James Webb Space Telescope: Project Meeting Cost and Schedule Commitments but Continues to Use Reserves to Address Challenges
Published: 2016-12-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:
The James Webb Space Telescope—NASA’s planned successor to the Hubble telescope—is on track to make its launch date in October 2018 and stay within its $8.8 billion budget. Most of the major project components have been delivered, and are now being integrated and tested.
JWST currently has 6 months of extra time set aside in its schedule to address any issues that might arise during integration and testing. This integration and testing period is when unexpected problems tend to show up—and JWST is an unusually complex project. To ensure that the telescope launches on time, NASA will need to quickly address any issues it discovers.

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: JWST is one of NASA's most complex and expensive projects, at an anticipated cost of $8.8 billion. Now in the midst of significant integration and testing that will last the 2 remaining years until the planned October 2018 launch date, the JWST project will need to continue to address many challenges and identify problems, some likely to be revealed during its rigorous testing. The continued success of JWST hinges on NASA's ability to anticipate, identify, and respond to these challenges in a timely and cost-effective manner to meet its commitments.
Conference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the fifth such report. This report assesses the extent to which JWST is (1) managing technological and developmental challenges to meet its schedule commitments, and (2) meeting its committed cost levels and managing its workforce plans. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed monthly JWST reports, reviewed relevant policies, conducted independent analysis of NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project is still operating within its committed schedule while in its riskiest phase of development, integration and test. Most hardware deliveries and two of five major integration and test efforts have been completed. Two other integration and test efforts are underway, with the final effort to begin in fall 2017. JWST used about 3 months of schedule reserve since GAO's last report in December 2015. For example, the project used one month of schedule reserve to address delays in integrating the Optical Telescope Element and the Integrated Science Instrument module, due to the complexity of this effort. The project's remaining 6 months of reserve is more than required by Goddard Space Flight Center requirements, as determined by project officials. The figure below shows JWST's elements and major subsystems, the schedule reserve remaining for each, and the critical path—the schedule with the least amount of reserve.
JWST is one of NASA's most technologically complex science projects and has numerous risks and single points of failure, which need to be tested and understood before launch. The project also faces a number of risks related to the observatory software. Looking ahead, the project will likely need to consume more reserves for its complex integration and test efforts.
JWST is meeting its cost commitments despite technical and workforce challenges. Although the project used $42.8 million more than planned for fiscal year 2016, it is maintaining spending within the levels dictated by the 2011 replan. NASA continues to emphasize that maintaining schedule is the priority, which resulted in the use of the fiscal year 2016 cost reserves to meet technical challenges. Also, as GAO previously found in December 2015, the observatory contractor has continued to maintain a larger workforce for longer than planned in order to address technical issues. For example, in 2016, the observatory contractor averaged 165 full-time equivalents more than projected to address technical issues while minimizing the impact on schedule. The contractor submitted a proposal to NASA this summer to cover cost overruns, which was the first such proposal since the replan in 2011.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO has made recommendations in previous reports, to which NASA has generally agreed and taken steps to implement. There are three recommendations that NASA has not fully implemented that could still benefit the JWST project.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is one of the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) most complex projects  and top priorities. It is intended to revolutionize our understanding of star  and planet formation and advance the search for the origins of our  universe. The innovative technologies within the telescope as well as the  sheer size of some of its components—such as the tennis-court-sized  sunshield—illustrate some of the immense challenges in building it. The  project has now entered into a period of significant integration and test  activities for its elements and major subsystems. During this period,  unforeseen challenges could arise and affect the cost and schedule for  the project. Until its launch, planned for October 2018, NASA and its  contractors’ continued ability to identify and respond to challenges in a  timely and cost-effective manner will likely influence whether JWST can  meet its cost and schedule commitments to Congress.
The on-time and on-budget delivery of JWST is also a high congressional  priority, as Conference Report No. 112-284 included a provision for GAO  to assess the JWST program annually and to report to the Committees on  Appropriations on key issues relating to program and risk management,  achievement of cost and schedule goals, program technical status, and  oversight mechanisms. This report is our fifth in response to that  provision. For this report, we assessed the extent to which the JWST  project is (1) managing technological issues and development challenges  to maintain its committed schedule, and (2) meeting its committed cost  levels and managing its workforce plans.
Our approach included an examination of the schedule, technical, and  cost performance of the project since our last report in December 2015— which also focused on the project’s cost and schedule commitments and  the extent to which independent oversight provided insight to  management about project risks. To assess the extent to which JWST is  managing technological issues and development challenges to maintain  its committed schedule, we reviewed project and contractor schedule  documentation, monthly project status reports, selected individual risks  from monthly risk registers, and other documentation. We also held  interviews with program, project, and contractor officials on the progress  made and challenges faced building and integrating the various elements  and major subsystems of the observatory. To assess the extent to which  JWST is meeting its committed cost levels and managing its workforce  plans, we analyzed program, project, and contractor data and  documentation. We compared projected workforce levels to actual  workforce levels to determine differences and their effect on cost.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2016 to December  2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: JWST is envisioned to be a large deployable, infrared-optimized space  telescope and the scientific successor to the aging Hubble Space  Telescope. JWST is being designed for a 5-year mission to find the first  stars and trace the evolution of galaxies from their beginning to their  current formation, and is intended to operate in an orbit approximately 1.5  million kilometers—or 1 million miles—from the Earth. With a 6.5-meter  primary mirror, JWST is expected to operate at about 100 times the  sensitivity of the Hubble Space Telescope. JWST’s science instruments  are to observe very faint infrared sources and as such are required to  operate at extremely cold temperatures. To help keep these instruments  cold, a multi-layered tennis-court-sized sunshield is being developed to  protect the mirrors and instruments from the sun’s heat. The JWST  project is divided into three major segments: the observatory segment,  the ground segment, and the launch segment. When complete, the  observatory segment of JWST is to include several elements (Optical  Telescope Element (OTE), Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM),  and spacecraft) and major subsystems (sunshield and cryocooler). The  hardware configuration created when the Optical Telescope Element and  the Integrated Science Instrument Module are integrated, referred to as  OTIS, is not considered an element by NASA, but we categorize it as  such for ease of discussion. Additionally, JWST is dependent on software  to deploy and control various components of the telescope as well as  collect and transmit data back to Earth. The elements, major subsystems,  and software are being developed through a mixture of NASA, contractor,  and international partner efforts. See figure 1 below for an interactive  graphic that depicts the elements and major subsystems of JWST.
For the majority of the work remaining, the JWST project will rely on three  contractors: Northrop Grumman Corporation, Harris Corporation (formerly  Exelis), and the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy’s  Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI). Northrop Grumman plays the  largest role, developing the sunshield, the OTE, the spacecraft, the  cryocooler for the Mid-Infrared Instrument, and integrating and testing the  observatory. Northrop Grumman performs most of this work under a  contract with NASA, but its work on the Mid-Infrared Instrument (MIRI)  cooler is performed under a separate subcontract with the Jet Propulsion  Laboratory (JPL). Harris is manufacturing the test equipment, equipping  the test chamber, and assisting in the testing of the optics of JWST.  Finally, STScI will solicit and evaluate research proposals from the  scientific community and will receive and store the scientific data  collected, both of which are services that they currently provide for the  Hubble Space Telescope. Additionally, STScI is developing the ground  system that manages and controls the telescope’s observations and will  operate the observatory on behalf of NASA.
JWST depends on 22 deployment events—more than a typical science  mission—to prepare the observatory for normal operations on orbit. For  example, the sunshield and primary mirror are designed to fold and stow  for launch to fit within the launch vehicle payload fairing and deploy once  in space. Due to its large size, it is nearly impossible to perform  deployment tests of the fully assembled observatory, so the verification of  deployment elements on JWST is accomplished by a combination of  lower level component tests in flight-simulated environments; ambient  deployment tests for assembly, element, and observatory levels; and  detailed analysis and simulations at various levels of assembly.
subsections: section_title: Cost and Schedule Reserves for NASA Projects
paragraphs: Complex development efforts like JWST face myriad risks and  unforeseen technical challenges, which oftentimes can become apparent  during integration and testing. To accommodate these risks and  unknowns, projects reserve extra time in their schedules—which is  referred to as schedule reserve—and extra money in their budgets— which is referred to as cost reserve. Schedule reserve is allocated to  specific activities, elements, and major subsystems in the event there are  delays or to address unforeseen risks. Each JWST element and major  subsystem has been allocated schedule reserve. When an element or  major subsystem exhausts schedule reserve, it may begin to affect  schedule reserve on other elements or major subsystems whose  progress is dependent on prior work being finished for its activities to  proceed. The element or major subsystem with the least amount of  schedule reserve determines the critical path for the project. Any delay to  an activity that is on the critical path will reduce schedule reserve for the  whole project, and could ultimately impact the overall project schedule.
Cost reserves are additional funds within the project manager’s budget  that can be used to address unanticipated issues for any element or  major subsystem and are used to mitigate issues during the development  of a project. For example, cost reserves can be used to buy additional  materials to replace a component or, if a project needs to preserve  schedule reserve, reserves can be used to accelerate work by adding  shifts to expedite manufacturing and save time. NASA’s Goddard Space  Flight Center (Goddard)—the NASA center with responsibility for  managing JWST—has issued procedural requirements that establish the  levels of both cost and schedule reserves that projects must hold at  various phases of development. In addition to cost reserves held by the  project manager, management reserves are funds held by the contractors  that allow them to address cost increases throughout development. We  have found that management reserves should contain 10 percent or more  on the cost to complete a project and are used to address different  issues.
section_title: History of Cost Growth, Low Project Reserves, and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: JWST has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays.  Prior to being approved for development, cost estimates of the project  ranged from $1 billion to $3.5 billion with expected launch dates ranging  from 2007 to 2011. Before 2011, early technical and management  challenges, contractor performance issues, low level cost reserves, and  poorly phased funding levels caused JWST to delay work after  confirmation, which contributed to significant cost and schedule overruns,  including launch delays. The Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on  Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies requested from  NASA an independent review of JWST in June 2010. In response, NASA  commissioned the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel, which  issued its report in October 2010, and concluded that JWST was  executing well from a technical standpoint, but that the baseline funding  did not reflect the most probable cost with adequate reserves in each year of project execution, resulting in an unexecutable project. Following  this review, the JWST program underwent a replan in September 2011,  and Congress in November 2011 placed an $8 billion cap on the  formulation and development costs for the project. On the basis of the  replan, NASA rebaselined JWST with a life-cycle cost estimate of $8.835  billion that included additional money for operations and a planned launch  in October 2018. The revised life-cycle cost estimate included a total of  13 months of funded schedule reserve.
section_title: Previous GAO Reviews of JWST Project
paragraphs: We have previously found that since the project’s replan in 2011, the  JWST project has met its cost and schedule commitments. Most  recently, in December 2015, we found that the JWST project was meeting  its schedule commitment established at the replan but would soon face  some of its most challenging integration and testing. All of the project’s  elements and major subsystems were within weeks of becoming the  project’s critical path—the schedule with the least amount of reserve—for  the overall project. The project had yet to begin 3 of 5 integration and test  events, where problems are most often identified and schedules begin to  slip, while working to address over 100 identified technical risks and to  ensure that potential causes of mission failure were fully tested and  understood. We further found that JWST continued to meet its cost  commitments, but that larger than planned workforce levels, particularly  with the observatory contractor, posed a threat to meeting cost  commitments. Additionally, unreliable contractor data could pose a risk to  project management. We recommended that the JWST project require  contractors to identify, explain, and document anomalies in contractor- delivered monthly earned value management reports. NASA concurred  with this recommendation and, in February 2016, directed the contractors  to implement the actions stated in the recommendation.
We have made recommendations in previous reports with regard to  improving cost and schedule estimating, updating risk assessments, and  strengthening management oversight. NASA has generally agreed and  taken steps to implement a number of our recommendations; however,  there are three recommendations that NASA has not fully implemented  that could still benefit the JWST project.
section_title: JWST Is Maintaining Schedule Commitment with Significant Integration and Test Efforts Underway
paragraphs: The project has completed most of its major hardware deliveries including  the telescope, instrument module, and the majority of the spacecraft. The  project has also made significant advances on the sunshield and  cryocooler, two major subsystems that have historically posed  challenges. Two of five planned integration efforts are complete and two  more are currently underway. The project has used 8 months of its  schedule reserve to address technical challenges, but is maintaining its  schedule commitment. The project’s schedule reserve, currently 6  months, remains above the Goddard Space Flight Center requirement, as  determined by project officials, and is on track with the project’s more  conservative internal plan. Integrating the Optical Telescope Element  (OTE) and Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM) into the  combined OTE+ISIM (OTIS) element has taken longer than initially  planned and is currently the critical path for the project. As a result, the  reserve allocated to the remaining OTIS integration and test work,  including a cryovacuum test that takes 93 days to complete, has been  reduced from 3 to 2 months. However, risk reduction tests on pathfinder  hardware have mitigated issues that would likely have consumed  additional schedule reserves during OTIS testing. As we also found in  2015, other JWST elements and major subsystems are within weeks of  becoming the project’s critical path, which could further reduce schedule  reserves. As we have previously reported, integration and testing is the  phase where problems are most likely to be found and schedules tend to  slip. Thus, going forward, technical issues encountered are more likely to  require critical path schedule reserves to address.
subsections: section_title: Project Has Made Significant Progress on Hardware Deliveries and Integration Work
paragraphs: The project and its contractors have delivered the majority of the  observatory’s hardware, including the telescope, instrument module, and  the majority of the spacecraft components. These deliveries also include  significant advances on two subsystems that have historically been  sources of numerous technical challenges and delays. For example,  Northrop Grumman received the sunshield’s final membrane layer from  its subcontractor in September 2016, following a delay of over 3 months.  This delay in delivery of the final sunshield membrane layer capstones a  series of challenges Northrop Grumman and its subcontractor have  experienced with the membranes. According to Northrop Grumman  officials, their subcontractor struggled to deliver the membranes on time  due to a variety of technical factors including additional time needed to  seam the last layers with a new lot of material, additional testing  requirements, and facility limitations. Technical challenges with the  membranes were further complicated by Northrop Grumman’s difficulty in  addressing the resulting schedule issues with their subcontractor.
After an 18-month delay and numerous technical challenges, the  cryocooler compressor assembly was delivered by the subcontractor to  the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in July 2015, where it met its acceptance  and end-to-end testing requirements. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory then  delivered the compressor and electronics assemblies to Northrop  Grumman for spacecraft integration and test in May 2016, about 9 weeks  ahead of the need date that was based on a revised schedule. Over the  last several years, the project has accommodated a series of cryocooler  schedule slips by reordering and compressing the Jet Propulsion  Laboratory’s test schedule and resequencing the spacecraft integration  schedule. Some additional work on the cryocooler will be carried forward  into spacecraft integration and test, including completion of vibration  verification of refrigerant lines and related hardware that was augmented  after cryocooler vibration testing had been completed and confirming  bonding resistance of cryocooler hardware when it is integrated with the  spacecraft. Jet Propulsion Laboratory officials characterized residual risks  as minor and the additional work required at the higher level of integration  as typical. JWST project officials further stated that the cryocooler’s  performance in testing was excellent and met all of its requirements with  healthy margin, and that they are comfortable with the work that will be  carried forward into spacecraft integration and test.
With most major hardware deliveries complete, the project is primarily  focused on integrating and testing the individual elements and major  subsystems that compose the observatory. Specifically, the project and  Northrop Grumman completed two of five planned integration efforts—the  instrument module and the telescope elements—respectively, in March  2016. Two additional integration efforts—integrating the OTE and ISIM  into the OTIS element and integrating the spacecraft—are underway, as  illustrated in figure 2.
section_title: Project Has Consumed Schedule Reserve to Mitigate Technical Issues with Critical Integration Work Still Ahead
paragraphs: The project has consumed 8 of 14 total months of its overall schedule  reserve to address technical challenges across elements and major  subsystems. Almost 3 months of this reserve have been consumed within  the past year. The remaining 6 months of reserve is more than required  by Goddard Space Flight Center, as determined by project officials, and  on track with the project’s more conservative internal plan—which was set  above the Goddard standard at the replan in 2011. The OTIS integration  and test work is currently the project’s critical path. However, as we also  found in 2015, all of JWST’s elements and major subsystems are within  weeks of moving onto the critical path, increasing the likelihood of further  use of schedule reserve. While the project plans to use all its available  schedule reserve to mitigate issues as it approaches launch, the proximity  of each element to the critical path means that the project must prioritize  the mitigations when problems occur. See Figure 3 below for a  comparison of the schedule reserve held by each element and major  subsystem in 2016, compared to last year.
Each of JWST’s elements and major subsystems have experienced  technical issues that, while reducing their individual schedule reserves as  shown in Figure 3 above, also consumed overall project critical path  schedule reserve in the past year.
OTIS: In August 2016, the project designated one month of critical path  schedule reserve to the OTIS element integration effort. According to the  project, a portion of the additional time was needed due to the complexity  inherent in integrating the telescope and instruments. For example,  project officials explained that work progressed slower than planned  because of the manual nature of the work and physical reach and access  limitations, which created a more serial work flow, particularly with  installing over 900 thermal blankets. Additionally, the project addressed  concerns regarding contamination control in the clean room.
The project took steps to optimize the OTIS integration and test flow to  minimize critical path schedule impact. For example, the project  conducted some tasks in parallel and added more work shifts to minimize  the length of time to complete a task. In addition to addressing integration  challenges, a portion of the one month was designated for the chamber  operations and preparation work to be conducted at Johnson Space  Center in advance of the OTIS cryovacuum test—the final event in the  OTIS integration and test effort—based on lessons learned from the  integration and test work that has occurred thus far. As a result, the  reserve allocated for the OTIS integration and test effort has been  reduced from 3 to 2 months. If an issue occurred that required stopping  and repeating the cryovacuum test, which is planned to take 93 days, the  remaining 2 months of OTIS reserve before the observatory integration  and test effort begins, could easily be exhausted and consume reserve  allocated for later integration and test work. Figure 4 shows the OTIS  element.
In an effort to allow OTIS testing to proceed more smoothly and prevent  the use of additional schedule reserve, the project and its contractor for  OTIS testing, Harris Corporation, have undertaken a series of three risk  reduction tests on pathfinder hardware at Johnson Space Center. Optical  ground support equipment tests 1 and 2 were completed in June and  October 2015, respectively, and the third and final risk reduction test,  Thermal Pathfinder, was completed in October 2016, after a 3-month  delay to update the processes for cooling down the chamber. The  pathfinder work was conducted in parallel to instrument, telescope, and  OTIS integration and test activities and was scheduled to conclude in time  to begin the OTIS cryovacuum test in early 2017. See figure 5 below.
The pathfinder tests have allowed the project and Harris to practice  processes and procedures that will be used for the eventual OTIS  cryovacuum testing and validate the performance of ground support  equipment. This is intended to create a more efficient test flow and  proactively address issues before the test on flight hardware commences.  For example, the second pathfinder test showed that vibration levels  inside the test chamber were too high, and adjustments to the ground  support equipment were implemented to address this issue. Additionally,  after the second pathfinder test, the project discovered that the adhesive  on the back of the tape used throughout the observatory can flake and  release particles at cryogenic temperatures, which raised concerns about  contamination of sensitive hardware, particularly in the instrument  module. Because these issues were discovered during the pathfinder  tests, the project was able to address them before OTIS testing where  flight hardware could have been affected and prevent the use of  additional schedule reserve.
Sunshield: The sunshield experienced several issues, which in total  reduced schedule reserves by 7 weeks and required adjustments to the  integration and test flow at Northrop Grumman to minimize further  schedule impacts. For example, in October 2015, the project reported that  a piece of flight hardware for the sunshield’s mid-boom assembly was  irreparably damaged during vacuum sealing in preparation for shipping.  The damaged piece had to be remanufactured, which consumed 3 weeks  of schedule reserve. In January 2016, subcontractor manufacturing  delays with the individual sunshield membrane layers consumed 2  additional weeks of schedule reserves. Most recently, in June 2016,  Northrop Grumman redesigned the membrane tensioning system, which  allows the sunshield to unfold and maintain its shape when deployed.  According to contractor officials, during previous mass reduction efforts,  the pulley walls in the system were thinned out; however, when tested  under higher loads, the weaker walls allowed a cable to become pinched  during a test. Because the observatory now has sufficient mass margin,  the system was redesigned to thicken the walls. The redesign of the  system consumed an additional 2 weeks of schedule reserves, and the  project is tracking further schedule threats related to conducting an anti- corrosion chemical treatment of the system’s parts and investigating a  deployment test anomaly. To accommodate the 2-week slip and minimize  use of additional schedule reserves, Northrop Grumman adjusted its  planned sunshield and spacecraft integration and test flow. For example,  delivery of the structures that support the sunshield will now be delayed  from September to December 2016. Sunshield integration needs to be  completed by September 2017 to avoid delaying integration and testing of  the completed observatory. Figure 6 shows the full scale sunshield  templates used for testing the deployment of the sunshield.
Spacecraft: The spacecraft consumed 4 weeks of schedule reserves due  to a variety of technical challenges, particularly with the electronics and  propulsion components. For example, 2 weeks of reserves were  consumed in January 2016 due to a deficient test cable which caused a  vibration test anomaly, following the late delivery of spacecraft electronics  components from the supplier. According to program officials, a series of  assembly issues on the propulsion system consumed another 2 weeks of  reserves. For example, installation and welding of the spacecraft  propellant lines was more complicated and took more time than expected.  Additionally, Northrop Grumman discovered that, during spacecraft check  out testing, components in the propulsion system that are used to  measure fuel levels had been damaged due to operator error. The  damaged parts will require replacement and the project and Northrop  Grumman continue to track this issue as a schedule threat. Due to the  technical issues experienced, the reserves allocated for spacecraft  integration and test have been reduced from 3 to 2 months. However,  significant integration and test work remains. Specifically, Northrop  Grumman will complete integration of the cryocooler electronics and  compressor assemblies and spacecraft electronics panels into the  spacecraft bus structure, conduct the first comprehensive system test in  2016, and begin integration testing in early 2017. Figure 7 shows the  spacecraft.
In an effort to provide additional schedule margin, the JWST project has  been working with the launch vehicle provider on the possibility of  expanding the potential launch window. According to program officials, at  its former expected mass and due to its planned trajectory and its  relationship to the moon, JWST could not launch for a period before and  after the solstices. This means if it misses the planned October 2018  launch date, the project would have to wait until February 2019 for  another opportunity. However, prior mass reduction efforts have made the  observatory lighter and resulted in more flexibility in launch dates near the  winter solstice.
section_title: Complexity of JWST Underscores Integration and Test Risks
paragraphs: JWST is one of the most technologically complex science projects NASA  has undertaken. In addition to the previously noted challenges that have  reduced schedule reserves, much significant and technologically  challenging work remains to be completed in the 2 years remaining  before launch, which could further erode schedule reserves if problems  occur. As integration and testing moves forward, the project will need to  be able to reduce a significant amount of risk and address technical  challenges in a timely manner to stay on schedule.
The project maintains a list of risks—currently with 73 items—that need to  be tested and mitigated to an acceptable level in the remaining 2 years  before launch. According to the project, approximately 25 of these risks  are not likely to be closed until the conclusion of the observatory  integration and test effort—just prior to project launch. In some cases, the  project will determine that no further mitigations are feasible and whether  to accept any residual risk. Many of these risks relate to the project’s  numerous deployments or single point failures. According to project  officials, in comparison with other NASA unmanned spaceflight missions,  JWST has a greater number of and more complex deployments. The  extent of these deployments—which are necessary because the  telescope and sunshield must be stowed for launch to fit within the launch  vehicle payload fairing—means the telescope could fail to operate as  planned in an extensive number of ways. For example, the four release  mechanisms that hold the spacecraft and OTE together for launch are  key deployments, as well as potential single point failures, for the project.  Once in space, these mechanisms are to activate and release to allow the  OTE to separate from the spacecraft. If the mechanisms fail to deploy, or  release prematurely, mission failure could occur. The project has  redesigned the mechanisms due to excessive shock when performing the  release function, and efforts to qualify the new design and mitigate as  much of the risk of failure or premature release as possible are ongoing.
According to project officials, there are over 100 different single point  failure modes across hundreds of individual items in the observatory,  nearly half of which involve the deployment of the sunshield. To ensure  that all deployment mechanisms are ready for flight, Northrop  Grumman—with participation from the project—is conducting a series of  deployment reviews using standards developed by the contractor and  employed on a variety of systems with large, complex, or high risk  mission deployments. These reviews are tailored to the more rigorous  requirements of JWST and provide a phased series of assessments  throughout the mission’s development. The project is also seeking a  waiver from NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance for its  numerous single point failures throughout the observatory, including  those related to the sunshield. The approval of critical single point failures  requires justification from the project including sound engineering  judgement, supporting risk analysis, and implementation of measures to  mitigate the risk to acceptable levels. According to project officials, this  approach is consistent with other high-priority NASA missions, which  require the most stringent design and development approach that NASA  takes to ensure the highest level of reliability and longevity on orbit.  Additionally, program officials noted that NASA leadership has been well  informed of JWST’s potential single point failures, and that the items  covered in the waiver are well understood and expected.
JWST also faces a number of risks related to software integration.  According to NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation office— which independently examines mission critical software development for  most NASA programs and projects, the project is unique among  spaceflight projects in the amount and complexity of the software required  to operate it and the number of developers contributing the software. For  example, while most science programs or projects have two to four  software developers, JWST has eight. This creates inherent cost and  schedule risk for the project. The project is tracking a number of software- related risks throughout the observatory. However, NASA’s Independent  Verification and Validation officials stated that they believe that JWST is  on track to continue meeting its software milestones, but the testing that  lies ahead—when the different components are integrated—will be a  challenge. Going forward, NASA’s Independent Verification and  Validation office will be focusing its efforts on the software related to the  ongoing OTIS integration and test work.
Our prior work has shown that integration and testing is the phase in  which problems are most likely to be found and schedules tend to slip.  For a complex project such as JWST, this risk is magnified. Now that the  project is well into its complex integration and test efforts, events are  more sequential in nature and there are few opportunities to mitigate  issues in parallel. According to contractor officials, opportunities for  schedule work-arounds and recovery options, which have preserved  some schedule reserves in the past, are diminishing. Thus, going forward,  technical issues encountered during integration and test are more likely to  require critical path schedule reserves to address, as has recently been  observed in the OTIS integration and test effort.
section_title: JWST Continues to Meet Cost Commitments Amid Technical and Workforce Challenges
paragraphs: Program and Project Reserves  Project reserves are those costs that are  expected to be incurred but have not yet been  allocated to a specific project cost element. A  project’s reserves may be held at the project  level, program level, and mission directorate  level. The project’s reserves are divided and  portions are controlled by the project  manager, the program and mission  directorate.
Though the project spent $42.8 million more than planned for fiscal year  2016, project officials managed JWST within its allocated budget for the  fifth consecutive year since the 2011 replan. The project estimates that it  will carry over into fiscal year 2017 about half of the amount it projected.  NASA officials attribute the reduced amount of carry over to their  emphasis on maintaining schedule, which has required additional dollars  to meet technical challenges. As in past years, the project used a portion  of its cost reserves to address technical challenges, such as completing  OTIS integration. The project also received additional program-level cost  reserves in fiscal year 2016. For example, program-held reserves were  used to offset cryocooler costs in fiscal year 2016 for the work remaining.  Our analysis indicates that these additional costs will not result in  exceeding the project’s overall cost commitment. However, NASA has  already committed the majority of its fiscal year 2017 program-held  reserves to address increased costs on the Northrop Grumman contract.  As a result, NASA will have diminished project and program reserves to  address technical and other challenges that may occur.
Though 89 percent of the work on the Northrop Grumman contract has  been completed, the primary threat to JWST continues to be the ability of  Northrop Grumman, the observatory contractor, to control its costs and  decrease its workforce. For the past 32 months, Northrop Grumman’s  actual workforce has exceeded its projections and is not expected to fall  to under 300 full-time equivalents until the spring of 2017. Based on its  projections at the beginning of the fiscal year, Northrop Grumman  exceeded its total fiscal year 2016 workforce monthly projections by about  37 percent. Figure 8 below illustrates the difference between the  workforce levels that Northrop Grumman projected at the beginning of  fiscal year 2016 and its actual workforce levels for that period.
Northrop Grumman’s workforce has declined slightly in fiscal year 2016  when compared to fiscal year 2015, but, on average, Northrop Grumman  was above its projections by 165 full-time equivalents each month in fiscal  year 2016. In the beginning of the fiscal year, Northrop Grumman’s  workforce was close to projected levels. However, in the latter half of the  year, the contractor increased its workforce instead of decreasing as  projected. For example, in July 2016, Northrop Grumman’s workforce was  593 instead of 284 as projected. Almost half of the July increase was due  to a need for more workers to work on observatory integration and test  activities. According to project officials, Northrop Grumman continues to  maintain overall higher workforce levels than planned because the project  has asked them to prioritize schedule when addressing technical issues  that arise to minimize impacts to the project’s schedule. The project,  however, has also communicated the need to reduce the workforce size,  including holding frequent discussions with the contractor on workforce  planning. As Northrop Grumman hardware schedule milestones are  completed, NASA expects the contractor to reduce its workforce  accordingly.
While Northrop Grumman did consume fiscal year 2016 reserves to  address technical issues and challenges, it was able to operate within  budget for fiscal year 2016. However, in July 2016, Northrop Grumman  submitted its first cost overrun proposal to NASA since the replan in 2011.  The costs associated with Northrop Grumman’s higher workforce levels is  the primary reason for their overrun proposal. The project had  independently forecasted that Northrop Grumman costs would be higher  than anticipated as the contractor dealt with technical issues and cost  increases for critical hardware deliveries such as the sunshield and  spacecraft. Currently, the project is evaluating Northrop Grumman’s  proposal, including the impact on program cost reserves, and does not  expect to conclude negotiations before early 2017.
While Northrop Grumman is developing and manufacturing large portions  of the observatory, as well as integrating and testing the observatory,  NASA relies on other entities for other support, components, and  observatory operations. For example, Harris Corporation is manufacturing  the test equipment used to test the OTIS flight hardware. Since most of  the work performed by these entities is complete or has a significantly  lower contract value than the observatory contractor, it is unlikely that it  will result in JWST exceeding its cost commitments as a result. For  example;  Harris Corporation: Projected costs will likely overrun the contract when  it completes the work performed under this contract in December 2016,  but our analysis shows that it will not cause JWST to exceed its cost  commitment. In 2017, Harris will perform additional work on JWST, but  that work will be performed through a Goddard Space Flight Center  support contract rather than a contract specifically for JWST.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory: In fiscal year 2016, the laboratory overran  its cost for work related to JWST and the project used budget reserves to  cover additional costs. Overall, in developing and testing the cryocooler  system, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory costs grew about 258 percent and  consumed a disproportionate amount of JWST reserves. Because most  of the work remaining for JPL is complete—testing of the spare  cryocooler remains—it is unlikely that cryocooler costs will have any  significant impact on JWST cost reserves in the future.
Space Telescope Science Institute: The STScI has generally  performed work within planned costs. To gain further insight on its costs,  NASA has an ongoing effort to require the institute to provide earned  value management data on its JWST contract. STScI has submitted its  proposal on how it will meet this new requirement and a contract  modification is expected to be executed in January 2017.
section_title: Agency Comments and our Evaluation
paragraphs: We requested comments from NASA, but agency officials determined that  no formal comments were necessary. NASA provided technical  comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and  interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to assess the extent to which the James Webb  Space Telescope (JWST) project is (1) managing technological issues  and development challenges to maintain its committed schedule and (2)  meeting its committed cost levels and managing its workforce plans.
To assess the extent to which the JWST project is managing  technological issues and development challenges to maintain its  committed schedule, we reviewed project and contractor schedule  documentation, and held interviews with program, project, and contractor  officials on the progress made and challenges faced building and  integrating the different components of the observatory. We examined  and analyzed monthly project status reports to management to monitor  schedule reserve levels and usage and potential risks and technical  challenges that may impact the project’s schedule, and to gain insights on  the project’s progress since our last report in December 2015. Further, we  attended flight program reviews at the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) headquarters on a quarterly basis, where the  current status of the program was briefed to NASA headquarters officials  outside of the project. We examined selected individual risks for elements  and major subsystems from monthly risk registers prepared by the project  to understand the likelihood of occurrence and impacts to the schedule  based on steps the project is taking to mitigate the risks. We examined  test schedules and plans to understand the extent to which risks will be  mitigated. Furthermore, we interviewed project officials at Goddard,  contractor officials from the Northrop Grumman Corporation, the Harris  Corporation, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the Association of  Universities for Research in Astronomy’s Space Telescope Science  Institute concerning technological challenges that have had an impact on  schedule, and the project’s and contractor’s plans to address these  challenges.
To assess the extent to which the JWST project is meeting its committed  cost levels and managing its workforce plans, we reviewed and analyzed  program, project, and contractor data and documentation and held  interviews with officials from these organizations. We reviewed JWST  project status reports on cost issues to determine the risks that could  impact cost. We analyzed contractor workforce plans against workforce  actuals to determine whether contractors’ are meeting their workforce  plans. We monitored and analyzed the status of program, and project  cost reserves in current and future fiscal years to determine the project’s  financial posture. We examined and analyzed earned value management  data from two of the project’s contractors to identify trends in  performance, whether tasks were completed as planned and likely  estimates at completion.
Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington,  D.C.; Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland; Northrop  Grumman Corporation in Redondo Beach, California; and the Space  Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore, Maryland. We also conducted  interviews at the Independent Verification and Validation facility in  Fairmont, West Virginia; the Harris Corporation, Chester, Maryland; and  the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2016 to December  2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Elements and Major Subsystems of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Observatory
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Richard Cederholm, Assistant  Director; Karen Richey, Assistant Director; Jay Tallon, Assistant Director;  Molly Traci, Assistant Director; Marie P. Ahearn; Brian Bothwell; Laura  Greifner; Katherine Lenane; Jose Ramos; Carrie Rogers; and Roxanna  Sun made key contributions to this report.