Wildland Fire Management: Agencies Have Made Several Key Changes but Could Benefit from More Information about Effectiveness
Published: 2015-09-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Wildland fire plays an important ecological role in maintaining healthy ecosystems. Over the past century, however, various land management practices, including fire suppression, have disrupted the normal frequency of fires and have contributed to larger and more severe wildland fires. Wildland fires cost billions to fight each year, result in loss of life, and cause damage to homes and infrastructure. In fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the five federal wildland fire agencies obligated a total of $8.3 billion to suppress wildland fires.
GAO was asked to review multiple aspects of federal wildland fire management across the five federal wildland fire management agencies. This report examines (1) key changes the federal wildland fire agencies have made in their approach to wildland fire management since 2009, (2) how the agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs, and (3) how the agencies determine the distribution of their wildland fire management resources. GAO reviewed laws, policies, and guidance related to wildland fire management; reviewed agency performance measures; analyzed obligation data for fiscal years 2004 through 2014; and interviewed officials from the five agencies, as well as Interior's Office of Wildland Fire.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Since 2009, the five federal agencies responsible for wildland fire management—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in the Department of the Interior—have made several key changes in their approach to wildland fire management. One key change was the issuance of agency guidance in 2009 that provided managers with more flexibility in responding to wildland fires. This change allowed managers to consider different options for response given land management objectives and the risk posed by the fire. The agencies also worked with nonfederal partners to develop a strategy aimed at coordinating wildland fire management activities around common goals. The extent to which the agencies' steps have resulted in on-the-ground changes varied across agencies and regions, however, and officials identified factors, such as proximity to populated areas, that may limit their implementation of some changes.
The agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs in several ways, including through performance measures and reviews of specific wildland fires. The agencies are developing new performance measures, in part to help better assess the results of their current emphasis on risk-based management, according to agency officials. However, the agencies have not consistently followed agency policy regarding fire reviews, which calls for reviews of all fires resulting in federal suppression expenditures of $10 million or more, nor have they used specific criteria for the reviews they have conducted. GAO has previously found that it is important for agencies to collect performance information to inform key management decisions and to identify problems and take corrective actions. Forest Service and Interior officials said focusing only on suppression costs does not allow them to identify the most useful fires for review, and they told GAO they are working to improve their criteria for selecting fires to review and conducting these reviews. Forest Service officials did not indicate a time frame for their efforts, and while they provided a draft update of their policy manual, it did not contain specific criteria. Interior officials told GAO they expect to develop criteria by the end of 2015, but did not provide information about how they planned to develop such criteria or the factors they would consider. By developing specific criteria for selecting fires to review and conducting reviews, and making commensurate changes to agency policies, the agencies may enhance their ability to help ensure that their fire reviews provide useful information about the effectiveness of their wildland fire activities.
The Forest Service and Interior determine the distribution of fire management resources for three primary wildland fire activities of suppression, preparedness, and fuel reduction in part on the basis of historical funding amounts. For suppression, the Forest Service and Interior manage suppression funding as needed for responding to wildland fires, estimating required resources using the average of the previous 10 years of suppression obligations. For preparedness and fuel reduction, the Forest Service and Interior distribute resources based primarily on historical amounts. Both are working to distribute resources in ways that better reflect current conditions, including developing new systems that they stated they plan to begin using in fiscal year 2016.
section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the agencies develop specific criteria for selecting wildland fires for review and conducting the reviews, and revise agency policies accordingly. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Wildland fire plays an important ecological role in maintaining healthy  ecosystems, with many ecosystems being adapted to or dependent upon  fire. However, over the past century, various land management practices,  including fire suppression, have disrupted the normal frequency of fires in  many forest and rangeland ecosystems across the United States,  resulting in abnormally dense accumulations of vegetation. According to  scientific reports, this altered landscape, combined with drought and other  climate stressors, has contributed to larger and more severe wildland  fires, and many scientists and researchers expect fires to become even  larger and more severe in the future. In addition, continued development  occurring in and around wildlands, an area often called the wildland-urban  interface (WUI), has placed more people, businesses, and other valuable  infrastructure at risk from wildland fire. Wildland fires cost billions of  dollars every year and have resulted in loss of life, both of residents as  well as firefighters, and damage to homes and infrastructure. Wildland  fires have also destroyed or damaged important cultural resources and  critical natural resources, such as watersheds that provide drinking water  to communities.
Five federal agencies—the Forest Service within the Department of  Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land  Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park  Service (NPS) within the Department of the Interior—are responsible for  managing wildland fires on federal lands. State forestry agencies and  other entities—including tribal, county, city, and rural fire departments— have primary responsibility for managing wildland fires on nonfederal  lands and share responsibility for protecting homes and other private  structures.
As noted in the 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review, an interagency report  prepared for the federal wildland fire agencies, balancing the need to  suppress unwanted wildland fires to protect people and resources with  the need to recognize fire’s natural role on the landscape is a complex  task. In recent decades, increased wildland fire intensity has placed  greater demands on federal wildland fire management programs and  prompted new policies and efforts aimed at implementing more effective  management strategies to manage wildland fire. These efforts take on  greater importance in light of constrained budgets and the amount spent  by federal agencies on wildland fire management; in fiscal years 2009  through 2014, for example, federal agencies reported obligating a total of  $8.3 billion to suppress wildland fires. According to several agency  reports, given the current condition of the nation’s landscapes and the  future outlook for wildland fires, increasing demands on federal wildland  fire management programs are likely to persist.
The five agencies’ wildland fire management efforts have undergone  multiple reviews, including by us and the Offices of Inspector General for  Agriculture and Interior, to assess whether federal wildland fire activities  and policies are appropriate and are being carried out in a cost-effective  manner. We last conducted a comprehensive review of federal wildland  fire management in 2009. The resulting report provided an overview of  the agencies’ efforts to address wildland fire issues, including the  progress the agencies had made in managing wildland fire.
You asked us to review multiple aspects of federal wildland fire  management across the five federal land management agencies  responsible for wildland fire management. This report examines (1) key  changes the federal wildland fire agencies have made in their approach to  wildland fire management since 2009, (2) how the agencies assess the  effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs, and (3) how  the agencies determine the distribution of their wildland fire management  resources.
To perform this work, we reviewed laws, policies, and guidance related to  federal wildland fire management. We also interviewed headquarters  officials from each of the five federal land management agencies  responsible for wildland fire management (the Forest Service, BIA, BLM,  FWS, and NPS), as well as Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire. We also  conducted interviews of officials from each of the 9 Forest Service  regional offices and 11 of BLM’s 12 state offices, as well as from  selected BIA, FWS, and NPS regions. We focused these regional  interviews primarily on the Forest Service and BLM because those  agencies receive the greatest percentage of federal wildland fire funding.  For BIA, FWS, and NPS, we selected the two regions from each agency  that received the most funds—BIA’s Northwest and Western Regions,  FWS’s Southwest and Southeast Regions, and NPS’s Pacific West and  Intermountain Regions. During these interviews, we asked about changes  to the agencies’ approach to wildland fire management, agency efforts to  assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management activities, and  agency processes for determining the distribution of fire management  resources.
To address our first objective, we reviewed agency documents, including  policies, guidance, and reports such as the Quadrennial Fire Review, to  identify changes the agencies have made to their approach to managing  wildland fire since 2009, efforts the agencies have undertaken to address  wildland fire management challenges, and any agency-identified  improvements resulting from those changes. To further our understanding  of these issues, we interviewed agency headquarters and regional  officials about these changes. In particular, we asked about the extent to  which changes to the agencies’ wildland fire management approaches  have occurred or are planned and how the regions implemented national  direction and policy. We analyzed the responses provided to us during  the interviews to identify prominent changes since 2009 and challenges  associated with implementing them.
To address our second objective, we reviewed documents, such as  agency strategic plans and budget justifications, and interviewed officials  to identify key performance measures and other mechanisms the  agencies use to determine the effectiveness of their wildland fire  management programs, as well as any changes they are making in this  area. We also reviewed legislative and agency direction related to fire  reviews, including agency policies and the Interagency Standards for Fire  and Fire Aviation Operations, and we reviewed reports resulting from fire  reviews conducted by the agencies since 2009. We compared agency  practices for conducting fire reviews to direction contained in relevant  agency policy. To obtain additional insight into the use of performance  information on the part of federal agencies, we also reviewed our  previous reports related to agencies’ use of performance information.
To address our third objective, we reviewed relevant agency budget  documentation, including annual budget justifications, as well as  information about the tools and systems the agencies use to distribute  funds and resources, to identify the agencies’ distribution processes. We  did not assess the design or the use of these tools or systems. We  interviewed agency officials about their agencies’ processes for budget  formulation and resource distribution, including any differences among  agencies or regional offices in how funds and resources are distributed,  as well as the extent to which distribution decisions have changed in  recent years at the headquarters and regional levels for each of the five  agencies. We also obtained and analyzed Forest Service and Interior  data on wildland fire management obligations for fiscal years 2004  through 2014, analyzing the data in both nominal (actual) and constant  (adjusted for inflation) terms. We reviewed budget documents and  obligation data provided by the agencies and interviewed agency officials  knowledgeable about the data, and we found the data to be sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. Unless otherwise noted, dollar  figures provided in this report represent obligations reported to us by the  agencies and are presented in nominal dollars, unadjusted for inflation.  Appendix I describes our objectives, scope, and methodology in more  detail.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to September  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Wildland fires are both natural and inevitable and play an important  ecological role on the nation’s landscapes. These fires have long shaped  the composition of forests and grasslands, periodically reduced  vegetation densities, and stimulated seedling regeneration and growth in  some species. Wildland fires can be ignited by lightning or by humans  either accidentally or intentionally. As we have described in previous  reports, however, various land use and management practices over the  past century—including fire suppression, grazing, and timber  harvesting—have reduced the normal frequency of fires in many forest  and rangeland ecosystems. These practices contributed to abnormally  dense, continuous accumulations of vegetation, which in turn can fuel  uncharacteristically severe wildland fires in certain ecosystems.
According to scientific reports, several other factors have contributed to  overall changes to ecosystems and the landscapes on which they  depend, altering natural fire regimes and contributing to an increased  frequency or intensity of wildland fire in some areas. For example, the  introduction and spread of highly flammable invasive nonnative grasses,  such as cheatgrass, along with the expanded range of certain flammable  native species, such as western juniper, in the Great Basin region of the  western United States—including portions of California, Idaho, Nevada,  Oregon, and Utah— have increased the frequency and intensity of fire in  the sagebrush steppe ecosystem. Changing climate conditions,  including drier conditions in certain parts of the country, have increased  the length and severity of wildfire seasons, according to many scientists  and researchers. For example, in the western United States, the  average number of days in the fire season has increased from  approximately 200 in 1980 to approximately 300 in 2013, according to the  2014 Quadrennial Fire Review. In Texas and Oklahoma this increase  was even greater, with the average fire season increasing from fewer  than 100 days to more than 300 during this time. According to the U.S.  Global Change Research Program’s 2014 National Climate Assessment,  projected climate changes suggest that western forests in the United  States will be increasingly affected by large and intense fires that occur  more frequently. Figure 1 shows the wildfire hazard potential across the  country as of 2014.
In addition, development in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) has  continued to increase over the last several decades, increasing wildland  fire’s risk to life and property. According to the 2014 Quadrennial Fire  Review, 60 percent of new homes built in the United States since 1990  were built in the WUI, and the WUI includes 46 million single-family  homes and an estimated population of more than 120 million. In addition  to increased residential development, other types of infrastructure are  located in the WUI, including power lines, campgrounds and other  recreational facilities, communication towers, oil and gas wells, and  roads. Some states, such as New Mexico and Wyoming, have  experienced significant increases in oil and gas development over the  past decade, adding to the infrastructure agencies may need to protect.
subsections: section_title: Primary Federal Land Management Agencies with Wildland Fire Management Responsibilities
paragraphs: Under the National Forest Management Act and the Federal Land Policy  and Management Act of 1976, respectively, the Forest Service and BLM  manage their lands for multiple uses such as protection of fish and wildlife  habitat, forage for livestock, recreation, timber harvesting, and energy  production. FWS and NPS manage federal lands under legislation that  primarily calls for conservation; management for activities such as  harvesting timber for commercial use is generally precluded. BIA is  responsible for the administration and management of lands held in trust  by the United States for Indian tribes, individuals, and Alaska Natives.  These five agencies manage about 700 million surface acres of land in  the United States, including national forests and grasslands, national  wildlife refuges, national parks, and Indian reservations. The Forest  Service and BLM manage the majority of these lands. The Forest Service  manages about 190 million acres; BLM manages about 250 million acres;  and BIA, FWS, and NPS manage 55, 89, and 80 million acres,  respectively. Figure 2 shows the lands managed by each of these five  agencies.
Severe wildland fires and the vegetation that fuels them may cross the  administrative boundaries of the individual federal land management  agencies or the boundaries between federal and nonfederal lands. State  forestry agencies and other entities—including tribal, county, city, and  rural fire departments—share responsibility for protecting homes and  other private structures and have primary responsibility for managing  wildland fires on nonfederal lands. Most of the increased development in  the WUI occurs on nonfederal lands, and approximately 70,000  communities nationwide are considered to be at high risk from wildland  fire. Some of these communities have attempted to reduce risk of  wildland fire through programs aimed at improving fire risk awareness  and promoting steps to reduce their risk, such as the Firewise  Communities program.
section_title: Key Components of Wildland Fire Management
paragraphs: Wildland fire management consists of three primary components:  preparedness, suppression, and fuel reduction.
Preparedness. To prepare for a wildland fire season, the five land  management agencies acquire firefighting assets—including  firefighters, fire engines, aircraft, and other equipment—and station  them either at individual federal land management units or at  centralized dispatch locations in advance of expected wildland fire  activity. The primary purpose of acquiring these assets is to respond  to fires before they become large—a response referred to as initial  attack. The agencies fund the assets used for initial attack primarily  from their wildland fire preparedness accounts.
Suppression. When a fire starts, interagency policy calls for the  agencies to consider land management objectives—identified in land  and fire management plans developed by each land management  unit—and the structures and resources at risk when determining  whether or how to suppress the fire. A wide spectrum of strategies is  available to choose from, and the land manager at the affected local  unit is responsible for determining which strategy to use—from  conducting all-out suppression efforts to monitoring fires within  predetermined areas in order to provide natural resource benefits.  When a fire is reported, the agencies are to follow a principle of  closest available resource, meaning that, regardless of jurisdiction,  the closest available firefighting equipment and personnel respond. In  instances when fires escape initial attack and grow large, the  agencies respond using an interagency system that mobilizes  additional firefighting assets from federal, state, and local agencies,  as well as private contractors, regardless of which agency or agencies  have jurisdiction over the burning lands. The agencies use an incident  management system under which specialized teams are mobilized to  respond to wildland fires, with the size and composition of the team  determined by the complexity of the fire. Federal agencies typically  fund the costs of these activities from their wildland fire suppression  accounts.
Fuel reduction. Fuel reduction refers to agencies’ efforts to reduce  potentially hazardous vegetation that can fuel fires, such as brush and  “ladder fuels” (i.e., small trees and other vegetation that can carry fire  vertically to taller vegetation such as large trees), in an effort to  reduce the potential for severe wildland fires, lessen the damage  caused by fires, limit the spread of flammable invasive species, and  restore and maintain healthy ecosystems. The agencies use  multiple approaches for reducing this vegetation, including setting  fires under controlled conditions (prescribed burns), mechanical  thinning, herbicides, certain grazing methods, or combinations of  these and other approaches. The agencies typically fund these  activities from their fuel reduction accounts.
Risk is an inherent element of wildland fire management. Federal  agencies acknowledge this risk, and agency policies emphasize the  importance of managing their programs accordingly. For example, Forest  Service guidance states that “the wildland fire management environment  is complex and possesses inherent hazards that can—even with  reasonable mitigation—result in harm.” According to a 2013 Forest  Service report on decision making for wildfires, risk management is to be  applied at all levels of wildfire decision making, from the individual  firefighter on the ground facing changing environmental conditions to  national leaders of the fire management agencies weighing limited  budgets against increasingly active fire seasons. For example, the  report explains that, during individual wildland fires, risk can be defined as  “a function of values, hazards, and probability.”
section_title: Funding for Federal Wildland Fire Management
paragraphs: Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, federal agency  officials, and others have raised questions about the growing cost of  federal wildland fire management. According to a 2015 report by Forest  Service researchers, for example, the amount the Forest Service spends  on wildland fire management has increased from 17 percent of the  agency’s total funds in 1995 to 51 percent of funds in 2014. The report  noted that this has come at the cost of other land management programs  within the agency, such as vegetation and watershed management, some  of which support activities intended to reduce future wildfire damage.  From fiscal years 2004 through 2014, the Forest Service and Interior  agencies obligated $14.9 billion for suppression, $13.4 billion for  preparedness, and $5.7 billion for fuel reduction. Figure 3 shows the  agencies’ total obligations for these three components of wildland fire  management for fiscal years 2004 through 2014.
After receiving its annual appropriation, the Forest Service allocates  preparedness and fuel reduction funds to its nine regional offices, and  those offices in turn allocate funds to individual field units (national forests  and grasslands). Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire, upon receiving its  annual appropriation, allocates preparedness and fuel reduction funds to  BIA, BLM, FWS, and NPS. These agencies then allocate funds to their  regional or state offices, which in turn allocate funds to individual field  units (e.g. national parks or national wildlife refuges). The Forest Service  and Interior agencies do not allocate suppression funding to their regions.  These funds are managed at the national level.
section_title: Federal Wildland Fire Policy History
paragraphs: Federal wildland fire management policy has evolved over the past  century in response to changing landscape conditions and greater  recognition of fire’s role in maintaining resilient and healthy ecosystems.  According to wildland fire historians, in the late 1800s and early 1900s,  the nation experienced a series of large and devastating fires that burned  millions of acres, including highly valued timber stands. In May 1908,  federal legislation authorized the Forest Service to use any of its  appropriations to fight fires. During the following decades, the Forest  Service and Interior agencies generally took the view that fires were  damaging and should be suppressed quickly, with policies and practices  evolving gradually. For example, in 1935, the Forest Service issued the  “10 a.m. policy,” which stated that whenever possible, every fire should  be contained by 10 a.m. on the day after it was reported. In more remote  areas, suppression policies had minimal effect until fire towers, lookout  systems, and roads in the 1930s facilitated fire detection and fire  deployment. The use of aircraft to drop fire retardants—that is,  chemicals designed to slow fire growth—began in the 1950s, according to  agency documents. Subsequent to the introduction of the 10 a.m. policy,  some changes to agency policies lessened the emphasis on suppressing  all fires, as some federal land managers took note of the unintended  consequences of suppression and took steps to address those effects. In  1943, for example, the Chief of the Forest Service permitted national  forests to use prescribed fire to reduce fuels on a case-by-case basis. In  1968, NPS revised its fire policy, shifting its approach from suppressing  all fires to managing fire by using prescribed burning and allowing fires  started by lightning to burn in an effort to accomplish approved  management objectives. In 1978, the Forest Service revised its policy to  allow naturally ignited fires to burn in some cases, and formally  abandoned the 10 a.m. policy.
Two particularly significant fire events—the Yellowstone Fires of 1988, in  which approximately 1.3 million acres burned, and the South Canyon Fire  of 1994, in which 14 firefighters lost their lives—led the agencies to  fundamentally reassess their approach to wildland fire management and  develop the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy of 1995. Under the  1995 policy, the agencies continued to move away from their emphasis  on suppressing every wildland fire, seeking instead to (1) make  communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by  wildland fire and (2) respond to fires so as to protect communities and  important resources at risk while considering both the cost and long-term  effects of that response. The policy was reaffirmed and updated in 2001,  and guidance for its implementation was issued in 2003 and 2009.
In 2000, after one of the worst wildland fire seasons in 50 years, the  President asked the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to submit a  report on managing the impact of wildland fires on communities and the  environment. The report, along with congressional approval of increased  appropriations for wildland fire management for fiscal year 2001, as well  as other related activities, formed the basis of what is known as the  National Fire Plan. The National Fire Plan emphasized the importance of  reducing the buildup of hazardous vegetation that fuels severe fires,  stating that unless hazardous fuels are reduced, the number of severe  wildland fires and the costs associated with suppressing them would  continue to increase. In 2003, Congress passed the Healthy Forests  Restoration Act, with the stated purpose of, among other things, reducing  wildland fire risk to communities, municipal water supplies, and other at- risk federal land through a collaborative process of planning, setting  priorities for, and implementing fuel reduction projects.
Along with the development of policies governing their responses to fire,  the agencies developed a basic operational framework within which they  manage wildland fire incidents. For example, to respond to wildland fires  affecting both federal and nonfederal jurisdictions, firefighting entities in  the United States have, since the 1970s, used an interagency incident  management system. This system provides an organizational structure  that expands to meet a fire’s complexity and demands, and allows entities  to share firefighting personnel, aircraft, and equipment. Incident  commanders who manage the response to each wildland fire may order  firefighting assets through a three-tiered system of local, regional, and  national dispatch centers. Federal, tribal, state, and local entities and  private contractors supply the firefighting personnel, aircraft, equipment,  and supplies which are dispatched through these centers. The agencies  continue to use this framework as part of their approach to wildland fire  management.
section_title: Agencies Have Made Several Key Changes in Their Approach to Wildland Fire Management Since 2009
paragraphs: Since 2009, the five federal agencies have made several changes in their  approach to wildland fire management. The agencies have issued fire  management guidance which, among other things, gave their managers  greater flexibility in responding to wildland fires by providing for responses  other than full suppression of fires. In collaboration with nonfederal  partners such as tribal and state governments, they have also developed  a strategy aimed at coordinating federal and nonfederal wildland fire  management activities around common goals, such as managing  landscapes for resilience to fire-related disturbances. In addition, Interior,  and BLM in particular, have placed a greater emphasis on wildland fire  management efforts in the sagebrush steppe ecosystem by issuing  guidance and developing strategies aimed at improving the condition of  this landscape. The agencies have also taken steps to change other  aspects of wildland fire management, including changes related to  improving fire management technology, line officer training, and firefighter  safety. Agency officials told us the agencies are moving toward a more  risk-based approach to wildland fire management. The extent to which  the agencies’ actions have resulted in on-the-ground changes varied  across agencies and regions, however, and officials identified factors,  such as proximity to populated areas, that may limit their implementation  of some of these actions.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Issued Guidance That Provided Greater Flexibility in Responding to Wildland Fire
paragraphs: The agencies have increased their emphasis on using wildland fire to  provide natural resource benefits rather than seeking to suppress all fires,  in particular through issuing the 2009 Guidance for Implementation of  Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. Compared with interagency  guidance issued in 2003, the 2009 guidance provided greater flexibility to  managers in responding to wildland fire to achieve natural resource  benefits for forests and grasslands, such as reducing vegetation densities  and stimulating regeneration and growth in some species. The 2003  guidance stated that only one “management objective” could be applied  to a single wildland fire—meaning that wildland fires could either be  managed to meet suppression objectives or managed for continued  burning to provide natural resource benefits, but not both. The 2003  guidance also restricted a manager’s ability to switch between full  suppression and management for natural resource benefits, even when  fire conditions changed. In contrast, under the 2009 interagency  guidance, managers may manage individual fires for multiple objectives,  and may change the management objectives on a fire as it spreads  across the landscape. For example, managers may simultaneously  attempt to suppress part of a fire that is threatening infrastructure or  valuable resources while allowing other parts of the same fire to burn to  achieve desired natural resource benefits. According to agency  documents, the 2009 guidance was intended to reduce barriers to risk- informed decision making, allowing the response to be more  commensurate with the risk posed by the fire, the resources to be  protected, and the agencies’ land management objectives.
However, agency officials varied in their opinions about the extent to  which this guidance changed their management practices, with some  telling us it marked a departure from their past practices, and others  telling us it did not significantly change the way they managed wildland  fire. Several headquarters and regional agency officials told us the  guidance improved managers’ ability to address natural resource needs  when managing a fire, rather than simply suppressing all fires. For  example, BIA officials told us that the flexibility provided through the  guidance allowed managers on the San Carlos Apache Reservation in  southeastern Arizona to use a variety of management strategies to  manage the 2014 Skunk Fire. According to a BIA fire ecologist, managers  were able to maximize firefighter safety while fostering desirable  ecological benefits, including helping to restore the historical fire regime  to the area. In addition, Forest Service officials from several regions,  including the Rocky Mountain and Intermountain Regions, told us they  have used the full range of management options in the guidance more  frequently over the last 5 years, and they credited the 2009 guidance for  giving them the ability to manage fires and their associated risks. For  example, during the 2011 Duckett Fire on the Pike-San Isabel National  Forests in Colorado, managers attempted to contain part of the fire to  protect a subdivision while allowing the portion of the fire uphill from the  subdivision to burn into wilderness. Officials told us that, prior to the 2009  guidance, they would likely have responded to this fire by attempting full  suppression, which could have put firefighters at risk at the upper part of  the fire because of the steep and rugged terrain.
In contrast, other officials told us the effect of the guidance was minimal  because certain factors—including proximity to populated areas, size of  the land management unit, and concerns about resources necessary to  monitor fires—limit their ability to manage wildland fire incidents for  anything other than suppression. For example, Forest Service officials  from the Eastern Region told us that they try to use fire to provide natural  resource benefits where possible, but they have fewer opportunities for  doing so because of the smaller size of Forest Service land units in this  region, which makes it more likely the fires will cross into nonfederal land,  and their proximity to many areas of WUI. Similarly, Forest Service  officials from the Pacific Southwest Region told us they are limited in  using the added flexibility provided through the 2009 interagency  guidance in Southern California, in part because the forests there are so  close to major cities. However, in other more remote areas of California,  these officials said they have managed wildland fires concurrently for one  or more objectives, and objectives can change as the fire spreads across  the landscape. Officials from BLM’s Utah State Office also told us that  their changed landscape is a limiting factor in responding to wildland fire.  Specifically, cheatgrass, a nonnative, highly flammable grass, has  replaced much of the native vegetation of the sagebrush steppe  ecosystem that used to exist on the lands they manage in western Utah.  As a result, introducing fire into this area could be detrimental rather than  helpful because cheatgrass’s flammability makes fires difficult to control.
Several officials also told us that managing wildland fires for objectives  beyond full suppression, as provided for in the 2009 guidance, is highly  dependent on circumstance. Officials told us that allowing fires to burn  requires the agencies to devote assets to monitoring the fires to prevent  them from escaping, which—especially for long-duration fires—can  reduce the assets available to respond to other fires that may occur. For  example, in 2012, in response to what it predicted to be an expensive and  above-normal fire season, the Forest Service issued guidance to its  regions limiting the use of any strategy other than full suppression (i.e.,  any strategy that involved allowing fires to burn for natural resource  benefits) for the remainder of that year. The Forest Service noted that it  was issuing this guidance because of concerns about committing the  assets necessary to monitor long-duration fires that were allowed to burn  in order to provide natural resource benefits. In 2015, during the Thunder  Creek fire in North Cascades National Park, concerns about the  resources needed to monitor the fire if it were allowed to burn to provide  natural resource benefits led NPS managers instead to order full  suppression efforts to help ensure that the resources would be available  for other fires. In a press release about the fire, NPS noted that experts  anticipated a very high potential for wildfire in 2015, leading to agency  concerns that significant fire activity throughout the west could leave few  available firefighting resources later in the season.
section_title: Agencies Made Changes Intended to Formalize Collaboration with Nonfederal Partners
paragraphs: Another change since 2009 was the completion in 2014 of the National  Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy (Cohesive Strategy),  developed in collaboration with partners from multiple jurisdictions (i.e.,  tribal, state, and local governments, nongovernmental partners, and  public stakeholders) and aimed at coordinating wildland fire management  activities around common wildland fire management goals. The  agencies have a long history of collaboration with nonfederal partners in  various aspects of wildland fire management, including mobilizing  firefighting resources during wildland fire incidents and conducting fuel  reduction projects across jurisdictions. The Cohesive Strategy is  intended to set broad, strategic, nationwide direction for such  collaboration.
Specifically, the Cohesive Strategy provides a nationwide framework  designed to more fully integrate fire management efforts across  jurisdictions, manage risks, and protect firefighters, property, and  landscapes by setting “broad, strategic, and national-level direction as a  foundation for implementing actions and activities across the nation.”  The vision of the Cohesive Strategy is “to safely and effectively extinguish  fire, when needed; use fire where allowable; manage our natural  resources; and as a nation, live with wildland fire.” The Cohesive Strategy  identified three goals: (1) landscapes across all jurisdictions are resilient  to fire-related disturbances in accordance with management objectives;  (2) human populations and infrastructure can withstand wildfire without  loss of life or property; and (3) all jurisdictions participate in developing  and implementing safe, effective, and efficient risk-based wildfire  management decisions. According to a senior Forest Service official, the  Wildland Fire Leadership Council is responsible for providing a national,  intergovernmental platform for implementing the strategy. In September  2014, an interim National Cohesive Strategy Implementation Task Group  completed an implementation framework that included potential roles,  responsibilities, and membership for a “national strategic committee” that  is intended to provide oversight and leadership on implementing the  strategy.
Agency officials differed in the extent to which they viewed the Cohesive  Strategy as having a significant effect on their wildland fire management  activities. On the one hand, several headquarters and regional agency  officials told us the Cohesive Strategy has improved wildland fire  management. For example, Forest Service officials from the Southern  Region told us the Cohesive Strategy has reinforced existing work that  better enabled them to collaborate on new projects, which they told us is  important because nearly 85 percent of the land base in the region is  privately owned, and little could be achieved without collaboration. Forest  Service officials cited one instance in which they signed a regional level  agreement that will cover several state chapters of The Nature  Conservancy to exchange resources for fuel reduction treatment and to  promote public understanding of its benefits—an action they said was  supported by the Cohesive Strategy. Similarly, Forest Service officials  from the Intermountain Region told us about several efforts that have  been implemented across their region that they attribute to the Cohesive  Strategy. For example, in 2014, the Forest Service, the state of Utah, and  other stakeholders collaborated on the implementation of Utah’s  Catastrophic Wildfire Reduction Strategy, which aims to identify where  fuel treatment across the state would be most beneficial. In contrast,  many officials told us they have collaborated with partners for years and  did not find the additional direction provided through the Cohesive  Strategy to be much different than how they already operated. For  example, several regional BLM, FWS, and NPS officials told us they have  long worked with nonfederal partners on issues related to wildland fire  management and that the Cohesive Strategy did not change those  relationships.
However, implementation of collaborative actions stemming from the  Cohesive Strategy may be limited by such factors as differences in laws  and policies among federal, tribal, state, and local agencies. For example,  while the 2009 federal interagency guidance provided federal managers  with additional flexibility in managing a single fire for multiple purposes,  laws and regulations at the state and local levels typically require full  suppression of all fires, according to the 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review.  For example, according to California state law, state forest officials in  California are “charged with the duty of preventing and extinguishing  forest fires.”
section_title: Increased Emphasis by Interior on the Sagebrush Steppe Ecosystem
paragraphs: Since 2009, Interior and BLM have placed a greater emphasis on  wildland fire management, restoration, and protection related to the  sagebrush steppe ecosystem—particularly with respect to habitat for the  greater sage-grouse. Several changes, including urbanization and  increased infrastructure built in support of various activities (e.g., roads  and power lines associated with oil, gas, or renewable energy projects),  have altered the sagebrush steppe ecosystem in the Great Basin region  of the western United States. In addition, the introduction and spread of  highly flammable invasive nonnative grasses such as cheatgrass have  altered this ecosystem by increasing the frequency and intensity of fire.  As of July 2015, FWS was evaluating whether to list the greater sage- grouse, a species reliant on the sagebrush steppe ecosystem, as a  threatened and endangered species under the Endangered Species  Act. FWS has noted the importance of fire and fuel management  activities in reducing the threat to sage-grouse habitat. Beginning in  2011, BLM issued guidance to its state offices emphasizing the  importance of sage-grouse habitat in fire operations and the need for fuel  reduction activities to address concerns about the habitat, more than half  of which is located on BLM-managed lands. In 2014, the agency issued  guidance reiterating this importance and stating that it would make  changes in funding to allow field units to place greater focus on reducing  fire’s threats in sage-grouse habitat areas.
In January 2015, the Secretary of the Interior issued a Secretarial Order  to enhance policies and strategies “for preventing and suppressing  rangeland fire and for restoring sagebrush landscapes impacted by fire  across the West.” The order established the Rangeland Fire Task Force  and directed it to, among other things, complete a report on activities to  be implemented ahead of the 2016 Western fire season. Under the order,  the task force also was to address longer term actions to implement the  policy and strategy set forth by the order. In a report issued in May 2015,  An Integrated Rangeland Fire Management Strategy, the task force called  for prepositioning firefighting assets where priority sage-grouse habitat  exists, including moving assets from other parts of the country as  available. The goal is to improve preparedness and suppression  capability during initial stages of a wildfire to increase the chances of  keeping fires small and reduce the loss of sage-grouse habitat.
The report also identified actions aimed at improving the targeting of fuel  reduction activities, including identifying priority landscapes and fuel  management priorities within those landscapes. These actions are to be  completed by the end of September 2015 and continuously improved  upon in subsequent years. According to BLM state officials, the increased  emphasis on sage-grouse habitat will significantly change how they  manage their fuel reduction programs. BLM officials from states that  include sage-grouse habitat said they expect a large increase in fuel  reduction treatment funding and increased project approvals. In contrast,  BLM officials from states without this habitat told us they expect  significant funding decreases, limiting their capacity to address other  resource issues important for nonsagebrush ecosystems.
section_title: Agencies Made Additional Changes in Other Areas of Wildland Fire Management
paragraphs: Since 2009, the agencies also have taken steps to change other areas of  wildland fire management, including technology for wildland fire planning  and response, line-officer training, and firefighter safety.
subsections: section_title: Working to Improve Technology for Wildland Fire Planning and Response
paragraphs: Since 2009, the agencies have applied new technologies to improve  wildland fire management planning and response. Prominent among  them is the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS), a Web- based decision-support tool that assists fire managers and analysts in  making strategic and tactical decisions for fire incidents. WFDSS replaced  older tools, some of which had been used for more than 30 years and  were not meeting current fire management needs, according to the  system’s website. According to this site, WFDSS has several  advantages over the older systems, such as enabling spatial data  layering, increasing use of map displays, preloading information about  field units’ management objectives, and allowing for use in both single  and multiple fire situations. Officials from several agencies told us that  using WFDSS improved their ability to manage fires by allowing  information from fire management plans to be loaded into WFDSS and  providing substantial real-time fire information on which to make  decisions. For example, one Forest Service official told us that, at one  point in a recent particularly active fire season in the Pacific Northwest  Region, the system processed information on approximately 20  concurrent fires that managers could monitor in real time. As a result,  they were able to make strategic and risk-informed decisions about the  resource allocations needed for each fire, including decisions to let some  fires burn to meet natural resource benefit objectives. According to Forest  Service reviews of several fires that occurred in 2012, however, some  managers said WFDSS did not provide effective decision support for  firefighters because the system underestimated fire behavior or did not  have current information.
According to officials from several agencies, another example of updated  wildland fire technology has been the replacement of traditional paper- based fire management plans with electronic geospatial-based plans.  Federal wildland fire management policy directs each agency to develop  a fire management plan for all areas they manage with burnable  vegetation. A fire management plan, among other things, identifies fire  management goals for different parts of a field unit. According to an  interagency document describing geospatial-based plans, agency officials  expect such plans to increase efficiency because the plans can more  easily be updated to account for changes in the landscape resulting from  fires, fuel reduction treatments, and other management activities. In  addition, the electronic format is designed to allow plans to more easily be  shared across multiple users, including personnel responding to wildland  fires. Agency officials mentioned other technological improvements, such  as the development of an “Enterprise Geospatial Portal” providing  wildland fire data in geospatial form using a Web-based platform,  although many officials also told us that additional improvements are  needed in wildland fire technology overall.
In addition to specific technologies, in 2012 the Forest Service and  Interior issued a report titled “Wildland Fire Information and Technology:  Strategy, Governance, and Investments,” representing the agencies’  efforts to develop a common wildland fire information and technology  vision and strategy. The agencies signed a Memorandum of  Understanding later that same year intended to establish a common  management approach for information and technology services.  Nevertheless, the 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review concluded that the  wildland fire management community does not have an agenda for  innovation and technology adoption or a list of priorities, stating that the  wildland fire community “sometimes struggles to define common  technology priorities and implement integrated, enterprise-level solutions”  and noting that there are more than 400 information technology systems  in use by the wildland fire community. The report provides  recommendations on actions the agencies could consider for  improvement; however, because it was issued in May 2015, it is too early  to determine what, if any, actions the agencies have taken. In  commenting on a draft of this report, Interior stated that the agencies are  completing an investment strategy for wildland fire applications and  supporting infrastructure, but did not provide an expected date for its  completion.
section_title: Increasing Line-Officer Training
paragraphs: Officials from several agencies told us that, since 2009, the agencies  have increased training efforts, particularly those aimed at improving line  officers’ knowledge about, and response to, wildland fires. Line officers  are land unit managers such as national forest supervisors, BLM district  managers, and national park superintendents. During a wildland fire, staff  from “incident management teams” with specific wildland firefighting and  management training manage the response, and line officers associated  with the land unit where the fire is occurring must approve major  decisions that incident management teams make during the response.  Officials at BLM’s Oregon/Washington State Office, for example, told us  they provide line officers with day-long simulation exercises, as well as  shadowing opportunities that give line officers experience on actual  wildland fires. Beginning in 2007, the Forest Service initiated a Line  Officer Certification Program and began a coaching and mentoring  program to provide on-the-ground experience for preparing line officers to  act as agency administrators during wildland fires or other critical  incidents. This program is aimed at providing officials that do not have  wildland fire experience the opportunity to work under the advisement of a  coach with wildland fire experience. According to Forest Service  documents, this program has evolved substantially, in part to address the  increased demand for skills necessary to manage increasingly complex  wildland fires. In May 2015, the Forest Service issued guidance for the  program and called for each Forest Service regional office to administer it  within the regions.
section_title: Emphasizing the Primacy of Firefighter Safety
paragraphs: Officials told us that, since 2009, the agencies have, in some cases,  changed firefighting tactics to better protect firefighters, including making  greater use of natural barriers to contain fire instead of attacking fires  directly. The agencies have also issued additional guidance aimed at  emphasizing the primacy of firefighter safety. In 2010, the agencies  developed and issued the “Dutch Creek Protocol” (named after a wildland  fire where a firefighter died), which provided a standard set of protocols  for wildland firefighting teams to follow during an emergency medical  response or when removing and transporting personnel from a location  on a fire. Both the Forest Service and Interior have also issued agency  direction stating that firefighter safety should be the priority of every fire  manager.
section_title: Agencies Assess Effectiveness of Their Programs in Several Ways, but Have Not Consistently Conducted Reviews That Could Improve Responses to Wildland Fires
paragraphs: The agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management  programs in several ways, including through performance measures,  efforts to assess specific activities, and reviews of specific wildland fire  incidents. Both the Forest Service and Interior are developing new  performance measures and evaluations, in part to help better assess the  results of their current emphasis on risk-based management, according to  agency officials. In addition, the agencies have undertaken multiple  efforts, such as studies, to assess the effectiveness of activities including  fuel reduction treatments and aerial firefighting. The agencies also  conduct reviews of their responses to wildland fires. However, they have  not consistently followed agency policy in doing so or used specific  criteria for selecting the fires they have reviewed, limiting their ability to  help ensure that their fire reviews provide useful information and  meaningful results.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Use Various Performance Measures to Assess Wildland Fire Management
paragraphs: Both the Forest Service and Interior use various performance measures,  such as the number of WUI acres treated to reduce fuels and the  percentage of wildland fires contained during initial attack, to assess their  wildland fire management effectiveness. These measures are reported in,  among other things, the agencies’ annual congressional budget  justifications. Officials from both the Forest Service and Interior told us  their performance measures need improvement to more appropriately  reflect their approach to wildland fire management and, in June 2015,  officials from both agencies told us that they were working to improve  them. For example, several performance measures for both agencies use  a “stratified cost index” to help analyze suppression costs on wildfires.  The index is based on a model that compares the suppression costs of  fires that have similar characteristics, such as fire size, fuel types, and  proximity to communities, and identifies the percentage of fires with  suppression costs that exceeded the index. We found in a June 2007  report, however, that the index was not entirely reliable and that using the  index as the basis for comparison may not allow the agencies to  accurately identify fires where more, or more-expensive, resources than  needed were used. The agencies continue to use the index, but have  acknowledged its shortcomings. The Forest Service reported in its fiscal  year 2016 budget justification to Congress that improvements were  forthcoming. In April 2015, Forest Service officials told us they have  incorporated detailed geospatial information into the model on which the  index is based to help yield more accurate predictions of suppression  expenditures and have submitted the model for peer review. Once that is  complete, the agencies plan to begin to implement the updated model,  but officials did not provide a time frame for doing so.
Both agencies have also made efforts to improve their performance  measures to better reflect their emphasis on a risk-based approach to  wildland fire management. In fiscal year 2014, Interior began using a new  performance measure intended to better reflect a variety of strategies in  addition to full suppression: “Percent of wildfires on DOI-managed  landscapes where the initial strategy (ies) fully succeeded during the  initial response phase.” The same year, the Forest Service began  developing a performance measure intended to reflect that, in some  cases, allowing naturally-ignited fires to burn can provide natural resource  benefits at a lower cost and lower risk to personnel than fully suppressing  the fire as quickly as possible: “Percent of acres burned by natural ignition  with resource benefits.” Forest Service officials told us they are working  with field units to evaluate whether this measure will effectively assess  their efforts to implement a risk-based approach to fire management and  that they will adjust it as needed. The officials told us they plan to finalize  the measure and use it in 2017.
Also, in fiscal year 2014, the Forest Service began developing a  performance measure that would assess the risk that wildland fire  presents to highly valued resources such as communities and  watersheds. This measure is known as the “National Forest System  wildfire risk index.” According to the agency’s fiscal year 2016 budget  justification, it would create an index of relative fire risk based on the  likelihood of a large fire affecting these highly valued resources. It may  also incorporate factors measuring the relative importance of these  resources and the expected effects that might occur from fire. The Forest  Service plans to establish a national baseline measure for this index in  2015 and then periodically remeasure it, likely every 2 years, to determine  if overall risk has been reduced, according to Forest Service officials.  Changes that could affect the index include those resulting from fuel  reduction treatments, wildland fire, forest management activities,  vegetative growth, and increased WUI development, among others,  according to the agency’s 2016 budget justification. As with the  performance measure described above, agency officials told us they will  evaluate whether the measure meets their needs before adopting it; if it  meets their needs, they plan to finalize the measure and use it in 2017.
section_title: Agencies Have Undertaken Multiple Efforts to Assess Effectiveness of Specific Activities
paragraphs: The agencies have also undertaken multiple efforts to assess the  effectiveness of particular activities, such as fuel reduction and aerial  firefighting. Regarding fuel reduction activities, we found in September  2007 and September 2009 that demonstrating the effectiveness of fuel  reduction treatments is inherently complex and that the agencies did not  have sufficient information to evaluate fuel treatment effectiveness, such  as the extent to which treatments changed fire behavior. Without such  information, we concluded that the agencies could not ensure that fuel  reduction funds were directed to the areas where they can best minimize  risk to communities and natural and cultural resources. Accordingly, we  recommended that the agencies take actions to develop additional  information on fuel treatment effectiveness. While the agencies took  steps to address this recommendation, they are continuing efforts to  improve their understanding of fuel treatment effectiveness. For example,  the Forest Service and Interior agencies use a system called Fuel  Treatment Effectiveness Monitoring to document and assess fuel  reduction treatment effectiveness. The Forest Service began requiring  such assessments in 2011 and Interior requested such assessments be  completed starting in 2012. Under this approach, the agencies are to  complete a monitoring report whenever a wildfire interacts with a fuel  treatment and enter the information into the system. Officials told us that  additional efforts are under way to help understand other aspects of fuel  treatment effectiveness. For example, in February 2015, the Joint Fire  Science Program completed its strategy to implement the 2014 Fuel  Treatment Science Plan. It includes as one of its goals the  “development of measures/metrics of effectiveness that incorporate  ecological, social, resilience, and resource management objectives at the  regional and national level.”
The Forest Service and Interior are also implementing an effort known as  the Aerial Firefighting Use and Effectiveness Study, begun in 2012 to  address concerns about limited performance information regarding the  use of firefighting aircraft. As part of this effort, the agencies are collecting  information on how aerial retardant and suppressant delivery affects fire  behavior and plan to use this and other collected information to track the  performance of specific aircraft types, according to the study website.  This will help the agencies identify ways to improve their current fleet of  aircraft and inform future aerial firefighting operations and aviation  strategic planning, according to the website. Agency officials told us the  study is not a one-time activity, but is an ongoing effort to continually  provide information to help improve their use of firefighting resources.
section_title: Forest Service and Interior Agencies Have Not Consistently Conducted Reviews of Wildland Fire Incidents to Assess their Effectiveness
paragraphs: The Forest Service and the Interior agencies have conducted reviews to  assess their effectiveness in responding to wildland fires but have not  consistently followed agency policy in doing so and did not always use  specific criteria for selecting the fires they have reviewed. Officials from  both the Forest Service and Interior told us that current agency policy  regarding fire reviews overly emphasizes the cost of wildland fire  suppression rather than the effectiveness of their response to fire.  However, the agencies have neither updated their policies to better reflect  their emphasis on effectiveness nor established specific criteria for  selecting fires for review and conducting the reviews. By developing such  criteria, the agencies may enhance their ability to obtain useful,  comparable information about their effectiveness in responding to  wildland fires, which, in turn, may help them identify needed  improvements in their wildland fire approach.
Congressional reports and agency policy have generally called for the  agencies to review their responses to wildland fires involving federal  expenditures of $10 million or more. For fiscal years 2003 through 2010,  congressional committee reports directed the Forest Service and Interior  to conduct reviews of large fire incidents, generally for the purpose of  understanding how to better contain suppression costs; beginning in fiscal  year 2006, these reports included a cost threshold, specifying that such  reviews be conducted for fires involving federal expenditures of  $10 million or more. The agencies, in turn, have each developed their  own policies that generally direct them to review each fire that exceeds  the $10 million threshold.
The agencies, however, have not consistently conducted reviews of fire  incidents meeting the $10 million threshold, in part because, according to  officials, current agency policy that includes the $10 million threshold  does not reflect the agencies’ focus on assessing the effectiveness of  their response to fire. However, the agencies have not developed specific  criteria for selecting fire incidents for review. Forest Service officials told  us that, rather than selecting all fires with federal expenditures of  $10 million or more, they changed their approach to selecting fires to  review. These officials told us that focusing exclusively on suppression  costs when selecting fires limits the agency in choosing those fires where  it can obtain important information and best assess management actions  and ensure they are appropriate, risk-based, and effective. Forest Service  officials told us the agency judgmentally selects incidents to review based  on a range of broad criteria, such as complexity and national significance,  taking into account political, social, natural resource, or policy concerns.  Using these broad selection criteria, the Forest Service reviewed 5  wildland fires that occurred in 2012 and 10 that occurred in 2013.  However, with these broad criteria it is not clear why the Forest Service  selected those particular fires and not others. For example, the 2013 Rim  Fire, which cost over $100 million to suppress—by far the costliest fire to  suppress that year—and burned over 250,000 acres of land, was not  among the 2013 fires selected for review. Moreover, the reviews  completed for each of those years did not use consistent or specific  criteria for conducting the reviews. As of July 2015, the agency had not  selected the fires it will review from the 2014 wildland fire season and,  when asked, agency officials did not indicate a time frame for doing so.
Forest Service officials told us they believe it is appropriate to  judgmentally select fires to provide them flexibility in identifying which  fires to review and which elements of the fire response to analyze.  Nevertheless, Forest Service officials also acknowledged the need to  develop more specific criteria for selecting fires to review and conducting  the reviews and, in July 2015, told us they are working to update their  criteria for doing so. They provided us a draft update of the Forest Service  policy manual, but this draft did not contain specific criteria for selecting  fires for review or conducting the reviews. Moreover, officials did not  provide a time frame for completing their update.
Within Interior, BLM officials told us BLM completed its last fire review  based on significant cost (i.e., federal expenditures of $10 million or  more) in 2013. These officials told us that BLM, similar to the Forest  Service, plans to shift the emphasis of its fire reviews to evaluate  management actions rather than focusing on cost, and that officials are  working to determine criteria for selecting fires for review. Interior  headquarters officials told us that FWS and NPS have continued to follow  the direction provided through their policies regarding reviews of fires that  met the $10 million threshold. Interior headquarters officials, however,  acknowledged the need to improve Interior’s approach to selecting fires  for review to focus more on information about decision making rather than  fire costs. In July 2015, the officials told us they plan to develop criteria  other than cost for use by all Interior agencies in selecting fires to review,  and that they plan to develop standard criteria for implementing the  reviews. They stated that they expect this department-wide effort to be  completed by the end of calendar year 2015 but did not provide  information about how they planned to develop such criteria or the factors  they would consider.
Agency reports have likewise cited the need to improve both the  processes for selecting fires for review and the implementation of the  reviews. A 2010 report, for example, noted the importance of improving  the selection of fires to review and stated that the agencies would benefit  from a more productive review strategy. The report said the agencies’  existing approach to conducting reviews tended to produce isolated  efforts and unrelated recommendations rather than establishing a  consistent foundation for continuous improvement. A 2013 report  assessing the usefulness of the Forest Service’s five reviews of 2012 fires  noted shortcomings in consistency across the reviews, including unclear  criteria for selecting fires and conducting reviews, as well as limitations in  the specificity of the resulting reports and recommendations. As noted,  both agencies have acknowledged the need to improve their criteria for  selecting fires to review and conducting the reviews. By developing  specific criteria in agency policies for selecting fires for review and  conducting the reviews, the agencies may enhance their ability to help  ensure that their fire reviews provide useful information and meaningful  results. This is consistent with our previous body of work on performance  management, which has shown that it is important for agencies to collect  performance information to inform key management decisions, such as  how to identify problems and take corrective actions and how to identify  and share effective approaches. By collecting such performance  information, the agencies may be better positioned to identify needed  improvements in their wildland fire approach and thereby use their limited  resources more effectively.
section_title: Agencies Distribute Resources in Part on the Basis of Historical Amounts, but Are Developing New Methods Intended to Better Reflect Current Conditions
paragraphs: The Forest Service and Interior determine the distribution of fire  management resources in part on the basis of historical amounts but are  developing new methods intended to better reflect current conditions. For  suppression, the Forest Service and Interior manage funding as needed  for units to respond to individual wildland fires. For preparedness, the  Forest Service and Interior distribute resources based, in part on  historical funding levels generated by an obsolete system. The agencies  are working to replace the system and develop new tools to help them  distribute resources to reflect current landscape conditions, values at  risk, and the probability of wildland fire. For fuel reduction, until recently,  the Forest Service and Interior both distributed funds using the same  system. In 2014, the Forest Service began using a new system to help it  distribute fuel reduction funding in ways that better reflect current  conditions. Interior is working to develop a system that likewise reflects  current conditions.
subsections: section_title: Agencies Fund Suppression as Needed for Responding to Wildland Fires
paragraphs: The agencies manage funding for suppression at the national level as  needed for field units to respond to individual wildland fires. The overall  amount of suppression funding the agencies obligate is determined by the  complexity and number of wildland fire responses over the course of the  fiscal year and can vary considerably from year to year. For example,  federal agencies obligated approximately $1.7 billion for suppression in  fiscal year 2006, $809 million in fiscal year 2010, and $1.9 billion in fiscal  year 2012. (See app. II for more detailed information about suppression  obligations by the Forest Service and the Interior agencies for fiscal years  2004 through 2014.)
Each year, the agencies estimate the expected level of funding for  suppression activities using the average of the previous 10 years of  suppression obligations. The estimated amount, however, has often  been less than the agencies’ actual suppression obligations, particularly  for the Forest Service. In all but 2 years since 2000, Forest Service  suppression obligations have exceeded the 10-year average that forms  the basis of the agency’s annual appropriation. To pay for wildfire  suppression activities when obligations are greater than the amount  appropriated for suppression, the Forest Service and Interior may transfer  funds from other programs within their respective agencies as permitted  by law. As we found in a prior report, these transfers can affect the  agencies’ ability to carry out other important land management functions  that are key to meeting their missions, such as restoration of forest lands  and other improvements. For example, according to a Forest Service  report, funding transfers led to a canceled fuel reduction project on the  Sante Fe National Forest and the deferral of critical habitat acquisition on  the Cibola National Forest, both located in New Mexico.
In their annual budget justifications for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the  agencies proposed an alternative mechanism to fund suppression  activities. Under that proposal, the agencies would receive 70 percent of  the standard 10-year average of suppression obligations as their  appropriation for wildland fire suppression, which reflects the amount the  agencies spend to suppress approximately 99 percent of wildland fires.  If suppression obligations exceed this amount, additional funds would be  made available from a disaster funding account. Forest Service and  Interior officials told us this proposal would allow them to better account  for the variable nature of wildland fire seasons and reduce or eliminate  the need to transfer funds from other accounts to pay for suppression. In  addition, legislation pending in Congress would change how certain  wildland fire suppression operations are funded.
section_title: Forest Service and Interior Distribute Preparedness Funding Based in Part on an Obsolete System They Are Working to Replace
paragraphs: The Forest Service and Interior distribute preparedness funding to their  regions and agencies, respectively, based in part on information  generated from a system that is now obsolete. The agencies attempted to  develop a new system to distribute preparedness funding, but ended that  effort in 2014 and are now working to develop different tools and systems.  In distributing preparedness funds to individual forests, some Forest  Service regions have developed additional tools to help them distribute  funds; similarly, three of the four Interior agencies have developed  additional tools to help them distribute preparedness funds to their  regions. Overall preparedness obligations in 2014 totaled about  $1.0 billion for the Forest Service and about $274 million for the Interior  agencies. (See app. II for detailed information on each of the agencies’  obligations for preparedness for fiscal years 2004 through 2014.)
subsections: section_title: Forest Service and Interior Distribution of Preparedness Funds to Regions and Agencies
paragraphs: To determine the distribution of preparedness funds from Forest Service  headquarters to its regions, and from Interior to the department’s four  agencies with wildland fire management responsibilities, the Forest  Service and Interior rely primarily on amounts that are based on results  from a budgeting system known as the National Fire Management  Analysis System (NFMAS). That system, however, was terminated in  the early 2000s, according to agency officials. Relying on the results from  the last year NFMAS was used, and making only incremental changes  from year to year, the Forest Service and Interior have not made  significant shifts in the funding distribution across their respective regions  and agencies over time, and they have generally maintained the same  number and configuration of firefighting assets (e.g., fire engines and  crews) in the same geographic areas from year to year. Several agency  officials, however, told us that these amounts no longer reflect current  conditions, in part because of changes to the landscape resulting from  increased human development, climate change, and changes to land  management policies that consider natural resource values differently  than they did when NFMAS was in use.
Beginning in 2002, the agencies attempted to replace NFMAS with an  interagency system designed to help them determine the optimal mix and  location of firefighting assets and distribute funds accordingly. In  developing this system, known as the Fire Program Analysis system, the  agencies’ goal was to develop “a comprehensive interagency process for  fire planning and budget analysis identifying cost-effective programs to  achieve the full range of fire management goals and objectives.”  According to agency documents, this effort proved problematic because  of the difficulty in modeling various aspects of wildland fire management.  In addition, agency officials told us it is difficult to design a system that  could account for multiple agencies’ different needs and varying missions.  After more than a decade of work, and investment that Forest Service  officials estimated at approximately $50 million, the agencies terminated  the system’s development in September 2014. At that time, they stated  that it “only delivered inconsistent and unacceptable results.”
Since the termination of the Fire Program Analysis system, the agencies  have continued to rely on results based on the terminated NFMAS, but  have begun working on new tools to help them distribute funding and  assets based on current conditions and updated information. Forest  Service headquarters officials told us the agency is developing a new tool  called the Wildland Fire Investment Portfolio System. According to these  officials, this proposed system is intended to model scenarios such as  large shifts in firefighting assets, various potential dispatch procedures,  and changes in fire behavior due to climate change, which will allow  managers, both at the national and individual unit level, to conduct  resource trade-off analyses and assess whether assets are being used  effectively. Forest Service officials told us that the agency is in the early  stages of developing this proposed system and anticipates using it for  planning and analysis purposes in fiscal year 2016.
Interior documents state that Interior is developing a system called the  Risk-Based Wildland Fire Management model, which Interior will use to  help support funding distribution decisions to the four Interior agencies for  both preparedness and fuel reduction. The proposed system will assess  the probability and likely intensity of wildland fire, values at risk, and the  expected value of acres likely to burn. A key element of this system will  be the development of strategic business plans by each of the four  Interior agencies, detailing how each agency intends to distribute its  preparedness and fuel reduction funding to reduce the risks from wildland  fire on its lands. Interior officials said that, once the agencies provide  these business plans, Interior will assess them in making funding  distribution decisions among the agencies. According to several Interior  agency officials, identifying priority values at risk across Interior’s four  agencies may be challenging given the variation in agency missions and  the types of lands they manage. For example, a threatened species  located primarily on BLM lands may be among BLM’s highest priorities,  but a forested area relied upon by an Indian tribe for its livelihood may be  among BIAs’ highest priorities. Interior officials told us that they expect to  identify the prioritized values and issue guidance on the proposed system  by the end of calendar year 2015, and then use its results to inform their  fiscal year 2016 funding distributions to the four agencies.
section_title: Forest Service Regions’ Distribution to Individual National Forests
paragraphs: Once the Forest Service distributes preparedness funding to regions, it  gives regions discretion to determine how to subsequently distribute  funding to individual national forests, as long as those determinations are  consistent with policy and annual budget program direction. Forest  Service headquarters officials told us they do not plan to direct regions to  use any specific system to help inform distributions to national forests, so  that regions can have flexibility in distributing their funds and take into  account local conditions and priorities. According to agency officials, most  regions distribute funding to individual national forests based on historical  amounts resulting from NFMAS. However, two regions have changed the  way they determine funding distribution to individual national forests to  better reflect current landscape conditions. The Rocky Mountain Region  uses a new system that ranks each of its forests according to a “risk  priority score.” According to regional officials, use of the system has  resulted in shifts in funding across forests in the region; for example, the  officials told us they have provided additional resources to forests along  Colorado’s Front Range because of increased development in the WUI.  The Pacific Northwest Region also uses its own funding distribution tool,  which considers elements such as fire occurrence and the number of  available assets to develop a weighted value for each forest in the region.  The region distributes the funding proportionally based on the values  calculated for each forest.
section_title: Interior Agencies’ Distribution to Regional Offices
paragraphs: Once obtaining preparedness funds from Interior, each agency—which,  as noted, have their own land management responsibilities and  missions—distributes these funds to its units. Three of these agencies— BLM, FWS, and NPS—use newer systems and current information, such  as updated fuel characterization and fire occurrence data, to distribute  funding to their regional offices. The fourth agency, BIA, generally uses  historical-based amounts (i.e., NFMAS results), but has made some  changes to reflect updated priorities. The regions subsequently distribute  funding to individual land units, typically using the same systems. The  four agencies’ approaches are described below.
BLM. Since 2010, BLM officials told us they have used results from  the Fire Program Decision Support System to help determine funding  distributions to state offices. The system analyzes BLM’s fire workload  and complexity using four components: fire suppression workload,  fuel types, human risk, and additional fire resources, and assigns  scores to state offices accordingly. Based on the resulting analyses,  BLM has shifted funding across state offices to help better reflect  current conditions. BLM officials told us that most states use the new  system to help inform the distribution of funding to their units. BLM is  also developing an additional component of the Fire Program  Decision Support System to help offices determine the appropriate  number of firefighting assets needed in each area. Officials expect to  apply the new component with their overall system in the fall of 2015.
FWS. In 2014, FWS began distributing its preparedness funding to  regions using the Preparedness Allocation Tool. Officials told us that  the tool uses information such as historical wildland fire occurrence,  proximity to WUI areas, and other information, to inform preparedness  funding distributions to regions. Agency officials told us that results  from this tool did not generally identify the need for large funding shifts  across units, but rather helped identify some smaller shifts to better  reflect current landscape conditions. Officials with one FWS region  told us that the tool has helped the agency provide better assurance  that funding amounts are risk-based and transparent.
NPS. Since 2013, primarily in response to their overall wildland fire  management program funding reductions, NPS began using a system  called the Planning Data System to determine what level of firefighting  workforce the agency could afford under different budget distribution  scenarios. The system generates personnel requirements for each  NPS unit by establishing a minimum number of people for any unit  that meets certain criteria. Those results are rolled up to also provide  regional workforce requirements. The results generated from this  system showed that some NPS regions, as well as individual park  units, had existing wildland fire organizations that they could no longer  adequately support in light of reduced budgets.
BIA. BIA relies primarily on historical funding amounts derived from a  system similar to NFMAS. However, BIA officials told us they have  made adjustments to the historical amounts using professional  judgment. BIA officials told us that the regions also still primarily use  historical-based amounts to distribute funding to their units. The  officials told us they will wait until Interior finalizes its Risk Based  Wildland Fire Management model before they develop a new funding  distribution tool.
section_title: Agencies Are Working to Distribute Fuel Reduction Funding to Better Account for Current Conditions
paragraphs: Beginning in 2009, the Forest Service and Interior both used systems  collectively known as the Hazardous Fuels Prioritization and Allocation  System (HFPAS) to distribute fuel reduction funds. Officials told us  these systems, based on similar concepts and approaches, were  developed by the agencies to provide an interagency process for  distributing fuel reduction funding to the highest-priority projects.  Starting in 2014, the Forest Service instead began using a new system,  which, according to officials, allows the agency to more effectively  distribute fuel reduction funds. Interior continues to distribute fuel  reduction funding to the four agencies based on funding amounts derived  from HFPAS, but it plans to develop a new system for distributing funds to  reflect more current conditions and risks. Overall fuel reduction  obligations in 2014 totaled about $302 million for the Forest Service and  about $147 million for the Interior agencies. (See app. II for detailed  information on the agencies’ fuel reduction obligations for fiscal years  2004 through 2014.)
Forest Service officials told us their new system identifies locations where  the highest probability of wildland fire intersects with important resources,  such as residential areas and watersheds critical to municipal water  supplies. These officials told us the new system allows the agency to  invest its fuel reduction funds in areas where there are both a high  probability of wildland fires and important resources at risk. In contrast,  according to officials, HFPAS in some cases prioritized funding for areas  where important resources, such as extensive WUI, existed but where the  potential for wildland fires was low. The new system has identified  locations for funding adjustments to Forest Service regions. For example,  in 2015 the agency’s Eastern and Southern Regions received a smaller  proportion of fuel reduction funding than they had previously received,  and some western regions saw increases, because results from the  system showed that the western regions had more areas with both  important resources and high wildland fire potential.
The Forest Service directs its regions to distribute fuel reduction funding  to national forests using methods consistent with national information, as  well as with specific local data. A senior Forest Service official told us  that, as a result, most regions distribute funding to individual national  forests based on information generated using HFPAS, augmented with  local data. One region has developed a more updated distribution  approach. Specifically, in 2012, the Rocky Mountain Region, in  conjunction with the Rocky Mountain Research Station and Forest  Service headquarters, developed a fuel reduction funding distribution tool  that generates a risk priority score for each forest in the region. The risk  priority score is based on fire probability, resources at risk from fire,  potential fire intensity, and historical fire occurrence. Each forest’s risk  priority score is used to inform the region’s distribution of funding to the  national forests.
Interior currently distributes fuel reduction funding to its agencies based  on the funding amounts derived from HFPAS results that were last  generated in 2013. Interior officials also told us they plan to stop using  HFPAS results and are planning to use the new system they are  developing, the Risk-Based Wildland Fire Management model, to reflect  current information on conditions and risks in distributing fuel reduction  funds.
Within Interior, officials from the four agencies told us they have  developed, or are in the process of developing, funding distribution  systems and tools while they wait for Interior to complete the Risk-Based  Wildland Fire Management model. BLM, for example, uses a fuel  reduction funding distribution tool that maps values at risk, including WUI,  critical infrastructure, sagebrush habitat, and invasive species data. BLM  combines this information with data on wildland fire probability to create a  spatial illustration of the values at risk relative to potential fire occurrence.  BLM then uses the results of this analysis to fund its state offices. BIA  uses its own tool to distribute fuel reduction funding to its regions based  on wildland fire potential data generated by the Forest Service. That  information is then combined with fire occurrence history and workload  capacity to generate a model that shows potential fire risk and capacity  across BIA units. FWS officials told us they are developing a fuel  reduction funding distribution tool, expected to be used for fiscal year  2016, which considers fire risks associated with each FWS unit. FWS  officials told us this tool will identify risk reduction over longer periods of  time, contain an accountability function to monitor results, and will share  many attributes with FWS’ preparedness allocation tool. NPS officials told  us the agency will continue to rely on historical amounts, based largely on  HFPAS. Similar to the previous Interior distribution approach, NPS  distributes funding for specific projects identified at the headquarters  level. However, if a unit is not able to implement an identified project, the  unit can substitute other projects, as necessary.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Faced with the challenge of working to protect people and resources from  the unwanted effects of wildland fire while also recognizing that fire is an  inevitable part of the landscape, the federal wildland fire agencies have  taken steps aimed at improving their approaches to wildland fire  management. Their 2009 update to interagency guidance, for example,  was designed to continue moving away from the agencies’ decades-long  emphasis on suppressing all fires, by giving fire managers more flexibility  in responding to fires. In addition, the agencies are working to develop  more up-to-date systems for distributing wildland fire resources. A central  test of such changes, however, is the extent to which they help ensure  appropriate and effective agency responses to fires when they occur. The  agencies have acknowledged the importance of reviewing their  responses to individual wildland fires to understand their effectiveness  and identify possible improvements. However, the agencies have not  systematically followed agency policy regarding such fire reviews and, in  the reviews they have conducted, they have not used specific criteria in  selecting fires and conducting the reviews. Officials from both the Forest  Service and Interior told us cost alone should not be the basis for such  reviews and have acknowledged the need to improve their criteria for  selecting fires and conducting reviews. Draft guidance provided by the  Forest Service did not contain specific criteria for such reviews, however,  and Interior officials did not provide information about how they planned  to develop criteria or the factors they would consider. By developing  specific criteria for selecting fires to review and conducting the reviews,  and making commensurate changes to agency policies to help ensure the  criteria are consistently applied, the agencies may enhance their ability to  ensure that their fire reviews provide useful information and meaningful  results. This, in turn, could better position them to identify improvements  in their approach to wildland fire management and thereby use their  limited resources more effectively.
section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To better ensure that the agencies have sufficient information to  understand the effectiveness of their approach to wildland fires, and to  better position them to develop appropriate and effective strategies for  wildland fire management, we recommend that the Secretaries of  Agriculture and the Interior direct the Chief of the Forest Service and the  Director of the Office of Wildland Fire to take the following two actions:
Develop specific criteria for selecting wildland fires for review and for  conducting the reviews as part of their efforts to improve their  approach to reviewing fires, and
Once such criteria are established, revise agency policies to align with  the specific criteria developed by the agencies.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the  Departments of Agriculture and the Interior. The Forest Service  (responding on behalf of the Department of Agriculture) and Interior  generally agreed with our findings and recommendations, and their  written comments are reproduced in appendixes IV and V respectively.  Both agencies stated that they are developing criteria for selecting fires to  review and conducting reviews. Both agencies also provided technical  comments which we incorporated into our report as appropriate. Interior  also provided additional information about wildland fire technology, which  we likewise incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to the report are listed in appendix VI.
section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines (1) key changes the federal wildland fire agencies  have made in their approach to wildland fire management since 2009,  (2) how the agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire  management programs, and (3) how the agencies determine the  distribution of their wildland fire management resources.
To perform this work, we reviewed laws, policies, guidance, academic  literature, and reviews related to federal wildland fire management. These  included the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and  subsequent implementation guidance, the Interagency Standards for Fire  and Fire Aviation Operations, and the 2009 and 2014 Quadrennial Fire  Reviews. We also interviewed headquarters officials from each of the five  federal land management agencies responsible for wildland fire  management—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and  the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM),  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS) in the  Department of the Interior—as well as Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire.
We also conducted semistructured interviews of regional officials in each  of the agencies to obtain information about issues specific to particular  regions and understand differences across regions. We interviewed  wildland fire management program officials from each of the 9 Forest  Service regional offices, 11 of BLM’s 12 state offices, and 2 regional  offices each for BIA, FWS, and NPS. We focused these regional  interviews primarily on the Forest Service and BLM because those  agencies receive the greatest percentage of appropriated federal wildland  fire funding. For BIA, FWS, and NPS, we selected the two regions from  each agency that received the most funds in those agencies—BIA’s  Northwest and Western Regions, FWS’s Southwest and Southeast  Regions, and NPS’s Pacific West and Intermountain Regions. We  conducted a total of 25 semistructured interviews of regional offices.
During these semistructured interviews we asked about (1) significant  changes to the agencies’ approach to wildland fire management,  including regional efforts to implement the policy areas identified in the  2009 interagency Guidance for Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire  Management Policy, (2) agency efforts to assess the effectiveness of  their wildland fire management activities, and (3) agency processes for  determining the distribution of fire management resources. We focused  our review on three primary components of wildland fire management— suppression, preparedness, and fuel reduction—because they account  for the highest spending amounts among wildland fire management  activities.
To address our first objective, we reviewed agency documents, such as  policy and guidance, as well as other documents such as agency budget  justifications, to identify changes the agencies have made to their  approach to managing wildland fire since 2009, efforts the agencies have  undertaken to address wildland fire management challenges, agency- identified improvements resulting from those changes, and challenges  associated with implementing them. Our review focuses on changes  since 2009 because we last completed a comprehensive review of  wildland fire management in that year, and because the agencies’ last  significant change to interagency wildland fire management guidance for  implementing the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy also  occurred that year. To further our understanding of these issues, we also  asked about these changes in our interviews with agency headquarters  officials. In particular, we asked about the extent to which changes to the  agencies’ wildland fire management approaches have occurred or are  planned, the effects of these changes, and associated challenges. In  addition, we relied on the semistructured interviews of regional officials  described above to understand how the regions implemented national  direction and policy. We analyzed the responses provided to us during  the interviews to identify common themes about prominent changes since  2009, and challenges associated with implementing those changes. The  information we report represents themes that occurred frequently in our  interviews with both regional and headquarters officials. We did not report  on changes described during our interviews that were not directly related  to wildland fire management, such as changes to general workforce  management policies.
To address our second objective, we reviewed agency strategic plans  and budget justifications describing performance measures, as well as  other documents associated with agency efforts to assess their programs,  including fire reviews. We also reviewed legislative and agency direction  related to fire reviews, including agency policies and the Interagency  Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations, and reviewed reports  resulting from fire reviews conducted by the agencies since 2009. We  compared agency practices for conducting fire reviews to direction  contained in relevant agency policy. We also interviewed headquarters  officials to identify the agencies’ key performance measures and the  extent to which those measures reflect changing approaches to wildland  fire management. In our interviews with headquarters and regional  officials, we also inquired about other mechanisms the agencies use to  determine the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs,  as well as any changes they are making in this area. To obtain additional  insight into the use of performance information on the part of federal  agencies, we also reviewed our previous reports related to agencies’ use  of performance information.
To address our third objective, we reviewed relevant agency budget  documentation, including annual budget justifications and documentation  of agency obligations, as well as information about the tools and systems  the agencies use to distribute funds and resources. We did not assess  the design or use of any of the agencies’ tools or systems for distributing  funds. We interviewed agency officials at the headquarters and regional  levels to identify the processes they use for budget formulation and  resource distribution. We asked about the extent to which these  processes have changed in recent years at the headquarters and regional  levels for each of the five agencies and the extent to which they have  changed funding and resource amounts. We also obtained data from the  Forest Service and from Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire on obligations  for each of the three primary wildland fire management components— suppression, preparedness, and fuel reduction—from fiscal years 2004  through 2014, analyzing the data in both nominal (actual) and constant  (adjusted for inflation) terms. Adjusting nominal dollars to constant dollars  allows the comparison of purchasing power across fiscal years. To adjust  for inflation, we used the gross domestic product price index with 2014 as  the base year. We reviewed budget documents and obligation data  provided by the agencies, and interviewed agency officials  knowledgeable about the data, and we found the data sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to September  2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
section_title: Appendix II: Forest Service and Interior Agency Obligations for Preparedness, Fuel Reduction, and Suppression, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2014
paragraphs: This appendix provides information on preparedness, fuel reduction, and  suppression obligations by the Forest Service and the Department of the  Interior’s four wildland fire agencies—the Bureau of Indian Affairs,  Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National  Park Service—for fiscal years 2004 through 2014.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show overall agency obligations for preparedness,  fuel reduction, and suppression for fiscal years 2004 through 2014.  Individual agencies’ obligations for each of the three programs are  described later in this appendix.
Table 1 and figure 7 show annual Forest Service wildland fire  management obligations for fiscal years 2004 through 2014.  Preparedness obligations increased from nearly $760 million in fiscal  year 2004 to about $1.0 billion in fiscal year 2014, an average increase  of 3.2 percent per year, or 1.2 percent after adjusting for inflation. Fuel  reduction obligations increased from about $284 million in fiscal year  2004 to about $302 million in fiscal year 2014, an average annual  increase of 0.6 percent, or a 1.4 percent decrease after adjusting for  inflation. Suppression obligations fluctuated from year to year, with a  high of about $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2012 and a low of about  $525 million in fiscal year 2005.
Table 2 and figure 8 show annual Bureau of Indian Affairs wildland fire  management obligations for fiscal years 2004 through 2014.  Preparedness obligations decreased from nearly $58 million in fiscal  year 2004 to about $51 million in fiscal year 2014, an average annual  decrease of 1.3 percent per year, or 3.2 percent after adjusting for  inflation. Fuel reduction obligations decreased from about $39 million in  fiscal year 2004 to about $30 million in fiscal year 2014, an average  annual decrease of 2.6 percent, or 4.5 percent after adjusting for  inflation. Suppression obligations fluctuated from year to year, with a  high of about $105 million in fiscal year 2012 and a low of about  $43 million in fiscal year 2010.
Table 3 and figure 9 show annual Bureau of Land Management wildland  fire management obligations from fiscal years 2004 through 2014.  Preparedness obligations increased from nearly $152 million in fiscal  year 2004 to about $160 million in fiscal year 2014, an average annual  increase of 0.6 percent per year, or a 1.4 percent decrease after  adjusting for inflation. Fuel reduction obligations decreased from about  $98 million in fiscal year 2004 to about $75 million in fiscal year 2014, an  average annual decrease of 2.6 percent, or 4.6 percent after adjusting  for inflation. Suppression obligations fluctuated from year to year, with a  high of about $299 million in fiscal year 2007 and a low of about  $130 million in fiscal year 2009.
Table 4 and figure 10 show annual Fish and Wildlife Service wildland fire  management obligations for fiscal years 2004 through 2014.  Preparedness obligations decreased from about $33 million in fiscal year  2004 to about $27 million in fiscal year 2014, an average annual  decrease of 2.1 percent per year, or 4.1 percent after adjusting for  inflation. Fuel reduction obligations decreased from about $24 million in  fiscal year 2004 to about $21 million in fiscal year 2014, an average  annual decrease of 1.5 percent, or 3.5 percent after adjusting for  inflation. Suppression obligations fluctuated from year to year, with a  high of about $41 million in fiscal year 2011 and a low of about $4 million  in fiscal year 2010.
Table 5 and figure 11 show annual National Park Service wildland fire  management obligations for fiscal years 2004 through 2014. Obligations  for preparedness increased from about $35 million in fiscal year 2004 to  about $36 million in fiscal year 2014, an average annual increase of  0.5 percent per year, or a 1.5 percent decrease after adjusting for  inflation. Fuel reduction obligations decreased from about $31 million in  fiscal year 2004 to about $21 million in fiscal year 2014, an average  annual decrease of 3.7 percent, or 5.6 percent after adjusting for  inflation. Suppression obligations fluctuated from year to year, with a  high of about $58 million in fiscal year 2006 and a low of about  $22 million in fiscal year 2009.
section_title: Appendix III: Differences in Forest Service and Department of the Interior Salary Payments Using Preparedness and Suppression Funding
paragraphs: The Forest Service and the Department of the Interior use different  approaches for paying the base salaries of their staff during wildland fire  incidents. For periods when firefighters are dispatched to fight fires, the  Forest Service generally pays its firefighters’ base salaries using  suppression funds, whereas Interior pays its firefighters’ base salaries  primarily using preparedness funds. Forest Service officials told us that  under this approach, regional offices, which are responsible for hiring  firefighters in advance of the fire season, routinely hire more firefighters  than their preparedness budgets will support, assuming they can rely on  suppression funds to pay the difference. Forest Service officials told us  that their funding approach helps the agency maintain its firefighting  capability over longer periods of time during a season and accurately  track the overall costs of fires. Interior officials told us they choose to use  preparedness funds to pay their firefighters’ base salaries during a  wildland fire because it constitutes a good business practice. According  to a Wildland Fire Leadership Council document, in 2003, the council  agreed that the agencies would use a single, unified approach and pay  firefighters’ base salary using Interior’s method of using preparedness  funds. However, the council subsequently noted that in 2004 the Office  of Management and Budget directed the Forest Service to continue  using suppression funds to pay firefighters’ base salaries. The agencies  have used separate approaches since 2004.
section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Agriculture
section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of the Interior
section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Steve Gaty (Assistant  Director), Ulana M. Bihun, Richard P. Johnson, Lesley Rinner, and Kyle  M. Stetler made key contributions to this report. Important contributions  were also made by Cheryl Arvidson, Mark Braza, William Carrigg, Carol  Henn, Benjamin T. Licht, Armetha Liles, and Kiki Theodoropoulos.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Wildland Fire Management: Improvements Needed in Information,  Collaboration, and Planning to Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Program  Success. GAO-13-684. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2013.
Station Fire: Forest Service’s Response Offers Potential Lessons for  Future Wildland Fire Management. GAO-12-155. Washington, D.C.:  December 16, 2011.
Arizona Border Region: Federal Agencies Could Better Utilize Law  Enforcement Resources in Support of Wildland Fire Management  Activities. GAO-12-73. Washington, D.C.: November 8, 2011.
Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Have Taken Important  Steps Forward, but Additional Action Is Needed to Address Remaining  Challenges. GAO-09-906T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2009.
Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Have Taken Important  Steps Forward, but Additional, Strategic Action Is Needed to Capitalize  on Those Steps. GAO-09-877. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Wildland Fire Management: Actions by Federal Agencies and Congress  Could Mitigate Rising Fire Costs and Their Effects on Other Agency  Programs. GAO-09-444T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2009.
Forest Service: Emerging Issues Highlight the Need to Address  Persistent Management Challenges. GAO-09-443T. Washington, D.C.:  March 11, 2009.
Wildland Fire Management: Interagency Budget Tool Needs Further  Development to Fully Meet Key Objectives. GAO-09-68. Washington,  D.C.: November 24, 2008.
Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Lack Key Long- and  Short-Term Management Strategies for Using Program Funds  Effectively. GAO-08-433T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2008.
Forest Service: Better Planning, Guidance, and Data Are Needed to  Improve Management of the Competitive Sourcing Program.  GAO-08-195. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2008.
Wildland Fire Management: Better Information and a Systematic Process  Could Improve Agencies’ Approach to Allocating Fuel Reduction Funds  and Selecting Projects. GAO-07-1168. Washington, D.C.: September 28,  2007.
Natural Hazard Mitigation: Various Mitigation Efforts Exist, but Federal  Efforts Do Not Provide a Comprehensive Strategic Framework.  GAO-07-403. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2007.
Wildland Fire: Management Improvements Could Enhance Federal  Agencies’ Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires. GAO-07-922T.  Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2007.
Wildland Fire Management: A Cohesive Strategy and Clear Cost- Containment Goals Are Needed for Federal Agencies to Manage  Wildland Fire Activities Effectively. GAO-07-1017T. Washington, D.C.:  June 19, 2007.
Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders  Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires.  GAO-07-655. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2007.
Department of the Interior: Major Management Challenges.  GAO-07-502T. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2007.
Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders  Agencies’ Cost-Containment Efforts. GAO-07-427T. Washington, D.C.:  January 30, 2007.
Biscuit Fire Recovery Project: Analysis of Project Development, Salvage  Sales, and Other Activities. GAO-06-967. Washington, D.C.: September  18, 2006.
Wildland Fire Rehabilitation and Restoration: Forest Service and BLM  Could Benefit from Improved Information on Status of Needed Work.  GAO-06-670. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of  Costs between Federal and Nonfederal Entities. GAO-06-896T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns  about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities.  GAO-06-570. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to  Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats.  GAO-06-671R. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006.
Natural Resources: Woody Biomass Users’ Experiences Provide  Insights for Ongoing Government Efforts to Promote Its Use.  GAO-06-694T. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2006.
Natural Resources: Woody Biomass Users’ Experiences Offer Insights  for Government Efforts Aimed at Promoting Its Use. GAO-06-336.  Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Timely Identification of Long-Term Options  and Funding Needs Is Critical. GAO-05-923T. Washington, D.C.: July  14, 2005.
Natural Resources: Federal Agencies Are Engaged in Numerous Woody  Biomass Utilization Activities, but Significant Obstacles May Impede  Their Efforts. GAO-05-741T. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2005.
Natural Resources: Federal Agencies Are Engaged in Various Efforts to  Promote the Utilization of Woody Biomass, but Significant Obstacles to  Its Use Remain. GAO-05-373. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2005.
Technology Assessment: Protecting Structures and Improving  Communications during Wildland Fires. GAO-05-380. Washington, D.C.:  April 26, 2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Progress and Future Challenges, Protecting  Structures, and Improving Communications. GAO-05-627T. Washington,  D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Forest Service and Interior Need to Specify  Steps and a Schedule for Identifying Long-Term Options and Their  Costs. GAO-05-353T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but  Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy. GAO-05-147.  Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.
Wildland Fires: Forest Service and BLM Need Better Information and a  Systematic Approach for Assessing the Risks of Environmental Effects.  GAO-04-705. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004.
Federal Land Management: Additional Guidance on Community  Involvement Could Enhance Effectiveness of Stewardship Contracting.  GAO-04-652. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004.
Wildfire Suppression: Funding Transfers Cause Project Cancellations  and Delays, Strained Relationships, and Management Disruptions.  GAO-04-612. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004.
Biscuit Fire: Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and  Personnel Certification Standards. GAO-04-426. Washington, D.C.: April  12, 2004.
Forest Service: Information on Appeals and Litigation Involving Fuel  Reduction Activities. GAO-04-52. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2003.
Geospatial Information: Technologies Hold Promise for Wildland Fire  Management, but Challenges Remain. GAO-03-1047. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2003.
Geospatial Information: Technologies Hold Promise for Wildland Fire  Management, but Challenges Remain. GAO-03-1114T. Washington,  D.C.: August 28, 2003.
Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to Better  Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction. GAO-03-805.  Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2003.
Wildland Fires: Forest Service’s Removal of Timber Burned by Wildland  Fires. GAO-03-808R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2003.
Forest Service: Information on Decisions Involving Fuels Reduction  Activities. GAO-03-689R. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2003.
Wildland Fires: Better Information Needed on Effectiveness of  Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments. GAO-03-430.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the  Interior. GAO-03-104. Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003.
Results-Oriented Management: Agency Crosscutting Actions and Plans  in Border Control, Flood Mitigation and Insurance, Wetlands, and  Wildland Fire Management. GAO-03-321. Washington, D.C.: December  20, 2002.
Wildland Fire Management: Reducing the Threat of Wildland Fires  Requires Sustained and Coordinated Effort. GAO-02-843T. Washington,  D.C: June 13, 2002.
Wildland Fire Management: Improved Planning Will Help Agencies  Better Identify Fire-Fighting Preparedness Needs. GAO-02-158.  Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002.
Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to Reduce  Risks to Communities and Resources. GAO-02-259. Washington, D.C.:  January 31, 2002.
Forest Service: Appeals and Litigation of Fuel Reduction Projects.  GAO-01-1114R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
The National Fire Plan: Federal Agencies Are Not Organized to  Effectively and Efficiently Implement the Plan. GAO-01-1022T.  Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Reducing Wildfire Threats: Funds Should be Targeted to the Highest  Risk Areas. GAO/T-RCED-00-296. Washington, D.C.: September 13,  2000.
Fire Management: Lessons Learned From the Cerro Grande (Los  Alamos) Fire. GAO/T-RCED-00-257. Washington, D.C.: August 14,  2000.
Fire Management: Lessons Learned From the Cerro Grande (Los  Alamos) Fire and Actions Needed to Reduce Fire Risks.  GAO/T-RCED-00-273. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2000.