Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the Process and Realize Efficiencies
Published: 2013-06-20T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2012, the Director of National Intelligence reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held a security clearance.
Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases in the government-wide personnel security clearance process. The Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive Agent, is to develop uniform and consistent policies and procedures. Executive branch agencies are to determine which positions require access to classified information. OPMs investigators from the Federal Investigative Service conduct the majority of security investigations on personnel holding those positions, and adjudicators from requesting agencies, such as DOD, make the final clearance eligibility determination. Reform efforts and reporting requirements since 2005 have focused on expediting the processing of clearances.
This testimony is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued between 2008 and 2013 on DODs personnel security clearance programs and security clearance reform efforts. This testimony addresses three areas for improvement to the government-wide personnel security clearance process: (1) a sound requirements determination process, (2) performance metrics to measure quality, and (3) guidance to enhance efficiencies.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In July 2012, GAO reported that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive Agent, had not provided agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine whether a civilian position required a security clearance. Underdesignating positions can lead to security risks; overdesignating positions can result in significant cost implications. Also, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense (DOD) components' officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. GAO recommended that, among other things, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policies and procedures to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance, and also guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. The Director of National Intelligence concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified actions to implement them.
Executive branch agency efforts to improve the personnel security process have emphasized timeliness but not quality. In May 2009, GAO reported that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most of OPM investigative reports. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing required documentation. In May 2009, GAO recommended that the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of OPM's Federal Investigative Services to measure the frequency with which its investigative reports met federal investigative standards in order to improve the completeness--that is, quality--of future investigation documentation. As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented this recommendation.
Government-wide personnel security reform efforts have not yet focused on potential cost savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes improving cost savings. For example, OPM's investigation process--which represents a portion of the security clearance process and has significant costs--has not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February 2012, GAO reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations in fiscal year 2011. GAO raised concerns that OPM may be simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012, GAO recommended that, to improve the efficiency of suitability and personnel security clearance background investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative Services to take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost savings within its background investigation process. OPM agreed with this recommendation and GAO is working with OPM to assess any progress it has made in this area.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for the opportunity to be here to participate in the discussion of  the government-wide personnel security clearance process. As you know,  we have an extensive body of work on issues related to the security  clearance process dating back several decades. Since 2008, we have  focused on the government-wide effort to reform the security clearance  process.
Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel  to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized  disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S.  national security. As you know, a high volume of clearances continue to   that  be processed. In 2012, the Director of National Intelligence reportedmore than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held  a security clearance, making it a formidable challenge to those  responsible for deciding who should be granted a clearance. The  Department of Defense (DOD) accounts for the vast majority of all  personnel security clearances.
My testimony today will focus on three areas for improvement to the  government-wide personnel security clearance process: (1) a sound  requirements determination process, (2) performance metrics to measure  quality, and (3) guidance to enhance efficiencies.
My testimony is based on our reports and testimonies issued between  2008 and 2013 on DOD’s personnel security clearance program and  government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts.reports and testimonies were conducted in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that  we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a   Our  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases in  the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. In 2008,  the Director of National Intelligence, for example, was designated  Security Executive Agent by Executive Order 13467 and, in this capacity,  is responsible for developing uniform and consistent policies and  procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of  background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of  eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a  sensitive position. In turn, requesting executive branch agencies  determine which positions—military, civilian, or private-industry  contractors—require access to classified information and, therefore,  which people must apply for and undergo a security clearance  investigation. Investigators—often contractors—from Federal  Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)  conduct these investigations for most of the federal government using  federal investigative standards and OPM internal guidance as criteria for  collecting background information on applicants. Adjudicators from  requesting agencies, such as DOD, use the information contained in the  resulting OPM investigative reports and consider federal adjudicative  guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel  security clearance.
DOD is OPM’s largest customer, and its Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence (USD(I)) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and  overseeing the implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance  for personnel, physical, industrial, information, operations,  chemical/biological, and DOD Special Access Program security.  Additionally, the Defense Security Service, under the authority and  direction and control of USD(I), manages and administers the DOD  portion of the National Industrial Security Program for the DOD  components and other federal services by agreement, as well as  providing security education and training, among other things.
Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004) (relevant sections codified at 50 U.S.C. § 435b).
Council. Under the executive order, this council is accountable to the  President for driving implementation of the reform effort, including  ensuring the alignment of security and suitability processes, holding  agencies accountable for implementation, and establishing goals and  metrics for progress. The order also appointed the Deputy Director for  Management at the Office of Management and Budget as the chair of the  council and designated the Director of National Intelligence as the  Security Executive Agent and the Director of OPM as the Suitability  Executive Agent.
section_title: Improvements Needed to the Personnel Security Clearance Process
subsections: section_title: Sound Requirements Determination Process
paragraphs: We have previously reported that, to safeguard classified data and  manage costs, agencies need an effective process to determine whether  positions require a clearance and, if so, at what level. Last year we found,  however, that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive  Agent, has not provided agencies clearly defined policies and procedures  to consistently determine if a civilian position requires a security  clearance.for, among other things, developing uniform and consistent policies and  procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of  background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of  eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a  sensitive position, and gives the Director authority to issue guidance to  agency heads to ensure uniformity in processes relating to those  determinations. Further, the Director also has not established guidance to  require agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian   Executive Order 13467 assigns the Director responsibility  position designations. Executive Order 12968certain exceptions, eligibility for access to classified information shall only  be requested and granted on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable  need for access, and the number of employees that each agency  determines is eligible for access to classified information shall be kept to  the minimum required. The order also states that access to classified  information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need  for access, and prohibits requesting or approving eligibility for access in  excess of the actual requirements. Without such requirements, executive  branch agencies may be hiring and budgeting for initial and periodic  security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security  clearance requirements that no longer reflect national security needs.   says that, subject to  In our July 2012 report, we found that Department of Homeland Security  and DOD components’ officials were aware of the need to keep the  number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always  required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security  clearance needs of existing positions. Overdesignating positions results in  significant cost implications, given that the fiscal year 2012 base price for  a top secret clearance investigation conducted by OPM was $4,005, while  the base price of a secret clearance was $260. Conversely,  underdesignating positions could lead to security risks.
In the absence of guidance to determine if a position requires a security  clearance, agencies are using a tool that OPM designed to determine the  sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the  type of investigation needed. OPM audits, however, found inconsistency  in these position designations, and some agencies described problems in  implementing OPM’s tool. In an April 2012 audit, OPM reviewed the  sensitivity levels of 39 positions in an agency within DOD and reached  different conclusions than the agency for 26 of them. Problems exist, in  part, because OPM and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence  did not collaborate on the development of the position designation tool,  and because their roles for suitability—consideration of character and  conduct for federal employment—and security clearance reform are still  evolving. In our July 2012 report, we concluded that without guidance  from the Director of National Intelligence, and without collaboration  between the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and OPM in  future revisions to the tool, executive branch agencies will continue to risk  making security clearance determinations that are inconsistent or at  improper levels.
In July 2012, we recommended, among other things, that the Director of  National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other  executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy  and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal  civilian positions require a security clearance. We also recommended that  the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of  OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue  guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and  revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. The  Director of National Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and  has taken steps to implement them.
section_title: Performance Metrics to Measure Quality
paragraphs: We have emphasized—since the late 1990s—a need to build quality  and quality monitoring throughout the clearance process to promote  oversight and positive outcomes, such as honoring reciprocity.  Executive branch efforts have emphasized timeliness, but efforts to  develop and implement metrics for measuring the quality of investigations  have not included goals with related outcome focused measures to show  progress or identify obstacles to progress and possible remedies.  Furthermore, our recent reviews of OPM’s investigations show reasons  for continuing concern. For example, in May 2009 we reported that, with  respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008,  documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We  independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative  reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decision were  missing required documentation. We recommended that the Director of  OPM direct the Associate Director of OPM’s Federal Investigative  Services Division to measure the frequency with which its investigative  reports meet federal investigative standards in order to improve the  completeness—that is, quality—of future investigation documentation.  As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented our  recommendation to measure how frequently investigative reports meet  federal investigative standards. Instead, OPM continues to assess the  quality of investigations based on voluntary reporting from customer  agencies. Specifically, OPM tracks investigations that are (1) returned for  rework from the requesting agency, (2) identified as deficient using a  web-based survey, and (3) identified as deficient through adjudicator calls  to OPM’s quality hotline. In our past work, we have noted that the number  of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of the  quality of investigative work because adjudication officials have been  reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation of delays that  would impact timeliness. Further, relying on agencies to voluntarily  provide information on investigation quality may not reflect the quality of  OPM’s total investigation workload.
In February 2011, we noted that one of OPM’s customer agencies, DOD,  had developed and implemented a tool known as Rapid Assessment of  Incomplete Security Evaluations to monitor the quality of investigations  completed by OPM. In that report, we noted that leaders of the reform  effort had provided congressional members and executive branch  agencies with metrics assessing quality and other aspects of the  clearance process. Although the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete  Security Evaluations was one tool the reform team members planned to  use for measuring quality, according to an OPM official, OPM chose not  to use this tool. Instead, OPM opted to develop another tool but has not  provided details on the tool including estimated timeframes for its  development and implementation.
section_title: Guidance to Enhance Efficiencies
paragraphs: Since 2008, we have highlighted the importance of the executive branch  enhancing efficiency and managing costs related to security clearance  reform efforts. Government-wide suitability and personnel security  clearance reform efforts have not yet focused on identifying potential cost  savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes  improving cost savings. For example, in 2008, we noted that one of the  key factors to consider in current and future reform efforts was the long- term funding requirements. Further, in 2009, we found that reform-related  reports issued in 2008 did not detail which reform objectives require  funding, how much they will cost, or where funding will come from.Finally, the reports did not estimate potential cost savings resulting from  these reform efforts. While the Performance Accountability Council has a  stated goal regarding cost savings, it has not provided the executive  branch with guidance on opportunities for achieving efficiencies in  managing personnel security clearances.
For example, OPM’s investigation process—which represents just a  portion of the security clearance process and had significant costs—has  not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February  2012, we reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more  than 2 million background investigations (suitability determinations and  personnel security clearances) for government employees in fiscal year  2011. OPM officials explained that, to date, they have chosen to address  investigation timeliness and investigation backlogs rather than the  identification of process and workforce efficiencies. To its credit, OPM  helped reduce the backlog of ongoing background investigations that it  inherited from DOD at the time of the 2005 transfer. However, only  recently has OPM started to look at its internal processes for efficiencies.  Further, while OPM invested in an electronic case-management program,  it continues to convert submitted electronic files to paper. In November  2010, the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management  and Budget testified that OPM receives 98 percent of investigation  applications electronically, yet we observed that it was continuing to use a  paper-based investigation processing system and convert electronically  submitted applications to paper. OPM officials stated that the paper- based process is required because a small portion of their customer  agencies do not have electronic capabilities. As a result, OPM may be  simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while  maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012,  we recommended that, to improve transparency of costs and the  efficiency of suitability and personnel security clearance background  investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, the Director of  OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative Services to  take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost savings  within its background investigation process. OPM agreed with this  recommendation and we are working with OPM to assess any progress it  has made in this area.
Further, agencies have made potentially duplicative investments in case- management and adjudication systems without considering opportunities  for leveraging existing technologies. In February 2012, as part of our  annual report on opportunities to reduce duplication, overlap and  fragmentation, we reported that multiple agencies have invested in or are  beginning to invest in potentially duplicative, electronic case management  and adjudication systems despite government-wide reform effort goals  that agencies leverage existing technologies to reduce duplication and  enhance reciprocity. development of its Case Adjudication Tracking System in 2006 and, as of  2011, had invested a total of $32 million to deploy the system. The  system helped DOD achieve efficiencies with case management and an  electronic adjudication module for secret level cases that did not contain  issues, given the volume and types of adjudications performed. According  to DOD officials, after it observed that the Case Adjudication Tracking  System could easily be deployed to other agencies at a low cost, the  department intended to share the technology with interested entities  across the federal government. However, at that time, five other agencies  were also developing or seeking funds to develop individual systems with   With multiple agencies developing  capabilities similar to DOD’s system.
GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and  Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington,  D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012). individual case-management systems, these agencies may be at risk of  duplicating efforts and may fail to realize cost savings.
In 2012, we recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at  OMB, in his capacity as the Chair of the Performance Accountability  Council, expand and specify reform-related guidance to help ensure that  reform stakeholders identify opportunities for efficiencies and cost  savings, such as preventing duplication in the development of electronic  case management. OMB concurred with our recommendation. As of  March of this year, however, OMB has not expanded and specified  reform-related guidance to help ensure that reform stakeholders identify  opportunities for cost savings. According to OMB officials, they are  exploring whether and how to develop and implement guidance on  information technology spending that is minimally disruptive, will not  compromise agencies’ ability to adjudicate cases, and is implementable  within budget constraints. While these specific efforts may be notable  steps in clearance reform, they do not meet the intent of our  recommendation for OMB to develop overarching guidance that reform  stakeholders can use to identify opportunities for cost savings.
In conclusion, while the executive branch has made strides in improving  the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process, now is the  time to focus on making the improvements GAO has recommended.  Failing to do so increases the risk of damaging unauthorized disclosures  of classified information. This concludes my prepared statement. I would  be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.
For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S.  Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be  reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this testimony include David Moser (Assistant Director), Sara Cradic, Mae  Jones, Erin Preston, Leigh Ann Sennette, and Michael Willems.
section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals  under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.:  April 19, 2013.
Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for  Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington,  D.C.: July 12, 2012.  2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and  Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.  GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to  Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings.  GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.
GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  16, 2011.
Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to  Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T.  Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve  Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum.  GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s  Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T.  Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and  Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide  Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T.  Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce  Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain  Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is  Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington,  D.C.: May 19, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January  2009.
Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement.  GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts  to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington,  D.C.: September 28, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of  Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.  GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January  2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
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