conflicts in scheduling events, and  duplication of efforts.
Additionally, there is no overarching system to disseminate observations  and results on joint seabasing experimentation. The U.S. Joint Forces  Command has a database containing documents and reports from  experimentation activities; however, the database contains different levels  of information based on what the services choose to publish. As a result,  the database is not a comprehensive resource of joint experimentation  information. The Navy’s Warfare Development Command also maintains  a Web site of information pertaining to its Sea Trial campaign, which other  entities within the Navy contribute to, but it is not overarching within the  Navy. In response to a January 2006 memo from the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command is developing an online  knowledge management portal to disseminate information on  experimentation activities across the joint concept community. The  portal contains a repository of information on experimentation concepts,  projects, and documents; a bulletin board to post insights and  observations; hotlinks to other sites; and a calendar function for upcoming  experimentation activities. The portal also contains a section on activities  relating to joint logistics, and joint deployment and sustainment; however,  it does not yet contain information on joint seabasing. Furthermore, while  the portal has the ability to disseminate information, it may not be  successful in increasing communication across the joint seabasing  community because the services have not been directed to use the portal  in planning their activities.
section_title: DOD Lacks a Feedback Mechanism to Interpret Results From Joint Seabasing Experimentation
paragraphs: DOD lacks a feedback mechanism to interpret and clarify results from  joint seabasing experimental activities. Feedback on analyses and findings  produced from experimental activities provides the joint seabasing  experimentation community an opportunity to comment on the results and  ask questions. It also gives the experiment sponsor an opportunity to see  how the work was received, assist in interpreting results, and provide  further advice on how the results should be used. In the context of an  experimentation campaign, it may also give the sponsor an opportunity to  clarify how the results affect the overarching campaign concept. While  individual seabasing experiments may have had some form of feedback,  the lack of an overarching joint seabasing experimentation campaign plan  that includes procedures for providing and obtaining feedback may  prevent the joint seabasing experimentation community from fully  realizing how the results of individual experiments affect the development  of joint seabasing.
section_title: Timeframe for Completing Joint Seabasing Total Ownership Cost Estimates is Uncertain
paragraphs: While some service acquisitions tied to seabasing are approaching  milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete  development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint  seabasing options. Understanding estimated total ownership costs helps  decision makers measure the whole cost of owning and operating assets  and make comparisons between competing options. The joint seabasing  capability is being assessed in the JCIDS analysis process. However, DOD  has not yet begun a key study of approaches and their associated costs  and may not complete this study for at least a year. In the meantime, the  services are considering or pursuing systems to enhance seabasing  capabilities. For example, a major Navy-Marine Corps initiative is  scheduled to undergo a major milestone review in fiscal year 2008. Until  total ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing options are developed  and made transparent to DOD and Congress, decision makers will not be  able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives.
subsections: section_title: Total Ownership Cost Estimates Help Decision Makers Evaluate Options
paragraphs: In order to evaluate options and make informed, cost-effective decisions,  decision makers must have an understanding of the total ownership costs  for establishing a desired capability. A total ownership cost estimate  includes the costs to develop, acquire, operate, maintain, and dispose of all  systems required to establish a seabasing capability. Understanding total  ownership cost estimates helps organizations measure the whole cost of  owning and operating assets by providing a consistent framework for  analyzing and comparing options. Total ownership cost estimates can be  used to assess the possible return on investment of new initiatives.  According to DOD guidance, all parties involved in the defense  acquisition system must be cognizant of the reality of fiscal constraints  and treat cost as an independent variable when developing systems.  Furthermore, the policy stresses the importance of identifying the total  costs of ownership, including major cost drivers, while considering the  affordability of establishing needed capabilities. Even with future  concepts, such as joint seabasing, where uncertainty exists, total  ownership cost estimates can be developed. According to DOD cost  analysis guidance, in such cases, areas of uncertainty can be quantified  using ranges of cost, thereby giving decision makers, at a minimum, a  rough estimate of the total costs to achieving a desired capability. For  systems of systems, such as seabasing, a total ownership cost estimate  should include research, acquisition, operation, maintenance, and  disposition costs of all systems, primary and support, needed to achieve  the desired end state. Understanding the estimated total ownership costs  of seabasing options can help decision makers make informed decisions to  determine the most cost-effective method of achieving a seabasing  capability. Furthermore, they can be used to more effectively evaluate  joint seabasing against alternative methods of projecting and sustaining  forces in an antiaccess environment.
section_title: JCIDS Has Not Yet Produced Cost Estimates for Joint Seabasing Capability Options and Timeframes Are Uncertain
paragraphs: Joint seabasing is currently going through the capabilities-based  assessment phase of the JCIDS analysis process. One part of the JCIDS  analysis process is the Functional Solutions Analysis—an operationally  based assessment of all potential approaches, including changes to  doctrine, organization, training, as well as material solutions, to solve  identified capability gaps. According to Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, this  process will assess the costs of potential approaches to joint seabasing.  For any material approaches that are developed, the cost to develop,  procure, and sustain each approach will be estimated. These estimates  should provide decision makers with some understanding of the costs of  these approaches. However, the timeframe for when these cost  assessments will take place is unclear. According to DOD officials, cost  assessments for joint seabasing approaches have not yet begun and may  not be completed for a year or more. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff  guidance does not provide a specific methodology for what level of cost  assessment should take place. Rather, the guidance only states that the  process should “roughly assess” the costs of each identified approach.
section_title: Service Acquisitions May Outpace Joint Seabasing Cost Analysis
paragraphs: Although DOD has not yet begun its analysis of joint seabasing approaches  and costs, the services are either considering or actively pursuing systems  to develop enhanced  seabasing capabilities. For example, the Department  of the Navy Fiscal Year 2007 Budget includes funding for the development  of seabasing ships, including ships for the Maritime Prepositioning Force  (Future) and Joint High Speed Vessels. Furthermore, the Navy has  included eleven ships for its Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), three  Joint High Speed Vessels, and one Joint High Speed Sealift ship in its  Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal  Year 2007 report to Congress. Although the plan could change as the  Navy continues to assess its requirements and address affordability issues,  the Navy estimates that these investments will cost nearly $12 billion. The  ships the Navy has programmed for the Maritime Prepositioning Force  (Future) do not include the cost of a Landing Helicopter Deck (LHD)  amphibious assault ship, which is planned to be part of the squadron. The  Congressional Research Service has reported that this ship has an  estimated cost of $2.2 billion, and that the estimated cost of the entire  Maritime Prepositioning Squadron is about $14.5 billion. However,  unknown factors remain that could affect these estimates. Furthermore,  the number of connectors required to support the Maritime Prepositioning  Force (Future) is yet to be determined. Within the Maritime Prepositioning  Force (Future) squadron, several factors that could influence cost—such  as manning and ship survivability levels—remain in flux. Figure 4 shows  the ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).
The Navy and Marine Corps have not yet estimated the total ownership  costs of their preferred options for establishing a seabasing capability.  However, both the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) and the Joint  High Speed Vessel, which will play a critical role in establishing a joint  seabasing capability, are in development and progressing through DOD’s  acquisition system. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) is  approaching its second major milestone, which initiates system  development and demonstration, in mid-2008. Prior to this milestone, a  total ownership cost estimate will be required in order for the Maritime  Prepositioning Force (Future) to be validated and approved before  program initiation. Although a total ownership cost estimate may be  available for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron for this  milestone, according to service documentation, the costs of the supporting  vehicles and vessels needed for the squadron to operate as planned for use  in joint seabasing will not be included. Furthermore, one of the ships in  the squadron—the Mobile Landing Platform—is going through its own  acquisition process with its second milestone scheduled in fiscal year  2008. Furthermore, because the JCIDS analysis process for Joint  Seabasing will not produce any cost assessments for at least 1 year,  decision makers risk making substantial investment concerning the  Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) without knowledge of the  potential costs of other joint seabasing options. The Navy plans to acquire  the first ship for the squadron in 2009.
The Army is also exploring new initiatives for establishing a seabasing  capability. In conjunction with the Navy and Marine Corps, the Army is  developing the Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint High Speed Sealift ships.  Although not being developed specifically for seabasing, according to  service documentation, these systems will have a significant role in  establishing a seabasing capability. The Army plans to acquire five Joint  High Speed Vessels beginning in fiscal year 2008, with a total acquisition  cost of $210 million for the first ship and $170 million for the remaining  ships. The Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan estimates the Joint High  Speed Sealift ship to cost around $920 million. Furthermore, the Army is  also in the early stages of exploring ideas for its Afloat Forward Staging  Base to provide aerial maneuver to Army forces. One option the Army is  exploring for the Afloat Forward Staging Base is to add flight decks to a  commercial container ship, along with other alterations, as a means to  provide aerial maneuver to Army forces. Several research organizations  also recommended this option, because it is seen as a potentially low-cost  means of establishing a seabasing capability. A rough order of magnitude  estimate of the cost to convert a commercial cargo ship is approximately  $300 million to $600 million.
section_title: Options Cannot Be Compared without Cost Estimates
paragraphs: In addition to the options in development, additional means for projecting  and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment exist. However, they  cannot effectively be compared when total ownership costs are not  known. For example, the U.S. Transportation Command is working to  enhance the military’s joint logistics over-the-shore capabilities, which  utilize existing assets, such as the Army’s Logistics Support Vessel and the  Navy’s Improved Navy Lighterage System, to deploy and sustain forces by  allowing strategic sealift ships to discharge through austere or damaged  ports, or over a bare beach. Furthermore, the Air Force has developed its  Expeditionary Airbase Operating Enabling Concept. This concept is a  methodology and plan for rapid airbase seizure, establishment, and  operation to support the joint force commander in sustaining forces. Other  possibilities include Army air-dropped or air-landed operations to roll- back enemy shore-based defense or joint special operations forces to  attack high-value coastal defense assets prior to or in concert with naval  strikes from the sea. Some of these options represent existing capabilities,  which could prove to be a more cost-effective means of projecting and  sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment. Until total ownership costs  are developed, the cost-effectiveness of these options cannot be effectively  evaluated.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While DOD’s ability to project and sustain forces in an antiaccess  environment is expected to become increasingly important, DOD has not  taken all of the steps needed to effectively manage joint seabasing  initiatives across the department and evaluate competing options for force  projection and sustainment. Without a comprehensive management  approach to guide and assess joint seabasing, DOD may be unable to  ensure that ongoing or planned joint seabasing initiatives are properly  focused and complement each other and the capability is being developed  in an efficient and cost-effective manner. One consequence of this lack of  effective management is the absence of a joint experimentation campaign  plan. Without a campaign plan to direct experimentation for joint  seabasing, DOD and the services’ ability to evaluate and validate their  solutions, coordinate efforts, perform analysis, and disseminate results  could be compromised. As a result, the services risk duplicating  experimentation efforts and developing and fielding seabasing capabilities  that are not compatible or interoperable, and they will be unable to  leverage the results of individual experiments across the joint seabasing  experimentation community to maximize synergies. Furthermore,  establishing a joint seabasing capability could be the source of significant  investment by DOD. Given the challenging fiscal environment facing DOD  and the rest of the federal government, decision makers must make  investment decisions that maximize return on investment at the best value  for the taxpayer. By understanding the estimated total ownership costs of  options for establishing a seabasing capability, decision makers would be  in a better position to make informed decisions about what options are  most cost-effective, and evaluate the costs and benefits of establishing a  seabasing capability against other competing priorities. However, while it  is unclear when DOD will complete its analysis of joint seabasing  approaches and costs, the services are pursuing initiatives and systems to  develop a seabasing capability, some of which are approaching milestones  for investment decisions. If individual systems that support seabasing are  allowed to move forward through the acquisition process before total  ownership cost of seabasing options are developed and made transparent  to DOD and Congress, there is a risk that DOD could make significant  investments to develop a capability that may not be the most cost-effective  means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To assist decision makers in developing a comprehensive management  approach to guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for force  projection and sustainment in an antiaccess environment and integrate  service initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the  following actions to incorporate sound management principles into DOD’s  management of joint seabasing:   assign clear leadership and accountability for developing a joint  seabasing capability and coordinating supporting initiatives;    establish an overarching, dedicated implementation team to provide  day-to-day management oversight over the services, combatant  commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others involved in joint  seabasing; and    develop and implement a communications strategy to ensure  communication between and among the services, combatant  commands, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, and to provide information on all joint seabasing activities across  DOD.
To better guide joint seabasing experimentation and inform decisions on  joint seabasing as an option for force projection and sustainment in an  antiaccess environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense do  the following:    Direct the U.S. Joint Forces Command to lead and coordinate joint  seabasing experimentation efforts, under the purview of the joint  seabasing implementation team. U.S. Joint Forces Command should be  responsible for developing and implementing a joint seabasing  experimentation campaign plan to guide the evaluation of joint  seabasing as a capability for force projection and sustainment. Such an  experimentation plan should include the following elements:    a clear focus and objectives for joint seabasing that encompass  near-, mid-, and long-term experimentation plans;    a near-term plan for joint seabasing experimentation that includes  events for the next fiscal year, participants, timelines, and resources  that will be used to support the events;    a spectrum of joint experimentation activities that include  wargaming, comprehensive modeling and simulation, live  demonstrations, workshops, symposiums, and analysis;    a data collection and analysis plan to capture and evaluate results;    a method for communicating observations, results, upcoming  activities, and feedback across the joint seabasing experimentation  community.
Direct that the services collaborate with the U.S. Joint Forces  Command in developing, implementing, and using the joint seabasing  experimentation campaign plan.
Direct that the services utilize and contribute to the U.S. Joint Forces  Command’s knowledge management portal by providing their  observations, insights, results, and planned activities to the portal for  use by the joint seabasing experimentation community.
To assist decision makers in evaluating the costs of joint seabasing options  against the capabilities that joint seabasing could provide the joint  warfighter as a means for force projection and sustainment in an  antiaccess environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the implementation team or other appropriate entity to synchronize  development of total ownership cost estimates for the range of joint  seabasing options so decision makers have sufficient information to use in  making investment decisions on service seabasing initiatives.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our  recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated implementation  team. In its comments, DOD stated that it is premature to establish  additional oversight at this time and that in the interim the Force  Management Joint Capabilities Board is providing an appropriate level of  management oversight. As discussed below, in view of the magnitude of  potential DOD investments in seabasing and DOD’s need to efficiently  manage future resources and distinguish between needs and wants, we  continue to believe that an implementation team is needed to coordinate  disparate service and defense organization initiatives related to seabasing  and urge the department to further consider the need for action now  rather than waiting until after it establishes joint requirements. In addition,  although DOD partially agreed with our other recommendations, its  comments did not indicate that it would take specific actions beyond  those it has already begun and which we evaluated as part of our review.  In light of DOD’s stated agreement with the intent of our  recommendations, we urge the department to develop specific actions and  plans to implement our recommendations.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation regarding leadership and  accountability for developing a joint seabasing capability and coordinating  supporting initiatives. DOD stated that the Joint Staff is assigned  responsibility to develop the Joint Seabasing Concept and the resulting  capability and that there is clear and accountable leadership established  within the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Capabilities  Board to accomplish this development. While the Joint Staff, Joint  Requirements Oversight Council, and the Joint Capabilities Board have  oversight and responsibilities within JCIDS, we found that none of these  organizations have the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability  to coordinate joint seabasing initiatives and the service acquisitions that  may support joint seabasing. As discussed in the report, the services have  their own seabasing concepts and some service initiatives are outpacing  joint seabasing in development. DOD has not provided sufficient  leadership to ensure these initiatives are fully leveraged, properly focused,  and complement each other. Because of the potential for billions of dollars  to be spent to procure these systems, we continue to believe our  recommendation has merit and that assignment of clear leadership and  accountability for developing a joint seabasing capability and coordinating  supporting initiatives is needed.
DOD did not agree with our recommendation that an overarching,  dedicated implementation team be established to provide day-to-day  management oversight over the services, combatant commands, the Joint  Chiefs of Staff, and others involved in joint seabasing. DOD commented  that the joint seabasing concept is still being developed within the JCIDS  and the Force Management Functional Capabilities Board is providing the  appropriate level of management oversight. DOD stated that it is  premature to establish additional oversight at this time and that after the  needed joint seabasing capabilities have been defined, the department will  determine if additional oversight is necessary. We believe that the Force  Management Functional Capabilities Board’s oversight does not go far  enough in providing comprehensive management oversight for joint  seabasing. While the Board is responsible for leading the joint seabasing  capabilities-based assessment and oversees the sponsor (the Navy) in  developing documents, the Board’s responsibilities do not constitute the  type of oversight needed to ensure ongoing or planned service initiatives  that may support joint seabasing are coordinated and complement each  other. We continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and that  creation of an implementation team to provide day-to-day management  oversight of joint seabasing is needed. Therefore, we urge the department  to create such a team now rather than waiting until needed joint seabasing  capabilities are defined.
DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation regarding  implementing a communications strategy for all joint seabasing activities  in DOD. DOD stated that the JCIDS process, Joint Capabilities Boards, and  the Joint Requirements Oversight Council provide for communication  between the Joint Staff, all four services, the combatant commands, and  the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). However, as discussed in our  report, we found that while the Joint Staff, all four services, the combatant  commands, OSD, and others participate in the JCIDS process, the  information shared is not all inclusive and it is not always clear who is  involved in joint seabasing and what they are doing. A DOD-wide  communication strategy that provides a framework to effectively manage  activities can support the overall development of joint seabasing by (1)  providing better information for the participants in organizing and  planning initiatives and (2) enabling the participants to minimize  redundancy by leveraging activities being conducted by others. We  continue to believe, as we have recommended, that a communications  strategy should be developed and implemented.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendations regarding coordination  of joint seabasing experimentation efforts and development of a joint  experimentation campaign plan. DOD stated that the Joint Staff, with  service, combatant command, and OSD support, is developing a draft Joint  Capabilities Document that recommends a joint seabasing  experimentation plan. However, DOD’s comments did not address which  organization would be responsible for developing the experimentation  campaign plan. As we recommended, we continue to believe that the U.S.  Joint Forces Command should be charged with developing and  implementing the joint seabasing experimentation campaign plan. As  noted in our report, the U.S. Joint Forces Command is the DOD executive  agent for joint warfighting experimentation. In this role the command is  responsible for conducting joint experimentation on new warfighting  concepts, disseminating the results of these activities, and coordinating  joint experimentation efforts.
DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation regarding the U.S.  Joint Forces Command’s knowledge management portal. DOD concurs  that a common portal should be established and used by the services. DOD  stated that the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s knowledge management  portal is one option that will be considered in order to share joint  seabasing experimentation observations, insights, results, and planned  activities. While we support DOD’s plans to establish a knowledge  management portal for joint force projection and sustainment  experimentation, we continue to believe our recommendations merit  action and that DOD should direct the services to use the U.S. Joint Forces  Command’s knowledge management portal to share information on joint  seabasing rather than consider it an option.
Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation regarding  development of total ownership costs for joint seabasing options. DOD  stated that once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council defines the  required joint seabasing capabilities, total ownership costs for the options  to satisfy the needed capability gaps will be developed as part of the  DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution and acquisition  processes. We support DOD’s plans to develop total ownership costs;  however, as our report points out, we do not believe that these actions  alone will sufficiently ensure that total ownership costs for all joint  seabasing options are synchronized. While total ownership costs will be  estimated and synchronized for those options being developed in DOD’s  JCIDS process for joint seabasing, the services are either considering or  actively pursuing systems to develop their own seabasing capabilities.  Some of these systems are approaching major milestone reviews for  investment consideration. Requiring that total ownership cost estimates be  developed for only those options developed in DOD’s joint seabasing  JCIDS will provide decision makers with an incomplete picture of all joint  seabasing options. Without ensuring that total ownership cost estimates  are developed as we recommended for both joint seabasing options being  developed in JCIDS and those options being developed by the services,  DOD will risk making investment decisions that may not be the most cost- effective means of establishing a joint seabasing capability.
DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have  incorporated as appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II  of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; the  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces  Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will  make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will  be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  employed a sound management approach for developing a joint seabasing  capability, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the joint staff, two combatant commands, the four military  services, and the private sector; received briefings from relevant officials;  and reviewed key documents. We compared DOD’s approach with best  practices for managing and implementing major efforts. To identify these  best practices, we reviewed our prior work including GAO, Results- Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and  Organizational Transformations. In the absence of a comprehensive  planning document, we used relevant questions derived from the identified  best practices in interviews with officials and in analyzing pertinent  documents such as the August 2005 Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept,  and instructions and manuals on DOD’s Joint Capability Integration and  Development System (JCIDS), including (1) the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and  Development System (May 11, 2005); (2) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration  and Development System (May 11, 2005); and (3) the Joint Chiefs of Staff  White Paper on Conducting a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA)  Under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System  (JCIDS) (January 2006). We also interviewed officials involved in the  development of the joint seabasing to obtain information on how involved  the services, combatant commands, Office of the Secretary of Defense,  and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in developing joint seabasing, what their  respective roles and responsibilities were, the level of authority available  to direct the services and combatant commands to participate in the  JCIDS analyses, how information on joint seabasing development efforts  and initiatives was shared, how initiatives that may support joint seabasing  were coordinated, and other issues. In addition, we examined the  Seabasing Working Group Web site to identify what information was being  communicated through the Web site.
To assess the extent to which a joint experimentation campaign plan has  been developed, implemented, and used to inform decisions on joint  seabasing options, we obtained briefings and interviewed officials from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S.  Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, and the Army,  Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. We also discussed the status of joint  seabasing experimentation efforts and the extent to which they  coordinated with each other in conducting joint seabasing  experimentation. We examined DOD guidance to identify and clarify roles  and responsibilities for leading joint warfighting experimentation. To  identify key aspects for conducting experimentation campaigns, we  reviewed books and publications on experimentation campaigns,  including Code of Best Practice: Campaigns of Experimentation; Code of  Best Practice: Experimentation; Guide for Understanding and  Implementing Defense Experimentation; and The Role of  Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. We obtained and  reviewed DOD and service reports and briefings containing the analyses  and findings of experimentation activities. We also attended an Army  Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise demonstrating the unloading and  loading of equipment to the shore when port facilities are inadequate,  unavailable, or nonexistent.
To assess the extent to which DOD and the services identified the cost of  joint seabasing options so that decision makers can make informed, cost- effective decisions, we reviewed official statements, obtained briefings  from, and interviewed officials from, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,  Defense Science Board, and Center for Strategic and Budgetary  Assessments. We examined DOD documents and data including, but not  limited to, the President’s Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Budget, the  Department of the Navy Ships and Aircraft Supplemental Data Tables,  and the Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction  of Naval Vessels for FY 2007. We assessed the reliability of the data used  through discussions with knowledgeable officials. We determined that the  data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. We reviewed  statements by the Congressional Budget Office and Center for Strategic  and Budgetary Assessments. We also reviewed reports on seabasing  including, but not limited to, Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow  by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Sea Basing by the  Defense Science Board, Sea Basing by the Naval Research Advisory  Committee, and Seabasing: Ensuring Joint Force Access From the Sea by  the National Research Council. To identify guidance on cost estimating  and total ownership costs, we reviewed DOD documentation, including  DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003),  DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System  (April 5, 2002), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E,  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11, 2005),  and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of  the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11,  2005). We also reviewed our prior work on cost estimating and total  ownership cost.
We conducted our review from February 2006 to October 2006 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards at the  following locations:    Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
Office of Force Transformation    Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and    The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
Office of Force Structure Resources and Assessment—Studies,  Analysis, and Gaming Division    U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia    Joint Experimentation Directorate    Joint Futures Lab    U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois    Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
Office of Expeditionary Warfare    Office of Assessments, Seabasing Pillar    Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.    U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia    Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island    Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia    Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island    Marine Corps Combatant Development Command, Quantico, Virginia    Capabilities Development Directorate, Seabasing Integration Division    Operations Analysis Division, Mission Area Analysis Branch    Marine Corps Warfighting Lab    Offices of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant  Director; Sarah Baker; Renee Brown; Nicole Harms; Margaret G. Holihan;  Ian Jefferies; Kevin L. O’Neill; Roderick Rodgers, Analyst-in-Charge; and  Rebecca Shea made key contributions to this report.