Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended
Published: 2010-09-29T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Cargo containers could be used to transport unlawful cargo, including weapons of mass destruction, illicit arms, stowaways, and illegal narcotics into the United States. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for container security. To enhance container security, CBP has partnered with DHS's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to develop performance standards--requirements that must be met by products to ensure they will function as intended--for container security technologies. After successful completion of testing, S&T plans to deliver performance standards to DHS's Office of Policy Development and CBP. As requested, this report addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has made progress in conducting research and development and defining performance standards for the technologies, and (2) the remaining steps and challenges, if any, DHS could face in implementing the technologies. GAO, among other things, reviewed master test plans for S&T's four ongoing container security technology projects, and interviewed DHS officials.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: DHS has conducted research and development for four container security technology projects, but has not yet developed performance standards for them. From 2004 through 2009, S&T spent approximately $60 million and made varying levels of progress in the research and development of its four container security technology projects. These projects include the Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD), to detect intrusion on all six sides of a container; the Container Security Device (CSD), to detect the opening or removal of container doors; the Hybrid Composite Container, a lightweight container with an embedded sensor grid to detect intrusion on all six sides of the container; and the Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS), to track containers. The ACSD and Hybrid Composite Container technologies have not yet completed laboratory testing, but the CSD and MATTS are proceeding to testing in an operational environment, which will determine if the technologies can operate in the global supply chain--the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers. S&T's master plans for conducting operational environment testing, however, do not reflect all of the operational scenarios the Office of Policy Development and CBP are considering for implementation. According to DHS guidance, before S&T can provide performance standards to the Office of Policy Development and CBP, the technologies are to have been proven to work in their final form and under expected operational conditions. Until the container security technologies are tested and evaluated consistent with all of the operational scenarios DHS identified for potential implementation, S&T cannot provide reasonable assurance that the technologies will effectively function as the Office of Policy Development and CBP intend to implement them. If S&T determines that the container security technologies are mature enough to provide performance standards for these technologies to the Office of Policy Development and CBP, key steps and challenges remain before implementation can occur. These key steps involve (1) obtaining support from the trade industry and international partners, (2) developing a concept of operations (CONOPS) detailing how the technologies are to be deployed, and (3) certifying the technologies for use. The Office of Policy Development and CBP plan to take these steps if and when S&T provides performance standards.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS test and evaluate the container security technologies consistent with all the operational scenarios DHS identified for potential implementation. DHS concurred with our recommendation.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In addition to serving an important role in transporting legitimate cargo,  cargo containers can also be used to transport unlawful cargo, including  weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illicit arms, stowaways, and illegal  narcotics, into the United States. In fiscal year 2009, 9.8 million cargo  containers arrived at U.S. ports. Within the federal government, the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) is responsible for administering container security and  reducing the vulnerabilities associated with the supply chain—the flow of  goods from manufacturers to retailers. As it performs this mission, CBP  maintains two overarching and sometimes conflicting goals—increasing  security while efficiently facilitating legitimate trade. To address these  goals, CBP has developed a layered security strategy. Core components of  this strategy include analyzing information to identify cargo containers  that may pose a security risk, working with host governments to examine  high-risk containers at foreign ports before they are loaded onto vessels  bound for the United States, and providing benefits, such as reduced  examination of cargo, to private-sector companies that comply with  predetermined security measures.
Recognizing that security can be further enhanced, CBP has partnered  with DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to develop  performance standards—requirements that must be met by products to  ensure they will function as intended—for container security technologies  that can (1) detect and report container intrusion, (2) alert officials to  possible security threats, and (3) track the movement of cargo containers  through the supply chain. S&T is responsible for researching, developing,  testing, and evaluating new technologies in order to develop performance  standards. If S&T is able to demonstrate through testing and evaluation  that container security technologies exist that can meet CBP’s  requirements, then it plans to provide performance standards to CBP and  the Transportation, Cargo & Infrastructure Unit within DHS’s Office of  Policy Development to pursue for implementation. The Transportation,  Cargo & Infrastructure Unit is responsible for, among other things,  developing, implementing, and coordinating policy relating to the security  of the global supply chain.
You requested information on DHS’s efforts to develop and implement  container security technologies. In particular, this report addresses the  following questions:    To what extent has DHS made progress in conducting research and  development and defining performance standards for container  security technologies?
What remaining steps and challenges, if any, does DHS face in  implementing container security technologies?
To address the first objective, we reviewed all four ongoing container  security projects initiated by S&T to develop technologies that can detect  cargo container intrusions and track the movement of cargo containers  through the supply chain. For each of the four projects, we reviewed  project requirements documents, test plans, technology transition  agreements, and task orders to determine the projects’ scope and  requirements. We then evaluated DHS’s plans against criteria for planning  in DHS’s Developing Operational Requirements guide. To assess DHS’s  progress in developing technologies, we reviewed the test reports  outlining the performance of the technologies under evaluation to identify  the capabilities of the technologies and performance deficiencies. We also  reviewed each of the project schedules and compared them to the current  status of each of the container security technology projects as of June  2010. We interviewed senior officials in S&T’s Borders and Maritime  Security Division in Washington, D.C., who are responsible for the four  container security projects to discuss the status of the projects. We also  interviewed officials representing the four members of the Container  Security Test and Evaluation (CSTE) team created by S&T to test and  evaluate the technologies—Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,  Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and  the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific—to discuss the  results of the four projects’ test and evaluation processes. In addition to  these interviews, we also conducted a site visit to Sandia National  Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico—the location for all laboratory  testing of the container security technologies—to view technology  prototypes, observe the test facilities, and to learn more about the specific  laboratory tests that have been conducted on the container security  technologies. We also met with officials representing the vendors whose  technologies were under testing and evaluation at the time our audit began  in October 2009—Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI); iControl, Inc.;  Maine Secure Composites (MSC); and Science Applications International  Corporation (SAIC)—to discuss how they have developed and modified  their technologies. Further, we reviewed the contracts and interagency  agreements that provided funds to the CSTE team and vendors to  determine the amount of money DHS has spent on testing, evaluating, and  developing the technologies since funding for the container security  technologies began, in April 2004, through 2009.
To address the second objective, we discussed container security  technology implementation plans with officials from DHS’s Office of  Policy Development Transportation, Cargo & Infrastructure Unit, and with  CBP officials from its Office of Field Operations and its Customs-Trade  Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Office.We also spoke with  Department of Defense (DOD) entities, including the U.S. Army and the  U.S. Transportation Command, to identify any lessons learned from DOD’s  implementation of container security devices in transporting supplies and  equipment to support war efforts in Afghanistan. With representatives of  the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and World  Customs Organization (WCO),we discussed the process for obtaining  international adoption of container security technology standards, and the  imposition of duties and taxes on container security technologies,  respectively. Further, we spoke with trade industry representatives to  understand the trade industry’s perspective on how container security  technologies could be implemented in the global supply chain, and to  identify any potential challenges to implementation. Specifically, we spoke  with officials from the World Shipping Council, which represents vessel  carriers that transport cargo containers, as well as with two individual  vessel carriers and one non-vessel operating common carrier.We also  spoke with representatives from two trade industry associations—the  American Association of Exporters and Importers and the National  Association of Manufacturers—as well as 22 individual U.S. importers the  trade association members identified for us among their membership. We  conducted interviews with these importers in group settings. This  interview format allowed us to determine consensus and also identify and  examine instances where viewpoints differed among importers. As a result  of the group settings, we do not explicitly identify the number of importers  who expressed particular views. Rather, we express these views as those  of some of the importers we interviewed. Further, we met with an official  from the Institute of International Container Lessors, which represents  companies that lease containers to members of the trade industry,  including vessel carriers and importers. Our interviews with these trade  industry representatives were based on a nonprobability sample, so they  are not generalizable to the entire maritime trade industry, but they did  provide us with insights into the willingness of members of the maritime  trade industry to partner with DHS and CBP to implement container  security technologies, and identify potential challenges to implementation.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 through  September 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Global Supply Chain
paragraphs: Given the complexity of the supply chain and the vast number of cargo  containers that are shipped to the United States, the supply chain is  vulnerable to threats. The typical supply chain process for transporting  cargo containers to the United States involves many steps and  participants. The cargo container, and material in it, can be affected not  only by the manufacturer or supplier of the material being shipped, but  also by vessel carriers who are responsible for transporting the material to  a port, as well as by personnel who load and unload cargo containers onto  vessels. Others who may interact with the cargo or have access to the  records of the goods being shipped include exporters who make  arrangements for shipping and loading, freight consolidators who package  disparate cargo into containers, and forwarders who manage and process  the information about what is being loaded onto a vessel. Figure 1 depicts  the key participants and points of transfer involved in the supply chain— from the time that a container is packed with cargo in a foreign location to  its arrival at a U.S. port.
section_title: CBP Has Developed a Layered Strategy to Secure Cargo Containers
paragraphs: CBP has developed a layered security strategy to mitigate the risk of an  attack using cargo containers. CBP’s strategy is based on a layered  approach of related programs that attempt to focus resources on  potentially risky cargo shipped in containers while allowing other cargo  containers to proceed without unduly disrupting commerce into the  United States. The strategy is based on obtaining advanced cargo  information to identify high-risk containers, utilizing technology to inspect  containers, and partnering with foreign governments and the trade  industry. A brief description of the core programs that comprise CBP’s  layered security strategy for cargo containers is provided in table 1.
section_title: Legislation Enacted to Improve Cargo Container Security
paragraphs: Several U.S. laws and regulations govern the security of cargo containers  and the supply chain within which they are transported. In 2006, Congress  passed, and the President signed, the Security and Accountability for  Every (SAFE) Port Act. The SAFE Port Act established a statutory  framework for some of the programs comprising CBP’s layered security  strategy, including CSI and C-TPAT, which previously had been agency  programs not required by law. The SAFE Port Act also required that DHS  initiate a rulemaking process and subsequently issue an interim final rule  to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in  transit to the United States. In August 2007, the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) was  enacted, amending this SAFE Port Act requirement. Specifically, the 9/11  Act required that if the interim final rule was not issued by April 1, 2008,  then effective no later than October 15, 2008, all containers in transit to the  United States would be required to use an ISO 17712 compliant seal. DHS  did not establish standards by the set deadline, so all maritime containers  in transit to the United States are now required to be sealed with an ISO  17712 compliant seal. According to DHS, it did not establish minimum  standards for securing cargo containers in transit because there were no  available technology solutions at the time that would adequately improve  container security without significantly disrupting the flow of commerce.  Although the 9/11 Act default standard is now in effect, the act provides  that this standard will cease to be effective upon the effective date of a  rule issued in the future pursuant to the original SAFE Port Act  requirement.
In addition to the possibility of a future rulemaking in this area, DHS  remains responsible for implementing an earlier provision enacted by the  Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). This provision  requires DHS to establish a program to evaluate and certify secure systems  of international, intermodal transportation. This program is to include  standards and procedures for securing cargo and monitoring security  while in transit, as well as performance standards to enhance the physical  security of shipping containers, including standards for seals and locks.  This provision continues to govern DHS efforts to establish standards for  new technology in the cargo container security area.
section_title: Past CBP Efforts Identified Need for Container Security Technologies
paragraphs: In response to a July 2002 memo from the then-CBP Commissioner, CBP  undertook a study to identify and evaluate available technologies to  improve container security. The study demonstrated that existing  container seals provided inadequate security against physical intrusions.  We reported in January 2006 that despite the widespread use of container  seals, they are not effective in preventing tampering. For example, entry  into a container through the roof or sides will not be indicated by a  container seal affixed to the doors. Further, various methods to  circumvent seals installed on container door hasps (see fig. 3) have been  demonstrated by the Department of Defense and the Vulnerability  Assessment Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Seals installed  through the door hasp can be bypassed and left intact by simply removing  an entire container door. Recognizing the limitations of existing container  technology, CBP desired a technology with the ability to monitor and  record door openings and eventually detect and report intrusions on all six  sides of a container. Figure 3 shows a container with a bolt seal affixed to  the door hasp.
CBP initiated the Smart Box program in 2004 in order to develop  technologies with the ability to monitor the physical integrity of a  container, among other things. In September 2005, CBP, in consultation  with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, determined  through operational testing that there was no existing container security  device that could meet its requirements. CBP made a second attempt, in  December 2007, to find a commercially available container security device  with the ability to monitor container doors for intrusion. According to CBP  officials, only one security device—offered by General Electric— demonstrated the potential to meet CBP’s requirements. However,  according to CBP, subsequent operational testing revealed that the device  had a relatively high false alarm rate, which, according to CBP officials,  would have resulted in an unmanageable workload for CBP staff at ports  given the number of containers they would have to examine because of  the alarms. According to CBP officials, before they could schedule another  round of testing to determine if a revised prototype of the device would  meet CBP’s requirements, General Electric decided to stop producing the  device.
section_title: DHS S&T Initiated Four Projects to Develop Container Security Technologies
paragraphs: S&T is developing four container security technologies, which are  described in table 2, in response to MTSA requirements and CBP’s need  for container security technologies with the ability to detect intrusion and  track the movement of containers through the supply chain. In May 2004,  S&T issued a broad agency announcement for the Advanced Container  Security Device (ACSD) project seeking industry submissions for  technologies that could be developed to provide six-sided intrusion  detection for cargo containers. The initial results of ACSD testing  demonstrated that a solution would require years of additional investment  and development. As a result of the challenges, DHS created the Hybrid  Composite Container to embed six-sided detection in a container made of  composite material, and the Container Security Device (CSD) project to  provide the capability to detect container door intrusion as an interim  solution until six-sided detection is available. In November 2003, S&T  issued a small business innovative research (SBIR) solicitation seeking a  Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS) with the capability to provide  both worldwide container tracking, and communicate the security status  of the CSD and ACSD in the supply chain. Table 2 provides a description  of each of the four container security technology projects, including the  projects’ goals, key vendors, and time frames.
S&T’s overall objective for each of these container security technology  projects is the development and delivery of performance standards for the  technologies to DHS’s Office of Policy Development and CBP.  Performance standards define a set of requirements that must be met by  products to ensure they will function as intended. Before S&T can provide  performance standards to the Office of Policy Development and CBP, the  capability of the technologies to meet stated requirements must be  demonstrated through the successful completion of testing and evaluation  activities, as described in the technology transition agreements. S&T has  defined two phases of testing and evaluation for these projects:    Phase I—Laboratory Testing: The purpose of Phase I is to identify  capabilities and deficiencies in prototypes in a controlled environment  to determine the likelihood of a prototype functioning under a variety  of anticipated environmental and usage conditions. At least 10  prototypes are used for Phase I testing of a technology.
Phase II—Trade Lane Testing: Phase II is designed to determine  whether a prototype can enhance supply chain security while  minimizing the effect on cargo operations. Phase II includes testing in  an operational trade lane—the route a container travels—using 100  trips from the container packing location to arrival at a U.S. port.
After successful completion of both phases of testing, S&T is to deliver  performance standards—including system requirements and test plans—to  the Office of Policy Development and CBP. Figure 4 shows how the testing  process leads to the development of performance standards.
section_title: DHS Has Made Progress in Researching and Developing Container Security Technologies, but Needs to Conduct Testing Using Defined Operational Scenarios before Delivering Performance Standards
paragraphs: From 2004 through 2009, S&T spent over $60 million and made varying  levels of progress in the research and development of its four container  security technology projects—ACSD, CSD, Hybrid Composite Container,  and MATTS—to support the development of performance standards for  these container security projects. Each of these projects has undergone  Phase I laboratory testing, but S&T has not yet conducted Phase II trade  lane testing in an operational environment to ensure that the prototypes  will satisfy the requirements so that S&T can provide performance  standards to the Office of Policy Development and CBP. Prior to the  development of performance standards by S&T, each of the technology  prototypes will need to undergo Phase II trade lane testing consistent with  the operational scenarios that have been identified for potential  implementation. According to S&T, the master test plans do not reflect all  operational scenarios being considered because DHS is currently focused  on using the technologies in the maritime environment.
subsections: section_title: DHS S&T Has Identified and Funded Vendors’ Container Security Technologies for Development
paragraphs: S&T used a multiple-round process to select vendors’ technologies for  development. Several vendors responded to S&T’s 2004 broad agency  announcement for the ACSD project and 2003 SBIR solicitation for  MATTS. The vendors’ technology proposals were evaluated on their ability  to meet the project requirements, and those technologies considered to be  viable were funded by S&T to develop prototypes for test and evaluation.  Because of the challenges in developing an ACSD solution, S&T created  the CSD project and selected vendors for the project based on the  performance of vendors’ prototypes during ACSD project testing.  Similarly, selection for the Hybrid Composite Container project was based  on performance in the ACSD project. From 2004 through 2009, S&T has  provided a total of about $24 million in funding to vendors to develop  container security technologies. Appendix I provides additional details on  the vendor selection process.
S&T created the Container Security Test and Evaluation (CSTE) team to  develop requirements and independently monitor and evaluate the  performance of container security technologies. CSTE membership is  composed of three Department of Energy national laboratories— Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National  Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories—and the Navy’s Space and  Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific. As described in table 3, these  organizations were each selected for participation based on their areas of  applicable technical expertise in fields such as sensor systems, wireless  communications, and maritime environment product testing. From 2004  through 2009, S&T obligated nearly $36 million to the CSTE team to  develop requirements and conduct testing and evaluation of container  security technologies.
One of the responsibilities of the CSTE team was to develop test plans that  specify the testing activities that technologies need to successfully  undergo in order to move on to later phases of testing and eventually the  development of performance standards. These test plans require that  technologies be evaluated on their installation and usability, functionality,  performance (including under adverse environmental conditions), and  vulnerability to attack by an adversary.
section_title: S&T Has Identified Deficiencies That Could Delay or Prevent the Development of Standards for Some Container Security Technologies
paragraphs: The CSD project is expected to be completed on time, and MATTS is  slightly behind schedule, as performance standards are expected to be  delivered in December 2010 rather than fiscal year 2010. The ACSD project  is not currently being funded due to the deficiencies identified during  Phase I laboratory testing, although funding may resume if one of the  vendors demonstrates progress. The Hybrid Composite Container project  is undergoing contract negotiations to resume work on the composite  container after challenges were encountered with the vendor. Table 4  summarizes the status and expected completion date for each of S&T’s  container security technology projects.
In order for these container security technologies to provide the  functionality that DHS desires, they must interface with readers—both  handheld and fixed in place—that can use wireless communications to  send commands to or gather operational or intrusion alarm status  information from the technologies for CBP’s use. Readers also serve as a  means to arm and disarm ACSDs (including the sensor grid embedded in  the Hybrid Composite Container) and CSDs. Because ACSDs and CSDs are  mounted on the interior of a container in a manner that protects them  from being physically accessed from outside of a container, a remote,  wireless device such as a reader is needed to turn on the devices’ intrusion  detection functionality upon sealing the container (arming the device) and  to turn off the devices’ intrusion detection functionality when the  container is opened by authorized parties (disarming the device). A  handheld reader would also allow an official in close proximity to the  container to detect and read the ACSD or CSD to determine if the  container had been opened after it was sealed. In contrast, a fixed reader  has a longer range and would be designed to automatically relay such  status information to a centralized data center. ACSDs and CSDs must also  support an encryption scheme for two reasons. First, commands to disarm  a device must be encrypted to prevent unauthorized parties from  circumventing the device by disarming it. Second, status information that a  device sends may contain sensitive information, so status messages must  be encrypted to protect the information during wireless transmission.  Devices, such as handheld readers, would then be “trusted,” in that they  would have the ability to handle encrypted communications with ACSDs  and CSDs. Appendix II provides further information on the planned  communications system supporting ACSDs and CSDs.
subsections: section_title: S&T Halted ACSD Funding during Phase I Laboratory Testing Because of Performance Deficiencies
paragraphs: According to S&T, because of deficiencies observed in Phase I laboratory  testing, it is not currently funding the development of any vendor’s ACSD  prototype beyond Phase I laboratory testing. S&T officials added that L-3  Communications (L-3) and SAIC, the two vendors selected to participate  in Phase I laboratory testing, did not demonstrate enough progress  meeting the requirements. According to S&T and CSTE team officials,  meeting the requirements of the ACSD program, including detecting  intrusion on all six sides of a container, has proven to be very challenging.  According to S&T, it may resume funding for the development of the SAIC  ACSD if SAIC demonstrates sufficient improvement in its CSD, which uses  similar technology. If no ACSD is found to demonstrate enough progress  in meeting the requirements, performance standards will not be delivered  for this project. Table 5 summarizes the test results for the ACSDs.
During Phase I laboratory testing, conducted from April 2008 to September  2008, the L-3 ACSD prototype successfully detected container door  openings. However, it failed to identify preexisting holes in containers,  was unable to consistently detect wall intrusions in ideal (empty  container) conditions, and was largely unable to detect wall intrusions in a  loaded container. Consequently, the L-3 ACSD prototype failed the project  requirement that a device detect a hole in a container. According to S&T,  based on the conclusions of the CSTE Team, in October 2008, S&T  decided not to fund the L-3 ACSD for additional testing and evaluation.
During Phase I laboratory testing, conducted from April 2008 to June 2008,  the SAIC ACSD prototype detected door openings and closings, but it  generated a false alarm rate higher than that permitted by the ACSD  project requirements. Similar to the L-3 ACSD, in September 2008, the  CSTE team concluded the SAIC ACSD was deficient. S&T decided that no  further funding be provided to SAIC for the ACSD project. However,  according to S&T officials, SAIC’s ACSD prototype is closely related to  that of its CSD (see below), and therefore, if SAIC’s CSD demonstrates  improvement, S&T will consider funding SAIC’s ACSD for further tests and  evaluations.
section_title: CSD Performance Has Varied and S&T Anticipates One Vendor’s CSD Prototype Will Begin Phase II Trade Lane Testing
paragraphs: Performance of the two CSD prototypes varied during Phase I laboratory  testing and, according to the S&T program manager, Phase II trade lane  testing is expected to begin for one of the prototypes in late 2010. S&T  anticipates that Phase II trade lane testing will begin for the GTRI CSD in  September 2010. According to S&T officials, the SAIC CSD began another  round of Phase I laboratory testing in May 2010, but testing has since  ceased due to the high false alarm rate the device exhibited. The S&T  program manager expects to meet a November 1, 2010, due date for  completion of CSD performance standards for the Office of Policy  Development and CBP. Table 6 summarizes the test results for the CSDs.
While the GTRI CSD reliably and consistently detected container door  openings, minor deficiencies in environmental durability and physical  security were identified in the first set of Phase I laboratory testing. GTRI  responded to the identified deficiencies and submitted a revised prototype  for additional Phase I laboratory testing. According to the S&T program  manager, S&T determined that GTRI appropriately modified its prototype  to resolve the deficiencies identified in the last round of Phase I laboratory  testing, and S&T plans to include this device in Phase II trade lane testing  scheduled to begin in September 2010. The S&T program manager added  that during Phase II trade lane testing, the CSD will be installed on  containers that will travel from the Port of Shanghai, China, to Savannah,  Georgia. Figure 5 shows photographs of GTRI’s and SAIC’s CSDs, which  are mounted on the interior of cargo containers.
The SAIC CSD reliably and consistently detected door openings, but  frequent false alarms, deficiencies in the connections of electrical  components, and deficiencies in the device’s installation and mounting  system were identified during Phase I laboratory testing. According to  SAIC, it is adjusting the detection algorithms, which is expected to reduce  the device’s sensitivity to normal cargo shifting during transit in an effort  to reduce the device’s false alarm rate, and it expects to simplify the  installation procedure to address S&T’s concerns. According to the S&T  program manager, the new version of SAIC’s CSD was delivered to S&T in  May 2010 and during Phase I testing and evaluation it exhibited a high  false alarm rate.
section_title: The Hybrid Composite Container Project Has Demonstrated Potential, but S&T Terminated the Vendor’s Contract during Phase I Laboratory Testing Because of Internal Management Issues
paragraphs: According to S&T, it terminated MSC’s contract to build the composite  container for the Hybrid Composite Container Project in June 2010  because MSC was experiencing internal management issues that were  preventing the project from progressing. MSC had been building an ISO- compliant 20-foot shipping container made out of a composite fiber  material instead of steel. The container consists of 4-foot by 8-foot  corrugated, fiber-reinforced polymer panels welded to a steel frame. Five  of the panels are welded together to form a 20-foot container wall. The  container is 15 percent lighter than a steel container of the same size, and  according to an official at the University of Maine (a subcontractor to  MSC), it is expected to exhibit three to five times greater resistance to  corrosion than a steel container. Damaged panels must be replaced,  however, rather than repaired with a patch as can be done on a steel  container. The container incorporates an embedded sensor grid to provide  six-sided intrusion detection. In addition to the sensor grid, the composite  container is to use a CSD for door-opening detection. Finally, a  communications chip is integrated into the sensor grid to allow for  wireless communications with readers.
Previous test results of the composite container indicate that the container  would likely meet or exceed ISO standards and, therefore, be suitable for  use in international trade. S&T selected GTRI to develop a sensor grid that  could be embedded within the walls of the composite container to provide  intrusion detection capability. The sensor grid provides ACSD-like security  for the container in that a hole in the container wall would be detected by  the sensor grid triggering an alarm. However, one of the composite panels  with the embedded sensor grid failed durability testing conducted by the  vendor. Although development of the composite container has been  halted, S&T has directed GTRI to continue developing its sensor grid to  address this deficiency because S&T is exploring other contracting options  to continue the development of the composite container. According to  S&T, it anticipates that work on the composite container will resume in  September 2010.
section_title: Marine Asset Tag Tracking System Is Progressing to Phase II Trade Lane Testing
paragraphs: One vendor, iControl, Inc., is currently being supported by S&T to develop  MATTS, which includes the iTAG, a communications tag mounted on the  exterior of containers, and the iGATE, a remote reader used to  communicate with the iTAG. MATTS will participate in Phase II trade lane  testing with the GTRI CSD in September 2010. MATTS provides the  capability to globally track the location of containers. In addition, the  MATTS iTag provides a long-range wireless communications system for  CSD and ACSD devices. A CSD or ACSD device mounted on the interior  of a container has a short-range wireless communications system, but the  iTAG, when mounted outside of a container, can act as a relay to pass  messages from the CSD or ACSD to centralized locations at a designated  read point, such as a port of departure. The CSTE team conducted  limited Phase I laboratory testing of the iTAG, but it did not conduct all  needed laboratory testing because changes were still being made to the  iTAG. According to the S&T program manager, the iTAG will undergo all  required testing when it is produced in its final form.
While MATTS has not undergone DHS’s Phase II trade lane tests, iControl,  Inc., conducted two trade lane tests of MATTS beginning in 2007 and 2008.  During each of these trade lane tests, iControl, Inc., placed 100 iTAGs on  100 cargo containers and shipped them from the Port of Yokohama, Japan,  to the Port of Los Angeles. At the conclusion of these tests, 199 of the 200  MATTS iTAGs arrived at their destinations. However, the trade lane testing  identified deficiencies with iControl, Inc.’s MATTS iTAG. Specifically, 13  to 15 percent of the iTAGs sustained damage during the tests, including  loose connectors that affected the performance of the MATTS tags. In one  test, power management features did not function as intended, resulting in  battery usage in excess of that allowed by the project requirements.  During the trade lane tests, iControl, Inc., did not test MATTS in  conjunction with any ACSD or CSD prototypes. However, iControl, Inc.,  did test the environmental durability of the iTAG, as well as its power  management and container tracking capabilities. According to the S&T  program manager, the deficiencies identified in MATTS are being  addressed by iControl, Inc., and a new version of the iTAG, in conjunction  with the GTRI CSD device, will undergo Phase II trade lane testing from  the Port of Shanghai, China, to Savannah, Georgia, in September 2010. The  S&T program manager anticipates providing MATTS performance  standards to the Office of Policy Development and CBP in December 2010.  Figure 6 shows the MATTS tag mounted on a cargo container.
section_title: Testing All Operational Scenarios Would Enable S&T to Better Determine the Performance of Container Security Technologies in Their Intended Operational Environments
paragraphs: Before S&T can provide container security technology performance  standards to the Office of Policy Development and CBP, all technology  prototypes have to undergo Phase II trade lane testing, according to the  master test plans. According to S&T, the MATTS tag and GTRI’s CSD are  expected to undergo Phase II trade lane testing in September 2010.  However, S&T’s plans for conducting Phase II trade lane testing of these  container security technologies do not reflect all the operational scenarios  agreed upon within DHS for how the technologies could be implemented.  S&T’s master test plans define Phase II trade lane testing as 100 maritime  moves to a U.S. port. However, some of the operational scenarios being  considered for implementation by the Office of Policy Development and  CBP involve using technologies on cargo containers that would either not  be placed on a vessel, or only applied during overland shipping after their  arrival in the United States. Before S&T can provide performance  standards, per the technology transition agreements signed by S&T, the  Office of Policy Development, and CBP, the technologies are to have been  proven to work in their final form and under expected operational  conditions. DHS acknowledged that the testing is limited and that future  testing should reflect all the operational scenarios. Unless the container  security technologies are tested in all operational scenarios, the  performance standards that are delivered by S&T to the Office of Policy  Development and CBP may not fully meet DHS’s or CBP’s needs. Our prior  work has shown that when operational requirements are not established  prior to acquisition, it can negatively affect program performance.Conducting Phase II trade lane testing for the container security  technologies consistent with all operational scenarios would better  position S&T to determine if the technologies will be suitable for use in  their intended operational environments.
section_title: Key Steps and Challenges Remain before Implementation of Container Security Technologies Can Move Forward
paragraphs: If S&T determines that the container security technologies are mature  enough to provide performance standards for these technologies to the  Office of Policy Development and CBP, key steps and associated  challenges remain before DHS and CBP can implement the container  security technologies in the supply chain that meet those performance  standards. Based on our discussions with Office of Policy Development  and CBP officials, we identified three key steps that remain before  implementation can occur: (1) obtaining support from trade industry and  international partners, (2) developing a concept of operations (CONOPS)  that describes how the technologies are to be deployed, and (3) certifying  the technologies for use in the supply chain. According to Office of Policy  Development and CBP officials, they will take these steps if and when S&T  is able to provide performance standards. Our work indicates that the  Office of Policy Development and CBP could face challenges when  executing some of these steps.
subsections: section_title: Obtaining Trade Industry and International Partners’ Support to Implement Container Security Technologies Could Be Challenging
paragraphs: DHS could face challenges in obtaining support from the trade industry  and international partners as it pursues implementation of the container  security technologies. According to an Office of Policy Development  director, there are two approaches DHS could likely pursue to implement  container security technologies—mandatory or voluntary participation by  the trade industry. The director added that if DHS determines that the  universal use of container technologies would provide a worthwhile  security benefit, DHS would likely pursue a rulemaking approach to  mandate the use of the technologies on all U.S.-bound containers. If DHS  determines that the technologies would be primarily beneficial in a more  limited portion of the supply chain, though, it would work with the trade  industry to encourage voluntary use of the technologies. Some members of  the trade industry we spoke with were resistant to purchasing and using  the technologies given the number of container security programs they  already have to comply with. Representatives of the World Shipping  Council and both vessel carriers we spoke with questioned the role of  vessel carriers in implementation because of the uncertainties that  presently exist concerning how the technologies could be implemented  and which parties are to be involved. The representatives of the two vessel  carriers we spoke with expressed interest in purchasing the Hybrid  Composite Container because of the commercial benefit that could be  provided by its reduced weight, but they added that they are not interested  in spending additional money on the embedded sensor grid that is to  provide the security benefit. Further, the importers we spoke with  questioned their role and whether they have the authority to affix  technologies on containers they do not own, as the containers they use are  typically leased.
If CBP adopts a voluntary approach, it may also have challenges getting  support from C-TPAT members—its trusted private sector partners.  Container security technologies could provide security benefits in the  supply chain, but using technology that detects intrusion into a cargo  container when there is no assurance illicit materials or contraband were  not earlier introduced could give the false impression that the container is  secure or could have the effect of potentially locking dangerous or illicit  cargo in a container. Since C-TPAT members are committed to a  comprehensive security process, including procedures for securing  containers at the point of packing, they provide such assurance. According  to DHS’s 2007 Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain  Security, the department intended to use C-TPAT Tier III members to  implement commercially available container security devices that CBP  previously tested. However, C-TPAT Tier III members we spoke with were  resistant to the idea of having to purchase and use technologies, such as  the CSD and ACSD, on their containers to maintain their Tier III status. In  particular, some of the members stated that from a financial standpoint,  the additional benefit of reduced number of container inspections that  CBP provided to Tier III members over Tier II members, would not  outweigh the costs of using the technologies. As a result, they stated that  they would likely downgrade to Tier II status rather than have to purchase  the technologies. The C-TPAT Tier III members, as well as other trade  industry representatives we spoke with, said DHS should demonstrate,  through a risk-benefit analysis, that using the technologies would provide  a clear security benefit before making the use of such technologies a  requirement. CBP officials told us that they are aware that the trade  industry is generally not willing to spend money on container security  technologies and that C-TPAT members question whether the cost is  worth the benefit.
In addition to obtaining trade industry support, DHS will also need to  obtain support from international organizations and WCO to implement  the new container security technologies. In order for the container  security technologies to be admitted into foreign countries without being  subject to import duties and taxes, as well as import prohibitions and  restrictions, the technologies first have to be recognized as accessories  and equipment of the containers under the Customs Convention on  Containers. The convention essentially provides for the temporary  admission and reexportation of containers and their accessories and  equipment that meet certain requirements without the imposition of duties  or taxes by any customs authority. According to a WCO director, while an  individual device attached to a container most likely would be viewed as  an accessory to the container, if multiple devices are shipped in bulk for  reuse on other containers, the question of how to treat them for import  duty purposes would be more difficult. He also noted that, if requested by  a member country, WCO could provide an advisory opinion as to whether  the technologies should be treated as container accessories and equipment  pursuant to the Customs Convention on Containers, but the ultimate  decision as to whether to classify the technologies as exempt from import  duties and taxes resides with each individual foreign government.
Other options under consideration for how the container security  technologies are to be implemented would also require support from  foreign governments. CPB officials told us that they are considering  implementing the use of container security technologies in high-risk trade  lanes—trade routes that have been determined to pose the highest risk of  transporting threats to the United States. S&T officials stated that another  option would be to use the technologies on cargo containers departing  from ports participating in the Container Security Initiative. CBP officials  recognize that they will need to work with international partners, and plan  to do so when S&T provides performance standards.
section_title: Developing a Feasible Concept of Operations Could Prove Difficult
paragraphs: The successful implementation of container security technologies depends  on the security procedures throughout the supply chain as well as the  people engaged in those procedures. These procedures are typically  documented in a concept of operations (CONOPS)-—a user-oriented  document that describes how an asset is to be employed and supported  from the users’ viewpoint. A CONOPS also describes the operations that  must be performed, who must perform them, and where and how the  operations will be carried out. DHS and CBP could face challenges  developing a feasible CONOPS that addresses the necessary technology  infrastructure needs and protocols. Container security technologies  require a supporting technology infrastructure, including readers to  communicate to customs officials whether a technology has identified an  unauthorized intrusion, and a means to capture and store the data. CBP  will be faced with determining who will have access to the container  security technologies through readers, where to place these readers, and  obtaining permission to install fixed readers at both domestic and foreign  ports. Prior work we conducted on container scanning technologies  identified challenges in obtaining permission and space from terminal  operators at both domestic and foreign ports to install equipment.  Further, several pilots previously conducted to test the feasibility of using  container security technologies have also noted challenges with  establishing the reader infrastructure at ports. For example, during  Operation Safe Commerce, difficulties were encountered with the  installation and maintenance of fixed readers at both foreign and domestic  ports. Furthermore, several foreign ports did not allow installation of the  fixed readers, and problems were also encountered in installing and  maintaining power to fixed readers at domestic port facilities. In addition,  databases are needed to collect the data obtained by the readers from the  container security technologies. Pilots have also demonstrated the  challenges with establishing information systems to collect the data  provided by the technologies.
Establishing protocols regarding which supply chain participants will be  involved in arming and disarming the technologies, reading the status  messages generated by the technologies, responding to alarms, and  accessing data will also be important. For example, if the CONOPS calls  for technologies to first be affixed to a container at the point of packing, it  will require the packers to have the ability to first install and arm the  technologies. The packing of goods into cargo containers can be handled  by a number of different parties, including the shipper (i.e., seller), a third- party consolidator, or the buyer. Regardless of which party is packing the  container, these participants have the last visual check of the goods before  they are sealed for transport. At any point during the transfer of the  container from its packing point to the port of embarkation, foreign  customs may need to stop and open a container for inspection. In these  instances, it will be important to ensure foreign customs officials have the  ability to arm and disarm the technologies so they can open a container  without triggering the alarm. Response protocols will need to be  developed that include information on which parties are to respond to an  alarm and the associated processes for responding. While CBP would  likely respond to a container alarm by first scanning the container with NII  equipment to mitigate any potential danger to a CBP officer entering the  container to conduct a physical examination, CBP officers may not be  nearby when an alarm occurs, particularly if it occurs during a container’s  transport to a foreign port, at a non-Container Security Initiative port, or  while on a vessel in-transit. Furthermore, CBP will also need to consider  whether foreign governments’ customs agencies will be allowed access to  the data generated by the technologies on containers departing their  respective ports.
section_title: CBP Plans to Certify Technologies before They Can Be Used in the Supply Chain
paragraphs: Once a CONOPS is developed, certification testing can take place to  determine the suitability of technologies consistent with the CONOPS.  According to CBP officials, CBP plans to conduct certification testing to  demonstrate whether technology products meet the performance  standards issued by S&T and are suitable for implementation consistent  with its operational concept. CBP officials stated they would begin the  certification process by issuing a request for information seeking vendors  to submit technologies for certification testing. Interested container  security technology vendors would submit their products to CBP for  certification testing, which consists of a mix of laboratory and trade lane  testing to demonstrate whether the products meet the performance  standards. According to CBP officials, they would determine a means to  select vendor products for testing and then establish detailed methods to  test and evaluate the technology products submitted by the vendors.
Office of Policy Development and CBP officials we spoke with anticipate  certification testing would take approximately 3 to 4 months. The officials  added that in advance of the testing, preparation time is needed to solicit  participants from the trade industry and select trade lanes for testing.  After conducting the tests, additional time will be needed to analyze the  results to determine if the vendor’s technology product will function as  intended in the supply chain. If a technology product successfully  completes certification testing, DHS will certify it as meeting its standards  and the trade industry would be able to purchase it for use in the supply  chain. Technologies that are successful during certification testing are  expected to be implemented in the supply chain, according to an Office of  Policy Development director. Figure 7 shows the process of developing an  approved products list.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Container security technologies have the potential to contribute to CBP’s  layered security strategy by tracking containers, and detecting and  reporting intrusions, while containers move through the supply chain. S&T  has made progress in testing and evaluating certain container security  technologies, and continues to work with vendors to develop these  technologies, but challenges continue in finding technologies that can  provide intrusion detection through any of the six sides of a container. The  ACSD project is not currently being funded due to the deficiencies  identified during Phase I laboratory testing and the Hybrid Composite  Container project is undergoing contract negotiations to resume work on  the composite container after challenges were encountered with the  vendor. In contrast, the CSD and MATTS projects—which will provide  intrusion detection through container doors and a communications  system, respectively—are nearing their completion and S&T expects to  deliver performance standards to the Office of Policy Development and  CBP by the end of 2010. Before delivering the performance standards, S&T  must demonstrate that these container security technologies can work in  the operational environments in which they are intended to be used.  However, the operational environment testing that S&T plans to conduct is  limited to the maritime environment and does not fully address the  operational scenarios being considered by the Office of Policy  Development and CBP. Until all intended operational scenarios are tested,  S&T cannot provide reasonable assurance that the container security  technologies would effectively function in all the operational scenarios  identified by the Office of Policy Development and CBP for potential  implementation. Conducting Phase II trade lane testing for the container  security technologies in all intended operational scenarios would better  position S&T to determine if the technologies will be suitable for use in  their intended operational environments.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that the container security technologies being developed  will function in their intended operational environments, we recommend  that the Secretary of Homeland Security instruct the Assistant Secretary of  the Office of Policy, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border  Protection, and the Under Secretary of the Science and Technology  Directorate, to test and evaluate the container security technologies  consistent with all of the operational scenarios DHS identified for  potential implementation, before S&T provides performance standards to  the Office of Policy Development and CBP.
section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided draft copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland  Security, Energy, and Defense for review and comments. DOE and DOD  did not provide official written comments to include in the report. DHS  provided official written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III.  DHS concurred with our recommendation. In addition, DHS and CBP  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In  response to DHS’s technical comments and subsequent discussion with  agency officials, we modified our recommendation to clarify its intent that  DHS test and evaluate container security technologies consistent with all  of the operational scenarios it has identified for potential implementation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland  Security, Energy, and Defense; and interested congressional committees.  In addition, the report will be available on GAO’s Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or Timothy M. Persons at  (202) 512-6412, or by e-mail at caldwells@gao.gov or personst@gao.gov,  respectively. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and  Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key  contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Vendors Selected to Participate in Container Security Technology Projects
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on how the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate selected  vendors to participate in the four container security technology projects.  S&T used a multiple-round process to select vendors’ technologies for  development. Several vendors responded to S&T’s 2004 broad agency  announcement (BAA) for the Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD)  project and 2003 small business innovative research (SBIR) solicitation for  the Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS). Respondents’ technology  proposals were evaluated on their ability to meet the project requirements,  and those considered to be viable were selected by S&T to participate in  Round I. S&T selected vendors for subsequent rounds of development  based on vendor performance and proposals. Vendor selection for the  Container Security Device (CSD) project was based on the performance of  prototypes during Round I of the ACSD project. Similarly, selection for the  Hybrid Composite Container project was based on performance in the  ACSD project. Table 7 provides information on the vendors selected to  participate in each of the projects and the funds provided to the vendors.
section_title: Appendix II: Description of Container Security Technologies’ Communications Systems
paragraphs: Appendix II provides information on the communications system used to  support container security technologies. Because ACSDs (including the  sensor grid embedded in the Hybrid Composite Container) and CSDs are  mounted inside of a container without a physical connection accessible  from the outside of a closed container, a wireless communications system  is to facilitate the remote arming (activating the intrusion detection  capabilities) and disarming (deactivating the intrusion detection) of the  ACSDs or CSDs. Furthermore, the communications system is to allow U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) remote access to status  information from an ACSD or CSD, including information about the health  of the device and whether the device had detected an intrusion.
ACSDs and CSDs are intended to be a single component of a larger  Security Device System, which may also include the following components  (see fig. 8):    Communications Modules (CM): These devices are mounted on the  exterior of a container. A CM is to relay status information from an  ACSD or CSD to a fixed status reader using radio frequency (RF) at 2.4  GHz or cellular communications. iControl, Inc. is developing a device  known as the iTAG under the MATTS project to serve as a CM.
Fixed status readers: These devices are to receive status information  from ACSDs or CSDs located within 100 feet of the reader (or status  updates relayed by a CM) and relay that status information using a  variety of methods, such as RF, cellular, or Ethernet access, to a  centralized data center. iControl, Inc., is developing a device known as  the iGATE under the MATTS project to serve as a fixed status reader.
Handheld readers: These are to be used by CBP or other authorized  parties to receive status information from ACSDs or CSDs located  within 10 feet of the reader.
Centralized data centers: These centers are to receive status  information from CMs and readers and allow CBP or other authorized  parties to remotely monitor status information from all ACSDs and  CSDs in the area served by the data center.
ACSDs and CSDs should be able to communicate to a reader with or  without the use of a CM. If no CM is mounted with an ACSD or CSD, the  ACSD or CSD can communicate—by means of short-range RF at 2.4 GHz  using communications capabilities on the ACSD or CSD itself—intrusion  alerts and periodic general status updates to a fixed status reader located  within 100 feet of the monitored container or to a handheld reader located  within 10 feet of the monitored container. If a CM is associated with an  ACSD or CSD, the ACSD or CSD can use short-range RF communications  to relay messages through its CM to a more remote reader. If an ACSD or  CSD needs to send status information to the data center while out of range  of a reader, the external CM can attempt to relay the information through  other CMs mounted on nearby containers until a reader is in range. This  relayed communications process is known as “meshing.” Similarly, if a  reader is unable to communicate to the data center, it may attempt to pass  messages to other nearby readers until communication with the data  center is achieved.
Secure data generated by the ACSDs and CSDs are to be protected by  translating the data into an unreadable form using a code (encryption).  This encryption is to occur directly on the ACSDs and CSDs to avoid  possible interception of confidential information transmitted during  normal operation. Transmitted information includes security-related  information used by CBP to determine the status of a container, but it may  also include proprietary shipping information used by carriers or shippers  (although such information must be encrypted separately). The encryption  scheme also allows remote disarming of the devices (arming need not be  done with an encrypted command), as only those devices with the  encryption key will be capable of sending commands that the ACSDs or  CSDs will recognize. The ACSDs, CSDs, handheld readers, and data  centers (but not the fixed readers, as they are unattended and insecure)  will be provided with the encryption key, allowing these components of  the Security Device System to exchange information in a secure manner.
Communication of status information to remote readers for transfer to a  data center is to occur, at minimum, at all points where reading is  specified by DHS. These read points include the point of packing, the  entrance gate at the port of departure, the exit gate at the port of arrival,  and the entrance gate at the point of deconsolidation (where a container is  unpacked). Communications should be designed in a nonproprietary  format designed specifically for this application. This standard ensures  that a Security Device System is permissible under all necessary  international communications standards.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contacts named above, Christopher Conrad and Richard  Hung, Assistant Directors, and Lisa Canini, Analyst-in-Charge, managed  this review. Leah Anderson, Alana Finley, Scott Fletcher, Adam Mirvis, and  Matthew Tabbert made significant contributions to the work. In addition,  Stanley Kostyla assisted with design and methodology; Frances Cook  provided legal support; Katherine Davis and Lara Miklozek provided  assistance in report preparation; and Pille Anvelt and Avy Ashery helped  develop the report’s graphics.
section_title: Glossary
paragraphs: The terms below are defined for the purposes of this GAO report.
The freight (goods or products) carried by a vessel, barge, train, truck, or  plane.
Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
A CONOPS is a user-oriented document that describes how an asset,  system, or capability will be employed and supported from the users’  viewpoint. A CONOPS also describes the operations that must be  performed, who must perform them, and where and how the operations  will be carried out.
The party who packs the container or arranges for the packing of the  container.
A box made of aluminum, steel, or fiberglass used to transport cargo by  ship, rail, truck, or barge. Common dimensions are about 20 feet x 8 feet x  8 feet (called a TEU, or 20-foot-equivalent unit) or about 40 feet x 8 feet x 8  feet.
Government agency charged with enforcing the laws and rules passed to  enforce the country’s import and export revenues. In the United States  these responsibilities are handled by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
The person who prepares the needed documentation for importing goods  (just as a freight forwarder does for exports). In the United States, the  broker is licensed under federal regulations to act on behalf of others in  conducting transactions related to federal import and export  requirements.
A person or company that is responsible for the sending of goods out of  one country to another.
An individual or company that prepares the documentation and  coordinates the movement and storage of export cargoes. See also  customs broker.
A person or company that brings in goods from a foreign country.
A one-way trip through the supply chain from stuffing to U.S. port of  arrival on an ocean-going vessel.
Using technologies to scan the contents of a container without opening the  container.
A non-vessel operating common carrier buys space aboard a ship to get a  lower volume rate and then sells that space to various small shippers,  consolidates their freight, issues bills of lading, and books space aboard a  ship.
Requirements that must be met by products to ensure they will function as  intended.
The opening of a container and removal of its contents for inspection.
The likelihood that a device will properly alarm when in the armed mode.
The likelihood that a device will improperly alarm, when in the armed  mode, due to environmental conditions or conditions other than opening  or removing the door(s).
A functional preproduction version of a new type of product.
Red teaming is performed from the perspective of an attacker with  malevolent intentions, to identify and exploit weaknesses in a technology.  The results of these tests allow for a better understanding of the risk  associated with the corresponding device or system.
Nonintrusively inspecting the contents of a container using technologies.
Assessing the security risk posed by a container based on available  information.
The person or company that is usually the supplier or owner of  commodities shipped.
The international network of retailers, distributors, transporters, storage  facilities and suppliers that participate in the sale, delivery, and production  of goods.
A sea route ordinarily used by vessels.
Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit (TEU)
A unit of measurement equal to the space occupied by a standard 20-foot  container. Used in stating the capacity of container vessel or storage area.  One 40-foot container is equal to 2 TEUs.
An entity that develops container security technology prototypes.
A ship or large boat.
Any person or entity who, in a contract of carriage, undertakes to perform  or to procure the performance of carriage by sea.
Includes, among other things, a list of cargo being carried by the vessel.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port  Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not  Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or  Closed Identified Gaps. GAO-10-883T. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would  Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the  Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12.  Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced  Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show  Limits of the New Technology. GAO-09-655. Washington, D.C.: May 21,  2009.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Phase 3 Test Report on Advanced  Portal Monitors Does Not Fully Disclose the Limitations of the Test  Results. GAO-08-979. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to  Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but  Challenges Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2008   Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.- Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign  Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance  Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One  Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Maritime Security: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the SAFE Port  Act. GAO-08-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our  Nation’s Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the In-Bond Cargo System  Impede Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Address Revenue,  Trade, and Security Concerns. GAO-07-561. Washington, D.C.: April 17,  2007.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.  GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment  Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection  Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in  Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign  Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.