NASA: Progress Made on Strategic Human Capital Management, but Future Program Challenges Remain
Published: 2007-08-08T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is engaged in efforts to replace the Space Shuttle with the next generation of human space flight systems and implement the President's space exploration policy. To do this, NASA must recruit, develop, and retain certain critical skills in its workforce, guided by its strategic human capital management plan. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which NASA (1) has aligned its human capital planning framework with its strategic mission and programmatic goals and (2) is recruiting, developing, and retaining critically skilled personnel, given future workforce needs. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed NASA's policies, planning, and implementation documents; reviewed budget documents and performance and accountability reports; and interviewed cognizant agency officials. To assess NASA's efforts to recruit, develop, and retain critically skilled personnel, we analyzed demographics data, and critical skills information; NASA's policy, procedures and guidance for recruiting and hiring; and implementation of information systems programs, and processes that support human capital management and planning. We are not making any recommendations in this report.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: NASA's strategic human capital framework is generally aligned with its strategic mission, outcomes, and programmatic goals. NASA's leaders have set its overall direction and goals and involved its mission directorates and centers in implementing human capital strategy and providing feedback to headquarters. Recently, NASA has been improving its workforce planning information technology matching program requirements with human capital resources. Some centers have been critical of the systems' performance, but others find these tools useful. NASA attracts and retains critical personnel by using tools such as recruiting and retention bonuses. Recently, NASA has asked Congress for additional human capital flexibilities to help manage its workforce. The centers also have their own programs that address their critical skills shortfalls by training and developing employees. NASA recognizes that critical skills now present in the civil service and contractor Space Shuttle workforce are needed to complete present and future mission objectives, but also understands that additional capability will also be needed in certain areas. Given this, NASA is looking ahead and considering how best to mitigate any potential loss of skills and knowledge that could take place in the period between the Space Shuttle's retirement in 2010 and the resumption of human space flight in 2015.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the  midst of a complex transition effort due to the impending retirement of the  Space Shuttle in 2010 and its replacement by the next generation of human  space flight systems such as the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, the Ares  family of launch vehicles, and other exploration vehicles. An effort of this  scope has not been attempted since the end of the Apollo program, which  was designed to land humans on the Moon and bring them safely back to  Earth, and the start of the Space Shuttle Program more than three decades  ago. In 2004, the President established a new exploration policy—  A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for U.S. Space  Exploration (Vision for Space Exploration). The cost of implementing it  over the coming decades will require hundreds of billions of dollars and a  sustained commitment from multiple administrations and Congresses. A  major component of this transition involves NASA’s workforce, which  comprises about 18,000 civil servants at various centers across the  country. To meet its future needs, NASA is seeking to maintain certain  critical skills in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics  research. The agency needs to take action to align its workforce to the  new mission and goals in a timely fashion to help the safe operation of the  shuttle through retirement and a smooth transition to exploration  activities. We reported that strategic human capital management must be  the centerpiece of any serious change in NASA’s management strategy.
NASA’s workforce challenges are not unique within the federal  government. Federal agencies, as a whole, face new and increasingly  complex challenges in the 21st century. These agencies must transform  their organizations to meet the challenges of long-term fiscal constraints,  changing demographics, evolving governance models, and other factors.  To do so, they must engage in strategic workforce planning, including  systematic assessments of current and future human capital needs and the  development of long-term strategies to fill any gaps. We recently reported  that human capital management is a governmentwide high-risk area  because federal agencies typically lack a strategic approach to human  capital management that integrates human capital efforts with their  missions and program goals.
Given the importance of NASA’s ability to sufficiently recruit, develop, and  retain the staff it needs to execute the agency’s missions, you requested  that we examine the extent to which NASA (1) has aligned its human  capital planning framework with its strategic mission and programmatic  goals and (2) is recruiting, developing, and retaining critical science and  engineering personnel needed to address future workforce requirements.  To assess the alignment of NASA’s human capital framework with its  strategic mission and programmatic goals, we analyzed a range of policies,  planning, and implementation documents; reviewed budget documents  and performance and accountability reports; and interviewed cognizant  officials in NASA’s Office of Human Capital Management, mission  directorates, and various field centers. To assess NASA’s efforts to recruit,  develop, and retain critical science and engineering personnel, we applied  our five strategic workforce planning principles (see figure 4). In doing so,  we analyzed NASA’s (1) demographics data; (2) critical skills information;  (3) policies, procedures, and guidance for recruiting and hiring;   (4) implementation of information systems, programs, and processes that  support human capital management and planning. We also assessed the  internal and external challenges that NASA faces in achieving its  workforce needs, by conducting interviews with key NASA officials in  headquarters and various centers, and researching recent publications on  workforce trends affecting NASA. We conducted our work from July 2006  through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Appendix I further discusses our scope and  methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, established  NASA as the civilian agency that exercises control over U.S. aeronautical  and space activities and seeks and encourages the fullest commercial use  of space. NASA’s mission is to pioneer the future in space exploration,  scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. Its activities span a broad  range of complex and technical endeavors: from investigating and  evaluating the composition and resources of Mars, and working with its  international partners to complete and operate the International Space  Station, to providing satellite and aircraft observations of Earth for  scientific and weather forecasting; to developing new technologies  designed to improve air flight safety.
subsections: section_title: NASA Organization and Staff
paragraphs: NASA is organized under four mission directorates—Aeronautics  Research, Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations—each of  which covers a major area of the agency’s research and development  efforts:    Aeronautics Research conducts research in aeronautical disciplines  and develops capabilities, tools, and technologies that improve aircraft  and air transportation system.
Exploration Systems develops systems and supports research and  technology development to enable sustained and affordable human and  robotic space exploration.
Science conducts the scientific exploration of the Earth, the Sun, the  rest of the solar system, and the universe.
Space Operations directs space flight operations, space launches, and  space communications and manages the operation of integrated  systems in low Earth orbit and beyond, including the International  Space Station.
NASA is composed of NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., nine  centers located around the country, and the contractor-operated Jet  Propulsion Laboratory (as shown in figure 1). In addition, NASA partners  with academia, the private sector, state and local governments, other  federal agencies, and a number of international organizations.
NASA considers itself a mission-driven agency, and its strategic  management approach requires all of its organizations to use a  program/project management method to manage requirements, schedule,  and budget. NASA’s management functions are centralized at its  headquarters. NASA manages through its governance structure, which  consists of three agency-level management councils (see figure 2.):    Strategic Management Council, which determines NASA strategic  direction at the vision and mission level, and assesses the agency’s  progress;    Program Management Council, guides program and project  performance, defining successful achievement of NASA strategic goals  and objectives; and    Operations Management Council, which reviews and approves  institutional plans.
Delivery of institutional capabilities  The primary roles of the mission directorates include development of  strategy and program assessment. While the mission directorates provide  direction and oversight to programs, the centers execute programs and  projects, including developing approaches for workforce planning that  meet agency and center goals. For example, centers develop human  capital plans to meet workforce requirements, such as recruiting engineers  and developing programs redirecting employees from nonenduring work  to new work.
section_title: Workforce Trends in the Federal Government and NASA
paragraphs: NASA’s efforts are taking place in the context of broader federal  workforce trends. Today and in the near term, the federal government is  facing a retirement wave and with it the loss of leadership and institutional  knowledge at all levels. In 2006, The Office of Personnel Management  (OPM) reported that approximately 60 percent of the government’s   1.6 million white-collar employees and 90 percent of about 6,000 federal  executives will be eligible for retirement over the next 10 years. Agencies  not only face a fiercely competitive market for talent but hiring is also  affected by uncompetitive salaries in some critical occupations and  lengthy hiring processes.
NASA projects that by fiscal year 2012 the total number of personnel  needed to meet its strategic goals will decrease from 18,100 to 17,000.  Approximately 59 percent of NASA’s overall workforce is comprised of  scientists and engineers, some 14 percent of whom were eligible for  retirement as of the end of fiscal year 2006. According to NASA officials,  employees eligible for retirement at NASA tend to stay on longer than is  typical in the federal workforce, however. On average, NASA’s scientific  and engineering employees retire 6.2 years after eligibility, versus 4.6 years  for the overall NASA workforce.
In fact, the average age of NASA’s science and engineering employee is  steadily increasing (See fig. 3 for information on the average age of NASA  science and engineering employee and the average of federal  governmentwide age). At this time, within the science and engineering  workforce, the 55 and over population outnumbers the under-30  population nearly 3 to 1. In time, this will be a concern, as the process of  retiring the Space Shuttle will last several years and affect thousands of  critically skilled NASA civil service and contractor employees that support  the program. We have reported that the safety of the Space Shuttle is  largely contingent on NASA’s ability to sustain the critically skilled  workforce necessary to support Space Shuttle operations through  retirement. While the agency is taking advantage of the flexibilities  outlined in the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 to attract highly qualified  candidates, continued buyouts and the threat of a reduction in force could  create a feeling of instability among its workforce.
section_title: NASA Human Capital Management
paragraphs: In 2005, we reported that NASA had made limited progress toward  developing a detailed long-term strategy to retain a critically skilled  workforce for shuttle operations, and recommended that the agency  implement an approach for identifying the space shuttle program’s future  workforce needs based upon various possible future scenarios. NASA  concurred with our recommendation—acknowledging that shuttle  workforce management and critical skills retention will be a major  challenge for the agency—and has taken action on this issue. Since we  made our recommendation, for example, NASA has developed an  agencywide strategic human capital plan and workforce analysis tools to  assist it in identifying critical skills needs, along with a human capital plan  with a focus on sustaining and transitioning the space shuttle workforce.
Since our report, two recently completed studies contain  recommendations on how the agency should address the space shuttle  workforce transition. In March 2006, the Senate Appropriations  Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies and  NASA asked the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to  assist the agency in planning for the Space Shuttle’s retirement and  transition to future exploration activities. In February 2007, a NAPA panel  recommended that the Space Shuttle Program adopt a RAND model for  projecting a core workforce because of its emphasis on “long-term  scheduling projections, quantification of core competencies and  proficiencies, and analysis of overlapping mission needs.” Under the  RAND model, an organization maintains a core capability for any  competency that will be needed in the future. According to NAPA, this  model is useful where a given expertise is not immediately required, but is  likely to be needed in the future—in this case, for the Orion Crew  Exploration Vehicle.
In 2005, NASA requested assistance from the National Research Council  (NRC) to assess the current and future supply of a qualified U.S. aerospace  workforce, and identify realistic and actionable solutions to meet  identified needs. In April 2007, the NRC reported that the average age of  NASA’s workers has marched steadily upward over the past decade and a  half, and the agency now has a relatively low number of younger workers  to assume future leadership roles as older workers retire. It noted that if  NASA does nothing to achieve a better age distribution across its  workforce, it will suffer gaps in technical leadership and experience,  especially if the development dates for key Vision for Space Exploration  components slip and highly skilled workers with experience in the Space  Shuttle Program retire. The report concluded that if NASA is to avoid a  long-term shortage of the required in-house technical expertise in human  space flight systems and other areas, it will have to adopt a strategy to  address potential long-term shortfalls. The report found that NASA does  have programs and methods currently available for meeting its workforce  needs.
section_title: Strategic Human Capital Management and Workforce Planning
paragraphs: NASA’s issues with human capital strategy development are also taking  place in the context of broader federal trends. Beginning in 2001, we have  designated strategic human capital management as a high-risk area in our  biannual high-risk series and performance and accountability series. We  reported that serious human capital shortfalls are threatening the ability of  many federal agencies to economically, efficiently, and effectively perform  their missions. Federal agencies are faced with a workforce that is  becoming more retirement-eligible and finding gaps in talent because of  changes in the knowledge, skills, and competencies in occupations needed  to accomplish their missions.
Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that  successful organizations in both the public and private sectors use  strategic management approaches to prepare their workforces to meet  present and future mission requirements. For example, preparing a  strategic human capital plan encourages agency managers and  stakeholders to systematically consider what is to be done, how it will be  done, and how to gauge progress and results. Federal agencies have used  varying frameworks for developing and presenting their strategic human  capital plans.
Strategic workforce planning, an integral part of human capital  management and the strategic workforce plan, involves systematic  assessments of current and future human capital needs and the  development of long-term strategies to fill the gaps between an agency’s  current and future workforce requirements. Agency approaches to such  planning can vary with each agency’s particular needs and mission.  However, our previous work suggests that irrespective of the context in  which workforce planning is done, such a process should incorporate five  key principles: (1) involve management and employees, (2) analyze  workforce gaps, (3) employ workforce strategies to fill the gaps, (4) build  the capabilities needed to support workforce strategies, and (5) evaluate  and revise strategies. Figure 4 provides a fuller description of each of the  five principles.
Taken together, these five principles can help federal agencies  successfully implement strategic workforce planning strategies. Planning,  developing, and implementing workforce planning strategies, such as  those that involve reshaping the current workforce, can cause significant  changes in how an agency implements its policies and programs. It is  essential that agencies determine the skills and competencies that are  critical to successfully achieving their missions and goals. This is  especially important as changes in national security, technology, budget  constraints, and other factors change the environment within which  federal agencies operate.
section_title: NASA’s Strategic Human Capital Framework Is Generally Aligned with Its Strategic Mission, Outcomes, and Programmatic Goals but Some Improvements in Workforce Planning Can be Made
paragraphs: NASA’s strategic human capital planning framework is generally aligned  with its strategic mission, outcomes, and programmatic goals. We found  that many of NASA’s efforts related to workforce planning were consistent  with effective strategic workforce planning, such as developing effective  communication strategies. Other efforts, such as monitoring and  evaluating progress toward achieving programmatic goals, are still being  developed, but NASA’s efforts to identify critical skills needed in the  future could be improved.
subsections: section_title: NASA’s Strategies Aligned with Mission
paragraphs: NASA’s leaders have generally aligned its human capital management  strategies with its agency mission, goals, and organizational objectives,  and integrated those strategies into its strategic plans, performance and  accountability plans, and budget requests. NASA has developed a strategic  human capital plan and workforce strategy plan with input from its  mission directorates, centers, and union representatives. NASA’s centers  have also aligned their human capital programs to support the objectives  of the agency. These linkages allow NASA to assess and understand the  extent to which its workforce contributes to achieving the overarching  mission. Other examples of some key policies and plans that guide  NASA’s human capital efforts include the following:    development of the Strategic Management and Governance Handbook  and policy directives that set forth principles by which NASA manages  itself and identifies the specific requirements that drive NASA’s  strategic planning process;    development of a workforce strategy in April 2006 that identified three  underlying workforce principles: building and sustaining 10 healthy  centers, maximizing the use of NASA’s current human capital  capabilities, and evolving to a more flexible workforce that permits  NASA’s human capital efforts to help carry out the Vision for Space  Exploration and science and aeronautics research; and  the creation of NASA’s Workforce Integrated Product Team—which  consists of human capital office division directors and selected human  resource directors—for day-to-day implementation and tracking of  progress and results of human capital initiatives.
NASA’s centers have also aligned their programs with agencywide mission  and goals, and their human capital approaches support the organizational  performance objectives of the agency. For example, the Langley Research  developed career path development plans, and proposes defining career  development plans for individual employees based upon planned  organizational staffing that is driven by current and anticipated work,  budget, and center requirements. Similarly, Glenn Research Center has  developed a strategic implementation plan that includes internal  milestones used to assess the center’s progress in meeting agencywide  goals.
section_title: Developing Effective Communications Strategies
paragraphs: NASA’s headquarters’ leaders and human capital office have involved the  mission directorates and centers in establishing a communication strategy  that intended to create shared expectations for the outcome of the  workforce planning process. NASA’s Workforce Integrated Product Team,  for example, solicited input on its white paper on NASA’s mission support  implementation plan from mission directorates, mission support offices  and centers. They also created a document that captured the disposition of  comments and included this feedback and the status of the  recommendation. The Johnson Space Center hosted a conference for  human resources directors to discuss the redesigning of agency leadership  training, and also worked with Marshall Space Flight Center and Glenn  Research Center to share training and development program approaches.
All of NASA’s centers have regular communication with headquarters  human capital office on policy and procedures relating to the workforce  planning process through telephone conferences, meetings, e-mails  exchange, and video conferences. NASA’s centers also communicate with  each other to leverage knowledge on key policies and programs. The  centers conduct their own communication strategy directly to employees  through committees, working groups, town hall meetings, e-mail  messages, and center newsletters. The Langley Research Center, for  example, sends regular e-mail updates on human capital policy issues to  employees, as well as a human capital newsletter. The Glenn Research  Center uses the Office of Human Resources and Workforce Planning  Personnel Newsletter, the Human Capital Information Environment  Steering Committee Review, and Senior Management Meetings to convey  relevant information on workforce planning and human capital policies.
section_title: Efforts to Monitor and Evaluate Progress toward Achieving Programmatic Goals Are Still Being Developed
paragraphs: In 2007, NASA implemented a new strategic workforce planning  governance structure to strengthen the agency’s human capital strategic  planning capability (see fig. 5). This governance structure has  representation from NASA’s human resources community, mission  directorates, other mission support offices, and the NASA centers. The  governance process will be used to align the agency’s resources in a  manner that ensures the effective utilization of the workforce and skills  needed are available to accomplish the agency’s mission and will focus on:  increasing the level of integration and collaboration across workforce  planning functions; improving the quality of information used to make  decisions; balancing short and longer-term planning needs.
There are three main components of the Governance Structure: the  Agency Governance Group; a Workforce Planning Technical Team; and  other issue-specific technical teams as needed. The Agency Governance  Group is responsible for surfacing high-risk issues and recommendations  to senior management, evaluating the results of planning activities and  redirecting resources and efforts to areas of highest priority, and  overseeing progress of the operational groups and development of  workforce planning capabilities. The Workforce Planning Technical Team  is a standing, on-going group that implements workforce planning  guidance and policies; helps develop and implement Center workforce  planning capabilities; and assists in collecting data in support of workforce  activities undertaken by the team. It is the hub of workforce planning  information collection, distribution, and reporting across NASA. The ad  hoc technical teams are formed to deal with specific issues. Their purpose  is limited to the issue they are tasked with solving, with a defined scope  and timeline. (Agency, mission directorates, center team membership)
In addition, NASA’s human capital office has been reengineering work  processes and developing tools for workforce planning purposes. For  example, according to NASA officials, the Workforce Integrated  Management System ties together the agency’s budgeting and planning  process. The Workforce Integrated Management System is the designated  agency workforce planning tool for future workforce requirements, which  has various modules such as the Workforce Planning System, the  Competency Management System, and others, provides a single repository  of workforce and competency planning data for use in NASA’s workforce  planning decisions and analysis. The Competency Management System is  designed to capture the competencies and skills of NASA’s individual  employees so that the agency can respond to current and projected  workforce requirements, assess center readiness for new activities, locate  expertise, and better align projected work with demand.
NASA is also in the process of developing the Human Capital Information  Environment, which will integrate NASA’s human capital information tools  into one Web-enabled portal. This will allow NASA’s management to go to  one source for information on full-time equivalent vacancies, contractor  data, and workforce forecasting tools.
While we have not evaluated these workforce planning tools, center and  union officials gave NASA’s Competency Management System mixed  reviews. Some told us that the system does not correctly capture the skill  sets of the workforce, while others found it a useful planning tool.
section_title: The Identification of Critical Skills Could Be Improved
paragraphs: Our previous work has found that human capital strategies can work as  intended when periodic measurements and evaluation are conducted that  obtain data for identifying shortfalls and revising future workforce  planning efforts. A 2007 National Research Council report noted that the  agency’s gap analysis was conducted by NASA headquarters and is not  specific enough to determine the number of positions needed in the future  at centers where most of the hiring will occur.
NASA conducted a survey to gauge employee sentiments as the agency  faces the impending retirement of the shuttle and the onset of  Constellation activities. While NASA officials told us that there was an  overall “goodwill” towards the agency and the Space Shuttle Program  specifically, there were some differences in response by centers and some  neutral responses. For example, the survey found that 72 percent of  Marshall Space Flight Center respondents indicated they will likely stay  through the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program because the nature of  Marshall’s work is easily transitioned to the Constellation program, but   63 percent of these respondents indicated that they will likely start looking  for jobs outside the Space Shuttle Program (or retire) starting in 2010 or  later. The Kennedy Space Center response was similar to Marshall’s, with  69 percent of Kennedy’s respondents indicating they would likely stay  through the retirement of the Space Shuttle and approximately 60 percent  indicating that they would start seeking jobs outside of the program or  retire starting in 2010. The Johnson Space Center respondents were  slightly different, with 59 percent likely to stay through retirement and   53 percent of respondents likely to seek job elsewhere starting in 2010 or  later. At the Stennis Space Center, 71 percent of respondents stated they  would stay through the retirement and approximately 71 percent indicated  that they would leave Stennis starting in 2010 or later. Finally, NASA told  us that a number of the neutral responses in the survey indicate that some  level of the workforce is adopting a “wait and see position.” These neutral  responses make up 13 percent of Kennedy, 19 percent of Johnson,   14 percent of Marshall, and 18 percent of Stennis respondents.
The survey is one step in evaluating how some of the workforce is reacting  to ongoing changes. NASA has established metrics to measure or evaluate  its progress toward achieving programmatic goals that has been made by  its human capital efforts, in particular the impact its programs are having  on addressing anticipated problems from the shift from the shuttle to the  Constellation program. We have not evaluated the new metrics.
section_title: NASA Has Generally Been Effective in Recruiting, Developing, and Retaining Science and Engineering Employees, but Future Uncertainties Could Adversely Affect Its Overall Workforce Capacity
paragraphs: NASA uses a variety of approaches to meet its long-term needs for  recruiting, retraining, and sustaining its workforce. In the past 5 years,  NASA hired on average about 330 scientists and engineers per year  (ranging from 199 to 571), the majority of those hired were engineers, and  most of the new hires were for midlevel positions. Recruiting is  accomplished using a multifaceted approach at universities and colleges  and the private sector, that some centers have found quite successful. The  agency has also been granted a number of human capital flexibilities that  allow it to offer incentives to attract and retain scientist and engineers.  However, the agency as a whole faces challenges in recruiting and  retaining highly experienced senior-level engineers in certain specialties.  NASA’s principal workforce challenge will be faced in the transition to the  next generation of human space flight systems.
subsections: section_title: NASA Recruitment Efforts Use a Combination of Techniques
paragraphs: NASA uses a multifaceted approach to recruiting critically skilled workers,  including targeted recruitment activities, educational outreach programs,  improved compensation and benefits packages, professional development  programs, and streamlined hiring authorities. Despite the array of  initiatives used across field centers, they used generally similar  approaches for recruiting and retaining critically skilled workers.
Many of NASA’s external hires have been entry-level positions through the  Cooperative Education Program, which provides centers with the  opportunity to develop and train future employees; discover firsthand the  abilities of potential employees; ensure they are able to meet professional,  technical, and administrative requirements; and achieve a quality  workforce. Another source of candidates for NASA are its education  programs which help inspire students to pursue careers in science,  technology, engineering, and mathematics. These programs help NASA to  develop a pipeline of highly trained scientists and engineers in aeronautics  and space-related disciplines.
NASA believes its reputation also helps centers recruit by attracting a pool  of student applicants for the Cooperative Education Program (co-op).  Centers also administer and tailor their own programs for students, such  as the Johnson Space Center’s efforts with the graduate student research  program, fellowships, and the Minority University Research Education  Program help create a pipeline of students. These programs assits the  center to cultivate ties with local universities and outreach to others with  engineering programs that meet the Johnson Center’s critical workforce  needs. NASA centers use other approaches to stimulated interest in  working for the agency. For example, Ames’ Education Associates  program allows the center to access students and faculty at universities  while giving them the opportunity for hands-on learning opportunities  within mission-relevant NASA programs and projects. Thus, the program  gives Ames’ scientists, engineers and managers another way to have direct  access to short-term, high quality human capital and the opportunity to  tryout potential employees. The Dryden Flight Research Center sponsors  fellowships for students in engineering and science to continue their  graduate studies. Similarly, centers attend university job fairs and  administer student loan repayment programs as a tool to retain their new  hires (see table 1 for additional examples). While NASA centers have  developed numerous talent development programs, NASA does not  generally coordinate these programs across the agency. The agency is  missing opportunities to leverage its resources.
In addition to recruiting, NASA uses a variety of approaches to retain and  sustain its workforce. These tools include nurturing NASA’s reputation as  one of the best places in the federal government to work, pursuing the  strategy of building and engaging all 10 NASA centers, establishing an  agencywide career development program to foster lifelong learning, and  using a number of targeted incentives (e.g., pay and relocation incentives,  pay enhancements for candidates in critical positions, and  Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments).
While some centers told us that they are competitive in recruiting students  to entry-level positions, the agency faces challenges in recruiting and  retaining senior-level employees such as experienced aerospace engineers.  For example, NASA is unable to compete with the private sector in  recruiting senior management because of its lower salaries and smaller  compensation packages, in spite of flexibilities granted to NASA by  Congress through the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004, NRC reported.  Industry senior-level compensation packages, including recruitment  bonuses, far exceed federal government pay scales, which include stock  and retirement packages for senior executives in industry that can range  into the tens of millions of dollars. (See app. II for additional information  on use of the act.) However, NRC did find that NASA’s pay scale is  competitive with industry’s at the entry and middle levels.
NASA centers have developed several ways to respond to this challenge.  According to Langley Research Center officials, for example, enhanced  annual leave under the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 is used to recruit  senior executives from outside of the federal government, members of the  Senior Executive Service, and senior-level employees so that they can  accrue more vacation time. The Johnson Center uses retention bonuses to  recruit and retain personnel in hard-to-fill positions that can have  undesirable hours, such as mission operations controller positions and  physicians. For example, it developed the Gemini flight controller  initiative, which has improved retention of controllers. Gemini flight  controllers are certified in three systems and work nights and weekends to  maintain the International Space Station. The Center had difficulty  recruiting and maintaining employees in this area, so it piloted a 2-year  program that offered additional training and retention bonuses with 1-year  service agreements. To help the Johnson Center retain its medical officers,  a Physician’s Comparability Allowance is used to make the center more  competitive with the private medical community. The Center also uses  retention bonuses, but sparingly; these are generally related to specific  knowledge retention or transition needs.
Despite the many challenges that NASA faces today, the agency continues  to rank as one top places to work in federal government. Additionally,  NASA officials told us that the NASA’s brand name continues to attract  new applicants from colleges and universities throughout the country.  Furthermore, NASA officials said that its employees are motivated by the  agency’s mission. In some cases, this results in employees continuing to  work after they become eligible for retirement, and some former  employees volunteer their time and expertise after retiring from the  agency.
section_title: NASA Increased Use of Term Appointments
paragraphs: NASA uses term appointments for most of the agency’s new hires of  scientists and engineers (see table 2). Term appointments are offers of  nonpermanent employment with NASA for a limited amount of time,  which is extendable. A NASA term employee, if he or she meets eligibility  criteria, may be converted to a career or career-conditional appointment  without going through the competitive examination process normally used  to make such appointments. According to NASA officials, job candidates  can be offered term appointments up to 6 years, but each center varies the  length of appointment. For example, the Langley Research Center offers  appointments to all new hires of 2 to 4 years; according to Johnson Space  Center officials, it offers appointments to all new term hires for 6 years,  but usually converts them to permanent after 2 years; depending on a  continuing need for the position and proven performance of the employee  on the job; Glenn Space Center converts cooperative program students to  6 year appointments. NASA has increased the used of term appointments  for recent science and engineering hires. The use of such appointments for  all new hires at NASA has increased from 6 percent in 2002 to 67 percent  in 2006, and for entry-level science and engineering positions, from less  than 2 percent in 2002 to 42 percent in 2006. Center officials stated that  using term appointments generally does not deter applicants.
section_title: NASA Has Development Programs in Place to Enhance Existing Capacity
paragraphs: NASA’s centers also invest in professional development and mentoring  programs to help meet specific performance needs and help centers create  cohesive cultures for new employees. For example, according to Glenn  Space Center officials, it uses the Advancing Careers and Employee  Success program as a formal mentoring effort designed to match  interested staff with more seasoned personnel who serve as mentors and  engage in activities such as designing developmental assignments and  networking opportunities. The centers also use additional programs that  include opportunities for formal and on-the-job training, individual  development plans, and rotational assignments for students to gain  different work experiences during their co-op, periodic consultations with  senior managers, periodic formal assessments, and mentoring  relationships with other employees. For example, the Johnson Center’s   co-op students have rotational assignments, formal mentors that provide  guidance, and performance feedback during the course of their co-op  assignments.
section_title: NASA Is Taking Efforts to Develop Long-Term Solutions
paragraphs: NASA recognizes the challenges it faces in its transition into the future  from the present, and has submitted to Congress a Human Capital Plan for  Mission Execution, Transition, and Retirement of the Space Shuttle  program. This focuses on retaining critical workforce skills needed for  safe and successful mission execution and the smooth transition of Shuttle  workforce skills to other agency programs. Currently NASA is mapping the  shuttle workforce to Constellation Program work in a document that will  reflect the planned migration of the employees, phased to correspond to  key milestones in both programs. According to NASA, the first mapping is  scheduled to be completed in September 2007 and will be revised as the  shuttle flight manifest schedules are updated and Constellation Program  needs are further defined. The agency estimates that many of the  employees currently working on the Space Shuttle Program will be  working on other agency programs such as the International Space Station  or Constellation Systems Program.
NASA decided to maintain program management and systems engineering  competencies within the civil service workforce to enable it to have the  capabilities it needs to develop programs and projects for its missions.  However, NASA does expect to use prime contractors in the development  of major systems such as launchers, upper stages, and crew vehicles. It  sees its role as the manager of the interfaces between major systems. In  order to accomplish this, NASA will develop strategic workforce plans to  align its workforce with the current and planned work of the agency.  Specifically, centers will need to determine whether the composition of  their workforce has the needed competencies to accomplish its tasks.  Centers will need to reshape their workforce to meet changes in  workforce demand as projects progress or are completed.
section_title: Human Capital Challenges in Retiring the Space Shuttle Program and Transitioning to Constellation Activities
paragraphs: The gap between the scheduled retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010  and the resumption of human space flight currently scheduled for 2015  will pose a unique set of challenges. NASA must realign where necessary  and plan for a workforce that will not be quite as large after the retirement  of the Shuttle Space Program. Technology funding must be redirected to  major development activities, programs canceled, aeronautics program  funding reduced, the science program restructured and planned funding  reduced. All these redirections, restructurings, and cancellations will  contribute to NASA’s “uncovered capacity” problem. The agency plans to  use its civil service workforce to sustain its core technical capabilities.  This is a long-standing workforce challenge for NASA, particularly since it  must balance the workload across NASA centers to maximize the  effectiveness of the overall organization.
Recognizing that its workforce is its most critical asset and it must  continue to have the scientific and technical expertise necessary to be a  leader in aeronautics, earth and space science, and technology, NASA has  tried, over the last several years, to address its workforce problems by  using employee buyouts to rebalance its workforce and establishing hiring  guidelines that emphasize filling vacancies from within the agency. The  agency recently requested Congress to amend the National Aeronautics  and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004  to authorize NASA to use additional human capital flexibilities so that the  workforce might be reduced without having a reduction in force.
NASA is also attempting to ensure that its field centers can accomplish  their missions through a focus on required core capabilities, to be  accomplished by directing all research, technology development, and  programs and projects, to the maximum extent possible, to the centers.  While improving workforce planning to better prepare for challenges in  the future is definitely an agencywide priority, some senior center officials  told us that they are currently focused on implementing immediate human  capital programs. To the agency’s credit, some centers have created  knowledge management programs. For example, the Johnson Space  Center recently appointed a Chief Knowledge Officer who is developing  efforts to capture the experiences and knowledge of senior employees in  engineering, management, and administration who may retire in the near  future. In addition, the Johnson Space Center has an active Oral History  Program that captures the experience of those individuals who first  developed the technologies used in previous space flight programs,  including life sciences and astromaterials. Participants include managers,  engineers, technicians, doctors, astronauts, and other employees of NASA  and aerospace contractors who occupied key roles during the Mercury,  Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle programs. The Glenn Research  Center’s Knowledge Management Working Group, has piloted programs  that record interviews with their senior managers to retain some of their  work experiences, and the center uses the Advancing Careers and  Employee Success mentoring program and shadowing of senior engineers  by recently hired engineers to transfer knowledge.
section_title: Concluding Observations
paragraphs: NASA has placed considerable emphasis on human capital management  and addressing challenges that the agency has been facing in recruiting,  retaining, and developing critical personnel. At the headquarters level, this  has involved strategic planning to align agency goals with actions taken by  the centers such as the introduction of new information systems to  enhance workforce planning. At the center level, this has involved the  application of new ways to attract and develop staff. Taken together, these  actions represent credible progress in enhancing the workforce and  preparing for the future. However, there are challenges ahead for NASA  that will test its ability to sustain its progress—notably the retirement of  the shuttle program and the expansion of exploration activities. The  magnitude of these changes and their implication for future workforce  needs will require NASA to accurately measure its progress, identify gaps  or obstacles that need to be addressed, and sustain a high degree of  coordination with its centers and work is just getting under way. The  extent to which NASA can anticipate these challenges and lay the  groundwork for addressing them will greatly affect its ability to negotiate  them in the future.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided draft copies of this report to NASA for review and comment.  NASA provided written comments and they are included in appendix III.  Separately, NASA provided technical comments, which have been  addressed in the report, as appropriate.
We will send copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and interested  congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others  upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this  report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major  contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To assess the alignment of the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration’s (NASA) human capital framework with its strategic  mission and programmatic goals, we analyzed a broad range of NASA’s  policy, planning, and implementation documents; reviewed budget  documents and performance and accountability reports; and interviewed  officials in NASA’s Office of Human Capital Management, Office of the  Chief Financial Officer, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office  of the Chief Engineer, Office of Diversity and Equal Opportunity, Office of  Education, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, and the Space  Operations Mission Directorate and attended NASA Advisory Council  meetings. We did not evaluate how well the various NASA plans,  programs, systems and teams (such as the Available for New Work  Technical Team) actually functioned. We visited 3 of NASA’s 9 centers— the Glenn Research Center, the Johnson Space Center, and the Langley  Research Center. We collected data from the following centers—the Ames  Research Center, the Dryden Flight Research Center, the Goddard Space  Flight Center, the Kennedy Space Center, the Marshall Space Flight  Center, and the Stennis Space Center. Finally, we conducted interviews at  the National Research Council.
To assess NASA’s efforts to effectively recruit, develop, and retain  critically skilled science and engineering staff we applied our five strategic  workforce planning principles. In doing so, we analyzed NASA’s   (1) demographics data; (2) critical skills information; (3) NASA’s policy,  procedures and guidance for recruiting and hiring; (4) implementation of  information systems, programs, and processes that support human capital  management and planning. Specifically, we interviewed NASA Center  managers about the supply and demand for critically skilled workers,  examined NASA’s efforts to develop a “pipeline” for recruiting these  personnel and reviewed its application of new flexibilities and authorities  under the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004. Also, we interviewed NASA  officials responsible for workforce and strategic human capital planning to  determine how NASA plans to address future challenges in managing its  science and engineering workforce. We also analyzed and compared  NASA’s science and engineering workforce and strategic human capital  planning efforts with GAO’s principles of effective human capital  management. In addition, we interviewed NASA officials responsible for  workforce and strategic human capital planning to determine how NASA  plans to address future challenges in managing its science and engineering  workforce. We also analyzed and compared NASA’s science and  engineering workforce and strategic human capital planning efforts with  principles of effective human capital management. In addition to obtaining  NASA officials’ views and concerns regarding future human capital  challenges, we analyzed data from the Office of Personnel Management’s  (OPM) Central Personnel Data File (CPDF), which is its database of  federal civilian employees, and we reviewed data from NASA’s Workforce  Information Cubes for NASA (WICN) which is a workforce reporting and  monitoring system. Specifically, to assess the potential for retirements in  the next few years in NASA’s science and engineering workforce, we  analyzed CPDF data on NASA employees—as of September 30, 2006. We  limited our analysis to science and engineering occupational categories  that comprise NASA’s science and engineering workforce. We analyzed  CPDF separations and demographic data (on the ages and years of  service) and NASA’s WICN data for scientists and engineers in order to  identify the extent to which NASA’s experienced science and engineering  workforce is eligible for and thus has the potential for retiring in the near  future. We did not independently verify the CPDF data on NASA’s science  and engineering occupation series employees for the year we reviewed.  However, we previously reported that data from the CPDF for key  variables used in this study—occupation, agency/subagency, birth date,  and service computation date—were 99 percent accurate. Moreover, we  compared the CPDF results for NASA employees to data from NASA’s  WICN system. CPDF data is limited to federal Executive Branch civilian  employees, and excludes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,  intelligence agencies, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Office of the  Vice President, Postal Rate Commission, Tennessee Valley Authority, U.S.  Postal Service, White House Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation,  Public Health Service’s Commissioned Officer Corps, Non-appropriated  fund employees and foreign nationals overseas, and the Judicial Branch.  Legislative Branch CPDF data is limited to the Government Printing  Office, U.S. Tax Court, and selected commissions. To assess the reliability  of the data we received from NASA’s WICN system we (1) reviewed  system documentation, (2) interviewed knowledgeable agency officials,  (3) performed manual data testing for missing data, outliers, and obvious  errors, (4) compared the data to CPDF results, and (5) reviewed the SQL  code that produced the data. We determined the data we used from the  CPDF and NASA’s WICN system to be sufficiently reliable for our purpose.  We leveraged previous GAO work on the retirement of the Space Shuttle  Program and the subsequent transition of its workforce to the  Constellation program.
We conducted our work from July 2006 through June 2007 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
section_title: Appendix II: Use of Human Capital Authorities by NASA
paragraphs: The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 provides new human capital authorities  to NASA to enable the agency to address its workforce challenges. The  NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 requires that the agency submit a report to  Congress for 6 fiscal years, beginning in fiscal year 2004, summarizing  NASA’s use of these authorities during each preceding fiscal year. Below is  a summary of NASA’s use of these flexibilities and those under another  authority during fiscal years 2004 through 2006.
section_title: Appendix III: Comments from NASA
section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant Director;  Christopher Kunitz; Masha P. Pastuhov-Purdie; Jose A. Ramos;   Sylvia Schatz; Rebecca Shea; Robert Swierczek; and Gregory H. Wilmoth  made key contributions to this report.