Regionally Aligned Forces: DOD Could Enhance Army Brigades' Efforts in Africa by Improving Activity Coordination and Mission-Specific Preparation
Published: 2015-08-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: In support of the Department of Defense's (DOD) increasing emphasis on strengthening partner nations' security forces, the Army is aligning its forces with geographic combatant commands to provide tailored, trained, and responsive forces to meet the commands' requirements. In 2013, AFRICOM became the first combatant command to be allocated an Army regionally aligned brigade combat team—the first of three to date—which was tasked to the command primarily to support security cooperation.
The House Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO assess DOD's efforts to plan for and employ these brigades in Africa. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which (1) AFRICOM has clearly identified and synchronized security cooperation activities for the brigades in Africa and (2) the brigades have been prepared to meet mission requirements in Africa. The term ‘synchronize' refers to coordination efforts by AFRICOM and its components to achieve unity of effort across the command. GAO reviewed documents and data and interviewed DOD and Department of State officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) identifies and synchronizes security cooperation activities through various planning processes, but the brigades allocated to AFRICOM sometimes lack key information about these activities. The brigades have conducted hundreds of security cooperation activities, such as exercises with partner nations, throughout Africa. As part of AFRICOM's planning processes, the Offices of Security Cooperation—located in U.S. embassies in Africa—work with U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) to identify and develop security cooperation activities based on the needs of the host nation and AFRICOM's objectives. The brigades are tasked to conduct many of these activities, but they sometimes lack timely and complete information about the activities, such as activity objectives, which can compromise their effectiveness. While personnel from USARAF and the Offices of Security Cooperation coordinate informally, they do not always have a shared understanding of the activity objectives or involve the brigades in planning. Furthermore, USARAF does not have a formal mechanism that includes both the Offices of Security Cooperation and the brigades to shape activities and address information gaps. As a result, the brigades' ability to conduct activities may be challenged, and the resources invested may not have the anticipated effect.
The brigades have been trained and equipped for their core missions, which has generally prepared them to meet requirements in Africa, but opportunities exist to enhance their mission-specific preparation. The brigades' core training is estimated to cover 90 to 95 percent of the skills needed to support activities in Africa. The brigades have developed regionally-focused, mission-specific training programs to cover the remaining skills. Some Army officials identified concerns about how this training is being supported, but the Army may not have the information it needs to address these concerns, because it has not completed an Army-directed assessment of training for regionally aligned forces. In addition, the brigades have experienced some equipment gaps, particularly in communications systems, because the Army has not fully identified mission-specific equipment requirements or established, or applied, a mechanism to ensure that brigades have the necessary equipment. Furthermore, the Army and the Department of State have not agreed on a process for providing official passports to brigade personnel before their employment period. As a result, the brigades have faced challenges in obtaining passports that have limited their ability to deploy the appropriate personnel to Africa. Without action on these issues, the brigades' ability to fully support the mission in Africa may be affected.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD develop a coordination mechanism to improve planning for activities, assess mission-specific training for aligned forces, identify and provide mission-specific equipment for the brigades, and that DOD and the Department of State coordinate on providing passports to the brigades. Both concurred with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing increasing emphasis on  engaging and strengthening partner nation security forces to deter  aggression and shape security environments around the world. In  accordance with this emphasis, the Army is regionally aligning its forces  to geographic combatant commands with the intent of providing tailored,  trained, responsive, and consistently available forces to meet combatant  command requirements, including operations, crisis response, and  security cooperation. The Army anticipates that proactive and sustained  engagement by regionally aligned forces will reduce the likelihood of  future conflict involving the United States by strengthening partner  nations’ abilities to respond to potential crises, and enhance the cultural  awareness and regional expertise of its forces. In fiscal year 2013, U.S.  Africa Command (AFRICOM) became the first geographic combatant  command to receive an Army regionally aligned force, when a brigade  combat team was allocated to the command primarily to support theater  security cooperation. According to AFRICOM and U.S. Army Africa  (USARAF) officials, allocating brigades through DOD’s standard process  for requesting forces—rather than separately requesting forces for each  individual activity that requires support—enables AFRICOM to more  efficiently and predictably access Army brigade capabilities to support  multiple security cooperation activities.
Although these reports were not about Army regionally aligned forces, we  have previously reported on challenges DOD has experienced in planning  and preparing forces to conduct security cooperation activities globally  and we have made recommendations to address these challenges. For  example, in 2012, we recommended that DOD provide additional  guidance to combatant commands to clarify how they should plan for and  track activities to build partner nation capability and capacity—also known  as security force assistance. In 2013, we recommended that theater  commanders establish clearer end states, objectives, milestones, and  mission specific information to guide advisors’ efforts in Afghanistan. We  have also made recommendations to DOD to improve the way in which  the military services track general purpose forces with advising  experience and to more clearly define capability, support, and equipment   DOD has taken some  requirements for advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan.actions in response to these recommendations, including more clearly  defining the capabilities required of advisors and facilitating advisors’  access to transportation and security, and providing additional guidance  to combatant commanders on planning for security force assistance  activities.
A report from the House Committee on Armed Services included a  provision that we assess DOD efforts to plan for and employ brigade  combat teams as regionally aligned forces (hereafter known as “the  brigades”) in Africa. For this report, we assessed the extent to which (1)  AFRICOM has clearly identified and synchronized security cooperation  activities for the brigades in Africa, (2) the brigades have been prepared  to meet mission requirements in Africa, and (3) the brigades have been  able to sustain core mission readiness while deploying for missions in  Africa.
To determine the extent to which AFRICOM has clearly identified and  synchronized security cooperation activities for the brigades in Africa, we  reviewed key documentation such as theater- and country-level plans,  guidance, and policy documents—including operations orders, task  orders, and brigade after-action reports. We also interviewed relevant  officials from AFRICOM, USARAF, the Combined Joint Task Force –  Horn of Africa, Offices of Security Cooperation from six U.S. embassies in  Africa, Army Forces Command, and the three brigades that have been  allocated to AFRICOM to date. To determine the extent to which the  brigades have been prepared to meet requirements in Africa, we  reviewed key documentation, such as execute and fragmentary orders,  training requirements, brigade training plans, operational needs  statements establishing equipment shortages, and passport regulations.  We also interviewed relevant officials from AFRICOM, USARAF, Army  Headquarters, Army Forces Command, the three brigades allocated to  AFRICOM to date and their parent divisions, and the Department of State  Bureau of Consular Affairs. To determine the extent to which the brigades  have been able to sustain core-mission readiness while deploying in  response to security cooperation and other requirements in Africa, we  reviewed readiness policies, Army guidance on readiness for regionally  aligned force units, and readiness data reported by the brigades in the  Defense Readiness Reporting System. We also interviewed officials from  Army Headquarters, Army Forces Command, and the three brigades  allocated to AFRICOM to date.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to August 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Engagement with Partner Nation Security Forces through Security Cooperation
paragraphs: DOD engages with partner nation security forces through a range of  security cooperation efforts. Security cooperation is the broad term used  to define those activities undertaken by DOD to build relationships that  promote specified U.S. interests, build partner nations’ capabilities for  self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with  peacetime and contingency access to host nations. These activities are  carried out under various statutory authorities and programs that allow  DOD to engage with partner nations across a range of activities, such as  sending out military liaison teams, conducting seminars and conferences,  and training and equipping partner nations’ security forces in support of  U.S. national policies and objectives. DOD also provides forces to support  the Department of State’s security assistance programs, such as the  Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. DOD  coordinates security cooperation activities with and through the  Department of State and its Embassy Country Teams.
section_title: AFRICOM’s Planning Processes
paragraphs: AFRICOM is one of DOD’s six geographic combatant commands and is  responsible for a variety of functions including planning for and  conducting missions such as security cooperation, humanitarian  assistance, and combat operations. AFRICOM is supported by its  component commands—USARAF, Air Forces Africa, Naval Forces Africa,  Marine Forces Africa, Special Operations Command Africa—which, along  with each of the military services, are responsible for organizing, training  and equipping their forces to execute AFRICOM operational  requirements. As part of its planning responsibilities, AFRICOM develops  a campaign plan, which is a joint, multiyear plan that reflects the  command’s strategy to achieve certain end states within its area of  responsibility, including activities to shape the environment and deter  conflict. This plan is informed by a hierarchy of national and strategic  guidance and guides the development, organization, and integration of  activities conducted in Africa. AFRICOM’s current campaign plan sets  forth specific lines of effort, such as countering violent extremist  organizations, strengthening defense institutions, and peacekeeping and  crisis response. The campaign plan also includes intermediate military  objectives, which are intended to be resource-informed, measurable, and  achievable objectives with a one-to-two year time horizon that build  toward the command’s identified end states. Subordinate campaign  plans, such as the East Africa Campaign Plan and individual country  cooperation plans, which are currently being developed, are intended to  further define and scope these intermediate military objectives by region  and country. In addition, AFRICOM’s country cooperation plans for each  country in Africa are intended to include objectives, focus areas, and  milestones that are specific to the country and identify the program  resources available to meet those objectives and milestones, which then  in turn drive the identification of individual security cooperation activities.These planning processes are depicted in figure 1 below.
AFRICOM’s security cooperation programs in Africa are coordinated  through Offices of Security Cooperation and Defense Attaché Offices in  approximately 38 nations. These offices are staffed by military personnel  and are located within the U.S. embassies. They manage DOD’s security  cooperation programs under the guidance of AFRICOM and serve as  DOD’s representatives to the U.S. Embassy Country Teams to ensure  that DOD activities conducted in country are coordinated with and through  the Department of State. Their mission is to enhance the long-term  bilateral defense relationship between the United States and the host  nation.
section_title: Army Brigades Allocated to AFRICOM
paragraphs: AFRICOM submits requests for forces to support its operations— including security cooperation activities—through the Global Force  Management process. The Global Force Management process enables  DOD to manage the availability of U.S. military forces by assigning and  allocating forces to meet rotational and emergent force requirements  within each geographic command. AFRICOM and USARAF officials said  that obtaining forces through this process to support individual security  cooperation activities can be slow and unpredictable because each  request for forces competes with requests from the other geographic  combatant commands and with other strategic priorities, which can make  it difficult for the commands to plan for security cooperation or respond to  emerging requirements.
To better support the combatant commands and be globally responsive  and regionally engaged, the Army is in the process of aligning its total  force to geographic combatant commands—including the Active  Component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves. Under its  regional alignment of forces policy, the Army has identified three  categories of aligned forces:
Assignment: Assigned forces are placed under a combatant  commander’s authority for a relatively permanent period of time at the  direction of the Secretary of Defense through the Global Force  Management process.
Allocation: Allocated forces are temporarily provided on a rotational  basis to combatant commands through the Global Force Management  process in response to specific requests for capabilities and at the  direction of the Secretary of Defense. Allocation conveys specific  authorities for the use of the forces by combatant commands. The  Army brigade combat teams aligned to AFRICOM since 2013 are  allocated forces.
Service Retained, Combatant Commander Aligned: All Army  forces that are not assigned or allocated fall into this category. This  type of alignment does not create any formal relationship between the  aligned forces and combatant commands but does allow for some  coordination between the two.
The allocation of a brigade to AFRICOM in 2013 was initiated in response  to AFRICOM’s request for a brigade combat team through the Global  Force Management system to conduct security cooperation and other  activities in support of its campaign plan. Historically, AFRICOM had to  submit a separate request for forces through the Global Force  Management process to support each individual security cooperation  activity that the command conducted. However, with this allocation,  AFRICOM was granted authority by the Secretary of Defense to utilize  personnel from the brigade to conduct individual security cooperation  activities in accordance with strategic guidance and within certain  timeframes. AFRICOM maintains accountability of the engagements by  producing and endorsing an annual operations order to the Joint Staff and  Army Forces Command. Any other use of the brigade, or request for  capabilities that the allocated brigade cannot provide, requires AFRICOM  to submit a new request for forces through the Global Force Management  system. Since 2013, three brigade combat teams have been allocated to  AFRICOM.
2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was the first brigade allocated to  AFRICOM and was employed in support of AFRICOM from April 2013  to June 2014.
4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was employed in support of  AFRICOM from June 2014 to February 2015.
4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division is expected to be employed in  support of AFRICOM from February 2015 to October 2015.
4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division was reflagged as 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division  during its employment in Africa as part of the Army’s ongoing restructuring initiatives, but  we will refer to it consistently as 4th Brigade throughout this report. 4th Brigade, 1st  Armored Division is also expected to have a shorter period of allocation as the Army is  moving toward using infantry or stryker brigades instead of armored brigades to support  the mission in Africa. of Africa, which required each brigade to deploy a battalion task force to  Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti for the duration of its alignment. These  battalion task forces also conduct some security cooperation activities in  support of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa. In addition,  the brigades have supported a significant number of activities for the  Department of State, such as providing units or individual mentors to train  African forces for peace keeping support operations. Figure 2 shows  personnel from the 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division conducting live fire  and search and seizure training in Senegal.
In addition to supporting AFRICOM-directed security cooperation  activities, Army guidance directs the brigades to maintain readiness for  their core missions—to fight and win “decisive action” operations globally.  Decisive action is broadly defined as tasks related to the continuous,  simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability or defense  support of civil authorities. To achieve and maintain readiness for  decisive action, the brigades conduct a combination of unit and individual  training. They report their core mission readiness monthly in the Defense  Readiness Reporting System, which provides the data that are used to  assess readiness in several areas, including personnel availability,  supply, equipment operability, and training.
section_title: AFRICOM Identifies and Synchronizes Security Cooperation Activities, but the Allocated Brigades Sometimes Lack Key Information about the Activities
paragraphs: The brigades have conducted a range of security cooperation activities  identified and synchronized through AFRICOM’s campaign planning  process. Within the construct of AFRICOM’s broader planning processes,  the Offices of Security Cooperation and USARAF have primary  responsibility to develop and coordinate individual security cooperation  activities conducted by the brigades based on theater- and country-level  objectives. However, the brigades sometimes lacked timely and complete  information required to effectively carry out these activities.
subsections: section_title: The Brigades Have Conducted Hundreds of Security Cooperation Activities throughout Africa
paragraphs: Since they were first allocated in 2013, the brigades have conducted  hundreds of security cooperation activities in Africa. These activities have  ranged in focus, duration, complexity, and location. Figure 3 below  provides information on the activities conducted by the brigades, including  some examples of specific activities, as reported by the brigades or  parent divisions.
AFRICOM, USARAF, the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa,  and U.S. embassy officials stated that the brigades’ availability and  capabilities have been an important tool for addressing increased  demand for security cooperation activities in Africa and supporting efforts  to enhance partner nation capabilities. During our review of after action  reports submitted by the 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, which was the  brigade allocated to AFRICOM during the majority of our review, brigade  personnel also generally reported that their efforts enhanced the partner  nations’ capabilities after the activity was completed. AFRICOM officials  told us that the Command is in the process of rewriting its intermediate  military objectives and developing associated measures of effectiveness  to assess security cooperation activity outcomes so that they can  ascertain the effect of these activities.
The Army and USARAF have also been examining other options for  meeting security cooperation requirements in Africa in the future. For  instance, USARAF has proposed that the Army make adjustments to the  alignment of forces in AFRICOM, including allocating or assigning an  entire division—which is substantially larger than a brigade—and either  assigning or habitually allocating units in order to maintain institutional  knowledge among forces and facilitate long-term relationships, among  other expected benefits. The Army also is examining the possibility of  creating a multi-functional battalion task force that could potentially be  allocated to AFRICOM to conduct smaller-scale security cooperation  activities. The degree to which such proposals may be implemented in  the future is unclear at this time.
section_title: AFRICOM’s Campaign Planning Process Includes Mechanisms to Improve Synchronization of Security Cooperation Plans and Activities across Components
paragraphs: Development of security cooperation activities begins with AFRICOM’s  planning process. AFRICOM’s campaign planning process includes  mechanisms to synchronize security cooperation activities across the  command. Planning for security cooperation involves multiple  stakeholders, including each of the service component commands,  AFRICOM’s special operations component, the Combined Joint Task  Force-Horn of Africa, program managers responsible for identifying  resources to support security cooperation activities, and the Offices of  Security Cooperation at U.S. embassies in Africa. Each of the  components and the task force plans for and conducts individual security  cooperation activities that are derived from the campaign planning  process, utilizing available forces.
AFRICOM officials said that synchronizing activities across the command  can be a challenge, but the command has taken several steps to refine  and synchronize security cooperation activities including establishing a  number of mechanisms as part of AFRICOM’s annual campaign planning  process. According to officials, these mechanisms are intended to  achieve unity of effort by the different stakeholders and to ensure that the  activities being conducted in Africa support the command’s identified  objectives. Such mechanisms include
Conferences: AFRICOM leads interagency conferences to discuss  theater- and country-level objectives, resources, and supporting  activities. For example, in September 2014, AFRICOM held its annual  Theater Synchronization Conference, which involved officials from  AFRICOM, its components, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of  Africa, and Offices of Security Cooperation. When we observed the  conference, theater, regional, and country objectives and supporting  activities were discussed and refined with the intention of  synchronizing planned activities within and across countries. Similarly,  in January 2015, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa held  its first annual Theater Security Cooperation Synchronization  Conference, which brought together planners from AFRICOM and the  service components, as well as the Offices of Security Cooperation to  refine and synchronize regional- and country-level objectives,  milestones, and security cooperation activities for the 10 countries in  the Task Force’s area of interest.
Guidance Related to the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of  Africa: With each of the components supporting activities in East  Africa, AFRICOM recently instructed the service components to  coordinate activities conducted in East Africa through the Combined  Joint Task Force’s headquarters to ensure that the Task Force has  visibility over efforts in its area of interest. The Combined Joint Task  Force has also established a Joint Activities Synchronization Board,  which it uses to validate and approve security cooperation activities to  ensure that they are aligned with the command’s objectives.
Country-Level Meetings: As part of AFRICOM’s process for  developing country plans, it holds country coordination meetings— typically for those countries with a large number of engagements— that include the components and officials from the host nation to  develop, review, and synchronize proposed security cooperation  activities in the broader context of country and regional goals. For  instance, the Office of Security Cooperation in Uganda held a  program review meeting with the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces  in December 2014 to discuss Ugandan capability needs and  coordinate security cooperation efforts for the coming year. Officials  said that while it would be beneficial to hold these in each country  annually, it is logistically difficult to do so. According to AFRICOM and  Department of State officials, each country plan should be reviewed  and validated by the corresponding U.S. embassy to ensure that  DOD’s objectives and supporting activities are aligned with and in  support of Department of State objectives and plans within that  country. The country plans also identify AFRICOM component  responsibilities for supporting key objectives, focus areas, and  milestones.
section_title: The Offices of Security Cooperation and USARAF Identify, Develop, and Support Individual Security Cooperation Activities for the Brigades to Conduct
paragraphs: Based on the objectives and end states identified through AFRICOM’s  broader planning processes, the Offices of Security Cooperation and  USARAF have key roles in identifying, developing, and supporting  individual security cooperation activities for the brigades.
Officials from AFRICOM, USARAF, and Offices of Security Cooperation  told us that the Offices of Security Cooperation generate many of the  initial concepts for security cooperation activities ultimately supported by  the brigades, based on their evaluation of the country-level objectives and  the force capability needs of the host nation. Because they are typically  located in the U.S. embassies, Office of Security Cooperation personnel  are often best positioned to inform country-level capability assessments  and coordinate with the host nations to identify their needs. For  example, one Office of Security Cooperation Chief stated that he routinely  attends security cooperation activities conducted by the U.S. forces in his  country, and that doing so provides him with an opportunity to assess the  performance of the country’s security forces. He uses this information to  develop ideas for further security cooperation activities. Offices of  Security Cooperation also represent the interests of the U.S. embassy  Country Team and are responsible for ensuring that security cooperation  activities conducted by DOD, including the brigades, are aligned with the  objectives and efforts of the U.S. Ambassador in that country.
Once proposed activities have been identified by the Offices of Security of  Cooperation, USARAF is responsible for further developing the concepts  for those activities in coordination with the Offices of Security  Cooperation, identifying resources and authorities to support the  activities, and validating the proposed activities in consideration of the  country-level objectives and in coordination with AFRICOM. USARAF has  established a working group and review boards to facilitate this process,  including a security cooperation working group to guide and coordinate  concept development, and synchronization, resourcing and final decision  boards that collectively review and determine whether to approve and  move forward with planning an activity. USARAF officials said that, in  addition to these mechanisms, component officials responsible for  planning activities are consistently engaged in informal conversations with  the Offices of Security Cooperation regarding the proposed activities.
Security cooperation activities that are identified and validated through  these processes are tasked to the brigades and other executing units on  both annual and emergent bases. USARAF provides an annual baseline  projection of validated security cooperation activities for the coming fiscal  year—via AFRICOM and Army Forces Command— to the brigades to aid   Emergent security cooperation activities may also  in their preparation.be generated for execution in the same fiscal year and are tasked to the  brigades on an individual basis as they are approved or through quarterly  updates to USARAF’s annual projection. For example, the United States  is in the process of equipping one country with Mine Resistant Ambush  Protected vehicles to support its deployments to Somalia, but late  changes to the location where the vehicles are being shipped was  expected to result in potential emergent requirements for the brigades, to  provide training to the host nation on those vehicles. According to  USARAF planning documents and officials, there are an increasing  number of emergent activities, which the brigades are being used to  support. USARAF officials told us that emergent activities accounted for  51 percent of 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division’s activities. AFRICOM  and USARAF officials attributed the number of emergent activities in  Africa to a dynamic planning environment with security threats and  opportunities that change quickly and to the uncertainty of funding,  among other factors. USARAF officials told us that as a result of this  environment, emergent activities may develop with limited warning,  challenging the command’s planning. Furthermore, planned activities are  frequently cancelled or delayed as a result of the dynamic environment.  For example, the 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division was tasked to support  188 baseline and emergent activities as of May 2015 according to brigade  documents. Of the 188 activities that the brigade was tasked with, 74  have been canceled and 26 placed on hold; USARAF officials said these  cancellations and delays are due mostly to changing conditions on the  ground that are driven by the host nation.
section_title: The Brigades Sometimes Lack Timely and Complete Information Necessary to Effectively Conduct Security Cooperation Activities
paragraphs: While USARAF and the Offices of Security Cooperation are responsible  for supporting the brigades’ preparation for the individual activities,  officials from each brigade also told us that the information they receive  for upcoming security cooperation activities is often untimely or  incomplete. USARAF is generally responsible for clarifying key  information about the activities with the Office of Security Cooperation  while the Office of Security Cooperation is responsible for discussing  activity logistics with the host nation, including who will attend, what  equipment is available, and where the activity will take place. To enhance  the brigades’ awareness of activities and facilitate coordination, the  brigades have each embedded a liaison officer with a small support team  inside USARAF’s headquarters. This team provides the brigades with  updated activity information and relays any questions the brigades may  have, among other things. In addition to the formal notifications that the  brigades receive, USARAF’s fiscal year 2015 Operations Order, which  establishes policies to guide USARAF’s planning efforts, states that  USARAF personnel are responsible for developing task orders for each  security cooperation activity.provide task orders to the brigades 90 days in advance of each activity to  guide their preparation. Task orders are intended to identify an activity’s  key details, such as the task, purpose, and desired end state.
USARAF officials noted that they try to  Although USARAF has a process in place to provide task orders to  executing units, we found that the brigades have not always received  activity information in a timely manner. Brigade officials told us that task  orders are often provided late and sometimes not at all. Specifically,  brigade officials from one team that deployed reported that they did not  receive a task order before deploying to conduct a logistics training  activity. These officials obtained a copy of the final task order through  alternative communication channels five days after arriving in country and  while brigade officials used previous experience to prepare as best as  they could, they did not receive a clear breakdown of the activities  objectives—which would have helped them develop a better program of  instruction—before deploying. USARAF officials said that while offices  responsible for planning and refining individual activities aim to provide  task orders 90 days in advance of an activity, they often provide them to  the brigades less than 30 days before execution, which in turn challenges  the brigades’ ability to prepare for the activity. According to officials, these  delays in providing some task orders are due to the challenges of  planning activities within a dynamic environment. USARAF officials also  said that while some task orders are very detailed, others may lack key  details due to a number of challenges including the planners’ ability to  confirm activity details with the host nation through the Offices of Security  Cooperation prior to the activity execution date or the increasing workload  of USARAF staff, who are often planning multiple activities at any one  time.
Officials from each brigade told us that the information they receive about  upcoming security cooperation activities is often untimely or incomplete.  The brigades may be aware before deploying that they do not have  complete information, but they are often unable to fully communicate and  collaborate with USARAF and the applicable Office of Security  Cooperation to get the information they need in the right time frame  because they may not have approval from USARAF to contact the Offices  of Security Cooperation directly or may not know whom to speak with at  USARAF. In other instances, the brigades may not know that there is an  information gap or miscommunication until they arrive in country. In  addition, officials from each brigade cited concerns regarding the  completeness of the information they receive before an activity, which  they said can affect their ability to effectively prepare for and conduct  security cooperation activities. Brigade officials identified the following  issues they have experienced:
Objectives unclear or inaccurate: Brigade officials cited instances  where activity objectives were not clearly articulated to them or where  they prepared to conduct one type of activity when the Office of  Security Cooperation and the host nation had expected them to  conduct a different activity. For example, one team deployed for an  activity with the understanding that they would be conducting artillery  training with the host nation, but when the team arrived in country it  discovered that it was supposed to conduct a site survey for future  training activities. This misunderstanding was not clear to the brigade,  the Office of Security Cooperation, or USARAF until the team arrived  in country. As a result, brigade officials had to work with the country  team to quickly revise their approach to the execution of the activity  and then return two months later to conduct the initially planned  activity. In an after-action report documenting this activity, brigade  personnel noted that earlier and more direct communication with  security cooperation personnel at the embassy are necessary to  confirm the purpose and intent of activities before execution. In the  case of another activity, brigade personnel deployed to conduct a  survey of training sites, plans, and logistics for future activities.  Brigade personnel noted that in the lead up to the activity it was  difficult to understand the purpose of their survey which made it  difficult to properly plan and prepare for the activity. The personnel  that conducted the activity stated that once the brigade is tasked with  an activity, it would be helpful for USARAF and the brigade personnel  executing the activity to discuss the activity in advance.
Personnel skill requirements not clearly defined: Brigade officials  cited instances where the activity information they received did not  clearly identify personnel skill requirements and that, as a result, the  brigades did not deploy the right personnel to fully conduct the  activity. For example, brigade officials who deployed to conduct  vehicle maintenance training said that they did not find out until two  weeks prior to deploying what type of vehicles they would be training  host nation personnel to maintain. As a result, they did not have  enough time to train their personnel specifically for maintaining those  types of vehicles before they deployed. Instead, they had to send  general mechanics, who, because they did not have expertise on the  specific vehicles themselves, were not fully prepared to train host  country personnel to maintain them.
Key information about host nation security forces’ capabilities  missing or incorrect: Brigade officials said that they often did not  have sufficient information about the host nation security forces’  capabilities to effectively target their training efforts, which forced  them to refine or develop new programs of instruction mid-event. For  example, brigade personnel deployed to provide field artillery training  to a host nation with the understanding that personnel attending the  training from the host nation would have at least a basic level of  proficiency that would enable brigade trainers to focus the activity on  refining and enhancing the host nation’s fire support skills. When  brigade personnel arrived in the host nation they learned that none of  the artillery personnel present had conducted live fire training with  their howitzers and other large caliber mortars in over a year. As a  result, brigade staff spent time developing follow-on artillery training to  bring the host nation’s live fire artillery skills to a basic proficiency  level, instead of working with the available artillery personnel to refine  and advance their abilities.
Logistics and support incorrect or uncoordinated: Brigade  officials noted instances where information about an activity—such as  translation services, equipment logistics and communications plans— was not fully coordinated before deploying. For example, brigade  officials deployed to a host nation to provide training on preparing  intelligence information and when they arrived in country they  discovered that they were required to pay for their interpreters and  drivers directly with cash, which was unexpected. Brigade personnel  were unable to use the local ATMs to obtain the cash, so an USARAF  official present had to cover the costs. Had the USARAF official not  been present, the brigade personnel may have had difficulty  completing the activity. In another example, brigade personnel  deployed to conduct vehicle maintenance training. However, when the  team arrived, the host nation asked to change the starting date twice  which the brigade personnel were not able to support. The brigade  personnel sent to conduct this activity noted in their after action report  that USARAF, the embassy, and host nation need to better coordinate  key activity logistics, such as the starting date.
USARAF and Office of Security Cooperation officials noted that they rely  on each other to develop and coordinate activities, but officials cited  challenges that limit their ability to do so. USARAF officials stated that the  Offices of Security Cooperation, which may be staffed by personnel from  different services (e.g., the Navy or Air Force), may not always know what  questions or information they should be communicating to the host nation  to effectively shape Army security cooperation activities. In addition,  according to USARAF and Office of Security Cooperation officials, the  increasing number of activities being conducted in Africa, coupled with  manning shortages, challenges the ability of the Offices of Security  Cooperation to fully coordinate individual activities with the host nation,  AFRICOM, USARAF, the other service components, and DOD executing  units, including the brigades. Furthermore, Office of Security Cooperation  personnel stated they may have limited insight into the development and  validation of security cooperation activities proposed by USARAF, which  makes it challenging to coordinate and refine activities. For instance, one  Office of Security Cooperation chief noted that he had proposed several  activities based on his assessment of the host nation’s security forces,  but he received a list of approved activities from USARAF that was  significantly different and was unaware of how those activities had been  developed and why certain capabilities were being targeted. Another  Office of Security Cooperation chief said that he sometimes receives  activity proposals from AFRICOM and its components that, particularly for  emergent activities, do not include specifics on the activity. This lack of  information challenges his ability to coordinate those activities with the  host nation. In those instances, he said that he will ask for greater details  on the activity or put such activities on hold until he can obtain sufficient  information from the component.
According to the Army’s Field Manual for Army Support to Security  Cooperation, security cooperation personnel should have a clear and  timely understanding of their objectives and operational environment to  effectively plan and conduct their activities. Furthermore, according to  GAO leading practices for interagency coordination, when coordination  mechanisms are not formalized or fully utilized, the result can be a  patchwork of activities that waste scarce funds and limit the effectiveness  of missions. Defining coordination mechanisms can help agencies  clarify key details about strategy implementation, such as the purpose of  an activity.
Brigades sometimes lack complete and timely information, which they  need to effectively conduct activities, because USARAF, which is  responsible for formally validating security cooperation activities, has not  established a formal mechanism to consistently share information with  country stakeholders such as the Office of Security Cooperation and the  brigades in order to address information gaps and shape the activity in  advance. Conferences like AFRICOM’s Theater Synchronization  Conference can provide an opportunity to discuss and synchronize  activities on an annual basis, but the significant number of emergent  activities and frequent changes to planned activities limits their  effectiveness for refining the details of activities leading up to execution.  Further, while USARAF’s fiscal year 2015 Operation Order identifies the  need to coordinate activity concepts with the Offices of Security  Cooperation, it does not specify a clear mechanism for doing so and  USARAF, the Offices of Security Cooperation, and the brigades lack a  collective venue for coordination, which they would need in order to  respond to dynamic activity requirements and to ensure a shared   For instance, officials said that  understanding of critical information.USARAF planners and the Offices of Security Cooperation informally  contact one another on an individual basis to discuss proposed activities,  but they do not consistently and formally meet to discuss upcoming  activities. Furthermore, the brigades are rarely involved in these informal  conversations and often do not have the authority to contact the Offices of  Security Cooperation directly until shortly before they deploy. Given the  challenges faced by the Offices of Security Cooperation, Office of  Security Cooperation officials said that the best method for refining  activity concepts and ensuring that they are completed in a timely manner  is to hold a meeting where key stakeholders can discuss activity details in  advance. Such a meeting could also help to refine the task orders that  USARAF issues to the brigades to ensure that they capture all critical  information and could provide an additional venue to further improve  synchronization of activities within AFRICOM. Figure 4 depicts the  fragmented way in which activity information is coordinated between  USARAF, the Offices of Security Cooperation, and the brigades.
Without a formal and consistent mechanism for stakeholders to  coordinate upcoming activities and ensure that information about the  activities is timely and complete, the brigades’ ability to effectively  conduct security cooperation activities may be challenged and the  resources invested may not have the anticipated effect.
section_title: The Brigades Have Generally Been Prepared to Meet Requirements in Africa, but Limitations Exist With Regard to Mission-Specific Training, Equipping, and Access to Passports
paragraphs: The brigades have been trained and equipped for their core decisive- action missions, which has generally prepared them to meet requirements  in Africa. The brigades conduct decisive-action training for their core  missions and then augment this training with programs they develop  specifically to prepare for deployments to Africa, but opportunities exist to  enhance training for the allocated brigades. All three of the brigades that  have been allocated to AFRICOM to date have experienced gaps in  communications capabilities, because mission-specific equipment  requirements for operating in Africa have not been clearly identified, and  no consistent mechanism has been established to ensure that brigades  have mission-specific equipment as they begin their missions. In addition,  delays in obtaining official passports have affected the brigades’ ability to  meet certain time and personnel requirements, sometimes leading to  delayed activities or the deployment of personnel not considered the best- suited for the activity—simply because they had passports.
subsections: section_title: Concerns Identified About Mission-Specific Training Programs that Augment Decisive-Action Training and Support Requirements in Africa
paragraphs: The brigades are expected to train for both their decisive-action and  AFRICOM-directed missions. To help accomplish this, Army Forces  Command has published Regionally Aligned Forces Pre-Deployment  Training Requirements to identify the decisive-action and mission-specific  training required for regionally aligned force units, including the brigades  allocated to AFRICOM. The brigades develop training programs to  address these requirements, but Army stakeholders have identified some  concerns about how brigade training is being conducted, supported, and  funded.
subsections: section_title: Brigades Develop Decisive- Action and Mission-Specific Training
paragraphs: To date, three brigade combat teams have conducted both decisive- action and mission-specific training for deployments to Africa in support of  AFRICOM and based on Army Forces Command guidance. The allocated  brigades first conduct decisive-action training for their standard  missions—including a rotation through one of the Army’s Combat Training  Centers—in order to remain globally responsive. Army and brigade  officials estimated that decisive-action training also addresses about 90 to  95 percent of the training required to support security cooperation and  other activities in Africa. In addition, the Army Forces Command training  requirements identify regionally-focused training to augment decisive- action training and prepare the allocated brigades to conduct security  cooperation activities. This training includes regionally-focused culture,  language, use of interpreters, non-standard weapons, and peace-keeping  support operations, among other things.
There is no standardized program of instruction for brigades allocated to  AFRICOM, although individual organizations that support training may  have standardized program offerings. Brigade commanders are expected  to utilize the Army Forces Command training requirements as they  analyze their missions to develop training for their units that will address  both their decisive-action and AFRICOM mission-specific requirements.  In some cases, the requirements specify how the brigades are to train for  their missions in Africa, such as identifying which organization is to  provide the training; in other cases, they do not. When no specific  program is identified, the brigades have flexibility in determining how to  meet the mission-specific training requirements. Figure 5 is a general  time line of the brigades’ decisive-action and mission-specific training.
To address tasks not covered as part of decisive-action training, Combat  Training Center rotation, or through other specifically identified training  organizations, each of the brigades has developed a mission-specific  training program at its homestation. For example, as the first brigade  allocated to AFRICOM, the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division developed a  5-day program referred to as Dagger University that included courses on  the region, language, use of interpreters, embassy operations, and how to  build rapport with partner nation forces. It also included situational  exercises with cultural role players and simulated key leader  engagements. The brigade used a number of external resources to  develop this training, including the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, the  Army Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center, the Asymmetric  Warfare Group, and the African Studies Department from nearby  Kansas State University, which provided African cultural expertise and  role players. The 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division created a similar  program that it referred to as Dragon University. The 4th Brigade, 1st  Armored Division also developed a program at its homestation referred to  as Highlander University, but this program did not incorporate external  training organizations—such as Army Training and Doctrine Command—  to the same extent. Figure 6 shows brigade personnel first conducting  mission-specific training at their homestation with the assistance of a role  player and then interacting with security forces from Burkina Faso in  2014.
USARAF, Army Forces Command, and brigade officials have generally  expressed confidence in the brigades’ capabilities to develop and execute  mission-specific training—with assistance from external organizations in  certain key areas where they do not have organic expertise, such as  peace-keeping operations and non-standard weapons. One brigade  commander noted when a brigade manages its own mission-specific  training rather than using a standardized curriculum it can maintain  scheduling flexibility, and young leaders reap benefits as they learn to  plan and develop training programs based on analyzing missions.
However, Army stakeholders from a range of organizations have  identified some concerns about how mission-specific training for  regionally aligned forces is being conducted, supported, and funded, and  in some cases they identified areas for improvement. For example, the  Army held a Regionally Aligned Forces Table Top Exercise in December  2014 that included participants from across the Army to discuss  challenges related to the implementation of the regionally aligned forces  concept. One of the findings from this exercise was that the current unit  approach to conducting mission-specific training is ad hoc, unfunded (i.e.,  no dedicated funding) and likely insufficient to meet all training  requirements. The table top exercise also found that there is limited or  poorly advertised institutional support for security cooperation and culture   Findings from the  and language training for regionally aligned units.table top exercise recommended that the Army identify capabilities to  support regionally aligned forces training and facilitate unit training at  homestation, including related funding. In addition, officials from Army  Training and Doctrine Command said the brigades may not be aware of  all of the training resources that exist in the Army and the extent to which  the units take advantage of those resources is largely unit driven. For  example, one Army Forces Command official said that the 85th Civil  Affairs Brigade has expertise and training capabilities that the allocated  brigades could leverage in support of their training programs, but it is not  clear to what extent the allocated brigades are aware of this potential  support. These officials noted that the Army does not have an entity to  coordinate all of the organizations that can support training for regionally  aligned forces consistently through different brigade rotations and may  need a central organization with expertise to serve that function.
In addition to providing training to regionally aligned forces, the 3rd Battalion, 353rd  Regiment has also been tasked with other missions, such as training individuals and  teams of advisors deploying to Afghanistan. from 2nd Brigade and 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. According to  documentation provided by 162nd Brigade officials, these training teams  were funded by the 162nd and incorporated other enablers, such as  contractors with regional expertise and the Army Training and Doctrine  Command Culture Center. Officials from 3rd Battalion said that the  battalion expects to be able to fund its own instructor and travel costs  related to the trainings, but future allocated brigades will likely have to  fund the costs of additional training enablers to augment these courses,  such as contractors with regional cultural expertise. According to battalion  officials, if brigades have to pay for the additional enablers, they might be  less likely to use them, and the region-specific training might not be as  extensive.
In an effort to determine whether its mission-specific training approach for  the regionally aligned forces was sufficient, the Army issued guidance in  2013 that established a requirement for Army Forces Command, with  support from other Army training organizations, to conduct an  assessment of the training and preparation of regionally aligned force  units by January 2014, with follow-up assessments every six months.  We have previously reported that training assessments provide  opportunities to enhance the coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency of  training. However, the Army may not have all of the information that it  needs to make this determination or address stakeholder concerns  because, as of March 2015, Army Forces Command had not completed  this assessment. When we asked why the assessment had not been  completed, officials from Army Forces Command said that the mission the  brigades are conducting is not new and does not require a special  assessment, as was initially thought when the requirement was  established. In addition, these officials noted that every unit is currently  assessed through brigade-level after-action reviews and the  documentation of lessons learned. While an individual unit after-action  review provides valuable insights on unit experiences, it may not provide  the breadth of information necessary to address some of the concerns  that were cited at the Army’s table top exercise or by other stakeholders.
Given that three brigades have completed mission-specific training for  AFRICOM-directed activities, and other brigades have been conducting  training for missions in other geographic combatant commands, the Army  should now be positioned to conduct an overall assessment of its  approach to training aligned forces. The Army’s 2013 Fragmentary Order  to the Regionally Aligned Forces Execute Order includes a framework for  the required assessment that specifies assessment questions for aligned  units and training enablers—for example, how training is certified and  whether the training is sufficient—and identifies collection methods that  provide a base of information, which could be expanded upon to include  additional questions and information sources, in order to address the  concerns about the training that have been identified by various  stakeholders. The Army has also commissioned the RAND Corporation to  conduct a study on the estimated operational and institutional support  costs of regionally aligned forces, including training costs. This study is  expected to be published in August 2015 and could further inform the  Army’s assessment of its training approach. Absent an assessment of the  allocated brigades’ mission-specific training that expands upon the  framework the Army established in its 2013 fragmentary order and fully  considers the training concerns that have been identified, such as the  degree to which institutional-level coordination or management of training  is needed and how training programs should be funded going forward,  and whether adjustments to its training approach are needed, the Army  may be missing opportunities to enhance the effectiveness and  sufficiency of training for brigades allocated to AFRICOM.
section_title: The Brigades’ Standard Equipment is Generally Sufficient to Support Activities in Africa but Gaps in Mission-Specific Equipment Remain
paragraphs: The brigades allocated to AFRICOM have largely relied on their standard  set of equipment to support their mission in Africa but have identified  some capability gaps. The brigades are each equipped with the standard  set of equipment needed to support their core decisive-action missions;  they can leverage this equipment to support deployments in support of  AFRICOM. According to Division and USARAF officials, the brigade’s  standard equipment set is generally sufficient for the mission in Africa.  However, all three of the brigades have identified some capability gaps  related to equipment—in particular communications equipment needed to  maintain command, control, and voice and data communications  capabilities while operating in Africa. While the brigades’ standard  equipment sets include communications equipment to support brigade  and battalion-sized headquarters elements and for use in conjunction with  large vehicles, they are not designed to support the many deployments by  small teams required for the AFRICOM mission. Communications  capability gaps can create risk for deployed teams by limiting their access  to communications they need for operational control and safety and  limiting the Commander’s situational awareness of deployed teams.  Some of the communications equipment needs identified by the brigades  are:
Secure Internet Protocol Router/Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router  Access Points, which are designed to provide satellite  communications to small units at remote forward locations; mobile communications terminals that provide secure and non-secure  internet service and can be transported with personnel on commercial  airlines; and high-frequency radios that are compatible with those of African  partner nations and can be used for training and exercises.
USARAF has been able to provide some communications equipment to  the brigades, such as satellite phones, local cellular phones, locator  beacons, and a mobile communications system, but USARAF officials  told us that the equipment they could provide was not sufficient for the  numerous brigade missions. The brigades were able to acquire much of  the remaining equipment they needed for mission-specific  communications through the Army’s operational needs statement  process, which operational commanders can use to document urgent  needs for nonstandard capabilities and request capabilities to correct a  deficiency or enhance mission accomplishment.
In addition to the communications equipment gaps for which the brigades   they  requested equipment through operational needs statements,experienced other mission-specific equipment gaps, such as water  purification systems, mosquito nets, cots, and medical supplies. Unit  officials said that this type of equipment was obtainable without much  difficulty through the Army’s supply system or the Army’s rapid fielding  initiative.
subsections: section_title: The Army Has Not Fully Identified and Supplied Mission-Specific Equipment Needs in a Timely Manner
paragraphs: According to Army officials, the Army has policies and procedures that,  when applied, can be used to fill the gaps between standard equipment  sets and mission-specific equipment. For example, the brigades have  been able to fill many of the communications equipment gaps that they  identified by submitting operational needs statements, but in some cases  delays in identifying these requirements—along with the process for  validating and providing the equipment—have resulted in mission-specific  equipment arriving late in the brigades’ mission so that the brigades have  had to operate without it. For example,
The 1st Infantry Division submitted an operational needs statement for  six Secure Internet Protocol Router/Non-Secure Internet Protocol  Router Access Points in October 2013 to support brigade missions in  Africa, as well as the Division’s own mission in Africa; the request  was approved in November 2013, but the division did not receive  these items until May/June 2014—the end of 2nd Brigade’s mission.
The 1st Infantry Division submitted a request for high-frequency  radios for the 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in May 2014, but the  brigade did not receive them until December 2014—just before the  mission was assumed by the next brigade.
As of late April 2015—two months after assuming the mission— 4th  Brigade, 1st Armored Division still had not received two of the three  communications equipment items that the brigade requested through  the operational needs statement process.
The justifications supporting these equipment requests described the  risks to the brigades of not having such equipment, including limiting their  ability to conduct command and control; communications; and  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance without the requested  Access Points and to train and prepare to operate a multi-national radio  network with African nations without the high-frequency radios.
The brigades have experienced capability gaps, because the Army has  not fully identified the mission-essential equipment required for the  brigades to operate in Africa as allocated forces throughout their period of  employment and has not provided this equipment to the brigades in a  timely manner. Army Forces Command guidance states that allocated  units are to be equipped according to the appropriate requirements  document for their mission—either their standard equipment set or a  mission-essential equipment list, which is a tool the Army can use to  address missions outside the scope of a unit’s standard equipment set.  This guidance further states that the Army Service Component  Command—USARAF in this case—is responsible for identifying mission- essential equipment that is not included as part of a unit’s standard  equipment set. In September 2012, we reported that identifying and  validating needs and clearly establishing well-defined requirements can  improve outcomes when managing programs. USARAF officials said  that no requirements had been initially identified, because it was not clear  what mission-specific equipment would be required when brigades were  initially allocated and beginning to operate in Africa. Officials said that  USARAF is working on developing communications equipment  requirements for the brigades and should be better positioned to fully  identify mission-specific equipment requirements after the current brigade  rotation, although they do not believe that mission-specific equipment  requirements are extensive.
section_title: Mission-Specific Equipment Not Consistently Transferred or Provided to Follow-on Units
paragraphs: When the brigades obtain mission-specific equipment through operational  needs statements to support their mission in Africa, this equipment is not  consistently transferred to the follow-on unit to support its activities, for  various reasons. In some cases, equipment obtained by the 1st Infantry  Division to support requirements in Africa was purchased by the Army  and thus it was transitioned to 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division (e.g.,  high frequency radios), but other equipment was not transferred because  it was purchased by 1st Infantry Division and added to its property book,  or the transfer has been delayed. For example, the 1st Infantry Division  had purchased several Secure Internet Protocol Router/Non-Secure  Internet Protocol Router Access Points with its own funds in order to  support division and brigade missions in Africa. Rather than transition this  equipment to the follow-on brigade, the division is currently utilizing it for  its mission in Iraq. As a result, the 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division  submitted an Operational Needs Statement for these same items, but  brigade officials said their request was rejected and, as of April 2015, they  are still operating without these items. As another example, officials  from 1st Infantry Division said that while a number of satellite phones  were being transferred to the 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division,  attachments for the phones that facilitate secure communications were  only on loan to the Division and would not be transitioning with the  phones. Moreover, the transfer of the phones had been administratively  delayed and the brigade did not receive the majority of the phones until  early April 2015, even though it had assumed the mission in February  2015. USARAF officials said that for the equipment that USARAF has  provided to the units, they are working with Army Forces Command for it  to assume responsibility for training personnel on the equipment and  transferring it between the brigades, but this has not yet been fully  coordinated. Additionally, a USARAF official said that USARAF had  obtained five additional Secure Internet Protocol Router/Non-Secure  Internet Protocol Router Access Points in May 2015, three of which  USARAF plans to rotate among the brigades to support security  cooperation activities in Africa, although the details for how this process  will work are not yet fully determined.
The current allocated brigade has experienced communication capability  challenges similar to those experienced by the initial brigades because, in  addition to not fully identifying requirements, the Army has not  established, or applied, a consistent mechanism to ensure that the  brigades allocated to AFRICOM have the required mission-essential  equipment at the start of their mission, whether through a coordinated  transition of equipment between brigades or through other means.  Further, while Army Forces Command guidance directs allocated forces  to utilize the operational needs statement process to address gaps in  mission-essential equipment, the challenges experienced by the brigades  in obtaining equipment through this process demonstrate the limitations of  relying fully on this approach. For example, Army Headquarters officials  said that one of the challenges of obtaining non-standard equipment  through Operational Needs Statements is that the process does not  include clearly associated sustainment or training plans, whereas formal  requirements documents, such as mission-essential equipment lists are  developed with these considerations in mind.
To address the gaps in mission-essential equipment that the brigades  have experienced, brigade and division officials have suggested that the  Army establish a consistent mechanism to ensure that each successive  brigade receives all mission-specific equipment at the outset of its  mission, such as a mission-essential equipment set that is centrally- funded, maintained and rotated among brigades. The 4th Brigade, 1st  Infantry Division developed a recommended list of equipment for such a  set, which includes communications equipment as well as other  equipment not included in the brigade’s standard equipment sets that the  brigade needed during its mission. This equipment included such items  as mosquito nets, and laptops with the capabilities required to support  exercises. The brigade stated that brigades need homestation access to  this mission-essential equipment. Stakeholders at the Army’s Regionally  Aligned Forces Table Top Exercise also recommended that the Army  identify mission-specific equipment acquisition, training, maintenance,  and turnover policies for equipment requirements identified by the  combatant commands. According to Army headquarters officials, a  working group looked at regionally aligned force equipping issues and  determined that the Army has existing policies, guidance, and procedures  that, when applied, are sufficient to address mission-specific equipment  needs, but more education regarding those policies, guidance,  procedures, and processes is necessary to ensure that brigades’  equipping needs are being met in a timely manner.
Without clearly identified, mission-specific equipment requirements and  the establishment, or application, of a consistent mechanism for ensuring  that brigades consistently receive mission-specific equipment at the  outset of their missions, future brigades allocated to AFRICOM will likely  continue to experience the same capability gaps and may repetitively  request the same types of equipment, resulting in both inefficiencies and  potential risk that brigades will not have the appropriate equipment to  operate effectively in Africa.
section_title: Challenges and Delays in Obtaining Official Passports Have Affected Brigades’ Ability to Meet Requirements
paragraphs: The brigades have experienced challenges and delays in obtaining official  passports that have affected their ability to deploy to meet requirements  in Africa because, in part, AFRICOM activity timeframes do not always  facilitate timely compliance with Department of State passport  procedures. Servicemembers are generally required to use official  passports to enter and exit a foreign country while performing official  duties; although in some countries, bilateral agreements enable  servicemembers to enter the country on their military orders.
subsections: section_title: Challenges Processing Large Numbers of Passport Applications
paragraphs: According to unit officials, the brigades had challenges at the installation  level processing the volume of passport applications as well as quality  control issues related to the applications. Most DOD installations have  DOD passport agents who process official passport applications, however  the volume of passport applications submitted to support the brigades’  AFRICOM mission far exceed the number of applications these offices  are staffed to process. For example, officials from the Fort Bliss passport  office said that the office typically processes approximately 2,500  passports a year; however they estimated that their office had received  and processed approximately 4,000 passport applications between  October 2014 and February 2015 and brigade officials said that  approximately 2,500 of the 4,000 passport applications processed were  submitted in support of the 4th Brigade’s mission in Africa. Army officials  said that the number of passport applications submitted by the brigades  has also challenged the Department of State’s processing capacity.
In addition, officials from the Fort Bliss passport office, the Department of  State, and Army Logistics Services Washingtonbrigade personnel filled out applications incorrectly. For example, brigade   cited instances where  personnel sometimes submitted passport applications to travel to  countries that do not require passports for military personnel, and the  Department of State rejected those applications. In response to these  challenges, the Army has taken steps to improve passport application  processes for regionally aligned force units, such as issuing guidance on  the process for obtaining passports and providing templates for brigades  to use in submitting passport applications. This guidance also identifies a  training course that personnel from aligned units can take to enable them  to support passport and visa application processes and assist with quality  control.
section_title: AFRICOM Activity Timeframes May Not Align with Passport Regulations
paragraphs: Division and brigade officials said that even with the Army’s efforts to  address the volume and quality of passport applications, the brigades  face continuing challenges obtaining passports because AFRICOM  activity timeframes do not always facilitate timely compliance with  Department of State passport procedures, which require information on  destinations, dates, and often supporting travel orders to clearly establish  an applicant’s need to travel to a specific country that requires a passport  for entry. The brigades typically used one of two application types— routine or expedited. Army officials who used these processes said that  normal processing time for routine passport requests was approximately  6-10 weeks, while the processing time for expedited passport requests  averaged about 2-4 weeks. Each of the brigades initially attempted to  process passport applications for a significant number of their personnel  before assuming the mission, but unit officials said that the sheer number  of applications being submitted by the brigades caused Department of  State officials to question whether the passports were actually required.
Officials from the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs said  the military was previously submitting a high volume of requests for  official passports for entire units through a Department of State waiver  process that allowed units blanket authority to apply for passports without  identifying a specific travel destination. Officials said that the high volume  of passport requests also created a backlog in passport processing, and  while the military does not pay a fee for official passports, there are costs  associated with processing applications and issuing passports, which  officials estimate to amount to approximately $110 per passport. These  costs get passed on to the general public. In addition, officials said that  thousands of passports obtained by DOD were being returned unused.  For instance, between October 23, 2014 and November 5, 2014, the  Bureau’s Special Issuance Agency reviewed 1,689 no-fee passports— 1,426 of them official passports—that were returned for proper disposition  and found that approximately 55 percent of these passports had never  been used. Of the 920 passports that had never been used, the agency  estimated that 482 were from DOD. As a result of these issues, the  Department of State determined that it needed to be more stringent in  reviewing passport applications, to ensure that the applicants had a  validated requirement for official passports. Subsequently, the  Department of State signed a Memorandum of Understanding with DOD  in 2012 that invalidated existing unit blanket-waiver letters and required  specific destination information to process individual official passport  applications for military personnel except in specific circumstances. In  addition, Department of State officials stated that on a case-by-case  basis, the Special Issuance Agency may request travel orders to validate  entitlement to an official passport; Army officials said that the Department  of State is requesting travel orders routinely in the case of the allocated  brigades.
However, brigades do not always receive deployment orders—required to  generate travel orders—for activities in time to apply for passports.  Brigade and division officials said that the brigades have been tasked with  many emergent activities with execution dates that leave little time to  apply for passports. They also said that the brigades are often informally  notified in advance of activities for which they are to prepare. However,  the activity may not be finalized and personnel may not have the official  deployment orders necessary to apply for passports until weeks or even  days before deployment. Officials from the 1st Infantry Division and 1st  Armored Division said that they employed different tactics to work around  the Department of State’s constraints with varying degrees of success.  For example, 1st Infantry Division officials said that they submitted a  memorandum signed by a 1st Infantry Division general officer stating that  any applications accompanying it were in support of validated  deployments, but this was rejected by the Department of State, which  division officials said continued to require official orders showing  personnel deploying into a country that required official passports for  entry. 1st Armored Division officials, on the other hand, said that they had  success working with Department of State officials to find a solution that  involved attaching the general Army Forces Command deployment order  for the 4th brigade’s overall mission to an AFRICOM administrative  message identifying the list of projected activities as of January 2015.  This method was successful, although the administrative message did not  include requirements for emergent activities. Brigades also had to utilize  workarounds, such as submitting passport applications for more  personnel than were actually needed for a specific event in order to try to  build a pool of personnel with official passports that could be used for  emergent requirements or to provide flexibility for planned events.
section_title: Delays in Obtaining Passports Have Affected Missions
paragraphs: The brigades’ inability to obtain adequate numbers of official passports in  advance has resulted in some adverse effects for the brigades. For  example, many countries in Africa require visas to enter the country.  While the visa application process is controlled by the host country and  varies by country, personnel cannot apply for a visa until they have a  passport. Thus, a delay in obtaining a passport places further time  pressures on the already constrained visa process, causing some  activities to be delayed. Brigade officials said that several of their  activities were cancelled or delayed because some personnel could not  obtain an official passport or visa in advance of the planned activity. In  addition, brigade officials said that when the soldier best suited for an  activity—and the commander’s first choice—did not have a passport, they  have been forced to deploy personnel that only meet the basic skill and  capability requirements of the activity simply because they had a  passport. In one instance, officials said their unit was unable to deploy its  lead maintenance technician as requested because he did not have the  official passport and visa necessary to support an emergent requirement.  The Army’s Field Manual for Army Support to Security Cooperation states  that soldiers supporting security cooperation efforts need a variety of  skills including technical proficiency and soft skills, noting that not every  soldier is suited to be an advisor; thus, limiting a commander’s choice of  personnel could hinder mission-effectiveness.
Our work on results-oriented government states that to facilitate  collaboration, agencies—which may need to find common ground while  still satisfying their respective operating needs—need to address  compatibility of standards, policies, and procedures that will be used in a  collaborative effort.Department of State, officials from the two organizations have met on a  number of occasions to discuss the passport challenges experienced by  the brigades, but have not agreed upon a consistent method through  which personnel from these brigades can apply for official passports  before they have deployment orders. While the 2012 Memorandum of  Understanding invalidated existing blanket waivers, it does still allow for  organizational commanders to submit new requests for waiver letters  under certain circumstances; it states that military commanders can apply  for waivers to the requirement to list a specific travel destination on the  application based on the organization’s mission and historical travel  pattern, including examples of missions that would have failed for lack of  a waiver. However, Department of State officials stated that there is no  official process to request a waiver from the requirement for DOD  personnel to submit travel orders when requested. Department of State  officials told us that if the Army could provide an accurate analysis on  historical data of the number of personnel with associated ranks and skill  requirements that have deployed to Africa for each allocated brigade,  then a waiver in accordance with the Memorandum could potentially be  provided. Brigade and division officials told us that, while it may not  address every emergent requirement, it would be beneficial for each  brigade allocated to AFRICOM to be authorized a certain number of  official passports based on their historical mission set, so that they could  build a pool of personnel with passports that are likely to deploy.
According to officials from the Army and the  Army officials said that the brigades are intended to be a flexible sourcing  pool that can quickly respond to USARAF’s unpredictable security  cooperation requirements, but that challenges obtaining passports limit  their responsiveness. Without a consistent, agreed-upon approach that  allows for the brigades to obtain a sufficient number of official passports  at the outset of their missions, future brigades allocated to AFRICOM will  likely continue to face challenges in this area, and the flexibility of the  brigades to respond to emergent requirements may be limited.
section_title: Brigades Have Reported Facing Some Challenges to Core Mission Readiness, but Deployments to Africa Are Perceived to Have Benefits for Soldier Development
paragraphs: The brigades allocated to AFRICOM have reported facing some  challenges in sustaining core mission readiness while deploying in  response to requirements in Africa, due in part to limitations on the  training that can be conducted in deployed environments. However, Army  officials have cited some benefits of deployments to Africa that are not  captured in the brigades’ readiness reporting, such as developing soldiers  with an expeditionary mindset and increased cultural awareness.
subsections: section_title: The Brigades Have Faced Some Challenges Sustaining Decisive-Action Readiness and May Require Augmentation or Additional Time to Train if a Contingency Arises
paragraphs: The allocated brigades are expected to maintain decisive-action  readiness for their core mission in order to be available for potential  contingencies, while being responsive to the requirements of the  combatant command to which they are allocated.  The Army’s regulation  on readiness reporting states that all Army units are required to report  their ability to accomplish core functions, provide designed capabilities,  and execute the standardized mission-essential tasks for decisive action  on a monthly basis. Additionally, Army guidance for regionally aligned  forces requires the brigades to maintain certain levels of decisive-action  readiness throughout their employment.
All three of the brigades allocated to AFRICOM conducted decisive-action  training and completed a Combat Training Center rotation, and they  continued to train on their core skills while employed in Africa. However,  the two brigades that have completed their missions in Africa reported  facing some challenges in maintaining core-mission readiness while  employed in Africa, and they said that they might have required additional  time to train or augmentation from another unit if they had been called  upon to support a contingency. Officials from the current brigade said that  they were anticipating similar challenges. The brigades identified several  factors that resulted in readiness degradation while they were employed  in Africa, including
Uncertain Security Cooperation Requirements and Timing: The  brigades each took steps to maintain the decisive-action readiness of  their homestation-based units and personnel during their periods of  availability, with a particular focus on training, but officials said that  factors such as uncertain security cooperation requirements, frequent  deployments of key leaders, and training events that kept personnel  and equipment deployed or in transit for long periods of time resulted  in some degradation of readiness. For example, with key leaders and  other personnel deploying frequently, the brigades’ ability to conduct  collective training, particularly at the higher unit echelons, is limited.  Additionally, although each of the brigades developed plans to  conduct decisive-action training around planned security cooperation  activities, emergent activities and frequently shifting schedules for  planned events sometimes made it difficult for them to adhere to their  training plans. Brigade officials said that, in one such instance, the  shifting dates of a planned event caused a battalion to miss its range  time, which prevented it from completing all of its collective gunnery  exercises. The unit utilized simulators to fulfill some training  requirements, but officials said that live fire training on the range  would have been preferable.
Battalion Task Force Deployments: A Battalion task force from  each of the three brigades was deployed for approximately six to nine  months to the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa to fill a  requirement for security and crisis response capabilities. These  deployments presented personnel readiness challenges for the  brigades because they caused some units within the brigades to be  bifurcated (i.e., part of the unit was deployed and part remained at  homestation). This affected the reported personnel readiness ratings  of the brigades, because the bifurcated units would not be prepared to  deploy elsewhere as cohesive units without time to redeploy  personnel and reassemble these units. Division officials said that they  believe readiness degradation caused by unit bifurcation is more of an  administrative concern, as they do not view the bifurcated units as  less capable simply because they have personnel who are forward  deployed. Army readiness officials said that assessing the strategic  readiness implications of unit bifurcation is an ongoing challenge for  the Army, which is increasingly being asked to do small unit  deployments.
Specific Effects for Armor Brigades: Unit officials said that the  requirement to maintain decisive-action readiness presented greater  challenges for the allocated armored brigades—the 2nd Brigade, 1st  Infantry Division and the 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division—than for  the allocated infantry brigade. An Army official said that this is  because, armored units are required to train frequently on their  equipment platforms (e.g., tanks and artillery) and conduct sequenced  gunnery exercises, which require significant time and resources. The  armored brigades were particularly affected by the task force  deployments. The two armored battalions from the brigades that  deployed for the mission could not fully conduct required gunnery  training because they did not have adequate range space and  equipment (e.g., mounted vehicles, crew-served weapons) in the  deployed environment.  In addition, brigade officials said that the  armored battalion currently deployed will not have enough time after  redeploying to reset and train before the brigade’s next Combat  Training Center rotation in 2016 and thus will have to go through a  rotation with a different brigade a few months later.
As a result of these challenges, brigade and Army Forces Command  officials said that the brigades may have needed some time to redeploy  personnel conducting security cooperation activities from Africa and to  conduct training. Furthermore, to replace the battalion deployed to the  Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, the brigades may require  augmentation from an external unit if they are called upon to support a  contingency.
According to Army Forces Command officials, the Army has made  changes to the types of units that it will use to fill both the allocated  brigade and security forces requirements in Africa. They further said that  these changes may lessen some of the negative effects on decisive- action readiness for future allocated brigades, although the extent of the  potential effect is unclear. The officials said that the Army will be  allocating infantry or Stryker brigades to AFRICOM in the future and that  they expect infantry brigades to be utilized for the mission more  frequently. The next brigade scheduled for this mission is an infantry  brigade. Brigade officials said that infantry brigades, in particular, are  better positioned than armored brigades to balance core-mission training  with requirements in Africa, and USARAF officials added that they are  also better suited to the environment in Africa. The current brigade’s  mission is being curtailed to hasten this transition. Army Forces  Command officials also said that the Army will be filling  the requirements  for security forces in the Horn of Africa with Reserve Component  battalions in the future, although the allocated brigade in Africa is still  projected to deploy a company to the Horn of Africa to provide crisis  response capabilities. The next battalion scheduled for this mission is a  National Guard battalion. Brigade officials generally said they believe that  without the deployments of the battalion task forces, the brigades could  more easily maintain adequate levels of readiness.
Furthermore, stakeholders at the December 2014 Army Regionally  Aligned Forces Table Top Exercise recommended that the Army consider  creating a multifunctional, battalion-sized force that could be allocated to  AFRICOM to directly satisfy AFRICOM’s requirements for small-scale  security cooperation activities while preserving the allocated brigades for  larger-scale exercises. Army Headquarters officials said that this idea is  currently being studied but if implemented, it may also help to preserve  unit readiness, although the extent of the potential effect is unclear.
section_title: Deployments to Africa for Security Cooperation Activities Can Have Benefits for Training and Soldier Development
paragraphs: Although the brigades have experienced some challenges maintaining  decisive-action readiness, their frequent deployments to Africa for  security cooperation activities can also have training benefits. Army,  combatant command, and unit officials cited ancillary benefits of the  mission in Africa for individual readiness and soldier development that are  not easily captured in the brigades’ readiness reporting. Examples noted  by some of these officials include the development of expeditionary  mindsets, increased cultural awareness and regional expertise, and  adaptive leadership capabilities.
Officials said that, based on findings from the Army’s December 2014  Regionally Aligned Forces Table Top Exercise, Army Headquarters is  currently looking at potential options for capturing some of these benefits  as part of the readiness reporting process. Officials provided the following  examples of these benefits:
Supporting exercises in Africa provides units with an opportunity to  exercise operations with multiple command posts, manage joint and  command relationships, and practice deployment and staging  processes.
Managing multiple concurrent and dispersed security cooperation  deployments can stretch and enhance the brigades’ command and  control and communications capabilities.
Deployments to Africa to support AFRICOM require soldiers to  operate in a complex, multicultural environment and to adapt quickly  to ill-defined or shifting requirements. Soldiers are forced to deal with  challenges in Africa with limited support, for example, equipment not  arriving in time for an activity or last-minute changes to programs of  instruction to accommodate foreign forces, and to step up at their  homestation to manage unit training and other tasks while key leaders  are deployed.
One brigade commander suggested that the long-term benefits that the  Army could accrue from having continuously engaged forces through  regional alignment may be worth the trade-off with individual brigade  readiness.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Army’s regionally aligned forces policy is a key element of DOD’s  broader strategy to build partnerships, strengthen partner nation security  forces, and shape security environments globally. The experiences and  lessons learned of the brigades allocated to AFRICOM provide the Army  with an opportunity to refine its approach to planning for and employing  regionally aligned forces in Africa and elsewhere. By establishing a formal  mechanism for key stakeholders to review, discuss, and shape upcoming  activities, USARAF can better ensure that its planners, the Offices of  Security Cooperation, and the brigades have a shared understanding of  the objectives and details of the activity. In turn, such a mechanism would  enhance the brigades’ ability to address potential information gaps in  advance and more effectively perform activities, resulting in a greater  return on investments made in the partner nation. Moreover, the use of  brigades to conduct activities beyond their typical mission sets has  revealed some gaps in the systems that the Army is using to train and  equip regionally aligned forces; accordingly, DOD must take steps to  ensure that the brigades are consistently and effectively prepared to  support security cooperation activities in Africa. An assessment of the  sufficiency and effectiveness of its approach for training regionally aligned  forces will position the Army to address stakeholder concerns about  training and identify opportunities to enhance the brigades’ ability to fulfill  their mission in Africa. Further, by formalizing mission-specific equipment  requirements for the brigades and utilizing existing policy and procedures  to establish a timely and consistent mechanism for the provision of such  equipment, USARAF and the Army can ensure that the brigades will have  the capabilities to safely and effectively carry out distributed activities  throughout Africa, and limit potential inefficiencies that may result from  each successive brigade obtaining mission-specific equipment on an  individual basis. Finally, the flexibility of the brigades to respond to  Combatant Commander requirements has been cited as an important  benefit of regionally aligned forces; for this benefit to be fully realized,  coordinated actions by the Army and the Department of State are needed  to ensure that allocated brigades have sufficient numbers of official  passports in accordance with their mission set.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions to enhance the efforts of the allocated brigades in Africa:  1.  To help ensure that the allocated brigades have timely and complete  information to enable them to prepare for and execute security  cooperation activities, direct the Commander of AFRICOM in  conjunction with the Commander of USARAF, to develop a formal  mechanism—such as regularly scheduled, country-specific meetings  that include USARAF desk officers, the Offices of Security  Cooperation, and the brigades—to review and discuss upcoming  security cooperation activities to ensure that key stakeholders are  aware of critical information, have an opportunity to shape the activity,  and can gather additional information if necessary.  2.  To identify opportunities to enhance brigade mission-specific training,  direct the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Commander  of Army Forces Command and the Commander of Army Training and  Doctrine Command, to conduct an assessment of the Army’s  approach to providing mission-specific training to regionally aligned  forces, including the brigades allocated to AFRICOM, and determine  whether any adjustments are needed. In addition to the assessment  questions already identified by the Army in the Regionally Aligned  Forces Execute Order, this assessment could consider
The degree to which the brigades’ training—to include the  curricula, resources, and execution—should be managed or  coordinated at the institutional level.
How unit training programs should be resourced and the degree to  which dedicated funding may be needed.  3.  To facilitate consistent, and predictable planning for mission-specific  equipment requirements and efficient provision of such equipment,  direct the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Commander  of Army Forces Command and the Commander of USARAF, to:  Identify the mission-specific equipment requirements on an  appropriate requirements document for the brigades allocated to  AFRICOM for security cooperation and other missions in Africa.
To the extent practicable, establish a consistent mechanism (e.g.,  a rotating equipment set, mission-essential equipment list) to  ensure that the brigades allocated to AFRICOM are equipped with  all known mission-essential equipment at the outset of their  missions.  4.  To facilitate the timely and efficient provision of official passports to  the brigades allocated to AFRICOM, direct the Secretary of the Army,  Commander of Army Forces Command, and the Commander of  USARAF to:
Conduct an analysis of the brigades’ personnel deployment trends  for security cooperation activities to identify the number of official  passports typically required for each allocated brigade to support  its mission.
Based on this analysis and building upon the 2012 Memorandum  of Understanding between DOD and the Department of State, as  appropriate, coordinate with the Department of State Bureau of  Consular Affairs to develop, agree upon, and execute a waiver  process authorizing an allotment of official passports to brigades  allocated to AFRICOM at the outset of their rotations.
We also recommend that the Secretary of State take the following action  to facilitate the timely and efficient provision of official passports to the  brigades allocated to AFRICOM. Building upon the process in the 2012  Memorandum of Understanding between DOD and the Department of  State as appropriate, the Secretary of State should direct the Bureau of  Consular Affairs to coordinate with the Department of the Army to  mutually develop, agree upon, and execute a waiver process authorizing  an allotment of official passports to brigades allocated to AFRICOM at the  outset of their rotations, based on the brigades’ personnel deployment  trends.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with each of  the four recommendations we directed to the Secretary of Defense, and  the Department of State concurred with the one recommendation we  directed to the Secretary of State. DOD’s and the Department of State’s  comments are summarized below and reprinted in appendixes III and IV,  respectively. DOD also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated where appropriate.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation, that AFRICOM and  USARAF develop a formal mechanism to review and discuss upcoming  security cooperation activities to ensure that key stakeholders are aware  of critical information, have an opportunity to shape those activities, and  can gather additional information if necessary. In its comments, DOD  stated that USARAF has implemented several changes to its business  practices since the end of GAO’s audit to improve planning, support, and  information exchanges with regionally aligned forces for Africa, including  improving the utilization of existing brigade liaison officers by integrating  them into working groups, relocating liaison officers’ workspace to  improve brigade situational awareness, increasing the number of liaison  officers embedded at USARAF, conducting multi-day planning and  synchronization meetings with brigades to be aligned to AFRICOM in  fiscal year 2016, and publishing a base operations order with a more  comprehensive projection of security cooperation requirements for fiscal  year 2016. While these actions are positive steps that may help to ensure  that the brigades are more aware of critical information, we continue to  believe that USARAF can further enhance its efforts by establishing a  consistent mechanism by which all of the key stakeholders, including  Offices of Security Cooperation, can consistently coordinate upcoming  activities and share information.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation, that the Army conduct  an assessment of its approach to providing mission-specific training to  regionally aligned forces, including brigades allocated to AFRICOM, and  determine whether any adjustments are needed. In its comments, DOD  said that updates to training guidance are based on lessons learned and  after-action reviews submitted by regionally aligned force elements  returning from missions. In addition, the Army is preparing an update to  existing regionally aligned forces guidance, to be issued in the fourth  quarter of fiscal year 2015, that will require commands to assess  regionally aligned forces implementation and submit lessons learned and  suggested improvements to the Army, which the Army will review and  make adjustments as necessary to enhance regionally aligned forces  implementation. Guidance requiring commands to assess regionally  aligned forces implementation, if fully implemented, should provide the  Army valuable information about the sufficiency of its training approach  for regionally aligned forces and where adjustments may be needed and  thus would meet the intent of our recommendation.
DOD concurred with our third recommendation, that the Army identify the  mission-specific equipment requirements for the brigades allocated to  AFRICOM and, to the extent practicable, establish a consistent  mechanism to ensure that the brigades allocated to AFRICOM are  equipped with all known mission-essential equipment at the outset of their  missions. In its comments, DOD said that the Army issued guidance for  USARAF to establish a prepositioned equipment set specifically designed  to support regionally aligned forces units operating in Africa, called the  Africa Activity Set. The concept for the Africa Activity Set is still under  development, but DOD stated that, once it is complete, this activity set will  consist of mission-specific, prepositioned equipment sets to be used by  regionally aligned force units conducting security cooperation,  humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other missions across Africa.  Prepositioned equipment sets that can be used by the brigades for  security cooperation and other activities will be very beneficial, but without  knowing the details of how the Africa Activity Set will be implemented and  how brigades will be able to access this equipment, it is difficult to know  the degree to which it will fully address the brigades’ gaps in mission- essential equipment. Specifically, as we noted in our report, the brigades  said that they need homestation access to this mission-essential  equipment. We therefore believe that USARAF, as it develops the  concept for the activity set, should consider how mission-essential  equipment can be made available to the brigades at the outset of their  missions, in accordance with our recommendation.
DOD concurred with our fourth recommendation, that the Army conduct  an analysis of the brigades’ personnel deployment trends for security  cooperation activities to identify the number of official passports typically  required for each allocated brigade to support its mission and, based on  this analysis, coordinate with the Department of State to develop, agree  upon, and execute a waiver process authorizing an allotment of official  passports to these brigades at the outset of their rotations. In its  comments, DOD stated that the Army is preparing an update to existing  regionally aligned forces guidance that will clarify existing passport  procurement policies to ensure that regionally aligned force units are  aware of processes and procedures to improve individual and unit-level  acquisition efforts. While clarifying guidance on passport policies may be  beneficial, we continue to believe that an analysis of the brigades’  personnel deployment trends and development of a process authorizing  an allotment of official passports to the brigades at the outset of their  rotations are essential to ensure that allocated brigades have sufficient  numbers of official passports, in accordance with their mission sets.
The Department of State also concurred with a parallel recommendation,  that the Bureau of Consular Affairs coordinate with the Army to mutually  develop, agree upon, and execute a waiver process authorizing an  allotment of official passports to brigades allocated to AFRICOM at the  outset of their rotations. In its comments, the Department of State  indicated that the Bureau of Consular Affairs has been coordinating with  AFRICOM to find a reliable way to verify passport requirements prior to  the creation of deployment or travel orders and understands that  AFRICOM will closely scrutinize the number of personnel being deployed  to countries requiring the use of special issuance passport, and will vet  this information through the Special Issuance Agency and Army Logistics  Services Washington on a quarterly basis. The Department of State  further stated that the Special Issuance Agency has provided comments  on a fragmentary order that details internal DOD coordination and  accountability for the passport application process, which it believes  establishes a mutually acceptable framework for identifying the positions  and individuals requiring passports within each brigade. While these  steps do not constitute a “waiver” as the Special Issuance Agency has  historically used the term, the Department of State indicated that these  steps should allow the Special Issuance Agency to issue required  passports to the brigades earlier in the process than it has been and  should assist the agency with resource management in the production of  the passports. To the extent that these steps enable brigades to receive  allotments of passports at the outset of their rotations, these actions  would meet the intent of our recommendation.
We are providing copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the  Secretary of the Army. In addition, this report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has  clearly identified and synchronized security cooperation activities for the  brigades in Africa, we reviewed key security cooperation activity planning  documentation such as theater- and country-level plans, briefings and  information on AFRICOM’s and U.S. Army Africa’s (USARAF) planning  processes, and operations orders. We observed conference sessions  during AFRICOM’s Theater Synchronization Conference and the  Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa Theater Security  Cooperation Conference to see how AFRICOM and its components,  including USARAF, coordinate as part of the planning process to  synchronize efforts across Africa and identify security cooperation  activities to meet theater and country objectives. We additionally reviewed  brigade data on the number and types of security cooperation activities  the brigades conducted in Africa and, based on information provided by  unit officials, determined that it was sufficiently reliable to use as one of  the bases for our findings. We also reviewed task orders provided to the  brigades and analyzed brigade after-action reports provided by 4th  Brigade, 1st Infantry Division for activities that were conducted between  June 2014 and December 2014 to identify the types of information  provided to the brigades in advance of tasked security cooperation  activities and any gaps in this information. Finally, we interviewed officials  from AFRICOM, USARAF, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of  Africa, Marine Forces Africa, Special Operations Command Africa, Army  Forces Command, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, the three  brigades allocated to AFRICOM to date, and Department of State  Headquarters. We also visited and interviewed Embassy Country Team  officials in Djibouti, Niger, and Uganda, including Ambassadors, Office of  Security Cooperation Chiefs, and Defense Attaches, and interviewed the  Office of Security Cooperation Chiefs from Rwanda, Ethiopia, and  Burundi that were onsite during our visit to the Combined Joint Task  Force – Horn of Africa.
To determine the extent to which the brigades have been prepared to  meet mission requirements in Africa, we reviewed documents that provide  guidance and information related to the implementation of the regionally  aligned forces concept, such as execute, fragmentary, and mission  alignment orders as well as briefings from the Regionally Aligned Forces  Table Top Exercise and issue-area working groups. We also reviewed  mission-specific training documentation, including training requirements  for regionally aligned forces, briefings on brigade training, and brigade  after-action reports and lessons learned documents. In addition, we  examined operational needs statements, which units use to request  mission-essential equipment to fill identified gaps, and related  memorandums validating such requests, brigade and division proposals  for mission-essential equipment sets, and guidance on equipping aligned  units. Furthermore, we reviewed documents pertaining to the passport  application process, for example a 2012 Memorandum of Understanding  between the Department of State and the Department of Defense, data  provided by the Department of State and the Army related to unused  passports and the number of passport applications that are processed,  respectively, and Army guidance on obtaining official passports. We also  interviewed relevant officials from AFRICOM, USARAF, Army  Headquarters, Army Forces Command, Army Training and Doctrine  Command, the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, the 3rd Battalion, 353rd  Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, the three brigades  allocated to AFRICOM to date, Army Logistics Services Washington, and  the Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs.
To determine the extent to which the brigades have been able to sustain  core mission readiness while deploying for missions in Africa, we  reviewed Army readiness regulations and readiness guidance applicable  to allocated brigades. We also analyzed readiness data reported by the  three brigades during their periods of allocation to AFRICOM as reported  in the Defense Readiness Reporting System through April 2015. We  spoke with brigade and division officials about this data and obtained  survey responses from Army Readiness Division officials in order to  assess its reliability. Based on these efforts, we determined that the data  is sufficiently reliable to use as one of the bases for our findings in  conjunction with corroborating evidence obtained during interviews. We  also interviewed officials from AFRICOM, USARAF, Army Headquarters,  Army Forces Command, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Armor Division, and the  three brigades allocated to AFRICOM.
We visited or contacted officials from the following DOD and Department  of State organizations during our review:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Virginia  Joint Staff, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Army Africa, Vicenza, Italy
U.S. Marine Corps Africa, Stuttgart, Germany
Special Operations Command Africa, Stuttgart, Germany
Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, Djibouti  o  Task Force 2-16, 4th Brigade/1st Infantry Division, Djibouti,
Department of the Army Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia
U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and subordinate  organizations, Fort Eustis, Virginia
162nd Infantry Training Brigade, Fort Polk, Louisiana
3rd Battalion/353rd Regiment Advise and Assist Battalion, Fort
1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas  o  1st Infantry Division Headquarters  o  2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team/1st Infantry Division  o  4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team/1st Infantry Division
1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas  o  1st Armored Division Headquarters  o  4th Armored Brigade Combat Team/1st Armored Division  o  Fort Bliss Passport Office
Logistics Services Washington, Office of the Administrative  Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Arlington, Virginia
Department of State Headquarters, Washington, DC
Bureau of Africa Affairs, Washington, DC
Bureau of Consular Affairs, Washington, DC
Global Peace Operations Initiative Program Office, Washington,
Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program  Office, Washington, DC
U.S. Embassy Djibouti City, Djibouti
U.S. Embassy Kampala, Uganda
U.S. Embassy Niamey, Niger
Office of Security Cooperation Chiefs from three additional U.S.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to August 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Examples of Security Cooperation Activities Conducted by the Allocated Brigades in Africa
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, James Reynolds, Assistant  Director; David Adams; Tracy Barnes; Kasea Hamar; Joanne  Landesman; Michael Silver; and Amie Steele made key contributions to  this report.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Afghanistan Transition: U.S. Force Reductions Impact DOD’s Advising  Mission in Afghanistan. GAO-14-475C. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2014  Security Force Assistance: The Army and Marine Corps Have Ongoing  Efforts to Identify and Track Advisors, but the Army Needs a Plan to  Capture Advising Experience. GAO-14-482. Washington, D.C.: July 11,  2014.
Security Force Assistance: More Detailed Planning and Improved Access  to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan.  GAO-13-381. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2013.
Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage  Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation.   GAO-13-335T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.
Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and  Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T.  Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.
State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training  Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners. GAO-12-548.  Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.
Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide  Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army  Brigades to Support the Advising Mission. GAO-11-760. Washington,  D.C.: August 2, 2011.
Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency  Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. GAO-10-794.  Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.