Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft
Published: 2010-06-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Billions of pounds of cargo are transported on U.S. passenger flights annually. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal agency responsible for securing the air cargo system. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As requested, GAO reviewed TSA's progress in meeting the act's screening mandate, and any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for the United States). GAO reviewed TSA's policies and procedures, interviewed TSA officials and air cargo industry stakeholders, and conducted site visits at five U.S. airports, selected based on size, among other factors.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: TSA has made progress in meeting the air cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, but faces challenges in doing so that highlight the need for a contingency plan. TSA has, for example, increased required domestic cargo screening levels from 50 percent in February 2009 to 75 percent in May 2010, increased the amount of cargo subject to screening by eliminating many domestic screening exemptions, created a voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points in the air cargo supply chain, conducted outreach to familiarize industry stakeholders with screening requirements, and tested air cargo screening technologies. However, TSA faces several challenges in developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, and it is questionable, based on reported screening rates, whether 100 percent of such cargo will be screened by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce. For example, shipper participation in the voluntary screening program has been lower than targeted by TSA. In addition, TSA has not completed a staffing study to determine the number of inspectors needed to oversee the screening program. Because it is unclear how many industry stakeholders will join the program, TSA could benefit from establishing milestones to complete a staffing study to help ensure that it has the resources it needs under different scenarios. Moreover, TSA faces technology challenges that could affect its ability to meet the screening mandate. Among these, there is no technology approved by TSA to screen large pallets or containers of cargo, which suggests the need for alternative approaches to screening such cargo. TSA also does not verify the self-reported data submitted by screening participants. Several of these challenges suggest the need for a contingency plan, in case the agency's current initiatives are not successful in meeting the mandate without impeding the flow of commerce. However, TSA has not developed such a plan. Addressing these issues could better position TSA to meet the mandate. TSA has made some progress in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo by taking steps to increase the percentage of screened inbound cargo--including working to understand the screening standards of other nations and coordinating with them to mutually strengthen their respective security efforts. Nevertheless, challenges remain and TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of inbound air cargo by the mandated August 2010 deadline. TSA officials estimate that air carriers are meeting the current mandated screening level of 50 percent of inbound cargo based on estimates rather than on actual data as required by law. Thus, TSA cannot verify if mandated screening levels are being met. In addition, the agency has not determined how it will eventually meet the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo; developing such a plan could better position TSA to assess its progress toward meeting the mandate.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In 2008, about 7.3 billion pounds of cargo was transported on U.S.  passenger flights—approximately 58 percent of which was transported  domestically (domestic cargo) and 42 percent of which was transported  on flights arriving in the United States from a foreign location (inbound  cargo). The 2009 Christmas Day plot to detonate an explosive device  during an international flight bound for Detroit demonstrates that  terrorists continue to view passenger aircraft as attractive targets.  According to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the  security threat posed by terrorists introducing explosive devices in air  cargo shipments is significant, and the risk and likelihood of such an  attack directed at passenger aircraft is high. Created by the November  2001 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is responsible for the  screening of all passengers and property, including cargo, U.S. mail, and  carry-on and checked baggage, transported on passenger aircraft. In  addition to TSA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays a role in  securing inbound cargo by selectively screening cargo upon its arrival in  the United States.
To help enhance the security of air cargo, the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission  Act) mandated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a  system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft— including the domestic and inbound flights of foreign and U.S. passenger  operations—by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo by August  2010. The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening for purposes of the air  cargo screening mandate as a physical examination or nonintrusive  methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation  security. The act also requires that such a system provide a level of  security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of  checked baggage. According to TSA, the mission of its air cargo security  program is to secure the air cargo transportation system while not unduly  impeding the flow of commerce. Although the mandate is applicable to  both domestic and inbound cargo, TSA stated that it must address the  mandate for domestic and inbound cargo through separate systems  because of differences in its authority to regulate domestic and  international air cargo industry stakeholders. This report will therefore  address efforts to meet the screening mandate as it applies to domestic  and inbound cargo separately.
You asked us to review TSA’s progress in meeting the air cargo screening  mandate. In response to this request, this report addresses the following  questions:  1.  What progress has TSA made in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act  screening mandate as it applies to domestic air cargo, and what related  challenges, if any, does TSA face?  2.  What progress has TSA made in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act  screening mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo, and what related  challenges, if any, does TSA face?
To assess TSA’s progress and challenges in implementing a system to meet  the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to domestic  cargo, we reviewed TSA’s air cargo security policies and procedures,  screening program documents, technology assessment procedures, TSA’s  Regulatory Activities Plan, the September 2009 air cargo interim final rule,  and various DHS and industry stakeholder reports and testimony related  to air cargo security, such as DHS Inspector General and industry reports.  In addition, we conducted site visits to four category X U.S. commercial  airports and one category I U.S. commercial airport that process domestic  and inbound air cargo. We selected these airports based on the following  criteria: airport size, passenger and air cargo volumes, location, and  participation in TSA’s screening program. At these airports, we observed  screening operations and technologies and interviewed local TSA officials,  airport management officials, and representatives from 7 air carriers, 24  freight forwarders, 3 shippers, and 2 handling agents to obtain their views  on TSA’s system to implement the screening mandate. We selected these  air carriers, freight forwarders, shippers, and handling agents based on  input from TSA and from industry stakeholders. We also interviewed TSA  air cargo program officials, officials from DHS’s Directorate for Science  and Technology (S&T Directorate), TSA Office of Inspections officials,  DHS Office of Inspector General officials, Department of Commerce  officials, three air cargo industry consultants and experts, and  representatives from six air cargo industry associations that represent a  variety of air cargo industry stakeholders. We selected these industry  associations because they represent a large portion of the air cargo  industry. We selected the industry consultants and experts based on their  experience in the field of aviation security, and their recognition in the  aviation security community. Our site visits and interviews with industry  stakeholders were based on a nonprobability sample and are not  generalizable to the entire air cargo industry. However, this sample  allowed us to observe cargo screening operations and programs in various  parts of the country with differing air cargo volumes and commodities,  and thus provided important perspectives on TSA’s air cargo screening  program. We also analyzed TSA data on cargo screening levels and  compliance violations from February 2009 through December 2009, and  TSA data on compliance inspections from February 2009 through February  2010. We selected these date ranges because the air cargo screening  requirement started in February 2009 and, at the time of our request, TSA  data for cargo screening levels, compliance violations, and compliance  inspections were only available through December 2009, December 2009,  and February 2010, respectively. To assess the reliability of the data, we  discussed quality control procedures with agency officials; reviewed TSA’s  data collection, entry, and analysis processes; and observed data entry and  processing activities for screening data. We found the data to be  sufficiently reliable to provide a general indication of cargo screening and  compliance levels. We assessed TSA’s efforts against criteria for  successful project planning and standard practices for program  management to determine if TSA’s efforts evaluate staffing implications  and include time frames and milestones. In addition, we assessed TSA  efforts against qualification testing procedures and time frames  established by TSA to determine its progress in completing qualification  testing of air cargo screening technologies. We also assessed TSA’s  screening verification procedures against the Office of Management and  Budget’s guidelines for ensuring information quality to determine if TSA  reviews and substantiates the integrity of information before it is  disseminated. In addition, we assessed TSA’s efforts against the agency’s  policies and procedures and criteria for successful project planning to  determine if the agency’s plan considers all phases of the project and  includes schedules and deadlines. Finally, we assessed TSA’s plan for  meeting the screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo against  criteria for comprehensive planning to determine whether it included  contingency planning.
To assess TSA’s progress and challenges in implementing a system to meet  the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to inbound air  cargo, we reviewed TSA’s air cargo policies and procedures and various  DHS and industry stakeholder reports and testimony related to inbound  air cargo security. We also interviewed local TSA officials, airport  management officials, and representatives from seven air carriers at the  five airports we visited to obtain their views on inbound cargo screening  issues. In addition, we interviewed TSA air cargo program officials,  including TSA international cargo inspectors, and representatives from six  air cargo industry associations, and discussed TSA’s plans with CBP  officials. We assessed TSA’s plans for inbound cargo screening  verification against standard practices for program management. We also  assessed TSA’s plan for inbound cargo screening against criteria for  successful project planning to determine if the agency’s plan considers all  phases of the project and includes schedules and deadlines.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 through June  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Approximately 16 percent of air cargo transported to, from, or within the  United States is shipped on passenger aircraft, while the remainder is  transported on all-cargo aircraft. Overall, approximately 20 million  pounds of cargo is transported on domestic and inbound passenger  aircraft daily. This cargo ranges in size from 1 pound to several tons and  in type from perishable commodities to machinery. Air cargo can include  such varied items as electronic equipment, automobile parts, clothing,  medical supplies, fresh produce, and human remains. As seen in figure 1,  cargo can be shipped in various forms, including unit load devices (ULD)  that allow many packages to be consolidated into one large container or  pallet that can be loaded onto an aircraft, wooden skids or crates, and  individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as loose or break bulk cargo.
Participants in the air cargo shipping process include shippers, such as  individuals and manufacturers of various product types; freight  forwarders, such as a company that accepts packages and ships them on  behalf of individuals or manufacturers; air cargo handling agents, who  process and load cargo onto aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and air  carriers that load and transport cargo. A shipper may take or send its  packages to a freight forwarder that in turn consolidates cargo from many  shippers onto a master air waybill—a manifest of the consolidated  shipment—and delivers the shipment to air carriers for transport. A  shipper may also send freight by directly packaging and delivering it to an  air carrier’s ticket counter or sorting center, where the air carrier or a  cargo handling agent will sort and load cargo onto the aircraft.
TSA’s responsibilities for securing air cargo include establishing security  requirements governing domestic and foreign passenger air carriers that  transport cargo, and domestic freight forwarders. TSA is also responsible  for overseeing the implementation of air cargo security requirements by  air carriers and freight forwarders through compliance inspections by  transportation security inspectors (TSI)—staff within TSA responsible for  aviation or cargo security inspections—and, in coordination with DHS’s  S&T Directorate, for guiding research and development of air cargo  security technologies. Of the over $5.2 billion provided to TSA for aviation  security in fiscal year 2010, approximately $123 million is for air cargo  security as called for in the Conference Report for the DHS Appropriations  Act, 2010. Of this amount, TSA was directed to use $15 million to test,  evaluate, and deploy screening technologies; to expand canine teams  operated by TSA by transferring 35 teams from those operated by local law  enforcement; to deploy technologies to screen skids and pallets; and to  increase the number of TSIs who oversee participants in the newly  developed Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)—a voluntary cargo  screening program for freight forwarders, shippers, and other air cargo  industry participants. For fiscal year 2011, TSA has requested  approximately $118 million for its air cargo security efforts.
U.S. and foreign air carriers, freight forwarders, and certified cargo  screening facilities (CCSF)—industry stakeholders that have joined the  CCSP—are responsible for implementing TSA security requirements,  including maintaining a TSA-approved security program that describes the  security policies, procedures, and systems the air carriers, freight  forwarders, and CCSFs must implement to ensure compliance. These  requirements include measures related to the acceptance, handling, and  screening of cargo; training of employees in security and cargo screening  procedures; testing for employee proficiency in cargo screening; and  access to cargo areas and aircraft. Air carriers, freight forwarders, and  CCSFs must also abide by security requirements imposed by TSA through  security directives and amendments to security programs.
In addition to TSA, CBP and foreign governments play a role in securing  inbound cargo. Unlike TSA, which requires screening prior to departure,  CBP determines the admissibility of cargo into the United States and is  authorized to inspect inbound air cargo for terrorists or weapons of mass  destruction upon its arrival in the United States. Foreign governments  may also impose their own security requirements on cargo departing from  their airports.
The 9/11 Commission Act specifies that air cargo screening methods  include X-ray systems, explosives detection systems (EDS), explosives  trace detection (ETD), explosives detection canine teams certified by TSA,  physical search together with manifest verification, and any additional  methods approved by the TSA Administrator. However, solely  performing a review of information about the contents of cargo or  verifying the identity of the cargo’s shipper does not constitute screening  for purposes of satisfying the mandate. Figure 2 shows some approved  screening methods.
section_title: TSA Has Made Progress toward Screening 100 Percent of Domestic Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft, but Remaining Challenges Highlight the Need for a Contingency Plan
paragraphs: TSA has made progress in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act air cargo  screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, and has taken several  key steps in this effort, such as increasing the amount of domestic cargo  subject to screening, creating a voluntary program—the CCSP—to allow  screening to take place at various points along the air cargo supply chain,  and taking steps to test air cargo screening technologies, among other  actions. However, TSA faces several challenges in fully developing and  implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo. For  example, shipper participation in the CCSP has been lower than targeted  by TSA. Furthermore, TSA lacks information to help ensure that it has the  inspection resources it may need to provide effective oversight of CCSP  entities. In addition, there is currently no technology approved or qualified  by TSA to screen ULD pallets or containers, and TSA is working to  complete qualification testing of several air cargo screening technologies  to provide reasonable assurance of their effectiveness. Questions also  exist about the reliability of the data used to calculate screening levels  reported by TSA. Moreover, in-transit cargo—such as cargo that is  transferred from an inbound to a domestic passenger flight—is not  currently required to undergo physical screening. Finally, TSA has not  developed a contingency plan to address CCSP participation and screening  technology challenges, which could be implemented should TSA’s current  efforts not be sufficient to achieve the 100 percent screening mandate  without impeding the flow of commerce.
subsections: section_title: Progress in Meeting the 100 Percent Screening Mandate as It Applies to Domestic Cargo
paragraphs: TSA has taken several steps to address the air cargo screening mandate.
TSA increased the amount of domestic cargo subject to screening.  Effective October 1, 2008, several months prior to the first mandated  deadline of 50 percent screening by February 2009, TSA established a  requirement for 100 percent screening of nonexempt cargo transported on  narrow-body passenger aircraft. In 2008, narrow-body flights transported  about 24 percent of all cargo on domestic passenger flights. Effective  February 1, 2009, pursuant to the 9/11 Commission Act, TSA also required  air carriers to ensure the screening of 50 percent of all nonexempt air  cargo transported on all passenger aircraft. Furthermore, effective May 1,  2010, air carriers were required to ensure that 75 percent of such cargo  was screened. Although screening may be conducted by various entities,  according to TSA regulations, each air carrier must ensure that the  screening requirements are fulfilled. Furthermore, TSA eliminated or  revised most of its screening exemptions for domestic cargo. For example,  TSA eliminated the screening exemptions for palletized shrink-wrapped  skids, effective February 2009, and for sealed pharmaceuticals and certain  electronics, effective September 2009. As a result of the elimination of  exemptions, most domestic cargo is now subject to TSA screening  requirements. However, TSA is retaining several of the screening  exemptions that apply to sensitive cargo.
TSA created a voluntary program to facilitate screening  throughout the air cargo supply chain. Since TSA concluded that  relying solely on air carriers to conduct screening would result in  significant cargo backlogs and flight delays, TSA created the voluntary  CCSP to allow screening to take place earlier in the shipping process, prior  to delivering the cargo to the air carrier (see fig. 3). Under this  decentralized approach, air carriers, freight forwarders, shippers, and  other entities each play an important role in the screening of cargo. Under  the CCSP, facilities at various points in the air cargo supply chain, such as  shippers, manufacturers, warehousing entities, distributors, third-party  logistics companies, and freight forwarders that are located in the United  States, may voluntarily apply to TSA to become CCSFs. Once in the  program, they are regulated by TSA. According to TSA officials, sharing  screening responsibilities across the air cargo supply chain is expected to  minimize the potential increases in cargo transit time, which could result if  the majority of screening were conducted by air carriers at the airport.  While the CCSP allows for a number of entities to conduct air cargo  screening, according to TSA regulations, air carriers are responsible for  ensuring that all domestic cargo transported on passenger aircraft is  screened. TSA officials stated that effective August 2010, unscreened  domestic cargo would not be transported on passenger aircraft.
TSA initiated the CCSP at 18 U.S. airports that process high volumes of air  cargo, and then expanded the program to all U.S. airports in early 2009.
CCSP participants were certified to begin screening cargo as of   February 1, 2009. The shipper participants were regulated pursuant to an  order, and the rules for freight forwarder participants were instituted  through an amendment to their security programs. On September 16,  2009, TSA issued an interim final rule (IFR) that effective November 16,  2009, regulates the shippers, freight forwarders, and other entities  participating in the CCSP. According to the IFR, to become a CCSF, a  facility’s screening measures must be evaluated by TSA or a TSA-approved  validation firm. Under its certification process, TSA requires each CCSF to  demonstrate compliance with its security standards that include facility,  personnel, procedural, perimeter, and information technology security.
Prior to certification, the CCSP applicant must submit for review and  approval its training programs related to physical screening, facility access  controls, and chain of custody, among other things. CCSF applicants must  also implement TSA-approved security programs and appoint security  coordinators before they can become certified. CCSFs must ensure that  certain employees have undergone TSA-conducted security threat  assessments; adhere to control measures for storing, handling, and  screening cargo; screen cargo using TSA-approved methods; and  implement chain of custody requirements. Once certified, CCSFs must  apply for recertification, including a new examination by TSA or a TSA- approved validator, every 36 months.
As part of the current program, and using TSA-approved screening  methods, freight forwarder CCSFs must screen 50 percent of cargo being  delivered to wide-body passenger aircraft and 100 percent of cargo being  delivered to narrow-body passenger aircraft. According to TSA, although  shipper CCSFs are not required to screen shipments to be delivered to a  passenger aircraft, when they choose to conduct screening, such  shipments must be screened at 100 percent. In addition, each CCSF must  deliver the screened cargo to air carriers while maintaining a secure chain  of custody to prevent tampering with the cargo after it is screened. In  fiscal year 2009, entities that were certified by TSA to participate in the  CCSP were subject to annual inspections by TSIs and additional  inspections at TSA’s discretion. According to the 2010 TSI Regulatory  Activities Plan, the agency plans to conduct at least two comprehensive  inspections a year (i.e., a review of the implementation of all air cargo  security requirements) for each CCSP participant. In addition, the agency  plans to conduct more frequent inspections based on each entity’s  compliance history, among other factors.
TSA is in the process of clarifying CCSF screening and training  requirements. During the course of our site visit conducted in July 2009,  we identified two instances where CCSFs misinterpreted CCSP screening  requirements. For example, a freight forwarder representative with whom  we spoke stated that the freight forwarder’s certified facilities have  flexibility in the levels of cargo they have to screen, such as screening a  percentage of cargo on some days while not screening any cargo on  others. This interpretation is contrary to the view of senior TSA officials  who are responsible for implementing the program, that freight forwarder  CCSFs must screen a percentage of cargo on a daily basis, as required in  their TSA-approved security programs. While the extent to which  misinterpretation of the CCSP requirements occurs among program  participants is unclear, the instances we identified indicated that freight  forwarder CCSFs may not be applying TSA screening requirements  consistently. When we brought this issue to the attention of a senior TSA  official, he stated that the agency would benefit from strengthening and  clarifying CCSP screening requirements. In March 2010, TSA officials  reported that the agency has taken steps to clarify the requirements,  though they did not specify what those steps were, and said the agency is  planning to communicate these clarifications to relevant stakeholders.
During our site visits conducted in June and July 2009, we also observed  two cases where training materials used by freight forwarder CCSFs to  educate their employees on the use of technology to screen cargo may not  have been consistent with TSA screening procedures. For example, one  freight forwarder representative we interviewed during our site visit stated  that his company compiled training materials on how to screen cargo with  ETD technology from public information found on the Internet. However,  TSA has no way of knowing whether the public information gathered from  the Internet or from other sources used to develop training materials is  reliable or consistent with TSA policies and procedures. After we brought  this issue to the attention of TSA officials, TSA reported that the agency  plans to clarify the CCSF training requirements regarding how to use  technology to screen air cargo. Specifically, TSA plans to update these  requirements in amendments to the freight forwarder CCSF policies and  procedures. TSA officials also stated that the agency is considering  providing CCSFs with a TSA-approved technology training package or a  list of approved training vendors that CCSP participants can use to  facilitate the training of their employees. The agency is in the early stages  of this effort and has not yet developed time frames for when this effort  will be completed.
TSA is conducting outreach efforts to air cargo industry  stakeholders. Starting in September 2007, TSA began outreach to freight  forwarders and subsequently expanded its outreach efforts to shippers  and other entities to encourage participation in the CCSP. While industry  participation in the CCSP is central to TSA’s approach to spread screening  responsibilities across the U.S. supply chain and, ultimately, meet the  screening mandate, attracting shippers and freight forwarders to join the  program is challenging because of the effect of the economic downturn on  their resources and cargo volume, and the perception by some in the  shipping and freight forwarder industry that screening costs and delays  associated with air carriers conducting cargo screening will be minimal.  TSA is focusing its outreach on particular industries, such as producers of  perishable foods, pharmaceutical and chemical companies, and funeral  homes, which may experience damage to their cargo if it is screened by a  freight forwarder or an air carrier. TSA officials stated that they reach out  to entities through a combination of conferences, outreach meetings,  Internet presentations, and information posted in numerous trade  association newsletters and on Web sites.
To enhance its outreach efforts, TSA established a team of 12 TSA field  staff, or CCSP outreach coordinators, to familiarize industry with the air  cargo screening mandate and the CCSP, as well as educate potential CCSP  applicants on the program requirements. In addition, outreach  coordinators are responsible for certifying cargo screening facilities.  They visit the facilities of the CCSP applicants to assess their ability to  meet program requirements and to address any deficiencies identified  during the assessment. To complete the certification process, the outreach  coordinator ensures that the facility has appropriate procedures and  training in place to screen cargo. According to TSA officials, in February  2009, the agency also began using its air cargo TSIs in the field to conduct  outreach. Officials from the one domestic passenger air carrier association  and the one freight forwarder association with whom we spoke reported  that TSA’s staff has been responsive and helpful in answering questions  about the program and providing information on CCSP requirements.
TSA is taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo. The  9/11 Commission Act specifies that the permitted methods of air cargo  screening are X-ray systems, EDS, ETD, explosives detection canine  teams, physical search together with manifest verification, and any  additional methods approved by the TSA Administrator. However, TSA is  responsible for determining which specific equipment models are  authorized for use by industry stakeholders. We reported in March 2009  that TSA and DHS’s S&T Directorate were pilot testing a number of  technologies to screen air cargo. For example, to test select screening  technologies among CCSFs, TSA created the Air Cargo Screening  Technology Pilot in January 2008, and selected some of the nation’s largest  freight forwarders to use these technologies and report on their  experiences. The screening that pilot participants perform counts toward  meeting TSA screening requirements and in turn the air cargo screening  mandate. In a separate effort, in July 2009, DHS’s S&T Directorate  completed the Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program that tested  the performance of select baggage screening technologies for use in  screening air cargo at three U.S. airports. TSA officials stated that the  agency will be reviewing the pilot results and conducting additional testing  on the technologies identified in the resulting S&T Directorate report.
Furthermore, TSA initiated a qualification process to test the technologies  that it plans to allow air carriers and CCSP participants to use in meeting  the August 2010 screening mandate against TSA technical requirements. In  November 2008, in addition to the canine and physical search screening  methods permitted by TSA to screen air cargo, as an interim measure, TSA  issued to air carriers and CCSFs a list of X-ray, ETD, and EDS models that  the agency approved for screening air cargo until August 3, 2010. TSA  approved these technologies based on its subject matter expertise and the  testing and performance of these technologies in the checkpoint and  checked baggage environments. In March 2009, TSA initiated a laboratory  and field-based qualification testing process to ensure effectiveness of  approved and other technologies in the air cargo environment and qualify  them for use after August 3, 2010. Once the initial stage of the  qualification testing process is accomplished, TSA’s policy is to add  successful candidates to a list of qualified products for industry  stakeholders to utilize when purchasing technologies. For example, TSA  added X-ray technologies to the list of qualified products in October 2009.  TSA recommends that industry stakeholders purchase technologies from a  list of qualified products because the technologies that do not pass the  qualification testing process within 36 months of becoming approved are  to be removed from a list of products authorized to screen air cargo. After  issuing the list of qualified products, TSA plans to conduct additional  stages of qualification testing and evaluation to determine the suitability of  the screening equipment in an operational setting. During the qualification  testing process, TSA expects to utilize the results of the Air Cargo  Screening Technology Pilot and conduct additional operational tests  independent of the pilot. A description of several programs to test  screening technologies for air cargo and their status is included in table 1.
TSA expanded its explosives detection canine program. TSA has  taken steps to expand the use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine  teams. According to TSA, in fiscal year 2009, TSA canine teams screened  over 145 million pounds of cargo, which represents a small portion of  domestic air cargo. As of February 2010, TSA had 113 dedicated air cargo  screening canine teams—operating in 20 major airports—and is in the  process of adding 7 additional canine teams. TSA worked with air  carriers to identify peak cargo delivery times, in order to schedule canine  screening during times that would be most helpful to air carriers. TSA also  deployed canine teams to assist the Pacific Northwest cherry industry  during its peak harvest season from May through July 2009, to help air  carriers and CCSFs handling this perishable commodity to meet the 50  percent screening requirement without disrupting the flow of commerce.
TSA established a system to verify that screening is being  conducted at the mandated levels. The agency established a system to  collect and analyze data from screening entities to verify that requisite  levels for domestic cargo are being met. Effective February 2009, TSA  adjusted air carrier reporting requirements and added CCSF reporting  requirements to include monthly screening reports on the number and  weight of shipments screened. Based on reporting guidance issued by the  agency, air carriers and CCSFs provided to TSA the first set of screening  data in mid-March 2009, to be used as the basis for TSA’s quarterly reports  to Congress. Under TSA’s current process, screening data are manually  reviewed and analyzed to determine if the screening is conducted at the  mandated levels. According to TSA officials, the agency plans to transition  from a manual process to automated data collection, review, and analysis  by mid-2010. Based on these preliminary data, TSA has determined that  over 50 percent of air cargo (by weight and number of shipments)  transported on domestic passenger aircraft has been screened since the 50  percent requirement went into effect. For fiscal year 2009, TSA submitted  its 2nd Quarter report, due in May 2009, on October 2, 2009, verifying these  screening levels. The 3rd Quarter report, due in August 2009, was  submitted on January 7, 2010. The 4th Quarter report, due in November  2009, is undergoing Office of Management and Budget review.
TSA is developing a covert testing program to identify security  vulnerabilities in the air cargo environment. TSA conducts undercover, or  covert, tests that are designed to approximate techniques that terrorists  may use in order to identify vulnerabilities in the people, processes, and  technologies that make up the aviation security system. TSA officials  reported that the agency plans to carry out a covert testing program for  the air cargo environment in two phases and will conduct tests at shipper,  freight forwarder, and air carrier facilities. Both phases are scheduled to  begin in 2010. TSA is in the early stages of developing the testing protocols  and thus has not yet established a timetable for their completion.  According to TSA officials, the agency plans to use the results of these  tests to identify and remedy vulnerabilities in the air cargo system.
In addition, TSA operates a risk-based Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessment  program to identify weaknesses and potential vulnerabilities in the  domestic air cargo supply chain. As of March 2010, TSA has conducted  assessments at 33 U.S. airports and completed assessments at all domestic  category X airports in December 2009. After completing these  assessments, TSA stated that it will utilize the results to refine policy for  air cargo security.
section_title: Challenges in Meeting the Screening Mandate as It Applies to Domestic Air Cargo
paragraphs: TSA faces industry participation, oversight, technology, and other  challenges, and could benefit from a contingency plan to identify  alternatives for meeting the air cargo screening mandate.
subsections: section_title: Lower-Than-Targeted Levels of Shipper Participation in the CCSP Could Affect TSA Progress in Meeting the Screening Mandate
paragraphs: Although TSA is relying on the voluntary participation of industry  stakeholders to meet the screening mandate, some stakeholders have not  participated in the program at targeted levels. As shown in figure 4, TSA  officials have estimated that an ideal mix of screening to achieve the 100  percent mandate as it applies to domestic cargo without impeding the flow  of commerce would be about one-third of cargo weight screened by air  carriers, one-third by freight forwarders, and one-third by shippers and  independent CCSFs. The air carrier portion includes a small amount of  screening by TSA canine teams and by TSIs at the smaller category II  through IV airports. TSA officials emphasized that this estimated ideal mix  is not precise but is intended to illustrate that balanced industry  participation is needed to achieve the goals of the program.
However, as of March 2010, the percentage of cargo reported as screened  by shipper and independent CCSFs remained at 2 percent—far lower than  the 33 percent TSA cites as the portion these entities should ideally screen.  To achieve TSA’s ideal mix of screening by August 2010, shipper and  independent CCSF screening efforts would need to increase by over  sixteenfold. Moreover, as shown in figure 4, the total percentage of  reported screened cargo rose on average by less than a percentage point  per month (from 59 to 68 percent) from February 2009 through March  2010. At these rates, it is questionable whether TSA’s screening system  will achieve 100 percent screening of domestic cargo by August 2010  without impeding the flow of commerce. Effective May 1, 2010, TSA  requires that 75 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft be  screened. However, even if this requirement is met, an additional 25  percent of domestic passenger air cargo would still need to be screened in  the 3 months prior to the August 2010 deadline, including some of the  most challenging types of cargo to screen, such as ULD pallets and  containers.
In March 2010, TSA officials stated that they surveyed current CCSFs and  CCSP applicants to estimate these air cargo industry stakeholders’  capacity for screening domestic cargo—this could help predict the  industry’s success in meeting the 100 percent screening deadline.  According to TSA officials, the survey indicated that current and  prospective CCSFs have the potential capacity needed to screen cargo so  that short-term delays at only the nation’s 18 major airports will result  when the 100 percent deadline goes into effect. However, TSA did not  have supporting documentation of the survey’s methodology or results.  Thus, we were unable to independently verify TSA’s assertions or the rigor  of TSA’s methodology and analysis. For example, it is unclear whether  TSA’s survey and estimation took into account cargo that is inherently  difficult to screen, such as ULD pallets or containers, or whether it  focused primarily on loose cargo that is being screened with relative ease.  It is also important to note that having the potential capacity to screen air  cargo does not ensure that this capacity will be fully utilized to meet the  air cargo screening mandate.
In addition, TSA officials stated that they did not develop milestones to  monitor CCSP progress because air cargo screening by industry  stakeholders is driven by market forces that are beyond the control of the  government and are impossible to forecast. Further, according to TSA  officials, if the CCSP participants cannot contribute the amount of  screening needed to achieve 100 percent screening by the August 2010  deadline, the air carriers will be responsible for screening any remaining  unscreened cargo at the airport or ensuring that it does not fly on a  passenger aircraft. However, according to officials from the two major air  carrier industry associations and the one freight forwarder association  with whom we spoke, if the volume of cargo is too great for air carriers to  handle, it could significantly disrupt the air cargo industry because of  delays from cargo screening at the airport and the shift of unscreened  cargo to alternate modes of transportation, such as all-cargo aircraft or  trucks. Officials from one major air carrier industry association further  noted that this would particularly be a problem if the volume of large  cargo configurations—such as ULD pallets or containers—that air carriers  have to disassemble and screen is too great for air carriers to handle. As  discussed earlier, according to TSA officials, these disruptions will be  short term and limited to 18 major airports. However, these 18 airports  process 65 percent of domestic cargo transported on passenger aircraft,  which suggests that disruptions may be substantial. TSA’s rationale for  creating the CCSP, and spreading screening responsibilities throughout  the supply chain, is to mitigate the risks of these sorts of disruptions.  However, these CCSP participation challenges demonstrate that TSA  could benefit from developing a contingency plan, as we will discuss later,  should it become clear that participation rates are not sufficient to achieve  the screening mandate without impeding the flow of commerce.
section_title: Regulatory and Economic Factors May Affect Industry Participation in the CCSP
paragraphs: According to TSA officials, some shippers have expressed interest in the  CCSP, particularly those in certain industries, such as the pharmaceutical  industry, whose cargo would be compromised if opened and screened by  others. However, TSA and industry officials reported that several factors,  such as lack of economic and regulatory incentives, are contributing to  low shipper participation levels. For example, TSA and the freight  forwarder industry association official with whom we spoke reported that  flexibility in applying current TSA screening requirements—such as the  ability to screen only easier-to-screen cargo and leave more challenging  cargo unscreened—and low cargo volumes have minimized screening- related cargo delays and cargo screening costs. For example, until the 100  percent screening mandate goes into effect in August 2010, air carriers  may be able to meet TSA screening requirements by screening mostly  loose or break-bulk cargo and not the more challenging and time- consuming cargo, such as ULD pallets and containers or large wooden  crates.
Officials from the domestic passenger air carrier association and freight  forwarder industry association with whom we spoke reported that  because of the difficult economic environment and flexibility stakeholders  have in choosing what cargo to screen, most air carriers are not currently  charging freight forwarders or shippers for cargo screening in order to  attract and retain customers. As a result, TSA and the domestic passenger  air carrier and freight forwarder industry association officials we  interviewed stated that many shippers and freight forwarders are not  incurring significant screening costs from air carriers, which decreases the  financial pressure on the entities to join the CCSP and invest resources  into screening cargo, factors that are making TSA’s outreach efforts more  challenging.
Moreover, the freight forwarder industry association official with whom  we spoke stated that some industry participants may not be able to join  the program because of potential program costs. TSA has estimated in the  IFR that the total cost for industry participation in the CCSP will be about  $2.2 billion over a 10-year period, though the agency has not provided per  capita cost estimates for industry. The freight forwarder industry  association official with whom we spoke reported that business models of  large freight forwarders require them to purchase time-saving screening  equipment so that screeners can avoid physically opening and examining  each piece of cargo. However, TSA and this industry official agreed that  the majority of small freight forwarders—which handle 20 percent of the  cargo but make up 80 percent of the total number of freight forwarding  companies—would likely find the costs of joining the CCSP, including  acquiring expensive technology, hiring additional personnel, conducting  additional training, and making facility improvements, prohibitive.  Moreover, shippers that distribute products from other companies in  addition to or instead of their own manufactured goods might also find it  cost prohibitive to join the CCSP if they were required to purchase  screening equipment. However, TSA officials stated that most shippers can  incorporate physical searches into their packing and shipping processes to  satisfy TSA screening requirements, thereby avoiding such capital  expenses.
TSA established the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot program to  make some financial reimbursement available to large freight forwarders  and independent CCSFs for the technology they have purchased. TSA  reported that it targeted high-volume facilities (i.e., facilities processing at  least 200 ULDs or their equivalent weight of approximately 500,000 pounds  annually, shipments annually that contain cargo consolidated from  multiple shippers) for the pilot in order to have the greatest effect in  helping industry achieve the new screening requirements. As of February  2010, 113 CCSFs have joined the pilot. However, the majority of CCSFs do  not ship large enough volumes of consolidated cargo to qualify for the  pilot, and thus cannot receive funding for technology or other related  costs. The freight forwarder industry association official with whom we  spoke expressed concerns regarding the cost of purchasing and  maintaining screening equipment. In response to concerns of medium and  small freight forwarders that they might not be able to join the program  because of potential costs, TSA officials stated that the agency is allowing  independent CCSFs to join the CCSP and screen cargo on behalf of freight  forwarders and shippers. In this scenario, small freight forwarders or  shippers would not need to join the CCSP or purchase technology to avoid  screening at the airport, but could send their cargo for a fee to an  independent CCSF for screening. However, TSA and the freight forwarder  industry association official with whom we spoke stated that the  independent CCSFs are having difficulties attracting clientele in the  current depressed economic environment. According to these officials,  shippers and other supply chain participants might use independent  CCSFs to screen their cargo once the 100 percent screening requirement  goes into effect, if cargo volumes increase before that time or if cargo  experiences screening delays. Many of the challenges in attracting industry  participation in the CCSP are outside of TSA’s control, and agency officials  stated that they are working to raise industry awareness of the benefits of  joining the program through TSA’s ongoing outreach efforts.
section_title: Determining the Level of Inspection Resources Needed to Effectively Oversee CCSP Entities Could Help TSA Efforts to Ensure the Program’s Success
paragraphs: While TSA has amended its Regulatory Activities Plan to include  inspections of CCSP participants, the agency has not completed its staffing  study to assess its staffing needs and determine how many inspectors will  be necessary to provide oversight of the additional program participants  when the 100 percent screening mandate goes into effect. TSA’s  compliance inspections range from reviews of the implementation of all  air cargo security requirements (i.e., comprehensive) to a more frequent  review of at least one security requirement (i.e., supplemental). TSA  recognized that the creation of the CCSP added additional regulated  entities to TSI oversight responsibilities, and incorporated additional  inspection requirements into the TSI Regulatory Activities Plan. Beginning  under the plan for fiscal year 2009, TSIs are to perform compliance  inspections of new regulated entities, such as shippers and manufacturers,  that voluntarily become CCSFs, as well as new inspections of freight  forwarder CCSFs that are in addition to inspections related to their freight  forwarder responsibilities. In addition to their pre-CCSP inspection  responsibilities, under the plan for fiscal year 2010, TSIs are to conduct at  least two comprehensive inspections a year for each CCSF to verify  compliance with the program requirements.
As of March 2010, TSA had 1,258 TSIs, of which 533 were dedicated cargo  TSIs or cargo TSI canine handlers. The agency was authorized 50 new  cargo TSI positions in fiscal year 2010 to provide additional oversight of  CCSP operations. TSA officials reported that they have developed an  interim program-level methodology to allocate these TSIs to airports based  on CCSP participation and cargo volume, among other factors, and that  they believe they have a sufficient number of inspectors to ensure  compliance with the CCSP. However, the agency staffing study, which  would determine the resources necessary to provide CCSP oversight, is  not yet complete. According to TSA, the agency’s staffing study is  continuing through fiscal year 2010 and is therefore not yet available to  provide guidance in helping to plan for inspection resources needed to  provide oversight.
Complicating TSA efforts to determine the level of inspection resources  needed is the extent to which market forces will affect CCSP participation  and therefore how many additional CCSFs will join the program and thus  be subject to TSA’s inspection requirements. As of March 1, 2010, 583  entities had joined the CCSP. Given this level of participation, TSA’s TSI  workforce must conduct at least 1,166 comprehensive inspections of  CCSFs per year. According to our analysis of TSA data, in the next year,  inspectors will need to at least double their comprehensive inspections of  CCSFs to reach this target. Moreover, according to our analysis of TSA  data, approximately one-quarter to one-third of CCSFs have not received a  comprehensive inspection.
According to TSA officials, CCSFs that have never been inspected are  deemed high risk and must be inspected by the following quarter.  However, since TSA officials anticipate that CCSP participation will  continue to grow, and that there could be a groundswell in CCSP  participants as the 100 percent screening deadline approaches, TSIs may  be challenged in dealing with the increased inspection workload once the  screening mandate goes into effect in August 2010. For example, the IFR  stated that about 5,600 entities are expected to join the CCSP. Based on  these figures, TSA would be required to conduct 11,200 comprehensive  inspections annually. TSA officials questioned the accuracy of this  estimate, and stated that for workforce planning purposes, a more realistic  near-term estimate for the number of CCSFs TSA is expected to oversee is  the number of current CCSFs and CCSP applicants. However, TSA did not  provide us this total figure. Moreover, as discussed earlier, TSA does not  know how many CCSFs will join the program in the future, and does not  plan to estimate the number of CCSP participants needed to meet the 100  percent screening mandate. Without this key information, it will be  difficult for TSA to obtain a reasonable estimate of the number of  inspectors that will be needed to oversee the CCSP participants— highlighting the need for a staffing study that considers various scenarios.
In addition, according to TSA data, of the CCSF compliance inspections  conducted from February 1, 2009, to December 29, 2009, some resulted in  at least one violation of CCSF security requirements—and a percentage of  these violations were screening related. Having the resources needed to  provide effective oversight will be critical to ensuring that CCSFs are  comprehensively inspected soon after being certified, in order to identify  violations and provide TSA with some assurance that CCSFs are  conducting their new screening activities in accordance with TSA  requirements.
As we reported in prior work, successful project planning should evaluate  staffing implications. Since fiscal year 2008, TSA officials have reported  on a planned TSI staffing study, and air cargo program officials stated that  this study would include an analysis of the resources necessary to provide  CCSP oversight and would incorporate information on the number of  CCSFs to be inspected in order to assess workforce needs. Officials stated  in March 2010 that the study would continue through fiscal year 2010.  However, the agency has not established an estimated completion date or  interim milestones (i.e., dates and related tasks) for completion of the  study, and officials did not provide an explanation for why this has not yet  occurred. Standard practices for program management call for the  establishment of time frames and milestones. Creating time frames with  milestones could help ensure completion of the staffing study, the results  of which should better position TSA to ensure that the inspectors it needs  are in place in order to oversee effective CCSF implementation of TSA  security requirements.
section_title: TSA and Industry Stakeholders Face Challenges in Screening Certain Types of Cargo, and TSA Is Working to Test the Effectiveness of Screening Technologies
paragraphs: TSA faces challenges related to screening certain types of cargo,  qualification testing of technology, and securing the chain of custody.
Screening Cargo in ULD Pallets and Containers  There is currently no technology approved or qualified by TSA to screen  cargo once it is loaded onto a ULD pallet or container—both of which are  common means of transporting air cargo on wide-body passenger aircraft.  Cargo transported on wide-body passenger aircraft makes up 76 percent of  domestic air cargo shipments transported on passenger aircraft. Prior to  May 1, 2010, canine screening was the only screening method, other than  physical search, approved by TSA to screen such cargo. Canine teams  were deployed to 20 airports to assist air carriers with such screening. In  addition, the 2009 S&T Directorate technology pilot study reported canine  teams to be an effective method of screening ULD pallets and containers,  but it identified an urgent need to find other effective methods for  screening such cargo because of the shortage of available canine teams.  TSA officials, however, still have some concerns about the effectiveness of  the canine teams, and effective May 1, 2010, the agency no longer allows  canine teams to be used for primary screening of ULD pallets and  containers. Instead, TSA allows canines to conduct primary screening of  only loose cargo and 48-by-48-inch cargo skids. Canine teams still may be  used for secondary screening of ULD pallets and containers; however,  secondary screening does not count toward meeting the air cargo  screening mandate.
TSA officials reported that they have conducted preliminary assessments  of technologies that are capable of screening ULD pallets and containers  but that commercially available technologies do not exist that effectively  detect explosives in the amounts described in TSA standards. TSA officials  stated that TSA continues to work with technology vendors on developing  technologies that will be able to effectively screen ULD pallets and  containers. In the interim, TSA officials indicated that the agency is  encouraging industry stakeholders through the CCSP to screen such cargo  earlier in the supply chain, before cargo is consolidated. However,  according to representatives of the two major air carrier industry  associations and the one freight forwarder association with whom we  spoke, technology available to screen consolidated or palletized cargo,  including cargo in a ULD, is critical in meeting the 100 percent screening  mandate given that such cargo represents a primary means for  transporting cargo transported on passenger aircraft. Moreover, while  industry participation in the CCSP may help ensure that screening takes  place earlier in the supply chain, which will help alleviate the challenges  posed by ULD pallets and containers, to date, far fewer shippers have  joined the CCSP than TSA anticipated, and these ULD pallets and  containers currently make up about 76 percent of domestic air cargo  transported on passenger aircraft, with no efficient method to screen  them. These technology challenges suggest the need for TSA to consider  alternative approaches to meet the screening mandate without unduly  affecting the flow of commerce, as we will discuss later.
TSA Is Working to Qualify Some Air Cargo Screening Technologies  In addition, TSA is working to complete qualification testing of air cargo  screening technologies; thus, until all stages of qualification testing are  concluded, the agency may not have reasonable assurance that the  technologies that air carriers and program participants are currently  allowed to use to screen air cargo are effective. Qualification tests are  designed to verify that a technology system meets the technical  requirements specified by TSA. TSA qualified several X-ray technologies  for purchase by industry stakeholders based on initial test results and  qualified EDS technologies based on their past performance in other  testing processes. TSA has not yet qualified ETD and other X-ray  technologies that TSA allows program participants to use to screen air  cargo. Once these technologies have been added to the list of qualified  products, the agency is to conduct additional stages of qualification  testing. TSA officials expressed confidence in the initial qualification test  results because the commercial off-the-shelf technologies being used for  cargo screening have a proven record in the passenger checkpoint and  checked baggage environments. However, TSA acknowledged that if the  results of additional stages of qualification testing do not meet its  technical requirements, these technologies can be removed from the list of  qualified products.
Furthermore, because of the mandated deadlines, TSA is conducting  qualification testing to determine which screening technologies are  effective at the same time that air carriers are using these technologies to  meet the mandated requirement to screen air cargo transported on  passenger aircraft. For example, according to TSA, ETD technology will  undergo the initial phase of qualification testing in the air cargo  environment in 2010, although many air carriers and CCSFs are currently  using it to screen air cargo. Moreover, technology reports and TSA  officials disagree as to the effectiveness of ETD technology. For example,  a pilot program completed by DHS’s S&T Directorate in July 2009 found  that the ability of ETD technology to detect explosive threats in cargo by  sampling the external surfaces of cargo shipments for explosive residue— the standard ETD protocol required by TSA—is poor. According to TSA  officials, external sampling of cargo shipments is a method of screening  preferred by freight forwarders and air carriers in order to avoid opening  all cargo pieces, which can result in possible damage to the contents and  significantly greater screening time. The pilot program recommended  further research to evaluate the applicability and efficacy of external  sampling using ETD systems, as well as other screening systems, to detect  threats, such as explosives, in air cargo. However, TSA officials disputed  the findings of this S&T Directorate study. They also stated that other S&T  Directorate reports support the acceptance of ETD technology; however,  we were unable to review these reports since this information was  provided late in our review. The lack of consensus within DHS regarding  the effectiveness of ETD technology in the air cargo environment suggests  the need for additional study.
Although TSA officials stated that simultaneous testing and use of  technology by the industry is not ideal, they noted that this was necessary  to meet the screening deadlines mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act.  While we recognize that certain circumstances, such as mandated  deadlines, require expedited deployment of technologies, our prior work  has shown that programs with immature technologies have experienced  significant cost and schedule growth. For example, we reported in  October 2009 that TSA deployed a passenger checkpoint technology—the  explosives trace portal (ETP)—to airports without proving its  performance in an operational environment, contrary to TSA’s acquisition  guidance, which recommends such testing. The agency purchased  hundreds of these machines but was forced to halt their deployment  because of performance, maintenance, and installation issues. All but 9  ETPs have been withdrawn from airports and 18 remain in inventory. TSA  determined that the remainder of the ETPs was excess capacity.
Since TSA plans to issue a list of qualified technologies before all stages of  qualification testing are complete, the industry lacks assurance that the  qualification status of technologies established by TSA for use after August  2010 will not change. Further testing could result in modifications to the  list of qualified technologies authorized for use after August 3, 2010, and to  the list of technologies approved by TSA for use through January 2012.
TSA has reserved the option of revising the status of any particular  technology or system in the event that its performance in an operational  environment indicates that it is losing effectiveness or suitability to an  unacceptable degree as it ages or that constantly evolving threats require  new detection capabilities. The domestic passenger air carrier and freight  forwarder industry association officials with whom we spoke expressed  concerns about purchasing technology from the lists of approved and  qualified technologies that are subject to change. TSA officials stated that  the agency is accelerating its testing timeline and the release of the  qualification testing results for these technologies to meet the screening  deadlines mandated by Congress. For example, TSA originally planned to  release the X-ray qualification results after completing all stages of  qualification testing. Because of approaching deadlines, however, in  December 2009 and based on initial test results, TSA announced the  qualification of certain X-ray technologies. It is unclear, however, whether  the challenges TSA faces in issuing a list of fully qualified screening  technologies will allow the industry to make informed decisions about  technology purchases to meet the screening requirements of the 9/11  Commission Act.
Securing the Chain of Custody in the Air Cargo Shipping Process  With regard to technology, another area of concern in the transportation  of air cargo is the chain of custody between the various entities that  handle and screen cargo before it is loaded onto an aircraft. TSA officials  stated that the agency has taken steps to analyze the chain of custody  under the CCSP, and has issued cargo procedures to all entities involved in  the CCSP to ensure that the chain of custody of cargo is secure. We found  that the procedures issued by TSA to the CCSFs include guidance on when  and how to secure cargo with tamper-evident technology, but do not  include standards for the types of technologies that should be used. TSA  officials noted that they are in the process of compiling a list of existing  tamper-evident technologies and their manufacturers. Once the list is  complete, TSA plans to test and evaluate these technologies and issue  recommendations to the industry. TSA has not yet set any time frames for  issuing such recommendations because, according to TSA officials, they  need to explore cost-effective technologies first.
Securing the chain of custody for cargo screened under the CCSP takes on  additional significance in light of the DHS Inspector General’s 2009 report  findings that TSA could improve its efforts to secure air cargo during  ground handling and transportation. For example, the report determined  that industry personnel were accessing, handling, or transporting cargo  without the required background checks. In addition, the report stated  that TSA’s inspection process has not been effective in ensuring that  requirements for securing air cargo during ground transportation are  understood or followed. In response to the DHS Inspector General report,  TSA concurred with the recommendation to improve the security threat  assessment process and stated that the IFR requires recordkeeping for  security threat assessments. TSA also concurred with the DHS Inspector  General recommendation to revise the Regulatory Activities Plan to allow  more time for inspectors to provide support and education to regulated  entities to ensure that air cargo security requirements are understood and  implemented. TSA reported that the fiscal year 2010 Regulatory Activities  Plan addresses this concern.
section_title: TSA Is Working to Verify That Domestic Screening Is Being Conducted at the Requisite Levels, but Questions Exist about the Reliability of the Reported Data
paragraphs: While TSA reported to Congress that industry achieved the February 2009  50 percent screening deadline as it applies to domestic cargo, questions  exist about the reliability of the screening data, which are self-reported by  industry representatives. TSA has been collecting and analyzing data from  screening entities, such as air carriers, freight forwarders, and shippers,  since March 2009 to verify that domestic screening is being conducted at  the requisite levels. As of March 2010 TSA reported that 68 percent of  domestic cargo by weight had been screened. After receiving data from  screening entities, TSA performs preliminary data quality checks, such as  viewing the data to identify missing or duplicate values. However, TSA  does not have a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data reported by  the industry. TSA stated that as part of its compliance inspections for air  carriers and CCSFs, TSIs check industry screening logs—which include  information on how and by whom a specific shipment was screened—to  verify that the required screening levels have been met. However, TSIs do  not compare these screening logs to the reports that air carriers and  CCSFs submit to TSA with their screening levels because according to  senior TSA officials, such comparisons would be significantly burdensome  to the industry. Specifically, senior TSA officials stated that the air carrier  reports do not contain details on specific shipments, thus verification is  not feasible. However, senior TSA officials agreed that it is important to  verify the accuracy of the data reported by the industry through random  checks or other practical means, and that greater coordination among TSA  program and compliance officials is necessary to ensure that these checks  are taking place. The Office of Management and Budget’s guidelines for  ensuring quality of information call for agencies to develop procedures for  reviewing and substantiating the integrity of information before it is  disseminated. Given that TSA uses the data submitted by screening  entities to verify its compliance with the mandate as it applies to domestic  cargo and to report to Congress, ensuring the accuracy of the self-reported  data is of particular significance. In order to do this, TSA could, for  example, adopt a program similar to CBP’s compliance measurement  program, which is used to determine the extent to which importers are in  compliance with laws and regulations. As part of this program, CBP  conducts regular quality reviews to ensure accuracy in findings and  management oversight to validate results. Verifying the accuracy of the  self-reported screening data could better position TSA in providing  reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels.
section_title: TSA Requirements Do Not Ensure That In-Transit Cargo Transferred from an Inbound to a Domestic Flight Is Physically Screened
paragraphs: Cargo that has already been transported on one leg of a passenger flight— known as in-transit cargo—may be subsequently transferred to another  passenger flight without undergoing screening. For example, cargo  transported on an inbound flight, a significant percentage of which is  exempt from screening, can be transferred to a domestic flight without  physical screening. According to TSA officials, though the agency does  not have a precise figure, industry estimates suggest that about 30 percent  of domestic cargo is transferred from an inbound flight. According to TSA  officials, the agency had determined that additional screening of this cargo  was not required, in part because an actual flight mimics a screening  method that until recently was approved for use.
A senior TSA official also stated that because in-transit cargo transferred  from an inbound flight has flown under a TSA-approved passenger aircraft  security program, it is in compliance with TSA screening requirements.  However, a significant amount of inbound cargo is exempt from  screening. In contrast, TSA’s policies and procedures require all cargo  flown on domestic flights to be screened at 75 percent, effective May 1,  2010. As a result, despite being flown under a TSA-approved security  program, in-transit cargo originating in foreign countries is not required to  be screened at the same levels as cargo transported on domestic flights.  Therefore, TSA lacks assurance that this cargo is being screened in  accordance with 9/11 Commission Act required screening levels.
In response to our questions as part of this review, TSA officials stated  that transporting in-transit cargo without screening could pose a  vulnerability, but as of February 2010, the agency was not planning to  require in-transit cargo transferred from an inbound flight to be physically  screened because of the logistical difficulties associated with screening  cargo that is transferred from one flight to another. However, these  logistical difficulties could be minimized if more cargo were screened  prior to departure from a foreign location. Thus, addressing the potential  security vulnerability posed by in-transit cargo is directly linked to TSA’s  efforts to secure and screen inbound cargo, which is discussed later in this  report. Although TSA officials stated that they plan to explore measures  for screening in-transit cargo in the future, these officials did not provide  documentation of these measures or information on milestones for their  implementation. A successful project plan—such as a plan that would be  used to establish such measures—should consider all phases of the  project, and clearly state schedules and deadlines. Developing a plan  with milestones that addresses how in-transit cargo will be screened in  accordance with 9/11 Commission Act requirements could better position  TSA to meet the mandate and reduce potential vulnerabilities associated  with such cargo.
section_title: Contingency Planning Could Help TSA Identify Alternatives for Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate
paragraphs: Although TSA faces industry participation and technology challenges that  could impede the CCSP’s success and the agency’s efforts to meet the 100  percent screening mandate, the agency has not developed a contingency  plan that considers alternatives to address these challenges. As discussed  earlier, as of December 2009, the percentage of cargo screened by shipper  and independent CCSFs remains far lower than the percentage TSA cites  as the portion these entities should ideally screen. Without adequate CCSP  participation, industry may not be able to screen enough cargo prior to its  arrival at the airport to maintain the flow of commerce while meeting the  mandate. Likewise, without technology solutions for screening cargo in a  ULD pallet or container—which makes up about 76 percent of cargo  transported on domestic passenger aircraft—industry may not have the  capability to effectively screen 100 percent of air cargo without affecting  the flow of commerce. TSA is continuing to work with vendors on  developing technology to effectively screen ULD pallets and containers,  and in the interim, is encouraging industry stakeholders as part of the  CCSP to screen such cargo earlier in the supply chain, before it is loaded  onto ULDs, but such actions will not ensure that such cargo is screened.  We have previously reported that a comprehensive planning process,  including contingency planning, is essential to help an agency meet  current and future capacity challenges. Alternatives could include, but  are not limited to, mandating CCSP participation for certain members of  the air cargo supply chain—instead of relying on their voluntary  participation—and requiring the screening of some or all cargo before it is  loaded onto ULD pallets and containers. Developing a contingency plan  that addresses the participation and technology challenges that could  impede the screening program’s success, and identifies alternate or  additional security measures to implement in case the program is unable  to effectively facilitate the screening of sufficient amounts of cargo prior  to reaching air carriers at the airport, could better position TSA to meet  the requirements in the air cargo screening mandate.
With regard to the consideration of alternatives to the CCSP, TSA reported  that it considered requiring air carriers to bear the full burden of the  screening mandate and also considered creating TSA-operated screening  facilities at airports, but determined that both strategies would result in  severe disruptions to commerce because of limited airport space for  screening. Representatives of the two major air carrier associations with  whom we spoke stated that additional TSA screening by canine teams  would be helpful, and industry stakeholders have also identified the option  of using private companies to provide canine screening in order to expand  the number of canines available for screening. According to TSA, the  agency is considering whether to pursue this option because of concerns  regarding certification of canines that have not been trained by TSA and  are not handled by TSA staff. In addition, TSA officials stated that the  agency does not plan to provide canine teams as a long-term primary  screening method once the CCSP grows and industry develops more  capacity to screen cargo, as industry, not the federal government, is  responsible for screening air cargo under TSA’s regulations.
TSA officials also stated that alternative or additional screening measures  will not be necessary because unscreened cargo will simply not be  transported on passenger aircraft, that is, “will not fly.” Although this  approach would ensure that 100 percent of air cargo transported on  passenger aircraft is screened, part of TSA’s mission is ensuring the flow  of commerce. Not transporting unscreened cargo could place the air cargo  transportation industry at risk of experiencing economic disruptions,  including shifts of cargo to other modes of transportation, which could  negatively affect the air cargo business. In order to help ensure that it  fulfills its mission and meets the 9/11 Commission Act mandate, TSA could  benefit from identifying alternative measures in a contingency plan, should  it become clear that the CCSP will not achieve the screening mandate  while maintaining the flow of commerce.
section_title: TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Several Challenges and Lacks a Plan for Achieving 100 Percent Screening of Inbound Cargo
paragraphs: TSA has made progress toward meeting the screening mandate as it  applies to inbound cargo by taking steps to increase the percentage of  inbound air cargo that has undergone screening. However, the agency  faces several challenges in ensuring that 100 percent of inbound air cargo  is screened, which will prevent it from meeting the mandate by the August  2010 deadline. While TSA is aware that it is unable to meet the screening  mandate as it applies to inbound cargo, it has not yet determined when or  how it will eventually meet the deadline.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Taken Several Steps to Increase the Percentage of Inbound Cargo Being Screened
paragraphs: TSA has taken several steps to increase the percentage of inbound air  cargo being screened. For example, TSA revised its requirements for  foreign and U.S. air carrier security programs, effective May 1, 2010, to  generally require air carriers to screen a certain percentage of shrink- wrapped and banded inbound cargo and 100 percent of inbound cargo that  is not shrink-wrapped or banded. According to our analysis of TSA  information, shrink-wrapped and banded cargo makes up approximately  96 percent of inbound cargo, which means that a significant percentage of  inbound air cargo is not required to be screened. According to TSA,  implementation of this requirement will result in the screening of 100  percent of inbound cargo transported on narrow-body aircraft since none  of this cargo is shrink-wrapped or banded.
Since TSA does not have the same regulatory reach to the supply chain in  foreign countries as it does in the United States, it is taking a different  approach to implementing the screening mandate as it applies to inbound  cargo. This approach focuses on harmonizing its security standards with  those of other nations. For example, TSA is working with foreign  governments to increase the amount of screened cargo, including working  bilaterally with the European Commission (EC) and Canada, and  quadrilaterally with the EC, Canada, and Australia. As part of these efforts,  TSA recommended to the United Nations’ International Civil Aviation  Organization (ICAO) that the next revision of Annex 17 to the Convention  of International Civil Aviation include an approach that would allow  screening to take place at various points in the air cargo supply chain.
According to TSA, ICAO’s Aviation Security Panel met in March 2010 to  finalize revisions to Annex 17, including TSA’s proposed revision to add  “screening” as a supply chain security concept. TSA has also supported the  International Air Transport Association’s (IATA) efforts to establish a  secure supply chain approach to screening cargo for its member airlines  and IATA’s efforts to have these standards recognized internationally.
In addition, TSA is working with CBP to leverage an existing CBP system,  known as the Automated Targeting System (ATS), to identify and target  elevated-risk inbound air cargo. ATS is a model that combines information  from inbound cargo manifest lists and entry declaration information into  shipment transactions and uses historical and other data to help target  cargo shipments for inspection. While CBP currently uses ATS to identify  cargo for screening once it arrives in the United States, according to  officials, TSA has established a TSA-CBP working group to focus on using  ATS to target inbound air cargo for possible screening prior to departure  from foreign locations. TSA and CBP officials stated that the working  group met regularly since June 2009, though agency officials did not  specify how frequently they met. As of February 2010, TSA and CBP  officials stated that they were conducting an exercise at Dulles  International Airport for TSA to observe CBP’s use of ATS, understand the  full capabilities of ATS, and determine whether ATS can assist TSA’s  inbound air cargo screening efforts. TSA officials said that they were not  in a position to provide time frames for completing the exercise since the  effort is in the early stages. Should TSA determine that ATS is effective for  targeting the screening of inbound air cargo, TSA plans for air carriers to  conduct the screening of shipments identified as elevated risk prior to the  cargo’s transport to the United States. The air carriers will also be  responsible for providing TSA with the results. In discussing how a system  to target certain, elevated-risk shipments for screening will fit into TSA’s  overall plans to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo, officials stated  that ATS would provide an additional layer of scrutiny for all cargo  entering the United States.
To help assess the rigor and quality of foreign screening practices, TSA is  also in the process of obtaining information from foreign countries on  their respective air cargo screening levels and practices. According to  officials, the agency has developed an assessment methodology in a  question and answer format to collect information on each foreign  country’s air cargo security practices, and it has used the new  methodology to collect initial information from one country. TSA has  indicated that it will use the methodology to identify key security practices  and that the information collected will also help determine if these  practices are comparable to TSA requirements, which will provide TSA  with details that can help determine how foreign standards align with TSA  standards. TSA officials indicated that the methodology used to collect the  information is part of a larger process that will involve collecting initial  information, analyzing what was received, and submitting additional  questions to the foreign countries. TSA anticipates storing the information  gathered in a database, which it has not yet created. TSA officials were  unable to provide time frames for use of the assessment methodology or  completing the database because the effort is in the early stages.
section_title: TSA Faces Several Challenges in Meeting the Screening Mandate as It Applies to Inbound Cargo
paragraphs: While TSA has taken steps to increase the percentage of inbound cargo  that has undergone screening, the agency faces several challenges in  meeting the mandate. Consequently, TSA has stated that it will not be able  to meet the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. For  example, in a March 4, 2010, hearing before the Subcommittee on  Homeland Security, House Committee on Appropriations, in responding to  questions, the Acting TSA Administrator stated that it could take several  years before 100 percent of inbound cargo is screened. According to TSA,  screening inbound air cargo poses unique challenges, related, in part, to  TSA’s limited ability to regulate foreign entities. As such, TSA officials  stated that the agency is focusing its air cargo screening efforts on  domestic cargo and on screening elevated-risk inbound cargo as it works  to address the challenges it faces in screening 100 percent of inbound  cargo.
Inbound air cargo is currently being screened at lower levels than  domestic air cargo. For example, while TSA removed almost all its  screening exemptions for domestic cargo, TSA requirements continue to  exempt from screening a significant amount of shrink-wrapped air cargo  transported to the United States, which represents about 96 percent of all  inbound cargo. Effective May 1, 2010, TSA requires that a certain  percentage of this cargo be screened. In April 2007, we reported that TSA’s  screening exemptions for inbound cargo could pose a risk to the air cargo  supply chain and recommended that TSA assess whether these  exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability and, if necessary, address  these vulnerabilities. TSA agreed with our recommendation, but beyond  expanding its requirement to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo  transported on narrow-body aircraft and a certain percentage of inbound  cargo that is shrink-wrapped or placed on banded skids, has not yet  reviewed, revised, or eliminated screening exemptions for cargo  transported on inbound passenger flights, and did not provide a time  frame for doing so. We continue to believe that TSA should assess  whether these exemptions pose an unacceptable security risk. TSA  officials stated that once the modified ATS is in place, screening  exemptions will be less relevant because air carriers will be more able to  target the screening of elevated-risk cargo as an interim measure before  100 percent screening is achieved. However, the 9/11 Commission Act  requires that all air cargo be physically screened and does not make  exceptions for cargo that is not elevated risk.
TSA faces challenges in meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as it  applies to inbound air cargo. For example, although TSA is authorized  under U.S. law to ensure that all air carriers, foreign and domestic,  operating to, from, or within the United States maintain the security  measures included in their TSA-approved security programs and any  applicable security directives or emergency amendments issued by TSA,  this authority is limited. Also, TSA has no legal jurisdiction over foreign  nations. Specifically, TSA has been authorized by Congress to set  standards for aviation security, including the authority to require that  inbound cargo be screened before it departs for the United States.  However, the agency also relies on foreign governments to implement and  enforce—including conducting actual screening, in some cases—TSA’s  regulatory requirements.
Harmonizing TSA regulatory standards with those of foreign governments  may be challenging because these efforts are voluntary and some foreign  countries do not share the United States’ concerns regarding air cargo  security threats and risks. TSA officials caution that if TSA were to impose  a strict cargo screening standard on all inbound cargo, many nations likely  would be unable to meet such standards in the near term. This raises the  prospect of reducing the flow of cargo on passenger aircraft. According to  TSA, the effect of imposing such screening standards in the near future  could result in increased costs for international passenger travel and for  imported goods and possible reduction in passenger traffic and foreign  imports. According to TSA officials, this could also undermine TSA’s  ongoing cooperative efforts to develop commensurate security systems  with international partners. TSA’s ongoing efforts to harmonize security  standards with those of foreign nations are essential to achieving progress  toward meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as it applies to  inbound air cargo.
Identifying the precise level of screening being conducted on inbound air  cargo is difficult because TSA lacks a mechanism to obtain actual data on  all screening that is being conducted on inbound air cargo. TSA officials  estimate that 55 percent of inbound cargo by weight is currently being  screened and that 65 percent of inbound cargo by weight will be screened  by August 2010. However, these estimates are based on the current  screening requirements of certain countries and are not based on actual  data collected from air carriers or other entities, such as foreign  governments, on what percentage of cargo is actually being screened.  For example, if a country requires that 100 percent of its cargo be  screened, as the United Kingdom does, TSA counts all the cargo coming  from that country as screened. While TSA officials stated that they discuss  screening percentages with foreign government officials, the agency not conduct any additional data verification to assess whether screening conducted at, above, or below the required levels. In addition, because  TSA’s efforts to complete assessments of other countries’ screening  requirements are ongoing, the agency does not always know whether the  screening requirements are consistent with TSA standards. The DHS  Appropriations Act, 2009, requires TSA to report on the actual screening   To improve data collection  being conducted, by airport and air carrier. efforts, as of May 2010, TSA requires air carriers to report on their actual  screening levels for inbound air cargo, and TSA officials stated that an  automated cargo reporting tool would be operational in May 2010 for this  purpose. The May 2010 security program changes only require air carriers  to report on the screening that they conduct and not on the screening  conducted by other entities in the air cargo supply chain to meet the air  cargo screening mandate. TSA officials stated that it may be challenging to  obtain screening data from some foreign governments and other entities  that conduct cargo screening. As such, TSA officials also stated that the  agency may still use estimates, such as the current screening requirements  of certain countries, when reporting data to Congress. Officials could not   is  provide information on milestones or time frames for obtaining actual  screening data for all inbound screening, including that conducted by air  carriers and other entities in the air cargo supply chain, because the  agency is still working to overcome inbound regulatory challenges.  However, establishing time frames for implementing a plan is consistent  with standard practices for program management. Finalizing a plan to  obtain actual screening data could help TSA obtain greater assurance that  mandated screening levels are being met.
section_title: TSA Has Not Yet Determined How It Will Meet the Screening Mandate as It Applies to Inbound Cargo
paragraphs: TSA has not yet determined how it will meet the screening mandate as it  applies to inbound air cargo. Although TSA has taken steps to increase the  percentage of inbound cargo transported on passenger aircraft that is  screened, the agency has not developed a plan, including milestones, for  meeting the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. While TSA officials  have stated that the agency does not expect to meet the mandate as it  applies to inbound cargo by the August 2010 deadline, TSA has not  provided estimates of when the mandate will be met or when steps toward  its achievement will be completed. Moreover, the steps that the agency is  taking to enhance inbound air cargo security do not fully support the 100  percent cargo screening mandate. For example, TSA is focusing on  developing its ability to utilize CBP’s ATS to target elevated-risk cargo for  screening. While we recognize this as a reasonable step to strengthen  inbound air cargo security, TSA does not have a plan that articulates how  this and other steps it is taking will fit together to achieve 100 percent  screening.
The 9/11 Commission Act requires the establishment of a system to screen  100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, including inbound  cargo. As we have reported in our prior work, a successful project plan— such as a plan that would be used to establish such a system—should  consider all phases of the project and clearly state schedules and  deadlines. TSA reported that it is unable to identify a timeline for meeting  the mandate for inbound cargo, stating that its efforts are long term, given  the extensive work it must conduct with foreign governments and  associations. However, interim milestones could help the agency provide  reasonable assurance to Congress that it is taking steps to meet the  mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. A plan that considers all phases of  the project and clearly states schedules and deadlines could help position  TSA to better measure progress it is making toward meeting the 9/11  Commission Act mandate as it relates to inbound air cargo and provide  reasonable assurance that its efforts are implemented in a relatively timely  manner.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Meeting the August 2010 mandate to establish a system to physically  screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft is a  daunting task. In August 2010, unscreened cargo will not be allowed to fly  on passenger aircraft, but leaving behind such cargo could affect the flow  of commerce. Although the CCSP should help TSA meet the mandate as it  applies to domestic cargo, addressing certain challenges could strengthen  agency efforts and help ensure the CCSP’s success. For example, TSA  might benefit from developing a contingency plan should it become clear  that participation levels are not sufficient to achieve the screening  mandate without disruptions to the flow of commerce. Establishing  milestones for completion of a staffing study to determine the number of  inspectors needed to oversee CCSP participants could provide results that  should better position TSA to obtain these inspection resources and help  ensure that air carriers and CCSFs comply with TSA requirements.  Moreover, the technology challenges TSA faces in screening cargo once it  is loaded onto ULD pallets and containers highlight the need for a  contingency plan in the event that industry stakeholders do not have the  capacity to screen such air cargo. In addition, verifying industry-reported  screening data could better position TSA in providing reasonable  assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels.  Furthermore, developing a plan and milestones for screening in-transit  cargo, which is not currently required to undergo physical screening,  could help ensure that such cargo is screened in accordance with 9/11  Commission Act requirements and mitigate a risk to the air cargo  transportation system. Developing a contingency plan that considers  additional or alternative security measures will better position TSA to  meet the mandate without disrupting the flow of commerce should it  become clear that the challenges related to CCSP participation and  screening technology will hinder the agency’s efforts.
With regard to inbound air cargo, while TSA has taken some positive steps  to increase the percentage of cargo that is screened, the agency could  better address the challenges to screening this cargo. For example,  finalizing its plans to obtain actual screening data for all inbound cargo  screening, including time frames and milestones, could provide greater  assurance that mandated screening levels are being met. In addition,  determining how it will meet the screening mandate as it applies to  inbound air cargo, including related milestones, could better position TSA  in providing reasonable assurance that the agency is making progress  toward meeting the screening mandate in a timely manner.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance efforts to secure the air cargo transportation system and  establish a system to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on  passenger aircraft, we are recommending that the Administrator of TSA  take the following five actions:    Establish milestones for the completion of TSA’s staffing study to  assist in determining the resources necessary to provide CCSP  oversight.
Develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all screening data, both  self-reported domestic data and inbound cargo data, through random  checks or other practical means. For inbound air cargo, complete the  agency’s plan to obtain actual data, rather than estimates, for all  inbound screening, including establishing time frames and milestones  for completion of the plan.
Develop a plan, with milestones, for how and when the agency intends  to require the screening of in-transit cargo.
Develop a contingency plan for meeting the mandate as it applies to  domestic cargo that considers alternatives to address potential CCSP  participation shortfalls and screening technology limitations.
Develop a plan, with milestones, for how and when the agency intends  to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of our report to DHS and TSA on May 19, 2010, for  review and comment. On June 23, 2010, DHS provided written comments  from the department and TSA, which are reprinted in appendix I. In  commenting on our report, TSA stated that it concurred with three  recommendations, concurred in part with one recommendation, and did  not concur with another recommendation. For the recommendations for  which TSA concurred or concurred in part, the agency identified actions  taken or planned to implement them. Although TSA concurred with part of  our second recommendation, the actions TSA reported that the agency has  taken do not fully address the intent of this recommendation.
Regarding our first recommendation that TSA establish milestones for the  completion of its staffing study to assist in determining the resources  necessary to provide CCSP oversight, TSA concurred. TSA stated that as  part of the staffing study, the agency is working to develop a model to  identify the number of required TSIs and that this effort would be  completed in the fall of 2010. If this model includes an analysis of the  resources needed to provide CCSP oversight under various scenarios, it  will address the intent of our recommendation.
TSA concurred in part with our second recommendation that the agency  develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of domestic and inbound  screening data, including obtaining actual data on all inbound screening.  TSA concurred with the need to capture data for inbound cargo and stated  that as of May 1, 2010, the agency issued changes to air carriers’ standard  security programs that require air carriers to report inbound cargo  screening data to TSA. However, as noted in this report, these  requirements apply to air carriers and the screening that they conduct and  not to the screening conducted by other entities, such as foreign  governments. Thus, TSA will continue to rely in part on estimates to report  inbound cargo screening levels. We recognize that it may be challenging  for TSA to obtain cargo screening data from foreign governments;  however, the agency could require air carriers to report on cargo  screening for all inbound cargo they transport, including the screening  conducted by foreign governments or other entities. This would be similar  to air carriers’ domestic cargo screening reporting requirements which  require air carriers to report on cargo that they screen as well as cargo  screened by CCSFs. We continue to believe that it is important for TSA to  obtain data for all screening conducted on inbound cargo so that it can  provide assurance to Congress that this cargo is being screened in  accordance with the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate. TSA stated  that verifying the accuracy of domestic screening data will continue to be  a challenge because there is no means to cross-reference local screening  logs—which include screening information on specific shipments—with  screening reports submitted by air carriers to TSA that do not contain  such information. We acknowledge TSA’s potential challenges in cross- referencing screening logs with screening reports and have modified the  report to reflect this challenge. However, as noted in this report, TSA  could consider a quality review mechanism similar to the compliance  measurement program used by CBP, which includes regular quality  reviews to ensure accuracy in findings and management oversight to  validate results. TSA could also develop another mechanism for verifying  the accuracy of the screening data through random checks—other than  those of the screening logs—or other practical means. Doing so would  address the intent of our recommendation. Given that the agency uses  these data to report to Congress its compliance with the screening  mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, we continue to believe that  verifying the accuracy of the screening data is important so that TSA will  be better positioned to provide reasonable assurance that screening is  being conducted at reported levels.
TSA concurred with our third recommendation that TSA develop a plan  for how and when the agency intends to require the screening of in-transit  cargo. TSA stated that the agency has implemented changes, effective  August 1, 2010, that will require 100 percent of in-transit cargo to be  screened unless it can otherwise be verified as screened. TSA’s action is  an important step toward addressing the potential security vulnerability  associated with in-transit cargo and if implemented effectively, will  address the intent of our recommendation. Because this is a significant  change and potentially operationally challenging, it will be important to  closely monitor the industry’s understanding and implementation of this  requirement to help ensure that 100 percent screening of in-transit cargo is  being conducted.
TSA did not concur with our fourth recommendation to develop a  contingency plan for meeting the mandate as it applies to domestic cargo  that considers alternatives to address potential CCSP participation  shortfalls and screening technology limitations. TSA stated that a  contingency plan is unnecessary since effective August 1, 2010, 100  percent of domestic cargo transported on passenger aircraft will be  required to be screened. The agency also stated that there is no feasible  contingency plan that can be implemented by TSA that does not  compromise security or create disparities in the availability of screening  resources. However, the agency noted that several alternatives are  available to and are currently being exercised by industry. The agency also  stated that TSA developed the CCSP in collaboration with industry  stakeholders to alleviate the burden on airlines to screen 100 percent of  cargo while still meeting the mandate. We disagree that a contingency plan  is unnecessary and unfeasible. As noted in this report, although TSA’s  approach would ensure that 100 percent of domestic cargo transported on  passenger aircraft is screened, not transporting unscreened cargo could  negatively affect the flow of commerce. In addition, while we recognize  the CCSP as a positive and critical step toward achieving the screening  mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, we continue to believe that there  are feasible alternatives that TSA should consider to address potential  CCSP participation shortfalls and screening technology limitations. Such  alternatives discussed in this report include mandating CCSP participation  for certain members of the air cargo supply chain and requiring the  screening of some or all cargo before it is loaded onto ULD pallets and  containers. Effective May 1, 2010, TSA embraced one of the alternatives  cited in this report by requiring freight forwarder CCSFs to screen all  cargo before it is loaded onto ULD pallets and containers. Expanding this  requirement to additional industry stakeholders could be a feasible  alternative to address both CCSP participation shortfalls and screening  technology limitations. Moreover, although many industry stakeholders  may support the CCSP, key partners in the program—shippers—have not  joined the program at the levels targeted by TSA, thus jeopardizing its  success. Therefore, we continue to believe that it is prudent that TSA  consider developing a contingency plan for meeting the air cargo  screening mandate without disrupting the flow of commerce.
Finally, in regard to our fifth recommendation that TSA develop a plan for  how and when the agency intends to meet the mandate as it applies to  inbound cargo, TSA concurred and stated that TSA is drafting milestones  as part of a plan that will generally require air carriers to conduct 100  percent screening by a specific date. If implemented effectively, this plan  will address the intent of our recommendation.
In addition, DHS noted in its written comments that CCSFs have reported  to TSA that they have the capacity to screen nearly the entire remaining  unscreened cargo volume and that air carriers have reported to TSA that  they do not anticipate any major disruptions to the transport of air cargo  on August 2010. We were not able to verify these assertions because TSA  did not provide supporting documentation. It is also important to note that  having the potential capacity to screen air cargo does not ensure that this  screening will take place when the 100 percent screening mandate goes  into effect in August 2010.
TSA also provided us with technical comments, which we considered and  incorporated in the report where appropriate.
As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 2 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, interested congressional committees, and other interested  parties. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site  at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report or wish to  discuss these matters further, please contact me at (202) 512-4379 or  lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations  and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major  contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Steve D. Morris, Assistant  Director, and Rebecca Kuhlmann Taylor, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this  review. Scott M. Behen, Erin C. Henderson, Elke Kolodinski, Linda S.  Miller, Matthew Pahl, and Yanina Golburt Samuels made significant  contributions to the work. David K. Hooper and Thomas Lombardi  provided legal support. Stanley J. Kostyla assisted with design and  methodology. Pille Anvelt and Tina Cheng helped develop the report’s  graphics. John W. Cooney, Elizabeth C. Dunn, Richard B. Hung, Brendan  Kretzschmar, and Amelia B. Shachoy also provided support.