Defense Infrastructure: Army and Marine Corps Grow the Force Construction Projects Generally Support the Initiative
Published: 2008-03-06T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In January 2007 the President announced an initiative, referred to as Grow the Force, to increase the end strength in the Army by more than 74,000 by 2013 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 personnel by 2011 to enhance U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and provide necessary forces for success in the Global War on Terrorism. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that it will need more than $17 billion for facilities to accommodate the planned personnel increases. GAO was asked to review (1) the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop construction projects associated with Grow the Force, (2) the extent to which the projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 support the initiative, and (3) whether the Army and Marine Corps plan to use temporary facilities while construction projects are completed. GAO reviewed the construction projects associated with Grow the Force in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, reviewed stationing documents, and interviewed officials at Army and Marine Corps headquarters and six installations on the process used to develop projects. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with GAO's assessment that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects do not support Grow the Force but did not provide sufficient documentation that existing capacity issues would be exacerbated by additional personnel.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps followed their typical process to develop construction projects when they developed the Grow the Force projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008; however, the process was compressed due to the short period of time between the announcement of the initiative and submission of budget requests. For example, the active duty Army took about 2 months and the Marine Corps took 6 months to develop projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008; the typical process takes about 2 years. Nearly all of the military construction projects submitted as Grow the Force projects in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supported the Grow the Force initiative. GAO found that 68 of the 69 projects submitted by the Army and Army National Guard, totaling more than $2.3 billion, and 37 of the 49 projects submitted by the Marine Corps, totaling more than $665 million, supported Grow the Force. However, GAO found that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects did not support Grow the Force because they addressed existing deficiencies and were needed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred or they supported another initiative. For example, the Marine Corps included a $7 million wastewater system modification project at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in its fiscal year 2008 budget request to address environmental issues. Officials said the project was already planned for a future budget request and would be needed regardless of whether Grow the Force had occurred. Additionally, GAO determined that 3 Marine Corps projects, totaling $58 million, were to construct facilities for wounded Marines that supported another initiative, not Grow the Force. While most of the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 projects were linked to Grow the Force, it may be more difficult to identify some Marine Corps and Army Reserve projects as supporting the initiative in future budget requests because the Marine Corps may not link installationwide projects to Grow the Force and the Army Reserve plans to identify projects for a related force structure effort as Grow the Force projects. GAO's analysis shows that some units will arrive at installations before facilities are constructed; however, the Army does not plan to purchase or lease temporary facilities, while the Marine Corps plans to do so to bridge the gap between when units are established and permanent facilities are constructed. The Army plans to use existing facilities, including facilities vacated by deployed units, to bridge the gap between the time when personnel arrive and the completion date of construction projects. The majority of new units will be established at Marine Corps installations before permanent facilities are complete and will require temporary facilities. The Marine Corps requested $147 million in fiscal year 2008 for temporary facilities, including armories and trailers, to bridge the gap between the time units arrive and the completion date of construction projects. A Marine Corps official expects that additional funding for temporary facilities will be required but the extent of the funding requirements have not yet been determined.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In January 2007 the President announced a permanent increase in the  Army and Marine Corps end strength through the Grow the Force initiative  to enhance overall U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and  provide necessary forces for success in the Global War on Terrorism. This  planned expansion will increase the Army’s end strength by more than  74,000 soldiers by 2013 and the Marine Corps’ end strength by 27,000  Marines by 2011. Currently, the Army and Marine Corps estimate that the  construction of operational and support facilities and housing associated  with this expansion will total more than $17 billion through 2013. The  Army and Marine Corps have already requested more than $3 billion for  construction projects related to the expansion in the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 budget requests.  Grow the Force is just one of several initiatives—including Base  Realignment and Closure, Army modularity, and overseas rebasing—that  will require a significant investment in military construction.
In the report accompanying its 2008 Military Construction, Veterans  Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill, the House  Appropriations Committee raised concerns about the Army’s and Marine  Corps’ ability to adequately plan for and execute the military construction  and family housing projects that support the proposed end strength  increase over the next 5 years. The committee report directed us to review  the planning and budgeting process for military construction projects  associated with Grow the Force submitted in DOD’s budget requests for  fiscal years 2007 and 2008. In response to that direction we examined   (1) the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop the  construction projects to accommodate the increased end strength due to  the Grow the Force initiative, (2) the extent to which the construction  projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008  support the initiative, and (3) whether the Army and Marine Corps plan to  use temporary facilities while construction projects are completed.
To examine the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop  construction projects to accommodate the increased end strength, we  reviewed information about the process typically used to develop  construction projects and the process the Army and Marine Corps used to  develop Grow the Force construction projects. We discussed this process  with knowledgeable officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics; key offices within the  Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Marine Corps  headquarters; and selected Army and Marine Corps installations. To  determine the extent to which the construction projects submitted in  DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 support the Grow the  Force initiative, we analyzed key documents, including budget justification  documents for all construction projects submitted for the fiscal year 2007  supplemental budget request, the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terrorism  supplemental budget request, and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget  request. We included in our scope only those projects that the Army and  Marine Corps submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and  2008. We determined that a project supported the Grow the Force  initiative if budget justification documentation for the project stated that it  supported the initiative, cited a particular unit that was being established  or increasing in size as part of the Grow the Force initiative, and referred  to a capacity issue due to the additional personnel. If the budget  justification documentation did not provide sufficient information to  determine whether the project supported the Grow the Force initiative, we  discussed the project with officials at the service headquarters or the  installation to obtain the needed information. We discussed our  methodology and assessment of whether projects supported the Grow the  Force initiative with Army and Marine Corps officials, who generally  agreed with our approach. While we evaluated the extent to which the  projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008  supported the Grow the Force initiative, we did not validate the need for  projects. To determine whether the Army and Marine Corps planned to  use temporary facilities, we reviewed Army and Marine Corps stationing  plans and project documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials  within the Army and Marine Corps headquarters and selected Army and  Marine Corps installations. We conducted this performance audit from  June 2007 through March 2008 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and  perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis  for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further  details on our scope and methodology are in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Grow the Force initiative will increase the end strength of the Army  and Marine Corps collectively by more than 100,000 by 2013, as shown in  table 1.
The Army and Marine Corps are using personnel from their increased end  strength to establish new units, as well as adding personnel to existing  units. The Army’s increased end strength will be used to create six new  Brigade Combat Teams (21,000 soldiers), establish new combat support  and combat service support units (16,000 soldiers), address shortfalls in  existing units (13,000 soldiers), and establish additional training and  headquarter capabilities (15,000 soldiers). The Army Reserve is adding two  new brigades to its force structure and the Army National Guard will add  new units and add personnel to existing units to increase its military  police, engineering, and medical units to increase combat support and  combat service support capabilities. The Marine Corps is using personnel  from its increased end strength to establish new units and add personnel  to existing units to address shortfalls in critical occupations, including  military police, infantry battalions, intelligence battalions, and explosive  ordnance disposal teams.
DOD projects that facility requirements associated with Grow the Force  will cost more than $17 billion, as shown in table 2.
The Army requested about $2.8 billion for military construction in its  budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, including over $400 million  in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request. The remaining   $7.5 billion is for projects to support new combat support and combat  service support units; new brigade combat teams; and quality of life  projects, such as child development centers, at installations that are  gaining additional personnel. The Marine Corps requested $951 million for  military construction in its budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008,  including approximately $493 million in the supplemental budget requests  for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. The remaining $6.1 billion will include  projects for newly established units or units increasing in size through  Grow the Force and quality of life projects.
section_title: Army and Marine Corps Used a Compressed Version of the Typical Process to Determine Construction Projects for Grow the Force
paragraphs: The Army and Marine Corps followed all of the steps typically used to  determine construction projects when they developed the Grow the Force  construction projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years  2007 and 2008, but the process was compressed. Specifically, the limited  time available between when the Grow the Force initiative was announced  and the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 budget requests were  submitted gave the services less time than during the typical process to  develop and submit projects.
The Army’s typical process for developing construction projects generally  takes over 2 years; however, the Army completed the process in about   2 months for Grow the Force projects included in its fiscal year 2007  supplemental budget request and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget  request. In general, the Army’s typical process to develop construction  projects includes five steps: (1) Army headquarters provides guidance to  installations, (2) installation officials develop construction projects,   (3) construction projects are submitted to Army headquarters for review  and approval, (4) senior Army officials review and approve construction  projects, and (5) construction projects are included in the Army budget for  submission to Congress. For Grow the Force projects included in the  fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request and the President’s fiscal  year 2008 budget request, the Army included all of the steps from the  typical process, but completed them in a compressed time frame, as  shown in figure 1.
According to Army officials, projects submitted in the President’s fiscal  year 2009 budget request were also developed using the steps of the  typical process in a compressed time frame. The projects were developed  in about 6 months instead of 2 years. Army officials expect that Grow the  Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request  and beyond will follow the typical process and time frames.
As with the Army, the Marine Corps’ process for developing construction  projects generally takes about 2 years; however, the Marine Corps  completed the process in 6 months for Grow the Force projects included  in DOD’s supplemental budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. In  general, the Marine Corps’ typical process for developing construction  projects includes 6 steps: (1) Marine Corps headquarters sends guidance  on facility projects to the installations, (2) installations develop project  proposals and submit them to Marine Corps headquarters, (3) a military  construction review board prioritizes the projects and sets funding limits,  (4) the Naval Facilities Engineering Command reviews projects and  validates the cost and scope of the projects, (5) Marine Corps  headquarters reviews projects, and (6) construction projects are included  in the Department of the Navy budget for submission to Congress. For  Grow the Force projects included in the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year  2008 supplemental budget requests, the Marine Corps included all of the  steps from the typical process, but completed them in a compressed time  frame, as shown in figure 2.
Similarly, the Marine Corps followed all of the steps of the typical process  for Grow the Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2008  budget request. A Marine Corps headquarters official said that the  installations did not submit new projects developed specifically for Grow  the Force in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. Rather, they  submitted projects that were already in the development process for  future budget requests due to the limited time available to develop  projects and environmental reporting requirements. Installations followed  the typical process when developing these projects.
According to a Marine Corps official, installations followed the typical  process to develop projects included in the President’s fiscal year 2009  budget request and had the same amount of time to develop projects,  although Marine Corps headquarters provided the guidance to installations  to develop projects about a month later than for the typical process and  installations submitted projects to Marine Corps headquarters about a  month later than usual. A Marine Corps official expects that Grow the  Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request  and beyond will follow the typical process and time frames for developing  construction projects.
As with the Army and Marine Corps, Army National Guard projects  included in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request were developed  following the typical military construction process. According to a  National Guard Bureau official, the Army National Guard’s process to  determine projects for the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request was  the same as the typical military construction process; however, the  projects were developed in a compressed time frame. The Army National  Guard’s Grow the Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year  2010 budget request and beyond will follow the typical process and time  frames.
Unlike the other components, the Army Reserve has not yet requested  Grow the Force construction funding, but Army Reserve officials said that  they have followed their typical process and time frames to develop  construction projects to be included in future budget requests.
section_title: Most Projects Support Grow the Force, but Some Lack a Clear Link to the Initiative
paragraphs: We found that nearly all of the Grow the Force construction projects  submitted by the Army and Army National Guard, and most by the Marine  Corps, in DOD’s fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 budget requests  supported the initiative. Specifically, we found that 65 Army projects, 3  Army National Guard projects, and 37 Marine Corps projects supported  Grow the Force, but 13 projects did not, as shown in table 3.
We determined that one Army project to upgrade a railroad yard at Fort  Lewis, Washington, did not support Grow the Force because the project is  in response to an existing deficiency. Specifically, the Army’s budget  justification states that current facilities are overtaxed to support  deployment from Fort Lewis as a result of growth through other Army  initiatives. While approximately 2,000 personnel are being added to Fort  Lewis through Grow the Force, we assessed this project as not supporting  Grow the Force because the project was needed regardless of whether  Grow the Force occurred and we did not identify a clear link between the  additional personnel and an increased number of deployments, which  would exacerbate the current capacity issues at the railroad yard. An  official in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation  Management agreed with our assessment.
As a result of the compressed time frame to develop and submit projects,  we found that the 22 projects submitted by the Marine Corps in the  President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request had already been planned and  were moved up from future years’ budgets to meet existing deficiencies.  We determined that 10 of these projects would support the Grow the  Force increase because the existing deficiencies would be exacerbated by  having more Marines on the installation due to the Grow the Force  initiative. For example, officials from Twentynine Palms, California, said  that they had already planned to include projects in their fiscal year 2010  and fiscal year 2011 military construction budget requests to build  operations facilities designed to house multiple battalions due to existing  deficiencies in administrative space on the installation. While the projects  were not originally intended for the new personnel, installation officials  identified these as projects that could be moved up to meet the new  requirements for Grow the Force.
However, we determined that the remaining 12 of the 22 projects totaling  $210 million did not support the initiative because they address existing  deficiencies rather than new units associated with Grow the Force, or  address initiatives other than Grow the Force. We found that 7 of the  Marine Corps projects totaling $137 million do not support Grow the Force  because they address existing deficiencies on the installations that needed  to be addressed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred and we  could not clearly identify that existing capacity issues these projects were  designed to address would be exacerbated by additional personnel from  Grow the Force. For example, the Marine Corps included a $7 million  wastewater system modification project at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,  which budget justification documentation indicates is needed to limit  environmental impacts and does not make reference to capacity issues  from additional personnel through Grow the Force.  Additionally,  installation officials said this project would be needed regardless of  whether Grow the Force occurred and was already planned to be included  in a future budget request. Similarly, according to project documentation  and information from installation officials, two projects to construct new  operations facilities at Camp Pendleton, California, were to address  existing quality issues, rather than capacity issues resulting from  additional Marines added to the facility through Grow the Force.
Additionally, we determined that 5 of the 12 projects that did not support  Grow the Force, totaling nearly $73 million, supported other initiatives.  For example, the Marine Corps submitted 2 projects for physical security  upgrades that support installation security and force protection efforts,  rather than supporting Grow the Force. The remaining three projects were  barracks at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton and a headquarters  building at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, totaling $58 million, that  support an initiative for wounded Marines, rather than Grow the Force.  Marine Corp officials agreed that the 3 Wounded Warrior projects do not  support the Grow the Force initiative. However, Marine Corps officials  disagreed with our assessment that the remaining 9 projects do not  support Grow the Force because they believe that each of the projects will  help the installations manage issues related to additional personnel on the  installation.
While most of the Army, Army National Guard, and Marine Corps projects  were clearly linked to Grow the Force, it may be more difficult to identify  some Marine Corps and Army Reserve projects as supporting the initiative  in future budget requests. Specifically, a Marine Corps official expected  that installations would identify future unit-specific construction projects  related to Grow the Force as supporting the initiative in budget  justification documentation. However, the official expected that  installationwide projects, including mess halls or quality of life projects,  such as child development centers, would not be clearly linked to Grow  the Force in future budget justifications because these installationwide  projects would benefit and be used by all of the personnel on the  installation, rather than only those added through Grow the Force.  Further, we found that the Army Reserve, which submitted its first Grow  the Force projects in the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request, plans  to link projects that support other related force structure changes to Grow  the Force in budget justification documentation. Specifically, Army  Reserve officials said they plan to link projects for about 16,000 soldiers to  Grow the Force even though these personnel are not part of Grow the  Force. These 16,000 soldiers are part of a related effort to realign the  Army’s forces to better match operational needs, called rebalancing, and it  is not clear what the facility requirements for these personnel may include.  Unless budget justification documents clearly and appropriately link  projects to the Grow the Force initiative, Congress will not have full  visibility over the military construction projects associated with the Grow  the Force initiative.
section_title: Army’s and Marine Corps’ Plans to Use Temporary Facilities
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that some units will arrive at installations before  facilities are constructed; however, the Army does not plan to purchase or  lease temporary facilities, while the Marine Corps plans to do so to bridge  the gap between when units are established and permanent facilities are  constructed. Our analysis shows that units will be established at 11 Army  installations prior to the completion of planned construction projects.  However, the Army has not requested funding to purchase or lease  temporary facilities to support the additional forces. To bridge the gap, the  Army plans to utilize existing space, including space vacated by units  deploying overseas, to accommodate the additional personnel. For  example, installation officials at Fort Carson, Colorado, said they have  used space temporarily vacated by brigade combat teams deployed  overseas to accommodate additional personnel at the installation.  However, the officials expressed concern about whether they would  continue to have sufficient space on the installation to accommodate  additional personnel with brigade combat teams returning from overseas  deployments. According to National Guard Bureau officials, the Army  National Guard will have units established before the completion of  facilities for those units; however, the states, which are responsible for  stationing personnel, have not yet submitted requests for any leased  facilities.
The majority of new Marine Corps units established between fiscal year  2007 and fiscal year 2011 will arrive at installations before permanent  facilities are available. The Marine Corps requested $147 million in the  President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request and plans to purchase or lease  about 1,500 temporary facilities to house units while permanent facilities  are completed. The majority of these facilities will be used at Camp  Pendleton, California; Twentynine Palms, California; and Camp Lejeune,  North Carolina. For example, Camp Pendleton requested nearly $40  million to lease some temporary facilities, such as office trailers, and  purchase other temporary facilities, such as armories. In its fiscal year  2007 supplemental budget request, the Marine Corps requested $18 million  to purchase temporary facilities for Twentynine Palms, including trailers,  portable armories, and storage containers, to accommodate the increase in  end strength until permanent facilities are completed. Camp Lejeune,  which is receiving the largest end strength increase from Grow the Force,  requested funding to lease trailers and purchase portable armories, which  installation officials said would be used until the permanent facilities are  complete. Each installation is responsible for determining temporary  facility needs, and Marine Corps officials noted that temporary facility  needs could vary from day to day depending on what units are deploying  or being established and the type of space that is needed. According to  installation officials we spoke with, temporary facilities will typically be  used for 3 to 7 years, depending on the time between when units arrive at  the installation and when construction is complete. A Marine Corps  headquarters official expects that the Marine Corps will need additional  funding for temporary facilities in the future, but has not yet determined  the extent of the funding requirements.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: While most projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years  2007 and 2008 that were identified as Grow the Force projects showed a  clear link to the Grow the Force initiative, some future Marine Corps and  Army Reserve projects may not be clearly and appropriately identified as  supporting Grow the Force. While the Marine Corps intends to clearly  identify unit-specific projects as part of the initiative, the link between  Grow the Force and installationwide projects may not be clear. Moreover,  Army Reserve officials plan to link construction projects that do not  support the end strength increase to Grow the Force. Because the Marine  Corps intends to make some linkage between the projects and Grow the  Force and the Army Reserve had not yet submitted projects for Grow the  Force at the time of our review, we are not making a recommendation at  this time.
Additionally, it is not clear whether the active duty Army can  accommodate the increased personnel through Grow the Force using only  existing facilities, particularly since the Army plans to complete its active  duty end strength increase by 2010, rather than 2013, as originally  estimated. Because we did not examine whether the Army’s temporary  facilities’ plan was efficient or feasible, we are not making a  recommendation at this time.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it disagreed with  our assessment that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects did not  support Grow the Force. DOD did not provide sufficient documentation  that the existing capacity issues these projects were designed to address  would be exacerbated by additional personnel from Grow the Force,  which is why these projects did not meet our criteria for supporting Grow  the Force.  We agree that projects that address existing deficiencies, in  addition to any number of other projects that DOD might undertake  without being explicitly established for Grow the Force, can also enable  DOD’s implementation of the Grow the Force initiative; our report does  not say otherwise.  It is important to note that we did not assess whether  the projects were needed on an installation, but only whether DOD could  provide sufficient documentation that the project met our criteria for  supporting Grow the Force.  For these reasons, we have not changed our  report. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as  appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary  of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and  the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make  copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop  construction projects for Grow the Force, we reviewed information on the  Army’s and Marine Corps’ typical processes for identifying construction  projects and the Army and Marine Corps stationing plans. Additionally, we  interviewed knowledgeable officials with the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Army’s Assistant  Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Operations and Plans (G-3),  Program Analysis & Evaluation (G-8), Army Force Management (G-3),  Installation Management Command, and the Army Corps of Engineers;  Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development and  Integration Command, and Naval Facilities Engineering Command;  National Guard Bureau; and Army Reserve. We also contacted and visited  officials at selected Army and Marine Corps installations, including Fort  Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Lewis, Washington;  Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California; and  Twentynine Palms, California, to discuss the process to determine  construction requirements. We selected these installations based on (1)  the total amount of funding requested for Grow the Force projects in  DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and (2) the number  of personnel to be added to the installation through 2013 as a result of  Grow the Force.
To determine the extent to which Grow the Force projects submitted by  the Army, Marine Corps, and Army National Guard supported the  initiative, we analyzed budget justification documentation for projects  submitted for the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request, the fiscal  year 2008 Global War on Terrorism supplemental budget request, and the  President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. We included in our scope only  those projects that the Army and Marine Corps submitted in the fiscal  years 2007 and 2008 budget requests. Using the data in the budget  justification documentation for each project, we categorized projects as  either supporting Grow the Force or not supporting Grow the Force based  on three criteria: (1) a statement affirming the project was in support of  Grow the Force, (2) information that the project was for a unit being  established as part of Grow the Force, and (3) reference to a capacity  issue due to the additional personnel. In cases where we could not  determine whether the project met our criteria, we sought additional  information from appropriate headquarters or installation officials. We  discussed our methodology and assessment with the appropriate Army  and Marine Corps officials, who generally agreed with our approach. While  we evaluated the extent to which projects submitted in DOD’s budget  requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supported the Grow the Force  initiative, we did not validate the need for projects.
To examine the Army’s and Marine Corps’ planned use of temporary  facilities, we reviewed the Army’s and Marine Corps’ stationing plans and  analyzed project documentation included in the Army and Marine Corps  budget requests as well as documentation provided by the Marine Corps  installations to determine which units may need temporary facilities. For  the Army, we analyzed the difference between the date that construction is  expected to be completed and the date units are expected to be  established at the installation for unit-specific projects included in the  fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request and the President’s fiscal  year 2008 budget request to determine the extent to which temporary  facilities may be required. For the Marine Corps we analyzed project  documentation for temporary facilities and documentation about  temporary facilities provided by the installations and compared this  information to the total number of new Grow the Force units for fiscal  year 2007 through fiscal year 2011 to see how many units would require  temporary facilities. Additionally, we interviewed knowledgeable officials  in the Army, Army National Guard, and Marine Corps headquarters and  selected Army and Marine Corps installations to discuss the overall  strategy for temporary facilities, as well as installation-specific strategies.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2008  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: Assessment of Army Grow the Force Projects
paragraphs: Table 4 shows our assessment of the Army’s Grow the Force projects  submitted in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request and the  President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. We determined that 65 of the  Army’s projects support Grow the Force, while 1 project does not support  Grow the Force because it addresses an existing deficiency that needed to  be addressed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred.
section_title: Appendix IV: Assessment of Marine Corps Grow the Force Projects
paragraphs: Table 5 shows our assessment of the Marine Corps’ Grow the Force  projects submitted in the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supplemental budget  requests and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. We  determined that 37 of the projects support Grow the Force, while 12  projects do not support Grow the Force. Of the 12 projects that do not  support Grow the Force, 7 of the projects address existing deficiencies  that needed to be addressed regardless of whether Grow the Force  occurred and 5 of the projects support another initiative.
section_title: Appendix V: Assessment of Army National Guard Grow the Force Projects
paragraphs: Table 6 shows our assessment of the Army National Guard’s Grow the  Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget  request. We determined that all of the Army National Guard’s projects  support Grow the Force.
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director; Hilary Benedict; Renee Brown; Rebecca  Guerrero; Linda Keefer; and Elizabeth Morris made key contributions to  this report.