Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed
Published: 2003-06-16T00:00:00

Fast Facts:

Highlights:
section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug activities. In fiscal years 2000-03 alone, the United States provided over $2.5 billion. Despite this assistance, Colombia remains the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the United States. The report discusses the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army and for a U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial eradication program. It also addresses challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these programs.
section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support. Nearly all this assistance has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations. However, the Colombian Army cannot operate and maintain the U.S.-provided helicopters at current levels without U.S. support because it does not yet have sufficient numbers of qualified pilots and mechanics. U.S. officials estimate that up to $150 million a year is needed to sustain the ongoing programs. In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in every year until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent, and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25 percent--the second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed this success primarily to the Colombian government's willingness to spray coca and poppy plants without restriction. These officials estimate that about $80 million a year is needed to continue the program at its current pace. Although the U.S.-backed counternarcotics program in Colombia has begun to achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia and the United States must deal with financial and management challenges. As GAO noted in 2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to achieve it. Colombia's ability to contribute more is limited, and it continues to face challenges associated with its long-standing insurgency and the need to ensure it complies with human rights standards and other requirements in order for U.S. assistance to continue.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the  early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug production and trafficking activities.  Despite this assistance, Colombia remains the world’s leading producer  and distributor of cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the  United States. Recognizing that illicit drug activities are a serious problem  in Colombia, the Colombian government in October 1999 announced a  $7.5 billion plan, known as Plan Colombia, which among other things  proposed reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal  narcotics by 50 percent over 6 years. In fiscal years 2000 through 2003, the  United States provided over $2.5 billion to Colombia for counternarcotics  assistance.  For fiscal year 2004, the administration has proposed an  additional $700 million in assistance to address many of the same purposes.  However, insurgent groups involved in illicit drug activities control more  than 40 percent of Colombia’s territory, making Colombian government and  U.S. interdiction and eradication operations immensely difficult and dangerous and leaving illicit-drug growers with few legal alternatives to  earn a living.
A key component of the Colombian-U.S. counternarcotics strategy was  forming a Colombian Army 2,285-man counternarcotics brigade and  providing it with helicopters to move the troops around southern Colombia  where much of the coca was being grown.  The brigade’s primary mission  was to plan and conduct interdiction operations against cocaine producers  and traffickers. Closely allied with the brigade’s objective was the  Colombian National Police’s goal to significantly reduce, if not eliminate,  coca and opium poppy cultivation through aerial eradication.  In some of  the insurgent-controlled areas of the country, the brigade was supposed to  provide security for the eradication program. Various components of the  Department of Defense—primarily with funding from the Department of  State—provided the training and equipment for the counternarcotics  brigade conditional on the Colombian military’s respect for human rights.  State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  has supported the police aerial eradication program.
You expressed concern that U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to  the Colombian Army was slow to arrive and has not been used as originally  envisioned and that the aerial eradication program has little to show for its  efforts. In response to your concerns, we determined (1) the status of U.S.  counternarcotics assistance provided to the Colombian Army in fiscal  years 2000-03, and how this assistance is being used; (2) what the U.S.- supported Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has  accomplished in recent years; and (3) what challenges Colombia and the  United States face in sustaining these programs.
To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent planning,  implementation, and related documentation and met with cognizant U.S.  officials at the Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C.; the  U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U.S.  Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Colombian  military, police, and government officials and visited Colombian Army  bases at Larandia, Tolemaida, and Tres Esquinas and aerial eradication  operational sites in the primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. In  addition, we observed a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade airlift  operation and several aerial eradication missions.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The United States has supported Colombia’s efforts to reduce drug- trafficking activities and stem the flow of illegal drugs entering the United  States for more than 2 decades. Despite Colombian and U.S. efforts to  disrupt drug-trafficking activities, the U.S. government has not reported  any net reduction in the processing or export of refined cocaine to the  United States.  According to State, Colombia provides 90 percent of the  cocaine and approximately 40 percent of the heroin entering the United  States. To further complicate matters, the country’s two largest insurgent  groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National  Liberation Army—and paramilitary groups have expanded their  involvement in drug trafficking. According to a State official, the  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the paramilitary United Self- Defense Forces of Colombia are involved in every facet of narcotics  trafficking, including cultivating, processing, and transporting. The  insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s  territory east and south of the Andes—which, as illustrated in figure 1,  includes the primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. According to the  Drug Enforcement Administration, several billion dollars flow into  Colombia each year from the cocaine trade alone. This vast amount of drug  money has made it possible for these organizations to gain unprecedented  economic, political, and social power and influence.
In an effort to address the influx of cocaine and heroin from Colombia, the  United States has funded a counternarcotics strategy in Colombia that  includes programs for interdiction, eradication, and alternative  development which must be carefully coordinated to achieve mutually  reinforcing results. Besides assistance for the Colombian Army  counternarcotics brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial  eradication program, the United States has supported Colombian efforts to  interdict illicit-drug trafficking along rivers and in the air and alternative  development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons  programs.
State and Defense have provided most of the counternarcotics funding and  State, through its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement  Affairs and Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S. Embassy Bogotá,  oversees the program. In addition, the Military Group in the U.S. Embassy  Bogotá manages much of the assistance to the Colombian military. Since  the introduction of Plan Colombia in fiscal year 2000, the United States has  provided more than $2.5 billion in assistance. (See table 1.)
In response to increased violence in Colombia during early 2002 and the  recognition that the insurgents and illicit drug activities are inextricably  linked, the Congress provided “expanded authority” for the use of the U.S.  assistance to Colombia. This authority enables the government of  Colombia to use the U.S.-trained and -equipped counternarcotics brigade,  the U.S.-provided helicopters, and other U.S.-provided counternarcotics  assistance to fight groups designated as terrorist organizations as well as to  fight drug trafficking.  Similar authority was provided for fiscal year 2003  and is being sought for fiscal year 2004. For fiscal year 2004, the  administration has requested about $700 million in funding for Colombia.
section_title: U.S. Assistance to the Colombian Army Has Been Delivered, but Problems Were Encountered
paragraphs: During fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million  in assistance to the Colombian Army for initial training and equipment for  the counternarcotics brigade and for 72 helicopters and related  operational, maintenance, and training support. These helicopters were  intended to transport the counternarcotics brigade on counternarcotics  missions. Nearly all this assistance has been delivered and is being utilized  by the counternarcotics brigade in conducting operations. However, both  the United States and the Colombian Army experienced some  unanticipated problems that delayed the operational use of the helicopters.  In addition, U.S. support will be needed for the foreseeable future to  sustain operations.
subsections: section_title: Status of the Brigade
paragraphs: The United States originally agreed to provide training and equipment for a  Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade made up of three battalions and  a headquarters staff with a total of about 2,285 professional and  conscripted soldiers. The battalions became operational in December 1999,  December 2000, and May 2001, respectively. The counternarcotics brigade  was assigned to the Colombian military’s Joint Task Force-South, which  was headquartered at Tres Esquinas in Caqueta—one of the principal coca- growing regions of Colombia. The task force comprised units from the  Colombian Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps and was tasked with the  overall military mission of regaining government control over southern  Colombia, primarily in the Putumayo and Caqueta departments.
The United States provided the counternarcotics brigade with about  $45 million in training and equipment—from weapons and ammunition to  rations, uniforms, and canteens. The brigade’s primary mission was to plan  and conduct interdiction operations against drug trafficking activities,  including destroying illicit drug-producing facilities, and, when called upon,  to provide security in insurgent-controlled areas where aerial eradication  operations were planned.
Although the Colombian Army’s counternarcotics brigade has achieved  some success, the Colombian military has not regained control over large  parts of the country where coca and opium poppy are grown. According to  U.S. and Colombian officials, the counternarcotics brigade was highly  effective during 2001 but somewhat less effective during 2002. For  example, during 2001 the brigade destroyed 25 cocaine hydrochloride  laboratories while in 2002 it destroyed only 4 laboratories.  U.S. embassy  officials stated that the brigade became less effective because the  insurgents moved their drug producing activities, such as the laboratories,  beyond the reach of the brigade. In addition, according to these officials,  the brigade became more involved in protecting infrastructure, such as  bridges and power stations, and performing base security. Moreover, the  aerial eradication program did not call on the brigade to provide ground  security on very many occasions, essentially planning spray missions in the  less threatening areas.
In August 2002, U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials agreed to  restructure the brigade to make it a rapid reaction force capable of making  quick, tactical strikes on a few days’ notice. As part of this restructuring,  the Colombian Army designated the brigade a national asset capable of  operating anywhere in Colombia rather than just in its prior area of  responsibility in southern Colombia. The newly restructured brigade  consists of three combat battalions and a support battalion with a total of  about 1,900 soldiers, all of whom are professional. Two of the combat  battalions have been retrained. The third combat battalion should be  retrained by mid-June 2003. This change, according to NAS, Military Group,  and Colombian Army officials, will improve the brigade’s ability to conduct  operations against high-value, drug-trafficking targets, such as laboratories  containing cocaine and the leadership of insurgent groups involved in drug- trafficking activities. One of the retrained battalions has been operating in  Narino department since early May.
section_title: Status of the Helicopters
paragraphs: A key component of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia was enhancing the  air mobility of the counternarcotics brigade. To accomplish this, the United  States provided the Colombian Army with 33 UH-1N helicopters, 14 UH-60  Black Hawk helicopters, and 25 UH-II helicopters.  The helicopters were  provided to give the brigade the airlift needed to transport its personnel in  the Joint Task Force-South’s area of responsibility in southern Colombia.  Both the UH-1Ns and the UH-60 Black Hawks are operational; the UH-IIs  are scheduled for full operations later this year. However, the Colombian  Army continues to need U.S. assistance and contractor pilots and  mechanics to fly the aircraft.
In September 1999, State and Defense initiated a plan to provide the  Colombian Army with 33 UH-1N helicopters that State had purchased from  Canada to support the counternarcotics brigade. The helicopters were  intended to serve as interim aircraft until the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters  funded by the United States as part of Plan Colombia were delivered. The  UH-1N helicopters were delivered in various stages between November  1999 and March 2001.  According to the U.S. embassy, the helicopters flew  their first mission in December 2000. Since then, the helicopters have flown  19,500 hours in combat and have supported more than 430  counternarcotics operations for the brigade. Although Colombian Army  personnel are qualified as pilots and mechanics, many of the experienced  pilots and mechanics who operate and maintain the helicopters are  provided through a U.S.-funded contractor. For example, 20 contractor  personnel serve as pilots-in-command when flying operations.
With the $208 million provided as U.S. assistance under Plan Colombia for  UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, State and Defense procured 14 helicopters,  a 2-year spare parts package, and a 1-year contractor support package. The  helicopters were delivered between July 2001 and December 2001.  However, the helicopters did not begin to support operations of the  counternarcotics brigade until November 2002 because of the lack of  Colombian Army pilots who met the minimum qualifications needed to  operate the helicopters. Forty-two Colombian Army personnel have  completed the minimum UH-60 pilot training, 13 have qualified as pilot-in- command. U.S.-funded contract pilots fill in as pilots-in-command. In  addition, a U.S.-funded contractor continues to maintain the helicopters  and provide maintenance training.
With the $60 million provided as U.S. assistance under Plan Colombia for  UH-II helicopters, State procured 25 aircraft. The original plan was to  deliver the UH-II helicopters to the Colombian Army between November  2001 and June 2002. However, the 25 helicopters were delivered between  March 2002 and November 2002. This 5-month delay occurred because the  Colombian military considered using a different engine than the one  usually installed because it may have been easier to maintain. After  numerous discussions, Colombia decided to use the more commonly used  engine.
According to NAS officials, although some of the UH-II helicopters are  being used for missions, all the helicopters will not be operational until  June 2003. As of January 2003, 25 Colombian Army pilots had completed  their initial training and 21 of these pilots are completing the training  needed to qualify for operational missions. However, contractor pilots  continue to supplement Colombian Army pilots and a U.S.-funded  contractor continues to provide maintenance support.
section_title: Problems in Training Helicopter Pilots and Mechanics
paragraphs: Although all the U.S.-provided helicopters are in Colombia, a number of  unanticipated problems were encountered in training Colombian Army  pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the helicopters. Some of  these problems continue to limit the Colombian Army’s ability to operate  and maintain the aircraft. Primarily, the Colombian Army will have to  continue to rely on contractor support because it will not have enough  trained pilots-in-command and senior mechanics for the foreseeable future.
subsections: section_title: Funding for Initial Training Was Not Provided
paragraphs: When the United States agreed to provide the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters  for the Colombian Army in July 2000, the assistance for Plan Colombia did  not include any funds to train the Colombian pilots and mechanics needed  to operate and maintain the helicopters. In October 2000—about 3 months  after passage of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia—State reported that,  although the Colombian military had qualified pilots and support  personnel, it did not have the numbers of personnel required to field and  operate the new helicopters. State requested that Defense provide the  training needed for the pilots and mechanics. Although Defense agreed to  provide the training, it took an additional 3 months to decide that the U.S.  Army would be responsible and to identify a funding source. In February  2001, Defense reported that it would transfer up to $20 million from other  counternarcotics projects in Colombia for this training.
section_title: Training Has Not Been Completed
paragraphs: A training plan was approved in mid-2001. Although the plan provided  training for Colombian Army personnel to meet the minimum qualifications  for a pilot and mechanic, it did not include the additional training necessary  to fly missions in a unit or to become a senior mechanic. Basic training for  117 helicopter pilots—known as initial entry rotary wing training—began in  November 2001 and is projected to be completed by December 2004. This  training is intended to provide a pool or pipeline of pilots for more  advanced training to fly specific helicopters. In addition, according to NAS  officials, a new pilot takes an average of 2 to 3 years to progress to pilot-in- command.
Specific UH-60 pilot training for 42 personnel began in August 2001 and  was completed in September 2002.
Specific UH-II pilot training for 75 personnel began in May 2002 and is  projected to be completed in December 2003.
In addition, according to NAS and U.S. contractor officials, 105 out of 159  Colombian Army personnel have completed the basic UH-60 and UH-II  maintenance training and are taking more advanced training to qualify as  senior mechanics. These officials told us that the remaining 54 personnel  will receive the contractor-provided basic training in the near future, but  they did not know when it would begin. NAS and U.S. contractor officials  also told us that it typically takes 3 to 5 years for mechanics to gain the  experience necessary to become fully qualified on specific helicopter  systems, in particular the UH-60 Black Hawks.
section_title: Colombian Army Support Is Limited
paragraphs: The Colombian Army Aviation Battalion is responsible for providing  helicopters and other aircraft and personnel for all Colombian Army  missions with an aviation component, including counternarcotics and  counterinsurgency operations throughout Colombia. Information provided  by the Colombian Aviation Battalion shows that it is staffed at only 80 percent of its required levels and, over the past several years, it has  received between 60 percent to 70 percent of its requested budget for  logistics and maintenance. According to Colombian Army personnel,  current plans indicate that the missions the battalion needs to support will  be expanding, but they do not know if they will have sufficient resources to  meet these demands.
The decision by the Colombian military to continue using the UH-1N  helicopters in addition to the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters will make it  more difficult for the Aviation Battalion to provide the numbers of  personnel needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. State originally  intended that the UH-1N helicopters would only be used by the  counternarcotics brigade until the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters were  available to support operations. However, in 2002, the Colombian military  requested and received approval from the United States to continue using  these helicopters. NAS and Military Group officials stated that this means  the number of pilots and mechanics needed to operate all the aircraft  increases the total requirement for the Aviation Battalion. For example, the  battalion will have to have a total of 84 additional Colombian Army  personnel qualified to serve as pilots-in-command (42) and co-pilots (42).  Even though the U.S.-funded contractor has trained Colombian Army  personnel since the UH-1N’s initial delivery in 1999, only 61 Colombian  Army personnel remain in the program.
section_title: Trained Personnel Were Not Available
paragraphs: According to bilateral agreements between Colombia and the United  States, the Colombian Army must ensure that pilots and mechanics who  receive U.S. training be assigned to positions using their training for a  minimum of 2 years. This has not always been the case. For example,   According to U.S. embassy data, at least 105 Colombian Army personnel  have completed the basic helicopter maintenance course. As of January  2003, 65 of these individuals were scheduled to receive additional  training that would enable them to become fully qualified mechanics  who can perform maintenance without U.S.-contractor oversight. Of  these, 22 had not reported for training. Neither the Military Group nor  the Aviation Battalion could provide us the location of these individuals.
According to U.S. contractor personnel, at least 10 pilots-in-command  should be available to fly missions.  Although 19 Colombian Army  personnel were qualified to serve as pilots-in-command on UH-1N  helicopters, as of January 2003, only one pilot was assigned to serve in  this position. The remaining nine pilots-in-command were provided by  the U.S. contractor. Again, neither the Military Group nor the Aviation  Battalion could provide us the location of these individuals.
section_title: Operations and Training Slowed for 5 Months
paragraphs: Of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2002, $140 million was used to  support Colombian Army counternarcotics efforts. Most of this went to  support U.S.-provided helicopter operations, maintenance, logistical, and  training support. However, not all the funding could be released until the  Secretary of State certified, in two separate reports to appropriate  congressional committees, that the Colombian military was making  progress meeting certain human rights conditions. According to U.S.  embassy political section personnel, they encountered difficulties  developing the information required to make the human rights  determination and certification. Because State was late in providing these  reports, the U.S. embassy could not use this funding for operations and training on two occasions for a total of about 5 months during 2002.   According to NAS, these delays resulted in fewer counternarcotics  operations and limited the training and experience Colombian Army pilots  could obtain to qualify as pilots-in-command.
section_title: Continued U.S. Support Needed to Sustain Operations
paragraphs: U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan  Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army  taking over these responsibilities. However, NAS, Military Group, and  Colombian Army officials stated that a continued level of U.S. contractor  presence will be needed beyond this date because the Aviation Battalion is  not expected to have the personnel trained or the resources necessary.  Although Military Group officials stated that they have not officially  estimated what this assistance level will be, they tentatively projected that  it would cost between $100 million and $150 million annually to sustain the  U.S.-supported counternarcotics programs. Moreover, other recently  initiated U.S. programs will likely require U.S. assistance and contractor  support, but the long-term costs of sustaining such programs are not  known.
subsections: section_title: Infrastructure Units
paragraphs: In 2002, the United States agreed to provide $104 million in training and  equipment to Colombian Army units whose primary mission is to protect  important infrastructure but whose initial mission is to minimize terrorist  attacks along 110 miles of the Cano Limon pipeline in the Arauca  department. The units will focus on patrolling, reconnaissance, and  immediate reaction in the area of the pipeline and key facilities.
Of the $104 million, $6 million is for ongoing U.S. Special Forces training  and $98 million is for procuring 2 UH-60 and 4 UH-II helicopters and  associated training and ground support. NAS and Military Group officials  indicated that some level of contractor support will likely be needed for the  foreseeable future because the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion does  not have sufficient numbers of trained pilots and mechanics to operate and  maintain the helicopters.
section_title: Commando Battalion
paragraphs: In 2002, the Colombian military decided to form a Commando Battalion  whose mission will be to conduct operations against high-value targets  including the capture of high-level leaders of insurgent and paramilitary  units. The United States has agreed to provide the battalion with training  and equipment. Although the costs of training are not readily available,  Military Group officials estimated that the United States will provide about  $5 million in equipment, including weapons and ammunition,  communication equipment, night-vision devices, and other individual  equipment.
section_title: Planning Assistance Teams
paragraphs: Also in early 2003, the United States began assigning U.S. military  personnel to selected Colombian military units for up to 179 days. These  personnel advise the commander and help plan attacks on drug trafficking  and related insurgent targets. Military Group officials did not know when— or if—personnel or funds would be approved for all the planned teams  because of other priorities, such as deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.  According to Military Group officials, these teams could cost about  $8 million annually if all become operational.
section_title: Colombia’s Aerial Eradication Program Has Had Mixed Results
paragraphs: Since the early 1990s, State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs (through the U.S. Embassy Bogotá NAS and the  bureau’s Office of Aviation) has supported the Colombian National Police’s  efforts to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the cultivation of coca and  opium poppy. However, for the most part, the net hectares of coca under  cultivation in Colombia continued to rise until 2002, and the net hectares of  opium poppy under cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001-02.   In addition, the U.S. Embassy Bogotá has made little progress in having the  Colombian National Police assume more responsibility for the aerial  eradication program, which requires costly U.S. contractor assistance to  carry out.
subsections: section_title: Recent Progress in Reducing Net Cultivation of Coca and Poppy
paragraphs: As shown in figure 2, the number of hectares under coca cultivation rose  more than threefold from 1995 to 2001—from 50,900 hectares to 169,800  hectares—despite substantially increased eradication efforts. But in 2002,  the Office of Aviation estimated that the program eradicated 102,225  hectares of coca—a record high. In March 2003, the Office of National Drug  Control Policy reported for the first time since before 1995 a net reduction  in coca cultivation in Colombia—from 169,800 hectares to 144,450  hectaresa 15 percent decline.
As shown in figure 3, the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation  varied between 6,100 and 6,600 for the period 1995-98 but rose to 7,500  hectares in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, the net hectares of poppy estimated  under cultivation declined to 6,500 and, in 2002, further declined to 4,900— nearly a 35 percent reduction in net cultivation over the past 2 years.
NAS and Office of Aviation officials attributed the recent unprecedented  reductions in both coca and poppy cultivation primarily to the current  Colombian government’s willingness to allow the aerial eradication  program to operate in all areas of the country. They also noted that   the number of spray aircraft had increased from 10 in July 2001 to 17 in   recently acquired spray aircraft can carry up to twice the herbicide as  the older aircraft; and   as of January 2003, aircraft were flying spray missions from three  forward operating locations—a first for the program, according to NAS  officials.
The ability to keep an increased number of spray aircraft operating out of  three bases was made possible, at least in part, because NAS hired a  contractor to work with the Colombian National Police to, among other  things, help maintain their aircraft. As a result, the availability of the police  aircraft needed for the spray program increased. Moreover, in August 2002,  the Colombian government allowed the police to return to a higher strength  herbicide mixture which, according to NAS officials, improved the spray’s  effectiveness.  NAS officials project that the aerial eradication program  can reduce the amount of coca and poppy cultivation to 30,000 hectares  and 5,000 hectares, respectively, by 2005 or 2006, assuming the police  continue the current pace and can spray in all areas of Colombia.
section_title: Colombian National Police Have Not Assumed Control over Aerial Eradication Operations
paragraphs: As we reported in 2000, beginning in 1998, U.S. embassy officials became  concerned with the rising U.S. presence in Colombia and associated costs  of the aerial eradication program. At the time, the embassy began  developing a 3-year plan to have the Colombian National Police assume  increased operational control over the program. But for various reasons,  the police never agreed to the plan. Since then, contractor involvement and  the associated costs have continued to rise and the Colombian National  Police are not yet able to assume more control of the aerial eradication  program.
As shown in table 2, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Aviation reported that  the direct cost for the U.S. contractor providing aircraft maintenance and  logistical support and many of the pilots was $37.8 million. In addition, NAS  provided $10.7 million for fuel, herbicide, and related support for a total of  $48.5 million. For fiscal year 2003, the comparable estimates for contractor  and NAS-provided support were $41.5 million and $44.8 million,  respectively, for a total of $86.3 million. Most of this increase occurred  between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support the additional spray aircraft,  multiple operating locations, and the anticipated continuation of spray  operations throughout Colombia. According to NAS and Office of Aviation  officials, these costs are expected to remain relatively constant for the next  several years.
The Colombian National Police do not provide funding per se for the aerial  eradication program and, therefore, the value of its contributions are more  difficult to quantify. In recent years, the police have provided helicopters  and fixed-wing aircraft for spray mission support and the use of many of its  facilities throughout Colombia. In addition, the police have about 3,600  personnel assigned to counternarcotics missions and estimate that 84 are  directly supporting the aerial eradication program.
section_title: U.S. Efforts to Improve Police Capacity for Aerial Eradication
paragraphs: To help the Colombian National Police increase its capacity to assume  more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, NAS has initiated  several efforts. In addition to hiring a contractor to help with the Aviation  Service’s operations, NAS has initiated a program to train T-65 spray plane  pilots and plans to begin training search and rescue personnel so they can  accompany the aerial eradication missions. NAS officials stated that the  contractor presence should decline and the police should be able to take  over more of the eradication program by 2006, when NAS estimates that  coca and poppy cultivation will be reduced to “maintenance levels”— 30,000 hectares and 5,000 hectares, respectively.
subsections: section_title: Aviation Service Operations
paragraphs: In February and March 2002, the Office of Aviation conducted an Aviation  Resource Management Survey of the Colombian National Police Aviation  Service.  According to Office of Aviation officials, these surveys are  intended to provide a stringent on-site assessment of flight operations from  management and safety to logistics and maintenance. The study noted that  the Aviation Service has some unique circumstances that have made its  operations difficult to manage. In particular, it grew from 579 personnel in  1995 to 1,232 in 2002 and operates 8 different types of rotary-wing and 9  different types of fixed-wing aircraft. Nevertheless, the team made a  number of critical observations. For example,  The Aviation Service’s organizational structure, lines of authority, and  levels of responsibility were not clear. In most cases, only the  commanding general was allowed to commit resources and make  operational decisions. This reliance on an overly centralized command  structure resulted in unnecessary delays and, NAS officials told us, the  cancellation of some planned aerial eradication missions because the  commanding general could not be reached.
The Aviation Service did not have a formal flying hour program. A flying  hour program is used to forecast budgetary requirements. It takes into  account the operational use and training requirements for each aircraft  and the various missions it performs and equates each flight hour to a  cost average for fuel and spare parts, which constitute the majority of an  aviation organization's annual expenses. The lack of a flying hour  program has prevented the police from more accurately forecasting  budgetary requirements. Moreover, according to NAS, maintenance  scheduling is enhanced when the number of flight hours can be  projected, which contributes to higher aircraft availability rates.
About 35 percent of the maintenance staff were inexperienced.
According to the survey team, this could result in improper maintenance  procedures being performed, which could adversely affect flight safety  and endanger lives. In addition, all locations the team visited had  deficiencies in standard maintenance procedures and practices. For  example, the survey team found that a UH-60 Black Hawk with gunshot  damage to a fuel cell was used in several local area flights. While fuel  cells are self-sealing to enable an aircraft to return to base for repairs  after sustaining damage, aircraft are not supposed to be routinely flown  in this condition.
Management of items needing repair and control of spare parts was  deficient. The survey team found 236 items awaiting repair—some from  August 1998. The team also found more than $4 million in UH-1H  helicopter blades and parts stored outside and unprotected.
The Aviation Service’s safety program did not have formal risk  management practices to ensure that all risk factors—such as weather,  crew experience, and mission complexity—are taken into account. In  addition, the team observed a majority of helicopter gunners failing to  take basic safety precautions, such as ensuring that their machine guns  and mini-guns were rendered harmless when personnel were around the  aircraft, especially during refueling and rearming operations.
To help correct these and other deficiencies, the survey team made  numerous recommendations for specific improvements. Overall, the team  rated the Aviation Service’s operational and maintenance procedures as  poor but concluded that it had an excellent chance for improvement over  the next 2 to 3 years due to the dedication of its young officers.
As a result of the survey, in July 2002, a NAS contractor (a $38.8 million, 1-year contract with options for 4 additional years) began providing on-the- job maintenance and logistical training to the Aviation Service and helping  the police address many of the issues raised by the Aviation Resource  Management Survey team. NAS officials already noted that a more formal  flying hour program has improved the availability rates of many of the  aircraft in the Aviation Service’s inventory. For example, the availability  rate of the Aviation Service’s UH-II helicopters—often used to support  aerial eradication missions—increased from 67 percent in January 2002 to  87 percent in December 2002. Similar improvements also occurred for  other Aviation Service aircraft, such as UH-60 Black Hawk and Bell 212  helicopters. According to NAS, the improved availability rates made it  easier to schedule and conduct spray missions.
section_title: T-65 Pilot Training
paragraphs: According to NAS officials, the police managed the T-65 pilot program prior  to July 2002, but the police repeatedly violated Office of Aviation standard  operating procedures by requiring pilots to fly without adequate rest and in  poor weather. As a result, NAS took tighter control of the program in April  2003. As currently planned, the program will train 21 Colombian pilots, 4 of  whom will eventually be hired to fly the T-65s. The training will enable  pilots to fly T-65 spray missions in both flat and mountainous areas.
section_title: Search and Rescue Training
paragraphs: NAS is also planning to initiate a program in mid-2003 to standardize and  modernize the police’s search and rescue capabilities. Currently, the Office  of Aviation contractor provides all search and rescue coverage for the  aerial eradication program. The training will make it possible for the police  to provide search and rescue coverage for some spray missions by  standardizing its operating procedures to make them compatible with the  Office of Aviation’s. The program will also allow the police to replace much  of its current equipment, which is antiquated or not standard. According to  NAS officials, the program should be fully operational in about a year and  self-sufficient in about 3 to 5 years.
section_title: Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities
paragraphs: The U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently  begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999-2000. However,  Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and  management challenges. In addition, Colombia faces continuing challenges  associated with its long-standing insurgency. Moreover, for U.S. assistance  to continue, Colombia needs to ensure that the army and police comply  with human rights standards, that the aerial eradication program meets  certain environmental conditions, and that alternative development is  provided in areas subject to aerial eradication.
subsections: section_title: Performance Measures and Specific Time Frames Have Not Been Developed
paragraphs: In 2000, we noted that the Colombian government had not finalized plans  for funding, sequencing, and managing activities included in Plan Colombia  and that State and Defense had not completed their implementation plans  to support Plan Colombia. We concluded that if Colombia or the United  States did not follow through on its portion of Plan Colombia, including  identifying sources of funding, Plan Colombia could not succeed as  envisioned.  Nearly 3 years later, Colombia and the United States still have  not defined performance measures or identified specific time frames for  completing ongoing counternarcotics programs.
After the new Colombian administration was inaugurated in August 2002, it  drafted a National Security Strategy to define Colombia’s vital interests,  principal threats, and short- and long-term objectives. According to State  officials, as of April 2003, the National Security Strategy had not been  finalized and was being held up while the Colombian military and police  complete their strategy for dealing with the insurgents, including  reclaiming the insurgent-controlled areas of Colombia and stemming illicit  drug activities.
As for the United States, we were told that in 2002, the President tasked  State to prepare a comprehensive, fully integrated political-military  implementation plan to reflect appropriate U.S. support for Colombia’s  National Security Strategy. The plan is supposed to include a statement of  the overall mission, goals, objectives, performance standards, timelines,  measures of effectiveness, and desired end state and outcomes. However,  according to State officials, development of this plan has not begun  because Colombia has not released its National Security Strategy and the  related military and police strategy.
section_title: Colombian Financial Resources Are Limited
paragraphs: Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the Colombian government  pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to provide  $3.5 billion. Until recently, Colombia had not provided any significant new  funding for Plan Colombia and, according to U.S. embassy and Colombian  government officials, anticipated international assistance for Plan  Colombia—apart from that provided by the United States—did not  materialize as envisioned. But because of overall poor economic  conditions, the government of Colombia’s ability to contribute more is  limited.
Since 1999, a combination of domestic and foreign events has limited  Colombia’s economic growth. Domestically, insurgent and paramilitary  organizations remained active and derailed the peace process. According  to the International Monetary Fund, the insurgency’s threats and attacks  displaced thousands of people, hindered investment, affected oil  production, and forced the government to increase military expenditures.  Externally, the price of coffee—a traditionally major Colombian export— reached historically low levels, trade with some neighboring countries fell  as their economies under performed, and foreign private financing to  Colombia was limited by the continuing insurgency and political  developments in the region during 2002. By mid-2002, Colombian finance  officials estimated that Colombia’s economic growth was below 2 percent  and its combined public sector deficit would likely exceed 5 percent of  gross domestic product.
In August 2002, the new Colombian administration announced a series of  decrees and proposals to increase defense expenditures and strengthen the  overall economy. Initially, the administration issued a decree establishing a  one-time tax on wealth that was supposed to raise about $860 million.  According to State, about $320 million of this amount would likely be spent  on the military. To help maintain this increased revenue, the administration  also submitted to the Colombian Congress a package of economic and  administrative reforms. Most were approved in December 2002, but some  reforms also require approval through a public referendum planned for  later in 2003. The overall reform program calls for tax measures to raise  revenues and a freeze on most current expenditures for 2 years. In addition,  structural reforms, particularly changes in the government pension system  and organizational streamlining, are planned to reduce expenditures.
However, passage of the reforms subject to referendum is far from certain  and, according to U.S. Embassy Bogotá and Colombian government  officials, Colombia’s ability to provide additional funding to sustain the  counternarcotics programs without a greatly improved economy is  virtually nonexistent.
section_title: Insurgency and Human Rights Conditions Complicate Counternarcotics Efforts
paragraphs: The Colombian government has stated that ending the civil conflict is  central to solving Colombia’s problems—from improving economic  conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. A peaceful resolution to the  long-standing insurgency would help stabilize the nation, speed economic  recovery, help ensure the protection of human rights, and restore the  authority and control of the Colombian government in the coca-growing  regions. The continuing violence limits the government’s ability to institute  economic, social, and political improvements.
The Colombian government has stated that it is committed to protecting  the human rights of its citizens. State and Defense officials reiterated that  they will not assist those who violate the basic tenets of human rights, and  State officials said they will apply the strictest human rights standards  before approving the provision of assistance to Colombian military and  police units. Nevertheless, human rights organizations continue to allege  that individuals in the Colombian armed forces have been involved with or  condoned human rights violations and that they do so with impunity. If this  is the case, Colombia’s failure to adhere to U.S. human rights policies could  delay or derail planned counternarcotics activities.
The appropriations act for fiscal year 2003 makes $700 million available for  Colombia and other Andean ridge countries, but it imposed some  restrictions on the availability of 25 percent of the funds provided for the  Colombian armed forces until the Secretary of State makes certain  certifications. The Secretary of State must certify that Colombia’s armed  forces are making progress in meeting human rights standards and, among  other things, executing orders to capture paramilitary leaders to lift the  restriction on 12.5 percent of the funds. To obligate the remaining 12.5 percent, the Secretary must certify after July 31, 2003, that Colombia  continues to make progress in meeting the conditions in the initial  certification.
section_title: Environmental and Alternative Development Conditions May Limit Aerial Eradication Efforts
paragraphs: The appropriations act for fiscal year 2003 also requires that the aerial  eradication program meet certain environmental conditions in its use of  herbicide and that alternative development programs be available in the  areas affected by the spray program. Otherwise, funds provided in the act  that are used to purchase herbicide for the aerial eradication program may  not be spent. State officials are still trying to determine the ramifications of  the restrictions, but State and NAS officials are concerned that these  requirements could delay funding needed to purchase herbicide and result  in a temporary suspension of the program, making it more difficult for the  program to achieve its ambitious goals. Such a suspension would also  likely undermine the progress made in 2002 by allowing the coca and poppy  farmers to reestablish their fields.
The 2003 appropriations act’s environmental conditions require the  Secretary of State, after consultation with the Administrator of the  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to certify that (1) the herbicide  mixture is being used in accordance with EPA requirements, the  Colombian Environmental Management Plan, and any additional controls  that EPA may recommend; (2) the mixture does not pose unreasonable  risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment; and (3) complaints  of harm to health or licit crops are evaluated and fair compensation is paid  for meritorious claims.  According to NAS and Office of Aviation officials,  similar conditions in the fiscal year 2002 appropriations act almost resulted  in a suspension of the aerial eradication program in October 2002 because  of delays in finalizing the required reports. The program was able to  continue operations by using prior-year funds but, at one point, had only a  10-day supply of herbicide available.
The 2003 appropriations act’s alternative development conditions require  that, in areas where security permits, USAID, Colombian government, or  other organizations implement alternative development programs for small  growers whose coca and poppy plants are targeted for spraying. According  to State, NAS, and USAID officials, alternative development programs are  not being implemented in all the specific areas sprayed because of  concerns about physical security and the economic feasibility of  implementing such programs in some locations.
As of March 31, 2003, USAID reported accrued expenditures of about $51.6 million for alternative development projects and projected that  expenditures for April through June 2003 would exceed $13.5 million.  USAID officials also said that the agency had 247 alternative development  projects benefiting more than 22,800 families in 9 departments where coca  or opium poppy are grown.
section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Colombia is a long-time ally and significant trading partner of the United  States; therefore, its economic and political stability is important to the  United States as well as the Andean region. Colombia’s long-standing  insurgency and the insurgents’ links to the illicit drug trade complicate its  efforts to tap its natural resources and make systemic economic reforms.  Solving these problems is important to Colombia’s future stability.
Colombia and the United States continue to face financial and management  challenges in implementing and sustaining counternarcotics and counter- insurgency programs in Colombia. Neither the Colombian Army nor the  Colombian National Police have the capacity to manage ongoing  counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor  support. Colombia’s financial resources are limited and its economy is  weak and thus will need U.S. assistance for the foreseeable future.  According to U.S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up to  $230 million per year, and future costs for some recently initiated army and  police programs have not been determined. In addition, we note that this  estimate does not include future funding needed for other U.S. programs in  Colombia, including other aerial and ground interdiction efforts; the police  Aviation Service’s U.S.-funded contractor; and alternative development,  judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons programs.
In recent years, world events—from the global war on terrorism to the  wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—have diverted scarce U.S. resources and  made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources  committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the  total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown.  Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not  developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in  Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to  achieve it.
section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: Because Colombia continues to face serious obstacles in substantially  curtailing illicit narcotics activities and resolving its long-standing  insurgency, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with  the Secretary of Defense, examine the U.S. assistance programs to the  Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police to (1) establish clear  objectives for the programs reflecting these obstacles and (2) estimate  future annual funding requirements for U.S. support. This analysis should  designate specific performance measures for assessing progress, define the  roles of U.S. personnel and contractors, and develop a timeline for  achieving the stated objectives. The Secretary should provide this  information to the Congress for consideration in the fiscal year 2005  appropriations cycle.
section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: State and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. See  appendixes I and II, respectively.
Both concurred with our recommendation. State said it very much agreed  with the overall findings and, in particular, the recognition that continued  U.S. programs will be needed for the foreseeable future to sustain  operations in Colombia and achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. It further said  that the time is appropriate for a comprehensive review of U.S. programs  with the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police and intends  to address our recommendation for providing key program information to  the Congress beginning in the fiscal year 2005 appropriations cycle.  Defense stated that it would work with State to establish clear objectives  and would coordinate with State and other agencies involved to develop  performance measures. Defense added that, once performance measures  are established, it would augment staff at the U.S. Embassy Bogotá Military  Group to collect information for measuring progress.
section_title: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to the  Colombian Army in fiscal years 2000-03, and how this assistance has been  used, we reviewed pertinent planning, implementation, and related  documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the Departments of  State and Defense, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Southern Command  headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia.  We also met with U.S.-funded contractor representatives at various  Colombian Army bases; the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion  commander and his staff at Tolemaida; and the counternarcotics brigade  commander and his staff at Larandia and Tres Esquinas. In addition, we  observed a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade airlift operation.
To determine what the U.S.-supported Colombian National Police aerial  eradication program has accomplished in recent years, we reviewed  pertinent documentation and met with cognizant officials at the  Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs in Washington, D.C., and the Office of Aviation  headquarters office at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. In Colombia, we met  with Office of Aviation officials and contractor representatives at the Office  of Aviation headquarters office at the El Dorado International Airport in  Bogotá; the Colombian National Police base at Guaymaral; and operational  sites at Larandia, San Jose del Guaviare, Santa Ana, and Villa Garzon in the  primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. We also met with the  Colombian National Police deputy commander and other police officials. In  addition, we observed several aerial eradication operations—from loading  the herbicide and refueling the spray planes to the actual spray missions.
To determine what challenges Colombia and the United States face in  sustaining these programs, we met with numerous U.S. and Colombian  officials to obtain their views on the issues discussed in this report. In  Colombia, we interviewed U.S. embassy officials, including the  Ambassador; Deputy Chief of Mission; and others from the Narcotics  Affairs Section, the Military Group, the U.S. Agency for International  Development, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. We also  interviewed Colombian Army, police, and other government officials,  including officials from the Colombian Ministries of Defense and Finance  and Colombia’s National Planning Department.
We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of State and  Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at  http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call  me at (202) 512-4268 or contact me at FordJ@gao.gov. An additional  contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.
section_title: Comments from the Department of State
section_title: Comments from the Department of Defense
section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
section_title: Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the above named individual, Jocelyn Cortese, Allen Fleener,  Ronald Hughes, Jose Pena, George Taylor, Kaya Taylor, and Janey Cohen.  Rick Barrett and Ernie Jackson provided technical assistance.
section_title: GAO’s Mission
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subsections: section_title: Order by Mail or Phone
section_title: To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
section_title: Public Affairs