Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals
Published: 2001-10-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: As a result of events surrounding the November 2000 presidential election, public officials and various interest groups have proposed reforms to address perceived shortcomings of various election systems. The complexity and intricacy of the American electoral system suggests that the success of an election system depends on the appropriate integration of people, processes, and technology. This report presents an analytical framework that Congress could use as it weighs the merits of various reform proposals.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Voting is fundamental to our democracy. Each year the millions of people  who go to the polls expect that their ballots will be cast in private and  accurately processed and counted. However, events surrounding the  November 2000 presidential election raised broad-based concerns,  including such issues as the performance of different types of voting  equipment, the disqualification of absentee ballots, and the accuracy of  vote tallies and recounts.  As a result, public officials and various interest  groups have proposed a number of reform measures to address the  perceived shortcomings of various election systems.
As part of the broad congressional interest in these issues, we were asked  to review certain aspects of elections throughout the United States. This  capping report draws upon the extensive body of recent work done by GAO  at the request of several congressional leaders, congressional committees  and Members of Congress on matters surrounding the November 2000  election.   Our work, which culminated in six other reports that are  summarized in the appendices, addressed the following topics: the scope of Congressional authority in election administration,  compilation and maintenance of voter registration lists,  absentee and early voting,  voting assistance for military and overseas voters,  election day administration,   voting accessibility for voters with disabilities,  vote counts, recounts, and certification,   voting technology,  Internet voting, and  status and use of the Federal Election Commission voting equipment  standards.
This capping report serves three purposes.  First, we discuss how the  constitutional and operational division of federal and state authority to  conduct elections has resulted in great variability in the ways elections are  administered in the United States.  As a result, given this diversity and the  decentralized nature of election administration, careful consideration  needs to be given to the degree of flexibility and the planned timeframes for  implementing new initiatives.
Second, in order for election reform to be effective, reform proposals must  address all major parts of our election systems—its people, processes, and  technology—which are interconnected and significantly affect the election  process.  We discuss the main challenges that election officials face in each  of these areas and the need to accurately characterize and diagnose related  issues.
Finally, as Congress considers if and how to address the challenges to our  national election system it will have to deliberate upon a number of reform  proposals. Based on our work, this report offers basic criteria for assessing  a range of election reform proposals.  It is not our intention to advocate any  particular reform proposal, but we believe that these criteria offer a useful  analytical framework with which to consider changes to our nation’s  election system.
Copies of this report are being sent to the President, the congressional  leadership and all other Members of Congress.  Copies will also be made  available to other interested parties via our web site at www.gao.gov.
If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin at (202) 512- 3610, Managing Director, Tax Administration and Justice; or Richard M.  Stana, Director, at (202) 512-8816. They can also be reached by e-mail at  rabkinn@gao.gov and stanar@gao.gov, respectively.
subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: On November 7, 2000, more than 100 million Americans cast their votes for  various candidates and ballot issues across the country.   This hallmark of  American democracy unfolded in more than 10,000 local election  jurisdictions, which used several different types of voting equipment,  ranging from hand-counted paper ballots to electronic touchscreen voting  machines.  Staffing the precincts were some 1.4 million dedicated poll  workers who opened the polls, logged in and assisted voters, closed polls,  and in many cases, tabulated the votes cast at the precinct.  These poll  workers were assisted by an army of unseen election workers who  answered phone calls from both voters and poll workers, delivered extra  ballots to precincts, replaced or repaired broken voting machines,  tabulated absentee ballots, and compiled the election results from  individual precincts within their jurisdiction.  This highly decentralized,  complex, and massive logistical effort made it possible for American  citizens to participate in one of the most fundamental democratic  traditions—that of eligible citizens to cast their votes for candidates of  their choice.
The controversy surrounding the presidential vote in the November 2000  election cast America’s election system in a new and revealing light,  spotlighting issues such as the  accuracy of voter registration lists;  procedures used to accept or disqualify absentee ballots for counting;  variety of ways elections are administered across and within   widely varying types of voting equipment used to cast and count ballots;   many different methods of determining voter intent when voters  improperly or incompletely marked their ballots.
Several congressional leaders, congressional committees, and Members of  Congress asked us to review our nation’s election systems.  Accordingly,  we focused on issues that may affect the ability of eligible U.S. citizens to  cast their ballots in private and have those ballots counted accurately.
This capping report draws on a considerable body of work recently done by  GAO on election systems.  We address three main issues that Congress may  wish to keep in mind as it approaches election reform.  First, we examine  the division of federal and state authority to conduct elections and the  resulting variation among election jurisdictions. Second, we describe the  challenges that election officials face as they work with the people,  processes, and technology involved in our administering our nation’s  election systems.  And third, we suggest four criteria that Congress could  use as it weighs the merits of various reform proposals.
Our work on election systems, which is contained in this capping report  and six separate reports, took us across the United States and around the  world as we employed a variety of methods to answer Congress’ questions.   We conducted a detailed analysis of relevant constitutional provisions,  federal statutes, and federal court decisions as well as state statutes and  regulations on selected election issues.  We met with and reviewed  documents provided by local election officials in 41 election jurisdictions in  22 states and met with officials at the Department of State, the Department  of Defense, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the National  Conference of State Legislatures.  We surveyed District of Columbia and  state election directors.  Moreover, we used a mail survey and a telephone  survey and interviews with local election officials to obtain information  about the election process that would generally be representative of the  more than 10,000 local election jurisdictions in the United States.  We also  visited 585 polling places and met with embassy and military personnel  abroad and overseas citizens as well as with manufacturers and testers of  voting equipment.  And finally, we reviewed documents provided by state  and local election officials, voting equipment manufacturers and testers,  and obtained data on voting methods and election results for the November  2000 election from Election Data Services, Inc., and other sources.
section_title: Section 1: States and Local Jurisdictions Indicated the Desire for Reasonable Flexibility and Time to Implement Reforms
paragraphs: Election administration in the U.S. is guided by federal and state laws,  regulations and policies. Within the broad framework established by the  Constitution and federal statutes, each state sets its own requirements for  conducting local, state, and federal elections within the state.  Consequently, state requirements and processes vary considerably, and the  U.S. election system comprises 51 separate election systems. In turn, states  typically have decentralized this process so the responsibility for  administering and funding elections resides in thousands of local  government election jurisdictions, creating even more variability among  our nation’s election systems. Thus, in adopting federal election reforms,  the degree of flexibility and the timeframes for implementing new  initiatives need to be given careful consideration during deliberation and  execution of related reforms.
subsections: section_title: The Federal Government Establishes a General Framework for Elections, but Elections Are Primarily the Responsibility of State and Local Governments
paragraphs: The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and  federal roles. With regard to the administration of federal elections,  Congress has certain constitutional authorities over both congressional  and presidential elections.  Congress has passed legislation relating to the  administration of federal elections, under its various constitutional  authorities in certain areas, including the timing of federal elections, voter  registration, accessibility provisions for the elderly and persons with  disabilities, and absentee voting. Congress has, however, been most active  with respect to enacting prohibitions against discriminatory voting  practices, which apply in the context of both federal and state elections.   The Voting Rights Act of 1965, for example, established the constitutional  guarantee that no person be denied the right to vote on account of race or  color. In addition, subsequent amendments to the Act expanded it to  include protections for members of language minority groups, as well as  other matters regarding voting registration and procedures.
Within the broad framework established by the Constitution and federal  statutes, each state sets the requirements for conducting local, state, and  federal elections within the state. For example, states regulate such aspects  of elections as ballot access, registration procedures, absentee voting  requirements, establishment of voting places, provision of election day  workers, and counting and certifying the vote.  The states, in turn have  typically delegated responsibility for administering and funding state  election systems to the thousands of local election jurisdictions—more  than 10,000 nationwide—creating even more variability among our nation’s  election systems.
State election codes and regulations may be very specific or very general.  In particular, some states have mandated statewide election administration  guidelines and procedures that foster uniformity in the way local  jurisdictions conduct elections. It is common for state provisions to furnish  some guidance regarding voter registration requirements and procedures,  absentee voting requirements and procedures, performance requirements  for voting methods used within the state, establishment of polling places,  provision of election day workers, and the count and certification of the  vote. Other states have guidelines that generally permit local election  jurisdictions considerable autonomy and discretion in the way they run  elections (see figure 1).
section_title: Great Variability Exists in the Ways Various Local Elections Are Conducted
paragraphs: The variability from state to state becomes even more pronounced at the  local level, as local jurisdictions have used the flexibility afforded in state  provisions to create local elections systems that vary from county to  county, and even, in some cases, within counties.  This variation stems  from several factors.  One factor can be a consequence of the size of local  election jurisdictions, which varies considerably.  For example, one rural  county has 208 registered voters in contrast with a large, urban county,  such as Los Angeles County, whose total number of registered voters  exceeds that of 41 states.  The complexity of preparing for and conducting  an election in large jurisdictions is generally greater than in smaller  jurisdictions.  For example, a rural county, with a few thousand voters who  share the same language, prints its ballot in one language.  In contrast, in a  large, urban jurisdiction with a diverse population of 4 million registered  voters prints its ballots in 7 different languages.  This can also have an  effect on the processes and type of voting equipment used.  As illustrated in  figure 2, the magnitude of other key administrative tasks in this large, urban  jurisdiction is a thousand times larger than for the small jurisdiction.
Variability can also be a consequence of local needs.  For example, a  jurisdiction with a large population segment that moves out of the location  each year might opt for certain voter registration and voter education  processes that reflect the need to address a large voter turnover.  As a  second example, a jurisdiction might use a certain type of voting equipment  based on financial resource availability.  More wealthy jurisdictions have  had the resources necessary to modernize equipment, while others need to  make do with what they have.
Finally, variability can be a consequence of a jurisdiction’s perceived need  to maintain voting traditions that have been in place for a long time.  In two  jurisdictions we visited, election officials opted to replace lever machines  with full-screen electronic voting machines because this machine uses a  ballot that most closely resembles the type of ballot voters were used to  seeing on lever machines.  This choice was possible because ballots did not  have to be printed in more than two languages in either jurisdiction so the  ballots could fit on a single page.
Variability among states and local jurisdictions was evident in each major  stage of an election--voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing  for and conducting election day activities, and vote counting and  certification.  Some examples follow.
subsections: section_title: Who Could Vote Varied
paragraphs: For the November 2000 election, the FEC reported that nearly 168 million  people, or about 82 percent of the voting age population, were registered  to vote. Registering to vote is not a federal requirement, but in November  2000, all states except North Dakota required citizens to register before  voting. At a minimum, every state and the District of Columbia required  that a voter be a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age, and a resident.  Additional requirements to vote, such as time in residence, varied.  Due to  variations in voter eligibility requirements, different citizens with the same  qualifications would be eligible to vote in some states but not in others  including (1) those that had completed their sentence after a felony  conviction; (2) those who had been adjudged mentally incompetent; and  (3) those who met all of the qualifications to vote but who had not  registered in accordance with prescribed timeframes.
section_title: When People Could Vote Varied
paragraphs: In November 2000, citizens had different opportunities for obtaining and  successfully casting absentee ballots due to the differences in absentee and  early voting requirements, administration, and procedures.  All states allow  some provision for absentee balloting;  some, however, require a reason to  vote absentee as indicated in the figure below.
For the November 2000 election, about 1.4 million poll workers staffed  polling places across the country on election day.  Although poll workers  are usually employed for only one day, the success of election  administration largely hinges upon their ability to perform their jobs well.   Depending on state law and the organization and traditions of the local  jurisdiction, poll workers have different titles, levels of pay, training  requirements, and responsibilities.  Some poll workers are elected, some  are appointed, and some volunteer.  Levels of authority and responsibility  that jurisdictions grant to poll workers also ranged from significant  autonomy over the operation of the polling place with final authority to  interpret improper ballot markings to having limited discretion, functioning  primarily as clerks and facilitators who refer issues and problems back to  elections headquarters.
section_title: How Elections Were Conducted Varied
paragraphs: Jurisdictions followed various procedures on election day that created  differences in the way elections were conducted.  For example, to  determine whether a citizen who appeared at the polls was eligible to vote,  some jurisdictions required voters to identify themselves by stating their  names and addresses to the poll workers, who also matched the signature  on the voter application with the voter registration records.  Other  jurisdictions also required voters to present a valid photo identification  card.  In other jurisdictions, a hunting or fishing license was sufficient to  verify one’s identity. Still other jurisdictions required no identification other  than the voter stating his or her name.  If a voter’s name did not appear on  the list of registered voters, some jurisdictions accommodated these  individuals by automatically giving them a provisional ballot which may  have been counted if the voter’s eligibility was verified at a later time.   Others did not.
section_title: How the Votes Were Cast Varied
paragraphs: Registered voters cast their ballots using one of five voting methods in the  November 2000 election: hand-counted paper ballots and lever, punch card,  optical scan, and Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting equipment.   Punch card and optical scan equipment was most widely used by registered  voters, as figure 4 shows.
section_title: Election Reform Requires An Appreciation for Variability Among Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Although the states have traditionally had broad authority to regulate and  conduct elections, Congress also has broad authority to regulate federal  elections, and, in particular, congressional elections. State and local  election officials generally use the same people, processes, and technology  to conduct local, state, and federal elections.  Consequently, as a practical  matter, congressionally directed changes in the conduct of congressional  elections are likely to affect the administration of state and local elections.   In addition, through the use of its spending power, Congress may  encourage state action by attaching conditions to the receipt of federal  funds.
Our work found wide variations across the country which have developed  over time in response to local economic, demographic, political, and  cultural traditions in each state and local jurisdiction.  As might be  expected given this variety, local election officials do not share a common  perspective on election reform.  For example, when asked their  preferences for the use of federal funds, should they become available,  local election officials identified a range of spending priorities, with no  clear consensus on the top priority.  Among these priorities were voter  education, voting equipment, poll worker pay, and postage for mailing  voting materials and printing ballots.  Nor was there a consensus among  local election officials on how involved the federal government should be  in state and local election administration and reform.  About 27 percent of  the local jurisdictions we surveyed supported uniform standards for  election administration, and 30 percent supported updated federal  standards for voting equipment.  However, many of the jurisdictions we  visited did not want federal funding for election administration if it meant  sacrificing local autonomy.  Some supported the concept of a federal  clearinghouse for sharing information about election administration  practices.
We estimate that 54 percent of local election officials support federal funding to subsidize postage for materials mailed to voters, 42 percent support federal funding to help with the operational costs of elections, and over 38 percent support federal funding for voter education.
Overall, our work suggests that a "one size fits all" approach may not be  suitable for every aspect of election administration.  In jurisdictions with a  small number of voters, for example, hand-counted paper ballots may  produce accurate and complete vote counts.  Conversely, full-faced DRE  equipment (this type of machine uses a large, single-page ballot) could not  readily accommodate Los Angeles County's long ballot printed in 7  languages.  Thus, the degree of flexibility afforded local jurisdictions in  implementing any reform should be given careful consideration when  deliberating specific reform initiatives.  Historically, changes in election  administration have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.  Both  election officials and voters become accustomed to and comfortable with  how elections are planned and conducted in their individual jurisdictions.   Many of the underlying conditions associated with the variations are not  likely to change in the short term.  Large-scale, immediate changes in the  use of people, processes, or technology will not necessarily change those  conditions.  Thus, appropriate time may be needed for state and local  jurisdictions to determine how to implement changes effectively in their  specific jurisdictions.
section_title: Section 2: Challenges Exist to All Parts of Election Systems: People, Process, and Technology
paragraphs: The second principal finding that emerged from our work is that election  officials face a range of challenges connected with all parts of the election  system:  people, process, and technology.  The people involved in an  election include election officials, legions of temporary poll workers, and  voters.  Processes guide people as they carry out their duties, such as  registering voters and conducting the vote.  Technology, such as voting  equipment, provides tools for officials to administer elections and for  voters to participate in them.
We estimate that 57 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had major problems in one or more areas on election day.
Our work identifies several challenges that can be categorized as primarily  people, process, or technology-related issues.  Although we classify  problems as falling into one of these three areas, what becomes apparent is  that a problem in any one of these three broad categories is related in some  way to another part of the system.  For example, people-related challenges  impinge upon process issues, process challenges affect technology, and  technology challenges affect people issues.
Specifically, several challenges emerged from our work on elections.   Issues with recruiting and training poll workers, educating voters, and  addressing needs of voters with disabilities posed major people-related  challenges in the November 2000 elections.  Election officials confronted  process-related challenges that included maintaining accurate voter  registration lists, completing and processing absentee ballots, and  canvassing the vote.  Technology-related challenges that faced our nation’s  election systems included assessing why voting equipment may fail to meet  jurisdictions’ needs, collecting useful performance data to make informed  investment decisions, and needing federal leadership in updating and  implementing standards for voting equipment.  Below we highlight the  main challenges identified through discussions with election officials and  our analysis.
subsections: section_title: People, Both Election Workers and Voters, Presented Challenges
paragraphs: Issues with recruiting and training poll workers, educating voters, and  addressing needs of voters with disabilities posed major challenges in the  November 2000 elections.   We estimate that over half of the jurisdictions in  the United States found it somewhat or very difficult to recruit and train a  sufficient number of poll workers.  The major challenge many jurisdictions  identified regarding voter education was finding sufficient funding.  On the  basis of our mail survey, we estimate that over a third of the jurisdictions  nationwide believed that the federal government should provide monetary  assistance for voter education programs.  Limited availability of accessible  buildings and other constraints create obstacles to election officials’ efforts  to make polling places accessible to voters with disabilities.  We estimate  that, from the parking area to the voting booth, 16 percent of all polling  places have no potential impediments, 56 percent have one or more  potential impediments but offer curbside voting, and 28 percent have one  or more potential impediments and do not offer curbside voting.
subsections: section_title: Recruiting and Training Qualified Poll Workers Presents a Major Challenge for Many Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Many election officials told us recruiting and training a sufficient number of  poll workers with appropriate skills to open, operate, and close polling  places was a major challenge on election day.  Factors that can work in  concert to complicate an already difficult task for election officials include  an aging work force, low pay, and little or no poll worker training.
Recruiting Enough Poll Workers Is Difficult for Many On the basis of our mail survey, we estimate that 51 percent of jurisdictions  nationwide had a somewhat or very difficult time getting enough poll  workers.  For these jurisdictions, obtaining enough poll workers (27  percent) was the most frequently identified major problem the jurisdictions  faced.
We estimate 51 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide reported that it was somewhat or very difficult to get a sufficient number of poll workers.
Poll Workers Drawn From Aging Labor Pool Many people who are available for occasional full-day employment as poll  workers are older, perhaps retired, and likely attracted to the work because  of something other than the pay because poll workers are generally paid  low wages.  For example, an election official in a small jurisdiction said  that over 70 percent of their poll workers are over 65 years old. One official  remarked that volunteering is characteristic of an older generation.   Several officials echoed the statement of an official in a small jurisdiction  that “ur election workforce is aging and we are having difficulty  recruiting younger workers.”
Low Pay, Long Hours May Discourage Younger Workers The pool of potential poll workers may be shrinking because poll worker  pay is inadequate to attract employed or more skilled workers and poll  workers often are required to complete a 15- to 18-hour day.  One election  official reported that “ince compensation for this job is only $80 to $135  per day, depending upon the election district, it is not sufficient to attract a  younger workforce.”  The length of the day is a complaint of many poll  workers and may even pose an obstacle for younger workers.  Another  official said that, “hat they (the election judges) used to consider as a  fun and interesting day and an American duty has become ‘heavy duty’.”  In  one large jurisdiction, election officials asked poll workers to provide  feedback on their experience in the November 2000 election.  One poll  worker responded that it was “bsolutely, positively too long a day.  I am  26 years old and very athletic and still went home at night and fell asleep  with my clothes on.  With the majority of helpers either older or disabled, I  have no idea how they survived the day.”
Poll Workers With Specialized Skills Are Often Difficult to Recruit  Another problem is addressing the specialized labor needs unique to  particular polling sites, according to several local election officials.  Some  polling places required poll workers to have specific language skills.   Finding qualified bilingual workers, specifically workers fluent in Asian  languages, is one very large jurisdiction’s biggest recruiting problem.  Some  places had trouble finding poll workers who are able to learn the technical  skills necessary to operate voting equipment.  Officials in one very large  jurisdiction said they have no scarcity of people willing to serve, but finding  people to meet specialized needs is the issue.  Obstacles to recruiting poll  workers may overlap.  One election official wrote that “t is increasingly  difficult to find folks to work for $6 an hour.  We are relying on older retired  persons—many who can’t/won’t keep up with changes in the technology or  laws.  Many of our workers are 70+.”
Minimal Training May Not Have Adequately Prepared Poll Workers  for Election Day  We estimate that 87 percent of jurisdictions nationwide provided some  training for poll workers. Poll worker training courses generally span a few  hours’ time and focus on the key processes that poll workers should follow,  including how to operate voting equipment.  Although most of the  jurisdictions we visited required some poll worker training, election  officials cited instances where poll workers who had attended training still  either did not understand what they were to do or chose not to follow  specific instructions on how to run the polls.  For example, to handle  unregistered voters in one very large jurisdiction, the poll workers were  instructed to provide those voters with questionable credentials a  provisional ballot.  However, some poll workers failed to follow these rules  and turned away some voters from the polling place.  Poll worker training  in the sites we visited rarely included discussion of the interpersonal skills  that poll workers should employ when dealing with frustrated citizens or  with each other.
section_title: Educating Voters About Processes, Voting Equipment is a Challenge
paragraphs: Another people-related challenge concerns educating voters about  particular processes, such as voter registration and how to operate voting  equipment.  Jurisdictions place varying degrees of emphasis on educating  voters about election processes and procedures.  A lack of funds is the  primary challenge that election officials said they face in expanding their  efforts to educate voters about elections.  Further, spending for voter  education is considered discretionary.  Some local officials must first take  care of mandatory items such as equipment, supplies, poll worker salaries  and polling places.  Many officials said that they see voter education as an  area where federal funds could be particularly helpful.  On the basis of our  mail survey, we estimate that over 38 percent of jurisdictions nationwide  believed that the federal government should provide monetary assistance  for voter education programs.
Voter Education Needed Regarding Processes, Use of Voting  Equipment How well a jurisdiction educates voters about election processes and how  to use voting equipment can effect how well an election system functions.   For example, a number of problems associated with processes, such as  requesting and completing absentee ballots and registering to vote, are  precipitated by voters failing to provide complete information or to meet  deadlines.  Voter education can be used to help remedy some of these  difficulties.
How well jurisdictions educate voters on the use of voting equipment can  affect how easy voters find the equipment to use and integrity of the vote.   Jurisdictions provide various types of voter education materials to help  voters correctly use voting equipment.
How frequently the voting equipment counts votes as intended by voters is  a function not only of equipment design, but of how well poll workers  properly instructed and guided voters, how well voters followed applicable  instructions, and what type of assistance was available to help voters who  have questions or make mistakes in voting.  To illustrate this point, officials  from a very large jurisdiction stated that in the November 2000 election  1,500 voters had inserted their punch cards in the recording device upside  down, thus causing their votes to be inaccurately recorded.  Similarly, at a  small jurisdiction that we visited where optical scan equipment was used,  officials reported that some voters incorrectly marked the ovals or used a  nonreadable pen to mark the ballot, resulting in partially read ballots.  In a  medium-sized jurisdiction that we visited, voters selected a candidate on  the optical scan ballot and then wrote the candidate’s name in the write-in  section of the ballot, thus overvoting (making more choices than are  permitted per contest) and spoiling the ballot.  The election officials stated  that they believed that this misunderstanding contributed to the  jurisdictions’ almost 5-percent overvote rate.  In each of these cases, the  way that the voter completed the ballot caused the vote to be recorded  inaccurately, even though the voting equipment correctly counted the votes  as recorded.
section_title: Officials Face Challenges Addressing Needs of Voters with Disabilities
paragraphs: A third people-related challenge surfaced during the November 2000  election—making polling places accessible to voters with disabilities or  providing alternative voting methods such as curbside voting.  The extent  to which any given feature may prevent or facilitate access to a polling  place is unknown;  however, based on our onsite work during the  November 2000 election, we estimate that, from the parking area to the  voting room, 16 percent of all polling places have no potential  impediments, 56 percent have one or more potential impediments but offer  curbside voting, and 28 percent have one or more potential impediments  and do not offer curbside voting (see fig. 6). These potential impediments  would primarily affect individuals with mobility impairments and occur  most often on the route from the parking area to the building or at the  entrance to the polling place.  Inside the voting room, the types and  arrangement of voting equipment used may also pose challenges for people  with mobility, vision, or dexterity impairments.
A number of efforts have been made by states and localities to improve  voting accessibility for people with disabilities, such as modifying polling  places, acquiring new voting equipment, and providing curbside voting.   State and county election officials we surveyed cited a variety of challenges  to improving access, including limited availability of accessible facilities  and funding constraints at the local level.  Some disability advocates  believe that alternative voting methods and accommodations should not be  viewed as permanent solutions for inaccessible polling places because  these remedies do not provide the same opportunity for voting afforded the  general public, that is, in a polling place and in private.
section_title: Processes for Election Activities Present Challenges to Election Administration Officials
paragraphs: Election officials confronted process-related challenges that included  maintaining accurate voter registration lists, completing and processing  absentee ballots, and interpreting voter intent.  A number of jurisdictions  reported they had trouble maintaining accurate voter registration lists  because of the NVRA.  This difficulty, in turn, may have exacerbated  problems related to qualifying voters at the polls on election day.  As the  number of voters at home and abroad who cast absentee ballots grows,  challenges related to absentee voting are increasing.  Election officials  reported difficulties with processing millions of absentee ballots cast in the  weeks and days before election day and noted the added financial burden  of processing these ballots.  Military personnel and overseas citizens’  absentee ballots were disqualified at a higher rate than voters at home  which presents another challenge.  And finally, interpreting improperly  marked ballots to determine the voter’s intent was a challenging process  because local jurisdictions often lack specific, written guidance and the  task itself can be inherently difficult.
subsections: section_title: NVRA May Complicate Maintenance of Voter Registration Lists, Qualifying Voters on Election Day
paragraphs: We estimate that about 46 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA or motor voter) during the November 2000 election. “You can ask any county clerk in the state and they will tell you that the biggest problem is  motor voter .  Residents can register at the welfare office, the health department, the  motor vehicle authorities, and they do, time and again.  This results in tons of registrations  which are costly and time-consuming to sort through and check against records.”
Inaccurate registration lists affect other parts of the election system,  especially qualifying voters on election day.  Officials reported that voters  appeared at the polls on election day claiming to have registered to vote  through the motor vehicle authority, but their applications never arrived in  the elections office.  These individuals were sometimes turned away from  the polls.  Dealing with voter eligibility issues can be a major problem for  some jurisdictions.  We estimate that 30 percent of jurisdictions considered  dealing with unregistered voters at the polls to be a major problem.
section_title: Processes for Assisting Citizens at Home and Abroad with Absentee Voting Present Challenges
paragraphs: All 50 states and the District of Columbia allowed some form of absentee or  early voting to increase voter access, convenience, and participation, and  the number of American voting absentee is growing.   Using Census data,  we estimate that for the November 2000 election about 14 percent of voters  nationwide cast their ballots before election day.Of these voters, about 73  percent used mail ballots and 27 percent voted in-person, as seen in Figure  7.  This represents an increase from the 1996 presidential election in which  a total of about 11 percent of voters cast ballots before election day.  We  estimate that nationwide local election officials received about 14.5 million  applications for mail-in absentee ballots (plus or minus 3 million) for the  November 2000 election.
As more voters, at home and abroad, cast absentee ballots, officials from  several local election jurisdictions reported costs and workload involved in  reviewing the volume of ballots have grown.  Each of the millions of mail-in  absentee ballots received by local election officials had to be qualified  before being counted.  Officials from one very large jurisdiction stated that  the sheer volume of mail-in ballots received creates a greater potential for  errors.
Military and Overseas Citizens’ Absentee Ballots Disqualified at  Higher Rates Because military and overseas citizens’ absentee ballots are disqualified at  higher rates than those of citizens voting absentee at home, processes for  assisting military personnel and overseas citizens need to be improved.   Although precise numbers are not available, we estimate that counties  having a voting age population of less than 60,000 nationwide disqualified  about 8 percent of ballots cast by military and overseas voters.  In contrast,  the ballot disqualification rate for civilian voters not living overseas was  less than 2 percent.  While counties having a voting age population of  more than 60,000 that responded to GAO's survey showed a similar pattern,  the data was insufficient to make a national estimate.
The survey showed that for all absentee ballots cast, almost two-thirds of  the disqualified absentee ballots were rejected because the ballots arrived  too late to be counted or the envelopes or forms accompanying the ballots  were not completed properly.   The figure below describes the forms that  must be completed in order for the mail-in absentee ballot to be qualified.
Processes for Assisting Military and Overseas Citizens Need  Improvement The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986  protects the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections for more  than 6 million military and overseas citizens and recommends that states  adopt a number of provisions that facilitate absentee voting by these  populations.  The Federal Voting Assistance Program, established within  the Department of Defense (DOD), is responsible for implementing the act  by informing U.S. citizens worldwide about their right to vote, fostering  voting participation, and working with states to simplify the registration  and absentee voting process.  Also, the State Department works with DOD  to provide voter assistance to overseas citizens.
The extent and quality of federal voter assistance for military personnel  and overseas citizens varied considerably in the November 2000 election.   While the Federal Voting Assistance Program developed a number of useful  tools for voters and some installations GAO visited had well run programs  providing assistance and information to potential voters, other installations  did not meet DOD and service requirements.  The variability in executing  the program is due to incomplete service-level guidance that does not  reflect DOD's directive, a lack of command support at some installations,  and a lack of program oversight by some DOD components.  Finally, the  State Department provided citizens abroad with a variety of useful  assistance, according to overseas citizens and federal employees GAO  spoke to, although both groups believed more outreach could be beneficial.   Also, State Department Headquarters has not played an active role in  sharing best practices and lessons learned or in overseeing the program.   We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State improve (1) the  clarity and completeness of service guidance, (2) voter education and  outreach programs, (3) oversight and evaluation of voting assistance  efforts, and (4) sharing of best practices.
section_title: Processes for Interpreting Voter Intent Posed a Challenge to Many
paragraphs: Processes for handling improperly marked ballots present a challenge for  many election officials, especially when an election is close.  Many states  specifically require election officials to count ballots if the “intent of the  voter” can be determined.  Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia  reported to us that they make some determination of voter intent.  Voter  intent issues arise with paper, optical scan, and punch card ballots, not  when the ballots are marked properly for the type of ballot used, but when  there are variations from proper marking.  During the canvassing stage  (when votes are counted and totals calculated), election officials are  tasked with reviewing ballots that are not properly marked and sometimes  required to determine how those voters intended to cast their votes.
After the polls close and ballots are returned to election headquarters,  workers canvass the votes, a process that entails reviewing all votes by  precinct, resolving problem votes, and counting all valid votes.  At this  point, workers deal with ballots that are either unclearly or improperly   marked.
Ballots can be improperly marked in variety of ways that differ according  to the type of voting equipment being used in a jurisdiction.  Because the  DRE and lever machines voters record the vote directly on the equipment  rather than a separate ballot, there is no opportunity for a mismarked  ballot.  Paper, punch card, and optical scan ballots, however, can be  improperly marked.  For example, on an optical scan ballot voters may  have circled a candidate’s name, instead of completing the oval, box, or  arrow next to the candidate’s name as illustrated in figure 9.
Interpreting a mismarked ballot to determine the voter’s intent can be a  challenging process.  While states may instruct officials to determine  voter’s intent on mismarked ballots, states do not always provide guidance  on how to do so.  Our work indicates that nationwide about 30 percent of  local jurisdictions had no instructions, either from the state or local  jurisdiction, on how to interpret voter intent, for example, how to read  stray marks on paper ballots or dimples or partially punched chads on  punch card ballots.  We estimate that about 15 percent of jurisdictions had  instructions developed by the jurisdiction and 23 percent had both state  and local written guidance.
We estimate that nationwide about 32 percent of local election jurisdictions had no written instructions, either from the state or local jurisdiction, on how to interpret voter intent, such as stray marks on ballots or partially punched punch card boxes.
Developing processes to interpret a voter’s intent can be challenging, and  local jurisdictions vary in how they approach this task.  Processes for  handling punch card ballots illustrate this point.  Jurisdictions we visited  reported various ways to handle problem punch card ballots.  For example,  in one jurisdiction, election officials told us if the punch card ballot  contains a dimple with a pinhole, employees put the original ballot over a  pink (or duplicate) ballot and held it up to the light.  Where they saw light,  they punched.  The employee also turned over the ballot and looked for  bumps, which indicated the voter inserted the ballot backwards.  If a ballot  contained bumps on the backside, the ballot could be duplicated.
In another jurisdiction, a vote on a punch card consisted of any removed  chad plus any chad that freely swung by one side.  The person scanning the  ballot inspected it for improperly punched chads by running the ballot  through their fingers.  In another jurisdiction, the ballot inspection teams  are given a pair of tweezers and told to remove any chads remaining on the  punch card.
One jurisdiction used persons called  “scanners” to go over the ballots  before they are counted. Each ballot is inspected for improperly punched  chad by running the ballot cards between the scanners’ fingers. Very loose  chad will be removed through this process. If the chad does not come off  and freely swings by one side, it may be removed.  Problem ballots, such as  those that are unreadable because of incompletely removed punches or  incorrect punches, can alter the counting results or create problems with  the computer processing.  They are given to “makeover scanners” to be  remade.
section_title: Technology Challenges Include Assessing Why Equipment May Not Meet Needs, Collecting Useful Performance Data, and Updating Standards
paragraphs: While problems related to voting equipment performance during the  November 2000 election received a great deal of media attention, the  performance of voting equipment is not only a function of the technology  design itself.  The people who interact with the technology and the  processes governing this interaction can also affect whether voting  technology meets the needs of a jurisdiction.  As a result, assessing why  voting equipment may not meet needs of some jurisdictions can be  difficult.  Another challenge facing election officials involved obtaining  reliable measures and objective data to make informed decisions about  whether to invest in new voting equipment or to invest in measures to  improve performance of existing equipment, such as maintenance  personnel.  Local jurisdictions do not always have the information they  need to select the most appropriate investment option given their needs  and resource constraints.  Although 96 percent of local jurisdictions report  that they are satisfied with their voting equipment, less than 50 percent of  them collect data on how well their equipment performed.  This  information is vital for jurisdictions considering modernizing their  equipment.  Another challenge relates to developing and maintaining  updated standards for voting equipment.  Although the FEC is in the  process of updating voting equipment standards issued in 1990,  responsibility for establishing, maintaining, and implementing up-to-date  standards for voting equipment has not been explicitly assigned.  As a  result, the 1990 standards have become dated.
subsections: section_title: Assessing Why Voting Equipment May Not Meet Jurisdictions’ Needs Poses a Challenge
paragraphs: Understanding a jurisdiction’s voting equipment needs and why voting  equipment may not meet those needs can pose a challenge.  In assessing  whether voting equipment meets the needs of a jurisdiction’s user  communities (both the voters and the officials who administer the  elections), election officials must have reliable measures and objective  performance data.  When voting equipment does not meet the needs of a  jurisdiction,  officials must also understand the cause or causes of the  problem before they can choose an appropriate solution, such as more  voter education, increased training for election workers, or acquiring new  equipment.  These causes can be difficult to identify because performance  of voting equipment is not only a function of the technology design itself,  but also of the people who interact with the technology and the processes  governing this interaction.
To illustrate this point, our survey of vendors showed little difference  among the basic performance characteristics of DRE, optical scan, and  punch card equipment.  However, when local election jurisdictions’  experiences with the equipment are considered, performance differences  among voting equipment became more evident.  These differences arise  because a real-world setting—such as an election in which equipment is  operated by actual voters, poll workers, and technicians—tends to result in  performance that differs from that in a controlled setting (such as in the  manufacturer’s laboratory).  This difference demonstrates the importance  of the effect of people and process on equipment performance.
While Some Voting Equipment Is Easier to Use, No Clear “Best  Performer”
Figure 10 shows a relative comparison of certain characteristics— accuracy, ease of use, efficiency, and security—of the various types of  voting equipment used in the November 2000 elections.  The comparison  reflects the results of our analysis of data provided by voting equipment  vendors that responded to our survey and survey responses of 513 local  election jurisdictions.  With appropriate maintenance and proper  operation, most equipment performs on par with each other.  Some voting  technology is easier to use thus eliminating some opportunities for voter  error.  Overall, our analysis of both the vendor and jurisdiction data  showed that DREs are slightly easier to use and slightly more efficient than  the other types of equipment.  In the area of security, DRE and optical scan  are relatively equal, and in the area of accuracy, all equipment is relatively  the same.
The differences among voting equipment can be attributed, in part, to the  differences in the equipment itself. However, they also can be attributed to  the people who use the equipment and the rules or processes that govern  its use. Further, all voting equipment is influenced by security, testing,  maintenance, and cost issues, each of which also involves people and  processes.
In addition, the accuracy of voting equipment (as measured by how reliably  the equipment captures the voter’s intent) can be affected by the processes  and procedures that govern how voters interact with the technologies.   Differences in these procedures can have noticeable effects on the  prevalence of undervotes (votes for fewer choices than permitted, such as  not voting for president) and overvotes, for example.  In particular, we  found that some precinct-count optical scan voting equipment can be  programmed to return a voter’s ballot if the ballot is overvoted or  undervoted.  Such programming allows the voter to make any changes  necessary to ensure that the vote is recorded correctly.  However, not all  states allow this.  For example, election officials in one Virginia jurisdiction  state that Virginia jurisdictions must accept ballots as cast.
Interaction Between People and Technology Affect Uncounted  Votes Our analysis showed that the type of voting equipment used (including  equipment which allowed for error correction) explained a relatively small  percent of the total variation among jurisdictions in uncounted presidential  votes. The state in which counties were located had more of an effect on  the number of uncounted presidential votes than either a county’s voting  equipment or demographic characteristics.  Figure 11 shows the results of  our analysis.
Counties’ demographic characteristics also affected their percentages of  uncounted presidential votes.  Specifically, counties with higher  percentages of minority residents tended to have higher percentages of  uncounted presidential votes, which counties with higher percentages of  younger and more educated residents tended to have lower percentages of  uncounted presidential votes.  Counties that used punch card equipment  did not generally have higher percentages of minority, less educated, or  lower income residents.
We found that the state in which counties are located had a greater effect  on counties’ percentage of uncounted presidential votes than did counties’  voting equipment or demographic characteristics combined.  State  differences, which may have included such factors as statewide voter  education efforts and state standards for determining that is a valid vote,  accounted for 26 percent of the total variation in uncounted presidential  votes across counties.  County demographic characteristics accounted for  16 percent of the variation.  Voting equipment, including the use of optical  scan error correction technology, accounted for a total of about 6 percent  of the variation in counties’ uncounted presidential votes.  The largest  percentages of uncounted presidential votes tended to occur in counties  that used punch card equipment.  Counties that used optical scan  equipment with error correction had about 1.1 percentage points fewer  uncounted presidential votes than did counties with punch card equipment.   The remaining 52 percent of variation was due to unknown factors such as  whether a county switched to a new type of voting equipment or the  number of inexperienced voters in a county.
section_title: Absence of Data Limit Ability to Make Informed Investment Decisions
paragraphs: Looking back to the technology used in the November 2000 elections, our  survey of jurisdictions showed that the vast majority of jurisdictions were  satisfied with the performance of their respective technologies.  However,  this satisfaction was in most cases not based on hard data, but on the  subjective impressions of election officials.  While these impressions  should not be discounted, informed decision-making regarding where to  make the most appropriate investments, for example, in new equipment,  training for election workers, or voter education, requires more objective  data.  Acquiring new voting equipment is not the only investment option  jurisdictions may consider, and, in some cases, may not be the most  appropriate solution for jurisdictions who find their voting equipment does  not meet their needs.
Making wise technology investment decisions present a challenge to our  election systems.  It is extremely important that election officials be able to  define, measure, evaluate voting equipment performance so that they may  properly assess whether their current technology is meeting their needs.   This information is also important as election officials consider the  suitability of available technology options to get the best return on their  investment if they choose to modernize their voting equipment.
However, we found that about half of the jurisdictions did not collect actual  performance data for the voting equipment that they used in the November  2000 election.  Table 1 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that collected  data on accuracy (which is one measure of performance) by type of voting  equipment.
Further, it is unclear the extent to which jurisdictions have meaningful  performance data.  For those local election jurisdictions that we visited  that stated that their voting equipment was 100-percent accurate, none was  able to provide actual data to substantiate these statements.  Similarly, the  results of our mail survey indicates that only about 51 percent of  jurisdictions nationwide collected data on undervotes, and about 47  percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on overvotes for the  November 2000 election.
Jurisdiction election officials were nevertheless able to provide their  perceptions about how the equipment performed. For example, our mail  survey results indicated that 96 percent of jurisdictions nationwide were  satisfied with the performance of their voting equipment during the  November 2000 election.
We estimate that 96 percent of jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with the performance of their voting equipment during the November 2000 election.
These perceptions aside, a lack of performance data may limit  jurisdictions’ abilities to select the most appropriate voting equipment that  gives them the best return on their investment.  Thus, without reliable  performance data, were federal funds to be made available for the  purchase of new voting equipment, over half of the jurisdictions in the U.S.  would not be in the best position to make wise investment choices.
section_title: Updating and Implementing Voting Equipment Standards Presents a Challenge
paragraphs: While no federal agency has been assigned explicit statutory responsibility  for developing voting equipment standards, the FEC assumed this role  developing voluntary standards in 1990 for computer-based systems, and  Congress has supported this role with appropriations.  These standards  describe specific performance benchmarks and address many—but not  all—types of systems requirements.   However, these standards have not  been maintained and are now out of date (the FEC initiated plans to issue  revised standards in 2002).
According to FEC officials, the Commission has not proactively maintained  the standards because it has not been assigned explicit responsibility to do  so.  Without current, relevant, and complete voting equipment standards,  states may choose not to follow them, resulting in the adoption of disparate  standards that could drive up the cost of voting equipment and produce  unevenness among states in the capabilities of their respective voting  equipment.
No federal agency has been assigned responsibility for or assumed the role  of testing voting equipment against the federal standards.  Instead, NASED,  through its Voting Systems Committee, has assumed responsibility for  implementing the federal voting equipment standards by accrediting  independent test authorities, which in turn, test voting equipment against  the standards.  To this end, the committee has developed procedures to  accredit the independent test authorities.  When testing is successfully  completed, the independent test authorities notify the NASED that the  voting equipment has satisfied testing requirements.  As of July 3, 2001,  the Association had qualified 21 voting equipment, representing 10 vendors.
Because development, maintenance, and implementation of voting  equipment standards are very important responsibilities, we are raising  matters for congressional consideration regarding the explicit assignment  of responsibility in these areas.  Additionally, we are making  recommendations to the FEC aimed at improving its efforts to update its  1990 voting equipment standards.
section_title: The Interaction of People, Process, and Technology Needs To Be Considered
paragraphs: Our nation’s election systems are complex and intricate.  Successful  election administration requires the appropriate integration of people,  processes and technology.  In the challenges that we have categorized as  related primarily to this part of the system, it is important to note that each  of them is related in some way to another part of the system.  Therefore, in  considering election reform proposals, it is important to remember that  people, processes, and technology issues should not be addressed in  isolation.  Any reform proposal that influences one part of the system, for  example, a process, may have an unforeseen and perhaps undesirable  effect on another part of the system, such as the people.  Additionally, any  problem attributed to people, processes, or technology might actually have  its root cause in a different part of the system or be precipitated by a lack  of integration among the components of the system.
For example, many problems that surfaced in the November 2000 election  were attributed to faulty technology, more specifically to punch card  machines.  While voting technology may need to be modernized, our work  showed that any of the types of voting equipment, if used properly, can  reliably record a voter’s selections.  In most cases, technology was not the  dominant factor related to voter error such as mismarked ballots or  uncounted votes.  Rather, problems were more closely related to voter  error included processes that did not allow for poll workers and voters to  recognize when errors occurred.  In fact, one of the jurisdictions we visited  that used punch card machines had a voter error rate of 1.2 percent, which  election officials attributed in part to voter education efforts.  Greater voter  education on voting processes and equipment, rather than the purchase of  new voting equipment, can be a more immediate way to resolve issues  related to voter error.
section_title: Section 3: Framework for Assessing Election Reform Proposals
paragraphs: Our work and the work of others have disclosed a number of challenges to  our national election system.  As Congress considers if and how it may  wish to address these challenges, it may turn to a number of reform  proposals put forth by commissions or by proposed legislation.   The  proposals to date may be grouped into broad categories such as those  listed below:  providing federal funds for replacing voting equipment,  providing federal funds for state or locally determined election   creating special postal rates, or requiring no postage, for election   creating federal election administration standards, mandatory or   updating FEC voluntary voting equipment standards and developing  operation standards for voting equipment,  developing or improving electronic voter registration systems and  statewide information sharing capabilities,  reforming absentee or early voting requirements,  creating uniform statewide standards for what constitutes a vote and  how votes are counted and recounted, and  mandating the availability of provisional ballots for all jurisdictions.
Variation in specific proposals may occur because of many factors,  including the source of the proposal.
Proposals may be crafted with various goals in mind—among them  enhancing the accessibility, integrity, fairness, consistency, affordability,  and sustainability of election systems.  While all of these goals are  consonant with our democratic traditions, some reform proposals may  advance one goal at the expense of the other.  For example, some officials  promote reforms such as early voting to enhance the accessibility of the  electoral process to the general public, while others claim such a move  could open the door to voter fraud and thus may come at the price of the  integrity of the election system.  When reform proposals forward  competing goals, the debate over election reform becomes more complex  and assessing different reform proposals more  difficult.
We do not presume to endorse any particular election reform proposal or  package, because this is best left to the Congress and other elected  officials.  However, our review of state and local practices, as well as our  analysis of input from state and local officials, suggest criteria that  Congress could use as it weighs the merits of reform proposals.
Criterion I:  The Appropriate Role of the Federal Government in  Election Reform. Does the proposed change call for an appropriate  federal role in affecting election reform, given the historic balance  struck between Congress’ constitutional authority to legislate election  administration and some states’ laws and traditions that grant autonomy  to local jurisdictions as they administer elections?
Criterion II:  The Balance Between Accessibility and Integrity.  How  are the goals of providing citizens broad access to the voting process  balanced against the public’s interest in ensuring the integrity of our  election systems?
Criterion III:  Coordination and Integration of People, Processes, and  Technology.   How does the proposed change affect both the discrete  problem it is intended to resolve and the election system as a whole?
Criterion IV:  The Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed  Election Reforms. Have the necessary resources been identified to  institute the change and to continually  monitor and re-evaluate it over  time?
We believe using these criteria will help clarify the debate and provide a  framework to evaluate the potential effects of various election reform  proposals.  The following sections further elaborate how Congress might  use each of the four criteria.
The Appropriate Federal Role in Election Reform A threshold consideration in assessing various proposals and legislation is  the appropriate role of the federal government in effecting election reform.   Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has periodically enacted  legislation that mandates elections be conducted in particular ways.  For  example, Congress has prohibited discrimination based on certain voter  characteristics, such as race or age for both state and federal elections.  In  addition, Congress has broad authority to establish requirements for  congressional elections that are binding on the states.  As a practical  matter, such requirements may also affect state and local elections held in  conjunction with elections to federal office.  Congress has enacted  legislation affecting the timing of federal elections, voter registration,  absentee voting for military and overseas civilian citizens of the United  States, and voting accessibility for the elderly and the disabled in federal  elections.  These statutes have basically focused on facilitating the  opportunity for voters to participate in the voting process and ensuring fair  and equitable treatment of voters.  Aside from direct regulation of election  administration, Congress may also, in exercising its spending power,  encourage state action by attaching conditions to the receipt of federal  funds.  The scope of congressional authority in election administration is  discussed in our March 2001 report.
This constitutionally-derived authority notwithstanding, election  administration has principally been the responsibility of state and local  jurisdictions that conduct elections for local, state, and federal offices.  As  discussed elsewhere in this report, states and local jurisdictions have  determined voter qualifications, types of voting equipment to be used,  ballot design, selection of poll workers, and what constitutes a vote.   This  historical balance between Congress’ constitutional authority to prescribe  change and the states’ and localities’ traditional roles in defining the terms  of election administration raises fundamental policy issues that must be  confronted in the debate about the federal government’s efforts to pursue  election reform.
Various reform proposals offered to date differ in the role envisioned for  the federal government.  These can be categorized into essentially four  distinct options for federal action that fall along a continuum of low- to  high- federal involvement.   The first option, falling on the low end of the  continuum, calls for the federal government to provide information,  guidance, and encouragement to states and local jurisdictions to take  action in specific areas.  At the second point on the continuum, a reform  proposal may envision a more involved federal role that calls for the federal  government to provide funds to states and localities to improve election  administration, allowing each jurisdiction to use the funds where it  believes they are most needed.  At the third point on the continuum,  proposals may go a step further suggesting that the federal government   provide funds, contingent on states and local jurisdictions taking specific  actions or achieving specific results.  In this role the federal government  uses a “carrot” to encourage a desired behavior by states and local  jurisdictions.  However, the states and local jurisdictions still have the  ability to opt for the status quo by refusing the federal funds.  At the fourth  point on the continuum, where election reform would involve the greatest  use of federal authority, the federal government would mandate that state  and local jurisdictions take specific actions or achieve specific results--with  or without accompanying funding.  Historically, this option has been used  when the federal government wishes to guarantee a voter right or  protection.
By way of illustration, consider how Congress would reach different  conclusions on the issue of replacing existing voting equipment given how  it might use its authority.  Many recommendations from recently completed  studies and congressional legislative proposals call for providing federal  assistance to state and local election jurisdictions for replacing voting  equipment.
Under the first option, Congress could require the FEC to act as a  clearinghouse to gather and disseminate information and to sponsor  research on the various types of voting equipment.  The federal  government would provide information, assistance, and advice that  would make it easier for that state and local election jurisdictions to  examine their choice of voting equipment in light of national data on  specific practices or issues.  This approach provides a minimal federal  role in affecting change, leaving the greatest discretion and control to  states and local election jurisdictions.  This federal role would not entail  disbursing federal funds to support purchase and installation of new  technologies, leaving acquisition decisions up to local jurisdictions.
Under the second option, the federal government could create a grant  program that would make federal funding available to states to support  purchase and installation of new voting equipment.  Funds would be  provided with no “strings” attached regarding which type of equipment  the state could buy.
Under the third option, the federal government could create a similar  grant program to that in the second option, except that strings would be  attached. For example, funds would only be provided for states to buy  equipment that meets federal standards, or only for certain types of  equipment (e.g., precinct-based optical scanners).  This further limits  local jurisdictions’ discretion in choosing appropriate equipment and  allows states to opt out of the program.
Under the fourth option, the federal government could mandate that  only certain types of voting equipment could be used in federal  elections.  Congress might or might not provide funding to enable states  without this type of equipment to purchase and install it.  Either way,  jurisdictions would have no choice but to comply with the law and  acquire that voting equipment, regardless of whether this choice best  meets local needs.  This option provides the least discretion.  Because  federal elections are usually conducted in conjunction with state and  local elections, congressional mandates regarding the conduct of federal  elections would likely involve changes in many, if not all, state and local  elections.
In addition to the appropriate federal role in election reform, the degree to  which reform proposals may affect the accessibility and integrity of an  election system, our work suggests, is an important criterion for Congress  to use in assessing the effect of reform proposals on our election systems.   Some proposals may seek to increase the general public’s access to the  election system.   Accessibility describes the degree to which an election  system promotes inclusiveness, thus making it as easy as possible for the  general population to register to vote and to cast their votes.  For example,  reform proposals that attempt to (1) make voter registration less  cumbersome, (2) give voters more opportunity to cast absentee or early  ballots, or (3) provide voting equipment that all voters can use with ease  can be considered as affecting an election system’s accessibility.  Other  proposals may attempt to increase the system’s integrity, that is, the degree  to which the system is impervious to voter fraud.  For instance, proposals  may implement controls to ensure that (1) voters present identification or  proof of eligibility at the polls on election day or (2) all eligible votes are  counted can be said to affect an election system’s integrity.
The goal of making the election system more accessible to voters can run at  cross purposes with the goal of ensuring the election system’s integrity.   This tension suggests decision makers should ask how reform proposals  balance the goals of providing all citizens broad access to the voting  process against the public interest in ensuring the integrity of the vote.
Most election reform proposals address one or both of these concepts to  some degree, with some placing more emphasis on one or the other.  The  weight individual policymakers may place on different concerns could vary,  depending on how they value different attributes.  For example, increasing  the opportunity to use absentee ballots may improve access to the vote, but  it also might negate the possibility of using some of the controls that may  be used at a polling place to assure voter identification and eligibility.  If  increasing access to the vote is deemed more important than ensuring the  presence of rigorous controls, then reform proposals emphasizing  accessibility considerations might be preferred.
In the past when Congress has taken action to change the election system,  it considered both accessibility and integrity issues.  Constitutional  amendments and federal legislation affecting the election process opened  access to those whose access was either denied or circumscribed—e.g.,  African-Americans, women, language minorities, people with disabilities.   All of these reforms assumed the existence of controls to ensure that only  those who were otherwise eligible among these groups would be able to  register to vote and cast their ballots.  The most recent federal statute  affecting the election process—NVRA, or motor voter act—specifically  recognized the dual goals of access and integrity.  The act established  registration procedures designed to “increase the number of eligible  citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office,” without  compromising “the integrity of the electoral process” or the maintenance of  “accurate and current voter registration rolls.”
Creating a proper balance between accessibility and integrity is sometimes  difficult, as seen in the following examples which illustrate the inherent  tension between these competing goals:  Requiring that citizens who register to vote present a form of picture  identification with their residence’s address provides some proof of  identify and some assurance that the person resides in the voting  jurisdiction and is therefore eligible to vote in the jurisdiction in which  he or she is registering.  However, this procedure makes it more difficult  for persons to register to vote if they meet registration qualifications but  do not have a driver’s license or other picture identification indicating  their place of residence.
Providing a provisional ballot to every person who wishes to vote but is  not listed in the poll books at the polling place maximizes the  opportunity of every person to cast a ballot.  The purpose of checking  whether these persons are in fact registered to vote prior to counting  their ballots is to assure that the vote count will include only ballots cast  by eligible voters.
Election officials may go to nursing homes to review absentee ballot  requests, and accept ballots cast by nursing home residents while the  officials are present to supervise the voting process.  In effect, the  nursing home becomes an unofficial polling place.  Residents are  provided a greater opportunity to vote but with better controls in place  to address the potential that the absentee ballot might be voted by  someone other than the registered voter.
Allowing remote voting via the Internet may improve some voters’  opportunities to cast a ballot.  Although this method is in an  experimental stage, unresolved questions about its impact on the  integrity of election systems remain.  As with other forms of remote  voting, such as absentee voting by mail, there is a need to ensure that  only eligible voters cast ballots, voter privacy is protected, and voters  are not subject to coercion.
Integration of People, Processes and Technology As Congress assesses various reform proposals, it may consider both  reforms that address a discrete problem and that address the election  system more broadly.  Congress may also be asked to choose among  proposals that address specific parts of a perceived problem or address  perceived problems in a more systematic fashion.
Effective election administration requires the appropriate coordination and  integration of people, processes, and technology.  For example,  successfully registering a new voter, whether the person registers by mail,  at the Department of Motor Vehicles, or at the registrar’s office, involves  the coordination and integration of (1) voters and registration workers who  know and follow the registration process, including obtaining the  information required to register successfully;  (2) the process for  registering new voters that guides election workers as they supply the  correct forms to voters, compile and update voter information, and notify  voters of their registration status; and (3) a computer system or other  means of creating and updating a voter registration list to assure an  accurate, current list of registered voters.  Shortcomings in any of three  areas can affect the ability of persons to register successfully and the  accuracy of the registration rolls.
To illustrate the difference between approaching reforms from a discrete  versus system-wide perspective, consider election reform proposals that  recommend Congress provide assistance to states and localities to  purchase new voting equipment in order to reduce voter error.  Some of  these proposals approach voter error as if it were precipitated by a single  cause, such as the type of voting equipment used.  However, introducing  new technology alone may not necessarily reduce voter error.  In fact,  switching equipment actually may introduce new opportunities for voter  error unless the jurisdiction deals with the people aspects of successfully  fielding new voting technology and offers voter education on how to use  the new equipment effectively.  Moreover, successful implementation must  include processes for dealing with machine failure, ensuring that the  equipment is programmed properly to accurately count the votes for each  office on the ballot and that the ballots and machines are secure.  Failure to  consider the interaction of people, processes, and technology in fielding  new voting equipment may result in increased voter or counting error,  rather than a decrease.
As a second example, some proposals suggest a change in process that  establishes standard voting hours such that all polling places across the  nation are opened and closed simultaneously, regardless of time zone.  With  this proposal, voters in every part of the country would cast their votes  while the outcome of the election is still unknown, thus negating any  influence that media reports of election results may have.  Although voter  participation might increase as a result, this proposal might also have  unintended consequences for other parts of the election system.  For  example, keeping polling places open at earlier or later hours may increase  the burden placed on poll workers.  Some elections officials currently  report difficulties in securing poll workers who are willing to work 15 to 18  hour days, a situation that might be exacerbated if poll workers were asked  to work even earlier or later.
Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed Election Reforms The implementation of election reforms will likely increase the overall cost  of our nation’s election systems.  Choosing among election reform  proposals, therefore, should include a careful assessment of the  affordability and sustainability of the reform as well as who is expected to  shoulder the costs.  Simply making funding available to state and local  governments to implement a reform without consideration of whether all  associated lifecycle costs have been considered or how the reform is to be  sustained could result in having to revisit reform issues.
Historically, incurring the costs of election administration and equipment  has largely fallen to local jurisdictions, with some support provided by the  state governments.  Elections have been conducted over the years with  relatively small budgets, and election officials consistently find themselves  competing for funds with other local government priorities.  Our work  confirmed that election administration is not usually at the top of state and  local funding priorities.  As an official in a large election jurisdiction told  us, election administration is often number 11 in the top 10 priorities of  local government budgets.
As a result, realistic reform proposals are those that not only identify  solutions to the issues at hand, but are also affordable and sustainable with  achievable financial commitments for the federal, state, and local  government stakeholders.   Along these lines, as Congress assesses reform  proposals, it should consider three factors related to affordability and  sustainability.
The first factor is the initial outlay required to fully implement the  proposal.  In this regard, the assessment should consider whether the initial  outlay for the proposed reform would be affordable to the state and  localities, including all associated and transition costs (e.g., training  workers and voters to use new equipment and any changes to voting  processes necessitated by new equipment).   For example, were Congress  to implement a proposal that requires all states to develop a state-wide  voter registration system, some states might find themselves unable to  comply unless federal funding sources were forthcoming.  States with  budgetary pressures that prevented them from quickly implementing the  federal requirement could be even less likely to supply the funding to  comply with the federal requirements.  In addition, the costs to the other  components of election administration (e.g., the cost of training election  workers to use the new voting technology) should also be considered.
The second factor is whether the federal government and/or state and local  jurisdictions could afford the long-term costs of sustaining the proposed  reform over time.   Reform proposals that provide funding for purchasing  new technology could enable some jurisdictions to upgrade their voting  equipment.  To the extent that a local jurisdiction could sustain the funding  needed to continue its use, the performance of voting equipment would be  improved.  For example, if the federal government were to make funds  available to purchase different voting technology (e.g., replacing punch  cards with electronic equipment), it should have some assurance that the  additional resources necessary to sustain the reform (e.g., software,  programming capability, vendor support, and updates) would be available.   However, not all jurisdictions are in a position to make that commitment.
The third factor is assigning responsibility for costs, and whether all  levels of government could commit to implement and sustain the reform.   As mentioned above, it is doubtful that every local jurisdiction could alone  commit the resources necessary to fund many of the reforms envisioned in  several proposals.  However, they might be in a position to fund some of  them, thereby making a commitment to the success of the reform.  On the  other hand, the question arises as to how much of a federal or state  presence in local election administration is perceived as desirable or  financially possible.
section_title: Section 4: Conclusion
paragraphs: Events surrounding the November 2000 election brought into question the  integrity of our nation’s election systems.  Although not all states and  jurisdictions reported experiencing major problems during the November  2000 election, important concerns were raised in most jurisdictions related  to each stage of the election process—registration, absentee and early  voting, preparing for and conducting election day activities, and vote  tabulations.  Congress has the opportunity to address these challenges  now, to avoid similar problems in the future.  However, addressing these  challenges involves complex considerations and even more difficult  choices when considering the range of proposals for election reform.
Accordingly, we have offered four criteria against which any election  reform proposals may be measured.  These may not be the criteria that  every analyst would suggest, and each policymaker would not give the  same weight to each criterion.  However, if election system reform  proposals were to be evaluated as to the (1) appropriate federal role in  election reform;  (2) balance between accessibility and integrity;  (3)  integration of people, process, and technology;  and (4) affordability and  sustainability of election reforms, Congress would have a good foundation  for devising sustainable solutions that will meet the needs of future  generations of U.S. citizens.
section_title: Results of Our Election Work
paragraphs: This section summarizes the major issues contained in the other six reports  that we prepared on our nation’s election systems.  Table 2 lists the issues  that we addressed in our elections work and the reports that discuss them  in further detail.
Collectively, our extensive research shows that election systems vary  widely across states and jurisdictions.  It also shows that federal, state, and  local governments face daunting, often long-standing challenges.  In the  following sections we summarize our findings and insights from each of  our reports.
subsections: section_title: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election Administration
paragraphs: This report describes Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate  congressional, presidential, and state and local elections and identify major  federal statutes enacted in the area of election administration.  Under the  Constitution, states are responsible for the administration of both their  own and federal elections.  Accordingly, states and localities incur the costs  associated with these activities.
Notwithstanding the state role in administering elections, Congress has  authority to affect the administration of elections in certain ways.   Congressional authority to legislate in this area derives from various  constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election.  With regard to  the administration of federal elections, Congress has constitutional  authority over both congressional and presidential elections.
Congress’ authority to regulate congressional elections derives primarily  from Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution (known as the  Elections Clause).  The Elections Clause provides that the states will  prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections, and  that Congress may “make or alter” the states’ regulations at any time,  except as to the places of choosing Senators.  The courts have held that the  Elections Clause grants Congress broad authority to override state  regulations in this area.  Therefore, while the Elections Clause  contemplates both state and federal authority to regulate congressional  elections, Congress’ authority is paramount to that of the states.
With respect to presidential elections, the text of the Constitution is more  limited.  Specifically, Article II, Section 1, Clause 4, provides that “Congress  may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they  shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United  States.”  Despite this limited language, the Supreme Court and federal  appellate courts have upheld certain federal statutory provisions regulating  presidential elections that go beyond regulating the “time” of choosing the  electors.  However, because federal legislation that relates solely to the  administration of presidential elections has been fairly limited, case law on  this subject has been sparse.  Consequently, the precise parameters of  Congress’ authority to pass legislation relating to presidential elections  have not been clearly established.
With regard to state and local elections, although Congress does not have  general constitutional authority to legislate regarding these elections,  a  number of constitutional amendments authorize Congress to enforce  prohibitions against specific discriminatory practices in state and local  elections, such as discrimination on the basis of race or color, in all  elections—federal, state, and local.
Historically, Congress has passed legislation related to the administration  of both federal and state elections in several major functional areas of the  voting process, including:  (1) timing of federal elections; (2) voter  registration; (3) absentee voting requirements; (4) accessibility provisions  for elderly and disabled voters; and (5) prohibitions against discriminatory  voting practices.  In general, the purpose of these federal statutes has been  either to prohibit discrimination on the basis of specific voter  characteristics or make it easier for citizens to register to vote.
section_title: Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation
paragraphs: Our report on the administration of the 2000 elections presents the results  of our review of aspects of elections in the United States.  Specifically, we  (1) describe elections in the United States and the activities and challenges  associated with each of the four major stages of election administration— voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting  election day activities, and vote tabulation;  (2) identify the types of voting  methods used, their distribution in the United States, and any associated  challenges; assess such characteristics of voting equipment as accuracy,  ease of use, efficiency, security, and cost; and estimate the cost of replacing  existing voting equipment in the United States with either optical scan or  electronic voting equipment; and (3) identify issues and challenges  associated with the use of the Internet for voting.
Although registration is a prerequisite to voting in nearly all states, we  found that different citizens with the same qualifications would be eligible  to vote in some states but not in others because of variations in voter  eligibility requirements.  A citizen’s access to voting is primarily based on  the appearance of his or her name on a voter registration list, which is  developed from registration applications and compiled and maintained by  election officials using various technologies and information sources.   Election officials nationwide expressed varying degrees of confidence in  the accuracy of their voter registration lists; however, information about  list accuracy and currency, as well as the extent of error, was difficult to  obtain.  Among the challenges identified were processing applications  submitted through sources other than elections offices, such as state motor  vehicle authorities; obtaining accurate and timely information from  numerous sources to update voter registration lists; and using technology  to help process applications and compile registration lists.
All states allowed some form of absentee or early voting in the November  2000 election; using U.S. Census data, we estimate that for the November  2000 election, about 14 percent of voters nationwide cast their ballots  before election day, three-fourths of them using mail-in ballots and one- fourth voting in person.  However, we found that no national data are  currently maintained on the number of mail-in absentee ballots  disqualified.  Differences in requirements, administration, and procedures  resulted in citizens having different opportunities for obtaining and  successfully casting absentee ballots.  For example, the likelihood of a  ballot being disqualified due to voters’ errors in completing and returning  mail-in absentee ballots varied even, in some instances, among  jurisdictions in the same state. Among the challenges local election  officials face are deciding whether and how to process incomplete and late  mail-in absentee applications and ballots; processing large numbers of  mail-in absentee applications and ballots in a timely manner; and obtaining  adequate staffing, ballots, and locations for conducting early voting.
Election officials across the country, with some variation, performed  similar duties to prepare for and conduct the November 2000 election.  Our  survey indicated that 57 percent of voting jurisdictions nationwide  encountered major problems in conducting the 2000 election.  While  jurisdictions did not experience the same problems, more than half cited  problems with recruiting enough qualified poll workers. However, because  few jurisdictions systematically collected information on how they  administer elections, what they consider to be major problems may be  based on anecdotal information and limited analysis. From the perspective  of election officials, a major election day challenge is resolving questions  about voter eligibility.  Large numbers of ineligible voters can create long  lines, voter frustration, and problems for poll workers. Many eligibility  issues stem from the reliability of voter registration lists.
Counting votes is not a simple task.  It involves counting votes cast before  and on election day and may be carried out at the precinct, at a central  location, by hand, or by some type of counting equipment.  Vote counting  problems are highlighted when the election results are close.  A ballot may  not be counted when a voter overvotes—marks for two candidates--or  when the ballot cannot be read by the counting equipment.  What  constitutes a proper mark on a ballot differs based on the type of voting  method used.  According to our survey of state election directors, 31 states  and the District of Columbia have a state law or other provision specifying  what is a proper ballot marking for each voting method, but state guidance  also varied from general to specific.  Forty-seven states and the District of  Columbia have laws with provisions for recount, but they vary.  For  example, 17 states provide for a mandatory recount, but two of these  require a tie vote and another requires a 1 percent or 200 vote difference.   According to officials in 42 of the jurisdictions that had recounts in the 2000  election, none of the recounts altered the original election outcome.   Counting ballots posed several challenges for election officials, including  counting only votes cast by eligible voters; interpreting variations when  ballots are not properly marked; and completing the results of a recount in  a close or contested election in a fair, accurate, and timely manner.
Four types of voting equipment—punch card, optical scan, lever, and  DRE—were used in 98 percent of all election jurisdictions in 2000.  While a  survey of vendors showed little performance difference among DRE,  optical scan, and punch card equipment, local election officials we  contacted rated DRE as more easy to use than other voting methods.  Only  about 50 percent of jurisdictions collected data on accuracy and few of the  jurisdictions we visited had collected actual performance data on the  voting equipment used in the 2000 election.  Nevertheless the vast majority  of jurisdictions across the nation were satisfied with their respective voting  equipment, based largely on officials’ perceptions of how their equipment  performed.  The cost to replace existing voting equipment depends on the  type of equipment purchased and the number of jurisdictions for which it is  purchased.  We estimated the cost of purchasing optical scan units, not  including certain software costs, could range from $191 million for optical  scan machines that use a central-count unit to about $1.3 billion for optical  scan equipment that counts ballots at the precinct and thus allows for voter  error correction. We estimated the cost of purchasing touchscreen DRE  units to be about $3 billion (including one DRE touchscreen unit per  precinct equipped for voters with disabilities and one central count optical  scan unit per county for absentee ballots). Among the voting equipment  challenges identified by election officials were having reliable measures  and objective data to know whether the technology used is meeting the  jurisdictions’ needs; ensuring that necessary security, testing, and  maintenance activities are performed; and ensuring that the technology  will provide benefits over its useful life commensurate with life cycle costs  and that these collective costs are affordable and sustainable.
Our review identified three kinds of internet voting--at a polling place; in a  voting “kiosk” at public places, such as malls or libraries; or at any location,  including the voter’s workplace or home through a personal computer.   Although opinion is not unanimous, security is seen as the primary  challenge for Internet voting. The cost effectiveness of Internet voting  remains unclear because reliable cost data are not available.  The broad  application of Internet voting presents several social and technological  challenges, including providing adequate voter privacy safeguards, security  for voting equipment to ensure that it is adequately safeguarded, and equal  access to all voters.
section_title: Voting Accessibility for Voters with Disabilities
paragraphs: This report examines state and local provisions and practices for ensuring  voting accessibility, both at polling places and with respect to alternative  voting methods and accommodations;  estimates the proportion of polling  places with features that might facilitate or impede access, including  features of polling booths and voting accommodations;  and identifies  efforts and challenges to improving accessibility.
All states have provisions (in the form of statutes, regulations, or policies)  that specifically address voting by people with disabilities.  However,  consistent with the broad discretion afforded states, these provisions vary  greatly.   State laws and policies also vary on how counties are to assure  accessibility of polling places.  Our survey of counties confirms that most  counties inspect all polling places for accessibility, although county  practices for ensuring accessibility vary.
All states provide for one or more alternative voting methods or  accommodations that may facilitate voting by people with disabilities  whose assigned polling places are inaccessible.  For example, all states  have provisions allowing voters with disabilities to vote absentee without  notary or medical certification requirements, although the deadlines and  methods (for example, by mail or in person) for absentee voting vary  among states.  In addition, many states, but not all, have laws or policies  that provide for other accommodations and alternatives for voting on or  before election day—such as reassignment to a polling place that is  accessible, curbside voting, or early voting.
Our onsite work on election day 2000 found that polling places are  generally located in schools, libraries, churches, and town halls, as well as  other facilities.  Although the extent to which any given feature may  prevent or facilitate access is unknown, we estimate that, from the parking  area to the voting room, 16 percent of all polling places in the contiguous  United States have no potential impediments, 56 percent have one or more  potential impediments but offer curbside voting, and 28 percent have one  or more potential impediments and do not offer curbside voting.   These  potential impediments would primarily affect individuals with mobility  impairments and occur most often on the route from the parking area to  the building or at the entrance to the polling place.  Inside the voting room,  the types and arrangement of voting equipment used may also pose  challenges for people with mobility, vision, or dexterity impairments.  To  facilitate voting inside the voting room, polling places generally provide  accommodations, such as voter assistance, magnifying devices, and voting  instructions or sample ballots in large print.  However, none of the polling  places that we visited had special ballots or voting equipment adapted for  blind voters.
A number of efforts have been made by states and localities to improve  voting accessibility for people with disabilities, such as modifying polling  places, acquiring new voting equipment, and expanding voting options.   Nevertheless, state and county election officials we surveyed cited a  variety of challenges to improving access, including limited availability of  accessible facilities and funding constraints at the local level.  Some  disability advocates believe that although alternative voting methods and  accommodations, such as curbside voting, expand options for voters with  disabilities, they do not provide the same voting opportunities afforded the  general public (that is, the opportunity to vote independently and privately  at a polling place) and should not be viewed as permanent solutions for  inaccessible polling places.
section_title: Improving Voting Assistance for Military and Overseas Voters
paragraphs: This report describes the extent and quality of voter assistance provided  for uniformed and overseas citizens;  the challenges that state and local  requirements may pose to these voters;  and the extent of and reasons for  disqualification of ballots cast by these voters.
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986  protects the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections for more  than 6 million military and overseas citizens.  The act also recommends  that states adopt a number of provisions that facilitate absentee voting by  these populations. The Federal Voting Assistance Program, established  within the Department of Defense (DOD), is responsible for implementing  the act by informing U.S. citizens worldwide about their right to vote,  fostering voting participation, and working with states to simplify the  registration and absentee voting process. Voter education and assistance  efforts for military personnel are largely implemented by the military  services through Voting Assistance Officers. Also, the State Department  works with DOD to provide voter assistance to overseas citizens.
The extent and quality of federal voter assistance for military personnel  and overseas citizens varied considerably for the 2000 general election.   The Federal Voting Assistance Program developed a number of useful tools  for voters and Voting Assistance Officers, but many potential voters we  spoke to were unaware of them.  While some installations we visited had  well run programs providing assistance and information to potential voters,  other installations did not meet DOD and service requirements because  they did not provide sufficient numbers of trained Voting Assistance  Officers, voter training, and voting materials.  The variability in executing  the program is due to incomplete service-level guidance that does not  reflect DOD’s directive, a lack of command support at some installations,  and a lack of program oversight by some DOD components.  Finally, the  State Department provided citizens abroad with a variety of useful  assistance, according to overseas citizens and federal employees we spoke  to, although both groups believed more outreach could be beneficial.  Also,  State Department Headquarters has not played an active role in sharing  best practices and lessons learned or in overseeing the program.
Despite progress made by states to facilitate absentee voting, many military  and overseas voters we spoke to believe that challenges remain, including  helping voters understand and comply with state requirements and local  procedures for absentee voting, such as deadlines for registering and  returning ballots.  Continued efforts by DOD officials to work with the  states to simplify procedures, modify election schedules, or allow more use  of technology, such as faxing and the Internet, to speed some portions of  the voting process may help alleviate the challenges, but state legislative  actions may be required.
Although precise numbers are not available, we estimate that small  counties (having a voting-age population of less than 60,000) nationwide  disqualified 8.1 percent (plus or minus 3.2 percent) of ballots cast by  military and overseas voters.  In contrast, the ballot disqualification rate for  civilian voters not living overseas was 1.8 percent (plus or minus 0.6  percent). While larger counties (having a voting age population of more  than 60,000) that responded to GAO's survey showed a similar pattern, the  data were insufficient to make a national estimate. The survey showed  that for all absentee ballots cast, almost two-thirds of the disqualified  absentee ballots were rejected because the ballots arrived too late to be  counted or the envelopes or forms accompanying the ballots were not  completed properly.
This report includes recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and  State to improve (1) the clarity and completeness of service guidance, (2)  voter education and outreach programs, (3) oversight and evaluation of  voting assistance efforts, and (4) sharing of best practices.
section_title: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards
paragraphs: This report identifies the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) role  regarding various voting equipment and assesses how well the FEC is  fulfilling its role.  Our work also identifies the National Association of State  Election Directors’ (NASED) process for testing and qualifying voting  equipment.
No federal agency has been assigned explicit statutory responsibility for  developing voting equipment standards; however, the FEC assumed this  role by developing voluntary standards in 1990 for computer-based  equipment, and Congress has supported this role with appropriations.   These standards describe specific performance benchmarks, and address  many—but not all—types of systems requirements.  In 1997, the FEC  initiated efforts to evaluate the 1990 standards to identify areas to be  updated, and in 1999, initiated efforts to update the standards.  The FEC  plans to issue revised standards in 2002.  This update is necessary because  the FEC has not proactively maintained them, thus allowing them to  become out of date.  According to FEC officials, the FEC has not  proactively maintained the standards because it has not been assigned  explicit responsibility to do so.  Unless voting equipment standards are  current, relevant, and complete, states may choose not to follow them,  resulting in the adoption of disparate standards that could drive up the cost  of voting equipment and produce unevenness among states in the  capabilities of their respective voting equipment.
No federal agency has been assigned responsibility for or assumed the role  of testing voting equipment against the federal standards.  Instead, NASED,  through its Voting Systems Committee, has assumed responsibility for  implementing the federal voting equipment standards by accrediting  independent test authorities, which in turn, test voting equipment against  the standards.  To this end, the committee has developed procedures to  accredit the independent test authorities.  According to the test  authorities, testing is generally iterative, in which the voting equipment  vendors are provided an opportunity to correct deficiencies identified  during testing and resubmit the modified voting equipment for retesting.   When testing is successfully completed, the independent test authorities  notify the NASED that the voting equipment has satisfied testing  requirements.  As of July 3, 2001, the NASED had qualified 21 different  types of voting equipment, representing 10 vendors.
Because development, maintenance, and implementation of voting  equipment standards are very important responsibilities, we are raising  matters for congressional consideration regarding the explicit assignment  of responsibility in these areas.  Additionally, we are making  recommendations to the FEC's Commissioners aimed at improving its  efforts to update its 1990 voting equipment standards.
section_title: Statistical Analysis of Factors Affecting Uncounted Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election
paragraphs: Our analysis of data from 2,455 counties shows that the type of voting  equipment that counties used in the 2000 general election had an effect on  uncounted presidential votes.  Specifically, counties that used punch card  equipment had roughly 0.6 percentage points higher percentages of  uncounted presidential votes than counties using electronic, paper, or  optical scan voting equipment.  Counties using lever equipment had 0.7  percentage points lower percentages of uncounted presidential votes than  counties using electronic, paper or optical scan voting equipment.  When  we supplement this analysis with information about the performance of  optical scan equipment with error correction from our sample of 404  counties, we found that counties using punch card equipment had  significantly higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes than  counties using error corrected optical scan equipment.  If we apply the  relationship we found in these 404 counties to the larger set of 2,455  counties, an estimated 300,000 additional votes may have been counted if  counties that used punch card equipment had, instead, used optical scan  equipment with error correction.  Overall, county voting equipment  accounted for 2% of the variation in uncounted presidential votes across  counties.  Additionally, the analysis of the subset of 404 counties showed  that the use of error correction accounts for another 4% of variation in  uncounted presidential votes across counties.
We found that counties’ demographic characteristics accounted for about  16 percent of the total variation in uncounted presidential votes.  Counties  with higher percentages of minority residents were more likely to have  higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes.  Counties with higher  percentages of 18- to –24 year olds and higher education were more likely  to have lower percentages of uncounted presidential votes.
The state in which counties are located accounted for about 26 percent of  the total variation in uncounted presidential votes.  Data were not available  to examine the extent to which specific factors that were common to  counties within a state but varied across states affected uncounted  presidential votes.  However, such factors may include statewide voter  education efforts, the number of candidates on the ballot, the extent to  which absentee or early voting occurred, and the state’s standards for  determining that is a valid vote.  Non-election specific factors, such as the  percentage of the state’s population for which English is a second language,  may have also contributed to the variability in uncounted presidential  votes.
Our statistical models left about half of the variation in uncounted  presidential votes unexplained.  Several factors may have contributed to  this remaining variability, including differences among counties, precincts,  and people.  An example of this type of difference is whether a county had  switched to a new type of voting equipment that voters found difficult to  operate.
Our findings, which are based on aggregate statistics and only those data  that were available for our sample of 2,455 counties, and the subset of 404  counties, have methodological limitations that are inherent to statistical  studies of this type.
section_title: List of Recently Issued Election Reports
subsections: section_title: GAO Reports
paragraphs: Elections:  Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation  (GAO-02-03, Oct. 2001).
Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards (GAO- 02-52, Oct. 2001).
Voters with Disabilities:  Access to Polling Places and Alternative Voting  Methods (forthcoming).
Elections:  Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should be  Improved (GAO-01-1026, Sept. 2001).
Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors that Affected Uncounted Votes  in the 2000 Presidential Election (GAO-02-122, Oct. 2001).
Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election  Administration (GAO-01-470, Mar. 2001).
Bilingual Voting Assistance: Assistance Provided and Costs (GAO/GGD- 97-81, May 1997).
section_title: Other Recent National Reports
paragraphs: The Constitution Project, Building Consensus for Election Reform (Aug.  2001).
National Association of Secretaries of State, State-by-State Election  Reform Best Practices Report (Aug. 2001).
The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride  and Confidence in the Electoral Process (July 2001).
National Conference of State Legislatures, Voting in America:  Final  Report of the NCSL Elections Reform Task Force (Aug. 2001).
National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2000: Review and  Recommendations by The Nation's Elections Administrators (Aug. 2001)
Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be  (July 2001).
section_title: State Commission and Task Force Reports
paragraphs: (alphabetical order by state)
The Governor’s Select Task Force on Election Procedures, Standards, and  Technology, Revitalizing Democracy in Florida (Mar. 2001).
Hon. Cathy Cox, Georgia Secretary of State, The 2000 Election: A Wake-Up  Call For Reform and Change - Report to the Governor and Members of the  General Assembly (Jan.  2001).
Hon. Chet Culver, Iowa Secretary of State, Commissioner of Elections, and  Registrar of Voters, Iowa’s Election 2000:  Facts, Findings, and Our  Future (Mar. 2001).
Hon. Ron Thornburgh, Kansas Secretary of State, Kansas Secretary of  State’s Six-Point Election Improvement Plan (Jan. 2001).
Special Committee on Voting Systems and Elections Procedures in  Maryland, Report and Recommendations (Feb. 2001).
Hon. Matt Blunt, Missouri Secretary of State, Making Every Vote Count:   Report of Secretary of State Matt Blunt to the People of Missouri (Jan.  2001).
Hon. Bob Brown, Montana Secretary of State, 2001 Election Reform Plan  (2001).
Office of New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, Voting Matters in New  York:  Participation, Choice, Action, Integrity (Feb. 2001).
Hon. Henry Cellar, Texas Secretary of State, Texas Overvote/Undervote  Study (Jan. 2001).
Secretary of State Deborah L. Markowitz, Review of Vermont's Election  Administration and Proposals for Improvement (Jan. 2001).