U.S.-Mexico Border: CBP Action Needed to Improve Wait Time Data and Measure Outcomes of Trade Facilitation Efforts
Published: 2013-07-24T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Trade with Mexico is important to the United States' economy. Most of this trade crosses the border by truck, and studies have shown that long waits at border crossings can negatively affect the U.S. economy. CBP is responsible for securing U.S. borders at ports of entry to prevent illegal entry of persons and contraband while also facilitating legitimate trade and travel. GAO was asked to examine CBP data on and actions taken to address wait times at southwest border crossings. This report addresses the extent to which (1) CBP wait time data are reliable for public reporting and informing CBP decisions, (2) CBP has identified infrastructure and staffing needed to process current commercial traffic volumes, and (3) CBP performance measures assess progress toward its trade facilitation goal. GAO assessed the reliability of CBP's wait time data; visited six land border crossings (not generalizable, but selected largely for high traffic volume); analyzed CBP documentation, including needs assessments; and interviewed stakeholders and CBP officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) data on commercial vehicle wait times--the time it takes to travel from the end of the queue to the CBP primary inspection point at land border crossings--are unreliable for public reporting and CBP management decisions across border crossings. These data--which are collected manually by CBP officers--are unreliable because CBP officers inconsistently implement an approved data collection methodology, and the methodologies used vary by crossing. For example, five of the six crossings GAO visited require observation of the end of the queue to estimate wait times, but officials at these crossings reported the lines extended beyond their view at times. As a result, these data are generally not used by the private sector and are of limited usefulness for CBP management decisions on staffing and infrastructure investments. Determining and taking steps to help CBP officials overcome challenges to consistent implementation of existing methodologies could improve the reliability and usefulness of CBP's current wait time data. CBP officials have identified automated wait time data collection technology as the best way to improve data reliability. The Department of Transportation (DOT), in coordination with state DOTs and CBP, has ongoing pilot projects to use technology to gather more reliable wait time data at some border crossings. However, CBP has not assessed the feasibility of replacing current methods with automated data collection. Doing so, consistent with program management standards, could help CBP determine how to best improve data reliability.
CBP officials report and analyses indicate infrastructure and staff needs, but documenting CBP's staff allocation process could improve transparency and facilitate review and validation by CBP and others. CBP officials and analyses identify needs for additional infrastructure--such as more lanes--at some crossings, and GAO analysis of CBP data on lane use generally supported agency views on the extent to which CBP opens lanes at the six crossings GAO visited. Further, GAO analysis of lane use and traffic volume data generally supported CBP officials' statements that they open and close primary inspection lanes in response to fluctuations in commercial traffic volume. CBP analyses identified a need for 3,811 additional officers, and CBP headquarters officials told GAO all southwest border ports require additional staff, but CBP field and port managers at three of six crossings GAO visited reported having sufficient staff. CBP human capital officials reported that they adjust staff allocations across locations to better ensure that staff levels match areas of greatest need, but CBP has not documented this process, and there is no guidance defining the methodology used or factors considered when allocating staff across ports. Documenting this process, consistent with internal control standards, could improve transparency, helping CBP and others to better ensure that scarce staff resources are effectively allocated to fulfill mission needs across ports.
CBP does not have outcome-oriented performance measures to determine the extent to which the agency is facilitating trade. The Office of Management and Budget and GAO guidance recommend using outcome-oriented measures to promote accountability for results. In the absence of such measures, it is difficult for the agency or others to gauge CBP's progress in meeting its stated goal of facilitating trade.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that CBP (1) determine and take steps to helpensure consistent implementation ofexisting wait time data collection methodologies, (2) assess the feasibility of replacing current methodologies with automated methods, (3) document its staff allocation process and rationale, and (4) develop outcome-oriented performance measures. DHS agreed with these four recommendations and identified steps to address them, although the planned actions will not address the intent of one.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Trade with Mexico, the nation’s third-largest trade partner behind Canada  and China, is important to the United States’ economic health, and timely  access to Mexican goods is important to both U.S. manufacturers and  consumers. The value of goods imported into the United States from  Mexico has increased over 30 percent in the last 5 years, and in 2012  imports from Mexico were valued at nearly $278 billion. Most of this trade  crosses the border by commercial truck, and in 2012 there were over 5  million truck crossings into the United States from Mexico. Industry  representatives who rely on commercial vehicles to quickly transport  goods across the U.S.-Mexico border have raised concerns about long  waits at border crossings, and several studies have shown that the time  that commercial vehicles spend waiting to cross into the United States  from Mexico can have a negative impact on the U.S. economy in terms of  lost revenue and jobs.
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) is the lead federal agency charged with a dual mission  of keeping terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible aliens out of the country  while facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and commerce at the nation’s   CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for cargo  borders.and passenger processing activities related to security, trade,  immigration, and agricultural inspection at air, land, and sea ports of  entry, and CBP’s Office of Administration (OA) is responsible for real  estate management, including the construction, maintenance, and leasing   CBP’s focus has historically been  of facilities, such as land ports of entry.on security; however, CBP has also undertaken specific efforts to  facilitate legitimate travel and trade, such as launching the Free and  Secure Trade (FAST) program in 2002 to expedite the travel of low-risk  screened shipments across the border, and publishing border crossing  wait times on a website to inform public and private sector border  crossing decisions.
GAO, Border Security: CBP Lacks the Data Needed to Assess the FAST Program at  U.S. Northern Border Ports, GAO-10-694 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2010). review and CBP expects to fully implement this recommendation by  December 30, 2013.
You asked us to review what data CBP collects and reports on wait times  for commercial vehicles at southwest border land ports of entry and  actions CBP has taken to reduce those wait times. This report addresses  the following questions:
To what extent are CBP wait time data reliable for public reporting and  informing CBP decisions on staffing and infrastructure investments?
To what extent has CBP identified infrastructure and staffing needed  to process current commercial traffic volume at select southwest  border crossings with high traffic volume?
To what extent do CBP performance measures assess progress  toward its goal of facilitating trade?
This report also presents information on the results of studies that have  quantified the economic impact of commercial vehicle wait times on cross  border commerce. This information, including the methodology used to  identify these studies, is presented in appendix I.
To inform our analysis of the first and second objectives, we visited six  border crossings—Bridge of the Americas and Ysleta in El Paso, Texas;  World Trade Bridge and Columbia Solidarity Bridge in Laredo, Texas;  Mariposa in Nogales, Arizona; and Otay Mesa near San Diego,  California—selected based on their commercial traffic volume, geographic  diversity, and representation of a mix of recent or ongoing infrastructure  modernization projects. At each location, we interviewed CBP  management, toured the facility, and convened a roundtable of local  industry representatives and local government officials. To obtain a range  of perspectives on commercial vehicle traffic at southwest border  crossings, we met with representatives of 21 companies and associations  (who were identified to us as knowledgeable stakeholders representing  industries that rely on cross-border commerce, including customs  brokers, trucking companies, and distributors) as well as bridge directors  and representatives of four local government entities (the Mayors of El  Paso and San Diego, the Laredo City Manager, and representatives of  the San Diego Association of Governments) at all four cities we visited or  by teleconference. We also interviewed officials from federal agencies  involved in securing the border and facilitating trade at land ports of entry.  Although the results of our site visits and interviews are not generalizable,  they provided us with perspectives on operations at ports of entry that  accounted for a total of approximately 70 percent of the commercial  vehicle crossings into the United States from Mexico for fiscal year 2008  through July 2012. Over the course of our work, we also interviewed other  stakeholders, including officials from the Mexican Foreign Ministry,  academics, and representatives of national trade associations, such as  the American Trucking Associations and the Border Trade Alliance, to  obtain a broader range of perspectives on commercial vehicle traffic at  southwest border crossings.
To address the first objective, we reviewed and analyzed CBP’s policies  and guidance for calculating and reporting wait times and CBP  evaluations of its wait time data, including a fiscal year 2008 CBP  Commercial Wait Times Analysis Report completed by CBP’s Western  Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) Office. We also reviewed CBP’s fiscal year 2012 wait time data for the six crossings we visited and  compared documentary and testimonial evidence of how wait times are  currently being calculated by officials at land ports of entry on the  southwest border against CBP policies and guidance to identify any  discrepancies. We also compared CBP’s policies and guidance with  criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Our  assessment of the reliability of these data is discussed later in this report.  To determine the status of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) pilot  projects to automate wait time data at the southwest border, we  interviewed officials at DOT’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),  Texas Department of Transportation, and Texas A&M University and  reviewed documentary evidence they provided, such as written updates  on the status of certain pilot projects. We compared CBP’s plans to  automate wait times with standards for program management.
To address the second objective, we reviewed and analyzed CBP and  General Services Administration (GSA) assessments of land port of entry  capacity, such as CBP’s Strategic Resource Assessments (SRA), and  reviewed documentation of CBP’s Workload Staffing Model, used to  determine staff needs at land ports of entry. We also interviewed CBP and GSA officials about infrastructure needs at land border crossings and  how these needs are identified and prioritized. We interviewed CBP  officials about the agency’s staff allocation policies and processes and  compared these with criteria in our previous work on human capital  management and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government.number of primary lanes open during operating hours at the six crossings  from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. We selected this time period for our  data analyses to permit a trend analysis. Our data analyses are not  generalizable to the entire southwest border, but represent trends at six  high-volume crossings. To assess the reliability of these data sources, we  reviewed documentation, interviewed agency officials, electronically  tested the data, reviewed internal controls, and traced a selection of data  to source files. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of our report.
We also analyzed CBP data on traffic volume and the  To address the third objective, we reviewed documentation of CBP’s  fiscal year 2013 performance goals, measures, and reports. We assessed  CBP’s measures against criteria in Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) Circular No. A-11 and useful practices GAO previously identified  to enhance performance management and measurement processes. We also interviewed relevant DHS and CBP officials regarding CBP’s  current performance measures and the extent to which CBP uses its wait  time data to measure progress, among other things.
See OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget  (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 2012). See also GAO, Managing for Results: Strengthening  Regulatory Agencies’ Performance Management Practices, GAO/GGD-00-10  (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 1999). In this report we gathered information from 23 federal  and state organizations that we or other credible sources identified as using or planning to  use a variety of useful practices to enhance specific aspects of their performance  management and measurement processes. The organizations, although they had different  missions, sizes, and organizational structures, said they consistently recognized that  these practices are important in their efforts to develop a stronger results orientation. wait times on the southwest border. A more detailed description of our  methodology and the results of these studies are presented in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to July 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope  and methodology are contained in appendix II.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Agencies’ Responsibilities at Land Ports of Entry
paragraphs: In addition to CBP, various agencies have responsibilities for facilitating  trade at land ports of entry and conducting inspections of commercial  vehicles. GSA oversees design, construction, and maintenance for all  ports of entry in consultation with CBP. In consultation with GSA, CBP  develops an investment plan to manage the modernization of the land  ports of entry inventory. Within DOT, FHWA provides funding for highway  and road construction. In addition, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety  Administration and state DOTs in some states—Arizona, Texas, and  California on the southwest border—may conduct commercial vehicle  inspections at or adjacent to land ports of entry to ensure compliance with  federal and state-specific safety standards.
In executing its mission, CBP operates 168 land border crossings, which  vary in size, location, and commercial traffic volume. Of these, 46  crossings are located on the southwest border, and 24 of these crossings  process commercial vehicle traffic. The four largest land border ports of  entry on the southwest border by commercial vehicle traffic volume are  Laredo, Texas; Otay Mesa, California; El Paso, Texas; and Calexico  East, California. See figure 1 for a picture of commercial vehicles in line to  enter the United States at the Otay Mesa border crossing near San  Diego, California.
Processing commercial vehicles into the United States at land ports of  entry involves various steps and requirements. First, CBP requires  carriers to submit electronic lists describing their shipments, known as e- Manifests, prior to a shipment’s arrival at the border.reviews the e-Manifest using its Automated Commercial Environment   Second, CBP  database, among others, and assigns a risk level to the shipment. Next,  the commercial vehicle proceeds into the United States and to a primary  inspection booth at the U.S. port of entry, where a CBP officer reviews  documentation on the exporter, importer, and goods being transported. If  the documentation is consistent with CBP requirements and no further  inspections are required, the truck is allowed to pass through the port.  Depending on the port of entry, goods imported, or law enforcement  requirements, CBP may direct the commercial truck to secondary  inspection. According to CBP, trucks are referred to secondary inspection  for numerous reasons, such as officer’s initiative, targeted inspection, or  random inspection. Secondary inspection involves more detailed  document processing and examinations using other methods including  gamma ray imaging systems and advanced radiation portal monitors or  unloading and physical inspection. Trucks that require secondary  inspection may be inspected by more than one federal agency,  depending on their cargo. See figure 2 for an illustration of the steps in  the commercial vehicle inspection process at land ports of entry.
To facilitate the travel of low-risk screened shipments across the border,  CBP created the FAST program, which is intended to secure and facilitate  legitimate trade by providing expedited processing of participants’  merchandise in designated traffic lanes at select border crossings, fewer  referrals to secondary inspections, “front-of-the-line” processing for CBP  secondary inspections, and enhanced security. To be eligible to receive  the benefits of the FAST program, every link in the supply chain—the  carrier, the importer, and the manufacturer—is required to be certified  under the Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)  program and the driver must be preapproved for participation in the FAST  program.
section_title: CBP Public Reporting of Border Crossing Wait Time Data
paragraphs: CBP defines border wait time as the time it takes for a vehicle to travel  from the end of the queue—which may be in Mexico or the United States,  depending on the length of the line—to the CBP primary inspection point  in the United States. See figure 2 for an illustration of these points in the  border-crossing process. As a service to the traveling public and the trade  community, CBP began publicly reporting hourly wait time data through a  web page on CBP.gov in early 2004, and currently reports these data for  42 of 46 crossings on the southwest border. CBP began formally  collecting commercial and private passenger vehicle wait times on a daily  basis in late September 2001 in response to the delays experienced  immediately after September 11, 2001, when heightened enforcement  efforts resulted in significant delays at many land border ports of entry.  Over time, the collection of wait time data evolved as additional crossings  were added and the amount of information collected was expanded. CBP  reported that it is important that the trade community have current and  consistent wait times on the CBP web site, noting that the web site is the  only source of wait time information at many locations.
Some border stakeholders, such as those in the private sector, find “total  crossing time” to be a more useful measure than CBP’s definition of wait  time. Unlike CBP’s narrower “wait time” measure, which captures the time  it takes for a vehicle to travel from the end of the queue to the CBP  primary inspection point, total crossing time is generally defined as the  total time elapsed from entering the line in Mexico leading to Mexican  export inspection through exit from U.S. inspection facilities, including any  U.S. state-conducted inspections. See figure 2 for an illustration of the  differences between these two measurements.
section_title: CBP Staff at Land Border Crossings
paragraphs: CBP has developed a workload staffing model to determine the optimum  number of CBP officers that each port of entry needs to accomplish its  mission responsibilities at its land, air, and sea ports of entry. This model  existed in different versions, beginning in fiscal year 2006. The  conference report for the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act,  expressing concern regarding CBP’s ability to align staffing resources to  mission requirements, directed CBP to submit a resource allocation  model for staffing requirements that would explain CBP’s methodology for  aligning staffing levels with threats, vulnerabilities, and workload across  all mission areas. In April 2013, CBP submitted the most recent version  of its workload staffing model to Congress in response to language in the  conference and committee reports for the fiscal year 2012 DHS  appropriations.
DHS has received appropriations to support increased staffing levels for  CBP officers on the southwest border over the last 5 fiscal years. For  example, the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2009  supplemental appropriation indicated that it included $30 million to fund  the hiring of up to 125 CBP officers for the southwest border, and the  fiscal year 2010 emergency supplemental appropriation for border  security included $29 million for hiring additional CBP officers for  southwest border land ports of entry.
section_title: Assessments of Port Infrastructure
paragraphs: CBP and GSA have assessed infrastructure needs at all land border  crossings over the last 9 fiscal years. From fiscal years 2004 to 2006,  CBP assessed its complete portfolio of land port of entry facilities and  identified infrastructure investment needs through its SRA process. The  SRA includes architectural and analytical assessments of land port of  entry inspection facilities’ condition and operations as well as relevant  regional planning data and studies. Appendix III provides more  information regarding CBP’s SRA process.
GSA has also assessed land port of entry infrastructure needs when  planning and designing land port of entry renovation projects. For  example, before undertaking construction, GSA evaluates the design of  projects to renovate, expand, or construct a new land port of entry using  its BorderWizardTM program—a program used to simulate projected traffic  flow through the proposed facility to help identify potential deficiencies,  such as insufficient primary inspection lanes.information on completed, ongoing, or planned infrastructure  improvement projects at southwest border land ports of entry for fiscal  years 2008 through 2012.
section_title: CBP’s Wait Time Data Are Unreliable for Informing the Public and CBP Management Decisions, and CBP Has Not Assessed the Feasibility of Automated Data Collection Options
subsections: section_title: Wait Time Data Are Unreliable and of Limited Usefulness; CBP Has Not Taken Steps to Improve Its Current Wait Time Estimation Methodology
paragraphs: CBP policy identifies two methodologies to be used by ports of entry for  manually calculating wait times for commercial vehicles; however,  challenges in implementing these methodologies contribute to CBP wait  time data being of limited usefulness for public reporting and  management decision making across border crossings. Specifically, CBP  policy provides port directors two options for manually calculating wait  times at the border crossings they oversee: (1) line-of-sight and (2) driver  survey. Port directors for each crossing are to choose which methodology  to use based primarily on a consideration of the infrastructure layout of  each crossing. CBP officers at border crossings are to use the first  methodology when the end of the line is visible via the naked eye or  camera. In accordance with this methodology, the CBP supervisor at the  crossing is to estimate wait time based on traffic volume, number of lanes  open, and where the end of the queue occurs relative to landmarks (i.e.,  foot of bridge, building, or intersection). When the end of the line is not  visible, CBP policy recommends that officials estimate wait times using  the second methodology—asking at least five drivers how long they have  been waiting in the queue, dropping the highest and lowest responses,  and averaging the rest.
CBP’s October 2007 interim guidance, which prescribes these two  methodologies to calculate wait times, states that “it is critically important  that all locally posted wait times for ports or crossings are reasonably  accurate and are uniformly reported by all stakeholders.” In addition,  CBP’s May 2008 memorandum on land border wait time measurement  states that “the importance of accurate land border wait time measures  cannot be understated. Efficient and reliable land border wait time  measures help to facilitate the movement of people and goods across our  border and directly impact the economic health of border communities  and the nation as a whole.” Among the six crossings we visited, Mariposa  used driver surveys, and the remaining five crossings used line of sight to  estimate wait times. However, CBP’s wait time data are of limited  usefulness for public reporting and management decision making across  border crossings because of three key factors: (1) CBP officers  inconsistently implemented the line-of-sight methodology; (2) the other  CBP-approved methodology, driver surveys, is inherently unreliable; and  (3) CBP officials use different methodologies to calculate wait times  across land border crossings.
CBP officials at three of the five crossings that reported primarily using the line-of-sight  methodology also reported using the driver survey methodology at times, such as during  construction or to routinely check their line-of-sight methodology. leading up to the primary inspection booths for commercial traffic.  According to these officials, these factors hinder officers’ ability to  accurately determine the full duration of wait times as gaps or cars  between commercial vehicles may make wait times appear to be  longer or shorter than they actually are.
At one crossing—Otay Mesa—CBP officers used the line-of-sight  methodology but did not consider the number of primary inspection  lanes open, as required by CBP policy. The number of lanes open to  commercial vehicle traffic influences the rate at which traffic moves  through primary inspection. CBP’s fiscal year 2008 WHTI study on the  reliability of CBP’s methods for calculating commercial vehicle wait  times notes that the number of lanes open greatly affects wait time, so  not considering the number of lanes open limits CBP’s ability to  accurately estimate wait times using the line-of-sight methodology.
Driver survey methodology is unreliable: CBP’s fiscal year 2008 WHTI  study on the reliability of CBP’s methods for calculating commercial  vehicle wait times stated that driver surveys have been shown to be  consistently inaccurate when measuring wait time in part because they  measure the wait time of travelers currently at the front of the queue, not  the expected wait time of travelers currently at the end of the queue. As a  result, if queuing conditions quickly change, the wait times collected using  this methodology become inaccurate. In addition, Port officials at  Mariposa used driver surveys as the crossing’s primary method of  estimating wait times, but noted that the methodology produced unreliable  wait time data. Senior CBP officials at this crossing reported that officers  had to use driver surveys to estimate wait times because a curve in the  road leading up to the crossing obstructs officers’ view of the queue,  thereby preventing the crossing from using the line-of-sight approach.  Senior CBP officials at this crossing stated that driver survey is an  unreliable methodology because of survey bias—drivers may be inclined  to report longer or shorter wait times than they actually experienced.
Different methodologies across land border crossings: Port directors  choose between the two CBP-approved methodologies to estimate wait  times in accordance with CBP policy; however, OFO and OA  headquarters officials stated that the use of different methodologies at  crossings precludes comparison of data across locations in making  management decisions. Although officials at each crossing determine  which of the two methodologies to use based on the layout of each  crossing and other local characteristics, the use of different  methodologies at crossings makes CBP’s wait time data unreliable for  comparison across southwest border crossings, as they may produce  different results. OFO and OA headquarters officials told us that because  of the different methodologies used at different crossings, the wait time  data are not comparable across crossings and therefore are of limited use  in making resource allocation decisions.
In light of these challenges in implementing CBP’s approved  methodologies for estimating wait times, CBP’s wait time data do not  allow for reliable trend analysis to show the extent of wait times within or  across southwest border crossings. Industry representatives at two of the  six crossings we visited reported that, in their view, the actual wait times  commercial vehicle drivers experienced were often longer than those  CBP publicly reported. For example, industry representatives at the  roundtable we convened in Nogales reported their view that wait times, as  defined by CBP, were at times up to 2 hours longer than those CBP  publicly reported. Industry representatives at two other crossings reported  that CBP’s wait time data were generally accurate. In addition, three  organizations that commissioned studies to quantify the economic impact  of wait times at southwest border crossings did not use CBP’s wait time  data as the basis for their studies but rather collected original wait time  data by, for example, using cameras to photograph trucks’ license plates  at various points along the border-crossing routes and then matching  these photographs to identify the wait time of each vehicle. (See appendix  I for the results of these studies.) Because of these various limitations, we  and others cannot use CBP’s wait time data to analyze the extent of  current wait times across border crossings on the southwest border or  determine historical trends.
Wait time data currently reported on CBP’s public website are of limited  usefulness to inform industry and the public because of the data  limitations we identified and because they do not reflect the total border  crossing time. None of the industry stakeholders representing 21  companies and associations we met with over the course of our study  reported using CBP’s wait time data because they questioned the  accuracy of the data. Industry representatives at the roundtables we  convened in Nogales, San Diego, and Laredo said that more reliable wait  time data would be useful to, for example, help businesses improve the  efficiency of their operations and to make informed decisions including  where to build new facilities, how much inventory to maintain, when and  how frequently to send shipments across the border, and when to  schedule truckers’ or manufacturing plant employees’ shifts. In addition,  industry representatives at our roundtables in El Paso and San Diego  noted that they did not use CBP’s wait time data because the data did not  provide information on the duration of the complete border-crossing  experience—total crossing time—a more comprehensive measure that  would be helpful in making business decisions. A 2008 study  commissioned by the Department of Commerce also found it was  important to use a measure of total crossing time to capture the border- crossing system as a whole, and to account for the fact that wait time  associated with U.S. primary inspection was not the sole driver of total  wait time for commercial vehicles. Instead, they reported that delays were  due to several factors, including many outside U.S. federal control. FHWA  officials acknowledge the value of total crossing time and are piloting  projects to automate such data collection.
In addition, according to CBP headquarters officials, these wait time data  are also not sufficiently reliable to inform CBP management decisions— more specifically, decisions on staffing and infrastructure investments— and officers at the six crossings we visited told us that they use the wait  time data in limited ways. At the headquarters level, OFO officials stated  that because of data limitations, CBP’s wait time data are not useful for  comparison across crossings and explained that they do not use the data  as a basis for determining staffing needs or allocating staff across field  offices but rather rely on CBP’s traffic volume data as a proxy. A senior OFO human capital official explained that the wait time data are not  systematically compared across ports but ports with known chronic wait  time problems do get consideration in staff allocation decisions. Similarly,  OA headquarters officials stated that they do not use wait time data to  prioritize infrastructure improvement projects because of concerns about  the reliability of CBP’s wait time data. However, CBP field office and port  officials reported using their existing wait time data to a limited extent to  inform management decisions in the field. Specifically, senior CBP  officials at the six crossings we visited reported using wait time data as  one of various factors considered when, for example, allocating staff  across crossings and shifts, overtime decisions, and as support for white  papers sent to headquarters requesting funding for infrastructure  improvement projects. CBP officials at the six crossings we visited  reported that more reliable wait time data would be useful to them in  making such decisions. For example, CBP officials at each of these  crossings stated that more reliable wait time data would help them in  making staffing decisions.
CBP does not have efforts underway or planned to help port officials  overcome challenges to consistent implementation of existing wait time  estimation methodologies. For example, CBP has not fully implemented  recommendations from a fiscal year 2008 CBP study that could help the  agency implement its current wait time estimation methodologies more  reliably. In fiscal year 2008, CBP’s WHTI program office studied the  reliability of CBP’s methods for calculating commercial vehicle wait times  and identified six recommendations, three of which could, in part, help  address the limitations discussed above. The recommendations directed  CBP to, among other things (1) use closed-circuit television cameras to  measure wait time in real time; (2) provide a standardized measurement  and validation tool, such as a useful and well-documented benchmarking  system; and (3) continue to monitor and evaluate applications of  transportation technologies at the border that allow for better  measurement and reporting of wait times.from three offices—the office that sponsored the report (Land Border  Integration), the office in charge of cargo operations (Cargo Conveyance  and Security), and the office that maintains the agency’s wait time data  (Planning Program Analysis and Evaluation)—were all unclear as to the  steps, if any, that had been taken to address the first two  recommendations and which office was responsible for implementing  them. With regard to the first recommendation, an official we met with in  Cargo Conveyance and Security said that some crossings had access to  cameras that helped them view the end of the line, but this official did not  know how many crossings on the southern border had cameras for this  purpose and further stated that there were no plans to expand camera  availability to improve wait time data reliability. With regard to the second  recommendation, this Cargo Conveyance and Security official stated that  CBP had not taken steps to develop a standardized wait time  measurement and validation tool and had no plans to do so. However,  CBP officials with Land Border Integration and Planning, Program  Analysis, and Evaluation stated that CBP had implemented the third  recommendation by continuing to monitor and evaluate applications of  transportation technologies in its work with FHWA to pilot projects for  automating data collection.
CBP guidance identifies the importance of reliable wait time  measurement to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the  border. Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  calls for agencies to establish controls, such as those provided through  policies and procedures, to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of data.  Control activities that ensure the prompt, complete, and accurate  recording of data help to maintain their relevance and value to  management in controlling operations and making decisions. In the near  term, identifying and carrying out steps that can be taken to help CBP  officials overcome challenges to consistent implementation of existing  wait time estimation methodologies—such as implementing past CBP  recommendations to expand the use of cameras to see the ends of  queues and providing standardized wait time measurement and validation  tools—could improve the reliability and usefulness of CBP’s current wait  time data.
section_title: CBP Has Not Assessed the Feasibility of New Automation Options
paragraphs: In February 2008, FHWA, in coordination with state DOTs and CBP,  initiated pilot projects to develop automated wait time data collection  methods at select southwest border crossings. Automation of wait time  data collection relies on Radio-Frequency Identification readers to read  the unique signals from passing vehicles at several points along the  border-crossing route. These data points are then automatically matched  and analyzed to estimate the current wait time at that crossing. As of  March 2013, FHWA and state DOTs in Arizona, California, and Texas  had eight pilot projects under way or completed to automate and  standardize calculation of both wait time and total crossing time at eight  crossings on the southwest border, including projects at each of the six  crossings we visited. Wait time data resulting from some of these pilots  is currently shared on a publicly available website with updates every 10  minutes. These eight projects were initiated on a crossing-by-crossing  basis and are in various stages of implementation—one completed and  seven ongoing. Two additional projects are planned so senior FHWA  officials expect automated wait time data to be available at 10 crossings  by 2015 at which point current federal funding commitments for these  projects end.
CBP headquarters and field officials, as well as FHWA and a Texas  Department of Transportation official, cited a range of potential benefits  that could result from automating border wait time measurement. CBP’s  fiscal year 2008 WHTI report found that the long-term solution to  standardize wait time measurement is to take advantage of automation  technology. CBP headquarters, field office, and port officials told us that  automation would reduce the burden on staff of manually collecting wait  time data and increase staff availability for security efforts and other  tasks. OFO headquarters officials also stated that automation would  increase the accuracy, reliability, and timeliness of the wait time data that  are collected and disseminated. Moreover, they stated that automated  data would come from a more independent source, and thus the data  may be perceived by industry organizations as more accurate than CBP’s  current data. This would reduce the burden on CBP officials to respond to  queries about their wait time data, according to CBP officials. OFO  headquarters officials and senior CBP officials at the six crossings we  visited reported that accurate wait time data would facilitate CBP  management decisions such as staffing needs, infrastructure investment,  performance management (such as evaluating efforts to mitigate wait  times), and operations planning at land ports of entry. In addition, CBP  officials at four of the six crossings reported automation could provide  data on CBP’s definition of wait time as well as total border-crossing time.  This could provide CBP with more holistic information on the complete  border-crossing experience, thereby improving CBP’s ability to identify  and address bottlenecks and providing industry stakeholders with more  useful data to inform their business processes.
At the same time, CBP officials reported limitations of the current  automation pilot projects. In 2011, CBP commissioned a study to review  the quality of the data resulting from the Texas-based pilot projects and  found the automated wait time data were not yet sufficiently accurate for  CBP’s purposes. In response to these findings, CBP worked with pilot  project officials to modify the algorithm used to calculate the wait times,  with the intention to improve the accuracy of the data. Another concern  raised by CBP officials is that none of the pilots are yet able to  consistently differentiate between wait times for FAST and non-FAST  traffic. Not capturing separate wait time data for FAST and non-FAST  traffic could limit the usefulness for key industry stakeholders and limit  CBP’s ability to measure whether FAST participants are experiencing  reduced wait times, as set forth in FAST program goals. FHWA officials  reported that the technology solutions used in the current pilot projects  are flexible enough to enable adding more readers to differentiate results  for FAST and non-FAST traffic, but none of the current pilot projects are  gathering data for this purpose, and FHWA officials reported that they  have no plans to conduct additional research on solutions that  differentiate between FAST and non-FAST traffic. In addition, CBP  officials note that there are no pilot programs to automate wait time data  collection at 34 of the 42 southwest border crossings where CBP  currently reports hourly wait times.
CBP, as the lead agency in collecting and reporting wait time data and  the sole source of wait time data across the southwest border, does not  have plans to oversee or manage these automation projects, although  FHWA and others are anticipating an expanded CBP role once the pilot  phases conclude. FHWA officials have led the research phase of these  projects but expect their role to decline as the pilot phases end, and they  are looking to others to manage these efforts in the longer term. FHWA  has taken a lead role in the research, testing, and evaluation of wait time  automation technology including fully funding the pilot projects at the  Bridge of the Americas and Otay Mesa and providing limited financial  support for others. However, FHWA officials stated that they do not plan  to fund these projects after the pilot phases end. CBP has coordinated  with FHWA by, for example, consulting on the algorithms used to project  wait times, but CBP has not provided funding for the projects on the  southwest border. CBP officials reported that they do not intend to fund,  adopt, or otherwise oversee these wait time automation projects once the  pilot phases supported by FHWA and state DOTs conclude because CBP  officials stated that they want another entity, such as FHWA or state  DOTs, to do so. Texas Department of Transportation officials report that  they are committed to continuing the Texas-based pilot projects in the  short term, but are looking for another source of funding, possibly CBP or  others to support the projects in the future. There are no other such  commitments for the pilots in other states. CBP officials report that they  are in discussion with FHWA about collaborative approaches to  continuing these efforts, such as public-private partnerships.
CBP officials stated that the agency has not taken action to improve or  modify its current methods for collecting and reporting wait time data in  the short-term because officials believe that automated collection of wait  time data is the most effective way to obtain reliable, standardized data,  and the current automation projects are still in development. However,  CBP has not assessed the feasibility of replacing or supplementing  current methods of manually calculating wait times with the automated  methods piloted by DOT or other means. Assessing the feasibility could  include assessing all of the associated costs and benefits, options for how  the agency will use and publicly report the results of automated data  collection, the potential trade-offs associated with moving to this new  system, and other factors such as those influencing the possible  expansion of automation efforts to the 34 other locations that currently  report wait times but have no automation project under way. OFO officials  stated that CBP has not considered assessing the feasibility of  automating wait time data collection and does not have estimates of  potential costs or time frames because the pilot projects are still in  development and CBP management has not committed to automating  wait time data collection. However, standards for program management  call for the feasibility of programs to be assessed early on. Given that  CBP officials have stated that automated data collection is the most  effective method for obtaining standardized and reliable wait time data,  conducting an assessment of the feasibility of the methods piloted by  FHWA or other automation methods, in consultation with FHWA and state  DOTs, could help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of  improving the reliability of its publicly reported wait time data.
section_title: CBP Analyses and Officials Identified Some Infrastructure and Staff Needs, but the Methodology Used to Allocate Staff across Ports of Entry Has Not Been Documented
subsections: section_title: CBP Analyses and Officials Indicated Need for Additional Infrastructure at Some Crossings, and Our Analysis of Data on Primary Lane Use Generally Supported These Assessments
paragraphs: CBP analyses and port officials identified needs for additional  infrastructure—such as more lanes—at some border crossings, and our  analysis of CBP data on lane use generally supported agency views on  the extent to which CBP opens lanes at the six crossings we visited.  Further, our analysis supports CBP officials’ statements that they  generally open and close primary inspection lanes in response to  fluctuations in commercial traffic volume, but some port officials cited  constraints to opening more lanes during times of peak traffic.
CBP and GSA assessments and officials identified current infrastructure  limitations affecting commercial vehicle processing at three of the six  crossings we visited. Specifically, CBP and GSA assessments and CBP  officials cited infrastructure limitations related to an insufficient number of  primary lanes at Otay Mesa, insufficient space for secondary inspections  at Otay Mesa and World Trade Bridge, and poor facility layout as well as   CBP port  an insufficient number of exit gates at Bridge of the Americas.of entry officials for two of the three remaining crossings we visited stated  that current infrastructure was sufficient to process commercial traffic at  Columbia Solidarity Bridge and Ysleta. At the last crossing, Mariposa,  CBP port officials reported that infrastructure would be sufficient once  GSA’s ongoing project to replace and expand the port is completed in the  fall of 2014. Table 1 summarizes the infrastructure needs identified in  CBP or GSA assessments as well as those identified by CBP port officials  at the six crossings we visited.
Further, our analysis of CBP data on lane use generally supported CBP  officials’ statements regarding the extent to which CBP officials open  existing primary inspection lanes at the six crossings we visited. The  number of primary inspection lanes available and open at each crossing  was frequently cited by CBP and industry officials as a critical variable  affecting wait times for commercial vehicles and, further, as evidence of  whether a crossing’s primary lane infrastructure was sufficient to process  current traffic volumes. For example, at all the locations we visited,  industry representatives expressed concern that CBP had an insufficient  number of primary inspection lanes to process current traffic volumes or  was not fully utilizing existing lanes. To determine the extent to which  CBP was opening its existing primary inspection lanes, we analyzed CBP  data on the average hourly percentage of primary inspection lanes open  per month during operating hours over the last 5 fiscal years (October  2007-September 2012). This analysis showed the following:  In fiscal year 2012, lane use data for two of the six crossings we  visited suggest that these crossings—Otay Mesa and Mariposa— were at times operating at or near full capacity, as reported by agency  officials. In fiscal year 2012, Otay Mesa opened an hourly average of  82 to 89 percent of its primary inspection lanes per month. At  Mariposa, our analysis of lane use data for the first half of fiscal year  2012, prior to the addition of four new primary inspection lanes in April  2012, showed that during months of peak traffic, port officials opened  an hourly average of between 80 and 84 percent of Mariposa’s  primary lanes per month.
The average hourly percentage of primary lanes open per month at  the remaining four crossings we visited—Bridge of the Americas,  Ysleta, Columbia Solidarity Bridge, and World Trade Bridge—were all  lower. This generally supported CBP officials’ statements that they  have the capacity to open more primary inspection lanes at these  crossings.
Our analysis does not indicate whether CBP is maximizing use of its lanes, but rather  allows us to observe how closely the average hourly traffic volume per month corresponds  to the average number of hourly lanes open per month. lanes were opened, causing congestion throughout the facility because of  limited space at secondary inspection. The one crossing where the lane  use and commercial traffic volume did not appear to track as closely was  Columbia Solidarity Bridge. However, CBP officials at Columbia Solidarity  Bridge explained that traffic volumes and wait times there were so low  that they generally did not need to open or close lanes in response.  Figure 3, an interactive graphic, summarizes our analysis and includes  additional information for each of the six crossings we selected.
Click on the highlighted border crossings for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer friendly version please see appendix V.
CBP officials at headquarters and in the field cited various ways they are  working to address infrastructure limitations given challenges caused by  budgetary and geographic constraints, among others. In regard to  budgetary constraints, CBP and GSA officials stated that GSA has not  received funding to conduct additional expansion projects in the last 2  fiscal years, and as a result, they have not been able to execute new  projects to address infrastructure needs at land ports of entry on the  southwest border. GSA officials reported that the agency has used  alternative funding sources to pay for prioritized infrastructure projects.  For example, GSA and CBP officials reported using funds from the city of  Laredo to support the expansion of primary inspection lanes at the World  Trade Bridge crossing in 2011. In regard to geographic constraints, port  officials at the Bridge of the Americas stated that the urban area around  that crossing limits opportunities to expand the crossing’s footprint.  Officials with the city of El Paso told us that they are promoting a plan to  divert all commercial traffic to the nearby Ysleta crossing because it has  greater capacity to process commercial traffic and a larger footprint that  can accommodate future expansion. CBP field office and port officials  stated that they support this plan. In another example, CBP officials at  headquarters and in the field reported participating in binational working  groups in an effort to address the infrastructure limitations of ports of  entry along the southwest border. For example, senior CBP officials  reported participating in the U.S.-Mexico Joint Working Committee to  develop regional master plans to better ensure the development of a well- coordinated land transportation and infrastructure planning process along  the border.
section_title: CBP Cites Need for Additional CBP Officers to Process Commercial Traffic at Some Crossings but Documentation Could Increase Transparency of Staff Allocations across Locations
paragraphs: CBP’s workload staffing model—CBP’s primary tool for determining the  number of CBP officers needed at the nation’s air, land, and sea ports— found that additional CBP officers are needed to meet CBP’s mission  requirements. CBP submitted the most recent version of its workload  staffing model to Congress in response to language in the conference  and committee reports for the fiscal year 2012 DHS appropriations.  According to CBP documents submitted to Congress, the workload  staffing model found that 3,811 additional CBP officers are needed to  meet CBP’s mission requirements in fiscal year 2014.
In addition, CBP field and port officials at three of the six crossings we  visited reported having insufficient staff to process commercial traffic.  Specifically, CBP field office and port officials reported insufficient staff at  the World Trade Bridge, Columbia Solidarity Bridge, and Mariposa  crossings and noted that insufficient staff at these crossings contributed  to commercial vehicle wait times and reduced their ability to conduct  secondary inspections, among other effects. Officials at the remaining three crossings—Otay Mesa, Bridge of the Americas, and Ysleta— reported having a sufficient number of staff to process commercial traffic.  However, senior OFO headquarters officials reported that all southwest  border land ports of entry require additional staff to perform at optimal  levels.
CBP headquarters and field office officials cited efforts to mitigate the  effect of reported staffing shortages on ports’ ability to process  commercial vehicle traffic. CBP officials reported that these staffing  shortages, caused in part by budget constraints and the time needed to  train and assign new CBP officers, challenged their ability to increase the  numbers of officers at the ports of entry. Specifically, CBP officials  reported that since fiscal year 2009, CBP has not received sufficient  funding to hire the number of CBP officers that it requires at land ports of  entry. In response to budgetary constraints, CBP headquarters officials  reported working to identify alternative funding strategies as well as  reviewing user fees to ensure they effectively support operations. For  example, DHS’s fiscal year 2014 congressional budget request included a  proposed increase for 1,877 fee-funded full-time-equivalent positions in  addition to a funding increase of approximately $210 million for 1,600  additional CBP officers. In response to staffing shortages related to the  length of time it takes for new CBP officers to complete required training  and to be available for duty at their assigned ports of entry, CBP  headquarters officials reported considering the extent that new CBP  officers have completed their training and are available for duty when  allocating staff. They further reported actively working to adjust staff  allocations across locations to better ensure that staffing levels are  matched to areas of greatest need. For example, a senior OFO official  reported prioritizing allocations to field offices with the highest  discrepancy between current staffing levels and workload staffing model  results when developing fiscal year 2012 annual staffing allocation.  Finally, port officials at all six crossings we visited reported using overtime  to mitigate the effect of any staffing shortages on ports’ capacity to  process commercial traffic. For example, port officials in El Paso said that  using overtime pay was an effective and efficient solution to provide  increased coverage to process commercial traffic during peak times on  weekdays and on weekends. However, officials at the Otay Mesa port of  entry noted that the availability of overtime funds has decreased because  of budget constraints in recent years.
In fiscal year 2013, CBP revised its process to allocate available CBP  officers to its field offices, ports of entry and border crossings. However,  CBP has not yet documented this process or its methodology, including  the factors and underlying rationale considered in making staff allocation  decisions. A senior official in CBP’s Human Capital Division reported that  CBP’s most recent staff allocation process consisted of the following six  steps: (1) OFO’s Human Capital Division obtained the workload staffing  model’s findings to determine the number of officers ideally needed to  meet the expected workload; (2) Human Capital Division staff conducted  a “gap analysis” by comparing the model’s findings to current staff levels  to identify the locations with the greatest gap between current and the  staff levels identified by the workload staffing model; (3) Human Capital  Division staff drafted a proposed staff allocation that realigned staff to  those field offices with the greatest gap; (4) OFO leadership made  adjustments to the proposal based on institutional priorities including  mission, priorities, and threats before approving the allocation; (5) on  receiving approval from leadership, OFO staff communicated the  authorized staffing levels to each field office; and (6) the field offices then  allocated their authorized staff to the individual ports of entry under their  purview. However, this official explained that this process is not  documented and there is no guidance clearly defining this methodology,  the factors considered, or the rationale for making staff allocation  decisions.
OFO Human Capital officials acknowledged the need to document this  process and stated that they had not yet done so because, historically,  such decisions were made informally and the current, more formalized  process is still evolving. In addition, these officials noted that the last  fiscal year was the first time OFO used the process described above and  they planned to make further changes to the process within the next 2  fiscal years.
Best practices for strategic workforce planning identified by GAO  emphasize the importance of ensuring that the methodology underlying  staffing decisions is well documented. Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government also calls for clear documentation of policies and  procedures that are readily available for examination. These standards  state that such control activities are an integral part of an entity’s  accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving  effective results. Without documented policies and procedures including  its rationale and factors considered in allocating staff, OFO’s staff  allocation process lacks transparency and is therefore difficult for CBP  officials or others to review and validate. As a result, CBP and its  stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that its staffing  processes most effectively and efficiently allocate scarce resources to  fulfill mission needs across ports.
section_title: CBP Performance Measures Do Not Reflect Progress in Achieving Trade Facilitation Goals
paragraphs: In fiscal year 2013, CBP identified 28 performance measures to assess  and report on progress toward CBP’s security and trade facilitation  goals. Nine measures were selected by DHS as Government  Performance and Results Act (GPRA) measures (these are also called  strategic measures within the department); 15 management measures  are used to inform agency decisions on program priorities and resource  allocation, and to monitor progress and performance; and 4 operational  measures are maintained by OFO to capture former GPRA measures that  OFO continues to use internally.fiscal year 2013 performance measures.)
The percent of cargo by value imported to the United States by participants in CBP trade  partnership programs is a GPRA or strategic measure, and the percent increase in  travelers to the United States enrolled in a Trusted Traveler program is a CBP operational  measure. CBP’s Trusted Traveler programs provide expedited travel for preapproved, low- risk travelers through dedicated lanes and kiosks. FAST is one of several such programs. stated that DHS would improve measurement of desired mission  outcomes and the contribution of programs, activities, and resources to  them. OFO and OA officials stated that CBP’s existing performance  measures imply that trade will be facilitated through increased  participation in trade partnership programs rather than by directly  measuring the desired outcomes. More specifically, OFO and OA officials  stated that the measure percent of cargo by value imported to the United  States by participants in CBP trade partnership programs implies that  trade will be facilitated through participation in the programs, rather than  directly measuring the desired outcomes of shorter wait times, for  example. Similarly, OFO and OA officials told us that the measure  percent increase in travelers to the United States enrolled in a Trusted  Traveler program is not intended to capture the benefits to the program  participants or trade facilitation, but, rather, is primarily an internal  program measure that captures progress toward CBP’s goal of growing  enrollment in Trusted Traveler programs, including FAST.
DHS and CBP officials stated that they have not developed more  performance measures for trade facilitation primarily because key  stakeholders, including DHS leadership and Congress, have not pushed  for this, and trade facilitation measures are difficult to develop. DHS and  CBP officials reported that they have more performance measures  focused on security and enforcement because these have been more of a  focus for stakeholders than trade facilitation. In addition, CBP officials  report that they have not created outcome-oriented measures for trade  facilitation because the results of their trade facilitation efforts are difficult  to capture in one or two measures. OFO and OA officials told us that it  can be hard to articulate trade facilitation to external stakeholders  because trade facilitation means different things to different stakeholders,  each with its own interests. However, these same concerns could apply to  outcome-oriented measures for CBP’s security and enforcement efforts,  and CBP has developed an outcome-oriented measure in that area—the  land border interdiction rate for major violations. OFO and OA officials  told us that this measure is the single best outcome measure for security,   In addition,  though they note that it is limited to passenger vehicles.OMB guidance states that proxy measures that are closely tied to the  desired outcome can be used to indirectly measure program outcomes  when programs are difficult to measure because data are not available.Potential outcome-oriented measures or proxy measures for trade  facilitation could include, for example, measures to determine the extent  to which CBP trusted shipper programs have met their goal, such as the  percentage of time FAST traffic waits a certain percentage less time than  regular commercial traffic or the ratio of FAST to non-FAST referrals to  secondary inspection.
In the absence of outcome-oriented or proxy measures, CBP’s ability to  identify and publicly report the impact of the agency’s trade facilitation  programs is limited. OFO and OA officials reported that as a result of not  having more outcome-oriented measures for trade facilitation, the agency  is less prepared to identify and report the positive impact of its trade  facilitation efforts to the public, and industry representatives we met with  noted a lack of information on the impact of CBP’s trade facilitation  efforts. CBP officials at headquarters and in the field have stated that  participation in the FAST program has resulted in shorter wait times for  program participants, but Border Trade Alliance officials and industry  representatives at two of the roundtables we held raised concerns that  FAST program participants were not receiving these benefits and were  unclear about the impact of this particular trade facilitation program.
OMB and our guidance recommend the use of outcome-oriented  performance measures to promote accountability for results. Our  guidance states that leading organizations promote accountability by  establishing results-oriented outcome goals and corresponding measures  by which to gauge progress.measuring performance allows organizations to track the progress they  are making toward their goals and gives managers critical information on  which to base decisions for improving their progress. More specifically,  we identified establishing performance goals and measures to better  translate activities into results as a useful practice to enhance  performance management and measurement processes, and we have  previously issued guidance that agencies should identify and use   This guidance further states that  outcome goals wherever possible to reflect the results of their activities.  In addition, OMB guidance encourages the use of outcome measures  because they are much more meaningful to the public. In the absence  of meaningful outcome-oriented performance measures, or proxy  measures, for trade facilitation—such as measures capturing whether  FAST participants are receiving their intended benefits of quicker  processing time and fewer inspections—it is difficult for CBP, decision  makers, and other stakeholders to gauge CBP progress in achieving the  agency’s stated trade facilitation goals.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Trade between Mexico and the United States is important to the United  States’ economic health, and the value of goods imported into the U.S.  from Mexico is on the rise. The length of time commercial vehicles wait in  line at the border affects this trade activity. However, CBP’s current wait  time data are unreliable, limiting the extent to which CBP can use wait  time data across border crossings to inform management decisions about  infrastructure investment and staffing allocation and industry stakeholders  can rely on publicly reported data. Taking steps to help CBP port officials  implement CBP’s existing mechanisms for collecting wait time data,  consistent with agency guidance, could improve data reliability and  usefulness for these purposes. Moreover, assessing the feasibility of  options for automating wait time data consistent with program  management standards could help CBP consider ways to reduce port  officials’ current burden in manually collecting the data and provide CBP  with more reliable and comprehensive data it can use to identify and  address challenges to trade facilitation.
CBP’s ability to meet its mission goals—including both security and trade  facilitation—are affected by its allocation of staff across the southwest  border, among other things. In the absence of transparency about the  methodology and process by which CBP allocates staff resources across  ports of entry, it is difficult for CBP and others to evaluate whether  existing staff have been allocated to most effectively address CBP’s  mission needs. Documenting CBP’s staff allocation methodology in  accordance with best practices for strategic workforce planning could help  better position CBP to ensure that it is allocating its staff efficiently and  effectively across ports of entry and border crossings.
In addition, it is difficult for CBP or others to gauge the agency’s progress  in meeting its trade facilitation goal because CBP does not have  outcome-oriented measures for its trade facilitation efforts. Developing  outcome-oriented, or proxy, performance measures that capture the  impact of CBP’s trade facilitation efforts, consistent with OMB and our  guidance, could help CBP officials, Congress, and other stakeholders  better assess the effectiveness of CBP’s trade facilitation programs in  supporting the agency’s overall mission and goals.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take four actions.
To improve the usefulness of southwest border crossing wait time data for  informing public and management decisions, the Commissioner of CBP  should take the following two actions:  Identify and carry out steps that can be taken to help CBP port  officials overcome challenges to consistent implementation of existing  wait time estimation methodologies. Steps for ensuring consistent  implementation of these methodologies could include, for example,  implementing the fiscal year 2008 WHTI report recommendations to  use closed-circuit television cameras to measure wait time in real time  and provide a standardized measurement and validation tool.
In consultation with FHWA and state DOTs, assess the feasibility of  replacing current methods of manually calculating wait times with  automated methods, which could include assessing all of the  associated costs and benefits, options for how the agency will use  and publicly report the results of automated data collection, the  potential trade-offs associated with moving to this new system, and  other factors such as those influencing the possible expansion of  existing automation efforts to the 34 other locations that currently  report wait times but have no automation projects under way.
To better ensure that CBP’s OFO’s staffing processes are transparent  and to help ensure CBP can demonstrate that these resource decisions  have effectively addressed CBP’s mission needs, we recommend that the  Commissioner of CBP document the methodology and process OFO  uses to allocate staff to land ports of entry on the southwest border,  including the rationales and factors considered in making these decisions.
To facilitate transparency and performance accountability for its trade  facilitation programs and meeting CBP’s goal of balancing its trade and  security missions, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP develop  outcome-oriented performance measures or proxy measures to capture  the impact of CBP’s trade facilitation efforts, such as measures to  determine the extent to which CBP trusted shipper programs have met  their goals.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, GSA, DOT, the Department of  Commerce, and the Department of Health and Human Services for their  review and comment. GSA, DOT, the Department of Commerce, and  Department of Health and Human Services did not have any comments  on the draft of the report. DHS provided written comments, which are  summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix VII. In the written  comments, DHS concurred with our four recommendations and discussed  actions to address them. However, the actions DHS identified will not  address the intent of one of these recommendations. DHS also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.
DHS agreed with our first recommendation that CBP identify and carry  out steps to help CBP port officials overcome challenges to consistent  implementation of existing wait time estimation methodologies. In written  comments, DHS officials explained that if funding is available, CBP has a  goal to automate the estimation and reporting of border wait times. To this  end, they plan to establish an internal and external stakeholder group and  identify the best candidate technologies to pilot. These steps will help  further CBP’s longer-term plans to automate wait time data collection, but  do not address the intent of our recommendation that CBP take steps to  help port officials more consistently implement existing manual wait time  estimation methodologies.
DHS agreed with our second recommendation that CBP assess the  feasibility of replacing current methods of manually calculating wait times  with automated methods. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS  officials noted that CBP has taken some steps to assess options for  automating wait time data collection at northern and southern land border  crossings and provided us with supplemental documents that included  rough cost estimates for piloting, deploying, and maintaining automation  technology. Based on this information, DHS requested that we consider  this recommendation closed. While DHS has taken positive initial steps to  address this recommendation, DHS should complete additional feasibility  analysis to fully address the intent of our recommendation and better  position the agency to decide whether and how to automate data  collection. For example, DHS written comments stated that the feasibility  of financing, funding, and operating automation technology is “reduced.”  More detailed and comprehensive cost analysis—such as estimating and  comparing the costs of different technology solutions and analyzing  potential funding sources—could help CBP assess the feasibility of wait  time automation. In addition, DHS officials noted in their written  comments that CBP has not yet identified the best technologies to pilot.  Determining the best technology, if any, for use at each border crossing  could influence the overall feasibility of planned automation across  southwest border land ports of entry.
With regard to our third recommendation that CBP document the  methodology and process OFO uses to allocate staff to land ports of  entry, DHS agreed and stated that CBP will develop and document a  standardized process for allocating CBP officers that includes  assumptions, factors, and concerns to guide the decision-making  process. If implemented effectively, these actions should meet the intent  of our recommendation.
With regard to our fourth recommendation that CBP develop outcome- oriented performance measures or proxy measures to capture the impact  of CBP’s trade facilitation efforts, DHS concurred and stated that they  plan to create a team of subject matter experts from OFO trade-related  programs to identify at least two outcome measures or acceptable proxy  measures for trade facilitation. They also noted plans to collaborate with  private sector entities in order to identify metrics of greatest concern. If  implemented effectively, these actions should meet the intent of our  recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Departments of Homeland  Security, Commerce, Transportation, and Health and Human Services;  and the General Services Administration. The report is also available at  no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777, or at GamblerR@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VIII.
section_title: Appendix I: Results of Studies on the Economic Impact of Wait Times on Cross- Border Commerce
paragraphs: To determine what is known about the economic impact of wait time on  cross-border commerce, we identified and analyzed relevant studies. We  searched academic, government, and other literature published from  January 1, 2000, to June 30, 2012, to capture a wide array of recently  published literature, and asked all relevant interviewees—including  officials with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs  and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Commerce, trade  associations, private industry, and academics—whether they were aware  of any such studies. We reviewed over 100 identified studies and  narrowed our focus to the 6 studies that determined an economic impact  of commercial vehicle wait times on the southwest border. We  interviewed officials at the organizations that sponsored each of the  qualifying studies to better understand the methodologies and limitations.  We then analyzed the studies by comparing their methodologies with best  practices for economic impact studies, including cost-benefit criteria in  Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) Circular A-94 and  comparing and contrasting the studies’ scopes, methodologies, and  findings.
subsections: section_title: CBP Study Estimated the Effect of Additional Staff at Ports of Entry on Wait Times and the U.S. Economy
paragraphs: An April 2013 CBP-commissioned study found that reduced waits at  select border crossings would result in benefits to the U.S. economy in  terms of increased gross domestic product (GDP) and jobs. This study,  conducted by the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of  Terrorism, estimates the benefit of adding one CBP officer to select  border land and air border crossings—assuming these added staff would  each open one additional primary inspection lane—in terms of reduced  waits and resulting benefits to the U.S. economy. The study found, for  example, that at seven of the biggest southwest border commercial  vehicle crossings, having one additional staff member open one  additional primary inspection lane during the 8 most congested hours of  the day would result in wait time reductions ranging from 1.5 minutes to  7.2 minutes for commercial vehicle traffic during those hours. The study  then estimated that over the course of a year, these wait time reductions  for commercial vehicles at these seven crossings would lead to direct  economic benefits of $915,000 in GDP (in 2011 dollars) and 9.3  additional jobs. CBP officials report that they plan to use the results of  this study to demonstrate the benefit of adding CBP officers. These  officials report that CBP has typically demonstrated its benefit in terms of  number of seizures and arrests, for example, but this study will permit  CBP to show an officer’s trickledown effect on the U.S. economy.
However, we identified three limitations to consider regarding the reported  economic benefits. First, this study estimated the benefits of this change  but not the costs. CBP officials state that the study was not intended to be  a cost-benefit analysis and noted that the types of costs that would have  to be considered in a cost-benefit analysis include staff salaries,  inspection booth and lane maintenance, and equipment. Second, the  study assumes that one additional primary processing lane is available to  be opened during the busiest 8 hours of the day. However, CBP officials  report that at some crossings they already open all primary inspection  lanes during peak hours. Therefore, this assumption is unrealistic or  would require CBP investment in additional primary inspection lanes.  Third, the study used CBP’s reported wait time data for fiscal year 2012,  which, as described earlier in this report, we determined are not  sufficiently reliable for analysis across crossings, among other things.  Officials who conducted this study told us that they did not test the  reliability of CBP’s wait time data but found the basic data pattern  plausible and therefore determined that the data were sufficiently reliable  for their analysis.
section_title: Other Commissioned Studies Reported That Wait Times Directly Affect the U.S. Economy, Resulting in Lost Revenue and Jobs
paragraphs: Five other studies, one of which was commissioned by DHS, have  quantified the effects of commercial vehicle wait times on cross-border  commerce and also found evidence of lost revenue and jobs. The studies’  findings are not comparable because of their differing scopes and  methodologies, but they estimate direct impacts ranging from $452 million  in the San Diego area to $1.9 billion across five cities with major border  crossings. All five studies have limitations that may have led to an  overstatement of the economic impacts of wait times. In particular, four of  these studies used economic multipliers to quantify the effect of wait time  delays on the U.S. economy. As stated in OMB Circular A-94, these  secondary effects should not be used when measuring social benefits or  costs. Rather, the reported effects should be limited to direct effects only.  Therefore, we included only the direct impacts in our summary of these  studies. The five studies’ findings and limitations are summarized in table  2.
section_title: Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the following questions:
To what extent are CBP wait time data reliable for public reporting and  informing CBP decisions on staffing and infrastructure investments?
To what extent has CBP identified infrastructure and staffing needed  to process current commercial traffic volume at southwest border  crossings with high traffic volume?
To what extent do CBP performance measures address progress  toward its goal of facilitating trade?
This report also presents information on the results of studies that have  quantified the economic impact of commercial vehicle wait times on  cross-border commerce. This information, including the methodology  used to identify these studies, is presented in appendix I.
To inform our analysis of the first and second objectives, we visited six  crossings at four land ports of entry: Bridge of the Americas and Ysleta at  El Paso, Texas; World Trade Bridge and Columbia Solidarity Bridge at  Laredo, Texas; Mariposa at Nogales, Arizona; and Otay Mesa near San  Diego, California. We selected these crossings based on their commercial  traffic volume, and geographic diversity, and to include representation of  crossings with a mix of recent or ongoing infrastructure modernization  projects. At each location, we interviewed CBP management, toured the  facility, and convened a roundtable of local industry representatives and  local government officials. To obtain a range of perspectives on  commercial vehicle traffic at southwest border crossings, we met with  representatives of 21 companies and associations (who were identified to  us as knowledgeable stakeholders) representing industries that rely on  cross-border commerce including customs brokers, trucking companies,  and distributors), as well as bridge directors and representatives of four  local government entities (the Mayors of El Paso and San Diego, the  Laredo City Manager, and representatives of the San Diego Association  of Governments) at all four cities we visited or by teleconference.  Because we focused on four land ports of entry with six commercial  vehicle crossings, our findings are not generalizable to the entire  southwest border. However, the ports we visited accounted for, in total,  approximately 70 percent of the commercial vehicle crossings into the  United States from Mexico in fiscal years 2008 through July 2012. Over  the course of our work, we also interviewed officials from agencies  involved in securing the border and facilitating trade at land ports of entry,  including officials from CBP’s Office of Administration and Office of Field  Operations, the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department  of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Highway Administration and Federal  Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the Department of Commerce  (Commerce), the Department of Health and Human Service’s Food and  Drug Administration, and the Department of State. We also interviewed  other stakeholders, including officials from the Mexican Foreign Ministry,  academics, and representatives of national trade associations, including  the American Trucking Associations and the Border Trade Alliance, to  obtain a broader range of perspectives on commercial vehicle traffic at  southwest border crossings.
To address the first objective, we reviewed and analyzed CBP’s policies  and guidance for calculating and reporting wait times to determine the  source of these data and the agency’s control over these data. We  interviewed CBP headquarters officials about the wait time data, including  data quality, data entry protocols, quality assurance procedures, and any  steps taken to improve the reliability of these data. We also interviewed  officials at the six crossings we visited about how they collect and report  wait time data. We reviewed CBP documents evaluating the quality of  CBP’s wait time data on the southwest border, including a fiscal year  2008 CBP Commercial Wait Times Analysis Report.documentary and testimonial evidence of how wait times are currently  being calculated by officials at land ports of entry on the southwest border   We compared  against CBP policies and guidance to identify any discrepancies. We  reviewed CBP’s data and reports on wait times for the six crossings for  fiscal year 2012. In addition, to obtain non-CBP perspectives on CBP’s  methods for calculating wait times and the quality and usefulness of  CBP’s wait time data, we interviewed DOT officials, local officials, industry  groups, and a Mexican official. We compared CBP’s policies and  procedures for collecting and maintaining wait times data with criteria in  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. According to  the assessment, the usefulness of the wait time data is limited and the  reliability of the data is not insufficient for certain purposes, such as for  comparisons across ports. To determine how CBP officials use the  agency’s wait time data to inform management decisions, we analyzed  CBP guidance, policy, and other documents as well as interviewed CBP  officials from headquarters and the six crossings to determine the extent  to which wait times are a factor in CBP staff allocation decisions and  infrastructure investment requests and decisions. To determine the status  of DOT’s pilot projects to automate wait time data at the southwest  border, we interviewed officials at DOT’s Federal Highway Administration,  Texas Department of Transportation, and Texas A&M University and  reviewed documentary evidence they provided. We compared evidence  of CBP’s stated plans to automate wait times with criteria on standards for  program management.
To address the second objective, we reviewed and analyzed CBP and  GSA assessments of land port of entry condition and capacity, such as  CBP’s Strategic Resource Assessments and GSA’s BorderWizardTM  reports. We also interviewed CBP and GSA officials about infrastructure  needs at land border crossings and how these needs are identified and  prioritized. We reviewed documentation of CBP’s workload staffing  model, which is used to determine staff needs at land ports of entry, and  interviewed CBP officials about the agency’s staff allocation policies and  processes and compared these with criteria in our previous work on  human capital management and Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government. In addition, we conducted an analysis of CBP’s  hourly data on traffic volume and number of primary lanes open at the six  selected crossings to determine the extent to which CBP has utilized  primary lanes for commercial vehicle traffic from fiscal years 2008 through  2012. We selected this 5-year period to provide a sufficiently long time  period for trend analysis. As our analysis focused on identifying trends in  routine commercial vehicle traffic by crossing, we included both Free and  Secure Trade (FAST) and non-FAST traffic volume and lanes, but   To ensure data reliability, we did  excluded hazardous materials traffic.not include any records on traffic volume or lanes open that fell outside  CBP’s reported hours of operation. In addition, within the reported hours  of operation, we included the data in our analysis for any given hour if  CBP provided records for both traffic volume and lanes open. We  conducted this analysis for the six crossings we visited; thus our findings  are not generalizable to the entire southwest border. However, these six  crossings processed approximately 70 percent of commercial vehicle  traffic coming into the United States from Mexico for fiscal year 2008  through July 2012. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed  relevant documentation; interviewed knowledgeable agency officials; and  electronically tested for missing data during hours of operation, outlier  records outside of hours of operation, and obvious errors (such as data  records showing traffic being processed when no lanes were reportedly  open). We also reviewed related internal controls and traced a selection  of data to source files. We determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of our report.
In addition, to address the second objective, we asked CBP officials at  headquarters, field offices, and ports of entry about (1) the sufficiency of  staffing levels and infrastructure capacity to process the current volume of  commercial traffic at the six crossings we visited, (2) CBP assessment  and consideration of any staffing or infrastructure gaps when making  resource allocation decisions, (3) CBP actions and plans to address any  of these gaps, and (4) any challenges to effectively responding to any  gaps that CBP identified. We also discussed CBP processes for  determining staff needs at land ports of entry and allocating staff to the  ports of entry. We then compared CBP’s staffing policies and processes  with criteria in our previous work on human capital management and  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. In addition,  we discussed CBP’s workload staffing model and how it has been used to  inform staffing processes with CBP officials responsible for the model. In  addition, we interviewed relevant GSA, state, and local officials, as well  as nongovernmental stakeholders regarding any coordinated efforts to  identify, prioritize, and implement infrastructure improvements at land  ports of entry on the southwest border.
To address the third objective, we reviewed documentation of CBP’s  fiscal year 2013 performance goals, measures, and reports. We then  assessed CBP’s measures against criteria in OMB Circular No. A-11 and  useful practices GAO previously identified to enhance performance  management and measurement processes to determine the extent to  which CBP’s existing performance measures capture progress toward  goals and incorporate successful practices. We also interviewed  relevant DHS and CBP officials about CBP’s current performance  measures, the adequacy of these measures, their perspectives on the  balance between the agency’s security and trade facilitation goals, and  the extent to which CBP uses its wait time data to measure progress.
We also identified studies that quantified the economic impact of  commercial vehicle wait times on cross-border commerce by searching  literature and asking relevant interviewees whether they were aware of  any such studies. We reviewed over 100 identified studies and analyzed  the six studies that determined an economic impact of commercial vehicle  wait times on the southwest border. A more detailed description of our  methodology and the results of these studies are presented in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to July 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix III: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Capital Investment Planning Process
paragraphs: This appendix describes CBP’s reported process for identifying and  prioritizing its infrastructure investment needs at land ports of entry on the  northern and southwestern land borders.
According to CBP documents, CBP identifies and prioritizes the  infrastructure needs of land ports of entry through a six-part process that  culminates in a 5-year-plan. The Department of Homeland Security  Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2009 required beginning in fiscal year  2010 and every year thereafter, that CBP’s annual budget submission for  construction include, in consultation with GSA, a detailed 5-year plan for  all federal land port of entry projects with a yearly update of total  projected future funding needs.investment plan (CIP), includes gathering data through Strategic  Resource Assessments (SRA), scoring identified needs at each land port  of entry using data and information gathered from the SRA, conducting a  sensitivity analysis on the initial ranking of needs, assessing projects’  feasibility and risk, using the information gathered from the previous steps  in the process to develop and issue CBP’s 5-year capital investment plan,  and assessing the CIP process. Each step is described in further detail  below.
This process, known as the capital  1.  Strategic Resource Assessments  According to CBP, the first stage in the CIP is to conduct SRAs, which  are infrastructure needs assessments intended to gather and present  data to support the prioritization of CBP’s facility projects on a national  level. The SRA includes internal and external stakeholder input,  workload and personnel forecasts, space capacity analyses,  architectural evaluation of port facilities, and recommended options to  meet current and future space needs.  2.  Capital Project Scoring  Once CBP has completed the SRAs, the agency scores the  infrastructure needs of each land port of entry by the criticality of its  need for modernization using the data collected by the SRA. This  score is calculated by combining the data collected in the SRA with 60  distinct criteria within the predefined four categories (see table 3),  adjusted to reflect the relative weight of each category. For example,  factors CBP considers under the Personnel and Workload Growth  category include current and projected commercial vehicle traffic  volume as well as the current peak and projected number of  inspections personnel over the next 10-year period.
Table 4 summarizes the priority rank assigned to the SRA-identified  infrastructure needs at land ports of entry on the southwest border that  process commercial vehicle traffic. The crossings are listed below in order  of their ranking relative to CBP’s entire portfolio of land ports of entry on  northern and southwestern borders, including facilities that process bus,  commercial, passenger, pedestrian, and rail traffic.
CBP applies a sensitivity analysis of the initial ranking to determine if  the results should consider factors unaccounted for through the  standard SRA process, such as any unique regional conditions;  bilateral planning and international partner interests; or interests of  other U.S. federal, state, or local agencies. According to CBP officials,  recent examples of factors CBP has considered include the  identification of new manufacturing developments immediately  adjacent to an existing land port of entry facility that would increase  the demand for commercial processing capacities, facility damage  resulting from floods that occurred after the SRA was completed in  2006, and the development of new land port of entry facility proposals  in the same transportation region as an existing facility. CBP officials  report that this information helps CBP identify additional drivers,  constraints, and legislative mandates that may change the critical  needs ranking.  4.  Risk and Feasibility Assessments  In this phase, CBP coordinates with key project stakeholders such as  GSA to evaluate the feasibility and risk associated with project  implementation including environmental, cultural, and historic  preservation requirements as well as land acquisition requirements.  Additionally, according to senior CBP officials, CBP considers the  likelihood of obtaining the necessary resources to fund the proposed  project.   5.  5-Year Capital Investment Plan  Once CBP has taken the previous steps, it uses the information and  analyses to develop its capital investment plan, in coordination with  GSA. CBP and GSA update the capital investment plan annually,  taking into account any changes in DHS’s mission and strategy, the  changing conditions at land ports of entry, and any other factors  discovered in the course of projects already under way. With each  update, CBP identifies which projects are of highest priority. GSA then  works with CBP to identify which projects may be considered for near- term design and construction funding, which require an initial or  updated feasibility study, or which require further evaluation to  account for issues such as environmental and local community  concerns.   6.  Assessment of the CIP Methodology  In response to expected budget constraints and as a general  revalidation of its existing planning cycle, according to CBP Office of  Administration officials and CBP documents, CBP is revisiting the  process it uses to develop the 5-year plan. Although the assessment  is in development, CBP aims to better incorporate up-front  stakeholder involvement, place additional emphasis on state and local  government-driven master planning fed by regional trend analyses,  adopt a consistent and comprehensive communications approach,  evaluate alternative funding mechanisms, assess broader  programmatic needs, and target high-impact and lower-cost  investments.
section_title: Appendix IV: Ongoing, Planned, or Completed Land Port of Entry Renovation Projects, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012
paragraphs: The tables in this appendix summarize infrastructure improvement  projects that CBP and GSA officials reported were completed from fiscal  year 2008 through 2012 at southwest border land ports of entry that  process commercial traffic as well as infrastructure improvement projects  GSA and CBP reported to be ongoing or in planning or design phases as  of May 2013. GSA’s Federal Buildings Fund included $564 million for  land port of entry infrastructure improvement projects in fiscal years 2008  through 2010 and none in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. In addition, the  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 allocated  $300 million for the GSA-owned land ports of entry that is being used to  provide design or construction funds to seven new or ongoing capital  projects. CBP officials reported that the completed projects presented in  table 4 cost a total of approximately $115 million and estimates that  ongoing and planned projects to renovate these land ports of entry,  presented in table 5, will cost approximately $370 million.
Table 5 summarizes the five infrastructure improvement projects GSA  completed at southwest border land ports of entry that process  commercial traffic in the period of fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Three  of these projects were at crossings we visited—World Trade Bridge in  Laredo, Texas; Ysleta in El Paso, Texas; and Otay Mesa near San Diego,  California.
Table 6 summarizes the three ongoing GSA infrastructure improvement  projects at southwest border land ports of entry that process commercial  traffic as of May 2013.
Table 7 summarizes the one planned infrastructure improvement project  at a southwest border land port of entry that processes commercial traffic.  .
section_title: Appendix V: Average Hourly Traffic Volume and Average Hourly Percentage of Lanes Open Per Month, Fiscal Years 2008-2012
paragraphs: This appendix provides additional information on the average hourly  traffic volume and average hourly percentage of lanes open per month at  selected crossings, for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Table 8 describes,  for each of six selected land border crossings on the southwest border  that process commercial vehicle traffic, (1) the year the crossing was built  and last renovated, and (2) the number of primary inspection lanes for  commercial vehicles in fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Figures 4 to 9  illustrate the layout of five of the six selected crossings and the primary  inspection lanes of the remaining crossing for which CBP was not able to  provide an aerial photo. Tables 8 through 13 provide the average hourly  traffic volume, per month and the average hourly percentage of lanes  opened, per month, at each of six selected crossings that process  commercial vehicle traffic on the southwest border for the period fiscal  years 2008 through 2012. Figures 10 through 15 graphically depict the  average hourly traffic volume and average hourly percentage of lanes  open per month for each of the six selected crossings.
section_title: Appendix VI: Performance Measures for U.S. Customs and Border Protection Activities, Fiscal Year 2013
paragraphs: Table 15 lists the 28 performance measures DHS and CBP are using in  fiscal year 2013 to assess and report on CBP progress toward the  agency’s security and trade facilitation goals. These CBP-focused  performance measures include the following:
Nine measures selected by DHS as Government Performance and  Results Act (GPRA) measures. (These are also called strategic  measures within the department.) These measures are aligned with  the goals and objectives in DHS’s Quadrennial Homeland Security  Review Report and publicly reported to communicate achievement of  these strategic goals and objectives.
Fifteen management measures that are not reported publicly but  rather inform internal CBP decisions on program priorities and  resource allocation, and to monitor progress and performance. CBP  officials report, for example, that these measures are used in crafting  the department’s budget justification.
Four CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) operational measures that  capture former GPRA measures that OFO uses internally to evaluate  senior officials’ performance, for example.
section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Lacinda Ayers, Assistant  Director; Claudia Becker; Sarah Kaczmarek; and Michael Lenington  made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were  Pedro Almoguera, Frances Cook, Juan Gobel, Eric Hauswirth, Phil Herr,  Stan Kostyla, Jessica Orr, Minette Richardson, and Loren Yager.