Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Incorporate Elements of a Strategic Management Planning Framework into Retrograde and Reset Guidance
Published: 2016-05-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Following the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD is in the process of resetting equipment and materiel to meet mission requirements. Retrograde refers to the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from one forward area to another area of operation or to a reset program. Reset includes maintenance and supply activities to restore and enhance combat capability to equipment used in combat.
Section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 included provisions for DOD to establish a policy and implementation plan on retrograde and similar efforts related to forces used to support overseas contingency operations and for GAO to review DOD's policy and plan. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD developed a strategic policy and (2) the services developed implementation plans consistent with leading practices on sound strategic management planning for the retrograde and reset of operating forces. GAO reviewed DOD reports, interviewed officials, and assessed documents against those leading practices, which include elements similar to several of the requirements in section 324.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In its response to the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014, instead of developing new policies for retrograde and reset of operating forces used to support overseas contingency operations, the Department of Defense (DOD) relied on three existing guidance documents as its policy for retrograde and reset activities in support of overseas contingency operations. DOD's November 2014 report to congressional committees—issued in response to requirements in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014—states that three DOD guidance documents address the department's retrograde and reset efforts: the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and the Defense Planning Guidance. DOD officials told GAO that they believe the QDR and other documents provide the policy and guidance needed to inform the department's retrograde and reset efforts. However, GAO found that these documents do not include key elements for sound strategic management planning, such as a mission statement and long-term goals. Without a strategic policy for retrograde and reset that incorporates key elements of sound strategic management planning, DOD cannot ensure that its efforts provide the necessary strategic planning framework to inform the military services' plans for these efforts. Further, DOD emphasizes the use of consistent terms across departmental documents, but GAO found that DOD's guidance is not consistent in identifying what information to use in budget reporting on retrograde and reset activities. If DOD does not ensure the use of consistent information and descriptions in policy and other departmental documents used to inform budget estimates on retrograde and reset costs, Congress may not receive consistent and accurate information to make informed decisions concerning these efforts.
GAO found that the Marine Corps has published an implementation plan for the retrograde and reset of operating forces, but the Army, Navy and Air Force have not. In DOD's November 2014 report to congressional committees, DOD pointed to the specific planning activities undertaken by each service related to retrograde and reset. According to DOD officials, the services are responsible for developing their own implementation plans. The Marine Corps has an implementation plan for retrograde and reset, which is contained in two of its guidance documents, and largely meets all the elements of sound strategic management planning, some of which generally correspond to several of the requirements in section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. However, the Army, Navy and Air Force either have not published implementation plans or have provided GAO with published documents or plans that did not include all elements of leading practices for sound strategic planning—such as strategies on how a goal will be achieved, how an organization will carry out its mission, and resources required to meet goals, among others. Without implementation plans that, among other things, articulate goals and strategies for retrograde and reset of equipment, Army, Navy, and Air Force efforts may not align with DOD-wide goals and strategies for retrograde and reset, reset-related maintenance costs may not be consistently included, and resources and funding for retrograde and reset may not be consistently or effectively budgeted or distributed within the services.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD establish a strategic policy that includes key elements of leading practices; use consistent information and descriptions for budget reporting; and that the Army, Navy and Air Force develop implementation plans for their retrograde and reset efforts. DOD generally concurred with all three recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Following the cessation of major combat operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of  reconstituting, retrograding, and resetting forces, equipment, and materiel  to meet current and future mission requirements and available resources.  Reconstitution is a broad term that generally refers to the process, after a  contingency/surge operation, of making a unit or activity available again  for operational commitments and includes such planning factors as  maintenance of equipment, training, and an examination of the impact of  operations on personnel and attrition rates. Reset, which is a subset of  reconstitution, refers to a set of actions to restore equipment to a desired  level of combat capability commensurate with a unit’s future mission. It  includes maintenance and supply activities that restore and enhance  combat capability to unit and pre-positioned equipment that was  destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out beyond economic repair  because of combat operations by repairing, rebuilding, or procuring  replacement equipment. Retrograde refers to the movement of non-unit  equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset program or to  another directed area of operations. Figure 1 shows how reconstitution,  reset, and retrograde activities are related.
Neither DOD nor the military services track reconstitution as a separate  activity. According to DOD officials, this is because personnel and training  costs and efforts are integrated in each service’s force generation model  as units undergo the cycles of deploying to and returning from  contingency operations. Additionally, DOD officials stated that the military  services are responsible for tracking the implementation of retrograde and  reset activities. DOD identified $10.1 billion in fiscal year 2015 overseas  contingency operations funding related to equipment reset and readiness  and requested an additional $7.9 billion for reset in overseas contingency  operations funding for fiscal year 2016.
In prior work we identified challenges that DOD faced related to the reset  of equipment. For example, in March 2006 we testified before a  subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that, in light of  continuing contingency operations, until the services are able to refine  overall requirements and reset cost estimates, neither the Secretary of  Defense nor the Congress will be in a sound position to weigh the trade- offs and risks associated with funding levels to reset equipment. Further,  we reported in June 2015 that there was no departmental guidance  regarding how reset liability cost estimates are to be produced and there  was not a standard process for producing reset liability estimates. We  did not make any recommendations in these reports.
Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal  Year 2014 required DOD to establish a policy relating to the retrograde,  reconstitution, and replacement of units and materiel used to support  overseas contingency operations. DOD was also to submit a plan for  implementation of the policy within 90 days of enactment of the NDAA.  The act included a provision that GAO review and report on DOD’s policy  and implementation plan and annual updates. We reported in April 2014  that DOD had not established a policy or submitted an implementation  plan to congressional committees within the mandated 90 days, but noted  that DOD was in the process of developing these documents and that we  would continue to monitor DOD’s progress and review the policy and  implementation plan as they became available. In November 2014,  DOD completed a classified report and subsequently submitted it to the  congressional defense committees in response to section 324 of the  NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. In April 2015, DOD updated its report.
In this report, we evaluate the extent to which (1) DOD developed a  strategic policy consistent with leading practices on sound strategic  management planning for the retrograde and reset of operating forces  that support overseas contingency operations and (2) the services  developed implementation plans consistent with leading practices on  sound strategic management planning for the retrograde and reset of  operating forces that support overseas contingency operations.
For our first objective regarding the extent to which DOD developed a  strategic policy consistent with leading practices on sound strategic  management planning for the retrograde and reset of operating forces  that support overseas contingency operations, we reviewed the two  reports DOD developed and provided to the congressional defense  committees in response to the requirements in the NDAA for Fiscal Year  2014. In addition, we analyzed the documents identified in DOD’s  November 2014 report as providing policy and guidance for retrograde  and reset using leading practices on sound strategic management  planning that we identified in prior work. These leading practices  include, for example, a mission statement and long-term goals (appendix  II provides more detail regarding these six elements). We also reviewed  other relevant department documents related to retrograde and reset. We  interviewed officials from various offices within the Office of the Secretary  of Defense, such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). For  consistent and reliable information concerning retrograde and reset for  budget reporting, we assessed DOD guidance, such as guidance related  to budget estimates, and other relevant documents using Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government specific to information and  communications, which state that for an entity to run and control its  operations it must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications.
For our second objective on the extent to which the services developed  implementation plans consistent with leading practices on sound strategic  management planning for the retrograde and reset of operating forces  that support overseas contingency operations, we reviewed DOD and  service policies and plans for retrograde and reset. We analyzed service  guidance, plans, and other documentation for retrograde and reset using  our previously-identified leading practices on sound strategic  management planning. These leading practices include, for example,  strategies on how a goal will be achieved, how an organization will carry  out its mission, and resources required to meet goals, among others.  Additionally, we conducted interviews with officials from each of the  services that we identified through review of policy and guidance  documents, or were referred to by other DOD officials as having key  responsibilities or information we needed related to retrograde and reset.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2015 to May 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I discusses our  scope and methodology in greater detail.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Statutory Requirements for DOD Policy and Implementation Plan
paragraphs: Section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 requires DOD to establish  a policy setting forth the programs and priorities of the department for the  retrograde, reconstitution, and replacement of units and materiel used to  support overseas contingency operations. The policy is to take into  account national security threats, combatant command requirements,  current readiness of military department operating forces, and risk  associated with strategic depth and the time necessary to reestablish  required personnel, equipment, and training readiness in such operating  forces. Section 324 further requires that DOD’s policy include the  following elements:
Establishment and assignment of responsibilities and authorities  within the department for oversight and execution of the planning,  organization, and management of the programs to reestablish the  readiness of redeployed operating forces;
Guidance concerning priorities, goals, objectives, timelines, and  resources to reestablish the readiness of redeployed operating forces  in support of national defense objectives and combatant command  requirements;
Oversight reporting requirements and metrics for the evaluation of  DOD and military department progress on restoring the readiness of  redeployed operating forces in accordance with the policy; and
A framework for joint departmental reviews of military services’ annual  budgets proposed for retrograde, reconstitution, or replacement  activities, including an assessment of the strategic and operational  risk assumed by the proposed levels of investment across DOD.
Additionally, section 324 requires DOD to submit a plan for  implementation of the policy for retrograde, reconstitution, and  replacement that contains the following elements:
The assignment of responsibilities and authorities for oversight and  execution of the planning, organization, and management of the  programs to reestablish the readiness of redeployed operating forces;
Establishment of priorities, goals, objectives, timelines, and resources  to reestablish the readiness of redeployed operating forces in support  of national defense objectives and combatant command  requirements;
A description of how the plan will be implemented, including a  schedule with milestones to meet the goals of the plan; and
An estimate of the resources—by military service and by year—that  are required to implement the plan, including an assessment of the  risks assumed in the plan.
DOD is to provide an update on progress toward meeting the goals of the  plan not later than one year after submission, and annually thereafter.
section_title: DOD Identified Existing Guidance As a Framework for Its Policy for Retrograde and Reset, but This Framework Does Not Include Elements of Sound Strategic Planning DOD Identified Existing Guidance Documents Related to Retrograde and Reset Instead of Developing New Policy
paragraphs: In its response to the requirements of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014,  instead of developing new policies for retrograde and reset of operating  forces used to support overseas contingency operations, DOD relied on  three existing guidance documents as its policy for retrograde and reset  activities in support of overseas contingency operations. However, the  guidance does not incorporate key elements of leading practices for  sound strategic management planning of these efforts. Further, the  department has not used consistent and reliable information or  descriptions for retrograde and reset to facilitate consistent and accurate  budget reporting to Congress.
In response to the requirements in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 for  DOD to establish a policy related to retrograde and other activities, in its  reports to congressional defense committees, DOD identified existing  guidance documents that inform retrograde and reset. These reports did  not develop new policy for retrograde and reset activities. For example,  the November 2014 report indicates that three existing strategic-level  policy and guidance documents inform the department’s retrograde and  reset efforts, among other things: the Quadrennial Defense Review,  Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and the Defense Planning  Guidance. The report also highlighted the military services’ current  activities for some of these areas, to include some funding information  related to overseas contingency operations and reset, in the context of  resources required. Similarly, the April 2015 report DOD submitted to the  congressional defense committees also describes the military services’  current activities—to include, for example, budget information related to  reset—and provides a progress update on some of the information  submitted in the previous year’s report. As in the November 2014 report,  the April 2015 follow-up report provides broad information concerning  each of the military services’ efforts concerning various activities, such as  retrograde, reset, and readiness.
In addition to the two reports, DOD identified other guidance related to  retrograde and reset. For example, in 2013 the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness issued a memorandum  for Afghanistan that officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics indicated to us as  providing the department’s policy guidance for retrograde. In addition to  departmental documents addressing retrograde and reset, U.S. Central  Command has issued orders and annexes that address retrograde.
subsections: section_title: DOD Guidance Does Not Include Key Elements of Leading Practices for the Strategic Management Planning of Retrograde and Reset
paragraphs: The DOD guidance documents identified as the strategic framework for  retrograde and reset do not incorporate key elements for sound strategic  management planning. GAO’s leading practices work has shown that  sound strategic management planning can enable organizations to  identify and achieve long-term goals and objectives. We have identified  six elements of strategic management planning that are key for  establishing a comprehensive, results-oriented strategic planning  framework. These elements establish that an organization’s strategic  management planning framework should include, for example, a mission  statement and long-term goals. Elements of sound strategic management  planning also correspond to requirements in section 324 of the NDAA for  Fiscal Year 2014 related to retrograde and other efforts. For example,  whereas an element of sound strategic management planning calls for  the setting of specific policy, programmatic, and management goals,  section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 calls for the required policy  to include guidance concerning priorities, goals, objectives, timelines, and  resources, among other things, and for the implementation plan to  establish them.
Our review of the three documents (i.e., the Quadrennial Defense  Review, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Defense  Planning Guidance) referenced in DOD’s November 2014 report as  providing the department’s strategic policy and guidance for retrograde  and other activities, including reset, found that they do not contain the  elements to facilitate the strategic management planning of these  efforts. For example, the Guidance for the Employment of the Force  was the only document of the three that mentioned retrograde: once in  the context of funding resources and a second time to address U.S.  Transportation Command’s responsibilities to support retrograde  planning. In addition, although all three documents mentioned reset,  they did so only in general terms. For example, the Quadrennial  Defense Review states that DOD will need time and funding to reset the  joint force as the department transitions from operations in Afghanistan,  but generally does not expand on this point. Reset is also mentioned in  the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, but it offers no specificity  about reset activities. None of the documents include a mission  statement that addresses retrograde or reset activities. Further, long-term  goals for retrograde and reset are not outlined in any of the three  documents, which is an element, among others, of strategic management  planning, and could improve DOD implementation of section 324. An  official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy told  us that the Guidance for the Employment of the Force is not a strategic  policy document for retrograde or reset.
Similarly, other documents that DOD officials directed us to as providing  policy guidance for retrograde lacked key elements necessary for the  sound strategic management planning of this effort. Our review of U.S.  Central Command’s 2011 fragmentary order on the retrograde of  equipment from Afghanistan found that it provided information  concerning tasks, such as additional retrograde plans; metrics to track  equipment retrograde from Afghanistan; and factors that could affect  retrograde operations. However, the order does not include a mission  statement. Although a later version of the fragmentary order contains a  mission statement, it is specific to operations in Afghanistan and does  not, therefore, constitute the department’s comprehensive vision  concerning the retrograde of equipment from all overseas contingency  areas. Likewise, though the August 2013 memorandum from the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness on  the retrograde and disposition of equipment in Afghanistan includes some  information on equipment retrograde, it does not include key elements,  such as a mission statement and long-term goals, necessary for the  strategic management planning of retrograde to inform plans across the  department.
DOD officials stated that they believed the Quadrennial Defense Review  and other strategic-level documents provide the necessary policy and  guidance to inform the department’s efforts. However, without a strategic  policy for retrograde and reset that incorporates key elements of strategic  management planning, DOD cannot ensure that its efforts to develop  retrograde and reset guidance provide the necessary strategic planning  framework to inform the military services’ plans for retrograde and reset.
section_title: Inconsistent Information and Descriptions of Retrograde and Reset for Budget Reporting Impact DOD’s Strategic Communications About These Efforts
paragraphs: We also found that DOD’s guidance is not consistent in identifying what  information DOD and the services are to use in budget reporting on  retrograde and reset activities. DOD emphasizes the use of consistent  terms across department documents. Specifically, it is DOD policy to  improve communication and mutual understanding within the department  through the standardization of military and associated terminology; and  that the DOD components use the Department of Defense Dictionary of  Military and Associated Terms when preparing department documents,  such as policy and strategy. Also, Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government specific to information and communication state that  for an entity to run and control its operations, it must have relevant,  reliable, and timely communications. Information is needed throughout  the agency to achieve all of its objectives.
However, we found differences in how DOD guidance and other  documents refer to retrograde and reset, particularly with respect to what  they include in the description. For example, the Department of Defense  Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms describes retrograde as a  process for the movement of equipment and materiel, while June 2015  guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicates that the  DOD components should include all retrograde requirements, including  those for base closure, equipment, and people for future budget  estimates. Later, in the same budget guidance, the components are  directed to describe costs related to equipment retrograde as part of a  briefing.
Similarly, descriptions of reset and what it includes are inconsistent  across departmental documents. The Department of Defense Dictionary  of Military and Associated Terms defines reset as a set of actions to  restore equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate  with a unit’s future mission. A 2013 joint publication, referenced by the  definition, and a 2007 memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness expand upon what reset  includes, using similar language. However, our review of a fiscal year  2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget justification document  found that it did not provide information regarding what reset includes  consistent with these descriptions. Specifically, the 2013 joint publication  and 2007 memorandum identify reset as generally including repair,  replacement, and recapitalization of equipment, while the fiscal year  2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget justification document  indicates that reset includes the repair and replacement of equipment as  well as the replenishment of munitions consumed, destroyed, or damaged  due to combat operations. Furthermore, DOD Comptroller officials told  us that they include replenishment of ammunition along with repair and  replacement when reporting reset budget information to Congress, but  they do not include costs for the recapitalization of equipment. In  December 2009, DOD’s Resource Management Decision 700 directed  the DOD Comptroller, in coordination with various components, to publish  a DOD definition of reset for use in the DOD overseas contingency  budgeting process. This definition was to be submitted to the Deputy  Secretary of Defense for approval by January 2010.
In 2011, because the department had not published a definition of reset  for use in DOD’s budget process, we recommended that the DOD  Comptroller take action concerning the Resource Management Decision  700 to develop and publish a DOD definition for reset. DOD concurred  with this recommendation and commented that the definition of reset  would be incorporated into an update of its DOD Financial Management  Regulation. As of October 2015, however, the DOD Comptroller had not  published a definition for reset. A DOD Comptroller official told us that the  reset definition had not been published due to delays in the finalization  and approval of the definition’s language.
Further, we found that the current DOD Financial Management  Regulation does not include a specific definition or description of  retrograde for use in the DOD overseas contingency operations  budgeting process. For example, although major operations typically  involve retrograde, the volume and chapter of the DOD Financial  Management Regulation specific to contingency operations does not  provide a definition of retrograde or include any information describing  how retrograde costs should be considered or calculated. The June 2015  budget guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense which, as we  previously noted, provides inconsistent information about retrograde  within the same document, may not provide clarification for the services  to develop consistent, accurate information for budget reporting  concerning retrograde. If DOD does not ensure the use of consistent  information and descriptions in policy and other departmental documents  used to inform budget estimates on retrograde and reset, Congress may  not receive the consistent and accurate information that it needs to make  informed decisions concerning retrograde and reset.
section_title: One of Four Military Services Has Published an Implementation Plan for the Retrograde and Reset of Equipment
paragraphs: We found that the Marine Corps has published an implementation plan for  the retrograde and reset of equipment, but the Army, Navy and Air Force  have not. The Army, Navy and Air Force have issued guidance and other  documents that address reset but that, taken either collectively or  individually, do not include key elements of sound strategic management  planning, such as strategies to achieve goals and objectives. According to  DOD officials, the military services are responsible for developing  implementation plans related to retrograde and reset.
As previously described, leading practices in our prior work have shown  that sound strategic management planning can enable organizations to  identify and achieve strategies to achieve long-term goals and objectives.  Some of these elements also generally correspond to several  requirements in section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. For  example, an element of sound strategic management planning calls for  goals, as well as the strategies and resources needed to achieve goals,  among others. Similarly, section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014  requires that DOD’s implementation plan include, among other things, the  establishment of priorities and goals, a description of how the plan will be  implemented, and an estimate of resources by military service and year  required to implement the plan. DOD reports in response to the NDAA  requirement describe overall service goals and objectives, among other  things, but service-specific implementation plans that incorporate best  practices could better position the services to plan, carry out, and track  the further implementation of these overarching goals and objectives.
subsections: section_title: Marine Corps Has Developed an Implementation Plan for Retrograde and Reset
paragraphs: The Marine Corps’ implementation plan for the conduct of retrograde and  reset of its equipment is contained in two complementary documents: the  Operation Enduring Freedom Ground Equipment Reset Strategy  (Strategy) and the Ground Equipment Reset Playbook (Playbook).  Taken together these two documents present a service-wide plan for the  retrograde and reset of Marine Corps’ ground equipment used in  overseas contingency operations that largely meet all of the elements of  sound strategic planning, as shown in table 1 below. For example, the  strategy describes long-term goals to coordinate retrograde and reset  efforts, and then to synchronize these efforts with the larger Marine Corps  readiness posture.
section_title: The Army Has Published Information on Various Aspects of Retrograde and Reset, but Lacks an Implementation Plan and Has Inconsistent Descriptions
paragraphs: Army officials discussed a variety of documents when we asked for  implementation plans for retrograde and reset. However, none of these  documents individually or collectively constituted a service-wide  implementation plan for retrograde and reset that included relevant key  elements for sound strategic management planning. For example,  officials provided us with information on an Automated Reset  Management Tool, which provides information about web-based logistic  components that the Army uses to manage the reset program. While  Army officials use this tool to plan, review, analyze, validate, and execute  reset, it is not an implementation plan that includes strategies to achieve  goals but rather a tool for collaboration. Additionally, officials from the  Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army (G-8) and the Assistant  Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics cited the  Army retrograde and reset handbook as an authoritative source  document for retrograde and reset activities. The handbook includes,  among other things, information on roles and responsibilities for  retrograde and reset for different Army offices, which can be considered  components of the strategic management planning element of strategies  to achieve goals. However, in a letter introducing the handbook, the  handbook is described as a tool and desk reference for retrograde and  reset activities. Further, there does not appear to be uniform agreement  about the handbook as such because officials at a different Army  organization did not refer to this document as an authoritative source.  Specifically, officials from the Army G-4 who helped prepare the  handbook described it as a lessons-learned document and stated further  that the Army has no plans to codify guidance in the handbook. They  further stated that the handbook was created in an attempt to organize  and clarify previously published information and guidance about Army  retrograde and reset activities contained in several different orders. The  fact that different Army officials are referring to different documents as  implementation plans for retrograde and reset suggests that there is  confusion on the strategies for the Army’s activities. As such, this could  lead to inconsistent efforts, especially for reset, within the Army.
Further, inconsistent descriptions for retrograde and reset activities for the  Army could complicate communicating about and budgeting resources for  retrograde and reset efforts. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of  Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, generally defines  retrograde as the process for the movement of non-unit equipment and  materiel from a forward location to a reset program or to another directed  area of operations. However, when Army budget officials provided the  cost breakdown structure for their budget formulation, the specific code  for retrograde includes both personnel and equipment. Also, the  Department of Army Financial Management Guidance for Contingency  Operations provides a limited discussion of retrograde. As a result, Army  officials may not be appropriately planning and funding retrograde  activities because of inconsistent descriptions of retrograde. Similarly,  officials at different Army organizations do not agree on what is and is not  included in reset. For example, Army Forces Command officials stated  that any upgrade to equipment is not a reset action, and therefore is not a  reset expense, while officials from Army G-4 stated that upgrades of  equipment are reset actions, and therefore are reset expenses. With  differing information and descriptions in documents, as well as differing  perspectives on what is considered and included in retrograde and reset  activities within the service, the Army may not be sure of what amount is  being expended for the retrograde and reset of equipment.
If the Army does not develop an implementation plan that, among other  things, articulates goals and strategies for retrograde and reset of  equipment, the Army’s retrograde and reset efforts may not align with  DOD-wide goals and strategies for retrograde and reset, reset-related  maintenance costs may not consistently be included, and resources and  funding for retrograde and reset may not be consistently or effectively  budgeted or distributed within the service.
section_title: The Navy Has No Separate Implementation Plan for the Retrograde and Reset of Its Equipment
paragraphs: According to Navy officials, the Navy has not developed guidance and  implementation plans for the retrograde and reset of naval equipment  because it already has maintenance guidance and retrograde policy for  its ground equipment and has established maintenance schedules for its  ships and planes. For example, maintenance guidance for ground  equipment identified by naval officials includes the Naval Facilities  Engineering Command: Management of Civil Engineering Support  Equipment (P-300). P-300 includes procedures for administration,  operation, and maintenance of automotive, construction, and railroad  equipment, which includes maintenance such as repair, modification, as  well as guidance for the budgeting of procurement of equipment.  Additionally, P-300 includes guidance on when to repair or replace  automotive, construction, railway, and transportation equipment. While  officials referred to this document as guidance for reset, it does not  contain the key elements of an implementation plan for reset, such as  strategies and goals for reset. Naval officials also identified a 2009 Navy  Expeditionary Combat Command retrograde message that outlines  guidance for determining whether equipment should be retained for  operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, or  whether it should be disposed of or retrograded for repair. The message  also describes ensuring that retrograde activities are conducted with  minimum impact and distraction to deployed unit operations and roles and  responsibilities for retrograde. However, this document falls short of an  implementation plan because it does not include information on actual  resources needed or timeline information.
According to Navy officials, there is no implementation plan for the  retrograde or reset of ships or planes because maintenance is scheduled  as a part of their deployment cycle. For example, Navy officials explained  that aircraft maintenance is dictated by an integrated maintenance  concept particular to each type of aircraft. As described by the Naval  Aviation Maintenance Program guidance, an integrated maintenance  concept emphasizes a fixed maintenance schedule determined by a Navy  analytical maintenance process that includes strategies such as  scheduled inspections to determine, among other things, if equipment is  in satisfactory condition, and includes scheduled removal of items that will  exceed their life limits. Likewise, Navy officials explained that ships are on  fixed maintenance schedules, though because of the demands of  overseas contingency operations some ship maintenance has been  deferred. While these maintenance schedules include information on  maintenance goals and strategies for repairs for planes and ships, they  do not describe reset specifically even though the Navy draws on reset  funding for some repairs. As such, they do not include information on  strategic elements of goals, strategies, and resources that would be  expected in a comprehensive implementation plan.
Without service-wide guidance with goals and strategies defining reset  and reset resources, there are inconsistent reset efforts across the Navy.  For example, though Navy officials told us that submarines are not reset  and therefore should not receive reset funding, the Navy Office of  Finance Management and Budget classified submarine propeller  maintenance as reset costs. The same Navy office also classified some  ship depot maintenance and other equipment and weapons maintenance  as reset costs. When asked to reconcile reset funding with the absence of  any comprehensive implementation plans for reset, Navy officials pointed  us to a set of business rules describing, for example, how and when a  ship might be eligible for reset funding, but then emphasized that these  rules are not codified in any reset guidance or implementation plan. If the  Navy does not develop an implementation plan that, among other things,  articulates goals and strategies for retrograde and reset of equipment, the  Navy’s retrograde and reset efforts may not align with DOD-wide goals  and strategies for retrograde and reset, reset-related maintenance costs  may not be consistently included, and resources and funding for  retrograde and reset may not be consistently or effectively budgeted or  distributed within the service.
section_title: The Air Force Has No Implementation Plan for the Retrograde and Reset of Its Equipment
paragraphs: Air Force officials stated their service does not deploy with large amounts  of equipment. According to Air Force officials, the equipment that they  deploy with does not need much maintenance after returning from  overseas contingency operations, and officials did not identify an  implementation plan for retrograde and reset. However, the Air Force has  requested funding for reset suggesting that it needs to develop an  implementation plan for even the limited amount of reset activities that it  conducts. Specifically, the November 2014 report that DOD submitted to  the congressional defense committees indicates that the Air Force, like  the other services, has used overseas contingency operations funds for  equipment reset. An implementation plan could help the Air Force to  identify where to place key resources and help to strategically fund reset  efforts. When we asked for more information on what is described as  reset, Air Force budget officials provided a brief that explained that Air  Force reset costs are contained within other budget accounts such as  aircraft, ammunition, missile and ground equipment procurement, among  others. Some repairs are also classified as reset. For example, the Air  Force requests reset funding for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected  vehicle depot-level reset. The officials explained that while they request  funds for reset from Congress, they do not track the execution of funds for  reset maintenance separately, but rather they track the execution of  equipment maintenance in general. DOD financial management guidance  includes various reset-related cost categories to be used by components  to estimate and report contingency operations costs.
If the Air Force does not develop an implementation plan that, among  other things, articulates goals and strategies for retrograde and reset of  equipment, reset-related maintenance costs may not consistently be  included and resources and funding for retrograde and reset may not be  consistently or effectively budgeted or distributed within the service.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Although DOD and the services have identified various guidance and  documents to guide their retrograde and reset activities, with the  exception of the Marine Corps, no strategic policy or implementation plan  has been developed that includes key elements of a strategic  management planning framework. As a result, DOD cannot ensure that it  is effectively managing its retrograde and reset activities at the  department-level nor does it have assurance that there is clear and  consistent guidance for three of the services. Furthermore, without  consistent and reliable information and terminology in DOD documents,  such as guidance, that informs planning and accounting for retrograde  and reset funding, Congress may be limited in its ability to provide  oversight for actual retrograde and reset costs. Without a comprehensive  implementation plan for retrograde and reset, the Army, Navy, and Air  Force cannot ensure that their efforts are consistent or comprehensive  within and across the services.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to establish a  strategic policy that incorporates key elements of leading practices for  sound strategic management planning, such as a mission statement and  long-term goals, to inform the military services’ plans for retrograde and  reset to support overseas contingency operations and to improve DOD’s  response to section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014.
To enhance the accuracy of budget reporting to Congress, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in coordination with  the DOD Comptroller, to develop and require the use of consistent  information and descriptions of key terms regarding retrograde and reset  in relevant policy and other guidance.
To improve Army, Navy, and Air Force planning, budgeting, and  execution for retrograde and reset efforts, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air  Force to develop service-specific implementation plans for retrograde and  reset that incorporate elements of leading practices for sound strategic  management planning, such as strategies that include how a goal will be  achieved, how an organization will carry out its mission, and the  resources required to meet goals.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, which are summarized below and reprinted in  appendix III, DOD partially concurred with all three recommendations.  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.
DOD agreed with the actions within all three recommendations. However,  for the first two recommendations, DOD did not agree with identifying the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics as  the lead for these recommendations. For the third recommendation, DOD  also did not agree with directing the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and  Air Force to implement this recommendation. DOD stated that because  these policies involve multiple organizations, the department will  determine the appropriate Principal Staff Assistant to oversee the  implementation of the strategic policy to inform service plans for  reconstitution (with personnel, training, and retrograde and reset of  equipment as subelements), to lead the development of applicable fiscal  terminology, and to lead the development and application of service- related implementation plans. We identified the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Secretaries of  the Army, Navy, and Air Force to implement our recommendations since  these organizations have responsibilities related to developing policies  and guidance for reset and retrograde at their respective levels within  DOD. However, since these policies involve multiple organizations, we  agree with DOD’s approach to determine which appropriate Principal  Staff Assistant will help coordinate each effort and we believe that these  actions, if fully implemented, would address our recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Air  Force, Army, and the Navy; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512- 5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which DOD developed a strategic policy  consistent with leading practices on sound strategic management  planning for the retrograde and reset of operating forces that support  overseas contingency operations, we reviewed the two reports DOD  developed and provided to the congressional defense committees in  response to the requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2014, guidance documents related to retrograde and  reset, and the three documents DOD identified in its November 2014  report as providing strategic policy and guidance for these efforts. We  analyzed these documents and a related fragmentary order to determine  if they included the key elements that we identified in prior work to  facilitate a strategic management planning framework for retrograde and  reset. GAO leading practices identified six key elements that should be  incorporated into strategic plans to facilitate a comprehensive, results- oriented framework. We selected these leading practices because they  include several elements that are similar to some of the requirements in  section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2014 for a policy and implementation plan, such as the establishment of  goals, objectives, and metrics. According to the leading practices, if they  are followed, an agency can develop a results-oriented framework to  improve its planning. We determined that GAO’s leading practices were  relevant to evaluate DOD’s strategic policy and planning efforts for  retrograde and reset.
Concerning consistent information for retrograde and reset, we reviewed  various department documents: Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of  Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and DOD Resource  Management Decision 700 requiring the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller), in coordination with various components, to publish a reset  definition for use in the contingency budgeting process. We assessed  guidance, such as budget guidance, and other documents that provide  information related to retrograde and reset using Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government specific to information and  communications, which state that for an entity to run and control its  operations it must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications.  We also reviewed DOD Instruction 5025.12 on the Standardization of  Military and Associated Terminology, which emphasizes the  standardization of military and associated terminology and use of Joint  Publication 1-02 by DOD components when preparing policy, strategy,  doctrine, and planning documents. In addition, we interviewed DOD  officials from the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness and the Comptroller about, for example, the reports  provided to the congressional defense committees.
To determine the extent to which the services developed implementation  plans consistent with leading practices on sound strategic management  planning for the retrograde and reset of operating forces that support  overseas contingency operations, we reviewed the two reports DOD  developed and provided to the congressional defense committees in  response to the requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act  for Fiscal Year 2014. In its November 2014 report, DOD pointed to the  specific planning activities undertaken by each service related to  retrograde and reset. Additionally, according to DOD officials, the military  services are responsible for developing implementation plans related to  retrograde and reset. Accordingly, we sought to determine the extent to  which each military service has developed a plan to implement the  service-specific efforts identified by DOD in the report. We reviewed  documents provided by the services to determine if they included the key  elements to facilitate a strategic management planning framework for  retrograde and reset such as strategies to achieve goals, external factors  that could affect goals, the use of metrics to gauge progress, and  evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives. GAO previously  identified six key elements that should be incorporated into strategic plans  to facilitate a comprehensive, results-oriented framework. We selected  these leading practices because they include several elements that are  similar to some of the requirements in section 324 of the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 for an implementation  plan, such as the establishment of goals and objectives. According to the  leading practices, agencies that follow them can develop a results- oriented framework to improve planning. We determined that these  leading practices were relevant to evaluate the services’ planning efforts  for retrograde and reset activities.
Officials we interviewed provided us with relevant documents that  described their services’ guidance, plans, and other information on  retrograde and reset activities. In addition, we requested any other  documents we saw referenced in the set that the services initially  provided, and reviewed these as well. Key retrograde and reset  documents we reviewed that were provided by the services as relevant  guidance for retrograde and reset include: Army Regulation 750-51: Army  Materiel Maintenance Policy; Army Headquarters G-4 Ground Equipment  Retrograde and Reset Handbook; Army Pamphlet 710-2-1 Using Unit  Supply System (Manual Procedures); Army Regulation 735-5, Property  Accountability Policies; and Headquarters, Department of Army and U.S.  Army Forces Command Execution Orders on RESET for fiscal years  2009, 2010, and 2012; Army Headquarters Execution Order 083-12  Materiel Retrograde Policies and Procedures in Support of Operation  Enduring Freedom; Marine Corps Operation Enduring Freedom Ground  Equipment Reset Strategy; and The Reset Playbook; Office of the Chief  of Naval Operations Instruction 3000.15A, Optimized Fleet Response  Plan; Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command Instruction 4790.3, Joint  Fleet Maintenance Manual Volume 2; Commander Naval Air Forces  Instruction 4790.2B, the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program; Naval  Facilities Engineering Command, Management of Civil Engineering  Support Equipment, and Air Force Instruction 10-401, Air Force  Operations Planning and Execution. Additionally, we reviewed funding  and cost data for retrograde and reset, and other documents for clarity  and context on retrograde and reset procedures for the services  including: Army Sustainment Command Materiel Support Branch,  Coordinating Instructions for the Unit Equipping and Reuse Conference; a  white paper regarding the State of U.S. Army Forces Command Logistics;  examples of maintenance and schedule availabilities for different ship  classes; Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3120.47, Surface Ship  Engineered Operating Cycle Program; written responses from the Air  Force concerning our questions about retrograde and reset policy and  other guidance; and Air Force reset briefing slides.
We interviewed service officials from several offices, asking them to  define and identify retrograde and reset guidance and implementation  plans, as well as relevant offices related to these efforts. Also, we asked  service officials in these meetings to identify any other offices they  believed could be knowledgeable about retrograde and reset and we  contacted these offices for interviews as well. Those offices include the  following: Department of Army Headquarters Assistant Secretary of the  Army for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the Deputy  Chief of Staff for the Army, Logistics (G-4); Office of the Deputy Chief of  Staff (G-8); Army Forces Command; Army Materiel Command; Army  Sustainment Command; Marine Corps Systems Command; Marine Corps  Logistics Command; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N431  Maritime Readiness Branch; Naval Expeditionary Combat Command,  N434 Expeditionary Readiness; Program Executive Office Aircraft  Carriers; Commander Naval Air Force; Navy Surface Maintenance  Engineering Planning Program; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air  Force for budget officials from Financial Management and Budget.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2015 to May 2016 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: GAO’s Leading Practices for Sound Strategic Management Planning
paragraphs: This appendix provides detail regarding the six elements GAO has  identified as leading practices for sound strategic management planning  to establish a comprehensive, results-oriented framework (see table 2).  These leading practices include several elements that are similar to some  of the requirements in section 324 of the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2014 for a policy and implementation plan, and may  be applicable to help improve DOD’s planning for retrograde and reset.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Guy LoFaro (Assistant Director),  Martin H. de Alteriis, Rebecca Guerrero, Richard Powelson, Claudia  Rodriguez, Michael Shaughnessy, Yong Song, and Amie Lesser made  key contributions to this report.