Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but Additional, Strategic Action is Needed to Capitalize on Those Steps
Published: 2009-09-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The nation's wildland fire problems have worsened dramatically over the past decade, with more than a doubling of average annual acreage burned and federal appropriations for wildland fire management. The deteriorating fire situation has led the agencies responsible for managing wildland fires on federal lands--the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and four agencies in the Department of the Interior--to reassess how they respond to wildland fire and to take steps to improve their fire management programs. GAO reviewed (1) progress the agencies have made in managing wildland fire and (2) key actions GAO previously recommended and believes are still necessary to improve wildland fire management. GAO reviewed previous GAO reports and agency documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Forest Service and the Interior agencies have improved their understanding of wildland fire's ecological role on the landscape and have taken important steps toward enhancing their ability to cost-effectively protect communities and resources by seeking to (1) make communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by wildland fire and (2) respond to fire so as to protect communities and important resources at risk but to also consider both the cost and long-term effects of that response. To help them do so, the agencies in recent years have reduced hazardous fuels, in an effort to keep wildland fires from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help protect important resources by lessening a fire's intensity; sponsored efforts to educate homeowners about steps they can take to protect their homes from wildland fire; and provided grants to help homeowners carry out these steps. The agencies have also made improvements that lay important groundwork for enhancing their response to wildland fire, including adopting new guidance on how managers in the field are to select firefighting strategies, improving the analytical tools that assist managers in selecting a strategy, and improving how they acquire and use expensive firefighting assets. Despite the agencies' efforts, much work remains. GAO has recommended several key actions--including development of an overarching fire management strategy--that, if completed, would substantially improve the agencies' management of wildland fire. Nonetheless, the agencies have yet to: (1) Develop a cohesive strategy laying out various potential approaches for addressing the growing wildland fire threat, estimated costs associated with each approach, and the trade-offs involved. Such information would help the agencies and Congress make fundamental decisions about an effective and affordable approach to responding to fires. (2) Establish a cost-containment strategy that clarifies the importance of containing costs relative to other, often-competing objectives. Without such clarification, GAO believes managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing costs and are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the costs of suppression. (3) Clarify financial responsibilities for fires that cross federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Unless the financial responsibilities for multijurisdictional fires are clarified, concerns that the existing framework insulates nonfederal entities from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface--and that the federal government would therefore continue to bear more than its share of the cost--are unlikely to be addressed. (4) Take action to mitigate the effects of rising fire costs on other agency programs. The sharply rising costs of managing wildland fires have led the agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay for fire suppression, disrupting or delaying activities in these other programs. Better methods of predicting needed suppression funding could reduce the need to transfer funds from other programs.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The nation’s wildland fire problems have worsened dramatically over the  past decade, threatening communities as well as important natural and  cultural resources. Both the average acreage burned annually and federal  appropriations for wildland fire management activities have more than  doubled, with appropriations reaching more than $2.9 billion annually, on  average, during fiscal years 2001 through 2007. State and local  governments have likewise spent hundreds of millions of dollars to  suppress fires during severe fire years. A number of factors have  contributed to these increases. Uncharacteristically dense, continuous  accumulations of vegetation, due in part to past fire suppression policies  and land management practices, and severe regional weather and drought  have led to higher-intensity fires and longer fire seasons. At the same time,  continued development in and near wildlands, an area often called the  wildland-urban interface, has placed more homes at risk. Five federal  agencies—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the  Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife  Service, and National Park Service within the Department of the Interior— are responsible for managing wildland fires on federal lands. State  forestry agencies and other entities—including tribal, county, city, and  rural fire departments—have primary responsibility for managing wildland  fires on nonfederal lands and share responsibility for protecting homes  and other private structures.
A series of damaging wildland fires in the 1990s led the Forest Service and  the Interior agencies to reassess their approach to managing fire. It also  prompted a sustained effort, known as the National Fire Plan, on the part  of the federal agencies and Congress to improve fire suppression  capabilities, reduce potentially hazardous vegetation that can fuel wildland  fires, restore fire-adapted ecosystems, and help communities better  withstand wildland fire. Growing recognition of the long-term fiscal  challenges facing the nation has also led Congress, the agencies, and  others to focus on ensuring that federal wildland fire activities are  appropriate and carried out in a cost-effective manner. Over the last  decade, this focus led federal agencies (including the Forest Service,  Interior, the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Inspector General, and  us) and other organizations (including the National Association of State  Foresters and the National Academy of Public Administration) to conduct  numerous reviews of federal wildland fire programs. For example, we  have reported or testified more than 50 times since 1999 on issues related  to wildland fire management, recommending more than 50 actions the  Forest Service and the Interior agencies could take to improve the  programs. The agencies have taken—and continue to take—steps to  address the shortcomings the reviews identified and to otherwise improve  their fire management programs, but concerns persist over the agencies’  response to the deteriorating fire situation.
In this context, and to provide the administration and the 111th Congress  with an overview of the agencies’ efforts to address the wildland fire  problem, this report provides information on (1) the progress the Forest  Service and the Interior agencies have made in managing wildland fire and  (2) key actions we previously recommended and believe are still necessary  to improve the agencies’ management of wildland fire. We prepared this  report under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations  on his own initiative.
To address our first objective, we reviewed agency documents to identify  the agencies’ overall approach to managing wildland fire, the key steps the  agencies have taken to address the growing wildland fire problem, and any  improvement resulting from those steps. To further our understanding of  these issues, we interviewed various agency officials, including officials in  Washington, D.C., and at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise,  Idaho. To address our second objective, we reviewed our prior reports and  testimonies to identify steps we previously recommended that the  agencies take to improve their wildland fire programs and reviewed  relevant agency documents and interviewed agency officials to determine  the status of the agencies’ implementation of those recommendations.  Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in more detail. We  conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to September 2009,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Wildland fires triggered by lightning are both natural and inevitable and  play an important ecological role on the nation’s landscapes. These fires  shape the composition of forests and grasslands, periodically reduce  vegetation densities, and stimulate seedling regeneration and growth in  some species. Over the past century, however, various land use and  management practices—including fire suppression, grazing, and timber  harvesting—have reduced the normal frequency of fires in many forest and  rangeland ecosystems and contributed to abnormally dense, continuous  accumulations of vegetation. Such accumulations not only can fuel  uncharacteristically large or severe wildland fires but also—with more  homes and communities built in or near areas at risk from wildland fire— threaten human lives, health, property, and infrastructure. Moreover, the  introduction and spread of invasive nonnative species (such as  cheatgrass), along with the expanded range of certain flammable native  species (such as western juniper) have also altered natural fire regimes,  contributing to wildland fires’ burning in some areas with uncharacteristic  frequency or intensity.
The Forest Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management,  Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service are responsible for  wildland fire management. These five agencies manage about 700 million  acres of land in the United States, including national forests, national  grasslands, Indian reservations, national parks, and national wildlife  refuges. The Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management manage  the majority of these lands. The Forest Service manages about 190 million  acres; the Bureau of Land Management manages about 260 million acres;  and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National  Park Service each manage less than 100 million acres. Figure 1 shows the  distribution of land among the five agencies. Each agency has from 7 to 12  regional or state offices that oversee field units.
The federal wildland fire management program has three major  components: preparedness, suppression, and fuel reduction. To prepare  for a wildland fire season, the agencies acquire firefighting assets— including firefighters, fire engines, aircraft, and other equipment—and  station them either at individual federal land management units (such as  national forests or national parks) or at centralized dispatch locations. The  primary purpose of these assets is to respond to fires before they become  large—a response referred to as initial attack—thus forestalling threats to  communities and natural and cultural resources. The agencies fund the  assets used for initial attack primarily from their wildland fire  preparedness accounts.
When a fire starts, current federal policy directs the agencies to consider  land management objectives—identified in land and fire management  plans developed by each land management unit—and the structures and  resources at risk when determining whether or how to suppress the fire. A  wide spectrum of strategies is available to choose from, and the land  manager at the affected local unit is responsible for determining which  strategy to use. In the relatively rare instances when fires escape initial  attack and grow large, the agencies respond using an interagency system  that mobilizes additional firefighting assets from federal, state, and local  agencies, as well as private contractors, regardless of which agency or  agencies have jurisdiction over the burning lands. Federal agencies  typically fund the costs of these activities from their wildland fire  suppression accounts.
In addition to preparing for and suppressing fires, the agencies attempt to  reduce the potential for severe wildland fires, lessen the damage caused by  fires, limit the spread of flammable invasive species, and restore and  maintain healthy ecosystems by reducing potentially hazardous vegetation  that can fuel fires. Approaches used for managing vegetation include  setting fires under controlled conditions (prescribed burns), mechanical  thinning, herbicides, certain grazing methods, or combinations of these  and other approaches. The agencies fund these activities from their fuel  reduction accounts.
Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, federal agency officials,  and others have expressed concern about mounting federal wildland fire  expenditures. Federal appropriations to the Forest Service and the Interior  agencies to prepare for and respond to wildland fires, including  appropriations for reducing fuels, have more than doubled, from an  average of $1.2 billion from fiscal years 1996 through 2000 to an average of  $2.9 billion from fiscal years 2001 through 2007. Adjusting for inflation, the  average annual appropriations to the agencies for these periods increased  from $1.5 billion to $3.1 billion (in 2007 dollars). The Forest Service  received about 70 percent, and Interior about 30 percent, of the  appropriated funds; table 1 shows the agencies’ combined fire  appropriations for fiscal years 1996 through 2007.
Analysis of structures damaged during past fires and experimental  research have identified a number of relatively simple steps that can  reduce the risk of damage to structures from wildland fire. Minimizing or  preventing damage requires understanding the different types of wildland  fire and how they can ignite structures. Surface fires—which burn  vegetation or other fuels, such as shrubs, fallen leaves, small branches,  and roots, near the surface of the ground—can ignite a home or other  building by burning nearby vegetation and eventually igniting flammable  portions of the building, including exterior walls or siding; attached  structures, such as a fence or deck; or other nearby flammable materials,  such as firewood or patio furniture. Crown fires—which burn the tops, or  crowns, of trees—place homes at risk because they create intense heat,  which can ignite portions of structures even without direct contact from  flames. Embers, or “firebrands”—which can be carried on the wind a mile  or more from a fire—can ignite a structure by landing on the roof or by  entering a vent or other opening. Figure 2 illustrates how each type of fire  can take advantage of a structure’s vulnerabilities and those of its  immediate surroundings.
subsections: section_title: B B
paragraphs: Wildland fires can ignite homes and structures  in different ways.
Surface fires (A) can ignite a home by burning  nearby vegetation.
section_title: A A
paragraphs: Crown fires (B) create intense heat, which can  ignite portions of structures, without direct contact  from flames.
Firebrands (C), or embers, can ignite a home by  landing on the roof or entering a roof vent or other  opening.
section_title: Agencies’ Efforts to Implement a New Approach to Managing Wildland Fire Have Better Positioned Them to Respond to Fire Effectively
paragraphs: As the Forest Service and the Interior agencies have improved their  understanding of wildland fire’s role on the landscape, their approach to  managing fire has evolved. Under the new approach, the agencies seek to  make the landscape less susceptible to damage by wildland fire and to  respond to fires in ways that protect communities and important resources  while also considering the cost and long-term effects of that response.
subsections: section_title: Agencies’ Approach to Managing Wildland Fire Has Evolved
paragraphs: Historically, the Forest Service and the Interior agencies generally viewed  fire as a damaging force that they attempted to suppress quickly—as  exemplified by the “10 a.m. policy,” in which the goal was to contain every  fire by 10:00 the morning after it was reported. For decades, the agencies  were often successful in this approach. This emphasis on suppression led  to a substantial decline in the average number of acres burned annually  from the 1930s through the 1970s. A number of damaging fires in the  1990s, however, led the agencies to fundamentally reassess their  understanding of wildland fire’s role on the landscape. Their view of fire’s  ecological role began to expand, from seeing benefits in a few ecosystems,  like certain grasslands and forest types, to realizing that in many  locations—particularly the arid West—fire was inevitable. In addition,  they recognized that by allowing brush, small trees, and other vegetation  to accumulate, their past success in suppressing fires was in part  responsible for making recent fires more severe.
The agencies’ increased awareness of fire’s benefits, as well as of the  unintended negative consequences of suppression, led them in 1995 to  develop the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, a policy they  reaffirmed and updated in 2001. Under the policy, the agencies  abandoned their attempt to put out every wildland fire, seeking instead to  (1) make communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by  wildland fire and (2) respond to fires so as to protect communities and  important resources at risk but also to consider both the cost and long- term effects of that response. As a result, the agencies have increasingly  emphasized firefighting strategies that focus on land management  objectives, which may lead them to use less aggressive firefighting  strategies that can not only reduce costs in some cases but also be safer  for firefighters by reducing their exposure to unnecessary risks, according  to agency fire officials.
section_title: Agencies Have Laid Important Groundwork through Their Efforts to Reduce Damage to Communities and Resources and to Improve Their Responses to Wildland Fire
paragraphs: In recent years, the Forest Service and the Interior agencies have taken  steps to help them better achieve the Federal Wildland Fire Management  Policy’s vision. In an effort to make the landscape less susceptible to  damage from wildland fire, for example, they have reduced hazardous  fuels and fostered fire-resistant communities. They have also improved  their ability to respond efficiently and effectively to wildland fires that  occur, including taking steps to (1) implement the federal wildland fire  management policy, (2) improve decisions regarding fire management  strategies, and (3) improve how they acquire and use firefighting assets.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Have Taken Steps Intended to Reduce Wildland Fire Damage to Communities and Resources
paragraphs: In an effort to reduce damage to communities and resources from  wildland fire, the agencies have continued to reduce fuels and foster fire- resistant communities, but the extent to which these efforts have reduced  risk is unknown.
Reducing hazardous fuels. Reducing hazardous fuels—to keep wildland  fires from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help protect  important resources by lessening a fire’s intensity—is one of the primary  objectives of the National Fire Plan. The agencies reported reducing fuels  on more than 29 million acres from 2001 through 2008. The agencies have  also improved the data they use to help identify lands where fuels need to  be reduced and have taken steps to improve their processes for allocating  fuel reduction funds and setting priorities for fuels projects. The agencies  have nearly completed their geospatial data and modeling system,  LANDFIRE, as we recommended in 2003. LANDFIRE is intended to  produce consistent and comprehensive maps and data describing  vegetation, wildland fuels, and fire regimes across the United States. Such  data are critical to helping the agencies (1) identify the extent, severity,  and location of wildland fire threats to the nation’s communities and  resources; (2) predict fire intensity and rate of spread under particular  weather conditions; and (3) evaluate the effect that reducing fuels may  have on future fire behavior. LANDFIRE data are already complete for the  contiguous United States, and the agencies have reported they expect to  complete the data for Alaska and Hawaii in 2009. Because vegetative  conditions change over time for a variety of reasons, including landscape- altering events such as hurricanes, disease, or wildland fires themselves,  the agencies also plan several processes for updating the data, including  selective updates every 2 years to reflect changes due to fires, fuel  treatments, and other disturbances and a comprehensive update every 10  years.
In addition, the agencies have begun to improve their processes for  allocating fuel reduction funds to different areas of the country and for  selecting fuel reduction projects, as we recommended in 2007. The  agencies have started moving away from “allocation by tradition” toward a  more consistent, systematic allocation process. That is, rather than relying  on historical funding patterns and professional judgment, the agencies are  developing a process that also considers risk, effectiveness of fuel  reduction treatments, and other factors. The Forest Service uses this  process to allocate funds to its nine regions and has directed the regions to  use it to allocate funds to their respective national forests. Interior uses a  similar process to allocate funds to its four agencies, and the agencies in  turn use it to allocate funds to their respective state or regional offices.  The agencies have been increasing their use of this process, in fiscal year  2009 applying the results to help them determine how to allocate their fuel  reduction dollars. Interior, however, kept its agencies and regions from  gaining or losing more than 10 percent in funds relative to fiscal year 2008.  Agency officials told us they expect to continue to improve their processes  and to increasingly rely on them to allocate fuel reduction funds.
Despite these improvements, further action is needed to ensure that the  agencies’ efforts to reduce hazardous fuels are directed to areas at highest  risk. The agencies, for example, still lack a measure of the effectiveness of  fuel reduction treatments and therefore lack information needed to ensure  that fuel reduction funds are directed to the areas where they can best  minimize risk to communities and natural and cultural resources. Forest  Service and Interior officials told us that they recognize this shortcoming  and that efforts are under way to address it. The Joint Fire Science  Program, for example, has funded almost 50 studies examining the  effectiveness of fuel reduction treatments in different locations and has  begun a comprehensive effort to evaluate the effectiveness of different  types of fuel treatments, as well as the longevity of those treatments and  their effects on ecosystems and natural resources.  Efforts like these are  likely to be long term, involving considerable research investment, and  have the potential to improve the agencies’ ability to assess and compare  the cost-effectiveness of potential treatments in deciding how to optimally  allocate scarce funds.
Fostering fire-resistant communities. Protecting the nation’s  communities is both one of the key goals of wildland fire management and  one of the leading factors contributing to rising fire costs. Increasing the  use of protective measures to mitigate the risk to structures from wildland  fire is a key goal of the National Fire Plan—a goal which also may help  contain the cost of managing fires in the long term. This plan, developed  by federal wildland fire agencies and state governors, encourages, but  does not mandate, state and local governments to adopt laws requiring  homeowners and homebuilders to take measures to help protect  structures from wildland fires. Because these measures rely on the actions  of individual homeowners and homebuilders or on laws and land-use  planning affecting private lands, achieving this goal is primarily a state and  local government responsibility. Nonetheless, the Forest Service and the  Interior agencies have helped sponsor the Firewise Communities program,  which works with community leaders and homeowners to increase the use  of fire-resistant landscaping and building materials in areas of high risk.  Federal and state agencies also provide grants to help homeowners pay for  creating defensible space around private homes.
A few relatively simple steps can reduce the risk of damage to structures  from wildland fire. Experts from a symposium convened for us in 2004 by  the National Academy of Sciences emphasized that the two most critical  measures for protecting structures from wildland fires are (1) reducing  vegetation and flammable objects within an area of 30 to 100 feet around a  structure, often called creating defensible space (see fig. 3), and (2) using  fire-resistant roofing materials and covering attic vents with mesh  screens. Analysis of structures damaged during past fires and  experimental research have shown these two steps to be key determinants  of whether or not a structure is damaged by wildland fire.
Nevertheless, use of protective measures is inconsistent. We reported in  2005 that many homeowners in the wildland-urban interface have not used  such measures to mitigate fire risk because of the time or expense  involved. State and local fire officials estimated that the price of creating  defensible space, for example, can range from a negligible amount, if  homeowners can do the work themselves, to $2,000 or more. Competing  concerns also influence the use of protective measures. For example,  although modifying landscaping to create defensible space has proved to  be key in protecting structures from wildland fire, officials and  researchers have reported that homeowners are more concerned about  the effect of landscaping on their property’s appearance, privacy, or  habitat for wildlife. Defensible space can, however, be created so as to  alleviate many of these concerns. Leaving thicker vegetation away from a  structure and pruning plants close by it, for instance, can help protect the  structure and still be attractive, private, and wildlife-friendly.  Misconceptions about fire behavior and the effectiveness of protective  measures can also influence what people do to protect structures from  wildland fires. For example, homeowners may not know that homes can  be more flammable than the surrounding trees, shrubs, or other vegetation  and therefore do not recognize the need to reduce the flammability of the  structure itself (see fig. 4). Fire officials told us that few people realize that  reducing tree density close to a structure can return a wildland fire to the  ground, where it is much easier to keep away from structures, or that fire- resistant roofs and screened attic vents can reduce the risk of ignition  from firebrands. Finally, homeowners may not use protective measures  because they believe that firefighters are responsible for protecting their  homes and do not recognize that they share this responsibility.
Implementing the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. The  Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy directs each agency to develop  a fire management plan for all areas they manage with burnable  vegetation. Without such plans, agency policy does not allow use of the  whole spectrum of wildland fire response strategies, including less  aggressive strategies—meaning that, for areas without such plans, the  agencies must attempt to suppress fires regardless of any benefits that  might come from allowing them to burn. We reported in 2006 that about 95  percent of the agencies’ 1,460 individual land management units had  completed the required plans. We also reported, however, that the  agencies may not always find it easy to update these plans; a Forest  Service official told us, for example, that, if the introduction of new data  into a fire management plan results in the development of new fire  management objectives, the agency might need to conduct a new  environmental analysis of that plan, requiring additional time and  resources. Moreover, in examining 17 fire management plans, a May 2007  independent review of large wildland fires managed by the Forest Service  in 2006 identified several shortcomings in the plans, including that most of  them examined did not contain current information on fuel conditions and  that many did not provide sufficient guidance on selecting firefighting  strategies. If fire management plans are not updated to reflect the most  current information on the extent and distribution of fire risks and the  most promising methods for dealing with these risks, the plans will be of  limited use to the agencies in managing wildland fire.
The Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy also states that the  agencies’ responses to wildland fires are to be based on the circumstances  of each fire and the likely consequences to human safety and to natural  and cultural resources. Interagency guidance on implementing the policy,  adopted in 2009, clarifies that the full range of fire management strategies  and tactics are to be considered when responding to every wildland fire  and that a single fire may be simultaneously managed for different  objectives. Previous guidance required each fire to be managed either for  suppression objectives—that is, to put out the fire as quickly as possible— or to achieve resource benefits—that is, to allow the fire to burn to gain  certain benefits such as reducing fuels or seed regeneration. Both the  Department of Agriculture’s Inspector General and we criticized the  previous guidance, in part because it did not allow the agencies the  flexibility to switch between these strategies as fire conditions changed or  to manage parts of a single fire differently. By allowing this flexibility, the  new guidance should help the agencies achieve management objectives on  more acres and help contain the long-term costs of fire management.
Improving decisions about fire management strategies. The agencies  have recently undertaken several efforts to improve decisions about  firefighting strategies. In 2007 we reported that previous studies had found  that officials may not always consider the full range of available strategies  and may not select the most appropriate strategy, which would account  for the cost of suppression; the value of structures and other resources  threatened by the fire; and, where appropriate, any potential benefits to  natural resources.
Managers of the agencies’ individual land management units—typically  known as line officers and including national forest supervisors, BLM  district managers, and others—are responsible for making strategic  decisions about how to manage a fire. A 2000 review by the National  Association of State Foresters, however, concluded that many line officers  have little wildland fire experience and may select fire management  strategies that lead to unnecessarily high suppression costs. Fire officials  told us such strategies may also have a low likelihood of success,  unnecessarily exposing firefighters to risk of injury. The Forest Service  initiated a program in 2007 designed to add to line officers’ knowledge and  experience through a series of certifications at three competency levels,  certifying the officer to manage a fire of low, medium, or high complexity.  If a fire exceeds the line officer’s certification level, a more experienced  officer is assigned to coach the less experienced officer; final decisions on  strategies, however, remain the responsibility of the line officer of the unit  where the fire is burning.
To help line officers and fire managers in making on-the-ground  decisions about how to manage a particular fire, the agencies in 2009  began to use a new analytical tool, known as the wildland fire decision  support system. This new tool helps line officers and fire managers  analyze various factors—such as the fire’s current location, adjacent fuel  conditions, nearby structures and other highly valued resources, and  weather forecasts—in determining the strategies and tactics to adopt. For  example, the tool generates a map illustrating (1) the probability that a  particular wildland fire, barring any suppression actions, will burn a  certain area within a specified time and (2) the structures or other  resources that may therefore be threatened. Having such information can  help line officers and fire managers understand the resources at risk and  identify the most appropriate response—for example, whether to devote  substantial resources to attempt full and immediate suppression or instead  to take a less intensive approach, which may reduce risks to firefighters  and be less costly.
The agencies have also established four teams, known as national incident  management organization teams, staffed with some of the most  experienced fire managers. These teams have several purposes, including  managing some of the most complex and costly fires; identifying and  disseminating best management practices throughout the agencies; and,  during periods of low fire activity, working with staff at the national  forests where large fires are particularly likely to occur, to better prepare  staff to respond. Fire officials said that over time they expect these teams  will improve decisions about firefighting strategies, both for fires the  teams manage directly and those where they worked with staff ahead of  time.
In addition, the agencies, following congressional committee direction,  require an independent review of all fires whose costs exceed $10 million,  including an examination of the strategic decisions affecting suppression  costs. Although these reviews may identify instances where the agencies  could have used more cost-efficient firefighting strategies, and may  provide long-term benefits by helping the agencies identify and  disseminate best practices, the reviews are typically conducted after the  fires have been suppressed and therefore are not intended to help fire  managers change strategies while fires are still burning, before managers  have taken ineffective or unnecessary suppression actions.
To influence strategic firefighting decisions while fires are still burning,  the Forest Service (which, among the responsible federal agencies, most  often manages the most expensive fires) has experimented in recent years  with several approaches for identifying ongoing fires where suppression  actions are unlikely to be effective and for influencing strategic decisions  made during those fires that might help contain costs and reduce risk to  firefighters. A senior Forest Service official told us that these efforts have  helped raise awareness of the importance of basing strategic decisions on  (1) the resources at risk of damage and (2) the likelihood that suppression  actions will be effective, but that the agency was still working to improve  its ability to quickly identify strategic firefighting decisions likely to be  ineffective. This official told us that the concept of reviewing strategic  decisions while a fire is still burning is new, as is the concept of  considering the probability of success, and not just the resources at risk,  in making those decisions; he added that he believed the agency was  making strides in implementing this approach but that it would be a long  process dependent on managers in the field gaining a better understanding  of the benefits of the new approach.
According to this official, the agency’s approach in 2009 is to identify  ongoing fires for which the cost of suppression—estimated using  information from the wildland fire decision support system—is expected  to be higher than the cost predicted by a measure known as the stratified  cost index, based on the costs of previous fires with similar  characteristics. On those fires for which suppression costs are expected  to be substantially higher than costs for similar fires in the past, Forest  Service officials will consult with local line officers and fire management  officials to ensure that the most appropriate firefighting strategies are  being implemented. The basis for this comparison—the stratified cost  index of previous fires—is not entirely reliable, however; our 2007 report  identified several shortcomings with it, including the lack of data from  many fires where less costly firefighting strategies were used (because the  agencies have only recently emphasized the importance of using less  aggressive suppression strategies). As a result, using the index as the  basis for comparison may not allow the Forest Service to accurately  identify fires where more, or more-expensive, resources than needed are  being used.
Although these efforts are new and we have not fully evaluated them, we  believe they have the potential to help the agencies strengthen how  firefighting strategies are selected. The efforts, however, do not address  certain critical shortcomings. We reported in 2007, for example, that  officials in the field have few incentives to consider cost containment in  making critical decisions affecting suppression costs, and that previous  studies had found that the lack of a clear measure to evaluate the benefits  and costs of alternative firefighting strategies fundamentally hindered the  agencies’ abilities to provide effective oversight. Although the agencies  have made progress in other areas, they still lack such a measure.
Acquiring and using firefighting assets effectively. In 2007 we reported  that (1) federal agencies lacked a shared or integrated system for  effectively determining the appropriate type and quantity of firefighting  assets needed for a fire season; (2) the agencies’ processes and systems  for acquiring firefighting assets lacked controls to ensure that the agencies  were procuring assets cost-effectively; and (3) the agencies sometimes  used firefighting assets ineffectively or inefficiently, often in response to  political or social pressures. Despite continued improvement, further  action to address these shortcomings is needed.
First, to address congressional committee direction that they improve  their system for determining needed firefighting assets, the agencies in  2009 began deploying an interagency budget-planning system known as  fire program analysis (FPA). FPA was intended to help the agencies  develop their wildland fire budget requests and allocate funds by, among  other objectives, (1) providing a common budget framework to analyze  firefighting assets without regard for agency jurisdictions; (2) examining  the full scope of fire management activities, including preparing for fires  by acquiring and positioning firefighting assets for the fire season,  mobilizing assets to suppress fires, and reducing potentially hazardous  fuels; (3) modeling the effects over time of differing strategies for  responding to wildland fires and treating lands to reduce hazardous fuels;  and (4) using this information to identify the most cost-effective mix and  location of federal wildland fire management assets. In 2008, we reported  that FPA showed promise in achieving some of the key objectives  originally established for it but that the approach the agencies have taken  hampers FPA from meeting other key objectives, including the ability to  project the effects of different levels of fuel reduction and firefighting  strategies over time. We therefore concluded that agency officials lack  information that would help them analyze the extent to which increasing  or decreasing funding for fuel reduction and responding more or less  aggressively to fires in the short term could affect the expected cost of  responding to wildland fires over the long term. Senior agency officials  told us in 2008 that they were considering making changes to FPA that  may improve its ability to examine the effects over time of different  funding strategies. The exact nature of these changes, or how to fund  them, has yet to be determined. Officials also told us the agencies are  currently working to evaluate the model’s performance, identify and  implement needed corrections, and improve data quality and consistency.  The agencies intend to consider the early results of FPA in developing  their budget requests for fiscal year 2011, although officials told us they  will not rely substantially on FPA’s results until needed improvements are  made. As we noted in 2008, the approach the agencies took in developing  FPA provides considerable discretion to agency decision makers and,  although providing the flexibility to consider various options is important,  doing so makes it essential that the agencies ensure their processes are  fully transparent.
Second, we also reported in 2007 that the agencies were planning  improvements to their acquisition processes to ensure they were  procuring assets cost-effectively. The agencies rely on private contractors  to provide many firefighting assets and have begun implementing a new  system for determining which contractors to use. This system considers  the capabilities of the equipment or personnel, as well as the cost, and is  intended to help the agencies identify the “best value” and not just the  lowest cost or closest asset. A Forest Service official said that the agencies  are also evaluating how the equipment and personnel from each  contractor perform in the field and, once they have gathered enough data,  plan to apply that information in selecting contractors. The agencies are  already using this system to select contractors for many kinds of  frequently used equipment, including firefighting crews, fire engines,  aircraft, and water trucks, and plan to expand the system to include other  equipment in future years.
Third, the agencies have taken several steps to improve their efficiency in  using firefighting assets. As we reported in 2007, for example, the agencies  implemented a computer-based dispatching system called the resource  ordering and status system. The agencies had been using a manual,  paper-based system for requesting and assigning firefighting assets, and  the new system was meant to allow them to more effectively and  efficiently monitor firefighting assets during a fire or other incident. We  reported that although the system’s benefits had not been quantified, it had  likely reduced suppression costs by making it easier to use local  firefighting assets—which could hasten response and thus perhaps reduce  fire size—and by reducing the personnel needed to dispatch resources.  The agencies can also use the system to identify individuals qualified and  available to serve in various firefighting positions, which may help  increase the agencies’ use of local incident commanders and reduce the  need to mobilize more-costly incident management teams.
We also reported in 2007 that the agencies required that an “incident  business advisor” be assigned to fires expected to cost more than $5  million and recommended that an advisor be assigned to fires expected to  cost more than $1 million. An incident business advisor represents the line  officer’s interest in containing costs by observing firefighting operations  and working with the incident management team to identify ways those  operations could be more cost-effective. For example, an incident  business advisor may observe the types and quantity of firefighting  personnel and equipment assigned to a fire and how they are used;  observe how equipment and supplies are procured; and, as a fire comes  under control, ensure that the most expensive personnel and equipment  are released first.
In 2008, the agencies also changed how they determined where to send  certain firefighting assets to ensure that assets perform the highest-priority  work. Agency officials told us they instituted a new practice to increase  the likelihood that firefighting assets perform the highest-priority actions.  Under this practice, certain assets that are often in high demand (including  some of the most experienced firefighting crews) are assigned to perform  only the highest-priority actions on a particular fire or set of adjacent fires  and are then reassigned to perform high-priority actions on other fires,  rather than being assigned for several weeks to a single fire, as has been  typical. This practice should help the agencies address a shortcoming  previous studies have identified—that firefighting assets may sit idle at a  fire rather than be released for use elsewhere because managers are  concerned that they will be unable to recall an asset if they need it later, a  practice that unnecessarily increases a fire’s cost and prevents those  assets from helping to protect communities and resources from fires  burning elsewhere. In addition, the officials said it can be important to  ensure that assets are sufficiently flexible to respond to new fires, even if  many fires are already burning. Responding quickly can substantially  increase the likelihood that firefighters will be able to contain fires before  they become large, which is particularly important when fires start in  weather and fuel conditions that can cause them to burn intensely and  spread rapidly. Agency officials also said they have improved their ability  to predict when an unusually high number of fires might start and have  emphasized the need to keep some firefighting assets in reserve to  respond to new fires quickly.
Previous studies also found that agencies sometimes use more, or more- costly, firefighting assets than necessary, often in response to political or  social pressures to demonstrate they are taking all possible action to  protect communities and resources. Consistent with these findings, fire  officials told us they were pressured in 2008 to assign more firefighting  assets than could be effectively used to fight fires in California. More  generally, previous studies have found that air tankers may drop flame  retardants when on-the-ground conditions may not warrant such drops.  Aviation activities are expensive, accounting for about one-third of all  firefighting costs on a large fire. Providing clarity about when different  types of firefighting assets can be used effectively could help the agencies  resist political and social pressure to call up more assets than they need.
section_title: Agencies Have Yet to Take Certain Key Actions That Would Substantially Improve Their Management of Wildland Fire
paragraphs: Despite the important steps the agencies have taken, much work remains.  We have previously recommended several key actions—including  development of an overarching investment strategy for addressing the  wildland fire problem—that, if completed, would improve the agencies’  management of wildland fire. In addition to completing the overarching  strategy (which we have termed a cohesive strategy), we have  recommended that the agencies clarify the importance of containing costs  relative to other, often-competing objectives and clarify financial  responsibilities for fires that cross federal, state, and local jurisdictions.  Finally, we have identified several steps the agencies should take, and  Congress could consider, that could mitigate the effects on the agencies’  other programs of rising fire management costs.
subsections: section_title: Develop a Cohesive Strategy
paragraphs: If the agencies and Congress are to make informed decisions about an  effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire  problems that have been decades in the making, the agencies need a  cohesive strategy that identifies the options and associated funding for  reducing excess vegetation and responding to fires. By laying out various  potential approaches for addressing the growing wildland fire threat, the  estimated costs associated with each approach, and the trade-offs  involved, a cohesive strategy would help Congress and the agencies make  informed decisions about how to invest scarce funds.
We first recommended a cohesive strategy for addressing excess  vegetation in 1999. Subsequently, after evaluating a number of related  wildland fire management issues, we reiterated the need for a cohesive  strategy in 2005 and 2006 and broadened our recommendation to better  address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction efforts and wildland fire  response. The agencies have concurred with our recommendations to  develop a cohesive strategy but have yet to develop a strategy that clearly  formulates different approaches and associated costs. In July 2009,  agency officials told us they had begun planning how to develop a  cohesive strategy but were not far enough along to provide further  information. We were therefore unable to determine the extent to which it  might provide the information the agencies and Congress need to make  fundamental decisions about the best way for the nation to respond to the  growing wildland fire problem. Because of the critical importance of this  step in improving the agencies’ overall management of wildland fire, we  continue to believe that the agencies should complete a strategy, and  begin implementing it, as quickly as possible. The Federal Land  Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act, introduced in 2009,  would require the agencies to produce, within 1 year of its enactment, a  cohesive strategy consistent with our previous recommendations.
A document that included the critical elements of a cohesive strategy was  created in 2002: an analysis by a team of Forest Service and Interior  experts estimated the funds needed to implement each of eight different  fuel reduction options for protecting communities and ecosystems across  the nation over the next century. The team determined that reducing the  risks to communities and ecosystems across the nation could require an  approximate tripling of funding for fuel reduction, to about $1.4 billion  annually, for an initial period of several years. These initially higher costs  for fuel reduction would decline after fuels had been sufficiently reduced  to make it possible to use less expensive prescribed burning methods in  many areas. More important, the team estimated that the reduction in fuels  would allow the agencies to suppress more fires at lower cost and would  reduce total wildland fire management costs and risk after 15 years.  Alternatively, the team concluded, maintaining the then-current level of  investment in fuel reduction would increase costs, as well as risks to  communities and ecosystems in the long term.
The Office of Management and Budget raised concerns about the accuracy  of the long-term funding estimates used by the strategy document,  however, and Office of Management and Budget officials told us in 2006  that the agencies needed to have sufficiently reliable data before they  could publish a strategy with long-term funding estimates. Since that time,  the agencies have continued to improve their data by nearly completing  their LANDFIRE and FPA projects, laying important groundwork for  future progress. Our 2008 review of FPA, however, recognized that  although FPA represented a significant step forward and showed promise  in meeting several of its objectives, it had limited ability to examine the  long-term effects of differing funding allocation strategies—a shortcoming  that could limit FPA’s ability to contribute to the agencies’ development of  a cohesive strategy. In addition, the agencies’ abilities to develop  effective long-term options for reducing fuels will improve if they succeed  in their current efforts to measure the effectiveness and durability of  different fuel reduction treatments.
section_title: Establish a Cost- Containment Strategy
paragraphs: We reported in 2007 that although the Forest Service and the Interior  agencies had taken several steps intended to help contain wildland fire  costs, they had not clearly defined their cost-containment goals or  developed a strategy for achieving those goals—steps that are  fundamental to sound program management. Since our 2007 review, the  agencies have continued to implement individual cost-containment steps,  including the wildland fire decision support system and updated guidance  for implementing the federal wildland fire management policy, but they  have yet to develop clear cost-containment goals or a strategy for  achieving them, as we recommended in our 2007 report. Without such  goals and a strategy, we believe the agencies will have difficulty  determining whether they are taking the most important steps first, as well  as the extent to which the steps they are taking will help contain costs.
The Forest Service and Interior generally disagreed with the  characterization of many of our 2007 findings. In particular, they identified  several agency documents—including the 2001 Review and Update of the  1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and their 10-year  strategy to implement the National Fire Plan—that they argued clearly  define goals and objectives and that make up their strategy to contain  costs. Although the documents cited by the agencies provide overarching  goals and objectives, they lack the clarity and specificity needed by land  management and firefighting officials in the field to help manage and  contain wildland fire costs. Interagency policy, for example, established an  overarching goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost,  considering firefighter and public safety and the importance of resources  being protected, but the agencies have established neither clear criteria by  which to weigh the relative importance of the often-competing elements of  this broad goal, nor measurable objectives by which to determine if the  agencies are meeting the goal. As a result, despite improvements the  agencies continue to make to policy, decision-support tools, and oversight,  we believe that managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the  relative importance that the agencies’ leadership places on containing  costs and—as we concluded in our 2007 report—are therefore likely to  continue to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of the  costs of suppression. Forest Service officials told us in July 2009 that  although they are concerned about fire management costs, they are  emphasizing the need to select firefighting strategies on the basis of land  management objectives and reducing unnecessary risks to firefighters, an  emphasis that, in the long run, may also help contain costs. Nonetheless,  we continue to believe that our recommendations, if effectively  implemented, would help the agencies better manage their cost- containment efforts and improve their ability to contain wildland fire  costs.
section_title: Clearly Define Financial Responsibilities for Fires That Cross Jurisdictions
paragraphs: In 2006, we reported that federal and nonfederal officials had concerns  about how costs for suppressing fires that burn across federal, state, and  local jurisdictions were shared among federal and nonfederal entities and  that these concerns may reflect a more fundamental issue—that those  entities had not clearly defined their financial responsibilities for wildland  fire suppression, particularly those for the often costly efforts to protect  the wildland-urban interface. Nonfederal entities—including state  forestry entities and tribal, county, city, and rural fire departments—play  an important role in protecting communities and resources and  responding to fires. We reported in 2006, however, that federal officials  were concerned that the existing framework for sharing suppression costs  among federal and nonfederal entities, coupled with the availability of  federal emergency assistance, insulated state and local governments  from the cost of providing wildland fire protection in the wildland-urban  interface. As a result, state and local governments had less incentive to  adopt laws (such as building codes requiring fire-resistant building  materials in areas at high risk of wildland fire) that, in the long run, could  help reduce the cost of suppressing wildland fires. We therefore  recommended that the federal agencies work with relevant state entities to  develop more-specific guidance as to when particular cost-sharing  methods should be used and to clarify their respective financial  responsibility for fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple  jurisdictions. The agencies have updated their guidance on when  particular cost-sharing methods should be used, although we have not  evaluated the effect of this guidance. Still, the agencies have yet to clarify  the financial responsibility for fires that threaten multiple jurisdictions.
Our 2006 report identified two primary ambiguities regarding financial  responsibilities for fire suppression.
Federal wildland fire management policy states that protecting structures  is the responsibility of state, tribal, and local entities but it also states that,  under a formal fire protection agreement specifying the financial  responsibilities of each entity, federal agencies can assist nonfederal  entities to protect the exterior of structures threatened by wildland fire.  Forest Service guidance defines actions to protect the exterior of  structures to include removing fuels in the vicinity of structures and  spraying water or retardant on structures or surrounding vegetation.  Federal and nonfederal officials agreed that federal agencies can assist  with such actions, but they did not agree on which entities are responsible  for bearing the costs. Federal officials told us that the purpose of this  policy is to allow federal agencies to use their personnel and equipment to  help protect homes but not to bear the financial responsibility of providing  that protection. Nonfederal officials, however, said that these actions are  intended to keep a wildland fire from reaching structures, and financial  responsibility should therefore be shared between both federal and  nonfederal entities. The Forest Service developed new “structure  protection principles” in 2009, but these principles do not clarify the  financial responsibilities for suppression actions intended to protect  structures.
The presence of structures adjacent to federal lands can substantially alter  fire suppression strategies and raise costs. A previous report and agency  officials have questioned which entities are financially responsible for  suppression actions taken on federal lands but intended primarily or  exclusively to protect adjacent wildland-urban interface areas. Fire  managers typically use existing roads and geographic features, such as  rivers and ridgelines, as firebreaks to help contain wildland fires. If,  however, homes and other structures are located between a fire and such  natural firebreaks, firefighters may have to construct other firebreaks and  rely more than they would otherwise on aircraft to drop fire retardant to  protect the structures, thereby increasing suppression costs. Nonfederal  officials in several states questioned the appropriateness of assigning to  nonfederal entities the costs for suppression actions taken on federal  lands. They said that an accumulation of fuels on federal lands is resulting  in more-severe wildland fires and contributing to the increased cost of fire  suppression. They also said that federal agencies are responsible for  keeping wildland fires from burning off federal land and should therefore  bear the costs of doing so. Federal officials recognized this responsibility,  but some also said that with the growing awareness that wildland fires are  inevitable in many parts of the country, policy should recognize that  wildland fires will occur and are likely to burn across jurisdictional  boundaries. In their view, those who own property in areas at risk of  wildland fires share a portion of the financial responsibility for protecting  it. Previous federal agency reports have also recognized this issue and  called for clarifying financial responsibility for such actions.
Agency officials, in conjunction with officials from nonfederal entities,  including the National Association of State Foresters, have initiated an  effort intended to help clarify federal and nonfederal financial  responsibilities, although it is too early to determine if the effort will  succeed. Yet the continuing expansion of the wildland-urban interface and  the rising costs for protecting these areas make resolving these issues ever  more urgent. Unless the financial responsibilities for multijurisdictional  fires are clarified, the concerns that the existing framework insulates  nonfederal entities from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban  interface from fire—and that the federal government therefore continues  to bear more than its share of that cost—are unlikely to be addressed.
section_title: Mitigate Effects of Rising Fire Costs on Other Agency Programs
paragraphs: Rising wildland fire costs have led the Forest Service and the Interior  agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay for fire  suppression. The year-to-year variability in the number, location, and  severity of fires makes it difficult to estimate needed suppression funds  accurately, and when appropriated funds are insufficient to cover actual  suppression expenditures, the agencies are authorized to use funds from  their other programs to pay for emergency firefighting activities. We  reported in 2004 that from 1999 through 2003, the agencies transferred  more than $2.7 billion from these other programs. The Forest Service  transferred funds from numerous programs, including construction and  maintenance; the national forest system; and state and private forestry  programs that provide grants to states, tribes, communities, and private  landowners for fire and insect management, among other purposes.  Interior transferred funds primarily from its construction and land  acquisition programs. We have not examined this issue in detail since our  2004 report, but in 2009 we testified that funding transfers continued, with  the agencies transferring funds in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008.
Although the agencies received additional appropriations to cover, on  average, about 80 percent of the funds transferred, we found that the  transfers caused the agencies to cancel or delay some projects and fail to  fulfill certain commitments to their nonfederal partners. We reported, for  example, that funding transfers delayed planned construction and land  acquisition projects, which in some cases led to higher project costs due to  revised budget and construction plans or higher supply and land  acquisition costs. In one instance, the Forest Service delayed purchasing a  65-acre property in Arizona that it had planned to acquire for  approximately $3.2 million in 2002; it was able to purchase the property  about a year later, but the cost of the property had increased by $195,000.  Also, although funds were transferred to help the agencies suppress  wildland fires, among the delayed projects were ones to reduce fuels to  lower the fire risk to communities, construct new firefighting facilities,  and provide firefighting training courses.
To help the agencies address the impacts of funding transfers on other  agency programs, we recommended in 2004 that they take a number of  steps, including improving their methods for estimating annual  suppression costs. Typically, the agencies base their estimates of needed  suppression funding on the 10-year rolling average of fire costs—a  method with known problems. Although we noted in our 2004 report that  better estimates of the costs of suppressing fires in a given year would  reduce the likelihood that the agencies would need to transfer funds from  other accounts, the agencies continue to use the 10-year rolling average as  the foundation of their budget requests. Interior stated at the time that it  believed that the 10-year average was a “reasonable and durable basis for  suppression budgeting.” The Forest Service, however, concurred with our  recommendation. Nevertheless, a Forest Service official told us in 2008  that the agency had analyzed alternative methods for estimating needed  suppression funds but determined that no better method was available.  While we recognize that the accuracy of the 10-year average is likely to  improve as recent years with higher suppression costs are included in that  average, the need to transfer funds in each of the last 3 years suggests that  the agencies should continue to seek a more accurate method for  estimating needed suppression costs.
In addition to the actions we believe the agencies need to take, we have  also suggested that Congress consider legislating alternative approaches to  funding wildland fire suppression that could help reduce the need for the  agencies to transfer funds. As we reported in 2004, for example, Congress  could consider alternative funding approaches for wildland fire  suppression, including establishing a reserve account that the agencies  could access when their suppression accounts are depleted. Such an  account could provide either a specified amount (a definite appropriation)  or as much funding as the agencies need to fund emergency suppression  (an indefinite appropriation).
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. Establishing a reserve  account with a definite appropriation would provide the agencies with  incentives to contain suppression costs within the amount in the reserve  account, but depending on the size of the appropriation and the severity of  a fire season, suppression costs could still exceed the funds reserved, and  the agencies might still need to transfer funds from other programs. An  account with an indefinite appropriation, in contrast, would eliminate the  need for transferring funds from other programs but would offer no  inherent incentives for the agencies to contain suppression costs.  Furthermore, both definite and indefinite appropriations could raise the  overall federal budget deficit, depending on whether funding levels for  other agency or government programs are reduced. The Federal Land  Assistance, Management, and Enhancement bill would establish a  wildland fire reserve account; the administration’s budget for fiscal year  2010 also proposes a $282 million reserve account for the Forest Service  and a $75 million reserve account for Interior to provide funding for  firefighting when the appropriated 10-year average is exhausted.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: The agencies responsible for managing wildland fires on federal lands  have unquestionably improved their understanding of the nation’s  wildland fire problem and have positioned themselves to respond to fire  more effectively. Noteworthy advances include more flexible firefighting  strategies, better information and decision-making tools, and a more  coordinated approach. Yet it is not clear how much ground the agencies  have gained through these improvements, because at the same time the  agencies have been working to improve, the conditions contributing to the  nation’s fire problem have worsened—with increasing development in the  wildland-urban interface, a continued excess of accumulated fuels, and  growing evidence of the effects of climate change. The agencies have  recognized that additional, strategic action is needed if they are to get  ahead of the fire problem rather than simply react to it, but they have yet  to take the bold steps we believe are necessary to implement such a  strategic approach. Such steps—including implementation of a cohesive  strategy and efforts to better predict, contain, and share firefighting  costs—could, over time, allow the agencies to better prepare for, and  respond to, the severe wildland fire seasons to come. Without such steps,  the agencies risk failing to capitalize on the important, but incomplete,  improvements they have made—and risk losing ground in their fight to  manage the wildland fire problem.
We are making no new recommendations at this time. As noted, however,  we believe that our previous recommendations—which the agencies have  generally agreed with—could, if implemented, substantially assist the  agencies in capitalizing on the important progress they have made to date.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture and  the Interior for comment. Both the Forest Service and the Department of  the Interior agreed with the findings in the report. The Forest Service’s and  Interior’s written comments are reproduced in appendixes II and III,  respectively.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior; the Chief of  the Forest Service; the Directors of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of  Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service;  and other interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on  the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at  (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine progress the Forest Service and Department of the Interior  agencies have made in managing wildland fire, we reviewed pertinent  agency documents and our previous reports and testimonies. To identify  the agencies’ overall approach to managing wildland fires and any changes  they have made to that approach, we reviewed key agency documents,  including the 1995 and 2001 federal wildland fire management policies and  the key documents making up the National Fire Plan. To identify key steps  the agencies have taken to address the growing wildland fire problem and  any improvement resulting from these steps, we reviewed agency  documents and previous GAO reports and testimonies related to wildland  fire. To further our understanding of the changes in the agencies’ approach  to managing wildland fire and the steps they have taken to address the  problem—and to identify any additional agency efforts to improve their  wildland fire programs—we interviewed various agency officials,  including officials in Washington, D.C., and at the National Interagency  Fire Center in Boise, Idaho.
To determine the key actions we previously recommended and believe are  still needed to improve the agencies’ management of wildland fire, we  reviewed our previous reports and testimonies and identified steps we had  previously recommended the agencies take to improve their wildland fire  programs. In many cases, our earlier recommendations were based on our  review of agency documents and of independent analysis of the agencies’  programs (including reviews by the National Academy of Public  Administration and the National Association of State Foresters). To  determine the status of the agencies’ implementation of our  recommendations, we reviewed relevant agency documents and  interviewed agency officials.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to September  2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Agriculture, Forest Service
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Steve Gaty, Assistant Director;  David P. Bixler; Ellen W. Chu; Jonathan Dent; Richard P. Johnson; and  Kim Raheb made key contributions to this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Wildland Fire Management: Actions by Federal Agencies and Congress  Could Mitigate Rising Fire Costs and Their Effects on Other Agency  Programs. GAO-09-444T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2009.
Forest Service: Emerging Issues Highlight the Need to Address Persistent  Management Challenges. GAO-09-443T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2009.
Wildland Fire Management: Interagency Budget Tool Needs Further  Development to Fully Meet Key Objectives. GAO-09-68. Washington, D.C.:  November 24, 2008.
Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Lack Key Long- and Short- Term Management Strategies for Using Program Funds Effectively.  GAO-08-433T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2008.
Forest Service: Better Planning, Guidance, and Data Are Needed to  Improve Management of the Competitive Sourcing Program. GAO-08-195.  Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2008.
Wildland Fire Management: Better Information and a Systematic  Process Could Improve Agencies’ Approach to Allocating Fuel Reduction  Funds and Selecting Projects. GAO-07-1168. Washington, D.C.: September  28, 2007.
Natural Hazard Mitigation: Various Mitigation Efforts Exist, but  Federal Efforts Do Not Provide a Comprehensive Strategic Framework.  GAO-07-403. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2007.
Wildland Fire: Management Improvements Could Enhance Federal  Agencies’ Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires. GAO-07-922T.  Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2007.
Wildland Fire Management: A Cohesive Strategy and Clear Cost- Containment Goals Are Needed for Federal Agencies to Manage Wildland  Fire Activities Effectively. GAO-07-1017T. Washington, D.C.: June 19,  2007.
Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders  Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires.   GAO-07-655. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2007.
Department of the Interior: Major Management Challenges.   GAO-07-502T. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2007.
Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders  Agencies’ Cost-Containment Efforts. GAO-07-427T. Washington, D.C.:  January 30, 2007.
Biscuit Fire Recovery Project: Analysis of Project Development, Salvage  Sales, and Other Activities. GAO-06-967. Washington, D.C.: September 18,  2006.
Wildland Fire Rehabilitation and Restoration: Forest Service and BLM  Could Benefit from Improved Information on Status of Needed Work.  GAO-06-670. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing  of Costs between Federal and Nonfederal Entities. GAO-06-896T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns  about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities.  GAO-06-570. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop  a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats. GAO-06-671R.  Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006.
Natural Resources: Woody Biomass Users’ Experiences Provide Insights  for Ongoing Government Efforts to Promote Its Use. GAO-06-694T.  Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2006.
Natural Resources: Woody Biomass Users’ Experiences Offer Insights for  Government Efforts Aimed at Promoting Its Use. GAO-06-336.  Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Timely Identification of Long-Term Options  and Funding Needs Is Critical. GAO-05-923T. Washington, D.C.: July 14,  2005.
Natural Resources: Federal Agencies Are Engaged in Numerous Woody  Biomass Utilization Activities, but Significant Obstacles May Impede  Their Efforts. GAO-05-741T. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2005.
Natural Resources: Federal Agencies Are Engaged in Various Efforts to  Promote the Utilization of Woody Biomass, but Significant Obstacles to  Its Use Remain. GAO-05-373. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2005.
Technology Assessment: Protecting Structures and Improving  Communications during Wildland Fires. GAO-05-380. Washington, D.C.:  April 26, 2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Progress and Future Challenges, Protecting  Structures, and Improving Communications. GAO-05-627T. Washington,  D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Forest Service and Interior Need to Specify  Steps and a Schedule for Identifying Long-Term Options and Their  Costs. GAO-05-353T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but  Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy. GAO-05-147.  Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.
Wildland Fires: Forest Service and BLM Need Better Information and a  Systematic Approach for Assessing the Risks of Environmental Effects.  GAO-04-705. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004.
Federal Land Management: Additional Guidance on Community  Involvement Could Enhance Effectiveness of Stewardship Contracting.  GAO-04-652. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004.
Wildfire Suppression: Funding Transfers Cause Project Cancellations  and Delays, Strained Relationships, and Management Disruptions.  GAO-04-612. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004.
Biscuit Fire: Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and  Personnel Certification Standards. GAO-04-426. Washington, D.C.: April  12, 2004.
Forest Service: Information on Appeals and Litigation Involving Fuel  Reduction Activities. GAO-04-52. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2003.
Geospatial Information: Technologies Hold Promise for Wildland Fire  Management, but Challenges Remain. GAO-03-1047. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2003.
Geospatial Information: Technologies Hold Promise for Wildland Fire  Management, but Challenges Remain. GAO-03-1114T. Washington, D.C.:  August 28, 2003.
Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to Better  Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction. GAO-03-805.  Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2003.
Wildland Fires: Forest Service’s Removal of Timber Burned by Wildland  Fires. GAO-03-808R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2003.
Forest Service: Information on Decisions Involving Fuels Reduction  Activities. GAO-03-689R. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2003.
Wildland Fires: Better Information Needed on Effectiveness of  Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments. GAO-03-430.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the  Interior. GAO-03-104. Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003.
Results-Oriented Management: Agency Crosscutting Actions and Plans  in Border Control, Flood Mitigation and Insurance, Wetlands, and  Wildland Fire Management. GAO-03-321. Washington, D.C.: December 20,  2002.
Wildland Fire Management: Reducing the Threat of Wildland Fires  Requires Sustained and Coordinated Effort. GAO-02-843T. Washington,  D.C: June 13, 2002.
Wildland Fire Management: Improved Planning Will Help Agencies  Better Identify Fire-Fighting Preparedness Needs. GAO-02-158.  Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002.
Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to Reduce  Risks to Communities and Resources. GAO-02-259. Washington, D.C.:  January 31, 2002.
Forest Service: Appeals and Litigation of Fuel Reduction Projects.   GAO-01-1114R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
The National Fire Plan: Federal Agencies Are Not Organized to  Effectively and Efficiently Implement the Plan. GAO-01-1022T.  Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Reducing Wildfire Threats: Funds Should be Targeted to the Highest Risk  Areas. GAO/T-RCED-00-296. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2000.
Fire Management: Lessons Learned From the Cerro Grande (Los  Alamos) Fire. GAO/T-RCED-00-257. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2000.
Fire Management: Lessons Learned From the Cerro Grande (Los  Alamos) Fire and Actions Needed to Reduce Fire Risks.  GAO/T-RCED-00-273. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2000.
Federal Wildfire Activities: Issues Needing Future Attention.   GAO/T-RCED-99-282. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999.
Federal Wildfire Activities: Current Strategy and Issues Needing  Attention. GAO/RCED-99-233. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 1999.
Western National Forests: Status of Forest Service’s Efforts to Reduce  Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. GAO/T-RCED-99-241. Washington, D.C.:  June 29, 1999.
Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address  Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. GAO/RCED-99-65. Washington, D.C.:  April 2, 1999.
Western National Forests: Nearby Communities Are Increasingly  Threatened By Catastrophic Wildfires. GAO/T-RCED-99-79. Washington,  D.C.: February 9, 1999.