Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation and Surface Transportation Security Programs, but More Work Remains
Published: 2008-05-13T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Since its inception, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. More recently, TSA has taken actions to secure the nation's surface transportation modes. TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004, and for surface transportation security activities, about $175 million since fiscal year 2005. This testimony focuses on TSA's efforts to secure the commercial aviation system-- through passenger screening, air cargo, and watch-list matching programs--and the nation's surface transportation modes. It also addresses challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2004 through April 2008 including selected updates obtained in February through April 2008.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's transportation system, including actions to address many recommendations made by GAO. With respect to aviation security, TSA has focused its efforts on, among other things, more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce--formerly known as screeners; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; strengthening domestic air cargo security; and developing a government operated watch-list matching program, known as Secure Flight. For example, in response to GAO's recommendation, TSA developed a plan to periodically review assumptions in its Staffing Allocation Model, and took steps to strengthen its evaluation of proposed procedural changes. TSA has also explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to better detect explosives and other threats, and has taken steps to strengthen air cargo security, including conducting compliance inspections of air carriers. Finally, TSA has instilled more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight's systems development, including preparing key documentation and strengthening privacy protections. With regard to surface transportation security, TSA has, among other things, taken steps to develop a strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highways; established security standards for certain transportation modes; and conducted threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly related to passenger and freight rail. While these efforts should be commended, GAO has identified several areas that should be addressed to further strengthen transportation security. For example, TSA has made limited progress in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and management challenges. In addition, TSA has not revised screening exemptions for air cargo transported into the United States that may leave the air cargo system unacceptably vulnerable. GAO further identified that TSA experienced some program management challenges in the development of Secure Flight, including developing cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices; fully implementing the program's risk management plan; developing a comprehensive testing strategy; and ensuring that information security requirements are fully implemented. In addition, DHS and TSA lack performance measures to fully evaluate the effectiveness of current processes for passengers who apply for redress due to inconveniences experienced during the check-in and screening process. GAO recently made recommendations to address these issues. Additionally, although TSA has recently taken actions in a number of areas to help secure surface modes of transportation, particularly passenger and freight rail, the agency has not fully defined its role with respect to securing other transportation modes, such as commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure. We are continuing to assess TSA's efforts to secure surface modes of transportation as part of our ongoing work and will report on our results later this year.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the  security of our nation’s transportation system. The Transportation  Security Administration (TSA) was established in 2001 with the mission to  protect the transportation network while also ensuring the free movement  of people and commerce. Since its inception, TSA has focused much of its  efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety  of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. To implement  these efforts, TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about $26  billion since fiscal year 2004. Other parties also play a role in securing  commercial aviation, including air carriers that are responsible for  screening air cargo, among other things, and the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), which is  responsible for the research and development of aviation security  technologies. TSA is also responsible for securing surface modes of  transportation, including passenger and freight rail, mass transit,  highways, commercial vehicles, and pipelines, in partnership with other  federal entities, state and local governments, and the private sector. In  carrying out its broader homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the  daunting challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources  within the transportation system and across all sectors to address threats  and strengthen security.
My testimony today focuses on TSA’s efforts to ensure the security of the  following key areas of commercial aviation, which represents about $4.5  billion of the President’s budget request for TSA for fiscal year 2009: 1)  screening operations, including transportation security officer (TSO) and  private screener allocations, and checkpoint screening technologies; 2) air  cargo; and, 3) passenger watch-list matching. My testimony also addresses  TSA’s efforts to ensure the security of the nation’s surface transportation  systems. In particular, I will address the numerous efforts TSA has taken  or plans to take to strengthen security in these areas and the challenges  that remain.
My comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from  February 2004 through April  2008 addressing the security of the nation’s  commercial aviation and surface transportation systems, including the  status of TSA’s development of the Secure Flight program conducted in  response to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission  Act of 2007. Selected updates to this work were conducted in February  through April 2008. We conducted these performance audits in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in  November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all  modes of transportation. As part of this responsibility, TSA oversees  security operations at the nation’s more than 400 commercial airports,  including establishing requirements for passenger and checked baggage  screening and ensuring the security of air cargo transported to, from, and  within the United States. TSA has operational responsibility for  conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at most airports,  and has regulatory, or oversight, responsibility, for air carriers who  conduct air cargo screening. While TSA took over responsibility for  passenger checkpoint and baggage screening, air carriers have continued  to conduct passenger watch-list matching in accordance with TSA  requirements, which includes the process of matching passenger  information against federal watch-list data before flights depart. TSA is  currently developing a program to take over this responsibility from air  carriers for passengers on domestic flights, and plans to assume from the  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) the pre-departure name- matching function for passengers on international flights traveling to or  from the United States.
According to DHS’s budget execution reports and TSA’s congressional  budget justifications, TSA received appropriations for aviation security  that total about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004. During fiscal year 2004— the first year for which data were available—TSA received about $3.9  billion for aviation security programs, and during fiscal year 2008, received  about $6.1 billion. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2009  includes about $6.0 billion to continue TSA’s aviation security activities.  This total includes about $5.3 billion specifically designated for aviation  security and about $0.76 billion for aviation-security related programs,  such as Secure Flight, and mandatory fee accounts, such as the Aviation  Security Capital Fund. Figure 1 identifies reported aviation security  funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2008.
TSA is also responsible for securing surface modes of transportation,  including passenger and freight rail, mass transit, highways, commercial  vehicles, and pipelines, in partnership with other federal entities, state and  local governments, and the private sector. According to TSA congressional  budget justifications, TSA received appropriations for surface  transportation security that totaled about $175 million since fiscal year  2005. During fiscal year 2005—the first year for which data were  available—TSA received about $36 million for surface transportation  security programs. TSA further received $52 million during fiscal year  2006, $41 million during fiscal year 2007, and $47 million during fiscal year  2008 for securing surface modes of transportation. The President’s budget  request for fiscal year 2009 includes about $37 million, about $10 million  less than last year’s appropriation, to continue TSA’s surface  transportation security activities, including conducting compliance  inspections, developing best practices and standards, assessing security  vulnerabilities, establishing baseline data against which to evaluate  minimum-security standards, and providing domain awareness training.
subsections: section_title: Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening
paragraphs: One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from  the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening operations  to the use of federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs). Prior to ATSA,  passenger and checked baggage screening had been performed by private  screening companies under contract to airlines. ATSA established TSA and  required it to create a federal workforce to assume the job of conducting  passenger and checked baggage screening at commercial airports. The  federal screener workforce was put into place, as required, by November  2002.
Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA  inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any  unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item into  a sterile area or onboard an aircraft. Passenger screening personnel must  inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated screening locations.  The four passenger screening functions are X-ray screening of property,  walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, hand-wand or pat- down screening of individuals, and physical search of property and trace  detection for explosives. Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray  screening of their carry-on items and screening by the walk-through metal  detector. Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine,  who alarm the walk-through metal detector, or who are designated as  selectees—that is, passengers selected by the Computer Assisted  Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS) or other TSA-approved  processes to designate passengers for additional screening—are screened  by hand-wand or pat-down and have their carry-on items either screened  for explosives traces or physically searched.
Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security  screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent  the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon  onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage screening is accomplished through  the use of explosive detection systems or explosive trace detection  systems, and through the use of approved alternative means, such as  manual searches and canine teams when the explosive detection or  explosive trace detection systems are unavailable.
The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of  three elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the  screening of airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked  baggage, the technology used during the screening process, and the  procedures TSOs are to follow to conduct screening. Collectively, these  elements help to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of passenger  and checked baggage screening operations.
section_title: Air Cargo Security
paragraphs: Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type from  perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic  equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry goods,  fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish, and human  remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including large containers  known as unit loading devices that allow many packages to be  consolidated into one container that can be loaded onto an aircraft,  wooden crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/boxed pieces,  known as break bulk cargo.
TSA’s responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other things,  establishing security rules and regulations governing domestic and foreign  passenger air carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign all-cargo  carriers that transport cargo, and domestic indirect air carriers. TSA is  also responsible for overseeing the implementation of air cargo security  requirements by air carriers and indirect air carriers through compliance  inspections, and, in coordination with DHS’s S&T Director, for conducting  research and development of air cargo security technologies. Air carriers  (passenger and all-cargo) are responsible for implementing TSA security  requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved security program  that describes the security policies, procedures, and systems the air carrier  will implement and maintain in order to comply with TSA security  requirements. Air carriers must also abide by security requirements issued  by TSA through security directives or emergency amendments to air  carrier security programs.
Air carriers use several methods and technologies to screen domestic and  inbound air cargo. These include manual physical searches and  comparisons between airway bills and cargo contents to ensure that the  contents of the cargo shipment matches the cargo identified in documents  filed by the shipper, as well as using approved technology, such as X-ray  systems, explosive trace detection systems, decompression chambers,  explosive detection systems, and certified explosive detection canine  teams. Under TSA’s security requirements for domestic and inbound air  cargo, passenger air carriers are currently required to randomly screen a  specific percentage of non exempt air cargo pieces listed on each airway  bill. All-cargo carriers are required to screen 100 percent of air cargo that  exceeds a specific weight threshold. As of October 2006, domestic indirect  air carriers are also required, under certain conditions, to screen a certain  percentage of air cargo prior to its consolidation. TSA, however, does not  regulate foreign freight forwarders, or individuals or businesses that have  their cargo shipped by air to the United States. Under the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, DHS is required to  implement a system to screen 50 percent of air cargo transported on  passenger aircraft by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo by  August 2010.
section_title: Airline Passenger Watch- List Matching
paragraphs: The prescreening of airline passengers who may pose a security risk  before they board an aircraft is one of many layers of security intended to  strengthen commercial aviation. One component of prescreening is  passenger watch-list matching—or the process of matching passenger  information against the No-Fly and Selectee lists to identify passengers  who should be denied boarding or who should undergo additional security  scrutiny.
Aircraft operators are currently responsible for checking passenger  information against the No-Fly and Selectee lists to identify passengers  who should be denied boarding or who should undergo additional security  scrutiny. To further enhance commercial aviation security and in  accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004 (IRTPA), TSA is developing a program to assume from air carriers the  function of matching passenger information against government-supplied  terrorist watch-lists for domestic flights. Secure Flight is the program  through which TSA plans to meet this requirement. Following domestic  implementation, TSA, through Secure Flight, plans to assume  responsibility from CBP for watch-list matching of passengers on  international flights bound to and from the United States. Secure Flight’s  mission is to enhance the security of commercial air travel by:    eliminating inconsistencies in current air carrier watch-list matching  reducing the number of individuals who are misidentified as being on  the No Fly or Selectee list,  reducing the risk of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive watch-list  information, and  integrating the redress process so that individuals are less likely to be  improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft.
TSA plans to implement Secure Flight in three releases. During Release  One, completed in March 2008, TSA developed and tested the Secure  Flight system. During Release Two, scheduled to be conducted from April  2008 through August 2008, TSA plans to begin parallel testing with air  carriers during which both Secure Flight and air carriers will perform  watch-list matching. Finally, during Release Three, TSA is to develop the  capability for “airline cutovers” during which Secure Flight plans to begin  conducting all watch-list matching for domestic air passengers. Release  Three is scheduled to begin in September 2008. Domestic cutovers are  expected to begin in January 2009 and be completed in July 2009. TSA  plans to assume from CBP watch-list matching for flights departing from  and to the United States some time after domestic cutovers are completed.
Over the last 5 years, we have reported that the Secure Flight program  (and its predecessor CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or finalized its  goals, objectives, and requirements, and faced significant development and  implementation challenges. Acknowledging the challenges it faced with  the program, TSA suspended the development of Secure Flight and  initiated a reassessment, or re-baselining, of the program in February 2006,  which was completed in January 2007. We were mandated by the  Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to  assess various aspects of Secure Flight’s development and  implementation. In accordance with the act, we reviewed (1) TSA’s  efforts to develop reliable cost and schedule estimates for Secure Flight;  (2) progress made by TSA in developing and implementing the Secure  Flight system, including the implementation of security controls; (3) TSA’s  efforts to coordinate with CBP to integrate Secure Flight with CBP’s  watch-list matching function for international flights; (4) TSA’s plans to  protect private passenger information under Secure Flight; and (5) DHS’s  efforts to assess the effectiveness of the current redress process for  passengers misidentified as being on or wrongly assigned to the No Fly or  Selectee list.
TSA’s available funding for the Secure Flight program during fiscal year  2007 was $32.5 million. In fiscal year 2008, TSA received $50 million and  requested a transfer of an additional $24 million to the program under  statutory authority, making as much as $74 million available for the  program in fiscal year 2008. For fiscal year 2009, TSA has requested $82  million in funding to allow the agency to continue development and  implementation of the Secure Flight program and the full assumption of  the watch-list matching function in fiscal year 2010.
section_title: Surface Transportation Security
paragraphs: TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes with  federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. TSA’s security  mission includes establishing security standards and conducting  assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes, including  passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and commercial  vehicles; and pipelines. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s  Grant Programs Directorate provides grant funding to surface  transportation operators and state and local governments, and the  National Protection and Programs Directorate, in conjunction with the  grant allocation process, conducts risk assessments of surface  transportation facilities. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT),  the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad  Administration (FRA) have responsibilities for establishing standards for  passenger rail safety and security. In addition, public and private sector  transportation operators are responsible for implementing security  measures for their systems.
section_title: TSA Has Made Significant Enhancements to Its Passenger Screening Operations, but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts
paragraphs: TSA has taken significant steps to strengthen the three key elements of the  screening system—people (TSOs and private screeners), screening  procedures, and technology—but has faced management, planning, and  funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing Allocation  Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect current  operating conditions, and implemented several initiatives intended to  enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly improvised  explosives. We reported that TSA also proposed modifications to  passenger checkpoint screening procedures based on risk (threat and  vulnerability information), among other factors, but could do more  evaluation of proposed procedures before they are implemented to help  ensure that they achieve their intended results. Finally, TSA is exploring  new technologies to enhance the detection of explosives and other threats,  but continues to face management and funding challenges in developing  and fielding technologies at airport checkpoints.
Of the approximately $6.0 billion requested for aviation security in the  President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request, about $4.0 billion, or  approximately 66 percent, is for passenger and checked baggage  screening. This includes approximately $3.9 billion to support passenger  and checked baggage screening operations, such as TSO salaries and  training, and about $154 million for the procurement and installation of  checked baggage explosive detection systems.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Allocation of Its TSO Workforce
paragraphs: TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the allocation  of its TSO workforce. We reported in February 2004 that staffing shortages  and TSA’s hiring process had hindered the ability of some Federal Security  Directors (FSD)—the ranking TSA authorities responsible for leading and  coordinating security activities at airports—to provide sufficient resources  to staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their  checkpoints without using additional measures such as overtime. Since  that time, TSA has developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine  TSO staffing levels at airports.  In August 2005, TSA determined that the  Staffing Allocation Model contained complete and accurate information on  each airport from which to estimate staffing needs, and the agency used  the model to identify TSO allocations for each airport.
FSDs we interviewed during 2006 as part of our review of TSA’s staffing  model generally reported that the model is a more accurate predictor of  staffing needs than TSA’s prior staffing model. However, FSDs expressed  the following concerns about assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006  model:  the model assumed that airports could achieve a 20 percent part-time  TSO level, even though it was difficult for airports to achieve this;  the model did not specifically account for the recurrent training  requirement for TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged over a fiscal year  quarter; and the model did not account for TSO’s time away from screening to  perform operational support duties.
To help ensure that TSOs are effectively utilized, we recommended that  TSA establish a policy for when TSOs can be used to provide operational  support. Consistent with our recommendation, in March 2007, TSA issued  a management directive that provides guidance on assigning TSOs,  through detail or permanent promotion, to duties of another position for a  specified period of time. Further, in response to FSDs’ input and the  various mechanisms TSA had implemented to monitor the sufficiency of  the model’s allocation outputs, TSA made changes to some assumptions in  the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2007, including assumptions  related to part-time TSOs, training, and operational support to address the  issues identified above. In our February 2007 report, we recommended  that TSA establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all of the  model assumptions on a periodic basis to ensure that the assumptions  result in TSO staffing allocations that accurately reflect operating  conditions that may change over time. TSA agreed with our  recommendation and, in December 2007, developed a Staffing Allocation  Model Rates and Assumptions Validation Plan. The plan identifies the  process TSA will use to review and validate the model’s assumptions on a  periodic basis.
Although we did not independently review TSA’s staffing allocation for  fiscal year 2008, the TSA fiscal year 2009 budget justification identified  that the agency has achieved operational and efficiency gains that enabled  them to implement or expand several workforce initiatives involving  TSOs, which are summarized in table 1. For example, TSA reported  making several changes to the fiscal year 2008 Staffing Allocation Model,  such as decreasing the allocation for time paid not worked (annual, sick,  and military leave; compensatory time; and injury time off) based on past  performance data. TSA also reported revising the exit lane staffing based  on each checkpoint’s unique operating hours rather than staffing all exit  lanes based on the maximum open hours for any checkpoint at an airport.
TSA’s fiscal year 2009 budget justification includes $2.7 billion for the  federal TSO workforce, and represents an increase of about $80 million  over fiscal year 2008 funding. Of the $80 million increase, about $38  million is for cost of living adjustments, and about $42 million is for the  annualization of the full-year cost of the Behavior Detection Officer and  Aviation Direct Access Screening Program positions. According to DHS’  budget justification, the $2.7 billion includes funding for compensation and  benefits of 45,643 full-time equivalent personnel—approximately 46,909  TSOs and about 1,100 screening managers. Table 2 identifies the total  TSO and screening manager full-time equivalents and the funding levels  for fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as reported by TSA.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger Screening Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Procedures
paragraphs: In addition to TSA’s efforts to strengthen the allocation of its TSO  workforce, TSA has taken steps to strengthen passenger checkpoint  screening procedures to enhance the detection of prohibited items.  However, we have identified areas where TSA could improve its  evaluation and documentation of proposed procedures. In April 2007, we  reported that TSA officials considered modifications to its standard  operating procedures (SOP) based on risk information (threat and  vulnerability information), daily experiences of staff working at airports,  and complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public.
We further reported that for more significant SOP modifications, TSA first  tested the proposed modifications at selected airports to help determine  whether the changes would achieve their intended purpose, as well as to  assess its impact on screening operations. However, we reported that  TSA’s data collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA  determine whether proposed procedures that are operationally tested  would achieve their intended purpose. We also found that TSA’s  documentation on proposed modifications to screening procedures was  not complete. We recommended that TSA develop sound evaluation  methods, when possible, to assess whether proposed screening changes  would achieve their intended purpose and generate and maintain  documentation on proposed screening changes that are deemed  significant. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and TSA has  taken steps to implement them. For example, for several proposed SOP  changes considered during the fall of 2007, TSA provided documentation  that identified the sources of the proposed changes and the reasons why  the agency decided to accept or reject the proposed changes.
Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that  TSA have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with  established procedures. In our April 2007 report, we identified that TSA  monitors TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs  through its performance accountability and standards system—which was  implemented in response to a recommendation by us in 2003 and in  response to airport staff concerns—and through local and national covert  testing. We further reported that some TSA airport officials have  experienced resource challenges in implementing these compliance  monitoring efforts. TSA headquarters officials stated that they were taking  steps, such as automating the performance accountability and standards  system data entry functions, to address this challenge. Since then, TSA has  also implemented a new local covert testing program nationwide, known  as the Aviation Screening Assessment Program. This program is intended  to measure TSO performance using realistic and standardized test  scenarios to achieve a national TSO assessment measurement. TSA plans  to use these test results to identify vulnerabilities across screening  operations and to provide recommendations for addressing the  vulnerabilities to various stakeholders within TSA.
section_title: DHS and TSA Are Pursuing New Checkpoint Technologies to Enhance the Detection of Explosives and Other Threats, but Continue to Face Challenges
paragraphs: We reported in February 2007 that S&T and TSA were exploring new  passenger checkpoint screening technologies to enhance the detection of  explosives and other threats. However, we found that limited progress had  been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger  screening checkpoints, in part due to challenges S&T and TSA faced in  coordinating research and development efforts. TSA requested $103.2  million in its fiscal year 2009 budget request for checkpoint technology  and checkpoint reconfiguration. Among other things, TSA plans to procure  and deploy Advanced Technology Systems to further extend explosives  and prohibited item detection coverage at category X and I checkpoints.  The President’s budget request also identifies that TSA may purchase  Whole Body Imagers, Bottled Liquids Scanners, Cast and Prosthesis  Imagers, shoe scanner systems, technology integration solutions, and  additional units or upgrades to legacy equipment, among other  technologies. TSA further requested $11.5 million to support the  optimization and reconfiguration of additional checkpoint lanes to  accommodate anticipated airport growth and maintain throughput at the  busiest airport checkpoints.
Of the various emerging checkpoint screening projects funded by TSA and  S&T, the explosive trace portal and the bottled liquids scanning device  have been deployed to airport checkpoints, and a number of additional  projects have initiated procurements or are being researched and  developed.  Table 3 provides a description of passenger checkpoint  screening technologies that have been deployed as well as technologies  that have initiated procurements or are in research and development. This  list of technologies is limited to those for which TSA could provide  documentation. TSA is planning to develop and deploy additional  technologies. We are continuing to assess TSA’s deployment of new  checkpoint screening technologies in our ongoing work and expect to  report on the results of this work later this year.
Despite TSA’s efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening  technologies, we reported that limited progress has been made in fielding  explosives detection technology at airport checkpoints. For example, we  reported that TSA had anticipated that the explosives trace portals would  be in operation throughout the country during fiscal year 2007. However,  due to performance and maintenance issues, TSA halted the acquisition  and deployment of the portals in June 2006. As a result, TSA has fielded  less than 25 percent of the 434 portals it projected it would deploy by  fiscal year 2007. TSA officials are considering what to do with the portals  that were procured and are currently in storage. In addition to the portals,  TSA has fallen behind in its projected acquisition of other emerging  screening technologies. For example, we reported that the acquisition of  91 Whole Body Imagers was previously delayed in part because TSA  needed to develop a means to protect the privacy of passengers screened  by this technology.
While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research,  development, and deployment of checkpoint technologies, we reported in  February 2007 that challenges remained. For example, TSA and S&T  officials stated that they encountered difficulties in coordinating research  and development efforts due to reorganizations within TSA and S&T. A  senior TSA official further stated at the time that, while TSA and the DHS  S&T have executed a memorandum of understanding to establish the  services that the Transportation Security Laboratory is to provide to TSA,  coordination with S&T remained a challenge because the organizations  had not fully implemented the terms of the agreement. Since our February  2007 testimony, according to TSA and S&T, coordination between them  has improved.
We also reported that TSA did not have a strategic plan to guide its efforts  to acquire and deploy screening technologies, and that a lack of a strategic  plan or approach could limit TSA’s ability to deploy emerging technologies  at those airport locations deemed at highest risk. The Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 2008, provides that, of TSA’s appropriated funds for  Transportation Security Support, $10,000,000 may not be obligated until  the Secretary of Homeland Security submits to the House and Senate  Committees on Appropriations detailed expenditure plans for checkpoint  support and explosive detection systems refurbishment, procurement, and  installation on an airport-by-airport basis for fiscal year 2008, along with  the strategic plan for checkpoint technologies previously requested by the  committees no later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Act  (enacted December 26, 2007). According to TSA officials, they currently  plan to submit the strategic plan to Congress by June 2008. We will  continue to evaluate S&T’s and TSA’s efforts to research, develop and  deploy checkpoint screening technologies as part of our ongoing review.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Action to Strengthen Air Cargo Security, but Additional Efforts Are Needed
paragraphs: TSA has taken steps to enhance domestic and inbound air cargo security,  but more work remains to strengthen this area of aviation security. For  example, TSA has issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan that focused on  securing the domestic air cargo supply chain. However, in April 2007, we  reported that this plan did not include goals and objectives for addressing  the security of inbound air cargo, or cargo transported into the United  States from a foreign location, which presents different security challenges  than cargo transported domestically. We also reported that TSA had not  conducted vulnerability assessments to identify the range of security  weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists related to air cargo  operations. In addition, we also reported that TSA had established  requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo, but had  exempted some domestic and inbound cargo from screening. With respect  to inbound air cargo, we reported that TSA lacked an inspection plan with  performance goals and measures for its inspection efforts, and  recommended that TSA develop such a plan. Finally, TSA is taking steps to  compile and analyze information on air cargo security practices used  abroad to identify those that may strengthen DHS’s overall air cargo  security program, as we recommended. For fiscal year 2009, the  President’s budget includes a request of about $104 million for TSA’s air  cargo security program. Specifically; TSA is requesting $52 million for 460  air cargo inspectors, $33.5 million for 170 canine teams, and $2.8 million  for the Certified Cargo Screening Program. We issued two reports that  examined TSA’s efforts to secure domestic air cargo and inbound air  cargo. Table 4 summarizes our key findings, recommendations, and TSA’s  response.
section_title: TSA Has Made Progress in Developing and Implementing the Secure Flight Program, but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts
paragraphs: In February 2008, we reported that TSA has made substantial progress in  instilling more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight’s development and  implementation, but challenges remain that may hinder the program’s  progress moving forward. For example, TSA developed a detailed  concept of operations, established a cost and schedule baseline, and  drafted key management and systems development documents, among  other efforts. However, while TSA developed a life-cycle cost estimate and  an integrated master schedule for Secure Flight, the program has not fully  followed best practices that would help to ensure reliable and valid cost  and schedule estimates. We also reported that TSA can strengthen its  systems development efforts by demonstrating that it has fully  implemented its risk management plan, incorporated end-to-end testing  as part of the program’s testing strategy, and more fully addressed system  security requirements and vulnerabilities. We further reported that DHS  and TSA can strengthen their assessment of the current redress process  for passengers who believe they were inappropriately inconvenienced  during the watch-list matching process. TSA officials stated that they have  considerably strengthened Secure Flight’s systems development efforts,  and have already taken or plan to take action to address the issues we  identified. We made a number of recommendations to strengthen TSA’s  development and implementation of Secure Flight to address the issues  discussed below, which officials generally agreed with.
subsections: section_title: TSA Has Made Progress in Strengthening Secure Flight’s Development and Implementation
paragraphs: TSA has taken numerous steps to address previous GAO  recommendations related to strengthening Secure Flight’s development  and implementation, as well as additional steps designed to strengthen the  program. TSA has, among other things, developed a detailed, conceptual  description of how the system is to operate, commonly referred to as a  concept of operations; established a cost and schedule baseline; developed  security requirements; developed test plans; conducted outreach with key  stakeholders; published a notice of proposed rulemaking on how Secure  Flight is to operate; and issued a guide to key stakeholders (e.g., air  carriers and CBP) that defines, among other things, system data  requirements. Collectively, these efforts have enabled TSA to more  effectively manage the program’s development and implementation.
TSA has also taken steps to integrate the domestic watch-list matching  function with the international watch-list matching function currently  operated by CBP. We previously reported that TSA and CBP experienced  coordination challenges which, among other things, could result in a  duplication of effort and conflicting results from domestic and  international watch-list matching. We recommended that DHS take  additional steps and make key policy and technical decisions that were  necessary to more fully coordinate these programs. TSA and CBP have  since worked with DHS to develop a strategy called the One DHS Solution,  which is to align the two agencies’ domestic and international watch-list  matching processes, information technology systems, and regulatory  procedures to provide a seamless interface between DHS and the airline  industry. TSA and CBP also agreed that TSA will take over the screening  of passengers against the watch list for international flights from CBP,  though CBP will continue to match passenger information to the watch list  in fulfillment of its border-related functions. Full implementation of an  integrated system is not planned to take place until after Secure Flight  acquires the watch list matching function for domestic flights.
TSA has also taken steps to address key privacy principles in plans to  protect private passenger information for the Secure Flight program. We  previously reported that TSA, as part of its requirements development  process, had not clearly identified the privacy impacts of the Secure Flight  system or the full actions it planned to take to mitigate them. We also  reported that TSA violated provisions of the Privacy Act by not fully  disclosing its use of personal information during systems testing. In  March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify how Secure Flight will  protect personal privacy. In August 2007, TSA published, for public  comment, the required privacy impact assessment and system of records  notice that address key privacy protection principles. TSA also  developed a Program Privacy Architecture describing key aspects of TSA’s  plans to protect private passenger information. We will continue to  monitor TSA’s efforts as part of our ongoing work to ensure that privacy  protections continue to be appropriately considered.
section_title: TSA Has Not Fully Followed Best Practices for Developing Reliable and Valid Cost and Schedule Estimates for Secure Flight
paragraphs: Although TSA has developed a life-cycle cost estimate and maintains an  integrated master schedule for Secure Flight, the program has not fully  followed best practices for developing reliable and valid cost and schedule  estimates, and several program milestones have been missed or have  slipped. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) endorsed the  useof GAO’s Cost Assessment Guide in the development of life-cycle cost  and program schedule estimates. Without adhering to these best  practices in the development of its cost and schedule estimates, TSA is at  risk of the Secure Flight program experiencing cost overruns, missed  deadlines, and performance shortfalls.
Life-cycle cost estimate. We reported that TSA has not fully followed  best practices for developing a reliable and valid life-cycle cost estimate.  Using our Cost Assessment Guide’s 12-step process for creating cost  estimates, we assessed the Secure Flight cost estimate against these best  practices. DHS’s Cost - Benefit Analysis Guidebook, which TSA program  officials stated that TSA used to develop the life-cycle cost estimate for  Secure Flight, contains most of the best practices outlined in our Guide.  TSA followed some of these practices in developing its cost estimate,  including defining the purpose of the program and estimate purpose;  identifying many program cost elements, including expenditures for  facilities, hardware, and software; and identifying the numbers of staff,  their pay, and associated travel and training costs, among other elements.  However, it is unclear whether TSA followed other best practices or did  not address the practices in developing its estimate. For example, it is  unclear whether the cost estimate had been updated to reflect the current  program because the detailed support for the estimate was produced  between 2004 and 2006, and does not reflect the current program plan. In  addition, the cost estimate does not capture all key costs. For example, the  estimate does not capture costs beyond 2012 even though the system is  expected to be operational beyond that date. TSA officials stated that the  program’s cost figures were updated in 2007 and continue to be updated as  changes warrant. Officials further stated that their estimates were  prepared in accordance with DHS and OMB guidance and were reviewed  and approved by DHS and OMB. However, without adhering to the best  practices discussed above, as recommended by OMB, TSA’s cost estimate  may not provide a meaningful baseline from which to track progress, and  effectively support investment decision making.
Schedule estimate. We reported that TSA also did not fully follow best  practices for developing a reliable and valid schedule estimate. GAO’s Cost  Assessment Guide includes 9 best practices, which if followed correctly,  should result in high quality, reliable, and valid schedule estimates.
Without a reliable schedule baseline and careful monitoring of its status, a  program may not be able to determine when forecasted completion dates  differ from planned dates. TSA has made progress in developing a reliable  and valid schedule estimate, including capturing key activities and  accounting for the development of program requirements and testing.  However, TSA officials could not provide evidence that their scheduling  software can produce a critical path (i.e., the longest path of sequential  activities in a schedule) driven by discrete lower level tasks. Best practices  call for the critical path to be generated using scheduling software. We  also reported that the schedule is not fully integrated because several  lower level activities were not connected in a logical manner, as called for  by best practices. As a result, the Secure Flight schedule estimate may not  provide a meaningful benchmark from which to gauge progress, identify  and address potential problems, and make informed decisions. For  example, the inability to institute a reliable schedule could affect TSA’s  ability to effectively measure contractor performance in meeting  deliverables. TSA officials stated that their scheduling software can create  a critical path, and that lower level tasks in their schedule were logically  linked together; however, they did not provide evidence that supported  this.
In February 2008, we reported that since TSA completed a re-baselining of  the Secure Flight program, and began using its current schedule, the  program has missed milestones and experienced schedule slippages. For  example, while TSA reported that it had met most of its March 2007  schedule milestones to date, the August 2007 milestone for developing  memoranda of understanding and other written agreements (e.g. service  level agreements) with key Secure Flight stakeholders (e.g. CBP) was  missed and had not yet been met. TSA officials attributed schedule  slippages in part to an extension in the Secure Flight rulemaking comment  period and underestimating the time needed to complete key activities.
In February 2008, we recommended that TSA fully incorporate best  practices into the development of Secure Flight life-cycle cost and  schedule estimates.  TSA generally agreed with these recommendations.  We will continue to assess TSA’s efforts to develop life-cycle cost and  schedule estimates as part of our ongoing review of the Secure Flight  Program.
section_title: TSA Has Made Progress in Strengthening Secure Flight’s Development, but Can Further Strengthen Efforts
paragraphs: While TSA has taken numerous steps to strengthen the development of  Secure Flight, additional challenges remain. These challenges include: 1)  implementing the program’s risk management plan, 2) planning and  conducting end-to-end testing as part of their overall parallel testing  strategy, and 3) addressing information security requirements and  vulnerabilities.
Risk management. In October 2006, TSA issued a risk management plan  for identifying, managing, and mitigating Secure Flight program risks that  was consistent with relevant guidance and best practices. TSA also  acquired an electronic tool to guide its risk management efforts. However,  TSA has not yet provided us with evidence that it has implemented all  aspects of the plan, including developing an inventory of risks and related  information to demonstrate that its risk management tool has been  populated and is being used to identify, prioritize, mitigate, and monitor  risk. In November 2007, TSA hired a risk management coordinator, a  position that had been vacant since June 2007. According to program  officials, the coordinator has been tasked with supporting the risk  management board in implementing the risk management plan and has  provided related training for its members. We will continue to assess TSA’s  efforts to mange risk as part of our ongoing review of Secure Flight.
End-to-end test planning. Secure Flight does not fully outline plans for  end-to-end testing in its overall test and evaluation plan, or other test  plans. Federal guidance and related best practices recommend end-to-end  testing to verify that the systems that collectively support a program like  Secure Flight will interoperate as intended in an operational environment,  either actual or simulated. We reported in March 2005 on the importance  of Secure Flight end-to-end testing and recommended that TSA perform  such testing. TSA agreed with this recommendation. However, Secure  Flight’s current test and evaluation master plan only outlines plans for  partner organizational entities (e.g., CBP for integration of international  watch-list functions) to test their respective parts of the system on their  own—rather than a coordinated end-to-end test involving all parties. TSA  developed a preliminary working draft of an end-to-end testing strategy,  called the parallel testing strategy. However, the plan does not contain  provisions for (1) testing that ensures that supporting systems will operate  as intended in an operational environment, (2) definitions and dates for  key milestone activities and parties responsible for completing them, or  (3) the revision of other test plans, such as the test and evaluation master  plan, to reflect the performance of end-to-end tests. In February 2008, we  reported that Secure Flight officials stated that they plan to conduct full  end-to-end testing of the program, beginning in the spring of 2008, and that  they planned to reflect this testing in test plans that were still under  development. While we commend TSA’s plans to conduct end-to-end  testing, the draft of TSA’s test plan that discusses end-to-end testing does  not define a scope that extends to all aspects of the program. Until TSA  has well-defined and approved end-to-end test plans and procedures, it  will be challenged in its ability to demonstrate that Secure Flight will  perform in a way that will allow it to achieve intended program outcomes  and results. We will continue to assess TSA’s testing strategy, to include  end-to-end testing, as part of our ongoing review of the program.
Information security. While the Secure Flight program office has  completed important steps to incorporate security into the system’s  development, it has not fully completed other steps to ensure security is  effectively addressed. Federal standards and guidance identify the need to  address information security throughout the life-cycle of information  systems, and specifies a minimum set of security steps needed to  effectively incorporate security into a system during its development. The  Secure Flight program has performed several steps that incorporate  security into the system’s development, including performing a security  risk assessment, identifying and documenting recommended security  control requirements, and testing and evaluating security controls for the  system and incorporating identified weaknesses in remedial action plans.  However, other steps pertaining to ensuring that security requirements are  tested, preparing security documentation, and conducting certification and  accreditation activities were not adequately completed. For example,  security requirements planned for Release One did not always trace to test  activities for this release. Program officials stated that some security  requirements were deferred until future releases due to delays in funding  for acquiring specific hardware and other requirements require  coordination with the information system security official to verify  whether they were tested as part of security test and evaluation. In  addition, security documentation contained incorrect or incomplete  information. To illustrate, the systems security plan did not identify all  interconnecting systems that Secure Flight will interface with, such as  those operated by the DHS Watch-List Service, the organization that will  transmit the watch-list to Secure Flight. Program officials stated that  security documentation was outdated or incorrect because there was  insufficient time to update the documentation for changes in the  computing environment and security requirements.
Furthermore, program officials granted an authorization to operate—one  of three possible accreditation decisions made in the certification and  accreditation process—although the system had 46 known vulnerabilities,  including 11 high-risk and 27 moderate-risk vulnerabilities and the controls  had not yet been implemented. Federal guidance as well as DHS policy  provide for an interim authority to operate accreditation when significant  restrictions or limitations exist and certain deficiencies and corrective  actions need to be addressed within a specified period. Although security  officials identified plans of actions and milestones for addressing the  vulnerabilities within 60 and 90 days for the high and moderate risks,  respectively, given their significance, an interim authorization to operate  would be the more appropriate determination. In addition, hardware  components used to implement controls over user identity and account  management (i.e., authentication, logins and passwords, and user roles  and privileges), as well as the alternate processing site had not yet been  implemented. Once implemented, the security controls over these  components could have an impact on the information security and,  therefore, may require a re-accreditation. Program officials chose the  authority to operate accreditation because they asserted that the DHS  Chief Information Security Officer does not allow interim authorizations. If  these security activities are not completed, there is an increased risk that  key security controls and requirements may not be fully developed, tested,  implemented or documented. In February 2008, we recommended that  TSA fully implement the Secure Flight risk management plan; finalize and  approve Secure Flight’s end-to-end testing strategy; and strengthen  information security documentation and controls. TSA generally agreed  with these recommendations.
section_title: DHS and TSA Lack Performance Measures to Fully Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Redress Process, But Plan Additional Measures under Secure Flight
paragraphs: DHS and TSA have not developed a complete set of performance measures  to assess the effectiveness of the redress process for passengers  inconvenienced as a result of watch-list matching. Measuring  performance allows organizations to track the progress they are making  toward their goals and gives managers critical information on which to  base decisions for improving their programs. DHS and TSA are developing  additional measures for the redress process that they plan to implement  when Secure Flight becomes operational.
TSA, supported by the Terrorist Screening Center, provides opportunities  for airline passengers to seek redress in cases where they experienced  inconveniences during the check-in and screening processes due to the  possibility they have been misidentified as being on or wrongly assigned to  the terrorist watch-list. The redress process enables these individuals to  file an inquiry to have erroneous information corrected in DHS systems  that may prevent future delays and inconveniences at the airport. In  February 2007, DHS established the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program  (TRIP) to serve as the central processing point within the department for  redress inquiries. TSA’s Office of Transportation Security Redress (OTSR)  is responsible for reviewing redress inquiries submitted by air passengers  through TRIP.
TRIP and OTSR’s redress program goals are to process redress  applications as quickly and as accurately as possible. However, to measure  program performance against these goals, TRIP and OTSR currently track  only one measure for redress related to the timeliness of case completion,  and do not track any performance measures related to program accuracy.  Previous GAO work identified that agencies successful in evaluating  performance had measures that used attributes from GAO’s best  practices. Specifically, our previous work identified that agencies  successful in evaluating performance had measures that demonstrated  results, covered multiple priorities, provided useful information for  decision making, and successfully addressed important and varied aspects  of program performance. TRIP and OTSR officials stated that they do not  plan to develop additional performance measures, such as measures  related to accuracy of the redress process, but rather are awaiting the  implementation of Secure Flight to determine the program’s impact on the  redress process before creating additional measures. Secure Flight is  intended to reduce the inconveniences experienced by air passengers by  taking over from air carriers the responsibility for prescreening passengers  in order to ensure consistent and effective use of the cleared list, which  should impact the effectiveness of the redress process.
In addition to TRIP and OTSR’s performance measures for the redress  process, the Secure Flight program office is working with OTSR to  develop redress performance measures for the Secure Flight Program.  Secure Flight plans to use the TSA redress process that is currently  available for individuals affected by the air carrier identity-matching  processes. Secure Flight is coordinating with OTSR to determine how this  process will be integrated with other Secure Flight requirements. Secure  Flight and OTSR are jointly developing a set of performance measures and  targets covering multiple priorities for redress that are to be implemented  when Secure Flight becomes operational, and officials told us that they  will follow best practices in the development of these measures.
While we commend TSA for developing redress performance measures for  the Secure Flight Program, since the program is not scheduled to be  implemented until January 2009, DHS and OTSR’s current redress process  lacks a complete set of measures with which they can assess performance  and make program improvements. Since measures are often the key  motivators of performance and goal achievement, the program’s overall  success is at risk if all priorities are not addressed and information is not  obtained to make future adjustments and improvements to the program.  Moreover, such performance data would provide a baseline against which  to benchmark Secure Flight’s progress and planned improvements to the  redress process. In February 2008, we recommended that DHS and TSA re- evaluate redress performance measures and consider creating and  implementing additional measures that, consistent with best practices,  demonstrate results, cover multiple priorities, and provide useful  information for decision making. TSA generally agreed with this  recommendation.
section_title: TSA Has Taken Steps to Secure the Nation’s Surface Transportation Systems, but More Work Remains
paragraphs: DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken initiatives to  strengthen the security of the nation’s surface transportation systems.  While TSA has devoted the vast majority of its resources to securing  commercial aviation and to meeting related statutory requirements, it has  more recently increased its focus on the security of surface modes of  transportation. However, these efforts are still largely in the early stages.  International events such as the March 2004 bombing of commuter trains  in Madrid, Spain, and the July 2005 bombings and attempted attacks  against public transit in London, England, have, in part, contributed to this  increased focus. TSA and other DHS components have developed a  strategic approach for securing surface modes of transportation, have  taken steps to conduct risk assessments of surface transportation assets  and have administered related grant programs. TSA also issued a proposed  rule in December 2006 which, if finalized as proposed, will require freight  and passenger rail operators to implement additional security  requirements, and will increase TSA’s oversight of operators’ security  efforts. However, TSA has not issued standards for securing all surface  transportation modes or determined whether it will issue standards for all  modes, and is still defining what its regulatory role will be for these  modes.  We have ongoing work assessing the security of surface modes of  transportation, and will report on our results later this year.
subsections: section_title: Strategic Approach for Implementing Security Functions
paragraphs: In September 2005, DHS completed the National Strategy for  Transportation Security. This strategy identified and evaluated  transportation assets in the United States that could be at risk of a  terrorist attack and addressed transportation sector security needs.  Further, in May 2007, DHS issued a strategic plan for securing the  transportation sector and supporting annexes for each of the surface  transportation modes, and reported taking actions to adopt the strategic  approach outlined by the plan. The Transportation Systems Sector- Specific Plan describes the security framework that is intended to enable  sector stakeholders to make effective and appropriate risk-based security  and resource allocation decisions within the transportation network. TSA  has begun to implement some of the security initiatives outlined in the  sector-specific plan and supporting modal plans. Additionally, the  Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11Commission Act imposes a  deadline of May 2008, for the Secretary of DHS to develop and implement  the National Strategy for Public Transportation Security. Our work  assessing DHS’s efforts in implementing its strategy for securing surface  transportation modes is being conducted as part of our ongoing reviews of  mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and highway  infrastructure security.  We will report on the results of this work later this  year.
section_title: Threat, Vulnerability, and Criticality Assessments
paragraphs: TSA has taken actions to assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and  vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly for  mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail, but its efforts related to  commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure are in the early stages.  For example, TSA had conducted threat assessments of all surface modes  of transportation.  TSA has also conducted assessments of the  vulnerabilities associated with some surface transportation assets. For  example, regarding freight rail, TSA has conducted vulnerability  assessments of rail corridors in eight High Threat Urban Areas where  toxic-inhalation-hazard shipments are transported. With respect to  commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure, TSA’s vulnerability  assessment efforts are ongoing. According to TSA, the agency performed  113 corporate security reviews on highway transportation organizations  through fiscal year 2007, such as trucking companies, state Departments of  Transportation, and motor coach companies.  However, TSA does not  have a plan or a time frame for conducting these reviews on a nationwide  basis.  Furthermore, DHS’s National Protection and Programs  Directorate’s Office of Infrastructure Protection conducts vulnerability  assessments of surface transportation assets to identify protective  measures to reduce or mitigate asset vulnerability. With regard to  criticality assessments, TSA reported in April 2008 that the agency had  conducted 1,345 assessments of passenger rail stations.  Additionally, the  Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11Commission Act has several  provisions related to security assessments. For instance, the act requires  DHS to review existing security assessments for public transportation  systems as well as conduct additional assessments as necessary to ensure  that all high-risk public transportation agencies have security assessments.  Moreover, the act also requires DHS to establish a federal task force to  complete a nationwide risk assessment of a terrorist attack on rail  carriers. We will continue to review threat, vulnerability, and criticality  assessments conducted by TSA related to securing surface modes of  transportation during our ongoing work.
section_title: Issuance of Security Standards
paragraphs: TSA has taken actions to develop and issue security standards for mass  transit, passenger rail, and freight rail transportation modes. However,  TSA has not yet developed or issued security standards for all surface  transportation modes, such as commercial vehicle and highway  infrastructure, or determined whether standards are necessary for these  modes of transportation.  Specifically, TSA has developed and issued both  mandatory rail security directives and recommended voluntary best  practices—known as Security Action Items—for transit agencies and  passenger rail operators to implement as part of their security programs to  enhance both security and emergency-management preparedness.  TSA  also issued a notice of proposed rule making in December 2006, which if  finalized as proposed, would include additional security requirements for  passenger and freight rail transportation operators. For example, the rule  would include additional security requirements designed to ensure that  freight railroads have protocols for the secure custody transfers of toxic- inhalation-hazard rail cars in High Threat Urban Areas. DHS and other  federal partners have also been collaborating with the American Public  Transportation Association (APTA) and public and private security  professionals to develop industry wide security standards for mass transit  systems. APTA officials reported that they expect several of the voluntary  standards to be released in mid-2008. Additionally, the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11Commission Act requires DHS to issue  regulations establishing standards and guidelines for developing and  implementing vulnerability assessments and security plans for high-risk  railroad carriers and over-the-road bus operators.  The deadlines for the  regulations are August 2008 and February 2009, respectively. With respect  to freight rail, TSA is developing a notice of proposed rulemaking  proposing that high-risk rail carriers conduct vulnerability assessments  and develop and implement security plans. We will continue to assess  TSA’s efforts to issue security standards for other surface transportation  modes during our ongoing reviews.
section_title: Compliance Inspections
paragraphs: TSA has hired and deployed surface transportation security inspectors  who conduct compliance inspections for both passenger and freight rail  modes of transportation; however, questions exist regarding how TSA will  employ the inspectors to enforce new regulations proposed in its  December 2006 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and regulations to be  developed in accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the  9/11 Commission Act. TSA officials reported having 100 surface  transportation inspectors during fiscal year 2005 and, as of December  2007, were maintaining an inspector workforce of about the same number.
The agency’s budget request for fiscal year 2009 includes $11.6 million to  fund 100 surface transportation security inspectors—which would  maintain its current staffing level. Inspectors’ responsibilities include  conducting on-site inspections of key facilities for freight rail, passenger  rail, and transit systems; assessing transit systems’ implementation of core  transit security fundamentals and comprehensive security action items;  conducting examinations of stakeholder operations, including compliance  with security directives; identifying security gaps; and developing effective  practices. To meet these compliance responsibilities, TSA reported in  December 2007 that it had conducted voluntary assessments of 50 of the  100 largest transit agencies, including 34 passenger rail and 16 bus-only  agencies, and has plans to continue these assessments with the next 50  largest transit agencies during fiscal year 2008. With respect to freight rail,  TSA reported visiting, during 2007, almost 300 railroad facilities including  terminal and railroad yards to assess the railroads’ implementation of 17  DHS-recommended Security Action Items associated with the  transportation of toxic-inhalation-hazard materials.
TSA has raised concerns about the agency’s ability to continue to meet  anticipated inspection responsibilities given the new regulations proposed  in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and requirements of  the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. For  example, the act mandates that high-risk over-the-road bus operators,  railroad carriers, and public transportation agencies develop and  implement security plans which must include, among other requirements,  procedures to be implemented in response to a terrorist attack. The act  further requires the Secretary of DHS to review each plan within 6 months  of receiving it. TSA officials stated that they believe TSA inspectors will  likely be tasked to conduct these reviews. The act also requires that the  Secretary of DHS develop and issue interim final regulations by November  2007, for a public transportation security training program. As of April  2008, these interim regulations have not been issued.  According to TSA  officials, TSA inspectors will likely be involved in ensuring compliance  with these regulations as well. To help address these additional  requirements, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11Commission  Act authorizes funds to be appropriated for TSA to employ additional  surface transportation inspectors, and requires that surface transportation  inspectors have relevant transportation experience and appropriate  security and inspection qualifications. However, it is not clear how TSA  will meet these new requirements since the agency has not requested  funding for additional surface transportation security inspectors for fiscal  year 2009. We will continue to assess TSA’s inspection efforts during our  ongoing work.
section_title: Grant Programs
paragraphs: DHS has developed and administered grant programs for various surface  transportation modes, although stakeholders have raised concerns  regarding the current grant process. For example, the DHS Office of  Grants and Training, now called the Grant Programs Directorate, has used  various programs to fund passenger rail security since 2003. Through the  Urban Areas Security Initiative grant program, the Grant Programs  Directorate has provided grants to urban areas to help enhance their  overall security and preparedness level to prevent, respond to, and recover  from acts of terrorism. The Grant Programs Directorate used fiscal year  2005, 2006, and 2007 appropriations to build on the work under way  through the Urban Areas Security Initiative program, and create and  administer new programs focused specifically on transportation security,  including the Transit Security Grant Program, Intercity Passenger Rail  Security Grant Program, and the Freight Rail Security Grant Program.  However, some industry stakeholders have raised concerns regarding  DHS’s current grant process, including the shifting of funding priorities,  the lack of program flexibility, and other barriers to the provision of grant  funding. For example, transit agencies have reported that the lack of  predictability in how TSA will assess grant projects against funding  priorities makes it difficult to engage in long-term planning of security  initiatives. Specifically, transit agencies have reported receiving funding to  begin projects—such as retrofitting their transit fleet with security  cameras or installing digital video recording systems—but not being able  to finish these projects in subsequent years because TSA had changed its  funding priorities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11  Commission Act codifies surface transportation grant programs and  imposes statutory requirements on the administration of the programs.
For example, the act lists authorized uses of these grant funds and  requires DHS to award the grants based on risk.  It also requires that DHS  and DOT determine the most effective and efficient way to distribute grant  funds, authorizing DHS to transfer funds to DOT for the purpose of  disbursement. According to the TSA fiscal year 2009 budget justification,  to ensure that the selected projects are focused on increasing security,  DHS grants are to be awarded based on risk. We will continue assessing  surface transportation related grant programs as part of our ongoing  work.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the  security of the nation’s transportation system, and should be commended  for these efforts. Regarding commercial aviation, TSA has developed  processes to more efficiently allocate and deploy the TSO workforce,  strengthened screening procedures, is working to develop and deploy  more effective screening technologies, strengthened the security of air  cargo, and improved the development of a program to prescreen  passengers against terrorist watch-lists. Further, TSA has more recently  taken actions in a number of areas to help secure surface modes of  transportation. More work, however, remains. For example, TSA’s surface  transportation security efforts are still largely in the early stage, and the  nature of its regulatory role, and relationship with transportation  operators, is still being defined. Opportunities therefore exist to further  strengthen these efforts, in particular in the areas of risk management and  program planning and monitoring. Our work has shown—in homeland  security and in other areas—that a comprehensive risk management  approach can help inform decision makers in the allocation of finite  resources to the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that risk  management has been a cornerstone of DHS and TSA policy, and that TSA  has implemented risk-based decision making into a number of its efforts.  Despite this commitment, however, TSA will continue to face difficult  decisions and trade-offs—particularly as threats to transportation systems  evolve—regarding acceptable levels of risk and the need to balance  security and its investments among all transportation modes. We recognize  that doing so will not be easy.
Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer  any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at  this time.
section_title: Contact and Acknowledgements
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.  Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, Jason Berman, Chris Currie, Joe  Dewechter, Chris Ferencik, Dawn Hoff, Daniel Klabunde, Tracey King,  Anne Laffoon, Thomas Lombardi, Gary Malavenda, Vicky Miller, Steve  Morris, Maria Strudwick, and Meg Ullengren made contributions to this  testimony.
This  is  a  work  of  the  U.S.  government  and  is  not  subject  to  copyright  protection  in  the  United  States.  The  published  product  may  be  reproduced  and  distributed  in  its  entirety  without  further  permission  from  GAO.  However,  because  this  work  may  contain  copyrighted  images  or  other  material,  permission  from  the  copyright  holder  may  be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.