USAID Acquisition and Assistance: Challenges Remain in Developing and Implementing a Strategic Workforce Plan
Published: 2009-04-28T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has shifted from conducting its own activities to managing acquisition and assistance (A&A) instruments--contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements--it awards to implementing organizations. From fiscal years 2002 through 2008, USAID's A&A obligations increased from about $5 billion to about $11 billion. A&A staff--contracting officers (COs) and A&A specialists--are primarily responsible for managing A&A instruments. This testimony is based on a September 2008 GAO report that examined USAID's capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan and the extent to which USAID has implemented a mechanism to evaluate its A&A function.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: USAID lacks the capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan because it is missing two elements: (1) sufficiently reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and (2) comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A staff. Data on the numbers of overseas A&A specialists collected by two USAID offices were unreliable or out of date. GAO found significant discrepancies between these offices' data sets and officials acknowledged that their A&A staff level data are neither reliable nor up-to-date. Also, USAID has not collected comprehensive competency information on its overseas A&A specialists. GAO's model of strategic workforce planning notes the importance of these data in developing a plan that could enable the agency to better match staff levels to changing workloads. During fieldwork at 7 USAID missions, GAO found that the numbers and competencies of A&A staff did not match A&A workloads at some missions. The numbers of A&A staff with the needed competencies were less than adequate at some missions, while at others they were more than adequate. For example, officials at the mission in Mali said they had delayed time-sensitive projects because key A&A staff were not available when needed to approve contracts, while officials at the mission in Peru said the current number of A&A staff may be more than adequate. In GAO's survey administered to USAID A&A staff in headquarters and overseas, most of the survey respondents overseas reported difficulty in altering staffing patterns to meet A&A workloads. USAID's efforts to address its A&A workforce issues do not constitute a strategic A&A workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. Without accurate and reliable A&A staff data, USAID does not have adequate information to address current workload imbalances. USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide oversight of its A&A function. The Evaluation Division in the Office of Acquisition and Assistance is responsible for providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID policies, primarily by assessing A&A operations worldwide. In fiscal year 2007, the division developed an evaluation mechanism that combines scorecard evaluations, in which COs self-assess their A&A operations, and onsite visits by division staff to selected locations based on the scorecard results and other factors. The division has completed scorecard evaluations at 4 missions and identified weaknesses in A&A operations. For example, the division found that one mission lacked resources to adequately monitor contractor performance. The division has set a goal of implementing this evaluation mechanism, including on-site visits to 5 missions within a 2-year period. However, according to agency officials, the division did not have the staff level needed to fully implement this evaluation mechanism. The division has increased its staff levels from 4 staff in fiscal year 2008 to 9 staff as of April 2009 and completed two more evaluations. However, USAID officials told us that OAA has not implemented the evaluation mechanism due to other priorities. As a result, USAID cannot certify the adequacy and effectiveness of management controls for the A&A function.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I am pleased to be here to discuss the management challenges currently  facing the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in  developing and implementing a strategic acquisition and assistance (A&A)  workforce plan. This hearing is of particular importance given that USAID  is primarily responsible for managing U.S. humanitarian and development  assistance efforts worldwide, and its total foreign assistance obligations  has more than doubled from about $5 billion in fiscal year 2002 to about  $11 billion in fiscal year 2008.
Over the last few decades, as the U.S. government has increasingly come  to rely on the private sector to perform various functions, USAID has  shifted from conducting its own activities to managing A&A instruments,  which are awarded to and implemented by nongovernmental  organizations. For example, as we noted in previous work, USAID and  other government agencies have increasingly relied on contractors in  Afghanistan and Iraq to carry out their missions. USAID staff are  responsible for monitoring the activities of A&A recipients to provide  reasonable assurance that the funds provided are used in accordance with  applicable regulations and policies and sound business practices. These  staff include contracting officers (CO)—assisted by A&A specialists—who  have primary responsibility for managing A&A instruments. In  headquarters, these staff are part of USAID’s Office of Acquisition and  Assistance (OAA); abroad, they are part of USAID’s missions. Cognizant  technical officers (CTO), who work in USAID functional or geographic  bureaus or overseas missions, also design and manage assistance  activities. In addition, they share some of the responsibility of managing  A&A instruments.
My testimony today is based on a report we issued on September 26, 2008.  I will focus on three topics. First, I will discuss USAID’s capacity to  develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan. Second, I will  describe the extent to which USAID has implemented a mechanism to  evaluate its A&A function. Finally, I will summarize our recent  recommendations regarding the importance of a workforce plan for the  A&A function, as well as the actions that USAID has taken in response to  our reported findings and recommendations.
In preparing this testimony, we largely relied on our September 2008  report and additional information provided by USAID in April 2009 on the  management of USAID’s A&A function. To address our objectives, we  focused on USAID’s administration of the A&A process. We analyzed  USAID’s documents related to the A&A function; conducted audit work at  USAID headquarters in Washington, D.C., as well as at missions in  Cambodia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mali, Peru, and  Thailand; conducted interviews with USAID and nongovernmental  organization officials; and administered a survey to USAID A&A staff in  headquarters and overseas, for which we received a response rate of 95  percent—150 respondents out of a total of 158 surveyed. Both our prior  and current performance audits were conducted in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards  require that we plan and perform audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings, conclusions, and  recommendations based on our audit objectives. We believe that the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings,  conclusions and recommendations based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: USAID is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has field locations in  approximately 90 countries to provide economic, development, and  humanitarian assistance worldwide in support of U.S. foreign policy goals.  USAID’s OAA has overall responsibility for the administration of A&A  instruments in headquarters. Its A&A staff provide professional advice and  technical support to USAID’s functional and geographic bureaus for  developing and managing A&A instruments. USAID A&A staff at overseas  missions provide advice and support to mission staff who design and  manage assistance activities; they also have overall responsibility for the  administration of A&A instruments at overseas missions. A&A offices are  typically headed by a CO who reports to the mission director or deputy  mission director. At most bilateral missions, COs are co-located with A&A  specialists and CTOs. However, under USAID’s regional mission structure,  COs often provide A&A support to more than one mission and are not  necessarily co-located with either the CTOs or the A&A specialists who  assist them. Some missions with no on-site CO may instead have on-site  A&A specialists who provide A&A support to CTOs. Within USAID, the  Office of Human Resources (OHR) is the primary office that defines and  manages the agency’s workforce planning process, including managing the  human resources databases and directing the workforce planning  program.
USAID’s total obligations for A&A instruments more than doubled from  about $5 billion in fiscal year 2002 to about $11 billion in fiscal year 2008.  Most notably, A&A obligations overseas increased by 600 percent, from  about $1 billion in fiscal year 2002 to about $6 billion in fiscal year 2008. In  fiscal year 2008, A&A obligations managed by overseas missions made up  a little more than half of A&A obligations. USAID’s total number of A&A  instruments from fiscal years 2002 through 2008 also increased  substantially, from about 6,000 to about 13,000. In fiscal year 2008, about  62 percent of the total number of A&A instruments was managed by  overseas missions.
section_title: USAID Lacks Sufficiently Reliable Human Capital Data Needed for a Strategic A&A Workforce Plan
subsections: section_title: USAID Lacks Sufficiently Reliable and Up-to-Date Data on A&A Staff Levels
paragraphs: In September 2008, we reported that USAID lacked the capacity to develop  and implement an A&A strategic workforce plan because the agency  lacked sufficiently reliable and up-to-date overseas A&A staff level data  and comprehensive information on the competencies of its A&A staff, who  play a critical role in assisting COs and CTOs in overseas missions.
Two offices in USAID collect data on A&A staff levels—the Office of  Human Resources (OHR) and the Office of Acquisition and Assistance  (OAA). We found that the data collected by OHR was not sufficiently  reliable and OHR officials acknowledged that they had concerns about the  reliability and accuracy of overseas staffing level data reported by its  overseas missions. These officials added that misclassification and  inaccurate reporting of A&A staff levels may occur because mission staff  may not have received adequate guidance for classifying overseas staff  positions. Furthermore, OHR officials do not validate or confirm the data  they collect from missions nor do they know if overseas missions validate  the data before submitting it to OHR, according to these officials.
We also noted that OAA does not systematically track the number of  overseas A&A specialists, and its data on overseas A&A staff levels are out  of date. According to OAA officials, the office’s most recent data on the  agency’s entire A&A workforce are the result of a fiscal year 2005 survey  of all overseas missions to analyze workload and staffing within OAA.  While OAA’s data are not current, the OHR officials told us that OAA’s data  may still be more accurate than the data collected by OHR in fiscal year  2005.
Our analysis of OAA’s and OHR’s separately collected data on overseas  A&A staff levels for the end of fiscal year 2005 revealed substantial  discrepancies. For example, comparing the two sets of data showed that  OAA’s reported total overseas A&A staff levels for fiscal year 2005 were  more than 78 percent higher than those reported by OHR—OAA reported  264 overseas A&A staff, while OHR reported 148. In addition, we found  that, at certain missions, OHR’s data showed no A&A specialists, whereas  OAA’s data indicated several A&A specialists.
Although ready access to the OHR’s databases would allow other USAID  offices to identify and resolve discrepancies in their staffing data, the  offices lack such access. To date, according to OHR officials, OAA has not  specifically requested OHR staffing data in order to compare them to its  own.
section_title: USAID Lacks Comprehensive Information on A&A Staff Competencies
paragraphs: We also reported that USAID has not collected comprehensive information  on the competencies—including knowledge, skills, abilities, and  experience levels—of its overseas A&A staff. In May 2008, OAA and OHR  jointly conducted competency assessments for A&A staff in headquarters  and COs in overseas missions. These assessments identified key A&A staff  competencies, assessed A&A staff competency levels, and established  strategies to reduce skill gaps through recruitment and training. However,  USAID has not yet begun similar competency assessments of A&A  specialists at overseas locations and, according to OHR officials, USAID  will likely not begin implementation until fiscal year 2011 at the earliest.  Without sufficiently reliable data on its entire A&A workforce—including  A&A specialists overseas—USAID cannot collect comprehensive  competency information; identify gaps in the numbers, skills, and  competencies of its A&A workforce; and develop strategies to address  them.
subsections: section_title: USAID Has Not Matched A&A Staff to Workload at Missions We Visited
paragraphs: A possible effect of USAID’s lack of reliable and up-to-date data on the  level of A&A staffing at its overseas locations is that the numbers and  competencies of A&A staff do not match A&A workload. At some missions  we visited last year, the numbers of A&A staff with the necessary  competencies were considerably less than adequate, while at other  missions they were more than adequate, according to mission officials.
Officials at five missions we visited—Thailand, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, the  Kyrgyz Republic, and Mali—told us that at times their A&A staff could not  provide adequate and timely support, such as providing guidance to CTOs  and approving A&A documents, primarily because the numbers of A&A  staff with the necessary competencies to manage their workloads were  insufficient. We found several such examples, including the following:    A CO at the regional mission in Thailand said that she sometimes could  not address some missions’ needs in a timely manner because of  competing workload demands. Staff at Cambodia, one of the missions for  which the regional mission provides A&A support, told us that at times  they have not received adequate A&A support, primarily due to a decline  in A&A specialist staff levels as well as the inexperience of the mission’s  one remaining on-site A&A specialist. The mission director told us that, as  a result, she has had to perform tasks that are among A&A staff’s  responsibilities, such as revising A&A documents.
The mission director and A&A staff in Kazakhstan—a regional mission  responsible for A&A activities at missions in Kazakhstan and four other  Central Asian countries that do not have on-site A&A specialists—told us  that they could not adequately support A&A activities at those four  missions because of a heavy workload and competing demands from other  missions in the region. Staff at one such mission, in the Kyrgyz Republic,  noted that A&A staff were unavailable when needed to provide more  guidance to their less experienced CTOs.
Officials at the mission in Mali, which received A&A support from COs at  the regional mission in Ghana, told us that these remotely located COs  were sometimes not available to assist them in meeting their activities’   goals. For example, they said they had delayed time-sensitive seasonal  agricultural projects because the CO was not available when needed to  approve contracts.
Our survey of A&A staff overseas generally supported these findings from  our fieldwork. For example, about 70 percent of A&A respondents  overseas reported that it was somewhat or very difficult to alter staffing  patterns to meet the demands of changing workloads. Most notably, one  respondent reported a disparity between the workload, numbers, and  competencies of A&A staff levels at the missions to which she was  previously and currently assigned. While the respondent found the  workload to be less manageable at her prior mission with inexperienced  A&A staff, she found the workload at her current mission more easily  manageable because it had more experienced A&A staff.
In contrast, we noted that two missions we visited—Peru and Indonesia— had more than adequate numbers of A&A staff with the necessary  competencies to manage their workload. Some staff even indicated to us  that these missions may not need all of their assigned COs to adequately  manage their A&A work. For example, a CO at the mission in Peru told us  that because the mission had so many experienced or competent A&A  staff, the A&A workload was more easily managed, and staff even had  sufficient time to volunteer the mission as a location for USAID to pilot a  new system through which USAID A&A instruments will be awarded.
section_title: USAID’s Recent Planning Efforts Do Not Comprehensively Address Its Strategic A&A Workforce Planning Needs
paragraphs: USAID has launched some ad hoc attempts to address its A&A workforce  issues. However, as the following indicates, these efforts lack critical  elements of a strategic A&A workforce plan, particularly comprehensive  information on its A&A specialists overseas:    Proposal to increase OAA staff levels. In May 2008, OAA officials proposed  to the Management Bureau an increase in staff from 133 to 218 in OAA  headquarters. According to Management Bureau officials, OAA has been  approved for 154 positions for fiscal year 2008. This proposal only  addresses A&A staff levels in headquarters, however, and does not  consider A&A staff levels overseas.
Development Leadership Initiative. This agencywide, multiyear effort is  intended to recruit U.S. staff to be placed overseas. Under this initiative,  USAID plans to hire 120 staff, including 15 COs, in fiscal year 2008.  However, this initiative only seeks to increase the levels of overseas COs,  not the levels of A&A specialists.
A&A Workforce Capability Assessment. As mentioned earlier, this was a  May 2008 effort to identify and assess the competencies of all COs, as well  as A&A specialists in headquarters. Competency assessments of A&A  specialists overseas are not expected to begin until fiscal year 2011 at the  earliest.
Workforce planning model. This agencywide management tool projects  the number, type, and location of staff needed to accomplish the agency’s  mission, based on expectations for future program funds as well as the  size and location of overseas missions. However, the model does not  incorporate data on either the current A&A staffing levels or the  competencies of existing A&A staff.
Effective workforce planning entails that an agency determine the number  of staff, and critical competencies of those staff, to achieve the agency’s  goals. Taken together, these efforts do not constitute a strategic A&A  workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. USAID  has yet to take an integrated approach to develop and implement such a  workforce plan.
section_title: USAID Has Not Implemented the Evaluation Mechanism of Its A&A Function
paragraphs: USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide adequate  oversight of its A&A function. OAA’s Evaluation Division is responsible for  providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID  policies, primarily by assessing the agency’s A&A operations worldwide.  GAO’s internal control standards emphasize the importance of  evaluations—whether in the form of self-assessments or other means—to  ensure an agency’s operational effectiveness and compliance with  applicable policies. In fiscal year 2007, the Evaluation Division developed  an annual scorecard evaluation, intended to be completed by all COs as a  self-assessment of their A&A operations. The division was to review the  scorecard evaluations and use a risk-based approach to determine  locations for further on-site visits. The division has finished piloting the  scorecard evaluations at four missions and identified weaknesses in A&A  operations. For example, the division found that one mission lacked  resources to adequately monitor contractor performance. The division has  set a goal of implementing the scorecard evaluation and on-site visits to at  least 5 missions within a 2-year period. However, agency officials informed  us that the Evaluation Division did not have the staff needed to fully  implement the evaluation mechanism. In addition, officials told us that the  agency lacked a system that contains all the missions’ A&A files, which  could facilitate the evaluation process. Without implementing the  evaluation mechanism it has developed, USAID cannot certify the overall  adequacy and effectiveness of management controls for the A&A function.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As USAID increasingly relies on nongovernmental organizations to  implement its activities, the agency’s responsibility to effectively manage  the implemented activities gains in importance. Critical to its success in  this area is USAID’s management of the A&A function. As the amount of  its A&A obligations and the number of A&A instruments continue to  increase, especially at overseas missions, USAID should work to ensure  that the appropriate number of staff, with the requisite competencies and  skills, are available to manage A&A operations. Without sufficiently  reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and  comprehensive information on the competencies of the A&A staff, which  are key elements of federal workforce planning models, USAID cannot  identify its critical staffing needs and adjust its staffing patterns to meet  those needs. In addition, a critical component of USAID’s oversight of its  A&A operations is the successful implementation of its new evaluation  mechanism. The mechanism is designed to ensure that A&A operations  follow USAID policies, primarily by assessing A&A operations that manage  about $11 billion worldwide. However, until USAID has the capacity to  implement the evaluation mechanism, it lacks the ability to ensure that  potential weaknesses in the A&A process are quickly identified and  corrected.
section_title: GAO Recommendations and Agency Response
paragraphs: To address the concerns I have just summarized, we recommended in our  September 2008 report that the Administrator of USAID develop and  implement a strategic A&A workforce plan that matches resources to  priority needs, such as the evaluation of the A&A function. Specifically, we  recommended that the strategic A&A workforce plan includes a process to  collect, analyze, and maintain (1) sufficiently reliable and up-to-date data  on the agency’s A&A staff levels and (2) comprehensive information on the  competencies of the A&A staff.
USAID informed us that, as of April 2009, USAID continues to experience  challenges with collecting information needed to develop a strategic A&A  workforce plan. USAID agreed that it needed to put in place a strategic  A&A workforce plan that includes all of USAID’s A&A staff at overseas  missions. OAA has not updated staffing data on its entire A&A workforce  since fiscal year 2005; rather, OAA relies on the staffing data collected by  OHR. While OHR officials informed us that they have improved guidance  to missions for preparing staffing data, they cannot ensure that all  missions are accurately capturing these data or that missions have  instituted procedures to ensure that the data reported to OHR are reliable.  OHR and OAA officials also told us that they have collected competency  information for 85 percent of its A&A staff in headquarters and its COs at  overseas missions and have established a training schedule for A&A staff  to address some competencies. However, OHR and OAA do not expect to  begin collecting competency information for A&A specialists overseas  until 2011, at the earliest. Under the Development Leadership Initiative,  USAID planned to hire 15 COs to be placed overseas. To date, USAID has  hired 12 COs who will soon be deployed overseas and it expects to fill the  other three positions by the end of fiscal year 2009. Finally, the Evaluation  Division has increased its staff levels from 4 staff in fiscal year 2008 to 9  staff as of April 2009. However, according to USAID officials, OAA has not  fully implemented the evaluation mechanism of its A&A function and has  completed evaluations of only two additional missions since the time of  our report. OAA officials said they have been unable to make further  advances due to other priorities.
Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes  my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may  have.
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Thomas Melito at  (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Other major contributors to this  testimony were Zina Merritt, Acting Director; Debbie Chung; Mark  Dowling; Joel Grossman; Victoria Lin; and James Strus.
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