Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation
Published: 2007-05-15T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: As a new hurricane season approaches, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces the simultaneous challenges of preparing for the season and implementing the reorganization and other provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act stipulates major changes to FEMA intended to enhance its preparedness for and response to catastrophic and major disasters. As GAO has reported, FEMA and DHS face continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings on these challenges and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address them; and (2) discusses several disaster management issues for continued congressional attention.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major disaster are needed--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be ready for the coming hurricane season. The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the  Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) efforts to address the  shortcomings of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and  enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including  hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season begins in just a few weeks.  Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,  state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of  preparing for, responding, to and recovering from any catastrophic  disaster. The goal of disaster preparedness and response is easy to state  but difficult to achieve and can be stated as follows:  To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to  disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated,  and effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and  set the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in  particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre- and post- disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of  government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.  Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as knowing  evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having a family  and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS’s high-risk  status and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS must  overcome continuing challenges, including those related to clearly  defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary  disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to  provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and  abuse. These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels  of government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to  major disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and  capabilities. This is because effective preparedness for and response to  major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple  actors from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of  government as well as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put  aside and cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event.  The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to  tackle these difficult issues.
My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership,  response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made by  DHS and FEMA in their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act  and other recommendations made in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,  and (2) highlights several disaster management issues for continued  congressional attention. My comments today are based on our body of  work on disaster and emergency management including more than   30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, our review of recent  emergency management reform legislative changes, and materials and  statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit work in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation  for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster  Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily  establishes the programs and processes for the federal government to  provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal  governments, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations.  FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions of  the Stafford Act.
Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a catastrophic  disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining surge  capacity—the ability to draw on additional resources, such as personnel  and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. One  way of sharing personnel and equipment across state lines is through the  use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an interstate  compact that provides a legal and administrative framework for managing  such emergency requests. The compact includes 49 states, the District of  Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. We have ongoing work  examining how the Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been  used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect  to report by this summer.
As the committee is aware, a number of specific recommendations have  been made to improve the nation’s ability to effectively prepare for and  respond to catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of Hurricane  Katrina. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select  Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to  Hurricane Katrina, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental  Affairs Committee, the White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS  Inspector General, and DHS and FEMA all identified a variety of failures  and some strengths in the preparations for, response to, and initial  recovery from Hurricane Katrina. In addition to these reviews, a report  from the American National Standards Institute Homeland Security  Standards Panel (ANSI-HSSP) contains recommendations aimed at  bolstering national preparedness, response, and recovery efforts in the  event of a natural disaster. A key resource identified in the document is  the American National Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and  Business Continuity Programs (ANSI/NFPA 1600), which was developed  by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The standard defines  a common set of criteria for preparedness, disaster management,  emergency management, and business continuity programs.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,  state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of  preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic  disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane  Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively  coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts,  particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of  state and local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our  analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood  leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary  disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively  balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent  waste, fraud, and abuse. In line with a recommendation we made  following Hurricane Andrew, the nation’s most destructive hurricane until  Katrina, we recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit  authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters  when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS  1.  rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the  roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of  leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified  coordination problems;  2.  direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic  Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed  operational implementation plans;  3.  provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local  planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully  support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a  jurisdictional and regional basis;  4.  take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to  meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National  Preparedness Goal; and  5.  use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to  invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic  disaster.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and  recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for and  response to Hurricane Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the act  enhances FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA is  to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency  management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and  mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports directly to the  Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within DHS; and the  Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or significantly reduce the  authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to  perform them unless authorized by subsequent legislation. FEMA has  absorbed many of the functions of DHS’s Preparedness Directorate (with  some exceptions). The statute establishes 10 regional offices with  specified responsibilities. The statute also establishes a National  Integration Center responsible for the ongoing management and  maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post-Katrina Reform Act also  included provisions for other areas, such as evacuation plans and  exercises and addressing the needs of individuals with disabilities, In  addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen the management  and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For example, the statute called for a  strategic human capital plan to shape and improve FEMA’s workforce,  authorized recruitment and retention bonuses, and established a Surge  Capacity Force. Most of the organizational changes became effective as of  March 31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in organizational autonomy  for FEMA and establishment of the National Integration Center, became  effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4,  2006.
section_title: FEMA Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act
paragraphs: After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were  over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS  as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act,  whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested  disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed  weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and  recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS, the  department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA’s internal  structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and  integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities within  FEMA.
As I stated in March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of  recent recommendations and the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational  changes and related roles and responsibilities should address many of our  emergency management observations and recommendations. In addition,  we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate  disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, particularly for  catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of state and local  governments are almost immediately overwhelmed.  Our analysis showed  the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and  responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities;  and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast  and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
subsections: section_title: Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters
paragraphs: In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic  disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of  authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively  communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective  decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve  leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic  disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the capabilities  needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall national  preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to  be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), how it should  be done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what  standards. The principal national documents designed to address each of  these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG.
All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by  federal, state, and local government officials, tribal authorities, non- governmental and private sector officials. For example, the review of the  NRP is intended to assess the effectiveness of the NRP, identify  modifications and improvements and reissue the document. This review  includes all major components of the NRP including the base plan,  Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes such as the Catastrophic  Incident Annex and Supplement; as well as the role of the PFO, FCO, and  the Joint Field Office structure. Also during the current NRP review  period, FEMA has revised the organizational structure of Emergency  Support Function 6 (ESF-6), Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services,  and places FEMA as the lead agency for this emergency support function.  The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in the responsibilities  and activities of ESF-6. According to a February 2007 letter by the Red  Cross, this change will not take place until the NRP review process is  complete and all changes are approved.
The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June  2007. In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that some  important issues were more complex and require national-level policy  decisions, and additional time was needed to complete a comprehensive  draft. DHS noted that the underlying operational principles of the NRP  remain intact and the current document, as revised in May 2006, still  applies. FEMA officials have told us that the final version of the National  Preparedness Goal and its corresponding documents like the Target  Capabilities List, are currently receiving final reviews by the White House  and are expected to be out shortly.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of clearly  understood roles and responsibilities. One that continues to be a subject  of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, who has the  authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for response  and recovery under the Stafford Act, and the PFO, whose role was to  provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The  May 2006 revisions to the NRP made changes designed to address this  issue. However, as we noted in March 2007, the changes may not have fully  resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of the PFO and the FCO.  While the Secretary of Homeland Security may avoid conflicts by  appointing a single individual to serve in both positions in non-terrorist  incidents, confusion may persist if the Secretary of Homeland Security  does not exercise this discretion to do so. Furthermore, this discretion  does not exist for terrorist incidents, and the revised NRP does not  specifically provide a rationale for this limitation.
FEMA has pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf Coast  and eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This includes FCOs and  PFOs for the Gulf Coast Region, Northeast Region, and the Mid-Atlantic  Region, and separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of Florida and Texas.  It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of  these pre-designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly understood by  all. There is still some question among state and local first responders  about the need for both positions and how they will work together in  disaster response. One potential benefit of naming the FCOs and PFOs in  advance is that they have an opportunity meet and discuss expectations,  roles and responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials  before an actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved  coordination and communication in an actual disaster.
section_title: Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond to Major Disasters
paragraphs: Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White  House, and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and  capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and  nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate  challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number  of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the ability to  prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic disasters  requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to  integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be  done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what  standards. As previously discussed, the principal national documents  designed to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and  the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision.
Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people,  skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are  available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with  training and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested and  problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other  federal, state, and local stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA  management of day-to-day operations, we found that although shifting  resources caused by its transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA,  the agency’s management of existing resources compounded these  problems. FEMA lacks some of the basic management tools that help an  agency respond to changing circumstances. Most notably, our January  2007 report found that FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related  human capital strategies—such as succession planning or a coordinated  training effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they  enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills needed  to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and  future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said they are  beginning to address these and other basic organizational management  issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 areas, whose  final reports and recommendations are due later this spring.
An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to  identify and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety of  sources—federal, state, local or tribal governments; military assets of the  National Guard or active military; nongovernmental entities; and the  private sector. One key method of tapping resources in areas not affected  by the disaster is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact  (EMAC). Through EMAC about 46,000 National Guard and 19,000 civilian  responders were deployed to areas directly affected by the 2005 Gulf  Coast hurricanes. We have ongoing work examining how EMAC has been  used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect  to report by this summer.
One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard.  States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and  equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are  frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states. However,  as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the  National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been  fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would  have roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated  their plans. As a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states,  the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning  for National Guard forces. However, until the bureau’s charter and its civil  support regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state  planning for multistate events, such planning may remain incomplete, and  the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and  efficiently as possible. In addition, questions have arisen about the level of  resources the National Guard has available for domestic emergency  response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness of  nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or  report this information to Congress. Thus, although the deployment of  National Guard units overseas has decreased the supply of equipment  available to nondeployed National Guard units in the U.S., there has been  no established, formal method of assessing the impact on the Guard’s  ability to perform its domestic missions. Although DOD has begun to  collect data on units’ preparedness, these efforts are not yet fully mature.
The nation’s experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some  of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of  a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational  assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications,   (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care   and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of  actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies in  each of these areas. Examples include designating national and regional  situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite  communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving and  tracking the status of requests for assistance and supplies; acquiring GPS  equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to areas of need;  and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify roles and  responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. However, a  number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate their  effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to have been  tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand  they would face following a major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is  difficult to assess the probable results of these initiatives in improving  response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or   5 hurricane. The section below briefly discusses actions taken or  underway to make improvements in each of these areas. Additional details  can be found in appendix I.
Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly  deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called  National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal  presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing the  national response for catastrophic incidents. These teams will support  efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the capability  to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers and support  the initial establishment of a unified command.
Emergency Communications. Agencies’ communications systems during  a catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient  communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication  requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications  interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire,  emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public works,  transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across  agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have  identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to  improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken  action to design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive,  interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability, which  we discuss further in appendix I.
Logistics. FEMA’s inability to effectively manage and track requests for  and the distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came under  harsh criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days, FEMA  became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over much  of the logistics mission. In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress  required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive.  FEMA’s ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy and efforts are  designed to initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a  disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on  to establish sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose  resources are needed for ongoing response and recovery activities,  according to FEMA officials. In addition, we recently examined FEMA  logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary  for an effective logistics system, which are discussed in appendix I. In  short, FEMA is taking action to transition its logistics program to be more  proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other initiatives hold  promise for improving FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will be several  years before they are fully implemented and operational.
Mass Care and Shelter. In GAO’s work examining the nation’s ability to  evacuate, care for, and shelter disaster victims, we found that FEMA needs  to identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal  government and outside the federal government. In an April testimony,  FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Operations said that emergency  evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA’s most pressing priority for  planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He said that FEMA is  undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning; the  Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing methods for more  quickly identifying and uniting missing family members; and FEMA and  the Red Cross have developed a web-based data system to support shelter  management, reporting, and facility identification activities.
section_title: Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
paragraphs: Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are  used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision  makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and  accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and  recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples  where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required  extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital  supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples  where FEMA’s processes assisting disaster victims left the federal  government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited assistance  payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million  to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to  applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash  assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to  be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery  programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic incident  but also provide accountability. Examples include significantly increasing  the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such as food, ice, and water;  placing global positioning systems on supply trucks to track their location  and better manage the delivery of supplies; creating an enhanced phone  system for victim assistance applications that can handle up to 200,000  calls per day; and improving computer systems and processes for verifying  the eligibility of those applying for assistance. Effective implementation of  these and other planned improvements will be critical to achieving their  intended outcomes.
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude of  capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also require  more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a catastrophe,  streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly  replace “business as usual” and unquestioned adherence to long-standing  policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for providing  relief to disaster victims. At the same time, controls and accountability  mechanisms must be sufficient to provide the documentation needed for  expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance that resources have  been used legally and for the purposes intended.
We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that  effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need  to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to provide  assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the  magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster  assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for response  and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We  also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement  practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal agencies with  roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal agencies could  then better manage disaster-related procurement and establish an  assessment process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for  their disaster-related procurement needs and the maintenance of  capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency response  practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how  the federal government can better manage its disaster-related  procurements. These practices include developing knowledge of  contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing vendor relationships  prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust  the level of capacity to match the response with the need.
In my March 2007 testimony I noted that recent statutory changes have  established more controls and accountability mechanisms. For example,  The Secretary of DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to  limit the excessive use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The  Secretary of DHS is also required to promulgate regulations that limit  certain noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional  circumstances apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate  up to one percent of funding for agency mission assignments as oversight  funds. The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain internal  management controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and develop  and implement a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of  federal funds in response to or recovery from a disaster. Verification  measures must be developed to identify eligible recipients of disaster relief  assistance.
section_title: Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional Attention
paragraphs: In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional  leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight. He suggested  that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing  for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic  events. Recent events—notably Hurricane Katrina and the threat of an  influenza pandemic—have illustrated the importance of ensuring a  strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management.  Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and coordinated  can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively functioning  insurance market can substantially reduce the government’s exposure to  post-catastrophe payouts.
Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity  for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of potential  catastrophic events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice  of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization  requirements and additional organizational changes made under the  Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were  to become effective on March 31, 2007. As stated in our March 2007  testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s  organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities—in addition  to those changes already undertaken by DHS—should address many of  our emergency management observations and recommendations.
The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress  could also consider how the federal government can work with other  nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector  organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help ensure  the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively. Given the billions of  dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and  rebuilding after catastrophic disasters, congressional oversight is critical.
A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term  efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for  immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and  implementation of the National Preparedness System, including  preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local  capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining those  capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and  preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and   (5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance.
subsections: section_title: DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post- Katrina Reform Act
paragraphs: On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation  of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional  organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All  of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective on March 31,  2007. According to DHS, the department completed a thorough assessment  of FEMA’s internal structure to incorporate lessons learned from  Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and existing assets  and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the following DHS  offices and divisions to FEMA:    United States Fire Administration,    Office of Grants and Training,    Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,    Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,    Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,    Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational  elements, such as a logistics management division, a disaster assistance  division, and a disaster operations division. In addition, FEMA expanded  its regional office structure with each region in part by establishing a  Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional Strike Team. With the  recent appointment of the director for region III, FEMA officials noted that  for the first time in recent memory there will be no acting regional  directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed by experienced  professionals.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate  intended to consolidate FEMA’s strategic preparedness assets from  existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate  programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions  related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It also  will include the National Integration Center that will maintain the NRP and  NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities reflect these  documents.
subsections: section_title: Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s Provisions Should Respond to Many Concerns
paragraphs: As I have previously stated in my March 2007 testimony, the effective  implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational changes  and related roles and responsibilities—in addition to those changes  already undertaken by DHS—should address many of our emergency  management observations and recommendations.
As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina  showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles  and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster  capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the  need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste,  fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership roles and  responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA  Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management adviser to  the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS  and to provide recommendations directly to Congress after informing the  Secretary of DHS. The incident management responsibilities and roles of  the National Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary of DHS must  ensure that the NRP provides for a clear chain of command to lead and  coordinate the federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or  other man-made disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that  appointees must meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must have a  demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and  homeland security and 5 years of executive leadership and management  experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For  example, the statute requires the President to establish a national  preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national  preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities,  including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, training  and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting  requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a  national training program to implement, and a national exercise program  to test and evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and  strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a national  emergency management system. States must develop plans that include  catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in order to be  eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must  be developed in consultation with local officials, including regional  commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to foster the development  of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must enter into a  memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to  collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities, including  credentialing of personnel and typing of resources. In addition, FEMA  must implement several other capabilities, such as (1) developing a  logistics system providing real-time visibility of items at each point  throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a prepositioned  equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support and response  teams.
section_title: The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster Capabilities
paragraphs: More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the  construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System,  which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland  Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to  coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards  preparedness goal “to establish measurable readiness priorities and targets  that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist  attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources  required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.” The goal was  also to include readiness metrics and standards for preparedness  assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the nation’s overall  preparedness to respond to major events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness  Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist  related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major  earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS’s National  Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate  the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for  which the nation needs to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying  the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of large scale  emergency events. The scenarios focused on the consequences that first  responders would have to address. Some state and local officials and  experts have questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs  for preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and  the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local  emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over   1,600 discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then  identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, state, and  local first responders on the capabilities they need to develop and  maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised draft  list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. Because no single jurisdiction or  agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target  capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources,  ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some combination of  the two. However, DHS is still in the process of developing goals,  requirements, and metrics for these capabilities and the National  Preparedness Goal in light of the Hurricane Katrina experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in  the Post-Katrina Reform Act—the NPG, target capabilities and  preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment systems—should  be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had established  seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness,  including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; strengthening  capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and strengthening  capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those seven priorities  were incorporated into DHS’s fiscal year 2006 homeland security grant  program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority that  emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching  priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on risk- based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized regional  coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize regional  security strategy integration. In addition to the two overarching priorities,  the guidance also identified several others. These include (1) measuring  progress in achieving the NPG, (2) integrating and synchronizing  preparedness programs and activities, (3) developing and sustaining a  statewide critical infrastructure/key resource protection program,   (4) enabling information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing statewide  communications interoperability, (6) strengthening preventative  radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic  planning to address nationwide plan review results. Under the guidance,  all fiscal year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an  investment justification that provides background information, strategic  objectives and priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan,  and the impact that each proposed investment (project) is anticipated   to have.
section_title: The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic
paragraphs: The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat to  the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a question of if but  when such a pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the  preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are similar to those for any  other type of disaster: clear leadership roles and responsibilities,  authority, and coordination; risk management; realistic planning, training,  and exercises; assessing and building the capacity needed to effectively  respond and recover; effective information sharing and communication;  and accountability for the effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes,  earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short  period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can  have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following  Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely to  affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate damage  is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely to continue  in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months and affect wide  areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. Depending upon the severity  of the pandemic, the number of deaths could be from 200,000 to 2 million.  Seasonal influenza in the United States results in about 36,000 deaths  annually. Successfully addressing the pandemic is also likely to require  international coordination of detection and response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a  severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an  affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family members,  or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation’s economy, as  businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing to provide  essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. In addition,  our nation’s ability to respond effectively to hurricanes or other major  disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first responders,  health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise unable to  perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a pandemic are  potentially widespread and effective planning and response for such a  disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all levels of  government, the private sector, individuals within the United States, as  well as international cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to  implementing the Department of Health and Human Services’ National  Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for  pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of  Agriculture’s preparedness efforts and plans, public health and hospital  preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease surveillance.   We expect most of these reports to be issued by late summer 2007.
section_title: Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities Is Limited
paragraphs: Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on  state and local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying risk  management principles to guide federal investments, over the past 4 years  DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal funding to states, localities,  and territories through its HSGP grants. Remarkably, however, we know  little about how states and localities finance their efforts in this area, have  used their federal funds, and are assessing the effectiveness with which  they spend those funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and act on  the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about emergency  preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what are our  priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk assessments,  performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and sustain success?  On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data available  for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better  information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some types of  major emergency events than for others. For some natural disasters, such  as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and therefore  a better basis on which to assess preparation and response efforts and  identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with  earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has  experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in  a major city. Although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some  related experience, there have been no recent pandemics that rapidly  spread to thousands of people across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant  guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that  eligible recipients must provide an “investment justification” with their  grant application. States were to use this justification to outline the  implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to  achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and Capability  Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global program  management plans for the entire state homeland security program that  look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The  justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland  security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it would use a  peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the basis of the  effectiveness of a state’s plan to address the priorities it has outlined and  thereby reduce its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate  the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security investments.  For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk and effectiveness  assessments to inform final funding decisions, although changes have been  made to make the grant allocation process more transparent and more  easily understood. DHS officials have said that they cannot yet assess how  effective the actual investments from grant funds are in enhancing  preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have the metrics  to do so.
section_title: Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust
paragraphs: Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate  planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been  focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors.  However, well-documented problems with the abilities of first responders  from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site of an incident and  the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated  a debate on the extent to which first responders should be focusing their  planning and preparation on a regional and multigovernmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the National  Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to building,  sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP  applications are to reflect regional coordination and show an investment  strategy that institutionalizes regional security strategy integration.  However, it is not known to what extent regional and multistate planning  has progressed and is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. Our  early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region Coordination  (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic planning reported  that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated challenges in managing  federal funds in a way that maximizes the increase in first responder  capacities and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and  unnecessary duplication of expenditures. One of these challenges  included a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder  performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of  expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent work  on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that  needed strengthening in the Region’s planning, specifically improving the  substance of the strategic plan to guide decision makers. For example,  additional information could have been provided regarding the type,  nature, scope, or timing of planned goals, objectives, and initiatives;  performance expectations and measures; designation of priority initiatives  to meet regional risk and needed capabilities; lead organizations for  initiative implementation; resources and investments; and operational  commitment.
section_title: Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons Learned
paragraphs: Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane  Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and refine  assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on the  strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective assessments  of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a national  exercise program, and training and exercises are also included as a  component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any skill  and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For first  responders, exercises—especially of the type or magnitude of events for  which there is little actual experience—are essential for developing skills  and identifying what works well and what needs further improvement.  Major emergency incidents, particularly catastrophic ones, by definition  require the coordinated actions of personnel from many first responder  disciplines and all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and the  private sector. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective  interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in  developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response.
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas  needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to test and  stress the system, involve all key persons who would be involved in  responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest and realistic  assessments that result in action plans that are implemented. In addition  to relevant first responders, exercise participants should include,  depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors,  and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for  such things as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation  or ask for federal assistance.
section_title: DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational Decisions
paragraphs: Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS’s policies  regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified that  DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management  areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to be  guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive toward  oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with access to various  documents and officials have impeded our work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that  DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken  other corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However,  DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent  enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and  economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually,  and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous legislative  requirements and presidential directives.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of  dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to assist in  strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has developed  several key national policy documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and the  NPG to guide federal, state, and local efforts. The aftermath of the 2005  hurricane season resulted in a reassessment of the federal role in  preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. The studies and  reports of the past year—by Congress, the White House Homeland  Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO, and others—have  provided a number of insights into the strengths and limitations of the  nation’s capacity to respond to catastrophic disasters and resulted in a  number of recommendations for strengthening that capacity. Collectively,  these studies and reports paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that  the nation—federal, state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental  entities; the private sector; and individual citizens—faces in preparing for,  responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post- Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy  changes to respond to these findings and challenges.
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency  preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that  requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many  stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of  government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no “silver bullet,” no  easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires continuing  commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances change  and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any  questions you and subcommittee members may have.
section_title: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information about this statement, please contact   William O. Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on  (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from  GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors  to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino, Analyst- in-Charge; Flavio Martinez, Analyst; and Amy Bernstein, Communications  Analyst.
section_title: Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery
paragraphs: Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial  resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal  governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to  meet the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of  damage and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be  part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate  and define what needs to be done and where, how, and how well it should  be done—that is, according to what standards. The principal national  documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP,  NIMS, and the NPG. The nation’s experience with Hurricanes Katrina and  Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of  capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the  areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency  communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and  (6) mass care and sheltering.
FEMA is taking actions to address identified deficiencies in each of these  areas. Examples include designating national and regional situational  awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite  communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving and  tracking the status of requests for assistance and supplies; acquiring GPS  equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to areas of need;  and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify roles and  responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. This appendix  provides additional details of FEMA’s actions in each of these areas.
subsections: section_title: FEMA Taking Steps to Improve Situational Assessment Capabilities
paragraphs: One of the critical capabilities that FEMA is working to improve is their  situational assessment and awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for  rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time  called National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal  presence to facilitate managing the national response for catastrophic  incidents. FEMA is planning to establish three national-level teams and ten  regional-level teams, one in each of the ten FEMA regions. These teams  will support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as  the capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers  and support the initial establishment of a unified command. According to  FEMA’s plans, these teams will have a multi-agency composition to ensure  that the multi-disciplinary requirements of emergency management are  met. The teams are envisioned to have the capability to establish an  effective federal presence within 12-hours of notification, to support the  state, to coordinate federal activities, and to be self sufficient for a  minimum of 48-hours so as not to be a drain on potentially scarce local  resources. National-level and regional-level teams will be staffed with  permanent full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a  collateral duty basis. Team composition will include representatives from  other DHS components, interagency and homeland security partners.  When not deployed, the teams will team-train with federal partners and  provide a training capability to elevate state and local emergency  management capabilities. The teams will also engage in consistent and  coordinated operational planning and relationship-building with state,  local, tribal, and other stakeholders.
According to FEMA officials, these teams are still being designed and  decisions on team assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have not  yet been finalized. The new teams are envisioned to eventually subsume  the existing FIRST (Federal Incident Response Teams) and ERTs (FEMA’s  Emergency Response Teams), and their mission and capabilities will  incorporate similar concepts involving leadership, emergency  management doctrine, and operational competence in communications.  FEMA plans to implement one National Incident Management Team and  one Regional Incident Management Team by May 25, 2007.
section_title: Some Progress Has Been Made on Interoperable Communications
paragraphs: As our past work has noted, emergency communications is a critical  capability common across all phases of an incident. Agencies’  communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be  operable, with sufficient communications to meet everyday internal and  emergency communication requirements. Once operable, they then should  have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies  (e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies  (e.g., public works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within  and across agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed.
DHS officials have identified a number of programs and activities they  have implemented to improve interoperable communications nationally.  DHS’s Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) was established  to strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts to  improve local, tribal, state, and federal emergency preparedness and  response. SAFECOM, a program of OIC which is transitioning to the Office  of Emergency Communications (OEC)—in response to the Post-Katrina  Reform Act—is developing tools, templates, and guidance documents,  including field tested statewide planning methodologies, online  collaboration tools, coordinated grant guidance, communications  requirements, and a comprehensive online library of lessons learned and  best practices to improve interoperability and compatibility across the  nation. DHS officials cited the development of the following examples in  their efforts to improve interoperable communications:    Statement of Requirements (SoR) to define operational and functional  requirements for emergency response communications.
Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) to help emergency  response agencies map interoperable communications system  requirements and identify system gaps.
Project 25 (P25) suite of standards and a Compliance Assessment  Program. This project is in conjunction with the National Institute of  Standards and Technology (NIST) to support the efforts of the  emergency response community and industry;    Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning Methodology to  offer states a tangible approach as they initiate statewide  interoperability planning efforts. SAFECOM also collaborated in DHS  grant guidance to help states develop statewide interoperability plans  by the end of 2007.
According to FEMA officials, the agency is taking actions to design, staff,  and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, interoperable, and highly  reliable emergency communications capability using the latest commercial  off-the-shelf voice, video, and data technology. FEMA’s Response Division  is the designated lead for tactical communications, along with situational  awareness information technology enablers that are provided by FEMA’s  Chief Information Officer. Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS)  detachments provide robust, deployable, command, control, and incident  communications capabilities to DHS/FEMA elements for catastrophic  Incidents of National Significance. The MERS mission supports  Emergency Support Function partners at the federal, state, and local levels  of government. The plan is to utilize enhanced MERS capabilities and  leverage commercial technology to provide real-time connectivity between  communications platforms in a manner consistent with emergency  communication deployment doctrine being developed by DHS and FEMA.  According to FEMA officials, emergency managers at the federal, state,  and local levels of government will benefit from an integrated  interoperable emergency communications architecture that includes the  Department of Defense, United States Northern Command and the  National Guard Bureau.
Our recent work noted that $2.15 billion in grant funding has been  awarded to states and localities from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year  2005 for communications interoperability enhancements helped to make  improvements on a variety of interoperability projects. However this work  noted that the SAFECOM program has made limited progress in improving  communications interoperability at all levels of government. For example,  the program has not addressed interoperability with federal agencies, a  critical element to interoperable communications required by the  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The SAFECOM  program has focused on helping states and localities improve  interoperable communications by developing tools and guidance for their  use. However, based on our review of four states and selected localities,  SAFECOM’s progress in achieving its goals of helping these states and  localities improve interoperable communications has been limited.  Officials from the states and localities we reviewed often found that the  tools and planning assistance provided by the program were not helpful,  or they were unaware of what assistance the program had to offer. The  program’s limited effectiveness can be linked to poor program  management practices, including the lack of a plan for improving  interoperability across all levels of government and inadequate  performance measures that would provide feedback to better attune tools  and assistance with public safety needs. Until SAFECOM adopts these key  management practices, its progress is likely to remain limited.
Further, little progress had been made in developing Project 25  standards—a suite of national standards that are intended to enable  interoperability among the communications products of different vendors.  For example, although one of the eight major subsets of standards was  defined in the project’s first 4 years (from 1989 to 1993), from 1993 through  2005, no additional standards were completed that could be used by a  vendor to develop elements of a Project 25 system. The private-sector  coordinating body responsible for Project 25 has defined specifications for  three additional subsets of standards. However, ambiguities in the  published standards have led to incompatibilities among products made by  different vendors, and no compliance testing has been conducted to  ensure vendors’ products are interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has  strongly encouraged state and local agencies to use grant funding to  purchase Project 25 radios, which are substantially more expensive than  non-Project 25 radios. As a result, states and local agencies have  purchased fewer, more expensive radios, which still may not be  interoperable and thus may provide them with minimal additional benefits.  Thus, until DHS takes a more strategic approach here, progress by states  and localities in improving interoperability is likely to be impeded.
section_title: FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems
paragraphs: In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA’s performance in the logistics  area came under harsh criticism. Within days, FEMA became  overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over much of the  logistics mission. In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required  FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. FEMA’s  improvements to their logistics strategy and efforts are designed to  initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a disaster site  mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish  sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are  needed for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA  officials.
According to FEMA officials, the agency is building forward-leaning  capabilities that include, for example, its MERS resources designed to  support a variety of communications requirements—satellite, land mobile  radio, computer and telephone systems—with the ability to operate from  one or more locations (mobile and stationary) within the response area of  operations. FEMA has also developed a Pre-Positioned Disaster Supply  (PPDS) program to position containers of life-saving and life-sustaining  disaster equipment and supplies as close to a potential disaster site as  possible, in order to substantially reduce the initial response time to  incidents. Further, FEMA is developing a Pre-positioned Equipment  Program (PEP) that also consists of standardized containers of equipment  to provide state and local governments responding to a range of major  disasters such equipment as personal protective supplies,  decontamination, detection, technical search and rescue, law  enforcement, medical, interoperable communications and other  emergency response equipment. According to FEMA officials, currently  FEMA has established 8 of the 11 PEP locations, as mandated by the Post- Katrina Reform Act, and FEMA is currently conducting an analysis to  determine where the additional PEP sites should be located. FEMA has  also stated that it has enhanced its relationships with the public sector  with its disaster logistics partners and has worked to utilize the public  sector’s expertise through Inter-Agency Agreements with the Defense  Logistics Agency, the Department of Transportation and Marine Corps  Systems Command.
According to FEMA officials, another critical component of creating an  effective logistics system is based upon FEMA’s ability to work  collaboratively with and leverage the capabilities of its public and private  partners. FEMA’s logistics efforts have identified private sector expertise  to improve and develop software systems to increase logistics program  efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the Logistics Information  Management System (LIMS) is FEMA’s formal accountability database  system for all property managed within FEMA nation-wide or at disaster  field locations. At the same time, FEMA is also developing a multi-phased  Total Asset Visibility (TAV) program with the assistance of the private  sector to leverage the collective resources of the private and public sector  to improve emergency response logistics in the areas of transportation,  warehousing, and distribution. The current phase of the program, which is  operational at two FEMA logistics centers (Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort  Worth, Texas), encompasses two software management packages  designed to provide FEMA the ability to inventory disaster response  commodities upon arrival at a warehouse, place the commodities in  storage, and track the commodities while stored in the warehouse. FEMA  plans to expand the capabilities of this first phase of the system to all  FEMA Regions during 2007. This will provide FEMA with sufficient  logistics management and tracking capabilities until an expanded phase  two can be implemented. For the second phase, FEMA is currently  conducting market research to solicit input from the private sector and  other sources to facilitate final design of the program’s second phase.  According to FEMA officials, initial operational capabilities for this phase  are scheduled to be in place by June 2008, and fully-operational in June  2009. According to FEMA, the completed product will provide a more  comprehensive approach to producing real-time, reliable reporting and  incorporate FEMA’s financial resource tracking requirements. It will also  be able to support other federal departments and agencies, non- government organizations, and state, local and tribal organizations under  the guidelines of the NRP.
While FEMA has been working to address its logistics capabilities, it is too  early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA logistics  issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an  effective logistics system. Below, we describe these five areas along with  FEMA’s ongoing actions to address each.
Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place  to address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information  on states’ capabilities and resources. As a result, FEMA does not  have information from these sources to define what and how much  it needs to stock. However, FEMA is developing a concept of  operations to underpin its logistics program and told us that it is  working to develop detailed plans and the associated stockage  requirements. However, until FEMA has solid requirements based  on detailed plans, the agency will be unable to assess its true  preparedness.
Inventory management: FEMA’s system accounts for the location,  quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies in- transit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to improve  transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as  expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from the two test  regions to all FEMA regions.
Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of  smaller storage facilities across the country. However, it has little  assurance that these are the right number of facilities located in  the right places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of  determining the number of storage facilities it needs and where  they should be located.
Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA’s distribution system,  including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and  lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described initiatives  under way that should mitigate some of the problems with  contractors, and has been working with Department of Defense  and Department of Transportation to improve the access to  transportation when needed.
People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the  logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff,  supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance  staff. However, FEMA’s recent retirements and losses of staff, and  its difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have  created staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to a  January 2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant  shortfalls in staffing and skill sets of full-time employees,  particularly in the planning, advanced contracting, and relationship  management skills needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission.  FEMA has recently hired a logistics coordinator and is making a  concerted effort to hire qualified staff for the entire agency,  including logistics.
In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics program to  be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other  initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will  be years before they are fully implemented and operational.
section_title: Revisions Made to Evacuation Planning, Mass Care, Housing and Human Services
paragraphs: In an April 2007 testimony, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Operations  said that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA’s most  pressing priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He  said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support  planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing  methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing family members;  and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data system to  support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification  activities.
Evacuation. Recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the  responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially for  those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state and  local governments are generally not well prepared to evacuate  transportation-disadvantaged populations (i.e. planning, training, and  conducting exercises), but some states and localities have begun to  address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006, DHS reported  that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the urban  area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these  populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include  collaboration with social service and transportation providers and  transportation planning organizations—some of which are Department of  Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholders—to determine  transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of drivers  and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation assistance to  state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance have hindered  many of these governments’ ability to sufficiently prepare for evacuations.  This includes the lack of any specific requirement to plan, train, and  conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged  populations as well as gaps in the usefulness of DHS’s guidance. We  recommended that DHS should clarify federal agencies’ roles and  responsibilities for providing evacuation assistance when state and local  governments are overwhelmed. DHS should require state and local  evacuation preparedness for transportation-disadvantaged populations  and improve information to assist these governments. DOT should  encourage its grant recipients to share information to assist in evacuation  preparedness for these populations. DOT and DHS agreed to consider our  recommendations, and DHS stated it has partly implemented some of  them.
In his April 26, 2007 testimony statement for the House Transportation and  Infrastructure Committee, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator stated that  FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuation support planning to  help State and local government plan and prepare for hosting large  displaced populations. The project is to include the development of an  evacuee registration and tracking capability and implementation plans for  federal evacuation support to states.
Mass Care and Shelter. During the current NRP review period, FEMA has  revised the organizational structure of ESF-6, Mass Care, Housing, and  Human Services, and places FEMA as the primary agency responsible for  this emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a  supporting agency in the responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. FEMA  continues to maintain a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Red  Cross that articulates agency roles and responsibilities for mass care. The  MOU and addendum were recently revised in May 2006 and December  2006, respectively. FEMA is currently working with Red Cross and other  support agencies to revise ESF-6 standard operating procedures.  According to a February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will not  take place until the NRP review process is complete and all changes are  approved. According to FEMA's Deputy Administrator, FEMA and the Red  Cross have developed the first phase of a web-based data system to  support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification  activities. The system is intended for all agencies that provide shelter  service during disasters to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the  shelter populations and available shelter capacity.
Temporary housing. Other recent GAO work noted that FEMA needs to  identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal  government and outside the federal government, including temporary  housing. In a recent report on housing assistance we found that the  National Response Plan’s annex covering temporary shelter and housing in  ESF 6 clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two primary  responsible agencies—FEMA and the Red Cross. However, the  responsibilities described for the support agencies—the Departments of  Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and  Veterans Affairs—did not, and still do not, fully reflect their capabilities.  Further, these support agencies had not, at the time of our work,  developed fact sheets describing their roles and responsibilities,  notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific authorities, as  called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. Our February 2007 report  recommended that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that  fully reflect each respective support agency’s capabilities for providing  temporary housing under ESF-6, develop the needed fact sheets, and  develop operational plans that provide details on how their respective  agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities. The  Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans Administration,  and Agriculture, concurred with our recommendations. The Red Cross did  not comment on our report or recommendations. As part of a housing task  force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of incorporating housing  assistance offered by private sector organizations. FEMA says it has also  developed a housing portal to consolidate available rental resources for  evacuees from Federal agencies, private organizations, and individuals.
section_title: Appendix II: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2007  First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications  Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has  Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will be  Challenging. GAO-07-411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007  Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA’s Efforts  to Protect Workers’ Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO-07-193.  Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs:  Evolution of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress.  GAO-07-485R. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007.
Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has  Occurred and Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies.   GAO-07-356. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of  Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters.   GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete  Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses.   GAO-07-205. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and  Other Health Care Needs. GAO-07-67. Washington, D.C.: February 28,  2007.
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of  Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007  Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal  Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability. GAO-07-245. Washington, D.C.:  February 23, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance  Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO-07-114. Washington,  D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes  Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO-07-484T.  Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance  Preparedness of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs.  GAO-07-219. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to  Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing  the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:  February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide  Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to  Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T.  Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007  GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard  Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60  Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2007  Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to  Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139.  Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify  Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.  Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.  Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and  Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could  Enhance Education’s Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and  Universities. GAO-07-64. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the  Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions  Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington,  D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and  Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,  D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and  Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for  the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.:  September 6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red  Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.  Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and  Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.  Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding  Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:  March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges  Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,  D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:  July 11, 2005.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better  Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies.   GAO-05-577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
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