Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety Oversight Program
Published: 2006-07-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In this report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the program's impact; and (3) challenges facing the program. We also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To do our work we surveyed state oversight agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for developing a program standard that transit agencies must meet and reviewing the performance of the transit agencies against that standard. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Rail transit moves over 7 million daily passengers. According to Federal  Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, rail transit accounts for less than 6  percent of all public transportation’s accidents while providing almost 32  percent of all public transportation’s passenger trips, making it one of the  safest modes of public transportation. However, safety and security are still  concerns, especially as the number of rail transit systems—and therefore  the number of passengers riding rail transit—increases. For example, the  number of rail transit systems in FTA’s State Safety Oversight program  increased from 32 in 1997 to 42 in 2006, and as many as 7 new systems are  expected to open in the next 3 years. Furthermore, the number of fatalities  and accidents has varied over the past few years. For example, while  fatalities ranged from 26 to 57 per year (with an approximate average of 40  per year) between 1999 and 2005, total reported accidents decreased 3  percent. Finally, recent acts of terrorism on European and Indian transit  systems illustrate the need to maintain high levels of safety and security for  transit.
The federal government is involved, in varying degrees, with the safety and  security of the nation’s transportation system. For example, the  Department of Transportation (DOT) provides oversight of several  transportation modes. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad Administration  (FRA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal  Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials  Safety Administration (PHMSA) promulgate regulations and technical  standards that govern how vehicles or facilities in their respective modes  must be operated or constructed. In addition, each of these agencies use  federal or state inspectors, or a combination of both, to determine  compliance with the safety regulations and guidance they issue. Finally,  these agencies can mandate corrective actions and levy fines to  transportation operators who do not comply with regulations.
FTA’s oversight of safety and security differs from the other DOT agencies.  In 1982, FTA’s role in transit safety evolved when Congress gave it the  discretion to investigate unsafe conditions in any operation financed by the  agency. Congress also gave FTA the power to withhold funds until a plan  for correcting the conditions had been approved, but did not give it power  to levy fines or take legal actions against transit agencies. However, the  National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) suggested that states and  localities take a more proactive role in overseeing transit safety, and that  FTA closely monitor this state and local oversight. Subsequently, in 1991,  Congress required FTA to (1) issue regulations requiring states to designate  an oversight agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit  agencies and (2) withhold federal funds if a state did not comply with the  regulations. Through the resulting State Safety Oversight program, which  became effective in 1997, FTA requires states to designate an oversight  agency to implement FTA safety and security oversight over rail transit  agencies. In addition, in 2001, Congress passed legislation creating the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and defined its primary  responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. While  TSA’s most public role to date has been its airport screening duties, the  agency is taking several steps to secure the U.S. rail transit system,  including developing a rail inspector force.
To assist with Congress’ oversight activities, we (1) describe how the State  Safety Oversight program is designed, (2) identify what is known about the  impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, and (3) identify  any challenges to the State Safety Oversight program. In addition, you  asked us to provide information on how the State Safety Oversight program  functions in areas where transit systems cross state lines. See appendix I  for a description of program implementation where transit systems cross  state lines.
To determine how the program is designed, we interviewed a wide range of  stakeholders including FTA, NTSB, TSA, and the American Public  Transportation Association (APTA), an industry group. We also reviewed  program documentation and guidance. To identify what is known about the  impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, we reviewed FTA  documents and interviewed officials with FTA, NTSB, APTA, transit  agencies, and state safety oversight agencies. To identify challenges facing  the program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the 25 state safety  oversight agencies across the country and 37 of the 42 operating rail transit  agencies. We visited 8 oversight agencies and 17 transit agencies. We  selected these agencies to present a cross-section of transit and oversight  agencies in major cities, smaller cities, states with several rail transit  agencies, and states with only one rail system. In addition, 2 of the 17  transit agencies that we selected will soon begin operations to see how the  program may be incorporated into new transit systems. Also, we selected 3  of the 17 because they cross state boundaries, so that we could determine  how the program functions in these regions. We interviewed staff of the  transit and oversight agencies we visited and reviewed relevant program  documentation such as interagency agreements and program standards.  We conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. III for  more detailed information on our methodology.)
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency  Act of 1991 (ISTEA), which added Section 28 to the Federal Transit Act.  ISTEA required FTA to establish a state-managed safety and security  oversight program for rail transit agencies. As a result, on December 27,  1995, FTA published a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway  Systems; State Safety Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA’s rule in  this report), for improving the safety and security of rail transit agencies.  State oversight agencies were required by the rule to approve transit  agencies’ safety plans by January 1, 1997, and security plans by January 1,  1998. As part of the FTA rule, FTA officials stated they incorporated APTA’s  1991 Manual for the Development of Rail Transit System Safety Program  Plans to describe steps the state oversight agencies should take in  developing the program standards that transit agencies would have to  meet.
In 1995, at the time of the FTA rule’s publication, 5 of 19 states affected by  the FTA rule had oversight programs in place for rail transit safety and  security, and no oversight agency met all the requirements in the FTA rule.  During the first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to  develop compliant programs that addressed FTA’s requirements. Ten years  after FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA published a revision to it in the  Federal Register on April 29, 2005. The FTA rule stated that oversight  agencies had to comply with the revised rule by May 1, 2006. The revisions  address, in part, the needs of a growing oversight community and NTSB’s  recommendations arising from transit accident investigations. For  example, according to FTA and NTSB, NTSB found that the initial rule did  not include the requirement that oversight agencies verify transit agencies  are following safe and secure operating procedures by formally  documenting how transit agency employees were performing specific work  functions in compliance with the transit agency’s rules and procedures—a  process known as “proficiency and efficiency testing.” Thus, the revised  rule specifies what the state oversight agency must require of rail transit  systems regarding such verification, and incorporates into the regulation  material previously incorporated by reference to the APTA manual. Finally,  the revised rule included additional information on ensuring rail transit  security and emergency preparedness.
FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the State  Safety Oversight program—and hired the current Program Manager in  March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties in  addition to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff within  the Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to transit and  oversight agencies and additional tasks. For example, FTA has devoted a  Transit Safety Specialist to the program full time; a Training Manager, Data  Analyst, and Safety Analyst are also available to assist on an as-needed  basis. FTA regional personnel are not formally involved with the program’s  day-to-day activities, though officials from several FTA Regional Offices  help address specific compliance issues that occasionally arise at transit  agencies. Also, staff in at least one FTA Regional Office have taken it upon  themselves to take an active role supporting transit agencies and oversight  agencies in meeting the program’s requirements. In addition, regional staff  help states with new transit agencies establish new oversight agencies,  help new transit agencies create safety and security plans, and have helped  facilitate disputes between oversight and transit agencies as needed.  However, after a transit system begins operations, the program is primarily  managed from FTA’s headquarters office. FTA also relies on contractors to  do many of the day-to-day activities ranging from developing and  implementing FTA’s audit program of state oversight agencies to developing  and providing training classes on system safety.
FTA’s rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway systems operating in  their jurisdictions. The FTA rule defines a rail fixed guideway system as any  light, heavy, or rapid rail system; monorail, inclined plane, funicular, trolley,  or automated guideway that is not regulated by FRA and  is included in FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles or receives  funding under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C.  5336); or   has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be included  in FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive funding  under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 5336).
Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included in  the State Safety Oversight program.
FTA’s rule states that rail systems that are regulated by FRA, such as  commuter railroads, are not considered rail transit agencies and are  therefore not subject to its rule. In addition, FRA has oversight authority  over the safety of portions of rail transit systems that share track or rights- of-way with the general railroad system. Furthermore, the revised rule’s  definition of “rail fixed guideway system” includes systems built entirely  without FTA capital funds, but that intend to receive FTA formula funding.  Examples of these systems include Houston’s METRORail system and the  New Jersey Transit RiverLINE system. Rail transit operations that do not  receive FTA formula funds are not subject to oversight through FTA’s  program. Las Vegas’ monorail line does not receive FTA formula funds and  therefore does not fall within the FTA program. However, some of the rail  transit systems—including automated airport people-movers and  sightseeing tramways—that are not subject to the FTA program may be  subject to state-mandated oversight in certain states.
FTA and FRA have different regulatory authority and this has implications  for their ability to provide oversight. According to statute, FTA cannot  regulate safety and security operations at transit agencies except for  purposes of national defense or in cases of regional or national  emergency. In addition, FTA does not have safety inspectors. FTA may,  however, institute nonregulatory safety and security activities, including  safety- and security-related training, research, and demonstration projects.  In addition, FTA may promote safety and security through grant-making  authority. Specifically, FTA may stipulate conditions of grants, such as  certain safety and security statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA  may withhold funds for noncompliance with the conditions of a grant. In  relation to the State Safety Oversight program, both the authorizing statute  and the FTA rule state FTA may withhold urbanized area program funds  from states that do not meet the requirements of the program. For  example, FTA invoked this authority and withheld federal funding from two  states that failed to meet initial deadlines specified in the FTA rule. FTA  withheld approximately $95 million in federal funding from one state for its  failure to designate a state safety oversight agency and approximately $2.3  million from another state for failure to meet the FTA rule’s implementation  deadlines.
FRA has broader jurisdiction over safety regulation than FTA. FRA  oversees over 500 freight railroads and over 20 commuter railroads, in  addition to Amtrak. According to agency officials, FRA can directly enforce  safety statutes or regulations against railroads using a “toolkit” of  consequences, which vary in severity and are used to compel rail carriers  to comply with safety regulations. Most commonly, FRA will issue a civil  penalty, or fine, against a railroad not in compliance with a particular  regulation. Depending on the infraction, however, FRA can also issue an  emergency order (the strongest response to noncompliance) or it can cite a  defect (a minor deficiency that needs to be addressed but is not egregious  enough to warrant a fine). FRA officials stated that the agency trains and  maintains its own cadre of safety inspectors that are authorized to conduct  safety inspections at any time, 24 hours per day and 7 days per week. In  addition to these inspectors, FRA manages a program called the State Rail  Safety Participation Program which allows states to employ their own FRA- certified inspectors who can enforce FRA regulations.
Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),  federal agencies should design programs with measurable goals that  support the agency’s strategic goals. Congress enacted GPRA to shift  agencies’ focus from simply monitoring activities undertaken to measuring  the results of these activities. Each agency’s strategic plan is to include a  mission statement, a set of outcome-related strategic goals, and a  description of how the agency intends to achieve these goals. To measure  progress toward the strategic goals, we have previously reported that the  agency should also have a plan for collecting data to measure and evaluate  program performance. Without measurable goals and evaluation, it is  difficult to determine whether the program is accomplishing its intended  purpose and whether the resources dedicated to the program efforts  should be increased, used in other ways, or applied elsewhere.
section_title: Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program
paragraphs: FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,  other federal agencies such as DHS, states, and rail transit agencies  collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. Under  the program, FTA is responsible for developing the regulations and  guidance governing the program, auditing state safety oversight agencies to  ensure the regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance and  other information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in only  limited instances under the program. State oversight agencies directly  oversee the safety and security of rail transit systems by reviewing safety  and security plans, performing audits, and investigating accidents. Rail  transit agencies are responsible for developing safety and security plans,  reporting incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all other  regulations state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to FTA,  federal agencies such as FRA, DHS’s Office of Grants and Training, and TSA  also have regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit safety and  security.
subsections: section_title: FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program
paragraphs: FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety approach  in developing the State Safety Oversight program. Federal, state, and rail  transit agencies collaborate to ensure the rail transit system is operated  safely; each of these agencies has some monitoring responsibility, either of  themselves or another entity. FTA oversees and administers the program.  As the program administrator, FTA is responsible for developing the rules  and guidance that state oversight agencies are to use to perform their  oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA also is responsible for informing  oversight and transit agencies of new program developments, facilitating  and informing the transit and oversight agencies of available training  through FTA or other organizations, facilitating information sharing among  program participants, and providing technical assistance. One avenue FTA  uses to provide these services is the annual meeting to which all program  participants are invited. FTA also calls special meetings and communicates  information to program participants via e-mail when applicable. (See fig. 2  showing roles and responsibilities of participants in the State Safety  Oversight program.)
FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk-management  approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and risk-mitigation  procedures, are included in the program standard that each state oversight  agency issues to the transit agencies they oversee. This is consistent with  our position that agencies make risk-based decisions on where their assets  can best be used, both in transportation security and safety. However, FTA  recognizes that only parts of the State Safety Oversight program are risk- based. The parts of the program that are risk-based are the areas where it  believes risk management is most applicable to safety and security. These  areas are similar to those in which other transportation modes, such as  aviation and pipelines, also use risk-based approaches. Areas that are not  risk-based would include such things as requiring minimum standards for  all transit agencies in the program, no matter their size or ridership.
While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies with  regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through audits and  reviews of oversight agency reports, state oversight agencies comply with  the program requirements. For example, according to the FTA rule, when a  state proposes to designate an oversight agency, FTA may review the  proposal to ensure the designated agency has the authority to perform the  required duties without any apparent conflicts. FTA has recommended in  two instances that a state choose a different agency because the oversight  agency that the state proposed appeared to be too closely affiliated with  the transit agency and did not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA is  responsible for reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit to  (1) ensure they include all the required information (e.g., descriptions of  program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions), and (2) look  for industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. FTA also has  authority, under the FTA rule, to request additional information from  oversight agencies at any time. Furthermore, FTA is responsible for  performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure they are complying with  program requirements and guidance. FTA audits evaluate how well an  oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the FTA rule, including  whether or not the oversight agency is investigating accidents properly, if it  is conducting its safety and security reviews properly, and if it is reporting  to FTA all the information that is required. Finally, FTA does not provide  funding to states for the operation of their oversight programs. However,  states may use FTA Section 5309 (New Starts program) funds—normally  used to pay for transit-related capital expenses—to defray the cost of  setting up their oversight agency before a transit agency begins operations.  Also, FTA officials stated this year that FTA used a portion of the funding  originally designated for FTA audits to pay for one person from each  oversight agency to attend training on the revisions to the FTA rule, which  oversight agencies had to comply with by May 1, 2006.
section_title: State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit Agencies
paragraphs: In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are directly  responsible for overseeing rail transit agencies. According to the FTA rule,  states must designate an agency to perform this oversight function at the  time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any New Starts project involving  a new rail transit system, or before the transit agency applies for funding  under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas. States have designated  several different types of agencies to serve as oversight agencies. Most  frequently—in 17 cases—states have designated their departments of  transportation to serve in this role, either due to their expertise on rail  transportation, or because state officials believed they had no other  agencies with transportation expertise. In three instances—California,  Colorado, and Massachusetts—states have designated utilities  commissions or regulators to oversee rail transit safety and security.  Officials from these states stated that since these bodies already had  regulatory and oversight authority over utilities in these states, it was a  natural extension of their powers to add rail transit to the list of industries  they oversee. In fact, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)  has been overseeing railroads and rail transit in that state since 1911. The  commission has issued and enforces several “general orders” that rail  transit agencies in California must follow or face fines and suspended  service. Two states have designated emergency management or public  safety departments to oversee their rail transit agencies. Officials in one  state, Illinois, have designated two separate oversight agencies—both local  transportation funding authorities—to oversee the two rail transit agencies  operating in the state. In the Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia),  region, the rail transit system runs between two states and the District of  Columbia. These states and the District of Columbia established the Tri- State Oversight Committee as the designated oversight agency. Finally,  one state, New York, has given its oversight authority to its Public  Transportation Safety Board (PTSB). PTSB officials said they have  authority similar to the public utilities commissions discussed above, but  have no other mission than ensuring and overseeing transit safety in New  York. See appendix I for further discussion of multi-state operations. Also,  see appendix II for a table showing each oversight agency and the rail  transit agencies they oversee.
The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit  agencies varies widely. While FTA’s rule gives state oversight agencies  authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the  oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies authority  to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit agencies or shutting  down their operations. However, we found five states where the oversight  agencies have some enforcement authority over the rail transit agencies  they oversee. In all cases, this was due to the regulatory authority states  have granted their oversight agencies. For instance, state utilities  commissions may have this authority written into their authorizing  legislation. In other instances, states had given this authority to the  oversight agency in state legislation. Officials from oversight agencies that  have the authority to fine or otherwise punish rail transit agencies all stated  that they rarely, if ever, use that authority, but each stated that they  believed it gives their actions extra weight and forced transit agencies to  acquiesce to the oversight agency more readily than they otherwise might.  A majority of oversight agencies, 19 of the 24 with which we spoke, have no  such punitive authority, though officials from some oversight agencies  stated they may be able to withhold grants their oversight agencies provide  to the transit agencies they oversee. Although officials from several of  these agencies stated that they believe they would be more effective if they  did have enforcement authority, under the current program this authority  would be granted by individual states.
While the states have designated a number of different types of agencies  with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a basic set of  rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the program, oversight  agencies are responsible for the following:   Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail  transit agency responsibilities. According to the FTA rule, the program  standard “provides guidance to the regulated rail transit properties  concerning processes and procedures they must have in place to be in  compliance with the State Safety Oversight program.” FTA requirements  for the program standard are procedural rather than technical. For  example, the program standard must include, at a minimum, areas  dealing with the oversight agency’s responsibilities, how the program  standard will be modified, how the oversight agency will oversee the  transit agency’s internal safety and security reviews, how the oversight  agency will conduct the triennial audits, and requirements for the rail  transit agency to report accidents. According to FTA, oversight agencies  may choose to develop technical standards, such as requirements for  the strength of track, crashworthiness of rail vehicles, or brightness of  signals. In addition, the standard must contain sections describing how  the oversight agency will investigate accidents, how the rail transit  agency will develop a corrective action plan to address investigation and  audit findings, and the minimum requirements in the agency’s separate  safety and security plans. FTA mandates that the transit agency’s safety  plan must include, among other requirements, a process for identifying,  managing, and eliminating hazards. Similarly, FTA mandates that the  transit agency’s security plan must include, among other requirements, a  process for managing threats and vulnerabilities, and a method for  conducting internal security reviews.
Reviewing transit agencies’ safety and security plans and annual  reports. FTA requires oversight agencies to review and approve these  plans and reports of their safety and security activities to ensure they  meet the program requirements.
Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at  least a triennial basis. FTA requires oversight agency officials to audit  the rail transit agencies’ implementation of their safety and security  plans at least once every 3 years. We found one oversight agency that  performed this audit on an annual basis. In addition, we found five  others that perform the audit on a continuous basis, auditing the rail  transit agency on a portion of their safety and security plans each year.  FTA has approved both these alternative auditing schedules.
Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed. FTA  requires oversight agencies to establish a process for tracking and  approving the disposition of recommendations from the triennial audits.  Oversight agencies must also have a process for tracking and  eliminating hazardous conditions that the transit agency reports to the  oversight agency outside the audit process.
Investigating accidents. FTA requires oversight agencies to investigate  accidents on the rail system that meet a certain damage or severity  threshold and develop a corrective action plan for the causes leading to  the accident. Oversight agencies may hire a contractor or allow the  transit agency to conduct the investigation on its behalf.
Submitting an annual report to FTA. According to the FTA rule,  oversight agencies must submit an annual report to FTA detailing their  oversight activities, including results of accident investigations and the  status of ongoing corrective actions.
Under the FTA rule, rail transit agencies are mainly responsible for meeting  the program standards that oversight agencies set out for them. However,  the FTA rule also lays out several specific requirements that oversight  agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as developing  separate system safety and security plans, performing internal safety and  security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a hazard-management  process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight agencies within 2  hours. FTA also requires that these requirements are included in each  oversight agency’s program standard. The locations and types of transit  agencies participating in the program are shown in figure 3.
section_title: Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight Program
paragraphs: In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit  agencies, other governmental agencies have some role in ensuring the  safety and security of rail transit systems. One of these agencies is DHS’  TSA. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), passed by  Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave TSA  authority for security over all transportation modes, including authority to  issue security regulations. While TSA’s most public transportation security  duties are its airport screening and aviation related activities, TSA has  taken steps to enhance rail transit security. For example, in May 2004, TSA  issued security directives to rail transit agencies to ensure all agencies  were implementing a consistent baseline of security. Also, TSA has hired  100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress. While the exact  responsibilities of the inspectors are still being determined, a TSA official  stated that they will monitor and enforce compliance with the security  directives by passenger rail agencies, as well as increase security  awareness among rail transit agencies, riders, and others. The inspectors  have begun outreach activities with rail transit systems aimed at enhancing  security in rail and mass transit systems. TSA officials stated their  responsibilities encompass the security of other rail systems, including  freight rail, which is consistent with ATSA.
In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, the Office of Grants and  Training within DHS’ Preparedness Directorate, plays a role in ensuring rail  transit security through supporting security initiatives. The Office of Grants  and Training (formerly known as the Office of Domestic Preparedness) is  the primary federal source of security funding for passenger rail systems,  and is the principal component of DHS responsible for preparing the  United States for acts of terrorism. In carrying out its mission to prevent,  prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism, the Office of Grants and  Training provides training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support  for the planning and execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other  support to assist states, local jurisdictions (such as municipalities and  transit agencies), and the private sector. The Office of Grants and Training  has provided over $320 million to rail transit providers through the Urban  Area Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant Program.
In addition to FTA, another DOT agency, FRA, plays a role in ensuring  transit agencies operate safely. In general, FRA exercises its jurisdiction  over parts of a rail transit system that share track with the general railroad  system, or places where a rail transit system and the general railroad  system share a connection (e.g., a grade crossing). Rail transit systems  that share track or grade crossings—or are subject to FRA regulations for  other reasons—may apply to FRA for a waiver from these rules. According  to FRA, if a rail transit vehicle were to operate on the same tracks and at  the same time as general railroads, FRA would make the rail transit agency  operating the vehicle meet the safety standards of the general railroads.  This would likely require rail transit agencies to use much sturdier (and  more expensive) vehicles, and could be cost-prohibitive for the rail transit  agencies. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have requested waivers from  FRA based on the fact that their trains operate at different times than heavy  freight trains, and will not be on the track at the same time, meaning the  risk of collision is low or non-existent. According to an FRA official, as of  June 2006, FRA granted waivers to 10 of the 11 rail transit agencies that  applied for them. After granting a waiver, FRA stays in contact with FTA  and the relevant transit and oversight agencies to address any safety  questions or problems that arise.
NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit safety, though  it has no formal role in FTA’s oversight program. NTSB has authority to  investigate accidents involving passenger railroads, including rail transit  agencies. Rail transit agencies must report to NTSB, within 2 hours, all  accidents involving fatalities, multiple injuries, evacuations, or damage  over certain monetary thresholds. NTSB officials stated they generally will  investigate only the more serious accidents, such as those involving  fatalities or injuries, or those involving recurring safety issues. Often, NTSB  accident investigations of rail transit accidents will result in  recommendations to federal agencies or rail transit agencies to eliminate  the condition that led to the accident. NTSB has no power to enforce its  recommendations, but NTSB states that, historically, agencies have  implemented over 80 percent of its recommendations. NTSB also maintains  expertise on transportation safety across all modes of transport and  conducts studies on pressing issues. Rail transit agencies and FTA both  stated that they consult NTSB periodically when they have safety  questions, in addition to reporting accidents to it.
section_title: Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and Security
paragraphs: The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we  spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety and  security in their organizations. These officials provided illustrations about  how the program enhanced safety or security; however, they have limited  statistical evidence that the oversight program improved safety or security.  FTA has obtained a variety of information on the program from sources  such as national transit data, annual reports from oversight agencies, and  its own audits of the oversight agencies. FTA has used national transit data  and oversight agencies’ annual reports to collate information on safety,  including information about fatalities and the causes of incidents; FTA last  issued a report summarizing this information in 2003. However, this data is  not linked to any program goals or performance measures. FTA officials  recognize the need for performance measures for its safety and security  programs and are taking steps in 2006 to begin to address this need. Finally,  although FTA expected to audit the oversight agencies every 3 years, it has  not conducted these audits as frequently as it had planned (it has  conducted eight since September 2001). However, program officials stated  they are committed to getting “back on track” to meet the planned  schedule. Ensuring that FTA devotes enough resources to conduct the  planned audits, and develops and uses planned performance goals and  measures to improve the program, will be important for future assessments  of the program.
subsections: section_title: Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as Worthwhile and Valuable
paragraphs: Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA’s State  Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it helps them  maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit agency officials  with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees their safety and  security is worthwhile. Several officials stated that it is important and  beneficial to have an independent agency verify their safety and security  progress. One transit agency official explained that the oversight agency  helps transit officials to identify larger, or systemic, issues. In addition, the  program provides support to exert extra influence on a transit agency’s  board of directors or senior management to get safety or security  improvements implemented faster. Furthermore, officials identified  specific examples illustrating how oversight agencies helped improve  safety or security. Officials from 15 transit agencies explained that the  program helped modify equipment to improve safety and security. For  example, one transit agency had problems with train operators failing to  stop at red light signals. The oversight agency helped the safety department  exert enough influence with the transit agency’s senior management to  replace all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals that were  brighter and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials believe that FTA’s  program is an effective method for overseeing safety and security. Several  officials said that having a state or local (rather than national) oversight  agency facilitated ongoing safety and security improvements and  consistent working relationships with the oversight staff.
In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state safety  oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State Safety  Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving transit  systems’ safety and security. Several officials commented that the program  provides an incentive to examine safety and security issues and avoid  complacency. It also helps the transit agencies by providing an independent  third party, since self oversight is not, in the officials’ view, the best way to  have an agency identify and resolve its safety and security issues.  Furthermore, several officials commented that they believed the current  system worked well, and that the program provides consistency and  endows the state safety oversight agencies with enough authority to  accomplish their tasks. Also, officials said that having the states carry out  the program provides ongoing oversight in addition to formal audits, which  helps maintain a constant oversight of safety and security issues.
Furthermore, some transit and oversight agency officials stated that,  because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved  safety statistics for their rail system. For example, CPUC provided safety  statistics showing an 87 percent drop in rail transit collisions at the San  Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) from 1997, when the CPUC became its oversight agency, to 2005. Although FTA changed its definition of a  reportable accident during this time period—making it impossible to  determine exactly what impact external oversight had on MUNI safety— both MUNI and CPUC staff stated they were confident CPUC’s efforts had  been a major factor in the reduction in accidents. A MUNI representative  estimated that the reduction in accidents was more likely about 15 percent,  but stated that CPUC oversight led MUNI to develop a comprehensive  safety program, which helped reduce accidents and increase the agency’s  focus on meeting safety goals. In another example, New York oversight  officials stated that, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fires were prevalent  in New York City’s transit system. After the New York State Legislature  created the PTSB in 1984 to oversee public transportation safety in New  York, the PTSB tracked incident numbers, approached the transit agency  and, according to oversight and transit agency officials, was able to develop  and implement an action plan which heightened the awareness of (and  ultimately improved) the situation. Since these efforts occurred several  decades ago, the data that might support the officials’ statements were not  easily accessible today; however, FTA, PTSB, and New York City transit  officials all cited this as an early success of state oversight of rail transit.
APTA officials with whom we spoke stated that, although the State Safety  Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety and security,  the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged industry officials to  surpass minimum standards and continue striving for improved safety and  security. However, transit officials with whom we spoke often discussed  the benefits of a federal program. For example, a transit agency official  explained that a benefit of FTA’s rule is that it standardized rail transit  safety and security across the country. In addition, officials from 17 transit  agencies reported that respective state safety oversight agencies imposed  requirements above those required in FTA’s requirement. For example,  three state safety oversight agencies reported that they require transit  agencies under their purview to have an “hours of service” type policy  which requires minimum time off duty for train operators to rest. In  addition, several oversight agencies have established more stringent  reporting and notification requirements than required by FTA. For example,  officials from two transit agencies reported that their oversight agencies  require them to report accidents occurring in a rail yard, while two others  stated that their oversight agencies require notification of any accident  involving contact between vehicles, no matter how minor.
section_title: FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information but Does Not Have the Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and Security
paragraphs: One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight  program’s impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through  the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. The  reports include information on many different issues, including program  resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous conditions, and any  corrective actions taken resulting from audits or accident investigations.  FTA officials stated they have used the oversight agency information, as  well as national transit data, to publish its own annual reports from 1999 to  2003. FTA’s reports included ridership data, fatality and injury data, and the  results of accident investigations to identify common incident causes.  Although these reports may have informed oversight agencies about what  safety or security problems existed, the information was not tied to any  program goals or performance measures. In addition, it has not issued a  report since 2003. Although the reports provide data on transit safety, it is  unclear how oversight agency officials use this data. For example, one state  safety oversight official with whom we spoke recommended that FTA  provide more extensive analysis of the accident data it receives from  oversight agencies. He stated that analyses of such data could identify  trends and help oversight agencies develop a more cooperative and  collegial relationship with each other.
According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better  information and performance measures for its safety and security  programs; also, it has not published a report since 2003 because it has been  looking for ways to improve the type of safety and security data it can  collect, and how it can use the information to track program performance  and progress toward as-yet-undefined goals. FTA’s 2006 business plan for  its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to continue developing and  implementing a data-driven performance analysis and tracking system to  help ensure management decisions are informed by data and focused on  performance and accountability. As part of these efforts, FTA is working  with a contractor to develop performance measures for the State Safety  Oversight program. FTA officials stated that their contractor is working  with oversight and transit agencies to identify measures that they use and  find useful in tracking the safety and security of their systems. Although it  may be difficult to identify such measures—many of the oversight agencies  with whom we spoke do not have performance measures, either—this  effort could allow FTA to more readily determine areas where the program  is having a positive impact on transit safety and security, and areas where  more focus is needed.
Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies that  FTA attempts to conduct every 3 years. Although the audits provide  detailed information on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought  together information from these audits to provide information on the safety  and security of transit systems across the country. FTA tracks the  deficiencies and areas of concern, and follows up with oversight agency  staff to assure that each state safety oversight agency resolves the  suggested corrective actions. Furthermore, FTA has not conducted the  audits frequently enough to provide a current picture of transit system  safety and security, or to identify some challenges that oversight and transit  agency officials raised during our interviews with them. FTA has audited  each state safety oversight agency that existed prior to 2004 at least once  since the program began; two agencies were audited twice. According to  the FTA contractor, they piloted the audit program in late 1998 by  conducting audits in three states with different legal authorities and a range  of differently sized rail transit agencies. Regularly scheduled audits began  in 1999. However, FTA largely discontinued the audit program after the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and acknowledged that the agency’s  priorities shifted in the wake of the attacks. FTA has audited 8 of 24  existing oversight agencies since September 2001. However, during that  time period, FTA also conducted nine security and safety reviews to  evaluate whether new rail transit projects could enter operations safely and  securely. In addition, the program had several staffing changes after 2001,  causing some oversight and transit officials to state that the program did  not seem to be a priority for FTA. According to FTA officials, including the  Program Manager, who started in February of 2006, FTA is not conducting  audits in fiscal year 2006 so it can use the money and time to help states  comply with the revised rule; FTA has planned a detailed outreach effort to  this end, including a workshop for oversight agency officials to help ensure  compliance. FTA plans to return to its triennial audit schedule in fiscal year  2007, with 10 audits scheduled. FTA plans to begin with the states that it  has judged to have had the weakest program standards and procedures,  based on their initial submission under the new rule.
section_title: FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety Oversight Program
paragraphs: Despite the program’s popularity with participants, FTA faces challenges in  implementing the program’s revised rule and continuing to manage the  program. First, several oversight agency officials stated they are not  confident they have adequate numbers of staff to effectively oversee rail  transit system safety and security and they are unsure the current training  available to them is sufficient. Also, we found the level of staffing and  expertise of oversight agency staff varies widely across the country. A  second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that many  transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how security  issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be  responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail transit  security.
subsections: section_title: Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are Adequately Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff
paragraphs: While a clear majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with  whom we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight  program, many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that  they were adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, 18 of 24  oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated they believed additional  training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and  security oversight. We found that the level of expertise of oversight agency  staff varied widely across the country. For example, we found that 11 of the  24 oversight agencies we examined had oversight staff that had no career  or educational background in transit safety or security. Conversely, another  11 oversight agencies required their staff to have certain levels of  experience or education. For example, while New York’s PTSB requires its  staff to have 5 years of experience in transit safety, the Massachusetts  Department of Telecommunications and Energy requires its lead oversight  staff person to have an engineering degree. According to some oversight  agency officials who had no previous transit safety or security background,  they had to rely on the transit agency staff they were overseeing to teach  them about transit operations, safety, and security. Therefore, it took them  several years before they were confident that they knew enough about rail  transit operations to provide effective oversight. These officials stated that  if they left their positions, any new staff taking over for them would face a  similar challenge.
Most oversight agency staff believe they are doing a good job and are  helping transit agencies operate more safely and securely through  overseeing their operations, but several cite the lack of a training  curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness. Officials  from some of the 18 agencies who stated additional training would be  useful cited several examples of how additional training could benefit  them. For example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated that the  training they had received in transit operations, accident investigations,  and other areas was beneficial, but they had not received any training on  how to perform specific oversight functions. Thus, they were unsure how  to carry out their agencies’ primary oversight role. Officials at a majority of  oversight agencies (15 of 24) stated that they felt the training that had been  made available to them either by FTA, the Transportation Safety Institute  (TSI), or the National Transit Institute had been adequate. However,  officials from 17 of 24 oversight agencies also stated that they were  somewhat unsure of which courses they should take to be effective in their  oversight role. For example, several oversight agency personnel stated  that, while FTA officials have encouraged oversight agencies’ staff to obtain  certifications from TSI in transit safety and security and have encouraged  oversight agency staff to take selected TSI courses, FTA officials have not  developed or recommended a course specifically related to oversight.
Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency staff  (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state oversight  agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay staff to travel to  these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay their own tuition and  travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA or TSI. Officials from 10  of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as  one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend.
Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA provided  some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition for training they  wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to spend their  limited resources on direct oversight activities, such as staff overtime,  travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring contractors. Several  oversight agency officials also cited the example of other DOT agencies  that provide free training or pay for state staff to travel to attend training.  For example, 30 states participate in FRA’s State Safety Participation  Program. These states have inspectors who FRA has certified to enforce  FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their initial and ongoing classroom  training and state staff’s travel to this training. In addition, the federal  agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA, authorizes state-employed inspectors  to inspect pipelines in many states. To help defray their costs, PHMSA  provides up to 50 percent of a state’s expenses in carrying out their pipeline  safety program. PHMSA also recently paid for two inspectors from each  state to attend training when it instituted a new inspection approach.  Officials from both FRA and PHMSA stated that providing funding to states  to train their employees helps federal agencies more effectively carry out  their enforcement activities, easing the states’ burden of paying to enforce  federal regulations. For the first time, FTA paid for oversight agencies’  personnel to travel to attend a special meeting in June 2006 in St. Louis,  where FTA provided technical assistance and shared best practices in  meeting the requirements of the revised rule. This instance could provide a  model for future funding of training or training-related travel for oversight  agency personnel.
FTA officials noted that the agency has provided considerable training in  transit safety and security through TSI and through the State Safety  Oversight program annual meeting, which includes a discussion of best  practices and exchanges of information between oversight agencies.  However, FTA officials agree that they have not provided training  specifically pertaining to oversight activities, or provided a recommended  training curriculum to oversight agencies; officials stated that it would not  be difficult to take these steps in the future. Also, FTA officials told us that  they considered addressing the lack of consistency in oversight agency  staff qualifications when they were revising the FTA rule in 2005. However,  they stated they did not have the legal authority to direct states to require  certain education, experience, or certifications for oversight agency staff.  Also, these officials stated that FTA has not issued any guidance to states  about what level of training is appropriate for oversight staff or what level  of staffing is appropriate for an oversight agency. However, these officials  noted that, despite the lack of formal guidance, FTA checks to ensure  oversight agency personnel are adequately trained during its audits; in five  instances, FTA has recommended that oversight agency staff take  additional training. FTA officials also stated that FTA could issue informal  guidance or recommendations to oversight agencies about the level of  training their oversight staff should have.
In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure  about whether they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a  transit agency’s operations. Specifically, officials at 14 of 24 oversight  agencies with whom we spoke stated that more staff would help them do  their job more effectively. We spoke with some oversight agency personnel  who were highly dedicated to performing oversight, even though they said  they had no assistance and their states had limited resources to allocate to  the task. Some staff took it upon themselves to stay informed about a  transit agency’s operations by staying in regular contact with transit agency  personnel, attending transit agency safety meetings, and making regular  inspections of the system—even though these tasks were not required by  their oversight agencies. However, officials from 11 oversight agencies told  us they had devoted the equivalent of less than one person working half- time to oversight duties, and, in some cases, described the oversight part of  their job as a “collateral duty.”   Personnel from some of these oversight  agencies told us they simply did not have time to perform the kind of active  oversight that involved attending transit agency meetings, making spot  inspections, and staying in regular contact with transit agency personnel.  While in some of these instances, the transit agencies overseen are small,  such as small streetcar lines, some of the transit agencies with the highest  ridership levels have similar levels of oversight. For example, one state that  estimated it devotes 0.1 full-time equivalent (FTE) to oversight program  functions is responsible for overseeing a major transit agency that averages  nearly 200,000 daily passenger trips. This state supplements its staff time  with the services of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial audits of  the transit agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting 0.5 FTE to  oversight functions is responsible for overseeing five transit agencies  (including two systems not yet in operation) in different cities. The  oversight staff in this state reported that it was difficult to maintain active  oversight when their responsibilities were so spread out. Furthermore, we  found 13 oversight agencies that estimated dedicating less than one full- time equivalent staff member to the oversight task. This meant that the  person (or persons) assigned to the oversight tasks had other duties, in  addition to oversight of a transit agency. Table 1 shows the amount of  personnel oversight agency representatives estimated their agencies  dedicate to oversight responsibilities. (See app. II for information on  estimated FTE and transit system information for each state safety  oversight agency and related transit agency).
Although it is up to states to determine the resources allocated to this  program, providing appropriate and continuing training and experience  may increase the effectiveness of the limited staff states have to dedicate to  this program.
section_title: Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA’s Emerging Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program
paragraphs: Another challenge facing the program is how the emergence of TSA and its  rail inspectors might affect oversight of transit security. As discussed  above, TSA now has full regulatory authority over transportation security  across all modes, and TSA officials stated the agency has hired 100 rail  inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among other duties, monitor and  enforce compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May 2004.  However, of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke, 20  stated they did not have a clear picture of who was responsible for  overseeing transit security issues. Similarly, officials at 14 of 37 transit  agencies were also unsure of lines of responsibility regarding transit  security oversight. Several state oversight agencies were particularly  concerned that TSA’s rail inspectors would be duplicating their role in  overseeing transit security. One oversight agency official stated that he felt  transit agencies could begin to experience “audit fatigue” if both TSA and  oversight agencies audited transit agencies’ security practices. This official  stated it would be more efficient if TSA and oversight agency staff audited  transit agencies’ security practices at the same time. Officials at several  transit agencies were also confused about what standards they would be  required to meet. For example, while oversight agencies are free to create  their own standards, TSA issued rail security directives in May 2004—and  could issue future directives or requirements that transit agencies must  meet. Security officials at one transit agency specifically voiced concern  that there could be conflicting security requirements and hoped that TSA  would coordinate with oversight agencies’ requirements and vice versa.
TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies at a  meeting they jointly hosted with FTA for oversight agencies in May 2006.  FTA program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both stated that they were  committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating their  respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as soon as  possible. However, as TSA is still developing their program, currently there  is no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety Oversight program,  and TSA has not determined the roles and responsibilities for their rail  inspectors. While the FTA rule discusses requirements for a transit agency’s  security plan (e.g., a method for conducting internal security reviews and a  process for determining security threats and vulnerabilities to a transit  agency), and requires oversight agencies to include security performance  in their audits of transit agencies, the FTA rule does not discuss TSA’s  specific role in the program; both TSA and FTA officials stated that exactly  how TSA would participate in the program was still to be determined.  However, TSA and FTA officials both stated they are committed to working  together to ensure inspection activities are coordinated to foster  consistency and minimize disruption to rail transit agency operations. Also,  a TSA regional manager of rail inspectors with whom we spoke was unsure  what the rail inspectors’ role would be in relation to the program; in  addition, the manager was unsure what the details of the program were,  including the identity of the relevant oversight agencies for the region.  However, he stated that he was working to learn these details, and that he  and his staff had been in touch with transit agency security officials to  introduce themselves and gather information.
Furthermore, in May 2006, after we had finished our interviews with transit  and oversight agency staff, TSA staff stated that they were engaged in an  ongoing dialog with FTA and oversight agencies, to determine how the rail  inspectors could best assist oversight agencies in reviewing transit agency  security. TSA gave several examples of activities resulting from this  coordination. For example, TSA reported that they had designated 26 rail  inspectors as liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, TSA officials stated  that they are working with FTA and the oversight agency from California to  pilot a coordination approach they could use with oversight agencies  across the country. Additionally, the director of the rail inspector program  attended a meeting with representatives from almost all oversight agencies  to discuss the concept of rail inspectors participating in oversight-agency  audits of transit agencies. Finally, TSA is working to bring the 26 TSA rail  inspectors involved in the State Safety Oversight program to the next  annual meeting for the program’s participants, so that the rail inspectors  can learn more about the program and develop a “game plan” for how the  inspectors will participate in the program.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: While FTA faces several challenges with the State Safety Oversight  program, most participants in the program consider it a success at  improving rail transit safety and security; nearly all participants can cite  anecdotal evidence suggesting the program has had a positive impact.  Although FTA collects data on safety and security from transit and  oversight agencies, FTA has not developed a framework for demonstrating  the impact the program has had on rail transit safety and security. As new  leadership takes over administration of the program, this is an opportune  time for FTA to determine how to assess the impact of the program,  including determining a way to measure the impact of the program, setting  performance goals, and developing and providing the means to meet a  consistent schedule of auditing oversight agencies.
Second, state oversight agencies have inconsistent training and  qualifications for oversight staff across the United States, although it is  unclear what impact, if any, this has had on rail transit safety and security.  In other federally mandated transportation safety programs where states  partner with the federal government to perform oversight duties, the  federal government pays for a portion of the training expenses of oversight  staff, (or for oversight staff to travel to attend training) because having  well-trained state officials makes the federally mandated oversight more  efficient and effective. Yet, in this program, FTA relies entirely on the states  to determine how to fund their direct oversight of rail transit agencies and  does not help defray their training or travel costs. While the program is  generally thought of as bringing about positive change, these differing  levels of training and qualifications are a cause for concern; it is  conceivable that inadequately trained staff, especially staff that have no  experience overseeing transit agency safety, might miss safety problems  they otherwise would notice, or may be unable to effectively evaluate a  transit agency’s proposals for resolving existing safety problems (though it  is not clear whether either of these have occurred). One way to help ensure  that oversight agency staff have at least a basic understanding of how to  oversee rail transit operations would be to evaluate the amount of training  oversight agency staff have obtained and, subsequently, develop a training  curriculum that FTA could recommend to oversight agency personnel.  Also, since many oversight agency personnel have little experience  conducting rail transit safety oversight, including the basic tenets of  conducting oversight in the training curriculum would help ensure that  oversight agency staff did not have to rely on transit agency personnel for  advice on conducting oversight. In addition, FTA could review oversight  staff qualifications in more detail during its audits of oversight agencies to  help ensure oversight staff are adequately trained to perform their duties.
Lastly, many transit and oversight agency staff are concerned that the  existence and deployment of TSA’s rail inspectors will complicate security  oversight. While TSA and FTA are undertaking several efforts to coordinate  their activities and determine the roles and responsibilities of the rail  inspectors, the official role of the rail inspectors in the State Safety  Oversight program remains unclear. Therefore, it is understandable why  transit and oversight agency officials fear possible duplication of effort,  especially for activities such as reviewing security plans and auditing  transit security practices. Also, since TSA and DOT agencies have had  some difficulties coordinating their actions in the past, such concern is  warranted, though FTA and TSA statements promising to address this  issue, and their recent activities in this direction, are a positive step.
section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: In order to assure that FTA devotes an appropriate level of staff resources  to the State Safety Oversight program, obtains sufficient information to  evaluate the performance of the program, and supports state oversight  agencies in adequately training their staff to perform their oversight duties,  we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following two  actions:  Direct the Administrator of FTA to take advantage of the opportunity  presented by having new program leadership to set short- and long-term  goals for the program, along with measures to ensure that the program  is making progress toward meeting those goals; develop performance  goals for the agency’s other approaches for evaluating the impact of this  program on safety and security; and develop a plan for maintaining FTA’s  stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies at least once every 3  years.
Direct the Administrator of FTA to assess whether oversight agency  personnel are receiving adequate amounts of training to perform their  activities effectively and, based on the results of this assessment, work  with oversight agencies to develop a strategy to address any deficiencies  they identify. This strategy should include developing an appropriate  training curriculum, including training on conducting oversight for  oversight agency staff and guidance to oversight agencies encouraging  them to have their staff complete the training curriculum. If FTA  determines that it does not have the authority to issue such guidance, it  should seek such statutory authority from Congress.
Furthermore, to reduce confusion among transit and oversight agencies  about the role of TSA in transit security oversight and reduce the potential  duplication of effort that would inconvenience transit agencies, we  recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant  Secretary of TSA to:   coordinate with the Administrator of FTA to clearly articulate to state  oversight agencies and transit agencies the roles and responsibilities  TSA develops for its rail inspectors; and  work with state oversight agencies to coordinate their security audits  whenever possible and include FTA in this communication to help  ensure effective coordination with these agencies.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: Officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB provided oral comments on a draft of  this report through their respective liaisons. The agencies concurred with  the report. Furthermore, FTA and TSA officials stated that they are working  to determine how to implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA  provided a technical comment which we included in the report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Acting Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary of  Homeland Security. We will also make copies available to others upon  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems
paragraphs: Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States—the Port  Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink in St.  Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)  in Washington, D.C.—cross state lines. Therefore, these systems require  the collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the State Safety  Oversight program or states can agree that one state will be responsible for  oversight of the transit system. Each of these multi-state transit systems  has a different structure to handle oversight responsibilities. The oversight  programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed strategies to  centralize decision making, streamline collaboration, and respond  promptly to safety and security audit findings. In contrast, the Tri-State  Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the oversight agency in the  D.C. area, requires majority decision making by the six committee  members of the agency, including at least one member from each  jurisdiction, and has experienced difficulty obtaining funding, responding  to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) information requests, and ensuring  audit findings are addressed.
subsections: section_title: Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently
paragraphs: Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure, and each performs  oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, authority to serve as  the oversight agency was delegated to one of the two state agencies— namely, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) agreed  to allow the New Jersey Department of Transportation to serve as the sole  oversight agency for the PATCO heavy rail transit line. MetroLink in St.  Louis is subject to oversight from both Illinois (through the St. Clair County  Transit District) and Missouri (through the Missouri Department of  Transportation); the two organizations share oversight duties. Finally, TOC,  which is composed of multiple representatives from each jurisdiction  (including Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.) provides oversight for  WMATA.
The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders daily  and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO’s track is  in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. Until early 2001,  safety and security oversight functions were shared by Pennsylvania and  New Jersey through the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), a regional  transportation and economic development agency serving both  southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When DRPA  implemented organizational and functional changes, DRPA and PATCO  leadership no longer believed that DRPA could perform its role as the  designated oversight agency without facing conflicting interests. As a  result, Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreed to have the New Jersey  Department of Transportation (NJDOT) replace DRPA as the oversight  agency. This arrangement allows the oversight agency to take corrective  action without seeking additional levels of approval from Pennsylvania,  although the oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania informed of its  activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides some support to the NJDOT by  having PennDOT perform oversight functions for the stations,  passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports  any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted during the  performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through meetings or  other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be performed by  the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or directly by New  Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time and one part-time staff  members to its oversight program, and while these staff members must  oversee several transit systems, including PATCO, their sole  responsibilities for safety and oversight functions.
The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis  International Airport, in St. Louis, and Scott Air Force Base outside Shiloh,  Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the system included  about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles of track in Illinois.  Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois officials agreed to allow the  Missouri Department of Transportation to provide safety and security  oversight for the entire system. However, in 2001, MetroLink opened a 17.4- mile extension in Illinois, which roughly equalized the amount of track in  both states. Because of this, the states agreed that it was appropriate for  Illinois to play a greater role in safety and security oversight, and Illinois  designated the St. Clair County Transit District as its oversight agency. St.  Clair is one of the few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight agency.  The involvement of two separate oversight agencies could create  challenges to effective implementation, but the agencies have taken steps  to ensure close coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri oversight  agencies have agreed to use only one uniform safety and security standard  across the entire MetroLink system. According to area officials, this  arrangement creates consistency throughout the system and allows both  agencies to perform their oversight functions in a consistent manner. In  addition, the agencies use a single contractor who is responsible for the  triennial audit. All other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri  oversight agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies  coordinate very closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically,  there is one employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his time to  safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several employees who  devote smaller percentages of their individual time to the program, but the  Managing Director is primarily responsible for coordinating with Missouri.  MetroLink, in turn, indicated that responding to state safety oversight  directives is a priority, and the agency works quickly to implement changes.
WMATA operates a heavy rail system within Washington, D.C. (the District  of Columbia), Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of  Columbia decided to carry out oversight responsibilities through a  collaborative organization through the TOC. TOC is composed of six  representatives—two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of  Columbia. All of the representatives have other primary duties, and their  activities on TOC are collateral to these other daily duties, as is the case  with staff at several other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any  dedicated staff, and TOC members have limited rail operational  experience. To gain access to additional experience and expertise in rail  oversight, TOC contracts with a consultant to provide technical knowledge,  perform required audits of WMATA, and ensure that audit  recommendations are completed. In addition, TOC funding comes from,  and must be approved by, each of the jurisdictions every year. The  Washington Council of Governments processes TOC funds and handles its  contracting procedures. These issues result in a lengthy process for TOC to  receive its yearly funding and process its expenses.
section_title: Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Administrative Challenges in Different Ways
paragraphs: The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have  attempted to streamline decision making, while TOC has a more  collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed  strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration,  albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New  Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO’s  territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency’s staff. New  Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety Oversight  program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates communication, and  provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with on the  implementation of any new safety or security processes. Although St. Louis  has two agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight agencies have  made it a priority to ensure that they are providing consistent information  to the transit agency, and they are coordinating activities so MetroLink is  not burdened by multiple contacts about the same issue. To do this, the  Missouri and Illinois representatives stay in close contact with each other.  Both oversight agencies stated they have in-house staff dedicated to safety  and security oversight, and the agencies have very good working  relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis could face  challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and new  employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In addition,  officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had disagreements over  safety or security standards, or how to enforce the existing standards, it  would be highly problematic. However, officials in the Illinois and Missouri  oversight agencies, as well as at MetroLink, thought that the current  arrangements have produced one set of standards, good communication,  and effective coordination. Both MetroLink and oversight agency staff in  St. Louis credited each other with creating an environment where this  system of having multiple oversight agencies could work well.
In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making  decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have  contributed to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA information  requests. On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would perform TOC’s  audit in late July 2005. FTA requested information prior to the audit to  facilitate the time it spent on-site. TOC did not submit the requested State  Safety Oversight program materials despite several FTA requests and an  extension by FTA to move the audit to a later date. At the end of August,  FTA initiated its audit even though it had not received requested  information, but was not able to complete the audit until the end of  September, when it received all requested materials. FTA’s Final Audit  Report to TOC cited 10 areas for improvement and provided TOC 60 days  to resolve these issues. According to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within  the time period. FTA held a follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to  check on the status of the remaining areas for improvement. As of June  2006, FTA was evaluating how many of the remaining audit findings  remained open, although FTA stated that TOC had created a detailed set of  internal operating procedures to address many of FTA’s findings and  concerns. In addition, TOC representatives stated that some of the areas  for improvement FTA found were complicated issues, such as reviewing  WMATA’s accident investigation procedures and approving modifications,  and could not be addressed within the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC  staff emphasized that, although WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to  TOC audit recommendations or information requests, they were pleased  with their relationship with WMATA and that WMATA was responsive to  TOC. Similarly, FTA officials stressed that they recognized and appreciated  the effort TOC had undertaken in addressing FTA’s findings.
TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track  outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on  at least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, TOC  members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to FTA’s  initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds for the year  and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working with the  consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and maintained their  files. According to TOC officials, since the process for acquiring additional  funding would require approval from all three jurisdictions represented on  TOC, it was not feasible to obtain additional funding quickly. In addition,  TOC cannot take any action without a majority of its members, and at least  one member from each jurisdiction, approving the action. Reaching such  majority agreements can be time consuming since all members of TOC  have other primary responsibilities. This is especially a concern when  quick decisions are necessary, such as responding to FTA’s audit  recommendations.
TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission,  including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy  process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of  corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they  believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and  oversight agencies, due to their location in Washington, D.C., and proximity  to FTA’s headquarters staff. To address these challenges, the chair of TOC  stated that she planned to spend additional time on overseeing WMATA and  was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the administrative and  funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a full-time administrator,  or designating a TOC member to serve in a full-time capacity, could help  solve some of these issues. However, funding this position could be a  challenge and the administrator would need to have decision-making  authority to be effective and act quickly.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To provide Congress with a better understanding of how the Federal  Transit Administration (FTA) oversees safety and security in rail transit  systems and what is known about the impact of the State Safety Oversight  program on rail safety and security, we met with FTA management and  consultants to discuss the history, mission, and design of the oversight  program. In addition, we discussed system safety and risk management  approaches used by FTA, but we did not independently verify that oversight  agencies use these approaches. We met with officials from other federal  agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the National  Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); we also met with the American  Public Transportation Association (APTA), a transit industry association.   We met with these organizations to determine how oversight  responsibilities are shared and coordinated, and the extent to which  duplication of safety and security guidance existed among these agencies.   We also spoke with a TSA Local Area Supervisor.  To compare other  transportation safety and security approaches to the oversight program, we  interviewed FRA, APTA, and safety officials from Canadian transit  agencies.
In addition to these interviews, we also reviewed key documents, including  rules, regulations, procedures, and guidance of the State Safety Oversight  program; the triennial audits FTA performs on oversight agencies;  documents tracking the performance of corrective action items; and  memorandums of agreement between federal agencies to facilitate safety  oversight coordination. At the state level, we reviewed annual reports that  the oversight agencies provide to FTA. When states were willing to share  these documents, we reviewed audits performed by the oversight agencies  on transit agencies (40 percent of the states provided these documents)  and authorizing legislation, or executive action, creating the state safety  oversight agency (more than 80 percent provided the legislation or  executive action). To compare the State Safety Oversight program with  other transportation safety approaches, we reviewed our past work on  pipeline, aviation, motor carriers, and highway safety.
To further our understanding of the design and impact of the program and  also to identify challenges facing the program, we conducted semi- structured interviews with oversight and transit agencies. To determine the  universe of oversight agencies and rail transit agencies under the State  Safety Oversight program, we requested a list from FTA. We compared  FTA’s list of transit systems to information published by APTA regarding  rail systems currently in operation, as well as those that were under  development. In two cases, APTA listed a transit agency that had initiated  service as “proposed,” and we were able to resolve this discrepancy by  comparing it to the FTA list and checking the agency’s website, which  showed that service had been initiated. We contacted all transit and  oversight agencies participating in the program that were in operation as of  October 2005. This included a total of 25 oversight agencies and 42 rail  transit systems. Twenty-four of the twenty-five oversight agencies, and 37  of the 42 rail transit systems, agreed to participate in these interviews.  The  New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (a transit agency) and Louisiana  Department of Transportation (an oversight agency) requested that we  exclude them from our review due to the difficulties posed by recovering  from Hurricane Katrina, and we agreed to the request. Four additional  transit agencies—the Jacksonville Transportation Authority, Chattanooga  Area Regional Transportation Authority, Metro-Dade Transit Agency, and  Hudson-Bergen Light Rail line—did not participate in our interviews.  The  semi-structured interview guide included questions concerning issues that  could create challenges for the program such as an estimate of the number  of FTE employees dedicated to the program, availability of FTA or other  federally sponsored safety training to oversight agency employees, state  funding schemes to support the program, the workload associated with  audit responsibilities, the role of outside contractors to conduct the  triennial reviews, employee turnover, and frequency of communication  between the transit agencies and federal security agencies.
The information collected from our semi-structured interviews with the  oversight and transit agencies may be subject to errors, commonly referred  to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in how a particular  question is interpreted, the sources of information that are available to  interviewees, or how the data are entered into a database or were analyzed,  can introduce unwanted variability in the results obtained in these  interviews. However, we took steps in the development of the interview  questions, the data collection, and the data analysis to minimize these types  of errors. For example, social science survey specialists developed the  questions used in the interviews in collaboration with our own subject  matter experts. Then, the questions were pretested to ensure that they  were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to comprehend. When the data were  analyzed, a second independent analyst checked all computer programs.   Since the interviews were conducted using an electronic interviewing  system, our interviewers entered answers obtained from officials directly  into the electronic interview instrument. This eliminated the need to have  the data keyed into a database by a third party, thus removing an additional  source of error.
We also conducted several site visits to further our understanding of the  challenges facing the program. We visited 17 transit and 8 oversight  agencies in both large and small cities, as well as in states with several rail  transit agencies and only one agency; we chose this variety to witness a  cross-section of transit agencies and observe the interactions the transit  agencies had with their oversight agencies.  Complete lists of the transit  and oversight agencies we visited are in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.   To determine how the program functions in regions where transit systems  cross state boundaries, we visited three systems that crossed state  boundaries. To identify how the program may be incorporated into new  transit systems, we visited two systems that are in the design or  construction phase, and one oversight agency  that will eventually oversee  a transit agency yet to begin service. We confirmed the accuracy of  information presented in the report about state oversight and transit  agencies by asking for the agencies to confirm text we sent to them prior to  the publication of the report. We conducted our work from August 2005  through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Catherine Colwell, Assistant  Director; Ashley Alley; Colin Fallon; Michele Fejfar; Joah Ianotta; Stuart  Kaufman; Joshua Ormond; Tina Paek; Stephanie Purcell; and Raymond  Sendejas made key contributions to this report.