Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a Results-Oriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories
Published: 2010-03-26T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) requested about $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 for new unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and for expanded capabilities in existing ones. To support ongoing operations, the Air Force and Army have acquired a greater number of larger systems. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) plans were in place to account for the personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure needed to support Air Force and Army UAS inventories; (2) DOD addressed challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations; and (3) DOD updated its publications that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to reflect the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing operations. Focusing on UAS programs supporting ongoing operations, GAO reviewed the services' program and funding plans in light of DOD's requirements definition and acquisition policy; interviewed UAS personnel in the United States and in Iraq about training experiences; and reviewed joint, multiservice, and service-specific publications.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DOD continues to increase UAS inventories, but in some cases, the Air Force and the Army lack robust plans that account for the personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure to support them. Regarding personnel, the Air Force and the Army have identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel to meet current and projected UAS force levels, but they have not yet fully developed plans to supply needed personnel. Further, although DOD has recently requested funding and plans to request additional funds, the Air Force and the Army have not completed analyses to specify the number and type of facilities needed to support UAS training and operations. Having identified a vulnerability to the communications infrastructure network used to control UAS missions, the Air Force is taking steps to mitigate the risk posed by a natural or man-made disruption to the network but has not formalized a plan in the near term to provide for the continuity of UAS operations in the event of a disruption. While DOD guidance encourages planning for factors needed to operate and sustain a weapon system program in the long term, several factors have contributed to a lag in planning efforts, such as the rapid fielding of new systems and the expansion of existing ones. In the absence of comprehensive planning, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that Air Force and Army approaches will support current and projected UAS inventories. The lack of comprehensive plans also limits the ability of decision makers to make informed funding choices. DOD has not developed a results-oriented strategy to resolve challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations. GAO found that the limited amount of DOD-managed airspace adversely affected the amount of training that personnel conducted to prepare for deployments. As UAS are fielded in greater numbers, DOD will require access to more airspace for training; for example, DOD estimated that based on planned UAS inventories in fiscal year 2013, the military services will require more than 1 million flight hours to train UAS personnel within the United States. Further, Air Force UAS personnel and Army ground units have limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment, and they have not maximized the use of available assets during training. Current UAS simulators also have limited capabilities to enhance training. DOD has commenced initiatives to address training challenges, but it has not developed a results-oriented strategy to prioritize and synchronize these efforts. Absent a strategy, DOD will not have a sound basis for prioritizing resources, and it cannot be assured that the initiatives will address limitations in Air Force and Army training approaches. In many cases, DOD's UAS publications articulating doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures did not include updated information needed by manned and unmanned aircraft operators, military planners, and ground units to understand current practices and capabilities. Such information can serve as the foundation for effective joint training programs and can assist military personnel in integrating UAS on the battlefield.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Battlefield commanders have experienced a high level of mission success  in ongoing operations with capabilities provided by unmanned aircraft  systems (UAS). Beyond replacing human beings in aircraft that perform  dangerous roles, UAS are highly valuable because they possess  characteristics that many manned aircraft do not. For example, they can  fly long-duration missions, thereby providing a sustained presence over  the battlefield. Because of greater demand for UAS, the Department of  Defense (DOD) continues to increase its investment in these programs,  requesting approximately $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 for new systems  and expanded capabilities in existing ones. In 2000, DOD had fewer than  50 unmanned aircraft in its inventory; as of October 2009, this number had  grown to more than 6,800. Although each of the military services operates  several types of UAS, the Air Force and the Army have acquired a greater  number of larger, more capable systems that have been deployed to  support ongoing operations.
While DOD has expanded its inventories of UAS to meet warfighter  demand, our prior work has found that DOD has faced obstacles in  overcoming challenges in the development and acquisition of UAS  programs and in the integration of these systems into combat operations.  For example, in 2007 we reported that because DOD began the UAS  acquisition process too early, the related UAS development plans  contained requirements and funding uncertainties. We also reported in  2007 that DOD had been unable to fully optimize the use of its UAS assets  in combat operations because it lacked an approach to allocating and  tasking them that considered the availability of all assets in determining  how best to meet warfighter needs. In 2008, we reported that DOD had not  developed a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan with priorities,  timelines, and long-term implementation goals to align departmental and  military service efforts in order to improve the management and  operational use of UAS. More recently, the Congress has expressed  interest in DOD’s plans regarding UAS, for example, in the steps that DOD  has taken to develop qualifications for UAS operators necessary for the  routine access of unmanned aircraft to U.S. airspace to conduct training  and operations.
Integral to the operation of UAS are numerous support elements— including personnel, facilities, and a communications infrastructure to  relay signals to and from the aircraft; programs to train personnel for UAS  operations; and publications to guide personnel as they conduct training  and operations. Regarding training programs, DOD guidance directs the  military services to take actions to support joint and integrated operations  training to the maximum extent possible. Thus, training programs ideally  require access to the national airspace system (a complex system  comprising thousands of people, procedures, facilities, and pieces of  equipment) and opportunities for ground combat units and UAS personnel  to participate in joint training exercises so that these personnel can  practice the interactions they will have with one another on the battlefield.  However, DOD’s UAS operations are subject to numerous restrictions,  which can create competition for the limited available airspace and can  constrain DOD’s ability to effectively utilize training and operational  locations. Further, commitments to ongoing operations can limit the  amounts of UAS personnel and equipment that are available to conduct  training. Because of airspace access and personnel and equipment  availability issues, DOD has used simulators (or virtual training devices) to  increase training opportunities. To guide service and joint training  programs and to assist individuals and units in integrating military  capabilities in joint operations, the military services are responsible for  coordinating with each other to develop timely publications. These  publications describe doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and  concepts of operations and can be used to optimize the integration of UAS  during joint operations.
As you requested, we evaluated DOD’s ability to support UAS inventories.  Specifically, we determined the extent to which (1) plans were in place to  account for the personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure  needed to support Air Force and Army UAS inventories; (2) DOD  addressed challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army  to train personnel for UAS operations; and (3) DOD updated its existing  publications that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and  procedures to reflect the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing  operations.
To determine the extent to which plans were in place to account for the  personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure to support Air  Force and Army UAS inventories, we focused primarily on Air Force and  Army UAS programs that support ongoing operations. Excluded from this  review were programs for small unmanned aircraft. While the military  services have acquired more than 6,200 of these aircraft, they generally do  not have substantial support requirements. We examined UAS program  and funding plans and DOD’s policies governing the requirements  definition and acquisition processes. We consulted the Office of  Management and Budget’s Capital Programming Guide and our Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide for instruction on developing cost  estimates and plans to manage capital investments. In determining the  extent to which DOD addressed challenges that affect the ability of the Air  Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations, we visited  select military installations and the Army’s National Training Center at  Fort Irwin, California, and spoke with knowledgeable DOD officials to  determine the specific challenges that the Air Force and the Army faced  when training service personnel to perform UAS missions in joint  operations. Specifically, we spoke with personnel in Air Force and Army  UAS units in the United States and in Iraq to identify the training they were  able to perform prior to operating UAS in joint operations and the  challenges, if any, that prevented them from performing their required  training tasks. In identifying Air Force and Army unit personnel to speak  with, we selected a nonprobability sample of units that were preparing to  deploy for contingency operations or had redeployed from these  operations from May 2009 through September 2009. We assessed DOD’s  efforts to overcome these challenges in light of leading practices derived  from principles established under the Government Performance and  Results Act of 1993 and key elements of an overarching organizational  framework, such as developing results-oriented strategies, as described in  our prior work. To determine the extent to which DOD had updated its  existing publications that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and  procedures to reflect the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing  operations, we reviewed joint, multiservice, and service-specific UAS  doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and concepts of operations. We  interviewed DOD and military service officials and analyzed publications  to determine how the documents articulate knowledge gained from using  UAS in ongoing operations; the degree to which information is provided  for UAS stakeholders, such as military planners and ground commanders;  and the processes that the services use to update the publications. We  conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through March 2010  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed discussion of  our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD defines a UAS as a system whose components include the necessary  equipment, networks, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft— that is, an aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is capable of  flight under remote control or autonomous programming. Battlefield  commanders have experienced a high level of mission success in ongoing  operations with capabilities provided by UAS. Beyond a traditional  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role, UAS have been  outfitted with missiles to strike targets, with equipment to designate  targets for manned aircraft by laser, and with sensors to locate the  positions of improvised explosive devices and fleeing insurgents, among  other tasks.
DOD has acquired UAS through formal acquisition programs, and in  certain cases, the military services have purchased common UAS  components. For example, the Army and the Marine Corps are purchasing  the Shadow UAS and the Air Force and the Navy are acquiring a similar  unmanned aircraft for the Global Hawk and the Broad Area Maritime  Surveillance UAS programs. DOD has also fielded other UAS in order to  meet urgent warfighter requests and for technology demonstrations. In  2008, U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint UAS Center of Excellence  established a system to categorize UAS in groups that are based on  attributes of vehicle airspeed, weight, and operating altitude. For example,  group 1 UAS weigh 20 pounds or less whereas group 5 UAS weigh more  than 1,320 pounds. Table 1 provides the military services’ inventories of  groups 3, 4, and 5 unmanned aircraft as of October 2009.
Several major systems—including the Air Force Predator, Reaper, and  Global Hawk; the Army and Marine Corps Shadow; and the Army  Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) UAS—have been deployed and  used successfully in combat. Because of the resulting demand for these  assets, several of the military services’ UAS programs have experienced  significant growth. For example, DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget request  sought funds to continue to increase the Air Force’s Predator and Reaper  UAS programs to 50 combat air patrols by fiscal year 2011—an increase of  nearly 300 percent since fiscal year 2007. DOD’s fiscal year 2007 through  fiscal year 2010 budget requests for all of DOD’s UAS programs reflect an  increase in the amount of funding requested by DOD for UAS investments  to support warfighting needs, as shown in table 2.
Beyond development and acquisition costs, DOD’s UAS programs have  additional funding requirements, for example, those costs to operate and  sustain the weapon system, to provide personnel, and to construct  facilities and other infrastructure. DOD guidance encourages acquisition  personnel to consider factors, including personnel, facilities, supporting  infrastructure, and policy costs, when fielding new capabilities. However,  DOD’s and our prior work have found that decision makers have had  limited visibility over total weapon system costs because estimates have  not reflected a full accounting of life cycle costs. In a November 2009  report, for example, DOD concluded that its acquisition processes pay too  little attention to weapon system support costs, even though the  department spends more than $132 billion each year to sustain its weapon  systems.  The report also concluded that the lack of adequate visibility of  operating and support costs has been a long-standing barrier to effectively  assessing, managing, and validating the benefits or shortcomings of  support strategies. In our prior work, we have found that DOD often  makes inaccurate funding commitments to weapon system programs  based on unrealistic cost estimates. The foundation of an accurate  funding commitment should be a realistic cost estimate that allows  decision makers to compare the relative value of one program to another  and to make adjustments accordingly. We reported that DOD’s unrealistic  cost estimates were largely the result of a lack of knowledge, failure to  adequately account for risk and uncertainty, and overly optimistic  assumptions about the time and resources needed to develop weapon  systems. By repeatedly relying on unrealistically low cost estimates, DOD  has initiated more weapon systems programs than its budget can afford.
We have also conducted an extensive body of work on DOD’s efforts to  ensure the availability of defense critical infrastructure, which includes  space, intelligence, and global communications assets, reporting on DOD’s  progress in addressing the evolving management framework for the  Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, coordination among program  stakeholders, implementation of key program elements, the availability of  public works infrastructure, and reliability issues in DOD’s lists of critical  assets, among other issues. For example, we reported in 2008 on the  challenges that the Air Force faced in addressing the continuity of  operations and physical security at Creech Air Force Base, a location  where nearly half of the Air Force’s UAS operations were being performed  at the time.
While many of DOD’s UAS operations currently take place outside of the  United States, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military services  require access to the national airspace system to conduct UAS training,  among other reasons, and personnel and equipment to support training  exercises. However, DOD has experienced several challenges in gaining  access to the national airspace system and limitations in the availability of  UAS personnel and equipment to support training because of operational  commitments. Because DOD’s UAS do not meet several federally  mandated requirements for routine access to the national airspace system,  most types of UAS may not perform routine flight activities, such as taking  off and landing outside DOD-managed airspace. For example, UAS do not  have personnel or a suitable alternative technology on board the aircraft to  detect, sense, and avoid collision with other aircraft. The Federal Aviation  Administration approves applications from DOD (and other government  agencies) for authority to operate UAS in the national airspace system  outside of that restricted for DOD’s use on a case-by-case basis.
To provide military personnel with information on UAS, DOD  components, which include the military services and other defense  organizations, have produced several publications, including joint and  service doctrinal publications that describe processes to plan for and  integrate UAS into combat operations. In addition, DOD components have  produced concepts of operations for UAS, as well as multiservice and  platform-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures manuals. These  publications are intended to provide planners at operational and tactical  levels of command, such as joint task forces and divisions, with an  understanding of the processes to incorporate UAS into their intelligence  collection plans and into combat operations. Tactical ground units  requesting support from UAS, which can range from small special  operations units to large infantry brigades engaged in ground combat  operations, may use these documents to understand UAS capabilities and  how to best incorporate them into preplanned and dynamic missions. UAS  operators use these documents to establish best practices, standard  operating procedures for integrating UAS into joint operations, and  processes for interacting with other air and ground forces on the  battlefield. Periodically, DOD components update these publications to  include new knowledge on military practices and capabilities. Generally,  these updates are accomplished through comprehensive service- or  departmentwide reviews conducted by subject matter experts.
section_title: Plans Are Not in Place to Fully Account for the Personnel, Facilities, and Some Communications Infrastructure Needed to Support Air Force and Army UAS Programs
paragraphs: DOD has policies that encourage its components to plan for factors,  including personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure, that are  needed to support weapon systems programs. Extensive planning for  these factors provides decision makers with complete information on total  program costs and assurances that weapon system programs can be fully  supported in the long term. During our review, however, we identified  areas where, despite the growth in UAS inventories, comprehensive plans  for personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure have not  been fully developed to support Air Force and Army UAS programs.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Processes to Plan for Personnel, Facilities, and Communications Infrastructure for UAS Programs
paragraphs: DOD guidance recommends that acquisition personnel determine a  weapon system program’s life cycle costs by conducting planning for the  manpower, facilities, and other supporting infrastructure, among other  factors, needed to support a weapon system, and fully fund the program  and manpower needed in budget requests. Decision makers use this  information to determine whether a new program is affordable and the  program’s projected funding and manpower requirements are achievable.  DOD components are expected to conduct continuing reviews of their  strategies to sustain weapon systems programs and to identify deficiencies  in these strategies, making necessary adjustments to them in order to meet  performance requirements.
In addition, the Office of Management and Budget’s Capital Programming  Guide also indicates that part of conducting cost analyses for capital  assets, such as weapon systems, is refining cost estimates as programs  mature and as requirements change, and incorporating risk analyses in  these estimates. We have reported that accurate cost estimates are  necessary for government acquisition programs for many reasons, for  example, to evaluate resource requirements, to support decisions about  funding one program over another, and to develop annual budget  requests. Moreover, having a realistic estimate of projected costs makes  for effective resource allocations, and it increases the probability of a  program’s success.
section_title: Service Strategies Are Not Fully Developed to Supply the Personnel Needed to Support UAS Programs
paragraphs: The Air Force and the Army train personnel to perform functions for UAS  operations, such as operating the aircraft and performing maintenance.  Because of the rapid growth of UAS programs, the number of personnel  required to perform these functions has substantially increased and the  services have taken steps to train additional personnel. However, in  service-level UAS vision statements, the Air Force and the Army have  identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel for UAS  operations, but they have not yet fully developed strategies that specify the  actions and resources required to supply the personnel needed to meet  current and projected future UAS force levels.
The Air Force, for example, has identified limitations in the approaches it  has used to supply pilots to support the expanded Predator and Reaper  UAS programs. Since the beginning of these programs, the Air Force has  temporarily reassigned experienced pilots to operate UAS, and more  recently, it began assigning pilots to operate UAS immediately after they  completed undergraduate pilot training. Air Force officials stated that this  initiative is intended to provide an additional 100 pilots per year on a  temporary basis to support the expanding UAS programs. While the Air  Force has relied on these approaches to meet the near-term increase in  demand for UAS pilots, officials told us that it would be difficult to  continue these practices in the long term without affecting the readiness  of other Air Force weapon systems, since the pilots who are performing  UAS operations on temporary assignments are also needed to operate  other manned aircraft and perform other duties.
In an attempt to develop a long-term, sustainable career path for UAS  pilots, the Air Force implemented a new initiative in 2009 to test the  feasibility of establishing a unique training pipeline for UAS pilots.  Students selected for this pipeline are chosen from the broader Air Force  officer corps and are not graduates of pilot training. At the time of our  work, the Air Force was analyzing the operational effectiveness of those  personnel who graduated from the initial class of the test training pipeline  to determine if this approach could meet the long-term needs of the Air  Force. In addition, officials told us that the Air Force would ultimately  need to make some changes to this pipeline to capture lessons learned  from the initial training classes and to help ensure that graduates were  effectively fulfilling UAS mission requirements. For example, officials  stated that the initial graduates of the training pipeline have not yet been  provided with training on how to take off and land the Predator and that  these functions are being performed by more experienced pilots. However,  the Air Force had neither fully determined the total training these  personnel would require to effectively operate the Predator and Reaper  aircraft during UAS missions nor fully determined the costs that would be  incurred to provide training for these assignments. Officials estimated that  it would take at least 6 months after the second class of personnel  graduated from the training pipeline to assess their effectiveness during  combat missions and to determine what, if any, additional training these  personnel require.
Further, the Air Force has not finalized an approach to supply the  personnel needed to perform maintenance functions on the growing UAS  inventories and meet servicewide goals to replace contractor maintenance  positions with funded military ones. Currently, the Air Force relies on  contractors to perform a considerable portion of UAS maintenance  because the Air Force does not have military personnel trained and  available to perform this function. For example, contractors perform  approximately 75 percent of organization-level maintenance requirements  for the Air Combat Command’s Predator and Reaper UAS. According to  the Air Force’s UAS Flight Plan, replacing contractor maintenance  personnel with military personnel would enable the Air Force to develop a  robust training pipeline and to build a sustainable career field for UAS  maintenance, while potentially reducing maintenance costs. According to  officials with whom we spoke, the Air Force’s goal is to establish a training  pipeline for military maintenance personnel by fiscal year 2012. However,  the Air Force has not developed a servicewide plan that identifies the  number of personnel to be trained, the specific training required, and the  resources necessary to establish a dedicated UAS training pipeline.  Officials estimated that it could take until fiscal year 2011 to determine  these requirements and to test the feasibility of a new training pipeline.
Our review also found that the Army’s personnel authorizations are  insufficient to fully support UAS operations. For example, according to  officials, the Army has determined on at least three separate occasions  since 2006 that Shadow UAS platoons did not have adequate personnel to  support the near-term and projected pace of operations. Officials from  seven Army Shadow platoons in the United States and in Iraq with whom  we spoke told us that approved personnel levels for these platoons did not  provide an adequate number of vehicle operators and maintenance  soldiers to support continuous UAS operations. Army officials told us that  currently approved personnel levels for the Shadow platoons were based  on planning factors that assumed that the Shadow would operate 12 hours  per day with the ability to extend operations to up to 16 hours for a limited  period of time. However, personnel with these platoons told us that UAS  in Iraq routinely operated 24 hours per day for extended periods of time.  Army officials also told us that organizations, such as combat brigades and  divisions, require additional personnel to provide UAS expertise to assist  commanders in optimizing the integration of UAS into operations and  safely employing these assets.
Despite the shortfalls experienced during ongoing operations, the Army  has yet to formally increase personnel authorizations to support UAS  operations or approve a servicewide plan to provide additional personnel.  Officials told us that on the basis of these and other operational  experiences, the Army was in the process of developing initiatives to  provide additional personnel to Army organizations to address personnel  shortfalls, and included these initiatives in an October 2009 UAS vision  statement developed by the Army’s UAS Center of Excellence. These  initiatives include increasing authorized personnel levels for vehicle  operators and maintenance soldiers in Shadow UAS platoons as well as  other initiatives to assign UAS warrant officers and Shadow vehicle  operators to brigade and division staffs. According to the Army’s UAS  vision statement, the initiatives to increase UAS personnel to meet current  and projected requirements will be completed by 2014. However, at the  time of our work, the Army had not developed a detailed action plan that  identified the number of additional personnel that would support UAS  operations and the steps it planned to take in order to synchronize the  funding and manpower necessary to provide these personnel, such as  reallocating existing manpower positions within combat brigades to  increase the size of Shadow platoons.
section_title: Facilities Needed to Support UAS Programs Have Not Been Systematically Defined and Costs Are Uncertain
paragraphs: Although DOD has requested funding to some extent in recent budget  requests and expects to request additional funds in future years, the Air  Force and the Army have not fully determined the specific number and  type of facilities needed to support UAS training and operations. For  example:    The Air Force has neither determined the total number of facilities  required to support its rapidly expanding Predator and Reaper  programs nor finalized the criteria it will use to renovate existing  facilities because decisions regarding the size of UAS squadrons and  the locations where these squadrons will be based had not been  finalized. In some cases, the Air Force has constructed new facilities to  support UAS operations. In other cases, the Air Force determined that  it did not need to construct new facilities and is instead renovating  existing facilities on UAS operating locations, such as maintenance  hangars and buildings to use for unit operations facilities. However,  until the Air Force determines where it plans to locate all of its new  UAS units and finalizes the criteria that would be used to guide the  construction or renovation of facilities, the Air Force will be unable to  develop realistic estimates of total UAS facility costs and long-term  plans for their construction.
The Army has begun to field the ERMP UAS and has determined that  the Army installations where the system will be stationed require  facilities uniquely configured to support training and operations. These  facilities include a runway, a maintenance hangar, and a unit  operations facility. However, the Army has not fully determined where  it will base each of these systems and it has not completed assessments  at each location to evaluate existing facilities that could potentially be  used to meet the ERMP requirements and to determine the number of  new facilities that the Army needs to construct. The lack of detailed  facility planning has affected the Army’s fielding schedule for the  ERMP. Army officials told us that the fielding plan for this system has  been adjusted to give priority to locations that do not require  significant construction. According to Army officials, initially the Army  had developed its fielding plan for the ERMP so that the plan for  fielding the system synchronized with the estimated deployment dates  for units supporting ongoing contingency operations.
The Army has not definitively determined, for the Shadow UAS, the  type and number of facilities needed to support training and aircraft  storage. In 2008, the Army established a policy that directed its ground  units to store Shadow aircraft in facilities with other ground unit  tactical equipment and not in facilities uniquely configured for these  aircraft. Ground units typically store equipment in facilities, such as  motor pools, that are not always near training ranges. Previously, the  Army had allowed some units to construct unique facilities for the  Shadow nearby installation ranges to facilitate their ability to conduct  training. Army officials told us that storing equipment within the motor  pool creates constraints to training when ranges are not in proximity.  In these situations, units are required to transport the Shadow and its  associated equipment from the motor pool to the training range,  assemble and disassemble the aircraft, and transport the equipment  back to the motor pool. Officials we spoke with at one Shadow platoon  estimated that these steps required more than 3 hours to complete,  thereby limiting the amount of flight training that can be performed  during one day. This practice may also lead to a more rapid  degradation of aircraft components. Officials told us that the frequent  assembling and disassembling of aircraft increases the wear and tear  on components, which could increase maintenance costs. While the  Army maintains a process for installations to request a waiver from the  policy that would allow for the construction of unique aircraft facilities,  officials told us that the Army is reevaluating whether the Shadow  requires unique facilities. Any decision to change the policy on Shadow  facilities would ultimately increase total program costs.
Because systematic analyses of facility needs for UAS programs have not  been conducted, the total costs to provide facilities for Air Force and  Army UAS programs are uncertain and have not been fully accounted for  in program cost estimates that are used by decision makers to evaluate the  affordability of these programs. Further, although costs for facilities were  not included in these estimates, our analysis of DOD’s budget requests for  fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2010 found that the Air Force and the  Army have sought more than $300 million to construct facilities for UAS.  Moreover, as these services finalize assessments of the number and type of  facilities required for UAS operations and field additional systems, they  will likely request additional funds for facilities. For example, Army  officials told us that cost estimates for ERMP facilities would be  unavailable until all of the ongoing requirements assessments were  complete; however, our analysis of the Army’s facility plans for the ERMP  estimates that the Army could request more than $600 million to construct  facilities for this program alone.
section_title: The Air Force Does Not Have a Plan in Place to Address Near-Term Risks to Communications Infrastructure
paragraphs: In general, the military services operate UAS using two different  operational concepts. For example, Army and Marine Corps units  primarily conduct UAS operations through a line-of-sight operational  concept. As depicted in figure 1, UAS are launched, operated, and landed  in this concept nearby the ground units that they support and are  controlled by a ground station that is also nearby.
In this concept, UAS can also transmit video and data to ground units or  other aircraft within line of sight to support a range of missions, such as  reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. Some level of risk is  introduced in a line-of-sight operational concept if the command and  control links to the aircraft are not secure.
Air Force and Navy units use this line-of-sight concept but also use a  beyond-the-line-of-sight operational concept that increases the risk of a  disruption in operations. In this concept, the operation of the UAS relies  on additional equipment and networks, some of which are located outside  of the country where the UAS operations occur. According to Air Force  officials, the use of a beyond-the-line-of-sight concept permits the service  to conduct UAS operations with limited numbers of personnel and  equipment deployed within an operational theater. As in the line-of-sight  concept, the UAS are launched and landed by deployed ground control  stations; however, the UAS are controlled during missions by a pilot and  sensor operator located at a fixed ground control station located at a  remote site. A satellite relay site delivers the signals between the UAS and  the ground control station at the remote site (see fig. 2).
The Air Force currently employs this operational concept for Predator,  Reaper, and Global Hawk UAS missions that support contingency  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For these missions, a ground control  station located within the United States takes control of the aircraft. A  satellite relay site at a fixed location (located outside of the continental  United States) relays signals from the ground control station to the UAS so  that they can communicate. Any disruptions at the satellite relay site  caused, for example, by a natural or man-made disaster could affect the  number of UAS operated under this concept.
DOD assesses risks and vulnerabilities to its critical assets and  installations using the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program and other  mission assurance programs and efforts, including those related to force  protection, antiterrorism, continuity of operations, and installation  preparedness. For example, Air Force doctrine dated June 2007 calls for  the establishment of backup or redundant command and control systems  for high-value systems so that operations can continue in the event of  failure or damage of the primary system. This doctrine further states that  planning for redundant command and control systems should be  formalized and exercised before military operations begin. However, the  Air Force has not established an alternate, redundant satellite relay site  with the capacity to control all UAS missions that are supporting ongoing  combat operations. Because of the satellite relay’s critical importance in  supporting ongoing contingency operations, the Air Force is taking steps  to establish a redundant satellite relay site to support UAS missions in the  event of disruptions at the current location. For example, officials told us  that the Air Force is acquiring new communications equipment with  increased capacity for the current site, which will allow equipment  currently in use to be available for other locations. In addition, the Air  Force is seeking funds to conduct surveys to identify potential locations to  establish a redundant satellite relay site. However, officials stated that  these efforts are not scheduled to be completed until fiscal year 2012, at  the earliest. Air Force officials also told us that they would have options to  pursue in the event of a near-term disruption at the satellite relay site, such  as relocating assets from other Air Force operations. At the time of our  work, however, the Air Force had not conducted a detailed analysis of  these options to determine the extent to which they would provide for the  continuity of UAS operations, or established a specific milestone to  formalize a plan that could be implemented quickly in the event of a  disruption.
section_title: Various Factors Have Contributed to a Lag in Planning for Personnel, Facilities, and Communications Infrastructure for UAS Programs
paragraphs: Several factors have contributed to a lag in Air Force and Army planning  for the personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure that  are integral to the operation of UAS. For example, although DOD’s primary  requirements definition process—termed the Joint Capabilities Integration  and Development System—encourages acquisition personnel to develop  cost estimates for its new weapon systems programs, including  consideration of various support factors, the Air Force’s current UAS  programs were, for the most part, initially developed and fielded as  technology demonstrations. According to the Air Force, these programs  have been subsequently approved within the Joint Capabilities Integration  and Development System, but comprehensive life cycle plans that fully  account for the personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure to  effectively manage the systems have not yet been completed.
Further, to meet near-term warfighter demands for these capabilities,  several UAS programs have been expanded beyond planned force  structure levels and, in some cases, have been fielded more rapidly than  originally planned. Given the changes in program requirements in the near  term, the Air Force and the Army have, for example, in the case of the Air  Force Predator and the Army Shadow programs, taken measures to  support UAS inventories. However, these measures have been taken  without the benefit of rigorous planning for the specific numbers and  types of personnel and facilities and some communications infrastructure  that are needed to support these programs in the long term. Finally, while  DOD components are expected to identify deficiencies in their strategies  to support weapon systems programs and to make necessary adjustments  to them as requirements change, the Air Force and the Army have not  completed the analyses or developed plans to account for new personnel  and facility requirements, and the Air Force has not developed a plan to  ensure the communications infrastructure needed to support its UAS  programs. In the absence of detailed action plans that fully account for  these factors and include milestones for tracking progress and  synchronize funding and personnel, DOD cannot have a reasonable  assurance that these services’ approaches will fully support current and  projected increases in UAS inventories. In addition, the lack of  comprehensive plans limits the visibility of decision makers to evaluate  the total resources required to support UAS inventories and to make  informed choices about funding one program over another.
section_title: DOD Has Not Resolved Challenges That Affect the Ability of the Air Force and the Army to Train Personnel for UAS Operations
paragraphs: Prior work shows that in order to improve the management of federal  activities, it is important that agencies develop comprehensive strategies  to address challenges that threaten their ability to meet long-term goals.  We identified several initiatives that DOD has commenced to address UAS  training challenges, but DOD lacks a results-oriented strategy to ensure  that compatible goals and outcomes are achieved among these initiatives.
subsections: section_title: Availability of Airspace Limits Training Opportunities
paragraphs: Many of DOD’s UAS operations take place outside of U.S. airspace, but  DOD requires access to the national airspace system for training, to  conduct operations such as homeland defense, and for the transit of  unmanned aircraft to overseas deployment locations—requirements that  have created airspace access challenges. For example, according to Army  officials, a single Shadow UAS platoon requires more than 3,000 flight  hours per year to fully train all aircraft operators. Because UAS do not  meet various federally mandated requirements and therefore do not have  routine access to the national airspace system, personnel must train in  DOD-managed airspace and training ranges located near their home  stations. Competing for this finite airspace are other units located at home  stations that also require access to DOD-managed airspace for their  operations, such as manned aircraft training. This competition, among  other factors, has affected the amount of training UAS personnel can  conduct and their ability to prepare for deployments. Army officials with  four of the seven Shadow platoons we met with told us that they were  unable to fully train the number of personnel needed to perform  continuous combat missions before they deployed for overseas  operations. As a result, UAS personnel had to conduct additional training  tasks upon arrival in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Plans to further increase UAS inventories on selected military installations  will likely further increase the demand for airspace. For example, the  Army plans to increase the number of Shadow UAS from about 70 systems  fielded at the time of our review to a goal of more than 100 systems by  fiscal year 2015. According to current plans, all active and reserve  component combat brigades, Army Special Forces units, fires brigades,  and battlefield surveillance brigades will be provided with Shadow  systems. In some cases, relocations of UAS to different installations have  resulted in increased UAS inventories at the new installations. For  example, in 2009, the Army moved the 4th Infantry Division and two  combat brigades from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort Carson, Colorado. This  move resulted in the addition of two Shadow systems on Fort Carson.  Army officials acknowledged that increases in UAS inventories will further  complicate the competition for limited quantities of DOD-managed  airspace.
As more advanced UAS are fielded in greater numbers, the military  services will require increased access to the national airspace system. For  example, the Army has fielded the ERMP UAS to its training battalion at  Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and plans to provide one system, comprising 12  aircraft, to each of its active component combat aviation brigades.  Because these aircraft are designed to operate at higher altitudes and  possess capabilities beyond those on the Shadow UAS, officials told us  that personnel who are responsible for operating the ERMP will require  access to airspace that they cannot currently access to conduct training.  Similarly, the Air Force requires expanded access to the national airspace  system to train pilots who operate its UAS, and also to move aircraft, such  as the Global Hawk, from bases in the United States to operational  theaters around the world. Because UAS do not possess “sense and avoid”  technology mandated by federal requirements for safe and efficient  operations, the military services must provide, in many cases, an air- or  ground-based observer of the aircraft during its flight in the national  airspace system. According to DOD and military service officials, this  restriction negates many of the most effective advantages of UAS, such as  aircraft endurance, and creates an impractical requirement given the  numbers of aircraft and personnel that are needed to monitor the  unmanned aircraft during training. Moreover, the practice may be an  unsustainable solution for meeting the demands of the military services’  growing inventories of UAS. DOD estimated in a December 2008 report  that based on planned UAS inventories in fiscal year 2013, the services will  require more than 1 million flight hours to train UAS personnel within the  United States.
In recent years, DOD has taken several actions to integrate UAS into the  national airspace system. For example, in November 2004, DOD issued an  airspace integration plan for unmanned aviation. The plan established  timelines and program milestones to achieve a goal that DOD’s UAS would  have safe, routine use of the national airspace system by 2010 while  maintaining an equivalent level of safety to that of an aircraft with a pilot  on board. In 2007, DOD convened a UAS Task Force with the participation  of the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Homeland  Security to find solutions to overcome the restrictions that limit the  integration of UAS in the national airspace system, among other tasks.  According to an official with the task force, DOD is in the process of  revising the airspace integration plan by October 2010 to include near-,  mid-, and long-term actions that DOD can take in concert with other  federal agencies to improve the integration of UAS in the national airspace  system. In our prior work, however, we reported that although some  progress has been made to provide increased access to the national  airspace system for small UAS, routine access for all types of UAS may not  occur for a decade or more.
The Congress has also raised questions about the progress made by DOD  and other federal agencies in developing an approach to enable greater  access for the department’s UAS to the national airspace system. In the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the Congress  directed DOD and the Department of Transportation to jointly develop a  plan to provide the military services’ UAS with expanded national airspace  system access. The plan, which is due April 2010, is to include  recommendations concerning policies for the use of the national airspace  system and operating procedures that should be implemented by both  DOD and the Department of Transportation to accommodate UAS  assigned to any state or territory of the United States.
section_title: Limited Opportunities Exist for Air Force and Army Units to Train Together in a Joint Environment and Available Training Opportunities Have Not Maximized the Use of UAS
paragraphs: Army ground combat units and Air Force UAS units primarily train  together at the Army’s large training centers and not at home stations. In  the United States, the Army has two large training centers—the National  Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training  Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Army ground combat units conduct 2-week  mission rehearsal exercises at one of these training centers before  deploying for ongoing operations. The Air Force, however, has UAS  stationed in the United States only near the National Training Center, so  Air Force UAS do not support Army training exercises at the Joint  Readiness Training Center.
At the National Training Center, several factors limit the time Air Force  UAS are available to support ground unit training. First, considerable  numbers of Air Force UAS personnel and equipment items are supporting  overseas contingency operations and therefore are unavailable to  participate in training exercises in a joint environment. Air Force officials  with the 432nd Wing, the unit that operates Air Force’s Predator and Reaper  UAS, told us that all of its unmanned aircraft are deployed to support  overseas operations except for those that are supporting the initial  training of UAS personnel or the testing of aircraft. These officials stated  that in the event that additional aircraft were made available, the wing’s  personnel levels are insufficient to support additional training events  because the unit does not have adequate personnel to support projected  operational commitments and greater numbers of training exercises.  Second, Army and Air Force officials told us that when Air Force UAS are  at the training center, these aircraft are not always available to support  ground unit training because a considerable portion of the UAS flight time  is dedicated to accomplishing Air Force crewmember training tasks.  Officials told us that the Army and Air Force have reached an informal  agreement to allot about half of the time that an Air Force UAS is flying at  the training center to support Army ground unit training objectives and the  other half to accomplish Air Force training tasks. Air Force officials  pointed out that although they try to align their crewmember training  syllabi with ground unit training objectives at the National Training  Center, training new personnel to operate these aircraft is their priority.  Third, UAS may not be available during certain hours to support ground  unit training, which can occur on a 24-hour schedule. For example,  Predator UAS from the California Air National Guard are available to  support ground units only during daylight hours. To travel to the training  center, these aircraft must pass through segments of national airspace that  are not restricted for DOD’s use and therefore must rely on a ground-based  observer or on chase aircraft to follow them to and from the training  center. Because of this reliance on ground or airborne observers, flights to  and from the training center must be accomplished during daylight hours.
As a result of the limited number of unmanned assets that are available to  support ground unit training at the National Training Center and the Joint  Readiness Training Center, Army ground units conducting training  exercises have relied on manned aircraft to replicate the capabilities of the  Air Force’s Predator and Reaper UAS. Officials told us that the use of  manned aircraft in this role permits ground units to practice the process to  request and integrate the capabilities provided by Air Force UAS in joint  operations. However, this practice is not optimal as the manned aircraft do  not replicate all of the capabilities of the Predator and Reaper aircraft,  such as longer dwell times. At the time of our work, DOD was analyzing  the utilization of manned aircraft for this purpose in order to assess  whether there is a need for additional UAS to support joint training.
Additionally, when UAS are available to support ground unit training, we  found that several factors affect the ability of ground combat units to  maximize the use of available assets during training exercises. Officials we  spoke with at the National Training Center pointed out that the effective  integration of UAS in training exercises, like the integration of other types  of joint air assets, depends on the priority that ground units place on  developing training objectives that require the participation of joint air  assets and their ability to plan for the use of these assets in the exercise.  An Army Forces Command official stated that Army combat brigades often  focus UAS training objectives during exercises on integrating their  Shadow UAS and do not emphasize planning for and employing Air Force  UAS. This is consistent with challenges that DOD has found in the  integration of other joint air assets with ground unit training at the Army’s  training centers. A 2009 U.S. Joint Forces Command study found that  although the National Training Center provides well-designed training  environments to integrate Air Force aviation assets to support combat  brigade training, a lack of adequate pre-exercise planning resulted in  aircraft that were not fully integrated with ground combat units in training  scenarios. The study recommended that to improve the integration of  joint air assets into ground training, ground units should conduct planning  meetings with Air Force organizations early in the training process to  identify mutually supporting training objectives and to synchronize air  assets to achieve these training objectives.
section_title: Air Force and Army UAS Simulators Have Limited Capabilities to Enhance Training, and Long-Term Plans Are Unclear
paragraphs: DOD officials have indicated that UAS simulators can play an essential  role in providing training opportunities for UAS personnel. Specifically,  simulators may allow personnel to repetitively practice tactics and  procedures and to meet training proficiency requirements without the  limitations of airspace constraints or range availability. UAS are  particularly well-suited for simulation training given that UAS vehicle and  sensor operators rely on video feeds to perform operations, and DOD and  service officials have indicated that current simulators have been used to  complete initial training tasks for UAS vehicle and sensor operators.
DOD’s current UAS simulators have limited capabilities, however, to  enhance training. For example, a recent study performed for DOD found  critical deficiencies in each of the UAS training simulators evaluated. In  particular, the study found that the military services lacked simulators that  were capable of supporting training that is intended to build proficiency in  skills required of UAS vehicle and sensor operators and prepare these  personnel to conduct UAS combat missions. During our review, we also  found several key deficiencies that limit the ability of Air Force and Army  simulators to be used for training—including the inability of some  simulators to replicate all UAS procedures and to enable the integration of  UAS training with other types of aircraft. For example, Air Force officials  told us that the Reaper simulator will initially be fielded without weapons- release capabilities, which would enable UAS personnel to replicate the  procedures used to attack targets, and this capability will not be available  until fiscal year 2011. Similarly, the Army’s Shadow Institutional Mission  Simulator is not currently capable of replicating system upgrades that are  being fielded directly to ongoing combat operations, such as a laser target  designator and communications relay equipment. As a result, Shadow unit  personnel expressed concern that they would be unable to train with these  capabilities prior to their deployment.
Air Force and Army simulators are also currently incapable of providing  virtual, integrated training opportunities between manned and unmanned  aircraft because of interoperability and information security concerns. For  example, the Air Force’s Predator and Reaper simulators are not  interoperable with the Air Force’s Distributed Mission Operations  Network, which creates a virtual training network for Air Force aviation  assets. Officials told us that the Predator and Reaper simulators do not  meet Air Force information security requirements for the Distributed  Mission Operations Network, which precludes these simulators from  participating in virtual integrated training exercises. Similarly, the Army’s  Shadow Institutional Mission Simulator is not fully interoperable with the  Army’s manned aviation simulator (the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical  Trainer) because of differences in the two simulators’ software. According  to Army officials, the lack of interoperability of the two simulators  detracts from the training value that UAS personnel would receive by  performing virtual integrated training with other types of Army aviation  assets.
Moreover, the Air Force and the Army have not fully developed  comprehensive plans that address long-term UAS simulator requirements  and associated funding needs. The Air Force, for example, has not  finalized plans to address its UAS simulator goals. Some goals established  within the Air Force’s UAS Flight Plan, such as the development of high- fidelity simulators, are expected to be completed in fiscal year 2010.  However, we found that other goals are not linked with the Air Force’s  funding plans. For example, while officials recognize the training benefit  of connecting the Predator and Reaper simulators to the Distributed  Mission Operations Network, the Air Force has not identified funds within  its future funding plans for this initiative. The Army has not fully defined  the number and type of simulators that its active component forces require  to meet the training needs of personnel who operate the Shadow and  ERMP UAS or the resources needed to acquire these systems. Army  officials told us that steps to determine simulator needs are ongoing.  Specifically, the Army has commissioned the Army Research Institute to  complete a simulator requirements study by October 2010 and it has  developed an initial UAS simulation strategy. In contrast, the Army  National Guard has begun to acquire a simulator to train soldiers who  operate the Guard’s Shadow UAS based on the results of a study it  completed in 2007 to validate its simulator needs.
section_title: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive, Results- Oriented Strategy to Resolve UAS Training Challenges
paragraphs: DOD has identified several challenges that affect service and joint UAS  training and has commenced several initiatives intended to address them,  but DOD has not developed a comprehensive, results-oriented strategy to  prioritize and synchronize these initiatives. A leading practice derived  from principles established under the Government Performance and  Results Act of 1993 is that in order to improve the management of federal  agencies, it is important that agencies develop comprehensive strategies to  address management challenges that threaten their ability to meet long- term goals. We have previously reported that these types of strategies  should contain results-oriented goals, performance measures, and  expectations with clear linkages to organizational, unit, and individual  performance goals to promote accountability and should also be clearly  linked to DOD’s key resource decisions.
To address UAS training challenges, DOD has launched a number of  initiatives to identify requirements for UAS access to national airspace, to  identify available training airspace at current and proposed UAS operating  locations, to improve joint training opportunities for ground units and UAS  personnel, and to recommend effective training methods and UAS  simulator equipment, and these initiatives are at various stages of  implementation. Table 3 provides a summary of select DOD organizations  and initiatives that are intended to address UAS training challenges.
At the time of our review, DOD’s initiatives to improve UAS training were  at varying stages of implementation. For example, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense’s effort to identify UAS airspace and training range  requirements was established in October 2008 by the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Officials told us that as of January  2010, the team had completed initial meetings and data collection with  military service and combatant command officials. As a result of these  initial steps, the team has identified specific actions that DOD should take  to improve UAS training and airspace access, which include documenting  UAS training requirements, establishing criteria for UAS basing decisions,  and identifying supporting training infrastructure needs. Further, the Joint  UAS Center of Excellence initiated an effort to analyze UAS integration at  predeployment training centers in March 2009, and according to officials,  they have collected data on UAS training at the National Training Center at  Fort Irwin, California, and the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center,  Twentynine Palms, California. We have previously reported that the Office  of the Secretary of Defense’s UAS Task Force, established in October  2007, is addressing civil airspace integration planning and technology  development, among other issues.
Although many defense organizations are responsible for implementing  initiatives to resolve UAS training challenges and to increase UAS access  to the national airspace system, DOD has not developed a comprehensive  plan to prioritize and synchronize these initiatives to ensure that  compatible goals and outcomes are achieved with milestones to track  progress. Officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense who are  identifying the amount of DOD-managed airspace at planned UAS  operating locations told us that one of their first efforts was to determine  whether DOD had developed a comprehensive strategy for UAS training,  but that they found that no such strategy existed. These officials also  stated that while they intended to complete efforts to improve UAS  training and airspace access within 18 months, they had not established  specific milestones to measure progress or identified the resources  required to achieve this goal. Absent an integrated, results-oriented plan to  address the challenges in a comprehensive manner, DOD will not have a  sound basis for prioritizing available resources, and it cannot be assured  that the initiatives it has under way will fully address limitations in Air  Force and Army training approaches.
section_title: DOD Has Not Fully Incorporated Knowledge Gained from Ongoing UAS Operations in Key Publications
paragraphs: Battlefield commanders and units have increased the operational  experience with UAS and have used these assets in innovative ways,  underscoring the need for complete and updated UAS publications. We  identified several factors that create challenges to incorporating new  knowledge regarding UAS practices and capabilities into formal  publications in a comprehensive and timely way.
subsections: section_title: UAS Publications Have Not Been Fully Updated to Include Information to Assist a Range of Stakeholders
paragraphs: DOD components have produced several UAS publications, including  service doctrine; multiservice and service-specific tactics, techniques, and  procedures; and a joint concept of operations, which are intended to  provide military personnel with information on the use of these systems,  to address interoperability gaps, and to facilitate the coordination of joint  military operations. These publications serve as the foundation for training  programs and provide the fundamentals to assist military planners and  operators to integrate military capabilities into joint operations. For UAS  operations, such stakeholders include both manned and unmanned  aircraft operators, military planners in joint operations, and ground units  that request UAS assets. Because military personnel involved in joint  operations may request or employ assets that belong to another service,  they need comprehensive information on the capabilities and practices for  all of DOD’s UAS. However, many of DOD’s existing UAS publications  have been developed through service-specific processes and focus on a  single service’s practices and UAS, and they contain limited information  on the capabilities that the other services’ UAS could provide in joint  operations. This information would assist military personnel at the  operational and tactical levels of command to plan for the optimal use of  UAS in joint operations and determine the best fit between available UAS  capabilities and mission needs. Furthermore, military personnel who are  responsible for the effective integration of UAS with other aviation assets  in joint operations, such as air liaison officers and joint aircraft  controllers, require knowledge beyond a single service’s UAS assets and  their tactics, techniques, and procedures. To effectively integrate UAS,  these service personnel require information that crosses service  boundaries, including capabilities, employment considerations, and  service employment procedures for all UAS that participate in joint  operations.
An internal DOD review of existing key UAS publications conducted in  2009 also found that most of these documents are technical operator  manuals with limited guidance to assist military planners and ground units  on the employment of UAS in joint operations. For example, the review  suggests that military planners and personnel who request the use of UAS  assets require additional guidance that links UAS performance capabilities  to specific mission areas so that there is a clear understanding of which  UAS offer the optimal desired effects. Additionally, these stakeholders  also require comprehensive information on UAS planning factors and the  appropriate procedures for UAS operators to assist with mission planning.
section_title: DOD Has Processes to Capture Knowledge Gained from Ongoing Operations, but Key UAS Publications Do Not Contain Timely Information
paragraphs: In addition, many key publications do not contain timely information.  DOD officials told us that existing publications are due for revision given  the rapidly expanding capabilities of UAS and the utilization of these  assets in joint operations. As a result, information on UAS practices and  capabilities described in these publications is no longer current. For  example, DOD’s multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures manual  for the tactical employment of UAS was last updated in August 2006.  According to officials with whom we spoke, the document does not  contain detailed information on UAS operations in new mission areas,  such as communication relay, fires, convoy support, and irregular  warfare. Although DOD components have established milestones to  revise UAS publications, in some cases, these efforts have not been  successful. For example, the Air Force has canceled conferences that were  scheduled to occur in prior fiscal years that were intended to revise the  tactics, techniques, and procedures manuals for the Predator UAS  because, according to officials, key personnel were supporting overseas  operations and were therefore unavailable to participate in the process. As  a result, these publications have not been formally updated since 2006, and  Air Force officials acknowledged to us that these manuals do not reflect  current tactics and techniques. While past attempts to revise these  publications have been unsuccessful, the Air Force has scheduled another  conference in 2010 to revise the Predator publications.
Documenting timely information on the use of UAS in ongoing joint  operations is important because commanders and units are increasing  their operational experience with these new weapon systems. As a result,  military personnel have often developed and used new approaches to  employ UAS, which may differ or build upon approaches outlined in  existing publications. For example, according to officials, the use of UAS  in ongoing operations has contributed to the development of new tactics  for the employment of UAS in counterinsurgency operations—information  that has not previously been included in DOD’s publications. Officials told  us that although publications have not been formally updated, some units,  such as Air Force UAS squadrons, maintain draft publications that  describe current tactics, techniques, and procedures that are being used in  ongoing operations. However, these officials acknowledged to us that  while UAS unit personnel have access to these draft documents, other  stakeholders, such as military planners and manned aircraft operators, do  not have access to the new information contained in the draft  publications.
In the absence of updated publications, DOD components have captured  lessons learned and developed ad hoc reference materials that contain  updated information on UAS capabilities to use in training exercises and  during joint operations. For example, the military services and U.S. Joint  Forces Command’s Joint UAS Center of Excellence maintain Web sites  that post lessons learned from recent UAS operations. In addition,  warfighter unit personnel with whom we met provided us with several  examples of reference materials that were produced to fill voids in  published information on current UAS practices. Although this approach  assists with documenting new knowledge during the time between  publication updates, the use of lessons learned and reference materials as  substitutes for timely publications can create challenges in the long term.  Namely, these materials may not be widely distributed within DOD, and  the quality of the information they contain has not been validated since  these materials have not been formally vetted within the normal  publication development and review process.
section_title: Personnel Availability and Service Coordination Have Limited Development of Comprehensive and Timely Publications
paragraphs: Several factors create challenges to incorporating new knowledge about  UAS practices and capabilities into formal publications in a  comprehensive and timely way. Because the military services, in some  cases, have rapidly accelerated the deployment of UAS capabilities to  support ongoing contingency operations, there has been a corresponding  increase in new knowledge on the employment of UAS in joint operations.  This creates a challenge in incorporating new knowledge and maintaining  current information within UAS publications through the normal  publication review process. Military service officials noted that the pace of  ongoing operations for UAS subject matter experts has also limited the  amount of time that key personnel have been available to revise  publications. As one example, Air Force officials told us that the subject  matter experts who are normally responsible for documenting new tactics,  techniques, and procedures within formal manuals for the service’s  Predator and Reaper UAS are the same service personnel who operate  these UAS in ongoing operations. Because of the rapid expansion of the  number of Air Force UAS supporting operations, the Air Force has not had  enough personnel with critical knowledge on the use of these assets to  participate in efforts to update its formal UAS publications. Officials told  us that conferences scheduled in previous years intended to update the  Predator UAS publications and to develop initial publications for the  Reaper UAS were postponed because key personnel were supporting  operations and were therefore unavailable to attend the conferences. In  2008, the Air Force established a new squadron at the Air Force Weapons  School to develop tactical experts for the service’s UAS. According to  officials, personnel within the squadron will play a key role in conferences  scheduled in fiscal year 2010 that are intended to revise the tactics,  techniques, and procedures manuals for both the Predator and Reaper  UAS.
We recognize that the pace of operations has strained the availability of  key subject matter experts to document timely information in UAS  publications, but the military services have not, in some cases, assigned  personnel to positions that are responsible for UAS publication  development. For example, in 2006, the Air Force established the 561st  Joint Tactics Squadron on Nellis Air Force Base, comprising multiservice  personnel, with the primary mission to provide timely development and  update of tactics, techniques, and procedures publications. However, the  squadron did not have UAS subject matter experts on staff who would be  responsible for finalizing UAS publications and documenting procedures  for the integration of UAS in combat operations, such as in the areas of  airspace management and fire support coordination. Squadron officials  told us that as of August 2009, the Air Force had not filled its UAS expert  positions because of personnel shortfalls throughout the UAS community  and the Army had not filled its positions despite agreements between  Army and Air Force leadership to do so. According to officials, the lack of  these experts also limits the squadron’s ability to collect and validate  emerging UAS tactics and to disseminate these emerging tactics to  warfighters who are preparing to deploy for overseas contingency  operations.
Additionally, while a DOD directive makes the services responsible for  participating with one another to develop publications for those UAS that  are common among the services, they have not yet done so. To their  credit, the Army and the Air Force completed a concept in June 2009,  which presents a common vision for the services to provide theater- capable, multirole UAS to support a joint force commander across the  entire spectrum of military operations. The Army and Air Force view this  concept as the first step to improving service-centric UAS procedures, and  among other tasks, the services intend to update joint doctrine and tactics,  techniques, and procedures for multirole UAS capabilities. However, we  found that in several instances, the military services worked  independently to develop publications for common UAS and did not  maximize opportunities to share knowledge and work collaboratively. The  lack of collaboration during the development of publications can limit the  sharing of lessons learned and best practices that have been established  through the use of UAS in operations. For example:  In 2009, the Air Force developed the first tactics, techniques, and  procedures manual for the Global Hawk UAS, but did not collaborate  with the Navy on the process to develop this publication. The Navy is  using a similar unmanned aircraft for its Broad Area Maritime  Surveillance and has begun operating a version of this UAS to support  ongoing operations.
At the time of our work, the Marine Corps was finalizing its tactical  manual for the Shadow UAS, which the service began to deploy in  fiscal year 2008. However, the Marine Corps had limited collaboration  with the Army in the development of this publication, despite the fact  that Army ground units have considerable operational experience  employing the Shadow UAS system and have been operating it since  2002.
We were told that the Air Force did not plan to invite the Army to  participate in the process scheduled for 2010 to update the Predator  UAS tactics manuals. In 2009, the Army began to deploy an initial  version of the ERMP UAS, which is similar in design and performance  to the Predator.
The lack of comprehensive and timely publications that are written for a  range of stakeholders limits the quality of information that is available to  serve as the foundation for effective joint training programs and to assist  military planners and operators in integrating UAS on the battlefield.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Warfighter demand for UAS has fueled a dramatic growth in DOD’s  programs and the military services have had success providing assets to  military forces supporting ongoing operations. However, the rapid fielding  of new systems and the considerable expansion of existing Air Force and  Army programs has posed challenges for military planners to fully account  for UAS support elements, such as developing comprehensive plans that  account for the personnel and facilities needed to operate and sustain UAS  programs and ensure the communications infrastructure that is necessary  to control UAS operations. While the Air Force and the Army have  implemented various actions to address UAS support elements, these  actions in many cases have not been guided by a rigorous analysis of the  requirements to support UAS programs in the long term or the  development of plans that identify milestones for completing actions and  synchronize the resources needed for implementation. In the absence of  plans that fully account for support elements and related costs, DOD  cannot be reasonably assured that Air Force and Army approaches will  provide the level of support necessary for current and projected increases  in UAS inventories. Moreover, the lack of comprehensive plans limits the  ability of decision makers to evaluate the total resources needed to  support UAS programs and to make informed future investment decisions.  Furthermore, the challenges regarding UAS training may be difficult to  resolve unless DOD develops a comprehensive and integrated strategy to  prioritize and synchronize the initiatives it has under way to address  limitations in Air Force and Army training. Lastly, without assigning  personnel or taking steps to coordinate efforts to update and develop UAS  publications, information in UAS publications will not be comprehensive  and therefore will not include new knowledge on UAS practices and  capabilities. This has the potential to limit the quality of information that is  available to serve as the foundation for effective joint training programs  and to assist military planners and operators in integrating UAS on the  battlefield.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five  actions:  To ensure that UAS inventories are fully supported in the long term, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air  Force and the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to conduct  comprehensive planning as part of the decision-making process to field  new systems or to further expand existing capabilities to account for  factors necessary to operate and sustain these programs. At a minimum,  this planning should be based on a rigorous analysis of the personnel and  facilities needed to operate and sustain UAS and include the development  of detailed action plans that identify milestones for tracking progress and  synchronize funding and personnel.
To ensure that the Air Force can address the near-term risk of disruption  to the communications infrastructure network used to control UAS  missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Air Force to establish a milestone for finalizing a near- term plan to provide for the continuity of UAS operations that can be  rapidly implemented in the event of a disruption and is based on a detailed  analysis of available options.
To ensure that DOD can comprehensively resolve challenges that affect  the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS  operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with  the military services and other organizations as appropriate, to develop a  results-oriented training strategy that provides detailed information on the  steps that DOD will take to   identify and address the effects of competition and airspace  restrictions on UAS training,   increase the opportunities that Army ground units and Air Force UAS  personnel have to train together in a joint environment,    maximize the use of available assets in training exercises, and    upgrade UAS simulation capabilities to enhance training.
At a minimum, the strategy should describe overarching goals, the priority  and interrelationships among initiatives, progress made to date, milestones  for achieving goals, and the resources required to accomplish the  strategy’s goals.
To help ensure that all stakeholders, including unmanned aircraft  operators, military planners, and ground units, have comprehensive and  timely information on UAS practices and capabilities, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the  Secretary of the Army to assign personnel to update key UAS publications.  We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of  the Air Force, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Navy to  take steps to coordinate the efforts to develop publications for those UAS  where there is commonality among the services.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with four  recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation.  DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as  appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the  Air Force and the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to conduct  comprehensive planning as part of the decision-making process to field  new systems or to further expand existing capabilities to account for  factors necessary to operate and sustain these programs that at a  minimum, is based on a rigorous analysis of the personnel and facilities  needed to operate and sustain UAS and include the development of  detailed action plans that identify milestones for tracking progress and  synchronize funding and personnel. DOD stated that the department  conducts ongoing analysis to determine personnel requirements,  necessary capabilities for emerging and maturing missions, basing, and  training requirements as part of the military services’ processes for fielding  new systems and expanding existing capabilities and that this planning is  based on internal studies as well as rigorous computer modeling, which  provides detailed projections of personnel requirements based on  anticipated growth and training capacity. DOD further stated that these  plans take into account factors that are necessary to operate and sustain  UAS, which are applied in order to synchronize funding and personnel.  DOD also noted that some planning factors are variable over time and are  regularly reassessed in order to validate plans or drive necessary changes.  As discussed in the report, the Air Force and the Army are conducting  analyses of factors, such as personnel and facilities, which are required to  operate and sustain current and projected UAS force levels. However,  although the services are requesting funds, they have not finalized ongoing  analyses or fully developed plans that specify the actions and resources  required to supply the personnel and facilities that are needed to support  these inventories in the long term. Therefore, we reiterate our  recommendation that as DOD makes decisions to further expand UAS  inventories, it needs to ensure that the Air Force and the Army conduct  extensive planning, to include performing the necessary analyses for these  factors, so that decision makers have complete information on total  program costs and assurances that weapon system programs can be fully  supported.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the  Air Force to establish a milestone for finalizing a near-term plan to provide  for the continuity of operations that can be rapidly implemented in the  event of a disruption to the communications infrastructure network used  to control UAS missions that is based on a detailed analysis of available  options. DOD stated the Air Force is conducting a site selection process  for identifying a second satellite relay location and that until the alternate  site has been selected and funding secured, the Air Force has mitigated  risk of communication disruption with a plan for acquiring and positioning  backup equipment for the existing satellite relay site. We state in the  report that at the time of our review, the Air Force had not conducted a  detailed analysis of available options, such as repositioning backup  equipment, to determine the extent to which they would provide for the  continuity of UAS operations and it had not established a specific  milestone to formalize a plan that could be implemented quickly in the  event of a disruption. We are encouraged by DOD’s statement that the Air  Force has since developed a continuity plan. Although we did not have the  opportunity to review the plan’s contents, we would expect that it is based  on a detailed analysis of the equipment that is required to provide a  redundant communications capability at the existing satellite relay site  and that it includes specific milestones for acquiring and positioning new  equipment in the near term.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the military  services and other organizations as appropriate, to develop a results- oriented training strategy that provides detailed information on the steps  that DOD will take to identify and address the effects of competition and  airspace restrictions on UAS training; increase the opportunities that Army  ground units and Air Force UAS personnel have to train together in a joint  environment; maximize the use of available assets in training exercises;  and upgrade UAS simulation capabilities to enhance training. This strategy  should, at a minimum, describe overarching goals, the priority and  interrelationships among initiatives, progress made to date, milestones for  achieving goals, and the resources required to accomplish the strategy’s  goals. DOD stated that the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness has work under way to address this  recommendation and that organizations, including the offices of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Joint UAS  Center of Excellence, and the military services, are participating on a team  to facilitate identifying UAS training requirements and develop a concept  of operations for UAS training. DOD further stated that upon completion  of the concept, the department will develop and implement a mission  readiness road map and investment strategy.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary  of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Army to assign personnel to  update key UAS publications. DOD stated that military personnel are  updating regulations that govern training, certification, and operational  guidance for UAS personnel. DOD also stated that the military services are  active participants in the process for updating key joint guidance, such as  joint publications and other tactics documents, and that the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is  initiating development of the third edition of the Unmanned Systems  Roadmap and the Joint UAS Center of Excellence is writing the third  version of the Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft  Systems. DOD further stated that guidance on UAS tactics, techniques,  and procedures should be incorporated into joint functional guidance  rather than the update of documents that are dedicated only to UAS  tactics, techniques, and procedures. We state in our report that DOD  components, such as the military services and other defense organizations,  have produced several publications, including joint and service doctrinal  publications, that describe processes to plan for and integrate UAS into  combat operations. We also state in the report that DOD components have  produced UAS-specific publications, such as multiservice and platform- specific tactics, techniques, and procedures manuals. However, we  identified many cases where DOD’s UAS publications did not incorporate  updated information needed by military personnel to understand current  practices and capabilities, and we found that the military services have  not, in some instances, assigned personnel to positions that are  responsible for UAS publication development. This has the potential to  limit the quality of information that is available to serve as the foundation  for effective joint training programs and to assist military planners and  operators in integrating UAS on the battlefield. Therefore, we continue to  believe that our recommendation has merit.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the  Air Force, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Navy to take  steps to coordinate the efforts to develop publications for those UAS  where there is commonality among the services. DOD stated that  coordination to develop publications where commonality exists between  UAS is occurring. For example, DOD stated that the Army and Air Force  Theater-Capable Unmanned Aircraft Enabling Concept was approved in  February 2009. According to DOD, this document outlines how the two  services will increase the interoperability of similar systems, and as a  result, planning is under way to identify key publications and incorporate  joint concepts. As we note in our report, to their credit, the Air Force and  Army concept can serve to improve service-centric UAS procedures.  However, we found that in other instances, the military services did not  maximize opportunities to share knowledge and work collaboratively in  the development of UAS publications where there is commonality among  the services, which can limit the sharing of lessons learned and best  practices that have been established through the use of UAS in operations.  Therefore, we reiterate the need for the military services to coordinate the  efforts to develop publications for those UAS where there is commonality  among the services.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the  Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the  Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This report also is  available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any question about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To address our objectives, we met with officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense; the Joint Staff; several unified combatant  commands; the Multi-National Forces Iraq; and the Departments of the Air  Force, the Army, and the Navy who represent headquarters organizations  and tactical units. To determine the extent to which plans were in place to  account for the personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure to  support Air Force and Army unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) inventories,  we focused primarily on Air Force and Army UAS programs that support  ongoing operations. Excluded from this review were programs for small  unmanned aircraft. While the military services have acquired more than  6,200 of these aircraft, they generally do not have substantial support  requirements. We examined the military services’ UAS program and  funding plans, Department of Defense (DOD) policies governing the  requirements definition and acquisition processes, and data generated by  the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System—the  department’s principal process for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing  joint military capabilities and the process used by acquisition personnel to  document a weapon system’s life cycle costs (including support costs) to  determine whether the associated program is affordable. We analyzed UAS  funding requests included in the President’s budget requests for fiscal  years 2006 through 2010. We compiled data from the Departments of the  Air Force, the Army, and the Navy and the DOD-wide procurement,  research, development, test and evaluation, military construction, and  operation and maintenance budget justification books. We reviewed  documents that detail UAS operational concepts and we interviewed  officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military  services to determine whether UAS plans account for the services’  personnel, facilities, and communication infrastructure needs for these  concepts, and to determine any actions taken to update UAS plans to more  accurately reflect the costs of further expanding UAS programs. We  considered all of the information collected on these planning efforts in  light of knowledge gained by the services from operational experiences  with the use of UAS in ongoing contingency operations. In examining UAS  planning documents, we consulted the Office of Management and Budget’s  Capital Programming Guide and our Cost Estimating and Assessment  Guide for instruction on developing cost estimates and plans to manage  capital investments.
In determining the extent to which DOD addressed challenges that affect  the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS  operations, we visited select military installations and the Army’s National  Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and spoke with knowledgeable  DOD and military service officials to determine the specific challenges that  the Air Force and the Army faced when training service personnel to  perform UAS missions in joint operations. Specifically, we spoke with Air  Force and Army personnel in UAS units in the United States and in Iraq to  determine the training that they were able to perform prior to operating  UAS in joint operations through live-fly training and through the use of  simulators. We discussed the challenges, if any, that prevented them from  performing required training tasks. In identifying Air Force and Army unit  personnel to speak with, we selected a nonprobability sample of units that  were preparing to deploy for contingency operations or had redeployed  from these operations from May 2009 through September 2009. We  examined documents and spoke with DOD and military service officials to  identify initiatives that have begun to address UAS training challenges. We  assessed DOD’s efforts to overcome these challenges in light of leading  practices derived from principles established under the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993, which are intended to assist federal  agencies in addressing management challenges that threaten their ability  to meet long-term goals, and key elements of an overarching  organizational framework, such as developing results-oriented strategies,  as described in our prior work.
To determine the extent to which DOD updated its existing publications  that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to reflect  the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing operations, we  examined joint, multiservice, and service-specific UAS doctrine, tactics,  techniques, and procedures, and concept of operations publications. We  interviewed DOD and military service officials to determine which  organizational entities require information on UAS capabilities and  practices. We examined the publications to determine the level of  information provided to various organizations and personnel that are  responsible for planning for and employing UAS in joint operations. We  also analyzed the publications to determine the degree to which  information is provided to the various organizations and personnel that  are responsible for planning for and employing UAS in joint operations.  Finally, we interviewed DOD and military service officials about the  processes used to develop and update publications; any challenges that  affect their ability to update key publications; and how new knowledge  regarding UAS operations, such as lessons learned and best practices, is  captured. We analyzed these processes to determine the level of  coordination among the military services to develop UAS publications and  the frequency at which documents have been revised.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through March  2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Office of the Secretary of Defense
section_title: Department of the Air Force
section_title: Department of the Army
section_title: Department of the Navy
section_title: Other DOD Components
section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant  Director; Meghan Cameron; Mae Jones; Susan Langley; Ashley Lipton;  Greg Marchand; Brian Mateja; Jason Pogacnik; Mike Shaughnessy; and  Matthew Ullengren made significant contributions to this report.