NASA: Significant Challenges Remain for Access, Use, and Sustainment of the International Space Station
Published: 2012-03-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Construction of the International Space Station (ISS) required dedication and effort on the part of many nations to be successful. Further, the funding necessary to accomplish this task was significant, with the United States alone directly investing nearly $50 billion in its development. As construction of the on-orbit laboratory is complete, now is the time for the United States and its partners to make use of this investment and recently, Congress took steps to extend the life of the ISS until at least 2020.
GAO has cautioned for years that NASA should ensure it has a capability to access and utilize the space station following retirement of the space shuttle in 2011. We have highlighted the challenges associated with transporting cargo and crew to and from the ISS, as well as the difficulties NASA faces in ensuring the ISS supports its purpose of scientific research and in safely operating the station. Some risks have been realized. For example, commercial vehicles are significantly behind schedulewith the first launch to the space station planned for 2012.
GAO's statement today will focus on the progress NASA has made and the challenges the agency faces in accessing, ensuring full utilization of, and sustaining the ISS. To prepare this statement, GAO relied on prior relevant work on the ISS and NASA's commercial cargo and crew efforts and conducted a limited amount of additional work to update planned flight information.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NASA plans to use international partner and new domestic commercial launch vehicles to access, utilize, and sustain the International Space Station from 2012 through 2020. However, the agency faces challenges in transporting cargo and crew to the ISS as well as ensuring the station is fully utilized. NASAs decision to rely on the new commercial vehicles to transport cargo starting in 2012 and to transport crew starting in 2017 is inherently risky because the vehicles are not yet proven and are experiencing delays in development. Further, NASA does not have agreements in place for international partners to provide cargo services to the ISS beyond 2016. The agency will also face a decision regarding the need to purchase additional seats on the Russian Soyuz vehicle beyond 2016, likely before commercial vehicles have made significant progress in development, given the three-year lead time necessary for acquiring a seat. This decision is further complicated because restrictions prohibit NASA from making certain payments to Russia in connection with the ISS unless the President makes a determination. Further, NASA currently expects to transport all cargo needed by the ISS in 51 flights through 2020, but if international partner agreements and commercial service contracts do not materialize as the agency plans for the years beyond 2016, the situation could lead to a potential cargo shortfall.
If NASA can access the station, it will next be challenged with fully utilizing the ISS national laboratory for its intended purposescientific research. To take steps to meet this challenge and consistent with a 2009 GAO recommendation, in 2011 NASA selected an organization to centrally oversee ISS national laboratory research decision-making. It is too soon, however, to determine whether this organization is ensuring full scientific utilization of the ISS. Regardless of the efforts of the management body, as GAO noted in a 2009 report, constraints on crew time for conducting science could also impact full utilization.
If NASA can overcome its challenges related to accessing the station, it has reasonable approaches in place for estimating spare parts and assessing the structural health of the space station. These approaches provide NASA with increased assurance that the agency will have sufficient spares and will put mitigations in place to effectively and safely utilize the space station.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss utilization of the  International Space Station (ISS). The construction of the ISS is a  significant technical achievement. In essence, the National Aeronautics  and Space Administration (NASA) and its international partners have  assembled and constructed a skyscraper-sized laboratory in low-earth  orbit. This achievement involved dedication and effort on the part of all  participating nations and individuals. With construction completed and a  full crew of six astronauts on-board, the ISS stands poised to deliver  scientific breakthroughs enabled by its unique capabilities. The potential  of the ISS program to deliver on the promise of scientific discovery,  however, is inextricably linked to NASA’s ability to safely access, sustain,  and fully utilize the laboratory in orbit.
Now that ISS construction is finished, NASA and the ISS program face  three major challenges, which will be the focus of my testimony. First and  foremost, NASA must be able to transport cargo and crew to and from the  ISS. Second, NASA must ensure that the management of the ISS  national laboratory results in effective utilization of the station for its  primary purpose—scientific research. Finally, NASA must ensure that  replaceable spares are available and that the ISS is structurally sound  and can safely continue operations.
We have been reporting on the difficulties associated with sustaining the  ISS in the post-space shuttle era since May 2005 when we first  recommended that NASA take actions to determine the best available  options for supporting the station after shuttle retirement. In July 2006,  we expressed our initial concerns regarding NASA’s acquisition strategy  for the shuttle’s replacement, the human spaceflight system known as  Constellation, because of lack of a sound business case based on  resources that are matched to requirements, a stable design, and well- defined cost estimates.international launch vehicles is only a back-up and a less-capable means   Since 2008, we have cautioned that the use of  of supporting the station, as well as raised concerns about the ambitious  schedules for the vehicles being developed under NASA’s Commercial  Crew and Cargo Program. In a November 2009 report, we iterated our  concerns that limited international partner vehicle capacity and potential  delays in planned commercial vehicle development could impede efforts  to maximize utilization of all ISS research facilities. In 2011 reports and  testimony, we observed that commercial cargo launch development  remained behind schedule and, even when coupled with international  partner launch capacity, may not cover all of the ISS anticipated needs  beginning in 2014. Further, we reported that the funding provided for  NASA’s commercial crew efforts was significantly less than expected, as  other priorities such as the Space Launch System received increased  funding.
GAO-05-488; GAO-06-817R; GAO-08-581T; GAO-09-618; GAO-10-9; GAO-11-692T,  GAO-12-162; and GAO-12-282. conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence  obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The ISS program began in 1993 with several partner countries: Canada,  the 11 member nations of the European Space Agency, Japan, and  Russia. From 1994 through 2010, NASA estimates that it directly invested  over $48 billion in development and construction of the on-orbit scientific  laboratory, the ISS. NASA intended ISS assembly to be complete much  sooner than it was. For example, in 1995, NASA expected to ISS  assembly to be finished by June 2002, whereas the agency actually  completed assembly in 2010. With ISS expected to be in use only through  2015, this slower pace shortened the amount of time NASA had available  to take advantage of the significant monetary investment and to fully  utilize the station. As a result, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010  required the NASA Administrator to take all actions necessary to ensure  the safe and effective operation of the ISS through at least September 30,  2020.
The ISS is the largest orbiting man-made object. (See fig. 1) It is  composed of about 1 million pounds of hardware, brought to orbit over  the course of a decade. The ISS includes (1) primary structures, that is,  the external trusses which serve as the backbone of the station and the  pressurized modules that are occupied by the ISS crew, and (2)  functional systems made up of replaceable units, that is, systems that  provide basic functionality such as life support and electrical power that  are made of modular components that are replaceable by astronauts on  orbit.
The ISS was constructed to support three activities: scientific research,  technology development, and development of industrial applications. The  facilities aboard the ISS allow for ongoing research in microgravity,  studies of other aspects of the space environment, tests of new  technology, and long-term space operations. The facilities also enable a  permanent crew of up to six astronauts to maintain their physical health  standards while conducting many different types of research, including  experiments in biotechnology, combustion science, fluid physics, and  materials science, on behalf of ground-based researchers. Furthermore,  the ISS has the capability to support research on materials and other  technologies to see how they react in the space environment.
NASA planned for the space shuttle to serve as the means of transporting  crew, hardware, and supplies to the ISS through the end of the station’s  life. However, in 2004, President George W. Bush announced his Vision  for Space Exploration (Vision) that included direction for NASA to develop  new spaceflight systems under the Constellation program to replace the  space shuttle as NASA’s primary spaceflight system. The Vision also  included provisions for NASA to pursue commercial alternatives or  providing transportation and other services to support the ISS after 2010.NASA established the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program in 2005 to  facilitate the private demonstration of safe, reliable, and cost-effective  transportation services and purchase these services commercially. When  the Constellation program was cancelled in 2010, the commercial  vehicles became NASA’s primary focus for providing cargo and crew  transportation to the ISS. The success of commercial efforts became  even more important in 2010 when Congress authorized the extension of  space station operations until at least 2020 from 2015, and the President  directed that NASA transition the role of human transportation to low- earth orbit to commercial space companies.
section_title: NASA Faces Challenges Transporting Cargo and Crew to and from the ISS
paragraphs: The greatest challenge facing NASA is transporting cargo and crew to  and from the ISS to make effective use of the ISS. NASA plans to rely on  ISS international partner and new commercial launch vehicles to transport  cargo and crew to and from the ISS until at least 2020. NASA hopes to  begin using new commercial cargo vehicles in 2012 and crew vehicles to  transport astronauts to and from the ISS beginning in 2017. NASA’s  decision to rely on the new commercial vehicles is inherently risky  because the vehicles are still in development and not yet proven or fully  operational.
subsections: section_title: NASA Plans to Use International Partner and Commercial Flights but International Agreements Are Not in Place and Commercial Vehicles Remain Unproven
paragraphs: NASA is relying on 51 flights of international partner and commercial  vehicles to transport cargo to the ISS from 2012 through 2020, but  agreements for international flights after 2016 are not in place and the  commercial vehicles are unproven. NASA has agreements in place with  the European and Japanese space consortiums for their respective  vehicles—the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), and the  Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV)—to conduct cargo resupply  missions beginning in 2012 through 2016. The ATV and HTV are  unmanned vehicles that have flown to the ISS, and carry such items as  hardware and water.of 12 international partner launches—8 from 2012 to 2016 and 4 from  2017 through 2020. NASA does not have agreements in place for  international partners to provide cargo services to the ISS beyond 2016.  NASA plans to use the ATV for a number of cargo flights through 2014,  but no longer anticipates its use after that time. NASA plans to use HTV  for a number of cargo flights through 2016, but its negotiations with the  Japanese partners for flights beyond 2016 are in their infancy.
NASA’s current plans anticipate employing a total  NASA also plans to use two types of domestic commercial launch  vehicles to maintain ISS from 2012 through 2020. Development of these  vehicles—the Falcon 9 and Antares initiated effort known as Commercial Orbital Transportation Services.  These vehicles are being developed by private industry corporations— Falcon 9 by SpaceX and Antares by Orbital Sciences Corporation. In late  2008, NASA awarded contracts to both companies to provide cargo  transport services to the ISS. Only SpaceX will be able to safely return  significant amounts of cargo to earth, such as the results of scientific  experiments. NASA anticipates that SpaceX will begin providing that  capability in 2012.  —was fostered under a NASA- Commercial vehicles are essential to sustaining and utilizing the ISS. As  table 1 indicates, SpaceX and Orbital are scheduled to fly 20 (71 percent)  of the 28 launches NASA plans through 2016 and follow-on commercial  resupply vehicles are expected to fly 19 (83 percent) of the 23 launches  from 2017 through 2020.
The Antares was previously known as the Taurus II.
subsections: section_title: Total
paragraphs: This plan relies on commercial vehicles meeting anticipated—not  proven—flight rates. As we have previously reported, both SpaceX and  Orbital are working under aggressive schedules and have experienced  delays in completing demonstrations. SpaceX flew its first  demonstration mission in December 2010, some 18 months late, because  of such factors as design issues and software development. Currently,  SpaceX’s next demonstration launch to the ISS has been delayed from  November 2011 to late April 2012 because of additional testing and  resolution of some technical issues such as electromagnetic interference.  Likewise, Orbital experienced programmatic changes and developmental  difficulties that led to multiple delays of several months’ duration. In May  2011 testimony, we noted that Orbital’s inaugural demonstration mission  had been delayed to December 2011. Currently, this flight has been  delayed further to August or September 2012, primarily because of issues  related to construction and testing of the launch pad at Wallops Island,  Virginia. NASA has made efforts to accommodate delays in commercial  vehicle development, including use of the final shuttle flight in July 2011  to pre-position additional ISS spares. However, if the commercial vehicle  launches do not occur as planned in 2012, the ISS could lose some ability  to function and sustain research efforts due to a lack of alternative launch  vehicles to support the ISS and return scientific experiments back to  earth.
If the international partner agreements and commercial service provider  contracts do not materialize as NASA plans for the years beyond 2016,  this could lead to a potential cargo shortfall. As we reported in 2011,  NASA’s strategic planning manifests showed that, when anticipated  growth in national laboratory demands and margin for unforeseen  maintenance needs are accounted for, the 56 flights NASA was planning  for at the time of our review might not cover all of NASA’s anticipated  needs. These shortfalls amounted to a total of 2.3 metric tons— approximately the cargo that one SpaceX commercial vehicle will be able  to transport to the ISS. As of March 2012, NASA has cut its planned  number of flights from 2012 through 2020 from the 56 flights we reported  to 51 flights. However, its current ongoing analysis is no longer projecting  a cargo shortfall even with the decreased number of flights. According to  an ISS program official, cargo estimates, particularly beyond 2013, are for  planning purposes and could change as they are updated frequently  based on launch vehicle availability and the ISS’s need for spares.
section_title: NASA Lacks a Domestic Ability to Transport Crew to the ISS until at Least 2017
paragraphs: NASA faces two major challenges in transporting crew to the ISS— adjusting its acquisition strategy for crew vehicles to match available  funding and deciding if and when to purchase crew seats on the Russian  Soyuz in case domestic commercial crew vehicles are not available as  planned in 2017. In 2010, President Obama directed NASA to transition  the role of transporting humans to low-Earth orbit to commercial space  companies. Consequently, in 2010 and 2011 NASA entered into funded  and unfunded Space Act agreementsdevelop and test key technologies and subsystems to further commercial   with several companies to  development of crew transportation services. NASA’s intent was to  encourage private sector innovation and to procure safe, reliable  transportation services to the space station at a reasonable price. Under  this acquisition approach, NASA plans to procure seats for crew  transportation to the ISS from the private sector through at least 2020.
In 2011, we reviewed NASA’s plans for contracting for additional  commercial crew development efforts and found that the agency’s  approach employed several good acquisition practices including  competitive contracting that—if implemented effectively—limit the  government’s risk. As we also noted in that report, NASA’s funding level  for fiscal year 2012 is almost 50 percent less than it anticipated when it  developed its approach for procuring commercial crew services. Given  this funding level, NASA indicated it could not award contracts to multiple  providers, which weakened prospects for competition in subsequent  phases of the program. The main premise of its procurement approach  to control costs—full and open competition for future phases of the  program—therefore was likely no longer viable. Without competition,  NASA could become dependent on one contractor for developing and  providing launch services to the space station. Reliance on a sole source  for any product or service increases the risk that the government will pay  more than expected, since no competitors exist to help control market  prices. As a result of this funding decrease, NASA adjusted its acquisition  strategy. The agency now plans to enter into another round of Space Act  agreements to further the development of commercial crew vehicles and  has delayed the projected purchase of commercial crew transportation  until 2017.
Additionally, the agency faces another looming challenge—a decision  about if and when to purchase crew space on the Russian Soyuz vehicle.  NASA will likely need to decide by the end of 2013 whether to purchase  additional seats that might be needed beyond 2016 because the lead  time for acquiring additional seats on the Soyuz is 3 years. However, in  the 2013 time frame, NASA cannot be fully confident that domestic crew  efforts will succeed because the vehicles will not yet have entered the test  and integration phase of development. Furthermore, the decision to  purchase crew seats on the Russian Soyuz is complicated by restrictions  found in the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. These  restrictions prohibit NASA from making certain payments to Russia in  connection with the ISS unless the President makes a determination.  NASA currently has a statutory exemption from this restriction that allows  certain types of payments, but that exemption expires in 2016. According  to NASA officials, the agency has begun working toward resolution of this  problem, but the issue is not yet resolved.
section_title: NASA Faces Challenges Maximizing ISS Research Utilization
paragraphs: NASA’s greatest challenge to utilizing the ISS for its intended purpose— scientific research—is inextricably linked with the agency’s ability to carry  scientific experiments and payloads to and from the ISS. International  partner vehicles have much less cargo capacity than the space shuttle did  to carry supplies to the ISS and no ability to return research payloads  back to earth. The Russian Soyuz vehicle has some ability to transport  research payloads back to earth, but the capability is minimal at only 132  pounds. As mentioned previously, SpaceX, however, will provide NASA  with the capability to transport research payloads back to earth.  Consequently, if the new commercial launch vehicles are not available as  planned, the impact on ISS utilization could be dramatic. In the past,  NASA officials have told us that the impact of failures or significant delays  in developing the commercial cargo capability would be similar to the  post-Columbia shuttle disaster scenario,in a “survival mode” and moved to a two-person crew, paused assembly  activities, and operated the ISS at a lower altitude to relieve propellant  burden. NASA officials stated that if the commercial cargo vehicles are  delayed, they would pursue a course of “graceful degradation” of the ISS  until conditions improve. In such conditions, the ISS would only conduct  minimal science experiments.   where NASA operated the ISS  Nonetheless, NASA expects scientific utilization to increase since  construction of the ISS is complete. The ISS has been continuously  staffed since 2000 and now has a six-member crew. The primary  objective for the ISS through 2011 was construction, so research  utilization was not the priority. Some research was conducted as time and  resources permitted while the crew on board performed assembly tasks.  NASA projects that it will utilize approximately 50 percent of the U.S. ISS  research facilities for its own research. As we reported in 2009, however,  NASA’s scientific utilization of the ISS is constrained by limited crew time.  Limiting factors include the size of the crew on board the station; the  necessary division of crew work among many activities that include  maintenance, operations, and research; and the need to share research  facilities with international partners.
Per statutory direction, NASA has opened the remaining facilities to other  federal government entities and private industry and is operating the ISS  as a national laboratory. As we reported in 2009, NASA may face  challenges in the management and operation of ISS National Laboratory  research. There is currently no direct analogue to the ISS National  Laboratory, and though NASA currently manages research programs at  the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and its other centers that it believes  possess similar characteristics to other national laboratories, NASA has  limited experience managing the type of diverse scientific research and  technology demonstration portfolio that the ISS could eventually  represent.
GAO-10-9. this database when issuing solicitations for funded opportunities to  support research payload activities. Since the establishment of CASIS as  the management body of ISS research is relatively recent, we have not  examined its effectiveness; therefore, it is too early for us to say whether  it will be successful in ensuring full scientific utilization of the station as a  national laboratory.
section_title: NASA Has a Reasonable Approach to Meeting the Challenge of Estimating ISS Spares and Assessing Structural Health and Safety
paragraphs: We recently reported that NASA has an appropriate and reasonable  approach in place to determine the spares needed for the ISS as well as  to assess ISS structural health and safety. Estimating ISS spares and  gauging the structural health and safety of the ISS are not simple  challenges. Among the many factors to be assessed are the reliability of  key components, NASA’s ability to deliver spares to the ISS, the  projected life of structures that cannot be replaced, and in-depth analysis  of those components and systems that affect safety. While some  empirical data exist, because the ISS is a unique facility in space,  assessing its extended life necessarily requires the use of sophisticated  analytical techniques and judgments.
NASA’s approach to determining necessary spare parts for the ISS relies  on a statistical process. The statistical process and methodology being  used to determine the expected lifetimes of replacement units is a sound  and commonly accepted approach within the risk assessment community  that considers both manufacturers’ predictions and the systems’ actual  performance. NASA also has a reasonable process for establishing  performance goals for various functions necessary for utilization and  determining through modeling whether available spares are sufficient to  meet goals through 2020, but the rationale for establishing performance  goals has not been systematically documented.
NASA is also using reasonable analytical tools to assess structural health  and determine whether ISS hardware can operate safely through 2020.  NASA currently anticipates that—with some mitigation—the ISS will  remain structurally sound for continued operations through 2020. NASA  also is using reasonable methodologies to identify replacement units and  other hardware that could cause serious damage to the ISS if they were  to fail. Through 2015, NASA plans to develop methods to mitigate issues  identified and expects to begin implementing corrective actions as plans  are put in place.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: In summary, although NASA has done a credible job of ensuring that the  ISS can last for years to come, the question that remains is whether  NASA will be able to service the station and productively use it for  science. Routine launch support is essential to both, but the road ahead  depends on successfully overcoming several complex challenges, such  as technical success, funding, international agreements, and  management and oversight of the national laboratory. Finally, if any of  these challenges cannot be overcome, it will be contingent upon NASA to  ensure that all alternatives are explored—in a timely manner—to make  full use of the nation’s significant investment in ISS.
Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
section_title: Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
subsections: section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-4841  or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  testimony.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgements
paragraphs: Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Shelby S.  Oakley, Assistant Director; John Warren, Tana Davis, and Alyssa Weir.
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