Federal Emergency Management Agency: Additional Planning and Data Collection Could Help Improve Workforce Management Efforts
Published: 2015-07-09T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: FEMA historically has relied on both permanent and temporary disaster-related employees to respond to presidentially declared disasters. FEMA's total workforce increased by about 144 percent—7,558 to 18,449 employees—from fiscal year 2005 to September 2014. In 2012, FEMA deployed two new components to its disaster response workforce—the DHS Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps. However, an after-action report from Hurricane Sandy indicated that FEMA exhausted its staff resources during its response and that FEMA faced additional challenges related to its disaster response workforce.
GAO was asked to examine FEMA's efforts to manage its current and future workforce needs. This report addresses (1) FEMA's actions to address long-standing workforce challenges, and (2) the challenges that have affected FEMA's new disaster workforce components. GAO reviewed after-action reports, strategic plans, and program documentation for FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force. GAO also interviewed agency officials and conducted 23 nongeneralizable focus groups with members of FEMA's workforce who provided important insights.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is taking steps to address various long-standing workforce management challenges identified by GAO. Since 2007, GAO has found that FEMA faced challenges in completing and integrating its strategic workforce planning efforts. As a result, GAO recommended that FEMA develop a plan that identifies workforce gaps and includes performance metrics for monitoring progress. GAO has also identified other workforce challenges at FEMA, including low employee morale. FEMA has not yet resolved these challenges and fully addressed GAO's workforce-related recommendations but, according to agency officials, plans to do so through several efforts:
a new incident workforce planning model—pending final approval—that will determine the optimal mix of workforce components to include in FEMA's disaster workforce,
a new Human Capital Strategic Plan to be finalized in September 2015—that will help ensure it has the optimal workforce to carry out its mission, and
an executive-level steering committee to help ensure that these workforce planning efforts are completed and integrated.
FEMA's ability to address long-standing challenges hinges on its ability to effectively coordinate with agency stakeholders and integrate its workforce-related new efforts into a strategic human capital management approach. Given that the agency's efforts are ongoing, it is too soon to determine whether these challenges will be addressed.
FEMA faces challenges in implementing and managing its two new workforce components: the Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps. For example, as of January 2015, the Surge Capacity Force was at 26 percent of its staffing target of 15,400 personnel, and FEMA does not have a plan for how it will increase the number of volunteers to meet its goals. Developing such a plan would help ensure that the Surge Capacity Force has a sufficient number of personnel available to support FEMA's efforts. Further, GAO found that FEMA does not collect full cost information, including the costs of FEMA Corps background investigations and the salaries and benefits of Surge Capacity Force volunteers who are paid by DHS components while they are deployed. Collecting this information would help provide a more accurate accounting of the cost of conducting both programs. Further, FEMA does not assess all aspects of program performance because it does not have performance measures that correspond to all program goals. The agency also does not collect reliable performance data, or have an automated system for comparing performance against FEMA Corps project goals. Doing so would better enable FEMA to assess whether it is meeting its program goals.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that FEMA develop a plan to increase Surge Capacity Force volunteer recruitment and collect additional cost and performance information for its two new workforce components. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified related actions the department is taking to address them.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA) has historically relied on both permanent  and disaster-related temporary employees to respond to presidentially  declared disasters. In 2012, FEMA first deployed two new components— made up of individuals who are not FEMA employees—as part of its  disaster response workforce: the DHS Surge Capacity Force, with more  than 4,000 DHS volunteers, and the AmeriCorps National Civilian  Community Corps (NCCC)-FEMA Corps (hereafter FEMA Corps), with  about 1,000 members per year. FEMA’s combined workforce increased  by about 144 percent (from 7,558 to 18,449 employees) from fiscal year  2005 through 2014. During Hurricane Sandy, FEMA deployed its  permanent and temporary employees, as well as these new disaster  workforce components. However, FEMA’s after-action report on its  response to Hurricane Sandy identified continuing challenges affecting  how the agency manages its workforce, noting that the deployment of  FEMA’s disaster workforce nearly exhausted the number of available  personnel. In recent years, we have identified human capital  management challenges at FEMA and made a number of  recommendations to strengthen the agency’s efforts. FEMA has taken or  is planning various actions to address a number of these issues, as we  discuss throughout this report.
We have also reported that FEMA obligated $12.7 billion from the  Disaster Relief Fund for its administrative costs for major disasters  declared from fiscal years 2004 through 2013. These administrative  costs accounted for 13 percent of the total $95.2 billion FEMA obligated  from the fund for major disasters declared during this time frame. FEMA’s  average administrative cost percentages for major disasters during this  time doubled the average during the 10 fiscal years 1989 to 1998 and the  average number of FEMA staff deployed to a disaster has increased  significantly, from fewer than 500 in fiscal year 1989 to over 1,500 in fiscal  year 2009. Given that salaries and benefits make up a large proportion  of FEMA’s administrative costs of responding to and recovering from  disasters and the growing size of FEMA’s disaster workforce, you asked  us to review FEMA’s efforts to manage its workforce and plan for future  workforce needs. Our objectives were to determine the extent to which (1)  FEMA has taken steps to address long-standing challenges in managing  its workforce and (2) these challenges affected FEMA’s deployment and  management of its new disaster workforce components—the Surge  Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps.
To assess FEMA’s progress in addressing long-standing challenges in  managing its workforce, we reviewed our prior work on FEMA and agency  documentation such as FEMA’s after-action reports on its response to  Hurricane Sandy and the FEMA Strategic Plan 2014-2018. We interviewed agency officials from the Office of the Chief Component  Human Capital Officer (OCCHCO), the Incident Workforce Management  Division, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, and the Office of Policy  and Program Analysis to discuss FEMA’s progress in addressing our  open recommendations and implementing initiatives related to the  challenges we identified. We conducted focus groups at 3 of FEMA’s 10  regions with full-time FEMA employees—Permanent Full-Time (PFT)  employees and Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees  (CORE)—to obtain regional perspectives on the agency’s workforce  planning and management efforts, FEMA Qualification System (FQS)   We selected the three  implementation, and employee morale issues.regions based on factors including geographic dispersion and regions that  typically respond to different types of disasters. While we cannot  generalize the information we obtained from these focus groups, it  provides important insights.
NCCC is part of the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS), a federal  agency that manages programs such as AmeriCorps, Senior Corps, the Social Innovation  Fund, and FEMA Corps. challenges of the programs. Further, we conducted focus groups of  FEMA Corps team leaders and members at three FEMA regions to obtain  their perspectives on FEMA Corps retention challenges. We analyzed  these focus group discussions to identify common themes and patterns.  While the information obtained from our focus groups with FEMA Corps  team leaders and members in the three regions cannot be generalized, it  provided us with valuable examples of experiences in the program. We  applied standards from Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, program management best practices, program guidance,  Office of Management and Budget guidance on cost-benefit analyses and  surveys, and best practices identified in our prior work on collaboration,  program cost estimating and assessment, and strategic workforce  planning, to examine staffing, cost, and performance issues of its new  disaster workforce components.discussion of our scope and methodology.
See appendix I for a more detailed  We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to June 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: In 2001, we first identified strategic human capital management in the  federal government as a high-risk area because of the significant  challenges federal government agencies faced including acquiring and  developing staff whose size, skills, and deployment met agency needs.  In our February 2013 update, we reported that effective strategic  workforce planning is essential for ensuring that agencies have the talent,  skill, and experience mix they need to cost-effectively execute their  mission and program goals.
In our past reviews of these issues at FEMA, we have reported that  FEMA should strengthen the strategic management of its workforce,  including improvements in gathering workforce data, identifying staffing  gaps, and developing plans with goals and measures to fill those gaps.   we reported that FEMA lacked a strategic  For example, in 2007, workforce plan and recommended that, in responding to strategic  workforce planning requirements in the Post-Katrina Emergency  Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act), FEMA apply the key  principles of strategic workforce planning, such as assessing the number  of employees and critical skills that FEMA needs. Although FEMA  subsequently issued a strategic workforce plan for 2008-2012, that plan  did not include performance metrics or identify possible workforce gaps,   In 2011,  overlaps, or inconsistencies, as discussed later in this report.we again reported the need for and recommended that FEMA develop a  workforce plan. Most recently, in 2012, we recommended that FEMA  establish goals, performance measures, and systematic processes for  collecting and analyzing workforce data. FEMA has not yet fully  addressed many of our past human capital–related recommendations, as  we discuss later in the report.
subsections: section_title: Overview of FEMA’s Workforce
paragraphs: FEMA’s workforce consists of a combination of employees hired under   as well as individuals from two workforce  Title 5, and the Stafford Act,components who are not FEMA employees but are deployed to augment  FEMA’s workforce for disaster response: the DHS Surge Capacity Force  and the FEMA Corps.
Title 5 employees: These permanent and temporary employees  make up FEMA’s day-to-day workforce and are responsible for  administering the agency’s ongoing program activities in headquarters  and regional offices. During disasters, these employees can be  deployed as needed.
Stafford Act employees: These employees must provide support to  disaster-related activities and augment FEMA’s disaster workforce at  facilities, regional offices, and headquarters. Stafford Act employees  include Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees and  reservists (formerly disaster assistance employees). COREs are  temporary employees with 2- to 4-year appointments and can be  deployed to fulfill any role specifically related to the incident for which  they are hired and qualified during disaster assistance response and  recovery efforts. Reservists work on an intermittent basis and are  deployed as needed to fulfill incident management roles within their  cadre function.
Surge Capacity Force: The purpose of the Surge Capacity Force is  to augment FEMA’s disaster workforce in a catastrophic disaster. The  Surge Capacity Force consists of volunteers who are employees of  DHS components, such as the Transportation Security Administration  and U.S. Secret Service. DHS issued the Surge Capacity Force  Concept of Operations in 2010 and first deployed Surge Capacity  Force volunteers to assist in response and recovery efforts during  Hurricane Sandy which made landfall in October 2012— approximately 1,100 Surge Capacity Force volunteers from seven  DHS components deployed to New York in November and December  2012 to provide aid to survivors, information about disaster  assistance, and logistics support. Currently only DHS employees  can volunteer to join the Surge Capacity Force, although the Post- Katrina Act authorizes FEMA to include employees of other federal  agencies. FEMA manages and coordinates the Surge Capacity  Force program. The other DHS components provide management  support for the Surge Capacity Force program.
FEMA Corps: FEMA Corps is a national service program managed  by AmeriCorps NCCC whose members work under the supervision of  FEMA staff. FEMA staffs are responsible for developing projects for  FEMA Corps members and providing technical supervision at project  sites. Specifically, FEMA Corps members are young adults—ages  18 to 24—who are recruited to serve in the FEMA Corps program as  members of the AmeriCorps NCCC Program. They serve for 10  months under a service agreement providing national community  service for FEMA disaster management operations. The goals of the  program are to (1) strengthen the nation’s disaster response  capability, (2) achieve significant cost savings to the taxpayer, (3)  create pathways to work for young people, (4) promote an ethic of  national service, and (5) modernize government operations to improve  performance. FEMA, in conjunction with the NCCC, established the  FEMA Corps in 2012, and its first major deployment to assist in  disaster response and recovery efforts was during Hurricane Sandy in  October 2012. Figure 1 shows an image of a FEMA Corps member  participating in recent FEMA disaster recovery efforts.
During fiscal years 2008 through 2014, the number of individuals that  could be deployed as part of FEMA’s disaster response workforce  increased from 16,928 personnel in 2008 to 18,449 personnel in 2014— reflecting the incorporation of the two new non-FEMA components, the  Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps. Analysis of its mission and  personnel, changes in policies, technology advances, and workforce data  are some of the factors FEMA officials use to determine the agency’s  composition and staffing levels and the number of individuals needed for  the new components of its disaster response workforce. Figure 2 shows  FEMA’s combined workforce composition and staffing levels for fiscal  years 2008 through 2014.
Several program offices within FEMA play a role in the agency’s  workforce planning. At FEMA headquarters, OCCHCO (within the Mission  Support Bureau) is responsible for providing leadership and direction to  all stakeholders, including FEMA headquarters and regional offices, on  human capital programs, products, and services. OCCHCO is also  responsible for implementing policies and programs to recruit, hire, train,  and retain FEMA’s workforce including guidance and oversight related to  morale issues. Within the Office of Response and Recovery, the Incident  Workforce Management Division is responsible for the deployment of  personnel, the management of the surge capacity forces, disaster  response cadre management, and the implementation of FQS. See  appendix II for FEMA’s organizational chart, as of January 2015.
section_title: FEMA Is Taking Steps to Address Long- standing Human Capital Management Challenges, but Success Hinges on the Effective Completion and Integration of These Efforts
paragraphs: In recent years, we and others have identified long-standing human  capital management challenges at FEMA and made a number of  recommendations to strengthen the agency’s efforts. FEMA has taken or  is planning various actions to address a number of these issues, as  outlined below. However, since many of these efforts are ongoing and not  yet completed, it is not clear whether they will be effective or the extent to  which they will address our prior recommendations and the challenges  that we and others have identified.
subsections: section_title: FEMA’s Workforce Planning Efforts
paragraphs: Workforce planning has been a long-standing challenge for FEMA, as we  have previously reported. In 2007, we reported that FEMA lacked a  strategic workforce plan and recommended that FEMA, in responding to  strategic workforce planning requirements in the Post-Katrina Act, apply  the key principles of strategic workforce planning, such as assessing the  number of employees and critical skills that FEMA needs. We also  recommended that FEMA define what resources are needed to achieve  its disaster relief mission, and collect sufficient data in a way that enables  managers to monitor progress and support resource priorities, among  other things. In 2008, FEMA implemented our recommendations by  issuing a Strategic Human Capital Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2012.
However, that plan did not include performance metrics or identify  possible workforce gaps, which are leading practices for strategic  workforce planning that we have identified. An OCCHCO official said  that staff turnover and other emerging management issues prevented  FEMA from subsequently identifying workforce gaps, and developing  staffing goals and related metrics. In 2011, we again recommended that  FEMA develop a comprehensive workforce plan that meets Post-Katrina  Act requirements to identify agency staffing needs and skills  requirements.to conduct a baseline assessment of its workforce to inform the agency’s  future workforce planning efforts, including the development of a strategic  workforce plan for fiscal years 2012 to 2016. However, FEMA did not  develop a plan and our recommendation remains unaddressed.
In 2012, FEMA said the agency had acquired a contractor  In 2012, we also recommended that FEMA identify long-term quantifiable  mission-critical goals, establish a time frame for completing the  development of quantifiable performance measures, establish lines of  authority for agency-wide workforce planning efforts, and develop  systematic processes to collect and analyze workforce data. FEMA officials said that the new strategic workforce plan they were developing  to cover fiscal years 2012 to 2016 would help address these  recommendations. However, FEMA did not issue a new strategic  workforce plan. In 2015, FEMA officials identified two ongoing efforts that  they believe will address these previously identified challenges and our  recommendations—the development of a new incident workforce  planning model and a new strategic workforce plan.described in more detail below.
New incident workforce planning model—In September 2014, FEMA  entered into a contract to develop a new incident workforce planning  model to determine the optimal mix of workforce components to include in  FEMA’s disaster workforce. a new incident workforce planning model was needed to address  changes since the existing workforce model was developed. These  changes include current disaster workforce data such as deployment  rates of reservists and FEMA’s new disaster workforce components as  well as changes in policies, technological advances, and progress in  FQS, and the impact of national mitigation efforts. FEMA’s Office of  Response and Recovery officials said that the new incident workforce  planning model will provide a comprehensive analysis of the workforce  FEMA needs to conduct its response, recovery, and mitigation missions  including, for example, the required number of reservists, Surge Capacity  Force volunteers, COREs, and FEMA Corps members. They said they  intend to review and reevaluate the incident workforce model  approximately every 3 years to ensure that the workforce is capable of  carrying out FEMA’s mission. According to FEMA officials, results of the  analyses from the new model were imminent; however, the results were  not available at the time we concluded our review in June 2015.
According to FEMA officials, the incident workforce planning model also provides a  comprehensive view of staffing requirements based on historical trends of workload by  incident type and will be used to determine staffing needs for incidents.
OCCHCO officials, its forthcoming Human Capital Strategic Plan (HCSP)  will address all of the unaddressed workforce-related recommendations  from our 2011 and 2012 reports. FEMA’s OCCHCO officials said they  planned to issue the plan in September 2015. In the past, we have found  that organizations in both the public and private sectors use strategic  workforce planning to help ensure they have the capacity to meet both  current and future mission requirements. Preparing a strategic workforce  plan encourages agency managers and stakeholders to systematically  consider what is to be done, what skills will be needed, and how to gauge  progress and results. Until FEMA completes its new incident workforce  planning model and its strategic workforce plan, we cannot assess their  effectiveness or determine whether they will help to address the long- standing workforce challenges we and others have identified.
section_title: FEMA Employee Credentialing System
paragraphs: Employee credentialing has also been a long-standing challenge for  FEMA, as we and others have previously reported. Employee  credentialing involves assigning members of FEMA’s workforce with  qualification levels and areas of expertise which they can use to assist  state and local stakeholders during a disaster. In response to Post- Katrina Act requirements, FEMA launched an agency-wide credentialing  effort in June 2008 that officials renamed FQS in 2010. The Incident  Workforce Management Division assumed responsibility for the system in  June 2011, and FEMA implemented FQS in 2012.use the system to assign and track the various qualifications and  expertise of members of FEMA’s workforce.
In the five focus groups we conducted from July 2014 through November  2014, participants cited concerns about FEMA’s implementation and  management of FQS. Participants said that FEMA officials ignored FQS qualifications and titles when assigning tasks during Hurricane Sandy,  issues that were also identified in FEMA’s after-action report on its  response to the storm. They said that as a result, some of the managers  and participants were deployed without the skills or expertise needed to  effectively function in their assigned duties and contribute to disaster  response and recovery efforts. Additionally, some participants stated that  during Hurricane Sandy, staff did not know their FQS titles or had the  wrong FQS title and that they observed that other employees were  overqualified or underqualified, based on their training and experience, for  the cadre position and qualification level to which they were assigned.  FEMA officials noted that, at the time these issues occurred, FQS had  been implemented on an agency-wide basis for less than a month and  that difficulties in using the newly designed system in the operational  environment after Hurricane Sandy were understandable. Nonetheless,  employees in our focus groups said these issues have also negatively  affected employees’ morale, another long-standing challenge for FEMA,  as discussed below.
The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) has also identified various  problems in FEMA’s efforts to implement a credentialing system before,  during, and after the response to Hurricane Sandy. For example, before  Hurricane Sandy, the OIG identified problems in developing an  information technology system for implementing FQS in 2012.assessing the agency’s response to Hurricane Sandy, the OIG reported  on issues related to misclassified personnel and difficulties in finding   In  qualified personnel. The DHS OIG has also identified issues with FEMA  implementations of FQS in subsequent disasters, noting that FEMA’s  reliance on FQS to obtain enough appropriately skilled staff continued to  be an ongoing and systemic problem. As a result, the DHS OIG told us  it has an ongoing review of FEMA’s implementation of FQS and plans to  issue a report later this year.
FEMA’s strategic plan for 2014-2018 establishes a performance goal to  increase the operational readiness and deployability rating of the  agency’s workforce to 80 percent or greater by the end of 2018. To  achieve this goal, FEMA will need to, among other things, effectively  implement its FQS program, to appropriately size, train, and organize its  disaster workforce to conduct effective and efficient operations. FEMA’s  Incident Workforce Management Division officials said they had  established a working group in December 2014 to address issues  affecting the effectiveness of the FQS to complement other efforts they  had initiated to improve FQS implementation. For example, they  established a FEMA Incident Workforce Academy to streamline and  standardize training to better ensure that all workforce members received  the appropriate training prior to deployment. Resolving the long-standing  issues with FEMA credentialing efforts will better position FEMA to  implement its national credentialing system. However, because FEMA’s  efforts related to improving FQS are ongoing, it is too soon to determine  whether they will address challenges experienced.
section_title: FEMA’s Employee Morale
paragraphs: Since DHS began operations, in 2003, employee morale has been a long- standing workforce management issue for the department as well as for  FEMA. In September 2012, we reported that DHS employees had lower  than average morale compared with that of the rest of the federal  government, but morale varied across DHS components. FEMA has  had consistently lower than average employee morale scores on the  Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) annual federal employee  survey since the agency was transferred to DHS in 2003. In addition,  the Partnership for Public Service reported in 2014 that FEMA’s ranking  on the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government had declined  since 2010, and FEMA ranked 281 out of 315 agency subcomponents  in Best Places to Work in the Federal Government in fiscal year 2014.
Participants in our focus groups cited a number of concerns contributing  to continuing morale issues including FQS credentialing issues and  changes to FEMA’s management of the reservist workforce. Specifically,  in each of our five focus groups, participants expressed dissatisfaction  with the agency’s implementation of FQS and its long-term negative  impact on employee morale. Regarding changes to FEMA’s management  of the reservist workforce, focus group participants in each of the three  regions stated that there were negative impacts on morale when FEMA  moved management and oversight responsibilities for the reservist  program from FEMA’s 10 regional offices to FEMA headquarters in 2012  because the change eliminated long-standing positive relationships  between the reservists and regional staff. FEMA officials said that they  made the change in management of the reservist workforce because the  prior, decentralized system managed by the regions was dysfunctional,  inconsistent, inefficient, and lacked standardization and strategic  oversight.
FEMA’s OCCHCO officials said they have taken a number of steps to  address low employee morale. Among other things, they said they  provide program officials with a planning tool (the Employee Viewpoint  Survey Team Action Planning worksheet) to assist the agency’s  managers and supervisors in improving employee morale and increasing  satisfaction within their work units. They also said that they established  a working group in December 2014 to identify solutions for improving  employee morale. Officials said they planned to issue a report sometime  in 2015. Given that the working groups, as well as the other initiatives  officials described, are ongoing, it is too early to assess whether they will  be effective in addressing FEMA’s long-standing morale problems.
section_title: Success Hinges on the Effective Completion and Integration of Various Human Capital Management Efforts
paragraphs: Given the ongoing nature of FEMA’s efforts to address workforce  management challenges highlighted above, FEMA’s progress in resolving  these challenges hinges on the extent to which officials are able to  effectively coordinate and integrate various human capital efforts into a  strategic human capital management approach. We have previously  reported our concerns regarding the lack of coordination and  collaboration among FEMA offices and organizations. For example, we  reported in June 2011 that FEMA has much work ahead of it to ensure  effective collaboration between program and support offices. In April  2012, we reported that FEMA’s efforts related to workforce planning have  been independently conducted by various offices across the agency,  concluding that having integrated workforce planning and training could  help FEMA ensure that it has the properly sized and skilled workforce to  effectively carry out its mission.
FEMA’s OCCHCO officials told us that the multiple stakeholders  responsible for these various human capital efforts have coordinated  through an agency executive steering committee to ensure they will be  integrated into their broader strategic workforce plan. However, the  effectiveness of these coordination efforts remains to be seen. For  example, the statement of work for the contractor whom FEMA acquired  to support its human capital planning efforts does not specify that FEMA’s  ongoing workforce-related initiatives and activities are expected to be  integrated into the proposed strategic workforce plan, nor does it indicate  how OCCHCO plans to analyze future staffing needs for FEMA’s day-to- day, or steady-state operations. Such an analysis would help FEMA’s  agency-wide workforce planning but will not be included in the Incident  Workforce Management Division’s new incident workforce planning  model. In an August 2012 report commissioned by OCCHCO, the  Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute found that the existing  force planning model considered the FEMA workforce from a response- only perspective and did not consider the workforce requirements to fill  any steady-state activities. could provide valuable insights into FEMA’s workforce strategy.  According to FEMA officials, they plan to address the issue of steady- state operations for future workforce planning through its executive  steering committee to integrate it into the ongoing human capital planning  efforts. Given that FEMA’s efforts are ongoing, it is too early to assess  their effectiveness in addressing long-standing workforce-related  challenges over the long term.
Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, Informing FEMA’s Future Workforce  Strategy: FEMA Strategic Workforce Initiative Phase II Final Report (Washington, D.C.:  Aug. 24, 2012).
section_title: FEMA Faces Staffing Challenges with New Disaster Workforces and Does Not Collect All Information Necessary to Evaluate Program Costs and Performance
subsections: section_title: Retention and Recruitment Challenges Limit FEMA’s Ability to Meet Staffing Goals in Its New Disaster Workforce Programs
subsections: section_title: FEMA Corps Retention
paragraphs: FEMA Corps program attrition has varied from 23 to 28 percent in each  recruitment class, or “cohort.” As shown in figure 3, although the FEMA  Corps program did not meet its target of less than 25 percent attrition in  each of the first four FEMA cohorts of FEMA Corps members, the  program met its target for the most recent cohort. According to FEMA  officials, the responsibility for retaining FEMA Corps members is shared  jointly by FEMA and NCCC. FEMA is primarily responsible for  determining the suitability of FEMA Corps members to gain access to  FEMA’s facilities and networks. Keeping FEMA Corps members in the  program is important because of the costs associated with recruiting,  training, and equipping them for deployment, as well as the need for  FEMA Corps members to support FEMA’s response, recovery, and  preparedness missions.
Two of my four deployments did not have  enough work for my team. We were often  given busy work that had little to no impact on  the substantive work at the project sites.  Understandably, some of this may have had  to do with the unusually light storm season  this year. Nevertheless, it left the team (and  many of the other Corps members I spoke  with) feeling like the FEMA Corps program  oversold itself to its applicants. regarding the type of service activities they would be involved in and said  the work seemed meaningless or was unfulfilling. For example, some  said they would have preferred to provide direct service to disaster areas  instead of doing behind-the-scenes administrative and support work in  office settings.
During our FEMA Corps focus groups, participants also reported feeling  underutilized or having little or no meaningful work during some of their  service projects.
FEMA and NCCC officials said the survey results and our focus group  discussions reflected challenges during the initial implementation of the  program and the relatively limited number of disasters that occurred in  2013 and 2014. In August 2014, FEMA and NCCC reduced the  enrollment number of FEMA Corps members from 1,600 to 1,000 per  year to reflect the low number of disasters and resulting challenges with  providing enough substantive work for FEMA Corps members. FEMA  officials cited this change as an example of the steps they have taken  with NCCC to adjust the program to address FEMA Corps members’  satisfaction with the program. They also said they are taking steps to set  accurate expectations in advertising, target recruitment efforts, as well as  piloting different types of teams to provide members with additional  service project opportunities.
section_title: FEMA Corps Background Investigations
paragraphs: According to FEMA and NCCC officials, failing background investigations  is another reason that FEMA Corps members leave before the end of the  program. Members failing background investigations also contributed to  the program not meeting its retention target. As shown in figure 4, the  FEMA Corps security vetting process has three parts. First, applicants  who have been selected to join the FEMA Corps undergo initial  background screening by both FEMA and NCCC before they arrive on  campus. Members who pass these screenings receive FEMA badges  and equipment. Second, before deploying to the field, FEMA Corps  members are required to complete all necessary information for an OPM   Third, while FEMA Corps  “public trust” background investigation.members are deployed to the field, OPM conducts the background  investigation of members.
According to FEMA officials, FEMA allows members whose background  investigations are still pending to have access to FEMA’s facilities and  information networks as well as, depending on their project, survivors’  sensitive personal information, such as Social Security numbers.  According to FEMA security officials, such security risks are mitigated  because all members have undergone preliminary background screening  by both FEMA and NCCC. FEMA officials also stated that any members  who are found during background investigations to present serious risks  are immediately removed from FEMA until the member mitigates the  adverse information, if he or she is able to do so.
According to NCCC officials, if FEMA Corps members fail the background  investigation and are terminated from the program, members may not  receive some or all of the Segal AmeriCorps Education Award, which is a  key incentive for completing the program. However, these officials  stated that these members may be able to transfer to the traditional  AmeriCorps NCCC program, if positions are available. During FEMA  Corps focus groups, participants commented on the disruption to teams  when members are terminated from the program.
During a focus group with all four of FEMA’s liaisons to the five NCCC  regional campuses, liaisons stated that the cost and duration of the  security process pose a significant threat to the program’s ability to retain  FEMA Corps members.
FEMA officials stated it would be desirable to require members to submit  this information earlier, such as during the selection phase, which would  allow FEMA to begin processing background investigations up to 4  months earlier than the officials currently do.such changes to the security vetting process would be possible if they  were implemented in a phased pilot approach and the program accepted  or mitigated potential risks, such as higher costs for background  investigations for applicants who are not selected and member  recruitment challenges. FEMA and NCCC officials said they have had  discussions about modifying the security vetting process to minimize the  disruptions resulting from failed background checks and FEMA is  considering piloting changes to have team leaders complete background  investigations earlier in the process. According to NCCC officials, by  making it possible for incoming FEMA Corps members to complete the  information needed for the background investigation before members  arrive on campus, OPM could arrange for investigators to conduct  background investigation interviews of members while they are on  campus rather than after they have been deployed.
section_title: Surge Capacity Force Recruitment
paragraphs: FEMA has not met its goals for recruiting volunteers for the Surge  Capacity Force. FEMA has a goal of staffing the Surge Capacity Force  with 15,400 volunteers. As shown in figure 5, according to FEMA  officials, in January 2015, the Surge Capacity Force had 4,033  volunteers, and, as of March 2015, one of the eight participating DHS  components met the enrollment target of 7 percent of the eligible  workforce.
During focus groups with all eight DHS component program coordinators,  participants identified challenges related to FEMA’s management of the  program. The groups agreed in general that DHS components will not be  able to meet recruitment goals without additional resources, guidance,  marketing, and senior DHS and FEMA leadership engagement to help  recruit and manage additional Surge Capacity Force volunteers. All the  coordinators reported that their position was a collateral duty.
According to the Surge Capacity Force Concept of Operations, a baseline  level of staffing for the Surge Capacity Force to respond to program  requirements is 15,400 personnel. However, FEMA officials said they do  not have a strategy or plan for how they plan to increase the number of  volunteers because they believe this is the responsibility of the other DHS  components. However, an August 2012 Homeland Security Studies and  Analysis Institute report, commissioned by FEMA to support the agency’s  workforce planning efforts, reported that “many federal agencies have  their own protocols that must be followed in the event of a national-level  disaster, and other agency staff may not be available for deployment.  Careful advanced planning with partner agencies may ensure that staff is  available for the surge capacity.” In addition, the report said, “it would be  helpful to identify where surge employees will come from and what their  level of availability will be. . . . . Understanding the availability rate of  surge employees could ensure that FEMA has a sufficient surge force  when needed.” While FEMA officials said that they could fill the  volunteer shortfall by having DHS components designate their employees  to be part of the Surge Capacity Force, they said this would not take  place until needed during a disaster. As a result, employees specifically  designated for a disaster may not be ready to deploy within 48 hours of  no-notice activation, as required by program guidance, because they may  not have been trained on their agency’s travel procedures or possess a  valid government travel credit card. Because FEMA can increase the  number of potentially available Surge Capacity Force volunteers before a  disaster strikes, FEMA’s reliance on the designation option increases the  risk that FEMA may not have a sufficient Surge Capacity Force when  needed during a disaster.
Our work on leading strategic workforce planning practices calls for  agency leaders to develop workforce plans, implement recruitment and  retention strategies, and measure their effects. These leading practices  on collaboration state that agencies should identify and address needs by  leveraging resources, agree on roles and responsibilities, establish  mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, and reinforce agency  accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.
Given that the deployment of FEMA’s disaster workforce to Hurricane  Sandy nearly exhausted the number of available personnel, the lack of a  recruitment plan or strategy for how to increase Surge Capacity Force  staffing to reach targets may limit the capacity of FEMA’s disaster  workforces to support response efforts in the event of a disaster. Because  the Surge Capacity Force has a key role in augmenting FEMA’s  workforce in catastrophic disasters, having such a plan or strategy to  strengthen recruitment efforts would help ensure that FEMA has the  information it needs to identify the availability of Surge Capacity Force  volunteers needed to fully support its efforts.
section_title: FEMA Does Not Collect Complete Cost Information on New Disaster Workforce Programs
subsections: section_title: FEMA Corps Management and Background Investigation Costs
paragraphs: FEMA does not collect or consider data on all of the costs associated with  implementing the FEMA Corps program, although the low per capita cost  of employing FEMA Corps members was a primary justification for  establishing the program. FEMA has estimated that it will cost about $100  million to implement the FEMA Corps program over 5 years, from 2012  through 2017, and the final cost depends on factors such as member  enrollment, attrition, and housing costs, among others. While this cost  estimate accounts for NCCC’s costs of recruiting, selecting, and  deploying FEMA Corps members, FEMA officials said they do not collect  or account for data on all of FEMA’s costs of implementing the program or  its costs for conducting background investigations of program  participants.
First, FEMA does not collect data on the salaries and expenses of the  staff in FEMA’s 10 regions who are responsible for developing requests  for FEMA Corps teams, providing on-the-job training to the teams, and  supervising teams on a day-to-day basis. According to the FEMA Corps  Branch Chief in February 2015, on average, about 10 FEMA Corps teams  per month were operating in each of FEMA’s 10 regions in 2014. FEMA  Corps project sponsors in 1 FEMA region we visited reported that each of  its teams working out of the regional office has one or more regional  office staff supervisors.
In addition, although FEMA collects data on the costs of background  investigations for FEMA Corps members, it does not collect data on the  costs of staff to process them, and does not include either of these costs  in the per capita cost of employing FEMA Corps members. These costs  may be substantial as, according to FEMA officials, the program has had  between 756 and 1,045 new FEMA Corps members each year, and a  background investigation must be conducted on the new members.  According to FEMA officials, depending on the projects to which members  are assigned, the cost of these background investigations can range from  about $1,000 per member for the moderate-risk background investigation  to more than $3,600 per member for the full background investigation.  These costs could increase the per capita cost of members by up to 10  percent. According to FEMA officials, from October 2013 through April  2015, FEMA conducted background investigations for 1,507 FEMA Corps  members at a cost of about $2.2 million. According to FEMA officials, it  has reduced the number of FEMA Corps members subject to the full  background investigation for fiscal year 2015 after researching job  functions to which members were generally assigned. However, as the  program provides additional opportunities for members to engage in  projects, such as information technology projects, which require the more  expensive full background investigation, the cost of these background  investigations is likely to increase in the future.
According to Office of Management and Budget guidance, in order to  promote efficient resource allocation through well-informed decision  making, agencies should identify comprehensive estimates of the  expected benefits and costs in analyses used to support decisions to  expand programs. These analyses should also consider alternative  means of achieving program objectives by examining different program  scales and different methods of provision. In addition, the best practices  we have identified on program cost estimating and assessment state that  reliable cost information is required to know whether government  programs are achieving their goals and what the costs are.
FEMA officials said they consider their own management costs and the  background investigation costs for FEMA Corps members to be part of  their regular operating costs and therefore do not have a system in place  to estimate or capture these costs for any management analysis. They  said it was not feasible to determine the exact proportion of costs for staff  and other expenses that are attributable to the FEMA Corps program  because of the wide range and variance in staff and other resources used  to support the program in FEMA headquarters and regional offices.  However, by estimating the number of staff used to manage FEMA Corps  teams in the field and the proportion of their time spent on FEMA Corps  oversight and management, FEMA could use assumptions regarding the  proportion of costs for staff and other expenses and validate them with  relevant stakeholders. Further, the full costs of background investigations  are directly attributable to the FEMA Corps program. Complete cost  information on the FEMA Corps program would inform FEMA’s decision  making on allocation of its disaster workforce resources and help program  officials determine the extent to which the program is achieving the  significant cost savings that was a primary goal and justification for  establishing the program.
section_title: Surge Capacity Force Costs to DHS
paragraphs: When estimating total costs of managing and implementing the Surge  Capacity Force, FEMA does not collect or consider data on all of the  costs associated with implementing the Surge Capacity Force. While  FEMA collects information on its own costs of managing the program,  officials said they do not collect data on the costs incurred by DHS  components in managing the program and deploying staff during  disasters or annual deployment mobilization exercises. For example,  when reporting its costs for managing the Surge Capacity Force program  in 2014—about $1.2 million—FEMA included salaries of FEMA Surge  Capacity Force program management staff and program support staff, as  well as printing costs and reimbursable expenses to DHS components for  travel, lodging, per diem, and any overtime during an annual mobilization  exercise. In addition, according to FEMA human capital officials, when  collecting information on the costs of managing and deploying the Surge  Capacity Force during Hurricane Sandy response and recovery efforts,  the costs collected included reimbursable expenses incurred by these  employees for travel, per diem, lodging, and any overtime expenses.  According to FEMA’s Incident Workforce Management Division officials,  the total reimbursement cost for Surge Capacity Force volunteers during  Hurricane Sandy was about $14.2 million.
However, FEMA does not collect or consider data on other costs to DHS  components, related to the Surge Capacity Force, that are not reimbursed  by FEMA. These costs include the salaries and benefits of volunteers  when deployed for disasters or annual mobilization exercises, the costs of  coordinators in each DHS component to recruit and manage volunteers,  or any overtime paid to other employees to backfill positions vacant when  volunteers are deployed for disasters or exercises. For example, seven  DHS components deployed employees for up to 45 days during Hurricane  Sandy response and recovery efforts. These components paid the  salaries and benefits of these employees during their deployment.  According to FEMA officials, the costs to DHS components of deploying  employees to disasters as part of the Surge Capacity Force vary. For  example, the salary associated with deploying a highly-graded technical  or professional employee could be twice as much as deploying an  employee working in another sector within DHS.
During focus groups, Surge Capacity Force program coordinators at DHS  components said that staffing costs are a consideration when DHS  components determine which categories of their employees are eligible to  volunteer for the Surge Capacity Force and when supervisors in DHS  components approve their direct reports to volunteer and deploy as part  of the Surge Capacity Force. However, FEMA’s Office of the Chief  Financial Officer officials stated they do not consider the costs to DHS  components in supporting the program because FEMA is not responsible  for reimbursing DHS components for these costs. We requested  information from the DHS Office of the Chief Financial Officer to  determine whether DHS collected any information on the department- wide costs associated with implementing the program and the Office of  the Chief Financial Officer official referred us back to FEMA as the  department’s lead agency for managing the program. The costs to DHS  components when deploying their employees for Surge Capacity Force  may not be a direct cost to FEMA, but they are costs attributable to the  government’s overall management and implementation of the Surge  Capacity Force as a program. For example, the costs of deploying  volunteer DHS employees include the opportunity cost of time that  deployed employees could otherwise spend carrying out their routine  duties.
As discussed previously, according to Office of Management and Budget  guidance, agencies should identify comprehensive estimates of the  expected benefits and costs in analyses used to support decisions to  expand programs. In addition, the best practices we have identified on  program cost estimating and assessment state that reliable cost  information is required to know whether government programs are  achieving their goals and what the costs are.
The FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force have the potential to  help FEMA achieve its mission at a lower cost, but tracking and reporting  the full costs of deploying and managing these disaster workforce  components would help FEMA better assess actual cost savings resulting  from the programs and determine the most cost-effective size and mix of  FEMA’s disaster workforce and its deployment to disasters. Complete  cost information on the Surge Capacity Force would also help FEMA  determine whether the total number and the mix of Surge Capacity Force  volunteers who participated in the program and deployed during  Hurricane Sandy response and recovery efforts was cost-effective.  Additionally, more comprehensive and accurate cost information on both  workforce components could help inform ongoing discussions regarding  FEMA’s efforts—in the case of the Surge Capacity Force—to expand the  program outside of DHS to other federal agencies, and FEMA’s  decision—in the case of FEMA Corps—whether to renew or modify the  interagency agreement it has with NCCC to administer the FEMA Corps  program, which expires in February 2017.
section_title: FEMA Does Not Measure or Collect Full Performance Data Needed to Assess the Effectiveness of New Disaster Workforce Programs
subsections: section_title: FEMA Does Not Have Complete Measures or Reliable Performance Data
paragraphs: FEMA does not have complete measures to assess its progress in  meeting program goals—for example, the goal of having FEMA Corps  graduates gain employment in emergency management careers, such as  with FEMA. FEMA also does not have a measure to assess the FEMA  Corps program’s primary goal of enhancing FEMA’s disaster response  efforts, or the Surge Capacity Force’s goal of deploying a sufficient  number of qualified personnel to disasters. For example, FEMA officials  said they do not report on the number of FEMA Corps teams that are  assigned to service projects specific to a declared disaster compared with  the number of teams assigned to non-disaster-specific service projects.  For the Surge Capacity Force, FEMA does not report the numbers of  volunteers needed and available during a disaster to highlight any  potential gaps in the ability of the Surge Capacity Force to meet its  program goals.
Additionally, FEMA does not collect complete and reliable data necessary  for FEMA to assess FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force program  performance. For example, although the FEMA Corps program has a  retention goal of 75 percent, NCCC officials, who are responsible for  tracking these data, were unable to determine the number of FEMA  Corps members who left the program because of failed background  investigations because these data are not systematically collected.  Further, FEMA and NCCC officials provided us different numbers of  members who left because of failed background investigations, and were  unable to account for differences between the sets of data. As described  earlier, to measure whether members experienced personal growth and  development during their terms of service, NCCC conducts member exit  surveys, but these surveys do not include responses from FEMA Corps  members who did not graduate from the program (about 23 to 28 percent  of 2,710 total program participants). In addition, the 2013 NCCC survey of  FEMA Corps project sponsors to assess whether FEMA Corps teams  helped meet their needs had a response rate of 34 percent, which is far  below the 80 percent standard response rate for surveys as outlined by   FEMA’s performance data on  the Office of Management and Budget.the Surge Capacity Force program also were not complete or reliable.  FEMA officials said they did not collect data on the number of volunteers  deployed for Hurricane Sandy response and recovery efforts who left their  deployments early. While FEMA conducted a postdeployment survey of  Surge Capacity Force volunteers who deployed for Hurricane Sandy  response and recovery efforts for the program’s after-action report, the  resulting data are not generalizable because the survey had a response  rate of 13 percent. According to FEMA officials, for those staff who did  respond, FEMA did not collect data on the reasons why 23 percent of  these survey respondents indicated they would not deploy with the Surge  Capacity Force for a future event.
According to the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for  Program Management, agencies should develop meaningful measures to  monitor program performance and to track the accomplishment of the  program’s goals and objectives.  Additionally, The Standard for Program  Management states that in monitoring programs, agencies should collect,  measure, and disseminate performance information and analyze program  trends, so that program managers can determine the program’s state and  trends, and point to areas in need of adjustment. Regarding the Surge  Capacity Force postdeployment surveys, according to Office of  Management and Budget guidance, agencies must design surveys to  achieve the highest practical rates of response, and nonresponse bias  analyses must be conducted when response rates or other factors  suggest there is a potential for bias to occur.
FEMA officials said they had not yet established comprehensive  performance measures or collected reliable performance data for the  FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs because they are new  programs that are still being developed. However, the FEMA Corps  program was announced in March 2012, more than 3 years ago, and  DHS established the Surge Capacity Force program in April 2010, more  than 5 years ago. In addition, although FEMA and NCCC identified  some FEMA Corps program performance measures in August 2014,  during our review, as of February 2015, the FEMA Corps Branch Chief is  considering potential new measures for FEMA. Developing performance  measures that reflect all program goals would help FEMA assess the  overall effectiveness of the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force  programs and hold program officials accountable for meeting all program  goals and ensuring the appropriate use of its resources. With regard to  collecting complete and reliable performance data, FEMA’s managers of  the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs agreed that such  data collection is essential for proper program management and stated  that they may take steps to gather such information in the future, but did  not have specific plans to do so. Without collecting complete and reliable  data to help assess the performance of the FEMA Corps and Surge  Capacity Force programs, FEMA lacks assurance that its workforce  components are meeting desired objectives and goals.
section_title: Performance Assessment of FEMA Corps Teams
paragraphs: FEMA does not have a system in place to assess FEMA Corps teams’  performance in contributing to FEMA’s disaster response, recovery, and  preparedness missions. FEMA staff request FEMA Corps teams by  submitting service project requests to NCCC identifying the tasks and  goals associated with the disaster deployment or project. Service projects  may include Stafford Act–related disaster response or recovery activities,  as well as preparedness activities and include activities such as  registering survivors in the field on tablet computers, answering phones at  national call centers, and performing data entry and general  administrative duties. Once a team’s project is completed, FEMA Corps  team leaders complete project completion reports that describe the tasks  and accomplishments.
However, FEMA does not have a system in place to compare the service  project requests and the corresponding project completion reports to  assess whether the goals of the requests were met. We reviewed service  project requests and project completion reports from 2012 through 2014  that FEMA and NCCC provided and determined that they were completed  with varying amounts of detail and project identification information, such  as project or disaster declaration codes, which made it unfeasible to  match corresponding requests and completion reports for comparison.  FEMA and NCCC officials agreed that the limitations in the way the data  were documented and collected made comparison of the records very  difficult. During our review, FEMA and NCCC issued program guidance in  August 2014 that called for both agencies to collaborate on the  development of a standard system to share information. In April 2015,  FEMA and NCCC officials said they were manually matching  corresponding records and they intended to complete this effort in May  2015. In addition, as a longer-term project, FEMA and NCCC officials said  they were developing an automated system that would enable NCCC and  FEMA to more easily evaluate project completion reports against the  objectives in the service project requests. Officials said they intended to  complete this automated system in 2016. However, when we requested  the project plans for these efforts, NCCC and FEMA officials could not  provide any documentation, such as meeting minutes, agendas, budgets,  or documentation of expected time frames, related to either their  reconciliation efforts or the development of the automated information  technology system.
FEMA Corps program guidance establishes that the success of the  program will be measured by the completion of meaningful and  measurable service projects during FEMA deployments. Additionally,  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government suggests that  information should be recorded and communicated to management and  others within the entity who need it, and in a form and within a time frame  that enables them to carry out their internal control and other  responsibilities. Such internal control responsibilities include routine  evaluations of program and employee performance through FEMA Corps  service projects. Further, according to best practices for project  management, the development of a project management plan—which  defines how the project is executed, monitored, and controlled—is a key  element of project management. Best practices also call for the  development of milestone dates, among other factors, in carrying out a  project successfully.
Given the importance of evaluating FEMA Corps teams’ performance in  meeting the needs of service project requests, developing a plan, with  milestones, to create an automated information technology system or  process to efficiently compare project completion reports against their  initial service project requests would better position FEMA Corps  managers to carry out such performance evaluations. Being able to  conduct these performance evaluations would also better enable FEMA  to identify any necessary changes to the program to maximize the utility  of FEMA Corps teams and the FEMA Corps program as a component of  its disaster workforce.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Since 2007, we have highlighted the need for FEMA to develop a  strategic workforce plan that encompasses goals, performance metrics,  and other key aspects of workforce management. According to FEMA’s  OCCHCO officials, the agency has various efforts ongoing to address  long-standing workforce management challenges and open  recommendations, including its incident workforce planning model and its  HCSP. However, the success of these efforts will hinge on FEMA’s ability  to successfully coordinate them and to integrate various other workforce- related efforts involving FEMA’s employee credentialing system and  employee morale into a broader strategy on workforce management.  Regarding FEMA’s newest disaster workforce components—developing a  plan or strategy to improve recruitment efforts for the Surge Capacity  Force could help FEMA identify the availability of resources that could  help it reach its staffing goals for the program and respond effectively to  disasters. Further, collecting and accounting for total costs associated  with managing both the FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force  programs will better position DHS to compare the benefits of the  programs against the level of resources invested in these programs.  FEMA also does not have the performance measures, data, and system  to adequately assess the programs’ progress and ensure they are  meeting stated program goals. Establishing performance measures for all  stated program goals and collecting complete and reliable data—such as  the number of members who leave the program because of failed  background investigations, and working with NCCC to develop a plan,  with milestones, to create an automated system by which FEMA Corps  managers can assess FEMA Corps project completion reports against the  initial service project requests—are actions that will better position FEMA  managers to evaluate the program.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better enable DHS to meet its Surge Capacity Force staffing goals and  improve its capacity for disaster response, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to develop  a plan or strategy for improving recruitment efforts.
To better position DHS to evaluate the effective use of its resources and  to ensure that DHS is aware of the total costs of administering and  managing the FEMA Corps, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to collect and account  for all costs associated with this new workforce, including the costs of  background checks and staff time spent managing FEMA Corps teams.
To better position DHS to evaluate the effective use of its resources and  to ensure that DHS is aware of the total costs of administering and  managing the Surge Capacity Force, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to collect and account  for all costs associated with this new workforce, including the costs of  employee salaries and benefits of Surge Capacity Force volunteers when  deployed.
To better enable FEMA to track and evaluate the performance of the  FEMA Corps program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security direct the FEMA Administrator to establish performance measures for all program goals, such as the  rates of employment among program graduates in the emergency  management field, and the rates of deployment of FEMA Corps   members during disaster response; collect complete and reliable program performance data, such as  tracking the number of FEMA Corps members who leave the program  early for failing background investigations, and obtaining survey  responses from as many participants of the FEMA Corps as possible,  including those who have left the program or not graduated; and develop, in conjunction with NCCC, a plan, with milestones, to create  an automated system or process by which managers can assess  project completion reports against service project requests.
To better enable FEMA to track and evaluate the performance of the  Surge Capacity Force program, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to: establish performance measures for all program goals, such as the  rates of deployment of Surge Capacity Force members during  disaster response; and collect complete and reliable program performance data, such as  obtaining survey responses from as many participants of the Surge  Capacity Force as possible.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FEMA for review and  comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in  appendix III. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations  and described actions planned to address them. FEMA also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
With regard to our first recommendation, for FEMA to develop a plan or  strategy for improving recruitment efforts, DHS stated that by using  staffing requirements developed during the Force Structure review, the  Surge Capacity Force program will work with the DHS components to  establish recruiting priorities and metrics for Tier 3 volunteers in order to   In coordination with the DHS components,  improve recruitment efforts.DHS will also develop a communication strategy to ensure the  dissemination of information to DHS employees outlining the benefits of  volunteering in the Surge Capacity Force program. DHS estimated that all  of these efforts would be completed on or before March 31, 2016. These  actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the  recommendation.
With regard to our second and third recommendations, for FEMA to  collect and account for all costs associated with the new workforce  components, DHS stated that the department will work with FEMA’s  Office of the Chief Security Officer and Surge Capacity Force program,  respectively, to identify all costs associated with managing its two new  disaster response workforce components—FEMA Corps and the Surge  Capacity Force. For example, regarding FEMA Corps, DHS stated that it  will identify the costs related to processing security background checks.  For the Surge Capacity Force program, DHS stated that the program will  request and compile salary and benefit information of Surge Capacity  Force volunteers from the various DHS components. DHS estimated that  all of the efforts would be completed on or before April 30, 2016. These  actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the  recommendations.
With regard to our fourth recommendation, for FEMA to track and  evaluate the performance of the FEMA Corps program, DHS stated that  the FEMA Corps program will work with NCCC to develop mechanisms to  better track and evaluate the performance of the program. For example,  the FEMA Corps will work with NCCC to develop an exit survey for all  FEMA Corps members, including those that leave the program early and  will monitor results for continuous improvement. The estimated  completion date for all of the efforts is December 31, 2016. These  actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the  recommendation.
With regard to our fifth recommendation to track and evaluate the  performance of the Surge Capacity Force program, DHS stated that the  program will develop an exit survey for all Surge Capacity Force  volunteers and request the support of all DHS components in gathering  responses and establish a performance target for availability of Surge  Capacity Force volunteers to deploy if activated. DHS estimated that all of  the efforts would be completed on or before July 31, 2016. These actions,  if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security and interested congressional committees. In addition, the report  is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: The objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) the  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken steps to  address long-standing challenges in managing its workforce, and (2)  these challenges affected FEMA’s deployment and management of its  new disaster workforce components—the Surge Capacity Force and the  FEMA Corps.
To address the first objective, we identified FEMA’s long-standing  challenges in managing its workforce by reviewing GAO’s prior work on  FEMA and FEMA’s after-action reports on its response to Hurricane  Sandy. To assess the extent to which FEMA has taken steps to address  these challenges, we reviewed documentation that describes FEMA’s  workforce planning and management efforts, such as the FEMA Strategic  Plan 2014-2018, the statement of work for the contract for FEMA’s  updated strategic workforce management plan (expected to be finalized  in September 2015), and the statement of work for FEMA’s contract for its  new incident workforce planning model—expected imminently, pending  final approval. We interviewed officials from the Office of the Chief  Component Human Capital Officer (OCCHCO), the Incident Workforce  Management Office, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, and the  Office of Policy and Program Analysis to discuss FEMA’s progress in  addressing GAO’s open recommendations and implementing the  initiatives identified in FEMA’s Strategic Human Capital Plan, 2008-2012.  We also discussed the extent to which these initiatives and GAO’s  leading practices in human capital planning will be included in the  updated strategic workforce management plan and integrated into  FEMA’s workforce planning efforts. To assess FEMA’s implementation of  the FEMA Qualification System (FQS), we interviewed officials from  FEMA’s Incident Workforce Management Division. We also reviewed  FEMA’s Hurricane Sandy After-Action Report to identify the agency’s  progress and challenges faced with FQS during response and recovery  efforts for Hurricane Sandy. To help assess the extent to which FEMA is  experiencing employee morale issues, we reviewed findings of the  Partnership for Public Service, which ranked the best places to work in  the federal government for fiscal years 2010 through 2014—the 5 most  recent years for which data were available. We also interviewed  OCCHCO officials to obtain information on the agency’s progress and  challenges with addressing employee morale issues.
As shown in table 1, to obtain the views of FEMA’s disaster workforce on  FEMA’s challenges in managing its workforce, we conducted 23 focus  group sessions with a total of 136 participants from the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), FEMA, and the AmeriCorps National Civilian  Community Corps (NCCC).
To obtain regional perspectives on FEMA’s disaster workforce on FEMA’s  workforce planning and management efforts, we conducted focus groups  with Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees (CORE) and  Permanent Full-Time (PFT) employees at 3 of FEMA’s 10 regions  (Regions II, IV, and VI). We selected the 3 regions based on factors  including geographic dispersion and regions that typically respond to  different types of disasters. These sessions involved small-group  discussions designed to gain more in-depth information about issues  COREs and PFTs face. Discussions were guided by a moderator who  used a list of discussion topics to encourage participants to share their  thoughts and experiences as COREs or PFTs. Specifically, discussion  topics included experiences while being deployed to Hurricane Sandy or  other disasters, job differences during deployments and steady-state  conditions, likelihood of deployments, whether every employee is an  emergency manager, FQS implementation, force structure, training,  policies and procedures, communication, perspectives of other employee  groups, employee morale, and changes at FEMA; however, not all topics  were discussed in each group. Each focus group involved four to eight  COREs or PFTs. There were two types of focus groups based on whether  employees were deployed to Hurricane Sandy response efforts. The  participants were chosen from a random sample of the entire universe of  eligible participants at each region. We excluded supervisors from  selection to allow participants to speak freely. Selected individuals who  were not available for the focus groups were replaced with randomly  selected alternates, to the extent possible. We completed written  summaries of each focus group, and used qualitative analysis software to  categorize responses and identify common themes across the focus  groups, using appropriate checks to ensure accuracy. The results of  these focus groups are not generalizable. However, the views we  obtained from them provided us with valuable examples of CORE and  PFT experiences.
To address the second objective, we selected the FEMA Corps and  Surge Capacity Force programs for review because these new disaster  workforces were deployed for the first time during Hurricane Sandy, the  nation’s most recent catastrophic disaster. We also selected these  workforces for review because they are jointly managed by agencies  outside of FEMA and they consist of non-FEMA employees who are  funded by the Disaster Relief Fund. To examine the retention and  recruitment challenges of these programs, we reviewed program  documentation, such as the Surge Capacity Force Concept of  Operations, and NCCC surveys of FEMA Corps member graduating  classes. We also interviewed officials with FEMA, NCCC, DHS  headquarters, and DHS components about program staffing challenges.  We reviewed FEMA Corps program data on the number of FEMA Corps  members who left the program because of failed background  investigations from September 2012 through March 2015, but we  determined that these data were not sufficiently reliable for the purposes  of this report. We compared the information we gathered against our  leading practices on collaboration and strategic workforce planning. To  examine the extent to which these programs collect complete cost  information, we reviewed program documentation, such as the FEMA  Corps Business Case, and interviewed officials with FEMA, NCCC, DHS  headquarters, and DHS components responsible for implementing and  supporting the Surge Capacity Force and FEMA Corps programs. We  compared the information we gathered against Office of Management and  Budget guidance on cost-benefit analyses and our best practices on  program cost estimating and assessment.of these workforces, we reviewed program documentation, such as the  FEMA Corps Implementation Plan, and Surge Capacity Force  postdeployment surveys. We also interviewed officials with FEMA,  NCCC, DHS headquarters, and DHS components about performance  management for both programs. We intended to review FEMA Corps  service project requests and corresponding project completion reports  from September 2014 through November 2014, but as we discuss in the  report, the records could not be reliably compared. As a result, we could  not report on the number of service projects completed by FEMA Corps  teams or the extent to which the goals of service projects have been  accomplished by FEMA Corps teams. We visited two FEMA regions and  one FEMA region via teleconference to interview FEMA officials  responsible for requesting and managing FEMA Corps teams in the field   To examine the performance  and, as discussed later, to conduct focus groups of FEMA Corps team  leaders and members. We compared the information we gathered against  standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,  program management best practices, program guidance, and Office of  Management and Budget guidance on surveys.
To obtain perspectives on FEMA’s management of its new disaster  workforces—FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force—we conducted  focus groups with all four of FEMA’s liaisons to the five NCCC regional  campuses and all eight DHS component Surge Capacity Force  coordinators. These sessions involved small-group discussions designed  to gain more in-depth information about recruitment and retention issues  in the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs. Discussions  were guided by a moderator who used a list of discussion topics to  encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences.  Specifically, discussion topics included implementation, management,  deployment, recruitment, and retention issues; however, not all topics  were discussed in each group. We completed written summaries of each  focus group, and used qualitative analysis software to categorize  responses and identify common themes across the focus groups, using  appropriate checks to ensure accuracy. The results of these focus groups  of all four FEMA’s liaisons to the five NCCC regional campuses and all  eight DHS component Surge Capacity Force coordinators represent the  entire populations.
In addition, to obtain perspectives of participants in the FEMA Corps  program, we conducted focus groups with FEMA Corps team leaders and  members at FEMA Regions II, IV, and VI. These sessions involved small- group discussions designed to gain more in-depth information about  participant experiences in the FEMA Corps program. Discussions were  guided by a moderator who used a list of discussion topics to encourage  participants to share their thoughts and experiences. Specifically,  discussion topics included implementation, management, deployment,  recruitment, and retention issues; however, not all topics were discussed  in each group. Both focus groups with FEMA Corps team leaders  involved three team leaders each. Each focus group with FEMA Corps  members involved eight members from two or more teams in a region.  The participants were chosen from a random sample of the entire  universe of eligible participants at each region. We completed written  summaries of each focus group, and used qualitative analysis software to  categorize responses and identify common themes across the focus  groups, using appropriate checks to ensure accuracy. The results of  these focus groups are not generalizable. However, the views we  obtained from them provided us with valuable examples of experiences of  participants in the FEMA Corps program.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to June 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Organization Chart
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact above, Christopher A. Keisling (Assistant  Director); Frederick Lyles, Jr. (Analyst-in-Charge); Carla N. Argueta;  Chuck Bausell; Billy Commons, III; Eric Hauswirth; Susan Hsu; Tracey  King; Marc N. Meyer; Luis E. Rodriguez; Cynthia Saunders; and Michelle  Su all made key contributions to this report.