Security Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight
Published: 2006-07-31T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are important U.S. allies in the war on terrorism. The United States provides these countries with security assistance, however, Congress restricts funding when credible evidence exists that foreign security units have committed gross human rights violations. GAO (1) describes the goals of U.S. security assistance to these countries and examines U.S. agencies' assessment of this assistance, (2) assesses U.S. agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State's policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with congressional human rights funding restrictions, and (3) examines agencies' efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense articles provided through U.S. security assistance programs in the three countries, including Western Sahara, to ensure that they are not misused or diverted. GAO visited U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia and analyzed trainee files to determine compliance with human rights vetting policy.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security, building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have allocated approximately $146.6 million, from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, to train and equip security forces in these countries. DOD and State assess these programs together with other related activities through evaluations of security cooperation, counterterrorism, and other country goals. State policy requires human rights vetting of individuals and units of foreign security forces receiving U.S.-provided training. In Morocco and Tunisia, GAO found lapses in the vetting of trainees during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These lapses include more than 400 trainees for whom no vetting files existed at the posts. In addition, even though posts maintained vetting files on 468 trainees, GAO estimates that 27 percent of these files did not have evidence of vetting. The lapses in vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities for vetting, and the lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures were followed. Although State has issued a guide to clarify procedures and has required posts to assign an official responsible for vetting, it does not monitor whether posts are following vetting procedures. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin defense articles subject to DOD's systematic monitoring requirements, such as physical inventory and inspection requirements. According to DOD officials and human rights organizations, no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment have been made that would call for greater scrutiny of end use by these countries.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The U.S. government views Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as stable Islamic  countries that are key partners in the war on terrorism. These countries  are adjacent to vast expanses of ungoverned desert and have porous  borders vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist organizations. The  Department of State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD)  provide these countries with security assistance to further U.S. foreign  policy and security goals, such as supporting counterterrorism, promoting  stronger bilateral relationships, strengthening self-defense capabilities,  and promoting greater respect for democracy and human rights. To further  human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds  from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible  evidence exists that such units have committed gross violations of human  rights. However, we recently found lapses in State’s process for human  rights screening, or vetting, of foreign candidates for U.S.-funded training  in other countries. Additionally, an unresolved territorial dispute in the  Western Sahara is viewed as an impediment to regional cooperation and  contributes to concerns about human rights abuses.
In response to your request, this report (1) describes the goals of U.S.  security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and examines U.S.  agencies’ assessment of this assistance; (2) assesses U.S. agencies’  implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State’s policy to screen foreign  security forces to ensure compliance with congressional human rights  funding restrictions; and (3) examines U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor the  use of U.S-origin defense articles provided through U.S. security assistance  programs in the three countries, including in Western Sahara, to ensure  that they are not misused or diverted for unauthorized uses.
To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant State and DOD  planning, funding, and evaluation documents, and the agencies’ policies  and procedures. We spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington,  D.C.; Rabat, Morocco; and Tunis, Tunisia. We also interviewed DOD  officials at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany.  In addition, we met with government officials from Morocco to discuss  U.S.-provided security assistance and spoke with the commander of the  United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Western Sahara regarding  Morocco’s military presence there. In Rabat and Tunis, we analyzed a  stratified random probability sample of 273 out of 468 available human  rights vetting case files to determine U.S. agencies’ compliance with  State’s human rights vetting policy. These State and DOD files were  maintained for nominees for U.S.-provided training during fiscal years  2004 and 2005. We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit  trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed human  rights violations. We did not visit Algeria because the United States  provides much less security assistance to Algeria than it does to Morocco  and Tunisia. Appendix I contains a more detailed description of our scope  and methodology. We performed our work from October 2005 to July 2006  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: State and DOD provide a variety of security assistance programs to train  and equip security forces (military and police) in North Africa. Many of  these programs are funded by State and implemented by DOD. DOD  manages security assistance under its Theater Security Cooperation  umbrella along with a variety of other activities. The European Command,  which is the U.S. military entity responsible for these countries’ programs,  focuses its security cooperation activities on assisting allies and partner  countries to develop the capabilities to conduct peacekeeping, participate  in the war on terrorism, and perform contingency operations with U.S.  forces.
State funds the following programs to train and equip foreign security  forces:    Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) provides strategic, operational, and  technical training and equipment to foreign law enforcement agencies to  assist them in detecting and eliminating terrorist threats and in protecting  facilities, individuals, and infrastructure. State implements this program.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides grants and loans for the  acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training by foreign  governments. The goal of these grants is to enable key allies to improve  their defense capabilities and to foster closer military relationships  between the United States and recipient nations. DOD implements the  program.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) provides training to  foreign military and related civilian personnel. IMET training is intended to  promote professional militaries around the world and strengthen U.S.  military alliances. DOD implements the program.
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) seeks to  enhance the law enforcement capabilities of foreign governments in  combating criminal, drug, and terrorist threats. INCLE programs support  counternarcotics, intelligence, border patrol, and interdiction activities.  State implements the program through interagency agreements with other  U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Justice and  Homeland Security.
DOD funds and implements several programs to train foreign security  forces.
The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)  provides education and training on counterterrorism activities to foreign  military and related civilian officials. This training is intended to bolster  the capacity of friendly foreign nations to detect, monitor, and interdict or  disrupt the activities of terrorist networks.
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special operations  forces to train with foreign military forces to enhance readiness through  language proficiency, cultural immersion, knowledge of foreign  environments, and instructor skills. The training primarily benefits U.S.  forces. Benefits to the host nation’s security forces are incidental.
The Aviation Leadership Program (ALP) is a U.S. Air Force-funded  program that provides undergraduate pilot training to a small number of  international students from friendly, less developed countries.
Regional Centers for Security Studies provide a forum for bilateral and  multilateral communication, and military and civilian exchanges within a  region. Activities at five regional centers range from extended academic  programs to conferences on topics such as regional security issues,  defense planning, and civilian-military relations.
DOD’s three service academies conduct traditional academic exchange  programs of varying length and content. Up to 60 foreign students may  attend one of the service academies as members of an academy class. The  goal of the program is to expose future foreign leaders to their U.S. peers  and to promote military professionalism.
State and DOD also coordinate to provide nonappropriated assistance for  foreign security forces.
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) is nonappropriated assistance to help build  the defense capabilities of friendly countries in the form of excess U.S.  defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. Defense articles declared as  excess by the military departments can be transferred in an “as-is, where- is” condition to the recipient.
Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that transfers in-stock defense  articles and services from DOD’s inventory, as well as from any other U.S.  agency of the U.S. government, to foreign countries and international  organizations in response to unforeseen military emergencies,  humanitarian catastrophes, peacekeeping needs, or counternarcotics  requirements.
The governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are considered stable,  although State has reported problems with their human rights practices.
Algeria. Algeria has emerged from a period of terrorist and related  violence during the 1990s when more than 100,000 lives were lost,  according to State. Since then, as Algeria has made progress toward  democratization, casualties have declined sharply. Although Algerian  government actions have weakened terrorist groups domestically,  Algerians have been found among suicide bombers and terrorists captured  in Iraq. Terrorist cells operate in the Algerian east and far south and in the  Sahel, the area bordering southern Algeria. State’s most recent human  rights report stated that the Algerian government had several human rights  problems, including impunity of security forces, allegations of abuse and  torture of detainees, and arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial detention.  State also credited the Algerian government for taking steps to strengthen  human rights, which resulted in fewer such incidents than in the past.
Morocco. The United States views Morocco as a stable, moderate Arab  regime; an ally against terrorism; and a free trade partner. King  Mohammed VI retains ultimate power, including over the military. In May  2003, Moroccan suicide bombers attacked several sites in Casablanca. In  response, the government arrested an estimated 3,000 people and  sentenced at least 900 for crimes under counterterrorism laws, according  to State. Moroccan-born extremists associated with al Qaeda affiliates  were implicated in the March 2004 train blasts in Madrid. According to  State’s human rights report, Morocco’s human rights record “remained  poor in many areas.” The report highlighted accusations of excessive force  and harsh sentences against demonstrators in Western Sahara and torture  of human rights activists in that region. Also included among the human  rights problems were reports of police impunity, arbitrary arrest, and  incommunicado detention.
Western Sahara. Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front  for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have  disputed the independence of Western Sahara since the 1970s, when Spain  decolonized the territory. Following a long war in Western Sahara  between Morocco and the Polisario, the UN brokered a ceasefire that went  into effect in 1991, and a UN peacekeeping force remains in the region.  Morocco currently occupies 80 percent of Western Sahara. The United  States, which does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western  Sahara, supports efforts to reach a mutually acceptable resolution under  UN auspices; however, the situation remains at an impasse. This issue is  the main impediment to improving bilateral relations between Morocco  and Algeria, as Algeria backs the Polisario.
Tunisia. Tunisia has a stable yet authoritarian government with a  dominant majority political party and a president who has been in power  since 1987. The Tunisian government harshly suppressed an Islamist  opposition movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. More recently,  suspected terrorists bombed a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba  in 2002 and Tunisian expatriates have been arrested in Europe and North  America on terrorism-related charges. State’s human rights report stated  that Tunisia’s human rights record remained poor. Among the human  rights problems reported were incidents of torture and abuse of prisoners  and detainees, police impunity, and sanctioned attacks by police on  citizens who criticize the government.
section_title: U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed Collectively with Other Activities
paragraphs: The United States uses security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and  Tunisia to support the broad goals of security cooperation and  counterterrorism. Security assistance programs provide these countries a  mixture of training and equipment through programs such as IMET, FMF,  EDA for foreign military forces, and counterterrorism and other training  for domestic security forces. To carry out these security assistance  programs, State and DOD have allocated the equivalent of approximately  $146.6 million from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. The contributions of these  security assistance programs to achieving security cooperation and  counterterrorism goals are assessed collectively with those of other  activities, such as military-to-military events and economic and  humanitarian assistance.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Security Assistance Programs Are to Support Counterterrorism and Security Cooperation Goals
paragraphs: In Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, the goals for U.S.-provided security  assistance programs are to enhance security and political relationships,  fight terrorism, improve foreign military capabilities and interoperability,  and increase U.S. access for overflight rights and port visits. The security  assistance programs in each of these countries may support one or more  of these goals. Security assistance programs attempt to achieve these  goals by training and equipping foreign security forces.
State has a mission performance process in which the posts outline goals  for their countries and identify the security assistance and other programs  that would support those goals. For example, State has a goal to increase  Tunisia’s antiterrorism capabilities. State planning documents list the ATA  program, which provides training in airport security and crisis  management, as one of the resources it will employ to meet its goal.  Additionally, State has a goal to cooperate with Morocco on  counterterrorism and provides communications equipment and  intelligence officer training, under the FMF and IMET programs, as a  means to achieve this goal.
Similarly, DOD develops country campaign plans that include country  security cooperation goals and implementation activities, which  encompass security assistance programs. For example, DOD’s goals in  Algeria are to increase military professionalization and interoperability. To  achieve these goals, DOD uses security assistance programs, such as IMET  and JCET. Additionally, DOD links its goals to State’s mission planning  documents.
section_title: State and DOD Provided Security Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
paragraphs: State and DOD collectively allocated approximately $146.6 million through  their security assistance programs to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia from  fiscal years 2002 to 2005. Tunisia was the largest recipient of U.S.-provided  security assistance in this region, receiving $74.8 million, although about  40 percent of this came from the estimated value of excess U.S. equipment  delivered in fiscal year 2002 under the EDA program. Morocco received  approximately $66.9 million, and Algeria received $5 million. Figure 1  illustrates a breakdown of total assistance to each North African country.
Figure 2 shows the total allocations by program that Algeria, Morocco, and  Tunisia received from fiscal years 2002 to 2005.
State and DOD allocated approximately $5 million to Algeria in security  assistance from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. The IMET and ATA  programs were the principal security assistance programs (85 percent of  funding) in Algeria. IMET was used to train approximately 263 Algerian  security force personnel during this period. Unlike Morocco and Tunisia,  Algeria does not receive FMF funding or EDA equipment transfers. Table 1  shows the U.S. agency, program, allocations, and examples of U.S.- provided security assistance.
State and DOD allocated approximately $66.9 million in security assistance  to Morocco for training and equipment from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. Of  U.S. security assistance programs in Morocco, FMF and EDA are the  largest, accounting for about $47 million (71 percent) of the total. IMET  trained approximately 458 Moroccan security forces. Also, State-funded  training was provided in fiscal year 2005 through the INCLE program for  border security at ports-of-entry. Morocco is an active user of the EDA  program, acquiring hundreds of used U.S. 5-ton and 2.5-ton trucks, which  they use for spare parts. Additionally, Morocco uses the FMF program to  obtain spare parts to sustain aging equipment. According to DOD officials  in Morocco, as the equipment continues to age, it will become  unsustainable, and Morocco will need to find resources to replace this  equipment. Table 2 shows the U.S. agency, program, allocations, and  examples of U.S.-provided security assistance.
State and DOD allocated approximately $74.8 million for training and  equipment to Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. FMF and EDA were  the largest security assistance programs in Tunisia, accounting for 80  percent of the country’s total security assistance. EDA value is based on  DOD’s estimated value of the equipment at the time of delivery. Tunisia  received EDA in fiscal year 2002 only. The United States offered Tunisia 15  UH-1H 1960s-era helicopters in fiscal year 2005, 7 of which are being  refurbished as of April 2006 and will be delivered thereafter, according to  DOD officials. DOD would like to refurbish one or two additional  helicopters, if additional funds can be found. As in Morocco, the  equipment becomes unsustainable as it ages, and Tunisia will need to find  resources to replace it, according to State and DOD officials. IMET  funding was used to train approximately 406 Tunisian security personnel  from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. State provided ATA training in   fiscal years 2003 and 2004, but not in 2005. Table 3 shows the U.S. agency,  program, allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided security assistance.
section_title: State and DOD Assess the Broader Goals of Security Cooperation and Counterterrorism
paragraphs: For these countries, State and DOD assess whether and how security  assistance programs support U.S. foreign policy and security goals through  their evaluation of how broad goals, such as counterterrorism, regional  stability goals, and security cooperation goals, are being achieved. State  assesses these goals in its annual mission planning process. While the  goals are rated for the degree to which they are being achieved, the  effectiveness of specific programs, such as FMF or IMET, is not assessed.  State officials in Tunis and Rabat said that the assessments of goals in  country planning documents are qualitative and that the outcomes or  results are difficult to measure, requiring professional judgment to  determine the progress made from one year to the next.
DOD assesses the collective effectiveness of its programs, which include  security assistance and other activities. DOD’s unified command for the  region, EUCOM, is developing a new evaluation tool to assess how they  are achieving their country goals. This tool will attempt to measure the  degree to which desired outcomes, such as reduction in terrorist activities,  are achieved. EUCOM plans to use these assessments to allocate its  resources and set priorities.
Although neither State nor DOD conducts assessments for specific  security assistance programs, results from some programs are periodically  reported to Congress, and some results indicators are monitored for other  programs. The ATA program annually reports to Congress on program  activities and provides some examples of how these activities were  implemented worldwide. For example, the ATA fiscal year 2005 report  states that Morocco’s use of ATA cyberterrorism training supported U.S.  efforts to arrest a primary terrorism suspect. The IMET program tracks  individuals trained through IMET if they rise to important positions within  their government. IMET program officials are also developing a survey  tool to be administered to foreign trainees to measure whether the training  has affected their preparedness for joint military activities with the United  States and has instilled respect for U.S. values of democracy, human  rights, rule of law, and civilian control of the military.
section_title: Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from Unclear Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts’ Compliance with State Policy
paragraphs: In Morocco and Tunisia, lapses in vetting trainees for human rights abuses  occurred in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We found that these lapses  consisted of (1) the absence of vetting files at posts for approximately 438  trainees and (2) the absence of vetting evidence in an estimated 27  percent (127 of 468 trainees) of the vetting files maintained at posts.  These lapses resulted from unclear vetting procedures, undefined roles for  vetting, and the lack of a monitoring mechanism to ensure posts’  compliance with vetting procedures. State took steps in December 2005 to  address the need for clear procedures and defined vetting roles. However,  we found that responsible officials at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia did  not monitor whether offices within each post were following vetting  procedures, and State headquarters did not monitor the efforts of the posts  to vet trainees.
subsections: section_title: To Comply with U.S. Laws, State Policy Calls for Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Security Forces Receiving U.S. Assistance
paragraphs: Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has  included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, that  restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any  foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible evidence  that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. DOD’s  appropriations acts have contained a similar restriction on DOD-funded  training since fiscal year 1999. While the legal provisions restrict funding  to “any unit of the security forces of a foreign country,” State policy  applies the restrictions to individual members of security forces, as well.
To implement these legislative restrictions, State’s guidance calls for posts  and State headquarters units to vet individuals or units proposed for  training or assistance to determine whether these foreign security forces  have committed gross human rights violations. The various State or DOD  offices that implement different training programs at each post initiate the  vetting process by submitting names of training candidates for vetting by  post officials. These offices also receive the results of human rights vetting  conducted at each post and State headquarters, and they maintain vetting  files for trainees. See table 4 for various offices implementing training in  Morocco and Tunisia. See app. II for details on the description of the  human rights vetting process.
section_title: Lapses in Human Rights Vetting Existed at Posts Due to Unclear Guidance
paragraphs: In Morocco and Tunisia, we found two categories of lapses in human  rights vetting in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The first category consisted of  approximately 438 trainees for whom posts did not maintain vetting files.  The second category consisted of files that were maintained at the posts  but lacked evidence of vetting. Based on our review of 273 out of 468 files,  we estimate that 27 percent (127 trainees) lacked evidence of vetting.
Of the 438 trainees for whom posts maintained no vetting files, post  officials stated that no vetting occurred for approximately 148 Moroccan  and Tunisian trainees. These trainees included those who attended DOD- implemented IMET and CTFP training courses outside of the United  States, as well as attendees of regional centers and service academies. In  addition, we found that the two posts did not maintain vetting  documentation on approximately 290 trainees and were, therefore, unable  to determine whether vetting occurred. These trainees, who may not have  been vetted for human rights abuses, attended State-provided training,  including all 168 trainees who attended fiscal year 2004 INCLE courses in  Morocco, all 42 trainees who attended fiscal year 2004 ATA courses in  Tunisia, and some (80) of the trainees who attended fiscal year 2005 ATA  courses in Morocco. See table 5 in app. III for more information on the  number of trainees and types of training for which no vetting files existed  at the two posts.
The two posts did maintain vetting files for 468 trainees. However, we  estimated that 27 percent (127 trainees) of the files did not contain  evidence of human rights vetting. This estimate is based on a stratified  random sample of 273 of 468 available files at the two posts. For these files  lacking vetting evidence, posts could not locate any documentation  indicating that either the posts or State headquarters provided the  implementing office with results on vetting. Based on the results of our  sample, we estimate that 100 percent of the files for DOD-implemented  training in Tunisia had evidence of vetting. In Morocco, however, we  estimate that about two-thirds of the files for DOD-implemented training  contained no evidence of vetting. We also reviewed all the available files of  State-implemented training in Morocco and found that about one-sixth of  them contained no evidence of vetting. Table 6 in app. III shows the results  of the sample of trainees we reviewed at each post for evidence of human  rights vetting.
According to agency officials at both posts, lapses in vetting candidates in  fiscal years 2004 and 2005 were generally attributable to unclear guidance  that had been provided over the past decade. The guidance did not clearly  identify all types of training to which the vetting requirement applied. Until  December 2005, the guidance had been issued through multiple cables  from headquarters to posts dating from January 1994 through February  2005. Moreover, in Tunisia, State officials stated that, in keeping with their  understanding of standard State record retention policies, which were  distinct from human rights vetting guidance on record retention, they  destroyed files that may have contained evidence of vetting for attendees  of ATA training courses. Additionally, in Morocco, a State official stated  that he did not know if past vetting occurred because staff responsible for  implementing training at that time had rotated to a new post.
section_title: State Has Clarified Procedures and Responsibilities for Human Rights Vetting, but Lacks a Monitoring System to Ensure that Posts Comply with Vetting Procedures
paragraphs: Lapses in vetting occurred in prior years because of weaknesses in  agencies’ management controls: lack of clear and consistent vetting  procedures at departments and posts; lack of clear roles and  responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; and lack of an established  system to monitor compliance with these procedures at State and posts.  Although State has taken steps to correct the first two weaknesses, State  still lacks a mechanism to monitor compliance.
subsections: section_title: State Has Taken Steps to Clarify Procedures and Responsibilities for Vetting
paragraphs: To address our prior recommendation for State to establish clear and  consistent vetting procedures, State drafted a standard guide to human  rights vetting and distributed it to overseas posts in December 2005. This  guide clarifies the vetting procedures, outlines key steps in the vetting  process, requires each post to assign a single point of contact with  responsibility for vetting procedures, and provides required vetting  documentation and record retention policy. Moreover, the guide suggests  that each post develop standard vetting operating procedures that take  into consideration its needs and circumstances. In Morocco and Tunisia,  State officials established post-specific vetting procedures. For example,  the procedures at both posts require that the office implementing training  prepare a standard memorandum and send it to other offices within the  post to request vetting of training candidates. According to these officials,  the issuance of a written guide has clarified post officials’ understanding  of vetting requirements under State’s policy. For example, the two posts  did not always maintain the records of completed vetting results in fiscal  years 2004 and 2005. The new State guidance and posts’ standard  operating procedures now specify a requirement to maintain these records  for 3 years.
section_title: State Has Required Points of Contact at Posts
paragraphs: Furthermore, in response to our prior recommendation that State  establish clear roles and responsibilities at posts for human rights vetting,  State has required that each post assign a point of contact with  responsibility over human rights vetting. Specifically, State’s December  2005 guide specified that this official would have responsibility for   oversight of vetting procedures. At the posts in Morocco and Tunisia, an  official from the political affairs section serves as the designated point of  contact responsible for human rights vetting.
section_title: State Lacks a Monitoring Mechanism to Ensure Posts’ Compliance with State Policies
paragraphs: As we found in Southeast Asian countries, post officials in Morocco and  Tunisia, along with officials from State headquarters office, do not monitor  posts’ compliance with State’s human rights vetting procedures. However,  our internal control standards state that an organization should ensure  that ongoing monitoring occurs as part of normal operations to assess the  quality of performance over time. State’s December 2005 guide states that  each post’s point of contact should have oversight of vetting procedures,  with the Chief of Mission responsible for ensuring that vetting procedures  are in place and being followed. However, neither post had established  specific activities to carry out this oversight responsibility. For example,  the points of contact did not regularly verify with the State and DOD  offices implementing training at posts that all relevant trainees were  vetted. Also, they did not monitor whether these offices were following  vetting procedures, such as maintaining documentation of completed  vetting of trainees.
Furthermore, as of June 2006, no headquarters office within State is  charged with monitoring posts’ compliance with State’s human rights  vetting procedures. State’s December 2005 guide specifically states that no  single bureau is tasked with monitoring human rights vetting procedures.  According to State, some oversight is provided through the established  channel of periodic post inspections conducted by the Office of the  Inspector General (OIG). However, as of May 2006, assessments of posts’  compliance with State’s human rights vetting process were not part of  State OIG’s post inspections. In March 2006, State officials requested the  OIG to include reviews of human rights vetting procedures in post  inspections. In May 2006, a State OIG official stated that the OIG workplan  for inspection would incorporate a check that posts are vetting candidates  appropriately. However, inspections of a post would be conducted  approximately once every 5 or 6 years, according to a State OIG official.  This periodic inspection of posts’ compliance does not meet our standard  for ongoing monitoring.
Without a monitoring system in place, State has no means of determining  whether posts are complying with required procedures intended to ensure  that trainees do not have records of human rights abuses. Consequently,  State lacks the information it needs to ensure that all posts are following  procedures to prevent foreign security forces with suspected human rights  records from receiving U.S. assistance.
section_title: Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.- Origin Defense Articles that Require Systematic Monitoring
paragraphs: To comply with the Arms Export Control Act, DOD established the Golden  Sentry program to monitor countries’ use of U.S.-origin defense articles  provided through government-to-government transfers. This program  requires systematic monitoring, such as conducting physical inventories,  of only the most sensitive defense articles. Morocco and Tunisia do not  have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment subject to this systematic  monitoring, and Algeria does not participate in any programs involving  government transfers of U.S.-origin equipment, such as foreign military  sales or EDA. Monitoring of non-sensitive defense articles is done in  conjunction with other assigned duties with no reporting requirements or  additional resources.  DOD officials in Rabat have not conducted any end- use monitoring in Western Sahara.  Additionally, according to State and  based on our work, there have been no allegations of unauthorized use of  U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia, Morocco, and the Western Sahara that  would trigger greater scrutiny of end use.
subsections: section_title: End-Use Monitoring Program Established to Comply with Arms Export Control Act
paragraphs: In compliance with the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended,DOD established an end-use monitoring program called Golden Sentry to  ensure the proper end-use monitoring of government-to-government  transfers. To make optimum use of the limited resources available for  such monitoring purposes, the Golden Sentry program requires different  levels of monitoring for different types of defense articles. For those  articles deemed sensitive by Golden Sentry such as man-portable air  defense systems and night vision devices, systematic monitoring, including  physical inventory and inspection procedures, is required. In addition,  other conditions or events can affect the level of monitoring that may  occur.  For example, allegations of a country’s misuse, a country’s  development of ties with countries prohibited from receiving U.S. exports,  or unusual political or military upheaval can result in greater scrutiny.
The monitoring of nonsensitive defense articles and services, such as  trucks and spare parts, is referred to as routine end-use monitoring.  This  routine end-use monitoring is performed by DOD officials in conjunction  with other assigned duties.  Because DOD applies its resources to end-use  monitoring of sensitive items, it does not expend additional resources nor  require specific reporting on routine monitoring that is performed  incidental to its normal business contacts in these countries.
Only routine end-use monitoring is required in Morocco and Tunisia  because these countries do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment.  The U.S. government gives these countries excess equipment through the  EDA program and sells them material to sustain their aging stocks of U.S.- origin equipment with the help of FMF grants. Algeria does not obtain any  defense articles from the U.S. government. In accordance with DOD and  EUCOM guidelines for routine end-use monitoring, DOD officials at the  posts in Morocco and Tunisia stated that they visit a sample of host  country bases while conducting other business, such as meetings,  exercises, or exchange events, at those locations. These visits help DOD  officials confirm the proper use and condition of non-sensitive U.S.-origin  equipment. Additionally, according to DOD officials from EUCOM, DSCA,  and at the posts in Rabat and Tunis, there have been no allegations of  unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment, including in Western Sahara,  that would trigger greater scrutiny.
section_title: Morocco’s Use of Equipment in Western Sahara
paragraphs: According to State, the United States has not placed any special  restrictions on Morocco’s use of equipment in Western Sahara beyond  those provided for in the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign  Assistance Act. Since DOD officials in Morocco do not generally conduct  other business in the Western Sahara, they have not conducted end-use  monitoring activities involving Morocco’s use of equipment in Western  Sahara, according to a DOD official in Rabat. This official and a DSCA  official responsible for DOD’s end-use monitoring program noted that,  given the absence of sensitive defense articles or allegations of misuse,  DOD has no reason to commit resources to inspections there. According  to State and other officials, State representatives do, however, visit  Western Sahara on other business including fact finding and humanitarian  activities. In addition, a State official stated and DOD  guidance indicate  that, should an allegation of misuse arise, procedures exist for  investigation. In addition, the commanding general of the UN  peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara stated that there had been no  allegations of Moroccan military misuse of U.S.-origin equipment in the  Western Sahara. Representatives of the human rights organizations we  spoke with also reported that they had no reports of misuse.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: Security assistance is used as a tool to advance U.S. foreign policy and  security goals, including respect for human rights. In 2005, we reported  that U.S. agencies did not have adequate assurance that U.S. training funds  were used to train and equip only foreign security forces with no  violations of human rights. Although State has taken steps to ensure more  consistent human rights vetting of foreign security forces receiving U.S.- provided training, it still lacks a mechanism to monitor whether or not  posts are following its guidance, which is intended to ensure that trainees  do not have records of human rights abuses. State’s guide, issued in  December 2005, assigned responsibility for monitoring the vetting process  to points of contact at U.S. posts but did not provide them with guidance  in carrying out this responsibility. Posts’ points of contact in Morocco and  Tunisia were not monitoring posts’ compliance with vetting procedures,  and State headquarters lacks assurance that posts are following its vetting  policy. This suggests that additional action is needed to strengthen the  monitoring element of internal controls. Although State OIG inspections of  posts once every 5 years may be a means of monitoring whether posts  follow vetting guidelines, internal control standards recommend ongoing  monitoring in the course of normal operations. A routine monitoring  mechanism would provide greater assurance that all individuals are  properly vetted for human rights issues before receiving U.S. assistance  and that any lapses in the proper screening of recipients of U.S. assistance  could be corrected.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security assistance  programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and State policies  on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in  consultation with the Secretary of Defense, further strengthen the process  of human rights vetting of foreign security forces by establishing a  systematic monitoring mechanism that will ensure that State’s vetting  procedures are carried out at overseas posts. Specifically, we recommend  the following two actions:    The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at each post  should verify that the various offices implementing U.S. training at the  post comply with State’s vetting policy.
Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to a designated  State headquarters unit to provide State with assurance of posts’  compliance with its human rights vetting policy.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State  for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our draft.  State  provided a written response that is reprinted in appendix IV and technical  comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. In  commenting on our draft and in a subsequent e-mail, State concurred with  our recommendations and indicated that they are taking steps to  implement them.  State also noted that our review did not uncover any  evidence that the U.S. government has trained any individual or unit that  has committed gross violations of human rights. However, our review only  focused on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis vetted trainees.  We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit trained by the  United States, whether vetted or not, had committed human rights  violations.
We are providing copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and  State and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies  available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available  on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the goals of U.S. security assistance and how these goals are  assessed, we interviewed officials from the Department of Defense (DOD)  and the Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C., responsible for  overseeing security assistance programs. We also interviewed DOD  officials at the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany; U.S.  Embassy officials in Rabat, Morocco, and Tunis, Tunisia; and foreign  government officials in Rabat. We did not include Algeria in our site visits  because its level of participation in U.S. security assistance programs was  significantly lower than Morocco’s and Tunisia’s. Additionally, we  reviewed State’s Mission Performance Plans and DOD’s Country Campaign  Plans for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as a variety of other State  and DOD documents to determine how U.S. security assistance programs  were linked to State and DOD goals. We obtained data on the nature and  extent of the activities funded by these programs in Algeria, Morocco, and  Tunisia from program officials and State and DOD documents. We  reviewed the reliability of funding data provided by State and DOD by  comparing it with similar data obtained from other sources to check for  completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We also interviewed  program officials responsible for managing the data to assess how it was  developed and maintained. We found the data sufficiently reliable for  representing the nature and extent of program funding and activities.
To assess U.S. agencies’ implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State’s  policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with  congressional human rights funding restrictions, we reviewed relevant  statutes and implementing guidelines. These include the fiscal years 2004  through 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts and the DOD  Appropriations Acts, and the DOD Security Assistance Management  Manual. We also reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State  and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at the posts in Rabat and  Tunis. To understand human rights vetting requirements and processes,  we interviewed relevant officials in Washington, D.C., the U.S. European  Command, and the two posts to discuss vetting requirements and  processes. We also reviewed the recommendations made in our July 2005  report on human rights vetting in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, we  communicated with a State Office of Inspector General (OIG) official to  determine the extent to which State OIG has oversight of human rights  vetting at posts. To obtain a general understanding of the human rights  situation in Morocco and Tunisia, we met with State human rights officers  and representatives of nongovernmental organizations involved with  human rights issues.
To determine the extent to which the two posts complied with human  rights vetting policy in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, we asked the relevant  State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at each post to determine  the number of foreign security force personnel receiving training  implemented at the posts in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We further asked  post officials to identify the total number of vetting files maintained at the  post for trainees in this time frame. To identify the approximate number of  trainees for whom posts did not maintain vetting files and, therefore, who  may not have been vetted, we used training data provided by agency  reports as well as State and DOD officials. For vetting files that were  available at the posts, we drew a stratified random probability sample of  273 of 468 trainee vetting files available at the U.S. posts in Morocco and  Tunisia. With our probability sample, each member of the study  population had a nonzero probability of being included, and that  probability could be computed for any member. We stratified the  population by country and by agency implementing training into the  Morocco DOD, Morocco State, and Tunisia DOD case files. Each sample  case file was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account statistically  for all the case files in the population, including those who were not  selected. We reviewed the files for compliance with State human rights  vetting policy. To conduct the file review, we used a data collection  instrument to systematically capture whether key steps in the post’s  human rights vetting process occurred, such as whether the political  affairs office at each post was involved. We did not collect data on  whether any individual or unit trained by the United States, whether vetted  or not, had committed human rights violations.
Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections,  our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have  drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we  express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results  as 95 percent confidence intervals (e.g., plus or minus 7 percentage  points). These are intervals that would contain the actual population  values for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we  are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in this  report will include the true values in the study population.
To examine U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense  articles provided to these countries, we reviewed relevant federal laws  governing the use of arms exports, including the Arms Export Control Act  of 1976, as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,  and reviewed DOD end-use monitoring guidance. We interviewed DOD  officials responsible for end-use monitoring at the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and the posts in Rabat and Tunis to  determine what monitoring activities took place in these countries,  whether these countries have any sensitive defense articles requiring  systematic monitoring under DOD guidelines, and whether there have  been any allegations of misuse of U.S.-origin equipment. Algeria does not  receive U.S.-origin defense articles from the U.S. government. We also  interviewed State human rights officers in Rabat, Tunis and Washington,  D.C. as well as representatives of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty  International to determine if there have been any allegations of misuse  involving U.S.-origin defense articles. Furthermore, we spoke with the  commander of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Western Sahara  regarding Morocco’s military presence there. We also received intelligence  briefings from EUCOM and DIA officials.  To determine U.S. policy on the  use of U.S.-origin equipment by Morocco in Western Sahara, we  interviewed State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at the post in  Morocco and reviewed relevant State and DOD congressional testimony  regarding Western Sahara.
We conducted this review from October 2005 to July 2006 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process in Morocco and Tunisia as of February 2006
paragraphs: Agency vetting of candidates for human rights concerns in Morocco and  Tunisia typically includes the following steps. First, the office at the post  implementing the training programs receives names of training candidates  and reviews background information from the host government.
Second, the implementing office forwards the names of training  candidates to the point of contact at State’s political affairs office at the  post for screening, which includes searches using paper and electronic  files, for evidence of the candidates’ involvement in human rights  violations. The political office may also consult human rights  nongovernmental organizations for any information they have on the  candidates. The implementing office also circulates the candidates’ names  to other relevant offices within the post, such as State’s regional security  office and consular affairs office, for vetting. These offices respond to the  implementing office with their vetting results.
The point of contact in the post’s political affairs office sends the training  candidates’ names via cable to the relevant regional bureau, such as the  Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, to request human rights screening by State  headquarters. The regional bureau checks candidates’ names against  bureau files, and then forwards these names to other bureaus at State  headquarters for further vetting. These bureaus—including the Bureaus of  Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Intelligence and Research; and  Political-Military Affairs—screen candidates’ names using paper and  electronic files available to them and then report vetting results to the  regional bureau.
Finally, the regional bureau communicates State headquarters’ vetting  results via cable to the post to inform the point of contact and the  implementing office whether credible evidence of gross human rights  violations existed for training candidates. implemented ACES in February 2005, officials at posts and State  headquarters informed us that ACES does not contain entries for Morocco  and Tunisia because they had no derogatory information on specific  individuals to report as of June 2006.
section_title: Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence of Vetting in Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005
paragraphs: We obtained the estimated number of trainees for whom posts lacked  vetting files using data provided by State and DOD training reports and  agency officials. See Table 5 for more information on the types of training  which lacked vetting files.
Our review of a sample of human rights vetting files showed that an  estimated 27 percent had no evidence of vetting. Details by the  implementing office and country are shown in Table 6.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition, Muriel Forster, Assistant Director; Lynn Cothern; Howard  Cott; David Dornisch; James Krustapentus; Victoria Lin; Mary Moutsos;  and Sidney Schwartz made key contributions to this report.