Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote
Published: 2005-09-27T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO's past work and the work of others has shown that challenges processing voter registration applications and maintaining voter registration lists can result in individuals arriving at polls on Election Day to find they were not listed as registered. GAO surveyed local election officials in 14 jurisdictions in 7 states (AZ, CA, MI, NY, TX, VA, and WI) to obtain their views on managing voter registration for the 2004 election. GAO selected the 7 states considering characteristics relevant to voter registration, such as whether a statewide voter registration list existed prior to the enactment of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002. Locations were selected within each state to represent one small and one large election jurisdiction. This report discusses election officials' characterization of (1) challenges receiving voter registration applications, including checking them for completeness; (2) removing voters' names from voter registration lists and ensuring that names were not inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing HAVA's provisional voting and identification requirements. HAVA, in part, requires that states offer provisional ballots to voters not listed as registered who declare eligibility and first-time voters who registered by mail after January 1, 2003, and could not provide identification. GAO offered election officials the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses used to prepare this report.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Local election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions GAO surveyed after the November 2004 election reported facing some challenges processing voter registration applications and took steps to address them. Processing applications received from voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental organizations posed a challenge to election officials in 12 of the 14 jurisdictions, while half of the officials reported challenges receiving applications from other external sources, such as motor vehicle agencies. Challenges occurred in processing these applications for reasons such as incomplete or inaccurate information on voter registration applications. Half of the officials reported that their offices faced challenges checking applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates, citing, among other things, insufficient staffing to check the applications. Steps taken by election officials to address these and other challenges included hiring additional staff to handle the volume of applications received and contacting applicants to get correct information. All but 1 of the 14 election officials reported that, using various sources of information, they removed names from voter registration lists during 2004 if, for example, voters had moved, were deceased, or were ineligible due to a felony conviction. To help ensure names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from voter registration lists, officials reported contacting voters to confirm removal, matched voters' identifying information (such as name and address) with address changes provided by the U.S. Postal Service, and matched voter registration records with felony or death records. GAO reported in June 2005 about problems officials in these same jurisdictions experienced verifying voter information with death or felony information from existing data sources. GAO's survey showed that all 14 election jurisdictions permitted citizens to cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. HAVA gives states discretion to implement provisional voting based on state voter eligibility requirements. According to the election officials surveyed, about 423,000 provisional ballots were cast in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions, and 70 percent of those votes were counted. Also, 8 of the 14 jurisdictions reported challenges implementing provisional voting, in part, because some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting or staff did not have sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To address these challenges, election officials in these jurisdictions said they hired extra staff or provided training to poll workers.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: After the November 2000 election, reports in the media and elsewhere  have questioned the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration and  voter registration list maintenance by highlighting accounts of individuals  who thought they were registered being turned away from polling places  on Election Day. In managing the voter registration process and  maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials must  balance two goals—(1) minimizing the burden on eligible people of  registering to vote and (2) ensuring that voter lists are accurate (limited to  those eligible to vote), which includes ensuring that appropriately  registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter registration  lists. All the while, state and local election officials must try to ensure that  eligible citizens have the opportunity to cast their votes and have them  counted accurately in federal, state, and local elections.
Over the last several years, federal legislation has been enacted to expand  the opportunities for citizens to become registered to vote, improve the  accuracy of voter registration lists, and ensure that eligible voters have the  opportunity to cast their ballots. In 1993, the National Voter Registration  Act (NVRA), commonly called the Motor Voter Act, was enacted. Among  other things, NVRA expanded the opportunity of citizens to register to  vote in federal elections at state motor vehicle agencies and other public  organizations, such as public assistance agencies and armed forces  recruiting centers.  NVRA also limited the circumstances under which  states could remove the names of eligible voters from registration lists for  federal elections and required states to take certain steps to accurately  maintain such voter registration lists by removing the names of certain  types of ineligible persons. In 2002, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)  was enacted and, among other things, it requires states to implement  provisional voting for elections for federal office.  HAVA, in general,  requires that individuals not listed as registered or whose eligibility is  questioned by an election official must be notified about and permitted to  cast a provisional ballot that is set aside for review by election officials at  a later time so that they can determine whether the person is eligible to  vote under state law. HAVA also requires that provisional ballots be  provided to first-time voters who had registered to vote by mail on or after  January 1, 2003, but were unable to show photo identification or another  qualifying identification document when voting in person or by mail in a  federal election. In addition, HAVA requires that election officials must  provide access to information that permits voters to learn if their  provisional ballot was counted, and, if not, why not.
Our work, which began in January 2004, focuses on the efforts of local  election officials in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states to manage the  registration process, maintain accurate voter registration lists, and ensure  that eligible citizens in those jurisdictions had the opportunity to cast  ballots during the 2004 election. Specifically, for the 2004 election, we are  reporting on election officials’ characterization of their experiences with  regard to (1) managing the voter registration process and any challenges  related to receiving voter registration applications; checking them for  completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and entering information into  voter registration lists; (2) removing voters’ names from voter registration  lists and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed; and (3) implementing HAVA provisional voting and identification  requirements and addressing any challenges encountered related to these  requirements. We are also providing information on motor vehicle agency  (MVA) officials’ characterization of their experiences assisting citizens  who apply to register to vote at MVA offices and forwarding voter  registration applications to election offices. This information is contained  in appendix VIII.
In addition to this report, we have also issued, or plan to issue this year,  reports on other specific election issues. In June 2005, we issued a report  on the efforts of state and local election officials in seven states—the same  seven states and local jurisdictions covered in this report—to ensure that  voter registration lists are accurate. Later this year we plan to issue  reports on (1) actions by nine states without HAVA waivers to create and  maintain computerized, statewide voter registration lists as of January 1,  2004; (2) significant security and reliability concerns that have been  identified for electronic voting systems; and (3) the Department of  Defense’s implementation of the Federal Voting Assistance Program to  facilitate absentee voting by military personnel during the November 2004  election. These reports respond to congressional requests made prior to  the November 2004 election. In addition, given concerns about the  November 2004 election process, we are undertaking a broader, more  comprehensive study of election administration and processes related to  the November 2004 general election. This more comprehensive study,  which we plan to issue in 2006, will address activities and challenges— people, processes, and technology—associated with each major stage of  election administration to include registration, absentee and early voting;  Election Day preparation and activities; and vote counting and  certification. In October 2001, we issued a similar report that focused on  how elections were conducted in the United States, and the people,  processes and technology that were generally associated with the  preparation for and administration of elections. Among other things, the  report discussed the activities and challenges associated with each stage  of election administration, including voter registration.
To address our objectives for this report, we analyzed information  collected from elections and motor vehicle agency offices in seven  states—Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and  Wisconsin. Our selection of the seven states is geographically diverse, and  took into consideration a range of voter registration-related factors and  unique characteristics of the states that might affect the implementation of  HAVA. Specifically, we selected states that took various approaches for  administering elections—for example, Wisconsin has same-day  registration, which exempts the state from the HAVA provisional voting  requirement; Arizona has on-line registration; Michigan has a reputation as  a model for registration practices; and some local jurisdictions administer  elections at the county level and others at the city or township level.  Within each of the seven states, using population data from the 2000 U.S.  Census, we then selected two jurisdictions: a local jurisdiction with a large  population and a local jurisdiction with a small population. Other criteria  we applied to select these jurisdictions included the proximity of the  locations to our site visits with state election and motor vehicle officials,  suggestions by state election officials, and proximity to a local motor  vehicle office. The 14 jurisdictions we selected were Gila and Maricopa  Counties, Arizona; Los Angeles and Yolo Counties, California; City of  Detroit and Delta Township, Michigan; New York City and Rensselaer  County, New York; Bexar and Webb Counties, Texas; Albemarle and  Arlington Counties, Virginia; and the cities of Franklin and Madison,  Wisconsin. The selected states and jurisdictions are the same states and  jurisdictions we discussed in our June 2005 report.
We gathered information from state and local officials using a multi- pronged approach. First, we reviewed relevant laws, state reports, and  documents related to the voter registration process in the seven states.  Second, we interviewed state and local election officials in the seven  states and 14 jurisdictions to obtain information on their registration  processes and implementation of the HAVA requirements for provisional  voting and voter identification. Third, we sent a survey to election officials  in the 14 jurisdictions to gather information about their experiences with  the November 2004 election. We developed our survey questions on the  basis of our review of laws, reports, and documents and our interviews  with state and local election officials in the seven states and 14  jurisdictions. Our survey primarily asked questions on (1) challenges, if  any, in processing voter registration applications—specifically, challenges  receiving voter registration applications from MVAs, other NVRA agencies,  and voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental  organizations; checking voter registration applications for completeness,  accuracy, and duplicates; and entering voter information into registration  lists or systems; (2) whether names of registrants were removed from  voter registration lists, reasons why names were removed, and steps taken  to ensure that names of eligible registrants were not inadvertently  removed; and (3) HAVA’s provisional voting and first-time voter  identification requirements—specifically, the number of provisional  ballots cast and counted, including reasons why jurisdictions did not count  provisional ballots if this did occur; how voters were informed about  provisional voting and its outcome; and whether first-time voters who  registered by mail were allowed to cast provisional ballots if they did not  provide required identification. Appendix II provides a copy of the survey  we sent to each jurisdiction.
Finally, to provide information on MVA officials’ characterization of their  experiences with voter registration applications received before the  November 2004 election, we sent a survey to state and local MVA officials  in six of the seven states and 12 of the 14 jurisdictions. The survey  primarily asked questions about the MVA offices’ experiences with   (1) assisting citizens with completing voter registration applications,   (2) forwarding the applications to election offices, and (3) responding to  individuals and state or local election officials who contacted their offices  about individuals who declared they had applied to register to vote at MVA  offices but their names were not on voter registration lists when they went  to vote in the November 2004 election. Appendix IX provides a copy of the  survey we sent to the MVA officials.
We did not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of  responses provided from our surveys of election officials and MVA  officials. However, local election officials and state and local MVA officials  we surveyed were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their  responses for this report and, on the basis of the comments we received,  we made technical changes, where appropriate. The results of our work  cannot be generalized to state and local election jurisdictions and MVA  offices at the state level or nationwide.
We conducted our work from January 2004 through September 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Appendix I discusses our scope and methodology in greater detail.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and  federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of both their  own elections and federal elections. They also regulate various aspects of  the elections process, including, for example, ballot access, registration  procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of polling places,  provision of Election Day workers, and counting and certifying the vote.  Although the states are responsible for running elections, Congress has  authority to affect the administration of elections. Congress’ authority to  regulate elections depends upon the type of election. With regard to  federal elections, Congress has constitutional authority over both  congressional and presidential elections. In addition, with respect to  federal, state, and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments  authorize Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory  acts.
subsections: section_title: Federal Laws Affecting Voter Registration and Provisional Balloting
paragraphs: Under its various constitutional authorities, Congress has passed  legislation regarding the administration of elections, including voter  registration, voter registration list maintenance, and provisional voting. In  1993 Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, also  known as the “motor voter” law, to establish registration procedures  designed, in part, to “increase the number of eligible citizens who register  to vote in elections for Federal office. . . . protect the integrity of the  electoral process. . . .  ensure that accurate and current voter  registration lists are maintained.” NVRA expanded the number of locations  and opportunities for eligible citizens to apply to register to vote. Under  NVRA, an eligible citizen conducting certain transactions at a motor  vehicle agency—such as applying for, renewing, or changing the address  on a driver’s license—can simultaneously apply to register to vote in  elections for federal office or, if applicable, change the voter’s address.  Also, various agencies, such as those involved in providing public  assistance, U.S. armed forces recruitment offices, and offices in a state  providing state-funded services to people with disabilities, must be  designated as voter registration agencies. Each state may also designate  other offices as voter registration agencies, such as public libraries,  schools, offices of city and county governments, and unemployment  compensation offices. In addition, NVRA requires states to accept and use  a mail-in registration application developed by the Federal Election  Commission.
NVRA also outlined various requirements for the processing of registration  forms and maintenance of voter registration lists for elections for federal  office. Under NVRA, agencies designated as voter registration agencies,  such as motor vehicle agencies, are to transmit completed voter  registration forms to the appropriate state election officials not later than  10 days after the date of acceptance or, if accepted within 5 days before  the end of the registration deadline for an election, the forms are to be  transmitted not later than 5 days after acceptance. Also, under NVRA, the  names of people who are registered to vote may not be removed from  voter registration lists for federal elections except for the following  reasons: upon written confirmation of a change of address outside the  election jurisdiction; on the grounds that the voter has changed address to  a location outside the election jurisdiction on the basis of change of  address information from USPS, but only if there is also a failure to  respond to confirmation mailings and a failure to vote in any election  within two subsequent general federal elections; the request of the voter;  the death of the voter; a criminal conviction, as provided by state law; and  mental incapacity, as provided by state law.
HAVA was enacted in October 2002 and, in addition to establishing  requirements for provisional ballots for federal elections effective 2004,  the law requires, in general, that individuals who registered by mail on or  after January 1, 2003, and have not voted in a federal election beginning in  2004 in the state since registering to vote to show photo identification or  another qualifying identification document when voting in person or by  mail in a federal election. Under HAVA, the other qualifying documents  that can be provided to show proof of identity and residency are a copy of  a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, pay check, or  other government document that shows the voter’s name and address.
section_title: Voter Registration in States and Local Jurisdictions
paragraphs: Voter registration is a prerequisite in nearly all voting jurisdictions and is  based on state designated voter eligibility requirements. Ensuring that  eligible persons are registered to vote is an ongoing challenge for election  officials and is complicated by factors such as jurisdiction size, mobility of  voters, and community diversity. Communities with large student or  military populations must manage voters constantly moving in or out of a  jurisdiction, and communities with diverse populations must handle  substantial numbers of new citizens and face language challenges in  communicating voter registration requirements. U.S. citizens who meet  state voter eligibility requirements have numerous opportunities to  register to vote and can do so by filling out and submitting applications by  certain deadlines. States establish voting eligibility requirements that  generally include that the voter is at least 18 years of age on the day of the  election, a citizen of the United States, mentally competent, and meets  state eligibility qualifications regarding felon status. In general, to register  to vote, eligible citizens may apply at local election offices or at motor  vehicle agencies and other agencies, such as public assistance agencies,  covered by NVRA; by submitting applications to local election officials; or  through registration drives sponsored by various groups, including  political parties. Figure 1 illustrates some of the opportunities citizens  have to apply to register to vote.
Information commonly requested on applications to vote can include full  name, address, citizenship status, and signature; other information  requested may include date of birth, social security number, gender, race,  and/or place of birth. Figures 2 and 3 provide sample registration forms  from two of the jurisdictions we visited.
Once an application is received and accepted, state and local jurisdictions  compile registration applications into lists of registered voters. A citizen’s  access to voting is based primarily on the appearance of his or her name  on such a list. For votes cast absentee by mail (absentee voting), for votes  cast in person prior to Election Day (early voting), and for votes cast at the  polls on Election Day, election officials typically verify an individual’s  eligibility using a list of registered voters or a poll book before allowing  him or her to vote. Election officials also update and delete information  from voter registration lists. However, NVRA’s provisions specifically  prohibit removing a name from the voter registration list for a federal  election solely for failure to vote or for a change of address to another  location within the same election jurisdiction.
section_title: Selected Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Processing Voter Registration Applications and Various Steps They Took to Address Them
paragraphs: In our survey of election officials, all but one of the jurisdictions reported  that they faced challenges receiving and processing voter registration  applications and that they took various steps to address them. Most of  these challenges occurred with applications received from voter  registration drives sponsored by non-governmental organizations. Election  officials in half the jurisdictions also reported challenges checking voter  registration applications for completeness, or for accuracy, or for  duplicates. And when asked to what extent elections staff experienced  challenges entering voter information into voter registration lists, 4 of 14  jurisdictions reported this as being a challenge, to some extent. Election  officials reported taking steps to address these challenges by hiring extra  staff, among other things. Over the past few years, our work and the work  of others have found that challenges processing voter registration  applications can result in eligible citizens not being registered to vote on  Election Day.
subsections: section_title: Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Receiving Voter Registration Applications from Various Organizations External to Election Offices
paragraphs: Our survey of election officials representing the 14 jurisdictions showed  that staff in most of these offices reported challenges receiving voter  registration applications from various organizations external to election  offices and most of these challenges occurred with applications received  from voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental  organizations. Citizens in the states and jurisdictions covered by our  survey can register to vote with various organizations external to election  offices. In all of the jurisdictions—except those in Wisconsin, which is  exempt from NVRA because it permits voters to register at the polling  place on Election Day—citizens can apply to register to vote at MVAs and  other NVRA agencies. Also, as mentioned earlier, citizens can register to  vote during registration drives sponsored by political parties. Applications  from these organizations are then sent electronically, or by mail, or are  hand-delivered to election offices. Figure 4 shows the extent of challenges  encountered in the 14 jurisdictions as reported by the election officials  representing those jurisdictions when receiving voter registration  applications from voter registration drives sponsored by non- governmental organizations, MVAs, and other NVRA agencies.
Election officials representing the 13 jurisdictions that reported  experiencing challenges to some extent or to a great extent receiving  applications responded that these challenges occurred for various reasons,  such as incomplete or inaccurate information on voter registration  applications or applications that were received close to or after the  registration deadline. In the states and 14 jurisdictions we selected for our  review, deadlines for submitting applications to vote varied by state, as  specified by state statute. In five of the seven states—Arizona, Michigan,  New York, Texas, and Virginia—registration applications were to be  received at the election office about 1 month before the election. In one  state, California, citizens could register 15 days before the election. In  Wisconsin, which allows “same-day registration,” eligible citizens with  required identification can register to vote at the polling place on the day  of the election.
Election officials also reported that they took a variety of steps to try to  address the challenges they encountered, including contacting individual  voters to resolve issues with incomplete or inaccurate information, adding  staff to handle the volume of applications received near registration  deadlines, and offering training to organizations sponsoring voter  registration drives. (App. III discusses in greater detail responses to our  survey with regard to receiving applications from external organizations.)
section_title: Election Officials in Half of the 14 Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Checking Voter Registration Applications for Completeness, Accuracy, or Duplicates
paragraphs: Election officials representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions also reported that  their staff experienced challenges, to some extent or a great extent,  checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or  duplicates. During interviews we conducted prior to the November 2004  election, state and local election officials told us that they take specific  steps to check voter registration applications before entering voter  information into voter registration lists. All of the officials told us that they  check applications for completeness before entering voter information  into voter registration lists, and with regard to accuracy, took steps to  verify eligibility when an applicant applies to register. For example,  officials in Arizona, Texas, Virginia, and New York said that their voter  registration computer systems are programmed to calculate the age of the  applicant, on the basis of the date of birth the registrant provides, and  reject applications of individuals who will be younger than 18 years of age  on the day of the next election. At the same time, Arizona and Michigan  match their voter registration applications against state motor vehicle  agency records to verify information. Also, officials we spoke with in the  seven states said that they initially verify that an applicant resides in the  jurisdiction. Finally, to identify duplicate registrations, election officials  said that they check existing voter lists before adding new voters to the  registration lists.
Our survey asked election officials in the 14 jurisdictions the extent to  which their offices experienced challenges checking voter registration  applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates and officials  representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that their staff  experienced, to some or a great extent, challenges in at least one of these  three areas. Figure 5 shows how election officials in the 14 jurisdictions  responded to our survey regarding checking applications for  completeness, or accuracy, or duplicates.
In those instances where officials responded that checking applications  for completeness, accuracy, and duplication was a challenge to some or a  great extent, they also identified what caused the challenges to occur and  what actions they took to try to address them. According to officials in 7 of  the 14 jurisdictions, challenges occurred for various reasons—including  difficulties determining what information on the application was  inaccurate, problems contacting individuals to obtain complete and  accurate information, insufficient time between receiving the applications  and the state’s registration deadline, and lack of sufficient resources or  staff to check the applications.
Officials from these jurisdictions reported that they tried to address these  challenges by, among other things, sending letters or calling applicants to  get the correct information, asking individuals to provide information at  the polls, and hiring additional staff or having staff work additional hours.  (App. IV discusses responses to our survey regarding checking voter  registration applications in greater detail.)
section_title: Few of the 14 Jurisdictions Reported That They Experienced Challenges Entering Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Our survey also showed that few of the jurisdictions experienced  challenges entering voter information into voter registration lists and  scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration system. Once  election officials receive and address any issues associated with voter  registration applications, they enter voter registration information into  voter registration lists. In some jurisdictions with computerized  registration lists, signatures of new voters are scanned into the voter  registration system.
When asked to what extent their staff experienced challenges entering  voter information into voter registration lists, election officials  representing 4 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that entering voter  information into voter registration lists was, to some extent, a challenge  and the remainder responded little or no challenge. When asked whether  election office staff experienced challenges scanning signatures of new  voters into their voter registration system, three of eight officials  responded that scanning signatures was, to some extent a challenge. The  remaining six officials responded that this question was not applicable to  their jurisdictions. Figure 6 shows the election officials’ responses to  questions about entering voter information into lists, and scanning  signatures of new voters into registration systems.
In those instances where entering voter information into the list was, to  some extent, reported as a challenge, two of the four officials responded  that the challenge occurred because of the high volume of registration  applications received close to Election Day—a response consistent with  these officials’ responses to our questions about receiving applications  from organizations, like voter registration drives, external to the election  office. One of these officials responded that this challenge was addressed  by hiring additional staff or having staff work overtime. In those instances  where scanning signatures was a challenge to some extent, one official  responded that the challenge occurred because of the high volume of  applications, and three officials responded that the challenge occurred  because of problems with scanning equipment. Officials also responded  that they tried to address this challenge by hiring additional staff or, when  problems with equipment occurred, having the equipment fixed.
For example, an election official in one county reported that staff faced  some challenges entering voter information into the registration list and  scanning new voters’ signatures into the voter registration system because  the election office (1) needed to hire additional staff to ensure information  from voter registration applications was in the voter registration list by  Election Day and (2) had problems with the scanning equipment.  To  address challenges associated with entering and scanning voter  information, the county official reported that additional staff were hired,  staff worked additional shifts, and budget requests were submitted to  upgrade the scanning equipment. This official also reported that their  office was challenged with having to add registration information for more  than 400,000 prospective new voters to the voter registration list in the 15- day period immediately prior to the November 2004 presidential election  while also having to process more than 800,000 absentee ballot  applications during this same 15-day period. (App. V discusses responses  to our survey regarding entering information onto voter registration lists  and systems in greater detail.)
section_title: Past Reports Show That Challenges Processing Voter Registration Applications Can Result in Individuals Discovering That They Were Never Registered to Vote
paragraphs: Our past work and the work of others has shown that challenges  processing voter registration applications—including challenges receiving  timely and accurate applications, checking them for completeness, and  entering information into voter registration lists or systems—can have an  effect on whether a citizen is registered to vote. In October 2001, we  issued a report that described the operations and challenges associated  with each stage of the election process, including voter registration. We  reported that, on the basis of a telephone survey, an estimated 46 percent  of jurisdictions nationwide had problems, in general, with NVRA  registrations during the November 2000 election. Officials most frequently  noted challenges with processing incomplete or illegible applications,  applications that arrived late at the local election office, and applications  that never arrived. We stated that, according to local officials, each of  these three situations could result in individuals who show up at the polls  to vote and discover that they were never registered.
Other organizations have also reported that challenges processing voter  registration applications can result in applicants finding that they were  never registered to vote. In a 2001 report to the Congress, the Federal  Election Commission (FEC) reported on the results of a survey of election  officials in the 44 states and the District of Columbia subject to NVRA for  the period covering 1999 through 2000 on the impact of NVRA on the  administration of elections for federal office. Among other things, FEC’s  survey showed that some election officials expressed concerns about  problems identifying multiple registrations by the same individual or  applicants that provided incomplete names. Also, according to FEC,  several states reported problems with election officials receiving  applications from MVA offices in a timely manner. Regarding the latter,  FEC stated that:  “Several States reported that motor vehicle offices in some areas failed to  transmit voter registration applications or changes of address to the  appropriate election authorities in a timely manner. The result,  unfortunately, was the effective disenfranchisement of those citizens who  had duly applied but whose registrations were not processed by election  day.”
Two years later, in another report to the Congress, FEC reported similar  findings and said that some states also noted similar problems with other  agencies charged with offering voter registration. FEC reiterated its  conclusion about the disenfranchisement of those who had applied but  whose registrations were not processed by election day and  recommended, as in the earlier report, that states develop an ongoing  training program for personnel in agencies covered by NVRA, such as  MVAs, regarding their duties and responsibilities under NVRA.
In 2001, the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, which was  organized by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of  Virginia and The Century Foundation, expressed concerns through a task  force on voter registration that delegating voter registration  responsibilities to agencies and organizations outside of election offices,  such as organizations that conduct voter registration drives, can result in  citizens who thought they had registered being turned away from the polls  on Election Day.  The Commission’s final report stated that voters can be  turned away from the polls because of administrative errors by election  offices or NVRA agencies that accept voter registration applications and  noted that, although NVRA does not require it,  “most states allow practically anyone to go out and register voters by  taking and transmitting their mail-in applications. These people thus act in  effect as deputy registrars. Election administrators we have encountered  in every part of the country tell us of numerous cases where these  unofficial registrars, often meaning well, mishandle or lose such  applications. The applicants, of course, rightly believe they have  registered. Then they show up on Election Day and find out that they are  not on the list.”
The task force on voter registration went on to say that “third party  registrars—political parties, advocacy groups and citizens groups that  conduct voter registration drives—delay to send applications or fail to  send them at all, sometimes inadvertently, sometimes deliberately.”  According to the task force, agencies other than election offices and third  party registrars take applications that are incomplete or inadmissible, such  as applications with postal boxes rather than street addresses, and  applications that are unsigned.
More recently, in May 2005, the National Task Force on Election Reform,  sponsored by the non-profit Election Center, also known as the National  Association of Election Officials, issued a report on various issues  surrounding the 2004 general election, including voter registration. The  Task Force stated that voter registration groups operated vigorously  during the 2004 election and were recognized and welcomed by election  officials. However, the Task Force expressed the concern that “when voter  registration forms are delivered to registration authorities after the close  of registration or not at all, usually at no fault of the applicant, voters find  themselves not registered and not eligible to vote on Election Day.” The  Task Force also pointed out that NVRA agencies, which have voter  registration as a secondary responsibility, are challenged to provide voter  registration opportunities to their clients in a consistent manner and,  although processes for transferring registrations accurately and efficiently  to voter registration offices have improved, breakdowns can still occur.
We did not analyze the extent to which registration applications  transferred from an external organization, like a voter registration drive or  MVA office, to an election office resulted in voters’ names not appearing  on registration lists on Election Day. However, as part of our survey of  MVA officials in six states and 12 jurisdictions, we asked if any state or  local election offices contacted MVA offices because individuals’ names  were not on the list of registered voters for the November 2004 election.  Representatives of 5 of the 18 MVA offices responded that their offices  were contacted by state or local election officials about individuals whose  names did not appear on the registration list, but only 2 of the 5 reported  data on the number of individuals affected. For example, one of  representatives who reported data on the number of individuals affected  said that the state election board—which has access to MVA customer  data—analyzed the MVA records for 1,288 individuals whose names did  not appear on voter registration rolls, but who said they had registered at  MVA locations within the state. The representative reported that the board  of elections found that 295 (23 percent) individuals had in fact applied to  register to vote and their applications were sent to the state board of  elections office. The representative also reported that, of the remaining  993 individuals, 591 (46 percent) had indicated that they did not wish to  apply to register to vote and did not complete applications; 245 (19  percent) had no record of conducting MVA business or submitting voter  registration applications at MVA offices; 128 (10 percent) conducted  Internet, mail, or phone transactions with the MVA but did not request that  paper voter registration applications be mailed to them; and 29 (2 percent)  submitted their voter registration applications after the registration  deadline. (App. VII discusses responses to our survey of MVA officials in 6  state and 12 local MVA offices in greater detail.)
section_title: Jurisdictions Reported They Removed Voter Names from Registration Lists for Various Reasons, but Took Steps to Ensure That Eligible Voters’ Names Were Not Inadvertently Removed
paragraphs: Election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions we surveyed  reported that their offices removed voters’ names from voter registration  lists during 2004 for various reasons, including at the request of the voter  and upon identification of the voter as ineligible due to a felony  conviction. However, before removing names, election officials reported  that their offices took steps to ensure that names of eligible voters were  not inadvertently removed from lists. Our June 2005 report identified list  maintenance challenges faced by election officials in the 14 jurisdictions  because of problems using felony, death, and other information from  existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter registration data.
subsections: section_title: Jurisdictions Reported They Took Various Steps to Ensure that Eligible Voters Were Not Inadvertently Removed from Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: As discussed earlier, NVRA prohibits removing a name from a registration  list for a federal election solely for non-voting but permits removal for  certain specified reasons, including at the request of the voter, by reason  of criminal conviction or mental incapacity under state law, the death of  the voter, or upon written confirmation by the voter regarding a move out  of the jurisdiction. Our survey of officials in the 14 jurisdictions showed  that all but 1 of the jurisdictions said they removed names from voter  registration lists during 2004 for a variety of reasons, including when the  voter requested that his or her name be removed, the jurisdiction received  a change of address notice from USPS, or data from other federal, state, or  local organizations showed that the voter was ineligible due to a felony  conviction or had died. In addition, before removing names, jurisdictions  reported they took various steps to ensure that the names of eligible voters  were not inadvertently removed from voter registration lists, including  sending letters or postcards to voters to confirm that the voters wanted  their names removed; sending follow-up notices to voters or phoning  voters to notify them of removal; or matching voters’ identifying  information contained in voter registration records with felony records or  death records maintained by other government organizations.
When asked if their offices removed names of any voters from voter  registration lists during 2004, 13 of 14 officials responded that, in their  jurisdictions, names were removed for a variety of reasons, including  when the voter requested that the name be removed from the list, felony  records received from federal/state/local courts or correction facilities  identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction, information  received from state/county vital statistics offices identified the voter as  deceased, and change of address information received from USPS showed  that the voter had moved outside of the jurisdiction where registered.  Table 1 shows the election officials’ responses to questions about reasons  for removing names of voters from voter registration lists.
Delta Township, MI did not respond to this question because, as the election official reported, no  names were removed from the voter registration list during 2004.
Election officials also reported that, before removing names from voter  registration lists during 2004, their offices took a variety of steps to ensure  that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from the  voter registration list. For example, election officials representing 12 of the  13 jurisdictions reported that their offices removed voters’ names from  voter registration lists at the request of the voter. However, before doing  so, officials representing 4 of the 12 jurisdictions reported that their offices  sent a letter or postcard to confirm that the voter wanted his or her name  removed from the voter registration list. Representatives of 4 of the 12  jurisdictions reported that their offices took other steps including  matching the voter’s identifying information—e.g., name, address, date of  birth, and driver’s license number—with voter records to confirm it was  the same person and requiring voters to file a document to indicate that  they were either moving out of state or, if moving to another jurisdiction in  the state, a request to transfer to another jurisdiction so that a letter can  be sent to confirm the new address. Election officials representing 3 of the  12 jurisdictions reported that their offices did not take any additional steps  before removing the names of eligible voters from registration lists.
Election officials from 11 of the 13 jurisdictions also reported that their  offices removed voters’ names from registration lists because felony  records received from federal, state, or local courts or correction facilities  identified them as ineligible due to felony convictions. Of the 11  jurisdictions, officials representing 10 reported that, before removing  names because of felony convictions, their offices matched the voter  identifying information (e.g., name, date of birth, social security number,  and address) contained in voter registration records with felony records to  confirm it was the same person. Eight of these 11 jurisdictions also sent  letters to the voters notifying them of removal on the basis of felony  convictions, and 1 of the 11 also attempted to reach the voters by phone to  notify them of removal. One of the 11 election officials reported that the  jurisdiction did not take any additional steps before removing the names  of these voters from registration lists.
Regarding deceased voters, election officials in 11 of the 13 jurisdictions  reported that they removed names from voter registration lists because  information received from state/county vital statistics offices showed the  voters as deceased. Before removing these names, all 11 of the election  officials reported that they matched the voters’ identifying information  contained in voter registration records with death records to confirm it  was the same person. According to an election official with one  jurisdiction, the jurisdiction also sent a letter to the deceased voter’s next  of kin notifying them of removal and another election official reported that  the office also asked for confirmation, and one other jurisdiction  attempted to reach the voter’s next of kin by phone. Election officials  representing 8 of the 13 jurisdictions used obituaries as a source of  information for removing voters’ names from lists and 3 of the 8 reported  that, before removing names of voters, they also matched voter records  with state or county vital statistics information. Election officials  representing 2 of the 13 jurisdictions reported that their offices relied  exclusively on obituaries as a reason for removing names from voter  registration lists.
In addition, election officials in 10 of 13 jurisdictions reported that their  offices removed names from registration lists because information  provided by USPS showed that the voters had moved outside the  jurisdiction where they were registered. Of the 10 jurisdictions, 9 election  officials reported that their offices matched the voter’s identifying  information, such as name and address, contained in voter registration  records with the data provided by USPS to confirm it was the same  person; 8 reported that they sent a notice to the voter of the removal; and 1  reported that, in addition to matching, the office sent notices and  attempted to reach voters by phone. One election official responded that  the jurisdiction sends a letter to voters and voters’ names are removed  only after they sign and return the letter, indicating they no longer wish to  be registered, and another official representing one other jurisdiction  reported that, after receiving notices from voters, the office sends the  voters letters asking them to confirm their current residence. Regarding  the latter, the official reported that, if the address is outside of the state,  voters’ names are removed from the list; if it is in the same state, the  information is forwarded to the receiving jurisdiction. (App. VI discusses  responses to our survey on removing names from voter registration list in  greater detail.)
section_title: Jurisdictions Face Challenges Maintaining the Accuracy of Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: Although officials reported that they took steps to ensure that names of  eligible voters are not removed from registration lists, election officials  still face challenges maintaining the accuracy of these lists. In June 2005,  we issued a report on the efforts of state and local officials in the same  seven states and 14 local jurisdictions to maintain accurate voter  registration lists. We pointed out that officials faced challenges  maintaining the accuracy of voter registration lists because of problems  using existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter registration  data. For example:    Some state and local officials were concerned about the timeliness of  death data—with the names of some deceased voters possibly  remaining on registration lists after the election. Also, one state official  and local officials in two states said that problems can arise in getting  timely records on residents who pass away out of state. In one  jurisdiction, an official expressed the concern that the election office  could not identify which of several voters with the same name had died  because of the lack of a birth date on some state death records.
State and local officials stated that criminal information was often  incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher. Information on felony  convictions, particularly from federal sources, was not useful because  the information was old, had limited matching criteria, or was in  different formats.
State and local officials were challenged ensuring voters resided within  an election jurisdiction because of missing information, no street  numbers in rural areas, new streets, redistricting or untimely  forwarding of new addresses.
We stated that some of these challenges might be addressed as state and  local jurisdictions implement specific HAVA provisions that require states  to (1) develop interactive computerized statewide voter registration lists  for federal elections and (2) perform regular list maintenance by  comparing the voter registration list against state records on felons and  death. However, we also pointed out that other challenges, such as  identifying duplicate registrations or deceased individuals out of state,  may continue to be issues. Our June 2005 report echoed some of the issues  highlighted in our 2001 report, wherein, on the basis of a national survey of  local election officials, we reported on challenges that election officials  identified with voter registration, such as obtaining accurate and timely  information to update voter registration lists.
section_title: All Jurisdictions Reported Enabling Provisional Votes to Be Cast but Not All Provisional Ballots Met States’ Criteria for Whether These Votes Should Count
paragraphs: HAVA, in general, requires states to implement provisional voting for  elections for federal office whereby individuals not listed as registered or  whose eligibility is questioned by an election official must be notified  about and permitted to cast a provisional ballot. Election officials  representing all 14 jurisdictions reported offering provisional voting to  voters, and 9 of the 14 jurisdictions informed voters that provisional  ballots were available by, for example, posting signs at polling places and  generating media announcements. In addition, election officials in 12 of  the 14 jurisdictions reported that their jurisdictions offered certain first- time voters—those who had registered by mail after January 1, 2003, but  did not provide a copy of required identification when they applied to  register to vote—the opportunity to cast provisional ballots even if they  were unable to provide identification at the polling place. Election  officials we surveyed reported to us that, during the November 2004  election, provisional ballots were cast in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions and in  11 of the 13, the percentage of ballots counted ranged from none to nearly  90 percent. Overall, on the basis of the data reported by election officials,  the 11 jurisdictions counted 70 percent of all of the provisional ballots  cast. Table 2 shows the number of provisional ballots cast and counted, by  jurisdiction, during the November 2004 election, as reported by election  officials.
To better understand what proportion of total ballots cast constituted  provisional ballots cast, we compared the number of provisional ballots  cast, as reported in our survey, with Web-based state and local data on  total ballots cast for president for the 2004 election. Our comparison  showed that the percent of provisional ballots cast, relative to total ballots  cast in the 13 jurisdictions, ranged from less than 1 percent in 6 of the 13  jurisdictions to as much as 7 percent in one of the 13 jurisdictions. Table 3  shows the number of provisional ballots cast as a percent of total ballots  cast, by jurisdiction, for the November 2004 election.
Under HAVA, states have discretion to determine if an individual is eligible  to vote and to determine whether the provisional ballot should be counted  as a vote in accordance with state law. When asked to report the most  frequent reasons why provisional ballots were not counted after the  November 2004 election, election officials reported that the most frequent  reasons were that individuals did not meet the residency eligibility  requirements for the precincts where the provisional votes were cast,  election officials did not have evidence that the individuals had registered  or tried to register to vote before the election, and local election officials  did not have evidence that the individuals casting provisional ballots had  applied to register to vote at motor vehicle agency offices. Figure 7 shows  the main reasons that provisional ballots were not counted after the  November 2004 election in the 13 jurisdictions we surveyed where  provisional ballots were cast in November 2004.
To enable voters who cast provisional ballots in the November 2004  election to learn whether their votes counted, HAVA requires that state or  local election officials establish free means of receiving the information.  Local election officials in 12 of the 13 jurisdictions where provisional  ballots were cast for the November 2004 election said that they set up free- access mechanisms to inform provisional voters about the outcome of  their provisional votes during the November 2004 election, including toll- free telephone numbers, Web sites, and letters sent to the provisional  voters who cast provisional ballots. They also said that provisional voters  were provided written information at their polling places about how to  find out about the outcome of their provisional ballots. Eight of the 13  jurisdictions said that provisional voters had access to information about  the outcome of their ballots within 10 days after the election.
Local election officials in 8 of the 14 jurisdictions said that they  experienced challenges implementing provisional voting for the November  2004 election. In these jurisdictions, the election officials said that they  viewed provisional voting as a challenge for various reasons, including  some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting or, in one  jurisdiction representing a large number of precincts, staff reported not  having sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To address these  challenges, the officials reported that they provided additional training to  poll workers and hired additional staff to count provisional ballots within  the time frames allowed.
In addition, local election officials in 3 of the 14 jurisdictions said that they  experienced challenges verifying the identification of first-time voters who  applied to register to vote after January 1, 2003, and who did not provide  identification with their applications. Specifically, these officials said that  this requirement was very time-consuming due to the high number of  voters, they needed additional staff to send notices to these voters to  notify them that they needed to provide the necessary identification, and  the state did not have a statewide voter registration database to verify the  voters’ identification. (App. VII discusses responses to our survey on  HAVA provisional voting and identification requirements in greater detail.)
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the  report date. At that time we will make copies available to others on  request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s  Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for   our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix X.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: Our objectives were to describe election officials’ characterization of their  experiences in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states with regard to the  November 2004 election:  (1) managing the voter registration process and  any challenges related to receiving voter registration applications,  checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and entering  information into voter registration lists; (2) removing voter names from  voter registration lists and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were  not inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing provisional voting and  identification requirements in accordance with HAVA and addressing any  challenges encountered. In addition, we describe the experiences of  selected motor vehicle agency (MVA) offices during 2004 in carrying out  voter registration application procedures—specifically, assisting MVA  clients with completing voter registration applications, accepting  applications from these clients, and forwarding application to state or  local elections offices.
We first selected states and, subsequently, local jurisdictions within those  states consistent with our earlier report on maintaining accurate voter  registration lists. We selected the following states using a non-probability  sample: Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and  Wisconsin. Our selection of the seven states took into consideration  several voter registration-related factors and unique characteristics of the  states that might affect the implementation of HAVA. For example,  Wisconsin has same day registration, which exempts the state from the  HAVA provisional voting requirement; Arizona has on-line voter  registration; and Michigan has a reputation as a model for registration  practices. Also, we selected New York State because, when receiving voter  registration applications or checking applications with voter registration  lists, New York State may have to rely on social security number  verification procedures more than other states because it has a large  population who live in New York City and may not have driver’s licenses.  We also selected states to provide geographic diversity and variation in  election administration—some administer elections at the county level and  others at lower levels such as city or townships. Our goal was not to target  a particular state, but rather to identify a range of issues facing states in  managing the voter registration process, including updating voter  registration lists, and implementing HAVA provisional voting and  identification requirements. Information from these seven states cannot be  generalized to all states. Table 4 describes the voter registration-related  characteristics of each state.
Within each state, we selected the two jurisdictions using a non- probability sample. Our selection criteria for the 14 jurisdictions (2  jurisdictions in each of the 7 states) included population size, the  proximity of the locations to our site visits with state election and motor  vehicle officials, suggestions by state election and motor vehicle officials,  and proximity to an MVA office. The local jurisdictions we selected were:    Maricopa County, Arizona;    Gila County, Arizona;    Los Angeles County, California;    Yolo County, California;    City of Detroit, Michigan;    Delta Township, Michigan;    New York City, New York;    Rensselaer County, New York;    Bexar County, Texas;    Webb County, Texas;    Arlington County, Virginia;    Albemarle County, Virginia;    City of Franklin City, Wisconsin; and    City of Madison, Wisconsin.
To address our objectives, we used a multi-pronged approach. First, we  reviewed HAVA and other relevant laws, state reports, and documents  related to the voter registration process in the seven states. Second, we  interviewed state and local election officials in the 7 states and 14  jurisdictions to obtain information on their registration processes and  implementation of the HAVA requirements for provisional voting and voter  identification. Third, because so many voter registrations originate with  applications from motor vehicle agencies, we also interviewed officials  from these agencies in 10 jurisdictions to discuss their procedures for  processing voter registration applications. In Michigan, where we spoke  only with Secretary of State officials, the Secretary of State’s office is  responsible for elections and motor vehicle functions, such as issuing  driver’s licenses.
Following our site visits, we sent a questionnaire to the same officials in  the 14 local elections offices in the seven states to gather information  about their experiences with the November 2004 election. We did not  survey state election officials because voter registration and operations  are carried out at the local level (e.g., county, city, or township).  Consistent with our objectives, our survey focused primarily on (1)  challenges, if any, processing voter registration applications, specifically,  challenges receiving voter registration applications from MVAs, other  NVRA agencies, and voter registration drives sponsored by non- governmental organizations; checking voter registration applications for  completeness, accuracy, and duplicates; and entering voter information  into registration lists or systems; (2) whether voters names were removed  from voter registration lists, reasons why names were removed, and steps  taken to ensure that voters names were not inadvertently removed; and (3)  HAVA’s provisional voting and first-time voter identification requirements,  specifically, the number of provisional ballots cast and counted, including  reasons, if any, why jurisdictions did not count provisional ballots; how  voters were informed about provisional voting and its outcome; and  whether first-time voters who registered by mail were allowed to cast  provisional ballots if they did not provide identification. We also sent a  survey to the state and local motor vehicle agency officials in six of the  seven states to gather information about (1) their experiences assisting  citizens in filling out voter registration applications and forwarding  applications to election offices and (2) their experiences with the  November 2004 election related to voter registration applications.
Because our surveys were not sample surveys, there are no sampling  errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may  introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For  example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the  sources of information that are available to respondents, or in how the  responses we received are entered into a database or were analyzed, can  introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in  the development of the surveys, the data collection, and the data analysis  to minimize these nonsampling errors and help ensure the accuracy of the  answers that were obtained. For example, a social science survey  specialist designed the surveys in collaboration with our staff with subject  matter expertise. When the data were analyzed, a second, independent  analyst checked all computer programs. With regard to numbers received  as part of our surveys, such as the number of provisional ballots cast and  counted, we determined that the data reported via the surveys were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report by asking the survey  respondents to identify any limitations associated with using the numbers  provided and actions taken to check the accuracy of the numbers. We did  not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of responses  provided from our surveys of election officials and MVA officials. Local  election officials and state and local MVA officials we surveyed were  provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses for this  report and, on the basis of the comments we received, we made technical  changes, where appropriate. The results of our work cannot be  generalized to state and local election jurisdictions or MVA offices either  nationwide or at the state level. Appendix II contains the survey we sent to  local election officials, and appendix IX contains the survey we sent to  state and local officials representing MVAs.
We also reviewed state and local Internet sites, such as sites maintained by  Secretaries of State and County and City Clerks Offices to obtain data on  total ballots cast for president for the 2004 elections in the seven states  and 14 jurisdictions covered by our review. We used these data to show  the relative proportion of provisional ballots cast to total ballots cast for  each of the jurisdictions. These data were used for limited comparison  purposes; we asked election officials to verify the accuracy of these data  but we did not independently asses their reliability. In addition, we  reviewed relevant federal and state statutes pertinent to the state and local  jurisdictions covered by our review. To obtain information on the  challenges facing state and local election officials during the registration  process, we reviewed our past reports on various aspects of the election  process as well as reports by the Federal Election Commission, the  National Commission on Federal Reform, and a Task Force Report to  Accompany the Commission’s Report—both organized by the Miller  Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and the Century  Foundation—and a May 2005 report by the National Task Force on  Election Reform, sponsored by the Election Center, which is also called  the National Association of Election Officials. We also reviewed various  reports developed by the Election Reform Information Project, a  clearinghouse for election reform information and an online forum for  learning about, discussing, and analyzing election reform issues and  providing research on questions of interest to the election reform  community. After the November 2000 election, the Election Reform  Information Project received a 3-year grant from the Pew Charitable  Trusts via the University of Richmond.
Our work was performed from January 2004 through September 2005 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
section_title: Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Receiving Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office  representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges they  encountered during the November 2004 election in receiving voter  registration applications from organizations external to the election  office—motor vehicle agencies (MVA), other National Voter Registration  Act (NVRA) agencies, and non-governmental organizations that sponsor  voter registration drives; why these challenges occurred; and steps that  election officials took to try to address these challenges. The statements in  this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local  election officials and were not independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Gila County, Arizona
paragraphs: Staff in the Gila County election office experienced little or no challenges  receiving registration applications from MVA offices. However, staff faced  some challenges receiving applications from NVRA agencies other than  MVA offices and voter registration drives held by non-governmental  organizations. These challenges occurred because applications from these  sources were received after the voter registration deadline. A  representative from the county election office reported that political  candidates and parties that sponsored voter registration drives did not  send all voter registration applications to the election office after receiving  them from people who completed them. The election office tried to  address these challenges by talking to the candidates and political parties  about turning in applications on a timely basis.
section_title: Maricopa County, Arizona
paragraphs: Staff in the Maricopa County election office experienced little or no  challenges receiving registration applications from NVRA agencies other  than MVA offices. However, staff faced some challenges receiving  applications from MVA offices and faced challenges to great extent  receiving applications from voter registration drives held by non- governmental organizations. Receiving applications from MVA offices and  voter registration drives was challenging because the county election  office received applications from these sources too close to the  registration deadline. A representative from the county election office  reported encountering numerous occasions when individuals who  indicated that they wanted to apply to register to vote at MVA offices were  not given voter registration forms to complete, and consequently these  individuals were not registered to vote. Staff in the county election office  tried to address these challenges by (1) adding additional staff and  resources to update the voter registration list in time for the election and  (2) allowing the aforementioned MVA clients who showed copies of their  applications for driver’s licenses indicating that they had requested to  register to vote to complete voter registration forms so that they could be  added to the voter registration list.
section_title: Los Angeles County, California
paragraphs: Staff in the Los Angeles County election office experienced little or no  challenges receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA  agencies. However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications  from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.  These challenges occurred because the county election office received  these applications close to or after the voter registration deadline. To  address these challenges, staff from the county election office contacted  these organizations and will be developing a training program focused on  legal requirements for registering voters.
section_title: Yolo County, California
paragraphs: Staff in the Yolo County election office faced little or no challenges  receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies.  However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications from voter  registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These  challenges occurred because the county election office received the  applications after the voter registration deadline, but a representative from  the county election office said that the applications were still processed.
section_title: City of Detroit, Michigan
paragraphs: Staff in the Detroit election office faced challenges to a great extent  receiving applications from MVA offices, NVRA agencies, and voter  registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These  challenges occurred because the applications were received either too  close to or after the voter registration deadline. The representative who  responded to our survey said that the election office did not try to address  this challenge.
section_title: Delta Township, Michigan
paragraphs: Staff in the Delta Township election office faced little or no challenge  receiving voter registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies.  However, staff faced challenges to a great extent receiving applications  from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.  These challenges occurred because applications were received either too  close to or after the voter registration deadline and were incomplete. To  address this challenge, the office added these applications to the voter  registration list and sent verification letters to applicants whose  applications were incomplete. If staff in the election office was not able to  verify incomplete information on applicants before the election, the  affected applicants’ names were coded on the voter registration lists so  that poll workers could ask them to identify themselves before voting.
section_title: New York City, New York
paragraphs: Staff in the New York City election office faced little or no challenges  receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies.  However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications from voter  registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These  challenges occurred because the applications were received too close to  the voter registration deadline. To address these challenges, the city  election office requested that non-governmental organizations submit all  voter registration forms as soon as possible and not wait until the last  minute. A representative from the city election office said that most of  these groups complied with this request, but some did not. Staff in the city  election office also addressed these challenges by hiring additional data  entry staff to handle the large volume of registrations and by working  extended hours to process the applications received before the deadline.
section_title: Rensselaer County, New York
paragraphs: Staff in the county election office faced little or no challenges receiving  registration applications from MVA offices, other NVRA agencies, and  voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.
section_title: Bexar County, Texas
paragraphs: Staff in the county election office experienced little or no challenges  receiving applications from MVA and other NVRA agencies. However, staff  faced some challenges receiving applications from voter registration  drives held by non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred  because these applications were not properly completed, had missing  information, had invalid addresses, or were turned in on a Friday even  though the county election office had asked the organizations sponsoring  voter registration drives not to do so. According to the official, the latter  resulted in staff having to work overtime and weekends to process  registrations. To address these challenges, staff from the county election  office discussed these issues with leaders of the non-governmental  organizations, state election officials, and political parties, among others.
section_title: Webb County, Texas
paragraphs: Staff in the county election office faced some challenges receiving voter  registration applications from MVA offices and faced little or no challenges  receiving applications from other NVRA agencies. In addition, staff did not  know or had no basis to judge whether the office faced challenges  receiving applications from voter registration drives sponsored by non- governmental organizations. The challenges in receiving applications from  MVA offices occurred because some applications got lost in the mail and  were not received at the county election office. To address this challenge,  staff reviewed information received from the Secretary of State and MVA  offices, and mailed new applications to persons who had completed their  applications at MVA offices. Staff also installed a lock box at the local  MVA office so that MVA staff could keep completed voter registration  applications in the lock box and staff from the county election office could  pick up the applications at the MVA office 3 times a week.
section_title: Albemarle County, Virginia
paragraphs: Staff in the county election office faced little or no challenges receiving  voter registration applications from MVA offices. However, staff faced  some challenges receiving applications from other NVRA agencies and  voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. An  official from the county election office said that these challenges occurred  because (1) some NVRA agencies may not have been in compliance with  NVRA and (2) the county election office may not have received  applications from individuals who completed voter registration  applications at a voter registration drive. To address these challenges, staff  from the county election office contacted staff in NVRA agencies to  encourage compliance with NVRA and offered training to all private  groups who contacted the office about voter registration drives.
section_title: Arlington County, Virginia
paragraphs: Staff in the county election office faced some challenges receiving  applications from MVA offices and faced little or no challenges receiving  applications from other NVRA agencies. In addition, staff faced challenges  to a great extent receiving applications from voter registration drives held  by non-governmental organizations. The challenges in receiving  applications from MVA offices and voter registration drives occurred  because the county election office received applications too close to the  voter registration deadline and the county election office did not have  enough staff to handle the applications that were received. To address  these challenges, staff worked extra hours and the office extended the  hours of temporary staff to process applications and meet deadlines.
section_title: City of Franklin, Wisconsin
paragraphs: In response to questions about receiving applications from MVAs and  NVRA agencies other than MVAs, a representative from the city election  office said that this was not applicable. However, staff faced challenges to  a great extent receiving applications from voter registration drives held by  non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred because       (1) the city election office received these applications too close to or after  the registration deadline, (2) the city election office did not have enough  resources or staff to handle the applications, and (3) the applications  contained inaccurate information, which required staff in the election  office to do extensive follow-up work. To address these challenges, staff in  the city election office attempted to make direct contact with the voters.
section_title: City of Madison, Wisconsin
paragraphs: Staff in the city election office faced some challenges receiving voter  registration applications from NVRA agencies other than MVA offices and  from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.  These challenges occurred due to incomplete applications. In response to  a question about receiving applications from MVAs, a representative from  the city election office said this was not applicable. Staff in the city  election office tried to address these challenges by sending letters to the  applicants, if time allowed, and returning incomplete applications to staff  in the NVRA agencies and non-governmental organizations sponsoring the  voter registration drives.
section_title: Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Checking Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office  representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges their  offices encountered during the November 2004 election with regard to  checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or  duplicates, and if challenges occurred, why they occurred and any actions  taken to overcome them. The statements in this appendix reflect the  responses to our survey by the applicable local election officials and were  not independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Gila County, Arizona
paragraphs: Checking voter registration applications to ensure information on the  applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate  applications posed little or no challenges to staff in the election office.
section_title: Maricopa County, Arizona
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced some challenges checking voter  registration applications to ensure the information in the applications was  complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications. These  challenges occurred because local election office encountered problems  contacting the individuals to obtain complete or accurate information.  Staff in the local election office tried to address these challenges by  putting the applications in a suspense file and sending letters to the  applicants requesting the missing information.
section_title: Los Angeles County, California
paragraphs: While election staff experienced little or no challenges checking individual  applications for completeness and duplicates, they experienced  challenges, to some extent, checking the accuracy of voter registration  applications because the elections office did not have sufficient time,  resources, and staff to check them. To address this challenge, additional  staff were hired, multiple work shifts were added, and a great deal of  overtime was worked.
section_title: Yolo County, California
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced little or no challenges checking voter  registration applications for accuracy, completeness, or duplicates.
section_title: City of Detroit, Michigan
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to a great extent, checking  voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates.  The challenges they faced checking voter registration applications were  due to problems with (1) determining what information was inaccurate,  (2) contacting individuals to obtain complete or accurate information, and  (3) checking the accuracy of information in the applications against  various databases, such as motor vehicle or Social Security Administration  databases, or against state records. To overcome this challenge, election  office staff attempted to reach the applicants by telephone and mailed  response cards to them to verify the information contained in their  applications.
section_title: Delta Township, Michigan
paragraphs: Although checking applications for accuracy or duplicates posed little or  no challenge to election office staff, they experienced challenges, to some  extent, checking the completeness of voter registration applications.  These challenges occurred because hundreds of registration forms were  received too close to the registration deadline and staff encountered  difficulties determining what information was not accurate. To address  these challenges, election staff added the names of the applicants to the  voter registration lists and sent the applicants letters asking them to verify  the information contained in their registration applications. If the  applicants did not respond to the letters, their names were placed on the  registration list and if they appeared at the polls to vote, they were asked  to provide identification.
section_title: New York City, New York
paragraphs: Election office staff faced little or no challenges checking voter  registration applications to ensure information on the applications was  complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications.
section_title: Rensselaer County, New York
paragraphs: Election office staff faced little or no challenges checking voter  registration applications to ensure information on the applications was  complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications.
section_title: Bexar County, Texas
paragraphs: Election office staff faced little or no challenges checking voter  registration applications to ensure information on the applications was  complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications.
section_title: Webb County, Texas
paragraphs: Election staff experienced little or no challenges checking voter  registration applications to ensure information on the applications was  complete and to identify duplicate applications. The official who  responded to our survey did not know the extent of challenges, if any, that  staff may have experienced checking voter registration applications for  accuracy.
section_title: Albemarle County, Virginia
paragraphs: Election office staff faced little or no challenges checking voter  registration applications to ensure information on the applications was  complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications.
section_title: Arlington County, Virginia
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced some challenges checking voter  registration applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates.  These challenges occurred because the election office did not have  enough resources and staff to check the applications, and staff did not  have enough time to check the applications between the registration  deadline and when voting began. To address these challenges, staff  worked extra hours.
section_title: City of Franklin, Wisconsin
paragraphs: To a great extent, election office staff experienced challenges checking  applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates. Staff experienced  these challenges because of (1) difficulties determining what information  was inaccurate, (2) problems contacting individuals to obtain complete or  accurate information, and (3) insufficient time between the state’s  registration deadline and when voting began to check whether  applications were complete, accurate, or duplicates. To overcome these  challenges, staff from the election office attempted to make direct contact  with the voters.
section_title: City of Madison, Wisconsin
paragraphs: To some extent, election office staff faced challenges checking  applications for completeness and accuracy but had little or no problems  checking applications for duplicates. The challenges of checking the  completeness and accuracy of applications occurred because of problems  with contacting individuals to obtain complete and accurate information.  To overcome these challenges, additional staff were hired.
section_title: Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Entering Information into Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office  representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges they  encountered during the November 2004 election entering information on  eligible voters into voter registration lists, and when challenges occurred,  why they occurred and actions taken to overcome them. The statements in  this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local  election officials and were not independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Gila County, Arizona
paragraphs: Entering information on eligible voters into voter registration lists posed  little or no challenges to staff in the election office. However, scanning  signatures of new voters into the voter registration system posed  challenges to some extent because staff in the election office encountered  problems with the scanning equipment. To address the challenges of  scanning new voters’ signatures into the voter registration system, the  equipment was repaired.
section_title: Maricopa County, Arizona
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering  voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of  new voters into the voter registration system.
section_title: Los Angeles County, California
paragraphs: To some extent, election office staff experienced challenges entering voter  information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of new  voters into the voter registration system. These challenges occurred  because the election office lacked sufficient resources and staff and had  problems with the scanning equipment. To address these challenges,  additional staff were hired, and staff worked additional shifts and a great  deal of overtime. In addition, budget requests were submitted to upgrade  the scanning equipment.
section_title: Yolo County, California
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering  voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of  new voters into the voter registration system.
section_title: City of Detroit, Michigan
paragraphs: To some extent, election office staff experienced challenges scanning  signatures of new voters into the voter registration system but experience  little or no challenges entering information on eligible voters into the voter  registration lists. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter  registration system was a challenge because there were too many  applications to enter into the system by the registration deadline or  Election Day and because of problems with the scanning equipment. To  address this challenge, election office staff scanned as many signatures as  possible and waited until the equipment malfunctioning could be  corrected.
section_title: Delta Township, Michigan
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering  voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of  new voters into the voter registration system.
section_title: New York City, New York
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering  voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of  new voters into the voter registration system.
section_title: Rensselaer County, New York
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering  voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of  new voters into the voter registration system.
section_title: Bexar County, Texas
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering  voter information into voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of new  voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to this election  office.
section_title: Webb County, Texas
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering  voter information into voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of new  voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to this election  office.
section_title: Albemarle County, Virginia
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering  voter information into voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of new  voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to this election  office.
section_title: Arlington County, Virginia
paragraphs: Election office staff experienced challenges, to some extent, entering  information on eligible voters into voter registration lists because the  election office lacked sufficient resources and staff to enter the  registration application information into these lists by registration  deadline or Election Day. To address these challenges, election office staff  worked extra hours to meet deadlines for entering information on eligible  voters into the voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of new voters  into the voter registration system was not applicable to this election office.
section_title: City of Franklin, Wisconsin
paragraphs: To some extent, election office staff experienced challenges entering  information on eligible voters into voter registration lists because of the  volume of registration applications that had to be entered by the state’s  registration deadline or Election Day. To address these challenges, staff  worked extended hours and additional staff was hired to process  registration applications that were required to be entered into voter  registration lists by Election Day. Scanning signatures of new voters into  the voter registration system was not applicable to this election office.
section_title: City of Madison, Wisconsin
paragraphs: To some extent, election office staff experienced challenges entering  information on eligible voters into voter registration lists because of the  volume of registration applications that had to be entered by the state’s  registration deadline or Election Day. To address these challenges, staffing  was increased and the office operated with extended hours. Scanning  signatures of new voters into the voter registration system was not  applicable to this election office.
section_title: Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists
paragraphs: This appendix describes the responses of local election officials,  representing 14 jurisdictions on their reported experiences removing the  names of voters from voter registration lists during 2004. All but 1 of the 14  local election officials responding to our survey reported that voters’  names were removed from registration lists during 2004 for various  reasons, such as voter requested name be removed or records identified  voter as deceased or as ineligible due to a felony conviction. For  information on the reasons that election officials in each jurisdiction  removed names of voters from registration lists, see table 1. The local  election officials also reported steps that they took before removing  voters’ names from the voter registration lists in order to ensure that  names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed. The statements  in this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local  election officials and were not independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Gila County, Arizona
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal, because the voter  failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted  or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections,  but received no response to the follow-up notice;    sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address  information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had  moved to another jurisdiction or felony records identified the voter as  ineligible due to a felony conviction;    sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter wanted  his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested;    sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records  identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence;    sent a letter to the deceased voter’s next of kin notifying of removal  and asking for confirmation of the voter’s death;    contacted the funeral home to obtain the deceased voter’s identifying  information (such as name, date of birth, and address);    matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from  the state/county vital statistics offices; and    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of  Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths.
section_title: Maricopa County, Arizona
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    mailed two notices to the voter—one to the mailing address on file and  one to the residence address, if different from the mailing address—when  the office received information indicating that the voter had moved from  the address on file; if both notices were returned undeliverable, moved the  voter to an inactive registration list and if no voter activity occurred  through two federal elections, the voter’s registration was canceled;    canceled the voter’s registration when the voter requested in writing that  his/her name be removed from the registration list;    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, date  of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter registration list  with information received from various sources on changes of address  (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address list), felony  convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;    sent a letter to the voter asking if he/she wanted to remain registered in  the county when information from the U.S. Postal Service indicated that  the voter had moved to another jurisdiction, and if the voter signed and  returned the letter indicating that he/she no longer wanted to be registered  in the county, the registration was canceled;    sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records  identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction and gave the  voter an opportunity to inform the election office that the information  provided from the courts was incorrect or that the felony was overturned;  and    sent a letter to the deceased voter’s family asking to confirm the voter’s  death when information provided by the state/county vital statistics offices  or newspaper obituaries was insufficient to positively identify the voter as  deceased.
section_title: Los Angeles County, California
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  changes of address (e.g., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of  Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;    sent the voter a letter and attempted to reach the voter by phone to  notify of removal on the basis of a felony conviction; and    sent the voter a letter notifying of removal because court records  identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence.
section_title: Yolo County, California
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of  Address list), felony convictions, and deaths;    sent the voter a letter or notice of removal to confirm that the voter  wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as  requested or to notify the voter of removal on the basis of change-of- address information from the U.S. Postal Service; and    matched information from newspaper obituaries with information from  state/county vital statistics offices.
section_title: City of Detroit, Michigan
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  changes of address and deaths;    sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because the voter  failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted  or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections,  but received no response to the follow-up notice;    sent the voter a notice of removal because the voter no longer resided  in the jurisdiction; and    canceled the voter’s registration as requested by the voter and  annotated the registration card with the reason the registration was  canceled.
No steps were taken before removing a voter’s name from the voter  registration list when felony records identified the voter as ineligible due  to a felony conviction.
section_title: New York City, New York
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  changes of address, felony convictions, mental incompetence, and  deaths;    sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address  information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had  moved to another jurisdiction, or felony records identified the voter as  ineligible due to a felony conviction, or court records identified the  voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence; and    sent the voter a letter or postcard to confirm that the voter wanted  his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested.
section_title: Rensselaer County, New York
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address  information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had  moved to another jurisdiction and    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in thevoter  registration list with information received from various sources on  changes of address, felony convictions, or deaths.
No steps were taken before removing voters’ names from the voter  registration list when voters requested that names be removed or  newspaper obituaries identified voters as deceased.
section_title: Bexar County, Texas
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because the voter  failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted  or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections,  but received no response to the follow-up notice;    sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter wanted  his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested;    sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony  conviction or mental incompetence; and    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths.
section_title: Webb County, Texas
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because voter failed to  respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted or had  not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but  received no response to the follow-up notice;    sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address  information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had  moved to another jurisdiction;    sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  felony convictions and deaths;    attempted to reach the deceased voter’s next of kin by phone to notify  of removal and to ask for confirmation of voter’s death; and    matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from  state/county vital statistics offices.
section_title: Albemarle County, Virginia
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:  required the voter to file a document with the election office before any  action was taken to remove the name from registration list as the voter  requested;    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  felony convictions, mental incompetence, deaths, or change of  registration notice from another state; and    sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony  conviction.
No steps were taken before removing voters’ names from the voter  registration lists when newspaper obituaries identified voters as deceased.
section_title: Arlington County, Virginia
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address,  date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter  registration list with information received from various sources on  changes of address, felony convictions, mental incompetence, and  deaths;    sent a letter asking the voter to confirm current residence because  change-of-address information from the U.S. Postal Service showed  that the voter had moved to another jurisdiction;    sent the voter a postcard to confirm a request to remove his/her name  from the voter registration list; and    sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony  conviction or on the basis of court records that identified the voter as  ineligible due to mental incompetence.
section_title: City of Franklin, Wisconsin
paragraphs: Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps  were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently  removed:    matched voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, date of  birth, and social security number) contained in the voter registration  list with information received from the U.S. Postal Service National  Change of Address list;    sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address  information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had  moved to another jurisdiction; and    attempted to reach the voter by phone to confirm that he/she had  moved outside the jurisdiction.
No steps were taken before removing voters’ names from the voter  registration list when voters requested that names be removed or  newspaper obituaries identified voters as deceased.
section_title: City of Madison, Wisconsin
paragraphs: When the office received voter cancellation cards from other  municipalities, staff checked the voters’ dates of birth before removing  their names from the voter registration list to ensure that names of eligible  voters were not inadvertently removed from the list. No steps were taken  before removing voters’ names from the voter registration lists when  voters requested that their names be removed or newspaper obituaries  identified voters as deceased.
section_title: Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Implementing Provisional Voting
paragraphs: This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office  representatives to questions in our survey and interviews about their  experiences during the November 2004 election in implementing the  requirements in HAVA for provisional voting and identification  requirements for certain first-time voters who applied to register to vote  after January 1, 2003. Unless otherwise noted, the statements in this  appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local  election officials and were not independently verified by us.
subsections: section_title: Gila County, Arizona
paragraphs: In Gila County, 575 provisional ballots were cast and 505 of these ballots— 88 percent—were counted. For a provisional vote to count, the voter had  to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for not counting  the other 70 provisional ballots were that (1) the voters did not meet the  residency eligibility requirements, (2) the election office received voter  registration applications very close to or after the registration deadline,  and (3) the provisional ballots or the envelopes containing those ballots  were incomplete or illegible. The county election office did not experience  challenges implementing the provisional voting requirements during the  November 2004 election.
The county election office used various means to inform voters of the  availability of provisional ballots and the outcome of provisional votes.  Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that  they notified voters of the availability of provisional ballots by posting  signs at polling places. Voters were also provided with written information  at their polling places informing them that they could find out whether or  not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes were not  counted, the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast provisional  ballots could find out the outcome of their votes by calling a toll-free  telephone number, calling the local election office, calling the state  election office, and via a letter from the local election office informing  voters of the outcome of their provisional votes. Information on the  outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters  between 6 and 10 days after the election.
In response to a question in our survey asking if the county allowed first- time voters who registered by mail as of January 2003 but did not provide  a copy of identification with their applications to cast provisional ballots if  they were not able to provide identification at the polling place, the  representative who responded to the survey said this was not applicable.  Arizona passed a ballot initiative in 2004 requiring voters to show  identification prior to receiving ballots. The county election office did not  report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first- time voters.
section_title: Maricopa County, Arizona
paragraphs: In Maricopa County, 68,642 provisional ballots were cast and 50,719 of  these ballots—74 percent—were counted. For a provisional vote to count,  the voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for  not counting the other 17,923 provisional ballots were that (1) no evidence  existed that the individuals who cast these ballots had registered or tried  to register to vote directly with the elections office, (2) the voters did not  meet the residency eligibility requirement, and (3) other reasons including  election officials not receiving voter registration applications until after  the state’s deadline to register to vote. In describing challenges that the  county election office faced in implementing provisional voting for the  November 2004 election, officials from the county election office said they  had to modify the form and envelope used for provisional voting to  provide a statement for the voter to sign to indicate U.S. citizenship.
Voters were informed of the availability of provisional ballots and  outcome of provisional votes using various means. Representatives we  spoke with at the county election office told us that they notified voters of  the availability of provisional ballots by posting signs at polling places.  Voters were also provided with written information at their polling places  informing them that they could find out whether or not their provisional  votes were counted and, if the votes were not counted, the reason they  were not counted. Voters who cast provisional ballots could find out the  outcome of their votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, checking a  Web site, calling the local election office, calling the state election office,  visiting the local election office, and via a letter from the local election  office informing voters of the outcome of their provisional votes.  Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to  the voters between 6 and 10 days after the election.
In response to a question in our survey asking if the county allowed first- time voters who registered by mail as of January 2003 but did not provide  a copy of identification with their applications to cast provisional ballots if  they were not able to provide identification at the polling place, the  representative who responded to the survey said this was not applicable.  Arizona passed a ballot initiative in 2004 requiring voters to show  identification prior to receiving ballots. The county election office did not  report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first- time voters.
section_title: Los Angeles County, California
paragraphs: In Los Angeles County, 204,578 provisional ballots were cast during the  November 2004 election and 166,894 of these ballots—82 percent—were  counted. Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified  voters in any precinct within the county. The main reasons for not  counting the other 37,684 ballots were that (1) no evidence existed that the  voters had registered or tried to register to vote, (2) the voters did not sign  the voter registration forms, and (3) the voters did not provide dates or  places of birth on the voter registration forms or the provisional ballot  envelopes. The county election office experienced challenges  implementing the HAVA provisional voting requirements during the  November 2004 election and took steps to address these challenges.  Provisional voting was a challenge because staff had to prepare duplicate  ballots to remove ineligible or invalid contests when voters cast their  provisional ballots at the wrong precinct. To overcome this challenge,  staffing was increased to prepare the duplicate ballots.
Voters were informed of the availability of provisional ballots and how to  find out the outcome of provisional votes using various means.  Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that  voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots by posting  signs at polling places, conducting public education campaigns, and  working with community-based organizations. Also, they said that  information on provisional voting is contained in California’s Voting Bill of  Rights and the state’s election code. Voters were provided written  information at their polling places informing them that they could find out  the outcome of their provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone  number or the local election office. Information on the outcome of the  provisional votes was made available to the voters more than 10 days after  the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January  2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to  cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at  the polling place; 12,264 of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots  during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and elections  staff of first-time voters who were required to provide identification at the  polls because they did not provide it when they registered by mail,  notations were made to the voter file, voter roster, and absentee  identification envelope. The county election office reported experiencing  challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters.  Specifically, this proved to be a challenge because the state did not have a  statewide voter registration database to verify the identification of these  voters. To overcome this challenge, voters were requested to provide  identification at the polls and absentee voters were requested to enclose  identification with their ballots.
section_title: Yolo County, California
paragraphs: In Yolo County, 2,050 provisional ballots were cast during the November  2004 election. The representative from the election office who responded  to our survey did not know how many of these provisional ballots were  counted. For a provisional vote to count, the voter had to be a qualified  voter in any precinct within the county. The most frequently cited reason  for not counting provisional ballots were (1) a lack of evidence that the  voters had submitted voter registration applications at MVA offices, (2)  voters not providing identification as required by HAVA for individuals  who registered by mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct or  jurisdiction, and (3) voters not signing a sworn statement that they met the  qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precinct or jurisdiction. The  county election office did not experience challenges implementing the  HAVA provisional voting requirement during the November 2004 election.
The county election office used various means to inform voters of the  availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.  Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that  voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots by posting  signs at polling places and mailing sample ballots to voters. Voters were  also provided written information at their polling places informing them  that they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes by calling a  toll-free telephone number or the local election office. Information on the  outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters more  than 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January  2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to  cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at  the polling place. The representative from the county election office who  responded to our survey did not know how many first-time voters cast  provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert  pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to  provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when  they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes,  codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The county election office did  not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these  first-time voters.
section_title: City of Detroit, Michigan
paragraphs: In Detroit, 1,350 provisional ballots were cast during the November 2004  election, and 123 of these ballots—9 percent—were counted. Provisional  votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned  precincts. The main reasons for not counting the other 1,227 provisional  ballots were that the voters did not (1) provide acceptable identification or  proof of residence, (2) sign sworn statements that they met the  qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precincts or jurisdictions, or      (3) meet the residency eligibility requirements for the precincts or  jurisdictions. The election office experienced challenges implementing  provisional voting during the November 2004 election. Provisional voting  was a challenge because Detroit has the largest number of voting precincts  in Michigan, and the 6-day time frame for processing provisional ballots  was very challenging and unrealistic. To overcome this challenge, the  entire department’s employees were mobilized to process provisional  ballots.
The election office used various means to inform voters of the availability  of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes. Representatives  we spoke with at the election office told us that election staff notified  voters of the availability of provisional ballots by speaking to community  and church groups and through a voter education program. Voters were  provided with written information at their polling places informing them  that they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes by  contacting the local election office by phone and in person, and by  receiving a letter from the election office. Information on the outcome of  the provisional votes was made available to the voters within 6 to 10 days  after the election.
The city allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January  2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to  cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at  the polling place. The representatives from the city election office who  responded to our survey did not know how many of these first-time voters  cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert poll  workers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to provide  identification at the polls because they did not provide it when they  registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes,  codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The city election office did not  report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first- time voters.
section_title: Delta Township, Michigan
paragraphs: In Delta Township, four provisional ballots were cast during the November  2004 election, and one of these ballots was counted. Provisional votes are  counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts.  The reason for not counting the other three ballots was that the voters’  registration applications were postmarked after the registration deadline.  The township election office experienced challenges implementing the  HAVA provisional voting requirement during the November 2004 election  and took steps to address these challenges. Provisional voting was a  challenge because it was viewed as too complex and time-consuming for  poll workers to administer along with all the other issues they face on  Election Day. To overcome this challenge, the election office provided the  poll workers with general information on provisional voting and instructed  staff in precincts to call the election office about each provisional  envelope ballot being considered.
The election office used various means to inform voters of the availability  of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes. Representatives  we spoke with at the election office told us that voters in the township  were notified of the availability of provisional ballots primarily through the  media. Voters were also provided with written information at their polling  places informing them that they could find out the outcome of their  provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling the local  or state election office telephone number, or visiting the local election  office in person. Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was  made available to the voters within 5 days after the election.
Delta Township allowed first-time voters who registered by mail to cast  provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the  polling place. To alert pollworkers and elections staff about first-time  voters who needed to provide identification at the polls because they did  not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter registration list was  marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. None of  these first-time voters cast provisional ballots during the November 2004  election. The county election office reported experiencing challenges  verifying the identification of these first-time voters. Specifically, this was  viewed as very time-consuming due to the high volume of voters, and that  other voters suffered because this resulted in delays. To overcome these  challenges, poll workers asked for identification as needed.
section_title: New York City, New York
paragraphs: In New York City, 140,779 provisional ballots were cast and 77,804 of these  ballots—55 percent—were counted. Provisional votes are counted when  they are cast by qualified voters in their precincts. The main reasons for  not counting the other 62,975 provisional ballots were that (1) no evidence  existed that the individuals who cast these ballots had registered or tried  to register to vote directly with the elections office, (2) the envelopes or  ballots were incomplete or illegible, and (3) voters did not meet the  residency eligibility requirements. The city election office did not report  experiencing challenges with implementing provisional voting.
In response to a question about how the city election office notified voters  of the availability of provisional ballots, election office representatives  said that voters were already familiar with the system. Voters were not  provided with written information at their polling places informing them  that they could find out whether or not their provisional votes were  counted and, if the votes were not counted, the reason they were counted.  Instead, the election office sent letters to only those provisional voters  whose ballots were not counted because state election law requires  notifying only those voters whose provisional ballots were not counted.  Information on the outcome of the provisional ballots was made available  to the voters more than 10 days after the election.
The city allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January  2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to  cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at  the polling place; 551 of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots  during the November 2004 election. The names of these voters were  marked on the registration list so that poll workers knew that these voters  needed to show identification. The county election office did not report  experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first-time  voters.
section_title: Rensselaer County, New York
paragraphs: In Rensselaer County, 1,914 provisional ballots were cast and 972 of these  ballots—51 percent—were counted. For a provisional vote to count, the  voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for not  counting the other 942 provisional ballots were that (1) the county election  office received registration applications after the state’s registration  deadline, (2) no evidence that individuals had registered or tried to  register directly with the election office, and (3) voters did not meet  residency eligibility requirements. The county election office did not  report experiencing challenges with implementing provisional voting.
In response to a question about how the county election office notified  voters of the availability of provisional ballots, election office  representatives said that poll worker inspectors did so if they were not  listed in the voter rolls. Voters were not provided with written information  at their polling places informing them that they could find out whether or  not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes were not  counted, the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast provisional  ballots could find out the outcome of their votes by calling the election  office. Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made  available to the voters more than 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January  2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to  cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at  the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots  during the November 2004 election. The names of these voters were  marked on the registration list so that poll workers knew that these voters  needed to show identification. The county election office did not report  experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first-time  voters.
section_title: Bexar County, Texas
paragraphs: In Bexar County, 2,996 provisional ballots were cast during the November  2004 election and 602 of these ballots—20 percent—were counted.  Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in  their assigned precincts. The main reasons that the other 2,394 provisional  ballots were not counted were that (1) voters did not meet the residency  eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction and (2) no evidence  existed that the individuals had registered or tried to register directly with  the elections office or had submitted their voter registration applications  at MVA offices. The county election office reported experiencing minor  challenges implementing provisional voting during the November 2004  election, which included missing signatures and provisional ballots cast in  incorrect precincts. To address this issue, efforts were made to review all  available records for the missing or incorrect information, such as the  voter registration database, secretary of state records, motor vehicle  agency records, and cards containing the voters’ original signatures.
The election office used various means to inform voters of the availability  of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes, such as posting  signs at polling places. This information was also made available to voters  upon request. Voters were not provided with written information at their  polling places informing them that they could find out whether or not their  provisional votes were counted and, if the votes were not counted, the  reasons they were not counted. Voters could find out the outcome of their  provisional votes by calling the local election office or by receiving a letter  from the election office. Information on the outcome of the provisional  votes was made available to the voters within 6 to 10 days after the  election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January  2003 and did not send a copy of identification with their applications to  cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at  the polling place. The representative from the county election office did  not know how many first-time voters cast provisional ballots during the  November 2004 election. To alert poll workers and elections staff about  first-time voters who needed to provide identification at the polls because  they did not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter registration  list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The  county election office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the  identification of these first-time voters.
section_title: Webb County, Texas
paragraphs: In Webb County, 60 provisional ballots were cast during the November  2004 election and 23 of these ballots were counted. Provisional votes are  counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts.  The main reasons for not counting the other 37 ballots were (1) voters did  not meet the residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or  jurisdiction, (2) a lack of evidence that the individuals had submitted their  voter registration applications at MVA offices, and (3) the county election  office received voter registration applications after registration deadline.
The county election office did not report experiencing challenges with  implementing provisional voting.
The election office provided written information to voters who cast  provisional ballots informing them that they would receive a letter from  the election office notifying them of the outcome of their votes.  Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to  the voters in 5 days or less after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January  2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their registrations to  cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at  the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots  during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and elections  staff about first-time voters who needed to provide identification at the  polls because they did not provide it when they registered by mail, the  voter registration list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the  voters’ names. The county election office did not report experiencing  challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters.
section_title: Albemarle County, Virginia
paragraphs: In Albemarle County, 49 provisional ballots were cast during the  November 2004 election. The representative from the county election  office who responded to our survey did not know how many provisional  ballots were counted. For provisional votes to be counted, they must be  cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts. The main reasons for  not counting provisional votes were that (1) voters did not meet the  residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction because  they had moved from one jurisdiction to another within Virginia and had  not updated their voter registration records within the required time frame  and (2) no evidence existed that the individuals had submitted their voter  registration applications at MVA offices or at other NVRA agencies. The  county election office reported experiencing challenges implementing  provisional voting. Specifically, provisional voting was viewed as a  challenge because ballots were provided to ineligible voters to placate  them, given the common misperception among some voters that they  could cast ballots anywhere. In addition, because various groups created a  high level of mistrust among voters, who at times were confrontational or  disruptive, provisional ballots were provided to placate voters and to keep  order at the polls. To address these challenges, the county election office  said it would expand outreach efforts to ensure individuals who were  moving understood the need to provide the election office with a timely  change of address.
The county election office used various means to inform voters of the  availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.  Representatives we spoke with at the county registrar office told us that  voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots through the  media. Voters were also provided with written information at their polling  places informing them that they could find out the outcome of their  provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling the local  or state election office, contacting the local election office in person, or  receiving a letter from the local election office. Information on the  outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters within 6  to 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January  2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their registrations to  cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at  the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots  during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and elections  staff about first-time voters who needed to provide identification at the  polls because they did not provide it when they registered by mail, the  voter registration list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the  voters’ names. The county election office did not report experiencing  challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters.
section_title: Arlington County, Virginia
paragraphs: In Arlington County, 147 provisional ballots were cast during the  November 2004 election and 19 of these ballots—13 percent—were  counted. Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified  voters in their assigned precincts. The main reasons for not counting the  other 128 ballots were (1) a lack of evidence that the individuals had  registered or tried to register directly with the elections office, (2) a lack of  evidence that the individuals had submitted their voter registration  applications at MVA offices, and (3) that they did not meet the residency  eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction. The county  election office reported experiencing challenges implementing provisional  voting. Specifically, provisional voting was viewed as a challenge because  some poll workers did not understand, according to the county election  office, that anyone who insisted on voting a provisional ballot was entitled  to do so and, as a result, some voters whose names were not in the  registration list might not have been offered provisional ballots.  Provisional voting was also a challenge because, according to the county  election office, lawyers stationed outside the polls sometimes erroneously  told voters that they could insist on voting a provisional ballot even though  poll workers had directed them to their correct polling places. The  election office plans to address some of these issues during training  sessions for poll workers.
The county registrar office used various means to inform voters of the  availability and outcome of provisional votes. Representatives we spoke  with at the county registrar office told us that voters were notified of the  availability of provisional ballots by posting signs at polling places. Voters  were also provided with written information at their polling places  informing them that they could find out the outcome of their provisional  votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling the local or state  election office telephone number, contacting the local election office in  person, or by receiving a letter from the local election office. Information  on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters  within 6 to 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who applied to register to vote by  mail after January 2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with  their registrations to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to  provide identification at the polling place. None of these first-time voters  cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert  pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to  provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when  they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes,  codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The county election office did  not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these  first-time voters.
section_title: City of Franklin, Wisconsin
paragraphs: No provisional ballots were cast in Franklin during the November 2004  election. If provisional ballots had been cast, voters would have been  provided written information at their polling places informing them that  they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes. Provisional  votes would have been counted if the ballots were cast by qualified voters  in their assigned precincts. The election office reported experiencing  challenges implementing provisional voting and took steps to address  these challenges. Specifically, providing thorough instructions to all  election workers and voters about provisional voting during an extremely  high-turnout election was challenging. To address this issue, the city  election office provided thorough and repeated poll worker education.
Provisional ballots were made available to individuals who applied to  register to vote after January 2003 but did not send a copy of identification  with their applications. None of these first-time voters cast provisional  ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and  elections staff about first-time voters who needed to provide identification  at the polls because they did not provide it when they registered by mail,  the voter registration list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to  the voters’ names. The city election office did not report experiencing  challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters.
section_title: City of Madison, Wisconsin
paragraphs: In Madison, five provisional ballots were cast during the November 2004  election but none were counted. Provisional votes are counted when they  are cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts. The main reason  these provisional votes were not counted was that the voters did not  provide identification as required by HAVA for voters who applied by mail  after January 2003 and were voting for the first time in the precinct. These  voters were instructed to bring their identification to the local election  office within 24 hours after the election but did not do so. The city election  office did not report experiencing challenges implementing provisional  voting.
Voters were provided with written information at their polling places  informing them that they could contact the local election office to find out  the outcome of their provisional votes.  However, the local election office  did not provide information to voters on the outcome of provisional votes  since this information is only provided when provisional votes count.
The representative from the city election office did not know if first-time  voters who registered by mail after January 2003 but did not send a copy  of identification with their applications were allowed to cast provisional  ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the polling place.  To alert poll workers and elections staff about first-time voters who  needed to provide identification at the polls because they did not provide  it when they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with  notes, codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The city election office  reported experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first- time voters. Specifically, the city election office required additional staff to  send notices to these voters to notify them that they needed to submit the  necessary documentation or bring it to the polling place on Election Day.
section_title: Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with Voter Registration Applications
paragraphs: This appendix describes the responses of state and local motor vehicle  agency (MVA) representatives to our survey about their experiences  during 2004 in carrying out various voter registration application tasks— specifically, assisting MVA clients with completing voter registration  applications, accepting applications from these clients, and forwarding  applications to state or local elections offices. It also describes actions  MVA officials reported that they took when individuals and state or local  election officials contacted their offices about individuals who said they  submitted their applications to MVA offices but their names were not on  the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses to our  survey by the applicable state and local MVA officials and were not  independently verified by us.
In 1993, NVRA, also known as the “motor voter” law, was enacted. NVRA,  among other things, established procedures to facilitate the registration of  eligible citizens to vote in federal elections by providing them the  opportunity to apply to register to vote at various locations, such as motor  vehicle and other NVRA agencies primarily in states that have a voter  registration requirement. Under NVRA, an eligible citizen conducting  certain transactions at a motor vehicle agency (MVA)— such as applying  for, renewing, or changing the address on a driver’s license—can  simultaneously apply to register to vote or, if applicable, change the  voter’s address.
In 2001, we reported that about 46 percent of the jurisdictions responding  to our nationwide survey expressed concerns about applications received  from NVRA agencies. For example, officials most frequently noted  challenges with processing incomplete or illegible applications,  applications that arrived late at the local election office, and applications  that never arrived. Because local election officials around the country  expressed concerns about processing applications submitted at MVAs, as  noted in our 2001 report, we surveyed MVA officials in six states and 12  local jurisdictions about their experiences during 2004 in carrying out  voter registration application tasks and assisting voters who said they had  submitted their applications to a MVA office but their names were missing  from the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November  2004 election. Appendix IX provides a copy of the survey sent to MVA  officials in each of the six states and 12 local jurisdictions.
subsections: section_title: Experiences of Selected State MVA Offices
paragraphs: As figure 8 illustrates, state MVA representatives reported, for the most  part, that during 2004 MVA staff found that helping clients complete their  voter registration applications, accepting applications from clients, and  forwarding applications to state or local elections offices was either very  easy, somewhat easy, or neither difficult nor easy.
Discussed below, by state, are the reasons MVA representatives reported  that MVA staff did not experience difficulty performing the voter  registration application tasks and the assistance staff provided to  individuals who said they had submitted their applications to MVA offices,  but their names were not on the voter registration lists when they went to  vote in the November 2004 election.
subsections: section_title: Arizona
paragraphs: When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients  complete the voter registration application, the state MVA representative  responded “not applicable” because staff do not help MVA clients  complete their voter registration applications. Accepting voter registration  applications was easy because the electronic form walks the clients  through each part of it. MVA clients cannot proceed through the form if all  the required boxes have not been completed. Forwarding the applications  to the state or local elections offices was more time consuming than  difficult or easy.
Twelve individuals contacted the state MVA office saying that they had  submitted a voter registration application to their MVA office or another  MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter registration lists  when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office  referred these individuals to the local election office and checked the MVA  electronic transaction information for their voter registration applications.  State or local election officials contacted the state MVA office about  individuals who said they were told their names were not on the voter  registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.  However, the state or local election officials did not know whether the  individuals had said that they had submitted their voter registration  applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office.
section_title: California
paragraphs: When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients  complete the voter registration application, the state MVA representative  responded not applicable because staff do not help MVA clients complete  their voter registration applications. Accepting applications from MVA  clients and forwarding these applications to state or local elections offices  was very easy.
The state MVA office was not contacted by individuals who said that their  names were missing from the voter registration lists when they went to  vote in the November 2004 election. But the MVA office was contacted by  state or local elections officials who indicated that the individuals said  they had submitted their voter registration applications to the state MVA  office or another MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter  registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.  The state MVA representative, who did not know how many individuals  had contacted the state or local elections officials, reported that when the  elections officials provided adequate information, the MVA office  researched the driver’s license database to determine if the individuals’  claims could be confirmed and informed the elections officials of the  outcome of the MVA research.
section_title: Michigan
paragraphs: Helping MVA clients to complete their voter registration applications and  accepting the completed applications from them were very easy because  the MVA offices process thousands of voter registrations annually  following standard procedures that have not changed substantially in  many years. Also, the voter registration applications are printed  automatically with the voter name, address, and date of birth. The clients  only have to verify the information in the application and sign it.  Forwarding applications to the state or local elections offices was  somewhat easy because clients are not always sure about their city or  township. MVA offices are provided with pre-printed mailing labels for  forwarding the applications to the various election jurisdictions, which  makes the process quite simple overall.
The state MVA representative did not know how many individuals or state  or local elections officials had contacted the state MVA office or another  MVA office about individuals who said that their names were not on the  voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election because this information was not collected or tracked.
section_title: New York
paragraphs: The state MVA representative responded that helping MVA clients to  complete their voter registration applications, accepting the completed  applications from them, and forwarding the applications to state or local  elections offices were neither difficult nor easy for MVA staff during 2004.  The state MVA office has not been made aware of any difficulties that MVA  staff might have encountered in carrying out these voter registration  application tasks.
Individuals and state or local elections officials had contacted the state  MVA office about 421 individuals, in total, who said that they had  submitted their voter registration applications to the state MVA office or  another MVA office, but their names were not on the voter registration  lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The state MVA  office searched its electronic files to determine whether the 421  individuals had indicated they wanted to apply to register to vote at the  time of the MVA transaction.  Also, if necessary, the state MVA office  pulled the original source documents to determine the individuals' intent  to apply to register to vote.
section_title: Texas
paragraphs: The state MVA representative responded that helping MVA clients to  complete their voter registration applications was neither difficult nor  easy for MVA staff during 2004, but this task added time to processing  MVA transactions. Accepting the completed applications from the clients  also was neither difficult nor easy and added time to processing MVA  transactions. MVA staff had to review the completed applications before  accepting them and forwarding them to the state or local elections offices.  Forwarding the completed voter registration applications to state or local  election offices was neither difficult nor easy. Applications were either  mailed or hand delivered to the state or local elections offices.
Individuals and state or local elections officials had contacted the state  MVA office about individuals who said that they had submitted their voter  registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office,  but their names were not on the voter registration lists when they went to  vote in the November 2004 election. However, the state MVA office did not  know how many individuals had said that they had submitted their voter  registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office.
section_title: Virginia
paragraphs: Helping MVA clients to complete their voter registration applications and  accepting the completed applications from them were neither difficult nor  easy because MVA has been handling voter registration since 1996. MVA  staff provide the same level of service for voter registration as they do for  other MVA transactions. Forwarding applications to the state or local  elections offices is very easy because the applications are mailed daily to  the state board of elections by all of the MVA offices.
Four individuals contacted the state MVA office saying that they had  submitted a voter registration application to their MVA office or another  MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter registration list  when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office(s)  and the state board of elections office researched various automated  systems and paper records to determine when the clients had conducted  business with the MVA and the disposition of any voter registration  applications. The MVA clients were advised by letter of the outcome of  this research. Also, the state board of elections office contacted the state  MVA office indicating that 1,288 individuals had said that they had  submitted their voter registration applications to the MVA state office or  another MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter  registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.  MVA assisted the state board of elections office in verifying the  individuals’ claims and determining when they submitted an application to  a MVA office. The state board of elections office, which has access to MVA  records and houses all voter registration information, found that 295  individuals had applied to register to vote at a MVA office and their  applications were sent to the state board of elections office. Of the  remaining 993 individuals, 591 had indicated that they did not wish to  apply to register to vote and did not complete an application; 245 had no  record of conducting MVA business or submitting a voter registration  application at a MVA office; 128 conducted an Internet, mail, or phone  transaction with MVA but did not request that a paper voter registration  application be mailed to them; and 29 submitted their voter registration  applications after the registration deadline.
section_title: Experiences of Selected Local MVA Offices
subsections: section_title: Gila County, Arizona
paragraphs: The MVA representative responded not applicable when asked how  difficult or easy was it for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter  registration application because staff do not help MVA clients complete  their voter registration applications. The customer completes the  application and MVA staff glance at it to ensure all the information has  been completed. Accepting applications from clients and forwarding the  applications to the elections offices is very easy because, after the clients  complete their applications, a copy of the application is given to them and  the original applications are mailed daily to the elections offices.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election  officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from  the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election.
section_title: Maricopa County, Arizona
paragraphs: When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients  complete the voter registration application, the MVA representative  responded not applicable. Accepting applications from MVA clients and  forwarding the applications to election offices was very easy.
One individual contacted the MVA office saying that he/she had submitted  a voter registration application to their MVA office or another MVA office,  but his/her name was missing from the voter registration list when he/she  went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the  individual to the local election office. No state or local election officials  contacted the MVA office about individuals who said they were told that  their names were not on the lists of registered voters when they went to  vote in the November 2004 election.
section_title: Los Angeles County, California
paragraphs: The MVA representative responded not applicable when asked how  difficult or easy was it for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter  registration application because staff do not help MVA clients complete  their voter registration applications. Accepting applications from clients  and forwarding the applications to the elections offices is very easy  because the applications are collected and mailed to the elections offices  daily.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election  officials about individuals who said their names were missing from the  voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election.
section_title: Yolo County, California
paragraphs: When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients  complete the voter registration application, the MVA representative  responded not applicable because MVA staff do not assist MVA clients  with completing voter registration forms. MVA staff provide clients the  forms, accept the completed forms from the clients and note in the MVA  database that the forms were received, and forward the forms to the local  voter registrars. Accepting the forms from the clients and forwarding them  to the elections offices was very easy. Most forms are forwarded weekly to  the local registrars by mail and a special pickup is arranged for the  deadline day before an election.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election  officials about individuals who said their names were missing from the  voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election.
section_title: City of Detroit, Michigan
paragraphs: Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications and  accepting the applications from them was very easy because the  applications are completed by computer as part of other transactions. The  individuals only have to sign their applications. Forwarding applications to  the elections offices was very easy because applications are presorted and  pre-printed labels are used for mailing them to the elections offices  weekly. Around the time of elections, applications are forwarded daily to  the elections offices.
The representative from the MVA office did not know whether individuals  or state/local election officials had contacted their MVA office about  individuals who said their names were missing from the voter registration  lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election because this  information was not collected or tracked.
section_title: Delta Township, Michigan
paragraphs: Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications and  accepting applications from them was very easy because thousands of  these transactions are processed yearly; the clients check the information  in their applications and sign them. Forwarding applications to the  elections offices was neither easy nor difficult, but it can be time  consuming based the volume of applications and the need to separate  them by election jurisdictions.
The representative from the MVA office did not know whether state or  local election officials contacted the MVA office about individuals who  said their names were missing from the voter registration lists when they  went to vote in the November 2004 election because this information was  not collected or tracked. Approximately 12 individuals contacted the MVA  office saying that they had submitted their voter registration applications  to their MVA office or another MVA office, but their names were missing  from the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November  2004 election. The MVA office referred the individuals to the local election  office and tried to look up a record of the voter registration applications  the individuals reportedly submitted.
section_title: New York City, New York
paragraphs: Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter registration form,  accepting forms from them, and forwarding the forms to the elections  offices was very easy. When assisting clients with completing the forms,  MVA staff question information on the voter registration forms only if the  clients have not filled out any of the information on the voter registration  forms.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election  officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from  the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election.
section_title: Rensselaer County, New York
paragraphs: Assisting MVA clients with completing their voter registration forms was  very easy because MVA staff do not assist clients with completing the  forms. Accepting the voter registration forms and forwarding them to the  local elections offices was also very easy. The forms are mailed to the  elections offices.
Two individuals contacted the MVA office saying that they had submitted a  voter registration application to their MVA office or another MVA office,  but their names were missing from the voter registration lists when they  went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the  individuals to the local election office. No state or local election officials  contacted the MVA office.
section_title: Bexar County, Texas
paragraphs: Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter registration application,  accepting applications from them, and forwarding the applications to the  elections offices was very easy.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election  officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from  the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election.
section_title: Webb County, Texas
paragraphs: Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter registration application,  accepting applications from them, and forwarding the applications to the  elections offices is somewhat easy. The applications are very easy for the  clients to complete, and staff forward the applications to the elections  offices daily. MVA staff review incomplete applications for accuracy.
The MVA office was contacted by individuals saying that their names were  missing from the voter registration list when they went to vote in the  November 2004 election. The representative from the MVA office did not  know how many of these individuals contacted the MVA office. The MVA  office was not contacted by state/local election officials about individuals  who said they were told that their names were not on the lists of registered  voters when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.
section_title: Albemarle County, Virginia
paragraphs: Assisting MVA clients with completing their voter registration applications  was neither difficult nor easy because MVA clerks are responsible for  quickly reviewing the applications to ensure all parts have been completed  and informing the clients of any parts of the application that are  incomplete. If clients have questions about the voter registration  application, MVA staff refer the clients to the local voter registrar or the  state election office because the MVA is responsible for providing clients  the opportunity to apply to register to vote, not answering voter  registration questions or verifying clients’ responses contained in the  applications. Accepting applications from MVA clients was somewhat easy  because sometimes the clients do not complete all parts of their  applications and return incomplete applications to the MVA clerk.  Forwarding applications to elections offices was also neither difficult nor  easy because a policy and procedure are in place for carrying out this  activity.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election  officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from  the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election.
section_title: Arlington County, Virginia
paragraphs: Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications was  neither difficult nor easy because MVA clerks do a quick review of the  applications to make sure they are complete but do not verify any of the  clients’ responses. MVA offices are tasked with providing their clients with  the opportunity to apply to register to voter. Accepting applications from  the clients and forwarding them to the elections offices was somewhat  easy. Forwarding these applications is a task that is performed daily.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election  officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from  the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004  election.
section_title: Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials
section_title: Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, John Mortin and Linda Watson,  Assistant Directors; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein; Katherine Davis; Gina  Flacco; Evan Gilman; Mary Martin; and Maria Santos made key  contributions to this report.