Maritime Security: DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy
Published: 2013-10-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million small vessels operating in the United States in 2012. Terrorists, smugglers, and other criminals can use small vessels as platforms for their activities because small vessels are generally unregulated and largely anonymous. Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between legitimate small vessel operators and the relatively few individuals estimated to be engaged in illicit activities. DHS issued its SVSS in April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011 to help guide actions to mitigate the security risks arising from small vessels. Given the importance of small vessel security, GAO was asked to review DHS's efforts in developing and implementing the SVSS Implementation Plan .
This report examines what actions, if any, DHS and its components have taken to address small vessel security concerns, and the extent to which they have implemented action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan . GAO analyzed DHS documents; interviewed DHS officials; and visited two ports selected on the basis of the volume of small vessel traffic and security initiatives in place, among other things. While the results of the port visits cannot be generalized across all ports, they provided insights on small vessel security issues and operations.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components--such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--have started or completed initiatives to address small vessel security risks, but DHS is not tracking the progress being made to address action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS ) Implementation Plan . "Small vessels" are characterized as any watercraft--regardless of method of propulsion--less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or commercial purposes. DHS component officials GAO met with identified examples of key initiatives that they have completed or have under way to enhance small vessel security, including an initiative to help CBP better track small vessels arriving from foreign locations and another to assist the Coast Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites. Although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS is to assess and update the plan, DHS has not determined the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders--such as the Department of Defense--are making in completing the action items and has no current plans to do so. DHS officials stated that this is due, in part, to budget constraints that make this a low priority. DHS officials stated that updating the SVSS Implementation Plan would be valuable, and doing so is particularly important since more than one component could be responsible for action items in the plan. Accordingly, by systematically gathering information from its components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the progress they are making in addressing the action items in the plan, DHS could help prioritize initiatives given constrained budgets and better identify successes and lessons learned, among other things.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS regularly update the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders are making in addressing action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan . DHS concurred with the recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million  small vessels operating in the United States in 2012. Terrorists,  smugglers, and other criminals can use small vessels as platforms for  their activities because small vessels are generally unregulated and  largely anonymous. Consequently, law enforcement agencies face the  challenge of distinguishing between the vast number of legitimate small  vessel operators and the comparatively few individuals that are estimated  to be engaged in illicit activities. On any given day, small vessels share  waterways with commercial and military vessels, operating at hundreds of  U.S. ports and waterways. According to the Coast Guard’s Strategy for  Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, a small vessel represents  one of the greatest risks from terrorism in the maritime domain. Further,  small vessels have the potential to be used to smuggle terrorists or  weapons of mass destruction into the United States. According to the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the consequences of a weapon  of mass destruction attack in the United States could be catastrophic, and  potentially include the loss of life, direct and indirect economic costs, and  adverse environmental effects, including the contamination of the impact  area with subsequent loss of its use for decades.
Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to attack  targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband to enter the  United States, DHS issued its Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) in  April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011  to help guide its efforts to mitigate the security risks arising from small  vessels. components that have a key role in addressing small vessel security,  including the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP),  DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, and DHS’s Domestic  Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), as well as other federal stakeholders.For more information on the roles and responsibilities of these DHS  components, see appendix I. Given the importance of small vessel  security, you asked us to review DHS’s efforts in developing and  implementing the SVSS Implementation Plan. This report addresses the  following question:   The SVSS and Implementation Plan identify several DHS
What actions, if any, have DHS and its components taken to address  small vessel security concerns, and to what extent have they  implemented action items from the SVSS Implementation Plan?
Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.:  April 2008), and Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to the Public  (Washington, D.C.: January 2011). DHS also issued a sensitive security information  version of the SVSS Implementation Plan.
DHS’s actions for tracking the SVSS Implementation Plan with (1)  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, (2) provisions  in DHS’s SVSS, (3) key management practices, and (4) useful practices  for performance management and measurement. Further, we  interviewed headquarters officials responsible for developing or  addressing the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan from the  DHS Office of Policy, as well as four DHS components—the Coast  Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T. In these meetings, we also  discussed key initiatives that each of the four DHS components’ have in  place to address small vessel security and reviewed related documents  on these initiatives. Although these initiatives relate to the overarching  goals of the SVSS, each initiative is not directly aligned with a specific  action item in the SVSS Implementation Plan. Accordingly, we focused  on describing these key initiatives identified by the DHS components, not  the individual action items in the plan. In addition, we conducted visits to  two ports—San Diego, California and Miami, Florida—to interview port  security stakeholders and observe small vessel security activities. We  selected these ports on the basis of various factors, including the (1)  relatively high volume of small vessel traffic and (2) initiatives initiated at  these ports by DHS components to address small vessel security risks. At  these ports, we interviewed officials from local Coast Guard units, as well  as from CBP’s Office of Field Operations and Office of Air and Marine.  Further, we interviewed representatives from the U.S. Navy, two local law  enforcement agencies, two port authorities, and six industry  associations—who were selected because they worked with DHS  components regarding small vessel security issues and operations. While  we cannot generalize the results of our interviews and observations to all  ports, officials we interviewed and observations we made provided us  with a general overview and perspective on small vessel security issues  and operations at the selected locations.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to October  2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Small Vessels Pose Security Risks
paragraphs: Larger vessels—such as cruise ships, container ships, and oil and natural  gas tankers—can travel among small vessels that operate with little  scrutiny or notice, and some of these larger vessels have suffered  waterborne attacks overseas by terrorists or pirates who operated from  small vessels. Although there have not been any small vessel attacks in  the United States, terrorists have used small vessels to facilitate their  attacks, such as those on the USS Cole in 2000 (see fig. 1), the French  oil tanker Limburg in Yemen in 2002, and the Japanese tanker M Star in  2010. Our prior work has found that the use of small vessels to deliver  improvised explosive devices was one of the most significant concerns for   The concern about small vessel attacks is exacerbated  larger vessels.by the fact that some larger vessels, such as cruise ships, sail according  to precise schedules and preplanned itineraries that could provide  information to terrorists in preparing for and carrying out an attack against  a vessel. Small vessels have also been successfully employed by pirates  to hijack international cargo vessels, and at least three cruise ships have  been attacked by pirates aboard small vessels who were armed with  automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades.
In addition, DHS reported that small vessels have the potential to be used  to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States.  According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, from 1993 through  2012, there were 2,331 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear  and other radioactive material. Although these incidents do not all  involve the use of small vessels, the former commandant of the Coast  Guard testified that small vessels pose a greater threat than cargo  containers for smuggling nuclear materials. In addition, DHS reported  that there is limited ability to screen small vessels for weapons of mass  destruction, and as a result, small vessels could be used by terrorists to  transport such weapons. In January 2009, we reported that DNDO had  developed and tested equipment for detecting nuclear material on small  vessels, but that efforts to use this equipment in a port area had been   We further reported that DNDO had not  limited to pilot programs.established a detailed plan to address gaps and vulnerabilities and  recommended that DHS develop a plan to help ensure the future success  of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities and that this plan  should focus on, among other things, small vessels. To address this  recommendation, DHS issued a strategic plan in December 2010 and an  implementation plan in April 2012.
section_title: Small Vessels Are Generally Unregulated
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime enforcement  efforts have been primarily focused on large commercial vessels (over  300 gross tons), while federal efforts to address small vessels are more  limited. In particular, large commercial vessel security is governed by  Coast Guard regulations issued pursuant to the Maritime Transportation  Security Act of 2002 and other relevant legislation. For example, certain  larger vessels are required to submit information—in advance of U.S.  arrival or departure—on crew members, passengers, cargo, and vessel  operations.to conduct risk-based analyses and gain a greater awareness of large   This advance information allows the Coast Guard and CBP  commercial vessel operations, their passengers, and their crews. In  addition, certain large commercial vessels are also required to carry and  operate transponders—such as an automatic identification system— which broadcast information on the vessels and their locations, allowing  authorities to track their movements. In contrast, small vessels are  generally exempt from these requirements. As a result, the federal  government has limited knowledge regarding the owners and locations of  small vessels.
Although small vessels are generally unregulated, the federal government  has put in place some requirements for these vessels. For example, small  vessel operators traveling to foreign ports or places are required to report  to CBP upon their return to the United States.  However, CBP estimates  that a small percentage of the international small vessel traffic returning to  the United States actually report this information. According to CBP, this  low level of compliance is due, in part, to a lack of (1) public awareness of  the reporting requirements, and (2) inspections to emphasize and ensure  compliance. CBP has taken actions to help address this issue as part of  its Small Vessel Reporting System initiative, which is discussed later in  this report. At the international level, the International Maritime  Organization issued guidelines in 2008 regarding the security of small  vessels that are not subject to the International Ship and Port Facility  Security Code, but these guidelines are voluntary.
In March 2009, we reported on the challenges of tracking small vessels  using available technologies. For example, we reported that although  the Coast Guard and other agencies may have technology systems that  can track small vessels within some ports, these did not always work in  bad weather or at night. Further, we reported that even with systems in  place to track small vessels, there is agreement among maritime  stakeholders that it is difficult to detect threatening activity by small  vessels without prior knowledge of a planned attack. Ultimately, DHS  documents report that the U.S. government has only limited knowledge  about international recreational boaters and their travel patterns.
According to the SVSS, in the United States, there is a tradition and  expectation among small vessel operators to generally have unrestricted  access to U.S. waterways. In addition, small vessel operators have  expressed concerns about the cost of requirements that would allow the  government to track their movements. For example, DHS conducted  outreach efforts with the small vessel community while developing the  SVSS, and DHS reported that small vessel operators and national  recreational vessel associations expressed concern that the cost of  transponders would present an objectionable burden for recreational  boaters. Accordingly, DHS faces a challenge in balancing the collection of  information necessary for the proper assessment of risks posed by small  vessels with the freedom of the seas expected by small vessel operators.
section_title: Development of the SVSS and SVSS Implementation Plan
paragraphs: In June 2007, DHS held an initial small vessel security summit to engage  private, commercial, and government stakeholders in discussions on a  range of issues involving the security risks posed by small vessels in the  U.S. maritime environment. During this summit, the stakeholders that  attended provided numerous recommendations to DHS, including a  recommendation that DHS develop a national strategy regarding small  vessel security. In response to this recommendation, DHS convened the  Small Vessel Security Working Group in August 2007, which consisted of  representatives from DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, CBP,  and the Transportation Security Administration, as well as participation by  representatives from the Departments of Justice and Defense. The  working group developed the SVSS in April 2008 to address the potential  for small vessels to be used (1) to smuggle terrorists or weapons,  including weapons of mass destruction, into the United States; (2) as a  standoff weapon platform; or (3) as a direct attack method to deliver a  waterborne improvised explosive device. The four overarching goals— which include more specific objectives—of the SVSS are to develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel  community and public and private sectors in order to enhance  maritime domain awareness; enhance maritime security and safety based on a coherent plan with a  layered, innovative approach; leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect; determine intent;  and, when necessary, interdict small vessels; and enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between  federal, state, local and tribal partners and the private sector, as well  as international partners.
DHS subsequently issued the SVSS Implementation Plan in January  2011.subject matter experts at DHS components to provide input on what  action items should be included. From these efforts, DHS includes a total  of 132 action items in the plan, organized according to the four  overarching SVSS goals. Each of the action items provides a description  of the action to be taken and the lead federal department or component  responsible for coordinating and implementing the action. Examples of  action items include the following:   In developing the plan, the SVSS Working Group relied on  increase systematic visits to maritime facilities to build relationships,  improve knowledge of threat conditions at marinas, and deter  criminals; partner and coordinate with foreign countries, particularly in the  Caribbean region, on radiological and nuclear detection and  interdiction; explore research and development of a permanent sensor system to  detect and track noncooperative vessels; and improve federal, state, tribal, and local interagency information  sharing, joint targeting, collaboration on boardings, and related  operations.
Based on input from the DHS components’ subject matter experts, the  SVSS Implementation Plan also includes information on the general time  frames, estimated relative costs, and anticipated impacts that each action  item may have in achieving the goals of the SVSS.
After DHS issued the SVSS Implementation Plan, each federal agency or  component was responsible for separately determining the feasibility of  the relevant action items and deciding which ones to implement after  taking into account its specific mission, priorities, and the resources  available.a guidance document to provide greater specificity about how preexisting  programs may be developed and coordinated to achieve the goals and  objectives outlined in the SVSS.
section_title: DHS and Its Components Are Taking Actions, but DHS Is Not Tracking Progress in Addressing the SVSS Implementation Plan
subsections: section_title: DHS Components Have Various Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security Concerns
paragraphs: DHS components have completed some initiatives and have other  initiatives under way to address small vessel security concerns. Some of  these initiatives go back more than a decade, and include security  measures that the components have implemented to protect vessels and  infrastructure from small vessel attacks, including the enforcement of  security zones around certain vessels—such as ferries—or infrastructure.
Another security measure is the escort of larger vessels—such as cruise  ships and liquid natural gas tankers—into a port, as shown in figure 2.
More recently, DHS components developed initiatives to address small  vessel security concerns that relate to the four goals of the SVSS— although many initiatives began prior to issuance of the SVSS  Implementation Plan. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that many of  the initiatives in the plan are not new or uniquely dedicated to terrorist  threats or small vessels, and that a number of the initiatives are ongoing  in the various federal agencies responsible for facilitating maritime safety,  security, recreation, and commerce. Further, more than one DHS  component may be responsible for addressing a single action item in the  SVSS Implementation Plan, and a single action item could be addressed  through several initiatives. In addition, DHS officials stated that initiatives  often aligned with multiple action items in the plan.
DHS component officials we met with identified the following key  initiatives that they have completed or have under way to enhance small  vessel security. These initiatives relate to the goals of the SVSS and are  linked to multiple action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. For  additional information on these four initiatives, see appendix II.
Focused Lens. Originally piloted by the Coast Guard in 2008,  Focused Lens is an ongoing initiative intended to assist Coast Guard  units in preventing small vessel attacks in their areas of operation by  identifying and directing additional resources and efforts toward the  most likely points of origin for a small vessel attack, such as marinas  and boat ramps.
Small Vessel Reporting System. In May 2010, CBP developed this  voluntary, online program to enable small vessel operators to expedite  the reporting of their foreign voyages to and planned arrivals in the  United States. This program is intended to allow CBP to assess the  risks for known small vessels and associated passengers in advance  of arrival in the United States and, as a result, make it easier to  identify suspicious or unknown small vessels.
West Coast Maritime Pilot. Under this pilot, DNDO provided  equipment and training to a variety of federal, state, local, and tribal  agencies to enhance their ability to detect and interdict the smuggling  of radiological and nuclear materials onboard small vessels. The pilot  ran from September 2007 to December 2010, and according to DNDO  officials, has integrated the lessons learned and standard operating  procedures developed to expand assistance efforts in other regions  around the country.
Coastal Surveillance System. DHS S&T is developing a system that  is designed to integrate information from publicly available data  sources and sensors to improve (1) maritime domain awareness by  tracking vessels in real time and (2) the interdiction of vessels  involved in illegal or illicit activities by identifying anomalies or  suspicious behavior.
In addition to specific initiatives, DHS officials and port security  stakeholders cited general efforts that they believed have helped to  improve coordination among federal, state, and local agencies—one of  the goals of the SVSS. For example, federal and local port security  stakeholders at one of the ports we visited stated that their joint  operations center has helped them coordinate security operations, such  as the security boarding of small vessels. According to Coast Guard  officials, the Coast Guard performed 11,399 small vessel security  boardings in 2012, and with the assistance of other port security  stakeholders, an additional 789 small vessels security boardings were  conducted that year. In addition, in one of the ports we visited, the  Coast Guard and local law enforcement officials developed a  memorandum of understanding to conduct joint boardings of small  vessels. Local law enforcement and port authority officials at the two ports  we visited stated that enhanced coordination with federal agencies has  improved the overall level of communication and cooperation related to  small vessel security operations.
section_title: DHS Is Not Tracking Progress on the SVSS Implementation Plan
paragraphs: Although DHS components have various initiatives under way, DHS does  not know the extent to which its components or other relevant  stakeholders have made progress in addressing SVSS Implementation  Plan action items because DHS is not systematically gathering  information on their efforts. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that  DHS is to assess and update the plan annually and focus on realigning  the plan with the activities under way by its components and other federal  agencies. The SVSS Implementation Plan directs that this review is also  to (1) eliminate short-term action items that have been completed over  the previous year; (2) transition action items from long-term to short-term  status, as appropriate; and (3) augment the plan with new action items.  Since the SVSS Implementation Plan was issued in 2011, however,  neither DHS nor its components are tracking progress on the action items  in the plan.
Officials we spoke with from four of the key DHS components that have  responsibility for leading the majority of the action items in the SVSS  Implementation Plan (the Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T)  stated that while they are tracking efforts and initiatives of their  component-specific missions that may address risks posed by small  vessels, they are not systematically tracking these efforts as they relate to  the specific action items listed in the plan. After the SVSS Implementation  Plan was issued, the Coast Guard conducted a one-time review in  November 2011 of the action items in the plan where it was identified as a  lead or colead. This review included information on the status of  preexisting or planned Coast Guard initiatives that were related to each  action item and which action items were determined to not be  implementable.
DHS officials we spoke with stated that there is no plan to update the  SVSS Implementation Plan because it is not a priority, given budget  constraints, and it is too early to measure the effectiveness of action  items in the plan. According to a senior DHS Policy official, although the  SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS should assess and update  the plan annually, given these constraints, an annual review is too  frequent. The senior DHS official added that per the Secretary of  Homeland Security’s direction, DHS components are focusing on  maintaining their ongoing operations under constrained budgets, and so  efforts to update the SVSS Implementation Plan are not currently a  priority. For example, Coast Guard officials we met with stated that, in  many instances, the ability to expand certain efforts in scope or scale so  as to more effectively address small vessel security risks may be  dependent on the funding of particular port programs or the availability of  related grant funding, which can be affected by budget constraints. Coast  Guard officials added that America’s Waterway Watch—a program  highlighted in the SVSS Implementation Plan that provides outreach to  the public, including the small vessel community, on awareness of threats  and how to report suspicious activity—may not receive funding in DHS’s  fiscal year 2014 appropriation.
DHS officials also stated that because the SVSS Implementation Plan  was issued in early 2011, it is too early to expect a majority of the action  items to be completed or, especially for the long-term action items, to  have been implemented. These officials stated that accomplishing the  SVSS’s goals and objectives through implementation of the many action  items in the SVSS Implementation Plan will require a significant  investment of time and resources, along with buy-in from state and local  maritime security stakeholders. Accordingly, it could take years to fully  implement some of the action items and determine whether they are  effective. Further, according to DHS officials, not all action items listed in  the SVSS Implementation Plan may be feasible or implemented at all port  locations nationally. For example, Coast Guard officials we met with  stated that while the placement of floating security barriers is an effective  security strategy used by the U.S. Navy to protect certain high-value  assets (see fig. 3), it would not be economically feasible to install such  barriers at all ports because they would have to be designed for the  specific characteristics and needs of each port location.
DHS officials involved with the SVSS Working Group, as well as officials  from four of the DHS components we spoke with, stated that receiving  updates on progress or lessons learned from efforts to implement the  action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan would be valuable  information. For example, officials we met with from DHS Policy and the  Coast Guard stated that they recognize the value in updating the  progress of the SVSS Implementation Plan to incorporate new  information about threats, changes in technologies, requirements, and  lessons learned as programs are assessed, prioritized, and implemented.  In addition, a Coast Guard port security specialist we met with at one of  the ports added that updating the progress of the plan could help DHS  better determine where to focus its research and development efforts and  prioritize the related funding and resources needs. Further, DNDO  officials we met with stated that there is value in understanding what  individual DHS components are implementing regarding the SVSS  Implementation Plan, as well as the methods and techniques that are  being used. The DNDO officials added that obtaining a common  understanding of ongoing efforts to implement related initiatives could  prevent duplication of effort, provide a means of sharing lessons learned  among components, and potentially save time and resources. DHS S&T  officials we met with similarly stated that there is value in learning about  the overall progress of the SVSS Implementation Plan and that, to do this  effectively, this information needs to be collected in a more systematic  way and then be made widely available to all the agencies involved.
Although it may be too early to measure the effectiveness of some action  items in the SVSS Implementation Plan, updating the progress made in  addressing the action items could help DHS and its components prioritize  their efforts given constrained budgets; better identify successes and  lessons learned; and enhance collaboration with federal, state, and local  stakeholders regarding small vessel security issues. The SVSS  Implementation Plan states that, because of risk, the unpredictability of  budgets, policy changes, and administrative priorities, the plan must be  reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains current and accurate. By  engaging in this review process, the plan states that it is intended to be a  living document that provides a strategic overview of participating  agencies’ implementation of the SVSS. Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government calls for federal agencies to design and  implement control activities to enforce management’s directives.  Further, the SVSS Implementation Plan calls for DHS to assess and  update the plan to determine the progress that has been made to address  the action items in the plan. This provision is a control activity to help  ensure the achievement of the goals and objectives of the SVSS. The  SVSS Implementation Plan calls for this review to be conducted annually,  but given resource constraints and the time it will take to complete some  of the action items, less frequent but regular assessments may be  warranted. By systematically gathering information from its components  and other relevant stakeholders to update the action items in the SVSS  Implementation Plan on a regular basis, DHS would be better able to  monitor progress against the plan and the goals and objectives of the  SVSS. This is particularly important given that more than one agency or  component may be responsible for addressing action items in the plan  and because, according to DHS officials, accomplishing the SVSS’s goals  and objectives will require a significant investment of time and resources.  According to key management practices, for agency efforts that require a  substantial commitment and that could take years to complete, it is  essential to track implementation goals to pinpoint performance shortfalls  and gaps and suggest any needed corrections. Further, according to  useful practices for performance management and measurement, having  a clear understanding of current performance—a baseline—is essential to  determining whether new initiatives will result in accomplishing the goals  and objectives of the SVSS.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to attack  targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband to enter the  United States, DHS issued its SVSS Implementation Plan in January  2011 to help guide efforts to mitigate the security risks arising from small  vessels. DHS component agencies have completed some initiatives and  have other initiatives under way to address the risk of a small vessel  attack, but DHS is not gathering information on the progress its  components or relevant stakeholders are making to address action items  in the SVSS Implementation Plan and has no plans to do so. The SVSS  Implementation Plan, by design, is to be revised to accommodate new  information about threats, technologies, requirements, and lessons  learned as action items are implemented, but DHS has not updated the  plan since it was issued in 2011. Given that internal controls call for  federal agencies to design and implement control activities to enforce  management’s directives, DHS could better prioritize initiatives and  identify successes if it was to regularly update the progress its  components and other relevant stakeholders are making to address the  action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. This information could be  particularly useful to DHS components that may be operating under more  constrained budgets than when the plan was first issued.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To improve DHS’s ability to monitor progress, prioritize action items, and  identify successes, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security systematically gather information from the department’s  components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the  progress they are making in addressing action items in the SVSS  Implementation Plan.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: In September 2013, we requested comments on a draft of this report from  the Department of Homeland Security. The department provided technical  comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In  addition to its technical comments, DHS provided an official letter for  inclusion in the report, which can be seen in appendix III. In the letter,  DHS stated it concurred with the recommendation and, by October 31,  2014, plans to complete a review of the progress its components are  making in addressing SVSS Implementation Plan actions. We think this  review is an important first step, but want to emphasize that such  progress reviews should be conducted on a periodic basis until the SVSS  Implementation Plan action items are fully addressed.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of  Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Stakeholders Involved in Small Vessel Security
paragraphs: This appendix provides details on the numerous stakeholders that play a  role in small vessel security. These stakeholders include various  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components with regulatory,  statutory, and management responsibilities that affect small vessel  security. See table 1 for key DHS components involved in small vessel  security, including the components that are the lead or colead for the  majority of the action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS)  Implementation Plan.
To enhance deterrence and improve preparedness, state, local, and tribal  governments are also involved in small vessel security. For example,  state and local law enforcement agencies carry out a variety of security  operations at their respective ports, such as small vessel boardings or  escorts of vessels into port. Finally, the general public, including the small  vessel community and fishing associations, play a role in small vessel  security by identifying and reporting suspicious activity to relevant law  enforcement agencies.
section_title: Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security
paragraphs: This appendix provides additional details on four key initiatives that DHS  components have completed or have under way to improve small vessel  security. Each of these initiatives is led by one of the four DHS  components with a key role in addressing small vessel security—the  Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS’s S&T. The initiatives included in  this appendix are illustrative of actions DHS components have taken to  enhance small vessel security and are linked to multiple action items in  the SVSS Implementation Plan.
subsections: section_title: Focused Lens
paragraphs: Originally created by the Coast Guard’s District Eleven as Operation  Focused Lens, the initiative was piloted in 2008 to address small vessel  security risks. As a continuing Coast Guard initiative, Focused Lens is  intended to increase awareness of suspicious activity in and around U.S.  ports. In particular, Focused Lens is intended to assist Coast Guard units  in preventing small vessel attacks in their areas of operation by directing  additional resources and efforts toward the most likely points of origin for  a small vessel attack, such as marinas and vessel ramps. Focused Lens  relates to the SVSS goals, particularly the goal to develop and leverage a  strong partnership with the small vessel community and public and private  sectors.
Phase 1 activities can be conducted by the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard Auxiliary (a  voluntary organization), or local law enforcement officials. Under the pilot initiative, District  Eleven identified any location that could be used as a launch site. The expansion of  Focused Lens is limited to identifying and assessing privately owned or public access  marinas and boat launch ramps, per the guidance of local Coast Guard officials.
Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM). A MSRAM analyst is to evaluate the  data to determine the potential of the launch sites to be used by terrorists  based on the various attributes, and prioritize the launch sites  accordingly. In phase 3, the Coast Guard is to decide on where to  conduct security activities (i.e., boarding small vessels, conducting  surveillance patrols, or promoting citizen awareness programs) based on  the prioritization of the launch sites. These security activities are to be  conducted at the discretion of Coast Guard officials in their specific areas  of operation to prevent and deter terrorist activity.
The Coast Guard does not have a requirement to conduct operations in support of  Focused Lens. Such operations are left to the Coast Guard officials responsible for  determining which activities to undertake given the MSRAM analysis of launch sites.
section_title: Small Vessel Reporting System
paragraphs: CBP developed the Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS)—a  voluntary, online program for small vessel operators and passengers  (participants) to report their foreign travels—to better track small vessels  and make it easier to identify suspicious or unknown vessels. To enroll in  the SVRS program, participants are to first complete an online application  and then make an appointment for a face-to-face interview with a CBP  officer who verifies the information provided and, if needed, obtains their  digital fingerprints and photograph. Once enrolled, participants are able  to submit float plans for their intended international travel online. By  doing so, participants can expedite the process for reporting their  intended arrivals from foreign locations and may not have to appear in  person for inspection by CBP officers each time they enter the United  States.
Since the SVRS enables CBP to capture certain biographical and vessel  data much earlier than upon a vessel’s arrival at the United States from a  foreign location, CBP can review this information to identify potential high- risk small vessels and determine, in advance of the vessels’ arrival, if a  face-to-face inspection may need to be conducted. A CBP official we met  with who is familiar with the SVRS stated that if the SVRS is used by a  participant, CBP inspection officers will be better able to determine if a  face-to-face inspection is needed and, if so, what level of resources is  needed to conduct an inspection upon the participant entering the United  States. Further, CBP officials we spoke with at one of the ports we visited  stated that the SVRS enables them to increase the amount of time CBP  officers are spending in the field to conduct enforcement activities by  limiting the amount of time officers spend collecting and entering data  from boaters reporting their arrival by phone. The SVRS relates to the  goals of the SVSS, particularly the goal of enhancing maritime security  and safety through the implementation of advanced data submission  procedures and efforts to increase reporting compliance.
The SVRS was initially piloted in Miami, Florida, in May 2010. Miami was  selected as the pilot location because of the large population of small  vessels operating in that area. The pilot was made available to  participants already enrolled in a local CBP registered traveler program.  Later in 2010, the SVRS pilot was expanded to additional CBP field  offices covering southern Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin  Islands. In May 2011, CBP further expanded the pilot to include five  additional field offices—Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, and Seattle— and eligibility was also expanded to include all U.S. and Canadian  citizens, among others. As of October 2011, the SVRS pilot was  deployed to all CBP field offices nationwide with the exception of two—El  Paso and Tucson—that do not have a nexus to water. According to CBP,  as of May 28, 2013, the number of participants enrolled in the SVRS had  grown to 30,190, along with a total of 5,862 float plans submitted, and  11,189 vessels registered, as shown in table 2.
As of May 2013, three CBP field office locations—Miami and Tampa,  Florida, and San Juan, Puerto Rico—accounted for 79 percent of the  SVRS registrants. CBP officials attributed this to the fact that the SVRS  pilot originated in these locations and the number of small vessels  operating in these locations is very high relative to the number in other  locations. CBP officials added that the number of SVRS registrations is  not very high in some locations and noted that CBP is attempting to  address challenges to implementing the SVRS in other locations. For  example, CBP officials we met with at one of the ports we visited stated  that, as of April 2013, a total of 14 people had enrolled in the SVRS at  their location and a few float plans had been submitted. The CBP officials  stated that they believed these numbers were low, in part, because of the  lack of publicity regarding the SVRS program. CBP officials added that  CBP is in the process of increasing its efforts to promote the SVRS  through various community outreach efforts at a number of locations in an  attempt to expand public awareness and increase use of the SVRS  among small vessel operators and passengers. Finally, CBP officials told  us that because of the proximity of many locations along the U.S. border  to Canada, a trip between the two countries may require only a few  minutes to complete. As a result, a program to expedite the reporting  process is already being utilized in this region, thereby negating the need  to register in the SVRS.determining whether modifications can be made to the SVRS in an effort  to increase its use in this region.
section_title: West Coast Maritime Pilot
paragraphs: DNDO conducted the West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) program from  September 2007 to December 2010. The pilot program—which provided  equipment and training to a variety of federal, state, local, and tribal  agencies—was designed to enhance agencies’ ability to detect and  interdict the smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials being  transported onboard small vessels. DNDO implemented the WMCP  program in two locations—Puget Sound, Washington, and San Diego,  California—and coordinated it through local Area Maritime Security  Committees.layered, preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) defense across  the participating state and local agencies that would enhance the limited  resources of federal agencies. The WCMP program also sought to  develop, implement, and evaluate standard operating procedures for  detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear materials transported  onboard small vessels that could then be adapted to the needs of other  ports or regions. The WCMP program relates to the goals of the SVSS,  including enhancing maritime security and safety based on a coherent  plan with a layered, innovative approach.
The objective of the WCMP program was to create a  In both of the pilot locations, DNDO procured commercially available  boat-mounted and portable radiation detection equipment (for examples  of the latter, see fig. 5), trained agency personnel on how to use the  equipment, and evaluated agencies’ maritime PRND operations in  exercises involving small vessels that were carrying radiological or  nuclear materials onboard.
According to DNDO’s final reports, the WCMP program resulted in the  successful development of a regionally coordinated, layered, maritime  PRND capability to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear threats  transported onboard small vessels at each of the two pilot locations. The  final report for one of the pilot locations stated that more than 250  additional radiation detectors were deployed, new training materials were  developed, and training was provided to over 400 emergency responders.  Further, the final report for the other pilot location stated that the number  of agency boats conducting PRND screenings of small vessels has more  than doubled and the number of screenings has increased significantly  because of leveraging the resources and expertise of state, local, and  tribal agencies. These reports also stated that the participating agencies  successfully detected the presence of radiological or nuclear materials  transported on small vessels during exercises. Additionally, according to  DNDO officials, the WCMP program demonstrated that it is possible for  maritime PRND operations to be integrated into the operations of law  enforcement and emergency responders with limited impact on their  duties.
The final WCMP program reports also highlighted some challenges  related to the development of maritime PRND capability focused on small  vessels. For example, although these reports stated that the WCMP  program exercises proved successful, DNDO officials stated that reducing  the risk posed by small vessels containing illicit radiological or nuclear  materials in the real world is a challenge, in part because, at any given  time, there could be a large number of small vessels that would need to  be screened. DNDO reported that further analysis is needed at the port  level to determine the numbers and placement of PRND equipment and  operational tactics that would be most effective.
Since completion of the pilots, DNDO has integrated the lessons learned  from the WCMP program to expand its maritime PRND program  assistance efforts in other regions around the country. For example,  according to DNDO officials, lessons learned from the WCMP program  were used to develop a regional maritime PRND program in Boston,  Massachusetts, and similar efforts are under way in Charleston, South  Carolina; Rochester, New York; and San Francisco, California. DNDO  also developed generic standard operating procedures for a regional  maritime PRND program and provided these to the Coast Guard for  potential distribution to all of the Area Maritime Security Committees  around the nation. Further, both WCMP programs in Puget Sound and  San Diego have been sustained with continued use of the equipment  from the pilot, and, according to DNDO officials, the maritime PRND  program in Puget Sound continues to grow with additional agencies  joining the effort and the number of boat-mounted detection systems in  the region increasing as well.
section_title: Coastal Surveillance System
paragraphs: DHS S&T is developing and piloting the Coastal Surveillance System   which is intended to improve (1) maritime domain awareness by  (CSS),tracking vessels in real time and (2) the interdiction of vessels involved in  illegal or illicit activities by identifying anomalies or suspicious behavior.  With respect to small vessels, DHS S&T officials stated that the key  benefit of the CSS, once fully developed, will be its ability to help users— such as CBP, the Coast Guard, and law enforcement agencies— distinguish small vessels that are not a threat from those that may warrant  further action. Specifically, DHS S&T officials stated that they believe the  CSS will be able to improve interdiction effectiveness—the number of  boardings that result in apprehensions and prosecutions. Accordingly, the  CSS relates to the goals of the SVSS, particularly the goal to leverage  technology to enhance the ability to detect; determine intent; and, when  necessary, interdict small vessels.
According to DHS S&T documents, the CSS is intended to improve  maritime domain awareness and interdiction effectiveness by integrating  a variety of unclassified information on vessels collected from publicly  available data sources, as well as data collected from sensors. Through  analytical tools, the CSS is intended to alert users to suspicious vessels.  According to DHS S&T officials, the CSS is intended to provide users with  an operational picture similar to what the Federal Aviation Administration  uses to identify the location of all airplanes at all times.
Although the 3-year CSS pilot program was to be initiated in fiscal year  2014, DHS S&T officials stated that they were ahead of scheduled time  frames and deployed the CSS to three DHS field locations in December  2012 to obtain early feedback on the system.  DHS S&T officials stated  that they are documenting feedback they receive on the CSS and are  making changes before the pilot is officially launched in fiscal year 2014  and the CSS is deployed to other entities, including state and local law  enforcement agencies and international partners.
Although DHS S&T intends for the CSS to track small vessels, DHS S&T  officials stated that, as of May 2013, the CSS does not have the capability  to detect most small vessels, since these vessels are generally not  required to submit information to systems that would feed into the CSS.  DHS S&T officials stated that more information sources are needed to be  able to track small vessels. For example, according to an April 2013 CBP  assessment of the CSS, the initial rollout of the CSS to its Air and Marine  Operations Center had limited sensor integration to track small vessels.
The CSS is being piloted at CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside,  California; Coast Guard Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach; and DHS S&T’s Maritime  Security Technology Pilot in St. Petersburg, Florida.
DHS S&T reports that it plans to take advantage of technological  advances to detect small vessels that are being developed under two  DHS S&T programs, and incorporate these data sources into the CSS   DHS S&T officials identified some examples of technologies  over time.DHS S&T is in the process of developing or piloting, including the Smart  Chart Automatic Identification System—a smart phone application that is  to provide free nautical maps to the user but is to also provide vessel  positioning information to authorized federal agencies—and the SeaWeb  acoustic tripwire, which is to deliver an acoustic sensor to detect small  vessels. DHS S&T officials stated that these are currently in different  phases of development and are not yet integrated into the CSS.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant  Director), Tracey Cross, Julian King, Tracey King, Stanley J. Kostyla,  Jessica Orr, and Hugh Paquette made significant contributions to the  work.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Coast Guard: Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Faced in  Developing and Implementing a Common Operational Picture.   GAO-13-784T. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2013.
Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common  Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program.  GAO-13-321. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2013.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could  Advance DHS’s Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other  Infrastructure. GAO-13-11. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of  Its Cargo Targeting System. GAO-13-9. Washington, D.C.: October 25,  2012.
Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime  Transportation Security Act. GAO-12-1009T. Washington, D.C.:  September 11, 2012.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed Plans for Its Global  Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying  Equipment. GAO-12-941T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Efforts to Address Port Recovery and  Salvage Response. GAO-12-494R. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2012.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management  of Interagency Operations Centers. GAO-12-202. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2012.
Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but More Training  Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations.   GAO-12-14. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Maritime Security: Progress Made but Further Actions Needed to Secure  the Maritime Energy Supply. GAO-11-883T. Washington, D.C.: August  24, 2011.
Maritime Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address  Risks Posed by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened.   GAO-11-195. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2011.
Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but  Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security.  GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2010.
Maritime Security Responses to Questions for the Record.  GAO-11-140R. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 2010.
Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port  Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not  Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or  Closed Identified Gaps. GAO-10-883T. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship  Security, but Some Concerns Remain. GAO-10-400. Washington, D.C.:  April 9, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist  DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to  Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington,  D.C.: October 30, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but  the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337.  Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to Promote  Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges  Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2008.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were  Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.- Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12,  2008.
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has  Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges  Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility  Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices,  and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign  Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance  Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25,  2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in  Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity  Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure  Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.  GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.  Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in  Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March  28, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a  Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316.  Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.