Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program
Published: 2006-09-07T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2005, nearly 16 million people entered the country under the program. After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the risk that aliens would exploit the program to enter the United States became more of a concern. This testimony discusses our recent report on the Visa Waiver Program. Specifically, it (1) describes the Visa Waiver Program's benefits and risks, (2) examines the U.S. government's process for assessing potential risks, and (3) assesses the actions taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy officials in six program countries and reviewed relevant procedures and reports on participating countries
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits as well as some inherent risks. It facilitates travel for millions of people and eases consular workload, but poses challenges to border inspectors, who, when screening visa waiver travelers, may face language barriers or lack time to conduct in-depth interviews. Furthermore, stolen passports from visa waiver countries are prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has intercepted many fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver country. DHS's process for assessing the risks of the Visa Waiver Program has weaknesses. In 2002, Congress mandated that, every 2 years, DHS review the effect that each country's continued participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and security interests, but did not set a reporting deadline. In 2004, DHS established a unit to oversee the program and conduct these reviews. We identified several problems with the 2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during portions of the process, the review process lacked clear criteria and guidance to make key judgments, and the final reports were untimely. Furthermore, the monitoring unit cannot effectively achieve its mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement and security concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient resources. DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the program's risks; however, the department has faced difficulties in further mitigating these risks. In particular, the department has not established time frames and operating procedures regarding timely stolen passport reporting--a program requirement since 2002. Furthermore, DHS has sought to require the reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has not issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries. While most visa waiver countries report to Interpol's database, four do not. Further, DHS is not using Interpol's data to its full potential as a border screening tool because U.S. border inspectors do not automatically access the data at primary inspection.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss our observations on the Visa Waiver  Program. In fiscal year 2005, nearly 16 million travelers entered the United  States under this program, which facilitates international travel and  commerce, and eases workload for consular officers at overseas posts, by  enabling citizens of 27 participating countries to travel to the United  States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a  visa. Participating countries were selected because their citizens had  demonstrated a pattern of compliance with U.S. immigration laws, and the  governments of these countries granted reciprocal visa-free travel to U.S.  citizens. The Visa Waiver Program was created as a pilot program in 1986,  and it became permanent in 2000, about 1 year prior to the 9-11 terrorist  attacks. After the attacks, the potential risks of the program became more  of a concern. In particular, convicted terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui and  “shoe-bomber” Richard Reid both boarded flights to the United States with  passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries. Moreover, the foiled  alleged terrorist plot to board planes at London’s Heathrow Airport and fly  to the United States with explosive materials highlights the importance of  having effective tools to ensure that only legitimate travelers enter the  United States. In May 2002, Congress mandated that the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) evaluate and report to Congress at least every  two years on the effect that each country’s continued participation in the  program has on U.S. law enforcement and security interests. Effective  oversight of the Visa Waiver Program is essential to find the right balance  between facilitating legitimate travel and preventing potential terrorists,  criminals, and others that may pose law enforcement and immigration  concerns from entering the United States.
Earlier this week, we released two reports on the Visa Waiver Program:  the first discusses the process by which the United States assesses and  mitigates the program’s risks, and the second describes the process by  which additional countries may be admitted into the program. My  statement will focus on the first of these reports. Specifically, I will discuss  (1) the Visa Waiver Program’s advantages and potential risks; (2) the U.S.  government’s process for assessing the program’s risks; and (3) the  actions that have been taken to mitigate these risks. In addition, we have  ongoing work examining international aviation passenger prescreening,  including DHS’s use of passport and reservation data to screen travelers  and the pilot Immigration Advisory Program at several airports overseas,  and expect to report on our findings later this fall.
In conducting this work, we reviewed documentation, including the laws  governing the program, relevant regulations and agency operating  procedures, and DHS’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reports. We  also examined 15 of the 25 completed reports from the 2004 review  process that assessed the participation of Visa Waiver Program countries.  Additionally, we interviewed political, economic, consular, commercial,  and law enforcement officials at U.S. embassies in six Visa Waiver  Program countries, as well as foreign government officials in three of  these countries. We met with officials from several DHS component  agencies and offices; the Department of State (State); and the International  Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in Lyon, France. We conducted our  work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards (see app. I for a list of related GAO products and ongoing  reviews).
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 created the Visa Waiver  Program as a pilot program. It was initially envisioned as an immigration  control and economic promotion program, according to State.  Participating countries were selected because their citizens had a  demonstrated pattern of compliance with U.S. immigration laws, and the  governments of these countries granted reciprocal visa-free travel to U.S.  citizens. In recent years, visa waiver travelers have represented about one- half of all nonimmigrant admissions to the United States. In 2002, we  reported on the legislative requirements to which countries must adhere  before they are eligible for inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program. In  general, to qualify for visa waiver status, a country must:    maintain a nonimmigrant refusal rate of less than 3 percent for its citizens  who apply for business and tourism visas.   certify that it issues machine-readable passports to its citizens; and    offer visa-free travel for U.S. citizens.
Following the 9-11 attacks, Congress passed additional laws to strengthen  border security policies and procedures, and DHS and State instituted  other policy changes that have affected the qualifications for countries to  participate in the Visa Waiver Program. For example, all passports issued  after October 26, 2005, must contain a digital photograph printed in the  document, and passports issued to visa waiver travelers after October 26,  2006, must be electronic (e-passports). In addition, the May 2002  Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act required that participating  countries certify that the theft of their blank passports is reported to the  U.S. government in a timely manner.
section_title: Visa Waiver Program Has Benefits and Risks
paragraphs: The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits. The program was created to  facilitate international travel without jeopardizing the welfare or security  of the United States, according to the program’s legislative history.  According to economic and commercial officers at several of the U.S.  embassies we visited, visa-free travel to the United States boosts  international business travel and tourism, as well as airline revenues, and  creates substantial economic benefits to the United States. Moreover, the  program allows State to allocate its resources to visa-issuing posts in  countries with higher-risk applicant pools. In 2002, we reported that  eliminating the program would increase State’s resource requirements as  millions of visa waiver travelers who have benefited from visa-free travel  would need to obtain a visa to travel to the United States if the program  did not exist. Specifically, if the program were eliminated, we estimated  that State’s initial costs at that time to process the additional workload  would likely range between $739 million and $1.28 billion and that annual  recurring costs would likely range between $522 million and $810 million.  In addition, visa waiver countries could begin requiring visas for U.S.  citizens traveling to the 27 participating countries for temporary business  or tourism purposes, which would impose a burden of additional cost and  time on U.S. travelers to these countries.
subsections: section_title: Visa Waiver Program Can Pose Risks to U.S. Security, Law Enforcement, and Immigration Interests
paragraphs: The Visa Waiver Program, however, can also pose risks to U.S. security,  law enforcement, and immigration interests because some foreign citizens  may exploit the program to enter the United States. First, visa waiver  travelers are not subject to the same degree of screening as travelers who  must first obtain a visa before arriving in the United States (see fig. 1). Visa  waiver travelers are first screened in person by a DHS Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) inspector once they arrive at the U.S. port of  entry, perhaps after having already boarded an international flight bound  for the United States with a fraudulent travel document. According to the  DHS OIG, primary border inspectors are at a disadvantage when screening  Visa Waiver Program travelers because they may not know the alien’s  language or local fraud trends in the alien’s home country, nor have the  time to conduct an extensive interview. In contrast, non-visa-waiver  travelers, who must obtain a visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate,  receive two levels of screening before entering the country—in addition to  the inspection at the U.S. port of entry, these travelers undergo an  interview by consular officials overseas, who conduct a rigorous screening  process when deciding to approve or deny a visa. As we have previously  reported, State has taken a number of actions since 2002 to strengthen the  visa issuance process as a border security tool. Moreover, consular  officers have more time to interview applicants and examine the  authenticity of their passports, and may also speak the visa applicant’s  native language, according to consular officials. Therefore, inadmissible  travelers who need visas to enter the United States may attempt to acquire  a passport from a Visa Waiver Program country to avoid the visa screening  process.
Another risk inherent in the program is the potential exploitation by  terrorists, immigration law violators, and other criminals of a visa waiver  country’s lost or stolen passports. DHS intelligence analysts, law  enforcement officials, and forensic document experts all acknowledge that  misuse of lost and stolen passports is the greatest security problem posed  by the Visa Waiver Program. Lost and stolen passports from visa waiver  countries are highly prized travel documents, according to the Secretary  General of Interpol. Moreover, Visa Waiver Program countries that do not  consistently report the losses or thefts of their citizens’ passports, or of  blank passports, put the United States at greater risk of allowing  inadmissible travelers to enter the country.
Fraudulent passports from Visa Waiver Program countries have been used  illegally by travelers seeking to disguise their true identities or  nationalities when attempting to enter the United States. For example,  from January through June 2005, DHS reported that it confiscated, at U.S.  ports of entry, 298 fraudulent or altered passports issued by Visa Waiver  Program countries that travelers were attempting to use for admission into  the United States. Although DHS has intercepted some travelers with  fraudulent passports at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged  that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the  United States using a lost or stolen passport from a visa waiver country.  According to State, these aliens may have been inadmissible because they  were immigration law violators, criminals, or terrorists. For example:  In July 2005, two aliens successfully entered the United States using lost or  stolen Austrian passports. DHS was not notified that these passports had  been lost or stolen prior to this date; the aliens were admitted, and there is  no record of their departure, according to CBP. In October 2005, CBP  referred this case to DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement for  further action.
In June 2005, CBP inspectors admitted into the United States two aliens  using Italian passports that were from a batch of stolen passports. CBP  was notified that this batch was stolen; however, the aliens altered the  passport numbers to avoid detection by CBP officers. DHS has no record  that these individuals departed the United States.
section_title: Process for Assessing Program Risks Has Weaknesses
paragraphs: DHS has taken several steps to assess the risks of the Visa Waiver  Program. However, we identified problems with the country review  process by which DHS assesses these risks, namely a lack of  inclusiveness, transparency, and timeliness. Furthermore, OIE is unable to  effectively monitor the immigration, law enforcement, and security risks  posed by visa waiver countries on a continuing basis because of  insufficient resources.
subsections: section_title: Initial Steps Taken To Assess Risk of Visa Waiver Program
paragraphs: In April 2004, the DHS OIG identified significant areas where DHS needed  to strengthen and improve its management of the Visa Waiver Program.  For example, the OIG found that a lack of funding, trained personnel, and  other issues left DHS unable to comply with the mandated biennial  country assessments. In response to these findings, DHS established OIE’s  Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit in July 2004, and named a director to  manage the office. The unit’s mission is to oversee Visa Waiver Program  activities and monitor countries’ adherence to the program’s statutory  requirements, ensuring that the United States is protected from those who  wish to do it harm or violate its laws, including immigration laws. Since  the unit’s establishment, DHS, and particularly OIE, has made strides to  address concerns raised by the 2004 OIG review. For example, DHS  completed comprehensive assessments of 25 of the 27 participating  countries and submitted a six-page report to Congress in November 2005  that summarized the findings from the 2004 assessments.
section_title: DHS Lacks a Clearly- Defined, Consistent, and Timely Process to Assess Risks of Visa Waiver Program
paragraphs: Despite these steps to strengthen and improve the management of the  program, we identified several problems with the mandated biennial  country assessment process, by which DHS assesses the risks posed by  each of the visa waiver countries’ continued participation in the program.  For the 2004 assessments, we found the following:    Some key stakeholders were excluded from the process. After conducting  the site visits and contributing to the reports on the site visits, DHS and  the interagency working group did not seek input from all site visit team  members while drafting and clearing the final country assessments and  subsequent report to Congress. For example, DHS’s forensic document  analysts, who participated in the site visits in 2004, told us that they did  not see, clear, or comment on the draft country assessments, despite  repeated attempts to obtain copies of them. Additionally, at the time of our  visits, ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission in each of the six posts  told us that they were not fully aware of the extent to which assessments  for the country where they were posted discussed law enforcement and  security concerns posed by the continued participation of the country in  the program. Without this information, key stakeholders could not be  effective advocates for U.S. concerns.
The reviews lacked clear criteria to make key judgments. We found that  DHS did not have clear criteria to determine at what point security  concerns uncovered during their review would trigger discussions with  foreign governments about these concerns and an attempt to resolve them.  State officials agreed that qualitative and/or quantitative criteria would be  useful when making these determinations, although DHS stated that the  criteria should be flexible.
DHS and its interagency partners neither completed the 25 country  assessments nor issued the summary report to Congress in a timely  manner. The interagency teams conducted site visits as part of the country  assessments from May through September 2004, and transmitted the final  summary report to Congress more than 1 year later, in November 2005.  OIE, State, and Justice officials acknowledged that the assessments took  too long to complete. The teams collecting information about the visa  waiver countries’ risks in 2004 used, in some cases, information that was  two years old; by the time the summary report was issued in November  2005, some of the data was over 3 years old. As a result of this lengthy  process, the final report presented to Congress did not necessarily reflect  the current law enforcement and security risks posed by each country, or  the positive steps that countries had made to address these risks.
section_title: DHS Cannot Effectively Monitor Ongoing Concerns in Visa Waiver Countries
paragraphs: OIE is limited in its ability to achieve its mission because of insufficient  staffing. The office has numerous responsibilities, including conducting  the mandated biennial country reviews; monitoring law enforcement,  security, and immigration concerns in visa waiver countries on an ongoing  basis; and working with countries seeking to become members of the Visa  Waiver Program. In 2004, the DHS OIG found that OIE’s lack of resources  directly undercut its ability to assess a security problem inherent in the  program—lost and stolen passports. The office received funding to  conduct the country reviews in 2004 and 2005; however, OIE officials  indicated that a lack of funding and full-time staff has made it extremely  difficult to conduct additional overseas fieldwork, as well as track ongoing  issues of concern in the 27 visa waiver countries—a key limitation in  DHS’s ability to assess and mitigate the program’s risks. According to OIE  officials, the unit developed a strategic plan to monitor the program, but  has been unable to implement its plan with its current staffing of two full- time employees, as well as one temporary employee from another DHS  component. Without adequate resources, OIE is unable to monitor and  assess participating countries’ compliance with the Visa Waiver Program’s  statutory requirements.
In addition to resource constraints, DHS has not clearly communicated its  mission to stakeholders at overseas posts, nor identified points of contact  within U.S. embassies, so it can communicate directly with field officials  positioned to monitor countries’ compliance with Visa Waiver Program  requirements and report on current events and issues of potential concern.
In particular, within DHS’s various components, we found that OIE is  largely an unknown entity and, therefore, is unable to leverage the  expertise of DHS officials overseas. A senior DHS representative at one  post showed us that her organizational directory did not contain contact  information for OIE. Additionally, a senior DHS official in Washington,  D.C., told us that he may find out about developments—either routine or  emergent—in visa waiver countries by “happenstance.” Due to the lack of  outreach and clear communication about its mission, OIE is limited in its  ability to monitor the day-to-day law enforcement and security concerns  posed by the Visa Waiver Program, and the U.S. government is limited in  its ability to influence visa waiver countries’ progress in meeting  requirements.
section_title: DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks
paragraphs: DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the risks of the Visa Waiver  Program. However, though the law has required the timely reporting of  blank passport thefts for continued participation in the Visa Waiver  Program since 2002, DHS has not established and communicated time  frames and operating procedures to participating countries. In addition,  DHS has sought to expand this requirement to include the reporting of  data, to the United States and Interpol, on lost and stolen issued passports;  however, participating countries are resisting these requirements, and  DHS has not yet issued guidance on what information must be shared,  with whom, and within what time frame. Furthermore, U.S. border  inspectors are unable to automatically access Interpol’s data on reported  lost and stolen passports, which makes detection of these documents at  U.S. ports of entry more difficult.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Taken Some Actions to Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program
paragraphs: As previously mentioned, during the 2004 assessment process, the working  group identified security concerns in several participating countries, and  DHS took actions to mitigate some of these risks. Specifically, DHS  determined that several thousand blank German temporary passports had  been lost or stolen, and that Germany had not reported some of this  information to the United States. As a result, as of May 1, 2006, German  temporary passport holders are not allowed to travel to the United States  under the Visa Waiver Program without a visa. In addition, DHS has  enforced an October 26, 2005, deadline requiring travelers under the Visa  Waiver Program to have digital photographs in their passports.
section_title: DHS Lacks Standard Procedures for Obtaining Stolen Blank Passport Data
paragraphs: A key risk in the Visa Waiver Program is stolen blank passports from visa  waiver countries, because detecting these passports at U.S. ports of entry  is extremely difficult, according to DHS. Some thefts of blank passports  have not been reported to the United States until years after the fact,  according to DHS intelligence reports. For example, in 2004, a visa waiver  country reported the theft of nearly 300 stolen blank passports to the  United States more than 9 years after the theft occurred. The 2002  Enhanced Security and Visa Entry Reform Act provides that the Secretary  of Homeland Security must terminate a country from the Visa Waiver  Program if he and the Secretary of State jointly determine that the country  is not reporting the theft of its blank passports to the United States on a  timely basis. However, DHS has not established time frames or operating  procedures to enforce this requirement. While the statute requires visa  waiver countries to certify that they report information on the theft of  their blank passports to the United States on a timely basis, as of June  2006, DHS has not defined what constitutes “timely” reporting. Moreover,  the United States lacks a centralized mechanism for foreign governments  to report all stolen passports. In particular, DHS has not defined to whom  in the U.S. government participating countries should report this  information.
section_title: Some Participating Visa Waiver Program Countries are Resisting Additional Reporting to United States and Interpol
paragraphs: In addition to blank passports, lost or stolen issued passports also pose a  risk because they can be altered. In June 2005, DHS issued guidance to  participating Visa Waiver Program countries requiring that they certify  their intent to report lost and stolen passport data on issued passports by  August 2005. However, DHS has not yet issued guidance on what  information must be shared, with whom, and within what time frame.  Moreover, some visa waiver countries have not yet agreed to provide this  information to the United States, due in part to concerns over the privacy  of their citizens’ biographical information. In addition, several consular  officials expressed confusion about the current and impending  requirements about sharing this data, and felt they were unable to  adequately explain the requirements to their foreign counterparts.
In June 2005, the U.S. government also announced its intention to require  visa waiver countries to certify their intent to report information on both  lost and stolen blank and issued passports to Interpol. In 2002, Interpol  developed a database of lost and stolen travel documents to which its  member countries may contribute on a voluntary basis. While most visa  waiver countries use and contribute to Interpol’s database, four do not.  Moreover, some countries that do contribute do not do so on a regular  basis, according to Interpol officials. Participating countries have  expressed concerns about reporting this information, citing privacy issues;  however, Interpol’s database on lost and stolen travel documents does not  include the passport bearers’ biographical information, such as name and  date of birth. According to the Secretary General of Interpol, in light of  the high value associated with passports from visa waiver countries, it is a  priority for his agency to encourage countries to contribute regularly to  the database.
section_title: Inefficient Access to Interpol’s Database on Lost and Stolen Passports
paragraphs: Though information from Interpol’s database could potentially stop  inadmissible travelers from entering the United States, CBP’s border  inspectors do not have automatic access to the database at the primary  inspection point at U.S. ports of entry—the first line of defense against  those who might exploit the Visa Waiver Program to enter the United  States. The inspection process at U.S. ports of entry can include two  stages—a primary and secondary inspection. If, during the primary  inspection, the inspector suspects that the traveler is inadmissible either  because of a fraudulent passport or other reason, the inspector refers the  traveler to secondary inspection. At secondary inspection, border  inspectors can contact officials at the National Targeting Center, who can  query Interpol’s stolen-travel-document database to determine if the  traveler’s passport had been previously reported lost or stolen, but is not  yet on CBP’s watch list. However, according to DHS, State, and Justice  officials, because Interpol’s data on lost and stolen travel documents is not  automatically accessible to border inspectors at primary inspection, it is  not currently an effective border screening tool. Moreover, according to  the Secretary General of Interpol, until DHS can automatically query  Interpol’s data, the United States will not have an effective screening tool  for checking passports. According to Interpol officials, the United States is  working actively with Interpol on a potential pilot project that would allow  for an automatic query of aliens’ passport data against Interpol’s database  at primary inspection at U.S. ports of entry. However, DHS has not yet  finalized a plan to do so.
section_title: Recommendations to Improve Program Oversight and DHS’s Response
paragraphs: In our report, we made a series of recommendations to improve the U.S.  government’s process for assessing the risks in the Visa Waiver Program,  including recommending that DHS provide additional resources to  strengthen OIE’s visa waiver monitoring unit; finalize clear, consistent, and  transparent protocols for the biennial country assessments and provide  these protocols to stakeholders at relevant agencies at headquarters and  overseas; create real-time monitoring arrangements for all 27 participating  countries; and establish protocols for direct communication between  overseas posts and OIE’s Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit. In addition,  we made recommendations to improve U.S. efforts to mitigate program  risks, including requiring that all visa waiver countries provide the United  States and Interpol with non-biographical data from lost or stolen issued  passports, as well as from blank passports; developing clear standard  operating procedures for the reporting of lost and stolen blank and issued  passport data; and developing and implementing a plan to make Interpol’s  stolen travel document database automatically available during primary  inspection at U.S. ports of entry. Given the lengthy time it took for DHS to  issue the November 2005 summary report to Congress, and to ensure  future reports contain timely information when issued, we also proposed  that Congress establish a biennial deadline by which DHS must complete  the country assessments and report to Congress.
DHS either agreed with, or stated that it is considering, all of our  recommendations. Regarding our matter for congressional consideration,  DHS did not support the establishment of a deadline for the biennial  report to Congress. Instead, DHS suggested that Congress should require  continuous and ongoing evaluation. With continuous review, DHS stated  that it would be able to constantly evaluate U.S. interests and report to  Congress on the current 2-year reporting cycle on targeted issues of  concern, rather than providing a historical evaluation. We agree that  continuous and ongoing evaluation is necessary, and that is why we  recommended that DHS create real-time monitoring arrangements and  provide additional resources to the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit to  achieve this goal. Regarding the mandated biennial country assessments,  we believe that they can serve a useful purpose if they are completed in a  timely fashion.
In closing, the Visa Waiver Program aims to facilitate international travel  for millions of people each year and promote the effective use of  government resources. Effective oversight of the program entails  balancing these benefits against the program’s potential risks. To find this  balance, the U.S. government needs to fully identify the vulnerabilities  posed by visa waiver travelers, and be in a position to mitigate them. It is  imperative that DHS commit to strengthen its ability to promptly identify  and mitigate risks to ensure that the Visa Waiver Program does not  jeopardize U.S. security interests. This is particularly important given that  many countries are actively seeking to join the program.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to  answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please call Jess T. Ford, (202) 512- 4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this  statement include John Brummet, Assistant Director, and Kathryn H.  Bernet, Joseph Carney, and Jane S. Kim.
section_title: Related GAO Products and Ongoing Reviews
subsections: section_title: Issued Reports
paragraphs: Border Security: More Emphasis on State’s Consular Safeguards Could  Mitigate Visa Malfeasance Risks. GAO-06-115. October 6, 2005  Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit From  Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859.  September 13, 2005  Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of  Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801.  July 29, 2005.
Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered  Burden on Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further  Refinements Needed. GAO-05-198. February 18, 2005.
Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on  Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. September 9, 2004.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-795. July 13, 2004.
Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to  Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-371.  February 25, 2004.
Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in  the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. June 18, 2003.
Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.  GAO-03-38. November 22, 2002.
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security. GAO-03- 174. November 15, 2002.
Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an  Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. October 21, 2002.
section_title: Ongoing Reviews
paragraphs: Review of International Aviation Passenger Prescreening. Requested by  the Chairman and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary, and the  Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, House of  Representatives. Report expected in the fall of 1006.
Review of the Department of State’s Measures to Ensure the Integrity of  Travel Documents. Requested by the Chairman, Committee on the  Judiciary, House of Representatives; Chairman John N. Hostettler and  member Darrell E. Issa, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security  and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives; and,  Chairman Lamar S. Smith, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and  Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, House of  Representatives. Report expected in the spring of 2007.
Review of the Department of State’s Effort to Address Delays in Visa  Issuance. Requested by the Chairman and Ranking Member of the  Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. Report  expected in the spring of 2007.
Review of Immigrant Visa Processing. Requested by the Ranking Member,  Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. Report  expected in mid-2007.
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