Civilian Intelligence Community: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Reporting on and Planning for the Use of Contract Personnel
Published: 2014-01-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The IC uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could inappropriately influence the government's decision making.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in September 2013. GAO was asked to examine the eight civilian IC elements' use of contractors. This report examines (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2) the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the eight civilian IC elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a sample of 287 contract records. This sample is nongeneralizable as certain contract records were removed due to sensitivity concerns. GAO also reviewed agency acquisition policies and workforce plans and interviewed agency officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements--the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury--use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel and data shortcomings limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the 287 records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.
The civilian IC elements used core contract personnel to perform a broad range of functions, such as information technology and program management, and reported in the core contract personnel inventory on the reasons for using these personnel. However, limitations in the information on the number and cost of core contract personnel preclude the information on contractor functions from being used to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function. Further, civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.
Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Only the Departments of Homeland Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. In addition, IC CHCO requires the elements to conduct strategic workforce planning but does not require the elements to determine the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. Further, the elements' ability to use the core contract personnel inventory as a strategic planning tool is hindered because the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government's control over its decisions. Without guidance, strategies, and tools related to these types of functions, the eight civilian IC elements may not be well-positioned to identify and manage related risks.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is recommending that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data's reliability and transparency and revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The intelligence community (IC) comprises 17 different organizations, or  IC elements, across the federal government. Of these, eight are civilian  IC elements—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of  Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A),  Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence  (DOE IN), Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research  (State INR), Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and  Analysis (Treasury OIA), Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of  National Security Intelligence (DEA NN), Federal Bureau of Investigation  (FBI), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Like  other federal agencies, these civilian IC elements rely on contractors to  meet a variety of mission needs. In a 2013 report on intelligence oversight  activities, Congress cited long-standing concerns about the IC’s reliance  on contractors, which it noted increased dramatically after the terrorist  attacks of September 11, 2001. In October 2009, the Director of National  Intelligence (DNI), who serves as head of the IC, issued Intelligence  Community Directive (ICD) 612 to define and establish IC-wide policy for  managing the use of core contract personnel that support intelligence  missions. As defined by ICD 612, core contract personnel provide a range  of direct technical, managerial, and administrative support functions to IC  elements—some of which may directly inform government decisions,  such as intelligence collection, processing, and analysis, along with  program management. Core contract personnel are distinct from  individual contract personnel who produce commodities or provide widely  available commercial services such as building security. ICD 612 also  states that core contract personnel typically work alongside government  personnel, augment the government workforce, and perform staff-like  work.
Determining whether services should be performed by federal employees,  contract personnel, or a mixture of both is essential to the federal  government’s effective and efficient use of taxpayers’ dollars. Further,  while the use of contractors can provide benefits in supporting agency  missions, such as flexibility to meet immediate needs and obtain unique  expertise, their use can also introduce risks for the government to  consider and manage. Federal acquisition regulations state that certain  functions government agencies perform, such as setting agency policy  and issuing regulations, are inherently governmental and must be  performed by federal employees. In some cases, contractors perform  functions closely associated with the performance of inherently  governmental functions. For example, contractors performing certain  intelligence analysis activities may closely support inherently  governmental functions. Agencies should give special management  attention to contractors performing services that closely support inherently  governmental functions to guard against the potential for loss of  government control and accountability for mission-related policy and  program decisions.
Our prior work has examined reliance on contractors and the mitigation of  related risks at the Department of Defense (DOD), DHS, and several  other civilian agencies and found that they generally did not fully consider  and mitigate risks of acquiring services that may inform government  decisions. In this context, you asked us to review the civilian IC  elements’ reliance on contractors. This report is a public version of the  classified report that we provided to you in September 2013, which  addressed: (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements rely on  core contract personnel; (2) the functions performed by core contract  personnel and the factors that contribute to their use; and (3) whether the  civilian IC elements have developed policies and guidance and  strategically planned for their use of contract personnel to mitigate related  risks. ODNI, in consultation with the other civilian IC elements, deemed  some of the information in the September 2013 report as classified, which  must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits  sensitive information about (1) the number and associated costs of  government and core contract personnel and some details on how the  civilian IC elements prepare the core contract personnel inventory, (2)  specific contracts from civilian IC elements we reviewed, and (3) details  related to the civilian IC elements’ or their respective departments’  progress in developing policies to mitigate risks related to contractors and  the civilian IC elements’ strategic workforce planning efforts.
To determine the extent to which the civilian IC elements rely on core  contract personnel, the functions performed by these personnel, and the  factors that contribute to their use, we requested and reviewed data from  each of the eight civilian IC elements: CIA, DEA NN, DHS I&A, DOE IN,  FBI, ODNI, State INR, and Treasury OIA. provided by the civilian IC elements to the IC Chief Human Capital Officer  (IC CHCO) for use in the annual core contract personnel inventories. We  reviewed five data fields related to information on obligations, the number  of full-time equivalents (FTE) on core contracts, the functions performed  by core contract personnel, and the reasons for using these personnel.
DEA NN and FBI are components of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
We originally planned to review fiscal years 2007 through 2011 inventory  data. However, we could not conduct a reliability assessment of the data  for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 due to a variety of factors. These  factors include civilian IC element officials’ stating that they could not  locate records of certain years’ submissions or that obtaining the relevant  documentation would require an unreasonable amount of time. As a  result, we generally focused our review on data from fiscal years 2010  and 2011. To assess the data’s reliability, we selected a random  nongeneralizable sample of 287 records—representing 222 contracts or  purchase orders—and compared the information reported in these  elements’ submissions for these years to contract documents.  Observations from our nongeneralizable sample cannot be used to make  projections about the eight civilian IC elements’ submissions as a whole.
We determined that four of the five data fields we reviewed—fiscal year  obligations, total FTEs, reason code, and budget category—were not  sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our review. We present these data  and their associated limitations where appropriate in the report. The fifth  data field, primary contractor occupation and competency expertise, was  sufficiently reliable, though we identified some limitations. Appendix II  contains a more detailed discussion of our data reliability assessment.  We also reviewed relevant IC CHCO guidance and documents and  interviewed agency officials responsible for compiling and processing the  data.
To determine whether the civilian IC elements have developed policies  and guidance and strategically planned for their use of core contract  personnel to mitigate related risks, we reviewed relevant acquisition  policies and guidance, workforce planning documents, and strategic  planning tools. We also interviewed human capital, procurement, or  program officials at each civilian IC element to discuss ongoing efforts  related to developing policies and strategic planning to mitigate risks. We  compared these plans, guidance, and tools to Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) guidance that address risks related to contracting for work  closely supporting inherently governmental and critical functions,  including the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter  11-01, OMB’s Memorandum on Managing the Multisector Workforce, and  OMB’s memoranda on service contract inventories. Further, we  compared the civilian IC elements’ efforts to strategic human capital best  practices identified in our prior work.
A detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in  appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to  September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. We subsequently worked with ODNI from September  2013 to December 2013 to prepare an unclassified version of this report  for public release. Government auditing standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Organization of the IC
paragraphs: Established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004, DNI serves as head of the IC, acts as the principal advisor to the  President and National Security Council on intelligence matters, and  oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence  Program. The IC comprises 17 different organizations, or IC elements,  across the federal government represented by 6 executive departments.  These IC elements include ODNI, seven other civilian IC elements, and  nine military IC elements. The eight civilian IC elements within the scope  of our review include two intelligence agencies and six intelligence  components within five departments (see fig. 1).this review, we are referring to the eight as the civilian IC elements.  Appendix III provides additional information on each of the eight civilian  IC elements’ missions.
section_title: IC Core Contract Personnel Inventory
paragraphs: IC CHCO officials indicated they are responsible for leading the design,  development, and execution of human resource strategies, plans, and  policies for the IC. In this role, IC CHCO works with both the civilian and  military IC elements to collect and maintain information on the use of core  contract personnel throughout the IC. Since fiscal year 2007, IC CHCO  has compiled an annual core contract personnel inventory to provide  information to Congress and others about the IC’s use of core contract  personnel. This effort was in response to concerns from Congress that  the IC relied too heavily on contractors and could not account for the  number and costs of contract personnel on an annual basis.
The core contract personnel inventory includes information on both the  civilian and military IC elements’ contracts for over 10 different data  fields. IC CHCO uses information from the inventory to develop an  annual briefing for Congress, which includes year-to-year changes in the  number of and reasons for using core contract personnel across the IC. In  addition, since fiscal year 2011, IC CHCO has prepared a statutorily  required IC-wide annual personnel level assessment. As part of this  assessment, IC CHCO is required, in consultation with all of the IC  elements, to report on the current, projected, and prior five fiscal years’  number and costs of core contract personnel, as well as present the  budget submission for personnel costs for the upcoming fiscal year.
To prepare the inventory, IC CHCO provides guidance and a data call to  the IC elements on an annual basis that details how the elements should  report information on their core contracts from the previous fiscal year.  Civilian IC element officials stated that generally their elements’  contracting, program, finance office, or a combination thereof, collects  and reports the information for the data call.
section_title: Risks Related to Reliance on Core Contract Personnel
paragraphs: For more than 20 years, OMB procurement policy has indicated that  agencies should provide a greater degree of scrutiny when contracting for  services that can affect the government’s decision-making authority.  Without proper management and oversight, such services risk  inappropriately influencing the government’s control over and  accountability for decisions that may be supported by contractors’ work.  The policy therefore directs agencies to ensure that they maintain  sufficient government expertise to manage the contracted work. The  Federal Acquisition Regulation also addresses the importance of  management oversight associated with contractors providing services  that have the potential to influence the authority, accountability, and  responsibilities of government employees. Core contract personnel  perform the types of functions that may affect an IC element’s decision- making authority or control of its mission and operations. While core  contract personnel may perform functions that closely support inherently  governmental work, these personnel are generally prohibited from  performing inherently governmental functions, which require discretion in  applying government authority or value judgments in making decisions  that can only be performed by government employees. Figure 2  illustrates how the risk of contractors influencing government decision  making is increased as core contract personnel perform functions that  closely support inherently governmental functions.
OMB has initiated a number of government-wide interrelated efforts that  help to address the risks related to relying on contractors for services that  are closely associated with inherently governmental work or critical to an  agency’s mission (see app. IV for additional information on these OMB  policy requirements). Although the IC elements are not required to  address certain aspects of the OMB policies, either because of the  classified nature of the contracts or because the IC element is a  component of an executive department, these efforts provide IC elements  with leading practices related to considering and mitigating risks when  relying on contractors to perform services that are closely associated with  inherently governmental and critical functions. The IC elements are also  required to follow applicable IC-wide guidance and federal laws and  regulations on the use of contractors. In addition, the departmental  elements—the six civilian IC elements that are components within  executive departments—must comply with related departmental policies  and guidance. For example, DEA NN must comply with federal laws and  regulations as well as all applicable OMB, DOJ, DEA, and IC-wide  guidance.
OMB’s July 2009 guidance and our prior work have emphasized that  decisions regarding the use of contractors should be based on strategic  workforce planning regarding what types of work are best done by  government personnel or by contractors. Specifically, agencies should  identify the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel on a  function-by-function basis, especially for functions that are critical to an  agency’s mission. The OMB guidance requires an agency to have  sufficient internal capability to control its mission and operations when  contracting for these critical functions. Our prior work has found that  agencies should have overarching strategic-level guidance related to the  extent to which contractors should be used, and agencies’ strategic  workforce planning documents should contain evidence of strategic  considerations of contractor use. In May 2013, we found that DOD had  not yet assessed the appropriate mix of government and contract  personnel in its strategic workforce plans as required by law and, as a  result, was hampered in making more informed strategic workforce  decisions. We recommended that DOD revise existing workforce policies  and procedures to address the determination of the appropriate workforce  mix. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation and noted that it  had efforts underway to determine the workforce mix.
OFPP’s September 2011 Policy Letter 11-01 builds on past federal  policies on closely supporting inherently governmental functions by  including a detailed checklist of responsibilities that must be carried out  when agencies rely on contractors to perform services that closely  support inherently governmental functions. The policy letter also builds  upon past OMB guidance by seeking to broaden agencies’ focus to  include critical functions, which can pose a risk if not carefully monitored.  The policy letter establishes criteria agencies are to use in identifying their  critical functions, which are functions that are necessary to the agency to  effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations. The  policy letter further states that the more important the function, the more  important it is that the agency have internal capability to maintain control  of its mission and operations. The policy letter requires executive branch  departments and agencies to develop and maintain internal procedures to  address the requirements of the guidance.
Further, OFPP’s November 2010 and December 2011 guidance on  service contract inventories and our prior work have emphasized that  an inventory of contracted services, if effectively developed and analyzed,  can inform an agency’s strategic workforce planning efforts and help  identify which contracts may require additional oversight. The inventories  can assist an agency in understanding the extent to which contractors are  being used to perform activities that closely support inherently  governmental work or support the agency’s mission and operations.  Civilian agencies and DOD are statutorily required to compile service  contract inventories on an annual basis. In September 2012, we found  that the civilian agencies did not have good visibility on the number of  contractor personnel or their role in supporting agency activities because  they had not yet collected these data in their fiscal year 2011  inventories.
Additionally, in May 2013, we found that DOD generally continued to have  challenges collecting key data in its fiscal year 2011 inventory, which  limited the utility, accuracy, and completeness of the inventory data.  Specifically, most DOD components, other than the Army, were not able  to determine the number of contractor FTEs used to perform each  contracted service and were still not able to identify and record more than  one type of service purchased for each contracting action entered into the  inventory. We made a number of recommendations to help implement  and improve both the civilian agencies’ and DOD’s service contract  inventories. For example, we recommended that OMB clarify guidance to  require agencies to consistently report on the number of contract  personnel. OMB generally concurred with our recommendations and  agreed to work with the agencies to strengthen their use of service  contract inventories by sharing lessons learned and best practices from  the initial inventories.
section_title: Limitations in the Inventory Undermine Ability to Determine Extent of Civilian IC Elements’ Reliance on Contractors
paragraphs: Due to limitations in the core contract personnel inventory, we could not  accurately determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements  have used core contract personnel. The inventory contains two data  fields—fiscal year obligations and total FTEs—that IC CHCO uses to  identify the civilian IC elements’ extent of contractor reliance. IC CHCO  used this inventory information to report to Congress that from fiscal year  2009 to 2011, the number of core contract personnel for the civilian IC  elements declined by approximately 30 percent. However, we identified  several issues that limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of  the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. First,  changes to the definition of core contract personnel and data reliability  limitations identified by the elements for certain years hinder the ability to  use the inventory to make year-to-year comparisons of cost and FTE  data. Second, our analysis found that the reported contract costs for the  fiscal years 2010 and 2011 inventories were inaccurate or inconsistently  determined. Third, elements calculated the number of core contract  personnel FTEs differently, affecting the consistency of the information  reported. In addition, a lack of readily available documentation limits the  civilian IC elements’ ability to validate the information reported. Further,  IC CHCO did not clearly explain the effect of the limitations when  reporting the information to Congress. On an individual basis, some of the  limitations we identified may not raise significant concerns. When taken  together, however, they undermine the utility of the information for  determining and reporting on the extent to which the civilian IC elements  use core contract personnel.
subsections: section_title: Changes to Core Contract Personnel Definition and Data Shortcomings Limit Comparability of Obligation and FTE Data Across Years
paragraphs: Trends in the civilian IC elements’ use of core contract personnel from  fiscal year 2007 to 2011 in terms of the number of personnel and  associated costs cannot be identified due to changes in the definition of  core contract personnel and known data shortcomings. However, IC  CHCO used the inventory information to compare IC-wide core contract  personnel use from year to year when reporting to Congress. In response  to federal statute, IC CHCO prepares an annual personnel assessment  that compares the current and projected number and costs of core  contract personnel to the number and costs during the prior 5 years.  According to IC CHCO, the number of core contract personnel FTEs and  associated costs declined nearly one-third from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal  year 2011. However, we could not validate the extent to which there was  a change in the number of core contract personnel providing support as  we determined that a significant portion of the reported reduction is  attributable to definitional changes and improvements to data systems.  Further, we assessed the reliability of the civilian IC elements’ reported  information for the total FTEs and fiscal year obligations data fields and  determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable for our purpose of  identifying the extent of reliance on core contract personnel (see app. II).
Since IC CHCO’s initial data collection efforts for the core contract  personnel inventory in fiscal year 2006, it has taken actions to further  clarify and refine its guidance to address concerns that IC elements were  interpreting the definition of core contract personnel differently and to  improve the consistency of the information in the inventory. IC CHCO  worked with the elements to develop a standard definition that was  formalized with the issuance of ICD 612 in October 2009. Further, IC  CHCO formed the IC Core Contract Personnel Inventory Control Board,  which has representatives from all of the IC elements, to provide a forum  to resolve differences in the interpretation of IC CHCO’s guidance for the  inventory. As a result of the board’s efforts, IC CHCO provided  supplemental guidance in fiscal year 2010 to either include or exclude  certain contract personnel, such as those performing administrative  support, training support, and information technology services. For  example, the guidance stated that IC elements should include contract  personnel who provide training that is unique to the IC mission but  exclude those who provide training commercially available through a  vendor. IC CHCO officials told us that changes made over time were  intended to clarify the definition of core contract personnel and improve  the consistency of the information in the inventory. Appendix V  summarizes the major changes in the definition reflected in IC CHCO’s  guidance from fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
While these changes could improve the inventory data, it is unclear the  extent to which the definitional changes contributed to the reported  decrease in the number of core contract personnel and associated costs  from year to year. For example, for fiscal year 2010, officials from one  civilian IC element told us they stopped reporting information technology  help desk contractors, which had been previously reported, to be  consistent with IC CHCO’s revised definition. One of these officials stated  consequently that the element’s reported reduction in core contract  personnel between fiscal years 2009 and 2010 did not reflect an actual  change in their use of core contract personnel, but rather a change in how  core contract personnel were defined for the purposes of reporting to IC  CHCO. The official told us that their reported information for fiscal year  2010 was therefore not comparable to data from prior years, in part  because of definitional changes.
Further, this civilian IC element identified data reliability limitations in the  information reported to IC CHCO for certain fiscal years’ inventories,  which the element has taken steps to address. However, while IC CHCO  noted that this civilian IC element implemented an enhanced contract  management system that affected the element’s reporting in the briefing  and annual personnel level assessment, IC CHCO did not disclose how  these improvements affected the ability to compare data across years.  For its submission to the fiscal year 2011 inventory, officials from the  civilian IC element stated that they used a new contract management  system that provided more clarity into which FTEs and obligations should  be included in the inventory and thus improved the reliability of their  reported information. These officials acknowledged significant limitations  with certain aspects of their reported data prior to fiscal year 2011 due to  limitations with the contract management system used for those years.  For example, officials told us that prior to the contract system upgrade,  the system did not allow them to accurately separate out which  obligations and FTEs on certain contracts should be considered core  versus non-core. As a result, these officials stated that we should not  compare the information reported from fiscal year 2010 to 2011 due to the  improvements made in the contract management system.
However, IC CHCO included this civilian IC element’s data when  calculating the IC’s overall reduction in number of core contract personnel  between fiscal years 2009 and 2011 in its fiscal year 2011 briefing to  Congress. In addition, IC CHCO included these data when comparing the  number and costs of core contract personnel between fiscal year 2009  and 2011 in the fiscal year 2013 personnel level assessment. OMB  guidelines provide that agencies should ensure that disseminated  information be reliable, clear, and useful to the intended users.CHCO explained in the briefing and personnel level assessment that this  civilian IC element’s rebaselining had an effect on the element’s reported  number of contractor personnel for fiscal year 2010. IC CHCO did not  explain that the rebaselining would limit the comparability of the number  and costs of core contract personnel for both this civilian IC element and  the IC as a whole because the element did not adjust the number and  costs previously reported.
In addition, another civilian IC element changed its methodology for  calculating core contract personnel FTEs over time, which limits the ability  to compare this FTE information across certain years. Prior to its  submission to the fiscal year 2010 inventory, this element calculated an  estimated number of core contract personnel FTEs by applying a certain  percentage to the number of contractor FTEs. For its submissions to the  fiscal year 2010 and 2011 inventories, the element reported the actual  number of core contract personnel FTEs. According to officials from this  civilian IC element, because the methodology for calculating the number  of core contract personnel FTEs fundamentally changed from fiscal year  2009 to 2010, the data cannot be compared across these years.  However, IC CHCO reported and compared these numbers in its annual  briefings and personnel level assessments without including information  on these changes and any associated limitations. IC CHCO officials  stated that they rely on the IC elements to inform them of any  methodological changes that would impact the information reported. In  addition, IC CHCO officials stated that they identify any major differences  between fiscal years and the associated causes. By not fully disclosing  the appropriate qualifications for making year-to-year comparisons, the  information reported in the briefings and personnel level assessments  may not be consistent with leading practices outlined in OMB’s guidelines  for disseminated information.
section_title: Inventory Does Not Accurately and Consistently Account for Contract Costs
paragraphs: The civilian IC elements’ core contract personnel costs for fiscal years  2010 and 2011 could not be reliably determined, in part because our  analysis identified numerous discrepancies between the amount of  obligations reported by the civilian IC elements in the core contract  personnel inventory and these elements’ supporting documentation for  the records we reviewed. We compared the information reported for a  sample of 287 records—representing 222 contracts or purchase orders— from the civilian IC elements’ submissions for the fiscal years 2010 and  2011 inventories. We found that the civilian IC elements either under- or  over-reported the amount of obligations by more than 10 percent for  approximately one-fifth of the records. In addition, the civilian IC elements  could not provide complete documentation to validate the information  reported for 17 percent of the records we reviewed. Overall, we were able  to validate the amount of reported obligations for approximately 43 to  77 percent of the records we reviewed at any one element. However, IC  CHCO used the core contract personnel inventory information to report  fiscal years 2010 and 2011 contract costs for the eight civilian IC  elements in our review.
Civilian IC element officials identified several issues that may account for  the discrepancies between the reported obligations and the  documentation provided. For example, ODNI officials told us that the  system used to report their fiscal year 2010 data had reliability issues, in  part because the users had to manually enter obligations for certain  contracts or manually delete duplicate contracts to avoid double-counting  obligations. ODNI officials stated that a new contract management  system was used for reporting contract obligations in their submission for  the fiscal year 2011 inventory. According to these officials, the new  system offers greater detail and improved functionality for identifying the  amount of obligations on their contracts. While we observed an  improvement in ODNI’s reporting of obligations from fiscal year 2010 to  2011, we still identified discrepancies in 18 percent of ODNI’s fiscal year  2011 records in our sample. ODNI officials noted that, even with the new  system, they manually enter the information into the inventory  submission, which may result in data entry errors.
Internal control activities, such as accurate and timely recording of  transactions, help provide reasonable assurance of the reliability of  reported information. According to federal internal control standards, for  an agency to run and control its operations, it must have relevant, reliable  information relating to internal events.review the IC elements’ submissions for outliers and obvious errors but  rely on the elements to ensure the accuracy of the information, in part  because IC CHCO does not have the staff resources for more extensive  reviews. IC CHCO officials also explained that their role is to provide  guidance to the IC elements for reporting the information to the inventory  but not to audit the reliability of the information reported. While civilian IC  element officials described some steps taken to help ensure the reliability  of the information reported, such as reviewing the information reported for  outliers or prohibiting changes without prior approval, these internal  controls may not be sufficient in light of the challenges we identified.
We were unable to determine the full magnitude of obligations not included in the  inventory because we did not have a way to identify all contracts not reported by the  civilian IC elements. disclose this methodology or its effects on the information it reports to  Congress.
section_title: Lack of Detailed Guidance and Complete Documentation Limit Consistency of FTE Information Reported
paragraphs: The number of core contract personnel providing support to the civilian IC  elements for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 could not be reliably determined,  in part because we found that the eight civilian IC elements used  significantly different methodologies when determining the number of  FTEs. For example, some civilian IC elements estimated contract  personnel FTEs using target labor hours while other civilian IC elements  calculated the number of FTEs using the labor hours invoiced by the  contractor. As a result, the reported numbers are not comparable across  these elements. The IC CHCO core contract personnel inventory  guidance for both fiscal years 2010 and 2011 state that full accounting is  the preferred method for identifying FTEs, but does not provide additional  detail, such as specifying appropriate methodologies for calculating FTEs,  requiring IC elements to describe their methodologies, or requiring IC  elements to disclose any associated limitations with their methodologies.
Depending on the methodology used, an element can calculate a different  number of FTEs for the same contract. For example, for one contract we  reviewed at a civilian IC element that reports FTEs based on actual labor  hours invoiced by the contractor, the element reported 16 FTEs for the  contract. For the same contract, however, a civilian IC element that uses  estimated labor hours at the time of award would have calculated 27  FTEs. As a result, using different methodologies limits the comparability  of civilian IC elements’ reported numbers and obscures what the  information represents in a given fiscal year. IC CHCO officials stated  they have discussed standardizing the methodology for calculating the  number of FTEs with the IC elements but identified challenges, such as  identifying a standard labor-hour conversion factor for one FTE. IC CHCO  guidance for fiscal year 2012 instructs elements to provide the total  number of direct labor hours worked by the contract personnel to  calculate the number of FTEs for each contract, as opposed to allowing  for estimates, which could improve the consistency of the FTE information  reported across the IC. Since this methodology is different than the  methodology used by several civilian IC elements to calculate their  number of FTEs in the fiscal year 2010 and 2011 inventories, IC CHCO  will be further limited in the extent to which it can compare FTE data  across years.
In addition, we found that most of the civilian IC elements did not maintain  readily available documentation of the information used to calculate the  number of FTEs reported for a significant number of the records we  reviewed. As a result, these elements could not easily replicate the  process for calculating or validate the reliability of the information reported  for these records. Federal internal control standards call for appropriate  documentation to help ensure the reliability of the information reported.  For 37 percent of the 287 records we reviewed, we could not determine  the reliability of the information reported. Two of the civilian IC elements  were able to provide documentation to support the number of FTEs  reported for almost all of the records we reviewed, but the other civilian IC  elements experienced challenges in providing documentation to varying  degrees. For example, officials from one civilian IC element explained  that they did not document how they calculated the number of core  contract personnel FTEs at the time of reporting. As a result, these  officials stated that it would be very time-consuming to replicate the  process for making these calculations, and that, for contracts with higher  numbers of contract personnel, it could take months to recreate the  methodology used. In addition, another civilian IC element had challenges  providing documentation for certain records, in part because some  contracts included in the inventory are fixed-price contracts for which it  does not negotiate or have insight into the number of FTEs. While IC  CHCO does not require the IC elements to maintain documentation of  their calculations, without complete documentation, elements cannot  ensure the reliability of the information reported in their submissions or  may not be able to replicate the methodology used to report the number  of FTEs for their contracts. However, IC CHCO aggregates and compares  the FTE data across the civilian IC elements when reporting to Congress  and has not disclosed in its briefings or personnel level assessments that  the FTEs, reported collectively or by element, reflect various definitions  and methods of counting contract personnel.
IC CHCO and the civilian IC element officials further identified several  challenges related to elements’ preparation of their inventory  submissions. Officials at several civilian IC elements stated that they  experienced turnover in the staff who prepared their submissions over the  years. As a result, these officials were unable to explain the methodology  used by staff to report the information for certain submissions in prior  years. IC CHCO officials stated that they frequently have to work with  new staff at the elements to help them understand the reporting  requirements because the elements did not have documentation of how  prior staff reported certain information. In addition, for a large civilian IC  element, many contracting and program officials can be involved in  preparing the elements’ submissions, making it difficult to ensure  consistency in reporting.
section_title: Inventory Provides Limited Insight into Functions Performed by Contractors and Reasons for Their Use
paragraphs: The civilian IC elements have used core contract personnel to perform a  range of functions, such as human capital, information technology, and  program management, and have reported in the core contract personnel  inventory the reasons for using contractors for such functions. Due to  limitations in the core contract personnel inventory, the number of core  contract personnel performing these functions in support of the civilian IC  elements and the reasons for their use cannot be reliably determined. We  found for the contracts we reviewed, the civilian IC elements generally  reported reliable information in the inventory on functions performed by  contractors by selecting from one of over 20 broad categories. However,  the limitations we identified in the inventory’s obligation and FTE data  preclude the information on contractor functions from being used to  determine the extent to which civilian IC elements contracted for each  function. Further, in the inventory, the civilian IC elements provided  information on their reasons for using core contract personnel, such as  the need for unique expertise, but our analysis found that 40 percent of  the contracts in our sample did not contain evidence of the reasons  reported. As a result, we could not corroborate the information reported in  the inventory on the reasons for using core contract personnel. Moreover,  the most widely cited reason in the sample of contracts we reviewed does  not describe why a civilian IC element contracted for a service but rather  describes the nature of the contract.
subsections: section_title: Extent to Which Functions Are Performed by Contract Personnel Cannot Be Determined
paragraphs: As part of the core contract personnel inventory, IC CHCO collects  information from the elements on contractor-performed functions using  the primary contractor occupation and competency expertise data field.  An IC CHCO official explained that this data field should reflect the tasks  performed by the contract personnel. IC CHCO’s guidance for this data  field instructs the IC elements to select one option from a list of over 20  broad categories of functions for each contract entry in the inventory.  Based on our review of relevant contract documents, such as statements  of work, we were able to verify the primary contractor occupation and  competency expertise reported for almost all of the records we reviewed.  Using the primary contractor occupation and competency expertise data  field in the core contract personnel inventory, the civilian IC elements  reported functions performed such as human capital, information  technology, program management, administration, collection and  operations, and security services, among others.
While we could verify the categories of functions performed for the  contracts we reviewed, we could not determine the extent to which civilian  IC elements contracted for these functions. Limitations we identified in the  obligation and FTE data reported in the inventory precluded us from using  the information on contractor functions to determine the number of  personnel and their costs associated with each function category. For  example, we were able to verify for one State INR contract that contract  personnel performed functions within the systems engineering category,  but we could not determine the number of personnel dedicated to that  function because of unreliable obligation and FTE data.
In addition, IC CHCO provides information on contractor functions in its  reports and briefings to Congress. However, it does not include the  information it collects through the inventory’s primary contractor  occupation and competency expertise data field. IC CHCO instead uses  the budget category data field in the inventory as its source for  information on functions performed by core contractor personnel, citing a  desire for information provided to Congress to align with the budget  request. The budget category data field, however, reflects a contract’s  funding source rather than the functions performed by personnel working  under these contracts. By using budget category information as a proxy  for contractor functions, IC CHCO does not adhere to leading practices  outlined in OMB guidelines for disseminated information. OMB  guidelines provide that agencies should ensure that disseminated  information be accurate, clear, and useful to the intended users. IC  CHCO and civilian IC element officials acknowledged that the budget  category is not the best representation of the functions performed by  contractors. For example, we found contracts from one civilian IC element  that were reported as collection and operations for the budget category,  as required by IC CHCO guidance, included services such as policy and  program development support, information technology, and  administration.
section_title: Data on Reasons for Contractor Use Not Supported by Documentation and Do Not Always Provide Insight
paragraphs: The reasons that the civilian IC elements use core contract personnel  could not be reliably determined from the core contract personnel  inventory information due to a lack of documentation to corroborate the  reasons reported in the inventory. In preparing their inventory  submissions, IC elements can select one of eight response options for the  reason data field (see table 1).
However, we could not verify the information reported by the civilian IC  elements in the inventory due to a lack of corroborating documentation.  For the 81 of the 102 records in our sample coded as unique expertise,  we did not find evidence in the statements of work or other contract  documents that the functions performed by the contractors required  expertise not otherwise available from U.S. government civilian or military  personnel. For example, ODNI contracts coded as unique expertise  included services for conducting workshops and analysis, producing  financial statements, and providing program management. Based on  inventory submissions by both the civilian and military IC elements, IC  CHCO reported to Congress that for fiscal year 2011, 57 percent of the  core contract personnel FTEs were contracted for their unique expertise.
Further, we found that the most widely used reason response option  among the records we reviewed—specified service—does not provide  insight into the civilian IC elements’ reasons for using core contract  personnel. Instead, this response option describes the nature of the  contract. Of the 287 records we reviewed, civilian IC elements selected  specified service as the reason for the contract for 45 percent of those  records. For example, an official from one civilian IC element stated that  they selected specified service for all of their contracts in the fiscal years  2010 and 2011 inventories because, in accordance with the definition,  they were buying services. However, these officials also cited the need  for contractors due to personnel restrictions and budgetary  considerations, which could correspond to the insufficient staffing  resources response option.
Civilian IC element officials noted that the reasons for contractor use  reported in the inventory are subjective and based on the knowledge of  the contracting or program official at the time of reporting. IC CHCO does  not require elements to maintain supporting documentation for their  contract reason codes. As a result, the civilian IC elements could not  provide documentation for 40 percent of the records we reviewed.  Additionally, an official from one civilian IC element told us that there was  confusion among program offices responsible for determining the reason  code as to the specific meaning of certain response options for the  reason code. Civilian IC element officials stated that multiple reasons  could pertain for utilizing the contract, but they can only select one option  for the purposes of the inventory. For example, while officials from one  civilian IC element stated that many of their contractors are brought on  board for their institutional knowledge and skills, this element’s inventory  data does not reflect the transfer of institutional knowledge reason code  for any of their reported contracts. Most of this element’s contracts were  coded as unique expertise, more efficient or effective, and specified  service, which were supported by the contract documents. Due to the  subjectivity of the coding, combined with the capability to only select one  response and without requiring supporting documentation, the reasons  identified in the civilian IC elements’ inventory submissions do not fully  reflect why they use core contract personnel.
section_title: Limited Progress Has Been Made in Developing Policies and Strategies on Contractor Use to Mitigate Risks
paragraphs: CIA, ODNI, and the executive departments, which are responsible for  developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six  civilian IC elements within those departments, have generally made  limited progress in developing such policies. Further, the eight civilian IC  elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that  address contractor use. While DHS and State have issued policies and  guidance that address generally all of OFPP Policy Letter 11-01’s  requirements related to contracting for services that closely support  inherently governmental functions, the other departments, CIA, and ODNI  are in various stages of developing required internal policies to address  the policy letter. In addition, the civilian IC elements’ decisions to use  contractors are generally not informed by strategic workforce plans or  other strategic-level guidance on the appropriate mix of government and  contract personnel for functions that are critical to elements’ missions.  The civilian IC elements’ ability to use the core contract personnel  inventory as a strategic workforce planning tool is hindered because the  inventory does not provide these elements insight into the functions  performed by contractors or the extent to which contractors are  performing functions that closely support inherently governmental  functions or are critical. Without guidance, strategies, and tools related to  services that closely support inherently governmental functions and  critical functions, the civilian IC elements may not be well-positioned to  identify and manage the related risks of contracting for those functions.
subsections: section_title: CIA, ODNI, and Departments of the Other Civilian IC Elements Have Not Fully Developed Policies That Address Risks Associated with Contractors Supporting Inherently Governmental Functions
paragraphs: OFPP Policy Letter 11-01’s requirements related to contracting for  services that closely support inherently governmental functions include  giving special consideration to using federal employees to perform these  functions, and if contractors are used to perform such work, giving special  management attention to contractors’ activities. The policy letter includes  a checklist of responsibilities that must be carried out when agencies rely  on contractors to perform these functions and requires agencies to  develop and maintain internal procedures to address the requirements of  the guidance. OFPP, however, did not establish a deadline for when  agencies need to complete these procedures. In 2011, we concluded that  a deadline may help better focus agency efforts to address risks and  therefore recommended that OFPP establish a near-term deadline for  agencies to develop internal procedures, including for services that  closely support inherently governmental functions. OFPP generally  concurred with our recommendation and commented that it would likely  establish time frames for agencies to develop the required internal  procedures, but it has not yet done so.
We assessed the extent to which CIA, ODNI, and the executive  departments of the other civilian IC elements—DHS, DOE, DOJ, State,  and Treasury—developed internal procedures to address the policy letter  because the civilian IC elements within departments are not required to  develop their own procedures to address the policy letter. The  departmental civilian IC elements are subject to policies and guidance at  the department level for considering and managing risks related to  contracting for services that closely support inherently governmental  functions. Our analysis found that DHS and State have issued policies  and guidance that generally address all of these requirements, but CIA,  ODNI, and the other three departments have not fully developed policies  to do so.
Civilian IC element and department officials cited various reasons for not  yet developing policies to address all of the OFPP policy letter’s  requirements. For example, Treasury officials stated that the OFPP policy  letter called for dramatic changes in agency procedures and thus elected  to conduct a number of pilots before making policy changes. DOE officials  stated that they are waiting for revisions to the Federal Acquisition  Regulation, which would incorporate the OFPP policy letter’s  requirements, before reviewing and updating their acquisition policies as  necessary.
section_title: Decisions to Use Contractors Not Guided by Strategies on Appropriate Mix of Government and Contract Personnel
paragraphs: OMB’s July 2009 memorandum on managing the multisector workforce  and our prior work on best practices in strategic human capital  management have indicated that agencies’ strategic workforce plans  should address the extent to which it is appropriate to use contractors.  The civilian IC elements’ current strategic workforce plans, however,  generally do not address the extent to which it is appropriate to use  contractors, either in general or more specifically to perform critical  functions, as called for in the OMB guidance. For example, ODNI’s 2012- 2017 strategic human capital plan outlines the current mix of government  and contract personnel by five broad function types: core mission,  enablers, leadership, oversight, and other. The plan, however, does not  elaborate on what the appropriate mix of government and contract  personnel should be on a function-by-function basis. The plan also  discusses efforts to reduce the number of core contract personnel but  does not elaborate on particular functions to target. In August 2013, ODNI  officials informed us they are continuing to develop documentation to  address a workforce plan.
OMB M-09-26 (July 29, 2009). should be done by government personnel and contract personnel based  on program goals, priorities, and associated human capital needs.
While IC CHCO requires IC elements to conduct strategic workforce  planning and prepare a human capital employment plan, neither effort  requires the elements to determine the appropriate mix of personnel  either generally or on a function-by-function basis. ICD 612 directs IC  elements to determine, review, and evaluate the number and uses of core  contract personnel when conducting strategic workforce planning but  does not reference the requirements related to determining the  appropriate workforce mix specified in OMB’s July 2009 memorandum or  require elements to document the extent to which contractors should be  used. IC CHCO also required IC elements to submit a 2012-2016 human  capital employment plan, which was to include information on the current  workforce mix and expected changes as well as information on elements’  efforts to examine the mix of government and contract personnel, as  appropriate. One IC CHCO official, however, explained that some IC  elements’ strategic workforce planning efforts are more robust than  others, so the level of detail and information provided in the plans vary  widely across the IC elements. Nevertheless, irrespective of an agency’s  size, OMB’s guidance on managing the multisector workforce notes that  agencies that have a strategic understanding of their current and  appropriate mix of personnel for each function are better positioned to  build and sustain the internal capacity necessary to maintain control over  their missions and operations.
section_title: Civilian IC Elements’ Ability to Use Inventory for Strategic Planning Hindered by Limited Information on Contractor Functions
paragraphs: OFPP’s November 2010 memorandum on service contract inventories  indicates that a service contract inventory is a tool that can assist an  agency in conducting strategic workforce planning. Specifically, an  agency can gain insight into the extent to which contractors are being  used to perform specific services by analyzing how contracted resources,  such as contract obligations and FTEs, are distributed by function across  an agency. The memorandum further indicates that this insight is  especially important for contracts whose performance may involve critical  functions or functions closely associated with inherently governmental  functions. OFPP officials stated that the IC’s core contract personnel  inventory serves this purpose for the IC and, to some extent, follows the  intent of the service contract inventories guidance to help mitigate risks.  OFPP officials stated that IC elements are not required to submit  separate service contract inventories that are required of the civilian  agencies and DOD, in part because of the classified nature of some of  the contracts. The core contract personnel inventory, however, does not  provide the civilian IC elements with detailed insight into the functions  their contractors are performing or the extent to which contractors are  used to perform functions that support their missions and closely support  inherently governmental work. Without complete and accurate information  in the core contract personnel inventory on the extent to which  contractors are performing specific functions, the civilian IC elements may  be missing an opportunity to leverage the inventory as a tool for  conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that  may require increased management attention and oversight.
We found that the data reported by the civilian IC elements in the primary  contractor occupation and competency expertise data field accurately  reflect the broad categories of contracted functions for each contract, but  these data do not provide detailed information on the functions performed  by contractors. Based on the contract documents we reviewed, such as  statements of work, we identified at least 128 instances in the 287  records we reviewed in which the primary contractor occupation and  competency expertise data field did not reflect the full range of services  listed in the contracts. This was due in part to IC CHCO’s guidance, which  instructs the elements to select only one service from the list of multiple  response options for each contract entry in the inventory. An IC CHCO  official explained that elements are instructed to select the predominant  type of service provided by the contract given that elements are not able  to record more than one type of service purchased for each contract. The  civilian IC element officials acknowledged that the primary contractor  occupation and competency expertise coding is not fully reflective of the  services the contractors are performing.
IC CHCO’s guidance, including ICD 612 and core contract personnel  inventory guidance, do not require the elements to review all of their  contracts, including classified contracts, to ensure that they identify and  manage risks related to contracts for services that closely support  inherently governmental or critical functions. In contrast, the civilian  executive agencies are statutorily required to compile an annual service  contract inventory, and as part of the inventory review process, agencies  are required to ensure that they are not using contract personnel to  perform critical functions in such a way that could affect the ability of the  agency to maintain control of its mission and operations and giving  special management attention to functions that closely support inherently  governmental functions. However, certain civilian IC elements’ contracts,  along with classified contracts at the civilian IC elements, are excluded  from the civilian agencies’ service contract inventories. For those  elements with contracts that are excluded from the civilian agencies’  service contract inventories, identifying which contracts contain these  types of functions in the core contract personnel inventory could help  target agencies’ efforts to provide enhanced management attention.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The eight civilian IC elements, like other federal agencies, have long  relied on contractors to support their missions. In fiscal year 2006, IC  CHCO initiated data collection efforts for the core contract personnel  inventory to collect information from elements on their use of these  personnel and to report to Congress on the number of core contract  personnel and their associated costs. IC CHCO and the civilian IC  elements have taken and continue to take steps to improve the reliability  of the reported information, such as standardizing how FTEs will be  calculated for the fiscal year 2012 inventory. These are positive steps.  Nevertheless, we identified several limitations, including definitional  changes, inaccurate data, methodological differences, and poor  documentation, that collectively undermine the utility of the information for  determining the extent to which the civilian IC elements rely on core  contract personnel. As a result, the IC CHCO cannot reliably report on  statutorily required information comparing the number and cost of core  contract personnel over time. By enhancing their internal controls, the  civilian IC elements can help ensure that the data being reported to  Congress are as accurate and complete as possible and consistent with  OMB guidelines. Further, inherent limitations or changes in definitions or  methodologies, including those intended to improve the data, can affect  data accuracy, completeness, and comparability. Not fully disclosing  these limitations and the effects of these changes limits the transparency  and usefulness of the information reported to Congress.
Within the IC, core contract personnel perform functions that could  influence the direction and control of key aspects of the U.S. intelligence  mission, such as intelligence analysis and operations. Our prior work and  OMB policies have underscored the importance of agencies having  guidance, strategies, and reliable data to inform decisions related to the  appropriate use of contractor personnel. Building on longstanding OMB  policy, OFPP’s September 2011 guidance requires agencies to develop  internal procedures to identify and oversee contractors providing services  that closely support inherently governmental functions. Yet, of the  agencies we reviewed, ODNI, CIA, DOJ, DOE, and Treasury have not  fully developed such procedures or established required time frames for  doing so. Without these procedures in place, ODNI, CIA, and the civilian  IC elements within these three departments risk not taking appropriate  steps to manage and oversee contract personnel, particularly those  performing work that could influence government decision making. In an  effort to help manage the use of contractor personnel within the IC,  elements are required by ICD 612 to conduct strategic workforce planning  related to their use of core contract personnel. However, ICD 612 falls  short of OMB’s July 2009 memorandum on managing the multisector  workforce by not requiring the elements to document their assessment of  the appropriate use of contractors or the appropriate mix of government  and contractor personnel on a function-by-function basis. One tool  identified by OFPP that can help agencies plan for the use of contract  personnel and mitigate associated risks is a service contract inventory,  which for the IC is the annual core contract personnel inventory. Yet, as it  is currently structured, the core contract personnel inventory is limited in  its ability to be an effective tool for doing so. As a result, the civilian IC  elements cannot use the inventory to identify those services that require  increased management attention under OFPP’s September 2011  guidance. Additionally, ICD 612 and other IC CHCO guidance do not  require elements to identify in the inventory those contracts that provide  critical services or those that closely support inherently governmental  functions. Consequently, civilian IC elements or their respective  departments we reviewed are not well-positioned to assess the potential  effects of relying on contractor personnel who perform such functions.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve congressional oversight and enhance civilian IC elements’  insights into their use of core contract personnel, we recommend that IC  CHCO take the following two actions:
When reporting to congressional committees, clearly specify  limitations and significant methodological changes and their  associated effects and  In coordination with the IC elements, develop a plan to enhance  internal controls for compiling the annual core contract personnel  inventory. Such a plan could include requiring IC elements to  document their methodologies for determining the number and costs  of core contract personnel and the steps the elements took for  ensuring data accuracy and completeness.
To improve civilian IC elements’ or their respective departments’ ability to  mitigate risks associated with the use of contractors, we recommend the  Director of National Intelligence, Director of the Central Intelligence  Agency, Attorney General of the United States, and Secretaries of Energy  and the Treasury direct responsible agency officials to set time frames to  develop guidance that fully addresses OFPP Policy Letter 11-01’s  requirements related to closely supporting inherently governmental  functions.
To improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for  their contractors and mitigate associated risks, we recommend that IC  CHCO take the following three actions:
Revise ICD 612’s provisions governing strategic workforce planning to  require the IC elements to identify their assessment of the appropriate  workforce mix on a function-by-function basis;
Assess options for how the core contract personnel inventory could be  modified to provide better insights into the functions performed by  contractors when there are multiple services provided under a  contract; and
Require the IC elements to identify contracts within the core contract  personnel inventory that include services that are critical or closely  support inherently governmental functions.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our September 2013 classified report to CIA, DHS,  DOE, DOJ, ODNI, State, and Treasury for review and comment. We  received written comments from ODNI, which are reprinted in appendix  VI, as well as technical comments that we incorporated into the draft as  appropriate. In its written comments, ODNI generally agreed with the six  recommendations that we directed to it.
With regard to our first recommendation to clearly specify limitations and  significant methodological changes and their associated effects when  reporting on the IC’s use of core contract personnel, ODNI agreed that IC  CHCO will highlight all adjustments to the data over time and the  implications of those adjustments in future briefings to Congress and  OMB. Similarly, ODNI agreed with our second recommendation  to develop a plan to enhance internal controls for compiling the annual  core contract personnel inventory. ODNI stated that IC CHCO, in  coordination with the IC Chief Financial Office, has added requirements  for the IC elements to include the methodologies used to identify and  count the number of core contract personnel and their steps for ensuring  the accuracy and completeness of the data. ODNI further stated that IC  CHCO intends to request the methodologies used by the IC elements for  the fiscal year 2014 budget data call, which includes the core contract  personnel inventory.
In commenting on our third recommendation, ODNI proposed that when  ICD 612 is revised, IC CHCO will request notification on the mechanism  by which each IC element adheres to OFPP Policy Letter 11-01. We  believe IC CHCO’s proposal to monitor the IC elements’ implementation  of OFPP Policy Letter 11-01 can help improve policies and guidance to  mitigate the risks associated with using contractors across the IC. ODNI,  however, did not directly address whether it will set time frames to  develop guidance for use within ODNI to fully address OFPP Policy Letter  11-01’s requirements. We continue to believe that ODNI as an IC element  should set timeframes to develop its own guidance that fully addresses  the OFPP policy letter.
With regard to our fourth recommendation to revise ICD 612’s provisions  governing strategic workforce planning, ODNI stated that IC CHCO has  recognized the need to update ICD 612 and will work to determine the  most appropriate mechanism to identify the functions performed within a  contract. ODNI further noted that IC CHCO proposed that IC elements be  responsible for ensuring they are addressing the appropriate workforce  mix when conducting workforce planning rather than requiring this  information as part of core contract personnel inventory data collection  efforts. We believe that ODNI’s comments are consistent with our  recommendation.
Regarding our fifth recommendation to assess options for how the core  contract personnel inventory could be modified to provide better insights  into the functions performed by contractors when multiple services are  provided under a contract, ODNI stated that IC CHCO will examine the  requirement to provide insights into all functions under a contract to  determine if there is a need to modify the inventory to capture that level of  information. As we note in our report, having better insight into contractor  functions through the core contract personnel inventory can help the  civilian IC elements conduct strategic workforce planning and prioritize  contracts that may require increased management attention and  oversight.
For our sixth recommendation to require the IC elements to identify  contracts within the core contract personnel inventory that include critical  services or those closely supporting inherently governmental functions,  ODNI stated it will explore doing so. ODNI noted in its comments that the  definition of core contract personnel in ICD 612 is already aligned with  OFFP Policy Letter 11-01’s definition of contract personnel who perform  services that closely support inherently governmental functions. As we  note in our report, however, not all core contract personnel perform  functions that closely support inherently governmental functions and  therefore do not need enhanced management oversight required by  OFPP. Further, the definition of core contract personnel does not identify  those functions that are critical to an agency’s mission. OFPP Policy  Letter 11-01 requires agencies to take different steps to manage the risks  related to contractors performing critical functions, such as ensuring  government personnel perform or manage these functions to the extent  necessary to maintain control of their missions and operations. Clearly  identifying which contracts within the core contract personnel inventory  include services that closely support inherently governmental functions as  well as those that include critical functions will better position the civilian  IC elements to assess the potential effects of relying on contract  personnel who perform such functions and take any necessary actions to  mitigate risks.
CIA, DOE, DOJ, and Treasury did not comment on our recommendation  to them but generally provided technical comments that we incorporated  into the draft as appropriate. DHS and State also provided technical  comments which we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees and the Attorney General of the United States;  the Director of National Intelligence; the Director of the Central  Intelligence Agency; and the Secretaries of Energy, Homeland Security,  State, and the Treasury. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need additional  information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or dinapolit@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be   found on the last page of this report. Staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VII.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this review were to determine (1) the extent to which the  civilian intelligence community (IC) elements rely on core contract  personnel; (2) the functions performed by core contract personnel and the  factors that contribute to their use; and (3) whether the civilian IC  elements have developed policies and guidance and strategically planned  for their use of these contract personnel to mitigate related risks. The  eight civilian IC elements covered by our review are the Central  Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Energy’s Office of  Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE IN), Department of Homeland  Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A), Department of  State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State INR), Department of  the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (Treasury OIA), Drug  Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence  (DEA NN), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Office of the  Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
To address our first and second objectives, we examined the civilian IC  elements’ submissions to the fiscal years 2007 to 2011 core contract  personnel inventories, when available. The submissions contain  information on the elements’ core contracts from over 10 data fields,  which vary by fiscal year. For the purposes of answering the first and  second objectives, we focused on five data fields related to the elements’  extent of reliance on core contract personnel, the functions performed by  these contract personnel, and the factors that contributed to their use:  fiscal year obligations, total full-time equivalents (FTE), primary contractor  occupation and competency expertise, budget category, and reason  code. We were not able to assess the reliability of the information  reported for these data fields in the elements’ submissions to the fiscal  years 2007 to 2009 inventories for various reasons, such as elements not  having records of their submissions for certain years. In addition, the  information reported for the fiscal year obligations, total FTEs, budget  category, and reason code data fields in the elements’ submissions to the  fiscal years 2010 to 2011 inventories was not sufficiently reliable for our  intended purposes of determining the civilian IC elements’ extent of  reliance on core contract personnel, the functions performed by these  personnel, or the factors that contribute to their use. We present this  information with the associated limitations in the report where appropriate.  Although we identified some limitations, the primary contractor occupation  and competency expertise data field was sufficiently reliable for  identifying the general types of functions performed. However, because  neither the fiscal year obligations nor total FTEs data field was sufficiently  reliable, we could not determine the extent to which the civilian IC  elements use contract personnel to perform certain functions based on  the primary contractor occupation and competency expertise data field.  Appendix II contains a more detailed discussion of our sampling  methodology and data reliability assessment.
We also reviewed the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital  Officer’s (IC CHCO) annual guidance to elements for preparing their  submissions to the fiscal years 2007 to 2012 inventories and information  reported in annual core contract personnel inventory briefings and  personnel level assessments provided to Congress. We interviewed  officials at IC CHCO and the eight civilian IC elements on the processes  for collecting and reporting their information for the inventory.
To address our third objective, we compared the civilian IC elements’ or  their respective departments’ relevant guidance, planning documents,  and tools related to their use of contractors to Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) guidance that address risks related to relying on  contractors. We reviewed Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)  Policy Letter 11-01 and compared the policy letter’s requirements  addressing contracting for closely supporting inherently governmental  functions to civilian IC elements’ or their respective departments’  acquisition policies and guidance to determine the extent to which the  requirements were met. We reviewed OMB’s July 2009 Memorandum on  Managing the Multisector Workforce and GAO’s prior work on strategic  human capital best practices and compared the leading practices  identified to the strategic workforce planning requirement in Intelligence  Community Directive (ICD) 612 and civilian IC elements’ strategic human  capital or other workforce plans to determine the extent to which the  leading practices were implemented. We reviewed the leading practices  identified in OMB’s November 2010 and December 2011 memoranda on  service contract inventories and the civilian IC elements’ data on  functions performed by contractors. We reviewed IC CHCO guidance on  core contract personnel to determine the extent to which it addressed  services that closely support inherently governmental functions and  critical functions. We also interviewed human capital, procurement, or  program officials at each civilian IC element to discuss ongoing efforts  related to strategic planning and developing policies to mitigate risks from  each IC element or their respective departments.
ODNI, in consultation with the other civilian IC elements, deemed some of  the information in the September 2013 report as classified, which must be  protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive  information about (1) the number and associated costs of government  and core contract personnel and some details on how the civilian IC  elements prepare the core contract personnel inventory, (2) specific  contracts from civilian IC elements we reviewed, and (3) details related to  the civilian IC elements’ or their respective departments’ progress in  developing policies to mitigate risks related to contractors and the civilian  IC elements’ strategic workforce planning efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to September  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. We subsequently worked with ODNI from September 2013 to  December 2013 to prepare an unclassified version of this report for public  release. Government auditing standards require that we plan and perform  the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Observations on Reliability of Eight Civilian Intelligence Community Elements’ Inventory Data Submissions
paragraphs: We conducted an analysis to determine whether the eight civilian  intelligence community (IC) elements’ submissions to the fiscal years  2007 to 2011 core contract personnel inventories were sufficiently reliable  for the purpose of identifying the extent to which these elements have  relied on core contract personnel, the functions performed by these  contract personnel, and the factors that contributed to their use. We  examined data fields from the submissions related to these purposes,  including the amount of obligations (fiscal year obligations), the number of  contractor full-time equivalents (total FTEs), the types of functions  performed by the contract personnel (primary contractor occupation and  competency expertise), the type of funding used for the contract (budget  category), and the reason for using contract personnel to perform a  service (reason code). In addition, we reviewed the Intelligence  Community Chief Human Capital Officer’s (IC CHCO) guidance to the  elements for preparing their submissions and interviewed civilian IC  element officials on their processes for compiling and reporting the  information. We could not determine the reliability of the information  reported for these data fields in the elements’ submissions to the fiscal  years 2007 to 2009 inventories. In addition, we identified several  concerns with the reliability of the information reported for the fiscal year  obligations, total FTEs, budget category, and reason code data fields in  the civilian IC elements’ submissions to the fiscal years 2010 and 2011  inventories. As a result, we determined that the data in these submissions  were not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review.identified some limitations, the primary contractor occupation and   Although we  competency expertise data field was sufficiently reliable for identifying the  broad types of functions performed. However, because neither the fiscal  year obligations nor total FTEs data fields was sufficiently reliable, we  could not determine the extent to which the civilian IC elements use  contract personnel to perform certain functions based on the primary  contractor occupation and competency expertise data field.
subsections: section_title: Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the civilian IC elements relied on core  contract personnel, the functions performed by these contract personnel,  and the factors that contributed to their use, we examined data from the  eight civilian IC elements’ submissions to the core contract personnel  inventory: fiscal year obligations, total FTEs, budget category, reason  code, and primary contractor occupation and competency expertise. We  planned to examine these five data fields for the civilian IC elements’  submissions to the fiscal years 2007 to 2011 inventories. We chose to  assess the submissions for fiscal years 2007 to 2011 because IC CHCO  published the first inventory in fiscal year 2007, and the fiscal year 2011  inventory was the most recent data available at the time we started our  review. In addition, we chose to analyze data for these five fields  because they were related to our audit objectives.
We planned to review the civilian IC elements’ submissions to the fiscal  years 2007 to 2011 core contract personnel inventories. However, we  could not determine the reliability of their submissions for the fiscal years  2007 to 2009 inventories for various reasons. For all but one of these  elements, we were unable to assess at least one year of data because (1)  element officials told us they did not have records of the data they  submitted to IC CHCO, (2) element officials told us they had specific  concerns about the reliability of data reported in certain fiscal years that  would make it difficult for us to verify the data, or (3) obtaining relevant  documentation would require an unreasonable amount of time. As a  result, we assessed the reliability of the five data fields from the elements’  submissions to the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 inventories because we  could assess the data for at least a majority of the elements for these  years.
To determine whether the five data fields from the civilian IC elements’  submissions to the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 inventories would be  reliable for the purpose of our review, we interviewed IC CHCO and  civilian IC element officials knowledgeable about the processes for  compiling and reporting the information. In addition, we reviewed IC  CHCO’s guidance to elements for preparing their submissions. We also  assessed the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of the data in the  submissions by analyzing the five data fields from the civilian IC  elements’ submissions. We compared the information reported to  information in relevant documentation for a sample of 287 records— representing 222 contracts or purchase orders. For elements that  reported 30 or fewer records in either fiscal year, we reviewed data for all  reported records for both fiscal years. For elements that reported more  than 30 records in either fiscal year, we selected a random,  nongeneralizable sample of records from their submissions.
We reviewed relevant documents to determine whether they validated the  information reported in the civilian IC elements’ submissions to the fiscal  year 2010 and 2011 core contract personnel inventories for the five data  fields for each record in the sample. Table 2 below summarizes our  criteria for making these determinations for each data field.
After our initial review of the documents, we provided the civilian IC  elements with an overview of our determinations that indicated whether  the documentation validated the information reported. In addition, we  offered these elements an opportunity to provide additional  documentation for records in which we identified discrepancies with the  documents or lacked sufficient information to validate the reported data.  In the instances in which elements provided additional documentation, we  reviewed the documents and made adjustments to our determinations, as  appropriate.
section_title: Results of Analysis
paragraphs: We made the following determinations of whether the information  reported for the five data fields was sufficiently reliable for our intended  purposes.
subsections: section_title: Fiscal Year Obligations
paragraphs: We determined that the information reported for the fiscal year obligations  data field was not sufficiently reliable for our intended purpose of  identifying the eight civilian IC elements’ extent of reliance on core  contract personnel for several reasons. First, we could only validate the  amount of obligations reported for approximately 62 percent of the  records we reviewed. For an additional 21 percent of the records we  reviewed, the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the  amount of obligations by more than 10 percent.
Second, we identified inconsistencies between civilian IC elements’  methodologies for reporting the amount of obligations. Officials from six of  the civilian IC elements stated that they reported the amount of  obligations on core contracts that are active at any point within a given  fiscal year while officials from two of the civilian IC elements told us they  do not report the amount of obligations on certain contracts if they are not  active on the date of reporting. As a result, the information reported  cannot be compared across the eight civilian IC elements.
Lastly, the amount of obligations reported for two of the civilian IC  elements does not reflect all of the obligations in a given fiscal year. First,  these elements’ methodology would exclude certain obligations on core  contracts that are active at some point during a fiscal year but not on the  date of reporting. We were unable to determine the magnitude of  obligations not included in the inventory because we did not have a way  to identify contracts not reported by the civilian IC elements. Further,  officials from these two elements stated that they also do not report  obligations on contract option periods that are no longer active on the  date of reporting even if the contract is active at that time.
section_title: Total FTEs
paragraphs: We determined that the information reported for the total FTEs data field  was not sufficiently reliable for our intended purpose of identifying the  eight civilian IC elements’ extent of reliance on core contract personnel.  First, the elements could not provide complete or readily available  documentation to validate the information reported for approximately 37  percent of the records.
Second, we identified inconsistencies in civilian IC elements’  methodologies for calculating the number of FTEs in their submissions to  the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 inventories, thus limiting our ability to  compare the number of FTEs reported across the elements. The civilian  IC elements reported the number of FTEs by: (1) calculating estimates  based on target labor hours, (2) calculating the number of labor hours  invoiced by the contractor, (3) counting the number of contract personnel  on board on a selected date and the number of approved contractor  vacancies, or (4) using the amount of obligations and average labor hour  rates.
Lastly, as noted above, officials from two of the civilian IC elements stated  that they do not report certain contracts in their submissions if they are  not active on the date of reporting. As a result, the number of FTEs on  core contracts that are active at some point during a fiscal year but not on  the date of reporting would not be reflected in these two elements’  submissions. We were unable to determine the magnitude of the number  of FTEs not included in the inventory because we did not have a way to  identify contracts not reported by these two elements.
section_title: Budget Category
paragraphs: We determined that the information reported for the budget category data  field in the eight civilian IC elements’ submissions was not sufficiently  reliable for our intended purpose of identifying the types of functions  performed by core contract personnel. We intended to use this data field  to describe the types of functions performed by core contract personnel  because IC CHCO uses the budget category in its briefings to Congress  to provide information on the functions performed by core contract  personnel. The IC CHCO core contract personnel inventory guidance  instructs the elements to complete the budget category data field by  reporting where the funding for the contract is assigned according to the  Congressional Budget Justification Books. Civilian IC element officials  acknowledged that the budget category is not the best representation of  the functions being performed by contractors. Based on our review of  documents, we found that contracted functions are not necessarily  reflected by the budget category designation. Further, we identified  discrepancies between the budget category information reported and the  information contained in relevant documents for approximately one-third  of the records we reviewed for two of the civilian IC elements. Based on  our review of the documents provided, the reported budget category  information for one of these elements improved from fiscal year 2010 to  2011. However, we still identified discrepancies between the information  reported and relevant documents for 23 percent of the records we  reviewed.
section_title: Reason Code
paragraphs: We determined that the information reported for the reason code data  field in the eight civilian IC elements’ submissions was not sufficiently  reliable for our intended purpose of identifying the factors for using core  contract personnel because we could not determine the reliability of the  information reported for a significant number of the records we reviewed.  We could not validate the reported reason code based on the information  in the documents provided for approximately 40 percent of the records we  reviewed. Further, this percentage is even more pronounced for those  records coded as a category other than specified service, which is a  broad category defined as when the service being provided is of indefinite  quantity. The civilian IC elements selected specified service for  approximately 45 percent of the records we reviewed. For the 156  remaining records coded as a category other than specified service, we  could not validate the information reported for approximately 73 percent  of the records.
In addition, we identified instances when multiple selection options could  apply to a record. IC CHCO guidance requires elements to select one  category per record. However, civilian IC element officials acknowledged  that more than one response option can apply to a record and that  officials at the time of reporting make a subjective determination of which  option best applies. As a result, the subjective nature of the determination  and that more than one record could apply to a record raises concerns  about the consistency of the information reported.
Lastly, because we determined that the fiscal year obligations and total  FTEs data fields were not sufficiently reliable for determining the extent of  reliance on core contract personnel, we would not be able to use the  information reported for these data fields to describe the extent to which  the civilian IC elements used these personnel for particular reasons  based on the reason code data field.
section_title: Primary Contractor Occupation and Competency Expertise
paragraphs: Although we identified some limitations, the information reported for the  primary contractor occupation and competency expertise data field is  sufficiently reliable for our intended purpose of identifying the types of  functions performed by core contract personnel. Based on our review of  relevant documents, we were able to find support for the selected  response option for almost all of the records we reviewed.
However, we identified some limitations that would limit insight into the  functions performed by the contract personnel. First, we identified  instances when multiple selection options could apply to a record. The  core contract personnel inventory guidance instructs the elements to  select only one response option for each record. Based on the documents  provided, we identified at least 128 instances in the 287 records we  reviewed in which the primary contractor occupation and competency  expertise data field did not reflect the full range of services listed in the  documents. Civilian IC element officials acknowledged that the primary  contractor occupation and competency expertise coding are not fully  reflective of the services the contractors are performing. As a result, the  information may not be consistently reported given the subjective nature  of this data field.
Further, we identified a limited number of instances when the information  may not be consistently reported as a function performed by the contract  personnel. For example, an element may make a selection based on the  mission the contractor supported or the contractor’s general area of  expertise rather than the type of function performed.
Lastly, because we determined that the fiscal year obligations and total  FTEs data fields were not sufficiently reliable for determining the extent of  reliance on core contract personnel, we would not be able to use the  information reported for these data fields to describe the extent to which  the contract personnel performed certain types of functions based on the  primary contractor occupation and competency expertise data field.
section_title: Appendix III: Overview of the Eight Civilian Intelligence Community Elements and Their Respective Missions
subsections: section_title: Civilian intelligence community (IC) element Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
paragraphs: Mission  Collects, analyzes, evaluates, and disseminates foreign intelligence to assist the President  and senior U.S. government policymakers in making decisions relating to national  security.
Department of Energy Office of  Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE  IN)
Provides expert scientific, technical, analytic, and research capabilities to other agencies  in the IC and participates in formulating intelligence collection, analysis, and information  relative to foreign energy matters.
Department of Homeland Security Office  of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A)
Equips DHS, other IC elements, departments, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private  sector partners with the intelligence and information needed to keep the homeland safe,  secure, and resilient.
Facilitates intelligence coordination and information sharing with other members of the IC  and leverages its global law enforcement drug intelligence assets to enhance efforts to  protect national security, combat global terrorism, and facilitate IC support to DEA’s law  enforcement mission.
Ensures that well-informed and independent analysis informs foreign policy decisions and  that intelligence and counterintelligence activities support America’s foreign policy.
Department of the Treasury Office of  Intelligence and Analysis (Treasury OIA)
Receives, analyzes, collates, and disseminates intelligence and counterintelligence  information related to the operations and responsibilities of the entire Treasury  Department. Publishes analytic products and intelligence information reports for senior  leaders at Treasury and other policymakers and intelligence consumers throughout the  government.
DOJ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  Protects and defends against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, upholds and  enforces the criminal laws of the United States, and provides leadership and criminal  justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.
Serves as head of the IC; acts as the principal adviser to the President, National Security  Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national  security; and develops and ensures the execution of an annual budget for the National  Intelligence Program based on budget proposals provided by the IC elements.
section_title: Appendix IV: Selected Office of Management and Budget Guidance Related to Considering and Mitigating Risks
paragraphs: Appendix IV: Selected Office of Management  and Budget Guidance Related to Considering  and Mitigating Risks Selected requirements related to closely  supporting inherently governmental  functions  Agency officials must provide an enhanced  degree of management controls and oversight  when contracting for functions that closely  support the performance of inherently  governmental functions.
Selected requirements related to critical  functions  Not applicable  As part of determining whether it is appropriate  to use contractors, fill critical functions only with  government personnel to the extent required by  the agency to maintain control of its mission  and operations and by either government or  contract personnel once the agency has  sufficient internal capability to control its mission  and operations.
Beginning with the fiscal year 2012 service  contract inventory submissions, identify which  contracts include services that are  predominantly for functions closely associated  to inherently governmental work.  Analyze the inventory to ensure the agency is  giving special management attention to  functions that are closely associated with  inherently governmental functions.
Beginning with the fiscal year 2012 service  contract inventory submissions, identify which  contracts include services that are  predominantly for functions that are critical.  Analyze the inventory to ensure that the agency  is not using contractor employees to perform  critical functions in such a way that could affect  the ability of the agency to maintain control of  its mission and operations.
Limit or guide a contractor’s exercise of  discretion and retain control of government  operations.  Assign a sufficient number of qualified  government employees, with expertise to  administer or perform the work, to give special  management attention to the contractor’s  activities.
Identify agency’s critical functions.  Ensure that government personnel perform  and/or manage critical functions to the extent  necessary for the agency to operate effectively  and maintain control of its mission and  operations.
section_title: Appendix V: Intelligence Community Core Contract Personnel Definitions and Associated Major Changes by Fiscal Year
subsections: section_title: Fiscal year Core contract personnel definition 2007
paragraphs: Contracts that provide direct support to core intelligence  community (IC) mission areas such as collection activities  and operations; intelligence analysis and production; basic  and applied technology research and development;  acquisition and program management; and/or  management and administrative support to these  functions.  Also, these employees are functionally indistinguishable  from U.S. government personnel whose mission they  support. Consulting contractors are to be included when  they provide primarily intellectual products or services.
Individuals employed by a private or independent  contractor to provide analytical, technical, managerial,  and/or administrative support to: (1) intelligence collection  activities and operations; (2) intelligence analysis and  production; (3) basic and applied technology research and  development; (4) acquisition and program management;  (5) enterprise information technology; and (6) ongoing  operations and maintenance in support of a particular  product; and/or support the general management and  administration of an IC agency or element.
From contracts that provide “direct support” to individuals  that “support.”  Removes “such as” for mission areas and names six core  IC mission areas.  Adds “enterprise information technology” and “operations  and maintenance” as mission areas not previously listed.  From “management and administrative support to these  functions” to “support the general management and  administration of an IC agency or element.”  Removes that the “employees are functionally  indistinguishable from U.S. government personnel whose  mission they support.”
Personnel that provide only direct support to core IC  mission areas that include: (1) collection activities and  operations (technical and human intelligence);  (2) intelligence analysis and production; (3) basic and  applied technology research and development; (4)  acquisition and program management; (5) enterprise  information technology; and (6) management or  administrative support to these functions.  Also, these employees are functionally indistinguishable  from U.S. government personnel whose mission they  support.
From individuals that “support” to personnel that provide  “only direct support.”  Specifies technical and human intelligence for collection  activities and operations.  Reverts from “support the general management and  administration of an IC agency or element” to “management  or administrative support of these functions.”  Adds back in that the “employees are functionally  indistinguishable from U.S. government personnel whose  mission they support” but does not mention consulting  contractors.
Personnel that provide only direct support to core IC  mission areas that include: (1) collection activities and  operations (technical and human intelligence),  (2) intelligence analysis and production, (3) basic and  applied technology research and development,  (4) acquisition and program management, (5) enterprise  information technology, and (6) management or  administrative support to these functions.  Also, these employees are functionally indistinguishable  from U.S. government personnel whose mission they  support.
No definitional change.  Guidance includes that personnel performing certain  administrative support, training support, information  technology services, and operations and maintenance will  either be included or excluded depending on the types of  services they provide.
section_title: Fiscal year Core contract personnel definition 2011
paragraphs: Personnel that provide only direct support to core IC  mission areas that include: (1) collection activities and  operations (technical and human intelligence),  (2) intelligence analysis and production, (3) basic and  applied technology research and development, (4)  acquisition and program management, (5) enterprise  information technology, and (6) management or  administrative support to these functions.
Summary of major changes from prior fiscal year  Revision to “substantive work products may be  incorporated in and/or indistinguishable from those of U.S.  government personnel.”  Guidance further refines the inclusion or exclusion of  personnel performing certain administrative support,  information technology services, and operations and  maintenance.
section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  ODNI’s observation that the number of core contract personnel  reported during initial data collection efforts may not have fully or  accurately reflected all core contract personnel due to the potential  exclusion of some functions underscores our finding that the core  contract personnel inventory data cannot be used reliably to make  year-to-year comparisons or establish trends.  2.  Our recommendation did not specify that the assessments of the  appropriate workforce mix be addressed as part of the core contract  personnel inventory. However, as discussed in our report, OFPP has  indicated that a service contract inventory can assist an agency in  conducting strategic workforce planning by providing insight into the  extent to which contracted resources are distributed by function  across an agency.
section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, John P. Hutton, Director (ret.); Johana R.  Ayers, Acting Director; Molly W. Traci, Assistant Director; Laura Greifner;  Julia M. Kennon; John A. Krump; Claire Li; Stephen V. Marchesani; Anne  McDonough-Hughes; Kenneth E. Patton; Jared A. Sippel; and Roxanna  T. Sun made key contributions to this report.